



**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES**

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**Torfinn Harding and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik**

Number 526  
January 2011

Manor Road Building, Oxford OX1 3UQ

# FDI and Export Upgrading

Torfinn Harding\* and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik\*\*

## Abstract

The debate on trade and growth increasingly focuses on the composition of exports. Exports of more “sophisticated” products appear to be positively correlated with growth, and upgrading the quality of exports is high on the policy agenda of many countries. This study presents evidence suggesting that attracting inflows of FDI offers potential for raising the quality of exports in developing countries. Our empirical analysis relates unit values of exports measured at the 4-digit SITC level to data on sectors treated by investment promotion agencies as priority in their efforts to attract FDI. The sample covers 105 countries over the period 1984-2000. The findings are consistent with a positive effect of FDI on unit values of exports in developing countries. The evidence for high income economies is ambiguous. When we examine the link between FDI and the overlap between the export structure of developing and high income economies (“export sophistication”), we find no evidence of FDI increasing the similarity of export structure between the two groups.

Keywords: export quality, unit values, FDI, investment promotion, industrial policy  
JEL codes: F10, L52, F21, F23

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\* University of Oxford, Department of Economics, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK. Email: [torfinn.harding@economics.ox.ac.uk](mailto:torfinn.harding@economics.ox.ac.uk).

\*\* University of Oxford and CEPR, Department of Economics, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK. Email: [beata.javorcik@economics.ox.ac.uk](mailto:beata.javorcik@economics.ox.ac.uk).

The authors are grateful to Gernot Doppelhofer, Hiau Looi Kee, Timothy Kehoe, Yue Li, Magne Mogstad, Caglar Ozden, Jørn Rattsø, Kjetil Storesletten, Yushi Yoshida, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at Oxford, NTNU in Trondheim, NHH in Bergen, Copenhagen Business School, and Empirical Investigations in International Trade and Investment conference in Tokyo for their comments and suggestions. Harding appreciates support from Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies (Oxcarre) and the Norwegian Research Council.

## 1. Introduction

While export-led growth has often been cited as the engine behind the Asian miracle, recent research has shifted the focus of the debate away from the mere fact of exporting and towards the importance of export composition for growth. For instance, one of the recent stylized facts of development is the finding that countries promoting exports of more “sophisticated” goods grow faster (Rodrik 2006; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2006).<sup>1,2</sup>

If “you become what you export” is indeed true, introducing measures facilitating export upgrading becomes a key policy issue. The importance of product upgrading and climbing up the export value chain has been instinctively accepted by politicians. To quote Ross Perot’s famous line, politicians tend to believe that it is better to make computer chips than potato chips. Such beliefs are also partially responsible for the recent revival of interest in industrial policy. However, export upgrading, especially in a developing country, is not a trivial task given the resources and time needed to build up the capital stock, the skills of the labor force and the reputation in foreign markets and considering the appropriability issues pointed out by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).

This study argues that policies aimed at attracting FDI inflows can boost a country’s ability to upgrade its export basket. The entry of multinationals can affect the composition of exports through two channels. First, multinationals using a country as an export platform can engage in production of more sophisticated or higher quality goods than those previously exported by the host country.<sup>3</sup> Second, the presence of multinationals can lead to knowledge spillovers to local firms in the same industry (i.e., multinationals may engage in “cost discovery” to use Hausmann and Rodrik’s terminology) or to local firms in the supplying sectors, which in turn can facilitate product upgrading. For instance, in a recent World Bank survey, 24 percent of local enterprises in the Czech Republic and 15 percent in Latvia reported that they have learned about availability of new technologies by observing multinational enterprises operating in their country and their sector. A half of suppliers of multinationals surveyed in the Czech Republic

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<sup>1</sup> Though others suggest that it is the sophistication of the export structure combined with the ability to export to industrial countries that matters for growth (see Mattoo and Subramanian 2009).

<sup>2</sup> The argument made by Hausmann et al. (2006) is based on the “cost discovery” mechanism of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). An entrepreneur who attempts to produce a good for the first time in a developing country faces uncertainty about the underlying cost structure of the economy. If the project is successful, other entrepreneurs learn that the product in question can be profitably produced and follow the incumbent’s footsteps. In this way, the returns to the pioneer investor’s cost discovery become socialized. If the incumbent fails, the losses remain private. This knowledge externality means that investment levels in cost discovery are sub-optimal unless the industry or the government find some way in which the externality can be internalized. In such a setting, the range of goods that an economy produces and exports is determined not just by the fundamentals, but also by the number of entrepreneurs engaging in cost discovery. The larger this number, the closer that the economy can get to its productivity frontier. When there is more cost discovery, the productivity of the resulting set of activities is higher in expectational terms.

