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# Gottfried Hermann's Laboratory: Meaning and Methods in Early Nineteenth-Century Classical Scholarship

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# Abstract

This thesis focuses on Gottfried Hermann and his philological practices, considered especially with a view to his dispute with August Boeckh in the early 1800s. Through an analysis of Hermann's scholarly persona in the context of German academia, his theory of metrics and hermeneutics, and of the issues at stake in the dispute, this thesis keeps as a background reference the categories of *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologi*e, which are traditionally associated with Hermann and Boeckh respectively. It aims to show that these two categories are methodologically unjustified and instead highlights the prominence of the socio-biographical aspect of their origins and presence in the history of classical scholarship. The examination of Hermann's philology is conducted through a close reading of primary sources, discussions of his own textual-critical analysis, and archival materials. The conclusion underlines the need for a re-evaluation of Hermann's scholarly work, with particular regard to his methods and hermeneutics; it also, more broadly, calls for further inquiry into Hermann's work of the type that would encourage the rejection of the faulty idea of *Wortphilologie* in association with Hermann, arguing that the label generated implications which are part of the reason for Hermann's underrepresentation in modern scholarship of intellectual history.

# List of Abbreviations

ch(s).= chapter(s)
ed(s).= editor(s)
edn.= edition
esp.= especially
f(f).= following page(s)
fasc.= fascicle
p(p).= page(s)
pt.= part
transl.= translator/ translation
vol(s).= volume(s)
## = unreadable word in the textual source

# Introduction

As the title suggests, the main subject of this thesis is the philologist Gottfried Hermann (1772-1848), a scholar who has so far been underrepresented in the critical literature, despite past and presently increasing interest in the history of classical scholarship and philology.

In bringing attention to Hermann, this thesis serves two purposes. First, it shows why Hermann should, indeed, be a worthwhile subject of study: not only because he has been an extremely influential figure in the history of philology, but also because an analysis of his work encourages a broader reflection about philology itself. Second, the thesis aims at drawing together two perspectives which rarely tend to appear simultaneously in the same work: the history of classics and hermeneutics, and the history of philological practices, achieved by the inclusion of elements of textual analysis.

Both purposes are better achieved by considering Hermann within the context of the early nineteenth-century dispute between so-called *Sachphilologie* and *Wortphilologie* (or *Sprachphilologie*), which functions as a background reference throughout the whole work. This antinomy refers to a distinction of two types, traditional for early nineteenth-century philology: *Wortphilologie*, or a philology only interested in the language of ancient texts, and consistently attributed to Hermann; and *Sachphilologie*, or a philology only interested in the "facts" of antiquity, attributed to Hermann's long-time nemesis, August Boeckh (1785-1867). This

opposition is already attested during Hermann and Boeckh's lifetime and thus it is clear that the terminology was created by their contemporaries,[1] while I will offer, below,[2] an overview of the emergence of the terms, and their association with Hermann and Boeckh, in historiographical works starting in the 1800s. Considering the historical picture of the early nineteenth-century German academic environment, it seems evident that the primary function of the idea of *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* was a socio-biographical one, to group together scholars identifying or identified as followers of Hermann and followers of Boeckh, respectively. This was a consequence of the dispute that, in the early 1800s, had started to emerge between Hermann and Boeckh. However, I argue, subsequent historiography went on to translate the socio-biographical meaning of the dispute into a methodological one, openly describing the *Wortphilologen* as promoters of a philology solely "based on words", and the *Sachphilologen* as emphatically interested in the study of the "things" of antiquity. In this sense, *Sachphilologie* was not just defined as essentially equivalent to Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824)'s new notion of *Altertumswissenschaf*, despite the fact that Boeckh can be considered a continuator of the work of Wolf, but it assumed a specific and narrower meaning. While *Sachphilologen* were the followers of Boeckh, the label was also supposed to indicate their difference from other scholars whose idea of philology was considered inferior and surpassed. While critical-biographical literature about Hermann has usually

[1] Cf. below, p. 22, for Friedrich August Wolf's opinion on the divide between *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie.*
[2] Cf. pp. 17-22.

noticed the importance of Hermann's metrical work, at the same time such work has also become a contributing factor in the fabrication of a negative image of Hermann, as someone interested in the mere formal elements of the text more than in obtaining information about the ancient world: thus, a limited, negative image of (Hermann's) *Wortphilologie*. The idea that *Sachphilologie* constituted a modern and innovative type of philology and that *Wortphilologie* was a *passé* type of investigation of antiquity, inherent in the genesis of the two terms,[3] pointed towards a set of methodological differences that should characterise these two types of philology – or it should, at least, point towards a set of new instruments that the *Sachphilologen* employed in their philological work, in a way that would enable them to actually deal with "things" rather than with "words" – this are indeed the textbook definitions of *Sach-* and *Wortphilologie*. Wolf's idea of *Altertumswissenschaf* had broadened the list of disciplines through which to investigate antiquity – and, indeed, Boeckh carried out extensive work in the field of epigraphy. But *Sachphilologie* was not just a synonym of *Altertumswissenschaf*, and while it is perfectly legitimate to think that the *Sachphilologen* might be more interested in broadening the spectrum of the methods through which to study antiquity, ultimately this widening of scope led to the development of side-disciplines, such as epigraphy and numismatics, and not to a radical change of the field of philology.

[3] Cf. Hermann's words on the genesis of the terminology in his time, ch. four, note 84, where Hermann speaks of the divide between the two types of philology as something (1) that has just started, recently, (2) in Göttingen, as a consequence of the dispute between Wolf and Heyne, and (3) about which he has some uncertainty (he says, 'as far as I know [..] a distinction has begun to be made [..]').

Philology, as what was meant as the subject of the discussion between Hermann and Boeckh that this thesis will analyse, remained essentially text-centric.[4] One must therefore ask whether there was really something different that *Sachphilologie* would provide, in the way of doing philology, that would otherwise have remained inaccessible. Throughout the thesis I will argue that this is not the case, and I will evaluate Hermann's and Boeckh's methods in their own terms, calling attention to the way in which they do not adhere to either *Wortphilologie* nor *Sachphilologie*, and to how the two categories are essentially caricatures by their own nature: they were indeed created to be caricatures, because their function was an eminently social one.

When the literature portrays the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh as one between *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* the prominent, personal element which is the essence of the dispute is largely lost, and we are left with the impression that the dispute was based on the clear opposition between two distinct sets of methods, something which the dispute was purely not. Of course, this impression is strengthened by the limited amount of work about Hermann and Boeckh, and their dispute, currently available. With some exceptions, current literature does not seem to make use of the two concepts with enough clarity, especially due to the fact that sufficient understanding of Hermann's work in its context is itself lacking. If we had to consider Hermann's and Boeckh's methods through the lens of *Wort-* and

[4] The term 'philology' went on to assume a meaning which is partly geography-dependent, mostly on the basis of the scholarly traditions of different countries; thus, the meaning of 'philology' leans either towards what we could call 'textual criticism' or towards what we could, more broadly, name 'classics', or 'classical civilisation'. However, despite the variable meaning of the word 'philology', in all places there are such things as textual criticism *and* a broader study of the ancient civilisations, and they continue to exist as two separate – albeit overlapping and, in the case of the latter, multi-articulated – fields of study.

*Sachphilologie* we would find constant overlaps and incursions in each other's territories, because the two categories, away from their socio-biographical significance, are fundamentally devoid of meaning. Instead, the thesis would like to encourage a wider reflection upon the legacy of early nineteenth-century scholarship to modern philology and upon the epistemology of the discipline itself.

This thesis also aims to place itself within the context of a long-standing interest in the history of classical scholarship, from the works of Sandys and Pfeiffer up to those by Christopher Stray,[5] as well as the more recent attention to the history and theory of philology by James Turner, Sean Gurd and Sheldon Pollock among others.[6]

This work would also like to make a contribution to the inquiry into practices of scholarship, as articulated for instance by Constanze Güthenke, Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, Christopher Stray.[7] Surprisingly, not much attention has been dedicated to Gottfried Hermann – with only a few exceptions, such as the work of Enrico Medda, who has considered Hermann's philology mostly in relation to Aeschylus and British classical scholarship.[8] This thesis also sees itself as a contribution to investigating the overlap between the history of classics and the history of science as it has emerged in works such a programmatic piece by Lorraine

[5] Cf. Pfeiffer (1976), Sandys (1908), Stray (1998, 1998a, 2018).
[6] Cf. Turner (2014), Gurd (2005, 2007, 2010), Pollock (2009, 2010, 2015), Hardwick and Stray (2008), Porter (2008).
[7] Cf. Güthenke (2015, 2015a, 2017, 2018), Grafton (1983–1993, 1981, 1991, 2009), Grafton and Most (2016), Most (1997), Butterfield and Stray (2009), Haugen (2011), Cancic-Kirschbaum (2018). On the history of classics and text criticism specifically also Peirano (2012), Tarrant (2016), Reeve (2000).
[8] Cf. Medda (2006, 2010).

Daston and Glenn W. Most (2015), where philology is considered with a strong focus on practices and the emphasis is shifted from what is studied to how it is studied. Finally, this thesis takes inspiration from the turn inaugurated in the history of science by the work of Bruno Latour (1979), who investigated the sciences from a more humanities-oriented point of view. In this sense, the thesis would like to offer an insight into Hermann's "laboratory": as if observing him at work, it aims at rendering as clear a picture as possible of the conditions under which Hermann's work came to be.

Each of the five chapters of the thesis will analyse a different aspect of Hermann's persona and work and, from different viewpoints, challenge the idea of the feasibility of maintaining the division between *Sachphilologie* and *Wortphilologie* as a suitable exegetical technique to address early nineteenth-century classical philology, or philology in general. Indeed, believing that such distinction is possible, and talking about it as if it were, constitutes a claim about the nature of the discipline itself, namely that there could be such things as a philology solely based on "words" and a philology only based on "things".

Overall, two themes will emerge in reading Hermann: the *eques* and the *Wissenschaftler*, the first operating as an exegetical tool in Hermann's socio-biographical, quarrelsome portrait, and the second in relation to his programmatic scholarship. The beginning of the thesis will present Hermann the *eques*, utilising the biographical aspect – his self-portrayal and frequent external representation as a

knight –, to underline significant features of his persona, and in particular his self-fashioning as a high-profile scholar. In chapter one, I will reflect upon biographical and scholarly portraits of Hermann that have been presented in various sources, and especially on the important role played by early ones, such as that of Hermann's biographer Hermann Koechly, in shaping our perception and characterisations of him as a "hero of thought." In particular, I will follow interpretative techniques suggested by Espagne (2010), bringing to bear the rhetoric and tropes, typical of the nineteenth-century biographical genre, upon an analysis of the image of Hermann that we have inherited; I will provide examples of how Hermann's textual-critical practice effectively related to his persona, constituting almost an embodiment of it.

While chapter one already features some unpublished archival materials, the fruit of a year of research spent in Leipzig, Berlin and Dresden, such materials provide the main structure for chapter two. This chapter will revolve around the creation of a Hermannian school, which Hermann pursued through the leadership of his Leipzig private society, the *Societas Graeca*, and later his directorship of the philological seminar. Here, my research will build upon Clark (2006) but, through the integration, in my discussion, of archival sources and examination of Hermann's writings, I will provide the first attempt at a comprehensive account of the foundation and institutional value of the seminar in Leipzig and the Greek Society. These two institutions will be contextualised, especially with an eye to Boeckh's seminar in Berlin, as vehicles of Hermann's monopoly over the academic scene in

Leipzig and of his *Wissenschaftpolitik,* taking as a model the similar work that has been done on Boeckh, especially by Seifert, Horstmann and Baillot in Hackel and Seifert (2013) and Poiss (2009).

Chapter three will consider the beginnings of the dispute, showing how it initially played out in the field of metrics, rather than, as the narrative of the dispute traditionally goes, Hermann's critique of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (*Corpus of Greek Inscriptions*, *CGI*). I will follow in the steps of Poiss (2010), who has already proposed such a retro-dating of the quarrel, but I will provide additional context for understanding such a claim and carry out an in-depth analysis of significant parts of the discussions on metrics between Hermann and Boeckh. This chapter will build upon the previous two, in the sense that the social and biographical elements are kept in mind as a fundamental interpretative technique running in the background; it will also draw attention to how the labels of *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* are not a good fit to describe the respective owners' methods, which should, instead, be considered in their own terms.

In chapter four Hermann the *eques* and Hermann the *Wissenschaftler* will meet, more than anywhere else in the thesis, in the continuation of my analysis of the materials of the dispute, based upon both Hermann's 'knightly character'[9] and his conception of the science of antiquity. I will focus on further preludes to the *querelle* over Boeckh's *CGI*, that started in 1825, supporting the idea that the motor of the dispute was not so much the particular discussion over the *CGI*, but rather

[9] Cf. Wilamowitz (1921), 49.

that the latter originated as a consequence of the socio-biographical element. I will then chronicle the methodological problems that Hermann raised in his review of Boeckh's *CGI*, showing how, contrary to the traditional rhetoric of the dispute, Hermann's objections were not directed at the project of collecting inscriptions itself, nor at its self-portrayal as a *sachphilological* endeavour, but rather responded to an ideal of science parallel to the one that had inspired the *CGI* project itself. I build upon Most (1997) and take as background reference the methodological account of the role of disputes in the history of science as outlined by Harloe (2013), in addition to engaging in in-depth analysis of primary sources. Finally, to conclude my demonstration of the fact that we would be mistaken in considering Hermann's philology as "*Wortphilologie*", or in considering it as exhausted in an exclusive interest in "words", I present Hermann's archaeological discussion of some conjectures over the lost hippodrome at Olympias, taken as a case study to evidence the presence and the details of broader, archaeological-antiquarian interests in Hermann's work.

Hermann the *Wissenschaftler* makes his final appearance in chapter five, with a discussion of Hermann's metrics, and the way in which, with the aim of turning the discipline into a science, Hermann grounded it in Kantian philosophy. In particular, I here challenge the assumption, which looms large across the literature and prominently so in Medda (2006), that Hermann's metrical Kantianism, in the way it was theorised by Hermann, could really have consequences for his philological practice. Instead, I show how the bulk of Kant's influence on Hermann

ought to be recognised in his hermeneutical, *sensus*-based techniques. I take Schramm (2010) as a reference work detailing the reflection of Kantian philosophy in Hermann's thought, but I consider the matter specifically from the point of view of the philologist and his practice. Keeping in mind the idea of Gadamer (1977) that aesthetics must be absorbed into hermeneutics, I show how Hermann's Kantian aesthetics functions as a form of hermeneutics; I then put it side by side with some salient aspects of Boeckh's hermeneutics, emphasising the similarities that exist beyond the differences, because the latter have so far been the primary focus in the literature and, instead, much is to be gained from a serious consideration of Hermann's hermeneutics. In so doing, I contextualise the significant similarities between Hermannian and Boeckhian hermeneutics within a larger scientific framework, arguing that they insisted on concerns that lie at the very core of any type of scientific evaluation, and thus of classical philology.

One of the two first questions that the thesis raises is: why study the dispute? Of course, there is no simple answer and, naturally, the thesis means to answer this question by, simultaneously, mirroring and progressively unpacking its complexities. But surely one of the possible immediate answers would have to appeal to the fact that, to this day, narratives of the history of classical philology, especially when touching upon Hermann or Boeckh, never fail to mention the dispute. Moreover, they tend to mention it according to a recurrent scheme: a harsh dispute occurred between Hermann and Boeckh, because the first thought that

philology should only be concerned with words, and the latter that it should only be concerned with things; the dispute arose on the basis of Hermann's negative review of Boeckh's *CGI*, an eminently *sachphilological* project; after less than twenty years, the two of them recognised that, after all, they always held the same conception of philology, despite a slight difference in the emphasis attributed to the importance of texts.

I argue that there are several things that do not add up in this account. First of all, what is a philology that focuses only on words, and what is a philology that focuses only on things, and how is either of those two things possible? Next, why would such a harsh dispute arise in the first place, and especially so suddenly? Among the many other disputes that took place in the history of German academia, or that were happening around the same time, such as that between Wolf and Heyne, that particular dispute stands out as one that split philology into two camps. If it came to such fame because of the particular harshness of the tones used during the *CGI querelle*, what could have been so outrageous about the project of collecting ancient inscriptions that it would inspire such immediate, violent responses? And if it was, indeed, something outrageous, how could the dispute end with a handshake a few years later, with its protagonists recognising that all had been mostly about nothing?

By engaging with the primary agents of the dispute, Hermann and Boeckh themselves, the thesis will try to address such intriguing questions and to eliminate the internal contradictions that they reveal. Here, it might be useful to turn to some

of those accounts of the dispute, to listen to the makers of this narrative themselves. Its origins in the Anglophone historiography appear as early as 1843, when both Hermann and Boeckh were still alive. One of the first references to the 'Berlin method of philology' and the 'Leipzig method of philology',[10] seen as alternatives, is in a work dealing with the history of philology, Sears et alii (1843)'s *Classical Studies*, which contained a section dedicated to schools of German philology.[11] In the introduction, the authors noted that a new 'mode of studying antiquity'[12] had arrived in America from the old continent, and that it was associated with the characteristics of the study of *Altertumswissenschaft* prescribed by Wolf in Germany. This new wave of philology is defined as 'higher and better than the dry study of words and grammatical forms', a rather 'liberal and elegant pursuit', 'a comprehensive appreciation of the greatest works in history, poetry, and the arts, that the genius of man has ever produced.'[13]

For the purpose of giving some account of 'the principal classical philologists of Germany,' the authors proposed to exhibit 'the peculiar character of the different schools of German philology, accompanied by examples of individuals,'[14] eminent for particular acquired merits in the study of antiquity. Boeckh's reputation is described as 'higher than that of any classical scholar in Germany', and, the authors write, 'in a knowledge of what the Greeks and Romans were practically – in the

[10] Sears et alii (1843), 28.
[11] Ibidem, xix, 13-32.
[12] Ibidem, iv.
[13] Ibidem.
[14] Ibidem, 13.

power of reproducing Grecian and Roman life, in all its thousand forms – no one can pretend to be his equal', whereas 'in mere language, Hermann is, undoubtedly, his superior'.[15] In fact, they add, 'the best Latin writers of the present day, and the best expositors of words and phrases, are trained under Hermann.'[16]

To this commendation of Boeckh's philology, Sears et alii (1843) added a comparison between two ways of doing philology:

> Hermann and Böckh are to be regarded as the heads of the two great schools of philology that divide Germany: the former, making language the end, and all historical and antiquarian research subservient to that end; the latter, making a complete knowledge of antiquity the end, and language only the means: the one aiming chiefly at intellectual discipline, the other at useful knowledge.[17]

What distinguishes this first account of the division in early nineteenth-century German philological schools is the authors' clear admiration for Boeckh's philology. Despite giving a positive scholarly portrait of Hermann,[18] Sears et alii (1843) fully embraced the idea of a sharp division between two types of philology, and saw the Boeckhian type as more progressive and forward-thinking, surpassing the allegedly old ways of philology represented by *Sprachphilologie*, when he says 'it is very evident that the Berlin method of philology is gaining upon that of Leipsic [sic], and is more closely united with all the intellectual movements of the present

[15] Ibidem, 27.
[16] Ibidem, 28.
[17] Ibidem, 30.
[18] Ibidem, 29-30.

day.'[19] The success of the Boeckhian way is explained, in fact, through the ability to interpret 'the spirit of the times, which is more intent upon great discoveries in the world of facts, than upon the niceties of language.'[20]

The sense in which *Sachphilologie* was able to interpret 'the spirit of the times' is well explained by Grafton (1981). He offered an example of how, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a certain satire of the methods of the *Sachphilologen* of the previous century existed, and portrayed some followers of Boeckh, such as, among others, Moritz Hermann Eduard Meier, as overly-serious scholars of the most trivial details of ancient life.[21] However, even those satirists, Grafton argues, had to recognise that the introduction of the new notion of *Altertumswissenschaft* had played the important role of redeeming the ancients from the bi-dimensionality that the Enlightenment had attached to them, encouraging moderns to consider the ancients as real men and 'to breathe life back into them'.[22] In the picture of a widening of the spectrum of the study of antiquity, with the promotion of epigraphy as a central point of reference inaugurated by Boeckh and a general broadening of the subject that attracted the interest of classicists, the idea of a 360-degree study of the ancients, to the 1843 reviewers of the dispute, seemed alluring.

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[19] Ibidem

[20] Ibidem, 28.

[21] Cf. Grafton (1981), 101: 'The Greek professor spews out over Plato's *Protagoras* a flood of details about the daily trivia of ancient life', and, quoting Hatvany (1914), 14: 'As you see, gentlemen, the porter shut the gate [on Socrates and his companions]. At this passage anyone would be struck by the question of how this gate was constructed, and also by the important, still unsolved problem of door-shutting in antiquity.'

[22] Ibidem.

The other face of the coin, as Grafton's example shows, is how this approach could carry a risk of reasoning about antiquity in a purely speculative manner, on the basis of a collection of trivia that would become an object of mockery. This thesis will engage, in various places, with reflections upon features of such a speculative character of the discipline, which could come to be associated with the act of imagining antiquity on the basis of material evidence,[23] and with the ways in which such speculation was or was not different from the "quasi-divinatory" character of textual criticism as pursued by Hermann.

Sears et alii (1843)'s early account of the situation of philology in Germany shows a one-sidedness which betrays the influence of a still fresh debate, with its protagonists still alive and just recently reconciled, and an eagerness to harvest the fruits that the advancement of *Altertumswissenschaft* promised to bring forth.

This perspective, however, would become atypical very quickly. After Sears et alii (1843), most of the works dedicated to the history of philology that incorporate some information about the dispute were confronted with a new problem, namely the need to put together two aspects not easy to merge. On the one side, the necessity to give an account of the dispute in its full significance, and of the cutting tone that it came to assume at its peak; on the other side, an awareness that the dispute could not be reduced to a quarrel between a philology that only looks at "words" and a philology that only looks at "things", because the study of language and of the historical context of antiquity are both essential elements of classical

[23] Cf. in particular Hermann's critique of the idea of *Anschauungen*, chapter 4, note 86.

studies. Most literature, already in the late nineteenth century, presented an account of the dispute that ended in a note of recognition that the two sides, despite their emphasis on different things, had after all the same objective in mind. For example, Conrad Bursian's *Geschichte der classischen Philologie in Deutschland* provides an account of the dispute in such terms:

> In order to continue the magnificent construction of classical science which had begun, two men, who in their later years stood in foreground as leaders, different in talent and in their scientific direction, for a time as heads of two schools, stood alien to one another, sometimes hostile but, after realising that they were pursuing the same goal, albeit on different paths, they reconciled and shook hands as friends.[24]

Only forty years after the first impressions about the dispute published in Sears et alii (1843), and, this time, in a German context, Bursian advances clearly the idea that, despite the dispute, Hermann and Boeckh had the same goal in mind for their philology. Twenty-five years later, in England, Sandys' *A history of classical scholarship* (1908) documented the same conclusion, showing an approach that is now consolidated and still widespread:

> It is now, however, generally agreed that, while, in theory, the comprehensive conception of the wide field of classical learning formed by Boeckh is undoubtedly correct, in practice a thorough knowledge of the languages is the indispensable foundation for the

[24] Cf. Bursian (1883), 665.

superstructure. That knowledge is in fact [..] the master-key to all the departments of the intellectual life of the ancient classical world.[25]

And yet, going back to the years of the dispute and the sources of the time, we see that its contemporaries were already sceptical about the notion of having two kinds of philology, and especially in the terms in which later literature tells the narrative of the *querelle*. In the 1830s, years in which the dispute is traditionally portrayed as still at its peak, a biographer of Wolf, Koerte, noted how Wolf used to mock and dismiss the notions of *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* intended as labels signalling an exclusive interest either in things or in words:

> In the later lectures of the philological Encyclopedia, Wolf had all too much reason to dismiss, not without a biting joke, the absurd and thoroughly unscientific distinction between philologists of things, who in the study of classical antiquity deal exclusively with what they call things, and philologists of language, who exclusively pay attention to the language. [26]

Yet modern scholarship has consistently presented an account of the dispute as a tangible division which, at least for a while, split philology. As a consequence, scholarship seems to have inherited the troublesome task of having to reconcile a

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[25] Sandys (1908), 89.

[26] Koerte (1833), 197f., quoted in Poiss (2010), 143: 'In den späteren Vorträgen der philologischen Encyklopädie hatte Wolf nur zu viel Veranlassung, den widersinnig und durchaus unwissenschaftlich aufgebrachten Unterschied zwischen Sach-Philologen, als welche sich bei'm Studium des classischen Alterthums ausschliesslich nur mit dem beschäftigen, was sie Sachen nennen, -- und den Sprach-Philologen, als die dabei ausschliesslich nur der Sprache ihr Augenmerk widmen -- nicht ohne beissenden Witz zu beseitigen.'

conflict the basis of which is not entirely clear with the clamour that it made in its time. A certain cumbersomeness in dealing with the terms *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* is still typical of modern narratives, too. There is no wide agreement in modern literature on whether the two words should be put in italics, between quotation marks, accompanied by the phrase "so-called" or an equivalent, neither of the above, or perhaps even not used at all. While the literature arguably uses the two labels for the purpose of describing the historical dispute, generally their definition is still acritically offered as if it made sense to speak of "philology of words" and "philology of things", and the dispute is traditionally narrated in a way which does nothing to reconcile its aforementioned internal contradictions.[27] Moreover, the two labels still remain solidly attached to Hermann and Boeckh. While this might not influence the judgement of the most acquainted with the two scholars, it seems likely that anybody else would not be immune to the propagation of the faulty understanding of the concepts of *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* into the scholarship of Hermann and Boeckh, whose methods are at risk of being seen under the light of these faux categories and evaluated accordingly.

This lack of clarity in addressing the historical role of these categories is due, as mentioned above, to the difficulty of reconciling, and summing up in two labels, both the harshness of the conduct of the dispute and the weakness of its theoretical substance. The cognitive dissonance that this picture produces is often more implicitly recognised than not, along with a tacit sense of purposelessness attached

[27] Cf. above, pp. 16-7.

to the great clamour and resonance that the debate had, at least in the first half of the nineteenth century. The lack of a protocol for handling the relative names and concepts should thus be expected.

More recently, the dispute has been timidly resurfacing as an object of scholarly interest, especially among scholars of Boeckh.[28] If this return to the scene is partly due to a generally increasing scholarly interest in philology and hermeneutics in the field of classics and German studies, the relevance of the two protagonists of the dispute for philology is also an element to consider. Indeed, Hermann and Boeckh offered, and their study lends itself to, important reflections upon what it means to do philology and what a good philology requires, questions which never cease to be relevant.

The second question that might arise from consideration of the topic at hand is: why study Hermann? While Hermann is certainly well known among those interested in and acquainted with textual criticism, he has not received much attention from the studies dedicated to the history of classical scholarship. A good deal has by now been written about classical scholarship in the nineteenth century, but somehow Hermann has mostly been passed over in silence.[29] One of the possible reasons for this silence stems directly from the dispute. Namely, it comes from the perception of Hermann's attachment to an old way of doing philology,

[28] Cf. Poiss (2010), Nippel (1997), Vogt (1979).
[29] Cf. below, note 30, on the limited amount of available modern scholarly work dedicated to Hermann.

then replaced by the new discipline of *Alterthumswissenschaft*. It is among the tasks of my thesis to challenge this specific point, and I will do so in two ways. First, I will draw attention to the similarities between Hermann and Boeckh, rather than to the micro-differences, and to the overlap between what is traditionally intended as the domains of *Wortphilologie* and of *Sachphilologie* respectively, pointing towards the inconsistency of the two categories. Secondly, I will do so from the beginning and throughout the thesis, across multiple aspects of Hermann's philology, in an attempt to redeem him from the curse of a narrative about infinite dissonances culminating in a final reconciliation.

Hermann is the protagonist of the thesis and he will remain, throughout the five chapters, the main focus of my investigation, even if always with an eye to the background of the dispute. While neither Boeckh nor Hermann have received a profusion of attention in recent literature, it is fair to say that Boeckh has still so far gotten the lion's share.[30] My work hopes to encourage further interest in the philology of Hermann, by showcasing some of the most interesting features of his work and persona. When I studied Hermann for the first time, my focus was strictly on his textual-critical work, and even later I continued to know Hermann mostly through his commentaries on tragedy, especially Euripides, as a prolific emendator and creative conjecturer, prone to irony and sarcasm, strongly opinionated and

[30] For recent critical work on Hermann cf. Medda (2006, 2006a, 2010), on his textual criticism considered in comparison with British scholarship; the edited volume by Sier and Woeckener-Gade (2010); two articles, La Penna (1982) and Couturier-Heinrich (2011); Fornaro (2008), Michel (2018), and Mancuso (2018) have published Hermannian letters. On Boeckh, cf. esp., and also for more bibliography, Horstmann (1992, 1998); the edited volume by Hackel and Seifert (2013); Rebenich (2014), (esp. 9-13); Güthenke (2017). Vogt (1979), Most (1997) and Nippel (1997) have written on Hermann's disputes.

often oracular, lover of metrics, often inclined to simple interventions capable of re-establishing perfect metrical equilibrium with minimal disruption, and an expert on the distinctive features of the language of the ancients. Thus, when I began this project, I had an interest in philology, conceived as textual criticism but, by then, also from the point of view of the history of classical scholarship, as well as the philosophy of language. These were the main sparks of my research and the thesis reflects them. Indeed, it presents a circular more than a linear structure, where all chapters, to some extent, refer to and rely upon each other rather than constituting a single unidirectional narrative. Still, the thesis could overall be divided into two parts, which do not necessarily appear in sequence: one which considers the subject more historically and another which approaches Hermann's laboratory in a more prominently linguistic-philosophical way, namely, conducting inquiries into meaning, intentionality, thought and the constitution of concepts. The circularity plays into the fact that aspects belonging to the historical part are useful, or essential, to understanding elements of the linguistic-philosophical part, and, in turn, the latter can complete the meaning of the historical picture. Thus, for example, the authority exercised by Hermann in the Leipzig academic scene helps us to understand some of the methodological disputes in which Hermann and Boeckh were engaged, while details of the metrical theory and the work of Hermann can be used to explain features of his persona and even constitute, so this thesis argues, an important reason behind the dispute; even differences in approach towards hermeneutics and theorisations of the tasks of the philologist become

clearer when keeping in mind Hermann's and Boeckh's roles in the world of German academia. While cues are spread throughout, in order to follow the threads the reader will hopefully also approach the chapters keeping in mind that the road is not entirely straight.

One factor contributing to the lack of studies concerned with Hermann lies, probably, in the fact that he wrote mostly in Latin, both in his theoretical works and his commentaries, making his work now largely inaccessible. The translation and annotation of Wolf's *Prolegomena* by Grafton and Most, for example, have never been replicated for any of Hermann's works. The thesis proposes, as an antidote to such inaccessibility, to give space to Hermann's words through direct quotation and, also, by quoting sometimes in the original language, with translation in the footnotes, and sometimes in translation, with the original text in the footnotes. This choice – which also extends to other citations – has remained contingent to the given case, but the tendency has been to keep the original in the main text whenever particular attention ought to be paid to the words, as in the case of the analysis of the materials of the dispute, where the reader might benefit from the exact wording. All translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.

In addition to the fact that the thesis consists of different parts, historically or linguistic-philosophically oriented, it also encompasses topics quite at variance with each other, ranging from a more biographical interest in Hermann's academic persona and seminar directorship in Leipzig to programmatic and methodological issues in philology, and from metrics to aesthetics and hermeneutics. All these

elements come together, along with the discussion of some textual problems and Hermann's emendations, to showcase some of the most salient characteristics of his laboratory. In considering textual-critical problems, the emphasis has been on the evaluation of Hermann's philological practice and how it relates to his theory, and not so much on qualitative judgements; and specifically, not on whether certain practices are to be considered good or bad, but only on how they stand in relation to Hermann's philology. I often examine how successful or unsuccessful Hermann's emendations were, not for the sake of determining their quality per se, but to provide a series of snapshots on how he was perceived by later editors, especially with respect to different scenarios and several types of textual-critical contexts. The goal of any evaluation is always to explicate Hermann and to analyse his methodology as clearly and effectively as possible.

The task of mixing the analysis of philological praxis and intellectual history has not been without obstacles. But the reader will find, hopefully, that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks of the partial interruptions of the narrative flow that the analysis of textual passages sometimes produces. Such analyses correspond to the choice not to privilege the textual-critical aspect but to use it, as a card up the sleeve, to provide glimpses of Hermann's philological practice and to effectively show his methods, without failing to remain focused on the issues at stake in the wider exploration of his scholarship.

As a consequence, to some readers the thesis will seem not to have enough textual examples; to others, perhaps too many, which interrupt the narrative.

Similarly, the multi-disciplinary object of the thesis risks making everybody unhappy. However, the multi-disciplinarity of this work seeks to reflect the multi-articulated way in which the dispute unfolded, through the life and works of Hermann. The various topics investigated in the different chapters will offer a non-linear, prismatic narrative, where the same elements occur over and over again in different places, considered from multiple points of view in their multi-faceted value.

But, to come back to the question of why to study Hermann. Partly, because the study of Hermann forces us to address one of the pivotal questions about philology, namely exactly how imprecise a science philology is. Hermann exemplifies how, for the critic, choosing one reading over another very often requires a certain something that remains a step beyond rational arguments, and engages us with his theoretical justifications and reflections on the topic. Such reflections apply equally to today's philology, configuring themselves as the same problems that were presented to Hermann – a scarcity of data and the mysterious nature of the mechanics of interpretative thinking. Gurd and Tarrant are among the recent critics who have drawn attention to the fact that, today, philologists must contend with all the theoretical questions that interested nineteenth-century philology, but with a broader array of methodological categories within which to place themselves. Gurd (2005), for example, has shown how critics like Simon Goldhill, who openly defines himself as a post-modernist, would be better described as historicists, whereas a textual critic like James Diggle, who always

emphasises how the text is by its nature unsure, is, for Gurd, the real epitome of post-modernism. Others, like David Butterfield and Patrick Finglass, recognise that a restored text is always only part of the truth, but also ascribe to themselves the ability to find the *correct* reading, or to recognise it as such when they see it. Sometimes one reading can only be presented as "simply" better than another. Both Finglass and Martin West also exemplify the type of scholars who can feel that sense of being right about a reading, but at the same time are able to go back and change their opinion about previous emendations.

It is still completely natural, for contemporary editors, to assume that part of their readership will share their views on a proposed reading, whereas some other part will not, and, as a corollary, that the former must share an understanding of the text which certainly belongs to the domain of intuition much more than that of logic. While editors today are very careful not to speak openly of "intuition" or "divination", or to assume author-specific traits that fall outside a limited list of clearly attestable characteristics and tendencies, with respect to vocabulary, metrics, syntax, tropes, et cetera, one could argue that they are still, *de facto,* making use of the same techniques as philologists of a few centuries ago. Hermann's philology encourages consideration of all these factors, and the thesis will show how he tackled some of the issues here at stake.

Finally, there is one more reason to consider Hermann's philology. Also due to the narrative of the dispute, Hermann has been generally perceived, between the two protagonists, as the losing party, as a proponent of a *passé* view of classics

interested in grammar rather than more exciting aspects of the philology of the future. However, the thesis will show how philology today could be argued to be as "Hermannian" as it is "Boeckhian". Philology today defies the dichotomy, because it is an inconsistent one. But even if we wanted to try and consider it with reference to the concepts with which Hermann and Boeckh have been traditionally associated, we may observe that the importance of language for the discipline has certainly never gone out of fashion; as to what to make of Boeckhian concepts such as, for instance, his equation of philology to history, that has perhaps become, in today's world, a geography-dependent semantic matter, though certainly philology is at least historical. To distinguish a broad notion of classics, that the word philology might to some signify, from a more 'theoretically sophisticated form of classical scholarship'[31] Gurd (2005, 2007) has introduced the notion of 'radical philology', while other compounds, such as 'pataphilology',[32] have been used to indicate something that could be understood as closer to the Wolfian, and Boeckhian, notion of *Altertumswissenschaft*. Such a tendency constitutes, in a way, a reiteration of the division inherent in the dispute intended as an epistemological object, making the importance of studying it, and its protagonists, immediately evident. However, I argue that reasoning according to all-encompassing categories, such as *Sach-* and *Wortphilologie*, is unprofitable and ultimately counterproductive, if not impossible. The similarities between the two camps are by necessity far greater than the differences, due to the elusive nature of philology itself and its proneness

[31] Lernout (2016), 234.
[32] Gurd and van Gerven Oei (2018).

to deny classification. Neither Hermann nor Boeckh can be made to fully adhere to their respective realm of philology – the overlaps between the two camps are constant, their boundaries not at all well defined. While distinctions and definitions have in history and even today maintained a degree of utility, we should not give in to the temptation to think in terms of convenient, all-encompassing dichotomies, but we should rather turn to the internal complexities and multi-faceted character of things, and to the scholars' laboratories. Models are always wrong, but some can certainly be useful, when they are interpreted critically and considered carefully.

# Chapter one

## The *Eques* and Hero of Thought

Introduction

Whoever approached the subject of Gottfried Hermann for the first time would at some point be confronted with the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the position he occupies in modern histories of philology and among many textual critics, where he is presented as an indispensable cornerstone for the evolution of the discipline; and, on the other hand, a lack of clarity surrounding the reasons for such prominence, felt especially by those who have had no direct experience of Hermann's textual criticism in practice. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the notion of Hermann's fundamental importance for the history of philology starting from an analysis of his public persona, both as presented by and to his contemporaries and as emerging in his philological editions.

Positive characterisations of Hermann today have inherited that original perception of the self-presentation of Hermann, of his fame and intellectual prominence, and the uncertainty generated by the lack of scholarship on Hermann can partly be lessened by raising our awareness of the original context of Hermann's work and life.[1] I propose to achieve this goal by considering accounts of Hermann's public image as attested through Hermann's own words or those of his

[1] On the limited scholarship about Hermann available cf. Introduction, note 30.

contemporaries, including an analysis of some textual passages from Hermann's critical editions. Hermann's commentaries are a rich source for understanding features of his scholarly persona and his philological methodology – their format is less formal than that of modern commentaries and leaves ample space for Hermann's persona to emerge. The addition of unpublished archival material also adds on to the range of sources I use in this chapter. The analysis of Hermann's public persona is conducted following the threads of two speeches pronounced in honour of Hermann by two classicists. The first, by Hermann Koechly on the occasion of the centennial of Hermann's birth, the second by Ernst Günther Schmidt one hundred and fifty years after Hermann's death. The first one was then published and became the only book-long biographical source we have about Hermann; the manuscript of the second is preserved, in the form of a draft, at the university archive in Leipzig.[2] They constitute two interesting sources for partly overlapping reasons, insofar as, standing more than one hundred years apart from each other, they display themes that consistently accompany the image of Hermann as represented in the scholarly and biographical literature. Such features compose a series of leitmotifs that have not been analysed in their significance with regard to the modern perception of Hermann and its role in the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh. Koechly's book is an invaluable source of information about Hermann, but considering it in the light of the nineteenth-century tradition of biographies of scholars and its tropes is a useful technique to understand Hermann's persona in its

[2] *UAL NA Ernst Günther Schmidt 258, Leipzig Universität Archiv.*

context, and in the context of the history of classical scholarship. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to better define the public role of Hermann as an academic in Leipzig, for the purpose of clearly understanding his position in the dispute with Boeckh.

## Bentleian philology: *ingenium*, erudition and the use of manuscripts

On the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Gottfried Hermann's birth, on November 28th 1872, in front of a large circle of professors and students as well as other listeners, Hermann Koechly (1815-1876) delivered an honorary speech in the *Pandektensaal* of the university of Heidelberg, where he was professor of classical philology from 1864 to his death.[3] Printed in 1874 with a set of additions that included unpublished letters and materials, the text remains our largest source of biographical information about Gottfried Hermann. It is a large pool of knowledge and materials for the circumstances of Hermann's life and work but not immune to a certain nineteenth-century rhetoric, typical of the biographical genre of the time.[4]

Several elements emphasised in Koechly's book recur across many other biographical comments on Hermann, forming a range of leitmotifs consistently accompanying descriptions of his work or persona. Among them there is the presentation of Hermann as a 'hero of thought',[5] or better, a hero of philology, an extraordinary man and scholar whose life and character are to be understood in

[3] Koechly (1874). Hermann Koechly studied in Leipzig between 1832 and 1837, where he was also a member of Gottfried Hermann's Greek Society. For useful bibliography on Koechly cf. Hug (1882), Böckel (1904). Cf. also Lehrs (1979), 487.

[4] Cf. Espagne (2010).

[5] Cf. ibidem, 5: 'Le philologue, qu'on le prenne au terme de son ascension sociale ou même dans l'ensemble de sa carrière, est présenté dans les biographies qui lui sont consacrées comme un héros de la pensée.'

continuity with his academic achievements. This image of Hermann, particularly prominent in Koechly's biography, somehow survived to the present day, though in a complicated way. Those who have a certain familiarity with Hermann regard him as a very prolific and creative author of emendations to the tragedians and, generally, tend to maintain a vaguely heroic view of him. At the same time, however, Hermann has been studied very little;[6] this in turn partly contributes to the fact that such an aura of heroism surrounding Hermann has remained somewhat untouched; on the other hand, the lack of wider attention dedicated to him by the scholarship signals a certain disregard for his philology as something undeserving of interest – a view that is perhaps the most tangible outcome of the dispute with Boeckh, and that this thesis aims to challenge.

Another aspect that is seldom forgotten in Koechly's biographical work is a remark about Hermann's passion for horse riding, and his representation, and self-representation as a knight. The idea of Hermann's knighthood brings about a not entirely explicit but specific allusion to a certain conservativeness encompassing Hermann's character as much as his professional figure. While this intention must be registered as a common trope of Hermann's biographies, it also introduces an image of Hermann as an energetic and lively person that is best understood as a form of embodiment of nineteenth-century ideals of physical strength as a sign of moral perfection. This somehow contrasts with the frequent depiction of Hermann often given in the context of the dispute – as seen in the introduction –, as a creature

[6] Cf. Introduction, note 30.

of the past, devoid of any passion for or interest in the exciting discoveries of the *Sachphilologen* and their new tools.

Such knightly character is, for example, central in Wilamowitz's description of Hermann, in his *Geschichte der Philologie*: 'Er war ein Ritter in jedem Sinne des Wortes und liebte den Kampf, aber er führte ihn ritterlich', which continues:

> Als Kritiker ist Hermann das Gegenteil eines Systematikers und vertritt gegenüber der Analogie, die die Schule Porsons verfolgte, das Recht der Individualität, also die Anomalie. [..] Er ist oft zu weit gegangen, aber es befähigte ihn dazu, wie kein zweiter die stark idiomatische Sprache des Sophokles zu vestehen. Mut und auch Glück im Konjizieren hat er überall bewiesen, wo er an einen Text heranging.[7]

Here Hermann is described as a critic relying on the individuality and the anomaly rather than a system. In chapter five I will explore the ways in which this aspect, namely the lack of conformity, in a way to even his own system of metrics, is particularly important for Hermannian philology; but here I would like to linger on this feature for a moment because I believe it constitutes the core of the perception of "genius" still today associated with Hermann among those who are familiar with his textual-critical work.[8]

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[7] Wilamowitz (1921), 49: 'He was a knight in every sense of the word, and loved the battle but he waged it like a knight', 'as a critic Hermann is the opposite of a systematist and advocates the right of individuality, that is, anomaly, in comparison to analogy as pursued by the Porson school. [..] He often went too far, but that enabled him, like no other, to understand the strongly idiomatic language of Sophocles. He has shown courage as much as luck in his conjectures everywhere he has approached a text.'

[8] Cf. e.g. Danek (2010), 185 and Dawe (2010), 255-6.

Such a tendency to 'go too far'[9] is precisely the characteristic of Hermann's emendatory practice which is the most responsible for the attribution to him of genius. Many Hermannian emendations have had little success among modern editors because of this tendency, coming across as too far-fetched, excessively creative or too unlikely to be the true reading intended by the original author.[10] One might say, as Wilamowitz did, that a certain component of luck and courage is built into Hermann's textual criticism and see it as the function responsible for Hermann's "genius". This cornerstone feature of Hermannian philology is best understood in connection with his declared model, Richard Bentley (1662-1742). Bentley is often indicated by critics as a model for Hermann's practice – however the literature has so far not shown the terms and extent of his profound influence on Hermann's philology, limiting itself to mentioning the connection between the two *en passant*, as one of the leitmotifs associated with Hermann not particularly worthy of further exploration, but this in fact constitutes a valuable key to unlock some cogent questions about Hermann's philology. These include the contradiction between his reputation for genius and fame among the textual-critics, and his neglect in the history of classical scholarship more broadly indented. Hermann himself tells us, and various sources have since very early on attested the

[9] Cf. above, note 7.
[10] Cf. Itsumi (2009), 119-20.

fact, that he held Bentley in high regard as a critic and considered him his primary model.[11] For example, Moritz Haupt, Hermann's son-in-law, said that

> if there was anyone, from whom Hermann learned method, it was Richard Bentley, and two points stood out: first, that he read not many authors together, but only one at a time; secondly, that he accepted nothing on mere authority, but investigated the causes and roots of every matter.[12]

Bentley, champion of a philology based primarily on *emendatio ope ingenii*, built the image of personal excellence that he was eager to create on the display, in his editions, of an extraordinary, in-depth knowledge of ancient literature. When it came to formulating conjectures Bentley had the ability to take intellectual work to its extreme, but this often took the form of the introduction in his emendations of difficult and obscure words found through indefatigable perusals of Byzantine dictionaries or equally remote sources, an image that competes for demonstration of patience and dedication with the meticulous way in which Hermann compiled his own editions, as appears for instance from the following passage, in which Ernest G. Sihler reports the Egyptologist Dr. Seyffarth's description of an encounter with Hermann:

> Dr. Seyffarth, in 1824, in Leipzig, published a book entitled: "*De Sonis Litterarum Graecarum*". Hermann, among whose students Seyffarth had held honorable rank, had promised to write a prefatory note for that book. The older scholar then was fifty-two, the

[11] Cf. Hermann (1816), xii, Hermann (1799), v, and Medda (2010), 247.
[12] Sihler (1933), 68-9.

younger twenty-eight. Once, Seyffarth told me, he found the Greek scholar rather curiously occupied. He was making a *recensio* of the text of some tragedy, and in examining all the printed editions he pursued the following method. There was a long table. At both ends of it stood a large basket, "Waschkorb", as I remember. Hermann made his critical note of the text of the particular edition; then he pushed the book forward and made his excerpt from the next edition, still pushing forward until the first and foremost book in the train fell into the basket at the further end of the table. When all books were in the basket, Hermann went around to that end, and the pushing process was reversed. Infinite patience? Yes, infinite patience, of which there is so much concealed in all uncommon work. How often was the train of books pushed over the long table?[13]

Moreover, a certain continuity between Hermann's and Bentley's method can be traced in two more factors. First, in his edition of Terence, the English scholar resolved to do something that at the time must have sounded even more bold than what Hermann would do almost a century later by grounding his metrics in Kantian philosophy: a programme of systematic interventions in the text based on metrical concerns. Secondly, like Bentley, Hermann too dedicated himself to the study of one author at a time: he started working on his life-long project of an edition of all the tragedies of Aeschylus only after abandoning the study of Plautus, the "fiancé" assigned to the young Hermann by Friedrich Wolfgang Reiz.[14]

[13] Ibidem, 68.

[14] Reiz was responsible for introducing Hermann to the admiration for Bentley and the study of Plautus, as Hermann describes it: 'Als er einmal ein Buch suchte, wobei ich ihm leuchtete, waren wir an ein Bücherbret gekommen, das viele Ausgaben des Plautus enthielt. Da blieb er stehen und sprach: »das soll Ihre Braut sein: mit der verlobe ich Sie hiermit förmlich, und der sollen Sie treu

Hermann shared with Bentley the idea of having a particular, privileged connection with the authors of the literary works he took up for emendation. With regard to textual emendation, Bentley tended to bring up the topic of a fundamental distinction between competent and incompetent readers.[15] If some of the arguments in Bentley's 1699 *Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris* – a work in which he attacked the authenticity of the epistles –, as well as some of his emendations to Horace ultimately did not seem compelling, he thought that this was not due to a deficiency in his judgement, but that the fault was entirely to be found in the reader who was unable to see the goodness of the idea behind any offered evidence.[16] According to Bentley, in fact, his emendations were so outstanding that they ought to be intuitively obvious, and especially so on the basis of the evidence that he had collected and provided for the reader.[17] The implication here seems to be the idea of

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bleiben.« Er selbst hatte sich bekanntlich viel mil dem Plautus beschäftig', in *Op.* 8, 458. Cf. also Deufert (2010), 281.

[15] Cf. Haugen (2011), 115 and, quoted ibidem, Bentley (1712), xx-xxi.

[16] Cf. Bentley (1699), 19: 'And I shall not go to dispossess him, as those have done before me, by an Arbitrary Sentence in his own Tyrannical Way; but proceed with him upon lawfull [sic] Evidence, and a fair, impartial Tryal. And I am very much mistaken in the Nature and Force of my Proofs, if ever any Man hereafter, that reads them, persists in his old Opinion of making *Phalaris* an Author.' Cf. also Haugen (2011), 114, who points out how 'no reader could be literally forced to accept Bentley's conclusions, no matter how copious and detailed his evidence. [..] On the first occasion when he presented his scholarship to a wide public, then, Bentley faced local and practical difficulties as well as the basic epistemological problem that no reader's belief could be compelled.' However, 'in the Phalaris *Dissertation*, [..] Bentley's aim was to compel the qualitative, holistic conclusion that the letters were fake. Yet no predetermined number of arguments could actually force a given reader to accept Bentley's claim, even though Bentley averred that 'the Nature and Force of my Proofs" ought to convince every reader until the end of time.'

[17] Cf. Haugen (2011), 115, on how Bentley claimed 'that his emendations ought to be intuitively obvious to experts but that they could not convince the many unless he presented long documentation and argument. Meanwhile, in private, he explained to friends that an argument based on the style of the Phalaris letters would have been enough to persuade "the judicious"; it was only for the sake of less skilled readers that he must assemble "a kind of demonstration by chronological proofs that cannot be contested."'; cf. also Bentley (1713), praefatio p. 2: horum ego ut praejudicio & ἀνθολκῇ occurrerem; fuse pleraque & prolixe praeter morem meum in adnotationibus

having a special sensibility for the comprehension of an ancient author – otherwise, there would be no reason why the experts should, according to Bentley, find certain emendations 'intuitively obvious.'[18] Bentley believed that he had a particular understanding of Horace, a special access to his sensitivity for poetry and language, methods and inclinations, lexical taste, views and cognitive processes in general, a connection that he shared with the author and a few other 'judicious readers' only. Bentley was most concerned with rendering the best possible text, and he aimed at doing so mostly relying on his own *ingenium* and the formulation of conjectures exquisitely *ope ingenii*.[19] Bentley's famous quotation, 'reason and the thing itself (*ratio et res* ipsa) count for more than a hundred manuscripts, especially when the old Vatican manuscript agrees with me,'[20] should be interpreted in this sense, as a programmatic declaration of "oracular" philology and of Bentley's faith in his own critical skills.[21] Hermann's philology shares these points of commonality with

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deduxi: ut vel indignantes ac reluctantes cum rationum pondere tum exemplorum numero obruerem, inque meam tandem sententiam vel obtorto eos collo traherem.

[18] Cf. ibidem.

[19] Bentley prescribed that the critic needs 'a certain faculty of divination and prophecy. These can be acquired by no quantity of labor or length of life, but they come purely as the gift of nature and by happiness of birth. This is why alhough in other disciplines one's results answer to one's labors and prayers, in this arena of Criticism, out of so many who have rolled this stone their entire lives, making themselves old with books and study, there have been so very few who have managed to attain the reputation they hoped for among their successors. [..] Therefore in these Horatian notes I will produce more emendations from conjecture than from the help of Manuscripts, and, unless I am totally wrong, the greater part of them more certain' quoted in Haugen (2011), 133-4.

[20] Bentley (1712), 147, ad *Ode* 3.27.15: Nobis & ratio & res ipsa centum codicibus potiores sunt, praesertim accedente Vaticani veteris suffragio.

[21] Cf. Haugen (2011), 134: 'We are allowed to suspect that within the limits of the rhetoric, Bentley's reason counts more than manuscripts primarily because it is *Bentley's* reason.' and p. 135: 'Bentley's emphasis on conjecture and *ingenium* constituted an argument for his own personal authority – an authority that tended, in Bentley's annotations, to be virtually elided with Horace's poetic authority, as Bentley claimed that he (perhaps only he) could infallibly identify "what is Horace"' and 'before collating any manuscripts or older editions, Bentley filled the margins of a printed Horace with his

Bentley, and many of his arguments, in and outside his commentaries, are said to be based on his personal knowledge of antiquity, sensibility for poetry and rationality. Hermann showed particular care for re-establishing the text as it was written by its author, but he, too, believed that only certain readers, the "judicious ones", can successfully emend certain authors.[22] The following example from Euripides' *Bacchae*, l. 682 (674 of Hermann's 1823 edition), shows this "divinatory" attitude in action:

680 ὁρῶ δὲ θιάσους τρεῖς γυναικείων χορῶν,
ὧν ἦρχ' ἑνὸς μὲν Αὐτονόη, τοῦ δευτέρου
μήτηρ Ἀγαυὴ σή, τρίτου δ' Ἰνὼ χοροῦ.[23]

682 τρίτου Aldina: -τη LP, quo seruato τρίτου pro χοροῦ Hermann.

680 I see three companies of dancing women,
one of which Autonoe leads, the second
your mother Agave, and the third Ino.

Modern editions generally refuse Hermann's emendation at l. 682 and print the Aldine's τρίτου δ' Ἰνὼ χοροῦ.[24] Hermann proposes to write τρίτη δ' Ἰνὼ τρίτου:

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conjectures in the evident hope that he might find his conjecture confirmed by a manuscript or anticipated by a venerated older critic.'

[22] Cf. e.g. the idea, expressed by Hermann, that Boeckh was not able to select which information is necessary and which is not, in his comments to the inscriptions (ch. four, note 70), and ch. five, pp. 305ff., on Hermann's *sensus* as Kantian subjective universality.

[23] Diggle (1994a), 680-682.

the manuscripts L and P have τρίτη, that Hermann accepts as the correct reading, however he also thinks that τρίτου got corrupted into χορου̃, a gloss that became an interpolation in the text. The reading of the manuscripts τρίτη δ'Ινω̃ χορου̃ implies the vaguely clumsy hypallage that would make the adjective morphologically agree with Ἰνῶ but semantically refer to χορου̃, which might have led to the corruption of τρίτη into τρίτου.[25] Hermann's proposal offers to replace an unsure hypallage with an elegant polyptoton.

Hermann is particularly interested in the kind of mistakes that might have occurred when copying the manuscripts, and in tracing them backwards to retrieve Euripides' text. He asks himself questions about the genesis of the error, and seems to have clear criteria to find mechanical mistakes that will be established only later in the nineteenth century. When Hermann offers the explanation that the copyists might have needed the gloss χορου̃ to understand the line, he goes beyond the per se very acceptable reading τρίτου δ'Ινὼ χορου̃, because he is after the authentically Euripidean text and the reading τρίτη makes him suspicious. It is worth remembering the attitude towards manuscripts held by Bentley, convinced as he was that medieval scribes let their pens slip on purpose in order to produce mistakes.[26]

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[24] Cf. *ad loc.* Diggle (1994a), Grégoire-Meunier (1961), Kopff (1982), Murray (1913), Nauck (1889), Prinz-Wecklein (1898).

[25] Cf. also Stumpo (1921) *ad loc*.

[26] Cf. Haugen (2011), 146: 'In his note to *Ode* 1.3.18, as he argued for the reading *rectis oculis* ("with unwavering eyes") over the unanimous manuscript reading *siccis oculis* ("with dry eyes"), Bentley remarked that "the difference between the words is not so great that our daring friends the scribed would not have permitted themselves the crime" of inserting *siccis*. [..] This was to say any

Hermann's emendation avoids the repetition χορῶν... χοροῦ (ll. 680-2). However, the two words are relatively far apart, and thus this kind of repetition would not be unusual in tragedy, as Dodds (1960) observes ad. loc.: 'the Greek ear, and Eur.'s ear in particular, was less sensitive to such things than ours.' Hermann's suggestion, instead, produces a much closer and more noticeable repetition. Perhaps to Hermann the specific reiteration of the word χοροῦ within the very explanation of the composition of the χορῶν, mentioned at l. 680, seemed redundant. Or perhaps with Hermann's conjecture l. 682 provides, instead of a static image, a shift of focus from the choruses to their guides, since it does not only tell us that the third chorus is approaching, but it also calls attention to Ino coming third along with the third chorus. This would make our imagination jump from each chorus-lead to each crowd of chorus members, rather than evoking only the image of three choruses in which to distinguish their respective guides confused among the chorus members. Overall these do not seem like very compelling arguments to accept Hermann's emendation, which has been rejected by most critics (thought not by Elmsley). However, this example well illustrates Hermann's "Bentleian" attitude,[27] a reliance on his linguistic-philological sensibility as a prominent tool for textual emendation and sometimes as a substitute for the solid presentation of evidence or strong argumentative logic.

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manuscript variant that *looked like* a scribal error was very likely a malicious emendation in the guise of a careless slip of the pen.'

[27] Cf. above, notes 17, 19, 21.

Even though Hermann's emendation was not based on manuscripts per se, the process he describes in formulating his conjecture shows a willingness to think about how possible corruptions in the text might have been generated – as in his hypothesis of considering χοϱοῦ a gloss which might have corrupted the text. The literature traditionally insists on Hermann's lack of interest in manuscripts, only mitigated after 1816.[28] In the eighteenth century and at the turn of the nineteenth, before the advent of Lachmann, the systematic collection of manuscripts as basis for the emendation of texts was still not a consolidated practice among philologist. However, some British philologists, like Musgrave first and Elmsley later, were keener than others to collate manuscripts, while contemporary German philologists seemed, from this point of view, to have remained a step behind.[29] Hermann in particular is generally said to have been rather uninterested in making manuscripts part of his philological practice, and even Medda (2006), one of the few authors to have studied Hermann in recent years, suggests that, although Hermann throughout his life got progressively more convinced of the importance of viewing manuscripts, the power of Bentley's influence was still strong upon him so that Hermann nourished an 'aristocratic contempt for the paleographical *minutiae*, and the certainty that textual problems must be solved mostly thanks to philological intuition and excellent knowledge of the language and metrics of an author'.[30]

[28] Cf. Medda (2006), 103ff., Medda (2006a), 293ff; Mancuso (2018), 454.
[29] Cf. Di Benedetto (1965), 10.
[30] Translated from Di Benedetto (1965), 10-11.

It is true that in Hermann's editions manuscripts are not duly collated and noted down in an *apparatus*; even a quick look at his Euripides immediately reveals the absence of a critical *apparatus,* substituted by an ample commentary right below the text of the tragedy. Here Hermann proceeded to describe and explain point by point the interventions he put in place in the emended text, without giving systematic information about alternative readings as found in a plurality of witnesses, but rather giving account of the reading by a general *vulgata* (a general indication *vulgo* or *libri*) and some alternatives selected in different editions upon which he wished to offer comments and opinions, or to build his own arguments.[31]

When we compare two or more modern editions of the same play, we expect them to consistently present a high percentage of similarities in their *apparatus* because there is an implied general consensus in the scholarly community that some emendations are simply worthy of being reported in an *apparatus*, even when they are not recognised as the actual authentic reading by an editor. Hermann was not yet interested in giving an accurate overview of all the most relevant alternative readings in order to allow the readers to recreate, through them, a number of other "virtual" editions. He was concerned with finding and defending the readings he believed to be right. This, however, did not imply a full disregard for manuscripts, at least the ones he happened to be able to acquire. Hermann was certainly interested in viewing manuscripts directly, however he never left his country to

[31] Battezzato (2009), 174-5, has observed how we have to wait for the Prinz-Wecklein editions – or at least for Nauck's – to get something closer to our modern conception of an *apparatus*, where the systematic categorisation of useful variant readings provides the closest possible approximation to objective standards in a field 'necessarily as subjective as the evaluation of conjectures.' Providing this was clearly not yet a concern for Hermann.

collate any and it has been often observed that he did not see some of the manuscripts to which he could have had access even in Germany. However, some recent publications have started to challenge this view, and some archival material collected for the present research has shown the same. Mancuso (2018) has published letters written by Hermann to Elmsley that in his opinion confirm Medda's thesis that Hermann's methods were stirred towards a greater consideration of manuscripts after 1816, with the publication of the *Elementa doctrinae metricae* and Wilhelm von Humboldt's translation of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.[32] However, the unpublished correspondence of Hermann collected for this research shows how Hermann kept asking for information about manuscripts and their availability, and it is clear that he was having manuscripts sent to him by post, even before 1816. For example, the following letter dated March 8th 1808 attests that Hermann was about to request some Aeschylus manuscripts from Dresden, and indicates that he already had some borrowed ones in his hands:

[..] I would like to finish this work before I ask for the codices of the olios ## [unreadable] of the Aeschylus. How well does the liberality of your government do, which orders the communication of such treasures even by laws. On the other hand, all books are now being called back to Dresden, and new ones are not supposed to be issued for a while. Fortunately, there is nothing there for Aeschylus that I do not have myself; not even the edition of Prometheus by Morell, London, 1773, which I would like to buy if I could only find it somewhere. I take advantage of your kindness, and ask you to send me the two

[32] Cf. above, note 28.

codices indicated on the attached note. Of the four identical transcripts of the scholia ## to the three first tragedies, of course only one will be sufficient, considering what you write of it. I leave you the choice, as perhaps one can be easier than the others to be packed with the other manuscripts. If, however, one of these four manuscripts prefixes the words of the text to the scholia, while the others do not, I would prefer that one. Therefore, in my note, I ask you to supply the names that I have omitted. At the same time I ask you for information about the Codex n. 486, which contains a part of Prometheus. If this Codex contains the βίος Αἰσχύλου ποιητοῦ τραγικοῦ (as the title) and the Prometheus up to 4. ## αἴσχιστον εἰναί φημι συνθέτους λόγους , and has P. ## 683 ειπεῖν μάστιγι θείας γῆς πρὸς γῆν ἐλαύνομαι, then I have already had it in my hands, and I have compared it.[33]

Postulating Hermann's lack of interest in what could be found in manuscripts seems unfair not only in the light of letters like this,[34] which attest a

[33] Ms. 0661b, Leipzig Universität, '[..] Diese Arbeit wollte ich gern erst fertig haben, ehe ich um die Codices der ...olios ## des Aeschylus bät. Wie wohl thut einem die Liberalität Ihrer Regirung, welche die Mittheilung solcher Schätze sogar durch Gesetze befiehlt. Zu Dresden werden dagegen jezt alle ausgelieferten Bücher wieder eingefordert, und es soll eine Zeitlang gar nicht ausgegeben werden. Glücklicherweise ist dort für den Aeschylus nichts, das ich nicht selbst hätte; nicht einmal die Ausgabe des Prometheus von Morell, London 1773, die ich gern kaufen möchte, wenn ich sie nur irgendwo anträfe. Von Ihrer Gütigkeit mache ich Gebrauch, und bitte Sie mir die zwey auf dem beyliegende Scheine ausgegebenen Codices zu schicken. Von den vier gleichlautenden Abschriften der Scholien ## zu den drey ersten Tragödien ist mir natürlich, nachdem, was Sie davon schreiben, eine hinlänglich. Die Wahl lasse ich Ihnen, da sich vielleicht eine besser als die andern zu dem andern Codex packen läßt. Sollte jedoch eine dieser 4 Handschriften die Worte des Textes den Scholien ## vorsetzen, wenn dieß etwa die andern nicht thäten, so wär mir jene lieber. Ich bitte Sie daher in meinem Scheine die Namen, die ich weggelassen habe, zu suppliren. Zugleich bitte ich Sie noch um Nachricht wegen des mit N. 486. bezeichneten Codex, der einen Theil des Prometheus enthält. Wenn dieser Codex den βίος Αισχύλου ποιητόυ τραγικόυ (so ist die Überschrifft) und den Prometheus bis zu 4. ## bzw. αίσχιστον εἰναί φημι συνθέτους λόγους enthält, und P.## 683 ειπεῖν μάστιγι θείας γῆς πρὸς γῆν ἐλαύνομαι hat, so habe ich ihn schon in den Händen gehabt, und verglichen.'

