Days of Revolution: Three Essays on the Effects of Civil War Dynamics in Latin America



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There are few opportunities in life in which one can summarize in a few pages a life that, to be called as such, has to be a collective journey, never an individual one. And this is one of them. One of the many privileges that we have as scholars is that, at certain times, we have the possibility of thanking so many for their help. I have always thought that the best tributes need to be done in life, when you can still enjoy them. Regrettably, the opposite is often the case.

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Abstract

This doctoral dissertation studies the political effects of civil war dynamics at distinct conflict stages, with an empirical focus in Latin America. Concretely, it aims to address some of the following questions: How do distinct civil war dynamics affect subsequent institutional arrangements? Does exposure to violence from different actors affect civilian preferences towards peace? How do states distribute state power in the aftermath of conflict? Most of these questions have seldomly been treated in the literature of civil war studies. This dissertation aims to expand the debate on the variety of effects of civil war providing four core contributions: promoting the development of an analytical approach that conceptualizes conflict as processes with distinct phases; pushing towards an integrated agenda on political violence; advocating the necessity of engaging in actor dissagregation; and bringing the state back in into the analysis of internal armed conflicts.

In order to do this, this dissertation includes three articles. First, I provide a cross-national analysis focusing on the inter-relation between insurgent strength, intra-elite competition and coups d'etat, using a novel dataset of insurgencies operating in the region. Second, an article co-authored with Juan Masullo (Leiden University) studying the impact of violence against civilians on preferences towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the FARC-EP and the Government in the 2016 Colombian Referendum. And finally, a subnational analysis on the Sendero Luminoso rebellion in Peru (1980-1992), which traces the impact of the spatial distribution of wartime territorial control in the allocation of state capacity measures in the aftermath of conflict. The combination of these projects aim to provide new and important insights to the burgeoning research on civil war, but also to inform policymakers and international organizations about conflict processes and their capacity for intervention or resolution at different stages.

Contents

List of Figures **xvii**

List of Tables **xix**

I Introduction and Literature Review **1**

1 Introduction **1**

1.1 Three Essays on the Effects of Civil War Dynamics in Latin America 5
1.2 What Do We Know About Civil Wars? 7
1.3 Contributions 13
1.3.1 A Processual Approach to Civil War 14
1.3.2 Integrated Agenda on Political Violence 18
1.3.3 Actor Dissagregation 20
1.3.4 Bringing the State Back In 23
1.4 Research Design 25
1.4.1 Case Selection 26
1.4.2 Quantitative Analysis 30
1.4.3 Qualitative Analysis 32
1.4.4 A Novel Dataset on Latin American Insurgencies 33
1.5 Latin America: A Continent in Flames 35
1.5.1 The Foco Period 37
1.5.2 The Urban Guerrillas 40
1.5.3 The Prolonged People's War 42
1.6 Scope Conditions 45
1.7 Plan of the Dissertation 50

2 The Phases of Civil War **53**

2.1 Civil War Onset 56
2.2 In the Midst of War: The Micro-Level Agenda 60
2.2.1 Violence Against Civilians 60
2.2.2 Mobilization 62
2.2.3 Rebel Governance 64

2.2.4 Others . . . 66
2.3 Civil War Outcomes and Termination . . . 68
2.4 The Political Effects and Legacies of War . . . 72
2.4.1 Micro-Level . . . 72
2.4.2 Meso-Level . . . 75
2.4.3 Macro-Level . . . 77
2.5 The Way Forward . . . 81
2.6 The Unexplored Story of Latin American Insurgencies . . . 83
2.6.1 Descriptive Single Cases . . . 84
2.6.2 Comparative Descriptive . . . 85
2.6.3 Case Studies . . . 86
2.6.4 Comparative Testing . . . 88
2.7 Conclusion . . . 90

II Papers 93

3 Common Enemies? Coups, Insurgent Strength and Intra-Elite Competition: Evidence from Latin America 95
3.1 Introduction . . . 97
3.2 Theory . . . 101
3.2.1 Actors and Goals . . . 102
3.2.2 The Argument . . . 103
3.2.3 Elite Unity . . . 106
3.2.4 Elite Competition . . . 107
3.2.5 Insurgent Strength . . . 108
3.3 Data & Empirical Strategy . . . 114
3.4 Results . . . 121
3.4.1 Empirical Analysis . . . 121
3.4.2 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations . . . 126
3.4.3 Case Study: Argentina during the 70s . . . 129
3.5 Conclusion . . . 135

4 Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace (with Juan Masullo) 183
4.1 Introduction . . . 185
4.2 Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace . . . 187
4.3 Context Overview . . . 189
4.3.1 The Colombian Civil War . . . 189
4.3.2 The Peace Process with the FARC . . . 192

4.4 Why Should the Identity of the Perpetrator Matter for Civilian Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements? . . . 194
4.5 Data and Methods . . . 198
4.6 Results and Discussion . . . 200
4.6.1 Main Results . . . 201
4.6.2 Robustness Checks . . . 204
4.6.3 What About the Internal Logic of the Argument? . . . 207
4.7 Conclusion . . . 211

5 The Incursion of Leviathan: Wartime Territorial Control and Post-Conflict State Capacity in Perú 233
5.1 Introduction . . . 235
5.2 War and State Capacity: The Effects of External and Internal Conflicts 238
5.3 Buying Minds, Convincing Hearts and the Creation of Order . . . 240
5.4 Maoism & State Repression: An Overview of the Peruvian Conflict 246
5.5 Data & Empirical Strategy . . . 249
5.6 Results . . . 254
5.6.1 Descriptive Evidence . . . 254
5.6.2 Main Results . . . 256
5.6.3 Robustness Checks . . . 260
5.6.4 Qualitative Evidence . . . 262
5.7 Conclusion . . . 266

III Conclusion & Implications 293

6 Conclusion and Implications 295
6.1 Summary of Findings . . . 296
6.2 New Directions for Future Research . . . 299
6.2.1 Dynamic View of Conflict . . . 299
6.2.2 Data on Organized Violence . . . 301
6.2.3 Novel Actors . . . 303
6.2.4 Links Between Contentious Processes . . . 304
6.2.5 Scope Conditions . . . 304
6.2.6 Holistic Perspective on the Legacies of War . . . 306
6.3 Policy Implications . . . 307
6.3.1 Demobilization Effectiveness . . . 307
6.3.2 Building Strong Local Institutions . . . 308
6.3.3 Violence, Polarization and Institutional Stability . . . 309
6.4 Conclusion . . . 310

7 Bibliography 313

List of Figures

1.1 Phases and Stages of Conflict 16
1.2 Conflicts by Technology of Rebellion 27
1.3 Conflicts by Type of Organization 27
1.4 Wartime Coups by Region 28
1.5 Ideal Stages of Conflict 30
1.6 Map Latin America 36
1.7 Rebel Group Strategies 38

3.1 Observable Implications 104
3.2 Number Insurgencies (1955-1991) 115
3.3 Coups Latin America (1950-2020) 116
3.4 Irregular Conflict Stages 118
3.5 Logit Results 122

4.1 Map Colombia 191
4.2 Exposure Violence & Vote Referendum 202

5.1 Map Perú 247
5.2 Territorial Control 250
5.3 Spatial Territorial Control 251
5.4 Evolution State Capacity 255
5.5 Estimated Effects Perú 259

List of Tables

1.1 Datasets Comparison 34

3.1 Coups by Strength and Intra Elite Unity 121
3.2 Logit Coups Latin America 123
3.3 Logit Coups Contentious Events 125

4.1 OLS Identity Perpetrator 203

5.1 Spatial Lag Perú 257
5.2 Spatial Error Perú 258

Part I

Introduction and Literature Review

Violence can effectively destroy power, but it is, instead, totally incapable of creating it.

— Hannah Arendt

Nothing transforms ideas as much as taking them seriously.

— Isaiah Berlin

1 Introduction

Contents

1.1 Three Essays on the Effects of Civil War Dynamics in Latin America 5
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1.3 Contributions 13
1.3.1 A Processual Approach to Civil War 14
1.3.2 Integrated Agenda on Political Violence 18
1.3.3 Actor Dissagregation 20
1.3.4 Bringing the State Back In 23
1.4 Research Design 25
1.4.1 Case Selection 26
1.4.2 Quantitative Analysis 30
1.4.3 Qualitative Analysis 32
1.4.4 A Novel Dataset on Latin American Insurgencies 33
1.5 Latin America: A Continent in Flames 35
1.5.1 The Foco Period 37
1.5.2 The Urban Guerrillas 40
1.5.3 The Prolonged People's War 42
1.6 Scope Conditions 45
1.7 Plan of the Dissertation 50

Civil wars are extremely disruptive political processes. Internal armed conflicts promote the development of novel political actors; produce innovative repertoires of collective action; reshape attitudes towards state institutions; and create novel political cleavages. However, and despite the impressive advancement in the analysis

of civil war, our current understanding on the evolution of internal armed conflicts is highly limited, specially when focusing on their political effects. How do distinct civil war dynamics affect subsequent institutional arrangements? What is the interrelation between different types of contentious activities? How are elite interests shaped by the presence of insurgent groups? Does exposure to violence from different actors affect civilian preferences towards peace? How do states distribute state power in the aftermath of conflict? Could civil war strengthen state capacity? Most of these questions, while holding extreme importance both from scholarly and policy-making perspectives, have seldomly been treated in the literature of civil war studies.

Even though civil wars have just recently began to be studied comprehensively as a distinct area of analysis, they are a socio-political phenomenon that date back to ancient history (Armitage 2017). Already the ancient Greeks engaged in fierce military struggles, proving how the quest for political power is inherent to the development of political structures. Despite the long history of civil wars, until very recently, most of scholarly interest had been directed to the study of other contentious processes, with a special interest on interstate conflicts and revolutions. However, as civil wars became the most prominent type of war in the contemporary period, a new research program on the systematic study of internal armed conflicts emerged in the late 1990s.[1] This literature, which has mainly focused on the understanding of the correlates of civil war onset, together with a thorough analysis of a wide set of micro-level dynamics of war, has left unaddressed crucial questions, specially those related to the dynamic evolution and effects of internal armed conflicts (Shesterinina 2021).

This thesis brings together three pieces of research that focus on the dynamic effects of civil wars under the common regional framework of Latin America. The goal is to delve into a wide set of under-studied processes of internal armed conflicts. Concretely, I aim to provide the initial building blocks for a novel holistic perspective

[1] For thorough reviews of this literature, see Sambanis (2002), Kalyvas (2007), Blattman & Miguel (2010) or Cederman & Vogt (2017).

on the distinct effects of civil war at divergent stages of the conflict process, focusing on their impact at three conflict phases. First, with a focus on the wartime period, I trace the political consequences of insurgent strength vis-á-vis regime structures. At the conflict termination stage, in a paper co-authored with Juan Masullo, we study the impact of violence against civilians by different armed groups on preferences over peace. And finally, I analyze the effect of the spatial distribution of territorial control and rebel governance on the allocation of state capacity measures in the aftermath of conflict. Therefore, this thesis aims to develop novel theoretical arguments on the political effects of conflict and deepen into under-explored insights on the dynamic relation between insurgent groups, civilians and economic and political elites.

The combination of all these pieces of research bring together a fundamental change of approach towards our analysis of internal armed conflicts, showing that current studies disregard four fundamental features of civil wars: the understanding of internal armed conflicts as processes that unfold across multiple and discrete stages (Jones & Metzger 2018); the inter-relation of civil wars with other contentious events, such as coups d'etat, which manifest the need for the development of an integrated agenda on political violence (Staniland 2020); the importance of engaging in the dissagregation of conflict actors in order to study the heterogeneous effects of civil war dynamics (Lyall et al. 2013); and the need to trace the impact of conflict dynamics beyond an exclusive focus on exposure to violence against civilians, focusing for example, on the post-conflict effects of the establishment of rebel governance institutions (Huang 2016). In other words, throughout the dissertation, I bring to the front the necessity of building a more comprehensive approach to our understanding of civil war processes, but more particularly, of the social and institutional effects of a variety of civil war dynamics at distinct conflict stages.

For doing this, this thesis relies on a regional focus in Latin America insurgencies created during the Cold War period (1955-1991). Concretely, two types of analyses are included in this dissertation. On the one hand, a large-n cross-national analysis

on the determinants of coups d'etat in the midst of civil wars, which take advantage of the development of a novel dataset of revolutionary armed organizations in Latin America. And on the other hand, two sub-national studies on the impact of the dynamics of civil wars of two of the most relevant internal armed conflicts in the region, that between the FARC and the Colombian government (1964-2016) and the Sendero Luminoso rebellion (1980-1992) in Perú. Using fine-grained municipal data on violence against civilians and patterns of territorial control, these studies trace civilian attitudes towards peace and the allocation of state capacity measures in the aftermath of conflict.

This dissertation is divided in six chapters. First, this introductory chapter, where I present a brief review of the literature on civil war studies; then I turn into the contributions, the research design, the case selection and the scope conditions; and I end up discussing the plan for the rest of the dissertation. Second, a chapter reviewing the main literatures to which this dissertation aims to contribute, making a brief analysis of the macro and micro-level literatures of civil war studies, and the one on Latin American guerrilla wars. The third chapter presents the first paper of the thesis, which aims to disentangle the potential impact of patterns of insurgent strength and intra-elite competition on the dynamics of coups d'etat processes. Fourthly, the second paper of the dissertation presents an article co-authored with Juan Masullo (Leiden University) which delves into the determinants of civilians preferences towards peace agreements, focusing on the role of exposure to violence during wartime. The fifth chapter analyses the impact of the spatial distribution of wartime territorial control and rebel governance in the Peruvian civil war on postwar levels of state capacity. And Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main findings and proposing new avenues for further research and policy implications.

1.1 Three Essays on the Effects of Civil War Dynamics in Latin America

This dissertation is comprised of three papers, which explore distinct effects of civil war dynamics at different stages of conflict in the regional framework of Latin America. The three papers and their corresponding abstracts are as follows:

Paper 1: "*Common Enemies? Coups, Insurgent Strength and Intra-Elite Competition: Evidence from Latin America*".

Abstract: What is the inter-relation between coups d'etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes, however, has been surprisingly unexplored. Building upon different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others not. I show that the occurrence of coups during civil wars is directly related to two factors: patterns of elite unity and the level of strength of rebel groups. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts in the midst of internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and certain coalition insiders, interpret this situation as an unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions materialized in coups against regime structures. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on revolutionary insurgencies in Latin America formed in the Cold War era (1955-1991) and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d'etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.

Paper 2: "*Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Toward Peace: Evidence from the 2016 Colombian Referendum*" (with Juan Masullo).

Abstract: Does exposure to violence affect attitudes toward peace? Civilians living in war zones see peace agreements as an opportunity to improve their security prospects. However, in multiparty conflicts, this does not automatically translate into support for peace. Support hinges on the interplay between which faction has victimized civilians in the past and which faction is sitting at the negotiation table. If civilians have been victimized by the group that is involved in the peace agreement, they will be likely to support peace. On the contrary, if they have been victimized by another faction, they will be likely to refrain from supporting peace if they believe that this can trigger retaliatory violence against them. This article explores this argument empirically in the context of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC; both quantitative and qualitative data yield support to the study's theoretical expectations.

Paper 3: "*The Incursion of Leviathan: Wartime Territorial Control and Post-Conflict State Capacity, Evidence from Perú*".

Abstract: How do civil wars affect state-building decisions in the aftermath of conflict? Unlike prior studies which have linked civil wars to an undermining of state capacity, this paper shows that conflict can be an effective way of promoting investment in state-building measures. I argue that, in the post-conflict period, the state focuses its state capacity efforts to areas in which state power has eroded during wartime, with the goal of avoiding future insurgent threats. Using the Peruvian civil war (1980-1992) as the case of study, and relying on spatial model estimators, I show that districts contested and under rebel control during wartime received higher levels of state capacity measures than areas controlled by the government. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the inter-relation between state

capacity and civil war dynamics, showing how the end of internal armed conflicts can bring improved levels of state capacity to wartime areas.

1.2 What Do We Know About Civil Wars?

The last two decades have witnessed the expansion of a burgeoning literature on the systematic analysis of civil wars, which has widen our understanding of the set of characteristics and dynamics of internal armed conflicts. Not only plenty of theories analyse the factors leading to civil war onset or termination, but there has also been a considerable advancement on the analysis of a wide range of micro-level dynamics of war, including violence against civilians, civilian recruitment or insurgent governance. Moreover, an emerging area of research on the legacies of war has delved into the profoundly disruptive social, economic and political effects of internal armed conflicts. However, our understanding of civil wars remains deficient due to the inherent fragmented nature of the set of studies in this area of research.

While other contentious processes focused the attention of scholars until the late 1990s, such as interstate wars (Fearon 1995) or revolutions (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979), a novel literature on the study of civil wars processes emerged in the early 2000s. This literature, which initially was sparked by the interest to understand the eruption of internal armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War, provided a fruitful avenue for the systematic collection of comparative evidence, particularly, on the determinants of conflict onset. This macro-level research program has been the most prominent approach delved into the understanding of crucial stages of civil war processes. Most of this research has approached the question of what explains the outbreak of civil war from a structural perspective. In the search for the macro-level correlates of civil war onset, the literature has proposed competing and compelling arguments on the effect of a wide set of factors, but most prominently, on the role of greed (Collier & Hoeffler 2004), grievances (Cederman et al. 2013) and state weakness (Fearon & Laitin 2003). While these studies have widely informed policy interventions and have produced path-breaking advancements, recent research has

questioned the ability of these studies to explain *how* civil war begins, as well as the large variation in the types of civil war onsets.[2] Moreover, this research program is also criticized by not being able to capture the micro-level foundations of internal armed conflicts and by its incapacity to explain the subnational dynamics of war.

In order to deal with some of these limitations, a novel program shifted away from structural arguments and moved towards subnational levels of analysis, focusing on a wide variety of micro-dynamics of civil war. Concretely, this innovative agenda has delved into sophisticated and fine-grained explanations on the determinants of violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; Balcells 2017); rebel governance (Arjona 2016); insurgent alliances and fragmentation (Chirstia 2012; Woldemariam 2018); civilian displacement and resistance (Steele 2017; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2020; Schubiger 2020); or rebel internal organization (Staniland 2014; Hoover-Green 2018). Despite the new literature on the micro-level dynamics of civil wars addresses some of the problems of the macro-level research program, including improvements in data quality, higher levels of internal validity or the testing of causal pathways, it still suffers from severe limitations (Kalyvas 2008; Balcells & Justino 2014). Concretely, this agenda has been unable to explain how the wide set of micro-dynamics of war could have an impact on macro-level socio-political processes: without a proper analysis of how micro-level dynamics affect macro-level conditions, and vice versa, our understanding of civil wars remains limited. Moreover, the move towards case-studies led by this agenda has achieved the high level of internal validity and empirical granularity lacking in large-n cross-national studies, but at the cost of sacrificing the external validity of the micro-level arguments.

Therefore, and despite the important advancements made in our understanding of civil wars, these research programs have reached a certain impasse in our explanations

[2]For example, Lewis (2020) argues that most cross-national research on civil war onset is biased, due to a systematic inability to trace a wide number of groups that never make it into the existent civil war datasets. She shows that this selection issue creates confusion between the correlates of initial violence and the correlates of conflict escalation.

of internal armed conflicts. Six main limitations persist. First, an erroneous assumption of unit homogeneity. Most studies, specially those using a macro-level approach, have disregarded the variety of forms that internal armed conflicts adopt (Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2007; Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). As argued by Tarrow (2007: 596): "Civil wars vary enormously: some are strongly ideologically driven, and others seem to center on resource predation; some are ethnically structured, while others seem to cross ethnic lines; and some seek separate fates for their supporters while others fight over control of central states. If there is a master model of civil wars, we still do not know what it is." Only a scarce set of studies building typologies of civil wars have delved into the distinct features of internal armed conflicts (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010; Kaldor 1999; Sambanis 2001). This caveat has important consequences in our understanding of conflict processes. As we show together with Stathis Kalyvas and Benoit Siberdt in a recent paper (Kalyvas et al. 2021), some of the implications deriving from two of the main articles on civil war onset were based on their use of different subsamples of war: while Collier & Hoeffler (2004) were relying on conflicts taking place in bottom-billion countries characterized by high intensity onsets and abundance of natural resources, Fearon & Laitin (2003) relied on irregular wars taking place in peripheral regions and shaped by their low intensity onsets. This type of finding lead us to to be cautious about the over-generalizability of the findings promoted by the macro-level research program. Future research should take this task seriously and develop comprehensive theories for distinct types of war in order to provide systematic evidence on their similarities and differences with other types of internal armed conflicts. The inclusion of stringent scope conditions is therefore of fundamental importance both for the macro-level and the micro-level research agendas.

A second problem is related to the lack of analysis of the systematic inter-relation between different types of contentious actions. Civil wars are not isolated events, but the trajectories of insurgent groups are directly related to the structural context and are shaped by related socio-political processes, such as mass mobilization,

state repression or coups d'etat (Tarrow 2007; Staniland 2020).[3] A careful look at available historical evidence supports this complex reality. Future research should build on the advice given by Sambanis (2004:267): "This question is related to whether we want civil wars to become a subspecialty distinct from other forms of mass violence and from nonviolent forms of contention. It was a step in the right direction to distinguish civil wars from other forms of civil strife. But unless we are careful to map their relations to social movements and other forms of contention, this new tradition will risk becoming a specialty that guards its borders and ignores findings from research on adjoining forms of contention. This means that we should try to embed our studies of civil wars in the larger episodes of contention from which they emerge and to which they may eventually give way."

A third problem relates to the lack of convergence across the different macro and micro level research programs. Following the over-compartmentalization of civil war studies within the literature on contentious politics, a similar process in the civil war research program is also pervading a more holistic understanding of conflict. Currently, the macro and micro level research agendas develop separate research trajectories, having the micro-level agenda focused on overly-specialized dynamics of war, while the macro-level program disregards the findings and fine-grained evidence developed by this new approach to the understanding of armed conflict. As stated by Balcells & Justino (2014:1346): "Establishing a theoretical link between macro-level political processes and local conflict dynamics is [...] crucial for gaining a better understanding of key outcomes such as the outbreak, duration, and eventual cessation of violent conflict." In a similar vein, Cederman & Vogt (2017:2008) urge researchers to bridge across these distinct research programs: "In the future, conflict scholars will have to steer a middle course between over-generalized macro models and myopic micro investigations. Such a pragmatic approach would narrow the existing gap between quantitative civil war research and the policy community." In

[3]This problematic feature pervades not only the civil war literature, but more broadly, the literature on contentious politics.

sum, we currently lack comprehensive approaches to the study of civil wars that bring together the findings from these distinct research programs.

Fourthly, current research on civil war processes suffers from a lack of clarity and testing on causal mechanisms. A clear example of this is the wide literature on the correlates of civil war onset. Cross-national analyses on global samples of civil war are mainly useful for the understanding of why some conflicts are more prone to the risk of civil war initiation than others. However, the identification of theoretically grounded causal mechanisms has been beyond the scope of this area of research (Sambanis 2004). In the search of causally identified effects of structural variables, they have underspecified the set of potential pathways by which civil war onset is related to a broad set of independent variables. Indeed, and as portrayed by Kalyvas (2007), several competing and observationally equivalent mechanisms might explain the correlation between two set of variables.[4] Mapping the potential pathways through which variables are linked between each other requires a combination of macro and micro level approaches that has not yet been addressed in the civil war literature. Moreover, capturing the inherent dynamic nature of conflict processes will prove to be fundamental for a clear understanding of how a wide range factors have distinct impact at different civil war stages. Specifying the causal mechanisms at different points in time is a fundamental step-forward that is required to broaden our understanding of internal armed conflicts.

Fifth, the current trend in the literature towards causal identification techniques brings with it a stringent armour where there is no place for thorough analysis of the enormously complex and fluid character of civil wars. While current approaches aim to eliminate the endogenous nature of war, evidence from case-studies and rich empirical research show that disregarding these factors provide a patchy image

[4]For example, Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that weak states are more prone to suffer civil war than stronger states. A wide range of mechanisms might explain this finding, including ineffective counter-insurgent practices (Valentino et al. 2004), long-standing unaddressed material demands (Cederman et al. 2013) or reduced intelligence capacity due to lack of access to peripheral areas (Lewis 2020).

of what are wars and what occurs in the midst of them. Civil wars are highly endogenous and fluid processes (Wood 2003; Kalyvas 2006): the combination of exposure to violence, novel political authorities, or the militarization of the local space reshape existent social orders; transform the norms and expectations of civilians and other social actors at the local level; create new identities; and radically reconfigure existent patterns of relations between actors. However, researchers have delved into the simplicity and parsimony of searching for fundamental master causal variables that explain not only the variety of civil wars, but such a contingent and complex event as civil war eruption. The main problem is that this tendency obscures the sophisticated and intricate nature of civil wars processes. As stated by Marks (2020:6): "The problem with narrowing standards of causal inference in conflict research, while ignoring the dynamic and relational features of conflict processes, is that political scientists think they are looking at timber grids, when in fact, we are looking at fungal patches." As research on conflict has been shown to be heavily consequential with regards to policy-choices (Collier & Sambanis 2005), it does not seem accurate nor self-sufficient to disregard the complexity of such transformative processes as civil wars are for the sake of methodological reasons or theoretical elegance.[5]

Finally, and more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, civil war scholars have emphasized the focus on a diverse set of single stages of conflict (Diehl 2006). Through a static view of civil wars, they have neglected the inherent fluid, dynamic and constantly evolving nature of internal armed conflicts. This emphasis on static one-shot views of conflict stages, mainly on the correlates of conflict onset, escalation or termination, provides flawed assumptions about the evolution of internal armed conflicts, as the correlates of civil war initiation might

[5]Cederman & Vogt (2017:2008) also caution about the limitations prompted by an over-focus on the use of causal identification techniques: "The current tendency to focus on only those research designs that allow for clever inferential solutions could deflect attention from the most important drivers of conflict, especially at the level of national-level dynamics and governmental policies that defy experimental manipulation. Likewise, the quest for exogeneity promises to improve causal identification but could at the same time shift research away from important, fast-changing, and inherently endogenous processes."

not be the same as those leading to conflict escalation, de-escalation or termination. The lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework providing contextual conditions to the evolution of civil war is unfortunate as it does not allow the understanding of civil wars as dynamic and self-evolving processes over time.[6]

The existence of these limitations portrays the vigorosity of the civil war research agenda. Many promising avenues for scholarly inquiry show the vibrancy of one of the areas in the social sciences that has developed more fastly in the last two decades. Building upon the conception of civil wars as heterogenous and dynamic processes, together with the reliance on novel methods such as process tracing, while approaching these questions from a comparative perspective, would embark the civil war field into a novel and more fruitful research path.

1.3 Contributions

This thesis does not deal individually with each of these caveats. Indeed, it incurs in some of the core limitations described above for the prominent literature on civil war studies: it is incapable of establishing adequate analytical and theoretical links between the macro-level and micro-level research programs; it only partially covers the tracing of clarity and testing on the set of mechanisms explaining causal relations through a mixed-methods approach; and it does not comprehensively capture the endogenous and fluid nature of internal armed conflicts. However, the articles included in this dissertation aim to provide partial advancements to some of the most problematic features of this literature. Concretely, this thesis provides four fundamental contributions. First, it develops an innovative analytical approach

[6]The neglection of the dynamism of civil wars is surprising, especially given the acknowledgement of the complexity of various social and political processes in some of the most influential work on comparative politics. Different strands of literature highly related to civil wars studies have tried to understand different outcomes as dynamic processes. This includes the literatures on contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001); revolutions (Brinton 1938; Barrie 2019); inter-state wars (Senese & Vasquez 2008); conflict resolution (Hampson 1996; Hopmann 1996; Walter 2002; Findley 2012); or state repression (Shellman 2006). As argued by Tilly (1985:1): "Since collective action is dynamic, and since its outcomes depend very strongly on the course of interaction, static models that simply match behavior to group characteristics or outcome to group behavior represent the entire process poorly."

that delves into the dynamic nature of conflict from a comprehensive perspective, capturing the evolution of civil wars from the onset until the post-conflict period. Second, it builds against the current isolation between different areas of research in the field of contentious politics, showing the inherent relation between distinct contentious processes. Third, it unpacks the nature of the set of actors operating in internal armed conflicts. And finally, it delves into the effects of civil war dynamics at the regime-level structure, both during conflict and in the aftermath of war. The combination of all these contributions on the trajectories and effects of insurgent activities in Latin America provides an original and innovative approach that captures the fluid nature of internal armed conflicts from a novel perspective, with a focus on the effects of civil war at distinct phases of the conflict process.

1.3.1 A Processual Approach to Civil War

One of the core contributions of this dissertation is the development of a novel conceptual framework that advances our understanding of civil wars as dynamic processes with a distinct set of stages. This thesis build upon the conception of civil wars developed by Kalyvas (2006), which counters most of the macro-level, deterministic and path-dependent structural research on internal armed conflicts. Concretely, and despite the explicit acknowledgement of the causal complexity of civil wars presents plenty of theoretical and methodological challenges, this conception supports the idea that the multiplicity of mechanisms, interactive relations, endogenous effects, and the various pathways and outcomes circumscribed to most civil wars, follow systematic trajectories that allow us to understand the evolution of civil wars in patterned ways. In other words, the causal complexity of civil wars should not drive researchers away from a thorough understanding of the black-box of conflict processes, but there is a need of embracing and recognizing this complexity as an opportunity to conceptualize civil wars as processes that present substantial empirical regularities.

Therefore, the analytical framework of this thesis relies on an ontological perspective that characterizes civil wars as highly fluid and dynamic processes (Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Tarrow 2007). I attempt to provide a more holistic understanding of civil wars as processes with distinct characteristics, configurations and features at diverse conflict phases. To put it simply, unlike previous macro-level studies that have studied single phases from a static point of view, including war onset (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Ross 2004; Hegre & Sambanis 2006; Thies 2010; Cederman et al. 2013; Young 2013), escalation (Della Porta 1995; Davenport et al. 2006; Webster 2018) or termination (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Kreutz 2010; Joshi & Quinn 2020), I rely on a characterization of civil wars as processes that unfold across different stages (Jones & Metzger 2018). The integration of distinct civil war phases into a comprehensive analytical approach allows the analysis of civil wars as coherent processes from onset to termination and facilitates a more careful assessment of the dynamics, trajectories and outcomes of insurgent groups. While a thorough understanding of the systematic trajectories of distinct war types and the factors explaining transition across different conflict phases falls beyond the scope of this doctoral dissertation, this thesis aims to partially facilitate the development of this endeavor with a particular emphasis on the understanding of the political effects of civil war dynamics at distinct conflict stages.

As shown in Figure 1.1, I differentiate according to three distinct temporal periods: pre-war, conflict and post-conflict phases. Moreover, within the *conflict* time-frame, I develop three broadly encompassing categories capturing different moments of the trajectory of rebel groups, considering the relative level of insurgent strength vis-à-vis the state. Concretely, I differentiate between the stages of (1) Minor Force; (2) Break Out; and (3) Dual Power. This conceptual framework builds upon the understanding of the different stages characterizing the ideal evolution of irregular wars as developed by a variety of guerrilla theorists, including




Figure 1.1: Ideal phases and stages of irregular conflict.

Mao Tse-Tung (1937), Ernesto Che Guevara (1967) or Vo Nguyen Giap (1970).[7] While these authors developed these frameworks with the aim of influencing the political and military actions of an entire generation of rebels, I rely on an inductive approach based on fine-grained evidence on the historical trajectories of contemporary insurgencies that captures the fluid nature of internal armed conflicts since the inception of rebel groups until the end of their armed actions. The goal is to reduce the staggering complexity of civil wars into a manageable set of phases and stages, reflecting the distinct pathways and the varying trajectories characterizing the lifecycles of insurgent groups.

Albeit this categorization of conflict might lead to profound descriptive novel explanations on the factors explaining subsequent transitions, it is of paramount importance as well to deepen in the interrelation across conflict phases and stages, as they could potentially be connected in non-obvious ways. One underlying assumption of macro-level research in conflict studies is that the different stages of conflict are independent from one another (Diehl 2006): onset is a separate analytical category that does not influence conflict escalation or war termination. Deviating from this independence assumption, close scrutiny to evidence from various case-studies

[7] Of special importance as well is the work by McColl (1969), who delves into the relevance of territorial control in each of these phases.

shows that this is empirically inaccurate, as "what happens in one stage of conflict has downstream consequences in a later stage" (Diehl 2006:198).[8] This sequential approach to conflict processes draws upon the concept of path dependence, which in its broad categorization entails "that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time" (Sewell 1996:262-263), portraying "the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence" (Pierson 2000:252).[9] This type of approach facilitates the analysis of relationships between temporally sequenced phases and stages, which are fundamental for the analysis of path-dependent processes of change (Mahoney 2000).

However, and despite the promises of a research program focused on the understanding of the dynamic evolution of civil wars (Shesterinina 2021), this thesis only partially address some of the potential research venues prompted by this novel understanding of conflict processes. I particularly analyze the political effects of a variety of civil war dynamics at distinct stages and phases of conflict. Concretely, I focus on three periods. First, I trace the determinants of coup attempts during *ongoing* civil wars, showing how mid-levels of insurgent strength under conditions of overt intra-elite competition, facilitate the cooperation across distinct elite groups for the formation of alternative regime coalitions that promote the development of novel socio-political and economic projects. The second paper is instead focused on the temporal period right before the potential termination of civil wars. I particularly focus on the temporal frame covering the development and approval of peace agreements, showing how the dynamics of conflict before the beginning of peace negotiations could have a direct impact on individual preferences towards peace and on the implementation of the peace agreement. Finally, in the

[8]Supporting this contention, recent research has shown that the onset of war is an accurate predictor of how conflicts unfold (Kalyvas et al. 2021).

[9]There has been an enormous strand of research focused on path dependence. On the one hand, we can find a wide literature on the conceptualization and analysis of path dependence (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000; Page 2006; Freeman & Jackson 2012). And on the other hand, a lot of researchers have used path dependence as an analytical tool for explaining a broad set of complex outcomes, but more prominently, economic development (Acemoglu, Robinson & Johnson 2001; Nunn 2008). A few studies have also used this concept for explaining dynamics of violence and conflict (Sánchez-Cuenca 2019).

third paper, I trace the inter-relation between wartime dynamics and subsequent patterns of state capacity at the local level in the aftermath of conflict. Using the case of Perú and Sendero Luminoso, I show how, even after 15 years after the end of the conflict, state decisions seem to remain shaped by the dynamics experienced throughout the conflict.

However, this dissertation keeps unaddressed four core features. First, it lacks fine-grained explanations on the variety of political effects of civil war dynamics at the *onset* period. Second, it does not trace the factors explaining transition across each of the conflict stages, which would suppose a fundamental contribution to the understanding of civil wars from a comprehensive perspective. The analysis of the political and military factors that explains the evolution of conflict, both from the rebels and incumbents' perspective, would facilitate the understanding of the core features explaining processes of conflict escalation and de-escalation. A third element unaddressed in this dissertation are the potential linkages between pre-war and conflict phases, as a considerable strand of research portrays the fundamental role that the pre-war structural conditions and leaders' decisions prior to the onset of the war play in the subsequent dynamics of conflict (Weinstein 2006; Blaxland 2020). Finally, further research should engage in the analysis of how the concrete configurations of initial war phases could shape the dynamics and nature of a variety of social and political processes in the post-conflict period.

1.3.2 Integrated Agenda on Political Violence

As stated before, one of the key limitations in the conflict literature is the analysis of civil wars as isolated events from broader political processes. The over-compartmentalization of different research areas leads to unfruitful and unfortunate conclusions on the dynamics of political violence. However, as shown by Kalyvas (2019:1): "the boundaries that separate the different subfields are insufficiently porous, poorly demarcated, constantly contested, and often policed with zeal by armies of experts who, nevertheless, seek to expand them at the expense of

neighboring subfields." In this dissertation, I posit that a necessary step for a more holistic understanding of processes of political violence is to broaden the scope under study and link the dynamics and evolution of civil wars to other types of political violence and contentious events, concentrating into their inter-relations. Plenty of historical evidence points against the common isolation between research agendas in the field of political violence: civil wars can directly erupt from social movements (Cederman et al. 2013; Della Porta et al. 2017); state repression can be one of the drivers leading civilians to join insurgent armed forces (Wood 2003); civil wars might be directly interlinked with dynamics of organized crime (Kalyvas 2015); or the decline of protest cycles could explain the creation of urban clandestine armed groups (Della Porta & Tarrow 1984; Della Porta 1995; De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2020). I build upon the calls for the need of integration of distinct processes of political violence (Kalyvas 2019; Staniland 2020; Balcells 2015; Davenport 2013), aiming to provide a more comprehensive approach to the study of societal dynamics and interactions across distinct processes of political violence. Despite this existent gap in the literature, few systematic efforts have been made yet in this direction. The best example of this was the work of McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly (2001), who in their path-breaking study on the dynamics of contentious politics showed the common recurrence of different types of mechanisms under distinct dissent activities. Much more remains to be done if we aim to develop a more integrative view on processes of political violence.

In this dissertation, I focus on one of these interactions. Concretely, I delve into the inherent relation between civil war and coups d'etat. As described by Bell & Sudduth (2017:1443), between 1990-2010, 3 out of 4 states that suffered a coup in this period also experienced civil war. Indeed, since the end of WWII, 25% of coups occurred in the midst of civil wars. Despite this important connection, we still lack a clear understanding of what are the factors leading to coups in the midst of internal armed conflicts. What are the mechanisms explaining coup attempts during civil wars? How do distinct civil war dynamics affect the stability

of political regimes? Does the strength of insurgent groups influence intra-elite dynamics at the regime level? The few studies on the relation between coups and civil wars (Roessler 2016; Bell & Sudduth 2017; Thyne 2017) have left these questions unanswered, despite their fundamental importance for the understanding of processes of political violence from an integrated viewpoint.

1.3.3 Actor Dissagregation

A third contribution of this dissertation challenges one of the most prevalent assumptions in the literature on conflict studies, which is related to the ontological basis of the main contenders taking part in internal armed conflicts: the unitary nature of rebels and the state (Kalyvas 2006:10). On the one hand, insurgent groups have been widely conceived as unified and coherent organizations that operate under a single, centralized leadership. In contrast to this view, recent research has started to show that the nature of rebel groups could be heterogeneous and is indeed endogenous to the evolution of war. A rebel group propensity for fragmentation has been found to be linked to factors such as external support (Tamm 2016), state accommodation and repression (Seymour, Cunningham & Bakke 2016; Fjelde & Nilsson 2018), internal cohesion and leadership divisions (Kenny 2010; Staniland 2014, Mosinger 2017) or battlefield outcomes (Woldemariam 2018).

However, on the other hand, the unitary nature of state forces has remained undisputed: state and security forces operate under a single chain of command towards the common goal of promoting the preservation of existent regime structures. Building upon the recent developments of social conflict theory (Ansell & Samuels 2014; Albertus 2015), I argue that the state could be analytically described as a volatile and dynamic institution where the ruling power coalitions are constantly updated on the basis of existing contextual conditions, and where the capacity for forging alliances across the interests of different social forces is contingent to the existent distribution of power across political actors. The presence of a viable armed force challenging the main attributes of regime structures opens

the way for changes in the distribution of power. Concretely, the presence of an insurgent group with rising levels of strength increases the incentives for regime overthrow or regime re-shuffle in the face of elite-competition.[10] More concretely, I focus on the interactive relation between the relevant set of actors operating in internal armed conflicts, including insurgents, incumbents and economic and political elites. Most of the existent studies on civil war overlook the role of other actors beyond the state and insurgents, providing a partial and incomplete view of how processes of political violence evolve.

This elite-focused approach is novel in the understanding of civil war processes and makes two different contributions to this literature. First, unlike previous research, it delves into the heterogeneous nature of priorly conceptualized cohesive entities, showing that conflicts over the distribution of political and economic power are inherent to the existence of state structures. And second, I trace an understudied mechanism for explaining regime transitions, such as insurgent violence within a broader landscape of subversion and dissent. Most prior research has suffered from a lack of conceptual clarity, merging together activities with divergent effects, such as terrorism, labour strikes, rebel group activities or protests. Aiming to unpack the divergent effects of these broad set of actions also provides a nuanced approach to the dynamic effects of violence at the state-level.

But this analysis on actor dissaggregation also affects the study of other civil war dynamics. More concretely, most of the works on the political legacies of exposure

[10]The heterogeneous character of preferences of the different groups aiming to influence the actions of the state has been widely embraced in other areas of research beyond the civil war literature. For example, Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) argue that "Regimes are not monolithic, and internal, institutional considerations can affect their use of force. States are comprised of decision makers and implementers with varying preferences, and decisions regarding whether and how to repress can be heavily influenced by their internal relationships." In a similar vein, Chenoweth et al. (2017:1960) show that: "One of the core propositions among nonviolent resistance scholars is that the loyalty of regime agents to the regime leadership is impermanent and always vulnerable to pressure from below. The primary mechanism through which nonviolent resistance works is by constraining the options of the regime leadership in implementing abusive or unjust policies by dividing it from its sources of power—the military, security forces, business and economic elites, the judiciary, the civilian bureaucracy, and others."

to violence tend to disregard the identity of the perpetrating actor. In other words, there is an implicit assumption of the homogeneous effects of exposure to violence. While plenty of studies have aimed to unpack the impact of violent events on a wide variety of political outcomes, such as level of political participation (Blattman 2009), pro-social cooperation (Bauer et al. 2016) or political identities (Balcells 2012; Villamil 2020), few studies have delved into the heterogeneous nature of violence based on the perpetrators' identity (Lyall 2010; Lupu & Wallace 2019). Moreover, prevailing analyses on civil war processes tend to neglect the presence of other non-state armed groups beyond insurgents and state security forces.[11]

As an attempt to provide a more comprehensive perspective, together with Juan Masullo, we argue that the subsequent dissaggregation of perpetrators identity show the heterogeneous effects of civil war dynamics, and more concretely, of exposure to wartime violence. The asymmetrical effects of violence on individual attitudes directly derive from civilians' expectations on the potential for violence engagement by actors priorly operating in their territories. In the quest for maximizing their security, civilians adopt distinct preferences over peace agreements in multiparty civil wars based on the exposure to violence from distinct armed groups and their potential for engagement in violent actions and retaliation activities.

This approach towards the dissagregation of actors provides a more nuanced understanding of the effects of civil wars and develops evidence pointing towards the heterogeneous and complex nature of internal armed conflicts. A more complete view of civil war processes should include the entire set of actors whose actions are directly or indirectly affected by the dynamics of conflict. Moreover, further analyses capturing the asymmetrical effects of armed groups with distinct ideologies, tactics, goals and repertoires of actions would open promising avenues of research.

[11] This approach has been recently challenged by the few set of studies made on militias and paramilitaries groups (Jentzsch et al. 2015), as well as self-defense forces (Schubigger 2020).

1.3.4 Bringing the State Back In

Finally, the fourth contribution of this dissertation aims to bring the state back in into the study of civil wars. Even though pioneering work put state structures at the centre of the analysis (Fearon & Laitin 2003), these studies approached the role of the state in an excessively narrow manner, focusing particularly on the impact of state capacity on the prevention of civil war onset. The theoretical underpinnings of these studies were clear: states with low levels of state capacity were more prone to suffer the initiation of internal armed conflicts than countries with higher capacity. This probabilistic argument only touched upon the surface on the role that state structures and state security forces play during different phases of civil war processes. The "feasibility approach" to conflict onset (Lewis 2020) provided an overly structural argument on the role of the state, overlooking the internal dynamics of regime structures and how they are inherently affected by the evolution of civil wars. In a similar vein, the more recent and burgeoning micro-level research agenda on the study of conflict has largely overlooked the role of state actions in the fluid process of civil war. Most of the main studies in this area of research have delved into a fine-grained understanding of a wide variety of dynamics of insurgent groups during civil war, including rebel insurgent organization (Weinstein 2006; Staniland 2014), rebel governance institutions (Mampilly 2012, Arjona 2016) or patterns of mobilization and recruitment (Petersen 2001). However, they have neglected the role of the state as a pivotal actor whose actions and decisions are capable of setting the conflict into distinct trajectories, while at the same time disregarding the interactive relation between insurgents and state forces.[12]

In this dissertation, I focus on two different factors related to the dynamics of the state as a distinct actor during civil war and in the aftermath of conflict. First, focusing on the endogenous and interactive relation between insurgents,

[12]Wood (2003), Kalyvas (2006), De la Calle (2015) and Daly (2016) are among the most important exceptions.

state forces and elite groups. And second, through the analysis of the strategic distribution of state capacity.

Regarding the former, I deepen into the heterogeneous set of actors aiming to maximize its level of political power in the midst of war. This broader view on the set of actors whose actions are directly influenced by the dynamics of internal armed conflicts helps to provide a more nuanced understanding on the interactive relations between insurgent groups, state forces and elites aiming to maximize their political power, because in its essence, civil wars are just "one manifestation of a set of broader struggles for power among individuals and organizations" (Staniland 2020:30). Expanding the set of actors whose actions are influenced by civil war dynamics helps in the development of a more integrative perspective on the distinct trajectories, rationales and factors behind the varying pathways of insurgent groups in internal armed conflicts.

Regarding the latter, and as described above, the weak state research paradigm posits the importance of developing strong bureaucratic and administrative structures in order to avoid the creation of insurgent groups in peripheral areas (Fearon & Laitin 2003). The expansion of state structures at the subnational level facilitates the coordination of intelligence efforts, leading up to higher constraints in the formation of insurgent groups (Lewis 2020). While most of the focus of this literature has been related to factors explaining civil war onset, due to its policy implications, less research has been made on the relation between conflict and state capacity in the aftermath of conflict. The few studies made on this area research point into a similar direction: civil wars are destructive political and military processes that hinder state capacity and economic development (Besley & Person 2008). Contrary to this view, I posit that civil wars could be an effective way of promoting the expansion of the state at a subnational level in the aftermath of conflict, as states aim to avoid the creation of new insurgent groups after the demise of an insurgency challenging its monopoly on the use of force. After the end of the war, states strategically

target with state capacity measures areas that were under rebel control or contested during conflict. This finding provide important insights into the under-studied relation between conflict and state capacity after the demise of insurgent forces, challenging the consensus on the destructive effects of civil war.

This focus on under-studied dimensions of incumbent actions provide novel evidence on the evolution of civil wars, including decisions on counter-insurgent actions, repression, intra-elite competition and strategic distributive politics in the aftermath of war. Bringing the state back in into the study of conflict is of fundamental importance. An over-emphasis on the nature, dynamics and characteristics of insurgent groups provides a biased, partial and incorrect understanding of civil wars as holistic processes. In sum, this thesis provides new and important insights to the burgeoning civil war research program, having as well the potential of informing policymakers about conflict processes and their capacity for intervention during war and in the aftermath of conflict.

1.4 Research Design

This dissertation relies on a multi-method design with an empirical focus on Latin America. Two different types of studies could be found in this dissertation. On the one hand, a regional cross-national analysis of Latin American insurgencies, with the goal of unpacking the inter-relation between coups, intra-elite competition and insurgent strength. And on the other hand, two subnational studies focused on Colombia and Perú, whose aim is to trace the impact of violence against civilians and the spatial distribution of territorial control on preferences over peace and subsequent choices over state capacity measures, respectively. In each of these papers I combine the use of rigorous quantitative analysis with a wide range of qualitative methods, including fieldwork evidence, semi-structured interviews and the use of archival material.

1.4.1 Case Selection

Unlike extant research in the civil war literature, which has a clearly demarcated line between a macro-level agenda relying on the use of worldwide samples of civil war, and a micro-level research program mostly focused on the use of individual case-studies, I consider that a fruitful avenue for a more generalizable understanding of civil war processes is to study the dynamics of conflict at a regional level. It is of fundamental importance to focus on this level of analysis as "regions have particular dynamics and political processes that are specific to those regions [...] Different regions may present distinctive and systematic causal patterns that an assumption of worldwide causal homogeneity would obscure" (Mainwaring & Pérez Linan 2013:24).

But what is the rationale behind the focus in the Latin American continent? What can we learn from this region? Since the end of World War II, but more particularly since the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Latin America was a full-fledged laboratory of political violence, and more particularly, of an enormous variety of revolutionary insurgent groups. As it is thoroughly described in Section 1.5 below, the diversity of insurgent strategies and puzzling trajectories of groups sharing common ideologies and patterns of action present a unique opportunity to understand the political effects of distinct war dynamics at different phases of conflict under a common regional framework. The use of Latin America as the main area of study is ideal for testing the political effects of a very concrete type of insurgencies: revolutionary organizations using irregular war and guerrilla tactics as their main warfare strategy. In a comparative perspective, and as shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, Latin American represents the second region in the world with the highest proportion of irregular insurgencies, being as well the continent with the greatest percentage of Marxist armed organizations since 1945.

Furthermore, the puzzling connection across distinct types of contentious processes, and more concretely, between insurgent violence and coups d'etat, makes Latin America an ideal case for testing the inherent dynamics prompting the




Figure 1.2: Distribution across regions of types of civil wars according to their technology of rebellion. Source: Kalyvas & Balcells (2010).




Figure 1.3: Percentage of organizations across regions by revolutionary ideology. Source: Kalyvas & Balcells (2010).




Figure 1.4: Number of coups d'etat attempted during civil wars by region. Source: Bell & Sudduth (2017).

engagement in coup attempts in the midst of internal armed conflicts. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1.4, together with Africa[13], Latin America has been the second continent most widely affected by the connection between internal armed conflict and coups processes. Finally, it is of utter importance to engage in systematic analyses of the varying effects of conflict dynamics in Latin America, as the civil war literature has surprisingly neglected the study of this region from a comparative point of view, being the work of Wickham-Crowley (1992) the single and unique relevant exception to date.

The 2016 Colombian Referendum is used as the main case of study for the second paper of this dissertation. The referendum over the peace agreement between the FARC-EP and the administration of Juan Manuel Santos provides a

[13]The linkages between coups and civil wars in the African region has been thoroughly analyzed by Roessler (2016).

unique opportunity to explore the determinants of support for peace agreements in multiparty civil wars. Moreover, the scattered geographic pattern of conflict dynamics at the local level, facilitates the tracing of the potential differential impact of divergent experiences of violence. The Colombian civil war serves as well as a "rich comparative laboratory in which to seek answers" (Daly 2016:1) to the complex nature of contemporary civil wars. The presence of a wide variety of insurgent groups and paramilitary organizations, coupled with the fact that only one of these factions was sitting at the negotiation table, make the Colombian civil war the ideal case for testing a theory of the divergent impact of wartime violence on support for peace agreement, facilitating the distinction of conflict events according to the identity of the perpetrator. Despite the unique characteristics of the Colombian conflict (high number of rebel organizations, the strength of paramilitary groups, or the long duration of the conflict), it becomes a fundamental case for understanding processes of transition into peace, and more particularly, for protracted irregular wars. Concretely, the findings from this study would find applicability in other conflicts, such as the Naxalite-Maoist conflict in India or the NPA revolutionary war in the Philippines.

Finally, the third paper of this dissertation is empirically focused on the Peruvian civil war (1980-1992), where the Maoist insurgency of Sendero Luminoso (SL) was the main rebel organization operating in the country. The Peruvian conflict presents an ideal case for analyzing which factors contribute to state decision making after the end of the war, specially considering the wide levels of territorial control and institutions developed by SL. Despite this conflict represents an anomaly in terms of the high level of civilian and battle-deaths, the dynamics of Sendero Luminoso parallel the trajectory of a wide set of insurgent organizations around the world. More concretely, the levels of territorial expansion and rebel governance development are highly similar to the ones achieved by powerful insurgencies as the FMLN in El Salvador, the LTTE in Sri Lanka or the NPA in the Philippines. This case will therefore be helpful for the understanding of the determinants of postwar state




Figure 1.5: Ideal stages of irregular conflict. This is a recursive and non-linear model showing ideal types of war evolution.

building when incumbents are capable of defeating strong rebel organizations that have emerged as threatful challengers to state power.

1.4.2 Quantitative Analysis

For the cross-national regional analysis, I have developed a novel dataset on Latin American armed groups created during the Cold War period (1955-1991). This dataset, which has been built during almost three years of intense data collection, brings together the complete universe of insurgent groups operating in the region, covering a sample of 80 insurgent groups. The most important task in the development of this dataset is the compilation of information on insurgent strength. As stated above (see Section 1.3.1), I develop three broadly encompassing categories capturing different moments of the trajectory of rebel groups during conflict: (1) Minor Force; (2) Break Out; and (3) Dual Power. I also show the ample variation existent in a wide set of micro-level characteristics defining the military and political capacity of rebel groups, including the presence of political wings, arms quality, rebel diplomacy or insurgent governance, among many others.

In the other two papers, I rely on fine-grained subnational data on the dynamics of civil war on two of the countries mostly affected by internal violence in Latin

America: Colombia and Perú. For the case of Colombia, together with Juan Masullo, we gathered micro-level evidence on the dynamics of the Colombian conflict relying on data coming from the *Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario*. The greatest advantage of this dataset is that it facilitates the testing of the heterogeneous effects of exposure to violence based on the identity of the actor perpetrating violent attacks. This type of data allows us to show the null effects of overall levels of exposure to violence on preferences over peace, while disentangling the assymetric effects of violence engaged by different non-state armed actors. We merge this data with municipal level results from the 2016 Colombian Referendum on the Peace Agreement between the government and the FARC. Through the use of a wide set of quantitative techniques, including ordinary least squares estimators, matching and instrumental variables, we show that the results of the 2016 Colombian Referendum were driven by *who shot the bullets*: while municipalities exposed to FARC violence were more prone to support the Peace Agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government, those exposed to paramilitary violence were more prone to vote negatively on the implementation of the agreement.

For the case of Perú, I gathered micro-level evidence at the municipal level on a wide set of dynamics of the Peruvian conflict as well as on a variety of proxies of state capacity. Regarding the former, I make use of very rich granular data of the dynamics of the war at the municipal level coming from the CVR (2003), including information on the violent killings perpetrated by Sendero Luminoso as well as by state forces. Together with this, I make use of data on the results of local elections held during the conflict (1980-1992) coming from De la Calle (2017), for tracing the impact of the spatial distribution of wartime territorial control and rebel governance. I merge this data with distinct proxies of state capacity measures coming from the Peruvian censuses of 1981, 1993 and 2007, including information on state bureaucrats, access to electricity and secondary school provision. The time-frame of the censuses directly fits the period in which the conflict took place (1980-1992), which allows me to provide strong evidence on the relation between

wartime rebel territorial control and the post-conflict distribution of state capacity at the local level. Through the use of spatial model estimators (spatial lag and spatial error models), I show that, paradoxically, civil wars could be an effective way of promoting state expansion in the aftermath of conflict: the state, in an attempt to avoid the resurgence of insurgent movements, expands its bureaucratic structures and distribute goods and services to areas that remained contested and under insurgent control during wartime.

1.4.3 Qualitative Analysis

Despite quantitative data is useful for uncovering cross-national and sub-national trends, qualitative evidence through in-depth case studies is used in each of the three papers in order to understand and complement the quantitative results. For the cross-national paper on the relation between coups and insurgent strength on Latin America, I rely on a brief case-study of the 1976 military coup in Argentina. I delve into the wide evidence on the dynamics of elite convergence between the military and certain economic elites from the rich secondary literature and digital archival materials on this case. With this evidence, I trace the impact of insurgent actions on the coordination across key military forces, elite outsiders and other actors leading to the 1976 military coup in Argentina.

From a qualitative perspective, the paper on the impact of the Peruvian civil war on post-conflict decisions on state capacity relies on a combination of semi-structured interviews and in-depth analysis of available secondary sources. Between the months of July and October 2020, I held semi-structured online interviews with one former combatant of Sendero Luminoso, three state representatives and the director of one of the key development programs in the country.[14] This evidence is used in the paper to uncover the main mechanism proposed in the theoretical

[14]Ethics approval for these online interviews was granted by the DPIR Departmental Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford in April 2020. Research Ethics Approval reference number: SSH-DPIR-C1A-20-018.

argument, related to the strategic expansion of state power to areas under rebel influence, in order to avoid the resurgence of future insurgent movements.

