27 Responsibility, Atonement, and Forgiveness

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The New Testament is full of claims that Christ died for our sins, claims which imply very clearly that Christ's act made it possible for the guilt of our sins to be removed and for us to be forgiven by some objective process and not merely by being an example to us of how to behave. I shall call a theory of how this process worked a theory of the Atonement. But while the early Ecumenical Councils spelled out the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity in precise ways, no Ecumenical Council (or Pope) has pronounced on *how* Christ's death secured that Atonement.[1]

I. GENERAL MORAL PRINCIPLES

In this chapter I shall seek to analyse how one person can provide atonement for the sins of another. I shall then show that—given certain other Christian doctrinal and historical claims—Christ did provide atonement for human sins in this way; and I shall conclude by pointing out the inadequacies of rival theories of how this happened. The theory which I shall claim to be the correct theory coincides with the account given in the Letter to the Hebrews of Christ's death as Christ's voluntary sacrifice, and also with Anselm's satisfaction theory as modified by Aquinas and Scotus.

I begin with an analysis of the nature of wrongdoing and how it is to be dealt with in ordinary inter-human relations. Obligations are obligations to someone. I have an obligation to you to tell you nothing except what is true; I have an obligation to my children to feed and educate my children. When we fail in our obligations, we wrong those to whom we had or believed we had the obligation. Wronging is of two kinds—objective wronging, which is failing to fulfil your obligation whether or not you believed that you had that obligation; and subjective wronging, which is doing what you believed to be objectively wrong. In the first case you wrong the person to whom you had the obligation, and in the second case you wrong the person to whom you believed that you had an obligation. I wrong you objectively if I have borrowed money from you and do not repay it. I wrong you subjectively if I believe that I have borrowed money from you and do not repay it. And of course much wrongdoing is both objective and subjective, as when I do not repay money which I both have borrowed and believe that I have borrowed. By objective wrongdoing, I acquire what I shall call

objective guilt; and by subjective wrongdoing I acquire what I shall call subjective guilt.

Obviously subjective guilt is the worse kind of guilt since it results from consciously chosen action. It is a stain on the soul, and needs to be dealt with. We are culpable, blameworthy for our subjective wrongdoing. Clearly to my mind, we can only acquire subjective guilt and so blameworthiness, if we have freely chosen to do the subjectively wrong action. And the "free will" which we need is libertarian free will, free will to act one way or a different way despite all the causal influences to which we are subject. Otherwise we would not be the ultimate source of our actions. So many of the Christian Fathers before Augustine asserted that we have free will and that we need it in order to be responsible for our actions, and they seem to have in mind this natural libertarian sense of free will.[2] I believe that we have such free will, although for reasons of space I cannot argue that here.

Although it matters less than subjective guilt, objective guilt also matters. If I have not repaid the money I owe you, there is still something amiss with me which needs to be dealt with even if I believe that I have repaid you. In interacting with other people we are responsible for our obligations to them, and an unintended failure to perform these obligations involves (non-culpable) guilt. I shall call dealing with our guilt "making atonement" for our wrongdoing.

Atonement has four components—repentance, apology, reparation and penance, not all of which are required to remove objective guilt or the subjective guilt arising from less serious wrongdoing. If I wrong you I must make reparation for the effects of my wrongdoing. If I have stolen your watch, I must return it and compensate you for the inconvenience and trauma resulting from my thieving. If the watch has been destroyed, I must give you back something of equivalent value. When I have deprived you of a service I owe you, I must perform the service and compensate you for the delay. But what needs to be dealt with is not merely the effects of wrongdoing; there is also the fact of wrongdoing—that I have sought to hurt you. I must distance myself from that as far as can be done. I do this by sincere apology; that is, public apology expressing inner repentance. But for serious wrongdoing, mere words of apology are often not enough. I need to show you my repentance by doing something extra for you, doing for you more than is needed to compensate for the effects of my wrongdoing. I may give you a small gift, or provide an extra service as a token of my sorrow; and I shall call doing this making a penance. Where the guilt is only objective, repentance is not required (I cannot repent of something for which I am not to blame); and where the wrongdoing is not serious, there is less need of penance. The process is completed when the wronged person, whom I will sometimes call the victim, undertakes to treat the wrongdoer, in so far as he can, as one who has not wronged him; and to do that is to forgive him. It is often done by saying the words "I forgive you." Treating the wrongdoer in this way involves both public

and private acts, the private acts being of trying one's best to control any feelings of resentment against the wrongdoer.[3]