[34] For Hermann's reference to the review of mss. cf. also his preface to Hecuba (1800), cf. below note 25, and Hermann (1816), XIX, where he expresses his gratitude towards Blumner for having provided him with a codex of Plautus. Hermann's private correspondence, such as the one collected in ms. 0661b, contains several references to manuscripts that he has consulting for his own work or

regular exchange of manuscripts between Hermann and other scholars, but also in view of his preface to *Hecuba* published already in the year 1800, which might suggest Hermann's earlier interest in manuscripts than it was otherwise thought.

This is the very first edition of Euripides by Hermann, age twenty-eight, and here he gives a detailed description of four manuscripts he viewed in the Bibliotheca Augustana in Leipzig, and some of their *variae lectiones*. He quotes the manuscripts he viewed according to the *catalogus Reiseri.*[35] This is followed by a twelve-page-long listing of all the readings Hermann found deserving of consideration. Here he specifies details such as when an interesting reading in the *codices* is a correction,[36] and he points out whenever he finds one of his conjectures confirmed by manuscripts, a circumstance which occurs very often –[37] this, again, recalls Bentley's custom to proceed, in the emendation of Horace, to correct the text before checking the manuscripts for variants.[38] For l. 223 Hermann mentions the *varia lectio* δράσεις from the mss. a, b and c, and says that c also registers a variant

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on behalf of other scholars (cf. letters dated 21/07/38, 17/10/38, 20/12/38, 24/03/39, 1/12/41, 13/01/42, 24/03/[missing]). Further analysis of this kind of materials is needed and seems likely to produce further evidence of this type, possibly even for the earlier period of Hermann's life, as it seems evident from Hermann's tone and phrasing in the currently available materials that the practice of exchanging mss. with other scholars was routine.

[35] Hermann (1800), vi. It is Hermann himself who named the mss. a, b, c and d. He makes the following observations: a) n. 45 mentioned at p. 69 of the *catalogus*, that contains only the first 789 verses of Hecuba and Hermann describes as not particularly good, with chaotic writing and no notation of *personae*. Particularly remarkable is the fact that Hermann notes that it is *descriptus* and must have been copied from a good manuscript; b) n. 48 p. 83, 'chartaceus. recentissimus, cum paucis glossis inter lineas'; c) n. 68 p. 90, made of silk, older, 'cum multis glossis interlinearibus', and some *scholia* always in agreement with the text. Hermann reports that it contains, at the beginning, four pages of *scholia* written by a different hand, and a dictionary of terms used in Hecuba, for which various meanings and synonyms are given; d) n. 2 p. 35, silky, with *glossae inter lineas* and *scholia*. The whole play before v. 1253 is missing.

[36] Cf. e.g. ibidem vii: 44. ἀδελφὴ καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν τῆδ' ἡμέρα, a. ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἐμὴν τῆδ' ἡμέρα b. c. sed in b postrema duo verba in litura scripta sunt.

[37] Eight times, at ll. 69, 201, 206, 226, 258, 812, 813, 1244.

[38] Cf. above, note 21.

written in the margin;[39]at l. 630 Hermann notes ′Ελέναν a. Memorabilis lectio'; he gives information about conventions the manuscripts adopt, as in 671 'δέ a. in quo saepe perparuum inter ε (?) et η discrimen est'; at l. 699 he expresses a suspicion of how an error might have been generated in a, b and c, for which he gives a possible correct reading with a background metrical justification.[40] In his remarks about ms. a, Hermann notes that it must have been copied from a good manuscript. Despite being still far from what Jo. Lenting would do almost thirty years later, attempting to organise manuscripts of *Andromache* in different family groups,[41] Hermann certainly showed here that he was aware of the affinity linking manuscripts, and interested in keeping in mind their genealogical relations when he identified any. Forty years later, in the preface to *Phoenissae*, Hermann would observe: sive ad instrumentum respiciat, quod libri ad emendandam fabulam suppeditent, numerum quidem codicum ingentem, bonitatem autem tam exiguam esse deprehendet, ut discrepare magis inter se, quam alii alios superare videantur,[42] showing that he was still actively thinking about the relationship among manuscripts when preparing an edition; but also that the old Hermann, rather than having become progressively interested in manuscripts, had remained ultimately

[39] Hermann (1800, ix: 223. δράσεις a. b. c. In margine MS. c. altera lectio notata. Even though Hermann does not give any further information about it, it seems likely that he does not specify what this ghost variant might be due to circumstances of force majeure (perhaps it was not readable), rather than because of a specific lack of thoroughness or interest in checking the manuscript carefully.

[40] Ibidem, xv: εχ'ὅσι ἐδ' et δίπα a. b. c. Vnde suspicio oritur, versum fuisse dochmiacum hoc modo: ἐχ ὅσι, ἐδ'ἀνεκτά· τί δίκα ξένων.

[41] Cf. Di Benedetto (1965), 13ff.

[42] Hermann (1840), v: 'or if one turns to the tool that the manuscripts constitute to emend the play, the huge number of manuscripts certainly surpasses their limited good quality, so that it seems that they present differences among each other more than that some manuscripts are better than others.

more reliant on his own *ingenium* than on manuscripts. However, the fact that Hermann collated the four manuscripts of *Hecuba*, giving a detailed account of their *variae lectiones* and even mentioning details such as the material of which the manuscripts were made, seems to testify to an early interest in manuscripts per se, even if just as a confirmatory method for emendation, rather than an absence of that interest before 1816.

Emendations based on the criterion of *usus*

As the above reported anecdote by Seiffarth suggests, Hermann can be considered an heir to Bentley's approach towards antiquity not only because of the precision and meticulousness with which he conducted the making of his editions, but also in so far as he believed that the best possible emendations are achieved through the steady level of acquaintance that comes from habitual reading. Hermann's emendations based on the criterion of the ancient author's *usus* follow ostensibly modern textual-critical praxis. The general idea of establishing what is the typical use of a word made by an author, for Hermann, should be understood within this tradition. Such *usus*-based method is a marker of a complex understanding of language, that is not only established through an imagined special connection between author and editor but is also firmly grounded in contextual considerations. Establishing the use of a word, for Hermann, is not merely functional to a linguistic clarification but it also stands in evident connection to the state of affairs of antiquity – the so-called "things" of antiquity, or *Sache*. It

constitutes an attempt to collect information around the reality that the authors wanted to convey through their literary works. Let us consider the following example of usus-based emendation from Eur, *Bacchae*, ll. 53-54:

[..]

ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω

μορφὴν ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν.

[..]

on which account I have changed my form to a mortal one,

and altered my shape into the nature of a man.[43]

These two verses have been expunged by Bernhardy because they repeat the same concept twice,[44] and according to some editors they do not add anything meaningful to this passage, or they even lessen the efficacy of the way in which the war cry ἀλλ' ὦ λιποῦσαι Τμῶλον of l. 55 follows from l. 52 συνάψω μαινάσι στρατηλατῶν.[45]

Hermann observed that tragedians often use tautologies, but to say the same thing twice with the same sentence structure seems too pedantic even for Euripides.

[43] Translation by Buckley (1850).

[44] Cf. Sandys (1880), 98-9: 'as Euripides himself in the *Ranae* (1154) says of Aeschylus, δὶς ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν εἶπεν', and Stumpo (1921), 151.

[45] The passage at ll. 50-61 is the following: 'But if ever the city of Thebes should in anger seek to drive the Bacchae down from the mountains with arms, I, the general of the Maenads, will join battle with them [συνάψω μαινάσι στρατηλατῶν]. On which account I have changed my form to a mortal one and altered my shape into the nature of a man. [55] But, you women who have left Tmolus [ἀλλ' ὦ λιποῦσαι Τμῶλον], [..] my sacred band, [..] take your drums [..] and going about this palace of Pentheus beat them, so that Kadmos' city may see.' Transl. by Buckley (1850).

He proposes to read ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἐγὼ (for ἔχω) μορφὴν ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. He adds that it is not possible to change ἐγὼ into ἓχω without adding τέ.[46] His emendation is based on style considerations and observation of the *usus* of Euripides – namely, indicating that, even though tautologies are common in tragedy, in this particular passage *Euripides* would avoid one.

Some editors think that εἶδος θνητὸν is ambiguous, and ἀλλάξας is uncertain in sense, and thus the second line may very well have been added to clear up the first;[47] but some others agree with Hermann that tautologies appear often in Euripides, despite the fact that l. 54 could look like a gloss.[48] Sandys keeps the two lines as they are in the mss., for reasons similar to Hermann's: 'such a redundancy of expression is quite allowable in this particular part of the ῥῆσις, as the two lines in question close a distinctive portion of it with a couplet summing up the general sense of the speech up to this point. The effect of this parallelism of sense is very like that of the parallelism of sound at the end of Shakespeare's speeches, which often close with a rhyming couplet.'[49]

Hermann follows the Bentleian practice of establishing a particular connection with the ancient author and investigating what his particular choice would be in a given passage, taking into consideration his usual modus operandi

[46] Cf. Hermann (1823), 12-13: Multa abundantius dicere solent tragici, sed talis tautologia, quae non modo rem ipsam bis dicat, sed bis etiam eodem modo composita oratione, nimis putida videtur, quam ut admissam ab Euripide credas. Quare correxi. Nam ἐγὼ quum semel in ἓχω mutatum esset, fieri non potuit, quin etiam τέ adderetur.
[47] Cf. Sandys (1880), 98-9.
[48] Cf. Cammelli (1980), 23.
[49] Cf. Sandys (1880), 98-9.

but also the specificity of the passage. This is the marker of a philology which is informed by exercise, general knowledge and practice, but also the *je ne sais quoi* that makes it more art than science.[50] As Wilamowitz's judgement of Hermann also suggests,[51] this constitutes the heart of Hermann's critique of Richard Porson (1759-1808) and his followers, too, who, according to Hermann, proceeded by the identification of rules and their application, sometimes without due attention to the specificities of the particular passage.[52]

*IT* l. 951 [925 Hermann] is another example of this category of Hermannian emendations, based on Euripidean *usus*:

οἳ δ᾽ ἔσχον αἰδῶ, ξένια μονοτράπεζά μοι
παρέσχον, οἴκων ὄντες ἐν ταὐτῶι στέγει,
σιγῆι δ᾽ ἐτεκτήναντ᾽ ἀπόφθεγκτόν μ᾽, ὅπως
δαιτὸς τ᾽ ὀναίμην πώματός τ᾽ αὐτῶν δίχα [..]

951 ἀπρόσφθεγκτόν Hermann: ἀπόφθ- L.

Then some who felt shame offered me a table apart,
as a guest, themselves being under the same roof,
and in silence they kept me from speaking, so that

[50] On Hermann's attempt to present philology, or at least metrics, as a science, cf. ch. 5, esp. note 27, and ch. four, 227-30.
[51] Cf. above, note 7.
[52] Cf. ch. five, 282ff.

I might be apart from them in food and drink [..][53]

This passage concerns the treatment reserved for murderers, to whom, among the Greeks, was prescribed silence. The Athenians, here, because of *aidōs,* do not deny hospitality to Orestes; however, the compromise is that they will not entertain him in conversation – the latter being a typical element of the Greek banquet and part of the duties of the ξένος. Orestes is offered food and shelter, but he is not supposed to contaminate others with the impurity with which, following the matricide, he is now tainted. As Kyriakou (2006) notes, the choice of an unusual verb like τεκταίνομαι seems appropriate to express the complicated and artificial situation in which the Athenians find themselves with respect to Orestes, halfway through the wish to respect the sacred rules of hospitality and the ones concerning the treatment of murderers.[54]

The term ἀπόφθεγκτον, instead, is problematic because it should, theoretically, refer to the fact that, because nobody speaks to Orestes, thus he must not speak either. However, ἀπό- takes on the function of alpha privative only when it forms a compound with a noun, and thus the interpretation *without speaking* seems difficult.[55] Hermann notes that ἀπόφθεγκτον, which, he says, could also be written ἀπρόσφθεγκτον, is unparalleled, but it certainly does not have the same

[53] Transl. by Potter (1938).
[54] Cf. Kyriakou (2006), 307-10.
[55] Cf. Platnauer (1938), 140.

meaning as ἄφθεγκτον.[56] He also adds that adjectives formed with the prefix ἀπο- signify the subtraction of something which had been previously given. Sophocles, for example, uses απότιμος at *OT* 215, meaning *that who has lost his honour*.[57] Additionally, ἀπόφθεγκτον seems to mean *enounced, spoken out loud*, rather than *silent*, like ἄφθεγκτον.[58] In Sophocles' *Phil* 1067 we find that πρόσφθεγκτος (*addressed, spoken to*) is attested, and Euripides often uses the verb προσφθέγγομαι and the noun πρόσφθεγμα.[59] Diggle (1981a), Kovacs (1999) and Cropp (2000) adopted Hermann's conjecture.

Hermann's emendation solves the problem with the meaning of the mss., and it does two things: it is close to the tragic, and specifically Euripidean use, but it also proposes an unattested word. This combines both characteristics of Hermann's "Bentleian" philology: a good intuition, or sense of what the language of an ancient author would be, based on deep acquaintace with ancient literature; simultaneously, Hermann shows no hesitation in proposing a word which is unparalleled in tragedy, because of his confidence in his ability to think like the ancient author he is emending.

Despite the impression of certain Hermannian emendations being based on a display of authority,[60] Hermann warned against the idea of basing emendations on authority only, rather than being motivated by the wish to restore the original

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[56] Cf. Hermann (1833), 106: ἀπόφθεγκτον, quod fortasse alicui ἀπρόσφθεγκτον scribendum videatur, etsi ne hoc quidem alibi repertum scio, non est idem quod ἄφθεγκτον.
[57] Cf. ibidem.
[58] Cf. Kyriakou (2006), 310.
[59] Cf. Cropp (2000), 231.
[60] Cf. also ch. three, pp. 153ff, for this impression of Hermann held by his contemporaries.

reading. This is evident, for example, in his critiques of Porson, whom he accused of intentionally speaking in an obscure way, so that his readers would agree on the basis of Porson's authority more than because what he said was right.[61] The *litera humaniores*, Hermann thought, are more important than anybody and one must not fear to go against authoritative figures, nor to be criticised himself when he commits mistakes. Clearly, as seen in the examples above and especially when it came to metrics, Hermann himself was occasionally guilty of succumbing to the temptation of making his authority count, and thus partly his remarks against Porson must be interpreted as the rhetorical device that they are. At the same time, they at least signal Hermann's distancing from Bentley's worse traits, namely his most outspoken sense of righteousness and scarce openness to the possibility of being wrong,[62] and bring Hermann closer to the adoption of modern philological methods.

Heroic biographies as narratives of social advancement

The matters of method presented above are closely interwoven with Hermann's persona, not only on the basis of his self-representation in his theoretical writings and commentaries, but also because they are the foundational elements behind the perception of Hermann as an extraordinary scholar. Koechly's biography, indeed, presents Hermann as extraordinary both as a scholar and as an individual. This is important because the information Koechly provided about

[61] See Hermann (1800), iv.
[62] Cf. above, notes 17, 19, 20, 21.

Hermann is well propagated among later biographies up to the present time.[63] Thus, it is worth taking a closer look at Koechly's account of Hermann's persona, as he played an essential role in shaping the perception of Hermann for critics throughout the centuries.

Koechly's narrative of the life of Hermann should be understood within the framework of nineteenth-century "heroic biographies" of scholars, in the sense described by Espagne (2010). Espagne shows how aside from constituting a source of factual information for scientific investigation, scholarly biographies also constitute a real literary genre originating in Germany, endowed with its own tropes and recurrent features. Partly an encomiastic genre, it is generally characterised by personal acquaintance between the biographer and his subject, which ostensibly puts the former at least potentially at risk of constituting a biased source. Koechly, a former student of Hermann, despite maintaining a generally moderate register in his biography, is not immune to such risk, as manifested both implicitly, through the adherence to some of the tropes of the genre of biographies of this time, and explicitly when he betrays implied critiques of the *sachphilologische* school, 'blabbers' uninterested in language and grammar who prefer to read the ancients in translation:

The ancients also counted as grammar the science which we now indicate with the Greek name of aesthetics [..] Today's philologists of strict observance want to know nothing about it and leave it to dilettantes of all kinds; a fatal error: for in this way it almost

[63] Cf. for a most recent example cf. Kößling (2010), throughout.

invariably comes into the hands of ignorant babblers, who can not understand the old masterpieces in the original, and therefore, if they really take so much trouble, content themselves with the fleeting reading of translations, which are for the most part mass-produced, but are not sufficient, the whole lot of them, for real understanding.[64]

In such words we certainly recognise Hermann's views, and surely one of Espagne's points is that the background of a personal encounter is exactly part and parcel of what makes this a recognisable trope for the genre.

Another key feature of the nineteenth-century biographical genre is the representation of the scholar's life as a story of social advancement, where the scholar is portrayed as a great man who becomes the receptacle of the spirit of his nation.[65] Canonically, the scholar is of humble origins and he progressively gains social recognition for his intellectual merits.[66] Hermann's story does not fully adhere to this model. Indeed, the fact that Hermann grew up in an elegant environment is not unimportant. Unlike Boeckh, who is presented by his biographer Hoffmann as a man of humble origins whose life circumstances are only redeemed through his

[64] Koechly (1874), 31: 'Zur Grammatik rechneten die Alten auch die Wissenschaft, welche wir jetz mit dem griechischen Namen Aesthetik [..]. Die heutigen Philologen strenger Observanz wollen von ihr Nichts wissen und überlassen sie den Dilettanten aller Art; -- ein verhangnissvoller Irrthum: denn dadurch ist sie fast ausnahmslos in die Hände unwissender Schwätzer gerathen, welche die alten Meisterwerke im Original nicht verstehen können, und daher, wenn sie sich wirklich noch so viel Mühe geben, mit der flüchtigen Lectüre von Uebersetzungen sich begnügen, die grösstenteils fabrikmässig angefertigt werden, für das wirkliche Verständniss aber sammt und sonders nicht ausreichen.' Cf. also Hermann's frequent rebuke, during the dispute, concerning the scarce knowledge of the ancient languages allegedly displayed by the *Sachphilologen*. Cf. ch. three, 195-6.
[65] Cf. Espagne (2010), 127: 'Destiné à conforter une sorte d'homogénéité sociale de l'Allemagne, le philologue est présenté comme un cas d'ascension sociale. Il vient souvent de milieux modestes. Quelle que soit son origine il apparaît comme un grand homme dans lequel peut se cristalliser l'esprit d'une époque. À mesure que le XIX$^{e}$ siècle avance ce grand homme est de plus en plus lié à une histoire nationale de l'Allemagne.'
[66] Cf. ibidem.

intellectual merits,[67] Hermann did not come from a poorly-endowed pastor's or teacher's family from the countryside or a small town, but from an established home in Leipzig. Already his father, from the village of Püchau near Wurzen, had made the leap into the big city and his way into a prestigious profession. Of course, when Gottfried was born, he was not yet a senior at the *Leipziger Schöffenstuhl*, a respected legal body of supraregional importance, but after successful studies he was a doctor of law and advocate, he could afford an apartment at the finest address and later he was appointed to an honorary grant.[68] Hermann's mother, born Plantier, came from a French Huguenot family in Halle an der Saale.[69] Like Goethe, Hermann is often said to have more closely resembled his mother than his father. However, conforming now to the model identified by Espagne (2010), Koechly informs us that Hermann never felt French or even half-French but rather, as a patriotic German, named his sons after the German medieval emperors Rudolf, Konrad and Otto, and apparently he was never stirred by the desire to know his French half-homeland.[70] These details loom large among the other scholars who have written about Hermann and they contribute, along with the importance attributed to his knighthood, to suggest the idea of Hermann as a personification of the spirit of the

[67] See Hoffmann (1901), 1-25.
[68] Cf. *UAL NA Ernst Günther Schmidt 258*, Leipzig *Universität Archiv*; Koechly (1874), 3.
[69] Cf. ibidem.
[70] Cf. ibidem and Koechly (1874), 65: 'But wherever in his circle he approached the duty to testify, he did so with male freedom without fear and respect. He was a German man, and could at times be enthusiastic about the glory of the German Empire, and especially of his freedom of choice, that even the smallest prince might have been emperor: in the hope of his former resurrection – he would probably have said –, he had also given to his sons names of emperors, Otto, Konrad, Rudolph. He was a German man, and, as a matter of fact, he decidedly disliked the French language, which he knew perfectly well, as well as English and Italian. He called the French themselves "civilized cannibals," a description which has indeed been best illustrated by the conduct of the "great nation marching at the head of civilization" in the last few years!'

German nation.[71] Furthermore, as we will see below, for Hermann we can certainly talk of social advancement despite the fact that he was not of humble origins; the starting point might have been more advantageous than the norm for scholars, but Hermann did indeed reach a level of fame that can only be described as an ascension to stardom of international profile.

Koechly's description of Hermann's success begins with an account of his youth narrated almost as an adventure, the story of the making of a classicist.

### From *enfant terrible* to *enfant prodige*

Hermann's decision to dedicate himself to the classics follows, not untypically of nineteenth-century intellectuals, the decision to abandon his university study of law. In 1786 Hermann started university in Leipzig to study jurisprudence at his father's wish, with the aim of following in his steps.[72] As mentioned above, Hermann's father was a lay judge, 'the senior member of the local court of Sheriffs',[73] described by Koechly as a Saxon gentleman of the old school. By underlining such qualities in Hermann's father, Koechly implies the presence of similar characteristics in Hermann, hinting at a certain conservatism and a protectiveness towards old values not well defined but nonetheless indicated as good, that were ostensibly running in Hermann's family. These characteristics were

[71] Or better, with the spirit of 'the Germanies', as Germany was not yet unified – the term is Van Bommel (2015)'s.
[72] Enrolment in the faculties of law and philosophy was particularly high in the Germanies because both the *Abitur* and those university degrees were essential for a broad range of bureaucratic posts and for accreditation in key liberal professions. Cf. Mayer (1981), 268-9.
[73] Sandys (1908), 89.

often exploited to different effects among Hermann's detractors, to imply that his moral conservatism also entailed a resistance to the new wave of philology, an obstinate anchoring to a surpassed form of philology – the so-called *Wortphilologie*.

Despite the promising career planned for Hermann by his father, Koechly tells the story of Hermann's conversion to philology: 'aber auch an ihm bewährte sich die Wahrheit des Goetheschen Spruches: „es sind's die Griechen!"'[74] The idea of Hermann receiving his calling and fulfilling a fate is catalysed through the figure of Professor Friedrich Wolfgang Reiz (1733-1790), another favourite of Hermann's critics and biographers. According to Koechly, Hermann himself used to speak of this in a similar way, often referring to the fascination which Reiz exercised over him with 'the confidence of his method' and 'the magic of his immaculate, unpretentious, duty-bound nature.'[75]

However, in Koechly's narration the role of Reiz is not as central as the one played by the former teacher of the younger Hermann, Karl David Ilgen (1763-1834). Often only mentioned in passing by Hermann's biographers and critics, Ilgen is deemed responsible for leading Hermann to humanistic studies, a circumstance that Koechly presents in the guise of the adventurous making of an *enfant prodige*, the story of a hero to be who needs a helper to grow into the person he is destined to become. Hermann is first described as an *enfant terrible*, not precociously interested in books at all but dreaming of becoming a soldier; a young student who

[74] Koechly (1874), 5.
[75] Koechly (1874), 5: 'Und war es besonders Einer, Wolfgang Reiz, der ihn ganz fesselte, wie durch die Sicherheit seiner Methode, so durch den Zauber seines sittenreinen, anspruchslosen, pflichtgetreuen Wesens'; cf. also Jahn (1866), 96-7.

never attended a public school, was always home-schooled, and had already made a previous tutor run for the hills.[76] Only when Hermann was twelve, Ilgen was called to take on his education and to tame the young student's impetuous nature.[77] Ilgen would take the unruly Hermann and make a devotee of the classics out of him,[78] the *enfant prodige* who would start university as a fourteen-year-old, at a time when the average age to start academic studies was about the same as today.

Following, again, the trends typical of nineteenth-century biographies of scholars, the relationship between Hermann and his tutor David Ilgen is presented as a reciprocal love relationship between master and disciple, similar to the one between a father and a son.[79] This picture is reinforced by an element of an initial difficulty that needs to be overcome.[80] Hermann's youthful unruliness, lack of interest in his studies, and 'mild mockery' (milden Spott),[81] that could only be conquered by Ilgen, who acts, like Reiz, as another agent of fate, contribute to the restoration of order and the delivery of Hermann to his rightful place in the world.

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[76] Koechly (1874), 4: 'Sein erster Lehrer, ein guter aber etwas wunderlicher Mann, vermochte durch seinen „milden Spott" über den Unfleiss des Knaben nicht Herr zu werden.'

[77] Koechly (1874), 3: 'Schwächlichen Körpers verdankte das Kind wohl nur ihrer treuen Pflege, dass es am Leben blieb; körperlich kaum erstarkt, entwickelte der Knabe eine feurige, ja trotzige Gemüthsart: Nichts von Büchern, Nichts von Stillsitzen wollte er wissen, Soldat zu werden sein einziger Gedanke!'

[78] David Ilgen had studied at the university in Leipzig, starting in 1783, where he attended the philological lectures given by Reiz, Ernesti and Beck. Since 1785 he had been a member of the philological society of the latter and had published his first works dedicated to classical topics (*Poeseos Leontini Tarentini specimen* in 1785 and *De choro Graecorum tragico* in 1788). It is in these years that he started tutoring the young Hermann. Cf. Kaemmel (1881), 19-23; Seidel (1993); Kraft (1837), 8; Stern (1839); on Schulpforta cf. Kirchner (1843), esp. 73ff, and Taylor (2013), 51-65.

[79] Cf. Espagne (2010), 2: 'Dans cette entreprise Wyttenbach s'autorise d'une relation d'amour réciproque entre le maître et le disciple: 'Ruhnkenius me ut filium dilexit, ego illum ut parentem colui.'

[80] As Espagne (2010), 2, notes: 'Les vies de philologues sont d'abord le récit d'une ascension sociale conduite malgré les obstacles insurmontables qui se dressent sur la route du héros, ce qui leur donne l'aspect de romans balzaciens.'

[81] Koechly (1874), 4.

Surely Hermann throughout his life would keep in some measure this quality – a taste for mockery and irony. In this light, the fact that Koechly presents the narrative of the conquering of Hermann's unruliness appears perhaps even more significant. Hermann himself seems to have validated this image. He openly recognised that Ilgen had initiated him into the love of the classics, as attested in the dedication of Hermann's edition of the Homeric Hymns, where Ilgen is remembered with these thankful words:

Magna cum voluptate recordari soleo illius temporis, quo te, Ilgeni, vir summe reverende, magistrum habui. Nemo enim quisquam est, cui tantum, quantum tibi, debeam, qui simulac me, ferocis ingenii puerum, et ad arma quam ad literas parationem, in disciplinam acceperas, non modo domuisti facillime, sed mox etiam tanto litterarum amore incendisti, ut ex illo tempore nihil his studiis, quibus nunc quoque vir factus teneor, haberem iucundius.[82]

Hermann presents himself as holding the greatest debt towards the teacher, because Ilgen taught him the love for the studies which became the centre of his life. He, too, presents the same rhetoric picked up by Koechly, that of his unruly young self who had to be guided down the right path.

[82] Cf. Hermann (1806), iii: 'I always remember with great pleasure the time when you, Ilgen, highly respectable man, were my teacher. For there is nobody else to whom I owe as much as to you, as you brought me back to discipline, a child of fierce nature and more inclined to the battle than to the letters; not only did you tame me very easily, but you also inspired in me such love for literature that, since that moment, I have not been happier doing anything but dedicating myself to those studies, in which I still persists now as a grown man.'

The language in this passage matches the military theme evoked by the young Hermann's interest in becoming a soldier. At the same time, however, it presents the transposition of the topic of love into a martial context, a trope typical of ancient erotic poetry.[83] Thus the meaning of the love fight in this passage is twofold. Partly it stands for the love of Hermann towards the classics, and partly it refers to Ilgen's successful efforts to tame the nature of the student, to help the hero develop his potential.[84] Ilgen is for the young Hermann a Cheiron – in the Homeric rather than in the Nietzschian sense – described as being of choleric temperament, heavily built and of strong voice – perhaps also 'von starker Hand.'[85] Ilgen shares with Cheiron not only a strong personality, a hint of the violent nature typically attributed to centaurs, but also wisdom and fairness, as Cheiron had the peculiarity of being the wisest and most righteous (δικαιότατος)[86] of all centaurs. He succeeded in the task of conquering the young Hermann to the classics because, Koechly says, the student realised that Ilgen was not severe without reason, but with fairness and justice: 'his rigor was indeed paired with honesty and fairness, and he placed on others no more expectations to fulfil than he placed on himself, always with scrupulousness and faithfulness.'[87]

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[83] We need only think, for instance, of Ovid 1.9.

[84] This dynamic involving displays of strength is evident also in Koechly (1874), 4, who writes for example: 'Cholerischen Temperaments, von hohem Wuchs und starker Stimme — vielleicht auch von „starker Hand" — imponirte er [Ilgen] dem wilden Knaben, der zu nächst äusserlich in Gehorsam sich fügte, dann aber bald erkannte, wie gut es dieser Polterer mit ihm meinte, dessen Strenge mit Geradheit und Gerechtigkeit gepaart war, der die an Andere gestellten Anforderungen stets mit Gewissen haftigkeit und Treue selbst zuerst zu erfüllen beflissen war.'

[85] Cf. ibidem.

[86] *Iliad* 11.832.

[87] Cf. above, note 84.

A little further down the path of Hermann's life as recounted by Koechly this rhetoric would take an interesting twist. After becoming a professor at the university in Leipzig, Hermann would recommend Ilgen for the position of Rector at the famous school of Schulpforta, thus substantially furthering Ilgen's career as a schoolmaster.[88] The student had by then become the master. In Ilgen's own biography by Kaemmel we read that Ilgen, who was only nine years Hermann's senior, had received particular stimulation towards his own literary achievements and publications from the lessons he gave to Hermann.[89] The shadow of Hermann's later fame certainly weighs on this remark, but such an idea, thrown in casually in Kaemmel's biographical piece, only confirms the impression of the making of a hero, in which Ilgen played a small but important role. The underestimation of Ilgen's input to Hermann's education by comparison with the benefit exercised by Hermann on the tutor's own professional development makes the student appear greater than the master. This constitutes another marker of Hermann's professional and, as a consequence, social advancement as presented in his biographer's narrative.

Concerning Hermann's education under Ilgen, Koechly gives a brief indication that at fourteen years old Hermann had read at least a couple of chapters of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and a few books of the *Iliad*, and had already tried to edit

[88] Cf. Sandys (1958), 64.
[89] Cf. Kaemmel (1881), 19-23.

the *Hymn to Apollo*.[90] Hermann was ready for the university curriculum at fourteen, never having attended a day of public school but owing his education to private tutoring only; not an uncommon circumstance for middle class children and above, but here used as part of a more complex narrative aimed at underlining Hermann's singularity and vocation for the classics, as emphasised by his precocious entrance to university. With the help of Ilgen the *enfant prodige* was made.[91]

Additionally, Koechly starts another leitmotiv, dear to Hermann, too, which has become traditional among Hermannian scholarship, namely Hermann's extraordinary, innate understanding of rhythm. Koechly tells us that Hermann, as a young student, would read Plautus and propose to Reiz emendations by ear, while the professor, learned in metrics, earnestly implored him to proceed slower, so that he could 'count the individual feet on his fingers.'[92] Furthermore, Hermann could understand rhythm even before he could read, at a very young age: 'already as a boy, he began with the eager recitation of Gellert's fables and hymns; a scheme of

[90] The normal school curriculum to have access to university in the German world involved attending the Gymnasium, which in turn was the only avenue to an academic career. Cf. Mayer (1981), 253-273, esp. p. 267. The Gymnasium curriculum was heavily marked by the study of Greek and Latin. From the sixteenth century and up to the eighteenth, in fact, in Germany as much as across the other European countries, the study of the classics was pivotal not only to teaching in the university arts faculties but also to the curricula of schools and colleges. The language of teaching in these institutions was still Latin up to the late eighteenth century, and the study of the Roman and, in lesser part, Greek language and literature were the main object of attention, while other topics and subjects were taught only within the context of ancient cultures, as ancillary disciplines aimed at deepening understanding of the classical world. Cf. Van Bommel (2015), 1.

[91] Mayer (1981), 267, considers the mechanism of self-selection for access to the Gymnasium as a sign of persistence of the old regime. Sons of the less privileged classes of society could not compete for places in the Gymnasium, where the governing classes were instead favoured. The privilege of the old ruling class was thus perpetuated.

[92] Koechly (1874), 24: 'Weise mit Metrik beschäftigt, konnte daher der raschen Recitation seines Schülers nicht mit dem Ohr folgen und unterbrach ihn wohl mit einem „bitte, hübsch langsam," um die einzelnen Versfüsse an den Fingern nachzuzählen!'

the meters of Horace taught his ear before he could even grasp the words of Horace, "to sip the spiritual pleasure that drips from everlasting rhythms!"'[93]

This quality, presented both by Hermann himself and all his biographers and critics ever since Koechly, is meant to emphasise the extraordinary nature of Hermann, having an innate feeling for rhythm and an understanding of music which is, at least at first, entirely inborn and not yet manipulated by study. Only later would this talent involve some rationalising effort,[94] with Hermann's metrical studies and theory of metrics, and, importantly, with the Kantian framework which he imagined for metrics, whose value, as we will see in chapter five, remains nevertheless not free from complications.

This point represents a fundamental aspect in Hermann's work and philology, as many of his emendations are based on metrics, and on his unique ability to recognise rhythm in ways which are not always evident to everybody.[95] Of course, all emendations of poetry must be metrically acceptable, but this was not the state of affairs before Hermann, even just considering the sheer quantity of metrical emendations that he provided for the texts of the tragedians.

In Koechly's account, Hermann embodied a model of excellence in need of a catalyst to overcome the resistance posited by an unruly young nature. He needed the assistance and vigorous encouragement of someone like Ilgen, and any lesser

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[93] Ibidem: 'Schon als Knabe begann er mit der eifrigen Recitation von Gellertschen Fabeln und Gesangbuchliedern; ein Schema der horazischen Metra lehrte sein Ohr, ehe er noch die horazischen Worte verstand, den „geistigen Genuss zu schlürfen, der aus ew'gen Rhythmen träuft!"'

[94] Ibidem, 25: 'Er erkannte also das Verhältniss der Rhythmen zur musikalischen Composition vollkommen richtig.'

[95] Cf. above, notes 92-3, and chapter five, *Metrics: an object of special interest*.

teacher would not have been able to match his resistance to discipline with a greater passion – the one for the classics. The passion for the classics becomes the perfect outlet for the young boy's natural inclination, and it requires Ilgen's intervention to be inspired. Similarly to what some critics have argued apropos Nietzsche,[96] namely that his interest in the classics matured much later than is traditionally thought and that ultimately this represents a more powerful homage to the classical world and its values than it would otherwise, Koechly's narrative of Hermann's youth as a conquest of classics and a discovery of his own nature and inborn inclinations is meant to signpost the quality of the extraordinary philologist.

Thus, through Koechly's narrative, the reader gets a portrait of Hermann as a conservative man, repository of the old values and also the spirit of his nation. In addition, Koechly describes a model of academic potential that is not fully inborn but which, when realised, surprises with regard to its achievements. Hermann is not presented as an *enfant prodige* in the traditional sense, or not entirely – the emphasis on his interest for games of war rather than for his studies renders a very humane picture of Hermann, but also one of a miniature knight of the good olden ways. Unlike Karl Otfried Mueller, who is said to have organised, as a schoolboy, family celebrations according to the indications of the ancient authors, and to have regularly re-enacted Plautus's plays in his puppet theatre,[97] Hermann was not precociously interested in the classics; however his discovery of the classics

[96] Cf. Taylor (2013), 5-11.
[97] Cf. Karl Hillebrand's 1865 introduction to the translation of Karl Otfried Müller's *Histoire de la littérature grecque*, quoted in Espagne (2010), 15.

becomes a conquest catalysed by an almost mythical figure, and his achievements and the natural abilities he displayed when he finally turned to the classics appear even more impressive by comparison to what might have been without an initial obstacle to overcome.

The training for the classics seems to encompass also a physical dimension in Koechly's account of Hermann's youth:

> With all his physical training the feeble boy had become a fresh youth, small and daintily built, but muscular and quick and secure in all his movements. And above all the noble art of riding was responsible for it. For he had practised that his whole life with passion and the almost pedantic austerity of the old school, so that probably officers used to think: "he must have served in the cavalry."[98]

Hermann's transition to adulthood is both a result of his classical training and marked by his transformation into a knight, a trope that has remained dear to Hermannian scholarship. Such characterisation reflects the theme of the scholar as the spirit of the German nation, repository of traditional values, as already originally attached to Hermann with reference to his father. Here they appear through the introduction of Hermann's passion for horsemanship, an activity typical of the aristocracy. It was not uncommon for young Germans to serve as

[98] Koechly (1874), 7: 'Aus dem schwächlichen Knaben war ein frischer in allen Leibesübungen gewandter Jüngling geworden; klein und zierlich gebaut, aber muskelkräftig und rasch und sicher in allen seinen Bewegungen. Und vor Allem die edle Reit kunst hatte es ihm angethan; denn auch die hat er mit Leidenschaft und der fast pedantischen Strenge der alten Schule sein Leben lang getrieben, so dass wohl Offiziere meinten, „er müsse bei der Cavallerie gedient haben."' Cf. also Sandys (1958), 94: 'An officer of dragoons was so struck by the excellence of his horsemanship that he asked the professor whether he had ever served in the cavalry; and a scholar, who had learnt much from one of his reviews, described him, in the words of Horace, as a *grammaticorum equitum doctissumus*.'

officers in a regiment of the army before starting university. This experience, especially if completed in the cavalry, served as an initiation to 'upward socialization'[99] and contributed to hone 'the national, not to say nationalist, consciousness of provincial elites.'[100] Indeed, Hermann was awarded the badge of knighthood by King Frederick Augustus I, which understandably constituted an honour that might have motivated the proud display Hermann made of the badge. Indeed, in 1815, when the Saxon king founded the Saxon Civil Merit, Hermann was the first citizen of Leipzig to receive the Knight's Cross.[101] Likewise, in 1833 he became the first Leipzig bearer of the *Komthurkreuz* of this order.[102] Awards of the title for the period between 1851 and 1875 were in fact a little over a thousand, and earlier than 1851 they were granted even more sporadically.[103] But even considering this, Hermann's knighthood is emphasised to the point of becoming a permanent feature of his persona. And yet, at a time and in a place where actually serving in the cavalry was customary, he never did active duty in the army. On the practical level this is probably due to the fact that, having started university at a very early

[99] Cf. Mayer (1981), 276-7. Like France but unlike England, the German Empire had a public system of higher education. The *Kultusministerien* in the states of the German empire guaranteed certain standards of administration and overall quality of the schools comprised within the public higher education system. It was customary for students to attend the *Gymnasien* of their hometowns, and then to leave home after their *Abitur*, the final examination, to go to university. German universities generally did not board students, who often became part of a professorial house or found accommodation privately. According to Mayer (1981), 265ff., serving in the cavalry, or other regiments of the army, prepared young Germans for university life by facilitating that 'upward socialization' which in other countries occurred earlier, in the more exclusive institutions that were the English public schools and French *lycées*.

[100] Ibidem.

[101] Cf. *UAL NA Ernst Günther Schmidt 258*, Leipzig *Universität Archiv*.

[102] Ibidem.

[103] Ibidem.

age, Hermann missed the time-window, after the Gymnasium, normally allocated to this experience, being already embarked on an academic career.

However, this passion found its way into Hermann's scholarship, informing his editorial work and even a paper on the description of the different horse-gaits among the Greeks,[104] which is an example of the connection between a philologically and linguistically learned approach and the most realistic, *sachkundige* vision, driven by a desire to reconstruct aspects of ancient reality and bring them back vividly to modern eyes.[105]

Hermann's personal knowledge of the discipline of horse riding here becomes crucial for his philology. Hermann knew that, even though customs and habits related to that art certainly change through space and time, direct insight and experience with the discipline and practice of riding horses can be essential to understanding correctly the information we have about the field in the past. For instance, Hermann observed that Xenophon's writings can be fairly obscure and his language itself difficult to decipher, especially due to textual corruption, and thus he was convinced that having direct experience of his subject matter can make a difference for the critic. The philologist who attempted to emend the text relying

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[104] Cf. Hermann, *Commentatio de verbis quibus Graeci incessum equorum indicant ad Xenophontem de re equestri cap. VII*, in *Op*. 1, 63–80.

[105] Cf. ibidem. Koechly's choice of words here is significant: "seine Abhandlung über die Bezeichnung der verschiedenen Gangarten des Pferdes bei den Griechen ist ein Muster und Meisterstück der Verbindung philologisch gelehrter und realistisch sachkundiger Behandlung, welches leider bis auf den heutigen Tag in allen Theilen der Alterthumswissenschaft nur zu wenig Nachahmung gefunden hat. First of all, Koechly identifies, it seems, the *philologisch* and the *sachkundiger* as two separate concepts, even though he sees the manifestation of both in Hermann's work. However, he attributes the *sachphilolgoical* label to Hermann. This recalls Hermann's own refusal of the label of *Wortphilologe*, cf. chapter four, note 84.

solely on the analysis of language, Hermann says, would most likely find himself lost:

> in rebus autem, quas tractat Xenophon, hoc maximam habet difficultatem, quod multorum nominum significationem divinare tantum licet, in qua re hoc facilius est falli, quod grammatici veteres, in primis Pollux, ita rerum ad equitationem pertinentium imperiti fuerunt, ut saepe contraria eorum quae debebant attulerint.[106]

While Hermann's knowledge of horsemanship is certainly the best example of the connection between his personal interests and his scholarship, the practice of applying first-hand knowledge of the real world to his work is a systematic tendency in Hermannian philology. This also happens to be a staple of a philology that must be rooted in things, with the closest approximation that can be achieved by moderns to experiencing things that belong to the past in the way that is available in present times. This would become an essential point in the dispute with August Boeckh, *apropos* his collection of Greek Inscriptions, where Hermann would remark his belief that a critic must not write about what he does not know, but rather first-hand experience and verification must be, as much as possible, the pillars of every claim about the reconstruction of antiquity.[107]

A passage in Xenophon's *On the Art of Horsemanship*, cap. VII, offers an interesting example of Hermann's methods in this respect.[108] The passage concerns how to mount a horse and, Hermann says, is very easy but seems to have been

[106] *Op.* 1, 63.
[107] Ch. chapter four, note 86.
[108] Cf. Xen, *Eq.* 7.1-2.

misunderstood by previous critics. Xenophon says that the horse can be mounted in two ways, either with a pole, or without a pole. But either way, the bridle must be held with the left hand, and the reins must be held with the right hand. If someone mounts the horse without pole, with the left hand he must hold on near the ears of the horse, and if with a pole, then the left hand must hold the pole. Heubelius, who translated Xenophon in German, found this passage obscure as concerns the use of a pole to mount the horse, so that he asked himself with which foot first the ancients must have mounted horses. Hermann notes that the knight who uses a pole to mount a horse must hold on to the bridle and the pole, thus helping himself with hands first and feet later in order to have a better grip. However, he says, this method of mounting a horse would take far too long, especially in a battle, and it would be not without peril when dealing with an agitated horse.

This constitutes an interesting example of knowledge of reality informing scholarship, and the fact that it can be generalised into a characteristic of Hermannian method is evident from the fact that Hermann employed this kind of knowledge frequently in his editions of the tragedians. For example, Hermann had been challenged by problems concerning poetical representations of horseracing also in his second edition of Sophocles' *Electra* (1825), 102-5. Here, too, he reached a very concrete representation of the development of the action described by Sophocles. Hermann focuses on the following passage:

καὶ πρὶν μὲν ὀρθοὶ πάντες ἕστασαν δίφροι:

ἔπειτα δ᾽ Αἰνιᾶνος ἀνδρὸς ἄστομοι

πῶλοι βίᾳ φέρουσιν: ἐκ δ᾽ ὑποστροφῆς

τελοῦντες ἕκτον ἕβδομόν τ᾽ ἤδη δρόμον

μέτωπα συμπαίουσι Βαρκαίοις ὄχοις:

To this point, all the chariots still stood upright.

But then the Aenian's hard-mouthed

colts carried him out of control as they passed

out of the turn from the sixth into the seventh lap

and dashed their foreheads against the rig of the Barcaean.

Porson and Markland proposed the emendation of l. 725, with the verb φορεῖν. But Hermann remarks that it is a progressive verb, while φέρειν is an inceptive verb, and it works much better in this passage. Grammar and knowledge of language are essential in order to describe the action. Hermann does not want to establish a text that is just grammatically coherent, but also thinks of what is happening on the scene to establish a text that makes sense in context. Sophocles' scene describes when the first charioteer loses control of his horses and gives rise to a chain of accidents in the race. The poet is describing the exact moment when this happens, and it would make no sense to use a progressive verb, which would suggest that the action is ongoing, as this would lose all the dramatic tension

produced by capturing, with an inceptive verb, the exact moment when in the story things change for the worse.

Hermann's interpretation of the development of the events cannot be achieved through a merely linguistic solution, but rather by imagining what the poet meant to say and had in mind. Then he also provides an explanation of why he thinks so: quo eo facilius fieri potuit, quia non soli Aenianis equi, sed omnes una currebant.

According to Hermann the passage should be so interpreted: 'then the unbridled horses of the Aenian carry the charioteer away, and while the horses pass from the sixth lap, which they have just covered, to the seventh, they instead dash their foreheads into the Barcaean's chariot.'

The Aenian's horses were racing without bridles, turning lap after lap around the metae. When they ran eventually the turned from the sixth to the seventh lap, as they were leaning forward they ran into the Barcaean's chariot. It is clear, Hermann says, that this did not happen so that the two set of horses were facing each other and running against each other, but the Aenian's horses transversally ran into the side of the Barcaean's chariot, while the latter was turning around the meta.

With a very vivid reconstruction, Hermann thinks that one must imagine that the horses of the Barcaean at the moment of turning around the meta were running on the exterior side, while the Aenian's did so on the internal side. Thus there was a moment in which the horses of the Barcaean, who was trying to take the other over, closed in so that the side of his chariot ended up in front of the foreheads of the

Aenian's horses – hence the expression *adversas frontes*, namely the fact that Sophocles says they dashed their foreheads (μέτωπα) against the other chariot.

An embodiment of the spirit of the nation

The majority of older and modern works about Hermann does not abstain from referring to him as the 'grammarian on horseback',[109] or from mentioning the peculiar attire which he usually wore, as in this account of a typical entrance made by Hermann to his classes:

An aged, but spirited man, of moderate stature, with fire in his eyes, and fury in every movements, darts in at the door. The well-known signal, given by those nearest him, instantly silences a hundred tongues. By this time, you hear his clinking spurs, and, as he mounts the stairs to the desk, your eye falls upon his blue coat, with metal buttons and badge of knighthood, his deer-skin breeches, and long riding boots. His whip and gloves, and hat and chair are all flying to their places, and a stream of extemporaneous Latin is already pouring forth. Before you are even aware of it, the ship is under full sail.[110]

Hermann's seriousness and fame also attracted an eminent crowd to his lectures:

If one were to go into the lecture-room of the professor of Poetry and Eloquence at Leipsic [sic], a few moments before the hour, he would see a crowd of the maturest scholars

[109] Wes (1992), 120.
[110] Sears (1843), 28.

of the university, and of philologists who had been educated elsewhere, finding their seats, and preparing their papers, for taking notes. The hum of numerous whispering voices fills the room.[111]

The almost spiritual dimension of the German scholar is underlined by another trope that has become a standard feature of critical pieces about Hermann, namely the perfection of his language. Hermann's German was 'klar, einfach und kernig'[112] (clear, direct and vigorous), but it is Hermann's Latin that always receives mention among critics: spoken as if it were his native language, those fortunate enough to hear him are said to have been witnesses of the magical flow which irresistibly led even the indifferent listener and had quasi-mystical effects on the attentive and thinking students, stimulating them to their own work.[113] Koechly insists that Hermann never spoke empty phrases with no meaning, just for flattery or to similarly empty ends –[114] another marker of the purity of his scholarship and persona, put in direct relationship with the truth as a real, almost mystical representative of the utmost sacredness of his nation.

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[111] Cf. ibidem on how, however, Boeckh's lectures were attended by no less eminent scholars, 'in the lecture-room of Böckh, when he is upon some important subject, it is no uncommon thing to meet with such men as von Humboldt and others, who are, themselves, among the profoundest scholars of the age.'

[112] Koechly (1874), 15.

[113] Cf. ibidem, 17: 'Freilich auch so wird nur derjenige, welcher noch das Glück gehabt hat, ihn selbst zu hören, sich seiner mündlichen freien Rede Zauberfluss zu vergegenwärtigen vermögen, welcher unwiderstehlich selbst den gleichgültigen Hörer mit sich fortriss, den aufmerksamen und denkenden Schüler aber auch über die Vorlesung hinaus nach Inhalt und Form beschäftigte und zu eigener Arbeit anregte.'

[114] Ibidem, 16: 'Nur eine Eigenschaft war und blieb Hermann notwendig fremd, welche sonst vorzugsweise von den berühmtesten Latinisten alter und neuer Zeit mit besonderem Eifer erstrebt wurde -- die schonklingende aber nichts sagende Phrase zu was Ende sie auch angestrengt werden mag , die Gedankenarmuth zu umkleinden, die Wahrheit zu verhüllen oder leerer Schmeichelei zu dienen.'

It is clear that the insistence on Hermann's presentation as a knight in biographical and critical works goes beyond the mere curiosity that a university professor known for sporting a full-fledged horse riding attire might certainly have caused. Just as Koechly's mention of Hermann's father as a gentleman of the old school, guarantor of the good values of the olden days, stands for a general conservatism that invests the son, too, just so the image of Hermann who wears the clothes of a *Ritter*, even for delivering his lectures, is a powerful visual symbol of conservatism, a conservatism not confined to the private and moral spheres but one that, like the omnipresent knightly costume, encompasses also the academic and philological ones. On a symbolic level the emphasis on Hermann's knighthood rests quite evidently on his representation as a carrier of old values, and, academically, a defender of a philology perceived as more traditional if compared to emerging trends. Moral value is strictly attached to this representation:

> As a German knight he took care personally of his horse and he did not disdain, when there was the opportunity, to talk with experts, stable lads, carters and horse dealers. So he was an *eques* in the proper sense of the word, long before the Ordenskreuz gave him the title of "knight" (Ritter), and a knightly character had always been his own.[115]

This moral sketch blends with the academic one, too. Hermann's "knightly character" indicated by Koechly was to be displayed, from the academic point of

[115] Ibidem, 7: 'Als deutscher Reitersmann sorgte er denn auch persönlich für sein wackres Ross und verschmähte es nicht, wo die Gelegenheit sich bot, mit den betreffenden Sachverständigen, Stall knechten, Fuhrleuten und Rosskämmen erspriesslichen Verkehr zu pflegen. So war er längst eques im eigentlichen Sinne, ein ächter Reiter, ehe ihm das Ordenskreuz den Titel „Ritter" gab, und ein ritterliches Wesen ist ihm stets zu eigen geblieben.'

view, in the several disputes that would characterise Hermann's career.[116] As it has been observed, Hermann's battles were, in other words, rigorously confined to the written page.

Another consequence of Hermann's portrayal as a *Ritter* is the emphasis placed on the philologist's affirmation of life in the Nietzschean sense,[117] here highlighted by Hermann's passion for physical activity. This is suggested by elements such as the peculiarity of horse riding itself as a physical activity, allowing as it does a particular proximity to animals, to nature; the description of the fire in the 'spirited man''s eyes;[118] and the idea of a certain rapidity of Hermann's movements, to complete the dynamic picture:

> Hermann, although of a slight short figure, distinguished himself as much by physical exploits as by mental power. He sprung over broad ditches, all booted and spurred, and over a cord that reached as high as his breast. As I estimated the virtue and excellence of men at that time in proportion to their bodily strength, H. was the model whom I strove to imitate. Conventional forms being to boys insignificant pedantry and burdensome fetters, H. was sure to win my love and reverence, because he placed himself beyond these. He was one of the first who cut off the cue, and wore what was called a "Schuneden [sic] Kopf."[119]

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[116] Cf. ch. four, note 10.
[117] Cf. e.g. Adamakis (2017) for the role of physical activity in Nietzsche.
[118] Cf. above, note 110.
[119] Platner (2013), 471. Cf. a similar portrayal of Karl Otfried Müller made by Karl Hillebrand in Müller (1866), 133: 'Son sentiment si vif de la nature et sa passion pour les exercices du corps l'arrachaient souvent à la vie du cabinet, et nous le rencontrons tantôt égaré par sa hardiesse de touriste sur les falaises de l'île de Rügen, où il s'expose à une mort presque certaine, tantôt rêvant

In nineteenth-century German language this constitutes an embodiment of the spirit of the nation.[120] In fact it directly recalls the 1876 *Deutsche Turn-Zeitung*, the official journal of the German *Turner* associations, gymnastic clubs that also served as nationalist political groups, which carried a lengthy article on the importance of public shows of competition, while spectators of such public competitions felt like they could acquire an incitement to bodily self-perfection.[121] To strengthen the body through exercise therefore both served an ideal of individual perfection and, at the same time, served the nation as part of 'a national exercise of toughening up which put the members of the Turner movement—taken from the young educated elites in the early phases – to a moral test.'[122]

This image of moral virtue pairs up with the peaceful image of Hermann's household and relationship with his wife, and his fatherly figure as the pater familias, responsible and keeping the family affairs in order:

Simplicity, order and regularity were the foundations of his household, the most concise brevity was the form in which these things were settled. [..] He did not need, as it unfortunately began to be customary at that time, to make money by means of freelance writing or to swindle through stock market speculations. Nor did it ever occur to him to raise his salary or to exploit the multiple job offers he received. [..] He had three sons and three daughters, he was a loving and considerate father. [..] Hermann, on the other hand,

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dans les forêts de son pays natal, occupé à herboriser ou bien à écouter la Muse en composant des vers allemands', also quoted in Espagne (2010), 15.

[120] See Goltermann (1998), 30-126.

[121] Cf. Goltermann (2004), 333.

[122] Ibidem, 335; see also Düding (1984), 77.

had the spirit of Socrates as Xenophon shows him in the *Oeconomicus*, tending to the duties for which the father of the house is responsible.[123]

A style icon

One outcome of the strength of Hermann's personality and public perception and marker of his fame was the fact that he acted as a sort of modern influencer on his followers. Such influence is evident for example on Karl Reisig (1792-1829), a younger follower and former student of Hermann who had been teaching at the University of Halle since 1820 and had also been a member of the Greek Society, where he had come to appreciate the grammatico-critical philology of the Hermannian school.[124] Reisig's work and especially his *Coniectanea in Aristophanem* (1816) are replete with metrical observations and explorations of language use, making significant contributions to the study of Aristophanes in a way that clearly bore the mark of Hermann's teaching. But beyond Reisig's philological methods, similarities with Hermann extended also to the surface: 'in riding boots and spurs, leather trousers and a green hunting coat, he climbed from horse to teacher's desk and from there back on horseback, like his teacher Hermann'.[125] The portrait of Reisig by Ribbeck (1879) certainly follows some of the same trends of nineteenth-century biographies as contemporary works on Hermann. Overlaps between descriptions of the two are evident especially with traits of Hermann which have

[123] Cf. Koechly (1874), 21-2.
[124] Sandys (1908), 139; Ribbeck (1879), vol. 1, 34-40, and 269-70.
[125] Cf. Ribbeck (1879), vol. 1, 35.

had the greatest fortune among biographical materials of all ages, from the sporting of horse riding attire, to his customary speaking of Latin, to a certain proneness to humour.[126] Also the aura of genius translated onto Hermann's follower Reisig, who was certainly a very good representative of the Hermannian school and, according to Ritschl's judgement, 'vielleicht der genialste aller Hermannianer im besten Sinne des Wortes'.[127]

Even objects seemed not to be immune to Hermann's presence, as if resonating with his energy and strength, propagating it 'like an electric shock':

He lived then in the market place, six stairs up, in a long narrow room, lit by one window, where he sat upon a raised bench. On entering, you perceived him in the far off twilight, veiled like Aeneas in a mist; but it was one of tobacco smoke. The appliances of the chamber, and the general arrangement of the establishment during his bachelordom, (he married late in life,) were not remarkable for their practical propriety or symmetry. When a person stumbled against any object at one end of his room, the concussion was immediately felt in the opposite end, because the different articles of furniture leant so, the one on the other, in a continued disorder, that motion was communicated throughout like an electric shock. Before reaching him, it was necessary to pass through several defiles, formed by tables, chairs, and benches covered with books. Immediately in front of him, there was a rampart to surmount, crowned on the summit with an inextricable mass of boots and spurs. Having conquered this difficulty, and after much labour and fatigue got hold of a chair, first dispossessing it of the various habiliments laid on it, and made myself comfortable,

[126] Ibidem.
[127] Ibidem, 39.

was accustomed immediately to enter into Latin conversation with Hermann upon the subject of his Latin lecture.[128]

The disorder in Hermann's room crowded with riding boots and books is to be seen in close continuity with the conversation about the classics he had with his students. They are, both metaphorically and tangibly, different but contiguous manifestations of the spirit of the nation personified in Hermann. Furthermore, a picture of humanity and good-naturedness adds on to the theme of Hermann's closeness to nature:

> Visit him in his museum, as he calls his study in the city, and he will entertain you with free and lively conversation; and if you have any reasonable claim upon his attention, he will show you a chair, and draw you into protracted conversation, as if you were an old friend. In his family, that resides a little out of the city, he appears as a plain, but lively old man. Simplicity and sterling sense characterize his domestic circle.[129]

Thus Hermann is depicted as a representative of his nation, good-natured, honoring his role as a family man, full of physical energy and strength, direct and enchanting in his speech and, most of all, portrayed as a model scholar. Hermann falls under the category of scholars whose life is represented as a narrative of social advancement proposed by Espagne (2010) because even at the peak of his fame he kept being considered a rising star for essentially his whole life, as if his fame could only keep increasing.

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[128] A recollection of the year 1803 by Platner (2013), 471.
[129] Ibidem.

When Hermann received the title of professor in 1797 his fame was already so substantial due to his book of 1796 on the metrics of Greek and Roman poets, published again in an expanded, German version in 1799. By that time Hermann had already revolutionised metrics by grasping its complicated sets of rules and transforming it into a science, and, reacting to Wolf, he had engaged in the matter of the Homeric question recognising the first rules of oral poetry such as the use of formulaic words. As early as in 1800 he was so interesting to Goethe that the latter took the initiative to visit him during a stay in Leipzig. In 1805, a magazine put Hermann's portrait on the front of its title page, an event comparable to occupying the cover page in *Der Spiegel* today.[130] The highlight of the honours for Hermann came in 1840 with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of his professorship. The newspapers and magazines published long reports about this event, so we know that the banquet in his honour took place in the old Leipzig *Gewandhaus* on December 19th, two-hundred-twenty-nine people took part in the celebration, and Hermann, the passionate smoker, was presented with the perfect gift, a *Tabaksbüchse*,[131] or *Rauchaltar*, a tobacco box now at the University of Leipzig – recently shown in a 2007-2008 exhibition dedicated to Hermann. Furthermore, the Dresden court commissioned the Dresden court painter Vogel von Vogelstein to paint an oil portrait of Hermann to be donated to the University of Leipzig.[132] The Leipzig copy is still owned by the university and another copy was commissioned

[130] Cf. *UAL NA Ernst Günther Schmidt 258*, Leipzig *Universität Archiv*, 8.
[131] Cf. ibidem.
[132] Cf. ibidem, 9.

by the Russian Tsar's Court and is now in Moscow,[133] an eloquent testimony of the internationality of Hermann's fame. A final highlight in the series of honours dedicated to Hermann happened in 1844, when the university decided to commission a bust of Hermann from one of the best available artists at that time, the sculptor Ernst Rietschel, in Dresden, also creator of the Goethe-Schiller monument in Weimar.[134] It was the first marble bust commissioned by the University of Leipzig, and, above all, it was the first time that a Leipzig professor was honoured in this way during his lifetime.[135] Finally, the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna, founded in 1847, chose Hermann as one of its first foreign honorary members, together with celebrities such as Michael Faraday, Alexander von Humboldt , Karl Friedrich Gauss and Jacob Grimm.[136] This gives a final indication of the fact that he was one of the leading scientists of his time.

## Conclusions

This analysis of the public image of Hermann has touched upon matters of self-representation and public perception as much as philological methodology. Hermann's biography has been considered critically, investigating the tropes of the genre of nineteenth-century biographies of scholars and how they contributed to creating the image of Hermann that we have inherited. We might be tempted to ask

[133] Cf. ibidem.
[134] Cf. ibidem. Hermann's bust was destroyed during the air raid on Leipzig of December 1943, however Schmidt writes that a copy of it was recovered at the *Staatliche Kunstsammlungen* in Dresden, and I believe it is the one that it is possible to see today at the University of Leipzig.
[135] Cf. ibidem.
[136] Cf. ibidem, 9-10.

whether Hermann's fame came from his scholarly accomplishments, or the idea of the genius of Hermann, which survived until our times, is a product of the socio-biographical picture described in this chapter. There is, of course, a circularity in the sequence of events and, certainly, the fact that Hermann was a prolific emendator played an important role in his posthumous reputation – even if we did not, for a moment, consider the quality of his textual-critical contributions. Hermann's emendations seem to have a tendency to fall on the two extremes of the scale, with regard to quality – they are often either very successful or very unsuccessful.[137] Generally, both circumstances are better understood if considering Hermann as a follower of Bentley, as this helps to explain both the worse part of Hermann's philology – the conjectures which "go too far" – and the better part, which can only be attributed to Hermann's sense – of rhythm, of philology. This will be the focus of chapter five.

Hermann's public persona, understood in its context, is entirely coherent with Hermann's scholarly persona, as we know from Hermann's many academic disputes and we can see in his works analysed in chapter three, for example. This chapter has shown that this circumstance is not accidental, but mostly a construction. It would be difficult to imagine that the stature of this persona would not weigh on the judgements of posterity. Koechly's portrait clearly reinforced the glamour surrounding Hermann, but the chapter has shown how many other factors and actors in Hermann's life contributed to the final effect. In this sense it should

[137] Cf. ch. 5, notes 52, 53 and West (2010), an article where Hermann's scholarship is judged as mostly disappointing.

not surprise that Bentley's "oracular" philology was a model for Hermann, even thought within a more complex frame of modernity. Along with some negative consequences of this kind of philology, the chapter has also highlighted Hermann's interpretative techniques based on first-hand knowledge and experience of the world, something that is a recurrent element also in Hermann's work on the tragedians – where, for example, matters of *mise en scène* are sometimes crucial. There, Hermann's faculty of imagination, informed by the deep acquaintaince with the ancient texts, is an important ally.

