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Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents

Abstract:

One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the sets of goods, and a monotonicity property relative to changes in agents’ preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discrimi...

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0

Authors


Pages:
359-380
Publication date:
2010-12-01
DOI:
URN:
uuid:7df0a3f1-88fd-4873-9cbf-f759402abcaf
Source identifiers:
478594
Local pid:
pubs:478594

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