It is not necessary, in order for the victim to forgive the wrongdoer, that the latter should make a full atonement. Some apology and (if the wrong is subjective) repentance is always required, but the victim can determine how much (if any) reparation is required. (Henceforth when I write "reparation," "and penance" should also be understood.) I may let the wrongdoer off the need to compensate me for stealing my watch, if he has destroyed it and has no money with which to repay me—so long as he apologizes, and the apology sounds sincere (that is, sounds as if it is backed by repentance). It is however bad, I suggest, to treat someone who has wronged you seriously and yet makes no serious attempt at apology and repentance, as one who has not wronged you. It is not to take his hostile stance towards you seriously; it is to treat him as a child not responsible for his actions. If someone has killed your much loved wife and yet for some reason is beyond the reach of the law, it would be bad simply to ignore this and to enjoy his company at a party; it would be insulting to your wife to do so. Since forgiving is a good thing, I suggest that we only call treating the wrongdoer as one who has not wronged you "forgiving" him where it is good so to treat him, that is when treating him in this way is a response at least to some apparent repentance and apology on his part. Without this, treating the wrongdoer as someone who has not wronged you is condoning his wrong actions. Those theologians who think that God forgives everyone whether or not they want to be forgiven seem to me to have an inadequate view of what his perfect goodness consists in. And I do not think that the New Testament in any way supports that interpretation. In giving them the Lord's Prayer, Jesus taught his disciples to ask for forgiveness from God—which would be a pointless exercise if God had already forgiven them. Further, Jesus is quoted as saying "If your brother does wrong, rebuke him. If he repents, forgive him."[4] And Jesus added a condition for receiving forgiveness from God, a condition plausibly to be regarded as a mark of true repentance: "If you do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your wrongdoings."[5]

■ II. HUMANS NEED ATONEMENT

Now it does look as if almost all humans have wronged God, directly and indirectly. Wronging God is sinning. We wrong him directly when we fail to pay him proper worship. Deep reverence and gratitude is owed to the holy source of our existence. We wrong him indirectly when we wrong any of his creatures. For thereby we abuse the free will and responsibility we have been given by God—and to misuse a gift is to wrong the giver. And in wronging God's creatures, we wrong God also in virtue of the fact that he created these creatures. If I hit your child, I wrong you, for I damage a person on whom you

have exercised your loving care. Such wronging is actual sin—sometimes only objective but often subjective as well, at least in the respect that the wrongdoer believes that he is doing wrong to someone, even if he does not realize that he is doing wrong to God. But it is, of course, far worse if he realizes that he is wronging the good God who created him and keeps him in existence from moment to moment.

But there is more to our bad condition than mere actual sin. There is an element inherited from our ancestors and ultimately from our first human ancestor, whom—defined as the first of our ancestors who had free will and moral beliefs—we may call Adam. There is first a proneness to wrongdoing which (in view of the fact that so much wrongdoing involves wronging God, at least indirectly) I shall call original sinfulness. Our original sinfulness consists of the bad desires which we have inherited from our ancestors, especially a proneness to seek our immediate well-being in lesser respects at the expense of others and at the expense of our ultimate well-being. This inheritance is partly "social." If our parents behave badly, that influences us to behave badly. But the inheritance is also genetic. We inherit our ancestors' genes, which cause our strong desires to seek far more than our fair share of food, sleep, shelter, sex etc.; and evidence has emerged within the last two years that what a person does and suffers (at the hands of others) at an early age affects the genes he or she hands on to their children.[6]

But, as well as inheriting original sinfulness, we also inherit a debt. All our ancestors have done wrong, and in consequence they owe God atonement; but they have not (at any rate in general) made that atonement—it still needs to be made. We are indebted to our ancestors for our life and so many of the good things which come to us. For God in creating us has acted through them who have (in general) not merely brought us into the world, but often lavished much care on our nurture (or on the nurture of others of our ancestors who nurtured others who in turn nurtured us). Those who have received great benefit from others owe them a smaller benefit in return. And since what we have inherited from our ancestors includes not merely many good things, but also the debt they owe to God, our duty to our ancestors is to help them to make their atonement. Even the English law requires that before you can claim what you inherit from your dead parents you must pay their debts. To inherit a debt is not however to inherit guilt.[7] For we were not the agents of our ancestors' wrongdoing, but we have inherited a responsibility to make atonement for this debt of "original sin," as far as we can—perhaps by making some reparation.