Finally, the paper on the impact of exposure to violence and preferences over peace in the Colombian referendum is complemented with evidence gathered on a set of fieldwork trips that took place between 2014 and 2019.[15] Through semi-structured interviews and interactions with local civilians and insurgent combatants, we trace the causal mechanism behind the asymmetric effects of exposure to violence from non-state armed groups towards preferences over peace. Evidence from secondary literature, fieldwork testimonies and semi-structured interviews support the mechanism that we propose in our paper: in multiparty civil wars, civilians' preferences over peace are driven by safety-seeking considerations. Civilians exposed to violence from the armed group in the negotiation table will be more likely to support the agreement, as they expect the end of violent actions. However, civilians exposed to violence from another faction will be more likely to vote against it, due to the fear of retaliatory violence against them.

This combination of quantitative and qualitative tools allows me to provide systematic evidence on the theoretical arguments proposed in each of the papers, while facilitating as well an in-depth understanding of the processes leading to the political effects of civil wars studied in this dissertation.

1.4.4 A Novel Dataset on Latin American Insurgencies

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the development of a dataset on Latin American armed groups, covering the set of groups created during the Cold War Period (1955-1991).[16] This dataset presents several novelties that can widen

[15] Field research trips received due approval by ethics committees both at the European University Institute, former institution of Juan Masullo, and the University of Oxford.

[16] This means that the period of active operation of armed groups, and therefore of analysis in this dissertation, does not conclude in 1991. While most of the groups created during the Cold War stopped their operations during the 1990s, a few of them remained operative. A key example of this is FARC. The only armed group in the region created during the Cold War period and still active nowadays is the Colombian ELN.

the knowledge of the field both on the dynamics of armed groups in Latin America as well as on the factors explaining variation in insurgent lifecycles. First, it is the only dataset focused exclusively on the understanding of armed groups in Latin America. Second, it considerably broadens the sample of Latin American armed groups covered in the major datasets on internal armed conflict (Table 1.1). Third, it becomes one of the few cross-national datasets on internal characteristics of rebel groups, improving and expanding the information for Latin American armed groups present in the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013).[17] And fourth, to the best to my knowledge, it is one of the first datasets providing information at a panel-data level on rebel group features in a cross-national dimension, facilitating the understanding of how groups evolve over time, an under-studied feature of insurgencies in the conflict literature.

Table 1.1: Dataset Comparison on Latin American Insurgencies

	COW	**UCDP**	**NSA**	***Kreiman (2021)***
Number of Cases	10	34	29	80
Temporal Coverage	1945-2007	1946-2012	1945-2011	1955-1991
Type of War	Civil Wars	Civil Wars	Civil Wars	Civil Wars

Information on each of the characteristics of the groups has been collected in three ways. First, through the use of the rich and under-exploited secondary literature on Latin American insurgencies. This includes in-depth studies of each armed group, disclosed governmental reports and information coming both from academic sources and from national and international actors, such as NGO's or international organizations. Second, making use of digital archival resources, such as CEDEMA (Centro de Documentación de los Movimientos Armados)[18] or the CIA Freedom of Information Act documents, which facilitate the access to internal documents from guerrilla groups, declassified documents on counterinsurgent operations, as

[17] Partial exceptions to this are the Adaptation, Ideology and Rebellion dataset (McCauley, Ruggeri & Zelina 2021), and the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations dataset (Acosta 2019).

[18] Centre for the Documentation of Armed Groups.

well as government deliberations. And finally, a third source of information has been semi-structured interviews on combatants and members of government. The use of these three sources of data has allowed me to triangulate the information on the dynamics, evolution and characteristics of a wide array of insurgent groups operating in Latin America. This dataset will be submitted as a special data feature to the *Journal of Peace Research* in 2022.[19]

1.5 Latin America: A Continent in Flames

During the Cold War period, a wide variety of violent actors and contentious processes coexisted in Latin America, including military coups, insurrections, guerrilla attacks, strikes, violent demonstrations and revolutions, revealing the profound complexity and array of armed actions present in the region. The enhanced credibility on the possibilities of armed revolutionary success coming from the Cuban revolution, prompted distinct waves of violent conflict in the region. The use of guerrilla-style warfare and insurgent actions emerged in the 1960s as an effective repertoire of contention in the quest for socio-political transformations. An entire generation of young activists with prior experience and involvement in political parties and other political organizations decided to engage in armed actions both in urban and rural areas.[20] The example prompted by the Cuban revolution proved that the achievement of socialist regimes only required the creation of a small

[19]This dataset was initially planned to be complemented through the information collected on a series of expert workshops to be held at All Souls College (Oxford) in 2021 under the "Dynamics of War: Insights from Latin America" (DYNWAR-LATAM) project, made in collaboration with Stathis Kalyvas. The goal was to bring specialized scholars in Latin America and/or conflict studies from Oxford and other internationally renowned universities in order to have four one-day full workshop on the dynamics, evolution and characteristics of insurgent groups in Latin America. However, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the temporary suspension of this project.

[20]As shown by Wickham-Crowley (1992:41), rebel entrepreneurs were people with ample experience in prior political activities, specially political parties: "What is the significance of these deep historical links between political parties and guerrilla movements? Simply this: Guerrilla movements are not best understood as the response of oppressed peoples to government repression, although that was certainly present in several of the cases here. Rather they better fit Theda Skocpol's concept of marginal political elites, heretofore excluded from full power, who turn to revolutionary organizations. Their revolts are the response of part of the intrinsic elite to that exclusion and are an attempt to secure that power through the unorthodox means of a military alliance with the peasantry."

organization of armed revolutionaries in peripheral areas, but the reality would seem more complex than expected.



Figure 1.6: Map of Latin America. Source: United Nations Cartographic Section.

Despite the existence of considerable divergence on this issue[21], most analysts distinguish three different "waves" of guerrilla warfare in Latin America during the Cold War era: (1) the foco period, characterized by the creation of small insurgent groups acting in rural peripheral areas (Guevara 1960; Debray 1967), temporarily

[21]See Bartoletti (2011), Martín Álvarez & Rey Tristán (2012) and Wickham-Crowley (2014).

ranging between the Cuban revolution and the death of Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia ; (2) the urban guerrillas of the late 60s and 70s, mainly concentrated in the South Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil), and which entailed a profound change of tactics, turning the revolutionary actions to the urban cities (Marighella 1969; Guillén 1966); and (3) the prolonged people's war period (1970s-1990s), where insurgents mostly embraced the Maoist theory of guerrilla actions, based on a slow but rising accumulation of power, leading to insurrectionary activities after transitioning across several phases characterized by the combination of military and political actions. Despite several cases do not fit under these analytical scheme, and that certain insurgent groups embodied a combination of these strategies during its existence[22], they adequately reflect the evolution of different types of guerrilla warfare in the region.[23] These patterns show the importance not only of diffusion effects, but also, the capacity for tactical adaptation of insurgent groups to existent structural conditions. Figure 1.7 below shows the temporal boundness of distinct guerrilla strategies across time in Latin America.

1.5.1 The Foco Period

The victory of the Cuban revolutionaries of the Movimiento 26 de Julio (M26-J) in 1959 was the catalyst of a new wave of revolutionary movements in the Latin American region. The key impact of the Cuban revolutionaries was based on the shift in the dogmas existent on the adequate strategies to achieve revolutionary outcomes. The Cuban revolution showed to leftist activists throughout the entire continent that revolution was not a chimera, and that it only required the creation of a small foco group, which would develop the subjective conditions for revolution. Unlike other revolutionary strategies based on the accumulation of forces or the action

[22] A key example of this is the FSLN in Nicaragua, who relied on distinct guerrilla strategies at different phases of the war (May et al. 2018).

[23] Bartoletti (2011:6-7) provides evidence cautioning against the risk of over-generalization of ideal organizational types during each of these waves. For example, she shows how during the 60s, despite being the foquist organization the main type of insurgent strategy adopted by armed revolutionaries in Latin America, groups such as the MIR in Perú or Uturuncos in Argentina, do not perfectly fit the characteristics of the foquist models, as they retain strong links with urban bases and developed networks of support beyond rural areas.




Figure 1.7: Rebel group onset by insurgent strategy. Source: Martín Álvarez & Rey Tristán (2012:18).

of Communist parties in electoral processes, revolution was at hand, and it only required voluntarism: taking up the arms was sufficient to promote revolutionary consciousness and achieve the desired socialist regime.[24] In other words, the available repertoires of action suffered a sudden change.[25] The diffusion of the Cuban model was prompted by the expansion of the writings of Ernesto Che Guevara and Regis Debray[26], as well as by the promotion of insurgent actions by the Cuban government

[24]Aldrighi (2001:107) portrays the importance of shared cultural references and available repertoires of action to explain the onset of armed revolutionary violence: "not only political and economic processes can explain the appearance of groups that radically question the status quo. The socially shared ideas, the cultural elements, are also decisive to explain why, in a given conjuncture, discontent is channeled through the creation of organizations with the will of radical rupture."

[25]The leader of the Peruvian ELN, Héctor Béjar (1970:47), summarizes the importance of the Cuban revolution for an entire generation of leftists activists: "Cuban socialism made the problems of revolution of immediate concern and did not allow them to be postponed to a more or less distant future. It gave a precise goal to all Latin American revolutionaries, and it lent a certain support to heresies in general. Even when we didn't articulate it, we all understood in those years that a new revolutionary period had begun and that the revolution, if it were achieved, would not necessarily develop according to the models that we had in our heads."

[26]Fine-grained historical analysis build against the so-called "serranización" of the Cuban revolutionary process, focusing on the fundamental importance of urban actions for the success of the M26-J in 1959 (Sweig 2002).

throughout the entire continent. Therefore, the impact of the Cuban Revolution was multi-faceted. It did not only comprise the extension of available repertoires of actions, but the Cubans directly advocated the creation of new guerrilla groups throughout the region. Basically, their aim was to promote a continental socialist revolution whose expansion would be based in the Cuban model (Brands 2010).

The three main characteristics of the foquist strategy were summarized by Guevara in his book *Guerrilla Warfare* (1960:1): "(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army; (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them; (3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting." In other words, revolution could be triggered by a small group of people, which would become the armed vanguard of the revolutionary movement. Plenty of insurgent groups following the characteristics of foquist organizations emerged throughout Latin America during the 60s: in Argentina, with the creation of the the Peronist Uturuncos (Salas 2003) and the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo led by Jorge Masetti (Rot 2000); in Paraguay, with FULNA and M14 (Presa 2018); the MR14J in Dominican Republic (Raful 2007); Perú and the guerrillas of the MIR, led by Luis de la Puente (MIR) and the ELN of Héctor Béjar (Lust 2013); the FSLN in Nicaragua (Martí i Puig 2002); the Colombian ELN (Hernández 2006); in Guatemala with the creation of the FAR and MR13 (Sabino 2008); the FALN in Venezuela (Gudat 2018); and in Bolivia, with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional under the leadership of Che Guevara (Gálvez Rodríguez 2003). Most of these groups followed the prototypical type of insurgency developed by the foquist theories: "small clandestine groups, with weak or non-existent urban bases, few or no links with pre-existing political forces or traditions, and little or no political work among the peasantry" (Bartoletti 2011:6).

However, this overly voluntaristic approach failed in the expansion of revolutionary regimes in Latin America. An extremely dogmatic and deterministic view on the path towards revolutionary socialism, combined with the disregard of particular

national circumstances, the importance of sufficient political work towards the masses, and the disdain on the relevance of urban structures, proved the failure of the Guevaristic approach to guerrilla warfare. The great majority of the foquist groups created during the 1960s were easily crushed by much stronger state military forces. Incapable of building strong ties with the civilian population, isolated from the political and social movements operating in urban areas and doomed by huge levels of internal frictions, the revolutionary armed organizations created during the 60s were nothing more than an absolute failure. Only few of them were capable of surviving after their first years of existence (such as the FAR in Guatemala, the ELN in Colombia, or the FALN in Venezuela), while the greatest majority succumbed a few months after the beginning of their operations. Many analysts thought that the days of the revolutionary guerrilla organizations were over: "With the death of Guevara in the Bolivian jungle (1967), the stage of the organization and evolution of rural guerrillas ends and, in reality, also of guerrilla warfare" (Lamberg 1979:47-48).

1.5.2 The Urban Guerrillas

However, against these prospects, the death of Guevara in Bolivia did not lead to the demise of insurgent activities, but instead, a new wave of armed revolutionary organizations emerged. After the failure of the foquist strategy, groups decided to adapt their tactics and flipped around one of the basic premises of the Guevarist theory: that revolutionary change should begin by a small foco group in rural areas that then would spread into the cities.[27] Relying on the work of guerrilla theorists, such as the Spanish anarchist Abraham Guillén or the Brazilian Carlos Marighella, revolutionary armed organizations decided that the city would be their new main theater of operations.

Groups began to be concentrated in the South Cone, where the most advanced and industrialized cities were located, such as in Brazil, with the presence of ALN

[27]Another key change is related to the shift in Cuban external policy regarding the promotion of revolutionary movement. Changes in geopolitical circumstances, and more concretely, in the relation between Cuba and the Soviet Union, led Fidel Castro to take a more neutral stance on the expansion of revolution through armed actions in the region (Brands 2010; Castaneda 1995).

(Prestes 2005), AP (Ridenti 1998), COLINA (da Silva 2009), MR-8 (Codarin 2018) and VPR (Silva 2019); Uruguay, with the most popular urban guerrilla group of the period, the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T) (Rey Tristán 2005), the OPR33 (da Silva 2020) and the anarchist FARO (Cortina Orero 2012); Chile, with the influential MIR led by Miguel Enríquez (Pérez 2003), the short-lived VOP (Cortés 2015), FPMR (Pena 2016) and the youth of MJL (Bascur 2006); and finally, Argentina, where plenty of urban insurgent groups operated between 1968 and 1980, including Montoneros (Gillespie 1982), the ERP-PRT (Carnovale 2011), FAR (González Canosa 2013), FAL (Grenat 2004), or FAP (Duhalde et al. 2002). Beyond the South Cone, other groups engaged in urban armed operations, particularly in the Andean region. In Colombia, the M19 was created as a response to the allegedly fraudulent Presidential elections of 1970 and engaged in widely publicized actions, such as the stealing of Bolivar's sword or the takeover of the Palace of Justice (Benítez 2006). In Ecuador, Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) engaged in a wide set of actions against the governments during the 80s (Villamizar 1990). And in Perú, some years after the creation of Sendero Luminoso, the MRTA became widely known, specially in the early 90s, due to the takeover of the Japanese embassy in Lima (La Serna 2020).

This new set of insurgent movements relied on an interesting combination of political mobilization and selective military actions in order to spur the support of the masses. Some of these groups, despite its enormous heterogeneity mostly reflected in the divergent levels of success that the organizations had, were capable of becoming the vanguard groups of the leftist revolutionary movement. One of the key factors explaining this is the temporal effectiveness behind the use of the so-called "armed propaganda" actions. A brilliant description of how groups aimed to spur civilian support through armed propaganda is provided by Iazzetta (2015) for the Argentinian ERP-PRT: "A group of combatants stopped a truck delivering milk, chickens and other foodstuffs or goods in the street; they presented themselves as guerrillas, in most cases without the need to display weapons, and asked the

driver to go to a specific area to distribute their cargo among a population. Then the food delivery operation became a political act with harangues, flyers, flags and other symbols of the organization." However, a gradual process of militarization led most of these groups to an outright defeat in their fight against state structures.

Overall, groups during this new wave of insurgent movements were the least successful of the three guerrilla generations in the region. A combination of ineffective violent attacks, together with a move towards clandestine actions, made their capacity to survive longer but shown a deep incapacity to rely with the work of the masses. The latter became disenchanted with the increasing indiscriminate actions of the groups, more motivated in justifying their quest for survival than on the goals of the broader political movement.

1.5.3 The Prolonged People's War

The third wave of Latin American insurgencies is characterized by a novel strategy on the understanding of armed revolutionary actions. Disregarding the overly militaristic approach of the Guevarist foco theories, as well as shifting away from the clandestine character of urban guerrillas, since the mid-1970s a new approach to guerrilla warfare starts being implemented in Latin America. Directly influenced by the experiences of the Chinese revolution and the Vietnamese conflict, revolutionary armed organizations decided to adopt a strategy whose characteristics counter the basic premises of urban and rural foquist theories, aiming to combine the dual engagement in political and military activities.[28] These so-called Political-Military Organizations (PMOs) were characterized by their "promotion on the creation of popular fronts; by the incorporation of insurrection, general strike

[28]While most of the historical studies on Latin American insurgencies differentiate between these three waves, a few set of scholars argue that a different conceptualization could be made on the basis of distinct guerrilla ideologies, specially during the third wave of Prolonged People's War insurgencies. After the failure of the foquist theories, insurgent groups decided to either move to the cities or to reinterpret classic guerrilla strategies, in which either the Maoist approach towards sustained political work or the Leninist strategy on political action is prioritised (Noriega-Buendía 2021). Groups such as the EZLN, Sendero or the FMLN would fit under the former category, while insurgencies such as the PRTC of Honduras would represent paradigmatic cases of the latter.

and self-defense into the military and armed strategies; by seeking the unity or coordination among the guerrilla forces, adopting a broad policy of alliances, both of revolutionary and democratic forces; as well as for trying to articulate international networks" (Bartoletti 2011:4). The creation of political-military organizations was geographically clustered mainly in Central America and the Andean region. PMOs operated primarily in Nicaragua, where the initially foquist Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) shifted their strategy towards a unified movement by the late 1970s (Mosinger 2019); Perú, with the presence of one of the bloodiest insurgencies of the entire period, Sendero Luminoso (Stern et al. 1998); Colombia, when the FARC and the ELN shifted towards the incorporation of the masses into the insurgent movements (Villamizar 2017); and more prominently, Guatemala and El Salvador.

These two countries represent the paradigmatic examples of the development of PMOs in Latin America, following both very similar trajectories. In El Salvador, five different insurgent groups operated between 1972 and 1980: the ERP, led by Joaquín Villalobos (Montgomery 1992); the Maoist FPL of Cayetano Carpio (Harnecker 1991); the FARN, created in 1975 after a split from the ERP as a reaction to the foquist militaristic approach that the group was taking (Castaneda 2016); the PRCT-S, a regional communist organization, with branches in most of Central American countries (Allison & Martín Álvarez 2012); and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), which decided to join the armed struggle in 1977 (Harnecker 1988). In October 1980, these five groups came together and formed the umbrella organization Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) (McClintock 1998), which brought the Salvadorian government to a situation of military stalemate since its formation until the signature of the 1992 peace agreements. Similar conditions developed in Guatemala. By the late 1970s, several guerrilla groups operated in the country, including the EGP (Andersen 1982), the ORPA (Arias 1983), the FAR (May et al. 2018) and the PGT (Vázquez Medeles 2016). These groups, after several months of initial contacts and coordinated activities, created the

umbrella group Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), which despite it did not reach the level of strength of the FMLN in El Salvador, it still posed a credible threat to the Guatemalan government until the signature of the peace agreement in 1996 (Kruijt 2013).

While the prototype model of the Cuban foquist struggle disappeared, the openness towards political activities facilitated the incursion of the revolutionary organization within the masses: the slow and steady process of civilian political mobilization and incorporation, a paramount element of the Maoist prolonged people's war, shaped the trajectories of these insurgent organizations.[29] Together with the dual strategy of combining actions both in rural and urban, PMOs were comparatively more successful in terms of their capacity for mobilization, military strength and outcomes than their foquist rural and urban counterparts (Martín Álvarez & Rey Tristán 2012). Indeed, the Nicaraguan FSLN was the only revolutionary armed organization that got into power in 1979 after the victory of the Cuban guerrilleros. Despite other groups did not make it into state power, the Salvadorian FMLN, the URNG in Guatemala, or the FARC in Colombia, signed peace agreements that allowed them to transition to legal political parties. As an exception, Sendero Luminoso (SL), which by 1990 was in the verge of a revolutionary outcome (McClintock 1998), suffered a rapid defeat after the capture of its leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992. An overly-centralized and hierarchical organization such as SL could not survive the detention of its leaders and main cadres and stopped their armed activities right after these repressive actions.

The end of the Cold War and the expansion of democracy throughout the region made armed revolutionary activity a discredited pattern of action for the

[29] As argued by Wickham-Crowley (2014:229): "Given the pre-1970 disappearance of the foco-strategy as the only model for regional revolutions, it is no coincidence that those guerrilla insurgencies initiated or surviving after 1970 had not tried to light a fire quickly and in the style of foquismo, but rather were demonstrating extreme patience and long-term, sub-rosa preparation for the coming storm. They were also talking the talk of prolonged popular war—guerra popular prolongada."

promotion of social and political change. Indeed, only few insurgent groups have been created since the mid 1990s. The most important among them is the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in México. However, while marginal small armed groups have been created in Paraguay, Chile or Colombia (Sánchez 2011), none of them became *viable* rebel organizations (Lewis 2020). Currently, and after the peace agreement signed in 2016 between FARC and the Colombian government (whose dynamics are studied in detail in this dissertation), the only remaining revolutionary armed organization created during the Cold War operating in the region is the Colombian ELN, who currently has a marginal influence in the politics of the country. The days of revolution seem to be over: political violence is no longer accepted as a viable way of promoting political changes in the face of democratically elected regimes.

1.6 Scope Conditions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of civil war dynamics for armed groups in irregular conflicts that were created during the Cold War period (1955-1991). Therefore, three stringent scope conditions apply to the findings presented in this thesis: kind of armed actor; type of conflict; and temporal conditions.

Despite the prominence of inter-state wars throughout history, civil wars have become the most usual type of conflict since the end of World War II (Walter 2017). This has spanned a new literature on conflict processes focused on the dynamics of insurgent groups. Throughout this dissertation, but more particularly in the cross-national paper on the dynamics of insurgencies and coups in Latin America, I engage in conversation with this wide literature using a slightly different approach than the traditional one. Scholars in this area of research tend to use battle-death thresholds to study conflict dynamics. Concretely, two different approaches can be found. On the one hand, those studies related to the so-called *major* civil wars, which are wars that have escalated to a threshold of 1000 battle-deaths per year. And on the other hand, we can also find *minor* civil wars, which are wars which

have surpassed the 25 annual battle-death ratio per year. This classification has been mainly enforced by the existence of cross-national quantitative datasets that have normalized this distinction, playing a major role the following two: on the one hand, the Correlates of War dataset (COW), which uses the threshold of 1000 battle-deaths per year to categorize a conflict as a war; and on the other hand, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) armed conflict database, which has made use of the 25 battle-deaths year threshold. Moreover, this has been complemented by the information provided by the Non-State Actor Dataset (NSA), which uses the UCDP threshold as a baseline for the inclusion of cases in its data. As most of the current analyses in the conflict literature are based on these datasets, it is not surprising to have a lack of understanding on the dynamics of insurgent groups before they reach these thresholds.

Based on recent evidence pointing out how relevant this missing information can be for understanding conflict processes (Lewis 2020), in this dissertation I use a different perspective. Concretely I focus on *armed groups*, which following Staniland's (2014:5) definition, are every "group of individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence." I partly complement this definition, stating that, for the purposes of this dissertation, only armed groups which have committed *at least 5 attacks in their period of existence* will be included in this study. I argue that this lower threshold, together with the focus on number of attacks instead of on battle-deaths, will be helpful for understanding inner-dynamics existent in the violent paradigm of the region since 1955. These armed groups take part in internal armed conflicts, which following partly UCDP's definition, are "contested incompatibilities that concern government and/or territory, where there is use of armed forces between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state." Therefore, this is not a study about criminal or terrorist groups (even though armed groups can engage in criminal activities and terrorist actions), neither about self-defense forces or inter-state wars.

Moreover, the findings of this dissertation are only applicable to non-state armed groups engaging in what Kalyvas & Balcells (2010) define as *irregular wars*. This type of conflict is described as one in which "rebels have the military capacity to challenge and harass the state, but lack the capacity to confront it in a direct and frontal way. Rebels tend to hover just below the military horizon, hiding and relying on harassment and surprise, stealth, and raiding; yet, they are frequently able to establish territorial control in peripheral area" (ibid:418-419). In other words, findings are expected to be applicable to those situations in which there is power asymmetry between the rebels and the state, and the former tend to rely on war of attrition in order to surpass its weaknesses vis-a-vis the latter. The arguments developed in this dissertation are therefore not applicable to either conventional or symmetric non-conventional wars.[30]

Finally, this dissertation's temporal conditions apply only to the post World War II period, and more concretely, to insurgent groups created during the Cold War era (1955-1991), but whose period of operation could have expanded after these years. The exclusive focus on the post-WWII period is based on the fact that the end of the WWII brought changes not only in the international system, but also in the dynamics of war and technology of warfare (Lyall & Wilson 2009). Despite the choice of this temporal scope increases the internal homogeneity of the cases under scrutiny, it can also be questioned the choice of this temporal frame. Two factors should be considered. First, that some the strongest and most resilient groups in the region, such as the FARC in Colombia or the URNG in Guatemala, were capable of surviving the shock of the end of the Cold War. And second, that even after 1991, some insurgent groups have been capable of amounting considerable levels of

[30]It is of paramount importance to highlight that unlike previous analysis (Wickham-Crowley 1992), in my cross-national analysis of Latin American rebel groups I do include insurgencies acting both in rural and urban areas. There is a wide debate on what are the similarities and differences between urban insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, I argue in here that given the inherent power asymmetry between urban insurgents and the state, the whole set of characteristics applicable to rural insurgents should be applicable as well to groups acting in urban areas.

strength vis-a-vis the state and mobilizing wide popular support, such as the EZLN in Mexico. While these two characteristics indicate that a broader perspective beyond the Cold War would widen our understanding of Latin American guerrillas, I decide to focus on the Cold War period for internal consistency reasons. Moreover, I make this decision based on the arguments developed by prior research, which show that the end of the Cold War completely modified the structures, dynamics and goals of rebel groups worldwide (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010).

In parallel to this, the findings of the two subnational studies included in this dissertation are also surrounded by the applicability of strict scope conditions. Regarding the study on civilians preferences towards peace in the 2016 Colombian referendum, the finding on the asymmetric effects of violence against civilians is contingent to the number of parties taking part in the conflict. Concretely, the Colombian case portrays a conflict with an unusual number of armed groups active in the country (Villamizar 2017). However, multiparty civil wars are not an exception in the population of internal armed conflicts since the end of WWII. Indeed, according to the UCDP Dataset, around 45% of the civil wars since 1945 were fought by more than one non-state armed forces (Walter 2019). Moreover, Juan Masullo and myself exclusively focus on those cases in which one of the contenders is in the negotiating table with the corresponding national government, while the other remains active and outside of this agreement. Further research on the impact of violence against civilians on different political outcomes should build upon our finding on the asymmetrical effect of exposure to violence in order to trace its validity under distinct types of internal armed conflicts.

The paper on the impact of the distribution of wartime territorial control on post-conflict state capacity in Perú is characterized by two clearly defined conditions. First, the findings will only be applicable to those cases in which the state has been capable of defeating an irregular force. While the use of guerrilla tactics has been prompted by historians and military analysts as the most effective war

strategy against states (Merom 2003; Caverley 2010; Kilcullen 2010; Jones 2018), this interpretation is certainly biased due to an over-emphasis on the successful and rare events of insurgent victory in irregular civil wars, such as the Cuban revolution or the Vietnam war. A closer look to historical evidence and conflict data shows a clear pattern: more than 70% of irregular wars end up in government victory (Balcells & Kalyvas 2014). While current studies on the relation between wartime territorial control and post-conflict state capacity only focus on irregular wars won by the rebels (Liu 2019), a better understanding of these dynamics when conflicts are lost by the rebels will delve more accuracy to our understanding of civil war processes. And second, I focus only on those cases in which insurgent groups have been capable of developing extensive rebel institutions in those areas under their territorial control. While most of the literature on civil war studies have overly-focused on the dynamics and characteristics of the strongest rebel groups (the Salvadorian FMLN; the FARC in Colombia; LTTE in Sri Lanka; the Guatemalan URNG; or the LRA in Uganda, among many others), the recently published path-breaking work by Janet Lewis (2017, 2020) leads us to rethink the boundaries of applicability of plenty of the recent findings in this area of research: most of the groups engaging in irregular war fail at the beginning of their operation, being incapable of holding full territorial control and of developing any type of parallel rebel institutions. In other words, the control of territory and the development of insurgent structures are exceptional outcomes when we focus on the dynamics and evolution of rebel groups in irregular wars.

Acknowledging the intrinsic heterogeneity of civil wars is a necessary step forward for the current literature on conflict studies. Providing better specified findings will lead to more accurate explanations on the dynamics of civil wars while it will also produce better and more reliable evidence for policymakers operating in conflict-affected areas.

1.7 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided in three different parts, comprising six different chapters. Part I includes two chapters, which are the initial chapters of the thesis. Chapter 1 ends up here and has introduced the basic features of the project- brief review of the literature on civil war studies, main contributions, research design, case selection and scope conditions. Chapter 2 is focused on a detailed literature review on the areas of research to which the three papers included in this dissertation speak to. I make a thorough description of the macro and micro-level civil war research programs, while describing as well the works on the history and evolution of Latin American insurgencies. I point to the gaps that these papers aim to fill and propose further avenues of research.

Part II of the dissertation presents each of the three articles comprising this dissertation, covering the political effects of a variety of civil war dynamics at distinct phases of conflict. Chapter 3 is the cross-national paper on the dynamics of insurgent strength, intra-elite competition and coups d'etat in Latin America. In this paper I delve into the heterogeneous political consequences of dissent activities, showing how middle levels of strength of insurgent groups, under conditions of intra-elite strife, open the way for changes in regime structures. This argument is tested through the use of a newly developed dataset on Latin American armed groups together with fine-grained evidence on the 1976 military coup in Argentina. Chapter 4 delves into the intriguing results of the 2016 Colombian Referendum on the peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government, which brought to an end one of the longest insurgent campaigns since the end of World War II. In this paper, co-authored together with Juan Masullo (Leiden University), we trace the impact of exposure to violence on preferences over peace. Unlike prior research, we argue that the effects of violence on preferences over peace are conditional on the identity of the perpetrator. We test this evidence with fine-grained data at the municipal level on violence exposure and preferences over peace as well as with qualitative evidence gathered in three fieldwork trips between 2014

and 2019. Finally, Chapter 5 of this dissertation presents the second of the two subnational analyses. Using the Peruvian conflict between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian government as its main case of study, this paper traces the impact of the distribution of wartime territorial control and rebel governance institutions on decisions over state capacity measures in the aftermath of conflict. With a combination of spatial modelling techniques and qualitative evidence gathered through semi-structured interviews, this paper brings a paradoxical argument to the forefront: civil wars could be an effective way of promoting the expansion of the state in the aftermath of conflict. The state, having learnt from its prior experience, engages in a dual strategy of expansion of state control and state legitimacy in order to counteract the potential effectiveness of rebel practices with the goal of avoiding the creation or reemergence of insurgent movements.

Part III of the dissertation is comprised of only one chapter, Chapter 6. This chapter concludes summarizing the main findings of the dissertation and their potential impact both on the academic and the policy-making communities, while proposing as well avenues for further research.

There are two ways to get to disaster: one, ask for the impossible; another, delay the inevitable.

— Francisco Cambó

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

— Karl Marx

2

The Phases of Civil War

Contents

2.1 Civil War Onset 56
2.2 In the Midst of War: The Micro-Level Agenda 60
2.2.1 Violence Against Civilians 60
2.2.2 Mobilization 62
2.2.3 Rebel Governance 64
2.2.4 Others 66
2.3 Civil War Outcomes and Termination 68
2.4 The Political Effects and Legacies of War 72
2.4.1 Micro-Level 72
2.4.2 Meso-Level 75
2.4.3 Macro-Level 77
2.5 The Way Forward 81
2.6 The Unexplored Story of Latin American Insurgencies 83
2.6.1 Descriptive Single Cases 84
2.6.2 Comparative Descriptive 85
2.6.3 Case Studies 86
2.6.4 Comparative Testing 88
2.7 Conclusion 90

The impressive recent literature on the understanding of the structural determinants and micro-level dynamics of civil wars has become an enormous advancement for the field of political violence. However, this set of studies suffer from a fundamental limitation that restricts our ability to understand internal armed conflicts as evolving processes, and that is the fragmented nature of existent research.

While up to date plenty of scholars have systematically study the determinants of civil war onset and termination, the micro-level dynamics of war, and the short and long-term consequences of conflict, scant work has aimed to develop a comprehensive perspective that traces the evolution of civil wars from the pre-war to the post-war period.

The lack of a dynamic analysis of civil war processes contrasts with the broad set of calls by conflict scholars towards the development of an integrative perspective linking the different phases of war under a common analytical framework. For example, Cederman & Vogt (2017) state that: "Future research on civil war should attempt to bridge the phases of conflict. Given the complexity of each phase, it is understandable that so much of the literature has focused on either onset, within-war dynamics, conflict termination, or the post-conflict phase. Yet, recent studies have paved the way for a more integrated perspective." In a similar vein, Sambanis (2004) argues that: "Process-driven explanations, best explored through historical narratives that focus on the dynamic interaction among actors and between actors and opportunity structures, can elucidate particular outcomes and cases." Prior studies in the civil war literature have done so, but only in a piecemeal manner and with a focus on single case-studies (Wood 2003; Holtermann 2016; Marks 2020). They have analysed how particular dynamics of conflict, such as expansion, mobilization or reliance on natural resources, evolve over time, but do not provide an overarching conceptual and empirical framework capable of analysing the inherent dynamic nature of conflict.

This caveat is specially surprising given the extant set of works in other areas of comparative politics focused on a dynamic understanding of a variety of social and political processes (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; Brinton 1938; Barrie 2019; Hampson 1996; Hopmann 1996; Walter 2002; Findley 2012; Shellman 2006). While this dissertation does not advance a novel analytical approach and theoretical framework for the understanding of civil wars as dynamic process, it aims to partially

deal with this problem through the development of the initial building blocks for the study of civil wars as complex, ambiguous and inherently fluid processes (Kalyvas 2003). More concretely, this thesis aims to provide a more holistic perspective on the effects of internal armed conflicts through a focus on distinct conflict stages (during war; at conflict termination; and in the postwar period) while relying on three levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro). Combining two sub-national studies in Colombia and Perú, together with a cross-national analysis of the linkages between civil war and coups in Latin America, I attempt to provide important contributions to the burgeoning literature on civil war studies.

This chapter presents a brief literature review on the main areas of research to which this dissertation speaks to. Particularly, it summarizes the main conclusions of the studies focused on the understanding of each of the single phases of civil wars. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1. introduces the basic findings of the civil war literature on the macro-level research program, with a particular focus on the understanding of civil war onset. Section 2.2. analyses the main set of studies capturing the distinct micro-level dynamics of civil war. Section 2.3. turns into the most prominent explanations on war termination and war recurrence. Section 2.4. makes a brief analysis of the studies on the political consequences of internal armed conflicts, differentiating according to three levels of analysis: micro-level, meso-level and macro-level. Section 2.5. describes how the three papers included in this dissertation contribute to the filling of some of the existent gaps in the literature. And finally, Section 2.6. focuses on the abundant literature on Latin American insurgencies, differentiating between single and comparative studies, as well as between descriptive and analytical works. This literature review aims to put the articles included in this dissertation in the context of evolving scholarly discussion on the stages of civil war and other dynamics of conflict.

2.1 Civil War Onset

Unsurprisingly, the study of civil war onset has been one of the the main areas of interest for conflict scholars. Due to its fundamental policy implications on the prevention of war initiation, plenty of scholars have insightfully delved into the determinants and correlates of conflict onset. However, there are crucial disagreements on the main factors prompting the initiation of armed conflicts.[1] Concretely, two broad type of explanations can be found (Lewis 2020:28-33): arguments centered on the feasibility of rebellion and arguments based on motivational elements. While the former urges to focus on the structural factors that enable the formation and adequate operation of insurgent organizations, the latter emphasizes the role of factors such as group-level grievances, which facilitate the recruitment of individuals towards armed rebellion. In this brief review of the literature on civil war onset, I center in these explanations, describing as well recent developments that urge scholars to focus not only on the study of civil war onset, but more concretely, of the onset of civil war as a distinct analytical category.

Starting with the set of arguments based on the role of feasibility factors, two distinct type of explanations underlie this type of works. First, an approach that puts to the forefront the impact of *greed* in the determination of joining a rebel organization. In a landmark study, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that poverty reduces the individual opportunity costs of being recruited by a rebel group, and this, coupled with their potential capacity for capturing natural resources, increase the chances of civil war outbreak. In this individually-centered explanation, civilians are expected to join rebellions in the search of better economic conditions prompted by high levels of poverty, low access to educational opportunities and the potential capacity of access to rents by the insurgent organization through the exploitation of primary commodities.

[1] One of the few agreements across conflict scholars on the factors prompting the initiation of armed conflict is the level of poverty: poorer countries are more likely to experience the beginning of civil war than wealthier countries (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fearon 2004; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2004; Hegre & Sambanis 2006; Blattman & Miguel 2010).

A second approach focused on the role of feasibility factors, and which have dominated much of the research done in the analysis of civil war onset, is the so-called *weak state paradigm* (Roessler 2016). Fearon & Laitin (2003), in one of the most influential works in the literature on civil wars, focus on the structural elements that favor the creation and subsequent operation of insurgent organisations. They find that weak states, characterized by low levels of bureaucratic, financial and administrative capacity, are more likely to experience the onset of civil wars than countries with stronger states. This lack of state capacity, often materialized in the inability to expand state reach to peripheral areas of the country, leads to the formation of insurgent groups and to increasing levels of rebel strength through the use of inadequate counter-insurgent practices: in an attempt to deter the incipient rebellion, state forces often engage in indiscriminate repression in peripheral areas, facilitating the recruitment of civilians by insurgent groups (Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003).

Lastly, the type of arguments based on motivational elements, and more concretely on the role of *grievances*, have only recently found adequate expression in the wide literature on civil war onset. Already in the early 1970s, Robert Ted Gurr in his book *Why Men Rebel?*, emphasized the role of relative deprivation as the core explanation for the outbreak of contentious violent processes: the "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" bring individuals to engage in collective violence as way of channelling their discontent (Gurr 1970:37). Despite authors such as Tilly (1973), Skocpol (1979) or Fearon & Laitin (2003) challenge this type of arguments due to the ubiquitous nature of grievances, a renewed set of works prompted by Erik Lars Cederman and coauthors provide systematic evidence on the impact of grievances for the initiation of internal armed conflicts. In a corner-stone book, Cederman et al. (2013) show that grievances, proxied through levels of political exclusion and economic inequality,

play a fundamental role in the onset of civil wars, and more particularly, in the initiation of ethno-nationalist conflicts.

Despite this expansive research agenda on the determinants of civil war onset has impressively widened our knowledge of the main correlates linked to the beginning of internal conflict, this program suffers from two fundamental limitations: first, these studies are incapable of thoroughly explaining the process of *how* civil wars begin; and second, they disregard the variety of forms that civil war onset could take. Trying to solve some of these problems, a recent set of studies has aimed to renew a research program that was ineffective in pushing forward novel explanations on the initial phases of the conflict process. One of the first studies trying to break with this trend was Webster (2018), who, aiming to analytically distinguish between conflict onset and conflict escalation, shows that the correlates of conflict onset are not the same as the correlates of conflict escalation. This finding has important implications for the civil war literature, given that plenty of studies rely on databases such as COW, which rely on an arbitrary battle-deaths threshold for the determination of the initiation of conflict, leading to the conflation of the determinants of conflict onset with those of conflict escalation.

In a similar vein, Lewis (2017, 2020) urges conflict scholars to zoom in into the process of civil war onset since the very inception of the group. In her thorough analysis of the creation of insurgent organizations in Uganda, she shows that the use of these datasets produces systematic selection bias in the study of conflict initiation. In a similar conclusion to the one developed by Webster (2018), she urges students of civil war processes not to conflate the determinants of conflict onset with those of conflict escalation. Concretely, she shows that the main driven factor in the initiation (and subsequent survival) of armed rebellion is the capacity of the group to remain secret to state security forces, and that ethnic exclusion only plays a role as a correlate of conflict escalation, not onset.

Finally, Kalyvas, Kreiman & Siberdt (2021) provide three distinct contributions to the understanding of the onset of internal armed conflicts. Using a sample of 145 major wars, they firstly show that extant studies are uncapable of tracing the heterogeneous nature of civil war onset: while most of the studies implicitly assume that civil wars begin in a guerrilla-style manner through the creation of small armed forces operating in peripheral areas of the country (Fearon & Laitin 2003), 40% of the civil wars are shown to start with high levels of intensity. Secondly, they provide evidence portraying the systematic stability of civil war intensity across the life-span of the conflict, showing that onset intensity is a good predictor of the expected intensity of the entire war. And finally, building against the widely-held conflict escalation assumption, they show that conflict fluctuation is not necessarily linked to war escalation. Indeed, conflicts are found to either escalate, de-escalate or remain constantly fluctuating across levels of intensity throughout the extent of the civil war. This set of findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the features of civil war onset and its potential impact on subsequent conflict dynamics, urging conflict scholars to rethink some of the most commonly held assumptions on the nature of internal armed conflicts.

These recent works provide original theoretical arguments to an area of research that was struggling to provide novel explanations on the determinants of civil war onset due to its overly structural perspective. While facilitating the comparative understanding of which countries could be more vulnerable to the risk of conflict initiation than others, this initial research program was incapable of providing systematic fine-grained explanations on the mechanisms linking this structural factors to the onset of civil war. Moreover, it did not promote the understanding of the onset of civil war as a separate analytical category worth of systematic analysis. Future research should delve into the heterogeneous nature of civil war onset while at the same time focus on the process of conflict initiation, tracing the determinants of group formation and actors' interactions in order to develop a more thorough understanding of the transition from pre-war to conflict phases. In direct relation to

this, future work should also trace the links between conflict onset and subsequent patterns of conflict dynamics with the goal of testing whether distinct onset types set conflicts into trajectories with divergent characteristics.

2.2 In the Midst of War: The Micro-Level Agenda

The last fifteen years have seen a fundamental shift in the analysis of civil wars. While the works from the early 2000s were mostly focused on the search of the structural determinants of conflict onset, the landmark publication of *The Logic of Violence* by Stathis Kalyvas (2006) put the civil war research program into a novel research trajectory. Concretely, aiming to unpack the black-box of what happens during conflict processes, an innovative agenda shifted away from structural arguments and moved towards sub-national levels of analysis focusing on a wide variety of micro-dynamics of conflict. Concretely, this research program has delved into sophisticated and fine-grained explanations on the determinants of insurgent violence; rebel governance; civilian displacement; recruitment and desertion; insurgent alliances and fragmentation; rebel diplomacy; civilian resistance; or rebel internal organization. In this subsection, I focus on the three micro-level dynamics of war that have received the most scholarly attention: violence against civilians, insurgent mobilization and rebel governance.

2.2.1 Violence Against Civilians

Violence against civilians emerged as one of the core areas of research inquiry in the civil war literature. One of the first studies tracing the puzzling variation in the dynamics of violence against civilians across distinct insurgent organizations is the book by Jeremy Weinstein (2006). Using Perú, Mozambique and Uganda as his main cases of study, he argues that insurgent patterns of violence are directly shaped by the initial organizational basis of rebel groups. Their initial level of access to material resources determines the type of civilian profiles that are likely to join the organization: opportunistic civilians will attempt to join resource-rich insurgencies as a way to maximize their economic outputs, while idealistic and

committed individuals will be more likely to join rebel organizations with low access to material resources. These distinct profiles will be directly linked to patterns of violence against civilians in the course of war: resource rich organizations filled with opportunistic individuals will be more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, resource poor organizations will exhibit restrain and will be more likely to engage in selective violence, as their prospects for survival and expansion depend on their capacity to forge social ties with civilians at the local level.

Challenging this perspective, and building against conventional wisdom, Kalyvas (2006) shows that patterns of violence against civilians during irregular civil wars are far from irrational. Instead, he argues that both incumbents and insurgents engage in distinct types of violence against civilians according to the level of control of the territory in which they are operating. With the inherent goal of maximizing the collaboration of civilians, both incumbents and rebels display common patterns of action across distinct territories. Through an analytical innovation that distinguishes five distinct zones of territorial control and two types of violence (selective and indiscriminate), Kalyvas systematically traces the distinct patterns of violence engaged by incumbents and rebels in each of these territories. He convincingly shows that the level of indiscriminate violence is inversely related to the level of control of the territory, and that selective violence against civilians will be mainly applied in areas with partial levels of control, but not in fully contested or fully controlled territories.

In direct connection with the work of Kalyvas, Balcells (2017) studies the striking variation of violence against civilians in conventional wars at the local level, using the Spanish civil war as her main case of study (1936-1939). Through an analytical distinction between direct and indirect violence, she argues that patterns of violence against civilians in the civil war period should be traced back to the political dynamics of the pre-war period. Concretely, she shows that in areas with tight political competition between the Republicans and the Nationalists before the onset

of the conflict, direct violence against civilians was higher. These dynamics are reinforced in subsequent stages of the conflict and have been found to shape the political identities of the victims in the long-run (Balcells 2012).

More recent research has focused on non-lethal patterns of violence. More prominently, the works of Cohen (2016) and Steele (2017) stand as two of the core contributions in this area of research. Cohen (2016) studies the determinants of sexual violence through a combination of cross-national and sub-national analyses, showing that the type of civilian recruitment plays a fundamental role in the understanding of this type of violence: insurgent organizations relying on abduction and forced recruitment will be more likely to engage in sexual violence against civilians than those using other strategies of recruitment and mobilization. Steele (2017) focuses instead in the factors leading to variation in trends of civilian mass displacement. Similar to Balcells (2017), Steele (2017) puts the role of politics at the center of her explanation of patterns of displacement in the Colombian civil war. She argues that mass civilian deportations are a strategic choice made by armed groups with the goal of promoting effective territorial control of certain area. Using the results of local elections as a proxy of the ideological preferences of civilians living in these territories, armed groups displace civilians in an attempt to consolidate the control of certain geographical area in dispute with other armed organizations.

2.2.2 Mobilization

One of the main paradoxes facing scholars studying civil war processes is the one related to the successful mobilization and recruitment of civilians by insurgent groups. Considering the wide range of options available to individuals in the midst of conflict, why would civilians participate in high-risk political activities given the high costs and the small potential benefits? While this has been a long-standing puzzle that have prompted plenty of studies in the literature on comparative politics and contentious processes (Olson 1965; Popkin 1979; Wichkam-Crowley 1992; Goodwin & Skocpol 1989; Scott 1976), a specific set of studies in the civil war

literature has focused on a thorough understanding of the process of insurgent mobilization for civilian recruitment.

While certain works have relied on rational and opportunistic explanations of armed mobilization for the maximization of individual profits (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Weinstein 2006), the most prominent arguments in this area of research have aimed to provide a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of processes of mobilization through a shift in the level of analysis and through the connection of individual preferences for recruitment to structural characteristics of local communities. In a path-breaking book, Petersen (2001) shifts away from the implicit binary logic underlying most of prior studies analysing the correlates of conflict mobilization. Using the resistance by Lithuanians against the occupation from the Nazis and the USSR as his main case of study, he makes a fundamental contribution to students of high-risk mobilization showing how participation in armed activities is a dynamic, non-binary process in which decisions to participate in high-risk activities are not only based on individual factors, placing individual decisions into the structure of local communities.

In line with the work of Roger Petersen, Parkinson (2013) and Shesterinina (2016, 2021) expand his findings and develop a more comprehensive approach to the variety of roles that civilians could adopt in their support for insurgent groups. Furthermore, they also frame decisions to transition from civilians to armed militants in their corresponding organizational, local and social context. Parkinson (2013), who empirically focuses on Lebanese militant organizations during the 1980s, argues that a comprehensive framework of civilian mobilization during conflict requires an understanding not only of the determinants of combatants' motivations to join, but we should also consider the key role of other individuals that become fundamental for the survival and sustainment of armed clandestine organizations, such as those taking part in intelligence, logistical and material support branches. Shesterinina (2016, 2021), in her analyses of civilian mobilization

in the Georgian-Abkhaz war (1992-1993), shows how the embeddedness of civilians in distinct types of social structures has a direct impact on their perception of threat, and subsequently, on their decision to participate in armed rebellion. In close relation to the ideas of Petersen (2001), Shesterinina focuses on the iterative process between social structure characteristics and civilians' decisions to take part in armed conflict. She shows how distinct perceptions of threat developed at the community level directly shaped the participation of civilians in violent activities: individuals located in communities that perceived the arrival of the Georgian army as highly threatful were more likely to engage in armed mobilization than those located in structures where the advancement of the Georgian troops was not conceived as a threat to the community.

In parallel to this, an important strand of research focuses instead on the role of emotions. Elisabeth Wood's (2003) is the key work of this line of research. In her study on the motivations leading individual to join the Marxist guerrillas of the ERP, FPL and FMLN guerrillas in the Salvadorian civil war (1979-1992), she challenges most of the prior theories of collective action arguing that emotions play a fundamental role in revolutionary mobilization processes: voluntary recruitment and participation in insurgent organization was driven by "moral commitments and emotional engagements" (Wood 2003:18), mostly prompted by indiscriminate state violence. While some civilians decide to flee the affected municipalities, around 30% decided to join the local guerrillas as the "state violence deployed against unarmed civilians [...] legitimated the choice to rebel against the state, and to use arms in doing so." In line with this approach, Costalli & Ruggeri (2015) also provide supportive evidence on the pivotal role played by emotions and ideas in the understanding of collective armed mobilization in the Italian civil war (1943-1945).

2.2.3 Rebel Governance

Rebel governance has become one of the most fruitful areas of analysis of the increasingly complex micro-level research agenda. This strand of the literature studies

the interactions between insurgent groups and civilians in territories controlled by the former. Why do rebel groups establish institutions? What kind of services they provide? How do civilians respond to the intervention of insurgents in local affairs? These questions and others are addressed by scholars in this burgeoning area of research through the reliance on rigorous theorization and initial empirical testing.

Major theoretical contributions on the features and determinants of rebel order during wartime come from Mampilly (2012), Arjona (2016) and Stewart (2021). Mampilly (2012) provides the first attempt of systematically analyzing the reasons leading rebels to establish parallel governance institutions and the factors explaining variation on the types and breadth of services that they provide. Based on ethnographic research on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (Sudan) and the Rasemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma (Congo), he argues that decisions on services' provision and insurgent institutions depend on two factors. First, the initial preferences of the rebel leaders. And second, the complex interactions and dynamics of rebel groups with its own members, with civilians and with international organizations (Mampilly 2012:66).

With a similar goal in mind, but with a single focus on the tremendously complex scenario of the Colombian civil war, Arjona (2016) also aims to explain the puzzling variation in the strategies leading to the establishment of institutions by non-state armed groups. She argues that armed groups' time horizon and the quality of preexisting local institutions determine the kind of institutions to be established: where local capacity for collective action is sufficiently high, unarmed civilians are capable of resisting the implementation of broad insurgent institutions. When this is not the case, armed groups establish wide structures of governance. In parallel to this, she provides a novel conceptualization of insurgent institutions. Distinguishing between the existence or not of a social contract between the armed group and civilians, as well as the scope of the intervention in local affairs, she

differentiates three distinct ideal situations: disorder (no social contract), aliocracy (social contract and narrow intervention in local affairs) and rebelocracy (social contract and broad intervention in local affairs) (Arjona 2016:26-29). She tests these theoretical arguments using data from Colombia, becoming one of the first attempts to empirically analyze the determinants and evolution of rebel governance structures.

More recently, Stewart (2021) challenges the conventional idea that portrays that rebel governance boosts insurgent organizational capacity and levels of civilian support. Contrary to this perspective, and in line with Arjona (2016), Stewart argues that certain rebel organizations ultimately decide to engage in the development of alternative institutions according to their long-term revolutionary goals, regardless of the potential levels of civilian disenchantment or the unpopularity of certain instances of rebel governance.

This recent boom of rebel governance studies has brought an increasing interest in the understanding of the attributes, features and dynamics of insurgent institutions. Relying most of these works in single case qualitative studies, students of rebel governance have focused on aspects such as ideology (Suykens 2015; Kalyvas 2015b); symbolism (Mampilly 2015); external relations and diplomacy (Coggins 2015); judicial processes (Loyle 2021); myths and religious beliefs (Hoffman 2015); elections (Cunningham et al. 2021); alliances with societal forces (Barter 2015); external support (Huang & Sullivan 2020); patterns of displacement (Revkin 2021); civilian resistance (Arjona 2016); or types of services' provision by rebels (Stewart 2018).

2.2.4 Others

The research agenda on the micro-level dynamics of civil war also includes a variety of other works that focus on dynamics that remain comparatively understudied to the ones presented in the prior subsections. However, without the aim of being exhaustive, important studies on the features and factors prompting the development

of civilian resistance, insurgent organizational cohesion or rebel alliances have appeared during the last years.

Kaplan (2017) and Masullo (2020) analyze civilian resistance towards rebel ruling in the context of the Colombian civil war. While Kaplan argues that local cohesion and communitarian levels of organization explain subsequent patterns of resistance to armed actions, Masullo acknowledges the complexity of these processes and shows that civilian resistance only emerges when local communities converge in the desire and capacity for engaging in non-cooperation with armed organizations. Schubiger (2021) also studies instances of civilian non-cooperation, in this case, instances of *armed* mobilization. She shows how prior experiences of exposure to state violence lead to the development of local civil defense forces that fight against the subsequent penetration of insurgents into affected territories.

Other scholars, such as Staniland (2014), have systematically studied the determinants of insurgent cohesion in the midst of civil war. In a corner-stone book, he shows that the level of cohesion of rebel organizations is determined by the nature of pre-war networks and social bases. More research has been done on the determinants of rebel alliances in the midst of civil war. Christia (2012) emerges as one of the key studies in this area of research, showing that, contrary to existent arguments, ideology plays a negligible role in the determination of alliances across insurgent organizations during internal armed conflicts. She supports a less rigid conception of alliances showing the pivotal role played by the relative distribution of power across insurgents, and that groups will be keen to forge alliances with other rebel organizations regardless of their ideology if this maximizes their chances of being part of the potential minimum winning coalition.

The development of this research program since the mid-2000s has impressively advanced our understanding of the often complex, contradictory and ambiguous nature of civil wars. The systematic engagement in fine-grained analyses of a

wealthy variety of micro-level dynamics of war has dealt with some of the key limitations of the macro-level civil war agenda and has widely enriched a systematic understanding of a variety of processes taking place during the course of conflict. However, once we have reached this point, we are faced with a quite a paradoxical situation: we are incapable of levelling up and generalizing the conclusions of the micro-level agenda due to the lack of a macro-level framework with the capacity of capturing the complexity of the findings achieved. Moreover, the lack of integration between the macro and micro level research programs hampers the capacity of developing theoretically sound and empirically useful explanations of a variety of conflict outcomes, with crucial implications for the design of adequate policies in conflict affected areas (Balcells & Justino 2014). Finally, and more importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, there is a very limited understanding of how these micro-level dynamics of war are linked to prior and subsequent phases of the conflict. Do distinct types of conflict onset affect the micro-level dynamics of war in a consistent manner? How do patterns of violence or rebel governance affect the outcome of civil wars? Do these micro-level dynamics evolve across the distinct stages of conflict? These questions, while remaining fundamental for a comprehensive understanding of conflict as fluid processes, remain unaddressed in the vibrant literature on civil war dynamics.

2.3 Civil War Outcomes and Termination

The particular prominence of the studies on the determinants of civil war onset and the micro-level dynamics of war, has shifted away scholars from a thorough analysis of how civil wars end. The scant set of studies existent in this area of research rely on the search of the structural factors and insurgent features that characterizes concrete types of conflict termination.

