

BIG PHILANTHROPIES –
DISTINCTIVE APPROACHES IN GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY?
A Case study of the Gates Foundation in the health sector

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ABSTRACT

The policy making approaches, social policy agendas and instruments deployed by large, Western philanthropic donors – referred to as *big philanthropies* in this study – have tangible consequences for the institutions, mechanisms and processes of social policy formation and social policy delivery across the Global South. Over the past decade, big philanthropies have also become increasingly integrated and influential actors in the processes and structures of global social governance. Given their significance in shaping global social policy trends as well as aid architecture and welfare outcomes in the Global South, this research seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the social policy approaches deployed and promoted by contemporary philanthropic donors, as well as the theoretical frameworks that explain them.

This doctoral thesis examines these issues through a qualitative case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s work in the health sector in Tanzania. Two primary research interests guide the analysis: (i) understanding whether the ideologies, policy goals and instruments promoted by big philanthropies represent a coherent and distinctive global social policy paradigm; and, (ii) identifying the sources of authority and strategies deployed by the Gates Foundation to instigate transnational social policy transfer. The research also explores the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders on the comparative advantages and potential risks of social policy delivery by big philanthropies in a development context. Crucially, in addition to interviews with representatives of the Gates Foundation itself, the study examines the views and experiences of the government and civil society actors on the ground in Tanzania. The analysis is primarily guided by: Peter Hall’s theory of policy paradigms; policy transfer analytical frameworks; and Global Social Policy theory.

The findings of the thesis suggest that big philanthropies *are* significant policy actors and operate within a coherent social policy model. Underpinned by the view that poor populations lack the necessary assets to fully realise their economic capacity, the model constitutes an instrumental ‘social investment’ approach. It is primarily focused on strengthening individual capacity in order to spur employment, productivity and economic growth, in contrast to approaches that pursue social justice or social equality through universal welfare systems. It is also differentiated from other paradigms by its emphasis on private sector methods and targeted vertical

interventions (focusing on specific diseases or targets as opposed to broader system-wide objectives) that prioritise innovation, use of data and technology. The overall method is analogous to Third Way models – driven by short-term pragmatism rather than dogma, and promoting social policy approaches that integrate private, public and third sector actors.

The analysis also shows that big philanthropies have unique forms of normative and epistemic authority, derived from the legitimacy of altruism, celebrity status, up-to-date scientific knowledge and private sector expertise. Combined with extensive access to different cross-sectoral networks, these characteristics enhance their policy influence as global policy entrepreneurs. The evidence also demonstrates that the Gates Foundation’s policy transfer strategies combine high visibility policy promotion, covert influence notably through local policy intermediaries, and subtle financial pressure through ‘soft conditionalities’. Local stakeholder perspectives pointed to several risks and caveats associated with the involvement of big philanthropies, and the Gates Foundation specifically. These included the omission of national policy plans and priorities, exacerbation of fragmentation of development efforts, and friction with the domestic policy environment – potentially leading to inappropriate policy transfer.

This thesis underscores the fact that external actors – including Western big philanthropies – continue to influence social policy directions in the Global South and that this renders their involvement problematic. The study also demonstrates the robustness of policy transfer frameworks in explaining this phenomenon and shows that social policy ideas and approaches travel transnationally both through epistemic-hegemonic influences and hard mechanisms drawing on financial pressure.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
AFP	Advance Family Planning
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
BBVA	Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Country Coordination Mechanism
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEPI	Coalition for Epidemics Preparedness Innovations
CHAI	Clinton Health Access Initiative
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAH	Development Assistance for Health
DCF	Development Cooperation Framework
DFIF	Department for International Development
DIB	Development Impact Bond
DP	Development Partner
ERP	Economic Revival Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FP	Family Planning
FYDP	Five Year Development Plan
GAVI	Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance
GBS	General Budget Support
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Viruses
HLP	High Level Panel
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICFO	International Conference on Family Planning
IFI	International Financial Institution
IHME	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
LGA	Local Government Authority
LIEO	Liberal International Economic Order
LLC	Limited Liability Company
LIC	Low Income Country
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIC	Middle Income Country
MNCH	Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRI	Mission-Related Investments
NESP	National Economic Survival Programme
NetFWD	Network of Foundations Working for Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NSGRP/MUKUKUTA	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty

NSFP	National Social Protection Framework
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD's Development Assistance Committee
OPP	Out-of-Pocket Payments
PBF	Performance Based Funding
PEPFAR	The US President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PHC	Primary Health Care
PO	Programme Officer
PPP	Public-Private-Partnership
PRI	Program-Related Investments
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI	Population Services International
PSSN	Productive Social Safety Net
RBF	Results Based Financing
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPF-I	UN Social Protection Floor Initiative
SWAP	Sector-Wide Approach
TACAIDS	Tanzania Commission for AIDS
TASAF	Tanzanian Social Action Fund
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US dollar
VC	Voluntary Contribution
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

A new group of Western development donors has emerged as increasingly influential actors in global social policy since the early 2000s. Large, tax-exempt private foundations established by the super-rich, what I will call *big philanthropies* throughout this thesis, have become embedded and assimilated within structures of global governance, while implementing projects and programmes through development assistance across countries of the Global South.¹ These big philanthropies differ both from those charities focused on humanitarian assistance and responding to urgent need or providing old-fashioned bulk donations for cultural or other causes (Callahan, 2017; Phillips and Jung, 2016). Instead, they make large investments to address some of the most pressing obstacles to human wellbeing; tackling global health epidemics, extreme poverty and climate change dominate their policy agendas. The overarching aim of this thesis is to elucidate the global social policy features of big philanthropies' social sector interventions and means of policy influence. The thesis also critically evaluates the positives and negatives of big philanthropies in relation to development practice, based on stakeholder perspectives from Tanzania and the global development community.

This doctoral thesis responds to the calls for an increased analytical focus on the diverse social policy developments and processes occurring (often simultaneously) at supranational,

¹ This thesis acknowledges the conceptual and normative issues arising from the 'North-South' dichotomy as well as other neighbouring terms such as 'developing countries' or the 'third world'. However, lacking an alternative and less politically charged lexicon, this study will use the term 'Global South' in reference to the heterogeneous group of low- and middle-income countries receiving development aid and subject to global social and development policy agendas. 'Global North' or the 'West' will be utilised, in turn, to refer to their so-called counterparts – largely reflecting the group of OECD countries.

transnational and domestic levels in the Global South (Deacon, 2010a; Lewis, 2015; Midgley, 2019; Surender and Walker, 2013; Wood and Gough, 2006; Yeates, 2014). Previously, understandings of social policy formation have been rooted in the post-war processes of social policy making in the Global North, attributed largely to domestic actors and processes. Traditional explanations for welfare state emergence and social policy reform have encompassed the supply and demand side effects of *industrialisation* (new needs and technological developments) (Wilensky, 1974), the mobilisation of the working class (and their newly gained *power resources*) (Korpi, 1983), and the veto-points and path dependencies related to existing *institutions* (North, 1990; Pierson, 1994). Since the 1990s, the field has largely evolved around comparative social policy and study of *welfare regimes* in Europe and North America, driven largely by Esping-Andersen's (1990) seminal theorisation.

However, the established theoretical frameworks have proven less robust in explaining social policy trends and processes outside of the firstly industrialised countries of West. In the Global South (and some parts of the post-soviet Europe), the trajectories and explanatory factors behind changing social policy directions have been different. Colonial inheritance, weak institutions of welfare and democracy, political cleavages based on ethnicity, informal labour markets and under-developed modes of production represent only some of the contextual differences (de Haan and Dani, 2008; Gough and Wood, 2004; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012; Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013; Surender 2013). Importantly, social policy agendas and programmes have been and continue to be influenced by external forces, although to differing degrees depending on countries' domestic policy visions, existing resources, political settlements and geo-political power (Greenhill et al., 2013; Hickey and Lavers, 2015; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016).

Global Social Policy scholars have remedied some of the arising theoretical challenges by bridging the fields of Development Study, International Relations (IR) and Social Policy. This scholarship can be roughly traced to four different but interrelated and overlapping bodies of literature. These comprise (i) studies of *supranational social policy making* by international organisations, focusing namely on the development of global social rights, regulations and redistribution amid intensifying social, economic and political globalisation (Deacon, 2007, 2000; Deacon et al., 1997); (ii) works on the *social dimensions of development* and *transformative social policies* as drivers of sustainable economic and social development in the Global South (Hall and Midgley, 2004; Hardiman and Midgley, 1982; Hujo et al., 2016; Midgley, 2016; Mkandawire, 2004a) ; (iii) studies of *regional welfare regimes* (Abu Sharkh and Gough, 2010; Gough and Wood, 2004; Seekings, 2008) ; and, (iv) literature on *transnational social policy* making and processes at spaces above, below and across nation states, involving diverse non-state actors and cross-sectoral collaborations (Yeates, 2001; Yeates and Irving, 2005). To this ought to be added works exploring the interplay between global and local actors and dynamics in processes behind successful pursuit of universalist social policies in countries of the Global South (Hickey and Lavers, 2015; Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016).

Global policy agendas and external actors are of particular significance in sub-Saharan Africa. Many of the region's independence leaders vehemently promoted progressive social policies as part of the first nationalist development programmes and large government-led social policy schemes have recently emerged to mark new directions in welfare state building since decades of austerity politics (Garba, 2007; Gumede, 2018; Midgley, 2019). Literature concerned with development issues on the continent is also currently discovering the contemporary 'African

developmental states'.² However, international development agencies remain important players in shaping social policy directions and financing policy implementation in the region. Historically, the biggest influencers have been leading bilateral donors such as *USAID*, the UK's *Department of International Development* (DFID) or the *German Agency for International Cooperation* (GIZ) and International Financial Institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), together with the broader family of United Nations' institutions. Emergent individual Southern donors such as Turkey or China and collective groupings such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa) have also financed and advocated for different social policy and development interventions. Today, big philanthropies represent another prominent group within the aid regime, targeting primarily the sub-Saharan African region (OECD, 2018a, 2020).

This thesis is informed by and draws from the literature of Global Social Policy. However, this scholarship has remained largely silent on the social policy role and impact of contemporary big philanthropies. It remains unknown whether these new actors represent a coherent and unique policy model, and what exactly that might consist of. In addition, the strategies and processes through which big philanthropies engage and shape social policy directions globally and domestically within aid-receiving countries have lacked analytical attention, hampering theory development in the area of transnational policymaking by non-state actors. Pragmatic and normative questions arise too. It is true that new philanthropic foundations from the Silicon Valley have been praised for their innovative approaches to solving public issues drawing from new technologies, scientific advancements and business approaches (e.g. Anheier and Leat,

² The concept of the 'developmental state' has been typically associated with East Asian countries where strong state intervention in the economy has served development of national industries and economic growth. Alternative interpretations have been discussed to capture the independent, state-led pursuits of development in African countries such as Botswana, Rwanda or Ethiopia (e.g. Hillbom, 2019; Mkandawire, 2001; Routley, 2014).

2006; Bishop and Green, 2009; Singer, 2010). Similarly, the progress in several policy areas, such as malaria eradication, has also been widely accredited to effective resource allocation by private foundations. At the same time, however, there have been critiques which have argued that contemporary “*capitalist philanthropy is both politically and ideologically committed to market-based social investment*”, contributing towards the neoliberal world order which thrives on economic inequality (Morvaridi, 2012, p. 1191). Many have also stressed that contemporary philanthropies reflect imbalanced power-relations in which wealthy Western individuals hold unfairly significant political sway affecting less advantaged populations around the globe (e.g. Barkan, 2013; Edwards, 2011; Giridharadas, 2019; McGoey, 2015; Moran, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015; Reich et al., 2016). It is therefore legitimate to enquire whether the approaches to social policy making and delivery by private foundations are truly effective, legitimate and desirable in the Global South and beyond.

This doctoral thesis investigates contemporary big philanthropies through a qualitative case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the health sector, selected as a prime example and driver of contemporary philanthropic aid. As such, the research is focused, specifically, on large, tax exempt, independent Western philanthropic foundations established by wealthy individuals (e.g. individual philanthropists, a family, friends or business partners) that are operating in international development by investing in the social sector. This working definition excludes other types of philanthropic actors that equally engage in international development such as company foundations; philanthropies with limited liability company status; Donor Advised Funds (DAFs), or; community foundations. Naturally, charities funded through publicly collected resources are also omitted.

The principal aim of this study is to understand whether big philanthropies represent distinctive approaches in global social policy, with two particular research objectives. The **first** is to unveil the social policy approaches furthered by big philanthropies and establish to what extent these constitute a coherent *social policy paradigm* which is distinctive from other past and present social policy models promoted by different development actors in the context of development. The **second** is to understand the means of policy influence (strategies, sources of authority, models of engagement) through which big philanthropies propel *social policy transfer* at global and domestic levels of governance.

The main source of evidence from which this study draws consists of semi-structured interviews, conducted with a range of stakeholders (including Gates Foundation representatives, other leading development agencies and domestic policy actors) over the course of 2017. To gain information-rich perspectives from the ground, data was gathered also from one particular aid-receiving country, Tanzania, where diverse aid donors and domestic institutions compete for policy influence (see **chapter 2** for details). The interview data was complemented by a documentary analysis on the Gates Foundation's policy documents, webpage information, previously published interviews and other relevant materials, as well as a summarising desktop research on other leading big philanthropies. The overall data was analysed through thematic framework analysis.

The following section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the features characterising the rise of big philanthropies as a nascent force in global social policy, as described in the existing literature. This will be followed by a discussion justifying the general research 'puzzle' this study is seeking to solve and outlining the specific research aims and questions. In the final

section, this introductory chapter presents the overall structure of this doctoral thesis with a brief description of each chapter and their key arguments.

1.2 BIG PHILANTHROPIES – AN EMERGING FORCE IN GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY

The growing number of high net-worth individuals and their personal accumulated wealth has created an extremely rich global elite and deepened wealth inequalities, and raised significant global attention and debate (Piketty, 2014; Shapiro, 2017; Stiglitz, 2015). Indeed, the number of ultra-high net worth individuals (of net worth over 30 USD million), rose from 78 thousand individuals globally in 2009 to over 168 thousand in 2018 (with the highest concentration in North America).³ This phenomenon has also given birth to a new generation of 21st century philanthropists: from the WhatsApp founder Brian Acton to the richest man in modern history, the Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos, the world's wealthy are one by one in the business of giving.⁴ Philanthropic organisations engaging in international development have emerged as attractive policy innovators and complementary sources of development finance, against the background of ongoing debates concerning the effectiveness of traditional development aid (e.g. Easterly, 2006; Hancock, 1992; Moyo, 2010; Riddell, 2008) and negative effects of recent populist politics on foreign aid allocations within several donor countries (Heinrich et al., 2019). This section discusses the emergence of big philanthropies as global social policy actors, with their key characteristics and comparative advantages, as well as concerns and criticisms raised in the existing literature.

³ See 2019 World Wealth Report, CapGemini; see <https://worldwealthreport.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2019/07/World-Wealth-Report-2019-1.pdf>, last visited 8.4.2020; and 2009 World Wealth Report, CapGemini; see https://www.capgemini.com/resources/2009_world_wealth_report/#, last visited 8.4.2020.

⁴ See <https://actonfamilygiving.org/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/technology/jeff-bezos-climate-change-earth-fund.html>, last visited 19.8.2020.


The rise of philanthropic assistance for development – sizing up the phenomenon

The contemporary philanthropic landscape is diverse. Some of the most important philanthropists contributing to international development are wealthy industrialists, tech tycoons, hedge fund billionaires, prominent politicians and celebrities. Other philanthropic organisations are managed by selected boards representing families or individuals who are no longer alive. Some examples include the new generation of ‘Silicon Valley philanthropies’, such as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative and Omidyar Network (established by the Facebook and Ebay founders respectively); their predecessors in the tech industry, such as the Hewlett and Packard Foundations; philanthropies established by politicians such as the Bloomberg Philanthropies or the Clinton Foundation; as well as longer-standing family philanthropies deploying novel development approaches, like the Rockefeller Foundation.⁵

Figure 1.1 below exhibits the most prominent philanthropic donors for development based on average disbursements in 2017-2018, according to officially reported philanthropic aid flows. One particular organisation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, stands out as the largest existing philanthropic development agency. Its yearly endowments bypass entire budgets of leading International Organisations such as the United Nations system, the World Health Organisation (WHO) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Clarke, 2019).

⁵ The emergence of billionaire philanthropists outside of the West is also noteworthy, with individuals such as Patrice Motsepe (South-African mining billionaire), Carlos Slim Helu (Mexican business magnate), Azim Premji (India’s richest man and IT pioneer) and Li Ka-Shing (Hong Kongese industrialist and investor) all making substantial investments across social policy sectors.

Figure 1.1 Top 30 philanthropic development organisations, USD millions (2017-2018 average)




Source: OECD (2020)

The existing statistics show a notable increase of philanthropic funding for development since the beginning of the century. The share of overall philanthropic flows within *Official Development Aid* (ODA) grew ten-fold over the decade between 2003 and 2013 alone (OECD, 2015). Increases in development aid originating from American philanthropic organisations and individuals have been particularly noticeable and ongoing (OECD, 2018a, 2020). However, official numbers remain only indicative, as important gaps remain in the collection of data on philanthropic aid flows. Several large private foundations are yet to report to the OECD-DAC database,⁶ and contemporary philanthropies have introduced new forms of philanthropic giving made under profitable investment structures which remain outside of traditional development aid

⁶ Including Open Society Foundations, Howards G Buffet Foundation, Susan T. Buffet Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies (OECD, 2020).

tracking. Thus, while the share of philanthropic aid appears relatively slim compared to the overall ODA (in 2018, giving by the 33 largest foundations amounted to 7.8 USD billion compared to the overall aid flows of 167.8 USD billion; OECD, 2020), its significance is undoubtedly increasing.

Figure 1.2 Development Assistance for Health by donor, USD billion (1990-2018)



Source: IHME⁷

Further, a survey study conducted by the OECD’s NetFWD suggests that philanthropic development aid is primarily directed to the policy areas of health, education, human rights and social protection, as well as climate action. Philanthropic resources for development are therefore concentrated in traditional social policy areas, whilst the overall ODA flows are more widely spread across policy sectors including infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and debt relief. (OECD 2018). **Figure 1.2** illustrates the particularly important share of philanthropic financing in the area of health (see BMGF for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation). In fact, over 40 per cent of overall philanthropic aid is directed in the sector, as reported by the OECD (2020). This figure is largely influenced by the mammoth investments of the Gates Foundation. In 2019, the

⁷ IHME; see <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 15.3.2020.

Foundation was not only the biggest philanthropic funder of global health, but the second largest health donor altogether (after the US), by having allocated a total of 3.9 USD billion.

In accordance with the shifting tide in private giving for development, several philanthropic policy forums have formed, including the OECD's *Global Network of Foundations Working for Development* (netFWD),⁸ the *Global Philanthropy Forum*,⁹ the *Giving Pledge*¹⁰, the *SDG Philanthropy Platform*¹¹, the *American Philanthropy Roundtable*¹² and the yearly *Skoll World Forum*.¹³ To these may be added more informal gatherings such as the 2009 *Good Club* meeting which brought together the world's elite philanthropists with the lead of Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and David Rockefeller to set shared global policy goals to combine efforts within the philanthropic sector (Rogers, 2011). These platforms are a further illustration of the growing and increasingly organised participation of big philanthropies in global social policy making.

However, it is important to note that the global social policy role of big philanthropies has been facilitated, if not driven, by governments and institutions of global governance. Tax-exemptions and out-sourcing of social policy delivery to philanthropic actors are common practices among Western countries, particularly the US (Keidan, 2014; McCoy et al., 2009; McGoey, 2014; Nickel and Eikenberry, 2010; Phillips and Smith, 2016). In the UK, the New Labour government promoted philanthropic giving through public campaigns and initiatives (such as the *Centre for*

⁸ Established in 2012 to support foundations to dialogue and partner with governments to enhance their impact; see <https://www.oecd.org/site/netfwd/addedvalue.htm>, last visited 14.1.2019.

⁹ Established in 2001 “to build a community of philanthropists, and to inform, enable and enhance the strategic nature of its members’ giving and social investing”; see <https://philanthropyforum.org/about/>, last visited 14.1.2019.

¹⁰ An initiative created by Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffer in 2010 to encourage giving amongst the world’s wealthy with “a forum for some of the world’s most engaged philanthropists to discuss challenges, successes and failures, and how to be smarter about giving”; see <https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx>, last visited 14.1.2019.

¹¹ An organisation “partnering with foundations to align their work to the SDGs and collaborating with others likeminded organizations to scale impact”; <https://www.sdgphilanthropy.org/>, last visited 11.12.2019.

¹² “A network of donors committed to protecting philanthropic freedom, upholding donor intent, and strengthening our free society through charitable giving”; see <https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/>, last visited 18.8.2020.

¹³ See <http://skoll.org/about/about-skoll/>, last visited 21.3.2020.

Charitable Giving and Philanthropy and the ‘Giving Campaign’) as well as tax breaks and match-funding schemes (Ball, 2007; Daly, 2011).

At the global level, the UN, OECD and the WB have shown a great deal of interest in private foundations and expressed political support for their role in social policy making, financing and delivery,¹⁴ establishing bodies and frameworks to facilitate dialogue with these novel actors. Deliberate incorporation of philanthropic foundations into global governance increased after the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, which brought together for the first time “*traditional donors, South-South co-operators, the BRICS, civil society organisations and private funders*” in an agreed development cooperation framework.¹⁵ The Busan approach has been implemented and furthered by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Post-2015 Development Agenda report by the High Level Panel (HLP) highlighted that the fight against poverty requires a ‘new global partnership’ involving philanthropic donors (UN, 2013). Soon after, the UN Addis Ababa Action Agenda (which set out the implementation strategy of the SDGs until 2030) officially included philanthropic aid as an integral part of global development policy and practice (UN, 2015).

This amalgamation of private foundations into structures and processes of global social policy making is related to the very nature of global governance and the aid system itself. Lacking centralised authority, welcoming new resources for aid, experiencing an ongoing turn-over of national officials and being open to new influences, this system is ‘fluid’ and full of policy windows for new policy entrepreneurs to join in (Stone and Ladi, 2015). This constitutes an

¹⁴ See e.g. the 2008 World Bank Group Health Development Strategy, 2013 World Bank Group Strategy, the 2015 joint World Bank Group Approach to Harnessing the Private Sector in Health, as well as various Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and the replacing Country Partnership Frameworks (CPF), and Strategy and Business Outlook reports, such as the IFC’s FY-17-19 (WB, 2016, p. vi); see also Financial Year plans (WB, 2016b, 2014).

¹⁵ See <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/fourthhighlevelforumonaideffectiveness.htm>, last visited 14.11.2018.

important point in understanding the current and future role of big philanthropies in global social policy, where their influence may be expected to grow and diversify.

Big philanthropies as development donors – characteristics and comparative advantages

Some changes that big philanthropies have largely contributed towards (if not generated) within the development space are already observable, and important. These comprise new *policy goals* (e.g. full elimination of malaria), *policy outcomes* (e.g. near eradication of polio), *partnerships* (e.g. vertical funds such as GAVI), *public goods* (e.g. new vaccines and climate change-resisting seeds), and *financing models* (e.g. Development Impact Bonds and blended finance¹⁶). In addition, philanthropic donors are frequently investing in policy issues and beneficiary populations that remain under-funded or overlooked by public policy actors (e.g. OECD, 2018). The Gates Foundation, for instance, has dedicated an entire sub-programme to neglected tropical diseases,¹⁷ while work by the Howard G. Buffet Foundation is entirely focused on “*the world’s most impoverished and marginalized populations*” in conflict zones¹⁸.

Moreover, philanthropic donors frequently offer significant donations (of 10 million USD or more) for bold policy ideas and innovations – known as *big bets* in the lexicon of philanthropy. Another term also adopted within the sector, *catalytic capital*, describes how big philanthropies direct resources towards causes that governments and private businesses may deem to be too risky in order to ‘catalyse’ policy innovation for public good. Some compelling examples include the Gates Foundation’s 2018 ‘bets’ to develop a toilet that turns human waste into fertilizer (200

¹⁶ Defined by the OECD as the strategic use of development finance (i.e. development assistance from donor governments and philanthropic foundations) for the mobilisation of additional finance (i.e. commercial finance from pension funds, insurance companies, banks, businesses and other publicly or privately-owned sources) towards sustainable development in developing countries. (OECD, 2018a, p. 22).

¹⁷ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/what-we-do/global-health/neglected-tropical-diseases>, last visited 19.8.2020.

¹⁸ See <https://www.thehowardgbuffettfoundation.org/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

USD million, granted to improving sanitation) and a vaccine against the parasite responsible for half of the world's malaria cases (55 USD million, granted to PATH) (The Bridgespan Group, 2019). These examples reflect the results-driven mindset of philanthropic donors pursuing important returns for risky investments, driven by aspirations to trigger 'real' change (Gelles, 2015).

Contemporary philanthropies have also introduced different *profit-generating mechanisms* into development aid finance, including Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), equity bonds, debt instruments and diverse other mechanisms for generating financial return as well as advancing a social purpose (e.g. Salamon, 2014). This is typically called impact investing. For American, tax-exempt foundations, below market-rate profitable investments are legally allowed under Program-Related Investments (PRI) when their principal purpose is to contribute towards the foundation's tax-exempt activities or programmatic objectives, though these are not allowed to inure earnings to any individual or shareholder.¹⁹ Also, Mission-Related Investments (MRI) are common for big philanthropies, since these allow the generation of near to market-rate returns and grow the pool of funds available for charitable investments while furthering a social cause (e.g. micro-businesses, green energy, financial service provision or job creation in disadvantaged communities) (see e.g. Brest, 2016). MRIs are typically made by separate investment arms of philanthropic foundations, and must meet similar legal standards to conventional financial investments.²⁰ Profitable investments are thus an important tool for different types of philanthropic donor, including big philanthropies (as defined in this study) as well as those connected to multinational businesses and banks (such as the BBVA or Crédit Agricole) or

¹⁹ IRS (2019); see <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/program-related-investments>, last visited 13.12.2019.

²⁰ For legal framework, see e.g. https://www.macfound.org/media/article_pdfs/Mission-Related_Investing.pdf, last visited 21.11.2020.

venture philanthropies registered as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs, such as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative or the Omidyar Network). Based on 2017-18 average, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation represents the fourth largest philanthropy in the area of impact investing (OECD, 2020).²¹

Several arguments highlighting the potential comparative advantages and legitimacy of big philanthropies in global social policy making and delivery have been put forth. Firstly, Hovarth and Powell (2016), have advanced the concept of *contributory philanthropy*, to depict the ability of philanthropies to expand provision of public goods to address unmet social and minority needs (see also Goss, 2016). Relatedly, Reich (2016) has postulated that the participation of private foundations in public policy making may be justified through the *discovery argument*, if they are recognised as widening the portfolio of potential policies and approaches benefitting the public good. These arguments relate to the independent status and resources enjoyed by big philanthropies as public policy makers. Unlike governments and private businesses, philanthropic donors are not bound by expectations by the electorate or shareholders, and thereby able to explore and invest in different policy areas more freely. This leads also to another comparative advantage: ability to react nimbly in instances of ‘crisis’ and allocate emergency funds quicker than public sector actors. This has been demonstrated most recently with the COVID-19 pandemic, during which over one thousand philanthropic entities have donated grants totalling over 16.5 USD billion for relief and other efforts (as of November 2020).²²

Finally, in an ideal setting, philanthropic activity may be argued to constitute an additional channel for the definition and distribution of social goods, broadening the spaces for policy

²¹ After the BBVA Microfinance Foundation, Grameen CA Foundation and the Dell Foundation (OECD, 2020).

²² See <https://candid.org/explore-issues/coronavirus>, last visited 21.11.2020.

making and thereby contributing towards the democratic process. This constitutes the *pluralism argument* (Reich, 2016), which propounds the ability of private foundations to expand civil society participation in public policy making. Indeed, it is indisputable that big philanthropies have supported the broadening of the range of participants in global social policy making from public sector agencies and member states to private foundations, private businesses and NGOs. Global Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) such as the Global Fund are another prime example of novel multilateral consortiums established and promoted by philanthropic foundations (Browne, 2017).

Big philanthropies and public policy making – concerns and criticisms

The growing role of big philanthropies in public policy making and the actual effectiveness of their approaches have ignited debate amongst scholars from various fields. Whilst most of the existing literature is focused on American foundations and their political engagement domestically (e.g. Goss, 2016; Hacker, 2004; Hall, 2013; Reich, 2016, 2013, 2006; Rogers, 2011), many of the issues raised are equally pertinent to big philanthropies operating in the development context. The literature is particularly rich in accounts challenging the democratic contributions of big philanthropies, due to their inward accountability only to self-selected board members, trustees or individual philanthropists (e.g. Edwards, 2011; Hesselmann, 2011; Moran, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015; Youde, 2013). Such a narrow basis of accountability allows philanthropic organisations of all shapes and sizes to define policy problems, solutions and beneficiary populations based on their own knowledge and interests, while lacking feedback mechanisms and public evaluation of their implemented programmes (Salamon, 1987). Additionally, philanthropic organisations have been criticised for *plutocracy* – another form of

unjustified and democracy-threatening policymaking (Barkan, 2013; Goss, 2016). Certainly, philanthropies established by the world's super-rich can leverage substantial personal resources, celebrity endorsements and connections to the world's political and business elite to exert exceptional policy influence.

Furthermore, in the words of Soskis and Katz (2016), big bets and significant social policy investments by big philanthropies “(...) *underscore the power of a small elite to impose their preferences and priorities on the public and on private institutions*” (2016, p. 10). For contemporary philanthropies, economic inequality does not represent only a springboard for their political influence, but a precondition for their wealth – and thus for their giving. It is only the rise of billionaire wealth on the back of the unequal global capitalist system that has allowed private foundations to become social policy makers and redistributors of wealth (Nickel and Eikenberry, 2010). At the same time, it is known that most American philanthropies give away only around five per cent of their endowments per year (the minimum pay-out required by law),²³ while continuing to amass wealth through their profitable investments made both within and outside of philanthropic bodies (e.g. separate entities accruing endowments), often in multinational corporations (e.g. Curtis, 2016; McGoey, 2014; Stuckler et al., 2011). As such, a dominant capitalist world system continues to provide for the very existence of philanthropies, who have been accused of being not only unable but unwilling to tackle the root causes impeding human wellbeing, and worse still, aggravating them (Daly, 2011; Youde, 2013).

Beyond issues of potential profitable interests, it has been argued that individual philanthropists may ‘give’ for different self-serving purposes such as the advancement of their political careers

²³ 2017; see <https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/>, last visited 22.3.2020.

(as recent debates apropos Michael Bloomberg show),²⁴ creating jobs and work opportunities for their children and building their reputational image. According to Anheier (2006), for instance, contemporary billionaires perceive philanthropy as a means of accumulating social wealth, since “*it is considered advantageous from the point of view of both good business and good citizenship, not to mention the tax advantages that can be realized with the appropriate strategies*” (2006, p. 233). In fact, a broad range of social and economic theory addresses the motivations behind philanthropy (see Adloff, 2016; Barman, 2017), highlighting the complex and potentially contradictory mix of social pressures, self-interest and altruistic ethics that may all drive philanthropic giving.

Moreover, contemporary big philanthropies have been questioned for inaccurately perceiving issues such as poverty as mere ‘engineering problems’ requiring innovation, as opposed to broader transformation of political structures and welfare systems (Edwards, 2011; Moran and Stevenson, 2013). While not completely absent, social justice -related initiatives remain marginal areas of focus within the philanthropic sector and are driven predominantly by foundations that are younger, smaller and/or incorporated as public foundations (see Foster et al., 2016; Suárez, 2012), with the notable exception of the Ford Foundation.²⁵ The limitations in the overall ability of private philanthropies to trigger the *social change* needed to address the root-causes of complex societal problems has thus been widely flagged (Edwards, 2011; Eisenberg and Palmer, 2005; Moyo, 2011).

²⁴ See e.g. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/02/13/the-political-force-of-michael-bloombergs-tactical-charity/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/15/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-spending.html>, last visited 25.8.2020.

²⁵ See <https://www.fordfoundation.org/>, last visited 28.1.2019.

Relatedly, the policy solutions proposed by philanthropic organisations have raised attention for their potentially negative impact on the existing welfare systems and institutions in the Global South. It has been argued that the Gates Foundation, for instance, has shifted resources away from developing health systems as preferred by aid-receiving countries towards eradicating the small number of diseases in which it is primarily interested (e.g. LaMarche, 2016). Simultaneously, the use of business methods and financial markets, actors and institutions in social policy delivery by contemporary philanthropies has raised concerns over their actual achievements and potential negative side-effects from a number of perspectives. Mitchell and Sparke (2016), in particular, have argued that philanthropic social policy investments inevitably lead to erosion of public institutions for the benefit of profit-making actors; fragmentation of service delivery or welfare provision; problems in effective policy coordination; and, a loss of focus on broader long-term policy goals.

Such insights present an important critique of the contemporary, capitalist philanthropic worldview and practice. This is of particular relevance for Global Social Policy analysis, particularly in understanding the extent to which big philanthropies are aligned, or potentially out of step with the current emphasis on universal welfare systems (see **chapter 2**), explicitly advanced by the field of study (e.g. Deacon, 2007; Hall and Midgley, 2004; Hujo et al., 2016; Mkandawire, 2004; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2008; Yeates, 2018).

1.3 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As established previously, philanthropic donors can be both new, influential global policy entrepreneurs and alternative development partners for aid-receiving countries. However, while

the emerging Southern donors, and most prominently China, have received growing attention as global social policy actors and aid donors in Africa (e.g. Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Grépin et al., 2014; King, 2013; Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender, 2013), analyses of the role of philanthropic donors in *global social policy* remain rare. This thesis seeks to contribute towards filling that gap by investigating whether contemporary big philanthropies represent a novel and distinctive force in global social policy and, if so, what are the implications for social policy theory This section discusses the pragmatic and theoretical contributions of this study in more detail, and describes the research aims and questions guiding the analysis.

Research justifications: addressing overlooked policy actors, processes and contexts

Global Social Policy literature has focused attention on the role of global actors in shaping social and development policy agendas in the Global South and tackled some of the theoretical caveats of ‘eurocentrism’ in Social Policy study. Still, such analyses lack thorough accounts of non-state actors, and particularly private foundations, as global social policy actors. Similarly, *policy transfer* studies theorising on the processes through which social policies ‘travel’ transnationally through development agenda-setting and aid delivery, for instance, have predominantly been based upon evidence on processes occurring between public sector actors (see Obinger et al., 2013). While there has been an increasing interest in the diversification of (non-state) actors in transnational policy transfer processes (e.g. Baker and Walker, 2019), little focus has been directed to philanthropic organisations. Big philanthropies, standing in the grey zone between private and charitable actors, hold a unique status as social policy actors. This unavoidably impacts their legitimacy, abilities and

strategies in seeking to disseminate their policy views, goals and approaches for adoption in a range of policy contexts, rendering philanthropy-focused study twice as relevant.

The existing knowledge gaps have various repercussions on social policy practice and theory. These are also crucial to our understanding of social policy making and formation in aid-receiving countries, and particularly in the less investigated region of sub-Saharan Africa. For one, poor understanding of the overall social policy approaches represented by contemporary philanthropies hampers the evaluation of their policies and practices, as well as the effective ‘use’ and leveraging of their comparative advantages. In the same way, prevention of potential risks and unwanted effects at global and domestic levels is compromised as long as these are not clearly recognised and assessed. Moreover, a strong understanding of their engagement models and policy models on the ground is necessary for enhancement of effective aid cooperation in aid-receiving countries, in order to avoid duplication and fragmentation of development efforts as well as non-alignment with domestic development plans and priorities.

Second, shortage of in-depth knowledge of big philanthropies stifles Social Policy theory building on several fronts, such as the *welfare mix* (i.e. where do private foundations ‘sit’ and what is their role in welfare provision and advocacy?); *welfare state change and reform* (i.e. how do philanthropies interact with and shape processes of welfare system expansion in the development context?); *social policy making in aid-receiving countries* (i.e. how do philanthropic donors impact domestic social policy agendas and institutions?; what are the implications for domestic political sovereignty?); global *policy paradigms* (i.e. what is the social policy model represented by big philanthropies?; how is it different from those promoted by other actors?), and *social policy transfer* (i.e. how do big philanthropies disseminate their

policy approaches?; what are the primary mechanisms at play?; how do they interact with structural factors on the ground?).

Whilst unable to address all the above-mentioned areas, this thesis offers a rigorously conducted empirical study of big philanthropies as global social policy actors and adds to the descriptive account and knowledge base about them in the development context. The thesis also aims to generate new empirical insights on the particular policy context of sub-Saharan Africa, where social policy directions are shaped by a complex and intertwined group of domestic and external development actors (Adesina, 2014; Alou, 2009; Gumede, 2018; Mkandawire, 2011). Importantly, by providing new and substantive data this study also injects evidence into what are otherwise often polemical debates concerning the legitimacy and consequences of philanthropic engagement in public policy making and delivery.

This thesis makes several theoretical contributions. By investigating the potential social policy model represented by philanthropic donors, the study generates new information on their philosophies, policy objectives and instruments. This enables us to assess the *distinctiveness* of their approaches, with their potential continuities and overlaps with other social policy models promoted in the development context. In so doing, the study also builds on Hall's (1993) paradigm theory and contributes towards further development of analytical tools for the study of *global social policy paradigms*. More generally, the analysis is also relevant for our understanding of the current 'war of positions' within the global social policy community, in which diverse development agents compete for influence in setting global development agendas (Deacon, 2007). Investigating policy approaches promoted by big philanthropies

allows to understand, for instance, whether they are in keeping with, or potentially challenging, some of the recently emerged universalist policy agendas (see **chapter 2** for overview).

Moreover, this thesis explores how big philanthropies seek to instigate *social policy transfer* globally and in aid-receiving countries. Unlike multilateral organisations equipped with a democratic mandate and bilateral donors representing established development experts with important financial resources, big philanthropies represent novel policy entrepreneurs with much more limited resources and official decree in global social policy making and delivery (e.g. Stone, 2010, 2012a). In the light of the particularly prominent global influence of the Gates Foundation in areas such as global health (Shiffman, 2014; Youde, 2013), it is paramount to better understand the ways (strategies) and means (sources of authority and power) of policy influence deployed by philanthropic actors. This analysis also hints at the types of policy transfer mechanisms (e.g. diffusion/deliberate, voluntary/involuntary, linear/circular) that may follow, offering new insights for theory-building in the area of policy transfer by influential non-state actors and global ‘policy entrepreneurs’. These avenues of investigation generate new evidence on contemporary forms of contemporary global policy practice, which incorporates diverse public, private and non-state actors and networks; global, national and local levels of governance; and new and powerful avenues of influence enjoyed particularly by contemporary philanthropies.

Further, this study presents empirical evidence on the experiences of different stakeholders in Tanzania – other aid donors, NGOs executing Gates’ projects and a range of domestic development actors – to deepen and broaden the findings in the areas described above. This contextual evidence presents grassroots perspectives on the *risks* and *advantages* associated

with the social policy approaches promoted by the Gates Foundation and big philanthropies more broadly, as well as their development cooperation with different stakeholders at the country level. These evidential insights are particularly relevant for better understanding the distinctiveness of the engagement models deployed by philanthropic donors as experienced by other development actors. Moreover, the analysis also allows to consider the extent to which the mechanisms of aid delivery and models of engagement deployed by big philanthropies differ from traditional and emergent aid donors associated with political and/or commercial conditionalities, from the perspective of political sovereignty and leadership in directing domestic development efforts.

Research Questions

The overarching research aim of this thesis is to elucidate the global social policy features of big philanthropies' social sector interventions and means of policy influence. This is approached through two distinct research questions, as discussed below.

- 1. To what extent does the Gates Foundation's approach to development and social policy represent a distinctive *policy paradigm*?**
 - What are its underpinning ideological objectives and instruments?
 - Do these represent a coherent and distinctive global social policy paradigm?
 - What are the risks and advantages experienced and/or perceived by stakeholders?

- 2. How does the Gates Foundation seek to instigate *policy transfer* of its approaches and agendas?**
 - What are its sources of authority as a global policy supplier?
 - What are its strategies to instigate social policy transfer?
 - To what extent do big philanthropies represent unique policy transfer means and mechanisms?
 - What are the obstacles and opportunities for effective social policy transfer as experienced on the ground?

The first research question of this thesis seeks to understand the extent to which the Gates Foundation's social policy views and approaches represent a coherent 'global social policy paradigm' and in what regard such a paradigm might be distinguishable from the social policy models promoted by other traditional (e.g. IFIs, UN institutions) and emerging development actors (e.g. China). The existing literature on contemporary philanthropy has drafted a basic understanding of the public policy approaches commonly shared within the philanthropic sector, referred to as the *Silicon Valley - or California Consensus* (Kharas, 2009; Moran, 2014; Morvaridi, 2012). However, this study focuses on exploring the policy approaches and philosophies of the Gates Foundation through a systematic investigation conducted from a social policy perspective, with the aid of a global social policy paradigm framework inspired by Hall (1993) (specific parameters being discussed in **chapter 3**).

Additionally, the first research question addresses stakeholder experiences of the comparative advantages and particular issues related to the philanthropic donor agencies, and the Gates Foundation in particular. It will explore views and perspectives of Tanzanian government officials and other domestic development experts from civil society, as well as Gates Foundation's implementing partners in Tanzania and traditional development agencies operating in the country and globally. The analysis will include views and perspectives on the deployed *models of engagement* (i.e. approaches to communication, partnering, information-sharing and collaborative processes) on the ground, mechanisms of *aid delivery* and *conditionality* of aid, actual implemented *policies and programmes*, as well as other themes emerging from data. In so doing this study provides new, empirical data on the activities of philanthropic donors on the ground and a country context from the Global South.

The second research question examines how the Gates Foundation, and big philanthropies in general, prompt *social policy transfer* within the global development community and domestically in aid-receiving countries – these two being understood as deeply interconnected and entangled spheres of governance (see Deacon and Stubbs, 2013; Kauppinen, 2015; Yeates, 2014). In other words, the question focuses on the means by which the Gates Foundation seeks to disseminate its ideologies, development objectives and ideal policy instruments (i.e. policy paradigm). This will be investigated, to begin with, through an examination of the particular *sources of authority* and power upon which private foundations may draw for legitimacy and leverage. This question will also explore the deliberate *strategies of policy influence* and concomitant comparative advantages that facilitate instigation of policy transfer processes by contemporary big philanthropies.

Moreover, the second research question seeks to understand what the policy transfer mechanisms resulted by Gates Foundation's policy influence may look like at the country level, in the light of the existing policy transfer literature (e.g. Appuhami et al., 2011; Boettke et al., 2008; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2018, 2013; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2012b). It aims to map the different actors (policy sender, intermediates and adopters), levels of governance (global, national and sub-national), and types (e.g. voluntary/involuntary; circular/linear) of processes involved in policy transfer initiated by the Gates Foundation, and to understand the type and overall distinctiveness of these mechanisms. The general aim of this research question is therefore *not* to assess the successes or failures of the transfer of specific policies as such but to establish the dominant *means* and *mechanisms* behind policy transfer by the Gates Foundation.

Finally, drawing from data collected from Tanzania, the second research question seeks to capture indicative information on the Gates Foundation's potential for effective policy transfer on the ground. It addresses the key factors which may enhance, affect and/or limit the successful adoption of its policy approaches and agendas. In so doing, it sheds light on the interplay between *agency* (i.e. Gates Foundation's policy transfer strategies and engagement modes) and *structural factors* (e.g. political traditions, cultural norms) in the contextual setting. This endeavour generates new, empirically grounded insights on the potential opportunities and obstacles philanthropic donors may experience in influencing domestic social policy directions in aid-receiving countries, as well as the real-world complexities of policy transfer processes more generally.

1.4 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis consists of 8 chapters, divided into two major parts. **Chapters 1-4** build the contextual background and explain the methodological approaches adopted in this study. **Chapters 5-7** present the empirical data and analysis responding to the research questions, and **chapter 8** brings the analysis and the background together as a concluding discussion.

Chapter two offers an overview of the past and present global social policy prescriptions by leading traditional development agencies as well as emerging Southern donors, such as China, which holds a particular interest in the sub-Saharan African region. This review sheds light on the dominating actors, policies and development philosophies to which the Gates Foundation may be compared. The chapter highlights the changing trajectories of development cooperation particularly in sub-Saharan Africa in the course of changing aid eras. It describes how these

evolved from aid assistance to newly independent countries with clear policy visions, to policy imposition by external policy actors, and finally, to less obvious and more complex forms of aid conditionalities and ‘coproduction of policies’ (Alou, 2009). This discussion also highlights the contemporary context in which universalist policy agendas have gained considerable recognition, in order to understand the potential alignment, ‘fit’ or divergence of philanthropic donors.

Chapter two additionally offers background knowledge on the specific case of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as well as the Tanzanian setting. It discusses the Gates Foundation’s journey from a small family philanthropy to a world-leading policy innovator in global health and scrutinises the Foundation’s primary areas and modes of investment with a particular focus on the health sector. Lastly, the chapter explains the unique context of Tanzania from which the study has gathered data, by describing its diverse aid landscape, domestic political traditions rooted in African Socialism, and current structures established to guide aid cooperation with external donor and development agencies. In so doing, the chapter builds contextual knowledge which becomes pertinent in chapter 7 which assesses the Gates Foundation’s potential for instigating successful policy transfer in Tanzania.

Chapter three presents the key concepts and theoretical frameworks guiding the study. The first half of the chapter discusses the concept of a ‘global social policy paradigm’ developed for the purposes of this study. It draws particularly from Peter Hall’s (1993) theory of policy paradigms, while acknowledging its shortfalls in Global Social Policy analysis. Hall’s theoretical insights are therefore complemented by relevant conceptual and Social Policy literatures, which informed the construction of the global social policy paradigm -concept undertaken in the chapter. The

chapter then describes the adopted concept and its contours as a clearly defined *object of study* and an *analytical tool*.

Similarly, the second half of chapter three explores the definitions and theories of ‘policy transfer’, while also discussing the relevance of the concept of ‘policy entrepreneurship’ for analysis of big philanthropies as agents of policy change. The chapter pays particular attention to accounts of policy transfer under development cooperation and the range of mechanisms which aid donors can intentionally deploy to spur policy adoption in aid-receiving countries, in order to compare and identify policy transfer strategies deployed by philanthropic donors in the context of aid delivery. The discussion also points to a range of contextual factors in adoptive political settings that affect policy transfer success. By combining these opposing agency- and structure-centred angles of observation, the chapter underscores the multidimensional nature of transnational social policy transfer, whose depth, completeness and longevity depends on the extent to which externally designed policies match with the political and cultural environment of the adoptive political setting.

Chapter four outlines the methodological approaches of this study. It starts by discussing the qualitative single case study research design and explains the logic of case selection (i.e. the Gates Foundation), the choice of contextual setting for empirical data from country-level (Tanzania) and the policy sector under scrutiny (health). This is followed by an overview of the research data comprising elite interviews and a complementary documentary analysis, alongside a description of the data collection principles and processes, and the challenges experienced by the researcher. Here, the chapter highlights some of the issues encountered in accessing busy, high-profile informants, and reliable unbiased information. The final section is dedicated to

clarifying the technique of data analysis, which consists of thematic framework analysis. It explains the analytical procedure step-by-step and highlights the potential biases and limitations in the interpretation of findings. The chapter acknowledges, in particular, restrictions in generalisability of findings stemming from the single case study method as well as the limited timeframe and geographical spread of data collection.

After having built the thematic, theoretical and methodological foundations for the study, **chapter five** presents the empirical results, findings and data to address the *first research question*. Based on the concept components of a ‘global social policy paradigm’ defined earlier, the chapter explores the underlying ideologies, policy objectives, and policy instruments exhibited, deployed and promoted by the Gates Foundation based on the evidence. As postulated in the chapter, several identified characteristics indicate a coherent philanthropic social policy paradigm, with noted overlap with other capitalist approaches to development and, particularly, Third Way models previously implemented in the West. The chapter demonstrates that big philanthropies have adopted a ‘social investment’ model that pursues inclusive economic growth by bolstering individuals’ assets to build their productive capacities. The approach prioritises targeted vertical programmes and projects, which promote new public goods, technical ‘fixes’ and innovative services or ‘policy packages’ – rather than comprehensive measures seeking to expand and strengthen public welfare systems. The advanced policy model is guided by ideals of short-term pragmatism and imminent, large-scale impact, and draws on the comparative advantages of different public, private and third sector actors in social policy making and delivery.

Chapter six investigates the Gates Foundation as an engaged global policy entrepreneur seeking to instigate policy transfer within the global development community and across countries of the Global South. The chapter starts by addressing the epistemic and normative *sources of authority* from which big philanthropies may draw in disseminating their policy approaches. It contends that thanks to their specialist private sector knowledge, important investments in scientific discovery, ‘philanthropic status’ associated with benevolent giving and celebrity fame, big philanthropies are able to exercise considerable policy influence through avenues that are often unavailable to other development actors. Chapter six also explores the Gates Foundation’s strategic engagement both with *high-profile* and *low-key* networks and forms of influence at global and domestic levels to gain further leverage *and* effectively disseminate its policy objectives. The final empirical section of the chapter investigates how the Gates Foundation has mobilised its *financial resources* to enhance policy transfer towards leading international organisations and aid-receiving governments. It discusses the notion of ‘soft conditionalities’ as an alternative form of financial pressure accessible to philanthropic donors, differing from policy coercion associated particularly with international financial institutions. In addition, the chapter challenges the previous views associating policy transfer in the development context with the linear, vertical and one-directional North-to-South processes. Instead, it argues that policy transfer instigated by philanthropic donors occurs at multiple levels of governance, involves a range of intermediary agents and comprises different mechanisms occurring simultaneously in a circular (or multidirectional) motion.

Chapter seven turns the attention to aid recipients and other development actors operating on the ground in Tanzania, with the aim of capturing stakeholder views on the Gates Foundation’s pragmatic approaches, ways of working and opportunities and obstacles for successful policy

transfer. The chapter contrasts the findings with the international principles of effective aid cooperation established under the *2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, which guide development activities in Tanzania. The presented evidence suggests that the Gates Foundation's innovative policy solutions and independent project implementation outsourced to third parties raise a range of pragmatic and normative concerns. On one level, these include issues of coordination and harmonisation of development efforts nationwide, potentially risking effective use of ongoing and future investments. On another, they pose a threat on country ownership of development efforts and alignment with domestic agendas, when the promoted, foreign-designed approaches differ from country priorities and overlook government-led processes of agenda-setting. These questions are also considered from the perspective of aid conditionality and the realisation of domestic leadership and political sovereignty in social policy making and formation.

Moreover, based on the empirical evidence on the Gates Foundation in Tanzania, chapter seven provides new, indicative insights on policy transfer processes instigated by external, private policy entrepreneurs in aid-receiving countries of the Global South. It shows that for domestic governments, big philanthropies may represent an attractive, alternative source of development resources without political 'meddling'. Yet, the chapter also presents evidence suggesting that even when big philanthropies are welcomed at the highest levels of government, effective policy adoption may be hampered by inappropriate, top-down policy solutions and ineffective engagement with stakeholders for necessary buy-in at all levels of governance. The chapter highlights particularly the frictions arising from the Gates Foundation's attempts to transplant novel programmes and approaches without adequately accounting for political traditions and

ongoing policy developments on the ground, compromising the existing opportunities for policy transfer.

The thesis concludes with **chapter eight**, which summarises the key findings of the study and discusses their implications for social policy theory and practice. The chapter extends the discussion concerning the distinctiveness of big philanthropies as a novel group of global social policy actors. It addresses their divergences and convergences with other dominant actors and approaches in the complex landscape of competing global social policy paradigms. The chapter also pays particular attention to the distinctive features characterising big philanthropies as global policy entrepreneurs, which are key in shaping their adopted social policy model, internal processes of decision making and strategies of policy influence. Moreover, the chapter highlights the relevance of traditional debates concerning the effectiveness, impartiality and legitimacy of external social policy models and actors in the Global South in the context of philanthropic aid. It argues that despite its many contributions in global health, the Gates Foundation's autonomous, top-down and targeted approach to development cooperation is compromising democratic processes of social policy making and poses a significant threat to future expansion of universalist public welfare systems in aid-receiving countries. The thesis concludes by addressing the key limitations of the study and outlining potential future avenues for Social Policy study of philanthropy.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

“Most discourses on development have been framed around getting Africa to be formed in the image of the West, both economically, politically and socially. Economically, the various economic policies that have been adopted since independence have largely reflected the version of development that the West prescribes either directly or through international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Exceptions to these, such as the Ujaama, encapsulated under African socialism by Julius Nyerere (...) became casualties of the hegemonic neoliberal global capitalist system.” (Gumede, 2017, p. 124).

In his writing *‘Social Policy for inclusive development in Africa’* (2017), Gumede revisits the development discourses on Africa and highlights the dominance of Western understandings of development and the deriving social policy trends which have occupied the continent from the colonial era to the present day. The overwhelming influence of these outlooks and interventions was such that even strong institutionalised domestic policy paradigms, for example the model of African Socialism implemented in Tanzania in the 1960s-1970s, were overturned. This chapter revisits the historical evolution of global social policy paradigms. This represents a long period of contested and changing ideas and discourses about development and social policy, reflecting different normative and ideological positions. As big philanthropies have become part of the global aid regime, it is important to assess them in the context of existing debates and trends and see whether they represent truly new and distinctive social policy approaches or are only replicating old models and dynamics.

Moreover, dominant global policy models have created ideological, institutional, political and economic continuities that have moulded the contemporary contexts of policy making in aid-receiving countries. As highlighted by the Global Social Policy and policy transfer literatures (e.g. Boettke et al., 2008; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Mkandawire, 2011; Roland, 2004; Surender 2013), such features have a decisive role in shaping the success and longevity of externally introduced policy approaches – including those introduced by big philanthropies. Political traditions and institutional structures, economic forecasts, deeply rooted social norms, and historical experience of development cooperation determine: whether the policy models introduced ‘match’ the existing policy needs, visions and directions; whether there is political will for policy adoption; and if there is financial and technical capacity for implementation.

Policy prescriptions and their proponents have also become increasingly diversified over the past decades. Southern aid agencies have risen to further their own models for development, while challenging the global aid regime described by Gumede (2017). While the rise of alternative aid resources through new donors (such as Brazil, India, China and Turkey) has offered new political leverage for aid-receiving countries in negotiations with traditional donors (Greenhill et al., 2013; Harman and Williams, 2014; Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013), recipients are not shielded from potential risks related to the programmes and aid delivery mechanisms deployed by their new development partners. The existing accounts of emerging, Southern donor countries point to embedded, self-serving economic and political motivations echoing criticisms directed typically to traditional, Western donors (e.g. Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Fejerskov et al., 2016; Ozkan, 2013). Capturing these developments allows to better understand and assess the potential attractiveness and risks of philanthropic aid from the perspective of aid-receiving countries.

The principal aim of this chapter is to build a contextual understanding of the world of global social policy paradigms in which big philanthropies compete for influence. Before doing so, it is useful to highlight the differences and interlinkages between *social policy* and *development* investments. The term *social policy* typically refers to social protection, assistance and services provided by the welfare state as well as contracted or independent non-state providers (such as charities or private companies). *Development* practice, in turn, is more commonly understood as a range of interventions by diverse domestic and external actors to spur economic growth. However, as Mkandawire (2004b) has highlighted, “*social policy is collective interventions in the economy to influence the access to and the incidence of adequate and secure livelihoods and income. As such, social policy has always played redistributive, protective and transformative or developmental roles*” (2004b, p. 1). The developmental role of social policy has gained important emphasis under different notions of development – such as ‘social development’, ‘basic needs’ and ‘social investment’ – which have promoted social programmes as tools to boost economic development²⁶ and advanced the recognition of social progress as a valuable development goal alongside economic growth (Midgley, 2019).

This chapter starts by examining the spectrum of key global social policy actors, their policy models, and the historical ‘baggage’ of political, economic and geo-strategic motivations that can adversely affect development cooperation, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter then provides a brief overview of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as a key global social policy


²⁶ It has also been argued that in underdeveloped economies, economic policies are essential for increasing production which, in turn, enhances the *redistributive capacity* of governments for implementation of social policies. Conversely, social policies are seen to directly prevent and mitigate social distress and enhance the *productive capacity* of a population leading to increasing economic progress. (Adesina, 2011; Mhone, 2004; Mkandawire, 2004a).

actor in the area of health, before turning to the Tanzanian context with its key actors, political traditions and development models.

2.2 SOCIAL POLICY APPROACHES FOR DEVELOPMENT – REVIEW OF PAST AND PRESENT TRENDS

Development aid has constituted a major channel of social policy influence since its inception. As aid flows have amplified, the influence of external social policy models on policy formation and delivery in the Global South has both intensified and diversified. Since 1960, the total ODA received globally has increased from 32.3 billion to 160.5 USD billion in 2018²⁷, and from 0.3 to 44 USD billion in sub-Saharan Africa, respectively (see **figure 2.1**).

Figure 2.1. Net ODA received in sub-Saharan Africa, USD billions (1960-2018)



Source: The World Bank²⁸

²⁷ See <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.KD>, last visited 20.8.2020.

²⁸ See <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=T6>, last visited 21.8.2020.

The following discussion will address the different trends in social policies and social sector investments under the changing ‘aid eras’, looking at their characteristics, criticisms and frictions with domestic policy visions. A conscious effort is also made to spell out the shifting trends in the policy area of health – the primary policy sector favoured by the Gates Foundation.

The making of development aid: Post World War II – late 1970s

During the colonial era, social policy in Africa “*was geared towards ensuring the integrity of the structures of colonial rule*”, and while the settler populations were relatively well provided for by the ‘courtesy’ of the metropolitan government, local populations received, primarily, missionary charity (Manji and O’Coill, 2002, p. 569-570). Yet, the formal welfare arrangements introduced were, together with the imported European legal systems, important in setting the institutional context for the following independence-era social policy systems (Kpessa, 2010; Kangas 2012).²⁹ As African countries gained independence from colonial powers, the existing social policies consisted of wage-based social insurance systems serving the narrow elite in formal, modern employment.³⁰ These typically covered less than 10 per cent of the population, while the majority remained dependent on informal kinship-based welfare arrangements and limited government-provided health care. Instead of seeking to expand social insurance to the informal sector, the African political elites embraced the idea (promoted by Western donors) that gradual industrialisation would result in wide-scale salarisation and naturally integrate the overall workforce into the existing schemes (Merrien, 2013).

²⁹ Though this does not mean that pre-colonial African societies did not have institutionalised welfare arrangements, rather, these were largely disrupted during colonisation (Mhone, 2004), though the foundations of kinship-based welfare provision remained and continue to exist today under informal rotational saving systems, for instance.

³⁰ Former French colonies maintained the social insurance programmes introduced by France to secure the colonial administration. These covered work accidents, maternity and family allowances for those in formal, modern employment, and were added to old-age benefits. In contrast, the embryonic social insurance in former British colonies covered only employment injuries primarily for government officers, while national health services were more developed. (Merrien, 2013).

A similar ethos dominated early development assistance to what was then called the ‘Third World’. Development became a global concern after the second World War during the reconstruction of Europe under the *Marshall Plan* and the creation of the United Nations, whose founding governments committed to global promotion of “*economic and social progress and development*”.³¹ In fact, the UN was a leading advocate of the ‘social development’ model, which called for an increased focus on the social outcomes of economic development measures and greater investments in public social welfare as a means to bolster economic progress (Midgley, 2014). Nevertheless, investment in social security, particularly for those outside of formal employment, was largely outside of development thinking at the time. Instead, aid cooperation was dominated by ideas of how to boost industrialisation and production, as it was understood that economic growth would lead to a trickle-down effect, improving living standards for all (Merrien, 2013).

The post-war period was also a time in which domestic policy agendas were inspired by Keynesian thinking in Europe as well as in some regions of the Global South. This implied a strong intervening role of the state in the economy, investing in welfare and job creation through public expenditure with the aim of stabilising economic fluctuations (Surender 2013). Following the Keynesian principle of economic nationalism, aid donors supported the leading role of the state in development efforts and infrastructure, large-scale agriculture and manufacturing represented priority areas of donor investment (Addison et al., 2015). NGOs, on their behalf, remained largely disregarded development actors in the minds of official development agencies during this time (Manji and O’Coill, 2002).

³¹ UN Charter, Chapter IX, Article 55; see <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art55.shtml>; last visited 28.12.2019.

However, from its inception, development assistance reflected prominent political, economic and military interests, of most importance to bilateral donors. Former colonial powers sought to maintain the economic ties forged with previously occupied territories (Sogge, 2002), and the post-war competition between Western capitalist and East European socialist policy models was reflected in aid allocation flows (Stokke, 2009). During the cold war, the US backed several anti-Soviet leaders and provided large amounts of aid money for their governments (Carmody, 2016). Interestingly, the US State Department and Agency for International Development benefited from a collaboration with the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations – the three ‘mega philanthropies’ of the time – in spreading the Western hegemony across the Global South. These actively provided political and ideological support for American policy views during the cold war, acting as another arm of US foreign policy (Parmar, 2012, 2002).

The influence of the West and its policy prescriptions for Africa faced resistance. In many instances, national industries remained dominated by foreign companies and ethnic hierarchies that had been instituted in the colonial administration continued to divide post-colonial societies. As a result, several early leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania or Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, rejected Western interference and sought socialist policy models based on ideals of national self-determination and reliance. These allowed them to gain greater control of their newly independent countries through a nationalised economy and one-party systems. (Mukandala et al., 2006). These example countries, together with some others, were also forerunners in implementing comprehensive social policies, such as nationwide education and health care systems (Adesina, 2007a; Mkandawire, 2001). The colonial mould of urban, hospital-based health care provision was broken in favour of accessible health centres spreading across urban and rural communities (see Mukandala et al., 2006).

As development thinking continued to evolve amongst donor agencies, also global social policy trends shifted towards universalist social policy measures. In the early 1970s, broad range of *basic needs* (promoted particularly by the International Labour Organization, ILO) and, soon after, *poverty reduction* came to dominate debates and agendas, particularly among multilateral institutions and Nordic donor countries. The UN, in particular, In 1978, also the universalist principle of ‘health for all’ gained global traction for the first time, following the *Declaration of Alma-Ata*³² adopted at the International Conference on Primary Health Care convened by UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO). (Hulme, 2013; Kwon, 2019).

Washington Consensus: late 1970s – late 1980s

The dominant development paradigm had an entirely new look from the late 1970s. Inspired by academics such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, and progressed by neoliberal politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the new economic scholarship came to characterise debates over policy directions at home and overseas.³³ The newly adopted neo-liberal orthodoxy departed from the previously dominating Keynesian political and economic nationalism, favouring the *Liberal International Economic Order* (LIEO). High public expenditure and inefficient domestic state institutions were accused of hampering economic development, whilst the superior efficacy of global economic liberalism was both ethically and theoretically championed. Participation in global markets was seen to benefit developing countries through the increased capital and technological advancement brought about by *Foreign Direct Investment* (FDI). (Gore, 2000).

³² See https://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf?ua=1, last visited 3.7.2020.

³³ Spurred particularly by the Latin American debt crisis in mid-1980s.

