F R I E N D S H I P .

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B. Phil. thesis

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INTRODUCTION

There are three ways of approaching a philosophical study of friendship which would be of value: an historical survey of the occurrence of the notion in philosophical thinking; a scholarly interpretation of the neglected writings on friendship, in particular Aristotle's treatment of the subject; and a direct attempt to provide a theory of friendship as a peculiarly neglected moral phenomenon. In this thesis I shall concentrate on the latter two tasks, though necessarily in an incomplete way. A full treatment of any one of these projects would involve work and space beyond the scope of such a thesis. Thus the bulk of what follows consists of a study of Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's discussion in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, and direct treatment of the theory of friendship and its relation to moral philosophy.

One factor which requires this restriction of the scope of the essay is the almost total lack of contemporary writings on the subject. Commentators on Aristotle usually make some passing remarks on the subject, but with an obvious reluctance and lack of interest. As far as I am aware, no major philosopher has given any attention to friendship as a subject for ethics since Kant, and modern writings are restricted to a handful of chapters on Aristotle. Seen in the light of such indifference on the part of philosophical wisdom, it might be proper to give some preliminary justification for treating of friendship at all.

The philosophical importance and interest of the subject derives, in the first instance, from the significance of friendship in most people's moral behaviour, beliefs and feelings. Acts of kindness, help, comfort and generosity are most commonly done for friends; loyalty, solidarity and consideration are held to be important virtues, but virtues of friendship, not of our relations with just anybody; sympathy and benevolence are typically felt towards our friends. To pick some striking examples, it may often be regarded as not just permissible but obligatory to cause grievous bodily harm or give false witness if the alternative is to let down a friend. This attitude is most obvious in wartime (if the war has popular support). Or a man who claims to be an amoral 'realist' might send his sons to public school to give them a better chance in life. Moreover, friendship plays an important role in people's happiness and their view of the good life. Loneliness is seen as one of the worst fates that can befall a man, love as one of the best. And many activities are more enjoyable if engaged in with other people: if wine, women and song are the framework of a man's ideal lifem he is presumably not envisaging a solitary existence with endless bottles, Playboys, and a tape-recorder. Finally, the happiness of friends is in itself a source of pleasure to us.

The notion of "friend" here, and elsewhere in this thesis, is used in its widest sense and is meant to include family relations, lovers, work-mates, play-mates, fellow citizens and other such related people. The common factor here needs further analysis, which will be provided later.

The mere fact that friends are important to many people's view of duties and happiness is not a compelling reason for studying friendship but at least some attention should be paid to it. And when moral philosophers appeal to 'common intuitions' about morality, it would be well if they considered such widespread attitudes as those mentioned, rather than simply to the mythical 'pre-philosophical' man, whose intuitions often seem more like bad philosophical prejudices.

Secondly, I believe a study of friendship can throw a lot of light on the problem of altruism. I shall argue this more fully in the body of the thesis: but the basic point is that it gives us a way of regarding other people as standing in certain relationships to oneself which are morally relevant; and thus gives a motivation for altruism based on one's social relationships, and not on some metaphysical principle of counting persons, including oneself, as all of equal moral value. One may thus agree with the sceptic who sees no reason for taking just anybody into consideration, and still provide intelligible grounds for other-regarding behaviour.

There are further benefits to be derived, which I shall treat less fully. The subject provokes consideration of such notions as trust and sympathy, which get less attention than they deserve; one discovers the second person singular asking for attention, which philosophical grammar rarely if ever gives it; and it provides an interesting approach to political philosophy, in particular the problem of political obligation.

Let that serve as apology for the subject of this thesis. The rest of this introduction will be devoted to an outline sketch of the history of the notion of friendship in Western thought. This will, I think, help to explain why it has not been treated as a philosophical topic in modern times, apart from being to some extent an index of changing views about the relationship of the individual to society and to other individuals within his society.

(i) We may start with the literally pre-philosophical notion of "philos" in the works of Homer. The word is used of objects ranging from parts of one's body to other individuals. For this reason it is sometimes translated as "one's own", sometimes as "dear". The range

its usage suggests that the central notion is of that which is a part of, or an extension of, oneself: and so anything which is philos is in some sense oneself. They are thus differentiated from all those items in the world which I count as alien, as other. What this means is that their interests are of importance to me in the same way that my interests are, and, in the case of other persons who are philoi, that I can expect the same kind of consideration of my personal interests which I can expect from myself. Thus if the honour of a philos is at stake, I will defend it as though it were my own - as it indeed is, to me - and similarly, if my honour is at stake I can expect him to defend it. This notion of the philos, the friend, was to persist throughout Greek thought, enshrined in the definition of a friend as "another self": a paradoxical phrase, which recurs from before Aristotle to the 9th-century lexicographer Suidas.

The contrasting figure in Homer is the echthros, the hostile person, object or deity. Such enemies are regarded as threatening one's interests, an active danger to one's survival or status, and one is therefore in conflict with them and their interests, in order to remove their threat. In such a context, one's friends acquire a further importance because they are persons one can rely on for defence against one's enemies. Again, this aspect of friendship persists in Greek thought, through Aristotle and Epicurus, where friends are a refuge and provide safety.

Persons were not necessarily either friends or enemies: a large majority, even of the people one knew of, were neither one nor the other. But you could never be sure, whereas a friend, your other self, you could trust and rely on - and this too is a persisting feature of friendship. It is possible that in Homeric society only two nobles could be friends, because only such men could offer significantly greater help to each other than they could provide for themselves [1]; but it seems likely that the noble's men could be philoi with him too, since they were an essential part of his position, and he of theirs, and each could render the other defence in a very real way. And mutual trust would surely have been vital to their relationship.

Thus we have a picture of the individual facing a partly hostile world along with his extended self, the household and friends whom he can trust to defend him, and whom he will defend. Such a picture is found too in the Old Testament, in popular contemporary thought, and in Marxist writings as the notion of solidarity. When Plato and Aristotle discuss friendship, it is this notion that they are analysing, criticising and expanding on.

(ii) The first philosophical discussion is to be found in Plato's Lysis. A fuller account of this dialogue is presented later in the thesis, so the summary here will be brief. What Plato does is to raise various puzzles about the notion of friendship, which pose both analytical and ethical problems, including the following three questions: (1) how important a condition of friendship is reciprocity of feeling? (2) has the good man who is self-sufficient any motive for having friends? (3) could we have friends, as we do now, if we had no enemies. no obstacles to our pursuits? All these are important questions for the analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for friendship, and the last two raise ethical difficulties too: for it is of ethical significance if friends become redundant once one has achieved economic independence, or annihilated all one's enemies. Plato's arguments also challenge the 'popular' Homeric concept, in which, as we have seen, there was both a logical and a practical connection between having enemies and having friends, and it was also typical of friends that they rendered assistance to one. A further point that arises from the Lysis, is one that will trouble Aristotle, namely, the question of the similarity of friendship to love and hence to desire. Notable by its absence is any problem concerning why friends are, and are motivated to be, altruistic. The dialogue begins indeed with a difficulty as to why one's parents are not as enthusiastic for one's happiness as one might expect. It is not doubted that people who are friends will be benevolent and altruistic to each other.

Plato's theory of justice in the Republic, though not explicitly concerned with friendship, is relevant here. For he claims there to have provided an obvious motive for being just and altruistic. The interest of it here is that this motivation derives from one's function in, and membership of, a society which operates in one's own interest because of the principle of division of labour. Hence the theory provides a reason for being just only in regard to a limited number of people, those people who are also members of one's society. Now since the moral duties between friends (a limited group) can be regarded as a kind of justice, this suggests the possibility of basing the friendship relation itself on social or economic relations. This is taken up by Aristotle in his discussion.[2]

(iii) Aristotle, in part, pursues the general problems raised by Plato. That part of his discussion which is concerned with the difficulty of reconciling the importance of friendship with his own theory of ethical

tue need not concern us here. The main interest in his account is the general theory of friendship and human nature that he puts forward.

There are four main divisions in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics: (1) a tripartite classification of friendships, and the superiority of the friendship of virtuous men; (2) the relation of friendship to justice, and their common basis in some community (3) the various duties of friendships (4) a general theory of why friendship is a typically human relationship, and its connection with egoism.

The second part is where Aristotle takes up the Platonic idea of moral relations being based on social ones, though he neither develops it nor considers communities structured in any other way than economically, i.e. to satisfy certain needs and goals. The fourth part consists of an analysis of the concept of a friend as another self together with certain theses about human nature: the idea that man is (1) a social animal (2) enjoys his own and similar activities (3) enjoys altruism as a form of human activity. This kind of theory of human nature may be seen as an attempt to provide a formal account of human motivation based not on the conceptual limits of human rationality, but on the conceptual limits of human activity, of which rational activity is but a part. Hence it has interesting possibilities for a discussion of altruism.[3]

There are two minor points of historical interest in Aristotle: one is the tentative suggestion that perhaps there is a friendship between all men just because they are men, which points the way to deriving universal altruism from the notion of friendship. This relates to the kind of ethical injunctions we find in the New Testament. Secondly, the general theory of human nature, and the importance of economic social relations, is remarkably similar to that which may be found in the writings of Marx. The main point of resemblance is that both believe that human life is inconceivable without (1) activity, whether mental or physical (2) social relations with other men.

(iv) After Aristotle, we find little critical discussion of friendship, but the concept played a significant part in later ethics, in particular Epicureanism. A number of tracts were written by Theophrastus, Cicero and Plutarch among others. The quantity of the writing is more significant than its content for the most part, but one or two ideas may be picked out.

Theophrastus, pursuing the two themes of community as the basis of friendship, and friendship as the basis for a kind of justice, argued

at justice between men derived from their "kinship" (oikeiotes), and that people were"naturally akin" if they had the same parents, the same ancestors, or the same city. Greeks and barbarians, he says, are akin either because they have the same ancestors or "upbringing and habits of the same kind". These ideas are separately in Aristotle, but the conjunction of them to argue a thesis about natural justice is new.[4]

On the other hand, Theophrastus, as did many others, discussed the problem of a possible conflict between the needs of a friend and the requirements of justice. The answer was almost completely in favour of justice, but the possibility of such a conflict is a noteworthy admission. It marks an era where the behaviour naturally expected of friends was seen to be not necessarily right in the light of general ethical standards (of the kind one finds in Aristotle's theory of ethical virtue), and the principles for resolving such a conflict are not obvious. One could of course deny that the one kind of obligation was independent of the other: here again we might find a resemblance to the Marxist theory that a legal or political obligation is an expression of class interests. A denial might take the opposite form of course.[5]

Epicurus took a Marxist kind of line, in that he denied that injustice was evil in itself, arguing that it was only so because of the mistrust and suspicion it aroused. Friendship was valuable precisely because it offered "safety from men" and removed the cause of mistrust, in a way that political justice, imposed by an authority, could not. It was thus one further aspect of his programme for relief from anxiety: here, the anxiety generated by fear of other people. But friendship could also be valued as the source of pleasures that were otherwise not available: enjoyable conversations for example. Epicurus first provides the suggestion that friendship is an alternative to politics - the life in the garden, far from the rat-race.[6]

I think it is generally true of pre-Christian ethics that there is no admission of any general moral obligation to other men. Both friendship and justice were treated as generating obligations to people who stood in special relations to oneself, even if only as members of the same society or even the same species. Thus, for instance when Glaucon demands to know why a man should be just, Plato gives an answer which would show why an Athenian should be just to a fellow-Athenian, but would give him no reason for being just to a Corinthian. The argument could be elaborated to show a higher-level relationship between Corinth and Athens, but it would still be of the same type.

ıd at the highest level where a man's obligations are considered towards all other human beings, this would still depend on establishing that one did have a morally relevant relation to all other men, a relation based on social function. So too, in considering the individual's obligations to other persons over and above the obligations of justice, these are conceived of as restricted to a special class, namely, one's friends. There is a conflicting tradition of objective values determining the proper behaviour, but these are not based on, and do not consist of, general obligations to other persons. The objective ethics of both Plato and Aristotle are self-regarding: the standard in the agent's happiness.[7]

(v) There are two remarks of Jesus Christ which may be selected as responsible for the philosophical death of friendship. One is "love your enemies"; the other is "love thy neighbour as thyself". Now the former of these has an obvious paradoxical air, in a world where an enemy is one whom it is at least normal, if not obligatory, to harm. In this context, there are at least two ways of understanding the injunction: (a)("don't love only your friends;) love (everybody <u>even</u>) your enemies" - in which case we are also to love those who are neither friends nor enemies; or (b) "love (in addition to your friends, one other class of people) your enemies". The latter interpretation is supported by the context, which is a series of injunctions to avoid conflicts with the wishes of others [8], and by considering the importance of trust and mistrust in ancient discussions, e.g. Epicurus. For if one distinctive feature of friendship is that it involves trust, whereas it is precisely between enemies that mistrust exists (or <u>potential</u> enemies), then the injunctions can be read as advice on how to avoid emnity with anyone, rather than proposing a general obligation to treat <u>everyone</u> (including 'neutrals') as though they were one's friends: the other interpretation.

But the other remark, "love thy neighbour as thyself", suggests that Christ has precisely some such general obligation in mind. (It is worth noting the way this echoes the idea of a friend as "another self") For the illustrative parable that accompanies it - that of the Good Samaritan - presents an altruistic act to someone who is clearly not an enemy of the Samaritan. So it seems that Christ should be understood as saying that all men are one's friends in some sense, and hence appropriate objects of love. The argument for this seems to be theological and mystical - "inasmuch as ye have done it to one of these, ye have done it to me" - insofar as there is an argument.

The position itself is of greater historical importance, since for the first time all our moral obligations are regarded as universal, that is, they hold equally to all other persons indifferently. This goes beyond Theophrastus' argument that justice may be a universal obligation: the only earlier hint is Aristotle's remark that "there may perhaps be friendship between all men, isofar as they are men", but that suggestion need not entail a position as strong as the Christian thesis (it could be,for instance, that one should be disposed to treat people as friends rather than enemies in the absence of evidence of hostile intentions).