In one of the few studies using data on conflict events since the early 19th century, Lyall & Wilson (2009) portray the slow but continuous increase in the levels of insurgent victories against state forces during the last two centuries. The

authors argue that the lower likelihood of incumbent success is linked to increasing patterns of military mechanization, as state military forces do not need to rely on the collection of information at the local level, lowering ties with the civilian population and leading to higher levels of indiscriminate violence. With a focus on the endogenous features of conflict, Balcells & Kalyvas (2014) build against the conventional wisdom that supports the idea that irregular warfare is the most efficient military strategy for the defeat of state forces (Arreguín-Toft 2005; Kilcullen 2010; Jones 2017). They show that conventional wars, where the level of capacity of insurgents is matched with the capacity of state forces at a high level, are the ones most likely to end up in insurgent victory and state defeat. In line with this finding, Cunningham et al. (2009) show that the higher the level of strength of the insurgent groups, the higher their chances for rebel victory. Lastly, Krause (2017) provides one of the most comprehensive analysis of the factors leading to varying outcomes in internal armed conflicts. Through a meso-level perspective, he shows that the distribution of power within a movement is the fundamental element explaining subsequent patterns of civil war termination in nationalist conflicts: movements characterized by the presence of an hegemonic organization will be more likely to succeed in their fight against the state. Conversely, if power is split across two or more organizations, the prospects for rebel success decrease.

In direct connection to these studies, there is a strand of literature focusing on the conditions leading to postwar stabilization or war recurrence as a direct consequence of divergent conflict outcomes. Mixed evidence pervades the search of clear answers to this question. A considerable part of the literature sustains that negotiated settlements are not an effective way of promoting peace in the aftermath of war, and that military victories promote stability in the postwar period. Concretely, in a founding paper, Licklider (1995) uses cross-national data for civil wars since the end of World War II to systematically show how negotiated settlements produce

stronger prospects for war recurrence than military victories.[2] Toft (2010) supports Licklider's argument that military victories make war recurrence less likely. She posits that existent analyses on the pacifying effects of negotiated settlements are empirically biased, arguing that "although it is true that from 1940 to 2002, most negotiated settlements halted the killing in the short term, and often led to greater democratization, both peace and democratization have tended to be short lived, ending after the first or second election cycle" (ibid:36).

What it is less clear is what type of military victory lead to greater prospects of sustained peace. Mukherjee (2006) also supports the argument that negotiated settlements are more likely to incur into recurrent fighting, due to commitment problems, while clear military victories will lead to periods of longer peace. However, he finds no difference on the duration of the peace on the basis of whether the decisive military victory was made by the government or by insurgent forces. Challenging this, Mason et al. (2011) argue that insurgent military victories facilitate the prospects for sustained peace, and this is mainly explained by the fact that "rebel victories dismantle multiple sovereignty more thoroughly than government victories or negotiated settlements because they typically result in the annihilation or exile of the leaders of the defeated government" (ibid:174). Toft (2010:36) also supports this position, arguing that: "rebels who win civil wars seem better able to keep the peace and allow for more democratization." Contrary to this view, Kreutz (2010) finds systematic empirical evidence pointing that government victories are more likely to reduce the prospects for intrastate conflict resumption.[3]

Against these arguments, a few set of authors argue that negotiated settlements are as well prepared to create the conditions that lead to sustainable peace in the

[2]However, the latter are more prone to lead to acts of genocide (see also Uzonyi 2015). Similarly to Licklider's results, Walter (2004) finds that conflicts that end in partition have higher prospects of recurrence.

[3]In parallel to this, there is also consistent evidence on the decreasing possibilities for conflict recurrence related to the deployment of peacekeeping missions (Kreutz 2010; Collier et al. 2008; Quinn et al. 2007).

aftermath of war as outright military victories. Hartzell (2009), using cross-national data for the period 1945-1999, shows that negotiated settlements share the same prospects for postwar stability than military victories by either insurgents or the government. Similar evidence is provided in Hartzell & Hoddie (2007:7), where they reveal that "between 1945 and 1999, fifty-five civil wars ended via a military victory; among these cases, thirty-two, or 58 percent of the total, went on to experience renewed fighting. In contrast, negotiated settlements experience a lower failure rate, with peace breaking down in only thirteen of the thirty-eight cases (34 percent of the total)." However, not every type of settlement seems to produce similar effects. In Hoddie & Hartzell (2003), the authors delve into the factors that make the implementation of negotiated settlements more likely to promote sustained peace. They show that the more detailed the provisions on the power-sharing institutions and military power distribution in the aftermath of war included in the negotiated settlement, the higher the prospects for peace and post-conflict stability.

The task of further research in this line of inquiry is of particular relevance given the lack of analysis of the divergent trajectories of insurgencies and the puzzling question of what explains the success and failure of rebel groups. Most of the studies on civil war outcomes and termination present two fundamental caveats. First, and as extensively argued by Lewis (2017; 2020), current approaches fail to capture the empirical reality that most irregular groups fail at the beginning of their operations. The use of high battle-deaths thresholds in current conflict datasets lead to severe problems of selection bias and misleading theoretical and empirical conclusions. Disregarding previous studies that argue that irregular warfare is the best suited strategy to dismantle the state, fine-grained evidence shows that only a small proportion of the groups that initiate armed actions are successful in the formation of rebel structures, and less so in the conquest of state power. The second problem is the explicit use of a three-fold categorization for the understanding of variation in civil war outcomes. Civil wars can either end on outright rebel defeat, insurgent victory or "draw", the latter bringing together peace agreements and

ceasefires events (Lyall & Wilson 2009; Balcells & Kalyvas 2014; Krause 2017). The use of this analytical framework disregards the enormous variation existent in the types of potential defeats, labelling together under a single category groups such as the ELN in Bolivia, which was formed by 50 armed combatants and that remained operative for less than a year, with groups as Sendero Luminoso, which had the capacity of building strong insurgent forces and of holding full territorial control of a considerable proportion of the national territory. In addition to this, future research should aim to systematically analyze the linkages between distinct conflict dynamics and the divergent outcomes of war, and should as well study how different types of conflict termination shape a wide variety of post-war political processes.

2.4 The Political Effects and Legacies of War

The last area of research inquiry, highly neglected in the early 2000s, but in vogue during the last decade, has been the one on the effects and legacies of civil war. This stream of research plays a paramount role in the understanding of conflict processes, specially given the disruptive effects of civil wars in a wide of variety of factors. How do internal armed conflicts affect levels of individual political participation? Do political identities become polarized? How do the dynamics of war impact institutional structures? Is there any organizational legacy of violence? This section aims to trace the political consequences of civil war at three distinct levels of analysis: individuals (micro-level), communities and organizations (meso-level), and at the level of the state (macro-level).

2.4.1 Micro-Level

Armed with the strength of quantitative methodological techniques and access to fine-grained data at a sub-national level, a burgeoning literature has traced in a systematic and comparative manner the heterogeneous micro-level effects of a diverse array of civil war dynamics, with a special emphasis on the role of exposure to conflict violence on individual political outcomes.

One of the few findings over which there seems to be a considerable level of consensus in the literature is related to the impact of exposure to wartime violence on levels of political participation. Paradoxically, and contrary to some of the arguments presented by the literature examining the repression-dissent nexus (Hibbs 1973; Zhukov & Talibova 2018; Jaegher & Hoyer 2019), exposure to conflict violence is related to higher levels of political engagement in a variety of forms. Bellows & Miguel (2009), in their study of the Sierra Leone conflict, showed that those individuals more affected by conflict violence tended to engage in higher levels of postwar collective action activities. Similar evidence is shown in Blattman (2009). He founds, in the context of the Ugandan conflict, that former young locals abducted by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) tended to participate more in politics once the conflict ceased than young people of their communities who were not abducted.[4] This evidence has been recently further extended by studies portraying the cooperative effects of exposure to conflict events (Bauer et al. 2016). These behaviors seem to be driven by the impact of violence on shifts in civilian preferences: "individuals who have either experienced violence themselves, or who live in communities that have been violently attacked, display more altruistic behavior, are more risk-seeking, and act less patiently" (Voors et al. 2012:943).

However, evidence is not as encouraging when analysing the impact of conflict dissagregating by attitudes towards in-group and out-group individuals. Balcells (2012), studying the long-term effects of conflict violence on political identities in Spain, finds that those citizens which had an ancestor that suffered violence or victimization during the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) tend to reject the political identity of the perpetrator 70 years later.[5] Following this long-term approach, Lupu & Peisakhin (2017) provide evidence showing that Crimean Tartars whose ancestors suffered violence from the Russian authorities in the mid 1940's identify

[4]Bateson (2012) provides similar evidence with regards to people directly exposed to crime activities. Using a variety of regional barometers, she shows that people victimized by crime tend to have higher rates of participation than those not affected by crime victimization.

[5]Villamil (2020) shows that, in the Spanish context, this rejection of the perpetrator's identity at the community level is sustained over time through the existence of partisan local networks.

more strongly nowadays with their ethnic group and tend to have more hostile attitudes towards Russia.[6] In their study of the Sudanese conflict, Beber et al. (2014) also provide suggestive evidence on the impact of political violence on identity polarization in the short-term: civilians in the North who were exposed to riots by Southern Sudanese were more likely to support the independence of South Sudan, due to the increasing levels of hostility towards out-group individuals. Hadzic et al. (2020) find similar results for the Bosnian conflict. This set of findings lead to the conclusion that the pro-social behavior described in the initial studies on this area of research seem to be targeted to in-group members only.

More relevantly for the purposes of this dissertation, and, concretely, for the paper on exposure to violence and attitudes towards the 2016 Colombian Referendum, an emerging literature has focused on the impact of violence against civilians on preferences towards peace. Canetti et al. (2013) show how in the Israel-Palestinian conflict exposure to violence plays a fundamental role for understanding preferences over conflict compromise. Concretely, they argue that "perceived collective threat invokes usage of conflict-supporting shared narratives, reducing support for compromise to end the conflict" (ibid:87). Similar evidence is presented for the case of Northern Ireland, where Hayes & McAllister (2001) show that one of the factors leading to the intractability of the conflict was the constant exposure to violence by civilians: violence exposure strengthened civilian support towards paramilitary group activities and, consequently, against their demobilization.[7]

[6]The authors also find, in direct relation with the findings on the impact of violence on political participation, that they also tend to participate more in political activities.

[7]Other studies have casted doubt on the centrality of exposure to violence against civilians for explaining preferences over conflict resolution. More prominently, Newman (2012), using survey data on public opinion on the conflict between Palestine and Israel, shows that the position of Israelis on making concessions towards the Palestinians are not driven by prior levels of exposure to violence, but by their lack of trust in Arab religiosity and aspirations. In a similar vein, Liendo & Braithwaite (2018) argue that the main drivers behind preferences towards the 2016 Colombian peace agreement with the FARC were civilians' political identities, and not overall levels of exposure to conflict-related violence.

2.4.2 Meso-Level

Analyses on the dynamics of civil war have under-studied the effects and legacies of internal armed conflicts at the meso-level. This level of analysis is defined by Balcells & Justino (2014:1345) as "processes that take place at the community level or at the level of local social groups and organizations (e.g., local forms of collective action and governance, local institutions, and local and group leadership). The meso level connects individuals and households with larger communities and broader processes." Unlike the variety of studies found at the micro-level, meso-level analyses have only recently began to be object of systematic exploration in this strand of research.

One of the earliest and most striking findings is the one presented by Daly (2012) in her study of Colombian insurgencies. Challenging existent approaches to civil war onset, she convincingly shows that regions in which collective action, and more concretely, violent events and guerrilla formation, occurred during the years of the "La Violencia" conflict (1948-1958) are more likely to experience the formation of revolutionary armed organizations in the contemporary period. These "organizational legacies of violence" portray the often complex and heterogeneous factors explaining processes of civil war onset. Relatedly, Bateson (2013), in her study of vigilantism in the aftermath of the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996), shows the enduring effects of violence exposure with a focus on civilians' attitudes towards insecurity. She traces the variation in attitudes towards postwar organized crime to levels of exposure to violence during the war: communities that during the conflict had higher levels of wartime violence are more likely to engage in collective vigilantism in the postwar period in order to deter increasing rates of violent crime, while areas with lower exposure tend do adopt more individualistic responses. Through the development of collective perceptions of threat, together with the persistence of institutions created during wartime, civil war dynamics directly shape responses to distinct types of violence in the aftermath of war. In a similar vein, but with a long-term perspective, Osorio et al. (2021) trace the historical factors explaining the rise of vigilante groups against organized crime

in contemporary Mexico. They show that current patterns of civilian self-defense against crime could be traced back to violent dynamics of the 1920s: areas in which the Cristero rebellion took place in the early 20th century are more likely to see the creation of contemporary anti-crime civilian organizations, being this explained by a combination of institutional persistence, organizational legacies, and endurance of trust networks.[8]

Focusing as well on a meso level of analysis, Costalli & Ruggeri (2015, 2019) make path-breaking contributions to the study of the consequences and legacies of civil war and, unlike prior micro-level research, focus on the "supply-side" legacies of conflict. In their studies on the Italian civil war (1943-1945), they show that internal armed conflict led to the endogenous creation of novel violent political actors that were fundamental for understanding political dynamics in the aftermath of war. Concretely, they show that local bands of armed militias transformed into strong political parties in the postwar period, and that this organizational advantage led them to better electoral results once democracy was reestablished, specially in the areas in which they operated during the conflict. In a similar vein, Rizkallah (2016) traces the factors leading to divergent political trajectories at the subnational level in the aftermath of war. Focusing on Lebanon as her main case of study, she argues that the wartime distribution of territorial control, together with the outcome of the war, are the fundamental factors shaping the political landscape of the postwar period. She shows how the consolidation of territorial control led to the development of local political networks that were exploited for the mobilization of electoral support once the war ended. Relatedly, scholars have also recently turned their attention to the potential impact of conflict dynamics on postwar electoral success of rebel groups transformed into political parties (Allison 2010; Ishiyama & Widmeier 2013; Daly 2019). These authors have found that territorial control during wartime, levels of one-sided violence against civilians and the distribution of

[8]See also Arias & De la Calle (2021).

military power at the end of conflict are the the main factors explaining post-conflict victories in democratic elections for former insurgent groups.[9]

2.4.3 Macro-Level

While most of the studies focused on the effects and legacies of civil war at a macro-level have delved into the economic consequences of internal armed conflicts (Collier 1999; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2010; Murdoch & Sandler 2004; Maher 2015), a recent strand of the literature has started to unpack their impact on broader political processes. Unlike the micro-level legacies literature, much less is known on the macro-level political consequences of civil war. How do war dynamics affect subsequent political processes? Do the interactions between insurgents and the state promote lasting changes in macro-level political structures? The scarce number of studies on this area of research have mainly focused on two factors: the recurrence of internal armed conflicts (succinctly described in Section 2.3 above) and regime transformations in the aftermath of war.

On patterns of regime change, the literature presents mixed findings. Huang (2016), in one of the most insightful analysis on this area of research, uses cross-national evidence from 127 civil wars that took place between 1950 and 2006 to show that the factors explaining the development of distinct regime structures in the aftermath of war should be traced back to the dynamics of the conflict. More concretely, she tests the impact of the engagement and provision by insurgent groups of rebel governance institutions on prospects for democratization. In a careful combination of theoretical innovation and empirical rigourosity, she shows that countries in which insurgent groups developed wide and extensive rebel governance institutions, will be more likely to democratize in the aftermath of conflict. During war, the political inclusion of formerly excluded civilians by insurgent groups lead

[9]Beyond civil war, plenty of studies have delved into the meso-level legacies of exposure to a variety of violent processes, including genocide and mass violence (Charnysh & Finkel 2017), interstate wars (Grandi 2013; Ferwerda & Miller 2014), state repression (Rozenas & Zhukov 2019), lynchings (Messner et al. 2005), slavery (Dell 2010; Whatley & Gillezeau 2011), ethnic riots (Hager et al. 2019), or crime (Skaperdas 2001).

these individuals to higher levels of organizational capacity. In order to ensure stability, elites drive the shift towards democratization in order to protect the maintenance of their privileges in the wake of intense civilian mobilization.

Challenging this approach, other scholars argue that not all types of insurgencies building rebel governance institutions lead to the promotion and establishment of democratic regimes. Focusing on successful revolutionary movements, some of which arise from civil wars, including the cases of China, Cuba or Vietnman, Lachapelle et al. (2020) show that regimes created after violent social revolutions are more prone to lead to the creation of durable authoritarian regimes. Indeed, revolutionary autocracies seem to last for an average of 39 years, while non-revolutionary autocracies only survive, in average, approximately 15 years (ibid:557). The authors argue that, in the aftermath of revolution, these new regimes face important external and internal military threats, which lead them to invest in the development of cohesive ruling elites. This, combined with effective repression against dissent organizations, promote the establishment of durable autocratic institutional arrangements.

Much less is known on the relation between civil war processes and other macro-level contentious events. Particularly, and more relevantly for the purposes of this dissertation, only recently scholars have begun to systematically study the relation between civil wars and coups d'etat. Due to the over-compartmentalization of political violence sub-fields, we have a very scarce understanding about the relation between distinct types of contentious events, and more concretely, on the linkages between civil wars and coups. Despite this puzzling lacuna, empirical evidence portrays systematic linkages between these two distinct processes, specially for the case of Latin America, where several coups d'etat were attempted in the midst of fully-fledged internal armed conflicts. This connection between insurgent activities and dynamics of coups could be found in the cases of El Salvador in 1979, Argentina in 1976, Uruguay and Chile in 1973, or Perú in 1992, among others.

The few available works on the relation between civil war dynamics and coups have began to build the basic building blocks for the understanding of the inter-relation between these two processes. Roessler (2016), in his path-breaking war on Africa, shows that there is a constant trade-off in ethnically heterogeneous societies with regards to political power-sharing, leading to the so-called "coup-civil war trap": sharing power with outside groups increases the prospects for insider manoeuvres of coup d'etat, but excluding them increases the chances of civil war onset in the periphery. This trap explains the constant processes of political violence in countries such as Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Going beyond the African continent, Bell & Sudduth (2017) use cross-national data to trace the linkages between coups and civil wars. Concretely, they show that 25% of the coups occurred since 1945 took place in ongoing civil wars. They argue that ongoing internal conflicts increase the chances of coups attempts; that these coups are much more likely to be unsuccessful than those that take place in non-conflict periods; and more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, that the level of strength of rebel groups is a fundamental factor explaining coup attempts: stronger rebels will increase the risk of a coup during internal armed conflicts. Relatedly, Thyne (2017) shows that coups d'etat act as a shock in the civil war path, leading to a demise of insurgent forces in the aftermath of coups and shortening the overall duration of the conflict. Building a more holistic approach to the heterogeneity of contentious events, Gläßel et al. (2020) trace the impact of a wide range of dissent activities on subsequent coups d'etat. Unlike prior studies, they argue that the key driver of coup dynamics are strikes, due to the support of economic elites, while guerrilla attacks play a negligible role, as "significant parts of the armed forces see nonviolent forms of dissent as evidence of a subversive enemy gaining popular support, whereas violent resistance like guerrilla attacks or riots indicate a weakened insurgent enemy" (ibid:5). Finally, Sudduth (2021) studies the mechanisms leading members of the ruling coalition to punish leaders in the wake of civil war. He argues that culpability on the initiation of the actions play a fundamental role: leaders who are perceived

as guilty of the beginning of armed actions will suffer coups attempts from elites outside the ruling coalition, while the attempts will be crafted by members of the ruling coalition when the leader is perceived as non-guilty.

Despite all this novel understanding of the impact of civil war in a wide variety of political outcomes, there are still three fundamental problems in this stream of research. First, most of the studies have completely disregarded the endogenous political consequences of civil war *during* the conflict. While this shortcoming could be partially based on the over-reliance on quantitative causal identification techniques that make increasingly difficult the collection of data during conflict periods, future research should aim to deal with the under-explored endogenous nature of conflict and trace the variations at micro, meso and macro levels of analysis produced by the dynamics of civil war (Shesterinina 2021; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003). A second aspect that requires further research, and which is in direct line with some of the contributions of this dissertation, relates to the need to link the trajectories of conflict across its different phases and stages. While extant research aims to superficially connect the wartime period with postwar political outcomes, it does so in a piece-meal manner, without specifying the concrete stages of conflict in which these dynamics took place or the set of contextual conditions surrounding their evolution. This perception of conflict as a single overarching category neglects the inherent complex nature of civil wars. Finally, research on the political effects and legacies of war should enrich from the increasingly ample understanding of the characteristics and determinants of the wide set of dynamics of war explored by the micro-level research program. While extant research has particularly traced the impact of exposure to wartime violence on post-conflict political outcomes, more studies remain to be done on the potential effects of other factors such as rebel governance, insurgent strength or civilian displacement.[10]

[10]Cederman & Vogt (2017:2005) also point to further potential improvements in the legacies of war research: "Overall, however, the literature has produced relatively little systematic knowledge about individuals' post-conflict grievances, attitudes toward reconciliation, and, in particular, how such individual-level consequences aggregate up to collective outcomes."

2.5 The Way Forward

In the previous sections, I have highlighted some of the key shortcomings of the burgeoning and vibrant literature on civil wars. This dissertation, while not aiming to address each and all of the limitations presented above and explicitly incurring in some of the problems described, it expects to partially contribute to the endeavor of setting the civil war agenda into a new path forward, facilitating the analysis of internal armed conflicts as dynamics processes with different phases. Concretely, this thesis is comprised of three papers that address the impact of a variety of civil war dynamics (insurgent strength, exposure to violence and territorial control) on a variety of political outcomes (coup attempts, preferences over peace and state capacity) at the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. One of the main goals of these three papers is to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the potential linkages between distinct conflict phases and war stages, tracing through fine-grained empirical analysis the connections between conflict dynamics and their political consequences at three temporal periods: (1) during war; (2) right before conflict termination; and (3) in the postwar period. The three papers are ordered in a chronological way according to the phase of the conflict in which the outcome studied is situated.

The first paper centers on the impact of levels of insurgent strength on patterns of elite cooperation leading to the formation of alternative regime coalitions and coup attempts. Relying on a novel dataset of Latin American insurgencies, I trace the determinants explaining variation in coup processes in the region during the Cold War period. Concretely, I put the focus on the role of intra-elite competition and rebel capacity: when insurgents reach a sufficient level of strength, in contexts of overt intra-elite strife, alliances between the military and other social forces will be formed in order to instigate coup attempts. The presence of a sufficiently strong armed actor challenging the status quo is understood as an opportunity for changes in the distribution of power at the regime level. This set of findings not only provide important evidence on the fluid, complex and endogenous effects of civil war

dynamics on macro-level political processes, but also enriches our understanding of the constant interlinks between two contentious processes usually studied in isolation.

The second paper is directly linked to the broad discussion on the impact of exposure to wartime violence on individual political preferences. Unlike extant research, mostly focused on the short and long term legacies of this type of violence in the aftermath of conflict, together with Juan Masullo we delve into the relation between exposure to wartime violence and preferences over peace right upon conflict termination. Concretely, and relying on the results of the 2016 Colombian referendum, we propose a novel mechanism explaining the potential heterogeneous effect of violence against civilians. We argue that *who shot the bullets* is fundamental, and that in multiparty civil wars, civilians will make decisions over peace based on the maximization of safety-seeking considerations. While this paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on the impact of wartime violence showing the heterogeneous effects of violence exposure according to the identity of the perpetrator, it also urges scholars to understand that the prospects for conflict termination and transition to peace hinge upon individuals' wartime experiences.

The third and final paper of the dissertation links decisions on state building in the aftermath of conflict to local variation in levels of wartime territorial control. Using data from the Peruvian conflict (1980-1992), this paper questions existent perceptions of the disruptive effects of civil war. I show that those municipalities that were under control of Sendero Luminoso, or which remained contested during the conflict, received higher levels of investment in state building measures after the end of the war, as the state aims to expand its power to areas of former insurgent influence in order to avoid the onset or resurgence of dissent movements in these territories. One of the main contributions of this article is to shift the focus on the impact of war dynamics beyond exposure to violence, leading to a more holistic understanding not only of internal armed conflicts, but of the linkages between wartime dynamics and postwar political processes: strategic macro-level

distributive decisions in the aftermath of war are directly linked to dynamics of conflict, and more concretely, on the scattered nature of territorial control and insurgent governance institutions.

In sum, this dissertation adopts a two-pronged approach that aims, firstly, to develop a novel understanding of conflict as a process with distinct stages, and secondly, to engage in the systematic search of the political consequences of a variety of wartime dynamics. While this thesis fails in the endeavor of promoting a novel theoretical and analytical approach towards the understanding of civil wars as dynamic processes, it aims to push conflict scholars to rethink the boundaries of how we analytically conceptualize civil wars; to press for the development of a comprehensive perspective of conflict that captures their trajectory in a holistic manner; and to trace as well the wide set of political consequences that they produce, linking their potential effects to the dynamics of prior conflict phases.

2.6 The Unexplored Story of Latin American Insurgencies

The idealistic and romantic appeal of Latin American guerrillas has fascinated people from all over the world generation after generation. The image of a small group of highly politicized youngsters fighting against the injustice and oppression of brutal dictators, while having at the same time the ability to jeopardize state power, has inspired dozens of films, novels and songs based on their quest for a new world. Even the iconic picture of Che Guevara has become one of the global symbols of fight against capitalism. However, once we approach the civil war literature, we are faced with quite a paradoxical situation. If we disentangle wars according to the classification developed by Kalyvas & Balcells (2010), what we find is that most of the wars occurring in the Cold War were irregular wars led by combatants using guerrilla tactics. But despite the fact that the Latin American guerrilleros entail the paradigmatic example of armed organizations engaging in irregular wars, Latin American insurgencies have remained largely unexplored and

understudied in the civil war literature and we still lack nuanced and convincing explanations on the dynamics of these groups despite the broad set of studies made on their trajectories. How have Latin American insurgences been analyzed so far? Studies on Latin American armed groups can be classified according to two different characteristics: the number of cases studied (either single-case or comparative); and the approach of the research (merely descriptive or with empirical purposes). This brings four different kinds of works.

2.6.1 Descriptive Single Cases

Descriptive single-case studies account for the majority of investigations done in the region. Already since the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, plenty of journalistic accounts; academic studies from historians, sociologists and political scientists; testimonies from former combatants; or documentary compilations, have delved into the trajectories and dynamics of the extensive number armed groups operating in Latin America. Special emphasis has been given to the study of successful insurgencies, such as the Cuban Movimiento 26 de Julio (Ramírez 1997; Franqui 1967, 1976; Guerra & Maldonado 2005; Harnecker 1985; Meneses 1995; Farber 2006; Pérez-Stable 1998) and the victory of Nicaraguan Sandinistas against Anastasio Somoza's regime twenty years later (Baltodano 2010; Borge 1981; Carmona 1980; Disla 1995; Black 1981; Booth 1982; Perla 2016; Pisani 1981; Vilas 1986; Yanes 2008).

Beyond the cases of revolutionary success, the conflicts in Colombia and Perú have received special attention. The analysis of the Colombian guerrillas, despite their heterogeneity and divergent outcomes, has specially focused on the study of the strongest group, the FARC-EP (Pizarro Leongómez 1991; Marulanda Vélez 1973; Ferro Medina & Uribe Ramón 2002; Arango 1984; Arenas 1985). Less well understood are the trajectories of other important groups in the country, such as the ELN (Arenas 1971; Hernández 2006; Medina Gallego 1996, 2001, 2020; Harnecker 1988b; Villamarín 1995), the EPL (Calvo Ocampo 1987; Villarraga

1994), or the M19 (Villamizar 1995). For the case of Perú, few analyses delve into the history of the failed guerrillas of the ELN and MIR in 1965 (Lust 2013), as most of the focus has been on the brutal insurgency of Sendero Luminoso, which remained operative between 1980 and 1992 (Degregori 1985, 1989, 1990; Gorriti 2000; Rénique 2003; La Serna 2012; Stern 1998; Palmer 1994; Taylor 2006). Plenty studies have also been made on less known armed groups in the region, such as Montoneros and the ERP-PRT in Argentina (Gillespie 1982; Giussani 2011; Salcedo 2011; Carnovale 2011; Pozzi 2004), ELN in Bolivia (Gonzalez & Salazar 1969; Vázquez Viana 2000; Debray 2004), Tupamaros in Uruguay (Rey-Tristán 2005; Aldrighi 2001; Fernández-Huidobro 2001; Gatto 2004; Labrousse 2009) or the Venezuelan guerrillas of the FALN (Linárez 2006, 2011; Valsalice 1975; García Ponce 1977; Garrido 1999; Gudat 2018).

Most of these studies can be characterized as historical accounts on the origins, evolution and dynamics of these insurgent groups, without any attempt of building comparative analytical frameworks over which a concrete set of hypotheses could be tested. The abundance of descriptive case studies lead to a fragmented understanding of the trajectories of insurgent groups in Latin America as part of a common revolutionary endeavor with unique dynamics and comparable characteristics.

2.6.2 Comparative Descriptive

A second type of studies take a wider perspective and focus on comparative and descriptive analyses of the guerrillas operating in Latin America, or the broader concept of the Latin American left (Lowy 2007; Pereyra 1994; Wright 2000, Marchesi 2017), but without the aim of developing any causal argument and of systematically testing any set of hypotheses. The list of works that can be included in this category is extensive, but two studies deserve special reference: Gott (1971) and Kohl & Litt (1974), as they opened the way for further analysis. In Gott (1971), the author makes the first comparative study of the guerrilla movements operating in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution. Focusing on the rural foco guerrillas in

Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Perú and Bolivia, the book traces the history, evolution and defeat of the set of armed groups operating in these countries. This book was then complemented by the study of Kohl & Litt (1974), who focused on the understanding of the second wave of Latin American guerrilla groups, which shifted towards the implementation of a strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The authors' focus is on the three most prominent cases of urban revolutionary action: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

Since the publication of these fundamental studies, plenty of works have relied on a comparative and descriptive analysis of the Latin American guerrillas. Mercier-Vega (1969) and Lamberg (1979) provided some of the most insightful analyses on the eruption and characteristics of nascent rebel groups in the region. On a very helpful individual systematic tracking of the trajectories and characteristics of these groups, Radu & Tismaneanu (1990), Pereyra (1994) and Gross (1995) provide essential contributions to the comparative analysis of revolutionary armed organizations. More recently, a group of Latin American historians have crafted one of the most useful works for researchers aiming to understand the complex dynamics of civil war in the region. In a master volume, Oikión Solano and coauthors (2014), bring together some of the major experts on Latin American guerrilla movements and make a very detailed analysis of the state of the historiography on these revolutionary armed groups. A few years after, Kruijt et al. (2019) expanded on this work and provided comparative evidence through detailed case studies on the origins, evolution and outcomes of guerrilla groups in the region. Other comparative works on the trajectory of insurgent groups in Latin America include Estep (1975), Castro (1999), Rochlin (2003) or De La Pedraja (2013).

2.6.3 Case Studies

A third set of studies is related to a new wave of civil war scholars analyzing different conflict dynamics using Latin American rebel groups as their cases of analysis. This new array of empirical work has focused particularly in the study

of three different wars: the Colombian civil war, the Salvadorian conflict and the Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Perú.

It is not adventurous to state that the field of civil war studies suffers from a "Colombianist bias", as the analysis of the Colombian civil war has informed some of the most prominent theories in this area of research. Indeed, several of the most insightful and careful analysis on the micro-level dynamics of civil war are based on the findings provided by the studies made in this country. For example, the core works made on the understanding of dynamics such as civilian displacement (Steele 2017; Balcells & Steele 2016), civilian resistance (Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2020) or rebel governance (Arjona 2014, 2016) are based on fine-grained evidence gathered through extensive fieldwork in different areas of Colombia.

The Salvadorian conflict (1972-1992) has also served as a scenario for systematic empirical testing in the field of political violence. From a macro-level perspective, Wood (2000) traces the factors leading to an "insurgent-path" towards democracy, using El Salvador as one of her main case-studies. Most prominently, a wide set of micro-level studies of civil war dynamics have been influenced by the work of Wood (2003), where through immersive fieldwork in the Salvadorian guerrillas of the FMLN, FPL and ERP, she made a path-breaking contribution to the understanding of civilian mobilization during internal armed conflicts. More recently, Viterna (2013) also delves into the micro-processes of women mobilization during the Salvadorian civil war. Finally, Hoover-Green (2018) widens the spectrum of study of armed actors in a thoughtful comparison between Salvadorian Armed Forces and the FMLN in order to trace the determinants behind violence restraint during internal armed conflict.

Finally, the conflict between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian government has also attracted the attention of a wide set of researchers working on different dynamics of war in Latin America. McClintock (1998), in an early study on the

trajectory of revolutionary movements in the region, makes a dual comparison of the dynamics of Sendero Luminoso and the FMLN in El Salvador, in order to trace the factors explaining the military and political strength of these insurgencies by the late 1980s and early 1990s. A few years later, Weinstein (2006), in a cornerstone book on the dynamics of violence against civilians in irregular wars, uses the cases of Sendero Luminoso and its branch in the Upper Huallaga valley for testing his argument on the role of available resources in shaping recruiters' propensity for engaging in indiscriminate violence against the local population. More recently, Schubiger (2020) has traced patterns of civilian response to exposure to state violence through the creation of civilian defense forces focusing as well on the Peruvian experience.

While this over-reliance in a recurrent set of cases is problematic both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view, this thesis fails in the endeavor of promoting the understanding of conflict processes beyond the over-studied cases mentioned above. The extensive secondary literature, together with the availability of high-quality fine-grained data at the subnational level for the cases of Colombia and Perú, facilitates the endeavor of any researcher aiming to understand conflict process in Latin America. However, I aim to partially deal with this problem through the development of a cross-national analysis that relies on a novel dataset of Latin American insurgencies. Further studies should definitely take a clearer stand on this problem and systematically study micro-level dynamics of civil war on the wide set of under-analysed armed groups in the region, specially organisations operating in urban areas.

2.6.4 Comparative Testing

Finally, and despite the relevance of revolutionary armed violence in the region, it is an absolute surprise to see the scarce number of studies combining a rich comparative and historical account of the Latin American armed groups with rigorous empirical evidence. The seminal work by Wickham-Crowley (1992) remains the most important exception. In this path-breaking book, the author aims to

understand the striking puzzle of why some armed groups succeeded in their revolutionary attempts in the region while others did not. He develops a coherent and highly compelling explanation and considers that two factors are key for understanding this variation. First, the capacity of the insurgents to develop cross-class opposition coalitions against the authoritarian regimes. And second, the existence of patrimonial dictators, which he calls "mafiacracies", characterized by high levels of corruption and the lack of incorporation of other social strata into political structures. Besides this work, there is a lack of comparative evidence on the varying trajectories of insurgent groups in Latin America.[11]

In sum, the understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of Latin American insurgencies is scarce and fragmented. We lack nuanced explanations of key questions related to how these groups were created, why they engaged in varied armed strategies, why they followed different trajectories or why some of them endured for decades while others were eliminated during their first years of existence. As summarized by Bartoletti (2011): "Despite the simultaneities and similarities in the development of the Latin American revolutionary armed organizations from the 1950s on, a distinctive characteristic of the analysis on the subject is the predominance of case studies. These, despite many times having a great interpretative and empirical richness, usually lack comparative references to guide the reader regarding the specificity of the case. On the other hand, the few existing general works tend to be alternatively descriptive or interpretive, a dilemma that is reflected in elaborate interpretations with weak empirical foundations, concise interpretations for abundant empirical information or partial, unsustainable cuts of the analyzed phenomenon." While this dissertation cannot address all of these caveats and is mainly focused on the understanding of the political effects of

[11]Beyond this classification, it is important to highlight the works of the actual guerrilleros starring the armed fight. Among the main references, the books by Che Guevara (1960), Regis Debray (1967) or Marighella (1971) are key accounts for understanding the strategies, capabilities and limitations of these armed groups. Moreover, plenty of diaries, memoirs and compilation of interviews to former armed group leaders and combatants have been published throughout the last decades, providing insights into their experiences and day-to-day life during the conflict (Guevara 1968; Borge et al. 1986; Harnecker 1983).

civil war, further studies should take advantage of the rich and under-explored secondary literature on Latin American insurgencies and combine them with the broad theories on the dynamics of civil wars developed by scholars working in the understanding of processes of political violence.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a brief analysis of the main literatures to which this dissertation aims to contribute. Firstly, I have analyzed the wide set of studies on the determinants of civil war onset, describing the core debates between the role of greed, grievances and state capacity, while succinctly summarizing an emerging agenda that aims to move forward the boundaries of existent research towards the understanding of onset as a separate analytical category. After this, I have briefly reviewed the burgeoning set of studies of the micro-level dynamics of civil war, with a special emphasis on the works analyzing patterns of violence against civilians, civilian mobilization and rebel governance. Finally, I have briefly described the scant studies on the analysis of civil war outcomes and conflict termination, urging scholars to focus on this stream of research due to their relevance in the development of adequate policy strategies in the post-war period.

After this, I have delved into the burgeoning literature on the political consequences of civil war. Distinguishing between three different levels of analysis, I have shown that a lot of emphasis has been given to micro-level research, where the main findings relate to the lasting consequences of civil wars on the polarization of political identities and the encouragement of cooperative and pro-social behavior. From a meso-level perspective, I have argued that much more remains to be done, despite the set of recent analyses studying rebel-to-party transformations, the creation of vigilante groups in the aftermath of conflict as well as the organizational legacies of war. And finally, I have delved into the scarce analyses on the macro-level political effects of civil wars. While most of the studies focus on war recurrence and prospects towards democratization, I argue that future research should focus

on the interactive relation between civil wars and other contentious processes. I have positioned the contributions to be made with each of the articles included in this dissertation within this burgeoning area of research.

The last part of the chapter has aimed to provide a very rapid review on the wide and rich secondary literature on Latin American insurgencies. Through an analysis of the distinct dimensions of this literature, it has shown the impressive set of studies made on Latin American rebel groups and how civil war scholars have made an inefficient use of these resources, focusing only on the major and most distinguished civil wars in the region. A fundamental caveat of this research is the lack of comparative analysis on the trajectories, characteristics and dynamics of these insurgent groups, which have led to a fragmented understanding of civil wars in the Latin American region.

Through this review of the literature, this chapter has set the systematic building blocks of the areas of research to which this dissertation speaks to and the main contributions to be developed. The next three chapters present the three papers of this doctoral thesis, and the sixth and final chapter provides a summary of the main scholarly and policy implication of this research.

Part II

Papers

All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.

— Charles Wright Mills

When dangers are foreseen (and this is the privilege of the prudent), they are soon conjured; but if, ignoring them, they are allowed to grow so that no one notices, they are irremediable.

— Niccolo Machiavelli

3

Common Enemies? Coups, Insurgent Strength and Intra-Elite Competition: Evidence from Latin America

Contents

3.1 Introduction 97
3.2 Theory 101
3.2.1 Actors and Goals 102
3.2.2 The Argument 103
3.2.3 Elite Unity 106
3.2.4 Elite Competition 107
3.2.5 Insurgent Strength 108
3.3 Data & Empirical Strategy 114
3.4 Results 121
3.4.1 Empirical Analysis 121
3.4.2 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 126
3.4.3 Case Study: Argentina during the 70s 129
3.5 Conclusion 135

Abstract

What is the inter-relation between coups d'etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes, however, has been surprisingly unexplored. Building upon different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others not. I show that the occurrence of coups during civil wars is directly related to two factors: patterns of elite unity and the level of strength of rebel groups. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts in the midst of internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and certain coalition insiders, interpret this situation as an unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions materialized in coups against regime structures. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on revolutionary insurgencies in Latin America formed in the Cold War era (1955-1991) and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d'etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.

3.1 Introduction

In October 1979, in the midst of conflict escalation between the Salvadorian government and the Marxist insurgencies of the Ejército Revolucionaro del Pueblo (ERP) and the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (FPL), a revolutionary military Junta was imposed in El Salvador through a bloodless coup d'etat against general Carlos Humberto Romero (Stanley 1996). The ERP and the FPL[1] had been active for only 7 years, remained operative mainly in the peripheral areas of the country and lacked ample political support and military capacity. Despite sharing common ideological basis and armed strategies, the situation with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) was completely different. Although the strongest revolutionary insurgent organization in the country was active since 1964, it had considerable operational capacity in more than 25% of national municipalities, held extensive territorial control and had an armed force of around 10.000 combatants, no coup d'etat occurred in Colombia during the 62 years of existence of the group (Bottía 2003). Why do some regimes experience coups in the midst of civil wars while others not? What is the inter-relation between these two processes?

Extant research on the linkages between coups d'etat and internal armed conflicts sustains that the level of strength of insurgent groups is a core factor shaping coup attempts, portraying an intrinsically linear relation between the two: the higher the level of insurgent power, the higher the chances of wartime coups (Bell & Sudduth 2017). Challenging this perception, this paper presents a more complex picture. It posits a curvi-linear relation between levels of insurgent strength and coup activity, arguing that coups will be more likely to occur at mid-levels of rebel capacity and only in scenarios of elite disunity. Under conditions of intra-elite competition, the presence of a violent insurgent organization with mid-level of

[1]The ERP and the FPL were the strongest guerrilla organizations in El Salvador, but other three revolutionary armed groups were active by the late 1970s: Resistencia Nacional (RN), Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (PCS) and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).

strength creates the necessary incentives and ability for elites within and outside of the ruling coalition to coalesce with strengthened state military forces for the formation of alternative regime coalitions. If successful, and under the adequate contextual conditions, this will materialize in the engagement in coups d'etat against existent political structures. This process of elite convergence in the midst of conflict is facilitated by the overcoming of informational asymmetries and the resolution of collective action problems.

I explore this argument in the context of the post-WWII Latin American civil wars, concretely focusing on the dynamics of revolutionary guerrilla groups created during the Cold War era (1955-1991). Latin America presents a universe of cases that facilitates the thorough comparative analysis of the effects of distinct insurgent dynamics and other contentious processes on coups d'etat, as the region was one of the main laboratories of political violence during the second half of the 20th century. A combination of revolutionary insurgent groups, political assassinations, mass strikes, coups d'etat and riots shaped its political landscape for decades. In order to test the theoretical argument, I make use of a novel database on insurgent group dynamics which covers 80 groups active in the region during this period (Kreiman 2021). Fundamentally for the purposes of this study, this database disaggregates the level of success of insurgent groups in three different categories, allowing the comparison across cases with low, medium and high level of strength. In parallel, I rely on a qualitative case study of the dynamics between insurgent actions and the process of elite convergence leading to the 1976 coup d'etat in Argentina.

The analysis supports the proposed theoretical argument: intra-elite competition and insurgent strength play a fundamental role in the understanding of the dynamics of coup d'etat in the midst of civil wars. When insurgents reach a medium level of strength, under conditions of intra-elite competition, the military forms alliances with a subset of the elite forces in order to instigate coup attempts against existing political structures. The presence of an armed actor with medium levels of strength

challenging the existent status quo is understood as an opportunity for changes in the distribution of power at the regime level.

This paper contributes to several literatures in the fields of political violence and contentious politics. First, it directly speaks to the scarce set of studies that explore the inter-relation between coups and internal armed conflicts (Roessler 2016; Thyne 2017). As stated before, I build against one of the core findings of this area of research that portrays the linearity of the relation between levels of rebel strength and coup attempts. One of the main caveats of these studies is that they overlook the structure of elite alignments both in the pre-conflict period and during the civil war process. In an attempt of fruitful cross-fertilization, and relying on the developments of an emerging set of works focused on the effects of intra-elite competition on a variety of outcomes, I provide a more nuanced analysis of the intrinsic dynamics of elite alignments in the midst of civil wars for the instigation of coup attempts.

A second literature to which this study contributes relates to the vibrant research program on the study of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016). Despite the pivotal role of intra-elite dynamics in processes of democratization (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1985; Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Ansell & Samuels 2014), state building (Mares & Queralt 2015; Garfias 2018; Beramendi, Dincecco & Rogers 2018) or revolutions (Skocpol 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1992), the interactive relation between insurgents, incumbents and other elite forces during civil wars has been completely under-studied in this area of research.[2] The reliance on an elitist-approach challenges existent perceptions about the ontological nature of the state in the civil war literature, which conceptualizes the state as a cohesive and unitary institution. While recent research has started to unpack the potential fragmented and dynamic nature of insurgent organizations (Christia 2012; Staniland 2014), scant work in the civil war literature has considered the heterogeneous and dynamic character of regime coalitions and elite alignments.

[2]See Wood (2000) as the main exception.

Finally, this article is in direct connection with the wide set of studies tracing the determinants and dynamics of coup processes (Thyne 2010; Gassebner et al. 2016; Bell 2016; Bellin 2012; Gallopin 2019; Keel 2021). While the study of the linkages between coups d'etat and civil wars is still in its infancy, much more research has traced the systematic inter-relation between coups d'etat and wider contentious processes. Several studies show that one of the factors that consistently shapes the prospects for coup occurrence is political instability, specially linked to the onset of contentious actions (Belkin & Schofer 2003; Casper & Tyson 2014; Johnson & Thyne 2018). Their effects, however, are highly unclear and two different strands of research provide alternative implications. On the one hand, most of the macro-level cross-national studies on coups d'etat argue that political instability facilitates coup attempts due to its dual role as a signaling device of decreasing leadership legitimacy and due to the reduction of coordination problems across distinct elite groups (Casper & Tyson 2014). And on the other hand, a different strand of research argues that contentious processes prompt a "rally around the flag" effect. Slater (2010) presents the most compelling approach to the question of how political actors and other social forces react to the increasing strength of revolutionary contentious activities, showing how, in the face of threatful mass collective action, elites forge agreements that bind them together against the risk of revolution.[3]

While this research has provided fundamental advancements to our understanding of these processes, certain gaps remain to be filled. First, a scarce set of studies have systematically delved into the heterogeneous effects of distinct contentious processes. The tendency in this area of research is to bring together distinct processes under the common labels of "domestic turmoil" or "socio-political instability",

[3]Much more consensus is found when tracing patterns of elite coordination distinguishing between violent and peaceful contentious events. Most studies on this area argue that the likelihood of coup occurrence *decreases* when *violent* contentious processes take place. Coalition insiders and elite outsiders are expected to coalesce with the regime leadership due to the unappealingness of violence for broad constituencies, the perception of violence as "the weapon of the weak", and due to the fulfillment of military grievances during periods of internal conflict. Gläßel et al. (2020:11) and Chenoweth & Stepan (2011:48-49) provide evidence in this direction.

implicitly assuming an homogeneous nature across contentious events that is far from realistic given the wide historical evidence pointing into a different direction (Kalyvas 2006; Goodwin 2001). In this paper, I systematically compare the potential impact of distinct contentious actions, such as demonstrations, riots, political assassinations, strikes and insurgent activities. Second, most of the literature on coups d'etat, and more particularly on processes of elite coordination and defection, neglect the fundamental role that non-military civilian elites outside institutional structures play in the construction of alternative regime coalitions for the instigation of coups d'etat. The inclusion of these actors into the analysis of coup processes provides a more holistic understanding of the dynamics leading to coup attempts (Leventoglu & Metternich 2018). And third, overly deterministic arguments on the role of contentious violence on coup processes disregard the overtly complex nature of elite strategic interactions in the midst of conflict. In direct contrast to the expectations of prior research, I side with recent works that support the assertion that the effects of violent processes will be contingent on a variety of conditioning factors, and more particularly, on the level of elite unity (Paine 2020).

The combination of insights from these research programs, and the burgeoning literature on intra-elite competition, facilitates a more careful analysis of the intrinsic dynamics between coups d'etat and civil wars, two violent political processes much more interlinked between each other than what previous scholarship has examined.

3.2 Theory

In the development of a theory of elite choices under insurgent threat, I rely on the key building blocks of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and social conflict approaches (Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Ansell & Samuels 2014; Albertus 2015). First, I adopt a conception of society formed by a variety of social actors with divergent preferences over institutions, policies and social choices. Second, I rely on a understanding of politics as a zero-sum game, in which choices over policies, institutions and regimes are conflictual in a

relational way: the set of policies that benefit one group will necessarily be contrary to the interests of other social force (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006:15). Third, from a rationalist perspective, it is expected that each of these actors has an inherent preference for the maximization of their power within institutional structures. And fourth, no political leader rules alone: "every leader answers to some group that retains her in power" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003:7). Ruling coalitions, formed by the compromise between leaders and the set of actors that support them and guarantee their survival (Svolik 2012:6), are also characterized by their fluid and elusive nature. Alignments between the incumbent and supportive social forces are therefore subjected to constant adaptations.

3.2.1 Actors and Goals

Before turning to the main argument, I briefly describe the core actors of my theoretical framework. In an exercise of analytical simplification, I focus on the interactions in the quest for political power between five distinct actors: (1) incumbents; (2) coalition insiders; (3) key military players; (4) elite outsiders; and (5) insurgent organizations.

The *Incumbent* is the leader of the political regime. It is in charge of the direction of the executive power, either in democratic or authoritarian settings. The main goal of incumbents is "to remain in office or to obtain greater power and autonomy for the institutions [they] represent" (Albertus 2015:33). *Coalition insiders* are the set of social forces that are part of the incumbent ruling coalition. Leaders rule in cooperation with other actors, and "governing coalitions -loyal supporters drawn from a larger population- form around the leader in a mutually beneficial relationship" (Heger & Salehyan 2007:387). They retain important positions within governmental structures, have sufficient capacity to influence policy outcomes and their main goal is to maximize the prospects of being part of the ruling coalition. *Key military players*, mainly represented by top military officers, also hold a fundamental role in any regime structure. Either part of the ruling elite in military dictatorships,

or through its role as the key actor in charge of the repression of contentious activities, the military emerges as a pivotal political force. Driven by the fulfillment of their corporate interests (Nordlinger 1977; Huntington 1991; Slater et al. 2014), top military forces aim to maximize their political power within state institutions through the holding of key office positions.[4] *Elite outsiders* are the set of elite forces without access to governmental decisions and political power. In the case of holding any position within state structures, they are "excluded from key positions with power to influence policy and enjoy political privileges" (Kim & Sudduth 2021:7). These actors' main aim is to enter into state institutions with the goal of being part of a ruling coalition that represents their political, social and economic interests. Finally, *insurgent organizations*, conceived as every "group of individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence" (Staniland 2014:5). In this paper I focus particularly on the role of "revolutionary" rebel groups, whose main goal is the implementation of a socialist regime through the use of armed violence.[5]

3.2.2 The Argument

How do civil war dynamics, and more concretely, insurgent strength, affect coup attempts in the midst of internal armed conflict? A comprehensive answer to this question requires a thorough analysis of the endogenous effects of rebel activity on elite preferences, as well as of the structure of elite relations prior to the beginning of insurgent actions.[6] Given that prior research has provided mixed evidence on the expected patterns of elite collective action as a response to contentious processes (Slater 2010; Powell 2012), I argue that a more nuanced understanding can emerge through a focus on levels of elite unity *before* and *during the course* of contentious

[4]These corporatist preferences "only occasionally align with those of [...] other economic elites" (Albertus 2015:37).

[5]Future versions of the paper will include game theoretical models tracing the strategic interactions of this set of actors.

[6]Burton, Gunther & Higley (1992:8) define elites as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially."

actions, as the effects of conflict will be highly dependent upon the existent structure of elite relations prior to the onset of contentious activities (Lachmann 1997:92): pre-war elite politics will therefore shape patterns of elite coordination during civil war. This integrated approach shows how, under conditions of *initial* intra-elite strife, key military players, elite outsiders and a subset of coalition insiders, have the disposition and the ability to coordinate for the formation of an alternative regime coalition, due to the opportunities created by the presence of a violent actor with mid-levels of strength. The process of elite coordination, if effective, could eventually crystallize in the alteration of institutional structures through a coup d'etat (see Figure 3.1 below).




Figure 3.1: Observable implications of the argument.

But are elite splits a characteristic inherent to the existence and development of political structures? Historical evidence shows that the type and scope of agreements between elite groups vary across countries and evolve over time. Concretely, Burton, Gunther & Higley (1992:10-13) distinguish three different types of national elites according to their level of unity: (1) *ideologically unified elites*, defined by low levels of disagreement on ideological and policy issues; (2) *consensually unified elites*, in which there is an underlying accord on the respect of existent institutions, despite disagreements on concrete policies; and (3) *disunified elites*, with high levels of distrust across social forces and lack of institutional and policy cooperation. While a

thorough explanation of the factors behind the presence of distinct levels of elite unity falls beyond the scope of this paper, careful consideration of pre-war settlements, as well as of the endogenous effects of insurgent violence, allows the development of a more holistic perspective of the dynamic and interactive process of elite strategic choices in the midst of civil war (Wood 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan 2011).

In situations of crisis, such as contexts of widespread armed violence, elite collective action becomes activated. Indeed, "contentious politics [...] powerfully and persistently shapes how political alliances and rivalries will be defined" (Slater 2010:276). Distinct social forces, regardless of whether they are part of the ruling coalition or not, are confronted with sudden modifications in the political opportunity structure prompted by the presence of violent insurgent groups. The overt scenario of civil war facilitates the prospects of potential alignments across elite forces aiming to produce profound changes in the political structure, as the threat on the monopoly of violence posed by guerrillas acts as a shock that opens a window of opportunity for changes in the distribution of political power (Powell 2012; Garfias 2018). In other words, "dissent and violence [...] alter the opportunities and motivation of potential coup plotters" (Aksoy et al. 2015:430). This opening of the coup opportunity structure generates changes in the configuration of resources and institutional arrangements (Kitschelt 1986:58), leading to the potential formation of novel elite alignments as a direct reaction to violent insurgent actions. But how do elites (coalition insiders, elite outsiders and key military players) respond to these contentious processes? Two stylized situations could occur: (1) elite collective action could materialize under coherent settlements with incumbents in order to ensure protection against the threat of violent actors; or (2) elites could coordinate and develop a sufficiently strong alternative regime coalition that engages in a coup d'etat against existent regime structures.

3.2.3 Elite Unity

When pre-war elite cohesion is characterized by being either *ideologically* or *consensually unified*, I expect that, regardless of the level of insurgent threat, elites will remain cohesive enough as to preserve the stability of existent institutions. The pact forged across elites reduces not only the incentives, but also the ability to coordinate elite preferences against the regime coalition. On the one hand, the "underlying consensus about rules of the game and the worth of existing political institutions" (Burton, Gunther & Higley 1992:11) reduces the disposition to intervene, and specially, of becoming the first-mover in the coup process: the elemental agreement across social forces on the basic institutional arrangements and their overt access to state decision making, reduce the incentives of any social actor of becoming the instigator of profound changes at the regime level. Moreover, the capacity of finding institutional accommodation to the demands of coalition insiders and elite outsiders reduces the chances of successful coups. The small odds of succeeding, the access to institutional decisions, together with the harsh consequences linked to failed coup attempts (Easton & Siverson 2018), should hamper the disposition of aggrieved social forces to promote profound regime changes through coups d'etat.

In addition to this, the lack of extant intra-elite competition exacerbates pervading coordination problems, reducing the ability to intervene of coup instigators: potential first-movers lack sufficient information about the degrees of loyalty of distinct elite groups towards the regime leadership (Singh 2014). Under scenarios of formal elite agreement it is difficult to grasp the actual preferences of these groups, given that interactions under settings of formal elite unity could be characterized by preference falsification, as no actor has incentives to deviate from the existent status quo (Kuran 1991). The combination of these characteristics make increasingly difficult the development of strategic alignments across distinct forces that bring together sufficient factions as to promote the development of a potentially successful alternative regime coalition. The immediate observable implication is that, under

conditions of elite unity, the presence of insurgent groups produces a "rally around the flag" effect that strengthens the cohesiveness across elite forces.