<sup>3</sup> A comparison of unit values of new export products introduced by foreign and domestic producers operating in Mexico (normalized by the mean price of all exported goods within the same product category) indicates that foreign establishments tend to export higher quality products (Iacovone and Javorcik 2008). A similar conclusion is reached by Wang and Wei (2008) who find that after controlling for processing trade, exports by foreign-invested firms in China tend to have systematically higher unit values than indigenous firms, suggesting that they produce higher-end product varieties. FDI may also lead to a greater volume of exports. For instance, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) show that foreign acquisitions in Indonesia lead to large increases in the export intensity in the acquired plants.

reported improving their quality control systems in response to the request of their multinational customers (Javorcik 2008).<sup>4</sup>

To examine whether FDI is a catalyst for upgrading the export portfolio, we use information on exports of 105 countries during the 1984-2000 period. A cross-country analysis of the relationship between upgrading export products and FDI poses two challenges. First, in order to distinguish the effects of FDI inflows from all other country-specific shocks and policies one would ideally like to use sector-level information on FDI inflows. Unfortunately, such data are difficult to come by, particularly in a developing country context. To the best of our knowledge, the only sufficiently comprehensive data set on sectoral FDI figures for a large number of countries is available from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This data set, however, covers only the US FDI. Although the US FDI is likely to constitute a considerable share of total FDI in certain countries, in others it might not. Using direct FDI measures would therefore be likely to give a less than complete picture of the actual foreign presence in many country-sector combinations.<sup>5</sup> The second challenge in the analysis is to identify the direction of causality. FDI may promote upgrading of export products but it may also be attracted to countries and sectors that are already exporting higher value products.

To address these challenges, our study utilizes a new data set on industry-level targeting done by national investment promotion agencies (IPAs) rather than the data on actual FDI inflows. The information on whether or not a particular country has been targeting a particular sector in an effort to attract FDI, the timing of such activities and the list of priority sectors is available from the World Bank Census of Investment Promotion Agencies covering over one hundred countries around the world. Sector targeting is considered to be best practice by investment promotion professionals, as it is believed that more intense efforts concentrated on a few priority sectors are likely to lead to greater FDI inflows than less intense across-the-board attempts to attract FDI (Loewendahl 2001; Proksch 2004). Indeed, in the World Bank Census a vast majority of IPAs reported being involved in sectoral targeting. A difference-in-differences analysis by Harding and Javorcik (2011) shows that targeting a particular sector by a national IPA leads to more than doubling of FDI inflows into the sector.

Our empirical analysis, based on export data from Feenstra et al. (2005), also follows the difference-in-differences approach. We ask whether sectors that were chosen by IPAs as targeted industries for attracting FDI exhibited higher unit values of exports in the post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and relative to sectors that were not awarded the priority status. In other words, we compare unit values of exports in priority sector before and after targeting starts to unit values in non-targeted sectors during the same time period. Unit values of export products are calculated at the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level, while sector targeting information is available at the 3-digit level of

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<sup>4</sup> In the same survey, a quarter of local suppliers of multinationals operating in the Czech Republic reported that the knowledge gained by doing business with a multinational helped them become an exporter, 12% said that they started supplying foreign sister companies of their multinational customer and 9% benefited from the multinational customer recommending them to other companies abroad.

<sup>5</sup> In addition, the time period covered by the BEA data is quite short, as the FDI stock information starts in 1989. Moreover, in some cases figures in particular country-industry-year cells are suppressed for confidentiality reasons.

the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).<sup>6</sup> To take into account country endowments and other time-invariant unobservables that could influence unit values of exports from a particular country-sector combination, the empirical specification includes country-sector fixed effects. In other words, our analysis focuses on within country-sector variation in unit values. To control for differences in unit values between products (e.g., the fact that pencils have lower unit values than computers), the empirical specification includes product-year fixed effects. These fixed effects also control for factors that might cause the relative price of pencils to computers to change over time. Finally, the empirical model includes country level controls.

The results suggest a positive relationship between FDI and unit values of exports in developing countries. We find a positive and statistically significant association between a sector being targeted (proxied by an indicator variable or by the number of years the targeting has been in place) and unit values of exported products. This result can be found in a contemporaneous specification as well as the specifications with one, two or three lags. To check that our results are not subject to a reverse causality problem, we estimate a “placebo” regression and show that the sectors that will be targeted next period (or in two or three periods, depending on the specification) do not have higher unit values before the start of targeting.

The magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful. We find that exports of targeted sectors enjoy a unit value premium of about 11 percent. To put this figure into perspective, consider Slovenia targeting Transportation equipment manufacturing (NAICS 336). Doing so, would increase the unit value of its exports of Motor vehicles for the transport of goods (SITC 7821) above the level found in Bulgaria, Mexico and Israel. Similarly, if Slovenia targeted the Chemical industry (NAICS 325), the unit value of its exports of Mineral or chemical fertilizers, nitrogenous (SITC 5621) would increase above the unit value of exports originating from Norway, Netherlands, Canada, South Korea and Singapore among others. Although we also find a positive correlation between FDI and unit values of exports from high income countries, this result is less robust.

Next we ask whether the association between FDI and unit values tends to be stronger in differentiated products. Differentiated products, defined based on Rauch’s (1999) classification, are the goods lacking a reference price because of their intrinsic features or the goods whose price is not set on organized exchanges. Women’s skirts and blouses (SITC 8434 and 8435) are an example of differentiated products, while cement and printing paper (SITC 6412 and 6612) are not. In the developing country subsample, we find no difference between the effect of FDI on differentiated and homogenous products. In the developed country subsample, FDI matters only for differentiated products. A likely explanation for this finding is that in developed countries there is little room for increasing the quality of exported homogenous goods as these countries already possess sophisticated technologies for production of goods such as cement or paper. In contrast, FDI inflows into developing countries may facilitate quality increase in both homogenous and differentiated products.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Examples of 4-digit SITC products include SITC 8434 Skirts, women’s of textile fabric, SITC 8435 Blouses of textile fabric, SITC 6412 Printing paper and writing paper, in rolls or sheets, SITC 6612 Portland cement, ciment fondu, slug cement.

<sup>7</sup> Rauch (1999) argues that search costs for differentiated goods exceed those of homogenous or reference-priced goods, since information is not as easily collected and compared in differentiated goods industries. If multinational corporations enjoy better

We also check whether the effects of FDI are more pronounced in the case of final products, as opposed to intermediate inputs and raw materials. It turns out that the effect of FDI manifests itself mostly in the case of final goods when developing countries are considered. If the seller's reputation matters more in the case of final products than in intermediates, it may be much easier for multinationals than for indigenous producers to obtain higher prices.

A series of robustness checks confirms our baseline findings. We show that the results are robust to controlling for the gross fixed capital formation in the sector, which suggests that the effect is not driven by FDI just bringing in new capital. To attenuate the concern that export unit values may be influenced by transfer pricing, we show that the effect of targeting does not depend on the corporate tax rate in the host country or the tariff level in the main export markets. Further, we find that FDI not only leads to increasing the unit values in absolute terms, but also brings the host country's export basket closer to the technological frontier (defined as the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of the unit values in a given product and time period). Our conclusions are also confirmed when we use sector targeting as an instrument for the presence of US investors. Finally, our results for developing countries are robust to using the most disaggregated trade figures available, namely the data on US imports broken down by 10-digit HS codes and to instrumenting for the choice of priority sectors.

We also extend our analysis to examine whether FDI increases the "sophistication" of the host country's exports. To measure export sophistication, we use the index proposed by Hausmann et al. (2006) which captures the income level associated with a particular export basket and the measure of export dissimilarity between the export basket of a given country and that of high income economies proposed by Wang and Wei (2008). In both cases, our measures of export sophistication vary by country, sector and year. We find no evidence suggesting that FDI boost the sophistication of the host country's exports, which is line with Wang and Wei's findings for China.

While our results on the positive relationship between FDI and unit values of exports cannot distinguish between upgrading due to exporting by multinationals themselves or due to indigenous producers learning from foreign investors, they suggest that FDI can play an important role in helping developing countries improve the quality of their exports. They also indicate that the fears that FDI will relegate developing countries to producing only simple low value added products are not warranted.

Our study is related to two strands of the existing literature. The first strand documents quality differences among exports originating in different countries (Schott 2004; Hummels and Klenow 2005). Schott (2004) finds a positive association between country-level capital and skill abundance and unit values of exports. To the extent these country characteristics are proxies for producer productivity, this finding is inconsistent with New Trade Theory which suggests a negative relationship between productivity and prices. Our study is complementary to the research mentioned. Its novelty lies in testing how access to developed countries' technologies

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reputation than national producers, it may be easier for them to convince potential foreign buyers about the quality of their export products.

and know-how through inflows of FDI affects unit values of exports from developing countries hosting foreign investors. FDI flows are an important aspect of globalization, yet to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to examine the impact of FDI on unit values of exports in a wide range of countries. Our results indicate that the mapping between unit values and producer characteristics is at least two-dimensional. On the one hand, FDI presence may put a downward pressure on unit values of exports due to superior productivity of foreign affiliates. On the other hand, FDI presence may lead to upgrading of production and marketing techniques and thus increasing the ability of exporters to obtain higher prices in foreign markets. Our findings are consistent with the latter force being dominant in developing countries. In high income economies the dominant effect varies depending on the context. Our results not only have policy implications, but also offer a potential explanation for the relatively fast narrowing of the quality gap documented by Hallak and Schott (2010) during the period of rapid globalization between 1989 and 2003.