The assertion of the universality of moral obligations clearly rules friendship out of court as a subject for moral philosophy. For there will no longer be any obligations I have to certain people that I don't have to everybody else (other than contractual obligations, which are a different matter). A fortiori, the possibility of justifying the general obligation by an argument showing that the general obligation is based on universal friendship (as Aristotle might have argued), is ruled out.[9]

Post-Christian moral philosophy is thus dominated by the idea of equal treatment for all other persons. Moral scepticism became of interest in that it denied that we have any general obligations, and thus challenged the ingenuity of Christians to provide a rationale for their position: and one who admitted obligations of friendship was, in this light, as much a sceptic as one who admitted none at all, if he still denied general obligations. Hence it was perhaps necessary that the romantic revival of interest in love should be preceded by a period of scepticism in the 18th century. One rare example of a comment on friendship may be provided from Kant, who says (Lectures on Ethics, p.200): "Friendship is not of heaven but of the earth; the complete

> moral perfection of heaven must be universal; but friendship is not universal; it is a peculiar association of specific persons; it is man's refuge in this world from his distrust of his fellows, in which he can reveal his disposition to another and enter into communication with him".

It is Marx's revival of the Aristotelian notion of man as a necessarily social animal which makes a rejection of this possible. And we have thereby a new possibility of answering the complete moral sceptic, he who denies that we have any obligations to any other person. For the currently favoured alternative to autonomous ethics as an answer to the sceptic is based on arguments for the objectivity of values and the indifference between oneself and other persons.[10] But it is, I think,

possible both (i) to admit that values are objective and still deny any moral obligations, and (ii) to deny that values are objective and still admit that there are moral duties to others. The questions of objectivity and altruism are distinct. It is also possible to admit that one is "merely one person among others" and still deny that others necessarily deserve consideration. (indeed I hope to show that we must accept egoism to make sense of friendship.) Thus moral solipsism is distinct from moral scepticism. And if we examine man's life as a social animal, we can find the basis, not indeed of any general altruistic obligations, but of those limited obligations derived from social relations which may be broadly called those of friendship. And we can also show why such obligations are all that should be regarded as properly human ones, hence vindicating most people's non-philosophical intuitions.

CHAPTER I

I. PLATO: Lysis

The Lysis is set, as usual with the early dialogues, in the context of homosexual desires: the explicit lesson of the first argument (210D 2-5)is that philosophy is a better seduction technique than flattery, and the conclusion of the last argument is that something or someone, if loved, must necessarily feel great affection for the true lover (222A6-B2). The discussion thus involves attachments which Aristotle regarded as stronger than, and distinct from, friendship (see N.E.1156B1-3,1171A11-13) and this affects the arguments. A related feature of the work is that it does not restrict itself to cases of philia between persons. Thus, for instance, the suggestion that both parties must philein for them to be philoi is rejected on the grounds that horses are philoi to horse-lovers but don't or can't love in return (212D5-213A3). And when Plato considers likeness and unlikeness as possible principles of friendship, he is discussing theories of Greek physicists: although the arguments are mainly in terms of personal relationships (214B4-5). The most important result of this admission of impersonal objects as philoi is the rejection of reciprocity as a necessary condition for philia, mentioned above: Plato takes the rejection quite seriously, and only re-introduces reciprocity at the end of the dialogue, and there perhaps with tongue in cheek (222A6-B2). Again there is a contrast with Aristotle who has no hesitation in making it a necessary condition of friendship that the benevolence should be mutual (N.E.1155B33-4), thus intentionally excluding love of non-personal objects. There are two reasons for Plato's inclusion of objects in a discussion of friendship: one is the importance of concepts like desire in his discussion, whereby one person is envisaged as being wanted by another (see in particular 215A3-216A5 and 220E6-end) - and one does not have to be an agent to be wanted; the second, which partly explains the first, is his concern with sexual love especially when one considers his later development of this theme in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. For Diotima's speech in the former (Symposium 210A-212B) concerns the progress of love from the level of desire for a person to a love of the mysterious ultimate beauty, which is presumably not a person; and the Phaedrus discusses the progression of love to philosophy. In both there is a process of seeking that which one has not yet found, and a corresponding desire for

what one has not got. Some of what Plato says in the Lysis is of importance for this theory of love and philosophy, but I shall ignore this aspect of it except where it obviously affects his view of friendship.

(a) The first philosophical section of the Lysis may be dubbed the Parents Paradox (207D5-210D4). Lysis' parents love him, but are far from allowing him to do what he wants. By way of solution, Socrates points out that he is allowed to do things if he is sophos in such matters: and the inference is drawn that if you are sophos, everyone will be philoi to you and you will be philos to everybody, enjoying as a result both power and profit.

The first point worth remarking is the assumption at the outset that if you philein someone then you will want them to be as happy as possible (207D5-7). Plato never mentions this aspect again. Indeed, if one lifted his own argument about philippoi and hippoi, one could reject this assumption on the grounds that e.g. lovers of wisdom do not want wisdom to be happy. It is not in fact clear that Plato thought this an essential feature of philia, even in the context of human relations; the idea that friends "value each other highly" does occur later, but both the phrase and the context make it quite likely that this refers to caring for friends in the way that one might care for one's capital (215B6-7).

Secondly, happiness seems to be equated with "doing what you want" (Epithumei, Bouletai:207E1-208E3), and the advantages of being wise are that one is entrusted with other peoples affairs, one can do what one wants without interference, one is ruling others, and one derives profits from one's commissions (210A9-C4). Freedom, power, dominion and material gain are what makes life worth living. This is of interest because it is precisely this concept of happiness against which Socrates argues in the Gorgias. And yet the arguments of this section of the dialogue depends on it, and it is assumed throughout the rest of the work. It is instructive that a view of what constitutes happiness makes such a difference to the way one analyses friendship.

The third point of note is the implication in 210C5 that being of actual practical benefit to someone is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of being philos to him. This is indeed claimed by Adkins[11] to be central to the Greek

notion of friendship, the motive for benefaction being irrelevant. But the paradox in this section depends also on the assumption that one who is philos will want one's happiness; and the subsequent discussion is about conceivable motives for friendship, to a certain extent.

(b) The next section (212A8-213C9) discusses the question:

> "when one person loves another, which becomes the friend of which? The lover of the loved, or the loved of the lover? Or is there no difference?"

The ostensive reason for discussing this question is that Socrates wants, above all other possessions, a friend, and wants to know how to acquire one (211D6-E8). Hence Plato considers the situation of one person loving another, the suggestion being that one might perhaps be able to make someone a friend by loving them. The idea that this is possible is again connected with the idea of happiness, because a friend is treated as something one wants and will therefore have to get if one is to be happy.

The argument of this section raises the greatest problem for this conception of friendship:

> "nothing is a friend to its lover unless it loves in return" (212D4).

Because it is necessary to being a friend that one should love the other, one cannot make a person a friend of one by one's own effort alone. It should be noted that this is not just because human beings have wills of their own, but because friends must be loving of their own volition. The condition of reciprocity was taken by Aristotle as necessary from the outset of his discussion (N.E.1155B33-4) (though it is this which makes it impossible to locate a virtue of friendship in the individual's character, a fact which is awkward for Aristotle).

The bulk of this section is used by Plato to expose ambiguities in the use of 'philos', and offer arguments to show that neither the lover, nor the loved, nor both are friends. As already mentioned, he in fact rejects reciprocity as a necessary condition: but in this mood he is capable of rejecting anything.

(c) Plato next turns his attention to the theories of friendship advanced by the physicists: that like befriends like,

and the contrary theory that unlike things are friends (214A2-216B9).

Two arguments are offered against the first principle that require its restriction to the thesis that men who are alike and <u>good</u> befriend each other. The first is that bad men will get less friendly with intimacy "for they act unjustly" (214C2), implying that friends must be just to each other. This proposition may be, and should be, seriously questioned: the film of "Midnight Cowboy" should be enough to raise doubts. The second argument is:

> "that which is unlike, and at odds with (<u>Diaphoron</u>) itself, could hardly become like or friendly to some other." (214D1-3).

This is against the possibility of intemperate men having any friends, and presages the platonic concern with spiritual unity as a condition of happiness. A similar argument plays an important role in the Gorgias, where of the man who is not temperate he says:

> "such a man would not be dear to another man, nor to God: for he is incapable of community life: and for the man who has no community life (<u>Koinonia</u>) there is no friendship." (507E)

Later in the same dialogue, it is argued that one can only befriend a corrupt ruler at the cost of corrupting one's own soul, of making it like his (510A-511A). We have space for only two comments on all this: firstly, that these arguments are superior to any that Aristotle has to offer for the necessity of being a good man to be friends, based as they are on a man's relation to himself; secondly, the connection made in the Gorgias between being temperate, having a communal life, and having friends is of the utmost importance both for the general theory of morality and its relation to a social life, and to the interpretation of the relation in the Republic between justice in the soul and justice in the state.

To return to the Lysis, and Plato's arguments against the 'like to like' principle (the one he explicitly assumes in Gorgias 510B). No-one, he argues, would find an alike person useful (214E3-215A3). The dependence of this on the utility notion of happiness is obvious. Further, a good man will need no-one (215A3-C2), which makes the same assumption about happiness and also the assumption that the good man is "sufficient for himself". The notion of self-sufficiency here seems to

comprise both the idea that you have everything you need to be happy and the idea that you don't need any assistance to get what you want (215B4-8). It is this notion which makes friendship a difficult subject for anyone with a conception of the good life as something that is (or should be) entirely within the power of the individual, dependent on his dispositions and choices alone. In this respect utilitarians line up with Aristotle and Kant: friendship appears to be contingent to a man's pursuit of and attainment of the good life, something which is not necessarily a good.

Against the principle of friendship between unlike people, Plato argues, inter alia, that under this conception a just man would be friends to an unjust man (216B4-6): the grounds for rejecting this possibility have already been discussed.

(d) The rest of the Lysis gives way under the weight of its concept of happiness, and consists of an elaborate discussion of the relations between being good, being bad, being neither and wanting something. Among this is an argument for the existence of "that which is primarily philon", "that which is truly philon" based on the principle that all is philon for the sake of something which is good and philon, plus the requirement that the regress must stop somewhere. This "real philon" is then identified with the good (218C5-220B7). This is of obvious relevance to the development of the theory of forms, and of particular interest because it is both a regress argument, and concerned with a moral concept, and based on reasons for wanting. The immediately following argument, that the truly good is only good because of the bad (220B8-E6) is also of interest from this point of view.[12] For the topic of friendship, however, the most important passage is where Plato argues that we want what we lack, we lack what is proper (oikeios) to us, and so we necessarily love what is by nature oikeios (221D6-222B2). It still uses, of course, the idea that a friend is a person we want, but by analysing wanting something as missing something which is properly ours, he opens the way to exploring the notion of a friend as another self. Moreover, if a friend is "naturally oikeion" to us, then it is not an arbitrary matter that the persons who are our friends are our friends. It is regrettable that Plato did not pursue this line of thought further.

(e) Plato's final thoughts on friendship are to be found in the Laws 836E-839D. There he distinguishes two kinds of friendship:

> "that of opposites, which is terrible and savage, and rarely involves that which is communal (to koinon) among us; and that of like people, which is gentle and communal (koine) throughout life."

The former class he has earlier characterised as that kind of friendship between a needy man and a rich man, the latter as "likeness in respect of virtue between equals". (the pair are also distinguished as being respectively love of the body and love of the soul). The distinction is of great importance, for it detaches the notion of friendship that Plato is working with in the Lysis - that of one person wanting another, to satisfy some need - from the notion which is found in the Gorgias, which is dependent on the capacity for communal life. This section in the Laws is also suggestive of a conception of community which does not involve any reference to persons having economic need of each other, because he explicitly states that the friendship between opposites, the friendship of need, does not involve what is communal. The possibility of social relations that are not based on obtaining mutual satisfaction of economic needs is, as I hope to show, crucial to a theory of friendship.

II.

ARISTOTLE

Two books of the Nicomachean Ethics are devoted to friendship, because, says Aristotle,

> "it is a virtue, or involves virtue: and it is, besides, absolutely necessary to the good life" (1155A1-3)

It is this last belief which makes the subject important to him, and the former which provides him with his difficulties. For he should be able to show how friends can be an essential part of the good life without infringing the requirement that the good man should be self-sufficient (see 1097B6-10); and to show that a man with virtue will be better off than others in respect of this feature of the good life too - otherwise the attractiveness of being a good man would suffer considerably, and the importance of virtue to the good life would be diminished (cf.1098A16-18). It may be significant that after the discussion of friendship we find in Book X a new conception

of happiness as to be found in a life of pure philosophical speculation: it is explicitly said of the philosopher there that:

> "he may perhaps speculate better with collaborators, but he is nevertheless the most self-sufficient of men" (1177A34).

For it is not obvious that Aristotle succeeds in these books in showing that the enjoyment of friendship is intimately connected with the possession of ethical virtue: and therefore he might well have reason to abandon ethical virtue as particularly valuable to the man seeking a self-sufficient good life.

It is hard to fit Aristotle's account into a coherent pattern of thought: if what he has to say on friendship never actually contradicts itself, it is nevertheless not always clear how one thing he says relates to another. The reader of Book IV.6, for instance, will have been told that the social virtue of charm or friendliness

> "is different from friendship, because it is without emotion and love for those with whom one associates" (1126B22-3).

But emotion "pathos" is scarcely mentioned in the books on friendship, except where Aristotle declares that

> "affection (philesis) is like an emotion, but friendship (philia) is like a disposition".

(a) Aristotle's preliminary remarks make some good points about the importance of friendship. Firstly, he mentions that travel shows how every man is oikeion and philon to other men (1155A21-2), which indicates that if much altruism to passing strangers is to be understood, it must be in terms of friendship between all men qua men. He returns to this point later (1161B5-8). Secondly, he observes that friendship holds states together, and legislators are keener to induce friendship than justice (1155A22-3). The relevant feature of friendship in this context is unanimity (homonoia), which, when he discusses it in more detail at IX.6, he declares to be "political friendship" (1167B2-3). It is a question of unanimity on practical issues, an important qualification for the understanding of the common basis to friendships.

