GOD AS DIONYSUS

MARTIN BUBER'S RECEPTION OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

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A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity 2015

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ABSTRACT

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Martin Buber was a source of inspiration for a generation of young German Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century; throughout his career, however, he was also criticised by scholars of Jewish history and mysticism. In response, Buber and contemporary scholars alike have tended to split the development of his thought into two main phases: the earlier mystical phase, which sought to realise the divine, and the more mature dialogic phase, which overturns mysticism and instead attempts to encounter God.

This thesis contributes to the growing scholarship that argues for the continuities in Buber's career by examining his reception of Friedrich Nietzsche. Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue is inextricable from Nietzsche, who exerted a powerful influence on the young Buber but was later dismissed as a 'mystic of the Enlightenment'. With reference to Harold Bloom's theories on the anxiety of influence, the thesis suggests that Buber developed his dialogic thought on the basis of his aesthetic encounter with Nietzsche: Buber subconsciously misreads his literary precursor, as well as his own controversial mysticism, in order to maintain his artistic authenticity. Crucially, Buber does so through two specific ratios: *tessera*, which reads Nietzsche as overly idealistic and abstract; and *daemonization*, which reads him as all too human. The result is that the precursor is distanced in two diametrically opposed directions, yet encountered as another artist in between. The thesis locates the embodiment of Buber's mysticism and dialogue in his description of the Bacchant, a figure who recurs throughout his *oeuvre* and functions as a *mise en abyme* of anxiety: as he or she is being observed on stage, the Bacchant, directed towards Dionysus as the ultimate precursor, simultaneously performs a mythical role yet remains a distinct physical presence.

In chapters that cover Buber's aesthetics, mysticism, myth, history and philosophical anthropology, the thesis discovers that Buber returns time and again to Nietzsche and the figure of the Bacchant, demonstrating not only a synchronic anxiety of influence at any given moment, but also a diachronic anxiety across Buber's thought; it hopes to offer a new organic development in our understanding of Buber's career, to highlight the religiosity of Nietzsche's thought, and to emphasise the importance of German romanticism in Buber and the generation of young Jews whom he influenced in turn.

LONG ABSTRACT

God as Dionysus: Martin Buber's reception of Friedrich Nietzsche

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Throughout his long literary and philosophical career, Martin Buber (1878-1965) was a prodigious writer, voracious reader and charismatic speaker; he came into contact with an extraordinary number of the most prominent artists and thinkers of his age. He was a source of inspiration for a generation of young German Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century; throughout his career, however, he was also criticised by scholars of Jewish history and mysticism. In response, Buber and contemporary scholars alike have tended to split the development of his thought into two main phases: the earlier mystical phase, which sought to realise the divine, and the more mature dialogic phase, which overturns mysticism and instead attempts to encounter God. The traditional distinction, and transition, between mysticism and dialogue in his work falls between *Daniel* (1913), the apotheosis of his mystical phase, and *Ich und Du* (1923), his seminal work on dialogue. This thesis contributes to the growing scholarship that argues for the continuities in Buber's career, but adds an alternative guiding principle in the development of Buber's thought: Friedrich Nietzsche's aesthetic absolute in the form of Dionysus.

Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue is very closely related to his reception of Nietzsche, whom he paradoxically calls a 'mystic of the Enlightenment'. Indeed, Nietzsche's reception in general appears to be perennially underpinned by contradiction. A common thread in the diverse interpretations of Nietzsche appears to be a longing for an inchoate moment where irreconcilable opposites meet: in terms of deconstruction, the recognition that form

implies its negation and *vice versa*; in terms of mysticism, the realisation that being is nothing and nothing is being; and in terms of romanticism, the paradox that the artist is never truly original, but only interprets and translates what has come before in his or her own form. In spite of Nietzsche's indeterminacy, however, Buber's own reception of Nietzsche tends to pin him down as a deconstructionist and a nihilist, then to dismiss him. An example of Buber's post-dialogic reception of Nietzsche may be found in 'Was ist der Mensch?', a series of lectures on his 1938 appointment as professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead, Buber contends, ultimately renders him a monologic and solipsistic thinker: without God, Nietzsche can naturally have no interest in the integrity of either the individual or the absolute.

In *Begegnung* (1960), a collection of autobiographical fragments, Buber acknowledges the powerful influence that Nietzsche had exerted on his teenaged self, but claims that Nietzsche, unlike him, was never able to overcome the Dionysian. However, these sentiments are not substantively different from those that he had written as a teenager in 'Zarathustra', where he also claims to have overcome Nietzsche. In both cases, the intersection appears to be aesthetic, which poses two distinct problems for Buber: first, the tension between the sensual and the conceptual; and second, the same tension between active creation and passive appreciation. The overall direction that Buber's aesthetic interests take, both during his mystical and dialogic phases, is to rescue the individual, whether subject or object, I or You, perceiver or perceived, from abstraction and depersonalisation.

Buber's reception of Nietzsche can be brought into focus through Bloom's concept of the anxiety of influence. Bloom's theories account for the way in which a young poet (or ephebe), seeking to be original or strong, expresses his or her anxiety by misreading a precursor poet through one of six revisionary ratios. In Buber's reception and misreading of Nietzsche, there are two ratios that seem to apply simultaneously: *tessera*, which reads the precursor as

being too idealistic; and *daemonization*, which conversely renders the precursor all too human, leaving only the ephebe with divine inspiration. The consequence of these two ratios' simultaneity is not only to distance the precursor, which all ratios achieve, but also to encounter the precursor as an inchoate moment. Either one of these ratios, taken to its extreme, could turn into its opposite, a process that C. G. Jung calls *enantiodromia*. For instance, reading the precursor exclusively through *tessera* could turn the ephebe into a solipsistic figure, a god within his or her own world, whereas reading the precursor exclusively through *daemonization* runs the risk of the ephebe's own idealisation. The simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*, however, means that the precursor is distanced in two diametrically opposed ways, the ideal and the human, and encountered as an inchoate moment, potential and real, in between.

This thesis reads both mysticism and dialogue as anxiety of influence, not just from Nietzsche, but from divine inspiration itself. Like Bloom's anxiety of influence, Buber's dialogue is about engaging an indefinable other. Through the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*, the other becomes a precursor who is necessarily distanced and encountered. As an artistic influence, therefore, God becomes the ultimate precursor. The only discernible difference between mysticism and dialogue is that this self-overcoming becomes conscious, reflected. In other words, when the dialogic Buber dismisses Nietzsche as well as his mystical self, he is suffering from an anxiety of his own influence, which is necessary to regain an inchoate moment and achieve self-renewal.

Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche forms not only the link between, but also the basis of, mysticism and dialogue. The link is made manifest in the recurring figure of the Bacchant, who first appears explicitly in *Daniel*. Having just come from a theatre performance, the eponymous protagonist in *Daniel* describes the duality of the Bacchant he has just seen on stage. To the viewer (in this case the protagonist Daniel and by extension the reader) the Bacchant is simultaneously a physical actor and mythical character. The viewer

reads the Bacchant's role both through *tessera* and *daemonization*: the latter as a mythical character turned into flesh; the former as a physical actor turned towards Dionysus. Consequently, the Bacchant's performance is both an act of creation on the part of the actor and an act of appreciation on the part of the viewer. In this moment, the Bacchant is turned both figuratively and literally towards Dionysus, the artist's god, as both performing artist and artwork appreciated by Daniel, both an ephebe of Dionysus and precursor to Daniel.

The figure of the Bacchant, although not explicitly named, recurs throughout Buber's *oeuvre*: in Maurice Barrès, whose reading of Nietzsche Buber enacts in his early literary criticism; in the Hasid in Buber's cultural criticism, who negotiates a mythical past become physical present (and who is read in turn by Buber's equally dual German-Jewish audience); in Gideon, who re-enacts the same process for the reader of the Bible in *Königtum Gottes*; and in the philosophical anthropologist in 'Was ist der Mensch?', who treads the narrow line between idealism and realism, and subjective and objective. The encounter between the self and the other is what unites but also separates Bloom's anxiety of influence and Buber's dialogue: the mutual exclusivity of *tessera* and *daemonization* in Buber's dialogue also liberates the artistic individual from the strong appropriation implied by Bloom's anxiety of influence. In *Ich und Du*, aesthetic appreciation is in harmony with artistic creation. As a consequence, Buber's conception of God becomes a divine and ultimate precursor, the Dionysus; the ephebic Bacchant, is both artist and artwork, reader and writer.

By demonstrating the importance and persistence of the figure of the Bacchant as a symbol of the anxiety of influence, this thesis examines the development of Buber's thought in the light of his reception of Nietzsche over the course of five chapters. The first chapter sheds light on Buber's early aesthetics to demonstrate the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* in the sickness metaphor of his 'Zarathustra'; it will also show how Buber translates Nietzsche's concept of tragedy into his own literary criticism, notably on the authors of Young

Vienna in 'On Viennese Literature'. The pivotal second chapter focuses on Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue in greater depth through the figures of the Bacchant and Orpheus, whom Buber appears to read as Dionysus through *tessera* and *daemonization*; these figures find echoes in Buber's *Ich und Du*. The third chapter contextualises Buber's work on Jewishness and Hasidism: what links Buber's work on the Jewish Renaissance, cultural Zionism and Hasidism is the figure of the Jew or Hasid as a Bacchant, who treads the line between myth and reality, potential and actuality. The fourth chapter looks at Buber's biblical hermeneutics during his sober, dialogic phase in the context of German historicism; the result is that Buber treads the line between myth and history, Germanness and Jewishness, through a reading of the biblical figure Gideon that is akin to the Bacchant. The final chapter concludes by examining Buber's final written engagement with Nietzsche in his philosophical anthropology, where the implied philosophical anthropologist appears to be playing the role of the Bacchant.

The main scholarly contribution that this thesis offers is a new and organic continuity in our understanding of the development of Buber's thought, as well as the implicit interconnectedness of the wide-ranging areas of his *oeuvre*, while preserving the nuance of his contributions. The thesis suggests that Buber's simultaneous distancing and encountering of Nietzsche is not only a synchronic moment limited to his autobiographical reflections, but a diachronic direction that guides the development of his thought throughout. In addition, the thesis sheds light on what proved so attractive to a generation of young German Jews in Buber's mysticism, his work on the Jewish Renaissance and the *Drei Reden über das Judentum*. Through the figure of the Bacchant, Buber was able to speak to the duality and longing for unity inherent in his German-Jewish audience. Moreover, the thesis contributes to the view of Nietzsche as an intrinsically religious figure by offering another reader who paradoxically finds God in Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead.

Through its analyses of literary reception and perspective, the roles of artist and artwork, and history and myth, the thesis introduces Buber as an independent figure to the student of German literature, and to literary and cultural theory in general. The thesis emphasises the importance of German romanticism in Buber and the young German Jews whom he influenced in their perceived duality and longing for unity. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber is attempting to outdo Nietzsche at his own game by trying to build a house that can withstand the shifting sands of reality, a skiff that can weather the storm; as a scion of the German romantic tradition, Buber heeds Nietzsche's call in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 'Manches Haus giebt es noch zu bauen!'

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude:

to my supervisor, Prof. David Groiser, and my examiners, Prof. Ritchie Robertson, Prof. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Prof. Anthony Phelan, for carefully guiding me through this journey;

to my former tutors, Prof. Richard Sheppard, Prof. Toby Garfitt and Prof. Reidar Due, who set me on this journey;

to the Arts & Humanities Research Council, whose generous Doctoral Award provided me with all the provisions that I could have needed;

to Magdalen College, Oxford, whose Senior Mackinnon Scholarship allowed me to take my first steps, and in particular Dr Mark Pobjoy, Hillary Pattison, Susan Burton, Nancy Cowell, Steed Henry and the Revd Dr Michael Piret, whose support came in every form;

to the Leo Baeck Institute London and the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes, whose Research Fellowship Programme enabled my sojourn at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and in particular Prof. Raphael Gross, Dr Daniel Wildmann, Dr Cathy Gelbin, Paul Maurer, and the Goldschmidt and Brison families;

to Prof. Georgina Paul, Prof. Helen Swift, Dr William McKenzie, Dr Lucia Nixon and my colleagues at St Hilda's College, Oxford; to Dr Sabine Müller, Prof. Barry Murnane and my colleagues at St John's College, Oxford; to Prof. Charlie Louth and my colleagues at The Queen's College, Oxford; to Dr Geraldine Horan, Dr Stephanie Bird, Prof. Susanne Kord, Dr Judith Beniston, Dr Seb Coxon and my colleagues at University College London; and to all my students;

to Dr Benjamin Spagnolo, Dr Tyler Fisher, Dr Leopold Haller and Fazilat Nassiri, Dr William Kolkey, Dr Katie Low, Dr Daniel Jolowicz, Dr Claudia Wehrspaun, Niels Martens, Nigel and Jemma McBride, and Richard Kendall for their unwavering encouragement;

to Marta Arnaldi and my parents, without whom none of this would have been possible.

INTRODUCTION

'[E]s hat lange gedauert, bis ich mich loszumachen vermocht habe', writes Martin Buber (1878-1965), late in his life in his autobiographical fragments, *Begegnung* (1960). Buber's plaint recalls the grip that the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) had over his youth. Just as with the eponymous protagonist of Robert Musil's *Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß* (1906), the question of the infinite had perplexed the young Buber.[1] Kant soothed his soul by declaring the infinite unknowable, Buber adds, but Nietzsche threw him back into turmoil by offering a seductive alternative.[2] Henceforth, Buber repeatedly distances himself from Nietzsche throughout his career. In contrast to the development of his own thought, Buber suggests, the solipsistic Nietzsche never matured out of his Dionysian phase into a fully-fledged philosopher ('Das "dionysische" Pathos hat sich hier keineswegs, wie Nietzsche schon früh im Sinn hatte, zum philosophischen gewandelt; es ist dionysisch geblieben, als dessen moderne Abart, von der Begeisterung des Dionysikers an den eigenen Höhen und Tiefen hervorgebracht').[3] Yet Buber's statement as an old man in *Begegnung* echoes almost exactly a sentiment in 'Zarathustra', a short piece that the adolescent Buber wrote as a preface to Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra* in 1896 or 1897. As a former sick devotee of Nietzsche ('krank[er] Anhänger', MBW 1, 105), Buber writes sarcastically, 'Und auch Apollo und alles apollinische lernte ich vergessen, und Lionardo und Goethe und Böcklin. Ich erkannte mein Hellas der weissen, vollkommenen Leiber nicht mehr in diesen wirren, verwirrenden Bacchanten-Verzückungen und Zerfleischungen' (MBW 1, 105). On account of Nietzsche, Buber forgets the Apollonian Greece of beautiful forms and allows himself to be eviscerated

[1] I would like to thank Prof. David Groiser for drawing my attention to this remarkable parallel. See also Groiser, MBW 2.1, 88.
[2] Martin Buber, *Begegnung: Autobiographische Fragmente* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), p. 18.
[3] Buber, *Begegnung*, pp. 18-19.

by Nietzsche's Dionysus. Eventually, Buber is able to cure himself of this sickness ('doch zuletzt erlöste ich mich von meiner Krankheit, und nach deinem Rezepte, du alter Erlösungsgegner und Erlösungsschauspieler!' MBW 1, 104).

Contrary to his self-criticism, this thesis will argue that Buber's engagement with Nietzsche continues throughout his entire career. In fact, this thesis intends to demonstrate how Buber's reception of Nietzsche informs the development of his thought and even bridges the gap between mysticism and dialogue, into which traditional scholarship tends to divide the development of Buber's thought.[4] Mysticism, in Buber's own estimation, aims for union of the self with the divine, whereas dialogue distinguishes the self from the divine and attempts to encounter it. The thesis, conversely, will read both mysticism and dialogue as a form of literary and aesthetic reception. Specifically, Buber's philosophy will be read through the prism of Harold Bloom's theory of the anxiety of influence, which regards the divine as the ultimate source of creativity and inspiration.[5] Consequently, Nietzsche becomes a particularly important moment in the formation of Buber's concept of dialogue; in fact, Buber's reception of Nietzsche appears to be the basis of his dialogic philosophy. This can be demonstrated through Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian world artist and Buber's figure of the Bacchant, who recurs throughout Buber's *oeuvre* as a mediated performance of the anxiety of influence.

HAROLD BLOOM AND THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE

The intersection between the threat of infinity, to use Maurice Friedman's term, and Buber's reception of Nietzsche is brought into focus through the lens of Bloom's theory of the anxiety

[4] See in particular Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 3 vols (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988); and Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue: Martin Buber's Transformation of German Social Thought* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989).
[5] Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

of influence.[6] A number of other reception theorists could have been brought to bear, namely the reader-response theory of Hans Robert Jauß and the horizon of expectations, or of Wolfgang Iser and the implied reader; or, going back even further, the fusion of horizons in the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960).[7] However, the particular benefit of Bloom's theories is that they allow the analysis not only of the participation of the reader in the creation of meaning, but the reader's participation in a new writing process. Bloom's anxiety of influence accounts for – in psychoanalytic, rhetorical and even Kabbalistic terms – the way in which a young poet or ephebe misreads a particularly influential precursor poet in order to maintain his or her own authenticity or originality; such poets are said to be strong poets. An ephebe may misread a precursor in one of six particular ways, which Blooms terms revisionary ratios: these are *clinamen*, *tessera*, *kenosis*, *daemonization*, *askesis* and *apophrades*.

In Buber's misreading of Nietzsche, there are two ratios that seem to apply simultaneously, *tessera* and *daemonization*, which deal with the tension between the human on the one hand, and the sublime and divine on the other. *Tessera* reads the precursor as being too idealistic; *daemonization* conversely, renders the precursor all too human and accords genuine divine inspiration to the ephebe instead. At first glance, the revisionary ratio that seems to describe most adequately the adolescent or ephebic Buber's relationship towards Nietzsche, whom in 'Zarathustra' he calls poet ('Dichter und Erdichter', MBW 1, 108) and educator ('Erzieher', MBW 1, 104), would be that of *tessera* or 'completion and antithesis'.[8] Through *tessera*, the ephebe reads the precursor as being too idealistic, whereas the ephebe's own poetry

[6] See Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, *The Early Years 1878-1923*, ch. 2, 'The threat of infinity and the promise of time', 26-32.
[7] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, 10 vols, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985-1995), 1, *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode*. For a general introduction to reception theory, see *Rezeptionsästhetik: Theorie und Praxis*, ed. by Rainer Warning, 2nd edn (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1979). On the horizon of expectations, see Hans Robert Jauß, 'Literaturgeschiche als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft', in *Rezeptionsästhetik*, pp. 126-162. On the implied reader, see Wolfgang Iser, *Der Akt des Lesens: Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung*, 4th edn (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1994), 'Vorüberlegungen zu einer wirkungsästhetischen Theorie', pp. 37-86.
[8] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*, ch. 2, '*Tessera* or Completion and Antithesis', pp. 49-76.

becomes more in touch with reality by contrast through its contrarian adaptation of the precursor's terminology: 'A poet antithetically "completes" his precursor, by so reading the parent-poem as to retain its terms but to mean them in another sense, as though the precursor had failed to go far enough'.[9] Indeed, Bloom even attributes his understanding of *tessera* to Nietzsche, who, 'as he always insisted, was the heir of Goethe in his strangely optimistic refusal to regard the poetical past as primarily an obstacle to fresh creation'.[10] An example of Buber's *tesseratic* reading of Nietzsche would be the use of the word sickness in 'Zarathustra': Nietzsche had complained about idealism as a sickness of society; now, in Buber's reading, Nietzsche himself is sick with idealism.[11] However, this very example also offers evidence of the slightly more intricate relationship that Bloom terms *daemonization* or the counter-sublime:

> Turning against the precursor's Sublime, the newly strong poet undergoes *daemonization,* a Counter-Sublime whose function suggests *the precursor's relative weakness*. When the ephebe is daemonized, his precursor necessarily is humanized, and a new Atlantic floods outward from the new poet's transformed being.[12]

Through *daemonization*, the ephebe creates a new sublime that appears to relativise the precursor's own. Returning to the example of sickness in 'Zarathustra', Buber's rendition of Nietzsche is sick and therefore mortal, whereas only Buber can reach the mystical heights he goes on to describe.

The simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* has a number of pertinent consequences that Bloom does not develop in *The Anxiety of Influence*. Instead of the precursor being simply misread and distanced, the simultaneity of two diametrically opposed readings allows the original tension to come to the fore in mediated form. The domination of either extreme causes it to collapse into its opposite, a process that C. G. Jung termed *enantiodromia* by way of

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[9] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*, p. 14.
[10] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*, p. 50.
[11] Buber appears to be following on from the sort of ironic game that Nietzsche plays with himself in the preface to *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: 'Aber lassen wir Herrn Nietzsche: was geht es uns an, dass *Herr Nietzsche* wieder gesund wurde?' (KSA 3, 347).
[12] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*, p. 100.

Heraclitus.[13] The problem appears to revolve around a simple issue of perspective, which may be demonstrated with reference to Nietzsche's aesthetic concepts of the Apollonian and Dionysian. In Nietzsche's distinctive reading of ancient Greek aesthetics in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, these two artistic drives represent form and formlessness. The Apollonian is best demonstrated by the sculptor who crafts a work of art with his or her hands with the lucidity of a dream; Dionysus, conversely, is best represented by the dancer, whose body dissolves the distinction between art and artwork in an exhilarating moment of intoxication or drunkenness. The union of these artistic drives is achieved, Nietzsche says, first in Greek tragedy, then in German music and finally Wagner's operas.[14] These drives, however, can easily turn into their opposite when the perspective changes. The Dionysian is formless when interpreted from the perspective of the writer, but when it becomes a concept in its own right from the perspective of the writer, it suddenly turns into Apollonian form. Similarly, the Apollonian can no longer distinguish form when it reaches perfection from the perspective of a reader, and thus becomes Dionysian.[15] Similarly, depending on whether seen from the point of view of the ephebe or the precursor, the process is repeated with *tessera* and *daemonization*, which simply reverse perspectives compared with one another. For instance, reading the precursor exclusively through *tessera* could turn the ephebe into a solipsistic figure, a god within his or her own

[13] Cf. 'Der alte Heraklit, der wirklich ein großer Weiser war, hat das wunderbarste aller psychologischen Gesetze entdeckt: nämlich die regulierende Funktion der Gegensätze. Er nennt dies die Enantiodromia, das Entgegenlaufen, worunter er versteht, dass alles einmal in sein Gegenteil hineinlaufe' (Carl Gustav Jung, *Gesammelte Werke*, 18 vols (Zurich: Rascher, 1958-1981), 7, 77-78).

[14] Cf. 'An ihre beiden Kunstgottheiten, Apollo und Dionysus, knüpft sich unsere Erkenntnis, daß in der griechischen Welt ein ungeheurer Gegensatz, nach Ursprung und Zielen, zwischen der Kunst des Bildners, der apollinischen, und der unbildlichen Kunst der Musik, als der des Dionysus, besteht: beide so verschiedne Triebe gehen nebeneinander her, zumeist im offnen Zwiespalt miteinander und sich gegenseitig zu immer neuen kräftigeren Geburten reizend, um in ihnen den Kampf jenes Gegensatzes zu perpetuieren, den das gemeinsame Wort „Kunst" nur scheinbar überbrückt; bis sie endlich, durch einen metaphysischen Wunderakt des hellenischen „Willens", miteinander gepaart erscheinen und in dieser Paarung zuletzt das ebenso dionysische als apollinische Kunstwerk der attischen Tragödie erzeugen' (KSA 1, 25-26).

[15] The simultaneous distancing and encounter of the precursor reflects a process that my own critical approach underwent in the process of compiling my doctoral thesis. The original draft of the thesis responded to Jacob Golomb's assertion that Buber's dialogue reintroduces Nietzsche's Apollonian into his initially Dionysian mystical thought ('Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard', *Existentia*, 12 (2002), 413-427). However, the more I tried to read Buber's concept of the Eternal You as Dionysus, the more this concept became perfectly formed and Apollonian.

world: the ephebe becomes so stuck in reality that there is no guiding principle, which becomes a principle in itself and an ideal over time. Conversely, if the precursor is misread as too human through *daemonization*, then the ephebe's divinity is also in danger of *enantiodromia*: from a tragic perspective, the hubris of becoming divine will be punished with a fall to earth; from a hermeneutic and divine perspective, everything becomes like everything else. Some literary examples of this include Icarus who flies too close to the sun, or the trope in Westerns of camera panning towards the sun when losing consciousness, underlining the fact that looking directly at the sun causes blindness.

NIETZSCHE, THE DEATH OF GOD AND THE DIONYSIAN WORLD ARTIST

From a theological point of view, the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* recalls Nicholas of Cusa's concept of the coincidence of opposites, which he discusses in *De Visione Dei* (*The Vision of God*, 1453): 'Unde in ostio coincidentiae oppositorum, quod angelus custodit in ingressu paradisi constitutus te Domine videre incipio' ('Hence, at the door of the coincidence of opposites, guarded by the angel stationed at the entrance of Paradise, I begin to see You, O Lord').[16] Aesthetically, the coincidence of opposites recurs in German romanticism.[17] In Friedrich Schlegel's lectures on *Transzendentalphilosophie* (1800-1801), it is associated with a longing for the infinite.[18] On the stage, this is perhaps most eloquently

[16] Nicholas of Cusa, *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia*, ed. by Ernst Hoffmann and Raymond Klibansky, 22 vols (Leipzig: Meiner, 1932-), 6, *De Visione Dei*, 36; *Nicholas of Cusa's Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and Interpretative Study of De Visione Dei*, trans. by Jasper Hopkins, 3rd edn (Minneapolis: Banning, 1988), p. 698. Nicolas of Cusa had an important influence on the intellectual development of the young Buber, as evidenced by his doctoral thesis on the problem of individuation ('Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems (Nicolaus von Cues und Jakob Böhme)', MBW 2.1, 75-101).

[17] For an excellent discussion of the coincidence of opposites in German romanticism, see Dennis McCort, *Going Beyond the Pairs: The Coincidence of Opposites in German Romanticism, Zen, and Deconstruction* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), along with Paul J. Archambault's review in 'Review Essay', *Symposium*, 56 (2002), 163-173, which also contains the author's reply.

[18] Cf. 'Dies ist ein Sehnen, die Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen. Etwas Höheres gibt es im Menschen nicht'; and 'Die Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen muß immer Sehnsucht seyn. Unter der Form der Anschauung kann es nicht vorkommen. Das Ideal läßt sich nie anschauen. Das Ideal wird durch Spekulation erzeugt' (Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. by E. Behler et al., 35 vols, (Munich: Schöningh, 1958-2002), 12, 7-8).

demonstrated by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Faust*. Mephistopheles, in his discussion with the Lord in the 'Prolog im Himmel', mocks the play's protagonist for being tragically caught between the animal and the divine:

> Der kleine Gott der Welt bleibt stets von gleichem Schlag,
> Und ist so wunderlich als wie am ersten Tag.
> Ein wenig besser würd er leben,
> Hättst du ihm nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben;
> Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein,
> Nur tierischer als jedes Tier zu sein (*Faust I*, ll. 281-286).

Faust himself longs for the eternal ('Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält', *ibid.*, ll. 382-383), yet is conflicted with his desire for the immediate and sensual in the form of Gretchen ('Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust, / Die eine will sich von der andern trennen', *ibid.*, ll. 1112-1113). The temporal aspect of Goethe's aesthetics ('Verweile doch! du bist so schön!', *ibid.*, l. 1700) continues into modernist poetry. Like Faust, the poets of T. S. Eliot's 'The Dry Salvages' (1941) from *Four Quartets* ('To apprehend / The point of intersection of the timeless / With time, is an occupation for the saint —' and Rainer Maria Rilke's 'Früher Apollo' (1907) attempt to grasp an inchoate moment, present yet in the process of coming into being, in the eternity of its beauty.[19]

The intersection of the theological and the aesthetic, the divine and the human, and the eternal and the present, was heralded for the modernist generation by Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead.[20] The announcement first appears in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882) in an aphorism entitled 'Der tolle Mensch' (KSA 3, 480-482), but its more well-known occurrence appears in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-1891) when the eponymous prophet, upon meeting a holy man or saint figure, remarks, 'Dieser alte Heilige hat in seinem Walde noch Nichts davon

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[19] T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot* (London: Faber, 1969), 'The Dry Salvages', pp. 184-190 (pp. 189-190); Rainer Maria Rilke, *Werke in drei Bänden* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1966), 1, 237.

[20] Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1992), ch. 7, 'After the Death of God: Varieties of Nietzschean Religion', pp. 201-231. On Nietzsche's religiosity, see *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. by Weaver Santaniello (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Nel Grillaert, *What the God-Seekers Found in Nietzsche: The Reception of Nietzsche's "Übermensch" by the Philosophers of the Russian Religious Renaissance* (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2008).

gehört, dass Gott todt ist!' (KSA 4, 14). However, the God whose death Nietzsche proclaims seems to be not only the God of Christianity, but specifically of philosophy, where the metaphysical laws of causality determine, and even appear to merge into, a physical world to which they no longer correspond. Maintaining the tension between the eternity of metaphysics, and the here and now of the physical world, is Nietzsche's concept of God as artist or the Dionysian world artist. In his 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik' in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche attempts to put distance between his current and his former self, as well as one of his precursors, Richard Wagner. Nevertheless, he writes about the artist's god behind it:

> Bereits im Vorwort an Richard Wagner wird die Kunst – und nicht die Moral – als die eigentlich metaphysische Thätigkeit des Menschen hingestellt; im Buche selbst kehrt der anzügliche Satz mehrfach wieder, dass nur als ästhetisches Phänomen das Dasein der Welt gerechtfertigt ist. In der That, das ganze Buch kennt nur einen Künstler-Sinn und -Hintersinn hinter allem Geschehen, – einen „Gott", wenn man will, aber gewiss nur einen gänzlich unbedenklichen und unmoralischen Künstler-Gott, der im Bauen wie im Zerstören, im Guten wie im Schlimmen, seiner gleichen Lust und Selbstherrlichkeit inne werden will, der sich, Welten schaffend, von der Noth der Fülle und Überfülle, vom Leiden der in ihm gedrängten Gegensätze löst (KSA 1, 17).

M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern place the Dionysian world artist at the centre of Nietzsche's philosophy: 'As befits an art-centred philosophy, however, the world-building force is most distinctively represented not as a child, but as an artist: the Dionysiac world-artist (*der dionysische Weltenkünstler*), who works in an Apolline medium, and whose finest creation is us'.[21] As a figure of reception, the artist's god that inspired *Die Geburt der Tragödie* managed to bring into tension several irreconcilable opposites: between Apollo and Dionysus ('Er theilt mit der apollinischen Kunstsphäre die volle Lust am Schein und am Schauen und zugleich verneint er diese Lust und hat eine noch höhere Befriedigung an der Vernichtung der sichtbaren Scheinwelt', KSA 1, 151); and also, from the point of view of Bloom's anxiety of influence, between reader and writer ('Somit ist unser ganzes Kunstwissen im Grunde ein völlig illusorisches, weil wir als Wissende mit jenem Wesen nicht eins und identisch sind, das sich, als einziger Schöpfer und Zuschauer jener Kunstkomödie, einen ewigen Genuss bereitet', KSA

[21] M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, *Nietzsche on Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 292.

1, 47). In the Dionysian world artist, Buber's and Nietzsche's conceptions of the divine coincide.

BUBER'S BIOGRAPHY: FROM MYSTICISM TO DIALOGUE

Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue is very closely related to his reception of Nietzsche, whom he later calls a mystic of the Enlightenment ('Mystiker der Aufklärung', W I, 349). For the definitions of these terms, we rely largely on Buber's own accounts, which are subject to his revisions and anxieties towards his younger self. Buber repeatedly dismisses his earlier thought as mystical and develops his dialogic philosophy to correct the excesses of mysticism in the transitional lecture series 'Religion als Gegenwart' (1922): 'Das, was man in der Mystik zumeist Vereinigung, Unio nennt, bedeutet [...] eine Hypostasierung der reinen Beziehung'.[22] Asked about the meaning of 'Unio', or *unio mystica*, at the end of the lecture, Buber clarifies, 'Unio, das meint jene seltsame wirklich randhafte Übersteigerung der Du-Beziehung, wo die Beziehung selbst, ihre Einheit so ungeheuer stark, vehement gelebt wird, daß ihre Glieder zu verblassen, abzusterben scheinen'.[23] The individual is no longer able to act authentically, because he or she has been absorbed into the infinite. Dialogue addresses the duality of man by maintaining there are two ways to relate to the world, depending on whether we use the word I-It or I-You to address it. If we use the word I-It, everything becomes a third-person object in our own, personalised worldview; if we use the word I-You, however, we encounter another first-person subject who is not limited by our worldview. All subjects are ultimately guaranteed by the Eternal You (*das* or *der ewige Du*), Buber's conception of God ('Die verlängerten Linien der Beziehung schneiden sich im ewigen Du. […] Es vollendet sich

[22] Buber, 'Religion als Gegenwart', in Rivka Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou": An Historical Analysis and the First Publication of Martin Buber's Lectures "Religion als Gegenwart"* (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1978), pp. 43-152 (p. 118).
[23] Buber, 'Religion als Gegenwart', p. 123.

einzig in der unmittelbaren Beziehung zu dem Du, das seinem Wesen nach nicht Es werden kann', W I, 128). Mysticism, in dialogic terms, seems to represent a hypostasis of You, whereas dialogue appears to insist on the separation of I and You.

Maurice Friedman, Paul Mendes-Flohr and Rivka Horwitz all take Buber's lead in maintaining the traditional distinction, and transition, between mysticism and dialogue in his work, which they place between *Daniel* (1913) and *Ich und Du* (1923).[24] The First World War certainly proves to be a turning-point in Buber's career. Buber's initial war enthusiasm earned him the moniker 'Kriegsbuber' ('Buber the warrior') from his close friend, Gustav Landauer, the anarchist, mystic and one of the leaders of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic until his brutal death at the hands of the Freikorps in 1919.[25] Mendes-Flohr sees the turning-point in a letter that Landauer sent Buber in May 1916 on the basis of the following three observations: his express opposition to war and chauvinist nationalism; his re-evaluation of duty (*Aufgabe*) and realising (*Erleben*); and a shift of emphasis from a community based on a subjective-cosmic realisation (*Erlebnis*), to relationships between people.[26] In a section of *Zwiesprache* (1929) entitled 'Eine Bekehrung', Buber also relates the story of a young man named only Mehé, who came to him for help while he was meditating. The German word *Bekehrung* has the primary sense of a religious conversion; etymologically, however, the word also connotes turning (*kehren*), in this case not just towards God, but towards the world. Buber describes the meeting as an everyday event or, more literally, an incidence of the everyday ('ein Ereignis des Alltags', MBW 1, 186): a young man approaches Buber after a morning's meditation ('an einem Vormittag nach einem Morgen »religiöser« Begeisterung', MBW 1, 186), from which

[24] See Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*; Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*; and Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"*. Others who argue for continuity over rupture in the development of Buber's thought include Avraham Shapira, *Hope for Our Time: Key Trends in the Thought of Martin Buber* (New York: State University of New York, 1999); and Leora Batnitzky, 'Renewing the Jewish Past: Buber on History and Truth', *Jewish Studies Quarterly*, 10 (2003), 336-350.
[25] MBB 1, 434 (12.5.1916, Landauer to Buber); quoted in Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, p. 19.
[26] Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 93-126.

we may infer an ecstatic experience that left behind the world ('Es gab Stunden, die aus dem Gang der Dinge herausgenommen wurden', MBW 1, 186). Mehé's death on the front in the First World War while he was meditating on otherworldly and ultimately unreal ideals, namely national honour, brought to Buber's attention the danger that mysticism posed to the individual. Dissenting voices to the notion that Buber ever changed may be found in Gershom Scholem, the Kabbalah scholar and later Buber's colleague at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Israel Koren, who refute any clear distinction at all between mysticism and dialogue. In 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums', Scholem writes, 'Was [Buber] an der chassidischen Welt bewegte, war viele Jahre lang die Mystik in ihr, und noch als er später versuchte, diese Mystik im Sinne seiner eigenen späteren Entwicklung um- oder wegzuinterpretieren, blieb es noch immer, auch unter der Hülle einer neuen Terminologie, nichts anderes als Mystik'.[27] Channelling Scholem's observations onto a less critical route, Israel Koren has recently emphasised the similarities between mysticism and dialogue through an analysis of Hasidism in Buber's work: he argues that Buber's mysticism is not *unio mystica*, but *devekut*, a Hasidic mystical term that means devotion or, more importantly for Buber's supposedly solipsistic and godless mysticism, 'clinging to God'.[28]

The argument elaborated in this thesis agrees with the positions of Scholem and Koren, but adds an alternative guiding principle in the development of Buber's thought: Buber's anxiety towards Nietzsche and his aesthetic absolute in the form of Dionysian world artist. As Steven Aschheim's excellent study of Nietzsche's reception in Germany makes abundantly clear, Nietzsche means many things to many people.[29] In fact, Nietzsche's reception appears to be perennially underpinned by contradiction. For instance, despite his eventual appropriation

[27] Gershom Scholem, *Judaica II* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums', pp. 133-192 (p. 155).
[28] Israel Koren, 'Between Buber's *Daniel* and His *I and Thou*', *Modern Judaism*, 22 (2002), 169-198; and *The Mystery of the Earth: Mysticism and Hasidism in the Thought of Martin Buber* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
[29] Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*.

by the National Socialists, Nietzsche also had a fruitful reception among left-wing and Jewish intellectuals.[30] On the one hand, Nietzsche becomes the champion of Martin Heidegger and later of the French philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, to all of whom it would appear that 'Nichts ist wahr, Alles ist erlaubt' (KSA 5, 399).[31] On the other, Nietzsche becomes a romantic defender of history in Hayden White's *Metahistory*; Nietzsche's apology for the integrity of the poet may be felt in works such as Karl Joel's *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (1905) and Bloom's *Anxiety of Influence*, which liberally references Nietzsche.[32] In spite of various ways in which Nietzsche has been received, Buber's own reception of Nietzsche tends to pin him down as a deconstructionist and a nihilist, then to dismiss him. Several scholars have focused specifically on Buber's later interaction with Nietzsche. In assessing Buber's later interaction with Nietzsche, most scholars, among them Dominique Bourel and Paul Mendes-Flohr, follow Buber's own claims.[33] Jacob Golomb, conversely, has placed particular emphasis on the persistence of Nietzsche in Buber's thought: Golomb goes so far as to see Buber's dialogic thought as a reincorporation of Nietzsche's

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[30] On Nietzsche's appropriation by National Socialism, see *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Absues of a Philosophy*, ed. by Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, ch. 8, 'Nietzsche in the Third Reich', pp. 232-271. On the Jewish reception of Nietzsche, see Ahad Ha'am, 'Nietzscheanismus und Judentum', *Ost und West*, 4 (1902), 241-254; Richard Maximilian Lonsbach, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Juden: Ein Versuch*, 2nd edn, ed. by Heinz Robert Schlette (Bonn: Bouvier, 1985); *De Sils-Maria à Jérusalem: Nietzsche et le judaïsme, les intellectuels juifs et Nietzsche*, ed. by Dominique Bourel and Jacques Le Rider (Paris: Cerf, 1991); Weaver Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews*; *Jüdischer Nietzscheanismus*, ed. by Werner Stegmaier and Daniel Krochmalnik (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997); *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, ed. by Jacob Golomb (London: Routledge, 1997) and Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion* (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[31] See Louis Pinto, *Les neveux de Zarathoustra: La réception de Nietzsche en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1995) and Jacques Le Rider, *Nietzsche in Frankreich* (Munich: Fink, 1997).

[32] Hayden V. White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), ch. 9, 'Nietzsche: The Poetic Defense of History in the Metaphorical Mode', pp. 331-374.

[33] Bourel, 'De Lemberg à Jérusalem: Nietzsche et Buber', in *De Sils-Maria à Jérusalem*, pp. 121-130 (p. 129); Paul Mendes-Flohr, 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, pp. 233-243. See also Hans Kohn, *Martin Buber, sein Werk und seine Zeit: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte Mitteleuropas, 1880-1930*, 3rd edn (Cologne: J. Melzer, 1961), pp. 21, 26-27; Grete Schaeder, *The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber*, trans. by Noah J. Jacobs (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), pp. 17-22; Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, pp. 105-107; Barbara Schäfer, 'Die Jüdische Renaissance im Schatten Nietzsches', MBW 3, 25-28; and Nils H. Roemer, 'Reading Nietzsche – Thinking about God: Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig', *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 84 (2010), 427-439.

Apollonian into his erstwhile Dionysian mysticism, but ultimately concludes that Buber was able to liberate himself from Nietzsche.[34]

There is no lack of evidence for Buber's infatuation with Nietzsche. The teenaged Buber, who gave up translating *Also sprach Zarathustra* into Polish when he discovered an eminent academic was doing the same, would go on to write an article entitled 'Ein Wort über Nietzsche und die Lebenswerte' (1900), not to mention his adoption of what has become known as Buber's *Zarathustrastil*.[35] Buber's post-dialogic reception of Nietzsche focuses mainly on the death of God and will to power. An example of the former may be found in 'Was ist der Mensch?', a series of lectures on his 1938 appointment as professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead, Buber contends, ultimately renders him a monologic and solipsistic thinker:

> [A]ber die Stunde der nackten, letzten Einsamkeit kommt, wo die Stummheit des Seins unüberwindlich wird und die ontologischen Kategorien sich auf die Wirklichkeit nicht mehr anwenden lassen wollen. Wenn der einsam gewordene Mensch zu dem »toten« bekannten Gott nicht mehr »du« sagen kann, kommt alles darauf an, ob er es noch zu dem lebenden unbekannten dadurch sagen kann, daß er mit seinem ganzen Wesen zu einem lebenden bekannten anderen Menschen »du« sagt (W I, 365).

Following the logic of Buber's dialogue, without God, Nietzsche can naturally have no interest in the integrity of either the individual or the absolute:

> Nietzsche freilich will vom Absoluten selbst nichts wissen, aller Absolutheitsbegriff ist ihm, nicht wesentlich anders als Feuerbach, nur ein Spiel und eine Spiegelung des Menschen; indem er jedoch den *Sinn* des menschlichen Seins in seinem Übergang zu einem »Übermenschen« finden will, setzt er sozusagen ein relatives Absolutes ein, und dieses hat seinen Gehalt nicht mehr in einem überzeitlichen Sein, sondern nur noch in dem Werden, in der Zeit (W I, 382).

Consequently, Nietzsche has been reduced to a perspectivist and solipsistic thinker, whose concept of the will to power becomes an end in itself and, in Buber's estimation, an emblem of his monologic attitude ('Nicht die All-Macht bloß, auch das All-Leid ist Gottes', W II, 1034).

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[34] Golomb, 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'; and *Nietzsche and Zion*, ch. 5, 'Martin Buber's "Liberation" from Nietzsche's "Invasion"', pp. 159-188 (pp. 170-171).
[35] Mendes-Flohr, 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', pp. 235-236.

GOD AS DIONYSUS: THE BACCHANT AS *MISE EN ABYME* OF THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE

Buber's post-dialogic statements show no substantive change from those he made as a teenager; he rejects Nietzsche's solipsistic death of God and will to power, but remains attracted by the antinomian Dionysian world artist. What it means to call God Dionysus changes according to perspective from which the question is asked. From the point of view of Bloom's anxiety of influence, the divine cannot be encountered directly, but needs to be mediated aesthetically using two revisionary ratios in particular, *tessera* and *daemonization*, whose simultaneity means that the divine is distanced but encountered. In a similar vein, Nietzsche posits a Dionysian world artist, who both writes and reads the world as creation. Then Buber, in turn, reads and adapts this concept of the divine, completing this particular chain of influence.

Buber's figure of the Bacchant functions as a *mise en abyme* of this chain of influence. The Bacchant first appears in *Daniel*, but recurs in function throughout Buber's work: from Maurice Barrès in 'Zarathustra' to Buber's discussion of Nietzsche's *Übermensch* in 'Was ist der Mensch?'. In real life as within the fiction, a Bacchant is an actor who turns to Dionysus: becomes an actual worshipper of Dionysus, but is brought back down to earth when her physical performance is viewed by another person. The eponymous protagonist in *Daniel*, having just seen a play, remarks, 'Wieder aber, von dem Hochzeitsreigen der Szene gerufen, stand ein neues Spiel vor mir: ich sah die Bakchen auf der Bühne. Nicht die euripideische Dichtung: das alte Dionysosspiel selber' (MBW 1, 225). The apotheosis of Daniel's aesthetic experience comes when he sees both actor and Bacchant simultaneously: 'Und jetzt sah ich, nunmehr vollkommen klar und unverhüllt, *zwei* Wesen. Keiner der Zwei glich dem Mann, den ich eben noch angeschaut hatte; beide glichen ihm' (MBW 1, 226). In this moment, the Bacchant is turned both figuratively and literally towards Dionysus, the artist's god, as both performing artist and artwork appreciated by Daniel, both an ephebe of Dionysus and precursor

to Daniel. Through the *tessera* and *daemonization* of their performance in the eyes of the viewer, creates a chain of influence: the Bacchant turns to the original, divine source of inspiration, but continues to embody herself in her performance. In this way, the Bacchant maintains the tension between the reader of the divine source and the writer of the performance, as well as between the physical and the divine. Consequently, the Bacchant is not God, but another artist who reveals the Dionysian world artist, the ultimate precursor, through her performance of the anxiety of influence. Similary, this thesis reads both mysticism and dialogue as a continuing reflection on the anxiety of influence, not just from Nietzsche, but from divine inspiration itself. Like Bloom's anxiety of influence, Buber's dialogue is about engaging an indefinable other. The only discernible difference between mysticism and dialogue is that the encounter with the divine, mediated by the figure of the Bacchant, becomes reflected. In other words, when the dialogic Buber dismisses Nietzsche as well as his mystical self, he is suffering from an anxiety of his own influence, which retains the necessary tension in a moment of self-renewal.

Buber read many writers and philosophers who influenced his own writing and thought. However, through the figure of the Bacchant, who encounters God as the Dionysian world artist through the anxiety of influence, the thesis suggests that Buber's dialogue is based most profoundly on his reception of Nietzsche. Over the course of five chapters, this thesis follows the development of the Bacchant in Buber's thought, whose performance of the anxiety of influence brings into tension *tessera* and *daemonization*, artist and artwork, reader and writer, human and divine. The first chapter documents Buber's earliest encounter with Nietzsche in his juvenilia at the end of the nineteenth century, which reveals Buber's simultaneously *tesseratic* and *daemonized* reading of Nietzsche through the metaphor of sickness in 'Zarathustra'. Moreover, a number of figures come to perform the role of Bacchant as mediators of Nietzsche, specifically Maurice Barrès and Arthur Schnitzler in 'On Viennese

Literature'. The pivotal second chapter focuses on Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue and demonstrates Buber's first encounter with, and theorisation of, the Bacchant. The chapter reads two works, *Daniel* and *Ich und Du*, which represent mysticism and dialogue respectively, as aesthetic treatises on the anxiety of influence. Through the figure of the Bacchant, the chapter is able to demonstrate that mysticism already contains a dialogic concept of the other, Nietzsche's Dionysian world artist, who carries on in Buber's discussions of art and the artwork in *Ich und Du*. Buber's dialogue reads Nietzsche through *tessera* and *daemonization*, since dialogue does not get absorbed into Nietzsche's metaphysics yet maintains an encounter with the divine as the Eternal You. Moreover, in a moment of self-anxiety and self-renewal, Buber reads his own former mysticism in the same way. The third chapter examines Buber's work on Jewish renaissance, myth and Hasidism, through which Buber is gradually able to realise the figure of the Bacchant: from the intellectualisation of the Bacchant in the Jewish renaissance, through the incorporation of the Hasid as a sick Bacchant caught between myth and reality, to the actual performance between Buber and his German-Jewish audience during his *Reden über das Judentum* (1911). The fourth chapter looks at Buber's biblical hermeneutics in the 1920s and 1930s during his sober, dialogic phase in the context of German historicism. The recurrence of the Bacchant in the form of the contemporary reader of the Bible, who encounters an anxiety of influence towards the biblical material as both historical and mythical, demonstrates the continuity of Buber's reception of Nietzsche's own writings on historicism. The final chapter concludes by examining Buber's final engagement with Nietzsche in his lecture series on philosophical anthropology, 'Was ist der Mensch?' (1936). Buber's statements continue the simultaneous *tesseratic* and *daemonized* reading of Nietzsche that begins in his juvenilia, but this becomes the basis for Buber's philosophical anthropologist, who as Bacchant performs the role of anxiety of influence towards his or her subject matter through distance and encounter.

1 – 'Und auch Apollo und alles apollinische lernte ich vergessen': Nietzsche in Martin Buber's early aesthetics

In his autobiographical fragments, *Begegnung* (1960), the mature Buber reflects on his intellectual roots as a teenager. Following an Augustinian confession of the follies of his youth, Buber says of Nietzsche, 'Das "dionysische" Pathos hat sich hier keineswegs, wie Nietzsche schon früh im Sinn hatte, zum philosophischen gewandelt; es ist dionysisch geblieben, als dessen moderne Abart, von der Begeisterung des Dionysikers an den eigenen Höhen und Tiefen hervorgebracht'.[36] In contrast to the development of his own thought, Buber suggests that the solipsistic Nietzsche never matured out of his Dionysian phase into a fully-fledged philosopher; the difference between his precursor and himself, Buber claims, is that he was able to look beyond his own highs and lows. Buber's statements in *Begegnung* hint at an anxiety of influence from which he suffers throughout his career, not least because they echo almost exactly a sentiment in 'Zarathustra', a short piece that the adolescent Buber wrote as a preface to Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra*. As an erstwhile sick devotee of Nietzsche ('krank[er] Anhänger', MBW 1, 105), Buber writes, '[D]och zuletzt erlöste ich mich von meiner Krankheit, und nach deinem Rezepte, du alter Erlösungsgegner und Erlösungsschauspieler!' (MBW 1, 104). Buber even suggests his reintegration of Apollo as a correction to Nietzsche's Dionysianism when he writes, 'Und auch Apollo und alles apollinische lernte ich vergessen, und Lionardo und Goethe und Böcklin. Ich erkannte mein Hellas der weissen, vollkommenen Leiber nicht mehr in diesen wirren, verwirrenden Bacchanten-Verzückungen und Zerfleischungen' (MBW 1, 105).

[36] Buber, *Begegnung*, pp. 18-19.

Buber's reception of Nietzsche in *Begegnung* seems to revolve around the problem of the infinite, an issue concentric with his own transition from mysticism to dialogue.[37] For Buber, the infinite is both an attraction and a threat: it seduces the individual with the promise of absolute authenticity but, by the same token, it poses the risk of plunging the individual into a meaningless void. Kant, thanks no doubt to his dry and rationalist style, convinced the young Buber that the problem was unsolvable; Nietzsche's exciting and at times dangerous aesthetics, however, made the problem very much alive ('Am Geist des Siebzehnjährigen vollzog sich, wiewohl er diese Konzeption nicht annahm und nicht annehmen konnte, doch eine gleichsam negative Verführung').[38] To preserve his own integrity as an individual and artist ('Es war in mir immer eine geraume Dosis Romantik, eine Art Künstlerwille, sich einen Gott zu schaffen', MBW 1, 107)', Buber begins to read Nietzsche in a way that demonstrates a Bloomian anxiety of influence. In 'Zarathustra', one of the earliest fragments of his writing, Buber takes an ambivalent attitude towards Nietzsche that encompasses both praise and criticism, admiration and condemnation ('Man muß von Nietzsche abfallen, um ihn liebgewinnen zu können', MBW 1, 113). Buber focuses on the paradoxes of Nietzsche's thought and negates its productive irony that relies on bringing irreconcilable opposites into creative tension with one another, by forcing them into one extreme or another. These examples may be read simultaneously as an instance of *tessera*, where the precursor is shown to be too idealist, and of *daemonization*, where the ephebe soars with the precursor's sublime, but who in turn is shown to be mundane and merely human, even all too human. The overall effect is one of distancing and imitation: through either *tessera* or *daemonization*, Buber is able to trap Nietzsche in his own irony;

[37] See Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, *The Early Years: 1878-1923*, ch. 2, 'The Threat of Infinity and the Promise of Time', 26-32; Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, ch. 3, 'Buber's *Erlebnis*-Mysticism', pp. 49-82; and Gilya Gerda Schmidt, *Martin Buber's Formative Years: From German Culture to Jewish Renewal, 1897-1909* (Tuscaloosa, AL; London: University of Alabama Press, 1995).
[38] Buber, *Begegnung*, p. 19.

through their simultaneity, however, Buber turns this irony into Nietzsche's very own artistic metaphor.

Buber's ironic defence against, and metaphorical imitation of, Nietzsche is revealed in two documents, both written at around the age of eighteen when Buber was in his first term at the University of Vienna, 'Zarathustra' and 'On Viennese Literature'. Buber wrote 'Zarathustra' as an imagined introduction to a future book on Nietzsche ('dies ist die Einleitung dazu und die Anleitung zum Verstehen') addressed to his future friends ('Meinen zukünftigen Freunden', MBW 1, 103), imitating a trope whereby Nietzsche frequently addresses his readers as friends.[39] Amusingly, Gilya Gerda Schmidt notes how the young Buber gave up translating *Also sprach Zarathustra* when he discovered that a more eminent Polish scholar was already in the process of doing so.[40] However, as an apostrophe to Nietzsche, the text's comments and style allow a unique insight into the nature of Buber's relationship to this particularly important precursor at early stage of his career. In a similarly enthusiastic vein, Buber wrote 'On Viennese Literature' in his early days as a student in Vienna. The article, originally published in Polish as 'Z literatury wiedeńskiej' in the weekly literary journal *Przegląd tygodniowy* in 1897, is a literary review of the authors of Young Vienna (*Jung-Wien* or *das Junge Wien*), a group of writers who embody transition from naturalism to modernism and aestheticism.[41] It contains vignettes on Hermann Bahr, Peter Altenberg, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Arthur Schnitzler at a very early stage of their careers, who were readers of Nietzsche themselves.[42]

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[39] For a discussion of Nietzsche on friendship, see Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 3rd edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 363-371; Jacques Derrida, *Politiques de l'amitié, suivi de L'oreille de Heidegger* (Paris: Galilée, 1994); and Robert C. Miner, 'Nietzsche on Friendship', *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 40 (2010), 47-69.

[40] Schmidt, *Martin Buber's Formative Years*, p. 24.

[41] See Gotthard Wunberg, *Das Junge Wien: Österreichische Literatur- und Kunstkritik 1887-1902*, 2 vols (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976); and Jens Rieckmann, *Aufbruch in die Moderne: Die Anfänge des Jungen Wiens: Österreichische Literature und Kritik im Fin de Siècle* (Tübingen: Athenäum, 1985).

[42] On Nietzsche's reception in Vienna, see David S. Luft, *Eros and Inwardness in Vienna: Weininger, Musil, Doderer* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 31-36, who claims that Nietzsche barely had any impact on the Young Vienna of the 1890s, a phenomenon that would have been unimaginable for the generation of 1905 with whom he chimed so strongly. The generation of 1905, by which Luft means 'the generation of intellectuals who began to reach creative maturity in the decade before the First World War' (p. 6), to which

'Zarathustra' and 'On Viennese Literature' are the earliest documents to bear witness to Buber's simultaneously *tesseratic* and *daemonized* reading of Nietzsche. In 'Zarathustra', Buber claims that he is a greater romantic by appropriating Nietzsche's own metaphors. Particularly revealing is the example of sickness, which demonstrates both *tessera*, insofar as Nietzsche is sick with his own idealism, and *daemonization*, because Nietzsche is unable to overcome this all-too-human sickness unlike the supposedly real artist, Buber. 'On Viennese Literature' applies these aesthetic demands to evaluate the extent to which the authors of Young Vienna are able to overcome the dissonance between inner and outer reality. As linking figure between both texts, not to mention between Buber and Nietzsche as another reader and interpreter, the French author Maurice Barrès functions as a precursor to the Bacchant in Buber's *Daniel*, whom we shall encounter in the following chapter. Buber's Barrès reads Nietzsche and brings his idealist thought down to earth through *tessera*, yet both Barrès and Buber have become *daemonized* through their creative interpretation. In this way, the young Buber describes a chain of influence going back through Nietzsche to Dionysus, into which he inserts himself. Consequently, the artists in 'On Viennese Literature' are themselves hierarchized by Buber according to their ability to fulfil the role of Bacchant. They too are read by Buber through *tessera* and *daemonization*, not to mention condescendingly with the exception of Arthur Schnitzler, who comes closest to performing the role of Bacchant.