It is beginning to look as if we humans are in no very good position to make proper atonement for sins, good though it would be that we should make that atonement. We owe much anyway by way of service to God our creator, who has given us so much. We owe a lot more in virtue of our own actual sins; and

yet more in virtue of the sins of our ancestors. And yet, because of the size of the debt and because of our own original sinfulness, it would be very difficult for us to make any proper atonement. We need help.

How can someone else help us to make atonement? "No one can atone for the sins of another."[8] Taken literally, that remains profoundly true. You cannot make my apologies, or even pay my debts. If I steal £10 from John and you give him an equivalent sum, he has not lost money; but it remains the case that I still owe £10 to John. But one human can help another to make the necessary atonement—can persuade him to repent, help him to formulate the words of apology, and give him the means by which to make reparation.

So what would be a proper reparation (with penance) for us to offer to God, if someone else provided the means of reparation? What has gone wrong is that we humans have lived bad human lives. A proper offering would be a perfect human life, which we can offer to God as our reparation. Maybe one human life, however perfect, would not equate in quantity of goodness the badness of so many human lives. But it is up to the wronged person to deem when a sufficient reparation has been made; and one truly perfect life would surely be a proper amount of reparation for God to deem that sufficient reparation had been made.

But why would God require any reparation, when he could simply forgive us in response to some minimum amount of repentance and apology? Well, he could have done so—various theologians recognised that.[9] But they also say that there is much good in him taking our wrongdoing so seriously as to insist on some reparation. When serious wrong has been done, parents and courts rightly insist on the wrongdoer providing some minimum amount of reparation. It involves the wrongdoer taking what he has done seriously. And if he has no means to make reparation, a well-wisher may often provide him with the means; the wrongdoer can then choose whether or not to use that means for that purpose. Suppose that I owe you some service, for example suppose that I have promised to clean your house and that you have already paid me to do this. Suppose also that I have spent the money but omitted to clean the house at the promised time, and that I have now had an accident which makes me unable to clean the house. Clearly I owe you repentance and apology; but I must also try to get someone else to clean the house. Even if you don't badly need the house to be cleaned, you may think it important that I should be involved in getting it cleaned; it matters that I should take responsibility for what I have omitted to do. So you may encourage a third person to offer to me to do for you the service on my behalf. If I accept the third person's offer I am involved in providing the reparation. When with repentance and apology, I ask you to accept the third person's action as my reparation, you, the victim, may then judge that I have taken my wrongdoing seriously enough to forgive me for it.

III. HOW GOD PROVIDED ATONEMENT

As we have seen, ordinary humans are in no good position to make atonement for our own sins, let alone provide reparation for the sins of all other humans; and in my view God would have no right to require or even allow anyone else to perform such a demanding task. The Christian claim is that in Jesus Christ God provided the atonement, and I now suggest that this may be best understood in this way that he provided an act of reparation of which we can avail ourselves. God the Father (or perhaps God the Holy Trinity) was the wronged person (the victim of our wrongdoing); and God the Son was the one who, as Jesus Christ sent by God the Father, thinking it so important that we should take our wrongdoing seriously, made available the reparation for us to offer back to God the Father.

What would show that Christ provided an atonement for our sins in this way? Jesus Christ would have to have been God incarnate, to have led a perfect life, and to have claimed that this life was available for us as our reparation. Also God would need to show by some act which God alone could do that he had accepted the sacrifice (and which would be recognizable in the contemporary culture as showing this)—for example by raising Christ from the dead, and thereby showing his approval of what Christ had done. To the extent to which we have evidence that these things are so, to that extent we have evidence that Christ has provided an atonement for our sins. A perfect life need not end in a death by execution, but in so many human societies that may well happen; those who protest too strongly against injustice, above all if they claim divine authority for their actions, were very likely to get executed in many ancient societies. If God is to live a perfect life among us, just once for the sins of the world, it is plausible to suppose that he might choose to live in a society where it is highly probable that living a perfect life would involve bearing serious suffering, and where protest pays the highest price. Most theologians have thought of the reparation made by Christ as his Passion or Crucifixion, or perhaps the series of events from his betrayal to his death. But they have also stressed that what mattered about these events is that Christ freely allowed them to happen; and so the series must include the free actions of Christ which led to his crucifixion, and that will include at least all the public part of his perfect life. The reparation is not so much his death, as his actions which led to his death.