(b) In VIII.2-4 he elaborates his tripartite classifcation of friendships into friendships of utility, pleasure and goodness. It is only the last, he claims, which is true friendship, the others are so by analogy.

Firstly, in VIII.2, Aristotle distinguishes the three possible objects of love: the good, the pleasant and the useful. More precisely, of the class of lovable things some are good, some pleasant and some useful: and it is because of these properties that we love them (1155B27). This classification does not yet exclude inanimate objects, which, later on, are discounted on other grounds, and Aristotle, when he goes on to say that it is only the good and the pleasant which are lovable as ends (1155B19-21) is including inanimate good things and pleasant things. Indeed he must be, since the man who is useful can scarcely be so by virtue of being a means of producing a good person! It is clear from this that the good man is supposed to be lovable independent of his products (though it appears from 1156A18-19 that the pleasant man is loved for his producing pleasure).

Secondly, it is argued that he is lovable by virtue of his character and not some contingent property. This idea should be remembered when we come to consider the social basis of friendship later in Book VIII, and the value of friends to the good man in IX.9. The argument is clearest at 1157A14-20, where Aristotle is clearly correlating to his 3 classes of friends, 3 types of character: namely, the good, the bad and the indifferent. The point is simply that while it is a contingent matter whether the bad or indifferent man is pleasant or useful (and logically impossible for them to be good), it is necessarily true that the good man is good. This means, given the three possible reasons for being lovable, that only the good man is necessarily lovable: as Aristotle puts it "because of themselves". Another way Aristotle has of making the same claim for the good man is by using his distinction between "good in the abstract" and "good for the individual" (see VIII.2.1155B21-5; 3.1156B12-24; 5.1157B25-8). This distinction I take as being between a man, thing or action which is good when considered in isolation or relative to the end for man, and a man etc. which is good only when considered relative to certain persons and their ends and needs. We might relate this to Plato's distinction between two types of

friendship in the Lowe- By introducing the rather surprising concept of "lovable in the abstract" (1155B24), Aristotle can argue that whatever all his acquaintances may think, it is always true that the good man is a proper object of love, because he is necessarily a good thing considered against the true end of life. He may be no good to anyone, but he is the opposite of no good at all.

The third point in favour of the good man as a friend is his reliability and endurance. Whereas other people may be only temporarily pleasant or useful according to circumstances and their changeable characters, good people will always remain lovable both regardless of circumstances (the previous point) and because their characters do not change: "virtue is enduring" (1156B10-12). This is presumably supposed to appeal to the fact that once we have acquired the knowledge of right and wrong, it is impossible to lose it. But Aristotle seems to be inconsistent about this, since he envisages the possibility of lapsing from virtue later:

> "if he is accepted as a good man, but becomes evil and appears so, is he still to be loved?" (1165B13-14).

and if a good man can change his character for the worse, there is at best only an inductive argument for refusing to believe the worst of him, which is the other aspect of his reliability (1157A20-2). This point is the more crucial because Aristotle is prepared to base the distinctinction between proper friendships and friendships of utility or pleasure on just this characteristic of persistence and proof against slander:

> "and it seems that they are and are not friendships through their similarity and dissimilarity to the same thing: for they appear to be friendships by similarity to the friendship of virtue (for one contains the pleasant, the other the useful and these belong to the friendship of virtue too); but they appear not to be friendships by dissimilarity to it - for it is proof against slander and lasting, while they quickly collapse and suffer many other changes." (1158B5-11).

Aristotle has been criticised notably by Adkins,[13] for failing to provide a genuine distinction between the friendship of good men and the friendship of useful men. His main point of attack is that Aristotle wrongly pretends that the friendship of virtue is unselfish, when he claims that their being lovable

in themselves shows that they are loved for their own sakes. This is, however, to misrepresent Aristotle: this claim, as we have seen, is to the effect that good men are necessarily lovable. His usage of dia and heneka are scrupulously distinct, and he nowhere in this book uses heneka except where it means "for the sake of". Aristotle is quite clear, as Adkins mentions, that whatever our reasons for loving somebody for it to be a genuine case of love we must be wishing them well for their own sake. Perhaps Aristotle's main difficulty here is that Ross persistently mis-translates dia as though it were heneka.

The lesson of this is that Aristotle is not engaged in the modern practice of claiming that the truly good man will be altruistic. He is, rather, giving an account of what the good life consists in, and the three classes of friends, as we have seen, represent three different objects of desire, and the superiority of friendships of virtue should be understood in this light

(c) At VIII.9, Aristotle begins a discussion on the relation between friendship and justice. His basic thesis is that

"in all community (koinonia) there seems to be some element of justice, and indeed friendship" (1159B26-7), the counterpart to which is his later assertion that "all friendship is in community" (1161B11-12). From his examples, we are to take this as implying that all cases of cooperative activity produce some kind of friendship, and also, when he quotes "koina ta philon", that being friends is a reason for making what you have common. The later assertion may be taken as implying that friendship is not possible outside a social context.

This doctrine would be of great importance if Aristotle were not insistent that all koinonia was for some utility - sumpheron. Unlike the implicit notion in Plato's Laws, Aristotle does not consider the possibility of a community, particularly the political community, as being based on any other than common utility. For this reason, it has been suggested that Aristotle here is only talking about friendships of utility. But this is a misunderstanding: this part of Aristotle's doctrine is echoed by his emphasis on man's nature as a political animal, a notion which is closely linked by him to the value of friendship (1169B17-19).

It is Aristotle's conception of society which is limited to a basis of utility, not his conception of friendship.

(d) At IX.4, Aristotle argues that a man's relations to his friend, as commonly conceived, proceed from a man's relations to himself. The ood man is important from this point of view, because he typically has all these relations to himself- that is, he is beneficent,benevolent, cohabiting, unanimous and sympathetic with his friends and himself. There are two points here: firstly, this is a genuine argument as to why being good is necessary to forming friendships, the same one that we saw in the Lysis and the Gorgias: a man who is not together with himself will be unable to be together with another. Secondly, since it appears in Aristotle linked to the idea that a friend is another self, it provides a motivational basis for beneficence and the rest.

Further IX.7 provides an argument that beneficence is more valuable than receiving of benefits from another. The argument is tight and based on a clear assertion of man's nature as an active being and the centrality of his activity to his happiness. We will have reason to re-visit this argument later. Finally, IX.8 argues for the rationality and morality of self-love (1168B28-1169A11) on the grounds that virtue is self-love because it involves assigning oneself the greatest goods, and obeying that element in oneself which is truly oneself, ones reason. This latter argument assumes a view that man's species-being lies in his rational faculty, the former assumes the view about the centrality of activity to happiness that we noticed in the contect of the previous argument. It is interesting that self-control is said to involve self-love because of its obedi nce to reason, for this, linked to the notion of a friend as another self, will lead to an austere conception of friendship as two people doing the right things and helping each other to do so. Compare with this the platonic view of self-respect as internal togetherness, which makes external togetherness possible: where likeness between people will be more important than their virtue. The criticisms discussed by Hardie[14] are out of place, because the self-love on which Aristotle bases friendship is a matter principally of rational pursuit of an objective good.

And the argument in IX.9 (which we shall have occasion to mention later) brings this out: for what the good man values in his friends is the chance they give him of observing virtuous actions. Talk of egoism, in the utilitarian sense, is as out of place here as altruism, in the post-Christian sense of indifferent altruism, is an alien concept to Aristotle. He is not trying to reduce altruism to enlightened self-interest because his age was enlightened enough not to have invented altruism in the first place.

CHAPTER 3

(a) I remarked in the introduction on an historical difference between the concerns of ancient and modern ethics, in that the latter has sought understanding and justification of an indifferent and universal altruism which did not concern the Greeks. There is another difference between the two which is relevant to a philosophical study of friendship. To both Plato and Aristotle, the point of moral philosophy was to discover how to live the good life. To quote at random:

> "... what sort of man one must be, what pursuits one should cultivate, and how far, both as an old and a young man."
>
> (Gorgias 488A)

> "Will not the knowledge of the supreme good, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?"
>
> (Nicomachean Ethics I.2.1094A)

Modern ethics, however, has conceived its task as to provide the basis for duties, or to understand 'ought' statements (a gross generalisation, meant only to bring out the contrast). To quote Hume:

> "The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty"
>
> (Enquiry, section I)

The distinction I wish to bring out is not that between substantive and non-substantive ethics: it is rather the difference between discussing what makes a life good as opposed to bad, and discussing what may properly be required of a man's practical conduct. One aspect of this difference is the prominence of 'ought' in the latter kind of project, and its unimportance in the former. 'Ought', as is said, entails 'can', because it is not reasonable to require a man to do what it is impossible for him to do. But the good life may, in principle, consist entirely of situations beyond the individual's control (though this would be a depressing discovery), and even if one's own actions are, to a greater or lesser extent, potentially important, there is strangely little temptation to say that one 'ought' to perform these actions: e.g. to say that one ought to appreciate great art. Certainly, it would be very peculiar to understand such an 'ought' as 'it is your duty to'.[15] What we seem to have here is rather a statement to the effect that one <u>can</u> appreciate great art, and, if one does, one will be happier.

The immediate relevance of this is that it does not make sense to say that men in general 'ought' to have friends; though Plato, Aristotle, and G.E. Moore found no difficulty at all in saying that friends were essential to the good life. No one in a law court or in heaven would punish a man for having no friends, nor would anyone at all resent him for having had none.[16] It would seem, therefore, difficult to say much of interest about friendship if one insisted on an 'ought' for every moral subject. What there is to say about it concerns rather its role in people's lives and happiness.

It may be suggested that there are obligations between friends, and thus there are discoverable 'oughts': acts which friends resent from each other, but would not resent from other people. But I am not sure that gratitude is not a more important phenomenon than resentment, and the former implies acts of supererogation rather than duty. The appropriate reaction to being let down by a friend might rather be to become sadder but wiser (and perhaps angry), rather than resentful. And one could give no cause for resentment, and still fail to be a good friend, whereas if one gives cause for gratitude one is necessarily being a good friend to the extent that one has made the other happier.[17]

What follows, then, takes the Greek way of ethics, pointing out what is possible and how it relates to happiness, rather than arguing for certain obligatory restraints on human activity. Friendship, I shall argue, is a valuable 'can' rather than an inescapable 'ought'.

(b) The way people actually live, and the intuitions one might claim to be widespread, provide indication of how essential friendship is, and is thought to be, to the happiness of the individual. As far as this goes, the importance of friendship might be a contingent matter - that is, a completely good life might be conceivable without it - and certainly, its precise role would still remain in need of explanation. But the phenomena, both the facts and the opinions, deserve stating.

Firstly, it is quite commonly believed that life is scarcely worth living without friends. Aristotle for one was firmly convinced of this (N.E.1155A5-6), and the same idea is embodied

in many of our contemporary thoughts, writings and songs about loneliness. (The other side of the ethical coin of friendship is, indeed, loneliness rather than enmity: one project of interest would be an analysis of loneliness and its relation to, say, scepticism.) There seems to be a strong intuitive conceptual argument here, in the challenge to describe a life that looks <u>at all</u> worth living without including any friends in the picture.

Secondly, given that one has friends, their happiness will be directly relevant to how happy one's own life is. Again one can refer to Aristotle for support (N.E.1097B8-11), and more vividly to what must be a common experience - that of desolation at a friend's misfortune or death, even where this affects one's self in no other way. One might again present a challenge as a conceptual argument: would it be possible to conceive of a situation such that (i) x was utterly unhappy (ii) y was completely happy (iii) x was a friend of y? The answer seems to be a clear no; it is part of being a friend that a friend's happiness is necessary to one's own complete happiness. Why this should be so requires explanation which I hope to provide later: I shall for now simply note that it will not necessarily be because we <u>want</u> our friends to be happy, unless one conceives of happiness as simply the maximum possible satisfaction of one's wants.

Thirdly, enjoying other people's company is more valuable to us than the conferring or receiving of benefits. This is so simply because the value of benefits is contingent on there being needs, whereas one could enjoy the company of others whether or not one's needs were satisfied. (which is not a merely utopian possibility, because one can in fact reduce one's needs to those which are satisfied or satisfiable by one's own efforts). It is a comparative point: enjoying the company of others is valuable in the first place for other reasons, partly because it looks like a necessary part of the good life (see above), partly because it involves an essentially human capacity (see below). The point of the comparison is simply to suggest that the areas of other-regarding behaviour which are of greatest interest in a study of the good life, are not those of mutual benefaction but those of mutual enjoyment. More will be said on this later.

Fourthly, a large part of our everyday life normally involves dealings with our friends. We have colleagues whom we work with, neighbours with whom we exchange gossip and loans, friends and lovers to whom we behave affectionately, and companions with whom we talk, drink, commiserate and laugh. In purely quantitative terms, friends are important to us. One can see fairly clearly why this should be so since it is people that we spend our time with who tend to become our friends. Again, one could advance an argument to the effect that if anything is being done in the presence of, or together with, other people, then it must be more valuable if done with friends (or at least as valuable): for could x be a friend of y, if there were no situation in which x, if substituted for a complete stranger, made y's activity more enjoyable?

Finally, we deal with persons as the persons they are far more than with persons simply as persons. I mean by this simply that more of what happens to Mrs. Biggs during the day will be done by people who know who she is than by people who have no idea. This is important because it means that a certain picture of our position in the world is unrealistic: the picture of the typical agent as a self-conscious being in a situation which may contain 5 other persons, all of whom are supposedly simply persons (if that) to him and have no extra moral interest for him. Our life is not like that: usually the other 5 will be individuals to whom we are related in certain ways (perhaps ways in which we are related to noone else). For instance, we may know one of them as our sister's boyfriend, or perhaps as an old school friend, and this will make a considerable difference to how we treat them. Thus the situation where one is confronted with 5 indifferent persons is rare indeed, and it may hence be doubted whether it matters to have reasons for considering such persons or not. At least, it is dubious whether the reasons we may have for considering just any person, are likely to be important to the good life. And one might also wonder whether we could have such reasons for considering others if we had no friends.

