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ABSTRACT

Abstract

This thesis is a study of the organisations, behaviour and attitudes of a group of parliamentarians, conventionally described as the "Right", between 1905 and 1919. The Right is defined as comprising those deputies and senators who belonged to parliamentary groups which were almost united in opposing the law of Separation of the Churches and the State. It is pointed out in the Introduction that categories, suggested by writers such as Goguel, Rémond and Thibaudet, which attempt to describe more meaningfully the divisions in French politics are not particularly useful for the purposes of this study.

Members of the Right were, before the passing of the law of Separation, in varying degrees conservative on the religious issue. They were united in opposition to the ministries of the years 1899 to 1906. They shared the same antipathies but lacked a positive aim. The Right could be described as a coalition as long as a bond of mutual sympathy lasted. After 1905 it rapidly disappeared.

Section 1 contains a description of the electoral and parliamentary organisations of the Right and the effects upon them of four general elections. Those groups, which had no representatives in parliament, the most celebrated being the Ligue de l'Action Française, are outside the scope of this

study. The parliamentary and electoral organisations were weak, divided and undemocratic. In 1905 most of them were of recent formation. They were formed during a period when there was a sharp division in French politics. The blurring of this division and successive electoral defeats took much of the life out of them.

Only the electoral organisations had formal constitutions and these provide useful illustrations of the nature of the organisations. They were oligarchic and their importance depended on the stature of their leaders. At elections they approved rather than sponsored candidates. The parliamentary groups met infrequently and had no control over their members. But group membership is a useful guide to the political tendencies of deputés. The Senate groups became, after 1906, more eclectic and therefore a less useful guide to the opinions of their members.

The major national issue of the election campaign of 1906 - the religious question - separated the Right from all other political tendencies. In 1910 the three main issues - the question scolaire, income tax and proportional representation - were confused and submerged by discussions about Briand and his policy of apaisement. On the main issues in 1914 - the Three Years Law and proportional representation (the question scolaire and income tax were of lesser importance) - the attitudes of the Right were shared by men

of other political tendencies. The major issue of 1919, anti-socialism, provided common ground for all members of the Right and the Centre. Thus between 1905 and 1919 the Right became progressively less isolated in election campaigns.

In Section II those issues on which the Right is usually thought to have distinctive views are examined. The most obvious of these is the clerical question. The difference of opinion within the Right on this question and the decline in its parliamentary importance are described. The formation of the bloc national marks the symbolic end to the isolation of the Right on the religious issue. It lived on as a divisive factor in politics but it no longer had the same primary importance that it possessed in 1905.

On the constitutional question the Right was divided within itself as well as from its opponents. Republican, plebiscitary, corporative, bonapartist and monarchist ideas were defended by different sections. Since neither monarchist restoration nor major constitutional revision was a serious possibility during this period, constitutional discussion was academic. But the ideas of members of the Right usefully illustrate the way they approached basic political problems.

Under the heading "External Affairs" the views of the Right on colonial and foreign affairs are considered. Apart

from a certain amount of polemical extremism and hints of racialism, the views of the Right varied in degree and not in kind from those of the Centre. The nationalists, who were noisy patriots, were more concerned about the enemy within than the enemy without. Few paid much attention to the practical difficulties which occured in the daily conduct of affairs.

In Section 111 a diversity of subjects are treated under the general heading of "Interest". No group had a monopoly of deputies engaged in a particular activity. General patterns of personal interests emerge but they give no precise indication of individual political views and behaviour. The behaviour of the groups of the Right towards the ministries is described as this forms a background to (although it was not directly related to) discussions on social and financial measures. It also illustrates the evolution of the parliamentary tactics of the Right from disapproval of all anticlerical ministries to obvious preference for some ministries and eventually during the First World War, to support for governments.

Some deputies and senators of the Right expressed views on the way in which society should be organised and on possible methods of resolving social discord. These are examined as an introduction to the reactions of the Right

to trade unions and strikes. The attitude of the Right on the social question became progressively more negative. The preservation of the status quo became the primary consideration. The social and financial reforms, proposed by the Left to redistribute power and wealth within the community, were opposed by the Right. But there were divisions within the Right on the lengths to which opposition should be carried. Moreover the Right was never isolated in its opposition to these measures. The reason why the bills nationalising the Western railway, introducing old age pensions and income tax were delayed for so long was opposition in the Centre rather than on the Right of the Chamber and Senate. The passing of these bills and their acceptance by public opinion had a somewhat similar effect to the passing of the law of Separation. It removed them from public discussion and they lost their political importance.

The thread running through the period 1905 to 1919 is the growing realisation by most of the Right that they had much in common with the Centre. There was something of a realignment in parliament and the country, with socialism replacing clericalism as the great divisive force. This realignment should not be overstressed. In parliament the most significant feature about the Right as a whole was not their shared beliefs and common tactics (which were minimal)

but the fact that they were all in some way left out of the regime. Even in the Chambre bleu horizon there was a minority on the Right of the Chamber, as large as the opposition of the Right at the end of 1906, which was hardly represented in the cabinets of 1919 to 1924.

More space is given to describing opinions rather than activities because the important initiatives taken by members of the Right were very few in number and present no difficulties.

For most of the period the Right was a relatively passive opposition. External circumstances moulded attitudes and organisations. These circumstances are mentioned only briefly. The most important were: the break up of the bloc des gauches after 1905 and the consequent socialist opposition to ministries between 1906 and 1914; the completion, before 1914, of the radical social and financial programme which converted most of the radicals into a conservative element in French politics; the rivalry between Briand and Caillaux; the growing threat of war, the decline of anti-militarist sentiment on the Left, the war itself and the "authoritarian" premiership of Clemenceau. Government policy and bills on clerical, social and financial policy are mentioned only in order to place the statements of the Right in their context. The extra-

parliamentary Right, which had much intellectual influence, has been ignored as far as possible,

I have also avoided covering the same ground as other research workers on the Separation of the Churches and the State, the nationalist revival, the Three Years law, the agitation for proportional representation and the Presidency of Poincaré. I have included such discussion and supplementary information which seemed necessary to the understanding of the positions of the Right.

The public positions and statements of members of the Right form the basis of the thesis. These are found in parliamentary documents, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets and miscellaneous writings of the period. An extensive search for corroborative evidence in private documents has produced some results. But the depredations of two world wars have wrought havoc with the collections of private papers of politicians. This, together with the reticence of conservative Frenchmen about the affairs of their fathers or grandfathers, has restricted to five the number of manuscript sources which are both valuable and available.

THE PARLIAMENTARY RIGHT

IN FRANCE 1905-1919

D. Phil. Thesis Hilary Term 1961

Submitted by Malcolm Anderson of University College.

Preface

Although much academic attention has been directed towards the ideas of the intellectuals of the Right who became famous during and after the Dreyfus Affair, the opinions and behaviour of members of the parliamentary Right have not been subjected to an equivalent examination. This study is intended to fill the gap for the period from 1905 to 1919.

A number of important monographs have been written which impinge on the history of the parliamentary Right during this period. These are: E.A. Brown, The French Parties and the Electoral Law. Thesis Columbia 1956; M.J.M. Larkin, French Catholics and the Separation of the Churches and the State, 1902-1906. Thesis Cambridge 1958; G. Michon, La Préparation à la guerre. 1935[1]; E. Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905-1914. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1959; and G. Wright, Poincaré and the French Presidency. Stanford 1942. Also, G. Bonnefous and E. Bonnefous, L'Histoire politique de la Troisième République. Vols. I-III. 1956-1959, although inaccurate in detail, provides a useful digest of the parliamentary record of the period. This thesis owes much to these writers although no attempt has been made to cover the same ground.

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1. All works cited are published in Paris unless otherwise stated.

I wish to thank, in particular, Monsieur Denys Cochin, Monsieur le colonel Philippe d'Elissagaray, and S.E. Adrien Thierry who communicated private documents to me and Monsieur Victor Bucaille who gave me verbal information. I also wish to thank all those, in England and France who have discussed this study with me. I owe the greatest debt to my supervisor, Mr. P.M. Williams, who has given invaluable advice and assistance in all stages of the preparation of the thesis.

Manchester, January, 1961.

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Introduction

This study is concerned with the parliamentary Right from the passing of the law of Separation until the victory of the bloc national in the elections of 1919. The Right is defined as members of those groups which were united or almost united in opposing the law of Separation of the Churches and the State in December, 1905. It is necessary to qualify a traditional definition of the Right as the clerical party in order to include certain progressistes and nationalists[1] who voted for the law. It is unreasonable to exclude these from the Right on the evidence of one vote, especially as other members of the groups to which they belonged had at one time been anticlericals. The Right is not regarded crudely as the clerical party. Men who came down on different sides of the great symbolical issue of the Separation of Church and State were not necessarily in fundamental opposition to one another.

The purpose of this somewhat arbitrary definition[2] is to

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1. The terms progressiste and nationalist are generic - a progressiste could belong to either or both the Union Républicaine and the Groupe Républicain Progressiste or like Benoist between 1905 and 1910 could be an Independent. On the other hand Progressiste, Liberal and Nationalist refer to members of the groups Progressiste, Action Libérale and Nationaliste. After 1910 the unorganised Independents became the Groupe des Indépendants.

2. At the time the definition was acceptable to government supporters. The socialists tended to regard the Right as being more extensive. The parliamentary record described the progressistes as the Centre. The progressistes asserted that "tous les républicains sont forcément de gauche." La République Française, 17th May, 1908.

provide a short-hand term to describe a collection of groups whose members felt, at the beginning of the period, that a bond of sympathy linked their groups. In practice the Right in 1905 was a loose coalition with no national electoral organisation and the attempt at inter-group co-operation in the Chamber did not take root.

More precise and sophisticated definitions would have a general validity but are not particularly useful for the study of parliamentary politics. An explanation, on marxist lines, of the divisions in politics as the result of the conflict of class interests meets with the immediate difficulty that there was no precise correlation between social class or material interests and political attitudes and behaviour. To attempt to prove a subjective identification with class interests, when no material link existed, would lead us from an historical analysis into a never never land of speculation. There were broad associations of social groups with political movements. The marxist can argue that the French <u>bourgeoisie</u> was numerically large, deeply entrenched and had many different interests and as a result could afford the luxury of political division. But the form which these divisions took can be explained only in terms of political traditions and personal psychology.

Two academic attempts to provide frames of reference for

the political divisions during the Third Republic are illuminating. M. François Goguel's thesis[1] that the fundamental split was between the party of l'ordre établi and the party of mouvement is a useful formulation. On any single issue there was always a coalition in favour of change and another which preferred the existing situation to the possible alternative. But, as M. Goguel admits, these coalitions varied from issue to issue. It is clear that this simple division does not provide an explanation of the complexity of political positions and attitudes - it effectively throws into relief this complexity. The differences within any coalition in favour of preserving the established order or of change were profound and serious. There was, for example, in 1905 a great difference in tactics, temperament and immediate political interest between the activist of the extreme Right and the progressiste grand bourgeois. Yet both must be counted as members of Goguel's party of l'ordre établi.

M. René Rémond has explained the divisions within the Right as the result of traditional differences. He sees the origins of the conflicting traditions in the three monarchical regimes of the nineteenth century.[2] These traditions were still very much alive at the beginning of the twentieth century. It

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1. F. Goguel, La Politique des partis sous la IIIème République. 2 vols. 1946. (Works are published in Paris unless otherwise stated).

2. R. Rémond, La Droite en France de 1815 à nos jours. 1954. Especially p. 14.

is possible to make interesting analogies, as M. Rémond does, between Orleanist and progressiste attitudes, between nationalism and bonapartism.[1] But they are analogies of manner or tone.[2] They do not provide adequate categories for the study of parliamentary politics. Like Thibaudet's "six familles d'esprits" they coincide "souvent plus mal que bien, avec des systèmes d'intérêts, et ne coincident parfois que d'assez loin avec les groupes parlementaires."[3] Useful in providing continuous themes through a chaos of regimes and parties, Rémond's framework breaks down when individual politicians are considered. An examination of some of the opinions of major figures of the Right during the early years of the twentieth century shows that many of them had something in common with all three traditions. Jules Roche, for example, was a progressiste (and therefore, according to M. Rémond, in the Orleanist tradition), a regionalist, a plébiscitaire and, in addition, he invoked the principles of the Revolution as criteria for judging all major legislation. Thus, any attempt to categorise members of the parliamentary Right according to Rémond's traditions would have to recognise that many of them

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1. R. Rémond, op. cit. Especially pp. 161-162.

2. These terms to describe political traditions are used by A. Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest. 1913. p. 366 and M. Barrès, L'Appel au soldat. 1900. p. 150.

3. A. Thibaudet, Les Idées politiques en France. 1932. p. 9.

had split personalities.

The complexity of groups and attitudes within the Right was produced by the interaction of several factors - tradition, generalised social forces, constituency interests, personal eccentricity on the part of parliamentarians and the exigencies of particular political situations. This interaction is not susceptible to general theorising. There was no close correlation among parliamentarians between social class, wealth and political allegiance. Those who belonged to the landowning, legitimist aristocracy were often monarchists but there were notable representatives of this class who were Liberals (for example, de Mun), progressistes (Perier du Larsan, Caraman) and even radicals (la Trémoille). Although there were more merchants and industrialists on the moderate Right than the extreme Right, there were bonapartist, just as there were radical, manufacturers. In spite of the stability of voting habits there were few constituencies whose general allegiance was to the Right which insisted on a deputy with a particular political allegiance. It made little difference in most constituencies whether its deputy belonged to the progressiste or Liberal groups as long as he was thought to be "sound" on the major issues of the day. A non-Catholic could not have represented de Mun's constituency of Morlaix 2 (Finistère) but a monarchist would almost certainly have continued to

represent it if a person of lesser stature than de Mun had stood as a rallié in 1898. Some concession to regionalist sentiment helped candidates in elections in Brittany but, as de Mun illustrated, this was not essential. In Paris Jules Roche advocated sweeping constitutional changes but mentioned these only in a minority of manifestoes to his electors of Touron 2 (Ardèche). National issues and questions of constitutional organisation were, in many constituencies merely froth on the surface of bitterly fought battles on local issues. In the heat of the contest a candidate sometimes alleged that he differed fundamentally from an opponent on national issues when little difference, in fact, existed.[1]

The attitudes which deputies took on national issues were not, therefore, necessarily all of a piece with the attitudes they took on local issues. The basic reason for this was the local nature of interest groups. There were

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1. For example, in the electoral contest of Lesparre (Gironde) in 1906 Renaud d'Elissagaray attacked his opponent, the comte du Perier de Larsan (Progressiste) as being an agent of anti-clericalism and freemasonry and a creature of the bloc des gauches. The latter had opposed Combes and the law of Separation and there was little substance in these charges. D'Elissagaray when he was elected to the Chamber joined the progressiste group. The real issue of the campaign was the protection of the wine-growers (or at least some of them) by appelations controlées. R. d'Elissagaray, Mémoires. MS. pp. 112-116. Letters of R. Brat to R. d'Elissagaray, 7th May, 1906 and 16th April, 1908. D'Elissagaray MSS.

national pressure groups such as the Comité des forges but there were no nation-wide pressure groups. Agriculture (the most powerful interest on the Right) would, at first sight, seem to be an exception. It was represented by national organisations and it was a powerful interest in every region of France. But the interests of those who raised different kinds of crops often diverged. Government intervention in favour of the sugar beet industry in no way helped the vine-growers. Effective parliamentary activity on behalf of any section depended on a coalition of representatives of pressure groups whose interests might not, in other respects, be complementary.[1] The existence of strong local interest groups militated against the formation of strong national parties and the absence of these parties excluded the possibility that the coalitions of interest groups would become permanent.[2]

These general considerations (which, unfortunately, cannot yet be investigated because of difficulties in documentation) form a background to this study of the attitudes and activities of members of the parliamentary Right during the period 1905 to 1919.

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1. Occasionally there were expressions, in the Chamber, of the desirability of reciprocal help by representatives of interest groups. See Leret d'Aubigny (Independent), Débats Parlementaires - Chambre des députés - Compte rendu 'in extenso.' (Hereafter, J.O.) 16th February, 1906. p. 810.

2. Unable to form effective political groups some members of the Right tended to despise them. Henri Maret wrote: "les groupes ne sont que les divisions ridicules..." La République Française, 10th December, 1908.

This period had a certain significance and unity. 1905 was something of a watershed in French politics.[1] The Separation of Church and State marked, for the Left, the final defeat of a clerical, militarist and nationalist plot against the Republic.

The law of Separation was important, not because of its practical effects, but because of its ideological significance. France divided on the issue, not into Catholic and non-Catholic camps (although all Catholic public men were on one side), but along the lines which had come into being during the Dreyfus Affair. The law was the last great measure of the so-called "dreyfusian revolution". There were echoes of the Affair in subsequent years - the interment of Zola in the Panthéon in 1908, the question scolaire during the years 1908 to 1914 and the state funeral of Picquart in 1914. But these were reminders rather than continuations of the battle. They helped to preserve a barrier between the Right and the Centre.

Few, by 1905, were primarily, or even at all, concerned about the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus himself. The argument between dreyfusard and anti-dreyfusard was about the organisation of society.[2] According to dreyfusard polemics,

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1. It is so-described by D. Thomson, Democracy in France. 3rd ed. London 1958. p. 72.

2. For the evolution of the Affair from a particular to a general argument, see G. Chapman, The Dreyfus Affair. London 1955. Especially pp. 321 et seq.

the Church stood for a traditional, ordered, hierarchical society whose chief representatives were the priest, the châtelain and the army officer. The lay school was the symbol of the dreyfusard camp and its opponents associated the school with anti-militarism, socialism, freemasonry, atheism, Jews and radical politicians. The two sides were not, however, as exclusive as they were represented by the polemicists. There were examples of the radical army officer, the democratic priest and the Catholic socialist just as there were examples of the atheist monarchist, the agnostic defender of the Church. In a general and confused way the argument between the two sides was over the privileges of classes and institutions. The dreyfusards were determined to show that no corporation or public institution could oppose a democratically elected legislature. The anti-dreyfusards defended the quasi autonomy of Church and Army as a barrier against social revolution and as being essential to a conservative idea of liberty. The non-Catholic members of the Right, therefore, defended the Church not as a religious but as a social institution.[1] They were opposing combiste doctrines and policies rather than defending the doctrines of the Church. Their position was tactical rather than dogmatic. As a result the introduction of new factors

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1. The most celebrated and explicit examples of this were the leaders of Action Française who described themselves as catholiques athées.

into the situation broke the unity of the Right on the clerical issue. Dislike and fear of the doctrines malsaines of radicalism and socialism did not prevent certain progressistes deserting the cause of the Church in 1906. The unpopularity of papal policy was the stronger consideration. After the passing of the law of Separation even Catholics wished to avoid making the interests of the Church the sole basis of their political activities.

The law of Separation was not only the last measure of the "dreyfusian revolution", it was the last great issue fought between the lay Republic and its enemies during the Third Republic. The challenges of monarchy, empire, plebiscitary dictatorship, military coup and clericalism had been disposed of. For the most part these challenges were made by straw men who lacked the backing of serious organisations but they dominated political controversy for the first thirty-five years of the Third Republic. The Right had not lacked causes to support but all the causes which it had espoused had been defeated[1] even though some of its members had made the concession of accepting the Republic and even though it had received "republican" reinforcements after 1899.

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1. A possible exception to this was agricultural protection which was included in the general tariff of 1892. But this can be regarded as one of the many occasions on which the Centre used the Right as "vote-fodder" to achieve its own ends.

The causes which the Right had supported or adopted show that the Right was essentially composed of people who had been left out of the regime.[1] This exclusion implied no unity amongst the excluded. There was a feeling of unity during the fight against militant anticlericalism. Members of the Right referred to the Right as a bloc and to the ordinary elector of 1906 it must have seemed that there were only two parties in France.[2] But members of the Right thought of themselves primarily as progressistes or Liberals or nationalists or bonapartists or monarchists. They considered any situation in terms of how it would affect the interests of their own group or tendency. They were inclined to gloat over the failures of their colleagues and even blame them for the lack of success of the Right as a whole. As a result there was no grand inquest by parliamentarians on the condition or the role of the Right after the passing of the law of Separation.

The important development after 1905, a development which reached its logical conclusion in the formation of the bloc national, was the growing realisation by members of the Right of the things they had in common with the Centre. The

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1. From this point of view the radical division of politicians into "Republicans" and "Reactionaries" (many of whom claimed to be Republicans) is more reasonable than it first appears if the "Republicans" are regarded as the "insiders" and the "Reactionaries" as the excluded.

2. See J. Chastenet, La France de M. Fallières. 1949. p. 35.

preservation of the social status quo became the primary political issue. There were still, in 1905, particular social and financial measures - income tax, nationalisation of the Western Railway and old-age pensions - which appeared to divide the Right from the Centre and were matters of principle almost on the same level as the separation of Church and State. But the attitudes of the Right to these measures were extremely confused. Although principles were discussed, the debates centred mainly on the practical difficulties of implementing the measures. Moreover, there was no sharp dividing line between those who opposed and those who supported them - many people were undecided. There was considerable passive opposition to them in the Centre and this opposition helped to delay the passage of the bills. The measures affected the general interests of the Right and Centre in much the same way. After they were passed and accepted by the electorate the attitude of members of the Right and Centre to them became almost indistinguishable.

There was a noticeable decline in the original thinking on the social question by members of the Right. This thinking had been stimulated by the experience of the Commune, the growth of trade unions and large capitalist organisations, the common opposition of extreme Right and extreme Left to the lois scélérates, papal teaching, the revival of the ideas

of Lamennais by the Christian Democrats and the need of Action Libérale to find a comprehensive social programme. But anti-clericalism destroyed what mutual respect and sympathy had existed between the reformers of the Right and large sections of the urban and rural working class. It also destroyed the possibility (which was always remote) of co-operation between reformers of the Right and reformers of the Left. The violent syndicalist agitation of 1906 to 1911 and the overt revolutionary aims of the syndicalist leaders helped to convince the doubtful members of the Right that their interests were conservative rather than reactionary or reforming. The expressed opinions of the Right on the social problem, for the most part, degenerated into a negative anti-socialism common among members of the Centre.

The agitation of 1906 to 1911 also drove a wedge between the radicals and socialists and forced the latter into almost permanent opposition. This meant that the Right shared with successive governments a common anti-socialism and anti-syndicalism. It also created the possibility that a government would be forced or would find it expedient to make concessions and gain the support of some sections of the Right. The Barthou government came near to this in 1913.

The support which the Right gave to governments before 1914 was closely connected with the social problem. The issue of national defence made this support respectable. The

progressistes rejected a suggestion in 1907-1908 that they should join an anti-socialist ministerial coalition. But progressistes, Liberals and nationalists were tempted to offer support to Briand and his policy of apaisement and national unity in 1909 and 1910, although Briand did not ask for it. When Poincaré made the defence of national prestige the most important item on his programme, the Right showed little hesitation in supporting his administration in 1912 and his candidature for the Presidency in 1913. In 1913 the Right supported Barthou whose policy on the schools question it disapproved. Finally, during and after the First World War, the Right continuously supported ministries composed of its former enemies, in which they were scarcely represented. The result of this trend was the electoral understanding in 1919 between the Right and Centre, with the declared objects of preserving national unity and maintaining national prestige but the real aim of assembling an anti-socialist coalition.

The aim of this study is to illustrate the trend away from isolation towards co-operation with the Centre examining those issues which separated the parliamentary Right from their colleagues of the Centre and which created divisions within the Right itself. At the same time awareness, by members of the Right, of this trend was limited. Long established attitudes were dying, even in monarchist circles, but they were not being subjected to systematic criticism by

those who held them.

In a sense the Right between 1905 and 1919 became less reactionary and more conservative. There was a turning away from far-reaching solutions for the ills of society because, for the time being, they seemed impractical.

The Groups in Parliament

The first groups of the Right formed in the parliament of the Third Republic expressed differences of opinion on the constitutional question.[1] In the legislature 1876 to 1877 the members of the Groupe du Centre Droit were supporters of an Orleanist restoration, the members of the Groupe de l'Appel au peuple of a Bonapartist restoration and the Groupe de la Droite of a Bourbon restoration. Some Orleanists became reconciled to the idea of a conservative Republic and joined the Groupe Constitutionnel at the beginning of the following legislature. This group amalgamated with the amorphous Union des Gauches in 1878; thus, in theory, its members came to form a section of the Left.[2]

Until 1889 the groups of the Right remained, at least

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1. The nature of and the changes in the parliamentary groups are given in L'Année politique, edited by André Daniel (a collective pseudonym), published annually from 1874 to 1905. The Annuaire du parlement, edited by G. Bonet-Maury and R. Samuel, and published annually or biennially from 1899 to 1912, gave lists, usually accurate, of the members of the groups of the Chamber and Senate. After 1910 the Chamber group lists were published in the Journal Officiel.

2. Some of the men who took part in this movement survived as progressistes to become once again members of an opposition of the Right. The ideological connection between the Orleanists and the progressistes which René Rémond notices (La Droite en France. 1954. p. 161), was strengthened by personal connections and also by the taking over by progressistes of Orleanist electoral support.

in name, monarchist. Just before the elections of 1889 the supporters of General Boulanger formed the Groupe Revisionniste. After the elections the group counted thirty members, some of whom pretended to belong to the extreme Left. As a group they acted and voted with the opposition of the Right rather than the opposition of the extreme Left. Although of bonapartist inspiration, the group was the first "Republican" organisation of the Right in parliament. It disappeared shortly after the flight of the General to Belgium.

A more enduring Republican Right emerged in 1893 under the leadership of Jacques Piou, comte Albert de Mun and baron Armand Mackau. They formed a Groupe de la Droite Républicaine in accordance with the advice, given by Leo XIII in the encyclical Au milieu des sollicitudes (issued on 16th February, 1892), that Catholics should reconcile themselves to existing institutions. The group changed its name to Action Libérale in 1899. The members of the group were not accepted by the ministerial Republicans and, apart from a brief honeymoon during the period of the esprit nouveau of Spuller and Méline, they remained what they were before the ralliement, a section of the opposition of the Right.

An organisational evolution in the Centre of the Chamber began in 1894 and ended with the association of a considerable number of conservative Republicans with the opposition of the Right. In 1894, the unorganised Républicains de gouvernement

split into two groups - the Gauche Progressiste and the Union Progressiste, the latter being somewhat more conservative than the former. In the next legislature (1898) the nomenclature changed and the tendencies became more clearly defined. The Gauche Progressiste became the Groupe de la Gauche Démocratique and the Union Progressiste became the Groupe Républicain Progressiste. Between the two was formed the Groupe de l'Union Démocratique, and in the following legislature the Groupe de l'Union Républicaine appeared between the Union Démocratique and the Groupe Républicain Progressiste. The groups Gauche Démocratique and Union Démocratique remained a part of the ministerial majority whilst, after 1899, the members of the Groupe Républicain Progressiste, and subsequently the members of the Union Républicaine became, as a result of the growing power and militancy of the radicals, part of the opposition of the Right.

The formation of the Groupe Républicain Nationaliste after the elections of 1902 added another non-royalist element to the Right, The "Republicanism" of the Nationalists, like that of the Liberals, was suspect, partly for the same reason; about half of the fifty-nine members of the nationalist group were ex-monarchists. In 1902 the monarchists in the Chamber ceased to have a group organisation and became independents. Not all independents were monarchists, for

there were also Catholics, nationalists, and unclassifiable deputies. Nearly all voted consistently with the Right.

In 1905 the Right in the Chamber was composed of the groups Union Républicaine, Républicain Progressiste, Action Libérale, Républicain Nationaliste and the Independents. The same elements were present in the Senate - monarchists, ex-monarchists, nationalists, Catholics and conservative Republicans - but the group organisation of the Senate was looser and less important than that of the Chamber. In 1905 most monarchists were members of the Groupe des Droites; a few remaining Orleanists made up the Groupe du Centre Gauche. The Alliance Républicaine Progressiste was the equivalent (its members on the whole were more conservative) of the Groupe Républicain Progressiste of the Chamber. Other Senators with similar tendencies were found in the Groupe de la Gauche Républicaine, although this group was split on the clerical issue.

The weakness of the group organisations in the Senate is illustrated by the amalgamation of the Alliance Républicaine Progressiste and the Centre Gauche with the Gauche Républicaine in 1907 and 1908. The group then contained men with conflicting attitudes, the main division at the time being between clericals and anticlericals. Yet this did not provoke a split in the group. No one even suggested that other groups should be formed to cater for the different viewpoints.

This kind of amalgamation did not happen in the Chamber, where the trend throughout the Third Republic was towards more rigidly defined groups. The practice of dual and triple membership of groups shows the haziness of the dividing line between groups; but, in spite of this, and of the existence of dissident members within their bosom, the groups in the Chamber represented clear general tendencies.

The election of 1906 did not affect group organisation in the Chamber. An informal monarchist group - Groupe des intérêts moraux et nationaux - established itself for a while and held meetings,[1] but it soon disappeared. After the elections of 1910, however, a change in the regulations of the Chamber ended the practice of belonging to more than one group, and simplified group organisation.

The pattern of dual and triple membership of groups was straightforward. Deputies generally belonged to groups which were adjacent in the political spectrum. Exceptions existed but they were not numerous. In 1905 Ferdinand Farjon belonged to the groups Républicain Progressiste and Union Démocratique without belonging to the intervening group - Union Républicaine. Charles Disleau belonged to the same combination of groups in the following year. There were other examples.

There were two main reasons for belonging to more than

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1. La République Française, 21st December, 1906.

one group. A deputy might have belonged to the Nationalist and Liberal groups for ideological reasons, these groups representing for him two important aspects of his political philosophy. Another deputy might have been a member of the progressiste group and the Union Républicaine for tactical reasons, agreeing with the majority of the progressiste group on all issues, but at the same time feeling that the way should be kept open for co-operation with Centrist Republicans. In the Centre of the Chamber deputies occasionally joined more than one group to increase their contacts and influence and therefore their chances of ministerial office. Deputies of the Right, at this time, could hardly have been influenced by such considerations. Even Joseph Thierry who became a minister in 1913 said that, because he belonged to the Right,[1] he had never believed that he would achieve office.

The practice of belonging to more than one group came to an end when the Chamber, just after the 1910 elections, decided to select its permanent grand committees by proportional representation. These committees had existed (at first they had not been permanent) since the early days of the Republic and had been formally recognised by the standing orders in 1902. The Right was against permanent committees, and complained that the method of selection made discrimination

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1. He said this to his younger son. (Adrien Thierry in a conversation with the author, 20th February, 1960).

against members of opposition groups easy.[1] Since most members of the Right favoured proportional representation in elections to the Chamber, they also favoured it in the choice of committees, and supported the amendment proposed by J.-L. Breton (Socialist unifié), Carpot and Maunoury (Gauche Radicale), to make the composition of the grand committees proportionate to the numerical strength of the groups in the Chamber. Only one member of the Right, the abbé Jules Lemire (Independent), spoke against the proposal in the Chamber.[2]

The character of the groups did not alter in any significant way as a result of this change in standing orders.[3] Deputies could still, if they wished, belong to more than one group although they could not be regarded as belonging to more than one for the procedure of choosing the grand committees. It is probable, however, that double appartenance became less common. Although the groups now had a formal reason for existing, group discipline did not seem to be strengthened.

There were four groups of the Right constituted after

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1. Until 1910 the committees were elected by eleven bureaux of the Chamber which were in turn chosen by lot. This system could result in the Right having no representative at all on a grand committee.

2. J.O., 1st July, 1910. pp. 2369-2370. Lemire argued that legal recognition of groups would lead to the domination of the individual deputy by disciplined parties.

3. The new system was that the committees of the groups should deliver a list of the members of their groups (no deputy could be on more than one list) which would be published in the Journal Officiel. The groups would then elect members of the commissions in proportion to their numerical strength. J.O. 1st. July, 1910. p. 2369.

the elections of 1910[1]: these were the groups des Républicains Progressistes et de l'Union Républicaine, de l'Action Libérale, des Droites and des Députés Indépendants. The amalgamation of the Union Républicaine with the Progressiste group was a natural development, as before the election thirty-three of the forty-seven members of the Union Républicaine were also members of the Groupe Républicain Progressiste. In November 1911, however, the Union Républicaine was re-formed with thirty-one members, leaving forty-nine members in the Progressiste group. No nationalist group was formed after the election and of the sixteen re-elected deputies who had been members of the group Républicain Nationaliste, four became progressistes, four joined Action Libérale and eight became Indépendants.

After the elections of 1914 the only change was the disappearance of the Union Républicaine.[2] The former president of the group, Joseph Thierry, and most of his colleagues became members of the Gauche Démocratique. For some time they had acted as a part of the Centre of the Chamber and it was natural for them to join one of the groups of the Centre. The Progressiste group changed its name to the Fédération Républicaine, but this did not signify any change in character.

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1. Lists published J.O., 5th July 1910. p. 2424.
2. Lists published J.O., 23rd June 1914. pp. 2567-2568.

After the elections of 1919, the groups Fédération Républicaine and Action Libérale disappeared and were replaced by the Entente Républicaine Démocratique, which also included amongst its members a number of former members of Centre groups as well as many new deputies.[1] The victory of the bloc national in the elections had made some reorganisation and amalgamation of groups inevitable. As the Right (with the exception of the extremists) and the Centre had fought the election under the same banner, the re-emergence of the old groups in the Chamber would not have made a good impression in the public mind. But the Entente Républicaine Démocratique, formed under the presidency of François Arago (formerly of the Gauche Démocratique), was only a partially successful attempt to transfer the appearance of unity from the electoral arena to the Chamber. With one hundred and eighty-six members, it was the largest group of the new Chamber. However, over two hundred deputies, who had also been elected on the "national" lists, joined four other groups (excluding the two independent groups).[2] The Entente was essentially a formation of the Right. All the twenty-six surviving members of the Fédération

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1. Lists published J.O., 30th January, 1920. pp. 93-94.

2. These groups were: Action Républicaine et Sociale - forty-six members, mostly new deputies; Gauche Démocratique - ninety-three members; Républicains de Gauche - sixty-one members; Groupe Républicain Socialiste - twenty-six members.

Républicaine and seven of the eleven survivors of Action Libérale joined the group. The new deputies could, for the most part, be ascribed to the Liberal or progressiste tradition. There were amongst them such famous Bonapartist and Orleanist names as the duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, duc de Broglie and Reille-Soult, duc de Dalmatie, but no member of the group actively combatted the Republican constitution.

Although fifteen former independents joined the Entente, a majority of the extreme Right preferred to hold aloof. One of the two groups of independents - the Groupe des Indépendants (twenty-nine members) - was composed almost entirely of deputies with monarchist or bonapartist tendencies, the most notable of them being Baudry d'Asson, Bermond d'Auriac, Ferdinand Bougère, Paul J. de Cassagnac, Dion, Léon Daudet, Ginoux-Defermon, La Ferronays and La Cour Grandmaison. It also contained four Liberals: Gailhard-Bancel, Groussau, Guichenné and Rochereau. The other independent group, the Groupe des non Inscrits, which had twenty-six members, was a more varied collection of people amongst whom were Republicans with a bonapartist background - Prince Joachim Murat and the baron des Retours - Liberals such as Chappedelaine, the famous progressive Catholic, Marc Sangnier and Clémenciste Republicans, for example Mandel, Lacotte and Levasseur.

There were few changes in group membership during

legislatures. The changes which occurred resulted usually from deaths or elections to the Senate. The figures of membership of groups from 1905 to 1920 were these:

	1905[a]	1906-1910[a]	1910-1914	1914-1919	1920
Union Rép.	30	46-47	b-29	-	-
Progressiste	101	79-76	80-42	37-33	-
Action Lib.	79	64-59	34-31	24-20	-
Nationaliste	55	29-29	-	-	-
Droite	-	-	19-20	16-12	-
Indépendants	42	34-35	21-19	46-36	29
Entente Rép.	-	-	-	-	186
Non Inscrits	-	-	-	-	26

a. Total number of deputies of the Right is exaggerated because those deputies with double appartenance are counted twice.

b. Group reformed in November 1911 when 31 deputies broke away from the main progressiste group.

When deputies changed their groups, they generally did so after an election. The groups were re-constituted at the beginning of each legislature and it was the natural time to make a change. The changes made after the elections of 1906, 1910 and 1914 were, in the great majority of cases, a move towards the Left.[1] This movement had little practical

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1. The main outlines of these changes in 1906 are: of the six deputies who seceded from the Groupe Républicain Nationaliste five remained in (having previously had dual membership) or joined groups to the Left; five of the seven deputies who did not rejoin Action Libérale made a similar move to the Left; twenty members of the progressiste group joined the Union Républicaine and fourteen deputies who were members of one or the other of these two groups joined the Union Démocratique.
The nationalist group disappeared after the elections of 1910. Four old members joined Action Libérale, four joined the progressistes and the other eight became independents. Action Libérale lost eight of its members to the progressiste

significance, except in cases of the movement of progressistes into the Union Républicaine in 1906 and the former members of the Union Républicaine into the Gauche Démocratique in 1914. In these instances a change of groups marked a change of tactics though not of fundamental attitudes: for the most part it reflected no more than a desire to belong to a group with a progressive sounding name. The main pressure behind this desire was the apparent distaste of the electorate for overt reactionaries. The groups of the Right in the Chamber looked, if one judged by their names, very much less conservative than they were in fact.

Only in the legislature 1906 to 1910 was there any attempt to organise the opposition of the Right by co-operation between the groups. Members of the Right felt that they were not adequately represented on the grand committees,

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group. Fourteen ex-members of the Union Républicaine joined the Gauche Démocratique and two joined the Gauche Radicale.

After the elections of 1914 there was a slight movement to the Right on the part of ex-members of the progressiste group and Action Libérale. Six deputies left the former group; five became independents and the other one joined the Gauche Démocratique. Only two deputies left Action Libérale and both became independents. On the other hand the nineteen members of the Union Républicaine, which did not re-form after the elections, carried on the tradition. Fourteen moved to the Left - twelve of them joined the Gauche Démocratique. The remaining five moved rightwards and joined the Fédération Républicaine.

The foundation of the Entente Républicaine Démocratique, put an end temporarily to the drift towards the Left, as it attracted nearly all the former members of Action Libérale and the Fédération Républicaine, and some former members of Centre groups.

and consequently it was decided to establish comités d'études parallel to the official committees.[1] The comités d'études were intended to prepare bills and to study the proposals made by the official committees. The presidents of the groups of the Right began to meet every Thursday to consider common problems and the matters which the comités d'études placed before them. Occasionally they issued a communiqué couched in very general terms. One typical example stated that the presidents had studied the problems placed before them by the comité d'études, and added:

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1. The officers of these comités d'études were:
Agriculture et travaux publics: president - Louis Passy; vice-presidents - Flayelle, Galpin, Limon, Villiers; secretaries - Pomereu, Belcastel, Monsservin.
Travail et prévoyance sociale: president - de Mun; vice-presidents - Lerolle, Ramel; secretaries - Adigard, Guyot de Villeneuve.
Affaires étrangères et colonies: president - La Ferronays; vice-presidents - Spronck, Montaigu; secretaries - Blacas, Dutreil.
Réforme judiciaire et administrative; president - Piou; vice-presidents - Castelnau, Pugliesi-Conti; secretaries - Auriol, Leblanc.
Commerce et industrie: president - Georges Berry; vice-presidents - Binder, Millevoye; secretaries - Laurent Bougère, Pinault.
Finances: president - Fouquet; vice-presidents - Xavier Reille, Le Gonidec de Traisson; secretaries - Durand, Néron.
Enseignement et beaux arts: president - Groussau; vice-presidents - Ollivier, Rudelle; secretaries - Lavrignais, l'Estourbeillon.
Guerre et marine: president - Bienaimé; vice-presidents - Jacquey, Alicot; secretaries - Fontaines, Osmoy.
La République Française, 12th July, 1906.

> Ils ont reconnu que la façon hâtive et superficielle avec laquelle la majorité a traité les questions économiques les plus graves a causé dans le pays une profonde inquiètude augmentée encore par la vote d'un budget fictif, équilibré sur le papier seulement, aux moyens d'impôts nouveaux et de taxes vexatoires. Cette situation impose à la minorité le devoir de redoubler la vigilance pour ne pas laisser aucun abus sans en signaler les dangereuses conséquences.[1]

They were seldom more specific than this. The meetings both of the presidents of the groups and of the comités d'études gradually ceased to take place.[2]

More successful, in that it achieved limited but concrete results, was a group composed of all the prominent Republican members of the Right: this was the Groupe Républicain de l'Egalité devant la loi[3], founded on 28th January 1908, the aim of which was to keep a close watch on administrative abuses. The president of the group was the baron de Belcastel (Action Libérale). Meetings were held periodically to hear reports from members. When a serious complaint was established a delegation went to see the appropriate minister. For

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1. La République Française, 11th January 1907.

2. Obviously there continued to be frequent informal contacts between individuals for the co-ordination of tactics. For example, Ribot wrote to Denys Cochin (Droites) on 16th December 1912 to co-ordinate the attack in the Senate and the Chamber on the government's Middle Eastern Policy. Cochin MSS.

3. La République Française, 29th January, 1908.

example, one delegation led by Pierre Adigard (Progressiste) went to see the minister of War on 9th June 1908 about the inadequate arrangements for finding employment for ex-soldiers.[1] Judging by the reports of the meetings of the group, this method seemed to achieve results. In spite of this, the group declined; after four years there were no further reports of its activities. The general reason for its disappearance was probably that the work carried out by the group required attention to detail and was often of a tedious nature. The results were not widely publicised and therefore not politically advantageous.

There were other ostensibly non-political groups which were composed entirely or almost entirely of deputies of the Right. This was the result of circumstances rather than of a desire to be exclusive. A good example of this is the Groupe de défense des intérêts bretons. There were obviously very few deputies not of the Right who could have been a member of this group.

The groups of the Right in Parliament were ephemeral. The most successful seldom out-lasted a single generation of parliamentarians. They were born, withered away and were resurrected without causing more than a ripple of interest

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1. La République Française, 10th June 1908. There were other representative reports, Ibid. 21st, 27th March and 19th June 1908.

in public opinion or even in parliamentary circles. But their existence was not completely devoid of significance. Although seldom united on matters of detail, they represented fundamental tendencies and provided the only objective method of assessing how strong these tendencies were.[1] Deputies sometimes remained in groups, apparently out of lethargy, after they had ceased to have much in common with their colleagues. Nevertheless group membership remains the most satisfactory means of assessing the strength of general political tendencies in the Chamber. The division lists cannot provide this information as, for example, neither the progressiste nor the Liberal element of the Chamber was ever isolated in a vote. Similarly, the electoral manifestoes of deputies were frequently so vague and ambiguous that it is difficult to distinguish between Liberal and progressiste. Yet they represented two different traditions and ways of looking at political problems. Even the blurring of dividing lines through the practice of double appartenance was useful in showing to what extent the broad tendencies overlapped.

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1. On important issues members of groups of the Right generally voted together. An examination of forty-two division lists of the period 1905 to 1919 has shown that 81% of the votes were cast with the majority of each group. The moderate groups were less cohesive than the more extreme groups.

As organisations the groups were very weak. No powerful central committees exercised a strict group discipline, no party machines existed with a vested interest in their continued existence. The groups were formed because of the desire of like-minded men to associate with one another. They were nothing more than this.

The Electoral Organisations.

There were two focal points around which opposition of the Right could gather - the press and the party organisations. The press was the more permanent of these two points. The organisations, although active in 1905, were soon to go into a decline. This raises the question of why they came into existence in the first years of the twentieth century. The law of Associations undoubtedly gave an impetus to organisation, providing as it did a water-tight legal status for political associations which had not existed before. The underlying reason was that there existed a more definite dividing line in politics during this period than there was before or afterwards. Men felt the need to organise against the enemy and were able to sink their differences in order to do so. The first national electoral organisation established was the Parti Radical et Radical Socialiste in 1901. As the local radical committees were unused to direction from above, the party remained very much a superstructure.[1] Many prominent radicals remained outside the party and neither sought nor received its approval during electoral campaigns.[2]

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1. For its activities during the 1902 elections see Emile Combes, Mon Ministère, Mémoires 1902-1905. 1956. pp. 9-11.

2. The number of officially sponsored radicals seems to have varied considerably from one election to the next. In 1910 it was high, being in the region of 60% of all radical candidates. P.-G. La Chesnais and G. Lachapelle, Tableau des élections législatives.... 1910. p. 6. In 1914 the proportion was probably less than 30%. P.-G. La Chesnais, Statistique des élections législatives de 1914. 1914, pp. 4 et seq.

Later in 1901 an important Centre party, the Alliance Républicaine Démocratique, was formed under the presidency of Adolphe Carnot, brother of Sadi Carnot, former President of the Republic. This party impinges on the history of the Right during our period. Its members held similar views on social and financial matters to the Right. In the elections of 1910 and 1914 there was a certain amount of co-operation between the Alliance and the Fédération Républicaine. In the election of 1919 the Alliance played a leading part in the bloc national.

The Alliance was exclusively an electoral organisation. The candidates which it supported at elections joined one of the ministerial groups in the Chamber. Many successful politicians belonged to the Alliance, Waldeck-Rousseau, Emile Loubet, Raymond Poincaré, Paul Deschanel, and others. Five presidents of the Third Republic were members of the Alliance.[1] It commanded considerable financial resources.[2] But its strength was more apparent than real. It was an alliance of a number of political "clans" led by chieftains of the Centre[3] and had no control over their activities.

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1. Georges Lachapelle, L'Alliance Démocratique. 1935. Back cover.

2. Ibid. p. 21. For the effort of the alliance in the election campaign of 1902.

3. For the men concerned in the foundation of the Alliance see E. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des dynasties bourgeoises. Vol II. 1948. pp. 328-330.

The Fédération Républicaine was the electoral organisation of the progressistes. It was close in form and spirit to the Alliance Démocratique, although more conservative. It was formed in 1903 as a result of the amalgamation of three conservative Republican groups.[1] The formal object of the Fédération was:

> ... de grouper et d'unir tous les républicains pour l'application des principes de la Révolution française, tels qu'ils ont été formulés dans la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. 2

It was not a very democratic organisation.[3] All decisions

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1. Alliance Républicaine Progressiste (pres. Méline), Association Nationale Républicaine (pres. Audiffret) and Union Républicaine Nationale (pres. Barboux). La République Française, 19th November 1903. The constitution of the Fédération was deposited with the prefecture of police in accordance with the law of Associations of 1901. Brochure published by the Fédération Républicaine: Programme et Statuts. p. 1. The first edition of this brochure was undated; subsequent editions were sometimes dated.

2. Ibid. p.3.

3. The federation was administered by a conseil général composed of at least fifty members, a fifth of whom were renewed annually. This conseil every two years elected its bureau, which consisted of a president and at least six vice-presidents, a secretary-general and a treasurer (art. 9). The conseil could delegate all or part of its powers to a comité directeur which consisted of twelve members (art. 10). This was in practice what happened. Also: "Le Président et le Trésorier ont, chacun isolément et sous le contrôle du conseil, tous les pouvoirs pour représenter l'Association et agir, aux mieux de ses intérêts, aimablement comme en justice." (art. 10). The conseil or the comité directeur, if these powers were delegated to it, controlled the admission of new members tothe association and could expel, if there was a two-thirds majority, any member of the association. The conseil (or the comité) could change the constitution of the federation but all changes had to be ratified by the general assembly (art. 11).

- and this the constitution (article 10) allowed for - were made by the comité directeur and the president could, on his own initiative, speak for the whole federation. Strangely enough, the only objection made to this situation was voiced not by a rebel from the floor of an annual conference but by Jules Méline, one of the most prominent oligarchs of the federation. At the conference of 1912 he made a plea for greater activity on the part of the conseil général.[1] The power of the comité directeur was limited only by a negative pressure from below. Members would have left the federation if the comité had attempted to impose a strict discipline or an unpopular policy. It is difficult to envisage in what ways the rank and file of the federation could have been more active.

The oligarchic nature of the federation was emphasised and encouraged by its graded membership; it had "membres fondateurs, sociétaires, participants et adhérents" (article 4 of the statuts) who paid annual subscriptions of five hundred, one hundred, twenty and five francs respectively (article 5). The affiliated groups and committees paid small subscriptions ranging from five francs if they had less than one hundred members to fifty francs if they had over two thousand. The small subscription necessary to become a member was no doubt designed to attract rather than repel potential members, but the largest subscribers (who were also, and

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1. Congrès de la Fédération Républicaine de 1912. Compte-rendu. 1912. p. 37.

perhaps not incidentally, the founder members) naturally controlled the federation.

The federation was required by its constitution (article 7) to hold an annual general assembly.[1] The amount of influence the delegates could collectively bring to bear on the leadership was limited by a requirement that the assembly should split into sections to discuss special fields of the federation's activity (article 8). The plenary session was confined to speeches by progressiste notables and the voting (never the discussion) of resolutions presented by the sections.

As many as a thousand delegates attended the congresses,[2] which lasted two or three days, opening with a speech by the president and closing with a banquet. Before they opened there was generally an attempt to invest the proceedings with importance and significance. In an interview before the congress of 1906 the president of the federation, Joseph Thierry, gave a description of its purpose:

> La nuance politique de notre congrès est une nuance très républicaine d'abord et ensuite très large et très générale. On a cru y voir une oeuvre d'opposition; sa portée est plus vaste. Nous ne faisons pas un congrès pour ou contre le cabinet de M. Clemenceau; nous faisons

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1. Anyone who had been a member of the federation for more than a month on the day the congress opened could attend and affiliated groups could send one delegate for every fifty, or fraction of fifty, members (art. 8).

2. In 1906 there were one thousand - le Temps, 23rd November 1906, and four hundred at the banquet - Thierry MSS (discours). In 1908 there were only three hundred - la République Française, 10th December 1908.

> un congrès pour notre parti.
>
> Il n'est pas douteux qu'aux élections dernières nous avons essuyés une défaite. Nous n'avons plus la force numérique avec laquelle on fait et on impose sa politique dans le Parlement. Là j'accepte parfaitement de faire dans la politique des autres tout ce qui s'accommode avec la mienne et l'on aurait tort de voir dans notre congrès aucune opposition parlementaire et systématique.

He outlined the tasks of the congress: a review of the forces of the federation and a reorganisation of its formations in the provinces; an exchange of views between delegates coming from all parts of the country; a discussion of the law of Separation (which Thierry wanted to amend but not repeal); a consideration of proposals "qui menacent la fortune publique et l'activité nationale" and the passing of resolutions on:

> .... monopoles d'Etat, l'initiative individuelle, la liberté commerciale et tous les principes par lesquelles la Révolution a entendu protèger l'individualisme et la liberté des citoyens;

a study of the warnings made by Poincaré on the state of the budget; and finally, the delegates to the congress would once again assert that they were sincere Republicans.[1] Thierry mentioned all these things again in his opening speech at the congress.[2] His views were echoed in the resolutions passed in the plenary session on the last day of the congress. Some were watered down; for example, his proposal that the provincial formations of the federation should be reorganised was reduced to a resolution that greater influence should be applied to the local press.[3] Other resolutions were merely

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1. La République Française, 9th November 1906.
2. Thierry MSS. (discours).
3. La République Française, 25th November 1906.

repetitions of those which had been voted the year before, as for instance, the support of the principle of non-obligatory old age pensions. The influence of Jules Méline was marked on the resolutions concerned with agriculture: that mixed unions of farmers and farm workers should be encouraged, that measures should be voted to help landless agricultural labourers to buy land.

No delegate went beyond the terms defined by the leaders. Generalities were the currency of the congresses. There were no attempts to plan specific courses of action and, consequently, there were no open disagreements. On particular questions, such as protection, the leaders of the federation were deeply divided. Méline was the most prominent advocate of protection of his time and within the federation he was faced with an influential group of free-traders - Thierry, Beauregard and Aynard. Yet this fundamental difference was slurred over. Thierry said at the banquet of the congress of 1909:

> A la séance inaugurale de lundi, M. Méline, en me faisant le grand honneur de venir m'asseoir à mes côtés, me disait: Ne sommes-nous pas nous deux en désaccord sur les questions économiques? N'avons-nous pas toujours lutté ... chacun d'un côté différent? Et cela nous empêche-t-il de collaborer dans un sentiment d'estime et de confiance réciproque? Il en est de même pour nous tous, Messieurs, en ce qui concerne pour les uns tel de nos voeux peut-être, pour les autres tel ou tel article de notre programme. .... nous pouvons avoir des conceptions différentes sur quelques questions d'ordre matériel, nous sommes pleinement d'accord, et c'est le point capital, sur les données morales et essentielles de notre doctrine. 1

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1. Thierry MSS. (discours).

The main interest of the congresses is that they give the date at which the mass of progressiste opinion accepted certain developments to which it had originally reacted unfavourably. The acceptance of the law of Separation at the congress of 1906 is one example. The programme approved by the congress of 1909, which Thierry hailed as a great renovation,[1] and at which some of the newspapers of the Left feigned astonishment,[2] contained nothing new - the approval of the principle of obligatory old age pensions, the drawing up of a "code de travail et de la prévoyance sociale" (a proposal sponsored for some years by Charles Benoist), profit sharing, sickness and unemployment assurance. Thierry was genuinely concerned with these reforms and wanted to give the federation a progressive image so that "... les jeunes gens ne soient pas effrayés de la rigidité de notre programme.."[3] But most progressistes gave the impression that they viewed such reforms without enthusiasm.

The very lack of published information about the Fédération Républicaine is a sign of its weakness; it produced neither a bulletin nor, at election times, a list of candidates whom it supported. This was not a desire for

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1. Thierry MSS. (discours).
2. See article by Louis Latapie, La République Française, 23rd November 1909.
3. Thierry MSS. (discours).

secrecy; it was willing to supply information to those who asked for it.[1] The fund raising organisation, the Union du Commerce et de l'Industrie which was "en rapport étroit" with the federation,[2] worked in private.[3] It did not, however, make any secret of its function and the banquets of the union ended with an appeal by the president (who was usually also the president of the Fédération Républicaine) for the election fund.[4]

The federation was not an impressive organisation. Its prestige was directly related to the power of its leaders and during this period they were condemned, through waning electoral support, to political impotence. An oligarchy with the oligarchs divided amongst themselves, lacking militancy and militants, having a limited appeal and a programme unlikely to make converts, the federation did not have the appearance of a party which could dominate the country.

Action Libérale Populaire was a more formidable organisation. The parliamentary group was formed in 1899 after

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1. See P.-G. La Chesnais and G. Lachapelle, Tableau des élections législatives .... 1910. p. 4.

2. Letter of Adrien Thierry to the author, 1st January 1960.

3. This committee must be distinguished from the Comité Républicain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, commonly called the Comité Mascuraud, which until 1910 was firmly linked to the radical party.

4. See, for example, the appeal of Paul Beauregard, le Monde Economique, 30th March 1912. p. 290.

the Toulouse speech of Waldeck-Rousseau defining the orientation of his ministry.[1] The group published a programme for the elections of 1902 signed by Jacques Piou and Albert de Mun.[2] After the elections it was organised, under their leadership, into a party - the first party organisation modelled on the statute of association required by the law of 1st July 1901. The statutes of the party were deposited with the prefecture of police on 17th May 1902. Its stated purpose was:

> ... de défendre sur le terrain constitutionnel, par tous les moyens légaux et en particulier par la propagande électorale, les libertés publiques; de favoriser les réformes législatives, de créer ou développer les oeuvres et les institutions sociales; d'améliorer le sort des travailleurs. 3

The association consisted of committees or groups set up or approved by the central committee, membres sociétaires paying a sum of five hundred francs for life membership or an annual subscription of not less than twenty francs and membres adhérents paying an annual subscription of not less than one franc (article 4 of the statutes).[4] As in the case of the

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1. There are a few rather terse descriptions of the formation of the group. One such is: "... un groupe des députés, réunis dans un bureau de la Chambre décida la fondation de l'Action Libérale et lui donna son description et son nom." Congrès National de l'Action Libérale Populaire. 1909. p. 81.

2. E. Flornoy, La Lutte par l'Association. 2nd. ed. 1907. p. 37.

3. Programme et Statuts. Action Libérale Populaire. 1903.

4. Groups and committees could be affiliated to A.L.P., paying a small subscription, whilst preserving their independence and control over their property. (art. 5.).

Fédération Républicaine the large difference in the subscription rates buttressed an oligarchic constitution.

There was no pretence to democracy in the constitution of Action Libérale. The central committee was self-appointed and self-perpetuating:

> L'association est représentée par un comité central composé des fondateurs et des membres qu'il s'appellera par la suite. Il se recrute par co-option. (article 6).

The committee could, if there was a majority of two-thirds, expel one of its own number and, with a simple majority, expel an ordinary member of the association (article 6). The committee had complete power to modify the statutes; it also elected the bureau which consisted of the president and at least one vice-president and one secretary. The president had wide powers:

> Le Président représente l'Association et est investi des pouvoirs les plus étendus pour son administration et sa direction. (article 7).

The condition that a general assembly composed of the founding members and delegates of the local committees (article 8) should be held every year did little to temper the oligarchic nature of this constitution.

The officers of the association continually stressed that Action Libérale was different to the other political organisations of the time. Louis Laya, one of the secretaries of Action Libérale, echoed many speeches made by the leaders during a progress report at the congress of 1907. He denied

that Action Libérale was:

> .... un simple comité électoral, un agrégat occasional qui sommeille pour se réveiller à la veille de chaque scrutin. Elle est surtout et avant tout ..... UNE ASSOCIATION, c'est-à-dire qu'elle veut grouper dans une unité puissante, active et disciplinée - dans une solidarité effective et réalisée pratiquement par des institutions économiques - autour d'un programme politique et social 1

There were, however, only two organisations which could be described as "institutions économiques" - the Union des Caisses Rurales et Ouvrières Françaises whose founder and president was Louis Durand, a Catholic of a more reactionary kind than was usually found in Action Libérale, and the Union Fédérale des Patrons industriels et commerçants with its bureaux de placement. There were others which engaged in social good works such as de Mun's Cercles Ouvrières (by this time almost moribund), the Association de la Jeunesse Catholique Française, Jeunesse Libérale, the Ligue Patriotique des Françaises and the Union des travailleurs libres.

A national Cercle d'Etudes Sociales was founded and many provincial study groups were organised. These were supposed to study local social conditions and report on them to the annual congresses; few seem to have had an active life.[2]

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1. Action Libérale Populaire. Compte-rendu du congrès national de 1907. 1908. p. 37.

2. George Maze-Sencier wrote two books, based to a considerable extent on the work done by these study groups: L'Amélioration du sort des travailleurs. 1906; and Les Cahiers agricoles de l'Action libérale populaire. Mende 1909. One of the most impressive works of the Cercle d'Etudes was an extensive constitutional enquiry and the writing of a draft constitution published in Projet de Constitution Libérale, 1907.

Action Libérale made serious attempts to spread its doctrines and organisation throughout the country. A large number of pamphlets were published, especially in the years 1902 to 1906.[1] Detailed memoranda were drawn up on the methods which should be used to form local committees.[2] Not every département was penetrated, but resolutions were passed by a number of congresses recommending that they should be.[3] Regional and départemental congresses were held and the leaders of the association attended them in order to stimulate local activities.

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1. A selection of titles gives an indication of the range of subjects covered by these pamphlets: J. Piou, Le Rôle du patron. 1903. ------- Un programme social. 1904. ------- La Franc-maçonnerie. 1904. ------- Les Catholiques et la loi de Séparation. 1905; A. de Mun, Les Catholiques et l'Action libérale populaire. 1903. ------- Contre la loi de Séparation. 1905; C. Villeneau, Plus de libertés, moins d'impôts. n.d; L. Laya, L'Organisation électorales. n.d. ------- Surveillance des opérations électorales. n.d. ------- La Conspiration anti-française. n.d.; Anonymous, Le Socialisme. n.d. ------ Retraites Ouvrières. n.d. ------- De l'organisation professionelle. 1906. There were many others.

2. Instructions were published in Annuaire de l'Action libérale populaire. Ed. E. Saillard. 1904. Two or three sincere men (p. 147) and a leader - "un homme sûr, débrouillard, tenace, affable" (p. 151) were necessary. To provide resources: "Intéresser à l'organisation quelques personnes riches, et recruter de nombreux adhérents et sociétaires" (p. 149). On electoral tactics: "Les manifestations platoniques sur un nom voué d'avance à l'insuccès ne mènent à rien: mieux vaut donc viser le résultat pratique et possible, c'est-à-dire l'élection du meilleur candidat" p. 170. There was more advice in L. Laya, Manuel pratique des secrétariats électoraux. n.d.

3. These resolutions were usually phrased in the same way. The congress of 1911 passed the voeu that the association should make: "... tous les efforts tendant à constituer, ou à développer rapidement dans chaque département un comité départemental avec toutes ses ramifications exclusivement

The work of the national congresses was, on the whole, well-prepared. The congresses divided into sections, in the same way as those of the Fédération Républicaine but the level of discussion was higher, at least until 1908, at the congresses of Action Libérale. The sections of the congresses heard and discussed detailed reports on many topics; the section on social questions, for example, considered workers' hygiene, housing, domestic budgeting, wages, pensions and other topics. There was a considerable divergence of views within the association, especially on social questions and matters concerning trades unions, and as a result surprisingly few concrete proposals emerged.

Usually there was no formal relationship between electoral organisations and parliamentary groups. There was no attempt within Action Libérale to diverge from this practice. When Piou was in the Chamber (he sat without a break from 1906 to 1919) he was president of the group and president of the association. The comités directeurs of the group and of the association were composed of almost the same people, but some deputies were members of the group without being members of the association. The parliamentary group had its own

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composée d'adhérents de l'Action Libérale Populaire où tous les arrondissements et dès qu'il sera possible tous les cantons seront réprésentés...." Congrès national de l'Action Libérale Populaire de 1911. Compte-rendu. 1911. p. 64.

organisation.[1]

Action Libérale was the creation and the creature of Jacques Piou who presided over its destinies from its foundation until his retirement in 1919. A subtle politician, an accomplished parliamentary tactician and, on occasion, an effective orator he was able, for a time, to infuse life into Catholic political organisation. He had a strong belief, which infected his followers, in the efficacy of organisation. He coined the slogan "nous vaincrons par l'organisation" and often repeated that "l'avenir est aux mieux organisés".[2] As late as 1914 Action Libérale was called the best organised of parties by a contemporary political observer.[3]

Piou refused to call Action Libérale a Catholic party, though it was composed entirely of Catholics. He considered that "la constitution d'un semblable parti est au moins actuellement impossible" and not desirable because anti-clericalism was only one of many problems facing the country.[4]

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1. Officially the parliamentary group met every Tuesday and heard the report of a "commission permanente d'études" (which for the legislature 1906-1910 was composed of three members - Gailhard-Bancel, Groussau and Rudelle). The purpose of this committee was ".... pour mieux coordonner l'action parlementaire du groupe, examiner et préparer les projets de loi et amendements à présenter en son nom, notamment, ceux qui pourraient assurer ou hâter la réalisation des réformes sociales ...." Action Libérale Populaire, 21st June 1906. The comité directeur of the group also made decisions on parliamentary tactics.

2. For example, Le Correspondant, 10th October, 1904.

3. P.-G. La Chesnais, Statistique des élections Législatives de 1914. 1914. p. 7.

4. E. Flornoy, La Lutte par l'association. 2nd ed. 1907. p. 7.

De Mun also opposed the formation of a Catholic party, having suffered from the experience of attempting to form one in 1885, because he thought the majority of Frenchmen were not willing to act in the interests of Catholicism.[1] No appeal to Catholic principles was made in the programme of the party. The defence of religious "liberty" was given a prominent place but Piou said that this was because it was the liberty most threatened.[2] As Catholics, however, most of the individual members appealed, in their speeches, to Catholic principles and these were also defended in many of the publications of the association. Equivocation on the Catholic nature of the party exposed it to damaging attacks. The objections which Piou and de Mun made to describing Action Libérale as a Catholic party were scarcely relevant. Piou assumed that a Catholic party must necessarily gather within its ranks the majority of Catholics and that religious policy must be the only raison d'être of such a party. Both Piou and de Mun seemed to assume that Action Libérale was capable of attracting non-Catholics to its banner and would possibly become the majority party in France. These hopes were over-sanguine.

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1. E. Flornoy, op. cit. p. 13. In 1907 de Mun wrote, recalling the experience of 1885: "La création d'un parti exclusivement catholique .... se heurterait aujourd'hui ... aux même obstacles sans doute plus fortes." A. de Mun, Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. 1911. Vol. III. pp. 338-339.

2. Le Gaulois, 28th February 1909.

The most important nationalist organisation was the Ligue de la Patrie Française. Founded by Jules Lemaître, who almost wrecked it by his erratic behaviour,[1] it was originally intended to be a union of all anti-dreyfusard Republicans. It soon became identified with the Right and, according to Maurice Barrès, little more than an electoral committee.[2] After 1902 Barrès, the most respected nationalist of the time, ceased to be a member of the Ligue and did not join the nationalist group in the Chamber. Catholics also distrusted the Ligue especially "quand ils entendirent Jules Lemaître dire en réunion publique de ne pas plus désirer voir à la Chambre 300 catholiques que 300 radicaux."[3]

By 1905, through scandal and ineffective leadership, its influence was in rapid decline. The Left wing of the group had been decisively beaten at the elections of 1902 and as a result it was faced with the alternative of "l'impuissance ou l'absorption par la droite."[4] The latter alternative was chosen and the chance that the nationalist movement might seduce large numbers of Leftist voters was forever lost. Its influence in the provinces disappeared. It had been

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1. L. Fatoux, Les Coulisses du nationalisme, 1903. pp. 17-18.
2. M. Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme. 1902. p. 95.
3. J. Piou, D'une guerre à l'autre. 1932. p. 171.
4. L. Fatoux, op. cit. p. 38.

active in the West but mainly in the Republican towns; the anti-Republicans of the countryside gave it nominal support.[1] It lingered on in Paris until 1912 but its function was limited to organising meetings for candidates at elections and holding the occasional conférence at which spoke prominent nationalists such as Gauthier de Clagny, Camille Guyot de Villeneuve, Admiral Bienaimé and Lucien Millevoye.

There were other nationalist Ligues such as Déroulède's Ligue des Patriotes and Driant's Ligue anti-maçonnique de France. The presidents of both were unsuccessful candidates in 1906, and neither had any parliamentary representation until 1910 when Driant was elected in Meurthe et Moselle and when on Déroulède's death in 1914 Barrès became the president of the Ligue des patriotes. Both groups made noisy contributions to election campaigns.

There were two bonapartist organisations - the Comité Plébiscitaire and the Comité Central de l'Appel au Peuple - but in 1905 there was little difference between them. The former was in direct touch with the pretender, Prince Victor (a descendant of Jerôme Bonaparte), but the latter contained more important politicians such as the deputies Gaston Galpin, Cunéo d'Ornano and the marquis de Dion. There was a right

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1. André Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest. 1913. p. 493.

and a left wing in the bonapartist movement, as, indeed, there always had been in the bonapartist tradition. The Right was more attached to the dynasty, the Left to the plebiscite. In theory, the Appel au Peuple was the Leftist group; it held its banquet on 10th December to commemorate the anniversary of the election of Louis Napoleon to the presidency of the second Republic. There were genuine and life-long Republicans who were also plébiscitaires such as Jules Roche, Lucien Millevoye and Paul Déroulède who had no contact with Appel au Peuple. Others such as Ernest Flandin, Arthur Legrand, and Henry Fougère did not seem strongly attached to Republican institutions. Although they did not proclaim a bonapartist allegiance, they had had a bonapartist family background and attended the banquets of Appel au Peuple.[1] In a land where lost causes frequently come to life again they probably thought it wise to maintain their contacts.