Buber belongs (p. 33). It is for this reason that Jacob Golomb, 'Stefan Zweig's Tragedy as a Nietzschean *Grenzjude*', in 'Jüdische Aspekte *Jung-Wiens* im Kulturkontext des *Fin de Siècle*', in *Jüdische Aspekte Jung-Wiens im Kulturkontext des »Fin de Siècle«*, ed. by Sarah Fraiman-Morris (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2005), pp. 75-94, writes about the importance of Nietzsche for Stefan Zweig as a marginal Jew (*Grenzjude*) within the context of Young Vienna, even though he was not one of the members of Young Vienna who frequented the Café Griensteidl. Todd Samuel Presner, *Muscular Judaism: The Jewish Body and the Politics of Regeneration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), ch. 3, 'The aesthetics of regeneration: Martin Buber, E. M. Lilien and the aesthetic state', pp. 65-105, also assumes a strong connection between Nietzsche's philosophy and Young Vienna (p. 73).

'ZARATHUSTRA': NIETZSCHE'S SICKNESS AS STIMULANT

Mendes-Flohr dates the manuscript of 'Zarathustra' between 1898 and 1900. The earlier date incorporates an anecdote by Ahron Eliasberg, when the teenaged Buber, in a moment of juvenile bravado in the presence of a younger friend, claimed to have outgrown Nietzsche; the later date takes into account the broad reading in French and German literature and philosophy that Buber displays.[43] Martin Treml, conversely, suggests the earlier dates of 1896 or 1897: after Barrès' anti-Semitic turn in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair, Buber would no longer have been able to cite him as often as he does (MBW 1, 307-309). Undoubtedly, this document was written by a young Buber, eighteen years old or only slightly older, at the beginning of his student career at the University of Vienna. The style of 'Zarathustra' also places the manuscripts among Buber's juvenile writings: Buber imitates Nietzsche in the dithyrambs ('So verzeiht mir die Un-Art dieser Zarathustra-Klänge, oh meine Freunde!', MBW 1, 103) of the first half of the document, as well as in the aphorisms of the second half, which were probably compiled at a different time from previous notes ('Aus älteren Papieren', MBW 1, 109).

Buber's *Zarathustrastil*, as it has become known, not only imitates the dithyrambic style that Nietzsche employs most notably in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, an influence that arguably continues all the way through to *Daniel* and arguably even in *Ich und Du*; it also creates an intoxicated stream of concepts and influences that are difficult to distinguish from one another, even in those cases where they are properly developed. Despite the precociousness of Buber's juvenile writings, 'Zarathustra' sets the tone for the remainder of Buber's early work; in the way that it foreshadows Buber's autobiographical fragments, it also is the gateway for Buber's considerations on art, the individual and metaphysics in his later work. In the manuscript, Buber sees Nietzsche and Richard Wagner as the two poles of contemporary art

[43] Eliasberg, Ahron, 'Aus Martin Bubers Jugendzeit', *Blätter des Heine-Bundes*, 1 (1928), 1-5; quoted in Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 88-89, and in MBW 1, 308.

('»Nietzsche gegen Wagner« – das ist die eigentliche Frage der heutigen Kunst', MBW 1, 117), representing modernity and romanticism respectively; in turn, Buber considers himself more romantic than Nietzsche ('Es war in mir immer eine geraume Dosis Romantik', MBW 1, 107). In its consideration of romanticism and its careful demarcation of creative space with regard to Nietzsche, 'Zarathustra' immediately lends itself to Bloom's considerations on the anxiety of influence. Buber's ambivalent treatment of Nietzsche, where he is both far too idealist and all too human, and his focusing on the deliberate paradoxes in Nietzsche's antinomian thought, reveals a combination of *tessera* and *daemonization*. The result is a direct imitation of Nietzsche's irony and metaphor, as well as a reclamation and renewal of the tension between the individual and the sublime.

'Der Fall Nietzsche': Buber and the anxiety of influence

'Zarathustra' represents a simultaneous fascination with, and falling away from, Nietzsche. On the one hand, Buber's enthrallment with Nietzsche is obvious ('ich liebe dich, Friedrich Nietzsche', MBW 1, 109).[44] In addition to 'Vom Baum am Berge', a passage in *Also sprach Zarathustra* in which a lonely tree grows high above all the others (KSA 4, 51-54), Buber considers 'Schopenhauer als Erzieher' to be mandatory reading for anyone wishing to understand Nietzsche (MBW 1, 104). On the other hand, Buber also demonstrates a critical stance towards his mentor. Paradoxically, Buber expresses an outright dislike for the *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, of which 'Schopenhauer als Erzieher' is one of the four constituent essays (MBW 1, 106). Most of all, Buber laments Nietzsche's 'Wagnerei' (MBW 1, 106), the infatuation that Nietzsche exhibits in his early work with Wagner's operas, which were supposed to bring about a cultural reawakening of the German spirit: 'Ein Wort aber in

[44] Buber's embarrassed declaration of love will be echoed by Walter Kaufmann when he writes, 'I love him although my disagreements with him are legion' (*Discovering the Mind*, 3 vols (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 2, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber*, 6).

der »Geburt« machte mir Kopfzerbrechen: »Wagner«' (MBW 1, 105). Mendes-Flohr speculates that Buber's frustration with Wagner, as related in Eliasberg's anecdote, coincides with Buber's own turning-away from Nietzsche; Treml, conversely, offers an alternative psychological interpretation of the young Buber's boasting: 'Hier hat ein Wunderkind – als das Buber von den Großeltern betrachtet wurde – dem jüngeren und ihn bewundernden Verwandten eine Lektion erteilt' (MBW 1, 308). Indeed, Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner is not quite as straightforward as Buber suggests in 'Zarathustra'. Buber does not point out, for instance, that even by the time of 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', the fourth essay of Nietzsche's *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, Nietzsche was already distancing himself from Wagner. Nietzsche met Wagner for the first time in 1868, praised him as leading the way to cultural regeneration in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, which bore as its subtitle 'Aus dem Geiste der Musik', then began to fall out with him following his disappointment with the Bayreuth Festival in 1876. Nietzsche discusses his relationship with Wagner on several occasions, but in *Der Fall Wagner* in particular. In this text, Nietzsche describes his relationship in two ways: first, as a recovery from illness ('Mein grösstes Erlebniss war eine Genesung. Wagner gehört bloss zu meinen Krankheiten', KSA 6, 12); and second, as self-overcoming ('Eine lange Geschichte! — Will man ein Wort dafür? Wenn ich Moralist wäre, wer weiss, wie ich's nennen würde! Vielleicht Selbstüberwindung', KSA 6, 11). Wagner's music may have been sick, Nietzsche writes, but it is a necessary illness because it highlights the symptoms of modernity: 'Ich würde aber auch einen Philosophen verstehn, der erklärte: „Wagner resümirt die Modernität. Es hilft nichts, man muss erst Wagnerianer sein…"' (KSA 6, 23). Consequently, the sickness brought on by Wagner also acts as a stimulant to life: 'Die Krankheit selbst kann ein Stimulans des Lebens sein: nur muss man gesund genug für dies Stimulans sein!' (KSA 6, 22).

In his ephebic attempt to gain artistic independence, Buber imitates Nietzsche's own terminology to reflect on Nietzsche himself. Using a metaphor straight out of Nietzsche's own vocabulary, Buber's treatment of his own relationship with Nietzsche also becomes a tale of sickness and convalescence: Buber has sobered up from his intoxication with Nietzsche ('Ach wer ausser euch sollte einer Krankheitsgeschichte mit all ihrer Genesung und Erlösung zuhören wollen, zuhören können mit eigenem, innerem, lustvollem Erleben?' MBW 1, 103). Moreover, Buber undermines Nietzsche's thought through well-known and often self-identified paradoxes within it. One example is the following self-effacing remark that annihilates Nietzsche's position as a poet: 'Wie sagtest du doch, du feiner Dichter, Erdichter: »Alles Unvergängliche – das ist nur ein Gleichnis. Und die Dichter lügen zuviel [...]«' (MBW 1, 108). Another example is Buber's oxymoronic description of Nietzsche's thought as an unsystematic system ('das ganze unsystematische System dieses aristokratischen Radikalismus', MBW 1, 107), a reference that suggests the influence of Georg Brandes' 'Aristokratischer Radikalismus' (1890) on Buber's reception of Nietzsche.[45] Consequently, the anxiety of influence that Buber is suffering appears to push him in two directions. On the one hand, Buber still insists he is suffering from the illness that Nietzsche caused ('Und jetzt sollte eine Genesungs-Geschichte folgen; aber auf die müsset ihr noch warten, [...] [d]enn ich habe es euch gesagt, wie todeskrank, langsamen Todes krank ich bin' MBW 1, 109); on the other, Buber also places distance between himself and Nietzsche, in order to fall for him anew ('Man muß von Nietzsche abfallen, um ihn liebgewinnen zu können. In diesen Worten liegt viel, wenn nicht Alles', MBW 1, 113).

At first glance, the revisionary ratio that seems to describe most adequately the adolescent Buber's relationship towards Nietzsche, the poet ('Dichter und Erdichter', MBW 1,

[45] Georg Brandes, 'Aristokratischer Radikalismus: Eine Abhandlung über Friedrich Nietzsche', *Deutsche Rundschau* (April 1890), pp. 52-89; cf. Golomb's remarks on Buber's reception of Nietzsche's work as 'aristocratic individualism' in 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'.

108) and educator ('Erzieher', MBW 1, 104), would be that of *tessera*, which sidelines the precursor as too idealist and accords the ephebe a more down-to-earth perspective. This is achieved, Bloom suggests, by inverting the precursor's terminology to mean its exact opposition, the process of 'completion and antithesis'.[46] Buber's 'Zarathustra' offers several instances of *tessera*. First of all, Buber directly complains about Nietzsche's idealism ('Und nicht die Übermensch-Träumereien, sondern dieser mühselige Weg zur Wahrheit ist Nietzsche's wahrer, grosser Idealismus', MBW 1, 114). Second, Buber states that he offers greater realism in relation to Nietzsche. Buber praises Nietzsche as an artist or psychologist who examines the individual's interior reality, but distances himself from the moralist or narrow-minded observer of superficial tendencies ('Tendenzler') who is interested only in overarching narratives:

> [I]ch liebe den Künstler in euch und den Psychologen, – ihr verzeiht mir wohl diese Synonyma, – aber den Tendenzler in euch, den Moralisten (oder »Immoralisten«, was nur Leseart ist), den verkenne ich, denn ich habe mit ihm nichts zu schaffen, es sei denn als Psycholog (MBW 1, 108-109).

By focusing on the paradoxes that are central to Nietzsche's antinomian and counter-cultural thought, Buber deliberately unpicks these ironies and forces his version of Nietzsche down the idealist route. Nietzsche describes his own system of thought as immoral, as a protest or rebellion against prevailing systems of morality; however, Buber demonstrates how, insofar as irony both reinforces as much as it negates its object, Nietzsche's immorality is also a form of morality, an idealist system.[47] This is highlighted in the third example of *tessera*: Buber's inversion of Nietzsche's metaphor of sickness and convalescence to mean their direct opposite. Nietzsche ironically describes his philosophy as a sickness: it sets itself apart and isolates itself from the so-called healthy world of morality by exposing this world as an illusion, but in so doing gains true health by seeing the world as it is.[48] Buber forcibly takes Nietzsche's assertion

[46] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*, pp. 49-76.
[47] Cf. KSA 2, 533.
[48] Cf. Nietzsche's ironic remarks in the preface to *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: 'Aber lassen wir Herrn Nietzsche: was geht es uns an, dass *Herr Nietzsche* wieder gesund wurde?' (KSA 3, 347).

at face value: Nietzsche has identified the sickness of contemporary culture and even prescribed the cure, but only Buber was strong enough to take the medicine: 'doch zuletzt erlöste ich mich von meiner Krankheit, und nach deinem Rezepte, du alter Erlösungsgegner und Erlösungsschauspieler!' (MBW 1, 104). The sickness that Buber mentions is not only Nietzsche's suffering from a metaphysical worldview, but also Buber's own intoxication with Nietzsche himself; in a moment of *tesseratic* anxiety of influence, Buber sidelines Nietzsche as an idealist and claims his own artistic independence in the process.

Nevertheless, each example of Buber's *tesseratic* relationship with Nietzsche in 'Zarathustra' may also be read as an instance of *daemonization*. Unlike *tessera*, which consigns the precursor to the lofty and inaccessible heights of idealism, *daemonization* represents a bathetic move in the opposite direction: the precursor is reduced to the human, not to mention all-too-human world, while the *daemonized* ephebe soars in the poetic realm of divine inspiration. Buber recognises Nietzsche as an artist, the highest accolade that Buber accords in 'On Viennese Literature' (MBW 1, 127), yet Buber adds the enthusiastic and curiously condescending remark, 'Künstler war er; er wollte mehr sein' (MBW 1, 109). In this *daemonized* reading, Nietzsche becomes merely a teacher, Buber the true artist. Buber's inversion of Nietzsche's sickness metaphor may also be read in precisely this way: Nietzsche, who was sick on account of his humanity, was unable to take his own redemptive medicine.

The simultaneity of both *tessera* and *daemonization* that we observe in 'Zarathustra' towards the highly ironic philosophy of his precursor, Nietzsche, may be read as a concurrent imitation and reclamation of the romantic notion of the inchoate moment; in fact, the inchoate moment relies on the necessary tension between distance and proximity, between immediacy and longing that the combination of *tessera* and *daemonization* engenders. Buber claims that his own latent romanticism is what attracted him to Nietzsche, but also that this is the regard in which Buber has managed to surpass Nietzsche. In 'Zarathustra', Buber explains what he

means by romanticism: 'Ich war nie Ultra-Positivist. Es war in mir immer eine geraume Dosis Romantik, eine Art Künstlerwille, sich einen Gott zu schaffen, Zeus, Kronion, Ideal, Übermensch; Ich –; – Prometheus unbound; Peer Gynt; Schönheitskultur' (MBW 1, 107). Buber writes that he was never an ultra-positivist, that he did not out of hand reject metaphysics in favour of observable truth. Instead he claims he always retained a healthy dose of romanticism, which he understands on at least three levels: as the concept of the absolute, whether God or Zeus; of the individual or I, whether Prometheus or Peer Gynt; and their interaction through art, whether the artist's will or the culture of beauty. It is noteworthy that that Buber's romanticist hierarchy places Nietzsche's sublime, the *Übermensch*, at the threshold between the ideal and the individual.

Buber's reclamation of the individual from Nietzsche's metaphysics

Buber's claim that he is a greater romantic than Nietzsche rests on his idea that he has rescued the latter's conception of the creative individual from the threat of abstraction; or in other words, that, through the tension between *tessera* and *daemonization* towards his precursor, Buber has renewed the inchoate moment in his own thought by preventing it from becoming either too abstract or too mundane. This is a grand claim, a bold act of self-definition from the ephebe Buber over and against his precursor, Nietzsche, who has been considered an epigone of romanticism and a defender of the individual against idealism since at least Karl Joel's *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (1905).[49] Philosophical idealism takes the mind to be the most basic reality, through which the great German idealists, namely Kant, Hegel and Schelling, strove for greater individual autonomy. However, German idealism does not solve the problem of immanence, of how the mind is able to stand outside or transcend the realm it is interpreting without becoming part of it. Consequently, German romanticism counters the perceived threat

[49] Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, p. 126. See also White, *Metahistory*, ch. 9, 'Nietzsche: The Poetic Defense of History in the Metaphorical Mode', pp. 331-374.

of abstraction, of an all-encompassing objective worldview that extinguishes the subjective. Nietzsche tries to conserve the authenticity of the individual in a number of ways. He mounts an aesthetic defence of the individual in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* in the form of Greek tragedy, where crystallised individuality in the form of Apollo is kept in check by the destructive and regenerative Dionysus. In addition, Nietzsche defends the individual in ethical terms in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, which Buber holds in higher regard than *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* and even *Also sprach Zarathustra* (MBW 1, 105). In the first essay, entitled '"Gut und Böse", "Gut und Schlecht"', Nietzsche opposes two ethical systems. The first, master morality, contrasts good with bad. The so-called masters are strong enough to thrive in the world and therefore relate all ethical decisions to themselves: the strong call anything that refers to the present moment good and anything else bad. By contrast, in the second ethical system, slave morality, the weak are essentially oppressed by the strong: in a reversal of master morality, anything good for the strong becomes evil for the weak. This reversal occurs through recourse to another realm, an ascetic longing for another life which denies the current life, a theme that is also prominent in the third treatise of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, 'Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?'. The weak long for something beyond the present world, whether this is a universal system of ethics that condemn the strong, or a God that redeems their weakness. However, in Nietzsche's eyes, this is a fallacy, since nothing exists beyond the present world. Examples of a false metaphysical outlook include the Christian Church, with its concepts of God and heaven, and idealism. This culminates in Nietzsche's distinction between the *Übermensch* and the last man. In the prologue to *Also sprach Zarathustra*, the eponymous prophet contrasts two responses to the end of time: the *Übermensch*, who achieves absolute individuality meant only for him or herself; and the last man, who achieves universality, meant for everyone equally ('Kein Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer anders fühlt, geht freiwillig in's Irrenhaus', KSA 4, 19-20).

As an act of *tessera*, Buber reduces Nietzsche's thought to a form of idealism, to a conceptual framework laid over life as it is actually lived. In both the admiring language of Buber's initial denunciation of Nietzsche's idealism ('Und nicht die Übermensch-Träumereien, sondern dieser mühselige Weg zur Wahrheit ist Nietzsche's wahrer, grosser Idealismus' MBW 1, 114), as well as in Buber's discussion of Nietzsche's transvaluation of values, it becomes clear that Nietzsche came so close to salvaging the creative individual, but did not quite come far enough:

> »Und als ich meinen Teufel sah, da fand ich ihn ernst, gründlich, tief, feierlich: es war der Geist der Schwere, – durch ihn fallen alle Dinge.« Oh Zarathustra, du fröhlicher Wirbeltänzer, das hast du selber vergessen. Als du die alten Werthschätzungen auf den Kopf stelltesst und dann neue Tafeln vor uns legtest und sagtest: Diese Herrenmoral: die sei euch wahr! (MBW 1, 104)

Offering yet another instance of Nietzsche's central paradoxes, Buber accuses Nietzsche of replacing one set of values with another instead of transvaluing them; in Buber's eyes, Nietzsche's Zarathustra comes down from the mountain and simply replaces one truth with another. Buber diagnoses Nietzsche's idealism in his metaphysics: 'Nietzsche hasste alles Englische: der grosse Rassen-Urstreit. Leider war er nicht genug Slave um nicht ein wenig blond und metaphysisch, id est deutsch zu werden' (MBW 1, 111). It is not unusual to accuse Nietzsche of being metaphysical: for instance, Lou Andreas-Salomé, friend of Nietzsche and author in her own right, claimed that Nietzsche returned to his earlier metaphysical phase in his later works in *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* (1894). However, Nietzsche's metaphysics is exhibited neither in the *Übermensch*, nor even in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return, which Buber considers mere allegory (MBW 1, 108), but in his views on morality and the body. First of all, Buber objects to the hierarchy of Nietzsche's master-slave morality. The thrust of Nietzsche's views on morality, as Buber concedes, is that there is no concept of higher and lower – 'Er hat mich gelehrt, freudig-gross zu sein im »Guten« wie im »Bösen«. Höheres habe ich nie gelernt' (MBW 1, 115). Buber applauds Nietzsche for his attempt to eliminate a hierarchical ethics, for suggesting a morality beyond the binary of good and evil, and even

quotes *Also sprach Zarathustra*: 'Siehe, es giebt kein Oben, kein Unten!' (KSA 4, 291; quoted in MBW 1, 108). However, Buber's complaints that Nietzsche's ethics are in fact another form of truth ('Diese Herrenmoral: die sei euch wahr!', MBW 1, 104) suggest that Nietzsche did not go far enough in Buber's eyes. As for the body, Buber declares, '[T]rotz aller Lobreden auf den Leib war Nietzsche reiner Intellekt' (MBW 1, 111): as an example of *tessera*, Nietzsche's body has literally been turned into its opposite, intellect. Whether Nietzsche is an idealist or not is open to debate; what is clear from Buber's diagnoses is the way in which Buber appears to prize Nietzsche's individualism from his systematising tendencies.

At the same time, Buber's conception of the creative individual also shows symptoms of *daemonization*. On a number of occasions in 'Zarathustra', Buber concedes that he sees a kernel of Nietzsche's individuality. Buber even ascribes to Nietzsche the positive notion of a form of I-romanticism ('eine Art Ich-Romantik', MBW 1, 112). In addition, Buber says of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, '[D]enn es ist darin Nietzsche's Selbst, sein reines Metall, am besten, am geklärtesten ausgedrückt' (MBW 1, 105). However, this remark appears to be back-handed, not to mention an example of *tessera*: the idea that Nietzsche's self may be composed of pure metal suggests that it might belong to a rigid system rather than be dynamic. In each of these instances, however, the discovery of the precursor's individuality appears to be an achievement of the ephebe; the precursor is rendered human, while the artistic ephebe is *daemonized*. This becomes clear in the following quotation, where Nietzsche is unable to free himself from his own individuality:

> In fast allen Bemerkungen über Philosophen, Künstler, freie Geister liegt bei Nietzsche etwas tief Persönliches, in vielen überdies eine meist unbewusste Anspielung auf sich selbst, sei es als Klage, Lobpreisung, Ironie, Zurechtstellung. Er konnte sich nie von seiner Individualität loslösen (MBW 1, 111).

Nietzsche's reference to himself is unconscious, that is, not the author's intention; instead, Buber feels he has discovered something unknown to Nietzsche himself. Moreover, Buber repeats the idea of unintended merits, of denying Nietzsche intentionality and claiming it as his

own later in the manuscript ('Den Skepticismus künstlerisch verklärt und zugleich geklärt zu haben, gehört zu Nietzsches grossen ungewollten Verdiensten', MBW 1, 112). This may also explain the following quotation: 'Und so kam es, dass ich an Nietzsche, dass ich Nietzsche glauben musste' (MBW 1, 107). Buber was led to believe 'in' Nietzsche as an ideal, in what he was trying to do, rather than Nietzsche as a man, what he actually achieved; Buber loves the man for leading the way to his own *daemonization*, but in the end Nietzsche remains simply a man.

Apollo and Dionysus in 'Die Sensitiven'

Buber's apparent discovery of the personal aspects in Nietzsche's thought appears to be a deliberate misreading, not least since Buber takes the opportunity to flaunt his own thoughts on individuality. In addition to a number of famous authors, Henrik Ibsen and Leo Tolstoy are given particular praise. Buber sprinkles his writing with the names of several contemporary writers who dealt with the question of individuality, among them Alfred Binet, who would later compose the world's first IQ test, the Binet-Simon test, in 1905 (MBW 1, 106), and Stanisław Przybyszewski, the Polish novelist and author of *Zur Psychologie des Individuums*, which contains the essay 'Chopin und Nietzsche' (MBW 1, 37). Buber's great project on the individual, however, is 'Die Sensitiven': 'Meine Antwort – eine stolze, hochmütige, aristokratische Antwort: »Die Sensitiven«. Ich habe da eben einen plan für eine psychologische Essays-Sammlung, die diesen Titel führen dürfte. (Etwa Shelley, Stendhal, Slowacki, Poë, Baudelaire, Nietzsche, d'Annunzio)' (MBW 1, 109). As Treml points out, simply citing these authors does not mean that Buber has a deep understanding of them (MBW 1, 308). Nevertheless, Buber's proposed but never completed project, 'Die Sensitiven', shows the extent to which Buber has seized upon Nietzsche's concept of the artistic individual.

The term ‘Sensitiven’ refers to a type of artist who exhibits qualities that Buber esteems. In ‘On Viennese Literature’, Buber will once again place artists in a hierarchy according to an identifiable set of aesthetic values. In his writings about ‘Die Sensitiven’ in ‘Zarathustra’, these values may be summarised as an emphasis on sense, the self and art as a link to culture:

> Sie, welche die Welt nicht »idealisirten«, sondern selbst idealisirt in alle Dinge etwas von ihrer zweiten Welt einlegten, die Menschen der verfeinerten Sinne und der zersetzbarsten Nerven, die dionysischen Lust- und Weh-Verknüpfer, die »Fermenterreger der Menschheit«, die Unbefriedigten, die Überfeinen und Überempfindlichen, die Künstler par excellence, die in alle Räthsel und Wirrnisse der Form mit ihrem Oberlicht-Auge eindrangen, die Psychologen par excellence, die das große, unbekannte, überreiche Psyche-Leben erforschen, welches von der dünnen, für die große Menge allzustarren, Lavaschicht unseres Bewußtseins bedeckt, sich den Blicken aller nur flüchtig und verschwindend leicht in unseren Reflex-Bewegungen manifestiert, wie der rauchende Vulkan. Für sie ist Zarathustra gedichtet; für diese Menschen des Rausches und der Betäubung (MBW 1, 109-110).

The title ‘Die Sensitiven’ is itself a reference to the priority of subjective sensory experience over objective, idealist universalisation. As another clear-cut example of the tension between *tessera* and *daemonization*, those who are overly sensitive are able to cross over from the second world, which may be understood as the superimposed system of imagination or idealism, into the real world with their own idealised selves. As creative individuals, they are able to peer into the psyche of the masses, an inchoate moment that combines the general with the specific. However, they do so through anaesthetisation and intoxication, references to the aesthetic forces of Apollo and Dionysus. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche writes, ‘An ihre beiden Kunstgottheiten, Apollo und Dionysus, knüpft sich unsere Erkenntniss, dass in der griechischen Welt ein ungeheurer Gegensatz, nach Ursprung und Zielen, zwischen der Kunst des Bildners, der apollinischen, und der unbildlichen Kunst der Musik, als der des Dionysus, besteht [...]’ (KSA 1, 25). Apollonian art, on the one hand, is something to which form has been given, such as sculpture. This form, however, is illusory, a mere representation of reality, and is therefore associated with a dream-like clarity. Dionysian art, on the other, has no form: as in dance, artist and artwork have become one. Dionysus, therefore, is associated with intoxication, with a blurring of distinctions.

In ‘Zarathustra’, Buber implies that he reintroduces the Apollonian to the Dionysian through his discovery of Nietzsche’s unconscious allusions to himself. Nietzsche’s artist figure, in Buber’s reading, is reduced to Apollonian creation in the face of the Dionysian abyss; at one and the same time, Nietzsche’s self is projected into an idealist high through *tessera* and destroyed through *daemonization*. Buber’s artist figure, conversely, appears to be more faithful to the Dionysian world artist of *Die Geburt der Tragödie* than its original instantiation; Buber’s version is a mixture of Apollo and Dionysus in terms of form and psyche, and of anaesthetisation and intoxication, who is able to overcome his or her own boundaries. Buber’s reintroduction of the creative, Apollonian element to bridge the Dionysian gap is a pattern we shall observe in ‘On Viennese Literature’, where the writers of Young Vienna overcome the dissonance between the inner and outer world.

Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus have moral as well as cultural implications. Nietzsche believes that contemporary scholarship has been dominated by Apollo ever since Socrates’ philosophical turn towards reason. As suggested by the 1886 subtitle of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, ‘Griechentum und Pessimismus’, Nietzsche’s approach to reality is pessimistic, that is to say, he does not believe in ultimate reason given to this world from the beyond, nor in an explanation or causality for everything: reality is simply formless or, in his own terms, Dionysian. Nietzsche distinguishes three kinds of culture according to the extent to which they are able to acknowledge this terrible truth: the Alexandrian, or Socratic; the Hellenic, or artistic; and the Buddhist, or tragic.

> Aus diesen Reizmitteln besteht alles, was wir Cultur nennen: je nach der Proportion der Mischungen haben wir eine vorzugsweise sokratische oder künstlerische oder tragische Cultur: oder wenn man historische Exemplificationen erlauben will: es giebt entweder eine alexandrinische oder eine hellenische oder eine buddhaistische Cultur (KSA 1, 116).

Contemporary scholarship, in Nietzsche’s diagnoses, has become mired in Socratic culture: it creates forms and explanations, which although illusory are necessary, but starts to believe in

the veracity of these mere illusions. One such illusion is the *principium individuationis* ('principle of individuation'), which Nietzsche adopts from Schopenhauer.

> Ja es wäre von Apollo zu sagen, dass in ihm das unerschütterte Vertrauen auf jenes principium und das ruhige Dasitzen des in ihm Befangenen seinen erhabensten Ausdruck bekommen habe, und man möchte selbst Apollo als das herrliche Götterbild des principii individuationis bezeichnen, aus dessen Gebärden und Blicken die ganze Lust und Weisheit des „Scheines", sammt seiner Schönheit, zu uns spräche (KSA 1, 28).

In *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Schopenhauer divided the world into the world of appearances and the will. Schopenhauer's aim was to lift the illusion of reality, the veil of Maja, through the appreciation of pure beauty and liberation from the will. However, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer disagree on precisely this point:

> Und so möchte von Apollo in einem excentrischen Sinne das gelten, was Schopenhauer von dem im Schleier der Maja befangenen Menschen sagt. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, S. 416: „Wie auf dem tobenden Meere, das, nach allen Seiten unbegränzt, heulend Wellenberge erhebt und senkt, auf einem Kahn ein Schiffer sitzt, dem schwachen Fahrzeug vertrauend; so sitzt, mitten in einer Welt von Qualen, ruhig der einzelne Mensch, gestützt und vertrauend auf das principium individuationis" (KSA 1, 28).

While the individual may be an illusion, the world is all we have. Schopenhauer longs for death and the beyond, whereas Nietzsche opts for life. The Dionysian element of death and renewal is reintroduced by German music, specifically Wagner. In the same way, the great importance of Nietzsche for Buber is as a herald of a new artistic age: 'Nietzsche: eine Übergangsart zu einer neuen Kunst; – ich hoffe nicht mehr einst sagen zu dürfen: zu einer neuen Kultur' (MBW 1, 110). The creative individual is the link between art and culture:

> Er verband mit dieser – kaum Philosophie zu nennenden – Lehre eine Art Ich-Romantik und bildete aus Beiden, sich des »Ich« als Bindungsglied bedienend, einen harmonischen Rausch, während Schopenhauer eine (in Bezug auf Ursprung) ähnliche Romantik mit seinem Rationalismus zu einem Etwas verquickte, das Ja-Menschen, uns Hier-und-Heute-Menschen, wenn nicht unsympathisch, so doch recht fremdartig berühren muss (MBW 1, 112).

Buber discovers in Nietzsche a kernel of individuality that realises itself in the here and now; the individual becomes authentic through his or her artistic contribution to culture.

For Buber in 'Zarathustra', as for Nietzsche, it is the creative interaction with culture that renders the individual authentic. Previous metaphysical attempts to anchor individuality have proven not only unsuccessful, but impossible; Schopenhauer highlighted the fallacy of

the *principium individuationis*, but offered only nihilism as a solution. Nietzsche claimed to overcome the metaphysics of both Schopenhauer and Wagner in his later work. Nietzsche repeatedly criticises Wagner for becoming an apostle of chastity ('Apostel der Keuschheit', KSA 5, 204, 340, 341-343), for giving in to a Christian worldview. Instead, the individual becomes authentic not by operating within his or her own confines, but by exceeding them through a creative interaction with culture. To some extent, it would appear that Buber has reinvented the wheel in his youthful approach to Nietzsche. Buber's final aphorism declares that contemporary art pits Nietzsche against Wagner: '»Nietzsche gegen Wagner« – das ist die eigentliche Frage der heutigen Kunst' (MBW 1, 117). However, Nietzsche had already undergone this process without Buber's aid, which merely repeats Nietzsche's sentiment: 'Ich würde aber auch einen Philosophen verstehn, der erklärte: „Wagner resümirt die Modernität. Es hilft nichts, man muss erst Wagnerianer sein…"' (KSA 6, 23). Nietzsche overcame Wagner's decadence, but recognised him as a necessary sickness on the way to modernity. It is Buber who has only just liberated himself from Nietzsche's earlier writings: 'doch zuletzt erlöste ich mich von meiner Krankheit, und nach deinem Rezepte, du alter Erlösungsgegner und Erlösungsschauspieler!' (MBW 1, 104). As Nietzsche imitated Schopenhauer and Wagner through a process of *tessera* and *daemonization*, so Buber imitates Nietzsche.

'ON VIENNESE LITERATURE': BUBER AND DECADENCE

'On Viennese Literature' was unearthed by William M. Johnston, who remarked on its youthful, even exuberant style.[50] Treml comments that the vignettes constitute more an earnest report on literary developments in the capital for the people back home than the purple prose of an aspiring literary critic; he also adds that 'On Viennese Literature' is an excellent example of how Buber is able to make Nietzsche productive (MBW 1, 24-29). In 'On Viennese

[50] William M. Johnston, 'Martin Buber's Literary Debut', *The German Quarterly*, 47 (1974), 557-566.

Literature', Buber creates a hierarchy of types according to their ability to overcome the dissonance between inner and outer reality:

> Wenn wir diese drei Schriftsteller zu Typen erheben, dann können wir Bahr als einen Literaten bezeichnen. Das heißt, ein Mann, der die Welt subjektiv sieht, sie als ein Feld für sich selbst und seine Entwicklungen betrachtet, als eine Ansammlung von sowohl geeigneten Themen und Augen und Ohren, die seine Betrachtungen zu diesen Themen wahrnehmen können. Wir können Hofmannsthal als einen Dichter bezeichen (das deutsche Wort »Dichter« gibt die Nuance besser wieder als das griechische »Macher«), das heißt, einen Träumer, der über die Dissonanz zwischen der äußeren Welt und seinem geistigen Leben trauert, weil seine Seele hier keine Heimat findet und sich danach sehnt. Wir können Altenberg als einen Denker bezeichnen, der diese Dissonanz überwindet, indem er die Welt als universellen Stoff sieht, der in eine Unendlichkeit von Leben fließt. Sein Geist schöpft aus diesem Stoff die geheimen Gesetze ihrer Existenz (MBW 1, 126-127).

In this passage, Bahr becomes, in Johnston's translation, a man of letters, Hofmannsthal a poet and Altenberg a thinker.[51] Schnitzler, however, becomes that which Nietzsche, in Buber's estimation, strove to become but never achieved:

> Wenn wir jedoch von Schnitzler sprechen, kommt ein Wort über unsere Lippen: Künstler. Bahr zeigt zweifellos größeres Geschick; Hofmannsthal eine schönere Form; Altenberg tiefere Gedanken; und alle dreie einen weiteren Horizont. Dennoch kann man sie nicht als Künstler bezeichnen. Es fehlt ihnen etwas Undefinierbares, das wir, nicht sehr genau, als das kreative Element bezeichnen (MBW 1, 127).

Buber's vignettes in 'On Viennese Literature' contextualise Young Vienna within the literary movement of decadence and specifically in relation to the French decadent novelist Maurice Barrès, who, in 'Zarathustra' already, is a mediating figure for Nietzche ('Wer Maurice Barrès kennt, wird nicht zweifeln, dass die morgige Kunst von Nietzsche abhängig ist', MBW 1, 114). This mediating figure, a forerunner of the Bacchant in *Daniel*, allows Buber both to idealise Nietzsche as well as gain interpretative authority over him, a continuation of the simultaneous process of *tessera* and *daemonization* that we observed in 'Zarathustra'. Consequently, Buber reads each author in 'On Viennese Literature' through the anxiety of influence, evaluating them on their ability to bring *tessera* and *daemonization* into tension with one another.

[51] Johnston, 'Martin Buber's Literary Debut', pp. 564-565.

Maurice Barrès as mediator of Nietzsche and Bacchant

Decadence is one of the most influential literary movements at the end of the nineteenth century; it originates in France with Théophile Gautier and Charles Baudelaire, while its name was coined by Maurice Barrès.[52] In many ways, decadence proceeds from naturalism, which valued an almost scientific form of mimesis, by celebrating artificial forms of communication; it proved popular in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, a time and place where many old certainties were disintegrating: from the Habsburg Empire, which was on the verge of collapse, to the inability of language to express reality, the subject of Hugo von Hofmannsthal's seminal *Chandos-Brief* (1902).[53] The aesthetic, ontological and epistemological problem of what is in the world and how we perceive it, or of appearance and reality, has been at the forefront of philosophy since its very inception: from Plato, who postulated that everything we see is but an imperfect vision of an ideal form, to Kant, who reversed the relationship by declaring that the human mind imposes form on the chaos of sensory stimuli that constitutes the world. Nietzsche, with his aesthetic theories of Apollo and Dionysus, of form and formlessness, belongs to the previous generation of philosophers to confront this question; the latest generation formulate the question as a 'Dichotomie zwischen Ästhetik-Äußerlichem und Ethisch-Innerlichem, letzteres als Suche nach irdischer oder nach ewiger Wahrheit', as Sarah Fraiman-Morris puts it in her foreword to a collection of essays on the Jewish aspects of Young Vienna.[54] Pitted against romantic naivety, decadence attempted to reclaim purely aesthetic modes of expression over realist or even naturalist representations. The movement is synonymous with the motto 'l'art pour l'art' or 'art for art's sake'. Max Nordau, the pseudonym of Simon Maximilian Südfeld

[52] Philip Stephan, *Paul Verlaine and the Decadence, 1882-90* (Manchester: Manchester University Press; Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1974), p. 142.
[53] See William M. Johnston, *The Austrian Mind: An Intellecutal and Social History, 1848-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979).
[54] Sarah Fraiman-Morris, 'Jüdische Aspekte *Jung-Wiens* im Kulturkontext des *Fin de Siècle*', in *Jüdische Aspekte Jung-Wiens im Kulturkontext des »Fin de Siècle«*, ed. by Fraiman-Morris (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2005), pp. 1-4 (p. 1).

and Theodor Herzl's right-hand man in the World Zionist Organisation, attacked decadence in *Entartung* (1892), which he associated with Barrès.[55]

The experience of decadence for Young Vienna as for Buber is mediated by Maurice Barrès, to whom Bahr's *Studien zur Kritik der Moderne* was dedicated. Buber places Young Vienna in a position similar to that which Giovanni Battista Tiepolo, the eighteenth-century Venetian painter, occupies in Barrès' thought. Buber translates Barrès' remarks on Tiepolo in *Un Homme libre* (1889), the second volume of *Le Culte du Moi*: 'In ihm hörte die venezianische Seele auf ... zu schaffen, betrachte sich selbst und begann, sich selbst zu erkennen' (MBW 1, 119). The act of Platonic self-analysis over a more Nietzschean creation is a cornerstone of Barrès' thought. Also in *Un Homme libre*, Barrès stipulates the three main principles of his method:

> Premier principe : Nous ne sommes jamais si heureux que dans l'exaltation.
>
> Deuxième principe : Ce qui augmente beaucoup le plaisir de l'exaltation, c'est de l'analyser.
>
> Troisième principe : Il faut sentir le plus possible en analysant le plus possible.[56]

The intersection of physical feeling and pleasure with analysis bears a similarity to the inchoate moment that Goethe and Nietzsche sought. In 'Zarathustra', which refers to Barrès several times, Buber makes the link between Barrès and Nietzsche explicit (MBW 1, 114). What Barrès introduces into Buber's thought is an aesthetic reflection on decadence and the individual that is distinctly Nietzschean: 'Nietzsche auf die Kunst übertragen: L'art pour la vie, im höheren, Barrès'schen Sinne' (MBW 1, 111). Buber considers himself to be translating Nietzsche onto art by means of Barrès; the motto 'l'art pour l'art' becomes 'l'art pour la vie', an apparent

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[55] Cf. 'Hat Huysmans uns in seinem des Esseintes den Decadenten mit vorwiegender Verwirrung aller Triebe, also den vollen Baudelairianer mit Widernatürlichkeit, ästhetischem Aberwitz und gesellschaftfeindlichem Diabolismus, gezeigt, so verkörpert ein anderer Hauptvertreter des decadenten Schriftthums, Maurice Barrès, die reine Ichsucht des anpassungsunfähigen Entarteten' (Max Nordau, *Entartung*, 2 vols (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1893), 2, 120). See also George L. Mosse, 'Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 27 (1992), 565-581. For Nordau's own reception of Nietzsche, see Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion*, ch. 2, 'Max Nordau versus Nietzsche: The Structure of Ambivalence', pp. 46-64.

[56] Maurice Barrès, *Un Homme libre* (Paris: Emile-Paul, 1912), p. 11.

adaptation. Buber claims to be interpreting when he goes on to say, 'Aber es wird noch mehr als dieses missverstanden werden' (MBW 1, 111). However, 'l'art pour la vie' is inherent in Nietzsche's description of 'l'art pour l'art'. In the 'Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen' of *Götzen-Dämmerung*, Nietzsche comments:

> Der Kampf gegen den Zweck in der Kunst ist immer der Kampf gegen die moralisirende Tendenz in der Kunst, gegen ihre Unterordnung unter die Moral. L'art pour l'art heisst: „der Teufel hole die Moral!" — Aber selbst noch diese Feindschaft verräth die Übergewalt des Vorurtheils. Wenn man den Zweck des Moralpredigens und Menschen-Verbesserns von der Kunst ausgeschlossen hat, so folgt daraus noch lange nicht, dass die Kunst überhaupt zwecklos, ziellos, sinnlos, kurz l'art pour l'art — ein Wurm, der sich in den Schwanz beisst — ist. „Lieber gar keinen Zweck als einen moralischen Zweck!" — so redet die blosse Leidenschaft. Ein Psycholog fragt dagegen: was thut alle Kunst? lobt sie nicht? verherrlicht sie nicht? wählt sie nicht aus? zieht sie nicht hervor? Mit dem Allen stärkt oder schwächt sie gewisse Werthschätzungen… Ist dies nur ein Nebenbei? ein Zufall? Etwas, bei dem der Instinkt des Künstlers gar nicht betheiligt wäre? Oder aber: ist es nicht die Voraussetzung dazu, dass der Künstler kann…? Geht dessen unterster Instinkt auf die Kunst oder nicht vielmehr auf den Sinn der Kunst, das Leben? auf eine Wünschbarkeit von Leben? — Die Kunst ist das grosse Stimulans zum Leben: wie könnte man sie als zwecklos, als ziellos, als l'art pour l'art verstehen? (KSA 6, 127).

As a stimulant to life, Nietzche's concept of cultural decadence runs alongside his views on personal sickness and health.

In the mediating figure of Barrès, who in this way foreshadows the Bacchant in *Daniel*, Buber invests the same revisionary ratios regarding his actual precursor, Nietzsche, that we observe in 'Zarathustra', thereby creating a chain of influence. On the one hand, Buber's adaptation of Nietzsche's decadence to apply to life rather than art is an example of *tessera*; on the other hand, the elevation of Barrès' interpretation, let alone the very act of interpretation itself, into a supposedly higher sense, shows the extent to which the ephebe has been *daemonized*. Through the distancing factor of Barrès, Buber is able to reclaim and imitate Nietzsche's views on the artistic individual and the inchoate moment. Treml points out that Barrès' anti-Semitic outbursts with regard to the ongoing Dreyfus Affair eventually made him unpalatable (MBW 1, 308-309). Barrès' major cultural contribution before Buber wrote 'Zarathustra' and 'On Viennese Literature', however, was *Le Culte du moi*, a trilogy which affirms personality and the senses. The first volume, *Sous l'œil des barbares* (1888), underscored the need to recreate the self continually: 'Notre Moi, en effet, n'est pas immuable ;

il nous faut le défendre chaque jour et chaque jour le créer'.[57] The idea of the self being in flux and of recreating it anew each day is extremely similar to Nietzsche's own views on the self and self-overcoming. However, with the publication of *Les Déracinés* (1897) and the beginning of his second trilogy, *Le Roman de l'énergie nationale*, Barrès had already moved on to the other side of the spectrum between the individual and the nation. The date of publication of *Les Déracinés*, as well as Barrès' anti-Semitism, means that Buber's positive reception of Barrès is limited to the latter's Nietzschean views on the self.

Nietzsche's cultural criticism and the 'Dissonanz zwischen der äußeren Welt und seinem geistigen Leben'

Buber's 'Zarathustra', through *tessera* and *daemonization*, is particularly sensitive to the duality of life and spirit, and the longing for their unity, that the text finds in Nietzsche's romanticism; Buber, in turn, attempts a romantic defence of the individual through a reintroduction of Apollo into Dionysus. In 'On Viennese Literature', Buber establishes a paradigm based on Nietzsche's cultural criticism. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche responds to the duality of life and spirit with the tragic hero, who allows false Apollonian individuality to be destroyed through Dionysus and thereby achieve unity with the Dionysian world artist.

The most important appropriation of Nietzsche in 'On Viennese Literature' is Greek tragedy. Nietzsche establishes his aesthetics of tragedy in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. In this treatise, Nietzsche analyses the aesthetic function of Greek tragedy with reference to Apollo and Dionysus. Unlike the Socratic culture of his time, which has become overly Apollonian, Nietzsche believes ancient Greek tragedy more accurately reflects Dionysian reality. Nietzsche depicts Greek tragedy as a combination of Apollo and Dionysus, where the dialogue between individual protagonists represents form, the union of voices in the chorus formlessness. The

[57] Barrès, *Sous l'œil des barbares* (Paris: Emile-Paul, 1911), p. 22.

hero of Greek tragedy, faced with an irreversible fate, is unable to impose Apollonian form onto the chaos he inherits and, as a result, must die. The tragic hero is an Apollonian representation of Dionysus on the stage, a mask:

> Es ist eine unanfechtbare Ueberlieferung, dass die griechische Tragödie in ihrer ältesten Gestalt nur die Leiden des Dionysus zum Gegenstand hatte und dass der längere Zeit hindurch einzig vorhandene Bühnenheld eben Dionysus war. Aber mit der gleichen Sicherheit darf behauptet werden, dass niemals bis auf Euripides Dionysus aufgehört hat, der tragische Held zu sein, sondern dass alle die berühmten Figuren der griechischen Bühne Prometheus, Oedipus u. s. w. nur Masken jenes ursprünglichen Helden Dionysus sind. Dass hinter allen diesen Masken eine Gottheit steckt, das ist der eine wesentliche Grund für die so oft angestaunte typische „Idealität" jener berühmten Figuren (KSA 1, 71).

In Nietzsche's interpretation of Greek tragedy, the tragic hero *qua* Dionysus is torn asunder in a moment of *sparagmos*:

> In Wahrheit aber ist jener Held der leidende Dionysus der Mysterien, jener die Leiden der Individuation an sich erfahrende Gott, von dem wundervolle Mythen erzählen, wie er als Knabe von den Titanen zerstückelt worden sei und nun in diesem Zustande als Zagreus verehrt werde: wobei angedeutet wird, dass diese Zerstückelung, das eigentlich dionysische L e i d e n , gleich einer Umwandlung in Luft, Wasser, Erde und Feuer sei, dass wir also den Zustand der Individuation als den Quell und Urgrund alles Leidens, als etwas an sich Verwerfliches, zu betrachten hätten. Aus dem Lächeln dieses Dionysus sind die olympischen Götter, aus seinen Thränen die Menschen entstanden (KSA 1, 61).

The self-destruction of the individual is said to be indescribably pleasurable: here, the act of dismemberment is accompanied with laughter. In Greek tragedy, the audience identifies with the hero, who ends our sense of false individuality and allows us to re-establish unity:

> Die Hoffnung der Epopten ging aber auf eine Wiedergeburt des Dionysus, die wir jetzt als das Ende der Individuation ahnungsvoll zu begreifen haben [...]. In den angeführten Anschauungen haben wir bereits alle Bestandtheile einer tiefsinnigen und pessimistischen Weltbetrachtung und zugleich damit d i e M y s t e r i e n l e h r e d e r T r a g ö d i e zusammen: die Grunderkenntniss von der Einheit alles Vorhandenen, die Betrachtung der Individuation als des Urgrundes des Uebels, die Kunst als die freudige Hoffnung, dass der Bann der Individuation zu zerbrechen sei, als die Ahnung einer wiederhergestellten Einheit. — (KSA 1, 72-72).

Tragedy destroys the illusion of individuality, yet exalts in the primacy of aesthetics and even in the very destruction of the artist. In his own words, Nietzsche is ambivalent about the role of the artist: on the one hand the Apollonian artist merely creates illusions and runs the risk of decadence; on the other, art is the only means of coming to terms with Dionysian reality. This dynamic is illustrated in the following discussion in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*:

> Singend und tanzend äussert sich der Mensch als Mitglied einer höheren Gemeinsamkeit: er hat das Gehen und das Sprechen verlernt und ist auf dem Wege, tanzend in die Lüfte emporzufliegen. Aus seinen Gebärden spricht die Verzauberung. Wie jetzt die Thiere reden, und die Erde Milch und

> Honig giebt, so tönt auch aus ihm etwas Uebernatürliches: als Gott fühlt er sich, er selbst wandelt jetzt so verzückt und erhoben, wie er die Götter im Traume wandeln sah. Der Mensch ist nicht mehr Künstler, er ist Kunstwerk geworden: die Kunstgewalt der ganzen Natur, zur höchsten Wonnebefriedigung des Ur-Einen, offenbart sich hier unter den Schauern des Rausches. Der edelste Thon, der kostbarste Marmor wird hier geknetet und behauen, der Mensch, und zu den Meisselschlägen des dionysischen Weltenkünstlers tönt der eleusinische Mysterienruf: „Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen? Ahnest du den Schöpfer, Welt?“ — (KSA 1, 30).

The two aspects to note in this passage are the simultaneous elimination and deification of the self. As the artist becomes the artwork, he achieves a greater sense of communality or mutuality with the world as primordial unity. In this state, the artist does not cease to create, but creates reality itself: the artist becomes one with the Dionysian world artist, who creates the world in his or her own image and feels like God.[58]

Part of Nietzsche's attraction for Buber and Young Vienna alike is his revitalisation of what is already there. Equally, following on from the passage that Buber translates from *Un Homme libre* (MBW 1, 119), Barrès writes, 'Je ne me suis doté d'aucune force nouvelle, mais à celles que mon Être s'était acquises dans des existences antérieures j'ai donné une intensité différente'.[59] This quotation is likely to be at the root of Buber's observation of Young Vienna that 'in Wirklichkeit machen sie lediglich die bestehende Kultur auf sich selbst aufmerksam und verleihen ihr auf diese Weise eine sinnvollere Intensität' (MBW 1, 119). Young Vienna is decadent because of their sensitivity to dissonance between the inner life and the outer world, which Buber describes in 'Zarathustra' as a necessary sickness that must be overcome. However, each individual author is able to overcome this dissonance to varying degrees. Bahr is considered superficial because of his fleeting personality changes; Hofmannsthal is aware of the dissonance but incapable of overcoming it; Altenberg heralds the *Übermensch*; and Schnitzler is a tragedian who eliminates false individuality and finds a new artist who, in Buber's evaluation, encounters the Dionysian world artist more than Nietzsche himself could.

[58] See also Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[59] Barrès, *Un Homme libre*, p. 197.

Hermann Bahr: The apostle of the future

Bahr is described as a man of letters, by which Buber highlights Bahr's skill ('grösseres Geschick', a word that also implies destiny or fate) in his artistic temperament. In Buber's terminology, a man of letters implies someone who sees the world subjectively, is able to read the future, but is constantly changing: 'Das heißt, ein Mann, der die Welt subjektiv sieht, sie als ein Feld für sich selbst und seine Entwicklungen betrachtet, als eine Ansammlung von sowohl geeigneten Themen und Augen und Ohren, die seine Betrachtungen zu diesen Themen wahrnehmen können' (MBW 1, 126-127). The Nietzschean influences in Buber's critique of Bahr become apparent in the images of the apostle, the tightrope walker and the mask; they are part of Buber's Nietzschean paradigm, because they highlight a sensitivity to decadence and duality, but remain superficial as a response.

The word apostle (Greek ἀπόστολος) means an errand or messenger and derives from the New Testament, where it was used for the original Twelve Apostles of Jesus; the sense in which Buber calls Bahr an apostle ('Von jedem »Heute« kann er die künstlerische Mode, die morgen regieren wird, ablesen, so daß er zum Apostel einer noch ungeborenen Losung wird', MBW 1, 120) derives from Nietzsche. The term is used in a largely negative sense in Nietzsche: from Wagner as an apostle of chastity ('Apostel der Keuschheit', KSA 6, 429-431) in *Nietzsche contra Wagner*; to avenging apostle ('Rache-Apostel', KSA 5, 370). Nevertheless, the word is often used for Nietzsche himself, not least because of the biblical and oracular style of *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Paul Mendes-Flohr's study of Buber's reception of Nietzsche is entitled 'Nietzsche's Apostle', but this draws on more contemporary sources, such as Max Nordau and Kurt Eisner, the socialist politician and journalist. In *Entartung*, Nordau calls Brandes Nietzsche's apostle.[60] Kurt Eisner published 'Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft: Beiträge zur modernen? Psychopathia spiritualis' in *Die Gesellschaft* (1891), an article that

[60] Nordau, *Entartung*, p. 454. It is also interesting to note that Buber compares Bahr with Brandes in 'On Viennese Literature' (MBW 1, 120).

would eventually become *Psychopathia spiritualis: Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft*.[61] Nevertheless, the Nietzschean frame of reference in Buber's critique of Bahr is clear.

As with the word apostle, the image of the tightrope walker is also associated with Nietzsche. Buber picks up on Bahr's self-description as a tightrope walker:

> Dieses »s'amuser de soi-même« verdeutlicht uns Bahr; dies ist der Grund, warum er sich als einen Seiltänzer bezeichnet, einen geistigen Akrobaten; dies ist der Grund, weil er immer nach frischer Nahrung für seine Nerven sucht; dies ist der Grund, warum er »jeden Tag ein neues I c h wie eine neue Krawatte trägt« (MBW 1, 121).

The image of the tightrope walker comes from Bahr's 'Das Rätsel der Liebe' in *Die Überwindung des Naturalismus* (1891), the follow-up to *Zur Kritik der Moderne*: 'Aber die armen Schriftsteller, die werden, wenn die Litteratur in diese Phase des erotischen Problems tritt, die werden dann wirklich die Seiltänzer und Akrobaten werden müssen, mit denen sie der alte Barbey d'Aurevilly zu vergleichen liebte'.[62] While this particular essay does not refer to Nietzsche at all, in 'Akrobaten' Bahr describes Nietzsche as an acrobat, the meaning of which is related in a quotation from Barbey d'Aurevilly: 'Die braven Leute haben nämlich ganz das gleiche Metier wie wir, wir von der Feder. Nur, was wir mit dem Geiste, das machen die Akrobaten mit dem Leibe'.[63] The quotation recalls the image of the tightrope walker in the preface to *Also sprach Zarathustra*: 'Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Thier und Übermensch, — ein Seil über einem Abgrunde' (KSA 4, 16). Zarathustra goes to a town where people are gathered in the marketplace in anticipation of a tightrope walker, which becomes a metaphor for his teaching of the *Übermensch* and self-overcoming: 'Ich lehre euch den Übermenschen. Der Mensch ist Etwas, das überwunden werden soll. Was habt ihr gethan,

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[61] Richard Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society, 1890-1918* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 19.

[62] Hermann Bahr, 'Das Rätsel der Liebe', in *Kritische Schriften in Einzelausgaben*, ed. by Claus Pias, 29 vols (Weimar: VDG, 2003-), 2, 67-72 (pp. 71-72). For a discussion of the image of the tightrope walker and other acrobat figures in German literature, starting with Nietzsche, see Marion Faber, *Angels of Daring: Tightrope Walker and Acrobat in Nietzsche, Kafka, Rilke and Thomas Mann* (Stuttgart: Heinz, 1979); quoted in Charles H. Helmetag, '"... of Men and of Angels": Literary Allusions in Wim Wenders's "Wings of Desire"', *Literature/Film Quarterly*, 18 (1990), 251-254, which examines, among other literary allusions, the intersection of trapeze artist and angel in Marion, the heroine in Wim Wenders' *Der Himmel über Berlin* (1987).

[63] Bahr, 'Akrobaten', in *Kritische Schriften in Einzelausgaben*, 2, 23-27 (p. 23).

ihn zu überwinden?' (KSA 2, 279). Bahr is considered an apostle, a man of letters with great skill, because he aspires to the physicality of the body. In 'On Viennese Literature', Buber explains how Bahr describes himself as a spiritual acrobat and seeks sensory stimulus. The line has echoes of Barrès ('Il faut sentir le plus possible en analysant le plus possible'), as well as Buber's description of 'Die Sensitiven' in 'Zarathustra' ('[die Sensitiven], welche die Welt nicht »idealisirten«, sondern selbst idealisirt in alle Dinge etwas von ihrer zweiten Welt einlegten, die Menschen der verfeinerten Sinne und der zersetzbarsten Nerven, die dionysischen Lust- und Weh-Verknüpfer', MBW 1, 109).