3.2.4 Elite Competition

However, in situations of deep pre-war *elite disunity*, I posit that the presence of guerrilla organizations might lead to strategic alignments across social forces with the common goal of bringing changes at the regime structure through a coup d'etat. The situation of rampant insecurity, political uncertainty and weakened governmental legitimacy, opens the way for the contingent coordination across social actors, under the leadership of an increasingly strong military force, for the development of a potentially successful alternative regime coalition that has the rejection of existent political structures as its common unifying element (Beissinger 2013).[7]

Unlike in conditions of elite unity, scenarios of overt intra-elite competition facilitate the prospects for the disposition to intervene through coups d'etat. From a rationalist perspective, three distinct actors have incentives to coordinate in order to maximize the expected payoffs from a potentially successful coup attempt. First, military forces, who play a pivotal role in coup d'etat processes in the midst of civil war. The opening of the coup structure, and the potential implementation of a novel power structure under its leadership, maximize their capacity to promote their own corporate interests (Nordlinger 1977; Huntington 1991). The potential advancement in positions of power is complemented by the increased grievances by army forces due to its role as the repressive branch against insurgent groups, with the subsequent losses of members through its actions (Bell & Sudduth 2017:1435-1437). Moreover, the incapacity of the government to quell the insurgent threat deepens their demands of autonomy from the executive power in order to increase the effectiveness of their actions in their fight against rebel organizations. The combination of these factors rises their disposition to intervene through coups d'etat.

[7] As argued by Thyne (2017:294) "only coup leaders who are able to build a broad coalition of support with clear goals and strong leadership will be able to successfully take control of the government."

The second actor, elite outsiders, face the arrival of a prominent insurgent threat as a real opportunity to maximize the promotion of their institutional and policy interests. In a scenario in which intra-elite competition promotes the development of policies and institutional arrangements that favor the interests of the members of the ruling coalition, their lack of political power lead them to conclude that the only way of promoting their preferences is through their access into state institutions. The presence of violent armed organizations destabilizing the political regime and weakening its legitimacy presents as an ideal opportunity for this type of changes. Lastly, and despite their insertion into existent institutional structures, a subset of coalition insiders could potentially have enough incentives to coordinate with military forces and elite outsiders in order to gain prominence within the ruling coalition. Under the elusive and fluid nature of coalition arrangements, coalition insiders aggrieved by their scarce voice in policy and institutional decisions, could interpret as well the existence of an insurgent threat as an opportunity to expand their power within political structures and forge alliances with the potentially winning-side in the competition over the control of regime institutions. As argued by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003:8) "the incentive to defect from the incumbent to a challenger depends on the prospects of being included in the challenger's winning coalition if he should replace the incumbent."[8]

3.2.5 Insurgent Strength

While the presence of insurgent organizations shapes the incentives for strategic contingent alignments across social forces in scenarios of overt intra-elite competition, I posit that coup attempts should only be expected in contexts of mid-levels of guerrilla strength. In the following paragraphs, I distinguish the potential impact of three distinct *ideal* types of insurgent levels of strength.

[8]This type of actors will be likely targeted by the alternative regime coalition in formation, as the defection of pivotal actors shapes the prospects of success of coup instigators, prompting a decisive cascade effect in this type of contentious processes (Keel 2021).

Low Insurgent Strength

Insurgent organizations with low levels of strength are characterised by their lack of military and political capacity. The armed group is active but engages in scarce and non-influential attacks. It is formed by a few members, it is highly sensitive to counter-insurgent operations and lacks any type of territorial control. At this stage, the group is particularly focused on the reinforcement of its operational capacity and survival becomes its most relevant task (Guevara 1960; Lewis 2020). In other words, the group is a social and political reality, but it remains a marginal phenomenon. Therefore, at low levels of insurgent capacity, the threat of revolution is not credible enough by either members of the regime coalition or elite outsiders, making increasingly difficult the coordination of elite interests. Moreover, weak insurgencies are most likely targeted by police forces and other state security agencies, not by the military (Aksoy et al. 2015; Svolik 2012), toughening the penetration of military forces into regime structures, with the consequential incapacity by the army to play a central role in state decision-making processes. As well, levels of state legitimacy are unlikely to suffer a high level of decrease, given the scarce number and insignificant operations engaged by weak rebel organizations. Based on this, I do not expect coups d'etat to occur when incumbents face weak insurgent groups.

High Insurgent Strength

On the other extreme, insurgencies with high levels of strength have already become an established alternative to state power: the group has important levels of territorial control, it engages in highly complex military operations, and has a large number of armed combatants. The rebel organization is therefore conceived as an existential threat in a political and social landscape characterized by an implicit situation of dual sovereignty (Tilly 1978). Challenging prior findings positing that high levels of rebel strength increase the likelihood of coup attempts (Bell & Sudduth 2017), I argue that there is a fundamental, and often overlooked, factor when considering coup processes in the midst of war against strong insurgent organizations: the level of political mobilization achieved by these groups (Leventoglu & Metternich 2018).

Coup plotters, whose decision to engage in coup attempts is directly related to the potential chances of success (Thyne 2017), face a credible threat of countercoups if the level of rebel strength is sufficiently high. Beyond its level of military power, the capacity of insurgent groups to mobilize a considerable proportion of social forces, including not only civilians, but also grassroots local movements, religious organizations, as well as political parties or international actors (Wood 2003; Arjona 2016; Huang 2016b), convert rebel groups in a pivotal actor in the wartime political scenario. The forging of ties across these distinct organizations reduces the chances of success of a potential coup due to the ample support of a considerable part of the civilian population and of a variety of social actors, which could potentially include as well a subset of the military forces. These conditions facilitate the potential formation of a countercoup coalition that challenges the implementation of novel institutional structures. In parallel to this, the incumbent and the loyal members of the ruling coalition have an alternative path of action when facing high levels of insurgent strength. In order to reduce the chances of potential coups, they may advance negotiated settlements with strong insurgent forces, making increasingly difficult the justification of the coup as the only way out to end up with the insurgent threat. In line with the findings of previous research, I argue that mediation processes will be much more likely to occur and to be successful at high levels of insurgent strength, rather than at medium or low levels (Clayton 2013). This alternative solution hampers not only the disposition, but also the ability, of potential coup plotters to coordinate for the formation of novel regime coalitions.

Medium Insurgent Strength

A middle point between these two extremes is the scenario of insurgencies with medium levels of strength: armed groups begin to be considered as an increasing force characterized by the expansion of its military capacity and by its level of political mobilization. There is an important shift from clandestine operations by underground groups under strict security measures, to a group operating in wider

scale in public contexts, in some cases capable of holding considerable levels of territorial control. Despite its ability for expansion, the group does not pose a substantial threat to the state and the level of asymmetry between incumbents and insurgents' remains of paramount importance. I posit that, in situations of profound elite disunity, at mid-levels of guerrilla strength, the adequate contextual conditions are present: existence of a sufficient insurgent strength as to justify the need of profound institutional changes; the military forces play a pivotal role within regime structures; there are decreasing levels of government legitimacy; and insurgent groups have a relatively low level of political capacity. But how do mid-levels of insurgent strength facilitate the *ability* across social forces to coordinate and organize a coup attempt?

I argue that this process unfolds across three different layers. First, through the penetration of state military forces into political structures, leading to the so-called "guardianship dilemma." The rising force of insurgent violence puts the state army as a pivotal political actor with strengthened power within decision structures, as it becomes the only agent in charge of the repression of guerrilla activities (Carey 2010). However, the penetration of military forces into regime structures does not necessarily entail higher levels of political stability, as their incursion heightens the risks of coups (Acemoglu et al. 2010). Svolik (2012:125-129) summarizes this key dilemma of the politics of repression: "regimes that frequently face mass, organized, and violent opposition must integrate their militaries within their repressive apparatus by granting them corresponding material and institutional resources. It is these resources [...] combined with their political pivotalness that empower militaries to intervene in politics [...] Once soldiers attain a politically privileged position, they naturally attempt to preserve it." Already settled and with access to regime institutions, the military is in an advantageous position for the development of an alternative regime coalition with aggrieved coalition insiders and social forces outside of power.

Second, through a gradual procedure of social polarization. The heightened power of the military is accompanied by a reinforcement of the rising levels of conflict escalation: the new role of the army as the main repressive force leads to increasing levels of insurgent militarization, prompting moves towards clandestinity and shifts in armed strategies (Della Porta 1995). The spiral of violence between guerrillas and state armed forces lead to a polarization of the political sphere, widening the level of intra-elite competition and partitioning the political scenario into two poles: the "subversive" guerrillas and the counter-insurgent front led by the army (Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003). This situation of overt violence and polarization sharply reduces the level of state legitimacy, specially prompted by a feeling of social chaos in which the military forces emerge as the only actor capable of restoring institutional authority. In other words, the structural conditions elicited by increasing guerrilla strength lead to the perception across elite outsiders and aggrieved coalition insiders that there is *no other way out* than to unite around the strength of the military forces and engage in profound changes at the regime level, facilitating the coalescence of divergent elite groups' preferences.

Finally, and despite the formation of alternative regime coalitions is hampered by informational asymmetries on regime capabilities and strategic uncertainty about the choices and preferences of other social forces, insurgent violent actions facilitate the coordination across elite actors due to two distinct informational mechanisms (Casper & Tyson 2014). First, contentious processes provide elite groups with information on incumbents' capacity to cope with coup attempts. The ineffectiveness of the regime coalition in the deterrence of insurgent groups threatening state's monopoly of violence signals the fragile capacity of the regime coalition to resist a coup d'etat. And second, there is a reduction in the strategic uncertainty across distinct social forces, as the military, elite outsiders and aggrieved coalition insiders update their believes about the potential preferences and expected paths of action of other social forces. Faced with a threatful insurgent organization, and mediated by the publicity of rebel actions, the set of potential coup plotters expect that the weakening of the

existent leadership opens the way for changes at the regime level, facilitating the prospects for elite coordination across groups with distinct preferences but with a common interest of ousting the current regime coalition (Dix 1984).[9]

Once elites have reached a common coordination point for the implementation of a new political structure, finding the adequate timing and contextual conditions is of paramount importance in the coup process. Given that coup engagement is a risky option, and the fate of coup plotters is directly linked to death, exile or long-time imprisonment (Svolik 2009) "coup conspirators will carefully evaluate their chances of success and should only attempt a coup when the expected rewards of the maneuver and its probability of victory are high enough to offset the dire consequences of a failed putsch" (Powell 2012:1019). Therefore, coup attempts are more likely to occur "when the benefits of overthrowing the government are high and when coup plotters expect a high probability of success" (Johnson & Thyne 2018:599). This is expected to happen when a sufficiently cohesive alternative regime coalition is formed and when the legitimacy and strength of the ruling coalition is sufficiently low as to justify the coup towards internal and international audiences. Therefore, the argument developed derives the following hypothesis:

[9]Two complementary mechanisms could explain the process of elite convergence. The first mechanism relates to the instrumental exploitation of the presence of a sufficiently strong subversive force in the national territory. In a context of decreasing governmental legitimacy, the credible threat posed by these armed groups is exploited with the main goal of gradually weakening the incumbent coalition and preparing the basis for the implementation of a coherent political, economic, social and cultural project led by the novel alternative regime coalition formed. The opening of the coup opportunity structure produced by the presence of rising insurgent groups is further widened by the deliberate exploitation of the immediate menace posed by guerrilla groups, reflecting how the existence of "enemies" might be instrumentally used for the fulfilment of political goals (Fergusson et al. 2016). A second mechanism is related to the fear of successful revolution induced by rising insurgent activities. The existence of a serious challenge to regime structures and the incapacity of the existent regime coalition to contain violent activities facilitates the convergence across social forces on the necessity of coordination for the protection of their interests. The establishment of novel political structures that replace the incompetent regime coalition, and that has the capacity of neutralizing the violent chaos prompted by insurgent groups, ensures the protection of certain elite forces and the development of a socio-political project coherent with the maximization of their interests.

H1: Mid-levels of guerrilla strength, under scenarios of profound elite disunity, increase the likelihood of coup attempts in the midst of civil war.

3.3 Data & Empirical Strategy

In order to test this hypothesis, I rely on a cross-national analysis of the determinants of coups d'etat in the midst of civil wars with a regional focus on Latin America. Concretely, I make use of time-series cross-sectional data using country-year as the main unit of analysis. The sample covers 19 countries of the Latin American region for the period 1955-2018. Given that this analysis traces the determinants of coups *during* civil wars, I rely on a sample of observations that includes only the country-years in which any insurgent group was active in the national territory.

With the goal of identifying the impact of rebel groups' actions in Latin America, I have built a comprehensive dataset on Latin American insurgencies covering the dynamics of 80 armed groups. To the best of my knowledge, this dataset represents the first systematic effort of collecting comparative evidence on insurgencies operating in the Latin American context during the Cold War period (1955-1991) through detailed analytical narratives.[10] I have relied on the following criteria for the categorization of *ongoing* civil wars. First, I have made use of the definition of armed groups developed by Staniland (2014:5)[11], who puts aside battle-deaths thresholds and focuses instead on two factors: the use of armed violence for political purposes and the existence of formal structures of command and control (see Chapter 1). Second, I have only included armed groups which have engaged in *at least five armed actions* during its period of existence, in order to capture the activities of relevant groups that probably never made it to the battle-deaths thresholds proposed by the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Program (UCDP) and Correlates Of War (COW) datasets, but leaving apart marginal and short-lived

[10] See Appendices C and D.

[11] Umbrella groups are included in the sample, unless they represent short-lived contingent alliances. Splinter organizations are also included in the dataset once they have become autonomously operative from the actions of the parent organization.

groups with scarce capacity of action. This criteria reduces the critical selection bias present in cross-national datasets, as portrayed by Lewis (2017, 2020). Finally, the third condition relates to the temporal period of existence: groups need to have been created during the Cold War, that is, between 1955 and 1991.[12] This set of conditions lead to the inclusion of 80 armed organizations, distributed across countries as shown in Figure 3.2 below.




Figure 3.2: Number of Insurgent Organizations by Country (1955-1991).

The dependent variable, *Coup Attempt*, also relies on a novel collection of evidence of coup processes in the Latin American region. Given the considerable divergence between episodes of coup attempts collected in regional and global datasets[13] I bring together information from these databases in order to provide

[12]This does not preclude the fact that they remain operative after 1991. The full list of armed groups and their maximum level of strength can be found in Section C of the Appendix.

[13]Among others, the Center for Systemic Peace dataset on coups d'etat (Marshall & Marshall 2009), the regional database on Latin American coups from Lehoucq & Pérez Linán (2014) or the Dataset on Global Instances of Coups (Powell & Thyne 2011).

a more accurate picture of the set of coup attempts occurred in the region. The outcome variable is a dichotomous variable that captures any coup attempt, defined as "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Powell & Thyne 2011:252). Out of the 147 coups occurring in Latin America between 1950 and 2020[14], 24 took place in periods of active operation of insurgent groups, a 16.32% of the total sample (Figure 3.3).[15]




Figure 3.3: Number of coups in Latin America (1950-2020)

[14]Table A31 in Section F5 of the Appendix presents preliminary evidence on the determinants of coups d'etat in periods where no insurgent organization is active. Results are in line with findings from prior research on the lower likelihood of coup attempts under democratic regimes (Lindberg & Clark 2008; Powell 2012). Moreover, results also show the fundamental impact of mass unrest and contentious activities in coup processes, in this case, proxied by the variable on number of riots, positively and significantly related to coups in non-war periods (Slater 2010). Quite surprisingly, and contrary to secondary evidence on the dynamics of coups in countries such as Peru in 1968 (Sánchez 2002), prior experiences of civil war and insurgent activity do not seem to have an impact on coup attempts during periods of peace.

[15]This figure is highly similar to the proportion of coups during civil war found in prior cross-national analyses (Bell & Sudduth 2017). The full list of wartime coups in Latin America is described in Section B of the Appendix.

Regarding the main independent variables, I rely on an interaction variable between the degree of elite unity and the level of insurgent strength. For this, I have relied on two different data sources. On the former, it is with no surprise to anyone the acknowledgement of the intrinsic difficulties associated with the development of a quantitative indicator of elite splits. In order to deal with this, I make use of one of the most systematic and comprehensive measures of elite competition developed in the literature, and that is the one created by Albertus (2015). In order to capture the impact of coalitional splits in levels of land redistribution in Latin America, and relying on rich historical evidence from primary and secondary sources on elite splits since 1930, he creates a dummy variable of *Intra-Elite Competition* between ruling political elites and landed elites. Concretely, he codes the existence of a elite split when none of these three situations are present: (1) when members of the cabinet are not members of landed elites; (2) when cabinet members are not directly appointed by landed elites; and (3) when landed elites do not provide with financial, repressive, logistical or any other type of material support to ruling political elites (Albertus 2015:148-149). Otherwise, if any of these situations is present, no split will occur between incumbents and landed elites.[16] Despite this variable cannot capture the intrinsic level of complexity on the degrees of elite unity described in the theoretical section (Burton, Gunther & Higley 1992), and it clearly implies a partial coverage of the wide range of intra-elite strives that occur in the quest for political power (e.g. industrial vs. rural elites; national vs. local elites; political elites vs working class), it still captures important features of elite alliances and splits, specially in Latin America, where landed elites have played a pivotal role in the political dynamics of the region (Payne 1992; Wood 2000; Gilbert 1977).

On levels of insurgent strength, the development of a quantitative measure presents as much difficulties as the creation of an index on elite splits. As a solution

[16]One of the core problems of this measure is that it may be theoretically linked to the strength and location of insurgent groups: insurgent capacity has a territorial component that might be directly related to the interests of landed elites. Therefore, future versions of the paper will deepen into the fact of whether the way in which one of the core independent variables is partially capturing the effect of the variable on insurgent strength with which is being interacted.

to this, I have built upon the analytical frameworks developed by a variety of insurgent theorists as Mao Tse-Tung (1937), Ernesto Che Guevara (1960) or Vo Nguyen Giap (1970), who conceptualized irregular wars as processes with distinct stages. Concretely, I rely on an inductive and dynamic approach to conflict processes in order to reduce the complexity of civil wars into a set of discrete levels. This leads to the development of an ordinal variable on *Insurgent Strength* differentiating across three distinct stages (see Figure 3.4 below).




Figure 3.4: Ideal stages of irregular conflict

Stage 1 (*Minor Force*) represents the lowest level of strength. Usually held by groups at the onset of armed actions[17], it represents a phase of the insurgent life-cycle in which the group lacks the capacity for engaging in consistent political mobilization. It also lacks the necessary military capacity to perform complex operations. During this stage, most of the actions are targeted to increasing the operational capacity of the group. Stage 2 (*Break Out*) is defined by the ability of the armed group to successfully launch violent actions against harder targets, such as military barracks, or by its capability to mobilize a considerable number of armed combatants ($\geq$ 1000). This type of measurement captures the increasing strength and capacity of

[17]The creation of the group is measured on the basis of the formal recognition of the engagement by the organization on any type of violent activity.

the group, as the engagement in this type of actions require a solid organization both from a military and political perspective.[18] Finally, Stage 3 (*Dual Power*) is defined by the capacity of the group to establish territorial control of a city[19], of at least 1/3 of the national territory[20], or by the engagement in at least 500 armed attacks *and* 1000 battle-deaths per year. This focus on either levels of territorial control or high military capacity is an effective way of showing when an insurgent group has been capable of becoming a real threat to incumbents. Stage 0 (*End of Armed Actions*) and Stage 4 (*Revolution*)[21] are censoring variables.[22] This ordinal measure of insurgent power, which captures a recursive model of rebel transitions across distinct stages, facilitates the understanding of the impact of varying levels of strength of insurgent forces. Across the 80 armed groups covered in this dataset, 30% made it into Stage 2 (*Break Out*), 6.25% reached Stage 3 (*Dual Power*), and only 2 (2.25%), the Cuban M26-J in 1959 and the FSLN in Nicaragua in 1979, reached the Stage 4 of *Revolution*. The greatest majority, around 70% of the armed groups included in the dataset, never made it into more than the Stage 1 of *Minor Force*. Following prior research, I make use of the level of strength of the strongest insurgent group operating in every country-year (Bell & Sudduth 2017:1442).[23]

Regarding control variables, I include a variety of relevant measures of factors that could have a direct impact on coup attempts and civil war dynamics. Concretely, I include the natural logarithm of *GDP per capita* coming from Maddison (2018),

[18]There will be some cases in which groups misrepresent their capacity to engage in this type of actions. A clear example of this is the attack on the La Moncada barrack in Cuba. These cases are thoroughly described and explained in the individual analytic narratives.

[19]I use a measure of city as a territory in which around 50.000 people live within its boundaries.

[20]Becoming a political and military alternative to state power is directly related to the engagement in systematic and competitive state-building with the national government (Kalyvas 2006:218). However, this condition might be problematic if thinking about urban groups, which are defined by its lack of territorial control (De la Calle & Sánchez Cuenca 2015). Nevertheless, none of the groups engaging in urban actions made it further than to the Stage 2 of *break out* in this dataset.

[21]While the former is defined by the cessation of violent activities by the insurgent group, the latter captures revolutionary outcomes.

[22]Beyond this, other outcomes can occur and are also included in the dataset: ceasefires, peace agreements, group absorption, splintering and creation of umbrella groups.

[23]See Sections F2 of the Appendix.

as it has been found to have a direct impact on the onset of internal armed conflicts (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004) as well as on coup occurrence (Londregan & Poole 1990; Powell 2012; Kim 2016). I also control for *Regime Type* using a continuous variable coming from Polity IV, given that plenty of studies have shown the determinant role that types of political regimes have on a variety of dynamics of both civil wars and coups d'etat processes (Vreeland 2008; Jones & Lupu 2018; Bell 2016). And finally, I also include a variable on *Population* coming from Maddison (2018); a measure on amount of *Military Personnel* with data coming from the Correlates of War project; as well as a variable capturing the level *Ethnic Fractionalization* from Fearon & Laitin (2003). More importantly for the purposes of this paper, in order to unpack the potential heterogeneous effects of distinct contentious processes, I make use of data coming from the Banks CNTS Data Archive capturing the number of *Riots* and *Domestic Protests*. The use of these variables is fundamental not only to understand the heterogeneous nature and effects of contentious events, but also because these processes have been found to be systematically related to the onset of armed violence, as well as with a higher propensity of coup attempts (Della Porta 1995; Trejo 2012; Powell 2012). In order to partially address potential reverse causality issues[24], all these control variables are lagged by one year. A wide set of other control variables are included in the Appendix (see Section F4 of the Appendix).

Considering the binary nature of the main dependent variable on *Coup Attempt*, I rely on the use of logit estimators. This is complemented by robustness tests making use of probit models, linear probability models, conditional logit models and log-log models (see Section F3 of the Appendix). Robust standard errors clustered by country are used in order to deal with the potential heteroskedasticity of observations in a given country.

[24]Given the country-year level data, it might be possible that, during a coup year, a unit is capturing post-coup effects (e.g. the protests or riots occurring as a reaction to a coup.)

3.4 Results

This section provides three different types of analysis testing the argument described in the theoretical section. First, I make use of logit models to provide systematic empirical evidence on the impact of intra-elite competition and insurgent strength in the determination of coup attempts in the midst of civil wars. Second, I test the robustness of these results in light of different analyses. And finally, I rely on fine-grained evidence on the dynamics leading to the 1976 Argentinian coup d'etat as a case-study testing the implications of the main theoretical argument of the paper.[25]

3.4.1 Empirical Analysis

Before turning into the main model specifications, Table 3.1 below shows the distributions of coups d'etat according to the distinct levels of both insurgent strength and intra-elite competition. Despite coups seem to be present at the three levels of strength, they occur more prominently when regimes face rebel organizations with mid-levels of strength and under conditions of intra-elite competition, in line with the theoretical expectations.

Table 3.1: Coups by Strength and Intra Elite Unity

Strength / Elite	No Intra Elite	Intra Elite
Strength = 1	5	3
Strength = 2	2	6
Strength = 3	5	3

Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5 below show the results of the core analysis. Regarding the main independent variables, *Intra-Elite Competition* is a dichotomous variable in which no elite strife serves as a reference category, while *Insurgent Strength* presents three distinct levels of rebel capacity, being Stage 1 ("Minor Force") the reference category. Model (1) reports the results with the sole inclusion of the

[25]Tables A4a-A4d in Section F1 of the Appendix present the results of a series of t-tests comparing distinct group samples. Results stay in line with the main argument of the paper.

variable on Insurgent Strength; Model (2) only includes the variable on Intra-Elite Competition; Model (3) shows the results with the interacted variable between Intra-Elite Competition and Insurgent Strength, but without the inclusion of control variables; Model (4) reports the results when including *GDP per capita*, *Population* and *Regime Type*; Model (5) includes the variables on domestic instability (*Domestic Protests* and *Riots*); and Model (6) presents the final results with all the control variables, including the measures on *Military Personnel* and *Ethnic Fractionalization*.




Figure 3.5: Coefficient Plot coming from Model (6) of Table 3.2.

While Models (1) and (2) show the statistical insignificance of either the variable on insurgent strength or intra-elite competition, the interaction variable follows the theoretical predictions: the combination of mid-levels of insurgent strength in the presence of intra-elite competition increases the likelihood of coup attempts when compared to situations of no intra-elite strife under the actioning of weak insurgent groups. Concretely, the variable is positive and with high level of statistical significance ($p<0.01$ - $p<0.05$) after the inclusion of all control variables in Model

Table 3.2: Main Results

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Strength=2	0.443		-1.135	-0.961	-0.935	-1.017
	(0.625)		(1.152)	(1.090)	(1.043)	(1.064)
Strength=3	1.086		0.993*	1.033*	1.124	1.045
	(0.663)		(0.565)	(0.594)	(0.705)	(0.660)
Intra Elite		0.0670	-0.488	-0.432	-0.409	-0.400
		(0.525)	(0.646)	(0.631)	(0.667)	(0.683)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1			4.226***	4.016***	3.673***	3.860**
			(1.348)	(1.298)	(1.402)	(1.640)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1			-0.0994	-0.0442	-0.538	-0.210
			(1.145)	(1.112)	(0.961)	(1.173)
(ln) GDPpc t-1				0.413	0.0954	0.205
				(0.558)	(0.594)	(0.576)
(ln) Population t-1				-0.189	-0.290	-0.423
				(0.254)	(0.257)	(0.586)
Polity Score t-1				-0.0255	-0.00732	-0.00961
				(0.0363)	(0.0429)	(0.0502)
Domestic Protests t-1					0.0114	0.0153
					(0.00871)	(0.00962)
Riots t-1					0.273***	0.276***
					(0.0770)	(0.0839)
Military Personnel t-1						0.000469
						(0.00595)
Ethnic Fractionalization						1.136
						(2.149)
Constant	-2.803***	-2.485***	-2.603***	-4.405	-1.180	-1.431
	(0.418)	(0.422)	(0.442)	(5.327)	(5.500)	(6.276)
Observations	314	305	305	298	297	297
Pseudo R^2	0.0251	0.0001	0.1037	0.1046	0.1521	0.1547

Dependent Variable: Coup Attempt.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

(6). The substantive effect portrays that, mid-levels of insurgent strength in the presence of coalitional splits, increase the chances of coup attempts between 3.7-4.2 times than in the presence of low insurgent strength and no intra-elite competition. These results stay in line with the argument that, if levels of elite disunity are high, certain social forces could take advantage of the presence of insurgent organizations in order to justify the need of bringing profound political changes at the regime level. The formation of negative coalitions across factions aiming to implement novel power structures is facilitated by the decreasing leadership legitimacy faced by the regime, by the information provided on the capacity of the regime to resist a potential coup attempt and by the resolution of collective action problems across elite forces.

A high level of insurgent strength is only positively related to the engagement in coups d'etat ($p< 0.1$), as found by Bell & Sudduth (2017), in two of the models. However, the variable lacks statistical significance when it is not interacted with levels of intra-elite competition (Model 1) and when most control variables are included (Models 5 and 6).

Quite surprisingly, plenty of the structural factors that have been found in prior studies to affect the propensity towards coups, such as GDP per capita, regime type or ethnic fractionalization, did not seem to play any role in the understanding of coup occurrence in the midst of civil war in Latin America. This set of findings point to the necessary distinction across the heterogeneous dynamics that might have divergent impact under different contextual conditions: the drivers of coup attempts in the face of an increasing insurgent threat seem to considerably differ from those situations in which no armed group is operating in the national territory. The comparison between the results of Table 3.2 above and Table A31 of the Appendix, which test the determinants of coup attempts in non-war periods, portrays the centrality of wartime dynamics in periods of civil wars: while factors such as regime type, other contentious events or military grievances shape prospects of coups in periods with no active insurgent organizations, most of these effects vanish

once internal armed conflict begins. Moreover, the geographic focus on a single region facilitates the capturing of particular dynamics and processes that might not extrapolate to other regions in the world (Mainwaring & Pérez-Linán 2013).

Table 3.3: Contentious Comparative Results

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	4.226***	4.120***	3.583**	3.860**	3.528**	4.131**
	(1.348)	(1.448)	(1.435)	(1.640)	(1.471)	(1.758)
Domestic Protests t-1			0.00928	0.0153	0.0110	0.0197**
			(0.00982)	(0.00962)	(0.0102)	(0.00908)
Riots t-1			0.255***	0.276***	0.161*	0.164
			(0.0745)	(0.0839)	(0.0866)	(0.113)
Strikes t-1					0.315*	0.427**
					(0.185)	(0.170)
Political Assassination t-1					-0.0337	-0.0270
					(0.0447)	(0.0395)
Rest of Controls	***X***	✓	***X***	✓	***X***	✓
Constant	-2.603***	-5.183	-2.936***	-1.431	-3.124***	-1.132
	(0.442)	(5.351)	(0.454)	(6.276)	(0.503)	(5.671)
Observations	305	298	301	297	301	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1037	0.1051	0.1472	0.1547	0.1642	0.1808

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

As stated in the introduction, one of the core goals of this paper is to provide clarity on the role of distinct contentious events on the dynamics of coups d'etat. Unlike prior research, I unpack the concept of "political instability" and test the potential impact of five distinct processes: insurgent strength, domestic protests, riots, strikes and political assassinations (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3).[26] Following the main predictions, the interaction variable on mid-levels of insurgent strength and intra-elite competition remains positive and highly significant (p< 0.01 - p< 0.05)

[26]Data for these variables also comes form the Banks CNTS Dataset.

across all the model specifications. Beyond this, it is important to highlight that, in line with prior research (Gläßel et al. 2020), the only variable that remains highly significant across all the models in both Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 is the one on number of strikes ($p< 0.1$ - $p< 0.05$). Contrary to other studies, domestic protests do not seem to have played an important substantive role in the development of coups (Powell 2012; Johnson & Thyne 2018). No impact is found either for political assassinations, while riots remain positive and statistically significant except when including all the relevant control variables (see Model 6 in Table 3.3). These results portray the distinct effect of contentious events in the determination of coups d'etat, reflecting the necessity of unpacking the heterogeneous impact of divergent contentious processes.

3.4.2 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations

These results hold to a wide set of robustness checks, including tests on different variable specifications; the use of different empirical models; the inclusion of a wide set of control variables; as well as to a variety of other checks. In the final part of this subsection, I also discuss alternative explanations beyond the control variables included in the main models.

Variables Specifications and Model Sensitivity

As described above, the core variables of this analysis suffer from important limitations in terms of the operationalization of the concepts presented in the theoretical framework. In order to deal with this, I run a variety of distinct tests. First, I check the stability of the results when using two distinct datasets on coups d'etat, coming from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall & Marshall 2009), as well as from Lehoucq & Pérez-Linán (2014). Results remain robust to these distinct operationalizations of the dependent variable (Tables A5-A6). Moreover, I make use of distinct measures of insurgent strength, controlling for the number of insurgent groups active in each country-year (Table A7); using a measure of the mean level of strength of the set of active rebel groups (Figure A2); and relying on a continuous

index of insurgent capacity (Figure A3). Results remain robust to the use of these different specifications, portraying the expected non-linear effect under conditions of intra-elite strife. Furthermore, the results remain robust to the use of distinct measures of intra-elite competition (Tables A8-A9) and of pre-war levels of elite unity (Table A12). As well, the use of lagged measures of intra-elite and insurgent strength, and of unlagged control variables, does not affect the stability of the results (Tables A10-A11 and A17). The main findings also remain robust to the use of a variety of distinct empirical models: probit models (Table A13); linear probability models (Table A14); conditional logit models (Table A15); and log-log models (Table A16).

Omitted Variable Bias

One of the potential limitations of these results is the existence of omitted variable bias: variables not included yet in the empirical analysis that might distort the expected effect between insurgent strength, intra-elite competition and coup dynamics. However, results remain highly robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of additional control variables, including variables on economic performance and natural resources dependence[27] (Table A18); the use of different measures of regime type[28] (Table A19); the potential diffusion of coups d'etat occurring in the region (Table A20); the time since prior coups and number of coups in the country (Table A21); and to the control of average troop funding, conflict duration, rebel characteristics[29], the use of alternative measures of domestic protests[30], and a battery of other control variables (Tables A22-A25).

Further Tests

Moreover, these results remain robust to three further checks. First, to the running of sensitivity analyses, based on the individual drop of each of the variables included

[27]Concretely, I include measures of GDP Per Capita Growth, Dependence of Oil and Mineral Exports, as well as on the percentage of Labor Force in the Industrial Sector.

[28]I rely on variables on the average Polity score outside Latin America, as well as on the BMR and Cheibub-Ghandi variables on regime types.

[29]Including rebel origins, rebel governance, the presence of a political wing and number of combatants (Source: Kreiman 2021).

[30]Source: SPEED Dataset.

in the main models (Table A26). Second, to the control of the potential heterogeneity across units, including fixed effects at the country, regional, year and temporal period level (Table A27). And finally, to the use of matching techniques. One of the potential endogeneity problems of this type of analysis relates to the fact that, given the structure of the data, not only intra-elite competition and insurgent strength might lead to coups d'etat, but the direction of causality can go the other way around: coups might prompt sudden shifts in levels of elite cooperation and insurgent power, specially linked to expected changes in patterns of repression. In order to partially deal with this, Tables A28-A30 rely on the use of matching techniques. As expected, coefficients remain positive and with high levels of statistical significance across the models. While this does not adequate deal with the problem of endogeneity, it provides further evidence on the expected direction of causality.

Alternative Explanations

Other explanations could account for the observed patterns between the main variables of interest discussed in the previous sections. First, a key driving force facilitating cooperation across elite forces with distinct preferences over policies and institutions could be ideology. In the highly polarized global context of the Cold War, which profoundly shaped the politics of the Latin American region (Barnes 2010; Field et al. 2020), alignments across social forces could be based on shared ideological preferences, rather than on a purely instrumentalist perspective of siding with the potential winning coalition in order to maximize the prospects of having access to state structures. While further research should test the role of ideology with the development of fine-grained data on ideological preferences of a variety of social actors, existent evidence casts doubt on the centrality of ideology as the core driving factor in coup processes in the midst of war. A key example of this is the 1979 coup d'etat in El Salvador, where military forces, rather than exploiting the threat of revolution, ousted President Romero with the promise of conceding amnesty for political prisoners and the expansion of political rights. The newly Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno was formed by a variety of actors with highly

divergent political preferences, including leftist social forces, purely technocrats and conservative military officers (Stanley 1996:148-149).

A second potential alternative explanation relates to the the level of cohesion of the ruling coalition, endogenously affected by levels of insurgent strength. While this might be a valid alternative explanation, I argue that levels of elite competition will determine the way by which aggrieved social forces will seek its path to power. While in scenarios of elite unity "elite factions share an underlying consensus about rule of the game and the worth of existing political institutions", elites in overt competition "to protect and promote their own interests [...] they must destroy or cripple the regime and the elites who operate it" (Burton, Gunther & Highley 1992:10-11). Therefore, regardless of the weakness of the ruling coalition, social forces forming an alternative regime coalition will only engage in coups d'etat under situations of overt elite competition, while other paths to power, such as democratic elections or popular uprisings, would be promoted by unified elites.

3.4.3 Case Study: Argentina during the 70s

While the previous analyses provide systematic cross-national empirical evidence on the relation between insurgent strength, intra-elite competition and coup attempts, it is still unclear which are the set of mechanisms explaining this intriguing relation. Why do distinct elite groups coalesce in order to deter the actions of insurgent groups with mid-levels of strength? How did elites break up existent coordination problems? Do they instrumentally exploit the presence of rebel organizations in order to promote changes in the institutional structure? Were these groups actually threatened by the increasing civilian support and military power of insurgent groups? In order to provide partial answers to these questions, I rely on a brief analysis of the contentious processes and elite dynamics taking place in Argentina since the early 70s.

Argentina's history is marked by the footprint of political violence (Larraquy 2017). The "Revolución del Parque" [Park Revolution] promoted by the Unión Cívica Radical in 1890; the mass repression against leftist movements in the "Semana Trágica" [Tragic Week] in 1919; or the 1955 bombardment of Plaza de Mayo, are just a few examples of the chronic violence ravaging the country since its independence in 1816. However, none of these episodes attained the levels of atrocity reached from the late 1960s onwards. In 1966, a military coup d'etat led by Juan Carlos Onganía ended up with the constitutional presidency of Arturo Illia and avoided any possibility of ceasing the proscription of the majoritarian political force, the Peronism. In a regional scenario led by the advancement of revolutionary armed organizations, the newly Military junta established an authoritarian regime which repressed social protests and engaged in the promotion of a liberalizing economic model (Ollier 2005).

In a context of effervescent mobilization and outright repression of political rights, two armed revolutionary urban guerrilla groups emerged. On the one hand, Montoneros, a convergence of youth Peronist organizations and Christian groups, whose main goal was the establishment of a socialist regime under the direction of the proscripted leader Juan Domingo Perón. And on the other hand, the ERP, which acted as the armed branch of the Communist Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT).[31] In this scenario of ebullient social turnoil, both Montoneros and the PRT-ERP capitalized on the existent dissatisfaction of middle-strata and the working class against the authoritarian military regime through an astute combination of targeted selective violence and powerful social mobilization, becoming key political actors prompting the breakdown of the military regime and the return of Perón in 1973 (Gillespie 1982; Carnovale 2011). Contrary to the expectation of Perón and its closest allies, the comeback of the leader and the implementation of a democratic regime did not lead to the end of armed revolutionary activities. Indeed, the combined actions of guerrilla organizations reached a yearly average

[31] In parallel to this, other small rebel forces were also active, such as the FAR, FAL or FAP. Most of these organizations were organizationally weak and were either short-lived or absorbed by Montoneros or the PRT-ERP.

of 750 violent incidents between 1974 and 1976 (Moyano 1995:90). How did elites react to the presence of insurgent groups in the country?

Even before the onset of violent revolutionary activities in the early 70s, Argentina already had high levels of intra-elite disunity. The political and economic model of the Peronism widened the power of priorly excluded social actors, mainly trade unions, the working class and certain sectors of the industrial elite, encompassing an impressive variety of forces with divergent ideological preferences within a unique political movement. This regime coalition promoted the interests of these groups, to the demise of those of elite outsiders, such as land-holders and financial elites. However, the return of Perón in 1973 ended up the period of tactical alliance between the divergent ideologies within the movement: the comeback of the old leader required the definition of an increasingly ample political project. By early 1974, Montoneros, in a scenario marked by fierce competition to lead the political direction of the Peronism, was not capable of stopping the advancement in governmental positions of the rightist faction led by López Rega, with the expulsion of Montoneros from the movement as the main collateral effect. The increasing levels of Montoneros' violence against members of the rightist Peronist wing, such as the trade union leader José Rucci, facilitated the process of *ideological purge* within the movement: the subversive internal enemy that had "infiltrated" Peronism had to be abolished (Sigal & Verón 2003).

Soon, this process went beyond the strict boundaries of the Peronist movement[32], specially after the death of Juan Domingo Perón in July 1974 and the arrival to the Presidency of María Estela Martínez de Perón, which solidified the power of the rightist surge within the regime coalition. The increasing clandestine activities by the paramilitary group of the Triple A[33] led to a vicious spiral of violence between

[32]This was prompted as well by the actions of the PRT-ERP. The Marxist organization maintained its armed activities during the Peronist years, as it did not believe that Perón was the adequate leader for the establishment of a socialist regime in the country.

[33]Alianza Anticomunista Argentina.

them and insurgencies with mid-levels of strength, such as Montoneros and the PRT-ERP. This rising scenario of violence facilitated the incursion of military forces within the government of Isabel Martínez de Perón, becoming a pivotal political actor since 1974. The army emerged as "the guardian of an order that civilians could no longer guarantee" (de Riz 2008:54). From that moment onwards, the military not only became the unique actor capable of putting an end to the increasing disorder existent in the country by the mid-1970s, but also appeared as the only force capable of coalescing the interests of a divergent set of factions whose interests were not being represented by the Peronist movement.

The situation of chronic violence led to a profound crisis of leadership legitimacy for the government of Martínez de Perón, opening the coup opportunity structure for the implementation of profound modifications that would set the country into a new path forward. The context of social unrest and the incapacity of the government to tackle the actions of the revolutionary urban guerrillas facilitated the engagement in discursive practices justifying the necessity of deep structural social, political and economic changes under the direction of the military forces. In a gradual but rapid process of profound political polarization, a clear-cut division across two distinct poles arise in the country: subversive and counter-insurgent forces.[34] The overt violence of insurgent groups and the subsequent process of polarization facilitated the coordination across distinct social forces around the figure of the military. These groups interpreted this context of chaotic violence as an opportunity for furthering a social, political and economic project that would maximize their interests. Wide historical evidence supports this assertion and highlight the fundamental role played by certain corporate groups in the preparation for the coup (Verbitsky & Bohoslavsky 2016). A paradigmatic example of this are the statements by one of the largest conglomerates of corporate forces, the APEGE, which represented the interests of landed elites, the alimentary industry, or the financial sector, among many other

[34]This polarization had a direct impact on the positions of civilians. The vicious spiral of violence between guerrilla and paramilitary groups brought a sense of fear to the masses that led them to support the need of military intervention (Franco 2012:279; Caviglia 2006:99-100).

entities at that time outside of the Peronist coalition[35]: "The position of the entire business community is unanimous on the need to attack the evils that affect the country at its roots. Only an energetic action and a profound change will be able to modify the attitude of distrust, disorientation, lack of authority, lack of security and order in which Argentines live. Once this fundamental condition has been fulfilled, a drastic modification of the economic-social scheme that is leading us to the collapse as a Nation must be faced" (APEGE 1975:3).[36]

These actions proved the lack of support and the decreasing legitimacy suffered by the Peronist government across the social spectrum, including civilians, for which "that *perceived threat* made it possible for them to accept, advance, and celebrate the drastic program supported by the traditional exporting sector allied with big export-import commerce and the financial sector" (Schorr 2016:237-239). The basis for the formation of an alternative regime coalition were set by late 1975, as "there was widespread support in the military, among business-men, and even among politicians for removing Isabel from office" (Lewis 2002:124). In addition to the rural elite and the financial groups, "moderate union leaders [...] were urging the military to step in and impose order before the EPR and Montoneros took over the labor movement or profited from Peronism's internal chaos by gaining control of the party and possibly the government" (ibid). The gradual forging of an alternative regime coalition marked the beginning of the end of the government of Martínez de Perón.

While multiple mechanisms could explain the process of elite convergence in the midst of civil war in Argentina, most of the historical evidence points to the instrumental exploitation of the subversive threat for the advancement of the interests of certain social groups. Franco (2012:144) argues that, by 1975 "the military public presence became more frequent and visible through the denunciation of the advance of subversion [...] The coup tensions were as real as they were

[35]This not only includes economic actors, but also others such as the Church, who played a fundamental role in the 1976 coup d'etat (Morello 2012).

[36]Cited in Wermus (2016:231).

instrumentally agitated by various civil and military sectors." Indeed, since mid-1975, there is an "increase in [public] references to the problem of subversion [...] The inability of the government to solve the crisis is stressed over and over again, accompanied by a permanent call for the reestablishment of order, with clear coup overtones" (Sanz Cerbino 2010).[37] In line with this argument, Muleiro (2011:21) shows the instrumentality of violence for the promotion of a new political project: "the armed forces had the required instrument to invent their civil war [...] The encompassing nickname of *subversive* operated as a magic word for [the imposition] of a concrete economic model."

By early 1976, the implementation of a rightist civil-military regime was seen as the only way out to the chaos prompted by the extremist right-wing and left-wing violence. While rumors of coups were a constant during several months, the alternative regime coalition waited until the deepening of the governmental crisis. In the end "the economic chaos of 1975, the crisis of authority, the factional struggles, the death present daily, the spectacular action of the guerrilla organizations, and the terror sown by the Triple A, all of this created the conditions for the acceptance of a coup d'état that promised to restore order and ensure the state monopoly of the force" (Romero 2014:239). On March 24, 1976 the infamous coup occurred, setting in motion "the most significant and dramatic economic and social restructuring in the history of Argentina", where the emergence of a new power coalition "resulted in the transition from an industrial society to one based on the financial valorization of capital" (Schorr 2016:235). One of the main goals of the new political project was "to restore the political and economic power of the upper agrarian bourgeoisie and the large economic and financial groups by undermining local industry and the domestic market" (Rapoport & Zaiat 2016:258).

The arrival of the civilian-military dictatorship brought the highest levels of state repression seen in the Argentinian society in the entire 20th century, specially

[37] Cited in Wermus (2016:236).

targeted towards alleged members of armed leftists organizations. This systematic repression had a direct impact on the trajectory of both Montoneros and the PRT-ERP, which were incapable of sustaining their armed structures against the much stronger military capacity of the newly established civilian-military dictatorship (Gillespie 1982; Carnovale 2011).

3.5 Conclusion

Why do some regimes experience coups in the midst of civil wars while others not? What is the inter-relation between coups d'etat and civil wars? This paper has aimed to provide consistent evidence on the determinants of this relation relying on a novel dataset on Latin American insurgencies during the Cold War period. Drawing upon the literatures on civil war processes, coups d'etat and social conflict theories, it has argued that the level of strength of insurgent groups, combined with patterns of intra-elite competition, are fundamental factors explaining coups in the midst of internal armed conflicts. Concretely, it has shown that, in scenarios of intra-elite strife, the presence of insurgents with mid-levels of political and military capacity facilitates the coordination between military forces, elite outsiders and aggrieved coalition insiders in order to promote coups against existent political structures. This finding provides an important contribution, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, to the under-explored relation between two contentious processes that, until very recently, has been studied in complete isolation.

Despite of the evidence supporting the main theoretical argument of this article, there are certain areas that require further research in future studies. First, one of the limitations of this paper is the lack of consistent and comparable measures on distinct types of intra-elite competition. As shown before, I am relying on one of the most comprehensive and systematic collection of evidence on intra-elite splits, the one developed by Albertus (2015), but which limits its coverage to the presence of competition between rural elites and members of the incumbent cabinet. Future research should devote important efforts to the consideration of different types of

intra-elite measures. Second, the validity of the findings are only tested in the regional framework of Latin American for revolutionary insurgencies created during the Cold War period. It is unclear whether the main finding of this paper will be applicable in distinct regional contexts, but more importantly, when focusing on insurgent groups with secessionist goals, which represent a considerable proportion of the set of insurgent groups created since 1945 (Sambanis 2001). Third, I have not tested the heterogeneous effects of distinct types of coups. Recent research has shown that not every coup is the same an that two important distinctions should be made: between regime-changing and regime re-shuffling coups (Aksoy et al. 2015). Future studies should make use of this data from a comparative perspective in order to test the implications of the nexus between intra-elite competition and insurgent strength for different types of coups. And fourth, future research should build upon and expand the theoretical framework of this paper in order to cover the role of other key actors in these processes, such as subnational elites, civilians, foreign countries and international organizations. This would facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the profound linkages between civil wars and coup attempts.

Tracing the interconnection between distinct contentious processes is one of the key tasks that deserves further exploration in the ample literature on contentious politics. The reliance on a novel approach focused on patterns of elite coordination and elite choices under scenarios of violent armed actions, make us rethink some of the most basic existent assumptions in the civil war literature. More particularly, it leads to a reassessment of the set of actors taking fundamental decisions explaining the trajectories of insurgent groups in the midst of civil war and their impact on subsequent regime structures. Considering the effects of these events, future research should build upon these findings and ascertain the complex, dynamic and interactive nature of civil wars and coups d'etat. Shedding light on these issues is of critical importance in the development of a holistic understanding of heterogeneous, but highly interlinked, processes of political violence.

Appendix

Contents:

- A. Descriptive Statistics
- B. List of Coups
- C. List of Insurgent Organizations
- D. Model Documentation
- E. Coalition Formation Process
- F. Robustness Tests
  - F1. Tests of Means
  - F2. Variables Specification
  - F3. Model Sensitivity
  - F4. Omitted Variable Bias
  - F5. Other Tests

A. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Coup	314	0.07	0.26	0	1
Rebel Strength	314	1.47	0.73	1	3
Intra Elite	305	0.36	0.48	0	1
lag (ln) GPDpc	313	8.47	0.55	7.08	9.57
lag (ln) Military Personnel	309	3.66	1.1856	.69	6.04
lag Protests	301	7.21	12.59	0	87
Number Groups	314	1.98	1.38	1	8
Index Rebels	314	0.051	.051	0.01	.21
Per Capita Growth t-1	303	.016	.042	-.138	.13
Polity Score outside LATAM t-1	301	-1.56	1.25	-2.59	2.77
Polity Score Spatial Lag t-1	301	.057	2.09	-4.04	5.12
Ethnic Fractionalization	312	0.43	0.18	0.17	0.74
ln GDP pc t-1	303	7.64	0.61	6.50	8.90
Democracy BMR t-1	307	0.57	0.49	0	1
Military Expenditure t-1	308	597.5935	1302.134	1.300	1000.047
Military Personnel t-1	309	70.58	75.753	2	420
Regime (MBP) t-1	304	0.78	0.82	0	2
Cheibub-Ghandi Regime type t-1	302	2.75	0.92	2	4
Dependence of Oil and Mineral Exports t-1	304	0.21	0.41	0	1
% Labor Force Industrial Sector t-1	304	23.33	6.47	7.22	33.54
GINI Income Inequality t-1	238	50.81	6.89	29.96	63.7
Political Assasination t-1	310	1.34	3.26	0	26
Strikes t-1	310	0.42	1.12	0	13
Riots t-1	310	0.62	1.53	0	15
Population Total t-1	310	16857.18	18874.91	1417	101710
ln Population Total t-1	310	9.185107	1.07	7.26	11.53
Last succesful coup	298	1961.37	16.39	1919	1983
Years since last Coup	314	17.75	16.93	1	62
Years since last Coup Squared	314	600.77	979.93	1	3844
Coups in the Region	298	2.36	1.61	0	6
% Family Farms	298	0.25	0.09	0.04	0.48
Democracy LATAM	298	0.53	0.26	0.18	1
Polity t-1	298	1.41	6.73	-9	10
GDP Pc t-1	298	2.47	1.75	0.68	7.36
Economic Growth t-1	298	0.02	0.04	-0.14	0.13
Democracy t-1 (Smith)	298	0.43	0.49	0	1
Democracy t-1 (Mainwaring)	298	0.31	0.46	0	1
Polity t-1	298	1.41	6.73	-9	10
Cold War	314	0.82	0.38	0	1
Region Dummies	314	2.47	1.22	1	4
Ruggedness	314	1.31	0.65	.24	2.481
Antigovernment Demonstrations	310	0.751	1.59	0	15
Population	310	17237.84	19338.81	1428	104243
(ln) Population	310	9.21	1.07	7.26	11.55
(ln) GDP pc	312	8.49	0.55	7.08	9.58
(ln) Military Personnel	308	3.69	1.17	0.69	6.08
Riots	310	0.68	1.59	0	15
Domestic Protests	301	8.25	14.44	0	87
Antigovernment Demonstrations	310	0.76	1.59	0	15
Polity IV	313	1.47	6.69	-9	10
Gini Inequality	241	50.84	6.84	29.96	63.7
Intra Elite Competitiveness	300	0.56	0.32	0	0.99
Intra Elite Executive	301	5.46	1.15	3.08	8.76
Intra Elite Executive t-1	300	5.41	1.15	3.01	8.69
Intra Elite Rural t-1	305	0.37	0.48	0	1

B. List of Coups

Table A2 - List of Coups

Country	Year	N Active Groups
Argentina	1963	1
Argentina	1970	5
Argentina	1971	5
Argentina	1975	4
Argentina	1976	2
Argentina	1988	1
Brazil	1969	5
Chile	1973	1
Cuba	1957	1
Dominican Republic	1963	1
Dominican Republic	1965	1
Ecuador	1986	2
El Salvador	1972	2
El Salvador	1979	5
Guatemala	1962	1
Guatemala	1963	1
Guatemala	1982	5
Guatemala	1983	2
Guatemala	1988	1
Guatemala	1989	1
Peru	1992	2
Uruguay	1973	3
Venezuela	1962	1
Venezuela	1966	1

C. List Insurgent Organizations Dataset

Table A3a - List of Insurgent Groups

Country	Years of Operation	Organization	Maximum Strength
Argentina	1959-1960	Uturuncos	1
Argentina	1963-1964	EGP	1
Argentina	1973-1975	ERP-FR	1
Argentina	1973-1975	ERP-22A	1
Argentina	1970-1977	ERP	2
Argentina	1970-1971	FAL	1
Argentina	1968-1964	FAP	1
Argentina	1970-1973	FAR-ARG	1
Argentina	1970-1980	Montoneros	2
Argentina	1986-1989	MTP	1
Bolivia	1967	ELN-BOL	1
Bolivia	1988-1990	FAL-ZW	1
Bolivia	1989-1990	CNPZ	1
Bolivia	1989-1992	EGTK	1
Brazil	1967-1974	ALN	2
Brazil	1968-1969	COLINA	1
Brazil	1969-1972	MR8	1
Brazil	1972-1974	PCdoB	1
Brazil	1969-1972	VAR-Palmares	1
Brazil	1967-1972	VPR	2
Chile	1969-1988	MIR	3
Chile	1969-1971	VOP	1
Chile	1984-1987	FPMR	2
Chile	1987-1995	FPMR-D	1
Chile	1982-1994	MJL	1
Colombia	1984-1986	ADO	1
Colombia	1964-Present	ELN	2
Colombia	1964-2016	FARC-EP	3
Colombia	1967-1991	EPL	1
Colombia	1982-1988	FRF	1
Colombia	1974-1991	M19	2
Colombia	1984-1991	MAQL	1
Colombia	1982-1991	PRT	1
Colombia	1983-1986	CNG	2
Colombia	1983-1986	BA	1
Colombia	1986-1988	CGSB	2
Colombia	1991-1992	FFG	1
Costa Rica	1978-1981	La Familia	1
Costa Rica	1974-1978	MRP	1
Cuba	1955-1959	M26-J	3
Dominican Republic	1959	MLD	1
Dominican Republic	1963-1965	14J	2
Ecuador	1983-1988	AVC	2
Ecuador	1985-1991	MPL	1

Table A3b - List of Insurgent Groups

Country	Years of Operation	Organization	Maximum Strength
El Salvador	1980-1991	FMLN	3
El Salvador	1972-1980	ERP	2
El Salvador	1972-1980	FPL	2
El Salvador	1976-1980	PRTC-S	1
El Salvador	1977-1980	PCS	2
El Salvador	1975-1980	FARN	1
Guatemala	1975-1982	EGP-GT	2
Guatemala	1963-1982	FAR-GT	2
Guatemala	1980-1983	FP-31E	1
Guatemala	1961-1967	MR13-N	1
Guatemala	1979-1982	ORPA	2
Guatemala	1982-1996	URNG	2
Honduras	1979-1983	FMLN-H	1
Honduras	1988-1995	FPM	1
Honduras	1980-1990	FPR-LZ	1
Honduras	1980-1990	MPLC	1
Honduras	1965	MRFM	1
Honduras	1977-1983	PRTC-H	1
Mexico	1973-1979	LC23S	1
Mexico	1971-1980	PROC-UP	1
Mexico	1968-1970	UP	1
Nicaragua	1969-1972	FARN-NIC	1
Nicaragua	1963-1979	FSLN	3
Panama	1970-1974	MLN-29N	1
Paraguay	1972-1974	ERP-PY	1
Paraguay	1959-1965	FULNA	1
Paraguay	1959-1961	M-14	1
Paraguay	1973-1977	MOPAL	1
Paraguay	1975-1976	OPM	1
Paraguay	1973-1976	PORA	1
Peru	1965	ELN-PE	1
Peru	1965	MIR-PE	1
Peru	1980-1992	SL	3
Peru	1984-1997	MRTA	2
Uruguay	1968-1972	FARO	1
Uruguay	1966-1973	MLN-T	2
Uruguay	1969-1972	OPR33	1
Venezuela	1962-1969	FALN	2
Venezuela	1984-1997	Bandera Roja	1

D. Model Documentation

The final version of the dataset includes information on a wide variety of characteristics of insurgent organizations at the rebel group-year level. Concretely, for the 80 groups included in the dataset, around 450 pages of information are included. The following is an example of one of the analytic narratives included in the dataset, the one from Montoneros (Argentina).