Hermann's scholarly persona is characterised by the pairing of high energy and indefatigable work of precision, full immersion in the world of the ancients, and tireless curiosity and study of the texts. The next chapter will expand on these elements, and on the way in which they eventuated in different aspects of Hermann's life and work. Hermann's energetic irony is a constant in the dispute with Boeckh, and probably a perpetuating force there, while the insistence on the importance of accurate observation of linguistic phenomena is a crucial point in both Hermann's methodoloy and its caricatural deviation – the idea of Hermann the *Wortphilologe.*

# Chapter two

## Hermann's Authority, Monopoly and Politics in Leipzig

Introduction

The previous chapter has showcased features of Hermann's persona which have most often been associated with his name throughout the centuries. Such characteristics and Hermann's fame as a scholar constitute an essential background to understand the context of his academic teaching in Leipzig, and especially the foundation of a 'school' of his own, a project which he planned and achieved most prominently through his Greek Society, the private society he led since 1798, and the Leipzig seminar, which he directed from 1834 onwards.

Hermann's prominence in the Leipzig academic scene indeed favoured the creation of a network of personal relationships among Hermann and some of his contemporaries who studied in Leipzig, taking on the appearances of a real network of patronage working both to the benefit of students' career aspirations, and for the spreading of Hermann's name and teachings.

In Leipzig, Hermann's authority increased through a shrewd and empowered attitude towards the political authority, too, and this is exemplified by the experience of the re-institution of the Leipzig seminar, after the death of Christian Daniel Beck (1757-1832). In this circumstance, Hermann demonstrated the unusual freedom that he enjoyed as a seminar director, with respect to the German

ministry of education, and how he was capable of bringing to bear the full weight of his fame and established academic position to gain both a great degree of autonomy and an essential monopoly over the seminar, going above and beyond the liberties at the time normally conceded to directors.

Hermann's project to develop a school of classicists characterised by a sense of belonging to a 'Hermannian school' was built upon a rapid and successful career. In 1797 Hermann had already become Professor Extraordinarius,[1] and in those years his fame as a remarkable scholar was such that in 1802, age thirty, he was called to become principal (*Rektor*) of the prestigious school of *Schulpforta*, a position that represented a very great honour.[2] However, Hermann turned down the offer, probably preferring an academic career and the prospects this could offer. Indeed, the following year he became a member of the Faculty of Philosophy, having been promoted Professor Eloquentiae;[3] six years later, in 1809, he was also appointed to the prestigious second post of Professor Poeseos. As soon as Beck, the eminent founder of the Leipzig seminar, died, Hermann's academic success granted him the offer of the director chair; a proposal that, as this chapter will show, came with full acceptance of any demand which Hermann wanted to impose on the ministry of education. Even considering the lengthy bureaucratic times and possible communication delays between Leipzig and the headquarters of the ministry in

[1] A Professor Extraordinarius was not a title of merit, but the title described the fact that he was not a full member of the academic staff at the University of Leipzig, but an additional member with a temporary position and salary (as it still does in the German academy). Cf. Clark (2006), 46.
[2] Founded in the sixteenth-century, Schulpforta was already then one of the best schools in the Germanies, and had counted Nietzsche among its students.
[3] As was traditional, he presented a paper on this occasion: 'On the difference between prose and poetry' (cf. *Op.* 1, 81-128), which he defended in March 1803.

Dresden, the patience demonstrated by the ministry during the two-year negotiating period is a good indicator of the fact that Hermann was the ministry's primary and much sought after choice for the directorship of the seminar. Eventually, Hermann got to add to the leadership he held over his own private Greek Society a very hegemonic directorship over the philological seminar.

The influence Hermann exercised through these two important institutions contributed to the formation of a Hermannian school, because many future philologists, academics and schoolmasters joined the ranks of these associations from 1798 until Hermann's death. Many of them would leave with a sense of solidarity and admiration for the master, having assimilated Hermann's philological methods and principles, in a way that got particularly radicalised after the full explosion of the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh at the end of the 1820s. Many maintained contact with Hermann after starting their own careers, or effectively accepted Hermann's input and patronage in the furthering of their job aspirations. They contributed, I argue, to the strengthening of the notion of a school of Hermann, because – irrespective of what the notion of the existence of such school actually would entail in terms of philological theory and practices – their academic experience in Leipzig tied them to Hermann in a bond made of loyalty and admiration. At the same time, academically they moved freely between so-called, philology of words and philology of things, differentiating their interests throughout their lives and demonstrating as much openness to the philology of the "opposite" camp as harshness in the personal quarrels in which they got involved.

The strength of the idea of belonging to the school of Hermann could be such as to produce episodes like that involving Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl (1806-1876), who fed the feud between *Wort-* and *Sachphilologen* at the University of Halle, exemplifying how the identification as followers of Hermann or followers of Boeckh could give rise to a series of academic conflicts whose resonance swept a whole city. The academic substance of such quarrels was ultimately quite thin, and these disputes were arguably animated by personal animosities more than by precise scholarly concerns, as episodes like the one in Halle shows well. Thus the dynamics of the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh were, I argue, deeply inbuilt into a network of social relationships, where the two prominent scholars originated a series of sub-disputes played upon the loyalty professed either to Hermann or to Boeckh.

At the same time, instances of personal rivalry based on a sense of loyalty provide a measure of the public resonance of the dispute, and thus another explanation of the reasons why the memory of the dispute became so deeply rooted in the narratives of early nineteenth-century philology. In turn, the harshness and public resonance of such personal conflicts reflects the lack of substance at the centre of the feud in a way that is only apparently paradoxical. After all, it would have been very difficult for later scholarship to minimise the academic priority of a dispute invested with such formal violence, had the importance of its inherent academic value been proportional to the harshness of the conflict. As seen in the introduction, histories of classical scholarships do tend to consistently report on the

fact that, in the end, the differences between a so-called philology of words and a philology of things were subtle, a matter of details more than substance, with the same pertinacity with which they keep proposing a dichotomy between *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie*. Even though this distinction might, arguably, not be taken seriously by all modern scholars, insufficient attention has so far been drawn to the problem of what it actually means to speak, even in historical perspective, of a philology of words and a philology of things. If this is partly due to the implicit, factual association between the former and a traditional idea of the study of antiquity, and the latter and a rising notion of *Altertumswissenschaft* as a form of inaugurating new disciplines to study antiquity, at the same time the harshness and scale of the personal rancour and professional jealousies originating in the quarrel could only be explained effectively through the biographical and social dimension, which led to the over-determination of the methodological issues at stake.

## The philological seminar

The seminar was a new institution, with its own economical-bureaucratic and academic peculiarities, which became a central part of German universities in the century 1738-1838.[4] Along with the role played by private societies, the seminar contributed to the creation of the very concept of academic research, with emphasis

[4] Cf. Clark (2006), 141-89, and p. 530 for further bibliography on the seminars.

on the production of written work and on the practice of disputation, an ante-litteram form of peer review.

The first philological seminar was founded in Göttingen in 1738 and directed by Johann Matthias Gesner (1691-1761), and it represented a novelty because `it integrated aspects of the private societies and pedagogical seminars, and it translated the notion of the state-funded theological seminar(y) into the arts and philosophy faculty.`[5] Before Leipzig, philological seminars were instituted in Wittenberg (1771), Erlangen (1777), Kiel (1777), Helmstedt (1779), Halle (1787), Würzburg (1805) and Heidelberg (1807).[6] The new institution combined a particular type of teaching with a particular method of funding. At the origins of the seminar was, in fact, the model of the *seminarium praeceptorum* founded in Halle in 1695, which was aimed at supporting poor scholars who wanted to become teachers or academics. Thus the Halle seminar received public funding, a budget mostly dedicated to scholarships.[7]

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[5] Clark (2006), 159.

[6] Cf. Beck (1809), 4, Clark (2006), 485. Beck does not seem to be aware of the seminars in Kiel and Würzburg.

[7]After the Renaissance and Reformation a network of public funding had emerged in Germany to support poor students. It came typically in the form of a scholarship with room and board in a new sort of institution, the *convictorum.* The *convictorium*, or *pedagogicum*, went on to become a typical institution of many German Protestant universities. It resembled a medieval college, with an important juridical difference, namely that the *convictorium* typically possessed no legal endowment and had no corporate existence at law. On this cf. Clark (2006), 148-9. On *convictoria* and public funding see Tholuck (1853-54), 1, 207ff, Paulsen (1919-21), 1, 224ff. Another important difference between the *convictoria*, at the origin of the funding system of the modern seminars, and the seminars themselves, starting from the Halle seminar of 1695, lay in the monastic versus secular way of life. The convictoria preserved a monastic lifestyle, where the scholarship students were bound to traditions such as taking their meals at a common table in silence while hearing sacred reading, pursuing the *vita contemplativa* and celibacy. Already in the seminar at Halle, instead, a more secular and less rigid climate reigned over the formation of the future academic personae.

This fusion between new ways of economical-bureaucratic management and academic performance lay at the basis of the new German pursuit of knowledge as research. From the economical-bureaucratic point of view, the management of the seminar as a public institution involved the allocation of budgets from the state, dedicated to specific aims and administrated by the seminar directors.[8] Concerning academic performance, the seminar brought about a novel way of teaching, primarily directed at the pursuit of research as the main task demanded of professors and advanced students. The forefathers of the German seminars were the medieval private disputations, later called disputational collegia.[9] In some universities a few disputational collegia persisted into the nineteenth century, as the German lecture catalogues prove, but then the diffusion of the seminars made them redundant.[10]

From the start each seminar was regulated by statutes, which were largely controlled by the ministry through edicts or regulations.[11] The title of director given to the professor heading the seminar was not a traditional academic title, and the

[8] On this point cf. also below. This mechanism of budget allocation and administration generated a partition of the administration of learning that will fundamentally develop into the academic departments of the modern university. Cf. Clark (2006), 142.

[9] `The forefathers of the German seminar were the medieval private disputations, later called disputational collegia. The collegia were private classes, which had to be paid for by each student attending. The fees went directly from student to instructor. Though potentially very informal, there classes commonly used the traditional circular method of disputation, where materials presented in the lectures were reviewed and further glossed. They took place regularly in the colleges and residence halls, daily or nightly. The common means of conducting the private or informal disputation were the so-called circular method. The roles of respondent and opponents went through or around the circle of scholars. With a master or bachelor presiding each student took turns as the respondent, while the other students were opponents`. Cf. ibidem, 143-5.

[10] Ibidem, 152.

[11] Ibidem, 160.

director was nominated by the ministry or by the sovereign.[12] Clark (2006) has shown that such a system of appointment incorporated into the selection process `charismatic aspects of the calling or recognition by other charismatic leaders, namely, the sovereign or high ministers`.[13] Among the consequences of such a system there was the director's duty to draw up a regular report of the activities of the seminar for the ministry's benefit. In practice, reporting was fairly regular among directors, with modalities progressively ever more left to the discretion of the director.[14] It is clear however that the directorial autonomy was somewhat limited by the ministries of education, and very much so in the earlier phases. Directors gradually acquired leeway to further their own academic interests and projects, but in some cases, especially in the eighteenth century, important details such as textbooks and admission of students followed ministerial rather than directorial directives.[15] Seminars had generally one director, although there were cases of co-leadership of their activities, especially when they were split between a Greek and a Latin section, as it happened for example in Halle.[16]

In 1809 Leipzig saw the foundation of a seminar of classical philology.[17] The seminar in Leipzig evolved from a private society, the 1784-founded *Philologische*

[12] Ibidem.
[13] Ibidem.
[14] Ibidem.
[15] Ibidem, 161.
[16] With a small inadvertence, Clark (2006), 224, writes that the Berlin seminar also had two co-directors; but actually, Boeckh was always the only seminar director, with several assistants leading the Latin section – Buttmann, Bernhardy, Lachmann – but no co-directors. Cf. Seifert (2020), 105-127, who describes the three as *Mitarbeiter* of Boeckh, cf. esp. p. 109: 'Statutarisch und in der Praxis gab es nur einen Direktor, und das war Boeckh.'
[17] Cf. Clark (2006), 492, on how Beck was, along with Wolf, one of the German theorists of the research seminar.

*Gesellschaft*, or Societas Philologica Lipsiensis, run by the Professor of Greek and Latin Literature Christian Daniel Beck (1757-1832). In 1809 the society changed its name and passed under public administration, becoming an official institution of the state, a *Königliches Philologisches Seminar*. Beck led the seminar until his death. For two years the activities of the seminar were suspended, until in 1834 Hermann was appointed its new director.

The seminar was a new institution in the sense that it was different from any other form of teaching that took place in the German universities, and it received public funding to be administered by the seminar director, thus it was perceived as something new also by the first director of the Leipzig seminar. In his *De Consiliis et rationibus Seminari philologici* (1809), written on the occasion of its inauguration in Leipzig, Beck writes that the function of the new institution was the protection of the study of antiquity. The seminar should preserve and promote knowledge of ancient literature, a function which was starting to become necessary because, Beck writes, such knowledge was in decline not only among private citizens but also among scholars.[18] In these words reverberates an echo of the theories, championed especially by Wolf and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), that emerged in the late eighteenth century and led to a revival of appreciation for the classical world, going under the name of neohumanism. Those ideas represented an attempt to study

[18] Ad quae quidem literarum, quas dicunt, classicarum praesidia utrum etiam referenda sint ea accademiarum instituta, quae Seminaria philologica adpellantur, et inde a superiore saeculo fere medio plures academias ornarunt, dubitatum est a nonnullis, qui, si iis opus esse videatur ad haec studia conservanda et propaganda, illis certe solis academiis necessaria esse contendunt, in quibus literae antiquae vel a doctoribus vel a civibus spernantur et negligantur, non item his, in quibus dudum eae floruerint atque etiamnum colantur, Beck (1809), 4.

classical literature in a more modern way, which effectively allowed through the nineteenth century the notion of academic research to be born.[19] The seminar came to be an institutionalisation of these reflections and needs, and given the peculiarity of its working and structure it ended up becoming a dedicated space for the development of academic research, a concept that before the nineteenth century did not exist and would find full development only throughout the 1800s.[20]

Hermann's Greek Society

In 1798 Hermann, Professor Eloquentiae at the University of Leipzig, founded a private society, the Societas Graeca (also referred to as *Griechische Gesellschaft*, or, here, Greek Society). Private societies had been an established para-academic praxis in Leipzig since around 1624. They initially called themselves simply collegia but already by 1680, six properly defined societies existed in Leipzig and met regularly every week. During the eighteenth century they started to take over subject-specific connotations, and societies for classical philology started to appear.[21] The difference between private collegia and societies lay in the fact that the latter had statutes and distinguished their members into ordinary, extraordinary, and honorary ones.

[19] Cf. Clark (2006) 141-2, Van Bommel (2015), 3ff., Paulsen (1885), 217.
[20] Cf. Clark (2006), 158-82, 176-9. The birth of the notion of modern research was achieved through both the enhancement of students' oral participation in academic activities and, at the same time, by introducing new exam modalities centred on the submission of written papers.
[21] Clark (2006), 157, Schulze (1810), 177ff.

Since the last third of the eighteenth century, private classics societies had sought status as public, that is, university philology seminars. Clark (2006) has well documented how, as the new method of teaching and financial administration tied to the seminar became well-established, it came to be a widespread aspiration among academics to be entrusted with the directorship of a seminar; and especially so after the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the prerogatives and decisional freedom and power of the director on the rise. In a scenario that, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, presented scholars with the opportunity to pursue in an official environment their own academic interests and those of their students, and to administer funding coming from the state, it became common, for many of those academics who did not get a chair to lead their own seminar, to found private philological societies.

These societies could assume a more or less competitive attitude toward the parallel institution of the seminar at their university, but typically all of them were hoping to be granted, one day, the possibility of being transformed into a *Königlich-Philologisches Seminar*, an official institution of the state and as such recipient of public funding. They were fundamentally waiting to be confirmed as seminars, or they were "counter-institutions" opposed to the public seminar, founded by academics who had not been able to gain a chair as directors of a state seminar.[22] This is, for instance, what happened in the case of Beck, who since 1784 had been

[22] Clark (2006), 160.

leading a private society in Leipzig, the *Philologische Gesellschaft*, and in 1809 was then promoted to the status of director of the royal seminar.

We might wonder whether, after 1809, Hermann, too, was hoping that his 1798-funded Greek Society would achieve such status. It is probably safe to assume that the new, research-oriented approach to teaching typical of the seminar was congenial to Hermann, as it involved a hands-on approach on the part of the students with emphasis on the production of written pieces and offer of feedback on each other's works. Indeed this concept probably appealed to Hermann, who used to think that mere listening to formal lectures would not suffice for the independent formation of the students if the students' own exercise did not lead to it.[23] Moreover, as detailed in chapter two, Hermann's fame and career were growing at a steady pace, and especially in these years. Therefore it would not be too farfetched to think that, like many other scholars who did not get a seminar director position at other universities, Hermann probably founded the Greek Society to make up for the fact that he could not lead his own seminar. However, we know that, while it might have been so in the earliest phases of his society, the situation certainly changed fairly quickly and in a very remarkable way.

First of all, archival material containing the statutes of the Leipzig seminar proves that, since 1815, public funding had been granted to members of Hermann's Greek Society, in the form of three scholarships of thirty thalers each.[24] In the

[23] Koechly (1882), 17.

[24] The document was written by the Kultusministerium in Dresden on May 10th 1834 and is kept at the *Universitätsarchiv Leipzig*, cf. UAL, Rep. 02/01/H/2, BI. 18-21v. Cf. fol. 20: `Die unabhängig von

general landscape of scholars who were hoping to see their private societies reach the status of seminars, to be able to have access to monetary and status recognition, the case of Hermann's private society is truly unique.[25] Even more so if one considers that, along with the aspiration of many academics to receive recognition as seminar directors, the state, too, had every interest in taking over pre-existing private societies to transform them into state institutions, from where to harvest academically excellent future holders of important public positions. Yet Hermann's society received public investment without, in return, allowing the government to formally exercise control over its activities.

Hermann's *Griechische Gesellschaft* had quickly grown into something very valuable, both to Hermann and to its aspiring members. On the one hand, it became for Hermann a place to grow academic and personal relationships with students who would go on to become scholars or to important careers, especially in public offices, without falling out of touch with their former and much admired mentor. On the other hand, Hermann's glowing academic career and his fame were such that becoming members of the society was considered a great privilege and a serious aspiration for young classicists – at least for those who were convinced that, there, they would receive the best possible training in philology that was available. Sandys (1908) reckons that the Greek Society counted almost two-hundred

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dem Seminario bestehende Griechische Gesellschaft behält die ihr mittels Rescripte des vormaligen Königl. Kirchenraths vom 3. November 1815. und 7.ten April 1826. ertheilten drey Stipendien von Dreyßig Thalern.`

[25] Cf. Clark (2006), 160-72, esp. 163, is very clear on the fact that funding was linked to the institution of the seminar, and this was the reason why the position of seminar director was much sought after by academics, despite the limitations of academic freedom that directing a seminar generally involved. Cf. also below.

members during the half century of its existence, including later well-regarded schoolteachers, academics, librarians and statesmen who `in a special sense founded the school of Hermann.`[26]

On top of the fame that Hermann had achieved for his Greek Society, with the financial recognition that it had received by the state, Hermann's society was unique for one more reason. Hermann held the private institution that had allowed him to create his school in such high regard that, when in 1832 he was presented with the dream of many scholars, the chance to turn his society into a seminar, he

[26] Sandys (1908), 95. See also Sandys (1908), 102ff, Van Bommel (2015), 88, Koechly (1874), 89, 257, 330; Jahn (1849), 11; Paulsen (1921), 404-8; Bursian (1883), vol. 2, 706-971. In addition to Hermann Koechly (1815 – 1876) himself, who was schoolmaster in Saalberg and Dresden, then professor of classical philology in Zürich and Heidelberg, and member of the Reichstag, Greek Society members included Christian Karl Reisig (1792-1829), lecturer in Jena and then professor in Halle (cf. also below, pp. 33-4); Christian August Lobeck (1781-1860), professor in Wittenberg and Königsberg, who was also a significant ally of Hermann in the dispute against Friedrich Creuzer and his *Symbolik*'s theory on Greek religion; August Seidler (1779-1851), professor at Halle and Wittenberg, and later member, like Hermann, of the *Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*; Franz Passow (1786 – 1833), professor of Greek literature at the Weimar gymnasium and then professor of ancient literature at the University of Breslau; Friedrich Thiersch (1784 – 1860), professor at the gymnasium at Munich, and professor of ancient literature at the University of Landshut (and subsequently Munich, when the university was incorporated there); Karl Friedrich Hermann (1804 – 1855), professor of classical philology at the University of Marburg, and since 1833 also second librarian at the university, director of the philological seminar, then, after the death of Karl Otfried Müller, professor of philology and archaeology in Göttingen; Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802 – 1872), who was for many years tutor to the son of an intimate friend of Karl vom Stein zum Altenstein, the Prussian minister of education, and later professor in Berlin; Leonhard von Spengel (1803 – 1880), gymnasium professor in Munich, then professor at Heidelberg and Munich; Johannes Classen (1805 – 1891), director of the gymnasium in Frankfurt am Main, and then director of the Johanneum school in Hamburg; Friedrich Ritschl (1806 – 1876), professor and seminar director in Bonn; Hermann Sauppe (1809 – 1893), professor in Zurich, director of the gymnasium in Weimar, professor and seminar director in Göttingen; Moritz Haupt (1808 – 1874), professor in Leipzig, who in 1842 married Louise Hermann, the daughter of his master and colleague; Theodor Bergk (1812 – 1881), schoolmaster in Halle, Neustrelitz, Berlin and Cassel, and then professor in Marburg; Arnold Schaefer (1819 – 1833), gymnasium professor in Dresden and at the gymnasium St. Augustine in Grimma, then professor at Greifswald and Bonn; August Meineke (1790 – 1870), headmaster of the Joachimsthal gymnasium in Berlin; Karl Hermann Funkhänel (1808 – 1874), headmaster of the Eisenach gymnasium; and Rudolf Dietsch (1814 – 1875), teacher and headmaster at the gymnasium in Hildburghausen, Grimma and Plauen.

embarked on two years of negotiations with the Dresden ministry, and eventually refused.

The Royal Seminar of the Greek Society?

After the death of Beck, especially in virtue of the circumstances detailed in chapter two, Hermann was the obvious choice as successor to the seminar's directorship. Hermann commented on his appointment to the directorship of the seminar saying that the decision had been made by the summi viri, quorum supremo arbitrio res Universitatis nostrae gubernantur.[27] He speaks of supremum arbitrium, thus presenting the seminar as an emanation of the ministry and confirming his formal recognition of the fact that it was, unlike the Greek Society, a public institution, and one upon which the ministry had great influence even for what concerned academic matters. Nevertheless, in practice Hermann's attitude towards the ministry in the matter of the reinstitution of the Leipzig seminar, suspended in 1832 for lack of a director, proved that such recognition of the ministry's powers was indeed more formal than substantial, and he soon proved all his bargaining and decisional power.

In an unpublished letter to K. H. Funkhänel,[28] Hermann walks us through the key issues of the discussion he opened with the government in the years 1832-34, concerning matters of official recognition and internal administration of the

[27] Cf. Hermann (1834a), 3.
[28] Ms. 01248, of the Bibliotheca Albertina in Leipzig, which also contains forty-six other letters by Hermann to Karl Hermann Funkhaenel, dating from 1830 to 1848.

seminar. The result saw the powerful academic emerging essentially victorious, his authority enhanced by the successful negotiation.

The circumstance that the negotiations took about two years speaks to the fact that Hermann was at least willing to consider the possibility of merging the two institutions. But the society had grown so fast and to such a point that, counter to what was otherwise the norm, the opportunity to transform it into a seminar would mean for Hermann having more to lose than to gain. First, there would not be monetary benefits from the fusion of the two, as the funding that the Greek Society was already receiving would more likely disappear with the society itself rather than being redirected to the seminar, in addition to the budget already allowed for the seminarists' scholarships. Second, letting the society disappear would mean renouncing the leadership of an institution where Hermann had absolute freedom and executive power, to direct another that, even though it came with benefits and prestige, was at least formally subject to governmental directions. If, on the one hand, as mentioned above, academics generally sought to see their private societies turned into state-funded seminars, especially because they aspired to receive public funding, on the other hand this effectively meant surrendering some power to the ministry. The government had something to gain by taking over pre-existing private societies and transforming them into state institutions, as the philology seminar served primarily as a pedagogical institute of the state from which to harvest academic excellence that would go on to manage important public offices.[29]

[29] Cf. Clark (2006), 166-7.

These considerations were the essential background to Hermann's decision whether to see his Greek Society transformed into a seminar or to preside over both institutions independently, a determination which took Hermann two years of negotiations to reach. The foundation of the Greek Society had perhaps been driven by Hermann's desire to lead his own seminar-like institution, but the society had grown to such a point that, contrary to what otherwise was the norm, when presented with the opportunity to gain public funding – and direction – the Greek Society was in a position to turn that offer down. Speaking of his society, Hermann writes that it

> gaudet tot claris nominibus suorum quondam sodalium, qui nunc plerisque in Academiis scholisque patriae atque etiam extra patriam docent, ita caram eius memoriam esse video omnibus, qui illa amica in coniunctione antiquis litteris vel nunc operam dant vel olim dederunt, fuisseque caram scio illis eorum, quos in medio vitae cursu fatalis abstulit necessitas.[30]

Many current or former members of the private society maintained a sense of belonging and looked back on it fondly as a fundamental part of their lives. This was also undoubtedly due to the fact that Hermann did his best to create a sense of exclusivity surrounding membership in his Society; being a member was a sign of prestige that, thanks to the then successful beginnings of his pathway to stardom,

[30] *De officio interpretis*, 3: `it rejoices in the membership of some famous names, who now teach in many universities and schools both nationally and internationally. It seems to me that the memory of it is so dear to everyone who is either working now or has once worked on ancient literature in that amicable congregation, and I know that it has been dear to those carried off, in the middle of their life, by their destiny.`

likely emanated also from Hermann's persona itself. Thus, a plausible way to interpret Hermann's final decision concerning the possible merging of Greek Society and seminar is to be found in Hermann's ultimate aim of building a school. The Greek Society's members became his followers, and therein lay the importance to Hermann of keeping the society as it was, rather than seeing it engulfed by the public seminar. By living on, the name of the Greek Society and the sense of belonging of its members allowed Hermann to maintain important ties with those who could pride themselves on their current or former membership.

In an unpublished letter to the Saxon Ministry of the Arts (*Kultusministerium*) in Dresden, dated 25th February 1834,[31] we can read Hermann on the negotiations that occurred just before the re-institution of the seminar, following Beck's death. Here we can see the re-institution in the making. In the letter Hermann mentions that the ministry (*das hohe Ministerium des Cultus und öffentlichen Unterrichts*) intended to transfer the directorship to him and, upon Hermann's request, to institute an assistant lecturer to be in charge of the Latin section. Hermann also specifies that the University of Leipzig had remained since 1832 without a seminar precisely because the negotiations between Hermann and the ministry were taking some time – a sign that the ministry was really set on having nobody but Hermann as its director. The ministry's proposal was that the Greek Society was to be united with the seminar, an idea that did not gain the favour of the founder of the Society. Already in August 1833, in fact, Hermann had declared that the private association

[31] Ms. 01248.

was solely a fruit of his initiative and work, thus its continuation or dissolution depended only on him. Its merging with another institute also required his consent, and Hermann did not want to see the society, that he had created and that had existed for so many years, vanish into the seminar. The society indeed `had formed a school which he could really call his own,`[32] it included a number of honourable and well-known men, who treasured their membership and study with Hermann as a fond memory. Not long before that moment, the society had even appointed its first honorary member, the classicist Ludwig Bachmann.[33]

Before making a final decision Hermann negotiated with the ministry the possible merging of the Greek Society with the seminar, but he had a number of demands to advance. First, the institution should take the name of Royal Seminar of the Greek Society (*Königliches Seminar der Griechischen Gesellschaft*), or anyway Royal Greek Society (*Königliche Griechische Gesellschaft*) should be part of the name. Second, he asked that the internal and scientific direction of the institution would entirely be left to him, without interference from the ministry. Third, that he would take no part in the didactic exercises offered to schoolboys from the local schools, should the ministry intend to institute such activities. And finally, that the number of members would be set at twelve, of which the oldest nine would receive royal scholarships.

[32] `Die eine Schule gebildet habe, welche ich ganz eigentlich die meinige nennen dürfe`, ms. 01248.
[33] Ludwig Bachmann (1792-1881) was director of the Große Stadtschule in Rostock and a professor at the University of Rostock. Cf. Bursian (1883), 882; Klenz (1902), 172-174.

The most remarkable outcome of these negotiations lies in the fact that, even though the Greek Society remained independent from the seminar, nevertheless most of Hermann's requests were met, and his stipulations incorporated in his administration of the seminar. Hermann's demands were approved for what concerned the didactic exercises with students, which the ministry abandoned, and the internal direction of the seminar, which was left entirely to Hermann, a very uncommon praxis for the seminar of the time and quite inconvenient for the ministry at that, a sign that the ministry cared more about having Hermann as a director than about exercising its powers over the institution. We know from the seminar statutes that Hermann had to keep a book with the names of the members of the seminar, indicating the time of their admission and resignation, and any other memorable event for the history of that seminar.[34] This seems like a very vague indication of the director's duties, and very far from the obligation to send annual reports to the ministry that, as seen above, was still common at the beginning of the century. The fourth point, concerning number of students and scholarships, was to be partly approved.

In the negotiations for the merging of the Greek Society and the seminar, as Hermann describes them, the discussion about the name stands out in particular, because for Hermann so much was at stake there. The ministry did not consider the designation Royal Greek Society admissible, and would rather submit to Royal

[34] *Universitätsarchiv Leipzig*, cf. UAL, Rep. 02/01/H/2, BI. 18-21v, fol. 20v: `Der Director wird ein Buch führen, in welchem nächst der Stiftungs-Urkunde und der Statuten die Namen der Mitglieder mit Angabe der Zeit ihrer Aufnahme und ihres Austritts, ingleichen, was sich etwa sonst für das Seminarium Denkwürdiges ereignen möchte, aufgezeichnet werden.`

Seminar of the Greek Society. But all in all, the ministry would have preferred to limit the reference to the Greek Society to the public announcement of the institution of the seminar and its statutes, which both should expressly state that the new institution arose from the Greek Society founded by Hermann, and that it was an extension of the same. This was a semi-generous proposal, which Hermann nonetheless found unacceptable; this was due to the fact that it would in principle sever the ties between the members and the Greek Society, including their direct link of personal affiliation with Hermann and the clientele network that the existence of the Society encouraged and kept guaranteeing. Since all his other requests were well received, it is on these grounds that Hermann must have rejected the minister's proposal, using this pretext to maintain independent leadership of both the associations at stake. With all his other requests paradoxically well-received – a paradox because they were conditions of something, namely the merging, that eventually did not happen –, Hermann reaped from the situation as many advantages as possible. It was a politically savvy move, which had as its result that Hermann increased his overarching influence over Leipzig's academic scene.

Hermann's monopoly over the academic sphere in Leipzig was quite different from the situation in Berlin, where Boeckh had become seminar director in 1812. Partly due to the fact that Boeckh's directorship began twenty years earlier than Hermann's, Boeckh's relationship with the Prussian ministry of culture was a quite balanced equilibrium of powers, in which Boeckh sometimes had to make

concessions to the ministry.[35] If Hermann was sending regular reports to the ministry, these have at the moment not emerged from any archival research. Boeckh's reports, on the other hand, were regularly sent every year to the ministry. In response to one of them we also have a note, addressed to Boeckh, in which the ministry lamented the fact that the latter's report was not accurate enough, as it lacked a final comprehensive judgement on the work of each seminarist. Boeckh replied with a three-pages-long answer explaining why he could not provide such evaluation in the way in which it was requested by the ministry.[36] This evidences how Boeckh took seriously his duty of reporting to the ministry and tried to provide what was asked of him, or at least to defend himself when he could not. This example reveals a fundamental difference of attitude between Hermann and Boeckh: the former was invested in the establishment of a school and dealt favours in return for loyalty,[37] while the latter did not and felt more precariously his position as a director with relation to the ministry, perhaps even fearing to lose the chance to help his students get scholarships through the public funding scheme associated with the seminar.[38]

[35] Cf. Seifert (2020), 311-5.
[36] Cf. ibidem.
[37] Cf. below, *Patronage and clientele.*
[38] Boeckh's attitude is probably best explained by the fact that, unlike Hermann, he came from a poor family, with five siblings; originally destined to become a clergyman, he, too, fell in love with classical philology, but throughout his life approached his profession with a different care for his students, especially when in financial need, and a particular appreciation for his academic position, as his care in handling relations with the ministry shows, cf. Hoffmann (1901), 1-25.

*De officio interpretis*: proceedings of the seminar and Greek Society

Clark's research on the German seminar suggests that its teaching format was modelled on the *collegium*, a private class in which students took part after payment of a fee to the lecturer.[39] However, in the *Regii seminarii Philologici Instaurationem* Hermann states that the meetings of the seminar were public,[40] to give officially the possibility to audit to anyone interested, and to admit to the Greek classes students who were only registered for the Latin section of the seminar, and vice versa.[41] This resolution was made official in the statutes of the Leipzig seminar, which, too, indicate that the exercises of both the Greek and Latin division were to be kept public and open to everyone to attend as auditors.[42] Furthermore, the statutes prescribe that, as a rule, the members of one division should also take part in the other, but it was among the prerogatives of the director to allow students to take part in only one of the two, as long as overall the number of twelve members for

[39] Clark (2006), 143-7.

[40] Cf. Hermann (1834a), 3: Habebuntur illae exercitationes omnes publice, cuiuis harum litterarum studioso facta potestate audiendi.

[41] Cf. ibidem. However, the practice of open admission to the seminar sessions was not uncommon – the same happened, for example, in Berlin. Cf. Seifert (2020), 159: 'Die ordentlichen Mitglieder verbrachten durchschnittlich drei Semester in der intensiven Betreuungssituation des Seminars, was die Hälfte der damals veranschlagten Regelstudienzeit war. Bei den außerordentlichen Mitgliedern hingegen fand ein viel schnellerer Wechsel statt. Dass es neben diesen beiden Mitgliedergruppen Zuhörer gab, die bei den Übungen anwesend waren, ist in der Forschungsliteratur bisher kaum berücksichtigt worden. Deren Zahl, wie auch die der außerordentlichen Mitglieder, wurde seit Beginn der 1820er Jahre stetig größer, so dass mitunter bis zu 50 Studenten an einer Seminarsitzung teilnahmen. Mit zunehmendem Publikum änderte sich das Arbeits- und Betreuungsumfeld für den Einzelnen, ebenso die Konkurrenzsituation. Das gemeinsame Arbeiten und Forschen in den Seminarsitzungen fand somit nicht in einem gänzlich geschlossenen Raum statt, zu dem nur Mitglieder Zutritt hatten, sondern durchaus im öffentlichen Raum der Universität, der mit vorheriger Genehmigung durch Boeckh einer Vielzahl an Studenten offen stand.'

[42] *Universitätsarchiv Leipzig*, cf. UAL, Rep. 02/01/H/2, Bl. 18-21v, fol. 18v: `Die Uebungen beider Abtheilungen werden öffentlich [sic] gehalten und es steht Jedermann frei, ihnen als Zuhörer beizuwohnen.`

each section was not exceeded. Six ordinary members of the seminar were given a regium stipendium, which was not granted on the basis of merit but of the time they had been members of the seminar: fifty thalers each were assigned to the two students who had been members for the longest time, and thirty thalers each to the four students whose membership was next the oldest.[43] However, if one of the other students were recommended by the director for special needs, an extra scholarship would be assigned to him until the moment he could enter a regularly nominated grantee position.[44] This circumstance alone already evidences the acquisition of powers that Hermann was progressively achieving at the expense of the ministerial administration.

In a scenario in which seminarists elsewhere were normally identified and approved by the ministry,[45] Hermann also ensured that members of the Greek Society were allowed to be seminarists at the same time. The stipends were not cumulative, but if Greek society members moved up to one of the places of oldest member of the seminar, then they would receive fifty thalers instead of the thirty

[43] *Universitätsarchiv Leipzig*, cf. UAL, Rep. 02/01/H/2, BI. 18-21v, fol. 19: `Für die ordentlichen Mitglieder des Seminarii werden 6. Stipendien, zwei von Fünfzig Thalern - - für die beiden ältesten, und vier von Dreyßig Thalern - - für die auf diese der Eintrittszeit nach folgenden vier Mitglieder bestimmt.`

[44] Hermann (1834a), 4: Quumque ei Societati Friderici Augusti Regis munificentia concessa sint tria XXX Ioacimicorum stipendia, sodales eius Societatis, qui simul Seminario adscripti erunt, si pervenerint in numerum sex primorum Seminario sodalium, stipendiis fruentur iis, quae his destinata sunt; quod si quis eorum a Graeca societate stipendium habuerit, id accipiet is, qui ab illis sex proximis erit in Seminario.

[45] Cf. Clark (2006), 166. Wolf's power in Halle was similarly remarkable as he, too, during negotiations with the ministry, managed already in 1787-8 to obtain complete control of the institute, including the selection of topics to be treated in the seminar and the admission of members.

that they might have received as members of the Greek society.[46] To receive their scholarship, all members had to have their participation in the seminar confirmed by the director's signature. Finally, outgoing members of the seminar would receive a certificate stating how long they had been members of the seminar and the diligence they had shown in it.[47]

Fundamentally, these circumstances not only gave Hermann great freedom in leading the seminar but also room to gain further advantages for the Greek Society than he would have had, had he not become seminar director. Thus Hermann not only managed to keep a society, separated from the formally state-owned seminar, under his full control, but also, by instituting a fundamental freedom of movement between the two associations, he succeeded in granting a higher stipend, normally reserved to seminarists, to some members of the Greek Society.

Hermann's interest in mobilising funding for the Greek Society revealed the significance that this held for him. Not accidentally, biographical-critical works about Hermann consistently mention and focus on his Greek society and more rarely on his directorship of the seminar, even though, because of the relevance of the seminar as a milestone institution in the history of the research university, the latter should arguably be considered a more prestigious position and thus more

[46] *Universitätsarchiv Leipzig*, cf. UAL, Rep. 02/01/H/2, Bl. 18-21v, fol. 20: `Treten daher Mitglieder der Griechischen Gesellschaft, die als solche eines der dieser Gesellschaft bestimmten Stipendien genießen, auch in das Seminar, so kommen sie, wenn sie in demselben in eine der beiden ersten Stellen aufrücken zwar in den Genuß eines der größeren Stipendien von 50 thr. - verlieren aber dagegen das bis dahin allein genossene Stipendium der griechischen Gesellschaft.`
[47] Cf. ibidem.

worthy of being mentioned. It seems clear that Hermann kept the society in higher regard than the seminar, and that he aimed at building his school through the former more than through the latter. Even though Hermann exercised more power on the seminar than was historically customary for seminar directors, still the society remained the institution he had maintained for the longest time, and even later it was the place where he had full control and greater possibility to establish personal, long-lasting relationships with his students. Through the financial manoeuvre above described he managed to allocate funding to some Greek Society members, while for all the others there was still a promise of more informal future help and advice: Promissum est etiam, si quis eorum, qui non ad perceptionem stipendii pervenerint, propter egestatem a directore commendatus fuerit, curatum iri, ut ei prospiciatur.[48] The promise of future favour incorporated in the dynamics of the institutions a further element of directorial control, effectively encouraging competition among members, as the future help was at the director's discretion case by case.[49]

However, Hermann was clearly not passing up the chance of extending his power as much as possible also through his seminar directorship. He was probably also aided by the fact that the statutes of the seminar were never published but only

[48] Hermann (1834a), 4: `It is promised that, if someone who will not receive a stipend will be recommended by the director because of financial need, he will be taken care of as it will seem fit.` Cf. also Clark (2006), 168, underlining how the fact that seminars in Berlin, Breslau, Gießen, Greifswald, Leipzig and Tübingen during the first half of the nineteenth century did not have exactly stipulated amounts guaranteed as scholarships to their seminarists, and this gave more power to the directors. The idea of promising help in finding a teaching position as an additional form of assistance is documented also for the Dorpat seminar.

[49] See also Clark (2006), 172.

sent to Hermann, to be kept along with the few other records, such as names of members and membership duration, that, as mentioned above, he was entrusted to keep.

By comparison, the statutes of the Berlin seminar were not published by the Prussian Ministry of Education either, and they were sent to the director Boeckh privately, in a few copies to be distributed to the seminar members. As for the Leipzig seminar, there was never a public document released by the ministry. However, it is noteworthy that Boeckh wrote but never published his *Plan zur Einrichtung des Philologischen Seminar*; the only public document about his seminar that he was able to release was an announcement from the board of the university of Berlin, to inform potential participants of the beginning of the seminar.[50] In Leipzig, the ministry had not released any official statutes, thus the public version of the story behind the seminar was narrated solely by Hermann, who indeed wrote the *Regii seminarii Philologici Instaurationem indicit Director Godofredus Hermannus* (1834), more widely known as *De officio interpretis*.

Along with the official announcement of Hermann's directorship of the seminar, the paper on *De officio interpretis* contains Hermann's guidelines for the seminar. This piece is one of Hermann's best-known publications and is often presented as a *summa* of the methods of Hermannian philology and one of his few writings more expressly dedicated to the illustration of his conception of philology. However, it is rarely considered in its original context, the second inauguration of

[50] Cf. Seifert (2020), 59-66.

the seminar in Leipzig. In fact it contains first of all Hermann's general observations on how to manage the seminar, an overview of what he proposed to teach in that forum and with what methods. Only as a consequence of this are we able to read about some of the points that Hermann considered fundamental for philology, especially interesting only for the lack of much more expressly theoretical Hermannian writings about philology. However, such points are tied to the context of the seminar inauguration, and so linger on the activities of the institutions Hermann led rather than giving an omni-comprehensive overview of Hermannian philology, and thus they can only represent an inherently partial reconstruction of the latter. Aspects of the philological techniques indicated in *De officio interpretis* have arguably been most prominently associated with Hermannian philology as a consequence of the dispute, rather than constituting its premise; for example, the insistence on the prominence of language for philology assumes a different meaning if considered within the context of a programmatic description of the activities of a class of students, rather than a prescriptive account of the philologist's tasks.

Indeed, while *De officio interpretis* addresses problems such as defining the goals of exegetical work on the classics, it does so with a view to clarifying what activities Hermann had in mind for the seminar and what for his Greek Society. As this thesis aims to show, the Hermannian methodological approach to philology goes beyond the content of this document and bears profound influences coming from the revisited model of Bentleian philology,[51] the teachings of Kantian

[51] Cf. chapter one, *Bentleian philology:* ingenium*, erudition and the use of manuscripts.*

philosophy – in a less obvious way than normally intended –, and the broad scientific environment of the time.[52]

This view is not intended to diminish the importance that Hermann attributed to language, which he notoriously described as the primary source of knowledge of antiquity and indeed the only reliable source, because without it any other material remains essentially mute:

> Antiquitatem Graecorum et Romanorum cognoscere volentibus [..] non solum potissimus atque uberrimus, sed propemodum unicus fons, ex quo illarum rerum cognitionem hauriant, in scriptis est antiquorum propositus. Haec enim ex omni genere monumentorum, quae non temporis diuturnitate interierunt, non modo et numero plurima sunt et integritate praestant, verum etiam sola loquuntur, declarantque caetera, quae sine iis fere caeca sunt atque inutilia.[53]

Hermann without doubt believed – and any modern philologist would agree with him – that it is therefore essential for the philologist to have a perfect understanding of the ancient languages in order to be able to explain and interpret their meaning. This is indicated as the only way to reach a true knowledge of antiquity, and any interpretation based on other than accurate understanding of the language would be necessarily misguided:

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[52] Cf. chapter five.

[53] Hermann (1834a), 4: `For those who want to learn about the ancient Greeks and Romans the chief, most productive and essentially sole source from which to acquire knowledge lies in the writings of the ancients. For these, among all types of monuments which have not been consumed by the long amount of time, are not only the most abundant and the ones which are in the best shape, but they are also the only ones to speak and they reveal to us all the other things which, without them, would be almost obscure and useless.`

Ex quo apertum est, lectionem atque intelligentiam eorum, quae scripta ab antiquis habemus, fundamentum esse universae antiquitatum scientiae. Consequitur ergo, ut illa scripta explicare atque interpretari id sit, in quo praecipue elaborare oporteat eos, qui recte cognoscere antiquitatem voluerint. In quo multos errare animadvertimus, qui leviter et non penitus cognitis veterum linguis satis ducunt, si sententiam scriptorum quodammodo intelligere sibi videantur. [..] multa in scriptis antiquorum mendosa sunt, quae si quis aut non videat corrupta esse aut emendare nesciat, saepe accidat necesse est, ut vel aliud vel etiam contrarium eius, quod illi scriptores dixerunt, dictum ab iis esse credatur. Quo fieri non potest, quin quum omnino falsae pravaeque opiniones animo concipiantur, tum, si ex male intellectis verbis vel ad res historicas vel ad quamcumque aliam antiquitatis partem explicandam testimonia atque argumenta petantur, inania commenta proveniant, quibus qui fidem habeat, ab uno ad alium deinceps errorem abducatur.[54]

A faulty or incomplete understanding of language can lead to a wrong reconstruction of facts, generating interpretations that damage our knowledge of the ancient world and perpetrate errors through generations. Interestingly, Hermann's position here already moves away from the stereotypically *wortphilologische* version of his theories; the problem with a bad interpretation of

[54] Hermann, *De officio interpretis*, 4-5: `From which it is evident that the reading and understanding of the writings of antiquity is the fundament of the whole science of antiquity. It follows therefore that those who want to properly know antiquity must work primarily on explaining and interpreting those writings. We notice that in this task many people commit mistakes, when they proceed lightly and without having learnt thoroughly enough the languages of the ancients and yet they believe to have understood in a certain way the thought of the ancients [..]. The ancient texts are often faulty, so that if someone does not see that a passage is corrupted or does not know how to emend it, it often necessarily happens that they believe that the ancients said either something different from or even the opposite of what the authors actually wrote. This is impossible unless not only they conceive in their mind completely wrong and wicked opinions, but also, having misunderstood the texts, search for evidences and arguments to try and explain history or some other part of antiquity, and thus useless opinions are originated; when someone trusts them, they are led from one mistake to another.`

language, Hermann writes, does not stop at the language itself, as an object per se deserving the highest consideration, but the issue, rather, lies in the fact that bad interpretation of language leads to misunderstandings about the ancient world. Since language is sometimes all the evidence and source of information we have, an exact grasp of linguistic structures and meaning is essential to achieve the best possible representation of antiquity. As will be seen in chapter four, such were the terms in which Hermann stated what would today be considered an obvious principle of philology and any literary study of antiquity.

However, to understand *De officio interpretis* correctly we must notice that its focus was not on providing an exhaustive account of the methods and aims of philology, but it was on the seminar, the Greek Society and their procedural characteristics. The overemphasising of the treatise as the *summa* of Hermann's philosophy of philology reflects the fact that the theoretical net gain of Hermannian philology has been largely considered an otiose insistence on the importance of grammar and language, an opinion that has been inherited from the dispute and that partly helps to explain Hermann's neglect among scholars of the history of classical scholarship. Critics have so far obliterated the connection between *De officio interpretis* and the institution of the seminar, essentially flattening Hermann's hermeneutics by reducing it to concepts that, in the eye of the moderns, need not be reiterated, such as the prominence of language for the study of antiquity.

Indeed, Hermann's introduction to the tasks of the philologist is presented in the context of his plans for the Greek Society and the seminar, for which two different types of activities were destined:

> ita nobis haec negotia visa sunt distribuenda esse, ut Societati Graecae criticae artis in primis tractationem, in quo genere semper eius studia versata sunt, relinqueremus, interpretationem autem, delecto aliquo scriptore, in quo singuli deinceps interpretando exerceantur, destinaremus seminario.[55]

More than a programmatic description of his philological methodology delivered with a comprehensive breadth, Hermann here is identifying exact knowledge of language and grammar as an essential part of interpretation, because knowledge of language and interpretation are to be reflected in the organisation he had in mind for the two institutions under his lead. The interest in language by no means excluded a desire to understand the reality of things. Rather, Hermann argued, it is impossible to obtain any comprehension of ancient things without making use of the primary sources that we have – written witnesses. Only by being able to understand the text can we grasp the reality behind the words, because misunderstanding words means misunderstanding concepts and spreading wrong ideas about the ancient world. This logic is reflected in the division between the tasks assigned to the members of the Greek Society and to the seminarists. The first

[55] Hermann (1834a), 5: `we think that we should distribute these tasks in this way: we will leave to the Greek Society primarily the handling of textual criticism, towards which its studies have been always oriented, while we will assign to the seminar the task of interpretation, having selected one author to work on at a time.`

should dedicate themselves to textual criticism, the latter would be busy with the interpretation of the work of a single author.

The division of work between society and seminar partly underlines the fact that Hermann's intention in *De officio interpretis* was not to illustrate the tasks of the philologist, or at least not entirely. Indeed, if his task here had been to exemplify how to train the perfect philologist he would have brought textual criticism and interpretation together in the activities of both institutions.

On the other hand, the division of tasks signals that Hermann considered textual criticism and interpretation complementary and equally important parts of the study of antiquity, both requiring a serious amount of space and attention. In one series of meetings the students learned to correctly restore texts, and in the other they learned what to make of already restored texts, and, according to Hermann's prescription, to see through the words directly into the mind of their author.[56] If we read *De officio interpretis* as a programmatic manifesto of Hermannian philology we would have to conclude that one operation can be done at the expense of the other, but this does not prevent us from considering that perhaps, in practice, the flexibility of attending meetings of both the society and the seminar came to be an essential part of the training of classical philologists. The decision to separate the two activities, in the proceedings of the two different institutions, suggests that participation in both must have been common among Hermann's students. This impression seems also confirmed by the fact that cases of cross-attendance are

[56] Cf. Hermann (1834a), 5: Atque, ut a definitione proficiscamur, interpretari dicimus efficere, ut is, qui audiat legatve, verba mentemque scriptoris sic, uti eum oportet, intelligat.

common in the statutes of the seminar. The statutes comprise only 25 points, and it seems unlikely that many would be dedicated to this topic, as they are, if they had been considered as unlikely and sporadic exceptional occurrences.

Hermann's separation of activities between the two institutions could also be explained as a form of maintaining control and keeping himself in the role of patron and guide, hence exerting much greater control than was typical of other institutions, such as the Berlin seminar led by Boeckh. While we know that Boeckh's students in Berlin were free to choose the topics of their *Abhandlungen* and, while some dealt with grammatical and linguistic topics, the majority focused on broader historical subjects – such as the history of geographical areas, myths, institutions or significant events –,[57] it is not clear how different the activities of Boeckh's seminar in Berlin were from those of the Leipzig seminar. For certain, they too encompassed both textual criticism and interpretation, but questions concerning how such activities worked out in practice during the seminar classes should be the subject of further research.[58]

[57] Cf. Seifert (2020), 252-3: 'Die Themen der Seminararbeiten waren einerseits sehr spezifisch und betrachteten einzelne Details ausführlich und tiefgehend.Andererseits war das Feld von untersuchten Themen, Fragestellungen und Autoren insgesamt sehr breit. In dieser thematischen Vielfalt, die sich nicht in Textkritik und Kommentar erschöpfte, spiegelte sich Boeckhs Verständnis von Philologie wider, wie er es in seiner *Encyklopädie*-Vorlesung entwickelt hatte und den Seminaristen vermittelte. Nicht nur Literatur, Geschichte, Philosophie oder Mythologie waren angemessene Untersuchungsgegenstände, sondern auch Fragen der Kultur- und Rechtsgeschichte oder der Geographie.'

[58] Cf. Seifert (2020), 163-207.

Patronage and clientele

An important internal mechanism of the seminar and the Greek society involved the creation of a network of people engaged in an exchange of favours throughout the years following their experiences in the Greek Society and the seminar. As mentioned above, the seminarists who were not rewarded with a stipend were promised a more informal type of help to further their academic or work aspirations.[59] Similarly to the case of K. D. Ilgen, on whose behalf Hermann had interceded in 1802 for the position of principal at *Schulpforta*, a few other cases that exemplify this practice are documented in some of Hermann's unpublished correspondence.

For example, a letter by the Leipzig professor of philosophy Christian Hermann Weisse (1801-1866), addressed to an anonymous `Herr Doctor` and written in Leipzig on January 23rd 1845, states the following:

[..] Should a pupil of Gottfried Herrmann, or even a scholar who is in scientific communication with him, be among your former teachers, you should not fail to feel motivated to request from the mentioned famous philologist a letter of recommendation! Hermann's reputation and influence in the faculty, as you can see, are not insignificant, and I know his inclination to be energetically and emphatically interested in persons whom he considers worthy. However, since you are most interested in your academic career, such a

[59] Cf. above, note 48.

link would be desirable, and I urge you to seek the means to do so before you leave your hometown [..][60]

And sure enough, already in 1807 Hermann was busy recommending August Seidler (1779-1851) to an academic position in Gotha: `If I may hope that you will trust me with a conscientious love of truth, then I can justly recommend a man who has very good philological knowledge, and will soon come to this place with confidence, [..] distinguished by extraordinary strength of character, by humanity and liberal education. His name is Mr Seidler.`[61]

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[60] The letter, dated 23rd January 1845, is part of ms. 0661b:`Sollte sich vielleicht unter Ihren ehemaligen Lehrern ein Schüler Gottfried Herrmanns, oder überhaupt ein Gelehrter, der mit ihm in wissenschaftlichem Verkehr steht befinden so versäumen Sie dass ja nicht, sich, wenn Sie es irgend thunlich finden ein möglichst ausführlich motivirtes, wo möglich auch Ihren weiteren Lebens ##. Entwicklungsgang berücksichtigendes Empfehlungsschreiben von demselben an den genannten berühmten Philologen zu erbitten! Hermanns Ansehen und Einfluß in der Fakultät ist, wie Sie ohnehin voraussehen werden nicht gering, und ich kenne seine Geneigtheit, sich für Personen, die er dessen für werth erkennt thatkräftig und nachdrücklich zu interessiren. Da Sie nun Ihrer wissenschaftlichten Richtung ## ihm ferner stehen, so wäre ein derartiger ## Anknüpfungspunct allerdings wünschenswerth, und ich rathe Ihnen dringend, sich über die Mittel, einen solchen zu ermöglichen noch vor Ihrem Abgang aus Ihrer Vaterstadt mit Ihren dortigen ehemaligen Lehrern mit denen Sie etwa in Verbindung geblieb[en].`

[61] `Cf. ms. 0661b: Wenn ich hoffen darf, daß Sie mir gewissenhafte Wahrheitsliebe zutrauen, so kann ich mit Recht dazu einen Mann empfehlen, der eben so wohl äußerst gründliche philologische Kenntniße besitzt, und zuverlässig bald in diesen Fache ## einen ehren vollen Namen haben wird, als er sich durch die ## Rechtschaffenheit, durch außerordentliche Festigkeit des Charakters, durch Humanität und liberale Bildung ausgezeichnet. Sein Name ist Magister Seidler [..]`.The letter continues with a request of information about the salary Seidler would receive, which worried the possible beneficiary of the favour: `Nur ein einziges Bedenken ist bey den ## da er gar kein eignes Vermögen besitzt, jetzt aber bey einer Hofmeisterstelle, die er bekleidet, nebest einem leidlichen Gehalt, Woh[nung] und Unterhalt frey hat, so ist die Frage, ob er mit dem, was die Professur in Gotha einträgt, (es sollen 300 rt. seyn) ausreichen können. Sie würden mich daher un gemein verbinden, wenn Sie die Güte hätten, in dem Falle, daß auf den M. Seidler reflectirt werden könnte, mir wissen zu lassen, was ohngefähr Wohnung und Unterhalt in Gotha jährlich kosten, ob und welche Aussicht zu Verbeßerung der Einkünfte bei dieser Professur Statt haben, und wie viel und was für Unterricht der Professor geben müsse. Eine baldige Antwort hierauf würde ich als einen Beweis Ihrer mir höchst schätzbaren Gewogenheit ansehen, der ich mit der aufrichtigsten Hochachtg.`

In the same fashion, in a letter dated 1829 by Hermann to the Stadtrichter in Johanngeorgenstadt,[62] father of his former student and member of the Greek Society Karl Hermann Funkhaenel, we learn that Funkhaenel senior had written to Hermann to request his intercession in favour of his son, who was hoping to become principal of the school in Schneeberg. Hermann writes to Funkhaenel senior explaining the reasons for his refusal, namely that he thought the young man should dedicate himself to further study, and only then find a more challenging work position, rather than obtaining a comfortable employment for life. Hermann advises that K. H. Funkhaenel would also be too young for such a position, a circumstance that would force him to constantly prove himself to older teachers and colleagues.[63] But the majority of Hermann's disapproval seems to stem from the idea that such a career choice would stand in the way of Funkhaenel's dedication to personal and academic growth.

This case shows how Hermann maintained life-long relationships with his students and their families, even feeling free to offer perspective and life advice, and how that established something comparable to a system of clientage that involved Hermann as patron in providing favours to his former students. Despite his

[62] Cf. ms. 01248, (cf. note 28.)

[63] It was not the first time that Hermann expressed a similar concern: in his early work *De poeseos generibus* (1794), where he planned to lay out a completely novel theory for the classification of literary genres, Hermann had preventively defended himself from the possible accusation of being wrong and arrogant on account of his young age. Cf. *Op*. 1, p. 24: In qua omni disputatione si qui forte sunt, qui arrogantiae cuidam et fastidio tribuant, quod confidentius omnia et sine excusationum captationibus dixerim, eos vehementer rogo, at sibi persuadeant, me non eam iuvenilis parumque exercitati ingenii vim esse credere, ut nihil erraverim, sed haec tamen scripturum non fuisse, nisi vera putarem.

hesitations, in fact, Hermann ended up writing the recommendation letter to *Schneeberg* which he had been requested.

If the creation of personal and academic genealogies and affinities is not per se unusual, what is specific to Hermann's intentions is that, on the one hand, he thought about his students as his school, and, on the other hand, his students were generally prone to the internalisation and promotion of his philology. As quoted above, he himself stated that the Greek society `had formed a school which he should really call his own`.[64] Hermann clearly thought of the people with whom he maintained personal relationships as followers and possible perpetuators of his teachings. This is also achieved through the impression of exclusivity surrounding the Greek Society, whose members, when allowed to join, felt like they had received a great honour.

The propagation of the dispute as a social-biographical issue

One of Hermann's first acts as a seminar director was to institute two separate sections for Latin and Greek – a not entirely uncommon circumstance, as that was the case already in Berlin and Halle. While Hermann himself was to be the head of the Greek section, he assigned the leadership of the Latin branch to Reinhold Klotz (1807-1870), by then extraordinary professor of philosophy, who later went on to become a full professor as a successor of Hermann in 1848.

[64] Ms. 01248:`Die eine Schule gebildet habe, welche ich ganz eigentlich die meinige nennen dürfe.`

However, unlike at Halle, Leipzig did not have two directors – Hermann was the only one, and Klotz his assistant.[65]

In the obituary for his father, Klotz's son Richard writes that his father was an admirer of Hermann's `famous lectures, generally acknowledged to be brilliant, and his clever and lively explanation of the ancient works of literature,`[66] and that such works allegedly had had the deepest effect on Klotz, conforming to the fortunate leitmotif about the enchanting quality of Hermann's lectures.[67] Furthermore, we read that he was an `eager and respected` member of the famous Greek Society, `which was the constant aspiration of all young philologists.`[68] Reading behind the formal homage to Hermann and looking at the latter's private correspondence, however, the collaboration between director and assistant does not seem idyllic. Klotz's case, among others, showcases the importance of the individual, biographical element in the creation of Hermann's school, how personality played a role in the shaping of such scholarly networks and also, importantly, how scholars felt free to move back and forth between "*wortphilological*" and "*sachphilological*" interests, especially when their loyalty towards Hermann, or Boeckh, was not particularly well-defined, or not at all a part of the equation.

[65] This is attested also in ms. 01248.
[66] Klotz (1871), 154: `Hermanns berühmte und bekannte geniale Lehrvorträge und dessen gewandte und lebensvolle Erklärungsart der altclassischen Schriftwerke.`
[67] Cf. ibidem and ch. one, p. 80.
[68] Ibidem:`Dazu war es noch die berühmt gewordene griechische Gesellschaft Hermanns, der anzugehören das unablässige Streben aller jungen Philologen war.`

Indeed, among Klotz's works there is an edition of the treatise *Liber de Graecae linguae particulis* (1835–1842) by Matthaeus Devarius, a humanist of the sixteenth century who emended several Greek Vatican manuscripts. Klotz' son Richard, in the obituary, claims for Reinhold Klotz a place as an `ebenbürtiger Schüler von Hermann`[69] – where *ebenbürtiger* does not only indicate a worthy follower of Hermann, but also an equal to Hermann. If, on the one hand, Klotz' *Liber de Graecae linguae particulis* clearly shows the influence of Hermannian works such as his four books on the particle ἄν,[70] on the other hand, Richard suggests that his father was an alternative to Hermann rather than a follower. In doing so, he also insists that his father `did not close his mind to the correct conviction that all scientific grammar must be based on epigraphy, dialectology and above all on comparative linguistics.`[71] Essentially, conforming to the rhetoric of a time when the dispute was still perceived as a relatively recent event and was still bearing some tangible consequences,[72] Richard did not want his father to be remembered as a follower of the narrow-minded philologists who were full of false prejudices against the new and often pioneering linguistic science which Humboldt had founded and which had become, in the years in which Richard writes, institutionally established.[73] Thus,

[69] Ibidem, 159.
[70] Cf. *Op.* 4, 1-204.
[71] Klotz (1871), 159: `Er verschloss sich durchaus nicht der richtigen Überzeugung, dass alle wissenschaftliche Grammatik auf Epigraphik, Dialektologie und vor allem auf die Sprachvergleichung gegründet werden müsse.`
[72] Cf. Jensen (2014), on the role of Friedrich Ritschl and Otto Jahn as teachers of Nietzsche, and how their allegiancies in the dispute between *Wort-* and *Sachphilologie* had direct and indirect influences on their pupil.
[73] Klotz (1871), 159-60: 'Er gehörthe nich zu den engherzigen philologen, die diese neue und vielfach bahnbrechende sprachwissenschaft mit falschen vorurteilen betrachteten. In einer zeit, wo letztere kaum noch den gebührenden platz selbst beanspruchte, kam er an der seite seines Ciceronischen

Reinhold Klotz was captivated by the cause of Boeckh, and although he was a close collaborator of Hermann, this did not prevent him from seeing the good in new ideas that were in those years spreading and being marketed as the counterpart of the "linguistic school" of Hermann.

Perhaps not accidentally, in some of the unpublished letters to Funkhaenel,[74] Hermann confesses that he is not too happy about Klotz's job as his assistant leading the Latin section of the seminar. Reasons given for his disappointment include Klotz's strictness, which would not make students too fond of him, and the fact that Klotz would, in Hermann's opinion, leave out essential parts of his explanations during the seminar classes, so that, Hermann laments, he had to intervene himself to provide necessary clarifications and contributions. Hermann writes that he had also addressed the problem openly, in a letter to Klotz, warning him against such bad habits. There Hermann lamented that Klotz did not always prepare the textual passages to present to his students in advance, he repeated the same things too many times trying to make them clear, and often during the meetings he interrupted the students who were voicing an opinion.

Klotz was hardly the only scholar of the time who moved freely between the Hermannian and Boeckhian cohort. The shift in interests required to do so was subtle and devoid of methodological depth, and its consequences were entirely social in nature. While universities like Leipzig, Breslau and Bonn were very

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mitarbeiters Madvig ihr mit freudigem herzen und offenem bekenntnis entgegen und, wenn er auch auf selbständige weitere forschungen verzichtete, nahm er die sicheren resultate derselben gern auf.'

[74] Cf. ms. 01248.

invested in so-called Hermannian philology, and others like Halle and Berlin were Boeckhian strongholds,[75] most scholars moved freely from university to university, and even when, as exemplified below, the perpetuation of the dispute between the two camps took particularly bad turns, the research was never central to such quarrels. Scholars might learn different things in different places, but the approaches promoted by so-called *Sach-* and *Wortphilologen* could hardly be considered incompatible.