Despite Bahr's attempt to resolve the dissonance between inner and outer reality, Buber places Bahr at the bottom of his artistic hierarchy because of the superficiality of Bahr's overly spiritual conception of the self. The image of the tie ('Krawatte') is an allegory for identity in Bahr's *oeuvre*. In 'On Viennese Literature', Buber references a passage from Bahr's *Russische Reise*: 'Man ist nicht mehr einfach: man trägt Mehrere in sich und kann sich für jeden Tag der Woche ein neues Ich umschnallen, wie eine neue Cravatte'.[64] A symptom of increasing perspectivism against totalising metaphysical worldviews, the idea of different identities inhabiting the same person has many forerunners, not least Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the mask is an expression of the complexity of identity. In *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche writes, 'Alles, was tief ist, liebt die Maske' (KSA 5, 57). In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, the mask is a representation of Dionysus on the stage: the artist is momentarily able to represent on stage what cannot be represented before it is destroyed. In *Russische Reise* (1891), Bahr explicitly associates the identity quandary with Nietzsche's masks.[65]

[64] Bahr, *Kritische Schriften in Einzelausgaben*, 21, 2.
[65] Cf. 'Ich hätte allerdings endlich mich selbst gefunden, aber muß ich deswegen auf die vielen lustigen Masken verzichten? Und dann diese unvertreibliche Angst, ob es nicht am Ende, statt des erträumten Übermenschen, nicht am Ende dennoch blos der verkappte Urphilister ist' (Bahr, *Kritische Schriften*, 21, 116).

Buber diagnoses Bahr's superficiality as a deficiency of style, creativity and even masculinity. There is a certain creativity in the way in which Bahr lives in the moment, a moment that he must continually renew:

> Bahr ist einer derjenigen, die ihrer Zeit voraus sind, aber seine »Zeit« ist immer gerade der Moment, in dem er das eine oder andere verkündet, und auch dem soeben Verkündeten ist er in einem weiteren Moment schon voraus (MBW 1, 120).

However, Bahr remains a mere messenger, apostle or herald, terminology whose religious overtones cannot be overlooked. Bahr himself, however, lacks individuality ('Seine Individualität ist in Wirklichkeit ein gänzlicher Mangel an Individualität; sein Stil besteht in einem vollständigen Mangel eines einheitlichen Stils, der in all seinen Arbeiten vorherrschen würde', MBW 1, 121). Buber's Nietzschean critique is discernible in what Bahr lacks. Alexander Nehamas highlights the primacy of style in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, in which an aphorism from the fourth book declares, 'Eins ist Noth. — Seinem Charakter „Stil geben" — eine grosse und seltene Kunst!' (KSA 3, 530).[66] For Buber as for Nietzsche, individuality is a momentary illusion, but this illusion is given relevance through creativity. Aesthetically, Bahr also lacks a creative element:

> Von den vielen Menschen, die heute das Leben wie ein Künstler sehen und empfinden, die ihre Einsicht mit Schönheit darzustellen vermögen, deren Kunst aber nie tonangebend, sondern lediglich dekorativ sein wird, weil es ihnen an kreativem Element mangelt, scheint Bahr mir die interessanteste und originellste Gestalt zu sein (MBW 1, 120).

Instead, Bahr succumbs to decadence, to inactivity and delusion, rather than fighting for himself, as Buber comments on Bahr's *Renaissance*:

> [Bahrs *Renaissance* ist] eine neue Sammlung von Aufsätzen, die wunderschöne Worte über die Ruhe und die Reife, über Goethe und die Selbstbildung enthält. Bei jedem, der sich nicht dessen bewußt ist, daß dies lediglich eine neue »Phase« darstellt, wird das Buch die Täuschung hervorrufen, daß es von einem starken, männlichen, selbstbewußten Geist erschaffen worden sei, der nach vielen Kämpfen sein eigenes S e l b s t, seinen eigenen Stil und seine edelmütige Sicht aufs Leben gefunden habe. So groß ist sein schriftstellerisches Talent, so filigran ist seine Fähigkeit, seine Leser in die Irre zu führen und zu hypnotisieren, geschmiedet (MBW 1, 121-122).

[66] See Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). Cf. Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's "Genealogy"* (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 2007).

Even the idea that creativity is masculine may be said to originate from Nietzsche, stemming from the masculinisation of culture in Karl Joel's *Nietzsche und die Romantik* (1905).[67] In this way, Buber *daemonizes* Bahr.

Hugo von Hofmannsthal: The lifeless aristocrat

While clearly excited to be in the acquaintance of the author, Buber is ambivalent towards Bahr, who is superficial yet decadent in a way that gives form to the dualism of contemporary aesthetics. Hofmannsthal, by contrast, is conscious of the dissonance of his decadent age, but remains unable to overcome it. Instead of seeking greater physicality like Bahr, Hofmannsthal opts for a more beautiful form of the soul and spirit. The Nietzschean angle in Buber's treatment of Hofmannsthal becomes apparent through the comparisons that he makes with Stefan George, a kindred poet ('verwandt[er] Dichter', MBW 1, 122), and Gabriele d'Annunzio, both of whom are closely associated with Nietzsche. D'Annunzio, whom Buber also mentions in 'Zarathustra' (MBW 1, 109), offers his own version of the *Übermensch*, or 'superuomo' in Italian.[68] Nietzsche was also a guiding influence on the circle of authors that formed around Stefan George, which became known as the George-Kreis. Aschheim writes that their most significant points of contact with Nietzsche were a critique of the bourgeoisie and a distrust of science, along with an espousal of vitalism, heroism and the mythical.[69] As Maurice Friedman points out, Buber had no personal connection to George, but retained a deep admiration for him.[70]

[67] Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, p. 126.
[68] Cf. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, p. 56. D'Annunzio develops the Nietzschean theme of the *Übermensch* in four novels, published between 1894 and 1910: *Il trionfo della morte* (1894), *Le vergini delle rocce* (1895), which Buber references and Hofmannsthal reviews ('Der neue Roman von d'Annunzio, *Die Zeit*, 6 (1896), 25-27; quoted in MBW 1, 123), *Il fuoco* (1900) and *Forse che sì forse che no* (1910). I would like to thank Marta Arnaldi for drawing this to my attention.
[69] Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, p. 71.
[70] Friedman, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 17-19.

The clarity that Hofmannsthal appears to give to the feeling of dissonance, which he cannot overcome, projects the recovery from Nietzsche's illness of idealism that the ephebic Buber effects in 'Zarathustra' onto Hofmannsthal; this is in itself an imitation of Nietzsche's *Der Fall Wagner* in 'Zarathustra'. In Buber's treatment of Hofmannsthal, decadence takes the form of asceticism: the illusory nature of the idea that the denial of life will lead to greater spiritual insight stems from Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral* and is closely linked to the illusion of Apollonian form in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. Similarly, Buber characterises Hofmannsthal as an aristocrat who has not yet tasted life:

> Während der italienische Dichter [Gabriele d'Annunzio] selbst die eigentümliche Reife irgendwie überwand, indem er sich beständig neue, höhere Ziele setzte, gelangt Hofmannsthal nie über sich selbst hinaus, kämpft nie für sein Ich; alles, was sich in ihm entfaltet, sind äußere Dinge, nämliche Ansichten, Form; seine Seele bleibt stets unverändert, die zarte, müde Seele eines Aristokraten, der vom Leben nicht gekostet hat und der nichts mehr von ihm verlangt (MBW 1, 123).

Hofmannsthal is sensitive to the dissonance between inner and outer reality, and tries to overcome it through a more beautiful form; instead, Buber believes, Hofmannsthal should have been fighting for himself in order to overcome himself.

Hofmannsthal attempts to discern life's foundations and to explain them ('In Hofmannsthals Dichtung gibt es ein einziges Bestreben: Er möchte das Wesen des Lebens ergründen und erklären, desjenigen Lebens, das er, in sich selbst eingeschlossen, nur intuitiv kennt', MBW 1, 122), recalling Kierkegaard's concept of the ethical in *Fear and Trembling*, as well as the explanation of Dilthey's and Weber's sociology and *Lebensphilosophie*. However, it is the sense of eternity as well as the abundance of life that steers Buber's critique in the direction of Nietzsche. Buber applauds Hofmannsthal's Homeric ability to create a contemporary epic: 'Er hat Augenblicke, in denen es in der Tat scheint, als schaute er ins Herz des Universums und entnähme daraus dunkle, prophetische Lektionen' (MBW 1, 123). Buber appreciates the sense of the universal in Hofmannsthal's art, quoting from Hofmannsthal's dramatic one-act study, *Gestern* (1891): '»Und heute – gestern ist ein leeres Wort. Was einmal

war, das lebt auch ewig fort'.[71] Hofmannsthal is able to give spiritual and eternal form, but unable to find life. On Claudio, the protagonist of *Der Tor und der Tod* (1894), Buber writes:

> Er wird gewahr, daß er trotz der Erlesenheit und Vielfältigkeit seines geistigen Lebens, überhaupt nicht gelebt hat, da er das Leben nur von seinem Bereich außerhalb davon betrachtet und sich nie darin verloren hat. Er hat nie andere am Überfluß seiner Seele teilhaben lassen, seinen Geist nie mit dem der anderen in der Liebe verquickt (MBW 1, 124).

Hofmannsthal is no *Übermensch* who is able to overcome himself and embrace life as excess, but is able to give exquisite form to the life of the mind.

It is perhaps a little strange to describe Hofmannsthal, who would become famous largely for his poetry and libretti, as well as a number of plays, as Homeric. Homer is an epic rather than lyrical poet, narrating events in the third person from a distance rather than as a personal experience, as well as a mythical name whose existence as author and person, like Shakespeare, is sometimes disputed.[72] As his description in 'On Viennese Literature' conveys, Buber's comments come at a very early time not only in his own, but also in Hofmannsthal's career. Hofmannsthal has yet to meet Richard Strauss, with whom he would collaborate on his operas from 1900 onwards. [73] At this point in time, Hofmannsthal is principally known for his lyrical poetry, and the plays *Der Tod Tizians* (1892) and *Der Tor und der Tod*, as well as his association with Stefan George.[74] This description is a case in point of Buber's *tesseratic* reading of Hofmannsthal, who has been forcefully projected into the mythical.

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[71] Hugo von Hofmannsthal, *Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbänden*, ed. by Bernd Schoeller, 10 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1979), 1, 242; quoted in MBW 1, 124.

[72] On the Homeric question, see Minna Skafte Jensen, *The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1980); and Ahuvia Kahane, *Diachronic Dialogues: Authority and Continuity in Homer and the Homeric Tradition* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). On Shakespeare's identity, see Jonathan Bate, *The Genius of Shakespeare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and David Kathmann, 'The Question of Authorship', in *Shakespeare: An Oxford Guide*, ed. by Stanley Wells and Lena Cowen Orlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 620-630.

[73] Bryan Gilliam, 'The Strauss-Hofmannsthal operas', in *The Cambridge Companion to Richard Strauss* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 119-135 (p. 120).

[74] Jens Rieckmann, *Hugo von Hofmannsthal und Stefan George: Signifikanz einer 'Episode' aus der Jahrhundertwende* (Tübingen and Basel: Francke, 1997). Death is a theme to which Buber returns in 'On Viennese Literature' in his discussion of Schnitzler.

Peter Altenberg: The intellectual of the *Übermensch*

Hofmannsthal feels the dissonance between inner and outer reality; he cannot overcome it, but is able to give this dissonance greater form. Peter Altenberg, conversely, is a thinker who overcomes this dissonance by surmising life's universal rules. Altenberg trumps Hofmannsthal for two main reasons: first, because he sees these universal rules as a necessary, artistic illusion, a stage of necessary sickness as diagnosed in Buber's 'Zarathustra'; and second, because Altenberg longs for the *Übermensch*, who is mentioned specifically and represents a desire for unity through self-overcoming.

Altenberg's main quality is his love for the world ('eine grund- und grenzenlose Liebe für die ganze Welt', MBW 1. 124). Altenberg attempts to dissimulate this love, in which Buber perceives his strength: 'Er strebt danach, seine Liebe zu verbergen, er täuscht Mattigkeit, Kraftlosigkeit und Dekadenz vor, er nimmt den ironischen Ton des Salons an, der leicht und nachsichtig lächelt, aber kein volles, göttliches Lachen kennt' (MBW 1, 125). Altenberg's adoption of Young Vienna's ironic and life-denying tone is the mere illusion of decadence; instead, he seeks the divine laughter that Young Vienna's sniggering lacks. The idea of laughter is associated with Zarathustra, as well as with Dionysus ('Aus dem Lächeln dieses Dionysus sind die olympischen Götter, aus seinen Thränen die Menschen entstanden', KSA 1, 72). Altenberg's double irony betrays a romantic longing for unity and the world, for life and the *Übermensch* that is unmistakably Nietzschean:

> Wir lesen all jene Gefühle, die in den Tiefen seiner Seele schlummern; inmitten der Ruhe dieser Gedichte Lesen wir die Bewunderung für das stürmische, üppige, überfließende Leben; in ihrer vorgetäuschten Resignation lesen wir den Wunsch nach großen Revolution, überschwenglichen Hoffnungen, eine Sehnsucht nach einer »neuen Rasse« von Übermenschen, deren Herannahen wir beschleunigen sollten (MBW 1, 125).

Here we see a repetition of the notion of life as excess, as well as decadence as illusion: Altenberg's resignation is merely affected. We also see a wish for a Nietzschean revolution, the *Übermensch*, which cannot arise: Nietzsche would have us accelerate the coming of the *Übermensch*, but the time is not right: 'Aber unsere Zeiten, welche die Menschen klein und

schwach machen, haben diese schöne Seele verborgen und den Heiligenschein des Apostels von seiner Stirn genommen' (MBW 1, 125). Although Altenberg longs for the *Übermensch*, he still remains decadent in Buber's eyes because of his focus on the everyday, which is fatally different from the exceptionality of the *Übermensch*. Buber's *tesseratic* Altenberg has been *daemonized*, since Buber defends the link between the everday and the eternal, the real and the spiritual, that Altenberg establishes: 'aber jedes alltägliche Phänomen [...] eröffnet dem Autor eine Sicht auf die ewigen Gesetze der geistigen Welt' (MBW 1, 126); what makes Schnitzler a more consummate artist, however, is the creative move from passivity to activity.

Arthur Schnitzler: The Nietzschean tragedian

Arthur Schnitzler represents the pinnacle of Buber's Nietzschean aesthetic hierarchy. All of the artists of Young Vienna, Schnitzler included, are decadent insofar as they are dealing with dissonance between inner and outer reality: Bahr's superficial conception of identity highlights the problem; Hofmannsthal and Altenberg perceive the dissonance, but succumb to asceticism by giving greater form to the life of the mind. Schnitzler, however, both highlights and overcomes the problem of illusory individuation through his creativity:

> Wenn wir jedoch von Schnitzler sprechen, kommt ein Wort über unsere Lippen: Künstler. Bahr zeigt zweifellos größeres Geschick; Hofmannsthal eine schönere Form; Altenberg tiefere Gedanken; und alle dreie einen weiteren Horizont. Dennoch kann man sie nicht als Künstler bezeichnen. Es fehlt ihnen etwas Undefinierbares, das wir, nicht sehr genau, als das kreative Element bezeichnen (MBW 1, 127).

It is the creative element that earns Schnitzler the accolade of artist, to which Nietzsche, in Buber's moment of simultaneous *tessera* and *daemonization* in 'Zarathustra', merely aspired: Altenberg, the idealised intellectual, is a tesseratic version of Nietzsche, whereas Schnitzler the artist has become *daemonized*.

This becomes apparent in Buber's appraisal of Schnitzler as a tragedian. Schnitzler holds the reader in a completely aesthetic, thoroughly Greek state: 'Diese Fähigkeit, den Leser beständig in einem rein ästhetischen Zustand zu bewahren, ist so durch und durch griechisch,

daß wir bewundernd suchen, und uns fragen, ob jemand anders in unserer »Epoche« sie in solcher Vollkommenheit besitzt' (MBW 1, 127). Schnitzler's aesthetics manages to bind Dionysian reality and Apollonian illusion into unity: 'Zweifellos fehlen Schnitzler die Stimmen der Bronze und des Feuers, aber es wurde ihm die Kraft gegeben, die beiden in einer Einheit zu verbinden, die wir Wirklichkeit nennen und die wir Täuschung nennen' (MBW 1, 128). The dissonance of decadence is overcome through style, a harmony of inside and outside reality, rather than through simple artifice that rejects the possibility of such a unity:

> Für ihn existiert die Dissonanz zwischen der äußeren und inneren Welt überhaupt nicht. Er wischt die Grenze zwischen ihnen aus, atmet die Natur in sich ein und bringt sich selbst die Natur dar. Über alles läßt er die süße Harmonie fließen, die er seiner Seele entnommen hat (MBW 1, 128).

Buber interprets Schnitzler's *Anatol* (1893) explicitly as tragedy when the characters accompanying the protagonist take on the role of a Greek chorus ('welche die Rolle des griechischen Chors spielen', MBW 1, 128). Another tragic aspect of Schnitzler's drama is the way in which the destruction of the individual represents the destruction of humanity:

> In Schnitzlers Werk ist die Einzigartigkeit des Individuums beinahe völlig ausgelöscht. Es ist nicht Cajus, sondern der Mensch im allgemeinen, der Mensch, der stirbt. Die grausamste Gestalt, die der Selbsterhaltungsinstinkt vor dem Tod in der Gattung des Homo sapiens annehmen kann, wird von der sicheren, aber dennoch weichen und sanftmütigen Hand des Künstlers enthüllt (MBW 1, 129).

The illusion of individuation is destroyed through the death of the central character of *Sterben* (1895), Cajus, who has become the mask of Dionysus.[75] However, Buber's Nietzschean interpretation of Schnitzler's individual is in fact an apology for the individual. Schnitzler's destruction of the individual ('die Einzigartigkeit des Individuums [ist] beinahe völlig ausgelöscht', MBW 1, 129) represents, as in Nietzsche's *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, an opportunity for renewal. Schnitzler, in Buber's appraisal, does away with the illusion of individuality, but renews this with an authentic relationship between the individual and the

[75] It is not entirely clear from the context to whom Buber is referring with the name Cajus. In this particular passage, Buber is comparing Schnitzler's *Sterben* with the Polish author Ignacy Dąbrowski's *Śmierć* (*Death*, 1892) on account of their title; neither work, however, contains a character named Cajus or any of its variants (Kajus, Caius or Gaius). I would like to thank Pola Orlowska and Paulina Barszcz for their help in reaching this conclusion.

world, between inside and outside reality: ‘Ihre ehrbarste Eigenschaft ist die wunderbare Verquickung der gewaltsamsten Gefühle und der tiefgründigsten Mysterien mit den scheinbar leeren Ereignissen des Alltags, auf eine Weise’ (MBW 1, 129). Through the destruction of the individual, Buber reads Schnitzler simultaneously through *tessera* and *daemonization*: the asceticism of the destruction propels Schnitzler into *tesseratic* heights, whereas the individual brings him back down, *daemonizing* Buber as a result. In Buber’s assessment of *Sterben* (‘Letzteres Werk ist hauptsächlich eine großartige Psychologie eines Individuums’ (MBW 1, 128), Schnitzler becomes the artist and psychologist that Nietzsche is in ‘Zarathustra’. The consequence is that Schnitzler has been distanced yet encountered, becoming a Bacchant to Nietzsche and the Dionysian world artist.

2 – 'ENTSCHLOSSEN, UND MIT DER LYRA': FROM MYSTICISM TO DIALOGUE

In 'Was ist der Mensch?', a series of lectures given on his professorial inauguration at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1938, Buber ironically calls Nietzsche a mystic of the Enlightenment ('Mystiker der Aufklärung', W I, 349). In this remark, Buber dismisses Nietzsche, as well as his own pre-dialogic thought, as mystical. The problem, as Buber diagnoses in his post-dialogic terminology, is that both Nietzsche and mysticism are monologic: their approaches are directed either towards themselves or to an impersonal, abstract system, rather than turned towards the world and concrete reality. Nevertheless, the syntagm 'mystic of the Enlightenment' is a *contradictio in adjecto*: the Enlightenment is customarily characterised as the spirit of reason, whereas mysticism is often aligned with the irrational. This contradiction demonstrates not only the way in which Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche continues to dominate the development of his thought, but also the way in which mysticism and Nietzsche are intimately linked. As we observed in the previous chapter, when the ephebic Buber reads his precursor, Nietzsche, he pushes him towards one of two diametrically opposed poles, often within the same interpretation: either Nietzsche is too idealist, an example of *tessera*; or he is too human, an example of *daemonization*. In this case, the word 'Enlightenment', referring to a rational and idealised realm, is an unequivocal example of *tessera*; the word 'mystic', however, is crucially ambiguous, since it refers both to an ascent to an idealised realm from one perspective, as well as to a descent into the irrational from a critical and external perspective. The result is that both terms are called into question and distanced, yet paradoxically validated.

Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue is inextricably bound up with his reception of Nietzsche. Paul Mendes-Flohr focuses on Buber's *Erlebnismystik*, which sees the

concept of realisation (*Erlebnis*), as described by Dilthey and developed in Buber's *Daniel* (1913), as the highpoint of Buber's mysticism, whereas Maurice Friedman focuses on Buber's drive for unity (*Einheitslehre*).[76] Such accounts cite the abandonment of *unio mystica*, of Buber's desire to be reunited with God, as the distinguishing criterion between mysticism and dialogue. While dialogic terminology such as the interhuman (*das Zwischenmenschliche*) already makes an appearance in his introduction to *Die Gesellschaft* (1906-1912), the series of socio-psychological monographs he edited, Buber's insistence on the idea of unity in *Daniel* certainly lends credence to this point of view ('Einheit ist das, was ewig wird', MBW 1, 233). Dialogue, instead, introduces separation into mysticism through reciprocity or, more literally, over-againstness towards God: as Buber writes in *Ich und Du* (1923), the first fully-fledged expression of dialogue, 'Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit' (W I, 88).[77] Yet there are a growing number of scholars, critics and biographers who emphasise the continuity in Buber's work. Gershom Scholem, the Kabbalah scholar and later Buber's colleague at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was one of the first to suggest that there is no substantive difference between Buber's earlier mysticism and his later dialogue.[78] Israel Koren has recently emphasised the similarities between mysticism and dialogue through an analysis of Hasidism in Buber's work: he argues that Buber's mysticism is not *unio mystica*, but *devekut*, a Hasidic mystical term that means devotion or, more pertinently, clinging to God.[79] As for Buber's reception of Nietzsche, Dominique Bourel points out that Buber returned to Nietzsche many times in his later work; however, he insists that ultimately the two lines of thought had diverged.[80] Paul Mendes-Flohr,

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[76] Friedman, *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, 4th edn (London: Routledge, 2002); and Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*. See also Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"*; Koren, 'Between Buber's *Daniel* And His *I and Thou*: A New Examination', 169-198; Johan Hendrik Schravesande, '"Jichud": Eenheid in het werk van Martin Buber – De vraag naar de samenhang van zijn werk vanuit het perspectief van zijn zoektocht naar de eenheid van de werkelijkheid' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2009).
[77] Cf. Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, 312.
[78] See Gershom Scholem, 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums'; Avraham Shapira, *Hope for Our Time: Key Trends in the Thought of Martin Buber*; and Leora Batnitzky, 'Renewing the Jewish Past: Buber on History and Truth'.
[79] Koren, 'Between Buber's *Daniel* and His *I and Thou*', 169-198; and *The Mystery of the Earth*.
[80] Bourel, 'De Lemberg à Jérusalem: Nietzsche et Buber', pp. 127, 129-130.

in his authoritative study of Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue, admits that 'Buber apparently held fast to his youthful affirmation of Nietzsche's Heraclitean *Weltbild*', yet he also maintains a distinction between solipsism and turning towards '*das Du*, the social other'.[81] Nevertheless, there are studies that attempt to trace Nietzsche's influence in Buber's later work. Jacob Golomb suggests that Buber's dialogue reintroduces the Apollonian into the Dionysian.[82] Nils Roemer adds that 'Buber believed in Nietzsche's "Dionysian moments," subscribing to the primacy of life in its immediacy as well as its superiority to an Apollonian world of distance and abstraction'.[83] Golomb and Roemer still subscribe to the idea of dialogue as a correction to Buber's Nietzsche-inspired mysticism as a reintroduction of Apollo to Dionysus. Through an analysis of Buber's reception of Nietzsche in terms of anxiety of influence, this chapter will argue not only for the continuity of Buber's reading of Nietzsche as the simultaneity of Apollo and Dionysus, both before and after his dialogic turn, but also that dialogue appears to be a function of anxiety of influence.

This chapter will read Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue as a developing reflection on literary reception. By focusing on *Daniel* (1913), the pinnacle of Buber's mystical phase where the figure of the Bacchant first appears, and *Ich und Du* (1923), Buber's first fully-fledged expression of his dialogic philosophy, this chapter aims to highlight the recurring figure of the Bacchant in his oeuvre, a role played by Maurice Barrès in 'Zarathustra' as we saw in chapter 1. Buber's Bacchant is both a fictional and literal performance of reception, and a *mise en abyme* of the anxiety of influence. The figure creates a chain of influence that links the reader with the author and ultimately the divine. On a diegetic level, to use Gérard Genette's

[81] Paul Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 126, 92. See also Mendes-Flohr, 'Nietzsche and *das Individuationsproblem*', *From Mysticism to Dialogue* , pp. 52-54; and 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', pp. 233-243.
[82] Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion*, ch. 5, 'Martin Buber's "Liberation" from Nietzsche's "Invasion"', pp. 159-188; and 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'.
[83] Nils Roemer, 'Reading Nietzsche – Thinking about God: Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig', p. 430.

narratological terminology, the Bacchant is an ephebe who reads the divine as a precursor, yet in turn is a precursor actor who is watched by an ephebic audience.[84] On a metadiegetic level, the Bacchant is a mediating character encountered by the narrator, who is read in turn by the reader. In each case, the ephebe reads the precursor through *tessera* and *daemonization* simultaneously, which has the effect of both distancing and encountering the original source in a chain of influence that ultimately goes back to a *Künstlergott*. The ability to express this *mise en abyme*, as we also saw in chapter 1, is what made Schnitzler the consummate artist in 'On Viennese Literature' when compared with the other members of Young Vienna. Finally, on an extradiegetic level, Buber's own anxiety of influence, as this chapter will argue, appears to go back to Nietzsche and his concept of the Dionysian world artist.

MYSTICISM, THE THREAT OF INFINITY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Goethe's Faust, after exhausting the sum total of human knowledge, turns to arcane knowledge to find meaning beyond the visible world ('Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt / Im Innersten zusammenhält', *Faust I*, ll. 382-383). Similarly, the teenaged Buber turns to mysticism yet, unlike his literary counterpart, he fears this kind of knowledge might overwhelm him. Maurice Friedman terms this driving force in Buber's work the threat of infinity.[85] In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber cites two instances, one at the age of fifteen and the other at seventeen, when the infinite made an incisive impact on his way of thinking. In the first instance, Buber reflects on two of his self-identified philosophical influences, Immanuel Kant and Blaise Pascal:

> Es war damals eine mir unbegreifliche Nötigung über mich gekommen: ich mußte immer wieder versuchen, mir den Rand des Raums oder seine Randlosigkeit, eine Zeit mit Anfang und Ende oder eine Zeit ohne Anfang und Ende vorzustellen, und beides war ebenso unmöglich, ebenso hoffnungslos, und doch schien nur die Wahl zwischen der einen und der anderen Absurdität offen. Unter einem unwiderstehlichen Zwang taumelte ich von der einen zur anderen, zuweilen von der Gefahr des Wahnsinnigwerdens in solcher Nähe bedroht, daß ich mich ernstlich mit dem Gedanken trug, ihr durch einen rechtzeitigen Selbstmord zu entweichen (W I, 328).

[84] See Gérard Genette, 'Discours du récit: Essai de méthode', in *Figures III* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 65-282.
[85] Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, ch. 2, 'The Threat of Infinity and the Promise of Time', 26-32.

Attempting but failing to comprehend the epistemological problems of infinity with relation to Kant and Pascal, Buber confesses to contemplating suicide. Buber will eventually find his salvation ('Erlösung') in Kant:

> Die Erlösung brachte dem Fünfzehnjährigen ein Buch, Kants Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, das ich zu lesen wagte, obgleich es mir in seinem ersten Satze sagte, daß es nicht zum Gebrauch für Lehrlinge, sondern für künftige Lehrer bestimmt sei. Dieses Buch erklärte mir, Raum und Zeit seien nur die Formen, in denen meine menschliche Anschauung dessen was ist sich notwendig vollzieht, sie hafteten also nicht dem Innern der Welt an, sondern der Beschaffenheit meiner Sinne (W I, 328).

By declaring the issue of infinity in time and space as irresolvable, Kant assuages Buber's anxieties, a moment of relief that Buber would later also recall in *Begegnung*: 'Diese Philosophie hat eine große beruhigende Wirkung auf mich ausgeübt. […] Kants damaliges Geschenk an mich war die philosophische Freiheit'. This relief, however, would soon be taken away by Nietzsche in the second instance mentioned by Buber. Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra* posits the idea of time as eternal recurrence. This new, mystifying and seductive answer to Buber's philosophical dilemma, where Kant's epistemology only saw limitation and impossibility, would deprive Buber of his freedom. '[E]s hat lange gedauert, bis ich mich loszumachen vermocht habe', Buber writes in retrospective anticipation of a supposedly more critical relationship with Nietzsche.[86]

The threat of infinity has a similarly catastrophic effect on the eponymous hero of Robert Musil's *Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß* (1906). Musil's expressionistic *Bildungsroman* tells the story of a student at a military boarding school in Austria-Hungary. During his studies, the young Törleß is confronted with the mathematical concept of infinity:

> «Das Unendliche» […] Und nun durchzuckte es ihn wie mit einem Schlage, an diesem Worte etwas furchtbar Beunruhigendes hafte. […] Etwas über den Verstand Gehendes, Wildes, Vernichtendes schien durch die Arbeit irgendwelcher Erfinder hineinegeschläfert worden zu sein und war nun plötzlich aufgewacht und wieder furchtbar geworden.[87]

[86] Buber, *Begegnung*, p. 18.
[87] Robert Musil, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by Adolf Frisé, 2nd edn, 9 vols (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981), 6, 63. See Groiser, MBW 2.1, 88.

Unable to make sense of the infinite, the fictional Törleß, like the real-life Buber, contemplates suicide.[88] The existential urgency of the incident depicted in Musil's novel demonstrates how, from the very outset, Buber was concerned for the integrity of the world and the individual in the face of the infinite, where the world was under threat from abstraction. The astonishing similarities between Törleß and Buber underline the general rise in the historical popularity of mysticism.[89] Notable figures in the German revival of mysticism include Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Böhme. Kabbalah, too, was receiving renewed interest. As for Buber's own interest in mysticism, Koren identifies three main periods: one governed by ecstasy from 1899 to 1909, one governed by unity from 1909 to 1914, then a 'decision on behalf of the world'.[90] Buber's first point of contact was with Meister Eckhart, the fourteenth-century Christian mystic who distinguished between God (*Gott*) and the Godhead (*Gottheit*), proceeding to another German mystic in 'Ueber Jakob Böhme' (1901). This line of enquiry culminated in his doctoral thesis on Böhme and Nicholas of Cusa (also known as in German as Nikolaus von Kues, in Latin as Nicolaus Cusanus), entitled 'Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems', which he submitted to the University of Vienna in 1904. Following his first rupture with Zionism on Theodor Herzl's death in the same year, Buber's attention progressed to Hasidism, an eighteenth-century off-shoot of mainstream Judaism originating in Eastern Europe. The main fruits in this period of Buber's labour are his translations of the tales of Rabbi Nachman (*Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman*, 1906) and of the Baal Shem Tov (*Die Legende des Baalschem*, 1908).[91] The final stage of Buber's work on mysticism

[88] For Buber's *Ekstatische Konfessionen* as a central source for Musil's *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, see Dietmar Goltschnigg, *Mystische Tradition im Roman Robert Musils: Martin Bubers "Ekstatische Konfessionen" im "Mann ohne Eigenschaften"* (Heidelberg: Stiehm, 1974); and Alexandra Saemmer, *Duras et Musil : Drôle de couple ? Drôle d'inceste ?* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), ch. B, 'Reflets doubles: *Les Confessions extatiques* dans *L'Homme sans qualités* et dans *Agatha*', pp. 94-164.
[89] Cf. Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf, *Mystik der Moderne: Die visionäre Ästhetik der deutschen Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1989).
[90] Koren, *The Mystery of the Earth*.
[91] Martina Urban, *Aesthetics of Renewal: Martin Buber's Early Representation of Hasidism as Kulturkritik* (Chicago, IL; London: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

encompasses *Ekstatische Konfessionen* (1909), an anthology of descriptions of ecstatic experiences, and *Daniel* (1913).

With the outbreak of the First World War, Buber comes under pressure to change his attitude towards mysticism. Initially, Buber welcomes the opening of hostilities with great enthusiasm. In so doing, Buber's voice joins those with a number of fervent Nietzscheans, both on the left and the right of the political spectrum, who were excited by the impending clash of nations.[92] Among those hoping for the regeneration of man and the emergence of the *Übermensch* from the mechanised destruction of war were the Expressionist dramatists Georg Kaiser and Ernst Toller. Kaiser's changing attitude to the war is perhaps most eloquently reflected in the development of the *Gas* trilogy. *Gas I* (1917) ends on an exciting and explosive cliffhanger, with hope for a destructive regeneration of man; optimism gives way to pessimism in the final instalment, *Die Koralle* (1920), where in the ensuing war character names and identities have given way to designation by colours and numbers.[93] Toller also expresses a Nietzschean desire for the regeneration of man in the highly stylised *Die Wandlung* (1919).[94] Toller's optimism also gives way to pessimism but, unlike Kaiser, this is expressed through a

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[92] See Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, ch. 2, 'Germany and the Battle over Nietzsche, 1890-1914', pp. 17-50.
[93] On Georg Kaiser's reception of Nietzsche, see Herbert W. Reichert, 'Nietzsche and Georg Kaiser', *Studies in Philology*, 61 (1964), 85-108; Richard C. Helt and John Carson Pettey, 'Georg Kaiser's *Rezeption* of Friedrich Nietzsche: The Dramatist's Letters and Some Nietzschean Themes in His Works', *Orbis Litterarum*, 38 (1983), 215-234; and Rhys Williams, '*Der werdende Mensch*: Georg Kaiser and Gustav Landauer', in *Georg Kaiser and Modernity*, ed. by Frank Krause (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2005), pp. 75-88.
[94] Jacob Golomb lists three moments of encounter with Nietzsche in Ernst Toller's autobiographical *Eine Jugend in Deutschland*: the use of Nietzschean language when Toller says he has killed God by destroying the *mezuzah* on the door of his family home, discussing Nietzsche with friends while a student at Grenoble, and Toller's awakening sense of self and authenticity while reading Nietzsche (Toller, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by John M. Spalek and Wolfgang Frühwald, 5 vols (Munich: Hanser, 1996), 4, 18, 39-40, 42-43; quoted in Golomb, 'Nietzsche and the Marginal Jews', in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, ed. by Golomb (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 158-192 (p. 180, n. 16)). Golomb sees these moments culminate in Toller's first play *Die Wandlung* (1919). René Eichenlaub detects Nietzschean ideas in the play *Aufrüttelung* (*Ernst Toller et l'expressionisme politique* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1980), pp. 58-61). Michael Ossar also writes about Nietzsche's influence on Toller (*Anarchism in the Dramas of Ernst Toller: The Realm of Necessity and the Realm of Freedom* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 3). David U. Garfinkle, conversely, argues for Nietzsche's negative influence on Toller ('Between "I and Thou": Buber, Expressionism and Ernst Toller's Search for Community', in *Jews and Theater in an Intercultural Context*, ed. by Edna Nahshon (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 121-136 (p. 123)). Frederik Steven Louis Schouten compares and contrasts Nietzsche's concept of the death of God with Toller's moment of killing God, but also detects Nietzschean undertones in Toller's poem 'Der Ringende' (*Ernst Toller: An Intellectual Youth Biography, 1893-1918* (unpublished doctoral thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2007), p. 56 n. 169, pp. 138-140).

return to naturalism rather than increasingly alienating Expressionism. Toller's play *Hinkemann*, originally performed under the title *Der deutsche Hinkemann* (1923), is semi-autobiographical, charting the hopes of a Jewish man hoping to demonstrate his patriotic credentials by joining up for a colonial war; the injuries he sustains, however, literally emasculate him and prevent his integration into society. The cuckolded protagonist also recalls Georg Büchner's *Woyzeck*.

Buber's war enthusiasm eventually earned him the moniker 'Kriegsbuber' ('Buber the warrior') from his close friend, Gustav Landauer, the anarchist, mystic and one of the leaders of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic until his brutal death at the hands of the Freikorps in 1919.[95] Buber initially hopes the war would be a triumph of the German spirit, as may be surmised from 'Die Losung' and his interaction with the Forte-Kreis, a group of spiritually-minded European intellectuals who met in Potsdam just before the outbreak of the First World War to discuss the high ideals of modernity, utopia and the union of the peoples of the world.[96] Another, more literary example are the books that Buber recommends in 'Bücher, die jetzt und immer zu lesen sind' (1914) in the Christmas edition of *Wiener Kunst- und Buchschau*. With the exception of Meister Eckhart, all Buber's suggestions are uncomfortably bellicose and nationalistic: from Clausewitz' *Vom Kriege* to Hölderlin's *Hyperion*, 'die größte dichterische Urkunde träumenden und kämpfenden Deutschtums' (MBW 1, 279), in which Buber entwines the German spirit with the warrior spirit ('Um reiner zu erfassen, was der deutsche Krieg mit dem Geist des deutschen Menschen zu schaffen hat', MBW 1, 279). Buber also selects Fichte's *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, which, as Stefan Vogt points out, was a common rallying-point

[95] MBB 1, 433-438 (12.5.1916, Landauer to Buber); quoted in Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, p. 19. On Buber's war enthusiasm, see Mendes-Flohr, 'Landauer and the "Kriegsbuber"', in *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 97-101; and Treml, 'Der Kriegsbuber', MBW 1, 73-80.

[96] Members of the Forte-Kreis included Poul Bjerre, Henri Borel, Martin Buber, Theodor Däubler, Frederik van Eeden, Erich Gutkind, Gustav Landauer, Florens Christian Rang, Romain Rolland, Wassily Kandinsky and Walter Rathenau. See also Christine Holste, *Der Forte-Kreis, 1910-1915: Rekonstruktion eines utopischen Versuchs* (Stuttgart: M und P Verlag, 1992); *Der Potsdamer Forte-Kreis: Eine utopische Intellektuellenassoziation zur europäischen Friedenssicherung*, ed. by Richard Faber and Christine Holste (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001); and Treml, 'Der Forte-Kreis', MBW 1, 68-73.

for German nationalists in this period.[97] Landauer intially dismisses, then becomes wary of, Buber's metaphysical view of the war. The turning-point comes in a disappointed letter Landauer sent Buber in May 1916: 'ich war nicht bei dem Kriegsbuber und hatte ihn beinahe vergessen'. In response to 'Die Losung' (1916), which was published in *Der Jude*, and the speech 'Geist des Judentums' from his earlier *Reden über das Judentum*, Landauer accuses Buber of aestheticism and formalism: 'Trotz all Ihrem Einspruch nenne ich diese Art Ästhetizismus und Formalismus'. By this, Landauer means that Buber has retreated into Plato's realm of form and shadows, into a world of beauty rather than reality. Landauer is also particularly upset that Buber has compared modern-day Germans with the heroic Greeks of Pericles and Renaissance Italy: 'Ich gestehe, mir kocht das Blut, wenn ich [...] lese, wie Sie neben den Griechen der Perikleischen Zeit oder den Italiener des Trecento »den Deutschen unserer Tage« stellen'.[98] In Landauer's description, Buber appears to have retreated into the fairytale world of literature and myth; specifically, Buber has receded into the *Trecento*, the beginning of the Renaissance in fourteenth-century Italy, the era of Dante and the *Divine Comedy* (*La divina commedia*) so glamorised by Jakob Burckhardt in *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860) and, despite their fraught relationship, by Nietzsche, his younger colleague at Basel.[99] In sum, Landauer accuses Buber of a form of aestheticism that runs counter to Landauer, Nietzsche and Buber himself. While no written reply remains, it is widely held that the two friends met and Buber apologised: Friedman sees the sincerity of Buber's apology in his willingness to alter the passages that offended Landauer.[100]

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[97] Stefan Vogt, 'The First World War, German Nationalism, and the Transformation of German Zionism', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 57 (2012), 267-291.
[98] MBB 1, 433-438 (12.5.1916, Landauer to Buber).
[99] On the relationship between Burckhardt and Nietzsche, see Erich Heller, *The Importance of Nietzsche: Ten Essays* (Chicago, IL; London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), ch. 3, 'Burckhardt and Nietzsche', pp. 39-54. On Buber and Burckhardt, see Mendes-Flohr, 'Nationalism as a Spiritual Sensibility: The Philosophical Suppositions of Buber's Hebrew Humanism', *The Journal of Religion*, 69 (1989), 155-168; Biemann, *The Martin Buber Reader*, p. 144; and Biemann, 'Aesthetic Education in Buber: The Jewish Renaissance and the Artist', in *New Perspectives on Martin Buber*.
[100] Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, 397-398.

Over the course of the First World War, therefore, Buber begins to distance himself from mysticism and the metaphysical threat of the infinite. Mendes-Flohr terms this moment a volte-face, Martin Treml a sobering-up (*Ernüchterung*).[101] In his own words in a section of *Zwiesprache* (1929) entitled 'Eine Bekehrung', Buber relates the story of a young man named only Mehé, who came to him for help while he was meditating. The German word *Bekehrung* has the primary sense of a religious conversion; etymologically, however, the word also connotes turning (*umkehren*), in this case not just towards God, but towards the world. Buber describes the meeting as an everyday event or, more literally, an incident of the everyday ('ein Ereignis des Alltags', MBW 1, 186): a young man approaches Buber after a morning's meditation ('an einem Vormittag nach einem Morgen »religiöser« Begeisterung', MBW 1, 186), from which we may infer an ecstatic experience that left behind the world ('Es gab Stunden, die aus dem Gang der Dinge herausgenommen wurden', MBW 1, 186). Mehé's death on the front in the First World War brought to Buber's attention the danger that mysticism posed to the individual. To safeguard against the disappearance of the individual into the infinite, Buber replaces his earlier dialectic of *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* with his later monologue and dialogue, where the individual is never alone but always in relation to the rest of the world. Buber's enunciation of the problem of monologue becomes apparent in 'Was ist der Mensch?', a series of lectures in 1938 in which Buber develops a philosophical anthropology, an approach that combines the detached perspective of philosophy with the subject's involvement with his or her object of anthropological study. On the one hand, Buber claims in 'Aufblick', the conclusion to 'Was ist der Mensch?', that contemporary thought tends to err towards either collectivism, where the individual becomes simply a function of the whole, or individualism, where the whole is dependent on the view of one individual: the individualist and collectivist

[101] See Mendes-Flohr, 'Buber's *volte-face*', *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 101-113; and Treml, 'Ernüchterung', MBW 1, 80-85.

worldviews each produce anew an abstract copy or reflection (‘Spiegelung’, W I, 382) of the world emanating from the individual or the universe, but never from a between that incorporates both.

The transition from mysticism to dialogue mirrors a psychological need for self-criticism and self-renewal. The need for self-renewal is inherent in Buber’s philosophy as well as in Bloom’s anxiety of influence, but also a re-enactment of a change of heart that Nietzsche himself underwent. Although Nietzsche volunteered as a medical orderly for the Prussian army during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), Buber is genuinely excited by war, where arguably Nietzsche was not.[102] The important similarity, however, is their common support for a war and subsequent regret. Christian J. Emden suggests that in the short essay ‘Der griechische Staat’, based on a draft written months after returning, Nietzsche inadvertently carried on the German Romantic ‘idealization of war as a creative “world-principle,” which was able to awaken and channel cultural life in the service of a numinous “German spirit”’.[103] Having celebrated the victory of German culture over French civilization in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche subsequently changed his mind, as evidenced by his ‘Versuch einer Selbstkritik’, which he added in 1878. In the original publication of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche had thanked Martin Luther and the Reformation for the rebirth of the German myth: ‘Ihm antwortete in wetteiferndem Wiederhall jener weihevoll übermüthige Festzug dionysischer Schwärmer, denen wir die deutsche Musik danken — und denen wir d i e W i e d e r g e b u r t d e s d e u t s c h e n M y t h u s danken werden!’ (KSA 1, 147). In his ‘Versuch einer Selbstkritik’, however, Nietzsche describes *Die Geburt der Tragödie* as impossible (‘heute ist es mir ein unmögliches Buch’) and hates its rhapsodic nature (‘ein hochmüthiges und schwärmerisches Buch’, KSA 1, 14). The main points of Nietzsche’s regret

[102] See Julian Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 8, ‘War and Aftermath’, pp. 135-147.
[103] Christian J. Emden, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 121.

are the exuberant sense of nationalism and mysticism that the book contained, both of which he blamed on his former patron, Richard Wagner. In terms of nationalism, Nietzsche writes that the revolution that German music would engender in Europe fizzled out in the founding of the empire:

> Dass ich, auf Grund der deutschen letzten Musik, vom „deutschen Wesen“ zu fabeln begann, wie als ob es eben im Begriff sei, sich selbst zu entdecken und wiederzufinden — und das zu einer Zeit, wo der deutsche Geist, der nicht vor Langem noch den Willen zur Herrschaft über Europa, die Kraft zur Führung Europa’s gehabt hatte, eben letztwillig und endgültig a b d a n k t e und, unter dem pomphaften Vorwande einer Reichs-Begründung, seinen Uebergang zur Vermittelmässigung, zur Demokratie und den „modernen Ideen“ machte! (KSA 1, 20)

Bismarck’s liberalisation of German politics did not lead to supremacy, which may be interpreted not only as the domination of Europe, but also the self-mastery of Nietzsche’s master-slave dialectic; instead, Germany was left with the mediocrity of democracy and socialism. In terms of mysticism, Nietzsche regrets the Dionysian voice that pervades *Die Geburt der Tragödie*: ‘hier sprach — so sagte man sich mit Argwohn — etwas wie eine mystische und beinahe mänadische Seele, die mit Mühsal und willkürlich, fast unschlüssig darüber, ob sie sich mittheilen oder verbergen wolle, gleichsam in einer fremden Zunge stammelt’ (KSA 1, 15). Nietzsche, like Buber when he calls Nietzsche a Dionysian and a mystic of the Enlightenment, equates mysticism with Dionysus in the form of the maenadic to emphasise its frenzied and undesirably hysterical nature. For this Nietzsche blames Wagner:

> Hier redete jedenfalls — das gestand man sich mit Neugierde ebenso als mit Abneigung ein — eine f r e m d e Stimme, der Jünger eines noch „unbekannten Gottes“, der sich einstweilen unter die Kapuze des Gelehrten, unter die Schwere und dialektische Unlustigkeit des Deutschen, selbst unter die schlechten Manieren des Wagnerianers versteckt hat (KSA 1, 14).

Nietzsche claims to have been following an as yet ‘unknown God’, who we might assume has been revealed through Nietzsche’s self-criticism and self-renewal, or even his anxiety of influence towards his precursors and himself. The first paragraph ends with an invocation of Socrates, the original bogeyman of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, perhaps in recognition that his philosophy was not entirely worthless: ‘Oh Sokrates, Sokrates, war das

vielleicht d e i n Geheimniss? Oh geheimnissvoller Ironiker, war dies vielleicht deine — Ironie? ——', KSA 1, 13).

Daniel: Anxiety of influence in Buber's mysticism

The crucial point distinguishing mysticism from dialogue, at least in Buber's self-critical estimation, appears to be the issue of preserving the distinction between the individual and the absolute. Certain descriptions in *Daniel* lend some credence to this description of Buber's mysticism: in a dialogue entitled 'Von der Polarität', Buber's eponymous hero, Daniel, declares, 'Das ist die Erkenntnis. Denn wie der Jüngling im Bakchenspiel sich in den Gott verwandelt und ihn verwirklicht, so verwandelt sich der Erkennende in die Welt und verwirklicht sie' (MBW 1, 229). In this apparent moment of hubris, Daniel appears to be suggesting that a youth, playing the role of a Bacchant, a worshipper of Dionysus, in fact becomes Dionysus himself. However, in another passage entitled 'Von der Richtung', Daniel's longing for the divine appears in more humble terms:

> Weil wir nicht wie Ewige atmen können, die den einigen, richtungslosen Weltodem hauchen, machen wir uns aus dem Spiel des Ein und Aus eine kleine Wollust zurecht. Weil wir nicht schlaflos, lückenlos, schrankenlos, glühend über aller Dauer kreisen können, vergnügen wir uns am Versinken und Erwachen. Weil wir nicht ins Raumlose steigen können – (MBW 1, 184).

Daniel describes the divine in aesthetic terms that are meticulously negated linguistically ('nicht wie Ewige', 'richtungslos', 'lückenlos', 'schrankenlos' and '[r]aumlos'), contrasting form with formlessness; yet, at the same time, he expresses a longing to reach these heights or, more specifically, to fly above the duration of our mortal lives, thereby conflating space and time, and initiating a cycle of death and rebirth. In these lines, therefore, Daniel demonstrates both *tessera* and *daemonization* towards his divine source of inspiration. In fact, all of *Daniel* may be read as an aesthetic treatise that narrativises anxiety of influence. This becomes clear not only in the text's dialogic form, but in two key moments: Daniel's description of Orpheus' encounter with Dionysus, a clear reinterpretation of Nietzsche through *tessera* and

daemonization, and his description of the theatre, a *mise en abyme* of the entire process of dramatic creation and interpretation.[104] Through the figure of Orpheus, consequently, Buber describes a chain of influence that starts with Dionysus, goes through the narrator, Daniel, all the way back to the author and his own precursor, Nietzsche. Through the distancing and encounter by *tessera* and *daemonization*, the criticism of *unio mystica* and validation of reciprocity that apparently define Buber's dialogue are already present in his mystical work *Daniel*.[105]

Published in 1913, *Daniel* is a series of five dialogues, each between the eponymous hero and a different interlocutor. The format of these dialogues is not necessarily found in Nietzsche and is far more reminiscent of those that Plato recorded with his teacher, Socrates; nevertheless, the location of Daniel's dialogues in the mountains ('in den Bergen', MBW 1, 183), above the city ('über der Stadt', MBW 1, 191) or at sea ('am Meer', MBW 1, 234), not to mention Daniel's prophetic tone, cannot help but evoke Zarathustra's descent from the mountains in *Also sprach Zarathustra*. These dialogues, subtitled 'Gespräche von der Verwirklichung', deal with the distinction between reality (*Wirklichkeit*) and realisation (*Verwirklichung*), which Daniel introduces in the second dialogue: 'Wir sprachen ja schon

[104] Echoes of Apollo and Dionysus can also be heard in 'Das Gestaltende' (1912), where Buber distinguishes between form, and the formative and formless aesthetic principles. Buber writes, 'Wer von Ihnen in Florenz gewesen ist, der hat gewiß, wenn es in früheren Jahren war, in einer künstlichen Grotte des Boboligartens, wenn es in der jüngsten Zeit war, in der Akademie jene vier Torsi des Michelangelo gesehen, in denen in denkwürdiger Art die Form in die Materie versenkt ist. Man fühlt, wie die Idee des Meisters den Block nicht zu bewältigen vermochte, aber man fühlt auch, daß dies nicht eine Unzulänglichkeit des Künstlertums ist, sondern daß hier ein fundamentaler Gegensatz, ein unausgeglichener und unausgleichbarer Widerstreit waltet, daß diese Bildwerke Urkunden eines Kampfes sind: des Kampfes zwischen dem gestaltenden und dem gestaltlosen Prinzip, zwischen dem Prinzip, das Form geben, und dem, das sich nicht formen lassen will' (MBW 3, 260). The four sculptures by Michelangelo also recall Rilke's 1908 poem 'Archaïscher Torso Apollos' (Rilke, 'Archaïscher Torso Apollos', *Werke in drei Bänden*, 1, 313). The poem is an ekphrasis of a sculpture of Apollo that is missing its head, the seat of reason and its defining feature; this is reflected in the poem's sonnet form, which is cut through with enjambment, but bursts through in its absence with thanks to rhythm and rhyme. Just as Nietzsche ascribes a rebirth of Apollo and Dionysus to German music in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, so Buber holds that the interplay of form and formlessness is particularly expressed within Jewishness ('Das Judentum ist ein seltsamer, seltsam vorbestimmter Sonderfall dieses ewigen Prozesses', MBW 3, 261).

[105] Moreover, in the dialogue about reality ('Von der Wirklichkeit'), Daniel's interlocutor, Ulrich, comes to understand that realisation can happen only by turning towards chaos: 'Daß der Realisierende zu allererst das Chaos realisieren müßte?' (MBW 1, 203).

einmal davon, daß es ein doppeltes Verhalten des Menschen zu seinem Erleben gibt: das Orientieren oder Einstellen und das Realisieren oder Verwirklichen' (MBW 1, 192). In *Daniel*, Buber's particular contribution to the longstanding dualism in philosophy between appearance and reality is based on a linguistic conceit: reality in its proper sense is that which has been realised or brought to life (the literal meaning of *Erleben*); everything else is just orientation according to experience (*Erfahren*), a solipsistic snapshot of the world.[106] The distinction is perhaps most clearly illustrated in Daniel's example of a wanderer encountering a city for the first time:

> Der Wanderer, der stehen blieb, war nicht orientiert und wollte es nicht sein; er wußte nicht, wie die Stadt hieß, die er betreten hatte, wie der Platz hieß, nach dem die Straße führte; aber als er weiter ging, zögerte sein Schritt nicht, und als er an einen Kreuzweg kam, wählte er mit unmittelbarem Entschluß, wie aus einem tiefen Gebot. Der die Richtung hat, weiß nicht Bescheid, wie der Wille in Ursache und Wirkung bestimmt sei, noch was man für Gut und Böse zu halten habe, noch daß es Entwicklung gebe, der man eingetan sei; aber wenn er handelt, tut er seine Tat und keine andere, wählt er sein Los und kein anderes, entscheidet er sich mit seinem Wesen (MBW 1, 211).

The wanderer who orientates himself or herself in the city attempts to do so by naming the streets exactly with reference to a map; the wanderer who realises the city leaves behind the security of the map and simply enters directly. Buber terms this turning towards the city direction (*Richtung*).

Buber's descriptions of realisation in *Daniel* have several influences. The manner of entering a city directly rather than theoretically through a street map recalls the nineteenth-century current of thought known as *Lebensphilosophie*, inspired by the primacy of life in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, then developed by the social philosophers, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel.[107] Building on Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, which set out the limits of knowledge by describing the relationship between our experience (*Erfahrung*) and reason (*Vernunft*) through understanding (*Verstand*), Dilthey developed

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[106] Jean Wahl, 'Martin Buber and the Philosophies of Existence', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 475-510.

[107] See Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, ch. 1, 'Simmel's Paradox: Social Interaction as an "Objective Form of Subjective Minds"', pp. 25-30. See also Franz, Graf zu Solms-Laubach, *Nietzsche and Early German and Austrian Sociology* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007).

Kant's transcendental idealism, which sees the mind and reason as external to the realm of nature, for the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*) so that they take into account human involvement or, in other words, the self's involvement with the object of study. The influence that Dilthey and Simmel exerted as university teachers on Buber cannot be underestimated. Moreover, the term realisation (*Erlebnis*) was attributed to Dilthey both by Buber's friend, Gustav Landauer, and Julius and Heinrich Hart, the brothers who led the *Neue Gemeinschaft* society to whom Buber presented 'Alte und neue Gemeinschaft'.[108] Furthermore, the timbre of Buber's example of the wanderer contains a number of Nietzschean notes. First, the image of the wanderer appears in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, specifically in 'Der Wanderer und sein Schatten', and is closely related to the concept of the free spirit (*Freigeist*) and the 'Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei' at the end of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*. Zarathustra, too, would wander among humanity when he descended from his mountain. Second, Buber's wanderer contains a similar moral dimension to Nietzsche's free spirit, since both are beyond good and evil ('Gut und Böse'), as in Nietzsche's in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* and *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. Third, the way in which Buber's wanderer chooses his fate ('wählt er sein Los und kein anderes', MBW 1, 211) is reminiscent of Nietzsche's *amor fati*.

Buber's Orpheus as anxiety of influence

In *Daniel*, Buber depicts the confrontation between Apollo and Dionysus by opposing the ancient Greek myths of Zagreus and Orpheus; the myth of Zagreus functions as a distancing of Nietzsche through *daemonization* and *tessera*, the myth of Orpheus as the newly reclaimed inchoate moment. In the first dialogue with the Woman, which takes place on the mountains, Daniel opts for Orpheus' tale of musical resistance against the abyss over Zagreus' tale of destruction:

[108] Cf. Mendes-Flohr, 'Prophetic Politics and Metasociology: Martin Buber and German Social Thought', *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, 60 (1985), 67-82.

> Von Dionysos als Zagreus wird gesagt, die Titanen hätten ihn durch ein Spiel an sich gelockt und ihn in Stücke gerissen und verschlungen. Dieses Schicksal erfährt, wer sich mit ungerichteter Seele der Ekstase überantwortet. Die Gewalten des Chaos nehmen ihn hin, die Dämonie des Ungewordenen zersprengt seine Seele und schlingt sie ein. Ihm möchte ich das Bild des Orpheus gegenüberstellen, der mit der Lyra in das Land des Hades niedersteigt nicht um sein Geliebtes wiederzugewinnen, sondern um bei Dionysos, der Hades ist, zu sterben und aufzuerstehen, die Handlung der Erneuerung vollziehend, darin jener Rhythmus des Atems und des Schlafes zum Sakrament verklärt ist. Dies aber ist das Urbildliche an Orpheus, daß er in den ekstatischen Tod mit der Lyra geht. Nicht verlockt: entschlossen, und mit der Lyra (W I, 187-188).