This account of how Christ made an atonement coincides with the account in terms of sacrifice given in the Letter to the Hebrews. The letter regards Christ's death as an effective sacrifice which achieved what the sacrifices in the Jewish temple could not. But "the blood of Christ" contributed a sacrifice "without blemish,"[10] to "bear the sins of many."[11] It was offered only once, and that was all that was needed—"He entered once for all into the Holy Place, not with the blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus obtaining eternal

redemption."[12] In the most primitive way of thinking about sacrifice lying behind (the far more sophisticated) Old Testament thought, a sacrifice is the giving of something valuable to God who consumes it by inhaling the smoke, and often gives back some of it to be consumed by the worshippers (who eat some of the flesh of the sacrificed animal).[13] The sacrifice of Christ is then Christ (God the Son) giving to God (the Father) the most valuable thing he has—his life, a perfect life of service to God and humans in difficult circumstances, leading to its being taken from him by his crucifixion. In order for the sacrifice to be successful (that is, for God to accept the sacrifice) Christ "entered into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our behalf"[14]; and the letter also alludes to what the writer must regard as our evidence of Christ's exaltation, that God "brought [him] back from the dead . . . by the blood of the eternal covenant."[15]

I have written that Christ "provided" an atonement and pointed out that the benefits of sacrifice are available only to those who associate themselves with it. And clearly Christians have always claimed that Christ's act makes no difference to us if we do not in some way appropriate it for ourselves. (Christ is "the source of salvation to all who obey him"[16].) We can say to God "Please accept instead of the life which I ought to have led (and the lives which my ancestors ought to have led) this perfect life of Christ as my reparation." Thereby we join our repentance and apology with the reparation (and penance) which Christ provides. The ceremony of entry to the Christian church is baptism. The Nicene creed echoes various New Testament texts in affirming belief in "one baptism" (that is, a non-repeatable ceremony) "for the forgiveness of sins." It is in this way that God gives those of us who seek it, his forgiveness. At their baptism, wrote St Paul, Christians are baptised into the death of Christ[17]; as adults, they appropriate it for themselves, or—when infants are baptised—parents do so with the prayer that when the infants become older, they will themselves accept the association that their parents made on their behalf. And the association established by baptism is renewed at each eucharist when, St Paul claims, "as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes."[18] According to Matthew and Mark, Christ claimed that he could or would "destroy the Temple and build in three days another Temple not made with hands"[19]; and since they clearly thought that he himself was what came to life after three days, they thought of him as the substitute for the Temple, and so his life and death as a substitute for the Temple sacrifice. Since the bread and wine of the Eucharist are given the status of the "body" and "blood" of Christ (however that is to be understood), our participation in the sacrifice of Christ has an exact analogy to participation in older sacrifices when worshippers ate some of the sacrifice. "Body" and "blood" are the elements of sacrifice; and since the phrases "this is my body" and "this is my blood" are fairly clearly the original words of Christ, the sacrifice theory is not—I suggest—only that of the Letter to the Hebrews alone, but of Christ himself.[20]

While many of the Fathers continued to teach that Christ's death was a sacrifice, some of them put forward one or both of two other theories (to my mind very unsatisfactory theories) which some of them combined with the sacrifice theory.[21] Some of them thought of the atonement (in the sense defined at the beginning of this paper) as brought about by Christ taking and so perfecting human nature. But that involves a Platonic view of our human nature as a separately existing universal in which all humans participate; and Plato's theory of forms seems to most of us highly implausible. Further, this theory seems to imply that the atonement was achieved by the incarnation; and that makes it unclear how the Crucifixion has any role in this, as all the Fathers acknowledged that it did. Other patristic writers wrote of the Crucifixion as a redemption or the payment of a ransom. The question then arises to whom the ransom was paid? The only possible answer seems to be—the Devil. But then why did the ransom need to be paid? Could not God just have annihilated the Devil? The reply sometimes given is that in some way God had promised the Devil that he would be allowed to control the fate of those who sinned against God. But why should God have made so foolish a promise? True, there is much talk in the New Testament of Christ "redeeming" us and even paying a "ransom." There is much talk, too, of his rescuing us from evil, and sometimes this is put personally in terms of his rescuing us from the Devil. But any idea of a prior bargain with the Devil, so that God was obliged to pay a ransom to him, is—I suggest—alien to the New Testament. All that the New Testament texts are claiming is that Christ rescued us from the guilt of sin, and (to some extent) from the power to sin—that is, he gave us the power not to sin. And any theory of the Atonement (including the sacrifice theory) will incorporate the former element; the latter is a further aspect of the work of Christ—the beginning of our sanctification.