The second strand of the literature relevant to our work provides a motivation for why we would expect a positive link between the presence of FDI and unit values of exports. The literature includes work suggesting that foreign affiliates tend to export higher quality products (Wang and Wei 2008; Iacovone and Javorcik 2008) and the studies documenting superior performance of foreign affiliates (for a review see Arnold and Javorcik 2009). The literature also encompasses studies examining export externalities associated with the presence of multinationals. In a widely-cited paper, Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) use panel data on 2104 Mexican manufacturing plants from the period 1986-1990 to demonstrate that the presence of exporting multinationals in the same region reduces the costs of exporting for Mexican firms. No such externalities are found for exporting firms in general. Based on detailed Chinese trade statistics identifying the type of exporters and their location, Chen and Swenson (2008) find that the presence of multinationals in the same industry is associated with more and higher quality trade transactions by Chinese firms. Using the same data set, Swenson (2007) shows that the positive association between the presence of multinationals and new export connections by private Chinese exporters may be driven by information spillovers. Finally, this literature also includes work on intra- and inter-industry productivity spillovers generated by foreign affiliates (for a review of the former see Görg and Strobl (2001), for evidence on the latter see Javorcik (2004)). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first contribution to the literature on FDI and the quality of exports based on data from a large number of countries.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes.

## **2. Data and empirical strategy**

### **2.1. Trade data**

We use cross-country export data compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005) for the period 1984-2000.<sup>8</sup> The data are available at the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 classification, which includes 726 codes in our

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<sup>8</sup> For additional information on the data set, see [http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/FAQ\\_on\\_NBER-UN\\_data.pdf](http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/FAQ_on_NBER-UN_data.pdf) and <http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html>.

sample. The codes describe quite narrow product categories, and thus we believe this is a suitable level of aggregation for our analysis.<sup>9</sup> The table below gives some examples of code descriptions from two industries: woven cotton fabrics (652) and footwear (851).

**Table: Examples of 4-digit SITC products**

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6521	Cotton fabrics, woven, unbleached, not mercerized
6522	Cotton fabrics, woven, bleached mercerized, dyed, printed
6531	Fabrics, woven of continuous synthetic textile materials
6532	Fabrics, woven containing 85% of discontinuous synthetic fibers
6534	Fabrics, woven, of discontinuous synthetic fibers
6535	Fabrics, woven of containing regenerated textile materials
6536	Fabrics, woven containing 85% of discontinuous regenerated fibers
6538	Fabrics, woven of discontinuous regenerated fibers
6539	Pile & chenille fabrics, woven of man-made fibers

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Unit values are calculated by dividing the export value by the quantity of exports. The value of exports is measured in current US dollars. For some country-product-year combinations there are multiple observations on values and corresponding quantities, as for instance part of exports may be measured according to weight and part according to the number of units. In such cases, we follow Schott (2004) and calculate the unit value as the weighted average, where the shares of total country-product-year value are used as weights.<sup>10</sup>

To assess which countries had the largest increase in the absolute unit value over time, we considered the change in the unit value of product  $p$  exported by country  $c$  between 1984 and 2000 (the first and the last year of the sample). We focused on countries that exported at least 20 products in both years. The largest average increases in the unit values were registered by Malta (159%), Ireland (153%), Japan (146%), Denmark (145%) and Norway (142%). Among the top ten countries, Bangladesh (141%) was the only developing country. The ranks between 11 and 15 were occupied by developing countries: China (134%), Sri Lanka (134%), Kenya (132%), Hungary (131%) and Romania (131%). Many of the developing countries mentioned were also very successful at attracting FDI.

We also considered the largest increase in the relative unit value, where the relative unit value was defined as the ratio of the unit value of product  $p$  exported by country  $c$  at time  $t$  to the average unit value found for all exporters of product  $p$  at time  $t$ . The largest average increase in the relative unit value was registered by Malta (130%), followed by Ireland (123%), Sri Lanka (118%), Denmark (117%), Japan (116%), Cuba (115%), Bangladesh (114%), China (112%), UK (115%) and Iceland (111%).