(c) Friendships necessarily occur in a social context, and are typical features of a society. This allows us to give a good sense to the idea that man is by nature a social animal, if we can show that he is by nature a friend-having animal.

Further it means that whatever we say about the role of friendship in the good life will entail that the good life should be social, insofar as it involves friendship. And if we can provide a theory of friendship that does not depend on assuming any particular social structure, then we shall have some understanding of the value in the good life for the individual considered as a member of some society, rather than as an island unto himself.

Just how is friendship related to social life? Firstly, in that it is inconceivable that two persons should be friends if they do not and cannot have social relations with each other. The notion of social relations I take here to be that of the relations that hold between two or more agents who are aware in their actions of the contribution to those actions of the other agents or the possible effects of those actions on the intentions and interests of the others. This is a minimal requirement for social existence, I think, and allows in a lot. But such a demand has, surely, to be satisfied if people are to be friends. For if two practical beings are not aware of each other as practical beings, or unaware of the relevance of their own behaviour to the other's practical concerns, they could not be friends: for either they would not know who they were friends with or, if they did, they could not understand any possible practical relation between them that was different in kind from the practical relations one has to objects in the world.[18] In general, we could not imagine people being friends if they did not do certain kinds of things: and these things are social.

Which leads to the second point, that the behaviour which characterises friendship is social. Friends normally share membership of some social structure, with all its economic and moral relations, and their attitudes and actions towards each other will themselves be social phenomena. There need be no clear-cut distinction between human friendships and animal associations here, for this is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of friendship. But to be friends, two hermits would have to institute some social situation, or else it would make no difference.

Thirdly, friends ascribe the same meaning to the activities they share in. The idea of meaning here is roughly that, if asked what they were doing, the friends would give accounts that had important features in common. For this to be possible, they must share concepts which provide an understanding of what is going on, for otherwise they could not give accounts that were similar at all. But to share such concepts they must have some social background in common, for otherwise it would be a pure and unlikely coincidence that they should have such conceptual community. And the absence of coincidence is importance since the parties should know, in a case of friendship, that the other is interpreting their behaviour in the same way.

These points suggest that the possibility of being friends with somebody depends on the possibility or actuality of social relationships with him. It is also, however, arguable that if one is to practically engage in social relations, then one must have, or be able to have, friends in the relevant society. If we imagine a man engaged, say, in production line work, he is a social being insofar as what he does materially affects the welfare of others, and the activity itself depends on certain economic and social institutions. But if he has no friends, that is if there is noone with whom he has any mutual concerns for things which matter to them, then there is no reason why he should regard his economic role and the institution of production line work as anything other than alien: that is, a fact of life which has no more meaning for him than the law of gravity, by virtue of which he has certain relations to the surface of the earth. For though he may see his work in the same way as others do, the views of others on this or anything else will be to him as the views of a long-dead animal: irrelevant to his practical life. So though a man may be able to operate in a social framework with or without friends, his own existence will not be social unless he has friends, since what is social about his activity will be alien to him without friends.

There are ground here, therefore, for regarding all truly social relations between people as friendships in some way or other, in that any economic or cultural relation that one man has to another will be a relation to something alien unless there is mutual concern shared. Thus if man is by nature a

friend-having animal, then this would explain why he is a social animal - and, indeed, why it matters. One reason has been suggested: it matters because of the difference it makes to man's practical existence. The importance of this derives from a view of human nature that we have seen in Aristotle. A statement and defence of that view is now appropriate.

(d) At the start of this chapter we mentioned the idea of the good life for man as the proper subject of ethics without saying much about how this life was conceived. Does it comprise, one might ask, a set of intentions, or desires, or actions, or mental and bodily events, or what? For it would seem that the good life for man, with reference to his desires, would consist above all of satisfaction; with reference to his intentions, it would seem to involve willing what is, in some sense, the correct thing to will. Under what conception of human life, then, am I arguing that friendship is an essential part of the good life?

Three theses are involved: that man's nature is in activity; that man's activity is a realisation of himself; and that man is by nature a social being. Before elucidating and defending these ideas, it may be well to remark on the difficulty of argument in this area: human nature is not obviously accessible even to the mind's eye, and is a concept of a very high level of generality. Such ideas are, however, important, for they are often the basic determinants of the differences between various moral philosophies: if Aristotle, Kant and Mill could have agreed on the relative importance of activity, will and desire to human life, they would have differed less on what was the good for man. This suggests one way of arguing about such concepts, and that is by looking at the associated theories of morality and testing them against our intuitions. Another more satisfactory way would be to offer counter-examples of human ways of life against any rival theory that offered itself. But perhaps we are only faced with a special instance of a difficulty in all ethical discussion that has been clear ever since Socrates, the difficulty of producing a compelling argument <u>for</u> any moral doctrine, rather than simply negative ones against rival views. So perhaps the best that one can do is to present a view clearly,

plausibly and attractively in terms of the possibilities it offers for understanding, while being ready to demolish any opposition that may be advanced.

The first thesis then, is that man's nature is to be active. This is not meant to entail that it is unnatural to be inactive, but rather that a man's existence necessarily involves the capacity for being active. Since this is true of all animal life, some further specification would be needed to distinguish human existence. This further condition has been traditionally located in the capacity for rational activity, or in the capacity for social activity. This latter suggestion will be defended later (though I do not necessarily wish to deny the importance of rationality). The importance of activity to man's nature was seen by both Aristotle and Marx. It lies, I think, behind Aristotle's notion of a"function" of man (N.E.I.7), and when he claims that this function is "activity of the soul in accordance with a rational principle" he is presenting the view stated above: man's life necessarily involves the capacity for activity - specifically, rational activity. There is a very explicit assertion of the thesis in Book IX of the N.E.:

> "Existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and we exist by virtue of activity (i.e. by living and acting), and the work <u>is</u>, in a sense, the producer in activity."

What advantage does this proposal have over possible alternatives? Consider the notion that man exists by virtue of willing: if willing is not taken to imply a capacity to act, then our concept of man's nature becomes dislodged from the world, and his proper sphere located in some mysterious heaven. But if it does imply a capacity to act, then to understand the value of willing one has to consider the value of activity. (as Aristotle puts it, capacity is defined by reference to activity.) Thus from the ethical point of view, evaluation of activity remains fundamental. Or, consider the notion that man's nature lies in his capacity for desires, and that human life is to be evaluated by their satisfaction. It would then be a matter of indifference how this satisfaction was obtained, and hence the good life might consist in completely passive consumption, perhaps while asleep. If it were stipulated that man by nature desired to be active, this would amount to an implausible psychological claim that all men <u>wanted</u> to be what,

on the Aristotelian conception, they are by nature capable of being. The thesis I am advocating is not so strong or unacceptable: it says nothing about human motivation, only about human capacities and the necessity of their exercise for a human existence.[19]

The second thesis shows why the first one matters for the good life for man: it states how one is better off for being active. For human activity is not just the intentional causation of events in the world, it is an extension by the agent of himself. This obscure remark means simply two things: (a) that if a man does what he can do then he is fulfilling his potential: thus, since his potential is a property of himself he is making a difference to the world around him which is not only causally, but conceptually, dependent on himself, because a full description of the event (or the new state of affairs) must include the information that he did it; (b) that he is self-conscious in his actions, and hence knows that he is the person that he is and that it was he himself who acted thus. The obscurity, when thus unravelled, is in danger of seeming trite. It may seem worse to add that this still only shows that if you care for yourself then your happiness will depend on your activity: I do not want to say that a man must care for himself, only that he cannot be happy unless he does. But the point is important if one contrasts it with a view of actions as simply intentional changing of the world, since on this latter view one's reason for changing the world at all let alone in specific ways is going to look very much like a duty: and, if one is to relate this view to happiness, it will be difficult to avoid saying that there is a duty to be happy.[20] On our view, however, we can say both that happiness is permissible, though not compulsory, and give a plausible account of happiness - namely, that it consists in self-conscious fulfilment of one's potential. The plausibility of this derives from its basis in a concern for oneself (surely at least a necessary condition for happiness on any account) and its explanatory power with regard to actual cases of unhappiness. The outstanding example of this is Marx' analysis of alienation.[21]

The third thesis is that man is a social animal, Aristotle's oft-repeated remark. While it is possible to maintain that man is necessarily a social animal, that he cannot exist as a human being outside society, I only wish to propose a weaker thesis, though one with more obvious relevance to morality.

It is that man has a capacity for social life, and that the exercise of this capacity makes a crucial difference to his happiness. It will be argued in my theory of friendship that this capacity is a capacity for sympathy, and that an understanding of friendship shows why this capacity makes a difference to our happiness. This will also indicate how I believe friendship to be conceptually related to social relations. Hence the thesis that man is a social being should need no special defence here if the rest of my argument is successful.

The rest of this chapter will be devoted to two tasks: one is the criticism of two possible theories of friendship, based on trust and aesthetic contemplation; the other is to present what seems to be the most important feature of friendship, joint activity, and why I intend to base my theory on this aspect.

(e)The view that friendship is essentially a relation of mutual trust is one that was held by Epicurus (apparently) and Kant. The idea is that we need a refuge from other men, and protection from them: in particular, we need a refuge in which to reveal our dispositions freely without fear of their being misused and turned against us. One may distinguish two relevant senses of "trust": firstly, the sense in which one can trust somebody to do something for you (if you need it, or if he has promised it); secondly, the sense in which you can trust someone not to take advantage of you (if he is in a position to harm you). It is the second sense which concerns us here:the former one is relevant for cases of what Aristotle and Kant call friendships of utility, which neither regard as friendship proper.

Let us take Kant's statement:

> "Friendship is man's refuge in this world from his distrust of his fellows, in which he can reveal his disposition to another and enter into communion with him"
>
> (Lectures on Ethics, tr.Infield, p.207)

The first point to note is that this statement implies that communion with another is valuable, for otherwise trust would have no point. Kant says little on this topic, except to remark that men seem to have a "strong impulse to disclose

themselves", which suggests that all friendship is an opportunity to indulge in exhibitionism. In any case, are there not other possible barriers to 'communion' apart from mistrust: for instance, dislike? It would seem that trust is only one of a number of necessary conditions and, by no means a sufficient one, for the possibility of 'communion'. Thus it would seem that in Kant's terms it is possible that we could not commune with our friends. Further, trust is not a phenomenon peculiar to friendship, for we can quite reasonably trust people who are not our friends in any sense, if only they have the virtue of discretion. Thus friendship is not our <u>only</u> refuge from distrust of our fellows. It could, however, be said that it is only the people we can trust who <u>can</u> be our friends. This position, however, needs considerable qualification before it can be acceptable, for we may be close friends and constant companions with someone (we womanise together) whom we would nevertheless not trust an inch in certain circumstances (with our wives or sisters) - and this may be quite explicitly acknowledged on both sides. (There must be some tax inspectors with some friends whose finances are not all that the Inland Revenue might wish.) And such qualification makes a crucial difference, for it now appears that those people with whom we are friends need not be trusted by us in all areas of our lives, or even, perhaps, at all - people may be cheerfully mistrustful of each other, and indeed enjoy each other's company largely for this reason: a battle of wits can be fun, with the right person.

But perhaps the most important defect of a theory that friendship is based on trust is this, that it implies that we could not be friends with anyone if we mistrusted noone. Without mistrust, there would be no need for a refuge: nor, thus far, would any one individual be a more appropriate choice for communion than any other. We would, presumably, commune with some people rather than others, but this would be a contingent matter of geographical limitations and temporal coincidence: and we would have no grounds for calling such people our friends, in that it would be simply chance that we exercised our exhibitionist tendencies towards these people rather than anyone else. Now while there is, of course, a large element of chance in our having the friends we do have, it is not <u>completely</u> arbitrary: there are some people with whom we would not be friends under any circumstances. It is an import-

ant corollary of this that we do not need enemies to have friends, that in a world without enemies there would still be certain people who were our friends in distinction to others, and this necessarily so: for there are certain people with whom we could not possibly be friends.[22]

(f) As we have seen, Aristotle, at one point, claims that the reason why the good man needs friends is as follows:

> "His purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities"
>
> (N.E.IX.9.1170A2-4)

Thus the value of friendship lies in each being able to contemplate the virtuous acts of the other, with a sense of proprietary pride. G.E. Moore, in the final chapter of Principia Ethica, counts the "pleasures of human intercourse" as one of the two greatest goods, and the value of this lies in the cognition and contemplation of certain qualities of the other person (chapter 6, paras. 122-3). Moore, of course, does not claim to be offering a theory of friendship, but his analysis of the value of human intercourse shows up one important peculiarity of Aristotle's theory. This peculiarity is that for someone's activities to be our own, they must already be our friends; and therefore it cannot be characteristic of our friends that we contemplate their goodness. We can equally well contemplate the goodness of perfect strangers. If it were argued that this would be less valuable because these people's actions would in no sense be our own, then Aristotle must give some theory of what makes people "our own" (i.e. our friends), apart from their possession of qualities which we appreciate. For otherwise we have simply the notion that it is valuable to contemplate the good qualities of others - Moore's notion, which is not, as we have noticed, intended to provide a theory of friendship.

The impulse behind such a notion seems to be, in both cases, a belief in the value of a contemplative rather than a practical life. This is explicit in Moore's argument, where aesthetic enjoyment is the paradigm of value, and affection for others

and seeking after truth derive their value from the other. It is more surprising in Aristotle with his emphasis on the importance of practical activity as a self-realising human existence.