The Comité Plébiscitaire had no representative in Parliament and was not an important political force. It amalgamated with Appel au Peuple in May 1911. In November 1911 the amalgamated group issued a joint manifesto which

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1. L'Autorité, 11th December 1906, 11th December 1907, 11th December 1908.

was based on both traditions of bonapartism.[1]

The royalist political organisation was also very loose. The pretender maintained a secretariat in Paris which transmitted his wishes and instructions. There was a Comité Electorale Royaliste amongst whose members were the senators, the comte de Tréveneuc and the vicomte de Lamarzelle, and the deputies, the comte de Lanjuinais and prince Louis de Broglie. This committee issued a manifesto before parliamentary elections and echoed the views of the pretender on electoral tactics. It seemed to have no other activities. There was also a permanent committee for propaganda - the Association de Presse et de propagande monarchique - whose leading spirit was Gustave Jacinot, the veteran editor of the Gazette de France. There were other royalist groups, such as the Jeunesse Royaliste. The most vocal was the Ligue de l'Action Française led by Maurras, Daudet, Vaugeois and Pujo, but it had no parliamentary representative and did not, at this time, believe in contesting parliamentary elections. It had connections with parliamentary

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1. Bonapartists, like the monarchists, tended to live in the past: the most widely circulated pamphlet in the election campaign of 1910 (P. Blètry, Arbre et Fruits - aux électeurs de France. 1910) was primarily concerned in attacking Gambetta. Also bonapartism, like many movements on the extreme fringes of politics, tended to attract people who appeared to be mentally unbalanced. See, for example, C. Bosc, Le Parti Bonapartiste en 1902. n.d.

monarchists; colonel Villebois Mareuil, a member of the Ligue was the brother of the vicomte de Villebois-Mareuil, deputy for Chateau-Gontier (Mayenne).

The main extra-parliamentary activity of both the monarchists and the bonapartists was the holding of banquets. Some were notable social successes. Nine hundred turned up to the bonapartist banquet of 1906.[1] But they were no more than social occasions at which stirring words were spoken in a political vacuum. Sometimes a few hot-heads were arrested after the conclusion of the festivities for creating disturbances in the street.[2]

The newspapers of the Right played a more important role than most of the organisations of the Right in the discussion of policies and tactics. Each section of the Right had a press platform in Paris.

La République Française was the daily paper of the progressistes. It was biased in favour of the more conservative section of the group - the Jules Roche rather than the Joseph Thierry wing - but it provided a forum for all progressiste opinions. The paper was originally founded by Gambetta and subsequent editors claimed that they preserved the essence of his ideas. From 1899 to 1902 Jules Méline edited the paper.

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1. Only seven hundred were expected. L'Autorité, 11th December 1906.

2. For example, four were arrested after a royalist banquet in May 1909. La République Française, 17th May 1909.

He then handed it over to Georges Lachapelle but he remained editor for économie politique until 1906 when Jules Roche took over the paper. Méline went on contributing articles and although Roche brought in many new contributors[1] his influence was still obvious. The paper continued to be called the "journal de Méline".

Action Libérale did not control a daily paper in Paris but it published two bulletins - a fortnightly and a three-monthly - and an almanac. It also received general support from la Croix with its hundred provincial editions. Edited by Jules Bouvattier, la Croix was owned, after the Assumptionists had been compelled to relinquish control in 1903, by the Féron-Vrau trust.[2]

The identity of the controllers of la Patrie and la Presse

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1. Roche retained the more important journalists - Georges Bonnefous, Frédéric Clément, Louis Latapie, Louis Madelin, Georges Noblemaire and Pierre de Quirelle - and added an impressive array of progressiste parliamentarians - the senator, Jean Audiffred and the deputies Beauregard, Bonnevay, Brindeau, Dulau, Dupourqué, Lefas and Marin. He also recruited an able journalist in Henri Maret.

2. By 1914 this trust also controlled la Patrie, la Presse, l'Eclair, l'Eclair de l'Est (Nancy), l'Eclair Comtois (Besançon), l'Express (Lyon), la République de l'Isère (Grenoble), le Télégramme (Toulouse), la Liberté du Sud-Ouest (Bordeaux), l'Express de l'Ouest (Nantes), le Nouvelliste de Bretagne (Rennes), le Mémorial (Amiens). See Maurice de Ponthière, Les Partis de la Droite. 1914. p. 48. These papers were all, in varying degrees Catholic, nationalist, Republican and socially conservative. They were sympathetic to Action Libérale.

was shrouded in mystery. The papers were purchased on 31st October 1905 by (according to the published letter of the notary acting on their behalf)[1] "un groupe d'hommes indépendants" who remained anonymous. Montagnini alleged that the papers had been purchased by Piou[2] but when the Montagnini papers were published this was denied.[3] Both papers had a definite character which survived the change of ownership. La Presse had no particular political allegiances and no parliamentarian contributed regularly to its columns. Its policy was to support all the elements of the opposition of the Right. La Patrie, in contrast, was closely linked to parliamentary nationalism; among its principal contributors were the deputies, Georges Berry, Lucien Millevoye, Jules Dansette, Jean Plichon and Paul Pugliesi-Conti,. Its editor was Emile Massard. Marcel Habert, Déroulède's associate, collaborated with the paper. In October 1907 Henri Rochefort, the former communard turned nationalist, joined the journal leaving l'Intransigeant to Léon Bailby, the former editor of la Presse.[4] He contributed until his death in 1913 and was

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1. La Patrie and la Presse, 31st October 1905.

2. Montagnini to Merry del Val, 23rd November 1905, Montagnini MSS. Sc. 7 p. 43.

3. La Patrie and la Presse, 1st April, 1907.

4. Léon Bailby gained financial control of l'Intransigeant without Rochefort's knowledge. Alexandre Zévaès, Henri Rochefort, le pamphlétaire. 1946. p. 244.

accepted by the nationalists of the Right.

L'Echo de Paris founded by Valentin Simond in 1884 and edited by Henry Simond was the platform of Albert de Mun and Maurice Barrès. The Independent deputies Jules Delafosse, Gabriel Bonvalot and Denys Cochin and the famous conservative novelists, Paul Bourget and René Bazin, also contributed articles. Nationalist in matters of foreign policy, L'Echo de Paris was alarmist and pessimistic on the social problem. It was the only large circulation daily of the Right,[1] coming fifth among Paris papers.

There were two small bonapartist papers, le Petit Caporal edited by Faure-Biquet and le Napoléon edited by Paul Gaulois. More important and better known was l'Autorité founded by Paul Granier de Cassagnac. He died in 1904 and his sons Paul J. and Guy de Cassagnac carried on the paper with great verve and engaged in many violent controversies. They did not deny the bonapartism of their father but they were much influenced by the doctrines of Action Française. Their main collaborator was Jules Delahaye who was in and out of parliament a number of times, ending his career as senator for Maine et Loire. As

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1. The four big circulation papers were le Petit Journal, le Petit Parisien, le Journal and le Matin. These were journaux d'information rather than journaux d'opinion. All had connections with Alliance Démocratique and their attitudes were moderate Republican. The first was owned by Charles Prevet, the progressiste senator; another senator, Jean Dupuy, owned the second and the families Bunau-Varilla and Letellier owned le Matin and le Journal respectively.

a journalist he was irresponsible and violent.

There were two important monarchist papers, la Gazette de France and le Gaulois. Gustave Jacinot was the editor of the former (the oldest paper in France) until his death in 1910 which terminated a fifty year connection with the paper. It was the newspaper of traditional aristocratic royalists and gave full reports of their activities. Although Jacinot paid respectful attention to the ideas of Maurras, who had once been employed by the paper, he did not follow him. Le Gaulois was the journal of the snob; Meyer's attitudes were governed by what was fashionable in "society" at the time. Both these papers were very well produced and more expensive than most of the other dailies. In 1908 Action Française (which had been a weekly) became a daily paper and added a new and more scurrilous tone to monarchist journalism.

Le Journal des Débats, edited by Etienne de Nalèche, had originally been an Orleanist paper but it had become socially conservative and politically liberal, having no connections with political organisations. It occasionally carried an article by a prominent politician and gave general support to the Right.

These were the important papers of the Right in Paris in 1905. They provided an impressive chorus of opposition to the governments and to much of the legislation of the time. Collectively, they probably had more influence

than the organisations of the Right. There was a suggestion (made by the Cassagnac brothers) that an opposition should be formed based on the conservative press. They proposed that the newspapers should co-operate and adopt common opposition tactics:

> Nous souhaitons remplacer le système de guérillas, des escarmouches, par le système des batailles rangées. 1

Arthur Meyer rejected the idea, writing that newspapers lived by revelations and had to act alone.[2] The Right was the very antithesis of a disciplined army and its divisions were illustrated by its press even more accurately than by its organisations.

There were also a large number of provincial papers which were conservative in tone. It was claimed that over seven hundred local papers supported the Fédération Républicaine. This was probably an over-estimation but there is no doubt that the various tendencies of the Right controlled more of the local press than their opponents. Some deputies of the Right wrote regular articles for their local papers,[3] nearly all of them contributed occasional articles. The nature of the articles sometimes gives an indication of the

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1. L'Autorité, 11th July 1906.
2. Le Gaulois, 10th July 1906.
3. To give three examples, Joseph Thierry wrote weekly articles for le Petit Marseillais, Laurent Bonnevay (progressiste) for la Petite Gironde, Alexandre Lefas (Progressiste/Action Libérale) for l'Ouest Eclair.

kind of local pressure to which deputies were subject. But although in many of the large provincial cities there were old-established papers which enjoyed a considerable prestige (and were quoted by the Paris papers)[1], they contributed little to the general political debate. All could be regarded as the provincial equivalent of one or other of the Paris newspapers.

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1. The most quoted of the conservative provincial newspapers and therefore the most prestigious were: Bordeaux - La Petite Gironde and la Liberté du Sud-Oeust (est. 1911); Lille - La Dépeche, L'Echo du Nord, Le Réveil du Nord; La Nouvelliste de Lyon; le Petit Marseillais; Nancy - L'Est Républicain; Nantes - Le Phare de la Loire; Rennes - Le Nouvelliste de Bretagne, L'Ouest Eclair; Le Journal de Rouen; Toulouse - L'Express du Midi.

The Elections and the Organisations 1906-1919.

The elections of 6th and 20th May 1906

> Opposons au bloc des sectaires le bloc des catholiques, des conservateurs, des libéraux, des modérés. 1

This was the dream of the opposition before the legislative elections of May 1906; but in spite of the awareness of all groups of the desirability of unity no comprehensive electoral alliance was formed.

The bulletin of Action Libérale noticed that a number of seats were lost in the senatorial election of January 1906 through the disunity of opposition groups.[2] But it shied away from official contacts with other groups.[3] One reason

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1. Le Correspondant, 25th April, 1906.

2. Action Libérale Populaire, 11th January 1906.

3. The official policy of Action Libérale was that alliances were necessary and should be made with all those who defended "la liberté et le droit commun contre les collectivistes." Annuaire de l'Action Libérale Populaire, Ed. E. Saillard. 1904. p. 170. Courtesy should be maintained at all times with allies and "il ne faudra jamais, sous prétexte de donner une leçon, faire passer un pire." Most elections were fought between "un sectaire, un modéré, un conservateur catholique."
"Le candidat conservateur ou catholique ayant eu plus de voix au premier tour que le candidat modéré, celui-ci s'est retiré. Le candidat conservateur catholique s'est donc trouvé, au second tour, en face du candidat sectaire, lequel l'a battu. Dans ce cas la bonne politique aurait consisté pour nous, à ne pas présenter aucun candidat, pas même au premier tour, et à soutenir ou même susciter le modéré, qui avec nos voix, aurait battu le sectaire. Nous entrerons ainsi en relations amicales avec les modérés et, peu à peu, si nous agissons avec habilité et loyauté sur le terrain constitutionnel, ils nous feront ... une place sur leurs listes." Ibid. pp 170-172. Electoral tactics were, however, a local concern. Ibid. p. 174. This policy was obviously against the interests of the monarchists and was not welcomed by the progressistes.

was, perhaps, over-confidence. The parliamentary group had had considerable success in attracting deputies to its standard during the legislature 1902 to 1906. It was often repeated that in 1902 a majority of only 200,000 had returned the bloc des gauches to power and a small swing in the election would result in victory for the Right. Action Libérale also lived in the hope of rallying the whole of Catholic France and many non-Catholic conservatives to its support.[1] Certain factors seemed to favour this. It was numerically and, probably, financially the most powerful organisation opposed to the bloc. Its Republicanism of convenience fitted a prevailing conservative mood. It could, as the party of the ralliement, represent itself to Catholics as the party of those most obedient to the Pope and at the same time point out that it was not a sectarian confessional party. It possessed, in de Mun, the most eminent Catholic layman of the day and was patronised by Osservatore Romano which described it as "the germ of the future regeneration of France." The association also had a detailed social programme (judged by the standards of the programmes of other parties).

The possibility existed that the Fédération Républicaine and Action Libérale would be successful at the polls and

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1. Although Piou denied that he claimed a primacy or a directing role for Action Libérale amongst the groups of the Right (J. Piou, Les Elections de 1906. 1905. p. 14) he seemed to be aiming for this.

together would be able to change the orientation of the government. But, in spite of the desire expressed in official Liberal policy for co-operation with the progressistes, there was still much dividing them. The progressistes' role as defenders of the Church was more recent (many progressistes had been anti-clerical until the turn of the Century and a few still were) and more uncertain than the reconciliation of the Liberals to the Republic. In the great battles of the first twenty years of the Republic they had been on opposite sides of the fence. Close co-operation still seemed compromising to both.

Although the prominent progressiste leader, Jules Roche, attended Liberal congresses on more than one occasion, neither he nor any other progressiste notable called in 1906 for public co-operation between the Fédération Républicaine and Action Libérale. There was only one notable instance where such co-operation took place. Early in January 1906 a Comité d'Union des Républicains Libéraux et Progressistes de la Gironde was formed on the initiative of Ballande, the progressiste deputy for the second constituency of Bordeaux. All the progressiste and Liberal candidates who fought the election in the Gironde did so under the patronage of this committee. But the committee was an exception and not the forerunner of a national trend. The bulletin of Action Libérale in its review of the electoral situation did not advise its readers to vote for

progressistes when there was no Liberal standing. Some local committees did so and there may have been instructions from Paris in this sense. There was seldom a progressiste committee when there was no progressiste candidate so this support was not reciprocated. The national committee of the Fédération Républicaine did not publish a list of candidates whom it supported so it is impossible to say whether it preferred Liberals to, for example, candidates of Alliance Démocratique. Significantly the progressistes and the Liberals did not attack one another except where the former had voted for anticlerical legislation.[1] This entente, if it can be described as such, was tenuous and informal.

The aim of the leaders of Action Libérale, the creation of a strong conservative Republican party, prevented them from coming to an agreement with their co-religionists of the more extreme Right. This would have confirmed in the eyes of their enemies, and perhaps also in the eyes of some of their own Catholic supporters that they were not sincere Republicans.[2]

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1. Opinions were expressed that support by Liberals of progressistes was not reciprocated. See, for example, Action Libérale Populaire, 14th January 1904. On the other hand three Liberals stood against anticlerical progressistes in 1906 and defeated them: vicomte de Hercé defeated Renault-Morlière in Mayenne 1; Edmond Leblanc, Déribée-Desgardes in Mayenne 2; Pierre Adigard, François Salles in Domfront 2. Orne.

2. Piou said in 1905: "L'union, oui, mais l'union au grand jour. Je dis aux monarchistes, à tous qui ont gardé au coeur le culte du passé: "Vous êtes nos alliés, nous combattrons à vos côtés." Congrès National de l'A.L.P. Compte-rendu. 1905. p. 8. But Piou wanted co-operation and good-will without commitments.

Guilt by association seemed to frighten the moderate Right much more than the radical socialists who readily entered electoral agreements with the socialists even when major issues divided them. The reticence of the leaders of Action Libérale brought strong criticism from the exponents of "bloc contre bloc" on the extreme Right.

Men of bonapartist tendency were strongly in favour of a unification of the opposition. The most emphatic campaign for a coalition based exclusively on the issue of religious defence was carried on by the Cassagnac brothers and Jules Delahaye in l'Autorité. Since their influence was scattered and declining their arguments seem closely allied to self-interest. This group could not have given much assistance to the Right as a whole - indeed, in many constituencies their support would have been embarrassing - but the public support of their own candidatures by all sections of the Right would have helped them to conserve their few remaining positions. Larochе-Joubert, for instance, lost Angoulême 1 (Charente) which probably could have been held if he had had progressiste support. Déroulède was opposed by progressiste voters in Angoulême 2.

The manifestoes of the Ligue de la Patrie Française [1] and the Comité électoral du groupe Républicain Nationaliste [2]

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1. L'Autorité, 7th February 1906.
2. L'Autorité, 28th March 1906.

expressed the view that if the groups of the "opposition" worked together they would win. The nationalists tended to regard the Right as a fairly coherent coalition, permeated by their ideas. Indeed, all candidates of the Right, by this time, repeated nationalist slogans when talking about the army, social discipline and national prestige. The assurances demanded of candidates by the nationalist groups were of a kind which all members of the Right could give readily. The assurance required by the manifesto of the Ligue de la Patrie Française was simplicity itself:

> Une seule question suffira partout ..... Etes-vous prêts à combattre la francmaçonnerie? Etes-vous décidé à n'accepter aucune compromission avec les internationalistes?

Some of the moderate Right regarded the tactics of the nationalists as those of division rather than of union.[1] The nationalist programme was, however, generally well-received by all sections of the Right.

The Royalists also affirmed their desire for unity. The official electoral policy, laid down by the pretender in 1903, was that:

> Toutes les fois que sur un point quelconque le programme royaliste se rencontre avec le programme d'un autre parti, les chefs royalistes doivent tout mettre en oeuvre pour arriver à une entente et provoquer une action commune. 2

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1. See La République Française, 22nd April 1906. The main complaint was that the nationalists introduced the army into the electoral arena.

2. Revue Catholique et Royaliste, 20th March 1906. p. 144.

The manifesto of the Comité Electorale Royaliste stated that a restoration was necessary but that this did not mean that co-operation with others was impossible:

> .... dans l'état de division où sont les meilleurs esprits, ils (the Royalists) ont aussi le devoir de travailler à rapprocher et à unir toutes les bonnes volontés.

This could be done without anyone having to conceal their convictions or allegiance:

> Nos amis ont coutûme de pratiquer la politique de renoncement qui leur semble généreuse. L'heure est venue pour eux de ressaisir. 1

Monarchist statements before the election showed a willingness to co-operate with Action Libérale. A monarchist spokesman, the comte de Larègle, wrote an article on 20th March 1906 paying tribute to the Liberal leaders (although he had some doubts about Piou). He admitted that Action Libérale was the only strong organisation of the Right and that it would play the leading role in the elections.[2] He thought that a Catholic entente was possible and essential[3] but criticised the Liberal policy of deferring to progressistes whom he disapproved of and distrusted.[4]

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1. La Gazette de France, 26th January 1906.
2. Revue Catholique et Royaliste, 20th March 1906. p. 140.
3. Ibid. p. 144.
4. Ibid. p. 141.

The general tactical attitude of the parties of the Right was that they preferred to co-operate with the organisation immediately on their Left rather than groups further to the Left or with any group on their Right. In the law of Separation there was, apparently, a ready-made issue as a basis for co-operation between all the groups of the Right but there existed neither sufficient agreement on the attitude to be adopted on this issue, nor a sufficient sense of urgency that unity was necessary. The apparent desire for unity and the absence of any practical steps to effect it were the most remarkable features of the election campaign.[1]

The clerical issue dominated the election.[2] But neither the Catholic and non-Catholic moderates nor the nationalists wanted to fight the election on this issue. The moderates, realising that there was not a clerical majority in the country and who, in any case, were not clericals themselves, wished to avoid taking a strong line on the law of Separation. The Pope had not yet condemned the associations cultuelles so that there was no concrete reason why Catholics should declare unconditional hostility to the law or any part of it. The only areas of the country where such hostility was popular

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1. Some optimists saw a kind of unity emerging before the elections including not only the Right but stretching as far as Paul Doumer. See, for example, La Presse, 18th April, 1906.

2. See J. Guiraud, La Séparation et les élections. 1906. pp. 361 - 371.

were those which could not have been lost to the Right anyway. Consequently, the manifestoes of Liberal and progressiste moderates spoke vaguely of reform of the law and of its application. The manifesto of Action Libérale accused the bloc of wishing to "aggraver la loi de séparation, pour en faire une arme de guerre"[1] not of passing it in the first place. One of the few moderate manifestoes to state an unambiguous position on the law of Separation was that of the five "candidats Républicains Libéraux et Progressistes de la Gironde" who did not desire repeal or reform but:

> Nous voulons que l'application de la loi soit libérale sans aggravation nouvelle, et ne voulons point nous trouver une fois de plus en présence d'un piège tendu à notre confiance et notre loyauté. 2

The Parisian anti-clerical nationalists Henri Tournade, Ernest Roche and Gabriel Failliot deplored the importance given to the clerical problem. Failliot argued in a speech to his constituents that the opposition would have been on much surer ground if it had concentrated on the social question.[3] The nationalist press gave a great deal of space to social troubles; in particular, l'Echo de Paris ran a series

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1. Action Libérale Populaire, 18th January 1906.

2. They were taken to task for expressing these sentiments by the monarchists. Gustave Jacinot wrote: "On comprend dans ces circonstances que la "consultation nationale" perd tout intérêt." La Gazette de France, 28th April 1906.

3. La Patrie, 30th April 1906. Failliot's constituency was the first of the fourth arrondissement.

of alarmist articles in the months before the election on "la Révolution qui vient."[1] Some nationalists, though they had voted against the Separation in the Chamber, hardly mentioned it in their election campaign and tried to submerge it in their social programmes. Jules Auffray, an ex-monarchist, the outgoing deputy for the fifth arrondissement of Paris, and one of the more clerical of the metropolitan nationalists gave a typical example of this emphasis in an interview in which he outlined his programme:

> Je lutterais contre le collectivisme, avoué ou déguisé, contre le grève obligatoire, la limitation uniforme des heures de travail, la nationalisation ou la municipalisation des services tel que le gaz, l'électricité etc., mais je n'oublierai point ce que la société doit au prolétariat; je me préoccuperai d'améliorer la situation des petits fonctionnaires, et ouvriers de l'Etat; je poursuivrai l'amélioration, la coordination et le vote des lois réglant les conditions du travail. Je ferai appel à toutes les forces combinées de l'Assistance Publique et à la bienfaisance privée (dont je n'exclus pas les congrégations hospitalières que je défendrai contre les sectaires anti-démocrates) 2

He went on to say that he would combat anticlericalism (which he linked with anti-militarism and freemasonry) but his only specific engagement was to defend nursing orders. The reason for this reticence on the part of some nationalists and many progressistes was their desire to attract non-Catholic as well as Catholic votes.

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1. These articles surveyed a number of industries, concentrating especially on the state of the Arsenals at Toulon (by Gaston Dru) and at Brest (by Pierre Ciais) and the railways (by Jean Bello).

2. La Presse, 5th May 1906.

In some constituencies, however, the situation was exactly the opposite. In an attempt to gain Catholic votes the veteran nationalist Paul Déroulède, who had never been a noted dévôt, engaged himself to press for negotiations with the Vatican and a new concordat.[1]

Either through conviction or because of opinion in their constituencies the right wing of Action Libérale led by de Mun, Castelnau and Ollivier, the nationalists of the West and the monarchists gladly agreed to fight the election almost entirely on the clerical issue. Their minimum programme as a rule was negotiations with the Vatican and, either implied or stated, a new concordat.

The undecided attitude of the episcopate helped, if it did not create, the expression of different opinions by candidates of the Right. The pastoral letters of the bishops emphasised the importance of the elections and also the importance of extracting promises from the candidates. One bishop wrote:

> ... si vous voulez agir en vrais catholiques, vous ne pouvez donner votre confiance qu'aux hommes qui auront promis de réformer cette loi. Mais ne vous contenter pas de paroles en l'air, de promesses plus ou moins indéterminés, de phrases échappatoires; exiger des engagements formels, nettement accusés et publics. 2

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1. La République Française, 15th May 1906.
2. Pastoral of the bishop of Auch. L'Autorité, 26th April 1906.

Another instructed the faithful that candidates should be made to promise to abrogate the law.[1] The bishops wanted deputies who would be willing to reform the law in accordance with decisions which had not yet been made. Being unable to say this openly, they did not speak with one voice and their instructions could usually be given more than one interpretation.

In spite of the differences of emphasis and opinion, most candidates of the Right represented the election as a straightforward fight between the Right and the Left. The election appeal of Maurice Spronck, nationalist deputy for the seventh arrondissement of Paris, was typical of many:

> Jamais la situation électorale ne fut plus nette ni plus simple. Il s'agit de savoir si vous êtes: pour la patrie contre les internationalistes; pour le respect des libertés religieuses contre les attentats des sectaires francmaçons; pour l'union féconde de tous les français contre les profiteurs de guerres civiles; pour le drapeau tricolore contre les haillons rouges ou noirs de l'anarchie ..... pour la souveraineté du peuple contre la honteuse démagogie des Combes, des Pelletan, des Hervé, ou des Clemenceau; pour les honnêtes gens contre les mouchards. 2

It was a simple situation in so far as candidates either supported or opposed the bloc des gauches.[3] Candidates of the Right were unanimous in rejecting the work of the previous legislature. In addition allegations were made that the bloc

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1. Pastoral of the bishop of Marseilles. Le Temps, 5th May 1906.

2. L'Autorité, 26th April 1906.

3. For example, all issues were related to this simple division in the manifesto of Action Libérale. Action Libérale Populaire, 18th April 1906. And in electoral pamphlets such as J.-B.-J. Ayroles, Les Responsabilités des électeurs du bloc maçonnique. 1906.

would use all means to stay in power - fraud, corruption, favours and administrative pressure. The general impression created by the manifestoes of the organisations of the Right was that the object of the campaign was to remove the bloc from power and not to get their candidates elected to carry out a specific positive programme.

The inventories, the genuine fear of violence on May day, and Clemenceau's allegations that certain elements of the extra-parliamentary extreme Right had been plotting with the Confédération Générale du Travail to create disorders, combined to make tempers run high during the election campaign. There was some violence, although not as much as usually accompanied a major strike. Castelnau (Action Libérale) was injured during a disturbance at a meeting in his constituency in Aveyron. Another deputy, Lt/Col. Rousset (Independent), armed his supporters against opponents who came to his meetings in Meuse prepared for violence. He wrote insolently to the procureur de la République saying that he did not expect protection from "Republican" justice and that his supporters would use their weapons if necessary.[1]

Confident predictions of victory were made by representatives of both sides. For the Right, Gauthier de Clagny (Nationaliste) asserted in an interview:

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1. La République Française, 22nd April 1906. Rousset lost his seat.

> ... je crois que jamais l'opposition n'a eu depuis 1885, une occasion plus favourable pour engager la bataille avec des chances très sérieuses de victoire. 1

He added a note of caution by saying that he did not think that the opposition was exploiting this chance as much as it might have done. Admiral Bienaimé said in more direct language that the insufferable yoke had been borne too long; the Right was bound to win and the government itself was convinced that it was facing defeat.[2] However in private doubts were expressed; Denys Cochin (Independent) wrote in a letter:

> Je vais me représenter aux élections sans plaisir, même avec scrupules. Que dire, que promettre aux gens? Ils ne s'occupent plus de nous. Les radicaux leur ont promis la lune, et ne l'ont pas livrée. Nous, nous avons annoncé l'incendie, le pillage et le voil et cela n'est pas arrivé. On ne nous écoute plus. ... Vous sortez de la Chambre épouvanté de ce qui s'est dit et se prépare. Vous rencontrez des gens qui battisent, labourent, boursicotent, comme si de rien n'était. 3

The results of the first ballot produced various reactions. Some, as for instance Maurice-Binder,[4] were simply surprised that they were going against the Right. Others remained optimistic. Henri Galli (Nationaliste), himself en ballotage, asked the opposition not to lament and to remember the election of 1885[5] - which was not the happiest

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1. La Presse, 27th March 1906.
2. Ibid. 9th May 1906.
3. Letter of Cochin to Mme. Pierre d'Harcourt, December 1905. Cochin MSS.
4. La Presse, 9th May 1906.
5. Ibid. loc. cit.

of analogies. A leading article in l'Autorité said frankly that the results of the first ballot were bad and those of the second ballot would be worse.[1] There was much talk of corruption and administrative pressure.[2] The Right was not able to prove its charges before the committees of the Chamber which examined them.[3]

The election was a severe set-back for the Right. The official statistics, though inaccurate in detail and bitterly attacked as a result, gave an accurate general impression:

	Avant les élections	Après les élections	Différence
Réactionnaires	84	78	minus 6
Nationalistes	53	30	" 23
Progressistes	95	66	" 29
Républicains de Gauche	83	90	plus 7
Radicaux	96	115	" 19
Radicaux-Socialistes	110	132	" 22
Socialistes Unifiés	41	54	" 13
Socialistes Indépendants	14	20	" 6

The heading réactionnaires covered independents, monarchists and Liberals. The Liberals were justly indignant as they formed a separate entity both in the Chamber and in the country. Three groups, Gauche Démocratique, Union Démocratique and Union Républicaine, were covered by the title Républicains de Gauche. The latter would have been more accurately dealt

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1. L'Autorité, 11th May 1906.
2. See, for example, Action Libérale Populaire, 12th May 1906.
3. See Impressions Parlementaires - Élections Législatives de 1906.

with if it had been amalgamated with the progressistes.[1]

A guide to the extent of the change brought about by the elections was that eighty-four of the deputies who voted against the law of Separation did not appear in the new Chamber. One of these was a member of a Centre group and therefore did not belong to the Right in an organisational sense.[2] In addition two members of the nationalist group who voted for the law of Separation and two other members of the Right were absent for the division.[3]

There were eighty-seven deputies of the Right who were present at the time of the Separation who did not survive the elections. Four of them died[4] but only the seat of Godefroy Cavaignac was lost.[5] Five were elected to the Senate but all

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1. The progressistes provide a convenient example of the statistical problem which faced the ministry of the Interior in trying to give an accurate picture of the appearance of the new Chamber. The official statistics stated that there were sixty-six progressistes whereas the first group list published after the elections contained seventy-nine names. As fifty-one of these seventy-nine were also members of other groups, the ministry was not being unreasonable in ascribing thirteen of them to another of its general categories.

2. Colonel Astima (Union Démocratique), deputy for Bastia (Corse).

3. The nationalists were Ernest Roche and Lepelletier and the absentees were the progressistes Gouyon and Barbançois.

4. All of them nationalists - Edmond Archdeacon, Jules Brice, Harriague Saint-Martin and Godefroy Cavaignac.

5. A radical, Ajam, was elected at the by-election and again at the general election. Cavaignac, an ex-radical turned nationalist, had always depended on radical votes in his constituency of Saint-Calais (Sarthe). A return to a Leftist majority was inevitable after his death.

their seats were retained.[1] Eighteen retired, and, as two-thirds of these seats were lost to the Right,[2] the majority can be regarded as retiring in the face of imminent disaster. Sixty were defeated, five by candidates who joined groups of the Right.[3]

By this system of computation the Right lost a total of sixty-eight seats. The official statistics, so much abused, erred on the side of generosity.

The effect of the election on the strength of the groups in the Chamber was complicated. Success or lack of it at the polls was not the only reason for changes in the size of groups.[4] All the groups of the Right lost members except the Union Républicaine:

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1. Jean, comte de Gontaut-Biron, (Union Républicaine/Progressiste), Daudé (Action Libérale/Nationaliste), Elva (Action Libérale/Nationaliste), Lozé (Union Républicaine), Montalembert (Independant).

2. These seats were: Diagne (Basses Alpes), Marseilles 5 (Bouches du Rhône), Caen 1 (Calvados), La Châtre (Indre), Nérac (Lot et Garonne), Clémency (Nièvre), Lille 6 (Nord), Paris 10e arrondissement 1 (Seine), Saint-Denis 4 (Seine), Pontoise 2 (Seine et Oise), Moissec (Tarn et Garonne), Saint-Dié (Vosges).

3. These seats were all captured by Liberals: Yssingeaux (H.-Loire), Néron beat Adrien Michel (Action Libérale) Mayenne 1, Hercé beat Renault-Morlière (Progressiste) Mayenne 2, Leblanc beat Déribérée-Desgardes (Progressiste) Domfront 2 (Orne), Adigard beat François Salles (Progressiste) Levaur (Tarn), Belcastel beat Emile Campayré (Independent) (Belcastel and Néron were also members of the Progressiste group).

4. See supra p.11.

	Before Elections	Retired	Defeated[1]	Lapsed	New Members[2]	After Elections
Union Rép.	30	3	9	-	28(22)	46
Progressiste	98	8	31	-	20(6)	79
ActionLib.	78	8	20	6	20(5)	64
Nationaliste	51	3	17	3	1	29
Indépendents	42	6	10	4	13(6)	35

(Deputies belonging to two groups are counted twice). The nationalist group, losing over half its membership, suffered the most heavily as a result of the elections. The comparative proportion of members of the group who were defeated at the polls was much the same as that of Union Républicaine yet the latter increased its membership after the election by over one-third. The ability to attract new members did not depend absolutely on a successful electoral record. In the case of Union Républicaine after this election the tendency of old deputies to move Leftwards in group membership was the most important factor.

The elections of 1906 provoked more comment and discussion than the three subsequent elections. The reason for this was that there were two fairly clear-cut sides and the result of the battle between them was held by many to be uncertain. There was a serious possibility that the trend of the previous seven years could be halted.

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1. These deputies were defeated by candidates who joined the following groups: 7 Socialistes Unifiés, 3 Socialistes Ind., 16 Radical Soc., 30 Gauche Rad., 12 Union Démo./Gauche Démo., and 5 Right (see p.61 n. 3). Members of more than one of these categories have been paired off. The general tendency was for the Right to lose seats to the Centre rather than the Left.

2. The figures in brackets are the numbers of re-elected deputies who joined the group after the election.

Recriminations and attempts to explain away the results were the main occupations of the leader writers of the newspapers of the Right for some days after the elections. The nationalists could not avoid the unpleasant conclusion that they had been defeated. The headline carried by their most important journal was "nous sommes battus!"[1] and the intelligence of the electors was blamed for this result.[2] The elders of organised nationalism acknowledged defeat. Senator Marcère, the president of Patrie Française, said in an interview:

> Les élections ont été très mauvaises et pour ma part j'attribue l'échec de nos amis de l'opposition à un courant d'idées qui domine les cervelles des jeunes générations. 3

Jules Lemaître agreed with Marcère and accused the lay school of diffusing these ideas.[4] He added that many people were unwilling to vote for opposition candidates because they could not obtain favours from the government. Another nationalist, Henri Tournade, ventured the opinion that 800,000 additional votes over the number cast in 1902 were all fraudulent. Tournade added an original note in attributing the defeat of the Parisien nationalists to the:

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1. La Patrie, 22nd May 1906.
2. Ibid. 21st May 1906.
3. Ibid. 22nd May 1906.
4. La Presse, 23rd May 1906.

> ... déploiement vraiment excessif des forces militaires à l'occasion du premier mai. Le sabre a véritablement exaspéré le prolétariat parisien. 1

This explanation could well have been made by a socialist.[2]

The extreme Right put forward every possible excuse for its defeat. One of the most common was that Clemenceau's allegations of a royalist/C.G.T. plot and dishonest electoral manifestoes of radicals persuaded many gullible people, under the delusion that radicals were "men of order", to vote for candidates of the bloc. There were frauds in the country and frauds in the Chamber committees.[3] The electoral system was in itself immoral.[4] Progressiste tactics had weakened the opposition and the progressistes, although they talked of the "anéantissement du Nationalisme" and "la confusion des partis de la Droite", were themselves the real losers.[5]

The bulletin of Action Libérale was more measured in its appreciation of the situation but it did not admit the extent of the setback. Its major concern seemed to be

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1. La Presse, 9th May 1906.
2. Another nationalist opinion was that most of the blame was attached to : "L'imprévoyante politique du parti modéré, (i.e. the progressistes) .... En effet, le parti modéré au pouvoir a gouverné non pas uniquement avec ses amis et pour eux, mais, on peut le dire, au seul profit de ses pires ennemis." They were now reaping the harvest of their naïve policy of concessions. L'Echo de Paris, 9th May 1906.
3. See l'Autorité, 20th May 1906.
4. Ibid. 16th May 1906.
5. Ibid. 24th May 1906.

to keep up the spirits of supporters.[1] La Croix, at this time a firm supporter of Action Libérale, suggested that there should be no recriminations and appealed for a united opposition, implying that Action Libérale should lead it.[2] The comité directeur of Action Libérale gave its considered opinion in July.[3] It sought first to diminish the importance of the election, saying that an election was only an episode for Action Libérale the aims of which were primarily social and not political. The allegations that it had suffered a defeat, the committee stated, were untrue - it had merely failed to advance. The results were, the committee thought, unworthy of the effort made, the reasons being:

> Progrès évident des mauvaises doctrines, mensonges intéressés des professions de foi, invention perfide du faux complot, fraudes inouïes du scrutin ....

The committee saw some hope in the increase in the majorities of some successful candidates but it did not mention the unpleasant fact that some seats had been lost.[4]

The progressistes, whilst subscribing to the views

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1. See Action Libérale Populaire, 24th May 1906.
2. La Croix, 16th May 1906.
3. Action Libérale Populaire, 19th July, 1906.
4. These were increases in the majorities of Liberals in Dinan 2 (Côtes du Nord) - 346 votes, Chambèry 2 (Savoie) - 541 votes, Tournon (Ardèche) 531 votes, Castres 1 (Tarn) - 600 votes and Castres 2 - 3,260 votes. There were smaller gains elsewhere. Le Temps made the assertion that membership of the Liberal group in the Chamber remained high because "un certain nombre de membres de la droite proprement dite ou d'anciens nationalistes s'y sont, en effet, faire inscrire." This was denied - Action Libérale Populaire, 21st June 1906. In fact it was not

current amongst the Right on the perfidious behaviour of the administration and the candidates of the bloc, turned to the extreme Right for their scapegoat.[1] They complained bitterly of the effects of the politique du pire, which, they alleged, the monarchists practised on a large scale against the progressistes. The only seat they lost which could reasonably be described as resulting from the politique du pire was Lille 7 (Nord) where Jules Guesde (Socialiste Unifié) defeated Eugène Motte by just over three hundred votes.

Le Temps summarised the meaning of the election in terms of general conservative politics:

> Depuis vingt ans au lendemain de chaque consultation électorale nous répétons que le régime républicain sort fortifié ..... L'opposition libérale et conservatrice a eu le grand tort - à son point de vue - d'engager la lutte sur la question cléricale. C'est un mauvais terrain dans un pays comme la France. Et tout parti - monarchiste, impérialiste, voire républicain - qui se donne l'air de travailler dans l'intérêt du cléricalisme est voué d'avance à la défaite. Le vote récent de la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat, l'émotion causée par les inventaires, d'autres circonstances avaient fait concevoir à l'Action Libérale ..... un espoir de triomphe qui a été decu et des prétensions qui n'étaient pas justifiées.
>
> La France ne veut pas du cléricalisme. 2

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true; no monarchist joined the group and the former nationalists had also been members of Action Libérale before the elections.

1. La République Française, 22nd May 1906.

2. Le Temps, 7th May 1906. The writer ignored that the major issue on which the election was fought was not altogether of the opposition's choosing.

The Decline of Action Libérale

The aim of the leaders of Action Libérale was to make the association the great conservative party of France; its achievement depended directly on electoral success. If Action Libérale had been a well established party the defeat of 1906 need not have been serious. But it was the first election which the association had fought as an organised party and, in the circumstances of the time, it was decisive and irreversible. The morale of the members of the party was shaken and the attacks from the extreme Right were not effectively countered.

Hostility on the part of the extreme Right towards Catholics who had accepted the Republic was not a new thing. It had been manifest with varying degrees of intensity since the famous toast of Lavigerie. Many charges were made, villifying the motives and the tactics of Catholic Republicans. Before the elections of 1906 the Cassagnac brothers and Jules Delahaye conducted a campaign against Action Libérale, accusing Piou of misusing and misappropriating money contributed by Catholics to fight the common enemy.

The campaign, mainly directed at Piou[1] and not at the

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1. Albert de Mun was seldom attacked by the extreme Right, even by Action Française. Maurras confined himself to saying that the Republicanism of de Mun was unrealistic. See Charles Maurras, La Politique religieuse. 1912. p. 363.

ordinary members of Action Libérale, continued after the election. In 1907 Delahaye was calling him:

> ... le Chef destiné à incarner, par ses qualités et ses défauts, par ses prétensions et son insuffisance, la diminution des principes, et la décadence de caractère, qui ont engendré l'audace triomphante des ennemis de l'Eglise et de la Société.
>
> Il était d'une pauvreté d'idées, de savoir, de courage, exceptionnelle .....
>
> Il avait passé son existence à flotter entre tous les partis; mais il était une chose dont il n'avait jamais douté: c'était d'être né pour le plus haut rang. 1

Delahaye described him as "un simple fumiste" and a "vulgaire tapeur" and exploited with glee the reference made in the published papers of Mgr. Montagnini to a proposed attempt by Piou to bribe Clemenceau.[2]

These, and other similar attacks, might not have been important if Vatican policy had not changed. There was a change in Vatican policy, although the Liberals tried to deny it whilst the extreme Right tried to exaggerate its significance. In his encyclical Gravissimo officii of August 1906 Pius X called for Catholic unity in the interests of the Church without mentioning the need to accept the existing

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1. L'Autorité, 13th April 1907.

2. L'Autorité, 17th May 1908. Another monarchist, Denys Cochin, described Piou in almost exactly opposite terms, writing in a letter to d'Haussonville (17th April 1906) that he had "beaucoup de talent et beaucoup de courage - il a l'inconvenient d'une personalité trop militante ..... " Cochin MSS.

constitution. This remained his consistent position throughout his pontificate. The only crumb he threw to the ralliés was during his consistorial address of 15th April 1907 when he remarked, in passing, on " .. ce régime, nous l'avons toujours accepté, toujours respecté."[1] Although reaffirming that he was carrying on the policy of Leo XIII, Pius X emphasised the necessity of unity among Catholics rather than their acceptance of the regime. This led him to favour the foundation of a specifically Catholic political organisation. Merry del Val said on 19th June 1908:

> ..... Rien ne lui (the Pope) paraît plus opportun et plus pratique que d'appeler tous les gens de bien à s' unir sur le terrain nettement catholique et religieux, conformément aux directions pontificales. 2

The Liberals pointed to the saving clause "conformément aux directions pontificales" and said that these also included Au Milieu des sollicitudes. The implication that Catholics, whether monarchists, imperialists or republicans, should combine to defend the Church was clear and this was hailed by the extremists as a great victory for their point of view. It was a blow to the Republican, non-confessional Action Libérale although it was not a declaration of war against the Republic.

The so-called lifting of the "consignes de ralliement"

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1. See R. Cornilleau, Le "Ralliement" a-t-il échoué? 1927. pp. 22-23.

2. A. Dansette, Histoire Religieuse de la France contemporaine. 1951. Vol. II. pp. 381-382.

encouraged an attempt, led by comte Xavier de Cathelineau, a monarchist from Vendée, to form a coalition of Catholic organisations. Cathelineau wrote a letter to these organisations in December 1908 proposing an entente. He explained that if:

> ..... ces hommes de partis opposés acceptent de faire 'l'Entente' de tous, cela seul preuve qu'ils sont prêts à combattre pour la défense religieuse, même avec les institutions existantes en fait. Ils sont du reste, décidés à ne pas faire de politique de parti dans le comité de "l'Entente Catholique'." 1

The Vendéean panache of Cathelineau (only two years previously he had challenged Clemenceau to bring five hundred of his apaches down to Vendée and try to close a Church), his open monarchism and the phrase in his letter "même avec les institutions existantes en fait" made the proposal automatically suspect in the eyes of the leaders of Action Libérale. Their published response was a dry extract from the procès-verbaux of a meeting of the central committee:

> Le comité directeur de l'Action Libérale Polulaire, saisi par son président d'une lettre de M. de Cathelineau dans laquelle celui-ci exprime le désir de voir l'Action Libérale Polulaire entre dans une confédération de toutes les groupes politiques défendant les idées catholiques, confirme sa décision précédente: déclare qu'elle ne peut entrer que dans une confédération qui se placerait sur le terrain constitutionnel; affirme son désir de continuer les précédents de 1902 et 1906, et de s'entendre avec tous les groupes d'opposition de gauche ou de droite pour les questions électorales. 2

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1. Letter of 3rd December 1908. Published in all the newspapers of the Right and many of those of the Left.
2. Communiqué dated 7th December 1908.

Cathelineau again asked Action Libérale for co-operation later in the same month and continued attempting to secure it for the first half of 1909. La Croix devoted much space to the controversy which accompanied these attempts, showing a marked sympathy for the position of Action Libérale. By February Jules Bouvattier (the editor of la Croix) considered that the topic was exhausted and refused to publish anything more about it, but the discussion continued in other newspapers.

Only the main points of the controversy can be described here. The tone of the articles varied from courteous to scurrilous and offensive. The parliamentary monarchist leaders, Ramel and Lamarzelle, were courteous. They wrote a letter to le Soleil in February 1909 regretting the attitude adopted by Action Libérale but paying a personal tribute to Piou and saying that some of his tactics were good:

> .... la loyauté commande aujourd'hui, et nous sommes heureux de le reconnaître, que M. Piou a affirmé spontanément qu'il serait toujours disposé a conciler ses efforts avec les nôtres sur les points qui nous étaient communs, comme il l'aurait fait d'ailleurs en diverses circonstances. 1

The abbé Léon, director of the Ecole de Béthune at Versailles wrote a letter a few days after Lamarzelle and Ramel suggesting that some kind of comprehensive organisation should be set up specifically for the forthcoming elections.[2]

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1. Le Soleil, 23rd February 1909.

2. L'Autorité, 28th February 1909. The abbé Léon had made a similar proposal with the comte de Bourmont at the time of Keller's attempt to form a Catholic union in 1903.

Piou replied clarifying the electoral tactics of Action Libérale and denying in particular one innuendo:

> L'Action Libérale Populaire n'a jamais, ni aux élections de 1902, ni celles de 1906 subordonnée son concours à l'acceptation par les impérialistes et les royalistes de l'étiquette républicaine. Loin d'exiger des candidats qu'ils montrent "patte blanche" elle ne leur a demandé, sans s'inquiéter de savoir s'ils venaient de droite ou de gauche que de défendre sans reserve, et sans faiblesse les libertés en péril et surtout la liberté religieuse ... 1

Later in the year Emile Flourens, an ex-minister and former nationalist deputy, made a closely argued appeal in favour of the idea of an Entente Catholique. His conclusion was that the present party in power had governed France for the previous thirty years with the sole aim of dechristianisation; the issue must be made quite clear:

> A cacher son drapeau en face de l'ennemi, on ne gagne ni l'honneur ni profit. 2

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1. Le Gaulois, 28th February 1909.

2. Flourens argued that there were two possible objections to the Entente. Firstly, there existed a number of ligues and associations which, although their programmes differed in detail, were agreed on all essential points; the new grouping might be, therefore, a useless and perhaps dangerous superstructure - "... une complication nouvelle, et, par suite une chance de dispersion des forces." Secondly, it would have to include monarchists, imperialists and republicans. He countered the first objection with the argument that the number of different groups and associations was the result of individual initiatives and the legitimate aspiration of men to lead a political movement on which they could make their personal imprint. Flourens also admitted that the deep impression made on the country by former regimes had made them necessary but their number was one of the chief causes of the defeats of the Right. To most electors the divisions within the Right seemed an incurable weakness; they caused indifference, abstentions and disastrous electoral disputes. Moreover, all sections of the Right agreed that disunity was one of the more important causes of the defeat in 1906. Against the second objection he argued

The decision of the comité directeur of Action Libérale not to join the Entente remained unchanged. Without the support of the Liberals it could not have obtained the support of the majority of Catholics but Cathelineau, having obtained some episcopal support,[1] went ahead with his attempt to organise the Entente on a national scale. He failed but some diocesan catholic unions, under the patronage of the bishops, were formed. These unions never became very active political groups, probably because the bishops did not want to be directly involved in practical politics.[2] Between 1909 and 1914 there were twenty-one unions formed and some of the candidates whom they supported got into parliament.[3] They did not pretend to have control over the selection of candidates. Their principal propangandist, Jacques Rocafort, who wrote mainly in l'Univers (he was for some time its editor) wanted them to have a very

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that when one wished to overturn a tyranny it was ridiculous to refuse the support of any of the partisans of liberty whatever they might call themselves. The Republic might be the best form of government when it governed well but when it oppressed consciences and attacked interests one could not reasonably condemn those who preferred another form of government. L'Autorité, 29th September 1909.

1. He obtained particularly favourable responses from Mgrs. Richard (Auch), Henry (Grenoble), Cabrières (Toulouse), Turinaz (Nancy), Sevin (Chalons), Monnier (Troyes), and Izart (Pamiers).

2. See C. Guignebert, Le Problème réligieux dans la France d'aujourd'hui. 1922. p. 62.

3. The first successful candidate whom the unions supported was Taudière (Droites) (elected in Deux-Sèvres in 1912). At the elections of 1914 the successful candidates whom the unions supported were Taudière, Gouyon , Rohan and Baudry d'Asson (Droites) and Duboys-Fresnay (Indépendants).

much more active role[1] and accused Action Libérale of being their greatest obstacle.[2]

Although the achievements of this political organisation along confessional lines were not impressive, its very existence was an embarrassment to Action Libérale. There had been organisations before, such as the Ligue de la Résistance Catholique lead by Jules Delahaye and François Coppée, which asserted that they were "more Catholic" than Action Libérale and that Action Libérale was hesitant, through weakness or deceit, in its defence of the Church. But they neither attracted widespread support amongst the episcopate, nor received the tacit blessing of the Pope, nor flourished at a time when Action Libérale had suffered one electoral defeat and looked likely to receive another. Also the continuous sniping by ultra-Catholics at Action Libérale had a corroding effect on its prestige.

There were persistent reports, especially after the elections of 1910, of desertions from Action Libérale. Admiral de Cuverville admitted them openly at the congress of 1912.[3] Jacques Piou wrote that ".. les désertions se

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1. See J. Rocafort, Mes Campagnes catholiques. 1910.

2. J. Rocafort, Les Résistances à la politique de Pie X. 1920. Particularly p. 179. Abbé Lemire also opposed the unions and was severely criticised by right-wing Catholics. See Mgr. H. Delassus, La Démocratie chrétienne, parti et l'école. 1911. p.9.

3. J. Piou, D'une guerre à l'autre. 1932. p. 244.

multiplient dans ses rangs" and he began to wonder whether the Vatican had completely disowned them.[1] De Mun and he made a discreet enquiry at Rome, asking whether they should retire from politics in order to make room for more acceptable leaders.[2] The Vatican reply was that the instructions of Léo XIII were still the official policy of the Church and that they should remain at the head of their association; however, Piou wrote:

> ... comme on ne crut pas en haut lieu devoir rendre publique la déclaration faite dans un entretien privé l'accomplissement de leur mission devint pour eux aussi douloureuse qu'inéfficace. 3

Although Piou did not reply in kind to the scurrilous attacks made on him, they undoubtedly had an effect on his prestige. At one point a jury d'honneur consisting of de Mun, Paul Beauregard, Le Provost de Launay and Ramel had to be set up to consider the charges levelled against him by Delahaye.[4] This kept Delahaye quiet for a time but it showed that Piou thought that the charges were damaging. He seemed also, on occasion, to be trying to outbid the extremists by the violence of his language. He did not try violent tactics but by

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1. J. Piou, D'une guerre à l'autre. 1932. p. 244

2. Paul Lerolle (Action Libérale) also had an interview with the Pope with much the same result. See P. Blanchemain, Un Apostolat social et religieux: Paul Lerolle. 1925. pp. 420-421

3. J. Piou. op. cit. p. 263.

4. L'Autorité, 21st, 24th and 31st May 1909. Also La Croix, 22nd and 30th May 1909.

making statements such as "Soyons prêts pour les luttes, pour toutes les luttes"[1] he implied that there were other methods of opposition than the constitutional method which he had advocated for so long. The association of men of aggressive temperament with Action Libérale after 1910, as for example the nationalists Millevoye and Driant, changed the tone of the annual congresses. As the programme of the party had become more or less fixed by 1908, the congresses of Action Libérale became, like the congresses of the other parties, a forum for making fine speeches and little else.

Action Libérale was a product, firstly, of the ralliement and, secondly of the revival of anticlericalism which took place during the Dreyfus affair. The association gradually declined as these factors ceased to be of major importance in the political situation, in spite of attempts to give Action Libérale a doctrine and a programme transcending the issues which inspired its formation. It could have developed away from its origins only if the Liberals had been able to maintain or increase their numbers in parliament. This was the sine qua non of preserving the support of the Papacy and the majority of French Catholics. Without this support Action Libérale inevitably evolved towards a condition similar to that of the other minority groups of the Right.

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1. Congrès Nationale de l'Action Libérale Populaire, Compte-Rendu. 1911. p. 96.

The Elections of 24th April and 8th May 1910.

Neither the extreme Left nor the Right presented a real threat to the established political order in the elections of 1910;[1] many people noticed the dullness of the campaign. "Ces élections intéressent peu" wrote Denys Cochin in April.[2] A leading article in L'Autorité contained the complaint that:

> Jamais campagne électorale ne fut aussi plate, aussi dépourvue d'idéal, aussi vide de programme, que celle qui barbouille actuellement nos murs de ses répugnantes envies. 3

La République Française was of the same opinion and gave as reasons for this state of affairs:

> Il n'y a plus de partis, plus de programmes. La plupart des candidats battent pour un siège et non pas pour les idées: ils n'ont pas d'idées du tout si ce n'est pas celle de conquèrir la bonne place .... Les Radicaux ont pris le programme de républicains modérés; et cela supprime la bataille. Vous avez lu les programmes des comités. Ils se ressemblent tous par l'absence de tout engagement précis et de toute doctrine nette. ... Le vrai débat n'est pas devant les urnes. La grande question, c'est la question sociale; elle est hors du débat électoral. 4.

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1. André Siegfried classified the election of 1910 (along with those of 1876, 1880, 1893, 1898) as one of apaisement, contrasting it with the elections of 1877, 1885, 1889, 1902 and 1906 which he described as "élections de lutte (ou combat)". A. Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest. 1913. p. xxiii.

2. Revue de Paris, 15th April 1910. p. 778.

3. L'Autorité, 14th April 1910.

4. La République Française, 18th April 1910

But the parties were as much in evidence as they had ever been. Probably more votes went to candidates who were members of some national electoral organisation than ever before. A contemporary estimate was four-fifths.[1] Most of those who were not members were fairly easy to classify as radicals, independent socialists and so on. Those whom it was impossible to classify received collectively only about 50,000 votes.

The Right had certainly fallen into a state of lethargy and its members had not a great deal to say. They did not set great store by the outcome of the elections and were content, for the most part, to repeat the old slogans. The social question was not banished from the electoral campaign but it had ceased to be a real issue between the Right and the majority of the radicals; radical ministers had shown a readiness to oppose violent strikers with violence and were not tender-hearted towards civil servants attempting to organise.

The imprecision of the wording of electoral programmes was no greater, if no less, than in previous campaigns. The main formulae which made up the programmes were the same in

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1. P.-G. La Chesnais and G. Lachapelle, Tableau des élections législatives, 1910. p. 5. Both authors were partisans of proportional representation (the campaign for it was in full swing) and therefore were interested in ascribing as many candidates as possible to the parties.

1910 as they had been in 1906 but the relationship between the formulae and the political situation had changed. In 1906 a vaguely worded phrase about laïcisation committed a candidate to the anticlerical side of a violent controversy; by 1910 it could represent a passive acceptance of the status quo. In 1906 a commitment in favour of income tax, without qualification, could have meant anything; in 1910 it was a declaration against the Caillaux bill. Those in favour of the bill required an income tax which was "progressif et global." The extreme opponents of the bill affirmed that they were in favour of an "impôt sur les revenus sans inquisition ni vexations."

There were attempts to resurrect the combative atmosphere of 1906.[1] In 1909 an article in l'Autorité stated that the election should be fought "uniquement sur le terrain religieux et catholique"; if the Right did this, it could be stronger than ever.[2] During the election campaign the paper continuously repeated that religious persecution made civil peace impossible and that it threatened the most sacred rights and liberties. The writer of the article on le Devoir électorale

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1. The scurrilous anonymous pamphlets of the Right were much the same in the campaigns 1906, 1910 and even 1914. Compare, for example, Pour ou contre le bloc. 1906, with Le Bilan du bloc, Lyon 1910 and with La Foire blocarde, Besançon 1914. There was a revival of anti-semitic propaganda in 1910 - the most notable example was C. Fleury, La République Juive.

2. L'Autorité, 24th June 1909.

in l'Echo de Paris called for a complete rejection of the "system" which by:

> .... le gaspillage augmente chaque année les dépenses, la dette et le déficit; qui par abandon et par incurie, désorganise la défence nationale; qui a toutes les complaisances pour les meneurs des grèves et les agitateurs révolutionnaires; qui demeure impuissante à reprimer dans l'administration le désordre et l'anarchie ... 1

Many candidates carried on the tradition of verbal violence. Albert de Mun spoke with considerable bitterness in his constituency.[2] The nationalists maintained their aggressive posturing. The manifesto of Lucien Millevoye was much the same in wording and exactly the same in content as the one he wrote for the election of 1906. These were some of his main slogans:

> Pour la France d'abord! Pour la France avant tout! Pour la France toujours! Pour la France quand-même! Je n'ai jamais eu d'autre programme.
> .....
> Notre ARMEE doit être mise à l'abri des entreprises subversives qui s'attaquent audacieusement aux garanties de la discipline et à l'honneur du drapeau.
> Notre MARINE lamentablement distancée par les marines rivales ou ennemies, doit être résolument dotée des crédits indispensables à son relèvement, à son salut.
> Notre COMMERCE accablé des charges croissantes proteste avec une juste émotion contre une politique financière qui tour à tour l'inquiète et l'opprime.
> J'ai combattu, je continuerai à combattre les expériences fiscales qui fait peser sur chaque magasin,

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 24th April 1910.

2. A report in L'Echo de Paris, 20th April 1910 described a speech of de Mun's as a violent attack on the religious policies of all governments since 1887. De Mun wrote to the paper (23rd April) saying that he had also reviewed all aspects of recent government policies. The reporter's impression is not, however, irrelevant.

> sur chaque profession, sur chaque famille la menace d'une désastreuse inquisition.
>
> Le sort des OUVRIERS, des EMPLOYES de toute catégorie et de toute classe est lié aux relations cordiales du capital et du travail. TOUTE HAINE SOCIALE EST FRATRICIDE. [1]

The monarchists did not modify their language or their position. Some were affected by the contemporary atmosphere; the comité Royaliste de la Seine devoted a large part of its manifesto to electoral reform (although proportional representation was not advocated):

> La France depuis longtemps n'est pas représentée. C'est l'une des causes, et non la moindre, du mal qui nous dévore. Il ne peut y arriver - et il n'y aura de représentation nationale sérieuse et complète - que le jour où l'organisation sociale sera substituée au vote de l'individu associé; au vote individuel, le vote corporatif. [2]

The issue of electoral reform played some part in the election.[3] There were even men who were prepared to stake all on this one issue. One such was the nationalist, Maurice Spronck, who put forward this programme:

> 1. Voter la représentation proportionnelle selon le système Flandin ou tout autre, d'ailleurs, sur lequel on se mettrait probablement d'accord.
> 2. Voter le budget de 1911 pour assurer la marche des services.
> 3. Aussitôt la loi électorale et la loi des finances promulgés, demander au Président de la République et au Sénat de dissoudre la Chambre et de procéder à une consultation du pays selon le nouveau mode de scrutin. [4]

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1. La Patrie, 13th April 1910.
2. La Gazette de France, 16th March 1910.
3. See G. Hilleret, La Réforme électorale et les partis politiques en 1910. 1910.
4. L'Echo de Paris, 11th April 1910. This programme had first been suggested by George Grosjean, a former Liberal deputy.

His desire for an immediate dissolution probably resulted from the fear that the campaign for proportional representation would help the socialists. Charles Benoist asked, on behalf of the committee for electoral reform, that only those candidates who supported electoral reform should be voted for. This usually meant that voters of the Right should vote for socialists when no proportionalist of the Right was standing. Although most of the Right favoured proportional representation, there is no evidence that they did this on a large scale. Some candidates of the Right, as if to explain the impending defeat, said that the next Chamber could not be a good one because it would be the product of the scrutin d'arrondissment.

The Right was also more or less agreed on the issue of income tax. This was a subject hoary with age and nothing new could be said about it. Jules Roche, president of the Ligue pour la défense des contribuables, was the undisputed leader of the opposition to income tax. He received strong support from the Union du commerce et de l'industrie, the president of which at this time was Paul Beauregard. The latter organisation, although closely linked to the Fédération Républicaine, issued its own manifesto and carried on publicity which was not confined to economic issues. It supported proportional representation and was alarmist on the social problem: "... le temps presse. La Révolution n' attendra pas."[1]

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1. La République Française, 6th April 1910.

The most significant part of the election campaign of 1910 was the equivocal attitude of the moderate Right. An evolution had taken place since the great days of the "dreyfusian revolution". In this, Aristide Briand was a catalyctic agent. When he launched his slogan of apaisement in his speech at Périgueux on 10th October 1909 he was praised by many members of the Right.[1] This speech was made at the beginning of his ministry and since actions did not follow the fine words some of Briand's admirers on the Right became disenchanted.

When Briand advocated complete freedom of elections and described administrative pressure as immoral,[2] his statements were greeted with great scepticism, especially by the extreme Right. It was noticed that the prefect accompanied Viviani on a tour of his constituency, thus identifying the administration with Viviani's candidature; the Right therefore considered that Briand was not a man of his word.[3]

The content of Briand's campaign speech made in his constituency on 11th April 1910 was much the same as the content of the Périgueux speech. He placed more emphasis on

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1. For the text of Briand's speeches at Périgueux and Saint-Chamond (11th April 1910) see G. Bonnamour, L'Apaisement 1913. pp. 248 et seq.
2. See J.O., Sénat. 29th March 1910. p. 1047.
3. La Patrie, 4th April 1910.

the great work of laïcisation and implied that although he was receiving the plaudits of those who had once opposed him on this issue, he still retained his anticlerical views. On other issues his statements did not clash with the views of the moderate Right: he considered electoral reform necessary (but did not make any concrete suggestions); he favoured a statute for the civil servants but did not touch on the prickly subject of what their rights should be; the longest part of his speech was on the social question and here he came close to the views held by most members of the Right.[1]

All the newspapers of the Right reported and discussed Briand's speech at considerable length. Interviews with public men were sought and their comments on the speech were collected. The extremists, concentrating on the religious issue were harshly unfavourable. The conclusion drawn by l'Autorité was:

> M. Briand a pris soin de spécifier que pour entrer dans la République il faut accepter tous les lois de laïcité, c'est-à-dire tous les lois d'oppression et de tyrannie. .. Cette apaisement-là ne nous est rien qui vaille. 2

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1. There must be given, said Briand: ".... au monde ouvrier les moyens légaux de s'affranchir progressivement." He counselled the workers not to abuse their right to strike which could sometimes be detrimental to the interests of the country. "N'est-il pas possible de trouver les moyens de conciliation entre les travailleurs et les patrons, de ressoudre les conflits qui, le plus souvent naissent et s'aggravent de simples malentendus? Le Parlement devra travailler à la solution de cette problème." One of his solutions was ".. l'accession des travailleurs à la propriété, sinon individuellement, du moins collectivement ....." He asked industrialists to show confidence in the unions and concluded with a call for social apaisement.

2. L'Autorité, 12th April 1910.

La Patrie commented: "Certainement c'est très habile. C'est la manière serpentine."[1] Arthur Meyer wrote ironically that monarchists and bonapartists could not object to the parts of his programme that Briand had culled from the writings of the comte de Chambord and Louis Napoleon.[2] Le Soleil described the speech as drawing a prudent veil over the misdeeds of the majority in the previous legislature.[3]

The most charitable comment from the extreme Right was made by the nationalist, Gauthier de Clagny:

> Je ne mets pas en doute la bonne foi de M. Briand, je suis convaincu qu'il désire bien servir la France, mais avec l'instrument détestable qu'il a entre les mains il n'y parviendra pas mieux que d'autres.

He did not think that the speech would affect political alignments much.

> Les réformes sociales sont sans doute fort intéressantes, mais n'importe quel homme politique appartenant à n'importe quel parti aurait pu les inscrire dans son programme. .... .. la question de l'impôt sur le revenu ... semble avoir été passée sous la silence, volontairement ou non.....

Social peace, Gauthier thought, was not obtained by making beautiful speeches. Political peace was quite as difficult; Briand's attitude to the lois laïques illustrated this.[4]

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1. La Patrie, 12th April 1910
2. Le Gaulois, 12th April 1910.
3. Le Soleil, 12th April 1910.
4. La Patrie, 13th April 1910.

Gauthier was more favourably disposed towards Briand than was an important section of progressiste opinion. La République Française commented bitterly:

> M. Briand nous propose d'élever de petits tas de sable sur les bords de torrent qui menace de tout emporter. Merci, monsieur, merci pour vos bonnes intentions, mais ce n'est pas avec cela qu'on conjurera le désastre. 1

On the other hand the Thierry wing of the progressistes was influenced by Briand and even in the electoral campaign, when candidates usually adopted aggressive attitudes, this influence was apparent. A good example of the different attitudes of moderate Republicans was given in a meeting which opened the electoral campaign in Marseilles. The speakers were Charles Benoist, Joseph Thierry, Emmanuel Brousse and J. Exbrayat (secretary-general of the Fédération Républicaine). Benoist spoke only about electoral reform. Brousse, although according to group membership he was the furthest to the Left of those present, made a traditional speech in which he gave a harrowing account of conditions in the Midi since Combes:

> ... la magistrature, l'administration domestiquées au service du député du bloc; la fraude s'étalant partout, les fraudeurs impunis grâce aux protections scandaleuses qui les couvraient. 2

Thierry made a speech which was more conservative in tone

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1. La République Française, 12th April 1910.
2. Ibid. 14th April 1910.

than those of Briand but his choice of words and phrases showed the marks of the slogan of apaisement. He wished to exclude violent passions from the election, condemning what he considered the most common form of campaigning which was: "... à allumer et à attirer les passions, les convoitises et les haines"; and favouring the other which:

> ... consiste à se souvenir que ceux qui sollicitent les suffrages de leurs concitoyens devront plus tard, au milieu des intérêts et des passions opposés jouer le rôle des arbitres, poursuivre la recherche de l'intérêt commun, de concorde et de production nationale. 1

The manifesto of the Fédération Républicaine (the slogan of which was: "Nous ne voulons ni conserver sans renover, ni renover sans conserver".[2]) had the same tone:

> Le comité de la Fédération Républicaine fait appel à vos suffrages en vue d'une politique d'apaisement, de concorde et de réalisation. Le Pays est las de querelles stériles ou funestes qui n'engendrent que la haine et la ruine. 3.