In Greek mythology, Zagreus is the offspring of Zeus and Persephone, the queen of the underworld and herself daughter of Zeus and Demeter. When Zagreus is born, Hera, Zeus' wife, becomes jealous; she orders the Titans to rip Zagreus asunder and consume his flesh, except for the heart. Zeus then implants the heart in his own thigh or, in some versions, the heart is given to Semele, a mortal woman, from whom springs Dionysus, the aptly named twice-born (διθύραμβος). Martin Treml credits Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* with the rediscovery of the Zagreus myth.[109] There is some evidence for this assertion, since Zagreus is an essential element of Nietzsche's description of the tragic hero in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*:

> In Wahrheit aber ist jener Held der leidende Dionysus der Mysterien, jener die Leiden der Individuation an sich erfahrende Gott, von dem wundervolle Mythen erzählen, wie er als Knabe von den Titanen zerstückelt worden sei und nun in diesem Zustande als Zagreus verehrt werde (KSA 1, 61).

As a mask for Dionysus, the tragic hero, re-enacting the mythical fate of Zagreus, is ripped to shreds on the stage by the inescapability of fate, just as Buber describes here in *Daniel*. Buber, however, deplores the nihilism of such destruction, citing the lack of direction of the purely Dionysian soul ('mit ungerichteter Seele'), with which Buber associates Nietzsche both in 'Zarathustra' and *Begegnung*.

Buber's interpretation of the myth of Orpheus appears to introduce an Apollonian counterpoint to his purely Dionysian reading of Zagreus. Sometimes considered Apollo's protégé, Orpheus, the legendary musician and poet, descends into the underworld to retrieve his recently departed wife, Eurydice. On the failure of his quest, Orpheus turns to pederasty to satisfy his sexual needs. This provokes the ire of the Maenads, female worshippers of Dionysus

[109] Treml, MBW 1, 187, note 3.

also known as Bacchants, who tear him to shreds. In their encounter with, and inevitable *sparagmos* at the hands of, Dionysus, the basic myths of Zagreus and Orpheus have much in common; even so, Buber and Nietzsche also appear to diverge in their interpretation of Orpheus. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche sees an antithetical relationship between Orpheus and Dionysus:

> Wenn an diesem die ältere Tragödie zu Grunde ging, so ist also der aesthetische Sokratismus das mörderische Princip: insofern aber der Kampf gegen das Dionysische der älteren Kunst gerichtet war, erkennen wir in Sokrates den Gegner des Dionysus, den neuen Orpheus, der sich gegen Dionysus erhebt und, obschon bestimmt, von den Mänaden des athenischen Gerichtshofes zerrissen zu werden, doch den übermächtigen Gott selbst zur Flucht nöthigt (KSA 1, 87-88).

In this example, Nietzsche offers Socrates as an historical instantiation of the mythical figure Orpheus. Both Orpheus and Socrates, the father of philosophy and consequently the enemy of Dionysus, represent Apollonian form, sharing a similar fate at the hands of Dionysus: Socrates allows himself to be destroyed by the Athenian court, an historical counterpart of the mythical Maenads that destroy Orpheus. Nevertheless, neither Socrates nor Orpheus accept the older art of Dionysus, but cling to Apollonian aesthetics, Socrates as form and Orpheus as music, which is the cause of their death. Buber, however, interprets Orpheus slightly differently in *Daniel*. Buber's Orpheus also encounters Dionysus, not specifically in the form of the Maenads, but in the form of death during his *katabasis* or descent into Hades, the underworld ('um bei Dionysos, der Hades ist, zu sterben und aufzuerstehen'). Orpheus' musical resistance is his rebirth ('Dies aber ist das Urbildliche an Orpheus, daß er in den ekstastischen Tod mit der Lyra geht. Nicht verlockt: entschlossen, und mit der Lyra').

The divergences in Buber's and Nietzsche's interpretations of the myths of Zagreus and Orpheus may be read as an anxiety of influence; on account of their interpretations' Apollonian and Dionysian underpinnings, Buber's readings demonstrate an instance of both *tessera* and *daemonization*. As an instance of *tessera*, Buber has reversed Nietzsche's terminology and, as a response to the commonly held Dionysian abyss, simply replaced Nietzsche's Dionysian Zagreus with an Apollonian Orpheus. In this reading, the Dionysian abyss to which Buber's

Nietzsche *qua* Zagreus succumbs is the ideal in the form of fate, eternity and ultimately death; instead, Buber's Orpheus responds positively with life. At the same time, however, Buber's reading of Nietzsche demonstrates an instance of *daemonization*. In this reading, Buber takes Nietzsche's terminology in a straightforward sense. In contradistinction to the *tesseratic* reading, Buber's Nietzsche *qua* Zagreus becomes all too human, unable to overcome death and the limits of his own mortality; instead, Buber's *daemonized* Orpheus responds as musician and artist in the face of death. The tension between Buber's *tesseratic* and *daemonized* readings of Nietzsche is expressed in two particular facets of his version of Orpheus: first, in Orpheus' musical response and, second, in the figure of Dionysus. The Greeks made Apollo the god of music and the lyre, presumably on account of music's metre and rhythm; Nietzsche, conversely, ascribes an epic role to Apollo and makes music Dionysian for its ability to circumvent the intellect and tap into instinct. Wagner's operas, Nietzsche advocates in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, are supposed to bring about a rebirth of tragedy through their combination of Apollonian and Dionysian, of epic and lyrical elements. It is noteworthy that, in Buber's Apollonian interpretation of his lyre, Orpheus' response to Dionysus is just as lyrical as it is epic. The figure of Dionysus, in Nietzsche's as well as in Buber's interpretations, represents both death and rebirth. Nietzsche's Zagreus attempts to impose Apollonian form onto Dionysian reality, which is no different from Buber's Orpheus, who similarly plays music in the face of destruction. Both Nietzsche's Zagreus and Buber's Orpheus encounter Dionysus in order to be reborn out of the destruction of Apollonian illusion.

Nietzsche's Orpheus and Buber's Zagreus, the inferior figure in each philosopher's pairing, are both myths of the imbalance of Apollo and Dionysus; conversely, Nietzsche's Zagreus and Buber's Orpheus, the superior figure in each philosopher's pairing, are both myths not of the combination, but of the simultaneity of Apollo and Dionysus. Both Nietzsche and Buber attempt this rebalancing, an inchoate moment when Apollo meets Dionysus, when

Zagreus and Orpheus attempt to impose Apollonian form onto the Dionysian abyss, yet the two never combine; they remain distinct and disappear again in the following moment. Nietzsche and Buber are responding to different perceived traditions: Nietzsche to the overly Apollonian philosophical tradition of Socrates; Buber to the overly Dionysian influence of Nietzsche. To maintain this inchoate moment, which must constantly be renewed, Buber must retain his artistic integrity over and against Nietzsche: he distances himself both through *tessera*, where Nietzsche is too idealist, or through *daemonization*, where Nietzsche is too human; in both instances, Buber's reading of Nietzsche meets his demise. Nevertheless, precisely through the simultaneity of these diametrically opposed readings, Buber paradoxically maintains the inchoate moment, the impossible meeting, and tension between, Apollo and Dionysus, for which Nietzsche also strives, and which Buber first encounters in Nietzsche.

The aesthetics of dialogue in Buber's theatre

Buber's myth of Orpheus represents a distancing from Nietzsche through *tessera* and *daemonization*; at the same time, these paradoxical interpretations allow the ephebe to encounter anew his divine precursor, Dionysus. This pattern of distancing and encounter is repeated between every artist involved in Daniel's discussion about the theme of polarity in the theatre, 'Von der Polarität: Gespräch nach dem Theater'. In his recollections of the theatre, Daniel recalls having seen Bacchants, female worshippers of Dionysus, not in terms of their representation by Euripides in *The Bacchae*, but according to the ancient Dionysian mysteries: 'Wieder aber, von dem Hochzeitsreigen der Szene gerufen, stand ein neues Spiel vor mir: ich sah die Bakchen auf der Bühne. Nicht die euripideische Dichtung: das alte Dionysosspiel selber' (MBW 1, 225). The philological distinction between the Euripidean and an older, more immediate staging of the Bacchae is made by Nietzsche in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, in which he describes how the hero of ancient Greek tragedy was merely a mask for Dionysus on the

stage; Euripides, according to Nietzsche, was the first to reject this convention (KSA 1, 71). Daniel, perhaps as Buber's version of Zarathustra, reinterprets Nietzsche's interpretation of Greek tragedy by focusing on the mask itself:

> Der große Schauspieler nimmt nicht Masken vor. In jener formenden Stunde, in der er seine Rolle entscheidend erlebt, dringt er sich verwandelnd, seine Seele aufgebend und wiedergewinnend, in das Zentrum seines Helden ein und enthebt ihm das Geheimnis der persönlichen Kinesis, die ihm eigentliche Verbindung von Sinn und Tat (MBW 1, 228).

Reprising the criticism Buber made of Hermann Bahr's predilection for masks in 'On Viennese Literature', Daniel describes the great actor in identifiably Apollonian and Dionysian terms: the moment the actor takes up his or her role is described as an Apollonian moment of formation, whereas the same moment causes a Dionysian transformation, dissolution and rebirth of the actor's soul; it is an inchoate moment when action and thought, mind and body are one. In Daniel's estimation, the highest form of art, despite its striving for their unity, is that which retains the duality of appearance and reality in a distinct tension with one another:

> Ja, was ich sah war das Schauspiel der Zweiheit. Aber nicht Gut und Böse, alle Wertung war nur Gewand, sondern die Urzwei selber, Wesen und Gegenwesen, einander widersetzt und einander verbunden wie Pol mit Pol: polar widersetzt, polar verbunden, die freie Polarität des Menschengeistes (MBW 1, 218).

The references to good and evil ('Gut und Böse'), to primordiality ('die Urzwei selber') and, even more decisively, to the transvaluation of all values ('alle Wertung war nur Gewand') place these remarks, at least circumstantially, within a Nietzschean framework; crucial, however, is the repetition of the inchoate moment that Buber has distanced and encountered in Nietzsche through the figure of Orpheus. Daniel declares that encountering a theatrical performance as the unity of appearance and reality, of actor and character, is to entertain a superficial illusion: 'Als mir das offenbar wurde, schwand das Gesicht, und ich sah wieder unentzweit den Vorgang des Theaters' (MBW 1, 226). Only when the duality of appearance and reality becomes apparent does the stage recreate an inchoate moment when irreconcilable opposites meet: 'Und jetzt sah ich, nunmehr vollkommen klar und unverhüllt, *zwei* Wesen. Keiner der Zwei glich dem Mann, den ich eben noch angeschaut hatte; beide glichen ihm' (MBW 1, 226). In Daniel's

aesthetics of the theatre, Buber describes a chain of reception linked by the anxiety of influence. Starting with the mythical Bacchant enacted on stage by the actor, who is given a script by the poet, both are turned in some way towards the original Dionysus and interpreted by Daniel in his own text; in each case, this chain of influence instantiates a reiteration of the encounter between Buber's Orpheus and Dionysus. Each new interpreter, in order to be strong and original in the Bloomian sense instead of devolving into a mere reader, distances their precursor through *tessera* and *daemonization*, who is reduced either to mere text that the ephebe is reading, or to just a person whom the ephebe is surpassing. However, the simultaneity of these two diametrically opposed revisionary ratios that bring Apollo and Dionysus, the physical and the divine, and the perspective from on high to one from below into tension with one another, also allows the ephebic artist to encounter the precursor as another artist, as simultaneous person and text, reader and writer.

Buber's description of the actor, who reads the Bacchant but is read by Daniel, demonstrates the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* on two levels of interpretation. Buber places the actor on an equal footing with the Bacchant: 'Er vollstreckt die Polarität, in der er steht, indem er seinen Gegenpol verwirklicht: indem er den Sinn »findet«, wie der Bakche den Dionysos und der Schauspieler den Helden' (MBW 1, 229). The physical actor recreates the polarity of Daniel's description of the inchoate moment by realising his mythical counterpart, the Bacchant. On the level of interpretation, however, the relationship between actor and Bacchant becomes unequal: the Bacchant, a reiteration of Buber's Orpheus, turns to Dionysus, the source of Buber's inchoate moment, whereas the actor on the stage that Daniel has just seen turns towards the hero of the particular play; the hero of the play, in a mythical sense, is also the Bacchant turning towards Dionysus. Moreover, the actor also reads the Bacchant, who becomes a precursor to his own ephebic performance. Read as an anxiety of influence for the actor, the Bacchant becomes an example of both *tessera* and *daemonization*:

tessera because, as a performance, the Bacchant is a myth being turned into flesh by the actor; but also *daemonization* because, within the Bacchant's mythical framework, the actor is turning the human into an artistic performance, a re-enactment of the myth. The actor, in turn, is read by Daniel, perhaps most naturally, as an example of *tessera*, where the actor's artistic performance is encountered as flesh and blood. However, the actor is also an example of *daemonization*, since because he or she is playing a role that is just as human as it is mythical: the actor is playing the role of a mythical Bacchant who, at the very same Orphic moment, truly is a flesh-and-blood Bacchant turned towards Dionysus. Daniel's reading of the actor, who in turn is reading as well as becoming the Bacchant, demonstrates the reiteration of the inchoate moment, or Buber's Orpheus encounter with Dionysus, through the very same dynamic of *tessera* and *daemonization*. Through these revisionary ratios, the Bacchant and the actor are distanced; they are reduced either to a mythical text to be read or a physical person to be turned into an artistic performance. At the same time, however, they are encountered: in their Dionysian elimination, they are able to occupy a position between the physical and the divine through Daniel's reception. The actor plays, and in fact is, a Bacchant, but not the original Bacchant, who remains distinct.

When Daniel talks about the poet behind the play, the accolade Buber enthusiastically awarded to Schnitzler at the pinnacle of his hierarchy of Nietzschean artists, 'On Viennese Literature', Buber introduces an artist figure who is on a par with the prophetic narrator himself, Daniel. Unlike the actor on stage, the poet is not physical presence and may be encountered solely through his or her text, which in turn may be understood only through its interpretation by the actor. At least at first glance, the poet represents a higher, more Apollonian art when compared with the actor: the poet writes a text, the actor uses the body; the poet is epic, the actor lyrical, the poet is diegetic, the actor mimetic. Consequently, the position of the poet in Buber's chain of influence is both unique, yet simultaneously an instantiation of the same

inchoate moment, because the poet is analogous to Daniel himself. Like the poet, Daniel is also an artist: he interprets the poet's work through the actor on stage, but then goes on to write about it, retelling the story in the past, an epic layer over a lyrical reality. Daniel describes the poet as a messenger who manages to cross from the world of polarity to its divine transcendence and back again: 'Er, den Platon den Boten des überpolaren Gottes nennt, ist nicht minder als dies der Bote der polaren Erde' (MBW 1, 232). The reference to Plato's theory of forms introduces not only an Apollonian aspect, but also hints at the influence of his ideas. Consequently, the word messenger is ambiguous: the messenger is both a reader of these realms as well as writer; to remain strong (in the Bloomian sense), the poet must render the inchoate moment weak. As a messenger, therefore, the poet is analogous to Buber's Orpheus playing the lyre before Dionysus: in an act of *tessera*, the poet translates Plato's perfect forms for his or her worldly audience, while in an act of *daemonization*, the poet lifts the world beyond the chaos of polarity into art, thereby preserving the simultaneity of these two distinct perspectives. The messenger, however, is also being read by Daniel, who, as an artist in his own right, goes through the same process of rendering the poet weak: Daniel reads the poet's text, which, through the *tesseratic* device of the physical actor playing the mythical Bacchant, has become living; but again, the poet as a person, translated by the actor's physicality, is *daemonized* into an artistic performance. When Daniel writes about this process as a strong poet, he interprets and conveys the simultaneity of physicality and performance, history and myth. Through the actor's performance, Daniel has both distanced and encountered the poet.

In Daniel's distancing from, and encounter with, the poet through *tessera* and *daemonization*, we already see Buber's supposedly later criticism of mysticism and his philosophy of dialogue *in nuce*. Buber's criticism of, and later distancing from, the monologic dissolution of the individual into *unio mystica* is implicit in the *enantiodromia* that becomes apparent when the poet's *daemonization* becomes Daniel's *tessera* and *vice versa*. The poet

translates Plato's Apollonian forms for his audience as an act of *tessera*; Daniel reads this physical performance as a *daemonized* myth. Conversely, the poet's *daemonization* raises the physical into the mythical, but this mythical Bacchant is read by Daniel through *tessera* as a physical actor. This *enantiodromia* depends on a change in perspective: from the worldly to the divine, from the below to the above, and from the reader to the writer. Consequently, Plato's divine realm of forms may be considered Apollonian from below, but also Dionysian from above, because a Dionysian coincidence of life and form would result in personal destruction; similarly, the polar world of chaos may be considered Dionysian from above, but also Apollonian from below because of the illusion of appearance and reality. This process of *enantiodromia* shows that, considered in isolation, Apollo can turn into his opposite, Dionysus, and *vice versa*; moreover, as Daniel states at the very beginning of his description, to focus on the actor on the stage either as a person or a text is to see their illusory combination ('Als mir das offenbar wurde, schwand das Gesicht, und ich sah wieder unentzweit den Vorgang des Theaters', MBW 1, 226), pre-empting Buber's later fears of *unio mystica* as a hypostasis of dialogue to the point where it leads to the destruction of the individual. In addition, the inchoate moment that is retained through *tessera* and *daemonization* also allows for the tension and distinction necessary for the reciprocity of dialogue: each artist is able to distance and encounter another artist in an inchoate moment that they both are and represent, in body and soul, as text and person, as reader and writer. This becomes especially clear in the figure of the poet, who is absent, but whose creation is nonetheless brought to life by the interpretations of the actor and Daniel. In fact, this happens at every level, where a supposedly higher artist interprets a lower one or, by the same token, a strong ephebe renders a precursor weak: from Daniel through the poet, down to the actor and the Bacchant, and finally back to Dionysus, who, crucially and paradoxically, also represents the top. Far from being monologic as he goes on to fear, Buber's mysticism is in fact dialogic, creating an encounter between artists, who are

both aiming to be strong but inescapably ephebic, in an inchoate moment that must constantly be renewed: 'In der Verwandlung gelöst, geläutert, verklärt verwirklicht er den Helden in immer neuer Erstmaligkeit mit seiner Seele wie mit seinem Leibe' (MBW 1, 227). Based on the mythical encounter between Orpheus and Dionysus, this chain of influence ultimately goes back to the author himself and his ephebic relationship with his own precursor, Nietzsche.

ICH UND DU: GOD AS DIONYSUS IN BUBER'S DIALOGUE

The traditional trajectory of Buber's career holds that *Daniel* is one of the final expressions of Buber's mysticism; dialogue, as a turning away from the self towards other people, begins to develop in 'Religion als Gegenwart' with the introduction of God as a separate presence, then reaches its first fully-fledged expression in the seminal *Ich und Du*. Even in the light of Buber's theist turn away from Dionysus in *Daniel* to a new conception of the divine, reading Buber's dialogue as anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche suggests a conceptual and psychological continuity between mysticism and dialogue. The antithesis between the new philosophy of dialogue and the counterpoint of monologue, to which Buber also assigns his former mystical philosophy (albeit tellingly as an overabundance of dialogue), is in fact a recapitulation of realisation and experience. *Ich und Du* sets out the essential duality of humanity and its new dichotomy, dialogue and monologue, in its first paragraph:

> Die Welt ist dem Menschen zwiefältig nach seiner zwiefältigen Haltung
>
> Die Haltung des Menschen ist zwiefältig nach der Zwiefalt der Grundworte, die er sprechen kann.
>
> Die Grundworte sind nicht Einzelworte, sondern Wortpaare.
>
> Das eine Grundwort ist das Wortpaar Ich-Du.
>
> Das andre Grundwort ist das Wortpaar Ich-Es; wobei, ohne Änderung des Grundwortes, für Es auch eins der Worte Er und Sie eintreten kann.
>
> Somit ist auch das Ich des Menschen zwiefältig.
>
> Denn das Ich des Grundworts Ich-Du ist ein Andres als das des Grundworts Ich-Es (W I, 79).

Buber posits two types of relation, I-It (*Ich-Es*) and I-You (*Ich-Du*, often translated as I-Thou). When the individual relates to the world by tacitly addressing it as I-It, it is given spatiotemporal form: 'Die Eswelt hat Zusammenhang im Raum und in der Zeit' (W I, 100; repeated verbatim W I, 146). In the I-You relation, however, the world is experienced simply in its otherness, that is, in the fact that it is both not I and beyond conceptual form:

> Wer Du spricht, hat kein Etwas zum Gegenstand. Denn wo Etwas ist, ist anderes Etwas, jedes Es grenzt an andere Es, Es ist nur dadurch, daß es an andere grenzt. Wo aber Du gesprochen wird, ist kein Etwas. Du grenzt nicht (W I, 80).

All I-You relations cross in the Eternal You, Buber's new dialogic sublime in the form of God: 'Die verlängerten Linien der Beziehung schneiden sich im ewigen Du. […] Es vollendet sich einzig in der unmittelbaren Beziehung zu dem Du, das seinem Wesen nach nicht Es werden kann'. (W I, 128). Insofar as Buber's dialogue posits the relationship with God as a process of distancing and encounter, it retains the same process of *tessera* and *daemonization* that we saw in *Daniel* in the eponymous hero's reciprocal meeting with the absent poet and, by extension, between Orpheus and Dionysus. It could almost be asserted that the main difference between mysticism and dialogue, apart from the historical and biographical pressures that prompted Buber's apparent change in direction, is that his anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche is now also directed towards his former self, which would not only be a corroboration of Buber's anxiety of influence in *Daniel*, but also slightly incorrect: at every point in his career, Buber laments his perpetually prior enthrallment to Nietzsche, whether in *Begegnung*, 'Zarathustra' or, even earlier, in Eliasberg's anecdote, when the teenaged Buber, in a moment of juvenile bravado towards a younger friend, claims to have outgrown Nietzsche.[110]

[110] Eliasberg, Ahron, 'Aus Martin Bubers Jugendzeit', *Blätter des Heine-Bundes*, 1 (1928), 1-5; quoted in Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue*, pp. 88-89, and in MBW 1, 308.

Buber's post-dialogic reflections on mysticism

In *Ich und Du*, Buber distances himself from his former mysticism: 'Ich weiß nicht von einem allein, sondern von zweierlei Geschehnis, darin man keiner Zweiheit mehr gewahr wird. Die Mystik vermengt sie zuweilen in ihrer Rede; auch ich habe es einst getan', (W I, 135). Rather than drawing a distinction with his mystical thought as expressed in *Daniel*, Buber's statement that he himself was unable to see the duality necessary for dialogue in fact recalls Daniel's interaction with the actor, who is both a Bacchant and a physical person at the same time. Moreover, the statement may be read as an example of post-dialogic Buber's anxiety of influence towards his pre-dialogic self, applying the very same techniques of distancing and encounter in a chain that leads back through Orpheus, Dionysus and, in the case of Buber himself, Nietzsche.

Buber's anxiety of influence towards his former self becomes clear in his discussion of *unio mystica* in the sixth lecture of 'Religion als Gegenwart', which he gave on 26 February 1922: 'Das, was man in der Mystik zumeist Vereinigung, Unio nennt, bedeutet [...] eine Hypostasierung der reinen Beziehung'.[111] Asked about the meaning of *unio mystica* at the end of the lecture, Buber clarifies, 'Unio, das meint jene seltsame wirklich randhafte Übersteigerung der Du-Beziehung, wo die Beziehung selbst, ihre Einheit so ungeheuer stark, vehement gelebt wird, daß ihre Glieder zu verblassen, abzusterben scheinen'.[112] Without the counterpoint of the I-It relation, Buber sees mysticism as an excess of I-You; his apparent innovation is to bring them back into balance. Reading these statements as anxiety of influence towards his own, supposedly mystical self, however, Buber has reinterpreted his former thought simultaneously through *tessera* and *daemonization*. Buber's *tessera* is evident in the way that, in mysticism, the I-You that has yet to be named as such has been pushed to its ideal extreme, as a perfect, all-encompassing union; dialogue, by contrast, retains the separation

[111] Buber, 'Religion als Gegenwart', p. 118.
[112] Buber, 'Religion als Gegenwart', p. 123.

necessary in the real, spatiotemporal world. At the same time, the consequence of Buber's *tessera* is that the mystical suddenly becomes physical and mortal, and begins to pale and die; dialogue instead remains in touch with the divine in the form of the Eternal You, a *daemonization* of Buber's former mysticism. The consequences of this are twofold. First, the way in which an overabundance of dialogue becomes monologue reflects the *enantiodromia* that we saw in *Daniel*: when *tessera* or *daemonization* happen independently, they become separated and, paradoxically, combined by being indistinguishably monologic; however, when they happen simultaneously, able to distance and encounter his own thought through dialogue. Second, Buber's anxiety of influence towards his former self reflects the need for self-renewal that *Daniel* and *Ich und Du* continue to share. In the preface to his translation of *Daniel*, Maurice Friedman records how Buber will later say,

> This is an early book, in which there is already expressed the great duality of human life, but only in its cognitive and not yet in its communicative and existential character. This book is obviously a book of transition to a new kind of thinking and must be characterised as such.[113]

From this perspective, Buber goes some way at least to imitate Nietzsche's own practice of self-criticism, although Buber certainly appears to be more gentle with himself than the seemingly emotional Nietzsche, who ranges from complete self-denial when he writes 'heute ist es mir ein unmögliches Buch' (KSA 1, 14) of *Die Geburt der Tragödie* in his retrospective 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', to the hubristic when, in *Ecce Homo*, he already compares himself to Jesus in the title and writes on the subjects of 'Warum ich so weise bin', 'Warum ich so klug bin' and 'Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe'.

The anxiety that Buber appears to feel towards his own mysticism not only originates indirectly with Nietzsche, the precursor in Buber's ephebic *Daniel*; Nietzsche's presence also continues directly in a number of dialogic texts, not least in 'Was ist der Mensch?'. First of all,

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[113] Friedman, 'Translator's Preface', in Martin Buber, *Daniel: Dialogues on Realization*, trans. by Friedman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. ix; quoted in Koren, 'Between Buber's *Daniel* And His *I and Thou*', p. 169. Cf. Schaeder, *Martin Buber*, p. 91.

the Buber's qualification of Nietzsche as a mystic of the Enlightenment, which distances the precursor as both too rational and too irrational through *tessera* and *daemonization* respectively. Second is the way in which Buber responds to Nietzsche's declaration through his own prophet, Zarathustra, that God is dead ('Dieser alte Heilige hat in seinem Walde noch Nichts davon gehört, dass Gott todt ist!', KSA 4, 14). In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber takes up this phrase specifically as an instance not only of Nietzsche's loneliness, but also of being irrevocably monologic:

> Wenn der einsam gewordene Mensch zu dem »toten« bekannten Gott nicht mehr »du« sagen kann, kommt alles darauf an, ob er es noch zu dem lebenden unbekannten dadurch sagen kann, daß er mit seinem ganzen Wesen zu einem lebenden bekannten anderen Menschen »du« sagt (W I, 365).

Buber laments that, by declaring the death of God, the Nietzschean individual also loses the ability to relate to another living person. However, this statement, too, can be read as an example of both *tessera* and *daemonization*: Nietzsche has killed the God of philosophy, who can be known; for Nietzsche, this is a simultaneous moment of *tessera* towards his own source of inspiration, because he has swept away idealism and replaced it with lived experience, but also of *daemonization*, because life has been made divine as a result. Buber's reading of Nietzsche is exactly the same but in reverse: as an act of *tessera*, Buber's Nietzsche is still within the framework of the old, philosophical God because he has been unable to find life in the form of another person; and as an act of *daemonization*, because Nietzsche remains similarly mortal and dying, whereas through this meeting with another individual, Buber's dialogue encounters God. Buber's suggestion that Nietzsche, through his declaration of the death of God, is irreconcilably lonely perhaps finds some evidence in the 'Vorrede' to *Also sprach Zarathustra*: Zarathustra, for instance, talks to his own heart ('Endlich aber verwandelte sich sein Herz, — und eines Morgens stand er mit der Morgenröthe auf, trat vor die Sonne hin und sprach zu ihr also', KSA 4, 11). However, Buber perhaps underplays Zarathustra's love of humanity ('Zarathustra will wieder Mensch werden', KSA 4, 12); 'Ich liebe die Menschen', KSA 4, 13), which is contrasted with the misanthropic views of an aged holy man ('Jetzt liebe

ich Gott: die Menschen liebe ich nicht. Der Mensch ist mir eine zu unvollkommene Sache. Liebe zum Menschen würde mich umbringen', KSA 4, 13). When Buber writes, '[F]ür Nietzsche ist das Problem des Menschen ein *Rand*problem, das Problem eines Wesens, das aus dem Innern der Natur an ihren äußersten Rand geraten ist, an das gefährliche Ende des natürlichen Seins, [...] der schwindelerregende Abgrund des Nichts beginnt' (W I, 349), Buber rightly picks up on the problem of man as transition rather than being ('[W]as geliebt werden kann am Menschen, das ist, dass er ein Übergang und ein Untergang ist' (KSA 4, 17); however, he again underplays this *katabasis* as worldliness ('Ich liebe Den, welcher arbeitet und erfindet, dass er dem Übermenschen das Haus baue und zu ihm Erde, Thier und Pflanze vorbereite: denn so will er seinen Untergang', KSA 4, 17; 'Ich liebe Den, welcher die Zukünftigen rechtfertigt und die Vergangenen erlöst: denn er will an den Gegenwärtigen zu Grunde gehen', KSA 4, 18). Nietzsche's house that is in the process of being built as a momentary residence for an individual that is both in transition and in decline, represents a necessary *tessera* and *daemonization* of the inchoate moment; it pre-empts the house that Buber builds for man in 'Was ist der Mensch?'.

The aesthetics of dialogue

The persistence of Nietzsche's influence in Buber's dialogue is tangible not only in continuation of mysticism's psychological distancing through *tessera* and *daemonization*; *Ich und Du* also recreates the aesthetic chain of influence in *Daniel* to encounter God as an artist. Buber's dialogic thought retain a sense of Romantic duality and longing:

> Solcher Art ist das Verlangen derer, die, vom dem Schauder des Schrankenlosen angefaßt oder von dem Blick des Widerspruchs getroffen, sich nur bewahren wollen. Ihr Wesen ist reif geworden zum Erkennen, das Mysterium hat sich ihnen geöffnet, aber sie rüsten sich nicht, ihm standzuhalten. Das Irrationale ängstigt sie; statt es zu realisieren, es mit der ganzen Kraft des Augenblicks ins Erlebnis aufzunehmen, trachten sie nur danach, ihre Sicherheit zu behüten (W I, 209).

As in his mystical phase, Buber still speaks in romantic terms of the longing for unity in the face of the infinite. Moreover, the terminology of mysticism and *Daniel* appears to continue

unabated. The words direction, realisation, orientation and experience all make an appearance, while relation is predicated on duality, just like when Daniel views the actor playing the Bacchant on stage: 'Aber ein Augenblick kommt, und er ist nah, da sieht der schaudernde Mensch auf und sieht in einem Blitz beide Bilder auf einmal. Und ein tieferer Schauder erfaßt ihn' (W I, 127). The response, as was the case with Orpheus in *Daniel*, is direction: 'Und vielleicht weiß er die Richtung doch, ganz unten, mit dem ungeliebten Wissen der Tiefe, die Richtung der Umkehr, die über das Opfer führt. Aber er verwirft dieses Wissen; das »Mystische« hält der elektrischen Sonne nicht stand' (W I, 167). Here, Buber is attempting to make a distinction between the direction of mysticism, that is, Orpheus' turning toward Dionysus, and the direction of dialogue. The mystical approach, disparagingly placed between quotation marks, is unable to do justice to the glory of the sun. However, Buber's attempts prove to be unsuccessful through the anxiety of influence. As an image, the sun, sometimes considered a symbol of Apollo, is a metaphor for the sublime: when it shines, its presence is seen everywhere, but looking directly at it results in blindness. Dialogue, conversely, distances and encounters this sublime through *tessera* and *daemonization*: *tessera* because mysticism's sun is an ideal that has proven to be electric and false; and *daemonization* because the real sun shines on in dialogue.

The mature Buber tries to distance himself from a purely aesthetic worldview on numerous occasions, not least when he establishes a hierarchy of aesthetics, ethics and religion in 'Religion als Gegenwart'. In the second of these lectures, Buber asserts not only the independence of religion but also its dominance over art, ethics and science, three approaches that have been used to explain and therefore reduce religion, in the nascent terminology of *Ich und Du*, from the realm of I-You to I-It. Buber explains that the difference between art and religion is that, while both designate action under a mandate, art strives to come into being, whereas religion is already pre-existent:

> Anders der Auftrag, dem die religiöse Konzeption entspringt. So anders dieser Auftrag, daß hier nicht mehr von einer in diesem menschlichen Sinn gefaßten Schöpfung, geschweige denn von einer in diesem allzu menschlichen Sinn gefaßt freien Schöpfung die Rede sein kann.[114]

The influence of Kierkegaard, whom Buber regards as a partial correction to Nietzsche's philosophy in *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, is palpable in the separation of experience into the aesthetic, ethic and religious. Nevertheless, what Buber dismisses here is a monologic view of the aesthetic, where creation is only simply the result of an isolated, original and entirely uninfluenced genius; the dialogic conception of the religious encounter with God, however, imitates the reciprocal relationship between Daniel and the absent poet, between aesthetic appreciation and creation.

Nietzsche's influence in the aesthetics of *Ich und Du* comes to the fore in three main ways. First, Buber compares dialogue with music:

> Und zum dritten, über Geist der Erkenntnis und Geist der Kunst erhöht, weil hier der vergängliche körperhafte Mensch sich nicht dem dauernderen Stoff einzubilden braucht, sondern ihn überdauernd selber als Gebild, von der Musik seiner lebendigen Rede umrauscht, am Sternenhimmel des Geistes aufgeht: das reine Wirken, die Handlung ohne Willkür. Hier erschien dem Mensch aus tieferem Geheimnis das Du, sprach ihn aus dem Dunkel selber an, und er antwortete mit seinem Leben (W I, 105).

This particular passage ends with characteristically Nietzschean dithyrambs ('O einsames Angesicht sternhaft im Dunkel, o lebendiger Finger auf einer unempfindlichen Stirn, o verhallender Schritt!', W I, 106). Just as in 'Religion als Gegenwart,' the dialogic relation, classified as religious because ultimately it encounters God, is given a privileged position above the ethic, represented here by the spirit of knowledge, and the aesthetic, represented by the spirit of art. The mortal person aims for, but cannot reach, the eternal realm; however, like the actor on Daniel's stage, this person turns himself or herself into the image of the mythical Bacchant and, at once, becomes an actual Bacchant. What this actor achieves is pure action, also described as acting without arbitrariness, the direct opposite of Schopenhauer's aesthetic liberation from the will. This description echoes Daniel's Orpheus encountering Dionysus, not

[114] Buber, 'Zweiter Vortrag: 22. Januar 1922', in Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"*, pp. 58-69 (p. 59).

least because the mortal addresses God with the music of living dialogue. Moreover, the word 'umrauscht' suggests, beyond its onomatopoeic qualities, the intoxication by, and the submission to, Dionysus. Consequently, the mortal distances the eternal through *tessera*, as well as his own mortality through *daemonization*, in order to encounter the Eternal You within the darkness of the abyss.

The second way in which Nietzsche's aesthetics persists is in Buber's conception of God as a poet:

> Wenn wir ein Gedicht wirklich aufnehmen, wissen wir von dem Dichter nur das, was wir daraus von ihm erfahren – keine biographische Weisheit taugt zur reinen Aufnahme des Aufzunehmenden: das Ich, das uns angeht, ist das Subjekt dieses einzigen Gedichts. Wenn wir aber in der gleichen getreuen Weise andre Gedichte dieses Dichters lesen, schließen sich ihre Subjekte doch in all ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit, einander ergänzend und bestätigend, zu dem einen polyphonen Dasein der Person zusammen (W I, 188).

This recalls Daniel's encounter with the poet behind the play that was being staged. There, too, the poet was physically absent, yet Daniel was able to encounter him or her through the poem that he or she had created. In *Daniel* as in *Ich und Du*, the reception of the work of art, whether play or poem, becomes a metaphor for the encounter with another person in his or her multiplicity; the fact that, in either case, both artist and art work are physically absent, makes this metaphor particularly apt for the encounter with God.

The third aspect of Nietzsche's aesthetic influence is the way in which the I-You relationship, between God as a poet and the music of dialogue, is compared with a work of art as an inchoate moment between aesthetic appreciation and creation. In *Ich und Du*, Buber describes how all art is originally form that wants to become work: 'Das ist der ewige Ursprung der Kunst, daß einem Menschen Gestalt gegenübertritt und durch ihn Werk werden will. Keine Geburt seiner Seele, sondern Erscheinung, die an sie tritt und von ihr die wirkende Kraft erheischt' (W I, 83-84). Consequently, the work of art does not arise from the monologic genius of the artist, but in dialogue with the outside world. The form that the artist encounters is an appearance that cannot be experienced or described, but only brought to life, a clear

transposition of the language of *Daniel* and realisation: 'Die Gestalt, die mir entgegentritt, kann ich nicht erfahren und nicht beschreiben; nur verwirklichen kann ich sie' (W I, 84). Through constant effort on the part of the artist to prevent the artwork from returning to the world of monologue, eternal form is retained: '[D]as Werk duldet nicht, wie Baum und Mensch, daß ich in der Entspannung der Es-Welt einkehre, sondern es waltet: – diene ich ihm nicht recht, so zerbricht es, oder es zerbricht mich' (W I, 84). These lines also emphasise the liminal position that Buber's dialogue attempts to describe: without contact with formlessness, the artwork either breaks into monologue itself or breaks the artist, a reiteration of the problem of *unio mystica* in 'Religion als Gegenwart', where the hypostasis of You threatens to eliminate the individual. The artist's act of realisation is simultaneously an act of revelation: 'Indem ich verwirkliche, decke ich auf. Ich führe die Gestalt hinüber – in die Welt des Es. Das geschaffene Werk ist ein Ding unter Dingen, als eine Summe von Eigenschaften erfahrbar und beschreibbar. Aber dem empfangend Schauenden kann es Mal um Mal leibhaft gegenübertreten' (W I, 85). Becoming flesh, the artwork is a glimpse of the eternal in the physical realm: 'Es »verkörpert sich«: sein Leib steigt aus der Flut der raum- und zeitlosen Gegenwart und an das Ufer des Bestands' (W I, 87).

Buber's concept of form in *Ich und Du* reiterates Orpheus' musical response to Dionysus in *Daniel*. Buber criticises monologue as focusing too much on the divine, a moment of *tessera*, or the divine, a moment of *daemonization*. In realising form, the artist raises the human world to the level of the divine, without letting it be reduced to an unrealisable ideal: 'So auch die Kunst: Im Schauen eines Gegenüber erschließt sich dem Künstler die Gestalt. Er bannt sie zum Gebilde. Das Gebilde steht nicht in einer Götterwelt, sondern in dieser großen Welt der Menschen' (W I, 105). What Buber seeks is the inchoate moment of physical and spiritual, not where they have become one in a monologic moment of *enantiodromia*, but where they are momentarily simultaneous: 'Gestalt ist Mischung auch von Du und Es. Sie kann in

Glauben und Kult zum Gegenstand erstarren; aber aus der Essenz der Beziehung, die in ihr fortlebt, wird sie immer wieder zur Gegenwart' (W I, 158). This happens in the simultaneous creation and reception, reception and creation of the artwork that Buber describes in the chain of influence both in *Daniel* and in *Ich und Du*. In this way, the artwork recalls Buber's Orpheus in *Daniel*, the disciple of Apollo who creates sublime music in the face of Dionysian destruction. Buber's artist, as a model of dialogue, is the romantic artist, who is a genius not in the sense of monologic creation *ex nihilo*, but in turning towards the world of multiplicity and Dionysus.

3 – 'AUS DEM GEIST DER JÜDISCHEN MYSTIK': NIETZSCHE AND MYTH IN BUBER'S EARLY WORK ON JUDAISM

Caught between two separate traditions, between opposing forces within those traditions, and between the decision to resist or assimilate, German-Jewish writers and thinkers were particularly sensitive to the challenge of modernity in the early twentieth century. The Enlightenment drive for reason against irrationality played out in Jewish circles in the form of the *Haskalah*, the Jewish Enlightenment, pitching Hermann Cohen and rational religion on one side, and Jewish myth on the other.[115] The *Haskalah* also had historiographical implications: with German historical thinking, from Hegel through to Leopold von Ranke, following an historicist route that created an inalienable Christian myth for the German nation, contemporary Jewish thinkers were left with the question of resisting or competing with their own form of myth.[116] The often anti-Semitic tension that arose out of these debates over the nature of Jewish identity also had political implications: Theodor Herzl, the Jewish inheritor of the European age of nationalism, responded with the direct, *Realpolitik* route of establishing a Jewish homeland that became known as political Zionism; this movement was opposed by the cultural Zionism of Ahad Ha'am, whose resistance to assimilation advocated a gradual aesthetic reacquaintance with Jewish tradition. In the words of David Ohana, Jewish modernism, like most forms of modernism, constitutes a simultaneous destruction of the past while engaging with tradition.[117]

[115] See *The Seductiveness of Jewish Myth: Challenge or Response?*, ed. by S. Daniel Breslauer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).
[116] David N. Myers, *Resisting History: Historicism and Its Discontents in German Jewish Thought* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003).
[117] David Ohana, *Modernism and Zionism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

In the face of modernity, Buber becomes increasingly cultural, irrationalist and romanticist in his work on Jewish art and culture in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. This chapter argues that Buber's interest in myth in his early work on Judaism is a continuity of his anxiety of influence towards Jewish tradition and Nietzsche, and that this represents a gradual progression towards dialogue during Buber's supposedly mystical phase. Both these aspects become apparent in the extent to which Buber is able to posit and actualise his German-Jewish audience as the figure of the Bacchant in *Daniel*. The Bacchant, who represents the simultaneity of the sensual and divine, of the physical and the mythical, embodies anxiety of influence insofar as he distances and encounters the precursor, in this case Dionysus, through the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*. The figure of the German Jew is like the Bacchant insofar as they encounter Jewish as well as German tradition in the same way in order to maintain their artistic independence.

By focusing on the figure of the German Jew as Bacchant, Buber's progression towards dialogue within his supposedly mystical phase appears to separate into three distinct phases: his work on the Jewish renaissance, his translation and anthologisation of Hasidic tales, and his *Reden über das Judentum*. In Buber's work on the Jewish renaissance, Buber prepares the ground for an aesthetic renewal based on the Bacchic figure of the German Jew, yet remains theoretical and unable to distinguish himself from his audience as ephebe. In his translation and anthologisation of the Hasidic tales, the next step towards dialogue, Buber becomes a Bacchic artist in his own right, mediating between Yiddish and German, tradition and modernity, but still fails to view his audience in the same way. Only in his *Reden über das Judentum*, where Buber directly addresses and actualises his German-Jewish audience as distinct yet similarly Bacchic individuals, does Buber achieve dialogue with his interlocutors.

NIETZSCHE AND BUBER ON MYTH IN THE GERMAN CONTEXT

George Williamson writes that theories of myth in German literature at the turn of the twentieth century go back to the Romantics, and specifically to Herder and Schelling.[118] Herder classifies myth as a poetic form of writing that pertains to some form of religious belief. Schelling adds that this writing arises out of the spirit of a people as if written by a single poet. Nietzsche's contribution, while retaining myth as the expression of culture, is to see in Greek myth not the signs of a superior culture *per se*, but one that transcends the boundaries of national identity. This forms part of Nietzsche's cultural criticism (*Kulturkritik*), which seeks to rejuvenate contemporary culture through a transvaluation of all values (*Umwertung aller Werte*). Nietzsche's genealogical method deconstructs preconceived cultural ideas in order to uncover eternal aesthetic forces; these forces, so Nietzsche claims, reject any form of abstraction and instead insist on the concrete.

Nietzsche's transvaluation finds an aesthetic expression in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and an ethical expression in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, no precise definition of myth is given, although the text posits Apollo and Dionysus as basic aesthetic and mythical forces.[119] Greek myth maintains the tension between life and spirit through tragedy, which depicts Apollo, the semblance of form giving way to Dionysus, the reality of formlessness, through the death of the tragic hero. *Die Geburt der Tragödie* laments that contemporary culture has lost touch with myth: 'Ohne Mythus aber geht jede Cultur ihrer gesunden schöpferischen Naturkraft verlustig: erst ein mit Mythen umstellter Horizont schliesst eine ganze Culturbewegung zur Einheit ab' (KSA 1, 145). Contemporary culture has not recovered from the imbalance of Apollo, which Nietzsche attributes to the overly rational

[118] George S. Williamson, *The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 1-18, esp. pp. 1-2.
[119] Jörg Salaquarda, 'Mythos bei Nietzsche', in *Philosophie und Mythos: Ein Kolloquium*, ed. by Hans Poser (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), pp. 174-198 (p. 179).

scholarly traditions of Socratism and Alexandrism that mistake the abstract form as reality itself, a tradition that carries on into contemporary scholarship (*Wissenschaft*): 'das ist die Gegenwart, als das Resultat jenes auf Vernichtung des Mythus gerichteten Sokratismus' (KSA 1, 146). Nietzsche's aesthetic project in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* is to revive the tension between life and spirit in contemporary culture through tragic myth, where Dionysus dispels the fair-seeming narrative of Apollo; and to reacquaint the contemporary artist with the Dionysian primordial will (*dionysischer Urwille*).

The development of Nietzsche's engagement between the physical and metaphysical realm tend to into three main periods: early, middle and late.[120] The early period encompasses everything up to and including *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, the late period everything from *Also sprach Zarathustra* onwards. The middle period is characterised by an increased interest in positivism and science, the late period by a return to the metaphysics of his earlier writings through concepts such as the *Übermensch*, eternal recurrence and the will to power. This development also appears to demonstrate the continuity of a tension. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche advocates the *tesseratic* return from Apollonian illusion to Dionysian reality, yet this is concurrent with a *daemonizing* artistic Dionysian will. Similarly, Nietzsche's cultural criticism continues to deal with the balance between life and spirit in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, but in terms of ethics. In the first treatise, '„Gut und Böse", „Gut und Schlecht"', Nietzsche distinguishes between two ethical systems, one that relates the negative pole to 'bad' (*schlecht*) and the other to 'evil' (*böse*). In Nietzsche's account, the strong would term everything that would help them 'good' and everything else 'bad'. The good of the strong values directness, individuality and physicality. However, the weak, suffering from envy and resentment (*Ressentiment*), instituted a slave revolt. In an example of *enantiodromia*, they

[120] See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*.

reversed the values of the strong and turned all that is good into evil, longing for a world beyond where they would not be so weak. Nietzsche terms this slave morality (*Sklavenmoral*).

Myth is an important part of Buber's oeuvre, whose Nietzschean influence has not gone unnoticed.[121] Gershom Scholem and Micha Josef Berdichevsky criticise Buber for his work on myth. Scholem distances himself from the neo-romantics, Buber and Berdichevsky, when he writes,

> Alongside his analysis of mysticism as a social factor in Judaism, Buber developed a no less keen interest in its mythical foundations which related to a change in appreciating the vital nature of myth. This change of assessment, common to many of Buber's generation, was the result of Nietzsche's influence.[122]

Berdichevsky objects to Buber's use of the word myth to describe Hasidic tales.[123] Scholem is not alone in acknowledging the Nietzschean aspect of these myths. Other critics have focused on the artistic solipsism that is common to both Nietzsche and Buber: Mendes-Flohr, who also identifies Nietzsche's cultural criticism and transvaluation of values as essential ingredients, writes that Buber was 'inspired by Zarathustra's lonely quest for a life of integrity, disciplined passion and creativity'; Golomb highlights Nietzsche's 'aristocratic individualism' as the crucial point where his influence on Buber ends; and David Ohana sees the end of Buber's reception of Nietzsche in the *Drei Reden*.[124]

In 'Der Mythos der Juden', Buber defines myth as divinity experienced as sensual reality ('Mythos bedeutet: ein Bericht von göttlichem Geschehen als einer sinnlichen

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[121] Friedman, *Martin Buber*, ch. 24, 'Symbol, Myth, and History', pp. 225-238; S. Daniel Breslauer, *Martin Buber on Myth: An Introduction* (New York; London: Garland, 1990); and Groiser, 'Einleitung', MBW 2.1, 11-59. See also Laurence J. Silberstein, 'Modes of Discourse in Modern Judaism: The Buber-Scholem Debate Reconsidered', *Soundings*, 71 (1988), 657–681; and David Ohana, *Modernism and Zionism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), ch. 1, 'The Myth of Zarathustra: Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem and the Nationalisation of Jewish Myth', pp. 29-79.

[122] Gershom Scholem, *Od Davar* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1989), p. 383; quoted in Ohana, 'Zarathustra in Jerusalem: Nietzsche and the "New Hebrews"', *Israel Affairs*, 1 (1995), 38-60. See also David Biale, *Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), ch. 2, 'Mysticism', pp. 35-50, and Klaus Davidowicz, *Gershom Scholem und Martin Buber* (Neukirchen, Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1998).

[123] S. Daniel Breslauer, 'Introduction', in *The Seduction of Jewish Myth: Challenge or Response?*, ed. by S. Daniel Breslauer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 1-8 (p. 3). See also William Cutter, 'The Buber and Berdyczewski Correspondence', *Jewish Social Studies*, 6 (2000), 160-204.

[124] Mendes-Flohr, 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', p. 241; Golomb, 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'; Ohana, *Modernism and Zionism*, ch. 1, pp. 29-79.

Wirklichkeit', JuJ, p. 76). As an expression of an inchoate moment when life and spirit meet, therefore, myth becomes a medium for dialogue as an anxiety of influence, where Jewish tradition as precursor is distanced and encountered through *tessera* and *daemonization* by the ephebe, in this case Buber's German-Jewish audience or Buber himself. The link between anxiety and dialogue in Buber's work on Jewishness may be briefly demonstrated in two essays, 'Das Gestaltende' (1912) and 'Renaissance und Bewegung' (1916). 'Das Gestaltende' deals with the aesthetic principles at work in Jewishness. Buber writes, 'Denn jener Gegensatz und Widerstreit des Gestaltenden und des Gestaltlosen, das war, so furchtbar sie sich auch zuzeiten darstellen mochte, die Gesundheit des Judentums. Seine Krankeit im Golus, das ist die Ohnmacht und die Entfremdung der Gestaltenden', MBW 3, 264). Here Buber emphasises the polarity inherent in German-Jewish identity. This polarity, a central theme in Buber's *Daniel*, is expressed aesthetically through the representation of form and formlessness, and physically as well as culturally through the imagery of sickness and health. Not only does this passage bear echoes of Nietzsche's cultural criticism, let alone Apollo and Dionysus, but it continues the discourse of Buber's 'Zarathustra', where sickness served as a metaphor for the anxiety of influence. Here the ephebe, Buber, distanced himself from, and paradoxically encountered, his precursor, Nietzsche, through *tessera* and *daemonization*: *tessera* because the precursor is too ideal or, in other words, the sickness is idealism itself; and *daemonization* precisely because the precursor is sick and human. In this particular case, the ephebe's Nietzschean anxiety is expressed towards Jewish tradition itself: through the process of assimilation, Buber's German-Jewish reader feels anxiety towards Jewish tradition. In this passage, there are hints of *tessera* insofar as Jewishness is healthy when it is alienated from form, yet Jewish tradition is also *daemonized* because it advocates a simultaneous return to artistic form; Jewish tradition is simultaneously too ideal and too human.

The anxiety that Buber's German-Jewish reader feels towards Jewish tradition is emphasised in 'Renaissance und Bewegung', where Buber writes,

> [W]elches kaum geahnte Rätsel einer ungeheueren Verschlossenheit hat uns dieser befreite Jude der Gesetzeära hinterlassen! Der neue Jude, der Jude der Befreiungsära, wandelte in den Wegen Spinozas, ohne Genie, aber mit einem dämonischen Wagemut. [...] Die Wiedergeburt des Juden setzt mit einer tragischen Episode ein, die noch heute nicht zu Ende ist [...]. Als die »Geistesfreiheit« aber für den Juden ein fertiges Gut geworden war, das man nur zu übernehmen brauchte, artete auch dieser Kosmopolitanismus in Assimilation aus (MBW 3, 271).

In this passage, Buber is contrasting the assimilated Jew with the freed Jew, which he also terms the new Jew or the Jew of the liberation era. The Nietzschean echoes, with its references to rebirth through tragedy, cosmopolitanism, the rejection of rationalism and genius are obvious. Additionally, in Buber's description, the new Jew becomes an ephebe by being liberated as an independent artist through *tessera* and *daemonization*: the ephebe frees himself through *tessera* from the ideal that dominates the precursor, here represented by a rabbinic Judaism obsessed with the rational rule of law; the *daemonization* comes to the fore not in the form of genius, since Buber is careful to avoid the solipsism of this word even before his dialogic phase, but through daemonic daring. In this particular instance, Spinoza takes the role of Bacchant. In cosmopolitanism, Buber attempts to preserve the tension between German and Jewish as an inchoate moment between form and formlessness; assimilation refers to homogenisation or becoming like, or similar to, everyone else, whereas cosmopolitanism ties in not only with Nietzsche's concept of the good European, but with the distinction between the last man and the *Übermensch*.[125]

[125] In *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* Nietzsche writes on the topic of 'Der europäische Mensch und die Vernichtung der Nationen', advocating the destruction of the appearance of national identity. The Good European (*Guter Europäer*), with the Jew as supranational model, will strive for this aim, whereby the whole problem of the Jews ('das ganze Problem der *Juden*') would cease to exist (KSA 2, 309-311). In addition, in the prologue to *Also sprach Zarathustra*, the eponymous prophet distinguishes between the last man (*der letzte Mensch*) and the *Übermensch* (KSA 4, 19-20): the last man represents the idea of universality, homogenisation and the destruction of individuality ('Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich', KSA 4, 19); the *Übermensch* the very pinnacle of authenticity. The ideas of resisting assimilation are reinforced by Nietzsche's call for cosmopolitanism and against homogenisation.

JEWISH RENAISSANCE: THE GERMAN JEW AS BACCHANT AND THE NEGATED SUBLIME

The version of myth that arises from Buber's involvement with, and theorising on, the Jewish renaissance at the very beginning of the twentieth century constitutes the first stage of the his transition from the anxiety of influence into dialogue. Buber reworked his theorising of the Jewish renaissance over several years and several documents, including 'Das jüdische Kulturproblem und der Zionismus' (1905), 'Renaissance und Bewegung' (1916), 'Kulturarbeit' (1917) and 'Wandlung' (1918). His first writing on the topic, however, may be found in 'Juedische Renaissance', an article published in 1901 by *Ost und West*, a monthly German-Jewish journal. At this time, Buber had already taken an active interest in the Zionist movement: in 1898 he had founded a chapter of the Zionist movement at the University of Leipzig with his friend, Ahron Eliasberg, and had represented the Agitation Committee at the Third Zionist Congress in Basel the following year. Buber was opposed to the mainstream political Zionism espoused by the movement's founder, Herzl. In his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* (1896), Herzl argued that anti-Semitism is an inescapable fact that can be avoided only by establishing a Jewish homeland.[126] In the pamphlet, Herzl opposed Zionist efforts to settle Jews in Ottoman Palestine and considered the possibility of a Jewish state in Argentina. Herzl appears to have prioritised the establishing of a Jewish state above all considerations; instead, Buber joined the ranks of the cultural Zionists. This counter-current, led by Ahad Ha'am, an alias meaning 'one of the people' or 'the people is one' of the Hebrew essayist Asher Ginsberg, insisted that an exploration of Jewish culture and of what it means to be Jewish was necessary before the establishment of any political state could be possible.

In his work on the Jewish renaissance, Buber indirectly posits the German Jew as a Bacchant. In Buber's *Daniel*, the Bacchant represents a physical actor playing a role as well as

[126] Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat: Versuch einer modernen Lösung der Judenfrage* (Leipzig and Vienna: M. Breitenstein's Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1896).

a mythical worshipper of the sublime, Dionysus; the Bacchant also becomes an ephebe, who distances and encounters an unattainable precursor through *tessera* and *daemonization*. In 'Juedische Renaissance', the German Jew as assimilated ephebe, anxious about Jewish tradition as mythical precursor, needs to distance and encounter it in order to maintain the inchoate moment of his own concrete identity, as well as his artistic independence. Buber advocates a cultural and spiritual renewal of Jewish identity that would occur within each Jewish individual ('Der äusseren Erlösung von Ghetto und Golus [...] muss eine innere vorausgehen' MBW 3, 145-146). In this way, Buber breaks down the monolith of Jewish tradition into something that the otherwise assimilated Jew can digest; it begins from the ground up, the Jewish individual and emphasises present experience. This individual transformation will then bring about a cultural regeneration ('Wir leben in einer Epoche der Kulturkeime', MBW 3, 143).