Since our proxy for the presence of FDI is available in the NAICS (1997) classification, we use a concordance between NAICS and SITC classification.<sup>11</sup> Thus the term *sector* refers in the paper to the 3-digit NAICS aggregates, while the term *product* is used to denote 4-digit SITC codes.

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<sup>9</sup> We will return to the aggregation issue in section 3.5

<sup>10</sup> Dropping country-product-year combinations for which quantities are reported in multiple units would not change the conclusions of this study.

<sup>11</sup> The concordance comes from <http://www.nber.org/lipsey/sitc22naics97>.

The trade in agricultural products tends to be more restricted than trade in manufactured products, therefore we exclude the following NAICS-sectors: Crop Production (111), Animal Production (112), Forestry and Logging (113), Fishing, Hunting and Trapping (114). We also exclude Oil and Gas Extraction (211) and Mining except Oil and Gas (212) because we believe that unit values in these sectors may be driven primarily by the quality of the natural resource endowments.<sup>12</sup> This leaves us with 23 sectors with non-missing unit value observations. These sectors are listed in Appendix A Table A1 along with the average, the minimum and the maximum number of distinct products available per sector across different years.

In Table 1, we present figures documenting the dispersion of unit values exported by different countries within each SITC product code in year 2000. The first set of figures list the ratio of the median unit value of product  $p$  exported by high income countries in 2000 to the median unit value of product  $p$  exported by developing countries in 2000.<sup>13</sup> The highest values of the ratio suggest that the median industrial country's exports of product  $p$  have a unit value an order of magnitude higher than those exported by the median developing economy. These high values of the ratio are found primarily in Machinery and transport equipment and Chemicals and related products. The median value of the ratio is 1.49 and is found in Gas, liquid, electricity meters and Rotary pumps.<sup>14</sup> All of these products are relatively R&D intensive, hence the large differences in unit values between rich and poor countries do not come as a surprise.

The lowest values of the ratio suggest that there is an overlap in the distribution of quality of products exported by the two groups. There exist products where the median developing country exports of product  $p$  have a higher unit value than the median high income country exports of product  $p$ , though the differences here are much smaller. These low values of the ratio are found mostly in Crude materials as well as in Chemicals and related products.

The second column of figures in Table 1 lists the ratio of the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile to the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of unit values of product  $p$  exported by all countries in 2000. The figures document a wide dispersion of unit values exported by different countries. As evident from the last column, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile unit value is often several orders of magnitude higher than the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile value, even in products with low values of the ratio of the median reported in the first column.

## 2.2. Using information on investment promotion activities to proxy for FDI inflows

We exploit data from the 2005 Census of Investment Promotion Agencies to proxy for inflows of FDI to a given sector in a given country in a given year. The Census includes information on

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<sup>12</sup> One may argue that the room for quality upgrading may be limited in non-manufacturing sectors which include Electric current (NAICS 221), Ships, boats and other vessels for breaking up (NAICS 483) and Motion picture and sound recording industries (NAICS 512). As we mention in the robustness checks section of the paper, dropping these three sectors would not change the conclusions of the study.

<sup>13</sup> The definition of developing countries is based on the World Bank classification as of July 2006. For a recent list, see <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups>.

<sup>14</sup> As argued by Schott (2004), the lower unit values of developing countries' exports point to the specialization within sectors. Schott interprets his finding—within product specialization rather than between product specialization—as support for the view that capital- and skill-abundant countries use their endowment advantage to produce higher quality varieties.

whether a country was concentrating its FDI promotion activities on selected priority sectors (so called sector targeting) rather than trying to attract all types of foreign investors. Sector targeting is believed to be the best practice by investment promotion professionals and has been practiced by more than half of the countries surveyed in the Census. If a country was engaged in sector targeting, our data include information on what sectors were targeted and the year when targeting started and ended. Using a difference-in-differences approach, Harding and Javorcik (2011) show that targeting a particular sector by a national IPA leads to more than doubling of FDI inflows into the sector. Therefore, we believe the information on targeted sectors is a good proxy for inflows of FDI.<sup>15</sup>

Based on the Census data, we construct two variables: (i) an indicator variable called *Sector targeted*<sub>sct</sub> equal to one if sector *s* was a priority sector in country *c*'s efforts to attract FDI in year *t*, and zero otherwise, (ii) a continuous variable *Length of sector targeting*<sub>sct</sub> defined as the number of years country *c* has treated sector *s* as a priority sector prior to (and including) year *t*.<sup>16</sup> We think of *Sector targeted* as a proxy for additional FDI inflows taking place in a given time period and of *Length of sector targeting* as a proxy for the stock of FDI.