LATIN AMERICAN ARMED GROUPS: CASE DESCRIPTION

Weberian Rebels: The Politics of Guerrilla War

Argentina - **Montoneros**

Montoneros was a Peronist left-wing guerrilla group operating in Argentina during the 1970s. The main goal of the group was the coming back of Peron after the proscription of Peronism since 1955. They promoted the implementation of a socialist regime through the leadership of Juan Domingo Peron. The group was initially formed by nationalist radicalized catholic movements without experience in mass movements (Gillespie 1982:47-88; Gambini 2008:192)

Montoneros started its armed activities by the early 1970s, and specially during the first years they were highly selective in the use of violence (Le Blanc 2012:63). The group provoked a great reaction into the masses as its first armed action was the kidnapping, and following assassination, of Aramburu, leader of the Revolución Argentina of 1955, which deposed Perón and proscripted Peronism. This action spread the knowledge about the existence of a revolutionary Peronist armed group. Only one month later, they took over the small city of La Calera in the province of Cordoba. During 1970 and 1971 the group became the main armed organization in the country together with the PRT-ERP and small armed groups started to join the organization, such as Descamisados in 1972 or FAR in 1973.

In 1973, a few days after the 1973 elections that were won by Perón with over 60% of the votes, Montoneros reacted to the Ezeiza massacre with the assassination of Rucci, which was one of the leaders of the CGT and one of the closest allies of the leader. The goal of the group was to let Perón know that they would do revolution with or without him (Zamorano 2005:195) But this created an unforgettable division with Perón, which was reflected on what occurred during 1974 in the celebrations of the 1st May in the famous Plaza de Mayo of Buenos Aires. In there, the once beloved leader accused Montoneros of stupid youngsters. In this time, Peron and its close ally Lopez Rega decided to creat a Death Squad in order to fight insurgent leftist guerrilla groups, the so-called Triple A (Anticommunist Argentinian Alliance). This paramilitary group started a cruel repression against all the members and alleged allies of the guerrillas.

In 1974 Montoneros engaged in one of its most famous actions: the kidnapping of the Born brothers, important businessmen in the country. Moreover, in 1974, on the 22nd August, they decided to attack the army marine (Gambini 2008:367) and one week later they put explosives in the airport of Tucuman. They also made another attack in 1975 into military barracks (Caviasca 2013:134). In September 1974, the group decides to go to clandestinity and reduce their presence in the political arena. They recentralized and started focusing mainly on military actions, with security forces (police and army members) as their main targets.

In March 1976 the military coup d'etat occurs and army forces engage in effective repression against all guerrilla organizations. The group membership declined and many went into exile. During the dictatorship, they attacked places such as the ESMA and other government buildings. They engaged in a counter-offensive in 1979 that failed, and after this, they stopped their armed operations.

Success

- 1970-1971 = 1 (Minor Force)

- 1972-1974 = 2 (Break Out)
- 1975-1980 = 1 (Minor Force)

The group follows an unusual pattern in Latin American guerrillas. They were born from a set of revolutionary catholic and nationalist groups which enforce the ideology of Peronism and whose main aim was the coming back of Peron to the country. They start with a very hard high target (former leader Aranburu), they do survive to initial counter-insurgency and from 1971 and 1972 expand its political base through linkings (such as with the JP) and creation of political organizations. Their military force was also expanded with the merging of other groups as Descamisados and FAR. They were, together with ERP-PRT, the main armed group in the country. They start their period of decline after the coming back of Peron and the complete division with the leader by 1974. They decide to become clandestine and start suffering the actions of the Triple A. They still resist but cannot survive to the repression engaged by the Military Junta since 1976. Some minor actions until 1980, when the failed counter-offensive lead the group to disintegration.

Basic Characteristics

- Start Year: 1970 (Assassination of Aramburu, leader of the Revolución Argentina of 1955, which deposed Perón). Prior existence before this, but this was the first military action.
- End Year: 1980 (Counter-offensives in 1980) Still existing in 1983, when transition to democracy, but without any military force. Last actions by 1980.
- Incompatibility: Regime Change.
- Method (Urban / Rural): Mainly urban, even though they helped the ERP in some situations in the province of Tucuman.
- Technology of Rebellion: Irregular.
- Ideology: Marxism & Peronism.

- Main Leader: Mario Firmenich.
- FORGE: The group is related to two different origins. First, to non-party political movements, but second as well, from a religious organization. 4 = Non-party political movements.
- Merger = 0
- Splinter = 0
- External Intervention = 0
- Peacekeeping = 0

Variables

- **Political Capacity**
  - Political Wing: Montoneros were a guerrilla group that had close ties with the Peronist movement. Nevertheless, they broke out in late 1973 after Peron's comeback. After going underground in 1974, they started their own political wing in 1976, the Partido Montonero, which combined with the proscribed Movimiento Peronista Autentico, brought the so-called Movimiento Peronista Montonero (MPM). It can be also said that the engaged in what is called the creation of Unidades Basicas Revolucionarias (UBR) (Le Blanc 2012: 64), which were aimed at developing mass political movements in popular neighbourhoods. In 1972, they linked up with the Juventud Peronista, which highly increased its mobilization capacity. They also created the Juventud Trabajadora Peronista.
    - *Political Wing* = 0 (1970)
    - *Political Wing* = 1 (1971-1973)
    - *Political Wing* = 0 (1974-1975)
    - *Political Wing* = 1 (1976-1980) (Salas 2007)

- External Support: No evidence on this.

- Rebel Diplomacy: Lack of evidence that the group engaged in rebel diplomacy abroad. Nevertheless, they had some links with Arab countries, specially from 1976, where they had military training from Arafat (Gambini 2008: 392). Plenty of their members flew to other countries, such as Uruguay, during the military dictatorship established between 1976-1983, but this does not mean any case of rebel diplomacy. Therefore:
  - *Rebel Diplomacy* = 0

- Armed propaganda =1. Yes, it was a basic part of the organization. They started with the delivery of magazines from 1973 onwards (A lot: Evita Montonera (1975-1979), El Descamisado (1974), La Causa Peronista (1973-1974); Diario Noticias (Gambini 2008: 297); See Slipak (2011)

- Political Participation: No participation in any of the elections, despite its ties with Campora (1973) and Peron (1974).
  - Political Participation = 0

- Rebel Governance:
  - *Judiciary* = 0
  - *Executive* = 1
  - *Legislature* = 0
  - *Civilian Taxes* = 0
  - *Tax Boycott* = 0
  - *Police* = 0
  - *Education* = 0
  - *Health* = 0
  - *Radio* = 0

- **Military Capacity**

- Combatants: There is a lot of divergence and discussion on this issue. Nevertheless, I consider that the most accurate estimate comes from Gillespie (1982), which consider that the number of effective combatants is between 5.000 & 7.500.
  - *Combatants* = 6.000
  - *Per Years*:
    - 1970-1971 = 20 (Gillespie 1982: 85)
    - 1972 = 200 (Le Blanc 2012: 65-66 & Moyano 1995)
    - 1973 = 3000 (Le Blanc 2012: 65-66)
    - 1974 = 10.000 (Le Blanc 2012: 65-66)
    - 1975-1978 = 500-1000 (Exile)
    - 1979-80 = 100-500
- Intelligence: Varying over time, but despite the detention of some of its members and clear intelligence failures, such as the gathering in a Pizzeria in 1973, they show a high level of resilience.
  - 1970-1972: Medium
  - 1973-1974: High
  - 1975-1977: Low
  - 1978-1980: Very Low
- Arms Procurement: High. This was mainly carried out through attacks on armed places as well as through the funding acquired via kidnappings. But it varied over time.
  - 1970-1972: Medium
  - 1973-1974: High
  - 1975-1978: Medium
  - 1979-1980: Low
- Military Effectiveness:

    * 1970-1972: Complete Structural Integrity (3)
    * 1973-1974: Guerrilla Capacity (4)
    * 1975-1980: Complete Structural Integrity (3)
  - Territorial Control: Mainly it was an urban guerrilla, so no control of territory.
    * Territorial Control: 0.
  - Cohesion: Variation over time.
    * 1971: Weak horizontal ties.
    * 1972-1978: Strong horizontal ties.
    * 1979-1980: Weak horizontal ties (Le Blanc 2012: 77)

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E. Coalition Formation Process

One of the main theoretical implications of Section 3 is the development of alternative regime coalition across distinct social forces. This includes social forces *within* the ruling coalition, actors *outside* of it, and the military, who play a pivotal role in the formation of this novel political structures. Figure A1 below develops a stylized process of coalition formation across divergent forces according to the relative level of strength of insurgent organizations.




Figure A1 - Stylized Process of Formation of Alternative Regime Coalition

Note: Brown dashed lines represent processes of convergence across elite groups in the formation of alternative regime coalitions. Blue dashed lines represent interests' convergence within the initial ruling coalition. Coalition insiders are organized on the basis of hierarchical positions of political power.

F. Robustness Tests

F1. Test of Means

I engage in four distinct comparisons: (1) Between country-years with coups and no coups; (2) Between country-years with and without intra-elite competition; (3) Between country-years with mid-level of insurgent strength and those with low and high; and (4) between country-years with conditions of intra-elite competition and mid-level of strength, against those without these conditions. Results stay in line with the expectations, showing the significant mean differences for cases of mid-level strength and intra-elite competition.

Table A4a - T-Test Means I

	Mean No Coup	Mean Coup	T-Test Difference
Insurgent Strength	1.452	1.792	0.339**
Intra Elite	0.359	0.375	0.015
Intra Elite & Strength=2	0.014	0.166	0.152***
Observations	290	24	314

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4b - T-Test Means II

	Mean No Intra Elite	Mean Intra Elite	T-Test Difference
Coup	0.076	0.082	0.006
Observations	195	110	305

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4c - T-Test Means III

	Mean Strength 1 and 3	Mean Strength 2	T-Test Difference
Coup	0.074	0.086	0.012
Observations	256	58	314

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4d - T-Test Means IV

	Mean No Intra Elite and Strength 2	Mean Intra Elite and Strength 2	T-Test Difference
Coup	0.065	0.75	0.685***
Observations	306	8	314

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F2. Variable Specifications

This second part covers different variable specifications, using distinct measurements of the dependent and independent variables. Tables A5 and A6 below present the results when using measures of coups coming from Lehoucq & Pérez Linan (2014) as well as from the Center of Systemic Peace (Marshall & Marshall 2009).

One of the key concerns of the main results relies on the fact that the variable on Insurgent Strength captures the level of strength of the main insurgent group in the country, unlikely to capture the dynamics of multiparty civil wars where more than one strong group might be operating. In order to solve this, I rely on two distinct analyses. First, I test for the robustness of the results to a variable controlling for the number of groups operating in each country-year (Table A7). And second, I test the non-linear effect of two variables, one capturing the mean level of Strength of the set of insurgent groups, as well as through an index of rebel strength (Figures A2 and A3 below).[38] What the results from the latter analyses show is a reinforcement of the theoretical framework presented in the paper: the likelihood of coups is higher at individual and overall mid-levels of insurgent strength.

I use two new measures of intra-elite competition. The first one captures the regulation of chief executive recruitment (Beramendi et al. 2018) using a categorical

[38]This weighted index measures the presence of a group with Insurgent Strength = 1 as 0.01; the presence of a group with Insurgent Strength = 2 as 0.025; and the presence of a group with Insurgent Strength = 3 as 0.05. Future versions of the paper will produce more complex measurements of country-year levels of insurgent strength.

variable coming from Polity V[39] The measure on designational/transitional is used as a proxy of high levels of intra-elite competition given the lack of competitiveness in this type of recruitment (Table A8). A second measure comes from Ansell & Samuels (2014). Concretely, following the approach of the authors, income inequality could serve as an effective proxy of industrial and intersectoral inequality (ibid:100). For testing this, I use a dichotomous measure of a GINI index of income inequality (Table A9).[40] In both cases, results support the main theoretical argument of the paper. Finally, results remain robust to the lagged measures of the main independent variables on Insurgent Strength and Intra-Elite competition (Tables A10-A11) and to the use of pre-war measures of Elite Unity (Table A12).

[39]This variable is divided in three measures: (1) *Unregulated*: "Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power"; (2) *Designational/Transitional*: "Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition"; and (3) *Regulated*: "Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections."

[40]Positive values if GINI > 50.

Table A5 - Sensitivity Coups I

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.109	0.462
	(1.180)	(1.131)
Strength=3	0.796	1.351**
	(0.690)	(0.623)
Intra Elite=1	0.239	0.189
	(0.827)	(0.875)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	2.988**	2.725*
	(1.418)	(1.520)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	0.397	-0.208
	(1.384)	(1.396)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		-0.254
		(0.676)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.426
		(0.671)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0652
		(0.0783)
Domestic Protests t-1		-0.00186
		(0.0190)
Riots t-1		0.202
		(0.173)
Military Personnel t-1		0.000302
		(0.00707)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.794
		(2.549)
Constant	-3.629***	2.255
	(0.486)	(7.928)
Observations	305	297
Pseudo R^2	0.0924	0.1372

Dependent Variable: Coups (Lehoucq & Pérez Linan 2014).
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6 - Sensitivity Coups II

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.992	-0.582
	(1.109)	(1.083)
Strength=3	1.136	1.819**
	(0.757)	(0.735)
Intra Elite=1	-0.346	-0.288
	(0.975)	(0.943)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	2.985**	2.378*
	(1.515)	(1.372)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.242	-1.269
	(1.386)	(1.222)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		-0.0141
		(0.592)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.462
		(0.551)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0443
		(0.0473)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.00434
		(0.0120)
Riots t-1		0.325***
		(0.0993)
Military Personnel t-1		-0.000505
		(0.00640)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.654
		(2.074)
Constant	-2.745***	1.307
	(0.586)	(6.858)
Observations	305	297
Pseudo R^2	0.0711	0.1792

Dependent Variable: Coups (Marshall & Marshall 2009).
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure A2: Predicted Probabilities Mean Success Active Insurgent Groups




Figure A3: Predicted Probabilities Index Rebel Strength

Table A7 - Number of Active Insurgent Groups

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-1.275	-1.118
	(1.207)	(1.100)
Strength=3	1.024*	1.070
	(0.563)	(0.672)
Intra Elite=1	-0.466	-0.368
	(0.630)	(0.646)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	4.151***	3.822**
	(1.350)	(1.613)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.132	-0.249
	(1.165)	(1.171)
Number of Groups	0.0917	0.0639
	(0.152)	(0.132)
Rest of Controls	***X***	✓
Constant	-2.777***	-1.400
	(0.362)	(6.330)
Observations	305	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1051	0.1552

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8 - Robustness Intra-Elite Polity Recruitment

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-1.079	-1.558***
	(0.892)	(0.603)
Strength=3	3.664**	3.788**
	(1.540)	(1.622)
Elite Recruitment=2	-0.785	-1.266
	(1.014)	(0.894)
Elite Recruitment=3	-0.0451	-0.230
	(1.193)	(1.274)
Strength=2 × Elite Recruitment=2	3.129**	3.516***
	(1.327)	(1.348)
Strength=3 × Elite Recruitment=2	-1.007	-0.824
	(1.693)	(1.706)
Strength=3 × Elite Recruitment=3	-3.728	-4.013
	(2.405)	(2.904)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.306
		(0.579)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.310
		(0.524)
Polity Score t-1		0.0319
		(0.0593)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.0185
		(0.0219)
Riots t-1		0.286***
		(0.0773)
Military Personnel t-1		0.00647
		(0.00460)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-0.228
		(2.068)
Constant	-2.565**	-2.859
	(1.078)	(5.591)
Observations	301	284
Pseudo R^2	0.1497	0.2158

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9 - Robustness Intra-Elite GINI

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.357
	(0.509)
Strength=3	0.491
	(0.611)
GINI	-3.987***
	(1.495)
Strength=2 × GINI=1	3.139**
	(1.409)
Strength=3 × GINI=1	3.173
	(2.475)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	-0.522
	(0.504)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.400
	(0.501)
Polity Score t-1	-0.0631
	(0.0464)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0252**
	(0.0114)
Riots t-1	0.350***
	(0.134)
Military Personnel t-1	0.00652
	(0.00504)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.050
	(1.681)
Constant	5.894
	(4.752)
Observations	297
Pseudo R^2	0.2170

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10 - Lag Rebel Strength

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Strength_1=2	0.331	0.128	0.499	0.444
	(0.809)	(0.755)	(0.746)	(0.734)
Strength_1=3	0.795	1.140**	1.462***	1.391***
	(0.590)	(0.453)	(0.469)	(0.410)
Intra Elite=1	-0.402	-0.295	-0.230	-0.207
	(0.663)	(0.697)	(0.776)	(0.791)
Strength_1=2 × Intra Elite=1	2.691***	2.716***	2.207**	2.392**
	(0.939)	(0.844)	(0.938)	(1.019)
Strength_1=3 × Intra Elite=1	0.504	0.492	-0.231	0.160
	(1.333)	(1.216)	(0.987)	(1.302)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.651	0.398	0.577
		(0.582)	(0.627)	(0.601)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.129	-0.111	-0.322
		(0.237)	(0.242)	(0.519)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0519	-0.0424	-0.0462
		(0.0337)	(0.0386)	(0.0461)
Domestic Protests t-1			-0.0180	-0.0164
			(0.0159)	(0.0150)
Riots t-1			0.287***	0.297***
			(0.0562)	(0.0623)
Military Personnel t-1				0.00135
				(0.00535)
Ethnic Fractionalization				1.502
				(2.499)
Constant	-2.843***	-7.261	-5.527	-5.866
	(0.584)	(5.375)	(5.528)	(4.899)
Observations	281	275	274	274
Pseudo R^2	0.0625	0.0916	0.1423	0.1582

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11 - Lag Intra-Elite

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Strength=2	-0.494	-0.336	-0.279	-0.301
	(0.880)	(0.832)	(0.790)	(0.776)
Strength=3	0.999*	1.078*	1.179*	1.147*
	(0.555)	(0.565)	(0.655)	(0.598)
Intra Elite t-1=1	-0.550	-0.507	-0.485	-0.484
	(0.647)	(0.646)	(0.674)	(0.691)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite t-1=1	3.618***	3.533***	2.967**	3.043**
	(1.182)	(1.079)	(1.236)	(1.411)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite t-1=1	-0.177	-0.0836	-0.609	-0.498
	(1.184)	(1.158)	(1.038)	(1.270)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.491	0.131	0.169
		(0.603)	(0.665)	(0.641)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.205	-0.278	-0.295
		(0.257)	(0.261)	(0.600)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0379	-0.0177	-0.0196
		(0.0381)	(0.0457)	(0.0545)
Domestic Protests t-1			0.00998	0.0112
			(0.00805)	(0.00821)
Riots t-1			0.273***	0.272***
			(0.0859)	(0.0935)
Military Personnel t-1				-0.000284
				(0.00631)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.357
				(2.042)
Constant	-2.575***	-4.895	-1.537	-1.840
	(0.448)	(5.582)	(6.039)	(6.989)
Observations	305	298	297	297
Pseudo R^2	0.0814	0.0875	0.1333	0.1336

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12 - Pre-War Intra-Elite

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.299	-0.441
	(0.633)	(0.428)
Strength=3	0.640	0.499
	(0.780)	(1.021)
Pre-War Elite=1	-0.855	-1.048
	(0.693)	(0.817)
Strength=2 × Pre-War Elite=1	2.332*	2.627**
	(1.281)	(1.288)
Strength=3 × Pre-War Elite=1	1.143	1.520
	(1.077)	(1.323)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.253
		(0.546)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.405
		(0.563)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0166
		(0.0566)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.0206**
		(0.00926)
Riots t-1		0.296***
		(0.0904)
Military Personnel t-1		0.00276
		(0.00630)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.124
		(1.807)
Constant	-2.431***	-1.474
	(0.404)	(6.296)
Observations	314	297
Pseudo R^2	0.0488	0.1279

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F3. Model Sensitivity

Results also remain robust to the use of a wide variety of different empirical models. Concretely, I show their robustness to the use of Probit models (Table A13); linear probability models (Table A14); Conditional Logit models (Table A15); and Log-Log models (Table A16). This set of findings show that the results of the main analysis are not driven by the type of empirical model applied.

Table A13 - Probit Models

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.507	-0.475
	(0.488)	(0.464)
Strength=3	0.516*	0.563*
	(0.303)	(0.328)
Intra Elite=1	-0.228	-0.166
	(0.297)	(0.286)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	2.219***	2.010***
	(0.604)	(0.772)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.0860	-0.262
	(0.576)	(0.598)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.190
		(0.274)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.219
		(0.286)
Polity Score t-1		-0.00562
		(0.0236)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.00898*
		(0.00486)
Riots t-1		0.148***
		(0.0480)
Military Personnel t-1		-0.000108
		(0.00281)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.568
		(1.065)
Constant	-1.484***	-1.551
	(0.214)	(2.720)
Observations	305	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1037	0.1556

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14 - Linear Probability Models (OLS)

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.0457	-0.0409
	(0.0371)	(0.0407)
Strength=3	0.0977	0.0931
	(0.0728)	(0.0830)
Intra Elite=1	-0.0255	-0.0155
	(0.0323)	(0.0325)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	0.502***	0.426***
	(0.106)	(0.144)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.0412	-0.0598
	(0.105)	(0.0914)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.0189
		(0.0337)
(ln) Population t-1		-0.0262
		(0.0297)
Polity Score t-1		-0.000369
		(0.00330)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.00117
		(0.000988)
Riots t-1		0.0351*
		(0.0180)
Military Personnel t-1		0.0000190
		(0.000297)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.0586
		(0.118)
Constant	0.0690**	0.0897
	(0.0286)	(0.287)
Observations	305	297
R^2	0.089	0.132
Adjusted R^2	0.073	0.095

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15 - Conditional Logit Models

	Model (1)	Model (2)
Strength=2	-0.913	-1.119
	(1.168)	(1.495)
Strength=3	1.226	2.682**
	(0.776)	(1.211)
Intra Elite=1	-0.767	-0.544
	(0.839)	(0.906)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.544**	3.450*
	(1.611)	(1.916)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	0.484	-0.750
	(1.585)	(1.964)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		-0.429
		(3.173)
(ln) Population t-1		-2.220
		(3.462)
Polity Score t-1		-0.0435
		(0.0689)
Domestic Protests t-1		0.0232
		(0.0215)
Riots t-1		0.334
		(0.204)
Military Personnel t-1		-0.0306
		(0.0274)
Observations	178	174
Pseudo R^2	0.1079	0.2240

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Grouped by country.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16 - Log Log Models

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.956
	(1.083)
Strength=3	0.970
	(0.637)
Intra Elite=1	-0.444
	(0.631)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.531**
	(1.399)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.0118
	(1.401)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	0.117
	(0.521)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.410
	(0.480)
Polity Score t-1	-0.0105
	(0.0384)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0122
	(0.0152)
Riots t-1	0.249***
	(0.0892)
Military Personnel t-1	0.00117
	(0.00623)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.047
	(1.640)
Constant	-0.799
	(4.961)
Observations	297

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F4. Omitted Variable Bias

Another important concern when running the main analysis relates to the possibility of confounding variables or omitted variable bias. In other words, the expected relation between insurgent strength, intra-elite competition and coups d'etat might be driven by other factors not included in the main models. In order to deal with this, I include a variety of robustness checks, including control variables at time t0 (Table A17); variables on economic performance and conditions (Table A18); new variables on political regimes (Table A19); variables on numbers of coups, coup timing and diffussion (Tables A20-A21); as well as on a wide variety of other controls (Tables A22-A25). Results remain robust to all these variables.

Table A17 - Controls t0

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Strength=2	-1.135	-0.991	-0.976	-1.076
	(1.152)	(1.064)	(1.057)	(1.011)
Strength=3	0.993*	1.182**	1.232**	1.145***
	(0.565)	(0.545)	(0.560)	(0.428)
Intra Elite=1	-0.488	-0.447	-0.422	-0.375
	(0.646)	(0.664)	(0.684)	(0.728)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	4.226***	4.122***	3.994***	4.172***
	(1.348)	(1.291)	(1.414)	(1.458)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.0994	-0.354	-0.354	0.150
	(1.145)	(1.095)	(1.202)	(1.139)
(ln) GDP pc		0.470	0.550	0.567
		(0.551)	(0.599)	(0.595)
(ln) Population		-0.170	-0.187	-1.044
		(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.645)
Polity		-0.0591	-0.0609	-0.0655*
		(0.0383)	(0.0395)	(0.0385)
Domestic Protests			-0.0754	-0.0885
			(0.164)	(0.151)
Riots			0.0594	0.0616
			(0.109)	(0.116)
(ln) Military Personnel				0.765
				(0.495)
Ethnic Fractionalization				1.459
				(1.990)
Constant	-2.603***	-5.079	-5.597	-1.355
	(0.442)	(4.907)	(5.303)	(7.135)
Observations	305	305	305	305
Pseudo R^2	0.1037	0.1236	0.1285	0.1411

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A18 - Robust Economy

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.960
	(1.142)
Strength=3	0.913
	(0.708)
Intra Elite=1	-0.298
	(0.633)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.773**
	(1.606)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.199
	(1.381)
Growth t-1	-3.713
	(4.183)
Oil & Mineral Exports t-1	-0.200
	(0.914)
% Labor Industry	-0.0500
	(0.0655)
Rest of Controls	✓
Constant	-3.450
	(6.155)
Observations	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1601

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A19 - Robustness Regimes

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Strength=2	-1.060	-1.122	-1.067
	(1.052)	(1.056)	(1.066)
Strength=3	1.164*	1.176**	1.155**
	(0.597)	(0.591)	(0.568)
Intra Elite=1	-0.393	-0.374	-0.385
	(0.682)	(0.650)	(0.649)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.955**	3.992**	3.957**
	(1.652)	(1.695)	(1.653)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.351	-0.392	-0.338
	(1.137)	(1.109)	(1.137)
Polity Outside LATAM	-0.00724		
	(0.188)		
BMR Democracy=1		0.210	
		(0.635)	
ACLP = Civilian Dictatorship			-0.112
			(0.978)
ACLP = Military Dictatorship			0.0428
			(0.586)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-1.093	-0.252	-1.219
	(5.518)	(6.703)	(6.856)
Observations	301	301	301
Pseudo R^2	0.1592	0.1601	0.1594

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A20 - Robustness Coups Diffusion

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.985
	(0.943)
Strength=3	1.267
	(0.945)
Intra Elite=1	-0.402
	(0.664)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.821**
	(1.574)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.471
	(1.168)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	0.367
	(0.535)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.311
	(0.541)
Polity Score t-1	-0.0198
	(0.0543)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0105
	(0.0126)
Riots t-1	0.251***
	(0.0807)
Military Personnel t-1	-0.000450
	(0.00596)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.468
	(2.474)
Regional Coups	0.281*
	(0.154)
Coups Neighbor	1.749
	(2.196)
Constant	-5.515
	(6.351)
Observations	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1707

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A21 - Robustness Temporal Coups

	Model (1)	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.678	-0.502
	(1.115)	(1.162)
Strength=3	1.230**	1.345*
	(0.513)	(0.703)
Intra Elite=1	-0.268	-0.213
	(0.623)	(0.691)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.241*	2.853*
	(1.842)	(1.620)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.265	-0.210
	(1.336)	(1.530)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	0.430	0.266
	(0.492)	(0.563)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.477	-0.726
	(0.605)	(0.672)
Polity Score t-1	0.000191	-0.00710
	(0.0480)	(0.0453)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0165**	0.0215
	(0.00769)	(0.0180)
Riots t-1	0.327***	0.327**
	(0.0958)	(0.152)
Military Personnel t-1	0.000174	0.00226
	(0.00561)	(0.00813)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.543	1.038
	(1.898)	(1.838)
Time Since Last Coup	-0.0560	
	(0.0444)	
Time Since Last Coup Squared	0.000261	
	(0.000843)	
Cumulative Number Coups 1950		0.0803
		(0.0858)
Number Coups Last 10 Years		0.346*
		(0.181)
Constant	-2.502	-0.582
	(6.256)	(5.759)
Observations	297	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1852	0.2236

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A22 - Robustness Controls I

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-1.088
	(0.922)
Strength=3	1.387**
	(0.675)
Intra Elite=1	-0.508
	(0.726)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.712**
	(1.573)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.423
	(1.225)
Military Expenditure t-1	-0.00675
	(0.00553)
Cold War	0.871
	(1.405)
Ruggedness	-0.420
	(0.421)
Land Inequality	1.848
	(2.868)
Rest of Controls	✓
Constant	-3.740
	(4.714)
Observations	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1758

Dependent Variable: Coups.

Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A23 - Robustness Controls II

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-1.044
	(1.022)
Strength=3	1.324*
	(0.715)
Intra Elite=1	-0.487
	(0.696)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.607**
	(1.726)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.411
	(1.111)
Soldiers Payment t-1	-0.121*
	(0.0673)
Rest of Controls	✓
Constant	-3.381
	(6.215)
Observations	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1547

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A24 - Robustness Controls III

	Model (1)
Strength=2	-0.460
	(0.497)
Strength=3	5.284***
	(0.889)
Intra Elite=1	-0.527
	(0.575)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	4.848***
	(1.759)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.387
	(1.197)
Conflict Duration	-0.230***
	(0.0696)
Rebel Origins = Political	-1.381**
	(0.642)
Rebel Origins = Armed Experience	-0.366
	(0.636)
Political Wing	1.632***
	(0.355)
Rebel Governance = Aliocracy	-1.665
	(1.157)
Rebel Governance = Rebelocracy	1.419
	(1.512)
Combatants = 100-500	0.923
	(0.678)
Combatants = 500-1000	0.415
	(0.903)
Combatants = 500-1000	-0.587
	(2.039)
Combatants = >1000	-4.374**
	(1.963)
Rest of Controls	✓
Constant	-8.852**
	(3.594)
Observations	270
Pseudo R^2	0.1763

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A25 - Robustness Controls IV

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
Strength=2	-0.919	-0.805	-0.765	-0.730	-0.882
	(0.973)	(0.926)	(0.963)	(0.964)	(0.994)
Strength=3	1.236**	1.180**	1.368***	1.415***	1.132**
	(0.593)	(0.518)	(0.436)	(0.472)	(0.530)
Intra Elite=1	-0.461	-0.412	-0.383	-0.463	-0.476
	(0.699)	(0.648)	(0.666)	(0.689)	(0.648)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.943**	4.125***	3.822***	3.761***	3.698**
	(1.576)	(1.311)	(1.450)	(1.457)	(1.574)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.409	-0.668	-0.536	-0.457	-0.442
	(1.234)	(1.340)	(1.135)	(1.137)	(1.166)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	0.173	-0.136	0.125	0.0689	0.102
	(0.587)	(0.525)	(0.598)	(0.627)	(0.617)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.336	-0.625	-0.280	-0.291	-0.418
	(0.581)	(0.643)	(0.556)	(0.568)	(0.591)
Polity Score t-1	-0.00904	0.0156	-0.00910	-0.00354	-0.00253
	(0.0508)	(0.0560)	(0.0494)	(0.0483)	(0.0509)
Riots t-1	0.323***	0.359***	0.327***	0.312***	0.277***
	(0.0964)	(0.113)	(0.0805)	(0.0875)	(0.0825)
Military Personnel t-1	0.000706	0.00212	0.000548	0.000854	0.000960
	(0.00610)	(0.00734)	(0.00595)	(0.00585)	(0.00595)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.382	1.385	0.287	0.104	0.735
	(2.062)	(1.651)	(2.066)	(2.011)	(2.026)
Anti Government Demonstrations	-0.151				
	(0.217)				
Protests Near t-1		0.234***			
		(0.0848)			
Protests Far t-1			-0.0197		
			(0.0174)		
Violent Protests t-1				-0.0351	
				(0.0342)	
Peaceful Protests t-1					0.0244
					(0.0296)
Constant	-1.479	2.806	-1.574	-0.935	-0.434
	(6.496)	(6.702)	(6.361)	(6.451)	(6.873)
Observations	298	297	297	297	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1557	0.1828	0.1554	0.1586	0.1533

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F5. Other Tests

As part of the set of robustness tests included in this Appendix, I also incorporate three distinct analyses: sensitivity analyses, dropping individually each of the variables included in the empirical models (Table A26); testing the potential existence of unit heterogeneity, through the inclusion of country, region, year and period fixed effects (Table A27); and the use of matching techniques, concretely, of propensity score matching (Tables A28-A30). Finally, Table A31 traces the determinants of coups taking place in non-war periods.

Table A26 - Sensitivity Analyses

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
Strength=2	-0.987	-0.989	-1.062	-0.891	-1.179	-1.017	-0.935	-1.017
	(1.082)	(1.137)	(1.048)	(0.990)	(1.196)	(1.069)	(1.044)	(1.191)
Strength=3	1.018	1.022	1.161**	1.191**	0.791	1.044	1.124	1.045
	(0.696)	(0.667)	(0.568)	(0.543)	(0.696)	(0.664)	(0.689)	(0.742)
Intra Elite=1	-0.431	-0.464	-0.393	-0.404	-0.391	-0.402	-0.409	-0.400
	(0.708)	(0.720)	(0.678)	(0.675)	(0.666)	(0.677)	(0.678)	(0.677)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.867**	3.939**	3.962**	3.777**	4.180***	3.881**	3.678**	3.860**
	(1.615)	(1.698)	(1.650)	(1.522)	(1.594)	(1.574)	(1.486)	(1.586)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.246	-0.240	-0.347	-0.523	0.392	-0.209	-0.536	-0.210
	(1.152)	(1.205)	(1.153)	(1.181)	(1.322)	(1.178)	(0.951)	(1.329)
(ln) GDPpc t-1		0.0444	0.199	0.159	0.465	0.204	0.0954	0.205
		(0.583)	(0.538)	(0.587)	(0.542)	(0.574)	(0.594)	(0.568)
(ln) Population t-1	-0.364		-0.468	-0.357	-0.192	-0.395	-0.284	-0.423
	(0.624)		(0.564)	(0.559)	(0.513)	(0.376)	(0.506)	(0.364)
Polity Score t-1	-0.00581	-0.0195		-0.00858	-0.0334	-0.0107	-0.00752	-0.00961
	(0.0475)	(0.0481)		(0.0501)	(0.0425)	(0.0434)	(0.0500)	(0.0425)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0145	0.0131	0.0160*		0.0230**	0.0153	0.0114	0.0153
	(0.00953)	(0.00965)	(0.00937)		(0.00974)	(0.00977)	(0.00817)	(0.0184)
Riots t-1	0.285***	0.257***	0.284***	0.298***		0.275***	0.273***	0.276**
	(0.0777)	(0.0833)	(0.0755)	(0.0898)		(0.0806)	(0.0809)	(0.109)
Military Personnel t-1	0.000351	-0.00390	0.000526	0.000637	-0.00214		-0.0000912	0.000469
	(0.00589)	(0.00399)	(0.00482)	(0.00583)	(0.00504)		(0.00602)	(0.00534)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.943	0.524	1.262	0.659	0.976	1.122		1.136
	(2.324)	(1.994)	(2.132)	(2.003)	(2.002)	(2.161)		(1.296)
Constant	-0.144	-3.315	-1.065	-1.369	-5.237	-1.633	-1.221	-1.431
	(4.643)	(4.777)	(5.543)	(6.383)	(5.221)	(5.499)	(6.156)	(5.672)
Observations	297	297	301	298	297	297	297	297
Pseudo R^2	0.1539	0.1506	0.1592	0.1508	0.1162	0.1547	0.1521	0.1546

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A27 - Unit Heterogeneity

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
Strength=2	-1.194	-1.322	-0.721	-0.717
	(1.453)	(1.103)	(1.724)	(0.993)
Strength=3	2.853	1.141*	2.782**	1.799**
	(1.800)	(0.586)	(1.218)	(0.863)
Intra Elite=1	-0.619	-1.306	-0.322	-0.607
	(0.625)	(0.876)	(0.764)	(0.694)
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1	3.751**	4.744***	5.055*	3.760**
	(1.619)	(1.813)	(2.980)	(1.709)
Strength=3 × Intra Elite=1	-0.731	0.622	-1.642	-0.247
	(0.972)	(1.140)	(1.695)	(1.099)
(ln) GDPpc t-1	-0.447	0.208	1.369***	0.531
	(2.899)	(0.564)	(0.416)	(0.517)
(ln) Population t-1	-2.345	0.141	-1.108*	-0.241
	(3.274)	(0.694)	(0.645)	(0.642)
Polity Score t-1	-0.0445	0.00748	0.0203	-0.000576
	(0.0520)	(0.0556)	(0.0574)	(0.0536)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.0251***	0.0186***	0.0928***	0.0189**
	(0.00399)	(0.00711)	(0.0284)	(0.00884)
Riots t-1	0.369	0.204***	0.383***	0.232***
	(0.256)	(0.0572)	(0.142)	(0.0894)
Military Personnel t-1	-0.0333	-0.0100	0.00925	-0.00157
	(0.0357)	(0.00852)	(0.00707)	(0.00771)
Ethnic Fractionalization	14.03	4.619*	3.106	0.693
	(14.27)	(2.762)	(2.971)	(1.967)
Country Fixed Effects	✓	***X***	***X***	***X***
Regional Fixed Effects	***X***	✓	***X***	***X***
Year Fixed Effects	***X***	***X***	✓	***X***
Period Fixed Effects	***X***	***X***	***X***	✓
Constant	17.98	-5.762	-6.527	-6.470
	(22.59)	(3.990)	(5.007)	(6.419)
Observations	174	297	151	292
Pseudo R^2	0.2639	0.2183	0.3972	0.1908

Dependent Variable: Coups.
Strength =1 & Intra Elite =0 as reference categories.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A28 - Pre-Treatment Covariate Balance Summary

	Means		***Variance***	
	Control	*Treated*	*Control*	*Treated*
(ln) Population t-1	9.118939	10.08245	1.107513	1.033591
Polity Score t-1	1.463668	-1.125	45.00649	58.98214
Domestic Protests t-1	6.757785	20.125	152.5522	243.2679
Riots t-1	.5847751	2.625	2.229767	6.267857
Military Personnel t-1	63.63322	170.125	4536.219	13040.13
Ethnic Fractionalization	.4246077	.3107022	.0335049	.0209422

Table A29 - Raw vs. Matched Data Balance

	Standardized differences		***Variance ratio***	
	Raw	*Matched*	*Raw*	*Matched*
(ln) Population t-1	.9312187	-.3975406	.9332545	.6916291
Polity Score t-1	-.3590033	-1.322599	1.310525	.2155887
Domestic Protests t-1	.9501824	-.2704257	1.594653	.2815073
Riots t-1	.9897928	.7822151	2.810991	.1908185
Military Personnel t-1	1.13597	-.2188064	2.874668	1.57505
Ethnic Fractionalization	-.6903544	-1.352251	.6250474	.265573

Table A30 - Matching

Propensity Score Matching				
	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Obs.	Treated Obs.
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1 (ATE)	0.774**	0.309	297	8
Strength=2 × Intra Elite=1 (ATET)	0.375**	0.153	297	8

Robust standard errors in parentheses.Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A31 - Non-War Coups

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Intra Elite	-0.226	-0.220	-0.227	-0.233	-0.254	-0.232	-0.241
	(0.412)	(0.417)	(0.416)	(0.405)	(0.421)	(0.409)	(0.423)
(ln) GDP per capita t-1	-0.415	-0.424	-0.405	-0.410	-0.381	-0.411	-0.398
	(0.596)	(0.599)	(0.595)	(0.593)	(0.591)	(0.594)	(0.595)
(ln) Population t-1	0.313	0.316	0.311	0.314	0.307	0.316	0.303
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.294)	(0.298)	(0.294)
Polity Score t-1	-0.0841**	-0.0862**	-0.0878**	-0.0851**	-0.0894**	-0.0858**	-0.0883**
	(0.0366)	(0.0361)	(0.0363)	(0.0357)	(0.0370)	(0.0356)	(0.0370)
Domestic Protests t-1	0.00252	0.0129	0.0182	0.00458	0.0224	0.00554	0.0187
	(0.0738)	(0.0739)	(0.0745)	(0.0737)	(0.0743)	(0.0734)	(0.0745)
Riots t-1	0.265***	0.266***	0.281***	0.271***	0.274***	0.271***	0.275***
	(0.0667)	(0.0659)	(0.0636)	(0.0638)	(0.0636)	(0.0649)	(0.0635)
Military Personnel t-1	-0.00718*	-0.00723*	-0.00712*	-0.00715*	-0.00704	-0.00719*	-0.00705
	(0.00428)	(0.00434)	(0.00430)	(0.00425)	(0.00438)	(0.00429)	(0.00429)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.751	1.694	1.592	1.720	1.559	1.715	1.599
	(1.236)	(1.221)	(1.258)	(1.211)	(1.254)	(1.214)	(1.238)
Active Civil War Last Year		1.100					
		(1.072)					
Active Civil War 5 Years			0.470				
			(0.379)				
Number of Insurgencies Last Year				-0.214			
				(0.606)			
Number of Insurgencies 5 Years					-0.350		
					(0.243)		
Insurgent Strength Last Year						-0.281	
						(0.555)	
Insurgent Strength 5 Years							0.395
							(0.270)
Constant	-1.999	-1.901	-1.945	-2.027	-2.076	-2.034	-1.933
	(5.335)	(5.369)	(5.362)	(5.325)	(5.309)	(5.329)	(5.329)
Observations	740	740	740	740	740	740	740
Pseudo R^2	0.1074	0.1107	0.1104	0.1077	0.1119	0.1081	0.1113

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

It is more difficult to maintain the balance of freedom than to bear the weight of tyranny.

— Simón Bolívar

Because death is not the opposite of life; living like a dead, that's the opposite of life.

— Pablo Ramos

4

Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace (with Juan Masullo)

Contents

4.1 Introduction 185
4.2 Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace . 187
4.3 Context Overview 189
4.3.1 The Colombian Civil War 189
4.3.2 The Peace Process with the FARC 192
4.4 Why Should the Identity of the Perpetrator Matter for Civilian Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements? . . 194
4.5 Data and Methods 198
4.6 Results and Discussion 200
4.6.1 Main Results 201
4.6.2 Robustness Checks 204
4.6.3 What About the Internal Logic of the Argument? . . . 207
4.7 Conclusion 211

4. Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace (with Juan Masullo) *184*

Abstract

Does exposure to violence affect attitudes toward peace? Civilians living in war zones see peace agreements as an opportunity to improve their security prospects. However, in multiparty conflicts, this does not automatically translate into support for peace. Support hinges on the interplay between which faction has victimized civilians in the past and which faction is sitting at the negotiation table. If civilians have been victimized by the group that is involved in the peace agreement, they will be likely to support peace. On the contrary, if they have been victimized by another faction, they will be likely to refrain from supporting peace if they believe that this can trigger retaliatory violence against them. This article explores this argument empirically in the context of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC; both quantitative and qualitative data yield support to the study's theoretical expectations.

4.1 Introduction

Different strands of literature have established that violence has the power to shape people's social and political preferences and behaviors. In the last decade, a rapidly growing body of research on the effects of wartime violence has established that exposure to violence can make people more cooperative and altruistic (see Bauer et al. 2016 for a meta-analysis). Similarly, a well-developed literature on political legacies has shown that experiences of violence can have a long-term impact on electoral behaviour (Balcells 2012; Bellows & Miguel 2009; Costalli & Ruggeri 2019; Rozenas, Schutte, & Zhukov 2017; Zhukov & Talibova 2018). In addition, an emerging field on the "politics of crime" has found that victimization can shape policy preferences regarding how to combat crime (García-Ponce, Young, & Zeitzoff 2018; Masullo & Morisi 2019b; Visconti 2020). If exposure to violence has such power to transform peoples' political preferences and behaviors, does variation in experiences of violence also translate into different attitudes towards peace?

This paper explores this question in the context of Colombia's 2016 peace referendum, in which a razor-thin majority opposed a peace agreement painstakingly reached by the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The spatial pattern of the vote and the geographical variation of violence during the war offer a rich opportunity to explore whether different experiences of violence have a differential impact on attitudes towards peace.

Rather than looking at violence *in general*, we contend that the identity of the perpetrator – who shot the bullets – matters when it comes to the effect of exposure to violence on attitudes towards peace. We argue that civilians' decisions about whether to support peace are guided by their desire to minimize post-agreement violence. In multiparty conflicts, when peace agreements involve some armed groups and not others, civilians' expectations of post-agreement violence are shaped by an interplay between which armed group has been their main victimizer and which

group is sitting at the negotiation table. When civilians have been mostly victimized by the group negotiating peace, support for the agreement will be higher, as they have good reasons to believe that violence by that group will decrease. However, if their main victimizer is not sitting at the negotiating table, civilians not only lack reasons to believe that violence by that group will decrease, but they could also fear violent retribution for supporting peace with another faction. Consequently, support for the agreement will be lower among this subset of the population.

Our empirical analysis provides supporting quantitative and qualitative evidence for this argument. We find that support for the 2016 peace referendum in Colombia was conditional on *who* inflicted the harm: people living in areas mostly affected by FARC violence were more supportive of the peace deal, while support was lower among those inhabiting localities mostly affected by paramilitary violence. This finding holds against different model specifications and several robustness checks. Qualitative testimonies collected in conflict-affected areas provide support for the internal logic of the proposed argument.

This study makes two core contributions. First, it shows that "who shot the bullets" matters, suggesting that a more disaggregated treatment of "violence" can help further advance research on both the effects of exposure to violence and citizens' support for peace. Second, it proposes a new relevant outcome – attitudes for peace – to be explored in the growing literature on the effects of exposure to violence. In doing so, and by proposing a theory of why experiences of violence by different groups can have a differential effect on peace attitudes in multi-party conflicts, this study adds nuance to recent efforts to explain the unexpected outcome of Colombia's 2016 peace referendum.[1] A better understanding of the determinants of support for peace is crucial for the prospects of securing peace in Colombia and in other countries transitioning from war to peace, as the successful implementation

[1]See special issue edited by Flores & Vargas (2018) and articles by Pechenkina & Gamboa (2019), Matanock & García-Sánchez (2017), Masullo & Morisi (2019) and Tellez (2019, 2019b).

of peace agreements is likely to require high levels of public support and local buy-in (Hayes & McAllister 2001; Mckeon 2005; Nilsson 2012).

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 broadly reviews the literature on the link between exposure to violence and attitudes towards peace and Section 3 summarizes the historical roots of the Colombian conflict and the political context in which the peace referendum took place. In Section 4, we propose a theoretical argument as to why the identity of the perpetrator should matter for attitudes towards peace. We also derive and specify observable implications for the Colombian case. Section 5 describes the data and methodology, and Section 6 presents and discusses the main results of our empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.

4.2 Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Peace

The emerging literature on violence exposure and attitudes towards peace has so far yielded mixed results. On the one hand, several studies have contended that experiences of violence are central in understanding people's attitudes towards peace. However, findings do not converge when it comes to the nature of the relationship. Some have found that violence reduces support for key dimensions related to peace and conflict termination. For example, Canetti et al. (2013) and Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) found that in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, individual-level exposure to violence has shifted people away from compromise and conciliatory policies. Similarly, studying Northern Ireland, Hewstoe et al. (2006) found that people that had negative experiences of "The Troubles" report lower levels of forgiveness. In stark contrast, other studies have found that violence exposure can spur pro-peace attitudes. For example, Hazlett (2020) found that refugees from Darfur that were directly affected by the wave of violence in the early 2000s were less supportive of harsher punishment and more likely to believe that peace was possible. Yet, other studies have yielded mixed results. In the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus, for instance, Bakke, O'Loughlin, & Ward (2009)

found that while personal experiences of violence decreased people's willingness to forgive, living in the proximity of communities with high levels of violent incidents made preferences for forgiveness more likely.

On the other hand, a series of studies have casted doubt on the centrality of exposure to violence al together, suggesting that other variables take the front seat when it comes to explaining attitudes towards peace. For example, focusing on the 2001 Macedonian civil conflict, Dyrstad et al. (2011) found that ethnicity trumps all other individual and contextual factors – including exposure to violence – in explaining people's support for the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the deal that brought the conflict to an end. Exploring citizens' attitudes towards peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Newman (2012) found that present conditions – largely related to lack of trust in Arab aspirations – rather than past experiences of conflict are what really help us to understand Israeli unwillingness to make concessions for peace.

Findings are similarly conflicting in the literature exploring attitudes towards peace in the Colombian civil war. This became readily clear in the days immediately after the 2016 peace referendum, when analysts and scholars offered preliminary analysis of the spatial patterns of the vote. While some argued that support for the peace referendum was generally higher in war zones and that people who had suffered the most from violence tended to vote in favor (Fergusson & Molina 2016), others contended that people living under FARC's control voted against the deal as strongly negative attitudes towards the group prevailed in these areas.[2] Yet others claimed that the presence or absence of conflict was not a central factor explaining vote choice (Morelo 2016).

If one looks beyond the referendum, evidence is equally conflicting. For example, analyzing the 2014 presidential elections, Weintraub, Vargas & Flores (2015) found

[2]See short interview with James Robinson: https://twitter.com/UChicago/status/783704638231023619 [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

that Juan Manuel Santos – the pro-peace candidate – performed well in communities with moderate levels of violence, but poorly in communities with very high and low levels. Relying on 2014 AmericasBarometer survey data, which included a question on support for the then ongoing peace process, Liendo & Braithwaite (2018) found that existing political preferences overwhelmingly drove attitudes towards the peace process with FARC, not experiences of violence (see also Brodzinsky 2016).

Not being able to adjudicate between these competing accounts is unfortunate, given the theoretical and policy importance of the debate. How can future research help overcome this impasse? One way is to further disaggregate the key terms of the relationship – that is, "exposure to violence" and "peace". Some scholars have begun to disaggregated "peace", finding that, for example, the peace agreement overall was more popular than some of its specific provisions (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz 2018; Tellez 2019). However, few studies have attempted to unpack "exposure to violence".[3] In this study we disaggregate exposure to violence by "who shot the bullets". To be sure, we are not the first to examine the effects of perpetrator identity on civilian attitudes (see, e.g., Gallego 2018; Lupu & Wallace 2019; Lyall 2010; Lyall, Blair, & Imai 2013). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to do so in the specific context of attitudes towards peace.

4.3 Context Overview

4.3.1 The Colombian Civil War

The ongoing Colombian civil war dates back to the 1960s, being one of the longest in the world. Throughout the last five decades, the war has involved several active left-wing guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary armies, and the forces of the Colombian state. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, guerrilla groups managed

[3] A recent exception is Pechenkina & Gamboa (2019), who explore the effects of insurgent and counterinsurgent violence on peace policy preferences. In the broader literature on exposure to wartime violence, some have explored the effects of different forms of targeting – indiscriminate or collective (Lupu & Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas, Schutte, & Zhukov 2017; Zhukov & Talibova 2018) – and types of warfare – symmetric and asymmetric (Krakowski 2020).

to significantly expand their territorial control and notoriously increased their military capacity. Among the several guerrilla groups operating in the country, the FARC – founded in 1964 – rapidly became the largest and most powerful.[4]

The geographical expansion of guerrilla groups increasingly threatened the (largely economic) interests and security of local and regional elites. Tired of extortions, kidnappings and assassinations in the 1980s, large landowners, cattle ranchers, agro-exporters and drug traffickers responded to the threat by setting up private self-defense armies. While initially organized as various independent regional groups, the most prominent of these armies created the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997. The AUC, a rightwing, anti-insurgent paramilitary federation of national scope, rapidly became FARC's fiercest enemy. With the overt support of local and regional elites, and the (sometimes) subtle support of the Colombian army, the AUC's counterinsurgent campaign led to one of the bloodiest periods of the Colombian conflict (Romero 2003).

Competing for civilian loyalties, armed groups fighting in the Colombian civil war have disproportionally victimized civilians. According to the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH), about 200.000 people were killed between 1958 and 2012, of which over 80% were civilians (CNMH 2013).[5] While every non-state and state armed group has played its part in this bloody war, the FARC and the paramilitaries – especially the latter – have accounted for a disproportionate number of civilians casualties (Restrepo, Spagat, & Vargas 2003).

In the mid-2000s, the AUC demobilized. However, the demobilization process spawned several smaller armed groups known as "criminal bands" (BACRIM –

[4]Second to FARC has been the National Liberation Army (ELN), also created in 1964 and active by the time of writing.

[5]These figures provide only a glimpse of the extent to which the Colombian population has been exposed to violence. Civilians have been also victims of a wide variety of non-lethal violence, including extortion, kidnapping, displacement or sexual violence. The report *Basta Ya!* by the CNMH provides a detailed picture of the different forms of victimization prevalent in the war.



Figure 4.1: Map of Colombia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Section.

from the Spanish *bandas criminales*) which are still active in various regions. Many BACRIM were formed by former AUC members and controlled some of the same areas the paramilitaries had held. Given these continuities, some analysts refer to them as "neo-paramiltiaries" (Granada, Restrepo, & Tobón García 2009) and many civilians on the ground actually call them *'paracos'* (Colombian slang for paramilitaries).

These groups are mostly interested in profiting from illegal markets, do not have a clear anti-insurgent agenda, and most lack the military capacity to directly confront larger armed groups. Nevertheless, to control the areas where their economic interests are settled, they have competed for civilian loyalties against other armed groups, including the FARC, and have recurrently used violence to ensure civilian collaboration and prevent defections. More important for this study, they have openly declared their opposition to the peace process (Arjona 2016:90).

4.3.2 The Peace Process with the FARC

During the eight years of Uribe's administration (2002–2010), the Colombian military was able to severely weaken the rebels, undermining their military capacity and killing some of the organization's most prominent leaders. Peace negotiations, by contrast, took place when Uribe's defense minister and successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010.[6] Following secret rapprochements between the Santos government and a militarily weakened FARC, peace talks formally began in October 2012.

The intense negotiation process eventually led to the announcement of a bilateral ceasefire in June 2016. In September 2016, a final agreement was reached and signed. This included important provisions for a comprehensive rural reform, permission for FARC to participate in elections, a strategy to curb coca cultivation and stop drug trafficking, and truth and justice for victims.[7]

Santos called for a referendum to give Colombians the opportunity to directly ratify and legitimize the agreement. Despite polls predicting wide support for the agreement, Colombians rejected it by a razon-thin margin of 0.5% on 2nd October. Santos and the FARC returned to the negotiation table, revised the document, and signed an amended version in November 2016. Deciding against popular ratification this time, Santos finally passed the agreement through the Colombian Congress.

[6]Before 2012, three different governments unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate peace with FARC in 1984, 1991 and 1998 (see González Posso 2014 and Nasi 2009).

[7]For a detailed analysis of this peace process, see Nasi & Rettberg (2019).

Despite deep challenges in the implementation of the agreement, the end of the conflict with the FARC today seems irreversible: combatants have disarmed and demobilized and the FARC has become a legal political party.

Paradoxically, the decision to have a democratic consultation to seal the deal provided a platform for elites seeking to upend the peace process (Matanock & García-Sánchez 2017), transforming the referendum campaign into "a battle of narratives between divided elites" (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz 2018:15). In the run up to the referendum, while Santos and his national coalition strongly promoted the agreement, a political faction led by Uribe, fiercely campaigned against, framing the final agreement as excessively lenient on the FARC.

The promoters of the No criticized the agreement as being too indulgent and giving unjustified concessions to the rebels, claiming that it promoted a culture of impunity. The opposition managed to successfully frame the agreement as a gift to the FARC, "rewarding" them for decades of war and violence. Voting in favor of it came to be seen, for many, as signal of FARC support.