The remainder of the manifesto was composed of the traditional phrases. [4]

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1. La République Française, 14th February 1910.

2. This phrase was coined by Charles Benoist. Joseph Thierry, 'Le Parti républicain modéré'. La Revue Hebdomadaire, 26th March 1910. p. 480.

3. La République Française, 14th February 1910.

4. The most typical asked the electors to condemn: "... le collectivisme, l'étatisme, les monopoles des alcools, des pétroles, des assurances, le rachat des chemins de fer, la fiscalité inquisitoriale, les grèves politiques, les excès de la Confédération Générale du Travail et tout ce qui paralyse et tue l'initiative individuelle.
Vous revendiquerez pour tous les français la liberté de conscience, la liberté d'enseignement, la liberté du travail et le respect pour de droits de l'homme et du citoyen."
The manifesto also called for proportional representation.

The left wing of the progressistes was the only section of the Right which was directly influenced by Briand but all the Right was very much concerned with what he said. He was the major source of news and controversy during the election campaign. This was partly because Briand, by representing himself as a man of national unity and concord, seemed to be cutting the ground from under the feet of the Right, and partly because there were no new issues and the election threatened to be a less exciting repetition of the election of 1906.

Unlike 1906 no section of the Right faced the election with exaggerated hopes. There were no confident predictions of success. The most sanguine comment was:

> Nous ne serons pas sans doute la majorité à la Chambre; mais nous devons être la majorité dans le pays 1

After the first ballot there was some cheerfulness. L'Autorité stated:

> Au point de vue sectaire, démagogique et révolutionnaire les élections de 1910 marquent un recul indiscutable sur les élections de 1906. 2

L'Echo de Paris expressed almost the same opinion:

> Ceci .... se dégage des chiffres connus, que la masse des électeurs français s'est complètement désaffectionnée des radicaux et des radicaux socialistes. 3

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1. La République Française, 24th April 1910.

2. L'Autorité, 25th April 1910. This comment was perhaps influenced by the success of Guy de Cassagnac in arriving at the head of the poll in Angoulême 1 (Charente). He was defeated at the second ballot.

3. L'Echo de Paris, 26th April 1910.

The evidence which the Echo produced to support this conclusion was that Henri Brisson was en ballotage and the majority of Camille Pelletan was reduced. La République Française was less complacent:

> Les résultats connus à l'heure où nous écrivons ces lignes témoignent du chaos qui régnait dans les esprits. 1

But the following day there was a happier note:

> Les élections sont meilleures que nous n'osions l'espérer: elle marquent un temps d'arrêt dans la descente vertigineuse vers l'abîme. 2

The results published by the ministry of the Interior after the second ballot were these:

	Chambre sortante		Chambre nouvelle	
Réactionnaires	80		71	
Nationalistes	16	- 96	17	- 88
Progressistes	60		60	
Républicains de Gauche	82	- 142	93	- 153
Radicaux et Rad./Soc.	269		252	
Socialistes Indépendants	29		30	
Socialistes Unifiés	55		74	

As usual there were protests against these statistics. Other sources gave widely differing results. Agence Havas thought that there were seventy-two progressiste deputies, le Temps sixty-eight and la République Française estimated the number at about a hundred. Estimates of the strength of other groups

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1. La République Française, 25th April 1910.
2. Ibid. 26th April 1910.

(with the exception of the Socialistes Unifiés) varied accordingly.

Alliance Démocratique objected to the telescoping of the radicals and the radical socialists on the grounds that there were often great differences in their programmes.[1] The Alliance had supported many radical candidatures and therefore was interested in making this distinction. Le Rappel, the Combiste paper, estimated that the radical socialists had lost about forty seats.[2] These losses were, to a certain extent, hidden in the ministry's statistics. An important swing to the right in the Centre of the Chamber was thus obscured.

This swing was pleasing to the Right which generally interpreted it as a swing in favour of Briand. La République Française considered that:

> Les élections du 8 mai signifient avec plus de force que celles du 24 avril:- Apaisement! Le discours de Périgueux marque une date dans notre histoire. Depuis vingt ans, pas une parole n'avait si profondément retenti dans l'âme du pays. On peut dire que les élections sont inspirées de cette parole, qu'elles répondent à cet appel. 3

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1. "On persiste à englober sous la même rubrique les radicaux-socialistes et les radicaux, on dissimule ainsi l'affaiblissement des premiers. On distingue entre les républicains de gauche et républicains, on classe dans l'opposition de droite des progressistes qui sont des républicains. La confusion est profonde, elle est peut-être voulue; le pays ne comprend pas." Bulletin de l'Alliance Républicaine Démocratique. May 1910.

2. Le Rappel, 10th May 1910.

3. La République Française, 10th May 1910. The writer also thought that the increased representation of the socialists was the result of the politique du pire practiced by the extreme Right.

L'Echo de Paris thought that the elections marked "la fin du Combisme."[1] The comité directeur of Action Libérale announced that it was content with the results although it deplored the loss of some seats.[2] Even l'Autorité thought that there was some good in the results.[3] This was the general attitude of the monarchists and the nationalists who could not pretend that they had increased their numbers in the Chamber but who could console themselves with the signs that the Chamber was becoming a little more conservative.

The results of the election, as reflected in the membership of the groups, showed that the Right had barely succeeded in maintaining its numbers. Forty-nine members of the groups of the Right disappeared but forty-eight new deputies replaced them. Of those who disappeared, twenty-seven were defeated and twenty-two retired (twelve of these seats were lost).[4] Thirty-nine new seats were captured by the Right

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 9th May 1910.
2. La Patrie, 10th May 1910.
3, L'Autorité, 9th May 1910.
4. The seats lost by the Right at the election went to candidates who joined the following groups:

Soc. Un.	Soc. Ind.	Rad. Soc.	Gauche Rad.	Gauche Démo.
3	3	14	8	10

The losses were more evenly spread than they had been in 1906.(See p. 62 n. 1).

but all had been in the hands of the Right within the previous twelve years.

The disappearance, after the elections, of the practice of double appartenance complicated the statistical appreciation of the effect of the elections on the groups (although it simplified it for future elections). The changes brought about were these:

	Before the elections		Losses and retirements	New members	After elections
Union Républicaine	6		3	-	-
Union Rép./Prog.	33)		8	-	-
Progressiste	26)	74	7	33	80
Prog./Action Lib.	15)		8	-	-
Action Libérale	31)	60	7	8	34
Action Lib./Nat.	14)	29[a]	8	-	-
Nationaliste	12)		3	-	-
Droite	-		-	-	19
Indépendants	35		5	7	22
	172		49	48	155[b]

a. Two had triple membership and another was a member of the progressiste group.
b. Sixteen former members of the Union Républicaine and progressiste groups seceded from the Right and joined groups of the Centre.

The decline in the membership of Action Libérale was due more to a failure to attract new deputies than to losses in the election - the margin of losses over gains had been only eleven whilst the group membership fell by twenty-six. This marked a stage in the merging of the Liberals with the rest of the Republican Right. The disappearance of the nationalist group, foreshadowed by the results of the elections of 1906,

was inevitable after further Nationalist defeats in 1910.

The elections of 1910 advanced the developments which were already apparent. The swing in the Centre of the Chamber affected the Right in that it helped Thierry and his friends to become accepted as members of the ministerial majority. This limited and weakened still further the opposition of the Right in the Chamber.

The Elections of 26th April and 10th May 1914.

The three years law provided important common ground between the Right and the Centre during the electoral campaign of 1914. Even Clemenceau said that if he had been faced with the alternative of voting for a progressiste who supported the law and a radical who did not he would have voted for the progressiste.[1] Despite this common ground the supporters of the law did not form a coalition for its defence. There were too many other issues dividing them.

L'Echo de Paris, reviewing the electoral situation, suggested that there were four key divisions in the legislature of 1910 to 1914 which could serve as an indication of which outgoing deputies were acceptable. These were:

1. Scrutin sur l'ensemble du projet de loi consacrant la service de trois ans.

2. Scrutin sur l'impôt sur le revenu avec inquisition (27 février 1914 - priorité sur l'ordre du jour de Jean Durand et Balitrand).

3. Scrutin sur l'amendment de Delpierre ayant pour but de consacrer l'immunité de la Rente.

4. Scrutin sur la prise en considération de l'amendment Drelon, visant l'article 2 du projet de loi relatif aux caisses des écoles, permettant tous les enfants indigents qui fréquentent l'école publique ou l'école privée de bénéficier des avantages accordés par ces caisses. 2

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1. La Presse, 10th May 1914.
2. L'Echo de Paris, 6th April 1914.

The programme implied here (support for the three years law, benefits for pupils of the école libre from the state purse, the rejection of income tax and tax on government securities) could only have been supported in its entirety by a member of the Right. Members of the Centre were not prepared to consider even indirect aid to Catholic schools and they would have found it inconvenient to oppose income tax in public.

A community of interest lead to a small amount of co-operation between the Alliance Démocratique and the Fédération Républicaine. Some candidates, Joseph Thierry being the most important of them,[1] were supported by both these organisations. These candidates collected between them only 161,942 votes or 1.94% of those cast.[2]

As in 1910, there were some sections of the Right which tried to increase the temperature of the electoral campaign by representing the election as a conflict between the bloc des gauches and the Right. Emile Massard wrote in la Patrie:

> La situation est très clair malgré les efforts tentés en vue de l'embrouiller par les gens de la rue Valois. Il y a d'un côté, le sectarianisme, l'inquisition fiscale, le renoncement national, le "Rochettisme". Il y a de l'

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1. Le Petit Provençal, 21st April 1914. The paper commented: "... cette timide tentative d'évolution politique ... laisse M. Thierry prisonnier de ses attaches réactionnaires locales."

2. P.-G. La Chesnais, Statistiques des élections législatives. 1914. p. 10.

> autre côté le libéralisme, les réformes honnêtes, le patriotisme et la représentation proportionnelle qui doit assainer les moeurs électorales et relever le prestige des élus en leur permettrant de soustraire aux intérêts particuliers pour défendre l'intérêt général ... 1

In 1914, however, the bloc des gauches was no longer a reality. The four major components of the bloc - the Socialists, the Caillaux (or rue Valois) Radicals, the Comité Mascuraud and the Alliance Démocratique were at loggerheads with one another. But propagandists like Massard realised that the precondition of a united and combative Right was a united and militant Left. They tried, therefore, to behave as if the latter existed; some probably believed that it did.

Not all the latter belonged to the extreme Right. The progressiste, Charles Benoist subscribed to the view, apparently sincerely, that the election was between the bloc on one side and all honest men on the other. He adopted a violent and bitter tone, describing the struggles in the constituencies as:

> Combats obscurs des rats et des grenouilles dans la vase des mares stagnantes!
> Dans cette vase pullulent les groupes, qui ne sont que des côteries d'ambitions, des syndicats de clientèles, et qui se comporte comme des bandes.. 2

The frustrating knowledge that the Right was about to face yet another electoral setback was behind much of the violent

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1. La Patrie, 26th April 1914.
2. Ch. Benoist, Un Programme - 1914. 1914. p. 9.

language spoken in 1914. The outcome of the election was usually referred to cynically -

> S'il est difficile de prédire à l'avance les résultats, il est aisé d'annoncer en tout cas comme certaine une confusion complète. 1

There was little new in the programmes or the issues raised in the electoral campaign. The Right used the Rochette affair as evidence of the corruption of Radical ministers. L'Echo de Paris distributed, at greatly reduced prices, the report of Maurice Barrès on the affair.[2] The programme of Action Libérale contained one depressing addition; it promised to support measures restricting the liberties and activities of foreigners in France.[3] Despite the recent discussion of measures touching the école libre the religious issue was mentioned less in 1914 than it had been in 1910. Maurice Spronck, a nationalist deputy for Paris, thought he discerned "un esprit nouveau des périodes électorales" resulting from the declining importance of the clerical question.[4]

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1. La République Française, 26th April 1914.
2. M. Barrès, Dans la cloaque. 1914.
3. Action Libérale Populaire, 14th February 1914.
4. La République Française, 14th April 1914. On a local level there was a remarkably bitter dispute between monarchists and Liberals in the constituency of Sables d'Olonne (Vendée). See L. Dimier, L'Action Libérale dans les élections. 1914.

After the first ballot, as a result of the success of supporters of the three years law, there was some jubilation on the Right. La République Française expressed the opinion that in some parts of the country there was: ".... un vif réveil de l'opinion publique au profit d'une politique d' ordre, de liberté et de progrès." Also, the country had expressed hositlity to official radicalism.[1] La Patrie considered that the success of the supporters of the three years law was the result of nationalist propaganda: ".... beaucoup de nos adversaires ont été obligés, pour se faire élire, d'afficher notre programme de défense nationale. 2 It was, however, only a partial triumph: "La loi des trois ans est consacrée, mais l'impôt sur le revenu est toléré. Les radicaux sont écrasés, mais les socialistes prennent leur place. Le péril révolutionnaire, et la guerre sociale nous menace plus que l'autre".[3] The journalists of the Right, and some of the parliamentarians, had an unfortunate inclination towards crystal-gazing.

When, after the second ballot, the extent of the socialist gains became apparent the newspapers of the Right were disturbed. La République Française said the results

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1. La République Française, 28th April 1914. The only evidence produced to support this assertion was that the official candidate of the radical party was beaten by another radical in Lodève (Hérault).
2. La Patrie, 26th April 1914.
3. Ibid.

were very bad: ".... il n'y a pas à dissimuler que la Chambre qui vient d'être sera pire que sa devancière."[1] An article in La Patrie contained the argument that the people had voted blindly in favour of the status quo:

> Le pays est conservateur, surtout dans les campagnes, et il veut conserver ce qui est, dans la crainte du pire. 2

L'Echo de Paris drew comfort from the decline in the number of deputies who belonged to the radical party:

> Les statistiques tronqués du ministère de l' intérieur n'y changeront rien - c'est le parti radical qui est le vaincu du 10 mai comme du 26 avril. 3

The statistics of the ministry of the Interior in 1914 were based more closely on the electoral organisations than had previously been the case.[4] They did not attempt to compare the old Chamber to the new one:

Radicaux Unifiés	136
Socialistes Unifiés	102
Socialistes Indépendants et Républicains Socialistes	30
Alliance Démocratique	100
Radicaux et Républicains de Gauche	102
Fédération Républicaine et Républicains Progressistes	54
Action Libérale	34
Droite	26
Indépendants	16

Other sources gave different results but one thing was apparent from them all: the election was another setback for

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1. La République Française, 11th May 1914.
2. La Patrie, 12th May 1914.
3. L'Echo de Paris, 12th May 1914.
4. The national electoral organisations were, however less active in this election than they had been in the previous one. See P.-G. La Chesnais, Statistiques des élections législatives. 1914. pp. 3-7.

the groups of the Right.

The membership of all the groups of the Right, with the exception of the Indépendants declined as a result of the elections:

	Before elections	Retired & defeated	Lapsed	New members	After elections
Union Républicaine	31	12	-	-	-
Progressistes	43	13	8	15(7)[a]	37
Action Libérale	29	8	2	4(1)	23
Droite	20	3	2	1	16
Indépendants	23	3	6	32(15)	46
	146	39	18	52(23)	122[b]

a. In brackets are the numbers of new members of groups who had been deputies in the previous legislature.
b. Fourteen deputies seceded from the Right (ex-members of Union Républicaine) and joined the groups of the Centre.

All of the twenty-three deputies of the Right who were defeated at the polls were beaten by candidates of the Left. Only six of the sixteen seats of retiring deputies were lost to the Left.[1] Fourteen of the twenty-nine new deputies of the Right had captured seats which had been held by members of groups of the Left in the previous legislature. Nine of the new deputies joined the Fédération Républicaine, four joined Action Libérale and the rest became Independents.

Although the Right and Alliance Démocratique lost seats

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1. The seats lost by the Right went to candidates who joined the following groups:

Soc. Un.	Rép. Soc.	Rad./Soc.	Gauche Rad.	Rép. de Gauche
6	1	14	3	5

and the socialists gained some, the centre of gravity of this Chamber did not appear to be more to the Left than the previous one. The candidature of Ribot for the *présidence du conseil*, a candidature which had seemed inconceivable for the previous fifteen years, was posed at the beginning of the legislature; it failed, but the fact that Ribot was able to present a ministry to the deputies showed that there was a strong conservative element in the Chamber. Later in the legislature, admittedly under abnormal war-time conditions, Ribot became a minister and then *président du conseil*. These were indications that there were many defenders of the *status quo* who were not members of the groups of the Right.

The Elections of 16th November 1919.

The atmosphere of 1919, a product of war and victory, was of great assistance to the Right in the election campaign. All sections of the Right had consistently been exponents of the doctrines of national unity and of the national interest and these doctrines found a wider audience during and after the war.

Also, industrial disputes, which had not been unknown during the last eighteen months of the war, became serious and bitter in 1919. In June, less than six months before the election, Paris and the important industrial regions of the provinces were affected by widespread, and sometimes violent strikes of metal, chemical, transport and mine workers. The communist revolution in Russia and the extremist resolutions passed by the socialist congress of April 1919 also helped to alarm the bourgeoisie and provided abundant propaganda for the Right during the election campaign. The reaction to the bolshevik threat (real or imagined) favoured the Right.

These were the assets of the Right but there were other factors which offset them. The organisations of the Right were in decay before 1914 and nothing during the war or for the first year after it revived them. The activities of most political organisations ceased during the war. The exceptions on the Right were the Ligue des patriotes and Action Française.

Both engaged in patriotic works and propaganda which was useful publicity for them and increased their following, but neither was capable of uniting a large body of conservative opinion. Much more serious was the lack of leaders of any standing. Almost all the pre-war progressiste leadership had left politics, or was about to disappear. Ribot was getting very old; Méline, Thierry and Aynard had died; Jules Roche, Benoist and Paul Beauregard were on the point of retiring. The only prominent figure left was Louis Marin but he could not, for themoment, assume the leadership because he had separated himself from the rest of his party by voting against the treaty of Versailles. The Liberal leadership was also melting away. De Mun died in 1914; Piou was about to retire; Gailhard-Bancel was getting old and l'Estourbeillon was too involved in Breton regionalism to be an acceptable national leader. Of the younger men, Henri Bazire who was considered as a possible successor to Piou and de Mun died as a result of poisoning by gas during the war; Joseph Denais was in bad odour with the ex-servicemen's organisations in Paris as a result of his unheroic war record. Jean Lerolle was the only member of the so-called "équipe Bazire" with any parliamentary experience who was left and he was defeated in the election. On the extreme Right Millevoye, Berry and Delafosse had died; Denys Cochin was about to retire. Lamarzelle was not prepared to renounce his monarchist allegiance in order to gain a

wider following. Maurice Barrès was respected and his views were applauded but as a leader and organiser he was of the second rank.

The disappearance of the old leaders had two effects. Men such as Barrès and Marcel Habert suddenly achieved a prominence far beyond their talents. Also a score of would-be regenerators of France sprang up. New men in France generally form new organisations; consequently a host of ligues and parties were founded. The names of these groups usually reveal them as creatures of the nationalist euphoria of 1919 - Parti Républicain de réorganisation nationale, IVe République, Ligue Civique, Union Nationale Républicaine, Démocratie Nouvelle, Parti Socialiste National, Parti Socialiste Français and others. Démocratie Nouvelle had the greatest impact on public opinion, though its success was short-lived. Founded by an ex-socialist called Ernest Letailleur who wrote under the pseudonym of Lysis,[1] its main platform was anti-socialism. The weekly newspaper of the group was widely read and in April 1919 it became a daily. Letailleur, partly because of the success he enjoyed and partly because he was anxious that a new page should be turned in the political life of the country, decided not to

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1. For the development of his ideas see Lysis, Politique et finance d'avant guerre. 1920.

co-operate in the bloc national with the result that not a single candidate on the lists of Démocratie Nouvelle was elected.

The desire for a complete renovation of politics was shared not only by all the mushroom parties but also by politicians already in place. The independent socialist, Anatole de Monzie, wrote two months before the election:

> J'ai eu l'espoir du neuf depuis août 1914. Cet espoir était associé de celui de la victoire. Je croyais à la dislocation des groupes parlementaires. Ils survivent. 1

He still hoped that "un activisme républicain et national" would manifest itself in the new Chamber. Something new, he said, was the universal cry ("un classement nouveau ... qui s'imposera même à la volonté des manoeuvriers électoraux"), which would separate the men:

> ... qui ont avant toutes choses l'honneur et la prospérité de la nation victorieuse et les hommes qui ne profiterait de la paix revenue que pour commencer les petites querelles de la politicaillerie où se gaspillerait l'energie nationale. 2

The slogan - "Ne votez pas pour les anciens" - launched by Letailleur was taken up by the Right and referred, presumably, to deputies of the Left. Marcel Habert wrote in La Patrie that in composing the lists of "national" candidates it was necessary to make:

> ... (une) table rase et ne garder parmi les députés

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1. La Patrie, 9th September 1919.
2. Ibid.

> sortants que ceux dont l'énergie physique, la valeur morale et la capacité intellectuelle étaient sûrs garants des services que l'on attendait d'eux. 1

He admitted sadly that this was not being done.

Another idea which had even wider currency amongst the Right, the Right Centre and the new groups was that political controversy should be ruled out of order during the period of reconstruction, that the problems facing France were of a technical and not of a political nature. The leading employers' organisations concurred with this view.[2] When the politicians of the Left did not agree they were condemned as anti-French.

Anti-socialist propaganda (typified by the poster of the bloc national of a savage looking man with a dagger between his teeth) was the most prominent feature of the statements of all the groups which came to form the bloc national. The socialist party was described in the manifesto of the Ligue Civique (one of the new groups) as "le parti de guerre, de l'esclavage et de la misère."[3] Adolphe Carnot, the president of the bloc national, linked the socialists with the bolshevists and then with the Germans (just as some members of the Right before the war had sought to confuse socialists,

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1. La Patrie, 28th October 1919.
2. G. Bourgin, J. Carrère, A. Guérin, Manuel des partis politiques en France. 2nd ed. 1928. pp. 104-105.
3. L'Echo de Paris, 1st October 1919.

anarchists and criminals). Carnot described the meaning of the elections as:

> Continuer le combat contre les Boches qui, déguisés sous un nom nouveau, celui des bolchévistes, s'acharnent à vouloir ruiner la France au profit de ses ennemis. 1

The class struggle was considered a fabrication, a non-existent bogey used by evil-minded agitators to disturb the social peace. The manifesto of the Parti Républicain de la réorganisation nationale stated:

> Nous répudions toute idée de lutte des classes: loin de lutter l'une contre l'autre, toutes les classes doivent collaborer au développement du progrès général. 2

Statements in favour of national unity and the collaboration of all Frenchmen were often couched in idealistic terms as, for example, in the resolution passed by the Union Nationale des Combattants:

> Dans l'intérêt supérieur du pays, collaboration de tous les français unis dans le sentiment de leurs devoirs sur le terrain des faits, au dessus des conflits d'idées et d'intérêts, pour le relèvement économique et social. 3

This national unity was, however, essentially a unity against socialism. The manifesto of Barrès and Millerand in the second constituency of Paris was frank about this, when they described their aim as:

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 10th November 1919.
2. La Patrie, 4th September 1919.
3. La Patrie, 13th September 1919.

> Réunir dans un solide faisceau ceux qui, ouvriers, employés, employeurs, ne veulent à aucun prix subir la tyrannie bolchéviste ... pour prevenir ces arrêts brusque et répetées du travail qui paralysent la vie d'une nation...[1]

The forces working for the formation of a "national" bloc were fear of socialism and communism, the desire to exploit patriotic emotions produced by war and victory, the general wish for a change in political groupings and against a resurrection of the pre-war political formations and the new electoral law.

The new electoral law embodied a limited form of proportional representation with the départements as constituencies.[2] It made national coalitions desirable and these coalitions, if they were to be successful, had to be as broad as possible.

The formation of a great anti-socialist coalition was, however, a delicate matter. The first in the field to call for such a coalition were the leaders of the Union Nationale Républicaine (founded in December 1918), Marcel Habert and Emile Massard. Both had long careers of violent nationalist agitation and were therefore unsuited to the role of gaining the confidence of Centre Republicans. Marcel Habert was,

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 4th November 1919.

2. The départements of Aveyron, Bouches du Rhône, Calvados, Loire Inférieure, Maine et Loire and Pas de Calais were divided into two constituencies and the département of Seine into four.

however, very keen to secure their support. In meeting after meeting he caused the passing of resolutions in favour of the collaboration of all honest Frenchmen "sans distinction d'opinions ou de croyances".[1] But he was opposed to the inclusion in "national" lists of candidates who opposed the Republican régime. Late in August 1919 he said:

> Les adversaires du régime républicain pourrait, si leur patriotisme le leur conseille, voter pour ces listes afin d'assurer la défaite de la révolution bolchéviste, comme ils ont aidé à assurer la défaite de l'invasion boche. Mais il est impossible d'admettre que la République soit mise en cause par l'admission sur les listes d'union nationale républicaine d'aucun candidate hostile à l'idée républicain, sans risquer de rompre l'union nécessaire qui permettra aux républicains patriotes de grouper une majorité compacte et homogène autour du gouvernement renovateur que la France attend. 2

In the period September-November he became more explicit saying that he desired radical co-operation with the Right.[2]

There were soon hints that the radicals and the Left generally were not willing to co-operate. Briand in a speech in his constituency in August argued strongly in favour of "freedom" of electoral contests.[3] He did not want the programmes of parties and candidates to be so blunted by compromise that the election would be without meaning and deputies would enter the new Chamber without definite commitments. In a letter to Jonnart (Senator for Pas de Calais)

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1. La Patrie, 29th August 1919.
2. R. Cornilleau, Du Bloc national au front populaire. Vol.I. 1939. p. 24.
3. La Patrie, 20th August 1919.

he put his point of view concisely:

> L'Union sacrée s'imposait devant l'ennemi.. Face au suffrage universel , elle devient vide de sens, illusoire et même dangereuse.

He asked Jonnart what use he saw of the union sacrée in the elections:

> Comment donc la concevez-vous du point du vue supérieur des intérêts de la patrie? Admettez-vous que le pays aille aux urnes sans directions politiques, sans programme, en pleine équivoque. 1

In view of Briand's willingness in the past to appease the Right this stand was of great significance. He was probably trying to out-manoeuvre Clemenceau who was the obvious candidate for the leadership of a national coalition. Clemenceau did not attempt to become the leader of the bloc; his attitude towards it seems to have been much the same as that of Briand. In spite of this many of the elements which came to form the bloc sought to retain him as the hero and father-figure of the coalition.[2]

Since Clemenceau and Briand preferred to hold aloof from the projected "national" coalition and Poincaré was not

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 30th August 1919.

2. Even late in the election campaign most of the Right tried to use the prestige of Clemenceau by affirming their support of him. His discours-programme of Strasbourg (4th November) was greeted warmly by all the newspapers of the Right with the exception of Action Française. In private the Right was probably not so enthusiastic. Denys Cochin complained that Clemenceau was conducting a campaign analagous to that of Boulanger and he strongly disapproved of it. Letter of Cochin to the comtesse de Griffuehles. 26th October 1919. Cochin MSS.

available, the leadership devolved on a man with a lesser reputation, Adolphe Carnot, president of the Parti Républicain Démocratique (formerly the Alliance Démocratique). The first official move which Carnot made was a letter to Herriot, the president of the radical party, inviting the radicals to co-operate in a coalition with all patriotic republicans.[1] Carnot argued that the radicals could not co-operate with the socialists because of the bolshevik danger. In view of this Carnot thought that the natural ally of the radicals was his own party. Herriot and the majority radicals, fearing that such an alliance would mean involvement with elements of the Right, were unconvinced. Carnot was prepared at this stage to offend the susceptibilities of the Right on the clerical question[2] but there was little else that he could offer to attract radical support. A few dissident radical associations were formed; the most important was a national federation whose president was Bonnet, which favoured close co-operation with the bloc. There were many radicals in the provinces who did co-operate with moderate republicans in lists of "Republican union". The radicals did not at any time rule out the possibility of alliances on a local basis.

When the radicals refused to co-operate on a national level with the bloc, the Right assumed a greater importance

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1. Le Temps, 28th September 1919.
2. See infra p. 152

in the eyes of Carnot and his collaborators. Carnot showed a willingness to make concessions on the religious question. Freed from the necessity of respecting radical opinion the propagandists of the bloc were frankly conservative on financial and social questions. The leading articles of le Temps (which was almost the official newspaper of the bloc) became more and more militant. On 23rd October it demanded the suppression of income tax and on the 28th it condemned all the social reforms and wage increases currently demanded by the socialists. The socialist party, it said, had been unable to realise the military defeat of France and was working for the economic defeat of the country. In the moderate and conservative press there was little attempt at serious discussion of the social problems created by the war and by what has been called "a second industrial revolution violently carried through in the worst conditions."[1]

The bloc national was publicly constituted at a meeting of Republican groups on 4th October.[2] It received the immediate adherence of Parti Républicain Démocratique, Union Nationale Républicaine, Fédération Républicaine, IVe République, Parti Socialiste Français, Démocratie Nouvelle (which dropped out later) and Action Libérale. Some of the smaller groups joined in the course of the month. Prominent individuals sent

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1. V.R. Lorwin, The French Labour Movement. Cambridge (Mass.) 1954. p. 45.
2. La Patrie, 5th October 1919.

their adherence. These included Millerand, Henri Galli, Mascuraud,[1] Bonnet, Lanternes and Steeg (the last three being dissident radicals). Adolphe Carnot was formally elected president.

General rules were laid down concerning whom could be accepted as a candidate on a list approved by the bloc national. Carnot wrote to Marmelot (secretary general of the Parti Républicain Démocratique):

> Comme de juste, nous repoussons tous les candidats qui ne pourraient apporter au Parlement que le trouble et le violence - qu'ils soient des partisans attardés de monarchies désormais impossibles ou qu'ils combattent les intérêts de notre patrie et cherchent à excuser les crimes de leurs prétendus amis de l'étranger, les Boches et les bolchévistes. Mais nous nous attacherons à maintenir fermement l'union entre les diverses nuances des républicains patriotes. 2

This did not exclude anyone, except perhaps certain moderate royalists, who would have considered joining the bloc. The bonapartists in the Comité Plébiscitaire threw the weight of their small influence behind the bloc. Théodore Rudelle issued a statement on behalf of the committee saying that:

> L'union de patriotes comme en août 1914 peut seule nous sauver. Il ne s'agit pas dans la lutte électorale qui va s'ouvrir de la victoire ou la défaite d'un parti. La question est plus haute, l'existence même de la France est en jeu.

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1. The Comité Mascuraud was represented by Hiret at the meeting. Mascuraud, in an interview (la Patrie, 6th October), explained that the committee itself was not engaged and on 12th October the press was informed that the committee would not co-operate.

2. La Patrie, 20th October 1919.

> Il faut d'abord défendre contre les révolutionnaires internationalistes qui prépare sciemment ou non la revanche de l'Allemagne en plongeant la France dans le chaos: votre devoir le plus impérieux sera de barrer la route **par tous** les accords nécessaires à ces traîtres et fous. 1

Plébiscitaires were encouraged to vote for plébiscitaires but were advised not to waste their votes on isolated candidates.

The bloc national was almost purely an organisation for propaganda. There was not, apparently, a single case where the central committee of the bloc intervened in the drawing up of a list of candidates. It was a cover for local bargains. The organisations which belonged to the bloc retained their independence. Their attitude towards the bloc was expressed in a statement of the central committee of Action Libérale after it had been criticised for joining:

> En entrant le Bloc national républicain, l'Action Libérale n'a renoncé ni à ses traditions ni à son programme: elle n'a abandonné aucune des causes pour la défense desquelles elle s'est constituée. Comme disait en son nom, M. Jean Lerolle, "Nous sommes entrés dans le cartel, la tête haute, avec tout notre passé et toutes nos croyances" .... dans les circonstances graves que traverse la vie nationale, alors qu'il nous faut relever nos ruines, veiller à l'exécution du traité de Versailles et au maintien d'une paix encore fragile, alors que la révolution sociale reste menaçante et que l'Allemagne redresse la tête, il nous a paru que c'était notre devoir de français de donner notre concours aux associations républicaines groupées pour constituer une force capable d'assurer dans l'ordre, le travail et la liberté, la reconstitution du pays. Aucun des partis coalisés dans le cartel n'a songé d'ailleurs à demander aux autres le reniement de leurs principes. 2

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 30th November 1919.

2. La Patrie, 26th October 1919. The tendency of liberal catholics at this period to emphasise their patriotism did lead to an apparent religious indifferentism. One of their opponents, Jules Delahaye, quoted (J. Delahaye, La Reprise des rélations

The doctrine here expressed was completely in accordance with the views of the president of the bloc who made a speech, on the day after the communiqué of Action Libérale was issued, with the theme that "chaque parti, chaque candidat conserve son idéal particulier."[1]

The programme of the bloc national was a carefully worded document which avoided specific engagements.[2] Different interpretations could be placed on most of its major sections.

The object of the bloc, according to the manifesto, was to prolong the unity - "si heuresement réalisée dans la guerre" - into the peace in order to repair the damage resulting from the war. The first section of the manifesto dealt with defence: the treaty of Versailles should be strictly enforced and the League of Nations made a reality; military service should be reduced "dans toute mesure compatible avec la sécurité nationale" and the obligations contracted towards ex-servicemen and victims of the war should be paid in full.

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diplomatiques avec le Vatican. 1921. p. 19.) a liberal catholic deputy, Anatole Monceau, saying at a ceremony to commemorate the war dead that one should learn to practice the religion of l'union sacrée and to love the France of Rabelais, Voltaire and Gambetta as well as the France of Jean d'Arc, Vincent de Paul and the glorious dead.

1. Le Temps, 21st October 1919.

2. Published on 25th October. Most of the press printed it in full.

Under the title "Union des citoyens dans la paix sociale et dans la paix religieuse" the necessity of defending civilisation against bolshevism and of respecting the liberties of association, the press and education, were affirmed. Piou's formula on laïcité was also included in this section.[1] The economic and social doctrine proposed was "liberté du travail, du commerce et de l'industrie": intelligence, labour and capital should combine to utilise national and colonial wealth to the best advantage. The social reforms suggested were vague: the extension of the "capacité civile" of "syndicats professionels," the foundation of arbitration tribunals to arrange industrial disputes, measures against the social evils of tuberculosis, bad housing and demoralisation, benefits for the family and encouragement of the birthrate, the development of social insurance and institutions "d'hygiene, de prévoyance et de solidarité", the facilitating of the acquisition of capital by the workers.

The doctrine of the section on public finance was very similar to the manifestoes of Jules Roche:

> Assainissement des finances publiques, lutte contre le gaspillage, équilibre sincère des budgets, limitation d'initiative parlementaire en matière de dépenses.

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1. See infra p. 156.

There was no mention of income tax (which can be taken as a very grudging acceptance of it); it was stated that the incidence of taxation should be fair and that there should be relief for men with families. The main point of the section was that Germany should be made to pay for the financial damage suffered by France.

On administrative and constitutional reform the manifesto included many ideas which had been current in progressiste circles for some time: the effective separation of powers (to ensure ministerial stability), the employment of technical experts in the drawing up of laws, a declaration of Rights written into the constitution, electoral reform, the suppression of some civil service posts, effective responsibility of civil servants, administrative decentralisation and reorganisation.

The programmes of the groups which belonged to the bloc differed little from the programme of the bloc itself. There were individual variations. The Union Nationale des Combattants, for example, included in its programme "développement des sports et de l'instruction morale et civique" and "mesures de sauvegarde nécessaire vis-à-vis des étrangers et des politiciens qui cherchent à exploiter nos divisions."[1] But the deviations were minor and the campaign, for the most part,

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1. La Patrie, 13th September 1919.

was conducted within the terms of the generalities of the manifesto of the bloc.

Most of the public speaking for the bloc national was done by politicians of the second rank such as Marcel Habert and Emile Massard (Union Nationale Républicaine), Jean Lerolle (Action Libérale), Halay (Fédération Républicaine), Thibout (Fédération des Républicains Démocrates) and Edouard Soulier (Ligue d'Action Morale et Sociale). The major figures tended to cultivate their own constituencies.

The participants in the bloc had a great moral advantage over their opponents in that they spoke almost with one voice whereas their opponents were deeply divided. This was brought into sharp relief by the newspaper strike which began early in November. The newspapers of the Right and Centre combined to publish a collective sheet called la Presse de Paris. It consisted mainly of editorial comment and all the various editors who contributed advocated support for the bloc national in the great fight against bolshevism. The radical-socialists, socialists and syndicalists also published a collective sheet, la Feuille commune, but the setting out of their opinions side by side only emphasised their differences. Also, in sheer quantity the press support of la Presse de Paris was impressive.[1]

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1. Fifty-seven newspapers co-operated in la Presse de Paris and only six in la Feuille commune.

It is almost impossible to generalise about the composition of the coalitions in the constituencies throughout the country. They had a wide range of titles - Bloc national, Union Nationale, Union Nationale Républicaine, Entente Républicaine, Réorganisation Nationale, Rénovation Nationale, Union Républicaine Démocrate Libérale and so on. There were three main types of coalition; the first was the Millerand/ Barrès type which extended from radical socialists to nationalists and included the Liberals; the second extended from radical socialists to progressistes; the third comprised Right of Centre Republicans and the Right (this combination was mainly restricted to the West). In those départements where the political situation was stable the electoral achievements of the parties before the war appeared to be the main basis upon which the composition of the coalitions was based. Thus alliances between progressistes and radical socialists, such as Lefas and Deschamps in Ille et Villaine, were comparatively common and on occasion alliances occurred between more conservative Republicans and radical socialists such as Lefebvre du Preÿ and Abrami in Pas de Calais. There was a great risk that combinations such as these could give the impression that their sole raison d'être was to enable outgoing deputies to save their seats.[1]

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1. This was one of the main reasons why the electoral system adopted for the elections of 1919 became discredited.

The coalitions in the constituencies were not merely combinations of outgoing deputies, for a large number of deputies were retiring (the legislature had been an unusually long and arduous one). There was a general recognition of the need for new blood[1] (no one presented a list composed entirely of old deputies) and most of the combinations thought it was wise to include at least one ancien combattant.[2]

The extreme Right was caught in a cleft stick when faced with the necessity of electoral alliances. It desired, like the rest of the Right and Centre, to take advantage of the great desire for unity in 1919 but anti-Republican sentiments formed a barrier against co-operation between the Right and any elements of the Centre. In this election monarchists, except for the most extreme, would have co-operated gladly with men of Carnot's party.[3] But Carnot and those who co-operated with him were compelled to rule out of court any monarchist

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1. Cochin, for example, warned Barrès against the inclusion of many old deputies in his list. M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. Vol. XII. p. 335. Cochin was disparaging about the quality of the candidates chosen in Paris. Letter to Jules Cambon, 24th October 1919. Letter to Barrès, 11th December 1919. Cochin MSS.

2. The most famous of these was General de Castelnau (Foch's chief of Staff) who was included on the list of Union Nationale in Aveyron. In an interview he implicitly admitted he had been pushed into accepting a candidature and that he had no programme: "Mes amis m'assuraient que mon passé, celui de ma famille, répondent aux yeux de mes compatriotes de mon attitude et de mon action à l'avenir." He said that he wished to serve "la petite et .. la grande patrie" and help close the ranks against evil-doers and saboteurs of victory. L'Echo de Paris, 4th November 1919.

3. On 18th July 1919 the duc d'Orleans issued a manifesto saying that the Union sacrée must be maintained for the elections.

participation on their lists in order to avoid alienating potential allies and voters on their Left. Action Française had to put up separate lists in Paris. On the other hand, in the provinces there were cases of monarchists reaching understandings with Republicans. In Hérault three members of Action Française were elected on a list of Union Nationale. In Vendée two monarchists, Baudry d'Asson and Bermond d'Auriac, combined with three Liberals, Rochereau, Fontaines and Bazire (whose brother's election had been fiercely and successfully combatted by the monarchists in 1914) and a very conservative Republican, Tinguy du Poüet. The prominent plébiscitaires, Laniel, Engerand, Flandin and Gérard co-operated with Republicans on lists in the two constituencies of Calvados. Paul de Cassagnac, whose brother Guy had been killed in the war, headed a "Republican" list in Gers.

The extreme Right suffered some setbacks in the places where it did not succeed in merging into a broadly based alliance. In the second constituency of Maine et Loire only one candidate (Bougère) was elected of a Liste d'Union Nationale consisting of Bougère, Jules Delahaye, Blacas and d'Andigné:[1]

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1. Blacas thought that the main reason for the defeat of his list was that"... Bessonneau, grand profiteur de guerre, a dépensé sans compte des sommes énormes de toutes espèces de façon ... il a eu la grande habilité de payer l'élection à trois autres candidats, candidats catholiques qui n'ont pas hésiter à prendre notre programme." Letter of Blacas to Denys Cochin, 26th November 1919. Cochin MSS.

a Centrist list entitled Liste Républicaine d'Union Nationale took the other three seats. In Morbihan a Liste des Républicains Indépendants et des Conservateurs consisting of the monarchists Rohan, la Villesboisnet, Gouyon and Pioger, and the Rightist Republicans Lamy, Robic and Sevène had only partial success; the Republicans on the list were elected but all the monarchists were defeated (radical and Centrist members of a list of Union Républicaine being the victors).

The leagues of anciens combattants put up separate lists in some constituencies - Bouches du Rhône, Gard, Haute Garonne, Lot de Garonne, Seine, Seine et Oise. Certain features of their programme such as the insistence on the need for unspecified but drastic change and "new" men, vague anti-parliamentarianism and the plea for religious toleration were sufficient to class them with the extreme Right.[1] These lists had no success at all. Nor did the other new combination Démocratie Nouvelle (whose programme of constitutional reform, religious liberty and violent anti-socialism also classed it with the Right) which put up lists in all the Paris constituencies.

The Liberals never formed a list by themselves and the progressistes did so only in three constituencies - Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haute Savoie. Unlike the isolated monarchist lists,

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1. There were cases where the anciens combattants allied themselves with the Left. In Cantal, for example, they formed a combined list with the socialist party.

these three progressiste were completely successful.

The elections were a triumph for the bloc national - about 435 deputies had been elected on lists which had some claim to the title of "national" - and for the Right within the bloc. All attempts at estimating the results depend on arbitrary definitions. Perhaps the most accurate estimate of the results classified as closely as possible to the groups of the previous legislature was given by the moderate Republican periodical, la Revue Politique et Parlementaire:[1]

	Ré-élus	Nouvelles	Total
Républicains de Gauche	55	78	133
Radical-Socialistes	77	66	143
Républicains Socialistes	18	9	27
Socialistes Unifiés	35	33	68
Socialistes Indépendants	5	1	6
Progressistes	34	99	133
Action Libérale	14	55	69
Conservateurs	12	19	31
	250	360 [2]	610

These statistics can be criticised in detail. There were only twenty-six ex-members of the Fédération Républicaine re-elected (eight Indépendants were included under the heading of re-elected progressistes). The ninety-nine new deputies called progressistes were unlikely to be all progressistes in an organisational sense, that is to say members of the Fédération Républicaine. The same applies to the fifty-five new deputies ascribed to Action Libérale.

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1. 10th December 1919. p. 428.

2. There were 370 deputies who had not sat in the previous Chamber.

Neither association published a list of candidates and as neither the progressistes nor the Liberals formed a separate group in the new Chamber it is impossible to say what attitude the new deputies would have adopted towards them.[1]

The statistics of la Revue Politique et Parlementaire are as accurate as it was possible to make them. They showed heavy gains for the Right; the progressistes had ninety-seven more seats than in the previous legislature, the Liberals thirty-seven and the conservatives four. In the Centre of the Chamber the Républicains de Gauche gained fifty seats. The losses were all on the Left. The number of radicals in the Chamber declined by over one hundred and although the socialists increased their total vote by 300,000 they lost thirty-three seats.

The results were enthusiastically reviewed by the press of the Right.[2] Gustave Hervé, the ex-anti-militarist,

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1. See supra pp.9-10 for a description of which groups deputies of the Right joined in the new Chamber.

2. There were no complaints from the Right of administrative pressure in this election. Jacques Piou said that the elections of 1919 were the most correct of the Third Republic. R. Camilleau, Du Bloc national au front populaire. Vol. 1. 1939. p. 38. Paul Cambon, however, alleged that Georges Mandel (Clemenceau's chef de cabinet) used all means at his disposal to influence the elections. P. Cambon, Correspondance, 1871-1934. Vol. III. 1946. p. 355.

exclaimed in la Victoire: "Nos 1,400,000 morts peuvent cette fois dormir heureux."[1] Even Action Française was content with the results. Charles Maurras wrote:

> Les réponses donnés par la France au question du scrutin portent une volonté d'action nationale, une réaction neuve et jeune, contre toute puissance d'amoindrissement. 2

Léon Daudet added the following day:

> La réflexe nationale n'a pas fonctionné jusqu'au bout, qui était la victoire éclatante de nos amis, à Paris comme en province. Mais il a fonctionné, et excellement, pour l'écrasement électorale des socialistes unifiés et des bolchévistes. 3

Daudet claimed that twenty "friends" of Action Française had been elected but he did not give their names.[4]

The nationalist press was unreservedly happy about the results. L'Echo de Paris described 16th November as an "admirable et glorieuse journée, par la tenue, par les résultats."[5] It looked forward to a ministry based on the bloc national:

> Ainsi se dégage, dès maintenant, la certitude de voir se constituter, dans la Chambre nouvelle, cette majorité coherente et résolue que réclamait M. Clemenceau à Strasbourg: ce grand parti d'union et de défense nationale, ce parti de la France dont le cartel Millerand-Barrès a tracé le programme et préparé les succès. 6

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1. La Presse de Paris, 18th November 1919.
2. Ibid. 18th November 1919.
3. Ibid. 19th November 1919.
4. Ibid. 19th November 1919.
5. Ibid. 18th November 1919.
6. Ibid. 18th November 1919.

Even Arthur Meyer who had been somewhat sceptical about the bloc national before the elections approved the results, writing that they had fulfilled "tout notre programme."[1] The only unfavourable comment made by a member of the Right came from Joseph Denais[2] who considered that such a high proportion of new deputies was of doubtful value. He thought that it could be an advantage:

> .... si les nouveaux élus apportent plus de clarté, plus d'énergie, moins de bavardages; qu'ils n'imitent pas les 200 nouveaux de 1914 qui furent dans leur généralité, l'élément le plus mauvais de la dernière Chambre! Ne dissimulons pas qui l'assemblée serait frappé d'impuissance et conduiraient le pays aux abîmes si nouveaux et anciens ne s'éfforcevaient dès l'abord de se discipliner. 3

This was carping on the part of an old deputy who had been rejected and did not find any echo elsewhere; most of the Right regarded the high proportion of new deputies as one of the most positive virtues of the results.

Maurice Barrès, the ideological father of the bloc, gave his opinion in an article entitled, "Pleine confiance dans la nouvelle Chambre":

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1. La Presse de Paris, 18th November 1919.

2. Denais was of military age but never served at the front; after 1916 he never left his place in the Chamber. The group of anciens combattants of his constituency heard his explanation of his behaviour and issued a statement saying that he had done nothing to fulfil his duty during the war and therefore it would not be possible to vote for him. E. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des dynasties bourgeoises. Vol. II. 1949. pp. 238-9.

3. La Presse de Paris, 19th November 1919.

> Après la mobilisation militaire d'août 1914, nous avons eu la mobilisation civique de novembre 1919. Et voici une excellente Chambre, de beaucoup la meilleure que j'ai connue, débarrassée des élément affreux qui durant la grande guerre ont failli faire chavirer la France. 1

But the very terms in which the election had been fought made the victory illusory.

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 8th December 1919. Reprinted in Maurice Barrès, Chronique de la Grande Guerre. Vol. XIV. pp. 181-187.

The Clerical problem

From the Dreyfus affair until the First World War the defence of the Church was closely connected with social conservatism. The view that the Church was necessary to the social order was regarded as self-evident by Catholics, and by most non-Catholics of the Right.[1] The Left, in their opinion, attacked the Church because it was a bulwark against revolution.[2]

The Right aroused far more passionate hostility when it defended the interests of the Church than when it defended the economic status quo. The electoral propaganda of the Left always contained variations of the charge that:

> Leur programme social tient en une phrase: c'est l' asservissement de la société laïque par le prêtre, le moine, la "bonne soeur." 3

Just as the Right tended to make little distinction between the fanatical believers in laïcisme and the moderate supporters

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1. This view was openly expressed. See statement of Piou (Action Libérale). Annuaire de l'Action Libérale Populaire ... 1904-1905. 1904. p. 192. Those members of the Right who held anticlerical opinions did not, by 1905, advertise them. Jules Roche (Progressiste), who had introduced a Separation bill in 1882 (See J. Roche, Le Budget des Cultes, la Séparation de l' Eglise et de l'Etat. 1883), was the most notable example in Parliament of this reticence.

2. For an extreme expression of this, see J. Delahaye (Independent) in l'Autorité 8th June 1908. De Mun (Action Libérale) came close to identifying the future of the Church with the social powers. See A. de Mun, Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. 1911. Vol. II. p. 370.

3. A. Vasse, Pour qui voter? 1910. p. 20.

of laïcité, the Left described members of the Right indiscriminately as clericals.

Members of the Right vigorously denied the charge of clericalism. Some alleged that it was made to divert attention from other problems.[1] Georges Berry (Nationaliste)[2] denied that any member of the Right was clerical according to the proper definition of the term.[3] The charge was, indeed, ridiculous when applied to a progressiste such as Alexandre Ribot who, during his ministry, had proposed "à la grande indignation de M. de Ramel et aux applaudissements de la gauche, un impôt spécial sur les biens de l'Eglise."[4]

Most of the progressistes, not being Catholics "mais des libre-penseurs tolérants",[5] defended the Church on the grounds that the liberties of Catholics were being infringed:

> ... nous ne cesserons pas de réclamer pour les catholiques aujourd'hui ce que nous eussions revendiqué pour les protestants il y a deux cents ans: la liberté totale de réunion, les conditions nécessaires de la liberté d'exercice des cultes. 6

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1. See J. Massabuau (Action Libérale), J.O., 8th May 1907.p. 933.

2. Sponsor of a contre-projet to the law of Separation and author of a book on the debate: Un page d'histoire. La Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat à la Chambre des Députés. 1905.

3. La Patrie, 17th November 1907.

4. Ibid.

5. There were practising Catholics among the progressistes, the most prominent being Aynard, Caraman and Thierry, but in practice their behaviour did not vary much from their colleagues.

6. L. Bonnevay (Progressiste) in la République Française, 13th December 1906.

They did not oppose the Separation of Church and State in principle but used the common conservative argument that it was being carried out by the wrong men at the wrong time.[1] Ribot, the progressiste leader on the religious issue, realised that the law could not be delayed and did his best to liberalise it.[2]

Only four progressistes in the Chamber voted against the law.[3] After it was passed most progressistes favoured acceptance of the law if it was applied in a liberal manner. A division appeared in the group after the papal condemnation of the measure. Some held that the head of the Church was being unreasonable[4] whilst others claimed that the Pope was within his rights and continued to repeat: "Il aurait un moyen de sortir de cet embarras et ce moyen consisterait à rétablir l'ambassade au Vatican."[5]

The nationalist movement was not in origin either Catholic or clerical[6] but the nationalists, finding themselves

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1. See Ribot's preface to G. Noblemaire, Concordat ou Séparation. 1905.

2. See his speech on his own amendment to article 19 of the law. J.O., 15th June 1905. Especially p. 2253.

3. Edmund Bartissol, François Carnot, Edmund Disleau and Vogeli.

4. Most of them belonged to Union Républicaine as well as the progressiste group. Their attitude was very close to that of le Temps, the great organ of Alliance Démocratique.

5. La République Française, 13th October 1906.

6. Lemaître, in the early days of Patrie Française, said that he would not have chosen to see three hundred Catholics in preference to three hundred radicals in the Palais Bourbon. J. Piou, D'une guerre à l'autre. 1932. p. 170. Piou objected to this and

on the same side as the Catholics during the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, took up the defence of the Church as a great "national" institution. A handful of Parisian nationalists - Gabriel Failliot, Henri Tournade and the ex-blanquist Ernest Roche - voted against the law of Separation. But, in 1905, twenty-six of the fifty-five members of the nationalist group were also members of Action Libérale and after the elections of 1906 conservative and Catholic elements dominated the group to an even greater extent. There was no split on religious policy, as there was in the progressiste group.[1]

The rest of the Right were Catholics. They can be divided roughly into two categories: the catholiques avant tout who were faithful servants of the Church, and who believed with de Mun that "toute la politique se réduit à ce dilemme inexorable: refaire la France chrétienne, ou consentir à sa perte"[2]; and the others to whom the clerical question was important because of the peculiar circumstances of the time and who, to differing extents, were as conscious of their own political fences as they were of the interests of the Church.

The extremists and catholiques avant tout believed that

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also to Barrèsian confessions of rationalism as in M. Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme. 1902. Vol. 11. p. 129. Later, both Barrès and Lemaître moved towards Catholicism.

1. After the elections of 1906 Tournade was the only remaining anticlerical in the group.

2. Action Libérale Populaire. Compte-rendu du congrès général de 1907. 1907. p. 184.

anticlericalism was the product of a plot:

> Si l'âme populaire s'est éloignée de Dieu, ce n'est pas l'effet d'une corruption spontanée: c'est l'oeuvre raisonnée des dirigeants actifs, résolus, unis entre eux par un dessein commun, conjuration savante de hautes influences, publiques et privées, morales et matérielles, toutes réunis contre le christianisme. 1

But no one, not even de Mun, suggested that a desirable alternative to the existing system was that the ecclesiastical hierarchy should exercise direct political power.

De Mun, with Piou as a very cautious supporter, gave Action Libérale the reputation of being the centre of the intransigent opposition to the law of Separation.[2] Even the moderate members of the group had, on occasion, to adopt a belligerent attitude, rather than face the charge of falling short of their duty. Early in the Separation crisis Piou proclaimed the order of the day:

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1. A. de Mun, Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. 1911. Vol. II. p. 370. The other major figures who shared this point of view were Charles Maurras, Cardinal Merry del Val (See Montagnini MSS. Sc. 7. p. 68), some members of the episcopate (for example Mgr. Delamaire, Les Catholiques et les élections de 1906. 3rd. ed. Périgueux 1905. p. 18), the disciples of Le Play who wrote for la Réforme sociale and the monarchist collaborators in the Revue Catholique et Royaliste.

2. This reputation adhered in spite of the known soumissioniste tendencies of the more moderate members of the group. Examples of conciliatory opinions are numerous. Jules Legrand, in his explication de vote made on behalf of certain of his colleagues, described the law as "rélativement libérale." (J.O., 3rd July 1905. p. 2688.). The abbé Gayraud preached co-operation with the law until the beginning of 1906. Denys Cochin and Léonce de Castelnau became notorious as signatories of the letter of the cardinaux verts. These men opposed the Separation in principle but did not think that it was profitable to create difficulties about it in practice.

> Pas de timidités, ni d'équivoques ... Si elle (Action Libérale) défend la liberté des catholiques, elle doit l'affirmer nettement et ne pas s'abaisser à craindre la ridicule accusation de cléricalisme. 1

All the prominent members of Action Libérale had been in opposition to the religious policies of successive governments since the Méline administration, and this tended to obscure their differences.

Some of the monarchists surpassed de Mun in their intransigent opposition to the law of Separation. They opposed an amendment, which was supported by de Mun and his colleagues, an amendment which went far towards providing a guarantee of the orthodoxy of the associations cultuelles.[2] But even die-hard monarchists were not usually prepared to pursue the politique du pire to the extent of voting for those articles of the law which they found most obnoxious.

In 1905, the unity of the Right on the clerical question, insofar as it existed, was essentially a unity of opposition to a particular measure. When the measure was passed,

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1. Le Correspondant, 10th October 1904. Piou was a master of making strong statements which did not commit him to any specific position. Another example was: "Nous ne voulons pas d'un catholicisme de Centre gauche ... Nous répudions dans les questions religieuse ces incertitudes d'attitude qui cachent des défaillances ou peut-être de secrets calculs." E. Flornoy, La Lutte par l'association. 2nd ed. 1907. p. 18.

2. The Pressensé (Socialiste Unifié) amendment to article 4. The Independents Broglie, Rosanbo and d'Ornano voted against it and La Bourdonnaye, Le Gonidec de Traissan, Lanjuinais and Rohan abstained. The associations cultuelles were intended to be groups of representative catholics to whom the property of the Church could be assigned.

divergences of opinion appeared.

The principle involved in the controversy over the application of the law of Separation was whether the State was a competent authority to influence the future organisation of the Church in France.[1] The Right, the progressistes as much as their more extreme colleagues, was convinced that it was not. Some members of the bloc agreed with them.[2] But there was considerable disagreement, even among Catholics until August 1906, on whether the establishment of the associations cultuelles would pervert the traditional organisation of the Church.

In this controversy and in the course of events which led to the Papal condemnation of the associations, the parliamentarians of the Right played a busy but rather marginal role. The extremists, using the inventories of Church property which began in February 1906 as a pretext, tried to provoke violent opposition to the law.[3] They had a certain measure of success when the Rouvier cabinet fell on 7th March as a result of an

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1. For a summary of attitudes towards the Separation and a detailed commentary on the law of Separation: M.J.M. Larkin, French Catholics and the Question of the Separation of the Churches and the State. Thesis Cambridge 1958.

2. See the interview of Paul-Meunier (Radical Socialiste) in l'Action Libérale Populaire, 6th September 1906.

3. See the articles in l'Autorité by Jules Delahaye (6th January and 4th February 1906), Paul de Léoni (14th January) and Paul J. Cassagnac (7th February).

interpellation concerning the killing of a demonstrator at Boeschêpe (Nord),[1] The extremist Ligue de la résistance catholique founded by Jules Delahaye, Paul J. Cassagnac and François Coppée failed to cause serious trouble and was able to hold successful meetings only in the West.

Certain prominent Catholic parliamentarians - de Mun, Piou, Denys Cochin, Groussau (Action Libérale) and to a lesser extent Gayraud (Action Libérale) and Senator Lamarzelle (Droites) - were in constant touch with Mgr. Montagnini, the papal chargé d'affaires and Cardinal Richard, the archbishop of Paris. To keep himself informed, Richard formed a committee of Catholic jurists which included Groussau and Lamarzelle.[2] They were on the side of intransigence. So were de Mun and, by general repute, Piou.[3] Cochin and Gayraud favoured co-

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1. The government was attacked by Jean Plichon (Action Libérale) and Lemire (Independent) but its fate was sealed by a critical intervention by Briand. Forty-six socialists, fifty-five radicals and all of the Right voted against the government. J.O., 7th March 1906. However, thirteen progressistes voted for the Sarrien cabinet and twenty-one abstained although Sarrien did not propose a change in religious policy. J.O., 14th March 1906.

2. Groussau, a professor of law at the Institut Catholique of Lille, enjoyed the confidence of both Richard and Montagnini; the latter introduced him favourably to Merry del Val. Montagnini Mss. Sc. 7. pp. 132, 239. The Secretary of State listened to his advice. The committee of Catholic jurists of which he was a member convinced Richard that the cultuelles were unacceptable. M.J.M. Larkin, op. cit. p. 309.

3. De Mun impressed on Montagnini the dangers of schism. M.J.M. Larkin, op. cit. p. 311. His general position, frequently stated was: "Il n'y a pas, pour l'Eglise de France d'organisation possible sans la formelle approbation du Pape." Action Libérale Populaire, 26th April 1906. The role and influence of Piou is obscure. He may have been "un simple soldat" (as he alleged) J.O., 12th November 1906; but he had the reputation of being a leader of "boulangisme religieux." G.Goyau, Journal.25th May1906.

operation with the law of Separation but, although they were heard with respect by their opponents, neither had any following in the Chamber.[1]

The Pope condemned the law of Separation in general terms in the encyclical Vehemter nos issued on 11th February 1906. He made it clear that an acceptable law would have to include recognition of the hierarchy. But the issue was not considered closed by French Catholics.[2]

Castelnau, Cochin (Action Libérale) and Caraman (Progressiste) signed the letter of the cardinaux verts[3] in which the bishops were advised to accept the associations cultuelles.[4] The plenary assembly of the bishops, which met on 30th May, seemed anxious to compromise. The results of the elections of 1906, which the moderate Right blamed on the intransigents,[5] made others willing to consider compromise. De Mun thought that the elections were an argument in favour

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1. Cochin collaborated in two attempts to re-establish contact between the French government and the Vatican (January and March 1906). Gayraud co-operated in the second of these. In 1904 Gayraud had suggested that Catholics should anticipate the law of Separation by forming the cadres of associations cultuelles. L'Univers, 18th November 1904. He drew back from this position in the course of 1905. For his views, see Abbé Gayraud, La Loi de Séparation. 1906.

2. Cochin considered that the encyclical was conciliatory and therefore opened the way for compromise. Letter of Cochin to the comtesse de Griffuehles, 18th February 1906. Cochin MSS.

3. So-called because many of the eminent Catholic signatories were Academicians.

4. This provoked a violent campaign in the extremist press against "les Grands Catholiques" (the ironic title of an article by Jules Delahaye in l'Autorité, 25th March 1906).

5. La République Française, 8th May 1906.

of the associations cultuelles. Lamarzelle (Droites) and Emile Ollivier (Action Libérale) temporarily were influenced in favour of their formation.[1] It seems likely that a compromise could have been reached if the Pope had not intervened on 15th August (Gravissimo officii) with a precise condemnation of the cultuelles.

Strong disapproval of this condemnation was expressed in moderate quarters. Le Temps, which had opposed Separation and campaigned for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, was disgusted and attacked French Catholics for lacking the courage of their convictions when they did not resist the Papal decision.[2] The reaction of la République Française was similar:

> .... si la loi était plus mauvaise, il serait plus facile d'approuver l'encyclique. ... Nous n'avons pas à juger l'acte du Saint-Siège, nous ne pouvons que déplorer. 3

It was felt that the encyclical was a triumph for the extremists who would profit from the ensuing strife.[4]

The Catholic deputies, when parliament reassembled, defended the Papal position. The interpellations of Piou, Groussau, (Action Libérale), Lasies (Nationaliste) and

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1. G. Goyau, Journal. 13th-30th May 1906.

2. Le Temps, 2nd September 1906. But Cochin still hoped for compromise. Letter of Cochin to the comtesse de Griffuehles, 6th September 1906. Cochin MSS.

3. See André Ballande (Progressiste) in la République Française, 3rd September 1906.

Delafosse (Independent), made before the government had defined its policy, were mainly affirmations of their own positions and expressions of solidarity with the sentiments of the Pope. Briand replied to them in a long speech on 9th November in which he cleverly associated the Right with partial responsibility for the law of Separation.[1] He also accused Piou of being the major influence behind the Vatican's refusal to co-operate with the law of Separation (a charge which Piou indignantly denied). Briand did not make any formal concession but said, whatever happened, the churches would remain open for public worship.

Briand published an administrative circular on 1st December saying, amongst other things, that Catholics, if they did not form cultuelles, could use the churches provided that they fulfilled the provisions of the law of Public Meetings of 1881.[2] The Pope riposted by forbidding priests to make the necessary annual declaration. The government replied by

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1. Briand: ... une loi a été faite avec votre collaboration.
Groussau (Action Libérale): Non!
Briand: M. Groussau, il n'est pas niable que si les adversaires de la Séparation, qui étaient très nombreux dans la commission, nous avaient dit, dès le début: "Vous posez une question que nous n'avons même pas nous, catholiques, le droit de discuter. Vous allez légiférer sur une question que nous sommes pas compétents pour apprécier, nous nous retirons", c'étaient pour nous l'impossibilité d'élaborer un projet de loi.
l'Estourbeillon (Action Libérale/Nationaliste): Vous avez cent fois raison; c'était la vraie tactique.
J.O., 9th November 1906. p. 2246. De Mun was very angry about this insinuation. L'Echo de Paris, 11th November 1906.

2. J.O., (proprement dit), 2nd December 1906. pp. 7979-7980.

expelling the papal chargé d'affaires, seizing his papers and introducing a bill for the immediate distribution of the property of the Church to charitable institutions. The Right did not take part in the debate on this bill (although the parliamentary group of Action Libérale passed a resolution to do so[1]) but the explications de vote contained absolute condemnations of it. The progressistes reacted against the strong measures of the government: only three voted for the bill.[2]

A difficulty arose over the distribution of the monies bequeathed to the Church for the saying of masses for the dead. Briand, in spite of previous assurances, introduced a bill on 2nd July 1907 to give these monies to charitable institutions. Catholic opinion was unanimous in finding this sacrilegious. De Mun wrote: "Il n'y a rien de plus odieux; c'est la volonté des morts foulée aux pieds, le droit des vivants effrontément violé."[3] Progressistes were also disturbed by the implications of the bill. Jules Roche and Paul Beauregard opposed it

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1. La République Française, 20th December 1906.

2. Disleau, Dubisson and Gaillard. It was voted by 388 votes to 146. J.O., 21st December 1906. On 29th February 1907 Etienne Flandin (Union Démocratique) proposed that the declaration required for holding public meetings should be dropped for the purposes of public worship, It was passed and the Right supported it. Flandin was praised, even by the extremists, for his initiative. See l'Autorité, 3rd February 1907.

3. L'Echo de Paris, 21st July 1907.

because it infringed the rights of property by overriding specific testamentary instructions and because its effects were made retroactive. More deputies voted against it than any other anticlerical measures of this legislature.[1]

A strong protest was made by prominent protestants on the grounds that it offended genuine religious convictions and a compromise was proposed in the Senate. Berger (Union Républicaine) suggested that the funds should be given to societies for retired priests who would be responsible for saying the masses. Catholics objected to any tampering with the monies but they did not strongly oppose the Berger amendment.[2]

The legislative business arising out of the law of Separation was concluded by April 1908. An anomalous situation had been created. The Church remained an important corporation but it had no legal recognition or representatives. There had to be contact between the Church and the civil authorities, at least on a local level, because the municipalities owned many churches. This lead to friction as some anticlerical local authorities demolished churches and sold their contents. Maurice Barrès made representations to Briand and raised this

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1. It was carried by 351 votes to 169. Of the Right only Gasparin, Archambeaud (Union Républicaine/Progressiste) and Thierry- Delanoue (Progressiste) voted for it. J.O., 21st December 1907.

2. It was voted by 221 votes to 56 in the Senate (7th April 1908) and 361 votes to 128 (10th April 1908). The opposing votes came from the Right.

matter in the Chamber.[1] The bishops remained important citizens and the civil authorities continued to pay them some marks of respect.[2] On important occasions, especially in the West, prefects and bishops still appeared on the same platforms.

Certain men of the Right, usually monarchists and bonapartists, did not want a rapprochement between the Church and the State. A Church which lived outside the law was more likely to be their ally. Since the bishops appointed by the Pope after the termination of the concordatory regime tended to be politically intransigent,[3] the extreme Right did not desire the resumption of consultations between the Vatican and the French government on ecclesiastical appointments. But most conservative Republicans, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, continued to believe that France should be represented at the Vatican.

In June 1908 Doumergue, minister of Public Instruction, finding evidence of pressure by Catholics on the state schools in the West, proposed certain measures to prevent this happening. They provoked a fairly mild response from the

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1. See the letter written by Barrès to Briand in January 1910. M. Barrès, La Grand pitié des églises de France. 1914. pp. 19-20. Barrès introduced the matter into the budget debate on 17th January 1911. On 25th November 1912 he proposed a projet de résolution (for which he collected an impressive array of signatures including those of Albert Thomas and Ferdinand Buisson) asking the government to preserve the architectural heritage of the Churches of France. It was rejected.