There are two advantages of using information on targeted sectors instead of the information on actual FDI inflows. The first advantage is the data coverage in terms of geography and time period. Figures on sector-specific FDI inflows are not readily available for developing countries. In our analysis, we are particularly interested in exploring the link between FDI and unit values of exports in a developing country context. We believe that the effects of FDI are likely to be more pronounced in low income economies which often lag in terms of technological capabilities. The most comprehensive source of sectoral FDI figures is the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Unfortunately, BEA only collects information on the US FDI and thus gives a less than complete picture of the actual foreign presence in many countries. It also covers a relatively short time period (the data with wide country coverage start in 1989) and suppresses quite a few country-sector-year cells for confidentiality reasons. The information is suppressed if the number of investments made in a particular country-sector-year combination was small, which means that we would often miss the information on the entry of the first few foreign investors, which are likely to have the most pronounced effect.

The second advantage of utilizing information on investment promotion efforts is that our proxy attenuates endogeneity concerns. Country-sector combinations with high unit value of exports might attract FDI with a greater ease than the sectors with relatively low unit values. This would manifest itself as a positive association between FDI inflows and unit values, but the direction of causality would run from high unit values to high FDI inflows. By employing information on sector targeting we attenuate the potential reverse causality problem. Targeting is a policy tool based on many factors and thus the choice of priority sectors is less likely to be driven by the quality of exports from that sector. Nevertheless, we test whether this is true and show that our assumption is reasonable.

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<sup>15</sup> Charlton and Davis (2004) draw similar conclusions for OECD countries.

<sup>16</sup> We include *Length of sector targeting* in the log form (adding one before taking the log).

Appendix A Table A2 presents detailed information on the sample used in the empirical analysis. It lists the minimum and maximum number of sectors available for each country, the number of observations and the number of observations pertaining to targeted sectors. Our data on investment promotion efforts include 88 countries whose IPAs responded to the question on targeting and 17 countries which did not have an investment promotion agency in 2004 and thus are treated as not engaged in targeting, which gives us a total of 105 countries. Out of 88 countries, 27 reported having been engaged in targeting and provided the exact timing information on at least one priority sector. In our analysis, we include all country-sector combinations for non-targeted sectors and all country-sector combinations for priority sectors for which the exact information on the timing of targeting is available.<sup>17</sup> This leaves us with 105 countries, for 27 of which we capture active targeting policies taking place during the time period considered.

Our data set also includes information on population size and GDP per capita taken from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI) and inflation figures provided by the IMF's *International Financial Statistics*. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2.

### 2.3. Empirical strategy

To examine the relationship between the quality of exported products and FDI, we use the difference-in-differences approach. We ask whether sectors that were chosen by IPAs as targeted industries for attracting FDI exhibited higher unit values of exports in the post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and relative to sectors that were not awarded priority status. In other words, we compare unit values of exports in priority (treated) sectors before and after targeting starts to unit values in non-targeted (control) sectors during the same time period. More specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$\ln \text{Unit\_value}_{pct} = \alpha + \beta \text{Sector\_targeted}_{sct} + \pi \ln \text{Export\_value}_{pct-1} + X_{ct} \theta + \gamma_{cs} + \gamma_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pct} \quad (1)$$

where  $\text{Unit\_value}_{pct}$  is the unit value (value of exports/quantity of exports) of product  $p$  exported by country  $c$  at time  $t$ , which is our measure of export quality.<sup>18</sup> Products are defined at the 4-digit SITC level.  $\text{Sector\_targeted}_{sct}$  is a dummy taking the value one if country  $c$ 's

<sup>17</sup> In other words, if we know that a particular country targeted a particular sector but we do not have the exact timing of targeting, we exclude the country-sector combination from the sample. Thus, our sample includes country-sector combinations with (i) the exact information on the timing of targeting is available, (ii) no targeting taking place; (iii) countries in which there is no IPA and hence it is assumed that no targeting efforts are made. The results are robust to restricting the analysis to the subsample of countries for which the exact information on the timing of targeting is available or to the subsample of countries for which the exact information on the timing of targeting is available and countries with no IPA.

<sup>18</sup> Although unit values are imperfect proxies for product quality, they have been widely used in the literature (see for instance Schott 2004, Hallak 2006 and Schott 2008). Unit values of exports may vary for reasons other than quality, such as production costs or market power. Unit values may also be noisy due to both aggregation and measurement error.