One great difficulty in making mutual contemplation the valuable part of friendship is the sort of situation this might produce between two rational persons who understood this. Aristotle indeed admits that friends will strive to give each other the opportunity for good deeds, and also, presumably, be keener to watch each other for a manifestation of goodness than to manifest their own goodness. We have a picture of two voyeurs of virtue trying to lure each other into committing a good action for the sake of seeing someone near and dear performing. Even if we assume that each will wish to realise his own virtues as well, the spectator pleasure seems to become adventitious: one's friends' activities will be of value insofar as they are one's own (though we still have no analysis of this), but one's own activities are valuable for other reasons than one's contemplation of them - or else they will be no more valuable than those of a perfect stranger. The circle has still to be broken.

If we take a weaker line, that mutual contemplation is just typical of what friends do with each other, we still have problems. The main one is that it in fact seems more usual to contemplate and admire people who are not one's friends, the contemporary cult-heroes and people one looks up to as father-figures. One does, of course, usually admire one's friends, but this is rather in the nature of an underlying assumption than a fulltime activity. And, pace the belief that only good men can be true friends, one can be close friends with people one does not admire at all, out of pity, or a proselytising motive, or simply fellow-feeling. Finally, there are many activities which are very friendly indeed, to which contemplation of the others virtues would be irrelevant if not a positive hindrance: for instance, if one is engaged, together with a friend, in fighting off larger numbers.

The common defect of both theories we have considered is their lack of explanatory power for the kind of activities which constitute a large part of the phenomena, and the value, of friendships. The final section will argue the importance of this defect.

(g) In view of the argument above, to the effect that man's nature lies in his activity, it would be unfortunate if friendship was independent of activities. It would make it irrelevant to the good life, if that is to be conceived as constituted by a certain form of activity, and hence would lose its moral interest. We must be able to show not only that friendship necessarily involves activity, but also that the phenomena of friendship which seem to make it valuable can only be understood in terms of activities.

Fortunately, there are arguments which demand that friendship be understood by reference to certain modes of activity. Firstly, as we have already argued, friendship is necessarily a social relation; and the existence of a social relation must ultimately rest on some activities with shared significance. If it were possible to be friends without one's activities being related to the other's at all, simply by virtue, perhaps, of each arousing an emotion of affection in the other, then it would be simply a contingent matter that men are friends with those with whom they share certain social situations. It would be possible for two nomadic hermits each of whom felt some courtly love for the other to be friends. Now even if they were aware of each other's feelings, the best one could say about their relationship would be that they enjoyed mutual contemplation of each other. But we have seen the difficulties involved in this view - particularly, the fact that it allows hero worship, if reciprocated, to count as a case of friendship. And while we need not worry about terminology, we need worry about making a persistent feature of friendships as we know them, namely their link with social activities, peripheral to our discussion of them.

Connected with this is a more cogent reason for focusing our theoretical attention on activities. One of the purposes of studying friendship at all is to make some sense of this kind of human relationship. To do this, we should show that it is not simply a contingent matter that we have, and care for, the friends we actually have, for then the phenomena would collapse into an uninteresting heap of dispositions that we happen to take out on the nearest person available. This would be unfair to the facts, for much friendship involves constancy. But if we do not make the activities of friends central to our theory, then we will have done precisely this,

for the phenomena largely comprise various activities engaged in by the friendly parties. So to seek the basis of friendship in activities will permit us to find a non-contingent and realistic theory.

Approaching the matter from the other end, one might observe that friendships tend to lapse as a result of boredom or separation. Both these have intimate links with activity: boredom, because it is a ceasing to enjoy each other's company, i.e. to enjoy doing things together; and separation because it at least entails removing the possibility of doing things together. Unless it is a necessary feature of friendship that friends do things together, it will be simply a contingent matter that separation and boredom end friendships. This of course, could be so, as it might also be a contingent matter that friends do things with each other that they do not do with just anybody. But this cannot be established either way without an examination of the ways of friends together.

I shall not go into elaborate detail of friends and their behaviour as we know them, except where examples are called for. But two things should be made clear (i) I intend to cover, by my use of 'friend' a wide range of socially related people. A colleague at work, a fellow-passenger, a fellow-communist, a wife, a child, a neighbour, a fellow-countryman, will all be taken into account. The justification for this is that all such relationships, in certain situations, will give grounds for activity which would lack grounds if such a relationship did not hold. Thus, to take the most tenuous mentioned relationship, that of fellow-countryman, one may consider a war-time situation in which people so related will behave very differently towards each other than they will to others. Or again, solidarity between members of a certain class or group will be a friendly relation for the purposes of discussion. (ii) The theory I advance is intended to be a formal one. That is, it attempts to present a framework of understanding for all cases of such relations independent of the social structure in which they occur and therefore of the particular content of any such relationship. What is said should hold true of every relationship between social beings which provides reason for behaving in certain ways peculiar to that relationship. To return to the opening theme of this chapter, the point of this is to show how, and why, such relationships are related to the good life for man.

CHAPTER IV

I. The theory of friendship that I shall propose, elaborate and defend may be simply stated as follows:

any numbers of persons are friends if and only if they both (a) co-operate and (b) sympathise with each other. We may add to this that the closeness and importance of the friendship to them may be judged by the extent and importance of the areas of activity in which they cooperate and sympathise. In elaborating this theory, I hope to show how friendship constitutes an important part of the good life, and why it is the aspect of social life by virtue of which man may be called a social animal.

One possible objection to the theory as already stated may be dealt with here: it is the objection that the statement above looks very much like a persuasive definition, likely to rule out much of what we want to call friendship, and to allow in relationships which are unacceptable as instances of friendship; hence it will tell us nothing about friendship. But this would miss the point. For whether or not sympathy and cooperation are typical elements of our relations with others, I hope to show that relationships of such a kind are of necessary value to human life. If they can be shown to be obviously valuable, then it will be possible to understand actual human behaviour of this kind, one will be able to make sense of it. The prior task must be, however, to establish some forms of behaviour as valuable, for without this there can be no understanding, only re-description. The theory does, in fact, I believe, provide an understanding of the phenomena of friendship, in its widest sense. But to establish this would seem to be a laborious task.

The argument which follows will consist in the main of an analysis and elaboration of the two key notions of cooperation and sympathy. As a preliminary to this, I offer a classification of the relationships I hope to cover, which will be useful on occasion for elucidation. We may distinguish (i) individual friends (ii) small group friends (iii) large group friends. The principle of division is that an individual friend of mine is identifiable by me as my friend by his person alone, the obvious instances being relatives or personal

friends - there is one person who is related to me in that way, for that reason, because there is only one person who is that person. The distinction amongst the others between small group and large group friends is simply if I personally know who all the members of a certain group are, then that is a small group: all others are large. Thus I would not necessarily recognise a large group friend if I saw him. Typical small groups are a family, a workshop, a college S.C.R., a football team, or the regulars in a certain pub. Typical large groups are fellow-communists, co-religionists, fellow-citizens or fellow-philosophers.

II

By cooperative activity I mean activity undertaken by two or more persons with a shared end or interest. This broad account needs to be broken down into three types of cooperation: (1) where the activity is end-seeking, and the end is shared (2) where the activity is not end-seeking, and the interest and enjoyment is shared (3) implicit cooperation of either of these types (which I shall explain later). The first type, that of end-seeking cooperation, can be further analysed into three kinds: (a) where the shared end is materially identical (b) where there is one necessary means for at least one end of each person, though none of their ends may be shared (c) where the ends of each person can only be realised together as constituent parts of one larger state of affairs.

(1) The simplest kind of cooperation is the first class of the first type: that is, where two or more persons consciously act in conjunction to realise a single end state of affairs. Putting down a piano that you've just carried upstairs is a paradigm case, where there are two men who are both trying to put the piano safely on the floor. Team games obviously involve a lot of cooperative activity in this sense (indeed, they would be inconceivable without it). To clarify the notion further, we may take a couple of borderline cases: firstly, the man who helps achieve a certain end without knowing it, e.g. the innocent student radical manipulated by communist conspirators. Secondly, the man who helps knowingly but not meaning to, e.g. the full-back who mis-kicks straight to the opposing striker. Thirdly, the man who is aware that what he does effectively helps to bring about a certain end, but,

while he is not trying to pursue that end, he is not doing what he could to stop it: e.g. the nice girl who carries on drinking. Now to take the last type of case first, these should not be counted as instances of co-operation. The demonstrator who allows himself to be dragged away by the police is not resisting arrest, but he is not cooperating with them either. There is a divergence here from legal criteria. for the armed guard who just watched a robbery taking place could reasonably be held guilty of materially assisting the robbers, whereas from our point of view he is not cooperating. A fortiori, the first two cases are not instances of cooperation either, although the poor full-back may be treated to congratulations from the opposition as though he were on their side - this would be a joke. What the third case does bring out is that a distinction between active and passive is highly relevant here, and so-called acts of omission do not necessarily count. This is one reason why it is preferable to use the word "activity" rather than "acts" or "actions".

(2) This end-seeking co-operation is, I think, more or less what our ordinary notion of co-operation covers. It is not, I think, normally applicable to cases of jointly undertaken activity which is done for its own sake rather than to produce some end result. I do intend to so use it,however, for the simple reason that not all activities are for the sake of some end, particularly joint activities of friends. One can go for a drink without trying to get drunk, one may go for a walk without wanting to get fit, one can look into somebody's eyes without wanting to find something. There is in principle no limit to the activities that can be jointly performed in this way: even reflexive activities like scratching one's back may be done in company with someone else who is scratching their back. It is also true that there are certain activities performed for their own sake which can only be enjoyed jointly, the most common example being conversation. Playing string quartets, some kinds of dancing, and gossiping are other cases of this. Moreover, activities which do have ends may be enjoyed regardless of success or failure in achieving those ends, both solitary and joint ones: one may enjoy a game of football that one loses, and you can enjoy making an ashtray more than possessing one or flicking one's ash into one.[23]

The sense in which such end-lacking activities can be said to be performed jointly will be discussed further on. The importance of this class of co-operation will also become apparent. One or two points may be made here about terminology: firstly, this category is another reason for using the word 'activity' rather than 'act' or 'action'. Secondly, the use of 'enjoyment' is intended to indicate pleasure in doing something, rather than pleasure caused by an action.

(3) If we consider this class of joint activities as activities which are ends in themselves, then both this and the previous class are of co-operative activities between people who share some end, which they are both acting to realise. There is, however, another sense in which people can be said to share an end: that is in a situation where, although neither party is in a position to bring about a certain state of affairs, or engage in certain activity, each would so so if the opportunity arose, and is known by the other to be so prepared. This may be called "implicit co-operation" and it is the essential feature of solidarity. Such solidarity may be a readiness to defend their present situation should it be threatened (a case where the end is not practically available at present because it is actually the case), or a readiness to canvass for the same candidate if he stands for election. Now obviously one cannot in such cases require that each knows that the other is trying to bring about a certain situation, since ex hypothesi neither can even try to do so. On what sort of evidence then, is the awareness of the other's "implicit" co-operation founded? One sort of evidence would obviously be assertions on the other's part; but this is not necessary. For it would surely be reasonable evidence, if one was aware that his situation was such that it would be in his interests, and would probably be seen by him to be in his interests, to actively co-operate when the time came. This kind of evidence is very important to the general understanding of the phenomena, for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it is one of the bases on which it is reasonable to believe the assertions made by others about their readiness to engage in certain enterprises: indeed, it is arguably irrational to believe such assertions if there is no indication that such action is, or is seen by him to be in his interest. Secondly, it makes sense of 'large group' friendships (see above) because it

allows us to be friends with, at least feel solidarity with, those whom we do not know personally and therefore can have no evidence of their likely behaviour from their own utterances. We can simply believe that all people in a certain situation have certain interests and are therefore, unless there are signs to the contrary, likely to cooperate in certain circumstances for certain ends. Thirdly, this seems to be the kind of evidence standardly used when looking for collaborators or companions: one seeks people with certain interests. It works too, for activities without ends or purposes; the difference is simply that instead of looking at a person's physical and economic circumstances, one looks at his character dispositions to see if he is the kind of person who enjoys going beagling.

The notion of implicit cooperation is in general indicative of the sort of basis on which friendships are formed: namely, to use a very convenient phrase, common interests. Since no two people ever do everything together, it gives an understanding of how friendships persist over a period of separation And it shows how phenomena like political affiliation, class solidarity and fellow-feeling for one's countrymen when abroad are essentially related to intimate friendships.

So we have three categories of co-operative activity, or dispositions to co-operative activity: (1) collaborative pursuit of a single end (2) joint enjoyment of an end-lacking activity (3) implicit disposition to cooperate in either kind of activity.

(4) A variety of further points should be made about co-operation, both to make more precise aspects of the notion which have been left unclear, and to illustrate the range of pursuits that the concept covers.

(a) It was said at the outset that end-seeking co-operation involved two people seeking to achieve the same one end together. This is not of course the same as two people trying to realise the same kind of end: for instance, if two people sit next to each other to eat, each is trying to fill his stomach, but it is not true that both are trying to fill the same stomach. By contrast, when a mother spoon-feeds her baby, it is a case of both persons working to achieve a single end. Now it is necessary that both agents involved should

have the intention of achieving the end in question: otherwise we would have to count as co-operative activity cases where one man was forcing another to carry out a certain task. But the state of affairs that each is ultimately trying to bring about by his actions need not be materially identical, there being two further possibilities (i) that there is a common necessary condition for two distinct ends (ii) that each man's end may only be realisable as a constituent part of some end state. The situations so far envisaged have been where both parties will the same state of affairs as an end: for instance both may want the same tree chopped down. Since a tree is more easily cut down by two men than by one, they will cooperate in achieving that end, by taking alternate shifts with the axe perhaps. They need have no ulterior motive for destroying the tree, just a common dislike of that particular tree, a simple whim to have it chopped down. Now take the situation where people do have ulterior motives: say, one man wants to let his house have more light and the other man wants room to construct a chapel, as high as the tree, in his garden. Both, clearly, need to chop down the tree to achieve their ends. But it is not true that they both desire the same final state of affairs to hold. This kind of situation is characteristic of business relations, where competition between people with conflicting aims is frequently modified by cooperation to achieve certain conditions: hence the need for anti-trust laws. Typically, people co-operate in this way in the face of a third party who threatens to make it impossible for either of them to prosper, and they collaborate in order to maintain their competition at all. In terms of game theory, they act to keep the game a zero-sum game. (People may of course co-operate in this way whether their ultimate purposes are in conflict or not: they may be compatible as well). The second further possibility, where each man's end is a constituent of some single end, is best exemplified in collective bargaining and procreation. In the former case, the various persons each want a wage increase for themselves, but since in practice this can only be achieved by securing a collective rise, they will cooperate to obtain such an end: an end which includes every individual's end. Similarly, if two people of opposite sex want a child, they may co-operate to produce a single child, one which satisfies both their requirements.