Indeed, the case of Klotz is similar to that of Boeckh's friend Gottfried Bernhardy (1800-1875), who had been a student of Boeckh and had received his doctorate in Berlin, in 1822.[76] When Bernhardy sought Hermann's advice on the edition of the *Suda* he was compiling and thus started a correspondence with Hermann, his relationship with Boeckh suffered a setback from which it would never recover.

At the same time, the original dispute found new resonance and further contexts through some scholars for whom a sense of loyalty towards Hermann or Boeckh was pivotal. Not accidentally, in 1838, in an unpublished letter to his student Funkhanel, Hermann writes *apropos* Friedrich Gottlieb Welcker (1784-1868), seminar director and one of the most famous classicists in Bonn, with reference to his criticism of Hermann's study *De Aeschyli Aetneis* (1837): `This man is *a priori* my opponent, just as I know *a priori* that when he writes anything, I will not be able to

[75] Cf. e.g. Benne (2005), 52.
[76] Cf. Clark (2006), 231.

agree with him.`[77] While the differences between Hermann and Welcker were likely to be also methodological, Hermann's phrasing here seems to indicate that their disagreement had a thoroughly personal dimension, too. In particular, the idea of rejecting an opinion 'a priori' shows a form of personal bias rather than openness to evaluating a scientific opinion objectively.

One last, more complex case could illustrate the intricacies of the personal quality of the dispute and testify both for the extent to which matters of personal allegiance played a major role in the dispute and, at the same time, show the fluidity with which scholars could pass from one party to the other. This is the case of Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl (1806-1876). Apart from illustrating the extent of the aura of exclusivity that surrounded the members of Hermann's Greek Society, Ritschl's experiences, first in Leipzig and then in Halle, show the consequences in action of the formation of a Hermannian school, especially within the context of philology after 1826; but they also demonstrate how fleeting such alliances could be and thus how thin methodological differences between the two parties were.

Today Ritschl is known mostly for having been Nietzsche's formative teacher, but in his time he was known for being a pupil of Hermann, like him an appreciative reader of Richard Bentley, and a very invested proponent of the importance of achieving proficiency in the study of the ancient languages. Not accidentally, influential histories of philology such as Wilamowitz's and Bursian's

[77] Ms. 01248.

dismiss him as a mere 'word philologist'.[78] Ritschl had indeed, at least for a while, been a convinced follower of Hermann,[79] and in his early years he made himself protagonist of a remarkable transposition of the dispute to the city of Halle.

At the beginning of his academic career, Ritschl, like Hermann, was unsure whether to study law or philology. According to the same biographical tropes already analysed in connection to Hermann's life as told by Koechly,[80] Ritschl's biographer suggests that he decided on philology only after spending a year in Leipzig in 1825, and attending Hermann's collegia about metrics and Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*.[81] After two semesters in Leipzig, Ritschl decided to change university and go to Halle, his reasons for the change being, apparently, not strictly academic.[82] But Ritschl did not want to leave before having earned a place in Hermann's Greek society, which he eventually did, and then decided to start his doctorate in Halle in 1826,[83] the year after the dispute between Herman and Boeckh had worsened.

In Halle, the Hermannian classicist Christian Karl Reisig had founded a private society that essentially worked as a counter institution to the seminar, whose directorship, to Reisig's disappointment, had been assigned to the former

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[78] Cf. Wilamowitz (1921), 60-2, Bursian (1883), 826, 832-3, 837; Benne (2005), 56, points out how Figls (1984) is imprecise when he portrays Nietzsche as belonging more to *Wortphilologie* than to *Sachphilologie* because he was a student of Ritschl, intending the latter solely as a word philologist.
[79] Ritschl had also written his dissertation, titled *Schedae Criticae*, under Hermann, and he had turned Hermann's abandoned studies on Plautus into his own life's work. Cf. Vogt (1990), 390; Jensen (2008), 217.
[80] Cf. chapter one.
[81] Cf. Ribbeck (1879), vol. 1, 23-4.
[82] Cf. ibidem 24, 27. Ribbeck suggests that Ritschl had spent most of the first semester in Leipzig dedicating himself more to Leipzig's *Corpus Lusatia*, a fraternity-like association of students, rather than to his studies, and that he decided to leave Leipzig because he had tired of that lifestyle.
[83] Cf. Clark (2006), 231-2, Ribbeck (1879), 43ff.

student of Boeckh, Moritz Meier (1796-1855), who had gained his doctorate in Berlin in 1818.[84] Reisig felt he had a righteous claim on the office, which he had not seen fulfilled. The situation got worse in 1828, when Gottfried Bernhardy came to Halle and was nominated ordinary professor and co-director of the seminar with Meier. Halle had essentially turned into a projection of the Hermann-Boeckh dispute, reflected into the enmity between Reisig's society and Meier's Greek section of the Halle seminar. Ritschl had been a member of Reisig's society, and a member of the seminar, too, but apparently only attended the Latin section, as opposed to Meier's Greek section. Ritschl's contribution to the feud between Hermannian and Boeckhian currents in Halle was exercised through his fame as an opponent during disputations, and his efforts were particularly directed against students from the Greek section of the seminar. Clark (2006) writes the following on what happened next:

In 1828, Heinrich Foss, the senior student in the seminar and a devoted disciple of Meier, wrote and tried to defend his doctoral dissertation. Foss himself had previously attacked a student named Wex from Reisig's classics society at Wex's public disputation. Ritschl sought to play the avenger by attempting to destroy Foss at Foss's public

[84] One need only think of the great influence that Boeckh's classical work on the public economy of Athens (1817) had had on Meier, whose first important publication, *Historia Juris Attici de Bonis Damnatorum* (1819), investigated precisely the legal antiquities of Athens. In 1826 Meier also authored a review piece about Boeckh's *CGI,* the *Analyse*, which made its appearance in the *Leipziger Literaturzeitung* n. 238-241 and contained a strong attack on Hermann's critical review of Boeckh's *CGI.* It represents a fundamental piece of the dispute which favoured the explosion of the tension until that point accumulated between, so-called, "new" and "old" conceptions of philology. Cf. Hermann (1826), 78-180 and Most (1997), 355-6.

disputation in 1828. Foss received his doctorate, but the disputational battle between him and Ritschl supposedly not only split the gown but also the town of Halle in two camps.[85]

The dispute had effectively spread, well beyond the university, to the whole city of Halle, where stories of the confrontation between Ritschl and Foss were traveling from mouth to mouth, including sensationalistic extracts from the debate,[86] and the whole city was cheering for one of the two opponents or the other.[87] Even in the context of the prominent disputes and side-taking of nineteenth-century German academia, this episode certainly attracted more public attention than academic matters normally did, and it was perhaps more intense than most.[88]

Nevertheless, much as Ritschl's stand in Halle was informed by personal allegiances to Hermann, later in life Ritschl expressly defended Boeckh's knowledge of language and methods; he opened himself to *sachphilological* positions, suggesting, for example, that "philologists of things", operating on the basis of scant sources, could achieve more than "word philologists" who are too focused on conjectural criticism;[89] overall, Ritschl can certainly also be seen, and is considered

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[85] Clark (2006), 232.

[86] Cf. Clark (2006), 232: Thus people of Halle were repeating excerpts from the debates and, for example, of how on a particular topic Foss was said to have told Ritschl `*tua sententia perversa est*`, and the latter directed at him the cutting answer `*sane quidem, sed mea sententia perversa est per te, tua autem per se.*`

[87] Ribbeck (1879), 46: `Die ganze Stadt, Studenten, Professoren, Gesellschaftszirkel, namentlich auch die Damenwelt soll sich bei der Besprechung dieses Ereignisses in zwei Lager gespalten haben, von denen die eine, aber schwächere Partei den inhumanen Gegner verurtheilte, die andre, zu der die meisten Professoren und fast alle Studenten gehörten, ihm Beifall spendeten. Uebringens haben die beiden Widersacher im späteren Leben Frieden mit einander geschlossen.`

[88] Clark (2006) certainly thinks so, cf. p. 232.

[89] Cf. Ribbeck (1879), 328f., and Benne (2005), 56: `Ritschl nahm im Philologenstreit sogar, unerhört für einen Hermann-Schüler, ausdrücklich Boeckhs Sprachkenntnis und Methode in Schutz. Er plädierte dafür, dass 'Wortphilologen' den 'Sachphilologen' gestatten mögen, bei dürftiger

by some, to stand for an investment in philology combined with a forward-looking programme of *Altertumswissenschaft*,[90] and some historians of philology categorise him `among the warmest admirers of Boeckh.`[91] As demonstrated by those who dismiss Ritschl as merely a "philologist of words", it is already hard to account for such fluidity of perspectives within a purely social and biographical framework – scholars tend to assign Ritschl to either *Wort-* or *Sachphilologie*. However, it would be even harder to reckon with the easiness with which changes in scholarly approaches from *Wort-* to *Sachphilologie*, or the other way around, took place, if we wanted to maintain the presence of a real methodological rift between the two types of philology.[92]

Clark (2006) advanced the hypothesis that the seminar directors in Leipzig and Berlin, Hermann and Boeckh, were sending some students as "spies" to the other seminar. While the fact that some students were going to study from Berlin to Leipzig and vice versa, sometimes even coming back to their original seminar afterwards, is documented,[93] there are, however, no proofs, beyond such speculation, of the fact that the ultimate aim was for the students to act as spies. More likely, students were studying at universities connoted as Hermannian and at more Boeckhian institutions for one simple reason: despite some shift in emphasis,

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Quellenlage über diese hinauszugehen. Sonst müssten sie auch bei sich selbst konsequent sein und auf Konjekturalkritik verzichten, [dass heißt] nur noch mechanisch Lesarten feststellen.`

[90] Cf. Benne (2005), 46ff.

[91] Sandys (1908), 100-101.

[92] See also Jensen (2008), 217-8, on Ritschl as a `Hermannian with growing sympathies towards antiquarianism` and other Boeckhian scholars, like Otto Jahn, who became personally linked to the Hermannians.

[93] Cf. Clark (2006), 501-2.

both trends dealt with philology and the study of antiquity in ultimately similar and transferable ways.

Conclusions

Hermann's school was created on the premise of a common academic experience in Leipzig, mostly built upon a sense of belonging to a community developed around the Greek society and the seminar. An element of elective affinity also probably brought it about that, while some scholars felt strongly their belonging to the Hermannian school, and either took advantage of their friendship with Hermann to further their career aspirations or, as in the case of Ritschl, amplified and propagated the dispute, some others, like Klotz, remained outside the Hermannian community. Hermann's school was based on this kind of personal affinities, in addition to the common background established through scholarly experiences in Leipzig. Descriptive elements such as the concepts of elective affinity and personality ultimately point towards an underlying irrationality that is a distinctive characteristic of the two groups gravitating around Hermann and Boeckh, in the sense indicated by Harloe: `it is not necessarily race, nor shared language, nor other shared customs (such as religion), that bind together a community of this type. This is one aspect of their irrationality—what Anderson terms their 'philosophical poverty and even incoherence.`[94]

[94] Harloe (2013), 16. See also Anderson (2006), 5-7, speaking, albeit in a different context, of communities als being always 'imagined', and Daston (1991) on the Republic of Letters as an immaterial (because lacking location, formal administration, and brick and mortar) but nonetheless

Indeed, Hermann's wish to create a school partly rested upon his commitment to the *ancien régime* and the traditional, "old customs" mentioned in chapter two, a mental landscape made of organisation of powers and relations of patronage; partly, it relied on a sense of community based on irrational more than rational grounds, on a network of personal relationships developed more contingently than methodologically, in a way a result of chance and life circumstances.

The Hermannian school placed itself in opposition to Boeckh's *Sachphilologie*, intended as an expansion of the evidentiary basis for the study of antiquity through the development of new sub-disciplines such as epigraphy, archaeology or numismatics, on the basis of the lack of methodological soundness with which such research was carried on. However, it was never in principle opposed to the use of new methods to approach classical studies. In this light, the appreciation of the social and biographical context of the dispute, and the features and aims of the creation of a Hermannian school, constitute an essential key to reading and fully understanding the dispute.

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real (it exercised dominion over thoughts and deeds) entity.

# Chapter three

## The Metrical Origins of the Dispute:

## *Sensus* or Mathematical Rigour?

Introduction

Poiss (2010) suggests that we date the beginning of the dispute back to the early 1800s, rather than maintaining that it started, as traditionally assumed, after 1825, with the publication of Hermann's review of Boeckh's *CGI*.[1] While generally accepting the proposed dating, this chapter will propose additions to Poiss' frame, but also suggest a *caveat* regarding his conclusions.

Poiss provides evidence for some unfriendly back-and-forth between Hermann and Boeckh that had already occurred between the two well before 1825,[2] but a picture of their academic relationship can benefit from an analysis of further materials and more detail. Poiss suggests that the increased specialisation that was driving the discipline even then inevitably led to rivalry in which Hermann likely felt threatened by Boeckh's vocal incursions into his territory – metrics and Greek tragedy. In particular, Poiss pointed to the natural level of competition that must have been in place between the two scholars, in virtue of the narrow scope of their academic interests, but he also seemed to suggest that Hermann was the wounded

[1] Cf. Hermann (1826), which reprinted also Hermann's 1825 review.
[2] Cf. Poiss (2010), 144-7.

party, and thus the main initiator of the dispute,[3] a conclusion that I consider problematic.

I will present an addition to Poiss' theory, namely a close reading of Hermann and Boeckh's debate playing out in their publications before Hermann's review of the first fascicle of the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions*. This will demonstrate the two scholars' methods in practice, with a close reading of the texts as evidence for the backdating – indeed, while Poiss (2010) discusses some of the original materials of the early dispute, much can be gained from a broader consideration of the dialogue that took place between Hermann and Boeckh in their publications. I argue that the bulk of the evidence for placing the beginning of the dispute in the early 1800s, and for characterising it accurately as a social phenomenon, should be found in the two scholars' quite public discussion, and in particular in the rhetorical expression of how they mutually perceived their attitudes.

In particular, my analysis of the two scholars' debate will show that their words and tone towards each other could hardly be read as a one-sided reaction to a perceived threat. Even though there was an element of inherent competition between the two scholars, we should not, as Poiss seems to suggest, consider the

[3] Cf. ibidem 144: 'Hermann nahm, wie wir aus einem erhaltenen Brieffragment wissen, die Widmung an, doch wenn man den Passus genau liest, stößt man auf erste Anhaltspunkte für das, was kommen sollte: "Ich selbst habe nächst so vielem, was ich daraus gelernt habe, noch den Vortheil davon, daß ich mancher Untersuchung, die ich noch vornehmen wollte und die nun von Ihnen vollendet ist, überhoben sein kann". Im Lob Hermanns versteckt sich auch schon ganz offensichtlich die Konkurrenzsituation, denn der Fluch eines hochspezialisierten Faches ist es ja, dass meist in denjenigen, die eine Leistung am kompetentesten beurteilen können, zugleich auch schon die Rivalen warten. Boeckh brach mit seinem Buch über die attischen Tragiker – daran kann auch die Widmung nichts ändern – in Hermanns bisherige Domäne ein. Und ganz harmlos war Boeckh - nach eigener Einschätzung – auch schon als junger Philologe nicht, sondern vielmehrt "geneigt zu Spott und strengen Urteilen".'

dispute as stemming from Hermann's feelings regarding Boeckh, but rather as the result of two-way academic and personal differences, like so many which characterised German academia of the time. As I will show below, the two scholars' methods were not necessarily per se incompatible. By reading closely new textual materials, which so far have not been studied, I will investigate the different approaches to metrics displayed by Hermann and Boeckh, employing their debate over dactylo-epitrites and the idea of a *sensus*-based philology as examples. In their *querelle* on the dactylo-epitrite each scholar rejected in the other's method something that the former would himself quite readily employ in different contexts. Even though context is obviously not irrelevant, it would be hard not to marvel at the absolute rejection of each other's methods when each scholar was certainly, at least theoretically, able to see some good in a given methodological approach. If we take the language and tone of these exchanges into consideration, we must conclude that mutual, personal animosity was the key element in the unfolding of the dispute.

While arguing against Poiss' conclusion concerning the role of Hermann in being the driving force in the dispute, my analysis relies on the description of the status that Hermann held as an academic in Leipzig and as an authority over both metrics and Greek tragedy, detailed in the previous chapters. I will add to Poiss' argument that the dispute might have its roots well before 1825, with further examination of Hermann and Boeckh's discussion over metre, a particularly useful place to look for the kind of arguments they had with each other. The beginning of the dispute should really be located in Boeckh's first volume of his edition of Pindar

(1811), reacting to Hermann's previous writings on metrics, and in Hermann's *Dissertatione de metrorum quorundam mensura rhythmica* (1815),[4] a publication followed closely by Hermann's *Elementa doctrinae metricae* (1816).[5] Boeckh's reply appeared in the preface to his *Pindarscholien* (1819),[6] followed by Hermann's reply in his *De Epitritis Doriis* (1824),[7] and Boeckh's *De Doriis Epitritis* (1824).[8]

To consider these writings creates two opportunities. On the one hand, they constitute a window on the view that the two men held of each other, which allows us, through the analysis of their language and rhetoric, to draw some conclusions about the level of personal rivalry that was at the origin of their dispute. Even though Poiss has provided some evidence of such an early onset of hostility, the analysis of other publications from these years, fundamental in the timeline of the dispute, can substantially add to the overall picture. These first Hermannian and Boeckhian publications on metrical topics are replete with references to each other, while their language and tone constitute an essential element in the whole picture of Hermann and Boeckh's historical dispute.

The second opportunity comes from examining the content of this early dispute, especially because it emphasises the methodology chosen by Hermann and Boeckh, respectively, to approach problematic matters of metrics and rhythm. This includes the question of the existence of dactylo-epitrites, a metrical form discovered by Hermann and initially denied by Boeckh. The back and forth through

[4] *Opuscula* 2, 105-123.
[5] Cf. esp. p. 647 ff.
[6] Cf. Boeckh (1819), XXXXIII ff.
[7] *Opuscula* 3, 83-97.
[8] *Kl. Schr*. 4, 213-227.

publications between the two casts some light on their *modi operandi* in this field. Hermann's approach is largely based on a notion of *sensus*, guided by his feeling for rhythm at all times and capable of making claims for imprecision when he deems it necessary.[9] Boeckh's approach, instead, is very mathematical, arguably excessively so for the context to which it is applied in the examined case, and it certainly betrays the influence of a personal interest in mathematics, as also reflected by some of his other writings about antiquity.[10] This is another example where the old distinction between *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie* is shown to be misleading. Instead, I will consider the two scholars' methods at both a practical and a theoretical level. It will become clear how the one's or the other's methodology clearly eludes the artificial constraints imposed by the label, and how the reduction to *Wort-* or *Sachphilologie* is ultimately a reduction *ad absurdum*. In particular, in considering Hermann's methods in their own terms, I will draw attention to several elements throughout the chapter. I will consider his practice of analysing ancient poetry according to categories such as "mood", or "character", in order to draw conclusions about its purpose or characteristics. I will draw attention to Hermann's systematic investigation of the performance dimension of ancient drama, even when it needs to be reconstructed on the basis of minimal clues or indications, and through the employment of imagination. Finally, I will analyse the dynamics of Hermann's fine understanding of metrics and rhythm, and the practical results to which Hermann's doctrine of metrics, with its Kantian inspiration, led: a combination of these two

[9] Cf. chapter five for a broader discussion of Hermann's *sensus*.
[10] Cf. Boeckh (1838) on weights and measurements in the ancient world.

elements allowed Hermann to proceed systematically to the categorisation of metres which brought him to the discovery of the dactylo-epitrite metre. I will argue that this methodology is clearly innovative, in the sense of being apt to produce new and positive scholarly results, and as such it should be considered, if anything, in competition with Boeckh's, also ostensibly progressive, historicist approach. This is also one of the reasons why Hermann's philology should be freed from the stigma of backwardness that tends to be associated with it.

## The origins of the dispute: metrics and a personality clash

The dispute over metrics between Hermann and Boeckh unfolded after the publication of Hermann's *Commentatio de metris Pindari* attached to Heyne's edition of Pindar.[11] In 1811 Boeckh published the first volume of his edition of Pindar and, in the introduction, he referenced Hermann's commentary and addressed some of the problematic points he saw with Hermann's doctrine of metrics.[12] Boeckh's comments, however, are striking as they seem to operate on a distinctly personal rather than content-oriented level, characterised by a particularly harsh tone in their criticism of Hermann, and addressing the flaws in Hermann's demeanour as a scholar even more than those in his metrical theories.[13] On both parts a moderate display of *captatio benevolentiae* usually accompanies the harshest critiques – such as,

[11] Heyne and Hermann (1798), 179-356.
[12] Cf. Boeckh (1811).
[13] Similarly, later in the dispute Boeckh will observe *apropos* Hermann: et Hermannum intellegerem armis pugnare ex sua magis meaque persona petitis quam ex re et ratione, cf. Boeckh (1819), XXXVIII.

for example, Boeckh's depiction of the excessive volatility of Hermann's opinions in his philological practice, which is correctly identified by Boeckh as a trait of Hermann's scholarship. Along with the details concerning Hermann's persona and public perception, discussed earlier, the dialogue between Hermann and Boeckh concerning metrics offers further significant evidence to place the beginning of the dispute beyond its traditional narrative. The tones of the aforementioned, not always content-focused critiques interest us for the purpose of analysing the onset of the dispute and its retro-dating to the first decade of the nineteenth century, which helps to demonstrate how the famous dispute was not grounded first and foremost in substantial differences in approaches towards philology, but instead in a socio-biographical element.

Hermann's *Commentatio de metris Pindari* (1798) looks like a small critical edition within Heyne's own edition of the *Epinicia*. Although comments on the text are largely devoted to metrical observations, the style of the *Commentatio* is very similar to that of Hermann's critical editions of tragedy, and his commentary is only slightly less extensive, by comparison with his practice in his editions of the tragedians. This indirectly gives an idea of how many of Hermann's observations are dedicated to metrics: metrics is normally a core part of Hermann's emendatory practice, so that, when asked to write a commentary about Pindar's metrics, Hermann provided a commentary just like any other, where the density of the observations of a metrical nature appears to be only slightly higher. Despite the fact

that the focus of his contribution to Heyne's edition was supposed to be metrics, in fact, Hermann had no qualms about extending his comments beyond that.

Heyne's request to Hermann to write a metrical appendix for his edition of Pindar constituted a form of recognition of the status of Hermann in relation to the discipline of metrics at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hermann was well aware of that, as he writes in the opening of his *Commentatio*:

> I received from Heyne a letter full of courtesy and kindness, where he told me that he would be grateful if I could write a dissertation on Pindar's metrics for the edition of that poet that he was preparing. Despite foreseeing that it would be a task full of trouble and difficulties, I did not hesitate to accept it, as a consequence of the good judgement of that most esteemed man that honoured me, and my great eagerness to perfect and improve the doctrine of metrics.[14]

Hermann presented himself as the only man who would be up to the difficult task of emending the metrics of Pindar, and the one whom Heyne deemed the most deserving to be called to the task. On the other hand, the agreement between Hermann and Heyne did not indicate that the former should limit his comments solely to matters related to metrics, as Hermann states clearly: 'I have taken advantage of the great courtesy of Heyne, who asked me only to dedicate myself to

[14] Heyne and Hermann (1798), 179: [..] quum literae a Chr. G. Heynio mihi allatae sunt, plenae humanitatis ac benevolentia, quibus ille gratum sibi fore significabat, si novae editioni Pindari, quam ipse pararet, disputationem de eius poeta metris adiicerem. Quam etsi plenam difficultatis et molestiae esse praevidebam, tamen, quominus eam in me recipere dubitarem, tum ipsa viri celeberrimi honorifica de me existimatio, tum excolendae etiam perficiendaeque artis metricae haud levis cupiditas effecit.

metrics but, at the same time, did not want me to refrain from any comments, should I believe that something besides metre must be emended.'[15]

Hermann's fame in the field of metrics had been well established through his disputes over Greek tragedy with Richard Porson, especially in the two editions of *Hecuba* that appeared at the turn of the nineteenth century and constituted a back-and-forth between the two scholars on several interpretative matters, with particular attention to metrics.[16] Both scholars were pioneers in the study of ancient metrics, following in the steps of Richard Bentley, and it was in the context of the dispute over *Hecuba* that Porson's famous Bridge was postulated.[17]

In his interpretation of the dispute over metrics, Poiss (2010) suggests that Hermann was feeling threatened by the younger Boeckh's rising fame as an expert on metrics, which would question Hermann's image as the national authority on the ancient doctrine.[18] In support of this argument, Poiss mentions the example of Thiersch's edition of Pindar, which followed Boeckh's restoration of Pindar's text, suggesting that it would constitute one of the proofs that Boeckh's fame as an expert on metrics, and his accomplishments as such, were surpassing Hermann's.[19] Here we would need to enter the realm of psychological speculation, where nothing certain can be established – in the light of the status of Hermann's academic career,

[15] Ibidem, 182: In qua re insigni comitate usi sumus Heynii, qui quum metri tantummodo curam nobis demandasset, tamen etiam, si quid praeter metri necessitatem mutandum censeremus, id silentio ab nobis praeteriri noluit.
[16] Cf. Medda (2010), 222 ff.
[17] Cf. Battezzato (2009), 157, on how the Porson's Bridge was recognised as a metrical rule by Hermann, rather than by Porson.
[18] Cf. above, note 3.
[19] Cf. Poiss (2010), 146.

as shown in the previous chapters, and the regard in which his publications on metrics were held, it looks like Hermann would not have had much to fear from the younger colleague; however, he might have nonetheless perceived a threat coming from the young Boeckh. Certainly the "knightly", pugnacious character of Hermann's persona made him inclined to take on academic quarrels, as it is well documented. What seems to me questionable is Poiss' acceptance of the traditional narrative of the dispute as motivated by Hermann's attack to Boeckh: even though the context, after the retro-dating of the origins of the dispute, is no longer the *CGI*, Hermann's discontent with Boeckh seems to be taken for granted as the spark of the dispute. Instead, we could benefit from considering afresh not only the dating of the origins of the dispute but also the dynamics that led to it. Especially when we look at the public exchanges between Hermann and Boeckh, it seems difficult to identify with certainty Hermann as the most prominent originating force in the dispute.

From a broader perspective, both Hermann and Boeckh made important contributions to the field of classical metrics. Hermann laid the foundation for a scientific understanding of Greek metrics, while Boeckh's contribution followed in those footsteps and pointed to the connection between metrics and music, investigating Greek music and instruments, rhythm as well as musical harmony. Heyne's edition of Pindar, with Hermann's *Commentatio*, reached its third edition in 1817-24. Overall, the extent and historical value of Hermann's publications on metrics is comparable to Boeckh's edition of Pindar, which became and remained the most complete edition of the poet for a long time, while Hermann's efforts to

affirm the concept that metres should be determined by objective standards are at the basis of the modern study of metrics.[20]

Looking at the early exchanges between the two scholars, Boeckh's comments on Hermann's doctrine of metrics cannot appear as the words of a man without animosity. On the contrary, they often seem very critical of a man, Hermann, whose authority was perceived as excessive. If perhaps we can in part agree that Hermann might have felt the pressure of Boeckh's competition, we must take note, however, that Boeckh's remarks on Hermann's theory of metrics, and on Hermann himself, were harshly critical themselves. Furthermore, we should consider that it was Boeckh who cast the first stone.

The language of the personal and the moral

Both Hermann's and Boeckh's writings of this period generally begin with a form of *captatio benevolentiae*, a tendency that is not only typical of these early writings but will remain a constant of even their most confrontational publications,[21] a quite established form of exaggerated politeness that extends beyond Hermann and Boeckh's texts to those of their contemporaries and predecessors, an established formality which often appears even in pamphlets and publications of a polemical nature.

[20] On both Hermann and Boeckh's contributions to the field of metrics, cf. Tessier (1995, 2007), Liberman (2010), Poiss (2013), West (1982) 4f., Gentili and Lomiento (2003), 38.
[21] Cf. Hermann (1826), 11-13, where, in the preface, he comments on his relationship with Boeckh as one of friendship, despite being in the middle of the dispute.

In the introduction to the second volume of his edition of Pindar, dedicated to the scholia (1819), Boeckh starts out by addressing Hermann as 'an esteemed man' who likes Boeckh as much as Boeckh likes him – a choice of words as amusing as it is ambiguous, only to be clarified by what immediately follows: 'who, however, first represents himself as having found the same treasure already, and then mistakes for gold the coal that he has found.'[22] Having eliminated any trace of ambiguity about the amount of mutual liking involved, Boeckh, then, offers a judgement on Hermann's theory of metrics:

For Hermann, whose famous merits in the field of ancient metrics I believe nobody praises more than I do, seems to be fully wrong when he says that he has determined the real boundaries of the doctrine of metrics: thus he denies that anything useful could be added to the science of metrics beyond the things found by himself and his disciples. He imparts orders, being aware of his authority and not seldom with a dictatorial voice. Finally, indefatigable in invention, he piles conjectures upon conjectures to support his views.[23]

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[22] Boeckh (1819) XXXVII: Itaque cum uno nunc Hermanno agam, homine et amplissimo et mihi ita favente ut ego ipsi faveo: qui tamen modo eundem se thesaurum dudum invenisse perhibet, modo pro auro carbones inventos decernit.

[23] Ibidem, XXXVIII: Nam Hermannus, cuius praeclara de metris veterum merita nemo credo magis quam ego praedicat, in eo omnino falli videtur, quod metricae doctrinae fines universos sese emensum esse arbitratur: unde fit, ut praeter sua et suorum discipulorum inventa ad artem metrorum utile quidquam allatum esse neget; suae sibi auctoritatis conscius haud raro dictatoria voce imperet: postremo in fingendo indefessus, ad rationes suas tuendas coniecturas coniecturis cumulet.

Note also the similarity between Hermann and Bentley in this judgement of Hermann's methods – namely, the practice of providing many examples while nonetheless coming from a place of aprioristically perceived authority and righteousness, cf. chapter one, notes 16-17.

The wordplay is the same as above, where Boeckh started out with a mockery disguised as praise, and then declared that the foundation of metrics stipulated by Hermann seemed to be 'fully wrong'. Furthermore, Boeckh's observations highlight Hermann's authoritative character and his tendency to favour his disciples, or others close to him, over anyone else. As already evidenced in the previous chapters, Boeckh offers a negative view of two elements that must have been apparent to anybody belonging to the learned circles of early nineteenth-century Germany: the stature of Hermann's persona in the public eye, and Hermann's circle of followers and imitators. Indeed, Boeckh's words closely resemble another classicist's, Robert Scott (of 'Liddell and Scott'), who in 1839 wrote the following about Hermann:

> This venerable man has long outlived the freaks which brought him under the lash of Porson... His pre-eminence cannot be disputed; pity only it is that he wishes to reign like the Turk, with no brother near the throne; and declares war against all and sundry who will not join his party... Our readers may smile at the use of such a word as party, in connexion with the dead languages and their literature. Political England has other excitements.[24]

It is clear that this view of Hermann was not unique to Boeckh, but Boeckh was, so to speak, in the front line of academic confrontation with Hermann. Thus, we should not only date the dispute back to the early 1800s, rather than placing its beginning in 1825; but we should also take a step further than the one made by

[24] Scott (1839), 317; quoted in Stray (1997), 363.

Poiss (2010), who still holds that the dispute originated primarily in Hermann's resentment of or uneasiness around Boeckh, and entertain instead the idea that Boeckh's contribution to the ignition of the dispute could have been greater than, or at least equal to Hermann's. This is an important point because it deflects from the standard narrative according to which the dispute originated, in 1825, as a consequence of Hermann's ill-founded and misguided criticism of Boeckh's endeavours in the field of epigraphy. As it will be shown in chapter four, Hermann's criticism of Boeckh's project could hardly be considered to be without cause; despite Hermann's review of the *CGI* being narrowly focused on the methods rather than, more broadly and charitably, on the academic merit of Boeckh's pioneering project, it could hardly be thought the product only of Hermann's feelings regarding Boeckh. The writings of the early 1810s analysed in this chapter cast further light upon Boeckh's idea of Hermann – or upon Boeckh's personal take on a probably quite widespread view of Hermann. The recognition of a specific character in Hermann and his academic persona might not have been unique to Boeckh, but the latter's reaction to it, for obvious reasons, certainly was. The stature of Hermann's persona in the public eye and Hermann's circle of followers and imitators were very much on Boeckh's mind, and he considered them counterproductive to advancing the study of metrics. When Boeckh writes that Hermann would not accept any contribution to his idea of the science of metrics, unless it came from himself or his disciples, Boeckh emphasises an element of personal animosity between the two: he attributed to Hermann a tendency to

polemicise against him for the sake of it, fueled by a prejudice against anything that Boeckh might have to add to the conversation about metrics.

G. W. Most has wisely warned us against the temptation to attribute historical disputes solely to personal rivalries and grudges between their promoters.[25] But the passages here examined show that this dispute was almost in essence a personal matter. There were surely differences in the chosen methodologies, but the *querelle* was indeed also carried out in the language of the personal, and the personal attacks between Hermann and Boeckh started early and persisted long even before the two started discussing matters of philology and interpretation.[26] If Hermann's doctrine of metrics, unconventional insofar as it broke with the classic metrical tradition, was bound to give rise to Boeckh's objections, their discussion unfolded and evolved by means of references to personality and personal demeanour rather than strictly privileging matters of content. Passages like the following account of Hermann's personality by Boeckh show how much the dispute was carried out in the language of the personal, and, importantly, the moral:

For, if a man spoke carefully and cautiously, I would consider it bearable – but what should we think, if Hermann speaks? He is the hastiest, indeed most hot-headed person I know, and, hostile to others with equal obstinacy, he retracts his own opinions so many

[25] Cf. Most (1997), 350.
[26] Indeed, the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh falls within the framework of the *wissenschaftliche Polemik* in Germany described, for example, by Osterkamp (1996) in the context of Winckelmann's life; see also Harloe (2013) on the active role of polemic in the history of classical scholarship.

times, that it looks like his books contain things similar to the Heraclitean road up and road down, in which there is nothing solid, unless, confronted with someone's opposing view, it is fixed beforehand under the impetus of that difference of opinion.[27]

The amendment of his own previous emendations was certainly a feature of Hermann's textual criticism –[28] and, I will argue in chapter five, also one of the problematic points of weakness of his programmatic metrical Kantianism. Boeckh suggested that, seeing through Hermann's theories and writings, nothing certain remains in place, and anything can be true as much as its opposite. This is a frequent problem in philology, where variant readings and conjectures are often polarising and incompatible with one other. The fact that Hermann had a tendency to change his mind or to review his own proposals is, as I will argue in chapter five, symptomatic of the instability of his metrical-hermeneutical system, but not really a reason to claim that for Hermann all interpretations were interchangeable, as Boeckh seems to hint provocatively. Different readings are very often possible in philology, a field in which uncertainty can be considered almost inherent, due to the vast lack of evidence with which scholars of antiquity must cope. A change of mind is almost expected, considering the conditions under which philologists are asked to propose their versions of the truth. What is unexpected is for someone as

[27] Boeckh (1819) XXXVIII-XXXIX: Quod si homo timidus et circumspectus diceret, ferendum ego iudicarem: quid vero censebimus, si Hermannus dicit, quo ego si non festinantiorem, certe fervidiorem neminem novi, qui in pari adversus alios pertinacia ipse suas sententias toties retractavit, ut in eius libris veluti in Euripo Heraclitea illa ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω expressa esse videatur, in qua nihil firmum constet, nisi occurrente cuius adversaria sententia discordiae illius vi prius defixum sit? The reference is to Heraclitus, Fragment 60: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὠυτή, 'the road up and the road down are one and the same.'

[28] Cf. Itsumi (2009), 112, 116-120.

'authoritative' – to use Boeckh's vocabulary – as Hermann to be able to openly change his opinion with such ease and frequency, especially given the almost oracular nature of philological insight that Hermann presents to his readers and academic audience. From this perspective, we can perhaps better sense how much Boeckh's remarks operated at a personal level. Changes of opinion can be a sign of a healthy, rather than unhealthy, philology, and perhaps even more so for Hermann, if he was, more or less self-consciously willing to go beyond the self-imposed dogma of his Kantianism, when interpretative necessity seemed to him to demand doing so.[29]

For his part, Hermann's tone towards Boeckh at this stage is generally dismissive, and much less heated than that of his colleague. First of all, Hermann only bothers to address Boeckh's critiques of his idea of the existence of dactylo-epitrites[30] in 1824, with his *De Epitritis Doriis*, almost ten years after formulating the discovery in *De metrorum quorundam mensura rhythmica dissertatio* (1815). Secondly, when Hermann does answer Boeckh, he does so very condescendingly, saying that he would have preferred Boeckh to see the truth by himself, without needing his help: 'I was hoping [..] that the excellent man, who wrote with a somewhat agitated spirit and not without passion, would afterwards spontaneously change his mind:

[29] On this cf. also chapter five, pp. 292ff. and note 88.
[30] Cf. below, note 31.

however, because I see that he remains of his opinion, I will use this opportunity to debate that matter again.'[31]

From this we might gather that Hermann, too, considered Boeckh's tone slightly excessive. Hermann's initial praise of the colleague mirrors Boeckh's *captatio benevolentiae*; however, what follows is a display of indifference and superiority rather than an attack on his opponent, to whom Hermann essentially suggests with impatience that admitting defeat would have been the opponent's quickest option. He then goes on to say that Boeckh's arguments, as laid out in his *Pindarscholien* (1819), against Hermann's metrical theories, are invalid. This is not demonstrated by Hermann by means of rational arguments but, from the very beginning, Hermann limits himself to stating that Boeckh's 'whole discussion rests on arguments whose validity I do not see as having been demonstrated.'[32] About one third of Boeckh's introduction to his *Pindarscholien* is dedicated, quite off-topic, to critiquing Hermann's theories, while Hermann's answer comprises a thirteen-page dissertation. In conclusion, Hermann's authority and self-perception do play a fundamental role in the dispute, and particularly at this stage, but evidence for Hermann's one-sided initiation of the dispute seems to be lacking.

[31] *De Epitritis Doriis* = *Opuscula* 3, 83: sperabam enim virum praestantissimum [Boeckh], quae animo nonnihil commoto neque a cupiditate vacuo scripsisset, postmodo sponte retractaturum: nunc tamen, quoniam permanere eum in sententia sua video, utar hac scribendi opportunitate ad illam rem iterum disceptandam.

[32] Ibidem, 84: Nititur enim omnis eius disputatio argumentis, quorum veritatem non video demonstratam esse.

Innovative approaches and a narrow-focus *querelle*

One of the sites of the debate between Hermann and Boeckh about metrics was the dactylo-epitrite metre. This debate exemplifies Hermann's and Boeckh's approaches towards metrics and it also casts light onto some interesting aspects of their philological approaches. It is not a negligible fact that the debate also happens to show how clearly both Hermann and Boeckh in their scholarship were comfortable operating at the microscopic level of the textual *minutiae* (in this case, as I will show when illustrating the focus of this debate, the term could not be more appropriate) of metrics and rhythm. Boeckh's philology, far from distinguishing itself from Hermann's for being uniquely interested in the big picture or the broad investigation of antiquity, was perfectly at ease dealing with matters of narrow and specific focus.

The discovery of the metre in which the poems of Simonides, Bacchylides and Pindar are composed is attributed to Hermann because he was the first to recognise the distinctive metrical pattern, which will later take the name of dactylo-epitrites, in the poetry of Pindar. Boeckh's initial reaction to Hermann's suggestion that some parts of the metrical structure of Pindar's odes might be better understood by means of the notion of the dactylo-epitrite was one of decisive opposition. This reaction rested on two pillars: an appeal to ancient descriptions of metrics and one to mathematical precision in considering rhythm.

Boeckh's first criticism of Hermann's identification of dactylo-epitrites as a metrical form in Pindar's poetry is that 'among neither the ancients nor the moderns

is there anybody who passes on something about those metres, and history declares that among the Greeks they never existed.'[33]

Next, Boeckh states that his own approach to metrics does not consist of 'somewhat external and mechanical laws', as does Hermann's metrical theory, 'but is based on the Greeks, the wisest masters of such discipline for a long time, whose deep knowledge does not seem to be appreciated by Hermann and seems to be neglected for new things [..].'[34] Hermann's philosophy of metrics was, in fact, based not only on traditional metrical forms, but mostly on finding new metrical forms independently from tradition, within a general framework of a wholesale reformation of metrics on a completely modern basis (the Kantian *a priori* principles).

Boeckh continues by saying that 'the epitrite type has been forgotten among the Greeks so early that Plato himself, who however commended the Doric music more than any other, only knew three types of metre, [..], along with Aristoxenus and recent Greek authors of music.'[35] Thus, Boeckh encourages us to do 'away with Doric epitrites', saying that critics like Hermann are 'wasting time trying to establish

[33] Boeckh (1819), XXXXV: sed ideo hoc facit, quod [..] neque veterum neque recentiorum quisquam quidquam de talibus numeris tradidit, eosque apud Graecos numquam exstitisse historia clamat.
[34] Ibidem, XXXXI: Sed mea ratio ita comparata est, non ut in externis quibusdam et quodammodo mechanicis numeri legibus consistam, sed ut Graecis, harum rerum longe sapientissimis magistris, quorum profundam scientiam ab Hermanno contemptam et novitiis placitis posthabitam video, obsecutus, numerorum vim et moralem indolem cognoscam, perfectiores numeros ab imperfectis distinguam, quidque pro re nata in quoque musices et poesis genere audere liceat, quantum possum inveniam.
[35] Ibidem, XXXXV: Accedit quod epitritum genus tam mature apud Graecos oblitteratum [*sic*] est, ut ipse Plato, qui tamen Doriam harmoniam maxime omnium probabat, nonnisi tria numeri genera noverit, de quo una cum Aristoxeno et recentibus musices auctoribus Graecis monui Metr. Pind. lib. I. p. 24. Igitur apage Dorios epitritos. At operam in ista doctrina convincenda lusimus: Proteum facilius continueris. Scilicet haec difficultas est, quae expediri nequit: ille epitritus ne epitritus quidem est.

such doctrine'[36] and that 'this is of such difficulty, that it is not possible to find out what is or is not an epitrite.'[37]

Thus Boeckh, in his criticism, appealed to the Greek metricians as the only acceptable source for determining the existence of metres, displaying an attitude in sharp contrast to Hermann's proposal of a wholly new metrical system.[38] This tension partially reverses the traditional dynamics of the dispute, insofar as Hermann takes the role of the innovator, who does not believe in the sufficiency of the rules of metrics given by the ancients, while Boeckh defends the latter against Hermann's new theory of metrics based on Kantianism.

The dynamic between, on one side, Boeckh's strongly historicist argument – according to which if something is not attested in the ancient metrical texts, then it is not a valid category – and, on the other side, Hermann's attempt at innovation and surpassing of the ancient prescriptions about metrics somewhat disrupts the traditional interpretation of the interplay around the *CGI*. In the context of the *CGI*, usually, the conflict is presented as one between Hermann's conservativeness and Boeckh's progressiveness, whereas here, in the *querelle* over metrics, we see how both approaches could be considered progressive in their own right. Considering, if we may, two circumstances which have equally been proven right by the future developments of the discipline, we see how history has rewarded Hermann's

[36] Ibidem. Hermann answers in *De epitritis doriis* (= Opuscula 3, p. 84) that there is mention of a "four-thirds" (sesquitertia) proportion, also listed by Aristoxenus, and so it is not completely lost in ancients sources on Greek metrics. See also pp. 90-91 on Plato.
[37] Ibidem.
[38] Indeed, Hermann believed that the ancients had often been quite mistaken in their classifications of metres, cf. Hermann (1796), 1-3 and chapter five.

discovery of dactylo-epitrites as much as it has regarded Boeckh's contribution to epigraphy as a fundamental step in the modern development of the field.[39] If Hermann was right about the existence of dactylo-epitrites as being a distinctive metrical form in Pindar's poetry, then Boeckh's attitude towards Hermann on this point mimics the latter's attitude towards the former concerning ancient inscriptions that is portrayed in the usual narrative of the dispute. Namely, in Boeckh's efforts to undermine Hermann's innovation in the field of metrics we can recognise the idea of Hermann's attack to Boeckh's *CGI* project, and with the project also, metaphorically, the pivotal importance that it would assume in the history of epigraphy. Boeckh, as seen above, calls upon the ancient Greek witnesses and metricians, and because he can find no trace nor mention of dactylo-epitrites there, he concludes that the metre does simply not exist, dismissing Hermann's theory as too contrived – and, as we will see below, lacking in exactness. In other words, here we can see a role reversal with respect to the traditional narrative of the dispute according to which Boeckh, with his *CGI* project, is presented as the innovator, attacked by Hermann in the name of a traditional way of doing philology and with a certain blindness towards the new wave of *Alterthumswissenschaft*; in the debate over metrics, instead, we see Boeckh's own reluctance to accept Hermann's proposal to make over the field of metrics from a distinctly contemporary perspective.

[39] Cf. Hendrick (2006), 118 and Gagos and Potter (2009), 48, on how Boeckh's *CGI* initiated the modern study of epigraphy, producing the first systematic effort to collect all known Greek inscriptions from the Mediterranean world and establishing fundamental principles for the collection of inscriptions.

Finally, the discussion about the dactylo-epitrite will show that Boeckh's metrical interpretation was extensively based on an attempt at mathematical exactness, which sought often literal textual analysis. By contrast, Hermann's approach relied on feeling or *sensus* in a way that encouraged to disregard the extreme attention to the *minutiae* of rhythm invoked by Boeckh. This is notable because Hermann's criticism to the first fascicle of the *CGI* was largely motivated by his concern with the alleged lack of precision in Boeckh's collection and representation of the inscriptions, thus with the excess of approximation in the latter's work. As I will show further in chapter four, Hermann's critique was part of a larger concern with the employment, in philology, of tools which were elusive in nature, the so-called notion of *Anschauungen* of the ancient world.[40] In the discussion on the dactylo-epitrite, instead, Hermann advocated against Boeckh's reliance on mathematical rigour and precise calculation of the tiniest fractions of metrical units. Conversely, Boeckh's insistence on extreme mathematical precision is absent from the thoughts in his *Encyclopedia*, where he abdicates the possibility of precision in favour of a philosophy of approximation. Even though the background context for the two methodologies was, of course, different, we should take note of the fluidity with which the two scholars' methods could go from demanding rigour and precision to, with equal ease, embracing a philosophy of approximation, in the case of Hermann structured by *sensus* and a consistent grasp of the fundamental role played by the loose, performance-related dimension behind the ancient plays.

[40] Cf. also chapter four, note 86.

Hermann's practice of interpreting metrical passages proves to be fully consequentialist and reliant on the importance of achieving good outcomes[41] in opposition to the model proposed by Boeckh, one of careful and calculated mathematical reckoning of metrics, which, for Hermann, had no place in the performance-based framework of ancient poetry.

Therefore, the *querelle* regarding metrics, at the origin of the dispute, did not at all configure itself as a battle between *Wortphilologica*l and *Sachphilological* methods, and thus not at all as an opposition between two trends of philology, but it was indeed all focused on words and their metrical-rhythmical dimension in the ancient texts.

The dactylo-epitrite

The *querelle* between Hermann and Boeckh about the dactylo-epitrite metre originated over Pindar's *Epinicia*. [42] Composed in a literary language which combines an overall colouring of Doric with the language of epic and a number of Aeolic features, Pindar's *Epinicia* are written in either Doric or Aolic metres.[43] Twenty-three out of forty-five of Pindar's epinician odes are of the Doric type,

[41] Cf. chapter five, pp. 291ff.

[42] See Szczepaniak (2013), 247: 'The term "dactylo-epitrites" is not of an ancient origin, nor is it the only one suggested by modern scholars. In addition to it, we can also find such names as "Doric metres", "Chalcidian metres", "dactylo-trochaic" and "anapaesto-iambic", κατ' ἐνόπλιον εἶδος or κατ' ἐνόπλιον-epitriti. Each of these terms provides us with some information on the presupposed nature, provenance or the general character of the metre under discussion. Only two of them, however, have gained considerable attention and seem to be well established. These are: "dactylo-epitrites" (the term used in this book but not without serious reservations) and κατ' ἐνόπλιον-epitriti.'

[43] With the exception of *Olympian* XIII, which mixes Aeolic with dactylo-epitrite. Cf. Dale 1969 (J 19) 41-97, and Nisetich 1980 (J 81) 31-9.

composed in a metre called dactylo-epitrite, in which dactylic cola are combined with iambo-trochaic metra and, occasionally, other elements.[44]

Line division in ancient commentaries was different from that of modern editions and for Pindar generally followed the division of lines in shorter metrical lengths provided by the Alexandrian scholars. Although Heyne's edition of Pindar, for which Hermann prepared a metrical appendix, preserves the line division of ancient tradition, Hermann was the first to recognise longer metrical periods, the dactylo-epitrites.

The discovery of dactylo-epitrites is one example of how the inspiring principle behind Hermann's theory of metrics proved useful, if not for its epistemological value (which will be challenged in chapter five) then at least as a form of encouragement to recognise and collect metrical forms: descripto enim versuum ambitu, caetera ex iis, quae cuiusque numeri propriae leges sunt, facile perspiciuntur.[45] Its Kantian framework is – as I will argue in chapter five – redundant, but the fundamental principle of identifying basic metrical forms and using them to measure the text remains an incontrovertible good practice of modern metrics and philology. A case for this judgement can be made by observing that nobody before Hermann had noticed the presence of a distinctive metrical pattern in the poetry of Pindar, which was thought to be characterised by the same metrical structures typical of dramatic lyric poetry, rather than by a distinctive metrical

[44] See West (1982), 69 and Bowra (1933), 81: 'Pindar may have called it 'Dorian.' Cf., *Ol*. III 5 Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ.'

[45] Hermann (1798), 182: once the scope of the metre has been described, everything else is easily seen from the rules proper to each metre.

type.[46] Hermann was the first to recognise the presence of this particular metrical structure, later going by the name of dactylo-epitrites,[47] which Hermann called Doric epitrites, [48] and which appear also in the poetry of Simonides and Bacchylides.[49]

Dactylo-epitrites are composed mainly of two elements, a dactylic series – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ – (–), also known as 'prosodiac', and what used to be called an epitrite, in the form – ∪ – (–), which could be seen as a trochaic dipody with a lengthened last syllable, or in the form – – ∪ –. Both forms have a characteristic ratio of 4:3 – hence the name of the metre.[50]

To describe dactylo-epitrites Paul Maas devised a notation for the metrical units that are the most commonly in use in the poems and fragments of Simonides, Bacchylides and Pindar:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| – ∪ ∪ – | $d^1$ | – ∪ – | e |
| ∪ ∪ – | $d^2$ | – ∪ – X – ∪ – | E |
| – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ – | D | | |

These units are used in various combinations, often joined by means of an anceps element (generally long) that works as a link before, between or after a unit.[51] Maas' proposed notation allows us to better analyse dactylo-epitrites on the

[46] Richardson (1992), 240.
[47] Ibidem, 239.
[48] The name dactylo-epitrites was introduced by Hermann's student Rudolph Westphal (1889). Cf. Snell (1962), 41.
[49] It is not clear whether Pindar, Bacchylides and Simonides developed dactylo-epitrites independently or as a result of the influence of one of them on the others. Cf. Ibidem, 41-42.
[50] Cf. ibidem and Bowra (1933), 81.
[51] Cf. Snell (1962), 41.

basis of the most common units, although it is not meant to indicate that those poets composed according to such metrical units, considering them as metrical feet, but rather it aims at constituting a useful tool for modern metrical analysis, and it remains a controversial but predominant notation system in modern analysis.

Because of the relative compositional freedom inherent in such metrical form, Hermann's discovery of dactylo-epitrites did not come without raising perplexities, and scholars are still debating the exact nature of dactylo-epitrites. Dorian lyric was after all characterised by the extensive use of dactylic and aeolic cola and by the tendency to create long and complex periods and strophes.[52] Although the use of dactylo-epitrites in Simonides, Bacchylides and Pindar is now conventionally recognised, we could easily read e (– ∪ –) as an acephalic iamb (∧ia), E (– ∪ – X – ∪ –) as a lekythion (lk), and so on. To contribute to the confusion, dactylo-epitrites are a somewhat elusive metrical form, presenting more difficulties than others: sometimes, although not very often, periods of dactylo-epitrites end with catalectic forms of e or E; D cola present contraction of the first biceps; we find imperfect strophic responsion, a normally allowed licence to accommodate for proper names; we are not always able to distinguish period end, especially in short poems; sometimes resolution of a long element, contraction of a biceps or the correspondence of a short element to a long element are tolerated; ancipites

[52] Stesichorus, Ibycus and Alcman made extensive use of these metres, whose categorisation is sometimes difficult and always open to multiple interpretations – even though some are more convenient than others. Cf. West (1987), 35-42.

elements are used freely, so that in some cases an extra anceps element occurs, or one is missing.[53]

The complexity and ambiguities inherent in such a metrical system provoked Boeckh's scepticism of the idea of the dactylo-epitrite as a distinctive, new metrical form to read Pindar's poetry. In the *Commentatio de metris Pindari* Hermann does not directly identify dactylo-epitrites as a category of Pindaric metra, but rather still considers them part of the category of 'paeonic and other longer metres' (de versibus paeonicis et aliis longioribus),[54] based on various combinations and expansions on the paeonic metre, composed of one long syllable and three short ones in any order (viz., a cretic – ∪ – or a bacchius ∪ – – with a resolution, or a tribrach ∪ ∪ ∪ and pyrrhic ∪ ∪ jointly).[55] The debut of dactylo-epitrites as a category of metres is in Hermann's *De metrorum quorundam mensura rhythmica dissertatio* (1815),[56] which provoked Boeckh's answer in the introduction to his *Pindarscholien* (1819).

The name dactlylo-epitrites suggests that the metre is composed of dactyls and the so-called epitrites, namely metres usually interpreted as trochaic or iambic having a slightly heavier and slower rhythm than the one of trochees and iambics found in other structures. This slower movement is due to the predominance of long syllables in places of an anceps element and to the fact that resolution tends to

[53] Cf. ibidem, 43-4 and West (1982), 75.
[54] Cf. Hermann (1798), 232-4.
[55] Cf. Anthon (1838), 111.
[56] Cf. *Opuscula* 2, 105-123.

be avoided. The dactylic part of the metre indicates sequences such as – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ –, – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ – –, – – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ –, or – – ∪ ∪ – ∪ ∪ – –.

The problem that led Hermann to his "discovery" is that the last two of the "dactylic" examples are, however, rising, not, as we might expect, falling. This poses the question of whether we are really dealing with dactyls here, a question over which there has been much debate. Hermann analysed such rising rhythms as caused by an anacrusis,[57] discouraging us from considering epitrites as trochaic or iambic metres. Boeckh, on the other hand, had no objections against considering such sequences as trochaic, although, as explained below, he considered some sequences as 'irrational trochees'. Following Hermann and Boeckh there has been much disagreement about the nature of this rhythm, some considering the rising "dactylic" sequences as anapaests (Masqueray 1899), some as ionic and choriambic (Blass 1898), or relaunching the idea of dactylo-trochaic metres, rejecting the idea of anacrusis and advancing the idea of a class of rising dactyls in which the first element, as opposed to anacrusis, constitutes an inseparable whole with what follows (Fraenkel), just to name a few. Analogically, in addition to the ascending class of dactyls, we also have rising trochaics (the seeming iambics). The general scientific consensus is that the epitrite rhythm is trochaic in nature, however epitrites are commonly preserved in the text by modern editors even when they could be avoided by emendation. On the one hand this confirms Boeckh's opinion about the trochaic nature of the metre, but on the other hand epitrites are

[57] Cf. Hermann (1816), 6-11.

considered as a metrical form independent from the trochaic dipody, as Hermann wanted.

Affinities and divergencies between the modern and ancient perceptions of rhythm

Hermann's and Boeckh's different ideas of rhythm point to two opposite approaches which bear significant practical consequences for their attitude towards metrical emendation. In the introduction to his volume of *Pindarscholien* (1819), Boeckh recognises the difference between metrics and rhythm, and his theoretical definition of the two is similar to Hermann's. For the latter, metrics refers to the structure of long and short elements in which the text is written, and rhythm refers to the way the text is sung or recited during performance. Boeckh, similarly, speaks of how, looking only at the composition of the verses on the page, we can see only two lengths – long and short – but poetical language, especially when accompanied by singing, musical instruments and dancing, behaves as if it actually had a greater variety of lengths and as if it made a broader use of metrical feet than what we can see from the metrical scheme of the words.[58] The fundamental difference between Hermann's approach and Boeckh's view of this aspect of poetry lies in the fact that Hermann, first of all, is focused on the identification of the practical working mechanisms of metrics with a view to reconciling them with the performance-based nature of Greek poetry. For Hermann, the philologist must be able to conjure up in

[58] See Boeckh (1819), XXXXIII.

his interpretation, even in the absence of concrete evidence, the register pertaining to each part of the text as intended by its author and delivered to its audience;[59] he aims at recreating, through the imagination, actual performance effects and modalities.

Boeckh, on the contrary, considers the loss or inaccessibility of information regarding the moment of performance an irreparable damage, and he therefore concludes that 'rhythmical metres are such that it is not possible to see clearly where they are used in poetry'.[60] Hence, the philologist should simply avoid trying to explain those metres.

Hermann's philosophy is entirely different, as he fully believes that the gifted philologist – namely, the only real philologist, in his Bentleian/Kantian conception – [61] has all the instruments to make appropriate judgements to restore what the author meant, even when there are no conclusive material indications about it. The understanding of such unintelligible aspects of the text should come from feeling and experience alone.

Hermann is well known for his account of how, as a student, he would suggest emendations by ear to his teacher Reiz when reading Plautus. The anecdote is told in most of the sources on Hermann's life and work, in addition to the many concerning the performances he was capable of giving when declaiming Greek in

[59] Cf. Hermann's emendations of Euripides' *IT* ll. 123-235, ch. five, pp. 268ff.
[60] Boeckh (1819), XXXXIII: Deinde rhythmici numeri tales sunt, ut quibus locis in poesi usurpati sint, plane discerni nequeat: quapropter in metris Pindari explicandis ab eorum me usu prorsus abstinui.
[61] Cf. chapter one, *Bentleian philology:* ingenium*, erudition and the use of manuscripts* and ch. 5, *Kant's subjective universality as a model of* sensus*-based philology.*

the classes he was teaching.[62] Hermann's theory of *a priori* metres implies that it takes a specific type of man to understand the rhythm of ancient poetry: a scholar who has vast experience of that literature and who possesses the innate qualities required to establish a connection with the ancient authors, a connection based on practical exercise and on sensibility, on the effort to get to know an ancient author through what he has left to posterity as much as on being able to feel the way the author must have felt. This leads the expert to dare sometimes bold conjectures, a category of intervention that can be considered to be among Hermann's most characteristic.[63]

Boeckh's approach, by contrast, is one of caution and scepticism towards the possibility of restoring lost aspects of poetic performance. Echoing his hermeneutical theories of the *Encyclopedia*, Boeckh suspends judgement before the impossibility of knowing with certainty some aspects of the text.[64] He claims, for instance, that the Greeks' ears were capable of picking up something that modern ears cannot:

For apart from the fact that each embellishment of rhythm in itself seems not unpleasing to us, one can hazard a guess how much difference there is between our sense and the Greeks' from the one fact that to our ears nothing is more agreeable than a metre with equal cadence with the same sound recurring at the end of the metre, or with rhymes,

[62] Cf. chapter one, esp. note 92.
[63] Cf. chapter one, note 7; Itsumi (2009), 119-20.
[64] Cf. Guthenke (2017), esp. 95; Boeckh (1877), 57: 'Da alles Allgemeine und Besondere in einander greift, und nicht auseinander gerissen werden kann, so ist auch keine genaue Sonderung der beiden Hauptabschnitte des materialen Theils möglich, sondern es wird immer der eine in den andern hinüberspielen.'

at which Greek ears were very much offended. But Hermann moved onward from the rhythmical measurement of metres, to enrich the ancient poets and especially Pindar with what he most recently calls Doric epitrite, and previously paeonic metre: I will say only so much as to make it clear why it seems to me that this new doctrine should be rejected. For, he is induced by the heaviness of Doric metre to bid that trochee be banished from Doric poems that substitute for them some 'epitrites' or other.[65]

Furthermore, Boeckh provides another reason behind his criticism of Hermann's theory of metrics, having to do with the idea that it displays an excess of speculation and that it would not be backed up by solid evidence. In addition to his claim that Hermann's theory is invalid because completely new, thus departing from the ancient theories of metrics, Boeckh adds that the philologist should follow *ratio* over *sensus*. As Boeckh writes in his Pindar edition:

Thus one can understand that the attention to metre was innate for the Greeks, so much so that, in comparison, they disregarded the very power and quality of the voice, here too, as in art in general, paying attention above all to the perfection of the form which is inherent to metre. Some are ignorant of this, and by them the ancients are criticised, who say they strayed from their sense of truth and right when adorning metres. But those less

[65] Boeckh (1819), XXXXIV: Nam praeterquam quod utraque rhythmi adornatio nobis per se haud inficeta videtur, quantum inter nostrum Graecorumque sensum discrimen sit, de eo licet ex hac una re coniecturam facere, quod nostris auribus nihil gratius est quam versuum aequabiliter cadentium in fine recurrentes iidem soni sive homoeoteleuta, quibus Graecorum aures vehementer perstringebantur. Sed Hermannus a rhythmica metrorum mensura progressus, ut olim paeonico numero, ita nuperrime epitrito quem vocat Dorio veteres poetas et maxime Pindarum ditavit: de quo tantum dicam, ut intelligatur, cur mihi nova haec doctrina improbanda esse videatur. Nam ut trochaeos a Doriis carminibus exulare iuberet, et iis epitritos nescio quos substitueret, Dorii numeri gravitate adductus est.

offensive concede that the ancients knew metres better by finger and ear; nevertheless, they had an imperfect doctrine of metres.[66]

Hermann's position is informed by his Kantianism, in a way that will be detailed in chapter five; but here it is useful to observe how Hermann chose to emphasise the continuity between moderns and ancients, and how metre, music and dance constituted three levels of a single thing. Because music and dance are lost to us, it is possible that, sometimes, imperfections in the metrics of a text might be explicable through something that was added by the other two rhythms, dance and music. It is a strong belief in Hermannian philology that our ears cannot be different from the Greeks' in any fundamental sense, and thus it is unlikely that the Greeks would hear something completely different from what moderns can perceive.[67] Hermann chooses to fill the gaps of the parts of performance which are lost to us and leans on the fact that our ears are basically the same; here we can read a demonstration of the influence of Kant on Hermann, as a sense of biological continuity between the ancients and the moderns posited through the notion of a Kantian *a priori* structure of the mind. In contrast, Boeckh gets discouraged by the loss of fundamental information, but he overcompensates by trying to understand metrics more precisely than necessary, as we will see in the following section.

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[66] Boeckh (1811), pt. 2, p. 2: unde intelligas, Graecorum animis tantam innatam fuisse curam numeri, ei ut ipsam vim et materiam vocum postponerent, hic quoque, ut in arte universa, formae, quae sita est in numero, perfectionem spectantes potissimum: quod quum ignorent nonnulli, vituperantur ab iis veteres, quos in adornandis numeris a veri rectique sensu aberrasse dicunt. Sed qui minus sunt molesti, illud concedunt quidem, veteres digito et aure numeros calluisse melius; tamen doctrinam numerorum habuisse imperfectissimam.

[67] On the topic of ancient *sensus* and sound cf. e.g. Butler and Nooter (2019), esp. D'Angour (2019), esp. 31-37.

Precision and feeling like the Greeks

Boeckh's persuasion that we cannot hear like the Greeks brings him to generate a rather paradoxical argument, focused on the *minutiae* of metrics and rhythm. On the one hand, Boeckh argues for the impossibility of knowing how the rhythm exactly sounded, because our ears hear differently from the Greek ear. On the other hand, he advocates for the necessity of understanding with absolute mathematical precision, down to the tiniest algebraic fraction, the composition and details of metrical schemes. These two points are kept together by Boeckh's philosophy of precise and quantitative understanding of metrics.