The rise of neoliberalism promoting a new economic model led to the adoption of a paradigm known as the *Washington Consensus*. This was heralded as a new approach to global development by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Executive (Williamson, 1990), who became the primary sources of development finance and new development ‘knowledge’. The Washington Consensus directed focus away from poverty alleviation to economic growth and was operationalised through *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs). SAPs were based on conditional lending first introduced by the *Baker Plan*, which sought to instigate “*the privatization of burdensome and inefficient public enterprises, the liberalization of domestic capital markets, tax reform, the creation of more favorable environments for foreign investment, and trade liberalization*” (Baker’s testimony in US House, 1986, p. 59 in Babb, 2013, p. 271). In reality, this meant reducing social sector spending in favour of liberal economic policies delivered through financial coercion, as access to aid resources became conditional on the implementation of such policy reforms.

SAPs led to large-scale policy reconfiguration which ran against the policy visions and ideologies dominant in Africa at the time.³⁴ In the health sector, the development of public health facilities and workforce was left underfunded, user-fees were introduced, and services privatised – following recommendations by the WB which had effectively replaced the WHO as the leading organisation shaping health policies in the Global South (Brugha et al., 2014). Public health systems left without adequate staffing and vital drugs resulted in a poorer health status amongst underprivileged local populations (see Brugha et al., 2014; Addison et al., 2015). At the same time, the role of the state was marginalised and welfare provision largely shifted to the

³⁴ In fact, the IMF-induced austerity policies faced fierce resistance around the world, leading to nearly 150 riots, strikes and protestations between the years of 1976 and 1992 (Manji and O’Coill, 2002).

responsibility of the private sector and development NGOs, which saw an unprecedented growth in numbers and size respectively during the 1980s (Bebbington et al., 2008). While big philanthropies were not yet an integral part of the global aid architecture, this period marked the beginning of an increasing handover of social policy delivery to diverse third sector actors.

Equally importantly, SAPs represented the start of extensive external policy interference in domestic social policy formation in sub-Saharan Africa. This was due not only to the coercive aid delivery mechanisms, but to a much more complicated political and economic context. While having vigorously pursued the building of national welfare systems, most countries in the region struggled with pressing challenges: tax systems remained under-developed and therefore unable to contribute towards public spending; social policies such as free health care or water failed to serve the rural poor populations; single party systems and the appointment of inexperienced African government officials to secure political independence led to drawbacks in governance; and the failure to create regional resistance to global economic plans that served the needs of the Western economy (Mukandala et al., 2006). These issues were exacerbated by the oil crisis and falling commodity exports in the 1970s which weakened national economies further. Consequently, sub-Saharan African countries were in desperate need of not only financial resources but also alternative development solutions – both of which were offered by SAPs.

However, the conditional nature of aid delivery inherently undermined the authority of governments in developing countries to design and implement development policy. This change from the early-independence era is fundamental to our understanding of development cooperation and social policy making in Africa today, argued to remain underpinned by dynamics of ‘co-production’ (if not coercion) rather than autonomy (Alou, 2009). This is

relevant also for analysis of philanthropic aid, both in terms of understanding how these dynamics impact the policy influence of Western philanthropies in the Global South, and reversely, how their approaches to aid delivery potentially increase or decrease the policy space of recipient countries.

Post-Washington Consensus: 1990s

The Washington Consensus had severe consequences for Sub-Saharan African countries in terms of welfare systems and political and financial independence. As highlighted by Adesina (2011), the model “*succeeded simultaneously in eroding the fiscal base of the state, shrinking the productive base of the economies, subverting economic growth, and engineering massive social dislocation*”, hampering domestic wealth redistribution in the cause of effective poverty reduction (2011, p. 462). In addition, it has been argued that the Washington Consensus reversed some previous social development gains, increasing rather than reducing poverty in several countries (Adesina, 2007a; Geo-Jaja and Mangum, 2001; Mkandawire, 2005; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Riddell, 1992).³⁵ The policy failure of the Washington Consensus was further demonstrated by the wave of economic crises sweeping across the Global South – including the regions of East Asia and Latin America which were previously celebrated as prime examples of trade liberalisation (Cypher, 1998; Tang and Midgley, 2002).³⁶ While this provided important evidence to refute the scientific justifications behind the paradigm (Babb,

³⁵ Some of the early critiques were put forth by UNICEF in its 1987 publication ‘*Adjustment with a Human Face*’ and were later picked up by the UNDP in its ‘sustainable human development’ approach. These alternative views put forth a different ideology, promoting equal partnership between donors and aid-receiving countries as well as the improvement of human lives as the fundamental objective of development efforts (Gore, 2000).

³⁶ Though, at the same time, the example of the East Asian ‘tigers’ (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea) attracted attention for challenging the assertion that social policies are not conducive to economic development by making important public investments in the health and education sectors while achieving significant levels of economic growth (e.g. Kwon, 2005).

2013), a new economic scholarship on *human capital* was emerging, emphasising social policy investments as a driver of social and economic progress. This had a prominent impact on policy thinking within the World Bank (see Addison et al., 2015, p. 1354), and the Washington Consensus became largely discredited in the 1990s.

Furthermore, the political pendulum in the West was on the move once again; this time towards the *Third Way*. The Third Way paradigm has been most commonly associated with Tony Blair's 'New Labour' in the UK and Bill Clinton's Democratic Party in the US, as well as proponents of new policy direction in Germany and the Netherlands at the time. It represented policy reconfiguration in the context of increasing globalisation, which saw civil society, government, and the economy as "*interdependent and equal partners in the provision of welfare*" while redirecting public policy focus on social issues (Surender, 2004, p. 3). The revival of political appetite for social policies in leading donor countries led to global social policy makers, including IFIs and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), adopting *Social Protection* as their new guiding policy ideology and framework in the 2000s (see Lewis, 2013). SAPs were consequently replaced by *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSP) and *Safety Nets* with a new emphasis on social protection alongside economic goals, under the so-called *Post-Washington Consensus* (Pender, 2001).

Nevertheless, the extent to which the Post-Washington Consensus departs from the neo-liberal development ideology and Western domination in agenda-setting through aid conditionalities has been widely debated. On the one hand, the re-introduction of social investments and recognition of human capital in economic thinking point to new approaches in development collaboration. The Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP) was also introduced as a new aid delivery mechanism

which pooled external funding into general budget support for governments. This reflected principles that differed drastically from those behind conditional lending under SAPs. (e.g. Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Sweeney and Mortimer, 2016). On the other, social policy implementation during this period was pursued with a *safety net* approach which favoured a narrow focus on the poorest over broader social transformation (Adesina, 2011). Many have also argued that the new ‘disbursement conditions’ and ‘eligibility criteria’ connected to PRSPs only masked new forms of political conditionalities related to aid (Booth, 2011; Zack-williams and Mohan, 2005).

Importantly, the Post-Washington Consensus framework also followed the trend set in the 1980s in reinforcing the state as a coordinator, while encouraging other global and domestic private, third and informal sector actors to take up its welfare provision task without restoring public social policy delivery (Surender, 2013). NGOs, in particular, were praised for both their ‘efficiency’ in implementation of social programmes and role as vanguards of democracy and *good governance* practice³⁷ – another major theme in development collaboration during this period and thereafter (Bukonya and Hickey, 2014). The heightened role of third sector actors was particularly visible in sub-Saharan Africa, considered as the region of ‘weak states’ and ‘bad governance’, and characterised by chronic corruption and misuse of public funds (see Alou, 2009; Khan and Gray, 2006). This development, parallel to the SWAP approach, countered the ideals of growing government leadership in development and social policy making and delivery.

The existing literature has raised a range of issues concerning the actual effectiveness of social policy implementation by NGOs and its effects on the emergent public welfare systems in the

³⁷ Yet, funding was directed primarily to implementing NGOs rather than those engaged with social movements and issues of social justice (Bebbington et al., 2008).

Global South. Among the key questions are: movement of workforces away from the public sector to the better paid third sector; draining of government resources for the benefit of NGOs;³⁸ lack of accountability and the consequent issues of poor service quality and profit-generation; provider concentration in wealthy urban areas and the accompanying problems of unequal access; and uncontrollable fragmentation of service delivery between numerous providers (Banks and Hulme, 2012; Bebbington et al., 2008; Fowler, 2014; Lewis, 2013). Additionally, since their growing demand, NGOs have become increasingly professionalised organisations competing for donor funding ear-marked for set causes – constituting a top-down relationship which undermines their connection to grassroots issues and advocacy (Banks et al., 2015; Burger and Seabe, 2014). Since big philanthropies have emerged to represent ‘meta-NGOs’ with considerable power in setting the trend for development NGOs through funding (Stubbs, 2005), these debates deserve a methodical re-appraisal in the context of contemporary philanthropic aid.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): early 2000s

As international aid cooperation entered the new millennium, social policy investments gained a primary position in thinking about how to enhance social and economic progress in the development context (Addison et al., 2015). The importance of globally coordinated efforts and development targets became increasingly recognised and accepted. It is against this background that the global development community settled, for the first time, on a shared policy framework – the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs). The MDGs set quantified priority goals in eight key social policy areas (see **figure 2.2**), towards which the global and domestic development

³⁸ Example can be drawn from British aid flows: “in the ten years between 1984 and 1994, the British government increased its funding of NGOs by almost 400 per cent to £ 68.7 million” (Manji and O’Coill, 2002, p. 580).

actors committed to work. Since its creation, the MDG agenda enjoyed sustained attention and came to dominate global social policy thinking and action. These developments coincided with the growth and increased integration of big philanthropies into systems of global governance.

Figure 2.2 Millennium Development Goals



Source: The UN³⁹


Though the MDGs represented a widely adopted global policy agenda approved by the 189 UN member states and diverse development organisations, it corresponded poorly with the individual actors' ideal policy objectives.⁴⁰ Indeed, the framework was born out of a process of combining and compromising two different initial agendas proposed by the OECD-DAC and the UN respectively, both of which were in the need of new development approaches for the millennium (Hulme and Scott, 2010). The MDGs, prepared largely by international bureaucrats, have also been accused of poorly representing the interests of countries from the Global South and have faced widespread criticism from different IOs, civil society and academia for not

³⁹ Image retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/mdgs.shtml>; last visited 22.1.2020; for exact targets under goals see https://www.unicef.org/statistics/index_24304.html; last visited 25.1.2020.

⁴⁰ The DAC had developed its agenda '*Shaping the 21st century*' and felt that it was more achievable and monitorable than the MDGs. This also included goals for gender equality and women's rights, while the UN agenda had more focus on economic growth, technology and issues faced particularly in Africa (Hulme and Scott, 2010).

accounting for issues of social justice and inequality (Bond, 2006; Kabeer, 2010; Saith, 2006). In fact, the agenda was deliberately built around narrow, quantified policy objectives to be achieved by 2015. Again, this new trend in development thinking and practice reflected policy developments in the West. The ethos of target specification chimed with policy practice in several donor countries at the time, such as the US, the UK, Germany and Norway, where *results-based management* had become the norm in public service reform (Hulme and Scott, 2010).

Figure 2.3 Development Assistance for Health by focus area, USD billions (1990-2019)



Source: IHME⁴¹

Moreover, the policy goals and targets promoted under MDGs diverted attention and investments away from the previously dominant education sector to global health (particularly child and maternal health and infectious diseases) – where the most pressing development issues were perceived to lie (see **figure 2.3**). This move was further strengthened by the newly established vertical funds⁴² *Global Fund* and *GAVI* (also known as the Vaccine Alliance), which

⁴¹ Image retrieved from <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>; last visited 22.11.2020.

⁴² Defined as “*development financing mechanisms confined to single development domains with mixed funding sources*” (Browne and Cordon, 2015).

were strongly supported by the Gates Foundation. The emergence of these organisations not only increased the relevance of, but also transformed the global health space with two major impacts. Firstly, the WHO was, in large parts, supplanted by the Global Fund and GAVI as a source of health assistance. Secondly, substantial resources were directed to the treatment of infectious diseases and child health (particularly immunisation). Vertical funds have consequently been accused of stalling health systems strengthening in aid-receiving countries (e.g. Mussa et al., 2013), while the relevance of MDGs has been questioned as a framework for national policy-makers and the WHO in addressing non-communicable diseases (Koivusalo, 2017).

Furthermore, the ‘MDG era’ saw the rise of two noticeably different approaches to aid delivery. While vertical funds represented a novel form of multilateralism by expanding access to roundtables to include a range of public, third and private sector actors (including businesses, celebrities and private foundations), they focused on delivering aid through rigid, top-down mechanisms with pre-decided priorities (Browne, 2017). At the same time, the OECD launched the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (consolidated by the 2008 *Accra Agenda for Action*) which emphasised the primary role of aid-receiving governments in leading development efforts at the domestic level. The Declaration put forth five overarching principles of good practice which detail responsibilities for both donors and recipient countries: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and results-based management.

While it is obvious that the MDG agenda rejuvenated public interest in development with a novel approach and encouraged joint efforts towards development progress, its principles did

not fundamentally shape the practices and ideologies of the IMF, World Bank or donor countries. The influence of MDGs remained very limited on the PSRPs, which continued to be guided by affordability and stability targets. At the same time, global poverty remained low on the domestic political agendas in donor countries, whose aid allocations continued to follow, to a large extent, national interests. (Hulme and Scott, 2010). Despite being hailed as a positive shift in policy leadership to aid-receiving countries, the 2005 Paris Declaration also had negative aspects. The Post-Washington -style good governance approaches continued to prevail during the implementation of the MDG agenda⁴³ as well as the World Bank's PRSPs (Kwon, 2019), and the principle of 'country ownership' was largely re-interpreted as a domestic commitment to donors' own policy prescriptions (Fraser and Whitfield, 2008a). Nevertheless, the idea of narrowly defined development objectives was picked up by a number of actors and continues to shape practice today – particularly within vertical funds that are deeply connected to big philanthropies.

Diversifying paradigm portfolio: Post-2015 agenda and universalist approaches

The paradigm landscape in which contemporary philanthropies have emerged looks very different from that at the beginning of aid cooperation in the early-post war era. The dawn of the 21st century was accompanied by an expansion of social policy approaches considered beneficial for development and a further diversification of policy actors proposing and delivering development solutions. While many of the organisations and approaches focusing on infectious diseases that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s have grown in influence

⁴³ Being promoted particularly by the *Millennium Development Project* launched by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and UNDP Director Mark Malloch Brown to devise recommendations for best implementation strategies to achieve the MDGs (Kwon, 2019).

(notably the leading vertical funds and the US government programmes *PEPFAR*⁴⁴ and the *US President's Malaria Initiative*), others have risen to challenge the narrow interpretations of development needs and solutions. This has been spurred by the drastic consequences of the 2007/9 financial crisis on welfare systems across the globe and the emerging vision that a social *safety net*, as promoted under the Post-Washington Consensus, is an inadequate form of social protection. In addition, the MDGs came to be regarded by many as too 'simplistic' to answer complex development questions, and there has been a widespread recognition that economic progress does not automatically translate into social wellbeing in the wider population.

The ILO has been at the forefront in advocating for robust state-led social policies with its *Social Protection Floor* strategy, which has grown and evolved over the past decade. This promotes universalist provision of basic social security for all as a socially and economically desirable and feasible reform (see an early discussion by Cichon and Hagemeyer, 2007), through four universalist, 'cradle-to-grave' policy measures or 'guarantees'.⁴⁵ Today, the agenda has been adopted under a broader, *UN Social Protection Floor Initiative* (SPF-I).⁴⁶ This demonstrates its success as a global social policy paradigm, which was partially driven by broad stakeholder engagement with policy adopters in aid-receiving countries. From its very inception, the design and launch of the ILO strategy involved policy practitioners from the Global South and received support from African policy makers in 2012, as opposed to some other social policy initiatives that have gained less traction globally (such as the *Universal Cash Transfer* initiative promoted at the Plus Five summit in 2000) (Deacon and Stubbs, 2013). The SPF-I is

⁴⁴ *The US President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief*.

⁴⁵ i. Access to essential health care, including maternity care; ii. Basic income security for children (eg. family allowances); iii. Basic income security for persons in active age who are unable to work (eg. social protection benefits for persons with disabilities, unemployed, maternity); iv. Basic income security for older persons (eg. pensions). See <https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/ShowTheme.action?id=1321>, last visited 24.6.2020.

⁴⁶ See <https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/ShowProject.action?id=2767>, last visited 24.6.2020.

thus an example of somewhat successful global policy diffusion through collaborative policy processes, as opposed to coercive mechanisms of aid delivery such as those implemented under SAPs.

Another key global social policy milestone has been the 2012 UN resolution on *Universal Health Coverage* (UHC), promoting universal and system-wide investment in health care provision. The UHC is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a situation in which “*all people can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship*”.⁴⁷ These new, universalist initiatives have been followed by and largely incorporated into the Post-2015 Agenda and the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs) replacing the MDGs. The SDGs promote a wide-ranging spectrum of policy objectives under 17 goals, denoting a shift from the more limited MDG objectives focusing on outcomes and as opposed to systems. For instance, the goal number three focused on health (to ‘*ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages*’) has 13 targets which include progress towards universal health coverage, expansion of health workforce and financing and tackling non-communicable diseases – all of which were overlooked under the previous MDG agenda.

Subsequently, universalist social policy approaches have gained recognition and shifted attention from vertical interventions responding to specific needs to the provision of basic social security for all. Though these new trajectories are evident, the literature also highlights the differing understandings around ‘universality’ amongst diverse development actors and the regular conflation of policy analysis with an advocacy agenda (e.g. Anttonen et al., 2012;

⁴⁷ See also http://www.who.int/health_financing/universal_coverage_definition/en/, last visited 31.10.2017.

Deacon and Stubbs, 2013). Despite the normative underpinnings of the initial UHC agenda which emphasised public sector strengthening, current debates have focused on enhancing private sector capacities (e.g. Mackintosh et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 2016; Wadge et al., 2017). Meanwhile, the support for narrow vertical approaches also remains strong; the Global Fund sixth replenishment conference in 2019 saw a pledge exceeding 14 billion USD for the next three years – the biggest amount ever donated to a multilateral health organisation.⁴⁸ This indicates that universalist, transformative policy agendas are competing with, rather than substituting, other policy approaches. Consequently, questions arise concerning the role and position of big philanthropies in such dynamics, particularly in the light of their on-going investments in vertical funds.

Alternative approaches from the South

Over the past 10-15 years, development agencies from the Global South have emerged with new resources and approaches in development cooperation in Africa. These comprise a range of bilateral and multilateral actors, such as the increasingly engaged Turkey and Gulf states (e.g. United Arab Emirates); the better-known BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the *New Development Bank* which they established in 2014; China's *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank*; and, other regional and national development organisations. Despite their considerable diversity (see e.g. Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019), Southern actors have challenged the Western hegemony in development cooperation through the rhetoric and practice of a shared vision that is both unique and attractive from the perspective of aid-receiving countries.

⁴⁸ See <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2019-10-10-global-fund-donors-pledge-usd14-billion-in-fight-to-end-epidemics/>, last visited 17.8.2020.

According to proponents, southern policy paradigms are not based upon economic simulations, external expert knowledge or coercive mechanisms, but donor countries' own development experience and solidaristic ideals of *south-south cooperation* (Bry, 2016; Corkin, 2014). Sharing an aversion to aid conditionalities such as those implemented under SAPs, these emergent donors often highlight the apolitical nature of their relationships with aid-receiving countries, particularly in the context of governance practice.⁴⁹ While the notion of purely solidaristic development cooperation is debatable, an important ideological divergence from Western aid delivery can be observed; in fact, most Southern donors hold roots in the *Non-Alignment Movement*.⁵⁰ Consequently, Southern aid rarely comes with requirements for policy reforms, demands for good governance measures⁵¹, or results-based measurements methods, while it is often embedded in broader economic cooperation between the donors and recipients (see e.g. Asmus et al., 2017; Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019).

Southern donors, and particularly the BRICS whose influence remains predominant in this group, share also some common features in terms of their social sector investments under development cooperation, characterised by technical assistance and support for infrastructure development delivered through project aid (see e.g. Asmus et al., 2017; Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019). China, which represents the largest Southern donor in Africa, has been a leading funder of hospital construction, for instance (Grépin et al., 2014; UNDP, 2014). Moreover, the development model experienced and advanced by Southern donors is by and large based on economic nationalism promoting national industries and regulating foreign investment. From Latin

⁴⁹ In fact, the Asian Developmental Model is based on an authoritarian form of governance. Although this model is strongly rejected by traditional donors emphasising 'good governance', economic progress has been seen as more important than civil rights by some politicians as well as electorates. Example can be drawn from Rwanda and Ethiopia, both implementing developmental authoritarianism. (Matfess, 2015; Reyntjens, 2015).

⁵⁰ See <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁵¹ With the exception of Chile, which explicitly maintains democracy as a key principle guiding its development investments (Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019).

America to East Asia, the fostered development models are principally centred around economic growth, spurred by a progression from agricultural activity and natural resource exploitation to manufacturing and higher skill industries with context-sensitive policy measures. (Babb, 2013; Gore, 2000). This naturally involves the state in a leading role in the making and implementation of development policies across sectors, which adds to its potential attractiveness amongst aid-receiving countries.

One policy paradigm deserves particular attention: the *Asian Developmental Model*. The policy prescriptions of the model, which is now mainly driven by China, have gained a particularly prominent stronghold within the African region. The social policy approach of the model is based on *productivist welfare*. Intricacies aside, the model implies narrow public investment concentrated particularly in the areas of education and health, with the aim of boosting human capital investment and economic growth. It is therefore centred around investments in a healthy and knowledgeable workforce as well as infrastructure as primary avenues to economic productivity. (de Haan, 2010; Ohno, 2013; Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender, 2013). Countries such as Tanzania have embraced this model in their recent development plans, finding credibility for the approach in the development experiences of East-Asian countries.

Nevertheless, evidence shows that bilateral aid is typically motivated by certain advantages obtainable to the donor. The existing literature on Chinese aid has widely observed that when not delivered as clearly defined development projects, Chinese ‘aid’ is practically undistinguishable from commercial loans and contracts and often tied to purchase of Chinese goods (e.g. Bräutigam, 2014; Corkin, 2014; King, 2013). Similarly, evidence on India’s aid decisions points to economic and political motivations (Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013), and while Brazil and

Russia recognisably hold energy interests, Turkey's aid allocation is being led by a range of interests from the commercial to the geo-strategic (Ozkan, 2013). Thus, while international aid cooperation has been transformed by changing development discourses and social policy agendas, it continues to be driven by a range of foreign policy and economic motivations as well as the dominating ideologies in donor countries (Apodaca, 2017; Greene and Licht, 2018). Still, for aid-receiving countries, Southern donors' lack of political interference and contributions towards expanding the menu of available development finance have presented a much-welcomed opportunity to re-negotiate the terms of aid delivery by traditional donor agencies and increase domestic policy space (Hackenesch, 2013; Harman and Williams, 2014; Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013; Swedlund, 2013).

Against this background, it is legitimate to wonder whether the transforming dynamics of development cooperation within recipient countries afford new opportunities for philanthropic donors to spread their policy influence. Like Southern donors, big philanthropies have adopted a rhetoric of apolitical aid delivery and they may attract considerable interest as alternative donor agencies thanks to their independent status and lack of colonial history. At the same time, it is important to include these new, Western donors in the debates on aid conditionality and potentially obscured interests, particularly considering their deep links with the global private sector and profitable mechanisms of aid delivery (see **chapter 1**).

2.3 GATES FOUNDATION IN THE HEALTH SECTOR

The speed and magnitude with which private foundations have entered global social policy making and finance has been amplified by, primarily, one organisation – the Bill and Melinda

Gates Foundation. The Foundation is not only the world's most influential private philanthropy, it is also a leading development actor in global health, which is its principal area of investment. This section takes a closer look at this organisation, which constitutes the central focus of this study, discussing its journey from a small family philanthropy to a world-leading development agency. The section will also describe its overall activities and particular interest areas within the health sector.

The rise of a family philanthropy

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is largely focused on Africa. The Foundation works across 45 nations on the continent with offices in three primary target countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa.⁵² While over half of private development finance provided by the organisation is unlocatable to a specific region, its largest allocable share – 28.5 per cent – is directed to Africa (2017).⁵³ In 2016, Bill and Melinda pledged 5 USD billion worth of investments to be made in the region within the following five years – health remaining the number one priority (see **figure 2.4**). This interest in health-related development issues on the continent is noteworthy; the 2016 pledge represents a larger sum of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) on the continent than many individual countries have allocated globally over periods of five years in the past.⁵⁴ However, the organisation operates in a range of policy fields, investing also in the areas of *agricultural development; financial services for the poor; and water, sanitation and hygiene* (also known as WASH) under its *Global Growth and Opportunity*


⁵² Its other focus countries include Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia; see <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Where-We-Work/Africa-Office>, last visited 24.6.2020.

⁵³ OECD (2019).

⁵⁴ Compare DAH statistics by IHME; <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 21.8.2020.

programme. More recently, the Foundation has expanded the work of its *Global Policy and Advocacy* programme to include *global education*.

Figure 2.4 Gates Foundation’s bilateral development finance, commitments in % (2017)



Source: OECD (2019)

Bill and Melinda Gates have frequently reiterated that their interest in global health was ignited by their personal experiences during a holiday in Africa, and subsequently increased by the World Bank’s *World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health* and several other global health publications (Harman, 2016). The couple made its first substantial global health investment in 1998, by gifting 100 million USD to the *Bill and Melinda Gates Children’s Vaccine Program*. The following year, they hired epidemiologists and global health experts for guidance in their work. The Gates family also pursued its interests in increasing vaccine coverage by joining GAVI in 1999. After the re-launch of the William H. Gates Foundation (established in 1997) as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in year 2000, the Foundation

quickly expanded to HIV/AIDS and anti-malaria programmes and opened several offices in the Global South.⁵⁵

By 2005, Bill and Melinda Gates were named ‘people of the year’ (together with the celebrity singer, Bono) by TIME Magazine, which celebrated their efforts to improve the lives of the world’s poor. A year later, in 2006, the Foundation became the wealthiest existing philanthropy. This was allowed by a substantial gift by the investor-billionaire Warren Buffet, who donated Berkshire Hathaway Class B shares worth over 30 USD billion to support the Gates Foundation’s activities.⁵⁶ It is at this point, that the organisation was re-structured under three core programmes of *Global Health*, *Global Development* and *Work in the US*, added since by *Global Growth and Opportunity* and *Global Policy and Advocacy*. Following drastic expansion of the Foundation’s work, Bill Gates left Microsoft to concentrate solely upon his philanthropic activities in 2008.

The Gates’ have been active philanthropists not only in their direct development work, but also in promoting philanthropic giving for international causes. Bill Gates himself has donated 35.8 USD billion worth of Microsoft stocks up to date⁵⁷, while the foundation leaders have joined efforts with Warren Buffet to launch initiatives such as the *Giving Pledge* in 2010, which has been widely accredited with having created social pressure to donate amongst the global elite.⁵⁸ The Pledge is signed today over 200 high network individuals from 23 countries committing themselves to donate “*the majority of their wealth to philanthropic causes or charitable*

⁵⁵ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/History>, last visited 10.11.2018.

⁵⁶ Warren Buffet pledged to give 10 million shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock to the Gates Foundation throughout the years, by giving each year a five per cent of the remaining total; see <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Leadership/Executive-Leadership-Team/Warren-Buffett>, last visited 24.6.2020.

⁵⁷ Forbes 2020, see <https://www.forbes.com/profile/bill-gates/#6fccc162689f>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁵⁸ For further information, see <https://givingpledge.org/>, last visited 24.6.2020; see also http://boldergiving.org/news/407_Bolder-Giving_CHRONICLE-PHILANTHROPY.pdf.

organizations during either their lifetime or in their will".⁵⁹ At the same time, the Foundation actively encourages and creates opportunities for philanthropic giving through its own *Philanthropic Relations* division.

Despite increased giving by the world's elite, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation remains the wealthiest and most influential philanthropic organisation in the world today. In 2019, the Foundation's endowments exceeded 50 billion USD, the philanthropy had nearly 1500 employees, its work extended across 138 countries,⁶⁰ and it donated 3.9 billion USD in DAH.⁶¹ Amid COVID-19 pandemic, the Gates Foundation has also become the most important funder of vaccine development against the coronavirus.⁶² As its resources, networks and influence grow, so does the importance of understanding its social policy and engagement models in Africa and beyond.

Gates' health aid flows: where does the money go?

Figure 2.5 exhibits the Gates Foundation's aid flows through funded actors (in the middle) to diverse end causes (on the right) in global health. As can be observed, the Foundation's resources are streamed through diverse channels, including the Foundation's own programmatic aid implemented by third parties, as well as independent or collaborative work by international organisations, global PPPs and NGOs. In fact, the Foundation stands as the single largest donor to diverse global health organisations such as the WHO and the vertical fund GAVI, with

⁵⁹ See <https://givingpledge.org/About.aspx>, last visited 14.11.2018.


⁶⁰ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Foundation-Factsheet>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁶¹ IHME, see <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁶² See <https://candid.org/explore-issues/coronavirus>; <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2020/04/Gates-Foundation-Expands-Commitment-to-COVID-19-Response-Calls-for-International-Collaboration>, last visited 21.8.2020.

considerable influence over their policy directions (Browne, 2017; Clinton and Sridhar, 2017; Youde, 2018).

Figure 2.5 Gates Foundation’s health aid flows: channels and focus areas (2018)



Source: IHME⁶³


Moreover, as is typical for contemporary philanthropy, the Gates Foundation financially supports several research institutions (e.g. universities) and global private sector actors, through its direct, charitable grants. The Foundation also makes profitable, Program-Related Investments (PRIs) under its *Strategic Investment Fund*, to social enterprises and other business actors (including leading pharmaceutical companies) in order to boost its operational mission.⁶⁴ These private sector investments are amplified by the *Bill and Melinda Gates Trust* which manages the Foundation endowment assets and holds shares in several multinational corporations including Walmart, Coca Cola and Amazon.⁶⁵ While the Trust and the Foundation represent legally separate entities, they are both directed by Bill and Melinda and serve the Foundation’s overall mission (see **figure 2.6**).

⁶³ IHME; see <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 6.2.2020.

⁶⁴ For portfolio, see <https://sif.gatesfoundation.org/portfolio/>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁶⁵ See e.g. <https://www.holdingschannel.com/all/stocks-held-by-bill-melinda-gates-foundation-trust/>, last visited 21.8.2020.

Figure 2.6 Gates Foundation’s organisational structure involved in global health



Source: own production


In terms of prioritised policy sectors, the Gates Foundation’s primary areas of investment in global health comprise *polio eradication*, *infectious diseases* (HIV&AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis), *immunisation*, *Maternal, Newborn and Child Health* (MNCH) and *family planning*, as is shown in **figure 2.7**. Beside its own programmatic aid, the Foundation has invested in developing new vaccines against HIV by funding the *International Aids Vaccine Initiative*,⁶⁶ and over 60 per cent of the philanthropy’s Voluntary Contributions (VCs) to the WHO are directed to polio eradication.⁶⁷ Bill and Melinda have also voiced ambitious global health targets, such as the eradication of malaria within Bill Gates’ lifetime and the imminent and full eradication of polio. It is evident that the Foundation occupies an important position as a

⁶⁶ See <https://www.iavi.org/about/global-funding-support>, last visited 27.12.2018.

⁶⁷ 2019; see <http://open.who.int/2018-19/contributors/contributor>, last visited 21.8.2020.

global health funder and policy maker. At the same time, the organisation is far from being the only influential actor in the sector, and it constitutes a relatively new development partner in numerous countries – including Tanzania.

Figure 2.7 Direct grants under Global Development and Global Health programmes, USD (2018)



Source: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation⁶⁸

⁶⁸ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/Resources-and-Media/Annual-Reports/Annual-Report-2018>, last visited 6.2.2020.

2.4 TANZANIAN AID LANDSCAPE, POLITICAL CONTEXT, SOCIAL POLICY TRAJECTORIES AND HEALTH SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS

Tanzania is an important aid recipient with a unique historical background as a pioneer of African Socialism. More recently, the country has also initiated a number of social policy frameworks and programmes – often times in coalition with leading international development institutions. Both past and present trends in Tanzania’s political and development landscape, as well as its health sector characteristics, shape the context from which this study draws its empirical insights. It is therefore important to locate the Gates Foundation’s activities in the context of broader development cooperation in Tanzania and shed light on the evolution of development agendas and social policy trajectories in the country.

Locating the Gates Foundation in the Tanzanian aid landscape

Tanzania is the third biggest aid recipient in Africa (after Ethiopia and Nigeria), while also being the fifth largest recipient of DAH on the continent.⁶⁹ In fact, 42 per cent of the overall aid received in the country is directed into the health sector.⁷⁰ The sectoral bias in aid allocations to Tanzania is partially driven by the persistent health sector -related challenges. While the country has made considerable progress in reducing its health burden and the level of Out-of-Pocket Payments (OPP) which figures much below the sub-Saharan African average (24.01 versus 35.54, respectively),⁷¹ important gaps remain. The maternal mortality rate remains high

⁶⁹ 2017; OECD, see <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2019.pdf>; last visited 21.8.2020.

⁷⁰ 2017-2018 average, OECD, see https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDACAidataglacebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no, last visited 24.6.2020.

⁷¹ World Bank, 2017; see <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOPC.CH.ZS?locations=TZ>, last visited 12.11.2020.

(524 deaths per 100,000 live births)⁷² and Tanzania represents five per cent of total malaria deaths globally (WHO, 2019). The most recent review of health service delivery indicators from 2014 also reported that only 50 per cent of Tanzanian health facilities have access to electricity, clean water or improved toilets, and 40 per cent of the required drugs remain unavailable (WB, 2015).

The Gates Foundation's first health-related investments in Tanzania date back to the late 1990s, when the philanthropy existed as the original William H. Gates Foundation. This support has continued throughout the years, and recently increased (see **appendix G**). At the time this doctoral research was conducted in 2017, the Gates Foundation announced a 350 million USD investment in the areas of health and poverty reduction in Tanzania for a period extending until 2022, a pledge which was coupled with a further 225 USD million commitment from the US government.⁷³ The same year, Tanzania became the Foundation's fifth largest aid recipient. Also the Global Fund – the world's leading PPP in global health and largely influenced by the organisation – has increased its investments in Tanzania by 1.5 USD billion over the past decade,⁷⁴ mirroring the Foundation's stable and increasing investments in the country.

However, as shown in **figure 2.9**, the Gates Foundation does not represent the important source of development finance for health within Tanzania, being far behind actors such as the US and the WB (IDA).⁷⁵ Most of the traditional development agencies, from bilateral actors such as

⁷² World Bank, 2017; see <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=TZ>, last visited 11.11.2020

⁷³ See e.g. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-health-idUSKCN1AT0IF>, <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/bill-gates-trumps-govt-pledge-575m-tanzania>, last visited 6.8.2018.

⁷⁴ Global Fund, see <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/?loc=TZA&k=19a42508-b05c-4128-a2ed-ff5eea6af30d>; last visited 6.8.2018.

⁷⁵ The illustrated data is from the time data was gathered for this thesis in 2017, and while it must be acknowledged that slight changes in development financing by the Foundation have occurred since, the overall directions have remained the same.


DFID, GIZ and USAID to UN institutions like UNAIDS and UNICEF and IFIs such as the WB (IDA), figure amongst the country's key development actors in the area of health as well as otherwise.

Figure 2.8 ODA to health, Top 5 recipients, USD millions (2017)

<i>commitments, USD million</i>	Nigeria	Mozambique	Kenya	Ethiopia	Tanzania
United States	282	417	618	282	442
IDA	57	81	-	220	43
EU Institutions	10	-	-	-	-
Global Fund	311	30	-	-	-
United Kingdom	19	19	11	41	12
Germany	46	-	3	13	1
Canada	34	105	4	19	3
Sweden	-	0	1	8	1
UNICEF	17	5	4	14	7
Japan	4	1	4	1	1
Other donors	7	87	45	52	49
Total	787	745	690	649	559

Source: OECD (emphasis added)⁷⁶

Figure 2.9 ODA by donor and sector to Tanzania, USD millions (2017)⁷⁷



Source: OECD⁷⁸

⁷⁶ See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2019.pdf>, last visited 21.8.2020.

⁷⁷ Sector specific investments illustrated in the colour grading as it follows: red (social infrastructure), blue (economic infrastructure), dark green (multisector), orange (production), yellow (administrative costs of donors), light green (programme assistance), purple (humanitarian aid).

At the same time, the overall aid landscape in Tanzania is going through important transformations. General Budget Support (GBS) – directed to the national treasury to “*support the implementation of a national development strategy*” (OECD, 2012, p. 6) – has been falling due to changes in the amounts⁷⁹ and modalities of aid delivered, particularly by traditional bilateral donors. Meanwhile, Tanzania has benefited from increased domestic resources and cooperation with Southern donors, which have jolted the existing power dynamics. Swedlund observed in 2013, that “*increasing domestic revenues, an increased Chinese presence, and the prospect of significant oil and gas exports are gradually reducing the government’s dependence on traditional donors*” (2013, p. 367). This statement was partially evidenced in July 2020, when the World Bank announced Tanzania to shift from a Low Income Country (LIC) status to a lower Middle Income Country (MIC) status.

Furthermore, Tanzania has made efforts to harmonise donor activities and ensure its own policy visions are respected in the course of their implementation. During the 2000s, when increased attention was directed to budget support mechanisms and aid harmonisation globally, Tanzania introduced several donor structures and frameworks. The *Development Partners Group* (DPG), comprising multilateral as well as Western bilateral donors, was established in 2004. It remains the most important donor platform today and is organised into sector specific sub-groups as the *DPG Health*.⁸⁰ The government has also sought donor coordination and control over aid efforts through different consensually agreed frameworks, most recently the *Development Cooperation Framework* (DCF, 2015-2025) which draws from the principles of the *2005 Paris Declaration*

⁷⁸ OECD; see <https://www2.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=282&lg=en&page=21>, last visited 14.12.2019.

⁷⁹ Partially due to corruption claims, political tension between Zanzibar and the mainland, and undesired political changes, such as the Cybercrime Act 2015 – criticised to stall freedom of expression.

⁸⁰ See <http://www.tzdp.org/dpg-website/dpg-tanzania.html>, last visited 24.6.2020.

on *Aid Effectiveness*.⁸¹ In addition, the Ministry of Health (MOH) engages with donors for policy evaluation and planning during meetings related to *health basket funds* and other *general budget support*. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), on its behalf, has individual divisions dedicated to dealing with multilateral, bilateral and regional aid collaboration, as well as aid coordination under the Department of External Finance.

All together, these trends, frameworks and principles characterise Tanzanian development cooperation, and give critical context to the Gates Foundation's engagement and potential for policy influence on the ground. In light of the efforts Tanzania has undertaken to bring donors and government agencies together to organise coordinated action, questions also arise concerning the Gates Foundation's alignment with the adopted measures.

Tanzanian political context and influence of external social policy models from a historical perspective

Tanzania's history as the leading country of African Socialism, pioneered by its independence leader Julius Nyerere and the current political situation add a unique nuance to the country context. During Nyerere's rule, the socialist development strategy was operationalised under the *Ujamaa* project inaugurated by the 1967 *Arusha Declaration*. The word 'ujamaa' refers to unity across ethnic and class divisions which Nyerere understood to be at the core of African Socialism, differentiating it thus from Marxist ideology focused on the emancipation of the proletariat from the economic, social and political oppression by the bourgeoisie (Cornelli, 2012). As for most leftist philosophies originating from the Global South, also African Socialism emphasised freedom from Western domination.

⁸¹ This was preceded by the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST, launched in 2006), which provided a new framework for development aid, making DPs commit to government priorities in terms of poverty reduction and support the use of government systems for the implementation of Tanzania's poverty reduction strategies; see <http://tanzania.um.dk/en/danida-en/policies-and-priorities/joint-assistance-strategy>.

The Ujamaa project triggered several profound reforms throughout the 1970s. It sought to gather the dispersed rural population together with large proportions of the urban dwellers into villages to increase agricultural productivity under cooperative farming (Orr, 2016). Nyerere also promoted village-level provision of health care as part of the strategies to achieve ‘self-reliance’ (Nyerere, 1967).⁸² The government maintained large investment in provision and planning of decentralised, preventative health care in rural areas. Private health service providers were banned in 1977 (Kida and Mackintosh, 2005), and 90 per cent of the Tanzanian population was at a distance of no more than 10 kilometres from a health clinic by 1978 (Thomas, 1983 in Benson, 2001, p. 1905).⁸³

These ideological stances and social policy measures continue to influence attitudes and approaches of the government today (e.g. Mercer and Green, 2013). This legacy is manifested in the fact the country remains led by the Revolutionary State Party or *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), in power since independence. CCM has maintained a strong focus on rural populations (Jacob & Pederson, 2018) and the current, twice elected president - John Magufuli- has revived the nationalist ambition of self-sufficiency and political independence. Since his inauguration in 2015, he has, among other measures, restricted the activities of multinational corporations considered as exploitative of the country’s natural resources; directed public resources to universalist social policies such as free secondary education; and fostered largely state-centred development. The President has also shown signs of

⁸² In foreign policy, Nyerere became hostile towards liberal Western countries, notably the UK, US and West Germany. This was driven by an interest in aid partnership with East Germany, China and other communist countries, as well as the West’s inaction vis-à-vis the South African apartheid regime. Social democratic Nordic countries were largely supportive of Nyerere’s policies favouring public welfare. (Havnevik and Isinika, 2010, p. 41-42).


⁸³ In addition to these social policy developments, Tanzania has remained one of the most peaceful countries in the region up until today, argued to have avoided ethnic conflict thanks to its socialist development strategy and promotion of a shared single language, Swahili (Orr, 2016).

authoritarianism and earned criticism for stifling political freedoms, banning opposition rallies and persecuting those critical of the government.⁸⁴ As will be discovered in **chapter 7**, stricter guidelines have been imposed on the activities of donor agencies.

Nevertheless, as **figure 2.10** illustrates, external influences have shaped the country's policy trajectories across time too – particularly during the era of Washington Consensus. Most of the socialist policies introduced by Nyerere were reformed through SAPs and PRSPs during the 1980-1990s, following the economic hardship the country experienced due to the oil crisis, poor economic planning, and resources spent in war in Uganda against the dictator Idi Amin. The influence of the policy prescriptions furthered by the World Bank and IMF are reflected in Tanzania's development programmes, from the Tanzanian *SAP* to PRSPs in the *National Strategies for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* (NSGRPs) over three decades. The introduction of the SAP led to a drastic transformation of the health sector in Tanzania, where public funding was nearly halved between 1978 (7.5 per cent) and 1989 (3.9 per cent). This was coupled with the introduction of user fees in public services in 1993, and the reforms gave rise to a significantly increased number of non-state health service providers. (see Buckley and Baker, 2009).

⁸⁴ See e.g. The Economist (2018), <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/15/tanzanias-rogue-president>; BBC Africa (2019), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47334545>; last visited 21.8.2020.

Figure 2.10 Histogram of Tanzania's development plans and influencing global development agendas



Source: own production

Moreover, the *Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals* have influenced development and health policy agendas in the country as consensually accepted overarching frameworks from the 2000s onwards. This is explicitly stated in government's policy documents, such as the fourth Tanzanian Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP IV, 2015-2020), for instance.⁸⁵ Since the MDGs, Tanzania's public investment in the health sector increased, and it has remained around 10 per cent of the national budget over the past decade (see Lee & Tarimo, 2018). Furthermore, the *Five Year Development Plan II* (FYDP II) specifically states that the SDGs, ratified by the Republic of Tanzania, are an international policy framework to guide the development plan particularly in areas of industrialisation, technology, and inclusive development.

Interestingly, the Asian Developmental model has also had an impact on Tanzania's development agendas, particularly since 2010. It inspired, for instance, the focus on industrial development under the FYDP I (2010/11-15/16) and II (2016/17-20/21). The FYDP II specifically states, "*A common lesson running through selected reference countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, Vietnam, etc. is the importance of taking deliberate measures aimed at promoting industrial development and transformation.*"⁸⁶ In fact, despite the recognition it affords for SDGs, the Plan remains largely driven by motives of industrialisation and increased productivity, which remain key development priorities under the Magufuli government. Against this background, it is, perhaps, unsurprising that Southern donors have become an important source of development ideas, approaches and resources in the country. However, it remains unknown whether big philanthropies such as the Gates

⁸⁵ See

http://www.tzdp.org.tz/fileadmin/documents/dpg_internal/dpg_working_groups_clusters/cluster_2/health/Key_Sector_Documents/Induction_Pack/Final_HSSP_IV_Vs1.0_260815.pdf.

⁸⁶ FYDP II, p. 31; see <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/laws/4822.pdf>.

Foundation enjoy similar momentum, or whether their activities are negatively affected by the dominant political climate.

Domestic social policy trajectories and health sector characteristics

The discussion above highlights the long tradition of public sector focussed social policy delivery in Tanzania – particularly in the areas of health and education. This is not to underestimate the influence of external policy actors in the planning and launch of different social policy programmes in the country, which has remained significant despite the government’s repeated calls for ‘freedom from dependency’ (Jacobs & Pedersen, 2018). Moreover, it is important to note that over the past decade, the country has increasingly focussed on strengthening its social protection system, and is currently envisaging the introduction of a new health insurance scheme as part of its commitment to achieving Universal Health Coverage. As such, the Gates Foundation operates in a specific political and institutional context characterised by existing domestic policy aspirations, dominant political coalitions, social policy trajectories and institutions, and health system features, as discussed in the following.

The evolution of the current social protection framework in Tanzania was largely ignited by the launch of the *Tanzanian Social Action Fund* (TASAF) as part of the national MKUKUTA poverty reduction programme in 2000, with the aid of the World Bank. TASAF is currently the country’s largest social policy initiative, and has implemented and expanded the range of its social protection measures over several years (Wang & Rosemberg, 2018). In 2008, the government also initiated the development of a *National Social Protection Framework* (NSPF), driven primarily by the Ministry of Labour but also by the ILO and some INGOs. Although the NSPF is still awaiting finalisation, the move has emphasised the growing

interest in social protection measures and comprehensive old-age pension systems in the country.

In 2013 TASAF moved, with the support of the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, to implementation of the *Productive Social Safety Net* (PSSN; also known as TASAF III)⁸⁷ (Ulriksen, 2016a). This Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme was framed to fit some of the government's guiding principles in poverty reduction, such as self-reliance, hard work and focus on agricultural productivity (Ulriksen, 2016b; Jacob & Peterson, 2018). It was thus designed to encompass elements of conditionality (requiring children's health check-ups and enrolment to primary and secondary education): targeting (with focus on the most vulnerable); public works; and also the strengthening of livelihoods (through entrepreneurial training and savings groups, for instance) (Ajwad et al., 2018).

Other social policies relating specifically to health include the insurance schemes *National Health Insurance Fund* (NHIF), mandatory for civil servants and available to all other citizens on a voluntary basis, the *Community Health Funds* (CHF), run by district authorities with the aim of increasing coverage amongst informal workers in rural regions, and its sister scheme *TIKA*, which is administered in urban areas (Wang & Rosemberg, 2018). However, these schemes have failed to achieve broad-based population coverage, and the extant *waiver and exemption policies* mitigating the negative effects of user fees on levels of Out-of-Pocket Payments (OPPs) have been reported to have only moderate effects.⁸⁸ It is against this background that the government is currently planning the launch of a new health insurance


⁸⁷ While the government runs also a number of social assistance and in-kind benefit schemes targeting the most vulnerable populations and communities, such as the *Most Vulnerable Children Response System* (MVCRS) and the *National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme* (NAIVS), these remain fragmented and the PSSN constitutes the largest and most comprehensive existing social protection programme in Tanzania (see e.g. Ulriksen, 2016; Ajwad et al., 2018).

⁸⁸ The exempted population categories include under-5 children, pregnant women and patients with 'priority health conditions' which include HIV and tuberculosis, and the policy has been widely implemented. The waiver policy covers the elderly and the poorest segments of the population, but important issues have remained in adequate implementation. (Wang & Rosemberg, 2018).

scheme “accommodating those who could not afford to pay the service”.⁸⁹ If realised, this would represent a major transformation of Tanzania’s social policy make-up and crucially enhance levels of financial protection.

In terms of the structure of the national health service system, Tanzania has maintained its multi-tiered, decentralised system which it adopted at independence in order to accommodate the needs of the largely rural population (Kwesigabo et al., 2012). Since 2007, the government of Tanzania has invested particularly in increasing access to health services within rural areas, through resource allocation for health infrastructure development, human resources and medicine availability (Wang & Rosemberg, 2020).

Figure 2.11 Tanzanian health system structure



Notes: CCBRT – Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania, FBO – faith-based organization, KCMC – Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre, MOI – Muhimbili Orthopaedic Institute, ORCI – Ocean Road Cancer Institute, RCH – reproductive and child health

Source: SHOPS Project (2013)⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Daily News, October 2020; see <https://dailynews.co.tz/news/2020-10-225f9156a8c89fc.aspx>, last visited 11.11.2020.

As **figure 2.11** illustrates, several key providers within the Tanzanian health system are non-state actors, including private hospitals and facilities run by INGOs. The system includes six key structures: (i) village health service (preventative services such as health education, caring for minor ailments); (ii) dispensary services (maternal and child health care, some outpatient curative care); (iii) health centres (preventative care, reproductive health services, minor surgery); (iv) district hospitals or government-contracted voluntary hospitals (outpatient and inpatient care); (v) regional hospitals (specialist care); (vi) referral hospitals in different zones (complex care, care requiring advanced technology) (Kwesigabo et al., 2012). Moreover, the Tanzanian health system is largely devolved, and Local Government Authorities (LGAs) play a significant role in the planning and delivery of health services and social protection programmes at the regional level, with resources allocated by the central government. However, the prime minister's office hosts a specific arm dedicated to centralised coordination of the country's HIV/AIDS response, the Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS).⁹¹

This overview of recent social policy developments and the health system in Tanzania underscores ongoing efforts, often supported by broader coalitions with international development institutions, to expand social protection measures and health insurance coverage. The government also places a strong emphasis on ensuring universal access to health services. While non-state providers (including INGOs) have become an integral part of the health system (see e.g. HSSP IV), it is obvious that the central government and its specialist agencies such as TACAIDS as well as LGAs have the primary role in planning and implementing health sector activities. This suggests that external policy initiatives and actors – such as Western philanthropies – must align and create internal buy-in with leading domestic actors

⁹⁰ See <https://www.shopsplusproject.org/resource-center/tanzania-private-health-sector-assessment-0>, last visited 13.11.2020.

⁹¹ See <https://www.tacaids.go.tz/en/>, last visited 12.11.2020.

and institutions in order to gain a permanent foothold. As discussed in the next chapter, this may represent a particular challenge for foreign philanthropic organisations promoting new and innovative approaches in the health sector.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has mapped the chronology of the major social policy prescriptions and development agendas in the Global South, and the sub-Saharan African region in particular. These have been under continuous change following shifting policy trends in the West, experiences of development in the South, and the global political economy. The discussion drafted a picture of a policy paradigm landscape in which numerous actors and models engage in a ‘war of positions’ (Deacon, 2007). Yet, the differentiation between policy paradigms is not always obvious, as new ideas often reinvent old ones in one way or another. Policy actors are also known to influence each other, for example when simultaneously competing for influence, engaging in collaborative work or seeking to conform with the ‘rules of the game’ (Fejerskov et al., 2016). Moreover, the chapter also presented the particular context of Tanzania, establishing a basis for the empirical context from which this thesis draws in order to gain a deeper understanding of the Gates Foundation’s activities and engagement models on the ground.

Despite the complex dynamics of global social policy making, the existing literature points to several distinctive policy paradigms which have come with a range of ideologies and practical approaches to social policy goals, implementation and aid delivery. These have had pivotal implications for social policy delivery and welfare outcomes in diverse aid-receiving countries, even where domestic policy vision and implementation has been particularly strong, as is the case with Tanzania. These

implications have extended beyond the reconfiguration of social policies to shape the financial and political independence of aid-receiving countries. Additionally, as reiterated throughout the chapter, development aid has historically been delivered with embedded political, economic and/or geostrategic motivations. Big philanthropies appear, at first sight, to remain outside of the debates concerning national interests in the global political economy, potentially representing an attractive alternative to bilateral and multilateral aid tainted by politics. Yet, it is legitimate to ask whether there are ‘hidden’ motivations driving the work of private foundations in the Global South today. While American foundations in particular operated as key propagators of US hegemony during the cold war, some argue that contemporary foundations are primarily benefitting the multinational corporations with which they collaborate (e.g. Curtis, 2016; McGoey, 2015; Morvaridi, 2012).

This study engages with ongoing developments in the global landscape of social policy paradigms through an investigation of big philanthropy. As was shown in this chapter, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has risen to dominance in the sector and has immense resources, particularly in the area of health. From the competing (when not collaborating) multi- and bilateral development organisations to the socialist policy traditions and authoritarian leadership that characterise the Tanzanian context, the philanthropy is faced with diverse contextual factors that affect the successful adoption of its promoted development approaches.

The next chapter will explore the theoretical perspectives informing the research design and analysis of this study. It will discuss exactly how the concept of a global social policy paradigm is operationalised as an analytical tool to examine the Gates Foundation’s social policy approaches and explore how the current literature describes

processes of social policy transfer based on previous examples of globally diffused policy initiatives and paradigms.

3. KEY CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter depicted the historical evolution of global social policy paradigms as processes of continuous change and reconfiguration, shaped by policy trends in the West, development experiences of the South, and shifting dynamics in the global political economy. However, the exact definition of the term ‘global social policy paradigm’ has hitherto remained unclear. Chapter 2 also deliberated on some of the different ways global development agencies have prompted adoption of externally designed policies in aid-receiving countries. These ‘policy transfer’ processes constitute another central concept for this study. This chapter sets out to explore the relevant theoretical literature in order to define the principal concepts from which this study draws and assess the analytic aptitudes and limitations of these concepts.

The theoretical framework of policy paradigms introduced by Peter Hall (1993) offers a starting point for understanding the foundational components of the *global social policy paradigm* concept. The framework is particularly helpful in organising the core attributes of a policy paradigm, comprising ideologies, policy objectives and policy instruments. However, Hall’s concept construction remains largely at this abstract level, while it represents a more detailed account of the mechanisms of paradigm shifts occurring at the national level. As such, it is neither designed nor capable of acting as the sole analytical tool for exploring social policy approaches promoted by aid donors in the Global South. The analytic frameworks of Global Social Policy are therefore essential to clarifying the very meaning of social policy in the development realm and assist in further construction of the global social policy paradigm

concept utilised in this study. These give important insight particularly concerning the relevance of different ideological strands in the context of development cooperation and commonly adopted pragmatic approaches to social policy and aid delivery in a development context. In addition, the theoretical and methodological propositions advanced by the Global Social Policy school highlight the transnational nature of global social policy, which consists of processes operating simultaneously at different levels of governance and involving diverse actors (e.g. Deacon, 2010a; Kaasch et al., 2019; Kaasch and Martens, 2015; Stubbs, 2003; Yeates, 2014, 2001). This allows for the addition of a ‘global’ dimension to the policy paradigm framework and enables its use in the analysis of big philanthropy in a development context.

Furthermore, Hall’s (1993) framework specifically discusses the case of economic policy change in the 1970-1980s UK, triggered by *external policy influence*. He describes the ways in which neoliberal economic thinking from the US attracted policy makers’ attention under the Thatcher government, which was eager to engage in social learning from an external political context in order to break with the dominant Keynesian policy models. Hall describes the dynamics of transnational policy (or social) learning, which may be captured with the aid of the existing theoretical frameworks of *policy transfer*. As posited by Evans (2018), “*policy transfer has developed into a core method (...) for analyzing the impact of processes of globalization on policy formation at different levels of governance; from the global to the local*” (2018, p. 1).

Adopting the analytical lens offered by policy transfer literature is useful in addressing the transnational policy influence of big philanthropies both globally and in aid-receiving countries. In a combination of *agency-centred* and *structural* viewpoints, this interdisciplinary scholarship has shed light on policy transfer strategies and mechanisms embedded in

development aid delivery (e.g. Appuhami et al., 2011; Collier et al., 1997; Dobbin et al., 2007), as well as the potential issues hampering effective policy adoption and effectiveness on the ground (e.g. Boettke et al., 2008; Roland, 2004). These, then, are central questions related to philanthropic aid from the perspective of aid-receiving countries and are relevant in developing our understanding of big philanthropies, and non-state actors more broadly, as instigators of transnational social policy transfer. This study will also draw from works focused on *policy entrepreneurs* (e.g. Béland and Cox, 2016; Cohen, 2016; Mintrom and Thomas, 2018), in identifying and analysing some of the key features that characterise big philanthropies as a new group of independent actors engaged in global social governance. As highlighted by Mintrom and Norman (2009), the concept of policy entrepreneurship can also “yield many insights into the politics of policymaking” and policy change (2009, p. 650) – being thereby useful in exploring transnational processes of social policy transfer.

This chapter will start by discussing *policy paradigms* and establishing the contours of the ‘global social policy paradigm’ framework developed for the purposes of this study. The following section will, in turn, investigate the ways in which policy change and paradigm shifts may be initiated through *policy transfer*. It will explore the concept and its neighbouring terms, discuss the specific role and characteristics of *policy entrepreneurs* as drivers of policy transfer, describe the existing literature with a focus on development, and address the range of contextual factor affecting the success of transfer processes initiated by external development actors within countries of the Global South.

3.2 CONCEPTUALISING A GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY PARADIGM

The concept of *policy paradigm* is often loosely deployed in literatures of social and political sciences. Its key attributes, the relationships between the attributes (e.g. hierarchical,

conditional) and the level of governance in which they are located are rarely defined. Yet, as highlighted by Goertz (e.g. 2009, 2006; Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Goertz and Mazur, 2008), before using a concept for analysis it is imperative to consider its aggregates and any theories they embed, in order to generate sound and theoretically consistent analysis. This section discusses the policy paradigm concept as theorised by Peter Hall (1993), with its strengths and caveats. It will then propose an operational concept of a ‘global social policy paradigm’ to be deployed as an analytical tool in this study, built with the aid of other related policy paradigm literature and Social Policy scholarship.

What are policy paradigms?

Hall’s seminal publication ‘Policy paradigms, social learning, and the State: the case of economic policy making in Britain’ (1993) examines shifts in macroeconomic policy making in the UK in the 1970s-80s. In his analysis inspired by Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) *scientific paradigms* (see in Kuhn and Hacking, 2012), Hall seeks to identify the key components of a policy paradigm and establish how these relate to and are affected in the process of paradigm change. Hall’s framework develops an initial conceptual understanding of coherent policy models which may be utilised to study social policy paradigms. He asserts that their key components, or ‘aggregates’ in Goertz’ (2006) terms, include policy goals, policy instruments, and problem definitions, which are rooted in the broader ideological foundations and normative understandings:

*“(...) policy makers customarily work within a framework of **ideas and standards** that specifies not only the **goals of policy** and the kind of **instruments** that can be used to attain them but also the very **nature of the problems** they are meant to be addressing. (...) I am going to call this interpretive framework a **policy paradigm**.”* (Hall 1993, p. 279, emphasis added).

Elaborating further, Hall connects these key components to processes of social learning, suggesting that policy makers learn and implement changes gradually – which may or may

not lead to an eventual paradigm shift. In fact, he understands these components to constitute a hierarchy of three successive levels of paradigmatic change. Following this reasoning, Hall presents a chronological sequencing comprising: *first order change* (adjustments in, or ‘fine-tuning’ of the existing policy instruments), *second order change* (introduction of new policy instruments alongside their new settings) and *third order change* (fundamental change in the overall policy goals in addition to new instruments and their settings).⁹² The fundamental criterion for paradigm change is, then, a real alteration in the actual policy aims and objectives – defined most closely by ideas and reflected in shifts within the dominant intellectual framework, while changes in instruments and their standards ought to be considered as ‘normal’ policy making (Hall, 1993).

In addition to explaining shifting policy directions through paradigm change, Hall (2013) asserts these processes derive from agency-based policy action, involving a *motivation* (e.g. economic downturn), *means* (e.g. attractive economic theories) and a *motor* (e.g. decisive government leaders). Concerning the latter, Hall refers to the changing locus of authority amongst policymakers as (typically) preceding and facilitating full paradigm change. At the same time, he suggests that widely accepted and adopted ideological foundations of a paradigm may become unconsciously maintained and perpetuated, locking-in a paradigm even in if alterations are being pursued (1993). Similarly, others have also noted that the durability of policy paradigms is reinforced by hegemonic knowledge dominant in the given context (e.g. Babb, 2013, p. 270-271). These views point to the importance of the institutional and political environment: neither paradigm shifts, nor continuity, take place in a vacuum, but in policy arenas shaped by agents, pressures and opportunities – as well as deeply entrenched

⁹²Hall maps the shift in UK’s economic policy from Keynesianism to US-inspired monetarism as a chain of events starting with changes in the settings or levels of typical of policy instruments, such as minimum lending rate (first order change). This was followed by adoption of new policy instruments such as the 1971 new system of monetary control (second order change), and eventually a radical shift in the selection of instruments, their levels and the overall policy goals marking a full departure from the previous paradigm as a consequence of social learning (third order change) (Hall, 1993).

ideas and path dependencies. In the context of this study, this speaks to the relevance of political traditions and institutions in the Global South when understanding the potential role of big philanthropies in prompting novel social policy ideas and approaches.

Hall's paradigm framework has been commonly applied in welfare state change analysis. However, many have called for new theorisations with better specified ideational variables and understandings of the causal mechanisms through which these influence *de facto* policies (Berman, 2013; Cairney and Weible, 2015; Daigneault, 2014). Daigneault (2014), for instance, has pointed to the flawed, yet common, methodological approaches that establish automatic correlation between the adopted *policies* and *ideas* of policy makers. In order to deal with this methodological dissonance, Daigneault distinguishes the ontological nature of a paradigm from that of 'concrete' policies. He argues that policy paradigms exist only at the ideational level, comprising "*i) values, assumptions and principles about the nature of reality, social justice and the appropriate role of the State; ii) a conception of the problem that requires public intervention; iii) ideas about which policy ends and objectives should be pursued; and iv) ideas about appropriate policy 'means' to achieve those ends (...)*" (2014, p. 461-462). In addition, he posits that the formation of an actual policy paradigm is conditional on the internal coherence and compatibility of these dimensions. Policy paradigms are, then, manifested in (rather than equated to) policy implementation at the most practical level.

Daigneault's (2014) definition places policy paradigms somewhere between common understandings of *political ideologies*, which are typically seen to consist of shared interpretations of society and how it should be structured (see Jost et al., 2009), and *welfare regimes* – the set of enacted, actual welfare policies kept in place by wide-scale institutionalisation in a given country (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Seekings, 2008; Wood and Gough, 2006). Nevertheless, it is considered important here to establish what the actual

policy ‘spheres’ where paradigm shifts occur look like. According to Hall (1993), policy paradigms exist within “*the complex of political parties and interest intermediaries that stand at the intersection between the state and society in democratic polities*” (1993, p. 288). However, this definition poses several challenges for social policy analysis in the development context.

Firstly, within countries of the Global South, the dominant policy paradigms may be global rather than domestic in terms of their motivations (e.g. global financial crises, epidemics), means (new ideas of development, global development agendas, existing resources to support policy reform) and motors (i.e. policy advocates). This is not to overlook the relevance of existing domestic policy visions, innovations and processes of ‘resistance’ to counter global policy influences (see Yeates, 2002). The Asian Developmental Model, for instance, originated from nationally adopted ideologies and implemented strategies that were opposed to those promoted by the West at the time, but exert significant transnational influence today.

