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Supervision and project performance: a principal-agent approach

Abstract:

This paper applies and extends principal-agent theory to analyze the performance of donor projects. As in many situations, there is variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the recipient government (the agent). Further, the effort expended on supervision of the agent is a control variable. We first present a principal-agent model that shows that conditional on optimal contracting, the marginal effect of more precise supervision on the likeli...

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Publication status:
Not Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed
Version:
Author's Original

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Institution:
IDR-DIAL, Paris
Role:
Author
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Institution:
University of Oxford
Research group:
Centre for the Study of African Economies
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics
Role:
Author
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Institution:
Harvard University
Department:
Department of Economics (graduate student)
Role:
Author
URN:
uuid:7c8c7237-b2c9-4bc0-b89d-6b09d2ec19eb
Local pid:
ora:1682
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:

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