The connection with the Bacchant and, more specifically, with an anxiety of influence that is modelled on Buber's reception with Nietzsche is signalled, both here as in 'Zarathustra', through Buber's return to the discourse of sickness ('Manchen Krankheitsstoffen müssen wir entfernen, manches Hemmnis niederzwingen, bevor wir reif sind zur Wiedergeburt des Judenvolkes, welches nur ein Teilstrom ist der neuen Renaissance', MBW 3, 147), as well as through his aesthetic considerations. Buber's commitment to art becomes obvious through articles such as his tribute to the Yiddish author, I. L. Peretz, and 'Eine Section für jüdische Kunst und Wissenschaft', both published in *Die Welt*, the central organ of the Zionist movement, in 1901; and his involvement with the Jewish *Jugendstil* artist, E. M. Lilien.

The limit of Buber's nascent dialogue at this stage of his career becomes clear in two main ways: first, in his current inability to properly separate the German Jew from himself as ephebe; and second, in the recurring trope of the negated sublime. Unlike his *Reden über das Judentum*, Buber is unable to separate himself from his audience, let alone become a creative

artist *stricto sensu* in his own right.[127] Moreover, Buber is as yet unable to find a positive source of Jewish myth, as he will discover in Hasidism. Instead, Buber resorts to a negation of the present condition of exile and assimilation, which have been rendered metaphysical and ideal through the phenomena of ghetto and diaspora: Buber easily distances these phenomena through *tessera*, but the *daemonization* occurs only through their negation as prosaic and everyday phenomena.

Ghetto and diaspora

In 'Juedische Renaissance', Buber identifies the specific problems confronting the Jewish renaissance as the ghetto and the diaspora (Yiddish *golus*; Hebrew *galut*). In the following passage, the ghetto and diaspora may be read as revisionary ratios that mediate Jewish tradition:

> Ghetto und Golus, nicht die äusseren, sondern die inneren Feindesmächte dieses Namens halten es mit eisernen Fesseln zurück: Ghetto, die unfreie Geistigkeit und der Zwang einer ihres Sinnes entkleideten Tradition, und Golus, die Sklaverei einer unproduktiven Geldwirtschaft und die hohläugige Heimatslosigkeit, die allen einheitlichen Willen zersetzt (MBW 3, 145).

Each pair of anxieties, ghetto and diaspora, is itself qualified by a pair of consequences, which are dominated by the rhetoric of a negated sublime ('Geistigkeit', 'Tradition', and 'einheitlich[er] Will[e] represent the sublime, whereas 'entkleidet', 'unproduktiv' and 'zersetzt' represent their negation; 'Heimatslosigkeit' represents the negated sublime in a single word). In this way, ghetto and diaspora each represent a simultaneous moment of *tessera* and *daemonization*. Buber describes the ghetto as fettered spirituality and the force of tradition that has lost its meaning. The ghetto represents *tessera* insofar as the precursor's spirituality has been locked into hard-and-fast idealist rules; they need to brought down to earth if they are to live once more. Moreover, tradition devoid of its meaning is an oblique reference to the decadent, spiritualised rabbinate that will make an appearance in the *Drei Reden*

[127] Exceptions might include Buber's early poems, whose *Zarathustrastil* end up imitating Nietzsche, or his Hasidic tales, which in the end are simply anthologisations and translations of pre-existing work. For an anthology and translation of Buber's own poetry, see Buber, *The First Buber: Youthful Zionist Writings of Martin Buber*, ed. and trans. by Gilya G. Schmidt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999).

('Rabbinismus', MBW 3, 251) and the priestly classes who turn away from the divine spirit in *Königtum Gottes* ('In Israel führte er von der gottesstolzen Zuversicht der frühen Königsprüche zunächst zu jener ersten Gestalt der Resignation, mit der unser Richterbuch endet', W II, 687), as well as to Nietzsche's criticism of monasticism in 'Was bedeuten asketische Ideale' in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. However, by dint of the negated sublime, the ghetto also represents *daemonization*: the freed Jew is able to liberate tradition, which therefore becomes reaestheticised. The same combination of *tessera* and *daemonization* occurs with Buber's description of the diaspora. For Buber, diaspora represents economic slavery ('die Sklaverei einer unproduktiven Geldwirtschaft') and a sense of hollow-eyed homelessness ('die hohläugige Heimatslosigkeit') that stifles any form of unified will ('die allen einheitlichen Willen zersetzt'). Buber's diaspora mediates Jewish tradition through *tessera* precisely because it represents slavery to an economic and therefore abstract system. However, the *daemonization* of the diaspora is again implicit in the negated sublime of the homelessness that replaces the unified and metaphysical will, which would come into existence through the liberation of the Jew as artist.

In the phenomena of ghetto and diaspora, Buber is able to distance and encounter Jewish tradition through the simultaneity of the revisionary ratios of *tessera* and *daemonization*. At times, however, Buber appears to aim for unity and combination, rather than the simultaneity of inchoate moment. For instance, Buber writes of the Jewish renaissance, 'Sie wird den Zwiespalt zwischen Denken und Thun, die Inkongruenz von Enthusiasmus und Energie, von Sehnsucht und Opfermut aufheben und die einheitliche Persönlichkeit, die aus einer Willensglut heraus schafft, wiederherstellen' (MBW 3, 146). However, Buber's thought on the Jewish renaissance, which is entirely dependent on the assimilated German Jew, remains predicated on duality and the anxiety caused by two precursors, that is, by not being wholly part of two separate sources of tradition. In the first instance, Buber's Jewish renaissance

represents a life-bringing antidote to a perceived imbalance of pure spirituality and intellectualism within priestly and Enlightenment Judaism ('Diese Bewegung wird vor allem das einheitliche, ungebrochene Lebensgefühl des Juden wieder auf den Thron setzen. Das ist ein Losungswort gegen die reine Geistigkeit', MBW 3, 146). This *tesseratic* moment is countered, in the second instance, by the *daemonization* of a number of inherently ironic concepts that incorporate the inversion of the profane into the sublime.

Despite Buber's statement about eliminating the distinction between longing and readiness to make sacrifices ('die Inkongruenz [...] von Sehnsucht und Opfermut aufheben'), the inchoate moment comes to the fore in the trope of longing and the verb *aufheben*. Despite the obvious Nietzschean echoes of slavery and will, Buber picks up on tropes common to Jewish writing: homelessness and wandering in the desert and diaspora, to slavery in Egypt, and longing for Canaan and Zion. The hardship of the ghetto and the longing for the promised land echo Herzl's seminal *Altneuland* (1902); previous iterations of longing and wandering range from the destruction of the Second Temple and the recollection of slavery in Babylon in psalm 137 ('By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion'), to wandering in the desert and the trope of the wandering Jew. However, the longing to overcome the split between life and spirit is also an essential component of German Romanticism, let alone contemporary *Lebensphilosophie*. Longing shows the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* precisely because it is inchoate; the ephebe has not, and cannot, achieve the ideal of combining life and spirit, or Jewishness and Germanness, but strives for it nonetheless. The verb *aufheben*, which literally means 'to pick up' is normally translated as 'sublation'; in Hegel's philosophy, it is used in it both its contradictory senses of 'to eliminate' and 'to preserve' to describe the dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Buber applies this irony to the very process itself: where Hegel aims for abstract and absolute knowledge, Buber reintroduces life; in the process, both life and spirit are distanced yet encountered.

Renaissance and rebirth

Another example of the way in which Buber maintains the tension of the inchoate moment may be seen in the way that he conceives of the Jewish renaissance in both historical and mythical time. Despite competing influences, Buber's cultural diagnoses of ghetto and diaspora, and his call for an artistic transvaluation of Jewish values through the spirit and the will are distinctly Nietzschean, even though the idea of Renaissance and Renaissancism does not necessarily originate with Nietzsche.[128] A particularly pertinent theorist of renaissance for Buber and the cultural Zionists was Ahad Ha'am, although in his essay 'The transvaluation of values' he attacks the Jewish supporters of Nietzsche. The transvaluation of values and the *Übermensch*, Ahad Ha'am claims, were anticipated by the Old Testament prophets and their concept of a super nation (*ha-am ha-eliyon*); however, the prophets sought to achieve this through their commitment to a codified ethics.[129] As David Biale writes, 'Nietzsche has been 'stood on his head'.[130] In his own definition of the term renaissance, Buber refers to the *Quattrocento*, the Italian renaissance that inspires Jacob Burckhardt's writings, as a renewal of classical style of life ('Erneuerung des klassichen Lebensstils'); the renaissance that Buber is advocating, however, does not suggest a return to a previous time, but a rebirth in the present, the here and now ('Aber als man tiefer in ihre Geschichte eindrang, erkannte man, dass Renaissance nicht Rückkehr, sondern Wiedergeburt bedeutet: eine Wiedergeburt des ganzen Menschen', MBW 3, 144). Time is not seen historically as progression, but mythically in terms of the present moment ('Nein, keine Rückkehr – aber auch kein »Fortschritt« in dem [sehr langweiligen] Gebrauchssinne dieses Wortes', MBW 3, 145). The simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*

[128] See Asher Biemann, 'The Problem of Tradition and Reform in Jewish Renaissance and Renaissancism', *Jewish Social Studies*, 8 (2001), 58-87; and Biemann, 'Aesthetic Education in Martin Buber: Jewish Renaissance and the Artist', in *New Perspectives on Martin Buber*, ed. by Michael Zank (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp. 85-110.
[129] Ahad Ha'am, 'The transvaluation of values', in *Nationalism and the Jewish Ethic: The Basic Writings of Ahad Ha'am*, ed. by Hans Kohn (New York: Schocken, 1962), pp. 165-187; Seen Mendes-Flohr, 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', pp. 239-241.
[130] David Biale, *Not in the Heavens: The Tradition of Jewish Secular Thought* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 82-83.

becomes apparent: the German Jew, as a proxy for the Bacchant, lives both in the realism of the here and now, but with an eye to what is classical and even eternal.

Cosmopolitanism

Buber's concept of renaissance represents an inchoate moment where the universal meets the immediate in terms of time; his conception of nationality represents the same moment in terms of space. Buber addresses the German Jew precisely because of his relativism towards two seemingly universalist traditions, one German the other Jewish. Bernd Susser has pointed out Buber's affinities to the nationalist *völkisch* movement; this becomes readily apparent in Buber's repeated mentioning of the word 'blood' in his *Drei Reden über das Judentum*.[131] However, in this regard Buber treads a similarly fine line to the one that Nietzsche followed in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*: written in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, Nietzsche's national fervour became apparent as he saw a victory of culture over civilisation. The more mature Nietzsche, however, would distance himself from this point of view. Nevertheless, Nietzsche retains a sense that conditions in Germany were such that they could engender a universal cultural revolution:

> Aus dem dionysischen Grunde des deutschen Geistes ist eine Macht emporgestiegen, die mit den Urbedingungen der sokratischen Cultur nichts gemein hat und aus ihnen weder zu erklären noch zu entschuldigen ist, vielmehr von dieser Cultur als das Schrecklich Unerklärliche, als das Uebermächtig-Feindselige empfunden wird, die deutsche Musik (KSA 1, 127).

In 'Die jüdische Mystik', Buber would echo the altered subtitle of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, 'out of the spirit of music' ('aus dem Geiste der Musik') by advocating his own spiritual renewal 'out of the spirit of Jewish mysticism' ('aus dem Geist der jüdischen Mystik', JuJ, p. 79). The fact that this regeneration is universal not nationalist is shown by Buber's focus on beauty ('Auf der einen Seite kündigt sich eine grosse allgemeine Schönheitskultur', MBW 3,

[131] Bernd Susser, 'Ideological Multivalence: Martin Buber and the German Volkish Tradition', *Political Theory*, 5 (1977), 75-96. See also Avraham Shapira, 'Buber's Attachment to Herder and "Volkism"', *Studies in Zionism*, 14 (1993), 1-30.

143). Even when Buber writes that the culture of beauty begins with the national Jewish movement. To emphasise this point, Buber later replaces ('Diese nationale Bewegung ist die Form, in der sich die neue Schönheitskultur für unser Volk ankündigt'), it is replaced with the new human culture ('die neue menschliche Kultur') when it is edited for publication in 1916 for *Die Jüdische Bewegung* (MBW 3, 147). Despite the language of Buber's first draft of 'Juedische Renaissance', it is clear elsewhere that Buber is advocating not just a nationalist movement: 'Nicht der Besitzdrang und die territoriale Expansionskraft der Nationen will sich nun ausleben, sondern ihre individuelle Nuance' (MBW 3, 143). Buber emphasises the elimination of national and supranational boundaries when he writes, 'So sehen wir in der tiefen Einheit der Evolution allgemeine und nationale Kultur verschmelzen', a line that is replaced with the 'Einheit des Werdens' in *Die Jüdische Bewegung* (MBW 3, 143).

HASIDISM: BUBER AS POET OF JEWISH MYTH

In his work on the Jewish renaissance, Buber initially rejects Hasidism. Speaking of Jews' natural lust for life in 'Juedische Renaissance', Buber complains, '[Das Lebensgefühl der Juden] verirrte sich in krankhafte Erscheinungen, wie Chuzpe und Chassidismus' (MBW 3, 146). Buber's otherwise Nietzschean analysis of Hasidism as sick and decadent is certainly in keeping with prevailing contemporary attitudes and an expression of his own anxiety towards these newcomers: with their antiquated clothes and funny accents that became known derisively as *Mauscheldeutsch*, the Hasidim or Eastern Jews became a source of embarrassment to Jews seeking assimilation as a reminder of their Eastern roots in the *shtetl*.[132] However,

[132] See Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness, 1800-1923* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); Ritchie Robertson, 'Western Observers and Eastern Jews: Kafka, Buber, Franzos', *Modern Language Review*, 83 (1988), 87-105, and '"Urheimat Asien": The Re-orientation of German and Austrian Jews, 1900-1925', *German Life and Letters*, 49 (1996), 182-92; and Mendes-Flohr, 'Fin de Siècle Orientalism, the Ostjuden, and the Aesthetics of Jewish Self-Affirmation', in *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), pp.77-132.

Buber's attitude changes, as evidenced by the excision of the above line on Hasidism in 'Juedische Renaissance' when it comes to be revised for the first of the two volumes on *Die Jüdische Bewegung* (1916), a collection of Buber's essays from 1900 to 1915. Following Herzl's death in 1904, Buber moves away from Zionism and spends a year with his family in Florence.[133] During this time, Buber reappraises Hasidism, although even in *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* (1906), his first collection of Hasidic tales translated from Yiddish into German, the decadence rhetoric continues ('wenn nicht im Chassidismus selbst eine Zersetzung begonnen hätte, die zu der Entartung führte, in die er heute versunken ist').[134] Other publications on Hasidism include *Die Legende des Baalschem* (1908) and *Der grosse Maggid und seine Nachfolge* (1922), while Buber's interests extend to other folkloric traditions in *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang Tse* (1910), *Die Rede, die Lehre und das Lied* (1917), *Die vier Zweige des Mabinogi: Ein keltisches Sagenbuch* (1914), *Kalevala* (1914) and *Chinesische Geistes- und Liebesgeschichten* (1919). What Buber found in Hasidism was a simultaneously a primordial source and mediation of Jewish myth.

Buber's turn towards Hasidism represents the second stage in the gradual transformation of the German Jew into the Bacchant, as well as the progression of his own aesthetic and cultural theory towards dialogue. Just as in 'Zarathustra', the metaphor of sickness signifies an anxiety of influence to distance and encounter Nietzsche's influence through simultaneous *tessera* and *daemonization*. Buber's version of the Hasid becomes a simultaneous precursor as a mediator of Jewish tradition, as well as an ephebe who is distancing and encountering the indefinable, inchoate moment of Jewish culture through *tessera* and *daemonization*. In this regard, the relationship between the Hasid and Buber is akin to that between the Bacchant and the eponymous interlocutor in *Daniel*: in the same way that Daniel

[133] See Friedman, *Martin Buber and the Theater* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969).
[134] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher* (Berlin: Schocken, 1927), p. 18.

encounters both the physical actor and the worshipper of the sublime in the Bacchant on the stage, so Buber sees both the mythical and physical Jew in the Hasid. Rather than simply negating an absent sublime, Buber's progression towards dialogue is manifest in his own in artistic creation. Buber is able to pick a positive source of Jewish culture, namely his primordial and mythical version of Hasidism, rather than simply the rejection, however ironic, of certain forms of assimilation, particularly in the form of ghetto and diaspora in 'Juedische Renaissance'. Moreover, Buber is no longer just theorising about Jewish art and advocating the work of other artists, but actively becoming an artist himself. Just like the poetic voice of Goethe's 'Auf dem See', who listens to, and simply translates into words, the intangible music of nature, so Buber finds a means to translate Jewish culture while preserving the inchoate moment through *tessera* and *daemonization*. However, it is in Buber's implied audience where we discover the limits of dialogue at this point in his career. Like the Bacchant, Buber's Hasid is both precursor and ephebe. In this way, Buber has not entirely separated himself from his audience as he does when he addresses them in his *Reden über das Judentum*.

The Hasid and Hasidism

Suffering from the same Nietzschean sickness that Buber diagnoses in 'Zarathustra', the Hasid occupies a role akin to the Bacchant in Buber's *Daniel*; he is simultaneously an ephebe and precursor, whom Buber and his German-Jewish audience, in the role of Daniel, are observing. There are many influences that govern Buber's approach to Hasidism, not all of which are necessarily Nietzschean in origin. Martina Urban's extensive research on the aesthetics of renewal has shown the many influences in Buber's reception of Hasidism.[135] As Grete

[135] Martina Urban, *Aesthetics of Renewal: Martin Buber's Representation of Hasidism as Kulturkritik* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Urban, 'The Jewish Library Reconfigured: Buber and the Zionist Anthology Discourse', in *New Perspectives on Martin Buber*, ed. by Michael Zank (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp. 31-60; Urban, 'Hermeneutics of Renewal: Biblical Imagery and Tropes of Ecstatic Experience in Buber's Early Interpretation of Hasidism', *Studies in Spirituality*, 15 (2005), 1-3; Urban, 'Retelling Biblical Mythos through the Hasidic Tale: Buber's "Saul and David" and the Question of Leadership', *Modern Judaism*, 24 (2004), 59-78; Martina Urban, 'In Search of a "Narrative Anthology": Reflections on an Unpublished Buber

Schaeder's analysis shows, Buber's emphasis on humility and home means that he takes Hasidism in a fairly traditional sense.[136] Even the opposition between Hasidim and the Mitnagdim, between fervour and the rational representatives of the *Haskalah*, is not particularly controversial. What makes Buber's Hasid ephebic, however, is the way in which he, like the equally sick German Jew, distances and encounters Jewish tradition. This particular duality is highlighted in 'Die jüdische Mystik'. Buber wrote 'Die jüdische Mystik' as a general introduction to *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman*, his first anthology of Hasidic tales, in which he considers how the teaching of the Baal Shem Tov made such easy inroads into the eighteenth-century community of Yiddish-speaking Jews in Eastern Europe. The essay contains a history of Jewish mysticism that focuses on the problem of life and spirit. Buber's point of attraction to the Hasidim is their sense of the divine ('Gottesgefühl'), which Buber defines as a feeling for mystical immediacy ('einen Hang zum mystischen Unmittelbaren'), an expression *in nuce* of Buber's later definition of myth.[137] Buber's Hasid has to negotiate between myth and the Enlightenment:

> Ein gefährlicherer Gegner erstand dieser später in der Haskala, der jüdischen Aufklärungsbewegung, die im Namen des Wissens, der Zivilisation und Europas gegen den "Aberglauben" auftrat. Aber auch sie, die die Gottessehnsucht des Volkes widerlegen wollte, hätte der Bewegung, die diese Sehnsucht stillte, nicht einen Fußbreit Bodens abzuringen vermocht, wenn nicht im Chassidismus selbst eine Zersetzung begonnen hätte, die zu der Entartung führte, in die er heute versunken ist.[138]

In this passage, not only does Buber contextualise the Hasid within the European and certainly Nietzschean opposition between culture and civilisation, but he also characterises the Hasidim as decadent, degenerate and full of longing. The European Enlightenment begins around the turn of the 18th century; the *Haskalah* or Jewish Enlightenment, conversely, pitches the Baal Shem, who died in 1760, against Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Like Buber in his work on

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Manuscript', *Jewish Studies Quarterly*, 7 (2000), 252-288. On Buber's reception of Hasidism, see also Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers*, ch. 6, 'From Rationalism to Myth: Martin Buber and the Reception of Hasidism', pp. 121-138; and Katja Pourshirazi, *Martin Bubers literarisches Werk zum Chassidismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008).

[136] Schaeder, *The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber*.

[137] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 17.

[138] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 18.

the Jewish renaissance, Mendelssohn advocates a move out of the ghetto but, unlike Buber, is also for assimilation and a critical engagement with religion. Consequently, the Baal Shem and Mendelssohn represent the opposite poles of myth and rationalism in the *Haskalah*. Buber's Hasid, therefore is engaged with Enlightenment through *tessera*, but longs for the divine through *daemonization*.

While Buber's characterisation of the *Haskalah* as rationalist is by no means unusual, its contextualisation within Europe and, specifically in the dialectic between culture and civilisation, relies on the particular form of cultural criticism that Paul Mendes-Flohr also identifies as Nietzschean.[139] In Buber's work on Hasidism, Nietzsche's influence comes to the fore in several ways. Overtly, Nietzsche's influence becomes evident in the use of certain terminology that belongs to this cultural criticism, such as sickness and decadence; more profoundly, however, it becomes tangible in the continued anxiety of influence that stretches from 'Zarathustra' to *Daniel*. In general, Buber adopts Nietzsche's consideration of civilisation as static yet decadent: examples may be found in 'Kultur und Zivilisation' and in 'Der Mythos der Juden', where Buber writes, 'Die Welterkenntnis des »zivilisierten« Menschen ist getragen von der Funktion der Kausalität, von der Betrachtung der Weltvorgänge in einem empirischen Zusammenhang der Ursachen und Wirkungen' (JuJ, pp. 82-83). Nietzsche's dichotomy also has moral implications, which Buber adopts. Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral* posits the opposition of two moral systems: one that is physical and instinctual, the so-called aristocratic; the other longing for the beyond. In another instance of the inchoate moment that suggests both rupture and continuity, Buber suggests in 'Die Jüdische Mystik' that Hasidism arose as a reaction against book learning, which he ironically calls the 'spiritual aristocracy' ('Dazu kam, daß das Volk sich bisher einer durchaus unfruchtbaren, wirklichkeitsfremden, tatenlosen, aber

[139] See Mendes-Flohr, 'Nationalism as a Spiritual Sensibility: The Philosophical Suppositions of Buber's Hebrew Humanism', *The Journal of Religion*, 69 (1989), 155-168 (pp. 156-157).

nie angezweifelten "geistigen Aristokatie" von Talmudgelehrten gegenüber gesehen hatte').[140] Buber's derisory description of mainstream Judaism as spiritual aristocracy, which is very dfferent from Nietzsche's physical and instinctual *Herrenmoral*, is an example of *tessera* and *daemonization*: *tessera* becomes apparent in the way that this spirituality is described as unproductive, estranged from reality and devoid of action; *daemonization* with regard to Jewish tradition remains, however, in the way that Buber still attempts to reclaim the artist's independence ('Nun wurde es mit einem Schlage von diesem Gegensatz erlöst und auf den eigenen Wert gestellt').[141] Buber's sick Hasid is able to overcome the all-too-human divide between body and spirit, nature and metaphysics, sensual and divine; and in his duality reach the mythical heights of the artist.

Buber claims that Hasidism would not have sunk into decadence if it did not contain sickness. Indeed, Hasidism remains sick in the form, and more specifically through the mediation, of *tzadikim* ('Und so entstand aus der Seelennot des Volkes eine Institution von Mittlern, welche Zaddikim, das ist Gerechte, genannt wurde').[142] *Tzadikim*, sometimes called *Wunderrabbi*, are the mystical community leaders of Hasidic communities, and begin to mediate the personal experience of the absolute as they fall into superstitition and corruption. Mediation, the attempt to give form or security to the illusion of form, recalls Nietzsche's remarks on Socratism in *Die Geburt die Tragödie*, or on the wisest ones in the passage 'Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung' in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (KSA 4, 146-149): 'Der Zaddik machte die chassidische Gemeinde reicher an Gottessicherheit, aber ärmer an dem einzig Wertvollen: dem eigenen Suchen und Eifern'.[143] Moreover, it focuses too much on the beyond and on spirit, while overlooking life and individual longing. Buber's *tzadikim* represent a reliance on

[140] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 17.
[141] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 17.
[142] *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 18.
[143] *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 19.

mediation and form, a collapse of the inchoate moment and a consequent lack of artistic independence on the part of the Hasid *qua* Bacchant.

Translation and anthologisation

In his translation and subsequent anthologisation of the Hasidic tales, Buber takes another step towards becoming an independent, dialogic artist. As a translator, Buber is able to give aesthetic expression to the duality of the real and the ideal, the mythical encounter between the sensual and the divine, since the very act of translation assumes duality; it transposes a text from one time and space to another, and as well as translator and reader. Just as in his theorising of the Jewish renaissance, Buber proceeds from the assumption of an assimilated Jewish audience to translate these tales from Yiddish to German, the target language of assimilation. Buber's subsequent anthologisation is an attempt to give form to this formlessness. The Hasidic tales that Buber translates are mediations of this mythical meeting of the sensual and the divine, in the form of the Hasid; Buber preserves this inchoate moment by giving form through anthologisation to a text whose status as translation is indeterminate or in transition. In a letter to Samuel Horodezky, the Hebrew writer and scholar of Jewish mysticism and Hasidism, Buber expresses his wish to write a history of Jewish mysticism:

> Eine moderne Geschichte der neueren jüdischen Mystik tut uns sehr not […]. Überhaupt ist es nicht mein Zweck, neue Tatsachen zu sammeln, sondern lediglich eine neue Auffassung ihres Zusammenhanges, eine neue synthetische Darstellung der jüdischen Mystik und ihrer Schöpfungen zu geben, sowie diese Schöpfungen selbst dem europäischen Publikum in einer künstlerisch möglichst reinen Form bekannt zu machen.[144]

While Buber claims that he intends neither to add any details nor to embellish, the project's superficial conservatism is undercut by his desire to offer a synthetic representation of Hasidism. Buber wishes to adapt the material for a European audience in a form that is as pure as artistically possible. Stephen Kepnes writes that '[Buber's] task, as Gershom Scholem once pointed out in derision, was not primarily historical; it was not a process of fact gathering, but

[144] MBB I, (Buber to Horodezky, 20.7.1906).

it was hermeneutical. He aimed to present a new interpretation of the Hasidic tales of the past which would render them relevant to the crisis of the contemporary reader'.[145] In his project of anthologisation, therefore, Buber becomes a dialogic artist. He is creating a history of mysticism for an assimilated German-Jewish audience. On the one hand, Buber, like his Bacchant in *Daniel*, counters the historical and rationalist current of the Jewish and European Enlightenment, and embodies Jewish myth and mysticism as an act of *tessera*; on the other, he gives it artistic and divine form, an act of *daemonization*. Consequently, Buber's assimilated and assumedly civilised German-Jewish audience distances yet encounters the Hasid, who is both precursor and ephebe. As a precursor, the Hasid mediates the source of anxiety, Jewish tradition, but is himself anxious; he distances and encounters Jewish tradition through *tessera* and *daemonization*. The irony of Buber's anthologisation, however, is that the Hasidim themselves experience the same longing for unity that the audience, who are simultaneously assimilated into their German but alienated from their Jewish identity, experiences: Buber, Hasid and German Jew share the same sickness, just as Daniel and the Bacchant. Buber has made steps towards dialogue, but is not yet able to distinguish them properly yet; Buber's method so far functions on the identification of his German-Jewish audience with the Hasid.

Ethos and pathos

While the practice of Buber's nascent dialogue still leaves a little to be desired in terms of distinguishing myth from reality, his theoretical writings on Hasidism from this period still reveal an insistence on maintaining the simultaneity of the sensual and divine; they also reveal Nietzsche's continuing influence, particularly in the terms ethos and pathos. Ethos and pathos are two of the three forms of artistic persuasion (*pistis*; ancient Greek πίστις) that appear in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; the third, logos or the appeal to reason (ancient Greek λόγος), is

[145] Stephen D. Kepnes, 'Buber as Hermeneut: Relations to Dilthey and Gadamer', *The Harvard Theological Review*, 81 (1988), 193-213 (p. 193).

conspicuously absent. Ethos (ancient Greek ἦθος, meaning custom or usage) is an appeal to moral character, which in turn relies on a moral system held in common by the community; pathos (ancient Greek πάθος, meaning suffering, feeling, emotion or passion) is an emotional appeal, referring to individual or subjective experience. Both ethos and pathos refer to the divide between individual and community, between life and spirit, rather than their reconciliation in reason.

The ethos of Hasidism becomes an example of Buber's *tessera* and *daemonization* towards Jewish tradition when he claims that Hasidism is ideally Jewish mysticism (*Kabbalah*) become ethos ('Der Chassidismus ist die Ethos gewordene Kabbala').[146] In the following passage from 'Die jüdische Mystik', Buber interprets the teachings ('Lehre') of Hasidism:

> All die Zeit bleibt auch die Lehre selbst dem Leben fremd: sie ist Theorie im neoplatonischen Sinn, Gottschauen, und verlangt nichts von der Wirklichkeit menschlichen Daseins; sie fordert nicht, daß man an ihr nachlebe, sie hat keine Fühlung mit dem Handeln, das Reich der Wahl, das der späteren jüdischen Mystik, dem Chassidismus, alles bedeutete, ist ihr nicht unmittelbar lebendig; sie ist außermenschlich und berührt sich nur da, wo sie die Ekstase zum Gegenstand hat, mit der seelischen Realität. Sie steht zwei andern Mächten im Judentum gegenüber, der harten, um das „Gesetz" besorgten Strenggläubigkeit und dem von Aristoteles bestimmten, naturfernen Rationalismus, aber sie setzt dem Ethos der einen und dem des andern kein eigenes entgegen, und so dringt sie nicht ins Volk.[147]

As a teaching, Hasidism itself is described as inimical to life: it is theoretical, alien to human existence and not interested in the realm of possibility. The teaching is interested only in ecstasy and the reality of the soul. The teaching is contrasted with the law and Aristotelian, unnatural rationalism. The mysticism of late Hasidism is missing ethos in order to enter the community, to allow the spirit to become life; it has been reinterpreted through *tessera*.

The *daemonization* comes to the fore in the way that it brings the beyond into the here and now so that it is filled with the divine:

> Aber das Leben, das er lehrt, ist nicht Askese, sondern Freude in Gott. Chassid bedeutet: der Fromme; aber der Chassidismus ist kein Pietismus. Er entbehrt aller Sentimentalität und Gefühlsostentation. Er nimmt das Jenseits ins Diesseits herüber und läßt es in ihm walten und es

[146] *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 13.
[147] *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 10.

> formen, wie die Seele den Körper formt. Sein Kern ist eine höchst gotterfüllte und höchst realistische Anleitung zur Ekstase, als zu dem Sinn und dem Gipfel des Daseins.[148]

Buber's reception of Nietzsche's metaphysics comes to the fore in two ways: first, Buber is careful to distinguish mysticism from asceticism, likely a defence against Nietzsche's treatise 'Was bedeuten asketische Ideale' in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*; and the union of the beyond in the here and now is a reference to *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. Moreover, the aesthetics of Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* come into play through Buber's emphasis on forming souls: the aim of Jewish mysticism, claims Buber, is to reach the pinnacle of existence through ecstasy that is at once divine and grounded, or *tessera* and *daemonization*.[149]

THE *DREI REDEN ÜBER DAS JUDENTUM*: BUBER'S DISCOVERY OF THE OTHER

Buber's *Reden über das Judentum* represent the final stage of his journey towards dialogue, where he is able apply his anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche and Jewish tradition to distance and encounter the duality of his German-Jewish audience *qua* Bacchant. Eventually, Buber uses this duality as the basis of Jewish identity ('Das Judentum ist nicht einfach und eindeutig, sondern vom Gegensatz erfüllt. Es ist ein polares Phänomen', MBW 3, 228), leading a generation of German-Jewish thinkers to find a new source of pride in their Jewishness: from Ernst Bloch ('Neu erwacht der Stolz, jüdisch zu sein!') to Max Brod and Hugo Bergmann, who heard Buber give a series of lectures on Jewishness at the Bar Kochba, a Jewish student union in Prague.[150] The result was the *Drei Reden über das Judentum*, which he gave between the years 1909 and 1911. The original lectures were entitled 'Der Sinn des Judentums', later republished as 'Das Judentum und die Juden', 'Der Jude und sein Werk', later republished as

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[148] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, pp. 13-14.
[149] Cf. 'Denn er würde, und sei es auch nur einnen Augenblick lang, etwas Göttliches schaffen, jenes aber nur etwas Allzumenschliches' ('Wege zum Zionismus', MBW 3, 93). 'Das jüdische Kulturproblem und der Zionismus', connects this idea explicitly with renaissance (MBW 3, 185).
[150] Ernst Bloch, 'Symbol: Die Juden', *Durch die Wüste: Frühe kritische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1964), p. 121; quoted in Mendes-Flohr, *German Jews: A Dual Identity* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 57.

'Das Judentum und die Menschheit', and 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums'; they were later expanded with three more addresses: 'Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum', 'Jüdische Religiosität' and 'Der Mythos der Juden'.[151] In the final of these lectures on the topic of Jewish myth, Buber calls for a rebirth of myth out of the spirit of Jewish mysticism ('aus dem Geist der jüdischen Mystik', JuJ, p. 79), which echoes the revised subtitle of Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* ('aus dem Geiste der Musik').

The anxiety of Nietzsche's influence becomes abundantly clear in the introduction of 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', the culmination of the first series of three lectures, where Buber challenges but ultimately adopts Nietzsche's line of thinking. Speaking against the abstraction of evolution and predestination as opposed to lived experience, Buber stresses the need for constant renewal:

> Diese übermenschliche Zuversicht ist zersetzt worden; das Bewußtsein Gottes und der Tat wurde einem schon in der Wiege abgeschnürt; man durfte nur doch hoffen, der Exponent eines kleinen »Fortschritts« zu werden; und wer das Unmögliche nicht mehr zu begehren vermag, kann nur noch das Allzumögliche vollbringen (MBW 3, 238).

As in 'Die jüdische Mystik', Buber laments the modern individual's inability to desire the impossible. In 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', however, this desiring of the impossible is now explicitly equated with the *Übermensch*. Buber also contrasts his sublime with the profanity of the all-too-possible, a reference to the rhetoric of *Menschlisches, Allzumenschliches* and Nietzsche's cultural criticism in general. Later in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', Buber introduces the idea of longing for the heroic life:

> Und sogar die Sehnsucht nach einem neuen heroischen Leben wurde von dieser Tendenz der Zeit verdorben; das tragischste Beispiel ist wohl das des Menschen, in dem diese Sehnsucht stark war wie in keinem und der dennoch sich dem Evolutionsdogma nicht zu entziehen vermochte: Friedrich Nietzsche (MBW 3, 238).

Buber contrasts the heroic life with the tendency of time and the dogma of evolution, a reiteration of the idea that Buber looks for presence as concrete, lived experience rather than

[151] See Roemer, 'Reading Nietzsche – Thinking about God: Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig'. For a summary of the *Drei Reden* and their publication history, see Barbara Schäfer's commentary in MBW 3, 414-416.

the abstract progression of history. Buber explains how Nietzsche falls to evolution in 'Was ist der Mensch?': despite Nietzsche's careful distancing from Hegel, his theory of will to power becomes evolution for two reasons: first, the *Übermensch* needs to breed; and second, the acquisition of more power turns into a monologic and Hegelian dialectic (W I, 344-348).

Buber's engagement with Nietzsche once again shows *tessera* and *daemonization* on the part of the ephebe, Buber, who makes the precursor the victim of his own sickness, tragedy. Buber has claimed the *Übermensch* in his thought and relegated Nietzsche's to that of the last man. In the prologue to *Also sprach Zarathustra*, the eponymous prophet contrasts two responses to the end of time: the *Übermensch*, who achieves absolute individuality meant only for him or herself; and the last man, who achieves universality, meant for everyone equally ('Kein Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer anders fühlt, geht freiwillig in's Irrenhaus', KSA 4, 19-20). The mediocre response of the last man is equated with socialism, Marxism, Hegelian dialectics, that is, any system of thought that dissolves the concrete individual's dissolution into an abstract concept of time.

Unity and duality

In his *Reden über das Judentum*, Buber makes use of a series of dualities. The most important is his distinction between the primordial Jew (*Urjude*) and the diaspora Jew (*Galuthjude*). In his speeches, Buber addresses his assimilated German-Jewish audience as diaspora Jews, as he is himself. However, he instils in them a longing for a mythical presence in the form of the primordial Jew, continuing a number of ideas that he developed in his work on the Jewish renaissance and Hasidism. Buber reapplies these dualities in three elements that define primordial Judaism, namely unity, deed and future ('Der geistige Prozeß des Judentums vollzieht sich in der Geschichte als das Streben nach einer immer vollkommeneren Verwirklichung dreier untereinander zusammenhängender Ideen: der Idee der Einheit, der Idee

der Tat und die Idee der Zukunft', MBW 3, 243). Each concept is in itself one half of a duality with a profane and a sublime side and represents an anxiety of influence, where Jewish tradition is mediated through *tessera* and *daemonization* into its all too human and all too idealistic form. However, the sublime that Buber advocates constitutes the simultaneity of these opposing mediations, whereas the profane side represents its collapsing into one or the other of these extremes.

Buber's concept of unity is perhaps the clearest example of this juxtaposition of simultaneity and separation. In 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', Buber describes the Jewish tendency towards unity as follows: 'Die Idee und Tendenz der Einheit ist im Volkscharakter darin begründet, daß der Jude von je mehr den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen als die einzelnen Erscheinung selbst wahrnimmt' (MBW 3, 244). Buber goes on to explain that the Jewish individual is more likely to see the broader context than the specific details, to perceive the sea than the waves or, in an expression that translates easily into English, to see the wood more than the trees. Buber then goes on to highlight moments in history where the longing for unity declines into a rigid scheme ('Die Idee verdünnt, entfärbt sich, bis aus dem lebendigen Gott ein unlebendiges Schema geworden ist, welches die Herrschaft des späten Priestertums und die des beginnenden Rabbinismus charakterisiert', MBW 3, 245). In his description of the living God, Buber has countered Jewish tradition through both *tessera* and *daemonization*: *tessera* because God is life, whereas Jewish tradition has abstracted it; and *daemonization* because a return to primordial Judaism also represents a return to God.

The link with Nietzsche is made explicit when Buber describes the longing for unity as tragic and an opportunity for self-affirmation in the previous lecture, 'Das Judentum und die Juden'. This lecture examines the relationship of each Jewish individual with the broader Jewish phenomenon ('Die Lebensgeschichte eines Volkes ist ja im Grunde nichts anderes als die ins Große projizierte Lebensgeschichte eines Volksmitgliedes', MBW 3, 229). In this

lecture, Buber repeats the idea not only of the duality of Jewishness, but its polarity, that the Jewish phenomenon covers extremes simultaneously:

> Denn das ist die Natur und das Los des Judentums, daß sein Höchstes an sein Niederstes gebunden ist und sein Erlauchtes an sein Schändliches. Das Judentum ist nicht einfach und eindeutig, sondern vom Gegensatz erfüllt. Es ist ein polares Phänomen (MBW 3, 228).

Quoting Jakob Wassermann's *Die Juden von Zirndorf*, Buber emphasises the theatricality of Jews by depicting them as actors on a stage: 'Dies ist sicher: ein Schauspieler oder ein wahrer Mensch; der Schönheit fähig und doch häßlich; lüstern und asketisch, ein Scharlatan oder ein Würfelspieler, ein Fanatiker oder ein feiger Sklave, alles das ist der Jude' (MBW 3, 228). Buber describes Jews as particularly sensitive to the aesthetic forces of history: '[D]ie großen Kräfte, die in diesem tragischsten und unbegreiflichsten aller Völker leben, haben noch nicht ihr eigenstes Wort in die Geschichte der Welt gesprochen' (MBW 3, 226). Buber also links the idea of tragedy with self-affirmation: 'Die Selbstbejahung des Juden hat ihre Tragik und ihre Größe' (MBW 3, 226). The concept of self-affirmation comes out most clearly in Nietzsche's concept of the *Übermensch*, who can say yes to his or her fate; the concept has its roots in Nietzsche's tragedy, where the tragic hero is crushed by his or her fate. Using Nietzsche's theatrical vocabulary, Buber transforms the longing for unity into a call for self-affirmation: 'Wenn wir uns so aus tiefster Selbsterkenntnis heraus bejaht haben, wenn wir zu uns selbst, zu unserer ganzen jüdischen Existenz Ja gesagt haben' (MBW 3, 226). Moreover, the theatricality of this example links it to Buber's Bacchant in *Daniel*, who is simultaneously physical and mythical.

Deed

According to Buber in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', Jews are more in tune with their motor skills than with their sensory skills ('Der Jude [ist] mehr motorisch als sensorisch veranlagt', MBW 3, 246). Buber explains that this distinction derives from the Jews' fundamentally Eastern nature: 'Dies darf ja wohl als ein fundamentaler Unterschied zwischen Orient und

Okzident angesehen werden: für den Orientalen ist die Tat, für den Okzidentalen der Glaube die entscheidende Verbindung zwischen Mensch und Gott' (MBW 3, 246). Arguably, the distinction between east and west goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks until Aristotle linked the idea of climate with politics. In the *Politics*, Aristotle claims that, because of their cold climate, the Europeans to the west were full of spirit but lacked practical skill, whereas the heat of the eastern climate sapped the spirit of the Asians, hence their propensity to slavery and despotism; only the Greeks with their temperate climate were able to form the ideal government, the republic.[152] The dichotomy is given a particular Nietzschean twist, however, in 'Der Geist des Orients', which elaborates on the notion developed in the *Drei Reden* that there is a fundamental difference in the way in which the West (referred to as the *Abendland* or *Okzident*) and the East (the *Morgenland* or *Orient*), function. Again, with reference to the fundamental difference between motor and sensory skills, the western mindset focuses on form, the eastern on deed, and consequently on relation and movement. It is Buber's insistence on the German context and aesthetics that clearly echoes Nietzsche's *Die Geburt der Tragödie*:

> Für diese weltgeschichtliche Mission bietet sich Deutschland ein Mittlervolk dar, das alle Weisheit und Kunst des Abendlands erworben und sein orientalisches Urwesen nicht verloren hat, das berufen ist, Orient und Okzident zu fruchtbarer Gegenseitigkeit zu verknüpfen, wie es vielleicht berufen ist, den Geist des Orients und den Geist des Okzidents in einer neuen Lehre zu verschmelzen.[153]

Just as Nietzsche shifts the focus from Greece to Germany as the mediator between east and west, so Buber continues the chain of influence by shifting the focus from Germany to the German Jew. However, Buber's descriptions of deed may also be seen as an expression of the anxiety of influence. The German Jew has become part of western tradition that has been idealised through the Enlightenment, not unlike the Jewish *Haskalah*. However, the German Jew has not lost his essential eastern being. Consequently, the German Jew is able to counter the Enlightenment through *tessera*, yet still aim for the divine through *daemonization*. The

[152] See also Julie K. Ward, '*Ethnos* in the *Politics*: Aristotle and Race', in *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays*, ed. by Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 14-37.
[153] Buber, 'Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum', in *Vom Geist des Judentums* (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1916), pp. 9-48 (p. 47).

result, as we also see in Nietzsche's description, is an encounter of east and west, body and spirit, sensual and divine, that maintains the inchoate moment, just like Buber's definition of myth, and that melts ('Verschmelzung') into a lesson ('Lehre') that Buber finds in Hasidism.

Future

Buber's concept of the future is another example of anxiety of influence, not least because at face value it constitutes a refusal to look at the past. Nevertheless, Buber's assertion that Jews tend to look towards the future picks up on the importance of time in his oeuvre: from the idea of renewal in the Jewish renaissance to a return to Jewish myth and mysticism in Hasidism. It is also perhaps a necessity of cultural Zionism to focus on tradition over time rather than territory over space. The issue of time was certainly in vogue in this period of time: Henri Bergson had already published *Time and Free Will* (*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889), *Matter and Memory* (*Matière et mémoire*, 1896) and *Creative Evolution* (*L'Evolution créatrice*, 1907), which prefigure some of the major themes of Buber's own thought. The aesthetic search for the inchoate moment also has its roots in German romanticism, to which Nietzsche responds. Nietzsche, however, wrote *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* as a prelude to a philosophy of the future (*Philosophie der Zukunft*), as the subtitle claims; the key ideas in Nietzsche's philosophy of time are genealogy, which dissolves the abstract and metaphysical notions of time, and the *Übermensch*, who overcomes a static identity through self-overcoming.

Buber's consideration of the future in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums' also has a Nietzschean twist because of its emphasis on movement, music and the moment. Buber's emphasis on movement picks up on the distinction made previously that Jews focus more on action than thought; the echo places the distinction within the context of Nietzsche's cultural criticism and the dichotomies east and west, movement and form, Dionysus and Apollo. This

becomes clear in Buber's comparison of the Bible with Homer: 'die malende Epitheta der Bibel sprechen – im Gegensatz z.B. zu den homerischen – nicht von der Form und Farbe, sondern von Schall und Bewegung' (MBW 3, 250-251). In contrast with Nietzsche's praise of the Greeks in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Buber has moved the geographical locus of western thought in the form and colours of Homer's ancient Greece; instead, it is the expressive epithets of the Bible that manage to capture the dynamism of sound and movement. Buber develops his aesthetic thought on sound into music ('die adäquateste Ausdrucksform der Juden ist die spezifische Zeitkunst, die Musik, und der Zusammenhang der Generationen ist ihm ein stärkeres Lebensprinzip als der Genuß der Gegenwart', MBW 3, 251). Buber's favouring of music may be a response to the increasing success of avant-garde German-Jewish composers such as Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schönberg; it also stems from the preoccupation with music of German romanticism, as exhibited by Richard Wagner and Nietzsche. Having addressed Nietzsche's infatuation with Wagner in 'Zarathustra' ('Ein Wort aber in der »Geburt« machte mir Kopfzerbrechen: »Wagner«', MBW 1, 105), Buber may also be responding to Wagner's anti-Semitic 'Vom Judenthum in der Musik' (1850). Buber also imitates Nietzsche in claiming that the rebirth of Jewish myth will happen not only through mysticism but through music, with Germany as mediator ('Für diese weltgeschichtliche Mission bietet sich Deutschland ein Mittlervolk dar').[154]

It would appear that Buber has moved away from Nietzsche's insistence on the moment by emphasising the flow of generations over the present ('der Zusammenhang der Generationen ist ihm ein stärkeres Lebensprinzip als der Genuß der Gegenwart', MBW 3, 251); nevertheless, like Nietzsche's philosophy of the future, Buber intends to maintain the tension between life and spirit, as made clear in Buber's understanding of messianism. Buber defines messianism as the idea of an absolute future that stands against the present and the past:

[154] Buber, 'Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum', p. 47.

'Messianismus, die Idee der absoluten Zukunft, die aller Realität der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart gegenübersteht als das wahre und vollkommene Leben' (MBW 3, 251). However, the insistence on future would appear to fall into the same trap of abstract history, always deferring the present, of which he accuses Nietzsche ('der dennoch sich dem Evolutionsdogma nicht zu entziehen vermochte: Friedrich Nietzsche', MBW 3, 238). This aspect ('so daß alle Realität des Daseins sich in der Zukunftsfürsorge auflöst', MBW 3, 251), Buber explains, is simply the profane rather than the sublime side ('Wie nun jede der drei Tendenzen ihre vulgäre und erhabene Seite hat', MBW 3, 251). At this point the moment when Buber distances and encounters Nietzsche through *tessera* and *daemonization* becomes abundantly clear. Buber's sublime, messianism as an absolute future, is an attempt to describe the inchoate moment, always far away yet always close:

> Der Messianismus ist die am tiefsten originale Idee des Judentums. Man bedenke: in der Zukunft, in der ewig urfernen, ewig urnahen Sphäre, fliehend und bleiben wie der Horizont, in dem Reich der Zukunft, in das sich sonst nur spielende, schwankende, bestandlose Träume wagen, hat der Jude sich ersonnen, ein Haus für die Menscheit zu bauen, das Haus des wahren Lebens (MBW 3, 251).

As he will attempt to do in 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber is attempting to build a house on the shifting sands of time; in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', he achieves this through a Nietzschean version of Jewish myth.

Myth

The *Reden über das Judentum* culminate in Buber's final lecture, 'Der Mythos der Juden'. The lecture's call for rebirth of myth from the spirit of Jewish mysticism not only echoes Nietzsche's call for the birth of tragedy from the spirit of music, but has distinct conceptual links with Nietzsche's thought. For a definition of myth, Buber turns to Plato: 'Mythos bedeutet: ein Bericht von göttlichem Geschehen als einer sinnlichen Wirklichkeit. Es ist demnach nicht Mythos zu nennen, wenn das göttliche Geschehen als ein transzendenter Hergang oder als ein Erlebnis der Seele zu erzählen versucht wird' (JuJ, p. 76). The definition

of myth as the mediation of a divine event as a sensual reality rejects the possibility of becoming pure transcendence. Along with Buber's warning against the other extreme, an experience of a single soul as an example of avoiding the monologic, we may see in this line an instance of Buber's pre-dialogic concern for encountering the absolute in the here and now, as well as the elimination of the idealistic and realistic perspectives that Buber will go on to discuss in 'Geschehende Geschichte' and 'Was ist der Mensch?'. In 'Der Mythos der Juden', Buber complains that Jews have been deprived of myth: 'Man ging weiter und stellte die polytheistisch empfindenden Völker den monotheistisch empfindenden als die mythenschaffenden den mythenlosen gegenüber' (JuJ, p. 76). The reasons for Buber's perception are manifold: first, as Buber discussed in 'Die jüdische Mystik', the Jewish Enlightenment has deprived Jewishness of irrational superstition ('Ein gefährlicherer Gegner erstand dieser später in der Haskala, der jüdischen Aufklärungsbewegung, die im Namen des Wissens, der Zivilisation und Europas gegen den "Aberglauben" auftrat');[155] second, this has led to the impression that Jews are overly focused on the spirit rather than the body, with which Buber engages in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums'; and third, German historicism, as we shall see in the following chapter, has fed on these perceptions to create a relativist German myth that eliminates any potential for a Jewish counterpart. Buber's response is to find both trends in the Jewish phenomenon: 'Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der jüdischen Religion ist in Wahrheit die Geschichte der Kämpfe zwischen dem natürlichen Gebilde der mythisch-monotheistischen Volksreligion und dem intellektualen Gebilde der rational-monotheistischen Rabbinenreligion' (JuJ, p. 79).

Through the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*, Buber tries to reconcile a number of aesthetic opposites: the sensual and the divine, the here and now and the eternal, life

[155] Buber, *Die chassidischen Bücher*, p. 18.

and spirit, Apollo and Dionysus. We may see this in the interplay of the myths of conservation and redemption:

> Die erste stellt gleichsam den ewigen Zusammenhang, die zweite die ewige Erneuerung dar. Die eine lehrt uns, daß wir Bedingte sind; die andere, daß wir Unbedingte werden können. Die eine ist der Mythos der Welterhaltung, die andere der der Welterlösung (JuJ, pp. 85-86).

We may also see it in Buber's contrast between civilisation and primitivism, which clearly corresponds to the distinction between diaspora and primordial Jew. The way of perceiving the world of the civilised individual, on the one hand, is defined by causality: 'Die Welterkenntnis des »zivilisierten« Menschen ist getragen von der Funktion der Kausalität, von der Betrachtung der Weltvorgänge in einem empirischen Zusammenhang der Ursachen und Wirkungen' (JuJ, pp. 82-83). The primitive individual, on the other hand, corresponds to Buber's Bacchant by being able to glimpse the absolute and encounter myth:

> Daraus ergibt sich die unzulängliche Empirie und Zwecksicherheit des Primitiven solchen elementaren Erlebnissen gegenüber, aber zugleich auch sein hohes Gefühl für das Irrationale des einzelnen Erlebnisses, für das, was daran nicht aus andern Vorgängen zu begreifen, sondern nus aus ihm selbst zu erschauen ist, für seine Bedeutung als Signum eines geheimen, überkausalen Zusammenhangs, für die Anschaulichkeit des Absoluten. Er stellt die Vorgänge in die Welt des Absoluten, des Göttlichen ein: er mythisiert sie (JuJ, p. 83).

Myth is described as *shekhinah*, the divine conceived as a dwelling place:

> Die Schechina ist in die Verborgenheit gebannt, sie liegt gebunden auf dem Grunde jeglichen Dinges, und sie wird in jedem Ding erlöst durch den Menschen, der schauend oder handelnd dieses Dinges Seele freimacht. So ist ein jeder berufen, mit seinem eigenen Leben Gottes Schicksal zu bestimmen; so steht jeder Lebendige tief verwurzelt im lebendigen Mythos (JuJ, 85).

Through his concerns for the balance of life and spirit in his pre-dialogic thought that this entails, it becomes clear that the house that Buber seeks to build in his dialogic thought is made of bricks crafted by Nietzsche.

4 – 'IHR IMMER WIEDER GESCHEHEN KÖNNENDES VERNOMMENWERDEN': BUBER, NIETZSCHE AND HISTORY

The previous chapters have demonstrated how Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche during his youthful, mystical phase in fact serves as the basis on which Buber then develops his later philosophy of dialogue. The first chapter highlighted the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* in Buber's initial reception of Nietzsche's aesthetics through the repeated metaphor of sickness in his early aesthetics. The second chapter established the figure of the Bacchant in Buber's *Daniel*, a figure that represents the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*, of myth and reality, in a chain of reception that leads back to the divine in the form of the Dionysian world artist; this figure then continues, in unnamed form, into Buber's dialogic *Ich und Du*. The third chapter traced this figure through Buber's early work on Judaism, from the Jewish Renaissance and cultural Zionism, through his translation of the Hasidic tales, to Buber's *Reden über das Judentum*. This particular chapter will continue tracing the development of the figure of the Bacchant in Buber's post-dialogic work through his historiography and biblical hermeneutics. Buber's interest in these topics is symptomatic of a number of anxieties: as a historian and as a German Jew, towards God as Dionysus.

Buber's post-dialogic thought is still governed by an anxiety of influence brought on by Nietzsche. This may be shown in his historiography and biblical hermeneutics, where Buber encounters anxiety both as an historian and as a German Jew. As the mediation of past occurrences into writing, history proves to be a fruitful site for anxiety. Each historian encounters the problem of time (whether to place his or her narrative in the past as a completed action or in a recreated present as if the action is ongoing) and perspective (the question of telling the story from the bottom-up or top-down, or of whose story is being told). Unable to

reconcile past with present, or an overarching perspective with a personal story that usually does not belong to him or her either, the historian naturally suffers from an anxiety of influence.

Buber's anxiety of influence as an historian is compounded by his particular historical context as a German Jew, which confronts him with two competing historical traditions. On the one hand, German historical thinking in the early nineteenth century was dominated by historicism, an approach to the past that foregrounds context, whether geographic or historical. German historicism creates a myth of Germany as a Christian people that leaves no room for its Jewish minority. Jewish thinkers, therefore, had to create their own response, which they did in a particularly interesting way. David Myers' broad study demonstrates how many German Jews sought to overturn historicism's relativism that refused to understand national history except from within the context of national myth and also tended to accord Judaism a lesser mythical stature than Christianity.[156] On the other hand, Buber is also rejected by members of the Jewish establishment, not least by Gershom Scholem.[157] These factors govern Buber's approach to the Bible as a site of Jewish history, myth and memory. Buber's biblical hermeneutics represents an attempt to trace his contentious dialogic philosophy through the Bible, to give it theological legitimacy. It also represents a response to Scholem, who to some extent may be seen to represent the embodiment of Buber's Jewish anxiety, by giving his dialogic philosophy historical legitimacy. At the same time, Buber's version of Jewishness undeniably retains the mythical aspects of the German romanticist and historicist tradition.

Buber responds to the predicament of Jewish identity and German historicism by propagating the figure of Bacchant in his texts on historiography and biblical hermeneutics. Buber's posited reader and writer of historical and biblical material suffers, like the Bacchant, from anxiety towards German and Jewish tradition, as well as towards the divine as the ultimate

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[156] David N. Myers, *Resisting History: Historicism and Its Discontents in German Jewish Thought* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), esp. ch. 3, 'Franz Rosenzweig and the Rise of Theological Anti-Historicism', pp. 68-105.