Secondly, the global policy space represents a heterogenous paradigm landscape (Babb, 2013), within which different paradigms compete against, and occasionally merge, with each other – as the case of the MDGs demonstrates (Hulme and Scott, 2010). In this context, paradigm proponents may represent entire governments, international organisations, knowledge networks and advocacy coalitions or globally powerful individuals, all of which partake in global governance (Stone, 2017, 2013). Consequently, the institutional arrangements and dynamics of policy making behind global paradigm shifts are more complex than those occurring at the national level in industrialised, Western countries. While not fully negating the usefulness of Hall’s (1993) framework, these insights call for further theoretical deliberations around the concept of policy paradigm.

What constitutes a ‘global social policy paradigm’?

This study is interested in understanding whether there is a new and distinctive set of social policy approaches promoted by contemporary big philanthropies, which constitute a distinctive ‘global social policy paradigm’. Hall’s (1993) framework establishes that policy paradigms are built upon ideological foundations which determine policy aims and objectives, as well as the choice of policy instruments deployed to attain them. These three hierarchical attributes will also be considered as the basis for global social policy paradigms. This subsection discusses the literature to define further the key components of the proposed concept.

Underlying ideologies and normative understandings

All development actors hold certain underpinning “*values, assumptions and principles about the nature of reality, social justice and the appropriate role of the State*” (Daignault 2014, p. 461). These ideological foundations and normative understandings touch upon several philosophical questions concerning social policy in the development context. The first of these questions relates to the perceived *nature* of development. For instance, ‘mainstream’ interpretations (inspired largely by neoclassical economics) have defined development through measures of *industrialisation* and *economic growth*, occasionally adding the ‘democracy component’. Voices from the Global South have promoted alternative perspectives, defining development in relation to global power dynamics as a process leading towards political, economic, ideological, cultural and social *freedoms*.⁹³

Definitions of (under-) development include, in equal measure, views on its *explanatory realm* (e.g. poor domestic governance vs. exploitative external powers) and *normative realm* (e.g. efficient global market actors vs. sovereign domestic governments). For instance, Latin

⁹³ This view has been promoted by early independence leaders and intellectuals such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Frantz Fanon (see Langan, 2017) as well as more recent academics (e.g. Escobar, 1991; Garba, 2007; Mkandawire, 2011).

American neo-structuralists or dependency theorists⁹⁴ have attributed development problems to global economic and political structures exploiting the Global South and advocated for strong country ownership and regional solidarity. Conversely, proponents of the Washington Consensus argued that states within the Global South are responsible for poor economic performance, while supra-national forces and global markets were seen to have the answers to stagnating development (Gore, 2000; Gumede, 2018). These diverging views have different effects on the political sovereignty of countries in the Global South. It is therefore important to understand the position of big philanthropies vis-à-vis these debates for prognosis of potential future power dynamics between private sector-, government- and philanthropic actors from the two hemispheres.

The second major ideological position within the context of ‘ideological foundations’ concerns the role of social policy in furthering social wellbeing and development more broadly. This comprises views on whether and when it has a place in reducing social and economic inequality and, if so, to what extent and for what purpose. Roughly categorised, the dominant approaches can be divided between those deploying social policy as a tool for economic development and those promoting social policy with the aim of greater political, social and economic equality and sustainability (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Kidd, 2015; Mkandawire, 2005). The opposing views have also considered the role of social policy either as an ‘add-on’ once industrialisation has started, or as a primary driver of economic and social development.

There are many gradations between these positions, and individual actors hold unique interpretations which have evolved to different degrees over time. Nevertheless, different perceptions of social policy in development imply fundamentally different goals and

⁹⁴ Such as Samir Amin (1998/2009, 1976) and Walter Rodney (1981).

mechanisms of social policy delivery. The *instrumentalist* approaches espouse social policy investment as means of enhancing economic growth, focusing more on investment in enhancing human economic productivity and less on welfare safety nets for the neediest (through social assistance schemes targeting the extremely poor, for instance). Also *productivist* approaches to social policy (e.g. Asian Developmental Model) have argued that public investments in social policy areas that sustain workforce productivity (such as health care, education or housing) are instrumental in generating economic growth (e.g. Ohno, 2013; Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender, 2013). While such investments have remained primarily linked to economic goals, the adopted policies have been universal and yielded important social progress. Protagonists of *rights-based* views, in contrast, have advanced social rights as a means to thwart the negative effects of capitalism on the realisation of social justice (Dean, 2019, 2002). These have typically advocated for universal social protection and free public welfare services, whereby social policy delivery is understood as a social right and deeply connected to principles of universal entitlement and social solidarity (Anttonen et al., 2012).

The third and final ideological stance under consideration here concerns the perceived role of the state in social policy. As the above discussion has established, this relates strongly to understandings of development and social policy. However, in the context of this study, it is relevant to establish the ideas and normative preferences big philanthropies have regarding the state within the broader *welfare mix* (Johnson, 2014; Powell, 2007), since this guides their approaches to social policy delivery on the ground. Arrangements of welfare delivery, financing and policy making between the different public, private, third sector and informal actors are also key features in all social policy models, welfare regimes and global social policy paradigms. As discussed in **chapter 2**, debates over the role of private businesses and development NGOs as social policy deliverers have remained vigorous. Consequently, an examination of the Gates Foundation's views on the welfare mix adds to these debates by

generating a new understanding of the potential distinctiveness of the global social policy approaches advanced by big philanthropies.

Policy goals and objectives

From ideological foundations flow “*ideas about which policy ends and objectives should be pursued*” (Daigneault, 2014, p. 461-462). These constitute the second core component of the global social policy paradigm framework in this study. In the context of global social policy making, the various outlooks have historically held different understandings of the primary obstacles hindering development progress (e.g. macro-economic issues or poor human capacity). These, in turn, have defined the prioritised *development axis* or overarching policy area (e.g. infrastructure development or productivist social policies), which represents the ‘macro’ level policy objectives under the framework developed here. However, this study is also interested in the more specific programmatic goals and objectives of the Gates Foundation or the ‘meso’ level objectives (e.g. prevention of non-communicable diseases or tackling youth unemployment) in order to capture its specific interests and ideas that it seeks to disseminate. These also encompass ‘micro’ level goals defining the more specific targets and beneficiary populations, which will also be examined.⁹⁵

Additionally, when considering a whole group or ‘bloc’ of emergent social policy actors, it is analytically fitting to examine whether there are common features that point to a specific *type* of policy objectives, which may otherwise vary between the different members of this group. Thus, while this study is focused on the Gates Foundation in the health sector, it explores its

⁹⁵ In the context of actual policy making, multiple objectives and target groups are naturally considered. The resulting problem-definitions and targets reflect the ideological views that underpin them; the Asian Developmental Model, for instance, furthers public investments in domestic industrialisation as well as education and health care – representing a compound development axis driven by the motive of state-driven economic development.

policy goals and objectives in a way that is meaningful for generating new knowledge on the broader philanthropic sector.

Policy tools and instruments

Policy instruments – or the “*ideas about appropriate policy ‘means’ to achieve those ends*” determined through policy goals and objectives (Daignault 2014, p. 462) – constitute the final paradigm component. For global social policy paradigms, these relate both to *social policies* and modalities of *aid delivery*. The relevance of assessing these two together originates from the dual role most global social policy actors hold as aid donors and policy advocates, both of which functions have consequential effects on the expansion of public welfare systems in the Global South.

Beginning with social policy instruments, these can be understood to comprise mechanisms of (i) wealth redistribution, (ii) private sector regulation and legislation of (ii) social rights which, all encompass a range of tools and approaches. These mechanisms or general instruments can also be deployed at national, regional and global levels. (Deacon, 2007).⁹⁶ In the Global South, the range of *redistributive* social policy tools innovated and implemented at the national level has expanded beyond the typically Western approaches of social insurance and welfare services. These have included, for example, fuel subsidies, benefits in kind, public works programmes, community-based insurance schemes or state-guaranteed access to farming land, among many others (e.g. Barrientos and Hulme, 2010; Ellis et al., 2009; Gough and Wood, 2004; Mkandawire, 2004a; Seekings, 2008; Spaan et al., 2012).

In global social policy, social *rights* are a policy instrument deployed particularly by several UN institutions and established INGOs (e.g. UNDP, ILO WHO, Oxfam and Save the


⁹⁶ Examples from such instruments at the global level include, for instance, debt relief, global taxes, global labour standards and UN social rights (Deacon, 2007).

Children), who draw from international ‘soft law’ such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the ILO Conventions (Gabel, 2016). The ILO, in particular, has focused on devising global standards promoting social rights for those in formal and informal employment (e.g. rights to social insurance, rights to fair pay, rights to decent work).⁹⁷ *Regulative* tools, on their behalf, comprise legislation around wages and the social responsibilities of business employers; regulating market participation of private sector actors more broadly (e.g. nationalising certain industries or banning private sector activity); and, developing the regulatory environment organising and restricting global markets.

Preferred approaches to *aid delivery* ought to be considered as another attribute under the policy instruments component, despite overlap with mechanisms of global redistribution. While the specific social policy instruments discussed above are aimed at recipient *populations*, aid delivery instruments target recipient *states*. In action, different instruments of aid delivery encompass primary mechanisms (e.g. general budget support, project funding, loans, impact bonds or results-based financing) and their attached conditions (e.g. performance- or governance-based conditionalities or political requirements). Different aid modalities also embed ideas about efficient and effective use of development resources. For instance, both Southern and Western donors have funded and implemented projects directly or through contracted NGOs with the aim of avoiding bureaucracy and potential corruption, and to ensure timely delivery (Dreher et al., 2015; Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019; Tar, 2014). As the next section elaborates, mechanisms of aid delivery are also being instrumentalised to influence domestic policies, which adds to their relevance in researching the social policy approaches and engagement models of philanthropic donors.

⁹⁷ However, countries of the Global South have not easily accepted Western understandings of social rights. Instead, these have promoted universalistic agendas from a viewpoint that emphasises ‘solidaristic moralities’ within their societies and broader political communities (Dean, 2019).

Figure 3.1 Analytic framework proposed for assessing global social policy paradigms



Source: own production

Figure 3.1 exhibits the different components and social policy attributes of what is called a ‘global social policy paradigm’ in this study. The developed framework integrates Hall’s (1993) paradigm theory, broader Global Social Policy literature and Goertz’s (2006) concept construction model. The abstract concept components comprise ideological foundations, policy objectives and policy instruments – the two latter being subordinate to the first. Each of these comprises further dimensions which have been pre-defined through the existing Social Policy literature discussed above and represent the empirical interest of this study. This framework therefore serves as an analytical tool; the specified social and development policy characteristics represent key areas of investigation in **chapter 5**.

3.3 SOCIAL POLICY TRANSFER IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Policy ideas and instruments introduced and disseminated by big philanthropies are spreading across the globe and being adopted by NGOs, governments and international organisations alike (Moran, 2014). Such processes of ‘travelling policies’ are commonly studied as *policy*

transfer in the fields of Politics (Evans, 2018, 2013; Marsh and Sharman, 2009), IR (Stone, 2013, 2012b, 2010, 2004), Geography (McCann and Ward, 2013; Peck and Theodore, 2010) and also Social Policy (e.g. Hulme, 2005). Literature focused on *policy entrepreneurs* is also relevant in analysing the distinctiveness of big philanthropies as a new group of political actors propagating development and social policy approaches. This section explores these theories and concepts further, with a particular focus on the context of development.

Policy transfer and policy entrepreneurs: exploring key concepts

Policy transfer is most commonly defined by the classic interpretation by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), as a “*process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting*” (2000, p. 5). While policy transfer study has mainly evolved around inter-state processes, this definition helpfully introduces the more abstract ‘political setting’, which in this study will be understood to encompass diverse policy arenas at different (and transnational) levels of governance. Moreover, Dolowitz and Marsh propose that the various objects of transfer may be “*policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas, attitudes and negative lessons*” (2000, p. 12), which are easily comparable to the components of a policy paradigm. The existing literature has also distinguished between hard, or concrete policies (e.g. regulations, programmes) and soft policies or policy guidelines (e.g. intellectual frameworks, policy knowledge, values) (e.g. Stone, 2004; Weyland, 2006).

Furthermore, the existing literature has put forth several related and overlapping concepts, which are considered in this study as differing mechanisms of policy transfer, rather than independent phenomenon. These include policy *convergence* (Bennett, 1991; Knill, 2005),

band-wagoning (Ikenberry, 1990), *learning* or lesson-drawing (Hall, 1993; Rose, 1991), *emulation* (Howlett, 2000), *diffusion* (Marsh and Sharman, 2009) and *coercion* (Appuhami et al., 2011; Drezner, 2004). The existing Social Policy literature is dominated by diverse analyses of *policy learning*, which have explored the rational and voluntary adoption of alternative, foreign practices and institutions by elected politicians and state officials (see Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Rose, 1991; Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2013). Emphasis on direct bilateral processes arises from the inherent focus the discipline has on the (welfare) state. Also, analyses focused on policy convergence resulting from political and economic competition, or policy adoption in countries ‘bandwaggoning’ their more advanced counterparts, have mostly adopted a statist focus (e.g. Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2001; Howlett, 2000).

The existing literature on policy transfer in the Global South describes a more complex picture of policy transfer processes: one which faithfully represents the ‘multilevelled’ and ‘multiacted’ nature of global social policy making. Indeed, policy formation through policy transfer in a development context involves an eclectic group of internal and external, governmental and non-governmental *actors* (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000); local, domestic, regional and global *levels of governance* (Hulme, 2005); and, non-voluntary, top-down or even ‘pretend’ *processes*.⁹⁸ Importantly, accounts of policy transfer in the particular context of aid delivery highlight the power of donor agencies in initiating transfer processes by *coercion* through use of aid resources (Appuhami et al., 2011; Jung and Harrow, 2015), as will be discussed further in the following sub-section. However, it is noteworthy that also Southern governments can engage actively in policy learning, which is a particular spur to South-South cooperation.

⁹⁸ This refers to *emulation* or *mimicry*, which occurs when institutional forms and policy practices of ‘*social leaders*’ (“*either states perceived to be more advanced or models provided by international organizations*”) are adopted in official policy agendas to gain positive feedback in the global policy community and access aid resources without actual policy implementation on the ground (Evans, 2013, p. 35).

The body of literature studying policy *diffusion* – “*the process whereby policy choices in one unit are influenced by policy choices in other units*” (Magetti and Gilardi, 2013, p. 3) – provides equally interesting analytical insights to transnational social policy transfer study in the context of development. The sociological constructivist approach, in particular, has pinned the global spread of certain policies down to their legitimation, or *social construction* as dominant, and promotion through international norms (Dobbin et al., 2007). This outlook accentuates the hegemonic power of certain *soft policies* and their originating institutions, such as international organisations, as a prominent channel of policy transfer:

“(...) dominant actors can have their influence felt through ideational channels. The thrust is that dominant ideas become rationalized, often with elegant theoretical justifications, and influence how policy makers conceptualize their problems and order potential solutions” (Dobbin et al., 2007, 456).

While these perspectives highlighting the role of powerful ‘sending’ agencies are helpful from the perspective of this study, big philanthropies – private foundations with roots in the global private sector – seem to differ in some important ways from governments and multilateral organisations with established status and democratically mandated power. Here, the concept of policy entrepreneur – which derives from analogies with business entrepreneurs who “*use their access to information and strategic savvy to develop and bring new products and services to market*” (Mintrom and Thomas, 2018, p. 153) – appears to be of particular relevance. Echoing current literature on contemporary philanthropy (see **chapter 1**), policy entrepreneurs are understood to advance their interests and policy innovations to gain important returns (e.g. Cohen, 2016; Kingdon, 1984). Although the concept is typically used in reference to individuals such as scientists, policy experts or politicians seeking power positions in society (see Beeson and Stone, 2013), it appears equally suited to the study of individual philanthropists and their foundations in the context of global social governance.

The policy entrepreneur literature proves helpful in understanding how big philanthropies may operate in order to disseminate their policy agendas, and what particular limitations they may face in so doing. The existing accounts suggest that in order to be successful, policy entrepreneurs must demonstrate *ambition* (or, commitment and energy), *social acuity* (understanding how other actors think and operate to gain their support), *credibility* (unique expertise or backing up by other more established actors) and *tenacity* (persistent promotion and momentum-building for their policy innovations) (see e.g. Cohen, 2016; Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Mintrom and Thomas, 2018). This study will draw from these insights to better understand the features that characterise big philanthropies as new global social policy actors and their engagement models in processes of social policy making. Conversely, the research findings will also aid further debate and theoretical discussion around *global* policy entrepreneurs.

Policy transfer in the context of aid cooperation

As **chapter 2** alluded to, the history of external policy influence in domestic policy making in the Global South goes back to the relationships and norms established in the era of early independence and inception of international aid cooperation (colonial history aside). This influence intensified as aid flows increased, and the dynamics of aid-dependency came to underpin policy making processes, reducing the policy space of domestic policy makers further. As such, any examination of policy making in developing countries inevitably draws attention to the question of policy imposition by external actors (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). These actors have traditionally been powerful donor countries (notably the US and OECD-DAC) and international financial institutions (IFIs; notably the WB and IMF), “*accused of dispensing ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies coercively imposed through loan conditionality (...)*”,

particularly in the 1980s under the infamous Structural Adjustment Programmes (Stone, 2010, p. 5).

Critiques and debates on the nature, degree and effect of coercion in the context of development cooperation are ongoing. Evans (2013, 2010), for instance, understands *negotiated transfer*, occurring when countries have some power to negotiate over the grants, loans and other investments, as different from fully coercive mechanisms, as those imposed by colonial occupation. Yet, many others have insisted on the coercive nature of policy transfer in the context of aid conditionalities, leaving few opportunities for genuine negotiation (e.g. Drezner, 2004, 2001, Stone, 2004).⁹⁹ Aid-receiving countries have long been dependent on the US, the EU and the Bretton Woods institutions for aid, but also for trade, foreign direct investment and even security (Dobbin et al., 2007). The complexity of donor-recipient relations, in which broader economic, commercial and political interests and power are at play, is therefore a vital consideration in understanding the type of policy transfer processes – and an interesting one in the context of philanthropic donor agencies emanating from the global private sector.

The literature drawing from empirical examples on aid conditionalities imposed by diverse bi- and multilateral donor agencies has also identified a range of different modes of non-voluntary policy reform. These include both rewarding and punitive modes. The first category comprises, for instance, recipient *selectivity*: delivering aid to countries with a favoured policy environment (e.g. Collier et al., 1997). *Aid suspension* or *withdrawal* occurring in instances of undesired political conduct (Portela, 2007; Langan, 2018) naturally fall in the second category, and are common practice for Western donors concerned with issues of good governance.

⁹⁹ Murithi (2009) has promoted the notion of aid colonisation, stressing “*aid which imposes conditionalities that are not in the best interests of the target populations in Africa is the functional equivalent of colonisation*”, based on patronage between the donor community and African societies (2009, p. 1).

Other modes of conditionality relate to specific aid plans. Project aid and programme lending may involve *inducement* of policy reform attractive to the donor (and unattractive to the recipient) under that specific programme or project (Collier et al., 1997). For instance, project funding for hospital infrastructure may include conditionalities for user fees. In addition, project aid naturally limits the use of aid resources to the particular project and reflects primarily donor interests, therefore representing a form of conditionality in its own right (e.g. Dreher et al., 2013). Finally, donors may seek to direct the use of aid resources to goods or services of their preference, such as produce manufactured by the donor country – a conditional aid mechanism termed *paternalism* by Collier et al. (1997) and also known as *tied aid*. Tied aid is connected particularly to commercial interests, and therefore a mechanism frequently deployed by Southern donors, while OECD-DAC donors in particular may (with the exception of US) follow a practice of untied aid (e.g. Fejerskov et al., 2016; Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019).

Furthermore, as highlighted previously, dominant aid agencies use scientific or expert knowledge to justify their engagement in policy advocacy and dissemination. Traditional bilateral donors typically have their own research departments (as GIZ in Germany and DFID in the UK) and engage with various epistemic communities, seeking to advance their ‘scientific validity’ (Stone, 2004; Babb, 2013). Edwards (1997) has even argued that the World Bank’s widely spread scientific evidence and intellectual authority outplayed its aid conditionalities in initiating policy transfer. Scholars have also pointed to the way in which donor countries benefit from international organisations as transfer intermediaries, understood to provide further ideational leverage thanks to their established status as expert organisations (Appuhami et al., 2011; Evans, 2010; Holden, 2009). At the same time, donor actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, and many others share knowledge through their capacity-building and advisory activities in aid-receiving countries (see Janus et al., 2015).

More recent accounts of South-South processes of policy transfer, and different policy transfer agents operating in the Global South, have directed attention to deliberate *persuasion* through story-telling, narrative-building and even organised ‘policy tourism’ in policy communication as a policy transfer strategy (Montero, 2019; Soremi, 2019). This draws our attention not only to the importance of *ideas* and hegemonic knowledge, but the ways these are communicated to ‘reach hearts as well as minds’. In the light of this literature, questions arise as to the means of influence available to, and favoured by big philanthropies; are these different to other donors and do they lead to effective policy transfer?

Policy transfer success, ‘stickiness’ and structural factors

Though there is little consensus on criteria and the time span to measure policy transfer *success*, it is intuitively understood that an effective policy transfer process is one that leads to policy adoption, and subsequently, to that policy becoming a natural component of the given political setting (i.e. policy ‘stickiness’). Magetti and Gilardi (2013) have suggested that policy transfer success can also be evaluated in terms of policy implementation and outcomes, such as the set policy objectives, achieved political support, as well as the challenges faced during implementation. Policy transfer *failure*, in turn, has been categorised by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) as uninformed transfer (following “*insufficient information about the policy/institution*”); incomplete transfer (institutional mismatch); and inappropriate transfer (due to “*differences between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts*”) (2000, p. 17).

So far, the discussion in this chapter has focused on policy transfer processes from the perspective of ‘sending’ transfer agents. However, the issues of policy transfer success and stickiness direct attention to the broader range of factors at play. It is important to consider the role of (i) ‘recipient’ agents, (ii) cultural, socio-economic and political factors in the adoptive

policy environment, and (iii) the nature of what is being transferred, in facilitating and hampering policy transfer processes. Firstly, *policy recipients* (political parties, administrations and even individuals) hold political interests and power, therefore playing an important part in operationalising policy transfer. On the one hand, the evidence shows that domestic policy makers may resist implementation, even in instances where coercion by external actors takes place (e.g. Bache and Taylor, 2003). On the other, aid-receiving governments may themselves seek aid conditionalities to ‘lock in’ agreeable policy reforms and secure policy adoption and continuity even in instances of government change (Collier et al., 1997), which naturally bolster policy transfer in the long term.

Existing theories concerning countries’ internal political settlements and their interplay with donor agencies provide further perspectives on when externally induced policies may gain long term internal support. Drawing from several example countries in the Global South, Lavers and Hickey (2015) have posited that the narrower the ruling elite is in any given country, the more likely it is to commit to implementation of reforms, but also to hold pre-existing development visions. Strong development ideologies would in turn necessitate a match with donor policy preferences for full reform to occur, otherwise the adopted policies and programmes may remain donor driven. In contrast, as argued by the authors, within the context of competitive clientelism (strong competition between the elite and lower level factions), an ideological match is not required, but new policies typically remain on an ad hoc basis and thorough reforms are unlikely to be carried through (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). These perspectives suggest that effective policy transfer can be bolstered by the commitment of ruling governments who feel their policy visions are respected in the proposed, external policy prescriptions.

Secondly, a large body of interdisciplinary literature has highlighted a full spectrum of *structural factors* which shape the existing opportunities for and potential success of externally induced policy transfer (e.g. Bender et al., 2014; Dobbin et al., 2007; Knill, 2005; Magetti and Gilardi, 2013).¹⁰⁰ This scholarship recognises that countries' integration into international organisations, communication networks and embedded epistemic communities spurs transnational policy transfer, particularly relating to dominant global social policy agendas and approaches (see also Stone, 2004). It also suggests that bilateral voluntary transfer is enhanced by geographical, socio-economic, political and ideological proximity (see Obinger et al., 2013; Evans, 2010; Linos, 2013), which partially explains the attractiveness of South-South cooperation. Nevertheless, specific political, economic and social developments (e.g. shift to authoritarian governments or increase of domestic revenue through discovery of natural resources) may equally stifle opportunities for external policy influence (see e.g. Evans, 2013).

Thirdly, taking the nature of the policy transfer *object* (particular policy, programme, instrument, idea) into account is interesting especially when new and different approaches – as the ones manifested by philanthropic policy entrepreneurs – are proposed. Although evidence on the impact of policy-specific characteristics on the likelihood of transfer remains lacking, some have argued that policies that are technical in nature, well-branded and/or promoted under high-profile policy agendas (as those advanced by international organisations) can be a compelling source of policy alternatives for voluntary adoption (Bender et al., 2014; Linos, 2013). However, in the context of policy transfer under development cooperation, it is pertinent to examine transfer objects in relation to their adoptive settings. Roland (2004), for instance, has criticised the common practice of

¹⁰⁰ The policy diffusion stream, in particular, has directed attention to international political pressures, economic competition, government structures, and media influence as well as politico-cultural factors in facilitating and hampering policy transfer processes.

development agencies to advance the transnational adoption of policy packages branded as ‘best practices’, which unavoidably overlooks contextual singularities in countries of the Global South. Similarly, Boettke et al (2008) have argued that the incoherence of foreign-introduced exogenous policies (e.g. Western style police institutions) with the historical, social and cultural context of the adoptive policy environment (=metis) often result in unwanted policy outcomes (e.g. corruption) or are quickly abandoned.

Hence, although certain types of policies might be introduced into national policy agendas easier than others, their actual sustainability (i.e. policy stickiness) and success in generating the desired outcomes and political support (i.e. policy effectiveness) is dependent on the aptness of the transferred policies within the adoptive context. This does not exclude agents from the equation but rather emphasises their role in enhancing this relationship. In fact, Boettke et al. (2008) have posited that even exogenous policy models and institutions can be successfully adopted when indigenous actors carefully align them with the *metis*. Such processes have been examined by a large branch of policy transfer literature dedicated to the study of policy *translation*, *mutation* and *assemblage* or *bricolage* (e.g. Campbell, 2004; Clarke et al., 2015; McCann and Ward, 2013; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Stone, 2012b). This literature sheds light on the ways in which domestic policy agents are re-interpreting foreign policies to best suit structural factors on the ground by either translating them or creating something completely new by combining components from different pre-existing policy ideas and institutions. Interestingly, Haang’andu and Beland (2020) maintain that such techniques are imperative for successful policy transfer particularly in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where the unique historical, political, economic, religious and cultural context “*does not render itself adequately amenable*” to Western policy approaches (2020, p. 310). While this study does not engage in systematic evaluation of effectiveness and stickiness of policy transfer by Western philanthropic donors, it offers insights on whether and how the Gates

Foundation accounts for challenges arising from the broader contextual factors on the ground in Tanzania.

3.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed the concepts of policy paradigms and policy transfer, with their key features, related terms and embedded theories. It has also elucidated the concepts of a global social policy paradigm, policy entrepreneurs and transnational social policy transfer, which assist analysis in **chapters 5** and **6**, as well as the theoretical outlooks on policy transfer success and failure that guide discussion in **chapter 7**.

The development of the *global social policy paradigm* framework has been distilled from Hall's (1993) original framework and utilised as an analytical tool to investigate whether or not policy approaches and ideas of the Gates Foundation represent a coherent and distinctive social policy model. The framework also seeks to revive the theoretical debate around policy paradigms in the context of global social policy. In so doing, this thesis raises questions as to how global social policy models should be understood and examined in terms of their characteristics, contours, playing fields, driving forces and relationships with each other. Conceptual contestations are also necessary to the development of new and updated analytical approaches in study of social policy trajectories in the Global South, where global and domestic actors and processes become entangled.

Theories of *policy transfer*, particularly concerning the development context, are also useful for grasping how a policy paradigm or its components might 'travel' to other political settings. The use of financial incentives and hegemonic ideas can be seen as primary, and often interconnected, channels of policy influence comprising a range of mechanisms.

Naturally, non-state actors and novel policy entrepreneurs do not benefit from democratic mandates and financial resources as IFIs might (Stone, 2004), and are often prohibited from direct policy advocacy (e.g. political campaigning) by law in their countries of origin and interest. Understanding the strategies of policy influence adopted by emergent global social policy actors, such as contemporary philanthropic foundations, is therefore a compelling area of study for both theoretical and substantive reasons. The theoretical understandings of *policy entrepreneurs* provide a valuable framework for such analysis, assisting in identifying the key comparative advantages, limitations and common practices of big philanthropies as distinctive non-state organisations in the realm of global social governance.

Furthermore, understanding how policy models emerge, are transferred and change over time is important in any setting. However, this becomes even more essential when focus is placed on the Global South, and aid-receiving countries in particular, because so much policy comes from outside. By extension, such processes become ones of ‘co-production’ between external actors and domestic policy makers (Alou, 2009), whereby the policy space for autonomous policy making becomes more or less restricted. As such, researching processes of transnational social policy transfer by big philanthropies provides important insights into national social policy formation in aid-receiving countries under the influence of such actors (Hulme, 2005). It will also add to our knowledge of whether, and in what ways, this gives more freedom to domestic policy makers than the literature typically associates with Western and Southern bilateral donor agencies.

Finally, the chapter highlighted the role of policy recipients, or domestic policy makers, in shaping policy transfer success in adoptive political settings. Even when policies are officially adopted from external sources, these exert considerable influence on the processes of implementation. As the literature elucidates, the final *outcome success* is, however, often

dependent on matching introduced policies to adoptive policy context. These insights are central for assessing Western philanthropies' potential for policy influence as well as *informed* and *appropriate* policy transfer in aid-receiving countries. Two specific conclusions remain to be drawn: agents (whether policy senders, intermediaries or recipients) are powerful actors in policy transfer processes with multiple strategies of policy influence at hand; and, the policy space within which they act (be it global, domestic or transnational) continually creates circumstances which both facilitate and hamper effective policy transfer and their outcome success. These insights become pertinent in **chapter 7**, where the Gates Foundation's activities and engagements are examined in the particular country context of Tanzania.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The transnational social policy influence of philanthropic donors represents a new and multi-faceted topic; little is known of the complex motivations, social policy ideas and engagement models of private foundations (without overlooking recent contributions by Fejerskov, 2018 and Mahajan, 2018). Big philanthropies operate simultaneously at supranational, national and subnational levels of governance, and they are equally affected by diverse institutional environments, historical contexts and competing policy actors within these spheres. This doctoral thesis is a qualitative study seeking to build our understanding of big philanthropies as a novel force in global social policy, through a case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's work in the health sector, and in Tanzania. It seeks to build our understanding of the policy approaches and agendas prioritised by big philanthropies, and their interactions within the playing fields in which they operate.

It is well established that qualitative research is the most appropriate method for investigating new, multi-faceted and complex social phenomena (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), and it is therefore relevant for the study of big philanthropy in global social policy making and delivery. This research approach is also effective in understanding the underlying values and motivations of political agents and comprehensive accounts of study contexts (Pierce, 2008; Yin, 2014). These features align with the research objectives of this study, and the qualitative method is a natural fit for this thesis.

Historically, qualitative and quantitative research methods have represented two opposing research traditions with distinctively different ontological, epistemological and

methodological logics. While quantitative methods are rooted in a positivist paradigm and generate systematic, quantifiable ‘facts’ through statistical analysis, qualitative researchers adopt a range of philosophical outlooks from phenomenology to feminism and often immerse themselves in in-depth studies of social meanings and complex research contexts (Pierce, 2008). More recently, however, quantitative approaches have infused and informed qualitative study. Sparked by the ground-breaking approaches introduced by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and furthered by several scholars of methodology since (e.g. Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012), rigorous methods of examining causal inference through process tracing have become particularly popular in qualitative political research. Also mixed-methods research has made its way into the mainstream, as scholars combine different qualitative and/or quantitative approaches to generate more comprehensive data and analysis.

The research aims and questions outlined in **chapter 1** highlight that the research focus of this study is not on actual policy processes, but normative and pragmatic policy *preferences*, *sources of authority* and *strategies* of policy transfer, as well as stakeholder *perspectives* and experiences. Investigating such abstract and complex themes, this study (which begins by adding to descriptive knowledge about big philanthropies as a new group of global social policy actors) is not primarily concerned with rigid theory-testing or focused solely on causation (see in Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2009). As such, this thesis remains in the realm of traditional qualitative research, though avoiding some of the caveats associated with participatory-activist methods and ethnography (full immersion of the researcher into the world of its informants) (Pierce, 2008). Differing from ethnographic and grounded theory - approaches, the thesis adopts a qualitative case study method. This involves review of relevant theoretical propositions and general literature related to the case prior to data collection, which allows a level of inductive *and* deductive reasoning (Yin, 2002).

Similarly, this thesis aligns itself with the philosophical approach of *critical realism*. This stance, developed particularly by Bashkar (1989), understands reality as independent of the observer, therefore rejecting extremely subjective interpretations of reality (constructionism), whilst also opposing approaches seeking to uncover ‘laws’ that overlook subjective experiences (positivism) (Gorski, 2012). It argues that both constructionism and positivism reduce reality to knowledge, be it fully subjective and existing within the human mind or objective and attainable only through empirical evidence. Critical realism, in contrast, posits that there is a real social world which can be reached through social science, and particularly through theory development and testing (see Fletcher, 2017). Guided by this underlying philosophy, this study looks for tendencies, not facts or laws, and detects these trends and patterns through qualitative analysis. The subjectivity of each interviewee is being considered when conducting interviews and analysing data, guided by a firm conviction that systematic analysis may be revelatory of ‘truths’ that apply more broadly than in the personal world of individual interviewees.

Moreover, this study adopts a *single case study* approach, which allows the generation of in-depth insights into the selected case (the Gates Foundation), and also generalisable information concerning the phenomenon (big philanthropy in global social policy) more broadly (Yin, 2014). The core data consists of *semi-structured elite interviews*, complemented by a documentary analysis. In order to gain a diverse range of perspectives on the Gates Foundation and big philanthropy in general, key informants included Gates Foundation representatives and their implementing partners, stakeholders within the broader development community (key bi- and multilateral donor agencies), and a range of domestic development actors in Tanzania. Documentary analysis covered a range of documents and reports published by the Gates Foundation and its co-leaders, previous published interviews with Foundation representatives, webpage texts, public statements and other communications

by Bill and Melinda Gates (e.g. personal blog posts). The collected data was analysed through a thematic *framework analysis*. This combines thematic content analysis with a method of organising and analysing data in frameworks (Gale et al., 2013).

Collecting data from multiple sites and informant groups allows a rich range of experiences and views to be captured. This enhances data triangulation, both assuring the validity of the information gathered and opening up new angles of access to information (Flicke, 2004). Consequently, this study also undertook a desktop study of the leading philanthropic donors operating in the social sector, in order to better describe and compare the Gates Foundation to the broader group of big philanthropies. A descriptive table was developed, which summarises their guiding principles, key objectives and areas of investment, and preferred pragmatic approaches (see **appendix c**).

This chapter discusses these adopted methodological approaches in detail and addresses the primary limitations of these choices. The first section elucidates the qualitative case study design and discusses the rationale behind selecting the particular case of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the health sector. The choice of the contextual setting of Tanzania from which data was collected will also be expounded. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of the research data and discusses the process of data collection together with the challenges experienced in the course of it. This is followed by a detailed description of data analysis as well as the approaches in interpreting findings. This chapter concludes by discussing some of the benefits and limitations of the chosen methodological techniques, while justifying their relevance to, and suitability for, this particular study.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

Gerring (2004) has defined the case study method as “*an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units*” (2004, p. 342). While all case studies involve in-depth investigation of a particular case and a level of generalisability of findings, their overall purposes and designs vary. This section takes a closer look at the case study design adopted in this doctoral research, as well as the adopted logic behind case selection.

Qualitative case study


While case studies conducted with process tracing are focused upon establishing causation through hypothesis-testing (Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012), ethnographic case studies develop rich descriptions of inter- or intra-organisational relationships (Schwartzman, 1993). This case study lies somewhere between these two poles and seeks to capture the complexity of a phenomenon while taking into consideration the context in which it occurs (Yin, 2014).

Different types of cases can be utilised to explore, describe or explain the examined phenomenon, depending on research interest (Yin, 2009). *Exploratory* and *descriptive* case studies are not bound to specific research questions or hypotheses, and are typically used for theory building (Gerring, 2004). *Explanatory* cases, on the other hand, are focused on establishing causal relationships and serve theory-testing. This study is largely *exploratory* in nature. This means that a range of *what-* and *how-*questions are investigated (as outlined in the introductory chapter) rather than seeking to elucidate the ‘*why*’ (Stake, 2006; Yin, 2014), though *why* the Gates Foundation experiences successes and challenges in Tanzania is explored in a descriptive manner (that is, without focus on causal inference).

Moreover, the chosen approach is a *single case study*. By virtue of focusing entirely on a singular case, this approach produces comprehensive and rich information. It also enables study of the case's relation to the context and the broader structural factors in which it is embedded. As discussed in **chapters 1 and 3**, this is paramount for producing a detailed, empirically grounded account of the Gates Foundation as a global social policy actor and to understand its actual approaches and models of engagement on the ground in aid-receiving countries. In terms of limitations, a single case study compromises some breadth in respect of the extent to which findings may be applicable (Gerring, 2004) and, clearly, cannot reveal the kind of nuanced differences that would only be apparent in multiple case studies (comparing different philanthropic donors, for instance). In light of such limitations, this study carefully 'binds' the case to a particular reference group as discussed further. In addition, the interview schedule seeks to address key differences between the Gates Foundation and other big philanthropies, aided by the desktop study conducted on other key philanthropic donors.

Further, the selection of the single case followed a set of criteria. Thomas (2011) has stressed the importance of distinguishing between the *object* (phenomenon; global social policy approaches of big philanthropies) and the *subject* (case; the Gates Foundation) in case studies. The latter offers a window through which to examine the former, and the choice of case should be based on and justified through the examined phenomenon. Simply categorised, the selected subjects of study can be distinguished between outlier cases (representing the 'abnormal' or deviant phenomenon) and key cases (allowing examination of the generalisable dimensions of a phenomenon) (see Thomas, 2011). The below **figure 4.1** maps out the design of the proposed case study through the highlighted characteristics, which shows that the Gates Foundation was selected as a *key* case representing the broader group of 'big philanthropies' as defined in this study.

Figure 4.1 Case study typology by Thomas (2011)



Source: Thomas, 2011, p. 518 (highlights added)

The purpose of the study is both *instrumental* (in the sense that it seeks to gain an appreciation of a broader phenomenon; Stake, 2006, 1995) and *exploratory* (in the sense that it ‘explores’ a new phenomenon and opens up the door for future investigation; Yin, 2014). As such, the study will contribute towards generating dense, *descriptive* knowledge of big philanthropy and *theory building* in the realm of global social policy making and transnational policy transfer by non-state actors. The selected method is a *single* case study, the temporal limitations of which are defined by the timing of the research, as information was mainly gathered on the Gates Foundation’s real-time approaches and activities, in 2017. The data collection method also sought to analyse some key developments over time, which means that the case study is both a series of ‘*snapshots*’ and *diachronic* processes.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: a key case

Seawright and Gerring (2008) remind us that unless the selected case is representative of a population, “*the utility of the case study is brought severely into question*” (2008, p. 306-307). It is therefore natural that case studies, even when considered *key* or *instrumental* (Thomas, 2011; Stake, 1995), are challenged for the generalisability of their findings. It is to this issue that methods scholars (e.g. Yin, 2003; Stake 1995; Creswell 2003; Miles &

Huberman, 1994) speak when suggesting ‘binding’ the case to a distinct time, place, activity, definition and context. This study examines the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as representative of the broader group of philanthropic donors, which therefore requires further definition.

Guided by the existing literature (e.g. Bishop and Green, 2009; Callahan, 2017; Edwards, 2011; Jung et al., 2016; Moran, 2014; Salamon, 2014), the concept of *big philanthropy* is defined in this study to describe contemporary (temporal attribute), Western philanthropic foundations (cultural attribute) engaged in development cooperation (context attribute), distributing their resources through big bets (size attribute) and engaging in direct grant giving (operational attribute). In terms of organisational attributes, the concept is limited to philanthropic foundations in ‘private’ ownership (e.g. individual philanthropists, a family, friends or business partners). Since these attributes are applicable to the majority of large philanthropic donors investing in the social sector (with the notable exception of the BBVA Microfinance Foundation) (see OECD, 2020, 2018), this study considers this definition suitable for examining contemporary philanthropies as emergent global social policy actors.

Still, other important forms of contemporary philanthropy, such as company foundations engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility (e.g. Google.org), the increasingly popular DAFs (e.g. Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund¹⁰¹), or venture philanthropies registered as limited liability companies (e.g. the Omidyar Network) – which have recently become popular with Silicon Valley philanthropists – are excluded. While some of the findings may be also applicable to these groups of philanthropic organisations, their differing capacities, legal statuses and other changing variables make them difficult to include in this study.

¹⁰¹ One of the largest Donor Advised Funds in the US, established by the financial firm Fidelity Investments. Other prominent American DAFs include *Schwab Charitable*, *the Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program*, and *the Goldman Sachs Philanthropy Fund*. These organisations have grown drastically in number and endowments over the last decade, allowing smaller givers to donate money into accounts for charitable purposes, while receiving tax deductions in turn.

Furthermore, considering the uniquely large resources and the vastly influential position the Foundation holds as the sole private foundation dominating global policy making arenas, the applied logic of case selection necessitates further unpacking. Firstly, (while it is important to note that even key cases may be atypical in some key areas) it is common for case studies to follow a combination of selection strategies without compromising the analytical strength of the study (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In this thesis, the Gates Foundation's abnormally influential policy voice represents not only an atypical feature of, but a driving factor behind the case selection. This is due to its trend-setter role in the philanthropic sector. As a keen advocate for philanthropic giving and an active promoter of its policy agendas and approaches, the Gates Foundation has both galvanised transnational transfer of philanthropic wealth and influenced its uses – as was mentioned by some interviewees. The organisation has also financed, organised and chaired different events and collective structures (e.g. the Philanthropy Roundtable or the 'Good Club'; see **chapter 1**) to strengthen collaborative policy making and coordinated action within the philanthropic sector. As such, the Gates Foundation may be considered to drive contemporary big philanthropy (without overlooking the existing diversity of policy preferences and approaches).

Secondly, and most importantly, the Gates Foundation represents and embodies key characteristics of contemporary big philanthropy as described in the existing literature. These include specific types of *public policy solutions* (quick, innovative and technical solutions with business-minded management; e.g. Birn, 2014; Ulbert and Hamm, 2011); *resource distribution tools* (grants, loans, equity investments, bonds; Salamon 2014b); approaches to *policy cooperation* (emphasis on cross-sectoral collaboration; Morvaridi, 2012; Stone, 2004); *philosophies* (combining self-interest and altruism through simultaneous profit-making and 'good-doing'; Bishop and Green, 2009; Morvaridi, 2015); and, *ambitions* (focus on global challenges and rapid, demonstrable results (Birn, 2014). In addition, the Gates Foundation

invests in policy areas and geographies characteristic of philanthropic donors more broadly (see OECD, 2020, 2018). At the same time, this study adopts different strategies to monitor the generalisability of the findings based on the selected case, as established earlier.

Placing the case study in context: health sector as a policy area and Tanzania as a country setting

The Gates Foundation ‘case’ is examined in the context of health policy, which constitutes its primary area of investment (though it is also involved in other policy sectors including agriculture, financial services and sanitation), with a specific focus on its work in Tanzania. The benefits of looking into health policy are both practical and methodological. Health represents a key social policy area in which diverse debates concerning social policy approaches, instruments and goals take place against a broad range of pressing, ongoing needs. Since the 2000s, health has also attracted a larger proportion of development financing, a shift that has been largely driven by the Gates Foundation (Birn, 2014).¹⁰² Indeed, the organisation is a leading global health donor, and its approaches and modes of influence upon other global and domestic actors are of great relevance to scholars and practitioners alike. In addition, since the Gates Foundation launched its work in the area of health and it remains its highest priority area by far, it is expected that the Foundation’s normative understandings and adopted approaches in this policy area are largely representative of its work in general.

Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa represents the most targeted region by philanthropic donors in general, and by the Gates Foundation in particular (OECD, 2020). The philanthropy has 10 focus countries in Africa, Tanzania representing one of the tier-two group states and the fifth largest recipient of Gates’ funds (OECD, 2019). Besides receiving philanthropic aid, Tanzania remains a ‘donor darling’ of traditional multi- and bilateral development agencies and holds long-term relationships with, in particular, China, which has provided development assistance

¹⁰² In fact, health has been one of the most targeted policy areas by philanthropic donors since the early 20th century up until today (OECD, 2020).

for the country since the 1960s. Health is, in equal measure, the most supported and critical policy area of development in Tanzania (see **chapter 2** for further description). Investigating the Gates Foundation's approaches, activities and engagement models in a 'busy' policy sector within an aid-receiving country where diverse donor influences compete enables the collection of rich information on the distinctiveness of the Gates Foundation.

Competing external policy approaches are challenged by strong domestic political traditions and distinct development approaches. Tanzania has a particular history of African Socialism – a political ideology furthered by President Nyerere during early-independence (see **chapter 2**). Although the derived social policies (e.g. large scale public health services) were reversed by the overpowering influence of traditional donors in the 1980s (Mercer and Green, 2013b), Tanzania continues to hold distinctive policy visions supporting public investment in health care provision, for instance (Allison, 2015; Ewald, 2013). Moreover, Tanzanian government has made important efforts to reduce fragmentation of external development investments by adopting a number of structures and policy frameworks, including the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles. Consequently, Tanzania is an interesting context for investigating the Gates Foundation's engagement models with domestic, as well as external, development actors whose views and approaches may differ from those promoted by the Foundation, and garnering initial insights on the potential effectiveness of its policy transfer approaches in such a context.

Nevertheless, conducting the study with a focus on the Gates Foundation's activities in the area of health and within the context of Tanzania generates its own limitations. The scope of this study is unable to establish with absolute certainty whether and in what ways the contextual setting actually influenced the findings in a substantive manner. However, and this will be elaborated upon next, the conducted interviews reached a broad range of elite

informants (both within the Gates Foundation and other leading development agencies) with experience from diverse countries and regions and a degree of familiarity with the Foundation's work across policy areas. In addition, placing the case in a particular setting allows for continuous monitoring of *validity* (fidelity and accuracy of findings) and *reliability* (soundness of the research; appropriateness, consistency and clarity of methods) (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2014). Additionally, when obvious limitations were encountered, these were acknowledged in the interpretation of findings.

4.3 DATA AND DATA COLLECTION

This section describes the research data gathered together with the data collection process. The core data of this study consists of in-depth elite and key informant interviews, which were complemented by an initial documentary analysis and a desktop study on other leading big philanthropies operating in the social sector for development purposes. It is well documented that interviewing elites presents particular challenges due to the informants' unique position of authority and may create issues because of exaggerated formality or perceived status inequality between researcher and informant (e.g. Harvey, 2011; Rice, 2010). The following discussion will therefore also describe the challenges encountered during data collection.

Describing data sources: documentary analysis, desktop study and elite interviews

There are several advantages to combining primary data collection with initial desktop research. A scoping documentary analysis develops an understanding of the examined phenomenon and case. This informs further interview study and facilitates successful completion of the overall research. Most importantly though, it contributes towards data triangulation and strengthens the *validity* of findings, since the information generated

through different data sources can be compared for consistency (Yin, 2009). In this study, documentary analysis of different publicly available materials on the Gates Foundation and its co-leaders from 2015 to 2020 was undertaken. The majority of the analysis was conducted before interview data collection in 2016-2017, but it continued to be updated and refined throughout the research as new relevant materials were published (e.g. the Gates Foundation annual letters) and information gaps identified in the course of data analysis.

The compilation of data for documentary analysis was guided by a particular focus on the guiding principles, worldviews and understandings of development by Bill and Melinda Gates, as well as other senior members of the organisation. This was considered necessary for adequately answering the *research question 1* as outlined in **chapter 1**. Different personal writings and audio recordings of speeches by Bill and Melinda were particularly significant as they offered direct views from the leadership and other insights concerning the Gates Foundation which would have been unobtainable during the conducted interviews. The Foundation's webpages, public statement, information on aid flows and other materials (e.g. previously published interviews in the press) were helpful in deepening the analysis of its preferred policy agendas and instruments (see **table 4.1** for overview of treated sources).

Moreover, the analysis focused primarily on the Gates Foundation's own programmatic work, and excluded materials related to important parts of its work conducted under vertical funds and other consortiums. Documentary analysis was halted when saturation was observed both in terms of "*the degree to which new data repeated what was expressed in previous data*" (i.e. data saturation) and the emergence of new themes (i.e. inductive thematic saturation) (Saunders et al., 2018, p. 1901).

Table 4.1 Data types and sources of information

Data	Type/degree	Sources of information
Semi-structured interviews	Primary	BMGF representatives, BMGF implementing organisations, Tanzanian government officials, Tanzanian civil society actors, and development experts from global aid community.
Documentary analysis	Secondary	Foundation webpages, annual reports, blog posts (e.g. GatesNotes), online audio and transcripts of speeches and discussions with Bill and Melinda, previously published interviews with Foundation representatives in the press and online. 'Data bank' on Gates Foundation's health related investments in Tanzania (2015-2020).
Desktop study	Complementary	Official webpages, reports, public statements, OECD report 2020, previously published pieces of investigative journalism.
Miscellaneous	Complementary	Field diary, notes during project site visits, existing grey literature, journalistic publications.

Alongside this documentary analysis, a 'data bank' compiling basic information on the Gates Foundation's health-related, programmatic investments in projects related to (but not exclusively focused on) Tanzania over five years (October 2015 - October 2020) was developed. This extracted information readily available through the Gates Foundation's 'awarded grants' database¹⁰³ and webpages (see **appendix G.**). The data bank provided important contextual knowledge on the Foundation's investments in the country and assisted in the analysis of its key priorities and pragmatic approaches in the health sector.

Furthermore, this doctoral research included a desktop study on ten leading philanthropic donors (according to reported aid allocations)¹⁰⁴ operating in the social sector was conducted. Drawing primarily from their webpages, reports and public statements, this approach garnered basic information on their guiding principles, key approaches and ways

¹⁰³ Basic search was initially made by inserting 'Tanzania' in the search engine and selecting all health-related grants. The results were then refined further by a closer look at projects focused specifically on Tanzania. See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database>, last

¹⁰⁴ As published by OECD (2020).

of working in the development context, which is presented as a summarising table in **appendix H**. This was guided by the pre-set information needs reflecting the core components of the policy paradigm framework (see **chapter 3**). Although the desktop study does not represent the principal source of information in this study, it contributed – together with existing literature – towards the assessment of the level of generalisability of findings.

The core data of this thesis consists of semi-structured interviews. These are well-suited to a flexible conversation with interviewees during which questions – setting a direction based on research questions (see interview schedules in the **appendix C**.) – can be re-focused and more information elicited once new topics emerge (see Kallio et al., 2016). The interviews were conducted throughout 2017 with representatives of (a) the *Gates Foundation*; (b) the *Gates Foundation's implementer organisations* (operating also but not exclusively in Tanzania); (c) *the Tanzanian government and domestic civil society actors*; and, (d) *the global development community* (operating both at the global level and in Tanzania) (see **table 4.2**).

Moreover, in order to assemble coherent evidence for analysis, staff involved in two particular innovative health intervention projects¹⁰⁵ were interviewed at the Gates Foundation, as well as within the intermediary and implementing organisations (their headquarters and field offices in Tanzania), and concerned government bodies (the government contact for implemented projects). The selected projects were considered representative of the Foundation's programmatic implementation work (as opposed to research or medical trials) at the country level in Tanzania (see **appendix G**. for an overview). Also, one of the project sites was visited during the fieldwork period in Tanzania (April-June 2017), in order to gain a deeper insight into the implementation

¹⁰⁵ Due to reasons of interviewee anonymity, the exact names of these projects cannot be published.

work and perspectives of the local community and practitioners involved. Extensive conversations took place with one employee at a health facility implementing the project during the visit, but these were not formal interviews and were not recorded, although the expressed perspectives were used as supplementary information for data analysis.

Table 4.2 Interviewee classification

Organisation/ interviewee group	HQ	Tanzania	Total
<i>Gates Foundation</i>	12	1	13
<i>Gates’ partner/implementing organisations</i>	4	6	10
<i>Tanzanian government</i> (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance); <i>other domestic development actors</i> (e.g. civil society organisations and independent country consultants)		4 4	8
<i>Bi- and multilateral development agencies</i> (Tanzania, Geneva, Washington DC, New York);	4	5	11
TOTAL	20	20	40

Overall, the interview data consists of 40 interviews with senior officials or high-level professionals, as well as other less experienced but nonetheless knowledgeable key informants. The initial criteria for selecting interviewees consisted of *representativeness* (holding a key role within the concerned organisation, division or project), *relevance* (knowledge about the Foundation’s activities in the health sector in Tanzania or globally, and the Tanzanian aid landscape or development policy) and *diversity* (levels of governance, types of responsibility, divisions within the Gates Foundation). Consequently, the interviewees represent both leading position holders (senior officials directing sub-divisions or entire programmes; i.e. elites) and programme officers and project managers involved in implementation work within the respective organisations (i.e. key informants). Additionally, four interviewees based in Tanzania had a background as medical practitioners, though this was not a pre-set requirement.

Importantly, the study sought to access informants from differing positions vis-à-vis the Foundation, and therefore included collaborators, competitors, implementers, recipients of funds and critical observers. While the analysed information from Gates' representatives reached a 'saturation point', the study could have benefitted from a larger representation of Tanzanian government officials. However, accessing government staff proved challenging and, in order to cover potential information gaps, other stakeholders interviewed in Tanzania were systematically asked about their understanding and experience of government's health policy priorities and perspectives on philanthropic aid.

Finally, to complement the interview data, a fieldwork diary was kept throughout the data collection process. This includes notes concerning the key issues raised during interviews as well as observations about research situations, environments and behaviours. These include impressions of occasionally forced and potentially misleading official discourse, interviewees demonstrating un- or disinterest in the discussion, interruptions, or any other pertinent factors. Such observations assisted in assessing the relevance and deeper meaning of different statements during the process of data analysis. Additionally, fieldwork notes provided additional information to the interview data, particularly in the context of project site visit and this helped to strengthened data triangulation.

Interview data collection: process and challenges

Prior to data collection, the researcher prepared interview schedules, study information sheets, a data management protocol (see **appendices A-F.**) and other materials required for successful fieldwork. These were submitted, together with additional information about the study design, for ethical review and approved by the Departmental Ethics Review Committee of the Department of Social Policy and Intervention at the University of Oxford (reference: SPI_DREC_16_12; see **appendix D.**). From assessment, the study was deemed not to

present any serious ethical considerations. Interviewees were not considered to be adversely affected by their participation in the study, and high levels of anonymity were maintained. Interviewees were asked for their permission to record and use direct quotations from interviews in final outputs. One interviewee asked to review potential quotations before publication, and this request was respected. In addition, the researcher obtained a research permit at the Tanzania Commission for Research and Technology (COSTECH) which enabled lawful collection of primary data within mainland Tanzania (see **appendix E.**).

Interviewees were identified primarily through web-searches. In a couple of rare instances, initial contacts within the different organisations were gained through the researcher's networks established during her study at Oxford and previous work at the United Nation's Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Interviewees were contacted through various means, from direct emails to LinkedIn messages and phone calls. Several of the contacted professionals directed the researcher towards additional and/or more knowledgeable informants, creating a snowball effect which facilitated the final selection of the most informative study participants, as recommended by Siritarungsri et al. (2013).

An introductory letter was sent by email before the actual interviews, whenever possible (see **appendix A.**). The letter clarified the research topic and its main interests and provided information concerning the interview process together with the contact details of the researcher. While this letter was sent out to be read by most interviewees before the actual interviews, domestic development actors in Tanzania were more often first accessed through direct phone calls, which afforded only a brief description of the research project. In these instances, the letter was read to the participant prior to interview. In all cases, formal consent to study participation was systematically asked for and orally recorded (see **appendix B.**).

Elite and key informant interviews are considered beneficial for providing timely, expert insights in a cost-effective manner; offering information on other actors and institutions; and providing access to other relevant interviewees and sources of information otherwise unavailable to the public (e.g. Huggins, 2014). Yet, several caveats related to elite informants had to be accounted for during data collection preparations. As highlighted by numerous methods scholars, one of the most important dimensions related to elite¹⁰⁶ interviews – such as those in this study – is the question of power and its influence (Rice, 2010). Elite interviewees hold positions of authority, exercising power in various ways as noted by Costa and Kiss (2011):

“They are always testing you, trying to defeat you: access to them is not easy, the time they make you wait before and during the interview is not an accident, and you must be prepared for the contingencies they ‘create’ as a subterfuge if they dislike your questions, your aspect, your verbal communication, and so on” (2011, p. 264).

In order to overcome some of the challenges related to interviewing elites, I carefully familiarised myself with the interviewee’s past, cultural background and career whenever possible, which has been acknowledged to contribute towards an honest, in-depth conversation (Mikecz, 2012). In addition, when ‘official discourse’ or pressures to convey a positive image of the Gates Foundation were detected (in an initial, introductory conversation prior to interview questions, for instance), these were carefully noted in the field diary and taken into consideration in the data analysis.

Conducting interviews in culturally unfamiliar settings (in this case, Tanzania) comes with its own challenges. Mikecz (2012) underlines the *“significance of in-depth knowledge of the country and familiarity with its language”* (2012, p. 489), and basic language training in

¹⁰⁶ According to Woods (1998), elites have access to and/or control over resources which may be used to exercise power, they belong to exclusive professional and/or social networks, influence and potentially patronage, and they are considered as elite through social constructions by themselves or others. In this study, the word *elite* is used flexibly referring to meso-level actors involved in policy formulation and the most powerful policy makers at the top echelons, both involved in the policy decision making processes.

Swahili was undertaken by the researcher in order to facilitate culturally appropriate communications. Although the interviews were conducted primarily in English, expressing appreciation in the local language was noticeably valued by Tanzanian interviewees. In addition, some interviewees highlighted their higher proficiency in Swahili than English, and many asked for clarification of ‘philanthropic foundations’ as the term itself was often unfamiliar to them. Consequently, introductory discussions prior to the interviews included explanations of the key terminology.

The interviews were conducted in phases. First, Gates Foundation representatives and some of their implementer organisations (headquarters) were interviewed on a face-to-face basis in Seattle in January 2017. This enhanced the identification of further informants, notably in Tanzania, and allowed for adjustment of the interview schedule for the following interviewee groups to address some important themes that emerged unexpectedly during the first round of interviews. The second phase took place in May-July 2017 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with initial interviews of non-state actors and Gates’ implementer organisations. Again, these contacts provided access to government officials and other donor agencies in Tanzania. Development agencies operating at the global level were interviewed throughout 2017, primarily via Skype, according to informant identification, access and availability.

The duration of interviews varied between 25 minutes and two hours, the shortest ones being those carried out via Skype with global development experts who were working to strict schedules and had limited windows for communication. The longest interviews took place in Tanzania, where informants appeared to be more relaxed about the length of meetings. Two of the interviews with government officials in Tanzania were interrupted on several occasions by interviewees’ work commitments, and this proved a challenge to

coherent and focused conversation. On some occasions, informants shared interesting perspectives off-the-record before and after the actual interview, and these were noted in the field diary.

The interview technique was semi-structured with, primarily, open-ended questions. These reflected themes, issues and topics which were informed from prior literature and the study's primary research questions. The interview schedule was therefore structured, but also provided ample space for the interviewees to elaborate upon their views and engage in a flexible, dynamic conversation. The standard interview guide was altered with interview-dependent questions in order to gain the most valuable insights from each informant according to their areas of expertise (see **appendix C.**). Additionally, as is common with a semi-structured technique, the interviews included pre-decided questions as well as those generated in the course of the interview to allow for clarification of some of the given answers and a deeper investigating of particularly interesting views (Hopf, 2004). When themes outside the initial interview schedule started to emerge systematically, these were incorporated into the schedule for following interviews. This overall process involved an "*interchange between material and prior theoretical knowledge*" (Schmidt, 2004, p. 253), representing an important phase for the analysis to follow.

4.4 ANALYSIS

Data analysis, in the context of case studies, comprises "*examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining evidence to draw empirically based conclusions*" (Yin, 2009, p. 126). In this study, the method selected for structured processing of the gathered evidence was *framework analysis* – a set of techniques for conducting thematic analysis developed by Jane Ritchie and Liz Spencer (1994). This section explores the adopted

approach of thematic framework analysis in detail and discusses the interpretation of the findings.

Thematic framework analysis

Framework analysis differs from exclusively inductive analytical methods, such as grounded theory (Hodkinson, 2008), as it responds to certain pre-decided information needs, as with those determined by the research questions outlined in **chapter 1**. Yet, framework analysis avoids mechanical hypothesis-testing by maintaining a space for inductive thematic development (Richie and Spencer, 1994). In practice, framework analysis consists of five key steps: (1) *familiarisation* with the data; (2) identifying a *thematic framework*; (3) *indexing* data relevant to the identified themes; (4) *charting* the indexed data; and (5) mapping and *interpreting* the findings (Srivastava & Thompson, 2009). The key differentiating characteristic of the method (in comparison to traditional thematic analysis) is the charting and interpretation of the data within and between different sub-units of analysis (e.g. interviewees, organised in rows) and key themes (organised in columns).

The collected data was analysed as follows. First, a thorough documentary analysis was conducted with an initial identification of key themes related to the policy priorities and approaches of the Gates Foundation. This was followed by a series of 40 interviews conducted primarily in Seattle, US and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. While all the interviews were conducted independently by the researcher, hired aid assisted in the processes of data transcription. Recommended, standard measures were adopted to ensure interviewee anonymity, data safeguarding and a suitable transcription method (see Burke, 2011). In addition, all transcriptions were read and when necessary corrected by the researcher to guarantee accuracy. The transcription depth was ‘general’; seeking to generate a written verbatim to include notable hesitations and pauses, and tones of, for example, sarcasm, as


these are indicative of interviewees' attitudes, whilst avoiding a detailed linguistic transcription (Kvale, 2007). Individual transcripts were then read with research questions and researcher's theoretical knowledge directing the focus (Schmidt, 2004), and summarised to gain an overarching understanding of the interview data. This allowed the noting of major themes as well as 'gaps' or areas where interviewees gave limited information.

The second phase consisted of identifying the basic thematic framework of the study. Coding and analysis of interview transcriptions and other data (included in documentary analysis) were conducted with the aid of the NVivo10 software, which was facilitated by a previously undertaken training course on the use of the programme. Although NVivo cannot be utilised for interpretation of findings, it is a widely recognised tool for managing and analysing text, images and audio data – easing considerably the otherwise tedious and time-consuming handling of large amounts of complex, qualitative data (e.g. Bazeley, 2007; Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). This is particularly helpful when there are multiple data sources and deductive-inductive research interests, as with this study.

Thematic analysis was based, in the first instance, on three pre-set areas flowing from the research questions: (i) the overall policy priorities and approaches of the Foundation (*policy paradigm*), (ii) its model of engagement and influence in the aid community and within aid-receiving countries (*means of policy influence*); and, (iii) the unique comparative advantages and distinctiveness of big philanthropies as a development actors (*distinctiveness*). The research question concerning the experiences and perspectives of aid-recipients was addressed in different ways under the thematic areas ii and iii. The three principal areas were further defined and complemented by key sub-themes, partially driven by research questions as well as the paradigm framework (see **chapter 3**), and partially emerging from the data in the process of coding (see Gale et al., 2013). As such, the method of analysis maintained a space

for inductive thematic development, while responding to pre-decided information needs (see Srivastava & Thompson, 2009; **figure 4.2**).