2. The prefects of Seine and of Police attended the funeral of Cardinal Richard. La République Française, 2nd February 1908.

3. See A. Dansette, Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine. Vol. II. 1951. pp. 377-378.

episcopate which, in a collective letter published in September 1908, advised parents to try and secure strict religious neutrality in the schools and, if they were not satisfied, to withdraw their children from them.[1] Following a complaint from Merry del Val that this letter was too platonic, a stronger one was issued in September 1909.[2] The bishops flatly condemned the principle of secular education and said that children could only attend state schools if nothing was taught which offended their consciences. Specific textbooks were singled out for condemnation. Radicals, school teachers' organisations, Alexandre Ribot and even Denys Cochin (in private)[3] expressed disapproval of the letter.

The question scolaire was discussed in the Chamber from 14th to 26th January 1910. The speakers ranged widely over all aspects of educational theory and policy but, as Lasies (Nationaliste) remarked "cette lettre .... somme toute, est le fond du débat."[4] The speakers of the Right either defended the content of the bishops' letter, like Denys Cochin

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1. This letter stimulated the formation of the associations of pères de famille, some of which were affiliated to Action Libérale Populaire. The latter organisation held that they should be non-confessional but this provoked widespread disagreement.

2. Full text published as an appendix to a pamphlet - La Foi des enfants et les écoles publiques en France. 1910.

3. Letter of Cochin to Mme. Pierre d'Harcourt, November 1909. Cochin MSS.

4. J.O., 19th January 1910. p. 177.

(Independent),[1] or like Edouard Aynard (Progressiste) were reticent about the content of the letter but strongly defended the right of the bishops to publish it.[2] This was the familiar split between those who defended the doctrines of the Church and those who defended her liberties. The latter, who were generally progressistes, tended to think that the schools problem was over-rated. Alexandre Lefas (Progressiste) remarked:

> Le fable du divorce des deux jeunesses, attribué au seul enseignement qu'elles reçoivent, pour l'apprécier à sa juste valeur, il suffit, mes chers collègues, de jeter les yeux sur nos bancs: car on trouve, à droite, je crois, autant d' anciens élèves de l'Université que, à gauche, d'anciens élèves de l'enseignement libre, et même de l'enseignement religieux proprement dit. 3

Two outstanding attacks on the lay school were made by Maurice Barrès and Denys Cochin (Independents). Barrès denied that neutral education was either possible or desirable:[4]

> ... la discussion ... m'enfonce dans la persuasion où je suis depuis longtemps qu'il ne peut pas avoir d'enseignement neutre ... Un digne instituteur ... est celui qui préoccupe de communique une flamme à l'enfant, de former une âme. 5

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1. J.O., 19th January 1910. pp. 183-185.
2. J.O., 24th January 1910. pp. 275-281.
3. J.O., 18th January 1910. p. 143.
4. Barrès had for a long time campaigned against the lay school. Before the Dreyfus Affair he had argued, in Les Déracinés, that the rationalist, abstract, pseudo-scientific teaching in the lay school divorced children from the traditions of their country. Barrès and the nationalists did not object to state schools in principle but to the men who ran them. They attributed to the doctrines taught in them many of the ills which afflicted France and also the lack of success of the nationalist movement (See interview of Jules Lemaître, La Presse, 23rd May 1906.)
5. J.O., 18th January 1910. p. 156.

The majority of instituteurs were, he alleged, doctrinaire in a negative way: "En réalité, ce sont des prêtres manqués." He declared that he would defend the lay school if it had anything positive to offer:

> Eh bien! messieurs, je vous surprendrai, mais je vous le déclare, j'accepte .... une école contre l'Eglise, si cette école a une valeur positive, si votre enseignement est autre chose qu'une suite des négations, s'il a une valeur positive, féconde et vivante. 1

The école laïque was a kind of anti-Church:

> On propose maintenant aux instituteurs une organisation très solide, très complète. M. Buisson a dit qu'elle sera une petite République dans la grande avec ses trois pouvoirs: déliberant, judiciaire, administratif. Ajoutez le Credo; c'est une Eglise. 2

The lay school was also like a church in political and social action. The government encouraged the instituteurs to concern themselves in politics. This was, said Cochin, "un nouveau cléricalisme."[3] Considering that neutrality of education was impossible, Cochin proposed that there should be "liberty" of education. The State should provide the material facilities and preserve academic standards but the choice of teachers and textbooks and the running of the schools should be left to parents' associations.[4]

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1. J.O., 18th January 1910. p. 156.
2. J.O., 19th January 1910. p. 182.
3. Ibid. loc. cit.
4. Ibid. p. 185. In a letter to Buisson, intellectually the most formidable of his opponents, Cochin wrote: "Je ne déteste qu'une chose: la tyrannie - Laïque ou non, peu importe - Je crois que la seule solution est le champ libre, le fair-play aux initiatives privées." 25th October 1910. Cochin MSS.

Education was a very sensitive issue and when the Right attacked the principle of a centralised national system there was no hope of a rapprochement with any members of the Centre. There were some members of the Centre who deplored the anti-patriotic and anti-militarist doctrines taught by certain instituteurs.[1] But even the Barthou government dared not affect the slightest indifference to measures to defend the lay school.[2]

After 1910 there was a growth in popularity amongst Catholics of the idea of government grants to all schools, whatever their religious or political affiliations, in proportion to the number of pupils who attended them. The slogan of R.P. scolaire was coined. The idea had many forms. One of these was the bill of Gailhard-Bancel (Action Libérale) which he defended in the Chamber on 4th and 11th June 1913.[3] He suggested that commissions scolaires communales (elected by fathers of families) should control the running of schools. If a significant minority disagreed with the policy of a commission, a second school should be founded. The object of

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1. See preface of René Goblet to E. Bocquillon, La Crise du patriotisme à l'école. 1905. The favourable comments of public men on this book were published in E. Bocquillon, Pour la Patrie. 1907. Nearly all those quoted belonged to the Centre and the progressiste Right. The points made in these two books were much the same as those made in a book written at the same time by a Liberal. G. Grosjean, L'Ecole et la patrie. 1906.

2. See infra p. 260.

3. Full text published in H. de Gailhard-Bancel, Les Revendications scolaires des catholiques. 1914.

the proposal was the creation of a government supported Catholic school wherever there was a majority or a strong minority of Catholics. The Chamber naturally rejected the proposal.[1]

There was an obvious objection to R.P. scolaire, which the abbé Lemire (Indépendants) made to the Chamber:

> Serait-il, en effet, d'un bon patriotisme de provoquer la lutte là où elle n'existe pas, par l'offre d'un subside, par l'appât d'une subvention? Serait-il d'un bon patriotisme d' organiser ainsi la bataille là où elle est inconnue? .... Serait-il, enfin, d'une véritable honnêteté sociale de subventionner une école d'antipatriotes ou d'apaches? 2

The cries of "liberty" and "equality" had implications which all members of the Right would have found objectionable.

The bill for the protection of the école laïque was passed by the Chamber in January 1914. It was an uncompromising measure and although the Union Républicaine had been hostile to its provisions, the group did not vote against it.[3] The bill was, therefore, passed by a large majority.[4]

Another attempt was made during the debate on the caisse des écoles in 1914 to gain concessions for Catholic school children. This fund was intended to help children who, through

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1. By 416 votes to 114. J.O., 11th June 1913.
2. J.O., 18th March 1913. p. 1156.
3. Punishment by fine and imprisonment was decreed for those found guilty of inciting pupils not to use official textbooks. Similar penalties were imposed for complicity in a grève scolaire (the systematic withdrawal of children from school).
4. 428 votes to 118. J.O., 20th January 1914.

poverty, could not make adequate use of the educational system. An amendment to make money available for pupils of the *école libre* was defeated by the usual lay majority.[1]

In 1910 Denys Cochin (Independent) expressed the hope that the "interminable clerical question" would take up fewer sittings of the Chamber.[2] His hope was realised. The Chamber spent less time discussing the clerical question in 1910-1914 than in the previous eight years. There was less to discuss. But the question could still provoke political crises. The downfall of Briand in February 1911 resulted from an *interpellation* on the application of the law on congregations.[3]

The period 1910-1914 showed that the Right could overlook the formal anti-clericalism of a government in order to assist the passage of an important measure. But this was not a new attitude. *La politique du moindre mal* had been the basis of

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1. 386 votes to 159. J.O., 27th January 1914.

2. *La Revue de Paris*, 15th April 1910. p. 776.

3. The rather incoherent voting behaviour of the groups *Union Républicaine* and *Progressiste* in the debate on 24th February 1911 illustrates that in this section of the Chamber religious policy was regarded as a minor issue. The groups split on the second part of the order of the day (passed by 429 votes to 70) approving the "application intégrale des lois de laïcité de 1901 et 1904."

	For	Against	Abstentions
Union Républicaine	16	12	1
Progressiste	3	3	20

progressiste behaviour during the Separation crisis and the Liberals, insofar as Papal policy allowed, avoided adopting positions which made compromise impossible.

The clear victory of the anticlerical cause took some of the heat out of the religious issue. Barrès (Indépendants) remarked on this in 1914:

> Il y a un léger recul de l'anticléricalisme typique, au front de boeuf, aux yeux injectés de sang. Les jeunes radicaux-socialistes sont moins d'attaque, moins musclés. Enfants de la victoire, nés dans des jours herueux et dans des circonscriptions qu'ils ont peut-être conquises sur les vieilles barbes de leur parti, ils ignorent ces vigoureux rancunes contre le presbytère qui présidaient à la formation des purs. 1

The threat of war, and, even more, the outbreak of war, reduced the temperature still further. Albert de Mun (Action Libérale) gave an example to Catholics by shaking hands with Vaillant in the Chamber on 4th August 1914, to forget the old quarrel. He wrote in September 1914:

> Les catholiques ont, dans notre pays, subi de cruelles persécutions. Nul ne les a ressenties plus profondément que moi. Je ne veux pas les rappeler, ni exciter, contre les auteurs, le ressentiment public. Je ne l'ai pas fait, je ne le ferai pas. Si quelques-uns de ceux qui partagent ma foi ont pu, comme on me l'a dit, s'abandonner à ces rancunes, je n'hésite pas à les blâmer. 2

Chaplains were once again attached to army units[3] and

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1. M. Barrès, La Grande pitié des églises de France. 1914. p.168.

2. L'Echo de Paris, 25th September 1914.

3. This had been made possible by a decree of May 1913. Through an intervention by de Mun in August 1914 facilities were provided for 250 chaplains. De Mun wrote (L'Echo de Paris, 28th September 1914) describing how well the chaplains had been received by the officers and men. He reprinted extracts from letters saying that the imminence of death made the troops look favourably on religion.

a large number of priests and ordinands fought in the trenches. These men probably reduced anticlericalism among the fighting men. The bishops wrote strongly patriotic pastoral letters. Cardinal Amette, archbishop of Paris, sought to identify the cause of the Church with the cause of France.[1] He also seemed to modify doctrine to assist the performance of patriotic duty.[2] There was public defiance by the French clergy of Papal policies in favour of a compromise peace.[3]

The response of the lay majority to displays of Catholic patriotism was not effusive. There was no appeal by Government leaders to sink differences over religion. At least one official attempt was made on a local level to prevent the resurrection of religious strife. The sous-prefet of Chateaubriant (Maine et Loire) wrote to the local papers in September 1914:

> Il m'a été signalé que dans certaines communes rurale, quelque personnes ont insinué que la guerre nous subissons a été provoquée par les prêtres les riches et les ligues patriotiques.

He hoped that good sense would put an end to rumours but, if it did not, severe sanctions would be enforced against those who

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1. He recalled that Pius X had contended that "la Séparation, qui a rompu les liens officiels entre l'Eglise et sa fille aînée, n'a pas brisé leur union." Cardinal Amette, Lettres pastorales et allocutions. 1915. p. 9.

2. Ibid. pp. 22-23.

3. A. Dansette, Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine. Vol II. 1951. pp. 490-491.

spread them. De Mun commented that this was the language of "un homme de gouvernement".[1] There was no suggestion, however, that the sous-prefet's action should become general policy. It was inconceivable that any action could be taken against anticlerical opinions in areas with a radical or socialist majority. There was no official action taken against the anti-clerical statements (the main charge was that there were no priests in the trenches) made in le Bonnet rouge and la Dépêche de Toulouse at the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916. A libel action undertaken by Barrès caused the papers to withdraw their remarks.[2]

The great parliamentary change was that the clerical question almost disappeared from the debates of the Chamber. Some topics were discussed which had religious implications but these implications were not the central issues. The most important of these topics was the education of pupilles de la nation (war orphans). During the debate of 20th to 26th July 1917, the Chamber rejected six amendments, proposed by members of the Right, designed to safeguard the religious rights of the children.[3] But the Right, which approved the general

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 25th September 1914.

2. A. Dansette, op. cit. p. 492.

3. These were proposed by Robic (Fédération Républicaine), Groussau, Lamy, Lerolle, Piou (Action Libérale)and Castelnau (Indépendant). The votes collected by these amendments were about the same - the lowest was 79 and the highest 85.

principle of the bill, did not oppose its passage. Two minor matters in June 1915 also isolated the Right - the utilisation of disused cemeteries and the provision of facilities for cremation. The Church opposed both on doctrinal grounds and the Catholic deputies voted against them in the Chamber.

The debates on these subjects were more restricted and less bitter than equivalent debates before the war. This was not purely because all civil issues were eclipsed; the debate on rent control aroused strong passions and occupied many sittings of the Chamber. There was a genuine reluctance (except on the extreme Left) to break the common ideological front of union sacrée.

After the war some observers thought that anticlericalism was a spent force. Barrès wrote: "Nous sommes en mesure d'en finir avec cet esprit de tracasserie qui a empoissoné la vie française pendant des années."[1] There were examples of a change of heart by public men. Fabre, radical socialist undersecretary of State and ex-Combist, is reported to have said in a conversation with the abbé Wetterlé[2] that the behaviour of Catholics during the war had been admirable and, as a reward, some provision should be made for religious instruction in state schools.[3] There was a complementary movement of opinion

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1. M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. 1929-1958. Vol XII. p. 191.
2. Ex-separatist member of the Reichstag, elected to the Chamber in 1919.
3. M. Barrès, op. cit. Vol. XII. p. 179.

on the Right in favour of the Republic. Denys Cochin (Droites) wrote:

> J'étais peu enthousiaste de la République il y a dix ans: comment ne pas reconnaître et même l'acclamer maintenant qu'elle a reconquis l'Alsace? 1

The general mood was one of apaisement.[2] The new political groups which sprang up in 1919 did not suggest, in their policy statements, that there should be a new concordat or that any specific favours should be shown towards the Church but they were quite definite that there should be no discrimination against anyone on religious grounds.

This mood created the possibility, and the elections of 1919 provided the opportunity, for extensive co-operation between Catholics and non-Catholics. There was still a high degree of sensitivity on both sides. In the negotiations for the formation of the bloc national the politicians of the Right and Centre found it easy to agree on slogans concerning financial, social and foreign policies but religious policy proved less tractable.

Hoping to draw the radical party into the bloc national Carnot was, at first, prepared to offend the susceptibilities of Catholics. On 17th October 1919, the Parti Républicain

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1. In a letter to Barrès, 19th November 1919. M. Barrès, op. cit. p. 322.

2. The incident between Poincaré and Clemenceau over attendance at the victory Te deum in Notre Dame showed that small things could still cause great excitement.

Démocratique issued a dry and unconciliatory formula on the religious question.[1] Although he assured the clergy soon afterwards that their liberties would be respected, he did not attempt to insert this assurance into the party programme.[2]

The refusal of the radicals to take part in the bloc necessitated the discovery of a conciliatory formula. The difficulties were obvious. The anticlericalism of the men of Alliance Démocratique had been the main reason for their acceptance among progressive republicans since 1899. Their personal political success and the success of their general policy of social conservation had been built on an alliance with the radicals. Many of them, and others who proposed to join the bloc such as Millerand, Puech and Steeg, were deeply committed to anticlerical policies by word and by deed. On the other side, some Catholics, particularly the older men, were reluctant to give up hope of reversing the lay laws and did not like co-operating with men who desired their preservation.

A thorough discussion of this problem took place between Millerand and Barrès during the formation of the national list in the second constituency of Paris. At first Millerand wanted to relegate the whole issue to a vague formula expressing the

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1. See G. Lachapelle, Alliance Républicaine Démocratique. 1935. p. 33.
2. Le Temps, 20th October 1919.

inviolability of the lay laws - the lois intangibles.[1] Barrès thought that this was too imprecise.[2] He eventually extracted statements out of Millerand approving the principle of freedom of association,[3] the constitution of association cultuelles "sous une forme respectueuse de la hiérchie catholique", the legalisation of the teaching orders and the possibility of the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.[4] Millerand repeated these assurances in an attenuated form during his discours-programme given at the Bar-Ta-Clan restaurant on 6th November.[5] He had committed himself to very little. He did

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1. He proposed this formula early in September in a private conversation with Barrès and others. It must have become generally known. Denys Cochin mentions it in a letter to Barrès dated 19th September 1919. M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. Vol. XII. p. 322.

2. Ibid. p. 190. Barrès was afraid of compromising too much. He wrote to Millerand; "Je ne puis pas souffrir l'idée que je puisse sortir de mon voie pour des avantages personnels." Ibid. p. 326. Arthur Meyer (le Gaulois, 31st October 1919) accused him of having "tout sacrifié au sentiment patriotique" and having subordinated his private views "à la volonté d'union à toute prix." Barrès had forestalled this criticism in an article in la Croix, 26th October 1919.

3. This assurance was given after a meeting between Barrès, Millerand, Puech, Galli, Lerolle and others at the Palais Bourbon on 2nd October 1919. Barrès, op. cit. p. 188.

4. Letter of Millerand to Barrès, dated 28th October 1919. Ibid. pp. 327-328. The assumption underlying these assurances seemed to be that no legislation was needed to put them into effect. Barrès also thought that a change in the application of the existing laws was all that was required. Ibid. p. 191. See also M. Barrès, Faut-il autoriser les congrégations. 1924. p. v. Denys Cochin was understandably very surprised by this assumption. Letter of Cochin to Barrès, dated 29th October, 1919. Ibid. pp. 331-334.

5. Reports in the press, 7th and 8th November. Notably, l'Echo de Paris.

not propose to change a single article of any law.

There were differing opinions among Catholics about this entente. Denys Cochin (Droites) felt unable either to join Barrès or to oppose him. He could not join him because he could not accept any formula which was respectful of the lay laws: "Ces lois et l'esprit qui les inspire sont pour moi l'iniquité."[1] Memories of individual cases of discrimination were still too painful for him to make concessions.[2] He was surprised by Millerand's assurances and said that Barrès would have served the country and the Church well if they were carried into effect.[3] But Cochin could not oppose Barrès because he could not definitely say that Barrès was wrong to act as he did and he had no alternative to offer. In spite of an attempt by Millerand to dissuade him[4] and the regrets expressed by Barrès, Cochin used personal reasons as an excuse to withdraw from active politics.[5]

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1. See letter of Cochin to Barrès. M. Barrès, op. cit. pp. 321 et seq.

2. Ibid. loc. cit. Cochin was no bigot and often spoke kindly of those who professed atheistic doctrines. He described the teachers of his youth at the University, amongst whom was the materialist Marcelin Berthelot, as "ces maîtres admirables." D. Cochin, 1914-1922. Vol. I. 1923. p. 224.

3. M. Barrès, op. cit. pp. 331-333. Letter dated 9th November 1919.

4. Letter of Millerand to Cochin, 26th October 1919. Cochin MSS.

5. See especially letter dated 19th September. M. Barrès, op.cit. pp. 321-324. These reasons were probably genuine (conversation with M. Victor Buccaille - who was Cochin's secretary, 17th December 1960). As early as February 1919 he was talking of retiring. Letter to the comtesse de Griffuehles, February 1919. Cochin MSS.

Jacques Piou (Action Libérale), taking a different view, wrote to Barrès that he would not voluntarily have retired from politics:

> ... au moment où les idées que j'ai défendue pendant quarante années approchent du succès, où les discours de M. Clemenceau et surtout celui si décisif de M. Millerand font entrevoir une pacification et de concessions qu'il y a peu de temps je croyais encore inespérées. 1

Piou composed the formula on religious policy which was included in the manifesto of the bloc national and of many national lists throughout the country:

> Le fait de laïcité doit se conciler avec les libertés et les droits de tous les citoyens, à quelque croyance qu'ils appartiennent, et ainsi sera assurée dans notre pays la paix religieuse. 2

Cardinal Amette approved this formula and his pastoral letter on the elections was a veiled plea to vote for the national lists.[3] Piou's support of Barrès seemed to be motivated, to some extent, by reaction to "les criailleries des catholiques à gros grain"[4] from which he had suffered so much.

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1. Letter of Piou to Barrès, dated 11th November 1919. M. Barrès, op. cit, pp. 333-336.

2. Piou personally showed this formula to Cardinal Amette; La Rochefoucauld, the representative of Action Libérale, presented it to the comité directeur of the bloc national. All the national lists in Paris used it. Clemenceau saw it and agreed with it. Ibid. loc. cit.

3. "Mieux vaudrait accorder vos voix à des candidats qui, sans vous donner pleine satisfaction, vous permettent cependant d' attendre d'eux une action utile au pays, plutôt que de reserver vos votes à d'autres, dont le programme serait plus parfait, mais dont l'échec à peu près certain, risquerait d'ouvrir la porte aux ennemis de la religion." L'Echo de Paris, 1st November 1919.

4. M. Barrès, loc. cit.

Catholics grumbled, especially if they were also monarchists like Jules Delahaye,[1] about the inclusion of notable anticlericals on national lists. But there was no organised opposition to the bloc national on religious grounds. The victory of the bloc did lead to an improvement in Church state relations. In March 1920 Millerand, true to the spirit of his election promises proposed a bill to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican.[2] Before this bill was discussed France had a temporary representative at the Vatican for the ceremony of the canonisation of Joan of Arc.[3]

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1. Delahaye complained that the bloc produced religious indifferentism among Catholic deputies and although, after the election, the Centre and the Right were in the majority "ce Centre et cette Droite s'y montrent parfois plus zélés que la Gauche en faveur 'des lois organiques de la laïcité.'" J. Delahaye, La Reprise des relations diplomatiques avec le Vatican. 1921. p. 24.

2. There was opposition in the Vatican, led by the Cardinals Merry del Val and Billot, and hesitations among the French bishops on the subject of re-establishment of relations. The Pope, however, was very anxious to reach an agreement. A. Dansette, op. cit. pp. 502-503. Jules Cambon thought that the government proposed the measures in order to ensure the loyalty of the Right in a forthcoming trial of strength with the Left. Letter of J. Cambon to Denys Cochin, 14th March 1920. Cochin MSS.

3. Since 1916 there had been informal relations between the French state and the Vatican. One of the reasons why Briand appointed Cochin to an undersecretaryship in December 1916 was to re-establish contact with Rome. Cochin achieved this object in the same month when, on his way to Greece, he met Cardinal Pacelli in Rome. Cochin's secretary, Victor Bucaille, made about thirty journeys to Rome as an unofficial emissary of the French government in the remaining two years of the war. Information given to the author by M. Victor Bucaille in an interview, 17th December 1960.

The reasons given by the government for its decision to send an ambassador to the Vatican were all of a practical, diplomatic nature. It stated firmly that the principles of laïcité enshrined in law were not under discussion.[1] In the debate the Left affirmed that these principles were being attacked.[2] But the Catholic rapporteur for the bill, Georges Noblemaire (Républicain de Gauche), concentrated on the alleged damage to France's diplomatic position during the war through not having a representative at the Vatican, and the advantages which would be gained in the troubled aftermath of the war by having such a representative. The Right also adopted a non-partisan attitude expressed by Xavier de Magallon (Indépendants):

> Personne ne peut avoir, dans ce débat, la pensée d'une victoire de parti, d'une victoire sur un parti. Et s'il y avait un parti qui dût sortir de ce débat victorieux, je n'hésite pas à dire que ce serait celui qui, surmontant ses propres préventions, les immolerait à l'intérêt national. 3

Almost all the deputies elected to the Chamber on national lists voted for the measure.[4] The extreme Right also voted for it.

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1. See the exposé des motifs, J.O. annexe, 11th March 1920. p. 134.

2. Conversely, the extreme Right alleged that the re-establishment of relations implied the acceptance by the Vatican of the lay laws and for this reason it was not desirable. This is the main thesis in Jules Delahaye, op. cit.

3. J.O., 23rd November 1920. p. 3301.

4. The exceptions to this were certain Républicains de Gauche who had been elected on national lists which did not contain a candidate of the Right.

The religious problem, which was the major domestic political issue in 1905, had become by 1919 an issue of secondary importance. It was in 1919, and still is, a living issue. André Siegfried, writing in 1930, described it as causing the fundamental division in French politics.[1] But this was already an old fashioned view, soon to be disproved by the experiences of the Vichy regime and the Resistance.

The problem declined in importance because, after the passing of measures against the congregations, separating the Churches and the state and defending the *école laïque*, attempts either to repeal or extend these measures were outside practical politics. The parliamentary effects of this decline were slight. The *Républicains moderés*, split since 1899 into two factions (represented by the *Fédération Républicaine and Alliance Démocratique*), came together again because the different positions which they had adopted on the religious question in the years 1899 to 1906 were no longer important. The *Alliance Démocratique* no longer shunned all contact with Catholics. Practising Catholics joined Centre groups.

But the clerical issue lived on to divide conservative men. The Radicals, having achieved their religious and social programme, became in the inter-war period the most powerful

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1. A. Siegfried, *Tableau des partis en France*. 1930. p. 62.

defenders of the established order. They retained their anticlericalism and resisted any weakening of the lois laïques and generally refused to co-operate with Catholics. The issue also divided reformers. After the war progressive Catholics, the heirs of the abbés démocrates and the Sillon, became more numerous and vocal. They sought, and to a certain extent succeeded (with the negative aid of fascism) in dissociating the Church from the Right. In practical matters an important Catholic minority came to have more in common with democratic socialism than with the Right. But co-operation between reforming Catholics and the Left has been often frustrated by the persistence of anticlericalism.

External Affairs[1]

Foreign and colonial affairs were seldom an important issue in French general elections. As a result, parliamentarians, even the noisy patriots, did not concern themselves with diplomatic problems unless a serious crisis occurred.[2] The majority of them did not express detailed opinions on the day to day conduct of affairs. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain exactly how representative the views of the spokesmen of the Right were. On the rare occasions that the Chamber voted on issues of external affairs, the division lists give us no clue. The most that can be said is that the views expressed by the orators of the Right during the period 1905 to 1914 were not personal eccentricities; they fitted into conservative tradition. Similar views have been held by other men both before and since.

There has been a tendency to regard the Right as united on foreign and imperial policy before the First World War,

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1. Eugen Weber has remarked that the thesis of a nationalist revival in the years 1905-1914 has become an accepted convention among French historians (E. Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905-1914. Berkeley 1959. p.1.) and it is a thesis well supported by the evidence. There is no attempt in this chapter of another review of the process. Useful contributions to the study of the nationalist revival are Georges Michon, La Préparation à la guerre. 1935. G. Wright, Poincaré and the French Presidency. Stanford 1942. J.C. Cairns, "Politics and Foreign Policy: the French Parliament." Canadian Historical Review. September 1953. pp. 245-276.

2. The nationalist movement (See D.R. Watson, The Nationalist Movement in Paris, 1900-1906. Thesis Oxford 1960, especially pp. 87-88), was primarily concerned with domestic issues and nationalists seldom mentioned imperial and foreign affairs in their electoral manifestoes.

One historian has written:

> Before 1914, the French Right supported a policy of alliances and armaments, commercial and colonial expansion, implacable opposition to the German Empire and to all manifestations of pacifism. The key to greatness was always military greatness. 1

But there were also contrary traditions and ways of feeling within the Right favouring cautious, non-aggressive foreign policies, "ideological" rather than realpolitik alliances ("la République du Pape et du Tsar"; a "latin" alliance with Italy; a conservative and Catholic alliance with Austria) and an attenuated form of anti-colonialism.

There was a substratum of polemical attitudes which underlay the more complex differences of opinion on the relations between France and the rest of the world. The Right made passionate appeals for national unity. The Right accused the Left of exacerbating differences within the nation through anti-religious policies and other measures. The Right tried to implicate all members of the Left in treason, internationalism and anti-militarism. The Left countered by regarding the Right as a group inspired by a narrow-minded chauvinism. In fact, the difference between the Right and the Left was one of degree. Xenophobia and chauvinism were more common on the Right. But some members of the Right were keen exponents of international détente. The progressiste senators, Philippe

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1. J.C. Cairns, op. cit. p. 246.

Berger, Boudenoot, Courcel and Labiche were members of the comité directeur of the Groupe inter-parlementaire de l'arbitrage international. No generalisation covers all the attitudes of members of the Right to international affairs.

Colonial policy was closely connected with European politics in the period 1905 to 1914 because of the conflicts which arose between France and Germany over Morocco. Previously the Right had attacked certain forms of colonial adventure, such as the Tonkin expedition of 1881, but by 1905 most of the Right accepted, and some gloried in, the existence of a large colonial empire.

The broad link between the Right and the empire was the army. Denys Cochin (Independent) remarked that in the empire: "Nous ... avons trouvé pour la valeur et les talents de nos militaires un emploi nouveau depuis quarante ans."[1] In the years of peace which followed 1871 the officer corps found congenial employment in the colonial empire. The Right was linked through sympathy and personal ties with the officer corps.[2] Some deputies of the Right, such as General Jacquey (Action Libérale/Nationaliste) and Admiral Bienaimé (Nationaliste) who had taken part in the Tonkin and Madagascar expeditions, had served in the colonies. There was a Groupe

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1. J.O., 16th December 1911. p. 4050.

2. For example, Cochin corresponded at various times with Lyautey, Gallièni, Weygand, Gourraud and Joffre. Cochin MSS.

de l'Armée coloniale of the Chamber. The president was the retired cavalry officer and ex-nationalist, Le Hérissé, the vice-president, Admiral Bienaimé and the secretary, Pierre Adigard (Progressiste/Action Libérale). In contrast, the comité directeur of the Groupe colonial was composed entirely of members of Centre groups.[1]

A number of deputies of the Right took an interest in colonial affairs for personal reasons. Gabriel Bonvalot (Independent) had participated in several exploring expeditions. Edmond Bartissol (Progressiste) assisted, as an engineer, in the construction of the Suez canal. The marquis de Pomereu (Action Libérale) travelled widely in Africa and Asia from 1881 to 1887. The marquis de Moustier (Progressiste) was a founder member of the Comité de l'Afrique française and of the Comité de l'Asie française. Others, such as Fleury-Ravaran (Progressiste), Dutreil (Action Libérale) and Driant (Indépendants), had written on aspects of the empire.[2] Alphonse Gourd (Progressiste) had a scholarly interest in colonial history.

The most influential of those interested in colonial matters were the progressiste contributors to la Revue Maritime et coloniale, Thierry, Beauregard and Ballande (who was a

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1. The Groupe colonial of the Senate had a monarchist president - Saint-Germain (Droites) - and one of the other six officers belonged to the Right - Jules Gervais (Progressiste).

2. Fleury-Ravarin, Notre défense Maritime et coloniale. 1900; M. Dutreil, Djbouti, création d'une colonie française. 1900; and Commandant Driant, Au dessus du continent noir. 1912.

member of the Comité de l'union coloniale française). This review was concerned mainly with the expansion of commerce but it also supported a cautious extension of political influence and control. The progressiste contributors represented constituencies in which commercial interests were strong. Thierry was deputy for Marseilles, Beauregard for Paris and Ballande for Bordeaux. They were supported by Aynard, deputy for Lyon, Fleury-Ravarin, deputy for Lyon and senator for Rhône, and Brindeau, deputy for Le Havre and senator for Seine Inférieure. All were in principle free-traders and they formed the only coherent group of free-traders in the Chamber.[1] Occasionally they made polemics about "le régime détestable et débilant de 1892"[2] but most of them had become reconciled to a protectionist world and sought to soften the tariff barriers with suggestions for treaties of commerce and the institution of free-ports. Thierry wrote articles on "l'inanité de la protection"[3] but co-operated in the revision of the general tariff which occupied the commission de douanes from 1907 to 1909.[4] Realising that tariff barriers had come to stay they

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1. The majority of the progressiste group, led by Méline, were strongly protectionist especially for agriculture and textiles. For an example of the majority view see Laurent Bonnevay, J.O., 24th May 1905. pp. 1876 et seq.

2. Paul Beauregard, J.O., 24th May 1905. p. 1871.

3. Le Petit Marseillais, 5th March 1909.

4. For this purpose Thierry admitted "(le) point de départ que nous acceptons encemble ... est notre tariff de 1892." Fédération des industriels et des commençants français. Bulletin mensuel. December 1907. p. 78.

supported, unlike the Manchester school, the expansion of empire to gain an assured market for domestic products.

There were no pressure groups for particular colonial interests operating within the Right and such groups sometimes came under heavy fire from the Right. As a result, the tradition of treating colonial problems in the context of the balance of power in Europe remained, to a large extent, intact.

Comparatively few members of the Right had important material interests in the colonies. An obscure independent deputy for Vosges, Prosper Ancel-Sietz, owned extensive plantations of coffee, cocoa, cotton and rubber at Loango in the French Congo and he was president of the colonial cotton association. Ballande was the head of a trading house in Bordeaux which had important connections in the colonies. The Ancel family (the head of which was Raoul Ancel (Droites), senator for Seine Inférieure, and subsequently his son, Georges Ancel, independent deputy for Le Havre) owned a shipping concern in Le Havre, mainly interested in colonial produce.

The differences existing within the Right on colonial and foreign policy can best be illustrated by reference to the Moroccan problem. Boni de Castellane led the nationalist attack on Delcassé's Moroccan policy.

Castellane's opposition to Delcassé was comprehensive. He would not even give him credit for the Entente cordiale:

> Attribuer à M. Delcassé l'oeuvre méritoire de réconciliation avec l'Angleterre est assurément lui reconnaître un mérite

qu'il n'y a pas. 1

Castellane alleged that Delcassé was using the Entente for the wrong purpose:

> L'erreur de M. Dalcassé a été de considérer l'entente ... comme un moyen de faciliter la dangereuse question de Maroc, alors que cette entente précieuse devait être la base de toute la politique française. 2

The reasons why Castellane opposed intervention in Morocco (which he called deplorable and detestable[3]) are obscure because he dealt in innuendoes. He argued that "la pénétration sera militaire ou ... elle ne sera pas"[4] and military intervention would create a situation "... dont on ne prévoit la fin ni l'issue."[5] Intervention had occured because of pressure from a sectional interest - the Comité Marocain - the members of which, he said, were of good repute but whose interests were not those of the country.[6] He repeatedly

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1. Le Figaro, 30th April 1905. Not all the extreme Right approved of the entente. Drumont and Daudet thought that it was dangerous to the Russian alliance. Ernest Judet wrote subsequently: "... l'entente anglaise ... fut une immense duperie." E. Judet, Ma Politique, 1905-1917. 1923. p. lxxi.

2. Le Figaro, 25th June 1905, Some members of the extreme Right continued to rail against Delcassé. Delahaye (Droites) remarked as late as 1911 on "le mal immense qu'il a fait dans nos affaires étrangères." J.O., 15th December 1911. p. 4140. On the other hand, another extremist, Jules Delafosse (Independent), praised his policy. J. Delafosse, La France au dehors. 1908. p. vii. Nearly all the Right came to recognise virtue in Delcassé's consistent anti-German policy.

3. J.O., 19th April 1905. p. 1541 and 28th January 1908. p.136.

4. J.O., 19th April 1905. p. 1542.

5. Boni de Castellane, Le Maroc. 1907. p.1.

6. Ibid. loc. cit.

mentioned the conflict of special interests with national interests. The latter, he thought, were essentially European:

> ... les intérêts spéciaux ... exigent ces sacrifices stériles de notre sang et notre or. L'intérêt réel et pressant du pays est de ne pas se compromettre davantage dans une entreprise qui immobiliserait dans l'Atlas une armée dont le véritable place est à la frontière. 1

His opposition to colonial commitments was general and not confined to Morocco. In 1904 he wrote:

> Un premier avertissement avait été donné par la guerre de Cuba aux nations qui épuisent leurs forces dans l'acquisition des colonies. 2

The concern of governments of the Third Republic with colonies was, in Castellane's view, sufficient to condemn the regime.[3]

These anti-colonial views do not seem to have been strongly held in 1905. There was little debate and no vote on the act of Algeçiras. The two orators who did take part in the debate both accepted France's position in Morocco. Jules Delafosse (Independent), considering that France had been in a strong diplomatic position, criticised the government for negotiating with Germany. He alleged that by doing so France had abandoned the advantages which she held through her previous engagements with England and with Spain. He regretted that concessions had been made and did not think that they were necessary.[4] Denys Cochin (Independent) made no criticism of

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1. Le Figaro, 9th September 1907.
2. Le Gaulois, 6th June 1904.
3. Boni de Castellane, La Politique extérieure. 1904. p. 231.
4. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 1737.

government policy. He thought that the concessions made had been necessary and rejoiced at the peaceful outcome of the crisis.[1]

Cochin and Delafosse were the most frequent speakers in debates on foreign policy. Their views make an interesting contrast. Cochin was opposed to an aggressive foreign policy: " ... je ne suis pas de ceux qui pensent que la France ne peut se relever que par le feu et qu'en versant le sang."[2] He did not approve a forward policy in Africa. As a good conservative he thought that France should not give up any territory or advantage without a very strong reason. Like Delafosse (although he expressed the view with less violence) he believed that a strong army was the prerequisite of successful diplomacy. In his speeches and articles on foreign affairs, two attitudes predominate: close attention must be paid to the practical implications of any course of action; and a policy must have a moral justification.

His views were not static. On Morocco he evolved in much the same way as the French government. After the 1905 crisis he said:

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1. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 1737.

2. Ibid. loc. cit. Cochin, however, supported Delcassé and the English alliance. He corresponded with Albert de Mun who was sceptical about both. For example, de Mun wrote on 17th October 1908: "Je n'ai point votre confiance dans le jeu de Delcassé: ce grand coup de barre donné par un tel pilote m'a toujours inquiété. L'engouement pour l'alliance anglaise ne nous porte bonheur." Cochin MSS.

> ... nous savions très bien que nous ne proposions pas un conquête brutale. Nous savions très bien que les conditions que tout le monde vient de reconnaître justes étaient celles mêmes que nous proposions: intégralité du Maroc: indépendance du Sultan, liberté du commerce pour tous. 1

He gradually became convinced that firmer policy was necessary and that France would have to establish some kind of protectorate over Morocco.[2] After the second Moroccan crisis he was justifying the conquest of Morocco:

> Aujourd'hui le mot "conquête" au lieu de signifier "abattre" et "dérober" ne signifie plus, en français, que "instruire", "civiliser", "élever". Voilà les conquêtes que nous avons faites et que nous sommes fiers d'avoir faites. 3

In spite of changes of front Cochin did not give the impression of cynicism. He did not regard foreign policy in a partisan manner and was ready to grant that his opponents of the Left were as patriotic as he.[4] His intelligently argued speeches often received applause from benches other than those of the Right.

Unlike Cochin, Delafosse denied that a foreign policy needed a moral justification: "C'est la loi des intérêts qui gouverne le monde. Elle est inflexible et ne comporte ni dérogations ni détours."[5] He supported the cause of Empire

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1. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 1738.
2. The turning point for Cochin seems to have been the march on Fez in 1909. See J.O., 18th January 1909. pp. 37-41.
3. J.O., 16th December 1911. p. 4050.
4. J.O., 12th January 1911. p. 15.
5. J. Delafosse, La France au dehors. 1908. p. 284.

but primarily he believed in: "... l'impérieux et sacré souci de relever la France de ses défaites en Europe avant de s' adonner aux conquêtes lointaines."[1] He was a consistent advocate of the extension of French control over Morocco. His reasons were that it was a rich and strategically important country and that anarchy in Morocco was dangerous to French control of Algeria.[2] For these reasons he thought that other powers should be kept out of the country.[3]

Unlike Barrès, who during the first Moroccan crisis thought that only England desired war,[4] Delafosse consistently believed in Germany's aggressive intentions. This view of Germany as the trouble-maker of Europe was reinforced by an element of racial antipathy towards Germans:

> Il n'y a pas d'Allemands bien élévés. On y rencontre, en grand nombre, des gens cérémonieux et polis jusqu'à l' obséquiosité. Mais ce n'est là qu'un vernis ... Ce qu'on ne rencontre nulle part ... c'est le goût, le tact, la bonne grâce et la générosité, bref tout les qualités essentielles et constitutives d'une éducation naturelle et partout achévée, parce qu'elles furent et resteront toujours inassimilables au génie épais et brutal de la race allemande. 5

Diplomatic conflicts were always used by Delafosse to illustrate the demand for a strong army. For example, after the first Moroccan crisis he said:

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1. J. Delafosse, La France au dehors. 1908. p. 36.
2. L'Echo de Paris, 4th October 1911.
3. J. Delafosse, La France au dehors. 1908. p. 254.
4. M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. Vol. IV. p. 151. Also, La Presse, 10th March 1906.
5. J. Delafosse, op. cit. p. 263.

> ... je ne puis formulé qu'un voeu, c'est que nous ayons toujours le souci de posséder l'instrument de notre diplomatie ... une armée solide, compacte, homogène et toujours prête, car l'une ne va pas sans l'autre. 1

Unlike the first, the second Moroccan crisis united the Right in opposition to the government. The Right was passionately concerned about the situation in a way that it had not been in 1905. There was a growing exasperation with Germany, shared by others, and a feeling that no more concessions should be made by France. The crisis probably convinced de Mun[2] and others that war was inevitable but no one suggested that war was likely at the time.[3] This atmosphere encouraged the intransigence of the Right. The presence of Caillaux, as président du conseil, was an important subsidiary cause of the hostility of the Right to the policy of the government.

The most common argument used by members of the Right against the Franco-German convention of 1911 was that it was a bad bargain. The debate on the convention opened on 14th December 1911 with a motion préjudicielle presented by de Mun (Action Libérale), Delafosse (Action Libérale), Cochin (Droites), and Chambrun (Progressiste) demanding an adjournment until the government could provide the Chamber with more information.[4]

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1. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 1737. This was a frequently expressed demand of the Right at this time because of the alleged damage done to the army by the policies of the bloc des gauches.

2. See article by de Mun in L'Echo de Paris, 12th January, 1911.

3. De Mun wrote: "Personne ne veut la guerre, personne n'y croit, et c'est peut-être la raison du calme extérieur de l'opinion." L'Echo de Paris, 11th July 1911.

4. J.O., 14th December 1911. p. 3970.

De Mun's object in proposing this motion was to express his disapproval of the convention on the grounds that part of the colonial Empire was being wrongfully ceded to Germany.[1] Only Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu (Progressiste) pretended that the part of the Congo which was ceded to Germany was valuable;[2] the usual argument was that it had been acquired by French blood and heroism and therefore should not be given away.[3] All the speakers of the Right, however, made the charge that: "Vous avez payé trop cher au Congo, parce que vous avez consenti des concessions infiniment trop larges."[4] Denys Cochin held this view[5] and even those who eventually voted for ratification of the convention - such as Fournier-Sarlovèze, Maurice Spronck (Progressiste) and Lemire (Indépendants) - spoke of the cession as "une nécessité politique douloureuse."[6]

Vague charges were made that the haute banque had a decisive influence over the negotiations. Piou (Action Libérale) alleged that:

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1. J.O., 14th December 1911. p. 3971. De Mun expressed his position concisely in a letter to Denys Cochin (Droites): "Je ne me sens pas du tout disposé à voter le traité qu'on nous fait présenter, avec l'abandon honteux, sans excuse que les tripotages financiers, du moyen Congo et une position implicite au Maroc. Je ne prendrai pas cette responsabilité. Une fois de plus, il apparait que nos gouvernants sont au dessous de la France, incapable de comprendre, de sentir avec elle." 29th November. Cochin MSS.
2. J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4140.
3. For example see Grandmaison (Progressiste) Ibid. p. 4139.
4. Ibid. p. 4134.
5. J.O., 16th December 1911. p. 4052.
6. Lemire, J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4142.

The circumstances leading to the signing of what Paul Pugliesi-Conti (Indépendants) called "cet accord ... incompatible avec la dignité de France"[1] gave the Right an opportunity for moralising, and, in the case of Benoist, for breast beating.[2] The moralising took the form of contrasting the wickedness of the Germans with the blamelessness of the French. Delafosse (Action Libérale) remarked:

> Il faut le dire très haut, messieurs, nous sommes, nous Français, sans reproche vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne. Je défie l'Allemand le plus pointilleux - et Dieu sait qu'il y en a - de relever à notre charge un seul grief dont l'Allemagne puisse se plaindre. 3

The Right drew comfort from the unity of the country during the crisis. Delahaye (Droites) alleged that "tous les partis se sont fait un devoir de serrer les rangs autour des porte-paroles de la France"[4] and Delafosse added "cette mobilisation morale de la France fut un admirable spectacle."[5]

Although members of the Right unanimously disapproved of the Franco-German Convention, a comparatively small minority -

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1. J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4138.
2. "... c'est nous mêmes qui avons créés cette difficile et redoutable affaire, c'est nous qui avons tissé de nos mains l'imbroglio marocain." J.O., 19th December 1911. p. 4095.
3. J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4135.
4. J.O., 15th December 1911. p. 4010.
5. J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4133.

> Une question d'affaires, une question d'argent a eu sur la direction de notre politique, sur une des plus grandes actes accomplies depuis 1870, une influence décisive. Il faut pour la dignité même de la France, pour la sécurité de ceux qui voteront tout à l'heure que les voiles soient déchirés et que le pays sache ... quelles causes subalternes, misérables peut-être ont rouvert l'ère des conflits et abouti à l' abandon d'un parti du Congo et au protectorat tronqué ou plutôt au sous-protectorat de Maroc. 1

Jules Delahaye (Droites) made the same allegation and extended his attack to accuse the banks and those who controlled them of creating all the ills which afflicted France.[2]

Nearly all the speakers of the Right, showed their general lack of interest in international affairs by treating the crisis in isolation. Charles Benoist (Progressiste) was an exception. He attempted a systematic analysis of the policies of successive administrations of the previous ten years. In doing so he formulated, without intending to, a negative apologia for the Caillaux government:

> Depuis 1904, une sorte de nécessité ..... a poussé ... notre politique marocaine. A cause de ce qu'a fait le ministère de 1904, le gouvernement de 1911 n'était plus absolumment libre. Nous ne déplorerons jamais assez que ces trois fautes aient été commises: négocier en 1902 avec l' Espagne en arrière de l'Angleterre; traiter en 1904 avec l'Angleterre en arrière de l'Espagne; de 1902 à 1905 garder envers l'Allemagne un silence obstiné et gros de dangers. 3

In spite of admitting that the Caillaux government was not responsible for what happened in 1911 Benoist voted against the ratification of the Convention.

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1. Lemire, J.O., 20th December 1911. p. 4142.
2. J.O., 15th December 1911. p. 4014.
3. J.O., 19th December 1911. p. 4100.

twenty-four - voted against ratification. The majority abstained. The contrary votes and abstentions were spread fairly evenly over the Right showing that the extreme Right did not have a monopoly of extreme nationalist sentiment.[1] Those who voted for ratification explained that they did so in order to help to preserve national solidarity.

The debate on the three years law brought the Right and Centre together in a common cause which had international implications. In the past members of the Right had differed on the question of military organisation. Some had favoured an all professional army;[2] some had voted for the reduction of the length of military service to two years.[3] But whatever the views of individuals on the ideal form of military organisation, these were subordinated in 1913 to the common aim of increasing the immediate strength of the army.[4]

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1. The groups split in this way:

	For	Against	Abstentions
Union Républicaine	18	1	11
Progressiste	15	8	22
Action Libérale	10	4	19
Droites	1	7	10
Indépendants	4	4	9
	48	24	71

Altogether thirty-one deputies voted against (the other seven were nationalistic members of the Centre such as Ernest Roche and Charles Beauquier) and one hundred and thirty-three abstained.

2. For example, J. Delafosse, Théorie de l'autorité. 1901. p. 272. Delafosse and others also expressed opinions favourable to selective conscription.

3. Notably Georges Berry, Dansette, Gauthier de Clagny, Maurice-Binder, Maussabré, Millevoye. Passy. J.O. , 17th March 1905.

4. Judging by the elections of 1914 most of the voters of the

The polemics which raged over the three years bill were bitter but it created a division of opinion different from the one caused by the principal measures of the previous ten years. Notable radicals such as Clemenceau and Bourgeois found themselves on the same side as the Right. The debate was dominated by one consideration - the alleged threat from Germany. The tenor of the debate reflected the widespread belief that war with Germany was not far distant. For this reason, Joseph Thierry (Union Républicaine)could state, with justification, early in 1914: "La politique extérieure est ce qui nous divise le moins."[1] There was, indeed, little discernible difference on foreign policy between members of the Right and the Centre in the years 1912 to 1914. The war sealed this unity.

Members of the Right were well-prepared to become war propagandists. They had been assiduous defenders of the army and navy, of the ideals of national solidarity, of la Patrie and, in some cases, of heroic sacrifice. The outbreak of war seemed to justify nationalist propaganda and this placed the Right in a strong moral position.

There was some self-congratulation amongst nationalists that their prophesy of war with Germany had proved correct. Admiral Bienaimé (Progressiste) wrote:

Right agreed with their deputies but Renaud d'Elissagaray (Progressiste) explains his defeat in 1914 as the result of his vote for the bill. R. d'Elissagaray, Mémoires. MS. p. 144. A more likely explanation was made by one of his constituents who said that he had irritated the wine merchants too much. Letter of R. Brat to R. d'Elissagaray. 30th April 1914.

1. Le Petit Marseillais, 12th March 1914.

> Il y a quelques semaines ... je parlais de la nécessité de tremper les âmes "pour la grande guerre dans laquelle se jouerait, peut-être demain ... l'avenir de notre pays." 1

The sitting of 4th August 1914, during which the presidential message containing the celebrated phrase union sacrée was read, moved the Right to passionate enthusiasm. De Mun wrote under the title le Jour Sacrée:

> Barrès a dit "l'inoubliable séance!" Je ne veux ajouter qu'un mot pour créer ... mon émotion profonde, ma poignante admiration, ma fierté patriotique. Rien me s'est vu si beau, si grand dans notre histoire. Tous ces hommes debout, frémissant d'enthousiasme, emportés par un superbe élan de dévouement à la patrie, de confiance en son bon droit, de passion pour sa grandeur et son indépendance, oubliant pour elle, en une minute, toutes les discordes de la veille et réconciliés dans l'unanime amour de la France, ce fut un spectacle sans pareil. 2

In their articles, the members of the Right immediately adopted the less pleasant attitudes of war propaganda. The German nation, it was alleged, bore all the responsibility for the war. Every German shared this responsibility.[3] Racial hatred against the Germans was encouraged. The monarchist senator, Gaudin de Vilaine wrote:

> La mentalité des Allemands demeure ... un perpetuel sujet d'étonnement. Tant de cruauté inutile et d'autant plus révoltante; tant d'insolence, d'outrecuidance, de sauvagerie, de canaillerie, dépasse notre entendement. 4

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1. La Libre Parole, 10th August 1914.

2. L'Echo de Paris, 6th August 1914.

3. For typical examples in the newspapers of the Right see l'Echo de Paris, 24th August 1914, Le Journal des Débats, 25th August 1914 and le Gaulois, 27th August 1914.

4. La Libre Parole, 30th November 1914.

Surprisingly, since half the German speaking peoples were Catholic,[1] la Croix led the way in violent racialism.[2]

Maurice Barrès was perhaps the most celebrated war propagandist in France. His articles in l'Echo de Paris achieved a wider audience than ever before.[3] He provided an idealisation of the men and issues involved in the conflict which was acceptable to the majority of patriotic Frenchmen. But he was also acidly satirised during the war[4] and bitterly combatted after the war by those who desired the "demobilisation of the intellectuals." These experiences permanently affected his literary reputation.

Although the writings of the Right during the war were diverse[5] and prolific they had little effect on political activity. The propagandists of the Right supported Léon Daudet and Clemenceau in the latters' pursuit of Caillaux and Malvy.. They welcomed this opportunity to pay off old scores but they were supporting the activities of others rather than taking the initiative themselves.

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1. It was explained that German Catholics were half protestant. La Croix, 15th August 1914.

2. Particularly the articles in la Croix, 15th August 1914 and 7th November 1914.

3. His wartime articles were collected in l'Ame française et la grande guerre. 11 vols. 1915-1920, and Chronique de la grande guerre. 14 vols. 1924-1939.

4. By Léon Werth in a novel Clavel Soldat especially pp. 12, 93-95. The novel was banned for the duration of the war.

5.Joseph Denais (Action Libérale) even published edifying verse - Deuil de mère. 1915. Tué à l'ennemi. 1915.

The hysteria of war propaganda persisted in the peace. A leading article of l'Echo de Paris nine months after the armistice contained this meditation:

> Ce soir au fond de mon cabinet de travail, droit et serré dans un fourreau de cuir noir, le drapeau de France est debout. Seul avec lui depuis une heure, heure grave et émouvante, je ne sais quel désir me prend et bientôt me presse de le revoir, de le contempler longement. 1

The writer, overcome by emotion, kissed the flag. There were a multitude of articles on the theme that such emotions were useful and that "le sentiment national s'arrangerait tout."[2]

In 1919 the generals gave strong support to propaganda for national solidarity. Their support carried some weight because the army had emerged from the war with an enhanced prestige. Generals spoke at many civic, ceremonial and private functions. As well as repeating clichés concerning the qualities of the one and a half million dead, they said forcibly that the attitudes which had prevailed during the war should be carried into the peace.[3]

As far as the Right is concerned the debate on the peace treaty destroyed the spirit of the union sacrée. After the end of the war the Right had loyally defended Clemenceau against

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 19th July 1919.
2. L'Echo de Paris, 22nd July 1919.
3. See, for example, the speech of Foch to the American Chamber of Commerce in Paris, L'Echo de Paris, 5th July 1919.

his detractors on the Left. But the Right became restive after the terms of the treaty were published.[1]

Clemenceau's conduct of the negotiations was criticised especially by Louis Marin (Progressiste). Marin made a long speech based on the assertion that "la paix ... aurait été infiniment meilleure, si vous avez fait appel au parlement et à la nation française."[2] A better treaty, according to Marin, was a harsher treaty and most of his colleagues agreed with him. The extreme Right complained that "la paix efface ... Sedan mais elle subsiste Waterloo."[3] Benoist (Progressiste)

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1. The Groupe des Droites went as a delegation to Clemenceau to demand changes in the treaty. This action provoked the resignation from the group of Denys Cochin. He wrote to Jules Cambon (19th May 1919): "J'ai donné ma démission du group de la Droite. Ces 8 ou 10 députés sont menés par Delahaye et Baudry d'Asson. Ils vont en délégation ... chez Clemenceau pour signifier les changements qu'ils exigent dans le traité - Delahaye correspond avec le Sénateur Lodge! Je trouve tout cela enfantin et imprudent. Si je m'en vais, résigné, a finir ma carrière hors de toute groupe." In spite of an impassioned appeal by Lamarzelle (20th May 1919), Cochin did not alter his decision to resign. In general Cochin approved the treaty. Letter to J. Cambon, 6th September 1919. Cochin MSS.

2. J.O., 23rd September 1919. p. 4057. See also Chappedelaine (Action Libérale) J.O., 26th August 1919. p. 3397.

3. Baudry d'Asson (Droites), J.O., 29th August 1919. p. 4161. See also Chappedelaine (Action Libérale), 26th August 1919. pp. 3998-3999.

affirmed that the Rhine was the military frontier of France and should have been the political frontier.[1] Many complained that the treaty left Germany unified whereas all efforts, such as the summoning delegates to the peace conference from "the Germanies", should have been made to destroy this unity.[2] Barrès (Indépendants) spoke strongly in favour of supporting Rhenish particularism.[3] Both the size and the means of recovering the reparations were strongly criticised. Gailhard-Bancel (Action Libérale) spoke of "l'insuffisance des réparations qu'il nous promet et des garanties qui en assurent le découvrement."[4] The League of Nations came under heavy fire. It was described as meaningless without an executive arm[5] and too imaginative, "hors de proportion avec tout ce qui avait été précédemment tenté."[6] The extreme Right was more abusive:

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1. J.O., 27th August 1919. pp. 4042-4043.

2. See Chappedelaine, J.O., 26th August 1919. p. 3999; Benoist, J.O., 27th August 1919. p. 4044; Gailhard-Bancel, J.O., 28th August 1919. p. 4049; Baudry d'Asson, J.O., 28th August 1919. p. 4160; Delahaye, J.O., 2nd October 1919. p. 4717; Piou, J.O., loc. cit.

3. J.O., 29th August 1919. pp. 4067-4069. and 1st October 1919. p. 4684.

4. J.O., 28th August 1919. p. 4050. See also Marin, J.O., 19th September 1919. pp. 4458-4471; and Benoist, J.O., 27th August 1919. p. 4045. Chappedelaine also called for the suppression of the German army. J.O., 26th August 1919. p. 4401.

5. Chappedelaine, 26th August 1919. p. 3988.

6. Benoist, J.O., 27th August 1919. p. 4042.

> ... la société des nations n'est qu'une Babel judéo-maçonnique qui contient les germes de toutes guerres, et dans laquelle l'Allemagne aura bientôt sa place prépondérante. 1

Only one orator spoke favourably of the principle of collective security.[2]

Although the most violent criticism of the treaty came from the extreme Right, the speakers of the extreme Right also affirmed their support for Clemenceau. Baudry d'Asson (Droites) said; "... nous n'entendons pas faire échec à M. Clemenceau qui nous considérons ... comme le rempart national contre le bolchevisme."[3] This quotation suffices to illustrate the change which the war had brought about in the attitudes of the extreme Right. Clemenceau did not have to make any concessions on the issues which formed the core of pre-war political controversy in order to be assured of the support of the extreme Right. He could even sign a treaty which it disapproved without losing this support.[4]

There was an unbridgeable gulf between the attitudes of

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1. Baudry d'Asson, 29th August 1919. p. 4162. See also Delahaye, J.O., 2nd October 1919. p. 4717.

2. Ancel (Droites) described it as "singulièrement précieuse." J.O., 1st October 1919. p. 4684.

3. J.O., 29th August 1919. p. 4160. See also Delahaye, J.O., 2nd October 1919. p. 4717.

4. Louis Marin (Progressiste) was the only member of the Right to vote against the treaty. Baudry d'Asson, Delahaye, Kernier (Droites), Castelnau, Ybarnégeray (Indépendants) and Grandmaison (Fédération Républicaine) abstained.

the Right[1] and those of radical socialists and the socialists to the treaty. But many members of the Centre took much the same line as the Right - the most notable example being Barthou who was rapporteur for the treaty. The proximity of views became even more apparent when Germany defaulted on reparations payments. The tone of the statements of members of the Right differed from those of the Centre but there was enough common ground for agreement on specific policies.

Although the extreme Right held views which were peculiar to itself, in general the attitudes of the Right on external affairs were not an important divisive factor in politics during the period 1905 to 1919. The Right never formed a united and isolated opposition to the colonial and foreign policies of a government. It responded quickly to the rallying call of the "national interest." It was in the cause of national solidarity that the great majority of the Right voted for the ratification of the treaty of Versailles although many members of this majority were highly critical of its terms.

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1. Outside parliament there were undoubtedly many men of the Right who did not desire a harsher treaty. For example, the duc de Gramont wrote two letters to Denys Cochin (11th and 16th February 1918) urging a treaty of apaisement and autonomy for the recovered provinces. Cochin MSS.

The Constitutional Question.

A monarchist restoration was not a serious political issue in 1905. There was no longer a clearly defined group of monarchists in the Chamber. About fourteen Independents could be described as being of tendance monarchiste.[1] Only three deputies proclaimed their allegiance to the bonapartist pretender but there were about twenty-five of tendance bonapartiste, using the description loosely. There were many expressions of monarchist and bonapartist sentiments in the Chamber, such as the ritualistic protest of the bonapartist, Albert de Dion, at the presidential elections of 1906 and 1913 that the National Assembly was not a competent electoral college. But these interjections had no practical importance.

There was, however, in all sections of the Right a leaning towards authoritarianism. The struggle between political groups was usually regarded by members of the Right as a conflict, not of material interests, but ideas. They alleged that their opponents were blind to their their own true interests because they held erroneous beliefs. Jules Roche (Progressiste), addressing the Left, said that civilised man

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1. There were more senators - twenty to twenty-five - of tendance monarchiste. Long exclusion from power had tended to make the monarchists parochial and sectarian. In parliament only Denys Cochin was successful in preserving liberal and urbane attitudes. He genuinely considered the sectarian slogans of Left and Right as ridiculous. Letter to F. Buisson, 25th October 1910. Cochin MSS.

had achieved a high level of enfranchisement:

> ... contre les forces de nature, le véritable ennemi. Car nous ne sommes pas des ennemis! Moi qui lutte contre vous sur le terrain des idées, vous qui luttez contre moi, nous ne sommes pas des ennemis ... ; il y a entre nous des équivoques, des malentendus, je ne sais quoi nous sépare, mais en définitive, nous sommes des membres de la même humanité et la même patrie ... et au lieu de nous déchirer, nous devrions unir pour dissiper ces équivoques. 1

The major reason why this harmony was not more apparent, according to the articulate members of the Right, was that no person embodied the authority of the state and represented the common interests of all Frenchmen. The President possessed no power, the deputies were elected to represent particular interests and, moreover, the Chamber had usurped functions which it could not successfully exercise. This state of affairs was condemned as much by republicans of the Right as by the monarchists and bonapartists.

Indeed, the progressistes, being more concerned with the preservation of the Republic, tended to dwell on the "crisis" of authority at greater length than the extreme Right. The former insisted that they were defenders of the parliamentary system but they alleged that the existing regime was "une parodie du parlementarisme."[2] Aynard gave the progressiste definition of the functions of parliament:

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1. J.O., 7th February 1908. p. 264.
2. La République Française, 30th June 1908.

> Les parlements ont été créés dans l'intérêt des contribuables et pour les défendre; ensuite pour contrôler les actes du gouvernement, puis ne faire que les lois longuement portée par l'opinion. 1

Progressistes had long complained that the Chamber had strayed from this order of priorities. Jules Roche had written in 1899:

> La Chambre est le siège du mal. Depuis vingt ans, par ses empiètements, par son génie de désordre, par son intolérance, elle a détruit peu à peu tous les éléments nécessaires du gouvernement. 2

The Chamber, it was alleged, had ceased to be a legislative assembly and had become a kind of convention.[3]

Jules Roche and Charles Benoist expressed typical progressiste views on the nature and the remedy of the constitutional problem. Roche thought that the crisis in the authority of the state had occurred because France had no valid constitution. The National Assembly had not been a constituent assembly and the so-called constitution of 1875 was, therefore, illegal and worthless. This constitution was:

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1. J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 353. The issue most useful to the Right (for propaganda purposes) to illustrate that the Chamber had defaulted on its first duty was the raising of deputies salaries from 9,000 to 15,000 francs in 1907. Those who voted for this became known as the "Quinze milles". Lasies (Nationaliste) is reported to have said: "Mon indignation n'a d'égale que ma joie". (M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. Vol V. p. 63). But the Right disclaimed all responsibility for the measure and accused the bloc of sharp practice and financial irresponsibility.

2. J. Roche, Finances et politique. 1899. p. 213.

3. See Aynard, J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 353

> ... uniquement un Code de procedure parlementaire organisant un gouvernement appelé "République", mais dépouillé de tout élément constitutif d'une République, c'est-à-dire de toute garantie des droits et des libertés nécessaires au citoyen dans le domaine individuel, de toute condition nécessaire au citoyen dans le domaine national; - en un mot, établissant purement et simplement le pouvoir absolu d'élus irresponsables, c'est-à-dire une système politique sans précédent ... fatalement générateur de l'anarchie, de despotisme et de ruine. 1

Roche proposed the convocation of a constituent assembly which should draw up a constitution containing a bill of rights.[2] He outlined the way in which the separation of powers should be written into the constitution:

> Le Pouvoir Exécutif est délégué par le Peuple Français, votant dans son ensemble à un Président de la République, nommant et revoquant seul ses ministres.
> Le Pouvoir Législatif est délégué par les électeurs des divisions administratives à une ou deux assemblées.
> Un Cour Suprême, comme dans toutes les Républiques, est chargée de garantir les Droits de l'homme et du citoyen.
> L'initiative financière en matière de dépenses de l'État est réservée au Gouvernement. 3

Roche was a democrat, believing in the universal desirability of universal suffrage. Benoist, on the other hand, accepted universal suffrage because it existed. He called democracy:

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1. J. Roche, Quand serons-nous en République. 1918. pp. 24-25. In this book Roche summarised the arguments he had been using for the previous twenty years.

2. Ibid. p. 139.

3. Ibid. p. 248. His ideas on the powers of the president had been much the same for twenty years. See J. Roche, Finances et politique. 1899. p. 213. For a statement of his argument in favour of universal suffrage for presidential elections see le Monde Economique, 30th March 1912. Especially p. 289.

> Un procédé de gouvernement, comme il y en a d'autres, il n'a rien en soi supérieur aux autres, rien de plus sacré qu'un autre, mais il est.
> Le suffrage universel est un fait vieux de cinquante ans, il faut nous en accommoder; il faut nous l'accommoder. 1

Benoist proposed that universal suffrage should be organised so that the legislature would be really representative of the country, advocated syndical representation,[2] and led a long and partially successful campaign for proportional representation.[3] But, in his opinion, the real vice of the Chamber was not that it was unrepresentative but that it had usurped functions which properly belonged to the executive, thus producing "un parlementarisme illimité ... un despotisme collectif."[4] The cure for this was to take from the National Assembly the right of electing the President. He wrote that this right placed:

> ... dans le législatif même d'origine de l'exécutif et elle subordonne ainsi au législatif, l'exécutif auquel elle donne une base trop étroite. 5

Whilst not a plébiscitaire like Roche, he advocated an extended electoral college composed of the representatives of local

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1. Ch. Benoist, La Réforme électorale. 1902. p. 140.
2. See for example, J.O., 26th March 1909. pp. 869-870.
3. For the debate on Proportional Representation see E.A. Brown, The French Parties and the electoral law 1871-1956. Thesis Columbia 1957. pp. 99 et seq.
4. Ch. Benoist, Un Programme. 1914. p. 21.
5. Ch. Benoist, Le Réforme parlementaire. 1902. p. xliii.

assemblies and professional organisations. The president, he thought, should not be concerned with the day to day conduct of affairs. This should be the responsability of a ministre unique:

> Responsable devant le Président qui pourrait le renvoyer, et responsable devant les Chambres, qui pourraient le renverser, ce ministre unique, chef et bouche du gouvernement, préconiserait et personnalerisait en lui la responsabilité, qui ne se vaporiserait plus, ne volatériserait plus, et, de fictive qu'elle est maintenent, deviendrait effective. 1

Deputies and senators who were appointed ministers should resign their seats to strengthen the distinction between legislature and executive. The number of deputies should be reduced.[2] A supreme court should be set up on the model of the Supreme Court of the United States.[3]

Most of the ideas expounded by Roche and Benoist had been mooted in républicain modéré circles before, particularly by Marcère and the group centred on le Parti National in the eighties. Although they were, in many ways, typical of progressiste attitudes, they cannot be regarded as forming a progressiste constitutional programme. The only attitude held in common by

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1. Ch. Benoist, Le Réforme parlementaire. 1902. pp. xxv-xxvi.