To the extent that product costs vary by country and affect the unit values of all products produced by country  $c$  in year  $t$ , they will be taken out by country-specific controls, such as the GDP per capita which tends to be a good proxy for wage costs. To the extent that market power of country  $c$  in sector  $s$  does not vary over time, it will be taken out by country-sector fixed effects. If market power is country-product rather country-sector specific, it is relevant to mention that our results are robust to controlling for country-product fixed effects. The same holds for measurement error if it is specific to country-product and time invariant. Aggregation is probably the most difficult issue to deal with. However, we do show in Appendix B that our conclusions are robust to using the most disaggregated trade data available (figures on US imports based on 10-digit HS classification). For alternative approaches to measuring quality, see Hallak and Schott (2010) and Khandelwal (2010).

investment promotion agency considered sector  $s$ , to which the product  $p$  belongs, as a priority (targeted) sector for attracting FDI inflows at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. Sectors are classified according to the 3-digit NAICS 1997 classification.  $Sector\_targeted_{sct}$  also takes the value of zero if country  $c$  did not have an investment promotion agency at time  $t$ .

The empirical specification incorporates a number of controls, including the size of the exporting industry proxied by the value of country  $c$ 's exports of product  $p$  at time  $t-1$  ( $Export\_value_{pct-1}$ ) and several country-level characteristics ( $X_{ct}$ ). As suggested by the findings of Hummels and Klenow (2005), we control for the size of the exporting economy with the logarithm of the population size. To control for the level of development, we include the logarithm of the GDP per capita (in current USD). Finally, to take into account macroeconomic stability and changes in the general price level in the exporting country, we add inflation.

Our specification also includes country-sector ( $\gamma_{cs}$ ) and product-year ( $\gamma_{pt}$ ) fixed effects. The former take out all time-invariant characteristics specific to a particular country-sector combination that might be important for unit values. Examples of such characteristics include availability of natural resources or climatic conditions. In other words, our analysis focuses on within-country-sector variation in unit values. As there are large differences in unit values between products, e.g., pencils are cheaper than computers, we include product-year fixed effects. These fixed effects not only absorb unit value differences across products, but they also take out all observed and unobserved global factors that might change the relative unit values over time. For instance, if the relative price of computers to pencils goes down in year  $t$  due to technological progress or changes in demand, this effect will be absorbed by the product-year fixed effect.

Our variable of interest,  $Sector\_targeted$ , is at the country-sector-year level, and our dependent variable is at the more disaggregated country-product-year level. Therefore we cluster standard errors at the country-sector-year level, as suggested by Moulton (1990).

### 3. Results

#### 3.1. Baseline results

The results presented in Table 3 are consistent with higher export unit values being found in sectors experiencing increased foreign presence. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the  $Sector\_targeted$  variable in the subsample of developing countries (columns 1 through 4). This is true in a specification with the contemporaneous indicator  $Sector\_targeted$  as well as in the specifications where the variable of interest enters as the first, second or third lag.

The magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful: targeted sectors are found to export products whose unit values are 11 percent higher than the average unit value of the same product observed in a given year.<sup>19</sup> This magnitude is plausible as it captures the average effect found during the duration of targeting. It is also sensible when one considers the following

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<sup>19</sup> This figure is based on the coefficient from the first specification:  $\exp(.103)-1 = .11$ .

through experiments. If Slovenia targeted Transportation equipment manufacturing (NAICS 336), it would increase the unit value of its exports of Motor vehicles for the transport of goods (SITC 7821) beyond the level found in Bulgaria, Mexico and Israel. Similarly, if Slovenia targeted the Chemical industry (NAICS 325), the unit value of its exports of Mineral or chemical fertilizers, nitrogenous (SITC 5621) would increase above the unit value of exports originating from Norway, Netherlands, Canada, South Korea and Singapore among others.<sup>20</sup>

In contrast to the strong association found for developing countries (significant at the one percent level), the results for developed countries (columns 5 through 8) are less robust. The contemporaneous effect is not statistically significant, while lags are significant only at the 10 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficients is also much smaller. A weaker and quantitatively smaller effect for developed countries is consistent with the view that foreign presence is closing a technology gap. For a developed economy, there is less of a technology gap to close and the foreign presence has a minor effect on the unit values of exports.<sup>21</sup>

As for the other controls, we find that a positive correlation between GDP per capita and unit values, which, as expected, suggests that more developed countries export more sophisticated products. The data also indicate a negative correlation of the population size with export unit values, which is consistent with the finding of Hummels and Klenow (2005) that more labor-abundant countries tend to export lower priced products. Additionally, in the developed country subsample we find that products with a higher volume of exports tend to have higher unit values.<sup>22</sup>