Figure 4.2 Illustration of the conducted inductive-deductive data analysis



Source: own production

The third step in the analysis involved indexing or coding of data contents either corresponding with the identified themes or representing novel issues relating to the broader research questions. In practice, the coding process took place in cycles, starting with *structural* and *descriptive* coding – following the pre-set and emergent themes respectively (see Saldaña, 2013,). During this first cycle, key phrases and sections of the interviews and other data were highlighted and named with representative expressions (as nodes) with the aid of NVivo. For instance, phrases answering to the specific question of ‘engagement with aid-receiving governments’ would be named as such. Other issues, relevant yet unspecified in the interview structure, were named as a topic (see Saldaña, 2013), such as ‘system-wide approaches’. These nodes were next revised and organised according to their relative weight during a second cycle of coding, when their meaning (e.g. uniqueness, frequency or tone) was investigated. Some individual nodes were clustered under a shared category representing a

new theme, such as ‘transformation of the Foundation’, whilst others were placed under a broader theme and re-named to reflect the content, e.g. ‘need for government collaboration’. As such, the indexing and building of the thematic sub-categories under the broader themes was a highly re-iterative process occurring over several cycles of revisiting the codes and their thematic categories.

Moreover, the coding was conducted for each interviewee group at a time (see **table 4.2** on p. 136), resulting in slightly differing emergent thematic clusters. This leads us to the distinctive fourth step in framework analysis – charting. Through charting, the indexed pieces (sub-themes and given meanings) were lifted in a matrix output made of cells synthesising the data according to themes and cases (different interviewee groups and materials gathered for documentary analysis). In this study, the rows were dedicated to the different interviewee groups and individual informants. Theme-based columns, on the other hand, included themes and their content arising from the data, in addition to the ones suggested in research questions, which were revised along the deepening of the analysis.

Interpretation of findings

The fifth step of thematic analysis consists of mapping and interpreting the findings. Here, the matrix was utilised to support further interpretation of the data, notably in comparing data content between different interviewee groups and sources of information, mapping linkages, building explanations and triangulating information (see Richie and Spencer, 1994). For instance, this method allowed for the detection of distinctively different views on the Gates Foundation’s public sector engagement between Foundation representatives and the Tanzanian government. In addition, the interview material included more information in some areas than others, and in-depth discussions on the exact development philosophies of the Gates Foundation, for example, were limited. Here, the interpretation drew from the

documentary analysis in order to fill voids. Previous literature and the conducted desktop study on other big philanthropies added a complementary source of information which helped to assess the *external validity* of findings (i.e. level of generalisability to other actors, contexts and times).

Clearly, interviews cannot be understood to be exact accounts of reality. Rather, they are descriptions motivated by agents' interests and dependent upon their knowledge and memory. Therefore, the data interpretation aimed to capture explicitly voiced issues as well as more covertly expressed thoughts and experiences. This was facilitated by fieldwork notes, as they described the types of discussions, 'positions' taken by the informants (Cunningham-Sabot, 1999), their attitudes towards the researcher and other factors affecting information sharing by each interviewee.

Moreover, although the researcher's outsider status is often considered as a limiting factor in accessing information, it has been suggested that foreign researchers may be considered less threatening by elite interviewees, thus potentially enabling more free, honest and more engaged discussions (Cunningham-Sabot, 1999). As reported in the field diary, my role as a white, female, junior researcher from Oxford University both facilitated and challenged access to key informants and frank conversations, depending on the age, position and cultural background of the interviewee. For instance, one senior interviewee likened the researcher as one of the students whom he would like to help and addressed a range of sensitive issues particularly openly. Meanwhile, less experienced, younger informants appeared to be more cautious of the establishment protocol and shared critical views and unofficial information less enthusiastically. These factors affected the weight given to each code or information unit interpreted.

Finally, in addition to considering informant subjectivity in gathered data, the interpretation process also acknowledged the subjective assumptions, knowledge and focus of the researcher in the data interpretation process. Interpretation errors flowing from potential partiality are naturally mitigated by the adoption of the systematic approach to data transcription described above. Familiarisation with the broader literature related to private philanthropy in public policy making, as well as global health debates, was also undertaken to ‘widen’ the researcher’s perspective on the issues at hand. This was also sought through the desktop study on other philanthropic donors operating in the social sector. In addition, the researcher has presented her work at various conferences, workshops and tutorials throughout the research project, and where her assumptions were challenged the feedback was subsequently utilised to strengthen the ‘truth value’ of the study (Noble and Smith, 2015).

4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The study drew from multiple sources of evidence to heighten validity (Yin, 2009). The collected data comprised interviews with informants from different levels of governance and with different relationships to the Gates Foundation, as well as a range of documents highlighting, notably, the views of the Foundation’s leaders Bill and Melinda. Reliability was pursued through a standard core interview structure, systematic coding with numerous re-iterative loops and the framework analysis method, which increases data transparency. Taking into account the overall aims of this study, semi-structured elite interviews and thematic framework analysis were chosen as the optimal methodological approaches. The semi-structured interview technique enabled the collection of rich data comprising a range of views and perspectives, within and without the initial interview schedule, which the

informants were able to communicate freely when they felt necessary. On numerous occasions, themes not anticipated by the researcher were raised and, particularly in the case of interviews with development actors in Tanzania, interviewees were afforded the flexibility to freely share their experiences and views.

The resulting data and findings provide novel, timely information on the Gates Foundation and big philanthropy in global social policy. Previous findings from wider research concerning ideological underpinnings and prioritised policy approaches of the Foundation were partially confirmed and complemented (**chapter 5**), but also new types of processes of policy influence were identified (**chapter 6**) and a range of philanthropic policy making and policy/programme -related advantages and risks for aid-receiving countries were mapped (**chapter 7**). These insights generate new knowledge on the social policy approaches and engagement models of contemporary big philanthropies in the development context, extending beyond the assessment of the distinctiveness of their policy model.

It is important to recognise that while this study aims to provide analytic generalisations which may also apply in other situations “*where similar concepts, constructs or sequences might be relevant*” (Yin, 2012, p. 18-19), the findings of the study are also limited to those very contexts. The strictly defined concept of big philanthropy was necessary for binding the case of the Gates Foundation into a reference group and contributes towards the monitoring of the external validity of findings based on the selected, *instrumental* case. For instance, observations were made concerning important outliers within the reference group, who have deliberately adopted very different approaches and philosophies and to whom findings cannot consequently be generalised (such as the Ford Foundation or the Open Society Foundations).

At the same time, the chosen definition of *big philanthropy* limits the gathered information to a defined group of independent, Western, philanthropic actors, although the contemporary

landscape of philanthropic development actors is broader, with different organisational forms, approaches and geographical origins – including emerging African philanthropies (Moyo, 2011). In addition, this study is focused on researching big philanthropy in the context of international development and global social policy making. Therefore, the generated findings cannot be directly interpreted as reflecting the work and policy making approaches of big philanthropies in the West where they also have a growing social policy role; thus, even if an important level of generalisability existed (as is suggested by previous works), its establishment requires different methodological choices. This leaves considerable knowledge gaps for future study of philanthropic social policy actors.

Furthermore, this doctoral thesis faces some more general budgetary and time related limitations. Firstly, the study is time- and context bound; it must be acknowledged that a larger study incorporating multiple study sites and a comparison of aid-receiving countries with different characteristics might have provided other perspectives on, for instance, the Gates Foundation's engagement models in different settings. Secondly, a comparative study between a number of leading big philanthropies would have been particularly commendable for a deeper analysis of the existing divergences and convergences within the philanthropic sector. Third, this study seeks to address some of the risks and advantages of philanthropic aid for stakeholders on the ground. However, experiences of practicing health professionals and service end-users were nearly completely neglected (with the exception of informal conversations held during one project site visit and interviews with domestic development experts with parallel experience in the medical profession). As a result, the study omits an important source of information with unique views on the lived experiences of the projects and programmes implemented by the Gates Foundation.

Despite the stated limitations, the following chapters will utilise the research methods and techniques reviewed in this chapter in an attempt to address the prominent knowledge gaps blurring our understanding of big philanthropies as emergent global social policy actors. In so doing, it will also highlight important future lines of inquiry for study of philanthropy in the field of Social Policy.

5. THE BILL AND MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION – REPRESENTING AND DRIVING A ‘PHILANTHROPIC SOCIAL POLICY PARADIGM’?

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter investigates the social policy ideas, approaches and interventions advanced by the Gates Foundation through its development assistance and whether these constitute a coherent global social policy paradigm. The chapter also evaluates the extent to which this potential policy paradigm is *new* and *different* compared to those previously and currently advanced by other traditional and emerging development actors. These questions come with pivotal theoretical and practical implications for the field of Social Policy, particularly in the development context, where social policy reform typically involves external policy agendas and pressures (e.g. Kaasch, 2013; Kwon, 2019; Mkandawire, 2004a; Surender, 2013). Consequently, the policy making approaches, agendas and instruments deployed by big philanthropies have tangible consequences on the institutions and mechanisms of wealth redistribution, the arrangements of the welfare mix, processes of social policy formation and social policy delivery in aid-receiving countries.

Moreover, theory building in the area of Global Social Policy requires an examination of the social policy approaches prompted by big philanthropies. On the one hand, gaining an understanding of the foundational ideologies and pragmatic approaches promoted by philanthropic donors contributes to a better understanding and comparison of competing policy influences in the global policy space, as well as their relative impact on global social policy agendas. On the other, exploring the guiding principles and key processes behind the Gates Foundation’s policy objectives and approaches generates new information on internal

policy deliberations and, in turn, the extent to which dominant global agendas influence the organisation (and, potentially, the philanthropic sector more broadly). While organisational characteristics, structures of decision-making and mutual pressures between leading international organisations (e.g. the World Bank and the IMF vs. the ILO) are well investigated (e.g. Deacon, 2013, 2007; Orenstein, 2008; Stubbs and Kentikelenis, 2018), less is known of private foundations acting as global social policy actors.

The study of global social policy paradigms through a well-developed framework is also relevant for developing the existing tools of Global Social Policy analysis. The philanthropic sector comprises an eclectic range of motivations and philosophies (religious, political, personal), end causes (climate change, women's rights, child welfare) and approaches (bulk donations to established projects, grass-roots involvement with benefactors, profitable investments). This heterogeneity makes the identification of a potentially shared policy model challenging without adequate analytical tools. As discussed in the introductory chapter, some have pointed to a *Silicon Valley-* or *California Consensus* as a novel development model promoted by contemporary philanthropies (Desai and Kharas, 2008; Edwards, 2011; Moran, 2014). However, the concepts lack methodical analysis and instead rely upon largely vague, descriptive terms. These works have also lacked focus on the particular social policy ideas and approaches of big philanthropies.

This chapter engages in a systematic investigation of the *social policy* ideas and approaches favoured by the Gates Foundation, while acknowledging the diverse areas of focus existing in the sector. The inquiry is guided by a clearly established framework drawing upon Hall's (1993) paradigm theory and broader Social Policy literature, as elaborated in **chapter 3**. The analysis draws primarily from interviews with Gates Foundation employees and representatives of its implementing organisation, and from its official statements and

publications (documentary analysis), alongside evidence of its actions in the global social policy sphere.

The chapter begins by establishing whether the Gates Foundation holds a distinctive *ideology* and set of normative understandings in the context of development. The second part of the chapter investigates the actual policy *objectives* of the Gates Foundation and their characterising ‘nature’, which will be followed by an examination of its ideal social policy *instruments*. The discussion continues to the key drivers behind the Gates Foundation’s *agenda-setting*, as well as the ongoing transformations within its policy directions. The chapter concludes by contrasting the findings with other past and present social policy models and discussing whether there is a coherent and distinctive ‘philanthropic global social policy paradigm’ emerging.

5.2 UNDERLYING IDEOLOGIES

As outlined in **chapter 3**, ideological foundations form the central pillar of a policy paradigm, while normative underpinnings shape subsequent policy goals as well as the selection of ideal policy instruments. More precisely, the ideological foundations comprise “*values, assumptions and principles about the nature of reality, social justice and the appropriate role of the State*” (Daignault 2014, p. 461). Applying this interpretation to the development context, this section unpacks the ideological foundations of the Gates Foundation on three primary fronts: the understanding of development (i.e. how ‘development’ is defined and achieved), the purpose and importance of social policy (e.g. as an instrument for economic progress or as a social right), and the ideal role of the state in the broader welfare mix.

Understanding of development: inclusive growth through shared responsibilities

What constitutes *development* is of course a contested idea. Interpretations advanced by classical economics (which largely inspired early stages of international development cooperation) as well as the subsequent neoclassical development theories (which defined the tenets underpinning the Washington Consensus) have defined and measured development through levels of industrialisation and *economic growth*. Alongside these views, others emphasising *social development* were equally promoted, despite their limited initial influence (see **chapter 2** for overview). However, predominantly growth-driven conceptualisations have become increasingly challenged amid persisting global inequality and environmentally unsustainable forms of production and consumption. Facing these challenges, the 21st century has seen a heightened interest in social policy as a social investment tool for *inclusive growth*, both in the Global North and South (an approach promoted particularly by the OECD). This approach requires economic growth to be conducive to development only when it serves the largest possible proportion of the population and is sustainable through the inclusion of all income groups. (Deeming and Smyth, 2018).

Other, radically different approaches have also been advanced. The idea of *transformative social policy/development*, which prioritises social justice and ecological considerations over economic goals, has been promoted by some academics and the United Nation's Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). The transformative social policy outlook adopts a comprehensive understanding of development as processes of social and political transformation driving not only sustainable economic growth, but also societal relations, equality and democracy (e.g. Deacon, 2016; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Hujo et al., 2016). Meanwhile, as described in **chapter 3**, various alternative voices – particularly

from the Global South and the post-development school – have conceptualised development as a process towards political, economic, ideological and cultural *freedom* (see Mkandawire, 2011).

In light of these developments, it is relevant to examine the position(s) adopted by contemporary big philanthropies. The findings from this study suggest that the Gates Foundation largely views development in terms of *economic growth*. During interviews conducted with Foundation representatives, this was repeatedly cited as being a key driver behind certain priority areas and approaches, such as family planning:

“...in order for countries to increase economic growth they need to decrease their population size, and in order to do that you can use family planning (...). And then you can see this demographic dividend when you have fewer people, which means that you have more people who have jobs, access to education and wealth.” (Gates representative 11).

Though lacking any sense of economic participation being a ‘right’ or ‘freedom’ (cf. Sen, 2001), the evidence points to a worldview that accounts for the economic hardship experienced by the lower income groups. The Gates Foundation’s understanding of economic growth emerging from data comprises thus an element of *inclusiveness*. The documentary analysis of key reports and materials by the Gates Foundation indicates that the organisation places particular emphasis on enabling the poor to become economically active members of society. More explicitly, the Gates Foundation states on its webpage that its *Global Growth and Opportunity* programme “*focuses on creating and scaling market-based innovations to stimulate inclusive and sustainable economic growth*”.¹⁰⁷ In idealising inclusive economies, the Gates Foundation’s views therefore correspond, to some extent, the principles of *inclusive growth* (see Deeming and Smyth, 2018).

¹⁰⁷See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do>, last visited 26.3.2020

Apropos the *explanatory* and *normative realms* of development (i.e. actors and sectors held responsible for poor development progress, and those seen as able to spur it; Gore, 2000), the views exhibited by the Gates Foundation appear to differ somewhat from previous interpretations. When considering high child mortality rates in the Global South, Bill Gates offered the following conclusion: *“The answer is simple, and harsh. The market did not reward saving the lives of these children, and governments did not subsidize it”* (Bill Gates, 2008). In this statement, the Foundation co-chair (Bill Gates) acknowledges the limitations and gaps between the market and the state. Moreover, evident in both documents and interviews with Foundation representatives, the competence of global private sector actors and ‘creative capitalism’ to invest in ways beneficial to the Global South was stressed repeatedly. At the same time, these sources recognised the role of governments in sustaining development investments introduced by global development actors at the domestic level and providing a basic safety net when markets fail to provide necessary services:

“I would say (...) we are placing increasing emphasis on private sector partners, while at the same time recognising that if we want to achieve universal access and bubble burst sustainable development goals, we have to work in partnership with public sector.” (Gates representative 12).

“Well I think that wherever the private sector can be effective that is the huge benefit to the system. But the truth is that – in the poorest countries where we work – all the useful healthcare is delivered typically through the public system.” (Gates representative 1).

“The market is not going to place huge bets on research when there are no buyers for a breakthrough. (...) In this gap, government plays an important role. It can offer services where the market does not, and thus provides a safety net.” (Bill Gates).¹⁰⁸

While governments and private sector often work together in most countries, the relative emphasis and trust placed on one or the other does vary. In this context, the Gates Foundation’s consistent ‘joint working’ of public and private sectors stands out. The viewpoints expressed in the quotations above hold both global markets and domestic

¹⁰⁸ See <https://www.gatesnotes.com/About-Bill-Gates/The-Power-of-Catalytic-Philanthropy>; last visited 24.3.2020.

governments accountable for development failures (explanatory realm), in contrast to the more polarised positions held by advocates of Southern ideologies or the Washington Consensus. Gates interviewees accentuated private sector competence *and* the pragmatic necessity of government involvement in delivering and implementing development solutions (normative realm). This two-level interpretation recognises interdependence and shared responsibility between different sectors and institutions as distinct from those advanced previously within the development realm.

Normative understandings on the role of social policy – a new productivist approach?

Definitions of development typically encompass different normative understandings about the role and purpose of social policy. The literature has broadly distinguished between two somewhat opposing interpretations: *rights-based* and *instrumentalist* social policy (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004; Kidd, 2015; Mkandawire, 2005; see **chapter 3**). The first emphasises social policies as a universal citizen-entitlement, enhancing equality and solidarity in a society. The latter, in contrast, perceives social policies as functional instruments in spurring economic growth – whether under neoliberal or productivist social policy paradigms. In a development context, however, the instrumentalist definition is broad and social policies have been embraced to advance both social and economic progress, as **chapter 2** expounds.

The findings suggest the Gates Foundation’s social policy visions contrast with the ideals of rights-based, universalist social policies. Though not explicitly addressed by Foundation interviewees, the noticeable absence of references to themes of social justice, democratic institutions and transformations in the broader social and political systems during interviews indicates that these do not constitute the core mission of the Foundation. In addition, a reluctance to align with universalist global policy agendas was apparent. This is illustrated below by the respondents’ reactions when asked about the Foundation’s interest in promoting

Universal Health Coverage (UHC) – a leading rights-based global policy initiative. These views reflect the current conceptual and practical debates concerning *universalism* as a principle and mechanism of social policy delivery (see e.g. Abihiro and De Allegri, 2015; Anttonen et al., 2012; Dean, 2019; Wadge et al., 2017), and point to a largely critical view of generous and comprehensive public provision of health services for all. Importantly, they also omit considerations of universal welfare provision as a *right*.

“I am not sure I can answer that question [whether UHC is a goal of the Foundation], because you need to define what you mean by Universal Health Coverage. (...). However, we see an important part – and the first part of universal health coverage – to be primary health care. (...) But I honestly don’t know what universal healthcare is.” (Gates representative 5; emphasis added).

“I certainly personally don’t think that it is a good mantra for people to go around talking about without practically seeing what that means. I mean in some countries, like Mozambique, where there is essentially no money for the healthcare system there, so how is this universal health care going to be provided?” (Gates representative 1).

At the same time, the overall data revealed a clear inclination towards instrumental and productivist views of social policy. As mentioned previously, Foundation representatives saw investments in global health as a primary driver for enhanced economic growth. Though these described views echo particularly with the *Asian Developmental Model*, there are some significant differences. The Asian Developmental Model promotes investments notably in public welfare systems, serving primarily the needs of *national* industries through a productive workforce (see **chapter 2**). In contrast, the Gates Foundation promotes increased investments in health (and several other areas) to boost *individuals’* economic participation in a society. This is demonstrated throughout the data, including the Foundation’s official webpage:

*“In developing countries, we focus on improving people’s health and wellbeing, helping individuals lift themselves out of hunger and extreme poverty.”*¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/>, last visited 25.3.2020.

*“Every year, millions of people find ways to transition out of poverty—by adopting new farming technologies, investing in new business opportunities, or finding new jobs.”*¹¹⁰

In addition, as opposed to pursuing national development objectives, the Gates Foundation is focused on generating *global* gains (e.g. a malaria-free world). As such, the Foundation’s motives focus less on the ‘national’, which characterises Southern developmental models (e.g. Gore, 2000; Seekings, 2008), and more on the ‘individual’ and ‘global’.

Role of the state and the welfare mix: new roles and responsibilities

The function of the state is of major importance to any analysis of social policy and debates continue over its role and relationship with other actors in the *funding, provision* and *governance* of welfare benefits and services – the ‘welfare mix’. Protagonists of social justice and rights-based approaches have naturally promoted the welfare state as the central locus of welfare policy making, legislating and provision. Such arguments have highlighted the particular capacity of the state for nationwide provision, as well as the benefits of national policy making which enables processes of democratic feedback. Public sector critiques, on the other hand, have questioned the bureaucratic deficiencies and lack of responsiveness of the state, whose functions are perceived to serve the interests of the administration rather than citizens. Those consequently antithetical to public sector involvement have advocated for increased involvement of private sector actors (privatisation) and methods (marketisation) in social policy delivery. In the Global South, such debates become ever more complex and critical, due to issues such as corruption and state capture by ‘rebel groups’ amongst others. In this context, development NGOs have also been promoted by international development agencies from the political right and left as complementary or, at times, competing actors to the state (Tar, 2014).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Within the Gates Foundation, views on the ideal role of the state were somewhat inconsistent and varied according to the public or private sector background of the employees, as explained by one representative. Additionally, despite Bill Gates' close collaboration with and promotion of the global private sector, the co-chairs have publicly argued in favour of increased public funding for health in countries of the Global South.¹¹¹ The question this raises is whether the Foundation holds a coherent view of the ideal role of the state at all, and if so, how it is perceived in relation to the broader welfare mix.

Despite the recognition of the state as a necessary institution in sustaining social policy and development programmes from a legal, political and financial perspective (see previous subsections), it was widely felt amongst Foundation interviewees that the private sector had specific *comparative advantages*. These included, among others, technical expertise and scientific know-how. The interviewees also voiced *pragmatic considerations* in relation to private sector actors on the ground, such as the existing infrastructure within the sector and the popularity of private providers in some countries. More compellingly though, several respondents expressed a view that the Foundation holds a general *interest* in strengthening the private sector in aid-receiving countries, including those with clearly leftist political traditions and relatively well-developed public health care systems - such as Tanzania. This indicates an appreciation of the private sector that is both pragmatic and normative, based on assumptions of the sector's superior competence in welfare provision compared with public actors. The citations below highlight some of the ways in which the Foundation and its leaders regard private companies as key actors for the delivery of social policy in aid-receiving countries.

“(...) in Nigeria, for example, 50 per cent of the people will go to the private sector, and then what we will do with the government is to say ‘we need to make sure that the

¹¹¹ One practical example of this is the Foundation's collaboration with the African Development Bank to develop financial tools for health sector investment at the country level. See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Policy/Development-Policy-Finance>, last visited 17.12.2018.

private sector is thriving, because people are by default going to them, so what do we do to make the service there effective (...)?’.” (Gates representative 6).

“(...) there was a USAID guy who was talking about...they have some funding set aside for trying to understand what could be done to increase trust in private facilities. And I said ‘oh you know what that’s really of interest to me, I’d love to learn more’.” (Gates representative 12).

“I am a true believer in the power of capitalism to improve lives. Where the free market is allowed to operate, it is agile and creative. It can meet demand the world over and plays a central role in increasing living standards.” (Bill Gates).¹¹²

The interview respondents also systematically emphasised the Gates Foundation’s keen interest in collaborative public-private consortiums, seen as the most effective model for development policy innovation, financing, and delivery, particularly at the global level. This is tangibly demonstrated by the Foundation’s active engagement in establishing, promoting and participating in different vertical funds and global PPPs such as GAVI, the Global Fund, the Polio Eradication Initiative, Roll Back Malaria and many others. These initiatives stream global health funding from governments, businesses, philanthropies and other donor organisations to countries of the Global South, while bringing them together under collaborative structures of policy making.

Furthermore, the Gates Foundation has elevated, and arguably transformed, the role of third sector actors in development. While the Foundation finances primarily (American and international business-oriented) NGOs as project implementers through its own grants (OECD, 2019) as well as work under different vertical funds, it preserves a particularly unique role for big philanthropies. In the context of the above-mentioned consortiums, the Foundation employees identified private philanthropists as necessary and able *conveners* between different actors (see quotations below). Another main premise highlighted in the overall data was the unique ability of philanthropies to launch risky, *catalytic investments* in areas where a governmental share of (individual and corporate) tax-payer revenue cannot be

¹¹² 2012; see <https://www.gatesnotes.com/About-Bill-Gates/The-Power-of-Catalytic-Philanthropy>, last visited 25.3.2020.

directed because of stakeholder expectations of returns and slow, democratic decision-making processes. Significantly, Bill and Melinda Gates have also framed philanthropic giving as a *moral responsibility* of the wealthy, as has emerged from the documentary analysis. This understanding of the role and comparative advantages of big philanthropies accords them considerable and unprecedented recognition and responsibility in global social policy.

“...we strongly believe in partnerships and (...) we work very very closely with both the private, multilaterals and governments and all. And most of the time, in different spheres we are there as a convener, we tend to convene people so that we can really think creatively about how to solve the toughest problems of the world.” (Gates representative 6).

“We definitely see our comparative advantage in our side being a willingness to take risks, be in the long haul, make some big bets. [...] I definitely think that other foundations share that.” (Gates representative 8).

“So when you come to the end of the innovations that business and government are willing to invest in, you still find a vast, unexplored space of innovation where the returns can be fantastic. This space is a fertile area for what I call catalytic philanthropy.” (Bill Gates).¹¹³

Differing views on the roles and responsibilities of the state are often framed as questions of effectiveness, affordability or equitable provision, while normative understandings are fundamental in choice of position. Based on evidence, it appears that while the Gates Foundation is not entirely discrediting the state, it affords an important recognition for a range of non-state actors from a pragmatic and normative perspective. Such views profoundly challenge the role of the state, questioning not only its competence in efficient and effective social policy delivery, but as a democratic institution with primary responsibility for social policy making. New multilateral organisations and public policy making by private foundations also contribute towards new forms of global social governance, which are no longer driven by democratic processes, but ideas of efficiency and policy voices gained through actors' financial contributions, as will be elaborated further in **chapter 8**.

¹¹³ 2012; see <https://www.gatesnotes.com/About-Bill-Gates/The-Power-of-Catalytic-Philanthropy>, last visited 25.2.2020.

5.3 POLICY OBJECTIVES

Policy objectives constitute the second core part of the developed policy paradigm framework in this study, and reflect most directly the underlying ideological foundations (Hall, 1993). Based on the analytical framework developed in **chapter 3**, these are understood to comprise the prioritised development axis or policy area receiving investment because of its perceived importance to development; general programmatic objectives; and micro-goals specifying, for example, target populations. This section explores in more detail the Foundation's policy objectives (briefly discussed in **chapter 2**), paying particular attention to characteristics which may be associated with the philanthropic sector more broadly and form a distinguishing feature of a philanthropic paradigm.

Macro level: development axis

Historically, development actors have prioritised a range of overarching policy objectives, such as increasing agricultural productivity, building a robust industrial infrastructure and/or providing the population with basic education and health care. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation was established in year 2000 with the primary goal of tackling global *health inequities*. These mean “*differences in health that are not only unnecessary and avoidable but, in addition, are considered unfair and unjust*” (Whitehead, 1985, p. 430). As explained by a Foundation interviewee below, addressing such unfair differences in health (outcomes) continues to drive the organisation's development work from a normative perspective. At the same time, the Foundation holds a strong understanding of the pragmatic opportunities (through innovation) and consequences (on economic development) of investing in global health. This clearly indicates a strong preference for health as a primary development axis, which the Foundation has actively promoted within the global development community.

*“I think there are probably two or three driving reasons why health was an initial one and remains as the primary area of focus. The first is (...) the real **inequities** that exist*

*in the availability and the access to life-saving interventions between the high-income countries and the low-income countries. [...] just because you are born in a different place in the world should not determine whether you have access to these life-saving interventions (...). The second is actually **innovation** as a source, as a solution to many of these problems. [...] I would say the third driver is the recognition that health is a precursor to better **economic development**, it is one of the basic things that you need.” (Gates representative 3; emphasis added).*

Nonetheless, the quotations below illustrate that interviewees also acknowledged the relevance of different policy sectors. In common with other development models, the thinking showed consideration for the mutually reinforcing impact of different development axes, and the Foundation was cited by interviewees as having pursued in particular a combination of health and agriculture (with financial services as an add-on). This points, again, to a thought-through approach in which investments in *health* are understood to be not just a preference or area of expertise but the most effective spur to development.

“People will ask us about education, people will ask us about youth employment – especially lately. And obviously those are bricks of the development picture, but they are just not ones that we currently have a comparative advantage in, or an issue that we focus on.” (Gates representative 8).

“We also know that in many of the countries that we work in, including Tanzania and across Africa, most people are farmers and agricultural success is the key to making sure that families are able to make a good living for themselves, (...) and the proceeds they get from increasing the total agricultural productivity is then able to be reinvested in the family in terms of their healthcare and schooling for their children (...). That combination of health and agriculture development, they are major the area we work in. Financial services for the poor contribute to development and they are critical pieces to emerging from poverty.” (Gates representative 9).

It is important to stress that the policy area of health, or the overarching objective of tackling health inequities, cannot be understood as a development axis representative of the overall group of Western philanthropic donors, who target a number of different focus areas (see **appendix H**). Nevertheless, it is striking to note that the number of contemporary big philanthropies investing primarily in global health has had a real influence on the sectoral allocation of overall development aid flows since the turn of the century (see discussion in **chapter 2**). It is therefore justifiable to stress the importance of health in current

understandings of development priorities within the philanthropic sector, and their broader ideational influence.

Meso level: programmatic goals

The interview data as well as the Gates Foundation's sector specific aid flows (see **chapter 2; appendix G.**) show the philanthropy to hold specific programmatic goals in the health sector. More specifically, the interviews stressed imminent full *eradication of polio*, *eradication of malaria* in Bill Gates' lifetime and acceleration in the *decline of HIV and Tuberculosis incidence* as primary goals. In the language adopted by the Gates Foundation, these goals are collectively referred to as 'disease control'. The interviews also underlined the Foundation's preoccupation with increasing *immunisation* amongst children, a key policy goal in which the Foundation follows the targets set by the *Decade of Vaccines* -initiative.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the data shows that in the area of Maternal, New-born and Child Health (MNCH), the Foundation prioritises the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets on *reducing maternal mortality and new born deaths*.¹¹⁵ The family planning goals, on their behalf, were stated to follow the global *Family Planning 2020* targets, such as providing *access to voluntary family planning* for additional 120 million women globally.¹¹⁶

From an analytical standpoint, it is relevant to accentuate the *type* of the Foundation's policy goals. In his own words, Bill Gates has proclaimed that "*measuring progress is the only way*

¹¹⁴ For the period of 2011-2020, the Decade of Vaccines action plan seeks to: achieve a world free of poliomyelitis; meet global and regional elimination targets; meet vaccination coverage targets in every region, country and community; develop and introduce new and improved vaccines and technologies; exceed the Millennium Development Goal 4 target for reducing child mortality. See e.g. https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA65/A65_22-en.pdf, last visited 30.10.2020.

¹¹⁵ "3.1 By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100 000 live births; 3.2 By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1000 live births", see <http://www.who.int/sdg/targets/en/>, last visited 25.3.2020.

¹¹⁶ For more information, see <http://www.familyplanning2020.org/>, last visited 26.10.2017.

*to drive lasting success*¹¹⁷, stressing his preference for narrowly set, quantified and ‘vertical’ policy targets. As acknowledged previously, private foundations operate in various policy areas with a range of policy goals. While many share some of the Gates Foundation’s priority areas as presented (family planning being particularly common; see **appendix H.**), these are not automatically coalescent.¹¹⁸ It is therefore the clearly defined *narrow targets* as well as their *foundation-dependent policy areas*, that ought to be considered to typify the philanthropic paradigm – if one is to be established.

Furthermore, the Gates Foundation’s health-related policy goals described above are increasingly out of step with the current, broadly shared interest in a ‘systems approach’ and more holistic goals, favoured particularly by the UN and WHO. An increasing focus on universalism has also affected the measurement methods of reform outcomes. In the health sector, for instance, the WHO and WB have furthered ‘equity-based measures’ accounting for level of affordability, population reach and benefit range as opposed to numericised ‘aggregate measures’ (e.g. per capita inpatient visits) (Boerma et al., 2014; WHO and World Bank, 2015). Yet, the described approach adopted by the Gates Foundation reflects and remains coherent with the previous MDG agenda directing global development efforts from year 2000 to 2015, which prioritised a more limited range of narrowly defined development issues and targets. As discussed in **chapter 7**, such policy objectives and measurement methods which are entirely and narrowly formulated by the donor, pose a series of potential issues on the ground, since they provide little room for the incorporation of domestic priorities and preferences.

¹¹⁷ GatesNotes 2013; see <https://www.gatesnotes.com/Development/MDGs-Dream-with-a-Deadline>, last visited 19.3.2019.

¹¹⁸ Other philanthropic foundations operating in the health sector, such as the Clinton Foundation’s Health Initiative (CHAI), Wellcome Trust and Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) share a similar focus to the Gates Foundation.

Micro level: beneficiary populations

The literature has typically categorised the different types of welfare provision in terms of population coverage into *universal* (e.g. family allowances or primary education to all citizens), *contributory* (based on contributions from income, covering population in formal employment), and *targeted* (covering the poorest or neediest of the population). These can be further divided into ‘selectivist’ approaches targeting populations based on *deservingness and need*, or ‘universalist’ ones which understand entitlement to social welfare as a *basic right* for all citizens (see e.g. Anttonen et al., 2012; Kidd, 2015; Mkandawire, 2005). Selectivity, in the context of social policy and development, is most commonly based on the level of poverty (e.g. direct selectivity through means-testing) or some otherwise marginalising measure (e.g. indirect targeting of ethnic minorities or rural regions).

The findings show that the Gates Foundation deploys a targeted approach focused on specific populations. The Foundation’s overall policy goal of enhancing health equity, and its specific targets within the health sector, the philanthropy’s primary focus remains on the *extremely poor*. This encompasses the sub-group of *children*, which the Foundation has targeted through its work in the areas of MNCH and immunisation, as well as its investments in pneumonia, and enteric and diarrheal diseases, as confirmed by the data.

“What is consistent is that we think about access and what will enable access most effectively especially for those in the lowest wealth quintiles.” (Gates representative 3).

“The most important basic principle for that is that we really try to work with governments and other donors to make sure that the poor get access to services and that the access is equitable and affordable for the poorest people.” (Gates representative 6).

The majority of the interviewed Gates representatives agreed that the Foundation’s primary focus is on those leading causes of death globally which happen to particularly affect the poorest populations, as well as on health conditions neglected by other actors. Such issue-

focused reasoning has also led to the targeting of *minority groups* particularly affected by the diseases addressed by the Gates Foundation. The philanthropy has developed HIV interventions and provided services, for instance, to sexual minorities and sex workers, and targeted small communities exposed to neglected tropical diseases (such as sleeping sickness in Congo).

Moreover, the Foundation has recently established a *Gender Equality* unit, which is run under the *Global Growth and Opportunity* programme and not associated uniquely with health.¹¹⁹ This new direction shows a strong and increased interest in assisting female populations. Interestingly, gender is a context in which the Foundation has directed attention to *socio-economic inequality* rather than *health inequity*. Still, the recognition of gender inequality appears to be coupled with similar underpinning development visions to other priority areas – suggesting a coherent overall approach. As the quotations from the Foundation’s webpage illustrate, economic participation and the largest achievable impact are emphasised above political empowerment or immediate income support, for instance (see also Fejerskov, 2018).

“The focus of our gender equality is on transforming the way the poorest women and girls participate in economies.” (Gates Foundation, 2018).¹²⁰

“When you invest in a woman’s health and empowerment, it has a ripple effect, helping families, communities, and countries achieve long-lasting benefits.” (Gates Foundation, 2018).¹²¹

In sum, the Gates Foundation’s specific target populations are predominantly defined through the prioritised policy *issues* – a largely top-down method that stands apart from typical logics of targeting which assess the level of *need*. Additionally, although the Foundation’s approach to population selectivism appears to be guided by ethical motivations (in targeting the

¹¹⁹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Growth-and-Opportunity/Gender-Equality#OurStrategy>, last visited 27.12.2018.

¹²⁰ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Growth-and-Opportunity/Gender-Equality>, last visited 15.6.2018.

¹²¹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/>, last visited 15.6.2018.

extremely poor or communities suffering from neglected diseases), it also reflects a productivist rationale. In focusing on populations of working age (as opposed to the elderly, for instance) and women who represent half of the workforce, the Foundation's approach mirrors its broader ideological stances discussed above.

5.4 POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Policy instruments constitute a particularly prominent paradigm dimension in the development space where different approaches, tools and solutions are continually initiated and debated. In this study, these are understood to consist both of *social policy instruments* deployed to achieve set policy goals concerned with the beneficiary populations or end users, and *aid modalities*, concerned with aid-receiving governments and thereby reflecting mechanisms of transnational wealth redistribution. This section explores the different policy instruments implemented and promoted by the Gates Foundation in the health sector.

Prioritising innovative, techno-scientific products, tools and services

As argued in the introductory chapter, the term Global South represents heterogenous regions and countries with diverse populations, welfare needs, and internal and external political influences. It has thus experienced a diverse range of social policy instruments, comprising different mechanisms of wealth *redistribution*, private sector *regulation*, and social *rights* (Deacon, 1997), as discussed in **chapter 3**. Redistributive instruments in particular have attracted attention in social policy practice in the Global South. Some of the key measures include approaches familiar to the West, such as pension programmes and health insurance schemes. Others are more characteristic of low- and middle income countries, such as conditional cash transfer programmes, food security measures or NGO-provided social assistance. (e.g. Barrientos and Hulme, 2010; Gough and Wood, 2004; Kangas, 2012;

Mkandawire, 2001; Seekings, 2008; Spaan et al., 2012). Also the tangible ‘benefits’ enjoyed by target populations have taken different forms, including *cash* (vouchers, bank notes, mobile phone texts), *food* (vouchers, ingredient packages, free grains or water), *inputs* (fertilisers, seeds) and *assets* (employment through public works programmes, education and health through services, farm land, livestock) (Ellis et al., 2009).

The findings discussed earlier in the chapter provided strong evidence for the Gates Foundation’s normative understandings of development in prioritising individuals’ economic participation. It is therefore unsurprising that the philanthropy has not focused on developing tax systems, pensions, care services or social assistance to redistribute money or benefits in kind. Instead, in-line with its ideological foundations, it deploys policy instruments to build individuals’ *assets*,¹²² which may be understood as abilities, opportunities and competences – necessary for their economic activity in society. However, rather than investing in schemes to provide employment opportunities or increase health status through service provision, the Gates Foundation has rigorously pursued scientific research and innovation¹²³ to develop new *global public goods*. In fact, the Foundation representatives underscored such investments to target new and impactful approaches in development, old ways of doing having largely failed. The Foundation’s focus on research and innovation is also demonstrated in its health sector investments in Tanzania (see **appendix G.**).

Specifically, the Gates Foundation’s ‘new global public goods’ refer to *tangible goods*, *technical fixes* for delivery (drawing particularly on data) as well as innovative ‘*policy packages*’ or guidelines for service provision. This categorisation is evidenced by the collected data and enshrined in the organisation’s official mission description:

¹²² As well as *inputs* (such as new climate change resistant seeds) in the agriculture sector.

¹²³ In addition to directing resources into research and various product development partnerships, it has encouraged innovation by funding the *Grand Challenges* initiative which provides grants on competitive basis for new ideas to solve development challenges in areas pre-defined by the Foundation; for more information, see <https://gcgh.grandchallenges.org/about>, last visited 29.12.2018.

*“Our Global Health division aims to reduce inequities in health by developing **new tools and strategies** to reduce the burden of infectious disease and the leading causes of child mortality in developing countries. Our Global Development Division focuses on **improving the delivery** of high-impact **health products and services** to the world’s poorest communities and helps countries expand access to health coverage.”* (Gates Foundation, 2020; emphasis added).¹²⁴

The tangible goods refer, mainly, to new diagnostics, drugs, vaccines (against tuberculosis and HIV, for instance), contraceptives and other medical products (e.g. colostrum-like formula). Some interviewees highlighted ways in which new medical products are able to overcome flaws in the existing *health systems*,¹²⁵ pointing to their superiority to investments in correcting existing defects. One particular area – *vaccines* – which receives 60 per cent of the organisation’s overall budget, was seen as a prime example of these innovative technical solutions and characterised to largely motivate the Foundation’s work in the area of global health:

“Vaccines are a key tool in all areas. Whether it’s (...) for the pneumonia, diarrhoea, whether it be even for malaria, HIV. And the reason why vaccines are so important, (...), is generally that there is such a poor infrastructure in the healthcare system that vaccine in the right form is the only tool that can transcend that.” (Gates representative 1).

“[Innovation is a key driver of the Foundation’s work in global health through] the idea that vaccines are this incredible innovation, really cost-effective intervention; and, that through both driving greater coverage of vaccines and the development of new vaccines – even for diseases that are more specific to the developing world – or lower cost versions of vaccines, they can be more accessible to people who live in low-income or lower middle income countries.” (Gates representative 3, emphasis added).

Moreover, the organisation has recently directed more attention to basic health care provision, notably in the areas of family planning and Primary Health Care (PHC). As described by the interviewees quoted below, it has sought to ‘package’ innovative health interventions under a set of priority tools and approaches as another type of public goods. Consequently, despite the more traditional area of service provision, the adopted approach differs from development of

¹²⁴ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do>, last visited 26.3.2020.

¹²⁵ Comprising as a whole, according to the WHO definition, the following building blocks: service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, access to essential medicines, financing, leadership/governance (World Health Organization, 2010).

public health facilities or staff training – popular approaches amongst Southern donors such as China or Cuba (Alcorn, 2015; Andersen, 2010; Grépin et al., 2014) as well as systems-wide approaches preferred by the WHO, for instance.

“So, we are quite focused on the basic health package, helping to find that. We are really trying to think about (...) what’s the basic package that is most essential, that most save lives, that you can build on.” (Gates representative 8).

“We are also working to define a replicable model: what is this (...) approach, how it is implemented, how could other countries take that up? [...]. So that we would end up with some sort of a (...) toolbox that could then be applied in different contexts as a public good.” (Gates representative 11).

Additionally, the Foundation has introduced innovative, technical ‘fixes’ in the area of last-mile delivery and service administration. Some key examples from the Tanzanian context include the introduction of tablets for web-based data collection at health facilities, the introduction of cold chain practices from private sector actors such as Coca Cola,¹²⁶ and working in partnership with Vodaphone to increase access to medical advice and support through smartphones (see also **appendix G**). These findings show that the Gates Foundation proposes primarily innovative, *techno-scientific* policy instruments, which draw from technological advancements and scientific discovery. In addition, by targeting narrowly defined issues, the adopted social policy instruments are also largely *vertical*. When such targeted approaches (e.g. technical fixes) are interfaced with different building blocks of existing systems (e.g. cold chains), they are also known as *diagonal* interventions (Frenk et al., 2003). This is pertinent when assessing the extent and ways in which philanthropic donors may contribute towards systems building on the ground, as will be discussed further in **chapter 8**.

The desktop study on other big philanthropies investing in the social sector for development purposes shows that the tools and approaches described here are novel and widely deployed

¹²⁶ See <http://www.getf.org/our-projects-partnerships/projectlastmile/>; last visited 13.3.2020; see also Linnander et al. (2017).

by contemporary big philanthropies (see **appendix H.**), but not completely distinctive. Vertical funds and auxiliary vertical programmes of bilateral donors (e.g. PEPFAR), for instance, have partially deployed similar instruments to the Gates Foundation. At the same time, it is worth highlighting that vertical funds such as GAVI and the Global Fund have been largely driven by the Gates Foundation itself and, unlike bilateral actors deploying vertical approaches as part of a wider instrument repertoire, these remain the sole policy measures deployed and promoted by the philanthropy. It must also be pointed out that the Foundation's social policy instruments remain redistributive (and technical, though such a category does not exist in the current literature), rather than regulatory or rights based. This draws attention to the Foundation's 'apolitical' approach in social policy, which prioritises new social sector investments rather than legislative measures.

Instruments of aid delivery: new approaches, old issues?

Different instruments of aid delivery are relevant when mapping out global policy paradigms, as they encompass mechanisms of transnational wealth redistribution. Mechanisms deployed by traditional donors are numerous, and include conditional lending to governments, General Budget Support (GBS), ear-marked Budget Support, pooled basket funding, project aid implemented by private companies or NGOs and direct provision of infrastructure, technical support, medical equipment or other goods. South-South cooperation has expanded the menu with diverse types of loans and aid delivery mechanisms included in broader economic cooperation (Bräutigam, 2014; Corkin, 2011; Dreher et al., 2015).

The Gates Foundation also has a specific format for aid delivery. For aid-receiving countries, the Foundation's programmatic *project work* is the most directly and tangibly experienced form of development assistance, and the most closely examined one in this thesis. This typically entails 3-5-year projects implemented by third parties, such as private companies

specialised in development work or large, professionalised NGOs, as is common for philanthropic aid more broadly (OECD, 2018). Out-sourced project delivery was seen by the interviewed Gates representatives as the ideal and standard way of operating for the Foundation, which appeared unable to, and uninterested in, mobilising resources for independent implementation work. Additionally, the Gates employees stressed that these projects differ from those run by INGOs (which they perceived as temporary initiatives ‘flopping’ after pilot phase), in that they are designed for long term up-take and upscaling by domestic governments and other donors, as discussed further in **chapter 6**.

Moreover, the documentary analysis highlights the Gates Foundation’s predisposition to private sector mechanisms in the context of aid delivery. Firstly, the Foundation has advanced *Performance Based Funding* (PBF; also known as Results-Based Financing, RBF), which refers to “a form of incentive where health providers are, at least partially, funded on the basis of their performance to meet targets or undertake specific actions”,¹²⁷ particularly through its work with(in) vertical funds.¹²⁸ In fact, the Global Fund’s operations are fully delivered through PBF mechanisms, under which implementing, recipient organisations (in aid-receiving countries) are granted resources for phase B of their programme on the condition that the set ‘achievable’ under phase A have been met. The Gates Foundation has also keenly advocated and provided technical support for deployment of *Development Impact Bonds* (DIBs) (also referred to as *Social Impact Bonds*) amongst global health actors.¹²⁹ DIBs consist of public-private investment structures providing returns (paid by governments) to private investors in the event of successfully conducted programmes. In 2012, the Foundation

¹²⁷ WHO definition; see http://www.who.int/health_financing/topics/performance-based-financing/en/, last visited 16.6.2018.

¹²⁸ Under its own programmatic work, the Gates Foundation has favoured PBF in its investments into US education; see e.g. <https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/07/21/study-performance-based-funding-3-states>, last visited 15.6.2018

¹²⁹ See e.g. https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/golab.prod/documents/Save_the_Children_2018_Investing_in_Maternal_and_Child_Health_-_DIBs.pdf, last visited 27.8.2020.

also established, together with J.P. Morgan, the *Global Health Investment Fund*, one of the world's largest social impact investment funds supporting development of innovative products for use in resource-limited settings.¹³⁰

Another example of amalgamating private sector methods and aid delivery are profit-generating activities under *Program-Related Investments* (PRIs) – which the Gates Foundation frequently makes under its own programmatic work. The Foundation's first profitable aid activities were launched in 2009 and the organisation has introduced a variety of financial mechanisms from the above-mentioned DIBs to debt, equity and guarantee investments in social enterprises and other initiatives seen to further its programmatic goals (e.g. Brest et al., 2016; Salamon, 2014). These investments are executed by the Foundation's *Strategic Investment Fund*,¹³¹ and as the following statement (from a previously published interview by the Foundation's director of PRIs) illustrates, they too are largely geared towards ensuring measurable results.

“We’re very aggressive in negotiating with our partners and our companies to deliver on the metrics to show that they’ve created that impact. (...) In the markets in which we work—where we’re focused on the poorest populations and we’re trying to solve market failures—we’re pretty conscious that we should be providing a subsidy and that the subsidy is valuable and enabling us to get toward impact.” (Brest et al., 2016, p. 6).

These aid modalities deployed and promoted by the Gates Foundation are specifically designed to achieve maximum impact in a short time period within pre-defined areas of interest. The desktop study on leading big philanthropies and the existing literature on philanthropy more generally shows that these approaches have been widely adopted and promoted by philanthropic donors. The world's first health care DIB launched in 2017 (with the aim of reducing mother and child deaths in India), for instance, was implemented by a

¹³⁰ See <http://www.ghif.com/>, last visited 3.7.2020.

¹³¹ See for actual portfolio and investments at <https://sif.gatesfoundation.org/>, last visited 3.7.2020.

consortium of partners with UBS Optimus Foundation as the upfront funder.¹³² It is also important to note that these modalities are not advancing only private sector methods in aid delivery, but also private sector providers. This accentuates further the deeply ingrained connection between contemporary big philanthropies and the private sector.

5.5 GATES FOUNDATION AND PROCESSES OF POLICY MAKING

The data on the Gates Foundation's public policy objectives, instruments and overall approaches was augmented by further information on the internal processes of decision-making and policy formation within the organisation. This enables a more nuanced understanding of the drivers and motivations behind the Foundation's policy objectives and instruments, and the ways in which these may be affected by other dominant approaches and actors within the global development community. This section explores some of the key features characterising processes of policy making by the Gates Foundation and discusses their theoretical relevance and distinctiveness in comparison to state-led processes of social policy making.

Internal agenda-setting drawing on evidence, opportunities and individual interests

The Gates Foundation's official discourse builds systematically around the narrative of 'evidence-based' policy making, scientifically proven development solutions and apolitical approaches focused on results and impact. It is thus unsurprising that the Foundation interviewees highlighted *evidence* of the global burden of disease¹³³ as a key driver behind the organisation's agenda-setting. However, *opportunities* for relatively quick and important

¹³² See e.g. <https://www.convergence.finance/news-and-events/news/21DGff2v0MmUcA284AmYcc/view>, last visited 27.8.2020.

¹³³ These perspectives refer to the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) health metrics generated by the Gates-funded IHME; see <http://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about>, last visited 9.3.2020.

advancements were also cited as drivers in the selection of priority policy areas, echoing guiding principles of other big philanthropies (see **appendix H.**). As such, the described evidence-based processes seeking to identify ‘issue prevalence’ were reported as being combined with a parallel objective of collecting the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (i.e. making investments where results could be easily achieved). Indeed, numerous interview respondents referred to the un-tapped opportunities in different areas of health, and the sector more broadly, due to a lack of investment in innovation and minimal use of private sector capacities. Interestingly, these issue- and opportunity focused logics were also mentioned in the context of geographical targeting of deciding which regions and countries to target:

“The Gates Foundation is investing specifically in diseases that cause the most significant mortality. So it really is a numbers game. (...) and then the few neglected tropical diseases where nobody else will intervene and with a limited amount of funding you can achieve really significant impact and eliminate or eradicate a specific disease because there is a way to do it.” (Gates representative 2).

“Those three priority sub-regions include the greater Mekong – because of the threat of drug resistance in that area; Southern Africa – to demonstrate what can already be done in the African continent in areas of relatively low transmission compared to the rest of the continent; and also in Middle-America/the Caribbean – where the technical feasibility is such that it represents the low-hanging fruit”. (Gates representative 7).

The interview respondents added *ethical* and *interest* -based drivers to those discussed above, challenging the purely pragmatic nature of the Foundation’s policy formation processes. As established previously, the interviewees saw health inequities between the Global South and the Global North as morally indefensible, while also underscoring the co-chairs’ deep commitment to improving the health of the disadvantaged. The philanthropists’ personal attachments were also considered to have shaped the Foundation’s actual policy objectives and target populations (see quotations below).

“Bill and Melinda have a very personal connection to these issues. I think more than 15 years ago, they were quite moved by the fact that there are people dying from preventable diseases like rotavirus (...) that haven’t since been killers in the US, and

really strongly felt sort of at a personal conviction level that, as our vision says – ‘all lives have equal value’.” (Gates representative 8).

“So, we may choose to work in malaria because it is something that the co-chairs are passionate about (...). But once we said we will work on malaria, we started looking at the evidence (...).” (Gates representative 7).

“Also I would say, that for Melinda Gates, for example, family planning and the wider set of maternal and newborn, child health, is a big priority for her.” (Gates representative 8).

“They know what they want. (...) ‘we will find a vaccine against everything’. Then ‘we will do innovation around everything in the world’ (...). Then, ‘we want to eradicate malaria by the lifetime of Bill’. Its him who sets the tone, it is obvious that the themes they evolve according to what the big man wants (...). They don’t have a board or a forum that truly would inform the strategy (...).” (Development expert 5).

Selection of policy issues and beneficiary populations according to idiosyncratic preferences is intrinsically linked to philanthropic giving. In his theory of ‘voluntary failure’ (1987), Salamon terms these characterising features of public policy making by philanthropies as *philanthropic paternalism* and *philanthropic particularism*, respectively. He underscores the distinctiveness of private foundations as public policy makers whose organisational characteristics translate into new approaches to policy formation. The findings here also corroborate previous accounts of policy entrepreneurs, who have been argued to “*pay attention to things they care about, or are already familiar with*” (Cairney, 2018, p. 203) and pursue policy agendas defined by self-interests (Cohen, 2016; Mintrom and Norman, 2009). While the motivations and interests of big philanthropies as independent donor agencies are arguably complex and not easily substantiated (see **chapter 1**), it is evident that they hold a much more prominent role in defining policy priorities and key approaches of policy agendas advanced by philanthropic donors than democratically defined needs and solutions.

Big philanthropies and the policy making process: between independence and isomorphism

From a theoretical perspective, the findings presented in this section bring new insights to our understanding of the *policy making process* by private foundations. The existing *policy cycle*

literature, descriptive of public policy making by governments, typically describes public policy making as a set of chronological phases through which social problems gain public attention and become under government scrutiny, leading to new policy measures, reforms or non-change.¹³⁴ Knoepfel et al. (2007) explain such processes to be ignited by collective action (e.g. new social movements), interest groups (e.g. political lobbies), electorate preferences, media attention or shock events (e.g. an environmental catastrophe) which pressure governments to incorporate new public issues into processes of democratic debate and decision making (2007). The *Advocacy Coalition Framework* (ACF) developed by Sabatier (1987; see also Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), challenges the linear perception of public policy making and emphasises the role of advocacy networks in shaping and potentially stalling the process at any given ‘phase’. Despite their disagreements, both policy cycle and the ACF literatures – and many other related theoretical propositions (see e.g. Zahariadis, 2016) – emphasise the diverse pressures, lobbyists and electoral motivations that influence government policy making.

The evidence of this thesis shows that for big philanthropies, in comparison, the relationship between problem recognition and intervention is more straight forward. Rather than facing public demands and consistent public debate, philanthropic social policy making occurs largely behind closed doors by virtue of being isolated from public accountability mechanisms, institutions of public policy making and democratic legislative requirements (Nickel and Eikenberry, 2010). Since their resources represent independent endowments, big philanthropies can also avoid pressures from different revenue-generating stakeholders (e.g. important companies, employer coalitions). Philanthropic social policy actors are therefore

¹³⁴ These are understood to involve *emergence of a problem* (raising awareness of a problem), *agenda-setting* (definition and selection of a policy problem), *policy formulation and decision making* (definition of policy objectives and instruments), *implementation* (execution and enforcement of a policy) and *evaluation* (identification of results and unintended consequences, re-modifications) (see Werner and Wegrich, 2007; Knoepfel et al. 2007).

able to make policy decisions more directly based on their individual interests or criteria used for assessing the relevance of different social problems for their mission.

Yet, the findings revealed that in many aspects, the Gates Foundation's policy agenda was fluid and dynamic. As already mentioned, the Foundation holds a growing interest in PHC and women's rights, while it also explores the area of continuous professional education and develops new strategies in the area of health insurance. These policy areas are somewhat different from the Foundation's initial *techno-scientific* and *vertical* approaches by virtue of their linkage with welfare *systems* and social *rights*. The interviewees gave various explanations for this apparent transformation, the most important one relating to internal policy learning, particularly by the Foundation's leaders, especially concerning the importance of effective delivery. Others included independent initiative-taking by individual employees with different policy interests and experience and – interestingly – external pressures from aid-receiving governments (notably Ethiopia) and global policy agendas such as those of the SDGs and Universal Health Coverage (see quotations below).

“We spend a lot of time in meetings and discussions negotiating and compromising. It probably is the notion that if you wanted to proceed the most rapidly you would just do things by yourself. As if you were in a company and you own the company and you will just do it by yourself. That is not possible in the global health area, you got many actors (...).” (Gates representative 1).

“(...) over time they have really realised that unless we understand primary health care really well, it will be difficult to increase in a more sustainable way the coverage of those key interventions. [...] This is a new interest in the Foundation, and we are trying to see what will be the best way we can support.” (Gates representative 6).

“And I think that we are figuring out as a Foundation...we are 15 years old...what our presence looks like on the ground. [...] I think a large part of that is the Ethiopian government saying ‘look, you know, we want you to be responsive to our needs as Ministry of Health’ (...).” (Gates representative 11).

However, it appears that despite the Gates Foundation's new interest in PHC, which it considers to be a contribution towards the achievement of UHC goals, its actual policy

approaches (as narrowly defined ‘policy packages’) do not operationalise a fully new direction (i.e. third order change; Hall, 1993). Also, the novel focus on gender equality is easily interpreted as an expansion towards rights-based thinking, while the actual interventions remain technical rather than politically transformative (see also findings by Mahajan, 2018) and overwhelmingly driven by the productivist rationale discussed earlier. Nevertheless, these perspectives on the ongoing adjustments and discursive changes within the Foundation reflect some of the real-world complexities of global social policy making, which remain relevant even for politically and financially independent actors such as private foundations (see also Fejerskov, 2015). They are also in line with views by sociological neo-institutionalists who have emphasised that policy actors may be influenced by the norms, values and isomorphic pressures of the social environments in which they are embedded (e.g. Meyer, 2010; Meyer et al., 1997).

5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter sought to elucidate the social policy ideas, approaches and agendas of contemporary big philanthropies and establish whether there is a new and coherent ‘global social policy paradigm’ emerging. This concluding section will summarise the key findings and discuss their analytical relevance for current understandings of competing models in global social policy and the distinctiveness of big philanthropies as global social policy actors.

Summary

Based on the concept components of a ‘global social policy paradigm’ defined in **chapter 3**, this chapter examined the underlying ideologies, policy objectives, and policy instruments exhibited, deployed and promoted by the Gates Foundation and philanthropic donors more

generally. The chapter demonstrates that big philanthropies have adopted a ‘social investment’ model that pursues inclusive economic growth by bolstering individuals’ assets to build their productive capacities. The advanced policy model is guided by ideals of short-term pragmatism and imminent, large-scale impact, drawing on the comparative advantages of different public, private and third sector actors in social policy making and delivery.

Moreover, the identified approach prioritises targeted vertical programmes and projects, which promote new public goods, technical ‘fixes’ and innovative services, or ‘policy packages’ drawing on data, new technologies, scientific discovery and innovation. It thus differs from comprehensive measures seeking to expand and strengthen public welfare systems, and approaches that emphasise social justice and universalist welfare provision. The adopted instruments of aid delivery rely on largely donor-controlled mechanisms of project aid, Performance-Based Funding and profitable impact investments.

Discussion: philanthropic paradigm emerging?

The findings of this chapter point to a distinct social policy model, driven by a combination of philanthropic values and business-style pragmatism, sometimes referred to as *philanthrocapitalism* (Bishop and Green, 2015, 2009). The underlying rationale is that capitalism needs ‘fixing’ – with the aid of philanthropic endeavour – to respond to the most pressing public *issues*. For the Gates Foundation, the elimination of the primary, global obstacles (e.g. epidemics, financial exclusion) which are ‘locking’ the economic capacities of the poorest populations is the best approach to spurring *development*.

The findings suggest that the Gates Foundation also holds a ‘philanthrocapitalist’ view of the ideal arrangements of social policy formation and delivery through the welfare mix. Importantly, it sees itself as an ideal connector between global businesses and domestic


development needs in the Global South, which is neglected as a source of profitable markets. In addition, the Foundation stresses the moral responsibility and competence of the world's wealthy elite to redistribute wealth transnationally through *catalytic* investments, while supporting the role of domestic governments as a necessary locus for legal administration and potential upscaling of introduced interventions. In all of this, big philanthropies are presented as 'great minds', capitalising on the technology and innovation existing in the private sector for use in public policy making. Meanwhile, implementing NGOs, states and other donors represent the 'muscle', responsible for launching, upscaling and sustaining novel development solutions.

In many regards, the views and approaches of the Gates Foundation presented in this chapter appear as a shadow from the past. In 1889, Andrew Carnegie's famous publication '*The Gospel of Wealth*' described private philanthropy under the liberal American political regime of 'intense individualism'. In his writing, Carnegie contemplated philanthropic giving as a necessary redistributive mechanism between the extremely wealthy and the poor, leading to far superior gains in wellbeing than might be achieved by public welfare provision. These principles were deeply held and shared by the early mega philanthropies of the 20th century (the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford Foundations) who believed "*that they had the answers – based on their experiences of the first 30 to 40 years of the century – to the world's problems and a duty (alongside their government) to mobilize knowledge to solve those problems*" (Parmar, 2002, p. 16). As explicated by Parmar (2002), their motivations were utilitarian, scientific, technocratic and elitist, and characterised by large investments in individuals, think tanks and research organisations – in other words, just like those of the Gates Foundation.

Nevertheless, while the current literature has largely debated the 'novelty' of contemporary big philanthropy (see Cunningham, 2015; Soskis and Katz, 2016), it has been widely accepted

that big philanthropies operating in the 21st century are investing more intensely, collaborating with leading private, public and third sector actors more extensively, and infiltrating public policy making arenas more systematically than their antecedents. As the Gates Foundation clearly illustrates, this has led to the creation of specific social policy agendas and instruments in the development context, revolutionising ideas of how development may be spurred. This chapter therefore argues that the views and approaches promoted by the Gates Foundation are indicative of a coherent philanthropic policy paradigm (see **figure 5.1**). Despite the fact that no other previous or current global social policy paradigm contains this particular combination of policy instruments, objectives and ideological foundations, an important level of continuity and overlap with other policy models can be observed.

Figure 5.1 Ideal type ‘philanthropic policy paradigm’



Source: own production

The philanthropic paradigm advances economic growth and private sector actors and methods much like the Washington Consensus, while it does not promote market freedom *per se* and advocates for increased investment in the social sector. Neither is it driven by the objective of developing national industries – as is the case for the Asian Developmental Model – despite

its clearly productivist dimension. Instead, the focus remains on boosting individuals' *assets* (e.g. good health, access to financial services and modern agricultural tools) in order to enable their economic participation through an *issue*-focused approach promoting *global policy goals* (such as total elimination of malaria).