Boeckh refuses the notion of dactylo-epitrites because they do not conform to his idea of metrics as a system of proportions standing in some harmonic ratio to each other. It is a very rational viewpoint influenced by knowledge of music, and in fact Boeckh provides a tentative musical reading of the metrical scheme he gives for Pindar's passage.[68] Boeckh mostly interprets as trochaic the metres that Hermann identifies as dactylo-epitrites because of his own conviction that trochaic metres should be avoided in Doric poetry. Boeckh proposes to read, instead of the epitrites found by Hermann (e.g. of the type E= – ∪ – X – ∪ –), series of trochaic dipodies (– ∪ – X) with a spondee in every other foot.

The debate also took up the character or mood of Doric poetry, which Hermann deemed to be solemn (*gravis*). Boeckh, on the contrary, speaks about the character of Doric poetry as being 'an intermediate melopoeia (music) and

[68] Cf. Boeckh (1819), L-LII.

rhythmopoeia (rhythm)',[69] rather than having a solemn (*gravis*) tone: it was an encomiastic genre, he thought, sometimes fit for 'sweet and merry singing',[70] characterised by uniformity and brevity.

On top of the role of trochees in determining the mood of Doric poetry, Boeckh also argues that another reason to disregard the epitrite metre is that it does not align with what he considers a basic sense of music. Indeed, he found a hierarchy of numerical proportions based on their *simplicitas*, where the type most pleasing to the ear is an even proportion among the parts, followed by the double ratio, the ratio of three to two, until the four-thirds (epitrite) is considered the least pleasant of all rhythmical proportions.[71]

Boeckh's disquisition on rhythm goes as far as categorising consonances between 'more perfect' and 'less perfect' ones,[72] postulating that not all metres are

[69] Ibidem, XXXXIV.

[70] Ibidem.

[71] Cf. ibidem: To me not only trochaic dipodies that have a spondee in every other foot seem to conform enough to the Doric gravitas, in a genre mainly encomiastic, which requires not a particularly austere, but an intermediate melopoeia (music) and rhythmopoeia (rhythm); for instance also the Doric music is fit for a sweet and merry singing [..] in fact not only I think that it is fit for the gravitas of the Doric metre, but also that on top of the gravitas it also has uniformity and brevitas. In reality, if it depends on the *simplicitas* of the numerical proportions, the most pleasing kind to the ear is the even, less pleasing is the double, much less is the ratio of three to two, and the least pleasing of all is the 4/3 or epitrite: straightforward like in a rhyme. = Mihi vero non solum dipodiae trochaicae in altero pede spondeum habentis severitate affatim prospectum Doriensium gravitati videtur, in genere praesertim encomiastico, quod nonnimis austeram, sed mediam quandam et melopoeiam et rhythmopoeiam deposcebat; quemadmodum etiam Partheniis dulciorem et hilariorem cantum postulantibus tamen Doria harmonia attemperata est (Plutarch. de music. c. 17): verum etiam non solam in Doriis numeris gravitatem spectandam arbitror, sed gravitati iunctam aequalitatem et concinnitatem. Haec vero quum a simplicitate rationum numeralium pendeat, maxime concinnum est genus par, minus concinnum duplex, multo minus sesquialterum, minime omnium sesquitertium sive epitritum: prorsus ut in consonantiis.

[72] Cf. Hobson (2004), 94, consonance defines 'a combination of musical notes which are in harmony with each other owing to the relationship between their frequencies.'

absolute, and some have an 'irrational' version.[73] In these metres dissonance is well tolerated, thus disturbance of rhythm (arhythmia) cannot be entirely excluded from metrics. According to Boeckh this depends largely on the type of poetry: some genres are calmer and simpler, others are suited for movement and commotion, and they mimic the ups and downs of emotions and the human mind. Essentially, for Boeckh, some genres of harmony and rhythm validly use consistent types of metres, and others use inconsistent types of metres repeatedly, depending on the relative strictness of the rules of metrics and harmony.[74] Through this explanation Boeckh seeks to undermine Hermann's notion of the existence of the epitrite, and by reducing the epitrite to an irrational form of trochee he feels that he has cut through the Gordian knot. He writes, commenting on Hermann's words:

> He [Hermann] says: *if there is no epitrite, then what else can it be? I will commend the one who would answer that, without leaving any doubt: I will just more definitely increase the basis for doubting in the matter at hand*. Who then, please, will deserve such praise, and how? Believe me, I deserve it, for I am the one who has solved this most intricate problem not with some artifice but by cutting the knot with a sword.[75]

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[73] Cf. Boeckh (1819), XXXXI.

[74] Ibidem: Nam ut consonantiae aliae perfectiores, aliae minus perfectae sunt, ita numeros non posse aeque omnes absolutos esse, qui utrorumque easdem a natura leges expressas viderit, non opinor negabit: praeterea ut in melopoeia dissonantia ipsa late patet, ita a numeris in promptu est non omnem posse arrhythmiam excludi. Iam vero alia poesis genera tranquilliora, sedatiora, simpliciora, puriora sunta; alia in affectibus hominum et describendis et movendis ut plurimum versantur, motusque animorum hinc inde fluctuantes liberius sequuntur, et quasi in alto iactatas mortalium mentes repraesentant: unde illa aequabilibus, haec discedentibus subinde a strictissima et numeri et concentus norma harmoniae et rhythmi generibus suo iure utuntur.

[75] Ibidem, XXXXV: *Quodsi ne epitritus quidem est*, inquit, *quid tandem erit aliud? Laudabo qui ad hoc ita responderit, ut locus dubitationi non relinquatur: ego satis habebo, distinctius constituenda quaestione etiam*

This impatient approach, that pretends to do without all subtleties and claims to have settled the matter once and for all, reminds one closely of the matter-of-fact quality of many of Hermann's formulated emendations with the assumption of best possible judgement, and of the general feeling that the last word is being spoken, often enforced in Hermann's attitude by the influence of Kantian subjective universality discussed in chapter five.[76]

Boeckh writes that the ancient scholars of rhythm exclude the ratio 'sesquitertia', namely a 'perfect fourth', an interval having the ratio of 1 to 1⅓, or 3 to 4, from the rational metre, but not from the irrational one. In the solemn (*gravis*) trochaic dipody, he finds the ratio of 4 : 3. An irrational trochee of the form – ∪, according to Boeckh, consists of the ratio 4 : 3, or 2 : 1 ½ , in which the long element has two morae and the short one bears one and a half.[77] In the *gravis* trochaic dipody, he continues, an irrational trochee is added to a rational trochee, so that the ratio is 2 : 1, 2 : 1 ½. Such foot is unbalanced, 'so that it is not possible either to sing it or to dance it,'[78] because, Boeckh says, 'the first law of rhythm is the equality of the progression of the feet.'[79] Boeckh concludes that we should postulate that in the irrational trochee something must be taken away, so that the length of a singular mora must be shorter than one unit, but in a way that the equilibrium between the

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*augere dubitandi materiam.* Verum quis tandem, amabo, hanc laudem mereatur, et quo pacto? Mihi crede, merui: qui istum intricatissimum nodum non arte, sed ense dissolvo.

[76] Cf. ch. five, *Kant's subjective universality as a model of* sensus*-based philology.*

[77] Cf. ibidem, XXXXVII: Nam choreum irrationalem constat hanc rationem tenuisse, 4 : 3, sive 2 : 1 1/2 : in qua quod longa praecedens duas moras habet, subsequens autem syllaba unam cum semisse, haec ipsa irrationalis dicta est.

[78] Ibidem.

[79] Ibidem.

two feet is maintained: 'first of all, in fact, one foot must be perfectly equal to the other, so that one represents the dactylic arsis and the other the thesis. [..] As in the levis [≠ *gravis*] dipody the ratio is 2 : 1, 2 : 1, so in the gravis the ratio is 2 : 1, 1 5/7 : 1 2/7.'[80]

Confronted with such intricacy of Boeckh's mathematical argument, Hermann bluntly answers that the last syllable is *anceps* and thus its exact length does not matter. Its length can be any n/x and it does not have to be 1 5/7 or whatever ratio Boeckh might propose. For good measure, Hermann notes that the ratio proposed by Boeckh happens to be completely arbitrary and, moreover, very difficult for the voice and the movement of the dancer's body to reproduce.[81] Hermann's rebuttal, additionally, simply states that a trochaic rhythm is not appropriate for that genre of Doric poetry, essentially limiting himself to opposing what was suggested by his *sensus* to Boeckh's remarks, when he writes:

Those metres were generally considered trochaic. That is wrong and there is no place for a trochaic rhythm in that Doric type of poetry, as I have been warned by my sensus and Boeckh himself admits, and I think that nobody who can judge what is

[80] Ibidem.

[81] Cf. *De Epitritis Doriis* (= *Opuscula* 3), 85-6: ut, qui canat saltetve, planissimas numerorum rationes observet, 2:1, 2:1, in fine autem moram adiiciat seu ½ seu n/x: quod contra quis non videt, quae Boeckhio placent rationes, 2:1, 1 5/7 : 1 2/7 ad observandum seu voce seu motu corporis esse difficillimas?

appropriate for that genre could disagree. Therefore they must not be called trochees, but epitrites, which is the proper name of that rhythm.[82]

Essentially, Hermann underlines how Boeckh's attempt to provide an accurate and detailed mathematical explanation of the irrational trochee would depend on Boeckh's erroneous interpretation of Aristoxenus' definition of that metre. Aristoxenus, Hermann points out, only indicated that the irrational tempus is generally between 2 and 1 ½.[83] To define the nature of Boeckh's explanation, Hermann takes it *ad absurdum* by comparing him to a historian like Thucydides, who, having read that Homer describes a battle scene for which he remembers a maximum of one hundred and twenty triremes and a minimum of fifty, might hazard a speculation that the exact number of boats must have been perhaps eighty five, rather than eighty four or eighty six, instead of just concluding that a great number of soldiers took part in the battle. The precise number, Hermann suggests, is not at all important because it ultimately does not impact the real-world conclusions that can be drawn. All that we would need to know to understand Boeckh's irrational trochaic dipody, according to Hermann, is that the standard

[82] Ibidem, 90: vulgo isti numeri habebantur trochaici. Id falsum esse, neque convenire Doricae illi compositioni trochaeos, et me sensus quidam admonebat, et idem sibi accidisse Boeckhius fatetur, nec dissentiet opinor, quicumque quid aptum in hoc genere sit, iudicare potest. Ergo non erant trochaei appellandi, sed epitriti, quod nomen proprium est illius mensurae.

[83] Cf. ibidem, 84: Atqui non demonstravit: collegit enim ex eo, quod Aristoxenus tempus irrationale medium esse docet inter 2 et 1. Hermann continues to say that what Boeckh deduces from Aristoxenus is not in Aristoxenus's text, which compares the δωδεκατημόριον τοῦ τόνου ("the twelfth mora of the tone") with that tempus, so that it seems that he did not have in mind the ratio suggested by Boeckh, but a different one. This had been understood by Nicomachus of Gerasa (Greek: Νικόμαχος; c. 60 – c. 120 AD), cf. *Institutione arithmetica* II. 23, p. 139.

metrical ratio of 2:1, 2:1 bears the addition in the last element of either ½ or n/x of a mora, while there is no basis to choose, like Boeckh, a ratio of 2 : 1, 1 5/7: 1 2/7.[84]

Thus we see how the matter revolved entirely around Boeckh's advocating for a philosophy of precision and Hermann's for one of approximation.

## Conclusions

In this chapter I have demonstrated how the dispute between Hermann and Boeckh can be better understood by looking at their writings on metrics in the first decades of the nineteenth century, before focusing on the texts they authored after the publication of Boeckh's *CGI*. Indeed, this phase of their academic exchange reveals the very personal nature of their scholarly disagreements, especially if considering the relevant materials here analysed in the light of the framework of Hermann's academic success presented in the previous chapters.

This chapter has provided, *en passant*, a quick introduction to notions of Hermann's doctrine of metrics. While the subject will be further explored in chapter five, its preliminary consideration here has allowed us to examine Hermann's metrical theory from a new point of view and in a novel context, namely its interaction with Boeckh's views on metrics. This has highlighted the differences and overlaps in methodologies between the two scholars, and in particular how, especially for Hermann, selection of specific methodologies was fluid and context-

[84] Moreover, according to Hermann, in Boeckh's reconstruction, the second foot has an entirely irrational rhythm (*tempus*), and this is against what is prescribed by Aristoxenus p. 298 and Bacchius p. 23. Cf. ibidem, 86.

bound, rather than flattened under the characteristics of a specific philological label. Thus, I have shown how Hermann's methodology, side by side with a request for precision and attention to language in the case of the *CGI*, could, in another context, be equally unconcerned with the *minutiae* of language or metrics and advocating, instead, for the consideration of broader aspects of the performance of the ancient texts. Additionally, Hermann's philology, even while remaining focused on the ancient texts, effectively employed tools, like *sensus*, which could have a certain elusive quality; and thus, its methods could be not entirely dissimilar from notions that Hermann would later reproach in his opponent, Boeckh, during the debate over the *CGI*, such as the concept of *Anschauungen* of the ancient world.

At the same time, in examining the differences between Hermann's approach to metrics, inspired by *sensus,* and Boeckh's methods, imbued with mathematical rigour, I have underlined how the debate at the origins of the dispute took place entirely in the domain of *Wortphilologie*, so to speak. It was a debate focused on the *minutiae* of language in the narrowest sense of the word, demonstrating how Boeckh's philology could also operate at the level of very narrow textual analysis, even more so than Hermann's. Even if we keep the two concepts running in the background while analysing the scholars' methodologies, we see how their methods overall do not fully nor consistently belong to either one of the two labels.

Finally, this chapter has shown how additions to the materials produced by Poiss (2010) for the backdating of the dispute bring to light some important further dynamics of the dispute. In particular, I showed how a close reading of the early

1800s publications by Hermann and Boeckh challenges the idea, traditional in the narrative of the dispute and maintained by Poiss, of Hermann as the initiator of the feud with Boeckh. In the examined texts not only is there little trace of the suggested one-sidedness in the initiation of the *querelle*, but also Boeckh, if anyone, seems to be the main promoter of the hostilities; an idea that seems also justified on the basis of the public perception of Hermann's persona that I presented in the previous chapters. This, too, should lead to a broader revaluation of Hermann's philology, considered in its autonomy rather than only as a reaction to Boeckh.

# Chapter four

## The Dispute between Hermann and Boeckh:

## in the Name of Science and *Altertumswissenschaft*

Introduction

This chapter will be concerned with a further analysis of the materials of the dispute, finally coming to the discussion between Hermann and Boeckh that followed the former's review of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (*CGI*).

In 1808, the twenty-three-year-old Boeckh, who had just been appointed *Professor Extraordinarius* in Heidelberg after his graduation in Halle in 1806, dedicated to Hermann an extremely eulogistic treatise in which he collected the results of his studies on the Attic tragedians.[1] Hermann did not know him then, nor of him.[2] Poiss (2010) has argued that the origins of the dispute between the two can be traced that far back in their relationship, suggesting that Hermann felt his monopoly over Greek tragedy and, later, over metrics, threatened by the young scholar's similar interests and the competition he provided.[3] Indeed, when Hermann later replied to Boeckh's dedication with his own letter, he also thanked him for having finished the work that he himself still had to complete – or, in other words, for taking away from him the opportunity to complete it: `I myself, in

[1] Cf. Boeckh (1808), V-XVI.
[2] Cf. Sandys (1908), 97, Poiss (2010), 144.
[3] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 23, Poiss (2010), 145.

addition to the great deal I have learnt from it, have also the advantage that I can spare myself much research which I wanted to undertake and which now has been completed by you.`[4] Chapter three has already analysed the phase of their discussion over metrics, challenging the idea, generally presented in the literature, that the dispute began with the quarrel that followed upon Hermann's 1825 review of Boeckh's first fascicle of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*.[5] As shown in chapters one and two, Hermann's fame and academic position were most likely in no danger of being threatened by the young Boeckh, especially in the 1820s, but Hermann certainly did care about making his voice heard in areas of expertise that he considered his own.

This chapter will, first of all, analyse another phase of the dispute immediately antecedent to the 1825 review, namely the discussion between Hermann and Boeckh over the date of composition of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, highlighting some of the dynamics that would become typical of the dispute and how they were anticipated here, before any exchange concerning Greek inscriptions took place. Indeed, just before his 1825 review of the *CGI*, Hermann had intervened in a dispute between Boeckh and Reisig on the dating of Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*. This, along with the debate over metrics, constitutes only part of a dispute

[4] Hoffmann (1901), 22, quoted in Poiss (2010), 144: `Ich selbst habe nächst so vielem, was ich daraus gelernt habe, noch den Vortheil davon, dass ich mancher Untersuchung, die ich noch vornehmen wollte und die nun von Ihnen vollendet ist, überhoben sein kann.`

[5] The review was collected and republished in Hermann's *Über Herrn Professor Boeckhs Behandlung der Griechischen Inschriften* (1826), from which I quote throughout the chapter, along with Boeckh's answer (pp. 66-73), Hermann's following *Erklärung* (73-78), Meier's *Analyse* of Hermann's review (78-189), Hermann's *Die Sigeische Inschrift* (190-219), concerning the 8th inscription in Boeckh's collection, and Boeckh's *Logisten und Euthynen* (220-238), concerning the Athenian account of the *logistoi*, which appears in the 76th inscription.

which assumed much larger proportions than the quarrel surrounding the *CGI*. Overall, the dispute unfolded over forty publications, and several letters, by Hermann, Boeckh and some of their followers; some are lengthy works, specifically addressed to the opponent, and others are publications generally unrelated to the dispute, but which still contain at some point – generally, a preface or introduction – a brief mention of, or remarks directed at the opponent.[6] This chapter will focus on the discussions over *Oedipus at Colonus* and the *CGI*. The first has never been examined before, but offers a good overview of the points of confrontation between Hermann and Boeckh; the discussion around the *CGI*, in turn, will hopefully bring more focused attention to the pivotal themes of the dispute than has generally been

[6] Contrary to the idea that the dispute stemmed from and focused only on the debate around Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (cf. also Hoffmann (1901), 48-62, for a comprehensvive synthesis of the phases of the dispute), exchanges between Hermann and Boeckh started as early as 1815 and were ongoing until 1824, with a debate about Pindaric metrics and the epitrite metre, analysed in chapter 3; it continued with the discussion over Sophocles'*Oedipus at Colonus* in 1825, analysed in this chapter; then, in October 1825, Hermann's review of Boeckh's *CGI* started the debate over the Greek inscriptions, also discussed here below, and around it the dispute between Hermann and Welcker took place, with two severe reviews by Hermann (cf. De *Aeschyli trilogiis Thebanis*, Op. 7, 190-210) of Welcker's *Die aeschylische Trilogie Prometheus* (1824), and *Sylloge epigrammatum* (1828) and publication of a treatise, *De inscriptionibus quibusdam Graecis* (Op. 4, 303-332), to oppose the emendations of inscriptions of epigrams given by Welcker, which perhaps encouraged Welcker's support of Boeckh against Hermann; in 1826 and 1828 Boeckh wrote two introductory notes on the Athenian Areopagus (*Kl. Schriften* 4, 245 ff. 308ff.) and the role of blood jurisdiction under Ephialtes, and, in 1829 Hermann's answer appeared with *De hyperbole* (Op. 4, 284-302), which does not name Boeckh, but says: credant haec qui volent, nihil enim non creditur; in 1832 Hermann's *De epigrammatis quibusdam Graecis*, (Op 5, 164-181) continued the dispute against Boeckh's remark in the second vol. of the *CGI* (cf. p. 63) and Hermann's *De tragoedia comoediaque lyrica*, (ibid. 211-240 with reference to *CGI* vol. 2, 509 ff.), against Boeckh's opinion that before the development of the drama there were lyrical tragedies and comedies; in 1833 Hermann's *De fragmentis poetarum in scholiis Vaticanis ad Euripidis Troades et Rhesum* (Op. 5, 182-206) answered to Boeckh's arrangement of Timokleon's fragments against Hermann's proposals on the same; in 1834, a debate over the Homeric questions started with Boeckh's *De hypobole Homerica* (Kl. Schr. 4, 385-399), an introductory lecture on the Homeric Rhapsodies, followed by Hermann's answer (*Quid sit upobolh et upobleden*, Op. 5) and Boeckh's response in the *CGI* (pp. 300-311, cf. also note in Hoffmann (1910), 59); in 1833, K. O. Mueller, in his preface to his *Aeschylus Eumeniden*, wrote a note about Hermann, which provoked the latter's answer in a lengthy review (cf. Op. 6, 2, 1-215) and then Hermann's publication against Mueller *De Graeca Minerva* (cf. ibid 260-284).

achieved so far, offering a direct overview of the opinions of its protagonists through their own words. I intend to show how they had actually little to do with a divide between a philology that aims at the exclusive study of 'things' and one that takes interest in 'language' alone, as the narrative about the dispute commonly indicates.

The aim of the chapter is, first of all, to show that the dialogue between Hermann and Boeckh already operated according to a specific set of parameters before the circulation of Boeckh's inscriptions project. Thus, the dispute was shaped by more than what was at stake with the *CGI.* Secondly, I argue that such specific features of the exchanges between Hermann and Boeckh manifested themselves independently of the *CGI,* and thus were not strictly related to Boeckh's work as an eminently "*sachphilological"* project. Indeed, I show how Hermann rejected the concept of *Wortphilologie* as absurd and how his views, namely that ancient languages were 'among' the objects of the study of antiquity rather than being 'an alternative' to the study of the things of antiquity, did not prevent him from investigating other *Sache*; instead, they rather encouraged and shaped his attention to broader aspects of antiquity. I consider Hermann's treatise *De Hippodromo Olympiaco* as a case study, in addition to the other materials already presented, for instance in chapter one, to testify to Hermann's exploration of contextual information well beyond language.

Hermann commented explicitly on his relationship with Boeckh in his preface to *Über Herrn Professor Boeckhs Behandlung der Griechischen Inschriften* (1826).

There, he responded to the charge that he was engaged in some kind of feud with Boeckh, and that therefore, in his review of the *CGI*, he had been `a partisan judge, and out of passion not only failed to praise what there was to praise, but also blamed what was not blameworthy`.[7] The way in which he rejected such accusations perfectly sums up the scope of the dispute. First, Hermann launched himself into an invective against Boeckh's attitude and tones in the *CGI*, saying that the `irritable` Boeckh seemed `unable to tolerate contradiction`, and that Hermann always regarded `the arrogant tone in which Mr. Boeckh speaks of himself, and the less respectable language in which he speaks of others, as a peculiarity of him, as if it were his dialect.`[8] But with this he also extended an olive branch, saying: `those who were once my fierce adversaries after they met me became my friends,`[9] considering it the best reward of his constant tendency to engage in disputes.[10] It was a matter of recognition of authority before anything else.

If the dispute generally revolved around an opposition between attention to language or to historical investigation, so-called "reality", it is useful to remind ourselves from the very beginning that the dispute ended with a handshake and the recognition, by its protagonists themselves, of substantial agreement on the nature

[7] Hermann (1826), 11: `ein partheiischer Richter ausgetreten sey, und aus Leidenschaftlichkeit nicht bloß nicht gelobt habe, was zu loben, sondern auch getadelt, was nicht zu tadeln war.`
[8] Hermann (1826), 12: `vielmehr habe ich stets den hochfahrenden Ton, in welchem Herr Böckh von sich, und die wenig anständige Sprache, in der er von andern spricht, als eine Eigenthümlichkeit von ihm, gleichsam als seinen Dialekt, angesehen.`
[9] Hermann (1826), 12: `und ich halte es für die beste Belohnung meines stets beobachteten Benehmens, daß die, die einst meine heftigen Gegner waren, nachdem sie mich kennen gelernt haben, meine Freunde worden sind.`
[10] Aside from the dispute with Boeckh, Hermann also engaged in disputes with Richard Porson on metrics, with Karl O. Müller on Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and with Friedrich Creuzer on the topic of ancient mythology, cf. Medda (2010), Most (1997).

and aims of philology. In 1837, Boeckh visited Hermann in Leipzig with the intention of making peace, and in 1846 both Hermann and Boeckh appeared at the Society of Philologists meeting in Jena, where they were seen to be friendly to each other.[11] At the next meeting, in Berlin in 1850, after Hermann's death, Boeckh, as chairman of the opening session, did not devote a detailed obituary to Hermann, but said that among the departed `great minds of science, the noble Gottfried Hermann` was to be mourned.[12] He clearly stated that he appreciated the enduring importance of the deserving man and considered the dispute long since done away with.[13] Looking back, Boeckh described himself as concerned with the general aspects of philology, but also remembered how, although he had only occasionally undertaken grammatical research himself, he had nevertheless given considerable impetus to this field – for example, with his observations on the diversity of dialects in the Greek inscriptions and by laying the foundations for the history of language and historical grammar.[14]

*Sachphilologie* and *Wortphilologie* assigned different levels of emphasis to language, considering it either just *one* of the objects of the study of antiquity like any other, or a particularly privileged object. However, the fundamental idea and feeling behind the concept of philology remained the same, particularly in light of the fact that Hermann's privileged consideration of language did not prevent him

[11] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 61.
[12] Cf. Boeckh (1859), 198.
[13] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 62.
[14] Ibidem.

from engaging in investigations of, for instance, an archaeological-antiquarian nature, as in the case of his investigation on the Olympic hippodrome.

## The rhetoric of the dispute before the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions*

The matter of the date of composition of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, treated by Hermann in the preface of his edition of this play, constitutes an interesting step in the making of the dispute, because it took place in the period between the discussion over metrics and Hermann's review of Boeckh's *CGI*. As I will show below, during the dispute Hermann never defended the idea that philology should only be concerned with grammar or eminently linguistic matters; nonetheless, it is significant that the discussion over *Oedipus at Colonus* was far from being a purely linguistic subject, as it did not involve much textual-critical discussion but rather a disquisition about the date of composition and circumstances of the first performance of the play.[15] As we will see, Hermann did propose a textual emendation, but here I would just like to draw attention to the fact that the topic per se was not linguistic, but rather concerned with an aspect of

[15] The discussion unfolded in the following publications: 1) Hermann's preface to *Oedipus Coloneus*, where he criticises Boeckh's interpretation of Vita Sophoclis (cf. p. XII of Hermann's preface). Hermann intervenes here in a dispute between Boeckh and Reisig about the date of the play (cf. p. XIII); 2) 1825. Boeckh criticises, in a review, Hermann's edition of Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* (1825): in *Kl. Schr.* vol. 4, 228-244 *De Sophoclis Oedipi Colonei tempore* (cf. also private correspondence on the topic, in Hoffmann (1901), 49) Boeckh argues that Hermann's statement about the period of composition of that tragedy was erroneous, and describes the improvement that Hermann had proposed for the relevant position of the *Vita Sophoclis* as unsuccessful (cf. Hoffmann (1901), 49); 3) Then Hermann's sharp review of the inscriptions appeared in October 1825 in the Leipziger Litteraturzeitung n. 245, pp. 289-293 (= Hermann (1826), 66-73), followed by (4) Boeckh's *Ueber die Logisten und Euthynen der Athener, mit einem Vorwort und einem Anhang* (appeared in 1827, in the first volume of Niebuhr's *Rheinischen Museums*, and reprinted in *Kl. Schr.* vol. 7, 262-328, cf. esp. 268ff.)

antiquity, perhaps not as broad as epigraphy but whose scope was certainly broader than grammar.

Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* is now considered his last play, likely composed in 406 BC. In the preface to his edition of the play (1825), Hermann intervened in a dispute between Boeckh and Reisig about its date of composition, manifesting the same side-taking attitude described in chapter two, typical of early nineteenth-century academia and particularly common among the protagonists of the dispute. The starting point of the dispute was the biographical account found in ancient sources, mentioned below, according to which Sophocles' least favourite son Iophon, in the hope of inheriting the family assets, took Sophocles to trial to prove the father's dementia due to his old age; however, as evidence of his clarity of mind Sophocles recited from his *Oedipus at Colonus* in front of the judges, who eventually granted him victory in the trial.

Considering the ancient sources providing that account of the *Life of Sophocles*,[16] Hermann argued that Sophocles wrote the play when he was sixty seven,[17] in the year 434/3 BC, and that it was performed for the first time after his death. This conclusion was based upon judgement of the metrical style of the play, which Hermann deemed to be characterised by a particular softness (temperata ad

[16] Cf. Hermann (1825a), IX-XI.

[17] Hermann (1825a), XIII: Atque Reisigius non modo Boeckhium recte refutavit, qui p. 187 summum inter Athenienses et Thebanos odium fuisse, quo tempore haec fabula acta est, scripsit, sed etiam scite monstravit, adscribendam videri Olympiadis LXXXVII, anno secundo vel tertio, quo tempore poeta annum ferme septimum et sexagesimum agebat. The 87th Olympic Games took place in 432 BC, thus the year to which Hermann refers would be 434/3 BC. If he thought that Sophocles would have been sixty-seven, he probably was dating Sophocles' year of birth three years later than 497/6 BC.

eximiam mollitiem,)[18] – which, apparently, was for Hermann a sign of lateness, even though he does not offer further explanations – and upon defence of Reisig's rejection of Boeckh's idea that, at the time of composition of the play, relationships between Athens and Thebes were turbulent, indicating the period towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, around 406 BC. Indeed, in the preface, Hermann marvels at Boeckh's opinion that the play would suggest that there was at that time hate between Athens and Thebes, and argues that he had found no trace of that hate in the play but rather evidence of friendship between the two. In particular, Hermann thought, Sophocles could not have written the following ll. 919-20, had relations between the two cities been negative:

καίτοι σε Θῆβαί γ' οὐκ ἐπαίδευσαν κακόν.
οὐ γὰρ φιλοῦσιν ἄνδρας ἐκδίκους τρέφειν.

Yet it was not Thebes that trained you to be evil.
Thebes is not accustomed to rearing unjust men;[19]

[18] Hermann (1825a), XIII. On similar basis, through an analysis of metrics and language, Hermann had reconstructed an exact date for the *Orphica*.
[19] Translation by Jebb (1889). Indeed, Hermann's impression was as wrong as his proposed date of composition for the *Oed. Col.*, and other interpretations of the same passage read it to the opposite effect (namely, if Thebes had trained Creon to be evil, then Creon would have been an even more unjust ruler. Such was Thebes' evilness.), cf. Miscellanea Classica (2013), 299: `The annexed γε adds a degree of point to the praise. "It was not Thebes that taught thee this injustice." And it may be observed, that this play was produced near the end of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans were animated with perhaps more hatred towards Athens than the Lacedaemonians themselves.`

Hermann accused Boeckh of having given a misleading interpretation of the play, overlooking details such as ll. 919-20, because he did not read the play carefully enough. Such a rebuke constitutes a first element recurrent throughout the later dispute – and one that, due to its vagueness and subjective nature, is more easily ascribed to personal animosities than to substantial matters: 'nimirum Boeckhius, quum de hac tragoedia in libro illo dicebat, festinantius eam inspexerat, ad Creontis personam magis, quam ad res Thebanorum Atheniensiumque animum advertens'.[20] This represented an occasion for Hermann to denounce the malpractice against which he had warned in *De officio interpretis*, adopted by those who do not pay enough attention to the ancient sources they consult: 'unde falsa opinione concepta et ipse dixit, quae aliter non erat dicturus, et, ut fit, alios ipsius iudicio fretos in societatem erroris induxit'.[21]

It is clear that Hermann expressed here a concern about the shared effort of the scholarly community aimed at restoring information about antiquity correctly. He insisted on the importance of reading accurately and exactly the ancient texts because, otherwise, they would generate mistakes difficult to eradicate. Such an idea would belong to the best practice of any modern philologist, and could hardly be associated with an exclusive, excessive attention to language; today it would rather count as a minimum requirement for any serious investigation of antiquity.

[20] Hermann (1825a), XIV: `Boeckh, when he spoke in that book about this tragedy, had investigated the tragedy too hastily, directing his attention more to the character of Creon than to the relationships between Thebans and Athenians.`
[21] Hermann (1825a), XIV: `whence a false opinion having been conceived, both he himself said what he would otherwise not have said and, as happens, he led others, relying on his own judgement, to join the community of error.`

Indeed this was, arguably, not a real issue in the dispute: while Hermann, as also shown in chapter three, repeatedly insisted on the lack of proper command of the ancient languages on the part of the *Sachphilologen*, it seems unlikely that, e.g., Boeckh's command of Greek was truly lacking. Rather, this seems to be an instrumental argument to further the dispute as a prominently social phenomenon, rather than the expression of a sound methodological disagreement. Similarly, the rebuke which was commonly coming at the *wortphilological* camp from the *sachphilological* one, that the *Wortphilologen* would be interested almost uniquely in language and the restoration of text for the sake of it, should be considered equally pretextual. It seems difficult to consider either of these issues as true stakes in the dispute, and much more likely they should be considered as symptoms of its social dimension.

However, following the rebuke of Boeckh's allegedly imperfect knowledge of Greek, Hermann provides an interpretation of the passage in the *Life of Sophocles*. He started out with an emendation whose aims appear motivated by the wish to attack Boeckh rather than by academic concerns. Its object was a correction of the text in the *Vita Sophoclis*: καί ποτε ἐν δράματι εἰσήγαγε τὸν Ἰοφῶντα αὐτῷ φθονοῦντα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φράτορας ἐγκαλοῦντα τῷ πατρί, ὡς ὑπὸ γήρως παραφρονοῦντι.[22].

[22] TrGF 4, T1 §13 (pp. 34f.) The whole passage is the following: `A number of authors also refer to his lawsuit with his son Iophon. For Iophon was his son by Nicostrate and Ariston by Theoris, a Sicyonian , and he showed greater affection for the latter's child, whose name was Sophocles. And once in a drama he brought on [...] Iophon as envious of him and making an accusation against his father before the phratry that he was suffering from dementia. But they penalized Iophon. According to Satyrus, the playwright said: 'if I am Sophocles I am not mad. But if I am mad, I am not Sophocles,' and then he read from the *Oedipus*.` Transl. by Burges Watson (2015).

Boeckh suggested ignoring this witness because it gave an account of the events that was unsuitable (inepte),[23] to which Hermann replied:

> Boeckhius quidem quum in libro de tragicis Graecis [..] istam horum grammaticorum narrationem ineptam appellavit, fecit quod saepius, damnavit, quod non e re sua esset. At illa narratio adeo non modo inepta, sed absurda est, ut emendandam potius, quam non audiendam fuisse pateat.[24]

This passage well illustrates another tendency that would appear consistently throughout the following years of the dispute, namely the attribution to the opponent of certain characteristics perceived as bad habits, clearly underlined as tedious tendencies, seen as symptoms of a reproachable temperament in addition to bad scholarship. Here, Hermann reproaches Boeckh for doing `what he often does,` rejecting `something which does not fall under his area of expertise,` meaning the knowledge of Greek language, and then proceeding to ignore what he does not understand. Hermann, indeed, suggests that the account given by the *Vita Sophoclis* `is not just unsuitable, but so absurd that it is obvious that it would have been better to emend it rather than to ignore it.` He thus emended ἐν δράματι to ἐν δικαστηρίῳ,[25] also resolving the possible lacuna in this passage, so that the text would read `and once in a drama he brought on Iophon [..]` with `and once he

[23] Cf. Boeckh (1808), 136: Quo pertinet nobilis lis inter ipsum et filium Iophontem, quam inepte narrant Scriptor Vit. Sophocl. et Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 73 melius Cicero, [..]

[24] Hermann (1825a), XII: `Boeckh, when in his book on the Greek tragedians called this account of the grammarians inept, did what he often does, namely rejected what does not belong to his sphere of expertise. But that account is not only inept, but absurd, to such a degree that it is obvious that it should rather have been emended than ignored.`

[25] Radt (1999) puts the phrase ἐν δράματι in cruces.

brought Iophon to court [..]` Hermann's reasoning relies on the fact that the topic of a play such as that which would be described in the passage of the *Vita Sophoclis* if we read ἐν δρ*ά*ματι, would only be appropriate to a comedy; but Sophocles did not write comedies, and even if he wrote the *Ichneutae*, the introduction of contemporaries onstage was not common in satyr plays.[26]

Essentially, despite the possible merits of Hermann's emendation, it remains noteworthy that Hermann's intervention also becomes an occasion to gratuitously discredit Boeckh, by remarking on the latter's lack of attention to details, alleged tendency to proceed hastily and scarce knowledge of Greek.[27] Indeed, inadequate command of Greek should not have been the point of the discussion here – after all, Boeckh had suggested to ignore the passage rather than proving in any way an improper command of Greek. Hermann clearly thought he was better understanding the passage, but he also did not waste any occasion to portray Boeckh's method as lacking all the disciplinary essentials. Hermann's proposal to read ἐν δικαστηρί*ῳ* is followed by the observation that, despite his interpretation, the story told may still be inaccurate for the reason that it is as likely that Sophocles brought Iophon to court for having accused his father of having dementia as that Iophon instigated a *court* battle over a claim that Sophocles had dementia.[28]

[26] Hermann (1825a), XI: Sed illud ἐν δρ*ά*ματι nec per se ferri potest, quia non comoedias scripsit Sophocles, a satyricis autem fabulis aliena est aequalium in scenam introductio, nec congruit cum reliqua narratione. Unde veri simile est, scribendum esse ἐν δικαστηρί*ῳ*.
[27] Cf. above, notes 20, 21, 24.
[28] Cf. Hermann (1825a), XI-XII: An nescio an etiam probabilius sit ab Sophocle accusatum esse Iophontem, quod se dementiae insimularet, quam ab Iophonte Sophoclem.

However that may be, Hermann's objection to the idea that Sophocles brought Iophon onstage remains compelling.

Additionally, Hermann justified his own dating of the play on a quite weak and unsound basis: he argues that, even though Cicero, Valerius Maximus and Apuleius state that Sophocles stood trial in his old age, this would not necessarily mean that Sophocles also wrote the *Oedipus at Colonus* when he was the same age, because he could have brought as an example of his clarity of mind a play he had composed previously.[29] This seems an unlikely interpretation as, if Sophocles was accused of senile dementia, a play composed at a younger age would not have served Sophocles' purpose of proving his clarity of mind even in his old age. Overall, Hermann's emendation added little to his demonstration and appears as an excuse to speak against Boeckh, rather than a way to support Hermann's proposed dating of the *Oedipus at Colonus*.

Boeckh's counterargument, demonstrating that Hermann's interpretation was wrong, did not take long to come. In *De Sophoclis Oedipi Colonei tempore* (1825),[30] Boeckh showed that Hermann's statement about the period of composition of that tragedy was erroneous, and described the improvement that Hermann had proposed for the passage of the *Vita Sophoclis* as unsuccessful:

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[29] Hermann (1825a), XII: Sed utut se habuit res illa, non sequitur verum esse, quod Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Appuleius referunt, si in extrema senectute iudicium illud subiit Sophocles, etiam Oedipum eodem tempore ab eo scriptum esse. Potuit enim, ut se integra mente uti ostenderet, etiam fabulae multo ante scriptae carmen recitare, neque opus erat, ut ea fabula ignota esset iudicibus. Sed tamen ex argumento illo cod. Laur. videtur colligi posse, non esse Oedipum vivo Sophocle in scenam productum.

[30] Cf. *De Sophocli Oedipi Colonei tempore dissertatio prior* in *Kl. Schr*. vol. 4, 228-244 (cf. also the correspondence on the topic quoted in Hoffmann (1901), 49.)

Insigni exemplo est Sophoclis Oedipus Coloneus, quam fabulam est qui initio, est qui prope extremo bello Peloponnesiaco, est qui paulo ante medium id bellum factam iudicaverit: ex quibus coniecturis quae proprior vero sit, si quis denuo examinare voluerit, quod eximius auctor eius editionis [Hermann] [..] nuperrime fecit; is operam det necesse est, ut neque quod non demonstratum sit, arbitretur demonstratum esse, nec coniecturae obesse censeat, quod non obsit; deinde ut, cui coniecturae non quidquam obstet, si quid pro ea argumenti allatum fuerit, eam iis, quae defendi nequeant, praestare concedat, nec quod incerta sit, eam contemnat.[31]

Boeckh's register here, replete with alliterations, repetitions and parallelisms, displays a certain mockery of Hermann's conjecture. Mockery and irony are typical features of the dispute, here followed closely by another judgement of the opponent's character:

Postremo ne, qui mos illiberalis et insolens, quidquid ab alio prolatum ipse non perspexerit, id vel festinationi vel cupiditati tribuere, quam causas iudicii indagare malit. Nos quum solo veri inveniendi studio ducti singulas pensitaremus sententias, in hac quoque quaestione, quod est in proverbio, mediam viam tutissimam esse intelleximus.[32]

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[31] *Kl. Schr.* vol. 4, 228: `a notable example is Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, which some judge to have been composed at the beginning, some just before the end of the Peloponnesian war, some slightly before the middle of that war: if someone wishes to examine afresh which of such hypotheses is closer to the truth, as the remarkable author of that edition [Hermann] has done most recently, they must be careful not to regard something that has not been demonstrated as having been demonstrated, nor to consider something an obstacle to a hypothesis which is not an obstacle to it; moreover that, in the case of a hypothesis to which there is no obstacle, if some argument for it is adduced, they must concede that it is superior to those hypotheses that cannot be defended and must not condemn it on the ground that it is uncertain.`

[32] Ibidem, 228-9: `Finally, they must not – an ignoble and arrogant way of behaving – neglect to consider thoroughly anything suggested by someone else and prefer to attribute it to haste or

Boeckh's accusation of Hermann concerning his hesitancy to think carefully about `something brought forward by someone else` is, too, a classic argument in the dispute, and it is yet another element that appears as early as this discussion about *Oedipus at Colonus*. A reproach to Hermann's temperament, `ignoble and arrogant`, indicates that Boeckh's feelings for Hermann were not much kinder than the ones displayed by the latter in his preface to the play; and Boeckh's answer to Hermann's remark *apropos* his alleged faulty knowledge of language demonstrates no less pugnacity: Neque vero quisquam, quod Hermannus perhibet, reiecit ista verba, quod non essent e re sua, sed quod rerum rationi non conveniunt. Nempe non cuiusquam hac in causa ex re est, Sophoclemne Iophon petierit an Sophocles Iophontem.[33]

This is a leitmotif of the dispute, and as late as 1827, after the series of reviews and counter-reviews that would follow the *CGI*, Boeckh would observe *apropos* Hermann's method of fighting that `it assigns to the adversary not merely error, but bad qualities and tries to persuade the reader that the quality of this or that part, which seems to him mistaken, is replicated on everything else,`[34] a tendency that, clearly, both parties very well displayed.

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partiality than to investigate the grounds of judgement. When, led solely by the aim of discovering the truth, I ponder the individual ideas, I recognise that in this matter too, as the proverb has it, the middle way is the safest.'

[33] Ibidem, 230: 'Nor in truth has anyone, as Hermann asserts, rejected those words because they fall outside his area of expertise, but rather because they do not conform to a rational sense of things. Of course, in this matter, it is not outside anyone's area of expertise whether Iophon went after Sophocles or Sophocles after Iophon.'

[34] *Kl. Schr.* vol. 7, quoted in Hoffmann (1901), 52: `Die dem Gegner nicht bloss Irrthum, sondern schlechte Eigenschaften zuschiebt und den Leser ueberreden will, wie diese oder jene Parthie, die ihm verfehlt scheint, beschaffen sei, ebenso verhalte es sich mit allem uebrigen.`

Hermann's arguments for the dating of *Oed. Col.* were quite weak, and Boeckh made that clear by showing that Hermann's thesis of the friendship between Thebes and Athens did not hold: even if the play had been written in 434/3, as Hermann proposed, Athens and Thebes would have already been opposed to one another by then,[35] therefore it would be best to follow the ancient sources indicating that Sophocles wrote this tragedy in his very old age. Furthermore, Boeckh provided an argument based on historical considerations, showing how, according to Athenian law, there were only two ways in which a trial in which a father brought his son to court could end, and in both cases, should the father win, he would end up with a trivial monetary compensation:

Neutra via Sophocle digna; qui si illa esset usus, deridendum sese civibus praebuisset, quod cum filio de minima pecuniae summa ob convicium litigaret; si hanc praetulisset, insanae esset iracundiae obsecutus, quum verborum causa filium tantis obiiceret periculis.[36]

Boeckh's explanation involved a psychological interpretation as much as it took into account historical-juridical sources and, overall, his arguments left Hermann defeated, by demonstrating a better use of the historical sources and

[35] *Kl. Schr.* vol. 4, 229: Nam ut hoc praevio exemplo utamur, quomodo, qui amicitia coniunctos Athenienses et Thebanos fuisse, quum ea fabula scriberetur, ex ipsis Sophoclis verbis iudicandum putet, potest eandem fabulam Olymp. 87, 2-3, factam censere, quo tempore Thebanos cum Atheniensibus bellum gessisse et certissimum et notissimum est?

[36] Ibidem, 231: `neither way seems appropriate for Sophocles, who if he had used the first would have exposed himself to ridicule in front of the citizens by suing his son for defamation for a minimal sum of money, and if he had preferred the second, he would have to have been prompted by insane rage to expose his son to such great dangers because of words.`

interpretative techniques. This episode well exemplifies the role that personal enmity probably played in this phase of the relationship between Hermann and Boeckh, and it well defines the atmosphere in which, in October 1825, Hermann wrote his review of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*.

## The *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions* between programmatic and epistemological analyses

In 1815 Boeckh conceived the project of realising and publishing a collection of all ancient inscriptions.[37] A proposal was formulated by Philipp Karl Buttmann (1764-1829) and presented to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences on March 24, to request that the Academy fund the research activities and publication of a corpus collecting all the inscriptions. This was supposed to be a collective effort, undertaken by all members of the historical-philological class of the Berlin Academy.[38] Boeckh published the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* in 1828, but a first fascicle of the work edited by him had already been circulated three years before, and subsequently reviewed by Hermann.[39] The preface to the 1828 publication thus bears traces of the dispute that followed Hermann's review, and references to Hermann and his polemical observations appear throughout it.

The first name mentioned in the preface to the *CGI*, however, is not that of the detractor at whom many of the explanations Boeckh was now offering were

[37] Cf. Rebenich (2014), 9ff.
[38] Harnack (1900), 375: `Der Hauptzweck einer Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften muss sein, Unternehmungen zu machen und Arbeiten zu liefern, welche kein Einzelner leisten kann.`
[39] I will discuss Hermann's review below, cf. *Hermann's methodological critique.*

directed, but that of the spiritual ally of the work, Friedrich August Wolf, vir de his litteris immortaliter meritus, the Northern Star that indicated the way for a new direction in philology. Thirty years before, Wolf had, with the *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, published the book that would revolutionise classical philology in many ways, from the initial and immediate impact that the work had upon classical philology in Germany, to the role it played in prompting the "Lachmannian turn" that would take place about a century later.[40] Epigraphy is the second to last in the list of twenty-four *artes philologicae* that Wolf indicates in his programmatic outline of *Altertumswissenschaft*:[41] it comes after numismatics, and it is one of the many parts that, according to Wolf, ought to define philology as a comprehensive discipline, multi-articulated and multi-faceted, embracing all aspects of antiquity that it is possible for modern scholars to investigate.

Boeckh's project was conducted in an entirely Wolfian spirit insofar as it conceived epigraphy as one of the many parts of *Altertumswissenschaft.* Boeckh stressed that epigraphy cannot be regarded as a separate discipline or as an end in itself, but rather served the goals of other disciplines,[42] because only an all-inclusive

[40] The influence of the *Prolegomena* on the theories of Lachmann has been suggested many times, in the form of more or less evident influences such as Lachmann's *Niebelungen* question being evidently modelled on Wolf's Homeric question, but also the very core of the "Lachmannian method" being deeply inspired by the prescriptions offered by Wolf in the Prolegomena; there, Wolf encourages philologists to emend ancient texts making systematic rather that just occasional use of manuscripts and available editions. This testifies to a deep familiarity of Lachmann with the work of Wolf, despite him not being directly named as the inspiration for any of the above. Cf. Grafton et alii (1985), 30ff. Wolf's influence on Hermann's pupil Lachmann is yet another demonstration of the overlaps between the two camps of *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie*, when stripped of their social-biographical connotations.

[41] Wolf (1807), 79ff.

[42] *CGI*, VII: `[..] efficitur ut haec quae vulgo fertur ars nulla omnino disciplina sit a ceteris separata, neque ullum in sese finem habeat, sed aliarum serviat disciplinarum finibus.`

study through a collective effort of all the *artes philologicae* could effectively cast light upon antiquity:

> ita ut qui vel rerum gestarum memoriam, vel antiquitates civiles et ius, vel privatas res, vel religionum, artium, doctrinarum, litteraturae, linguarum studia, denique qui ullam antiquitatis partem colat, ei inter ceteros fontes adeundae inscriptiones sint, omnibus illae antiquariis disciplinis communes.[43]

This spirit was already clearly expressed in the appeal to the Berlin Academy, in the demand that philology be given the possibility, through financial aid as much as organisational effort, to start doing research, not unlike what was already happening for mathematicians and physicists, and in other words to become a *Wissenschaft* even in its most exterior features.[44]

According to Boeckh, beyond achieving the status of science philology should be multi-articulated and should hence benefit from the contribution of epigraphy as much as any other discipline that can be useful to the study of antiquity. Epigraphy served this purpose particularly well because, Boeckh thought, there is no aspect of the *Altertumskunde* not reflected in inscriptions, which can help in understanding all. Epigraphy should therefore stop being a secret science

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[43] Ibidem: `Thus, those who either honour the memory of the ancient achievements, or of the public, giuridical, and private life, of religion, of the arts, doctrines, literature, linguistic studies, and finally any other part of antiquity, they must add inscriptions to the other sources, as they bring advantage to all disciplines of antiquity.`

[44] Harnack (1900), 375: `Die mathematische Klasse so wie die physikalische hat früherhin zu besonderen Unternehmungen Bewilligungen von Geldern erhalten: und es liegt am Tage, dass auch die historisch-philologische Klasse in ihrem Gebiete Forschungen darbietet, welche ohne Unterstützung des Staats unausführbar sind, indem sie historische Denkmäler aus dem Dunkeln ziehen und dem Gelehrten in die Hand geben muss, welche zu erwerben, zu bearbeiten und zu verbreiten, grosse und mannigfaltige Ausgaben erfordert.`

(*geheime Wissenschaft*) and should take its place among the disciplines exploring the ancient world.[45] As demonstrated by Hermann's Kantian theorisation of metrics,[46] and as we will see below again in the context of the dispute on the tasks of philology, the idea of turning philology into a science was definitely on Hermann's mind, too. As I will show in chapter five, for example, Kantian philosophy served the scope of providing legitimisation for aspects of Hermann's philology. While philology can be considered already *wissenschaftlich*, Hermann sought to strengthen the idea that it used scientific methods and principles as much as possible. This should probably be interpreted as a result of the influence of Kant on Hermann, insofar as the latter, like the former, sought to free the *schöne Wissenschaften* from the threat that the hard sciences represented after Newton's discoveries.[47]

In the corpus of inscriptions, Boeckh collected writings from any kind of material support – stone, bronze, wood as well as inscribed ornaments and furnishings –, and he included inscribed coins, gems, vases and seals. He did not think it useful to include inscriptions taken from ancient literary sources such as Herodotus, Strabo, Pausanias, Athenaeus or Cassius Dio, at least not systematically

[45] Ibidem, 376-7: `Kein Zweig der Alterthumskunde bedarf nicht ihrer Hülfe; die Inschriften enthalten wichtige Urkunden für die innere und äufsere Geschichte der Staaten, ihre inneren Einrichtungen, Gesetze jeder Art, Privatverhältnisse und dergleichen, welche nur aus ihnen mit der möglichsten Vollständigkeit erkannt werden können. Ein Theil der Paläographie beruht auf ihnen; selbst für die Geschichte der Sprache sind sie von äufserster Wichtigkeit. Aber da sie in wenigen Händen sind, ist das Studium der Inschriften gegenwärtig von den Philologen fast gänzlich vernachlässigt, und die Inscriptionenlehre erscheint den meisten wie eine geheime Wissenschaft. Es ist einleuchtend, dass durch dieses Unternehmen der Klasse dieses Studium wieder ein Gemeingut der Philologen werden wird, und die Klasse hegt daher die Übersetzung, dass die Akademie ihr diejenige Unterstützung gerne bewilligen wird.`

[46] Cf. chapter 5.

[47] Cf. chapter 5, note 167.

and not always, but only in special circumstances, and for specific reasons.[48] The project did, however, aim at making available to scholars an inclusive and complete collection of all those inscriptions that were scattered in manuscripts and various articles and treatises, or that were simply unpublished because they had only been recorded in private scholarly notes, or which remained *in situ*, never transcribed, written on monuments and artefacts in the Mediterranean area.[49]

In the 1828 publication, inscriptions are catalogued according to topic, date and geographical provenience. Buttmann, Schleiermacher, Niebuhr and Humboldt appear among the names of Boeckh's illustrious collaborators but also, and among many others, Immanuel Bekker, Georg Friedrich Creuzer, Friedrich Gottlieb Welcker and Karl Otfried Müller, who collected inscriptions for Boeckh and viewed important manuscripts in Paris, the Netherlands and England.

The collective nature of the work seemed to stand for the plurality itself of the concept of philology implied by the endeavour. Boeckh made clear from the beginning that the res philologica, to him, was invested with a very peculiar meaning, in that it should address four distinct areas: the State and civil institutions

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[48] *CGI*, XII: Inscriptiones a *veteribus auctoribus* traditas omitti par est, quod hoc opus eo consilio suscipitur, ut monumentorum litteratorum paretur supplementum: tamen utilitatis causa aliquot ex illis insigniores, ut monumentum Adulitanum, recipiemus.
The monumentum Adulitanum is a bilingual inscription, in Greek and the ancient South Semitic language Ge'ez, over a throne in Adulis, Eritrea. It describes the military campaigns of an Adulite king and, although there are no archaeological traces of the monument, the inscription was recorded by the sixth century Egyptian traveller-monk Cosmas Indicopleustes.

[49] Harnack (1900), 377: Was an Inschriften herausgegeben ist, befindet sich in 7 bis 8 Hauptwerken, welche nur grosse Bibliotheken zusammen darbieten, da sie theuer und selten sind. Ausserdem giebt es aber noch Tausende von Inschriften, welche in keiner Sammlung, sondern nur zerstreut in Werken und Abhandlungen stehn, die vielleicht nirgend vollständig anzutreffen sind. Und hiezu kommt nun noch eine grosse Anzahl, die noch gar nicht gedruckt sind [..]`

(res publice gestae), ancient private life, including economy and trade (res privatae), religion – or rituals and divine symbols –, and finally the whole history of knowledge categorised generically as *scientia*, in a broad sense and as comprehensive of disciplines such as philosophy and mythology, but also literature and language, which, Boeckh underlined, are only a part of what philology ought to study.

However, one of the core points of Hermann's review would rest upon the observation that the collective nature of the enterprise did not shine through, and that Boeckh effectively took over. In the *CGI*, there is plenty of Boeckh's reaction to Hermann's negative review. Hermann's criticism of Boeckh focused on the fact that many inscriptions were linguistically incorrect and therefore stood as a proof of Boeckh's inadequate knowledge of Greek. Not accidentally, in his 1828 publication of the *CGI*, Boeckh insisted on the fact that the inscriptions should not be put in the service of one single discipline, but should be a monumentorum Graeciae litterariorum supplementum, universo studio philologico utile.[50] By this Boeckh meant, specifically, that language was just part of what inscriptions might help us to study, and thus they should not be used as a mere instrument to understand Greek. In fact, praesertim ipsa lingua iniuriâ opponatur rebus:[51] focusing solely on the study of language would get in the way of the study of the *res*, derailing the philologist from his true goal, that is broad knowledge of antiquity, according to Wolf's notion of *Altertumswissenschaft*.

[50] *CGI*, VIII.
[51] Ibidem.

In the *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795) Wolf lingered on the problem of language and linguistic correctness:

Iam primum subeat mirari, cur, quum tam raro in Homero graviora vitia offendant, tantum tamen operae in correctione eius ponendum statuam. [..] At qualem integrum librum dicimus critico quidem sensu? Haud eum profecto, qui absque offensa legi possit, et in quo nihil sit eleganti consuetudini sermonis et reliquis recte scribendi legibus contrarium. Ut nihil eiusmodi sit in vulgato textu, non continuo pro puro et emendato habendus erit; immo nonnunquam ob id ipsum, si eiusmodi nihil insit, tanto magis germana integritate sua fraudatus esse videatur. Non dubito fore, qui hoc subabsurde dici opinentur. Sed si textum scriptorum veterum supra recte retuli ad *factorum historicorum* spectationem, in eo constituendo nullam speciem probabilitatis ex sensu elegantiae ductam, verum proba et satis antiqua exemplaria principatum habere necesse est.[52]

Wolf himself observed that the maxim that the purer a text seems, the more likely it is corrupted might seem ridiculous and counterintuitive. Being the first to theorise the necessity to collate all available manuscripts when preparing the *recensio* of a text, Wolf pointed out that unlikely readings might very well be the correct ones if they are supported by reliable manuscripts, irrespective of how other

[52] Wolf (1795), 14: `Now it may at first seem surprising that I maintain that so much work must be spent on correcting Homer, when serious faults occur so rarely in him. [..] But what sort of book do we call "pure" in the critical sense of the word? Clearly not one which can be read without displeasure, and in which nothing violates elegant usage and the other laws of correct writing. Granted that there is nothing of that sort in the vulgate text, it should not on that account be considered pure and correct throughout. On the contrary, sometimes the very fact that it contains nothing of that sort may make it appear all the more devoid of genuine purity. No doubt some will consider this statement ridiculous. But if above I properly related the text of ancient writers to the consideration of historical facts, then in establishing the text no appearance of plausibility drawn from one's sense of elegance, but pure and sufficiently old exemplars must take the first place.' Transl. by Grafton et alii (1985), 59.

seemingly authentic, more beautiful but less reliable readings might be. Therein lay the idea that any text can be authentic if there is convincing evidence pointing that way, and the appeal to concepts of beauty or perfection as unshakeable attributes of a golden idea of antiquity no longer sufficed if the aim was to re-establish a text as it was meant by its author.

This point found particularly fertile ground in the case of ancient inscriptions. The idea that a linguistically imperfect, or indeed even mistaken text can be authentic is in fact the best argument produced by Boeckh's favourite pupil Moritz Meier in his famous *Analyse*, a text in which he took the side of Boeckh and attacked Hermann's review:

> But surely it is only in the rarest of cases that public and private inscriptions and graffiti are composed by classical authors. Or are we to suppose that in ancient Hellas such matters were different from the way they are with us? The textual critic should produce or let stand only what is *true*; and he *must endure it*, if this truth also contains absurd and inconsistent thoughts.[53]

As seen already in chapter one, Hermann, too, was interested in restoring the text in the way that it had been written by its author; however, his critic Meier had hit a weak spot, namely Hermann's tendency, inherited from Bentley, to align the reconstruction of the words of the ancient playwrights to an ideal of beauty and perfection, a technique which could hardly hold in the case of Greek inscriptions.

[53] As quoted in Most (1997), 355.

Inscriptions, unlike the literary texts that Hermann was used to emend, were not a product of the intellectual élites of antiquity.[54] Much like contemporary graffiti, they were hardly concerned with achieving linguistic perfection, and they were often teeming with the kind of errors that testify to the natural evolution of language according to principles of economy of effort.[55] Also, they were engaged with the message they wanted to send much more than with the form through which any given content was conveyed. In this sense, inscriptions, as representation of a diverse sample of society, were one of the best ways to obtain a historical picture of antiquity. Restoring what is true, rather than what is beautiful, was thus one of the most important interpretative tasks for the "Boeckhian" type of philologist. In principle, Hermann was hardly of a different opinion, as his emendations were focused on the idea of restoring the text as it had been meant by its author; however, a sense of proximity to and even identification with the author, the ability to find out what would have been in the author's mind,[56] was a fundamental step in the Hermannian idea of interpretation. Thus the Hermannian methodology clearly would not have applied to the authors of graffiti, but only to the great authors of ancient literature whose work is possible to visit habitually and in depth.

On the other hand, Boeckh's approach to philology, despite its broadly historical declaration of intent, was no less complex than Hermann's. In particular, Boeckh reflected on his collection of inscriptions raising some of the same problems

[54] Cf. also ibidem, 353-7.
[55] On the idea of the evolution of language as responding to the principle of economy, or exchanging the least possible effort for the maximum possible gain, cf. e.g. Vicentini (2003), esp. 37-8.
[56] Cf. chapter 2, note 56.

and proposing some of the same techniques that he would investigate in his lectures, collected in the *Encyclopedia and Methodology of the Philological Sciences*. For instance, he made a distinction between the level of language and the level of content, explaining how the interpretation of inscriptions could engage either with meaning or with language. The task of the philologist as illustrated in the preface of the *CGI* consisted of two things: to excavate meaning and to judge words. Interpretation of meaning and judgement of words consisted, in turn, of four parts: understanding (intelligentia) and decision (crisis) as either linguistic (grammaticae) or historical, and they should be directed either at the personality of the writer (dicentis indolem) or at the precepts suggested by the type of art and genre to which the writing belonged.[57]

This, unfortunately, led to an *impasse* about subjectivity and objectivity of meaning, since words cannot be understood if they have not been emended, and they cannot be emended if they have not been understood; furthermore, it is not possible to make a decision about the right reading without having put in place some interpretation; likewise, it is not possible to interpret without having first made a decision about which words to accept in the text. Again, all these things have a claim of priority upon each other.[58]

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[57] *CGI*, XVII: Nam quum philologi negotium duabus rebus comprehendatur, sensu dictorum eruendo et iudicandis dictis, ex quibus alterum est hermeneutices, alterum critices iudicio insuper superstruentis emendationem, et quum utrumque sit quadripartitum, quod et intelligentia et crisis aut grammatica est aut historica, rursumque aut ad dicentis indolem aut ad praecepta artis et generis, cui opus quodque annumerandum, dirigitur.

[58] Ibidem: Verum quum intelligi scripta nequeant nisi emendata, neque emendari possint nisi intellecta, nec crisis incipi potest nisi absoluta interpretatione, neque interpretatio nisi absoluta crisi. At haec inter se pugnant.

Boeckh seemed to move from the perspective of the hermeneutical task required to deal specifically with epigraphy to the broader interpretative goals of the philologist. After all, according to Boeckh, epigraphy was just a part of the wider field of *Altertumswissenschaft* and as such it was also philology in a broad sense, it posed the same questions and required the same methodology as any other manifestation of *Altertumswissenschaft*, like the other disciplines that are its constituent parts.

In the preface to the *CGI* Boeckh got carried away with the same kind of epistemological reflections that he offered in his *Encyclopedia*, concerning how to interpret texts of much greater refinement than those of ancient graffiti. These exegetical questions will be discussed further in the following chapter, but here it should be noted that Meier's argument, the point of which, with respect to the emendation of inscriptions, Hermann missed, would not seem out of place among Boeckh's reflections in the preface to the *CGI*. Boeckh was contending with the same theoretical questions as Hermann, which do not only concern the highest expressions of ancient literature, but a plurality of the disciplines studying antiquity.