[157] See Scholem, 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums', pp. 133-192.

precursor and author of history. Consequently, this chapter will examine Buber's correspondence with Rosenzweig concerning *Ich und Du*, in which Buber's defence of romanticist metaphor to maintain rather than collapse the tension between myth and history becomes clear. Then, in 'Geschehende Geschichte', Buber implicitly resorts to the figure of the Bacchant by demonstrating how the contemporary reader of the Bible is alienated not only from the events portrayed in the Bible, but the divine spirit who inspires it as implied author, who causes the reader anxiety. Finally, in *Königtum Gottes*, the Bible becomes a vehicle not only for dialogue but for anxiety, with God as precursor, as perfect author and metaphor, who is then read by characters in the Bible, as well as by any reader of the Bible, as Bacchants.

THE CRISIS OF GERMAN HISTORICISM

As a scholarly method, historicism is an approach to the past that foregrounds context, whether geographic or historical; it tends to favour rigorous interpretation of contextualised information and rejects universal interpretation; it examines historical phenomena on their own merits, with the result that historicist analyses run the risk of becoming relativist. Important figures in the history of historicism are the Italian historian Giambattista Vico and Hegel, thanks to whom German historical thought was dominated by historicism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An important proponent of historicism was Wilhelm Dilthey, some of whose lectures Buber attended in Berlin and whose influence on him is not to be underestimated.[158]

Historicism reached crisis point when the Protestant theologian Ernst Troeltsch published 'Die Krisis des Historismus' in 1922.[159] The crisis of historicism can be seen in a

[158] Buber's report cards show that he signed up for the seminar 'Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie' given by Dilthey in the winter semester of 1899-1900 at Berlin (W I, 303).
[159] Ernst Troeltsch, 'Die Krisis des Historismus', *Die neue Rundschau*, 33 (1922), 572-590. For Troeltsch's reception of Nietzsche, whom the article briefly mentions, see Ingeborg Schüßler, 'Troeltsch und Nietzsche.

modernist context as a response to nineteenth-century historiographical tradition, precipitated not least by the First World War and the collapses of the Habsburg and German empires.[160] In 1932, the Protestant ecclesiastical historian Karl Heussi criticises the historicism of historians such as Dilthey, Leopold von Ranke and Friedrich Meinecke for rejecting universal laws in favour of historicity, while he berates historicism for its lack of cognitive analysis, its scepticism towards scientific knowledge and its attempt to reach philosophical and theological truths through an immanent study of history.[161] Georg G. Iggers, conversely, has argued that historicism tends to view the nation-state as an end in itself and is hostile to ethical normativity and to conceptuality in historical analysis.[162]

Insofar as it may be characterised by anxiety of influence, historicism appears to be suffering from a case of *enantiodromia*. Treating historical events as precursors, historicism tends to interpret history in *tesseratic* terms: it eschews overarching narratives and views history from a bottom-up perspective. However, through the creation of an independent national myth, historicism has the opposite effect, one of *daemonization*: German historicism creates a myth, an ideal narrative, of Germany as a Christian people that leaves no room for its Jewish minority. Jewish thinkers, therefore, had to create their own response, which they did in a particularly interesting way. David Myers' broad study demonstrates how many German Jews sought to overturn historicism's relativism that refused to understand national history except from within the context of national myth and also tended to accord Judaism a lesser mythical stature than Christianity.[163] Mendes-Flohr's in-depth analysis of Rosenzweig's

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Kritische Überlegungen zum Nietzsche-Bild von Ernst Troeltsch', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* 38 (1990), 1035-1046.

[160] On the cultural and aesthetic background of the crisis of historicism, see Otto Gerhard Oexle, 'Krise des Historismus – Krise der Wirklichkeit: Eine Problemgeschichte der Moderne', in *Krise des Historismus, Krise der Wirklichkeit: Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur 1880-1932*, ed. by Oexle (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), pp. 7-116.

[161] Karl Heussi, *Die Krisis des Historismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1932).

[162] Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969).

[163] Myers, *Resisting History*, ch. 3, 'Franz Rosenzweig and the Rise of Theological Anti-Historicism', pp. 68-105.

confrontation with historicism emphasises how, in striving for the absolute by eliminating all that is relative, Rosenzweig paradoxically affirms the status of history as past, present and future through the redemption of the stateless, hence in historicist terms ahistorical, nature of Judaism in the diaspora.[164]

Nietzsche's historical method

Nietzsche's historical method attempts to mediate the tension between history and myth through artistic form. One of the first to express this view of Nietzsche is Hayden White in *Metahistory* (1973).[165] White's methodology relates history to rhetorical tropes, the experience of time to its mediation through writing, along with political and aesthetics consequences. The novelty of White's method is to introduce a linguistic turn into historiography; it opens up history to literary analysis by viewing the process as a narrative governed by the categories of trope, mode, emplotment, argument and ideology. White identifies four main modes of nineteenth-century historical thinking, each associated with an archetypal historian and philosopher. Each mode is associated with a defining trope: with metaphor, which replaces one narrative with another; metonymy and synecdoche, which use exemplary narratives as part of an overarching narrative; or irony, which undermines the narrative. These tropes are then associated with a romantic, tragic, comic and satirical plot respectively, along with an anarchist, radical, conservative and liberal political ideology. In his analyses of nineteenth-century historians and philosophers, White characterises Nietzsche as a romantic defender of poetry through metaphor.[166] White states that '[metaphor] asserts that a similarity exists between two objects in the face of manifest differences between them', whereas synecdoche and metonymy

[164] Mendes-Flohr, 'Franz Rosenzweig and the Crisis of Historicism', in *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, ed. by Mendes-Flohr (Hanover; London: University Press of New England, 1988), pp. 138-161.
[165] Hayden V. White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
[166] White, *Metahistory*, ch. 9, 'Nietzsche: The Poetic Defense of History in the Metaphorical Mode', pp. 331-374.

draw a distinction between a macrocosmic and a microcosmic reading, and irony undercuts the literal reading.[167] In the metaphorical elimination of hierarchy, of above and below, White's description of similarity and difference also approaches the distance and encounter of Buber's dialogue. White also categorises Nietzsche as romantic not tragic. White writes that '[a] set of events emplotted as a tragedy may be explained "scientifically" (or "realistically") by appeal to strict laws of causal determination or to putative laws of human freedom, as the case may be'.[168] Conversely, White describes romance as 'a drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero's transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it'.[169]

White's statements appear to be borne out by Nietzsche's aesthetic concepts of Apollo and Dionysus, and of the *Übermensch*. Katrin Meyer acknowledges the role of Apollo and Dionysus in Nietzsche's historical method, of Apollonian writing giving illusory form to the Dionysian truth of ultimate formlessness.[170] In this way, Nietzsche offers a critique of historicism that at first rejects, then reincorporates historicity. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, historical writing (*Geschichtsschreibung*) is dismissed as decadent, as a rational, overly Apollonian scientific method that leads to destruction of myth (KSA 1, 145-149) and of creative instincts (KSA 1, 285-302); instead, Nietzsche looks for a rebirth of myth, of metaphorical storytelling that highlights aesthetic forces that govern life, in order to revivify culture. Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* also has political implications: Nietzsche's criticism of socialism because of its insistence on false individuality that eliminates all distinctions ending in Last Man, as well as his championing of German culture in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, underline White's anarchism as well as Buber's behaviour. The way in which

[167] White, *Metahistory*, p. 34.
[168] White, *Metahistory*, p. 27.
[169] White, *Metahistory*, p. 8.
[170] Katrin Meyer, *Ästhetik der Historie: Friedrich Nietzsches "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998), pp. 157-159.

Apollo and Dionysus relate to the rejuvenation of culture and the valuation of life, as well as to the scholarly doctrine of *Lebensphilosophie*, becomes apparent in the first of the *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, 'David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller' (1873), in which Nietzsche criticises David Strauss for the scientific determinism of his New Faith in *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (1872).[171] However, in the second of the *Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*, 'Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben' (1874), Nietzsche confronts Hegel's historicism and instead describes three kinds of history that in fact further life: monumental, antiquarian and critical history (KSA 1, 258-270).

The paradox between a Dionysian attempt to live history and an Apollonian attempt to encapsulate it forever reaches its culmination in Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, who overcomes the limits of causality to become individual in the face of the absolute through self-overcoming, eternal return and *amor fati*. Lou Andreas-Salomé writes, 'Nicht *Befreiung* von dem Wiederkunftszwange, sondern freudige Bekehrung zu ihm ist das Ziel des höchsten sittlichen Strebens'.[172] Nietzsche writes of eternal return as 'das Grosse, das einmal da war, jedenfalls einmal möglich war und deshalb auch wohl wieder einmal möglich sein wird' (KSA 1, 260). Describing a view of history in which all that has happened has already happened before and will recur an infinite number of times, the concept of Eternal Return has been interpreted in terms of its cosmological and ethical consequences. Karl Löwith interprets Nietzsche's eternal return from a cosmological point of view as the dichotomy between the human desire for a goal and the eternal turning of the world:

> Die Einheit des im metaphysischen Gleichnis der ewigen Wiederkehr spaltet sich auf in eine zweifache Gleichung, nach Seite des Menschen und nach Seite der Welt. Das *Problem* der

[171] David Friedrich Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. by Eduard Zeller, 12 vols (Bonn: E. Strauss, 1876-1878), 6, 'Der alte und der neue Glaube'.
[172] Lou Andreas-Salomé, *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, ed. by Ernst Pfeiffer (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1983), p. 261.

> Wiederkunftslehre ist aber die *Einheit* dieses Zwiespalts zwischen dem menschlichen Willen zu einem Ziel und dem ziellosen Kreisen der Welt.[173]

In subsequent scholarship, Nietzsche's cosmological worldviews have been mathematically demonstrated to be impossible, notably by Buber's former teacher, Georg Simmel.[174] In ethical terms, it would appear that Nietzsche's eternal return is related to Kant's categorical imperative, since the individual should be prepared to repeat his or her actions *ad infinitum*.[175] However, while Bernd Magnus may insist on the literal, cosmological interpretation of eternal return, the existential imperative to confront life as if it were fate, to will it as if it were one's own cannot be overlooked: 'Das grösste Schwergewicht. – Wie, wenn dir eines Tages oder Nachts, ein Dämon in deine einsamste Einsamkeit nachschliche und dir sagte: ›Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebst und gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen; und es wird nichts Neues daran sein [...]‹' (KSA 3, 570).[176] Affirming fate as his or her own will and thereby transcending the mechanisms of causality, Nietzsche's *Übermensch* views history as an eternal present, where the past guides us towards, but does not predetermine or place limits on, our future. Similarly, Buber's treatment of history may be read as an attempt to reincorporate the Apollonian as the medium through which the individual may encounter the Dionysian. This encounter, Nietzsche claims in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, acquires illusory form, or mediation, in Greek myth.

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[173] Karl Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. by Klaus Stichweh and Marc B. de Launay, 9 vols (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1981), 6, 'Anhang zu Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen: Zur Geschichte der Nietzsche-Deutung', 178.

[174] Georg Simmel, *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by Michael Behr, Volkhard Krech and Gert Schmidt, 24 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 10, 'Schopenhauer und Nietzsche (1907)', 167-408.

[175] Of Kant's many reformulations of the categorical imperative in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) and *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), cf. 'Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde' (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900-), 4, 421); and 'Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst' (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 4, 429).

[176] See Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

Buber on history

The issue of history as the interface between the flow of time and its mediation through text is the heart of Buber's dialogic project; it comes to the fore in Buber's notion of religion as presence as established in *Religion als Gegenwart*, in the encounter of the individual and the Eternal You, who is wholly present in the moment, and in the relationship between history as time past, memory and, crucially, written text. In 'Der Mensch von heute und die jüdische Bibel' and *Königtum Gottes*, Buber addresses the problem of the weight of tradition and the way that divine encounters are recorded in the Tanakh, the Old Testament. As a consequence, scholars have already addressed several aspects of Buber's historical method. Among the key themes of Buber's historical method (revelation, renewal, prophecy, eschatology, memory and myth), the central idea is presence and its mediation through dialogue.[177] For instance, revelation as the concept of perceiving the divine in the present moment corresponds to notion of the present in Rosenzweig's New Thinking, where creation corresponds to the past and redemption to the future respectively. The apocalypse and messianism are concepts concerned with eschatology, the end of time, history and the world; they are counteracted by renewal and renaissance, not just the return but the reliving of a previous time, as well as memory, which keeps the past alive through the testimony of a given people or community.[178]

[177] Leora Batnitzky, 'Renewing the Jewish Past: Buber on History and Truth', focuses on renewal; Jacob Taubes, 'Buber and the Philosophy of History', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 451-468, has shown the distinction between prophetic and apocalyptic history in 'Prophecy, Apocalyptic, and the Historical Hour' (1951); Ehud Luz, 'Buber's Hermeneutics: The Road to the Revival of the Collective Memory and Religious Faith', *Modern Judaism*, 15 (1995), 69-93, emphasises the role memory; Guy G. Stroumsa, 'Buber as an Historian of Religion: Presence, Not Gnosis', *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, 101 (1998), 87-95, analyses Buber as historian between presence and myth; Friedman, *Martin Buber*, ch. 24, 'Symbol, Myth, and History', pp. 225-238, comments on the relationship of history to myth in Buber's thought; and Emil Fackenheim, 'Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 273-296, expands on the idea of revelation.

[178] Cf. 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums': 'Der Messianismus ist die am tiefsten originale Idee des Judentums. Man bedenke: in der Zukunft, in der ewig urfernen, ewig urnahen Spähre, fliehend und bleiben wie der Horizont, in dem Reich der Zukunft, in das sich sonst nur spielende, schwankende, bestandlose Träume wagen, hat der Jude sich ersonnen, ein Haus für die Menscheit zu bauen, das Haus des wahren Lebens' (MBW 3, 251).

Buber compiled countless histories where he attempted to '[brush] history against its grain'.[179] As we have seen in chapter 2, Buber was concerned in his early work on the Jewish Renaissance with the renewal of a primordial ideal, which we also observe in his efforts to anthologise the tales of the Hasidim. Buber was also actively engaged with the history of ideas, from his doctorate, through the development of philosophical anthropology as an academic discipline, in 'Was ist der Mensch?', to the history of religion in *Zwiesprache*. In *Königtum Gottes*, Buber even attempts to compile a political history of ancient Israel. Central to all of them, as the title of *Zwiesprache* underlines, is the revelation of dialogic principle throughout history. In each case, Buber advocates the reintroduction of life to spirit, avoiding the monologic mistake he made with Mehé, through the guarantee of dialogue, of the other and, ultimately, of the Eternal You.

It is precisely these issues that Buber has with Nietzsche and *Lebensphilosophie* in general. However, Buber's response to the crisis of German historicism is characterised by his anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche. Buber engages with Nietzsche's historical method on a number of occasions. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber reduces Nietzsche's historical method to the endless acquisition of power (W I, 344-348).[180] This assessment serves to underline Buber's point, reiterated most importantly in his autobiographical *Begegnung*, that Nietzsche is monologic: since the individual appears to acquire power as an end in itself, a view that comes to the fore through the appropriation of will to power, then the individual is engaging with an abstract concept and ultimately with him- or herself, with a power projection, rather than with anything living on the other side. This reading is reinforced by Buber's defence of compassion, which Nietzsche expressly rejects ('Nicht die All-Macht bloß, auch das All-Leid ist Gottes', W II, 1034). The rhetoric of outdoing Nietzsche. as we observed in Buber's juvenile

[179] Jacob Taubes, 'Buber and the Philosophy of History', p. 452.
[180] Cf. 'Der Mensch von heute und die jüdische Bibel', W II, 854.

'Zarathustra', is nothing new.[181] Moreover, the proximity of Nietzsche in Buber's post-dialogic discussions of history, the continued association of Nietzsche with the problem of life and spirit, and the mixed rhetoric of history and myth that Buber ends up adopting ('nicht in zeitlos ungebundener Mythenphantasie, sondern in zeitgebundner, wiewohl mythisierter, Geschichte', W II, 664), suggest a simultaneous *tesseratic* and *daemonized* misreading of Nietzsche.

ROSENZWEIG AND THE NEW THINKING

Buber's favouring of romanticist metaphor and the tension between myth and history comes out fairly clearly in Rosenzweig's discussion of the role of God in the third person in *Ich und Du*. The crucial difference in their historical thinking is that Rosenzweig values the past and the future in addition to the present, whereas Buber emphasises the present only. There are many similarities between Rosenzweig's and Buber's thought: both agree on time as an essential determining factor in the individual; Rosenzweig's encounter with God through language has clear links with Buber's dialogue; and Buber enthusiastically adopts Rosenzweig's ideas of creation, revelation and redemption. In fact, the link between Rosenzweig and Buber is so strong that Rivka Horwitz and Bernhard Casper have argued for Rosenzweig's influence on Buber. Maurice Friedman, conversely, reverses this relationship by analysing the correspondence between Buber and Rosenzweig in September 1922. He points out, first, that dialogue is a continuation of Buber's previous concept of lived experience, and second, that Rosenzweig, along with Horwitz and Casper, misinterprets the I-It as a comment on nature rather than a way of relating to the world.[182] From around the time of his doctoral thesis onwards, later published as *Hegel und der Staat* (1920), Rosenzweig's historical approach struggles with the fact that historicism relativises all phenomena, and instead, like so

[181] Buber, *Begegnung*, p. 18.
[182] Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, 1, 415-427; Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"*, pp. 234-235; and Bernhard Casper, 'Franz Rosenzweigs Kritik an "Ich und Du"', in *Martin Buber: Bilanz seines Denkens*.

many existentialists before and since, seeks the absolute. Rosenzweig's historical method has received a fair amount of critical attention, with Myers contributing to a long list of scholarship dealing with Rosenzweig's response.[183] In brief, Rosenzweig's New Thinking, whose main elements are laid out in *Der Stern der Erlösung* (1921), divides history into a tri-partite relationship between creation, revelation and redemption, corresponding to the past, present and future: creation designates the relationship between God and the world or nature; revelation between God and man in time and space; and redemption between man and the world in eternity. Revelation can occur only by accepting the seemingly insuperable divide between man and God out of which arises pure factuality (*reine Tatsächlichkeit*): this term does not of course correspond to the objectivity for which historicism strives, but serves as an 'Archimedean point' that places the relationship between man and God beyond space and time, that is, beyond history.[184] In this way, history becomes absolute: from the here and now, Revelation is a glimpse into the unattainable future of Redemption, into eternity (*Ewigkeit*).

Maintaining the traditional historical distinctions between past, present and future, Rosenzweig realises that the concept of dialogue in Buber's *Ich und Du* is overly devoted to a notion of the present that is all too reminiscent of Buber's former mysticism. Rosenzweig expresses this concern as a fear that Buber neglects nature: 'Ich will den Stier gleich bei den Hörnern packen: Sie geben dem Ich-Du im Ich-Es einen Krüppel zum Gegner'.[185] Rosenzweig's observation is in fact incorrect: in Buber's dialogue, everything is immanent and embodies, in an inchoate moment, the monologic poles of abstraction and reality of monologue. Friedman is correct in pointing out that dialogue refers to a form of interaction and consequently extends to all parts of Rosenzweig's trinity of time: Rosenzweig's interpretation of the I-It limits it to nature, or Creation, as a whole, which the I-You does not deny.

[183] Myers, *Resisting History*, p. 69.
[184] Myers, *Resisting History*, p. 100.
[185] MBB II, 124-128 (from Rosenzweig, undated).

Consequently, Rosenzweig, while hailing Nietzsche as one of the first New Thinkers, fears that the I-You has no connection to the world of Creation and therefore no connection to God as creator,[186] which, adopting the biblical convention of referring to God as HE, he declares necessary:

> Um das Wort Es geht unser Gegensatz, in allen Einzelheiten, in denen wir ihn durchgesprochen haben; nicht bloß der Baum (der übrigens auch mich jetzt fast bezaubert hätte, so herrlich leuchtet er jetzt auf S. 13) und das Kunstwerk, auch die Frage des »Gesetzes«, die Erlaubnis (eine Erlaubnis! Nur eine Erlaubnis! Meine Herren, meine Lehrer, ihr Anwesenden, mit Erlaubnis!!!) von Gott wieder in der dritten Person zu sprechen und daraus (allein daraus) die Möglichkeit, sogar vom Schöpfer zu sprechen, – alles kommt aus diesem Punkt. Und zahlen nicht auch Sie dem verachteten Wort unfreiwillig immerfort Ihren Tribut? Indem Sie von Ich-Du reden. Und indem Sie für Cohens »Correlation« das wirklich nicht deutschere Wort »Beziehung« wählen.

Rosenzweig compares Buber's dialogue to Hermann Cohen. Later, Rosenzweig makes the distinction that. while Cohen resorts to reason, Buber becomes intoxicated, a clear reference to the dangers of Nietzsche and his perceived Dionysianism: 'Sie hingegen errichten von vornherein einen Neubau, machen die Schöpfung zum Chaos, gerade gut genug, Ihnen das Baumaterial zum Neubau zu liefern was nicht in ihn hineinpaßt, wird unwesentlich. Cohen war *erschrocken* über seine Entdeckung, Sie sind *berauscht* davon'.[187] Rosenzweig, conversely, describes himself as a Knight of It in reference to Kierkegaard, who in a leap of faith submits to God's law.

Rosenzweig's assumption that the realm of Buber's dialogue eschews immanence may be shown to incorrect through a comparison between his concept of eternity and Buber's Eternal You. Even in these terms there are great similarities: both attempt to overcome the limitations of German idealism by affirming God and the world, yet Rosenzweig requires a God who is transcendent, Buber one who is immanent. Rosenzweig's eternity, which lies beyond the spatiotemporal realm of revelation in the eschaton of redemption, in fact affirms history by providing it with a central point, and ahistorical Diaspora Judaism with a role

[186] Nahum N. Glatzer, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 3rd edn (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), p. xviii.
[187] MBB II, 124-128 (from Rosenzweig, undated).

alongside the Christian historicist myth. The Eternal You, however, is pure relation and, in Rosenzweig's terminology, can reside only in revelation: for Buber, therefore, the Eternal You cannot exist outside of the relation, but is relation itself; redemption, consequently, becomes a point indefinable even by the notion of religious transcendence, so that the absolute is glimpsed necessarily from within time and space. Consequently, Rosenzweig affirms a distinct above and below: 'After revelation there exists a real Above and Below in the world, a real Before and Hereafter in time. In the 'natural' world and in 'natural' time the point where I happen to be is the centre of the universe; in the space-time world of revelation the center is fixed, and my movements and changes do not alter it'.[188]

In contrast to Rosenzweig's concept of eternity, Buber's presence aims for an elimination of above and below. This becomes apparent in the short essay 'Geschehende Geschichte', which was first published in the *Jüdische Rundschau* on 11 August 1933 following the boycott of Jewish shops on 1 April 1933, with the purpose of offering solace to the beleaguered Jews in Nazi Germany; the issue's lead article, written by the editor Robert Weltsch, bore the title 'Tragt ihn mit Stolz, den gelben Fleck'.[189] 'Geschehende Geschichte' asks how the individual is able to relate to the process of history by discussing two types of approach that take into account the religious: the approach from above (*von oben*) and from below (*von unten*). The approach from above considers humanity to be the expression of God, whereas the approach from below envisages man in dialogue with God. Examining both approaches first in terms of the process of history, then in terms of authority, Buber's criticism of the approach from above is twofold:

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[188] Paraphrased in Alexander Altmann, 'About the Correspondence', in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig, *Judaism Despite Christianity: The Letters on Christianity and Judaism between Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 28; quoted in Mendes-Flohr, 'Franz Rosenzweig and the Crisis of Historicism', p. 144.

[189] On the context of 'Geschehende Geschichte' within National Socialism, see Samuel Hayim Brody, MBW 15, 582-583; and Kerstin Schoor, 'Deutsch-jüdische Literatur im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland', in *Handbuch der deutsch-jüdischen Literatur*, ed. by Hans Otto Horch (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), pp. 164-188 (pp. 181-183).

> Für die Betrachtung »von oben« ist die Geschichte aus Erfolgen zusammengefügt, und hinter jedem Erfolg steht Gott selber. Aus dem Erfolg, den einer hat, ergibt sich, daß er ermächtigt und gesegnet ist. Wer keinen hat, ist ersichtlich von Gott verleugnet. Geschichte, das ist die Reihe der Macht-Erringungen durch die Ermächtigten und ihrer Sieg-Ausnutzungen; die Besiegten, die Unmächtigen sind nur Folie. Wo gesiegt wird, ist göttliche Entscheidung, ist Gott; Erfolge sind Offenbarungen (W II, 1033).

Buber ascribes success to the approach from above, which also carries the sense of the succession of events: just as in Max Weber's Calvinists in *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1905), who seek to reveal predestination or God's favour through monetary success, Buber describes an approach to history in which God's favour appears to be borne out by success.[190] In addition to the implicit dismissal of asceticism, Buber makes two further points: first, success leads to a view of history as a succession of events; and second, it disproportionately privileges power as an expression of success. The latter is an implicit criticism of Nietzsche made explicit in 'Was ist der Mensch?' (W I, 344-348). The approach from below, in stark contrast, is envisaged as dialogue and posits, 'Nicht die All-Macht bloß, auch das All-Leid ist Gottes' (W II, 1034): God is not just the Almighty, but also the God of pity. The idea of pity (*Mitleid*) does not sit well with Nietzsche: it is associated with the inferior form of morality that Nietzsche posits in the first treatise of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, '„Gut und Böse", „Gut und Schlecht"' (KSA 5, 257-289). However, the process of history that the approach from below posits is very much akin to Nietzsche. History may be sensed only insofar as addressed personally: 'Der Sinn der Geschichte ist nicht eine Idee, die ich unabhängig von meinem persönlichen Leben formulieren kann, mit meinem persönlichen Leben allein vermag ich ihn aufzufangen, denn es ist ein dialogischer Sinn' (W II, 1036). In this analysis of the process of history and the authority of God, Buber goes beyond the categories of subjective and objective. Just like Buber's description of philosophical anthropology in 'Was ist der Mensch?', which limits philosophical truths to an anthropological perspective, the sense

[190] Max Weber, 'Die religiösen Grundlagen der innerweltlichen Askese' in Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, ed. by Marianne Weber, 3 vols (Tübingen: Mohr, 1988), I, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, 84-163.

('Sinn') of history, a term taken from Dilthey, cannot be known objectively, a criticism of Hegel's *telos*; nor does it arise simply from subjective experience; rather, it is the individual's immanent interaction with transcendence in an inchoate moment.

'Der Mensch von heute und die jüdische Bibel': The reader of the Bible and the anxiety of influence

On 17 June 1928, Buber gives the lecture 'Der heutige Mensch und die biblische Geschichte' in Zurich, a lecture that would be reworked for publication in *Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung* as 'Der Mensch von heute und die jüdische Bibel' in 1936. In the lecture, Buber analyses the contemporary reader of the Bible, who is alienated from the immediacy of the events that it describes. Buber focuses on divine revelation in events such as the burning bush on the one hand, an instance of pure encounter between Moses and the divine, and Sinai on the other, the revelation of divine law through the Sinaitic or Mosaic Covenant, when Moses received the Ten Commandments or Decalogue on Mount Sinai. In these examples of divine encounter, Buber deals with the problem of reader reception. In the Bible, these moments are necessarily mediated by the text and, by definition, lose their immediacy and presence. Consequently, the eponymous individual of today, or in fact anyone who is reading the Bible, is distanced by time as they read these mediated divine occurrences. Buber proposes a manner of reading that he calls biblical (*biblisch*). This manner of reading views the text as the simultaneity of word and happening ('Ereignis und Wort [stehn] hier durchaus im Volk, in der Geschichte, in der Welt', W II, 850-851), where each is a mediation of the ineffable divine. The main thrust of the lecture, therefore, is the desire to turn to the Bible not only as text but as action ('Zur Gesprochenheit wollen wir hindurch, zum Gesprochenwerden des Worts', W II, 869): the text in the Bible is not something that has been said in the past ('Gesprochenheit'), but something that is in the process of being said ('Gesprochenwerden'). To achieve this

simultaneity of past and present, Buber resorts to the figure of the Bacchant. Like the German Jew in Buber's work on the Jewish Renaissance, the contemporary reader of the Bible is alienated not only from the events portrayed in the Bible, but the divine spirit who inspires it as implied author, who causes the reader anxiety. To overcome this, Buber seeks not a passive reader, but a strong interpreter, who distances himself from the divine through *tessera* and *daemonization*, and thereby encounters it.

The alienation of the contemporary reader as anxiety of influence

In the lecture's opening passage, Buber reveals how the Bible may become a written medium of revelation through an active reading process that both distances and encounters the divine:

> Biblia, Bücher, so heißt ein Buch, ein Buch aus Büchern. Es ist aber in Wahrheit ein Buch. All diese Erzählungen und Gesänge, Sprüche und Weissagungen sind vereint durch das Grundthema der Begegnung einer Menschenschar mit dem Namenlosen, den sie, seine Rede erfahrend und ihn anredend, zu benennen wagte, ihrer Begegnung in der Geschichte, im Gang des irdischen Geschehens. Diese Erzählungen sind, offenkundig oder über sich hinausweisend, Berichte von Begegnungen (W II, 849).

In this passage, the subject of the Bible, the encounter with the divine, is distanced in two main ways. First, Buber creates distance by fragmenting the Bible's very form. Through an etymological analysis of the word 'Biblia', Buber suggests that the form of the Bible deconstructs itself: the Bible is a book composed of many other books, but the act of reading unifies the subject. Second, Buber distances the divine itself through a negative adjective, the 'nameless' ('d[er] Namenlos[e]'). In a manner typical of negative theology, which refuses to attribute any kind of form to the divine, as well as of the modern Jewish custom of refusing to name God, Buber renders the divine an unspeakable, ineffable divine.[191] Yet, in a manner akin to Nietzsche's aphorism on the abyss ('Und wenn du lange in

[191] There are a number of Jewish traditions that avoid attributing a name to the divine, for instance the common modern Jewish practice of avoiding pronouncing the tetragrammaton and replacing it either with *Adonai* ('my Lords') or *ha-Shem* ('the Name'), or the Kabbalistic tradition of referring to God as *Ein Sof* ('without end').The first example is simple periphrasis, the second a negated sublime.

einen Abgrund blickst, blickt der Abgrund auch in dich hinein', KSA 5, 98), Buber's sublime speaks and becomes an implicit author within the text, or a precursor that inspires it.

In the encounter between reader and revelation through text, the Bible becomes a vehicle for dialogue, as well as a source of anxiety. The collection of tales that constitute the Bible tend to mediate the encounter with the divine in two ways: they are either manifest or pointing beyond themselves ('Diese Erzählungen sind, offenkundig oder über sich hinausweisend, Berichte von Begegnungen'), immanent or transcendent. These tales mediate the ineffable through *tessera* and *daemonization*: through *tessera* by bringing them them into the normal run of everyday life ('im Gang des irdischen Geschehens'); or by *daemonization* in the way that the ineffable is given form ('mit dem Namenlosen, den sie, seine Rede erfahrend und ihn anredend, zu benennen wagte'). The absence of a name becomes a presence. In this way, reading the Old Testament accounts of the divine reinstates the inchoate moment where life encounters spirit ('Das »Alte Testament«, das, die heilige Vermählung von Geist und Leben lehrend', W II, 861). However, the encounter is described not as a union or combination, but as a marriage ('Vermählung'), which underlines their simultaneity but not their dissolution into one another.

Buber writes that the modern reader is no longer able to encounter the inchoate moment of life and spirit in the Bible through his alienation into abstraction. 'Der Mensch von heute' picks up on contemporary topoi of the rhetoric of decadence common to Max Nordau, Oswald Spengler and Nietzsche. Buber defines the modern reader through time and multiplicity ('uns[er] ganz[es] zeitverflochten[es] Wesen, die ganze Schwere unsere Vielfältigkeit auf der Seele', W II, 869); the modern reader is obsessed with values ('dem es wichtig erscheint, daß es Güter und Werte gibt', W II, 849). However, Buber addresses the problem of the spiritual individual ('Anders verhält es sich mit dem heutigen Menschen, worunter ich den »geistigen Menschen« dieser Zeit verstehe', W II, 849). This reader recognises the spiritual import of the

Bible, but is alienated from it (‘Unverbindlichkeit des Geistes’, W II, 851), and is therefore unable to read the Bible in such a way that it is relevant to life:

> Der spezifisch heutige Mensch aber vermag dies kaum noch. Wenn er an der Schrift überhaupt noch »Interesse findet«, dann eben ein »religiöses«, – zumeist nicht einmal das, sondern ein »religiongeschichtliches« oder ein »kulturgeschichtliches« oder ein »ästhetisches« und dergleichen mehr, jedenfalls ein Interesse des abgelösten, in autonome »Bereiche« aufgeteilten Geistes (W II, 851).

The spiritual individual is always trying to systematise, to attribute things to the spirit but disregarding life (‘in autonome »Bereiche« aufgeteilten Geistes’); to impose an abstract, overarching narrative, hence the repeated emphasis on ‘historical’ (‘geschichtlich’) when referring to the aberrations of religion, culture and aesthetics. In terms of anxiety of influence, the spiritual individual is someone who attempts to *daemonize*, to reside in the realm of the divine; the effect is the opposite, an instance of *enantiodromia*. By attempting to *daemonize* the divine by reducing it into an overarching narrative, the divine in fact becomes mundane; through *tessera*, the divine assigned into as many separate areas (‘ein Interesse des abgelösten, in autonome »Bereiche« aufgeteilten Geistes’) as there are individuals.

Buber’s metaphorical strategy

Buber’s spiritual reading is imbalanced because it lacks the simultaneity of *daemonization* and *tessera*; ‘Der Mensch von heute’ proposes a new reading strategy to reintroduce this simultaneity. Buber’s reading strategy for the Bible is to avoid the extremes of an overly spiritual reading from above and an overly individual reading from below, but instead goes for the middle (‘Wieder haben wir mit der Mitte zu beginnen’, W II, 856). What Buber means by this is revealed in three examples of how the Bible may be read: as metaphor or allegory, as supernatural happenings or as the textual traces of an event in the sensual world or revelation of God. Buber considers metaphor and allegory (‘ein metaphorischer Ausdruck für einen »geistigen« Vorgang’, W II, 856) to have the same problems as the spiritual reading (‘verdient kein besseres Schicksal als der kulturgeschichtlichen, ästhetischen oder sonst einer

Betrachtungsweise des modernen Menschen ausgeliefert zu werden', WII, 856); by attempting to offer another narrative from the divine, the ephebic *daemonization* turns into *tessera*. The reading of the Bible as a report of supernatural happenings ('Bericht eines »übernatürlichen« Vorgangs', W II, 856) encounters the same problem by neglecting life and immanence; *tessera* turns into *daemonization* because the divine is interpreted within an everyday context that cannot support it. The third approach, as the textual traces of an event in the sensual world or revelation of God ('die Wortspur eines natürlichen, d.h. eines in der Menschen gemeinsamen Sinnenwelt geschehenen und ihren Zusammenhängen eingefügten Ereignisses, das die Schar, die es erfuhr, als Gottes Offenbarung', W II, 856-857), is Buber's example of the middle approach and constitutes an encounter of the sensual with the divine.

Even though he expressly rejects this method of reading the Bible, Buber's method of reading the Bible is clearly metaphorical, at least in White's sense of the word. What Buber rejects is the fabrication or abstraction that detracts from its correlation to real-life experience, which he attributes to his examples of cultural history and aesthetics ('[die] kulturgeschichtlichen, ästhetischen oder sonst einer Betrachtungsweise des modernen Menschen', W II, 856). Buber rejects the metaphorical, but in the sense that this takes away life: cultural history or aesthetic, two abstract extremes that try to impose a great narrative through metonymy or synecdoche; Buber, however, does not reject the one-to-one matching of reality that is the cornerstone of White's definition of metaphor. Buber's rhetoric is often metaphorical, as may be demonstrated through his use of parataxis: see, for instance, the way in which history and the world are placed side-by-side in 'ihr[e] Begegnung in der Geschichte, im Gang des irdischen Geschehens' (W II, 849), or in 'in der Geschichte, in der Welt' (W II, 851). In addition, we may observe at least two occasions when Buber engages directly with the terminology of Rosenzweig's New Thinking: first, when Buber again prioritises revelation over creation and redemption in writing ('Von der Wahrnehmung der Offenbarung aus werden

Schöpfung und Erlösung wahrnehmbar', W II, 857); and second, when he warns against the separation ('Sonderung') of these three aspects of the individual's relationship with God in writing, 'Ist somit die treue *Sonderung* der Drei – nicht als Hypostasen oder Erscheinungsformen Gottes, aber als Stadien, Handlungen und Ereignisse in seinem Verkehr mit der Welt' (W II, 855). As we saw in chapter 3 on the transition from mysticism to dialogue, Buber's main fear in *Ich und Du* is the hypostasis of either the individual or the divine, of either life or spirit. Instead, here as in *Ich und Du*, Buber privileges the present moment, the moment of revelation, rather than the process of history.

The second example, the elimination of these hypostasised perspectives, comes in the criticism of idealism and realism:

> Gleichviel ob ein falscher Idealismus waltet, der das Leben von einer Azurglocke überwölben läßt, in deren unverbindlich erhebendem Anblick man sich von der spröden Erde erholt, oder ein falscher Realismus, der den Geist nur als Funktion des Lebens versteht und seine Unbedingtheit in lauter Bedingtheiten, psychologische, soziologische und dergleichen, auflöst, – immer wird ein falsches Verhältnis zwischen den beiden an die Stelle der Verbindung, Vermählung gesetzt (W II, 850).

As in 'Geschehende Geschichte', and as Buber will go on to elaborate in his philosophical anthropology in 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber views this as a problem of scholarship: idealism springs from the mind or spirit and represents a bottom-down approach; realism from worldly objects or bottom-up, a rejection of metonymy and synecdoche, and of the cultural phenomena of psychology and sociology. The biblical world of faith, however, does not distinguish between higher and lower regions ('Die biblische Glaubenswelt ist nicht eine höhere Region, in der man sich vom schlecht gelebten Alltag erholen kann. [...] Wer das mahnende Herz damit beschwichtigt, daß das um uns her eben »Schicksal« sei, verfällt der Gottesferne', W II, 869).

Traces of Nietzsche and the Bacchant in Buber's biblical hermeneutics

References to Nietzsche, both overt and oblique, confirm the anxiety of influence that Buber continues to have towards Nietzsche, as well as laying the ground for the figure of the Bacchant. Oblique references to Nietzsche may be found when Buber complains that the modern reader

is obsessed with goods and values ('dem es wichtig erscheint, daß es Güter und Werte gibt', W II, 849), a reference to Marx and Nietzsche, whom Buber goes on to discuss in 'Was ist der Mensch?'. Nietzsche, however, insists on a transvaluation of values. Overt references underline Nietzsche's monologic nature: 'Rechtschaffner hat es Nietzsche ausgesprochen: »Man nimmt, man fragt nicht wer da gibt«. Ich meine aber, es komme gerade darauf an, nehmend zu wissen, daß einer gibt' (W II, 857). Also Buber's contextualisation of *Lebensphilosophie* is never far away from Nietzsche: 'Die moderne Lebensphilosophie, die den lebendurchtränkenden Geist mit dem abgeschnürten Intellekt verwechselt und so degradiert, das Verhältnis zwischen zeugendem Geist und empfangenden Leben umkehrt und so die Urstände' (W II, 861). Here as in 'Zarathustra', Buber accuses Nietzsche of hypostasising intellect over life, yet this is precisely the same point of Nietzsche's contempt towards contemporary scholarship in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. Even the use of power and enslavement, which was part of Buber's Nietzschean rhetoric in 'Juedische Renaissance' and the *Reden über das Judentum* persists in 'Der Mensch von heute': 'Das »Alte Testament«, das, die heilige Vermählung von Geist und Leben lehrend, wie jede Versklavung des Lebens unter den Geist so jede Beugung des Geistes unter das Leben ablehnt, hat dennoch auch heute und hier noch die Macht, dem heutigen Menschen in seiner eigentlichen Not zu helfen' (W II, 861).

The figure of the Bacchant surfaces in a number of ways. Buber takes us back to the rhetoric of the Jewish Renaissance: 'Es gilt nicht eine »Rückkehr zur Bibel«. Es gilt die Wiederaufnahme bibelechten Einheitslebens mit unserm ganzen zeitverflochtenen Wesen, die ganze Schwere unsere Vielfältigkeit auf der Seele, die unumgreifbare Materie dieser Geschichtsstunde ohne Abstrich uns gegenwärtig' (W II, 869).[192] The point here, as in 'Juedische Renaissance', is that reading the Bible is not meant to return the reader to a time

[192] Cf. 'Renaissance [bedeutet] nicht Rückkehr, sondern Wiedergeburt [...]: eine Wiedergeburt des ganzen Menschen', 'Juedische Renaissance', MBW 3, 144.

past, but encourage the reader to render the Bible present through the engagement and encounter of the reader's self by the text's author. In terms of anxiety of influence, this entails a transition from a passive reader, who regards the past as something completed and to be consumed, to a strong interpreter, who becomes part of the creative process. This encounter occurs by distancing of the divine voice that inspires the Bible through *tessera* and *daemonization*, as demonstrated in the following passage:

> Der Anspruch der Schrift, mit dem sie an die Geschlechter herantrat und herantritt, ist, als Urkunde der wahren Geschichte der Welt anerkannt zu werden, jener nämlich, in der die Welt einen Ursprung und ein Ziel hat. Sie fordert von der menschlichen Person, in diese wahre Geschichte das eigne Leben einzubetten, so daß ich im Ursprung der Welt meinen Ursprung und in ihrem Ziel mein Ziel finde. Als die Mitte aber zwischen Ursprung und Ziel setzt die Schrift nicht etwas an, was sich einmal ereignet hat, sondern – eine bewegliche, kreisende, unfestlegbare Mitte – den Augenblick in dem ich, ich der Leser, der Hörer, der Mensch durch sie die Stimme vernehme, die vom Ursprung her auf das Ziel hin redet: diesen meinen sterblichen, ewigen Augenblick (W II, 853).

In this passage, Buber describes the voice behind the Bible demanding to be recognised as the origin ('Ursprung') and goal ('Ziel') of the world, which corresponds either to Rosenzweig's conceptions of God the creator and redeemer, or to narratological terms as author and interpreter. The reader of the Bible is to encounter this voice not as something that has already happened in the past ('etwas [...], was sich einmal ereignet hat'), but as a constantly turning, ineffable middle ('eine bewegliche, kreisende, unfestlegbare Mitte') by entering into the moment ('Sie fordert von der menschlichen Person, in diese wahre Geschichte das eigne Leben einzubetten'), so that the reader becomes not just a passive reader, but a strong interpreter. The simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* is indicated at the end of the passage through the oxymoronic personal moment that is both mortal and eternal ('diesen meine sterblichen, ewigen Augenblick'); it also occurs through the distancing of God as an unattainable creator and redeemer through *tessera* by the reader, who is still able to place his or her own limits alongside those of the divine ('so daß ich im Ursprung der Welt meinen Ursprung und in ihrem Ziel mein Ziel finde') through *daemonization*, and consequently to hear and translate the word of God ('den Augenblick in dem ich, ich der Leser, der Hörer, der Mensch durch sie die Stimme vernehme, die vom Ursprung her auf das Ziel hin redet').

The divine voice has been distanced through anxiety of influence, but encountered in the flow of life and the reading of text. This idea is developed in Buber's reading of the revelation at Sinai:

> Die Schöpfung ist der Ursprung, die Erlösung ist das Ziel, aber die Offenbarung ist nicht ein zwischen beiden ruhender, verfestigter, datierbarer Punkt; nicht die Sinai-Offenbarung ist die Mitte, sondern ihr immer wieder geschehen könnendes Vernommenwerden. *Darum* ist ein Psalm oder eine Prophetie nicht weniger »Thora«, Weisung, als die Erzählung vom Auszug von Ägypten. Die Volksgeschichte – Annehmen und Versagen in einem – weist auf die Menschheitsgeschichte, aber was in Psalm und Prophetie an heimlicher Zwiesprache laut wird, weist auf mein Geheimnis hin (W II, 853).

Sinai, as both a purportedly geographical space and historical time, is not a definable point, but a moment of interpretation, one that can be made again and again ('ihr immer wieder geschehen könnendes Vernommenwerden') by the strong interpreter of a divine that cannot be reduced to an interpretation.

KÖNIGTUM GOTTES: GIDEON AS BACCHANT

Königtum Gottes traces the dialogic principle in the Bible through an examination of the concept of divine authority, in its political sense as kingship, as well as its aesthetic sense as authorship. This particular work of biblical hermeneutics covers many areas, from conceptions of God in the Bible in the forms of El, Malk and Baal, to God's appearance in the burning bush and at Mount Sinai. Buber relates these incidents to the political history of ancient Israel as recorded specifically in the Book of Judges. In this book of the Bible, the judge Gideon was offered the kingship of Israel, which he turned down in order to establish an absolute theocracy with God as king until its disintegration into theocracy mediated by the priestly classes.

Königtum Gottes represents a continuity of the reading strategy developed in 'Der Mensch von heute', whose narratological approach rested on the metaphorical encounter between word and happening. In *Königtum Gottes*, however, the emphasis is on the encounter between happening and memory ('*es gäbe diesen Geist nicht, wenn es Ereignis und Erinnerung nicht gäbe, zu denen er sich bekennt*', W II, 663). Even more so than in 'Der Mensch von

heute', where he is dismissive of Nietzsche's monologue, Buber appears to be steering away from Nietzsche, who is not even explicitly mentioned in *Königtum Gottes*. Many themes associated with Nietzsche are already latent in the biblical material that Buber uses: wandering in the desert ('Der Gott is nicht dem Ort verhaftet, an dem er erscheint; [...] er wandert mit seiner Kreatur', W II, 609), for instance, comes from the Book of Exodus, let alone from the Gospels and Jesus' forty days in the wilderness, before it comes from Nietzsche. The rejection of higher and lower realms in the face of established scholarship, the metaphorical mixed rhetoric that validates the equivalence of event and writing in *Königtum Gottes* firmly places Buber's historiographical writing and hermeneutic technique within his anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche. In *Königtum Gottes*, the Bible becomes a vehicle for anxiety, with God as precursor, as perfect author and metaphor, who is then read by characters in the Bible, as well as by any reader of the Bible, as Bacchants.

El, Malk and Baal as anxiety of influence

In the chapter on 'Der westsemitische Stammesgott', Buber identifies three biblical conceptions of the divine, namely El, Malk and Baal ('Malk ist wie Baal ein Beziehungsbegriff, wogegen die allgemeinste semitische Bezeichnung eines Numens, El, ein Erscheinungsbegriff ist', W II, 589). These three conceptions correspond to different ways of encountering and reading the divine and correspond to three forms of anxiety of influence, each with God as the ultimate yet indefinable precursor.

In Buber's descriptions, El comes to represent an encounter with God through *tessera* and Baal through *daemonization*, while Malk, the etymological kingship of God and Buber's vehicle for dialogue in *Königtum Gottes*, represents their mutually exclusive simultaneity. El represents the top-down or ideal perspective and belongs to the realm of pure spirit. Described as merely appearance ('Erscheinung'), El exists conceptually but cannot be encountered and is

therefore monologic. Read in terms of Nietzsche's Apollo and Dionysus, El represents their combination: El is both like Apollo as an abstract illusion, but also like Dionysus, because it cannot be grasped either. In terms of anxiety of influence, El represents *tessera*: as a precursor, God cannot be encountered, or is distanced, because the concept is too ideal. Malk and Baal, conversely, can be encountered on a human, concrete level:

> Malk ist Einer, der Führer seiner Gefolgschaft, in seiner Einheit erfährt sie ihre eigne; andres Volk mag einen andern haben, der geht sie nicht an. Baal ist Vielfalt, je und je dieser Baal hier, das Baalspaar dieses Ortshimmels und dieser Ortserde im Mysterium ihrer Fruchtbarkeit; in den einzelnen Orten empfangen die Baale die siegreichen Krieger, als wären diese ihre Lieblinge von alters her (W II, 591).

In this description, Baal represents the ground-up approach: insofar as Baal is linked with individuality, multiplicity and a physical space, it is also linked with Apollo. The passage recalls Buber's description in *Daniel* of two ways of encountering an unknown city, either by trying to locate everything exactly but abstractly, or by insertion into the city to feel how it is actually lived (MBW 1, 191-204). In terms of anxiety of influence, Baal also represents *daemonization*, although crucially in a negative sense: God mediated as Baal is too human and lacks an overarching narrative that a more ideal God would provide. For this reason, Buber describes Baal as being without history (*'*Auch in seinem Verhältnis zur Natur erscheint er nicht geschichtslos wie die Baale, sondern als der Herr der Geschichte, der »König«', W II, 625). Through the necessary ambiguity of the negated word history ('geschichtslos'), which refers both to a physical reality and an overarching narrative by a divine author or precursor, Malk represents Buber's instantiation of the dialogic principle in the Bible, and shows the simultaneity of Apollo and Dionysus, as well as of *tessera* and *daemonization*: in accompanying the people of Israel, Malk is both indefinable yet immediately present in the here and now.

The burning bush as divine metaphor

The metaphorical implications of Buber's anxiety of influence are developed in Buber's discussion of the biblical story of Moses and the burning bush (Ex. 3:1-22). In this discussion, God takes the role both of the ultimate precursor in the form of the metaphorical burning bush, which is read both by Moses and the reader of the Bible as ephebe. In the biblical story, when Moses asks God for a name, he receives the reply, 'I AM THAT I AM' (Ex. 3:14). On this topic, Buber writes:

> Der Gott macht somit keine theologische Aussage über seine Ewigkeit oder gar seine »Aseität«, sondern er spricht seiner Kreatur, seinem Menschen, seinem Volk den Zuspruch zu, dessen sie bedürfen und der alle magische Unternehmung zunichte, aber auch überflüssig macht. Das erste ehje spricht einfach zu: Ich werde da sein (je und je bei meiner Schar, bei meinem Volk, bei euch) – also braucht ihr mich nicht zu beschwören; und das folgende ascher ehje kann nach Parallelen nur bedeuten: als welcher immer ich dasein werde, als der ich je und je dasein werde, d. h. so wie ich je und je werde erscheinen wollen, ich selber nehme meine Erscheinungsformen nicht vorweg – und da meint ihr mit irgendwelchen Mitteln mich bestimmen zu können, hier und nicht anderswo, jetzt und nicht anderswann, so und nicht anderswie zu erscheinen! Zusammen also: ihr braucht mich nicht zu beschwören, aber ihr könnt mich auch nicht beschwören. Was hier berichtet wird, ist, religionsgeschichtlich betrachtet, die Entmagisierung des Glaubens: in der Selbstverkündigung des bei den Seinen daseienden, ihnen gegenwärtig bleibenden, des mitgehenden Gottes (W II, 623-624).

Rhetorically, the statement 'I AM THAT I AM' does not in fact constitute a metaphor; in terms of its function, however, it attempts to establish a one-to-one relationship between being and representation, between text and reality. In White's sense, statement eliminates the hierarchy between being and representation through synecdoche or metonymy, and to create equivalence through metaphor.

The burning bush remains a metaphor created by God as author because it is mediated through text and read, first by Moses, second by the reader of the Bible. Like a precursor, God cannot be imitated, not just because the ephebe needs to maintain artistic independence to remain strong, but because the ephebe cannot become God. Therefore, God as precursor necessarily causes anxiety, and a psychological and aesthetic drive for distance ('ihr braucht mich nicht zu beschwören'). In this way, Moses and the reader of the Bible necessarily turn God into metaphor ('das folgende ascher ehje kann nach Parallelen nur bedeuten'). God is both distanced as eternally unreachable through *tessera* ('Der Gott macht somit keine theologische

Aussage über seine Ewigkeit'; 'da meint ihr mit irgendwelchen Mitteln mich bestimmen zu können') and brought down to the human level through *daemonization*, not least through the metaphor of the burning bush itself. Yet God refuses to be distanced ('ihr könnt mich auch nicht beschwören') and is, in fact, encountered ('d[as] bei den Seinen daseiend[e], ihnen gegenwärtig bleibend[e], d[as] mitgehend[e] G[ott]') as the ultimate precursor, some who can announce himself or herself ('Selbstverkündigung'). Buber asserts that this leads to a demystification ('Entmagisierung') of faith; this term, which refers to the process of eliminating the magic, might also be translated as demythicisation. Buber is overtly arguing against fictionalisation of the events of the Bible: rather than being merely religious rhetoric or some sort of fairytale, a story or a fabrication on the part of a single individual, these narrated events are an encounter with the divine that has been pushed towards its limits in opposite directions. Demystification operates as *tessera* by removing the magic of a fabricated fairytale, but also as *daemonization* through the reinsertion of the divine.

Historiography and the immediacy of Sinai

Buber's discussion of the burning bush, which establishes the implied author of the Bible as as divine metaphor and precursor, warns against a bottom-up approach that reduces the text to the magical fabrication of a single individual. Similarly, Buber warns against the top-down approach. Turning to Buber's assessment of contemporary historical approaches, the section entitled 'Der Gideonspruch' distinguishes between two types of history, the editing of history and its viewing of history:

> Die moderne Wissenschaft hat denn zumeist den wunderlichen Spruch gegenüber einen andern Weg eingeschlagen: sie hat ihn aus einer Zeit vorgangsnaher Geschichtsbetrachtung in eine Zeit vorgangsferner Geschichtsbearbeitung gerückt, indem sie ihn etwa als Einschub oder als »tendenziöse Änderung eines nicht mehr zu ermittelnden Wortlautes«, der jedenfalls die Annahme des angebotenen Herrschertums, auffaßt (W II, 541).

Buber advocates a form of historical writing that is close to the action by being a way of viewing, rather than yet another layer of mediating analysis, which contemporary scholarship

appears to add. Buber himself contextualises this within the problems of contemporary scholarship, which in turn can be seen as a reflection of a number of issues: of *Lebensphilosophie*, the imbalance between life and spirit that Buber has addressed on a number of occasions; by extension, of historicism, which veers either too close to the approach from below to the point of relativism, or too close to spiritual abstraction by creating inalienable narratives; and, of course, of Nietzsche's critique of contemporary scholarship that comes to the fore not least in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* and 'David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller'.

Buber's response is to reintroduce a figure akin to the Bacchant in *Daniel*, who manages to combine both past and present, real and mythical, through anxiety of influence. Buber's ideal reader encounters the characters of the Bible as precursors, who are themselves ephebes until the ultimate precursor, God. However, this particular approach seems to be rejected by Buber's renewed treatment of the Covenant at Sinai in the chapter entitled 'Der Königsbund':

> Es heißt jedoch dieser Einsicht ihren wesentlichen Wert nehmen, wenn man in dem Bericht über den Bundesschluß lediglich die »Historisierung« eines Kultdramas, die »in einer geschichtlichen und mythologischen Gestalt dargestellte und dem geschichtlichen und mythologischen Rahmen der Exodus-Erzählungen angepaßte« Beschreibung alljährlich begangener Festriten erblickt, so daß diese sich als Erneuerung eines Bundes gäben, dessen Bild in Wirklichkeit aus ihnen in die sagenhafte Vergangenheit »präjiziert« worden sei (W II, 663).

In this passage, Buber explicity rejects reading the Covenant at Sinai as the '"historicisation" of a cultic drama' ('»Historisierung« eines Kultdramas') that combines the historical with the mythical. Buber's description has all the hallmarks of the Bacchic performance he describes in *Daniel*: the Bacchant is, at one and the same time, a physical actor performing a role and a mythical worshipper of Dionysus. However, Buber is not rejecting the Bacchant as reader, but the idealisation of the physical performance into a metaphysical narrative that eliminates the physicality of the actors from an ideal perspective. This is the opposite point of Buber's rejection of magic, which is the narrative fabrication of a single individual, from a realist perspective. For Buber, the description of the Sinai Covenant is not merely an artistic creation

but a medium for spirit to be present in both event and word. Consequently, Buber takes issue with Sigmund Mowinckel, a Norwegian scholar of the Old Testament, who claims that spirit resides in history itself:

> »Der Geist einer geschichtlichen Religion« spricht sich nicht, wie Mowinckel meint, in solcher Historisierung aus; *es gäbe diesen Geist nicht, wenn es Ereignis und Erinnerung nicht gäbe, zu denen er sich bekennt*. Ätiologische Zurückverlegungen ritualer Gehalte in eine Urgeschichte finden sich in fast allen Religionen, und ihre bildnerische Projektionskraft ist zuweilen eine gewaltige, aber es ist eine Besonderheit der geschichtlichen Religion, daß sie von den zentralen Erzählungen ihres Geschichtsglaubens dergleichen fernzuhalten weiß (W II, 663).

The main issue being dealt with here is that of critical distance: the mere projection of divinity is common to all forms of religion, but this projection is mere illusion until it is tempered through encounter, through dialogue with the Eternal You.