Moreover, the Foundation's *social policy instruments* explored in this chapter differ from those of other leading global actors, such as WHO and European bilateral donors, who have emphasised health systems development through Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) (Brugha et al., 2014, p. 31). The difference from instruments favoured by Southern donors such as investing in health systems through infrastructure, medical equipment, staff or technical assistance (Abdenur, 2015; Bräutigam, 2014; Dreher et al., 2013; Quadir, 2013), is also palpable. The Foundation's social policy tools consist largely of technical new *global public goods* – such as vaccines, diagnostics tools and data, *technical fixes* in existing systems or innovative approaches to service provision through '*policy packages*'. In fact, the Foundation's pragmatic approach appears to be driven by a rejection of what is perceived as outdated, extant solutions and inefficient, bureaucratic, systems.

These findings corroborate previous accounts on philanthropies emanating from Silicon Valley's tech- and finance businesses, which are considered to be forerunners in promoting innovative, techno-scientific, private-sector oriented solutions in development (Birn, 2014; Bishop and Green, 2009; Ulbert and Hamm, 2011). These interpretations are further strengthened by the conducted desktop study examining the guiding principles and primary approaches of other major philanthropies operating in development. As exhibited in the summarising information table in **appendix H.**, also other leading philanthropic donors from the West have systematically promoted innovation, technology and science as solutions to development and social policy issues. The findings of this study also confirm the

consensus across the broader literature that big philanthropies push for new forms of global wealth redistribution through business-inspired *aid modalities* (e.g. Menkhoff, 2010; OECD, 2014; Salamon, 2014; Schervish, 2014), distinguishable from the approaches characterising other development actors (see **table 5.1**). Indeed, the examined leading big philanthropies have systematically advanced private sector approaches to development investment (such as PBF and profitable investments) and the role of non-state actors as key partners in development implementation.

Interestingly, the underlying principles that may be associated with contemporary big philanthropies are most clearly evident in Third Way thinking, prominent from the late 1990s up until early 2000s (see **chapter 2**). Underpinned by the view that poor populations lack the necessary assets to fully realise their economic capacity, the model constitutes an instrumental ‘social investment’ approach. The focus on inclusive growth, emphasis on pragmatism, prioritisation of PPPs, interest in comparative advantages of the private sector and commitment to civic responsibilities are all features characteristic of Third Way politics within the West (and, in great part, the OECD, WB and IMF) in the given time period (Ball, 2007; Giddens, 2013, 1999; Porter and Craig, 2004; Surender, 2004). As such, it contrasts with approaches that pursue social justice or social equality through universal welfare systems. It is also differentiated from other paradigms and previous Third Way approaches by its emphasis on private sector methods and targeted vertical interventions (focusing on specific diseases or targets as opposed to broader system-wide objectives) that prioritise innovation, use of data and technology.

Table 5.1 Classification of global social policy paradigms

PARADIGM	Worldview	View of Development & Normative Realm	Perceived policy problems	Welfare Mix	Development Axis	Population coverage	SP Instruments & Aid Modalities
Post WW2	Keynesian	Social and economic development National realm	Poor welfare provision, inequality	State-led	Infrastructure, basic welfare services	Universal	Investments in public health and education services, infrastructure Loans, ODA
Washington Consensus	Neo-liberal	Economic growth Global realm	Heavy public sector, regulated markets	Market-led	Private sector expansion, FDI	Means-testing	Public service privatisation and marketisation, market de-regulation Conditional lending
PWC	Third Way	Inclusive growth, social and economic development Global & national realms	Corruption, extreme poverty, development with inequality	Hybrid, new focus on civil society	Instrumental social policies across sectors	Pro-poor, targeted	Basic social assistance (<i>Safety Nets</i>), Good Governance -measures Budget Support, basket funding, PBF
Universalist Approaches (UN institutions)	Social rights - based	Social development, social justice, social transformation National realm	Weak social protection, inequality, social injustice	State-led	Comprehensive welfare services	Universal	Public provision of basic services, institutional rights (<i>Social Protection Floors</i>) Diverse modalities
Asian Developmental Model	Productivist	Economic growth National realm & South-South cooperation	Poor integration to world economy	State-led	Infrastructure, education, health care	Productive population	Development of national industries through public service provision Loans, project aid, economic cooperation
Philanthropic Paradigm	'Philanthro-capitalist'	Inclusive economic growth Primarily global, secondarily national	Locked capacities (assets) due to poor access to modern 'goods' and 'tools'	Hybrid: emphasis on private sector, PPPs and private foundations	Philanthropy-specific	Pro-poor, issue-centred targeting	Technical tools, policy packages (<i>Global Public Goods</i>) Project aid, PBF, profitable investments

Source: own production

It is important, however, to emphasise that big philanthropies work in different policy areas, due to foundation-dependent *foci* (while there are also some widely shared policy interests, such as family planning; see **appendix H.**). Therefore, it is not the Gates Foundation's overwhelming interest in the health sector and its investments in eliminating infectious diseases that characterises the philanthropic paradigm. Rather, it is the very *nature* of these approaches, and the key *drivers* behind the decision making that leads to these identified policy agendas that are of theoretical relevance. Indeed, the policy goals and instruments advanced by philanthropies are largely *vertical* (i.e. focused on narrowly defined issues, not holistic systems or questions of social justice) and *technoscientific* (i.e. technical, drawing from scientific discovery), differing from rights-based and system-wide approaches.

The actual policy areas where the techno-scientific approaches become operationalised are selected by processes unique to private foundations. The examination of the Gates Foundation demonstrates that these processes are driven by a combination of individual preferences, ethical considerations and pragmatic variables. In particular, *evidence* of the severity of the public problems addressed and the efficiency of the chosen approaches is frequently cited as a key justification for the causes and approaches pursued by private foundations. This creates a paradox that has sparked a range of debates: namely, that while big philanthropies have been widely regarded as champions of data-driven approaches, many have pointed to the capricious way of setting policy agendas based on the preferences of individual philanthropists or small boards of foundations (Edwards, 2011; McGoey, 2015; Moran, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015). A third driver behind the Gates Foundation's agenda-setting emerged from the data, and one which remains so far unobserved in the existing literature. This consists of un-tapped *opportunities* for quick impact in particular policy areas. While on the face of things this seems a reasonable and effective approach, it may also lead to a situation where more

complex and challenging problems might be ignored distorting attention and resources to a narrow set of objectives.

Finally, it is important to stress that the identified philanthropic paradigm remains an ‘ideal type’ and not a perfect replication of reality. While this ‘model’ largely represents contemporary philanthropic aid (see also **appendix H.**), there are important exceptions. The Ford Foundation, in particular, has made an important shift from business-oriented ideals (while still deploying similar investment mechanisms to other big philanthropies).¹³⁵ Nevertheless, the paradigm should be considered an important source of pragmatic ideas and normative understandings for global social policy practice, and the expansion of its ideational influence within the global community has been recognised (e.g. Birn, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015). The next chapter examines how, and by which means and strategies, big philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation seek to further their ideologies, policy objectives and instruments at global and domestic levels.

¹³⁵ This is reflected in the Foundation President Darren Walker’s message in 2015: “*We foundations need to reject inherited, assumed, paternalist instincts—an impulse to put grant-making rather than change making at the center of our worldview. [...] We need to interrogate the fundamental root causes of inequality, even, and especially, when it means that we ourselves will be implicated.*”; See <https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/toward-a-new-gospel-of-wealth/>, last visited 3.7.2020.

6. BIG PHILANTHROPY IN DEVELOPMENT – NEW APPROACHES TO TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY TRANSFER?

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter investigated the extent to which a new and distinct ‘philanthropic policy paradigm’ is emerging, one which competes for global influence with other concurrent social policy models. Hall (2013) argues that shifts in dominant paradigms have historically required a *motivation*, *means* and a *motor* (see also 1993). In the context of global social policy, the multifaceted issues of development represent an ongoing *motivation* for policy change. Issues such as absolute poverty, strained livelihoods and health epidemics continue to place pressure on the global development community to act, whilst not consisting of discrete external shocks as such. At the same time, the global development space is home to numerous *motors* – a variety of development actors competing for policy influence (see Daigneault, 2014).

Turning to the second research question of this thesis, the central focus of this chapter is to understand big philanthropies as a *motor* for global paradigmatic change and, more precisely, their *means* of disseminating novel policy ideas and approaches. The investigation will be informed by theories of *policy transfer*, which have focused on explicating how policies (such as those promoted by big philanthropies) ‘travel’ from policy senders to policy adopters, and how these processes may be strategically instigated by donor agencies in the context of development assistance. In addition to traditional Social Policy literature, relevant works and concepts from the fields of International Relations and Politics will also be referred to in examining both the sources of authority from which private foundations may draw and the factors affecting their legitimacy as global *policy entrepreneurs*.

This chapter highlights several practical and theoretical questions concerning the role of big philanthropies as aid donors and global social policy makers. Externally-driven policy transfer processes require *power* – be it financial resources, political mandate, scientific expertise, hegemonic influence or other (Evans, 2018). Historically, policy transfer embedded in aid delivery has often involved coercion through aid conditionalities, inducement through pre-designed projects and programmes, coaxing by use of broader political or commercial pressure points, or persuasion through policy expertise and branding (e.g. Appuhami et al., 2011; Dobbin et al., 2007; Drezner, 2004). Questions remain as to whether and how private foundations use power and create pressure on aid-receiving governments and other development organisations to adopt their promoted agendas and approaches. These knowledge gaps are also relevant to the development of a body of knowledge on policy transfer strategies and mechanisms involving non-state actors in the development context more broadly.

Big philanthropies were previously perceived to lack the authority of leading financial institutions and international organisations (Shiffman, 2014). However, their recent rise and impact has galvanised debate on the nature and exertion of power in global health. Youde (2019) has accentuated the importance of scrutinising the Gates Foundation in particular, since the organisation “*occupies a position of authority due to its wealth, shapes the context of various global health initiatives through its creation and dissemination of relevant knowledge, and uses a personalised basis for claiming authority for its operations and activities*” (2019, p. 53). In assessing the distinctiveness of big philanthropies as global social policy actors, it is essential to examine their sources of authority from a theoretical perspective. In more pragmatic and normative terms, this is also key to debating the acceptable basis of legitimacy upon which policy actors engage in global social policy making. Further, focussing on processes of transnational policy transfer instigated by big

philanthropies allows to observe contemporary forms of policy making within aid-receiving countries and the broader sphere of global governance (see Evans, 2018). Transnational policy influences are particularly salient in the Global South, where policy transfer instruments and coercion through aid resources ‘dominate and inform’ processes of domestic policy making (Tambulasi, 2013).

The aims of this chapter are three-fold. The chapter seeks, firstly, to explore the primary *sources of authority* from which big philanthropies may draw to prompt policy change. This will also help reveal the extent of any *limitations* experienced by private foundations as global social ‘policy entrepreneurs’. Secondly, the chapter aims to understand their *strategies of policy transfer* at global and domestic levels. The chapter’s third core question addresses the extent to which contemporary big philanthropies represent different and *distinctive means and mechanisms of policy transfer*. The analysis draws upon multiple sources of evidence: interview data collected from the global development community; with the Foundation representatives; its implementing partners; and, to a lesser extent, documentary analysis and other evidence of the Gates Foundation’s activities.

The chapter begins by exploring ways in which the Gates Foundation exploits *normative and epistemic power* to gain legitimacy as a global policy maker and promote its policy approaches. The second section investigates the Gates Foundation’s engagement with and within different *networks* within the global development community at large and in the specific context of Tanzania. The analysis also explores how the organisation seeks to instigate processes of policy transfer within (and across) these levels of governance. The third section is interested in understanding whether and in what ways the Gates Foundation’s *financial resources* represent a source of power and pressure in driving policy reform amongst beneficiary actors. The concluding discussion focuses on the distinctiveness of private

foundations as a motor for paradigmatic change, in comparison to other development actors (e.g. IFIs, UN institutions and bilateral donors), and discusses the observed mechanisms of policy transfer.

6.2 DRAWING FROM NORMATIVE AND EPISTEMIC POWER – OVERCOMING ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY

The Gates Foundation has emerged as a major global health actor, while it continues to face criticism over its perceived self-interests and, as it follows, its legitimacy as a public policy maker, both globally and in specific aid-receiving countries. *Legitimacy*¹³⁶ represents a foundational aspect of the authority required for public policy making (Avant et al., 2010), and is therefore a pivotal factor in, if not a precondition of, transnational policy transfer. This section explores how the Gates Foundation draws from unique sources of normative and epistemic authority to overcome its legitimacy challenges and enhance its global social policy influence.

Private foundations as global social policy actors – questions of legitimacy

Questions of legitimacy are particularly relevant in the post-colonial countries of the Global South, where the state has been criticised as a weak and democratically inept political apparatus. Its legitimacy has come under scrutiny due to lack of capacity, ethnic favouritism and single party systems, which have been argued by some to result in neo-patrimonialism, corruption and political oppression (e.g. Gough and Wood, 2004; Van de Walle, 2001). It is against this background that NGOs were promoted (by Western donors and the local civil society) as effective development deliverers and representatives of bottom-up democracy

¹³⁶ Understood in the classic definition by Suchman (1995) as “a generalized conceptions or assumptions that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (1995, p. 75).

from the 1980s onwards (see **chapter 2**). Legitimacy also sparks debate in the context of global governance, where powerful individual states have been criticised for exerting disproportionate power over more marginalised countries, especially from the Global South.

Scholte and Tallberg (2018) propose that actors of global governance typically gain legitimacy from their *democratic procedures* (e.g. accountability, democratic decision-making), *technocratic expertise* in policy making (e.g. evidence-based approaches) and *fairness* (e.g. political neutrality, lack of commercial interests), as well as the actual *policy performance* under these three categories (e.g. strengthening democratic institutions, yielding positive policy outcomes and contributing towards empowerment of the disadvantaged; see **table 6.1**).

Table 6.1 Sources of legitimacy in global governance

	Democratic	Technocratic	Fair
Procedure	Participation	Efficiency	Impartiality
	Accountability	Expertise	Proportionality
Performance	Democracy promotion in wider society	Problem solving Collective gains	Human dignity Distributive justice

Source: Scholte & Tallberg (2018, p. 62)

Third sector actors have typically been considered as impartial and *fair* policy actors, by virtue of the fact that their engagement with issues of social justice is unlike that of profit-seeking private businesses and public sector actors driven by political motives (e.g. Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Ott, 2001; Weisbrod, 1994). This assumption is also reflected in public attitudes towards big philanthropies. As stressed by Nickel and Eikenberry (2010), *governmental social policy* is systematically kept in check by public debate and contestation, while *philanthropic social policy* lacks democratic deliberations and continues to be perceived by the wider public as an apolitical, private act of good-will. In addition, the direction of

wealth by the super-rich away from private consumption and towards public causes continues to be praised, as it is not axiomatically associable with political or financial interests (e.g. I'Anson and Pfeifer, 2013; Reich, 2006). In fact, the sheer semantics of philanthropy, 'love for human kind', proclaims an ideology that protects philanthropic foundations from public criticism and debate (Jung and Harrow, 2015).

Yet, the unbiased nature of philanthropic giving by the world's wealthiest individuals has been disputed by a number of academics and civil society organisations. This has largely stemmed from the fact that private foundations lack *democratic procedure legitimacy* as individual policy entrepreneurs. Unlike multilateral agencies or bilateral donors, private foundations are deprived of political mandate. They also differ from Community Based Organisations (CBOs), which are deeply embedded in their respective communities. Instead, big philanthropies lack transparency and remain largely accountable to themselves (or their narrow directing boards) without being subject to official requirements of accountability and, as such, are arguably some of the least democratic development actors. (Edwards, 2011; Stone, 2012a p. 495, 2010). As interviews indicate, this lack of democratic legitimacy (and recognition of this deficit within the global development community) was acknowledged by Gates representatives. Interviewees recognised the organisation's philanthropic status as being a limiting factor in participating in democratic processes of global governance, underscoring dependence on those with political mandate.

"(...) we are not a sovereign state, so we didn't participate in the same capacity as a country does in the in the SDG process (...)." (Gates representative 3).

"(...) we fully support the WHO mandates. We are a philanthropy, so we don't have a specific point of view because we follow the WHO in moving forward (...)." (Gates representative 6).

"Now, I often look at that thing of influence, and people say that 'you have influence', 'they have too much influence'" (Gates representative 1).

Another salient drawback related to the role of private foundations as policy actors in the development context emerges from the data: potential conflicts of interest. The philanthropic sector has received criticism for accruing the wealth of multinational corporations with which it engages under diverse structures. Receiving charitable grants and gaining access to new, untapped markets in the Global South, the world's largest businesses are seen to benefit significantly from the development work carried out by big philanthropies (e.g. Curtis, 2016; McGoey, 2015). A quick look at the Gates Foundation's awarded grants provides a range of examples: the 2010 grant of 4.8 USD million to Vodacom to further financial inclusion in Tanzania through its mobile money service; a 16.5 USD million allocated to Pfizer Inc. in 2016 to develop a vaccine against group B streptococcus; and awarding Merck Sharp & Dohme B.V. 8 USD million in 2019 to increase the production and subsidise the sale of contraceptives to FP2020 countries, such as Tanzania.^{137 138}

As elaborated in **chapter 7**, concerns about profit-seeking motivations were evident in this study, reflecting cracks in the credibility (i.e. *fairness*) of private foundations as fully charitable social policy actors. This underscores the issues arising from the self-serving motivations of policy entrepreneurs from the perspective of instigating policy transfer, which may be challenged by potential adopting actors on the grounds of suspicion of, or confusion over, the motivations and actual benefits of adopting the proposed approaches.

‘Moral authority’, the celebrity factor and policy transfer

The findings suggest that the Gates Foundation has adopted several strategies to overcome legitimacy challenges. Firstly, the documentary analysis shows that in its various public statements and actions the Gates Foundation seeks *self-legitimation* through the disseminated

¹³⁷ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/how-we-work/quick-links/grants-database>, last visited 28.3.2020.

¹³⁸ The Foundation has also been observed to promote strong Intellectual Property (IP) while endorsing facilitated testing and launching of products into markets – argued to benefit the big pharma industry and hamper the production of generic drugs by low income countries (e.g. McGoey, 2015). See also <https://www.keionline.org/22181>, last visited 1.4.2019.

narrative that Bill and Melinda's moral convictions drive their philanthropic commitments. The Foundation has, for instance, stressed Melinda Gates' keen interest in empowering mothers and girls, a narrative that serves to strengthen its image as a deeply caring philanthropy (see also Harman, 2016).¹³⁹ Another compelling example of the Foundation's image building is the 2019 Netflix documentary series '*Inside Bill's brain: decoding Bill Gates*', which explores Bill Gates' ambitious goal of resolving the issues that threaten the future of humanity. These examples reflect arguments by Avant et al. (2010), who posit that policy entrepreneurs justify their motivations for engaging in public policy making by highlighting the *public good* they seek to achieve, in order to gain 'moral authority'. This moral authority, in turn, may be expected to enable big philanthropies to overcome some of the legitimacy deficits related to democratic and fair procedures and outcomes.

Moreover, big philanthropies established by world famous public personalities and "*charity projects fronted and, in the public mind, defined by celebrities*" constitute a particular form of philanthropy termed 'celanthropy' (Rojek, 2014, p. 127). For such conspicuous organisations, the celanthropy status implies a range of advantages. For one, though the celebrity factor does not represent legitimacy in global governance as such, it allows the organisation to benefit from popularity with the general public and draw attention away from issues of legitimacy to focus instead on benevolent action. Leaders of celanthropies are also equipped with 'charismatic authority' (e.g. Harman, 2016), which allows them to promote their proposed policy agendas and approaches in uniquely effective ways. Indeed, the interview data systematically highlighted the world-famous co-chairs and compelling brand name of the Gates Foundation as an exceptional comparative advantage in promoting the Foundation's work. As the below quotations illustrate, the charismatic authority of the Foundation leaders

¹³⁹ The Foundation co-chair has also recently published a best-selling book on the topic, 'The Moment of Lift: How Empowering Women Changes the World' (see Gates, 2019).

allowed the organisation to raise media visibility for their promoted policies and capture the attention of policy practitioners across the globe.

“At the global level, I think that’s where the Foundation is most successful because we have so many relationships, and Bill and Melinda have such a strong and influential voice that at the global level the Foundation has had a lot of impact over the last fifteen years.” (Gates representative 12).

“They have an enormous convening and messaging power, right, partly because of the resources and partly because of who they are. Because of this, they can get attention and headlines, and attention on issues, which is powerful.” (Development expert 9).

“(…) because they have a brand name – they can easily influence other donors (…).” (Implementing organisation representative 6).

Naturally, celebrity status also facilitates access to influential organisations and individuals, who may be key to enhancing the Foundation’s policy advocacy and dissemination (see Barkan, 2013). This is not only an advantage, but a need; Gates interviewees alluded to the improved image of the Foundation’s work under consortiums, which points to enhanced democratic *legitimacy*. These findings corroborate arguments put forth by Stone (2010, 2012a), who has claimed that non-state actors are particularly inclined to seek partnerships with established international organisations and governments as a legitimisation strategy.

“It’s much stronger effort if we can find partners, I think (…). Even if we can bring in other funders at a much lower level, it makes a huge difference to how people view that as a more general endorsement as opposed to the Gates foundation doing something that is unilateral.” (Gates representative 1).

‘Moral authority’ related to philanthropic action and ‘charismatic authority’ gained through celebrity status ought to be considered as some of the distinctive sources of authority in processes of policy transfer for large private foundations. However, these forms of normative power become particularly compelling when coupled with epistemic authority; as the extant literature informs, policy entrepreneurs typically draw on evidence-based arguments alongside persuasive techniques in order to encourage other policy actors to adopt their preferred approaches (Cairney, 2018; Cohen, 2016; Mintrom and Norman, 2009).

Epistemic authority and evidence-based policy transfer

Hall (2013) acknowledges that transnational spread of policy paradigms involves legitimisation of problem-definitions, policy agendas and pragmatic approaches through knowledge creation and dissemination. During the Washington Consensus, for instance, the WB and the IMF created a normative space in which neoliberal ideology and austerity politics were hegemonised through the new ‘*international economics scholarship*’ (Babb, 2013). Also emergent Southern donors, and China in particular, have gained expertise-based legitimacy, which derives from policy knowledge based on actual and recent experiences of development.

Private foundations lack actual first-hand experience of national development and the long-term expertise held by diverse organisations operating in international development since the World War II. However, the Gates Foundation has earned a unique expert status in global health, thanks to its investments in cutting-edge research. The organisation acts as the primary financier of the world’s topmost health metrics database developed by the *Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation* (IHME) which informs its work; publishes research funded by its own platform *Gates Open Research*; and, supports global health publications in the prestigious medical journal *the Lancet*. Recently, the Foundation leaders also established the *Bill and Melinda Gates Medical Research Institute*, focused on translational medical research. Through these initiatives, the organisation monopolises some of the most up-to-date medical knowledge and health data, positioning itself as a scientific forerunner within the global development community.¹⁴⁰

Interviewees both within and without the Gates Foundation acknowledged that the private sector knowledge and experience held by the philanthropy constitutes another key advantage compared with other leading development actors. Philanthropists emanating from world-

¹⁴⁰ These findings reflect the longstanding traditions of American philanthropic giving for scientific purposes (e.g. Parmar, 2002), which is also visible in activities by other leading philanthropic donors (see **appendix H**).

leading businesses, such as Bill Gates, hold first-hand experience in drawing from private sector assets and understand its primary logics and interests. The citation from the Gates Foundation’s website also highlights the organisation’s unique ability to marry academia and businesses to explore and develop new development instruments more rapidly than is usual for other actors.

“Drawing on our vast partner network, including private industry and academia, we can quickly assemble highly capable research teams and initiate projects to determine within a two- to five-year period whether a particular technology is worthy of further investigation, investment, and adaptation. This is a much shorter timeline than would be typical for testing a health or medical technology.” (Gates Foundation, 2020).¹⁴¹

These features have built the Gates Foundation’s credibility (or *technocratic legitimacy*; Scholte & Tallberg, 2018) to a great extent, reinforcing its presentation as an apolitical expert organisation with unique private sector -related specialist knowledge. Yamey and Volmink (2014) explain that the underlying ideology of evidence-based policy agendas is to defeat other forms of policy formulation by the virtue of being based on ‘real’ research evidence as opposed to partisan opinions or political games. Indeed, the official discourse of the Gates Foundation highlights its role as a non-partial, evidence-based development actor, which bases its goal setting *and* proposed solutions on evidence – and these constitute two different things, as reminded by Cairney (2016). Thus, the Gates Foundation differs from the vast body of development actors deploying evidence-based approaches to achieve goals based on democratically set policy agendas, international law, political affiliations, diplomatic pressures or grassroots preferences. Despite its interest-based forms of agenda-setting (see **chapter 5**), the Foundation is also able to emphasise this impartiality and evidence-based approach thanks to its fully independent status.

¹⁴¹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Health/Innovative-Technology-Solutions>, last visited 27.3.2020.

As discussed further in **chapter 7**, this constitutes a unique advantage for philanthropic donors in development cooperation and policy influence at the country level. Additionally, as can be seen below, the interviewees acknowledged that the Gates Foundation utilises its *epistemic authority* as a primary means of influencing processes of policy transfer at global and domestic levels. The scientific expertise provides the organisation with important weight in negotiations with aid-receiving countries, whose domestic policy knowledge may be counter-argued with the aid of latest health metrics, evidence and scientific discoveries.

“(...) bilateral agencies are obviously driven by taxpayer money and therefore beholden to the priorities of their governments. We as a private foundation do not have those same constraints, so we are able to be evidence driven as opposed to politics driven. That gives us credibility with a number of key stakeholders, that sometimes the bilateral major donors don't always have.” (Gates representative 8).

“I think the first thing is recognising that we are very evidence-based, so when we are trying to influence policy in regulatory environment and so on in a positive way, it is always on the back of this evidence generation (...).” (Gates representative 7).

“A lot of times the way we can deal with the situation [of conflicting policy priorities with aid-receiving countries] is to, first, surface what the differences are; second, to present the data that we have and then ask them to present the data that they have that suggests why they might have a different approach.” (Gates representative 3, emphasis added).

Furthermore, it is evident that through its collaboration with different research organisations, universities, think tanks and private companies in various funding, joint projects and knowledge sharing events, the Gates Foundation is intrinsically connected with *epistemic communities*. These are known to effectively legitimise and diffuse different development approaches across bodies and organisations to which the members of the communities are affiliated (e.g. Dunlop, 2009; Hulme, 2005). Epistemic communities hold power for policy transfer also at the state-level; as highlighted by Haas (1992): *“members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision*

makers may then deduce their interests" (1992, p. 4). Consequently, cross-sectoral epistemic communities are an important, extended arm for Gates Foundation's policy influence.

The findings presented in this sub-section point to the salient role of 'epistemic power' in building the Gates Foundation's image and policy influence. Its functions are numerous: to increase the Foundation's technocratic legitimacy; to further scientific knowledge and other expertise as superior to democratic policy processes; to act as an argumentation technique in instigating policy transfer; and to gain influence within epistemic communities that can further propagate the Foundation's ideas and approaches. The following section examines how the Gates Foundation also draws from other types of networks to advance its ideas and agendas.

6.2 POLICY TRANSFER WITH AND WITHIN DIVERSE NETWORKS

Rodgers' (2014) historical account of social policy formation contends that, from the very dawn of social policy practice, its processes have been influenced by cross-border networks of feminists, economic schools, labour union movements and others. In the context of global governance where institutionalised and centralised forms of power remain weak, networks are particularly influential agenda-setters (Stone, 2017, 2013). Besides *epistemic communities* which were discussed above, the existing literature on network governance distinguishes between (i) *professional networks* (practitioners sharing the same profession), (ii) *advocacy networks* (networks sharing an agenda-setting and advocacy mission), (iii) *policy networks* (institutionalised networks implementing policies in a specific policy area), and (iv) *governing networks* (networks of agencies and actors with institutionalised power) (Haas, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Rodgers, 2014; Stone, 2008, 2004; Yeates, 2014). This section adds to the existing body of knowledge by exploring the ways in which the Gates

Foundation engages with diverse networks to further its policy influence at global and domestic levels.

Overcoming pragmatic limitations and instigating policy transfer with and within global networks

Policy entrepreneurs have been recognised to “*exploit opportunities to influence policy outcomes to increase their self-interests – without having the necessary resources required for achieving this goal alone*” (Cohen, 2016, p. 180). Indeed, the findings of this study show that, besides legitimacy challenges, big philanthropies are also subject to some considerable *pragmatic limitations*. Despite their ‘big bet’ approaches and independent funds (see **chapter 1**), contemporary foundations are restricted in terms of their financial resources when compared to the leading multi- and bilateral development agencies. In addition, though big philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation have made a name for themselves in certain policy fields, their specialist knowledge is dependent on collaboration with scientific communities, and their project implementation relies upon third parties for execution. It is therefore unsurprising, that the interviews with Gates Foundation representatives highlighted networks as a primary avenue for overcoming the pragmatic limitations experienced by the organisation and amplify the impact of its investments. As reflected in the statements below, engaging in collaborative work allows the Foundation to gain financial, technical and other *leverage*.

“(...) it is all about how you work with others to maximise the impact you are having. So leverage is very important (...); leverage for organising the development of new products, leverage for funding, leverage for the delivery system.” (Gates representative 5).

“So what the Foundation does a lot is thinking about how to influence other people’s funding, because we’re a really small player. (...) how you influence other governments to provide funding focussed on these particular areas or increase funding for the Global Fund.” (Gates representative 12).

Additional leverage is helpful in propagating one's preferred policy approaches, since it allows to amplify the scale of the initiatives and programmes which naturally increases general interest. In fact, 'teamwork' (i.e. ability to rally support from other individuals and actors with relevant skills and knowledge to advance one's cause) has been identified as a key strategy of policy entrepreneurs to prompt policy change (e.g. Cohen, 2016; Mintrom and Thomas, 2018). However, the findings of this study show new information on *how* big philanthropies may purposefully engage with, and derive advantage from, diverse global networks for transnational social policy transfer.

Firstly, the data offers compelling evidence of covert forms of policy influence that draw upon the *professional networks*, on two primary fronts. The first of these consists of friendly relationships between the highly connected staff of the Gates Foundation – recruited from various world-leading organisations including pharmaceutical companies, powerful government institutions, and leading development agencies such as the World Bank or WHO – and their 'old colleagues' or 'friends at other organisations'. According to the interviews, these connections allowed Foundation staff to view the interests and priorities of other key actors: to inform potential collaborators about the Foundation's ongoing and future work; and to disseminate its policy knowledge for advocacy purposes in a largely organic manner. Equally importantly, the interviews with Foundation representatives and their implementing partners reveal that the philanthropy engages strategically with leading global development experts in other organisations through advisory boards that assess the Foundation's projects (see quotation below). One Gates representative recognised this explicitly as a means of disseminating policy ideas by sharing information on the Foundation's policy approaches and its successes (Gates representative 5).

“One thing that they really wanted was an external evaluator. (...). They wanted us to have an advisory board. (...) ...it's just hard, people are so busy. Especially that they

are globally known people, when we get them on they are very valuable to talk to. I remember that conversation when they [the Gates Foundation] really wanted that.” (Implementing organisation representative 1; emphasis added).

Secondly, the Gates Foundation has built and engaged with diverse global *advocacy networks*¹⁴² to enhance the dissemination of its policy knowledge and objectives. Thematic policy gatherings of high media coverage such as the World Economic Forum at Davos, the International Conference on Family Planning (ICFO), or the Gates-run annual Goalkeepers event annexed to the UN General Assembly represent some key platforms on which the Foundation has sought to engage with and develop advocacy coalitions. This work has yielded some considerable success. In the area of maternal and child health, for instance, the Foundation developed and launched the *Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health* in 2010 in collaboration with the UN secretary general, and was involved in the launch of *Every Newborn Action Plan* in 2014.¹⁴³ Other examples mentioned during the interviews included the *End Malaria Council* – an advocacy network comprising public and private sector leaders established in 2017 “*to drive progress towards eradication*”¹⁴⁴ and the *Coalition for Epidemics Preparedness Innovations* (CEPI) launched at Davos in the same year.

Thirdly, Gates Foundation’s strategic work carried out by its advocacy bodies (e.g. regional offices) is focused on generating shifts into its preferred direction within development *policy networks*. As elaborated upon by one of the Foundation’s representatives below, the organisation systematically engages with leading donor agencies to develop adequate policy transfer strategies. Understanding other actors’ trajectories and finding subtle forms of

¹⁴² These overlap with *policy communities*, groups of actors sharing consensual knowledge (Stone, 2010, p. 13), and *advocacy coalitions*, which are groups of actors united around common interests and policy ideas (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

¹⁴³ By 2015, the Global Strategy had gathered MNCH commitments worth 60 billion USD by diverse stakeholders, and since the Every Newborn initiative, 15 out of the 18 critical countries had started to introduce policy reforms in order to address the issue (see Smith and Shiffman, 2016).

¹⁴⁴ See <http://endmaliacouncil.org/>, last visited 1.4.2019.

engagement was a theme running across the interviews, and this was considered paramount for effectively influencing policy agendas within the global development community.

“The people in London who are zeroing in on an understanding country by country what are the opportunities for this [policy influence]; is it that we need to have donor members come to this parliamentary discussion around Global Fund, or foreign funding allocation discussion. Is it ample to have some big meeting in Europe around foreign aid, or Bill and Melinda need to have some side meetings with whoever we’ve talked (...).” (Gates representative 12, emphasis added).

Fourth, and as established previously, the Gates Foundation has been an enthusiastic promoter of new global health organisations, such as the vertical funds GAVI and the Global Fund. These gather a range of policy, public, private and third sector actors under a single structure with an institutional mandate and are therefore powerful *governance networks*. Through the implementation work of these networks, the Gates Foundation is able to transfer concrete policy instruments and governance structures¹⁴⁵ – or hard policies, as opposed to mere policy ideas and objectives. The role of these organisations has been paramount in advancing the adoption of the Gates Foundation’s techno-scientific policy instruments across the Global South (e.g. Birn, 2014; Clinton and Sridhar, 2017; Shiffman et al., 2016b). It must also be acknowledged that global policy agendas and new development interventions travel ‘naturally’ to aid-receiving countries due to diverse pull and push processes. These include domestic policy learning and emulation of global agendas as well as external financing and technical assistance for implementation of specific, globally favoured approaches (see Linos, 2013). Consequently, the processes of policy transfer that big philanthropies may prompt within global networks are likely to have a reverberating effect in domestic policy spheres.

¹⁴⁵ For instance, the Global Fund utilises a Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) as a new add-on to governance structure at the domestic level, in order to identify countries’ development targets, nominate the most suitable principal recipient and oversee implementation efforts. This enhances the participation of third sector actors in processes of social policy making and delivery, as 40 per cent of the CCM members are required to be civil society representatives. (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Gartner and Kharas, 2013).

Policy transfer through domestic gatekeepers and implementing actors

Hall (1993) acknowledges that paradigm shifts do not occur in a void, but require agency on behalf of politicians, policy experts and gatekeepers in the adopting policy environments. The findings show that the Gates Foundation has sought a range of strategies to trigger policy reform among domestic policy actors in Tanzania. These consist of *direct engagement* with high-level government representatives; mobilisation of implementing organisations as *policy intermediaries*; use of well-connected country consultants as *distanced informants* and *influencers*; and, building of *local advocacy networks*.

The Foundation's co-chairs and leading staff organise frequent meetings with presidents and ministers of the countries they operate in. As might be expected of anyone financing large development projects, both Bill and Melinda Gates have travelled to Tanzania to visit the projects implemented by the philanthropy within the country and met with the highest leadership, including President John Magufuli. In the short term, such visits and connections to domestic *governing networks* enable domestic consent and support for the Foundation's activities, thus legitimising its presence. They also allow the funder to monitor developments on the ground and influence policy directions and approaches. When such visits take place towards the end of the funded pilot phase, they can also be taken advantage of to pressure policy adoption and shift responsibilities to domestic actors. In the long term, maintaining warm relationships with country leadership may contribute towards potential policy take-up by the government.

Furthermore, contrary to literature that characterises implementing organisations as being passive in terms of policy influence (e.g. Fischer and Strandberg-Larsen, 2016), the Gates Foundation systematically stressed their policy advocacy role at domestic and global levels. The interview data shows that the organisation strategically mobilises its implementing

partners as policy *intermediaries*, who had adopted a range of strategies to bolster government uptake of the promoted projects in the context of Tanzania. As illustrated by the quotations below, these included official meetings with government officials, organised field trips to project sites, friendly favours, and ‘masking’ the identity of the Gates Foundation as the original policy source simply by acting as the primary point of contact. It is also noteworthy that through their financial resources and top-down approaches, big philanthropies have a prominent influence on policy directions *within* the community of development NGOs (e.g. Stubbs, 2005).

“(...) our partners all have capacity to be the best advocates for the issues that they work on – whether those are small NGOs or being big multinational organisations (...). they are generally in the best position to tell their own stories and explain why it makes sense to invest in certain issues and why make sense to skill up to programmes and tell the story of what works.” (Gates representative 9).

“The Gates Foundation, they don't push the countries or their partners to use their name, so they don't exist as ‘Gates Foundation’ on everything, you know. [...] So that countries feel its their thing, and it is good for sustainability as well.” (Implementing organisation representative 6).

“Do you have any strategy to influence the government policy? [...] *we are actually taking them along this week with us, so they understand everything, that they also understand what are the challenges and what are the ways. [...]. We are testing the counselling tool right now, and we are involving the government in testing that. [...] At one point I even invited the (...) coordinator, I asked her ‘if you think your office is very congested you are very welcome to come sit with us’. [...] The reason I was inviting her here is because I know that by having her here I can also talk about some stuff.”* (Implementing organisation representative 5).

Moreover, the evidence reveals that the Gates Foundation contracts highly respected and well positioned country consultants as external affiliates. This strategy was seen as allowing the Foundation to influence policy making in a roundabout manner by gaining access to rare and valuable knowledge on any ongoing policy developments or tensions within the domestic development sphere that might otherwise be inaccessible to foreign development practitioners. One interviewee mentioned that the Foundation also enhances its local

credibility through collaborations with influential domestic philanthropists (see quotations below).¹⁴⁶

“When you have a good consultant who is knowledgeable, well known, who can interact with senior policy makers in the country, it is to your advantage. Because when you can easily get to know what is happening, you also get some input into the thinking of the government (...).” (Global development expert 1).

“We are also increasingly interested in local philanthropy. In Nigeria, for example, we do a lot of work with Aliko Dangote and his foundation, because we really see that local buy-in and skin of the game can be incredibly valuable. And he is highly influential, highly respected and he brings us lots of credibility.” (Gates representative 8).

Interestingly, the Gates Foundation has also increasingly funded the strengthening of local advocacy networks and transnational policy coalitions in the Global South. One example of this is the *Immunization Advocacy Initiative*, which trains civil society organisations in evidence-based advocacy techniques in order to enhance bottom-up promotion of increased immunisation in Kenya, Ghana and Ivory Coast.¹⁴⁷ The Foundation has made similar investments also in Tanzania, with focus on building domestic civil society movements to support HIV/AIDS interventions (see **appendix G.**) In addition, the Gates Foundation has pursued the development of a Sino-Africa collaboration aimed at supporting voluntary male medical circumcision in sub-Saharan Africa for HIV control,¹⁴⁸ and financed the strengthening of sino-Tanzanian collaboration focused on malaria interventions (see **appendix G.**). These examples stress the Foundation’s growing interest in capitalising on the legitimacy and attractiveness of domestic and Southern actors as intermediary policy advocates for its priority goals and approaches. This strategy appears to be adopted also by other philanthropic, such as the Children’s Investment Fund (CIFF), Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Hewlett and Packard Foundations (see **appendix H.**).

¹⁴⁶ See also recent writing by Bill Gates (2019): <https://www.gatesnotes.com/Health/Working-with-Aliko-Dangote-to-fight-malnutrition>, last visited 17.2.2020.

¹⁴⁷ See <https://aphrc.org/project/immunization-advocacy-initiative/>; last visited 27.3.2020.

¹⁴⁸ 2019, See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2019/09/INV-003436>, last visited 3.7.2020.

Two separate observations can be made based on these perspectives. Firstly, engagement with domestic gatekeepers is, evidently, a key strategy for the Gates Foundation in accessing information and gaining political leverage and legitimacy in its countries of operation through *intermediation*. Secondly, and less obviously, such forms of policy advocacy appear to include covert influence, obscuring the Gates Foundation's identity behind these processes. By prompting domestic actors to take ownership of policy advocacy work and taking the place of an anonymous funder, the Gates Foundation seeks to 'mask' the foreign origins of its policy ideas and approaches on the ground. Stakeholders on the ground saw this strategy as differing from those deployed by traditional donors, which visibly advertise their aid delivery in the context of implemented projects and programmes (without excluding their behind-the-scenes influence). Here, questions arise concerning the appropriateness of such approaches from the perspective of aid-receiving governments, who are denied transparency and democratic policy deliberations, as the policies advocated by domestic civil society actors do not represent the views and preferences of citizens at the grassroots level but rather those advanced by American billionaire philanthropists.

6.3 INSTIGATING POLICY TRANSFER THROUGH FINANCIAL PRESSURE – AN OPTION FOR BIG PHILANTHROPIES?

Social policies have been transferred to the Global South throughout the decades in a non-voluntary manner by colonial empires as well as "*agencies of modern internationalism*" (Rodgers, 2014, p. 304). These refer to traditional aid donors known to have initiated social policy reforms through *aid conditionalities* attached to the allocation of financial resources (see **chapter 2**). Southern donors have also attracted attention following their application of commercial pressure in the context of development assistance, and brought into question the unconditional nature of South-South cooperation (see overview by Asmus et al., 2017). More

recently, Youde (2019) has highlighted the financial power of contemporary big philanthropies, suggesting that the “*financial largesse of major philanthropic donors can alter the balance and exercise of power within the international system*” (2019, p. 43). This section investigates whether, and in which ways, the Gates Foundation draws upon its financial resources for applying policy pressure within aid-receiving countries and international agencies.

Big philanthropies in aid-receiving countries: deploying ‘soft’ conditionalities?

Aid conditionality is a complex and heated topic. This is due to questions concerning morality of external policy interference within previously colonised regions, as well as the perverse effects of coercive aid modalities in instigating policy reform. At the same time, donor agencies have incorporated aid conditionalities with the aim of enhancing effective use and deployment of resources for the ‘right’ purposes – a rationale that cannot be dismissed as unreasonable use of donor influence. However, it is one thing to analytically assess the potential level and type of conditionality mechanisms deployed by philanthropic donors, and another to reason for or against their use. This sub-section examines how the Gates Foundation compares to other examples of conditional policy transfer described in the existing literature, from a largely *theoretical perspective* (normative and pragmatic questions being addressed in later chapters).

The conceptual overview in **chapter 3** established that transnational policy transfer takes different degrees of coerciveness. This can be better understood through a continuum that has fully voluntary *policy learning* by policy ‘adopters’ at one end, and *coercive* policy imposition by policy ‘senders’ at the other. Many differing forms of formal and informal pressures and conditionalities lie in between. (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2013; Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The findings of this study suggest the Gates Foundation’s aid delivery

includes elements of what will be called '*soft conditionalities*'. Through a range of strategies, the organisation draws upon its financial resources in development assistance to press for policy adoption in aid-receiving countries that were not actively or voluntarily seeking policy reform in the promoted areas or directions.

To begin with, non-pooled funding through vertical programmes and independent projects inherently entails donor control over what is funded and how the resources are deployed. This represents a policy transfer mechanism known as *inducement* (Collier et al., 1997). In practice, this means that, through its projects, the Gates Foundation may direct resources into the policy areas and approaches of its preference (as described in **chapter 5**). Consequently, aid-receiving governments must comply with project goals and approaches even if these do not reflect domestic policy priorities. Additionally, when receiving development assistance through project aid or vertical interventions, domestic actors are naturally required to accommodate project needs (e.g. regulative requirements, allocation of government staff for project surveillance, expansion of needed infrastructure). This impacts the broader institutional environment and heightens readiness for policy adoption in the long term, while reducing the scope for other agendas and interventions, reflecting 'material structuralist power' (Youde, 2019).

Moreover, interviewees indicated that the Foundation's project aid delivery is based on expectations for further programme upkeep and up-scale by aid-receiving governments. Differing from typical project aid delivery by INGOs, the Gates Foundation drafts Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the governments of countries in which they operate. Interviewees reported that these MOUs included clauses on broad government measures to sustain implemented projects after the pilot phase, rather than exact commitments (see quotations below). These techniques are not unique and rather standard practice for

development agencies, understood to reflect good business practice and necessary quality checks by many. However, even though these approaches represent administrative conditionality and avoid direct imposition (i.e. coercion), they constitute another layer of donor influence upon domestic policy making processes. Such contractual aid delivery can thus be interpreted as another form of ‘soft’ conditionality.

“We did do MOUs where definitely they would commit. [...] We are outlining ‘okay, you have been involved in the development of this software and this tool and the interventions – how are you going to make sure policy environment to support them; how do you change systems (...); and do you have enough capacity at the Ministry to manage (...).” (Implementing organisation representative 1).

“And for the Gates Foundation, it is important for them to see the government interest and plans that they want to take over. So they encourage the government to see how and what to do, they want to see what is contributed to sustainability or what is being done: change of policy, putting in money....” (Implementing organisation representative 6).

“We might say ‘we are going to support this programme but if you accept that you are going to hire people, to continue implementing this programme so that we see that’, those kinds of things. It is really towards sustainability and ownership of the programme down the road.” (Gates representative 6).

Furthermore, as discussed in previous sections, several domestic development actors in Tanzania regarded the Foundation as having close connections to private sector actors whose products the Foundation sought to enter into domestic markets (see quotation below). One example mentioned by the interviewees was the introduction of the self-injectable contraceptive Sayana Press in the context of the Foundation’s family planning investments, suspected of generating financial benefits to Bill Gates. Indeed, the Gates Foundation has invested in Pfizer Inc. *“to expand access to the pharmaceutical company’s all-in-one injectable contraceptive, Sayana”*.¹⁴⁹ Though the generated dividends may not benefit Bill Gates personally, this represents a tangible example of policy transfer *tying aid* to specific products or services determined by the donor (also known as ‘donor paternalism’; Collier et

¹⁴⁹ See <https://sif.gatesfoundation.org/investments/pfizer/>, last visited 27.10.2018.

al., 1997). Such a form of conditional aid delivery is commonly associated with traditional and Southern donors pursuing national commercial interests (e.g. Asmus et al., 2017; Lauria and Fumagalli, 2019), and its use in the context of philanthropic aid underscores the necessity of further analysis of motivations and mechanisms behind the global policy influence of big philanthropies.

“They can’t provide assistance unless they know that you will buy, medicines or whatever. (...) So this is two way; they are helping you, but you have no option. You need to take in the expertise, you need to buy the medicine from them; you need to work with them.” (Government official 4)

Finally, Performance Based Funding (PBF) has been argued to represent a novel form of aid conditionality, in continuity with logics of coercive SAPs in the 1980s and good governance conditionalities in the 1990s, though their scale remains smaller (e.g. Fraser and Whitfield, 2008b). The underlying logic of PBFs is to ensure implementation of pre-set policy reforms under highly controlled financial structures.¹⁵⁰ For instance, under the 2012 and 2015 *Salud Mesoamerica Initiatives*, the Gates Foundation engaged, under a consortium, in Cash-On-Delivery agreements with Central American states receiving resources when strict payment metrics (e.g. number of health units with supplies for new born and pregnancy emergencies) were met.¹⁵¹ The Foundation has also deployed similar approaches independently and through global PPPs in Africa.¹⁵² Again, while PBF is one of the mechanisms donors may adopt in an attempt to avoid corruption or other implementation-related inefficiencies, it represents a strictly top-down approach to defining policy priorities and evaluation methods on the ground. Accessing aid resources is thereby made conditional upon accepting the donor-defined policy objectives, instruments and deliverables.

¹⁵⁰ Including mechanisms of Cash On Delivery (COD), Performance Based Loans (PBLs; such as the World Bank’s Payment for Results approach), and Performance Debt Buy-Down (PDBD); see WB (2018).

¹⁵¹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2010/06/Gates-Foundation-Carlos-Slim-Health-Institute-Spain-and-the-IDB-to-Improve-Health-in-Mesoamerica>, last visited 30.6.2020; Mokdad et al., (2018); WB (2018).

¹⁵² See e.g. <https://www.hsdf.org.ng/mainstreaming-performance-based-financing-strengthening-primary-healthcare-systems/>, last visited 30.6.2020.

To sum up, the evidence shows that the Gates Foundation’s approaches to aid delivery (project aid modalities, MOU sustainability clauses, tying resources to specific products and PBF) involve use of financial resources to enhance policy transfer and adoption on the ground. While the scope of the desktop study on other leading philanthropic donors does not enable an in-depth analysis of their aid modalities, the overview clearly suggest a strong, shared interest different PBF mechanisms (including development impact bonds) alongside project aid modalities (see **appendix H.**). These observed mechanisms differ significantly from policy *coercion* through conditional state loans or strong commercial pressures but are equally incompatible with fully voluntary forms of policy adoption. As opposed to collaborative agenda-setting and mechanisms of general budget support directed to the national treasury to “*support the implementation of a national development strategy*” (OECD, 2012, p. 6), the chosen modalities further donor priorities through financial pressures and entail a level of ‘soft’ conditionality. This calls for further theoretical discussions concerning the mechanisms of non-voluntary policy transfer, particularly in the context of aid delivery by non-state actors.

Financing global development agencies and approaches

The existing literature widely acknowledged the Gates Foundation’s policy influence within the global aid community through its financial resources (e.g. Birn, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015; Shiffman et al., 2016a). While the scope of this study did not allow for investigation of the Foundation’s potential deliberate strategies of policy transfer involving financial pressure at the global level, this section describes the Gates Foundation’s role as a financier and the related opportunities for influence.

The Gates Foundation has provided grants to OECD and OECD-DAC on a yearly basis since 2008¹⁵³ and funded the World Bank's (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) multilateral initiatives.¹⁵⁴ Despite the IMF's very different development role as a global monetary agency, it too has received financial support from the Gates Foundation.¹⁵⁵ In addition, the Gates Foundation has funded several projects and programmes led by different UN institutions. This collaboration appears to be driven at least partially by the financial appeal of the Gates Foundation; one Gates representative stated that large development agencies have approached the organisation with the primary objective of gaining access to funding (Gates representative 5). Close contact and collaboration are naturally conducive to processes of policy transfer, and financial resources and technical support directed into specific policy areas can shape the operational focus of such agencies (Mitchell and Sparke, 2016). In addition, given the above-described dynamics, the recipient organisations are, expectedly, prone to adopt approaches favoured by the Foundation, although this was not directly demonstrated in interviews. As such, the Gates Foundation ought to be deemed as well positioned to initiate policy transfer in leading global development organisations by shifting policy objectives, practice and expertise into areas of its preference through project funding.

Furthermore, as discussed in **chapter 2**, the Gates Foundation provides core financial support to leading global health organisations, including the WHO, GAVI and the Global Fund. The philanthropy is currently the second largest donor (after the US) to WHO and provides 13 per cent of the specified Voluntary Contributions (VCs), which cover 75 per cent of WHO's


¹⁵³ See <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/search#q/k=OECD&sort=rec>, last visited 23.2.2018.

¹⁵⁴ As exemplified, for instance, by a 12 USD million grant in 2020 to support women's economic empowerment; an investment of over 20.5 USD million to "*establish an anchor trust fund for the World Bank as a global lever for the foundation with a focus on reimagining and transforming primary health care*"; or a MNCH-related grant amounting to over 280 million USD in 2015; see <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database#q/k=world%20bank>, last visited 17.9.2020.

¹⁵⁵ See e.g. <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2017/09/OPP1175918>, last visited 17.9.2020.

overall budget.¹⁵⁶ VCs constitute a form of ear-marked budget support, being tied to specific causes defined by the contributor and therefore constituting an important avenue of policy influence. In line with its pragmatic, business-driven and results-oriented worldviews described in **chapter 5**, the Gates Foundation has also introduced new private sector logics and actors into core functions of WHO. It has, for instance, funded WHO’s management reforms carried out by private consultancy firms such as McKinsey.¹⁵⁷

Figure 6.1 Donor contributions to GAVI (2000-2020)



Source: GAVI¹⁵⁸

As for GAVI and the Global Fund, “these two new funds are 100 per cent operational and thus a priori strongly influenced by their financiers”, as emphasised by Browne (2017, p. 36). In this context, not only the Gates Foundation, but philanthropic contributors more broadly, hold substantial political power. The considerable financier role of the Gates Foundation has provided it with a policy voice within the decision-making bodies of these organisations. The Foundation holds a permanent seat on the board of GAVI which was launched in 2000 thanks

¹⁵⁶ 2017, a percentage that increases when the indirect funding through the Global Fund, for instance, is added; see <http://open.who.int/2018-19/contributors>, last visited 18.2.2020.
¹⁵⁷ Belluz & Buissoniere (2019); see also <https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/12/13/21004456/bill-gates-mckinsey-global-public-health-bcg>, last visited 27.3.2020.
¹⁵⁸ See <https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/overview-2000-2037>; last visited 27.3.2020.

to the initial 750 million USD commitment by the Gates Foundation, who represents the its second largest donor (see also **figure 6.1**).

The Foundation also actively participates in the committees and the board of the Global Fund, to which it has donated 2.24 billion USD up to date.¹⁵⁹ Physical access to policy making platforms – from boards to internal meetings – opens important avenues for gaining information and impacting policy directions. The stakeholder quotations below stress that it is particularly the combination of financial resources and participation in such roundtables that has allowed the Foundation to emerge as a uniquely powerful global health actor. The interviewees suggested that the Foundation has strongly influenced not only the operational direction of these organisations, but also the selection of their CEOs.

“Because they are so big in terms of the money they have, they could bring their opinions into the agendas of any organisation. I know that they are also important funders of the WHO. So whatever they are advocating for, they find an avenue to be heard. (...) If somebody is not on the table, the person will have no influence. But if the person is on the table, there is always influence, especially someone who is very elaborate, eloquent, then the opinions will be heard.” (Global development expert 8).

“(...) a lot of decisions get centralised effectively to Gates and to Seattle, if you will. And that in two regards: one is directly through their money and what is on their agenda and what is not on their agenda, but secondly also by the fact that they affect and fund the salary positions of the personnel in the UN.” (Global development expert 7).

Though it is important to account for the exceptionally large assets of the Gates Foundation compared with other private philanthropies – this was mentioned repeatedly during interviews – other philanthropies also fund multilateral organisations and key development agencies. In fact, the World Bank Group alone collaborates with nearly 100 foundations (World Bank, 2016), and states in its 2019 Annual Report to have “*redoubled (...) focus on partnering with the private sector, including foundations, new philanthropists, impact investors, and social*

¹⁵⁹ See <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/private-ngo-partners/resource-mobilization/bill-melinda-gates-foundation>, last visited 18.2.2020.

entrepreneurs” in order to achieve the 2030 SDGs.¹⁶⁰ Other illustrative examples include the *Bloomberg Philanthropies*’ substantial financing of the UN Climate Change Secretariat;¹⁶¹ the *Ford Foundation*’s diverse projects implemented by UN Women;¹⁶² or the *Rockefeller Foundation*’s support to a broad range of WB projects in different policy sectors.¹⁶³ The findings are therefore telling of the ways in which big philanthropies hold growing influence as funders of global development organisations. The analysis also provides important information on broader dynamics in the global development community: established organisations are increasingly interested in private resources which may partially compromise their political sovereignty, and new structures of governance which base decision-making power on financial contributions and expertise rather than democratic mandate, are emerging (e.g. Stone, 2017; Youde, 2019).

6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter examined the Gates Foundation as a global social policy entrepreneur; it investigated the sources of authority and strategies enabling big philanthropies to engage in transnational social policy transfer. This final section sums up the key findings of the chapter and discusses the extent to which big philanthropies deploy and represent unique means and mechanisms of policy transfer in a development context.

Summary

The findings of this chapter show that big philanthropies hold specific forms of normative and epistemic authority deriving from their specialist private sector knowledge, important

¹⁶⁰ See <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report/mobilizing-partnerships>, last visited 17.9.2020.

¹⁶¹ See <https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/bloomberg-funding-un-climate-change-secretariat-ensure-us-will-honor-paris-commitment/>, last visited 5.1.2019.

¹⁶² See <http://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/businesses-and-foundations/major-partners>, last visited 5.1.2019.

¹⁶³ See <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/grants/>, last visited 5.1.2019.

investments in scientific discovery, ‘philanthropic status’ associated with benevolent giving and celebrity fame. Combined with extensive access to different cross-sectoral networks, these characteristics enhance their ability to instigate social policy transfer within the global development community and across the Global South.

Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that the Gates Foundation’s policy transfer strategies combine strategic engagement with both high- and low-profile forms of influence and policy intermediation at global and domestic levels. The Foundation also draws on its financial resources to enhance policy transfer to leading international organisations and aid-receiving governments, notably through ‘soft conditionalities’ such as project aid modalities, PBF mechanisms and tied aid.

Discussion: unique means and mechanisms of policy transfer?

As reviewed in **chapter 3**, the dominant theories on policy transfer processes prompted by ‘sending’ agencies highlight the use of *financial pressures* (e.g. aid conditionalities, commercial pressures) and *epistemic power* (e.g. hegemonic knowledge, monopolised information). UN institutions such as ILO, WHO or UNDP are known to draw from their established positions as global social policy actors and experts to propagate policy ideas and approaches through epistemic power. Also Southern donors have particular ideational acumen, thanks to their recent experiences of social and economic progress and the novel ‘South-South cooperation’ approach to development cooperation (Quadir, 2013). Institutions of economic governance (notably IMF and World Bank), in turn, are organisationally geared towards the use of financial instruments to shape social policy directions (O’Brien, 2002), while bilateral donors may exercise influence through pressures concerning broader economic cooperation as well as a range of aid-related conditionalities (see Fejerskov et al., 2016).

Big philanthropies constitute a relatively new group of aid donors with deep business connections, and the legitimacy of their participation in global governance has raised concern. The findings presented in this chapter show that the Gates Foundation draws from three particular *sources of authority*, utilised more or less intentionally to highlight its rightful place as a global social policy maker. First, *moral authority*, deriving from the charitable and benevolent act of giving, represents a form of normative power associable particularly with philanthropic organisations. The collected evidence shows that the Foundation has also systematically drawn attention to its co-funders' moral convictions through persuasive storytelling as a form of self-legitimation – obscuring some of the potentially dubious business motivations and approaches associated with private foundations. Second, big philanthropies established by celebrities enjoy *charismatic authority*, which may be considered a distinctive asset unavailable to other development actors. Bill and Melinda Gates are prime examples of this, and their names alone are enough to attract world-wide attention among heads of state, global businesses, academia, media and the wider public. These findings are in line with previous works which draw attention to policy entrepreneurs' persuasive strategies and abilities in influencing other policy actors (e.g. Cairney, 2018).

Third, the evidence shows that the Gates Foundation draws upon its access to cutting-edge scientific knowledge and private sector expertise in a similar way to other big philanthropies (see **appendix H.**), resulting in distinctive forms of *epistemic power*. The latest scientific knowledge and business sector know-how appear to open important avenues for policy influence at global and domestic levels, based on the collected data. Moreover, the findings show that the Gates Foundation engages in a range of *networks*, both out of necessity (to overcome its practical limitations and legitimacy challenges), and as a means of policy transfer. Many philanthropies represent a grey zone between the private and third sectors, and when combined with celebrity appeal, this leads to a particularly broad access to diverse

networks across sectors. Resonating with the existing literature (e.g. Stone, 2004; 2010), the findings show that engaging with global epistemic, knowledge and advocacy networks allows philanthropic donors to project influence transnationally within and between such groupings.


Policy transfer with the aid of financial conditionalities has typically been considered as an unreachable strategy of influence for private foundations with limited economic and political power (e.g. Stone, 2012, 2010). Such means of influence are also largely inexistent in accounts of policy entrepreneurs pursuing policy change. This study argues that the Gates Foundation has deployed its limited financial resources with indirect, ‘soft’ conditionalities through project aid modalities, MOU sustainability requirements, PBR mechanisms and tied aid – all of which pressures aid-recipients into adopting approaches the Foundation prefers. This adds to our knowledge base about transnational philanthropic policy making and draws attention to critical analysis of the adopted modes of aid delivery from the perspective of recipient countries.

In terms of policy transfer *mechanisms*, the presented evidence points to *circular and multileveled* processes. These perspectives challenge traditional views on policy transfer in the development context. The dominant understandings of donor-induced policy reform have described *linear* and *vertical* processes of policy transfer instigated through use of material power, illustrated in **figure 6.2**. Though the chain-like nature of such processes involving intermediary actors has been acknowledged (e.g. Appuhami et al., 2011; Swiss, 2016), policy transfer remains widely understood as top-down mechanisms. In contrast with the dominant literature, the findings of this chapter highlight the *multi-levelled* and -sited nature of policy transfer prompted by philanthropic donors in the development context (see **figure 6.3**).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Note resemblance with previous conceptualisations of ‘new reality of aid’ involving wealthy philanthropists by Kharas (2007).


This involves global as well as domestic actors in a range of roles, including systematic and often times *covert intermediation* of policy advocacy.

Figure 6.2 Policy transfer to developing countries through vertical mechanisms



Source: Appuhami et al. (2011, p. 435)

Figure 6.3 Transnational policy transfer by the Gates Foundation



Source: own production

The observed processes of policy transfer also appear to be largely *circular*, occurring across levels of governance and between the different policy actors involved. As discussed in **chapter 5**, in the process of disseminating its agendas and approaches, the Gates Foundation itself has been affected by some of the dominating global policy agendas and domestic policy resistance, pointing to *feedback effects* of some description. Interviews with stakeholders in Tanzania also showed that some policy initiatives introduced by the Foundation (e.g. ‘e-health strategy’) travelled through the intermediation of government bodies onto other global development actors operating in the country, while its actual origin was not communicated. This adds another covert and ‘circular’ dynamic to the overall approach.

The question remains whether the identified policy transfer mechanisms are distinctive to aid delivery by philanthropic donors or represent a more adequate description of donor-driven policy transfer in aid-receiving countries more broadly. With the exception of Southern donors who operate mainly on government-to-government basis, various donor agencies hire third parties and consultants to implement projects and enhance their policy influence at the country level, while promoting their policy agendas among global development actors. In common with the Gates Foundation, these donors are also influenced by the ‘isomorphic pressures’ of the global aid community (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and, in some instances, issues voiced by aid-receiving countries. The distinctiveness (if any) may thus be expected to lie in the depth and breadth of the observed multi-levelled and multi-actored mechanisms. Big philanthropies remain *dependent* on intermediary agents, due to their pragmatic limitations and legitimacy deficits, as well as their chosen role as short-term catalysts and policy innovators rather than long-term sustainers. At the same time, they have *exceptional access* to a range of networks, organisations and individuals, which makes this model of influence particularly suitable to them.

The discussed perspectives call for greater theoretical considerations to bridge policy transfer studies, theoretical frameworks of policy entrepreneurship and the field of Global Social Policy. They also highlight the need for better understanding of the contemporary forms and sources of legitimacy in global social governance, which is not a 'static standard' but evolves as forms of governance change over time (Youde, 2019). Understanding the social policy role of private foundations is not only theoretically important but also prepares the ground for debates concerning the basis on which political power ought to be granted and the ways in which policy makers can be held accountable in complex and overlapping spaces of governance (see Shiffman, 2014). These debates are ever more urgent when accounting for the experiences of external policy pressures in countries of the Global South, such as Tanzania.