So there are three forms of co-operation for ends: (i) where the end for each is materially identical (ii) where some

necessary means for the end that each seeks is materially identical (iii) where the end of each is only obtainable as part of an end which also includes the end of the other(s). People may be implicitly co-operative in respect of all these three types (details are, hopefully, unnecessary). It should be noted that the evidence needed for implicit co-operators in the latter two ways must include data about the world apart from the attitudes of the others in question.

(b) It has so far been deliberately left vague as to why people who engage in end-lacking activity may be said to co-operate. All the criteria so far used for co-operation have involved the ends and means of the participants, and we have explicitly ruled out the case where two people are seeking the same thing for themselves (e.g. where I want a meal and you want a meal too) and can achieve it independently. If this were all that could be said about cooperation, it would seem that our innocent delights in the company of others, our conversations, dances, games, and our preference for eating, drinking and spectating in company, could not count as cooperative behaviour and hence the theory of friendship being advanced would have a disastrously large gap. While not wishing to be either terminologically possessive or conceptually permissive, I do nevertheless wish to give some account of such joint activities as co-operative in some important sense. Since end-directed activities may also be enjoyed and valued apart from their end product, as with creative hobbies like painting, embroidery or repairing motor-bikes, we would also add a further possible dimension of co-operation to such end-seeking behaviour.

The problem may be phrased thus: in what sense can two people do something together if they are not doing the same thing? On a given evening, there may be 40 people drinking in a public bar, yet most of them will be drinking with a few others in a sense in which they are not drinking with all 40.[24] They may, indeed, be blissfully unaware of the presence of 38 of the others. Geographical proximity is not a sufficient condition for companionship.

First of all, awareness of others doing the same kind of thing as yourself is a fair step in itself. One of the worst problems for a convinced solipsist must be the desolate sense of loneliness (there is a science fiction story about God creating the world for just this reason: if men had not existed, he would have had to invent them). But mutual awareness does not take one very far: the field in the pub could still be 40 strong. Let us then add that they should be disposed to communicate, which means, effectively, that they should talk to each other at least occasionally. The trouble with this is not just its lack of precision, but the fact that it takes in too much and too little: too much, because it would mean that the barman was drinking with everybody if he was drinking at all, which is either untrue or uninteresting; and too little because one really does not have to talk, even occasionally - apart from just gazing into each other's eyes, activities like dancing or playing music do not need conversation with one's partner. So instead of adding communication, consider as a further condition enjoyment of each other's activity, that is, two people are drinking together if they are not only aware of each other's drinking but also deriving pleasure from the other's activity apart from enjoying their own drink. This seems to be nearer to what is wanted, and covers dancing and the like much more adequately. But again, too much is allowed in: it is a common phenomenon of the theatre that not only does the spectator take pleasure in the actor's playing, but the actor also delights in a responsive audience. Still, we have our original condition that they should be doing the same kind of thing, so the theatre might not be a relevant example. In any case, the excess covered by this suggestion, can be found in the public bar: an old dear who takes pleasure in seeing the young folk enjoying themselves. In case this example tempts a reversion to the communication condition, or a simple demand of reciprocity of such pleasure, one may take the case of two girls giggling at two students who are in turn exchanging fascinated observations on the behaviour patterns of the girls. Reciprocal pleasure, yes, but no togetherness; nor need any communication that takes place be any more than a stimulus to further pleasure-providing behaviour.

The full criterion, I suggest, should refer to each party enjoying the activity, at least partly, because both are doing it. If this sounds obscure, or no different from the

condition of reciprocal pleasure, the central idea is of mutual enjoyment of the other's pleasure in the activity: that is, your enjoyment derives not from your observation of the other drinking but lies in your appreciation of the other's enjoyment in drinking. This is in addition, of course, to your enjoyment of your own activity and should also be reciprocated. Just what is involved in this appreciation of someone else's enjoyment, and what makes it possible, will be discussed when we come to sympathy. It will also be appropriate, in that context, to explain how far, and why, people should be engaged in the same kind of activity for this to happen. For the moment, we may take it that there must be some degree of resemblance, if not in the contemporaneous activities, at least in the persons' attitude to them, for this kind of phenomenon to occur.

(c) One interesting feature about cooperative activity, whether end-seeking or not, is that some of what is significant about it holds true of conflict situations between enemies or opponents. Games, that is, amateur games, are the best example of this. Indeed, even at the most intense professional level, the element of mutual appreciation still persists, as witness Pele's applause for Bank's save in the last World Cup. In war too, it is not unheard of for one side to honour the heroism of an enemy, although he should preferably be a dead hero. More interestingly, whenever two sides are at war, or two people are fighting, there is a sense in which either side depends on a certain activity from the other as essential to achieving its end: namely, resistance. This does not necessarily apply to modern military operations (the invasion of Czechoslovakia springs to mind), but wherever there is the element of a duel, this holds true. The distinction between winning a fight and common assault is kept very clear: even people spoiling for a fight will arrange provocation - not so much to provide justification, as to introduce an element of resistance. You cannot win a fight if there is no opposition from the other side. This is obviously true of competitive games.

This does not mean that all competitive activity is co-operative under the criteria used above. The cases mentioned, like duelling and games, are not typical examples of competition. It is important, however, to realise that the kind

of joint activity we are discussing need not exclude all elements of conflict and competition.

(5) We have, then, three kinds of cooperative relations between persons: (1) cooperative activity for some shared end (2) cooperative enjoyment of non-productive activity (3) implicit cooperation in either of these respects.

It is a necessary condition of all these possibilities that the agents should have some common interests. In the first case, there must be empirical connections between the ends they seek, or they must be identical. In the second case, there must be some evaluative attitudes shared; otherwise it would be impossible to appreciate someone else's enjoyment. In the third case, one or the other of these conditions must hold, or be known to be likely to hold in certain envisageable circumstances.

The second kind of shared interests, i.e. shared attitudes, will be discussed in the next section. But the first kind also requires shared attitudes: for co-operative end-seeking behaviour requires that both the effects should be intended and the intentions be known to the participants: and this requires the sharing of evaluative attitudes and mutual awareness of them.

III.

(1) The other stated requirement for two persons being friends was that they should sympathise. By this is meant that they should see and appreciate a given situation as the other person, that it should matter to them as it matters to the other person. There are two ways in which one might conceive this: (a) caring about situations involving the other for the same reasons as he does, as if oneself were in that situation and had the kind of attitudes that the other actually has; or,(b) caring about situations involving the other for the same reasons as he does, as if one were he. The difference between these two conceptions will become apparent.

Two points should be made here: firstly, I do not mean to suggest that people are only friends at moments when they

actually sympathise. It is enough that they should be disposed to sympathise, that is, inclined to do so in situations where it makes a difference. It is not, however, enough for friendship that people should simply be <u>able</u> to sympathise, partly because, as I shall argue, it is in principle possible for any two people to sympathise. Secondly, I shall not insist on the intentional nature of sympathising. It does not matter whether people are aware of their own sympathy, or whether they are <u>meaning</u> to sympathise or not, because it is the fact of sympathy which is relevant to the role of friendship in the good life. Both for people who have tried to sympathise and failed, and for those who don't sympathise at all, and have never tried, the appropriate attitude is pity rather than blame. It is an interesting question as to who is to be pitied most.

(2) Let us distinguish three kinds of situation in respect of which it is possible to sympathise. Firstly, those situations in which the other person is an agent, and is conscious of himself as an agent. Any activity or action on the other's part will fall into this class, as will external features of a situation which are intentionally relevant for the agent to his action. If a man is feeding his cat, then to sympathise properly one should not only sympathise with his attitude to his act of feeding and some beliefs he may have about the cat, such as that it is ginger and therefore beautiful: one should also sympathise with his attitude to the cat as something to be fed and something which his action is designed to feed. It is sympathy in respect of this kind of situation that we are most concerned with, because of the importance of joint activities in friendship.

Secondly, there are situations of which the other person is merely a spectator, such as the view from his window. In this class I would place the content of idle wishes or speculations which are not (perhaps cannot be) the object of any activity of his. In these cases one should be sympathising with beliefs he may have about the beauty of the view, or nostalgia that he may be feeling as he gazes upon the view. I shall not pay further attention to this class as a whole.

Thirdly, there is an interesting sub-class of this last class, namely, those situations in which the other person is a spectator of activities of our own.

This classification brings out two points about sympathy. Firstly, just as activities may be counted as more valuable parts of the good life than experiences, so sympathising with someone in respect of an activity of his is of more value than sympathising in respect of an experience. This is because in sympathy one is seeing a situation <u>as if</u> one were in it: and if one were in it, then an active situation would be of more value than an experiential one. Secondly, in sympathising one is seeing a situation as <u>the other's</u>. The force of this is in cases of another person's activity, which is his in the sense of a realisation of his potential, and matters to him for this reason. The difficulty is in cases where another person is viewing my own activities. The interest lies in the distinction thus brought out between the two possible ways of conceiving sympathy (see above); for if sympathy is seeing a situation as if <u>I</u> were in it and had certain attitudes, then it would seem contradictory or rather impossible to sympathise with someone's views of me; but if sympathy is seeing things as if I were <u>he</u>, there is no such contradiction.

A more precise analysis of sympathy follows.

(3) The subject of sympathy was in fashion in 18th century Edinburgh. The discussions of Hume and Adam Smith will serve as a starting point for an analysis, and help show what sympathy is <u>not</u>. To be blunt, it is not the emotion of pity, nor is it the act of understanding what another person is feeling.

Hume (Enquiry on Morals, Section V part II) treats sympathy as fundamentally the emotional reaction of a spectator to what he witnesses.

> "in general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, everything still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness"

Nevertheless, Hume uses such phrases as "feeling <u>for</u> someone", and talks of our hearts "beating with corresponding movements" to those whose situation we are witnessing. But without further explanation, it would be pure chance that we should have the same emotional reactions on seeing or hearing of

another's plight as he himself has in that plight. Hume takes it as a truth of human nature that we do sympathise, but there is still a problem, of understanding how, that he does not touch. Adam Smith's theory is an attempt to solve just this problem (Theory of Moral Sentiments I.1.1.). He distinguishes the sympathy aroused in an observer of someone in distress from the sympathy derived from imagining ourselves in the position of the other person. This latter account is interesting because it suggests a way of sympathising that is not just a spectator's reaction but is still affective rather than cognitive: that is, it is not simply a matter of coming to know what the other person is feeling. It allows, as he points out, that we can feel for our person what he is not himself feeling (shame and embarrassment are his examples):

> "because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality."

But the other aspect of this is that we cannot sympathise with someone whose reactions to a situation are not what ours would be. Smith, indeed, allows that emotions may be sympathetically felt without such an imaginative procedure, although not, apparently, for the same reasons as they are originally felt:

> "The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned."

But this is, to him, a somewhat mysterious phenomenon, which from his description looks like the Humean spectator model. In any case, the kind of sympathy that interests us, that which is felt between friends, is of a less generalisable kind, and seems to involve knowing somebody well. To the lonely man, the smile on the face of a stranger only increases his misery. Moreover, one would like an explanation of why close friends may sympathise with each other though there is no public evidence of their emotions, and though they might react differently in similar situations.

For this is the great defect of Smith's theory its inability to explain those cases of sympathy where we do sympathise with persons who feel other than as we ourselves will. Smith's kind of sympathy seems to have very limited possibilities indeed if we examine it more closely: for a large part of what a man feels in a certain situation will be determined by his

previous history, his hopes, wishes and expectations. But Smith's imaginer will take himself, with his own very different history and aspirations, and conceive that he is in the contemporary circumstances that the other is in. The chances of coming up with a reaction anything like that of the other person is very small indeed. And it might perhaps make it impossible for people as close as husband and wife to sympathise at all, since such a large part of the wife's dispositions and desires concern her husband in a way that his own could not, and vice versa.

(4) There are further reasons for wanting a theory of sympathy to permit more than Smith's does. The first of these is the problem of the development of our emotional responses. If we are not born with an inate programme which provides us with our emotional dispositions for life, there must be some procedure whereby we develop our affective responses. And unless it would be possible to develop any range of such responses in an isolated life outside any society or contact with others, some at least of this development should take the form of acquiring the emotional tendencies of those around us: which would seem to be what the observed facts indicate. But this could never be done by imagining what our own reactions would be in the situation of others, and to talk of our reactions to what we witness is to leave the crucial element - our development of such reactions - unexplained.

The second reasons for wanting a new theory is that the facts show that we can sympathise with attitudes and reactions that are not, and perhaps could not, be our own. The reading of a novel, or the watching of a play, derive a large part of their interest from our coming to appreciate attitudes we have not previously encountered. It may be suggested that this is simply coming to be aware of such attitudes, an extension of our knowledge which need not in itself lead to an extension of the attitudes we can adopt, or the emotions we can feel. But to maintain this one would have to deny that anyone could appreciate new attitudes in a novel if he could not articulate, in propositional form, what it was he had come to know.

This seems untrue. There are cases of people being moved by fiction so intensely that it changes their way of life - a slightly unusual example is Vanessa Redgrave's conversion to C.N.D. after acting in a play about it - which is not an intelligible effect of learning a new fact about possible attitudes, and does not entail having such knowledge.