Given this intense campaign leading up to the referendum, the high levels of political polarization that characterized the peace process, and the complexity of the agreement (laid out in a 300-page agreement!), scholars have looked at how both the referendum campaign and the design of the agreement shaped people's vote. In fact, some of the agreement's provisions and concessions (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz 2018; Tellez 2019) and the role of campaign information and arguments (Masullo & Morisi 2019) have been found to have shaped Colombians' attitudes towards the peace agreement. In this paper we take a different perspective and explore whether exposure to violence shaped vote choice in the 2016 referendum. In particular, we investigate whether exposure to violence by the FARC as opposed to violence by the paramilitaries/BACRIM had an observable impact on vote choice.

4.4 Why Should the Identity of the Perpetrator Matter for Civilian Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements?

In civil wars – especially those fought irregularly – violence against civilians is unequally distributed throughout the territory and thus affects the population unevenly (Kalyvas 2006). Civilians going through the same war can have diametrically different experiences of violence. Depending on where they live, they might experience high, low, or negligible levels of violence. Moreover, civilians might be affected more by one faction than the others. We contend that these different experiences have differential effects on people's attitudes towards peace.

Our argument rests on a minimal assumption: civilians living in war zones have a baseline preference for reducing harm against them and their communities. As recent research on civilian agency in conflict settings has consistently found, civilians appreciate safety and make choices they believe will help them minimize the chances of further violence. We contend that a desire to reduce the possibility of future victimization shapes civilian attitudes towards peace because achieving peace – or at least ensuring a definitive ceasefire and/or having armed actors give up their weapons and demobilize – will likely have a strong impact on the safety conditions of those living in war zones.[8]

Populations that have experienced violence in their localities and assess that violence may plausibly be directed at them in the future are particularly likely to be willing to bring the conflict to an end. As a negotiated settlement is an expedient way to do so, it is reasonable to expect that people living in warzones would exhibit a positive attitude towards peace agreements.[9] However, deriving the

[8]This has been the case, for example, for decisions to both collaborate (Kalyvas 2006) and refuse to cooperate with armed groups (Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2017), as well as to displace (Lozano-Garcia et al. 2010; Steele 2009) and stay put (Krakowski 2017; Masullo 2015).

[9]This baseline expectation is shared and empirically supported by recent studies on attitudes towards peace in civil conflict (see, e.g., Hazlett 2020; Pechenkina & Gamboa 2019; Tellez 2019). We reckon, however, that it is at odds with findings from the "politics of crime" literature, consistently

expectation that exposure to violence *in general* translates into more support for peace implies assuming that the effects of violence are symmetrical and that civilian attitudes are indifferent to the identity of the perpetrator. The theoretical argument that we advance here moves away from this "symmetric effects assumption" (as in work by Lupu & Wallace 2019; Lyall 2010; Lyall, Blair, & Imai 2013)[10] and contends that "who shot the bullets" mediates the effect of exposure to violence on civilians' support for peace.

In multi-party conflicts – i.e., where more than one non-state armed group operates – governments commonly negotiate peace with a specific armed group or set of groups, but rarely include every fighting armed faction. In this sense, peace agreements are normally "incomplete" and the peace they bring about is "partial" at best (Franke & Öztürk 2015; Prem et al. 2018). Successfully sealing peace will likely lead to a decrease in violence by the group(s) involved in the negotiations but other factions may continue to operate and civilians may therefore remain at risk of violence. Given civilians' safety-seeking considerations, what shapes the way in which exposure to violence affects civilians' attitudes towards peace is the interplay between which groups victimized civilians in the recent past and which groups are sitting at the negotiating table.

A stylized version of our argument runs as follows. Two opposing non-state armed groups, Group A and Group B, are operating in a civil war. The government is in peace negotiations *only* with Group A. If the negotiations are successful, violence

showing that victims of crime tend to be more supportive of "iron fist" approaches (e.g., Bateson 2012; Malone 2010; Masullo & Morisi 2019; Visconti 2020). The setting of criminal violence and civil war differ in ways that are potentially consequential for our argument. Supporting "hawkish approaches" is likely to be more costly (in the form of, e.g., armed clashes, counterinsurgency operations, violent retribution, etc.) for those who live in warzones in civil war than for those who live in the commonly more urban and circumspect setting of violent crime. In the latter, a large share of "iron fist" promoters do not live in the areas where most of the violence happens and where violent retribution is more like to take place.

[10]For example, Lyall, Blair, & Imai's (2013) found that while violence by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afganistan decreased support for the ISAF and increased support for the Taliban, Taliban violence only marginally decreased support for the Taliban and did not translate into more support for ISAF.

perpetrated by Group A is likely to fall drastically or even cease completely. In this situation, civilians will likely believe that their safety situation will significantly improve. Hence, they are likely to support the agreement. However, this reasoning will be particularly applicable for civilians living in areas where Group A has had a violent presence in the recent past and, therefore, would be expected to continue causing harm in the absence of an agreement.

At the same time, civilians have no reasons to believe that violence from Group B will decrease. On the contrary, as the agreement is likely to grant concessions to Group A, civilians supporting it may fear retaliatory violence by Group B which might see pro-peace civilians as sympathetic to the other faction. This will particularly be the case for civilians living in areas where Group B has committed violence in the recent past and is expected to continue harming civilians.[11]

The dynamics of a multi-party conflict and civilians' natural desire to minimize future violence push civilians to think strategically when deciding to support a peace agreement. Even if someone has an underlying preference for bringing a conflict with one armed group to an end via a peace agreement, that person might not support peace to avoid potential retribution from those groups that still operate in the conflict. As we have seen in other repressive contexts, safety-seeking considerations and fear are likely to push civilians to publicly falsify their private preferences with important social and political consequences (Kuran 1991, 1995).

From this theoretical logic, we derive the two expectations below. They both reflect observable asymmetries in how exposure to violence can shape support for peace agreements:

[11] We assume that, on average, civilians expect that future violence will most likely come from the same group that has victimized them in the past. This assumption is both intuitive and largely consistent with testimonies collected in the field.

- In areas where Group A has committed most of the violence, residents are more likely to support a peace agreement with Group A.
- In areas where Group B has committed most of the violence, residents are more likely to refrain from supporting a peace agreement with Group A.[12]

The Colombian case fits the basic structure of the argument well. First, the Colombian civil war is a multiparty conflict in which several non-state enemy factions are active. Second, the 2016 peace agreement involved only one of these armed groups – the FARC. Third, among the other non-state armed groups active in the country, there were factions that opposed FARC and competed with it for civilian allegiances. While the AUC – the quintessential enemy of the FARC – had demobilized in 2006, several BACRIM – or neo-paramilitaries – were still active during the negotiation period and the referendum. Fourth, the 2016 peace agreement granted important concessions to FARC that were seen as incommensurate and unjustified by the opposition, including the BACRIM.

Under these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for those living in warzones to believe that FARC violence would largely recede or even stop fully if a peace agreement was reached. Equally, it would have been reasonable to believe that paramilitary or BACRIM violence would be left unaffected or even increase. As supporting the peace agreement could be easily taken by opposing forces as a sign of support for the FARC, civilians could well believe that the paramilitaries/BACRIM might punish perceived pro-peace individuals. As it had happened in the past, it would not have been unreasonable for civilians to believe that the paramilitaries/BACRIM could use electoral results as a proxy of

[12]Unlike studies on the asymmetrical effects of violence on civilian attitudes, we do not take asymmetry as deriving from intergroup bias – the tendency to interpret actions of one's own in-group in a more favorable light than those of the out-group – resulting from ideological resonance and/or ethnic identification. We contend that ethnic and/or ideological attachments are not necessary for asymmetric effects to emerge: the identity of the armed actor matters for safety-seeking considerations.

civilian allegiances and target "disloyal" individuals – an unintended consequence of democratization in conditions of persistent conflict (Steele 2017; Steele & Schubiger 2018).

Therefore, rather than expecting exposure to violence to have a uniform, symmetric effect on attitudes towards the 2016 peace agreement, we expect the effect on attitudes to be conditional on which armed group had victimized civilians in the recent past. Concretely, we expect that municipalities that were exposed mostly to FARC violence would see stronger support for the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum. Connectedly, we expect that municipalities that were exposed mostly to paramilitary/BACRIM violence would exhibit stronger opposition to the agreement.

4.5 Data and Methods

Our outcome variable is the percentage of votes per municipality supporting the peace agreement in the 2016 referendum.[13] Our independent variable, exposure to violence, is displayed in two different ways. First, we use a set of variables that allow us to capture *overall* exposure to violent attacks in each municipality. Second, in order to tap into "who shot the bullets", we use two independent variables, "(ln) FARC Attacks" and "(ln) paramilitary/ BACRIM Attacks". These measure the mean number of violent attacks carried out by each of these actors in each municipality between 1988-2010.[14] Electoral data for the 2016 referendum comes

[13]See Figure A1 in the Appendix for a map displaying the spatial distribution of the vote in the 2016 referendum.

[14]We are aware that the paramilitaries and the BACRIM are not the same. However, given the continuities between the two phenomena (see Section 3 and Granada, Restrepo & Tobón García 2009), we treat them together. Nevertheless, when differentiating between paramilitary and BACRIM violence, the results hold (Table A4 in the Appendix). We opted for the 1988–2010 timeframe for the core tests of our argument so that the results would be readily comparable with previous studies that have relied also on these data (e.g., Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores 2015). However, as our argument rests on civilians' expectations of future victimization at the time of the referendum, stopping in 2010 might raise some concerns – even if major transformations in dynamics of violence had already taken place by 2010. As a robustness check we ran the models for the period 2010 – 2012 (also using a different source, the CNMH) and results widely support our expectations, with larger substantive effects but a decline in statistical significance (Table A14 in the Appendix). We do not go beyond 2012, as this is the year when the formal phase of the peace negotiation began and, as a consequence, the dynamics of FARC violence entered a whole new phase. This way, our time frame reduces concerns of potential endogeneity, as the measures

from the Colombian National Civil Registry and data on violent events comes from the *Observatorio de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario* – an agency of the Colombian Presidency.

To estimate the effect of exposure to violence on preferences over peace we rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, given the structure of our dependent variable, with departmental fixed effects to capture any unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we run several robustness checks, including a matching procedure and an instrumental variable estimation for exposure to FARC attacks (see Tables A3 to A14 in the Appendix).

In all our models, we include a set of relevant variables to control for different factors that could have had an impact on preferences over peace and/or on armed group actions. We divide these controls into three groups. First, we include variables related to past political behaviour and political preferences, which have been argued to be central in explaining both attitudes towards peace in Colombia (Liendo & Braithwaite 2018; Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores 2015) and voting behaviour in Latin American referendums more generally (Breuer 2007; Durán-Martínez 2012). In particular, we control for the percentage of votes per municipality supporting Santos in the second round of the 2014 presidential elections[15] and referendum turnout.[16] In additional robustness models (see Tables A5-A6 in the Appendix), we control for the potential effect of long-standing ideological political preferences and attachments, including variables capturing the support for several political parties in four presidential elections: 1958, 1966, 1974 and 1986.

on exposure to violence are all prior to the referendum.

[15]We focus on the second round because it more accurately captures the set of Santos' supporters. The inclusion of the first round does not alter the results (Table A11 in the Appendix). Source: Colombian National Civil Registry.

[16]Turnout in the referendum was fairly low (37,41%), especially when compared to prior elections.

Second, we control for a set of socio-economic and demographic factors. We include measures of poverty[17] and "rurality" (i.e., the percentage of the population in the municipality living in rural areas) since preliminary analysis of the referendum results indicated that both affected the vote, with residents of poorer (Fergusson & Molina 2016) and more rural (Arjona 2016b; Idler 2016) areas more strongly supporting the peace agreement. In addition, prior studies have found that high levels of population may increase the number of potential rebels (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Therefore, we also include a variable capturing population.[18] Finally, we include a variable on education coverage (i.e., the percentage of matriculated students in primary and secondary education given the school-aged population) as a measure of economic isolation, a factor which has also been argued to shape conflict dynamics (Collier & Hoeffler 2004).[19]

And third, we included a set of variables on the availability of natural resources, as these have been argued to impact both conflict onset and municipal-level political preferences (Ross 2004). The key variable is the percentage of the municipal area with coca crops. Given that coca eradication and substitution was a central clause in the final peace agreement, the presence of coca crops could have played an important role in shaping citizens' preferences. Moreover, we use a dummy variable on oil availability and municipality elevation, which have been found to affect conflict onset and violent dynamics (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Ross 2006).[20]

4.6 Results and Discussion

This section is divided into three parts. We first present and discuss the results of the main OLS regression models we use to examine whether exposure to violence – both overall and from different armed groups – affected vote choice in the 2016

[17]We measure poverty with the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Angulo et al. 2011).

[18]Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE).

[19]Figures might exceed the 100%, as people above schooling ages or students from other municipalities might be attending these schools. Source: Ministry of Education of Colombia.

[20]Data on oil comes from Daly (2012) and on elevation from the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.

referendum. Second, we report and discuss a series of robustness checks for our results, including a matching procedure and an instrumental variables estimation for exposure to FARC violence. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence suggesting that the relationship we find in the quantitative analysis is indeed rooted in the logic of the theoretical argument outlined in Section 4.

4.6.1 Main Results

Our main models provide clear evidence that the identity of the perpetrator does matter when it comes to estimating the effect of exposure to violence on attitudes towards peace. While overall levels of violent attacks by all armed groups in each Colombian municipality does not have an impact on citizen's support for the peace agreement, clear (and statistically significant) effects emerge when we disaggregate by the identity of the perpetrator (see Figure 4.2).[21] This vindicates our claim on the importance of disaggregating "exposure to violence", since we could have easily rushed rushing into the conclusion that exposure to violence was not relevant in affecting preferences over the peace agreement if we would have looked at aggregated exposure.

Following our expectations, "who shot the bullets" seems to have played a key role in shaping the outcome of the 2016 referendum. As Table 4.1 reports, attacks by FARC ["(ln) FARC Attacks"] had a positive and significant effect ($p < 0.01$) on the vote for the Yes in the 2016 referendum. If the mean of FARC attacks in a given municipality increases by one percent, the vote for Yes in the referendum increases by approximately 1.06 points. By contrast, attacks by the paramilitaries and their successors ["(ln) paramilitary/BACRIM Attacks"] have a statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) negative effect on support for the peace agreement. If the mean of paramilitary/BACRIM attacks in a municipality increases by one percent, the vote for the Yes in the referendum decreases by approximately 1.32 points.

[21] See Table A2 in the Appendix for full results. Table A3 reports robustness checks on the use of these two measures. Concretely, we use two variables from CERAC's conflict database on the strength and persistence of violence. None of these variables are statistically significant.




Figure 4.2: Exposure to Violence and Vote Choices in the 2016 Referendum

After the inclusion of all relevant control variables, these effects hold with the same level of statistical significance.

Our results are consistent with claims made by several conflict scholars immediately after the shocking results of the referendum. Weintraub (reported in Meléndez 2016), for example, noted that communities that have been affected by FARC violence had a stronger tendency to vote Yes in the referendum. Similarly, but using a measure of armed group *presence* (rather than violence), Arjona (2016b) found that support for the agreement was 14% higher in communities with FARC presence than in communities with only paramilitary presence. Moreover, these results are also consistent with findings from other studies that have explored the differential effects of FARC versus paramilitary violence on Colombians' voting behavior more generally (Gallego 2018).[22]

[22]Moreover, and considering Pechenkina & Gamboa (2019), we test the potential impact of the interaction between exposure to counterinsurgent actions (proxied through government attacks) and FARC violence (Model 1 of Table A11 in the Appendix). Even though the interaction has a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) positive effect, the coefficients of both exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM attacks remain highly significant and in the expected direction.

Table 4.1: OLS Identity Perpetrator

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
(ln) Attacks FARC	0.785***		1.835***	1.302***	1.100***	1.050***	1.058***
	(0.277)		(0.321)	(0.243)	(0.249)	(0.254)	(0.264)
(ln) Attacks Para/BACRIM		-1.166***	-2.151***	-2.400***	-1.608***	-1.470***	-1.322***
		(0.322)	(0.385)	(0.289)	(0.418)	(0.431)	(0.445)
% Partic. Referendum				-0.0903*	-0.0313	-0.0366	-0.0688
				(0.0466)	(0.0513)	(0.0535)	(0.0549)
% Support Santos 2014				0.586***	0.596***	0.589***	0.585***
				(0.0220)	(0.0217)	(0.0225)	(0.0245)
Poverty					0.000283	0.00289	-0.00801
					(0.0352)	(0.0363)	(0.0404)
(ln) Population					-0.0181	-0.126	-0.196
					(0.527)	(0.538)	(0.556)
Rural Index					0.0919***	0.0833***	0.0852***
					(0.0211)	(0.0218)	(0.0230)
Coca						2.022**	2.128**
						(1.028)	(1.039)
Oil						-1.627	-1.781*
						(1.036)	(1.047)
(ln) Elevation							0.113
							(0.358)
Education Coverage							0.0198
							(0.0191)
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	53.67***	60.89***	58.50***	27.87***	30.22**	20.01***	18.78*
	(12.49)	(12.47)	(12.30)	(9.299)	(12.04)	(7.414)	(9.602)
Observations	993	1028	945	944	927	887	857
R^2	0.478	0.463	0.481	0.711	0.720	0.710	0.699
Adjusted R^2	0.460	0.445	0.462	0.700	0.708	0.698	0.685

Dependent Variable: % Yes 2016 Referendum
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The analysis also shows that other factors had an impact on the support towards the peace agreement. First, and in line with previous findings (Fergusson & Molina 2016; Liendo & Braithwaite 2018; Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores 2015), municipalities with higher levels of support for Santos in the 2014 Presidential elections were more prone to vote Yes in the referendum ($p < 0.01$). This was to be expected, as both the 2014 elections and the 2016 referendum were marked by a strong cleavage over the peace process, with Santos as the "pro-peace" candidate. Second, as noted early on by Arjona (2016b), rural municipalities ($p < 0.01$) and municipalities

with more coca cultivation ($p < 0.05$) were more prone to support the peace agreement. These two results were also to be expected, as concrete measures included in the final agreement aimed explicitly at improving the conditions of rural Colombia and involved a comprehensive strategy for crop substitution that could reduce the violent externalities of the coca trade. However, the substantive effect of exposure to violence from either armed group was significantly higher than the impact of these other variables.[23]

Moreover, in additional model estimations (Table A11 in the Appendix), we included a series of additional control variables that speak to a series of potential alternative explanations. In dialogue with Pechenkina & Gamboa (2019), we included a measure of exposure to attacks from the government (and its interaction with FARC attacks) to explore the role of government counter-insurgency efforts. In addition, we included attacks from the ELN (the second largest guerrilla group active in the period of analysis), levels of land inequality, geographical characteristics (land area), and access to other natural resources (gemstones). Across all of these additional specifications, the main coefficients of interest (exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence) remain significant and in the expected direction.

In sum, our results show a clear trend: municipalities affected by FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM attacks had different preferences over the peace agreement. Those municipalities with higher levels of FARC-related violence were more prone to support the agreement, while those municipalities mostly exposed to paramilitary/BACRIM violence tended to vote No in the 2016 referendum.

4.6.2 Robustness Checks

Concerns over the reliability and robustness of the effects that we find might persist despite the supportive evidence provided so far. First, it could be reasonably argued that the asymmetric effects we observe emerge from existing group-biases driven

[23]The only exception is coca cultivation.

by prevailing political ideological attachments (Lyall, Blair, & Imai 2013).[24] While in the original specifications (Models 4 – 7) we control for political preferences in the 2014 elections, we further address this concern by examining citizens' political preferences in four different presidential elections covering a period of almost thirty years – 1958, 1966, 1974 and 1986 – and across a wider variety of left-wing parties, including the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) and a coalition party that involved the FARC, the Patriotic Union (UP).[25]

When we take our last model (from Table 4.1) as a baseline and control for the level of support for left-wing political parties in each of these elections, results cast doubt on the potential impact of long-lasting political preferences on the support for the Yes in the 2016 referendum. None of the variables follow a common pattern and few of them are statistically significant (see Table A6 in the Appendix).[26] This provides us with additional confidence that our main findings are unlikely to be driven by the impact of this omitted variable.

Second, it could be argued that the location of FARC attacks is influenced by their expected electoral outcomes (Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores 2015) or by other strategic considerations related to the negotiations of the peace agreement. In other words, our results might be affected by reverse causality. While we agree that this is a generally valid concern, we consider that it is slightly less relevant in our study given that our models only include measures of violence exposure that stop *before* the beginning of the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, to deal with

[24]Given the nature of the Colombian conflict and the absence of clear ethnic cleavages, potential ethnic attachments are much less of a concern.

[25]Data comes from the Registraduría Nacional and the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE). A list of the main political parties in each election is presented in Table A5 in the Appendix.

[26]Evidence presented in this table goes firmly against the argument that support for the Yes in the referendum might have been driven by long-time political preferences towards the FARC. Vote for UP in the 1986 elections – a party founded by the FARC and the CCP as part of the peace negotiations held in the mid-80's – lacks any statistical significance.

these concerns more directly, we follow a matching procedure and employed an instrumental variable estimation for FARC attacks.[27]

Matching allowed us to compare pairs of municipalities that are similar in the set of covariates found significant in our main estimations, but that differ in their levels of exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence.[28] The results of the matching tests are consistent with our main models: coefficients remain in the expected direction and retain statistical significance in most of the model specifications (see Tables A7 to A9 in the Appendix). The effect of FARC violence remains positive, with a coefficient ranging between 0.67-0.82 ($p < 0.05$), similar to the OLS estimates. Paramilitary/BACRIM violence keeps its expected negative coefficients, but achieves a lower level of significance ($p < 0.05$ - $p < 0.1$) and the estimated effects are not as similar to the ones yielded by the OLS models (they range between -0.44 and -0.8).[29]

As for the instrumental variable estimation (Table A10 of the Appendix), we instrumented exposure to FARC attacks by distance of each municipality to its departmental capital. The underlying logic of this instrument is that while it is reasonable to expect that the government has more difficulties reaching more distant places, and therefore these areas might be more prone to FARC actions, this should not have a direct effect on the support for the peace agreement other than through the impact of exposure to FARC attacks – especially when controlling for the set of variables included in the main models. The first stage regressions (Table A10) show that the distance of each municipality to its departmental capital is indeed positively and highly correlated with the frequency of FARC attacks and the results of the second stage show that the instrument remains positive and significant ($p < 0.05$).

[27]Regrettably, a convincing IV could not be found for paramilitary/BACRIM violence.

[28]We make use of dose-response functions, which facilitate the creation of treatment and comparison groups based on continuous variables (see Bia & Mattei 2008). We create two different treatments, one for each type of exposure to armed violence.

[29]When including FARC violence as one of the covariates, the coefficient loses significance (Model 5 – Table A9). Nevertheless, it recovers it when we use a dummy variable on exposure to FARC violence (Model 6 – Table A9).

In sum, these different analyses and robustness checks provide added confidence that exposure to FARC and paramilitary/BACRIM violence had asymmetric effects on people's support for the peace agreement in the directions predicted by our theoretical argument.

4.6.3 What About the Internal Logic of the Argument?

While the results reported so far strongly support the theoretical expectations proposed in Section 4, the evidence does not speak directly to the logic underlying the expected effects according to our theoretical argument. Did citizens living in municipalities mostly affected by FARC violence support the peace agreement because they thought that peace would improve their security conditions? Did those who had been mostly exposed to paramilitary/BACRIM violence expressed less support for the agreement because they feared paramilitary retribution? Providing systematic evidence for this is a (important) task we leave for future research. However, here we offer qualitative evidence from different regions of Colombia that support to the logic outlined in the argument.[30]

We first adduce evidence from the El Catatumbo region in the north-east of the country. Historically abandoned by the Colombian state, El Catatumbo has experienced continuous guerrilla group presence since the 1970s. The FARC arrived in the territory in the mid-1980s and since then has fought for territorial control mostly with other non-state armed groups and engaged in numerous violent attacks. In fact, in seven out of the ten municipalities comprising the region, our measure of FARC violence is well above the mean. In line with our quantitative findings, support for the peace agreement in the region was also very high. Especially in

[30]Qualitative evidence comes from grounded knowledge of the local and regional dynamics of the Colombian conflict, as well as testimonies collected in the field in 2014, 2015 and 2019. The 2019 field visit was supported by CONPEACE, a research programme on transitions from war to peace based at the University of Oxford and led by Annette Idler. For more information https://conpeace.ccw.ox.ac.uk/.

those municipalities that had been most exposed to FARC violence (e.g., Teorama, Hacarí, El Tarra and San Calixto), levels of support were over 85%.[31]

In early 2019 we had the chance to visit El Catatumbo and ask residents about their attitudes towards the peace agreement. Almost every single person we spoke to reported having voted Yes in the referendum. When asked why, some noted that they saw the agreement as an opportunity to pacify, and therefore develop, the region. One resident of Teorama explicitly noted that she saw the agreement as a chance to finally live in her village without the fear of FARC victimizing them or dictating to them what to do.[32] A social leader from El Tarra noted that during the various ceasefires that FARC unilaterally declared during the negotiations and the bilateral ceasefire both sides agreed towards the end of the process, his community observed an important de-escalation of violence and this convinced them to support the peace agreement. In his words, "This [the decline of violence due to the ceasefires] showed us that we had no other option than going for the Yes."[33] In fact, support for the peace agreement in El Tarra was 91.5%. In general, most people in El Catatumbo saw the agreement as something that would not only benefit the FARC but also improve their living standards (Álvares Vanegas & Garzón 2016).

This was not the case, however, in the entire region. Some residents noted that things were different in Ocaña, a more urban municipality where the paramilitaries were particularly ruthless in the late 1990s and early 2000s and where, according to the official Registry of Victims (RUV), a large number of paramilitary victims live. One social leader explicitly noted that after the demobilization of the AUC, Ocaña became a "center of operations" of different BACRIMs, which allowed them to influence the vote in the referendum via threats and extortions – an underexplored

[31]Tibú, a core urban center in El Catatumbo, constitutes a partial exception.

[32]Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia. To protect the identity of respondents, we neither provide proper names, nor the specific villages where the testimonies were collected.

[33]Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia. According to data collected by CERAC (2017), FARC's military activity indeed dropped by up to 98% during these ceasefires. However, evidence also shows that FARC's ceasefires had unintended negative consequences on the security of social leaders (Prem et al. 2018).

expression of paramilitarism acting as a spoiler of peace (Maher & Thomson 2018).[34] Here, support for the agreement was minimal: only 30% voted Yes. These accounts are largely consistent with the internal logic of our argument.

Our argument also holds in places where the FARC are infamous for having committed some of the most brutal acts of violence in the group's history. This is the case, for example, in the afro-Colombian town of Bojayá in the Department of Chocó in the Pacific coast. In Boyajá, against all odds (but in line with our argument), residents overwhelmingly supported the peace agreement: 95.7% of the population voted Yes in the 2016 referendum. Explaining the community's vote choice, one resident noted: "We had all the reasons to vote No. But we have suffered [from FARC's violence] more than anyone else. We saw in the ballots the possibility to put an end to 52 years of conflict".[35] As in various municipalities of El Catatumbo, residents that had been highly affected by FARC violence in the past saw in the agreement an opportunity to improve their security conditions.

The story in the municipality of Apartadó, where we have also conducted field research, is quite different. In this area, in north-western Colombia, the AUC successfully managed to rip control away from the FARC back in the mid-1990s and deeply terrorized the population by selectively killing leaders and collectively targeting residents (see, Masullo 2017:Chap. 5; Steele 2017:Chap. 6). Since their demobilization in 2005, the Gaitanista Self-defense Forces (AGC) have increasingly taken control of the area.[36] While the government considers the AGC a "criminal band", the population largely see them as "the same old paramilitaries".[37] The AGC has caused the most harm to the civilian population in the last decade, engaging in extortions, forced displacement, death threats and selective killings. Unlike

[34]Field Notes, April 2019. El Catatumbo, Colombia.

[35]"Creímos en el perdón de las FARC y se lo concedimos en las urnas". Revista Semana. 10/04/2016. Available at https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/bojaya-plebiscito-por-la-paz-devolvio-la-desesperanza/497771 [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

[36]The group was formally known as Los Urabeños and later as the Clan Úsuga. Today they are also known as the Clan del Golfo.

[37]Field Notes, August 2015. Urabá, Colombia.

El Tarra or Bojayá, but in line with our argument, support for the agreement in Apartadó was only slightly over 50%.

Levels of violence from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries have historically been high in Apartadó. However, in the years leading up to the 2016 referendum, residents have been mostly concerned with paramilitary violence. When asked about their takes on the then-ongoing peace agreement in 2015, inhabitants of the village of San José told us that while they hoped the government could achieve peace with FARC, they were seriously concerned about what could happen in the aftermath of the agreement. "Real peace will only come to Apartadó if peace is negotiated with all armed groups, including the paramilitaries, not only with FARC", stressed a member of a "peace community" located in the rural village of San José de Apartadó.[38] Similarly, a leader of a peasant association from the same village noted: "There are some actors sitting [at the negotiation table] and we have seen an improvement [of security conditions] in the territory. We don't see that intimidation, the bombs, the combats; but we want those actors that aren't taking part in the negotiations to take part, so we can feel a form of peace in which peasants don't see weapons in our lands anymore."[39]

In line with the logic outlined in our argument, villagers of Apartadó feared retaliation from the AGC if they supported the peace agreement and this fear grew stronger as a potential agreement with FARC became more plausible. During the referendum campaign, peasants associations from the area constantly reported to the government and international agencies the increased presence of members of the

[38]Field Notes, August 2015. Urabá, Colombia.

[39]Peasant leader cited in "En San José de Apartadó exigen verificar presencia paramilitar" Verdad Abierta. 08/11/2016. Available: https://verdadabierta.com/en-san-jose-de-apartado-exigen-verificar-presencia-paramilitar/ [Last accessed: August 13, 2019]. These testimonies suggest a complementary interpretation of our results that is largely consistent with the internal logic of our argument but not explicitly captured by it: people living in areas affected by paramilitary/BACRIM violence might have had incentives not vote No because the peace process was framed as "ending the conflict" and for them the conflict was not going to end. They not only expected no change in violence, but also worried/feared that the idea of "ending the war" would push authorities to forget about them and the violence they suffer. We thank Elena Butti for calling out attention to this.

AGC in their territories and noted that the paramilitaries were coercing them into rejecting the peace agreement.[40] Residents of Apartadó had already experienced brutal paramilitary violence in the past for voting for a left-wing political party linked to the FARC, the UP (Steele 2011: 2017:Chap. 6). Despite being generally supportive of the peace agreement, they feared suffering the same fate with the 2016 referendum. As a consequence, to avoid credible violent retribution, many did not express their private preferences regarding the agreement at the ballots and voted against the agreement.

4.7 Conclusion

This paper has analyzed how exposure to violence affects attitudes towards peace in the context of the Colombian 2016 referendum. It finds that the identity of the perpetrator matters. Concretely, as formulated by our theoretical argument, while municipalities mostly affected by FARC violence were more prone to support the peace agreement, those mostly affected by paramilitary/BACRIM attacks were more prone to vote against the agreement. We argue that the driving force behind these asymmetrical effects are safety-seeking considerations. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the shocking outcome of the Colombian referendum and the underlying conditions that shape support for peace in the country – something that remains important today for the successful implementation of the agreement. In addition, it makes a theoretical and methodological contribution to the growing literature on the effects of wartime violence on peoples' preferences and behaviors, revealing the benefits of disaggregating "exposure to violence" and looking at "who shot the bullets."

Despite the strongly supportive quantitative and qualitative evidence offered, our study has certain limitations that should be acknowledged. First, we focused on violence alone, when we know that civilian attitudes and choices, that could definitely

[40]Field Notes, August 2015. See also "San José de Apartadó: ¿asediado por los 'Gaitanistas'?" Verdad Abierta. 15/02/2016 Available: https://verdadabierta.com/san-jose-de-apartado-asediado-por-los-gaitanistas/ [Last accessed: August 13, 2019].

affect support for peace, can also be shaped by non-violent combatant–civilian interactions that are a central part of irregular civil wars, such as rebel governance (Mampilly 2012; Arjona 2016, 2016b). Second, our examination focused on the municipality, with violence and voting behavior data aggregated at this level of analysis. Some important variation in the way local communities experience violence (and other wartime dynamics), which could have had an impact on their vote choice in the referendum, is likely to get lost at this level of aggregation. Moreover, while there is evidence suggesting that direct (self-reported) and indirect (contextual) victimization can have differential effects on civilian preferences (Masullo & Morisi 2019), our focus on the municipality does not allow us to tap into this difference. All in all, as much as we would have liked to explore these other non-violent dynamics and disaggregated beyond the municipality, here we were limited by data availability. Finally, as with most data on wartime violence, there is room for reporting bias in the datasets we relied on to measure our independent variables. Systematic sub/over-reporting of attacks by different factions included in our analysis would directly affect our results. Nevertheless, when compared to other datasets compiling violent events in the Colombian conflict, the *Observatorio* data has been found to suffer less from this type of bias (Albertus & Kaplan 2013).

While referendums to ratify peace agreement are not a common occurrence, the coexistence of elections and ongoing civil war is much more recurrent. While there is ample evidence that armed actors are often involved in electoral politics (e.g., Matanock & Staniland 2018; Staniland 2015), our study shows that when both phenomena coexist, citizens have the opportunity to boost or freeze peace efforts by voting in favor or against pro-peace candidates. Beyond this having a direct impact on war trajectories, this realization can also have important implications for citizens' security. As our theory suggests, asking civilians to participate in public, political decisions in an unstable environment such that of internal armed conflict can put people at grave risk of suffering violent retribution by armed actors (Steele 2017; Steele & Schubiger 2018). In the absence of strong and effective protection

measures, civilians will have incentives to falsify their private political preferences at the ballot box and/or to not participate in democratic processes at all, posing an obstacle to peace and ultimately undermining democratic institutions.

Appendix

Contents:

- A. Descriptive Statistics
- B. Robustness Violence
- C. Role of Politics
- D. Endogeneity
  - Matching
  - Instrumental Variable
- E. Other Tests
  - Robustness Controls
  - Sensitivity Analysis
  - 2018 Elections
  - 2010-2012 Attacks
- F. Figures

A. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
% Yes Referendum	1,117	52.60077	17.14791	10.43	100
(ln) FARC Attacks	996	-.1680068	1.671468	-3.135494	4.103721
(ln) Para/BACRIM. Attacks	1,031	-.537638	1.409221	-3.135494	5.095874
% Partic. Referendum	1,117	35.28815	8.332283	3.38	62.41
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	1,117	46.59715	20.65418	5.959836	95.65218
Poverty Index	1,065	68.65382	16.07918	14.27179	100
(ln) Population	1,095	9.532494	1.059444	6.682772	15.65469
Rural Index	1,094	58.08148	23.65175	.1851246	100
Coca	1,093	.0005863	.0047209	0	.1187151
Oil	1,009	.1179386	.3226953	0	1
(ln) Elevation	1,009	6.411968	1.665436	.6931472	8.101678
Education Coverage	1,058	97.29155	18.55754	0	233.828
(ln) Exposure Total	1,121	-.1449498	1.478192	-3.135494	4.69334
(ln) Exposure Total per 1000	1,065	-2.721112	1.104303	-7.009632	.9948266
CERAC Strong	1,121	.0802855	.2718559	0	1
CERAC Persistent	1,121	.0392507	.1942774	0	1
(ln) Attacks Government	933	-.4517119	1.453971	-3.135494	5.119295
(ln) ELN Attacks	707	-.9624348	1.621237	-3.135494	3.576246
% Santos 1st Round 2014	1,112	34.19157	18.98958	0	100
Land Inequality	953	.684857	.1118914	0	.981579
(ln) Area	1,063	10.38035	1.221364	7.313221	15.69763
Nat. Res. Royalties pc	1,095	.0248051	.1393667	0	2.904564
Gems	1,048	.0486641	.2152676	0	1
% Liberals 1958	832	66.7772	38.45945	0	100
% Liberals 1966	907	73.45768	23.52121	0	100
% Liberals 1974	951	50.8346	28.93294	0	99.87091
% Liberals 1986	995	51.48282	25.89293	.1655081	99.10847
% ANAPO 1966	907	24.11137	22.24633	0	100
% ANAPO 1974	951	7.551252	8.703659	0	61.75337
% UNO 1974	951	1.638465	4.693081	0	63.55685
% Unión Patriótica 1986	995	5.02046	11.35802	0	95.83778
% Communist Party 1986	995	.3552041	1.443927	0 38.84892	
% Duque 2nd Round 2018	1,121	63.82857	20.67748	4.694933	97.02352
(ln) FARC Attacks 2010-2012	1,121	.0356494	.1531994	-3.135494	1.714798
(ln) PARA/Bacrim Attacks 2010-2012	1,121	.0693136	.267415	-3.135494	4.043051
(ln) Distance Dept. Capital	1,009	4.58563	.8217077	1.609438	6.672033

B. Robustness Violence

Table A2 - OLS Exposure to Total Violence

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) Exposure Total	-0.267	
	(0.345)	
(ln) Exposure Total 1000 Pop.		-0.229
		(0.344)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0518	-0.0524
	(0.0517)	(0.0516)
% Support Santos 2014	0.584***	0.584***
	(0.0231)	(0.0231)
Poverty	0.0281	0.0273
	(0.0367)	(0.0367)
(ln) Population	-0.708	-0.974**
	(0.485)	(0.393)
Rural Index	0.0863***	0.0866***
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)
Coca	2.486**	2.484**
	(1.024)	(1.024)
Oil	-1.741*	-1.748*
	(0.993)	(0.993)
(ln) Elevation	0.250	0.250
	(0.338)	(0.338)
Education Coverage	0.0197	0.0197
	(0.0180)	(0.0180)
Department FE	✓	✓
Constant	22.67***	24.61***
	(8.205)	(7.610)
Observations	967	967
R^2	0.689	0.689
Adjusted R^2	0.678	0.678

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3 – OLS Exposure to Total Violence (Robustness)

	Model (1)
CERAC Strong	1.198
	(1.449)
CERAC Persistent	2.561
	(1.972)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0563
	(0.0516)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.581***
	(0.0230)
Poverty Index	0.0185
	(0.0361)
(ln) Population	-1.249***
	(0.412)
Rural Index	0.0880***
	(0.0216)
Coca	2.287**
	(1.032)
Oil	-1.990**
	(0.993)
(ln) Elevation	0.228
	(0.337)
Education Coverage	0.0165
	(0.0178)
Department FE	✓
Constant	26.60***
	(7.620)
Observations	967
R^2	0.691
Adjusted R^2	0.679

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4 – OLS Exposure to Paramilitaries/BACRIM

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) FARC Attacks	1.142***	0.978***
	(0.264)	(0.264)
(ln) Para Attacks	-1.600***	
	(0.427)	
(ln) BACRIM Attacks		-1.133***
		(0.438)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0686	-0.0722
	(0.0547)	(0.0553)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.584***	0.580***
	(0.0244)	(0.0247)
Poverty Index	-0.00537	-0.0116
	(0.0402)	(0.0407)
(ln) Population	0.0136	-0.170
	(0.549)	(0.563)
Rural Index	0.0833***	0.0884***
	(0.0229)	(0.0230)
Coca	2.176**	2.076**
	(1.036)	(1.041)
Oil	-1.645	-1.823*
	(1.045)	(1.058)
(ln) Elevation	0.116	0.202
	(0.357)	(0.366)
Education Coverage	0.0210	0.0239
	(0.0191)	(0.0192)
Department FE	✓	✓
Constant	16.51*	18.15*
	(9.579)	(9.646)
Observations	857	841
R^2	0.701	0.695
Adjusted R^2	0.687	0.682

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C. Role of Politics

Table A5 – Political Parties Presidential Elections

	Ideology	1958	1966	1974	1986
ANAPO	Left	***X***	✓	✓	***X***
Communist Party	Left	***X***	***X***	***X***	✓
Unión Patriótica	Left	***X***	***X***	***X***	✓
UNO	Left	***X***	***X***	✓	***X***
Liberals	Center-Left	✓	✓	✓	✓
Christian Socio-Democrat	Center	***X***	***X***	✓	***X***
Conservatives	Center-Right	✓	***X***	✓	✓
Others	Various	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: *Registraduría Nacional* and CEDE.

Table A6 – Omitted Variable Politics

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)	Model (9)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.914***	1.009***	1.008***	1.052***	1.039***	1.065***	1.004***	0.965***	0.991***
	(0.284)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.263)	(0.270)	(0.263)
ln_atparabacrim_cede	-1.179**	-1.108**	-1.122**	-1.272***	-1.199***	-1.239***	-1.436***	-1.417***	-1.407***
	(0.497)	(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.462)	(0.464)	(0.463)	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.447)
% Liberals 1958	0.00885								
	(0.00973)								
% Liberals 1966		0.0432***							
		(0.0157)							
% ANAPO 1966			-0.0490***						
			(0.0169)						
% Liberals 1974				0.0168					
				(0.0129)					
% ANAPO 1974					-0.0486				
					(0.0423)				
% UNO 1974						-0.0216			
						(0.0709)			
% Liberals 1986							0.0192		
							(0.0138)		
% UP 1986								0.0160	
								(0.0369)	
% Communist Party 1986									0.0299
									(0.237)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	26.52**	27.92**	32.03***	25.78**	28.09**	26.78**	17.69	18.99	19.06
	(12.37)	(12.15)	(12.19)	(12.02)	(12.05)	(12.01)	(11.79)	(11.77)	(11.77)
Observations	697	755	755	789	789	789	824	824	824
R^2	0.698	0.698	0.699	0.711	0.710	0.710	0.707	0.707	0.707
Adjusted R^2	0.681	0.683	0.683	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.694	0.693	0.693

D. Endogeneity

Table A7 – Main Matching Model

	Model (1)	Model (2)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.684**	
	(0.343)	
(ln) Paramilitary/BACRIM Attacks		-0.770**
		(0.389)
Constant	54.196***	55.732***
	(1.598)	(1.552)
Observations	802	836
R^2	0.0086	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.0061	0.0012

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8 – Matching Continuous Treatment FARC

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
(ln) FARC Attacks	0.721**	0.674**	0.714**	0 .671*	0.820**	0.676**
	(0.342)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.347)	(0.350)	(0.343)
Constant	55.435***	52.755***	54.745***	50.414***	54.796***	53.507***
	(1.568)	(1.561)	(1.574)	(1.566)	(1.567)	(1.568)
Observations	798	802	802	771	769	802
R^2	0.014	0.005	0.010	0.005	0.012	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.003	0.008	0.003	0.009	0.004

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Model 1: Variables of Table 2 as well as Santos 1st Round 2014.
2: Variables of Table 2 as well as Attacks by ELN.
3: Variables of Table 2 as well as other socio-demographic and natural resources variables (Gems and Population).
4: Variables of Table 2 as well as variables on geographic conditions and state capacity (Area; Elevation; Education).
5: Variables of Table 2 as well as paramilitary/BACRIM violence.
6: Variables of Table 2 as well as dummy on paramilitary/BACRIM violence.

Table A9 – Matching Continuous Treatment Paramilitary/BACRIM

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	-0.692*	-0.680*	-0.666*	-0.651*	-0.448	-0.793**
	(0.389)	(0.392)	(0.390)	(0.390)	(0.420)	(0.390)
Constant	56.243***	54.159***	55.573***	54.194***	53.873***	55.056***
	(1.544)	(1.583)	(1.566)	(1.542)	(1.666)	(1.551)
Observations	832	836	836	800	769	836
R^2	0.017	0.008	0.014	0.015	0.005	0.012
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.006	0.011	0.012	0.003	0.009

Dependent Variable: % Yes Referendum 2016. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Model 1: Variables of Table 2 as well as Santos 1st Round 2014.
2: Variables of Table 2 as well as Attacks by ELN.
3: Variables of Table 2 as well as other socio-demographic and natural resources variables (Gems and Population).
4: Variables of Table 2 as well as variables on geographic conditions and state capacity (Area; Elevation; Education).
5: Variables of Table 2 as well as FARC violence.
6: Variables of Table 2 as well as dummy on FARC violence.

Table A10 – Instrumental Variable Analysis

	First Stage	Second Stage	First Stage	Second Stage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(ln) Distance Departmental Capital	0.289***		0.213***	
	(0.059)		(0.061)	
(ln) FARC Attacks		10.343***		5.420**
		(2.838)		(2.451)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	***X***	***X***	0.614***	-4.103**
			(0.056)	(1.610)
Rest of Controls	***X***	***X***	✓	✓
Department Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	915	915	826	826
R^2	0.291	.	0.493	0.599

Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E. Other Tests

Table A11 – Robustness Controls

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
(ln) FARC Attacks	1.069***	1.102***	1.197***	1.033***	1.196***	1.050***	1.058***
	(0.312)	(0.357)	(0.258)	(0.261)	(0.283)	(0.263)	(0.264)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	-1.412***	-1.595***	-1.502***	-1.553***	-1.322***	-1.312***	-1.323***
	(0.484)	(0.592)	(0.435)	(0.427)	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.446)
(ln) Attacks Gvt.	-11.02**						
	(5.117)						
(ln) Attacks Gvt.* FARC	4.606**						
	(1.873)						
(ln) Attacks ELN		-0.224					
		(0.350)					
% Santos 1st Round 2014			0.276***				
			(0.0397)				
Land Inequality				-10.73***			
				(3.404)			
(ln) Area					-0.657		
					(0.491)		
Nat. Res. Royalt. pc						-4.357*	
						(2.342)	
Gems							0.0960
							(1.487)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	11.35	-0.535	9.693	31.68***	24.92***	19.27**	18.80*
	(9.447)	(13.04)	(9.441)	(8.728)	(9.453)	(9.591)	(9.612)
Observations	791	600	853	740	856	857	857
R^2	0.704	0.684	0.714	0.758	0.699	0.700	0.699
Adjusted R^2	0.689	0.663	0.701	0.746	0.686	0.686	0.685

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12 – Sensitivity Analysis

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)	Model (9)	Model (10)	Model (11)
(ln) FARC Attacks		0.624***	1.051***	1.679***	1.044***	1.050***	1.070***	1.087***	1.056***	1.095***	1.016***
		(0.240)	(0.264)	(0.342)	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.266)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.258)	(0.259)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	-0.710*		-1.296***	-1.739***	-1.320***	-1.412***	-1.532***	-1.311***	-1.455***	-1.455***	-1.341***
	(0.388)		(0.445)	(0.579)	(0.445)	(0.364)	(0.445)	(0.446)	(0.440)	(0.434)	(0.443)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0642	-0.0525		-0.0174	-0.0654	-0.0675	-0.0756	-0.0691	-0.0611	-0.0546	-0.0488
	(0.0533)	(0.0542)		(0.0714)	(0.0522)	(0.0548)	(0.0553)	(0.0550)	(0.0543)	(0.0542)	(0.0542)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.582***	0.593***	0.584***		0.585***	0.585***	0.582***	0.590***	0.583***	0.585***	0.590***
	(0.0238)	(0.0240)	(0.0245)		(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0247)	(0.0244)	(0.0244)	(0.0227)	(0.0243)
Poverty Index	0.0289	0.00641	0.00777	-0.0492		-0.00429	0.0734**	-0.00389	-0.00571	-0.000172	-0.00579
	(0.0374)	(0.0395)	(0.0384)	(0.0525)		(0.0389)	(0.0341)	(0.0404)	(0.0399)	(0.0367)	(0.0393)
(ln) Population	-0.330	-0.929**	-0.149	-0.265	-0.167		-0.481	-0.154	-0.154	-0.0828	-0.244
	(0.527)	(0.445)	(0.555)	(0.723)	(0.536)		(0.555)	(0.557)	(0.552)	(0.544)	(0.550)
Rural Index	0.0779***	0.0978***	0.0862***	0.0669**	0.0827***	0.0863***		0.0867***	0.0838***	0.0844***	0.0840***
	(0.0222)	(0.0227)	(0.0230)	(0.0299)	(0.0193)	(0.0228)		(0.0230)	(0.0229)	(0.0220)	(0.0228)
Coca	2.428**	2.183**	2.131**	4.541***	2.117**	2.114**	2.251**		1.915*	2.095**	2.039**
	(1.043)	(1.028)	(1.040)	(1.346)	(1.037)	(1.038)	(1.047)		(1.029)	(1.032)	(1.035)
Oil	-1.659	-1.919*	-1.733*	-0.0114	-1.786*	-1.775*	-1.802*	-1.510		-1.702	-1.700
	(1.026)	(1.025)	(1.047)	(1.360)	(1.046)	(1.047)	(1.055)	(1.041)		(1.045)	(1.039)
(ln) Elevation	0.254	0.278	0.0841	-2.603***	0.141	0.126	0.419	0.0802	0.161		0.0929
	(0.343)	(0.354)	(0.358)	(0.442)	(0.331)	(0.356)	(0.352)	(0.359)	(0.355)		(0.345)
Education Coverage	0.0202	0.0207	0.0189	0.00460	0.0204	0.0206	0.0176	0.0172	0.0187	0.0158	
	(0.0186)	(0.0187)	(0.0191)	(0.0249)	(0.0189)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)	(0.0191)	(0.0190)	(0.0184)	
Department FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	17.99**	27.56**	14.94	71.25***	19.24***	16.32**	18.25*	19.53**	23.58**	19.19**	25.49**
	(9.095)	(11.62)	(9.104)	(12.16)	(7.226)	(6.598)	(9.675)	(8.794)	(11.93)	(7.791)	(11.62)
Observations	923	888	857	857	857	857	857	857	871	873	871
R^2	0.691	0.695	0.698	0.489	0.699	0.699	0.694	0.697	0.701	0.705	0.704
Adjusted R^2	0.679	0.683	0.685	0.467	0.686	0.686	0.681	0.684	0.687	0.692	0.691

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13 – 2018 Presidential Elections

	Model (1)
(ln) FARC Attacks	-0.827***
	(0.275)
(ln) Para/BACRIM Attacks	0.957**
	(0.465)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0963*
	(0.0573)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	-0.734***
	(0.0256)
Poverty Index	0.147***
	(0.0421)
(ln) Population	-2.736***
	(0.580)
Rural Index	-0.00753
	(0.0240)
Coca	-1.224
	(1.085)
Oil	0.0436
	(1.093)
(ln) Elevation	-0.967***
	(0.374)
Education Coverage	-0.00953
	(0.0200)
Department FE	✓
Constant	108.2***
	(10.02)
Observations	857
R^2	0.798
Adjusted R^2	0.789

DV: % Support Iván Duque second round 2018 Presidential Elections
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14 – 2010-2012 Attacks


	Model (1)
(ln) Attacks FARC	5.406**
	(2.140)
(ln) Attacks Para/BACRIM	-2.324*
	(1.392)
% Partic. Referendum	-0.0498
	(0.0514)
% Santos 2nd Round 2014	0.575***
	(0.0232)
Poverty Index	0.0174
	(0.0361)
(ln) Population	-0.946**
	(0.394)
Rural Index	0.0829***
	(0.0218)
Coca	2.264**
	(1.024)
Oil	-1.924*
	(0.989)
(ln) Elevation	0.0725
	(0.350)
Education Coverage	0.0128
	(0.0179)
Department FE	✓
Constant	24.14***
	(7.552)
Observations	967
R^2	0.692
Adjusted R^2	0.680

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F. Figures

Figure A1 – Support for the "Yes" in the Colombian 2016 Referendum



Source: *Registraduría Nacional de Estado Civil*

Figure A2 – FARC Presence 2015



Source: International Crisis Group (2016)

Figure A3 – Margins FARC and Paramilitaries/BACRIM




Figure A4 – Dose Response Function FARC





Figure A5 – Dose Response Function Paramilitaries/BACRIM



Freedom [...] is the motivating principle of all revolutions. Without it, justice seems inconceivable to the rebel's mind. There comes a time, however, when justice demands the suspension of freedom. Then terror, on a grand or small scale, makes its appearance to consummate the revolution.

— Albert Camus

In history, the abstract value of an idea matters nothing. What matters is its concrete value.

— José Carlos Mariategui

5

The Incursion of Leviathan: Wartime Territorial Control and Post-Conflict State Capacity in Perú

Contents

5.1 Introduction 235
5.2 War and State Capacity: The Effects of External and Internal Conflicts 238
5.3 Buying Minds, Convincing Hearts and the Creation of Order 240
5.4 Maoism & State Repression: An Overview of the Peruvian Conflict 246
5.5 Data & Empirical Strategy 249
5.6 Results 254
5.6.1 Descriptive Evidence 254
5.6.2 Main Results 256
5.6.3 Robustness Checks 260
5.6.4 Qualitative Evidence 262
5.7 Conclusion 266

Abstract

How do civil wars affect state-building decisions in the aftermath of conflict? Despite a wide literature has analyzed the impact of interstate conflict on state capacity, few studies have focused on how civil wars influence state-building measures. This paper argues that, in the post-conflict period, the state focuses its state capacity efforts to areas in which state power has eroded during wartime, with the goal of avoiding future insurgent threats. Using the Peruvian civil war (1980-1992) as the main case of study, I test whether districts that were either contested or controlled by Sendero Luminoso received higher levels of state bureaucrats and welfare expenditures than those controlled by incumbents. For this, I rely on spatial models estimators employing data for the period 1981-2007. Results support the expectations. Contested and insurgent controlled districts are targeted with the deployment of state bureaucrats and security forces after the end of the conflict, while only rebel held territories improve their level of public goods and services provision. Results are complemented with anecdotal qualitative evidence and remain robust across several robustness checks. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the inter-relation between state capacity and civil war dynamics, showing how the end of internal armed conflicts can bring improved levels of state capacity to wartime areas.

5.1 Introduction

What is the relation between conflict and state capacity? During the last years, an emerging set of studies has aimed to understand the intrinsic features of the interconnection between state capacity and different types of war. Even though strong evidence supports the claim that countries with low levels of state reach are more prone to conflict onset (Fearon & Laitin 2003), conflict has also been found to have a direct impact on state-building. The long-established tradition started by Tilly (1985) has provided wide evidence on the claim that "war made the state". However, whether and how civil wars affect state capacity remains unclear. How do internal armed conflicts affect state-building decisions in the aftermath of war?

Surprisingly, only few studies have addressed this question in a systematic manner. Most of the literature on the determinants of state building has focused on factors such as commodity booms (Saylor 2014), political regimes (Ertman 1997), and, more prominently, interstate wars (Tilly 1992). Similarly, the literature on the legacies of war has focused on the varying effects of internal armed conflicts on a wide set of individual political outcomes, such as political participation (Blattman 2009) or political preferences (Balcells 2012), disregarding its meso and macro-level effects. While previous studies have analyzed the impact of civil wars on post-conflict state capacity from a cross-national perspective (Besley & Persson 2008), the determinants of local state building measures remain unexplored. Aiming to fill this gap, I provide one of the first sub-national studies on the determinants of state capacity in the postwar period focusing on an often overlooked, but fundamental, dynamic of civil war: wartime territorial control.

I argue that whether a territory was contested or remained under government or insurgent control during a civil war has a profound impact on post-conflict levels of local state capacity. I contend that, if the state defeats the rebels, it will engage in two types of state-building measures in order to avoid future insurgent threats: (1) the creation or recovery of sufficient state control through the (re)establishment of

its bureaucratic structure; and (2) the development of state legitimacy through the improvement of civilians' material conditions. In other words, it will combine the expansion of state power and a "hearts and minds" approach to areas where the rebels have profoundly eroded the level of state power, either contesting or achieving full territorial control of certain districts. Paradoxically, civil war seems to be an effective way of promoting state building at the local level in the aftermath of conflict.

I test these arguments analyzing one of the most paradigmatic cases of irregular war of the last century, the Maoist insurgency of Sendero Luminoso (SL), which operated in Perú between 1980 and 1992. Despite the initial weakness of its actions, SL became one of the largest rebel groups in Latin America, establishing broad governance structures throughout the entire country. Once the conflict ended, the state implemented a profound set of reconstruction programs and administrative reforms in those areas that were mostly affected by the war.