7. STAKEHOLDER EXPERIENCES OF PHILANTHROPIC AID: VIEWS FROM THE GROUND

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores stakeholder experiences of the Gates Foundation, and big philanthropies more generally, on the ground in Tanzania. It adds to the evidence examined in **chapter 5**, by exploring the Gates Foundation's *models of engagement* with other domestic and external development actors on the ground (style of working and approach to development cooperation) in order to better understand its distinctiveness as aid donor. Views on the social policy approaches and aid modalities promoted by the Gates Foundation are also explored, with their *risks and advantages* as perceived and experienced by stakeholders. The chapter builds on the findings of **chapter 6**, investigating *opportunities* and *obstacles* potentially faced by big philanthropies in instigating social policy transfer at the country level, and drawing from stakeholder perspectives in Tanzania.

An examination of stakeholder views has been overlooked in the existing literature on private foundations¹⁶⁵ and is therefore considered both ethically and methodologically necessary in this study. There are several reasons not to focus solely on the activities and views of donor agencies. While the omission of perspectives and experiences of local practitioners (e.g. health professionals), beneficiary populations, communities, and other 'experiencers' of public policies has been criticised as 'epistemic injustice' in any context (Farias et al., 2017; Fricker, 2007; Honneth, 2004), research which overlooks views 'on the ground' are ever more problematic in addressing development issues due to their potential, neo-colonialist underpinnings. Pioneering writings by Robert Chambers (2017, 2007, 2005, 1994, 1984), in

¹⁶⁵ With the exception of recent studies by Fejerskov (2018) and Mahajan (2018).

particular, present an unwavering critique of top-down strategies to development aid delivery and investigation adopted by Western development practitioners and academics alike. Chambers has highlighted the methodological caveats of top-down approaches alongside the concomitant, ethical issue of ‘cultural imperialism’ hegemonising Western understandings of development and devaluing local experiences and knowledge (see also Marglin and Marglin, 1990; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Teffo, 2011). As an alternative, he has proposed a range of *participatory approaches* accounting for stakeholder experiences and complexities on the ground, which he presents as being more (cost-) *effective* and *robust*, as well as *just* (e.g. Chambers 1994, 1981; Mayoux and Chambers, 2005).

Though this thesis is not focused on assessing the direct empowerment of communities or the wellbeing or livelihoods of target populations affected by Gates Foundation’s projects, it seeks to make sense of the issues, advantages, preferences and opportunities different stakeholders associate with development cooperation with big philanthropies in a bottom-up manner. It directs attention to Gates’ implementing partners in Tanzania (e.g. INGOs, private companies); Tanzanian government staff; domestic civil society organisations; and international development agencies operating in the country (see **chapter 4**). It is also noteworthy that four of the Tanzanian interviewees had a background in the medical profession and were therefore able to share particularly rich insights related to health sector investments by big philanthropies in the country.

In order to conduct robust and rigorous analysis it is essential to capture the perspectives of diverse stakeholders with differing connections to the Gates Foundation. The views of Gates representatives and their grantees alone do not afford a balanced understanding of the positives and negatives related to philanthropic social policy, and how these might differ for the different parties involved. Also, different domestic stakeholders have differing views and

motivations: for instance, while the president and ministers might be primarily concerned with increasing development resources, department directors may face pressure to show results, and civil society organisations remain motivated by un-addressed needs observed at the grassroots level, which makes it necessary to understand views and perspectives by a range of domestic actors. Perhaps most importantly, consideration of different stakeholder experiences allows triangulation of the information collected on the Gates Foundation and examination of any discrepancies between the Foundation's ideal ways of working and its actual practices at the country level.

Moreover, addressing stakeholder views from the ground is relevant for deepening our understanding of the role of transnational policy transfer in shaping domestic social policy processes in aid-receiving countries. This study has, hitherto, investigated the strategies and approaches of the Gates Foundation as an instigator of policy transfer from an *agency*-centred perspective. Turning the attention to a 'real' aid recipient setting (Tanzania) allows us to shift the focus to the *structural factors* on the ground, as described in **chapter 2**, and their importance in terms of actual policy adoption. Such factors include the dominating social and cultural norms and political traditions, as well as extant power structures and institutions of policy making (see **chapter 3**). Investigating the ways in which these affect the Gates Foundation's policy influence in Tanzania provides deeper insights into the processes of social policy transfer between philanthropic donors and their country counterparts, and the potential impact of such processes on social policy directions on the ground.

Furthermore, this chapter engages with broader debates related to development cooperation. Countries of the Global South, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, have continued to experience aid-dependency throughout the different post-colonial 'aid eras', resulting in compromised policy space for domestic policy makers (Fraser, 2009). As discussed in

chapter 2, development aid delivery has typically involved numerous external actors and initiatives on the ground. In Tanzania alone, over 700 development projects were implemented by 57 different actors in 2006, prior to the introduction of government-led coordination measures (see Mawdsley et al., 2014). Development cooperation has therefore become a matter of political sovereignty, as much as of aid effectiveness (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009). It is against this background that Tanzania has become the poster child of the OECD's *2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* – set of new international standards for aid cooperation, anchored on the underlying principle of country *ownership*.¹⁶⁶ Today, the Paris Declaration guides Tanzania's aid activities as stated in the government's *2014 Development Cooperation Framework*. Understanding the Gates Foundation's engagement models within the context of Tanzania is therefore especially useful and generates new information on where it stands in terms of the set standards of development cooperation, and whether or not it is considered as an attractive donor alternative in terms of aid conditionalities.

This chapter draws from a range of stakeholder interviews in Tanzania, including the Gates Foundation's contracted partners (implementing organisations) as well as domestic development actors engaged in development activities in the country. In order to focus the analysis, the data collection paid particular attention to two Gates-funded projects implemented in Tanzania at the time of the fieldwork in Spring 2017. Both of these introduced new approaches in service delivery in the health sector, as opposed to conducting primary research or launching new market products (see **annex G**. for overview of Gates Foundation's investments in Tanzania).¹⁶⁷ However, the interviewees shared freely on a range

¹⁶⁶ Previously, Tanzania represented a widely cited country example of uncountable, scattered donor-driven development projects without coordination or alignment with government priorities (Harrison et al., 2009; Sundberg, 2019). Tanzania is also known to have departed from its socialist policy agendas against domestic will following the Structural Adjustment Programmes deployed in the 1980s (e.g. Gumede, 2018).

¹⁶⁷ For reasons of data protection, the exact details of these projects cannot be released.

of experiences of working with the Foundation and other philanthropic donors, which extended beyond these particular projects.

The first section of this chapter examines how the Foundation's engagement models are experienced by different stakeholders on the ground to establish whether and how these may be different compared to other donor agencies. The second section investigates stakeholder views and experiences of the Foundation's policy goals, instruments and approaches to aid delivery, while comparing the findings against the Paris Declaration principles. In the third section, the discussion turns to the range of structural factors shaping the Foundation's potential for successful policy transfer in Tanzania. The chapter concludes by discussing the extent to which the investigated stakeholder experiences point to a truly new type of aid cooperation under philanthropic aid, or replicates age-old issues of aid fragmentation, conditionality and overlooked domestic policy visions.

7.2 MODELS OF ENGAGEMENT ON THE GROUND

This section investigates how the Gates Foundation engages with different stakeholders in Tanzania, particularly in the context of its project implementation delivered by third parties. It compares experiences between organisations and individuals closely working with the Foundation, with those of other development actors on the ground. As **table 7.1** exhibits, these different stakeholders can be divided into four categories: third parties responsible for the Foundation's project implementation under its programmatic work (*implementers*); other development agencies occasionally collaborating with the Foundation (*collaborators*); representatives from official structures and departments responsible for coordinating development activities and investments in the country (*coordinators*); and, other domestic and

external development actors such as civil society organisations and multilaterals interested in the Tanzanian aid landscape and social sector investments (*navigators*).

The majority of the interviewees had previous or ongoing experience of working with multi- and bilateral development agencies, which allowed comparisons between big philanthropies and traditional donor agencies. Several stakeholders also shared experiences of working with other philanthropic donors, though, interestingly, new Southern donors such as China or Turkey were nearly fully absent in interviews, being seemingly off the radar of most interviewees.


Table 7.1 Stakeholder classification (Tanzania)

GATES' PARTNERS	OTHER STAKEHOLDERS
<p>Implementers</p> <p><u>Gates Foundation grantees</u>: representatives from INGOs delivering Gates' project aid and a private sector consultancy. Interviewees included senior officials as well as lower level staff both at the HQs and at country-offices in Tanzania.</p>	<p>Coordinators</p> <p><u>Government staff (MOH & MOF)</u>: senior officials responsible for health sector policy planning, department directors and more junior officers.</p> <p><u>Development Partners Group (DPG)</u>: global development experts in leading positions involved in coordination of development efforts and external investments in Tanzania.</p>
<p>Other collaborators</p> <p><u>Global aid agencies co-funding or co-delivering initiatives</u>: development experts and consultants with experience from previous collaboration with the Gates Foundation.</p> <p><u>(Government staff liaising with implementing organisations</u>: mid-managerial officers in direct contact with Gates' implementing grantees during project implementation.)</p>	<p>Navigators</p> <p><u>Domestic civil society organisations</u>: senior development experts with longstanding experience in the health sector and/or development cooperation with external aid agencies as well as the government in the country.</p> <p><u>Multi- and bilateral development agencies</u>: senior representatives with longstanding experience in the country.</p>

Implementers and collaborators: experiences of pro-active engagement, flexibility and reactivity

At the country level, the Gates Foundation collaborates most closely with implementing partners which are typically INGOs with headquarters in the US and country offices in Tanzania, although the Foundation also contracts private public health consulting companies in Tanzania and elsewhere (see **figure 7.1**). Gates-funded project implementation work also involves liaison with government officials and potential partner organisations, such as development agencies operating in shared areas of interest – whose views will also be explored in this sub-section.

Figure 7.1 Gates Foundation’s grants to implementing organisations in the health sector in Tanzania, USD millions (2010-2018)



Source: data retrieved from OECD Creditor Reporting System¹⁶⁸

Overall, interviewees generally identified several important comparative advantages to collaboration with the Gates Foundation, and philanthropic donors more broadly. Interviewees highlighted *ongoing communication* and *pro-active engagement* in implementation as some of the most valued aspects of working with the Foundation, but also other philanthropic donors:

¹⁶⁸ Gross disbursements; data retrieved on 4.5.2020, see <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1#>.

“They [Children’s Investment Foundation Fund; Gates Foundation] follow very closely, they don’t give money and wait for report, they kind of partner in the implementations itself, they become part of it. [...] They play an active role, instead of a passive one; not only do they give the money, they also want to be a part of the understanding what is being planned, what is being done, they closely follow up.” (Development expert 3; emphasis added).

“(...) the general difference I notice is that it is very collaborative and relationship-driven at the Gates Foundation. I talk to my PO [Project Officer] every other week, quite often weekly (...). With many other funders, its like sending a quarter report, an annual report...” (Implementing organisation representative 1, emphasis added).

As shown in the quotations above, working with the Foundation was felt to be markedly different from the experience of working with other traditional donors, who in the main relied on quarterly and annual reporting mechanisms with little or no communication during implementation. Traditional procedures were seen as rigid, with little space to adapt to potentially changing contextual factors or to re-negotiate agreed policy objectives. Development experts explained that the unusually engaged, ‘hands on’ approach to project implementation adopted by the Gates Foundation reflected its wider interest in taking credit for quick, measurable results. Large development organisations such as the UN institutions or leading bilateral actors, in comparison, were felt to be less concerned with visible impact and showcasing ‘success’, and more concerned with meeting the ‘bureaucratic’ targets set on paper (see quotations below).

“They [the Gates Foundation] are also a donor who is engaged, a donor who wants to see results, a donor who even if you are not able to indicate the impact, they want to see the progressive steps towards the impact. That’s different from other donors (...).” (Development expert 3; emphasis added).

“we do very last-minute documents which are for low capacities; let’s say there is a situation, and we claim that we are reaching out to give aid, but we don’t necessarily do that directly. (...) they [the Gates Foundation] want the story, so because they want the story, they say ‘well let’s try to target as much as possible to target girls in Mwanza’.” (Development expert 4; emphasis added).

Another key characteristic distinguishing big philanthropies from traditional development agencies highlighted during interviews was *flexibility* in terms of timeframes and approaches

in implementation. Examples included the Foundation's readiness for potential changes in project implementation following the inauguration of the Magufuli government in 2015; adaptation of practical tools (vaccination cards) according to responses from local target populations; allowing implementers to expand timeframes for the learning phase of project implementation; and changing activity plans agreed with the government in the light of shifting investments by other donors. Both Gates' implementing partners and government officials involved in the Foundation's project delivery in Tanzania saw this flexibility as being a particular comparative advantage, enabling more effective implementation under changing circumstances on the ground (see quotations below). Equally, development experts, particularly from bilateral donor agencies, commended the Gates Foundation's *nimbleness* and *complementarity* in mobilising funds. For instance, the organisation's swift provision of leverage to initiatives of shared interest was appreciated.

"(...) it is good to be flexible because things happen, governments change. Now Tanzania had an election, luckily it worked very well for this project, they were really supportive, but it could have gone the other way. So, they'll work with you to change midstream if you needed, in my experience. Which I don't think other funders do." (Implementing organisation representative 1).

"You know some other donors, like USAID, they say 'you have to make it to the dollar' (...), even if you have brought another fund to make the dollar earlier than planned (...). So Gates, they are flexible. You can change activities during implementation (...). So similar applies to CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], but for some donors it is a little bit difficult." (Government official 1, emphasis added).

"I said 'hey if this is something you guys would like to support; I think it would be helpful'. And they actually were quite agile and were able to step in with a little bit of money within a couple of weeks and instigate that. So, it's a really useful thing about being able to collaborate with them. At least with the personal contacts that they have, they're very receptive to hearing suggestions." (Development expert 7).

It seems that from the perspective of their grantees and close collaborators, the Gates Foundation is a pro-active, flexible and nimble partner. This agility and nimbleness not only reflect a strong motivation to deliver rapid results, it also reflects the organisational characteristics of big philanthropies. Unlike traditional donor agencies and INGOs,

philanthropic donors are able to make quick decisions about new and ongoing investments thanks to their independent funds and narrow decision-making structures (see **appendix H**). Issues of accountability and transparency put aside, this represents an important and pragmatic comparative advantage for big philanthropies as development actors.

Views from navigators and harmonisers: limited information sharing and deliberate secrecy

In Tanzania, Western donor agencies and multilateral development organisations (known as *Development Partners* or DPs) are responsible for *harmonisation* of development efforts alongside the government. This means synchronising development implementation, increasing joint strategies and reducing mission duplication. Domestic civil society organisations, on their behalf, inform government’s policy planning with their expertise and seek ways to contribute towards development efforts in the country, constantly ‘navigating’ through the sea of development actors operating in Tanzania. While not directly partnering with the Gates Foundation, these stakeholders hold a significant interest in, if not responsibility for, understanding its agenda and approaches in the country.

Interviews with the navigators and harmonisers of development interventions in Tanzania show that participation of both the Foundation and its implementers in the existing donor platforms and institutional forums has remained marginal. Their absence was particularly conspicuous at the *Development Partners Group* (DPG), considered the most vital structure for creating transparency and harmonising development investments by aid agencies in alignment with government-approved policy priorities. The interviewed DPs wanted and expected Gates’ employees (when in the country), or the Foundation’s implementing partners, to engage in more systematic information sharing via this platform due to the organisation’s sizeable investments in the country. DPs also shared experiences of missed opportunities of engagement with the Foundation leaders Bill and Melinda during their country visits – viewed

as unique occasions for addressing the Foundation's activities and interests in Tanzania (see quotations below).

“But inside the country, we don't even know when they come (...). I know they are here, I just know from history and my previous job (...). But I wouldn't know [otherwise], they don't have offices or anything, they don't seek dialogue.” (Development expert 5; emphasis added).

“(...) because Bill was here, of course it was – you know – at highest level that they talk. But with partners, (...) we didn't have a chance to talk. I was supposed to have a meeting, (...) at the end of the day we didn't have the opportunity to sit down and talk about what was going on.” (Development expert 9).

Several DPs, as well as domestic civil society organisation representatives, shared their experiences of communicating with the Gates Foundation through more or less informal routes (such as dinner invitations or engagement through consultants), rather than official structures. However, as highlighted in the quotations below, the Foundation was seen to be reluctant to share information about its own plans and activities at these meetings, and interviewees interpreted this reluctance as deliberate *secrecy* rather than an oversight. Interestingly, a few interviewees also mentioned another anonymous, large philanthropist operating in Tanzania particularly in the area of family planning,¹⁶⁹ whose activities and interests in the health sector were even less known to different stakeholders. These perspectives show that philanthropic donors are able to operate largely autonomously without systematic information sharing on the ground, and that this causes confusion and frustration amongst other development actors.

“What is absolutely striking, is that they are like someone that you would expect to say ‘this is what we are interested in: (...) policy advocacy, work or supporting governance work – this is our plan’. But they are more like ‘can we meet and hear more about the context in Tanzania’ (...). Then three months later, ‘could we have dinner together?’ [...]. So, it is hard to say where do they want to venture next. (...) With the Americans and Europeans, I mean a lot of them are just exploring, but they say ‘these are our plans, we are not making any promises, but we might work towards that’.” (Development expert 2).

¹⁶⁹ Based on a desktop study of philanthropic donors and web-based information on the Tanzanian aid landscape, this is possibly the Susan T. Buffet Foundation.

“I often get requests to meet with the Foundation, increasingly so, or with their consultants; [...] So it’s almost like they come and they want to pry some information because they aren’t physically here, and then they go off and they do their own thing but without much feedback really.” (Development expert 7).

Perhaps more strikingly, government officials also acknowledged that *they* were poorly informed about the Gates Foundation’s activities and planned investments in Tanzania – despite Gates’ representatives’ statements which sought to emphasise the Foundation’s engagement, particularly with domestic governments at the country level. Tanzanian officials responsible for donor collaboration, management of aid flows and policy planning across the ministries of health and finance stated that they knew very little about the organisation. This was largely due to the fact that the Gates Foundation remained absent from the structures of collaborative policy making such as *budget support roundtables* or sector-specific *working groups* and elected instead to direct funds to implementing third parties (such as large American NGOs) rather than the government. This was illustrated by one official resorting to seeking information on the Foundation through the Global Fund and the US embassy (government official 4). In fact, the interviews show that only officials in roles designated for dealing with projects implemented by the Gates Foundation appeared to be aware of the organisation’s work. At times, even they remained confused about its role behind the projects, not least because of the deliberate, more highly visible role of the implementing organisations – an issue mentioned also by other actors on the ground (see quotations below).

“There are national projects and there are also some local projects which are not necessarily being done by the government, but by NGOs, CSOs, philanthropic aid, et cetera. But to be honest, as the government, we were not able to capture (...) those finances (...).” (Government official 4).

“Bill Gates is hardly ever working in their own name; they always have sub-contractors. When I hear ‘PATH’, I will know that Bill Gates is here. So, we go to the PATH event. That’s what Clinton’s also have, I suspect, especially if it is malaria – then it is Gates’ money.” (Development expert 5).

There seemed to be various factors behind the experiences of poor visibility, lack of information sharing and potential secrecy as recounted by interviewees. First, despite close engagement with its implementing partners, the Gates Foundation's 'light in-country presence' – a key facet of its work mechanisms in most countries (see **chapter 5**) – was lamented by stakeholders. According to interviewees, absence of physical offices, lack of a coordinator managing country-specific interventions, and the outsourcing of project implementation all hindered participation under different donor- and government structures. These views (also shared on Global Fund) point to some evident limitations of autonomous and externally led project aid delivery in effective collaboration and information sharing on the ground.

Second, the findings here are in coherence with evidence discussed in **chapter 6**, which suggested that deliberate masking of its identity was a specific policy transfer strategy of the Foundation. Both Foundation employees and their implementing partners stressed the importance to policy advocacy of implementers visibly staffed by local Tanzanians and other local actors. Additionally, the interviews highlighted the more experimental and entrepreneurial nature of philanthropic donors when compared to traditional actors, adding another potential explanation for the Foundation's cautious information sharing. One senior development expert, for instance, emphasised the Foundation's secrecy in the context of research projects introducing new tools for testing the effectiveness of different treatments in tackling diseases such as malaria or HIV (global development expert 5). Consequently, stakeholders' unfamiliarity with the Gates Foundation's activities may be partially explained by its strategic approaches prioritising partner-led advocacy and innovative, experimental work.

Third, several interviewees, including Gates' employees, mentioned that the Foundation's engagement in the field is consciously selective. The organisation was deemed to prioritise outreach towards actors or projects who shared its interest in techno-scientific policy instruments and private sector strengthening. Some interviews also suggested a more frequent engagement with US organisations such as PEPFAR and USAID as well as the Global Fund, due to their capacity for potentially up-scaling Gates' projects, existing employee contacts and other connections due to shared country origins. While connecting with organisations of ideological, cultural and geographical proximity is not abnormal as such, it is revealing of the Gates Foundation's overall attitude to aid cooperation, focused on strategic communication to inform its *own policy making* and gain further *leverage* for its projects and programmes. These findings complement and are in accordance with those discussed in previous chapters, highlighting the dependence of philanthropic policy entrepreneurs on other actors to be successful in their mission – reaching their interest-based objectives.

For many stakeholders on the ground, these engagement models limit their ability to navigate, coordinate and harmonise development activities. The accusation of deliberate secrecy is a serious one and poses a threat to the realisation of the *accountability* principle under the Paris Declaration by hampering the monitoring of aid flows.¹⁷⁰ As explored next, independent project implementation also creates a range of other issues related to effective governance.

7.3 PROJECTS, PROGRAMMES AND APPROACHES TO AID DELIVERY – STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON PHILANTHROPIC AID

A range of issues has been associated with public policy making by contemporary philanthropies in the existing literature, highlighting problems of accountability, transparency,

¹⁷⁰ Donors are expected to “provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens”; see <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>, last visited 29.8.2020.

profitable interests and power imbalances among many other (e.g. Edwards, 2011; Giridharadas, 2019; McGoey, 2015; Moran, 2014; Morvaridi, 2015; Villanueva, 2018). However, little is known of how the processes of project implementation and aid delivery have been experienced by stakeholders in aid-receiving countries. This section explores the advantages and risks of philanthropic aid from the perspective of development actors on the ground, paying particular attention to the implications of the findings on the principles of *harmonisation*, *country ownership* and *alignment* as defined in the 2005 Paris Declaration. Many of the expressed views are focused not only on the Gates Foundation, but also on other philanthropic donors of which the stakeholders had experience.

Policy objectives and instruments – breaching the principle of *alignment*?

Several DPs and domestic development actors in Tanzania showed a general appreciation of many of the policies and programmes implemented by the Gates Foundation. Increased immunisation efforts, enhanced use of private sector capabilities and new ideas for data use within the existing systems (i.e. *diagonal investments*) were among key contributions and successes accredited to the organisation. The Foundation's more general efforts in speeding up the development of new technical tools at the global level, such as faster diagnostic tests for malaria and HIV, were also acknowledged. Global development experts highlighted the fact that while bilateral donors remain the primary contributors of development and social policy delivery, they have limited resources for scientific research and product development – tasks effectively taken up by the Gates Foundation.

At the same time, domestic stakeholders (both government- and civil society representatives) felt strongly that the Gates Foundation's projects and approaches bypassed some of the existing policy agendas and preferences of the Tanzanian government. One of the most frequently recurring themes during interviews with government, civil society and international

development agency representatives was that of *vertical* health interventions. Stakeholders stressed technical ‘trouble-shooting’ of narrowly defined issues to be less effective than the holistic approaches to developing public health systems which were widely preferred on the ground. System-wide approaches also characterise the official, national development plans in Tanzania, which seek alignment with the global *SDG* and *Universal Health Coverage* agendas. Tanzania’s *Health Sector Strategic Plan IV* (HSSP 2015-2020) states the country has a priority “to give more attention to the quality of health services in tandem with the pursuit of *universal access*”,¹⁷¹ and the country is currently planning the launch of a new, universalist health insurance scheme, as elaborated in **chapter 2**.

Furthermore, in terms of priority areas, the HSSP IV systematically underscores the country’s epidemiological shift to non-communicable diseases and increased focus on their prevention, diagnosis and treatment, while stressing continuing efforts in expanding and improving MNCH services (also a high-ranking priority in the *Tanzania Development Vision 2025*¹⁷²). Focusing predominantly on infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis or malaria (see **appendix G.**), which are key priorities for the Gates Foundation, was therefore seen to be somewhat out of line with the increasing needs and plans to address non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, cardio-vascular diseases and cancer (see quotation below). MNCH, in comparison, also remains an important area of interest for the Gates Foundation and other philanthropic donors (see **appendix H.**), but government interviewees were critical of the adopted interventions which were seen to have produced few results in this particularly critical policy area.

“In the review of the landscape and the burden of health in Tanzania, we have now aligned to the burden of disease, now shifting from communicable diseases into non-

¹⁷¹ See

http://www.tzdp.org.tz/fileadmin/documents/dpg_internal/dpg_working_groups_clusters/cluster_2/health/Key_Sector_Documents/Induction_Pack/Final_HSSP_IV_Vs1.0_260815.pdf, last visited 23.4.2020.

¹⁷² See <https://mof.go.tz/mofdocs/overarch/vision2025.htm>, last visited 23.4.2020.

communicable diseases. [...] There's no donor; the government runs and runs and feels this is important, but yet there is no donor." (Development expert 3).

Tanzanian stakeholders also described a level of discomfort with approaches to population selectivism promoted by the philanthropic donors they had experienced. For instance, in the area of HIV, directing scarce resources towards minority groups such as sex workers, sexual minorities and drug users by different philanthropic donors was seen to compromise the prioritisation of mothers and children as preferred by the Tanzanian strategic planning, and affected the legitimacy and political support of the implemented programmes when involving government participation. Additionally, one government official shared experiences of philanthropic donors neglecting regional policy plans by autonomously implementing projects in pre-decided locations without consultation with local authorities (see quotations below). Due to the largely devolved Tanzanian health system, these hold a pivotal role in the planning and delivery of health services at the regional level in the country (see **chapter 2**). Such practices go against the 2005 Paris Declaration, which requires donors to “*base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies*” under the principle of *alignment*.¹⁷³ In fact, this principle conflicts in many ways with the very ideologies and policy approaches of big philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, which are primarily interested in *global* policy goals as opposed to local priorities and plans (as explored in **chapter 5**):

“Rather than look at the challenges that people face by region we identify challenges that can be tackled on a global level. We work with partners that can help to affect change globally, and then scale solutions to a local level.” (Gates Foundation, 2020).¹⁷⁴

“There was a very big programme of methadone replacement, and also needle exchange. (...) I see the technical rationale (...), but here we are struggling to get syringes and needles for treatment of important conditions! And if people see me giving needles for people to inject illicit drugs, as part of a public programme, how can I justify it? [...] So that's donor push. It's a priority, yes, but how many other cases of HIV can be dealt with in the same? (...) how is it a risk if you were to prevent

¹⁷³ See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>, last visited 23.5.2020.

¹⁷⁴ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do>, last visited 29.1.2020.

a new infection from mother to child (...)? That's the choice! Given the choice, the government might choose the mother and child.” (Development expert 6).

“Someone will come and tell me ‘I want to go work in a certain region’. I say ‘how did you know? I know my country better than yourself, but in your project is already said you are going to work in a certain region only, why? (...) there is a health management team in that region, you should sit together, and discuss with them and see their priorities and their system, to achieve what they want’.” (Government official 3).

Moreover, the principle of *alignment* promotes also support for domestic ‘institutions and procedures’, implying strengthening of the “*national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring*”.¹⁷⁵ Contemporary big philanthropies have adamantly promoted the use of quantified metrics for measuring *rapid, visible impact*, as was also found by the conducted desktop study on leading philanthropic donors Bill and Melinda Gates, for instance, have typically highlighted ‘process indicators’ (e.g. the number of children vaccinated, or contraceptives delivered) as key metrics when evaluating the Foundation’s investments in global health (see citations below).

However, stakeholder interviewees from the public sector questioned the benefits of these quantitative process indicators and instead favoured holistic outcome measures aimed at capturing improvements in *quality of services* or *performance*, as illustrated below. It may also be argued that ‘process indicators’ remain a poor tool for capturing the acceptability or likely sustainability of interventions – contrary to more holistic evaluation approaches. Some interviewees also raised the issue of PBF mechanisms as an approach to aid delivery, which holds measuring quantified deliverables as its most central function (see **chapters 5** and **6**). Such approaches were criticised for diverting attention away from broader outcomes and the overall effectiveness of actual systems – responsible for health care provision in the long term.

¹⁷⁵ See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>, last visited 23.5.2020.

“(…) our *evaluation policy is rooted in our business model, which involves working with partners to achieve the greatest impact. Early in the grant proposal process, we work with prospective partners to define and agree on measurable outcomes and indicators of progress and success.*” (Gates Foundation, 2020).¹⁷⁶

“(…) *it should work for the results, not for numbers. We can say ‘100 clinicians, or a 100 people can do C-section’, but at the end has that one improved the point of care for women? That’s what we want.*” (Government official 3).

“*In the health financing, they might also hopefully not go too strong in their own direction – to results-based financing. It’s always the solution to increase value for money, but clearly the practical experience (….) shows that it is not really improving performance.*” (Development expert 5).

Overall, the findings suggest that while philanthropic aid donors have considerable potential to complement development efforts by other actors thanks to their unique approaches and comparative advantages, they have yet to successfully meet the challenge of optimally aligning their objectives and approaches with domestic policy agendas *and* instruments favoured on the ground. It is also interesting to note that the Gates interviewees and the Foundation’s implementer organisations highlighted having mapped domestic policy interest in their proposed interventions before launching projects. This draws attention to potentially differing attitudes within aid-receiving governments: additional resources may be more eagerly welcomed at higher levels, while their conditions and embedded approaches are more closely assessed and criticised by officials involved in policy planning, implementation and delivery of effective solutions on the ground.

Approaches in aid delivery – endangering *harmonisation and country ownership of development efforts?*

Chapter 5 described the Gates Foundation’s keen interest in collaborative work and PPPs at the global level. Yet, according to interviewees in this study, the Foundation has adopted a largely *autonomous* approach to aid delivery in Tanzania. The quotations below show that DPs perceived this lack of joint strategies as being responsible for unfocused efforts, or even

¹⁷⁶ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/General-Information/Evaluation-Policy>, last visited 24.4.2020.

for jeopardising ongoing projects and programmes. These issues were seen to be exacerbated by ineffective internal coordination between the Foundation’s own divisions and officials – an issue equally acknowledged by the Foundation itself. A key example of this disorganisation was the funding of different implementing organisations to pursue two similar projects in Tanzania, thus duplicating the organisation’s own efforts on the ground.

“Suggestions that they make are often out of sync with what the in-country bilateral partners have kind of already...even brokered an agreement with the government on occasion. And then they’ll come in and kind of...it’s not directly contradictory, but just a little left sync in terms of timing, or ‘is this really of the highest need or priority?’” (Development expert 7).

“The fact is, that it does not coordinate its own efforts, its own initiatives, with those who are on the ground. They are disconnected. We are seeing it. And many are talking about it.” (Development expert 9).

“We have learned that Gates is also funding other players in the same field. For instance, we have been funded to do the [x]-programme, it includes [a, b and c]. But then (...) I found out I was another actor dealing with [a]. (...) and when they tried to tell us what they are going to do, it was actually what we had already done and were planning to do.” (Implementing organisation representative 5; masking added)

From a country perspective, uncoordinated and duplicative development investments and interventions imply severe problems of *harmonisation*. Findings from this study concur with earlier research, that these problems are amplified by the project aid modalities typically favoured by philanthropic donors. Project aid has been widely associated with increased *fragmentation* and a multiplicity of development actors, goals, modalities and instruments (e.g. Klingebiel et al., 2016). Importantly, stakeholders highlighted that project-based development cooperation also created a significant *management burden* for the government, while generating *resource waste* as a consequence of the numerous ‘middlemen’ involved. Interviewees saw these issues as being of particular relevance to the Gates Foundation, whose resources are radically larger than those of typical INGOs – be it either in the health sector or other areas of investment – as the quotations below highlight.

“So, it’s nothing new for governments (...) to have some sort of organization to come in and do their thing, troubleshoot it and then leave, right? (...) but the scale is much larger, the volume of funds is significantly bigger.” (Development partner 7).

“They follow a bit the trend (...). For Bill Gates, this means insurance – pretending nobody has thought about insurance models before them. Of course we have, we are just about to implement one! Now don’t come along and screw it up. That’s sometimes the risk of Bill Gates, because he is so big.” (Development expert 5).

“I was actually a bit more aware of what they were doing in agriculture in this country because they are financing the new strategy. [...] the person who was in charge of the Foundation was there [at the strategy presentation] and said, ‘well, you know, we haven’t been very active, at least in the coordination, but we are investing twelve million in agriculture’.” (Development expert 4; emphasis added).

Furthermore, *country ownership*, which compels donors to “*respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it*”,¹⁷⁷ represents a fundamental pillar of aid cooperation under the Paris Declaration. These suggest that a key barrier to the realisation of country ownership is the absence of institutionalised mechanisms of downward accountability within private foundations. The interviews quoted below highlight this issue by illustrating the divergent understandings of answerability between, on the one hand, domestic actors in Tanzania and, on the other, the Gates Foundation and its partners. Gates’ employees and grantees highlighted that, while the latter report to their donor (i.e. the Gates Foundation), the former remain accountable to the Foundation leaders. Such a chain of up-ward accountability excludes local populations and public institutions in aid-receiving countries, in direct contrast to the position of Tanzanian government officials who stressed their responsibilities towards the population.

“We don’t have the constituents other than Bill and Melinda who we have to answer to. (...) They are providing funding to see deaths are limited, to see maternal mortality decrease, and in order to know that’s happening you need to capture data providing information back.” (Gates representative 12).

“I am accountable (...) to see that this money that you are bringing in goes to the intended people and achieves our national priorities. But they always say ‘no, I am

¹⁷⁷ See <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf> p. 3, last visited 30.6.2020.

accountable to my donor!’ If you are not caring to help Tanzania, you shouldn’t be here.” (Government official 3).

Similarly, it was widely acknowledged amongst stakeholders, including those with the most positive views about the Foundation, that simple shifts in opinion or leadership within philanthropic organisations may drastically change their policies and approaches, as they remain largely ‘cut off’ from the populations and countries they serve.¹⁷⁸ The quotations below relate to similar issues experienced during the *Clinton Foundation’s* (CHAI) work in Tanzania. In addition, interviewees had strong concerns about the potential risk of abrupt, complete disappearance of philanthropic donors. Government officials, in particular, reported that philanthropic donors gave them a greater sense of vulnerability than bilateral aid agencies which are bound to their embassies and representative countries and therefore physically accessible at all times. Such concerns are relevant not only due to potential, rapid changes in philanthropic donor priorities, but also commitments to cease activities after a certain time frame. The Gates Foundation, for instance, has announced that it will exhaust all resources within 20 years of Bill and Melinda’s deaths.¹⁷⁹

“(…) maybe now the co-chairs are still there, maybe in the future when they are no longer, there will be a problem – who will maintain the same focus, the same vision the Gates Foundation has? With all these new philanthropic organisations, it depends who is leading.” (Implementing organisation representative 6)

“What I can say from my experience from CHAI, initially it was (…) very significant and very visible in the HIV-related activities. But over the years, I think their focus changed completely. […] So the risk I am seeing, (…) sometimes the change is just too huge. Today you focus on this Ministry, tomorrow you are completely gone, you are somewhere else.” (Implementing organisation representative 9).

“Working with like Finland or Netherlands, because it is country-specific...you know the issue of trust and the issue of existence. We cannot say that ‘tomorrow, the

¹⁷⁸ One may equally expect launching and withdrawing from development interventions to be both politically and practically easier in the context of vertical programmes which do not involve tax-based resources or public institutions. Example can be drawn from a swiftly ended Gates-founded large scale school project in the US, considered by the Foundation to have no “*path to having big impact*” (Riley, 2011).

¹⁷⁹ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Financials/Foundation-Trust>, last visited 4.7.2020.

Netherlands will not be there'. But if it is a foundation, any time it may not be there, depending on the management.” (Government official 1).

Many of the risks flagged by stakeholders were criticisms related to donor ‘chaos’ in general (see Fraser and Whitfield, 2008) and aid delivery by INGOs (e.g. Banks et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2008; Lewis, 2013). However, others appear to be more specific to big philanthropies and their organisational particularities. The combination of these old and new risks raises pertinent questions about potential implications on the ground. It is legitimate to question how country priorities and ongoing developments may best be served when aid is delivered with upward accountability, poor connections to local populations and the organisational independence required to stop, shift or retrieve funds at any given time.

7.4 OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES FOR POLICY TRANSFER IN THE CONTEXT OF TANZANIA

Marsh and Sharman (2009) posit that the “*developing world (...) provides a powerful testing ground for examining the relationship between policy transfer and effectiveness*” (2009, p. 280). While assessing the effectiveness (i.e. outcomes) of the Gates Foundation’s policy transfer strategies in Tanzania was not an initial focus in this study, several interesting insights concerning policy transfer success were revealed in the course of the analysis. These offer new information, albeit indicative, on *policy transfer success* and some of the different *structural factors* facilitating and hampering policy transfer processes instigated by big philanthropies at the country level.

Policy advocacy and coalition building: distinctive advantages and obstacles

Policy transfer *success* has been defined as the complete adoption of contextually adequate policies generating positive outcomes and political support (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000;

Magetti and Gilardi, 2013). However, as well as being an outcome, political support at different levels of governance is also a precondition for policy adoption (excluding instances of external policy coercion). Attitudes towards aid collaboration and dynamics within government leadership have an important role to play in affecting possibilities for external policy influence (Collier et al., 1997; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Whitfield and Fraser, 2009). Additionally, government officials responsible for policy implementation are in a primary role, creating internal push and pull effects for successful policy adoption within different public institutions (see Dussauge-Laguna, 2019), while support from beneficiaries, communities and society at large is essential for up-take, popularity and sustainability in the long term.

In Tanzania, two different government approaches or views were important in influencing external development agencies and development cooperation at the time of the data collection, and thereafter. Firstly, the Magufuli administration actively demanded that donors align with national policy priorities and impose fewer aid conditionalities, which represents a major change from previous governments, as explained below:

“The government wants a little more innovation, less conditionality, a bit more of diversity in financial instruments, diversity in actors – mainly having China, India, Brazil and others on board. [...] There is a political stance there, where ‘we want to be less dependent, we want to collect our own revenue, independently’. (...) It is again very political, it was not the case with the previous regime.” (Development expert 4).

Secondly, the President vocally opposed investments targeting sexual minority groups and banned advertising for family-planning in the country.¹⁸⁰ This constituted an important impediment to donor activities in such areas, while equally causing political friction between the government and external development agencies. Interviewees reported that these shifts in government attitudes complicated relationships particularly with traditional donors, bound by

¹⁸⁰ See e.g. <https://sokodirectory.com/2018/09/no-more-broadcasting-of-family-planning-adverts-in-tanzania-magufuli/>, last visited 2.10.2018.

the political and diplomatic expectations of their electorates and member-states. Stakeholders therefore saw philanthropic donors as being in a particularly advantageous position in terms of coalition building with the highest levels of the government because they were able to ignore instances of ‘undesired’ political conduct and thereby avoid potential tensions (see quotations below). Similar views were also shared by one Gates Foundation representative, who stressed that the philanthropy ‘works well’ with all kinds of governments, whether they are authoritarian or democratic (Gates representative 2). From the perspective of policy transfer, this means that while other donors may be facing political complications and withdrawing or stalling activities, big philanthropies might be experiencing new opportunities for policy influence.

“This time I think there is a difference, there have been some changes. (...) for instance, the ‘key population policy’ services that was previously approved and funded by USAID and others (...). Then this time the government said ‘no, we have certain ways that we want this intervention to be done, there are certain things you can’t do and other things that you can, because if you do these ones you violate the Constitution which we are not going to allow you to do’.” (Development expert 3).

“I don’t really see that type of interaction or that struggle as much for the foundations, they are kind of sheltered from that. US government has had to engage with a lot of diplomacy around the LGBT issues, in particular with the Magufuli Administration (...).” (Development expert 7).

“So I would say ‘ok, why the Foundation? Why not FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations] or some other party like the World Bank that have probably twice or three times the kind of amount they can put on the table’? [...] I think the culture of being able to say what we are doing clearly, where, and how it is helping the countries there, that’s what is probably different. Other donor parties are political, but the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, they are not into politics, so the coalition must be very easy.” (Development expert 4, emphasis added).

Nevertheless, while the Gates Foundation was recognised as having captured attention at the high levels of government thanks to its ‘alternative, apolitical resources’ (development expert 9), interviews revealed that its commitment to coalition building with other domestic actors was insufficient for creating internal buy-in. Stakeholders shared experiences of inadequate collaboration with the government, both at central and LGA levels.. Additionally, the

Foundation was told to conduct project work targeting a specific population segment, without seeking a broader engagement with the communities (and their leaders) affected by the project (see second quotation below). Such approaches were deemed improper considering the political traditions and social norms in the country (see description in **chapter 2**), resulting in diminished political support. Continuities with previously socialist institutions and policy models, together with a collectivist culture where families and communities hold a central role, represent important *structural factors* in the Tanzanian context from the perspective of policy transfer.

“Also, I’ve seen some almost...they’ve offended key people within the government. (...) one might feel the government is not one of the entities they want to collaborate with; maybe they want to build up the private sector in Tanzania! But still the government is such a powerful entity in a place like this, almost socialist, you can’t not be engaged with the government in here. And I feel there is a limited understanding of that, or they’re just less sympathetic to it.” (Development expert 7).

“They call [the target group] and talk to them one on one. Instead of talking to the members of that community, so they can buy in the idea. (...) I saw that was not correct.” (Government official 3, emphasis added).

Another complication was that the policy actors tasked (by Gates Foundation) with financially sustaining and up-scaling any programmes, such as regional councils of project sites or other donor agencies, were neither always fully aware of what was expected of them nor prepared to mobilise funds after the Gates-funded pilot phase. One development expert explained this to reflect the Gates Foundation’s poor understanding of the local actor landscape, dynamics of development cooperation and the priorities of other actors on the ground. These perspectives point to important failures in seizing the attention of key stakeholders in order to achieve complete and successful policy adoption.

However, it must be highlighted that these findings are not representative of all development projects run by philanthropic donors. At the same time as data was collected on Gates Foundation’s programmatic work in 2017, *Bloomberg Philanthropies* carried out long term

work enhancing access to maternal medical care together with the *Local Government Authorities* (LGAs), with a strong focus on public sector provision. This has now been upscaled by the national government.¹⁸¹ In fact, different philanthropic donors – as well as both their programmes and individual staff members – have different relationships with, and experiences of, working in different aid-receiving countries, which may be expected to lead to different degrees of policy transfer success under each intervention. Also the Gates Foundation representatives emphasised the organisation’s better country level organisation and engagement in Ethiopia, which is one of its focus countries with a strong domestic direction over the Foundation’s activities. Nevertheless, the findings of this chapter suggest that in countries where there is no physical presence or close relationship, important opportunities of policy influence may be compromised by inadequate engagement with key stakeholders and top-down approaches that overlook dominant practices and preferences on the ground.

Obstacles for policy ‘stickiness’ – foreign policies in domestic policy environments

Literature on transnational policy transfer between radically different cultural contexts emphasises that objects of transfer (e.g. policies, programmes) must match with the adoptive political setting in a mutually benign manner for them to ‘stick’ and yield positive outcomes (e.g. Boettke et al., 2008; Roland, 2004; see **chapter 3**). This naturally requires the sending party to have a deep understanding of the social, economic and political environment into which the policies are to be transferred. Alternatively, processes of *translation* (mutation of policies in accordance with local preferences, needs and norms) by intermediary agents or policy adopters can facilitate effective adoption and enhance stickiness (see Boettke et al., 2008; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Stone, 2012). These insights further highlight the importance

¹⁸¹ Bloomberg Philanthropies Annual Report 2019; see https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/39/2019/06/AnnualReport2019_Digital.pdf, last visited 16.9.2020.

of *structural factors* in policy transfer effectiveness, as well as the role of intermediary and adoptive *agents* in overcoming such obstacles.

According to several stakeholders, the Foundation lacked contextual knowledge of Tanzania as well as a broader understanding of the realities and practical challenges of development practice at the country level. In particular, DPs reported that the Foundation's programme officers had limited 'field' experience, while they were perceived to be more familiar with the global private sector and/or development work from an academic or scientific perspective (see quotations below). Interviewees argued that this detachment from the policy environments of the Global South also explained the preference for vertical policy interventions and technical fixes expressed by big philanthropies. A deeper understanding of the complexities on the ground was seen to lead more typically to more comprehensive, systems-wide approaches. In some ways, these views were also confirmed by the data showing that the Foundation's expansion to PHC and integrated delivery activities was partially prompted by internal learning concerning complexities of aid delivery on the ground (see **chapter 5**).

“They are like very much coming from the Silicon Valley private sector mentality (...), their world is very different from the development world.” (Global development expert 7).

“(...) beyond the technical heads who might have been recruited from all over the world, a lot of programme folks who work on these issues, they are typically white, American double-masters holders in their 30's, which I think does imply a certain lack of (...) low-income-country health systems type of perspective on these issues, and lends itself to technological fixes to more complex problems.” (Global development expert 10).

Moreover, the findings of this thesis challenge the current literature suggesting that policies, programmes and models that are technical in nature, well branded, or enjoy hegemonic 'weight' are more likely to be adopted (see Linos, 2013; Peck and Theodore, 2010). The evidence of this study shows that although the Gates Foundation's policy instruments were largely techno-scientific in nature as opposed to rights-based or regulative requiring lengthy

political processes (see **appendix G.**), they still faced considerable resistance, since the Tanzanian government was reportedly uncomfortable with purely technology-based policy instruments. In addition, the Gates Foundation’s policy approaches lack the ‘appeal’ of some of the globally consensual policy agendas, such as those of the SDG and the UHC – which are frequently mentioned in Tanzanian development plans and programmes.

“Someone will come with his money, say ‘I got money from a certain organization, I’m coming to help with maternal health but I would like to use this methodology of treating or family planning’, which currently we are not using in the country, so for that will be totally difficult because it will be confusing for the health care provider because they are not used to that.” (Government official 3).

“(…) they think using drones to deliver vaccines is more cost-effective (...). And although on paper that is the case; the government is so uncomfortable with using drones, even in that small pilot [...]. So, to bring in this approach that makes everybody kind of uncomfortable because it’s new and it’s such a mind shift, in addition to technical complexity and all these other things that are such a big difference...in addition to the fact that it was a problem that didn’t even need to be solved...I don’t see that going anywhere.” (Development expert 7).

Interviewees also shared experiences of philanthropic donors committing to technological solutions on public health projects where, for various reasons, the proposed devices would not work or there was inadequate internet connectivity. Unsurprisingly in the light of the views revealed above, the majority of stakeholders in Tanzania (apart from Gates’ implementing partners) argued that the policy approaches and programmes implemented by the Foundation are culturally and/or practically unsuitable and overlook common practices in the health sector on the ground.

Externally introduced ‘exogeneous policy ideas’ are more likely to be successfully adopted when *translated* by intermediary or adoptive policy agents into appropriate solutions for the adoptive political setting (e.g. Boettke et al., 2008; Roland, 2004). In the context of philanthropic aid – largely based on applying global solutions at a national scale – policy translation may be particularly necessary. It is significant that this study did not find examples

of effective policy translation, despite the implementation work being carried out by local staff with contextual knowledge. Rather, implementing organisations in Tanzania stressed that the Gates Foundation’s pre-set policy priorities and key approaches are not easily adapted or tailored, as illustrated by the example below:

“I think we were trying to get back to Gates and tell them ‘that this segmentation is not as useful as you were finding out’. But because they did that, they are actually trying to insist that you should use the segmentation message and all that. [...] I think that is something they wanted to be associated with this project, so they try to be really pushy. [...] but it doesn’t really work like that for us, there are many things that are different.” (Implementation organisation representative 5).

While this critique was levelled in Tanzania, there are other examples of more constructive engagement by Gates’ local partners. A recent study from India by Fejeroskov (2018), for instance, shows how the Foundation’s implementers re-interpreted a Gates-funded project seeking to empower women farmers in a more locally appropriate way.¹⁸² The distinguishing factor between the Indian case and findings from Tanzania appears to be the strong identity and local embeddedness of the implementing NGO in the Indian context, which enabled discrete *resistance* to the Foundation’s initial project design. In contrast, Gates’ grantees in Tanzania showed a greater level of ‘obedience’ to direction from Seattle. However, as the Foundation is known to fund implementation work particularly by American INGOs with a similar mindset and frequently refuses ‘open-door proposals’ from small local NGOs and community based organisations (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2015), the insights from Tanzania are likely to be relevant in a majority of contexts where implementation work is not carried out by grassroots-oriented organisations.

Overall, the findings of this sub-section suggest that the Gates Foundation’s largely top-down approaches to aid delivery and project design may negatively affect its ability to create

¹⁸² More precisely, the implementing partners utilised the language of ‘social justice’ and ‘social change’ echoing the country’s longstanding Marxist political movements. This was in stark contrast to the Gates Foundation’s original focus on *agricultural productivity* and *number of land titles* secured for women (Fejeroskov, 2018).

valuable coalitions and propose locally attractive policy solutions for triggering internal policy learning or *voluntary policy transfer* (see **chapter 3** for definitions). Based on the stakeholder perspectives presented in this chapter and previous findings by Mahajan (2018),¹⁸³ it is also possible that the Gates Foundation’s ‘soft conditionalities’ remain insufficient in pressuring (involuntary) domestic policy adoption after the Gates-funded pilot phase, unless considerable support is rallied amongst heads of state and other established external donor agencies in recipient countries. It therefore seems that even for particularly large and influential big philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, an inability and/or unwillingness to adequately consider structural factors on the ground may prevent them from optimising their unique opportunities for successful policy transfer

7.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter explored stakeholder experiences and views on the Gates Foundation’s pragmatic approaches, ways of working and opportunities and obstacles for successful policy transfer in the context of Tanzania. This section concludes the chapter by summarising its key findings and engaging in a critical discussion about the dynamics and relations between the Gates Foundation and domestic stakeholders in Tanzania, assessing the distinctiveness of big philanthropies as aid donors and development partners in the Global South.

Summary

This chapter shows that the Gates Foundation’s innovative policy solutions and independent project implementation outsourced to third parties raise a range of issues and concerns from the perspective of the 2005 Paris Declaration’s principles guiding development cooperation in

¹⁸³ Despite the Gates Foundation’s eager promotion of its HIV/AIDS programme *Avahan*, the Indian government felt it had insufficient funds to sustain the programme in the long term, and therefore favoured the already existing public schemes (Mahajan, 2018).

Tanzania. These include, namely, issues of coordination and harmonisation of development efforts nationwide, and poor alignment with domestic policy agendas and decision-making structures which threatens the realisation of country ownership in leading development efforts.

Moreover, the findings suggest that for domestic governments, big philanthropies may represent an attractive, alternative source of development resources without political ‘meddling’. Yet, successful policy transfer may be hampered by inappropriate, top-down policy solutions and ineffective engagement with stakeholders for necessary buy-in at all levels of governance. In particular, the chapter highlights frictions arising from the Gates Foundation’s attempts to transplant novel programmes and approaches without adequately accounting for political traditions and ongoing policy developments on the ground (i.e. structural factors), thereby compromising existing opportunities for policy transfer.

Discussion: old wine in new bottles or breaking the mould?

Kwon (2019) articulates that “*from the viewpoint of global social policy, political dynamics among global and national stakeholders should be carefully examined in order to fully understand global social policy making*” (2019, p. 92). The findings of this study offer new insights on the complexities of global social policy making by big philanthropies, when such dynamics are accounted for. This chapter has highlighted the diversity of domestic *stakeholders*, whose buy-in, political support and financial resources are paramount for successful social policy delivery by philanthropic donors, and adoption of their policies and programmes within the country. These stakeholders represent multiple layers of governance, from the highest levels of government leadership to local government authorities and village elders amongst beneficiary populations – each playing a different part in creating push and pull effects for externally proposed policy agendas.

Dynamics between donor agencies and domestic actors are equally important to understanding social policy making in aid-receiving countries. This dimension is particularly pertinent in sub-Saharan Africa, which has traditionally constituted the main target of policy experiments, coerced policy reforms and democratisation agendas by external actors (Adesina, 2007; Alou, 2009; Fraser and Whitfield, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008; Tar, 2014). Thus, it is relevant to ask whether and in what ways do philanthropic donors increase the domestic policy space in processes of social policy formulation and thereby enhance political sovereignty in the Global South. Granted, big philanthropies claim to represent a new type of aid cooperation, driven by a firm focus on delivering results and an apolitical approach that avoids interference with internal politics. But do they really break the mould according to the stakeholders on the ground?

To begin with, as explained by Whitfield and Fraser (2009), the concept of ‘ownership’ is frequently interpreted by donor agencies as commitment on the part of recipients to policies designed by external actors, as opposed to “*control over the process and outcome of choosing policies*” (2009, p. 3). Based on the findings, this appears to also characterise the Gates Foundation’s understanding in the context of Tanzania. Foundation employees and implementing partners in this study systematically embraced the notion of ‘country ownership’ during interviews, meaning government up-take and up-scale of policies and approaches crafted by the organisation itself. This was demonstrated by the incoherencies between the Foundation’s investments and the government’s official development plans in Tanzania, as well as the organisation’s remoteness from the political processes and responsibilities between the government and its citizens. The findings raise pivotal questions concerning the political empowerment of aid-receiving countries and the strengthening of their democratic institutions of social policy making.

Moreover, the stakeholder insights presented in this chapter suggest that the extent to which big philanthropies are able to make important contributions or disruptions to social policy delivery on the ground, depends on their degree of *harmonisation* with other actors, ideas and processes. It is significant that the Gates Foundation's autonomous implementation of development projects and programmes was understood by the stakeholders to hamper effective policy coordination between different donor agencies. Rather, these approaches were seen to add to issues of *fragmentation* and *duplication* – in line with previous literature on vertical policy investments (see in Addison et al., 2015). Indeed, while Gates' representatives acknowledged the Foundation's coordination issues within the organisation, no consideration was shown for the broader issues of fragmentation and disjointed investments with other development actors on the ground. Stakeholders also suggested that the Foundation's country-level engagement is driven, at least partially, by *strategic needs* (e.g. gaining political or financial leverage amongst other actors) and involves intentional *secrecy* towards a range of stakeholders.

These insights suggest that the Gates Foundation's engagement models are not only unfocused on effective coordination with other development actors at the domestic level, but problematic from the perspective of donor-recipient relationships. The evidence of this study points to a lack of *ethical consideration* for collaborative approaches and domestic policy priorities. So, based on the example of the Gates Foundation, philanthropic aid may be seen as representing a return to some of the age-old issues of donor-dominated development cooperation, which international frameworks and initiatives have ostensibly sought to challenge since the 1990s. From the World Bank's *Poverty Reduction Papers* (PRSPs) and the OECD's 2005 *Paris Declaration to south-south cooperation* by emergent Southern donors, both old and new players have pursued approaches to enhance country leadership in actively participating in the development of plans and activities.

Furthermore, the findings of this chapter challenge the potential effectiveness and sustainability of the policy transfer strategies described in **chapter 6** and bring into focus the complexities of policy adoption and success on the ground. Importantly, the stakeholders interviewed in this study exhibited hesitancy and scepticism when discussing the success and sustainability of some of the innovative, ‘silo’ approaches associated with the Gates Foundation. The Foundation was considered to fail frequently in creating coalitions within lower levels of government (LGAs) and communities, demonstrating yet another problem with its top-down approaches. Moreover, from cultural mismatch to issues of technical feasibility and more general non-conformity with existing *systems, institutions* and *social policy ideas* on the ground, many of the Foundation’s interventions were seen as unlikely to be adopted, sustained and ‘stick’ in the long term.

It is also interesting to note that the Gates Foundation’s investments are demonstrably isolated from the dominant social policy developments in Tanzania, such as the cash transfer scheme PSSN, focus on strengthening universal access to health services or the ongoing discussions around universal health insurance. At the same time, the Foundation’s project design and engagement models appear to be somewhat conflicting with overall health sector characteristics in the country, which rely on nation-wide systems rather than vertical programmes and strong government leadership and public provision (as elaborated in **chapter 2**). This is not to say that the Gates Foundation’s influence is non-existent; by streaming important resources, building relationships with the highest levels of government and promoting new policy ideas through their domestic intermediaries (see **chapter 6**), some of its policy ideas may well end up featuring amongst other social policy measures on the ground – even if they represented *uninformed* or *inappropriate policy transfer* (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). While this study is unable to evaluate the accuracy of these predictions, it would be imprudent to ignore them.

Finally, the Gates Foundation self-identifies as a risk-taking development actor, which does not shy away from pursuing policy ideas that might fail. In common with other big philanthropies investing in *big bets*, it can afford, and is apparently willing, to, experiment with novel policy ideas in developing countries even when there are no guarantees of these ‘sticking’ or generating desired policy outcomes. In the words of Bill Gates, “*The goal in much of what we do is to provide seed funding for various ideas. Some will fail. We fill a function that government cannot — making a lot of risky bets with the expectation that at least a few of them will succeed*”.¹⁸⁴ However, it is important to question how the Foundation measures failure and success, both in terms of policy outcomes and policy stickiness (when the latter is not a condition of the former). When a policy idea is new and innovative but does not generate desired results on the ground, it is not automatically indicative of a poor policy *per se*. Instead, failures may simply be indicative of poor engagement on the ground. This accentuates the importance of critically assessing the engagement models adopted by philanthropic donors, who may otherwise attribute all policy failures down to ‘risky investments’ rather than processes of top-down agenda-setting and autonomous implementation approaches.

¹⁸⁴ See <https://www.wired.com/2013/11/bill-gates-wired-essay/>, last visited 4.4.2020.

8. CONCLUSIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis makes an important empirical and theoretical contribution to the study of big philanthropies – large, Western philanthropic donor organisations – as increasingly influential social policy actors in the development context. Big philanthropies are no longer simply complementary development donors operating in the background of global governance. Rather, they collaborate and compete with other leading development organisations, actively seeking to influence social policy agendas at global, regional and domestic levels, and thereby occupying centre stage in global social policy making. These developments reflect what Harrow and Jung (2011) have described as “*a wider redefining and reconfiguring of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments, civil society and the private sector towards more strategic and collaborative alliances*” (2011, p. 1048). In other words, the emergence of big philanthropies as key development and social policy actors is concomitant with a broader transformation within the system of global social governance that allows for diverse actors to increasingly engage in social policy formation and delivery.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is widely recognised as the face of contemporary big philanthropy and a leading global health actor. In 2019, the organisation became the second largest provider of Development Assistance for Health (DAH) after the US with 3.9 USD billion worth of investments¹⁸⁵, while its DAH flows accumulated up to 17 USD billion over the previous five year period (2015-2019).¹⁸⁶ The Foundation’s deep involvement in global health is also demonstrated through its participation in official policy making processes within

¹⁸⁵ See data by IHME; <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 13.7.2020.

¹⁸⁶ IHME; see <https://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/>, last visited 26.8.2020.

leading global health institutions, including the WHO, GAVI and the Global Fund, and its pivotal role in launching new global consortiums such as *Family Planning 2020* (FP2020), the *End Malaria Council* or the *Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations* (CEPI), amongst many others. Besides its deepening integration into structures of global governance, the Gates Foundation engages directly in social policy delivery in aid receiving countries – in the areas of health, agriculture, education and financial services for the poor. While steering and funding development projects across 138 countries (with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa), the organisation has also made some significant ad-hoc investments in selected countries – such as the 76 million USD worth of debt relief granted to Nigeria in 2017 to celebrate the country’s progress in polio eradication.¹⁸⁷

At first sight, social policy promotion by big philanthropies seems at odds with their private sector backgrounds. In fact, state-led social policy has traditionally had the primary function of mitigating the negative effects of the market, and there have always been important tensions between the two (e.g. Hacker and Pierson, 2002; Mares, 2003; Skocpol, 1995). However, due to the much more difficult relationship towards funding and delivery of social policy by the state (and the unique religious and cultural context) in the US, philanthropic foundations have always constituted a part of the social sector make-up in the country (Callahan, 2017; Soskis and Katz, 2016; Zunz, 2012). From an international perspective, the US government is also exceptionally generous in subsidising philanthropic giving through tax concessions (Reich, 2018). The fact that most big philanthropies are (and have historically been) American is therefore no coincidence (without overlooking the prominent UK-based, health-sector focused philanthropies, such as the Wellcome Trust and CIFF). However, important questions remain in terms of their more recent role and agenda as engaged development actors and global social policy entrepreneurs.

¹⁸⁷ See e.g. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/bill-gates-nigeria-debt-pay-polio-eradication-foundation-money-pledge-a8163056.html>, last visited 6.7.2018.

Previously, literature on contemporary philanthropies has primarily focused on political science analysis or ethical debates concerning their public policy making role in the US (e.g. Edwards, 2011; Jung and Harrow, 2015; Morvaridi, 2015; Reich, 2018; Stone, 2017, 2010; Youde, 2019, 2013). Although there is a maturing body of literature addressing the role of philanthropies in the education sector, particularly in the UK and the US (Ball, 2008, 2007; Ball and Junemann, 2011; Baltodano, 2017; Lipman, 2015), philanthropies continue to be largely overlooked in the field of Social Policy. Despite the important theoretical contributions of the Global Social Policy literature in addressing the involvement of transnational non-state actors in different processes of global social policy making and delivery (Deacon, 2010a, 2007; Gough and Wood, 2004; Kaasch and Martens, 2015; Mkandawire, 2004a; Surender and Walker, 2013; Yeates, 2014, 2001), it too lacks focus on big philanthropies.

As the role of big philanthropies in global social governance and aid delivery in the social sector becomes more prominent, it can no longer be ignored in Social Policy study. The purpose of this doctoral study is to remedy some of the existing knowledge gaps and complement the existing literature, which is largely theoretical and sometimes normative, by conducting an empirically grounded investigation. It seeks to add both to our knowledge about big philanthropies as social policy actors and Global Social Policy frameworks by *elucidating the global social policy features of big philanthropies' social sector interventions and means of policy influence*. The key aims of the research are two-fold. Firstly, this study examines the extent to which big philanthropies represent novel ideological and pragmatic approaches which are indicative of a coherent and distinctive *social policy paradigm*. Secondly, this study explores the means and mechanisms of transnational *social policy transfer* instigated by big philanthropies. Additionally, the findings also shed light on the

perceived risks and advantages of the promoted social policy model, from the perspective of diverse stakeholders.

The research consists of a qualitative *case study* focusing on the Gates Foundation in the health sector. The Gates Foundation was selected as an exemplar for “*its capacity to exemplify the analytical object of the inquiry*” (Thomas 2011, p. 514), or in other words, the social policy approaches of big philanthropies in a development context. Despite its notably sizeable resources, visible media presence and influential position in global health governance, the Gates Foundation embodies many of the key characteristics of contemporary philanthropy as described in the existing literature, and largely reaffirmed by this study (see **chapter 4**). As well as exemplifying it, the Gates Foundation is also a driving force within (Western) philanthropic aid and social policy investment. An investigation focused on the Foundation is therefore valuable both for the case-specific insights it generates, and the information generalisable to the broader philanthropic sector.