Hermann's methodological critique

The quarrel over Boeckh's collection of Greek Inscriptions is usually taken as a sign of Hermann's rejection of *Sachphilologie*, the implication being that such a novel and monumental project could only be criticised by someone who did not

understand its scope and importance for the future of classics. Indeed, Hermann's negative review of Boeckh's work caused a series of counter-reviews, not only by Boeckh and Meier but also by K. Fr. Hermann, O. Müller, G. F. Schömann and Wilhelm Dindorf,[59] where many defended the project and blamed Hermann for a lack of appreciation of such a revolutionary enterprise. If these reviews responded in part to the side-taking dynamics illustrated in the previous chapters, they were also not mistaken in noticing that Hermann's reaction seemed disproportionately negative. Indeed, the context of already established personal rivalry between Hermann and Boeckh must be taken into account in judging Hermann's review, and it emerged in the tone and the number of personal remarks that the discussion involved; however, it is crucial to recognise that Hermann's critique was based on method,[60] and simultaneously that, in this context, he engaged with the concepts of *Sachphilologie* and *Wortphilologie*, essentially dismissing both, but openly and specifically the latter – as the idea that philology could ever be concerned only with words –, as nonsensical. Indeed, Hermann made no mystery of his appreciation for the idea of a project collecting inscriptions, saying that he had `sincerely looked

[59] Meier's *Analyse* of Hermann's review was published in the *Hallische Litteraturzeitung*. But there were also other reviewers who did not share Hermann's opinion, such as K. Fr. Hermann in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher* (1825, 7. Heft), K. O. Mueller in *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1826, p. 969 ff.), G. F. Schömann in *Seebodes Kritische Bibliothek* (1826, p. 657 ff., 781 ff.). Also F. G. Welcker, who had his special dispute with Hermann because of his sharp review of Hermann's book on Aeschylus' trilogy on Prometheus, declared himself in the supplement to this book in 1826 in favour of Boeckh, and the Leipzig scholar W. Dindorf also signalled his approval. Cf. Hoffmann (1910), 51.

[60] Cf. also Most (1997), 355, who also pointed out this aspect of Hermann's review.

forward to it with great expectation` – only the execution had left him disappointed.[61]

Hermann's review of the *CGI*, appearing in the *Leipziger Literaturzeitung* in 1825,[62] began by criticizing how the work undertaken by the Academy had been left `to a single man, though very learned, and famous for his considerable service to the most varied parts of Greek antiquity.` Following on from the acknowledgment, there comes at once a hit:

If, in particular, before printing the work had been presented for examination to Professor Bekker, a man who really understands Greek and has great prudence, this fascicle would be thinner by at least half, but with pleasure one would see ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός [by how much the half is more than the whole].[63]

As seen above, both a certain irony and Hermann's suggestion that Boeckh's knowledge of Greek left something to be desired are recurrent elements of the dispute, which reappear right from the beginning of Hermann's review. What follows are a series of considerations on the methods used by Boeckh for his collection, which shows how Hermann's criticism was directed at the way in which

[61] Hermann (1826), 12: `Was sein Werk über die Inschriften anlangt, so habe ich mich ausrichtig darauf gefreut, und demselben mit großer Erwartung entgegengesehen. Daß ich in dieser Erwartung getäuscht worden bin, ist nicht meine Schuld.`
[62] *Leipziger Literaturzeitung* 1825, n. 279, 2225-8.
[63] Hermann (1826), 19: `Wäre namentlich dem Hrn. Prof. Bekker, einem Manne, der wirklich Griechisch versteht, und große Besonnenheit besitzt, das Werk vor dem Abbrucke zur Prüfung vorgelegt worden, so würde dieses Heft wenigstens um die Hälfte schwächer sein, aber mit Vergnügen sähe man ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.` For the Greek, cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 30.

Boeckh's work had been conducted, rather than at Boeckh's project per se.[64] With the same touch of sarcasm, Hermann continues:

> Meanwhile, since this had not happened, but Mr. Boeckh had to do the work alone, it would be unreasonable to demand from him what might not be expected from the combined forces of several, and I owe him only the greater thanks that he had the courage to undertake such a Herculean work.[65]

Some scepticism over the idea of the possibility of realising the collection itself shows through, but the main target here is definitely Boeckh, to whom a certain arrogance is attributed under the pretence of an encomium.

Regarding the project, Hermann lamented, first of all, the lack of a sound and consistent modus operandi to display inscriptions in the book:

> first of all, every inscription requires the most accurate and complete statement of all external things which may contribute to their understanding and judgment, e.g., of the place where it was found, the nature of the stone or site, the writings in which it is taken into account, and so on.[66]

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[64] Hermann's immediate review is canonically described as the starting point of the dispute (even though, as explored above, it was not). The emphasis on the rapidity of Hermann's review seems to imply that Hermann's position towards Boeckh's project was negatively prejudiced and not so much interested in considering the *CGI* objectively.

[65] Hermann (1826), 19: `Indessen, da das nun einmal nicht geschehen ist, sondern Herr Boeckh die Arbeit hat allein verrichten müssen, so würde es unbillig sein, von ihm zu fordern, was vielleicht von den vereinigten Kräften mehrerer nicht überall zu erwarten war, und mir sind ihm nur desto größern Dank schuldig, dass er die Beherztheit hatte, sich einer so herculischen Arbeit zu unterziehen.`

[66] Ibidem: `Zuerst verlangt man denn jeder Inschrift die genaueste und vollständigste Angabe aller äussern Dinge, welche zu deren Verständniss und Veurtheilung beitragen können, z. B. des Orts, wo

For example, sometimes a visual representation of the statue, painting, or other object on which the inscription rested was given, while at times it was lacking.[67] Secondly, Hermann criticised the fact that Boeckh had not made the text of the inscriptions clear, because when an inscription came from several sources, he had offered a reconstruction made at his own discretion, thus forcing the reader to trust his version rather than being able to verify the different readings; in some cases Boeckh had included his own emendations in brackets:

> It seems to us that it is very reprehensible that several inscriptions from different copies have been composed arbitrarily, and thus the reader cannot have any certainty. Nor can we approve of the fact that Mr B., in several, usually longer inscriptions, has incorporated his own supplements, though enclosed in parentheses, right in the text itself.[68]

Thirdly, Hermann believed that the reading and understanding of the inscriptions should have been made easier, condemning the fact that Boeckh had offered lengthy comments on the lettering and appearance of the inscriptions, but had then failed to give an indication of how each sentence should be interpreted.[69]

The fourth point in Hermann's critique continues in the tone of personal attack and indicates a paricular type of methodological issue:

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sie gefunden worden, der Veschaffenheit des Steins oder Ortes, der Schriften, in denen sie berücksichtigt ist, u. s. w.`

[67] Cf. Hermann (1826), 19-20.

[68] Ibidem, 20-1: `Sehr zu tadeln scheint uns, dass mehrere Inschriften aus verschiedenen Abschriften nach Gutdünken zusammengesetzt sind, und also der Leser sich an nichts Gewisses halten kann. Auch können wir nicht billigen, dass Herr B. in mehreren, gewöhnlich in den längeren Inschriften, seine Ergänzungen, obwohl in Klammern eingeschlossen, gleich im Texte selbst eingeschaltet hat.`

[69] Cf. ibidem, 21-2.

[..] a fourth demand that may rightly be made of a work such as this one [..] concerns the considerate weighing of that which is necessary to say, and that which is unnecessary, in order that the necessary may not be missed and that the reader is not detained in the unnecessary, and that the work may not be burdened without a reason. In both respects the work leaves much to be desired. Although it was not to be demanded that all that was said about an inscription by others be repeated, we repeatedly find useful things, which others have noticed, left unmentioned, while we find insignificant comments mentioned, or evidently wrong ones extensively repeated. Even less, however, can we approve of the fact that Mr B. so often propagates the most well-known and trivial matters with a degree of detail that at most can be tolerated from a professor advising listeners who are not very well informed. Overall, the whole tone of this work is one of an academic lecture, and Mr B. seems to imagine the whole audience as students sitting at his feet, tacitly accepting what he says, and as he says it. Therefore, he speaks so often pro auctoritate, presupposing that the confident tone of his speech will make the listener believe that he knows exactly what one cannot know.[70]

[70] Ibidem, *23:* `[..] eine vierte Forderung, die an ein Werk, wie das vorliegende senn soll, mit Fug und Recht gemacht werden darf. Sie betrifft die mohlüberlegte Abwägung dessen, was zu sagen nöthig, und was unnöthig ist, damit nicht das nöthige vermisst, durch unnöthiges aber der Leser aufgehalten und das Werk ohne zureichnden Grund vertheuert werde. In beiden Rücksichten läßt die Bearbeitung vieles zu wünschen übrig. Wenn auch nicht zu verlangen war, daß alles, was über eine Inschrift von andern gesagt worden, wiederholt würde, so finden wir doch mehrmals brauchbare Sachen, die von andern bemerkt waren, unerwähnt gelassen, während unbedeutendes berührt, oder offenbar falsches weitläuftig widerlegt wird. Noch weit weniger aber können wir es billigen, daß Herr B. sich so oft über die bekanntensten und trivialsten Dinge mit einer Ausführlichkeit verbreitet, die höchstens einem Professor auf dem Rathe der vor nicht eben sehr unterrichteten Zuhörern gestattet werden kann. Ueberhaupt ist der ganze Ton dieses Werkes der akademischer Vorlesungen, und Herr B. scheint sich das ganze Publikum als zu seinen Füßen sitzende Studirende vorzustellen, die, was er sagt, und wie er es sagt, stillschweigend hinnehmen müssen. Daher er denn auch so oft pro auctoritate spricht, voraussetzsend, der zuversichtliche Ton seiner Rede werde den Zuhörer glauben machen, er wisse auch das ganz genau, was man nicht wissen kann.`

According to Hermann, in addition to the incomplete specification of the readings of earlier researchers, Boeckh gave a too extensive treatment and explanation of unnecessary things, and above all an inadequate critical treatment of the inscriptions he was presenting. However, the bulk of this last point of Hermann's critique rested upon consideration of Boeckh's tone and the attitude shining through his work. In line with one of the typical features of the dispute, as already seen above, Hermann concludes his general review with a moral judgement, which he would not cease to point out, even later, as significant. Additionally, such moral judgement is rendered even more cutting by the suggestion that Boeckh does not know `what one cannot know`, but pretends to. Such criticism touches one crucial epistemological point in the dispute, namely the question of where the boundaries around the achievable knowledge of antiquity lie. By denouncing Boeckh's tone as pompous and invested with a sense of superiority intended to deceive, Hermann seeks to expose Boeckh's overcompensation for a lack of knowledge and the fact that he presents opinions as if they were facts.[71] Such a view seems to operate along the same lines as Hermann's idea that the study of antiquity should make wise use of the art of not knowing, the *ars nesciendi*, for those parts of the past that Hermann deemed impossible to reach –[72] a problem that resonates closely with Boeckh's hermeneutical theories, too, as he illustrates them in his *Encyclopedia* and, as seen above, did not spare in his reflections upon epigraphy.

[71] Cf. above, note 24.

[72] Cf. Hermann, *Op.* vol. 2, 288ff., where Hermann speaks about the *nesciendi ars et scientia*, and Couturier-Heinrich (2011), 6.

Boeckh's reaction *Gegen G. Hermanns Recension des Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1825) was published in the *Hallische Litteraturzeitung*.[73] It started out with the very same trope employed by Hermann, attributing a lack of fundamental knowledge to his opponent. In his defence, Boeckh laid claim to a greater understanding of inscriptions than Hermann, who, according to Boeckh, thought many things were wrong only because of his lack of familiarity with the subject:

> Mr H. is easily led astray by his eagerness for the truth, but his point of view is completely different from mine. The treatment of difficult things requires experience and a practice acquired through many years of exercise; as Mr H. lacks these things, many things that I do not find striking seem amazing to him. And when he shouts at the boldness of the letter changes that I have made, whereby the crowd can perhaps be won, I will not let it rattle me, because I know from countless examples how inscriptions with the greatest errors are not only copied on paper, but even engraved in copper.[74]

Boeckh invokes his greater familiarity with the political life of the ancients and with a variety of ancient materials, subjects with which, he says, Hermann was scarcely concerned, and thus he essentially dismisses Hermann's review as useless. This attitude is not dissimilar from Hermann's. In both cases an epistemological

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[73] Cf. *Hallische Litteratrzeitung* 1825, n. 245, p. 289-93= Boeckh, *Kl. Schr.* vol 7, 255-261.

[74] Boeckh, ibidem, 256: `Herr H. sich von seinem Eifer für die Wahrheit sehr leicht zu weit führen lässt, ihm aber von seinem Standpunkt aus etwas ganz anderes als wahr erscheint als mir von dem meinigen. Zur Behandlung schwieriger Dinge gehört Erfahrung und eine durch vieljährige Beschäftigung damit erworbene Uebung; da Hrn. H. diese fehlt, erscheint ihm Manches wunderbar, was mir nichts Auffallendes hat; und wenn er über die Kühnheit der von mir vorgenommenen Buchstabenverwandelungen ein Geschrei erhebt, wodurch die Menge vielleicht gewonnen werden kann, lasse ich mich davon nicht erschüttern, da ich aus unzähligen Beispielen weiss, wie Inschriften mit den grössten Fehlern nicht nur abgeschrieben, sondern sogar in Kupfer gestochen werden.`

question is used primarily as a gateway for a personal attack to the opponent's character. Hermann bases his claim about what would be 'necessary' to say and what is, rather, useless, on his own personal opinion of what sources would have been best to quote. To take Hermann's critical editions as a comparison, there it is evident that his commentary, too, presents readings or mentions interpretations formulated by other scholars in a quite arbitrary manner, using criteria of judgment that are not always consistent with each other.[75] Not unlike Boeckh, Hermann, too, chooses to include or discuss particular readings or emendations when they seem the most appropriate to him, rather than following a precise or even systematic modus operandi. Hermann formulates a claim for a kind of knowledge that seems important enough to be configured as `necessary` in a way that is evident to anyone who is familiar enough with a subject. As seen elsewhere,[76] such a claim is almost inherently subjective but it becomes an expedient for a rebuke based on an unrealistic request for objectivity. Moreover, Boeckh and Hermann here attribute to each other the same type of shortcomings: Boeckh reproaches Hermann for a lack of general knowledge about antiquity that would allow him to understand the former's choices, and Hermann blames Boeckh for being unaware of the necessary scholarly background that would more relevantly contextualise his work. Both claims operate according to the same logic, a certain vagueness of the critique that does not indicate too narrowly what points the opponent is missing. This responds partly to a fundamental epistemological and theoretical issue – what is necessary to

[75] Cf. e.g. chapter five, pp. 291ff., on Hermann's changes of mind, and pp. 317-8, on exceptions.
[76] Cf. the critiques moved by Hermann to Klotz, chapter 2, pp. 132ff.

know in order to establish the truth? –, a subterranean question with which they engage constantly but whose resolution somehow retains a permanently ineffable quality.[77] Partly, both claims respond to a wish to criticise the opponent's personality, presented as the result of an incompatibility of character and experience. In particular, Hermann betrays the role played here by the memory of the exchanges he had with Boeckh on the topic of metrics, by saying that `the difference between Pindar and the inscriptions` lay in the fact that `there Boeckh had found work already done, while here he had to stand mostly on his own feet,`[78] alluding to his own primacy in the study of Pindar and metrics.

Indeed, if one compares Boeckh's work with Hermann's general reprimands, two things are immediately apparent which Hermann ought to have mentioned. Even though statues and paintings with ancient writing are not reproduced, columns and panels are, and the letterings are reported as accurately as was possible without the originals, using the best illustrations available at that time.[79] Moreover, Boeckh's emendations of the text[80] are only found in the Attic inscriptions of which the second part of the CGI consists, where the letters are in the stoichedon style, so that it is easier to fill in the gaps because one knows the precise number of missing letters, making Boeckh's interventions less doubtful.[81]

[77] Cf. chapter five on Hermann's hermeneutics.
[78] Hermann (1826), 25: `bedenkt man aber den Unterschied zwischen Pindar und Inschriften, und daß Hr. B. dort vorgearbeitet fand, hier aber meistens auf eignen Füßen feststehen mußte.`
[79] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 50.
[80] Cf. above, note 68.
[81] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 50.

The linguistic foundations of a broad study of antiquity

Following the series of counter-reviews against himself, Hermann came forward with a book, *Über Herrn Professor Boeckhs Behandlung der Griechischen Inschriften* (1826), in which he reprinted his review, Boeckh's reply and Meier's *Analyse*, with notes, adding two essays focused on two inscriptions.[82] Here he strongly opposed Boeckh's opinion that he did not know enough about antiquity to be able to understand Boeckh's work, but instead argued that he knew how to judge both *das Sachliche* and *das Sprachliche*.[83] Moreover, here it appears clearly that, unlike what the *wortphilological* stereotype would dictate, Hermann did not dismiss the subject of Boeckh's research as unworthy; he was not in any way opposed to research about the *Sache* of antiquity, and in fact could not conceive of researching 'anything but' the 'things' of antiquity, ancient language being one of them. The distinction itself between *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie* was foreign to Hermann's programmatic intentions:

At Göttingen, as far as I know, prompted by Wolf's unfair attacks against Heyne, a distinction began to be made between philologists who deal with things and those who are called grammarians and metricists, and the former think of themselves as standing one step higher and being entitled to look down on the others with some superiority. But this distinction is the result partly of a confusion between two very different concepts, and partly of the endeavour to hide a defective basic knowledge. Things and language can only

[82] Cf. above, note 5.
[83] Cf. Hoffmann (1901), 51.

be distinguished if by 'language' one means the mothertongue. For here language is treated, as the fully familiar system of signs through which things are known, is set entirely over against them; it is merely a medium, and need not be an object of knowledge.[84]

Here it appears clearly that Hermann certainly never claimed to be a *Wortphilologe*, nor did he think the concept of *Wortphilologie* useful or even meaningful in any way. Furthermore, the very distinction between a philology that deals with things and one that deals with language seemed absurd to Hermann, an artifice created as a consequence of personal disputes rather than a useful label indicating any distinction of substance. If anything, he considered such categorisation an expedient for some scholars to discount the knowledge of ancient languages as a way to cover up for their own ignorance of a fundamental prerequisite to study classics, a tendency that Hermann saw on the rise. For Hermann, the ancient languages were one object of the study of antiquity among many others, even though he held them in special regard as a particularly, ubiquitously useful one. Unlike a first language, ancient languages must be learnt and even translated into the system of signs that makes sense and is familiar to us as a primary code to decipher the world. Since we know things of antiquity almost

[84] Hermann (1826), 3: `Man hat, so viel ich weiß, zu Göttingen, durch Wolfs unbillige Ausfälle gegen Heyne veranlaßt, einen Unterschied zwischen Philologen, die sich mit den Sachen beschäftigen, und solchen, die man Grammatiker und Metriker nennet, zu machen angefangen, und die ersten haben sich gedünkt eine Stufe höher zu stehen, und auf die andern mit einiger Vornehmheit herabsehen zu dürfen. Es liegt aber dieser Unterscheidung theils eine Verwechselung zweier sehr verschiedener Begriffe, theils das Vestreben eine mangelhafte Kenntniß zu verstecken zum Grunde. Sachen und Sprache können nur da unterschieden werden, wo man unter Sprache die Muttersprache versteht. Denn hier tritt die Sprache, als das völlig bekannte Zeichen, durch welches die Sachen erkannt werden, gänzlich ihnen gegenüber; es ist bloß Mittel, und braucht nicht Gegenstand der Erkenntniß zu seyn.`

entirely through the writings of the ancients, according to Hermann in the end everything depends on them being understood correctly, in order not to accept the first interpretation as the best, but to get to what has really been said.[85] To circle back to Wolf's words, presented above in the examination of the programmatic content of the *CGI*, it is evident that Hermann was still perplexed by the idea of turning `beyond the text of the ancient writers,` `to the observation of the *historical facts*,` because knowledge of the historical facts came for him most prominently from texts. If Hermann, unlike Boeckh, did not foresee the important improvements in our knowledge of antiquity that would be brought about through archaeological or epigraphical studies, he was not wrong in insisting that the bulk of our knowledge of history would keep coming from written witnesses. Nonetheless, Hermann felt that he was fully embracing Wolf's suggestion to aim at the truth rather than an ideal of classical perfection.

The most significant point of disagreement with the methods of so-called *Sachphilologie*, for Hermann, was perhaps the idea that such knowledge of the historical facts, beyond the texts of the ancient writers should be achieved with the aid of intuition (*Anschauung*), proposed as an interpretative method to designate a knowledge which would allegedly be denied to those deemed linguistic scholars. Hermann observed that the meaning of such a concept is difficult to grasp, and that it would, at best, apply to the archaeological remnants of antiquity, which one can really see with one's eyes, such as buildings, monuments, statues, equipment, or

[85] Hermann (1826), 5: `Denn da wir die Sachen doch fast gänzlich bloß durch die Schriften der Alten kennen, so kommt am Ende alles darauf an, daß diese richtig verstanden werden.`

coins, where one can fill in the gaps with some imagination. As seen in chapter three, for Hermann this principle also applied, in a way, to metrical reconstructions and matters of rhythm in poetry. However, this would not apply to the spiritual and political life of the ancients. On that subject, Hermann says:

> But one speaks of views of the intellectual and political life of the ancients. Who could think that these could be drawn from anywhere other than a detailed acquaintance with their writings, to whose understanding, however, only the knowledge of language can lead? But the fact that to them language is not the source is already evident in the fashionable contempt for linguistic learning.[86]

This important concern aims at fostering the study of the ancient languages and encourages a sound, rather than vague, methodology for the study of antiquity. Hermann, as partly seen in chapter three and as will be argued again in the following chapter, was not immune to the problem of "intuition", which he conceptualised as *sensus*, and to some extent he used very similar exegetical techniques. However, he grounded them in Kantianism, to maintain the importance of soundness of methods and scientific approach. Also, in practice, Hermann never backed away from the chance to turn ad factorum historicorum spectationem, offering even elaborated historical reconstruction based on the available ancient texts, as exemplified through the case study below.

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[86] Hermann (1826), 6: `Aber man redet von Anschauungen des geistigen und politischen Lebens der Alten. Wer sollte denken, daß diese anderswoher, als aus einer genauen Bekanntschaft mit deren Schriften, zu deren Verständniß doch nur wieder die Sprachkenntniß fuhren kann, zu schöpfen wäre? Aber daß dieß nicht die Quelle derselbe ist, davon zeugt schon die vornehme Verachtung der Sprachgelehrsamkeit.`

Indeed, Hermann's claim about the prominence of literature corresponded to a wish to get to know the nations of the ancient world, a preoccupation which was very relevant for so-called *Sachphilologen* of his time.[87] The study of ancient languages was, for Hermann, the study of the highest expression of ancient civilisations and a window on those peoples' culture and thought:

> Although we learn about antiquity only through what its writers report, ancient languages are themselves a part of this antiquity, and can only become known to us again through our mother tongue. [..] Not only are the ancient languages overall a part of the things of antiquity, like all the things standing, so they say, in opposition to them, but they are the most important and perfect things of all. In itself, the language of a people is what characterises most of its essence as the living image of its spirit; it becomes even more important in that, primarily through it, all that is left that belonged to a people can be grasped and understood.[88]

Hermann's critique of so-called *Sachphilologie*, finally, lay in a demand for specialisation as opposed to a multi-articulated form of scholarship, and it envisaged an ideal of scholarship which assumes the traits of the modern scientific community, where individual scholars mostly specialise in the in-depth study of a

[87] Cf. Van Bommel (2015), 79.

[88] Hermann (1826), 4: `wenn wir auch das Altherthum erst durch das kennen lernen, was seine Schriftsteller berichten, so sind doch seine Sprachen selbst ein Theil dieses Alterthums, und können nur erst wieder mittelst unsrer Muttersprache uns bekannt werden. [..] Die alten Sprachen gehören aber nicht nur überhaupt, wie alle im Gegensatze gegen sie so genannten Sachen, zu den Sachen des Alterthums, sondern sie sind von allen gerade die wichtigste und vorzüflichste Sache. Schon an sich ist die Sprache eines Volkes das, was als das lebendige Bild seines Geistes am meisten sein Wesen charakterisirt; noch wichtiger wird sie dadurch, daß durch sie erst alles übrige, was einem Volke eigen ist, begriffen und verstanden werden kann.`

subject and lean on other specialised studies to further their own work and the overall research output of the intellectual community:

Finally, through such so-called knowledge of things (*Sachkenntniß*) one tries to give an appearance of versatility. But they do not realise that being able to speak of many things, and to be well acquainted with them, is not versatility, but rather what one calls with this name is the greatest one-sidedness. For the most part, of the endless field of things, it is only a small part in which one has settled in lightly built lodges, now the usual field of mythology, now a short period of history, now a single state of antiquity, now a branch of the fine arts. [..] If individual philologists direct their attention to a certain sphere of things which they seek to illuminate in a brighter light, this can not but be praiseworthy, since the scope of antiquity is so great that it is not completely encompassed by any individual. [..] Science in general continues only through the fact that several people share the work, and everyone draws the profit which he needs for his subject out of what the others have to-day brought to light, but no-one despises what is indispensable for the process, even if something is not directly belonging to his sphere.[89]

[89] Hermann (1826), 7-8, 10: `Endlich glaubt man sich durch diese sogenannte Sachkenntniß einen Anschein von Vielseitigkeit zu geben. Aber nicht zu gedenken, daß von vielerlei Dingen reden zu können, und mit keinem recht bekannt zu seyn, nicht Vielseitigkeit ist, so ist gerade das, was man mit diesem Namen belegt, die größte Einseitigkeit. Meistens ist es von dem endlosen Gebiete der Sachen nur ein kleiner Theil, auf dem man sich in leicht erbauten Hütten angesiedelt hat, bald das nebliche Feld der Mythologie, bald ein kleiner Zeitraum der Geschichte, bald ein einzelner Staat des Alterthums, bald ein Zweig der bildenden Kunst [..]. Wenn übrigens einzelne Philologen ihr Haptaugenmerk auf einen gewissen Kreis von Sachen richten, den sie in ein helleres Licht zu seßen suchen, so kann das nicht anders als lobenswerth seyn, da der Umfang der Alterthumskunde so groß ist, daß er von keinem einzelnen vollständig umfaßt werden kann. [..] Erst dadurch kommt ja die Wissenschaft überhaupt weiter, daß mehrere sich in die Arbeit theilen, und jeder von dem, was die andern zu Tage gefördert haben, den Gewinn zieht, den er für sein Fach nöthig hat, keiner aber das verachtet, was, wenn auch nicht unmittelbar zu seinem Kreise gehörig, doch zur Bearbeitung desselben unentbehrlich ist.`

Hermann saw a pretence of unachievable omniscience in the programmatic effort to study the entirety of antiquity, but only when this was to be intended as the task of a single man. In the illusory attempt to know everything, many things would elude such a scholar, and, indeed, this view recalls Hermann's initial critique at the beginning of his review of Boeckh's *CGI*. Such a perspective was not meant to be in opposition to the idea of studying multiple aspects of antiquity, and the account given by Hermann of the mechanisms according to which science should progress would find perfect accommodation within an *altertumswissenschaftlicher* programmatic declaration; it is indeed very similar to the inspiring motives behind the project of the Berlin Academy for the collection of ancient inscriptions. Hermann's idea of a science of antiquity admitted a broad, encompassing framework, and only methodologically did it respond to a narrower criterion, fostering an idea of specialisation intended as the most scientific way to study classics, or any other discipline. And indeed, Boeckh's *CGI* itself would lead to the establishment of epigraphy as a sub-discipline in the field of classics, encouraging many scholars to make it their privileged, narrow field of interest.

*De Hippodromo Olympiaco*: a case study

Hermann's philological analysis often demonstrated how it used language, as an object of antiquity, to investigate other, non-linguistic objects of *Alterthumswissenschaft.* Similarly to the cases reported in chapter one, where Hermann's direct experience with horse riding became a guide for his exegetical

arguments, Hermann's dissertation on the hippodrome at Olympia[90] (1825), published in the years of the dispute, constitutes an interesting case in this sense, as it displays a commitment to clarify elements of antiquity that most evidently pertain to the domain of Greek material culture. The case will be discussed in detail to give an accurate idea of Hermann's methodology.

This treatise considers the only remaining source about the Olympic hippodrome, Pausanias' *Description of Greece* books V and VI, and the various interpretations of two passages describing the site, which had given rise to much discussion among critics, as I will show below, from various fields– although not so much among the philologists specifically. Here, in fact, Hermann engaged in conversation with several authors who had written about the hippodrome and were all antiquarians or archeologists, and men with political or diplomatic careers, whose interest in the Greek world came from a material-culture point of view. Hermann "the *Wortphilologe*" would seem entirely out of place here, engaging in a purely archeological subject with relative approach.

The object of speculation was Pausanias' account of the structure of the hippodrome, and in particular the elaborate system for the start of the race invented by the Greek sculptor and architect Kleoitas,[91] the *aphesis*. This structure, according to Pausanias' account, required the chariots before the start of the race to be organised in a shape similar to that of the prow of a ship, and involved an

[90] Hermann (1839).
[91] Michaud and Michaud (1813), 52-3; Visconti and Labus (1830), 372-3.

elaborated sequence for the chariots to start their run, intended to guarantee impartiality in the way examined below.

At the beginning of the essay Hermann writes about how readers of the ancients must establish whether and in what way the things that are described in writing correspond to reality. Hermann clarifies immediately that it is among the tasks of the critic to achieve that reality inasmuch as the available sources allow it, in order to interpret the literary sources to reconstruct the ancient world, and he declares his intention to do so. In the incipit we read:

Perdifficile est quae oculis cernuntur ita verbis describere, ut qui res ipsas non viderint veram earum speciem mente concipiant. Hinc multa, quae de huiusmodi rebus apud antiquos scriptores memorata legimus, tam sunt dubia, ut qui ea pingendo informare conati sunt, non modo saepe in diversissima abierint, verum aliquando etiam finxerint naturae rerum contraria.[92]

Not only is it challenging to form a correct representation of what we cannot see, but the absence of any means of verification of the correctness of a mental representation thus achieved is almost sure to give rise to a plurality of different versions of the same thing; and the more of these blind readers there are, the more alternative versions can result from such an exercise. Furthermore, in a form of awareness of reception, Hermann observes that, because of this position of

[92] *Op*. vol. 7, 388: `it is very difficult to describe with words what can be seen with the eyes, so that those who do not see those same things can conjure up in their own mind the true image. Hence many things, about things which we read reported by ancient writers in this way, are so doubtful that those who have tried to represent them by drawing not only have often parted from each other with very different results, but also sometimes they have fashioned impossible things.`

disadvantage from which the critic is forced to operate, he must always keep in mind that the inverse process of putting into words what can be seen with one's own eyes, too, is no less difficult than trying to form a picture of something that is only described in a book. Ancient authors might therefore describe things in a way that does not entirely correspond to reality, and sometimes they might even have reasons to give false accounts deliberately. During his reconstruction of reality on the basis of words the critic must be aware of both these two faces of the coin, the difficulties encountered by the interpreter and those that present themselves to the writer.

Already in Medieval times the changing course of the Alpheios River had washed away nearly all traces of the site in Olympia, including the Stoa of Agnaptos (ca. 380 B.C.), the portico which had been built on the west side of the hippodrome, separating it from the religious complex at Olympia that lay to its north-west. The reconstruction of the hippodrome is therefore mostly conjectural, based solely on the descriptions of Pausanias and the partial help of the parallel with the Circus Maximus in Rome, as the latter was inspired by the hippodrome at Olympia.[93] The archaeological site began to arouse interest in the eighteenth century, with the English theologian Richard Chandler's 1766 expedition, which brought the first remains of the temple of Zeus back to light. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, famous English and French archaeologists started to show an interest in Olympia, to the point that some scholars were convinced that the site of

[93] The problems around the shape of the *aphesis* at Olympia and all the mechanisms involved have not been definitively solved yet, cf. Harris (1968); Mallwitz (1972).

the hippodrome had been discovered. Among them was Marie-Gabriel-Florent-Auguste Choiseul-Gouffier,[94] referred to by Hermann as one of the critics who took part in the speculations about the shape of the hippodrome and its *aphesis*. In his *Memoire sur l'Hippodrome d'Olympie* (1784), he described a visit to the site of what he thought was the hippodrome, only to soon be proven mistaken. To this day the site of the hippodrome has not yet been excavated, although German archaeologists seem to have recently discovered its exact location and dimensions using sophisticated geomagnetic technology.[95]

At the time Hermann writes, and long after that, one of the most controversial points concerning the hippodrome was the shape of the *aphesis*, the structure that accommodated the stalls for the chariots before the race started. The architect Kleoitas had devised the traps with the ingenious system for which he was renowned. Pausanias tells us that Kleoitas projected the *aphesis* in the shape of the prow of a ship, whose base was constituted by the Stoa of Agnaptus on the edge of the western short side of the elliptic *dromos*. Rather than having the stalls positioned in a straight line, parallel to the short sides of the racecourse, the stalls were positioned along the two sides of the prow, so that more of them could be fitted in the available space. This disposition naturally would involve some chariots starting off from a less advantageous positions than others, as some stalls were closer to the Stoa of Agnaptus, while some others were on the tip of the prow, in closer

[94] Marie-Gabriel-Florent-Auguste de Choiseul-Gouffier (1752-1817) was a scholar of ancient Greece and, from 1784 until the fall of the French monarchy, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire.
[95] Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, *Pferderennbahn im antiken Olympia nach 1600 Jahren entdeckt*. http://www.uni-mainz.de/presse/23389.php (last consulted 05/09/2020).

proximity to the racecourse. Hence part of Kleoitas' project was a system whereby the chariots in the most rearward stalls were the first to start off when the starting signal had been given. The barriers in front of the chariots occupying the second closest position to the Stoa of Agnaptus were then taken down, allowing those chariots to start their race, when their position had been reached by the chariots which had left their stalls first. The same system applied to all gates until the ones at the tip of the prow were reached.

Reconstructing how this actually worked in practice was not without problems. For example, Pausanias' description seems to indicate that the system was thought out in a way that, at the moment when the last two horses had left their stalls, all horses found themselves abreast with each other, as if disposed on a line, and at the same height.

Before the appearance of Hermann's treatise in 1839, there were three main theories circulating in order to interpret the passages of Pausania's *Description of Greece*, which contain information about the Olympic hippodrome (5.15.4, 6.20.7ff.) Here, I will discuss how and with what methods Hermann tackled the problems and the solutions offered by those previous critics.

He began by considering the parallel with Roman circuses, which, too, were of elliptical shape, and where the chariots started their run from one of the two ends, in the stalls (*carceres*), and ran along the two long sides of the circus on their way back and forth. Along the centre of the circus ran a long wall (*spina*),[96] often

[96] Cf. Visconti and Labus (1830), 225, for the history of the name of this stadium element.

adorned with monuments, with the function of preventing the horses from crossing over to the opposite side, against the flow of the chariots speeding in the opposite direction. In the Roman circus there were twelve stalls. Similarly, in the Greek hippodrome there were two long sides and two turning posts (*metae*) constituted by two pillars at each end of the dromos routes, but it looks like they did not have a *spina*, as there is no mention of it in the literary sources, although Hermann suggests there must have been a bulwark or a fence of some sort, for security reasons.

When it came to understanding how things took place at Olympia, he offered no less visual and realistic solutions. The first critic writing about the topic, whose idea Hermann takes into consideration, was the Chevalier de Folard (1669-1752), a former strategist whose interest in the matter of horse-racing at Olympia probably came from his own military experiences as a colonel of the *ancien régime* of France. This circumstance is well reflected in his commentary to a translation of Polybius, that teems with remarks and reflections on his military contemporaries,[97] while his theory on the structure of the Olympic hippodrome appears in the French translation of Pausanias made by the Abbé Gedoyn.[98] Folard imagined that a wall or a barrier had been erected between the *aphesis* and the racecourse, with a door in front of the tip of the *aphesis*. According to Folard, the chariots left their stalls in the

[97] The title of Folard (1759), as it appears on the front-page, already gives a good idea of the type of work Folard's commentary is, as it reads: *Histoire de Polybe, nouvellement traduite du Grec par Dom Vincent Thuillier, Bénédictin de la Congregation de Saint Maur. Avec un commentaire ou un corps de science militaire, enrichi de notes critiques et historiques, ou toutes les grandes parties de la guerre, soit pour l'Offensive, soit pour la Défensive, sont expliquées, démontrées, et représentées en Figures. Ouvrage très-utile non seulement aux Officiers Généraux, mais même à tous ceux qui suivent le parti des armes. Par M. de Folard, Chevalier de l'Ordre Militaire de Saint Louis, Mestre de Camp d'Infanterie*. On Folard's works cf. Sandys (1908), vol. 2, 389.

[98] Folard and Gedoyn (1797).

way described by Pausanias, only to pass through the door and dispose themselves on a latitudinal line after the wall. Needless to say, this hypothesis did not stir too much consensus and it got rejected by Hermann without being dignified with any comments, because it is evident that the whole mechanism devised by Kleoitas would become pointless if the chariots had to stop and start again after having made their way out of the stalls.[99] Moreover, this would require a second starting signal, on top of the one described by Pausanias, of which there is no mention.[100] However, this conjecture serves the purpose of highlighting the problematic nature of the interpretation of Pausanias' words:

First on either side the barriers are withdrawn by the porch of Agnaptus, and the horses standing thereby run off first. As they run they reach those to whom the second station has been allotted, and then are withdrawn the barriers at the second station. The same thing happens to all the horses in turn, until at the ram of the prow they are all abreast. After this it is left to the charioteers to display their skill and the horses their speed.[101]

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[99] Choisel-Gouffier (1842), 287: `Mais alors, à quoi bon cette disposition compliquée? pourquoi ces départs successifs? Il est évident qu'un tel appareil, et tant de mesures sans objet eussent été complètement ridicules.`

[100] For the sign to start the race described by Pausanias cf. *Gr. Desc*. 6.20.12:`δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βωμῷ χαλκοῦς κεῖται τὰ πτερὰ ἐπὶ μήκιστον ἐκτείνων. ἀνακινεῖ μὲν δὴ τὸ ἐν τῷ βωμῷ μηχάνημα ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῷ δρόμῳ: ἀνακινηθέντος δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐς τὸ ἄνω πεποίηται πηδᾶν ὁ ἀετός, ὡς τοῖς ἥκουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν γενέσθαι σύνοπτος, ὁ δελφὶς δὲ ἐς ἔδαφος πίπτει`, `and a bronze eagle stands on the altar with his wings stretched out to the fullest extent. The man appointed to start the racing sets in motion the mechanism in the altar, and then the eagle has been made to jump upwards, so as to become visible to the spectators, while the dolphin falls to the ground`, transl. by Jones (1918).

[101] Paus. *Gr. Desc*. 6.20.13`πρῶται μὲν δὴ ἑκατέρωθεν αἱ πρὸς τῇ στοᾷ τῇ Ἀγνάπτου χαλῶσιν ὕσπληγες, καὶ οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἑστηκότες ἐκθέουσιν ἵπποι πρῶτοι: θέοντές τε δὴ γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰληχότας ἑστάναι τὴν δευτέραν τάξιν, καὶ τηνικαῦτα χαλῶσιν αἱ ὕσπληγες αἱ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ τάξει: διὰ πάντων τε κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον συμβαίνει τῶν ἵππων, ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἐξισωθῶσιν

Like many other critics up to this day, Hermann drew attention to the fact that, as Pausanias indicates, once all the horses have left their starting gates, they end up being ἐξισωθῶσιν ἀλλήλοις, which scholars have largely interpreted as meaning 'all abreast', 'next to each other in a straight line'.[102] However, if the prow of a ship formation of the gates had been designed to fit more competitors in the available breadth of the stadium, then it follows that the chariots could not possibly fit on a line next to each other, or the whole mechanism of the *aphesis* would lose meaning.

The antiquarian Louis-Joseph-Alexandre de Laborde (1773-1842) formulated a second theory. He was the author, among other things, of a *Collection de vases grecs expliquée*,[103] and he had, too, been a military man in Austria, from where he had fled at the outbreak of the French Revolution, becoming in 1791 a captain in a regiment of light cavalry, and later a member of the Napoleonic administration.[104]

Laborde's model designed the *aphesis* in a triangular form, with the Stoa of Agnaptus as a base of the triangle, and the left side longer than the right one, so that the tip of the *aphesis* ended up in a point just on the right of the first turning-post in the racecourse. The *spina* of the racecourse – or, at least, the imaginary line connecting the two *metae* – was then slightly tilted, too, to accommodate for the

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ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τῆς πρῴρας τὸ ἔμβολον: τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ ἤδη καθέστηκεν ἐπίδειξις ἐπιστήμης τε ἡνιόχων καὶ ἵππων ὠκύτητος.` Transl. by Jones (1918).

[102] Harris (1968), 124-5, suggests that a misunderstanding of Pausanias is what has been confusing many critics throughout the centuries: when Pausanias says that the horses ἐξισωθῶσιν ἀλλήλοις, he does not necessarily mean that they are 'all abreast' as 'in a straight line', because the word means 'they are made equal', namely, at that point of the race they all have the same chances.

[103] Laborde (1824–1828).

[104] De Laborde's idea is published in Hirt (1827), cf. esp. Taf. XX, upon which figure 1 has been sketched.

*aphesis* reaching out with its tip until a point next to the first *meta* and to provide more space for the chariots coming from the left to pass through. This hypothesis tried to solve the issue that, if we imagine the base of the *aphesis* to cover the whole extension of the Stoa of Agnaptus and the *aphesis* to have sides of the same length, then the tip of the *aphesis* would end up exactly where the first turning-post is so that half of the chariots, once they have started their run, would find themselves on the left side of the racecourse, dashing counterclockwise in the direction opposite to the other half of the chariots, destined to crash into the chariots that run clockwise at the moment of their encounter in proximity to the second turning-post.



**Figure 1. Laborde's model of the hippodrome**

Hermann had two objections to this theory: first of all, the fact that Pausanias describes the *aphesis* as shaped like the prow of a ship. The sides of the structure should therefore be bent and not straight, otherwise Pausanias would have just more simply compared the structure to a triangle. As shown in figure one, within Laborde's model it is possible to imagine that the starting-gates were disposed in a ship-prow formation, and still at the start of the race moved along racing tracks in the shape of a triangle. However, Pausanias does not mention anything of the kind, and thus Hermann tried to keep his interpretation as close as possible to the

information provided in the text. Here we see where Hermann was inclined to draw a line between interpreting a text and relying on *Anschauungen*.

Furthermore, Hermann observed that, in Laborde's model, as the right side of the *aphesis* would be shorter than the left side, the chariot occupying the furthermost right position on the *aphesis* would have much less road to travel than the chariot occupying the furthermost position on the left. Thus the structure would not allow the fairness and impartiality that its inventor attributed to it, but it would rather almost deliberately make the starting system unfair.

The second objection concerned the fact that Laborde's reconstruction imagined that the tip of the wedge was pointing right, thanks to the left side of the structure being longer than the right side. All chariots therefore ended up on the right side of the racecourse, after leaving their stalls. The horses that started off from the wings proceeded on oblique lines, with the ones starting on the left proceeding towards the right and the ones starting on the right proceeding slightly to the left, so that they all converged towards a single point. This point was not far from the first turning-post and it was named by Laborde *punctum normale*. All the charioteers had to converge towards this point.

Hermann realised that in this way the risk of all the chariots crashing into each other already at the beginning of the race would be too high and would compromise the beginning of the race. Furthermore, from Homer's description of horseracing we know that the crucial point of the race was not at the very beginning, but at the second turning-post, where chariots encountered the

*Taraxippus*, a device that was said to be capable of terrifying horses. Hermann noted: 'sed, quod modo significabam, patientissima talium inventorum charta est, non item cursura in hippodromo'.[105] For Hermann the reconstruction offered by Laborde worked well on paper, but it was unrealistic if considering how things could actually happen in the hippodrome. This hypothesis would be particularly difficult to implement, Hermann observed, because of the problem of the localisation of the *punctum normale*, the point at the right of the first turning-post at which the charioteers should aim during the start of their race. The position of this point could not be defined. In fact it was not possible to mark it with a column, that would have been on the way of the racing chariots, nor with any other sign, as it would have been concealed by sand and dust. Hence it would have been left to the single charioteer to establish the position of the point, and what are the odds that all charioteers would agree on the same spot? Hermann concluded that it is simply impossible that all charioteers would be able to autonomously measure exactly the same point.

The third conjecture concerning the hippodrome belonged to the antiquarian and art historian Ennio Quirino Visconti (1751-1818), who had been curator of antiquities at the Louvre and professor of archaeology at the Institut de France.[106]

[105] *Op*. vol. 7, 394.
[106] Visconti (1820).

He tried to solve the problem in Pausanias' words in *Gr. Desc.* 6.20.15 where he says that `the race-course has one side longer than the other.`[107]

Hermann argued that it is evident that the sides of the race-course must be of the same length. He presented his argument in the form of a direct question, of the kind `nun quis non videat...?`, as many of his arguments went – including in his commentaries –, presented as the only possible logical viewpoint, as something obvious on which it is difficult, or should be difficult, not to agree.[108] The distance between the two turning-posts, in fact, cannot but be the same. But from Pausanias' description it looks like the right side of the race-course was longer. To solve this problem, Visconti's reconstructions moved the aphesis inside the racecourse itself, but it also confined the extension of the base of the aphesis only to the right side of the course. Thus the prow was positioned in a way that, if one drew a straight line from the tip of the prow, that line would divide the right side of the course into two identical parts.



**Figure 2. Visconti's model of the hippodrome.**

Hermann agreed with Visconti's idea of moving the aphesis to the right side of the race-course, with the aphesis having the shape of the prow of a ship, as described by Pausanias. Indeed, it was clear to Hermann that from each side of the

[107] παρεχομένου δὲ τοῦ ἱπποδρόμου παρήκουσαν ἐς πλέον τὴν ἑτέραν τῶν πλευρῶν, ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς μείζονος πλευρᾶς, οὔσης χώματος, κατὰ τὴν διέξοδον τὴν διὰ τοῦ χώματος τὸ τῶν ἵππων δεῖμα ὁ Ταράξιππος.

[108] On this cf. further in chapter five the discussion about Hermann's adoption of the Kantian concept of subjective universality.

building the chariots proceeded further and further for the same length, and thus Hermann believed that there might have been an error in the ms. and that Pausianias had written εὐρεῖα γεγένηται (perfect mediopassive) instead of εὐρεῖα γίνεται (present mediopassive).[109] This emendation is aimed at rejecting the idea that the aphesis had a triangular shape, probably by suggesting that its wings did not form a sharp angle with the base, but rather had a curvature. In fact if the prow formed two angles at the points where it touched the porticus of Agnaptos, it would form a sort of triangle, and Pausanias could have simply described the structure as a triangle (τρίγωνον). Instead, Pausanias compared it to the prow of a ship. Thus, in Hermann's new model, the prow near its base must have been particularly large and the whole wedge must have had the squeezed shape of a collapsed quasi-triangular object (a "triangle-like shape" with two bent sides, so a wedge), so that the chariots which were starting the race closer to the porch of Agnaptus were not that far behind from the ones which were starting in the front.

This also impacts how we can imagine the disposition of the altars and monuments inside the wedge, as in Pausanias' description in 15.5.6. Although Hermann did not explicitly say that he took the problem of acceleration into consideration – namely, the fact that the chariots that start off first would gradually gain more and more speed, making them faster than the others despite the gate-

[109] Cf. Pausanias, *Gr. Desc.* 6.20.10: παρέχεται μὲν οὖν σχῆμα ἡ ἄφεσις κατὰ πρῷραν νεώς, τέτραπται δὲ αὐτῆς τὸ ἔμβολον ἐς τὸν δρόμον: καθότι δὲ τῇ Ἀγνάπτου στοᾷ προσεχής ἐστιν ἡ πρῷρα, κατὰ τοῦτο εὐρεῖα γίνεται, δελφὶς δὲ ἐπὶ κανόνος κατὰ ἄκρον μάλιστα τὸ ἔμβολον πεποίηται χαλκοῦς, `At the point where the prow adjoins the porch of Agnaptus it broadens and a bronze dolphin on a rod has been made at the very point of the ram. The starting-place is in the shape of the prow of a ship, and its prow is turned towards the course.` Transl. by Jones (1918).

system of Kleiotas –, his representation also does much to solve this kind of problem with the structure, by reducing the distance between the stalls which occupied the furthest positions.

It remained to establish where the aphesis was positioned. On this Pausanias does not comment, and so, Hermann says, it must be deduced from the way the horses started off their race. The chariots in the most rearward position started first, then, when they reached the next stalls, the chariots in the second stalls would start off, and so on, until they were all aligned on the same line `as soldiers on a battle line, so that at the start of the race no chariot was behind.` Visconti's explanation worked well to illustrate what happened at this point. It provided a solution for why Pausanias said that the right side of the course was longer than the left, namely the fact that, on the right side, the space occupied by the aphesis must be added to the length marked by the two turning-posts. Therefore the first lap would be longer, due to the extra length added through the aphesis on the right side of the racecourse.



**Figure 3. Hermann's model of the hippodrome.**

Another point on which Hermann partly agreed with Visconti's representation was the idea that the stalls were not facing the racecourse, but they were placed obliquely, so that the walls of the stalls formed ninety-degree angles at

their intersection with the wings of the aphesis. Thus the chariots that started off from the stalls on the right wing had to turn towards the left before going straight, and the ones taking off from the left wing to the right.[110] This resulted in more space to fit a greater number of stalls than there would be if they had been all facing the racecourse, in conformity with the idea that Kleiotas had devised the wedge-shaped starting-gates in order to increase the possible number of competitors.

What, according to Hermann, did not work well in Visconti's description was that, without any apparent reason, Visconti imagined the left side of the hippodrome to end brusquely in a ninety degree angle (see figure two). Furthermore, Visconti thought that all the chariots ran together out of the stalls at the same time, to solve the problem that if the basis of the wedge was of the same width as each side of the wedge, since more stalls can be placed in the wings of the wedge than could fit along its basis, then the chariots could never find themselves side by side on a single line as Pausanias perhaps meant with the phrase ἐξισωθῶσιν ἀλλήλοις.

Hermann thought that, whatever dimension the width of the racing course was, it certainly was able to accommodate all the chariots next to each other: they simply would not have admitted to the race more chariots than that. Indeed, it was not known in advance how many chariots would have shown up at the Olympic games, so it was necessary that there were as many spaces as possible, even though

[110] Hermann did not indicate whether the wedge had a concave or convex shape, only that they definitely were not straight and thus the shape did not form a triangle. Cf. Hermann, *Op*. 7, 392: quae ab rostro alae ad Agnapti porticum pertinebant, alii paullum exterius, Hirtius interius curvatas esse voluit. Nihil huiusmodi scribit Pausanias, ut recta processisse videantur.

they might not be filled. Thus, at the start of the race, as many chariots would take off as there was space to have them on a line next to each other. The others, if there were any, had to be kept behind, and would take off with a second round, some time after the first one.

Hermann imagined a case in which there was, for example, enough space for ten chariots on a line. Then the first to start were, as Pausanias says, the ones who had the worst stalls, nearest to the Stoa of Agnaptos. In this case they would be the most rearwards ten chariots, up to the fifth station on both sides. When they all reached the same imaginary line at the beginning of the racecourse, ten more chariots were let off, starting from stalls on position number six on both sides, up to the stalls closest to the racecourse.

For the purpose of examining Hermann's methods in the context of *Wort-* against *Sachphilologie*, it is interesting to notice that Hermann's reconstruction moved freely and even somewhat arbitrarily between speculation and a claim of adherence to the text of Pausanias. Should the system of the aphesis work in the way Hermann described it, then letting chariots start off in several rounds according to the number of the participants would already seem to contradict Pausanias' account, which indeed seems to suggest a continuous flow from the base to the tip of the wedge. Furthermore, by proposing more than one round of chariots at take-off, Hermann's model found a way around the problem of the interpretation of Pausanias for which the horses would end up being 'all abreast' next to each other. And yet Hermann had insisted on this problem throughout his argument,

and indeed rejected certain hypotheses on the basis of this, but in the end made some concession on this very point. His model would also propose again, like Folard's hypothesis, the problem of the starting signal, as the complex signal described by Pausanias, with the eagle rising to the sky as the dolphin falling to the ground,[111] might have required some time to be readjusted to its original settings after being used once, in order to be ready for use again. Nevertheless, following Hermann's reasoning over the mechanisms of the starting-gates at Olympia allowed us an insight into the characteristics of a typical hermeneutical process for Hermann, here very much oriented to uncover the reality behind a text.

Conclusions

Hermann and Boeckh, as much as commentators around them and in the following decades, attributed their dispute to profound epistemological differences and to two essentially different conceptions of philology. A more comprehensive analysis of the context of the dispute, which takes into consideration its dimensions and complexity, has shown how elements such as personal rivalries had emerged already before the discussion over the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions*, which made the dispute eminently *not* based on Hermann's rejection of Boeckh's project on the basis of its spirit and broader scope. The chapter has also shown how recurrent motives of the twenty-year dispute appeared before the discussion on the *CGI*, with the quarrel about Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* involving the specific tones that

[111] Cf. above, note 100.

Hermann and Boeckh reserved for each other, and recurrent critical *manoeuvres* such as a mutual reproach of an alleged scarcity of knowledge in areas deemed fundamental by one or the other. I have demonstrated how such features of the dispute permeated the discussion about the inscriptions, too, drawing attention to the way in which they did and the fact that what was at stake for Hermann was not a defence of *Wortphilologie*, and indeed he himself dismissed the label as nonsensical. Hermann's critique was motivated by methodological observations, and also insisted on a personal level, underlining the prominence of the social-biographical element in the dispute. Along with a consistent reiteration of the importance of accurate knowledge of the ancient languages, due to the fact that these are the main source of knowledge of antiquity, Hermann also seems to rely on relatively arbitrary and contingent methods. While Hermann's critique of Boeckh's *CGI* underlines the flaws in the latter's project, Hermann also seems to attack Boeckh on the basis of personal animosities rather than solid arguments – for example, when he suggests that Boeckh could not distinguish between what information is necessary to provide and what is not.

Overall, Hermann's review should certainly not be interpreted as a "*wortphilological*" critique of a "*sachphilological*" problem. The chapter has analysed some points of contact between Hermann's and Boeckh's interpretation of philology as a science and thus their goals in judging philological endeavours, showing how the two scholars' approaches to antiquity share a common ground rather than being inspired by radically opposed principles. An analysis of the discussion regarding

the *CGI* has shown how Hermann and Boeckh shared epistemological concerns around the ways in which the philologist can reach the truth about antiquity, and how, in slightly different ways, they were both oriented towards the creation of a science of antiquity, indicating ways to ground the study of antiquity within eminently scientific principles.

Finally, even though Hermann did not programmatically advocate for the expansion of the objects of study of antiquity through, for instance, the fostering of new disciplines, such as Boeckh did with regard to epigraphy, his alleged opposition to so-called *sachphilological* projects should be re-evaluated. Indeed, Hermann not only considered the notion of *Wortphilologie* nonsensical, but he also explicitly aimed to harvest information about antiquity, with literary sources being one manifestation of the life and thought of the ancients, as shown through Hermann's own words and the case study of the Olympic hippodrome. Hermann did not hesitate to build upon such witnesses and to use them to reconstruct elements of material culture, as showcased in the example of this treatise, where he engaged with archaeologists and antiquarians on a topic which could only be considered to fall within the domain of the "things"of antiquity. While the genesis of the caricatural category of *Wortphilologie* is perhaps understandable, due to Hermann's prolific activity as an emendator of ancient texts and the emphasis he attributed to the importance of knowing and understanding the ancient languages, at the same time the attribution of this label is wildly misleading. It implies an exclusivity of philological interest which is simply not present in Hermann's

thought, is contradicted by Hermann's own rejection of the label of *Wortphilologe* and does not keep into account the broader, *altertumswissenschafteliche* tendencies that his work, as we have seen, reliably manifested.

# Chapter five

## A Re-evaluation of Hermann's Metrical Kantianism: an Aesthetical Hermeneutics

Introduction

When Hermann started to investigate metrics and, through his earliest publications,[1] to profile himself as an expert in the study of the metres and rhythm of ancient poetry, he had two goals. First, to promote the study of a discipline which had been largely neglected before, with the exception of Bentley's work,[2] and about which, he thought, even the ancients had been largely mistaken; second, to turn such discipline into a science, a task that he proposed to fulfil by grounding metrics in Kantian philosophy.

Hermann had read the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), because they were necessary introductions to the Third Critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790), which interested him because it dealt with the problem of the sublime.[3] After attending Karl Reinhold's lectures in Jena for a semester, in 1793-4, Hermann continued the study of Kantian philosophy

[1] See G. Liberman (2010), 200-1 for an effective overview of Hermann's publications on metrics.
[2] Hermann's teacher, Wolfgang Reiz, had been the first to try and follow in Bentley's steps with his 1789 edition of Plautus' *Rudens* and 1791 review of Bentley's Terence. Cf. Deufert (2010), 280-2.
[3] Cf. Koechly (1874), 121-2, Medda (2006), 12-3.

independently and in 1795 even taught a course on the *Critique of Judgement* in Leipzig.[4]

In this chapter, first of all, I propose a re-evaluation of the notion, generally considered to be unproblematic in the literature, that Hermann's metrics was *actually* based on Kantian a priori principles. I will show how the Kantian foundations of Hermann's metrical theory, as he described them, do not hold in the philological context in which he tried to transpose them; rather, as soon as we subject the Kantian principles which Hermann places at the root of his theory of metrics to proper investigation, it becomes clear that such transposition is inconsequential with respect to the actual value that can be added to practical philological work.

Instead, through a few textual examples with Hermann's emendations, I will argue that the real influence of Kant in Hermann's work is most evident in the enabling of a specific type of *sensus*-based philology: the philosophical backing subtly allowed and legitimised Hermann's employment of this technique, which, as I will show, constitutes a legitimate form of hermeneutics. In other words, the bulk of the weight of Kantian philosophy, in Hermann's practice, rested upon its aesthetic-hermeneutical consequences, while there are no visible traces, in Hermann's editorial work, of the application of Kantian principles in the way that Hermann intended when he theorised that the laws of metrics must be derived from a priori principles in the Kantian sense.

[4] Cf. Jahn (1866), 99.

By considering the input of Kantian philosophy in Hermannian philology as a form of hermeneutics, one must of necessity go beyond the idea, widespread in the literature, that Hermann's hermeneutical ideas should be traced solely in *De officio interpretis*.[5] In this chapter I will analyse some pivotal concepts of Kantian philosophy, in order to show how they are reflected in Hermann's interpretative techniques. Critical works on Hermann have rarely done that,[6] as they have been focused on either the very theoretical level, as, for example, Schramm (2010) does, or on the very practical level, like the many editorial works on the tragedians which discuss Hermannian emendations. Here, by dwelling on some concepts of Kantian philosophy, I hope to bring attention to the interaction between this philosophical layer, as interpreted by Hermann, and the work of the philologist in practice. Namely, I will show how considering Hermann's critical work through the lens of specific Kantian concepts can help us understand features of his philology which would otherwise remain unaccounted for, such as the dynamics which produced the current tension between Hermann's fame for philological *ingenium* and the relative obscurity in which he rests with regard to the wider field of classics.

Finally, through an intentionally selective approach, I will consider Hermann within a larger scientific framework, and in particular how the notion of *sensus*, which he regarded as a key concept to interpret the ancients, should be understood

[5] Cf. chapter two, De officio interpretis: *proceedings of the seminar and Greek Society*, for further reasons why *De officio interpretis* is arguably not the most appropriate place to look to draw definitive conclusions about Hermann's hermeneutics.

[6] Schramm (2010) is an exception, as he lay out a plethora of points of contact between Kantian philosophy and Hermannian thought; however, he did not really consider the application of Kantian philosophy to Hermann's editorial work, which is the perspective I intend to privilege here.

as a long-lasting, widespread interpretative technique, which exposes the *vexata questio* of how philology should deal with the objective absence or scarcity of empirical data upon which to build informed judgements. Following the thread of thought offered by Hermann and Boeckh, I will take the concept of *sensus* to show how it relates not only to philology but, more generally, to the notion of uncertainty, which is inherent in any form of assessment or acquisition of knowledge. Thus, I interpret Hermann and Boeckh's approaches to the hermeneutical problem as ultimately different, but similar in their final conclusions, insofar as they both in different ways offered probabilistic answers to the challenge of rediscovering antiquity.

## The principle of causality: a Kantian innovation in the field of metrics?

Hermann built upon the ancient scholars of metrics to establish basic principles, superimposing a stratum of Kantian philosophy on them.[7] Indeed, according to him, previous editors of ancient texts had treated metrics as a matter of sheer personal taste instead of looking for the *leges* regulating metre and acting in accordance with them in the emendation of texts.[8] According to Hermann, previous editors had been scarcely concerned with metrics, or they had been emending texts

[7] Cf. Schramm (2010), La Penna (1982), 438-9.

[8] Cf. *De metris*, 2: Omniae enim, quae tum ab antiquis scriptoribus, tum ab iis, qui hac aetate eam rem tractarunt, de numero tradita cognouimus, in eo consistunt, quod numerus quadam sonorum consequutione ad aurium iudicium expendenda contineatur. Qua definitione quid aliud effectum est, nisi vt omnis numerorum diiudicatio ab rationis inquisitione ad sensus arbitrium transferretur. Atqui id fieri non debuisse vel ex eo colligitur, quod alii numeri semper et vbique et omnibus placent, alii non minus constanter displicent. Quod fieri non posset, si solo voluptatis sensu, in quo nihil firmum et stabile inest, omnis numerorum ratio regeretur.

introducing obscure words taken from grammarians reflecting their poor abilities in listening to the musicality of the lines they were emending, so that, instead of decreasing the number of errors, they had ended up adding new ones.[9] They had emended metrics on the basis of their own personal taste, instead of searching for underlying regularities governing rhythm and using them as a consistent emendatory tool. Hermann believed that this danger was particularly enhanced by the fact that negligence and misunderstanding of the difficult Greek prosody were propagated from generation to generation, with misguided teachers, unaware of the very first rudiments of metrics, spreading among their students the same lack of interest and disdain for the study of meters that afflicted them in the first place.[10] In his project to found a science of metrics, Hermann sought to comprehend the strict regularity and conformity to law that contained and transcended the particular details. Kant supplied him with the idea of a law, by means of his concept of causality.

The way in which Hermann lays out his theory of metrics, in *De metris poetarum Graecorum et Romanorum* (1796),[11] strongly betrays the influence of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (*CPR*). Interestingly, the name of Kant is never directly

[9] Cf. De metris, 4: Ita quae a tot egregiis viris de dramaticis lyricisque Graecorum et Romanorum poetis cum maxima doctrina ac subtilitate disputata sunt, si ad numeri leges comparentur, dolendum est, quam non modo saepe frustra et sine ulla utilitate fuerint excogitata, sed haud raro illorum scriptorum libros vitiaverint magis, quam a vitiis purgaverint. Nimirum illi omnes incredibili quadam socordia, quidquid ab Hephaestione et scholiastis, ineptissimis hominibus, traditum vidissent, avide arripuerunt, tantaque religione custodierunt, ut etiam summam aurium improbationem obscuris quibusdam grammaticorum vocabulis obtundi posse existimarent.
[10] Cf. *De metris*, 4-5.
[11] The book was published in 1796, just after Hermann's semester in Jena (1793-4) to attend Karl Reinhold's lectures on Kant.

mentioned in *De metris*, and it appears sparingly in other Hermannian works, too, even where Hermann is most evidently reformulating Kantian philosophy in a philological-metrical context. In *De metris*, Hermann prescribes that, before analysing individual meters, one must understand the general law of rhythm. The fact that Hermann's explanation follows Kant closely is immediately evident from the structure of the first section of the work, titled *De notione numeri*.[12] This section mimics, in a concise and synthetic fashion, the opening of Kant's transcendental doctrine of elements in the *CPR*:

1) Kant's *CPR* begins stating that 'there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience.'[13] *De notione numeri* opens declaring the same principle and applying it to metrics: 'like in every kind of discussion, thus also in the explanation of the laws of metrics, one must begin from what can be gathered from experience.'[14]

Here Hermann, like Kant in *CPR*, is about to introduce the concept of a priori knowledge, namely knowledge that is *prior* to experience. However, for the sake of the arguments that I will later present in this chapter, I would like to draw attention to the fact that, in both Kant's and Hermann's works, the introduction of a priori knowledge consists in a declaration that *experience* is the only possible starting point

[12] Cf. *De metris*, 7-10.
[13] *CPR*, B1,2. Transl. by Weigelt (2007), here and throughout.
[14] *De metris,* 7: Sicut in omni disputationis genere, ita etiam in numeri legibus explicandis ab eo, quod ab experientia hausimus, incipiendum est.

for any knowledge or discussion: a priori knowledge is *prior*, but not *independent* from experience. As Kant continues:

> although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions merely prompting it to do so) supplies from itself, an addition which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice has made us attentive to it and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.[15]

This complex definition of a priori knowledge is essential to understand Hermann's doctrine of metrics; and in particular, as I will show below, how Hermann saw his doctrine in opposition to any other conception of metrics, and in particular that held by British scholars like Richard Porson (1759-1808).