2. Benoist introduced a bill to this effect in 1906, which was signed by twenty-two deputies of the Right (all the groups were represented) and five deputies of the Centre.

3. Benoist, like many progressistes, admired the constitution of the United States. See Ch. Benoist, La Réforme parlementaire. 1902. pp. 238-291. The main reason for this was the conservatism of the Supreme Court (especially since the Civil War) and the protection afforded to interests which were locally but not nationally important. See also J. Roche, Le Secret des Etats-Unis. 1917.

all progressistes was the desirability of a stronger President and executive. Ribot expressed opinions which were acceptable to all progressistes. He said that it was necessary:

> ... d'assurer, par l'exercice effectif du veto présidentiel, l'autonomie et la vitalité propre du pouvoir exécutif, en faisant le Président de la République, non pas comme chez nous, un rouage inerte et passif de la Constitution, mais comme aux Etats Unis, un organe actif et susceptible de protéger à la fois les libertés individuelles et les intérêts supérieurs de la nation contre les abus de l'omnicompetence parlementaire. 1

There was disagreement on more precise proposals.

Liberals shared many opinions with progressistes.

Jacques Piou condemned the excessive power of the Chamber:

> La Constitution de 1875 livre la toute-puissance à 300 parlementaires, petits Césars en veston. Ils font tout, ils peuvent tout. ... Si veut la majorité, veut la loi. Pas de droit supérieur, pas de droit naturel. En une loi votée en cinq minutes nos 300 petits tyrans peuvent disposer de nos biens, de nos croyances, de nos droits. A-t-on jamais vu une pareille tyrannie? 2

He demanded a constituent assembly and a charte constitutionelle[3]. The congress of Action Libérale in 1906 passed resolutions in favour of a Declaration of Rights which would include religious liberty, a supreme court, the examination of the validity of elections by an extra-parliamentary commission, an enlarging of the electoral college for Presidential elections, freedom of association, the inviolability of private residences, a referendum on important

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1. La République Française, 12th April 1906.
2. Action Libérale Populaire, 15th March 1906.
3. Action Libérale Populaire, 15th March 1906.

issues and administrative decentralisation. The congress set up a committee to draft a constitution based on these resolutions.[1] The essential features of this draft constitution were passed in the form of resolutions at the congress of 1908, The additions to those of 1906 were proportional representation, the right of constitutional revision and the principle of regionalism.

The extreme Right was united in its opposition to the existing constitutional organisation and the belief that constitutional revision was a cure for all ills was stronger on the extreme Right than in any other section of the Chamber. Some of the extremists dabbled in more than one form of constitutional change. For example Jules Delafosse believed in principle in hereditary monarchy, flirted with bonapartism and ended his political career as a pessimistic member of Action Libérale.

Delafosse regarded a "tyrannie douce", in which a monarch ruled without the aid of laws, as the ideal and the "monstrous" constitution of 1875 as the worst form of government.[2] Parliamentary government, he thought, was suitable only for unemotional and disciplined peoples.[3] Unfortunately, in France,

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1. The report of the committee was published as: Projet de Constitution Libérale présenté aux comités de l'Action Libérale Populaire par la section d'Etudes sociales. 1907.
2. J. Delafosse, Théorie de l'ordre. 1901. pp. 55, 26.
3. Ibid. pp. 59-60.

the traditional monarchy was dead beyond recall and the sovereignty of the people had to be accepted.[1] He advocated the plebiscite: "... le mode de consultation qui est l'expression la plus loyale et la plus certaine de la volonté du pays."[2] Moreover it was the best means of creating a powerful executive. Because he despised parliamentary forms, Delafosse made few practical suggestions for constitutional reform.[3]

The bonapartist remedy for the weakness of the authority of the executive was the plebiscite. The marquis de Dion claimed that he wanted "avant tout l'assainissement du suffrage universel et son application intégrale."[4] Other members of the extreme Right, such as Fernand Engerand, Arthur Legrand and Ernest Flandin, called themselves républicains plébiscitaires and advocated the plebiscite.[5] So too did certain nationalists such as Lucien Millevoye.[6]

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1. J. Delafosse, Théorie de l'ordre. 1901. p. 19.

2. Ibid. loc. cit.

3. He advocated extra votes for pères de famille (Ibid. pp. 29-30) and that deputies should not be paid. Ibid. p. 74.

4. L'Autorité, 11th December 1906. Bonapartists tended to concentrate on the social reforms accomplished during the Second Empire as an argument for the resurrection of the plebiscite.

5. See la Revue des Français, 23rd November 1912. p. 198.

6. La Revue des Français, 20th December 1912. p. 288. The complaint of the plébiscitaires against the existing system was, in the words of Déroulède, that it had produced "un parlement omnicompetant" and "un pouvoir exécutif impotent". See P. Déroulède, Qui vive? France! "Quand même." 1910. p. 304.

The monarchists rejected the concept of the sovereignty of the people however it was expressed. The leading monarchist theoretician in parliament, the senator Gustave de Lamarzelle, considered that democracy was illusory and that it was a theory which sought to evade social realities:

> Qu'elle vienne du peuple ou d'ailleurs, l'autorité est toujours l'autorité; elle implique des gens qui commandent et des gens qui obéissent ... ceux qui obéissent ne peuvent pas être en même temps ceux qui commandent, ceux qui subissent l'action ne peuvent pas être en même temps ceux qui l'exercent. Si donc le peuple parvenait un jour à se gouverner lui-même, c'est qu'il n'y avait plus de gouvernement, ce serait l'anarchie. 1

The spreading of the illusion that everyone was equal was dangerous. The worker was not the equal of a Rothschild merely because both had the right to vote. To suggest to the worker that he was equal inevitably turned him into a revolutionary.[2] Lamarzelle admitted that the old aristocracy of France was no longer an important force in the community but thought that the "représentation nationale" would soon produce a new aristocracy.[3] His implicit assumption was that the wealthy should rule.

Defenders of the traditional aristocracy were compelled to combat this assumption. The monarchist senator Emmanuel de Las Cases asserted that moral qualities and not wealth gave men

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1. G. de Lamarzelle, Démocratie politique, démocratie sociale, démocratie chrétienne. 1907. p. 2.
2. Ibid. p. 58.
3. Ibid. p. 29.

the right to rule.[1] Las Cases based his political philosophy on the maxim of Le Play: "Les peuples les plus prospères sont ceux qui se laissent le mieux guider par les conseils et les exemples des autorités sociales."[2] He made no attempt to justify this statement.

Those least concerned with the problem of authority in the constitution were the Christian democrats. Democracy was, for them, "un fait, un progrès, un résultat de l'Evangile"[3] but:

> ... les questions constitutionnelles... la forme, l'organisation et la fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics n'ont, à nos yeux, qu'une importance secondaire. ... pourquoi disputer et prendre parti au sujet de la monarchie ou de la république. 4

In practice, they were not indifferent. Lemire committed himself to the Republic and took the controversial step of paying his respects to the President of the Republic at the height of the anticlerical battle.[5] Lemire also took an active interest in minor reforms. He campaigned for the vote familial and he was one of the few members of the Right to speak publicly against proportional representation.[6] He did not, however,

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1. E. de las Cases, Des Autorités sociales dans une démocratie. 1903.
2. Ibid. p.3.
3. Abbé Gayraud, Les Démocrates chrétiens. 1899. p. 1.
4. Ibid. p. 118.
5. After being violently attacked for doing this in la Gazette de France and la Vérité Française, Lemire carefully justified his action in le Figaro, 7th January 1906.
6. J.O., 1st July 1910. pp. 2369-2370.

express any opinions on far-reaching constitutional reforms.

All members of the Right who held views on the constitution were authoritarians in a French context. Both monarchists and republicans of the Right believed in strengthening the executive, increasing its prestige and separating the legislature from it. Any prime minister or President, even if he did not call for these things, who appeared to be in favour of "strong" government was assured of some support on the Right. Thus Clemenceau during his first ministry had grudging admirers and during his second partisans on the Right. Poincaré in 1913 and Millerand in 1920 were voted for unanimously if not unanimously approved.

There was also a common sentiment in favour of regionalism amongst members of the Right. Regionalism was an opposition thing.[1] The Republicans during the Second Empire included decentralisation on their programme.[2] There were two national regionalist organisations - the Ligue nationale de décentralisation and the Fédération régionaliste française. The former had a predominantly conservative

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1. See H. Hauser, Le Problème du régionalisme. 1924. p. 2.

2. The dividing line between regionalism and administrative decentralisation is hard to draw. R.K. Gooch wrote (Regionalism in France. New York 1931. p. 17) that decentralisation is best thought of as an end and regionalism as a means. But those who described themselves as regionalists desired the preservation of regional communities and looked to decentralisation as a means of accomplishing this. Not all those who wanted decentralisation would have called themselves regionalists. Regionalism had a specifically conservative connotation.

membership. The monarchist deputy, the comte de Lanjuinais, was a founder member. The latter, founded in March 1900, was the more important and included many leading members of the Right[1] and prominent Centre Republicans such as Paul Doumer, Deschanel and Camille Krantz among its members.

Favourable remarks were made about regionalism by most of the prominent members of the Right. Jules Roche (Progressiste), for example, wrote in 1912:

> Alors, qu'est-ce qui peut représenter une nation qui comprend tant d'intérêts divers? On a dit les régions. Je veux bien! Au lieu des mares stagnantes, prenons les régions, les provinces: Bourgogne, Dauphiné, Provence, Normandie, soit! Au lieu de 86 départements nous avons 20 régions avec leurs souvenirs historiques. 2

It is unlikely that Roche, or those who made similar remarks, had any definite practical measures in mind. By invoking "souvenirs historiques" Roche identified himself with the most conservative kind of regionalism.

This kind of regionalism was strongest in Brittany. An Association bretonne with the purpose of preserving and encouraging Breton language and literature was founded in 1885.[3]

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1. Ribot, Marin (sometime president), Marcère, Lefas, Hémon, Jean Hennessy, Cornudet des Chomettes (Progressiste), L' Estourbeillon, Gailhard-Bancel, Beauregard (Action Libérale), Barrès and Arthur Legrand (Independents).

2. Le Monde Economique, 30th March 1912. p. 287.

3. The monarchist deputies, Le Gonidec de Traissan and Kerjégu, were prominent members.

The Union Régionaliste Bretonne which had more specifically political aims was founded in 1898. The Liberal deputy, the marquis de L'Estourbeillon, was president of the union. The programme defined by l'Estourbeillon was decentralisation in all its forms, the "re-awakening" of the Breton character and the safeguarding of Breton traditions, customs and language.[1] L'Estourbeillon represented regionalism as a retreat to the "petite contrée" made necessary by the successful attacks in France at large on the essential moral principles and ideals of "Dieu, Patrie et Liberté."[2] He saw in regionalism an instrument for the moral regeneration of France:

> ... c'est par la ... décentralisation que nous récuperons, non pas une sorte d'autonomie de fait qu'il serait aussi chimérique d'espérer que coupable de vouloir, mais cette autonomie morale, constitué par un respect plus équitable de nos traditions et nos libertés, auquel nous avons d' indéniables droits. 3

He rejected separatist ideas.[4] The Bretons, he asserted, were a nation with their own language, but they were a nation within the framework of "la grande Patrie."[5] His language, especially when expressing the need for social and political solidarity, was very like the language used by the nationalists.[6]

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1. Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, Discours ... à l'ouverture du congrès de Plougastel. Redon 1908. p. 6.

2. Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, Discours prononcé ... à l'ouverture du congrès de l'U.R.B. à Lesneven. Redon, 1903. p. 13.

3. Ibid. loc. cit.

4. There was a small separatist group called Parti Nationaliste Breton which indulged in violent polemics against Action Française.

5. Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, Discours...à Lesneven. pp.10-11

6. Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, Discours ..de Plougastel. p.8.

L'Estourbeillon thought that education should have a regionalist bias and blamed the anti-traditionalist teaching given in state schools for the depopulation of the countryside.[1] After the First World War he recognised that there were material reasons for rural emigration. The measures which he proposed to combat it tended to be reactionary in inspiration as, for example, the revival of the camberts (the primitive collective farming associations).[2]

Apart from l'Estourbeillon, Gailhard-Bancel (Action Libérale) was the only other regionalist of this type who was active in parliament. The particular concern of Gailhard-Bancel was the defence of local dialects.[3] The monarchists spoke of the provinces and regions with sentimental affection. Regionalism was on the programmes of Patrie Française and of Action Libérale.[4] But the cause of conservative regionalism was weakly supported in parliament.

The intellectual leader of the movement for administrative decentralisation was the geographer, Vidal de la Blanche.[5] He

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1. Marquis de l'Estourbeillon, Le Régionalisme dans l'éducation primaire. Reims 1912. p. 1.

2. Congrès Pancéltique de Quimper. Redon 1924. pp. 7-8.

3. See H. de Gailhard-Bancel, Les Syndicats agricoles aux champs et au parlement 1884-1924. 1928. pp. 231-247.

4. See article 3 of Projet de Constitution Libérale ... 1907. This article was passed as a resolution by the Congress of 1908.

5. See Vidal de la Blanche, "Les Régions de la France." La Revue de Paris, 15th December 1910 and ..... Les Divisions régionales de la France. 1913.

advocated, in the words of one commentator, a "régionalisme critique."[1] He thought that the formation of political and administrative regions was desirable because economic regions existed and their needs should be recognised. Jean Hennessy, progressiste deputy for Charente, was his principal political disciple. Before the war, Hennessy spoke little in parliament on the subject but sought, by a series of public meetings, to gain support in the country for decentralising ideas. After the war he published a book, based on a report for the Chamber committee on administrative reform. In it he argued that the département had become too small a unit for efficient administration. The general interests of the economic regions required that each should have a deliberative assembly and a "pouvoir administratif."[2] He explained carefully that this proposal was not an attack on the Republican tradition nor on the sovereignty of the French people expressed through the Chamber of Deputies.[3] He disclaimed any connection with sentimental traditionalism or nostalgia for the old provinces of France. He stressed that he wanted the creation of new regions.[3]

Hennessy's supporters both outside parliament (in the Ligue de réprésentation professionnelle et d'action

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1. H. Hauser, op. cit. p. 7.
2. J. Hennessy, Réorganisation administrative de la France. Paris and Nancy 1923. p. 5.
3. Ibid. pp. 5-6, 53.

régionaliste) and inside parliament were mainly moderate republicans such as Lannesan, Paul Mairat, Voyer and Robert David who were all members of the Groupe Gauche Radicale. His principal supporters on the Right were Bonnevay, Montjou (Progressiste) and Beauchamps (Action Libérale). Poitou and the Charentes were the geographical centre of Hennessy's movement and he held a consultative assembly in 1913 composed of notables of that region.[1]

Little practical result came from this movement for administrative decentralisation. Although governments, such as Clemenceau's, made decentralisation part of their programmes, they never introduced a practical proposal.[2] There were too many other pressing problems and the advantages of a centralised administration became more obvious to politicians when they were in power. The war brought about a certain measure of regional organisation to help place the economy on a war footing.[3] This development was applauded by the regionalists although they did not initiate it. The only permanent result of this wartime trend was the law of 7th April 1919 under

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1. J. Hennessy, op. cit. p. 103.

2. Hennessy and his colleagues proposed a bill on 9th May 1913 to abolish the départements and establish in their place administrative regions with consultative assemblies. Early in 1914 Bonnevay introduced a more limited measure. Neither was discussed by the Chamber.

3. The most important measures were sponsored by Rognon (24th October 1916) Barthe (13th November 1916), both socialists, and Peytral (12th July 1917), a radical socialist, none of whom had been notable supporters of regionalist ideas before the war.

which the Chambers of Commerce were organised into seventeen groups according to economic regions. These groups were given consultative and advisory functions.

Except for those who felt strongly, the constitutional question did not create a barrier between the Right and the Centre. The kind of regionalist ideas expounded by l' Estourbeillon were obviously profoundly opposed to the Republican tradition. They were taken seriously mainly in small intellectual circles outside parliament such as the Maurrasian monarchists and the Pronvençal Félibrige. If they had been held seriously by a large section of the Right, they would have provided a barrier at least as serious as the clerical question to co-operation between the Right and the Centre. Bordering on federalism, rejecting the unitary state, they were as antipathetic as monarchism to the Republican majority of the Chamber.

No one thought that the constitution of 1875 was perfect. There was general agreement that ministerial instability was a bad thing and all except the extreme oppositionists, would have liked to see a cure for it. The criticisms of most of the Right were no more severe than some made by members of the Centre. Poincaré was as critical of "government by deputies" as most members of Action Libérale and Deschanel was as favourable to decentralisation as Hennessy. Thus, though

extreme authoritarianism (whether monarchist or bonapartist) was an exclusive creed, the general authoritarianism of the Right could often find sympathetic echoes in other parts of the Chamber.

Interest

Introduction

The professions and personal interests of members of the Right present few unexpected features.[1] Although some, such as Paul Beauregard, Charles Benoist (Progressiste) and Ernest Roche (Nationaliste) came from comparatively humble origins only two - Pierre Biétry (Independent) and Albert Congy (Nationaliste)[2] - could describe themselves with any justification as members of the working class. The rest belonged to the property-owning and professional classes. Roughly half the deputies of the Right had, at some time, practiced two serious professions. They had a multitude of minor interests.

The Right had a strong backbone of landowners and land-owning farmers.[3] In 1905, 44.5% of the sitting deputies of the Right belonged to this category - about three-quarters

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1. See Appendix A for a statistical summary and the sources used in this chapter. Senators are not considered in this chapter. Although there are analogies between their personal interests and those of the deputies the eclectic nature of the Senate groups (See supra p. 4 sec. I) make general comparisons impossible. The most obvious differences between senators and deputies are that the former were older and had longer parliamentary careers and there were more ex-ministers and civil servants among them.

2. Biétry, deputy for the first constituency of Brest from 1906 to 1910, was a former watchmaker and sometime employee of the Creusot foundries. He had become an organiser of blackleg unions and anti-socialist propagandist.
Congy, deputy for Paris from 1902 to 1906, was formerly an employee of the company which supplied Paris with gas. He had become a nationalist journalist.

3. Former army officers usually belonged to this class. See infra pp. 215-216.

were landowners rather than practical farmers. The proportionate strength of this backbone increased slightly in our period; at the beginning of the legislature 1914-1919, 47.1% of the Right belonged to it. Naturally the extreme Right was more involved in these activities than the moderate Right - in 1905, 31% of Union Républicaine as against 53% of the Independents were farmers and landowners. Of the intervening groups, Action Libérale had a greater proportion of farmers and landowners than the Progressiste or the Nationalist groups. The Liberals became gradually swamped by the agricultural interest; in 1914 the proportion was 66.5% but even this was less than the 89.5% in 1910 and the 91.8% in 1914 found in the monarchist Groupe des Droites. The difference between the moderate and the extreme Right is even more striking if the deputies for whom landowning and farming were secondary concerns are excluded. For example, after the elections of 1906, only 17.4% of Union Républicaine as opposed to 61.8% of the Independents were primarily concerned in landowning and farming. Many of the landowners and farmers were active in agricultural affairs and derived their political strength and reputation from these activities. Perhaps the best known was Hyacinthe de Gailhard-Bancel (Action Libérale)[1]

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1. Deputy for the first constituency of Tournon (Ardèche) from 1899 to 1924, he started his political career as a monarchist (he was president of the comité royaliste de Drôme) but he had rallied to the Republic before he was elected to the Chamber. He was a farmer and property-owner at Allex (Drôme). His union activities were confined mainly to the South-East and the South of France. He wrote a number of books about his experiences.

who performed pioneering work in agricultural unions after the passing of the law of Associations of 1884.

Exactly the reverse pattern prevailed for the activities of banking, commerce and industry - 21.6% in 1905 and 15.6% in 1914 of the Right were concerned in them. The Progressiste group with 25.8% had the highest percentage in 1905, followed by Union Républicaine (20.7%), Independents (18.6%), Action Libérale (15.3%) and Nationaliste (12.7%). After the elections of 1906, Union Républicaine had the highest proportion with 43.5% and never lost this leadership until the disappearance of the group in 1914. There was no member of the Groupe des Droites whose primary activity was banking, industry or commerce during the period of its revived existence from 1910 to 1919.

The great names in banking were Raphael Bischoffshiem (Progressiste),[1] an immensely rich merchant banker, Guy de Wendel (Indépendents),[2] regent of the Banque de France, Edouard Aynard (Progressiste),[3] agent of the Banque de France

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1. Deputy for Puget Theniers (Alpes Maritimes) from 1889 to 1906, he came from a family of rich bankers in Amsterdam. He was naturalised by presidential decree in 1880 after he had made important gifts to French scientific establishments, including one and a half million francs for the observatory at Nice. He never spoke in the Chamber.

2. Elected deputy for the second constituency of Briey (Meurthe et Moselle) in 1914, he came from a family who had been iron masters in Lorraine since the beginning of the eighteenth Century. The Wendel companies owned the most important foundries in France.

3. Deputy for the eighth constituency of Lyon from 1889 to 1912, he inherited a banking house in Lyon which had been founded by

and André Ballande (Progressiste),[1] censeur of the Banque de France. With the exception of Bischoffshiem all these men had other important interests. The industrialists who were deputies of the Right included Eugène Schneider, (Action Libérale),[2] maître des forges and armament manufacturer, director of the famous Creusot works and the marquis de Dion (Nationaliste),[3] the car manufacturer. There were others such as Victor Vion (Union Républicaine)[4] president of a large beet-sugar manufacturing co-operative in Somme, Paul Lebaudy (Union Républicaine/Progressiste),[5] a competitor in cane-sugar refining, Armand Cardon (Independent),[6] Jules Dansette (Action Libérale)[7] and Eugene Motte (Progressiste)[8]

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his grandfather and a silk-manufacturing concern. He participated in the foundation and administration of important industrial and financial companies of the Lyon region. He was a convinced free-trader.

1. Deputy for the second constituency of Bordeaux from 1902 to 1924, he was a merchant, shipper and former judge of the tribunal of commerce of Bordeaux.

2. Deputy for the second constituency of Autun (Sâone et Loire) from 1902 to 1910. A former judge of the tribunal of commerce at Belfort. Son of a minister of Commerce and Agriculture of the Second Empire.

3. Deputy for the third constituency of Nantes (Loire Inférieure) from 1902 to 1924. Elected senator in 1924. Vice-president of the Automobile-Club de France. He had bonapartist tendencies.

4. Deputy for Péronne (Somme) from 1905 to 1910. An administrateur of the Banque de France and a member of many industrial and agricultural societies.

5. Deputy for Mantes (Seine et Oise) from 1890 to 1910.

6. Deputy for second constituency of Douai from 1900 to 1906.

7. Deputy for Lille from 1895 to 1919. A member of a very old family of the North.

8. Deputy for Lille from 1898 to 1906. He was defeated by Jules Guesde in 1906.

who all owned textile concerns in the North, Edgar Laroche (Independent),[1] paper manufacturer, Félix Léglise (Union Républicaine/Progressiste),[2] owner of forests and lumber mills in the Landes, and Gauthier de Clagny (Nationaliste),[3] speculative builder and proprietor of a marble quarry. The industrial interests of members of the Right were extremely varied. There was no significant section of French industry which gave its allegiance exclusively to the Right.

There were fewer deputies of the extreme Right than of the moderate Right who had had careers in one of the branches of government service or who had been law officers holding government appointments. Three of the extreme Right were old enough to have served the government of Napoleon III - Baron Mackau (Action Libérale),[4] Arthur Legrand (Independent),[5]

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1. Deputy for the first constituency of Angoulême (Charente) from 1884 to 1906. The son of a deputy of the second empire and was himself a bonapartist. An administrateur of the Banque de France.

2. Deputy for the second constituency of Dax (Landes), 1881 to 1885 and 1886 to 1914.

3. Deputy for the second constituency of Versailles (Seine et Oise) from 1889 to 1910. Built a new suburb on the Parc de Clagny (which had been the property of Mme. de Montespan). An avocat at the conseil d'Etat and the cour de Cassation and also the editor of the Journal de droit administratif. A former boulangist, a nationalist and a plébiscitaire.

4. Deputy of the corps législatif from 1866 to 1870 and deputy for Argentan (Orne) from 1876 to 1918. A member of a naval family - his father had been minister of Marine under Louis Philippe. An auditor to the conseil d'Etat and member of the conseil du Sceau. President of the Union Conservatrice in 1885. His political reputation was gravely damaged by the part he played in the Boulanger affair.

5. Member of the Assemblée Nationale in 1871 and deputy for Mortain (Manche) from 1876 to 1885 and 1889 to 1915. He remained a plébiscitaire but not an active bonapartist.

and Gaston Galpin (Independent).[1] In 1905, 11.8% of the Right had been civil servants or law officers; by 1914 the proportion had declined to 8.4%. This reflected a growing proportion of deputies who had spent their adult lives in political opposition. In 1905 the group with the highest proportion - 27.1% - of government appointees or employees was Union Républicaine, the lowest proportion - 9.6% - was the Nationaliste group. In 1906 no Nationalist belonged to these categories. The deputies of the Right who achieved the greatest eminence in government service were diplomats: François Arago (Union Républicaine)[2] retired with the rank of ministère plénipotentiaire and the marquis de Chambrun [3] had been ambassador of France to Washington. There were a number of ex-members of the prefectoral corps. Louis Andrieux (Independent)[4] was the prefect of police in the eighties:

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1. Deputy for the second constituency of Le Mans (Sarthe) from 1885 to 1924. Chef de cabinet of the prefect of Côte d'Or when the second empire fell. He was a bonapartist of the Left. There was a bevy of descendants of prefects of the Empire - Caffarelli, Chambrun, Legrand, Leret d'Aubigny, Leroy- Beaulieu, Ollivier, d'Ornano and Roulleaux-Dugage.

2. Deputy for the second constituency of Grasse (Alpes Maritimes) from 1903 to 1910 and from 1914 to 1924. One of the few anti-clerical members of the groups of the Right. President of Entente Républicaine Démocratique in 1919.

3. Deputy for Marvejols (Lozère) from 1898 to 1924. Came from a family of parliamentarians and diplomats; one of his ancestors was Lafayette.

4. Deputy for Rhône from 1876 to 1879 and for Forcalquier (Basses Alpes) from 1885 to 1889 and 1910 to 1924. Prefect of police and an ambassador. He was an Independent of tendance gauche and later joined the Gauche Républicaine.

Henry Lozé (Progressiste)[1] held this post later in the same decade. Michel Alicot (Action Libérale/Progressiste)[2], Audigier (Progressiste)[3], Fernand de Ramel (Independent),[4] Georges Vallée (Union Républicaine/Progressiste)[5] and Villault-Duchesnois (Union Républicaine)[6] had all been sous-prefets. There were representatives of the other branches of the domestic civil service, one of the most eminent being Roger Ballu (Progressiste/Action Libérale/Nationaliste).[7]

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1. Deputy for the second constituency of Cambrai (Nord) from 1902 to 1906 when he was elected Senator for Nord; Prefect of Cantal in 1884, secretary general of the prefecture of police from 1885 to 1888, prefect of police from 1888 to 1893 and then ambassador to Vienna from 1893 to 1896. A radical in his youth, he spent his parliamentary career violently opposing radical policies.

2. Radical deputy for Argelès (Hautes Pyrénées) from 1876 to 1877; he gradually moved to the Right throughout his interrupted parliamentary career - 1881-1885, 1892-1902, 1906-1910 - when the bonapartist challenge in his constituency lost its vigour. Sous-préfet in 1871, sous chef de cabinet to the minister of the interior in 1872-1873 and maître des requêtes to the conseil d'Etat, 1879-1881.

3. Deputy for the first constituency of Senlis (Oise) from 1902 to 1906. Sous-préfet of Senlis dismissed in 1900 by Waldeck-Rouseau for his political opinions.

4. Monarchist deputy for Alais (Gard) from 1889 to 1914. Sous-préfet from 1875 to 1879. A liberal monarchist who was prepared to serve the Republic. An avocat at the Conseil d'Etat and at the cour de Cassation. His son was elected deputy in 1919.

5. Deputy for Saint-Pol (Pas de Calais) from 1900 to 1910. Sous-préfet at Bar-sur-Aube from 1893 to 1900. A contributor to Northern provincial journals.

6. Deputy for Valognes (Manche) from 1902 to 1928. Resigned the post of sous-préfet of Valognes in order to contest a by-election in the constituency in December 1901. Invalidated for having used his official position to further his candidature but re-elected in 1902.

7. Deputy for Pontoise 2 (Seine et Oise) from 1902 to 1906. Inspecteur général des beaux arts from 1883 to 1901, when he was dismissed for his political opinions. Author of a number of

Few of the Right had achieved governmental office. Those who had - Godefroy Cavaignac (Nationaliste),[1] Emile Flourens (Nationaliste),[2] Louis Passy (Action Libérale),[3] Alexandre Ribot (Progressiste),[4] and Jules Roche (Progressiste)[5] - were all ex-républicains modérés. There were also seven

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books on art criticism.

1. Deputy for Saint Calais (Sarthe) from 1882 to 1905. Won the médaille militaire in 1870 at the age of seventeen. A civil engineer and licencié en droit. Maître des requêtes to the conseil d'Etat. Under-secretary of war in the Brisson administration, 1885-1886; minister of Marine and Colonies in the Loubet administration, 1892; minister of War in the Bourgeois administration, 1895-1896; minister of War in the Brisson administration, 1898 - resigned when the cabinet decided on the revision of the Dreyfus case.

2. Deputy for Embrun (Basses Alpes) from 1888 to 1898 and for the fifth arrondissement of Paris from 1902 to 1906. Member of the conseil d'Etat from 1874 to 1886. Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Goblet administration, 1886-1887, in the Rouvier administration, 1887, and the Tiraud administration, 1887-1888.

3. Member of the National Assembly and deputy for Andelys (Eure) from 1876 to 1913. Under-secretary of state in the administrations of Cissey, 1874, Buffet, 1875-1876, Dufaure, 1876 and Jules Simon 1876-1877. A member of the Institut and secretary of the Société nationale des agriculteurs. A prolific writer and journalist.

4. Deputy for Saint-Omer (Pas de Calais) from 1878 to 1885 and from 1887 to 1909 then elected Senator. Formerly an employee of the ministry of Justice. Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Freycinet administration, 1890-1892 and the Loubet administration, 1892 and président du conseil from 1892 to 1895 during which time he successively held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finances. A minister for the first three years of the First World War, being successively minister of Finance, président du conseil and minister of Foreign Affairs.

5. Deputy for Draguignon (Var), 1881-1885, for the first constituency of Chambèry (Savoie), from 1885 to 1898 and for the second constituency of Tournon (Ardèche) from 1898 to 1919; minister of Commerce, Industry and Colonies in the Freycinet administration, 1890-1892 and in the Loubet administration, 1892. The major spokesman of the Right on income tax and other fiscal matters.

progressistes who subsequently became members of governments - Paul Bignon,[1] the marquis de Dior,[2] Laurent Bonnevay,[3] Louis Marin,[4] Albert Lebrun,[5] Joseph Thierry.[6] and baron Flamius Raiberti.[7]

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1. Deputy for the first constituency of Dieppe (Seine Inférieure) from 1902. Under-secretary for Marine in the Briand cabinet, 1920-1922. He was the director of a large shipping and exporting firm at Eu (Seine Inférieure).

2. Deputy for Avranches (Manches) from 1906. Minister of Commerce in 1921 and 1924. He came from a very old Norman family and was a manufacturer of chemicals.

3. Deputy for the second constituency of Villefranche (Rhône) from 1902 to 1924 then elected Senator. Minister of Justice in the Briand administration, 1921-1922. He wrote a number of monographs on economic problems and was a founder of friendly societies.

4. Deputy for the first constituency of Nancy (Meurthe et Moselle) from 1905 to 1951. Minister for régions libérées in the administrations of Poincaré and François-Marsal in 1924, minister of Pensions in the Poincaré administration, 1926-1928, minister of Health in the Doumergue administration, 1934 and minister of State in the cabinets of Flandin, Bouisson and Laval, 1934-1936. He was president of the Fédération Républicaine from 1924 to 1951. A prodigiously active man, he was a member of the Institut and many societies of learning and for the encouragement of learning, a member of the conseil of the University of Nancy and a few colleges and a regular contributor to Journals.

5. Deputy for Briey (Meurthe et Moselle) from 1900 to 1919. A member of the groups Union Démocratique, Union Républicaine and Progressiste during the period 1905 to 1910. In 1910 he joined the Gauche Démocratique. An anti-clerical and generally far more to the Left than his group memberships suggest. Minister of Colonies in the Caillaux administration, 1911-1912, and Poincaré administration, 1912-1913; minister of War in the latter administration after the resignation of Millerand, 1913 and the Doumergue administration, 1913; the last President of the Third Republic, 1932-1940.

6. Deputy for the third constituency of Marseilles from 1898 to 1918. Minister of Public Works in the Barthou administration, 1913, under-secretary in Briand's fifth administration, 1915-1916, and minister of Finance in the Ribot administration, 1917. He was ambassador to Madrid from 1917 until his death in 1918.

7. Deputy for the first constituency of Nice (Alpes Maritimes)

Law was a traditional preparation for the career of politics although this was somewhat less true for the Right than for the Centre and the Left. In 1905 27.3% of the Right had been practicing lawyers - either avocats, avoués or notaires - and many more had qualifications in law. This proportion tended to rise; in 1914 it was 30.6% and 35.9% of the members of the groups of the Right who survived the elections of 1919 were lawyers. The nationalist group had the highest proportion of lawyers during this period - 38.2% in 1905 and 34.4% in 1906; the monarchists had the lowest proportion.

Journalism was another traditional avenue into politics and entry into parliament tended to stimulate rather than diminish journalistic activity. In spite of the reputation which the Right had for being comparatively inarticulate, a fairly high proportion of its members were serious journalists and nearly all contributed to newspapers at some time during their political career. The percentage of serious journalists in 1905 was 11.8% rising to 20.6% in 1914. Very few can have made much money out of journalism or any other form of writing - a notable exception to this being Maurice Barrès

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from 1890 to 1924. Minister of Marine in the Poincaré administration, 1922-1924.

(Independent).[1] Others, such as Albert de Mun (Action Libérale),[2] Charles Benoist (Independent)[3] and Jules Delafosse (Independent)[4] gained fame, if not fortune, through their pens. The notable editors on the Right were François Arago (Union Républicaine)[5] of le Petit Parisien, Paul Beauregard (Progressiste)[6] who founded and edited le Monde Economique,

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1. Deputy for the third constituency of Nancy from 1889 to 1893 and the first arrondissement of Paris from 1906 to 1922. Mainly famous for his novels but a regular contributor to l'Echo de Paris until his death. Bought the château of Mirabeau in 1906 on the proceeds of his writing. Elected to the Academy in the same year.

2. Deputy for Pontivy (Morbihan) from 1877 to 1893 and for the second constituency of Morlaix from 1898 to 1914. A great-grandson of the materialist philosopher, Helvetius, and grandson of the marquis de Mun who served the regimes of Napoleon I, Louis XVIII and Louis Philippe. Elected to the Academy in 1898.

3. Deputy for the sixth arrondissement of Paris from 1902 to 1919. Then ambassador to The Hague. He came from a humble family in Calvados. Without a formal university training he became a professor at the Ecole libre des science politiques and a member of the Institut. Author of many books on history and constitutional reform and collaborated in numerous journals, notably le Temps and l'Echo de Paris. Political editor of la Revue des deux mondes and the leader of the campaign for proportional representation.

4. Deputy for Vire (Calvados) from 1877 to 1898 and from 1902 to 1915. Founded the journal, la Nation and wrote ten volumes on politics and political reminiscence. He was a monarchist who never really rallied to the Republic although he joined Action Libérale for the legislature 1910-1914.

5. See supra p.209 n. 2.

6. Deputy for the sixteenth arrondissement of Paris, Another progressiste with a humble background. Professor in the faculty of Law in Paris and author of books on political economy. A member of the Institut. Some time president of the Fédération Républicaine.

Jules Roche (Progressiste)[1] who edited la République Française from 1906 to 1910 and Georges Bonnefous (Progressiste)[2] who edited l'Année politique from 1900 to 1905.

Anthime Ménard (Progressiste/Action Libérale)[3] was probably the most influential provincial political journalist of the Right. He founded l'Observateur in 1878 and la Nouvelliste de l'Ouest in 1891. The latter was the focal point of ralliement in the West.

Of the other major professions - teaching, medicine and the armed services - the last named was the most popular. 13.5% in 1905, 15.2% in 1906 and 9.9% in 1914 of the members of the Right had been officers in the services. Action Libérale had the highest proportion in 1905 with 22.8%, the Nationalists the second, with 18.2%. The proportions changed after the elections of 1906 - the Nationalists had 34.5% to the Liberals, 21.8%. In 1905 the moderate Right had a very low percentage of ex-officers but in 1914 the Fédération Républicaine had the highest percentage. About one sixth of

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1. See supra p. 211 n.5.

2. Deputy for the second constituency of Versailles from 1910 to 1936. Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Poincaré and Briand administrations (1926-1929). He made a considerable reputation as an avocat at the court of appeal of Paris before he entered parliament. Wrote for the newspapers, la Liberté and la République Française.

3. Deputy for the first constituency of Saint Nazaire (Loire Inférieure). Practiced law as an avocat as well as being a journalist.

the ex-officers were navy men and about half the ex-army officers were cavalrymen. Admiral Bienaimé (Nationaliste)[1] and General Jacquey (Action Libérale/Nationaliste)[2] had had the most notable careers. The career of arms was almost inevitably coupled with landowning or farming - the exceptions being Henri Tournade (Nationaliste)[3] and Camille Fouquet (Independent).[4]

The two members of the priesthood - abbés Gayraud (Action Libérale)[5] and Lemire (Independent)[6]- who sat on the benches of the Right, deserve mention. Both were so-called abbés démocrates but much of their youthful radicalism had disappeared by 1905.

The deputies of the groups of the Right who survived

Deputy for the second arrondissement of Paris from 1905 to 1919. Entered the navy in 1859. Promoted contre-amiral in 1895 and vice amiral in 1900. Chief of the naval general staff from 1899 to 1902 and then commander in chief and prefect of Lorient and Toulon. Relieved of his posts because of disagreements with Camille Pelletan, the radical-socialist minister of Marine.

2. Deputy of the first constituency of Marsan (Landes) from 1898 to 1910,(defeated in 1910 by Damour an Independent of tendance gauche who was a professional organiser for Alliance Républicaine Démocratique), Entered the army in 1852. Placed on the reserve in 1894 with the rank of général de brigade.

3. Deputy for the tenth arrondissement of Paris from 1902 to 1919. Paris agent for the Peninsular and Orient Steamship Co. An anticlerical nationalist.

4. Deputy for Bernay (Eure) from 1885 to 1912. Owned a manufacturing concern at Bernay.

5. Deputy for the third constituency of Brest (Finistère) from 1897 to 1912. A member of the Dominican order from 1877 to 1893 and professor of theology and scholastic philosophy at the Catholic University of Toulouse. Published a number of books on politico-religious subjects.

6. Deputy for the first constituency of Hazelbrouck (Nord) from

from the legislature of 1914-1919 into the legislature of 1919-1924 were too few - they were sixty-four in number - to be divided in a meaningful manner into their former groups. The overall proportions of their professions and interests - except for some increase in lawyers - does not present any unusual features. 37.5% were landowners and farmers, 35.9% were lawyers, 23.9% were in banking, industry or commerce and 10.9% were ex-officers.

The Right, in the period 1905 to 1919, as well as being a numerically dwindling opposition was also an ageing one. The survivors of the successive electoral defeats tended to be veterans and the recruitment of young deputies to the groups of the Right fell away. The large number of deaths and retirements of leaders of the Right during and after the First World War has already been mentioned.[1] The passage of time affected their followers in the same way. Only thirty-two who had been in the Chamber in 1905 were still there after the elections of 1919.[2] Another eight still survived but had

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1893 to 1928. He had been a teacher at the college of Saint-François d'Assise at Hazelbrouck. Founder of the jardins ouvriers movement and the author of books on Christian socialism.

1. See supra p. 103.

2. These were: Arago, d'Aubigny, Ballande, Bonnevay, Brice, Cornudet des Chomettes, Darblay, Desjardins, Duclaux-Monteil, Dutreil, Engerand, Ferrette, Ernest Flandin, Galpin, Gérard, Gourd, Grandmaison, Lamy, Henry Laniel, Marin, Montjou, Moustier, Raiberti and Vandame who became members of Entente Républicaine Démocratique; Ferdinand Bougère, Dion, Fontaines Gailhard-Bancel, Ginoux-Defermon, Groussau and Juigné who joined the Groupe des Indépendants; and Maurice-Binder who joined the Groupe des non-Inscrits.

become Républicains de Gauche.[1] This diminution was not extraordinary as the average length of time that deputies remained in the Chamber between the wars, for example, was 9.3 years.[2] After the elections of 1906 the average age of the Right as a whole was increased rather than lowered, as one would expect. In the case of Union Républicaine the average age went up by over 4 years - from 47.2 to 51.6 - between the end of 1905 and the end of 1906.

The average ages of the groups of the Right were these:

	1905	1906	1910	1911	1914	1919 (The Survivors
Union Républicaine	47.2	51.6	-	50.4	-	
Progressiste	52.9	51.7	-	52.2	51.9	
Action Libérale	50.3	50.0	52.7	-	52.2	
Nationaliste	48.4	48.8	-	-	-	
Droites	-	-	59.7	-	60.8	
Independents	55.9	54.0	53.9	-	52.6	
Overall average	51.9	50.5	53.0	-	53.8	56.2

The parliamentary life of deputies of the Right also tended to grow longer:

	1905	1906	1910	1911	1914	1919 (The Survivors
Union Républicaine	6.5	8.4	-	6.5	-	
Progressiste	8.7	8.4	-	10.5	9.2	
Action Libérale	7.8	7.6	10.6	-	12.0	
Nationaliste	5.8	6.3	-	-	-	
Droites	-	-	16.3	-	13.6	
Independents	12.9	12.6	9.6	-	9.0	
Overall average	8.8	7.8	11.0	-	11.0	14.0

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1. Amodru, Paul Bignon, Bonniard, Chambrun, Clament, Lemire, Mando and Villault-Duchesnois.

2. Mattei Dogan, "La Stabilité du personnel parlementaire sous la Troisième République." Revue Française de Science Politique. Vol. III. April-June 1953. p. 323.

Younger deputies with less parliamentary experience tended more frequently to belong to the recently formed groups (the Union Républicaine and Nationaliste in 1905) and also tended to be more willing to try a new parliamentary tactic (which the re-formation of the Union Républicaine in 1911 implied).

The re-formation of a monarchist group in 1910 showed that monarchists were older and had more parliamentary experience than the other independents. This pointed to two things. Recruitment to parliamentary monarchism had almost completely dried up - no new deputy joined the Groupe des Droites in 1910 and only one in 1914. Also, apart from the massacre of monarchists in Morbihan and Maine et Loire in 1919, monarchists tended to die or retire rather than be defeated in general elections.

The outlines of the geographical distribution of the seats of members of the Right have already been drawn by François Goguel.[1] Only a few additional remarks are required.

The distribution of the constituencies during the period 1905 to 1919 was wide - only fifteen départements were never

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1. F. Goguel, Géographie des élections française de 1870 à 1951. 1951. Although M. Goguel does not base his maps on parliamentary groups and although his maps for 1910 and 1919 confound the Centre with the Right, his work gives a very effective diagramatic illustration of where the electoral bastions of the Right were.

represented by a deputy of the Right.[1] Six of these départements - Allier, Cher, Corrèze, Creuse, Loir et Cher and Haute Vienne - formed a contiguous unit in the centre of France. This barren central area was usually much wider than this. In 1914 it also included Cantal, Dordogne, Nièvre, Puy de Dôme and Yonne. The Right was poorly represented in Eastern France with the exception of the départements of Meurthe et Moselle and Vosges which both had six deputies of the Right in 1905. By 1914 they had only five between them. By that year the representation of the Right in the South-Eastern départements had dwindled to almost nothing. However, the political orientation of Meurthe et Moselle, Vosges and the South-Eastern départements did not change greatly between 1905 and 1914; deputies who had formerly belonged or who might have joined groups of the moderate Right instead joined groups of the Centre and modified their attitudes only a little in doing so.

The main electoral strongholds of the Right were the West, the North and "greater" Paris (forming a total of twenty départements), with the South-West making a poor and unstable fourth. In 1905 they supplied well over half the deputies of the Right and in 1914 over three-quarters. The West

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1. Ain, Allier, Ardennes, Ariège, Belfort, Cher, Corrèze, Creuse, Jura, Loir et Cher, Moselle, Bas Rhin, Haute Sâone, Var and Haute Vienne. See Appendix B for a table of the distribution of the constituencies of the Right.

was the most important of these strongholds.[1] In 1905 sixty-seven deputies came from twelve Western départements.[2] In 1914, when the membership of the groups of the Right had declined from 245 to 121, fifty deputies came from these départements. There were more electoral reverses in the North. The six départements of Aisne, Nord, Oise, Pas de Calais, Somme and Seine Inférieure provided the Right with thirty-nine deputies in 1905 but only fourteen in 1914. The persistence of Catholicism and the benevolent paternalism of the patronat had preserved the political strength of the Right in the industrial départements of Nord and Pas de Calais but the effectiveness of these forces was ebbing. In 1905 twenty deputies of the Right were elected in these départements, in 1914 eight and in 1919 a socialist list came top of the poll in Nord, another socialist list won all the seats in the first constituency of Pas de Calais and in the second constituency the Right had to make an alliance with radical socialists to obtain representation.

The elections of 1906 reduced the representation of the Right in Paris from twenty-three (fifteen of whom were members of the Groupe Nationaliste) to fifteen (only five of whom

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1. For a classic description of the political geography of the area see André Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest. 1913.

2. Calvados, Côtes du Nord, Finistère, Ille et Vilaine, Loire Inférieure, Maine et Loire, Manche, Mayenne, Morbihan, Orne, Sarthe and Vendée.

joined the group). The Right revived a little in the capital and its representation was eighteen in 1914. But in spite of the victory of national lists in three of the four constituencies of Paris in 1919, this was not a victory for the Right. Only six outgoing deputies were re-elected and seven notable figures of the Right were defeated.[1] In Seine et Oise the Right was in decline - eight deputies in 1905, two in 1914 and two, perhaps three in 1919.

Although the electoral strongholds contracted, the largest proportionate losses were in isolated constituencies. Forty-seven _départements_ in 1914, against twenty-two in 1905, sent no deputy of the Right to the Palais Bourbon.

A few generalisations can be made about the geographical distribution of the constituencies of members of the parliamentary groups. The Nationalists were mainly concentrated in Paris and the West, with a few in the South-West (d'Elissagaray, Jacquey etc.). The Monarchists were strongest in the West with one or two members in the South. The Liberals were weak in Paris, comparatively strong in the North and West with a scattering of seats (Piou, Gailhard-Bancel, etc.) in the South and South-West. The _Progressistes_ were the most widely and evenly distributed being present in all the regions where the Right was represented. The only

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1. Bienaimé, Denais, Failliot, Jean Lerolle, P. Pugliesi-Conti, Spronck, Tournade.

selection of deputies in the same group from urban areas who can be significantly grouped together were the progressiste free-traders who have been discussed elsewhere.[1]

The constituencies of the Right fell into three very general categories. The first and most important was the agricultural. The constituencies which the Right held in the West and South (excluding Marseilles) all fell into this category. There was a considerable variety in their political allegiance and also in their social structure. The second was the traditional industrial in which the workers retained a certain deference towards their employers and also still practised Catholicism. The textile manufacturing area of the North was the only important area where this was so. The third was urban commercial, the political allegiance of which was either nationalist or progressiste. These constituencies were situated in the large cities of France.

Constituency interests varied enormously and as a result, so did the strength of conservative sentiment to be found within them. Nearly every social development since 1789 was hostile to the aristocratic, agricultural society in the remote parts of the West. On the other hand it was only the developments of the fifteen or twenty years previous to 1905 which disturbed the interests of the progressiste constituencies in the large towns and no doors were closed against coming to terms with these new developments.

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1. See supra pp. 165-166.

The attitude of the Right to the Ministries.

During the period 1899 to 1914 members of the Right liked to refer to themselves as the "opposition". The term was convenient (it had none of the emotional overtones associated with la Droite) and was accurate in that the most obvious attitude they had in common was opposition to the ministries of these years. But the concept of the Right as being by definition an opposition needs careful qualification even for the fifteen years preceding the first World War.

Occasionally representatives, and even a majority, of every group of the Right voted for motions which implied confidence in the government. No section of the Right consistently opposed measures merely because they were backed by the government, although there was a tendency on the part of certain monarchists to do so. But voting for government-supported legislation, and even giving a government general support over a period of time to facilitate the passage of a particular measure, did not mean that deputies regarded themselves or were regarded by others as part of the ministerial majority. Consistent public support of a government and representation in the cabinet were the criteria by which groups were recognised as part of the ministerial majority. No group of the Right fulfilled these criteria between 1905 and 1914.

Neither support of, nor opposition to particular pieces

of legislation implied an equivalent attitude towards the government. This division was not peculiar to the French parliament but weak party discipline and the organisation of business made it particularly clear there. Legislation was prepared for presentation to parliament, not by a minister, but by the appropriate committee of the Chamber or the Senate. The continued existence of a government was not at stake during the discussion of the details of a bill. For instance, during the debate on income tax the adoption of an amendment opposed by the minister of Finance did not force the cabinet to resign. But repeated incidents of this kind would gravely weaken the prestige of the government. In order to get measures through parliament the government sometimes had to make the passage of articles of a bill matters of confidence. This compelled some deputies to vote for them against their inclinations. This necessary procedure was criticised on the Right, especially by the progressistes. In 1909, Jules Roche complained that:

> M. Briand est toujours disposé à poser la question de confiance sur les motions préjucicielles, dont il demande le rejet. Son intention est de faire porter le débat principalement sur le terrain politique. Il veut mettre pour ou contre le cabinet. 1

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1. La République Française, 16th November 1909.

Roche thought that this was deplorable because issues were not judged on their merits.[1]

The government and the committees, all representing the majority in the Chamber naturally held fairly similar views on legislation. Most conflicts were between the government and the committees of the relatively conservative Senate. But differences of opinion occurred between committees of the Chamber and the government, since there were different majorities in the Chamber for different things. For example, when the progressiste Charles Benoist was president of the committee for electoral reform in the legislature 1910-1914, the views of the government and the committee seldom coincided and sometimes clashed. Usually, however, the president and rapporteur of the grand committees were strong contenders for ministerial office. As a result they differed from the ministers in place only within narrow limits.

The attitudes of members of the Right to ministries can be profitably separated from their attitudes to legislation. In the first place the discussion of certain measures was frequently not completed within the span of a single ministry;

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1. Roche was before anything else conservative on financial matters and he rightly suspected that many members of the Centre were more conservative on financial than they were on other issues. His argument was an "opposition" argument; he must have been well aware that any government would have been compelled to use a certain amount of pressure to ensure the passage of the budget or a serious programme of legislation.

the debate on the income tax bill of Caillaux outlived nine ministries. Members of the Right unlike the Centre did not change their attitudes to legislation because there was a change of ministry. Secondly, the Right tended to favour a prime minister who represented himself as the leader of the Nation (although his ministry in composition and declared policy conceded little to the Right) rather than a Republican seeking the support of Republicans only. Thirdly, the groups which made up the opposition of the Right had particular views on their own nature and function which formed a background to their attitudes towards ministries. Because of these views monarchists and the extreme Right could have participated only in the most conservative Republican government. Any support which they gave to a government between 1905 and 1914 was likely to cause grave embarrassment. In their view monarchist restoration or constitutional reform was required before other desirable reforms could be conceived; it was, therefore, almost impossible for them to co-operate with people who thought that the existing Republican constitution was the very basis of social progress. Members of Action Libérale hoped that their group would one day be a great conservative party capable of forming a government. As long as this hope lasted continuous, though responsible, opposition was the order of the day. The ambition became more and more remote and by 1910 some Liberals were trying to open the way for future co-operation with

ministerial Republicans.

The position of the progressistes had the most practical importance. From 1877 to 1899 they had been républicains de gouvernement. In 1899 they had been driven into opposition by the growing power of the radicals. Many of them found their subsequent role uncongenial. They continually affirmed their desire to support measures useful to the country and said that they never opposed measures for the sake of opposing. Gradually two distinct opinions became apparent among progressistes on the most desirable basis of a government. The more conservative, led by Jules Roche, pinned their hopes on the electoral victory of the "opposition". They would provide the key members of any government which emerged from such a victory. Joseph Thierry was the most prominent exponent of the other way of thinking. The aim of Thierry and his colleagues was to exclude the socialists and the extreme radical-socialists from the ministerial majority, but include the progressistes, thus moving the centre of gravity to the Right. Most of the members of the Groupe de l'Union Républicaine between 1906 and 1910 belonged to this tendency within the Groupe Républicain Progressiste. The Union Républicaine was a link between Right and Centre. Its aim, expressed in a resolution passed early in 1906, was:

> ... à substituer à une majorité disparate une majorité des républicains fermement unis sur les questions vitales.
>
> (which would oppose)

> ... aux agitations stériles, le progrès démocratique, au prétendu antagonisme de classes, la solidarité sociale. 1

Translated into concrete terms, this meant the creation of a majority which excluded socialists and those who favoured co-operation with them. Thierry eventually realised his aim but had to compromise so much that most progressistes refused to follow him.

The large conservative party, which seemed to be forming in opposition to the ministry of Combes and the law of Separation, was never realised. The major parliamentary reason was the division of opinion within the progressiste group. In 1906 monarchists were prepared to be friendly towards Liberals and Liberals towards progressistes; but those progressistes who sought to re-open relations with supporters of the law of Separation shunned all contact with their colleagues of the Right. Also progressiste votes sometimes helped to prolong the life of ministries; the votes of the rest of the Right only served to bring them down.

The ministry of Clemenceau: The elections of 1906 were a blow to those progressistes who wished to rejoin the ministerial majority. Such a movement, during the troubled period of the application of the law of Separation, would in any case have been premature but the increased strength of the radicals

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1. La Presse, 2nd March 1906.

made it almost impossible.

There was little in Clemenceau's personality or declared policy or composition of his ministry to appeal to the Right. He did not set out to conciliate his opponents. His career evoked only painful memories. At first the reactions of the Right to him were violent. L'Autorité described him as "un des personnages les plus louches" of the Third Republic.[1] His authoritarian temperament prompted accusations that he was aiming at dictatorship.[2]

Out of eleven parliamentary ministers, his cabinet contained five radical socialists and two independent socialists. His declaration of policy was the most radical of the Third Republic, until that of the Popular Front cabinet of 1936. Yet twenty-seven progressistes voted for the cabinet when it first appeared before the Chamber.[3] Part of the explanation lay in the progressiste tradition of not voting against a government until it did something deplorable. However, the reluctant and partial support which the progressistes gave to Clemenceau until the end must be explained by the personality of Clemenceau. He was committed to anticlerical legislation (as any other possible prime minister would be); but he was

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1. L'Autorité, 25th October 1906.
2. This accusation was first made in Action Libérale Populaire, 26th October 1906. Others thought that he was trying to imitate Gambetta. La Presse, 25th October 1906.
3. J.O., 25th October 1906.

no *combiste* and did not think that the clerical question was worth risking or provoking physical violence. More important, he abused socialists as well as priests and used force against syndicalist agitators. His preparations for possible trouble in Paris on May day 1906 impressed the *progressistes*. They voted for him as a "man of order".[1] But he could not satisfy them completely. Too frequently there was a coincidence of views between Clemenceau and the socialists. These provoked outbursts of passionate indignation:

> Tout gouvernement qui laisse ébranler la confiance des citoyens dans la République en pactisant avec les révolutionnaires travaillent pour la réaction.
> Faites front à gauche. Tout le péril est là. 2

There were no *progressiste* admirers of Clemenceau until 1917, but when he took strong measures against strikers some *progressistes* openly approved his policy although the compliments which they paid to his person were barbed: "Cet homme d'Etat n'est pas peut-être admirable, mais il est imprévu. Il n'a pas les mêmes formules que les autres."[3]

Some members of the Centre would have welcomed *progressistes* in the government. Lannesan, radical minister

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1. See A. de Mun, *Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*. 1911. Vol. II. p. 7.
2. *La République Française*, 1st October 1908.
3. *Ibid*. 5th February 1907.

of Marine in the Waldeck-Rousseau administration, publicly urged this in order to create, as he put it, "une majorité assez forte pour résister au parti socialiste."[1] A long discussion took place in the newspapers le Siècle (edited by Lannesan) and la République Française. Lannesan attacked the extreme caution of Méline, accusing him of fearing the resurrection of a political coalition which Méline had once led. Did Méline fear, he asked, that "les progressistes en s'alliant aux radicaux, soient entraînés à voter des réformes sociales?"; did he wish to condemn the progressistes "à l'impuissance en même temps ... à la résistance au progrès."[2] If the radicals and progressistes did not combine they would be supplanted by more extreme groups.[3] He could not understand why the progressistes associated with the extreme Right (which sought the destruction of liberty) and yet refused to associate with radicals. He thought that the radicals were tired of serving the interests of the socialists particularly on the issue of income tax; in his own name he offered to jettison the most important reforms on the radical programme.[4] The only way to create a liberal Republic was a radical/progressiste alliance.[5]

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1. Le Siècle, 24th July 1908.
2. Ibid. 27th July, 1906.
3. Ibid. 9th August 1907.
4. Ibid. 14th August 1907.
5. Ibid. 14th August 1907.

The progressiste answer was that they hoped relations would grow closer. The serious implication of Lannesan's proposal, in Georges Lachapelle's opinion, was that the progressistes would have to accept the social programme of the radicals. There was no majority in the Chamber for any positive social policy (the radical policy was dominated by socialist conceptions) but there was one for the preservation of law and order and the progressistes naturally formed part of it. Lachapelle's most significant point, although he did not stress it, was that since 1899 a barrier of ill-will had arisen between those moderate Republicans who had supported the cabinets of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes and those who had opposed them. The progressistes considered that their ex-colleagues had allied themselves with "the Revolution" and socialism.[1]

Jules Roches argued that the progressistes were not interested in power or even in the survival of their group - their ideals alone mattered. The current behaviour of the radicals (which he stigmatised as "cette abominable politique, qui est le contraire de la République") was not in accordance with progressiste ideals and made any association with them impossible.[2] As a result of his extreme economic conservatism

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1. La République Française, 28th July 1906.
2. Ibid. 10th August 1907.

Roche was closely associated with the rest of the Right.[1]

The view of the extreme Right on this controversy was given by Paul de Léoni in l'Autorité. He quoted Georges Vallée (Union Démocratique/Union Républicaïne/Progressiste) as saying: "Le parti progressiste est aujourd'hui confondu avec le parti réactionnaire." Léoni thought that it was natural that the progressistes should merge with and perhaps lead the "opposition"; unfortunately they insisted on flirting with their worst enemies:

> Et ils se trouvent alors que les blocards prennent leurs voix, acceptent leurs concours électoraux, mais récusent et leur politique et leurs personnes. [2]

Louis Brindeau tried to define the official position of the Groupe Républicain Progressiste in his inaugural speech as president of the group in 1908. There were differences of opinion within the group concerning its attitude towards the government, but he believed the independent position of the group should be preserved:

> Sans abdiquer notre liberté arbitre, et sans avoir besoin de demander permission à personne, nous considérons comme un devoir, tout en continuant à combattre les projets contraires à notre programme et à protester contre les actes qui offensent notre conscience, d'accorder notre vote au ministère toutes les fois qu'il saura à l'intérieur, prendre nettement position pour sauvegarder les principes essentiels de tous gouvernements, et à l'extérieur, se montrer le gardien vigilant des intérêts et de l'honneur du pays.

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1. See la République Française, 3rd September 1907. It is interesting that although Lannesan had been closely associated with anticlerical measures (for example, the abolition of the observance of Good Friday in the navy) this was not held against him.

2. L'Autorité, 24th August 1907.

He concluded by saying that the progressistes supported all proposals, "constituant de véritable progrès". [1]

Except for occasional hints that the understanding sought by Lannesan might not be impossible,[2] those in favour of joining the ministerial majority preserved a discreet silence in public during Clemenceau's administration. Nothing encouraged them to come into the open. The "liberté arbitre" of the progressistes was wishful thinking. Clemenceau rarely had to face the opposition of the progressistes and the socialists at the same time; he had a majorité de rechange. La Presse called this the double game of Clemenceau:

> Quel est le conservateur qui oserait renverser un gouvernement qui sauve la société avec tant de brio et qui couvre de fleurs le prévot d'archers, l'excellent M. Lépine.
>
> Quel est le socialiste unifié qui n'aurait pas confiance dans des hommes qui ferment les cercles, mais qui, pour raser ces vieux ponts de contribuables, introduisent la fâcheuse dans l'administration des finances. 3

The government never once compromised in order to capture progressiste votes. There were occasions on which those votes prevented the government being defeated and it would hardly

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1. La République Française, 1st April 1908. Brindeau repeated the substance of this statement in the Chamber a few days later (J.O., 6th April 1908. pp. 889-890). Clemenceau made a conciliatory reply. (Ibid. pp. 892 et seq.)

2. Such as that made by the journalist Frédéric Clément in la République Française, 18th February 1908.

3. La Presse, 23rd January 1907. Lépine was prefect of police, "ces vieux ponts" were the "quatre vieilles contributions directes" and la fâcheuse was income tax.

have lasted for three years if faced with continuous progressiste opposition.[1] Clemenceau said that he regarded their votes as being directed against the socialists rather than in favour of his government.[2]

Towards the end of his ministry the conservative wing of the progressiste group criticised Clemenceau sharply.

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1. Most notably:
a. Emile Cère (Union Démocratique) amendment, 29th January 1907, to law of Public Meetings with intention of restricting rights of worship rejected by 279 votes to 241 on demand of government and committee.
b. During budget debate, 6th November 1907, government and committee rejected the demand of Dessoye (Radical-Socialiste) and others that the sum granted to subsidiary services of state schools should be raised by a third. Defeated by 287 votes to 262.
c. Couderc (Socialiste Unifié) article additionnelle to the budget, 8th December 1907, challenged the government's integrity in the treatment of civil servants. Rejected on the demand of the government by 267 votes to 214.
d. Lasies (Independent) amendment, 10th February 1908, to the proposal to re-integrate Joseph Reinach into territorial army to extend it to cover all those who had been dismissed for public activities during the Dreyfus case was defeated on the demand of the government by 273 votes to 257.
e. Lemire (Independent) amendment to article 15 of income tax bill, 17th March 1908, to extend tax relief for the poor was rejected by the minister of Finance and the committee and defeated by 299 votes to 235. There were a number of other occasions during this debate on which progressiste votes helped to reject amendments.
f. Empereur (Radical-Socialiste) proposal, 10th November 1908, that the government should ask the Finance committee of the Senate to report on the proposal concerning the pay of the gardes forestiers which the Chamber had voted in 1906. Rejected by the government it was defeated by 272 votes to 226.
None of these issues was made a question of confidence but a defeat on any one of them would probably have shortened the life of the government.

2. J.O., 6th April 1908. Particularly pp. 890-891.

Benoist roundly accused him of creating social unrest,[1] and the comment of la République Française when he fell was brutal:

> Hissé enfin au pouvoir avec les cadavres de ses victimes comme piédestal, il en tombe misérablement de toute sa hauteur après trois années d'une administration dont l'histoire pourra dire qu'elle a été l'une des plus néfastes, par son incohérence, de toutes celles que le pays a subies. [2]

Not all progressistes agreed with this judgement for fourteen voted for the government on the issue which caused its fall[3] - although the position adopted by Clemenceau in his dispute with Delcassé had little to commend it to them.

The attitudes of the Liberals and the extreme Right to Clemenceau hardly varied throughout his ministry. When they approved something he did they accused him of abandoning his own principles and adopting theirs. The Independents Jules Delahaye and Laurent Bougère levelled this charge against him in the Chamber.[4]

The questions of Liberal co-operation with radicals and Liberal support of a cabinet not based on the groups of the Right, were not broached during the Clemenceau government. But Jacques Piou uttered words in November 1908 which foreshadowed another situation. Referring to a recent incident between France and Germany in Morocco, he said that opposition politics would be forgotten immediately there was danger of

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1. J.O., 26th March 1909. p. 867.
2. La République Française, 21st July 1909.
3. J.O., 20th July 1909.
4. J.O., 28th June 1907. p. 572.

war and warned the German Emperor not to be too impressed by domestic quarrels in France.[1] National emergency would bring Piou and his party into line behind any ministry.

The Briand Ministry: Two questions about Briand's first ministry must be considered here: to what extent was it a détente à droite and how far it was considered by the Right as such?

The Briand ministry was a continuation of its predecessor. Clemenceau declared that the vote of 20th July 1909 was directed against himself only, and he nominated Briand as his successor.[2] Ten out of the fourteen ministers in the new administration had held office under Clemenceau. However the radical socialist representation declined from seven to three and the inclusion of Millerand raised that of the Independent socialists from two to three. The most important change (excluding the person of the prime minister) was the replacing of Caillaux by Cochery (Union Démocratique) at the ministry of Finance. This appointment, together with Briand's infrequent references to the Caillaux income tax bill, was interpreted as a lack of enthusiasm for that measure. Barthou's promotion from Public Works to Justice added further weight to the moderate element.

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1. Compte rendu du congrès régional de l'Action Libérale Populaire. Lyon, 14th November 1908.

2. G. Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Troisième République. Vol. II. 1956. pp. 138-139.

The personal contrast Briand made with Clemenceau gave the impression of a great change.[1] Clemenceau was authoritarian and domineering and had ingrained, often-expressed radical, Republican and anticlerical convictions. He did not give the impression that he altered his opinions to suit prevailing views. Briand seemed to change his opinions both as his personal role and the political climate shifted.[2] Lack of clear convictions and an expressed readiness to evolve led some members of the Right to retain a hope that he might move in a sense favourable to them. This hope was encouraged by the respect with which he treated the opposition's convictions.

Electoral reform was assuming ever greater importance to members of the Right. With very few exceptions the Right was in favour of some kind of electoral reform and the great majority were in favour of proportional representation. Charles Benoist was the leader of the reform movement. He had the support of the progressistes and an influential committee for proportional representation. Action Libérale also supported it.[3] The monarchists wanted some kind of electoral reform (although not necessarily proportional representation).

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1. The change of personnel impressed Denys Cochin (Independent). He wrote: "C'est déjà quelque chose de n'avoir plus Clemenceau, Caillaux et Picquart. ... J'ai d'ailleurs ... un faible pour Briand." Letter of Cochin to Mme. Pierre d'Harcourt, July 1909. Cochin MSS.

2. See his speech, J.O., 27th July 1909. pp. 2253-2255.

3. Jacques Piou said: "La R.P. sera l'Edit de Nantes des temps nouveaux, la grande pacificatrice qui par la tolérance et la justice préparera les réconciliations nécessaires." Compte rendu du congrès de l'Action Libérale Populaire, 2nd December 1909. 1910.