The core data of this study consists of *semi-structured interviews* conducted in 2017 with a wide range of stakeholders including Gates’ officials at the headquarters in Seattle; representatives from its implementing partner organisations both at their US headquarters and in Tanzania; global development experts from international organisations and bilateral donor agencies both at global and domestic levels in Tanzania; and, domestic development actors including the Tanzanian government and some leading civil society organisations. The interview data was complemented by a *documentary analysis* of Gates Foundation’s publications, speeches and other relevant material, analysed through qualitative, *thematic framework analysis*. The analysis was also assisted by a *desktop study* on other leading philanthropic donor organisations (such as the Wellcome Trust, Hewlett Foundation and the

Bloomberg Philanthropies), as well as the existing research and ‘grey’ literature (e.g. OECD reports on philanthropic aid flows).

Relevance of the study for social policy analysis

This thesis speaks to a range of social policy issues. One of the most important debates this study addresses is the participation of non-state actors in social policy making and delivery. In the context of industrialised countries, the causes and consequences of private business involvement in social policy have been discussed far and wide (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Le Grand, 1991; Pierson, 1994; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby, 1999). The longstanding implications of *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs) and consequent policy prescriptions promoting private sector provision and marketisation of welfare in the Global South have also attracted considerable attention (Adesina, 2007b; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2014; Mehrotra and Delamonica, 2005; Mkandawire, 2001). In a similar manner, the complex roles and responsibilities of ‘charities’ in the West, and ‘development NGOs’ in the Global South, have also been widely explored and conceptually debated over the past decades (e.g. Banks et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2008; Jolkkonen, 2019; Lewis, 2013, 2008).

Combining features both from private and third sector organisations, big philanthropies represent a new type of hybrid non-state actor. Just like bilateral donors whose development cooperation has been largely influenced by their own experiences (e.g. Hall and Midgley, 2004), the policy ideas and approaches of philanthropic donors are naturally inspired by their own position and background in the global private sector. At the same time, they are both tax-exempt third sector actors and ‘meta-NGOs’ (Stubbs, 2005), exerting influence over their grantee organisations by directing support into specific policy areas and approaches. It is also important to highlight that philanthropies are not private service providers competing in the markets according to rules and regulations established by the state, *but* are rivals to states and

international organisations in the context of global social governance (despite certain limitations which are discussed later). These features and dispositions complicate the existing discussions and theoretical frameworks relating to non-state actors in different social policy processes.

This study also engages with ongoing debates concerning issues of aid conditionality and unequal power dynamics in the context of development cooperation. In much the same way as Southern donor agencies that have emerged as protagonists of ‘solidaristic’ and non-interfering new approaches to aid delivery (e.g. Abdenur, 2015; Abdenur et al., 2014; Corkin, 2014; Greenhill et al., 2013), big philanthropies have also entered the field of international development cooperation with promises of politically impartial and a purely evidence-based approach. Questions around motivations, conditions and political implications of aid are particularly relevant in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where discussions related to political neo-colonialism and economic exploitation by donor agencies remain both ardent and justified (see e.g. Chang, 2009; Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Fejerskov et al., 2016; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013; Langan, 2017; Moyo, 2010). Against this background, an examination of philanthropic donors is essential to understanding whether this new group of Western donors strengthens the policy voice of southern actors on the ground and in global arenas, continue to reinforce the status quo of North-South dynamics or drive entirely new dynamics.

Finally, the field of Global Social Policy has an explicit and strong commitment to robust and generous national, regional and global social policy systems as an alternative to neo-liberal development agendas, austerity measures and residualist approaches to social policy (e.g. Deacon, 2007; Hall and Midgley, 2004; Hujo et al., 2016; Mkandawire, 2004; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2008; Yeates, 2018). Informed by this scholarship and other mounting evidence on the limitations and dangers of development models focused narrowly on economic growth and parsimonious systems of social protection, global social policy

practice has lately adopted a range of policy agendas favouring universalist and comprehensive approaches to welfare provision. The *Universal Health Coverage* -agenda (UHC), *Social Protection Floors* -initiative and *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs) represent some of the leading policy agendas promoting investments in expansion of affordable health care, education and social protection *for all* (among other social, economic and environmental rights). Since contemporary big philanthropies remain deeply embedded in the global capitalist system, it is important to shed light on the ideologies and social policy approaches in order to better understand their exact policy views and preferences and position vis-à-vis the current universalist social policy trend.

Contributions of the study and summary of key findings

This doctoral study makes several empirical, analytical and theoretical contributions. Firstly, though not the first of its kind (see Fejerskov, 2018; Mahajan, 2018), it is one of the few works that incorporates the experiences, views and perspectives of domestic stakeholders and recipients of aid on social policy delivered by big philanthropies. In order to gain this breadth and depth of evidence, the Gates Foundation's activities are examined in the country context of Tanzania, where diverse domestic and external actors engage in health policy making and delivery. At the same time, the analysis draws on views shared by Gates Foundation representatives based primarily in Seattle, its implementing organisation representatives in headquarters and in Tanzania, and experts from the global development community (see **chapter 4** for further details). Therefore, this study comprises views and experiences from stakeholders with different relationships to the Gates Foundation *and* at different 'layers' of governance in the context of philanthropic aid. This enables an empirically driven, rich and detailed analysis of Gates Foundation's priority approaches, engagement models at global and domestic levels, and the comparative advantages and risks of philanthropic aid.

Secondly, this thesis adopts an original analytical approach for the study of philanthropy. Firstly, it draws on the classic Peter Hall (1993) policy paradigm theory to study contemporary philanthropic donors as key actors and ‘motors’ of paradigmatic change in the realm of global social policy. In addition, the research developed an analytical tool to examine global social policy paradigms and their constitutive components and attributes (described in **chapter 3**), such as those espoused and promoted by big philanthropies. It provides an important framework for enabling a theory-guided, systematic and structured analysis of social policy approaches and potential models deployed by social policy actors in a development context.

Moreover, this study adds to Global Social Policy literature challenging ‘methodological nationalism’, or, “*focus on social institutions, activities and ties at the level of individual countries*” in Social Policy study (Yeates, 2014, p. 2). The limitations of applying Western state-centred social policy models based on industrialised countries to the context of the Global South are now well established – as are the colonial legacies and the consequent global political and economic dynamics that have enabled political interference by external actors in ‘southern’ domestic policy processes (Adesina, 2007a; Gough and Wood, 2004; Midgley, 2019; Mkandawire, 2004a; Surender, 2013). Therefore, this study is located within, and contributes to, ‘*methodological transnationalism*’ by producing new knowledge on philanthropic social policy actors under multiple and simultaneous policy processes and arenas (see Kauppinen, 2015; Yeates, 2014). More specifically, this study discusses the supranational, transnational and national (as well as sub-national) spaces in which the Gates Foundation’s influence, policy cooperation and engagement with different stakeholders occurs. It argues that these spaces are not only important, but highly interconnected and therefore relevant in explaining the strategies, mechanisms and potential successes of social policy transfer by big philanthropies in aid-receiving countries.

Thirdly, this thesis adds to current theoretical understandings of large private foundations as a specific type of non-state social policy actor, and the *distinctiveness* of their social policy agendas, approaches and features as policy makers in comparison to other public, private and third sector organisations. Additionally, this thesis makes a particular contribution in the area of social policy change and reform in aid-receiving countries in the context of philanthropic engagement and aid delivery. It explores the strategies and mechanisms through which philanthropic policy entrepreneurs initiate policy transfer towards aid-receiving countries. At a more general level, the findings of this study are also relevant for theoretical debates related to the dynamics of global social policy making in the contemporary context, where big philanthropies have emerged as new sources of authority and legitimacy.

The key findings of this thesis are as follows. **Chapter 5** describes a ‘philanthropic global social policy paradigm’, representing a coherent, new type of Third Way social investment model adopted in a development context. It is driven by a philanthrocapitalist *ideology* emphasising the role of global markets and philanthropic investors in spurring inclusive development: it pursues narrowly defined, global policy *objectives* primarily focused on asset-building amongst target populations, and; it promotes techno-scientific policy *instruments* such as new public goods (e.g. vaccines or contraceptives), technical fixes to delivery systems, and innovative policy packages or approaches to service delivery. This model differs significantly from universalist, system-wide approaches and social policy models aimed at building generous public welfare systems and social protection institutions in the pursuit of social justice.

Chapter 6 of this thesis argues that despite their evidenced lack of democratic legitimacy, as novel global social policy actors big philanthropies are able to draw on unique sources of authority. These include moral authority deriving from altruism and celebrity status, as well as

epistemic authority gained through cutting-edge scientific knowledge and wide-ranging private sector expertise. The chapter also shows that big philanthropies have a range of policy transfer strategies which combine extensive use of network connections, high visibility policy promotion, covert policy advocacy through policy intermediaries, and subtle financial pressure through project modalities, tied aid and PBF mechanisms – coined as ‘soft conditionalities’ in this study.

Chapter 7 finds that there are several risks associated with philanthropic aid and social policy delivery on the ground, as perceived by stakeholders. These stem from their largely top-down approaches to agenda-setting, aid delivery and engagement on the ground, which lend themselves to the omission of domestic policy priorities, collaborative structures of policy planning and local institutional landscapes. This, in turn, results in increased fragmentation of development interventions and friction between philanthropic donors and the domestic policy environments in aid-receiving countries – potentially leading to inappropriate policy transfer. The following sections of this concluding chapter will discuss these findings more in detail.

8.2 KEY FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS I: DISCOVERING A PHILANTHROPIC SOCIAL POLICY PARADIGM

Mkandawire (2011) has postulated that “*the mental map that policy-makers have of the economy and society has huge implications as to how they frame questions and what they consider are realistic aspirations and permissible solutions*” (2011, p. 4). This study argues that this holds equally true for other stakeholders, and that the Gates Foundation holds a unique ‘mental map’ which has led to some distinctive (i) ideological foundations, (ii) policy objectives and (iii) policy instruments characterising its social policy delivery in the development context. This section will summarise and discuss the key findings, while

demonstrating the salience of Hall's (1993) policy paradigm framework – designed to analyse paradigm shifts in UK economic policy) and from which this study drew – in investigating global social policy paradigms and transnational social policy processes.

‘Philanthropic social policy paradigm’: a summary

Policy paradigms are guided by their underlying ideas and normative understandings (Daigneault, 2014; Hall, 1993). This study shows that the Gates Foundation's ideological underpinnings are rooted in a *philanthrocapitalist worldview*, which guides aid activities within the organisation and, arguably, the philanthropic sector more broadly.¹⁸⁸ Philanthrocapitalism¹⁸⁹ holds a set of ideas that places emphasis on failures in both global markets and domestic governments to tackle disease, climate crisis, financial exclusion and other development challenges. This ideological strand is also imbued with ideas about what constitute the best solutions: harnessing scientific discovery and private sector knowledge for development of new products and services; encouraging private sector investment into areas benefitting markets in the Global South; and – importantly – deploying the catalytic capital of big philanthropies to support this happening.

Moreover, under philanthrocapitalism, development is understood as *inclusive* (economic) *growth*. This posits the purpose of social policy largely as an instrument to facilitate economic participation of the poorest populations in society. Indeed, the evidence shows that as much as the Gates Foundation is focused on making capitalism ‘work for the poor’ (in terms of products, services and other innovations), it also seeks to make the poor work (thanks to the opportunities created by the former). Interestingly, however, this worldview also merges *economic individualism* (emphasising individual rights and self-reliance in the economic

¹⁸⁸ Which is not shared by those big philanthropies with a distinctive focus on social justice such as the Ford Foundation (since the 2015) and the Open Society Foundations; see **appendix C**.

¹⁸⁹ A term initially introduced by Matthew Bishop in a 2006 article in the Economist; see <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2006/02/25/the-birth-of-philanthrocapitalism>, last visited 16.8.2020.

sphere) with values of *altruistic giving* to the ‘less advantaged’ (with a moral concern over inclusiveness of the economic sphere). Not only does the Foundation challenge the poorest to ‘lift themselves out of poverty’ and ‘unleash their economic potential’,¹⁹⁰ it equally challenges those with wealth to give it away in ways that can enhance the economic activity of populations in stringent poverty.¹⁹¹

Contrary to public policy makers, philanthropic donors are motivated by individual concerns and passions, which means that the *policy objectives* and *programmatic goals* adopted by different big philanthropies remain idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, this study identifies some common features. Firstly, philanthropic donors are focused on building individuals’ *assets* through education, financial services or new farming methods, for instance (OECD, 2020, 2018; see also **appendix H.**). Deriving from the ideological foundations, these are ‘productivist’ in nature; by enhancing human capital within the active (and future) labour force such investments are contributing towards inclusive economic growth. In comparison, issues such as old age poverty or weak social protection systems are rarely prioritised by philanthropic donors, reflecting a visible distaste for direct social assistance and poverty reduction measures. Secondly, programmatic objectives or ‘targets’ pursued by big philanthropies are typically *narrowly defined* and *quantified*, measured by the corollary *process indicators* (e.g. numbers of people vaccinated, women receiving contraception or HIV cases eradicated). These approaches allow for the demonstration of rapid, ‘tangible’ progress, and diverge significantly from universalist ideas of social policy and longer-term holistic policy objectives addressing gaps and needs in welfare systems. Additionally, and as the Gates Foundation exemplifies, philanthropic donors select their target populations (e.g.

¹⁹⁰ See <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/>, last visited 16.8.2020.

¹⁹¹ Reflecting on their commitment to philanthropic giving in the Foundation’s Annual Letter 2018, Bill and Melinda state: “*we think that’s a basic responsibility of anyone with a lot of money*”; see <https://www.gatesnotes.com/2018-Annual-Letter>, last visited 31.3.2020.

women or the extremely poor) based largely on their prioritised issues (e.g. family planning), rather than means-testing or other methodical assessments of need or deservingness.

The final component of the examined social policy model comprises *social policy instruments*, including the specific tools utilised on the ground, and approaches to aid delivery. The evidence shows that, in line with its underpinning normative understandings and programmatic objectives, the Gates Foundation prioritises investments in new (i) *global public goods* (e.g. colostrum-like formula milk, self-injectable contraceptives, climate-change resisting seeds); (ii) *technical fixes* (e.g. health data collection through new technologies, malaria-eliminating drones, fixes to cold chains borrowed from Coca Cola); and, (iii) *innovative approaches to service provision*, often promoted under novel ‘policy packages’ (see **appendix G.**). Evidence on other leading philanthropic donors suggests that these are also more widely shared within the sector (see **appendix H.**). Taking into consideration the impact-oriented nature of contemporary philanthropy, this is not surprising; the underlying premise of these *techno-scientific* instruments is that, thanks to innovation, such instruments are able to completely overcome challenges or offer magic bullets to solve complex issues within *existing systems* and yield significant, rapid results.

A similar rationale is reflected in the Gates Foundation’s *aid modalities*, focused on generating optimal returns for investments. The organisation, and philanthropic donors more generally, delivers aid through grants for *projects* implemented by third parties. This has been argued to extricate social policy investments from potential bureaucracy and corruption under aid delivery by government agencies (see Desai and Kharas, 2008). Big philanthropies also pursue cost-effectiveness through some more novel approaches, such as *Performance Based Funding* (PBF) mechanisms and a broad range of *profitable investments* for social purposes (e.g. loans, equity investments, fixed-income instruments or Development Impact Bonds).

Many of these approaches are private sector -inspired innovations emanating from the philanthropic sector (Salamon, 2014), and their underlying logics are increasingly spreading across the organs of social governance – as the recent interest in *blended finance* illustrates.¹⁹²

Distinctiveness, overlaps, divergences and theoretical implications: a discussion

It is important to establish whether there are sufficient grounds for arguing that the examined social policy ideas and approaches within the philanthropic sector constitute a new and distinctive paradigm in global social policy. It has previously been argued that there is, indeed, a new Silicon Valley- or California Consensus which has a novel focus on innovation, technologies and business style management methods (see Desai and Kharas, 2008; Morvaridi, 2015). Others have claimed that the ideological foundations and approaches promoting welfare pluralism, and the social policy role of the private sector in particular, represent a fluid continuity with neoliberal approaches to development and especially those promoted by the Washington Consensus (e.g. Mediavilla and Garcia-Arias, 2019; Mitchell and Sparke, 2016).

This thesis argues that the ‘philanthrocapitalist’ social policy model advanced by the Gates Foundation is not one that fully aligns with the foundational tenets and approaches of the *Washington Consensus*, or other more recent pro-market models such as the *Asian Developmental Paradigm* – while similarities exist. In its more *microeconomic approach* focusing on individuals’ economic activity, the philanthropic social policy model differs significantly from paradigms which have advocated for macroeconomic shifts in order to develop national industries and spur economic progress. Arguably, the observed social policy model maintains an important link between economic goals and social policy, by understanding investments in the social sector to be key to enhancing *productivity* – in much

¹⁹² See e.g. DFI (2018); <http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/blended-finance-principles/>, last visited 12.9.2020.

the same way as the *Asian Developmental Paradigm* (de Haan, 2010; Ohno, 2013; Surender and Urbina-Ferretjans, 2015). However, rather than advancing state-led social policy delivery, big philanthropies have promoted a wide range of non-state actors. At the same time, the observed social policy paradigm goes beyond promoting privatisation of public welfare provision and market deregulation for the benefit of the global economy.

It appears, rather, that philanthropic donors perceive themselves as idea incubators, testing and proposing novel social policy approaches for governments to adopt and upscale (see also Mahajan, 2018). While there are grounds to argue that private sector service provision represents an important dimension in these novel approaches, it cannot be said that philanthropic donors promote public austerity measures as part of their development solutions *per se*. In fact, the Gates Foundation has promoted increased public investment in the health sector. This study therefore also challenges the idea of philanthropic aid advancing a new ‘cosmopolitan social contract’ between the world’s poor and wealthy philanthropists, eroding the responsibilities of the state towards its citizens (see Morvaridi, 2016).

Furthermore, it is evident that the worldviews, policy goals and instruments advanced by big philanthropies differ from rights-based, universalist and system-wide agendas traditionally associated with the UN and its specialised agencies such as the UNDP, ILO and WHO. Yet, curiously, an important number of big philanthropies have adopted a rhetoric promoting some of the dominant universalist agendas (notably the UHC and SDGs), despite their seemingly evident incongruity with vertical, techno-scientific approaches. This may be explained by the fact that widely accepted global policy *ideas* are often conceptually loose and thereby permissive of diverse actors and approaches (see Béland and Cox, 2016). In the context of global social policy, *universalism* remains such a ‘polysemic idea’: debates concerning the role of private sector actors in increasing universal access are ongoing (e.g. Mackintosh et al.,

2016; Morgan et al., 2016; Wadge et al., 2017); and the very concept of universalism faces ongoing conceptual contestation (see Anttonen et al., 2012; Anttonen and Sipilä, 2014). Consequently, organisations such as the Gates Foundation have claimed alignment with the UHC-agenda through primary health care ‘policy packages’¹⁹³ for the extremely poor. Interestingly, the Rockefeller Foundation was part of the global movement creating momentum for the UHC agenda and its incorporation into the SDGs, while heavily promoting increased involvement of private sector provision (Smith et al., 2018)

Pro-poor and selectivist approach to population coverage (adopted by most big philanthropies) has been characterised as the opposite of universalism in terms of its ideological underpinnings, pragmatic approaches and social justice outcomes in the traditional Social Policy literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Titmuss, 1973; Townsend, 1976). Many have also understood private sector provision to represent a key threat to universalism in the context of development in terms of equal access and affordability (e.g. Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2014; Mkandawire, 2005). Additionally, it is noteworthy that philanthropic donors have avoided the rights-based approaches and arguments in social policy typically adopted by proponents of universalism (Anttonen et al., 2012; Dean, 2002). With this in mind, it may be argued that the discursive changes and expansion of policy instruments amongst big philanthropies in favour of dominant universalist agendas reflects a redefinition or compartmentalisation of the concept under different functionalities and objectives, enabling ‘alignment’ under one of these (e.g. expanding service provision amongst poorest populations), while allowing to overlook some other dimensions.

What can be distilled from the collected evidence is that the Gates Foundation, and the philanthropic sector more broadly, operates with a strong sense of short-term pragmatism

¹⁹³ The term ‘policy packages’ has been used since the early 2000s in reference to interventions that address several health conditions in an integrated way and/or propose defined sets of high priority interventions. As such, they have been understood as another form of *vertical* health interventions. (Oliveira-Cruz et al., 2003).

embedded in a philanthrocapitalist worldview. This thesis argues that while perpetuating some of the underpinning tenets of the Washington Consensus in its idealisation of market fundamentalism and the effectiveness of private sector approaches, the examined philanthropic social policy paradigm is better compared to *Third Way* approaches, promoted by social liberal and social democratic parties in the UK, US and Germany between the 1990s and early 2000s.

Like contemporary philanthropies, Third Way politicians have also made space for big businesses and third sector organisations in welfare provision, and vowed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of ‘heavy’ public machinery (Giddens, 2013; Surender and Lewis, 2004). With a striking resemblance to writings by Bill Gates, a joint paper by two prominent Third Way leaders, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, states that the “*the essential function of markets must be complemented and improved by political action, not hampered by it*”.¹⁹⁴ Perhaps unsurprisingly, emphasis on business-style management and performance-based approaches in social policy delivery also appears to be widely promoted by contemporary philanthropists and Third Way politicians (see Hulme and Scott, 2010). Nevertheless, Third Way approaches and those promoted by contemporary big philanthropies have maintained state and public social policy delivery as key components of welfare systems, unlike the Washington Consensus, which pursued more aggressively “*restrictive fiscal policies, commercial and financial liberalization, minimizing public sectors, privatization and deregulation*” (Mediavilla & Garcia-Arias, 2019, p. 860).

Interestingly, both Third Way thinking and the philanthrocapitalist worldview equally emphasise moral responsibility in civil society, albeit in slightly differing ways. In the UK, New Labour adopted a discourse of ‘civic responsibility’ in an attempt to induce ideas of

¹⁹⁴ ‘*Europe: Third Way – Die Neue Mitte*’ (1998); see <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/02828.pdf>, last visited 16.8.2020.

moral responsibility into civil society (Ball, 2007). As established earlier, the ethic of civil responsibility has characterised contemporary philanthropies and their predecessors from the early beginnings, as Carnegie's *'Gospel of Wealth'* (1889) reminds us. Also, the understanding of the individual responsibility of those benefiting from social assistance and other interventions is shared by both paradigms. Third Way governments systematically reiterated ideas of individual 'rights and responsibilities' (leading to policy measures focused on crime, anti-social behaviour and labour market activation, in particular) (Giddens, 2013), while big philanthropies are largely focused on creating opportunities for, rather than providing assistance to, individuals striving to emerge from poverty.

Despite these conspicuous similarities, the philanthropic social policy model does not fully correspond with Third Way welfare, at least in its traditional sense. This becomes obvious when attention is directed to the observed emphasis (both pragmatic and ideological) on the philanthropic sector and its role in social policy making. This goes beyond embracing third sector actors as complementary partners: particularly at the global level, big philanthropies have promoted institutions and processes of global social governance in which philanthropic and other non-state donors hold equal, if not greater, 'steering' power than governments (see e.g. Browne, 2017). Additionally, big philanthropies have a significant focus on data, science, innovation, and technology as well as high risk investments (which also holds true for the Ford Foundation) – distinctive features which have led to some unique social policy instruments.

Moreover, some posit that, in a development context, the Third Way approach has been encapsulated by the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSPs) and 'social inclusion' policy frames adopted by the Bretton Woods institutions and the OECD, respectively (see e.g. Deeming and Smyth, 2018; Porter and Craig, 2004). However, despite shared ideas of

(economic) ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘activation of capacities’, some differences remain between such agendas and philanthropic aid. Unlike the previous models, the examined philanthropic development paradigm lacks *good governance* -measures, which are another manifestation of emphasis on the social policy making role by the state (despite their potentially perverse effects on governments, discussed in **chapter 2**). As such, this study contends that the observed ideological foundations, policy objectives and policy instruments adopted by big philanthropies represent a *new* type of Third Way approach implemented within the realm of global social policy, rather than an entirely distinctive, or, neoliberal paradigm.

This more nuanced understanding of the role philanthropic donors play in the complex arrangements of social policy formation and delivery is theoretically important. The findings suggest that, rather than understanding the *welfare mix* through roles and responsibilities occupied by different public, private and third sector actors (Ascoli and Ranci, 2002; Evers, 1995; Johnson, 1999), the concept would benefit from a temporal dimension and fluidity. Big philanthropies see themselves largely as incubators injecting new ideas into welfare systems by innovating and testing their pragmatic feasibility through the funding, piloting and launch of different programmes. As such, their role in both influencing policy priorities and delivering policies and programmes at the country level may be prominent, but it is also, primarily, *temporary*. Another difficulty in addressing the ‘position’ of big philanthropies within the welfare mix is that while private sector actors and third sector organisations are typically sub-contracted or mandated as service deliverers by governments, big philanthropies appear to have assumed the position of important policy makers for themselves, particularly at the global level.

8.3 KEY FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS II: DIVERSE APPROACHES TO SOCIAL POLICY TRANSFER

As underscored by Evans (2018), “*policy transfer is one of the first modalities of transnational policy-making undertaken by governments, international organisations, and other transnational policy actors*” (2018, p. 117). He also posits processes of policy transfer as ones that can be instigated only by those who hold *power*, be it material, financial, political or ideational. Policy transfer frameworks provide useful analytical tools for investigating the ways in which social policy actors such as big philanthropies exploit different sources of authority and power; disseminate their promoted policy models; and compete against other agents of global social governance (see Deacon, 2007). This study argues that big philanthropies have expanded the repertoire of approaches to social policy transfer typically associated with aid delivery and have distinctive features as global social policy entrepreneurs in terms of authority and legitimacy.

Big philanthropies as distinctive policy entrepreneurs: new sources of authority and legitimacy

Contemporary philanthropies have broken with previous traditions of bulk donations that involve little participation in processes of policy making and implementation, and become deeply engaged social policy actors with sophisticated policy agendas, advocacy strategies and ambitious goals. Consequently, big philanthropies are prominent *policy entrepreneurs*, who “*invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of a future return*” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 122) within the realm of global social policy. By investigating the *sources of authority* available to and exploited by big philanthropies to disseminate their social policy approaches for development purposes, this study adds to our understanding of philanthropies as global policy entrepreneurs and their abilities and limitations in instigating social policy transfer at global and domestic levels.

The case of the Gates Foundation exemplifies several distinctive ways in which big philanthropies gain and use authority in the context of global social governance. First, multilateral development organisations and states have institutionalised *democratic mandates*, and these are an effective means of justifying the legitimacy of their involvement in global social governance. While deprived of democratic legitimacy as a consequence of their independent status, big philanthropies can participate in global policy processes by virtue of their *normative power*, or in sociological terms, ‘symbolic capital’ (see Morvaridi, 2016). Importantly, philanthropic donors benefit from a positive public image originating from their benevolent giving, which translates into *moral authority* (see Avant et al., 2010). Bill and Melinda Gates, for instance, have gained moral authority by pledging to give away most of their wealth away before their death, signalling altruistic motivations and a significant commitment to work towards the general public good.¹⁹⁵ It is also noteworthy that Gates representatives felt the Foundation gained legitimacy from its perceived apolitical and unbiased approach to aid cooperation, by virtue of being insulated from the political processes and power-games that characterise the democratic forms of social policy making.

Another dimension to the normative power deployed by contemporary philanthropies established by world-famous tech gurus, singers, actors, politicians and other well-known figures is their leaders’ *charismatic authority* (see Scholte, 2011). Despite the unorthodoxy, charisma exhibited by billionaire philanthropists adds to their attractiveness as public policy actors and facilitates their access to diverse policy platforms. Additionally, the evidence shows that Bill and Melinda’s charisma and brand-name have allowed the Gates Foundation to gain media visibility for their policy initiatives, recruit world-leading experts into its ranks,

¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, other elite billionaires like the Amazon-founder Jeff Bezos have faced public criticism for not investing in philanthropic giving in a similar manner to the Gates family and their long-term supporter Warren Buffet; see e.g. <https://www.scmp.com/magazines/style/news-trends/article/3075956/why-hasnt-jeff-bezos-donated-much-charity-billionaires>; <https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-amazon-how-much-donations-charity-2019-5?r=US&IR=T>, last visited 17.8.2020.

attract further funding for its investments and build advocacy coalitions with other established organisations to promote and advance their work. As such, the charismatic authority of the Foundation's leaders has been an important enhancer of its policy influence within, and with the aid of, epistemic, advocacy and policy *networks*.

Furthermore, *epistemic power* has been widely recognised as a key factor behind power dynamics in global governance. Established development organisations have typically competed to provide the most compelling scientific basis for different approaches (Babb, 2013). More recently, Southern donors have gained considerable attention thanks to their own first-hand experiences of development and new ideas of solidaristic development cooperation (Greenhill et al., 2013; Surender and Urbina-Ferretjans, 2015). Also philanthropic donors have been recognised as valuable partners in global development largely thanks to their perceived new knowledge and abilities – representing a key source of *credibility* that policy entrepreneurs require to effectively pursue policy change (see Mintrom and Thomas, 2018). This study demonstrates that the Gates Foundation, in particular, has gained important *epistemic authority* and *technocratic legitimacy* (see Eckl, 2014; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018) through cutting-edge scientific knowledge and data, and expertise in mobilising private sector methods, actors and resources for development purposes.

Nevertheless, philanthropic donors, as policy entrepreneurs, are also faced with important pragmatic and legitimacy limitations. Findings from this study touched on mistrust born of suspected business motivations: insufficient legitimacy in the context of unilaterally promoted initiatives; reliance on the private sector and the scientific community for development and production of 'new public goods'; lack of in-house capacity for project implementation on the ground; and dependence on public sector actors for financial and political sustainability of the introduced programmes and policies in the long term. These intersectoral dependencies of big

philanthropies are relevant to debates concerning the degree and nature of policy influence exerted by philanthropic policy entrepreneurs.

Approaches to social policy transfer: a summary

Previously, social policy transfer modalities by Western development agencies, and particularly the Bretton Woods institutions in Africa, have involved conditional lending under the SAPs and direct financial pressure in the context of the later adopted PRSPs. Policy reforms have also been sought through punitive aid suspensions, and policy influence through budget support mechanisms by bilateral donor agencies is also well documented (Appuhami et al., 2011; Babb, 2013; Portela, 2007; Swedlund, 2013). Additionally, significant transfer of social policies has occurred through more or less voluntary mechanisms in the context of global development agendas such as the *Millennium-* and *Sustainable Development Goals*.

Big philanthropies represent a new group of Western development actors without the financial muscle and political mandate of the UN and leading IFIs. Since they prefer to direct resources towards third parties (e.g. NGOs, multilaterals, development consultancies) rather than public sector budgets (OECD, 2020, 2018a), philanthropic donors are less able to exert direct financial pressure on aid-receiving governments. Instead, they ‘act as examples’ – as is common for policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Norman, 2009) – by actively seeking to demonstrate to policy makers the effectiveness and feasibility of their policy innovations through pilot projects. This study shows that the Gates Foundation deploys three key approaches to the instigation of policy transfer in the context of its programmatic work at the country level: *high-visibility policy promotion*; *deliberate, covert influence* through the use of *intermediaries*; and ‘*soft conditionalities*’.

Firstly, Bill and Melinda Gates pay visits to Presidents and other high-level members of the government in aid-receiving countries such as Tanzania, which effectively earns them the endorsement of senior leadership. Arguably, other forms of contact with government leadership, such as the Gates Foundation's debt relief allocation to Nigeria, are also helpful strategies in gaining political support for promoted interventions and the authority of the Foundation as a policy actor at the domestic level.

Secondly, while other external development agencies operating in Tanzania sought to engage in policy conversations with other government officials and influence domestic agendas on collaborative platforms (see also Swedlund, 2013), the Gates Foundation engaged in covert forms of influence, principally by mobilising consultants, partner organisations with local staff or other local policy advocates (e.g. domestic philanthropists) as *intermediary agents* to promote its policy ideas and approaches (see also **appendix G.**). As highlighted in the interview data, the Foundation deploys such strategies to avoid government scepticism concerning the foreign origin of the promoted approaches and increase their attractiveness. Naturally, such approaches also differ from projects conducted by, for example, leading INGOs and UN institutions, which are typically promoted through billboards, stickers and other marketing techniques.

Thirdly, it is argued here that big philanthropies also can utilise financial resources to create policy pressure at the country level, although to a lesser degree than the World Bank and the IMF. The Gates Foundation does so by exploiting 'soft conditionalities', as termed in this study. These comprise, namely, *project aid modalities* which hold pre-decided policy priorities without incorporating domestic policy visions or needs ('inducement' in Collier et al., 1997): *MOUs* requiring government commitment to further up-scale and financially sustain introduced projects and other potential conditions; mechanisms of *tied aid* which

pressure the purchase of products or services decided by the donor ('donor paternalism' in Collier et al., 1997); and *Performance Based Funding* (PBF) structures which give donors strict control over policy goals and deliverables. This draws our attention to the relevance of traditional critiques of political interference by external policy actors for analyses of philanthropic aid. In fact, while some have previously argued that PBFs represent the modern version of donor conditionality (e.g. Fraser and Whitfield, 2008), the stakeholder perspectives discussed later in this chapter point to some potentially negative implications of Gates Foundation's aid delivery mechanisms on the domestic policy space in Tanzania.

Furthermore, besides the particular policy transfer strategies observed at the country level, the Gates Foundation has aggressively engaged in policy dissemination within the global development community. The Foundation co-leaders engage in high-profile policy promotion on global platforms (e.g. the World Economic Forum, Family Planning 2020 events, JP Morgan health conferences), all the while carrying out strategic 'behind-the-scenes' advocacy work with traditional donor agencies during their agenda-setting phases and occasionally mobilising the Foundation leaders for private meetings with key actors. These findings echo existing literature that has highlighted the *social acuity* of policy entrepreneurs, who seek to gain an in-depth understanding of the ideas, motives and operational processes of policy makers in order to identify opportunities and strategies to best influence them (Mintrom and Thomas, 2018).

It is also evident that the Gates Foundation utilises its financier role to influence policy directions within other global health organisations such as the WHO, Global Fund or GAVI. In fact, Clinton and Sridhar (2017) have argued that the organisation "*continually puts pressure on performance and results, and when unhappy, pushes for quick reform in whatever ways that it can, including withdrawing or providing funds*" (2017, p. 10; see also Youde,

2019). This has implications not only on the dynamics of global policy making, but also on policy agendas within aid-receiving countries: influencing global actors and agendas adds yet another avenue for the dissemination of policy ideas and programmes within countries of the Global South.

Big philanthropies – successful policy entrepreneurs? Implications for social policy theory and practice

While the Gates Foundation's particular financial weight and influence in global health ought to be acknowledged, the findings present relevant and generalisable information concerning transnational policy transfer *mechanisms* between philanthropic donors (sending agents) and aid-receiving countries (adopting counterparts). This study argues that these are intrinsically *multileveled* (occurring at global, national and subnational levels), *multi-actored* (involving a range of intermediary actors) and multidirectional or *circular* (influences circulating between all levels and actors). The evidence shows that while the Gates Foundation exerts policy influence at global, national and sub-national (implementing organisations) levels, it too is subject to influences from other development actors with which it engages. Besides the influence of dominant global agendas discussed above, pressures from aid-receiving countries (particularly the Ethiopian government) and feedback concerning the technical feasibility of the Foundation's approaches on the ground were also reported to have played a part in altering or 'fine-tuning' its policy instruments (see Hall, 1993).

The messy and complex mechanisms observed in this study differ significantly from those described in the existing literature explaining social policy transfer embedded in processes of aid delivery (cf. Appuhami et al., 2011). There, it is postulated that social policies travel from donor countries (and international organisations) to aid-receiving governments with the aid of financial incentives and hegemonic ideas under largely vertical and linear processes. Rather, these perspectives in this study extend previous discussions in the Global Social Policy

literature advancing the notions of ‘complex multilateralism’ and ‘politics of scale’. The concept of *complex multilateralism* posits contemporary global social policy making as processes in which non-state actors compete for influence amongst powerful states and international organisations – contrary to the conventional wisdom which depicts third sectors as mere lobbying agents operating in the background of ‘actual’ policy making (O’Brien et al., 2000; see also Youde, 2019).

At the same time, the idea of *politics of scale* highlights the multi-levelled and highly intertwined arenas in which such processes take place (Gould, 2005; Stubbs, 2005). Here, understanding policy making through different, compartmentalised levels of governance loses much of its meaning, since “*key policy players are transcending each level at any one moment*” (Deacon & Stubbs, 2013, p. 10). These perspectives are useful for understanding and analysing processes of transnational social policy transfer in the contemporary context, where state-centric interpretations of policy making are increasingly challenged by the evident proliferation of non-state agents and arenas (see also Baker and Walker, 2019).

Moreover, the observed means and mechanisms of policy transfer are indicative of a comprehensive and sophisticated overall approach to spurring policy change. By outsourcing aid delivery to implementing organisations with staff at the local level and directly engaging with the domestic government, while influencing global social policy agendas by creating policy coalitions in hubs such as Geneva, London and Washington DC, the Gates Foundation is operating across levels and networks of global social governance with considerable fluidity. Since it has been asserted that actors who travel with ease between these scales are particularly well placed to influence policy (Deacon & Stubbs, 2013), this has important implications for the dynamics of global social policy, in which big philanthropies appear to represent a new powerhouse.

Yet, this study also argues that philanthropic donors may not be as effective in prompting policy reform within aid-receiving countries as might be expected. This is not to say that they do not hold some particular advantages: in common with emergent Southern donors, philanthropic foundations represent alternative development partners without the historical baggage, complex diplomatic relations and bureaucratic processes often associated with traditional multi- and bilateral donors (e.g. Greenhill et al., 2013; Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013). The evidence from Tanzania underscores the less politically charged relations between the Gates Foundation and the domestic government. Unlike traditional donors obliged to react in instances of ‘undesired’ political conduct on the part of recipient governments, stakeholders emphasised the ability of philanthropic donors to overlook issues related to authoritarianism, for instance, and pursue development cooperation without meddling in internal affairs or issues of good governance.

Nevertheless, the Gates Foundation was described by stakeholders as being unable to keep up with policy developments and build effective advocacy coalitions at the country level in Tanzania, a shortcoming exacerbated by their physical absence from the country (and important domestic roundtables). Additionally, the externally designed policies and programmes of the Foundation were said to remain incognisant of the different cultural norms, political traditions and institutions of policy making, or *structural factors*, affecting feasibility and popularity on the ground. In fact, it appears that the Foundation’s intense focus on addressing global issues with innovative policy instruments may unavoidably overlook domestic needs, priorities and policy processes. Consequently, while the actual success of the Gates Foundation’s policy transfer processes in the post-socialist African country was not evaluated, the findings point to a considerable risk of *incomplete transfer* (i.e. institutional mismatch) and *inappropriate transfer* (i.e. socio-economic and politico-ideological mismatch) (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) of social policies. It is important to acknowledge that, in other

instances, philanthropic donors may have developed a closer working relationship on the ground and such issues may not be as prevalent. However, it may also be argued that the very characteristics of the philanthropic paradigm (e.g. idealisation of innovation and techno-scientific solutions; idiosyncratic policy objectives; top-down approaches to aid delivery) represent a considerable challenge to successful policy transfer in the context of development.

By illustrating the obstacles and opportunities of policy transfer at the country level, this study acknowledges the weight of the domestic policy environment in impeding policy influence by external philanthropic policy entrepreneurs. This suggests that traditional historical-institutionalist theories of Social Policy (e.g. North, 1990; Orloff, 1993; Pierson, 1994; Skocpol, 1996) also remain valuable in analysis of transnational social policy transfer. Common (2013), for instance, reasons that *“if we accept that path dependency shapes policy choices, or that policy making is the outcome of historical institutional arrangements, then policy learning and transfer is shaped by institutional routines and behaviour”* (2013, p. 15). This is an important recognition for analysis of transnational social policy processes, as it asserts that purely agency- and actor-centred tools will remain insufficient in explaining the role of global social policy or the impact of big philanthropies and other non-state actors. It also highlights the relevance of traditional state-centric explanations of social policy formation alongside the more recent theories of Global Social Policy in analysis of transnational social policy transfer.

8.4 BIG PHILANTHROPY IN A DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT – ASSESSING RISKS AND CAVEATS

Debates between those who argue in favour of philanthrocapitalism as a new and effective way to approaching development (e.g. Anheier and Leat, 2006; Bishop and Green, 2009;

Singer, 2010) and others questioning the motivations behind the use of private sector methods and actors in social policy delivery and aid cooperation more broadly (e.g. Curtis, 2016; McGoey, 2015; Morvaridi, 2016) continue to evolve. Questions related to philanthropic aid are also relevant in discussions between those defending vertical interventions directly and immediately targeting the biggest causes of mortality in the name of cost effectiveness (e.g. Ord, 2019) and those promoting more holistic, universalist, system-wide investments in a development context (e.g. Adesina, 2011; Hujo et al., 2016; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). Incorporating views by Tanzanian development actors, experts from bi- and multilateral agencies and other stakeholders, this study engages with these debates and discusses some of the potential risks and caveats associable with big philanthropy, and addresses some of the main policy implications.

Effective altruism or a threat to aid effectiveness?

It is obvious that philanthropic donors hold some important comparative advantages. Gates' partner organisations embraced the Foundation for engaged and ongoing communication and flexibility during project implementation, as well as its ability to rapidly allocate funds when needs and opportunities are presented on the ground. This is a key difference from multi- and bilateral donor agencies, which remain less agile due to their higher levels of bureaucracy and other organisational features. The Foundation has also gained significant recognition within the global aid community for its investments in under-funded areas of scientific discovery and product development which have the potential for significant future impact (i.e. the *discovery argument*; Reich 2016). For these same reasons, the Gates Foundation has become a

celebrated example of pioneering philanthropic giving that ‘does the most good’ within the *Effective Altruism* -movement.¹⁹⁶

Nevertheless, it is important to question the innovative, *techno-scientific* and *vertical* social policy investments advanced by philanthropic donors from the perspective of the sustainable development of emergent welfare systems and social policy delivery in the Global South. Firstly, while *diagonal* investments focused on fixing defined issues within public health care delivery (such as disruptions in cold chains, for instance) contribute towards improving health systems when successful (Assefa et al., 2018; Gounder and Chaisson, 2012), the Gates Foundation’s innovation-oriented *vertical* interventions are largely overlooking the most pressing needs at the systems level. In low- and middle-income settings, including Tanzania, resources are particularly scarce for development of public sector health facilities; hiring and training workforce; and routine provision of basic services (see Virk, 2016) – which are necessary for addressing a range of health needs (including epidemics) nation-wide and in the long term. Nor do the promoted social policy measures help to develop national industries (i.e. domestic productive capacity), tax systems¹⁹⁷, institutions of social policy or existing welfare systems (i.e. redistributive capacity). All of these elements are crucial to the creation of sustainable welfare systems (Adesina, 2007a; Mkandawire, 2004a).

Moreover, there are important linkages between *policy architectures* (i.e. the combination of different social policy instruments and programmes) and *access* to social policies, which are relevant to the evolution of welfare systems. Salamon (1987), for instance, asserts that

¹⁹⁶ A community of philosophers and researchers emphasising the imperative of maximising the impact of philanthropic giving. The movement promotes giving to causes that are “*great in scale (it affects many lives, by a great amount)*” and “*highly solvable or tractable (additional resources will do a great deal to address it)*”, while also emphasising use of data and science as key resources in making choices about giving. Some of the key proponents include William MacAskill, Peter Singer and Toby Ord. See <https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/introduction-to-effective-altruism/>, last visited 13.9.2020.

¹⁹⁷ It must be acknowledged, however, that the Gates Foundation has financially supported work “*to increase the generation, availability and use of the evidence base for pro-poor approaches to taxation in sub-Saharan Africa*”; see <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2018/11/OPP1197757>, last visited 15.8.2020.

targeted interventions which focus on specific population groups (i.e. *philanthropic particularism*) and causes (i.e. *philanthropic paternalism*) naturally exclude other prominent policy issues and populations in need. Importantly, he also stresses that idiosyncratic preferences lead to a proliferation of delivery agencies (catering for the diverse policy preferences defined through religious, ethnic or philosophical views). This, then, has a negative effect for the overall welfare system, since “*the upshot is that the number of agencies can increase well beyond what economies of scale might suggest, reducing the overall efficiency of the system and increasing its costs*” (1987, p. 41). Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) argue compellingly that poorly unified policy instruments or investments also play an important part in determining restraints for policy change towards universalist welfare systems in the long term, for instance by creating path dependencies within the existing institutions, resource streams and policy agendas.

It was also evident from the field work that there were important gaps in the *harmonisation* and *coordination* (key principles under the *2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*) of the Gates Foundation’s development investments with other ongoing activities and national development plans on the ground in Tanzania. Resonating with previous works on single disease -focused vertical programmes (e.g. Biesma et al., 2009; see also Sparkes et al., 2017), this was clearly an important obstacle to realisation of coordinated action, the effectiveness of interventions, as well as smooth delivery of social policy investments by other development actors. It is important not to overlook this collateral effect on broader aid systems on the ground. Aid-receiving countries such as Tanzania have undertaken important measures to gain the upper hand over uncountable, fragmented development projects implemented by numerous donors, and it is obvious that the potential damage of philanthropic aid is amplified when such efforts are overturned and investments by other agencies jeopardised.

Another important and particularly distinctive risk associated with philanthropic donors lies in potentially abruptly shifting priorities, disrupted investments or entirely ceased activity. In fact, several contemporary philanthropies – including the Gates Foundation – have committed to spend the entirety of their assets directed to charitable purposes within a given timespan. It is argued here, in line with Jung and Harrow (2019), that this raises noteworthy questions of responsibility, liability and accountability for such foundations in the context of their development work. Despite their external and independent status, investments by philanthropic donors become part of the institutional architecture in their recipient countries, where domestic policy plans and activities are organised with consideration for external actors. Consequently, rapid and unforeseen changes in contributions and the overall presence of big philanthropies poses important challenges to aid effectiveness in a much broader sense.

Finally, the findings of this study are pertinent from perspective of *country ownership* of development efforts and *alignment* with domestic priorities, depicted as pivotal preconditions for aid effectiveness under the Paris Declaration. Autonomously implemented and externally designed vertical programmes are naturally breaching these principles. It may also be argued that advancing ideas of ‘pragmatism’ over ‘social justice’ under the philanthropic paradigm questions both the overall credibility of the state as the primary social policy maker and deliverer, and the very purpose of social policy in promoting democratisation, governance and empowerment – as elaborated in the following.

Global social governance: challenging the democratic processes

Social policy activities and aid cooperation by private foundations are not directed or framed by any supra-national agreements, and national regulations are largely limited to addressing the tax status of third sector actors (see Phillips and Smith, 2016). Neither are philanthropic donors bound by democratic processes and structures in their countries of origin, nor those

within the countries they seek to assist. In the light of the role big philanthropies play in shaping global policy agendas and promoting novel social policy interventions for aid-receiving countries, it becomes necessary to problematise their internal decision-making processes and the lack of official and systematic debate over how resources are deployed and prioritised. This study stresses the relevance of these discussions by showing that big philanthropies *are* redefining the very basis of legitimacy in global social governance, in a way that undermines the perceived value of democratic and political processes.

Shiffman (2014) has voiced a need for critical scrutiny of normative and epistemic forms of power in global governance. These represent primary sources of authority and power for big philanthropies, who have amplified their value in global social governance and, consequently, prompted increasing *depolitication* of policy making (see Stone, 2017, 2013). Important questions arise. Firstly, this study illustrates that accrediting *moral authority* equal recognition with *democratic authority* in processes of policy formation is highly questionable due to the full exclusion of other stakeholders, including those expected to adopt and finance the promoted programmes (i.e. recipient governments) and those implementing and experiencing the interventions (i.e. practitioners and target populations). Issues of aid effectiveness aside, this represents a considerable normative issue, exacerbated by the fact that the interest based processes of agenda-setting adopted by big philanthropies increase the dependence of recipient populations on the ‘elites’ who have the power to define their needs (Salamon, 1987).

Secondly, this thesis argues that the use of *charismatic authority* to further one’s policy agendas – a means of policy influence often deployed by big philanthropies and enhanced by their existing *networks* to the rich and powerful – constitutes a questionable element in processes of public policy making. If compared to other third sector actors, such as

community-based organisations or social and labour movements whose participation in public policy making is gained through processes of collective campaigning and democratic struggle, charismatic appeal and the ability to pull strings within the political and economic elite represent a less earned or accessible (and consequently unfair) means of policy influence. As pinpointed by Rodgers (2011), such ‘philanthro-policymaking’ unavoidably undermines the relevance of democracy in processes of public policy making.

Thirdly, it is important to highlight that philanthropic donors have gained significant decision-making influence through the use of material or *financial power*. The Gates Foundation, in particular, has disrupted the dynamics within the previously member-state dominated institutions of global governance, such as the WHO, thanks to its voluntary contributions and other streaming of funds. Big philanthropies have also furthered altogether new forms of multilateralism. Under structures such as the Global Fund or GAVI, aid-receiving countries are allocated a (delivery) role that is subordinate to other, contribution-based steering bodies, thereby empowering donor agencies whether they represent countries, philanthropies or businesses (e.g. Browne, 2017; Mitchell and Sparke, 2016).

The critique of *upward accountability* also remains highly relevant for emergent philanthropic donors in the context of aid delivery on the ground. Prioritising aid delivery through professionalised NGOs – argued to empower donors rather than governments, citizens or local communities of the Global South (e.g. Banks et al., 2015; Bebbington et al., 2008; Bukenya and Hickey, 2014; Heydemann and Hammack, 2009) – big philanthropies continue to reinforce top-down mechanisms of decision making at the expense of bottom-up processes. This was also highlighted in the interview data of this study, which stressed the primary accountability of Gates’ employees and implementing partners to their ultimate funders – Bill and Melinda – ahead of the Tanzanian population. From the perspective of democratic

governance, this issue is exacerbated when donor interests are deliberately obscured by contracting local policy advocates in order to legitimise promoted policy ideas as domestically driven (e.g. Adesina, 2014; Tar, 2014). This constitutes a key policy transfer strategy for the Gates Foundation, as well as other big philanthropies (see **appendix H.**).

Finally, the case of the Gates Foundation demonstrates that big philanthropies are continuously building more or less formal advocacy networks and policy coalitions to further their policy ideas and approaches. These may be viewed as a threat to democracy in their own right as they become ‘new constellations of privatised power’ (Stone 2017, 2013, 2010). A critical example of this is the partially Gates-funded, *American Philanthropy Roundtable*, which constitutes a “*network of donors committed to protecting philanthropic freedom, upholding donor intent, and strengthening our free society through charitable giving*”.¹⁹⁸ Some other networks built by big philanthropies are much more closed door and/or inclusive of non-philanthropic actors. Whichever way, such networks defy open public debate and the democratic processes of social policy formation. As such, this thesis disputes the *pluralism argument* (see Reich, 2016) by arguing that rather than enhancing democracy by advancing broader participation of civil society actors in public policy making, big philanthropy is increasingly ‘privatising’ the processes and venues wherein this takes place.

Reinforcing the status quo: perpetuating neocapitalism and neocolonialism?

In the words of Morvaridi (2016), “*the question we should be asking is not whether new philanthropy is good or bad for global development or food security, but what motivates this form of giving and what transfer of power results from it*” (2016, p. 153; emphasis added). Bilateral aid donors have long been challenged for disguising as aid cooperation their foreign policy interests and commercial exploitation of their country-counterparts in sub-Saharan

¹⁹⁸ See <https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/>, last visited 18.8.2020.

Africa (e.g. Fejerskov et al., 2016; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, 2013; Moyo, 2010; Riddell, 2014). International aid also remains at the heart of the sempiternal questions of colonialism: whether it has truly ended, what are its contemporary legacies and manifestations, and how is it impacting state building and poverty reduction in Africa (e.g. Hagmann and Reyntjens, 2016; Langan, 2017; Sabaratnam, 2017)?

For individual philanthropic donors, issues of commercial interest and political gain are less glaring than for Western and southern donor countries. This does not mean that such factors have no part in philanthropic motivation. In her renowned publication *‘No such thing as a free gift: the Gates Foundation and the price of philanthropy’* (2015), Linsey McGoey highlighted the Foundation’s far extending connections to multilateral corporations – such as Goldman Sachs, Coca-Cola and Monsanto – and the profits these have reaped by accessing markets in the Global South. Indeed, by 2020, the Gates Foundation has spent nearly 2 USD billion of tax-exempt resources (i.e. foregone public money) in the form of charitable grants to private businesses in the context of its development work (for scientific discovery, product development, project delivery and other).¹⁹⁹ However, it is also interesting to note that 250 USD million of these grants was directed to private companies in which the Foundation holds bonds and stocks, thereby reinforcing its financial resources.

These approaches demonstrate that philanthropic aid delivery is also underpinned by certain mechanisms and logics of profitability. This is not surprising: in fact, acknowledging businesses as key development actors inherently involves accepting concomitant profitable interests, and the ambitious goals pursued by philanthropic donors (e.g. total elimination of malaria) will be counterbalanced by equally ambitious amounts of ‘catalytic capital’. At the same time, as has been stressed by others (e.g. Curtis, 2016; Giridharadas, 2019; McGoey

¹⁹⁹ The Nation, 2020; see <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/bill-gates-foundation-philanthropy/>, last visited 14.8.2020.

2015), the capital accumulation by big philanthropies is not only serving philanthropic goals but appears to be helping to maintain a neocapitalist world order that ultimately benefits billionaire philanthropists and the economic, political and social elite which they represent.

While this study was not focused on investigating the financial interests and commercial connections of the Gates Foundation under its multiple engagements in the Tanzanian context, the findings reinforce the existing critique from the perspective of economic and political independence in the Global South. There were clearly examples of *tied aid* (making aid delivery conditional to the purchase of specific products, such as self-injectable contraceptive Sayana Press), which were resented as unjustified forms of external policy pressure. Here, we see evidence of both the restriction of the policy space of domestic policy makers under philanthropic aid, and the empowerment of global market actors rather than national industries.

Furthermore, *hegemonic knowledge* and epistemic authority have represented significant sources of power that have been associated with unequal power relations and domination in the context of development cooperation (Marglin and Marglin, 1990; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Teffo, 2011). As Meyer (2010) has underscored, “*the expansion of science (...) provides a basis for legitimated cooperation and social control everywhere*”, whether the knowledge it creates is representative of reality or not (2010, p. 7). Big philanthropies represent a new type of business-oriented Western knowledge creators in the realm of development. They ‘construct’ selective (quantitative) forms of evidence, techno-scientific solutions and business-style investments as superior approaches to development (see also Birn, 2005). The Gates Foundation has even been argued to monopolise the production of global health metrics through the IHME (whose data is now used also by the WHO) and influence publications in the area through its funding to the Lancet, for instance (e.g. Mahajan, 2019; Shiffman, 2014;

Tichenor and Sridhar, 2018). Such processes undermine the value of autochthonous knowledge and the voices that are able to share it, leading to ‘epistemic injustice’ (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Teffo, 2011). This interpretation aligns with that postulated by Villanueva (2018), who has argued American foundations to be typically led by a neo-colonial mindset and ‘pyramidal processes’ that are “*top down, closed door and expert driven*” – being cut off from the societies and communities they seek to serve.

Philanthropic donors have also become leading protagonists of ‘new optimism’, directing attention to the perceived significant improvements in the human condition, particularly since the acceleration of international development efforts. Scholars such as Jason Hickel (2018) have drawn attention to the dangers of this misleading rhetoric: for instance, by highlighting the drastic drop in global poverty when measured at the 1.9 USD rate, the Gates Foundation both legitimises this fully arbitrary and insufficient standard baseline *and* covers up the actual and drastic *increase* of poverty since the 1980s when measured at other proposed rates such as the 7.4 USD. More importantly though, the social construction and ‘hegemonisation’ of these new sources of information, knowledge and evidence allows big philanthropies, such as the Gates Foundation, to claim credit for *their role* in spurring social and economic progress and eradicating disease (see citation below) – with little recognition for contributions by other actors and approaches (such as system-wide investments) when such is due.

“We usually express our optimism by highlighting some of the recent mind-blowing improvements in the human condition—like the fact that advances in medicine have saved 50 million lives just since we started our foundation in 2000.” (Gates Foundation, 2018).²⁰⁰

It is undeniable that the injection of cash and novel ideas by philanthropic donors has resulted in increased availability of life-saving medical products and redistribution of elite wealth for

²⁰⁰ See https://www.gatesfoundation.org/goalkeepers/static/downloads/report_en.pdf, last visited 13.11.2019; see also e.g. annual letter 2017; https://www.gatesnotes.com/2017-Annual-Letter?WT.mc_id=02_14_2017_02_AL2017GFO_GF-GFO_&WT.tsrc=GFGFO, last visited 19.2.2019.

social policy purposes in resource-scarce settings. It may thus appear counterintuitive to criticise their emergent role in global social policy. Nonetheless, the evidence from this research and the discussion here point to important perils of their neo-colonial attitudes and philanthrocapitalist approaches to development. The power shifts – or, rather, *status quos* – stemming from philanthropic aid continue to disadvantage the national industries in the Global South, delegitimise and impoverish the state, widen existing fissures in social cohesion and devalue local knowledge for the benefit of the capitalist philanthropist.

Implications of the research findings for policy practice

While this study is primarily an academic exercise, there are nevertheless some practical implications of the research findings for policy and practice. First and foremost, these findings lend weight to the call for greater efforts to bring the structures of governance and accountability mechanisms up to date with the transforming aid landscape at global and domestic levels. It is obvious that big philanthropies exert prominent influence on actors they finance (whether these are international organisations, aid-receiving countries or local civil society advocates) through their epistemic-hegemonic influence as well as financial allocations, while eschewing democratic processes of policy making.

For multilateral development organisations embedded in the broader UN system, this raises questions about “*what are member-states actually controlling or not if the money comes from an outside source which is not under that control? Or conversely, how would you update the governance mechanisms to reflect that reality?*”, as postulated by one interviewee (global development expert 10). For organisations such as the WHO, the mechanisms for Voluntary Contributions and the power they afford philanthropic donors need focus.²⁰¹ Additionally,

²⁰¹ This is particularly relevant in the current context where the Gates Foundation may become the single largest donor agency to the WHO if the US withdraws its membership as announced by the Trump Administration in

where philanthropies are funders of UN bodies, stricter requirements for information and detail about their methods would be in the service of greater transparency and open debate within such institutions.

Furthermore, the findings of this study have implications on (philanthropic) donor-recipient relations in sub-Saharan Africa. The evidence indicates that the Gates Foundation has enhanced its country-level coordination and collaboration with domestic stakeholders in Ethiopia, largely due to the central government's strong demands.²⁰² While not all aid-receiving countries have the same persuasive influence on philanthropic donors, this example shows that countries can make requirements for the ways in which philanthropic aid is delivered, coordinated and harmonised with other policy developments on the ground. Additionally, based on the challenges experienced by Tanzanian government officials in accessing full and transparent information on philanthropic aid flows, approaches to aid tracking and cooperation with new and private donors may be strengthened to facilitate policy planning.

Finally, this study has emphasised the negative consequences of top-down approaches to philanthropic social policy making. In line with previous arguments made by Villanueva (2018), one practical mechanism which would enhance the diversity of recipients' ideas and viewpoints in processes of agenda-setting within philanthropic organisations would be the inclusion of local stakeholders in leading boards and grant-making committees. Ultimately, these findings ask whether the *raison d'être* of multilateralism is undermined by the increasing integration of big philanthropies in the structures and processes of global social policy making.

June 2020. See e.g. <https://www.devex.com/news/big-concerns-over-gates-foundation-s-potential-to-become-largest-who-donor-97377>, last visited 21.11.2020.

²⁰² It has also been argued elsewhere that donor agencies are more willing than might be expected to align with the visions of recipient countries that show consistency and dedication to their cause while firmly negotiating for their priorities to be respected (Whitfield, 2008).

8.5 LIMITATIONS, CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH AGENDAS

This thesis makes an original and timely contribution to Global Social Policy analysis, by researching a powerful contemporary philanthropy – the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – as an example of a new and emerging group of non-state actors engaging in global social governance and aid delivery. However, due to practical considerations, issues of access and most importantly time and financial limitations, this doctoral study needed to make important choices about research design. Therefore, before concluding, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of the analysis (see also **chapter 4**) and address further research avenues deriving from the findings of this study.

Inevitably, a single case study design limits the generalisation of the findings and requires some caution (Gerring, 2004). A desktop study on leading philanthropic donors was conducted to enable comparison and monitor generalisability. However, although this assisted in identifying outliers, general trends and existing diversity within the sector, a comparative study investigating two or more big philanthropies would allow a greater level of explanatory power. Thus, the following commentary by Fejerskov et al. (2016) stands as an important reminder when reading and discussing this work: *“it is valuable to move beyond the blackboxing that sometimes characterises work on new actors. (...) Below the surface of presumably unitary actors, we find individuals, groups, and organisations coming together from different backgrounds and with different missions and purposes, who contest ideas, meanings or material resources (...)”* (2016, p. 17).

Besides questions of ‘breadth’, it may be argued that this study lacks the ‘depth’ that might possibly have been achieved by an ethnographic organisational study, for instance. Indeed, the collected evidence hinted at the complexities existing at different organisational layers of philanthropic social policy (involving staff members with differing views and a range of

intermediary organisations both at global and domestic levels). Also an alternative design examining the Gates Foundation's activities in a number of countries and/or policy fields would have allowed a deeper understanding of the Foundation's work in different contexts and strengthened robustness of findings. Moreover, this study did not examine the actual impact and effectiveness of Gates' programmatic work in Tanzania. Consequently, it is unable to say whether some of the Foundation's approaches were, in fact, more effective than those by other actors in enhancing economic participation of the extremely poor, or had other positive or negative effects on these populations. Engagement with end users or 'beneficiary populations' and professionals (e.g. clinicians, practitioners) would have also allowed to capture other and potentially different views and experiences concerning suitability of Gates' projects and programmes on the ground.

Nevertheless, the insights generated by this study provide new information on the role and implications of non-state actors on the realm of global social policy. In several fronts, it constitutes an important discussion starter for future works. To illustrate the point further, this study has only scratched the surface concerning the new forms of *normative and epistemic power* enjoyed by big philanthropies, and they remain fairly unknown in terms of uses and impact within different policy arenas and levels of governance. Important gaps remain in our knowledge of how persuasion, image-building and celebrity voice can be and have been exploited for policy social influence by global policy entrepreneurs. This study has also highlighted the prominent engagement with *intermediary actors* in processes of policy transfer instigated by big philanthropies. Yet, the strategies and roles of consultants, delivery organisations and famous domestic figures in this intermediary position are prompting further academic attention, with a recent publication by Fejerskov (2018) paving the way.