Moreover, I suggest that Hermann's insistence on the difference between himself and the scholars of antiquity before him, as mentioned above, is best understood precisely as a persuasion, rooted in the reading of Kant,[16] that his own 'long practice' had made him 'capable' of distinguishing the products which the proper a priori 'faculty of knowledge supplies from itself' from what is not determined a priori,[17] namely the objects of experience, or, in the philological context, the manifestations of metrical forms in the texts. This is exactly the spirit in

[15] *CPR*, B1, 2.
[16] Cf. ibidem.
[17] Cf. ibidem.

which Hermann set out to reform the doctrine of metrics: with a sense of operating from a privileged position in the philological domain.

2) Immediately after the statement described in point 1, Hermann introduces the notion of rhythm, defined as depending on the concepts of time and space.[18] In Kant's *CPR*, too, the concepts of time and space are the first to be analysed, right after the introduction; they are defined as the pure, a priori forms of sensible intuition. Namely (with the *caveat* addressed in point 1), time and space are not empirical concepts: we do not proceed to understand them "by abstraction", after coming into contact with them as objects of experience; rather, space and time are pure forms of intuition that we already possess before experience.[19]

Similarly, in Hermann's theory of metrics the law of rhythm depends first of all on these two a priori concepts, time and space, and thus is itself determined a priori: denique lex illa, quod attinet ad rationem, qua constituit atque ordinat

[18] Cf. *De metris,* 7-8: Nam Graeci, qui ῥυθμον, quem vocant, non modo in iis, quae tempore metimur, sed etiam in spatii descriptionibus esse dicunt, eo non videntur eamdem spatio describendo, quam tempori, legem tribuisse, sed omnino similitudinem proportionum significasse, quarum aliae sunt in spatio, aliae in tempore leges.

[19] Cf. *CPR,* B 37-53/ A 22-37. Esp. B 39/ A 24, 25: 'in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me [..] the representation of space must already be at the basis'; 'it is impossible to have a representation of there being no space, though one can very well think of space without objects to fill it. Space is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent upon them'; and B 46, 47 / A 31, 32, on how the notions of simultaneity and succession are only possible if 'the representation of time [..] underlie them a priori', and 'we cannot remove time itself from appearances [..] though we can quite well take away appearances from time.'

tempora vel spatia, innata nobis sit necesse est, quam a priori definitam philosophi vocant.[20]

By identifying the necessary order in which the meters are arranged in time and space, the certain and immutable laws governing metrics can be defined, without relying, like Hermann's predecessors had done, on arbitrary opinions.[21]

3) Hermann then proposes a definition of the law of rhythm as being expressed in the temporal form of causality, determined by the effect of alternation, or necessary succession.[22] He employs the Kantian notion of succession in time and the category of cause and effect.[23] According to Hermann, in a verse the *arsis* necessarily draws the *thesis* after itself and thus forms metrical series that are divided into units by caesurae.[24] Also in his *Elementa doctrinae metricae* Hermann will

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[20] Cf. *EDM*, 4. Even if in *De notione numeri* (cf. above, note 12) Hermann does not use the term 'a priori', it is clear from his later works (such as *Elementa*) and the other parallels, with regard to both content and structure, between this passage and Kant's *CPR,* that his introduction and use of the concepts of space and time should be understood with reference to the Kantian definition of the a priori concepts of space and time. Note, however, that again here Hermann refers generally to the 'philosophers' who use the term 'a priori', but does not directly mention Kant.

[21] Cf. *De metris*, 8: Quod si quis rerum deinceps consequentium ordo est, qui certis quibusdam et immutabilibus legibus regatur, eius caussae [*sic*] in ipsis illis rebus, non in nostro sensu nostraque animadversione quaerendae sunt.

[22] Cf. ibidem: Quorum illud, quarum rerum successione numerus contineatur, facile patet frustra quaeri, propterea quod etiam in iis rebus numerum esse videmus, quarum naturam et veram conditionem ne novimus quidem. Quamobrem hoc solum considerandum erit, ista consequutio, quarumcumque rerum sit, qua lege nitatur. Debet enim istius consequutionis certa quaedam lex esse [..]; and pp. 8-9: Quod si in ipsis illis rebus aliqua consequutionis necessitas inest, ea non potest alia esse, quam caussarum [*sic*] atque effectuum cohaerentia, sine qua nulla cogitari necessaria consequutio potest; cf. also Medda (2006), 18-19.

[23] Cf. *CPR* B46, 47 / A 31, 32 and note 19; B106/ A80 ff. on the category of cause and effect.

[24] Lynch (2016) has shown how traditional approaches to ancient metrics have been misinterpreting the concepts of arsis and thesis, assuming that the theseis, rather than arseis, were the metrical parts marked by ictus, perceived as rhythmically prominent and associated to high pitches; such misinterpretation has also produced a long-lived assumption in the scholarship of ancient rhythm, for which the meaning of arsis and thesis would have undergone a radical overturn in the Latin sources, coming to denote exactly the opposite of what they meant among the Greeks. It is

continue to remark the concept of succession, or continuity, as the fundament of rhythm, which 'rests upon nothing but what contains a shape of each succession or continuity, i.e. time and space. Indeed [..] succession is based on causality.'[25]

While this parallelism between the beginning of Kant's *CPR* and Hermann's introduction to his doctrine of metrics can serve here to give an idea of the way in and the extent to which Hermann modelled his doctrine on Kantian philosophy, this is by no means an isolated instance and the reader should turn to Schramm (2010) for a further examination of the many places, throughout many writings, where Hermann's thought and language are clearly mapped on to Kantian philosophy. Here I will now proceed to investigate critically how the influence of Kantianism translated into philological practice for Hermann, and I will only further explore some aspects of Kantian philosophy throughout the chapter to cast light upon their connection to Hermann's philological practice – a type of analysis that is currently lacking in the literature.[26]

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interesting to note that Hermann, instead, already followed what Lynch (2016) describes as the correct interpretation of arsis as the dynamic part of ancient rhythm.

[25] Cf. *EDM*, 3-4: successio illa vel continuitas non versabitur alia in re, quam quae formam omnis vel successionis vel continuitatis continet, i. e. in tempore ac spatio. Iam vero successionem niti ostendimus efficentia.

[26] Some of the available literature pays attention to Hermann's Kantianism (cf. e.g. Medda (2006), Couturier-Heinrich (2011), La Penna (1982), 438-9), while analysing the pivotal concepts recurring in Hermann's philology; however, it does so quite superficially, merely scratching the surface of the connection between Hermannian theory and Kantian philosophy and its consequences for Hermann's philology. Schramm (2010), on the other hand, offers a detailed investigation of the plurality of evidences of Kantian influence in Hermann's language and content, but little to no attention is dedicated to the practical consequences of Kantianism, in the way Hermann prescribed, for the emendation of texts.

As concerns the placement of Hermann within the tradition of the studies of ancient metrics, it is clear that Kantian philosophy played an essential role in Hermann's reformation of the doctrine of metrics. Even though Hermann's theory started from the ancient metrical concepts of *arsis* and *thesis*, he nonetheless felt that, thanks to the support of Kantian philosophy, he was the first to describe a true science of metrics, especially because, he argued, ancient grammarians had passed on barely any knowledge concerning metrics; and when they had, they had mostly given descriptions of metrical forms which were craftily meant to support their own interpretations of particular textual passages, as a way of confirming a meaning they had already established even before looking at metrics.[27] Instead, in his emendatory practice, Hermann proposed to apply the principle of establishing metrics first and then trying to interpret the meaning of the text. This philosophy had the merit of establishing and spreading, for the first time in history, the practice of observing metrical structures as a foundational part of ancient poetry, a practice upon which the modern textual critic has to rely.[28]

While it is undoubted that the reading of Kant inspired this approach to metrics and even, perhaps, allowed Hermann to reform the study of metrics

[27] Cf. *EDM*, IX: De natura numerorum nihilo nos certiores faciunt: nam vix attingunt eam, et, si quid afferent, consistit id in descriptionibus quibusdam, quae nos denique ad sensum quemdam convenientiae ablegant, quem ipsum, ex quo fonte promanaret, explicari volebamus. The same conception and attitude towards ancient studies we find in his proposal of reformation of Greek grammar, *De emendanda ratione Graecae grammaticae* (1801), cf. IV ff., 'ancient grammarians are more an obstacle than of any help', and especially VI on how quotations (when confirmed) and examples given by ancient grammarians are valuable, but all their theories are not. Grammar should be built all over again, upon ratio, and deriving from ratio some essential principles, 'prima artis elementa' (p. VI).

[28] Hermann's project of systematizing all the ancient metres would find only partial success, for he did not succeed in making sense of the whole array of the metrical materials he took into consideration.

according to a broad principle of taxonomical accountability, the idea that Hermann's appeal to Kantiniasm in actuality shaped his philological practice should not be taken for granted, but rather – as this chapter will continue to do – investigated critically.

Metrics: an object of special interest

When talking about Hermann it is essential to talk about metrics. This is not only because so much of his work was dedicated to the topic, but also because, as I will continue to argue in this chapter, metrics constitutes a gateway to Hermann's hermeneutics. There is a significant continuity between the ideas that Hermann lays out concerning metrics, and metrics-based textual emendations, and the principles that more broadly govern his interpretative practice and theory, even where metrics is not strictly involved. Metrics is, in this sense, an all-encompassing force in Hermannian philology.

Arguably, metrics is the central focus around which the whole of Hermann's philology gathers: Hermann's academic career began and flourished, as seen in chapters one and two, thanks to his publications on the topic of metrics; the vast majority of Hermann's theoretical work is dedicated to metrics, especially if considering his longer, most organic and structured works; unlike his predecessors' textual critical work, Hermann's practice is strongly concerned with the restoration of correct metrical units; finally, as I have so far only begun to show, the principles behind Hermann's theory of metrics serve as a very close model for the ones

underlying his hermeneutics. Thus, as Hermann's philology is concerned, metrics really is the place where all the threads come together.

That being said, a distinction between Hermann's project of linking Kantian philosophy to the doctrine of metrics and the general features and consequences of the influence of Kant on Hermann's philology seems necessary – and long overdue with respect to the literature on Hermann. Critics have been hinting at the fact that Hermann's metrics is not *really* Kantian since as early as 1817, when Hegel criticised it along these lines.[29] However, no comprehensive analysis of this view has been offered, and this is probably, at least partly, due to the great zeal with which Hermann overtly defined his own metrics as Kantian. If it is easy to imagine how the name of Kant would certainly help confer further legitimisation and science-like quality to Hermann's project, this is unlikely the only reason behind the great lengths to which Hermann went to use that philosophy as a background for his own theory.

[29] In addition to Boeckh's concerns, seen in chapter three, Geppert (1835) had denounced the discrepancy between theory and practice in the philology of Hermann, and so had Hegel, cf. Hegel (1845), 65: 'Sogar im "Handbuche der Metrik von Hermann" ist der Anfang mit Paragraphen Kantischer Philosophie gemacht; ja in § 8 wird gefolgert, daß das Gesetz des Rhythmus 1) ein objektives, 2) ein formales, 3) ein *a priori* bestimmtes Gesetz sein müsse. Man vergleiche nun mit diesen Forderungen und den weiter folgenden Prinzipien von Kausalität und Wechselwirkung die Abhandlung der Versmaße selbst, auf welche jene formellen Prinzipien nicht den geringsten Einfluß ausüben' and Bravo (1988) 70: 'Probablement Hegel a raison de dire – dans l'Encyclopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften – que le kantisme de G. Hermann est resté extérieur à son travail philologique.' Couturier-Heinrich (2011), 5, notes another way in which Hermann bends Kantian philosophy to his own aims: 'il emprunte à la deuxième et à la troisième analogies de l'expérience traitées dans la Critique de la raison pure les concepts de causalité et d'action réciproque, mais en établissant entre eux un lien nécessaire qui n'existe pas chez Kant.' See also Schramm (2010), esp. 102-3, for other examples of how Hermann's theory operates with a Kantian framework, but violates assumptions of Kantian philosophy *strictu sensu*.

Metrics, through Kantianism, is a key interpretative yardstick to measure Hermann's philology; however, not in the obvious way in which Hermann himself, and critics of his work alike, presented it. In this chapter I am showing how the significance of Hermann's use of and appeal to Kantian philosophy lies not so much in the actual utility that that philosophy had in Hermann's philological practice; but rather, Hermann's reading in Kantian philosophy deeply informed his hermeneutics, his attitude towards interpretation and his self-conception as a philologist.

As I will show below, despite Hermann's efforts to ground metrics in Kantianism, the postulation of a priori principles as a way to determine metrical structures in the ancient texts does not bear very straightforward advantages – and certainly not the ones that Hermann claimed. Thus, we should cease taking Hermann's own description of what Kantianism does for his doctrine of metrics at face value. Surely Kantianism inspired Hermann's commitment to finding a secure method to restore metrics in the ancient texts, which resulted in Hermann's project of classifying metrical forms, a novelty for the time and a fundamental step in the study of metrics in its own right; however, spirit left aside, it seems frankly impossible to derive rules of metrics from infallible, a priori concepts, and therein lies the problem with Hermann's Kantian theory of metrics taken at face value.

This Kantian inspiration operated, in Hermann's philological work, also as guidance for a systematic revision of the texts of tragedy with the aim of correcting metrical corruptions. In this sense, many of Hermann's emendations were of

metrical nature. While it might seem self-evident that all conjectures in poetry must be based on metrics, in the sense of producing metrically acceptable results, this had not always been the case before Hermann, as proven by both the sheer quantity of metrical adjustments that he provided to the texts of the tragedians and their quality: often, only minor adjustments to the text were needed to restore correct metre, and yet they had not been achieved by previous critics.

Therefore metrics was a privileged object of attention for Hermann, in two ways: with respect to the past and with respect to the future of philology. First, Hermann's emendations were concerned with metrics in a special sense because of the extent to which Hermann's project constituted an innovation in the field of classics, with its declaration of the importance of recognising and classifying metrical units, and proceeding to emend texts in accordance to such metrical schema; this idea was for Hermann in opposition to the model he ascribed to his predecessors, who had emended metrical passages on a case-by-case basis, with essentially arbitrary methods, relying on individual opinions instead of setting universally valid criteria.

Secondly, Hermann's approach to metrics, with its scientific aspirations, inaugurated a new way of looking at the text, where a precise understanding of metrics and sensitivity for rhythm started to be considered a basic, essential concern which the critic must have. Even though previous editors' efforts had been concerned with restoring poetical rhythm, many of Hermann's emendations, such as the ones I will list below among others, show that many passages in Greek

tragedy were still problematic due to their lack of metrical exactness or accurate responsion. In Hermann's practice metrics effectively became a useful constraint to define the work of the textual critic, indicating clearly the boundaries of his emendatory possibilities and therefore constituting a valuable ally in the restoration of texts. This is also partly an explanation as to why Hermann produced so many emendations: many of his interventions corrected small metrical errors that the texts still bore; additionally, many others were aimed at re-establishing responsion between tragic strophes.[30]

Hermann's interventions of the kind of small adjustments aimed at the restoration of metrical coherence are similar to his emendation to *Bacchae* l. 526 [519 ed. H.]

526 ᾽Ιθι, Διθύραμβ', ἐμὰν ἄρ-
σενα τάνδε βᾶθι νηδύν·

526 ᾽Ιθι Hermann: ἴθ' ὦ LP διθύραμμ' L (~ LIC uel Tr).

Go, Dithyrambus, enter
this my male womb.[31]

[30] Cf. also Medda (2006), 186-191.
[31] Transl. by Buckley (1850).

L. 526 [519 ed. H.] is an anaclastic ionic dimeter (∪ ∪ — ∪ — ∪ — —), in responsion with l. 545 [537 ed. H.] L and P record the reading ἴθ'ὦ, with a long second element instead of a short one, required by metrics. Hermann's expunction of the vocative ὦ re-establishes correct responsion with l. 545, an emendation which is widely accepted by later editors.

Similar, relatively minimal adjustments to re-establish metrical exactness are also, for example, Hermann's conjectures at Euripides' *Ba*. ll. 528 [521 edn. H.] ἀναφαίνω Hermann: -φανῶ LP; 549 [541] σκοτίαισι κρυπτὸν Bothe (1802), denuo Hermann: σκοτίαις κ- ἐν LP; 565 [557] μάκαρ Hermann: μάκαιρ' LP; 990-991 [982-3] ἔφυ... ὅδ'ἦ Hermann (ἔφυ... ἦ iam Aldina): ὅδ'ἔφυ... ἦ P; 1153 [1145] Βάκχιον Bothe (1802), denuo Hermann: βακχείων P; and in *IT* 155 〈μοι〉 Hermann: οἴμοι φροῦδος L; 234 [227] στέρνοις Hermann: -οισί L; 394 [386] ἵν' Hermann: ἣν L; 845 [831] Κυκλωπὶς ἑστία Hermann: -ίδες ἑστίαι L; 1235 [1204] τόν Hermann: ὅν LP. These emendations, though not always unanimously, are accepted very broadly among later editors (with the exception of *IT* l. 1235 [1204], where Hermann's conjecture is aimed at restoring responsion with l. 1259 and indicating clearly verse-end at the end of l. 1234, εὔπαις ὁ Λατοῦς γόνος. Since verse-end can be signalled by *brevis in longo,* this is an unnecessary emendation, which should be attributed to the fact that the principles to determine verse-end were not yet clear to Hermann.[32])

While Hermann's devotion to metrics, especially in its systematic and taxonomic effort, demonstrated itself to be an essential innovation in philology, it

[32] Cf. Libermann (2010), 209 and Medda (2006), 24-27 on how Hermann's ideas regarding the principles regulating verse ending were still cloudy.

did not come without some drawbacks. In particular, in Hermann's practice this approach could translate in an excessive commitment to restore metrics at all costs.[33] This is evident in cases where Hermann's emendations are motivated exclusively by metrics, despite making use of additional arguments as means of justification, as in Euripides' *IT* ll. 123-235. There, the members of the chorus, composed of fifteen enslaved Hellenic women,[34] lament their fate and express their longing for their homeland and freedom, as they do at many other points throughout the play (131, 447–55, 1089–1152, 1467–9, 1482–3);[35] Iphigenia laments the death of Orestes and the extinction of her *oikos* (148-154, 167-173, 223-7) and prepares to offer a sacrifice in honour of her dead brother.

The manuscript tradition of the parodos is unreliable, with difficult definition of cola, and most editors agree in finding no strophic responsion.[36] Hermann, however, presented a tentative division of this passage between some responding strophes and some verses without responsion.[37] His emendation was based upon

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[33] Cf. also Medda (2006), 86-8, on the weakness of Hermann's emendations to restore strophic responsion in certain passages, such as Aesch. *Ag*. 1448-1576.

[34] Platnauer (1938), 71.

[35] See Carter (2011), 380.

[36] See Cropp (2000), 182, Platnauer (1938), 71: 'At line 143 the πάροδος proper turns into a κόμμος, i.e. a θρῆνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς, as Aristotle (*Poet.* 12. 1452$^{b}$ 24) defined it. It is written in free anapaestic rhythm and is not antistrophic. Most of the lines are acatalectic dimeters, but a certain number are catalectic, and these are as a rule spondaic in character as befits the dirge-like nature of the choric song and Iph.'s monody. Whether we consider these lines as catalectic anapaestic dimeters or as paroemiacs is immaterial. Ll. 126, 7 are spondaic dochmiacs.' The text of *IT* depends entirely on two fourteenth-century mss.: the Laurentian (cod. Laurentianus xxxii, 2, or L) and the Palatine (cod. Palatinus 287, or P). The papyri, containing fragments of the tragedy, had not been discovered in Hermann's time. See Platnauer (1938), xxxi for the papyri.

[37] Seidler, before him, had tried doing the same, though without meeting with Hermann's favour, as we read in Hermann's commentary to l. 123 (H): 'Having found some clear traces of responsion in this parodos, both Seidler and I have tried to understand its antistrophic arrangement. Seidler has restored the antistrophe with quite harsh and not very likely changes, and, in the review of his edition, I have shown how doubtful his explanation was, and also another, more plausible option

the consideration that it is very likely that parts of the text which are connected by meaning should also bear the mark of metrical responsion. This is not due to the fact that, like the ancient scholars of metrics, we should restore metrics on the basis of interpretation, but it should be established, so to speak, by elimination: if that were not the case, Hermann says, then we should see traces of responsion in different parts of the parodos (the ones which are not connected by meaning), because the lack of responsion altogether would be inadmissible. As Hermann theorised in his *Elementa Doctrinae Metricae*: 'we need not think that poets deviated from the simple sequence of strophes and antistrophes randomly and without a certain reason, but rather, in this matter, they always observed with admirable diligence that uniformity that can be seen in so many other things.'[38] Sometimes, Hermann observes, responsion comes with possible further complexity: 'not only is such disposition of the strophes very diverse, but often there are also many systems of strophes [..] either contiguous, or linked to each other.'[39] Thus Hermann admitted a complicated system of responsion for the tragic parodos, with strophes and antistrophes which do not follow one after the other in a precise order. However, he would not tolerate the complete absence of responsion, and thus he does not in *IT*.

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that can be found. However, that option brings forth the necessity to emend excessively, and it lacks reasons evident enough to glean consensus. On this basis, even though I did not dare asserting that such part of the play is not antistrophic, I still do not believe that antistrophic verses can be restored with certainty, not without allowing great discrepancies; I do not think that it is possible to hope that some good manuscripts will provide a solution, and I think that, even if those lamentations were not antistrophic, there would be an evident, convenient explanation, which would show how, among those lines, there would still be some undoubted sign of responsion.'

[38] Cf. *EDM* III, cap. XXIII, p. 478: Non est autem putandum, temere poëtas et sine certa ratione a simplici stropharum atque antistropharum consequutione discessisse, sed semper hac quoque in re aequalitatem illam, quae tot aliis in rebus cernitur, admirabili diligentia observarunt.

[39] Cf. ibidem: non modo admodum varia est haec stropharum dispositio, sed saepe etiam plura stropharum systemata, [..] vel adnexa sibi, vel inter se conjuncta sunt.

In emendations of this type Hermann actively chose to respect a rule of metrics that he had set out in his theoretical writings, even if it meant finding incomplete correspondences in the text. In the case at hand, he could have easily waived the necessity of metrical responsion, as most other editors do, considering this yet another quirk of Euripidean drama; but in reality, Hermann felt a duty to enforce the "laws" of metrics, and the presence of responsion in the lyric parts of tragedy was one of them.

Metrics had been overlooked for so long by other critics, that the idea of waiving the necessity of responsion in the parodos must have seemed too unruly to be allowed. This approach surely shows Hermann's commitment to the restoration of metrical patterns where he could identify some – it also still does nothing to signify how such restoration would be derived from infallible, a priori laws of metrics.

Hermann's reasons for finding metrical responsion in *IT* (123-235), as he explains in his commentary, rely mainly on two factors, which are not the most persuasive: first, they exploit a weakness of this passage, namely the fact that ll. 126, 127, 197 and 220 do not metrically conform to the rest of the parodos; and second, Hermann motivates part of his intervention with the alleged presence of distinct original indications for acting and singing. Hermann has a clear interpretation of how the passage was brought to the scene by the actors, under Euripides' direction, despite the lack of any strong evidence in support of such a theory.

Hermann identified three pairs of strophe and antistrophe, indicated as ά., β΄. and γ΄:

**str./antistr. γ')** This is the spark that motivates Hermann's intervention on the parodos. In addition to metrical considerations, Hermann's conjecture relies on the content of ll. 197 and 220, which display two lamentations pronounced, respectively, by Iphigenia and by the chorus, and which Hermann considers particularly emphasised. These two lines, according to Hermann's interpretation, would be sung.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 197 | φόνος ἐπὶ φόνῳ, ἄχεα ἄχεσιν | ∪∪∪∪∪ – ǀ ∪∪∪∪∪∪ |
| 220 | ἄγαμος ἄτεκνος, ἄπολις ἄφιλος, | ∪∪∪∪∪∪ ǀ ∪∪∪∪∪∪ |

Ll. 197 and 220 scan as resolved iambic or trochaic dimeters.[40] Hermann thinks that they are trochaic in nature, and as such they stand out within the system of lyric anapaests that compose the rest of the parodos (ll. 123-235). For this reason Hermann believes that they must be in clear responsion with each other.

Not unlike what Hermann did with ll. 126 and 127, his emendation here tries to justify the suspicious metre. All modern editors note that the metre of ll. 197 and 220 seems out of place, but Dale and West consider these two lines, as well as ll. 213 and 232, as strings of short syllables still anapaestic in nature –[41] despite being

[40] Cf. Cropp (2000), 188.
[41] Cf. Dale (1968), 63-5, Dale (1971), vol. 3, 80-5, and West (1982), 124.

abnormal anapaests –, attributing a more emotional effect to the faster rhythm.[42] However sung anapaests in the form of proceleumatics (∪∪∪∪) could be typical of satyric choruses' entries, thus very unlikely for a tragic parodos with such dramatic content.[43]

**str./antistr. ά.)** Two responding single lines, 126 (H) and 127 (H), forming two dragged dochmiacs:[44]

126 Ὦ παῖ τᾶς Λατοῦς, – – – – –

127 Δίκτυνν' οὐρεία[45] – – – – –

Seidler, following the mss., groups the two lines in a single dimeter, but most other editors do not, and neither does Hermann, who thinks the manuscripts are mistaken, and follows the reading of the Aldine:[46] Ὦ παῖ τᾶς Λατοῦς,/ Δίκτυνν' οὐρεία. Hermann thinks that this reading is more solemn (*gravior*) and therefore more appropriate (*aptior*) for addressing a goddess; but also, the two lines are in responsion with each other, like ll. 197 and 220 below. According to Hermann, these

[42] Cf. also Cropp (2000), 182, Diggle (1981), 96, Diggle (1994), 315-6, and Sansone (1981), 56-8.
[43] See West (1982), 123.
[44] Cf. Kyriakou (2006), 471 and Dale (1968), 59-60. Ll. 126-7 could also be anapaests, but in that case the two ll. would go together and form one catalectic tripody (– – – – –). It remains anyway ambiguous whether they are dochmiacs or anapaests, but possible anapaests in this form would not be unparalleled (*Hec*. 182, 190, 193, 201, *IT* 188, *Ion* 906-9). See West (1982), 123. An anapaestic tripody, in any case, would still be out of place among the anapaestic tetrapodies and dipodies that follow. See Weil (1907), 457.
[45] 'O daughter of Leto/ Dictynna of the mountains.'
[46] Hermann often follows the readings of the Aldine for *IT*. This first edition, printed by Aldus Manutius in Venice in 1503, probably derived from a lost copy of L, and its text was held in high regard for the superior readings it sometimes provides. See Parker (2016), civ.

two ll. 126-7 were sung, while the following, until ll. 136, were interpreted with the chorus' voices keeping an intermediate register in between singing and speaking. In particular, the chorus would form two groups for delivering ll. 126 and 127: one group would say Ὦ παῖ τᾶς Λατοῦς, and the other would respond Δίκτυνν' οὐρεία, after which the coryphaeus, almost like a herald, would command silence by announcing his arrival: Ἐμολον· τί νέον; τίνα φροντίδ' ἔχεις;[47]

**str./antistr. β'.)** Hermann establishes responsion between ll. 136-142 (Hermann) (str. β΄.), in which the coryphaeus asks Iphigenia why she invited him to come forth, and ll. 168-174, in which Iphigenia addresses the spirit of her dead brother (antistr. β'.).

In Hermann's view, these two sections have the same rhetorical colouring as that of ll. 197 [192] and 220 [213], where Iphigenia and the chorus wail between themselves. For Hermann, responsion does not only indicate a parallelism between two parts which are metrically identical, but it should also be used to indicate a similarity of the style in which two passages were interpreted.[48] Hermann thinks that both parts, that he indicates as str. and antistr. β'., were recited and not sung anapaests:

Just as those two verses [197 and 220 (H)] are, for what concerns their metre, different from the rest of the lamentations presented here, their singing style is also

[47] 'I have come. What is the news? What is troubling you?'
[48] Hermann (1833), 18: omnis responsio, etiam quae non metri paritate continetur, ut quae in sententiarum et cantici modorum similitudine est, *ἀντίστροφος* dicatur.

different from the one of the other verses. In the same way, the other part of the song, in which the responsion seems certain, does not have a different metrical form but a different acting, and very different from the one in the remaining anapaests.[49]

Finally, Hermann's argument is based on the numerous similarities between *IT* and *Helen*, and the fact that the parodos of *Helen* has responsion.[50] Furthermore, the parodos of *Helen* presents an alternation between recited and sung parts, a responsion of solo strophe with choral antistrophe – probably a novelty introduced by Euripides –,[51] similar to what Hermann proposed for the parodos of *IT*. Thus, Hermann explains how the parodos of *IT* would have likely been interpreted during the original performance of *IT*: ll. 126-127 (stro/ant *ά*.) and ll. 197 (192 H.) and ll. 220 (213 H.) (stro/ant. γ'.) would be sung, while ll. 136-142 and ll. 168-174 would only be recited but not sung, and all the other parts of the parodos would be delivered by the actors with a voice intermediate between singing and reciting. The anapaests, apart from ll. 136-142 (ant. β), would be delivered jointly by the voices of some of the women of the chorus, but the chorus would form two groups for delivering ll. 126 and 127: one group saying Ὦ παῖ τᾶς Λατοῦς, and the other answering Δίκτυνν' οὐρεία, after which the coryphaeus would order silence.

Hermann's solution explains a metrical problem that other editors could not explain, and does so on the basis of metre, but, rather than through an appeal to a

[49] Hermann (1833), 18: Quemadmodum autem hi duo versus metro, et proinde etiam cantus genere a caeteris lamentis distinguuntur, ita alia pars carminis, in qua responsio certa apparet, non metri formam, sed recitationem habet diversam, multumque ab reliquis anapaestis discrepantem.
[50] Cropp (2000), 182, Platnauer (1938), xv.
[51] Cf. Willink (2010), 283.

priori principles, also by reasoning about staging and acting, constantly wondering how the delivery of the play might have worked at the time of its original performance.[52] This case is exemplary of Hermann's textual criticism, and shows that restoring strophic responsion was not the only criterion used by Hermann in his emendations of the tragic parodos. Rather, he pursued subtler, additional explanations supporting his arguments, although this was a consequence of and a necessity imposed by the rigidity of his theoretical metrical assumptions – and as such, a drawback rather an advantage derived from Hermann's metrical Kantianism. Because he managed to restore the text only partially, and his solution was quite speculative, the emendation maintains a certain tentativeness, but it well illustrates the lengths to which Hermann would go to restore metrical correctness. Thus, in other words, Hermann has to supplement his rigid schema with a speculative element about performance effects, to give credence to what might otherwise look implausible when following assumed, symmetrical rules of metrics.

Additionally, the problem with examples of metrical restoration of this type is that, unlike what would be the case for single metrical cola and the reconstruction of their rhythm, it is difficult to attribute these restorations of strophic responsion to specific laws of rhythm in the Kantian sense that Hermann postulated. In other words, while, if we want to read poetry, specific rhythms must be established for the microscopic level of the cola – and Hermann explained how this worked through causality –, it is not necessarily so for the case of responsion, a favourite

[52] Cf. Parker (2016), who also notes that Hermann constantly wonders how the audience must have received something during the performance of the play.

object of Hermann's metrical emendatory attention.[53] Indeed, most editors accept the parodos of *IT*, without responsion, as an exception to an established custom of tragedy. Hermann's theory of responsion surely cannot disregard what had been postulated for the single verses, as it effectively encompasses these smaller units. In other words, if metrical units must be determined on the basis of their internal causality, reliant on the a priori principles of the mind, this effect must surely propagate to the larger scale of strophic units, insofar as they are composed of smaller metrical units. However, Hermann's adamantine position on the necessity of responsion seems to operate from the top down rather than from the bottom up, applying broader, observational rules about the structure of the tragic parodos rather than making an accurate determination of rhythm the priority; and thus, seemingly, contrary to Hermann's own doctrine of metrics.[54] The recurrence of this contradiction seems more or less inevitable, when we assess how scarcely prolific Hermann's grounding of metrics into a priori principles practically really is. On the one hand, Hermann's commitment to restoring correct metrical units is part of the force that produced some of Hermann's most elegant emendations, which earned him the fame of genius; on the other hand, we have the rigid adherence to metrical rules, such as the ones concerning responsion in the parodos, that produced the

[53] Cf. Itsumi (2009), 275 on Hermann's restoration of exact responsions in Pindar's Pythian 11: 'Certainly, nobody could believe in these rewritings. The old Hermann reveals vehement intolerance of any irregular metrical responsion, especially in 'Emend. P.' [*Emendationes Pindaricae*= *Op.* 7, 129-73.] At the same time we should not forget that there are still good emendations in this article.'

[54] Not accidentally, many of Hermann's emendations aimed at restoring responsion are among the most controversial, often even among his worse emendations. Cf. note 33, above.

disappointing emendations of which recent critics like West (2010) have spoken about.

Overall, it is difficult to determine where, in Hermann's philology, the claim of grounding metrics into something higher, like the a priori principles, bears significant advantages for the emendation of specific textual passages.[55] In practice, the transposition into philological practice of Hermann's Kantianism does not seem to hold: Hermann's rules of metrics do not always result into a net advantage in the restoration of ancient texts, and, as I will show below, Hermann himself could not free himself from the necessity of admitting exceptions; rather, exceptions are fundamental in Hermannian philology, as they constitute for Hermann the true mark of good philology, the sign of a truly virtuous effort to understand an ancient author through a form of identification with him.

Metrics was a real object of special interest for Hermann, not only because of the quantity of Hermann's emendations that are dedicated to metrics, but also because metrics is the centre of the encounter between Hermann's philology and Kant. Kantian philosophy is a *fil rouge* running throughout Hermann's work; by following it, we can see how the principles that inspired Hermann's theory of metrics also span through other of his theoretical works and, ultimately, they are

[55] Schramm (2010) observes that Hermann's concepts of space and time, used to describe the progression of rhythm as a succession in space and time, are not thoroughly Kantian, but they are also adapted to the context of philology, cf. p. 101: 'language, music and dance have in common that they are movements and the measure of movement is time. By always understanding movement as a moving body, Hermann's 'movement' can understand 'rhythmics' not only in the limited sense of the ancient metrics as a time-measuring art, but also as a space-measuring art and also integrate music and dance into the rhythm.' However, from the point of view of textual emendation, I cannot fully agree with Schramm when he argues that Hermann remains 'Kantian enough', at least not in the sense indicated by Hermann himself and his appeal to Kanti's a priori principles.

the same that characterised his interpretative efforts when emending tragedy. I will now move on to show how, as such, these principles constituted a form of hermeneutics, and thus Hermann's doctrine of metrics is an essential piece of the puzzle to reconstruct Hermann's theory of interpretation. In this sense, Hermann's interpretation of Kantian philosophy and its application to philology should be considered not so much as an effective tool to emend metrics – indeed, it was quite a defective tool at that; rather, as a distinctive form of hermeneutics, where the philologist's *sensus* – or, in Kantian terms, the 'faculty of knowledge' that 'supplies from itself'[56] – interacts with the product of his philological knowledge, which for Hermann meant a process of deep acquaintance with the ancient texts – Kant's 'raw materials'.[57] In this sense, *sensus* was at the same time independent and a product of thorough philological knowledge – and this is the reason why, for example, so many of Hermann's attacks, to Boeckh among other contemporaries, lamented the opponent's scarce knowledge of the ancient languages – in the same way in which, as seen above, a priori knowledge must be 'prompted'[58] by experience, despite technically being independent from it. As such, Hermann's reading of Kant here is not so much thorough or very persuasive, but rather a way to explain away a paradox, or a tension, in Kantian philosophy.

[56] Cf. above, note 15.
[57] Ibidem.
[58] Ibidem.

*Sensus* as a substitute for a posteriori principles

The problem posited by the application of Kantian philosophy to textual criticism, in the way Hermann described it, essentially lies in how the philologist would gain access to the laws of metrics. Indeed, Hermann's goal was to establish certain rules of metrics by gaining access to the noumenon, what exists beyond human perception and experience, through the a priori concepts of the mind. But how was this process actually supposed to work?

The answer to this question underlines the entirely Kantian spirit of Hermann's theory of philology, and it consists in the prescription of the use of a blend of *ratio* and *sensus*.[59] Hermann describes the latter as an 'obscure and hidden' criterion to be used as a step in between the perception of the 'pleasure of rhythm' and the application of *ratio*'.[60] Hermann posited that the recognition of the a priori determined laws of metrics is conditional to a privileged understanding of rhythm, which is first pleasant to the ears and then appeals to something mysterious:

One could rightly conclude that the laws of metrics are certain and immutable, and on the basis of them we judge metres not after the mind has considered those things that

[59] Cf. La Penna (1982), 440 and Hermann's judgement on Bentley, *Op.* 2, 265, 267-8, on how Bentley had both *iudicium* and *sensus*, but in the textual criticism he leaned too much towards his *iudicium*, overlooking his *sensus*. On Bentley's 'linguistic facility and [..] legitimate aesthetic sensibility' cf. the examples given in Haugen (2011), 142-5.

[60] The idea that judgements of taste are based on pleasure was very common even before Kant, and in the first part of the *Critique of Judgement*, where Kant exposes his doctrine of aesthetics, he takes this point for granted.

are pleasing to the ears, but rather after the approval given by the ears has aligned them to some obscure and hidden judgment of the spirit.[61]

Similarly to what we already observed *apropros* the influence of Bentley on Hermann,[62] the philologist must establish a special connection with the ancients in order to emend them,[63] and the *sensus*, or feeling for rhythm that Hermann describes is a quality possessed largely by nature, that is very unlikely acquirable through practice, to the point that he advised the ones who do not have this quality against trying to achieve it:

If some people despair of acquiring that ability through practice, they certainly should abstain from the emendation of those poets. Indeed, not everybody possesses the same wit as Reiz, who, because he lacked the ability in question, made up for it with admirable discipline and study.[64]

For Hermann, while it is technically possible to acquire *sensus* through practice, it is ultimately also very unlikely that someone might do so, unless one is a special individual of the like of Hermann's revered professor Wolfgang Reiz.

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[61] *De metris*, 2: Iure igitur coniici poterat, certas quasdam et immutabiles numeri leges esse, e quibus quum numeros iudicamus, non mens ea, quae auribus placerent, rata haberet, sed aurium probatio ad obscurum quoddam et reconditum animi iudicium sese accomodaret. (Cf. also above, note 8.)

[62] Cf. ch. one, *Bentleian philology*: ingenium*, erudition and the use of manuscripts.*

[63] Cf. Hermann's preface to *Hecuba*, p. xii: non opus est quidem, mea sententia, ut ipse sit poeta, qui veteres poetas interpretari aggrediatur, sed illud tamen opus est, ut imaginem aliquam poetae animo suo informare et quomodo quis carmina condat cogitatione sciat comprehendere (it is not necessary, in my opinion, for the one who undertakes the task of interpreting the ancient poets to be himself a poet; however, it is necessary that he forms in his soul an image of the poet and, upon reflection, can understand in what way that poet composes poetry.)

[64] *De metris*, 142: si qui sunt, qui hanc facultatem exercitationemque se umquam consecuturos desperant, eos certe ab emendatione illorum poetarum abstinere decet. Neque enim omnes Reizii utuntur ingenio, qui ut ista, de qua loquimur, commoditate caruerit, eam tamen mirum quantum diligentia et studio supplevit.

Mostly, the philologist should be gifted with *sensus* by nature. Famous examples of this, also used programmatically by Hermann, are the anecdotes often told about himself concerning how he could understand the rhythm in Horace before he could read and, at university, he used to suggest metrical emendations by ear to Reiz. The latter, then, had to mechanically check the metrical scansions with his fingers, in order to be sure that they were correct, while the gifted student had an innate sense for rhythm.[65] Hermann presents Reiz as the exception to the rule, in as much as the latter did not innately possess the same ear for rhythm of which Hermann prided himself,[66] but, through practice, he acquired a good understanding and sensitivity for rhythm; and yet, Hermann's famous anecdote still portrays Reiz struggling to keep up with Hermann's natural feeling for rhythm.

Indeed, Hermann thought that, in order to really operate in accordance with the principle of causality governing rhythm, at the basis of his a priori doctrine of metrics, and to understand the way in which the metres flow on the basis of the succession of *theseis* and *arseis*, the philologist needs something more, something ineffable:

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[65] Cf. Hermann (1816), XIII: Reizius [..] natura valde circumspectus et lentus esset, non tam ad aurem exigebat numeros, quam pedes digitis numerabat: meminique me adolescentulum, quum Plauti Rudentem ederet, eique in erroribus typothetae corrigendis adiutor essem, saepe, si quid in metro offenderem, eique significarem: significare autem ipse iusserat: tanta enim in illo viro erat humanitas, ut ne a discipulis quidem moneri indecorum duceret, quin ea re etiam gauderet: tum igitur memini si recitarem versus illos, quo vel vitium, vel meliorem scripturam indicarem, "lentius, quaeso, lentius", eum mihi dicere, ac tum exploratis ad digitos singulis pedibus, si recte monuisse viderer, textui inserere, quoniam non fidebat aures solas consulere assueto.

[66] Cf. Medda (2006), 15-27.

And this is only a minimal account of the nature of metre. Indeed the metre is not just the whole succession of causes and effects, but it also lies in those things, which cannot be determined from metrics itself, because, as said above, we clearly do not need to understand things rationally in order to judge metres. For we need to seek the nature of metrics more deeply.[67]

This quality of a deeper nature allows the philologist to grasp the component of necessity inherent in the concept of causality, for which, Hermann says, 'given some parts of the rhythm, the mind automatically knows how the rest of the rhythm is going to go.'[68]

In his commentaries on tragedies, Hermann showed such an approach in practice all the time. Not only was he an extremely prolific emendator,[69] but many of his conjectures were based on metrics in the special sense described above. Many of these metrical emendations were justified on the basis of what essentially was presented as a feeling, or *sensus*, for rhythm. Often Hermann's arguments, in his commentaries, are based on the idea that he had a precise insight into what Euripides must have written.[70]

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[67] Hermann, *De metris*, p. 9: At ea re minime exhausta est numeri natura. Neque enim in omnibus caussarum atque effectorum consequutionibus numerus est, sed in quibusdam tantum, quae quales sint, e rebus quidem, in quibus numerus est, intelligi non potest, quoniam, ut ante dictum est, rerum cognitione ad animadvertendos numeros plane non indigemus. Altius igitur numeri naturam quaerere oportet.

[68] *EDM*, 3: Atque hoc quoque ipsa statim experientia comprobat. Nulla enim nisi in eo symmetria est, quod ut cohaerena consideratur: cuius data parte aliqua, mens, quales reliquae partes esse debeant, sponte consequitur.

[69] Cf. chapter one, note 8.

[70] Cf. above, note 63.

As I have argued above, the concept of *sensus* in Hermann's philology is not limited to the feeling for rhythm, but it really constitutes the ultimate hermeneutical guide for the philologist. *Sensus* is, of course, a problematic concept, not only because it raises the question of what exactly it stands for, what it takes to properly emend a text, either in its rhythmical components or more broadly, without providing an answer beyond the idea that it takes a certain *je ne sais quoi* –[71] a concession that, given its complex nature, can for now be made; but it also constitutes a failure of Hermann's practical application of his a priori metrics if considered from the perspective of what his theory stood up against, namely the model of Richard Porson's scholarship.[72]

So far, the idea of emending a text on the basis of *sensus* does not seem to require the grounding in a priori principles that Hermann wanted for his metrics. And yet, such foundation was essential to Hermann, because he hoped to establish a model of philology different from the one of the British scholar Porson, the other classicist who, at the end of the eighteenth century, was working on the metrics of Greek tragedy. According to Hermann, the metrical theory of British scholars operated a posteriori, because it started out from the observation of phenomena (the

[71] These are the epistemological cruces considered, for instance, in Pollock (2014), esp. 406 ('not all interpretations are worthy of philological attention to the same degree'), Pollock, (2009), 945 ff. (esp. p. 946: Hermann's "*sensus*-based philology" is clearly a consequence of the fact that 'philology never developed into a discrete, conceptually coherent, and institutionally unified field of knowledge but has remained a vague congeries of method'). Cf. Scholar (2005) for a historical perspective on the concept of *je ne sais quoi.*

[72] Cf. Medda (2010), esp. 229-33, on the controversy between Hermann and the British scholars. As it is the case also elsewhere (cf. below, note 158), an investigation of the role of *sensus* in Biblical criticism and hermeneutics, and how this traditions interact with Hermann's usage of *sensus* might be revealing, and should be the object of further study.

texts) and proceeded to the formulation of *regulae* on the basis of empirical findings. While the British method was inductive, Hermann's method rested on a claim of deduction. On these bases, British philology was heavily shaped by the amount of textual examples that the scholars could observe and collect, and influenced by the number of exceptions to those a posteriori rules that could be found, rather than being founded on the Kantian assumed connection with a noumenal layer of a priori given rules.

Hermann thought that British scholars were guided by various rules of metrics, presumably in such a way that some were stronger and more often observed rules, while others were weaker principles, more easily overlooked when a passage seemed as if it could contain an exception to a rule of such a kind. This hierarchy of principles would be, according to Hermann, inherent in the nature of such a posteriori determined principles. Instead rules of metrics, according to Hermann, should not be established fast and based on only a few examples.[73]

Thus the British method, in Hermann's opinion, came with two main problems: on the one hand, a tendency to systematically question metrical principles, perceived as always amendable, rather than solid laws of rhythm; on the other hand, a constant temptation to emend exceptions, with a normalising goal, especially when an emendation could be achieved easily, as an indirect

[73] See e.g. the methodological foreword to Elmsley's *Medea*, *Op.* 3, 146: [the regula] non est fortuita aliquot exemplorum consensio, sed necessaria parilitas. Atqui necessarium nihil est, nisi quod habet certam rationem, quare sic sit, ut est, neque aliter. Thus, rules should not only be based on enough empirical evidence, but they should also explain with enough scientific rationality the necessity of fixed metrical mechanisms.

reinforcement of those pre-established principles.[74] In the analysis of metrical forms during emendation, instead, Hermann prescribed a rational effort to identify the laws governing metre:

> Surely when one investigates new metres, which have clearly been composed arbitrarily by the poets, one must use a certain way and reason to find where the verses start and where they finish. [..] Indeed, once the scope of a verse had been described, it is easy to discern clearly the other laws which pertain to that metre. It is particularly important to thoroughly explain that reason (*ratio*), without which no certainty can be achieved in this type of metre.[75]

Despite the two main points of disagreement Hermann found with the British methods, Hermann himself was inclined both towards normalisation, especially, as seen above, in the case of strophic responsion in the tragic parodos, and towards allowing metrical exceptions on the basis of the claim of a "higher" feeling for rhythm. Therefore we can find a double fault with the a priori system that Hermann wanted for his science of metrics. Indeed, if the cases of extreme normalisation pose the problem of how the philologist can have access to laws of metrics which are given a priori and not just gathered through experience, the answer to this problem, namely the employment of *sensus*, is even more

[74] Cf. above, note 73.

[75] Heyne and Hermann (1798), 181-2: Nimirum ubi nova planeque ad arbitrium poetarum composita metra indaganda sunt, certa quadam via et ratione utare necesse est, qua ubi incipiant versus, ubi finiant, cognoscas. [..] Descripto enim versuum ambitu, caetera ex iis, quae cuiusque numeri propriae leges sunt, facile perspiciuntur. Quo magis oportet curam adhibere, ut hanc omnem rationem, sine qua nihil in hoc genere certi est, diligenter explicemus. In those years Boeckh had discovered the principles of *brevis in longo* and *hiatus* to mark verse-end in his *Pindari carmina quae supersunt* (1811-21) (cf. Itsumi (2009), 10, Santé (2008), 15 ff.) but Hermann had not recognised Boeckh's discovery.

problematic: at least on the surface, it is arbitrary, but at the same time, as I will show below, it is not infallible and is susceptible to revisions. As a consequence, any of the claims that Hermann's theory lays to Kantianism should be considered at least doubtful with respect to its practical outputs. In particular, if Hermann's critical methods were generally inspired by Kantian principles (as they were), this did not operate at the mechanical, microscopic level of the laws of rhythm, but it rather appealed to Hermann's macroscopic outlook on the tasks of the philologist – and herein lay Hermann's true "philosophy of philology".

Hermann deemed the a posteriori approach necessarily imprecise and aleatory, while the concept of a law of metrics he proposed did not allow for degrees or a hierarchy of validity of disposable principles, and imposed a solid set of rules established a priori as the ideal guide for the philologist. British scholars, instead, were less interested in formulating metrical rules per se, but rather contented themselves with the identification of tendencies that could guide their emendatory practice but would remain open to being questioned.[76] However, if Hermann's theory is theoretically justified, because it would have the merit of giving a precise and sure measurement of textual phenomena, it is hard to see how it could be achieved in practice. Hermann essentially took pride in his solution as the holy grail of philology, because its Kantian claim not only suggested that the evaluation of textual data should be carried out according to pre-established rules of

[76] Cf. chapter three, note 17.

metrics, but the definition of such rules as given a priori also essentially connected them to Kant's notion of synthetic a priori judgements.

As I will show below, judgements of tragedy are, for Hermann, aesthetic judgements, in the Kantian sense;[77] and aesthetic judgements, in Kantian philosophy, are 'synthetic a priori judgements'. Namely, they are not analytic but synthetic judgements,[78] because they posit no identity between the judgement and what the judgement is about. Synthetic judgements add to our concepts of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. As Kant writes:

> If I say, for instance, All bodies are extended, then this is an analytic judgement. I need not go beyond the concept which I connected with the body, in order to find that extension is connected with it. To find that predicate, I only need to analyse the concept, that is, become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it. The judgement is therefore analytic. But if I say, All bodies are heavy, the predicate is something quite different from what I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgement.[79]

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[77] Cf. below, *The Kantian concept of beauty applied to philology.*

[78] Kant defines a judgement as analytic if 'the predicate B belongs to the concept A' and 'the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity', cf. CPR A6/B10. In other words, 'an analytic judgement merely displays a constituent of the concept of the subject and is true by virtue of the principle of contradiction: 'a triangle has three sides' is analytic because the concept of three-sidedness is contained in that of triangularity and its negation is contradictory ('a triangle does not have three sides' says: something that is three-sided is not three-sided)', cf. Gardner (1999), 54.

[79] CPR, A7-8/B11-12.

Synthetic judgements therefore, as Kant puts it, are *argumentative*, because they bring additional information to the mere concept we have of the subject. Hermann makes use of these concepts, applying them to the study of meter by putting metrics side by side with mathematics, geometry and metaphysics, the only disciplines where, according to Kant, synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible, because they contain judgements that can not be derived by logic from the concept itself (therefore they are synthetic) and are necessary, but not essentially derived from experience (therefore they are *a priori*). As happens with the concept of cause-and-effect, namely the one involved in determining the a priori nature of metrics in Hermann's doctrine: the idea of cause is necessary, because every event has a cause, and is synthetic because the concept of event does not contain that of being an effect.[80]

Thus, for Hermann, the extrapolation of the laws of metrics would be achieved through synthetic a priori judgements: induced by the experience of examining the text, obtained by the formulation of informative judgements indicating the necessity of priori rules with which meters can be aligned. In such way Hermann's system contained the idea that meters must conform to *leges* of metrics determined by the alternation of causes and effects in space and time, and that empirical observations of metre in poetical texts actually led to the reconstruction of metrical rules which are given a priori, and to which the metrical structure of every piece of ancient poetry must intrinsically conform. While the

[80] Cf. Gardner (1999), 55.

methodology suggested by Hermann differs in theory from the one he ascribed to Porson, with his a posteriori collection of exempla, Hermann's model in actuality relies on knowledge based on the observation and collection of textual data, although it does so while exploiting the Kantian definition of a priori knowledge as fundamentally independent from experience. In practice, it is hard to see how this theory could ever become textual-criticism, or how the philologist who declared allegiance to Hermann's theory of metrics would actually acquire special access to a textual truth.

The knowledge of the laws of metrics, for Hermann, should be achieved through a connection with a noumenal layer of reality, exemplified by the way in which he felt he had a special *sensus*, or immediate understanding for rhythm.[81] According to Hermann, the philologist must possess the ability to explain rationally the impressions he intuitively gleans from reading the text. The first step for the philologist should be the innate recognition of what a correct rhythm should be, followed by a rational effort to explain metrical forms.[82] Reproposing the paradoxical Kantian definition of a priori concepts exposed above,[83] in the case of philology this method clearly presupposes an input from the phenomena, namely the textual data, to be used as a base for rational interpretation. In the practical

[81] Cf. Schramm (2010), 101, quoting Hermann's *Handbuch der Metrik*: 'the law of metrics is not empirical, for then it would depend on the opinion of a man, a people or an epoch; rather, it is "innate" (innata) or "a priori certain" (a priori certa), since it is not known through learning, but "by itself" (per se) and therefore can not be changed or abolished.'

[82] Below, I will further investigate the details of this methodological blend of *sensus* and *ratio* in Hermann's philology.

[83] Cf. above, pp. 255-6 (point 1).

context of Hermann's textual criticism, the problem of how a priori concepts would come to be prompted by experience becomes a crucial one.

Kant posits that 'all our knowledge begins with experience', thus a priori concepts, too, are in a sense 'prompted' by phenomena. However, the function of phenomena is purely instrumental and non-generative, in the sense that a priori principles are not a consequence of the existence of the phenomena and do not stem from them, but are, as far as their own nature is concerned, prior to experience. The transposition of this idea in the field of metrics hardly comes with fewer problems, but the most important consequence of this is that Hermann, in his attempt to constitute an alternative to Porson's model, essentially ended up substituting a philological model based on experience as a collection of textual examples – that he attributed to the British scholars –, with a model based on the philologist's innate ability to understand rhythm, or *sensus*. The two models, however, are almost interchangeable in their functioning, and neither fully presupposes a prior rational substratum, because arguably the application of vague principles established through experience, as in the British model that Hermann criticised, cannot be fully explained rationally either: rather, with time, such principles become part of the philologist's know-how. On the practical level, if in Hermann's view Porson's was a diachronic model based on the gathering of knowledge through time, Hermann's model aspired to be a synchronic model based on a form of immediate understanding based on innate qualities. However, under close examination both

models seem in fact to be characterised by a comparable level of fluidity and elusiveness of boundaries.

In practice, for instance, Hermann certainly recognised the importance of producing parallel examples for establishing the use and meaning of words in ancient texts, and he employed this method quite frequently in his commentaries. However, it is clear that a component of *sensus*, in the broader sense of application of intuition – a form of intuition that is still informed by experience – close to, so-called, "oracular philology", always tended to trump any other form of logic in Hermann's philology. In such respect Boeckh even addressed Hermann's tendency to deviate from the meaning suggested by use and context, by means of logical deductions, such as Hermann did for Antigone l. 1036 ὅσων σπαράγματ' ἤ κύνες καθήγισαν, where he defended the meaning of 'contaminating' for καθαγίζειν, rather than the more common 'to consecrate'.[84] Hermann's explanation for defending this unparalleled meaning was the following: because secular men are kept away from a consecrated place, by 'consecrating' we mean that we stay away from a place because of religious reverence; and because the contamination caused by the shreds of human remains left by dogs produces the same outcome, here καθαγίζειν means 'contaminando facere ut quivis se abstineat'. Boeckh was patently right when he denounced that what he deemed to be a rationalisation on the part of Hermann had gone too far, here (although, one could argue, this could also be regarded essentially as a contextual, cultural-historical explanation and it

[84] Cf. Boeckh (1877), 100-1.

certainly was so, in Hermann's intentions): the imaginative capacity of Hermann's logical deductions was admirable, but, as already observed by Wilamowitz, it often caused him to overshoot and miss the target.[85] On the other hand, Hermann's *sensus*-based philology was clearly capable, in other cases, to produce remarkable results,[86] in a way that the sole employment of *ratio* could not have allowed. Indeed, this methodology of the *je-ne-sais-quoi* is part of the reason for his over-representation in the apparatus critici of philological editions of Greek tragedy, and a distinctive mark of Hermann's philology.

Effectively, Hermann presented himself as a "philological deontologist", like Kant and through the employment of Kantian philosophy, but in practice his philology, even when strictly concerning metrics, was characterised by essential consequentialism hardly less than Porson's, in the sense that it tolerated a plethora of exceptions and case-by-case evaluations of textual passages, rather than conforming to a priori determined rules. Indeed, if the solution of metrical problems should be aided by the immediate arising, in the mind of those who possess an innate understanding of rhythm, of a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, inevitably making them aware if something violates the laws of rhythm, exceptions and changes of heart about a previous emendation should never happen. Instead, both of these happen frequently throughout Hermann's critical editions.

Granted that the laws of metrics normally allow variations, such as, for example, resolutions, and that they can give scope for legitimate differences of

[85] Cf. also Hermann's explanation of the meaning of θεωρεῖν at *Oe. Col.* 1086.
[86] Cf. Medda (2006), 27 ff.

opinion among critics emending a text, Hermann's Kantian metrics bears a claim of higher precision in the understanding of rhythm, and, because of its a priori structure, of infallibility. Hermann posited, in his Kantian metrics, that all metrical units are linked together through the alternation in time and space and the principle of causality, and that the critic equipped with a fine ear for rhythm can pick up on this sequences of necessary, a priori determined causes and effects. If this kind of critic really had access to a component of necessity inherent to metrics, how could he ever be mistaken?

Once again, like in the case of a priori judgements being 'prompted' by experience or the idea that principles determined a priori would still admit revisions and would even be subject to mistakes,[87] both Hermann's and Kant's theory lack straightforwardness. As regards Kant, whether a priori judgements can be fallible is object of debate among critics of Kant;[88] as concerns Hermann, it is clear that no philological emendations – not even his own – could actually pretend to enjoy an absolute degree of certainty. But certainly Hermann, in his commentaries and the details of his a priori determined doctrine of metrics, did want to create such illusion.

The fact of the matter is that synthetic a priori judgements, in Kant's philosophy, are only those of mathematics and metaphysics, and their basic

[87] Cf. above, note 83.

[88] Cf. e.g. Hawthorne (2013), 209-10, on how instances of a priori justification, even in the case of someone's carefully working through a mathematical proof, can reveal themselves to be fallible, for example if the person gets empirical evidence that he is mad or that his proof is probably mistaken (for instance, because of distorting background conditions, or even because 'lots of smart people are inclined to laugh when they hear' his 'proof'). It is possible to show that a priori justification is fallible and defeasible (i.e., it can be defeated by further a priori or empirical evidence).

principles are infallible.[89] As a consequence, Hermann's description of judgements of metrics – or, as I will show below, aesthetic judgements in general – as synthetic a priori judgements means de facto grouping these with mathematics and metaphysics. Thus, emendations reliant on a priori determined laws of rhythm should not be amendable. Hermann seemed to be aware of this problem, and in some cases tried to defend his changes of mind on a previous emendation by attributing it to something other than a true law of metrics, as he wrote, for example, with regard to a verse in Pindar's *Pythian* 5: librorum scripturam, καθέσσαντο μ. φ., ego quidem non propter metri legem, sed propter diligentiam, qua in hoc metro syllabas aequavit Pindarus, repudiatam velim.[90] The change of mind might be legitimate for the sake of restoring the text, however it would not be so in the light of a rigorous adherence to Hermann's own discipline of metrics. In this sense in the textual-critical practice Hermann's consequentialism always trumped the deontological attitude he kept in his theory.

Hermann's metrics intended to pass from *usus* to *ratio*,[91] from empirical practice to science, to look for causes of phenomena and systematise the subject of metrics, to establish principles and traceable methods to categorise and emend the ancient meters. However, the notion of *sensus* is the crucial one in Hermann's

[89] The notion of a priori concepts has changed since Kant, and today they are seen as potentially fallible, but for Kant they were not: he held that scientific laws involve necessity, and that 'this necessity is based not on (purely metaphysical and hence inaccessible) relations between universals, but rather on certain subjective, a priori conditions under which we can experience objects in space and time', cf. Watkins and Stan (2014). Thus a law of metrics, in the Hermannian system, would have to bear a metaphysical necessity.

[90] Quoted in Itsumi (2009), 228-9.

[91] Especially in comparison to Bentley, cf. La Penna (1982), 435.

theory, and he could not renounce it. Because of such arbitrary method, it is not clear how Hermann's a priori model would, in practice, be any different from the so-called a posteriori method of the British scholars, based on the habitual reading of the ancients, on *usus* and experience, and then on the know-how, arguably a form of '*sensus*', that might derive from that.

Setting out laws of metrics, as Hermann did, was essential for the future of the discipline of metrics, but the benefits of its grounding in Kant's a priori principles remain hard to envisage.[92] Medda (2010), who has studied Hermann in the context of his relationship with British scholarship, has read in Hermann's application of the idea of a priori laws of metrics to his emendatory practice a sign of metrics truly different from the British model of Richard Porson.[93] But if all it took to ground metrics in a priori principles were for philologists to observe and apply the rules of metrics, there would not be a single textual critic today who would not call himself a Kantian.

*Ratio* and *Sensus*

It is at this point essential to take account of the fact that, even though the Kantian inspiration of Hermann's doctrine of metrics is unquestionable, the influence of that philosophy was not confined to Hermann's doctrine of metrics. The critical tradition has so far taken Hermann's most obvious appeal to Kantian

[92] Cf. also above, note 29.
[93] Cf. note 73; Medda (2006), 21, however, recognises, in passing, the essential arbitrary nature of Hermann's appeal to the Kantian a priori concepts.

philosophy, namely its instrumentality for metrics, as the sole basis for consistently representing Hermann as a "Kantian philologist".[94] However, the influence of Kant on Hermann's thought and practice goes well beyond the scope of his metrical treatises.[95] This will become clear by turning to some Hermannian writings which are not concerned with metrics: I will show how these are no less imbued with Kantian philosophy than Hermann's theory of metrics, and how the function of Kantian philosophy is essentially equivalent in both these types of theoretical writings. The *fil rouge* of Kantian philosophy runs through Hermann's theoretical writings, grounding not only his doctrine of metrics, but also his theory of tragedy and thus, ultimately, his hermeneutics and philological practice.