In order to test the implications of the theory in the context of the Peruvian civil war, I use fine-grained administrative data on wartime dynamics and state capacity at the district level coming from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR 2003) and census data for the period 1981-2007. Given the spatial auto-correlation existent in the main variables of interest, the empirical tests rely on the use of spatial models. Moreover, anecdotal qualitative evidence based on secondary literature and semi-structured interviews complement these analyses.

Results provide strong evidence on the main theoretical expectation: areas where territory was disputed or under insurgent control received higher levels of state building measures than areas controlled by the government. Evidence shows that the state deployed higher levels of state bureaucrats and security forces to both contested and rebel controlled areas in order to avoid new insurgent threats. However, the state only aimed to spur its legitimacy through the distribution of public goods and services to areas that were controlled by insurgents. This asymmetry is explained

by the fact that the state aimed to counter-act the potential effects of the wide set of insurgent governance structures established in rebel controlled areas, which might have increased the level of affinity between the rebels and civilians (Mampilly 2012).

This article contributes to various strands of research. First, it brings clarity to the discussion on the relation between conflict and state capacity through a novel understanding of the determinants of state-building after the end of irregular civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003). It not only shows that civil wars could promote state building, but it also highlights that states take due account of the failures that made the onset and expansion of insurgencies possible. Second, it also contributes to the burgeoning literature on the legacies of war (Blattman 2009; Bauer et al. 2016), which has neglected both the importance of fundamental wartime dynamics, such as territorial control, as well as the role of the state as a strategic actor in the post-conflict era. Thirdly, this article also expands the novel literature on rebel governance (Mampilly 2012; Arjona 2016). Despite the increasing understanding on the origins and dynamics of this type of proto-governance structures, little attention has been paid to the legacies of insurgent rule in the postwar period. And finally, I contribute to the broad set of works on distributive politics (Golden & Min 2013), bringing an understudied element to the center of the discussion. Contrary to prior studies that have mostly focused on the short-term electoral benefits of targeted distribution, I argue that the allocation of goods and services in the post-war period is shaped by the same dynamics of the conflict. To be sure, there are plenty of considerations and incentives taking place when allocating the distribution of public goods and services in post-conflict periods. However, this study puts to the forefront the relevance of other factors in post-conflict scenarios, especially those related to the war itself.

5.2 War and State Capacity: The Effects of External and Internal Conflicts

Despite the importance that state capacity plays for economic development and political stability, its determinants still require further inquiry (Fergusson, Larreguy & Riano 2020:36). The broad literature on the causes of state development, found in the studies of Charles Tilly (1975; 1985; 1992) one of its most robust explanations: international wars have historically led to the creation and consolidation of state capacity. As military campaigns needed to be financed through taxes, states had incentives to develop a coherent set of administrative institutions capable of extracting enough resources to avoid the threat of foreign military invasions (see also Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002).

But as stated by the same Tilly (1975:42), state-building is "the process of attacking and checking competitors and challengers *within* the territory claimed by the state".[1] During the last years, a new set of studies have shifted the focus on the determinants of state capacity towards the impact of domestic political conflict (Slater 2010; Garfias 2018), and more concretely, civil wars. Challenging the consensus that civil wars have a negative impact on levels of state capacity (Besley & Persson 2008), recent works have started to unpack and test how different characteristics and dynamics of intra-state conflicts can affect distinct dimensions of state capacity (Ch et al. 2018).

In parallel to this, an emerging literature on the legacies of civil war has started to analyze its short and long-run effects. While at the macro-level, internal armed conflicts have been found to produce devastating effects (Chen, Loayza & Reynal Querol 2008), at the individual level, exposure to wartime violence seems to affect a broad set of outcomes, such as levels of political participation (Blattman 2009), political preferences (Balcells 2012) or pro-social behavior (Bauer et al. 2016).

[1] Quoted in Slater (2010:38).

As a bridge between these two literatures, a new set of studies has recently begun to explore the impact of wartime territorial control on post-conflict state capacity. Arias & De la Calle (2018), in their study of the Mexican War of Independence (1810-1821), show that those municipalities that were controlled by government militias had higher level of state capacity eighty years after the end of the conflict than those controlled by insurgents and those without conflict. They argue that this is explained by the easiness of cooperation between political and economic elites in these areas. In a similar vein, Liu (2019) studies how victorious rebels consolidate power after the end of irregular wars. She proposes a compelling argument based on organizational capacity as the main mechanism explaining divergence in post-war trajectories: the new revolutionary government mainly targets areas in which territorial control was contested during wartime. In territories that were controlled by the rebels, they rely on rebel governance institutions for post-conflict state-building, while areas controlled by former incumbents only see increases in security provisions.

Even though these papers prove to be foundational in this area of research, they suffer from restrictive scope conditions that limit the validity of their findings. While Arias & De la Calle (2018) focus on an anti-colonial war, with dynamics completely different to contemporary conflicts (Lyall & Wilson 2009), Liu (2019) narrows down its findings to a restricted sample of the whole set of irregular wars. Previous studies have found that close to 70% of irregular wars are won by incumbents (Balcells & Kalyvas 2014:1408). Wars which end up in insurgent defeat and those which conclude with rebel victory are not necessarily comparable. While victorious insurgents need to develop power, legitimacy and state infrastructures from the very scratch, a victorious state can rely on existing structures and extend its reach to areas where formerly it was not capable of penetrating or where it was displaced in power by the rebels.

This discussion shows that there is a need of a much more fine-grained understanding on the dynamics of state capacity and civil wars under distinct scope

conditions. A narrow focus on a small set of wars hinders our understanding of highly heterogeneous phenomena such as internal armed conflicts. While still in application of stringent conditions, to the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first studies examining the dynamics of postwar state building under the most common type of outcome in irregular wars: insurgent defeat.[2]

5.3 Buying Minds, Convincing Hearts and the Creation of Order

Territorial control plays a critical role in intra-state conflicts. The control of territory during wartime has been found to be decisive for the understanding of key civil war dynamics, such as violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006), insurgent fragmentation (Woldemariam 2018) or rebel tactical choices (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2015). Furthermore, territorial control is a precondition for insurgent groups aiming to govern civilians during wartime (Mampilly 2012; Arjona 2016). In contested or insurgent controlled areas, the combination of patterns of segmented and fragmented authority, exposure to violence, and novel types of governance, brings about new sorts of social order that transform the allegiances, expectations, values and preferences of civilians and other actors at the local level (Wood 2008).

How does the state face the prospects of penetrating into areas where the political and military power was disputed or relied in other actors during wartime? I argue that, in the aftermath of conflict, any attempt of creating or restoring state capacity[3] should be focused on the development of both state control and state legitimacy, which can be achieved in two different ways. First, through the expansion of state reach. And second, engaging in high levels of expenditure in public goods and services. Simply put, through the deployment of state bureaucrats and security forces, and by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians.

[2]For a very recent similar analysis, but with distinct methodological and theoretical implications, see Soifer & Vieira (2019).

[3]Depending on the pre-war levels of state capacity (See Table A3 in Appendix).

Regarding the restoration of state control, prior studies have shown that the demobilization of rebel groups is related to uncertain social orders in areas exposed to insurgent influence (Martin 2020).[4] Thus, once the war is over, "states should seek to regain legitimate, military, social, institutional and political control over their entire territories" (Daly 2016:256), and they will mainly do it through the (re)establishment of state institutions (Justino 2019). The development of state power at the local level, focused on the provision of order, security and governance, is also helpful for preventing some of the most common risks in the post-conflict period, specially combatants' remilitarization (Daly 2016). Given that the onset and expansion of insurgencies in irregular civil wars is directly related to limited state reach in peripheral areas (Fearon & Laitin 2003), states take due account of the failures of the past and strategically invest in the development of administrative structures in order to avoid future rebel threats.

Civil wars also have the potential to erode the legitimacy of the state. During intra-state conflicts, governments have been found to be the ones engaging in higher levels of violence against civilians (Valentino 2014). This combined with the potential effectiveness by insurgents on the channeling of grievances (Cederman et al. 2013) and the development of governance structures (Arjona 2016), make the (re)construction of state legitimacy one of the hardest tasks in the post-conflict period. How can the state deal with this? Mainly, but not only, through government expenditures in public goods and services. There is ample evidence on how expenditure in welfare programs in conflict affected areas is effective in the development and recovery of state legitimacy (Bohnke & Zurcher 2013), mainly through the winning over the "hearts and minds" of civilians (Berman, Shapiro & Felter 2011).[5] Consequently, "cash transfer programs, government welfare expenditures, and government investments in infrastructure may be useful

[4]This includes territories under rebel control and contested territories.

[5]The effects of this seem to be conditioned by the distribution of wartime territorial control (Sexton 2016).

tools to improve the social contract and avoid (or at least mitigate or reduce) violence and conflict" (Justino 2019:1372).

Do patterns of territorial control have lasting effects in the allocation of state-building measures in the aftermath of war? I argue that decisions over state-building will be shaped by the territorial nature of conflict at least in the medium-run (i.e. ten to fifteen years). This is based on three different factors. First, the building-up of bureaucratic structures and the shaping of allegiances of civilians towards the state are lengthy processes that require consistency long after the end of the conflict. This is especially relevant in countries with low levels of state presence in peripheral areas. If this is combined with the profound changes of the social order produced by insurgents at the local level and with the potential coercive nature of state actions (Valentino et al. 2004), it can be expected that the spatial distribution of wartime territorial control exerts influence on state-building decisions in the mid-run. Second, in the aftermath of civil wars there is a high risk of conflict recurrence. Indeed, over a half of the civil wars have been found to relapse into war in the next five years after the end of the conflict (Mason et al. 2011). Among the factors leading to this, there is a critical risk of insurgent remilitarization. Due to the high level of embeddedness of former combatants in communities under their area of influence (Daly 2016; Martin 2020), the reshaping of structures of authority and social norms at the local level are long-standing tasks.[6] And finally, the structural factors that gave rise to the onset of insurgencies might still be in play, such as high levels of poverty, economic inequality, ethnic discrimination or exclusion from political power (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Cederman et al. 2013). Dealing with this set of problems require enduring transformations that are not feasible to get achieved in the short-run.

Based on these assertions, I rely on three different assumptions. First, that the state aims to consolidate its power and maximize its level of reach to the entire national territory. Second, that there are budgetary constraints that put limits

[6]Another option is resistance to state rule by civilians living in conflict areas.

to the capacity of the state to expand its power and legitimacy throughout the country. And finally, as a direct consequence of the former, that the distribution of post-conflict state capacity will be geographically unequal, as the state will deploy bureaucrats and its welfare expenditures in a strategic manner. How does the state distribute its state-building projects in the aftermath of war? Let's consider separately each of the state's options on the basis of three different levels of wartime territorial control: state control, insurgent control and contested areas.[7]

State Controlled Areas

Comparatively, areas that remain under the control of the state during wartime are those that suffer the lowest level of disruption of the existent social order. State controlled areas present low levels of exposure to conflict related violence, which, if any, will be employed by insurgents in an indiscriminate manner (Kalyvas 2006:146-172). Moreover, they are also characterized by the preservation of the existent patterns of norms and authority. This renders the state as the sole legitimate ruling force, with the consequential retention of its bureaucratic structure and the lack of parallel insurgent government institutions.

Even though there can be a variety of reasons by which the state would target state controlled areas, such as a higher level of organizational capacity (Liu 2019), as a reward for the loyalty of civilians during wartime or based on the easiness of cooperation between political and economic elites (Arias & De la Calle 2018), I argue that none of these approaches is sufficient to understand state-building decisions in the aftermath of war. As territories controlled by incumbents during wartime are expected to have more level of state control, higher investments in these areas are not rational, especially considering budgetary constraints and the goal of maximizing the level of state reach throughout the entire country.

[7]The most usual categorization of wartime territorial control comes from Kalyvas (2006:196), who distinguishes five distinct categories. However, due to data constraints, I categorize three different types of control: full insurgent control (Kalyvas' zone 1); contested areas (Kalyvas' zones 2-3-4); and full incumbent control (Kalyvas' zone 5).

H1: In the post-conflict period, territories controlled by the government during wartime will receive lower levels of state building measures than areas contested or under insurgent control.

Contested Areas

Contested areas remain under a profound vacuum of power during the conflict, as neither incumbents nor rebels are capable of achieving full control of these territories. Two factors characterize contested spaces. First, the nonexistence of a clear authority, leading civilians to be caught in a crossfire between insurgents and state security forces (Stoll 1993). And second, as a consequence of the constant dispute over the control of territory, these areas tend to be the ones with the highest level of exposure to violence, with a combination of selective violence against civilians by the stronger force and indiscriminate violence by the force with lower of level control (Kalyvas 2006).

However, a particular type of violence plays a fundamental role in the attainment of territorial control, and that is the selective violence engaged by insurgent groups against state bureaucrats. The process of controlling territory can be conceptualized as a two-stage process (Kalyvas 2006). First, it comprises a military stage, in which rebels engage in selective violence against state representatives, such as local mayors, judges or educational workers in order to destroy any trace of existent state structures.[8] And second, a political stage in which insurgents become the sole political authority through the development of rebel governance structures. In contested areas, this second phase is never fully achieved. Therefore, there will be a reduction of state power, but no parallel rebel governance institutions are established, rendering the task of developing strong ties between civilians and insurgents more difficult.

[8]This applies to local areas with certain level of state presence. However, insurgent groups also operate in peripheral territories characterized by the lack of state structures (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

Based on this, I argue that, in the post-war period, states will aim to counterbalance the effects of this selective violence against state representatives with the deployment of state bureaucrats and security forces. However, I do not expect the state to concentrate its efforts in the restoration of state legitimacy in these areas through welfare expenditure.

H2: In the post-conflict period, territories that remained contested during wartime will only receive higher levels of deployment of bureaucratic personnel and security forces than government controlled areas.

Insurgent Controlled Areas

Areas controlled by rebel forces are characterized by insurgent hegemonic control. If sufficiently strong, rebels implement their own counter-state governance structures[9]: insurgents become the sovereign actors in these territories and engage in the administration of civilian affairs, providing services such as education, health, justice or security (Arjona et al. 2015:2). Groups also invest in the development of programs of ideological indoctrination (Sanin & Wood 2014; Hoover-Green 2018), as well as in symbolic processes, including rituals, discourses and a broad set of cultural practices. Mampilly (2012) highlights the effectiveness of these actions in strengthening the legitimacy and support towards insurgents, which may create long-lasting resentment against the state.[10]

Informational asymmetries shape the reaction of the state in these territories, both during wartime and in the aftermath of war. Historical examples show that state agents tend to equate rebel territorial control with civilian support for insurgents, leading to major indiscriminate repressive actions against civilians in insurgent held territories (Wood 2003). Regardless of the real ties between rebels

[9]I assume that rebels with full territorial control of an area will establish its own governance system, as insurgents have incentives to establish structures of governance in order to maximize the benefits of the control of territory (Arjona et al. 2015).

[10]However, the premise of coercive ruling and the violent nature of insurgent practices might also lead to instances of civilian resistance to rebel order (Arjona 2016).

and individuals living in insurgent liberated areas, as the post-conflict period is likely to be marked by the falsification of private preferences by civilians for safety-seeking considerations (Kuran 1991), I argue that the state has incentives to re-socialize civilians under the ruling of the state in order to counter-act any of the potential effects of the set of rebel practices described above.[11]

Driven by this logic, I argue that, in the aftermath of war, state capacity efforts will be mostly targeted to wartime insurgent controlled areas. Considering the deep changes in societal and institutional relations vis- à -vis civilians occurring in these territories (Wood 2008), this includes both the expansion of state control and the distribution of public goods and services, in an attempt to re-socialize civilians under state ruling and boost the legitimacy of the state.

H3: In the post-conflict period, territories controlled by insurgents during wartime will receive higher levels of bureaucratic personnel and security forces as well as public goods and services than government-controlled areas.

5.4 Maoism & State Repression: An Overview of the Peruvian Conflict

Violence shaped the political landscape of Latin America during the Cold War period. The combination of high levels of state repression and the increasing strength that insurgent groups were acquiring in the region led to a vicious spiral of violent actions (Wickham-Crowley 1992). Nevertheless, Perú did not seem to present the adequate conditions for the formation of new rebel groups. The failed guerrilla experiences of the 60's (Lust 2013), combined with the political incorporation of left-wing parties, didn't seem to shape the prospects for the birth of insurgencies.

[11] A fundamental caveat that cannot be addressed due to data limitations is the existence of displacement and resettlement during and after the war.

However, the stakes surprisingly changed on May 17th, 1980, the day before the first democratic elections in the country in more than a decade. In the small district of Chuschi, in the region of Ayacucho, a group of insurgents led by the philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán, burned the ballot boxes prepared for the elections. This was the first public action of Sendero Luminoso. However, these actions were ignored by the Peruvian government and were considered as isolated attacks in rural areas.



Figure 5.1: Map of Perú. Source: United Nations Cartographic Section.

But the government was not on the right track. This neglection of reality was exploited by Sendero, expanding its influence in the department of Ayacucho and nearby territories. In 1982, the government decided to change its strategy, but the expansion of SL was already under way. The military, under the direction

of President Belaúnde premises, started its attacks against the rebels, but its engagement in indiscriminate repression against civilians easily widened the support base of Sendero. The arrival of Alan García to the presidency in 1985 brought changes in the strategy of the state. The most important one was the partial externalization of the fight against insurgents through the creation and support of the so-called Rondas Campesinas, a set of self-defense rural committees. The effectiveness of the Rondas, combined with the increasing reliance in violence against civilians by SL (Stern et al. 1998), brought the conflict to a new stage. Not only there was an important strategic shift by the rebels, which aimed to launch its final offensive and conquer Lima, but the arrival of Alberto Fujimori to the Presidency in 1990 also changed the counterinsurgency policies of the state.

The new state approach towards the rebels was based in the end of repression against civilians, efficient intelligence and exploitation of the decreasing support of Sendero. In the end, these tactics were highly effective. Abimael Guzmán was captured on September 12th, 1992 and the process of disintegration was unavoidable for a highly centralized organization such as SL, which could not survive the capture of its leader and its main cadres.[12]

The Peruvian conflict became one of the bloodiest wars in the region, and according to the CVR (2003), around 70.000 people died. The one-day small group of rebels that started burning ballot boxes the day before long-awaited democratic elections, became one of the most powerful insurgencies since the end of WWII.

[12]Despite most of Sendero combatants demobilized by 1992, a branch of the group named *Sendero Rojo* continued to perform small actions throughout the country (Escárzaga 2001).

5.5 Data & Empirical Strategy

In order to test the hypotheses presented above, I rely on district level data on the dynamics of the Peruvian civil war and information on indicators of state capacity for the period 1993-2007, capturing a range of fifteen years after the end of the war in 1992.

For the outcome variable, I make use of three different measures that represent varying components of state capacity.[13] First, as a proxy of state control, I rely on a measure of the percentage of state bureaucrats and security forces per district.[14] The presence of state personnel is a precondition for the adequate operation of state structures at the local level as well as for the provision of public goods (Garfias 2018:346). I expect that the state aims to expand its reach both to areas that were controlled by the rebels during the war as well as to contested areas. Secondly, as a proxy of state legitimacy, I rely on a variable capturing the distribution of a fundamental service: public electricity.[15] Access to basic infrastructural means, such as electric power, are among the core demands of civilians living in wartime affected areas, and become salient issues in the aftermath of conflicts. As argued in Section 3, I expect electricity to be mainly targeted to areas that were under rebel control.

Finally, I make use of a variable that lies at the intersection between the provision of public services and as a mean to enhance state control of civilians living in conflict affected areas: access to secondary school education. While access to education has been at the core of the demands of underdeveloped areas of Perú (Degregori 1995), the control of the ideological materials is a cornerstone element of any state building strategy in the aftermath of war. Given the wide evidence on the relation between youth bulges and participation in rebel groups, specially SL (Urdal 2004),

[13] Future versions of the paper will include Infant Mortality Rates as another proxy for state capacity (Hanson 2015)

[14] This includes public servants and security forces- army and police.

[15] Evidence shows that the distribution of electricity in Perú in the period covered remained public (World Bank 2006)

access to secondary education can be used as an effective tool for reducing the threat of insurgent revival through the enhancement of state capacity. Based on the above-presented hypotheses, I expect a positive and significant effect of secondary school education both in contested and rebel controlled areas.

Data on each of these three variables is collected from the Peruvian censuses of 1993 and 2007. In all the models, I use the difference in the percentage of state bureaucrats, access to public electricity and level of secondary school enrollment at the district level for the period 1993-2007 as dependent variables.





Figure 5.2: Distribution of Territorial Control

The main independent variable, wartime territorial control, is built upon the measures developed by De la Calle (2017), who proposes a three-level measure of control using electoral boycott as a proxy for rebel and contested areas. Since its first armed attack in 1980, and throughout the entire span of the conflict, SL boycotted electoral participation in those places under its control (McClintock

1988). De la Calle (2017) exploits variation in electoral outcomes relying on data on the local elections held during the conflict. Using district-year as his main unit of analysis, he labels as areas controlled by SL those in which local elections did not take place; contested areas as those where the percentage of spoiled votes was over 50%; and the rest as state controlled districts.[16]

Based on this data, I create a new cross-sectional measure of territorial control during the conflict life-span (1980-1992). Concretely, districts are categorized on the basis of their overall exposure to any of these categories (50% or over).[17] Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the distribution of territorial control in Perú. I have data on territorial control for 1803 of the 1835 districts: 1511 were controlled by the state (83,81%); 167 were under SL power (9,26%); and 125 were contested (6,93%). In line with evidence from secondary literature (Kent 1993), the data shows that Sendero controlled areas were mainly located in the department of Ayacucho, as well as in the Northern Amazonas and the Andean regions of the country.



(a) State Control (b) Sendero Control (c) Contested Control

Figure 5.3: Maps Territorial Control Perú (1980-1992)

[16]While fully acknowledging that this measure is highly imperfect, it is still an approximation to the real distribution of territorial control throughout the entire conflict. See Tables A14 to A19 of the Appendix.

[17]In case of tie, considering the potential impact on civilians' life of being exposed to different types of wartime ruling, the order of preference is the following: SL > Contested > State.

I also include a set of variables in order to control for factors that could potentially relate to conflict dynamics and post-war levels of state capacity. I divide them in two groups. First, variables on the Peruvian civil war. I make use of measures of violence coming from CVR (2003), including variables on the killings perpetrated by the state, as well as by SL. Furthermore, I rely on a proxy for coca production through the inclusion of a dummy of the region of Alto Huallaga, the main coca-growing area of the country exploited by SL in order to finance their activities (Degregori et al. 2012). And second, I make use of variables capturing levels of development and geographic characteristics of the districts. These include measures of urbanization and population growth, as well as variables on district size and distance to provincial capital.[18]

Empirical Strategy

What is the impact of wartime territorial control on post-conflict levels of state capacity? Several inferential challenges arise in the response to this question. While producing causal claims is unrealistic given data constraints, I deal with three issues that deserve further attention.[19] First, the presence of spatial auto-correlation, as the distribution of wartime dynamics, as well as of state building measures, tends to be spatially clustered in certain geographic regions. The presence of spatial auto-correlation in the dependent variables produces biased estimates under OLS models, as it violates the assumption of unit independence. I test for the presence of spatial auto-correlation in the models through the use of the I-Moran index, which tests for the existence of global spatial correlation across units. The three dependent variables capturing distinct dimensions of state capacity present high levels of spatial clustering: the I-Moran's statistic for the three variables is positive (0.3298 for state bureaucrats, 0.3594 for electricity and 0.3398 for secondary school),

[18] All these variables come from RIMISP (Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural).

[19] Future versions of the paper will rely on a different empirical strategy. Concretely, in order to deal with potential endogeneity issues, I will make use of matching with data on covariates coming from the 1981 census. This will facilitate the testing of whether levels of territorial control are based on previous levels of state capacity. And second, I will collect data from the 1972 census in order to rely on a difference-in-difference approach using Conley standard errors to control for patterns of spatial auto-correlation.

and with high levels of statistical significance ($p<0.01$), rejecting in this way the null hypotheses of spatial randomness. Therefore, I rely for the main analyses on the use of spatial lag and spatial error models, controlling for the values of the DV of the neighboring districts and capturing in the error term the level of spatial correlation. I make use of a weights matrix constructed on Queen neighbours.

Other threats to inference are the existence of reverse causality, as well as of temporal dependence. Two situations are of particular importance in here. First, it could be the case that early investments on state capacity prior to the war could explain subsequent levels of capacity in the post-conflict period, offsetting the effect of wartime territorial control. And second, it may occur that areas with already low levels of state capacity were more prone to the onset of conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2003). In other words, the direction of causality might be unclear, leading to the presence of endogeneity through reverse causality: not only wartime dynamics affect state capacity, but the onset of conflict (and its subsequent dynamics) is directly related to levels of state expansion. In order to *partially* deal with this, I control for levels of state capacity at the beginning of the conflict using data from the 1981 census[20] and through the use of matching.

Finally, it is also relevant to consider the potential presence of omitted variable bias: it can be argued that other variables, beyond those included as controls in the main model specifications, could be driving the proposed relation between wartime territorial control and state capacity. More concretely, the threat of inference is particularly related to two factors: development and political preferences at the local level. Regarding the former, it cannot be disregarded that the level of development, both before war onset and after the end of the war, could influence war dynamics such as territorial control, but more importantly, post-war state building measures: the state will aim to target those districts with the lowest development in order to increase the conditions of civilians living in these areas. Regarding the latter, it

[20]Despite the conflict formally began in 1980, SL did not engage in sustained territorial expansion until the beginning of 1982 (Degregori et al. 2012).

can be expected that governments aim to target state capacity measures to areas where their electoral benefits could be maximized. In order to deal with this, I include a wide set of variables on development and political preferences at the local level as robustness checks (see Tables A10-A13 in the Appendix).

5.6 Results

5.6.1 Descriptive Evidence

Which has been the evolution of state capacity[21] in the three different types of territories? Figure 5.4 presents descriptive evidence on the temporal evolution of state control and public goods and services provision. Evidence points to a common trend: state building measures would have been implemented in SL and contested areas regardless of the presence of conflict, but war seems to speed up the process.

Evidence on the evolution of state control should be taken with caution, given the problematic measures from the 1981 census.[22] Due to the potential over-inclusion of state personnel in the 1981 census, there seems to be a common trajectory of lower levels of investment between 1981 and 1993, during wartime period. While most of this decrease is surely explained by data biases, what is mostly relevant for the purposes of this research is the trend between 1993 and 2007. As Figure 5.4 shows, after 1993, and in line with the theoretical argument developed, we see lower levels of state personnel in state controlled areas, given that the threat of insurgent revival was substantially lower in government controlled districts. On the contrary, in order to offset the set of insurgent actions engaged during wartime,

[21] Out of the three proxies of state capacity used, the most problematic variable to code is the one on public servants and members of the security forces. While censuses from 1993 and 2007 provide disaggregated data on the basis of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), concretely from ISCO-88, the 1981 census does not provide such disaggregated data. Instead, it collapses into a single category any person working for the public sector. Given this ample conceptualization, the capacity for comparability with the measures of 1993 and 2007 is, at least, doubtful. However, as no better evidence on this exists, I will make use of this data. Based on this caveat, the evidence presented in Figure 5.4 and Table A3 of the Appendix should be taken with caution.

[22] For the sake of reproducibility, I make use of the natural logarithm on the absolute number of executives for the analysis of state control in Figure 5.4. See previous footnote.




Figure 5.4: Temporal Evolution State Capacity

a process of state consolidation was held in contested and SL regions, territories of potential revolutionary revival, showing increases in the number of bureaucrats and army forces deployed to these areas.

The processes for electricity and secondary school follow a parallel pattern, but with the security of much lower potential for data biases. State, SL and contested territories saw considerable increases in their level of access to both goods and services since 1981. Even during wartime, there were slight increases in conflict affected areas, and this can be related to the set of "hearts-and-minds" measures that were implemented in order to shift the allegiances of civilians, specially since the arrival of Alberto Fujimori to the Presidency. Nevertheless, and following the theoretical expectations, increases in the level of electricity were considerably higher after the end of the war in SL districts than in incumbent areas. While contested territories also saw increases, the level of investment in rebel controlled areas is higher. Similarly, as expected, increases for secondary school were higher in SL and

contested areas than in state controlled territories. This descriptive evidence further strengthens the idea that wartime dynamics seem to shape decisions on post-conflict state building measures: in order to avoid future rebel threats, the state targets with special emphasis those areas with higher insurgent influence during the war.

5.6.2 Main Results

Tables 5.1-5.2 and Figure 5.5 below present the results of the spatial lag and spatial error models. The main independent variable is decomposed in three categories: districts can be labeled as controlled by the state (reference category), by Sendero Luminoso (SL), or as contested districts. Models (1) to (2) report the results for state bureaucrats; (3) to (4) report the results for access to electricity; and models (5) to (6) show the results for secondary school matriculation. In line with the theoretical argument, wartime territorial control seems to be a fundamental factor explaining variation in state capacity in the post-conflict period. Contested districts saw an increase of the level of state control in the aftermath of war: there is a positive and significant effect for state bureaucrats ($p<0.01$-$p<0.05$). Specifically, results show that in contested districts the increase in the number of state bureaucrats is 0.35 percentage points higher than in state controlled areas.[23] In terms of number of bureaucrats per 1000 population, this means that contested areas received 3.5 more bureaucrats than areas controlled by the state. Access to secondary school follows a similar pattern: there is also a positive and statistically significant effect ($p<0.01$-$p<0.05$) of between 3 and 5 percentage points, relative to state controlled districts. This means that, while the average state controlled municipality increased its level of access to secondary education by 22.66 percentage points, the average contested district increased by around 26-27 points.[24] As expected, insignificant effects are found in models (3) and (4) regarding the provision of electricity.

[23]This entails a 63.6 percent increase when compared to state-controlled districts.

[24]This shows that there is an increase in access to secondary school of approximately 13.87 percent in contested areas when compared to districts controlled by the state.

Table 5.1: Spatial Lag Models

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.390***	0.318**	1.360	0.629	5.175***	3.813***
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(1.886)	(1.896)	(0.999)	(0.966)
SL Control	0.468***	0.435***	7.057***	6.295***	3.494***	2.808***
	(0.136)	(0.136)	(1.745)	(1.746)	(0.917)	(0.882)
State Killings	0.0002	−0.0003	−0.078**	−0.078**	−0.011	−0.014
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.019)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.0002	−0.003	0.005	0.001	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.087	−0.197	−1.776	−2.795	−0.042	−1.915
	(0.282)	(0.281)	(3.599)	(3.601)	(1.894)	(1.823)
(ln) Size		−0.156***		−1.597***		−0.700***
		(0.024)		(0.313)		(0.157)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.003		0.021		0.017
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.074***		−0.114***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.001		−0.015		0.023***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.504***	0.453***	0.611***	0.596***	0.537***	0.474***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.315***	0.946***	11.226***	23.487***	10.435***	20.006***
	(0.044)	(0.159)	(0.891)	(2.245)	(0.683)	(1.260)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,386.879	−3,300.876	−7,890.214	−7,753.620	−6,715.983	−6,569.885
σ^2	2.481	2.421	403.663	397.636	111.687	101.943
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,789.757	6,625.752	15,796.430	15,531.240	13,447.970	13,163.770
Wald Test (df = 1)	323.555***	247.617***	623.104***	589.558***	403.207***	309.599***
LR Test (df = 1)	322.955***	246.082***	448.782***	425.912***	344.518***	270.163***

Note: Reference category: state control. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Results for districts controlled by SL also follow the theoretical expectations. In insurgent controlled territories, there is a positive and significant effect of around 0.45 percentage points in the level of post-conflict state control when compared to areas controlled by incumbents (p<0.01-p<0.05): areas controlled by SL received approximately 4.5 more bureaucrats per 1000 people in the post-conflict period. Similar results are found for access to public electricity and secondary school. Access to electric power in SL districts was approximately 5-7 percentage points higher (p<0.01): if the average municipality under incumbent control increased its electric

Table 5.2: Spatial Error Models

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.338**	0.311**	−1.861	−2.237	3.971***	2.983***
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(1.988)	(1.988)	(1.052)	(1.010)
SL Control	0.448***	0.411***	6.390***	5.439***	3.384***	2.574***
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(1.943)	(1.943)	(1.011)	(0.968)
State Killings	−0.001	−0.0001	−0.080**	−0.069*	−0.023	−0.016
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.020)
SL Killings	−0.0003	0.0003	−0.001	0.007	0.002	0.008
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.231	−0.308	−4.146	−4.834	−0.766	−2.235
	(0.384)	(0.372)	(5.227)	(5.173)	(2.644)	(2.461)
(ln) Size		−0.152***		−1.789***		−0.646***
		(0.028)		(0.367)		(0.181)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.004*		0.001		0.016
		(0.002)		(0.032)		(0.015)
Urban 1993		−0.009***		−0.083***		−0.138***
		(0.002)		(0.021)		(0.010)
Population Growth		0.00000		−0.015		0.021***
		(0.001)		(0.010)		(0.005)
λ	0.507***	0.464***	0.618***	0.611***	0.551***	0.508***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Constant	−0.573***	0.694***	29.569***	42.671***	23.348***	32.035***
	(0.078)	(0.192)	(1.274)	(2.650)	(0.577)	(1.265)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,389.165	−3,311.746	−7,891.656	−7,755.981	−6,721.076	−6,574.545
σ^2	2.486	2.446	403.412	396.867	111.923	101.684
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,794.330	6,647.492	15,799.310	15,535.960	13,458.150	13,173.090
Wald Test (df = 1)	326.582***	248.294***	640.412***	614.957***	424.439***	326.741***
LR Test (df = 1)	318.383***	224.342***	445.898***	421.189***	334.331***	260.843***

Note: Reference category: state control. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

provision by 27.5 percentage points, SL districts did it by approximately 33-34 percentage points.[25] In a similar vein, access to secondary education is between 2.5-3.5 percentage points higher in rebel held territories (p<0.01). These effects hold after the inclusion of all relevant control variables.

In sum, the results align with the theoretical expectations: wartime territorial control seems to be a key factor explaining post-conflict levels of state capacity. In

[25]This shows a 20.8 percent increase than in state-controlled districts




Figure 5.5: Estimated Effects

the aftermath of war, while investment in the delivery of public goods and services seems to be concentrated in wartime rebel-controlled territories, the deployment of state bureaucrats and security forces is targeted both at insurgent controlled areas and areas under dispute. Therefore, civil wars seem to be an effective way of increasing levels of state capacity once conflicts are over.

5.6.3 Robustness Checks

In order to validate the findings presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, I test the robustness of these results in light of different analyses. The full set of robustness tests are included in the Appendix. Moreover, I briefly discuss potential alternative explanations.

Endogeneity and Temporal Dependence

Firstly, I aim to deal with the presence of reverse causality in the main relation of interest. I partially deal with this concern controlling for levels of state capacity at the beginning of the conflict, concretely using data from the 1981 census.[26] This also helps to address concerns over temporal dependence: post-conflict state building could be directly linked to pre-war levels of state capacity. As shown in Table A3 of Appendix, controlling for almost pre-war levels of state building does not modify the direction nor the substantive impact of wartime territorial control when explaining post-conflict state capacity. The use of matching techniques (propensity score and nearest neighbor), while incapable of controlling for unobservable factors, also provide further evidence pointing in the direction of the main argument (Tables A8 and A9 of the Appendix). Far from claiming that the endogeneity of the relation between wartime territorial control and state capacity is resolved, results seem to support the theoretical argument proposed in this paper.

Omitted Variable Bias

Another inferential threat is the presence of omitted variable bias in the main model specifications. In order to deal with this, I focus on the two main potential confounding variables: the level of development and political preferences. Despite having included two proxies of development in the main tables (Urban 1993, Population Growth 07-93), the use of two new measures, such as road density in 1973 and levels of youth pregnancy in 1993 does not alter the main results (see Table A10 of the Appendix). Similarly, when adjusting for the potential confounding

[26] Data from the 1981 census should be taken with caution (see Section C in the Appendix). Prior versions of the census are not electronically available.

effect of local political preferences using data on Presidential elections from 1980 to 2006, does not bring important changes (see Tables A11 to A13 of the Appendix). Similarly, results remain unchanged when using different measures of territorial control (see Tables A14 to A19 of the Appendix), when including a broad set of distinct control variables (see Tables A20-A22 of the Appendix) and when testing for ceiling effects (Figure A3 and Table A23 of the Appendix).[27]

Alternative Explanations

Three distinct accounts could explain the observed relation between wartime territorial control and state building measures in the aftermath of conflict. First, the results could be driven by the targeting of poor voters through clientelistic policies, particularly during the Fujimori period (Schady 2000). The Fujimori regime was extremely effective in the targeting of voters from marginalized areas, with the ultimate goal of developing a strong electoral constituency that would allow him to stay in power for a long time. While I try to control for this through the use of data on local political preferences for the period 1980-2006, this might not fully capture the focused targeting of investments towards marginalized areas.

A second potential explanation refers to the presence of commodities. After the end of the war, Perú began a process of commodity exploitation that promoted the economic development of the country during the late 1990s. Given that these commodities were mostly found in marginalized communities and areas that suffered the presence of SL during the conflict, it is theoretical plausible to expect that the relation between wartime territorial control and post-war state building measures is mediated by the existence of commodities: in order to reduce the level of protests and mobilization against resource extraction (Ponce & McClintock 2014), the state could have targeted these communities with public investment in order to facilitate the adequate exploitation of the commodities found in these areas. The lack of

[27]Results also remain robust to the use of OLS and spatial durbin error models; the disaggregation of the variable on state control differentiating between state bureaucrats and army forces; the use of different conflict time frames; and to a wide set of sensitivity analyses.

subnational data on commodity presence hampers the capacity to empirically test the validity of this mechanism.

Finally, a third alternative explanation relates to a long-term approach in which marginalization, and not wartime dynamics, is the main driver behind the allocation of state capacity measures: despite marginalized areas were the ones that suffered the dynamics of the conflict, the state might target these areas with state building projects in the aftermath of war in order to redress their prior level of development, and not to avoid the resurgence of insurgent organizations. I try to deal with this through the use of four distinct variables on levels of development (Urban, Population Growth, Road Density and Youth Pregnancy), but none of them might comprehensively capture in an adequate way the role that development plays in state investments in the aftermath of conflict.

5.6.4 Qualitative Evidence

Despite the stability of these results, it is still unclear which is the concrete causal mechanism explaining these decisions. Why did the state invest more in districts that were either contested or controlled by Sendero during wartime?

State Control

As it has been widely studied in the literature on civil war, insurgent groups have incentives to control territory, as it increases their chances of military success against the state (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2016). Sendero Luminoso was well aware of this and engaged in sustained territorial expansion since 1982 (Degregori et al. 2012). In its quest for territorial control, Sendero cadres employed selective violence against state authorities present in these areas. As described by the CVR (2003:Tomo VII-217): "The elimination of local and communal authorities was a central objective of SL in order to control the population, first, and replace the leaderships, later. Faced with this situation, the authorities and leaders could flee or be killed." For example, in the city of Andahuaylas, Sendero assassinated various state representatives and

perpetrated attacks against a range of public agencies (Berg 1994:90-93). These actions led to the resignation of various state agents to their posts, creating a power vacuum that was filled by Sendero with the development of its own governance structures. Isbell (1994:71) describes how civilians initially supported these actions. In the district of Chuschi: "The communities [...] supported Sendero for the first two years because SL's short-term goals corresponded with their own [such as] getting rid of the enemies [...]. [These included] thieves, abusive bureaucrats, state agents of change, and the new rich peasants." With the birth and expansion of Sendero, the whole set of authority structures and power relations were modified in wartime areas in which it retained full territorial control as well as in those that remained contested throughout the conflict. While in the former Sendero set up its own governance structures, the latter areas remained under a vacuum of political power.

How did the whole set of power relations and institutional infrastructures were replaced after the end of the war in these territories? During the Fujimori years (1990-2000), this was mainly done through a process of state penetration in war-affected areas defined by its marked militarized character. The report by the CVR provides a detailed account on this, arguing that, after the end of the conflict, "in several of the rural areas most affected by the internal war, the military represented and embodied, for many years, the state itself" (CVR 2003:Tomo III-Capitulo 2:112). In a similar vein, Burt (2011:336-337) describes how "the proliferation of military bases in rural communities and urban slums gave the Armed Forces vast power [...] This process of militarization showed the population the new power of state authorities to analyze, control and repress undesirable social behavior." Despite the process of state penetration in war affected areas continued under the governments of Toledo (2001-2006) and García (2006-2011), the level of militarization of security forces activities sharply declined, except in those areas where remnants of Sendero Luminoso remained active (Escárzaga 2001).

In conjunction with the results presented above, anthropological accounts in war-affected areas in Perú show the strategic role played by the provision of education. Education was not only used as a tool to earn civilian support through the delivery of public services, but more importantly, it was instrumentally applied as a way of raising the level of state control in wartime areas. As thoroughly described by Wilson (2000:4-5) the government "sought to re-establish the state presence in territories lost to Sendero by instigating a vast program of public works and school building [...] The school building has become a visual symbol, a reminder in the landscape of the return to a state of government."

State Legitimacy

Tracing granular decisions on the strategic allocation of welfare expenditures present fundamental challenges. However, anecdotal evidence partially supports one of the main contentions of this paper: the state aimed to promote its legitimacy vis-à-vis civilians through the strategic deployment of public goods and services, with a special focus on those territories that were controlled by insurgents during the war.

A state representative during the Fujimori years argued that "these investments in infrastructure and development projects helped to consolidate the alliance between the population and the state for an effective demise of Sendero, especially in liberated areas, such as the high Andean regions." The set of projects was limited to the provision of basic infrastructures, such as "electricity, schools or medical posts."[28] Indeed, in many of Sendero controlled areas, "this was the first time that the state reached the villages in more than 150 years."[29] Likewise, in the department of Ayacucho, one of SL strongholds, Palmer (1998:10) shows how, after the end of the conflict, the government returned to the region with a combination of investment on infrastructures and other welfare expenditures in order to partially address the needs of civilians. Similar dynamics were seen in the department of Apurimac[30], which

[28]Interview #2: former state representative.
[29]Interview #4: former state representative.
[30]Interview #5: development program director.

together with Ayacucho and Madre de Dios, was among the regions with the highest level of territorial control by Sendero Luminoso.[31] The dynamics on contested territories were slightly different, as in these districts, "Sendero was very discredited and people were very hopeless."[32] Some of my interviewees argue that in these territories, unlike in areas controlled by Sendero, the provision of goods and services was made by a diverse set of organizations, such as NGOs, international agencies or the Church, being the state just one among the conglomerate of actors. This dynamic was particularly relevant in urban-marginal territories, a clear example of contested territories, especially during the end of the war.[33]

The strategic provision of welfare expenditures was part of a multifaceted counter-insurgent policy. As the CVR (2003:115) argues: "A second important component of the anti-subversive strategy, which allowed to withdraw support from SL, was the progressive attention to the needs of the population through social programs". In a similar vein, Palmer & Bolivar (2011:3) state that Sendero Luminoso was "progressively dismantled through cadre roundups, sympathizer rehabilitation, and rural micro development programs." In other words, policy practitioners and scholars agree that the provision of public goods, services and infrastructures played a key role in the elimination of SL. These programs explicitly aimed to be implemented as a way of promoting the pacification of local communities[34], and indeed, were effective in the achievement of this goal. For example, Palmer & Bolivar (2011:7) argue that the partial elimination of these programs is one of the key factors explaining the re-emergence of small Sendero remnants in the early 2000s.[35] It can be summarized by the words of one of my interviewees, the fulfilment of long-standing civilian demands "took away the rallying cry of the fight to the armed left."[36]

[31] According to De la Calle (2017) data.
[32] Interview #2: former state representative.
[33] ibid.
[34] Interview #5: development program director.
[35] As studied by Schady (2000), most interviewees also highlighted the political use of these actions, especially during the Fujimori period.
[36] Interview #5: development program director.

5.7 Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the impact of civil war dynamics on post-conflict state capacity using Perú as its main case of study. The main finding of the article is that internal armed conflict can be an effective way of promoting investment in state-building measures: once the conflict ends, the spatial distribution of territorial control shapes the strategies of the government in the expansion of state capacity. With the main goal of avoiding the revival of insurgent movements, the state will mainly target its state-building efforts to those areas that suffered a higher level of state power erosion during war. While it will expand its state control to disputed and rebel controlled areas, it will only aim to foster state legitimacy in areas controlled by insurgents, in order to offset the potential effectiveness of rebel practices in these territories.

Despite these findings, a set of limitations need to be acknowledged. First, the lack of annual data on state capacity measures makes more difficult the testing of the temporal effects of wartime dynamics on state-building decisions. It is highly likely that the effects of territorial control are more relevant in the first years after the end of the war than fifteen years later. Second, data limitations also hinder the capacity for more fine-grained tests on the effects of wartime territorial control. On the one hand, I have not been able to disentangle the impact of the two ideal types of rebel governance structures described by Arjona (2016). And on the other hand, data on territorial control does not capture the full variation existent regarding contested territories (Kalyvas 2006). Finally, the validity of these findings might only hold under the umbrella of strict scope conditions: in irregular wars where the state defeats a strong insurgent force that has been capable of holding territorial control and of establishing insurgent institutions. While examples of strong insurgents with wide levels of territorial control and governance structures abound, recent evidence shows that most groups engaging in irregular wars fail before they have the capacity to control territory and establish governance structures (Lewis 2020).

Civil wars produce major political transformations. As conflict dynamics completely shift the landscape of social order and patterns of authority at the local level, the path towards the consolidation of peace and the establishment of effective ruling persists as one of the key challenges in the aftermath of wars. Given its importance, understanding the determinants of state-building becomes a paramount task for avoiding conflict-traps. Despite its disruptive effects, the search for peace after civil wars might lead to a new way of bringing order and development to conflict-affected areas. In the quest for this goal, the annihilation of the internal enemy seems to reinforce the position of the state: the Leviathan is back.

Appendix

Contents:

- A. Variables and Sources
- B. Descriptive Statistics
- C. State Capacity Over Time
  - State capacity 1981
- D. Violence and Control
  - Violence over time
  - Violence by territorial control
- E. Spatial Analysis
  - LM spatial tests
- F. Correlations
- G. Robustness Tests
  - Matching
  - Development
  - Politics
  - Territorial Control
  - Other Controls
  - Ceiling Effects
- H. Qualitative Data Collection

A. Variables and Sources

Table A1 - Variables & Sources

Variable	Data Source
State Bureaucrats	Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática Perú (INEI)
Electricity	Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática Perú (INEI)
Secondary School	Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática Perú (INEI)
Territorial Control	De la Calle (2017)
SL Killings	Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú (2003)
State Killings	Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación Perú (2003)
Alto Huallaga	De la Calle (2017)
Size	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Distance Prov. Capital	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Urban	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Population Growth	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Density Roads 1973	Automobile Club & Banco Crédito Perú - Albertus (2020)
Youth Pregnancy 1993	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Election Results	Sulmont & Bazán (2011)
Spanish Speaking	De la Calle (2017)
Youth Bulge	De la Calle (2017)
Budget Availability 2004	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Political Competition 2002	Centro Latinoamericano para el Desarrollo Rural (RIMISP)
Rondas 1994	Agricultural Census 1994 - Albertus (2020)
Social Movements	Kammann (1982) - Albertus (2020)
Mountainous Terrain	Albertus (2020)
Lima	De la Calle (2017)
No Mayor 1989	McClintock (1998) - Albertus (2020)

B. Descriptive Statistics

Table A2 - Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
State Bureaucrats 07-93	1,792	−0.55	1.79	−25.43	10.76
Electricity 07-93	1,778	28.84	24.10	−71.00	93.00
Secondary School 07-93	1,773	23.73	12.28	−28.95	75.16
Territorial Control	1,803	1.25	0.61	1.00	3.00
State Killings	1,834	2.87	16.65	0	440
SL Killings	1,834	8.95	58.66	0	1,699
Alto Huallaga	1,834	0.02	0.14	0	1
(ln) Size	1,801	5.57	1.64	0.69	11.69
Distance Prov. Capital	1,820	20.98	23.09	0.00	405.62
Urban 93	1,834	41.02	30.76	0.00	100.00
Pop. Growth 07-93	1,778	16.63	52.37	−86.45	657.46
State Bureaucrats 81	1.483	14.12	16.06	0.00	78.38
Electricity 81	1,483	17.43	25.98	0.00	99.00
Secondary School 81	1,483	18.26	15.49	0.00	65.00
Density Roads 73	1,571	34.97	67.57	0.00	992.94
Youth Pregnancy 93	1,413	5.34	3.89	0.48	50.00
% Marxist Left 80	1,562	0.16	0.14	0.00	0.88
% Fujimori 90	1,163	21.62	20.74	0.00	89.41
% Left 90	1,163	50.19	22.64	0.99	97.65
% Fujimori 00	1,813	54.11	15.34	10.88	95.37
% Left 00	1,813	38.00	15.11	3.15	83.86
% Left 01	1,822	66.92	16.06	3.53	98.89
% Left 06	1,830	67.08	13.81	11.76	96.02
Spanish	1,684	58.94	39.75	0.00	100.00
Youth Bulge	1,684	13.91	3.50	2.78	34.14
Budget Av. 04	1,610	321.70	311.59	0.00	5,769.59
Political Competition 02	1,428	6.99	6.98	0.00	48.44
Rondas 94	1,563	0.08	0.19	0.00	0.97
Social Movements	1,571	0.15	0.75	0.00	13.00
Mountainous Terrain	1,571	5.66	3.67	0.00	19.53
Lima Province	1,834	0.02	0.15	0	1
Mean Urban 07-93	1,834	44.58	29.62	0.00	100.00
No Mayor 1989	1,571	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Territorial Control 40	1,803	1.27	0.63	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 30	1,803	1.53	0.85	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 89-92	1,803	1.63	0.85	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 92	1,718	1.66	0.86	1.00	3.00
Army 07-93	1,792	−0.60	1.37	−26.08	10.22
Executive 07-93	1,789	−0.06	0.84	−8.44	7.82
Territorial Control 80-93	1,803	1.25	0.60	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 80-95	1,803	1.24	0.59	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 81-92	1,803	1.27	0.62	1.00	3.00
Territorial Control 82-92	1,803	1.33	0.69	1.00	3.00

C. Pre-War State Capacity

Table A3 below shows the main results of the paper controlling for levels of state capacity at the beginning of the war (1981). All the variables remain in the expected direction and with similar levels of statistical significance. This evidence partially address endogeneity issues, strengthening the confidence in the results presented in Tables 1 and 2.

Table A3 - State Capacity 1981


	Spatial Lag			Spatial Error		
	State Bureauc.	*Electric.*	*Sec. School*	*State Bureauc.*	*Electric.*	*Sec. School*
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Contested Control	0.335**	0.187	2.412**	0.349**	−1.213	2.214**
	(0.169)	(2.075)	(1.064)	(0.174)	(2.103)	(1.091)
SL Control	0.335*	8.510***	2.652**	0.357*	9.206***	2.291*
	(0.191)	(2.366)	(1.189)	(0.207)	(2.570)	(1.290)
State Killings	0.0001	−0.095**	−0.009	0.0002	−0.096**	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.021)
SL Killings	−0.0001	0.003	0.004	−0.00004	0.003	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.180	−7.183*	−3.954**	−0.241	−10.435*	−4.371*
	(0.316)	(3.887)	(1.971)	(0.410)	(5.465)	(2.584)
(ln) Size	−0.156***	−1.333***	−0.789***	−0.155***	−1.106***	−0.651***
	(0.028)	(0.343)	(0.172)	(0.031)	(0.384)	(0.191)
Distance Prov. Capital	−0.005**	−0.007	0.021	−0.006*	−0.023	0.023
	(0.003)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.020)
Urban 1993	−0.008***	0.134***	−0.037***	−0.009***	0.121***	−0.056***
	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.026)	(0.013)
Population Growth	−0.001	−0.015	0.030***	−0.0002	−0.021**	0.029***
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.005)
State Bur. 1981	−0.005*			−0.007**		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Electricity 1981		−0.412***			−0.507***	
		(0.028)			(0.031)	
Secondary Sch. 1981			−0.267***			−0.296***
			(0.023)			(0.025)
ρ	0.384***	0.476***	0.374***			
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.030)			
λ				0.390***	0.529***	0.410***
				(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Constant	1.040***	24.452***	24.294***	0.894***	39.488***	33.503***
	(0.183)	(2.427)	(1.387)	(0.212)	(2.740)	(1.341)
Observations	1,447	1,436	1,442	1,447	1,436	1,442
Log Likelihood	−2,732.217	−6,326.525	−5,359.919	−2,737.451	−6,317.558	−5,365.827
σ^2	2.478	373.619	96.220	2.493	364.010	96.388
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,490.434	12,679.050	10,745.840	5,500.901	12,661.110	10,757.650
Wald Test (df = 1)	137.795***	293.130***	157.378***	136.193***	332.086***	155.852***
LR Test (df = 1)	143.993***	234.841***	143.521***	133.525***	252.776***	131.705***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

D. Violence and Control

Following the expectations of Kalyvas (2006), data from the Peruvian civil war shows that disputed areas suffered the highest level of violence during the war, concretely, an average of around 6.5 more deaths than areas controlled by Sendero Luminoso. This difference widens to over 20 when compared to areas controlled by the government. This evidence further strengthens the main mechanism developed in the paper, which argues that the state will focus on the distribution of territorial control during wartime in their state building measures distribution. Regardless of the higher level of violence in contested areas, the state mostly focus its efforts in insurgent controlled areas.

Figure A1 - Distribution of Violence by Territorial Control




Source: CVR (2003) & De la Calle (2017)

Figure A2 below portrays the evolution of violence between 1980 and 2000. Two elements deserve to be highlighted. First, the almost flat line between 1980 and 1981,

showing that the use of measures of state capacity in 1981 is effectively capturing pre-war levels of state capacity, as until 1982 there is not a considerable increase in armed actions, nor in territorial expansion (Degregori 2012). And second, the profound decline in violence after 1992. Despite there was certain level of violence between 1993 and 1994 it was mostly state violence (CVR 2003), showing how Sendero stopped being an effective organization by 1992.

Figure A2 - Evolution of Violence Over Time



Source: CVR (2003)

E. Spatial Analysis

A brief summary of the Langrange Multiplier diagnostics is presented below.

Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence

Table A4 - LM Spatial Tests State Bureaucrats

Test	**Diagnostic Value**	***p-value***
Lagrange multiplier spatial error	290.01	.0000
Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	340.8	.0000
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial error	5.7025	.0169
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	56.496	.0000
SARMA	346.5	.0000

Table A5 - LM Spatial Tests Electricity

Test	**Diagnostic Value**	***p-value***
Lagrange multiplier spatial error	509.08	.0000
Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	534	.0000
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial error	0.061984	.8034
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	24.982	.0000
SARMA	534.06	.0000

Table A6 - LM Spatial Tests Secondary School

Test	**Diagnostic Value**	***p-value***
Lagrange multiplier spatial error	315.27	.0000
Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	338.79	.0000
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial error	4.7892	.0286
Robust Lagrange multiplier spatial lag	28.31	.0000
SARMA	343.58	.0000

F. Correlations

I test the potential correlations existent between three different types of variables: those on state capacity, territorial control and level of development. One of the main problems of inference is that development might be one the main confounders in the relation of interest: it may not only drive control of territory by Sendero, but it can also affect investments in state capacity in the postwar period. Results in Table A7 below show that the highest positive correlation is of 0.2439 ($p<0.01$) between access to electricity and secondary school, while the lowest is between urban areas and secondary school, of around -0.37 ($p<0.01$). The rest of correlations vary between these ranges.