Gideon as Bacchant

In *Königtum Gottes*, Buber's instantiation of the Bacchant figure is Gideon, who turns to the Bible's divine precursor as a political and narrative authority. In the Book of Judges, Gideon is offered the kingship of Israel. Buber's comparative historical analysis, which makes extensive use of contemporary historical and theological scholarship, places Gideon's rejection in the light of contemporary middle-eastern kingdoms. In the manner of an historicist analysis, Buber deduces that Gideon's rejection is unique insofar as it is more than the semblance of a rejection to legitimise the power of a ruling dynasty, but an authentic and absolute rejection that makes God the true and only king of Israel ('Sein Nein, aus der Situation geboren, will für alle Zeiten und Geschichtsgestaltungen als ein unbedingtes gelten', W II, 539). In this rejection, Gideon may be understood as an anxious Bacchant, who both distances and encounters the divine precursor through *tessera* and *daemonization*. Through a *tesseratic* negation of the sublime, Gideon distances political authority through his rejection, which lowers the ideal into

the real and political.[193] However, Gideon's rejection also represents a *daemonization* through his claims to eternity.

For Buber, Gideon's rejection of kingship is not simply a representation, but the mediation of an actual event; it is not eschatological but historical and in the moment, rather than in written form: 'Das ist, da es nicht eschatologisch, sondern historisch, nicht als Weissagung, sondern als politische Kundgebung geschieht, ein geradezu geschichtswidrig anmutendes Wagnis' (W II, 539). Buber dismisses history as narrative (*Geschichte*), to which belongs the *telos*, the defined end, of an eschatological or abstract view of history; instead he replaces it with history as event (*Historie*), to which belongs the immediately relevant realm of politics. Gideon's rejection is not a prophecy ('Weissagung') in the past for some future event, but a political statement ('politische Kundgebung') in the here and now, a revelation. This, too, may be read as an anxiety of influence that distances and encounters the divine precursor. The descent from the eschaton to the historical as everyday represents *tessera*, as does the fact that the message is not a prophecy, which predicts the future, but a political message; *daemonization* that is simultaneous, not combination. Instead, Gideon becomes a translator, like an anxious Bacchant or Romantic poet. Similarly, the chapter on 'Der Königsbund' differentiates timekeeping in Babylon and ancient Israel: 'In Babylon mochte der kultische Kalendar unberührbar über den Wechselfällen der Historie seinen ewigen Kreislauf vollziehen, in Israel schrieb die Geschichte eigenhändig in den ungeheuren Zeichen des Einmaligen um' (W II, 664-665). *Historie* is described here as the ebb and flow of time ('Wechselfäll[e]'), whereas Israel begins to record history. Babylon is described as from above, applying

[193] Cf. the equation between current political affairs and the physical body in the following passage: 'Daß diese Dialektik ihre ganz irdische Gestalt hat, daß sie nicht auf theologischen Höhen, sondern mitten im Strudel der politischen Aktualitäten sich verleibt, und daß ihrer beraubt die stetige Historie eines Volkes Israel als Träger der Reichsbotschaft nicht zu verstehen wäre, erlaubt, ja gebietet uns, den Verfassungs-, d. i. Verwirklichungswillen als einen ursprünglichen Bestand in der Dynamik dieses Volkslebens zu erkennen, der in der Geschichtsschreibung wirkt, weil er in der Geschichte gewirkt hat' (W II, 547-548).

immutable laws of history; Israel, instead, deploys the mixed approach of writing and real-life, mortal action that Buber seeks.

By inserting the competing concepts of Malk and Baal into the political history of ancient Israel, Buber defines periods of Renaissance, when these aesthetic forces are in balance, and periods of decadence, when they are in imbalance, not unlike the genealogies that Nietzsche outlines in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. We see this again in Buber's discussion of theocracy:

> Das Wagnis einer radikalen Theokratie muß daher zum Aufbruch des in jedem Volk latenten Gegensatzes führen. Die aber in diesem Kampf die Sache der Gottesherrschaft gegen die der »Geschichte« führen, erfahren darin die ersten Schauer der Eschatologie. [...] In Israel führte er von der gottesstolzen Zuversicht der frühen Königsprüche zunächst zu jener ersten Gestalt der Resignation, mit der unser Richterbuch endet (W II, 687).

As the theocracy loses out to the priestly classes, life loses out to history as abstract, with a defined end that is experienced as a shudder. Life as action loses out to reflection and becomes dogma:

> Der theokratische Ruf in der Ausschließlichkeit seiner Forderung wäre demnach nicht die naive Äußerung einer unproblematischen Frühzeit, sondern die Rückdatierung von Ergebnissen langer und schlimmer Erfahrungen mit der Monarchie, – nicht Handlung, sondern Reflexion, nicht Wagnis, sondern »Dogma« (W II, 545).

The Book of Judges ends with resignation as they allow charisma and the kingship of God to cede to the decadence of the priestly classes; the subsequent monarchy degenerates into reflectivity and dogma rather than action. This echoes the cultural criticism of the *Reden über das Judentum*, when Buber laments the decline of unity in 'Die Erneuerung des Judentums', idea of unity: 'Die Idee verdünnt, entfärbt sich, bis aus dem lebendigen Gott ein unlebendiges Schema geworden ist, welches die Herrschaft des späten Priestertums und die des beginnenden Rabbinismus charakterisiert' (MBW 3, 245).

5 – 'MANCHES HAUS GIEBT ES NOCH ZU BAUEN!': NIETZSCHE'S *ÜBERMENSCH* AS BACCHANT IN BUBER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Martin Buber's inaugural series of lectures on his 1938 appointment as professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the metaphor of the home distinguishes between periods of shelter (*Behaustheit*) and homelessness (*Unbehaustheit* or *Hauslosigkeit*) in the social history of the world:

> In der Geschichte des Menschengeistes unterscheide ich Epochen der Behaustheit und Epochen der Hauslosigkeit. In den einen lebt der Mensch in der Welt wie in einem Hause, in den andern lebt er in der Welt wie auf freiem Feld und hat zuweilen nicht einmal vier Pflöcke, ein Zelt aufzuschlagen. In den ersten gibt es den anthropologischen Gedanken nur als einen Teil des kosmologischen, in den Zweiten gewinnt der anthropologische Gedanke seine Tiefe und mit ihr seine Selbständigkeit (W I, 317).

The lectures form part of Buber's work on philosophical anthropology, a discipline that takes into account 'die Sonderstellung des Menschen im Kosmos, sein Verhältnis zum Schicksal, seine Beziehung zur Welt der Dinge, sein Verstehen des Mitmenschen, seine Existenz als Wesen, das weiß, daß es sterben muß, seine Haltung in all den gewöhnlichen und außergewöhnlichen Begegnungen mit dem Geheimnis, die sein Leben durchziehen' (W I, 311). By tracing the origins of philosophical anthropology in the history of ideas and assessing the stage it had reached at the time of speaking, Buber endeavours to save the integrity of man in the face of the apparently all-consuming universe, a false home, from periods of homelessness that have shattered previous shelters; he insists there is such a thing as man who does not disappear into endless relativism. Buber's philosophical anthropology, therefore, may be understood as a response to what Maurice Friedman diagnoses as the threat of infinity and, by extension, to the disappearance of the individual in the *unio mystica* that appeared to be the guiding light of his earlier philosophy.[194]

[194] Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, ch. 2, 'The Threat of Infinity and the Promise of Time', 26-32.

The home metaphor of Buber's philosophical anthropology seeks to establish the finitude of man in a universe of endless potential. Buber classifies previous approaches to this long-standing intellectual problem as either philosophical (or cosmological) or anthropological:

> Entweder schaltet eine philosophische Disziplin den Menschen in seiner komplexen Ganzheit aus und betrachtet ihn nur als ein Stück Natur, wie es die Kosmologie tut; oder aber (so tun es alle anderen Disziplinen) sie entreißt der Ganzheit des Menschen ihr eigenes Sondergebiet, grenzt es gegen die anderen Gebiete ab, legt seine eigenen Grundsätze fest und bildet seine eigenen Methoden aus (W I, 313).

On the one hand, philosophy as the love of knowledge and universal truths threatens to reduce man to a mere function of nature or an insignificant aspect of the substance of the universe. Similarly, the perspective of cosmology attempts to study the universe in its totality. On the other, disciplines with a more anthropological bent veer towards a more individualistic or even solipsistic perspective, favouring an internally consistent system that pays little or no attention to context. Neither approach, on its own, is able to examine the nature of man. Buber's attempts to marry the two perspectives in his philosophical anthropology:

> Der philosophische Anthropolog muß nicht weniger als seine leibhafte Ganzheit, sein konkretes Selbst einsetzen. Und mehr noch. Es genügt nicht, wenn er sein Selbst als *Objekt* des Erkennens einsetzt. Die *Ganzheit* der Person und durch sie die Ganzheit des *Menschen* erkennen kann er erst dann, wenn er seine *Subjektivität* nicht draußen läßt und nicht unberührbar Betrachter bleibt. Sondern er muß in den Akt der Selbstbesinnung in Wirklichkeit ganz eingehen, um der menschlichen Ganzheit inne werden zu können (W I, 316).

By addressing the role of the self within the category of man, Buber's philosophical anthropology attempts to broach the perennial problem of anthropology – the participation of the observer in his or her subject – by making participation or subjectivity a keystone of his proposed method. Participation ensures that the individual does not participate in an abstract world, but in one that is concrete, a quality that previous periods of shelter, such as the space and time of the Platonic universe, and the faith in messianic time of an Augustinian one, are said to lack.

The house metaphor appears to resonate with a number of Buber's influences: the Jewish concept of *shekhinah*, the dwelling-place of the divine presence, or the longing for the

homeland of Jews in the Diaspora. It also appears to be an attempt to add philosophical weight to dialogue, which was criticised by both Franz Rosenzweig and Gershom Scholem. On reading a draft of *Ich und Du*, Rosenzweig feared that Buber's dichotomy between dialogue and monologue in fact negates the world: 'Ich will den Stier gleich bei den Hörnern packen: Sie geben dem Ich-Du im Ich-Es einen Krüppel zum Gegner'.[195] Buber's world of I-It is so impoverished as to be an ineffectual counterpart to I-You, yet contains common-sense elements necessary to avoid abstraction, such as the world of time and space that we inhabit. Gershom Scholem put it more strongly by being one of the first to suggest that there is no substantive difference between Buber's earlier mysticism and his later dialogue: '[N]och als er später versuchte, diese Mystik im Sinne seiner eigenen späteren Entwicklung um- order wegzuinterpretieren, blieb es noch immer, auch unter der Hülle einer neuen Terminologie, nichts anderes als Mystik'.[196]

Rosenzweig's and Scholem's indictments of dialogue appear to be borne out by the fact that Buber's philosophical anthropology does not stand up to metaphysical enquiry. In his examination of Buber's philosophical anthropology, Philip Wheelwright notes that, unlike Heidegger, Buber did not believe the discipline could yield a new metaphysical basis to follow on from the death of the old.[197] Indeed, Buber declares, 'Aber auch die philosophische Anthropologie selbst kann sich nicht zur Aufgabe setzen, eine Grundlegung, sei es der Metaphysik, sei es der einzelnen philosophischen Wissenschaften, zu schaffen' (W I, 314). A preliminary response to this paradox may be found in the same collection that contains Wheelwright's essay, *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, published shortly before Buber's death and containing both his 'Autobiographical Fragments' and 'Replies to My Critics', when

[195] MBB II, 124-128 (Rosenzweig to Buber, undated).
[196] Gershom Scholem, *Judaica II* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums', pp. 133-192 (p. 155).
[197] Philip Wheelwright, 'Buber's Philosophical Anthropology', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 69-95.

Charles Hartshorne begins his task of commenting on Buber's metaphysics almost plaintively, 'Buber has no metaphysics; Buber is one of the greatest metaphysicians'.[198]

The shelter that Buber appears to be looking for is based on dialogue and conceives of man as guaranteed by God as the Eternal You. However, this shelter is based on two paradoxes inherent in dialogue: first, Buber's later description of the Eternal You as an absolute person in *Gottesfinsternis* in 1953 (W I, 176), which is a *contradictio in adjecto* that deliberately combines the relative with the absolute; and second, the call to the philosophical anthropologist to overcome the separation of body and spirit by to taking into account his or her own incorporation within the field of his or her study. Buber attempts to destabilising the top-down, objectivist approach of philosophical anthropology by incorporating subjectivity of viewer. These dilemmas appear to be based on, and resolved by, the figure of the *Übermensch*, who plays the role of the Bacchant in Buber's philosophical anthropology. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', the *Übermensch* as a metonymical representation of Nietzsche is distanced yet encountered through the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*. Consequently, the absolute person becomes the Dionysian world artist, while in the character of the philosophical anthropologist we again encounter the recurring figure of the Bacchant in Buber's oeuvre. The defining features of Buber's Bacchant are that he or she is an ephebic character misreading a precursor character simultaneously through the revisionary ratios of *tessera* and *daemonization*, while being read at the same time by another. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber urges the philosophical anthropologist not to allow his or her own subjectivity to be separated off and perform as an object that is independent from his or her point of view. The reduction of the philosophical anthropologist's subject into object is an example of *enantiodromia*, against which Buber has warned on numerous occasions, most importantly in his warning in his lectures on 'Religion als Gegenwart' that mysticism is a hypostasis of pure relation ('Das, was man in der Mystik

[198] Charles Hartshorne, 'Martin Buber's Metaphysics', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 49-68 (p. 49).

zumeist Vereinigung, Unio nennt, bedeutet [...] eine Hypostasierung der reinen Beziehung').[199] There as now, Buber attempts to avoid this reduction, whereby maintaining a distinction causes the duality to collapse in on itself. Instead, Buber's encourages the philosophical anthropologist to bring body and spirit not into an illusory unity, but into creative tension with one another by taking on the features of the Bacchant. On the one hand, the philosophical anthropologist is able to do this because the reading or reception of other human individuals is already essential to the anthropologist. On the other, Buber's addition is to make the anthropologist aware of his or her own performance within the field of study, or of being read in turn. Consequently, 'Was ist der Mensch?' becomes a manual on the actualisation of the philosophical anthropologist as Bacchant, following a trajectory similar to the one established in Buber's work on Hasidism in chapter 3. As this chapter intends to demonstrate, Buber's philosophical anthropologist is modelled on the *Übermensch* through Nietzsche's concepts of self-overcoming and the innocence of becoming. The house that Buber is trying to build is the same house that occurs at the end of 'Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung' in *Also sprach Zarathustra*: 'Manches Haus giebt es noch zu bauen!' (KSA 4, 149).

THE DEATH OF GOD, *DER ANTICHRIST* AND ANIMALS

On a metadiegetic level, Buber's philosophical anthropologist is encouraged to become aware of his or her own diegetic role within his or her field of study. On an extradiegetic level, Buber's explicit engagement with Nietzsche in 'Was ist der Mensch?' represents a *mise en abyme* of his dialogic method, where philosophical anthropology itself is based on reception as an anxiety of influence. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber again distances himself from Nietzsche, although he is given prominence by being placed at the very end of Buber's history of philosophical anthropology. Buber credits Nietzsche with radicalising the eponymous question

[199] Buber, 'Religion als Gegenwart', pp. 118.

like no other thinker before him, but engages him on a number of specific points, namely the will to power as an end in itself, Nietzsche's reduction of man to an animal, and the death of God. In a continuation of his anxiety of influence, Buber pushes his reading of Nietzsche to two extremes, simultaneously through *tessera* and *daemonization*.

Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche becomes particularly clear when Buber addresses Nietzsche's attempt to understand man as just another animal:

> Nietzsche hat, wie wir sahen, mit leidenschaftlichem Ernst es unternommen, den Menschen aus der Tierwelt zu verstehen; dabei ist aber die spezifische Problematik des Menschen nicht verblaßt, sie ist sichtbarer als je geworden. Nur wird auf dem Boden dieser Auffassung nicht mehr gefragt: wie ist es zu verstehen, daß es ein Wesen wie der Mensch gibt?, sondern: wie ist es zu verstehen, daß ein Wesen wie der Mensch aus der Tierwelt hervorgegangen und herausgetreten ist? Das aber hat Nietzsche trotz allem, was er vom Anfang bis zum Ende seines Denkens herangetragen hat, uns nicht verständlich gemacht (W I, 350).

In these lines, Buber appears to be addressing a number of Nietzsche's reflections on animals, including *Also sprach Zarathustra* and *Der Antichrist*. In *Also sprach Zarathustra*, as we have seen in Buber's discussion of Hermann Bahr in 'On Viennese Literature' in chapter 1, man is a tightrope walker between the animals and the *Übermensch*, rooted on ground but aiming for the sublime. This particular characterisation is carried on into *Der Antichrist*, where it is embedded not only within Nietzsche's history of philosophical anthropology, but also within his own anxiety of influence. The voice of paragraph 14, for instance, is focalised through the first person plural, which eliminates the distinction between the person who used to think in a certain way and the person who thinks about philosophical anthropology now, as well as between the reader and the writer. This voice expresses relief at our modesty that we no longer define man from above through God, but from below among the animals ('Wir leiten den Menschen nicht mehr vom „Geist", von der „Gottheit" ab, wir haben ihn unter die Thiere zurückgestellt', KSA 6, 180). In its reflection on method that includes its own, the voice in this passage exhibits an anxiety of influence towards previous generations through *tessera* and *daemonization*, with its very own Bacchant in the form of Descartes ('Auch stellen wir logischer Weise den Menschen nicht bei Seite, wie noch Descartes that', KSA 6, 180). The

tessera is plain to see in its refusal to define man from a divine perspective. The *daemonization*, however, comes to the fore in the ambivalent image of sickness ('der Mensch ist, relativ genommen, das missrathenste Thier, das krankhafteste, das von seinen Instinkten am gefährlichste<n> abgeirrte — freilich, mit alle dem, auch das interessanteste!', KSA 6, 180), in the criticism of scientific language and that way in which it negates free will ('Das alte Wort „Wille" dient nur dazu, eine Resultante zu bezeichnen, eine Art individueller Reaktion, die nothwendig auf eine Menge theils widersprechender, theils zusammenstimmender Reize folgt: — der Wille „wirkt" nicht mehr, „bewegt" nicht mehr…', KSA 6, 180), and in the metaphor of the tortoise, which turns *tessera* on its head:

> Ehemals sah man im Bewusstsein des Menschen, im „Geist", den Beweis seiner höheren Abkunft, seiner Göttlichkeit; um den Menschen zu vollenden, rieth man ihm an, nach der Art der Schildkröte, die Sinne in sich hineinzuziehn, den Verkehr mit dem Irdischen einzustellen, die sterbliche Hülle abzuthun: dann blieb die Hauptsache von ihm zurück, der „reine Geist" (KSA 6, 180).

Nietzsche's tortoise metaphor is a performance of *enantiodromia*, such as we have seen in Buber's philosophical anthropologist. Here, too, Nietzsche's individual has separated spirit from body; however, in a comical image, the individual reaching for the heavens has turned inwards, like a tortoise, and has instead achieved nothing but his or her own physicality, thereby remaining animal. Nietzsche complains about pure spirit's rejection of the body as a mortal frame ('Der „reine Geist" ist eine reine Dummheit: rechnen wir das Nervensystem und die Sinne ab, die „sterbliche Hülle", so verrechnen wir uns — weiter nichts!…', KSA 6, 181), but through the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* still aims for the immortal in its absence. The consequence for Nietzsche's anthropology is that it remains as before: man is a tightrope walker, but the perspective, rather than being divinely ordained, comes from the human and strives for the divine.

Buber also exhibits a similar anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche when it comes to speaking about the death of God. Returning to the metaphor of the home, Buber ultimately declares Nietzsche a shelterless thinker:

> [A]ber die Stunde der nackten, letzten Einsamkeit kommt, wo die Stummheit des Seins unüberwindlich wird und die ontologischen Kategorien sich auf die Wirklichkeit nicht mehr anwenden lassen wollen. Wenn der einsam gewordene Mensch zu dem »toten« bekannten Gott nicht mehr »du« sagen kann, kommt alles darauf an, ob er es noch zu dem lebenden unbekannten dadurch sagen kann, daß er mit seinem ganzen Wesen zu einem lebenden bekannten anderen Menschen »du« sagt (W I, 365).

In this quotation, Buber complains that, by declaring the death of God, Nietzsche is unable to encounter not only God or another person but, in his solipsism, not even the world. Buber's logic regarding Nietzsche and the death of God is that, by applying internalised ontological categories onto an external reality, Nietzsche disappears into himself and endless relativism. Buber's Nietzsche re-enacts the *enantiodromia* of the tortoise in *Der Antichrist* but in reverse: by eliminating rather than turning towards the absolute in the death of God, Nietzsche with his negated sublime aims for the body but, by turning into himself like the tortoise, ends up as pure spirit. Through an anxiety of influence, Buber's Nietzsche aims for the physical but only achieves the metaphysical. Buber's *tesseratic* reading of Nietzsche becomes clear when he says that Nietzsche has no interest in the here and now:

> Er hat sich dabei um das kaum gekümmert, was für uns die anthropologische Grundtatsache und die erstaunlichste aller irdischen Tatsachen ist: es gibt in der Welt ein Wesen, das eine Welt als Welt, einen Weltraum als Weltraum, eine Weltzeit als Weltzeit und sich selbst eben darin als dies erkennend erkennt (W I, 350-351).

In a somewhat amusing contradiction that echoes the previous passage, however, Buber also manages to *daemonize* Nietzsche by concluding that Nietzsche can logically have no interest either in the integrity of the individual or of the absolute:

> Nietzsche freilich will vom Absoluten selbst nichts wissen, aller Absolutheitsbegriff ist ihm, nicht wesentlich anders als Feuerbach, nur ein Spiel und eine Spiegelung des Menschen; indem er jedoch den *Sinn* des menschlichen Seins in seinem Übergang zu einem »Übermenschen« finden will, setzt er sozusagen ein relatives Absolutes ein, und dieses hat seinen Gehalt nicht mehr in einem überzeitlichen Sein, sondern nur noch in dem Werden, in der Zeit (W I, 382).

Buber's Nietzsche has no sense of worldly time, yet is condemned to remain within it. However, by distancing him through *tessera* and *daemonization*, he ends up imitating the same anxiety of influence. Buber's assertion that Nietzsche looks away from the present moment echoes his statement in 'Zarathustra', where he claims that Nietzsche has no interest in the body ('[T]rotz aller Lobreden auf den Leib war Nietzsche reiner Intellekt', MBW 1, 111), yet

Buber continues to exhibit anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche both synchronically at any given moment in his career and diachronically across its whole development.

BUBER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The central question of Buber's philosophical anthropology is the nature of man, a question whose origins Buber traces back in its philosophical form to Kant (W I, 310). With reference to *Immanuel Kant's Logik: Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, originally edited by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche as far back as 1800, Buber writes that Kant distinguishes between philosophy in a scholastic and cosmic sense ('*in sensu cosmico*', W I, 310). Kant divides cosmic philosophy, which, pertains to the ultimate aims of human reason, into four principal questions, the last of which ('what is man?') Buber makes the original title of the series of lectures he gave in 1938. These lectures examine the history of, and contemporary responses to, philosophical anthropology. While the published origins of Buber's grappling with the topic may be traced from at least as early as *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* (1936), the 1950s saw the greatest proliferation of philosophical anthropology. Texts include 'Urdistanz und Beziehung' (1950), 'Der Mensch und sein Gebild' (1955), 'Dem Gemeinschaftlichen folgen' (1956), 'Schuld und Schuldgefühle' (1957) and 'Das Wort, das gesprochen wird' (1960). Buber's reflections, as with virtually all aspects of his highly integrated *oeuvre*, would continue for the remainder of his life.

The basis of Buber's reflections on philosophical anthropology, as he declares in 'Kampf um Israel' (1933), is dialogue. Maurice Friedman summarises philosophical anthropology's main task as the recuperation of man's wholeness and the 'problem of finding one essence of man in the constant flux of individuals and cultures', which he cites as another instance of Buber's 'narrow ridge'.[200] Dialogue, as Philip Wheelwright points out, rescues man

[200] Friedman, *Martin Buber*, p. 79.

from the purely philosophical or anthropological approach that belongs to the world of I-It or monologue; instead, dialogue places man in safety of the combined, concrete approach to the world of I-You.[201] Buber's innovation is the concept of relation or the 'between' (*zwischen*).[202] The linchpin of dialogue is the Eternal You ('Die verlängerten Linien der Beziehung schneiden sich im ewigen Du. […] Es vollendet sich einzig in der unmittelbaren Beziehung zu dem Du, das seinem Wesen nach nicht Es werden kann', W I, 128); it is the same intersection of all the lines of dialogue in the Eternal You that integrates Buber's philosophical anthropology into all other aspects of his thought by dint of describing the relationship between God, man and the world, a three-point wheel that Franz Rosenzweig identifies as a Star of David in *Der Stern der Erlösung* (1919).

For Buber, relation to the Eternal You, Buber's conception of God and the absolute, rescues concrete man and the world from relativism and abstraction, yet a shift in emphasis becomes discernible between 1923 and 1936 with the publications of *Ich und Du* and *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* respectively: whereas *Ich und Du* examined the relationship between man and God, Buber's philosophical anthropology instead prioritises the relationship between man and man. On several occasions, Buber insists that he reconciles the differences between these two perspectives. In 'Was ist der Mensch?' Buber declares, 'Die philosophische Anthropologie geht nicht darauf aus, die philosophischen Probleme auf die menschliche Existenz zurückzuführen und die philosophischen Disziplinen sozusagen von unten statt von oben zu begründen' (W I, 315). The nature of God as Eternal You essentially occupies the middle position between the first and third person, the second person, which is, at once and the same time, its greatest strength and greatest paradox.

[201] Wheelwright, 'Buber's Philosophical Anthropology'.
[202] See, for instance, Robert E. Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology: An Analysis of I and Thou* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 110.

God, the Eternal You who can be encountered exclusively through dialogue and cannot be reduced to an It. As a consequence, the Eternal You may never be abstracted into an It, into a being that may be analysed according to space, time or any other criteria. Buber's definition appears to be in keeping with the tradition of negative theology, which sees God as indefinable: the Eternal You remains above contingency, has no cause outside itself. However, to insist that God remains a person, a You, is a *contradictio in adjecto*. This crucial paradox for Buber that the Eternal You remains a person ensures that God does not become a function of man, and that God remains concrete rather than abstract. Through separation from, and relation to, this distinct Eternal You, a process that Buber terms primordial distance (*Urdistanz*) and relation (*Beziehung*), the individual in the guise of the anthropological observer both gains selfhood and is able to participate in the abstract category of man culminates in a collection of its constituent concrete individuals. In the contradiction of human and divine, of *tessera* and *daemonization*, and of distance and encounter, we may already hear echoes of Buber's Bacchant.

Anxiety of influence in Buber's philosophical anthropology: Nietzsche as simultaneous individualist and idealist

Through the Eternal You and the category of man, Buber seeks to avoid the dangers of relativism, which results in the permanent loss of identity in which nothing may be said simply to be. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber identifies two possible sources of relativism: 'Beide Lebensanschauungen – der moderne Individualismus und der moderne Kollektivismus –, wie verschieden auch ihre sonstigen Ursachen sein mögen: im wesentlichen sind sie Ergebnisse oder Äußerungen des gleichen menschlichen Zustands, nur in verschiedenen Stadien' (W I, 401). Individualism recreates the world anew from the standpoint of the individual, an idealist perspective, while collectivism renders the individual the mere expression of an overarching and equally unreal system. Buber admits that he himself had erred towards these poles in his

previous work. In *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, Buber writes, 'Diese Kollektivierung der Person knüpft sich geistesgeschichtlich an eine grundverschiedene Unternehmung, an der auch ich teilhatte und zu der ich mich deshalb hier bekennen muß' (W I, 262). In these lines, Buber is referring to his Nietzsche-inspired mystical phase, a creative moment of anxiety of influence not only towards Nietzsche but also towards himself.

Evidence of Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche may be seen in the confusion as to whether Nietzsche should be regarded as an individualist or collectivist. Of Nietzsche's doctrine of *amor fati* or love of fate, Buber writes, 'Im Individualismus unterfängt sich die menschliche Person, diese Lage zu bejahen, sie in eine bejahende Reflexion, einen universalen amor fati zu tauchen; sie will die Trutzburg eines Lebensystems bauen, in dem die Idee erklärt, die Wirklichkeit wie sie ist zu wollen' (W I, 401-402). By describing Nietzsche as an individualist, Buber again misreads Nietzsche simultaneously through *tessera* and *daemonization*: the *Übermensch*, the tacit embodiment of Nietzsche's individual in Buber's *tesseratic* description, strives for the absolute individuality yet, in a moment of *enantiodromia*, his love of fate ultimately propels him into the realm of the universal; the real individuality and encounter with God, whose death Nietzsche famously proclaims, is then claimed by Buber's *daemonized* dialogue.

Buber's reading of Nietzsche also focuses on the controversial doctrine of will to power, which Buber repeatedly renounces as a form of individualism or mysticism; indeed Buber mentions Nietzsche in several texts on philosophical anthropology, whom he blamed for being the source of a mystical form of romanticism that he no longer espoused, calling him a mystic of the Enlightenment ('Mystiker der Aufklärung', W I, 349). Will to power belongs to the world of monologue, Buber claims, because it is an ideation: it sets itself up as an ultimate reality but, without relation to another, may only refer back to itself and becomes an abstraction in the process, a projection layered over the world that may only be described as another

metaphysics. The will to power is point of contention in Buber's thought as early as 1925. In his 'Rede über das Erzieherische', an address to the Third International Educational Conference in Heidelberg, Buber compares the will to power and Plato's Eros as examples of direction with his own concept of direction towards God. In *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, Nietzsche's will to power arises in the context of the individual. In the section 'Trennungsversuche', in which he counters contemporary attempts to see the individual simply as part of the collective, Buber criticises Nietzsche's perennial resort to the will to power as no less nihilistic than Oswald Spengler's biological view of history, yet the main focus of *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* is Kierkegaard's eponymous category of the single one or single individual (*der Einzelne* in German or *hiin Enkelte* in the original Danish). Buber contrasts Kierkegaard's Single One with Max Stirner's unique one (*der Einzige*). Despite similarities between Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (1845) and Nietzsche, Georg Simmel considered the two irreconcilable:

> Dies ist auch der fundamentale und gar nicht zu überbrückende Abstand Nietzsches von Max Stirner, zu dem er, nicht weniger auf ganz oberflächliche Indizien hin als zu den Sophisten, rangiert worden ist; denn auch für Stirner sind alle objektiven Maßstäbe und Wertungen wesenlose Einbildungen, gespenstische Schatten, denen als einzige Realität das Subjekt gegenübersteht; daß das Ich noch etwas Übersubjektives bedeuten könne, daß es überhaupt in eine Ordnung nach Werten eingestellt werde, würde Stirner als schlechthin sinnlos erscheinen. In ihm hat die Sophistik ihre Renaissance gefunden und nicht in Nietzsche, der schreibt: »Ein Grauen ist uns der entartende Sinn, welcher spricht: Alles für mich!«[203]

Buber does not mention Stirner and Nietzsche together, but the depictions of individualism are alike: in establishing a relationship with God to the exclusion of the crowd, Kierkegaard is no better than the aristocratic individualism, which, as Golomb points out, Buber disliked so much in Nietzsche.[204] Buber also introduces Nietzsche's concept of the individual in relation to Kierkegaard, for whom Buber ultimately settles. In Buber's opinion, their greatest similarities are their flaws: neither Nietzsche nor Kierkegaard really pay attention to others, the centrepiece

[203] Georg Simmel, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1907), p. 234.
[204] Golomb, 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'.

of Buber's dialogue, and are classified as individualist. However, Buber gives Kierkegaard a reprieve:

> An der Stelle seiner Tagebücher, wo er die Frage ausspricht: »Und wie wird man ein Einzelner?«, beginnt die Antwort mit der in dem erörterten Belange offenbar gültigeren Formulierung, es komme darauf an, daß man, »was die höchsten Anliegen anlangt, einzig zu Gott sich verhält« (W I, 229).

In this passage, Buber sees evidence of a conflation on Kierkegaard's part of Jesus Christ's maxims, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself' (Luke 10, 27). Buber has to dig as far as the diaries to show that Kierkegaard supposedly considers neighbour ('Genosse') to mean 'der Mensch nicht im allgemeinen sondern der mir jeweils lebensmäßig begegnende Mensch' (W I, 229), whereas Nietzsche supposed allows no room for another person. While the status of *Der Wille zur Macht*, published posthumously and with dubious intentions by Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, and of Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, remains a topic of fierce debate, Buber need not have gone so far to find instances of the other in Nietzsche. Certainly, Nietzsche stresses the *Übermensch*'s need for self-sufficiency in the face of the death of God. However, while Zarathustra may be described repeatedly as lonely ('einsam') in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, he is searching for friends ('Freunde') who are not anaesthetised by an ideal, abstract reality. Nietzsche addresses his readers as 'friends', just as Buber dedicated his introduction to *Also sprach Zarathustra*, a work of juvenilia dated 1896 to 1897, to his own 'zukünftig[e] Freund[e]' (MBW 1, 103).

The 1938 lecture series 'Was ist der Mensch?' continues to dissociate itself from Nietzsche. On the one hand, Nietzsche is credited with sweeping away obsolete, and by extension false, securities. The first half of the lectures in their published form, *Das Problem des Menschen*, deals with the origins of anthropology. Nietzsche is given a place of honour by being the very last figure to be examined. On the other, Buber chides Nietzsche for not offering a new security in its place. Buber examines Nietzsche at the same time as Ludwig Feuerbach,

who is credited with discovering the dialogic principle but falling short insofar as Feuerbach's God is a mere projection or mirroring of humanity:

> Nietzsche freilich will vom Absoluten selbst nichts wissen, aller Absolutheitsbegriff ist ihm, nicht wesentlich anders als Feuerbach, nur ein Spiel und eine Spiegelung des Menschen; indem er jedoch den *Sinn* des menschlichen Seins in seinem Übergang zu einem »Übermenschen« finden will, setzt er sozusagen ein relatives Absolutes ein, und dieses hat seinen Gehalt nicht mehr in einem überzeitlichen Sein, sondern nur noch in dem Werden, in der Zeit (W I, 382).

Buber also criticises Nietzsche specifically on his theories of power, guilt and promising, which appear to absolve the individual from any form of responsibility. The second half of 'Was ist der Mensch?' deals with modern responses to the problem of philosophical anthropology, focusing specifically on Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger, remarkably in comparison with Nietzsche throughout. Buber equates Nietzsche with Heidegger insofar as they both respond to the death of God in the same way: Heidegger's ontological examination of being (*Sein*) represents a form of self-communication, of self-reference, that consequently cannot engage either with God or with others. Buber also laments that Nietzsche denies man as an ontological category by declaring man an animal. The ontological criticism of Nietzsche continues into Buber's critique of Scheler. Using Nietzsche to illustrate common flaws with Scheler, Buber declares that the *Übermensch*, as an absolute in the future dependent on man, creates a relative absolute ('indem er jedoch den Sinn des menschlichen Seins in seinem Übergang zu einem »Übermenschen« finden will, setzt er sozusagen ein relatives Absolutes ein', W I, 382) that, in its temporality, succeeds simply in introducing another metaphysics. To insist that the *Übermensch* establishes a metaphysics that could be said to have a traditional ontological status is an unusual reading of Nietzsche; nor would it be all too far-fetched to describe the paradox of the I-You as a particular kind of relative absolute.

At this stage, it may already be contended that Buber's descriptions of Heidegger and Scheler, let alone Nietzsche, are not unorthodox, but not necessarily accurate either. For instance, while Heidegger does attempt to isolate being and thereby create a new metaphysics,

it cannot be said that this being has no room for other individuals.[205] Bearing in mind the state of Nietzsche reception at the time may shed light on Buber's motivation for his own reading of Nietzsche. Scholars such as the contributors to *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?* as well as Aschheim note the centrality of the doctrine of will to power in the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche.[206] While the will to power was considered in terms of direction by Buber as early as 1925, the doctrine gradually becomes aligned with the self-reference of Heidegger's *Dasein* from 1936 onwards and becomes the central focus of Buber's critique of Nietzsche in *Gottesfinsternis*. During this period, Alfred Baeumler's *Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker* (1931) and Heidegger's lecture series on Nietzsche, which ran from 1936 to 1940, as well as his rectorate speech, 'Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität' (1933), may have begun to exert their influence on Buber's reception of Nietzsche. Noting Buber's defensive stance towards Nietzsche not only in *Die Frage an den Einzelnen* but also in 'Le-torath ha-adam shel Nietzsche', Golomb insists that it is Buber's sense of dialogue and community, not Nietzsche's Nazism nor even his Nazi appropriation, that made Buber neglect Nietzsche and turn to Kierkegaard.[207] Golomb also emphasises the necessity to accommodate the Zionist and often anti-German intelligentsia after Buber's move to the British Mandate of Palestine in 1938. Accepting Golomb's observations, I do not see why these two phenomena should be mutually exclusive. That Buber did not just make a limp attempt to defend Nietzsche against misappropriation, as Golomb suggests, but actively avoided naming Nietzsche as an authority for dialogue, is borne out by his critique in 'Was ist der Mensch?' (W I, 344-348) of Nietzsche's nationalism and will to power, the idea that a nation's greatness depends on its acquisition of

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[205] Haim Gordon, *The Heidegger-Buber Controversy: The Status of the I-Thou* (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2001), ch. 11, 'Buber's Critique of Heidegger', pp. 151-158.
[206] *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy*, ed. by Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy*, ch. 8, 'Nietzsche in the Third Reich', pp. 232-271.
[207] Buber, 'Le-torath ha-adam shel Nietzsche', *Gilyonot*, 7 (1938), 279-285, quoted in Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion*, p. 183.

power. This reading of Nietzsche could have been influenced only by the controversial *Wille zur Macht*.

The *Übermensch* as Bacchant in Buber's philosophical anthropology

In Buber's philosophical anthropology, the figure of the *Übermensch* becomes the latest iteration of Buber's Bacchant, whom the philosophical anthropologist both distances yet encounters through an anxiety of influence. Buber deals directly with Nietzsche's *Übermensch* throughout his philosophical anthropology but, like the Bacchant, misreads the figure in mutually exclusive directions. On the one hand, Buber's main criticism appears to be the *tesseratic* complaint that the *Übermensch* entails the annihilation of the individual and the creation of a new metaphysics, the will to power. On the other, Buber praises Nietzsche for questioning man and making the category relative, but *daemonizes* him by reproaches him for not providing an answer and failing to offer a new absolute. The simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization* becomes particularly clear in *Gottesfinsternis*, when Buber rightfully discusses Nietzsche's concept of the *Übermensch* within the context of the death of God. In a section entitled 'Religion und Ethik', Buber highlights the relationship between the absolute and the universal in Nietzsche thought ('Nietzsche hat, so gründlich wie nicht viele moderne Denker vor ihm, gewußt, daß die Absolutheit der ethischen Werte in unserer Beziehung zum Absoluten wurzelt', W I, 587). Quoting from Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, Buber writes, 'Der Nihilismus jedoch soll nun dadurch überwunden werden, daß ein Ziel geschaffen wird »das über der Menschheit stehenbleibt und über dem Einzelnen«, und das heißt, daß durch Nietzsches Lehre vom Übermenschen ein neues Ziel, ein neuer Sinn des Daseins und neue Werte gesetzt werden' (KSA 10, 653, quoted in W I, 587). In a *tesseratic* reading of Nietzsche, Buber rejects the creation of a goal above humanity, yet in so doing retains a *daemonized* claim to a more authentic individual. Buber also writes, 'Aber [Nietzsche] hat diese Proklamation [»Gott ist

tot«] nicht als Endpunkt, nur als Wendepunkt ertragen können. Immer wieder versucht er den Gedanken eines Ausgangs zu fassen, der Gott für die gottlos Gewordenen rettete' (W I, 588). The claim that Nietzsche was unable to go far enough in his declaration of God's death is symptomatic of *tessera*, yet in a negative sublime Buber *daemonizes* Nietzsche by rescuing the divine.

Buber's misreading manages to distance the *Übermensch*, who is already a transitional figure who straddles Nietzsche's own anti-metaphysical and metaphysical phases, first appearing in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* in Nietzsche's middle period, but only being properly elaborating in *Also sprach Zarathustra* at the beginning of Nietzsche's metaphysical late period. Yet Buber also manages to encounter the figure whom he misreads. There are many instances when Nietzsche confronts the concept of the individual and individuality, beginning with Apollo and Dionysus and the dissolution of Schopenhauer's *principium individuationis* as elaborated in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*; through the *Übermensch*, whose arrival is prophesied in *Also sprach Zarathustra*; and finally the sovereign individual (*das souveraine Individuum*) who, as Aaron Ridley notes, makes an explicit appearance only in the second essay of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, entitled '"Schuld", "Schlechtes Gewissen" und Verwandtes', yet becomes the guiding principle in Nietzsche's coming-to-terms with the notion of freedom, as the other essays in the recently-published *Nietzsche on Autonomy and Freedom* attest.[208] In his examination of Buber's transition from mysticism to dialogue, Mendes-Flohr summarises the problem of individuation at Buber's time from the broader perspective of German idealism, which from Kant onwards takes as its starting point the mind as the most basic reality.[209] Arthur Schopenhauer describes individuation in terms of space and time, the defining features of *principium individuationis*: neither may two individuals occupy

[208] Aaron Ridley, 'Nietzsche's Intentions: What the Sovereign Individual Promises', in *Nietzsche on Autonomy and Freedom*, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 181-195.
[209] Mendes-Flohr, *From Mysticism to Dialogue,* pp. 50-62. See also Nuno Nabais, 'The Individual and Individuality in Nietzsche', *Pli*, 12 (2001), 131-164.

the same space at the same time; nor may any individual be in two places at the same time. In a manner that takes its cue from his interpretation of Buddhism, Schopenhauer's philosophy is pessimistic both in the technical and vulgar sense in its attempts to escape the prison of individuation and all the suffering that it entails through aesthetics, defined here as pure appreciation that is not willed by the individual, the liberation from the will. Nietzsche, deeply influenced by Schopenhauer, may share the latter's pessimistic worldview, but he is not a nihilist. Adapting Schopenhauer's model of individuation, Nietzsche seeks to affirm the individual with the twofold movement of recovering the will and banishing transcendence: the death of God and the death of metaphysics. The extent to which Nietzsche, whose thought undergoes many permutations, may be classified as a metaphysician is a common point of debate. On the one hand, Heidegger insisted that Nietzsche paved the way for the renewal of metaphysics; on the other, Walter Kaufmann would be the classical opponent to this view, arguing that Nietzsche was in fact anti-metaphysical.[210] Scholars such as Kaufmann who divide Nietzsche into early, middle and late periods often see a return in the late period of Nietzsche's earlier metaphysics. Such views regard Apollo and Dionysus in the early *Geburt der Tragödie* as metaphysical on the grounds of their correspondence to appearance (*Schein*) and reality (*Sein*) respectively, the very dualism at the heart of Platonic metaphysics. At this stage of the development of his thought, Nietzsche warns against the *principium individuationis*: Apollo represents the individuated universe, but this is mere appearance, the veil of Maya perpetually lifted by Dionysus, whom the individual encounters as the primordial one (*das Ur-Eine*). In Nietzsche's later period, it is possible to apply the medieval ontological categories of essence and existence that permeate the thought of early modern thinkers such as René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza: essence designates what something is fundamentally, in the plane of any given

[210] See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsches Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990); and Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*.

reality; existence its 'extension' into the world of appearance. From this point of view, the essence of Nietzsche's ontology corresponds to the will to power, since it describes everything that is, while its existence is resolved by *amor fati*: objects gain self-identity in the realm of space and time through endless repetition.

Buber's concept of the individual, in its *tesseratic* denial of transcendence yet *daemonized* maintenance of creative individuality, is in fact not so different from Nietzsche's *Übermensch*. The important point of similarity is the hermeneutic emphasis on distinction rather than assimilation on the part of the reader, whether *Übermensch* or philosophical anthropologist. This becomes clear in the similarities of Buber's death of the philosophical God and the concept of the liberated self with Nietzsche's last man. When writing about Hegel's concept of universal reason, Buber kills the God of philosophy no less than Nietzsche: 'Weltvernunft ist nur ein neuer Begriff für Gott; und wie die Theologie, wenn sie »Gott« sagte, nur das menschliche Wesen selbst von der Erde in den Himmel versetzte, so versetzt die Metaphysik, wenn sie Weltvernunft sage, nur das menschliche Wesen vom konkreten Sein in ein abstraktes Sein' (W I, 340). Instead, Buber proposes the liberated self:

> Das freigemachte Selbst wendet der Welt nicht den Rücken zu, seine Entschlossenheit schließt den Entschluß ein, wirklich mit der Welt zu sein, in ihr zu handeln, auf sie zu wirken, aber sie schließt nicht den Glauben ein, daß in diesem Sein mit der Welt die Schranken des Selbst durchbrochen werden könnten, und sie schließt nicht einmal den Wünsch ein, daß es geschehe (W I, 368-369).

What Buber appears to emphasise here is the need to differentiate the individual from others or, in dialogic terms, the I from another I *qua* you and implicitly from God, the Eternal You. In Buber's eyes, Nietzsche espouses a form of mystical individualism that abstracts the world and thereby threatens the authenticity of the individual, yet Nietzsche's description of the last man, the negative response to the death of God, bears a number of similarities to Buber's own negative counterpart. In the prologue to *Also sprach Zarathustra*, the eponymous prophet declares:

> Wehe! Es kommt die Zeit, wo der Mensch keinen Stern mehr gebären wird. Wehe! Es kommt die Zeit des verächtlichsten Menschen, der sich selber nicht mehr verachten kann.

> Seht! Ich zeige euch den l e t z t e n M e n s c h e n.
>
> „Was ist Liebe? Was ist Schöpfung? Was ist Sehnsucht? Was ist Stern?“ — so fragt der letzte Mensch und blinzelt.
>
> Die Erde ist dann klein geworden, und auf ihr hüpft der letzte Mensch, der Alles klein macht. Sein Geschlecht ist unaustilgbar, wie der Erdfloh; der letzte Mensch lebt am längsten.
>
> „Wir haben das Glück erfunden“ — sagen die letzten Menschen und blinzeln.
>
> Sie haben die Gegenden verlassen, wo es hart war zu leben: denn man braucht Wärme. Man liebt noch den Nachbar und reibt sich an ihm: denn man braucht Wärme.
>
> Krank werden und Misstrauen-haben gilt ihnen sündhaft: man geht achtsam einher. Ein Thor, der noch über Steine oder Menschen stolpert!
>
> Ein wenig Gift ab und zu: das macht angenehme Träume. Und viel Gift zuletzt, zu einem angenehmen Sterben.
>
> Man arbeitet noch, denn Arbeit ist eine Unterhaltung. Aber man sorgt, dass die Unterhaltung nicht angreife.
>
> Man wird nicht mehr arm und reich: Beides ist zu beschwerlich.
>
> Wer will noch regieren? Wer noch gehorchen? Beides ist zu beschwerlich.
>
> Kein Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer anders fühlt, geht freiwillig in’s Irrenhaus (KSA 4, 19-20).

As with Buber, Nietzsche distinguishes between the abstract and the metaphysical on the one hand, and the concrete on the other. In this passage the last man anaesthetises him- or herself with poison, wrapped up in the warmth of universal concepts that are likened to dreams, the hallmarks of Apollo’s speciously individuated reality. The last man stifles differentiation and, with it, individuality and will. Everyone is part of the herd, there is no shepherd, no one to rule or obey.

A number of important points that seem to distinguish Buber’s philosophical anthropologist from Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*, namely the latter’s goal orientation and lack of receptivity towards his or her neighbours. Nevertheless, this overlooks a number of important similarities, namely the limitations that *amor fati* places on the *Übermensch*, that both the philosophical anthropologist and the *Übermensch* are turned towards an indefinable direction, and crucially that both are oriented towards distinction. Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* is not just a separate and ideal God towards which humanity is oriented, as Buber suggests in

Gottesfinsternis (‘Wenn nicht der neue Gott selber, so muß doch ein gültiger Gottersatz aus dem Menschen selber hervorgehen, als der »Übermensch«’, W I, 588), but simultaneously a model for humanity and the individual. In the same way, the philosophical anthropologist separates himself or himself off from, yet turns towards, this divinity, like the Bacchant towards the Dionysian world artist.

BUBER’S ANTI-METAPHYSICS

Buber’s philosophical anthropology attempts to achieve security in a relativist universe; it seeks to escape traditional metaphysics, into which he attempts to place his precursor, Nietzsche. Of Spinoza’s concept of substance, according to which everything is composed of the same divine substance, thereby fusing God and nature, Buber writes, ‘Eine neue Sicherheit des In-der-Welt-seins ist nicht gegeben’ (W I, 326). By security, Buber understands a framework or shelter in which the individual is given his or her due place. Previous attempts have sought security in space and time, including Plato in the world of forms, and Augustine in the coming of the messiah. Spinoza’s flaw, according to Buber, is that substance buys security at the cost of the individual, who becomes a mere expression of God. Buber’s innovation in philosophical anthropology is to seek this security in the other. Nevertheless, for this security Buber claims the necessity of ontological categories safeguarded by God. Buber describes security as ontological and as being under threat by the death of God, a shared starting-point between Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Nietzsche, from Buber’s standpoint, appears to threaten being in a number of ways. Nietzsche’s man is described as somewhere between animal and *Übermensch*, and therefore has no independent ontological status. However, it is the *Übermensch* that proves to be the apparent obstacle to Buber’s dialogue on two particular and diametrically opposed fronts. First, the *Übermensch*, when placed in the position of the divine as Buber and Golomb do, becomes

a God of becoming, rather than a God who simply exists. Second, the *Übermensch* as a category of man is exhorted by Nietzsche continually to overcome his or her own boundaries and aim for a goal beyond, which means that man has no ontological status either. These two points depict Nietzsche's inescapable perspectivism as endless relativism ('Das bedeutet nicht, daß es die Welt, wie man gesagt hat, im Bewußtsein des Menschen »noch einmal« gibt', W I, 351). According to Buber's dialogue, the individual needs the other in order to guarantee his or her own integrity, his or her separation from another entity that prevents the individual from living in a fairytale of his or her own creation, or from being subsumed into a universal reality in which he or she has no significance. The ultimate other for Buber is God, the Eternal You, a You who may never be abstracted, may never become an It. Buber reads Nietzsche, however, in two mutually exclusive ways: through *tessera*, Nietzsche apparently hypostasises individualism into a form of metaphysics but, in an example of *enantiodromia* on Nietzsche's part and *enantiodromia* on Buber's part, falls back into solipsism and monologue.

Buber's philosophical anthropology appears to be a matter of ontology, yet Buber's category of man is based not on reason but on the ability for dialogue, which separates the self from, and allows it to participate in, concrete reality. Robert Wood, in his analytical study of Buber's ontology with reference to *Ich und Du*, notes the peculiar position that Buber's notion of being occupies. On the one hand, Wood quotes Buber as musing in his later days, 'I build no towers, I erect bridges; but their columns are not sunk in "isms" and their arches are not fitted together by means of "isms"'; on the other, in 1923 Buber had declared his ontology as 'reality grasped as being'.[211] Wood concludes:

> The place it points to is the Between, which is the presence of binding together subject and object in every act of awareness. [...] It is the place where subjectivism and (for Buber) its projected correlate termed objectivism are transcended by man's reaching *Being*, which encompasses and grounds Buber's *ontology*.[212]

[211] Buber, 'Interrogation of Martin Buber', *Philosophical Interrogations*, pp. 84-85, and 'Von der Verseelung der Welt', *Nachlese*, p. 149; quoted in Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, p. 110.
[212] Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, pp. 110-111

Buber appears to combine ontological being as a two separate poles, between which the world of relativity arises. Similarly, Buber's philosophical anthropologist distances yet encounters the tension between being and becoming as an inchoate moment, distanced yet encountered through *tessera* and *daemonization*. Consequently, Buber's philosophical anthropology also becomes a *mise en abyme* of Buber's own reception of Nietzsche. Buber's ontology is necessarily not as rigid as he claims, but an anxiety of influence towards the God of becoming. This becomes clear in the similarities between the philosophical anthropologist and Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming, or paradoxically becoming who you are, and between the God of becoming and the Dionysian world artist.

Ontology's failure to capture Buber and the God of becoming

There is an inherent tension between Buber's claims to being and the fact that dialogue does not stand up to traditional ontology, which is expressed in Buber's anxiety towards the concept of the God of becoming. Ontology is a branch of philosophy that examines the nature of being, existence or reality. Since Plato, however, ontology is also considered as virtually synonymous with metaphysics, the study of what lies beyond the observable universe or nature. As Plato makes clear in his oft-cited cave allegory, the observable universe is an illusion, an abstraction, a mere approximation of reality.[213] If we lived chained in a darkened cave and could see nothing but shadow puppets projected onto the wall, we would assume these figures to be real. However, everything we observe is but a shadow of its ideal form, an imperfect version of the category to which it belongs. The only way to reach the reality of forms – the world of forms or ideas – is through philosophical enquiry. The result is a duality between appearance and reality: what we observe is not real unless refined by philosophical enquiry. Whereas Plato describes reality as the transition from the concrete, observable universe to the abstract world

[213] Plato, *Republic* 7.514a.

of forms. Kant, however, in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, revolutionises Plato's ontological thought by considering the limits of reason. In this way, Kant effects an inversion of appearance and reality. Kant's world is an assorted mass of stimuli that are interpreted by the human mind into commonly held categories. The name Kant gave to this way of viewing the world was transcendental idealism: idealism because it views the mind as the most basic reality; transcendental because the mind is part of the ideal way of viewing the world rather than the real world itself. As a consequence, Kant's ontology is dependent on epistemology, the study of how we know. Kant differentiates a number of different kinds of knowledge, which may be synthetic or analytic, depending on whether the predicate is contained within the subject concept or not; and *a priori* or *a posteriori*, depending on whether can be known with or without experience. Kant's system hinges on the existence of the synthetic *a priori*, on categories known by all individuals before they are experienced in the world, in order to function. The result is that categories are no longer out in the world, are no longer 'real', but in the mind, are ideal. The real world, which Kant has reduced to mere stimuli, has become inaccessible. Everything is abstract, a construct of the mind, which itself transcends reality.

Attempts to analyse Buber's metaphysics, however, have tended to fall short. Charles Hartshorne argues that Buber has no metaphysics in the sense of dualism, but does have a coherent system in the tradition of the German Idealists. Hartshorne focuses on the terms relative and absolute, but stumbles on the expression absolute person: 'God is the sole individual whose individuality can be conceptualised'.[214] In this way, Hartshorne attempts to make relativity an absolute principle, which he terms 'Transcendental Relativity', but this misunderstands Buber's Eternal You in a number of ways. The problem lies in Hartshorne's conflation of absolute and abstract, and relative and concrete. Buber's Eternal You is not an abstraction: although God may be encountered only in relation, God is not ideal, does not exist

[214] Hartshorne, 'Martin Buber's Metaphysics', p. 68.

only in the minds of men. For Buber, it is the world of monologue, the abstraction that is relative. The Eternal You, by contrast, is the absolute yet exists in the real, concrete plane; in relation to this absolute, the world also becomes concrete. For this reason Buber declares, '[D]ie Metaphysik, wenn sie Weltvernunft sage, [versetzt] nur das menschliche Wesen vom konkreten Sein in ein abstraktes Sein' (W I, 340). For Buber, the absolute is concrete and real, the relative abstract and ideal. Charles Hartshorne's attempts to fit Buber's I-You into traditional metaphysics could never prove to be an adequate fit, since traditional ontology is by definition an abstraction for Buber. Previous thinkers have also sought to overcome this abstraction, a worldview that stifles the instinct that there is an individual with some sort of will, and has subsequently become a hallmark for existentialists: an abstract ontology cannot account for the concrete individual. As a response, Hartshorne develops Alfred North Whitehead's concept of process philosophy, as outlined in the latter's *Process and Reality* (1929), into a process theology.

The hallmark of this theology is the notion of a God of becoming in contradistinction to static God of being: rather than exist independently and dominate all that exists, the God of becoming co-exists with man and is dependent on him. However, Buber dissociates himself from the idea of a God of becoming because of the risk of individualism: like Kierkegaard and the eponymous question to the Single One that Buber discusses in *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, how can the individual, like Abraham about to sacrifice his son Isaac, be sure that it is indeed God's voice that we are hearing and not our own abstraction? Rivka Horwitz, in her important analysis of the lectures 'Religion als Gegenwart', echoes Buber's claims that he abandons a God of becoming even before this point.[215] Friedman, conversely, argues that Buber does not exactly give up the idea of a God of becoming, more that the terminology does not apply.[216]

[215] Rivka Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"*, p. 33.
[216] Friedman, *Martin Buber*, ch. 24, 'Symbol, Myth, and History', pp. 225-238.