Only a few odd men out such as Lemire (Independent) and Gauthier de Clagny (Nationaliste) supported the existing system.

Briand's declaration (27th July 1909) committed his government to very little. On electoral reform Briand was conciliatory, saying that debate on the issue was necessary and that proportional representation could be tried in municipal elections. The reference to income tax was very brief and was construed as meaning the de facto abandonment of the Caillaux bill.

The Briand ministry was received by the Right, in the words of one publicist, "without anger and without joy".[1] La République Française greeted the ministry with a statement about electoral reform which could be construed as a veiled offer of support.[2] In the first week of the new ministry Henry Maret and Frédéric Clément wrote complimentary articles about Briand.[3] In the first months of the ministry there was usually a majority in the progressiste group prepared to vote confidence in the government. It was not long before Rocafort in l'Univers was complaining that the progressistes were

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1. Georges Bonnefous in la République Française, 25th July 1909. Certain progressistes had been favourable to Briand for some time. An ex-president of the group, Fleury-Ravarin, said when he inaugurated a progressiste circle at Lyon in 1907: "Nous défondrons M. Briand contre ses ennemis." (La Presse, 26th February 1907). This slogan did not find much support amongst his colleagues.

2. La République Française, 24th July 1909.

3. Ibid. 29th July and 2nd August 1909.

coming to form a permanent part of the ministerial majority.[1]

Rocafort added that the Liberals were not making "liberty" the first of their considerations.[2] Certain Liberals had abstained and four, the most prominent being Joseph Massabuau, had voted confidence in Briand.[3] Massabuau explained why:

> Nous ne voulons pas voir élever entre la République et nous la barrière du dogme laïque; et cela au profit de petits comités qui sous couleur de l'anticléricalisme veulent nous dominer. 4

They did not want the religious question to prevent them supporting a government with which they were in general agreement. There were strong complaints about this behaviour in l'Autorité[5] and when Massabuau's motives became known Jules Delahaye (Independent) attacked him:

> Le prétexte eût été la question sociale; le but à atteindre se fût borné à quelques faveurs dans les circonscriptions électorales: mais quoique s'affirment bons catholiques, ces libéraux n'avaient même pas le soin de chercher à obtenir en compensation de leur soumission "quelques concessions sur le terrain religieux." 6

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1. L'Univers, 6th November 1909.

2. Ibid. This was the first shot of a one man war Rocafort carried on against Action Libérale in the next few years. See J. Rocafort, Les Résistances à la politique de Pie X. 1920.

3. The majority of the group - twenty-four abstained. The other three who voted for the government were Bonniard, Monsservin and d'Osmoy. Twelve voted against.

4. An interview to XX siècle of Brussels quoted by Massabuau J.O., 19th January 1910. p. 203.

5. L'Autorité, 31st October and 6th November 1909.

6. Ibid. 20th January 1910.

Nothing, in Delahaye's opinion, could be gained from this manoeuvre.

Briand added to the confusion of the Right by his speech at Périgueux in October 1909 in which he called for the liquidation of political tension. He said that he wanted a united Republican party in which the old quarrels would be forgotten, a Republic "open to all" and an end to divisions and strife in the country. He hinted at the possibility of electoral reform, was evasive about income tax and made a rousing appeal to patriotic sentiment. He made no concessions to the claims of socialists and trade unionists.

The progressiste reception of this speech was wholly favourable.[1] That sectarian quarrels should be forgotten and equal treatment should be accorded to all citizens were constantly recurrent themes in the speeches of progressiste leaders. Joseph Thierry expressed them forcibly at the congress of the Fédération Républicaine in 1908.[2] Whether Briand and the progressistes meant the same things when they repeated the same verbal formulae is not important. The formulae were similar and they created hope among the progressistes and some Liberals of a better future. Piou, de Mun, Beauregard, Jules Roche and others preserved the posture of opposition but they seemed uncertain and unwilling

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1. See the leading article of la République Française, 11th October 1909. Some government supporters were expected to cause trouble.

2. Thierry MSS. (discours).

to press their criticisms.

Briand's success in throwing the Right into disarray can be guaged by the reactions of an extremist such as Jules Delahaye (Independent). Delahaye wrote an article of blistering personal abuse against Briand when he first became prime minister.[1] After eleven months Delahaye was able to review his post-electoral declaration favourably.[2] Renaud d'Elissagaray (Nationaliste), by temperament a violent oppositionist, described in his Mémoires how he was swayed by his admiration for Briand's personality.[3]

The highwater mark of Briand's popularity amongst the extremists and in the Right as a whole was in October 1910 when he defended the breaking of a railway strike by saying that he would use illegal methods, if necessary, to preserve the essential services of the community. Whilst the socialists heckled Briand, the Right stood up as one man and cheered him to the echo.[4] This display of enthusiasm for a prime minister was unique in the fifteen years preceding 1914. The reasons

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1. L'Autorité, 24th July 1909.

2. Ibid. 27th June 1910. He soon reverted to his former position.

3. "Mon admiration allait à Briand dont le courage s'était avéré splendide de denoncer, ainsi qu'il fit à Périgueux les mares stagnantes. Esprit vraiment libéral, coeur riche de bonté, que celui de cet homme, que l'opinion accusait de septicisme. (sic) Incapable de vouloir le moindre mal à un quelconque adversaire, d'un sang-froid rare, il ne s'emballait jamais" R. d'Elissagaray, Mémoires MS. pp. 136-137.

4. Information was given to the author by S.E. Adrien Thierry, who was present at the sitting, in a conversation on 15th February 1960.

were twofold: the Right had every sympathy for determined measures against violent working class agitation; and the authoritarian tone of Briand's statement appealed to the authoritarian temperament of certain sections of the Right, echoing the aphorism of Louis Napoleon: "Nous sortirons de la légalité pour rentrer dans le droit." In the vote, Briand depended on the support of the Right: only three of its members, Baudry d'Asson, Delahaye and Lavrignais (Droites) voted against the government in accordance with the politique du pire.

The position adopted by the three monarchists redounded to their credit. Shortly afterwards Briand reconstructed his cabinet and included Lafferre, sometime master of the Grand Orient and a defender of the system of fiches de délation practiced during the Combes era. The Right interpreted this as a slap in the face, as it was probably intended.[1] Denys Cochin expressed in a private letter what most of the Right must have felt:

> Briand n'invite pas la Droite à son banquet. C'est entendu: Méline lui-même en disait autant. Mais il fait plus. Il fait ... comme le vieux Guillaume I de Prusse qui voulant empêcher ses enfants de diner avec lui crachait dans les plats. C'est ce qu'a fait Briand, en nous offrait Lafferre. [2]

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1. Guy de Cassagnac like Jaurès thought that it was primarily an anti-socialist appointment. L'Autorité, 7th November 1910. The dropping of the two independent socialists, Viviani and Millerand, also tended to give the cabinet a more moderate aspect.

2. Cochin to Mme. Pierre d'Harcourt, 22nd November 1910. Cochin MSS.

The Right did not swing unanimously into opposition. Some important figures were noticably reticent.[1] Piou (Action Libérale) had always opposed Briand,[2] and Lafferre gave him an extra reason. The progressistes were divided. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu recalled Lafferre's defence of the fiches de délation and said that although he had voted for Briand after the "illegality" speech he could not vote for a cabinet containing Lafferre.[3] Paul Beauregard, on the other hand, said he would vote for the cabinet because of the assurances given in the ministerial declaration for the "protection of society".[4] The progressiste group split; those favouring Briand re-formed the Union Républicaine under the presidency of Joseph Thierry. In doing this they so denied

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1. Massabuau (Action Libérale)and Aynard (Progressiste) who had both spoken in favour of Briand after the elections of 1910 (J.O., 27th June 1910. pp. 2286-2290 and 28th June. pp. 2235-2237) made no comment on the reconstructed cabinet. The approval of these two catholics was always related to the amount of anti-Briand feeling on the Left. Aynard especially gave the impression that he was swayed as much by the reaction to Briand's words as by the words themselves (particularly, J.O., 28th June 1910. p. 2337). In November 1910 Briand was still being attacked violently from the Left and this was probably the reason for their silence.

2. Piou had even attacked Briand's very moderate statement of policy after the election, describing it as "un bill d'indemnité pour les excès du passé, un engagement à commettre de nouveaux pour l'avenir." J.O., 27th June 1910. p. 2294.

3. J.O., 9th November 1910 pp. 2712-2715.

4. Ibid. p. 2726. Beauregard remained the president of the progressiste group and did not join the Thierry faction. He was too conservative to become a regular government supporter.

their past that they cannot, from this time, be regarded as members of the Right. Thierry and his colleagues were adopting the same position as Poincaré, Jonnart, Barthou and other members of the Centre who disapproved of "Combism" but condoned it.

Briand managed to exert an attraction still further to the Right. Maurice Binder (Indépendants),[1] restated a doctrine expressed by Clemenceau with greater éclat five years previously. There were, he said, only two parties in 1911, the party of order and the party of revolution: both Briand and himself belonged to the former so he would vote for the cabinet in spite of Lafferre.[2]

Briand's "anti-radicalism", and his revival of the ideas of concentration Républicaine and esprit nouveau used by Méline and Spüller in the nineties,[3] were potentially of great significance to progressistes and Liberals. A ministry of the Centre supported by Republicans of the Right was once again within the bounds of possibility. Briand's ministry never approached this condition. When he said, "Je ne veux exclure

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1. Binder had been noticed applauding the declaration of the first Briand cabinet to the disgust of the extreme Right. L'Autorité, 28th July 1909.

2. J.O., 9th November 1910. p. 2727.

3. See Briand's declaration J.O., 9th June 1910. pp. 2082-2084. Characteristically Briand used a great many more words than Spüller. Briand also spoke favourably about reforms which the Centre and moderate Right approved such as electoral reform, extension of rights of associations, reform of the judiciary, statute for civil servants and the preparation of "l'accession à la propriété de la démocratie rurale."

personne de ma majorité", he also made it quite clear that he wanted the support of the Left.[1] His concessions to the Right were verbal and he was not prepared to remain in power supported by their votes.

Caillaux versus Briand 1911-1914: Briand resigned after surviving an interpellation on the application of the law on teaching orders by only fourteen votes and this majority depended on votes from the Right.[2]

The ministries from 1911 to 1914 were influenced by Briand's first period in power; they either revived the ideas of apaisement and national unity or, conversely, manifested a belief in the desirability of party strife. The practical differences between the ministries were, however, grossly exaggerated. The personal rivalry of Briand and Caillaux dramatised the conflict.

The short-lived ministry of Monis (who replaced Briand) aroused the violent hositlity of the Right.[3] Despite the moderation of the leading ministers,[4] Caillaux as minister of

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1. J.O., 27th June 1910. pp. 2295-2301.

2. J.O., 24th February 1911. 258 votes to 242.

3. The ministry lasted from 2nd March to 23rd June 1911.

4. Monis, although he subsequently joined a radical group, was an aggressive opponent of the first all-radical cabinet of Léon Bourgeois in 1895 since which time he had been very cautious. Berteaux (the minister of War and the most influential man in the cabinet)had been a strong anticlerical but Bonnefous alleges that certain sections of the Right would have supported him for the presidency in 1913. Bonnefous was given this information by de Mun. See G. Bonnefous, Histoire politique

Finance was sufficient to cause this hostility although the ministerial declaration was even more equivocal about income tax than Briand's.[1] When the cabinet appeared before the Chamber it was attacked by the Right.[2] Jules Delahaye (Indépendants) concentrated mainly on Caillaux whose interests in Crédit foncier égyptien and Crédit foncier argentin appeared scandalous to him.[3] For Delahaye the moderate men of the Monis cabinet were still the representatives of "the Revolution." Paul Beauregard (Progressiste) said that one must await acts before passing judgement on the government but it had been formed against the usual parliamentary rules (Briand had not been forced to resign by an adverse vote) to resurrect a policy condemned by the current legislature.[4]

The charge that the government was associated with revolutionary socialism was made by Léon Bérard (Républicain de Gauche)[5] as well as by speakers of the Right. It was not supported by the behaviour of the Socialistes Unifiés - seventy

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de la III République. Vol. I. 1956. p. 232.

1. See J.O., 6th March 1911. p. 979.

2. The socialist interventions in the debate, made by Colly and Sembat, advised rather than attacked the government although their language could have been interpreted as hostile.

3. J.O., 6th March 1911. pp. 980-982.

4. Ibid. pp. 986-987.

5. Ibid. p. 981.

out of seventy-three of whom abstained on the vote of confidence. Nearly all the opposing votes came from the progressistes and further to the Right.[1] The situation of the Combes epoch was revived; the alternative to Briand was clearly posed.

The alternative combinations (those of Poincaré, Briand, Barthou as against Monis, Callaux and Doumergue) did not present radically different cabinets. There were fewer radical socialists but the same men often held the key posts. Outstanding men such as Caillaux, Malvy, Briand and Poincaré, who held controversial views on general policy, set the tone of cabinets although they did not necessarily hold the chief offices. All deputies had definite personal reactions to them.[2]

The Right reacted against the ideas of Caillaux for very much the same reasons that it reacted in favour of those of Briand. Caillaux claimed that the radical party was "l' expression même de la démocratie française" and that the policy of trying to realise "l'union de tous les français"

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1. J.O., 6th March 1911. The cabinet received a majority of 309 votes to 114. Two progressistes voted for the cabinet, fifty-seven voted against (amongst whom was Thierry) and sixteen abstained (eleven belonged to Union Républicaine).

2. For example, on the credit for the new under-secretaryship of Justice to which Malvy had been appointed. This post was unanimously approved in principle but Jules Roche whilst stating his approval said he would vote against the credit, because he disapproved of Malvy (J.O., 21st March 1911. p.1346). Altogether 103 members of the Right of the Chamber voted against it . If the occupant of the post had been anyone else the Chamber would not have divided.

was "une veille antienne" which was both chimerical and dangerous; the struggle between the party of progress and the party of reaction was still the major issue of politics.[1] These ideas implied the revival of old quarrels and of the bloc des gauches. If they prevailed the progressistes would stand no chance of participating in or supporting a moderate government.

Caillaux's ministerial declaration contained nothing new or "dangerous". The attitudes of the prime minister were conveyed by the way he expressed himself rather than by his formal engagements.[2] The debate on the declaration was quiet except for a stir created by Buisson (Radical Socialiste) on the inadequacy of the government's engagement on electoral reform.[3] The government received a vote of confidence of 367 votes to 173. The socialists and the Right (with the exception of a few mavericks in the groups Progressiste and Union Républicaine) combined to form the minority.[4]

Although initially the Caillaux cabinet was faced by opposition from both Right and Left (usually fatal) it fell

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1. These points were made in a speech at Saint-Calais (Sarthe) - le Temps, 6th November 1911.

2. J.O., 30th June 1911. pp. 2536-2537.

3. Ibid. pp. 2537-2541.

4. J.O., 30th June 1911. The minority was composed of 71 Socialistes Unifiés, 46 members of the groups Union Républicaine and Progressiste, 25 of Action Libérale, 18 of Droites and 13 of Indépendants.

through internal dissension. As Caillaux's foreign policy was discredited it was natural that a man representing a different foreign policy should replace him. After approaching Bourgeois and Delcassé the president of the Republic chose Raymond Poincaré.

Poincaré had a revanchard past and (partly because he came from Lorraine) was regarded as the epitome of patriotism. He gave the impression that he was not soiled by the system. Only once in office since 1896 and then only for a few months, he had resigned because he could not keep his election promise of "ni impôts nouveaux, ni emprunts nouveaux"; this action was applauded by the Right.[1] His record and reputation as a careful, conservative financier gave him admirers, if not partisans on the Right. His almost complete abstention from politics during the "Affair" and the Separation crisis helped him. But although out of sympathy with anticlerical sectarianism he regarded the lay laws as sacred. In public he was not prepared to associate with anyone tainted with clericalism although in private he was prepared to make concessions to religious sentiment.[2]

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1. See la Presse, 3rd November 1906.

2. See F. Payen, Raymond Poincaré. 1936. pp. 389, 406-407. J. Caillaux, Mes Mémoires. 1942-1943. Vol. III. p. 34. G. Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency. Berkeley 1942. p. 56. for details of the concession made by Poincaré over the religious celebration of his marriage.

Poincaré's ministerial declaration commenced with the affirmation that the duty of the government was to group all sections of the "Republican party" under the banner of national sentiment:

> Pour réaliser cette union, nous n'avons eu qu'à suivre l'exemple du pays qui, toujours indifférent aux questions de personnes, doit, aux heures difficiles, s'élever sans peine à la claire compréhension de l'intérêt public. 1

This was an appeal, popular on the Right, to the pays réel. Although no member of the Right participated in the cabinet (in composition, the Caillaux cabinet extended as far to the Right), this kind of language made it possible for members of the Right to support it. Poincaré promised strong government and close attention to national defence; domestic policy appeared of secondary importance. Defence of the école laïque was the only item which provoked a protest from the Right. The protestor, Paul Beauregard (Progressiste), approved wholeheartedly of the rest of the programme and concluded by saying "Le pays adopte notre programme."[2] Millevoye (Indépendants) said the nationalists would support the government as long as it governed in the spirit of its declaration.[3] Albert de Mun in l'Echo de Paris extolled the

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1. J.O., 16th January 1912. p. 11.
2. Ibid. p. 14.
3. Ibid. pp. 14-15.

"noble language" of Poincaré[1] and even the most extreme newspapers praised Poincaré although with reservations.[2]

The cabinet received an impressive vote of confidence - 440 votes to 6.[3] Only one hostile vote came from the Right but there were many abstentions.[4] Few members of the Right wanted to create difficulties for Poincaré and they almost ceased to be an opposition.

Members of the Right were reticent about defining their attitudes towards Poincaré probably because they did not want to embarrass him. There were three main reasons for this silent, and generally unavowed support. The first was an awareness of external danger. Albert de Mun was particularly influenced by this.[5] The second was that a successful attack from the Left would have led to a Caillaux administration.

In fact, Caillaux attempted little whilst he was in power but

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1. 20th January, 24th February, 11th and 18th March 1912. Piou on the other hand, was silent, not wishing to support a government publicly which offered no hope of concessions on religious policy; his attitude was one of "réserve sympathique". J. Piou, D'une guerre à l'autre. 1932. p. 262.

2. Arthur Meyer in le Gaulois was the most enthusiastic supporter of Poincaré. He later became disillusioned when Poincaré, as president of the Republic showed no inclination to extend his constitutional powers.

3. J.O., 16th January 1912.

4. 7 Progressiste, 14 Action Libérale (including de Mun and Piou), 16 Droites and 11 Indépendants.

5. According to Piou, de Mun was the leader of the pro-Poincaré sentiment on the Right. See J. Piou, op. cit. p. 263. J. Piou, Albert de Mun. n.d. p. 334. J. Caillaux, op. cit. Vol.III. pp. 24, 33-34. Two letters written by de Mun during the period of the presidential election show his close identification with Poincaré's cause. F. Payen, op. cit. pp.389-392.

but they feared he might embark on far-reaching reforms in order to capture popular support. A third reason was that the organisations of the Right were in decay and the leaders of the Right felt impotent.

A speech by Paul Beauregard at the 1912 congress of the Fédération Républicaine illustrates this feeling of impotence. He was pessimistic in the extreme and saw no hope of improvement in the political situation. He sought to maintain morale by representing the progressistes as unchanging and rock-like amidst the chaos:

> Quand le pays, qui nous a quittés au moment de l'invasion de la formidable vague radical socialiste, voudra nous revenir, il n'aura pas de peine à nous trouver: même nom, même idées, même place. Nous n'aurons pas changé. 1

Roche and the older progressistes shared Beauregard's attitudes but they were opposed at the same congress by Joseph Thierry who favoured co-operation with the Centre. The difference of opinion was not forced into the open;[2] if it had been the Fédération would probably have collapsed.

Action Libérale Populaire was also in decline and just when nationalist sentiment was spreading there was no nationally important nationalist party. The Ligue de la Patrie

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1. Compte rendu du congrès de la Fédération Républicaine, 1912. p. 37.

2. Thierry used veiled phrases in his attack. See particularly Compte rendu du congrès de la Fédération Républicaine. 1912. p. 37.

Française went out of existence in 1912 and Déroulède's Ligue des Patriotes had few followers and negligible parliamentary contacts until Maurice Barrès became president in 1914. There were feuds between the new men of Action Française and the traditional monarchists. The violent campaign by Action Française to oust Larègle from the pretender's entourage in 1910 showed how deep the differences were. The two wings of bonapartism reached agreement in 1911, but this seemed almost an admission that the cause was lost.

The organisations of the Right were, therefore, in far worse condition than in 1905. They and their leaders had been discredited by successive electoral defeats. Only Action Française seemed likely to have a prosperous future, but few parliamentarians took it seriously at this time.[1]

In 1912 the idea that national unity was necessary to face external danger was beginning to triumph and the Right regarded this idea as its own. As there was no organisation or outstanding man of the Right to take advantage of this idée conquérante, the Right looked outside its own ranks for a national leader.[2] They chose Poincaré not only because they approved of certain of his attitudes but also because they were in a mood to clutch at straws.

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1. E. Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905-1914. Berkeley 1959. p. 64.

2. There were many other examples of this - Boulanger, Millerand, Caillaux, Daldier, Pétain, Laval and de Gaulle.

Inevitably there was some friction.[1] Electoral reform was its most important source.[2] Poincaré was favourable to proportional representation but if he had accepted it he would have had to depend for his majority on the extreme Left and the Right as was shown in the vote on an amendment by Jaurès. Poincaré went to the committee to explain his problem. He argued that the Jaurès amendment was not passed by a majorité Républicaine and that his government could not possibly accept an electoral reform unless supported by such a majority. When Charles Benoist (Progressiste) protested Poincaré rebuffed him in a celebrated exchange.[3] Poincaré obviously preferred

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1. For example, there were objections to the presence of Millerand at the War Office. L'Echo de Paris, 14th January 1912.

2. For the views of the parties and the debates on proportional representation of this period see E. Alden Brown, The French Parties and the Electoral Law, 1871-1956. Thesis, Columbia, 1957. Especially pp. 94-188.

3. The main point of this exchange was:
M. le Président du conseil: ..... sachez que je n'ai jamais été armé contre les républicains.
M. Charles Benoist: De vous à moi, il n'y a pas tant de difference.
M. le Président du conseil: De vous à moi, il y a toute l'étendue de la question religieuse.
Compte rendu de la commission du Suffrage universel, 5th March 1912.
There was a strong implication in Poincaré's words that to be a real Republican one must be an anticlerical. His attitude upset the Right, particularly de Mun. See A. de Mun, Pour la Patrie. 1912. p. 218. But no member of the Right suggested that Poincaré was deliberately trying to revive sectarian anti-clericalism.

an open break with Benoist and his friends rather than with the Radicals. But neither the progressistes nor the rest of the Right broke with Poincaré.

The latter carried out a clever political manoeuvre,[1] passing the initiative on electoral reform from the committee (dominated by Jaurès and Benoist) to the government. At the same time, he made it practically impossible to question the respectability of his majority, to accuse him of dependence on the Right. This was done without alienating the Right which showed sympathy for Poincaré's difficulties.

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1. The outlines of this manoeuvre were these: Early in June Poincaré accepted a radical motion to withdraw the committee's bill and promised to introduce a government bill for the consideration of the majorité Républicaine. He said that his government was unanimous in rejecting the existing system. His cleverly worded statement united all but the extreme proportionalists and those who thought that any reform was dangerous to the Republic. When the government's bill was presented in July, the anti-proportionalists declared it unacceptable and tried to wreck it by proposing the suppression of the quotient électoral. This was rejected and the government announced that it had received a majorité Républicaine. It excluded the Socialistes Unifiés and included the progressistes in this majority. The radicals introduced an order of the day inviting the government to proceed with electoral reform with the support of the majorité Républicaine of both Chambers, implying that the government had not had this majority on the previous motion. Poincaré called on the Chamber to decide whether this was so - thus admitting that an arithmetical majority was the only significant one.
The government on subsequent occasions needed Rightist votes during the debate of its bill.

The Poincaré cabinet lasted exactly a year. The prime minister made no concrete concessions to the Right yet retained its goodwill. The key to his success lay in his clever handling of the electoral reform issue, in his reticence on income tax and, most important, in his statements on foreign affairs. Suggestions that France should be ready for war[1] and that Russia could count on France if she was forced to go to war in the Balkans[2] appealed to nationalist and militarist sentiment. They also gave the impression that French interests and prestige were being purposefully defended.

Briand succeeded Poincaré when the latter was elected to the presidency of the Republic. He said in an interview that he intended to follow Poincaré's policies.[3] Before he presented his ministry to the Chamber the radicals adopted a hostile attitude[4] which provoked an outburst of sympathy for him in certain newspapers of the Right.[5] Only one member of

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1. In a speech at Nantes, October 1912. R. Poincaré, Au Service de la France. 1926-1932. Vol. II. pp. 281-282.

2. J.O., Sénat, 21st December 1912. p. 1595.

3. L'Echo de Paris, 22nd January 1913.

4. Ibid. for the resolution passed by the radical socialist group of the Chamber.

5. L'Echo de Paris (22nd January 1912) accused the radicals of thinking of défense laïque before défense nationale and said that they had given Briand an admirable opportunity to show that he was really a man of "réalisations nationales." Arthur Meyer (le Gaulois, 22nd January 1912) greeted the new ministry with satisfaction and progressiste opinion was favourable: "M. Briand nous paraît avoir fort bien compris les nécessités de l'heure présente." La République Française, 22nd January 1912. L'Eclair (22nd January) was reserved and la Libre Parole and

the Right - Jules Delahaye (Droites) - voted against Briand when he presented his ministry.[1] Briand fell as a result of an adverse vote of the Senate on the government's electoral reform bill; most right-wing Senators voted for the government.[2]

The main point of the declaration of the Barthou cabinet was the bill to extend military service from two to three years, (which had been proposed by Briand on 6th March).[3] The government had to answer only one interpellation - that of Franklin-Bouillon (Radical-Socialiste) concerning the composition of the cabinet. He objected to the presence of Joseph Thierry (Union Républicaine) in the cabinet on the grounds that this was a compromise with reaction.[4] No member of the Right intervened in the debate.

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la Gazette de France (22nd January) were distrustful. L'Autorité (22nd January) was frankly hostile although it had been a supporter of Poincaré: "C'est, prétend-on, le 'ministère national' dont on a complété les vacances. M. Briand s'est de son propre aveu, ingénié à chercher les hommes et les personalités qui puissent réaliser le maximum de concentration. Il paraît assez mal réussi."
Thus Briand, although he was the official heir of Poincaré, heading a similar ministry and proclaiming the same programme, could not be acclaimed with the same degree of unanimity and fervour as his predecessor.

1. J.O., 24th January 1913. The remainder of the Groupe des Droites and ten Liberals abstained.

2. J.O., Sénat, 18th March 1913. In a letter to Denys Cochin (5th March 1913), Albert de Mun outlined the tactics which most of the Right were pursuing at this time. He suggested that there should be no "adventures" and that "Il faut à tout prix éviter Caillaux, et tout ce qui divise les voix anti-radicales lui profite." Cochin MSS.

3. J.O., 25th March 1913. p. 1184.

4. Ibid. pp. 1185-1188. He was supported by Thalamas (pp.1190-

The press of the Right was enthusiastic about the three years bill but non-committal about Barthou and his cabinet.[1] The Catholics were mainly responsible for reservations about Barthou. He was sometimes an aggressive exponent of laïcité and for this reason fewer Liberals voted for his government when he presented it to the Chamber than had voted for the Poincaré and Briand administrations.[2] The decision of the government to allow the discussion of a proposal for the defence of the école laïque was criticised by the Right,[3] which scented a radical plot to embarrass the government and prevent the passage of the three years law.[4] Piou regarded as a deliberate insult to the Right Barthou's refusal, in the committee on the three years law, to give instituteurs instructions to teach children their duties towards God. Barthou did not attempt to be conciliatory on the religious issue, seeming to desire a barrier between himself and the Right.

The majority of the Right were not sufficiently irritated to pursue the politique du pire after the passage of the three

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1191) and Viollette (pp. 1188-1190) (both Républicain Socialiste).

1. Only la République Française (23rd, 26th March 1913) was explicitly favourable to the new prime minister.

2. Ten voted for the government, one against and nineteen abstained (including Piou and de Mun). J.O., 26th March 1913.

3. See supra Section II. p. 145.

4. Barthou categorically denied this and made strongly worded declarations of his lay principles. J. Rocafort, Les Résistances à la politique de Pie X. 1920. p. 164. L'Univers, 27th September 1913.

years law; they wanted to ensure its application. But, in the chain of events which led to the downfall of Barthou, the Liberal leaders were accused of the politique du pire. On the government's request for a loan to finance the cost of the military reform[1] de Mun and Piou helped to elect a hostile rapporteur and they, together with two other Liberals, Joseph Denais and Ernest Lamy and Baudry d'Asson (Droites), voted against the loan when it came before the Chamber.[2] They were accused of wanting the three years law but seeking to evade the cost - a charge which Piou indignantly denied, saying that he thought the cost should be borne by the wealthy.[3] The government fell when it lent its support to an amendment giving perpetual immunity from taxation on the interest of the loan.[4] The Right unanimously supported the government.

Le Temps said that overturning Barthou to open the way for a radical government was not a glorious exploit.[5] Another writer suggested that Piou and de Mun should have withdrawn from the leadership of Action Libérale because they were in disagreement with their rank and file on an issue of the first

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1. Le Temps, 3rd December 1913.
2. J.O., 1st December 1913. It was passed by 290 votes to 271.
3. J.O., 28th November 1913. p. 2662.
4. J.O., 2nd December 1913. The amendment was defeated by 290 votes to 265.
5. Le Temps, 3rd December 1913.

importance.[1] But probably they voted not against Barthou but against the proposal under consideration. Their expressed opinions on the Fédération des Gauches, the new party formed in December 1913 by Briand, Barthou and Millerand, suggests they were innocent of the politique du pire.[2]

Doumergue, Barthou's successor, was greeted badly by the Right.[3] He promised, on Poincaré's insistence, to maintain the three years law but there were three aspects of his government which made it impossible for the Right to support it. All but two ministers belonged to the radical groups; Caillaux was minister of Finance; and Doumergue insisted that he was a Republican of the Left, his ministry was one of the Left and he wanted support only from men of the Left.[4] No

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1. M. Ponthière, Les Partis de la droite. 1914. p. 40.

2. De Mun wrote (l'Echo de Paris, 15th December 1913) that Briand, Millerand and Barthou gave the country a hope of deliverance and that if they fulfilled this hope he was willing to be their "valet de chambre". Piou also affirmed his willingness to help them but with some traces of bitterness (l'Eclair, 18th December 1913). After Briand, in a speech at Saint Etienne, rejected support from the Right, Piou held his peace but de Mun was indignant (l'Echo de Paris, 26th December 1913). Piou and de Mun were strongly criticised by some Catholics for their attitude towards the new group, particularly by Jacques Rocafort who accused them of paying no attention to the interests of religion. It is indeed difficult to see why, if they voted against Barthou on religious grounds, they offered to support the Fédération des Gauches.

3. L'Echo de Paris described the ministry as one of ruin, discord and humiliation, born against the national will (9th December 1913) and forecast a violent reaction (10th December). Poincaré's reputation on the Right took a hard blow as a result of Doumergue's nomination. G. Wright. op. cit. pp. 101-102.

4. J.O., 11th December 1913. p. 3755.

member of the Right voted for the government when it was presented to the Chamber.

There was an unusual expression of opposition from the Right in the Senate when, on 16th December, Gaudin de Vilaine[1] and Lamarzelle[2] (Droites) interpellated the government on its general policy, alleging that it commanded no majority either in the country or in parliament. Only the Right supported them.[3]

The hostility of the Right to the cabinet was encouraged by the introduction of two bills concerning lay education in January 1914 and by Caillaux's inclusion in the budget for 1914 of a direct tax on capital and income, The experience of the Doumergue cabinet was probably the cause of the outburst of irritated frustration by certain members of the Right just before the elections of 1914. Typical of this frustration was an article written by Jules Delafosse (Action Libérale) in April. He said that a Chamber rarely terminated its existence with the regrets or admiration of the people; the current one was no exception. It had been more like a club than a legislature[4] and the deputies were of a very low

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1. J.O., Sénat, 16th December 1913. pp. 1528-1531.

2. Ibid. pp. 1531-1534.

3. The debate closed with the passage of an order of the day of confidence by 201 votes to 50.

4. Comment and criticism of the République des camarades was made frequently by members of the Right. The sincerity of this criticism can sometimes be doubted but Renaud d'Elissagaray (Progressiste) attacked the camaraderie of the Chamber in his manuscript Mémoires (p. 130).

quality. Delafosse said that other régimes had committed faults but had never reduced government and politics to such a low level. He did not think that the elections would bring a change for the better.[1]

He was correct insofar as the results of the election made very unlikely the emergence of a ministry which the Right could support. Poincaré asked Ribot to form a government probably to show how impossible a moderate government was.[2] Although the Ribot cabinet was broadly-based (the prime minister was its most conservative member) and quite definite about its laïcité there was no chance that the Chamber would tolerate it. It was defeated on a radical order of the day which insisted that the Chamber could give its support only to a government which united the forces of the Left. No member of the Right either voted against Ribot or abstained.[3]

Viviani presented his cabinet to the Chamber on exactly the same programme as Ribot. But the reference to défense laïque was much more violent and this ensured the hostility of the Right. Many members of the Right were inhibited in their opposition because Viviani defended the three years law

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1. L'Echo de Paris, 6th April 1914.

2. According to Ribot, Poincaré asked Doumergue to advise him to call Ribot so that he could then call on a radical on the advice of a moderate and thus conserve his own prestige. A. Ribot, Journal et correspondance inédit. 1936. p. 10.

3. Ribot was defeated by 306 votes to 262. There were 114 votes of the Right in the minority. J.O., 12th June 1914.

although he had voted against it. Eighty-five out of the hundred abstentions on the vote of confidence were members of the Right. Only about thirty voted against the government. Most of the opposing votes came from the socialists who disapproved of Viviani's stand on the three years law.[1] Although his government claimed to unite the Left, the most determined opposition to it came from that quarter.

"Union Sacrée" 1914-1919: When war was declared union sacrée became the order of the day. The Right renounced opposition and even the right to criticise government policies. Although in the past defeat in war had led to a change in regime, the idea of reaction through defeat appealed neither to the parliamentary monarchists nor to Action Française. The reasons are plain. The country was very much in favour of the war; even the socialists could not resist the prevailing climate of opinion. In any case most of the monarchists were primarily nationalists. Also they probably realised that defeat in war was more favourable to revolution than to reaction.

No member of the Right in parliament showed the slightest

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1. J.O., 16th June 1914.

hesitation in supporting the war.[1] De Mun, Barrès, Delahaye and others quickly applied their talents to war propaganda. In spite of the loyalty and patriotism of the Right, Viviani made only one small concession when he reorganised his cabinet on 26th August 1914. He baulked at Poincaré's suggestion that he should include Denys Cochin and de Mun[2] but he selected Ribot as his minister of Finance.[3] Throughout the war only one member of the Right, Denys Cochin (Droites), held office[4] as opposed to three Socialistes Unifiés - Marcel Sembat, Jules Guesde and Albert Thomas.

It was difficult to organise parliamentary opposition to

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1. Outside parliament, Ernest Judet, the fanatically anti-British editor of l'Eclair was a possible exception. Accused in 1917 of contact with the enemy, he fled to Switzerland. After the war he published his apologia which contained such comments as ; "... la guerre, n'était-elle pas spécifiquement anglaise?" E. Judet, Ma Politique 1905-1917. 1923.

2. R. Poincaré, op. cit. Vol. V. p. 182.

3. Ribot was minister of Finance, August 1914 to October 1915, Prime Minister and minister for Foreign Affairs, March to September 1917, and minister of Foreign Affairs September to November 1917. Another moderate, Joseph Thierry (Gauche Démocratique) was under-secretary for Ravitaillement et Intendances July 1915 to December 1916 and minister of Finance, March to September 1917.

4. Minister of State, October 1915 to December 1916 and under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, December 1916 to September 1917. In spite of this meagre reward no word of criticism was voiced by the Right in public. In private, it was probably a different matter. Germain Bapst, a diarist, who frequented the salons of the nationalist and extreme Right, recorded criticisms of every government during the war except Clemenceau's. G. Bapst, Journal de la Grande Guerre. 8 MS. Vols. Brousse (Socialiste Indépendant) wrote to Renaud d'Elissagaray (6th June 1916) that: "On ne fait rien à la Chambre que comploter contre le cabinet!" He added that Viviani and Millerand were strongly attacked. D'Elissagaray MSS.

the government during the war. When the chambers re-assembled in December 1914, it was impossible for security reasons to interpellate the government on the conduct of the war. A different method had to be found to control the cabinet. The committees of the Chamber and Senate provided one method. Their meetings took place in private and they could summon ministers for questioning. Dominant members of committees could and did make trouble for governments. But when a minister evaded questions in committee there was no redress. Eventually secret sessions of the chambers were decided on; Senators and deputies could then demand information from the government in the normal way. But the very demand for a secret committee was an expression of lack of confidence in a government as well as of keenness to supervise the executive.

Viviani resigned in October 1915 after a demand for a secret session. The prime minister, saying that he could not supply the Chamber with any more information, made the rejection of the demand a matter of confidence. The Chamber supported the government by 303 votes to 190. This was just an absolute majority and Viviani did not consider the support adequate. Very few members of the Right failed to vote for the government; there were six hostile votes (all Indépendants) and five abstentions.[1]

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1. J.O., 13th October 1915. The abstainers were Dumesnil (Fédération Républicaine), Pomereu (Action Libérale), Baudry d'Asson, Lavrignais (Droites) and Fontaines (Indépendant). The

The Right maintained this standard of loyalty to the government in power. They had little responsibility for the reduction of Briand's majority which led to the reconstruction of his ministry in December 1916 and his resignation in March 1917. A majority of nearly 350 in June 1916, by December had fallen to 175. There was some defection of Right votes, but proportionately very much less than average. Eight members of the Right voted against the government on an order of the day of confidence on 22nd June 1916; on 7th December, eleven voted against the government and nine abstained (abstentions were taken as a much more serious mark of disapproval during the war).[1] Support for Briand was constant during his subsequent ministry.[2]

The Painlevé cabinet (13th September - 13th November 1917) was the only ministry defeated in the Chamber during

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opposers were Poirier de Narçay, Meunier-Surcouf, Lagrosillière, Fougère, Chappedelaine and Bienaimé. All except the first of these showed a tendency to be anti-ministerial throughout the war.

1. The opposers in June were Dumesnil, Taillandier, Vandame and Wendel (Fédération Républicaine), Bernard, Chappedelaine, Lagrosillière and Meunier-Surcouf (Indépendants).
The opposers in December were: Vandame and Wendel (Fédération Républicaine), l'Estourbeillon (Action Libérale), Bernard, Bienaimé, Chappedelaine, Deyris, Espivent de la Villesboisnet, Fontaines, Lagrosillière and Meunier-Surcouf (Indépendants).
The abstainers were Piou, Pomereu (Action Libérale), Baudry d'Asson, du Halgouët, Juigné, La Ferronays, Montaigu (Droites) Duboys Fresnay and Maurice-Binder (Indépendants).

2. On 27th January when the government received a vote of confidence of 313 votes to 135, seven members of the Right voted against the government and eight abstained; on 9th March the vote on a motion of confidence was 296 to 1. The hostile voter was a member of the Right and thirteen others abstained.

the war. On 13th November the government was attacked by Abel Ferry, Lémery (both Gauche Radicale) and Charles Benoist (Fédération Républicaine) for lacking adequate authority. Millerand also criticised the government which received only a small majority.[1] An incident then occurred which would not have mattered if the government had been strong.

Accambray (Radical-Socialiste), a persistent opposer of all war-cabinets, whose conduct during the first months of the war had been denounced by Ybarnégaray (Action Libérale) and investigated by a military tribunal, announced that the investigation had terminated in his favour and asked the government to state this officially. In spite of loud protests from the Right and an affirmation that the investigation was not closed, Painlevé made the announcement. Pandemonium broke out on the Right. When Painlevé asked for a fortnight's adjournment, it was opposed from the Left, the Right and the Centre, and defeated by 277 votes to 186. The Right, which with the exception of a few progressistes had supported the government in the previous vote, voted almost unanimously against it on this occasion. Eight voted for it and three abstained.[2]

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1. 250 votes to 192. It is unlikely that the government could have survived long with a majority as small as this.

2. The eight were d'Aubigny, René Brice, Lefas, Marin, Wendel (Fédération Républicaine), Kernier (Droites), Chappedelaine and Deyris (Indépendants). The abstainers were Escudier, Maurice Spronck (Fédération Républicaine) and Juigné (Droites).

The Clemenceau ministry which followed was easily the most popular of wartime ministries on the Right which gave it wholehearted support until after the end of the war. Many would willingly have followed Clemenceau in peacetime if he had given them any encouragement.

The Right as a whole only once used their votes against a government during the war and that was the Painlevé government on the occasion described above. Its members also were unwilling to oppose or harass in secret session when they were at liberty to do so. They intervened relatively rarely during these debates, often merely to voice patriotic sentiments or make extravagant suggestions such as that of Espivent de la Villesboisnet (Droites) to use the rails of the railway lines to make cannon.[1] Charles Benoist was the most frequent speaker and he was generally sympathetic towards the government. Only once did he ask direct and potentially awkward questions.[2] He received the embassy to the Hague after the war for his services. If members of the Right did criticise the government it was almost always on particular and technical matters. For example, in the fifth secret session (14th March 1917) Lucien Millevoye (Indépendants) criticised the aeroplanes

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1. Compte rendu du premier comité secret de la Chambre des Députés, 17th June 1916.
2. Compte rendu du quatrième comité secret de la Chambre des Députés, 26th January 1917.

in service, their utilisation and the programmes of aircraft production. Chappedelaine (Indépendants), in the same debate, criticised the scanty provision of aircraft to the Salonica expedition.

Once a deputy of the Right came near to launching a general attack on the government. Ybarnégaray (Indépendants) had taken part as a serving officer in the unsuccessful offensive of 16th April 1917 and had played an important part behind the scenes in ending it.[1] In the secret session of 29th June he described the pointless and bloody battle of April and said that the army chiefs who planned and executed the attack were entirely to blame. He accused those responsible for appointing Nivelle of bearing the heaviest responsibility. He was then challenged by Renaudel (Socialiste Unifié) to name the generals whom he thought should have been given command; he tried not to answer for a few moments but his interrupter was persistent and he was forced to admit that he thought Pétain should have been appointed commander in chief. All his attack finally amounted to was that the government had done the right thing too late.[2]

The Right's self-abnegating role of supporting successive

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1. A. Ribot, op. cit. p. 83. Colonel Herbillon, Souvenirs. Vol. II. pp. 68-69. Gordon Wright, op. cit. pp. 203-204.

2. This speech made a considerable impression on the Chamber. Letter of Georges Leygues to d'Elissagaray, 5th July 1917. (d'Elissagaray MSS.).

governments by word and vote throughout the war was the product of two attitudes. Firstly, the ideology of nationalism made a fetish of national unity; during wartime this meant standing firmly behind the government. Political opponents who differed from the government were described by the Right as bad Frenchmen and, in the cases of Malvy and Caillaux, as traitors. Secondly, all tendencies of the Right were, before the war, agreed in condemning "government by deputies". This attitude was carried over into the war; the general feeling on the Right was that the government should direct the war with the help of the Chambers but with the minimum of interference from them. When the Chamber from 18th to 27th July 1916 debated a proposal (which resulted from the secret session on the defence of Verdun) to strengthen parliamentary control over the conduct of the war, Louis Marin (Fédération Républicaine) and Jacques Piou (Action Libérale) strongly combatted this suggestion which was eventually passed only in an attenuated form.

On individual items of legislation the Right sometimes formed an opposition. This happened on two matters which had religious implications, the education of war orphans and the requisition of cemeteries.[1] Also on several occasions during the discussions of measures on rents, excess profits, the

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1. See supra pp. 150-151.

extension of accident insurance to agriculture and the utilisation of abandoned lands, the Right formed an isolated minority, being more extreme than the Centre in defence of the rights of private, particularly rural, property.[1] But the socialists found themselves an isolated minority far more frequently.[2]

During the war and until the elections of 1919, the Right behaved very much as regular supporters of the government had done before the war. Firstly, their remarks about the men in power were generally discreet and they showed their disapproval by withholding praise (as, for example, from the Painlevé ministry) rather than by any positive act. It was difficult to tell exactly what they thought of particular developments from their public statements, except on a few notable occasions

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1. The Right was in the minority on three occasions - 17th, 18th and 22nd April 1916 - during the debate on the rent moratorium; on 15th February 1916 during the excess profits debate; on 25th February, 25th April, 6th and 7th May 1915 during the accident insurance debate; on 21st, 28th April and 25th May 1916 during the debate on the reclamation of abandoned lands. There were other occasions when the Right formed part of a minority.

2. The exact number of times is difficult to calculate because neither the socialists nor the Right voted together and there were seldom either exclusively socialist or Right votes on one side of a division. During the war there were thirty-four occasions when the Right formed the majority of a minority and two hundred and twelve when the socialists did so.

such as the choice of Clemenceau to form a ministry which the Right plainly approved. Secondly, the Right (though, it would have claimed, for different motives) voted, like the pre-war ministerial deputies, indiscriminately for successive cabinets. Thirdly, when the sectional interests of members of the Right were involved in a particular piece of legislation, they were prepared to oppose it without attacking the government. Fourthly, when further support of a government seemed likely to have disastrous consequences they withdrew their support with dramatic suddenness.

There was, therefore, a change of role by the Right in parliament during the war. From 1899 to 1914 members of the Right had occasionally acted as an opposition which had temporarily ceased to oppose. Though their support was sometimes necessary it was not considered desirable; and they were constantly reminded of their "anti-Republican" character. But only once during the war did a resolution of the Chamber stigmatise part of the Right with anti-Republicanism.[1] The

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1. On 18th January 1918 the government was interpellated on a publication sponsored by Action Française which mentioned the royalist sympathies of some serving officers. Against the violent opposition of the extreme Right an order of the day was passed condemning royalist and other plots against the Republic.

government desired and required the support of all sections of opinion and those who supported governments consistently were naturally looked on with favour. Thus members of the Right were re-habilitated and once again treated as people with whom it was possible to co-operate.[1]

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1. The one minister of the Right, Denys Cochin, expressed satisfaction with his new role: "Mais voici! moi qui toute ma vie ai parlé, et été battu, j'obtiens aujourd'hui - en silence et sans gloire - des résultats. Deux grandes lois (pupilles de la nation et instruction militaire) améliorées. Arrangements avec Rome et heureuse affaire de blocus réglée avec Angleterre." Letter to Mme. Pierre d'Harcourt, 10th August 1917. Cochin MSS.

Social Theories

Few parliamentarians of the Right did much systematic thinking on the social problem. Their theoretical opinions have little importance except as a background to their behaviour during debates on strikes and social legislation.

Most of them shared three general attitudes. The first was a distrust of working class organisations. The Bourses du Travail, the Confédération Générale du Travail and the more militant unions met with deep antipathy. It was felt that they did not represent the workers' true interests or real desires; that their leaders had gained their positions by fraud and preserved them by intimidation; and measures should be taken against these organisations whenever there was a breach of the peace. Members of the Right nevertheless said that syndical organisation was desirable.

The second attitude was that violent revolution was imminent. In sober publications statements such as "nous sommes au début d'une révolution"[1] were frequent. Some writers were talking early in 1906 as if a revolution had commenced.[2] Members of the Right represented themselves as

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1. E. Saillard (Ed.), Annuaire de l'Action Libérale Populaire ..... 1904-1905. 1904. p. 37.

2. For example, Gaston Dru: "La Révolution est là ... D'un bout à l'autre du pays, les citoyens terrorisés et revoltés se tournent vers le gouvernement." L'Echo de Paris, 22nd April 1906.

the only alternative to "the Revolution"; in this alarmist posturing they were bidding for electoral support. But there was also a genuine belief that socialist ideas had gained an unfortunate ascendancy over the majority in the Chamber.

The third widespread attitude was that legislative interference in the economy was potentially dangerous. Here opinions varied considerably. There was, however, in 1905 general opposition to government monopolies, nationalisation, uniform restriction of working hours, compulsory state pension and insurance schemes, and direct personal taxation.

The progressistes were the most negative section of the Right in social matters. An opponent wrote that it was they, rather than the extreme Right, who organised opposition in the country to: "..... l'établissement des rélations plus démocratiques entre le capital et le travail par l'intervention de l'Etat."[1] Another said that they believed theoretically in progress but did not desire it.[2] They, much more than the Liberals or the extreme Right, stressed the economic status quo, and tended to regard the real division in politics as being not between monarchists and Republicans or Catholics and

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1. A. Vasse, Pour qui voter? 1910. p. 29.
2. Dubois (Socialiste Unifié). J.O., 2nd July 1908. p. 1489.

anticlericals, but between socialists and anti-socialists.[1]

The progressistes frequently invoked, without much logic or consistency,[2] the principles of the great Revolution to attack social doctrines, policies and organisations of the Left. They considered that a society was free only when men regulated all their economic relations with each other without interference. No progressiste asserted that in practice the State must never interfere but they were sometimes alarmist about the most trivial interventions.[3] All would have argued with Thierry:

> L'Etat bienfaisant et tutelaire, faisant la police de la misère comme celle de la rue, oui; mais l'Etat concurrençant l'initiative individuelle, non. 4

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1. See particularly J. Thierry, la Revue Hebdomadaire, 26th March 1910 p. 483 and Jules Roche, la République Française, 21st July 1907.

2. Edouard Aynard, in a speech to the Union du Commerce et de l'Industrie in 1907, claimed that one of the first principles and great achievements of the Revolution was the destruction of the castes and corporations of the ancien régime. But, he said, the freemasons had replaced the nobility, the instituteurs, the priests and the trade unions the corporations. Whilst condemning this state of affairs he demanded the corporate representation of industry, commerce and agriculture which produced all the wealth of the country and which were under-represented in parliament. La République Française, 27th November 1907.

3. Cf. the opposition of Thierry, Adigard and Beauregard to a proposal that industrial establishments should be required to post a notice stating working hours. J.O., 18th July 1908.

4. La Revue Hebdomadaire, 26th March 1910. p. 483.

What constituted both misery and competition with private enterprise was disputed. Jules Roche opposed hygienic regulations for the white lead industry[1] but such callousness was comparatively rare. Joseph Thierry worked hard to get the group to accept the necessity (and inevitability) of social reforms.[2] But certain progressistes, notably Jules Méline, refused to accept this necessity, and as Thierry regretfully remarked in 1910:

> Quelques-uns des plus éminents parmi les nôtres ne s'étant jamais départis de ces doctrines non-interventionistes, on nous avait représentés comme rebelles aux réformes sociales. 3

Thierry failed to persuade public opinion that this was not so. "Bourgeois, levez-vous, unissez-vous" - the injudicious slogan which terminated an article in la République Française (19th November 1909) - seemed more typical than his reasonable words.

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1. La République Française, 23rd May 1909.

2. At the congress of the Fédération Républicaine in 1909 he obtained the approval of resolutions in favour of an obligatory state pension scheme, the uniform application of assistance to old people, the drawing up of a labour and social security code, profit-sharing and insurance against sickness and unemployment. This was not a radical programme, although some newspapers of the Left simulated amazement at it. La République Française, 24th November 1909.

3. La Revue Hebdomadaire, 26th March 1910. p. 482.

Two progressistes, Charles Benoist and Jules Méline, could be regarded as serious social thinkers. Others - Edouard Aynard, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul Beauregard and Jules Roche - wrote frequently on social matters but their interests were primarily financial. These four opposed social legislation because it implied government spending and militated against a balanced budget. They were against Trade Unions because they promoted useless and costly strikes.[1] This dislike of unions was comprehensive and included even the Jaunes.[2] Their solution to the social problem was the maintenance of industrial peace, if necessary by strong police action, with the hope that discontent would disappear in the gradually rising prosperity.

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1. Roche, in particular, wrote many polemics against the unions (See especially: Le Syndicalisme et la servitude nationale. La République Française, 2nd April 1908; La Tyrannie syndicale. Ibid., 13th April 1908; and La Féodalité syndicale. Ibid., 14th April 1908). He joined in a demand made by Gauthier de Clagny (Républicain Nationaliste) and Pierre Biétry (Independent) that the C.G.T. should be suppressed. La Presse, 18th May 1907. He was not the only progressiste to advocate this course of action. The journalist, Louis Latapie, wrote an article entitled "Qu' attend-t-on pour dissoudre la C.G.T.?" (la République Française, 16th May 1908). Maurice Spronck wrote (Ibid., 7th February 1908) attributing the social troubles to "une poignée des aventuriers énergiques" who stirred up trouble in an era of exceptional material prosperity, and concluded that it was essential to destroy their organisation, the C.G.T. Paul Beauregard wrote (Ibid. 10th May 1907) that the C.G.T. acted outside the terms of the law of 1884 and legal action should be taken to dissolve it.

2. See the complaint of Pierre Biétry. L'Autorité, 6th November 1908.

Benoist, after a detailed enquiry into the coal, glass, metallurgical, engineering and textile industries,[1] concluded that the incompatability of the industrial revolution with the political institutions of the country caused the crisis of the modern state. He viewed with undisguised dismay the growing political power of the working class. This, he thought, could lead only to anarchy unless political institutions were made to conform to the requirements of contemporary social conditions. He saw the key to social peace in the readjustment of power relations in the political system and he sponsored many schemes for this end - proportional representation, corporate representation, a supreme court, a strong president elected by an enlarged electoral college, a reduction in the number of deputies and eventually (after the first World War) a monarchist restoration.

But he thought that particular remedies for bad social conditions were quite ineffective. In the nineties he studied the working conditions of Paris seamstresses and found them deplorable.[2] This reflected a genuine concern, common on the Right, about the conditions of women and minors in industry. Benoist did not, however, advocate reform by legislation and logically he opposed attempts to protect adult male workers.

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1. Ch.Benoist, La Crise de L'Etat moderne. 2 vols., 1905-1914.
2. Ch.Benoist, Les Ouvrières de l'aiguille à Paris, notes pour l'étude de la question sociale. 1895.

He asserted that employers should do what they could to improve the lot of their workpeople; it was a moral duty imposed on them, as another progressiste writer put it, by "l'obligatoire dévouement de la classe aisée à la classe laborieuse."[1]

Jules Méline, senator for Vosges, was formerly linked with the textile interest but by 1905 he was primarily the spokesman of agricultural proprietors. Father of the general tariff of 1892, both this and his other agrarian projects brought him into close agreement with the Liberal and monarchist Right. His general views (contained in Le Retour à la terre et la surproduction industrielle, Paris 1905) fascinate by their very perversity. He considered that industry could not expand at its current rate indefinitely:

> Nous n'allons pas jusqu'à dire que l'industrie descend, mais elle nous parît tout au moins à son apogée pendant que l'agriculture monte visiblement. [2]

He illustrated the expansion of industrial production with lavish statistics and argued that consumption must lag behind - citing, quite irrelevantly, the periodic slumps in the market for industrial goods and the phenomenal - and to him unnatural growth in the export trade. He prophesied that people would, through necessity, return to the land when industry ceased to expand.[3]

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1. Fournier Sarlovèze, Devoir social. 1901. p. 14.
2. Jules Méline, op. cit. p. 102.
3. Ibid. loc. cit.

Méline was a rigid determinist, believing in immutable economic laws. The first was that the "heavy hand" of the state should interfere as little as possible. In practice he advocated extensive state support for agriculture - high tariffs, legal safeguards for agricultural property, and government funded (but not government controlled) credit facilities, pension and insurance schemes. Legislation to protect the industrial worker was against the economic laws.[1] He was convinced that the workers would agree once they understood the implications of protective legislation. Ignorance led to socialism; the opposition of the interests of labour and capital was a myth.[2]

Bad prophets abounded on the Right but Méline was the worst of them. His thinking anticipated, in some respects, the autarkic assumptions of the inter-war period. His main appeal was to conservatives who were alarmed by the destruction of the old rural society by depopulation.

Socialism, for the Catholic Right, was "le gros nuage noir qui monte plein de menaces à notre horizon national"[3] but

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1. For example, he sternly denounced the eight hour day for the miners and attacked the agitation for a general ten hour day. He suggested that no law on the latter should be applied until and international ten-hour day convention was signed. La République Française, 17th May 1906.

2. Ibid. loc. cit.

3. Phrase of Mgr. Delamire, Les Catholiques et les élections de 1906. Périgueux 1904. p. 31.

Catholics were less hostile than progressistes to social reforms. The Church had always taught the virtue of social good works and Leo XIII asserted (in De rerum novarum) that the state had the right to intervene in the economy. A Catholic holding laissez-faire beliefs appeared disrespectful of papal teaching. A minority of Catholic politicians took the social teaching of the Church seriously and produced a steady trickle of social reform proposals.[1] The split between left and right, always apparent in French Catholicism since Lamennais, was present in parliament. The right, which was generally monarchist but also included de Mun and other

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1. In the four legislatures preceding 1906 Catholics had proposed measures on the following subjects:
1889 de Mun: the subdivisions of small rural properties; the restriction of working hours.
1892 Thellier de Poncheville: making marriage easier; protection of French working men against foreign competition.
de Mun: the working conditions of women and children.
1893 Plichon: stoppages in wages.
1894 Berry: vagrancy.
1895 de Mun: industrial conciliation and arbitration.
1896 Lemire: a compulsory day of rest; a ministry of Labour.
1897 Henry Cochin: the protection of children.
1898 Berry: co-operatives.
1899 Gailhard-Bancel: a referendum in Trade Unions on the form of old-age pensions.
1900 Ramel: miners' pensions.
1901 Dansette: old-age pensions.
1902 Lemire: extension of the rights of associations; compulsory national assistance.
1906 Castelnau and others: professional associations.

Liberals, was paternalist and still believed in a hierarchical society. The left was Christian democratic.[1] Jacques Piou stood between these schools. As president of Action Libérale he sought electorally attractive formulae. The Catholic syndicalists - Hyacinthe de Gailhard-Bancel and Georges Berry - had attitudes in common with both.

Official monarchist doctrine was necessarily defined by the pretender, the duc d'Orleans. In his opinion, the restoration of the monarchy was the only way to end the class war (which was the product of the pretentions of individuals[2]) and achieve a healthy society.[3] The monarchy would replace the class war by "l'harmonie des droits sous l'égide de l' arbitre souverain"[4]; it would favour "l'accession de l'ouvrier à la propriété" and the right of associations to own property (as well as their complete liberty in other respects, restricted only by the requirements of public order).[5]

Senator Gustave de Lamarzelle (Droites), discussed in

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1. A Christian democratic party had been formed in 1897, the prime movers being the abbés démocrates, Naudet, Dabry, Lemire and Gayraud. The philanthropic manufacturer of Val-du-Bois, Léon Hamel, lent his support. It was the first practical attempt to form a Catholic political party which rejected all ties with conservative groups.

2. La Monarchie Française: lettres et documents politiques 1844-1907. Preface (by the duc d'Orleans) p. 14.

3. Ibid. p. 261. Letter of duc d'Orleans to presidents of royalist départemental committees.

4. Ibid. Preface p. 14.

5. Ibid. Preface pp. 15-16.

more detail remedies for the social problem. He wrote that social and political leadership was inevitably the prerogative of a fairly restricted class.[1] He called for the creation of a new enlightened aristocracy from representatives of associations of people with common interests.[2] Following Acton, Lamarzelle asserted that only strong voluntary associations could resist the pretentions of the state.[3] Where they flourished, individualist, laissez-faire doctrines would have no place. The state could intervene in favour of those who were not protected by associations and pass legislation encouraging socially beneficial institutions such as a weekly day of rest. In the existing society such legislation was merely a palliative and could not solve the basic causes of social frustration and unrest.[4]

There were other monarchists, for example, Senator Emmanuel de Las Cases (Droites), who were open apologists

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1. G. de Lamarzelle, Démocratie politique, démocratie sociale, démocratie chrétienne. 1907. p. 26.

2. Ibid. pp. 29-30.

3. There was a strong suggestion that if the Revolution had not happened there would have been no social problem. Socialism was, he argued, a direct descendent of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Ibid. p. 25. The most effective way of combatting it was by means of voluntary associations which had been suppressed by the Revolution and had been under a blight ever since. J.O., Sénat. 12th November 1909. p. 899.

4. G. de Lamarzelle, op. cit. pp. 31-35.

for the old nobility of France and could not believe the lower classes able to order their affairs without the help of the autorités sociales.[1] Albert de Mun (Action Libérale) believed in the beneficent moral qualities of the old nobility to whom he was avowedly attached by upbringing and affection.[2] Unlike Lamarzelle he showed no faith that the representatives of the new power and wealth in society could ever form an aristocracy with similar qualities.

As a young deputy de Mun had caused misgivings in his own milieu by impassioned descriptions of working class conditions but he never proposed measures affecting the existing structure of society. Discovering the plight of the urban proletariat during the suppression of the Paris Commune[3] he wished to improve conditions by personal action and limited practical reforms. His ideas developed little after the programme of Saint Etienne (his most famous statement) of 18th December 1892.[4] It contained a mixture of

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1. E. de Las Cases, Les Autorités sociales dans une démocratie. 1903. Particularly p. 3.

2. He considered that it was illusory to attempt the reconversion of France without the assistance of the autorités sociales. There are often statements in his articles such as: "J'ai parlé d'abord du châtelain, parce que ma pensée est allée naturellement à cette population rurale ...." A. de Mun, Combats d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. 1911. Vol. II. p. 377.

3. See A. de Mun, Ma Vocation sociale. 1908.

4. The most accessible text is in abbé Gayraud, Les Démocrates chrétiens.1899. pp. 165-167.

claims for the poor and conservative formulae. De Mun demanded for the people their essential rights, disregarded by the régime individualiste. His legislative programme was contrary to laissez faire liberalism but he preferred private initiative to state intervention wherever possible. He believed as strongly as Lamarzelle in the importance of strong associations within the state. He was impressed by the growth of syndical organisation since 1884 and came to accept the predominantly class nature of the new development.[1]

Although by 1905 his thinking on social questions had become quite rigid, and the cercles ouvriers which he founded to bring the workers and the bourgeoisie into contact were all but defunct,[2] his ideas were still important. They probably commanded wider assent amongst the Right than ever before and they were a most important influence behind the social doctrines of Action Libérale (which, of the groups of the Right, had the most precise social programme).

Its basic dogma, as defined by Jacques Piou, was that laissez faire doctrines were evil and socialist doctrines

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1. Letter to Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française, 10th May 1903. Reprinted in Annuaire de l'Action Libérale Populaire 1904-1905. 1904. p. 48. De Mun had been anti-parliamentarian and a believer in corporate representation but by 1905 he had abandoned these views.

2. When younger men took over the cercles, they admitted their decadence. See E. Flornoy and H. Reverdy, Oeuvre des cercles ouvriers. Reims 1913. pp. 4-5.

perilous.[1] Piou saw the duty of his association in face of the "antagonisme grandissant du capital et du travail" to assist the restoration of "la fraternité dans les moeurs et la justice dans les lois." This duty would be accomplished by bills on working conditions, conciliation of strikes, limitation of working hours of women and children, pensions and civil rights of associations;[2] congresses, study groups and propaganda would play a complementary role. The local branches of Action Libérale were to create "secrétariats du peuple, mutualités, cercles populaires, caisses de prêt, jardins ouvriers."[3] To realise these things was difficult, according to Piou, because of the prevalence of evil doctrines; the dominant passion of the masses, "la haine créatrice", could only be overcome by reconversion to Christianity.[4]

Although workers' organisations should be helped, Piou denied that they needed tutelage from the bourgeoisie.[5] One of the first resolutions accepted by Action Libérale (at the congress of 1904) was the extension of civil rights of associations.[6] But a survey carried out in the branches of Action

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1. Congrès social de Pau. Compte rendu. Pau 1903. (hereafter Congrès social de Pau) pp. 223 and 225.

2. E. Flornoy, La Lutte par l'association. 2nd ed. 1907. pp. 86-87.

3. Ibid. p. 88.

4. Ibid. pp. 89-90.

5. Congrès social de Pau. p. 224.

6. Many members were probably more concerned with freedom for religious orders than for trade unions.

Libérale showed that many members were hostile to labour unions.[1] Most Liberal support came from rural areas and no important member had large interests in industry and commerce. This helps to explain the frequent recognition that wages were too low, and the occasional polemics against the power of money and high finance.[2]

On agricultural questions the views of the association were very much less progressive.[3] It was, for example, opposed to the extension of obligatory accident insurance to agricultural workers.[4] The flight from the land and the decline of agriculture was ascribed to the waning influence of the autorités sociales and of the rural bourgeoisie which had opened the way for revolutionary politicians and propaganda.[5] Unions composed entirely of landless labourers were condemned.

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1. By G. Maze-Sencier. Action Libérale Populaire, 4th-14th February 1906. On 19th July 1906 Action Libérale Populaire published a bill, signed by all the prominent members of Action Libérale, in favour of virtually compulsory unionisation; the aim was, in part, to show that the trade unions of the extreme Left represented a small minority.

2. See Piou's polemic against "l'argent ... le roi des temps nouveau". Congrès Social de Pau. p. 224. There was a tendency to disapprove of large capitalist organisation and a nostalgia for the small organisations of the past. For example, Joseph Massabuau. J.O., 8th May 1907. p. 933.

3. See G. Maze-Sencier, Les Cahiers agricoles de l'Action Libérale Populaire. Mende 1909. pp. 61 et seq.

4. Annuaire de l'Action Libérale ... 1904. p. 191.

5. G. Maze-Sencier, op. cit. p. 25. and G. Maze-Sencier, L'Amélioration du sort des travailleurs. 1906. p. 102.

Hyacinthe de Gailhard-Bancel, a prominent member of Action Libérale, spent a lifetime organising agricultural unions in the South East.[1] Although he subscribed to the usual plot theory to explain why working class unions were revolutionary,[2] he vigorously combatted the view that unions of necessity made war on employers.[3] He favoured officially consulting unions when their interests were involved or when their advice could be useful,[4] and encouraging them by legislation to engage in social good works.[5]

The Christian democrats affirmed that they were men of the Left and emphasised their democratic convictions.[6] But

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1. His major publications were: Quinze années d'action syndicale. 1900; Manuel des syndicats agricoles. 1907; Les Syndicats agricoles aux champs et au parlement 1884-1924. 1924.

2. He became convinced of it after a visit, with la Tour du Pin, to a local branch of a revolutionary union. Les syndicats agricoles ... pp. 52-53.

3. Congrès social de Pau. p. 18.

4. G. Maze-Sencier, L'Amélioration du sort des travailleurs. 1906. p. iv.

5. Within Action Libérale the main supporters of similar ideas were Louis Durand (president of Union des caisses rurales et ouvrières) who was not a deputy, and Joseph Massabuau whose constituency, like Gailhard-Bancel's, was in the Midi. They failed to get the legislative assistance for unions which they desired and after the crise viticole of 1907 they had to fight for the very existence of the agricultural unions which the government alleged had strayed outside their legal functions. They were saved by the Left which realised that a similar attack could be made on all unions.