Hermann's first direct appeal to Kant appeared in 1794, not in a work of metrics but in the theoretical writing *De poeseos generibus*,[96] a treatise in which Hermann discusses the classification of poetical genres. There, Hermann thoroughly follows concepts laid out in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, demonstrating how he intended to apply notions of that philosophy to a much broader field than just metrics. Like he would later do for metrics, in *De poeseos generibus* Hermann proposed a taxonomy of poetical forms based primarily on Kantian categories such as causality, in the sense of what their object of interest, or their topic, is and how

[94] Cf. e.g. Couturier-Heinrich, C. (2011), even though, even there, the question on the true Kantianism of Hermann emerges.
[95] Once again, Schramm (2010) has already demonstrated this, albeit with a different focus than the one I am taking here.
[96] Cf. *Op.* 1, 14-5: Quodsi ea, quae Kantius de formositate et sublimitate disputavit, diligenter inter se comparamus, hoc nobis videmur colligere, sublimia pariter ac formosa ita esse comparata, ut, tamquam ad finem aliquem referenda sint, etsi, quo referantur, nihil est, apto quodam lusu mentis vires exerceant.

they deal with it: their *materia* and *forma*;[97] he then analysed them according to the Kantian categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality.[98]

Indeed, Hermann's project in *De poeseos generibus* shares a common theoretical background not only with his principles of metrics but also with his philological practice. Hermann's theory for the classification of literary genres, like his theory of metrics, rested on two pillars: a break with the tradition, on the basis of the claim that previous attempts to achieve the proposed task had been mistaken,[99] and the goal of establishing sound methods to classify genres in an objective way, or of reaching 'knowledge of truth.'[100] In *De poeseos generibus*, too, Kantian philosophy aided Hermann in providing the necessary structure for the essentially scientific aspiration behind the project. In particular, similarly to what he thought for metrics, Hermann's goal was to define a rational conception of poetry so that each genre would constitute a necessary part of the system,[101] seeking to find the necessary connection between effects and causes.[102] It is thus evident that the same inspiring principles were at play in multiple areas of Hermann's thinking and were reflected

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[97] 'In art', Hermann writes, 'all things must be judged by comparing their outcome with their cause' (*Op.* 1, 24: Omnia, quae arte fieri dicuntur, e fine aliquo, cuius caussa comparata sint, iudicantur), because in the narrative certain facts are unfolded as the effects of certain causes and their necessary connection. Cf. *ibidem*, 23: duas habebimus diuidendae poeseos caussas, vnam, quae ad tractationis, alteram, quae ad argumentorum diversitates spectet; and pp. 25-6: in poeseos autem generibus investigandis duas res [..] spectare convenit, materiam artis, qaue cogitationes sunt, et formam.
[98] Cf. Hermann (1802), 211-37 and Schramm (2010), 96-7.
[99] Cf. *Op*. 1, 20-4 and Schramm (2010), 94-5, on how Hermann criticises Aristotle's conception of beauty as imitation, and thus as based on knowledge and judgement, rather than being based on pleasure alone as Hermann, following Kant, holds. Hermann also worked further on Aristotle's *Poetics* in his 1802 commented edition of the book.
[100] Cf. *Op.* 1, p. 23: Nam quum in iis maxime rebus erratum fuerit, quae totius disceptationis fundamenta sunt, non videmur aliter ad veri scientiam pervenire posse, quam si, relictis omnibus, quae antea in hoc genere viri docti disputarunt, de integro rem ordiri conemur.
[101] For more on Hermann's *De poeseos generibus* cf. Schramm (2010), 94-8.
[102] Cf. *Op*. 1, pp. 25-9 and Hermann (1802), 207 f.

in a diverse array of theoretical and, as I will argue below, practical outputs. Hermann's Kantianism, in other words, was all but limited to metrics.

Two things concerning these early theoretical writings should be noted: first, that the combination of *ratio* and *sensus*, the most significant and characteristic mark of Hermann' hermeneutics, already emerges as a well-grounded cornerstone of his thought.[103] Second, we should take note of how Hermann did not, and indeed could not limit himself to follow Kantian philosophy strictly and *verbatim*, because the latter did not necessarily suit the philological needs that Hermann wanted to fulfil: most of the time, Hermann's Kantianism is a re-elaborated, synthetic version of Kant. As I have argued above, grounding metrics in Kantian a priori concepts does not constitute an actual advantage for emendatory practice, and thus the reason for Hermann's choice to represent his discipline of metrics in those terms should be found elsewhere. Similarly, I will now show how, in his definition of aesthetic judgments, Hermann does not really follow Kant to the letter, but rather exploits the ambiguities and complexities in Kant's philosophical system itself, in order to adapt the conclusions that can be drawn from an interpretation of that system to his practical goals of philologist. Thus, Hermann's philological practice should be considered as the fruit of the intersection between two operations emerging in his theory: the hermeneutical dyad of *ratio* and *sensus*, and the transforming descent of Kantian philosophy into the philological dimension.

[103] Cf. above, note 59.

Hermann derives the notions of *ratio* and *sensus*, which are at the core of his emendatory practice, from Kant's *CPR*. Kant's description of knowledge has a dichotomous structure centred around the concept of representation (*repraesentatio*),[104] which encompasses the notion of representation in consciousness, or perception (*perceptio*); this is subdivided into subjective perception, or sensation (*sensatio*), and objective perception, or knowledge (*cognitio*).[105] Knowledge, in turn, breaks down into intuition (*intuitus*) and concept (*conceptus*): 'the former refers immediately to an object and is singular; the latter refers mediately to the object, that is, by means of a characteristic mark that several things can have in common.'[106]

Hermann's imitation of Kant assumes the form of an adaptation, a concise rather than precise replica of Kantian philosophy. His classification of imagination is structured in three levels: (1) the subjective sensation, or receptivity to the impressions of external things ('Empfänglichkeit für die Eindrücke der äußern Dinge'[107]); (2) intuition in space and time ('Anschauung in Raum und Zeit'[108]); (3) the property of concepts, or understanding and reason ('Vermögen der Begriffe', or 'Verstand und Vernunft'[109]).[110]

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[104] Cf. Schramm (2010), 92, on how, when Hermann places the concept of imagination (*Vorstellungsvermögen*) at the centre of his definition of beautiful art, he refers back to the popularisation of Kantian philosophy promoted by Hermann's Jena teacher Reinhold. The latter had reduced the notion of imagination, which also occurs in Kant but is not central to it, to the guiding notion of epistemology, and reduced the cognitive faculties arranged by Kant on a scale of knowledge to a common ground of consciousness. Cf. also Koechly (1874), 9.
[105] Cf. CPR A320/B377 and Schramm (2010), 92-3, with more bibliography on Reinhold, too.
[106] CPR A320/B377.
[107] Hermann (1799), XIV.
[108] Ibidem.
[109] Ibidem.
[110] Cf. also Schramm (2010), 93.

This philosophical background bears consequences for Hermann's practice. Indeed, it should be kept in mind when reading Hermann's prescriptions on how to emend the ancient texts, insofar as this theoretical background structure enlightens the precise meaning of Hermann's words. For example, the idea that critics should study only one author at a time, and get well acquainted with such author,[111] does not generically indicate the importance that Hermann attributed to formulating emendations based on *usus*,[112] namely a knowledge of the characteristics of the language preferred and habitually employed by each specific ancient author; rather, Hermann's prescription also, more complexly, refers to the specific theoretical background that he laid out in his writings. Thus, for Hermann, establishing *usus* is tantamount to employing the Kantian *intuitus* and *conceptus*, as the structures of the mind that allow us to identify the singularity of an object and 'the characteristic mark that several things can have in common.'[113] As I will further discuss below, I suggest that we should take notice of this specific superimposition of a Kantian flavour on common philological tools and techniques, not only because it constitutes a specific mark of Hermannian philology, but also because this ostensibly was part and parcel of Hermann's hermeneutics, in the sense that the grounding of philology in Kantian philosophy created room for Hermann to believe his practice was very much a scientist's work, operating according to reliable and sound methods.

[111] Cf. chapter one, p. 40, note 12.
[112] Cf. chapter one, *Emendations based on the criterion of* usus.
[113] Cf. above, note 106.

Similarly, Hermann's insistence on the idea that the critic should have an excellent knowledge of the ancient languages, and, more specifically, the prescriptive attitude that Hermann displayed in his commentaries, when formulating his emendations, reflect the Kantian concept (*conceptus*). In this sense, for Hermann, the critic's emendations should always represent an accurate synthesis of his general knowledge, gained and refined through vast experience of both Greek literature in general and the work of the particular author under analysis. This technique can be summed up in what Hermann more generally describes as *ratio*.

The other face of the coin is intuition, or *Anschauung* (*intuitus*), namely a kind of knowledge that is less subject to being justified on rational basis – e.g. by providing parallel examples to support theories – and that corresponds to Hermann's notion of *sensus*. The latter gives aid, in specific passages, to emendations which are justified on the basis of being 'more elegant' or 'more appropriate' than other readings. It is evident from the above-mentioned Hermannian classification of imagination that perception, *sensus* and *ratio* are the three essential levels to interpret a text.

While perception is resolved in the mere apprehension of the textual data, Hermann prescribed a blend of *ratio* and *sensus* in his philological practice, and this is evident in his commentaries. Thus, for example, in his comment to Euripides' *IT* l. 146, he accepts Heath's emendation μολπαῖσι Βοᾶς, observing: coacervavit Euripides more suo verba idem fere significantia sic, ut non uno modo construi

possint et inter se copulari;[114] but he also pairs considerations of this type, about the usual characteristics of Euripides' language, with assessments of what language would best become poetry: ea ratio, quae maxime poeticae dictioni convenit, haec est [..];[115] or at *IT* l. 15, commenting on Matthiae's emendation: sed ista omnia *dura sunt ad constructionem*, neque *eleganter* ad numeros dicta;[116] at *Andr*. l. 190 he proposes *ἄπο* instead of ὕπο (mss ll. 189-90: οἱ γὰρ πνέοντες μεγάλα τοις κρείσσους λόγους/ πικρῶς φέρουσι τῶν ἐλασσόνων ἄπο): he proposes two parallel passages in favour of *ἄπο*,[117] and discusses why the corruption ὕπο might have originated, but adds: sed hoc tam *moleste dictum*, ut non dubitaverim *ἄπο* scribere.[118] Here considerations based on Kantian *conceptus* (or Hermannian *ratio)* are expressed but set aside in favour of what would be most appropriate for the passage in question, according to the Kantian *intuitus* (or Hermannian *sensus*). These are by no means isolated occurrences in Hermann's commentaries, but rather they can be considered a significant tendency in his practice.

These examples have hopefully begun to show how Hermann's reading in Kantian philosophy constituted a form of hermeneutical theory and thus influenced his practice in the emendation of tragedy, also in a context unrelated to metrics. I will now offer a more in-depth analysis of Hermann's theory of tragedy, in order to further demonstrate his use of Kantian philosophy as a form of hermeneutics.

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[114] Hermann (1833), 20.
[115] Ibidem.
[116] Ibidem, 6. Italics mine.
[117] Cf. Hermann (1838), 23: Soph. *Aj*. l. 494 μή μ' ἀξιώσῃς βάξιν ἀλγεινὴν λαβεῖν τῶν σῶν ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν and l. 1320 οὐ γαρ κλύοντές ἐσμεν αἰσχίστους λόγους, ἄναξ Ὀδυσσεῦ, τοῦδ' ὑπ'ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως. And *El*. l. 552 ἐρεῖς μὲν οὐχὶ νῦν γέ μ' ὡς ἄρξασά τι λυπηρόν, εἶτα σοῦ τάδ' ἐξήκουσ' ὕπο.
[118] Hermann (1838), 23. Italics mine.

The Kantian concept of beauty applied to philology

Hermann's classification of poetical genres in *De poeseos generibus* naturally also includes a disquisition on the place assumed by tragedy in the system of literary genres. This classification entails a definition of the tragic inscribed within the Kantian conception of beauty and aesthetic judgements; more precisely, for Hermann tragedy is a manifestation of the sublime and thus judgements of tragedy are judgements of taste, in the Kantian sense.

Kant's *Critique of Judgement* distinguishes between beauty and the sublime, however they are both judgements of taste and Hermann groups his treatment of the sublime within the Kantian definition of judgements of beauty. This is at least noteworthy because it exemplifies again the way in which Hermann embraces Kantian philosophy with a pragmatic, utilitarian spirit, adapting it to his philological ends, fitting Kantianism within his hermeneutical ideas rather than the other way around.[119] As it will appear clearly, Hermann understands very well the complexities of Kantian philosophy and, indeed, his own theory is based on some of the crucial nodes of that philosophical system; however, elsewhere in his use of that philosophy, Hermann dispenses with accuracy in respecting every detail, because he is evidently not interested in reproducing a precise transposition of Kantian philosophy in his philological system – a task that is also, arguably, impossible.

[119] According to Kant, experiences of beauty and sublimity, the primary categories of taste, are based on feelings of pure pleasure (beauty) and a subtle mix of pleasure and displeasure (sublimity), cf. *CJ*, §24, 247 and Guyer (2003), xi-xii. However, some critics have argued against the idea that Kant intended to define the two distinct predicates 'beautiful' and 'sublime' by the same set of criteria, a topic to which Guyer (1982) is dedicated.

Moreover, Hermann's classification of the tragic genre also gives us a measurement of his wider idea of tragedy, namely the broader conception Hermann held when approaching Greek plays as a critic and an editor; we cannot assume that such conception remained isolated from his philological practice, rather we must consider this part and parcel of the hermeneutical principles behind his philological work. The consequences that Hermann, starting from Kantian philosophy, draws for the character of tragedy should be understood as the theoretical background of his emendatory practice: they cannot but constitute a legitimate hermeneutical structure upon which Hermann's textual criticism operated, as it appears clearly from *De poeseos generibus.*

There, Hermann introduces the concept of beauty following Kant's definition. First, Hermann posits that beauty does not have a real purpose, despite seemingly having an end,[120] appealing to the Kantian notion of 'purposiveness without purpose' presented in the *Critique of Judgement*: 'beauty is the form of purposiveness in an object, so far as this is perceived in it apart from the representation of an end.[121] Second, for Hermann, rather than having any cognitive stock, beauty is based on pleasure alone;[122] like for Kant: 'the beautiful is that which,

[120] Cf. *Op*. 1, 24: Omnia, quae arte fieri dicuntur, e fine aliquo, cuius caussa [sic] comparata sint, iudicantur. Qui si certus quidam et verus finis est, mechanica arte facta dicuntur; [..] sin absque certo fine speciem tamen consilii cuiusdam prae se ferunt, pulcrarum artium opera vocantur.
[121] *CJ,* §17, 232-6.
[122] Cf. *Op*. 1, 24: In hoc ipso enim pulcritudinis natura prosita est, quod non certi cuiusdam finis cogitatione, sed quadam tantummodo specie consilii, quae animi viribus exercitandis accommodata est, iudicatur.

apart from a concept, pleases universally'.[123]

Below I will further explore the way in which Hermann employs universality and subjectivity as predicates of beauty (namely, if judgements of taste are based on pleasure alone, rather than on concepts, then it follows that they must be subjective, as feelings are, and yet for Kant they have also universal value), and the important consequences this has for his hermeneutics. Here I would like to continue drawing attention to the fashion in which Hermann introduces Kantian philosophy in his own theory.

In his classification of poetical genres, Hermann clearly categorises Greek tragedy as a sublime *dramaticus genus*,[124] and then proceeds to include his disquisition on tragedy within his illustration of the properties of judgments of beauty. As seen above, for Hermann, like for Kant, aesthetic judgements are based on pleasure alone and thus they do not involve a cognitive component. This idea is per se not very intuitive, but it becomes even more problematic if applied to philology and considered from the point of view of the textual-critic, like Hermann intended: if, for example, the philologist must judge the text of tragedy in order to restore it, it seems unlikely that his emendations could be formulated without a cognitive component or, for that matter, that they would be based on feeling alone. Moreover, as seen above, Hermann prescribed a mixture of *ratio* and *sensus* to emend the ancient texts.

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[123] *CJ*, §6, 211-2. Cf. also Dalton (2015), who argues that the notion of purposiveness without a purpose in Kant already per se makes beauty resistant to thought.
[124] Cf. *Op.* 1, 36: Pariter dramaticum genus, si sublime est, tragicum, si formosum, comicum nominatur.

Hermann solves this problem in the same way that Kant does, namely through the Kantian notion of the 'free play of imagination and understanding'.[125] While Hermann insists that there is no cognitive content in beauty, he also holds that there must be something attached to the feeling of beauty that allows a judgement to arise: Nam etsi certis notionibus pulcritudo caret, illa tamen adesse debent, unde possint omnino formari notiones, quia, haec si abessent, ne haberet quidem mens, in quo lusum quemquam experiretur.[126]

Herman continues by saying that, indeed, if an object, either sublime or of beauty, does not contain at least the appearance of purposiveness, then there would be nothing to 'set the feeling of pleasure in motion' (nam siqua res, sive illa formosa seu sublimis, non contineret quamdam speciem finalitatis, animi vires ea re ad aptum quemdam motum nullo pacto possent impelli).[127] Kant tackles this problem in the 'investigation of the question of whether in a judgement of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object', speaking of a 'free play of imagination and understanding', which he indicates as a final step in the making of an aesthetic judgement.[128] Not accidentally, Hermann repeatedly employs the word 'lusus' when referring to the emergence of aesthetic judgements in a subject.

Janaway (2003) has described the determining grounds which Kant set for judgements of taste, as based on pleasure alone, in the following sense:

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[125] Cf. *CJ*, §9, 217-8.
[126] *Op*. 1, 34.
[127] Ibidem, 33.
[128] Cf. *CJ*, §9, 217-9.

the experience of an object on a particular occasion enters the subject's awareness as being "unified" or as "making sense" in a certain manner not expressible as its satisfying any determinate concept, but rather as if there exists a special affinity between what is there to be experienced and the way the perceiving mind itself works, perhaps as if the two were "meant to be" for each other. This awareness of formal purposiveness is found by the subject to "accompany" some perceptual experiences and not others. [..] Consciousness of this "unity" or "making sense" is a pleasurable feeling, and on such a feeling alone is it possible to ground a genuine judgement of taste.[129]

This mechanism closely recalls Hermann's prescriptions to the philologist to acquire in-depth familiarity with the ancient authors and the passages in his commentaries where he justifies emendations or interpretations on the bases of the *usus* of the author in the special sense described above.[130] At the same time, the mechanics of the aesthetic judgement, as based on harmony and the idea of affinity, or "making sense", from which a pleasurable feeling originates, are very similar to what Hermann evokes when talking about metrics and his gifted ear for rhythm. Here we see clearly, again, how for Hermann interpretation of tragedy in a broad sense, which encompasses but is not limited to metrical interpretation, takes up the meaning of a Kantian aesthetic judgement; but also, importantly, it follows principles which are closely modelled on the specific ones that Hermann indicates as indispensable for the interpretation of metrics.

[129] Janaway (2003), 77.
[130] Cf. the notions of *conceptus* and *intuitus* described above, pp. 299ff.

As mentioned above, despite denying a cognitive component in the aesthetic judgements, Kant, at the same time, allows it. He writes:

> nothing is capable of being universally communicated but cognition and representation in so far as it pertains to cognition. For it is only as thus pertaining that the representation is objective, and it is this alone that gives it a universal point of reference with which the power of representation of everyone is obliged to harmonize.[131]

Similarly to the apparent contradiction observed above, in the context of a priori judgements – described as being independent from and yet somewhat reliant on experience –,[132] Kant speaks of a cognitive component to aesthetic judgements in the form of the above-mentioned free play of the cognitive powers:

> [it] describes a mental state in which those elements of the mind that arrange and process data to yield objective experience are at work, but in a "free" fashion, unconstrained by the rules that subsumption of the data under determinate concepts necessarily brings with it. [..] The pleasure on which judgements of taste may be founded is a feeling of the mind's cognitive powers being in harmony with one another, and being activated in an especially lively or intensified manner.[133]

In this way Kant derives the universality of aesthetic judgements from their subjective nature, too. It is also a gateway from feeling to concept in Kant's aesthetic judgements and, for Hermann, the place in which *sensus* and *ratio* meet. Hermann,

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[131] *CJ*, §9, 217.
[132] Cf. above, note 83.
[133] Janaway (2003), 77.

too, derives the presence of concepts in judgements of the sublime from their communicability – or better, from a certain *in*communicability that characterises the tragic element:

> Thus we understand that, while beautiful things can be expressed with words, sublime ones cannot: for beautiful things have expressed in themselves that form through which they were created by concepts themselves; things which are called sublime only reveal an idea which cannot be expressed, as if they showed it from afar. Thus the type of pleasure is different in the experience of the sublime and in the experience of beauty. Indeed beautiful things are per se and immediately pleasing; the things that are called sublime not only, first of all, cannot be understood mentally, but also, if they are considered per se, because they cannot be judged as having any purposiveness, they create a sense of unpleasantness; later, however, when they bring to mind the notion of infinity, they awaken rationality, and they no longer lack purposiveness nor pleasure.[134]

For Kant the key is that, in order for something to be communicable – as an aesthetic judgement must be –, it must also have a cognitive component. In judgements of the sublime, instead, the same function is absolved by 'the realisation of the limitations of sensuousness [which] engenders the realisation that we also

[134] *Op*. 1, 34: Sic enim intelligitur, quare formosae sici ipsae res possint, sublimes non possint: formosae enim res in se ipsis notionis quamdam formam, qua formatae sint, expressam habent; sublimes quae dicuntur, ideam, quae exprimi non potest, indicant tantum et velut e longinquo monstrant. Quare voluptatis quoque in sublimitate alia atque in formositate ratio est. Formosa enim per se et statim placent: quae res autem sublimes vocantur, eae primo non solum, quod sensu comprehendi nequeunt, sed etiam, quod, si per se solae spectantur, nulla finali forma iudicari possunt, iniucunditatem creant: postea vero, quum eo, quod ad infinitam magnitudinem referuntur, rationis vim excitarunt, nec formali finalitate, nec voluptate carent.

have access to forms of reason beyond sensuousness.'[135] Similarly, Hermann speaks of a component of ineffability in the sublime as the gateway to rationality in the aesthetic judgements. For Hermann, because the feeling emerging from witnessing something sublime evokes the idea of infinity, a rational component is brought forth in the aesthetic judgements.

Because for Hermann tragedy is a representation of the sublime, we see again how *sensus* plays the biggest role in Hermann's hermeneutical theory, and *ratio* is only second to feeling. Thus there overtly is a significant overlap between Hermann's theory of metrics and his theory of tragedy as a dramatic genre. This in turn necessarily represents a form of hermeneutical theory for the philologist, in as much as Hermann's reflection on judgements of the sublime, or judgements of tragedy, bears consequences for his philological practice.

In general, we can appreciate how Kantian philosophy must have resonated with Hermann, because of the way in which the philosophical giant provided solid ground to legitimise the coming together of *sensus* and *ratio* in Hermann's philology. Or rather, it is evident that Hermann, since the earliest of his writings in 1794, was largely making use of Kantian philosophy to build a scientific background for his theories. Hermann's investment in Kantianism was such that he well represented, and to some extent exploited, the more complex aspects of Kantian philosophy – namely, the complexities of a priori judgements' (in)dependency with respect to experience, and the problematic emergence of a

[135] Bowie (2003), 44.

cognitive component in the context of aesthetic judgements otherwise defined as based on pleasure alone. Hermann was clearly an attentive reader of Kant, and Kant provided legitimisation not only for Hermann's metrical theory, but also, as in *De poeseos generibus*, for his theory of tragedy. Hermann followed Kant quite closely, but never to the letter; he was not interested in recreating a Kantian system in a philological context, but rather in strongly legitimising his own philological system. Hermann's ideas about metrics, too, such as his pride for having an ear for rhythm, assume in this light a new meaning, as they reflect an all-encompassing, Kantian inspired view of philology, rather than constituting solely a guide to metrical emendation.

The pivotal point in the above-considered details of Hermann's theory is that, when it comes to textual-critical practice, the key of Hermann's hermeneutics could not be chalked up to *ratio* alone, because *ratio* is eminently objective; it required, instead, the prominence of the subjective dimension of *sensus*. Hermann used Kantian philosophy to objectivise the subjective nature of *sensus*, through the notion of the subjective universality of aesthetic judgements.

Kant's subjective universality as a model for *sensus*-based philology

If the applicability of Hermann's a priori system of metrics to his textual critical practice is difficult to concede, the spirit of Hermann's philology should be considered, however, thoroughly Kantian. The influence of Kant, as shown above, reached far beyond Hermann's doctrine of metrics; for instance, the idea that the

critic must essentially possess an innate feeling for rhythm is best understood in relation to the Kantian definition of aesthetic judgements, which imply a subjective judgement defined as based on feeling alone. Such subjectivity in the Kantian sense is, however, a 'subjective universality', which becomes a crucial notion to evaluate Hermann's philological practice.

As we have seen so far, Hermann's *sensus*, the 'hidden and obscure'[136] faculty that should lead the philologist's judgement after the perception of a 'pleasant' rhythm, independently, at least at first, from *ratio*, is deeply embedded in the Kantian concept of aesthetic judgement. The idea that judgements of taste are based on pleasure was very common even before Kant, and in the first part of the *Critique of Judgement*, where Kant exposes his doctrine of aesthetics, he takes this point for granted. As a consequence, for Kant, beauty is to be considered dependent on a feeling of pleasure in the observer rather than a property of the beautiful object; this is why judgements of taste have subjective grounds and they are different from logical or theoretical judgements, which, instead, attribute a property to the object.[137] For Kant, judgements of taste are based on pleasure and on pleasure only: they are not based on concepts,[138] in the same way in which *ratio* is secondary to

[136] Cf. note 61.

[137] Cf. *CJ* §28, 5:264.

[138] Cf. ibidem §9, 219: 'that is *beautiful* which pleases universally without a concept.' We do not judge that something is beautiful on the basis of having applied concepts such as, e.g, squareness, the shapely, the colourful etc., but only on the basis of the feeling of pleasure generated by something. Pleasure itself is not based on concepts: even by knowing what kind of thing something is (e.g., as a botanist, one might know that a flower is the reproductive organ of a plant), in order to make an aesthetic judgement that knowledge must be left aside (e.g., the pleasure taken from a flower does not derive from the fact that the flower is identified as the reproductive organ of a plant, even if one knows that it is). Cf. *CJ*, §16.

*sensus* in Hermann's philological system.

Another fundamental feature of Kant's aesthetic judgements is that they are not only subjective but also universal.[139] In brief, Kant posits that everybody ought to believe that something is beautiful even if only one person deems it so. The universal feature of aesthetic judgements, Kant explains, is based on the fact that everybody is capable of aesthetic judgements. And this in turn rests upon a very important fundament of Kant's moral philosophy: if you ought to do something, then you are capable of doing something.[140] In the same way, if you ought to agree with a judgement of taste, then you can agree with that judgement of taste. Since judgements of taste are based on pleasure, if you are capable of agreeing with a judgement of taste then you are capable of taking pleasure in a given object. But then, also, if we believe that everyone is capable of taking pleasure in a certain object, we cannot be certain of it through experience, but we need to know that a priori, because that statement falls under the category of universality (everyone is capable of taking pleasure in a given object). Universality is a mark of a priori knowledge, because a priori knowledge is prior to any personal experience and therefore it must be present in anyone independently of their own experiences.[141]

Given the fact that Hermann follows Kant closely in his determination of the nature of beauty and the sublime with regard to literary genres, as well as in the foundation of his doctrine of metrics, it seems reasonable to conclude that, in the

[139] Cf. ibidem §8.
[140] Cf. *CPR*, A547–48/B575–76; A802–3/B830–31.
[141] Another way in which Kant proves that aesthetic judgements are universal is through another of their characteristics, disinterestedness. Hermann, too, openly speaks of beauty without gain, cf. Schramm (2010), 87-8.

same way, Hermann's notion of *sensus* also includes the same component of subjective universality. This is not only evident from the above-described mapping of Hermann's theory of tragedy onto Kant's *CJ*, but also from the type and tone of the comments that Hermann provides in his editorial and theoretical works. Indeed, for instance, Hermann considered himself one of the few capable of establishing the laws of metrics correctly, but nonetheless felt that his emendations ought to be universally true. In this sense we can understand well why Hermann felt free to make conjectures that went 'too far',[142] or to propose emendations on the basis of what sounded appropriate, or 'elegant', to him.[143] Indeed, many Hermannian *sensus*-based emendations are attributed to notions such as the one of *elegantia* or appropriateness, and yet presented as the clearly most accurate reading, often without much else to add, in lieu of proper rational justifications. At IT 670 [658], for example, Hermann defends his emendation in only a few words, defining it on the basis of its appropriateness – or the quality of being '*aptus*' – and 'elegance' (*elegantia*). It was, indeed, a successful emendation among later editors:[144]

Πυ. ἔφθης με μικρόν, ταὐτὰ δὲ φθάσας λέγεις

πλὴν ἕν· τὰ γὰρ τοι βασιλέων παθήματα 670

ἴσασι πάντες ὧν ἐπιστροφή τις ἦν.

[142] Cf. chapter one, note 7.
[143] Cf. also pp. 38-9.
[144] There are exceptions, such as Murray (1913) and Gregoire (1942).

670 τοι Hermann: τῶν L.

Pylades: You are not much ahead of me: I was about to say the same things you said, except this: all who move about in the world know what happens to kings.[145]

Hermann proposed to swap L's reading τῶν with the particle τοι: libri τὰ γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων παθήματα. Valde inutilis et inelegans est τῶν articulus. Pro eo τοι scripsi: aptissimae enim hic τοί γὰρ particulae.[146] To the notion of *elegantia* Hermann added the one of usefulness, deeming the article unnecessary, but it is clear that he wanted to support his argument with the idea that his emendation would attribute to the passage some kind of perfection that the reading of L lacks. Some modern editors agree with this view, and they do not offer explanations that go much beyond Hermann's either: 'the nuance conferred by the article (see on 12) is inappropriate in the context of a general statement', writes for example Kyriakou (2006).[147] They, too, employ wordings endowed with some vagueness, referring to a certain *je ne sais quoi* which hints at the reason behind an emendation more than justifying it through concrete and objective evidence. This happens, of course, not without exceptions – Parker (2016) *ad loc.*, for example, explains the reasons for preferring τοι and adds a metrical consideration. However, overall, presenting a reading as "simply better" than another is still a well-established practice today,

[145] Transl. by Potter (1938).
[146] Hermann (1833), 73.
[147] Kyriakou (2006), 224.

especially where scarcity of evidence about the text does not seem to allow much more than "*sensus*-based" conjectures or explanations.

Kantian philosophy exercised its profound influence on Hermann thusly: it did not influence Hermann's practice in the sense that it allowed him to derive with more certainty the laws of rhythm from the noumenal dimension of the a priori concepts, as he postulated in his theory of metrics; rather, it conditioned Hermann's attitude towards his role as a philologist and the value of his skills and opinions. Thus, Hermann's feeling for rhythm and sense of connection with the ancients – which, he thought, were the reasons for his extraordinary skills – found a greater justification stemming from the broader influence of Kantian philosophy. Evidence for this are passages such as the ones mentioned above,[148] where Hermann's chosen tone and language indicate a tendency, in his interpretative style, that converges towards if not, so-called, oracular philology at least towards a "philology of feeling".[149] Hermann's insistence on the necessity of acquiring in-depth familiarity with the author whom one wants to emend and with the ancient languages is the necessary prerequisite to enable the work of *sensus*, a form of inspired insight that takes priority over rational methods.[150] Like for Leo Spitzer, as described by Gurd (2015):

languages are products of creative and clear-minded human agency, the understanding of which comes about not through "mathematical demonstrability" but

[148] Cf. note 144.
[149] Cf. also Medda (2006), 70-1, on the lack of clear explanation for some of Hermann's emendations.
[150] Cf. above, note 61.

through "a feeling of inner evidence", which depends on the *philologist*'s experience and insight. Philology depends, in other words, on a singular, personal *habitus*; it is not a method but a matter of feeling.[151]

It is therefore evident that this *sensus*-based methodology is not peculiar to Hermann, but rather a philological trend that is timeless, perhaps inherent in the nature of classical philology. All editors apply, to some extent, a form of "subjective universality" in making judgements. What is peculiar to Hermann's laboratory is the Kantian colouring that this methodology overtly assumed, as it is ostensibly clear from the analysis of Hermann's theory of tragedy. It is not possible to remove Kantian philosophy from Hermann's hermeneutics, and the former absolves a generative function with regard to the latter, conferring to it a deeper meaning and scope than the literature has so far been inclined to recognise. Even though Hermann's theory of metrics and of tragedy was specifically based on the attempt to eliminate arbitrariness, Hermann essentially proposed arbitrariness in what he deemed a more scientifically acceptable guise, namely Kant's aesthetic judgements, with all their determining features.

This also explains why exceptions to metrical rules are possible in the Hermannian system. He tolerated, in fact, that the poet might even introduce deviations from the rhythmical laws on purpose, because appropriate poetical

[151] Gurd (2015), 5.

words can be more important than rhythm.[152] Because the philologist must recognise, first of all, the *virtus poetica* of a text, exceptions become admissible, but only if they are established by those who can think like the ancient poets did. Hermann even arrived at theorising that philology is the process of gaining freedom from rules to privilege *sensus*, because reason is fallible but *sensus* is not:

> Not only do we judge what is appropriate and beautiful with *sensus*, not with reason, but our *sensus*, which is governed by a certain natural intuition and does not depend on our judgement, is usually also less fallible than reason, which, either due to a fallacy of our arguments, or due to the stubbornness of opinions, is susceptible to many mistakes: thus, as *sensus* differs from the decrees of reason, it is better to investigate its causes and sources rather than ignoring its clamours. For what is there to be gained, if something is demonstrated to be beautiful with an argument, and yet the *sensus* rejects it all the way as lacking in beauty?[153]

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[152] Cf. Medda (2010), 235, on how Hermann's emendation of Aesch. *Pe*. 1038 δίαινε δίαινε πῆμα· πρὸς δόμους δ' ἴθι, chooses a specific *ordo verborum*, perceived as more poetic and in which the words are arranged *ad animum commovendum*, instead of preferring a transposition of words that would have allowed to avoid the second anapaest.

[153] Hermann, *De Epitritis Doriis* = *Op*. 3, 83-4: Non solum enim quid aptum pulcrumque sit, sensu, non ratione iudicamus, sed solet etiam sensus, qui naturali quodam instinctu regitur neque ex arbitrio nostro pendet, minus plerumque fallere, quam ratio, quae vel propter argumentorum fallaciam, vel propter opinionum pervicaciam multis obnoxia est erroribus: ut, sicubi discrepat sensus ab rationis decretis, caussas [sic] eius potius et fontes investigare, quam clamantem non audire praestet. Quid enim lucrere, si argumentis demonstres pulcra esse, quae tamen sensus ille usque ut non pulcra repudiet?
In *De usu antistrophicorum* (1810), iv-v, Hermann even indicated the danger of paying too much attention either to the regulae or to the recognition of the free creativity of the ancients: it is, he thought, a difficult balance, again remarking the subjective nature of his methods. Cf. Medda (2010), 239-40.

Indeed, this kind of Kantian spirit is evident throughout the entire work of Hermann, and guides it as a form of aesthetic hermeneutics,[154] whereas the more explicit appeal to Kant, with the features described in this chapter, dies out after the first decade of Hermann's activity, the one of his metrical treatises, while in the second phase of critical editions and the *Opuscula* the name of Kant appears much less.[155] This is, I think, due to the fact that Hermann himself had realised how his grounding of the laws of metrics on a priori concepts was not only unnecessary in his own practice, but had also exhausted its initial function to elevate metrics, through his claim upon Kantianism, to the status of a science; it had not raised particular enthusiasm among contemporary scholars either, probably because it was not clear what practical advantage such a theory would offer to the philologist. The Kantian spirit reflected in the subjective universality of Hermann's hermeneutical techniques, instead, continued to be present throughout the entirety of Hermann's work and career.

A probabilistic answer to a non-deterministic world

As mentioned above, the idea of being able to establish a connection with the ancient authors was not peculiar to Hermann – even though his Kantian foundations were – and for good reasons. The Saxon classicist and schoolmaster

[154] Cf. Gadamer's claim that aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics, Gadamer and Linge (1977), 95-104, and Makkreel (1996) and Martin (2018) for a historical analysis and contextualisation of Gadamer's claim.
[155] Cf. La Penna (1982), 438-9.

Karl Gottfried Siebelis (1796-1843), whom Van Bommel (2015) describes as a model of classical humanism, [156] exemplifies how large such an idea loomed across the whole German pedagogical spectrum – even when considering that, of course, programmatic goals and application differed between schools and academia. However, for Siebelis, too, the ultimate, highest level of interpretation was the 'spiritual understanding' (*geistiges Verständnis*), which recalls Hermann's portrait of the true philologist, analysed above,[157] as the one who is capable of acquiring a true connection with the ancients:

> [Siebelis] considered it the ultimate goal of the explanatory process to "penetrate into the spirit" of classical authors by becoming intimately familiar with their "individuality" and "peculiarity." Apart from thorough philological knowledge, this required "psychological insight:" only when one sympathetically put oneself in the position of the author in order to fully understand the particular choices he had made, could one ultimately succeed in capturing his spirit.[158]

If Boeckh's teacher Wolf might have considered Siebelis' rationalistic-utilitarian pedagogy in the framework of a *Bildung* based upon *verba* and not *realia*, such an idea of the way in which the philologist should seek to understand the

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[156] Siebelis was rector of the Gymnasium in Bautzen and played a leading role in the Saxon pedagogical scene for almost four decades. His views were widely shared among classical schoolteachers and they are presented by Van Bommel (2015) as representative of nineteenth-century classical humanism, cf. pp. 19-52. On nineteenth-century humanism cf. also Jaeger (1936) and Horstmann (1978).

[157] Cf. above, note 63.

[158] Cf. Van Bommel (2015), 45-6. The language used by Siebelis points to the interweaving of the classical tradition with biblical studies, which is beyond the scope of this analysis, however cf. Grafton et alii (1985), 18-26.

ancients was nonetheless attested among the so-called *Sachphilologen*.[159] Indeed – for reasons discussed in previous chapters –, K. O. Müller's judgement of Hermann was in this sense a severe one:

To justify oneself against Hermann, I believe, would not lead to any essential result. He does not have the talent to put himself in the mindset of others and to discern the consequence of it. One may try harder, but he will remain stubborn. But this talent of understanding others is the philological talent and, in a wider sense, the historical one; and so I think one can assert with reason that Hermann, with some eminent gifts, lacks exactly the main requirement of the philologist.[160]

Moreover, proponents of *Sachphilologie* distinguished between two types of philology, a lower and a higher form:

Both Wolf and Creuzer, too, were not only inspired by a humanistic perspective on the ancient world, but looked upon scientific philology as the only true access to it. This point of view is exemplified by Wolf's and Creuzer's position on textual criticism. Both scholars distinguished between a lower and a higher form of textual criticism. In its lower form, they argued, critical judgment was formed by deduction on the basis of "historical evidence," usually consisting of "handwritten documents." In its higher form, critical

[159] Cf. Wolf's notion of 'genius' in his *Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaft*, as the one who employs freedom over causal determination or rationality, cf. p. 23.

[160] Müller here was in conversation with Boeckh, offering him an opinion about how to receive Hermann's review of the *CIG*: 'Sich zu rechtfertigen gegen Hermann, glaube ich, würde zu keinem wesentlichen Resultat führen. Er hat gar nicht das Talent sich in die Denkweise Anderer hinein zu versetzen und deren Consequenz zu erkennen. Man mag sich die grösste Mühe darum geben, er bleibt rein verstockt. Dieses Talent, Andere zu begreigfen, ist aber gerade das philologische und in weiterem Kreise das historische; und so glaub' ich kann man mit Grund behaupten, dass Hermann, bei manchen eminenten Gaben, eigentlich das Hauptforderniss zum Philologen abgeht', quoted in Güthenke (2017), 91.

judgment must do without such palpable evidence and was formed entirely by "inner arguments," accessible to the initiate alone.[161]

Boeckh's hermeneutical ideas, as collected in his *Encyclopedia and Methodology of the Philological Sciences*, explicitly addressed the hermeneutical problem along the same lines, beginning from a categorisation of interpretation into different types, such as historical or individual. In his *Encyclopedia*, Boeckh provided an account of the methodology of philology, defining philology as essentially history, knowledge of the known (*Erkenntnis des Erkannten*),[162] and also providing the background for much of the hermeneutical theory of the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries.[163]

The literature concerned with Hermann has, so far, focused on the idea of a lack of well-developed hermeneutics, or even lack of hermeneutical thought altogether, sometimes seen in opposition to the more developed and well-rounded hermeneutical thinking posited by Boeckh's philology.[164] Here, after having shown how Hermann's aesthetics assumed the features of a hermeneutical theory, which also guided his practice, I would like to focus on the similarities between Hermann's aesthetical hermeneutics and Boeckh's, rather than on what divides them. I would like to show how, despite reaching different conclusions, Hermann and Boeckh shared in a *sensus*-based methodology that, as mentioned above, was

[161] Van Bommel (2015), 83-4. Cf. Wolf (1807), 40, 106 and Creuzer (1807), 38-9.
[162] Cf. Horstmann (2010).
[163] On Boeckh's *Encyclopedia* and hermeneutics cf. Güthenke (2017); Horstmann (1992, 1998); Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, in particular, have considered Boeckh's hermeneutics as ahead of its time, cf. Dostal (2016), 451, 456.
[164] On Hermann cf. Schramm (2010), 115-9; on Boeckh cf. Thouard (2013); on Boeckh's hermeneutics versus Hermann's cf. Poiss (2010), 153-160.

typical of their time, and has also remained typical in philology as much as in science.

First, I would like to consider how the Wolfian notion of *Altherthumswissenschaft*, embraced by Boeckh, responded to the wish of turning philology into a science, a goal shared by Hermann through the emphasis on language, as analysed in chapter four, and particularly evident in the theory of metrics and tragedy detailed above. Then, I will look at Boeckh's concepts of congeniality and the problem of endless approximation,[165] and at how they can be mapped onto Hermann's notion of *sensus* and the problem of gaining access to a priori principles. Finally, I will show how both their hermeneutics were defined by a contention with the challenge represented by scarcity of data, and how they both ultimately offered probabilistic answers, one characterised by scepticism towards the accuracy of probabilistic interpretations (Boeckh's) and one fully at ease with the concept of uncertainty (Hermann's).

Hermann's effort to root his theory in Kantianism responded, as seen above, to his will to give solid, objective foundations to his philology. He subscribed to the view, widespread among classicists from the end of the eighteenth century, that philology should look more like a science, in order to keep up with the times in which the hard sciences were starting to threaten a certain primacy over the so-called *schöne Wissenschaften*, of which the study of ancient literature was a part.[166] Kant's philosophy had configured itself vastly, although not entirely, as a response

[165] Cf. Boeckh (1877), 15, and Poiss (2010), 155.
[166] Cf. Van Bommel (2015 ), 71-72, 77-78.

to Newtonian ideas, engaging with the physical and mathematical sciences in an effort to demonstrate how philosophy need not be made redundant by science.[167] The meaning of Hermann's claim on Kantianism should be understood in this sense, and not as separate from Wolf's concept of *Alterthumswissenschaft*. The concept of a 'science of antiquity' entailed a systematic taxonomy and ordering of the disciplines dealing with antiquity, so that they could form a systematic whole, and its model were the *genauere Wissenschaften*, the "more exact" sciences.[168] With regard to such an endeavour, Kant was Wolf's model to the point that the latter had earned the reputation of being the 'Kant of philology'.[169] Hence, the whole "new" concept of the study of antiquity, with its conceptualisation of antiquity as a science, responded from the beginning to a motive that was in this sense a Kantian one, just as much as Hermann's own ideal of philology did.

Such was the frame of reference for Boeckh's philology, and herein rested his ideas about authorship and access to antiquity, which are presented in the *Encyclopedia* in the guise of a complex entanglement of hermeneutical threads, through which the philologist must systematically go in order to grasp the ultimate meaning of the text. It is characteristic of post-Kantian philosophy that the fact is no longer regarded as a mere fact, but as the product of an action, 'a deception in the sense of Fichte.'[170] Boeckh hinted at the existence of an objective meaning for words, to be taken as a reference point; however, he emphasised that a psychological

[167] Cf. Smith (2017), on Kant's criticism of Newton, because the latter had not provided "metaphysical foundations" for science.
[168] Cf. Wolf (1807), 9, 40; Van Bommel (2015), 77-78.
[169] Cf. Van Bommel (2015), 77-78.
[170] Cf. Thouard (2013), 119.

stratum is always superimposed on reality, so that facts, such as words and their objective meaning, are always filtered by the subjective interpretation of the author of a literary work. In Boeckh's view, the author of a text selects words according to his own individuality, and even though he has an idea of what the (supposedly) objective meaning of words is, he still has the power to influence semantic structures, by choosing words and putting them together in a way that expresses his own nature, experiences and conditions of his spirit.[171] The task of the philologist, thus, is to identify the individuality of the author through what Boeckh called 'individual interpretation', which involved an explanation of compositional methods and an accurate scrutiny of single linguistic elements according to their individual meaning, that is the meaning they assumed for their author.

At the same time, however, Boeckh generated a sort of short-circuit, by saying that the meaning in itself of a word is not attainable if we do not attend to the individual interpretation first. Indeed, when it comes to practice, Boeckh observed that the philologist encounters a vicious cycle: the individuality of the author cannot but be reconstructed 'a posteriori', from what we read, but at the same time we do not have access to the meaning of the words without employing the 'individual' interpretation of the text, which implies a sense of the author's personality. The philologist, thus, has to appeal to exegetical methods that need to be based on a form of intuition, that is to say, that very same "feeling" for the individuality of the author that guided Hermann's interpretation. Indeed, it follows

[171] Cf. Boeckh (1877), 125.

from this type of synchronic, intuitive connection, which must be established with the ancient author, that evidently not any philologist can emend any author, but it takes a "special" type of philologists, one that, like Hermann's ideal critic, has an innate feeling for rhythm, and thus for interpretation.

As much as the role of *sensus* in Hermann's philology answered, in an 'obscure and hidden way', the question of how to derive a priori concepts through the notion of subjective universality, similarly, Boeckh's hermeneutical problem was solved by means of a technique close to the Hermannian notion of *sensus*, namely the idea of a *Geist* or λόγος to be rediscovered in antiquity. Boeckh's hermeneutical short-circuit, otherwise, would not have been able to offer practical philological solutions, it would have been useless for the critic, [172] in the same way in which, as seen above, without *sensus* Hermann's doctrine of a priori principles was essentially devoid of practical philological applications, and little more than a formality.[173]

Boeckh's employment of the concept of λόγος was perceived as the only solution to a problem which essentially configured itself as the establishment and recreation of an author's cognitive process. Only a perfect prior knowledge of the personality of the author would allow a perfect understanding of what he meant to say, to the point that Boeckh had to conclude that, if such knowledge were possible,

[172] Some critics have already noted, for Boeckh, how unpractical this speculative structure borrowed from idealistic philosophy is for the purposes of philology (cf. Thouard (2013), 120-22). Similarly, for Hermann, I have shown above how, in the way that Hermann theorises the foundation of knowledge on a priori principles, such theoretical structure in fact remains fundamentally unsuited to the making of philological emendations.

[173] Granted that Hermann's project of systematising metrics endowed future scholars with some ground-breaking work in terms of providing an array of metrical forms to use for their philological work, as I argued above the Kantian framework posited by Hermann for his work on metrics was, in all effects, only a formality, as far as his practice and investigation of metrics were concerned.

we would even be able to envision what the writer would think in any possible given circumstance.[174] Thus Boeckh's problem is formulated as an issue concerning a deterministic versus a probabilistic world – not in the sense that in the deterministic world there would be absolutely no individual agency, but at least in the approximate sense that, if the philologist could know every single thought of the ancient authors, there would be no room for mistakes in his emendatory work. Not only does Boeckh's formulation of this conundrum map perfectly onto the Hermannian concern to derive laws of metrics from the category of causality and to establish knowledge through a priori concepts, so as to deterministically harvest philological judgements;[175] but such interpretation of the problem was also on the mind of the scientists of the time.

Pierre-Simone Laplace (1749-1827) contended with the same idea of the impossibility of a deterministic world through the famous thought experiment, proposed in 1814, of an imaginary entity (later known as 'Laplace's demon') who would have such a vast intelligence that he would know literally all there is to know about the world, the position and velocity of every particle of matter in the cosmos, who knew all laws of physics and had infinite computing power. Only that intelligence could predict the future and reconstruct the past with perfect accuracy:

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[174] Cf. Boeckh (1877), 125: 'Die individuelle Interpretation würde vollkommen sein, wenn man die Individualität des Sprechenden so vollkommen nachzuconstruiren vermöchte, dass man vor der Betrachtung seiner Rede wüsste, wie er jeden Gegenstand anschaut. Dann könnte man bestimmen, was er in jedem Falle sagen musste.'

[175] The gap between theory of ontology (determinism) and theory of epistemology (a priori knowledge) should be filled by remembering that Hermann's theory of a priori knowledge necessarily relied, like Kant's, on an idea of biological continuity between human beings. Hermann's theory of knowledge by necessity draws conclusions that directly relate to reality and being – the nature of the philologist and not only the nature of his faculty of knowledge.

We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which would comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it – an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis – it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.[176]

Laplace's essay was a summa of the principles and general results of his theory of probability. He also discovered, applied, and promoted the theorem of Thomas Bayes (1701-1761), a mathematical formula that allows one to use the rules of probability theory. What, since the 1950s, has gone under the name of Bayesian probability is the name given to calculations of probability based on the expression of an initial judgement, a guess based on epistemic confidence and on the strength of one's belief towards something that must be measured statistically.[177] This approach, compared to non-Bayesian or so-called frequentist statistics, comes with the advantage that it allows the application of probability to all sorts of propositions, rather than just those that belong to a specific reference class, or reference data sample. This means that if we wanted to perform statistical calculations on a given population, e.g. on data collected from a group of people between 20 and 22 years old, Bayesian statistics would allow us to make inferences that fall outside the given reference class, e.g. to make inferences about people who

[176] Laplace (1902), 4; on Laplace and his demon cf. Kožnjak (2015) and van Strien (2014).
[177] Cf. Stigler (1986), 97–98, 131.

are younger or older than the ones that the data-set describes, something that is not possible to achieve through frequentist statistics and without the aid of an initial statement of belief, or an initial, *sensus*-based judgement.

The problem posed by Boeckh had to do with the impossibility of a sort of determinism in the real world. This is due to the lack of data inherent in the discipline of classical philology, and also the impossibility of ever replicating the mental conditions under which a given ancient author composed a text, so that the philologist can never be sure to have achieved a definitive truth. Yet, Hermann and Boeckh proposed two, similar, solutions which remained fundamentally probabilistic. Paradoxically, as Baysian statistics shows, in philology as much as in science a fully probabilistic *sensus*-based technique, a hermeneutics based on a sense of congeniality, on common sense, on a 'hidden and obscure' *je ne sais quoi* constitutes the closest approximation to a quasi-deterministic world, in which the ancients' thoughts could be reconstructed with absolute certainty. Through these means the philologist, like the Bayesian statistician, assigns probability to different possibilities by selecting one reading, deemed the one with the highest degree of probability, and reporting less probable readings in the *apparatus* or commentary. A simple step as the initial definition of a *sensus*-based judgement allows in statistics to achieve more accurate calculations than we would if we had all the information that Laplace's demon had. Similarly, in classical philology the solution of editorial problems can be achieved through the exercise of a quality that eludes rationality.

Both Hermann and Boeckh, in a similar way, contended with the problem of grounding what we might call 'philological values' into facts, as they both tried to define the most appropriate hermeneutical tools and establish what makes a truly virtuous philologist. They both did so by means of an irrational, or more-than-rational element, and only the outcome of their intellectual manoeuvres was different. Indeed, like other historians of his age, Boeckh thought that our ability to understand ancient texts was only possible when it was congenial to the editor's mind,[178] defining hermeneutics originally by the concept of *Congenialität* (Gorgias's ὅμοιος ὅμοιον γινώσκει), according to which the interpreter does not have to repeat the original creative process realised by the author of a text, but he has to reproduce it through a new creative process. Boeckh applies a probabilistic solution to overcome a non-deterministic situation, but ultimately remains sceptical of the possibility of ever achieving the truth.[179] Boeckh's faith in his famous *Erkenntnis des Erkannten* was limited, and even though he advocated the use of anagnorisis, or recognition, as a function of an intelligible content, a λόγος permeating the works of the ancients,[180] he ultimately remained trapped in the idea of an endless approximation to the truth.

Hermann's appeal to Kantian philosophy and to the notion of the a priori structure of the mind, on the other hand, essentially relied on a sense of not only

[178] Johann Gustav Droysen also 'considered research to be a fundamental and exhaustive demand, our ability to understand the writings of the past being possible because it is congenial to our minds', Moore (2011), 164. Cf. also Hackel (2006), 96-99.
[179] Cf. Güthenke (2017), 95: 'Boeckh steht (noch) in einer Welt, in der Verstehen grundsätzlich möglich, aber durch Kombination idealistischer und positivistisch empirischer Tendenzen reflektiert und nicht immer lösbar ist.'
[180] Cf. Thouard (2013), 120 ff.

spiritual, but also biological continuity between the ancients and the moderns, whose common denominator lay in the faculty of the mind to interpret facts through its immutable, or biologically determined, structure. Such commonality represented a key for the understanding of the ancients, and even if it required an element of irrationality to bring the two together, it still worked as a probabilistic antidote perceived, differently from Boeckh, as a very reliable instrument which discounted exactness in order to achieve a sufficient proximity to the truth. In this sense, the objective limits of knowledge evoked in Hermann's *nesciendi ars et scientia* were not so much the limits of the possibility of accessing the noumenal level of truth, but had to do with the scarcity of empirical evidence that characterises classical philology and the human experience.

## Conclusions

This chapter has investigated Hermann's Kantianism, showing how it was a defining feature of Hermann's hermeneutics arguably more than of his theory of metrics, and in particular how Hermann's aesthetics constituted a form of hermeneutics.

First I have examined the Kantian terms in which Hermann described his theory of metrics, as based on the a priori concepts of time and space and the category of causality, showing how this operation entailed a claim of necessity in the metrical conclusions that the Hermannian philologist can reach.

I have underlined how metrics was really an object of special interest for Hermann, first of all because many of his emendations were based on metrics, both in a good and a bad sense: often Hermann's focus was on restoring texts starting from the emendation of metrical structures, wherever Hermann's predecessors had failed to do so; at the same time, this method also imposed a certain rigidity in the necessity of applying "rules" of metrics, as in some cases of restoration of strophic responsion in the tragic parodos. Additionally, metrics truly is the place where all the threads come together in Hermannian philology, because the theoretical principles that Hermann posited for metrics extended far beyond the limits of his metrical theory and indeed encompassed his theory of interpretation.

I have shown how this is true in two ways. First, because the Kantian principles that Hermann posited for his metrics seem, from a closer analysis, essentially useless in actually facilitating the work of the philologist; the critic might, like Hermann did, rely on his "ear for rhythm" in emending metrics, but this does not require the Kantian structure that Hermann built around his metrics. Second, because core principles that emerge in Hermann's theory of metrics end up being fundamental in his hermeneutics, and, furthermore, coincide with the principles underlying his theory of tragedy, aesthetics and interpretation.

While Hermann established the modern custom of understanding metrics as a fundamental part of the work of the critic, the Kantian foundations that he posited for his theory of metrics do not seem to create any philological advantages when it comes to emendation, if compared to what can be achieved without recurring to the

notion of a priori concepts. The significance of the a priori grounding of Hermann's theory should, instead, be traced in the wish to use Kant to legitimise his own science of metrics, as well as in the broader consequences that the appeal to Kantianism had for Hermann's philology.

By examining some of Hermann's theoretical writings which do not deal with metrics, such as *De poeseos generibus*, I have demonstrated how Hermann used Kantian philosophy as the basis for his theory of tragedy and aesthetics, and therefore how Kantianism permeated Hermann's thought as a whole, rather than just his metrical thought. In particular, Hermann's Kantian conception of the beautiful and the sublime is behind the two pillars of Hermann's hermeneutics, *ratio* and *sensus*. The chapter has explored these two cornerstones of Hermannian philology, analysing them critically in their precise meaning in the context of Hermann's Kantian readings and thinking.

In particular, I have shown how the model that Hermann counterposes to the a posteriori one of the British scholar Porson is not so much an a priori model, in practice, but it is a *sensus*-based model. To replace the unsure examination of texts carried out by Porson, Hermann's method proposed a different kind of uncertainty, which, I argued, should be best understood under the notion of Kant's subjective universality.

Hermann's *sensus*-based philology, with his Kantian colouring, was his distinctive method to reconstruct antiquity, but it was also a necessarily probabilistic method, comparable to the one of other philologists, like Boeckh, or

even contemporary scientists. I have compared Hermann's aesthetic-hermeneutical system with Boeckh's, and, against the widespread idea in the literature that Hermann's thought was devoid of hermeneutical depth, I have focused on the overlap between the theoretical stock of the two philologists. This is not to imply that Hermann's actual theoretical output concerning hermeneutics was comparable to Boeckh's, but to underline that much of Hermann's hermeneutical thought remains traceable throughout his theoretical writings, like those concerning metrics and *De poeseos generibus*, and his commentaries. As a consequence, *De officio interpretis* should no longer be considered the only or primary place where to trace Hermann's hermeneutical thought. By showing how both Hermann and Boeckh operated within a framework of philology increasingly intended as a science, and how they both proposed a notion of *sensus* or congeniality to interpret the ancients, which they believe to be the only possible form of access to the truth of the ancient world, I have demonstrated how Hermann's hermeneutical methodology was a typical expression of probabilistic thinking.

Hermann and Boeckh contended in similar ways with the notion of a non-deterministic world, a problem which will never stop afflicting classical philology and against which they advanced more or less optimistic answers. In showing how the essence of Boeckh's idea of philology as *Erkenntnis des Erkannten* is not far at all from Hermann's *sensus*-based philology, I hope to have demonstrated that we would be mistaken in postulating a lack of complexity, or lack altogether, of a hermeneutical thought in Hermann's philology. Indeed, it is mostly *sub specie*

*scientiae hermeneuticae* that Hermann's Kantianism should be considered and appreciated.

# Conclusions

This research has considered the scholarship of Gottfried Hermann from multiple points of view and, in so doing, has demonstrated the complex and valuable nature of Hermann as a subject of scholarly interest; it has also shown how the label of *Wortphilologie,* traditionally attributed to Hermann, does not hold under close investigation of its meaning and purposes. Indeed, the thesis has demonstrated how the only way in which it would make sense to talk about *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie* is with reference to the social and biographical dynamics at the beginning of nineteenth-century Germany, in the academic environments of Hermann and Boeckh.

An in-depth analysis of Hermann's persona and academic context in Leipzig has allowed us to consider his dispute with Boeckh with close attention to primary sources. I have provided evidence of the extraordinary fame that Hermann enjoyed, in and outside Germany, as a prominent member of the intellectual community of his time; I have shown how his characterisation as a 'knight', in the narratives about his life, brought about a process of embodiment of the spirit of the German nation in the image of the scholar, profiling him as a 'hero of thought'.

I have then stressed the link between Hermann's ascension to stardom, begun very early, already at the end of the eighteenth century, and his works on metrics, which specifically provided the basis for Hermann's self-fashioning as the founder of a science of metrics. The achievement of such status probably

contributed to Hermann's desire to create a school 'that he could really call his own'. I have shown how, indeed, Hermann created a school, working throughout his life to maintain a network of friendships among those who had been members of the Greek Society or his seminar in Leipzig. On this basis, I have shown how the dispute had a very prominent social dimension, and matters of social, intellectual and academic status came to be involved in it and shaped its direction. In particular, Hermann's status was closely interwoven with his metrical work, which he had represented as a pioneering venture in the making of a science. In turn, Hermann's scholarly persona, and its *grandeur*, played a role in his grounding of metrics in the scientific rigour of Kantianism, and consequently in the dispute itself.

Among the numerous quarrels which Hermann carried on with other scholars of his time, two were played out on the field of metrics – the first against Richard Porson, in opposition to whom Hermann built his own system of a priori derived metrical laws; the second with Boeckh, on Pindaric metrics. I have analysed some of the methodological tools adopted by Hermann and Boeckh during their debate about metrics, following closely the development of their positions about the problem of dactylo-epitrites. There I have shown how Hermann's methods eluded the concept of attention to the *minutiae* of language, in this case associated with metrics, to turn towards solutions that valued approximation rather than perfect understanding. Thus, in chapter three the themes analysed in chapter five have been anticipated and considered from the viewpoint of a close reading of Hermann's and Boeckh's texts. Showing how the dialogue between Hermann and

Boeckh was characterised by mockery and the exchange of sharp words to the detriment of each other, I have demonstrated that the dispute was not generated, nor exclusively attached to the occasion of Boeckh's *CGI*. In so doing, I have also undermined the idea that the dispute originated in Hermann's negative reaction to an eminently *sachphilological* project, drawing attention to how both Hermann's and Boeckh's intellectual concerns could actually be inscribed within the idea of a programmatic development of a science of antiquity. *Wortphilologie* and *Sachphilologie* assume thus the guise of empty categories, rejected by contemporaries (Wolf, as shown in the introduction) and the protagonists of the dispute themselves (Hermann, as evidenced in chapter four).

If a socio-biographical element, concerning the monopoly over the fields of metrics and Greek tragedy, should be considered at the origins of the dispute, the latter, in turn, shaped later critics' judgements of Hermann. This has especially impacted the appreciation of his hermeneutics. In particular, the negative reading of Hermann as a representative of an old-fashioned type of philology has encouraged the opinion that his thought was devoid of hermeneutical depth. If this is partly due to the fact that Hermann did not leave any writing programmatically dedicated to the illustration of his philosophy of philology, this circumstance does not prevent us from inferring an account of his hermeneutics from his other theoretical works and philological practice. I have discussed, in chapter one, how *De officio interpretis* was meant, first of all, as a pedagogical treatise, and how the literature has been taking it as a manifesto of Hermann's philology and has used it to foster the image of a

scholar uniquely interested in grammar. However, I have demonstrated that, by looking at other Hermannian writings such as his books about metrics and poetry, in addition to his critical editions, it is possible to restore a better picture of Hermann's hermeneutical thought, and specifically a form of aesthetical hermeneutic based on Kantian philosophy. I have shown how the type of Kantianism that Hermann, during the first decades of his activity, had claimed as a guiding principle for his theory was essentially only a "Kantianism of surface", because it is not reflected in Hermann's practice, other than serving as an inspiring principle to collect and systematise metrical forms. At the same time, I have proposed a new reading of Kant's influence on Hermann, one that actually finds confirmation in his *sensus*-based philology. In the end, I have reconciled Hermann's aesthetical hermeneutics with some aspects of Boeckh's own hermeneutical thought. This should not be taken to suggest that Hermann cannot be considered in his own terms, independently from Boeckh, but only as a first step in what I hope will be a series of efforts dedicated to the investigation of Hermann's hermeneutics. The comparison with Boeckh is inherent in the nature of this work, which intended to keep the dispute as a background structure, but it has also, uncharacteristically, been used to point to the similarities rather than the differences between the two, exploiting, in a way, the better reputation which Boeckh enjoys among nineteenth-century intellectual history scholars. One could say that Hermann was owed this much.

This close link between Hermann and Boeckh is partly why, throughout the thesis, I have looked at Hermann through, so to speak, a Boeckhian lens: first historically, then philosophically – history and philosophy being the two fundamental components of philology in Boeckh's conceptualisation of the discipline. This was made even more intriguing by the fact that the two scholars cannot *strictly* be compared – Boeckh's work on tragedy is limited and very different from Hermann's, and while for Boeckh we find a comprehensive collection of theoretical thoughts, in the *Encyclopedia*, Hermann's theoretical work is very much interwoven with the concreteness of his editorial practice. Therefore, I have used the oppositions between the two to talk about philology and what philology is, insisting on creating a nuanced area where the two subjects overlap.

Ultimately, my analysis has found that the dispute constitutes a red herring, which has been used throughout the centuries as a simplistic, convenient way to think about philology. By focusing on the complexities rather than on the generalities, and by taking a journey to Hermann's laboratory, my research has taken a broad outlook on classical philology, and on the questions which, far from belonging to Hermann's time only, are still a living demon for today's scholarship. Therein, if nowhere else, lies the importance of studying the crucial time that the early nineteenth century was for philology, and I hope the thesis has shown why Hermann deserves a place among such studies.

# Reference Abbreviations

*CJ*= Kant (1790)

*Commentatio*= Heyne and Hermann (1819)

*CPR*= Kant (1781/1787)

*De arte poetica*= Hermann (1802)

*De metris*= Hermann (1796)

*De officio interpretis* = Hermann (1835)

*EDM*= Hermann (1816)

*Kl. Schr.* (vol. 2, 3, 4, 7)= Boeckh (1859, 1866, 1874, 1872)

*Op./ Opuscula* (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)= Hermann (1827, 1827a, 1828, 1831, 1834, 1835, 1839, 1877)

*TrGF*= Radt (1999)

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