Anselm's theory in *Cur Deus Homo?* is however similar to the sacrifice theory, although he uses the word "satisfaction" for the reparation which is offered to God, the voluntary payment of a debt by one who is God. His theory does however make rendering satisfaction of an amount equal to the harm done, necessary before forgiveness can be given. And it leaves it unclear how the benefits of Christ's death come to us. Aquinas takes over Anselm's basic idea, but remedies these deficiencies. Christ's death was desirable but not necessary, claimed Aquinas.[22] While God can provide the satisfaction, Aquinas accepted the objection that "the man who sins must do the repenting and confess," but "satisfaction has to do with the exterior act, and here one can make use of instruments, a category under which friends are included."[23] He also claimed that the benefits of Christ's death flow to us through our incorporation into it in baptism and other sacraments—"Christ's passion, the universal cause of the forgiveness of sins, has to be applied to individuals if they are to be cleansed from their sins. This is done by baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which derive their power from the passion of Christ."[24] And Aquinas regarded his theory both as a

sacrifice theory—"Christ's passion was a true sacrifice,"[25] and also a "satisfaction" theory.[26] Like Anselm however, Aquinas and then the Reformers claimed that human sin, because it consisted in wronging God, was enormously bad; and by contrast Christ's passion was infinitely good. Scotus rightly avoided such comparative talk—how can one weigh the goodness and badness of acts on an exact scale? He claimed instead that the value of Christ's passion was the value God put upon it; and so God could deem it a sufficient reparation for human sin.[27]

The Reformers had a penal substitution theory of the Atonement. Christ's death was a punishment which he voluntarily underwent instead of the punishment which we would have had to undergo.[28] Anselm's theory is often regarded as such a theory; but he himself distinguished "satisfaction" as something "freely given" from "the exaction of punishment."[29] Punishment is something undergone, imposed (whether on the guilty person or someone else) by the wronged person (or someone acting on his behalf) in order to deal with his guilt. And while someone may indeed voluntarily undergo a punishment, the voluntariness consists in someone allowing others to do something to him; the volunteer may allow others to take him into custody, but what happens after that depends on the others. But Anselm presumably held that at every stage of the process, Christ was active—for example, in allowing himself to be betrayed, in his struggle in Gethsemane and in not invoking his Father's help to rescue him. "Making satisfaction" is a voluntary act, as is offering a sacrifice. The Father did not need to impose anything on Christ or anyone else.

To give a theory of the Atonement, as I have understood that notion, is to give a theory of how Christ's act made it possible for the guilt of our sins to be removed; and in this paper I have sought to give such a theory. But in doing so I have no wish to deny that God's incarnation in Jesus Christ served many other good purposes, some of which have been misleadingly captured in other theories of "atonement." These include solidarity with us in the sufferings which God causes us to endure for good reasons, giving us an example of how to live, revealing to us important truths, and—as I have already mentioned—providing help to us in avoiding future sins and in forming characters fit for Heaven.

■ NOTES

1. This paper is a fuller version of a paper entitled "Christ's Atoning Sacrifice" published in *Archivio di Filosofia*, 2008.

2. Thus Irenaeus: "If some had been made by nature bad, and others good, these latter would not be deserving of praise for being good, for such were they created; nor would the former be reprehensible, for thus they were [originally]. But since all men are of the same nature, able both to hold fast and to do what is good; and, on the other hand, having also the power to cast it from them and not to do it,—some do justly receive praise even among men who are under the control of good laws (and much more from God), and obtain deserved testimony of their choice of good in general, and of persevering therein; but the others

are blamed, and receive a just condemnation, because of their rejection of what is fair and good." (*Against Heresies*, Book 4, ch 37, in: *The Writings of Irenaeus*, tr. A. Roberts and W.H. Rambault, vol 2, T. and T. Clark, 1869.)