6. Both Lemire and Gayraud were first elected to the Chamber against conservative opponents, the former against the rallié leader, the comte de Francheville, in 1893 and the latter against the monarchist comte de Blois in 1897.

they shared a certain kind of social radicalism with the extreme Right (which did not, like some progressistes, try to minimise the importance of the social problem[1]).

For the abbé Gayraud, as for de Mun, the social question was more important than political or constitutional matters.[2] His first concerns were the traditional conservative preoccupations, "la religion, la famille et la propriété privée."[3] He differed from his colleagues of the Right only on the methods of defending these things. He advocated a more equitable distribution of wealth on the grounds of Christian principle[4] (but he never explained how to achieve it). He was emphatic on the necessity of private property, including private ownership of capital goods, as a natural and necessary stimulant to human activity. He described common ownership as "le régime des peuples barbares et des sociétés informes."[5]

The abuses of the existing order were the result not of private property but of enslavement to machines and usury. In a parody of Proudhon he described the interest on capital as

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1. Examples of the seriousness with which the extreme Right viewed the social question are given in the speeches of Lasies (Nationaliste) J.O., 12th June 1908. p. 1175 and Dion (Nationaliste)J.O., 2nd July 1908. p. 1486.
2. Abbé Gayraud, Les Démocrates chrétiens. 1899. p. 118.
3. Ibid. p. 160.
4. Ibid. p. 14.
5. Ibid. pp. 52-53.

theft.[1] Usury was closely connected in his mind with Jews and he demanded a closer scrutiny of applications for naturalisation as well as "mesures repressives et préventatives de certains pratiques financières et commerciales."[2] The denunciation of money-power on the extreme Right sometimes resulted in a rapprochement with the extreme Left[3] but was more often associated with anti-semitism. The Left never made an indiscriminate association of Jews with capitalism. The tendency to make this connection identified Gayraud with the extreme Right.

Lemire described himself as "avant tout un homme d' action."[4] He advocated limited but useful schemes to help the poor.[5] His most successful venture was the Ligue française du coin de terre et du foyer which he founded in 1896.[6] In the Chamber he was concerned mainly with measures to help the family and related subjects.[7] His concept of the family was

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1. Abbé Gayraud, op. cit. pp. 62-63.
2. Ibid. p. 199.
3. See the Jaurès and Lasies speeches J.O., 15th June 1906.
4. Abbé Gayraud, op. cit. p. vii.
5. See his preface to G. Mény, Le Travail à bon marché. 1907.
6. After a time the ligue was exclusively concerned with obtaining allotments for working men. Congresses were held to discuss and co-ordinate this work (1903, 1906, 1909, 1912 and 1920 compte-rendus published in Paris, 1923 in Strasbourg). By 1926 (the date of Lemire's death) the ligue had provided over 56,000 allotments and under its stimulus other groups had provided even more. Ch. Droulers, Chemin faisant avec l'abbé Lemire. 1929. p. 159.
7. In 1894 he proposed a bill (taken up by Méline) to create a form of inalienable family property which a man could not sell

conservative and hierarchical; he had no sympathy with feminism.[1]

Both Gayraud and Lemire showed more goodwill than their colleagues to radical social reforms introduced to the Chamber but the sincerity of their social radicalism was never really put to the test. Anticlericalism separated them from the reformers of the Left and they emerged from the Separation crisis chastened and more cautious men.

Confused attitudes and views were expressed by the extreme Right. There was a certain rapprochement, already mentioned, with the extreme Left. One journalist of the extreme Right wrote:

> Décidement, les syndicats rouges sont de nos amis. A les entendre, on croirait le contraire; mais on aurait tort de juger les hommes sur leurs paroles: c'est par leurs actes qu'ils se font connaître. [2]

The extreme Right condemned the use of troops to put down strikes[3] and even to intimidate potential rioters on May

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without the consent of his wife and children - after delays and alterations it became the law of 12th July 1909. He advocated legal provisions to ensure an adequate salary for family men - le salaire familial (J.O., 15th March 1895) and bonus votes for family men - le vote familial. Ch. Droulers, op. cit. p. 139.

1. Ch. Droulers, op. cit. pp. 123-124.

2. L'Autorité, 10th April 1906. Maurras adopted a similar position in 1907-1908.

3. L'Autorité, 4th January 1907.

Day.[1] Employers were sometimes strongly urged to make concessions[2] and Mascuraud, the radical senator, when he made a speech containing conventional phrases of opposition to socialism and income tax was treated as a "bourgeois affolé".[3] But the opposite side of the coin was more frequently in view. There was always at least one member of the extreme Right to condemn the most innocuous social reform.[4] Violent attacks on trade unions were much more frequent than expressions of sympathy and common interest.[5]

Pierre Biétry was the only significant theorist of the extreme Right in parliament. His activities gave importance

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1. Henri Tournade (Nationaliste) in la Presse, 9th May 1906.

2. L'Autorité, 10th April 1906.

3. Ibid. 12th November 1910.

4. Jules Delahaye (Independent), for example, condemned the bill for a weekly day of rest which was generally approved on the Right. He called it a Jewish thing and suggested that employers should defy it when it became law. Ibid. 5th September 1906.

5. No parliamentarian advocated direct action against trade unions but the nationalist press looked favourably on the Ligue contre les révolutionnaires composed of petits bourgeois interests whose apparent object was to oppose violence with violence. La Patrie, 22nd March 1910. Georges Berry explained that the character of the revolutionary unions resulted from the personal interests of their leaders and sought to stimulate feeling against the unions by dwelling on the treatment of blackleg workers. He described those at Lens in 1906 as "les meilleurs travailleurs de la contrée." G. Berry, Syndicats patronaux, syndicats ouvriers. 1909. pp. 7-11.

to his ideas (which were the most obvious plagiarisms).[1]

He called his doctrines, developed in three books[2] and numerous articles, propriétisme:

> Les jaunes disent que les ouvriers et les paysans sont plus malheureux quand ils ne possèdent rien, et que ce n'est pas en leur faisant signer leur renonciation à la conquête de la propriété, c'est-à-dire en les rendant socialistes, qu'on les fera heureux mais en les aidant à conquérir, à acquérir la propriété. 3

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1. An ex-socialist, ex-watchmaker and former employee of the Schneider-Creusot works (where the "yellow" unions had first appeared in 1899), Biétry was founder (in 1903) of the Fédération des jaunes. The federation was supported by industrialists, in particular the protestant, Gaston Japy. Biétry had a brief moment of glory. He ran two newspapers, one in Paris and one in Brest; he was taken up by la Croix in the electoral campaign of 1906 and subsequently received by the Pope. Elected deputy of Brest in 1906, with the support of all the conservative elements of his constituency, in the Chamber he received considerable support from the extreme Right but the socialists would hardly let his voice be heard (e.g. J.O., 15th June 1906). The more important conservatives soon ignored him and he attacked them for political incompetence. L'Autorité, 6th November 1908. He held a number of successful meetings in the country and sometimes gained a wide range of support. Ibid. 8th April 1908. He received tentative support from bonapartists and monarchists when he founded the Parti Propriétiste in 1908. Ibid. 13th and 19th June 1908. He did not stand for re-election in 1910, saying that the Right had not followed his lead and was therefore an accomplice of socialism. La Voix Française, 7th January 1910. H. Rollet, L'Action sociale des catholiques en France, 1871-1914 Vol. II. 1958. p. 256. See G. Weill, Histoire du mouvement sociale en France. 1924. p. 425. J. Zirnheld, Cinquante années de syndicalisme chrétien. 1937. p. 144. Abbé Dabry, Ce qu'est Biétry. 1906. R. Warin, Les Syndicats Jaunes. Thesis 1908. J. Girard, Le Clergé, les royalistes et les jaunes. 1907.

2. Les Jaunes de France et la question ouvrière. 1906; Le Socialisme et les jaunes. 1906; Le Trépied. 1911.

3. Manifesto of the jaunes to the Russian people. L'Autorité, 29th August 1907.

He alleged that slaves had been emancipated, serfs enfranchised and all social progress achieved through the ownership of property.

The main points of his programme were property-ownership for the workers, the improvement of the lot of the poor by private initiative, co-operative and friendly societies and, in the last resort, by legislation; he also advocated the organisation of all workers into unions and the regional grouping of unions.

Biétry constantly had to defend himself against the charge that he was the lackey of capitalist interests.[1] His answer was that all progress and fruitful enterprise were the products of close co-operation between intelligence, capital and labour. Majority opinion did not consider that this was an adequate explanation of the way in which his movement was financed.

The writings of members of the Right reveal no common interpretation of the causes and cures of the social problem. In 1905 the different views of the major figures of the Right were peculiar to the Right - they were not held in the same form by members of the Centre. Under the impact of the great issues discussed in Parliament during the years 1906 to 1911 the originality and the sheer quantity of writings on the social question declined. They approximated more to the negative,

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1. He even had to defend himself against insinuations made by Clemenceau. J.O., 11th March 1907.

bourgeois, antisocialism of the Centre. Idiosyncratic ideas persisted but they were less frequently expressed.

Civil servants, railwaymen, and government intervention in industrial disputes.

Since the breaking of the postmen's strike of 1899 successive governments had adopted a policy of laissez-aller on the right of civil servants to form unions. Those which were already in existence were accorded grudging recognition but newly formed unions were not recognised. Clemenceau, in the name of the Sarrien government, reiterated this policy during an interpellation on 12th April 1906 concerning another postmen's strike.[1]

During this debate the orators of the Right were hostile to the strike. L'Estourbeillon (Action Libérale)said that he was:

> ..... hostile en principe à la création et à l'organisation de tout syndicat des fonctionnaires, parce que j'estime que ceux-ci sont contraire à l'ordre public et paralysent l' action gouvernementale, tout en compromettant les intérêts les plus respectables ..... [2]

Some of the extreme Right was not displeased to see the Government's inability to control its own agents and they voted against the government.[3]

During the debate on the next postmen's strike (March

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1. For description of the unions and government policy see M. Leroy, Les Transformations de la puissance publique. 1907. pp. 201-238.

2. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 1754.

3. The government's majority was 412 to 53. Most of the opposition came from the socialists but one Independent, ten Nationaliste, one Nationaliste/Action Libérale, and two Nationaliste/Progressiste also voted against the government. The great majority of the Right voted for the government without explaining why they did so.

1909) the orators of the Right again argued, mainly on practical grounds, against their right to strike. Jules Dansette (Action Libérale) was worried about the effect of the strike on the economy and also about the effects of any parliamentary encouragement for the postmen.[1] Gauthier de Clagny (Nationaliste) argued that the government was faced by serious internal and external difficulties and therefore should be supported in its conflict with the postmen (who, in any case, had no right to strike).[2] Joseph Lasies (Nationaliste) was opposed to the right to strike but thought the misdemeanours of the government more serious than those of the postmen.[3] The marquis de Rosanbo (Independent) said that the doctrines expressed by Clemenceau and Briand in opposition were responsible for the behaviour of the postmen.[4] Nearly all the Right voted against the right of civil servants to strike but a majority also voted against the government.

In May 1909 the postmen struck again and this time two members of the extreme Right came out openly in their favour. Jules Delahaye said:

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1. He was speaking on behalf of Cochin, Pasquier, Grandmaison (Action Libérale) and Lefebvre du Prey (Progressiste). J.O., 19th March 1909. p. 784.
2. Ibid. pp. 800-801.
3. Ibid. p. 783.
4. Ibid. p. 785.

> Je voterai ... pour le droit de grève qui dans l'état actuel des choses, n'est pas contraire à la loi, et qui est le seul moyen de légitime défense contre les abus et les excès ... 1

The marquis de Baudry d'Asson (Independent) went even further in his support for the principle:

> La liberté est due à tous, républicains, bonapartistes ou royalistes, elle est due à tous sans aucune restriction. Je vote donc pour les grèvistes, toujours au nom de la liberté. Je vote pour les grèvistes parce qu'au bout du compte j'ai applaudi leur mouvement. 2

Delahaye and Baudry d'Asson were joined by l'Estourbeillon (Action Libérale/Nationaliste), Rosanbo and Largentaye (Independents) in voting against denying civil servants the right to strike. Thirty-three other members of the Right abstained.

The postmen were the only non-industrial civil servants[3] to strike during this period but the instituteurs caused almost equal scandal by forming a union and affiliating to the Confédération Générale du Travail. During the debate on the government's counter-measures Alexandre Ribot (Progressiste) and Joseph Massabuau (Action Libérale) presented in great detail the two attitudes most prevalent on the Right concerning the unions of civil servants. Ribot categorically denied the right of civil servants to bargain with the government

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1. J.O., 13th May 1909. p. 1031.

2. Ibid. loc. cit. There was a more sophisticated defence of the fonctionnaires by the monarchist Firman Baconnier, La Revue catholique et royaliste, 20th January 1909. p. 69.

3. The right of industrial employees of the state to form unions in accordance with the law of 1884 and to strike was not contested.

and parliament. Although admitting that the standards of ministerial behaviour had declined Ribot did not regard this or any other reason advanced by the civil servants as sufficient grounds for allowing them to form unions. He was not alarmed by the possibility of strikes:

> Je ne me place pas au point de vue de grèves: je ne pense pas que les fonctionnaires soient très disposés à faire des grèves. 1

He was concerned by the other forms of pressure which unions could bring to bear on the government and parliament, especially at election time.[2]

Massabuau, like Ribot, placed the responsibility for the discontent of the fonctionnaires squarely on the shoulders of the ministries of the previous twenty years. Civil servants, he said, would feel no need to form unions if governments had always treated them justly and equitably. But if they thought they needed trade unions, they should have them because the right to form associations was the very essence of democracy. Massabuau made a distinction, which many of his colleagues rejected, between higher and lower civil servants, drawing an analogy between the latter and the industrial employees

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1. J.O., 14th May 1907. p. 990.

2. During this speech, Ribot (probably to guard himself against the charge of reaction) defended at great length the law of 1884, the liberal application of the law and the practice of the more "responsible" unions. On the other hand, he attacked the bourses du travail and demanded measures against the C.G.T. J.O., 14th May 1907. Particularly pp. 990-992.

of the state.[1] He demanded that the right of all civil servants to form unions should be recognised but that higher civil servants should form separate associations without the right to strike:

> Quel inconvénients peut-on y voir? La grève? C'est une véritable utopie d'une part d'un Gouvernement de croire qu'il empêchera une grève de fonctionnaires en mettant dans un texte qu'ils ne pourront faire la grève. 2

Massabuau and certain nationalists[3] voted for an order of the day asking the government to act with sympathy and understanding in its dealings with the instituteurs who had not been "instruits des limites légales de leurs droits." The majority of the Right refused to vote confidence in the policy of the government.[4]

Many members of the Right thought that the railwaymen's right to strike should also be restricted because the railways were an essential national service. During the debate in the Chamber on the great railway strike of October 1910, a progressiste, Paul Beauregard, a Liberal, Amedée Reille, and a monarchist, Fernand de Ramel, all affirmed their belief

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1. He pointed out the absurdity of a situation in which the arsenal workers were allowed to strike and the postmen were not. J.O., 8th May 1907. p. 933.

2. Ibid. p. 934.

3. Notably Barrès, Gauthier de Clagny, Lasies, Millevoye and Tournade.

4. Over half - 118 - of the opposing votes to the Maujan (Radical Socialiste) order of the day (which was carried by 323 votes to 205) came from the Right.

that the right to form unions need not imply the right to strike. Reille contradicted Colly (Socialiste Unifié) when the latter remarked that the right to form unions was meaningless without the right to strike.[1] Paul Beauregard sought to explain the distinction between the two rights by reference to the situation of the civil servants:

> A coup sûr, nous ne pouvons admettre la grève des fonctionnaires, et pourtant il est hors de doute qu'avec la loi de 1901 ils ont le droit d'associer,[2] c'est-à-dire, au fond, de former un syndicat. Cela met en plein lumière la distinction évidente qui existe entre les deux choses. 3

Ramel said that he strongly favoured the growth of unions, even those of the industrial employees of the state:

> Quant au droit de grève, c'est une question totalement différente. Il ne saurait s'excercer sans frein au détriment des services publics et de l'intérêt national 4

Little opposition came from the Right when the government intervened against strikers in the private sector of the economy. When Clemenceau threatened to call in the army to replace striking electricians in March 1907 only two members of the Right voted in favour of a hostile order of the day.[5] Joseph Thierry (Progressiste), the only orator to speak,

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1. J.O., 25th October 1910. p. 2565.
2. Beauregard does not appear to have defended this thesis before.
3. J.O., loc. cit.
4. Ibid. loc. cit.
5. Joseph Lasies and the marquis de Pins (Nationaliste). J.O., 11th March 1907.

praised the government's intervention in the seamen's strike of April-May 1910 during which the government had refused to recognise the seamen's union and had given orders for the strikers to be tried for desertion.[1] Since the seamen complained that foreigners were being employed at low wages on French ships, some of the extreme Right voted against the government.

Sometimes members of the Right criticised the government for not intervening actively enough in industrial disputes. Joseph Lasies (Nationaliste) argued that the government should have been more decisive after the mining disaster at Currières (10th March 1906):

> Dès que la catastrophe a éclaté, il s'agissait pour le contrôle de l'Etat d'entrer en fonctions, de ne pas seulement demander l'avis des ingénieurs de la mine mais d'imposer sa volonté, [2]

Georges Berry (Nationaliste), in a question addressed to the government, roundly condemned the government for not intervening actively enough in the lock-out by the building firms in 1908.[3]

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1. J.O., 8th July 1910. p. 2457.

2. J.O., 3rd April 1906. p. 542.

3. J.O., 10th April 1908. On the other hand government intervention was often blamed for provoking violence. A particular instance of this was the riot on 1st June 1908 at Draveil-Vigneux during which a striker was killed. Maurice Spronck (Progressiste), la République Française, 12th June 1908, Jean Argeliès (Progressiste) and the marquis de Rosanbo (Independent), J.O., 11th June 1908, accused the government of responsability. But only three members of the Right, Delahaye, Largentaye and Rosanbo (Independents) voted against the government.

The Right did not present a united front on the right to strike and on the great issues of principle such as the right of civil servants to form unions the Right did not form an isolated minority. The majority of the Right, although speaking more violently, agreed with the majority of the Centre. No motives of tactical advantage prompted their agreement, which was not confined to matters of principle.[1] Only three members of the Right, Baudry d'Asson, Delahaye and Lavrignais (Droites), voted against the most spectacular and controversial government intervention restricting the right to strike - the breaking of the railway strike by Briand in October 1910. The dissident members of the Right, who were generally extremists, were compelled to vote with the socialists.

There were, however, a number of issues on which the Right had very different views from the Centre. The Right was firmly convinced that political interference was partly responsible for discontent in the civil service. The postmen gave this as one of their grievances in March 1908. Members of the Right mentioned it on every possible occasion. For example, Massabuau (Action Libérale) accused the government of using positions in the post office as political patronage and of intimidating employees with heretical political views.

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1. On no occasion during the period 1906 to 1909 were the votes of the Right required to pass a motion which denied the right of civil servants to strike.

He quoted a report by the sous-préfet of Côtes du Nord demanding the removal of a postmistress because of her clerical views.[1]

The second major difference was the frequent recognition on the Right that wages and salaries were too low. Maurice Binder (Action Libérale) said categorically that the salaries of the postmen were far too low.[2] The marquis de l' Estourbeillon (Action Libérale) considered the "revendications des postiers ... absolumment justifiées."[3] Massabuau thought that the troubles were due to "une conception budgétaire absolument fausse du service postale"; a private enterprise would have been forced to utilise profits to improve wages and conditions.[4] But the solicitude of the Right for the poverty of postmen and others produced few practical proposals. The great majority strongly opposed any legislative attempt to regulate wages. A minimum wage amendment to a bill for protecting the silk industry received only a sprinkling of votes on the Right[5] and was attacked by progressistes both inside and outside the Chamber.

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1. J.O., 19th March 1909. p. 784.
2. J.O., 12th April 1906. p. 896.
3. Ibid.p. 898.
4. J.O., 19th March 1909. p. 758.
5. 2 Union Républicaine, 4 Progressiste. 6 Action Libérale, 6 Nationaliste and 10 Independents. J.O., 21st May 1909.

The Right mainly showed its limited sympathy for the working class in a more anodine way. It generally favoured amnesty proposals for those disciplined during strikes. In July 1906, during the discussion of an amnesty bill for those arrested for complicity in the May Day disturbances, the extreme Left tried to extend the amnesty to postmen not re-instated after the April strike. Maurice Binder (Action Libérale) spoke strongly in favour of this, asking the government:

> ... quelle espèce de motifs vous pouvez invoquer pour faire les facteurs de véritables parias auxquels vous refuseriez de parti pris le pardon et l'oubli. ... Nous n'avons pas à rechercher en ce moment, si les facteurs ont ou n'ont pas, auront l'amnestie, mesure d'apaisement, de clémence et d'oubli qui doit nous occuper. [1]

The motion was defeated by 349 votes to 127 and although the majority of the Right voted against it a significant number of the extreme Right voted for it.[2]

The aftermath of the riot at Draveil-Vigneux in 1908 provoked another amnesty debate. Jean Argeliès (Union Républicaine/Progressiste) introduced an amnesty bill on 23rd

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1. J.O., 10th July 1906.
2. The groups divided (counting twice those with dual membership):

	For	Against	Abstentions
Union Républicaine	2	46	1
Progressiste	4	70	2
Action Libérale	8	39	17
Nationaliste	14	9	4
Independents	5	10	17

December 1908; he described those demonstrators remaining in prison as:

> ... une femme agitée, un garçon de dix-huit ans jusqu'à là réputé bon travailleur; quelques ouvriers étrangers à la grève, dont la violence naturelle s'est revelée et exaltée au contact des évènements, dans l'agitation de leur milieu. 1

These were not, said Argeliès, the real culprits. The sentiment of the region he represented (in which the disorders had taken place) was favourable to the amnesty which would also help general social apaisement. Clemenceau secured the rejection of the bill by a very narrow majority - 245 votes to 237.[2] The extreme Right was more favourable to the bill than the moderate Right. Whereas there was a majority against the bill in the groups Union Républicaine and Progressiste, nearly all the members of Action Libérale, Nationaliste and the Independents voted for it.[3]

No general conclusions can convincingly be drawn from these and other amnesty debates because the Centre and probably the moderate Right feared a ministerial crisis.

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1. J.O., 23rd December 1908. p. 2935.

2. After rectifications there was a majority - 252 votes to 231 - in favour of the bill. Clemenceau introduced a government bill soon after the rentrée of the Chamber in January 1909.

3. The groups divided (counting twice those with dual membership):

	For	Against	Abstentions
Union Républicaine	4	32	5
Progressiste	26	34	4
Action Libérale	48	4	6
Nationaliste	26	2	-
Independents	28	3	3

However, quite apart from voting records verbal sympathy for workers who had, in some way, suffered from the effects of strikes were far more frequent among Liberals and the extreme Right than in the moderate Right and Centre. The latter had fewer illusions about the nature of working class agitation. The extremists believed that the workers were led astray by a small clique of conspirators and it was they who should be punished, rather than their misguided followers caught by the authorities.

The breaking of the railway strike in October 1910 underlined the limitations of the allegiance of rank and file unionists to their union. There were no more strikes with revolutionary overtones in the next four years. At the height of the syndicalist agitation the differences of attitude between the majority of the Right and the majority of the Centre were secondary. Even extremist demands such as the suppression of the C.G.T. found echoes in the Centre of the Chamber.[1] The basic aim of the Right and Centre was social peace and the preservation of the status quo. The wilder theories about the nature and solution of the social problem held by members of the extreme Right were scarcely heard in the Chamber during

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1. There were reports during August 1908 that the government was preparing to dissolve the C.G.T.

the four years preceding the war because few strikes were discussed. During and immediately after the war, the Right and Centre were agreed that strike action was immoral and against the national interest. The strikes of 1907 and 1919 found the Right solidly behind the government. The politique du pire, never practised by more than a small minority of the Right over questions arising out of social disturbances, disappeared entirely. Latent differences between the Right and Centre still existed but they remained unspoken.

The Redistribution of Wealth and Power in the Community

Three major pieces of legislation - nationalisation of the Western Railway, old age pensions and income tax - achieved some redistribution of wealth and power. They were also issues of principle almost on the level of the Separation of the Churches and the State.

The nationalisation of the Western Railway was the least important. Large state subsidies had been necessary since the company had commenced operating to meet running costs and the guaranteed interest to the shareholders. There had long been a demand for the rachat or nationalisation of the company on the grounds that it was unreasonable for the taxpayer to subsidise a private company indefinitely. This was not a revolutionary demand as the state had reserved the right in the original conventions with the railway companies to buy out the shareholders if this became necessary. It was pointed out in the debate of 1906 that the advocates of state run railways were not necessarily men of the Left and that conservative governments had nationalised railways.[1]

The Clemenceau government proposed a nationalisation bill and got it through the Chamber with a speed which the Right

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1. Louis Barthou. J.O., 7th December 1906. p. 2999.

considered alarming.[1] The debate was short - it lasted three days - partly because there was little well-established information and partly because the bill contained only one article stating the principle that the government would buy out the private shareholders.

Le Temps described the bill as "une oeuvre à la fois économique et politique."[2] The Right too condemned both these aspects of the bill. One very commonly expressed opinion was that it was "un apéritif",[3] opening the door to further interventions of the state in the economy. Louis Ollivier (Action Libérale) said that it was "la preface d'expropriations futures conduisant au socialisme d'état et à la confiscation de propriété."[4] Jean Plichon (Action Libérale) considered that it was "un incident de la marche générale vers la nationalisation de nos chemins de fer."[5] Hoping to cause divisions within the majority Louis Cachet (Action Libérale/Nationaliste) said that it was a most unpromising start for a general

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1. Paul Beauregard (Progressiste) described it as "plus que rapide." La République Française, 19th December 1906. Jean Plichon (Action Libérale) said "cette hâte ne me paraît ni raisonné ni raisonnable." J.O., 6th December 1906. p. 2939.

2. Le Temps, 9th December 1906. The newspaper looked, with foresight, to the Senate to correct the work of the Chamber.

3. Farjon (Progressiste). J.O., 5th December 1906. p. 2917. Also la République Française, 16th July 1906.

4. In an explication de vote made on behalf of twenty-five of his colleagues. J.O., 7th December 1906. p. 3010.

5. J.O., 6th December 1906. p. 2939.

reorganisation of society.[1] The other argument to which the Right attached even greater importance, probably to the detriment of their cause, was that the bill was an act of political revenge against the region which elected opposition deputies.[2] Paul Beauregard (Progressiste) said:

> ... la question nous apparaît essentiellement et peut-être uniquement politique. 3
> ... c'est parce que le parti qui a approuvé la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat a triomphé que l'on vous demande de racheter l'Ouest. 4

Louis Ollivier (Action Libérale) remarked that following the Separation so closely it looked very like a sanction taken against a certain section of the community.[5] Savary de Beauregard (Action Libérale) said that although he approved the principle of a state owned railway he opposed this nationalisation because it was motivated by political considerations.[6] The Right was afraid that the measure would increase the electoral influence of the government in the West.

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1. J.O., 6th December 1906. p. 2949.

2. The views of the "social powers" of the West had long been known. In 1900 an enquiry of the views of the chambers of commerce had been carried out and 101 of them had voted resolutions against nationalisation. In 1902 certain conseils généraux had also voted resolutions against it.

3. J.O., 7th December 1906. p. 2971. Savary de Beauregard (Action Libérale) went even further, interrupting Beauregard to say "Il n'y a pas d'autre question."

4. Ibid. p. 2978.

5. During a declaration made on behalf of twenty-five colleagues. Ibid. p. 3010.

6. Ibid. p. 3009.

The usual arguments against nationalisation were also advanced. It was alleged that the railway would be more costly to the community if it were nationalised,[1] that the services provided would be more expensive, and that the railway employees would become infected by civil service attitudes.[2]

The bill was voted on 7th December by 364 votes to 187. The opposition came from the deputies of the West and their friends who were nearly all of the Right.[3] It was an extended regional opposition, complaining of political persecution, rather than a laissez-faire opposition.

The vote stimulated rather than diminished the opposition press campaign. Paul Beauregard wrote on 19th December that the Chamber had voted "le principe sans occuper de la réalisation, elle l'a accepté le bandeau sur les yeux." He was convinced that the Senate would not do the same.[4] There were good grounds for his conviction. Opposition in the Senate was speedily organised. When it became apparent that

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1. The key argument advanced by Beauregard and others and subsequently taken up by the Senate committee was that since 1900 the subsidies required by the company had steadily diminished and would cease by 1910. The Left countered by allegations that the company was laying off essential staff and not doing essential servicing on the grounds that its future was uncertain.

2. Pierre Biétry (Independent) opposed the government's bill solely for this reason. J.O., 5th December 1906. p. 2928.

3. Only nine members of the Right - 3 Union Républicaine, 3 Union Républicaine/Progressiste, 2 Progressiste and 1 Independent - voted for; twenty members of the Centre voted against.

4. La République Française, 19th December 1906.

the Chamber was going to pass the bill, Emile Labiche (Union Républicaine), senator for Eure et Loir, organised a meeting of senators from the West which voted by 33 votes to 2 against the nationalisation.[1] The senate committee elected a hostile rapporteur, Charles Prevet (Progressiste) and started to hear representatives of the commercial associations of the West.

Nearly two years elapsed before the committee presented its report. Prevet led the opposition to the bill, saying that it would be less costly to continue the present regime.[2] Nationalisation, he stressed, was opposed by the deputies and senators of the West (and therefore the majority of the population) and was against the wishes of the merchants and industrialists of the West as expressed to the committee. Prevet also resurrected all the other major arguments used in the Chamber.

The extreme Right limited its intervention to brief interruptions.[3] This reticence was probably because the

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1. La République Française, 7th December 1906.

2. His argument was a strong one. The company owed more to the government than the value of its assets. The state was therefore buying a property which had no value. Moreover the state subsidy had declined from 25 million francs in 1901 to 6 million in 1906. Prevet alleged that it would be advantageous to wait for the concession of the company to expire. J.O., Sénat, 5th June 1908. pp. 717 et seq.

3. The press of the extreme Right repeated the old arguments. L'Autorité (17th June 1908) called the nationalisation "un coup de main sur les départements de l'opposition" and stated that the employees of the railway would become electoral agents for the government.

opposition received powerful support from the radical senators, Viger and Rouvier, who limited their attack to economic considerations. The debate in the Chamber had shown that the Right, by stressing the political implications of the measure, rallied the maximum amount of support for it. The orators of the Right could not present the economic arguments against nationalisation with the same authority as Rouvier (who had been a minister of Finance) and consequently wisely remained relatively silent.

The government came near to defeat when the Senate committee proposed the adjournment of the bill on 25th June 1908. The government made the rejection of this motion a matter of confidence. Even so its majority was only three. All the senators of the Right voted for the adjournment.

The principle of nationalisation was passed on 26th June after the government accepted the conditions that the procedure of the rachat and the subsequent running of the railway should be subject to special legislation. This delayed the execution of the measure by over a year.[1]

The vote of the bill provoked an outburst of rage in the newspapers of the Right. The progressistes were particularly

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1. It also prevented the creation of a precedent for the organisation of nationalised industries by administrative decree.

annoyed because they had been firmly convinced that the Senate would reject it. Jules Roche wrote on the day after the vote:

> La danse des millions va commencer, le Grand Livre de la dette publique va se rouvrir avec l'assentiment des représentants de la nation. ... Les électeurs contribuables ne peuvent plus compter sur personne pour défendre leurs intérêts et leurs droits. 1

The Ligue pour la défense des contribuables (Roche was president) continued attacking the nationalisation until the first World War. Action Libérale also campaigned against it.[2] The newspapers of the Right started to give prominence (in the same way as those of the Left for a number of years before the nationalisation) to accidents and inefficiencies on the Western Railway.

The nationalisation could not last long as a major political issue. No obvious injustice had been done. The shareholders of the company complained little about the transaction. The change of control of the railway - and this the Right feared most - probably affected adversely the power and influence of the "social powers" in the West in the long run. They had lost yet another political battle. But it was difficult to create an issue out of the political effects of the nationalisation because they could not be isolated.

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1. La République Française, 27th June 1908.

2. In 1914 Jacques Piou was still attacking the nationalisation and advocating drastic economies in the running of the railway. La République Française, 31st January 1914.

The delaying action fought by the opponents of a national system of pensions was impressive. The Chamber debated the measure in every year of the decade 1891-1901. But it was not until 1906 that a bill was passed and, as a result of Senate obstruction, it was not in effective operation before the first World War. Until 1906 the Right was unanimously opposed to a compulsory pension scheme but after the bill passed the Chamber there were important defections.

A number of amendments, proposed by members of the Right when the bill was before the Chamber, were designed to weaken the principle of obligatory participation. The last, proposed by Groussau (Action Libérale), was nearly successful. Groussau sought to gain privileges for privately endowed pension schemes.[1] He appealed directly to paternalist sentiments, saying that these privileges would encourage "la générosité naturelle de tant de familles."[2] His proposal rallied all those who preferred private initiative to state intervention to ameliorate social hardship. They included the Right and many members of the Centre particularly those who had interests in friendly society schemes.[3] The Groussau proposal was

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1. J.O., 23rd February 1906. p. 975.

2. Ibid. p. 976.

3. Those deputies most interested in friendly societies formed the comité directeur of the Groupe de la mutualité: Puech, Bussat (Radical Socialiste), Deschanel, Guist'hau, Réville, Abel Ferry (Gauche Radicale), Siegfried (Union Démocratique/Gauche Démocratique), Sibille, Bonnevay (Progressiste), Groussau and Vandame (Action Libérale).

defeated by 278 votes to 257.[1] It was the last stand of the opposition in the Chamber. The bill was voted shortly afterwards by 511 votes to 5.[2] Those who had criticised the bill preferred, in the last resort, to vote for it.

Jules Roche (Progressiste) led the opposition to the bill and after it was passed by the Chamber increased the violence of his opposition to it. In a typical speech at Rouen in 1906 he described the bill as objectionable because it was a product of "la conception socialiste". It was not the business of the state to interfere in the lives of individuals to the extent envisaged by the pensions bill:

> ... dans cette loi des retraites ouvrières ... est tout le problème politique et social .... travaillons tous ensemble à améliorer, dans la manière si faible où peut la loi, le sort des individus; faisons-le; mais n'oublions jamais que le rôle de l'Etat n'est point de faire à chaque individu sa vie propre..... 3

He also criticised the bill because it was restricted to the workers, who in his opinion did not want an obligatory scheme, and because it was impossible to ascertain accurately the number of people who would be eligible for the scheme, thus making its effects incalculable.

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1. Ten members of the Right voted against the amendment. 3 Union Républicaine/Progressiste, 1 Progressiste, 1 Progressiste/Action Libérale and 5 Independents (all of tendance gauche).

2. The five opposing voters were all progressistes, the most notable being Jules Roche.

3. Conférence de M. Jules Roche ..... et de M. Paul Beauregard au cirque de Rouen, le 1er avril 1906. Rouen 1906. p. 28.

The aim of the opposition after the bill had passed the Chamber was to weaken it rather than obtain its rejection. The opposition was helped by a fit of parsimony on the part of the government.[1] The bill introduced by Cuvinot (Gauche Radicale), rapporteur for the Senate committee, on 26th April 1909 was very different from the one passed by the Chamber. Although the government contribution to the pension fund envisaged was well above the maximum limit stipulated by the government in the previous year, Cuvinot was obviously much more afraid of criticisms from the Left than from the Right. He defended the bill at length against the charge that it was inadequate.[2]

Alexandre Ribot (Gauche Radicale) thought that this was the moment for a tactical retreat. He announced his adherence to the obligatory principle which he, in common with the rest of the Right, had combatted. The principle, he said, had become more generally accepted by public opinion and the Belgian scheme which had been in operation since 1900 had worked well.[3] He advised caution in the application of the

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1. On 16th February 1908 the government informed the Senate committee that the government contribution to the scheme should not exceed 100 million francs annually. The Senate committee replied that the existing bill was impractical in these conditions (J.O., Sénat, 13th February 1908. pp 139-140) and although the government conceded that this need not be regarded as an absolute maximum, the Senate committee adhered to its opinion.

2. J.O., Sénat, 4th November 1909. pp. 840 et seq.

3. Audiffred (Gauche Radicale) J.O., Sénat, 9th November 1909. p. 876 and Jules Roche denied that there was any parallel with the Belgian system.

measure and suggested that the capital of the pension fund should be widely placed to assist French industry and not increase "cette mainmise de l'Etat sur la vie économique du pays."[1]

One of the leading Catholic senators, Raoul Ancel (Droites), also accepted the committee's bill. He had reservations about it but recognised that the features he regarded as faults were necessary concessions to the majority in the Chamber:

> Ce à quoi je tiens absolumment ... c'est à voir se faire promptement des retraites ouvrières, à voir aboutir enfin cette question qui nous tient à coeur depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans. 2

It was left mainly to Audiffred (Gauche Radicale) to oppose the bill. He said that he had no hope of altering the vote. He thought that the measure would not work because the majority of the country was against it.[3] He combatted the view that obligatory pensions would arrest the growth of socialism.[4] Private pension schemes in conjunction with the

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1. J.O., Sénat, 5th November 1909. p. 867. This speech was a typical example of the way in which all the principal preoccupations of the opposition cropped up in any major speech by a member of the Right. Ribot touched on the treatment of pregnant women, the fonctionnaires, administrative tutelage, the flight of capital from France, the plight of French industry and the lay school.

2. J.O., Sénat, 9th November 1909. p. 877.

3. He quoted the enquiries made with trade unions in 1901 - when 87% of unions were hostile to obligatory pensions - and 1907 when 70% were hostile. J.O., Sénat, 9th November 1909. p. 869.

4. Ibid. p. 870. Montfort (Droites) made a speech supporting Audiffred. J.O., Sénat, 19th November 1909. pp. 931-932 and Gustave de Lamarzelle made a very general attack on the bill. J.O., Sénat, 12th November 1909. pp. 899-900.

Caisse nationale des retraites (which had been in operation since 1850) were providing an adequate service. He feared that the bill would damage this service.

Touron (Gauche Radicale) spoke against the creation of a funded scheme on the grounds that it would be difficult to place such large sums of money with reasonable security.[1] Dominique Delahaye (Droites) opposed it because he thought that the government would appropriate the money in times of dire need.[2] The Senate did not agree with these fears and with a few amendments the bill of the Senate committee was voted by 266 votes to 3 on 22nd March 1910. The Chamber accepted the bill without altering it by 531 votes to 3 on 30th March. The criticisms of the law at this time came mainly from the socialists who regarded it as inadequate.

But there were still criticisms from the Right. In May 1911 a radical senator, Codet, joined a monarchist, Brager de la Ville-Moysan, in an interpellation on the application of the law. Ribot spoke at length, as usual, advising caution. There was nothing in the règlement administratif which suggested that the government was going to be anything but cautious.

The bill passed by the Chamber in 1906 was not a drastic measure and the law eventually passed, still less. But it was the first bill passed in France which brought about small but

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1. J.O., Sénat, 19th November 1909. pp. 939-940.

2. J.O., Sénat, 4th November 1909. p. 847. He also spoke against the bill on other grounds. J.O., Sénat, 11th November. pp. 902-905.

generalised redistribution of income. The acceptance of it by some members of the Right in principle and by the rest in practice is an important landmark.

The older moderate Republicans had a long record of active opposition to income tax. Jules Roche, for example, had reported unfavourably in 1888 for the committee which examined the first bill to come before the Chamber. He had also published a book[1] attacking it in the year in which Paul Doumer introduced his income tax bill to the Chamber.

No member of the Right had ever campaigned in favour of income tax. The hostility of the Right to Caillaux's bill proposed on 7th February 1907 was predictable.[2] The bill was welcomed by an immediate drop in the value of government securities and even in some industrial equities. Jaurès accused the large credit establishments of encouraging the emigration of French capital[3] and the Right countered that the iniquity of the measure was proven.[4] Jules Roche wrote a

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1. J. Roche, Contre l'impôt sur le revenu. 1896.

2. Caillaux proposed a direct, personal and progressive tax on all income. Money earned in the form of wages, fees and salaries was to be taxed at a flat rate of 3%, mixed incomes derived from both capital and labour in agriculture, industry and commerce at 3½% and interest on capital at 4%. There was to be a progressive surtax starting at 2% for incomes of 5,000 francs and rising to 4% for incomes of 100,000 francs. The Rente française (interest on government loans) was to be taxed for the first time since the bankruptcy of the first Republic.

3. J.O., 7th February 1907. pp. 322-331.

4. See Aynard (Progressiste), J.O., 8th February 1907 pp. 342-344 and Massabuau (Action Libérale), Ibid. pp. 344-345.

series of ten articles attacking the bill from all angles (in three of them he was at pains to prove that income tax was against the practice and theory of the great Revolution) in la République Française during February and March. The other newspapers of the Right joined in the campaign.

The objections of the Right to income tax were all expressed in the general discussion of the Caillaux bill (which opened on 20th January 1908).[1] The progressistes led the attack. Jules Roche admitted that much was wrong with the present system of taxation but complained that his colleagues had no opportunity of assisting its reform as they were systematically excluded from the grand committees.[2] He thought that the Caillaux bill was impractical before a revaluation of property and a reform of local taxation had been carried through. He said that the tax would be a heavy burden on all wealth but particularly on capital in formation and would therefore affect the expansion and adaptability of the economy. But his major objection to it was that it was

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1. The urgency of the bill was voted in July 1907 after a number of poorly attended sittings. Georges Berry (Nationaliste) explained the poor attendance by saying that the law would never be implemented; the government was bluffing. La Patrie, 7th July 1907.

2. J.O., 7th February 1908. p. 253. Roche spoke twenty-five times during the discussion of the bill. See J. Roche, L'Impôt sur le revenu. 1910 and preface to H. Helly, Manuel des impôts. 1912. for all his arguments against income tax.

wrong in principle. Progressive taxation "porte atteinte au principe de l'égalité."[1] He quoted articles by Fernand Brun and Vaillant which stated that progressivity was the essential feature of the bill. These supported his argument that the bill was socialist in inspiration and in principle and that its application would further the cause of socialism. He rejected the analogy with other countries, saying that it was only in France that the tax could become:

> ... un instrument de guerre sociale et de destruction économique .... et c'est pour cela que ceux qui veulent renverser la société actuelle par la suppression de la propriété et du capital, veulent se servir de cet instrument. 2

Roche thus attempted to rally all anti-socialists against the measure.

Alexandre Ribot (Progressiste) defended the existing system of quatre contributions directes. There were some abuses; small incomes were taxed too heavily but the system provided a solid base for the budget and had the great virtue of requiring the minimum contact between tax collectors and citizens. Income tax would be impossible to assess with any degree of fairness, especially from farmers, large merchants and industrialists. Favouritism and abuses were inevitable in Latin countries. His constant theme was that it was impractical, that it was "un ballon qui ne peut pas s'élever de terre."[3]

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1. J.O., 7th February 1908.
2. Ibid. p. 257.
3. J.O., 12th February 1908. pp. 310-313.

Edouard Aynard (Progressiste) spoke, he said, as a banker:

> ... nous ressentons plus vivement que d'autres, à la fois les coups terribles que nous portent votre projet et les difficultés de le mettre en exécution. 1

The bill was not demanded by public opinion and, Aynard continued, would produce discord and misery. His main argument was that it was not in harmony with the French character.[2]

The case made by members of Action Libérale against the tax was obviously influenced by the writings and speeches of the progressiste economists.[3] Dussaussoy made a detailed attack on those parts of the bill which the Right called "inquisitorial and vexatious."[4] He also attempted to prove

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1. J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 351.

2. Ibid. p. 351.

3. Members of Action Libérale spoke frequently throughout the discussion of the bill. The main interventions were: Adigard, 16th February 1909; Belcastel, 29th October 1908, 4th February 1909; Castelnau, 1st, 9th February 1909; Gailhard-Bancel, 22nd, 29th October, 5th November 1908, 8th, 15th, 18th, 24th February 1909; Groussau, 28th February, 1st June 1908, 16th February 1909; Limon, 29th October 1908; Massabuau, 12th, 24th March 1908, 4th March; Ollivier, 30th October 1908, 19th January, 4th, 16th February, 8th March 1909; Piou, 2nd February, 8th March 1909; Vandame, 29th October 1908, 19th January 1909.

4. He described article 34 which gave government agents the right to make unannounced visits to industrial and commercial establishments as "la plus odieuse inquisition." J.O., 4th February 1908. p. 215. He condemned article 37 which allowed external signs of wealth to be used in assessing the tax because the taxpayer either had to pay an arbitrarily assessed tax or prove that he had been wrongly assessed. He argued that the variations in profits made assessment on the revenu moyen unfair especially since the administration reserved the right to make a reassessment if it was suspected that profits exceeded a previous calculation. This, he thought, was a tax on productivity. Ibid. pp. 215 et seq.

that the incidence of the tax would be very unequal on small incomes derived from different sources. He advanced the argument used by all opposers of the bill:

> ... toute modification dans le régime fiscal mérite une attention très délicate ... C'est un organisme que le main parfois si lourd du fisc peut fausser; il ne faut point oublier que l'impôt sur les professions industrielles et commerciales frappe non pas une richesse acquise, mais une richesse en formation, essentiellement mobile, qui peut s'évanouir et qui s'évanouit, en effet, à chaque instant avec une rapidité foudroyante. 1

Other members of Action Libérale such as Louis Ollivier[2] and Jacques Piou[3] repeated the arguments in favour of cautious reform of the present system and against "unjust and dangerous" aspects of the Caillaux bill. The group voted for discussing the articles of the bill on the grounds that some reform was necessary and the unpleasant articles of the bill could be amended.

The Independents were divided. The marquis de Villebois-Mareuil voted for discussing the articles for the same reasons and with the same reservations as the Liberals. The abbé Lemire openly supported the bill because:

> ... il y a dans ce projet deux principes qu'il proclame et qu'il consacre.
> Je le vote d'abord parce qu'il renferme le principe de

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1. J.O., 4th February 1908. p 220.
2. J.O., 6th February 1908. Particularly p. 237.
3. Declaration made on behalf of the Groupe de l'Action Libérale. J.O., 17th February 1908. pp. 356-357.

> l'impôt personnel et global sur le revenu (Applaudissements à gauche et à l'extrême gauche); ensuite parce qu'il renferme le principe de l'impôt progressif (Applaudissements sur les mêmes bancs - Interruptions à droite). 1

Most of the Independents were, however, absolutely opposed to the bill and were not prepared to make any concession. Georges Berry thought that the tax had become a major issue through fifteen years of radical propaganda in favour of it. He argued that it would cause a great deal of friction between tax-collector and taxpayer, employer and employee; it would not even protect the poor and the rentier would be severely burdened by it.[2] The marquis de Rosanbo thought that "sous un luerre de dégrèvements nous marchons à une argumentation des impôts."[3] The marquis de Dion concurred and thought that the increase would be used "à augmenter la quantité des fonctionnaires dont un grand nombre ne travaille qu'à empêcher les autres de travailler."[4] The arguments of the extreme Right were not technically of the highest order. Their aim was not to present a rational critique but to spread alarm.

The passage to the discussion of the articles was passed by the large majority of 487 votes to 56 on 17th February 1908. All the opposing votes came from the Right, the Independents

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1. J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 357.
2. J.O., 30th January 1908. pp. 158-161.
3. J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 356.
4. Ibid. loc. cit.

providing nearly half of them.[1] On the following day a move by members of the Right to delay the discussion was defeated by 439 votes to 68.[2]

Even on the important principle of taxing the rente française the opposition gained little support from the Centre. A radical, Aimond, joined the progressistes, Bouctot, Ribot and Roche, in condemning the proposal as a breach of the undertaking made in the law of 9 vendémaire an VI and repeated by all subsequent regimes, not to tax interest on government loans.[3] All asserted that this breach of faith, and the decline in real income derived from government loans, would damage the credit of the state. Over thirty members of the Centre joined the Right in opposing the principle which was carried by 370 votes to 170 on 25th May 1908.[4]

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1. 3 Union Républicaine/Progressiste, 11 Progressiste, 2 Progressiste/Action Libérale, 6 Action Libérale, 3 Action Libérale/Nationaliste, 6 Nationaliste and 25 Independents. There were eight abstentions on the Right.

2. This was a motion préjudicielle proposed by Beauregard, Marin (Progressiste), Belcastel (Progressiste/Action Libérale), Lerolle (Action Libérale), Berry, Bienaimé (Nationaliste) and Charles Benoist (Independent) that the government should prepare a bill on the reform of local taxation before the Chamber continued the discussion of the Caillaux bill. All those who voted for the motion belonged to the groups of the Right.

3. Roche, J.O., 21st May 1908. pp. 1012-1019; Aimond, J.O., 22nd May 1908. pp. 1025-1033; Ribot, J.O., 25th May 1908. pp. 1048-1056; Bouctot, J.O., 25th May 1908. pp. 1057-1058.

4. In spite of the forecast that the credit of the Republic would be damaged no monarchist voted for it. Three Independents (all of tendance gauche), three Liberals and, surprisingly, nineteen progressistes voted for the tax.

The articles concerning agricultural profits aroused the ire of the Right. During the discussion of article 3, Villebois-Mareuil (Independent) demanded that agricultural profits should be exempt from tax because they were impossible to assess and because impositions on agriculture were already too heavy.[1] His amendment to article 3 was supported by all the prominent men of the extreme Right.[2] The article was passed by 271 votes to 240 but after rectifications de vote the majority was reversed. The large number of rectifications was the result of deputies looking over their shoulders in the direction of their constituencies. They neither wanted to join an opposition of the Right in the Chamber nor did they want their rural supporters to think that they were in favour of the tax.[3] This was the closest that a major amendment sponsored by the extreme Right came to success in the period 1905-1919.

Tax exemption for the poor aroused strong feelings and had obvious electoral significance. The abbé Lemire

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1. J.O., 9th March 1908. pp. 534-535. Piou had spoken of exemptions for peasants in the general discussion. J.O., 17th February 1908. p. 357.

2. La Ferronays, Lanjuinais, Blacas, Monti de Rezé, Levis-Mirepoix, Flayelle, Pomereu, du Halgouët, Lerolle, Denys Cochin, Lasies, Rosanbo, Fouquet, Cachet, Arthur Legrand, de Pins and others. J.O., 9th March 1909. p. 535.

3. On 20th October the Chamber adopted a complicated compromise system of assessment for agricultural profits, Whilst not satisfying the extreme Right, which voted against it, it seemed to represent a considerable concession to the agricultural interest.

(Independent) proposed a considerable extention of exemption in an amendment to article 15. This amendment was approved by the two extremes of the Chamber but was defeated by 299 votes to 235 on 17th February 1909. The other amendments of the Right on this subject collected fewer votes.

The Chamber voted the bill on 9th March 1909 but the opposition to the bill was far from exhausted.[1] Early in April the Senate nominated a committee hostile to the bill,[2] The Senate was so slow in discussing the measure that in 1914 Caillaux, once again minister of Finance, decided to force its hand. He introduced a bill to impose a progressive capital tax and to start liquidating the old contributions directes. A motion proposed by Perchot, radical senator for Basses Alpes, which the Senate accepted by 140 votes to 134, destroyed the bill.[3] Soon afterwards the Senate rejected the principle of a tax on the rente française by a similar majority.[4]

Caillaux then tried to write income tax into the budget. The relevant article of the budget was not discussed before the elections of 1914. These elections returned an increased number of deputies who favoured income tax. The younger deputies of the Right were beginning to realise that the introduction of income tax was inevitable and were preparing

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1. The majority for the bill was 388 votes to 129. Nineteen members of the Right voted for it.

2. La République Française, 3rd April 1909.

3. J.O., Sénat, 25th February 1914. All the senators of the Right voted with the majority.

4. J.O., Sénat, 12th March 1914.

to accept it. For example, Rochereau (Action Libérale), a newly elected deputy for Vendée, said that he could see nothing wrong with the tax in principle.[1]

One of the main factors which broke the back of the opposition in the Senate was the formation of Ribot's ministry. Ribot was compelled to give an assurance that his government would press the Senate to pass the income tax measure[2] in spite of the fact that he had recently opposed this strongly.[3] As a result of this undertaking Ribot dropped his opposition to income tax. When, at the beginning of July Boivin-Champeux (Gauche Radicale) and Lamarzelle (Droites) proposed the disjonction of the article of the budget containing the principle of income tax, Ribot opposed them. The motion was defeated by 207 votes to 70. The more subtle amendment of Touron (Gauche Radicale) was also defeated by a similar majority.[4] The opposition was now reduced exclusively to the

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1. La Gazette de France, 9th June 1914.

2. J.O., 12th June 1914. p. 2448.

3. Ribot's position at the beginning of 1914 was that he did not oppose income tax "sur le plan général" but the alterations which he suggested to the existing bill all tended to the destruction of its essential features. Also he disapproved strongly of any attempt to put pressure on the Senate. J.O., Sénat, 19th February 1914. pp. 191-192.

4. Touron tried to introduce a new method of taxing property, making the incidence fall on the occupier (replacing articles 7-28 of the existing bill). He admitted he was attempting to destroy the unity of the measure - "j'aime mieux les impôts fragmentaires que l'impôt unique." J.O., Sénat, 3rd July 1914. p. 997.

senators of the Right who did not, however, carry their opposition to the length of voting against the budget.

The tax went into operation at the end of 1915 but the bill was not definitively voted by parliament until July 1917.[1] Only one deputy, Jules Roche, and no senator voted against it. The parliamentary opposition to the principle of income tax had collapsed. After the end of the war there was no demand in parliament for repeal of the bill. There were remarkably few attacks on it in the press. An occasional polemic resurrected the spirit of pre-war controversial writing:

> Les salaires ne doivent pas payer d'impôt direct et obligatoire. L'Etat a tout à perdre et rien à gagner à vouloir tenter des semblables expériences.
> Frapper directement le salaire comme on le veut faire aujourd'hui, c'est frapper l'initiative, diminuer l'esprit de prévoyance, restreindre la capacité de production ... 2

But propaganda against the tax was usually veiled in form.

All taxes had been increased during the war and there were some financial measures which the Right found more objectionable than income tax. The moratorium on rents was one of these.[3] The excess profits tax was bitterly opposed

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1. J.O., 18th July 1917. 462 votes to 1. J.O., Sénat, 31st July 1917. The Senate did not divide.

2. L'Echo de Paris, 26th July 1919.

3. It was called in a typical article, "la plus détestable maladresse qui ait été commise ... pendant la guerre." L'Echo de Paris, 5th January 1919.

during the war, especially by the extreme Right.[1] All kinds of state restrictions on industry persisted after the end of the war and it was against these that the energies of conservatives were mainly directed. Denys Cochin (Droites) expressed their major concern:

> L'étatisme, qui a servi pendant la guerre, n'a pas laissé les bons souvenirs. On est las des consortiums, des taxations, des interventions perpetuelles de l'état. On ne croit plus au protectionnisme à l'outrance ... On a soif d'initiative individuelle et de liberté commerciale. 2

The Right had more immediate measures to urge than the repeal of the income tax bill. Moreover the political implications of repeal agitation could have been undesirable. Barrès (Indépendants) wrote in his Cahiers:

> On a combattu l'impôt sur le revenu. Est-il question de revenir là-dessous.
> Les lois ne peuvent pas être rejetées, maintenant, et la seule annonce qu'on voudrait les remettre en question déterminerait une poussé d'anticléricalisme funeste pour les catholiques. 3

Apart from these practical considerations, the arguments used by the Right against the tax were being undermined. The

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1. See Jules Delahaye (Droites), J.O., 18th February 1916. pp. 323 et seq. His brother Dominique Delahaye, senator for Maine et Loire was involved in a controversy over the assessment of the excess profits of his business. See Delahaye-Bougère fils, La Contribution extraordinaire sur les bénéfices de guerre. Paris and Angers 1917. The correspondence between Delahaye and the administration on this subject shows that, even if he was not treated unjustly, the government agents were discourteous and inconsiderate.

2. D. Cochin, 1914-1922. Vol. I. 1923. p. 173.

3. M. Barrès, Mes Cahiers. Vol. XII. p. 193.

tax had worked in practice and there had been no political discrimination in assessment. The latter consideration became irrelevant after the elections of 1919 produced a majority approved by the Right which could control the activities of the government. This majority consecrated the tax by voting an important increase in it.[1]

The bills on old age pensions, nationalisation of the Western railway and income tax embody three principles which form the basis of the "welfare state"; redistribution of wealth, the right of the state to take over sections of the economy in the interests of the community and progressive taxation. In 1905 a majority of the Centre accepted the application of these principles, with varying degrees of reluctance, and the Right opposed them, with varying degrees of intransigence. The opposition of the extreme Right was, in many cases, based on political rather than economic grounds (they were not enamoured of laissez faire principles). It was clear that this political opposition could not persist long after the measures were passed. The contrary progressiste opposition was based on economic principles. But for them continued opposition to the measures would have exacted too heavy a political price.

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1. J.O., 29th April 1920. The majority in favour of the increase was 499 to 72. The extreme Left formed the opposition. A former progressiste, Raiberti, was rapporteur for the measure.

But the dividing line between the Right and Centre on the issues of welfare economics was less clear than on the clerical issue. The Centre was concerned primarily with placing obstacles in the way of the progress of socialism. The Right at least had sympathy with this motive even if it disapproved of the tactics employed. Also the principles became submerged in discussion of the detail of the application of the measures. Their practical effects rather than the philosophy behind them became the predominant consideration for all deputies who concerned themselves with their constituents' interests.

Differences about the principles of welfare economics were as great and as deeply felt in 1919 as in 1905. But root and branch opposition to any application of these principles became a less reasonable position after the three measures - income tax, pensions and nationalisation of the Western Railway - had been applied. Although members of the Right made disparaging comments about them, they did not campaign for their repeal. Like members of the Centre they became concerned to prevent further encroachments on the rights of property.

Epilogue

After the victory of November 1919 there was a feeble attempt to create a mystique for the bloc national. The bloc was represented as a united and energetic party with an extensive and useful legislative programme.[1] Edouard Soulier (Entente Républicaine Démocratique), deputy for Paris, tried to create the myth that the bloc was an expression of a permanent grouping in French politics:

> Le Bloc national n'est ... ni une improvisation de hasard, ni une formation étroite et fermée. Il s'appuie sur les conceptions et l'action de Gambetta, longtemps combattues, dont il pourra être, après cette longue élaboration, l'épanouissement et la réalisation. Il n'est pas fils de la guerre, qui n'a fait que le mener à l'âge adulte. Il est dans la République, le grand parti français. 2

Soulier admitted that the bloc had not been fully realised - "parce que personne n'a eu la volonté ou la capacité de le réaliser."[3]

Other men who were favourably disposed towards the bloc admitted that its victory was the result of fear of socialism[4] and that it lacked leaders.[5] Patriotism was the only positive

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1. See Deux Ans de législature (novembre 1919 - décembre 1921). 1922. Published by the propaganda committee of the bloc national.
2. La Revue Hebdomadaire, 1st December 1923. p. 108.
3. Ibid. 22nd December 1923. p. 577.
4. For example Yves-Guyot, Politique parlementaire, politique atavique. 1924. pp. 327 et seq.
5. E. Fournol, Le Plutarque moderne. 1923. p. 146.

unifying force of the bloc.

The Chambre bleu horizon accepted as prime ministers members of the Centre who had had long ministerial careers. Millerand, Leygues, Briand and Poincaré were not new men with new tactics. They governed in their accustomed manner - by relying on a shifting coalition of the Centre. The Right could support them if it chose and if it combined with the Left to overturn their ministries they were replaced by a colleague whose general policy was only slightly different.

These old leaders were not seriously challenged. Their chief critics from the Right, Mandel and Tardieu, were not accepted by the Right as its leaders. The attempt to build up the former progressiste, Laurent Bonnevay (minister of Justice in the Briand administration 1921-1922) as a potential prime minister was a dismal failure because Bonnevay had not the necessary stature. Yet Bonnevay seemed to be the only potential prime minister among the nine members of Entente Républicaine Démocratique who held ministerial office in the period 1919 to 1924.

Although four of these nine - Isaac, Lefebvre du Prey, Raiberti and Dior - held office in two administrations, the comparative representation of the Entente in cabinets was very small. Moreover its representatives were drawn from the moderate wing (which was roughly equivalent to the old Union Républicaine). A considerable block of deputies of the Right

was, therefore, without real representation in the governments.

In spite of this the Right, with the exception of the extreme Right which had been excluded from the bloc national, did not move into opposition. Many members of the Right were inhibited by the sentiments of the union sacrée, especially at the beginning of the legislature. They considered that they had a mandate from the country to preserve national unity. The attack by Daudet on the composition of the Millerand cabinet gained no support for this reason. But as the years passed the failure of the Right to assert itself cannot be attributed purely to this motive. To a considerable extent Poincaré from 1922 to 1924 fulfilled the desires of the Right in foreign and financial policy by his invasion of the Ruhr and by the appointment of Lasteyrie (Entente Républicaine Démocratique) as Finance minister. But it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Right remained quiescent because of the mediocrity of its leaders. The Right was indeed reluctant to accept intelligent leadership. It looked up to men of the type of General de Castelnau rather than Mandel. It became apparent that the thinking of the prominent men of the Right - excepting Mandel and Tardieu - did not progress much beyond the slogans of the manifesto of the bloc national. The increasing vagueness of members of the Right on fundamental questions of social and political organisation which has been

noticed for the period 1905 to 1914, reached its apotheosis in 1919 to 1924. Even Millerand's ideas concerning the Presidency did not provoke a coherent reaction from the Right. Differences of interest and tradition, although modified by the experience of the war, still persisted. It was never possible for the Entente Républicaine Démocratique to turn itself into a disciplined conservative party. Léon Daudet[1] and other members of the extreme Right exacerbated the dormant divisions. The absence of unifying and precise political doctrines need not have been important if the Right had occupied the important posts in the government. But the consequences of having neither doctrine nor power were fatal. A contemporary political observer made this point with force:

> Le Bloc national ... est un grand parti qui a des sentiments lesquels sont nobles, mais qui n'a pas de doctrine et qui n'a pas d'hommes. Je ne dis pas qu'il ne compte pas de talents: c'est tout autre chose. Un grand parti politique est soumis à une alternative vigoureuse; il doit avoir une doctrine ou occuper le gouvernement. 2

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1. See, for example, his books: La Chambre nationale du 16 novembre. 1923. L'Agonie du régime. Panorama des hommes, des clans et des crimes, 1919-1925. 1925.

2. E. Fournol, Le Plutarque moderne. 1923. p. 146.

APPENDICES

Appendix A.

The tables which follow and the statistics quoted from them in the introduction to Section III are intended to give general indications of the professions and interests of the members of the Right. The main sources used are listed in section G (collective biography) of the bibliography. Other indications have been found in autobiographies, biographies, newspapers and miscellaneous writing on politics.

The classifications are necessarily arbitrary and inexact. Another person reviewing the same evidence would undoubtedly produce different statistics.

Every member of the Right was probably a propriétaire in some sense. However, landowners are so-called only when there is evidence that they gained substantial revenues from land or if they had no other ascertainable source of income. Also most of the Right could be described as journalists in the widest sense of the term but only those who contributed regularly to a newspaper have been included in this category. A majority of the Right probably had investments in industrial, commercial or banking establishments but only those who were concerned in the management of these establishments have been included under the headings of industry, commerce and banking. There are obviously many doubtful cases and the evidence for deciding to include or exclude deputies,

especially the more obscure ones, is sometimes meagre.

The author has been greatly helped by the memory and advice of S. E. Adrien Thierry and M. le colonel Philippe d'Elissagaray.