Thirdly, if we were to accept Smith's theory, we would have to accept a view of the individual as detached and isolated even in his sympathy. For he would be no more practically concerned in the situation than was Hume's spectator, since he could perform his acts of imagination while peeping out from a padded cell. The trouble with this is that it should make some difference to the content of one's sympathy how well one knows the other person, and this is not allowed for. Neither is it explained how such sympathy would make any practical difference to one's behaviour: for since one is only exercising one's imagination, and pretending that one is in the other's situation when one is not, it is hard to see why one should care about the actual situation let alone be moved to action. Even if the pale emotions that this performance is supposed to arouse in us can be assumed to have motive force, we may still wonder what motive there was for performing the imaginative act in the first place. Nor can we see why we should sympathise with our friends rather than with others, or why our friends' happiness should make such a difference to us. If it is simply a matter of feeling emotions of delight and sorrow according to the circumstances of the other person, it seems strange that men should not concentrate on deriving a vicarious pleasure from sympathising with people who are flourishing, and avoid the painful results of sympathising with the miserable.

What is needed then is a theory of sympathy which (a) enables us to sympathise with people's feelings about a situation when they are not necessarily the ones we would have ourselves; (b) explains why we tend to sympathise with certain people rather than others; (c) indicates the value of sympathising.

(5) In short, we must understand sympathy as feeling as though one were the other person: as Adam Smith puts it, "becoming in some measure the same person as him". The rest of this section will attempt to analyse this notion in a way

that does not make it entail false beliefs about one's identity or a kind of volurtary schizophrenia.

Bernard Williams[25] has done much to remove this conceptual difficulty. It is, he claims,

> "as unproblematic that I can imagine being Napoleon as that Charles Boyer could act the role of Napoleon."

What Williams suggests is that one would be

> "visualizing the desolatio. at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of my short stature and cocked hat."

Thus far, it seems we are no further than Adam Smith's suggestion. Williams, however, adds that my imaginative project will be carried out

> "according to whatever knowledge or illusions I possess about Napoleon."

Here we go beyond Williams' own remarks, for he is not discussing sympathy, but only the conceptual possibility of imagining oneself to be someone else. One kind of knowledge one can have about someone is the knowledge of the kind of person he is: his emotional make-up, the things he cares about, his life history, his strength and weaknesses, and so on. It is this kind of knowledge which is claimed when we are said to know a person well. This allows us to understand what someone is feeling in a certain situation. Since it seems we can only have acquired this knowledge about him by experiencing, or learning of, his reactions in actual situations, there should be an elementary procedure for understanding the feelings of a person in a given situation. A simple procedure of this kind is not hard to outline. One will be able to learn what the external constituents of a person's situation are by simple observation. Moreover, by equally direct observation one may learn what emotional behaviour he is manifesting in that situation; though, since the reasons for this may not yet be clear, one does not thereby know what his reactions are in the sense of understanding why he behaves that way. One direct way of gaining understanding would be through linguistic communication from the other person. But we can also, surely, derive understanding from those attitudes and dispositions which we have in common with the other person. Given his behaviour and the situation; given that some of it is readily intelligible if we assume that he has certain of the attitudes that we have; it is

possible to infer what other attitudes he must possess to make sense of the remainder of his observed behaviour. Given, therefore, some shared attitudes, it is possible to begin understanding. And some shared attitudes are also a necessary condition of linguistic communication. Thus it seems to be generally true that to sympathise with, or come to know, a person, there must be some attitudes which we hold in common.

We may distinguish here two relevant kinds of such attitudes: firstly, common beliefs or feelings about certain kinds of things. For instance, we may both be driven to ecstasy by the smell of roast coffee; or, we may both appreciate food when we are hungry; or, we may hold similar principles about economic equality for all men. Secondly, we may share common attitudes to particular situations; we may both prefer shopping at Sainsburys, or both want to cook a certain piece of steak for dinner, or both want to keep the Tories in office. It is only this latter kind of attitude I shall be interested in, for it is this kind which is relevant to co-operative behaviour: our ends are particular situations, not general characteristics (though we are, of course, likely to share particular attitudes if we share general ones).

Why does this analysis of sympathy, however, not leave us with simply a procedure for gaining a detached understanding of how people are feeling, and not a procedure for feeling that one is the other person, which is what we are primarily seeking? We can go some way towards answering this in terms of motivation. For if we share practically relevant attitudes, e.g. about keeping the Tories in office, then there is a point in feeling that one is, "in some measure", the other person: crudely, the extra satisfaction derived thereby, or the reassurance of feeling not alone in one's disappointment. (The reassurance may be twofold: firstly, the feeling that one is not so likely to be wrong; secondly, the feeling that there is someone with whom one could be happy in at least one possible world.)

A final remark on the possible scope of sympathy thus conceived. It is possible, in principle, to sympathise with any other person, for the simple reason that it is possible in principle to have practical interests in common with some other person. Even without such common interests, it will be

possible to sympathise, in the sense of understand, anyone with whom one shares common attitudes to certain types of thing. Since a dislike of being hungry or ill may be assumed to be universal, we will be able to sympathise with (i.e. understand) anyone who is hungry or ill. This is relevant to an understanding of how altruism is possible towards those other than our friends.

(6) The step of feeling that one is the other person has still to be clarified and analysed. There is, perhaps, not much that can be said about it clearly: we must take it as a human possibility which cannot be denied. but there are two concepts which may offer some enlightenment.

The first is Martin Buber's notion of I and Thou.[26] He suggests that we move in two totally different worlds, and are related to these worlds in different ways. Our position in one world is based on the relation of I-It; our position in the other on the relation of I-Thou. He puts the distinction thus:

> "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. Every It is bounded by others; It exists only through being bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds.
> When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing. But he takes his stand in relation."

And further:

> "With no neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothingexists except himself. But all else lives in his light."

This is not a model of logical precision, but nor is it meant to be. There are three reasons, however, for suspecting that it is not just drivel. Firstly, consider the phenomenon of conversation. As I engage in a conversation with another person, I do not, as a rule, know exactly what he is going to say next - there would be little point if I did, except in cases of a conversation meant as a public exhibition. Even if determinism is true, and we could know in principle, it would remain true that I do not have a way of knowing in fact. Compare this with objects in the world that I may be working on: they do slip unexpectedly, but on the whole they conform to predictable patterns of response to my actions and it is

only this which makes it possible for me to work on them. Thus a conversation with another is peculiar in this way, that it places one's activity open to changes of direction that are willed by another person. Something similar may be said of games like tennis. Secondly, when two people are having a conversation, there is a single coherent activity going on but two persons are involved. There is a single action predicate which holds true of both of them together, but neither of them separately. Thirdly, whenever I make a third person statement, there must be some criterion for identification of the subject implicit in what I say. But this is not true for a second person statement, which I use to address someone, not to refer to a certain someone: "I take my stand in relation."

These are only suggestions: perhaps a thorough investigation of second person logic would be a worthwhile project. We need not talk of two worlds to acknowledge the peculiarities of an I-Thou relation.

The second notion is one we noted at the very beginning, the notion of a friend as another self. It implied, as we mentioned, that the same care is both taken for him and expected from him as one gives to oneself. Now this is just the situation that one would expect to hold in cases of reciprocated sympathy: in the areas in which people sympathise, they count each other's lives as their own. The practical relations between each person as agent and the other as intentional being, are obviously important to this other self relation. And we can here see the point of and value of sympathising. For if our happiness, the good life, is a function of our self-realising activity, then another self will clearly increase the population of actions in the world which are realisations of at least one of one's selves, and therefore increase one's capacity for happiness. The importance of activity should be noted: for if happiness were a function of satisfied desires, it would be irrational, i.e. destructive of one's happiness, not to carefully select successful and satisfied people as one's friends. But there may be some miserable people who are actually appropriate friends because we share common interests and therefore we have a portion of the world in common to work on.

(7) In summary, I wish to point out that this concept of sympathy is not restricted to sharing of emotions. The account of sympathy is not intended to be an account in a specific area of philosophical psychology, but an account of how one person's concerns may include those of another. It makes no crucial difference, I think, whether one considers concern to be basically a matter of emotions or beliefs or desires. A critique of Hume and Smith was simplified by assuming an emotive theory, but the same kind of arguments would hold if formulated in terms of beliefs or desires.

IV.

It is now possible to see how sympathy enables us to understand certain central features of friendship.

Firstly, the problem of joint activity: in what sense it is joint and why it is both a typical feature of friendship and one which seems particularly productive of happiness. The feature of it which makes it joint, we suggested, was the appreciation by each party of the other's enjoyment. As we have just seen, this is precisely what sympathy makes possible. Moreover, if happiness is a function of activity, then it is precisely activities with another person which one would expect to be of value in other-regarding behaviour. And the reason why it is commoner to enjoy doing the same kind of thing together than two different things will be because of the facility of sympathising with common attitudes: it would seem difficult, though not impossible, to sympathise with someone else's enjoyment in rubbing their stomach while enjoying patting one's own head. In cases of a single activity performed together of necessity, like conversation, the facility of sympathy and the value of it are even more obvious.

Secondly, we can see why friendship is a typical, and fundamental, social relation. For in respect of both co-operation and sympathy common practicable attitudes were found to be required. Now such shared attitudes imply the possibility of shared meaning in one's practical activities with others, which is, we argued, a typically social phenomenon. But the theory of friendship we have outlined also shows why people should enjoy non-productive activity when performed together.

We may thus argue that productive relations are not essential to a social existence: for if 22 well-fed nomads, with enough food and drink to keep them well satisfied for a year, met in the wilderness, there would be a point in their inventing football; although they do not need to cooperate in producing things to satisfy their wants. Thus since there is a point to establishing friendship relations independent of economic need, and since we may regard self-realising activity as more important to happiness than satisfaction of needs, we can say that what makes man a social animal is the fact that he is a friendly animal. Hence we have an argument, through our theory of friendship, for the third of our theses about human nature.

Thirdly, let us state what is ruled out by the requirements of both cooperation and sympathy for friendship. It is those relations between people which are co-operative in respect of an identical necessary condition for distinct ends which are not shared. For there is no common attitude involved in such a relation, and a fortiori no shared attitudes by virtue of sympathy. Persons so related may, of course, sympathise in respect of other co-operative relations, but not insofar as they are co-operating in this sense. It fits well with our intuitions that this class should be ruled out: business relations are not regarded as paradigms of friendship, nor is it thought appropriate for friends to use each other - which would be a good description of such business relations.

Finally, we may point out that since sympathy appears to be a human capacity, and since its operation allows us to enjoy a greater measure of practical activity that we can regard as our own, friendship appears to be of particular value and its value to be a typically human one.

CHAPTER 4

(1) It has been argued that, if we conceive of happiness as a function of the self-realising activity of a social being, then friendship, as analysed above, is an important element in human happiness. Moreover, if it is indeed true that a social existence is not possible without some friendship relations, it is an essential element: for a man will not then be able to live a social existence without friends, and will therefore have a less than fully human existence.

It remains to show that co-operation and sympathy provide a correct analysis of our concept of friendship, extended to include the notion of solidarity. In the first place, we can show that co-operation is a necessary condition for friendship, since without it we could not rule out the possibility of friends who never did anything together, and were neither inclined nor prepared to. We would have to count mutual hero-worshippers as friends, which we are not inclined to do. Pen friends may be mentioned as a counter-example, but it is not one which need worry us, for if there is not even any implicit co-operation between them they are simply exchanging a news service, and should count as traders rather than friends. It seems more difficult to argue that sympathy is a necessary condition: do we really have to care <u>that</u> intimately for someone in <u>all</u> cases, particularly cases of solidarity with large groups? The intimacy of sympathy is, however, less forbidding if we reject the assumption that concern is a matter of emotions. And making it a necessary condition at least rules out my being a friend of yours if I don't care about you at all. The stronger argument, I think, is this: that unless I sympathise with you there is no good sense to saying that you are <u>my</u> friend. My motivation for caring for you would appear to be simply an arbitrary matter of the person that my feelings happened to light upon.

The two conditions together are surely sufficient for friendship. Factors like affection, benevolence and trust may be derived from these two in an obvious way. There is in fact a danger in over-emphasising the importance of emotional affection, for not all friendships (and certainly not all solidarity) need involve strong feelings for the other person. Feelings will enter into our friendships through sympathy, to the extent to which they are involved in our caring. And our benevolence

to our friends has an intelligible basis on our theory - the basis of our regarding them as other selves, through sympathy based on common interests: the advantage of which is that we do not have a picture of two people wishing each other well in a vacuum, the victims of an arbitrary but compelling force of well-wishing.

(2) The theory is based on common interests between people and the activities they share in pursuit of such interests. It may be objected that this would involve a qualification in the description of all friendships, to the effect that 'x is a friend of y in respect of practicable interests a and b'. One of the reasons for regarding this as objectionable, the fact that we tend to be friends with those close to us in all aspects of life, can be removed easily enough. For people whom we live with, or even have lived with, will have an extremely large number of interests in common with us, and therefore we will sympathise over a large area of our lives. Moreover, the relation we have seen between sympathy and happiness gives us good reason to be friends with people to as great an extent as possible. But there is the further objection that, at least in cases of individual friends, we are friends with them as the person they are, with no restriction on the kind of activities they may enjoy and still be our friends. It is precisely this phenomenon, however, which our theory of sympathy was intended to cover. By allowing the possibility of sympathising with attitudes we may or may not share, and thus treating the other person as another self in a genuine sense, we have allowed people to be friends with other persons beyond any common interests. It is the attitudes, dispositions and history of a person that make them the persons they are, and it is in consideration of these that one acts when one treats a person as another self, for it is precisely these factors which the act of sympathy is intended to adopt.

(3) As a final test of the truth of the theory, let us take two kinds of examples: family relations, and one-sided relations.

The relation between parents and young children may seem to be a coun er-example to the theory, since there is usually little cooperation for common interests, but rather a relationship of benevolence on the one hand and gratitude on the other.