3. Many writers seem to suppose that one has only truly forgiven someone if one has ceased to have such feelings of resentment. Thus Jeffrie Murphy attributes to Joseph Butler, and himself endorses, the view that "forgiveness involves a change in inner feeling"; one "who has forgiven has overcome…vindictive attitudes." (See his *Getting Even: Forgiveness and its Limits*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 13) I do not find this view stated very explicitly in Butler's Sermon "Upon Forgiveness of Injuries" to which Murphy refers, but it is perhaps implicit there. However, one's feelings are not fully under one's control. Forgiving is a performative act, something one does. Doing it involves a commitment to try to control one's feelings, but it cannot involve more. But Murphy goes on usefully to distinguish forgiving from regarding the supposed wrongdoer as justified in having done what he did, from regarding the act as excusable, and from showing mercy to the wrongdoer. He also distinguishes forgiving someone from being willing to interact with them in the same way as before the wrong act (which he calls being "reconciled to them.") That also seems right. One might forgive someone who has abused one's children, but ensure that he did not see them again. The forgiving involves treating the abuser as someone who has not wronged you in the past, but it is compatible with treating him as someone who might wrong you in future.

4. Luke 17:3.

5. Matthew 6:15.

6. See for example the news report in *The New Scientist*, 7 January 2006, p. 10, and the earlier article "Hidden Inheritance" by Gail Vines in *The New Scientist*, 28 November 1998, pp. 27–30.

7. Augustine was responsible for the wide acceptance in the Western church of the view that the descendents of Adam are guilty for his sins (and so suffer from "Original guilt"), although—as far as I can see—none of the Fathers before Augustine had advocated it. On this see my *Responsibility and Atonement*, p. 144. The biblical passage which is always cited as expounding the doctrine of Original Guilt is Romans 5:12–21. I argue in *Responsibility and Atonement,* Additional Note 8 (p. 206) that this passage cannot bear that interpretation.

8. This point was made both by Jeremiah (31:29–30) and Ezekiel (18 passim) who affirm that no one will be held guilty and so condemned to die for the sins of their parents or children.

9. Thus Gregory Nazianzen wrote that "although as God [our Saviour] could have saved [us] by his will alone…He provided us a thing greater and more fitted to shame us, even fellowship in suffering and equality of rank" (*Oration* 19). Aquinas wrote that "If God had wanted to free man from sin without any satisfaction at all, he would not have been acting against justice." (*Summa Theologiae* 3a.46.2 ad 3.) And in effect too Scotus seems to say the same—see L.W. Grensted, *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*, Longmans, Green and Co., 1920, pp. 161–2. So too (with hesitation) does Bonaventure—Grensted, p. 148.

10. Hebrews 9:14.

11. Hebrews 9:28.

12. Hebrews 9:12.

13. See J. Pedersen, *Israel. Its life and culture*, Oxford University Press, rev. ed. 1959, pp. 299–375 (esp. p. 359).

14. Hebrews 9:24.

15. Hebrews 13:20.

16. Hebrews 5:9.

17. Romans 6:3.

18. I Corinthians 11:26

19. Matthew 26:61. Mark 14:58.

20. Although differing in other respects, all four accounts of the Last Supper given in the New Testament (in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and in I Corinthians) describe Jesus as uttering these words over the bread and the wine. Although John's Gospel has no account of the Last Supper, it insists on the need to eat the "flesh" and drink the "blood" of Christ in order to belong to the Christian community and share in Christ's Resurrection—see John 6:41–59.

21. See (e.g.) J.N.D. Kelly *Early Christian Doctrines*, 5th ed., 1977, ch. 14.

22. See note 9.

23. *Summa Theologiae* 3a.48.2 ad 1.

24. op. cit. 3a.49.1. ad 4.

25. op. cit. 3a.48.3.

26. "Christ by his suffering made perfect satisfaction for our sins"—op. cit. 3a.48.2.

27. For Anselm see *Cur Deus Homo?* 1.21 "How great a burden sin is" and yet 2.14, "no enormity or multitude of sins . . . can for a moment be compared with [a]bodily injury inflicted upon [Christ]." For Aquinas see op.cit 3a.48.2 ad2. For Scotus and (among the Reformers) Turretin, see F.W. Grensted *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*, Longmans, Green, and Co, 1920, pp. 158–62 and pp. 243–4.

28. While Calvin allowed that (in theory) God could have used another "mediator" between God and man, than one who was both God and man—though he did not see how (see J. Calvin *Institutes of the Christian Religion* 2.12.1), he seems to assume that it was necessary that there be a "mediator."

29. *Cur Deus Homo?* 2.15.

■ FOR FURTHER READING

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