The Right 1905

Average Age: 51.9

Average Parliamentary Experience: 8.8

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	72	29.4	7	2.9	79	32.3
Farming and Landowning	28	11.4	2	0.8	30	12.2
Regular Officer	-	-	33	13.5	33	13.5
1. Law (*avocat*, *avoué*, *notaire*)	42	17.1	25	10.2	67	27.3
2. Law (*juge*, *procureur*, *magistrat*)	7	2.9	4	1.6	11	4.5
Journalism	5	2.0	32	13.1	37	15.1
Commerce and Industry	44	18.0	3	1.2	47	19.2
Banking	3	1.2	3	1.2	6	2.4
Civil Service	18	7.3	11	4.5	29	11.8
Medicine	10	4.1	-	-	10	4.1
Teaching	6	2.4	4	1.6	10	4.1
Others	10	4.1	-	-	10	4.1
Totals:	245		124		369	

Union Républicaine 1905

Average Age: 47.2

Average Parliamentary Experience: 6.5

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age.	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	5	17.3	1	3.4	6	20.7
Farming and Landowning	3	10.3	-	-	3	10.3
Regular Officer	-	-	2	6.9	2	6.9
1. Law (*avocat, avoué, notaire*)	6	20.7	2	6.9	8	27.6
2. Law (*juge, procureur, magistrat*)	2	6.9	-	-	2	6.9
Journalism	1	3.4	6	20.7	7	24.1
Commerce and Industry	6	20.7	-	-	6	20.7
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	4	13.8	1	3.4	5	17.2
Medicine	1	3.4	-	-	1	3.4
Teaching	1	3.4	1	3.4	2	6.9
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	29		13		42	

Républicain Progressiste 1905

Average Age: 52.9
Average Parliamentary Experience: 8.7

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	19	18.8	2	2.0	21	20.8
Farming and Landowning	10	9.9	-	-	10	9.9
Regular Officer	-	-	6	5.9	6	5.9
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	24	23.8	10	9.9	34	33.7
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	4	4.0	3	3.0	7	6.9
Journalism	1	1.0	11	10.9	12	11.9
Commerce and Industry	22	21.8	-	-	22	21.8
Banking	1	1.0	3	3.0	4	4.0
Civil Service	7	6.9	5	5.0	12	11.9
Medicine	6	5.9	-	-	6	5.9
Teaching	4	4.0	-	-	4	4.0
Others	3	3.0	-	-	3	3.0
Totals:	101		40		141	

Action Libérale 1905

Average Age: 50.3

Average Parliamentary Experience: 7.8

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	26	32.9	1	1.3	27	34.2
Farming and Landowning	13	16.5	-	-	13	16.5
Regular Officer	-	-	18	22.8	18	22.8
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	17	21.5	4	5.1	21	26.6
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	1	1.3	1	1.3	2	2.5
Journalism	2	2.5	8	10.1	10	12.7
Commerce and Industry	9	11.4	1	1.3	10	12.7
Banking	1	1.3	1	1.3	2	2.5
Civil Service	3	3.8	5	6.3	8	10.1
Medicine	3	3.8	-	-	3	3.8
Teaching	1	1.3	2	2.5	3	3.8
Others	3	3.8	-	-	3	3.8
Totals:	79		41		120	

Républicain Nationaliste 1905

Average Age: 48.4

Average Parliamentary Experience: 5.8

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	17	30.9	2	3.6	19	34.5
Farming and Landowning	7	12.7	-	-	7	12.7
Regular Officer	-	-	10	18.2	10	18.2
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	16	29.1	5	9.1	21	38.2
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	2	3.6	-	-	2	3.6
Journalism	-	-	10.	18.2	10	18.2
Commerce and Industry	6	10.9	1	1.8	7	12.7
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	3	5.5	-	-	3	5.5
Medicine	2	3.6	-	-	2	3.6
Teaching	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	2	3.6	-	-	2	3.6
Totals:	55		28		83	

Independents 1905

Average Age: 55.9

Average Parliamentary Experience: 12.9

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	16	37.2	2	4.8	18	42.0
Farming and Landowning	3	7.0	2	4.8	5	11.9
Regular Officer	-	-	6	14.0	6	14.0
1. Law (*avocat*, *avoué*, *notaire*)	3	7.0	5	11.9	8	18.9
2. Law (*juge*, *procureur*, *magistrat*)	1	2.3	-	-	1	2.3
Journalism	1	2.3	4	9.5	5	11.9
Commerce and Industry	6	14.0	1	2.3	7	16.3
Banking	1	2.3	-	-	1	2.3
Civil Service	7	16.3	1	2.3	8	18.9
Medicine	1	2.3	-	-	1	2.3
Teaching	1	2.3	1	2.3	2	4.8
Others	3	7.0	-	-	3	7.0
Totals:	43		22		65	

The Right 1906

Average Age: 50.5

Average Parliamentary Experience: 7.8

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	48	26.1	11	6.0	59	32.1
Farming and Landowning	21	11.4	1	0.5	22	11.9
Regular Officer	-	-	28	15.2	28	15.2
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	28	15.2	18	9.8	46	25.0
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	8	4.3	1	0.5	9	4.9
Journalism	3	1.6	25	13.6	28	15.2
Commerce and Industry	38	20.7	2	1.1	40	21.8
Banking	2	1.1	4	2.2	6	3.3
Civil Service	15	8.2	8	4.3	23	12.5
Medicine	9	4.9	-	-	9	4.9
Teaching	5	2.7	2	1.1	7	3.8
Others	7	3.8	-	-	7	3.8
Totals:	184		100		284	

Union Républicaine 1906

Average Age: 51.6

Average Parliamentary Experience: 8.4

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	3	6.5	9	19.6	12	26.1
Farming and Landowning	5	10.9	1	2.2	6	13.0
Regular Officer	-	-	3	6.5	3	6.5
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	6	13.0	1	2.2	7	15.2
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	4	8.7	-	-	4	8.7
Journalism	-	-	8	17.4	8	17.4
Commerce and Industry	17	37.0	-	-	17	37.0
Banking	1	2.2	2	4.3	3	6.5
Civil Service	5	10.9	-	-	5	10.9
Medicine	4	8.7	-	-	4	8.7
Teaching	1	2.2	1	2.2	2	4.3
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	46		24		70	

Républicain Progressiste 1906

Average Age: 51.7

Average Parliamentary Experience: 8.4

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	14	17.7	2	2.5	16	20.2
Farming and Landowning	11	13.9	-	-	11	13.9
Regular Officer	-	-	5	6.3	5	6.3
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	18	22.8	13	16.5	31	39.3
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	3	3.8	2	2.5	5	6.3
Journalism	1	1.3	11	13.9	12	15.2
Commerce and Industry	18	22.8	-	-	18	22.8
Banking	-	-	3	3.8	3	3.8
Civil Service	5	6.3	4	5.1	9	11.4
Medicine	5	6.3	-	-	5	6.3
Teaching	4	5.1	-	-	4	5.1
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	79		40		119	

Action Libérale 1906

Average Age: 50

Average Parliamentary Experience: 7.6

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	20	31.3	1	1.6	21	32.9
Farming and Landowning	9	14.1	-	-	9	14.1
Regular Officer	-	-	14	21.8	14	21.8
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	13	20.3	5	7.8	18	28.1
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	2	3.1	1	1.6	3	4.7
Journalism	2	3.1	6	9.4	8	12.5
Commerce and Industry	8	12.5	-	-	8	12.5
Banking	1	1.6	-	-	1	1.6
Civil Service	4	6.3	4	6.3	8	12.5
Medicine	2	3.1	-	-	2	3.1
Teaching	1	1.6	1	1.6	2	3.1
Others	2	3.1	-	-	2	3.1
Totals:	64		32		96	

Républicain Nationaliste 1906

Average Age: 48.8

Average Parliamentary Experience: 6.3

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	12	41.4	1	3.4	13	44.8
Farming and Landowning	3	10.3	-	-	3	10.3
Regular Officer	-	-	10	34.5	10	34.5
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	7	24.1	3	10.3	10	34.5
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	2	6.9	-	-	2	6.9
Journalism	-	-	5	17.2	5	17.2
Commerce and Industry	2	6.9	-	-	2	6.9
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medicine	1	3.4	-	-	1	3.4
Teaching	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	2	6.9	-	-	2	6.9
Totals:	29		19		48	

Independents 1906

Average Age: 54.0

Average Parliamentary Experience: 12.5

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	19	55.9	1	2.9	20	58.8
Farming and Landowning	2	5.9	-	-	2	5.9
Regular Officer	-	-	5	14.7	5	14.7
1. Law (*avocat, avoué, notaire*)	1	2.9	2	5.9	3	8.8
2. Law (*juge, procureur, magistrat*)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	1	2.9	3	8.8	4	11.7
Commerce and Industry	2	5.9	2	5.9	4	11.7
Banking	1	2.9	-	-	1	2.9
Civil Service	3	8.8	3	8.8	6	17.6
Medicine	1	2.9	-	-	1	2.9
Teaching	1	2.9	1	2.9	2	5.9
Others	3	8.8	-	-	3	8.8
Totals:	34		17		51	

The Right 1910

Average Age: 53.0

Average Parliamentary Experience: 11.0

	First Interest		First Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	45	30.0	6	4.0	51	34.0
Farming and Landowning	16	10.7	-	-	16	10.7
Regular Officer	-	-	18	12.0	18	12.0
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	28	18.7	17	10.7	45	29.4
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	4	2.7	1	0.7	5	3.4
Journalism	6	4.0	25	16.7	31	20.7
Commerce and Industry	28	18.7	1	0.7	29	19.4
Banking	1	0.7	3	2.0	4	2.7
Civil Service	9	6.0	5	3.3	14	9.3
Medicine	3	2.0	-	-	3	2.0
Teaching	6	4.0	2	1.3	8	5.3
Others	4	2.7	1	0.7	5	3.4
Totals:	150		79		229	

Action Libérale 1910

Average Age: 52.7

Average Parliamentary Experience: 10.6

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	10	29.4	1	2.9	11	32.3
Farming and Landowning	4	11.8	-	-	4	11.8
Regular Officer	-	-	6	17.6	6	17.6
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	8	23.5	5	14.7	13	38.2
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	1	2.9	-	-	1	2.9
Journalism	2	5.8	5	14.7	7	20.6
Commerce and Industry	5	14.7	-	-	5	14.7
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	1	2.9	1	2.9	2	5.8
Medicine	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teaching	1	2.9	1	2.9	2	5.8
Others	2	5.8	-	-	2	5.8
Totals:	34		19		53	

Droites 1910

Average Age: 59.7

Average Parliamentary Experience: 16.3

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	16	84.2	-	-	16	84.2
Farming and Landowning	1	5.3	-	-	1	5.3
Regular Officer	-	-	4	21.0	4	21.0
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	-	-	2	10.5	2	10.5
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	1	5.3	-	-	1	5.3
Commerce and Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	1	5.3	-	-	1	5.3
Medicine	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teaching	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	1	5.3	1	5.3
Totals:	19		7		26	

Indépendants 1910

Average Age: 53.9

Average Parliamentary Experience: 9.6

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	7	31.8	-	-	7	31.8
Farming and Landowning	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regular Officer	-	-	1	4.5	1	4.5
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	2	9.1	2	9.1	4	18.2
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	1	4.5	-	-	1	4.5
Journalism	2	9.1	5	22.7	7	31.8
Commerce and Industry	3	13.6	1	4.5	4	18.2
Banking	1	4.5	-	-	1	4.5
Civil Service	3	13.6	2	9.1	5	22.7
Medicine	1	4.5	-	-	1	4.5
Teaching	-	-	1	4.5	1	4.5
Others	2	9.1	-	-	2	9.1
Totals:	22		12		34	

Union Républicaine 1911

Average Age: 50.4

Average Parliamentary Experience: 6.5

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	2	6.1	5	15.2	7	21.3
Farming and Landowning	7	21.3	-	-	7	21.3
Regular Officer	-	-	4	12.1	4	12.1
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	8	24.2	-	-	8	24.2
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	-	-	4	12.1	4	12.1
Commerce and Industry	10	30.3	-	-	10	30.3
Banking	-	-	1	3.0	1	3.0
Civil Service	4	12.1	-	-	4	12.1
Medicine	1	3.0	-	-	1	3.0
Teaching	1	3.0	-	-	1	3.0
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	33		14		47	

Républicain Progressiste 1911

Average Age: 52.8

Average Parliamentary Experience: 10.5

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	10	23.8	-	-	10	23.8
Farming and Landowning	4	9.5	-	-	4	9.5
Regular Officer	-	-	3	3.6	3	3.6
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	10	23.8	8	19.0	18	42.8
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	2	4.8	1	2.4	3	7.2
Journalism	1	2.4	11	26.2	12	28.6
Commerce and Industry	10	23.8	-	-	10	23.8
Banking	-	-	2	4.8	2	4.8
Civil Service	-	-	2	4.8	2	4.8
Medicine	1	2.4	-	-	1	2.4
Teaching	4	9.5	-	-	4	9.5
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	42		27		69	

The Right 1914

Average Age: 53.8

Average Parliamentary Experience: 11.0

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	39	32.2	3	3.3	42	35.5
Farming and Landowning	7	5.8	7	5.8	14	11.6
Regular Officer	-	-	12	9.9	12	9.9
1. Law (*avocat*, *avoué*, *notaire*)	27	22.3	10	8.3	37	30.6
2. Law (*juge*, *procureur*, *magistrat*)	2	1.7	-	-	2	1.7
Journalism	9	7.4	16	13.2	25	20.6
Commerce and Industry	17	14.0	1	0.8	18	14.8
Banking	1	0.8	-	-	1	0.8
Civil Service	2	1.7	6	5.0	8	6.7
Medicine	6	5.0	-	-	6	5.0
Teaching	7	5.8	1	0.8	8	6.7
Others	4	3.3	-	-	4	3.3
Totals:	121		60		181	

Fédération Républicaine 1914

Average Age: 51.9

Average Parliamentary Experience: 9.2

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	8	21.6	-	-	8	21.6
Farming and Landowning	2	5.4	-	-	2	5.4
Regular Officer	-	-	5	13.5	5	13.5
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	10	27.0	8	21.6	18	48.6
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	1	2.7	11	29.7	12	32.4
Commerce and Industry	10	27.0	-	-	10	27.0
Banking	-	-	1	2.7	1	2.7
Civil Service	-	-	1	2.7	1	2.7
Medicine	2	5.4	-	-	2	5.4
Teaching	4	10.8	-	-	4	10.8
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals:	37		26		63	

Action Libérale 1914

Average Age: 52.2

Average Parliamentary Experience: 12

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	8	33.3	2	8.2	10	41.5
Farming and Landowning	1	4.2	5	20.8	6	25.0
Regular Officer	-	-	3	12.5	3	12.5
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	4	16.7	-	-	4	16.7
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	3	12.5	1	4.2	4	16.7
Commerce and Industry	4	16.7	-	-	4	16.7
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	-	-	1	4.2	1	4.2
Medicine	2	8.3	-	-	2	8.3
Teaching	1	4.2	-	-	1	4.2
Others	1	4.2	-	-	1	4.2
Totals:	24		12		36	

Droites 1914

Average Age: 60.8

Average Parliamentary Experience: 13.6

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	11	78.6	-	-	11	78.6
Farming and Landowning	1	7.1	1	7.1	2	14.2
Regular Officer	-	-	-	-	-	-
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	-	-	-	-	-	-
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	1	7.1	-	-	1	7.1
Commerce and Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banking	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service	-	-	1	7.1	1	7.1
Medicine	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teaching	1	7.1	-	-	1	7.1
Others	-	-	1	7.1	1	7.1
Totals:	14		5		19	

Independents 1914

Average Age: 52.6

Average Parliamentary Experience: 9

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	12	26.1	1	2.2	13	28.3
Farming and Landowning	3	6.5	1	2.2	4	8.7
Regular Officer	-	-	4	8.7	4	8.7
1. Law (*avocat, avoué, notaire*)	13	28.3	2	4.3	15	32.6
2. Law (*juge, procureur, magistrat*)	2	4.3	-	-	2	4.3
Journalism	4	8.6	4	8.6	8	17.2
Commerce and Industry	3	6.5	1	2.2	4	8.7
Banking	1	2.2	-	-	1	2.2
Civil Service	2	4.3	3	6.5	5	10.8
Medicine	2	4.3	-	-	2	4.3
Teaching	1	2.2	1	2.2	2	4.3
Others	3	6.5	-	-	3	6.5
Totals:	46		17		63	

The Survivors 1919

Average Age: 56.2

Average Parliamentary Experience: 14.0

	First Interest		Second Interests		Total	
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Landowning	15	23.4	3	4.7	18	28.1
Farming and Landowning	5	7.8	1	1.6	6	9.4
Regular Officer	-	-	7	10.9	7	10.9
1. Law (avocat, avoué, notaire)	18	28.1	5	7.8	23	35.9
2. Law (juge, procureur, magistrat)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Journalism	2	3.1	10	15.6	12	18.7
Commerce and Industry	14	21.9	-	-	14	21.9
Banking	-	-	1	1.6	1	1.6
Civil Service	3	4.7	2	3.1	5	7.8
Medicine	4	6.3	-	-	4	6.3
Teaching	2	3.1	1	1.6	3	4.7
Others	1	1.6	-	-	1	1.6
Totals:	64		30		94	

Appendix B.

The distribution of the constituencies of the Right according to group membership.

Key

al	-	Action Libérale
dr	-	Droites
fr	-	Fédération Républicaine
ind	-	Independent, after 1910 Indépendants
pr	-	Progressiste
rn	-	Républicain Nationaliste
ur	-	Union Républicaine

The départements which did not elect a deputy of the Right have been omitted.

In 1905 and 1906 one group of those deputies who belonged to three groups has been ignored.

The appearance and disappearance of Independents of tendance gauche distorts the strength of the Right in certain départements.

Because of the tendency of deputies to change their groups these tables cannot give an accurate picture of the electoral situation in the départements.

	1905		1906		1910		1914		Survivors 1919	
	ur/pr ur/pr pr/al al/ru ind		ur/pr ur/pr pr/al al/ru ind		pr al dr ind		fr al dr ind		fr al dr ind	
Aisne	-1--2---	3	----2---	2	-1-1	2	----	-	----	-
Basses Alpes	---1-1--	2	------2-	2	---1	1	----	-	----	-
Hautes Alpes	--1--1--	2	1-------	1	1---	1	----	-	----	-
Alpes Maritimes	111----1	4	21------	3	2---	2	----	-	----	-
Ardèche	--2-1---	3	--2-1---	3	21--	3	21--	3	11--	2
Aube	--1-----	1	-1------	1	1---	1	----	-	----	-
Aude	----1---	1	--------	-	----	-	----	-	----	-
Aveyron	--1-2--1	4	--112--1	5	211-	4	-111	3	-1-1	2
Bouches du Rhône	--2-----	2	1-------	1	3---	3	----	-	----	-
Calvados	--1--132	7	-11--122	7	3-1-	4	1113	6	1112	5
Cantal	-1------	1	--------	-	----	-	----	-	----	-
Charente	-1--1--1	3	-------1	1	21-1	4	----	-	----	-
Corse	--------	-	--------	-	1---	1	---1	1	----	-
Côtes d'Or	-1------	1	-1------	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Côtes du Nord	-11-12-2	7	-2---2-2	6	-2--	2	---2	2	---1	1
Dordogne	-------1	1	-------1	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Doubs	--1----1	2	--1-----	1	1---	1	1---	1	1---	1
Eure	-1--2--1	4	-1-11--1	4	21-1	4	----	-	----	-
Eure et Loir	---1----	1	---1----	1	1---	1	1---	1	1---	1
Finistère	--4-3---	7	-11-3--1	6	14--	5	12-1	4	----	-
Gard	--------	-	--------	-	--1-	1	----	-	----	-
Haute Garonne	--------	-	---1----	1	-1--	1	----	-	----	-
Gers	------21	3	-----11-	2	----	-	---1	1	----	-
Gironde	--11----	2	-11-----	2	11--	2	1---	1	1---	1
Herault	--------	-	--1-----	1	1---	1	----	-	----	-
Ile et Vilaine	--1111-1	5	--2-2--1	5	213-	6	212-	5	1---	1
Indre	--1--1-1	3	1-------	1	1---	1	---2	2	----	-
Indre et Loire	--1-----	1	--1-----	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Isère	--11----	2	--------	-	1--1	2	----	-	----	-
Landes	11-1-2--	5	11---1--	3	---1	1	---2	2	---1	1
Loire	--2-----	2	-11-----	2	3--2	5	2---	2	1---	1
Haute Loire	--1-1-1-	3	---1----	1	2---	2	----	-	----	-
Loire Inférieure	--2-2--1	5	--1----3	4	--31	4	--32	5	--24	6
Loiret	---1----	1	---1----	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Lot	-------1	1	--1-----	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Lot et Garonne	-----1--	1	--------	-	----	-	----	-	----	-
Lozère	---1-1--	2	--1-1---	2	11--	2	-1-1	2	---1	1
Maine et Loire	----12-1	4	--1--1-3	5	2-31	6	2-22	6	1--1	2
Manche	212----1	6	1--1---2	4	1--2	3	--22	-	----	-

Marne	--1	---	11	3	-1	-----	1	2	1	---	1		---1	1	----	-
Haute Marne	--1	----	1	2	-------		1	1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Mayenne	--2	--2-	1	5	----	21-2		5	-11-	2	-112		4	-1-2		3
Meuse	----	1--1		2	--------		-		----	-	----	-	----	-
Meurthe et Moselle	1-1-	112-		6	-12-	1---		4	12--	3	22--		4	2---		2
Morbihan	----	13-2		6	---	212-2		7	-32-	5	1222		7	11--		2
Nièvre	----	1---		1	--------		-		---1	1	----	-	----	-
Nord	114-	4--3		13	1-1-	5--1		8	25-1	8	14-1		6	12-1		4
Oise	--21	----		3	---1	----		1	2--1	3	----	-	----	-
Orne	--2-	11-1		5	-1-	-21-1		5	31--	4	21--		3	2---		2
Pas de Calais	121-	2--1		7	33-	-1--1		8	2---	2	2---		2	1---		1
Puy de Dôme	-------		1	1	--------		-		----	-	----	-	----	-
Basses Pyrenées	3-1-	-----		4	-32-	-----		5	21--	3	-1-1		2	-1-1		2
Hautes Pyrenées	--1-	-----		1	--------		-		----	-	----	-	----	-
Pyrenées Orientales	--1-	-----		1	-1-1	----		2	----	-	----	-	----	-
Rhône	-22-	-----		4	-21-	-----		3	5---	5	3-1-		4	3---		3
Sâone et Loire	--1-	1---		2	----	1---		1	----	-	----	-	----	-
Sarthe	-----	113		5	-------	1		1	---1	1	1--1		2	1--1		2
Savoie	-1-	-----		1	--------		-		1---	1	---1		1	----		-
Haute Savoie	--------		-		--------		-		----	-	----	-	-1--			1
Seine	--3-	3142		23	1-3	11144		15	7225	16	7218		18	2--4		6
Seine Inférieure	1451	2---		13	1131	2---		8	51--	6	21-3		6	1-11		3
Seine et Marne	--------		-		--------		-		1---	1	----	-	----	-
Seine et Oise	--4-	-112		8	-31-	-11-		6	3---	3	2---		2	2---		2
Deux Sèvres	--1-	2---		3	----	1---		1	-1--	1	--1-		1	-1--		1
Somme	21-	-----	1	4	3-	-------		3	1---	1	----	-	----	-
Tarn	----	2--1		3	---	12---		3	-1--	1	---1		1	---1		1
Tarn et Garonne	----	1---		1	--------		-		----	-	-1--		1	-1--		1
Vaucluse	--------		-		--------		-		1---	1	----	-	----	-
Vendée	----	21-1		5	-----	1-2		3	--2-	-	-121		4	-112		4
Vienne	--1-	1---		2	----	1---		1	21--	3	11-1		3	1---		1
Vosges	--3-	--12		6	-13-	----1		5	---1	1	---1		1	---1		1
Yonne	2---	------		2	2---	------		2	----	-	----	-	----	-
Haut Rhin	--------		-		--------		-		----	-	---1		1	---1		1
Algérie	--------		-		--------		-		1---	1	----	-	-1--			1
Martinique	--------		-		--------		-		----	-	---1		1	----		-
Réunion	-------	1	1	-1-	-----		1	1	1---	1	----	-	----	-

Appendix C

The groups and how they voted, 1905-1919.

The Key

Until 1910 deputies could be members of more than one group: the second and third groups of the deputies are given in the left hand margin:

Additional abbreviations

The columns under the letter E indicate the success or failure of deputies at the elections. The E at the left of the division columns represents the election at the beginning of the appropriate legislature and the E on the right the election at the end of it:

a : did not contest the election.

b : defeated.

c : retained his seat.

d : a successful candidate for the first time.

e : formerly a deputy but not in the previous legislature.

The way the majority of each group voted is shown by the figures between parallel lines at the head of each division:

1 : in favour of the motion.

2 : against.

x : abstention.

The figures in the columns opposite the deputies' names indicate whether they voted with the majority of their groups or against it:

1 : with.

2 : against.

x : abstained

2 : in the cases when the majority of the group abstained those who voted against the motion.

When these figures are enclosed in brackets the deputy concerned was not a member of the group at the time of the divisions.

Eighth Legislature

The motions:

1. "Sur l'ensemble de projet de loi de Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat"

341-233 carried. 3rd July 1905.

2. "Sur la disjonction de l'amendment de M. Groussau."

(The amendment was: "Le dons et les legs faits aux sociétés, caisses et syndicats, avec affectation aux retraites de vieillesse et d'invalidité, sont exempts de tous droits de mutation".)

278-257 carried. 23rd February 1906.

3. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi relatif à la marine marchande".

(Protection for the merchant navy).

334-198 carried. 16th February 1906.

Union Républicaine 1905-1906

		1	2	3	E
		2	2	1	
	Arago	2	1	2	c
	Beharelle	1	1	1	a
pr	Bignon	1	1	1	c
pr	Bouctot	1	0	0	c
pr	Boury	1	1	1	c
al/ud	Caffarelli	1	1	1	b
pr	Carnot	2	1	1	c
pr	Castellane, S. de	2	1	1	b
	Coache	1	1	1	c
	Delaune	1	1	1	c
pr	Dulau	1	1	1	c
pr	Fabre	1	2	2	a
	Flandin, Etienne	2	1	2	c
pr	Fleury-Ravarin	1	1	0	b
pr	Gellé	1	1	1	c
pr	Gontaut-Biron, J. de	1	0	1	a
pr	Goujon	0	1	1	b
pr	Gourd	1	1	1	c
pr	Haudricourt	1	2	1	b
	Lebrun	2	1	1	c
pr/ud	Legrand, J.	1	0	1	c
pr	Le Moigne	1	1	0	b
pr	Marot	1	1	1	b
pr	Pradet-Balade	1	1	1	c
al/pr	Proust	1	1	1	b
pr	Rose	1	1	1	c
pr	Rouland	1	1	1	b
pr	Vallée	1	0	0	c
	Villault-Duchenois	1	1	1	c
	Vion	1	1	1	c

Républicain Progressiste 1905-1906

		1	2	3	E
		2	2	1	
	d'Alsace	1	1	1	c
	Amodru	1	2	1	c
	Anthime-Ménard	1	1	1	c
	Audigier	1	1	2	b
	Aynard	1	0	0	c
al	Ballande	1	1	2	c
	Bansard des Bois	1	1	0	c
	Barbançois	0	1	1	b
	Barrois	1	1	1	b
	Bartissol	2	1	1	c
	Beauregard, P.	1	1	1	c
	Berger	1	1	1	c
ur	Bignon	1	1	1	c
	Bischoffsheim	1	1	1	b
	Bonnevay	1	1	1	c
	Bonte	1	1	1	b
	Borgnet	1	1	1	b
	Boucher	1	1	1	c
ur	Bouctot	1	0	0	c
	Bourlon de Rouvre	1	1	1	b
ur	Boury	1	1	1	c
	Brice	1	1	1	c
	Brindeau	1	1	1	c
	Caraman	1	1	1	c
ur	Castellane, S. de	1	1	1	b
ur	Carnot	2	1	1	c
al	Chambrun	1	1	1	c
	Chevallier	1	1	1	b
	Claudinon	1	1	1	b
	Cornudet des Chomettes	1	1	1	c
rn	Coutant	1	1	1	b
al/rn	Darblay	1	1	1	b
al/rn	Denis	1	x	1	c
	Deribée-Desgardes	1	1	1	b
	Disleau	2	0	1	c
	Drake	1	1	1	b
	Dubuisson	1	2	2	c
	Duclaux-Monteil	1	2	2	c
	Dudouyt	1	1	1	c
ur	Dulau	1	1	1	c

	Dusquesnal	1	1	1	b
	Durand	1	1	1	c
ur	Fabre	1	1	1	a
ur	Fleury-Ravarin	1	1	0	b
al/rn	Frouchier	1	1	1	a
	Gaffier	1	1	1	c
al	Gaillard	1	1	1	c
	Gautier	1	1	1	b
ur	Gellé	1	1	1	c
ur	Gontaut-Biron, J. de	1	0	1	a
ur	Goujon	0	1	1	b
ur	Gourd	1	1	1	c
al	Guichenné	-	2	2	c
	Guillain	1	1	1	c
	Harriague Saint-Martin	1	0	0	a
ur	Haudricourt	1	2	1	b
	Hémon	1	1	1	c
	Kerjégu	1	1	1	c
	Krantz	1	1	1	c
	Laniel, H.	1	1	1	c
	Lannes de Montebello	1	1	1	b
ud	Laurençon	1	1	1	b
	Laurent	-	-	1	c
	Lebaudy	1	1	1	c
	Lefas	1	1	1	c
	Léglise	1	1	1	c
ur/ud	Legrand, J.	1	0	1	c
ur	Le Moigne	1	1	0	b
	Mando	1	1	1	c
	Marin	-	1	1	c
ur	Marot	1	1	1	b
	Miossec	1	1	1	b
	Montjou	1	1	1	b
	Motte	1	1	1	b
	Moustier	1	1	1	c
	d'Ory	1	1	1	c
	Perier de Larsan	1	1	1	c
	Perroche	1	1	1	c
al	Pichat	1	1	1	b
	Prache	1	1	1	c
ur	Pradet-Balade	1	1	1	c
al/ur	Proust	1	1	1	b
	Quesnal	1	1	1	c
	Quilbeuf	1	1	0	c
	Raiberti	1	1	1	c
	Renault-Morlière	1	1	1	b

	Riotteau	1	1	1	a
	Ribot	1	1	1	c
	Roche, J.	1	1	1	c
al/rn	Roger-Ballu	1	1	x	a
	Ripert	1	1	0	a
ur	Rose	1	1	1	c
	Rouland	1	1	1	b
al	Saint-Pol	1	1	1	c
	Salles	1	1	1	b
	Sibille	1	1	1	c
	Thierry	1	1	1	c
	Thierry-Delanoue	1	1	1	c
ur	Vallée	1	0	0	c
	Vogeli	2	0	0	a

Action Libérale 1905-1906

		1	2	3	E
		2	2	1	
	Adam	1	1	1	a
	Arnal	1	1	1	a
pr	Ballande	1	1	2	c
rn	Beauregard, G. de	1	1	1	b
	Benoist, A. de	1	1	1	b
rn	Boissieu	1	1	1	c
	Bougère, F.	1	1	1	c
rn	Cachet	1	1	1	c
ur	Caffarelli	1	1	1	b
	Castelnau	1	1	1	c
pr	Chambrun	1	1	1	c
	Cochin, D.	1	1	2	c
	Cochin, H.	1	1	1	c
rn	Corrard des Essarts	1	1	1	b
	Dansette	1	1	1	c
pr/rn	Darblay	1	1	1	b
rn	Daudé	1	-	-	a
rn	Dèche	1	x	2	b
pr/rn	Denis	1	x	1	c
	Desjardins	1	1	1	c
rn	Dutreil	1	1	1	c
rn	d'Elva	1	-	-	a
rn	Fabien-Cesbron	1	1	1	b
rn	Fontaines	1	1	1	c
	Forest	1	1	1	c
rn	Fouché	1	1	1	b
pr/rn	Frouchier	1	1	1	a
	Gailhard-Bancel	1	1	1	c
pr	Gaillard	1	1	1	c
	Galot	1	1	1	a
	Gayraud	1	1	1	c
rn	Grandmaison, G. de	1	1	1	c
	Groussau	1	1	1	c
pr	Guichenné	-	2	2	c
rn	Guilloteaux	1	1	1	c
	du Halgouët	1	1	1	c
rn	Jacquey	1	1	1	c
	Jaluzot	1	x	x	a
rn	La Chambre	1	1	1	b

	La Ferronays	1	1	1	c
rn	Lamy	1	1	1	c
	Laroche-Joubert	1	1	1	b
	La Rochethulon	1	0	1	b
	Laurens Castelet	1	x	x	b
pr	Lefas	1	1	1	c
	Lerolle	1	1	1	c
	Lespinay	1	1	1	b
rn	L'Estourbeillon	1	1	1	c
rn	Limon	1	x	1	c
	Ludre, F. de	1	1	1	c
	Mackau	1	1	1	c
	Maille	1	1	1	c
	Massabuau	1	1	1	c
	Maurice-Binder	1	1	1	c
	Maussabré	1	1	1	b
	Michel	1	1	1	b
	de Mun	1	1	1	c
rn	Ollivier	1	1	1	c
	d'Osmoy	1	1	1	c
	Pain	1	1	1	b
	Passy	1	1	1	c
rn	Paulmier	1	1	1	c
pr	Pichat	1	1	1	b
	Piou	1	1	1	c
	Plichon	1	1	1	c
	Pomereu	1	1	1	c
ur/pr	Proust	1	1	1	b
rn	Pugliesi-Conti, P.	1	1	1	c
	Reille, A. de	1	1	1	c
	Reille, X. de	1	1	1	c
pr/rn	Roger-Ballu	1	1	x	a
	Roscoat	1	1	1	b
rn	Rudelle	1	1	1	c
pr	Saint-Pol	1	1	1	c
	Savary de Beauregard	1	1	1	c
rn	Spronck	1	1	1	c
	Suchetet	1	1	1	c
	Taillandier	1	1	1	c
	Villiers	1	1	1	c

Républicain Nationaliste 1905-1906

		1	2	3	E
		2	2	1	
	Archdeacon	1	-	-	a
	Auffray	1	1	1	b
al	Beauregard, G. de	1	1	1	b
	Berry	1	1	1	c
	Bienaimé	1	1	1	c
al	Boissieu	1	1	1	c
	Brice, J.	1	-	-	a
al	Cachet	1	1	1	c
	Cavaignac	1	-	-	a
	Castellane, B. de	1	1	1	c
	Congy	1	0	1	b
al	Corrard des Essarts	1	1	1	b
pr	Coutant	1	1	1	b
pr/al	Darblay	1	1	1	b
al	Daudé	1	-	-	a
al	Dèche	1	x	2	b
pr/al	Denis	1	x	1	c
	Delarbre	1	1	1	a
	Dion	1	1	1	c
al	Dutreil	1	1	1	c
al	d'Elva	1	-	-	a
	Engerand	1	1	0	c
al	Fabien-Cesbron	1	1	1	b
	Failliot	2	1	1	c
	Faure	1	1	1	b
	Ferrette	1	1	1	c
	Flandin, Ernest	1	1	1	c
	Flayelle	1	1	1	c
	Flourens	1	1	1	b
al	Fontaines	1	1	1	c
al	Fouché	1	1	1	b
pr/al	Frouchier	1	1	1	a
	Gauthier de Clagny	1	1	1	c
	Gervauze	1	1	1	b
	Ginoux-Defermon	1	1	1	c
al	Grandmaison, G. de	1	1	1	c
al	Guilloteaux	1	1	1	c

	Guyot de Villeneuve, J.	1	1	1	b
al	Jacquey	1	1	1	c
al	La Chambre	1	1	1	b
al	Lamy	1	1	1	c
	Lasies	1	1	1	c
	Lepelletier	1	1	1	b
al	L'Estourbeillon	1	1	1	c
al	Limon	1	x	1	c
	Millevoye	1	1	1	c
al	Ollivier	1	1	1	c
al	Paulmier	1	1	1	c
	de Pins	1	1	1	c
al	Pugliesi-Conti, P.	1	1	1	c
	Roche, E.	2	1	1	b
pr/al	Roger-Ballu	1	1	x	b
al	Rudelle	1	1	1	c
al	Spronck	1	1	1	c
	Tournade	2	1	2	c

Independents 1905-1906

	1	2	3	E
	2	2	1	
Ancel-Sietz	1	1	1	b
Argeliès	2	1	1	c
d'Aubigny	1	1	1	b
Baudry d'Asson	1	1	1	c
Benoist, C.	1	1	x	c
Berthoulat	1	1	1	b
Bertrand	1	1	1	c
Bonvalot	1	1	1	a
Bougère, L.	1	1	2	c
Brisson	1	1	1	b
Broglie	1	1	1	c
Cardon	1	1	1	b
Cauvin	2	2	2	c
Cibiel	1	1	1	c
Compayré	1	2	2	b
Delafosse	1	1	1	c
Delelis-Fanien	1	2	1	c
De Mahy	1	0	0	a
Fouquet	1	1	1	c
Galpin	1	1	0	c
Gérard	1	1	1	a
Gérard, baron de	1	1	1	c
Godefroy	1	-	-	a
Le Gonidec de Traissan	1	1	1	c
Grosjean	1	1	1	b
Lachièze	1	1	1	b
Lanjuinais	1	1	1	c
Largentaye	1	1	1	c
Laville	1	1	1	b
Legrand, A.	1	1	1	c
Lemire	1	1	1	c
Levis-Mirepoix	1	1	1	c
Montalembert	1	1	1	a
d'Ornano	1	1	1	c
Poullain	1	1	1	c
Ramel	1	1	1	c
Rauline	1	1	1	c
Rohan	1	1	1	c
Rousset	1	1	1	b
Rozet	1	2	1	c
Saint-Martin	1	1	1	a

Ninth Legislature

Key:

The second group of deputies in the left hand column is contained in brackets (e.g. (ur)) when the deputy joined that group in 1908 and underlined (e.g. ur) when the deputy joined that group in 1909.

The motions:

1. "La Chambre approuvant les déclarations du gouvernement, confiante en sa fermeté pour assurer l'application intégrale de la loi de Séparation et repoussant toute addition passe à l'ordre du jour".

(the underlined part only). 385-144 carried. 13th November 1906.

2. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi concernant l'exercise public des cultes".

388-146 carried. 21st December 1906.

3. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi tendant à modifier divers articles de la loi de 9 décembre 1905 sur la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat".

351-169 carried. 21st December 1907.

4. "Sur la fixation d'une séance exceptionnelle à jeudi matin".

(For the discussion of attacks on the lay school).

370-152 carried. 2nd March 1910.

5. "Sur l'urgence de la proposition de loi de M. Argeliès, tendant à l'amnestie à l'occasion des évènements de Draveil-Vigneux et Villeneuve Saint-Georges (Seine et Oise)".

237-245 rejected (after rectifications this became 252-231 but according to the rules of the Chamber the result announced in the Chamber had to stand). 23rd December 1908.

6. "La Chambre, resolue à donner aux fonctionnaires un statut légal excluant formellement le droit de grève, confiante dans le gouvernement, passe à l'ordre du jour".

442-62 carried. 26th March 1909.

7. "Sur la disjonction de l'amendment de MM. Devèze et Pastre à l'article 4 du projet de loi rélatif à la sériculture et à la filature de soie".

(The amendment was: "Pour avoir droit à toucher les primes de l'article 4 les filatures devront payer à leurs ouvriers un supplement de 25 centimes par jour sur les salaires en cours, à prélever sur la prime".)

316-202 carried, 21st May 1909.

8. "La Chambre, approuvant les declarations du gouvernement en faveur de l'impôt progressif sur le revenu, passe à l'ordre du jour".

(The underlined part only). 433-83 carried. 13th July 1906.

9. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi concernant le rachat du réseau des chemins de fer de l'Ouest".

364-187 carried. 7th December 1906.

10. "Sur la proposition de M. Lasies de passer à une 2e délibération sur le projet de loi rélatif à l'impôt sur les revenus".

154-371 rejected. 5th March 1909.

11. "Sur le renvoi à la quinzaine de la discussion sur les graines oléagineuses (tarrif général des douanes)".

293-213 carried. 3rd November 1909.

12. "Sur le projet de loi concernant la réintegration dans les cadres de l'armée du capitaine Dreyfus, avec le grade de chef d'escadron".

432-32 carried. 13th July 1906.

13. "Sur l'article 1er du projet de résolution portant fixation des dépenses de la Chambre des Députés pour l'exercise 1907".

(Raising of parliamentary salaries).

290-210 carried. 30th November 1906.

14. "Sur le renvoi à la commission de la proposition de loi de MM. Maurice Violette et Steeg, tendant à la modification de l'article 33 du code civile, en ce qui concerne les enfants adulterins".

(Legitimisation of bastards).

198-340 rejected. 18th February 1907.

15. "Sur l'ensemble de projet de loi portant l'ouverture d'un crédit pour la translation des cendres d'Emile Zola au Panthéon".

344-144 carried. 19th March 1908.

Union Républicaine 1906-1910

		E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	E
			1	x	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	
pr	d'Alsace	c	1	2	1	-	0	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	0	-
pr	Amodru	c	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Arago	c	1	2	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	1	2	x	1	b
pr	Argeliès	c	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	x	x	1	1	x	a
pr	Bansard des Bois	c	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	x	2	1	0	c
ud/pr	Bar	d	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	x	c
(ud)pr	Bartissol	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	a
ud	Benazet	d	1	1	x	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	c
ud/pr	Bignon	c	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Bonnevay	c	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	c
(ud)al	Bonniard	d	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Bouctot	c	1	1	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	2	2	x	1	1	1	c
pr	Boury	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	x	1	1	x	c
(ud)	Brousse, E.	d	(1)	(1)	(1)	x	0	1	1	(1)	(1)	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	x	c
pr	Carnot	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	c
ud	Cauvin	c	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	-	-	1	2	1	-	-
pr	Chambrun	c	(2)	(2)	(1)	1	1	1	2	(1)	(1)	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	c
	Coache	c	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	1	0	c
pr	Cornudet des Chomettes	c	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	c
	Delaune	c	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	a
pr	Dubuisson	c	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	c
gd/ud	Delelis-Fanien	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	c
ud/pr	Dulau	c	1	2	x	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	x	c
	Dusquesnay	e	1	0	x	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	x	2	0	0	b
	Failliot	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	c
ud	Flandin, Etienne	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	x	0	1	1	1	x	c
pr	Gaffier	c	(1)	(0)	(1)	1	1	1	1	(1)	(1)	1	1	(x)	(1)	(1)	1	c
pr	Gasparin	d	x	1	2	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	1	1	(1)	(1)	1	1	1	(x)	b
pr	Gellé	c	1	2	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	2	1	1	-
pr	Gontaut-Biron, B.	d	-	-	1	1	x	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	c
pr	Gourd	c	2	2	1	1	x	1	0	2	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
pr	Hémon	c	x	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	1	0	0	c
pr	Laniel, H.	c	(2)	(2)	(x)	0	1	1	1	(2)	(1)	1	2	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	c
pr	Lebaudy	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	a
ud/pr	Lebrun, A.	c	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
ud/pr	Léglise	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	x	a
ud/pr	Legrand, J.	c	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	1	x	a

pr	Mando	c	2	2	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	c
pr	Ory	c	0	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	2	1	0	1	1	b
ud/pr	Perier de Larsan	c	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	0	1	-	-	0	1	0	0	-
pr	Perroche	c	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	2	1	a
	Poullain	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	x	c
pr	Pradet-Balade	c	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	x	c
pr	Raiberti	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Rose	c	0	0	x	x	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	2	x	0	b
pr	Thierry	c	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	c
ud/pr	Thierry-Delanoue	c	0	2	2	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	c
ud/pr	Vallée	c	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	a
ud	Villault-Duchesnois	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	2	1	2	0	x	c
ur	Vion	c	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	a

Républicain Progressiste 1906-1910

		E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	E
			2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	
al	Alicot	e	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
ur	d'Alsace	c	2	1	1	-	0	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	0	-
ur	Amodru	c	2	1	1	1	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	b
al	Anthime-Ménard	c	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	0	1	1	b
	Archambeaud, L.	d	-	1	2	2	2	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	0	a
ur	Argeliès	c	(2)	(0)	(1)	2	2	1	1	(1)	(2)	2	x	(x)	(1)	(1)	x	a
al	Auriol	d	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Aynard	c	x	x	1	1	1	x	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Ballande	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
ur	Bansard des Bois	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
ud/ur	Bar	d	2	x	0	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	x	c
ud/ur	Bartissol	c	2	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	a
	Beauregard, P.	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	x	1	1	1	c
al	Belcastel	d	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	b
	Berger	c	1	x	0	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	a
ud/ur	Bignon	c	2	x	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	c
ur	Bonnevay	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	c
	Boucher	c	x	1	1	-	x	-	-	1	1	-	-	x	1	1	1	-
ur	Bouctot	c	2	x	1	0	2	-	1	1	1	2	2	x	1	1	x	c
ur	Boury	c	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	x	1	1	x	c
	Brice, R.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	x	c
	Brindeau	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
ur	Carnot	c	2	x	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	c
ur	Chambrun	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
ur	Cornudet des Chomettes	c	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	c
al	Denis	c	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	x	2	1	1	-
	Des Lyon de Feuchin	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	c
ud	Disleau	c	2	2	x	x	2	0	1	1	2	2	0	1	2	1	x	c
ur	Dubuisson	c	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	c
	Duclaux-Monteil	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	c
al	Dudouyt	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	b
ud/ur	Dulau	c	2	x	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	x	c
	Dupourqué	d	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	a
	Durand	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	c
rn	d'Elissagaray	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	c
ud	Farjon	d	2	x	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	b
ur	Gaffier	c	x	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
al	Gaillard	c	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	x	1	1	1	a
ur	Gasparin	d	x	x	2	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	0	2	(2)	(2)	0	2	2	(0)	b
	Gauvin	d	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	1	1	2	x	1	0	1	a
ur	Gellé	c	2	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	2	1	1	-

ur	Gontaut-Biron, B.	d	-	-	1	1	x	1	1	1	-	1	1	2	-	-	1	c
ur	Gourd	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	0	2	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
al	Guichenné	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	x	1	1	1	c
	Guillain	c	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
al	Guilloteaux	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	b
ur	Hémon	c	x	x	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	x	1	0	0	c
	Kerjégu	c	2	1	1	-	0	-	-	1	0	-	-	-	0	1	0	-
	Krantz	c	2	x	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	b
al	Lamy	c	1	x	1	1	2	1	0	2	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
ur	Laniel, H.	c	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Laurent, G.	d	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	x	c
ur	Lebaudy	c	2	x	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	a
ud/ur	Lebrun, A.	c	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	x	c
	Lefas	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
	Lefébvre du Preÿ	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	c
ud/ur	Léglise	c	2	x	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	x	a
ud/ur	Legrand, J.	c	0	x	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	1	x	a
	Leroy-Beaulieu, P.	d	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	c
ur	Mando	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	c
	Marin	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
al	Monsservin	e	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Moustier	c	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	c
	Munin-Bourdin	e	1	1	1	0	x	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	a
al	Néron	e	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
ur	Ory	c	0	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	2	2	0	2	2	b
al	d'Osmoy	c	1	1	1	1	x	x	x	x	1	x	2	2	1	1	1	a
al	Pasquier	c	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	x	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	b
ud/ur	Perier de Larsan	c	2	x	1	-	-	-	-	0	1	-	-	0	1	0	0	-
ur	Perroche	c	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	a
	Prache	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	a
ur	Pradet-Balade	c	2	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	x	c
	Quesnal	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
	Quilbeuf	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	x	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
ur	Raiberti	c	2	x	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Ribot	c	2	x	1	-	1	-	-	x	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	-
	Roche, J.	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
ur	Rose	c	0	x	x	x	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	2	x	0	b
al	Saint-Pol	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	x	2	1	1	b
	Sibille	c	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	c
al	Spronck	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
ur	Thierry,	c	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	c
ud/ur	Thierry-Delanoue	c	0	1	1	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	c
ud/ur	Vallée	c	2	x	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	x	a

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		E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	E
			2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	x	2	1	2	
	Adigard	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Alicot	e	1	1	1	1	x	2	2	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	a
pr	Anthime-Ménard	c	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	b
pr	Auriol	d	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Belcastel	d	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
rn	Boissieu	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	b
ur	Bonniard	d	2	x	1	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	2	1	(2)	(1)	2	1	1	(1)	c
	Bougère, F.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
rn	Cachet	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	a
	Castelnau	c	1	0	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	0	-
	Cochin, H.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Dansette	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Denis	c	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	-
	Desjardins	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Dudouyt	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Dussaussoy	e	1	x	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	1	1	1	-
rn	Dutreil	c	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
rn	Ferrette	c	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	b
rn	Fontaines	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Forest	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Gailhard-Bancel	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Gaillard	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	a
	Gayraud	c	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
rn	Grandmaison, G.de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
	Groussau	c	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	c
pr	Guichenné	c	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	1	1	(1)	(1)	0	1	(1)	(1)	1	1	c
pr	Guilloteaux	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	b
rn	Guyot de Villeneuve, C.	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	b
	du Halgouët	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
	Hercé	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
rn	Jacquey	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	b
pr	Lamy	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Leblanc, E.	e	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
	Lerolle, C	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Ludre, F. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	c
	Maille	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	-
	Massabuau	c	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	c
pr	Monsservin	e	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Monti de Rezé	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	b

	de Mun	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
pr	Néron	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
rn	Ollivier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
pr	d'Osmoy	c	1	1	1	1	x	x	1	x	1	x	2	1	1	1	1	a
pr	Pasquier	c	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
	Passy	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	c
rn	Paulmier	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	0	1	-	-
	Pinault	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	a
rn	de Pins	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
	Piou	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Plichon	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Pomereu	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	c
rn	Pugliesi-Conti, P.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
	Reille, A. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	c
	Reille, X. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
rn	Rudelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
pr	Saint-Pol	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	b
	Savary de Beauregard	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Schneider	c	2	x	1	1	2	1	0	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
pr	Spronck	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Suchetet	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	x	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	a
	Taillandier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
	Vandame	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Villiers	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
rn	L'Estourbeillon	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c

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		E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	E
			2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	x	2	1	2	
	Berry	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	c
	Bienaimé	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
al	Boissieu	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	b
al	Cachet	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	a
	Castellane, B. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	b
	Dion	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	x	1	c
al	Dutreil	c	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
pr	d'Elissagaray	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	c
	Engerand	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	c
al	Ferrette	c	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	b
	Flandin, Ernest	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	c
	Flayelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	c
al	Fontaines	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Gauthier de Clagny	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	a
	Ginoux-Defermon	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
al	Grandmaison, G. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
al	Guilloteaux	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	b
al	Goyot de Villeneuve, C.	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	b
al	Jacquey	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	b
pr/al	Lamy	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Lasies	c	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	a
al	L'Estourbeillon	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
al	Limon	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
	Millevoye	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
al	Ollivier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
al	Paulmier	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	0	1	-	-
al	de Pins	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	b
al	Pugliese-Conti, P.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
pr/al	Rudelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Tournade	c	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c

Independents 1906-1910

		E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	E
			2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	
	Barrès	e	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Baudry d'Asson	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Benoist, C.	c	x	1	1	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
	Bertrand	c	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
	Biétry	d	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	1	0	1	a
	Blacas	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Bougère, L.	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Broglie	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Cibiel, A.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
(gd/ud)	Clament	c	2	2	2	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	2	2	(2)	(1)	2	2	1	(0)	c
	Cochin, D.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Delafosse	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	2	1	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	c
	Delahaye	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	c
	Dior	d	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	x	1	1	1	x	1	0	1	c
	Dussaussoy	e	1	x	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	1	1	1	-
	Flayelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Fouquet	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	c
	Galpin	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
pr/ur	Gasparin	d	(x)	(x	(2)	0	2	1	2	(2)	(1)	1	1	(2)	(1)	(1)	x	b
	Gérard, baron de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
	Le Gonidec de Traissan	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
	Hennessy, James	-	x	1	x	1	0	0	1	x	1	1	1	x	x	1	1	c
	Juigné	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	La Ferronays	c	1	1	1	1	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Lanjuinais	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Largentaye	c	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
	Lavrignais	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Legrand, A.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Lemire	c	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	x	2	2	2	2	1	1	c
	Levis-Mirepoix	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	b
	Maurice-Binder	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Montaigu	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	d'Ornano	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Ramel	c	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
	Rauline	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
	Rohan	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
	Rosanbo	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	b
(ud)	Rozet	c	2	2	1	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	2	1	(2)	(2)	(2)	1	1	(1)	c
	Villebois-Mareuil	-	-	1	1	2	1	1	0	-	1	1	2	-	1	0	x	c

Tenth Legislature

Key:

In November 1911 the Groupe Républicain Progressiste split; those who broke away re-formed the Groupe de l'Union Républicaine. The names of the latter are underlined in the group list. One deputy broke away late in 1912 and his name is in brackets.

The motions:

1. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi concernant le recrutement de l'armée".

(The three years law)

339-233 carried. 19th July 1913.

2. "La Chambre, prenant acte des déclarations du gouvernement, confiante en lui pour procéder sur le reseau d'Etat à la révision des cas de revocation dans la plus large esprit d'équité, de bienveillance et d'humanité et pour insister auprès des compagnies pour qu'elles procédent à cette révision dans le même esprit, et, repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour".

394-86 carried. 20th December 1910.

3. "La Chambre approuvant les déclarations du gouvernement, comptant sur lui pour obtenir des compagnies les mêmes mesures de réintegration que celles qui ont accordées par l'Etat aux employés de son réseau et repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour".

(the underlined part only). 341-115 carried. 14th April 1911.

4. "Sur l'amendment de M. Tournade à l'article 1er du projet de loi tendant à reduire à dix heures la durée de la journée de travail".

(This amendment substituted 11 hours for 10 hours). 49-400 rejected. 28th March 1912.

5. "Sur l'ajournement de l'interpellation (- sur l' augmentation croissante du prix du pain et la manque de farine dans plusieurs villes de la France -) de M. Georges Berry relative aux blés".

344-280 carried. 27th June 1912.

6. "La Chambre, approuvant les déclarations du gouvernement et confiante en lui pour assurer l'application intégrale des lois de laïcité de 1901 et 1904, repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour".

(the underlined part only) 429-70 carried. 24th February 1911.

7. "Sur l'amendment de M. Marin à un projet de loi concernant la fréquentation des écoles et la défense de l'école laïque".

(The control of reading matter in schools). 152-410 rejected.

16th January 1914.

8. "Sur l'amendment de Germain Périer, Gilbert Laurent, d'Elissagaray, et Boudoint à l'article 2 du projet de loi relatif aux caisses des écoles".

The amendment was the addition of two words to article 2:

"La caisses des écoles à pour but de faciliter le fonctionnement des écoles publiques et privées par tous les moyens propre à encourager la frequentation scolaire".

152-140 rejected. 16th June 1914.

9. "Sur l'amendment de M. Malavialle à l'article 1er du projet de loi tendant à établir le scrutin de liste avec représentation proportionelle".

The amendment was - "Les membres de la Chambre des Députés sont élus au scrutin majoritaire".

223-341 rejected. 22nd June 1911.

10. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi modifié par le Sénat, portant modification aux lois organiques sur l'élection des députés".

333-225 carried. 18th November 1913.

11. "Sur le projet de loi portant ouverture d'un crédit pour la célébration, aux frais de l'Etat, des funérailles de M. le général Picquart, ancien ministre de la guerre".

309-119 carried. 20th January 1914.

12. "Sur l'amendment de M. Delpierre, Roden et Lavoinne à l'article 3 du projet de loi concernant l'émission de rentes de 3 p. 100 perpétuelles".

The amendment was - "Mention sera faite, sur les extraits d'inscription, du maintien pour les rentes sur l'Etat, de toutes les immunités actuellement existantes".

265-290 rejected. 2nd December 1913.

Républicain Progressiste and Union Républicaine 1910-1914

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		1	1	2	x	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	
Adigard	c	1	0	1	0	0	2	-	-	1	1	-	1	-
Arbel	d	1	1	x	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Archambeaud, A.	d	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	a
d'Aramon	d	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
d'Argenson	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Aynard	c	-	1	1	1	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Bagneux	d	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Ballande	c	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Bansard des Bois	c	1	1	x	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	a
Beauregard, P.	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Benoist, C.	c	1	1	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Bienaimé	c	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Bonnefous	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	c
Bonnevay	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Bories	-	-	0	1	2	x	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Boudoint	d	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Bouge	d	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	c
Boury	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Brice, R.	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Brindeau	c	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Chambrun	c	1	1	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	x	x	1	c
Chanot	d	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Chiavo	d	-	1	x	1	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Cornudet des Chomettes	c	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	c
Crolard	d	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)	1	1	(1)	1	1	1	c
Daniélou	d	1	(1)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	1	1	(1)	1	x	1	b
Delachanel	d	1	1	x	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Desjardins	c	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)	1	1	(1)	1	1	1	b
Dior	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Dubarle	d	1	1	x	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	b
Dubois	d	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Duclaux-Monteil	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	0	1	c
Durand, J.	c	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Engerand	c	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Escudier	d	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Flandin, Ernest	c	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	c
Fleury-Ravarin	e	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	x	0	b
Forgemol de Bostquenard	d	1	1	x	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Fougère	d	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	c
Fournier-Sarlovèze	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	b

France	d	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Gaffier	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Gontaut-Biron, J. de	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	a
Gourd	c	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Grandmaison, G.de	c	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Guesnier	d	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Hémon	c	-	0	1	-	-	0	-	-	x	-	-	-	-
Hennessy, James	c	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
(Hennessy, Jean)	d	1	0	x	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	x	1	c
Houbé	d	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	1	-	1	x	1	c
Hucher	d	1	1	x	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Lacour	d	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	x	1	1	x	1	b
Lairolle	d	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	c
Laniel, H.	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Lannes de Montebello	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	a
Leblond	d	1	1	1	1	1	2	-	-	1	1	-	1	-
Lefas	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Lefébvre du Prey	c	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Leroy-Beaulieu, P.	c	1	x	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
des Lyons de Feuchin	c	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Marin	c	1	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Maunoury, G.	d	1	-	x	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Monprofit	d	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Monsservin	c	-	1	0	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Montjou	e	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Moustier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Néron	c	1	x	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	a
Nortier	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Passy	c	1	1	1	1	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Pays	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	x	1	c
Peyroux	d	1	0	0	1	x	0	1	1	0	1	x	1	c
Pradet-Balade	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Pugliesi-Conti, D.	d	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Quesnal	c	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Quilbeuf	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Raiberti	c	1	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Roche, J.	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	x	1	1	1	0	1	c
Roulleaux-Dugage	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	c
Seydoux	d	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Spronck	c	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Thierry	c	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Thierry-Delanoue	c	1	1	x	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Tournade	c	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Toy Riant	d	1	0	x	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	b
Vandame	c	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	c

Action Libérale 1910-1914

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		1	1	2	x	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	
Augé	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Auriol	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Cassadou	d	1	0	1	2	x	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Chappedelaine	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Cochin, H.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Daniélou	d	(1)	1	1	2	1	x	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	(x)	(1)	b
Dansette	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Delafosse	c	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Denais	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Desjardins	c	(1)	1	1	1	1	1	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	b
Driant	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Dumont	d	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Dutreil	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Forest	c	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Gailhard-Bancel	c	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
Gayraud	c	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	-
Groussau	c	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	c
Guichenné	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Hugot-Derville	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	b
Lamy	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Legendre	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lerolle	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
L'Estourbeillon	c	1	x	1	2	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Limon	c	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Ludre, F. de	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Mackau	c	0	1	1	2	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Massabuau	c	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Ménard	d	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
de Mun	c	1	x	x	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
Pain	e	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Piou	c	1	0	1	0	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Plichon	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Poitou-Duplessy	d	-	0	x	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Pomereu	c	1	0	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Porteu	d	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Reille, A. de	c	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	a
Savary de Beauregard	c	-	1	x	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Villiers	c	-	x	x	1	1	0	-	-	1	-	-	-	-

Droites 1910-1914

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	
Baudry d'Asson	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Blacas	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Bougère, F.	c	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	x	1	0	c
Cibiel, A.	c	1	x	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Cochin, D.	c	1	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Delahaye	c	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	x	1	1	1	c
Gérard, baron de	c	1	1	1	x	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Ginoux-Defermon	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Le Gonidec de Traissan	c	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
du Halgouët	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Hercé	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Juigné	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Kernier	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
La Ferronays	c	1	x	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Lanjuinais	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Lavrignais	c	1	x	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Montaigu	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Ramel	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	b
Rohan	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	c
Taudière	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Villebois-Mareuil	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a

Indépendants 1910-1914

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	
Andrieux	e	(1)	1	(0)	(2)	(1)	2	(0)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(0)	(x)	c
Ancel		1	-	-	1	x	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Barrès	c	1	1	1	x	2	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Beauchamps	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	1	-	1	1	1	b
Berry	c	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	c
Bougère, L.	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	c
Castelin	e	-	1	2	1	0	x	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Damour	d	2	1	x	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	c
Dion	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	c
d'Elissagaray	c	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Eymond	d	1	-	-	1	2	1	2	1	-	2	2	1	c
Flayelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Fouquet	c	-	1	x	x	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Galpin	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Heuzé	d	1	1	x	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	b
Houbé	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	-	1	x	1	c
Janin	d	(1)	1	(x)	(1)	(1)	2	(2)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	a
Josse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	c
Jousselin	d	(1)	1	x	(1)	(1)	2	(2)	(x)	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	b
Legrand, A.	c	1	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	c
Lemire	c	1	1	2	1	1	x	1	0	2	2	0	x	c
Maurice-Binder	c	1	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
Millevoye	c	1	0	x	x	2	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Poitou-Duplessy	d	-	0	x	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Pugliesi-Conti, P.	c	1	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Rauline	c	1	1	1	x	x	0	1	1	2	2	0	1	c
Simon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	0	c

Eleventh Legislature

The motions:

1. "La Chambre, respectueuse de la volonté récement exprimée par le suffrage universel, résolue à ne donner sa confiance qu'à un gouvernement capable de réaliser l'union des forces de gauche, et repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour".

(the priority) 306-262 carried. 12th June 1914.

2. "Sur le demande pour un comité secret".

303-190 carried. 13th October 1915.

3. "Sur la deuxième partie de l'ordre du jour de M. Maurice Sibille et plusieurs de ses collègues".

440-99 carried. 22nd June 1916.

4. "La Chambre prenant acte des déclarations de gouvernement sur la réorganisation du commandement, approuvant sa résolution de concentrer sous une direction restreinte la conduite générale de la guerre et l'organisation économique du pays".

   "Confiante en lui pour obtenir, en plein accord avec les alliés, les sacrifices et les efforts communs reconnus indespensables pour arriver, par une énergie redoublée, à la victoire définitive, repoussant toute addition, passe à l'ordre du jour".

(Underlined part only). 344-169 carried. 7th December 1916.

5. "Sur le mots de l'ordre du jour de M. Lenoir "confiante dans le gouvernement"."

313-135 carried. 27th January 1917.

6. "La Chambre, soucieuse de la nécessité d'intensifier toutes les forces de défense et de production de la nation, prenant acte des déclarations du gouvernement, comptant sur lui pour rendre à la terre tous les travailleurs dont la présence aux armées n'est pas indespensable et pour prendre les décisions urgentes afin d'assurer les besoins vitaux par une organisation méthodique et rationalle de toutes les resources, repoussant toute addition passe à l'ordre du jour".

296-1 carried. 9th March 1917.

7. "Sur l'ajournement des interpellations relatives à la politique intérieure".

186-277 rejected. 13th November 1917.

8. "La Chambre, flétrissant les menées royaliste de la guerre civile qui tendent à diviser le pays devant l'ennemi, confiante dans le gouvernement pour les supprimer, et pour assurer la défense des institutions républicaines par la stricte application de la loi, repoussant toute addition passe à l'ordre du jour".

(The underlined word only). 457-11 carried. 18th January 1918.

9. "Sur la demande de suppression des mots "à titre exceptionnel" (article 12 du projet de loi concernant les loyers échus par la guerre)".

214-228 rejected. 11th April 1916.

10. "Sur l'ensemble du projet de loi portant renouvellement du privelège de la banque de France".

231-72 carried. 30th July 1918.

11. "Sur le contre-projet de M. Jules Delahaye". This was: "Article unique: Sont supprimées à partir des déclarations de guerre, toute les naturalisations accordées aux sujets allemands, austro-hongrois et turcs, qui n'ont pas un ou plusieurs fils combattant sous les drapeaux de l'armée française. Toute naturalisation pourra être retirée en ces cas et dans une forme déterminée par un règlement d'administration publique".

43-436 defeated. 28th January 1915.

12. "Sur la motion préjudicielle, tendant au renvoi du projet de loi concernant la mise en culture des terres abondonnées et l'organisation du travail agricole pendant la guerre".

123-270 rejected. 21st March 1916.

Fédération Républicaine 1914-1919

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	x	1	
d'Aubigny	e	1	1	1	1	x	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	c
Ballande	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	c
Beauregard, P.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	2	a
Bonnefous	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	c
Bonnevay	c	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	0	2	2	c
Brice, R.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	c
Benoist, C.	c	1	1	1	1	x	x	1	1	1	x	2	x	a
Crolard	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Dubois	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	c
Duclaux-Monteil	c	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	2	2	c
Dumesnil	d	1	x	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	1	a
Escudier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	2	c
Gourd	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	c
Grandmaison, G. de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	c
Laniel, H.	c	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	c
Lefas	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	b
Lefébvre du Preÿ	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	c
Leredu	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	c
Ludre, marquis de	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Marin	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	c
Maunoury	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	0	1	1	c
Montjou	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Neyret	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	c
Moustier	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	c
Nortier	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pays	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	c
Peyroux	c	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	c
Prat	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	1	a
Robic	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	2	0	c
Roche, J.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	a
Roulleaux-Dugage	c	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	c
Soubigou	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spronck	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	x	b
Taillandier	e	1	1	2	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	x	b
Tournade	c	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	b
Vandame	c	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	c
Wendel, F. de	d	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	c

Action Libérale 1914-1919

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		2	2	1	1	1	1	2	x	2	1	x	1	
Augé	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
Cochin, C.	d	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	-
Constans	d	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	x	c
Dansette	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	-
Denais	c	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	2	1	1	1	0	b
Driant	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	-
Dutreil	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	c
Engerand	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	c
Gailhard-Bancel	c	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	x	c
Groussau	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	c
Guichenné	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	c
Lamy	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	x	2	x	c
Lerolle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	b
L'Estourbeillon	c	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	x	2	0	c
Ludre, F. de	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Mackau	c	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	-
de Mun	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pain	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	2	b
Piou	c	1	1	1	x	x	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	a
Plichon	c	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	c
Pomereu	c	1	x	1	x	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	b
Porteu	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	b
Puineuf	-	-	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	c
Rochereau	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	c
Sibuet	d	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	1	1	0	(2)	1	(2)	(1)	c

Droites 1914-1919

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		2	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	
Baudry d'Asson	d	1	x	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	c
Blacas	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	b
Cibiel, A.	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cochin, D.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	x	0	2	a
Delahaye	c	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
Gérard, baron de	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	c
Gouyon	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	b
du Halgouët	c	1	0	1	x	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	a
Hercé	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	o	-	1	-	1	1	-
Juigné	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	0	0	1	0	0	c
Kernier	c	1	1	1	1	x	1	2	x	1	1	1	1	b
La Ferronays	c	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	c
Lavrignais	c	1	x	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	a
Montaigu	c	1	1	1	x	1	x	1	1	0	1	1	0	a
Rohan	c	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	1	x	-
Taudière	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Indépendants 1914-1919

	E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	E
		2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	
Ancel	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	x	0	c
Bagneux	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	x	x	2	c
Barrès	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	c
Bernard, C.	d	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	x	2	1	c
Berry	c	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Bienaimé	c	1	2	1	2	x	1	1	x	1	1	0	0	b
Blaisot	d	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	c
Bougère, F.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	x	1	1	0	2	c
Bougère, L.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	x	0	1	0	0	b
Castelnau	d	1	1	1	1	x	x	1	x	x	x	1	2	c
Chambrun	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
Chappedelaine	c	1	2	2	2	2	x	2	1	x	1	x	2	c
Damour	c	2	1	1	0	2	x	1	1	0	1	0	1	b
Delafosse	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Deyris	d	2	1	1	2	2	x	2	1	0	0	2	1	c
Diagne	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	0	-	1	c
Dion	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	x	c
Duboys-Fresney	c	1	1	1	x	0	x	1	0	1	0	1	2	c
Espivent de la Villesboisnet	d	x	0	1	2	2	x	1	1	1	0	1	2	b
Faure, E.	d	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	1	a
Flandin, Ernest	c	1	1	1	1	2	x	1	1	0	1	x	0	c
Flayelle	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	c
Fontaines	c	1	x	1	2	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	2	c
Fougère	c	1	2	1	1	x	x	1	1	2	1	1	1	c
Galpin	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	c
Ginoux-Defermon	c	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	1	2	c
Lacotte	d	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lagrosillière	d	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	x	2	1	a
Lasies	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	x	a
Legrand, A.	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	2	-
Lemire	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	x	2	1	c
Maurice-Binder	c	1	0	0	x	0	1	0	0	0	1	x	0	c
Meunier-Surcouf	d	1	2	2	2	2	x	1	1	0	x	0	0	b
Millevoye	c	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	x	0	b

Monplanet	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	x	1	1	x	b
Monti de Rezé	c	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	x	0	1	0	0	c
Mun, B. de	d	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	a
Poirier de Narçay	d	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	1	1	1	a
Proust	d	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pugliesi-Conti, D.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	x	x	1	a
Pugliesi-Conti, P.	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	1	1	x	1	b
Rauline	c	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
Reille-Soult	d	1	1	1	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	c
Sibuet	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	c
Simon	c	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	c
Viellard	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	x	1	a
Ybarnégaray	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	x	2	c

Bibliographical Note

Thirty-four descendents of parliamentarians of the Right (of the period 1905-1919) have been traced but the number of collections of private documents placed at my disposal has been disappointingly small. About half the thirty-four did not reply to enquiries. Twelve replied that no papers existed or that only private letters had been preserved. Of those made available, the Cochin and Thierry papers are important as they belonged to prominent members of the Right. Renaud d'Elissagaray was a nationalist deputy for Gironde from 1908 to 1914. His papers are interesting because he was an active journalist and was associated with several of the political movements of the time - a rallié, he had contact with the Christian democrats, regionalists and anti-semitic and nationalist ligues.

Some of the papers left in the offices of the Républicains Sociaux by the administration of the Fédération Républicaine have been consulted. There is little of importance in them. The archives of Action Libérale probably still exist but I have been unable to obtain any definite information about them.

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Papers of Denys Cochin kindly lent by his grandson, Monsieur Denys Cochin. Copies of letters written by Cochin and letters from many notable politicians of the time, including political opponents.

Papers of Renaud d'Elissagaray kindly lent by Colonel Philippe d'Elissagaray. Mémoires. MS. pp. 194. About 200 miscellaneous letters.

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La Patrie
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Le Petit Provençal (Marseilles)

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