Table A7 - Pairwise Correlations

Variables	**Bureaucrats**	**Electricity**	**Secondary**	**Terr. Control**	**Urban**	**Pop. Growth**
Bureaucrats	1.000					
Electricity	0.1064***	1.000				
Secondary	0.0703***	0.2439***	1.000			
Terr. Control	0.1300***	0.1223***	0.1761***	1.000		
Urban	-0.1659***	-0.1360***	-0.3669***	-0.1211***	1.000	
Pop. Growth	-0.0889***	-0.0733***	0.0846***	0.0200	0.0914***	1.000

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G. Robustness Tests

Matching

In order to further increase the confidence in the findings presented so far, I make use of matching techniques. I follow the standard usage of matching taking advantage of binary treatments (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983). In this case, matching compares pairs of districts that are similar in a set of covariates, but that differed in their type of territorial control. Districts are either "treated" with territorial control by insurgents or by being contested. The main specifications are constructed with those variables included in Tables 1 and 2.

Table A8 - Matching Rebel Territories

Panel A: Propensity Score Matching				
	ATE	Std. Err.	Obs.	Treated Obs.
State Bureaucrats	0.630***	0.215	1754	147
Access to Electricity	8.573***	2.601	1742	147
Secondary School	2.290*	1.371	1750	147
Panel B: Nearest Neighbor Matching				
	ATE	Std. Err.	Obs.	Treated Obs.
State Bureaucrats	0.561***	0.199	1754	147
Access to Electricity	8.518***	2.260	1742	147
Secondary School	2.837***	1.053	1750	147

Robust standard errors in parentheses.Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9 - Matching Contested Territories

Panel A: Propensity Score Matching				
	ATE	Std. Err.	Obs.	Treated Obs.
State Bureaucrats	0.603***	0.151	1754	129
Access to Electricity	8.217***	2.756	1742	129
Secondary School	7.279***	1.295	1750	129
Panel B: Nearest Neighbor Matching				
	ATE	Std. Err.	Obs.	Treated Obs.
State Bureaucrats	0.571***	0.198	1754	129
Access to Electricity	5.059*	2.600	1742	129
Secondary School	6.719***	1.276	1750	129

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Development

One of the main confounders in the relation between territorial control and state capacity is the level of development. In order to ensure that the relation between the two variables of interest is not spurious, I include two different proxies capturing distinct dimensions of a country´s level of development at different periods of time: road density in 1973 and level of youth pregnancy in 1993. Results remain robust to the inclusion of these variables.

Table A10 - Robustness Development

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contested Control	0.342**	0.312*	1.749	−0.302	4.522***	4.207***
	(0.154)	(0.163)	(2.009)	(2.155)	(1.029)	(0.993)
SL Control	0.432***	0.473***	10.116***	5.497***	3.509***	2.820***
	(0.166)	(0.145)	(2.181)	(1.921)	(1.103)	(0.880)
State Killings	0.003	0.001	−0.146**	−0.058	−0.006	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.017)
SL Killings	−0.0001	0.0001	0.012	0.003	0.004	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Alto Huallaga	0.0002	−0.201	−4.968	−2.665	−2.590	−1.706
	(0.323)	(0.264)	(4.210)	(3.488)	(2.140)	(1.601)
(ln) Size	−0.188***	−0.134***	−2.182***	−1.199***	−0.888***	−0.602***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.347)	(0.331)	(0.174)	(0.151)
Distance Prov. Capital	−0.005**	−0.004**	0.027	0.001	0.024	0.008
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Urban 1993	−0.008***	−0.009***	−0.059***	−0.093***	−0.105***	−0.121***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Population Growth	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.022**	−0.020	0.021***	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Roads 1973	−0.001*		−0.024***		−0.014***	
	(0.001)		(0.008)		(0.004)	
Youth Pregnant 1993		−0.003		0.392***		0.217***
		(0.010)		(0.136)		(0.062)
ρ	0.429***	0.391***	0.550***	0.487***	0.439***	0.429***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	1.173***	0.809***	28.547***	22.594***	21.961***	19.762***
	(0.174)	(0.171)	(2.504)	(2.447)	(1.394)	(1.267)
Observations	1,535	1,389	1,525	1,378	1,531	1,389
Log Likelihood	−2,877.762	−2,520.111	−6,798.124	−6,072.973	−5,768.850	−5,030.105
σ^2	2.391	2.127	406.586	371.315	105.242	78.306
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,781.523	5,066.223	13,622.250	12,171.940	11,563.700	10,086.210
Wald Test (df = 1)	201.457***	157.231***	430.569***	287.209***	236.627***	229.394***
LR Test (df = 1)	205.555***	163.926***	316.797***	227.260***	208.740***	214.539***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Politics

The other potential confounding variable is the role politics, which play a fundamental role specially when considering the distribution of public goods and services. Indeed, for the case of Perú, strong evidence suggests that certain social expenditures, such as the social fund FONCODES, are directly targeted to areas where political benefits could be maximized (Schady 2000). In order to deal with this, I control for political preferences at the district level for the period 1980-2006 using data on Presidential elections. As shown in Tables A11 to A13 below, results remain unchanged.

Table A11 - Robustness Politics State

	State Bureaucrats						
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	0.364**	0.425**	0.424**	0.314**	0.322**	0.317**	0.305**
	(0.152)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.148)
SL Control	0.366**	0.487**	0.516***	0.433***	0.438***	0.435***	0.420***
	(0.166)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.136)
% Marxist Left 1980	−1.292***						
	(0.281)						
% Fujimori 1990		−0.002					
		(0.002)					
% Left 1990			−0.002				
			(0.002)				
% Fujimori 2000				0.001			
				(0.002)			
% Left 2000					0.001		
					(0.003)		
% Left 2001						−0.001	
						(0.002)	
% Left 2006							0.004
							(0.003)
ρ	0.417***	0.287***	0.286***	0.452***	0.452***	0.454***	0.451***
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.340***	0.982***	1.045***	0.875***	0.909***	0.975***	0.688***
	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.209)	(0.208)	(0.187)	(0.219)	(0.251)
Observations	1,527	1,141	1,141	1,750	1,750	1,751	1,753
Log Likelihood	−2,845.502	−2,035.540	−2,035.344	−3,295.397	−3,295.464	−3,295.672	−3,298.602
σ^2	2.343	2.040	2.039	2.427	2.427	2.421	2.421
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,717.004	4,097.080	4,096.687	6,616.794	6,616.928	6,617.344	6,623.205
Wald Test (df = 1)	188.013***	54.970***	54.817***	245.588***	245.465***	249.189***	243.918***
LR Test (df = 1)	193.408***	83.570***	83.272***	244.032***	243.864***	246.711***	242.531***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A12 - Robustness Politics Electricity

	Electricity						
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	1.979	2.226	2.232	0.467	0.585	0.816	0.374
	(2.012)	(2.662)	(2.661)	(1.901)	(1.903)	(1.899)	(1.900)
SL Control	10.752***	6.263**	6.157**	6.176***	6.266***	6.357***	5.974***
	(2.207)	(2.710)	(2.703)	(1.748)	(1.749)	(1.746)	(1.752)
% Marxist Left 1980	3.268						
	(3.677)						
% Fujimori 1990		0.005					
		(0.031)					
% Left 1990			0.007				
			(0.028)				
% Fujimori 2000				0.055*			
				(0.032)			
% Left 2000					−0.015		
					(0.032)		
% Left 2001						0.058*	
						(0.030)	
% Left 2006							0.070**
							(0.036)
ρ	0.558***	0.551***	0.551***	0.593***	0.595***	0.595***	0.594***
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	26.183***	20.896***	20.604***	20.678***	24.202***	19.841***	18.669***
	(2.510)	(2.788)	(3.061)	(2.806)	(2.582)	(2.936)	(3.311)
Observations	1,517	1,132	1,132	1,738	1,738	1,739	1,741
Log Likelihood	−6,768.290	−5,033.788	−5,033.764	−7,736.043	−7,737.439	−7,740.099	−7,747.507
σ^2	408.648	396.750	396.727	398.066	398.496	397.691	397.178
Akaike Inf. Crit.	13,562.580	10,093.580	10,093.530	15,498.090	15,500.880	15,506.200	15,521.010
Wald Test (df = 1)	450.240***	327.861***	327.535***	578.973***	584.049***	585.087***	581.074***
LR Test (df = 1)	328.893***	256.868***	257.053***	420.004***	422.971***	422.802***	421.286***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A13 -Robustness Politics Secondary

	Secondary School						
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	4.668***	2.937**	2.972**	3.806***	3.844***	3.934***	3.636***
	(1.028)	(1.171)	(1.170)	(0.965)	(0.965)	(0.965)	(0.966)
SL Control	4.240***	2.520**	2.269*	2.783***	2.806***	2.855***	2.525***
	(1.114)	(1.173)	(1.169)	(0.880)	(0.880)	(0.880)	(0.883)
% Marxist Left 1980	4.206**						
	(1.871)						
% Fujimori 1990		0.009					
		(0.013)					
% Left 1990			0.024*				
			(0.012)				
% Fujimori 2000				0.003			
				(0.016)			
% Left 2000					0.007		
					(0.016)		
% Left 2001						0.036**	
						(0.015)	
% Left 2006							0.078***
							(0.018)
ρ	0.441***	0.470***	0.467***	0.471***	0.471***	0.469***	0.451***
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Rest of Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	20.213***	18.216***	17.191***	19.878***	19.778***	17.809***	15.028***
	(1.379)	(1.373)	(1.438)	(1.527)	(1.413)	(1.572)	(1.718)
Observations	1,523	1,137	1,137	1,745	1,745	1,746	1,749
Log Likelihood	−5,739.701	−4,101.175	−4,099.486	−6,545.532	−6,545.458	−6,550.427	−6,557.545
σ^2	105.316	75.632	75.468	101.319	101.320	101.507	101.409
Akaike Inf. Crit.	11,505.400	8,228.349	8,224.972	13,117.060	13,116.920	13,126.850	13,141.090
Wald Test (df = 1)	240.500***	236.734***	230.670***	305.874***	305.082***	302.366***	271.470***
LR Test (df = 1)	211.275***	208.196***	204.802***	266.793***	266.369***	264.282***	237.505***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Territorial Control

I make use of six distinct variables on territorial control in order to test its robustness (Tables A14-A19). Concretely, I use a measure coming from Albertus (2020) capturing the lack of local authorities in 1989 as a proxy of SL control. Moreover, I make use of different specifications for territorial control, lowering the threshold presented in Section 5 to 40% and 30% and when using the territorial control of 1989-1992 and 1992. Results are less robust than expected for state bureaucrats in contested areas, but remain highly robust for the rest of specifications.

Table A14 - No Mayor 1989

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
SL Control (No Mayor 1989)	0.427***	0.372***	6.353***	5.514***	3.366***	2.658***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(1.218)	(1.217)	(0.642)	(0.619)
State Killings	0.003	0.003	−0.156**	−0.148**	−0.014	−0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.033)	(0.034)
SL Killings	−0.001	−0.0001	0.006	0.013	0.001	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alto Huallaga	−0.009	−0.153	−6.173	−6.927	−1.954	−3.748*
	(0.326)	(0.324)	(4.280)	(4.243)	(2.248)	(2.161)
(ln) Size		−0.172***		−1.887***		−0.742***
		(0.026)		(0.345)		(0.174)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.005**		0.035		0.027*
		(0.002)		(0.029)		(0.015)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.069***		−0.113***
		(0.001)		(0.018)		(0.010)
Population Growth		−0.0002		−0.022**		0.023***
		(0.001)		(0.010)		(0.005)
ρ	0.483***	0.426***	0.564***	0.555***	0.508***	0.459***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	−0.379***	1.022***	12.048***	25.517***	11.016***	20.287***
	(0.050)	(0.172)	(0.981)	(2.474)	(0.729)	(1.371)
Observations	1,569	1,535	1,558	1,525	1,553	1,531
Log Likelihood	−2,971.603	−2,877.344	−6,976.847	−6,803.791	−5,943.723	−5,779.654
σ^2	2.458	2.392	422.201	408.979	116.642	106.266
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,957.207	5,776.689	13,967.690	13,629.580	11,901.450	11,581.310
Wald Test (df = 1)	269.055***	196.494***	451.313***	442.596***	322.896***	264.061***
LR Test (df = 1)	275.970***	201.038***	338.577***	327.698***	280.121***	233.113***

Note: Reference category: Districts with Mayor in 1989.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A15 - Continuous Measure Territorial Control

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Continuous	0.041**	0.028*	0.427**	0.303	0.982***	0.792***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.108)	(0.106)
SL Continuous	0.069***	0.059***	0.844***	0.728***	0.532***	0.392***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.102)	(0.099)
State Killings	−0.0001	−0.0003	−0.088**	−0.085**	−0.020	−0.021
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.019)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.0001	−0.003	0.005	0.001	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.123	−0.225	−2.197	−3.054	−0.160	−1.880
	(0.281)	(0.281)	(3.606)	(3.605)	(1.865)	(1.806)
(ln) Size		−0.150***		−1.520***		−0.612***
		(0.024)		(0.315)		(0.156)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.003		0.023		0.018
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.067***		−0.106***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.001		−0.017*		0.022***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.495***	0.445***	0.603***	0.588***	0.500***	0.444***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.416***	0.828***	10.291***	22.042***	9.774***	18.673***
	(0.053)	(0.166)	(0.937)	(2.316)	(0.673)	(1.265)
Observations	1,792	1,754	1,778	1,742	1,773	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,395.766	−3,299.019	−7,929.745	−7,752.371	−6,713.706	−6,547.354
σ^2	2.464	2.420	404.484	398.104	108.168	99.966
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,807.533	6,622.039	15,875.490	15,528.740	13,443.410	13,118.710
Wald Test (df = 1)	308.400***	235.876***	599.068***	561.612***	339.606***	264.282***
LR Test (df = 1)	307.725***	234.066***	434.097***	409.214***	295.238***	233.554***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A16 -Territorial Control 89-92

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contested Control	0.091	0.008	2.711*	2.083	3.298***	2.320***
	(0.111)	(0.113)	(1.422)	(1.449)	(0.755)	(0.734)
SL Control	0.413***	0.344***	4.327***	3.599***	3.204***	2.529***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(1.163)	(1.169)	(0.616)	(0.593)
State Killings	0.001	0.001	−0.078**	−0.077**	−0.006	−0.010
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.019)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.00003	−0.003	0.005	−0.0004	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.105	−0.224	−1.660	−2.666	0.076	−1.822
	(0.282)	(0.281)	(3.608)	(3.612)	(1.896)	(1.826)
(ln) Size		−0.154***		−1.588***		−0.692***
		(0.024)		(0.314)		(0.157)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.003		0.029		0.022*
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.070***		−0.112***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.0005		−0.016*		0.024***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.499***	0.451***	0.605***	0.588***	0.534***	0.473***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.363***	0.906***	10.647***	22.652***	9.920***	19.388***
	(0.051)	(0.163)	(0.933)	(2.296)	(0.689)	(1.276)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,385.195	−3,300.203	−7,890.999	−7,755.144	−6,716.065	−6,570.070
σ^2	2.480	2.420	404.681	398.816	111.760	101.982
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,786.390	6,624.406	15,798.000	15,534.290	13,448.130	13,164.140
Wald Test (df = 1)	313.373***	243.044***	604.775***	576.034***	397.813***	307.052***
LR Test (df = 1)	313.056***	241.828***	439.818***	419.884***	339.444***	268.300***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A17 -Territorial Control 92

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.103	0.009	2.880**	2.178	3.486***	2.421***
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(1.411)	(1.436)	(0.765)	(0.743)
SL Control	0.430***	0.359***	4.383***	3.560***	3.225***	2.499***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(1.163)	(1.168)	(0.629)	(0.605)
State Killings	0.003	0.002	−0.080**	−0.082**	−0.011	−0.014
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.020)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.00004	−0.005	0.004	0.0002	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.074	−0.269	−2.208	−3.727	−0.673	−3.331
	(0.336)	(0.335)	(4.286)	(4.283)	(2.300)	(2.211)
(ln) Size		−0.145***		−1.584***		−0.654***
		(0.025)		(0.316)		(0.161)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.004**		0.030		0.026**
		(0.002)		(0.025)		(0.013)
Urban 1993		−0.009***		−0.075***		−0.114***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.0004		−0.019**		0.023***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.498***	0.447***	0.607***	0.593***	0.520***	0.457***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.385***	0.888***	10.483***	22.825***	10.155***	19.548***
	(0.052)	(0.165)	(0.930)	(2.310)	(0.697)	(1.301)
Observations	1,698	1,669	1,684	1,657	1,679	1,665
Log Likelihood	−3,204.682	−3,120.053	−7,489.598	−7,351.746	−6,400.170	−6,255.725
σ^2	2.419	2.359	392.176	385.212	112.875	102.671
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,425.365	6,264.105	14,995.200	14,727.490	12,816.340	12,535.450
Wald Test (df = 1)	314.574***	239.634***	619.975***	589.397***	366.498***	281.098***
LR Test (df = 1)	306.876***	233.640***	444.188***	423.556***	313.329***	246.922***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A18 -Territorial Control 40

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contested Control	0.409***	0.325**	1.925	0.957	5.140***	3.959***
	(0.149)	(0.148)	(1.895)	(1.900)	(1.004)	(0.968)
SL Control	0.522***	0.487***	6.892***	6.101***	3.162***	2.310***
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(1.691)	(1.695)	(0.889)	(0.856)
State Killings	−0.0001	−0.001	−0.082**	−0.081**	−0.012	−0.015
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.020)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.0001	−0.004	0.004	0.0002	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.114	−0.220	−2.106	−3.073	−0.209	−2.025
	(0.282)	(0.281)	(3.601)	(3.602)	(1.896)	(1.824)
(ln) Size		−0.155***		−1.585***		−0.699***
		(0.024)		(0.314)		(0.157)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.003*		0.020		0.017
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.074***		−0.114***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.0005		−0.016*		0.024***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.503***	0.452***	0.608***	0.594***	0.538***	0.474***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.323***	0.932***	11.232***	23.444***	10.436***	20.007***
	(0.044)	(0.159)	(0.893)	(2.247)	(0.684)	(1.261)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,384.861	−3,299.255	−7,889.989	−7,753.654	−6,717.166	−6,570.669
σ^2	2.476	2.417	403.805	397.839	111.813	102.022
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,785.723	6,622.510	15,795.980	15,531.310	13,450.330	13,165.340
Wald Test (df = 1)	322.593***	247.235***	615.894***	584.108***	404.448***	310.415***
LR Test (df = 1)	322.310***	245.919***	445.518***	423.514***	345.410***	270.697***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A19 -Territorial Control 30

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.489***	0.404**	0.321	−0.611	4.828***	3.494***
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(2.161)	(2.169)	(1.141)	(1.102)
SL Control	0.331***	0.265***	4.573***	3.923***	2.364***	1.521***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(1.148)	(1.153)	(0.607)	(0.585)
State Killings	0.0001	−0.0003	−0.074*	−0.074*	−0.010	−0.013
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.020)
SL Killings	−0.001	0.0002	−0.003	0.005	0.001	0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.137	−0.235	−2.391	−3.303	−0.450	−2.181
	(0.282)	(0.281)	(3.604)	(3.604)	(1.900)	(1.827)
(ln) Size		−0.155***		−1.557***		−0.702***
		(0.024)		(0.314)		(0.158)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.003		0.024		0.019
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.008***		−0.073***		−0.114***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.001		−0.017*		0.023***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.499***	0.451***	0.608***	0.595***	0.539***	0.477***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.354***	0.905***	10.885***	22.926***	10.231***	19.874***
	(0.047)	(0.161)	(0.912)	(2.273)	(0.689)	(1.274)
Observations	1,783	1,754	1,769	1,742	1,764	1,750
Log Likelihood	−3,385.923	−3,301.450	−7,890.437	−7,754.019	−6,720.365	−6,574.208
σ^2	2.481	2.424	404.031	398.012	112.176	102.376
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,787.846	6,626.901	15,796.870	15,532.040	13,456.730	13,172.420
Wald Test (df = 1)	314.851***	243.286***	616.385***	584.067***	406.413***	313.606***
LR Test (df = 1)	314.119***	241.031***	444.269***	422.445***	345.803***	272.580***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Other Controls

In Tables A20-A22 below, I include eight different control variables as robustness in order to see whether the main results of the paper remain similar after the inclusion of these measures. Concretely, I control by the percentage of population speaking Spanish; youth bulge; budget capacity; level of political competition; presence of Ronda Campesinas and other social movements; and mountainous terrain. Results present scarce changes.

Table A20 - Robustness Controls State

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	0.322**	0.359**	0.302**	0.329**	0.326**	0.353**	0.362**
	(0.155)	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.138)	(0.154)	(0.154)
SL Control	0.468***	0.447***	0.409***	0.410***	0.401***	0.446***	0.409**
	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.166)	(0.166)
State Killings	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0002	−0.002	0.002	0.005	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
SL Killings	0.0002	0.0004	0.00001	0.001	−0.0001	−0.0003	−0.00000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Alto Huallaga	−0.082	−0.003	−0.264	−0.259	0.037	−0.011	0.030
	(0.291)	(0.292)	(0.304)	(0.336)	(0.288)	(0.323)	(0.322)
(ln) Size	−0.174***	−0.161***	−0.160***	−0.189***	−0.167***	−0.179***	−0.166***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Distance Prov. Capital	−0.003	−0.002	−0.006***	−0.004*	−0.003	−0.005**	−0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Urban 1993	−0.008***	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.009***	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population Growth	−0.001	−0.0003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.0004	−0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Spanish	−0.003**						
	(0.001)						
Youth		−0.043***					
		(0.012)					
Budget Availability			0.0003**				
			(0.0001)				
Political Competition				0.014**			
				(0.006)			
Rondas Campesinas					−0.089		
					(0.199)		
Social Movements						−0.075	
						(0.061)	
Slope							0.040***
							(0.011)
ρ	0.419***	0.415***	0.389***	0.358***	0.518***	0.429***	0.416***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Constant	1.146***	1.474***	0.997***	1.108***	0.991***	1.103***	0.739***
	(0.170)	(0.206)	(0.173)	(0.218)	(0.156)	(0.170)	(0.199)
Observations	1,646	1,646	1,544	1,379	1,529	1,535	1,535
Log Likelihood	−3,094.339	−3,091.128	−2,866.303	−2,609.085	−2,710.718	−2,878.787	−2,873.421
σ^2	2.424	2.417	2.323	2.495	1.911	2.395	2.384
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,214.677	6,208.256	5,758.606	5,244.169	5,447.437	5,783.575	5,772.843
Wald Test (df = 1)	193.026***	189.829***	154.451***	129.572***	348.522***	201.003***	184.149***
LR Test (df = 1)	197.091***	193.485***	161.393***	129.839***	308.588***	205.025***	189.324***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A21 - Robustness Controls Electricity

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	0.557	0.524	1.809	1.394	2.005	2.014	2.094
	(2.009)	(1.949)	(1.914)	(2.104)	(2.010)	(2.009)	(2.008)
SL Control	9.615***	8.207***	5.277***	5.683***	10.496***	10.433***	10.025***
	(2.122)	(2.099)	(1.793)	(1.908)	(2.184)	(2.180)	(2.185)
State Killings	−0.095**	−0.094**	−0.075*	−0.085**	−0.134**	−0.155**	−0.155**
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.066)
SL Killings	0.006	0.010	0.002	0.004	0.011	0.013	0.014
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Alto Huallaga	−3.046	−0.667	−4.998	−5.066	−4.633	−4.634	−4.570
	(3.765)	(3.751)	(3.940)	(4.365)	(4.217)	(4.221)	(4.214)
(ln) Size	−1.620***	−1.262***	−1.407***	−1.353***	−2.088***	−2.014***	−1.854***
	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.334)	(0.487)	(0.346)	(0.343)	(0.347)
Distance Prov. Capital	0.022	0.035	0.022	0.026	0.037	0.038	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Urban 1993	−0.072***	−0.047***	−0.068***	−0.065***	−0.073***	−0.070***	−0.060***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Population Growth	−0.018*	−0.008	−0.014	−0.021**	−0.023**	−0.023**	−0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Spanish	−0.028**						
	(0.014)						
Youth		−1.091***					
		(0.162)					
Budget Availability			0.008***				
			(0.002)				
Political Competition				0.173**			
				(0.080)			
Rondas Campesinas					−3.815		
					(2.918)		
Social Movements						0.244	
						(0.797)	
Slope							0.392***
							(0.149)
ρ	0.555***	0.524***	0.587***	0.552***	0.557***	0.559***	0.548***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Constant	26.412***	37.245***	19.838***	21.428***	27.679***	26.672***	23.430***
	(2.446)	(2.983)	(2.409)	(2.976)	(2.503)	(2.444)	(2.742)
Observations	1,635	1,635	1,532	1,369	1,519	1,525	1,525
Log Likelihood	−7,285.313	−7,264.869	−6,806.896	−6,134.569	−6,775.423	−6,802.442	−6,799.060
σ^2	405.449	398.790	390.503	420.364	408.059	407.704	407.371
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,596.630	14,555.740	13,639.790	12,295.140	13,576.840	13,630.880	13,624.120
Wald Test (df = 1)	451.127***	384.525***	534.143***	454.386***	443.984***	455.603***	421.509***
LR Test (df = 1)	340.162***	297.757***	379.859***	335.150***	326.242***	333.249***	308.962***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A22 - Robustness Controls Secondary

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)
Contested Control	3.115***	4.141***	4.113***	4.215***	4.651***	4.647***	4.675***
	(1.013)	(0.998)	(0.978)	(1.074)	(1.030)	(1.030)	(1.030)
SL Control	3.298***	3.735***	2.691***	2.910***	3.641***	3.668***	3.583***
	(1.059)	(1.063)	(0.909)	(0.966)	(1.106)	(1.104)	(1.107)
State Killings	−0.025	−0.018	−0.015	−0.014	−0.008	−0.005	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
SL Killings	0.006	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Alto Huallaga	−1.663	−1.464	−3.462*	−3.661*	−2.433	−2.511	−2.415
	(1.890)	(1.909)	(2.000)	(2.215)	(2.146)	(2.148)	(2.146)
(ln) Size	−0.651***	−0.579***	−0.833***	−0.359	−0.824***	−0.790***	−0.754***
	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.246)	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Distance Prov. Capital	0.019	0.019	0.027**	0.009	0.032**	0.030**	0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Urban 1993	−0.103***	−0.107***	−0.118***	−0.112***	−0.109***	−0.111***	−0.108***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Population Growth	0.023***	0.027***	0.026***	0.024***	0.021***	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Spanish	−0.048***						
	(0.007)						
Youth		−0.326***					
		(0.081)					
Budget Availability			0.0002				
			(0.001)				
Political Competition				−0.032			
				(0.040)			
Rondas Campesinas					−0.159		
					(1.481)		
Social Movements						−0.178	
						(0.407)	
Slope							0.094
							(0.076)
ρ	0.396***	0.431***	0.461***	0.416***	0.450***	0.449***	0.446***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Constant	24.060***	24.501***	20.854***	19.818***	20.923***	20.824***	20.030***
	(1.424)	(1.623)	(1.364)	(1.620)	(1.384)	(1.361)	(1.499)
Observations	1,641	1,641	1,540	1,375	1,525	1,531	1,531
Log Likelihood	−6,152.113	−6,165.562	−5,772.671	−5,202.132	−5,752.381	−5,774.538	−5,773.869
σ^2	102.285	103.295	100.735	108.296	105.858	105.791	105.789
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12,330.230	12,357.120	11,571.340	10,430.260	11,530.760	11,575.080	11,573.740
Wald Test (df = 1)	183.273***	233.524***	275.416***	215.182***	249.890***	251.714***	243.843***
LR Test (df = 1)	166.054***	207.385***	242.261***	195.532***	219.442***	220.765***	214.100***

Note: Reference category: state control.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Ceiling Effects

In order to trace the potential existence of ceiling effects, I display the distribution of state bureaucrats by territorial control right upon conflict termination (1993) in Figure A3 below. Moreover, I test the robustness of the results when dropping the 5% of state controlled areas with the highest number of state bureaucrats in Table A23.




Figure A3 - Distribution of State Bureaucrats by Type of Territory.

Table A23 - Ceiling Effects

	State Bureaucrats		*Electricity*		*Secondary School*	
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
Contested Control	0.238**	0.201*	1.387	0.724	5.066***	3.742***
	(0.120)	(0.104)	(1.895)	(1.904)	(0.988)	(0.955)
SL Control	0.351***	0.320***	7.112***	6.368***	3.445***	2.795***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(1.753)	(1.753)	(0.907)	(0.872)
State Killings	0.002	0.002	−0.078**	−0.079**	−0.014	−0.017
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.019)
SL Killings	−0.001	−0.0001	−0.003	0.006	0.001	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alto Huallaga	−0.116	−0.179	−1.906	−2.864	−0.022	−1.858
	(0.228)	(0.227)	(3.613)	(3.613)	(1.872)	(1.801)
(ln) Size		−0.142***		−1.663***		−0.721***
		(0.020)		(0.318)		(0.157)
Distance Prov. Capital		−0.001		0.018		0.015
		(0.002)		(0.024)		(0.012)
Urban 1993		−0.006***		−0.073***		−0.113***
		(0.001)		(0.017)		(0.009)
Population Growth		−0.0004		−0.015		0.023***
		(0.001)		(0.009)		(0.005)
ρ	0.543***	0.432***	0.561***	0.516***	0.454***	0.428***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.022)
Constant	−0.198***	0.831***	11.641***	24.277***	10.335***	19.880***
	(0.035)	(0.130)	(0.908)	(2.278)	(0.681)	(1.257)
Observations	1,751	1,724	1,737	1,712	1,733	1,720
Log Likelihood	−2,983.824	−2,906.382	−7,750.809	−7,622.687	−6,579.547	−6,439.295
σ^2	1.622	1.582	406.349	400.008	109.049	99.518
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,983.649	5,836.764	15,517.620	15,269.370	13,175.090	12,902.590
Wald Test (df = 1)	662.243***	550.761***	573.673***	541.229***	418.157***	329.869***
LR Test (df = 1)	546.350***	454.919***	421.398***	398.420***	355.228***	285.228***

Note: Reference category: state control. Standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

H. Qualitative Data Collection

Qualitative data collection for this project took place between July-October 2020. Due to the existent COVID-19 travelling restrictions, interviews were held online. These interviews have the correspondent research ethics approval from the institutional review board (IRB) of my institution. The set of qualitative evidence corresponds to five semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were selected based on their in-depth knowledge of the processes under study in the manuscript. The list of interviewees includes: one former combatant of Sendero Luminoso, three state representatives and the director of one of the key development programs in the country. All the participants required to preserve their anonymity.

Part III

Conclusion & Implications

Come away, O human child!
To the waters and the wild
With a faery, hand in hand,
For the world's more full of weeping than you can understand.

— William Butler Yeats

There is no definitive defeat nor definitive triumph.

— José Újica

6 Conclusion and Implications

Contents

6.1 Summary of Findings 296
6.2 New Directions for Future Research 299
6.2.1 Dynamic View of Conflict 299
6.2.2 Data on Organized Violence 301
6.2.3 Novel Actors 303
6.2.4 Links Between Contentious Processes 304
6.2.5 Scope Conditions 304
6.2.6 Holistic Perspective on the Legacies of War 306
6.3 Policy Implications 307
6.3.1 Demobilization Effectiveness 307
6.3.2 Building Strong Local Institutions 308
6.3.3 Violence, Polarization and Institutional Stability 309
6.4 Conclusion 310

This thesis has traced the political consequences of a variety of civil war dynamics at distinct temporal periods. Moreover, it has also aimed to set the building blocks for the development of a novel analytical approach that characterizes conflicts as processes with several stages. For doing this, this dissertation presents three articles. In the first one, I have relied on a macro-level cross-national analysis on the impact of insurgent strength on the prospects for coup attempts in the midst of civil war. In the second, through a focus on the conflict termination period and from a micro-level perspective, I have delved into the determinants of preferences over peace in

the 2016 Colombian Referendum, aiming to disentangle the divergent impact of exposure to violence during wartime on the basis of the identity of the perpetrator. And finally, focusing on a meso-level perspective, I have studied the impact of the spatial distribution of wartime territorial control and rebel governance on the provision of state capacity measures in the aftermath of war, using the Peruvian civil war (1980-1992) as my main case of analysis. While these studies only provide a partial understanding of the variety of ways in which a processual approach to conflict could facilitate a more holistic understanding of civil wars, they nonetheless aim to provide important contributions to the analysis of the effects of political violence, and more concretely, of irregular civil wars. What are the scholarly and policy implications of these articles? Which avenues for further research do these studies provide? How could policymakers take advantage of their findings?

This final chapter is divided in three different parts. First, I provide a brief summary of the main findings of this dissertation. Second, I describe how future research could advance the conclusions reached in each of these articles. And finally, I trace the policy implications of these studies, with a focus on the dynamics of demobilization, institution building and violence prevention.

6.1 Summary of Findings

Each of the three papers included in this thesis contribute to our understanding of the political effects of civil war at distinct conflict stages. The regional focus on the Latin American continent facilitates the analysis of the effects of a concrete type of conflicts, irregular wars, which became the most usual type of civil war since the end of World War II (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Which are the main findings of these three papers?

I began this dissertation relying on a cross-national analysis of the impact of insurgent strength on coup attempts in the midst of internal armed conflicts. Concretely, through the development of a novel dataset on the evolution, characteristics

and dynamics of 80 insurgent groups in Latin America, I traced the impact of insurgent strength and levels of elite unity on the propensity for coup attempts. In this study, I show that, under situations of mid-level of insurgent strength in scenarios of overt intra-elite competition, the military and other social forces forge alternative regime coalitions that facilitate the overthrow of current power structures. The window of opportunity opened by the presence of a viable armed challenge, with enough strength as to become a serious competitor but with not sufficient force as to become a pivotal political and military actor, facilitates the coordination across societal forces that sees this context of violent unrest as a way of promoting a social, political and economic project that maximizes their interests. This paper provides mainly three contributions. First, from a theoretical perspective, it shows the necessity of bringing together analysis of contentious processes that, currently, remain studied in isolation. Second, it urges conflict scholars to trace the endogenous consequences of civil war dynamics in the course of the conflict. And thirdly, it develops a novel cross-national dataset on Latin American insurgencies providing rich micro-level data on the dynamics, characteristics and life-cycles of rebel groups created in this region since the 1955.

The second paper of this thesis relies on a subnational analysis of the factors explaining the outcome of one of the most relevant peace processes of the last two decades, that between the FARC and the Colombian government led by Juan Manuel Santos. Through a focus on the conflict termination stage, and using fine-grained data on a variety of conflict dynamics, together with Juan Masullo (Leiden University) we show that exposure to wartime violence had a direct impact on preferences over peace. Unlike prior research, we argue that overall exposure to conflict violent events is not sufficient to understand individual attitudes towards peace in the aftermath of conflict. We employ a more nuanced approach that traces the divergent impact of the violence engaged by distinct non-state armed groups. Concretely, we show that those areas affected by FARC violence were more prone to support the peace agreement, while those exposed to paramilitary violence were

more prone to vote against it. This divergence is mainly explained by expected processes of retaliatory violence: civilians living in areas where paramilitary groups remain operative are afraid of being targeted for their support towards the peace agreement. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a more nuanced understanding of the potential impact of distinct armed groups. Moreover, we show how preferences over peace are directly shaped by wartime experiences, linking distinct phases of the conflict process together. Future research should trace the effects of distinct armed groups on subsequent individual attitudes, as the ideology, dynamics and characteristics of these groups seem to shape individual preferences both at the conflict termination period, but also, in the aftermath of war.

The third and final article digs into the linkages between wartime dynamics and state-making decisions in the aftermath of conflict. Relying on a meso-level approach, this paper focuses on the impact of the distribution of territorial control and rebel governance on levels of local state capacity in the aftermath of conflict. Using the Peruvian civil war as its main case of study, and with a particular emphasis on the dynamics of the main insurgent group operating in the country, Sendero Luminoso, it shows how post-conflict subnational investments in state capacity remain influenced by the geographic distribution of insurgent activity during the civil war period. The state, in an attempt to avoid the resurgence of insurgent groups, targets those areas under the influence of Sendero Luminoso. Concretely, in those municipalities that remained under full insurgent control during the conflict, the state will aim to offset the potential ties between civilian and the rebels through the deployment of state bureaucrats and the distribution of public goods and services. However, in areas that remained contested during the war, the state will just focus on the deployment of state bureaucrats, as no rebel governance institutions were developed in these areas, so the level of potential ties between civilians and insurgents are expected to be weaker than in areas that remained under full insurgent control. The main contribution of this paper is to challenge the existent evidence on the role between state capacity and civil war, showing how

certain dynamics of internal armed conflicts could facilitate the expansion of the state to areas affected by the war in the aftermath of conflict. Moreover, it also advances a more thorough understanding of the mechanisms linking the different temporal phases of conflict, showing the inherent connections between wartime territorial control and state-making decisions even 15 years after the end of the war.

6.2 New Directions for Future Research

One of the core advantages of this thesis is the set of further avenues of research that its findings open. While this dissertation has left unaddressed crucial questions, such as the factors explaining transition across conflict stages; the inter-relation of civil wars with other processes beyond coups; the role of international organizations; or the generalizability of its main analytical framework towards ethnic conflicts, it nevertheless pushes political violence scholars to work on these issues in future research. Six further avenues of scholarly interest are described in this subsection: (1) a focus on a dynamic perspective of conflict; (2) the creation of novel datasets on insurgent trajectories; (3) a more thorough understanding of the set of actors taking part in conflict processes; (4) the development of an integrated agenda on political violence; (5) the testing of these findings beyond the scope conditions inherent in each of the analysis included in this thesis; and (6) the development of a comprehensive approach to the study of the legacies of war.

6.2.1 Dynamic View of Conflict

One of the core avenues for further research prompted by the findings of this dissertation is related to the reliance on a novel understanding of civil wars as inherently complex, fluid and dynamic processes (Sambanis 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Tarrow 2007). Future research should build on the basic analytical framework developed in this thesis in order to engage in the systematic study of the trajectories of civil wars from the pre-war to the post-conflict phases. This should be facilitated by the analysis of two factors. Firstly, through a focus on the politics of civil war as a fundamental explanation for the evolution of internal armed conflicts. Future

research should pay close scrutiny to historical evidence from various case-studies that portrays that civil wars evolve in patterned ways, showing the systematic recurrence of a set of political factors that facilitate rebel groups to transition across each of the conflict stages. Shifting away from overly deterministic and uni-causal accounts of civil wars, future studies should aim to overtly recognize and directly tackle the complex and endogenous nature of internal armed conflicts, showing how several factors play distinct roles at different stages of the conflict. While the use of this approach misses the attractiveness and elegance of parsimonious arguments, the goal should be to capture in a more accurate way the deeply complex nature of highly disruptive processes such as civil wars. And secondly, further research should also work on the development of accurate specifications of the temporal and contextual conditions under which the wide range of micro-level dynamics of war apply. Despite these dynamics are analytically conceptualized as static features inherent to certain types of insurgent organizations, empirical evidence from historical case-studies shows that these are dynamic features that evolve over time and whose applicability is contingent upon the presence of concrete contextual effects. Therefore, an analytical focus on wars as processes with different stages would uncover the wide set of empirical regularities that can be found at different phases of the conflict, providing an adequate temporal and contextual framework for the understanding of the unique characteristics and features of a wide set of micro-dynamics of war and their connection with wider macro-level processes.

This sequential approach would also facilitate the analysis of the relational and interactive nature of conflict across different phases. Insurgents, incumbents and civilians, together with a broad set of actors (including foreign governments, political parties, NGOs, religious associations or IIOOs, among many others) build connections, bargain and reveal information in a strategic manner throughout the different stages of conflict (Fearon 1995). In contexts characterized by acute informational asymmetries and profound commitment problems (Walter 2009), the use of a longitudinal approach to civil war facilitates the analysis of the set of

connections and relations between actors, which are characterized by its fluid nature and that are highly contingent to the evolution of several war dynamics. Each of these phases will delve a concrete type of interaction between the key actors during wartime and subsequent alliances and clashes will be based on the set of prior interactions between actors at each of the stages. As clearly summarized by McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001: 30): "We see such episodes not as linear sequences of contention in which the same actors go through repeated motions, but as iteratives sites of interaction in which different streams of mobilization and demobilization intersect, identities form and evolve, and new forms of action are invented, honed and rejected as actors interact with one another and with opponents and third parties." The reliance on this interactive and dynamic approach would facilitate the understanding of the wide set of constantly evolving interdependencies characterizing conflict processes.

6.2.2 Data on Organized Violence

A second area for further research relates to the development of accurate micro-level datasets on the dynamics and trajectories of insurgent groups during internal armed conflicts. The most relevant cross-national datasets available for conflict researchers are the ones developed by the Correlates of War project (COW), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Pettersson & Öberg 2020), Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2006). Almost 80% of quantitative civil war research relies on any of these datasets (Lewis 2020:5-6). However, these cross-national datasets suffer from important limitations. First, selection bias. As thoroughly shown by Lewis (2020), most of these datasets use arbitrary battle-deaths thresholds for the selection of cases, ranging between the 25 of UCDP to the 1000 of COW. This creates fundamental problems as the use of these high thresholds censors the existence of many groups that may not have reached that level of lethality, but that may have played an important role in the shaping of a variety of political and conflict processes. Second, these datasets lack any specification of the internal characteristics and organizational features of insurgent groups, being most of them focused on

macro-level correlates of war, such as civil war onset, duration or termination. And finally, most of these datasets do not trace the evolution of internal dynamics and characteristics of rebel organizations over time. This is highly problematic given the wide empirical evidence on a variety of case-studies of insurgencies around the world showing the dynamic nature of civil wars, as both states and rebels adapt their tactics, ideologies, methods of recruitment, or patterns of governance according to the evolution of the conflict.

In this dissertation I have made use of a novel dataset on the characteristics of Latin American insurgencies created during the Cold War period, covering a sample of 80 armed groups, a considerable number compared to the set of groups included in existent databases (see Table 1.1). This dataset contributes to a better understanding of the life-trajectories of insurgent groups correcting some of the problems of cross-national civil war databases. First, it covers the actions of groups regardless of the set of battle-deaths incurred during its period of existence. Its main condition for the inclusion of a rebel group in the dataset deals with the fundamental problem of selection bias through an inclusion condition based on the number of violent actions. Concretely, any group which have committed *at least 5 armed actions* during its period of existence is included in this dataset. This facilitates the coverage of groups that never made it into high levels of strength, while at the same time it excludes those that never became a viable insurgent organization. A second contribution of this dataset is the focus on the internal characteristics of insurgent groups, covering the existence of political wings, rebel governance institutions, rebel propaganda, number of combatants, military strength, among many others. Despite only recently a few datasets have focused on the systematic comparison of rebel group characteristics (e.g. the Non-State Actor Dataset), most of the existent cross-national analyses of civil war rely on datasets that are particularly focused on the timing of civil war onset, number of battle-deaths and conflict termination. Finally, this dataset provides one of the first longitudinal analyses on the evolution of the characteristics and trajectories of

insurgent groups from a comparative perspective. This will facilitate researchers to systematically test and compare some of the core findings of the micro-level literature on the dynamics of civil war from a macro and meso-level perspective.

6.2.3 Novel Actors

One of the other core contributions of this dissertation relates to the reliance on an ontological perspective that aims to unpack the divergent effects of distinct actors that for most of the existent civil war literature are studied from a unitary perspective. Regarding non-state armed groups, the majority of analysis trace the effects of exposure to wartime violence on a variety of post-conflict individual political attitudes and preferences. A key shortcoming of this type of studies is that they neglect the potential divergent effect of distinct actors engaging in violent activities, as the actions by insurgent groups, paramilitaries or state forces could shape in different ways the attitudes of individuals in the conflict termination and postconflict period. While a recent strand of research has begun to unpack these potential divergent effects during conflict and in the aftermath of war (Staniland 2014; Tamm 2016; Lupu & Wallace 2019), much more remains to be done in this area of research if we aim to systematically trace the divergent consequences of armed conflict on the basis of the identity of the perpetrator of wartime violence.

More importantly, this dissertation traces as well the dynamic nature of regime coalitions, proving against the implicit assumption in the civil war literature about the cohesive nature of state institutions. Concretely, I rely on the expanding work on competition between elites (Ansell & Samuels 2014; Albertus 2015) in order to show that processes of political violence lead to the activation of elite collective action, as they open the opportunity structure for profound changes at the regime level. Future research should take advantage of the ample literature on intra-elite competition in order to provide a more nuanced understanding on the effects of political violence, and more concretely, of a variety of civil war dynamics, in the shaping of macro-level political processes such as coup d'etat and other processes of regime change.

6.2.4 Links Between Contentious Processes

A fourth avenue for further research relates to the necessity of bringing together scholarly analysis that are currently developed in isolation. One of the key limitations of the burgeoning literature on political violence is its narrowness in the analytical clarity of its studies: "contentious politics had become a thriving but fragmented interdisciplinary field of study, with expertise divided across a confusing patchwork of disciplinary boundaries, geographic areas, historical eras, and nominally different types of contention" (McAdam et al. 2009:260). The divergent branches of political violence analyses are over-compartmentalized on the basis of hard analytical boundaries that do tend to fall apart once historical evidence is portrayed against them. Indeed, plenty of evidence from a variety of cases show the systematic inter-relation between contentious protests and civil war onset (Cederman et al. 2013); between civil war and state repression (Blaydes 2018); or between coups and internal armed conflict (Bell & Sudduth 2017). Future studies should aim to provide an integrative perspective on these processes, specially given the lack of systematic analysis and the fundamental policy implications that might derive from them. Ending up with the current fragmentation of political violence studies would enrich the development of this research agenda in ways that, up to date, have not been adequately explored.

6.2.5 Scope Conditions

As most of the analysis in the social sciences, each of the findings of the papers included in this dissertation are applicable under a concrete set of restrictive scope conditions. Future studies could test the robustness of the results presented in this dissertation in distinct geographic and temporal contexts. Fundamentally, the three articles cover the effects of civil war in Latin America for revolutionary insurgencies engaging in irregular wars created during the Cold War period.

Regarding the type of armed groups, various studies have already delved into the distinct features of a range of insurgent groups, differentiating across revolutionary

insurgencies, insurgencies with ethnic and secessionist claims, as well as religious armed groups. While the boundaries between each of these categories is blurry and they might mix and lead to consistent patterns of action and conflict dynamics (Balcells & Kalyvas 2015), the set of studies presented in this dissertation only cover the dynamics of revolutionary insurgencies. In other words, it only covers the action of armed groups whose main goal is the overthrow of state structures and the implementation of a socialist regime through the engagement in armed actions. Future studies should test whether the alleged linkages between coups d'etat, intra-elite competition and insurgent strength are applicable in cases of religious or ethnic and secessionist insurgencies. A second element that deserves further inquiry is the exclusive focus on the use of a concrete type of warfare, irregular war, characterized by the military asymmetry between rebels and the state (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Despite insurgent groups reaching a situation of dual sovereignty with the state (Stage 3) tend to shift to a strategy of conventional warfare, future studies should trace whether the findings of this dissertation hold in wars characterized by the symmetry of power between rebels and insurgents at a high level (conventional wars) and at a low level (symmetric non conventional wars).

Third, these analyses have been geographically focused to the Latin American continent. While this restriction has allowed me to test in a more rigorous and comparative way the political effects of civil war in a concrete region, it is still doubtful whether the findings would be applicable in areas with distinct historical trajectories and cultures, or where the role of ethnicity and religion is more relevant than in Latin America. And lastly, I have covered a concrete historical period whose dynamics might not be extrapolable to insurgencies created in distinct temporal frames. Concretely, I have just focused on the effects of civil war produced by insurgencies created during the Cold War period (1955-1991). It remains to be tested whether the findings would hold for insurgencies created in the 21st century, which have been particularly related to the rise of Islamism as a coherent ideology for violent mobilization (Walter 2017).

6.2.6 Holistic Perspective on the Legacies of War

Finally, the burgeoning literature on the legacies of political violence presents a fundamental caveat. Despite plenty of studies have been made on this area of research during the last years (Walden & Zhukov 2020), there is an important focus on the micro-level legacies of conflict. Most of these works tend to search for the political consequences of internal armed conflicts with a particular interest on a very concrete dynamic of war, exposure to wartime violence, on a single type of outcome, individual political participation or identity polarization (Balcells 2012; Bellows & Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Villamil 2020). While it is fundamental to keep delving into the determinants of these factors with more sophisticated analysis, much more studies should be done on the meso and macro-level legacies of civil war. The disruptive effects of internal armed conflicts reshape not only individual attitudes and preferences, but also produce important changes at the local and macro level. Regarding the effects at the local level, the ample literature on rebel governance has barely touched upon the potential consequences of these practices. The implementation of novel institutional structures, the arrival of new political authorities or the mobilization of civilians at the local level produce important changes in patterns of behavior and social networks at the community level that potentially have enduring effects after the end of the conflict (Wood 2008). Similarly, further research should delve into the most under-studied level of analysis on the legacies of civil war: the macro-level. While most of the existent research has focused on patterns of war recurrence (Licklider 1995; Mukherjee 2006; Toft 2010), few studies have traced the fundamental impact of internal conflict dynamics on subsequent institutional arrangements, macro-economic shifts or patterns of regime change.

The development of systematic analyses at these distinct levels will facilitate a more thorough understanding of the legacies of war from a holistic perspective. Further research should embark on this task in order to reduce the prospects of conflict resumption after the end of civil wars.

6.3 Policy Implications

However, this dissertation not only aims to facilitate advancements in the inquiry of academic studies. The findings developed in this thesis might be useful for policymakers acting in conflict affected areas, specially if they want to comprehensively understand the effects of conflict dynamics at distinct conflict stages. Concretely, three key policy implications could be derived from this thesis: (1) it urges policymakers and public institutions to invest in the development of effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs; (2) it advices policymakers, public institutions and international organizations to advance in the development of strong state institutions at the local level as an effective way for conflict prevention; and (3) it gives suggestive evidence on how to understand processes of political polarization for the prevention of conflict and the decay of democratic institutions.

6.3.1 Demobilization Effectiveness

One of the key challenges facing states in the midst of multiparty civil wars, and in the aftermath of conflict, is the effective demobilization of the members of organizations taking part in the armed struggle. Plenty of evidence shows that the demobilisation of non-state armed groups is marked by immense difficulties, both at the individual and at the local level. The reintegration of former combatants has been shown to be characterized by important risks of combatant re-militarization (Themner 2015; Daly 2016) or by the transition towards criminal activities (Daly, Paler & Samii 2020). Moreover, the demobilisation of non-state armed groups is linked to increasing levels of violence at the local level, given the disappearance of informal local orders of protection as well as of distinct sources of security and authority (Nussio & Howe 2016; Martin 2020; Voyvodic 2021). In other words, despite the demobilization of violent organizations is seen as a great step forward towards the achievement of peace, DDR programs require an effective process of compliance and monitorization in order to ensure the adequate transition of former combatants into civilian life and the development of a sufficiently strong order at the local level.

This problem has been one of the core features underlying the article on the determinants of preferences over peace in the 2016 Colombian Referendum. As described in this paper, the effects of exposure to violence on the support for the peace agreement were contingent on the identity of the perpetrator, being the potential for retaliatory violence the main mechanism explaining this divergence. Despite the formal process of demobilization of Colombian paramilitary groups in the early 2000s, a considerable proportion of the members of these organizations remained active in several communities, leading to the creation of the so-called BACRIM (*bandas criminales*) organizations (Granada, Restrepo & Tobán García 2009), whose main goal was the engagement in criminal and drug activities for the maximization of profit. The maintenance of prior structures of authority facilitated the potential monitoring of the actions of individuals at the local level during the referendum, producing that the threat of retaliatory violence shaped the prospects of support towards the 2016 Peace Agreement. Policymakers should take advantage of this finding with the goal of ensuring the effective demobilization of non-state armed organizations that could undermine the development of democratic institutions at the local, regional and national level. Voters did not have the capacity to express their inherent preferences due to the continuous threat of violence posed by formally demobilized armed groups that remain capturing institutions and political power at the local level.

6.3.2 Building Strong Local Institutions

In direct connection with the prospects for effective demobilization, the necessity of building strong institutional structures in war-affected areas becomes a fundamental task in the development of durable peace in the aftermath of conflict. Indeed, most of the literature on civil war studies portray the paramount importance of state expansion throughout the national territory for avoiding the creation of violent organizations, particularly in peripheral areas, given that "financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible

and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices" (Fearon & Laitin 2003:75-76).

The dynamics and decisions of the Peruvian state in the aftermath of the civil war against the Maoist insurgency of Sendero Luminoso reflect the importance of engaging in consistent institutional building at the local level, specially in areas exposed to rebel influence in the midst of internal armed conflict. Given the changes at the local order prompted by insurgent actions, which are most likely the result of a combination of exposure to violence and novel institutional structures provided by the development of rebel governance, states should seek to expand its institutional reach throughout the entire national territory in order to ensure the prospects of a sustainable peace through the avoidance of combatant re-militarization and the onset (or re-emergence) of insurgent organizations. Policymakers can take advantage of these findings as a paradigmatic example of the strategies, decisions and outcomes expected in post-conflict scenarios, specially after the demise of highly violent organizations such as Sendero Luminoso.

6.3.3 Violence, Polarization and Institutional Stability

A final policy implication relates to the prevention of processes of social and political polarization endogenously promoted by the violent dynamics engaged by insurgent organizations and state forces in the midst of civil war. Despite plenty of research traces the impact of polarization on the onset of internal armed conflict (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005; Esteban & Schneider 2008), there are scant analyses on the endogenous polarizing effects of wartime dynamics once civil war has already erupted. In my cross-national paper on the relation between intra-elite competition, insurgent strength and coups d'etat, I show that in situations of deep elite disunity, mid-levels of insurgent strength promote the formation of alternative regime coalitions that are subsequently crystallized in coups d'etat that bring profound changes from a social, political and economic perspective. These findings inform policymakers and international organizations about the necessity of preventing processes of conflict

escalation and about the impact of continuous spirals of violence in the shaping of the institutional structure of the state. The quest for institutional stability and the promotion of democratic principles seem to be disrupted by the actions of insurgent organizations and the responses from increasingly violent state forces. Preventing the polarization of elites and the convergence of interests across democratic groups is one of the key challenges for political actors in the midst of armed conflict.

6.4 Conclusion

This dissertation has been an initial attempt to understand the variety of political consequences that internal armed conflicts produce at distinct levels of analysis levels and at different phases of the conflict. In the first paper, I have delved into the macro-level effects of civil war during wartime through a focus on the inherent inter-relation between internal armed conflicts and coups d'etat, describing how certain elites could take advantage of scenarios of violent conflict in order to promote the development of social, political and economic projects that maximize their interests. After this, I have focused on a concrete type of micro-level effect during the conflict termination period, showing how distinct experiences of violence and the risk of ineffective combatant demobilization hinders the possibilities of effective transitions to peace. And finally, focusing in the aftermath conflict from a meso-level perspective, I have argued that civil wars could paradoxically be an effective way of promoting state expansion to those areas mostly affected by wartime dynamics, and which might have lacked access to state institutions for decades. While these studies only touch upon the surface of the massively complex dynamics of civil war processes and deeply fragile post-conflict scenarios, they aim to provide important contributions to an area of research that would benefit from the reliance on this novel understanding of civil wars as highly fluid, complex and dynamic processes.

Since 1945, civil wars have become one of the most usual types of political violence. Indeed, in the last 75 years, more than one-third of the countries suffered episodes of internal armed conflict, with an important decline in the number of

active civil wars after the end of the Cold War (Pinker 2011; Gleditsch 2019). However, the expansion of Islamist insurgencies; the ethnic tensions in countries such as South Sudan; the intractability of conflicts in the Middle East; the re-emergence of civil war in the Horn of Africa; as well as the survival of long-standing Marxist insurgencies, remark the fundamental importance that civil wars attain in the 21st century. In parallel to this, the rapid development of democratic backsliding taking place in Western countries, coupled with exclusionary policies and processes of political polarization, threaten the stability of societies which might be inadvertedly creating the conditions for the onset of internal armed conflicts. Learning from the past, and taking into account the particularities and history of each experience, would facilitate our understanding of the perils and solutions to increasingly complex processes of political violence. The accomplishment of a better world rests upon this type of endeavor.

7
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