Nietzsche, too, is accused, although in this particular case positively, of advocating a God of becoming in his still youthful 'Ein Wort über Nietzsche und die Lebenswerte', published in 1900, the year of Nietzsche's death. Instead, Buber attempts to create a less metaphysical concrete and a less contingent absolute: Buber's God is not contingent on man, nor is God the relative absolute of Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, an apparent contradiction in terms. In this way, Buber attempts to eliminate the threat of abstraction from the living God, who cannot simply be described as the philosophical God of being.

Buber was acquainted with Whitehead at least as early as when Hugo Bergmann wrote to him concerning an article that would subsequently become 'Der Physiker Whitehead'.[217] Whitehead began his career as a mathematician and made significant contributions to philosophy as well. The most important aspect of his metaphysics is the emphasis on becoming over being, reprising Heraclitus' side in his antithesis to Parmenides, where the latter declared that everything is static, the former that everything is in flux. Nietzsche has traditionally been seen to be Heraclitan, not least because of continual direct references to Heraclitus, but also on account of his philosophy of time: as Manuel Dries points out at length, Nietzsche's *oeuvre* may be described as a 'critique of staticism'.[218] Friedman is not entirely correct in his summary of Whitehead when he declares that the latter does not emphasise the 'transcendent as well as immanent, absolute as well as in relation'.[219] In fact, there are many *prima facie* terminological similarities between Buber and Whitehead. Both attempt to integrate many disciplines, notably science, ethics, religion and aesthetics on Whitehead's part. Moreover, Whitehead was also looking for the concrete in space and time and warned against the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', that is, the abstract taken as concrete. Hartshorne describes Whitehead's process

[217] MBB II, 294-295 (Hugo Bergmann to Buber, 29.9.1927); Hugo Bergmann, 'Der Physiker Whitehead', *Die Kreatur*, Berlin, 2 (1928), pp. 356-362; quoted in Friedman, *Martin Buber*, p. 227.
[218] Manuel Dries, 'Nietzsche's Critique of Staticism: Introduction to Nietzsche on Time and History', in *Nietzsche on Time and History*, ed. by Dries (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 1-19.
[219] Friedman, *Martin Buber*, pp. 226-227.

philosophy as the search for a 'middle way', an adualistic metaphysics that is neither monist nor dualist; that is, neither one where everything made of the same substance, nor one that separates the world of the body from the world of the mind.[220] The key to Whitehead's epistemological realism is serialisation: by focusing on events rather than individuals – Whitehead's individual is a series of events that actualise themselves – Whitehead attempts to solve the problem of knowledge by being both perspectival (idealist) and independent (realist). However, therein lies the difference between the two philosophies: unlike Buber, whose priority is to salvage the individual from the threat of infinity, Whitehead denies the possibility of there being any single occasion; the individual, as a series of events, belongs to a metaphysics that is rationally analysable through imagined categories. This distinction places Whitehead in the same category as other process philosophers such as Henri Bergson, whose concepts of intuition (*intuition*) and duration (*durée*) Buber dismisses in 'Zu Bergsons Begriff der Intuition' (1944). From Buber's perspective, Friedman's claim that Whitehead omits the transcendent and the absolute is clear: without these characterisations, there is no separation between the world and the individual, who becomes absorbed into a meaningless series of supposedly rational events that are analysable as imaginary categories. Hartshorne develops Whitehead's philosophy into a theology, but the resultant conception of God cannot correspond to Buber's absolute person. Consequently, Friedman is able to place his finger on the thrust of Buber's objection to the God of becoming: 'To the metaphysician, and particularly to the Whiteheadian metaphysician, it cannot be comprehensible that Buber speaks of God as an Absolute Person [...]. To speak of God as the Eternal Thou, as Being in relation to Becoming, is to express the same paradox'.[221] Buber also describes Nietzsche as advocating a God of becoming in 'Ein Wort über Nietzsche und die Lebenswerte', which at this point has a positive

[220] Hartshorne, 'Martin Buber's Metaphysics'.
[221] Friedman, *Martin Buber*, p. 226.

connotation: every individual has the ability within him- or herself to realise the divine in the world. Here we encounter the traditional distinction between mysticism and dialogue: Buber moves from *unio mystica* or mystical union with the absolute to separation and encounter within the world.

Nietzsche's ontology: perspectivism as direction

Buber puts forward a type of concrete being that eludes traditional categorisation and Whiteheadian metaphysics. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', however, Buber writes this new being is threatened by Nietzsche. Whereas Buber's I-You relationship guarantees the integrity of both man and God, Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, a God of becoming, removes this crux: Nietzsche's God becomes a relative absolute who, rather than being above time, in fact becomes contingent on it. Buber's interpretation of Nietzsche follows what could be described anachronistically as a deconstructionist reading: for Nietzsche, everything is reducible to a given perspective, hence everything is reproduced in the mind of the viewer and remains abstract. Nietzsche, in Buber's estimation, is a subjective idealist, who strives for monism but accidentally falls into dualism, whose anti-metaphysics reinforce a metaphysical view of the world; Nietzsche's individualist perspectivism annihilates the other and, by extension, the self. However, here we see a reiteration of Buber's anxiety of influence. Buber's constant desire for renewal is expressed his reading of Nietzsche, who becomes a metaphysican through *tessera* yet collapses into the profane through *daemonization*. Although Nietzsche adopts Schopenhauer's pessimistic worldview that there is ultimately no guiding force in the universe, his ontology attempts to tread a fine line between a validation of the world and the individual. Schopenhauer counters Leibniz's optimism which proudly declared, like the ridiculous character of Pangloss in Voltaire's *Candide* in the face of one disaster after another, that we were living in the 'best of

all possible worlds', by declaring that we could no longer have faith in God and reason;[222] his alternative solution in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818) was to see the world in the eponymous terms of will (*Wille*) and representation (*Vorstellung*), and to advocate that the best course of action was liberation from the will through selfless aesthetics. Nietzsche, however, was not so nihilistic: if Schopenhauer is correct in his pessimistic view, then life and the world are in fact all that we have. Nietzsche's lifelong project, therefore, may be appropriately described as the endeavour to overcome nihilism; he seeks an inchoate moment that guarantees both the individual and the world, that combines both Schopenhauer's aesthetic appreciation with creation. Indeed, Buber appears to be reiterating Nietzsche's own anxiety of influence.

Nietzsche's anxiety of influence is evident in his conception of truth as correspondence, as a negotiation between what the individual sees and what there is in the world. The problem of truth in Nietzsche is examined at length by Maudemarie Clark. In her excellent study both of the problem itself as well as its treatment in Nietzsche reception, Clark considers three main kinds of truth: correspondence, where a given statement corresponds with reality; pragmatic, which considers a statement true in accordance with its utility; and coherence, where the essential criterion is the internal consistency of a statement within a broader system.[223] Clark categorises previous attempts to summarise Nietzsche on truth as traditional or non-traditional solutions. The two main figureheads of the traditional approach are Kaufmann and Heidegger, who adhere to the correspondence theory. Kaufmann asserts a denial of metaphysics and emphasis on the empirical in Nietzsche's philosophy of truth, to which the logical objection is that the will to power appears to have a number of metaphysical qualities. Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, conversely, is entirely metaphysical: Nietzsche's philosophy engenders the feeling of the loss of being and leads to the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth,

[222] See Gottfried Leibniz, *Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal* (1710).
[223] Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 12.

leading him to uncover true being and the new metaphysics. The non-traditional approaches to Nietzsche are characterised by the idea that the only truth is there is no truth. These approaches Clark further sub-divides into analytic and deconstructionist. The analytic approach is represented by Arthur Danto, who rejects the correspondence theory and therefore has recourse to either the pragmatic or coherence theories; the deconstructionist approach, such as Jacques Derrida's, is even more radical in denying truth altogether. Clark, in turn, proposes a combined approach: 'Thus, we have two different conceptions of truth as correspondence: the minimal version, which combines the equivalence principle with common sense or ontological realism, and the metaphysical version, which combines the minimal version with metaphysical realism'.[224] Clark's Nietzsche rejects the 'metaphysical' but accepts the 'minimal' correspondence theory. Since the correspondence theory of truth distinguishes between appearance and reality, this also constitutes a rejection of the transcendent, of metaphysics, of the thing-in-itself. Clark's Nietzsche accepts that there is a world ('ontological realism'), but rejects a world beyond ('metaphysical realism'). As a result, Nietzsche's theory of truth rejects subjective idealism.

Clark's account of the minimal correspondence theory of truth in Nietzsche is compelling insofar as it makes sense of Nietzsche's insistence on perspectivism, and his rejection of idealism and metaphysics. Nietzsche elaborates on perspectivism in the third treatise of *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, where he asks the eponymous question 'was bedeuten asketische Ideale'. Asceticism, the denial of the body and of life, corresponds with a yearning, even a will to power, for the next life, for an abstract life that cannot be. Nietzsche, like Buber, discourages both the rejection of the world and the self:

> Hüten wir uns nämlich, meine Herrn Philosophen, von nun an besser vor der gefährlichen alten Begriffs-Fabelei, welche ein „reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt der Erkenntniss" angesetzt hat, hüten wir uns vor den Fangarmen solcher contradiktorischen Begriffe wie „reine Vernunft", „absolute Geistigkeit", „Erkenntniss an sich": — hier wird immer ein Auge zu denken verlangt, das gar nicht gedacht werden kann, ein Auge, das durchaus keine Richtung haben soll, bei

[224] Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, p. 41.

> dem die aktiven und interpretirenden Kräfte unterbunden sein sollen, fehlen sollen, durch die doch Sehen erst ein Etwas-Sehen wird, hier wird also immer ein Widersinn und Unbegriff von Auge verlangt. Es giebt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches „Erkennen"; und je mehr Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, je mehr Augen, verschiedne Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser „Begriff" dieser Sache, unsre „Objektivität" sein. Den Willen aber überhaupt eliminiren, die Affekte sammt und sonders aushängen, gesetzt, dass wir dies vermöchten: wie? hiesse das nicht den Intellekt c a s t r i r e n ? ... (KSA 5, 364-365).

Among the transcendent, abstract concepts that Nietzsche criticises are pure reason ('reine Vernunft') and pure knowledge ('Erkenntnis an sich'), but also absolute spirituality ('absolute Geistigkeit'). The rejection of pure reason is an attack on Kant's epistemology; the unwilled, painless, timeless subject of knowledge ('reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt der Erkenntniss') targets Schopenhauer's aesthetics. Perspectivism, by contrast, is a way of situating the individual in time and space, the point of philosophical anthropology, but also accords him or her a will and crucially a direction ('Richtung'), an individuated point of view directed towards a non-dual world. Even with the transcendence of God, Buber and Nietzsche have in common the validation of this world, not of the next, while both would consider Heidegger's isolation of being a form of asceticism.

Nietzsche, far from being a subjective idealist, in fact attempts to recuperate the individual in the face of idealism. Buber's fears of Nietzsche's individualism recreating reality anew, are not entirely unfounded: Nietzsche's adherence to Heraclitan flux, will to power, man's status as an incomplete animal and self-overcoming threaten traditional ontology. However, Buber's own position has been shown to be just as complex: Buber's God cannot be captured or made in any way contingent on traditional ontology, yet is still said to be, while the individual resides in an ever-changing world. In this way, Buber's dialogue and Nietzsche's self-overcoming have in common a transition from the abstract to the concrete; from the individual trapped in specious individualism and collectivism to one who turns towards the concrete, real world. Nietzsche's self-overcoming is described at length in a passage entitled 'Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung' in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, which enshrines the doctrine as an integral component of the *Übermensch*. In this passage, Zarathustra speaks to the 'wise

ones' ('ihr Weiseste'); 'wise' used ironically here as those adept in traditional wisdom, that is, philosophy and its obsession with metaphysical truth. The wise ones attempt to shackle life to philosophy, which Nietzsche diagnoses as an expression of will to power: like Plato, who advocated that the Republic should be ruled by philosopher-kings, philosophers draw their strength from a philosophical worldview. However, it is this abstract worldview that Nietzsche seeks to overcome. Zarathustra snaps,

> Wille zur Denkbarkeit alles Seienden also heisse i c h euren Willen!
>
> Alles Seiende wollt ihr erst denkbar m a c h e n : denn ihr zweifelt mit gutem Misstrauen, ob es schon denkbar ist (KSA 4, 146).

Nietzsche's problem with the philosopher's will to truth (*Wille zur Wahrheit*) is that all that is ('alles Seiende'), a present participle that suggests flow and continuation as opposed to the substantivised form of being (*Sein*), is removed from the concrete and made abstract, made thinkable and reduced to mere thought. The philosophers make real life abstract, which is exactly Buber's complaint. These abstractions are compared with the image of a skiff placed on the river of becoming ('Euren Willen und eure Werthe setztet ihr auf den Fluss des Werdens; einen alten Willen zur Macht verräth mir, was vom Volke als gut und böse geglaubt wird', KSA 4, 146). Recalling Heraclitus' maxim that Socrates quotes in Plato's *Cratylus*, 'δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης' ('you cannot step twice into the same stream'),[225] the river carries within it the threat of a maelstrom: 'Weiter trägt nun der Fluss euren Nachen: er m u s s ihn tragen. Wenig thut's, ob die gebrochene Welle schäumt und zornig dem Kiele widerspricht!' (KSA 4, 147). This elemental image is often referenced in Modernist literature: from the sea that represents the infinite in Thomas Mann's *Tod in Venedig* to the same image in Buber's own *Daniel*. In Nietzsche's rendition, the wise ones' values ('Werthe'), placed in a skiff, attempt to face the sea, but are destined to fail by dint of their rigidity. This moment needs

[225] Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a.

constant renewal: ‘Und diess Geheimniss redete das Leben selber zu mir. „Siehe, sprach es, ich bin das, was sich immer selber überwinden muss […]“’ (KSA 4, 148).

Consequently, Nietzsche’s emphasis on renewal and relativity does not entirely constitute the abandonment of being as Buber supposes. Bearing in mind Buber’s own repeated exhortations to relate ever anew to God in *Ich und Du*, ‘Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung’ refers specifically to the values good and evil: ‘Wahrlich, ich sage euch: Gutes und Böses, das unvergänglich wäre — das giebt es nicht! Aus sich selber muss es sich immer wieder überwinden’ (KSA 4, 149). However, for Nietzsche as for Buber, the theological concepts good and evil are intimately related to abstract philosophical worldviews. In this particular passage, they represent the values attributed to the old philosophical God, the same static value systems laid abstractly over vibrant, concrete life. Nietzsche is not a subjective idealist; his world exists independently of the mind. Self-overcoming, therefore, represents the sweeping away of an abstract, inflexible being in order to encounter life, the symbol of the concrete. The individual cannot simply be commanded by life but must also obey it (‘Wie geschieht diess doch! so fragte ich mich. Was überredet das Lebendige, dass es gehorcht und befiehlt und befehlend noch Gehorsam übt?’, KSA 4, 147). In this way, Nietzsche attempts to reclaim responsibility for our own actions in a world that is not of our own creation. Self-overcoming represents the abandoning of the inauthentic self for one that is authentic, both in relation to the self and to the concrete world. The washing away of rigid values is evoked by the water imagery, yet Zarathustra also mentions a house (‘Und mag doch Alles zerbrechen, was an unseren Wahrheiten zerbrechen — kann! Manches Haus giebt es noch zu bauen’, KSA 4, 149). Zarathustra does not mean that everything is to be swept away into perspectivism, just that a new conception of the self is to be built in our new-found reality.

At first glance, Nietzsche appears to be enemy of being, confirming Buber’s concerns, not just in *Der Wille zur Macht*, where Nietzsche is alleged to have written, ‘Becoming must

be explained without recourse to final intentions [...]. Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not flow into "being"',[226] but also as early as *Also sprach Zarathustra*, as in the example of the skiff in 'Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung' above. However, even in *Der Wille zur Macht*, the kind of being to which Nietzsche refers is a being of 'final intentions', which is more a criticism of Hegel's teleological universal reason than being itself. The kind of being that Nietzsche discards is not the same that Buber reclaims but in fact the metaphysical one, from which he also distances himself. Nietzsche does not abandon being completely, as demonstrated by the subtitle of Nietzsche's retrospective *Ecce Homo*, 'wie man wird, was man ist'. The significance of this particular paradox is given sole attention in an essay contributed to a collection on *The Existentialists* by Alexander Nehamas, who traces its origins back to 'Schopenhauer als Erzieher' in *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* and *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, and even sees Zarathustra declare, 'Werde, der du bist!'.[227] Nehamas tends to resort to sources from *Der Wille zur Macht*, but his literary reading and emphasis on the idea of 'style' as a form of self-mastery on the basis of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* are in fact not all too dissimilar to Kaufmann's principle of sublimation, which holds that will to power constitutes the focusing and repression of drives (*Triebe*).[228] Quoting Amélie Rorty, Nehamas summarises, 'The unity of the self, which thus also constitutes its identity, is not something given, but something acquired; not a beginning, but a goal'.[229] Nietzsche's individual is not an abstract self-creation, but one who directs himself or herself towards the real world.

[226] KSA 8, 277; quoted in Alexander Nehamas, 'How One Becomes What One Is', p. 73.
[227] Nehamas, 'How One Becomes What One Is', p. 75.
[228] Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, ch. 7, 'Morality and Sublimation' pp. 211-227.
[229] Amélie Rorty, 'Self-Deception, Akrasia and Irrationality', Social Science Information, 19 (1980), 905-922 (p. 920); quoted in Nehamas, 'How One Becomes What One Is', p. 82.

BUBER'S SELF-OVERCOMING: FROM MONOLOGIC TO DIALOGIC TIME

In the past, Buber claims in 'Was ist der Mensch?', there has been an over-reliance on space and time for the absolute: a true absolute, conversely, must necessarily stand beyond or transcend such contingency in order for there to be a whole individual. In this way, Plato, for instance, resorted to abstract space and time for his world of forms, while Spinoza's concept of divine material also depersonalised God by creating a synonymous and infinite universe. Nietzsche is said to overcome these issues by making the concept of man itself problematic, but he merely heralds another period of homelessness. This new period is marked both by the death of God and the attempt to render time absolute, two factors that go hand-in-hand in the idealist God of becoming, who does not exist in the present but merely comes into being in the human mind. Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler, the two modern responses to Kant's philosophical anthropology that Buber analyses in the second half of 'Was ist der Mensch?', are both seen in the light of an overestimation of the meaning of time for the absolute ('Überschätzung der Bedeutung der Zeit für das Absolute', W I, 382). At the same time, however, Buber writes of achieving a sense of absolute in human life through the transcendence of one's own limitations:

> Das menschliche Leben hat seinen Absolutheitssinn darin, daß es seine eigene Bedingtheit faktisch transzendiert, d. h. daß der Mensch das, dem er gegenübersteht und mit dem er in ein reales Verhältnis von Wesen zu Wesen treten kann, als nicht weniger wirklich sieht denn sich selbst, es nicht weniger ernst nimmt als sich selbst. Das menschliche Leben rührt an die Absolutheit durch seinen dialogischen Charakter, denn trotz seiner Einzigkeit kann der Mensch, wenn er auf seinen Grund taucht, nie ein Sein finden, das in sich ganz ist und als solches schon an das Absolute rührt; nicht durch ein Verhältnis zu seinem Selbst, sondern nur durch ein Verhältnis zu einem andern Selbst kann der Mensch ganz werden. Dieses andere Selbst mag ebenso begrenzt und bedingt sein wie er, im Miteinander wird Unbegrenztes und Unbedingtes erfahren (W I, 365).

Buber advocates the transcendence of the individual in relation to the other, an absolute which he describes as boundless and unconditional. Buber eliminates the risk of individualism and solipsistic self-reflection by inserting another self as the guarantor of one's own self: the extended lines of every encounter, as we read in *Ich und Du*, intersect in the Eternal You.

Buber appears to be in two minds regarding Nietzsche on the subject of time. On the one hand, Buber believes Nietzsche to disregard time completely, in accordance with a deconstructionist reading of perspectivism:

> Er hat sich dabei um das kaum gekümmert, was für uns die anthropologische Grundtatsache und die erstaunlichste aller irdisichen Tatsachen ist: es gibt in der Welt ein Wesen, das eine Welt als Welt, einen Weltraum als Weltraum, eine Weltzeit als Weltzeit und sich selbst eben darin als dies erkennend erkennt (W I, 350-351).

On the other hand, Buber recognises a number of instances where time is essential to Nietzsche's philosophy: Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, for instance, is a goal that is to be achieved in the future through breeding, like Saint Augustine's messianic faith or the abstract perfection of Hegel's universal reason. Buber once again focalises on an inherent tension in Nietzsche's philosophy between the exhortation to breed the *Übermensch* and Nietzsche's perspectivism, which prohibits any teleological final intentions by Buber's own definition. Buber's indecision and focalisation are both indicators of his continuing anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche, whose paradoxes he distances yet encounters through *tessera* and *daemonization*: Buber reads Nietzsche through *tessera* when he describes Nietzsche as atemporal and therefore metaphysical, and simultaneously through *daemonization* in Buber's reclamation of ontology and being. This tension is reflected in the two types of time that Buber posits, cosmological and anthropological time, where the latter tends towards the isolation of *tessera* and *daemonization* that collapse into one another, the former to their simultaneity.

Nietzsche on time: The Dionysian world artist and the innocence of becoming

Buber's notion of time relies on his anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche and his concept of the Dionysian world artist, who creates time through perceiving and being perceived in turn by the Bacchant. As John Richardson points out in his attempt to tie together its various strands, Nietzsche offers no coherent theory of time, but the topic has been approached on a number of

occasions.[230] Among the aspects to consider are the early Nietzsche's theory of Apollo and Dionysus, the nature of perspectivism, the doctrines of *amor fati* and eternal recurrence (*ewige Wiederkehr* or *Wiederkunft*), and the philosophy of the future (*Philosophie der Zukunft*). The main question in Richardson's and Kevin Hill's treatment of Nietzsche on time is whether time is real (existent independent of thought) or ideal (a creation of the mind). In response, Hill compares Nietzsche with Berkeley, whose subjective idealism establishes the doctrine *esse est percipi*.[231] Accordingly, Hill sees the early Nietzsche rely on the idea of the Dionysian world artist who perceives, and thus ensures the existence of, time. Hill's late Nietzsche, conversely, asserts that time is real in a way that retains a hint of Berkeley: time exists because there are enough individuals around to constantly perceive it. This appears to contradict Clark's assertion that Nietzsche rejects all forms of idealism. However, Hill's solution makes sense of Nietzsche's adualism: there is no thing-in-itself, nor is there a distinction between appearance and reality, yet there remains a real, mind-independent world. Moreover, it is precisely this apparent contradiction that Buber maintains when he overturns Nietzsche's alleged rejection of the world's space and time at the very end of the second half of 'Was ist der Mensch?': '[E]ine einheitliche, raumzeitliche Sinnenwelt [gibt es] erst durch den Menschen [...], weil erst die menschliche Person ihre eigenen Sinnesdaten mit den überlieferten des ganzen Geschlechts zu einer kosmischen Einheit zusammenzuschließen vermag' (W I, 351). The world of sensory space and time comes about through the fusion of one's own sensory data with that passed down through humanity into a cosmic unity. Buber, like Nietzsche, asserts both the reality of time and its dependence on humanity through the figure of the Bacchant.

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[230] John Richardson, 'Nietzsche on Time and Becoming', in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 208-229.

[231] R. Kevin Hill, 'From Kantian Temporality to Nietzschean Naturalism', in *Nietzsche on Time and History*, ed. by Manuel Dries (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 75-85; see also Hill, *Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).

Hill and Richardson's accounts of Nietzsche's philosophy of time maintain that the notion of time is real, insofar as it may be the object of perception but not the product of the human mind. For Nietzsche, nothing is real that cannot be experienced. This conception of time also makes sense of Nietzsche's idea of the innocence of becoming: time is real because it can be experienced, yet it does not define the individual. The innocence of becoming prevents the individual from being absorbed into time, thereby reclaiming a certain sense of autonomy. Nietzsche discusses the innocence of becoming in a section of *Götzendämmerung* (1888) entitled 'Die vier grossen Irrthümer'. Each of the great errors that Nietzsche highlights is a form of the fallacy of causality. The theological concept of free will, the 'Irrthum vom freien Willen', has paradoxically shackled man into a deterministic view of the universe: 'Das Christenthum ist eine Metaphysik des Henkers' (KSA 6, 96). Theologians give man free will so that he or she may be made responsible ('verantwortlich') for his or her actions, resulting in the loss of innocence: 'Man hat das Werden seiner Unschuld entkleidet, wenn irgend ein So-und-so-Sein auf Wille, auf Absichten, auf Akte der Verantwortlichkeit zurückgeführt wird' (KSA 6, 95). Instead, Nietzsche argues that this is impossible, claiming that no one can be responsible: 'Dass Niemand dem Menschen seine Eigenschaften g i e b t , weder Gott, noch die Gesellschaft, noch seine Eltern und Vorfahren, noch er selbst [...]. N i e m a n d ist dafür verantwortlich, dass er überhaupt da ist, dass er so und so beschaffen ist, dass er unter diesen Umständen, in dieser Umgebung ist' (KSA 6, 96). Following such a description, however, man appears to be hopelessly determined. The fate of the world is the fate of the individual: 'Die Fatalität seines Wesens ist nicht herauszulösen aus der Fatalität alles dessen, was war und was sein wird' (KSA 6, 96).

If fate is read as the predetermination of one's actions, it would reinforce Buber's collectivist view of Nietzsche, where man is absorbed into will to power and merely becomes its expression. However, in Nietzsche's argument against causality and determinism, this

cannot be the point. Nietzsche introduces a sense of autonomy by declaring the abolition of free will to be a liberation *per se*: 'Dass Niemand mehr verantwortlich gemacht wird, dass die Art des Seins nicht auf eine causa prima zurückgeführt werden darf, dass die Welt weder als Sensorium, noch als „Geist" eine Einheit ist, d i e s e r s t i s t d i e g r o s s e B e f r e i u n g' (KSA 6, 96-97). Nietzsche's world is not a unity either as an expression of God or as a fusion of individuals. The responsibility that Nietzsche rejects is that of an ethical system, of a 'duty' or 'obligation' towards a universal good. Buber, like Kierkegaard's reclamation of the the absolute God of faith over the universal God of ethics in *Die Frage an den Einzelnen*, also makes this distinction. What Nietzsche reclaims is some form of autonomy to act in the moment, the innocence of becoming, which would retain the sense of responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*) that Buber emphasises: the ability to respond (*antworten*).

Nietzsche may deny the existence of God, to whom the response or answers (*verantworten*) are directed in the fullest sense of Buber's responsibility. However, the innocence of becoming reclaims the same sense of being in the moment that is integral to Buber's presence. Referring to the past, Nietzsche says we are not responsible for how we came about. Nor is future a question of ethical responsibility: Nietzsche states on the one hand that we are not responsible for what will be and that our own fate is inextricably bound up with that of the world, but that there is no aim ('Zweck') on the other, since we are part of the whole, outside of which there is nothing that can direct or judge us.

> Wir haben den Begriff „Zweck" erfunden: in der Realität f e h l t der Zweck… Man ist nothwendig, man ist ein Stück Verhängniss, man gehört zum Ganzen, man ist im Ganzen, — es giebt Nichts, was unser Sein richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen könnte, denn das hiesse das Ganze richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen… A b e r e s g i e b t N i c h t s a u s s e r d e m G a n z e n ! (KSA 6, 96)

The innocence of becoming also precludes Buber's reading of the *Übermensch* as an ideal man: 'Er ist n i c h t die Folge einer eignen Absicht, eines Willens, eines Zwecks, mit ihm wird n i c h t der Versuch gemacht, ein „Ideal von Mensch" oder ein „Ideal von Glück" oder ein „Ideal von Moralität" zu erreichen' (KSA 6, 96). Nor does the rejection of an aim or

teleological goal such as Hegel's Universal Reason, prevent Nietzsche from the turning towards the concrete world (*Richtung*) that he describes in 'Was bedeuten asketische Ideale?'. The denial of this *telos* as well as a *prima causa* is a source of great liberation and redemption: we can live our lives as we want, not as prescribed. Nietzsche, at one and the same time, appears to be advocating a lack of responsibility towards a predetermined aim, whether God or spirit; and even that there is no such thing as an individual. He also appears to suggest that nothing can give the individual properties, not even the individual him- or herself. Man is part of the world and its fate, but the world is not one great unity: man is able to simply *be* without being made a quality. By denying the God of being of theology and philosophy, Nietzsche's innocence of becoming appears much closer to Buber's idea of presence. Nietzsche's individual exists in the present: by taking away the notion of properties, Nietzsche recovers existence, just like the distinction between I-It and I-You. 'Der Begriff „Gott" war bisher der grösste E i n w a n d gegen das Dasein… Wir leugnen Gott, wir leugnen die Verantwortlichkeit in Gott: d a m i t erst erlösen wir die Welt' (KSA 6, 97). The God that Nietzsche dismisses is the static God of philosophy; Buber's God is the dynamic Dionysian world artist.

The radicalisation of becoming: Max Scheler as Bacchant

In 'Was ist der Mensch' in a section entitled 'Die Lehre Schelers', Buber writes that Scheler, more radically than either Hegel or Nietzsche, resolves the absolute in time. However, there are aspects of Nietzsche's temporality that Buber erroneously equates with Scheler, even though they are closer to his own. Nietzsche is accused of introducing, along with Heidegger, a metaphysics of self-reflection and, along with Hegel, of longing for a future beyond the here and now. Both of these are some form of abstraction. However, Nietzsche, in all presumptions of his loneliness, does not advocate either of these abstractions, nor is Buber's concept of being

so rigid as to deny Nietzsche's innocence of becoming. Consequently, Scheler appears to function as another Bacchant between Nietzsche and Buber.

In his later work, Scheler develops a dualist philosophical anthropology based on spirit (*Geist*) and impulse (*Drang*), attempting to combine Saint Augustine's emphasis on love with Thomas Aquinas' emphasis on reason. As Buber notes, Scheler was unable to complete his philosophical anthropology before his untimely death in 1928 (W I, 380). Buber writes with enthusiasm that Scheler also recognises that the category of man has become problematic, from which point he attempts to assess man in his or her concreteness: 'Scheler will nicht, wie Heidegger, von der Konkretheit des ganzen vorgefundenen Menschen abstrahieren' (W I, 381). However, Scheler's dualism dooms him to failure: 'Es ist aber zu prüfen, ob Scheler die von ihm angegebene Methode in seinem anthropologischen Denken mit aller Strenge anwendet. Wir werden sehen, daß er das nicht tut' (W I, 382). The problem that Buber diagnoses in Scheler's case is the radicalisation of becoming:

> Von hier aus ist Schelers Metaphysik zu verstehen, die seine Anthropologie in deren späterer Gestalt wesentlich bestimmt hat – die Lehre nämlich von dem »Grund der Dinge«, der »im zeithaften Ablauf des Weltprozesses sich selbst verwirklicht«, und von dem menschlichen Selbst als »dem einzigen Ort der Gottwerdung, der uns zugänglich ist und der zugleich ein wahrer Teil des Prozesses dieser Gottwerdung ist«, so daß sie auf ihn angewiesen ist wie er auf sie. Damit wird das Absolute oder Gott noch weit radikaler als bei Hegel in die Zeit eingesetzt und von ihr abhängig gemacht; Gott ist nicht, sondern er wird, es ist also eingetan in die Zeit, ihr Produkt geradezu (W I, 382-383).

Scheler's distinction between spirit and impulse takes the notion of the God of becoming to its logical extreme. Scheler's divine spirit is powerless except through the impulse given by man, God has no independent existence but becomes through man, which, according to Buber's logic, can only be an idealist projection.

Buber distinguishes Scheler's radicalisation of the God of becoming from both Heidegger and Hegel. Even though Heidegger, with whom Nietzsche is said to share the loneliness of self-reflection, also appears to resolve being in time, as the title of *Sein und Zeit* suggests, he restricts himself to existence (*Dasein*), the human expression of being in the phenomenal world:

> Man darf diese Grundvoraussetzung der Schelerschen Metaphysik übrigens keineswegs mit Heideggers Lehre von der Zeit als Wesen des menschlichen Daseins und damit des Daseins überhaupt verwechseln. Heidegger bezieht eben nur das Dasein auf die Zeit und überschreitet die Grenze des Daseins nicht; Scheler aber läßt das Sein selber sich in Zeit auflösen. Heidegger schweigt von der Ewigkeit, in der die Vollkommenheit *ist*; Scheler verneint sie (W I, 383).

What lies beyond the phenomenal world, Scheler also resolves in time. With Scheler and, by extension, Nietzsche and Hegel, therefore, we move from the becoming of the real world, the 'chaos of possibility', to the resolution of humanity at some given point in the future:

> Hat Heidegger statt des wirklichen Menschen nur eine metaphysische Essenz und Komposition, einen metaphysichen Homunculus betrachtet, so läßt Scheler seine Betrachtung des wirklichen Menschen von einer Metaphysik durchdringen, und zwar einer, die wohl selbständig erarbeitet ist und selbständigen Wert hat, aber doch von Hegel und Nietzsche tief beeinflußt ist, so sehr sie sich auch dieser Einflüsse zu entledigen sucht (W I, 382).

However, Scheler is much more radical than Hegel, since unlike the static notion of Universal Reason, the idea of God itself is resolved in time. Buber illustrates this difference by comparing Scheler with Spinoza: '[Scheler] nennt das zweite seiner Attribute nicht wie Spinoza mit einer statischen Bezeichnung, wie Ausdehnung, Körperlichkeit, Stofflichkeit, sondern mit der dynamischen Bezeichnung Drang. Das heißt: er ersetzt die Attribute Spinozas durch die beiden Urprinzipien Schopenhauers, den Willen, den er Drang nennt, und die Vorstellung, die er Geist nennt' (W I, 385).

Buber appears to equate Scheler's radicalisation of being with Nietzsche. Buber's categorisation of Nietzsche's *Übermensch* as a relative absolute appears to suggest that this is another instance of a flawed absolute, an absolute that is a mere projection of the mind. However, even within Buber's own writings, there is a recognition that Scheler did not arrive at the idea of a future ideal from Nietzsche. In fact, Scheler criticises Nietzsche's anti-Christian stance in his 'Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen' (1915). Buber himself writes that, even though Scheler was influenced by both Nietzsche and Hegel, Scheler moved on from Nietzsche in his earlier metaphysics to Hegel in his later metaphysics, to which the dualist concepts of spirit and impulse belong.

Even though Scheler appears to be a retrograde step compared with Nietzsche in Buber's history of philosophical anthropology, this does not mean he plays the role of the Bacchant any less than Maurice Barrès, who in Buber's juvenilia was said to surpass Nietzsche. Scheler, in Buber's reading, misreads Nietzsche through *tessera* and *daemonization*: he *daemonizes* Nietzsche by reclaiming God but misreads him through *tessera* because he manages to resolve the absolute in time. Scheler, alongside Nietzsche, is reduced to Buber's relative absolute, a fruitless contradiction that collapses into one another in terms when read in combination; what Buber retains through anxiety of influence, is the simultaneity of the relative and the absolute.

Cosmological and anthropological time

In his appraisal of Hegel and Marx regarding philosophical anthropology in 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber distinguishes two kinds of time: anthropological and cosmological time, following the dichotomy maintained throughout the rest of the lecture series. Cosmological time is the time of the universe, which Buber aptly compares with the movement of the stars. Anthropological time, conversely, cannot be tracked so easily: it is how we experience the moment but, as soon as we grasp it, it already becomes the past, a present relative to our current present and part of cosmological time.

> Die kosmologische Zeit können wir gleichsam umfassen, das heißt, ihren Begriff verwenden, als ob die gesamte Zeit in einer relativen Weise vorhanden wäre, wiewohl die Zukunft uns überhaupt nicht gegeben ist. Dagegen läßt sich die anthropologische Zeit, das heißt, die Zeit in Hinsicht auf die besondere Wirklichkeit des konkreten, bewußt wollenden Menschen, nicht umfassen, weil die Zukunft nicht vorhanden sein kann, da sie nach meinem Bewußtsein und Willen in einem gewissen Maße von meiner Entscheidung abhängt. Die anthropologische Zeit is nur demjenigen Teil nach wirklich, der zu kosmologischer Zeit geworden ist, d. h. dem Teil nach, der Vergangenheit heißt (W I, 333-334).

The distinction that Buber draws here follows very closely that between dialogue and monologue as described in *Ich und Du*, where dialogue, as soon as it is grasped, already becomes monologue.

'Was ist der Mensch?' looks for a new anthropological security in the universe after the collapse of previous worldviews in space and time. The spatial worldview disintegrated after Copernicus' discovery that the earth orbited the sun rather than the other way around. In response, Hegel attempted to build a house in time: the development of man would reach completion (*Vollendung*), or as Gregor Smith translates, perfection, through the dialectical process of history that culminates in universal reason. However, the house that Hegel builds would prove uninhabitable: 'Das Hegelsche Welthaus wird bewundert, erklärt und nachgeahmt; aber es erweist sich als unbewohnbar' (W I, 333). Hegel constructed his house in cosmological time, which is abstract, ideal, not real: it cannot be lived in as we live in the present, the here and now:

> Die Zeit, die Hegel in die Grundlagen seines Weltbilds aufnahm, die kosmologische Zeit, ist nicht die konkrete Zeit des Menschen, sondern seine gedankliche. Die Vollendung in die Wirklichkeit des Seienden einzubeziehen liegt im Vermögen des menschlichen Gedankens, aber es liegt nicht im Vermögen der lebendigen menschlichen Vorstellung; es ist etwas, was man denken kann, aber mit dem man nicht leben kann. Ein denkerisches Weltbild, das »das Ziel der Weltgeschichte« in sich aufnimmt, hat in diesem seinem Teil keine sichernde Kraft (W I, 334).

Cosmological time is predictably described, in Gregor Smith's translation, as intellectual ('denkerisch' or 'gedanklich'), that is, one that involves critical distance, reflection and invention from the mind; anthropological time, conversely, is experienced by the concrete, consciously willing individual.

In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber distinguishes anthropological time, the time in which we live at any moment, from cosmological time, a relative intellectual present that has already become past or future. Nevertheless, Buber appears to privilege anthropological time not only with the lived moment but also its simultaneous critical reflection, to which cosmological time is reduced. In this way, Buber distinguishes his notion of the present from Bergson's duration (*durée*), which he describes as a flowing present: 'Die Unterscheidung ist somit nicht mit der bekannten von Bergson identisch, dessen durée eine fließende Gegenwart bedeutet, wogegen das Organ für die von mir gemeinte anthropologische Zeit im wesentlichen das Gedächtnis ist,

freilich das stets nach der Gegenwart zu »lockere« Gedächtnis' (W I, 334). While this appears to refute the flowing Heraclitan notion of Buber on time, Buber's objection lies in Bergson's intuition (*intuition*), which allows the experience of the absolute through duration. Buber's present cannot be grasped as a whole. As soon as the present is grasped, it has already become memory. Consequently, pure presence has no self-consciousness ('die reine Gegenwart kennt kein spezifisches Zeitbewußtsein', W I, 334). The point that Buber is emphasising here is the separation of the individual from the absolute, which is neither experienced nor realised, but encountered.

Anthropological time appears to reflect an anxiety of influence towards cosmological time, to which Buber consigns all of his precursors. Through *tessera*, cosmological time becomes metaphysical and unapproachable yet, through *daemonization*, it becomes too momentary and restrictive. Buber's anthropological time is not real except insofar as it has become cosmological time or memory. Consequently, anthropological time occupies a dual status. Anthropological time is described both as pure presence and corresponding to cosmological time when it becomes memory, which is a contradiction in terms: cosmological time is conscious of itself, anthropological is not. Crucially, anthropological time that has become cosmological may be treated as if real. Following on from Bergson's example, Buber writes that cosmological time cannot be grasped in its entirety:

> Zwar ist uns auch die kosmologische Zeit, trotz unserer Kenntnisse über die regelmäßigen Bewegungen der Sterne usw., nicht zur Gänze bekannt, aber auch damit, was uns davon nicht bekannt ist, und selbstverständlich auch, was uns an künftigen Handlungen der Menschen nicht bekannt ist, dürfen wir uns in unseren Gedanken als mit etwas Wirklichem befassen, da im Augenblick des Denkens all ihre Ursachen vorhanden sind. Dagegen dürfen wir uns mit der anthropologischen Zukunft in unseren Gedanken nicht als mit etwas Wirklichem befassen, da meine Entscheidung, die im nächsten Augenblick erfolgen wird, noch nicht erfolgt ist. Das gleiche gilt von den Entscheidungen der andern Menschen, da ich auf Grund des anthropologischen Begriffs des Menschen, als eines meinen wollenden Wesens, weiß, daß man ihn nicht einfach als einen Teil der Welt verstehen kann (W I, 334).

Anthropological time that has become cosmological may be treated as if real because all its causes are present or at hand: they are not creations of the mind but are already becoming memories. The description of anthropological time as both pure presence and memory recalls

Nietzsche's assertions of the innocence of becoming and the reality of time: the individual is not dependent on time, living or simply being in the moment, yet time gains its reality through perception, into which being dissolves at every moment. Similarly, the cosmological future may be treated as if real because it has a bearing on life, but there is no anthropological future, because it has not yet been instantiated in the present.

Buber writes that man cannot be understood simply as part of the world. As Hill points out, the main transition in Nietzsche's philosophy of time is from Kantian transcendentalism to his own form of naturalism. Buber might argue that Nietzsche's mind is inexorably embedded in the world, but he also writes that only God transcends the world's chaos of possibility. Nietzsche's perspectivism situates the individual in space and time, and his innocence of becoming in presence. By being unable to escape the fate of the world yet experiencing it independently, Nietzsche's innocence of becoming also approaches the descriptions of presence in Buber's lectures 'Religion als Gegenwart' or even the virtually untranslatable neologisms *Einmaligkeit* and *Allmaligkeit* that Buber introduces in *Zwiesprache* (1929), in a section entitle 'Die Zeichen': Gregor Smith renders the former as 'happening but once', the latter adverbially as 'for all time'. *Einmaligkeit* corresponds to the lived anthropological time, *Allmaligkeit* to the cosmological, the philosophical. The former is described as a world concrete (*Weltkonkretum*) which cannot be analysed, the latter as a rational spatiotemporal world continuum ('vernunftgemäßige[s] raumzeitliche[s] Weltkontinuum', W I, 184), yet despite nomenclature it is the former that flows. The world continuum is described as remaining the same ('das Gleichbleibende', W I, 184), aided by the metaphors of looking things up in a dictionary ('Nachschlagen', W I, 184), or even being encased in armour, a shell or even carapace ('Panzer', W I, 183), perhaps recalling the metaphor become real of Gregor Samsa's metamorphosis in Kafka's *Verwandlung*. The world concrete, conversely, similar to Nietzsche's 'Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung' is described as a flood or flow:

> Der Glaube steht in der Flut der Einmaligkeit, die vom Wissen überspannt wird. Unentbehrlich für die Arbeit des Menschengeistes sind all die Notbauten der Analogik, der Typologik, aber Flucht wärs, sie zu betreten, wenn dich, mich die Frage des Fragenden antritt. In der Flut allein erprobt und erfüllt sich das gelebte Leben (W I, 185).

Hegel's house is uninhabitable because it is guaranteed by the mirage of cosmological time; Buber's house is guaranteed by faith in the presence of God, but its foundations, like Nietzsche's and Heraclitus', are dynamic, able to withstand the flow of the here and now.

CONCLUSION

Throughout his long literary and philosophical career, which began in the Viennese *fin de siècle* and ended in post-Holocaust Israel, Buber was a prodigious writer, voracious reader and charismatic speaker; he came into contact with an extraordinary number of the most prominent artists and thinkers of his age. His influences, which as he himself carefully lists in 'Was ist der Mensch?', his 1938 lecture series on his appointment as professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and in *Begegnung* (1960), his autobiographical fragments written towards the end of his life, were many. This thesis hopes to have demonstrated that, foremost among them, was the romantic philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.

In *Begegnung*, Buber acknowledges the powerful influence that Nietzsche had exerted on his teenaged self ('[E]s hat lange gedauert, bis ich mich loszumachen vermocht habe'), but claims that Nietzsche, unlike him, was never able to overcome the Dionysian ('Das "dionysische" Pathos hat sich hier keineswegs, wie Nietzsche schon früh im Sinn hatte, zum philosophischen gewandelt; es ist dionysisch geblieben, als dessen moderne Abart, von der Begeisterung des Dionysikers an den eigenen Höhen und Tiefen hervorgebracht').[232] However, these sentiments are not substantively different from those that he had written as a teenager in 'Zarathustra' ('Und auch Apollo und alles apollinische lernte ich vergessen, und Lionardo und Goethe und Böcklin', MBW 1, 105). This thesis has shown that Buber does not turn away from Nietzsche, nor does his attitude towards him change, as previous scholars have suggested.[233] Instead Buber appears to be in the grips of a Bloomian anxiety of influence.[234] In order to maintain his authenticity as an artist, the ephebe Buber distances his precursor Nietzsche

[232] Buber, *Begegnung*, pp. 16-19.
[233] See Bourel, 'De Lemberg à Jérusalem: Nietzsche et Buber', in *De Sils-Maria à Jérusalem*, p. 129; Mendes-Flohr, 'Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance', pp. 233-243; and Golomb, *Nietzsche and Zion*, pp. 170-171, and 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'; and Roemer, 'Reading Nietzsche – Thinking about God: Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig'.
[234] Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence*.

through two opposing revisionary ratios: *tessera*, where the precursor is misread as being too idealist; and *daemonization*, where the precursor is too human, leaving the ephebe to soar into the heights of divine inspiration. The first and perhaps most pertinent example again comes in 'Zarathustra' in the sickness metaphor ('doch zuletzt erlöste ich mich von meiner Krankheit, und nach deinem Rezepte, du alter Erlösungsgegner und Erlösungsschauspieler!' MBW 1, 104): Nietzsche, in Buber's misreading, is both sick with idealism and paradoxically mortal as a consequence. The result, as shown through the very imitation of Nietzsche's sickness metaphor, is that Buber in fact encounters his precursor in an inchoate moment when irreconcilable opposites meet yet remain separate: being and becoming, subjectivity and objectivity, aesthetic appreciation and creation, artist and artwork.

Buber's anxiety of influence towards Nietzsche forms not only the link between, but also the basis of, mysticism and dialogue. The link is made manifest in the recurring figure of the Bacchant, who first appears explicitly in *Daniel*, as a *mise en abyme* of the anxiety. Having just come from a theatre performance, the eponymous protagonist in *Daniel* describes the duality of the Bacchant he has just seen on stage: 'Und jetzt sah ich, nunmehr vollkommen klar und unverhüllt, *zwei* Wesen. Keiner der Zwei glich dem Mann, den ich eben noch angeschaut hatte; beide glichen ihm' (MBW 1, 226). To the viewer, in this case the protagonist Daniel and by extension the reader, the Bacchant is simultaneously a physical actor and mythical character. The viewer reads the Bacchant's role both through *tessera* and *daemonization*: the latter as a mythical character turned into flesh; the former as a physical actor turned towards Dionysus. Consequently, the Bacchant's performance is both an act of creation on the part of the actor and an act of appreciation on the part of the viewer. The figure of the Bacchant, although not explicitly named, recurs throughout Buber's *oeuvre*: in Maurice Barrès, whose reading of Nietzsche Buber enacts in his early literary criticism; in the Hasid in Buber's cultural criticism, who negotiates a mythical past become physical present, and who is read in turn by Buber's

equally dual German-Jewish audience; in Gideon, who re-enacts the same process for the reader of the Bible in *Königtum Gottes*; and in the philosophical anthropologist in 'Was ist der Mensch?', who treads the narrow line between idealism and realism, top-down and bottom-up, inside and outside, subjective and objective. The encounter between the self and the other is what unites, but also what separates, Bloom's anxiety of influence and Buber's dialogue: the mutual exclusivity of *tessera* and *daemonization* in Buber's dialogue also liberates the artistic individual from the strong appropriation implied by Bloom's anxiety of influence. In *Ich und Du*, aesthetic appreciation is in harmony with artistic creation ('So auch die Kunst: Im Schauen eines Gegenüber erschließt sich dem Künstler die Gestalt. Er bannt sie zum Gebilde. Das Gebilde steht nicht in einer Götterwelt, sondern in dieser großen Welt der Menschen', W I, 105). As a consequence, Buber's conception of God becomes a divine and ultimate precursor, Nietzsche's Dionysian world artist; the ephebic Bacchant, is both artist and artwork, reader and writer.

This tension needs constant renewal in order to be maintained, which is reflected not only in Buber distancing himself from Nietzsche, but also from his own mysticism. Nietzsche's influence on Buber's pre-dialogic thought is far-reaching: from application of Nietzschean aesthetics in 'On Viennese Literature' (1901), his literary review of Young Vienna; to the creation of myth in the Jewish Renaissance and the *Reden über das Judentum* that heeds Nietzsche's call for a renewal of Germany myth ('Ihm antwortete in wetteiferndem Wiederhall jener weihevoll übermüthige Festzug dionysischer Schwärmer, denen wir die deutsche Musik danken — und denen wir die Wiedergeburt des deutschen Mythus danken werden!', KSA 1, 147). In the face of criticism from more serious scholars of Jewish history and mysticism, namely Franz Rosenzweig and Gershom Scholem, Buber begins to develop his dialogic philosophy, eventually grappling with the supposedly heavier topics of history, biblical hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology. However, even in

these texts, Buber returns time and again to Nietzsche. In his biblical hermeneutics, Buber returns to the tension between life and spirit ('Vermählung von Geist und Leben', W II, 861) as the confluence of event and word ('Ereignis und Wort [stehn] hier durchaus im Volk, in der Geschichte, in der Welt', W II, 850-851). In the history of philosophical anthropology that Buber develops in 'Was ist der Mensch?', Nietzsche is given the position of honour at the very end before Buber discusses contemporary responses, underlining Nietzsche's significance. In another example of the simultaneity of *tessera* and *daemonization*, Buber calls Nietzsche a mystic of the Enlightenment ('Mystiker der Aufklärung', W I, 349): in this particular instance, Nietzsche is paradoxically both too rational as an Enlightenment thinker and too irrational as a mystic. Buber's anxiety of influence is underlined not only by Nietzsche's recurrence in his writings, but also by the dismissal of his former mystical self alongside Nietzsche.

The main scholarly contribution that this thesis hopes to have offered is a new and organic continuity in our understanding of the development of Buber's thought, specifically from the perspective of his reception of Nietzsche. The thesis agrees with Scholem when he writes, 'Was [Buber] an der chassischen Welt bewegte, war viele Jahre lang die Mystik in ihr, und noch als er später versuchte, diese Mystik im Sinne seiner eigenen späteren Entwicklung um- order wegzuinterpretieren, blieb es noch immer, auch unter der Hülle einer neuen Terminologie, nichts anderes als Mystik'; it builds alongside Israel Koren's observation that Buber's mysticism is not *unio mystica*, but *devekut*, a Hasidic mystical term that means devotion or, more importantly, 'clinging to God', by offering an alternative from German romanticism in the form of Nietzsche's Dionysus; it goes further than Jacob Golomb, who sees Buber's dialogic thought as a reincorporation of Nietzsche's Apollonian into his erstwhile Dionysian mysticism, by suggesting that this moment of reincorporation is not synchronic but

diachronic, that it recurs, and that it is necessarily and continually renewed.[235] In addition, the thesis has sought to shed light on what proved so attractive in Buber's mysticism, his work on the Jewish Renaissance and the *Drei Reden über das Judentum*, which led Ernst Bloch to declare, 'Neu erwacht der Stolz, jüdisch zu sein!'[236] Through the figure of the Bacchant, Buber was able to speak to the duality and longing for unity that critics such as Jacques Le Rider and Paul Mendes-Flohr see as inherent in his German-Jewish audience.[237] Moreover, the thesis intends to have contributed to the argument put forward by Weaver Santaniello and Nel Grillaert that Nietzsche is an intrinsically religious figure by offering another reader who paradoxically finds God in Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead.[238]

There are several aspects tangential to the immediate concerns of this thesis that might have been incorporated, or that might be developed in future projects. In the light of the thesis' focus on Bloom's anxiety of influence and the Eternal You as divine precursor, future projects might also integrate Buber's aesthetics into literary theory: fruitful avenues seem to be *The Dialogic Imagination* (1975) by Mikhail Bakhtin, and the reader-response criticism of Wolfgang Iser and Hans Robert Jauß.[239] Specifically Roland Barthes, who declares the death of the author in 'La mort de l'auteur' (1967), asserts in *Critique et Vérité* (1966) that the critic is just as creative as the writer, and who elaborates the aesthetic and political function of myth in *Mythologies* (1957), would seem a particularly strong point of comparison for Buber's Bacchant, who also treads the line between reader and writer, myth and reality.[240] Barthes'

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[235] Gershom Scholem, 'Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums', p. 155; Koren, *The Mystery of the Earth*; Golomb, 'Buber's *I and Thou* vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard'.
[236] Ernst Bloch, 'Symbol: Die Juden', p. 121.
[237] See Le Rider, *Modernité viennoise et crises d'identité*; and Mendes-Flohr, *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity*; and *German Jews: A Dual Identity*.
[238] See *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. by Weaver Santaniello; and Grillaert, *What the God-Seekers Found in Nietzsche*.
[239] M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1981). For a general introduction to reader-response criticism, see *Rezeptionsästhetik*, ed. by Warning.
[240] Roland Barthes, 'La mort de l'auteur', *Le bruissement de la langue: Essais critiques IV* (Paris: Seuil, 1984), pp. 61-67; *Critique et Vérité* (Paris: Seuil, 1966); and *Mythologies* (Paris: Seuil, 1957).

Nietzschean yet left-wing declaration that the author is dead might also prove to be an interesting new angle in the discussion of Buber's politics.[241] Fears of Buber's right-wing politics, starting with Landauer in 1916 ('Ich gestehe, mir kocht das Blut, wenn ich [...] lese, wie Sie neben den Griechen der Perikleischen Zeit oder den Italiener des Trecento »den Deutschen unserer Tage« stellen'), might be usefully compared and contrasted with Buber's views on the art and the artist, which appear to maintain a conservative sense of authorship in the form of God, yet move on to a new kind of readership in dialogue.[242] Questions of literary perspective and politics might also build on Bernd Witte's research and bring Buber into critical dialogue with Franz Kafka, who met Buber through the Bar Kochba in Prague, and the Marxist and critical theorist Walter Benjamin, who also corresponded with Buber.[243]

The thesis aims to have rendered Buber accessible to the student of German literature, and to emphasise the importance of German romanticism in Buber and the young German Jews whom he influenced in their duality and longing for unity. In 'Was ist der Mensch?', Buber is attempting to outdo Nietzsche at his own game by trying to build a house that can withstand the shifting sands of reality, a skiff that can weather the storm; as a scion of the German romantic tradition, Buber heeds Nietzsche's call in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 'Manches Haus giebt es noch zu bauen!' (KSA 4, 149).

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[241] On Buber's politics, see Nathan Rotenstreich, 'The Right and the Limitations of Buber's Dialogical Thought', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 97-132; Robert Weltsch, 'Buber's Political Philosophy', in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 435-450; Bernd Susser, 'Ideological Multivalence: Martin Buber and the German Volkish Tradition', 'The Anarcho-Federalism of Martin Buber', *Publius*, 9 (1979), 103-115, and *Existence and Utopia: The Social and Political Thought of Martin Buber* (London: Associated Universities Press, 1981); Paul Mendes-Flohr, 'Prophetic Politics and Metasociology: Martin Buber and German Social Thought', *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, 60 (1985), 67-82; Laurence J. Silberstein, *Martin Buber's Social and Political Thought: Alienation and the Quest for Meaning* (New York: New York University Press, 1989); and Shapira, 'Buber's Attachment to Herder and "Volkism"'.

[242] MBB 1, 433-438 (12.5.1916, Landauer to Buber).

[243] Bernd Witte, *Jüdische Tradition und literarische Moderne: Heine, Buber, Kafka, Benjamin* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2007). For Kafka's correspondence with Buber, see MBB I, 409 (29.11.1915, Kafka to Buber), 491-492 (22.4.1917, Kafka to Buber) and 494 (12.5.1917, Kafka to Buber). For Benjamin's correspondence with Buber, see MBB I, 439-438 ([5.1916], Benjamin to Buber) and 448-450 (7.1916, Benjamin to Buber), and MBB II 280-281 (23.2.1927, Benjamin to Buber) and 286-287 (26.7.1927, Benjamin to Buber).

ABBREVIATIONS

JuJ	Martin Buber, *Der Jude und sein Judentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden*, 2nd edn (Gerlingen: Lambert Schneider, 1993)
KSA	Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 15 vols (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1980)
MBB I-III	Martin Buber, *Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten*, 3 vols (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1972-1975)
MBW	Martin Buber, *Werkausgabe*, ed. by Paul Mendes-Flohr and Peter Schäfer, 23 vols (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2001-)
W I-III	Martin Buber, *Werke*, 3 vols (Munich: Kösel, 1962-1964)

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