But firstly, as Aristotle pointed out, one's children are other selves in a more obvious and literal sense than any other people: they are one's own (a realisation of oneself) and therefore their self-realication will be, in a strong sense, an extension of one's own. This obviously does not hold, however, of the child's relation to the parents. But there is a more basic relation than gratitude, which in any case does not develop in very young children, and that is the strong bonds of common interests which develop from living together in a family unit: thus in conditions where gratitude is possible, we find the kind of friendship relation that we have outlined.

The interest of one-sided relations is the light they can shed on what is valuable and essential to a reciprocal friendship. One-sided affection is the obvious kind of example, but there is also one-sided assistance, one-sided delight in the other's success and happiness, and one-sided trust. The notion of sympathy, treating someone as another self, may be used to elucidate who is worse off in such relations and why. Firstly, the point of sympathising, as we said, was that it allowed one to derive happiness from the activity of others as one does from one's own. This, perhaps was what Aristotle was getting at when he declared that loving was more fundamental to friendship than being loved. Looked at from this point of view, the person who is <u>not</u> affectionate, helpful, delighted or trusting is worse off, for he has no other person whose happiness he can enjoy as he enjoys his own. It is to this kind of person that the statement "you <u>ought</u> to be friends" will have little force: one can simply point out what he is missing. But, secondly, the person whose friendship is not reciprocated suffers in a more immediate way, and it is his case which normally arouses pity. And we can understand this too. For if one treats a person as one treats oneself, then one will expect that person to treat oneself as one does. One cannot have one without the other: if I am to derive happiness from his activity, and his actions are inconsiderate of me, then I am stuck with enjoying actions which do not show any care for myself. But this is as difficult a situation to bear as a lack of self-respect, for my enjoyment of my own life, and derivately of the other's, depends on my valuing the realisation of myself. If I do not respect myself, I cannot value my own activities, which will therefore express my lack of self-respect.

Similarly, if someone whom I regard as another self, acts in a way which shows no respect for me, the same trouble arises.

There is a parallel here to the phenomenon of weakness of will. Both a friend and oneself may be regarded as agents who are both realising one's potential and pursuing one's own interests. In the case of weakness of will, it is oneself who is acting in a way which is not an expression of one's will or in accordance with one's conceived interests; in the case of one-sided friendship, it is another person. This brings out what was, I think, the Socratic interest in the phenomenon, namely, its relevance to the good life. The man with weakness of will, will be unhappy because his activities do not realise those aspects of his personality which he wishes to, neither do they advance his conceived interests. The elimination of weakness of will is not just a matter of consistency or efficiency, therefore, but a matter that is directly relevant to one's self-respect and therefore one's happiness.

(4) We may now turn, at last, to the question of altruism, and how far we may derive reasons for such behaviour from the basic form of friendship relations. I do not wish to show that we have reason for considering just anybody's interests: I do not believe we have. It is either a ridiculous claim to maintain this, or an unnecessary and unworkable injunction, or both. Instead I shall argue the extent to which friendship can lead us to act in consideration of others, and leave it to the individual intuition to judge if the yield is unrecognisably inhuman or incapable of moral perfection.

Firstly, we have reason to be friends with all those with whom we have common interests: our happiness as social beings depends on it. Since we have reason to be friends with them, we have some reason to cherish them: as we have reason for cherishing ourselves. So we have some reason for cherishing all those with whom we have common interests. Secondly, we have common interests with people (i) who have ends materially identical with ours (ii) who have ends which are only possible as constituents of a state of affairs which some ends of ours must be constituents of (iii) who enjoy an activity which we enjoy. It will only be possible to be friends with those with who we can, empirically, engage in cooperative behaviour pursuant of our common interests. But this must

always be possible in circumstances where we can act in consideration of those others. Therefore, whenever we can act considerately of those with whom we share common interests, we will have reason to do so.

Thirdly, in a society as complex as the one in which we live, there are an enormous number of people with whom we share some interests, mainly economic interests. Further, social contradictions will mean that there are people some of whose interests are shared by us and others are in direct conflict with ours. And there will be people whose interests - in fact, in the eyes of the individual, or both - are simply in conflict with ours.

Fourthly, then, we will have at least some reason for considering a large number of persons (although not necessarily as individuals, but rather as group members), and some reason for being positively antagonistic to others. Would this not seem to conflict with the value of friendship relations? Not if we can show how there might be a rational argument to persuade one side to yield its conflicting interests. And there is: namely, the argument that (i) better to have no conflict of interests, since (ii) better to have the possibility of friendship: (iii) that party which holds an unfair advantage over the other should yield: for otherwise hostility to it will retain good cause. The principle here appealed to is distributive justice. But if action in accordance with such an argument is not forthcoming, then hostility seems a rational attitude to adopt. The principle may be fought for.

Finally, have weleft ourselves without even the possibility of acting on a general principle, like 'all men should be free from tyranny', on behalf of people whose interests are not shared by us at all? On what we have said so far there are three options open: (a) such behaviour may be unjustifiable, irrational - and not necessarily the worse for that; (b) it may be argued, as Aristotle suggested, that all men are friends in some sense, perhaps engaged together in a war with nature. Such an argument is possible, but unlikely to be strong. (c) It may be that an extension of sympathy is rational to those with whom one cannot share a practical relation of friendship - because of economic and geographical separation - but with whom one could have, if things were different, been friends. The rationality here might depend on the idea that one was preserving the others for the possibility of our being friends

(implausible); or on the idea that we should not base our friendly behaviour on simply arbitrary factors; or on the idea of acting by analogy, treating conceivable friends as we would real ones. This latter interpretation would be strengthened by the argument that in a world where interests do conflict (and hence we have enemies), it is sensible to look after those whose interests do not conflict with our own, whether or not they obviously relate to them. Thus we have the interesting result that although the possibility of friendship does not depend on our having enemies, the possibility of rational altruism beyond our actual friends does depend on our having enemies.

In conclusion, we may examine the defects of a recent attempt to provide a formal motivation, that is always available for altruistic behaviour of an indifferent and universal kind. The book is Thomas Nagel's "The Possibility of Altruism".

(5) Firstly, what Nagel has achieved by his argument is not, on his own account, very important: such pure altruism, he says, "may never occur in isolation from all other motives" (p.80). It is not obvious what we would be missing without it, unless we hold one of those ethical theories which require altruistic behaviour when no obviously self-interested motive is present (p.75). It sounds as if Nagel is continuing in the Christian tradition of providing a rationalisation for a (divinely) required morality of universal and indifferent concern for persons. Secondly, if his argument is successful, it would be true that even if man were not a social animal, he would have the same sort of reason for considering the welfare of other men. This seems to me unacceptable, for two reasons: firstly, our happiness and well-being would be of a wholly different kind if we had no social relations, and would not necessarily be related to other persons in any way, in which case, we might as well care for other amoebae as for other persons; and, secondly, there seems as much reason, on Nagel's model, for caring for other amoebae anyway. We could not rely on a substantive value theory to exclude this, least of all in an age of ecological concern. But other persons' welfare does matter to us in a special way.

Thirdly, and most importantly, so far from having good reason for accepting Nagel's central argument, we have good reason for

rejecting it. Since, he says, we can regard ourselves "as merely one person among others", it is possible, from the impersonal point of view, to restate everything that is true of us in an impersonal third person form. Therefore any subjective reasons we have imply objective ones: therefore a rational altruism is possible. But, firstly, the point of regarding ourselves as "merely one person among others" is not shown to be any other than linguistic convenience (the possibility of informative communication arguably depends on such self-effacing description). This, however, does not entail that we adopt an impersonal standpoint at all, let alone when making up our minds about reasons for acting. And, secondly, from the impersonal point of view it is not clear that anyone would have a reason for anything: for a man to be an agent, he must be a person; if he is pretending not to be a person, he must forego the privileges of an agent, one of which is being able to have reasons for acting. Furthermore, this impersonal standpoint seems to lack any social location once again. And finally, such an annihilation of the first person singular would sweep away with it the second person singular, which had hitherto provided us with an excellent framework for consideration of other individuals. We could never have generated most of our reasons for considering others outside this necessarily egoistic framework (someone could not have become my friend if I insisted on the impersonal standpoint), therefore it must be logically prior to Nagel's. But since it is logically prior, and our only motive (as social beings, that is) for re-describing ourselves impersonally is for purposes of communication, we need not bother with seeing ourselves as "merely one person among others".

Most of all, it is the detachment of Nagel's kind of principle from any social life that makes it disturbing, unattractive and wrong. If this thesis has been at all successful, it will at least have shown reason to consider the basis of our behaviour towards other in the light of the social nature of our existence and how it relates to our happiness. This is not to be done by examining the formal structures of practical reasoning.

NOTES

1 See Adkins: "Friendship and Self-Sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle", C.Q.1963. There is a fuller discussion of the Homeric concept of philos in the first part of the article, where he argues that only nobles could be philoi in Homer.

2 Plato's only explicit statement of a motivation for justice is for justice in the soul, at the end of Book IV. But by analogy, there is an obviously similar motivation for justice in the state: justice is identical with performance of one's proper function, the prosperity of the state depends on members fulfilling their function, and the state works in everybody's interest.

3 An argument based on the conceptual limits of human activity might look something like this: (1) no human activity is conceivable without a social context (2) the formal motivation for any social activity will be determined by one's social relations (3) any social structure will involve members in some other-regarding activity (4) therefore, any human being will have some motivation for some altruistic activity derived from his social relations.

4 For discussion of the relevant fragments of Theophrastus, see Brink "Theophrastus and Zeno", Phronesis 1958

It may be observed that this theory of justice as based on kinship seems at odds with the possible conflict between duties of friendship that he discussed elsewhere (see next paragraph in text). But unless the social relations of men are themselves free from contradictions, there is no reason to exclude the possibility of conflict between the duties generated by one's various social relations.

5 See Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights I.3 for remarks by Theophrastus and Cicero on this problem. For an example of Marx' views on law, see Selected Writings ed. Bottomore and Rubel, pp.228-9,231-2.

6 This account of Epicurus is based on Benjamin Farrington's The Faith of Epicurus, chapters 1 & 2.

7 What makes virtuous activities right is that they are the proper way for a man to act if he is to be happy. Note that although none of Aristotle's virtues involve reference to some other person's happiness, he does point out that the good man must be self-sufficient not just for himself but for his family and friends also (1097B 8-11)

8
St. Matthew 6.38-48.

9
I am taking the word "love" as indicating that the strongest conceivable ties are asserted to hold: there is nothing extra left for one's friends. If this is right, and my interpretation as a whole is right, we have here a nice example of a conceptual change in operation. The old concept of friendship is used to assert the novel obligation of universal altruism; but it is used in such a way as to make the old concept redundant, although the intelligibility of the new one is in the first instance dependent on it. Even if "love" is not taken so strongly, and hence there is no conceptual destruction, the importance of friendship ties has obviously been considerably attenuated.

Much more detailed historical argument would be needed to show that the concept of moral obligations as universal became central to people's thoughts, and why it did so. The spread of Christianity, and in particular its establishment, would have had something to do with it. One interesting manifestation is a tendency to justify such obviously enemy-orientated activity as war by claiming that one is doing the enemy a favour. This was not a Greek idea.

10
For example, Thomas Nagel's <u>The Possibility of Altruism</u>. I discuss this work later in the thesis.

11
Adkins, op.cit., especially p.34.

12
It is possible to argue, on the grounds that Socrates' <u>daimon</u> in the Apology only gives negative injunctions and the rational faculty in the Republic is only shown in examples as forbidding actions, that rational goodness in Plato is a matter of knowing what is bad rather than what is good. This would fit well with the idea here that being good and desirable only have <u>meaning</u> because of the bad (220D4-7).

13
Adkins, op.cit.

14 Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, pp.325-331.

15 One context in which one might want to do so is a didactic one, where a system of rewards and punishments is used to incline someone into habits conducive to the good life. But moral education need not look like this.

16 It is of course a different matter if x resents y for not having x as a friend: for x cannot claim that he is, in general, an essential part of the good life for any man.

17 For the importance of resentment in modern ethics, see Strawson's British Academy lecture (P.B.A.1962); and Nagel, op.cit. p.83.

18 This difference in kind in our relations with friends and our relations to objects can elucidate some other points: (a) where persons are seen as related like objects to our practice, then they, like objects, figure as obstacles to our ends. Hence any consideration of other persons will be a restraint on us: hence the 'duty' notion of morality. (b) solipsism may be viewed as a denial of such a difference in kind, and thus perhaps entails a denial of the possibility of social life.

19 This emphasis on activity as the essential feature of human existence gives a way of understanding the Socratic doctrine that the good man cannot be harmed. For if a man's existence, and a fortiori his happiness, depend on his actions, then how can what is done <u>to</u> him matter?

20 The utilitarian view would avoid this undesirable conclusion: but it has already been argued that this view cannot ascribe any but contingent value to activity.

21 see D.M.McLellan (ed.) Early Texts, pp.133-145 and 188-203.

22
One further remark on trust: it would be ridiculous to say to a man who trusted everyone and was not lonely that he ought to mistrust some people or else he could not have any true friends.


23
Making, possessing and using are the three "ways of life" in relation to objects in the world.

24 see appendix.


25
"Imagination and the Self", Proc.Brit.Acad.1966.

26
Martin Buber, I and Thou,

SHE EATS A BISCUIT...
I EAT A BISCUIT.....





SHE PICKS UP HER SPOON.... I PICK UP A SPOON....



SHE STIRS THE CONTENTS OF HER CUP....
I STIR THE CONTENTS OF MINE.....


SHE DRINKS IT STRAIGHT DOWN—
I DRINK IT STRAIGHT DOWN...





GO ON—ASK ME!
DO I KNOW THE GIRL IN THE OFFICE ACROSS THE STREET?.....

KNOW HER?
OF COURSE I KNOW HER....





DON'T WE TAKE OUR COFFEE BREAKS TOGETHER?



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