Furthermore, while the adopted definition of *big philanthropies* (Western, non-corporate, charitable organisations) was necessary to increase the validity of the analytic generalisations, this study does not fully capture ongoing developments in the philanthropic sector globally speaking. New philanthropists are emerging from different backgrounds and origins; Chinese, Middle Eastern and African actors are increasingly joining and bringing their own priorities and cultural understandings into philanthropic social policy and aid delivery. The study of philanthropy has only recently started to engage with typologies and comparisons (e.g. Anheier, 2018; Jung et al., 2018), and this will also be important in understanding the extent to which the philanthropic paradigm explored in this thesis reflects the sector at large, and how it might be negotiated or contested amongst types of philanthropic organisations other than the ones under focus in this study.

Finally, it is worth re-iterating that the actual impact and outcomes of the social policy approaches embedded in the philanthropic paradigm are in need of further evaluation and analysis in terms of their intermediate welfare outcomes, broader effects on the expansion of emergent welfare systems, and the evolution of independent social policy formation within aid-receiving countries. Naturally, similar questions arise concerning the future of universalist global social policy agendas and the democratic basis of global social governance under the influence of philanthropic aid – the answers to which call for more focused investigation.

This thesis started by questioning the robustness and applicability of traditional Social Policy theory for social policy analysis in the context of the Global South, and investigation focused on transnational non-state actors. It will now conclude by arguing that the theoretical and practical insights of this study, drawing from analytical tools embedded in '*methodological transnationalism*' (Yeates, 2014) and the case of a powerful transnational global policy entrepreneur, will be useful in understanding contemporary social policy processes also in the

West. In the words of the late Bob Deacon, “*social policy within one country can no longer be understood or made without reference to the global context within which the country finds itself*” (2007, p. 3). Indeed, big philanthropies operate in aid-receiving countries while also engaging in social policy processes at the global level and directly at home. Consequently, many insights of this study related to the philanthropic social policy paradigm and social policy transfer, as well as related theoretical discussions, are relevant to understanding current and future developments in domestic social policy making and delivery in the West.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Interview invitation

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY AND INTERVENTION

Barnett House, 32 Wellington Square,
Oxford, OX1 2ER, United Kingdom
www.spi.ox.ac.uk



Study Invitation

My name is Roosa Jolkkonen, I am a graduate researcher at the Department of Social Policy and Intervention at the University of Oxford, UK. I am conducting research on philanthropic development aid in the health sector, with a case study focusing on the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in Tanzania. Contemporary philanthropic aid is an exciting source of new development resources and approaches, yet few empirical analyses have been produced. In my study, I am interested in identifying the role and impact of philanthropic aid in the health sector – its characteristics, successes and distinctiveness within the changing aid landscape.

Your expertise and experience would be of particular interest for the project and I would like to invite you to participate to the study. The interview questions will touch upon the Foundation's development goals, approach to delivery and overall strengths in global health. Your contribution would be highly valued and I hope the results of the study would also be useful for your own work. Ideally, I would like to hold interviews during the period of [xxx], and I am happy to accommodate your schedule as needed. If you are willing to meet me (or talk to me on the telephone/Skype), please contact me at roosa.jolkkonen@jesus.ox.ac.uk to arrange a convenient time and date.

This project has received ethics clearance through the University of Oxford Research Ethics Committee, and confidentiality is stressed throughout all research phases. Your name will not be used unless you would like your contributions to be acknowledged. If you have any questions or concerns about this project, please contact myself or my senior colleague (see for contact details below).

Sincerely Yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Roosa Jolkkonen', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

[contact details]

Appendix B. Oral information and consent script

(Information is delivered, and consent is given orally).

Hello, my name is Roosa Jolkkonen. I'm currently a doctorate student at the University of Oxford in the department of Social Policy and Intervention. My research is on Western philanthropic foundations and their policy influence on aid receiving countries – I am investigating particularly the case of Gates Foundation in Tanzania. Can I tell you more about the study – if not now, when would be a convenient time to talk?

In my study, I want to investigate how the Gates Foundation influences the Tanzanian domestic policy in the health sector, and how does the Tanzanian government welcome this influence. I am interested in talking with people who have expert knowledge regarding the changing donor landscape and/or who are involved in policy formulation in the health sector. Acknowledging your experience within the remit, I would highly value your contribution. If you choose to be a part of this piece of research, here is what will happen: I will have a conversation with you where I will ask a range of questions about your experiences regarding philanthropic donors and particularly the Gates Foundation in Tanzania (its overarching ideology, approach to development, aid modalities) and your understanding of the Tanzanian perspectives.

The answers you give will contribute to forming the basis of my D. Phil thesis. The personal information you will share with me will not be passed to any third party, apart from my supervisor Professor Rebecca Surender. This research is **anonymous**, which means that in my publications, your name will not be used, unless you insist for it not to be. This is completely **voluntary** and we can stop any time that you would like to. During the interview, I will use an audio recorder to make sure I'm getting an accurate record of your thoughts – are you OK with this? I may want to re-contact you to clarify information from your interview.

If you agree to participate in this project, the research will be written up as a thesis. On successful submission of the thesis, it will be deposited both in print and online in the University archives, to facilitate its use in future research. Further, the research will also be written up for articles to be published in academic and public journals.

This research project has been reviewed and approved by the university's ethics committee. If you would like to speak to the University directly, I'll give you their postal address. Their email is ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk. Do feel free to contact me also. My mobile number is [**local number**]. You can also reach me at roosa.jolkkonen@jesus.ox.ac.uk.

If you remain unhappy and wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the ethics committee.

Appendix C. Interview schedules

1. Gates Foundation – Programme Directors

- Could you start by briefly explaining why the Foundation invests specifically in health (beside agricultural and financial services development) to promote development?
- What are the Foundation's main priorities in the health sector and what are the specific drivers of these priorities (does it come from research evidence, private sector partners, the wider donor community, local stakeholders, the Gates' business expertise?)
- What is the Foundation's vision of how the different public, private and charitable actors would be best involved in the health sector to promote development?
 - o What would you like their roles to be specifically in health service provision in developing countries?
- Acknowledging that the Foundation invests a lot in the development of Primary Health Care (eg. PHCPI), I would like to know what is your approach to Universal Health Coverage – is it a key goal for the Foundation and in what form?
- Health financing is another difficult issue, what is the Foundation's view on health insurance systems, out-of-pocket payments, tax-financed free health services and other ways of organising health financing?

- What does the Gates Foundation bring to the aid environment, what is its value?
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from traditional donors (USAID, WB, WHO) and the emerging Southern donors (China, Brazil)?
 - o Do you see other philanthropic organisations to share these characteristics?
- Acknowledging that the Foundation has keenly participated in different partnerships – what exactly makes them so attractive for your work?
- The Foundation has equally been active in global policy venues (eg. the H8, UN panels on the SDGs) – to what extent is it important for the Foundation to influence development policy and practice and what are the biggest challenges you have faced?

- Is there a criteria/formula for selecting countries that you work in and are there any conditions that are typically attached to aid?
- How does the Foundation engage with the aid-receiving countries in the process (who do you talk to – the government, NGOs, the private sector; do you consult them before awarding grants, do you negotiate over conditions)?
- What aspects have been particularly welcomed and/or resisted by aid-receiving governments or other stakeholders (overall policy goals, specific policies, aid modalities)?

2. Gates Foundation – Division leaders/senior officers

- Could you start by briefly explaining why the Foundation invests specifically in health (beside agricultural and financial services development) to promote development?
- What are the Foundation's main priorities in your division and what are the specific drivers of these priorities (does it come from research evidence, private sector partners, the wider donor community, local stakeholders, the Gates' business expertise?)
- What is the Foundation's vision of how the different public, private and charitable actors would be best involved in the area of (eg. Malaria) to promote development?
 - o What would you like their roles to be specifically in health service provision in developing countries?

- Acknowledging that the Foundation invests a lot in the development of Primary Health Care (eg. PHCPI), I would like to know what is your approach to Universal Health Coverage – is it a key goal for the Foundation and in what form?
- Health financing is another difficult issue, what is the Foundation’s view on health insurance systems, out-of-pocket payments, tax-financed free health services and other ways of organising health financing for (Malaria care), for instance?
- What does the Gates Foundation bring to the aid environment in the area of (Malaria), what is its value?
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from traditional donors (USAID, WB, WHO) and the emerging Southern donors (China, Brazil)?
 - o Do you see other philanthropic organisations to share these characteristics?
- Acknowledging that the Foundation has keenly participated in different partnerships – what exactly makes them so attractive for your work?
- The Foundation has equally been active in global policy venues (eg. the H8, UN panels on the SDGs) – to what extent is it important for the Foundation to influence policy and practice in the area of (Malaria) and what are the biggest challenges you have faced?
-
- Is there a criteria/formula for selecting countries that you work in and are there any conditions that are typically attached to aid?
- How does the Foundation engage with the aid-receiving countries in the process (who do you talk to – the government, NGOs, the private sector; do you consult them before awarding grants, do you negotiate over conditions)?
- What aspects have been particularly welcomed and/or resisted by aid-receiving governments or other stakeholders (overall policy goals, specific policies, aid modalities)?

3. Gates Foundation – Tanzania/Africa experts

- Could you start by briefly explaining why the Foundation invests specifically in health (beside agricultural and financial services development) to promote development?
- What are the Foundation’s main priorities in the health sector in Africa/Tanzania and what are the specific drivers of these priorities (does it come from research evidence, private sector partners, the wider donor community, local stakeholders, the Gates’ business expertise?)
- What is the Foundation’s vision of how the different public, private and charitable actors would be best involved in the area of (eg. Malaria) to promote development?
 - o What would you like their roles to be specifically in health service provision in developing countries?
- Acknowledging that the Foundation invests a lot in the development of Primary Health Care (eg. PHCPI), I would like to know what is your approach to Universal Health Coverage – is it a key goal for the Foundation and in what form?
- Health financing is another difficult issue, what is the Foundation’s view on health insurance systems, out-of-pocket payments, tax-financed free health services and other ways of organising health financing for (Malaria care), for instance?
- What does the Gates Foundation bring to the aid environment in the area of (Malaria), what is its value?
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from traditional donors (USAID, WB, WHO) and the emerging Southern donors (China, Brazil)?
 - o Do you see other philanthropic organisations to share these characteristics?
- Acknowledging that the Foundation has keenly participated in different partnerships – what exactly makes them so attractive for your work?

- The Foundation has equally been active in global policy venues (eg. the H8, UN panels on the SDGs) – to what extent is it important for the Foundation to influence policy and practice in the area of (Malaria) and what are the biggest challenges you have faced?
-
- Is there a criteria/formula for selecting countries that you work in and are there any conditions that are typically attached to aid?
- How does the Foundation engage with the aid-receiving countries in the process (who do you talk to – the government, NGOs, the private sector; do you consult them before awarding grants, do you negotiate over conditions)?
- What aspects have been particularly welcomed and/or resisted by aid-receiving governments or other stakeholders (overall policy goals, specific policies, aid modalities)?

4. Gates Foundation – Experts on selected projects

- Could you begin by explaining why this is one of the projects funded by the Gates Foundation?
- Do you consider this to be a typical project funded by the Foundation and in-line with its overall approach?
- What are the overall goals of the project and how does the project support the Foundation’s strategies in the health sector?
- To what extent does the project involve different public-, private- and third sector actors?
- To what extent does the Foundation have power over the design and implementation of it?
-
- What are the unique aspects the Foundation brings to the aid environment through this project, what is its added value (in comparison to aid by traditional donors or the emerging Southern donors)?
- Is this project typical of wider philanthropic aid?
- Is the project seeking to influence development policy globally and locally?
- Has the project been praised or faced resistance by other development actors and for what reasons?
-
- Is there a criteria/formula for selecting countries that you work in and are there any conditions that attached to the project?
- How does the project engage with the aid-receiving countries, what domestic stakeholders are involved and what power do the stakeholders hold in the design, implementation and future of the project?
- What aspects of the project have been particularly welcomed and/or resisted by aid-receiving governments or other stakeholders (overall policy goals, specific policies, aid modalities)?

5. Partner organisations – selected projects

- Could you begin by explaining what are the overall goals and strategies of the project?
- Why do you think this is one of the projects funded by the Gates Foundation?
- How does the project involve the public-, private- and third sector actors (and is the typical approach taken by your organisation)?
- How has the overall design and implementation of the project been decided (namely, what has been the role of the Gates Foundation in shaping the project)?
- How is it like to work with the Gates-Foundation in comparison to other donors (are they flexible, rigid, bringing in different expertise, demanding)?
-
- What does the Foundation bring to the aid environment through this project, what is its added value (in comparison to aid by traditional donors or the emerging Southern donors)?

- Is this project typical of wider philanthropic aid?
- Is the project seeking to influence development policy globally and locally?
- Has the project been praised or faced resistance by other development actors and for what reasons?
- Is there a criteria/formula for selecting countries that you work in and are there any conditions that attached to the project?
- How does the project engage with the aid-receiving countries, what domestic stakeholders are involved and what power do the stakeholders hold in the design, implementation and future of the project?
- What aspects of the project have been particularly welcomed and/or resisted by aid-receiving governments or other stakeholders (overall policy goals, specific policies, aid modalities)?

6. Global development experts – multilateral and bilateral development agencies (HQ)

- Could you start by presenting yourself and your key responsibilities within the organisation?
- Please tell a little bit about your potential previous work with Gates-related projects.
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from traditional donors such as UN institutions, OECD-DAC, etc.?
 - o How are they different in terms of their approach in development/global health?
 - o How are they different in terms of donor collaboration?
- Has the Gates Foundation triggered any changes in the donor community?
 - o In terms of overall goals/priorities
 - o In terms of approaches
 - o In terms of aid delivery (eg. aid modalities)
- What have been the different strategies the Gates Foundation has utilised to have a policy impact in the donor community?
- In your opinion, how is the Gates Foundation welcomed in the aid community – are other actors attracted to their approaches and resources, or do they see the Foundation as a threat?
- What is your understanding of how welcomed they have been by aid-receiving countries?
- Have you observed an increasing participation of philanthropic foundations in international development/global health or does the Gates Foundation represent a singular case?
- What do you think the risks/limitations of philanthropic aid might be?
 - o For aid harmonisation, donor-collaboration, etc?
 - o For aid-receiving countries?

7. Development experts & civil society representatives – Tanzania

- Please tell a little bit about your background, role within the organisation and potential previous work with Gates-related projects.
- Could you begin by briefly explaining what have been the key changes in the donor landscape in Tanzania over the past 10 years?
- What are the key health donors in Tanzania at the moment?
 - o What are the key areas they are working on?
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from the other donors?
 - o How are they different in terms of areas of focus?
 - o How are they different in terms of government collaboration?
 - o How are they different in terms of working with other donors?

- Has the Gates Foundation triggered any changes in the donor community or development activities in Tanzania?
- What have been the different strategies the Gates Foundation has utilised to have a policy impact?
- What do you think the risks/limitations of philanthropic aid might be?
- How is the current government dealing with donors – do they have strong leadership and vision, do they negotiate over priorities and conditions, are they without much voice?
- Has there been any particular areas of tension between the donors and the government?
- Is the government welcoming any particular type of aid/donors?

8. Tanzanian Government officials

- Please tell a little bit about your background, role within the organisation and potential previous work with Gates-related projects
- Could you begin by briefly explaining what have been the key changes in the donor landscape the department/government has experienced over the past 5 or 10 years?
- What are the key health donors you deal with at the moment?
- How do you see the Gates Foundation to be different from the other donors?
 - o How are they different in terms of areas of focus?
 - o How are they different in terms of government collaboration?
 - o How are they different in terms of working with other donors?
- Has the Gates Foundation triggered any changes in the donor community or development activities in Tanzania?
- As the Gates Foundation rarely provides funding to governments, what have been the different strategies they have utilised to have policy influence over the government?
- Are there any conditionalities they attach to their aid?
- To what extent do they involve you in the design and planning of their projects?
- How have you proceeded when you have had differing policy visions/priorities?
- What do you think the risks/limitations of philanthropic aid might be?
- What is the government's approach to donor collaboration (philosophy, guiding principles...)?
- What are your overall preferences in terms of aid modalities, promoted policies, collaboration styles, donors?

Appendix D. Ethical approval (Departmental Research Ethics Committee)



Department of Social Policy and Intervention
University of Oxford

Barnett House, 32 Wellington Square,
Oxford, OX1 2ER, United Kingdom
www.spi.ox.ac.uk

Roosa Jolkkonen
Department of Social Policy and Intervention
University of Oxford

SPI_DREC_16_02

1st November 2016

Dear Roosa,

New Philanthropic Aid and Social Policy Transfer – the case of Gates Foundation in Tanzania

Your application for research ethics approval in connection with your research project has been considered by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University for Ethical Approval.

I am pleased to inform you that, on the basis of the information provided, the proposed research has been judged as meeting appropriate ethical standards and DREC approval has been granted.

If any revisions to your research methodology are made subsequent to this approval, these must be detailed in writing and submitted to DREC immediately.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. Lachman', is written over a horizontal line.

Dr Jamie Lachman
Chair of DREC

Point of contact: ethics@spi.ox.ac.uk | +44 (0) 1865 280734
General enquiries: tel. +44 (0) 1865 270325

Appendix E. Research permit (Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology)

**TANZANIA COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(COSTECH)**



Telephones: (255 - 022) 2775155 - 6, 2700745/6
Director General: (255 - 022) 2700750&2775315
Fax: (255 - 022) 2775313

Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road
P.O. Box 4302
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania

Email: rclearance@costech.or.tz
In reply please quote: CST/RCA 2017/36

13th April 2017

Commissioner General of Immigration
Ministry of Home Affairs
P.O. Box 512
DAR ES SALAAM

Dear Sir/Madam,

RESEARCH PERMIT

We wish to introduce **Roosa Amanda Jolkkonen** from **Finland** who has been granted Research Permit No. **2017-132-NA-2017-36** dated **13th April 2017**

The permit allows him/her to do research in the country "**New Philanthropic Aid and Social Policy Transfer-A Case Study on the**"

We would like to support the application of the researcher(s) for the appropriate immigration status to enable the scholar(s) begin research as soon as possible.

By copy of this letter, we are requesting regional authorities and other relevant institutions to accord the researcher(s) all the necessary assistance. Similarly the designated local contact is requested to assist the researcher(s).

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M. Mushi', written over a horizontal line.

M. Mushi

Fo: DIRECTOR GENERAL

Appendix F. Data management protocol

This data management protocol relates to the storage, safeguarding and destruction of all interview data collected during the D.Phil research.

All data will be electronic, including interview transcripts, and stored in locked folders in all devices utilised for collecting, circulating and storing data (work phone, memory sticks and laptops). Only researcher and the transcribe aid will have access to data. Audio recordings will be destroyed once transcripts have been made.

The researcher and the transcribe aid will be using network connections protected by passwords when working from home or any other location outside of University buildings. Public networks will be avoided when possible.

Personal data of interviewees regarding name, contact details, professional position and work place are being collected to facilitate the recruitment process and ensure representativeness of interview data. Only researcher and her thesis supervisor Rebecca Surender (excluding transcriber) will have access to this information. Data will be pseudonymised and linked to a unique study number assigned for each interviewee. All documents containing personal identifiable data, including the link between the study number and personal identifier, will be destroyed after five years of time from the final publication of the D.Phil study.

Appendix G. Gates Foundation’s programmatic health sector investments in projects related to Tanzania 2015-2020.²⁰³

YEAR	RECIPIENT	PROJECT TYPE/AREA	PROJECT AIM (as stated by the Gates Foundation)	PROGRAMME	AMOUNT
2020	Imperial College London	Research/data use	<i>“to optimize methods for tracking patterns of malaria transmission using data from antenatal care visits.”</i>	Global Health	\$1,089,658
2020	AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition	Policy advocacy (mobilising local civil society)	<i>“to build a sustainable, Africa-focused civil society coalitions that harnesses South-North solidarity to execute evidence-driven advocacy in Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe towards impactful HIV responses.”</i>	Global Health	\$2,309,266
2020	Charity Projects	(AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria)	<i>“to provide matching funds to Charity Projects to support the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM).”</i>	Advocacy	\$8,000,000
2020	Center for Public Health Kinetics Grantee Location: Zanzibar City	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to identify new insights and biomarkers for preterm birth and other pregnancy complications to inform prediction and treatment and improve maternal and neonatal health.”</i>	Global health	\$1,228,191
2020	Population Services International (PSI)	Implementing project (adolescent reproductive health)	<i>“to adapt and integrate innovative adolescent health models that support girls’ agency and voluntary use of contraception while accelerating learning for greater impact.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,699,999
2020	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Research (Malaria)	<i>“to produce Phase I and Phase II data for evaluation of a new alphacypermethrin-PBO LLIN.”</i>	Global Health	\$250,291
2020	Center for Global Development	(Reproductive Health and MNCH)	<i>“to understand and identify key areas to improve the development and implementation processes of RMNCAH-N Investment Cases across GFF countries.”</i>	Global Development	\$501,616
2020	University of Virginia	Research (Covid-19/MNCH)	<i>“to provide data on epidemiology and seasonality of infant low birth weight, and detect indirect effects of the COVID-19 outbreak on MNCH outcomes in Haydom, Tanzania.”</i>	Global Health	\$77,149
2020	National Institute for Medical Research Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Technical assistance (malaria surveillance)	<i>“to establish local molecular, genetic, and genomic laboratory and analytic capacity to support malaria surveillance in Tanzania.”</i>	Global Health	\$7,517,993
2020	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Research (malaria)	<i>“to conduct research on the basic biology and population genetics of the major malaria vector Anopheles funestus.”</i>	Global Health	\$2,821,000
2020	Swiss Tropical & Public Health Institute	Implementing project (data use)	<i>“to support National Malaria Control Programs to use data to create stratified and tailored national strategic plans.”</i>	Global Health	\$948,891

²⁰³ October 2015 – October 2020; Family Planning included, Nutrition excluded; see <http://www.gatesfoundation.org/search#q/k=tanzania>, last visited 28.10.2020.

2020	Tides Center	(Immunisation)	<i>“to support local innovators in developing needed demand-side immunization solutions addressing overall coverage and equity challenges.”</i>	Global Development	\$260,000
2019	London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to analyze the data from the Every Newborn–Birth Indicators Research Tracking in Hospitals (EN-BIRTH) study to answer questions related to intrapartum care service delivery.”</i>	Global Development	\$151,387
2019	WHO	Medical trial (MNCH)	<i>“to conduct two trials to optimize the treatment of infants with possible serious bacterial infection.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$19,682,025
2019	United States Fund for UNICEF	Implementing project (scaling up MNCH, nutrition and FP innovations)	<i>“to enable multiple countries to scale up MNCH, Nutrition and Family Planning innovations via optimized primary health care, food and social protection systems and will do so via UNICEF’s regional offices system.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,946,400
2019	University of Virginia	Medical trial (MNCH)	<i>“to support a pilot trial of lactating women at the site of the current ELICIT trial in Haydom.”</i>	Global health	\$549,842
2019	University of Birmingham	Research (MNCH – postpartum hemorrhage)	<i>“to evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of early detection and ‘first response’ treatment of PPH through a bundle of care in a cluster randomized trial.”</i>	Global Development	\$10,915,588
2019	PATH	Implementing project (data use – immunisation)	<i>“to support continued development of electronic immunization registry (EIR) resources designed to support countries with successful implementation.”</i>	Global Development	\$468,946
2019	DAMAX Solutions Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Policy advocacy (to enhance local demand for vaccinations)	<i>“to increase demand for vaccinations in developing countries by using human-centered design principles to develop a community-supported, social marketing approach that breaks down misconceptions and psychosocial barriers.”</i>	Global Development	\$100,000
2019	Pan-African Mosquito Control Association	(Malaria)	<i>“to increase local involvement, ownership, and integration of vector control implementation, surveillance and operational research for malaria elimination in Africa.”</i>	Global Health	\$6,316,258
2019	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Research (malaria – new technologies)	<i>“To identify the best mosquito control strategies for preventing malaria by developing technology that combines artificial intelligence and infrared spectroscopy to quantify mosquito age and disease transmission potential in real time.”</i>	Global Health	\$100,000
2019	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Research (malaria)	<i>“to support basic research on the important malaria vector Anopheles funestus.”</i>	Global Health	\$100,000
2019	International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network	Policy advocacy (to enhance local interest in family planning)	<i>“to better understand the values of key constituents in Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania as they relate to family planning, and develop messaging in support of family planning that reflects and respects those values.”</i>	Global Development	\$599,221
2019	PATH	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to track priority tools, diagnostics, drugs and interventions for MNCH and better understand barriers and enablers to uptake globally”.</i>	Global Development	\$3,544,093
2019	Save the Children Federation, Inc.	(Family planning)	<i>“to test scalable approaches to increase use of PFP among young mothers ages 15-24 through program enhancements to health and other development projects implemented at scale.”</i>	Global Development	\$7,603,310

2019	Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health	Policy advocacy (malaria/sino-Tanzanian collaboration)	<i>“to generate evidence for policy decision making regarding the China-Tanzania 1-7 mRCT-Response approach and offer new opportunities for collaboration and capacity building under the China-Harvard-Africa Network.”</i>	Global Health	\$651,628
2019	Macro-Eyes, Inc.	Technical fix (vaccine supply chain/new technologies)	<i>“to improve vaccination coverage in Tanzania by applying statistical machine learning to the supply chain to predict demand at individual health clinics in near real-time, to ensure the right vaccines and levels are always in stock.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,002,655
2019	PATH	Implementing project (digital health environments)	<i>“to develop a suite of globally adapted digital-health common goods to enable national governments to securely access, adapt, and implement fundamental digital assets to improve digital health environments at the country and national level.”</i>	Global Development	\$515,000
2019	WHO	Technical assistance (malaria/sino-Tanzanian collaboration)	<i>“to support an internal validation of the China-Tanzania demonstration project on malaria control.”</i>	Global Health	\$200,000
2019	WHO	(Health systems strengthening/MNCH)	<i>“to strengthen national systems and enable countries to identify optimized district implementation models for quality care in health services that are effective, scalable and sustainable across the countries.”</i>	Global Development	\$7,000,355
2019	United States Fund for UNICEF	(Health systems strengthening/MNCH)	<i>“to strengthen national systems and enable countries to identify optimized district implementation models for quality care in health services that are effective, scalable and sustainable across the countries.”</i>	Global Development	\$9,500,000
2019	KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation	Policy packages (National Strategic Plans/tuberculosis)	<i>“to support nine National TB Control Programs to develop people-centered, optimized, and evidence based National Strategic Plans (NSPs) that may be used as the basis for simplified “NSP-based applications” being piloted by the Global Fund.”</i>	Global Health	\$1,677,379
2019	Center for Public Health Kinetics	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to identify new predictive biomarkers for preterm birth to enable treatment and triage to decrease the disease burden.”</i>	Global Health	\$645,540
	Grantee Location: Zanzibar City				
2019	JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc.	Technical fix (data use/supply chains)	<i>“to develop and refine sustainable approaches to using information to improve supply chain systems and understand how to implement in different country settings.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,942,361
2019	AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition	Policy advocacy (to enhance local advocacy for contraception and HIV prevention)	<i>“to build capacity of journalists and advocates to plan for, understand and respond to the Evidence for Contraceptive Options and HIV Outcomes trial results, and policy implications.”</i>	Global Development	\$299,101
2019	PATH	Situation analysis (digital health/understanding successful donor collaboration)	<i>“to document successful examples of donor collaboration in developing countries in support of country digital health systems to facilitate defining approaches for future donor alignment efforts.”</i>	Global Development	\$56,000
2019	Kantar Public Africa	Situation analysis (FP product availability in the private sector)	<i>“to provide previously unavailable statistically significant estimates of the availability of family planning products in the private sector in 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Pakistan.”</i>	Global Development	\$1,727,807
2018	Partnership for Supply Chain Management Inc.	Situation analysis (health product wholesaling and distribution market trends)	<i>“to landscape wholesalers and distributors of health products in five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, assess the capabilities of a select subset, and analyze wholesaling/distribution market trends.”</i>	Global Development	\$1,239,798

2018	Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevoelkerung	(Health financing)	<i>“to leverage more and better funds for health and development in Germany, in east Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), and at the EU level.”</i>	Global Development	\$9,812,422
2018	East African Community Secretariat	Technical support (medicines regulation)	<i>“to ensure harmonized and consistent procedures and approaches for medicines regulation in order to facilitate fast access to safe, efficacious and quality essential medicines for treatment of conditions of public health importance.”</i>	Global Health	\$500,000
	Grantee Location: Arusha				
2018	Well Told Story Limited	Policy advocacy (to enhance uptake of contraception among youth)	<i>“to create a normative and behavior change campaign in Tanzania and Kenya to increase uptake of contraception among 15-24-year-old and generate new evidence to advance the global Social and Behavior Change Communication field.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,999,559
2018	Curtin University	(Data use/malaria transmission)	<i>“to develop and maintain a data and modeling platform for enhanced global and national-level monitoring of malaria transmission”</i>	Global Health	\$8,176,966
2018	The Institute of Development Studies (IDS)	(Pro-poor taxation)	<i>“to increase the generation, availability and use of the evidence base for pro-poor approaches to taxation in sub-Saharan Africa, and ensure policymakers and tax experts have the capacity to analyze and debate how governments raise revenue.”</i>	Advocacy	\$3,000,000
2018	Population Action International	Policy advocacy (to create momentum for reproductive health and FP)	<i>“to promote impactful, coordinated and sustainable momentum for reproductive health and family planning through increased and sustained mutual accountability and partnership among civil society and government in at least four countries.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,500,000
2018	Rice University	Implementing project (MNCH)	<i>“to provide Newborn Essential Solutions and Technologies (NEST) to address the leading causes of newborn deaths, so that the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to reduce newborn death rates to below 12/1,000 live births will be reached (...).”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$16,000,000
2018	KAIZEN INSTITUTE CONSULTING GROUP AFAE LIMITED	Technical fix (FP/product supply chains)	<i>“to improve availability of family planning and other health products at the last mile, through improving the process and approach of the supply chain organizations supporting those service delivery points.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,258,897
2018	United States Fund for UNICEF	(Health systems strengthening)	<i>“to strengthen historically under-supported and weak health systems at the sub-national level in four countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) region: Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.”</i>	Global Development	\$9,536,604
2018	Clinton Health Access Initiative Inc. (CHAI)	(Immunisation)	<i>“to identify, develop and scale new approaches to enhance immunization coverage globally.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$36,528,600
2018	National Institute of Parasitic Disease, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention	Implementing project (malaria control)	<i>“to support NIPD to extend and prepare for scale up the China -Tanzania pilot project on “1-7 mRCT-response” approach on malaria control and elimination aimed in adding value into the malaria control and elimination in Africa.”</i>	Advocacy Global Health	\$2,355,235
2018	Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health	Research (publishing results related to mortality reduction after oral azithromycin/MNCH)	<i>“to accelerate publication of important research findings from the MORDOR Tanzania study.”</i>	Global Health	\$14,998

2018	Clinton Health Access Initiative Inc. (CHAI)	Technical assistance (FP/data use)	<i>“to transition FP Dashboards to full MOH ownership in Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania in order to ensure sustained visibility into health workforce capacity and FP program performance and improved use of data for decision-making.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,046,347
2018	Avenir Health, Inc.	Technical assistance (HIV/data use)	<i>“to pilot guidance and methods designed to support countries in transitioning their planning and expenditure tracking processes to align with the harmonized budget and expenditure categories agreed by major donors and multilaterals.”</i>	Global health	\$361,481
2018	The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan	Technical assistance (HIV/data use)	<i>“to support donors and country governments in formalizing and operationalizing uniform budgeting and expenditure tracking.”</i>	Global health	\$121,112
2018	Dalberg Catalyst	Implementing project (to enhance government uptake of policies to improve adolescent health/HIV)	<i>“to support the Government of Tanzania in moving from strategy to well planned and prioritized implementation for improved adolescent health outcomes.”</i>	Global Health	\$1,321,251
2018	University of California San Francisco	New public goods (drug development)	<i>“to build pharmacometric capacity in Africa to efficiently and effectively support model-informed drug development, clinical research, and product registration.”</i>	Global Health	\$600,161
2018	National Institute of Parasitic Disease, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention	(Malaria, sino-Tanzanian collaboration)	<i>“to support investigation to identify the priorities for China-Africa cooperation on malaria control and elimination.”</i>	Advocacy	\$200,000
2017	Columbia University	(Development data applications)	<i>“to ensure that the Geospatial Reference Information Database succeeds at producing geospatial reference data that enhance the power of all development data applications in priority countries, and at building capacity to manage, curate, (...)”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$13,290,197
2017	London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine	Research (HIV)	<i>“to describe patterns and risks for HIV incidence in selected communities in Southern and Eastern Africa.”</i>	Global Health	\$2,761,379
2017	Clinton Health Access Initiative Inc. (CHAI)	(HIV/product access)	<i>“to accelerate access to a highly optimal HIV treatment, dolutegravir, for people living with HIV.”</i>	Global Health	\$3,296,934
2017	Kuehne Foundation	Technical assistance (professional education/supply chains)	<i>“to fund new university degree programs in supply chain and carry out professional supply chain seminars.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,153,500
2017	Restless Development	Policy advocacy (to mobilise local youth/SDG5 and FP2020 agendas)	<i>“to train, mobilize and connect young people in India and Tanzania to fuel a global accountability youth movement for SDG 5 and country level FP2020 commitments to improve family planning outcomes and gender equality.”</i>	Advocacy Global Development	\$999,070
2017	AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition	Policy advocacy (to mobilise local civil society/HIV)	<i>“to build a sustainable, nimble, Africa-focused civil society coalition that harnesses North-South solidarity to execute evidence-driven advocacy in the three countries of Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe towards impactful HIV responses.”</i>	Global Health	\$6,215,028
2017	Avenir Health, Inc.	(Data use/HIV)	<i>“to improve the use of accurate and sustainable data on the costs of HIV/AIDS interventions in three African countries.”</i>	Global Health	\$380,275
2017	Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to understand barriers to adherence to high dose calcium supplementation in pregnancy and to test the non-inferiority of a low dose calcium regimen in reducing the risk of preeclampsia and preterm birth in Africa and South Asia.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$6,950,098

2017	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Implementing project (medical supply delivery)	<i>“to deliver medical supplies to remote areas by recruiting local shopkeepers who are able to overcome poor transport infrastructures to regularly travel to central suppliers, also during the rainy seasons, to maintain their own stocks”</i>	Global Health	\$100,000
2017	Macro-Eyes, Inc.	Implementing project (immunisation/supply chain data)	<i>“to boost childhood vaccination coverage in Tanzania by using statistical machine learning on supply chain data to anticipate demand and avoid health facilities carrying the wrong amounts or types of vaccines”</i>	Global Health	\$100,000
2017	United States Fund for UNICEF	(MNCH)	<i>“to contribute to the reduction of preventable newborn deaths by strengthening essential newborn care through scale-up of the management of possible serious bacterial infections among newborns in four countries over three years.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,797,789
2017	Options For International Health	(Reproductive health, MNCH)	<i>“to improve maternal and newborn survival in three sub-Saharan countries through use of better evidence and improved advocacy and accountability for RMNCAH resource allocation in Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania.”</i>	Global Development	\$3,421,238
2017	National AIDS Control Program; Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children Grantee Location: Dodoma, Dar es Salaam	Technical assistance (HIV)	<i>“to develop and disseminate the Tanzanian health sector’s HIV research and evaluation agenda for the period 2018-2022.”</i>	Global Health	\$124,545
2017	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Research (malaria)	<i>“to demonstrate successful colonization and genetically characterize Anopheles funestus as the major driver of malaria transmission in Eastern and Southern African settings to inform potential novel approaches to large-scale malaria control and elimination efforts.”</i>	Global Health	\$2,000,007
2017	United Nations World Food Programme	(FP/commodity supply chains)	<i>“to accelerate supply chain maturity that impacts performance to enable sustained health commodity availability.”</i>	Global Development	\$12,196,985
2017	Ifakara Health Institute Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Implementing project (eliminating malaria-carrying mosquitoes)	<i>“to demonstrate local disruption of residual malaria transmission by targeting and eliminating Anopheles funestus mosquitoes, by combining innovative techniques that maximize behavioral and physiological susceptibility of the vectors.”</i>	Global Health	\$715,000
2017	Africa Resource Centre NPC	Implementing project (health commodity and medicine supply chains)	<i>“to provide independent strategic advice and to strengthen supply chain systems by mobilizing the private sector, academia and other professional institutions to contribute to improving the availability of medicines and health commodities.”</i>	Global Development	\$4,717,568
2017	RESULTS Educational Fund, Inc.	Policy advocacy (non-legislative policy/poverty-related diseases)	<i>“to mobilize resources and improve non-legislative policy across five continents to increase equitable access to priority health interventions for the reduction and prevention of poverty-related diseases.”</i>	Advocacy Global Development Global Health	\$23,875,545
2017	Population Reference Bureau	Policy advocacy (to mobilise local youth as advocates for FP)	<i>“to assess the implementation of youth-friendly family planning services in six countries, build the capacity of youth advocates to promote accountability for</i>	Global Development	\$4,500,000

		services)	<i>policy implementation, and develop communications materials that support advocacy.”</i>		
2017	PATH	Implementing project (PHC/data use)	<i>“to improve the performance of Tanzania’s Primary Health Care system through better use of data.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$15,000,000
2016	Haydom Lutheran Hospital	Research (MNCH)	<i>“to test whether linear growth can be improved through delivery of antibiotics and/or provision of nicotinamide during pregnancy and early childhood.”</i>	Global Health	\$5,995,492
2016	Pathfinder International	Implementing project (access to FP services for youth)	<i>“to develop and evaluate innovative solutions to address provider bias and to increase young people’s access to quality family planning needs, counseling and methods.”</i>	Global Development	\$5,377,543
2016	University of California, Berkeley	Situation analysis (reproductive health needs of adolescents)	<i>“to expand the body of knowledge about the sexual and reproductive health needs of early adolescents in Tanzania.”</i>	Global Development	\$3,398,780
2016	REPOA Grantee Location: Dar es Salaam	Policy advocacy (to enhance local advocacy for better local level service delivery)	<i>“to improve the lives of Tanzanians and Kenyans by providing them with information that they can use to advocate for improvements in local level service delivery across the health, education, agriculture, and financial services sectors.”</i>	Global Development	\$196,852
2016	The Good Samaritan Foundation (KCMC)	Implementing project (contraception use amongst young men/new technologies)	<i>“to promote the use of contraception in Ethiopia and Tanzania by using mobile phones, interviews and group discussions to learn about the contraceptive needs, and the sexual and contraceptive behaviors of young unmarried men.”</i>	Global Health	\$100,000
2016	MMV Medicines for Malaria Venture	New public goods (malaria drug promotion)	<i>“to increase post-approval knowledge about the safety and appropriate use of pyronaridine-artesunate in broader patient populations beyond those evaluated in the drug’s clinical development program.”</i>	Global Health	\$3,507,33
2016	Scope Impact Ltd	(HIV)	<i>“to inform implementation strategies for interventions that can demonstrably increase the diagnosis and linkage to care of people living with HIV in priority countries.”</i>	Global Health	\$1,464,876
2016	The Institute of Development Studies (IDS)	(Pro-poor taxation)	<i>“to increase the generation, availability and use of the evidence base for pro-poor approaches to taxation in sub-Saharan Africa, and ensure policymakers and tax experts have the capacity to analyze and debate how governments raise revenue.”</i>	Advocacy	\$1,927,059
2016	University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill	Research (HIV/women)	<i>“to support the study on how receipt of cash transfers to young girls and women influence their sexual behavior and financial decisions.”</i>	Global Health	\$1,790,407
2016	University of Otago	Research (Salmonella)	<i>“to estimate the burden and severity of invasive Salmonella infections in Moshi, TZ.”</i>	Global Health	\$302,591
2016	DKT International, Inc.	Medical trial (contraception)	<i>“to catalyze increased trial and use of modern contraception in African, Asian, and Latin American countries.”</i>	Global Development	\$29,500,000
2016	Wilfrid Laurier University	(Support for African scholarship/HIV)	<i>“to grow African scholarship through mentoring, fostering scholarly writing, and publication on the subject of Africa’s HIV-AIDS epidemic for an African and global audience of researchers, thereby supporting efficient use of resources by increasing access to research on costing, budgeting, expenditure data, and effective means of deploying resources.”</i>	Global Health	\$255,605
	Clinton Health Access Initiative Inc. (CHAI)	(FP/implant markets)	<i>“to invest in the growth and long-term sustainability of a healthy implant market while supporting scale-up of expanded family planning method mix access and use</i>	Global Development	\$5,781,661

			<i>in four countries through the use of data for decision-making.”</i>		
2016	University of Washington Foundation	Research (continuing professional education needs/HIV and tuberculosis service delivery)	<i>“to conduct a landscape analysis of continuing professional development in South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania towards improving HIV/TB care and delivery.”</i>	Global Health	\$245,733
2016	ITAD	Project evaluation (FP/adolescent reproductive health)	<i>“to fund a multi-country process, outcomes and cost-effectiveness evaluation of “Adolescents 360”, a four-year program aimed at identifying youth-driven solutions through user-centered design processes.”</i>	Global Development	\$2,881,426
2015	Zipline International Inc.	(Aerial health commodity delivery/supply chains)	<i>“to conduct rapid, on-demand aerial delivery of health commodities in Africa and conduct research on the cost-effectiveness and public health impacts of such deliveries in Africa, improving health care supply chains in the world.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$4,355,239
2015	Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung	(FP/local advocacy/FP financing)	<i>“to increase and improve funding from Germany and the EU for global health and development, to increase access to family planning funds by local civil society organizations in Africa, and to increase country finance for family planning in Africa.”</i>	Advocacy Global Development	\$10,877,750
2015	The Global Fund	Policy advocacy (to increase country budgeting for health).	<i>“to support the Global Fund’s efforts to increase the level of national financial commitments in the health sector in select African countries to impact long-term sustainability of health sector programs and transition out of donor support.”</i>	Advocacy	\$1,848,411
2015	Population Services International (PSI)	Implementing project (contraception amongst adolescents)	<i>“to meet the contraceptive needs of adolescents aged 15-19 year olds by using a user-centered design and youth-driven approach in the three project countries of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.”</i>	Global Development	\$15,000,000
2015	Penn State, The Ecology Institute	(Malaria)	<i>“to prove the value of low-cost housing improvements that will prevent malaria transmission.”</i>	Global Health	\$10,374,543
2015	African Capacity Building Foundation	Technical assistance (service delivery by local non-profits)	<i>“to enhance the capacity of local non-profits to deliver effectively programs of life-saving and human development nature in health, agriculture and financial service for the poor.”</i>	Global Development	\$3,000,000
2015	United States Fund for UNICEF	(MNCH)	<i>“to support implementation of the Global Strategy 2:0 for Every Woman Every Child through strengthened social accountability in selected countries.”</i>	Advocacy	\$6,998,799
2015	PATH	(Data use, health information systems)	<i>“to improve health outcomes by strengthening national health information systems and data use in key countries, building evidence of data systems and use practices that improve health outcomes.”</i>	Global Development Global Health	\$2,500,000
2015	Clinton Health Access Initiative Inc. (CHAI)	(Immunisation/cold chain systems)	<i>“to sustainably increase coverage with safe and potent vaccines by improving vaccines cold chain systems in Ethiopia, India, and Tanzania, as well as the global cold chain equipment market dynamics.”</i>	Global Development	\$16,124,479

Appendix H. Comparative table of 10 leading big philanthropies in the social sector²⁰⁴

PHILANTHROPY	IDEOLOGICAL STANCES AND WORLDVIEWS	ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND APPROACHES	POLICY OBJECTIVES	INVESTMENT TYPES	SOCIAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS
<p>Susan T. Buffett Foundationⁱ (founded by Warren Buffett and his wife, the late Susan Thompson Buffett)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 298 USD M</p>	<p>-Warren Buffett: strong belief in economic progress through women’s empowerment.</p> <p>-Warren Buffet adage: ‘philanthropy is society’s risk capital’ⁱⁱ</p>	<p>-Unique contemporary philanthropy with a particularly low-key profile.</p> <p>-No publicly available website, contact details nor information on leadership, funding strategies, goals or grantees.</p> <p>-Organisational culture of ambitious goals, willingness to take risks and adapt approaches in light of new information and evidence.</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> sexual and reproductive health and rights.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> enhancing reproductive choice.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> strong focus on women.</p>	<p>-Grants to large non-profits (e.g. PSI, Marie Stopes International, CHAI, Ipas, International Planned Parenthood) and the WHO.</p> <p>-Big bets.</p> <p>-PBF (through work executed by grantees such as the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF),ⁱⁱⁱ</p>	<p>-Service provision (abortion and contraception services).</p> <p>-New medical products and technologies.</p> <p>-Rights-based advocacy.</p>
<p>Open Society Foundations (founded by George Soros)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 268 USD M</p>	<p>-Draws on the idea of ‘open society’ by Karl Popper (1945) to describe societies which guarantee and protect rational exchange (while closed societies force people to submit to religious, political or economic authority).</p> <p>-Promotes ideals of a cosmopolitan global community; focus on <i>dogma</i> rather than <i>pragmatism</i>.</p>	<p>-Decentralised structure; extensive global network of advisory boards.</p> <p>-Strategies defined through discussions with local and global experts; “<i>the conversation between these global and local voices is an essential part of who we are.</i>”^{iv}</p> <p>-Aims to ‘respond nimbly and effectively to sudden crises.’</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> democracy & governance, health and education.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> bolstering democratic policy making and open debate; advancing social and economic justice.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> strongly universalist (ideologically); special assistance to refugees and ethnic and sexual minorities.</p>	<p>-Grants to groups and individuals.</p> <p>-Strategic human rights litigation.</p> <p>-Impact investing; big bets.</p>	<p>-Rights-based approaches to health & public education systems strengthening.</p> <p>- Strengthening of taxation and budget spending within governments.</p> <p>-Bolstering shared business ownership models.</p> <p>-Innovative social protection and insurance models.^v</p>
<p>Wellcome Trust (founded by Sir Henry Wellcome)</p>	<p>-Sir Henry Wellcome: “<i>health can be improved when research generates, tests and investigates</i></p>	<p>-The sole trustee of the Wellcome Trust is the ‘Wellcome Trust Limited’ – a company registered in</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> global health.</p>	<p>-Grants for product development (e.g. vaccines), medical research, social</p>	<p>-New global public goods (e.g. vaccines).</p>

²⁰⁴ Based on 2017/18 average disbursements for development purposes as reported by the OECD (2020).

<p>2017/18 average disbursements: 265 USD M</p>	<p><i>new ideas.</i>^{vi}</p> <p><i>-“We identify areas in which Wellcome can lead significant change, aiming to transform the global response to some of today’s biggest health challenges.”^{vii}</i></p>	<p>England.</p> <p>-Strong focus on research, product development and innovation around technologies.</p> <p>-A non-state actor in WHO’s official relations.</p>	<p><i>Goals:</i> tackling infectious diseases, epidemics, drug-resistant infections, mental health.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> young people (under mental health work).</p>	<p>sciences and global advocacy.</p> <p>-Cross-sectoral collaboration with academia, philanthropy, businesses, governments and civil society.</p> <p>-Profitable investments.</p> <p>-Supporting research related to PBF mechanisms.^{viii}</p>	<p>-Data & technology -driven innovations.</p> <p>-Training health workers.</p>
<p>Ford Foundation (founded by Edsel Ford)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 234 USD M</p>	<p>-Emphasis on people “<i>excluded from full participation in the political, economic, and cultural systems that shape their lives.</i>”^{ix}</p> <p>-Perceived causes of inequality: entrenched cultural narratives, poor investment into public goods (e.g. education), unfair rules of the economy, unequal access to government, prejudice and discrimination.</p> <p>-Sees innovative high-risk ideas as a key component of successful change (see footnote ix).</p>	<p>-Governed by a 16-member Board of Trustees across public, private and third sectors from the US and abroad.</p> <p>-Strong focus on creating social movements or a ‘global ecosystem of change agents’ that pursue social justice.</p> <p>-Aims to bridge “<i>technologists, workers, researchers, policy experts, private sector leaders, and social justice advocates to leverage existing collaborations and create new ones.</i>”^x</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> poverty and injustice, democracy.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> protection of human rights, participatory democracy, equal access to wealth, knowledge and resources to all.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> minorities, women and girls, indigenous populations.</p>	<p>-Grants to individuals, non-profits, businesses, social bonds.</p> <p>-Profitable-, Mission Related Investments (MRIs) since 2017.</p>	<p>-Innovative labour and social protection policies.</p> <p>-Innovative private sector practices and models.</p> <p>-Women’s rights advocacy.</p> <p>-Microfinance.</p> <p>-Advocacy for access to healthcare and livelihoods.</p>
<p>Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) (established by Chris Hohn and Jamie Cooper)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 219 USD M</p>	<p>-Chris Hohn: “<i>The original mission in setting up CIFF was to improve the lives of children in developing countries who live in poverty. This hasn’t changed. I want to solve problems, not make grants.</i>”^{xi}</p> <p><i>-“We strive to be nimble and take risks where the potential pay-off is big. We are not afraid to ‘fail fast’, learn and try something</i></p>	<p>-Led by a board of five trustees from the private sector including Chris Hohn and Jamie Cooper.^{xiii}</p> <p>-Strong focus on data, evidence and measurable large-scale impact (see footnote xi).</p> <p>-Explicit focus on partnerships, innovation and impact.</p> <p>-Rigorous private sector approach</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> global health, education, child protection, climate change.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> reducing HIV incidence, under-5 mortality and malnourishment; enhancing early education; improving reproductive health.</p>	<p>-Work through global PPPs.</p> <p>-Grants to INGOs, research organisations, universities and non-profits.</p> <p>-Big bets, profitable investments.</p> <p>-Development Impact Bonds.^{xv}</p>	<p>-New global public goods (e.g. antiretroviral medicines for children).</p> <p>-Innovative community-based approaches to service delivery and product sale.</p> <p>-Advocacy and strengthening of law enforcement systems to support child protection.</p>

	<p><i>new.</i>^{xxii}</p> <p>-Identification as non-religious and non-partisan organisation.</p>	<p>to funding.</p> <p>-Use of local advocates to promote policy ideas and approaches.^{xiv}</p>	<p><i>Target populations:</i> children and adolescents.</p>		
<p>William & Flora Hewlett Foundation (founded by William & Flora Hewlett)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 197 USD M</p>	<p>-Strong faith in the competence and contributions of philanthropy in benefitting the common good (bolstered by the Effective philanthropy program).^{xvi}</p> <p>-Official statement: “<i>development is about more than economic growth or reducing poverty; it’s about helping people reach their full potential as citizens, workers and parents. Increased economic opportunity and reproductive choices help women, and their families, thrive.</i>”^{xvii}</p>	<p>-Led by a board of 13 members across public, private and third sectors and including four members of the Hewlett family.</p> <p>-Strong focus on evidence and data.</p> <p>-Guiding principles include: “<i>tackling defined problems in a pragmatic, nonpartisan manner ; and, focus on outcomes in order to maximize the effectiveness of our support</i>”.^{xviii}</p> <p>-Five yearly refresh process of grant making strategies to ensure efforts are ‘meaningful and responsive’.^{xix}</p> <p>-Pursues strengthening of local advocacy to achieve set goals.^{xx}</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> women’s economic empowerment, reproductive health.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> increasing access to family planning and abortion services; make women’s work integrated into economic policymaking; support evidence-based policymaking; enhance citizen participation.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> women.</p>	<p>-Work through global PPPs</p> <p>- “<i>commitment to providing long-term general operating support to anchor institutions in the fields in which we work</i>”.^{xxi}</p> <p>-PBF.^{xxii}</p> <p>-Grants to INGOs, research organisations, universities and non-profits.</p> <p>-Big bets, profitable investments.</p> <p>-Blended finance.</p>	<p>-Innovative tools for family planning services.^{xxiii}</p> <p>-Rights-based approaches to enhance employee protection, allow women job opportunities and control over their assets.</p> <p>-Bolstering domestic advocacy for policy reform and government accountability concerning use of public resources.</p>
<p>Bloomberg Philanthropies (founded by Michael Bloomberg)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 180 USD M</p>	<p>-Driven by ideas and approaches of Michael Bloomberg, who has a highly pragmatic and non-partisan way of solving “<i>challenges where the potential for controversy or failure keeps others at bay.</i>”^{xxiv}</p> <p>-Michael Bloomberg: “<i>it’s philanthropy’s job to take risks – and government’s job to scale solutions</i>”;^{xxv}</p> <p>“<i>Governments have the authority to drive change in ways that philanthropies cannot. By leveraging our resources and forming partnerships with government, philanthropic</i></p>	<p>-24-member board of directors (of distinguished American individuals) overseeing and advising the operations; overall approach based on Michael Bloomberg’s views and approaches.</p> <p>-Strong focus on data, assessing opportunities, measuring progress and increasing impact.</p> <p>-Deploys and promotes PPPs as a key strategy.</p> <p>- “<i>In all of our work, we look for strong partners, try innovative solutions, follow the data, and spread what is proven to work.</i>” (see footnote xxv).</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> global health; climate change; women’s economic empowerment.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> Family planning 2020 goals; preventing maternal mortality and expanding reproductive health access; halting obesity; women’s training and skills building; improving tobacco control and traffic safety; (reducing NCD-related deaths).^{xxvii}</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> women, children.</p>	<p>- Grants to INGOs, research organisations and non-profits.</p> <p>-Impact investment, big bets.</p> <p>-PBF.^{xxviii}</p>	<p>-Clinical service provision in rural areas (upgrading public health centres, training staff, community health workers).</p> <p>-Women’s training and skills building.</p> <p>-Technical fixes; improved collection and use of data.</p> <p>- ‘Policy packages’ (e.g. MPOWER tobacco control strategies for governments).</p> <p>-Policy advocacy through funding of local advocates and policy promotion</p>

	<i>organizations can help push those changes forward.</i> ^{xxxvi}				organisations.
<p>Howard G. Buffet Foundation (founded by Howard G. Buffet)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 125 USD M</p>	<p>-Official statement: <i>“Our mission is to catalyze transformational change to improve the standard of living and quality of life for the world’s most impoverished and marginalized populations.”</i>^{xxxix}</p> <p>- Emphasises conflict and insecurity as key obstacles to economic prosperity.</p> <p>-Focus on risky, innovative ideas: <i>“there is simply no way global challenges like food insecurity and conflict will be solved by doing more of what we’ve already tried.”</i>^{xxx}</p>	<p>-The Foundation has four trustees including Howard G. Buffet.</p> <p>-Resources prioritised for grant-making purposes; no communications staff.</p> <p>- Official cessation date (final dissolution of assets) in December 2045.</p> <p>-<i>“The Foundation does not accept unsolicited proposals, and we typically do not provide general operating support.”</i>^{xxxix}</p> <p>-Collaboration with local advocates and philanthropists.</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> Food security; conflict mitigation; public safety.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> agricultural resource development for small farmers; preventing and ending violence; supporting communities affected by violence.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> vulnerable populations; farmers in fragile contexts/conflict countries; women and girls.</p>	<p>-Grants for <i>“research, conservation-based production practices, water resource management and advocacy.”</i> (see footnote xxxi).</p> <p>-Collaborative investments with other foundations (e.g. the Bridgeway Foundation, the Conflict and Development Foundation, CDF; International Women’s Media Foundation, IWMF).</p> <p>-Grants for NGOs, local initiatives.</p>	<p>-Infrastructure (e.g. border posts, hydro dams, electricity networks).</p> <p>-Market-based approaches to getting seeds to farmers.</p> <p>-Agricultural education programmes.</p> <p>-Innovative approaches to data collection and use for public sector actors.</p> <p>-Scholarship programmes for students; training and skills-building for female journalists.</p>
<p>David & Lucile Packard Foundation (founded by David and Lucile Packard)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 121 USD M</p>	<p>-Family foundation <i>“guided by the enduring business philosophy and personal values of Lucile and David Packard.”</i>^{xxxii}</p> <p>- <i>“We initiate and receive ideas in which a large commitment of funds and/or time can make a unique and lasting contribution.”</i> (see footnote xxxiii).</p> <p>-Focus on small scale farms and economic development in rural communities.^{xxxiii}</p>	<p>-Led by a 15-member Board of Trustees from the private, philanthropic and research sectors in the US.</p> <p>- Commitment to effectiveness: <i>“We identify unique and strategic opportunities to make a difference and evaluate their effectiveness and change as necessary.”</i> (see footnote xxxiii).</p> <p>-Strong interest in mission investing as an instrument to seize timely, high risk opportunities and achieve maximum impact.^{xxxiv}</p> <p>-Pursues strengthening of local advocacy to achieve set goals (see footnote xx).</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> reproductive health; agriculture, livelihoods & conservation (ALC).</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> increasing access to reproductive health (including safe abortion and post-abortion care);^{xxxv} enhancing livelihoods through small farm agriculture.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> women and girls, youth, indigenous communities (in agriculture).</p>	<p>-Grants primarily to tax-exempt charitable organisations for <i>“charitable, educational, or scientific purposes.”</i>^{xxxvi}</p> <p>-Profitable investments (e.g. loans, equity investments); <i>“we have dedicated up to \$180 million of our endowment for mission investments”</i> (see footnote xxxiv).</p> <p>-No funding to government institutions or direct service provision.</p>	<p>-Service delivery strengthening (reproductive health/family planning services).</p> <p>-Supporting global and regional advocacy around reproductive health.</p> <p>-<i>“Financial and agribusiness resources for women and young people through self-help groups and cooperative.”</i> (footnote xxxiv).</p>

<p>Rockefeller Foundation (founded by John D. Rockefeller)</p> <p>2017/18 average disbursements: 107 USD M</p>	<p>-Guiding principle: “<i>all men and women (...) have the right to health, food, power and economic mobility.</i>”^{xxxvii}</p> <p>-Promotes impact-oriented philanthropy for development.^{xxxviii}</p> <p>-Emphasis on cross-sectoral collaboration to achieve UHC: “<i>we placed additional emphasis on the role of the private sector in health, the potential of eHealth and the power of global networks.</i>”^{xxxix}</p>	<p>-Led by a minimum 12-member Board of Trustees with global representation (from the private sector and international development org.).</p> <p>-Strong focus innovation, science, data, and ‘breakthrough solutions’.</p>	<p><i>General focus:</i> health; food security; energy poverty.</p> <p><i>Goals:</i> SDG3-targets; eliminate health inequities, enhance production and consumption of productive foods; SDG7-targets.</p> <p><i>Target populations:</i> universalist approach to health.</p>	<p>- Grants to INGOs, research organisations, multilateral organisations and initiatives (e.g. WB, MDG Health Alliance).</p> <p>-Profitable impact investments; big bets.</p> <p>-Social Impact Bonds, Environmental Impact Bonds, PBF.</p>	<p>-New global public goods (e.g. new vaccines, grains).</p> <p>-Innovative approaches to service delivery (community health delivery).</p> <p>-Technical fixes (data systems development for the public sector).</p> <p>-Global and domestic advocacy for UHC.</p>
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ⁱ Information presented in the table primarily drawn from an article by Travers (2019).

ⁱⁱ See in Callahan (2017, p. 228)

ⁱⁱⁱ GFF Annual Report 2019, ‘Countries lead the way: delivering on the global promise of better health and nutrition; see https://www.globalfinancingfacility.org/sites/gff_new/files/documents/GFF-Annual-Report-2019-2020.pdf; see also <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/193531545314874843/text/Administration-Agreement-with-the-Susan-Thompson-Buffett-Foundation-for-TF072645-parallel-to-TF070955.txt>, last visited 14.11.2020.

^{iv} See <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/how-we-work>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^v See <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/what-we-do/themes/economic-equity-and-justice>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{vi} See <https://wellcome.ac.uk/about-us>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{vii} See <https://wellcome.ac.uk/how-we-work>, last visited 6.9.2020.

^{viii} E.g. Results4TB; see <http://results4tb.curatiofoundation.org/index.php/about-the-results4tb-research-project/>, last visited 14.11.2020.

^{ix} See <https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^x See <https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/future-of-work-ers/our-strategy/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{xi} See <https://ciff.org/about-us/who-we-are/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{xii} See <https://ciff.org/about-us/our-approach-and-values/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{xiii} See <https://ciff.org/about-us/governance/>, last visited 7.9.2020

^{xiv} See <https://ciff.org/priorities/adolescence/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

^{xv} E.g. ‘Educate Girls’ -project (2015, India); <https://ciff.org/news/educate-girls-development-impact-bond-delivers-impressive-results-surpassing-both-target-outcomes/>, last visited 14.11.2020.

^{xvi} See also <https://hewlett.org/about-us/hewlett-family-and-history/>, last visited 1.7.2020.

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- ^{xvii} See <https://hewlett.org/strategy/womens-choices/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xviii} See <https://hewlett.org/about-us/values-and-policies/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xix} See <https://hewlett.org/launching-our-global-womens-economic-empowerment-strategy-refresh-process/>, last visited 7.9.2020.
- ^{xx} See e.g. <https://www.hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/OFP-Guidebook.pdf>;
<https://www.gatesinstitute.org/sites/default/files/The%20Future%20of%20Advocacy%20-%20Options%20Brief.pdf>, last visited 14.11.2020.
- ^{xxi} Guiding principles -statement, 2019; see <https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Guiding-Principles.pdf>, last visited 14.11.2020.
- ^{xxii} See e.g. <https://www.ctphilanthropy.org/sites/default/files/resources/Foundation%20for%20Social%20Impact%20Bonds%2C%202014-1.pdf>, last visited 14.11.2020.
- ^{xxiii} International Women’s Reproductive Health: Supporting Local Advocacy in sub-Saharan Africa (2016); see http://www.hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/GDP_international-women-reproductive-health-Local-Advocacy-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf, last visited 7.9.2020.
- ^{xxiv} See <https://www.bloomberg.org/about/our-approach/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxv} Bloomberg Philanthropies Annual Letter 2019; see https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/39/2019/06/AnnualReport2019_Digital.pdf, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxvi} See in Callahan (2017, p. 14-15).
- ^{xxvii} See e.g. <https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/bloomberg-launches-worldwide-effort-fight-ncds-injuries/>, last visited 7.9.2020.
- ^{xxviii} E.g. ‘The Bloomberg Initiative’; see <https://www.bloomberg.org/program/public-health/tobacco-control/#problem>, last visited 14.11.2020.
- ^{xxix} See <https://www.thehowardgbuffettfoundation.org/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxx} Annual Letter 2018; see <https://www.thehowardgbuffettfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018-HGBF-Annual-Report-web.pdf>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxxi} See <https://www.thehowardgbuffettfoundation.org/about/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxxii} See <https://www.packard.org/about-the-foundation/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxxiii} Agriculture, Livelihoods, and Conservation 2020 – 2024 STRATEGY, see <https://www.packard.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/6-For-Website-ALC-External-Strategy-2020-2024-.pdf>, last visited 3.7.2020.
- ^{xxxiv} See <https://www.packard.org/grants-and-investments/mission-investing/>, last visited 1.7.2020.
- ^{xxxv} Population Reproductive Health Program, Sub-Sahara Africa Strategy Brief 2013, see <https://www.packard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Sub-Sahara-Africa-Strategy-Brief-FINAL.pdf>, last visited 3.7.2020.
- ^{xxxvi} See <https://www.packard.org/grants-and-investments/for-grantseekers/>, last visited 3.7.2020.
- ^{xxxvii} See <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/>, last visited 3.7.2020.
- ^{xxxviii} See https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/responsibility-philanthropy-join-forces-achieve-sdgs/?doing_wp_cron=1599578472.8598089218139648437500, last visited 8.9.2020.
- ^{xxxix} See www.rockefellerfoundation.org/initiative/universal-health-coverage/?doing_wp_cron=1599579440.2032980918884277343750, last visited 8.9.2020.