In Appendix A, we test the robustness of our results. First we show that excluding the volume of exports from the regression has no effect on the estimated coefficients (Appendix A Table A3). Then we focus on the argument of Bertrand et al. (2004) that estimations with a difference-in-difference method using panel data are likely to be subject to serial correlation problem, which means that their standard errors could be severely underestimated. We take Bertrand et al.'s advice on how this problem could be remedied and conduct two robustness checks. In Appendix A Table A4, we demonstrate that our results remain highly significant for developing countries, though not for high income economies, if we cluster standard errors on country-sector level (instead of country-sector-year combinations as in the baseline model).<sup>23</sup> In Appendix A Table A5, we follow their advice and ignore the time-series information when computing standard errors. We do so by regressing the logarithm of the export unit values on

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<sup>20</sup> The first thought experiment is based on 1994 figures, the second on 1996 figures.

<sup>21</sup> The lack of strong results for high income countries may be due to FDI having two opposite effects on unit values of exports. On the one hand, FDI may lead to exporting of higher quality (higher unit value) products. On the other hand, if multinationals are more productive than local producers, they may be able to produce and export the same products at lower prices. To shed some light on this question, we augmented our specification by controlling for labor productivity in sector  $s$  of country  $c$  at time  $t$  (using the value added per worker reported in the World Bank's Trade, Production and Protection database). The results, not reported to save space, show a positive link between FDI and export quality in both developing and high income countries. In most cases, the magnitude of the effect is larger for developing countries.

<sup>22</sup> One may argue that the room for quality upgrading may be limited in non-manufacturing sectors which include Electric current (NAICS 221), Ships, boats and other vessels for breaking up (NAICS 483) and Motion picture and sound recording industries (NAICS 512). Dropping these three sectors (which amounts to losing between 112 and 168 observations in the developing country subsample, and 451-495 observations in the high income group) has hardly any effect on the estimated coefficients in Table 3. The effect on the estimated magnitudes is miniscule, and the significance levels are not affected.

<sup>23</sup> Our results are also robust to clustering at the sector level.

control variables (other than the variable of interest) and the fixed effects. We keep the residuals only for sectors that were designated by their countries as priority sectors in investment promotion efforts. We divide these residuals into two groups: residuals from the years before targeting started and residuals from the post targeting years. Then we calculate the average for each country-sector combination for the pre- and post-targeting period. Finally, we regress the two-period panel of mean residuals on the dummy denoting targeted sectors. As evident from Appendix A Table A5, the dummy remains positive and significant in the developing country subsample. We therefore feel confident that our baseline results are not subject to the autocorrelation problem.

Returning to our baseline specification, in Table 4 we include the length of sector targeting instead of the indicator variable. It is intuitive to expect that the sectors targeted for a longer time period will attract larger inflows of FDI by the virtue of greater effort on the part of an investment promotion agency. The results confirm our earlier conclusions. We find a strong positive association between sector targeting and unit values in developing countries, but not in developed countries. Taken together, Table 3 and Table 4 point to a weaker, if any, effect of foreign presence on unit values of exports in developed countries.

One may be concerned about investment promotion agencies choosing to target sectors with higher unit values of exports. To attenuate this concern, we estimate a “placebo” regression which includes an additional regressor taking on the value of one for the year immediately preceding the first year of targeting sector  $s$  by country  $c$ , and zero otherwise. A statistically significant coefficient on this dummy would indicate that targeted sectors had higher unit values (relative to other sectors) even before targeting started. The first column of Table 5, however, indicates that this is not the case in the developing country subsample. The dummy bears a negative sign and is not statistically significant. Moreover, the F-test reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the difference between the coefficients on the dummy and the *Sector targeted* variable is statistically significant. In the second column, we repeat the exercise asking whether targeted sectors exhibited higher unit values during the two-year period preceding targeting. In column 3 and 4, we do so for the three- and four-year periods, respectively. We find no indication that the sectors with higher unit values were chosen for targeting in developing countries. The additional regressors are never statistically significant, and the F-tests reject the equality between the coefficients on each dummy and *Sector targeted*. In all four models, the coefficients on *Sector targeted* are much larger in magnitude than the coefficients on pre-targeting dummy. This exercise gives us confidence that it is the FDI presence that is leading to higher unit values of exports rather than the other way around. In the developed country subsample, neither the coefficients on pre-targeting period nor the coefficients on the post-targeting periods are ever statistically significant..

As our results are in line with FDI inflows leading to higher unit values of exports in developing countries, the natural question to ask next is whether this effect is due to additional investment in physical assets or to the knowledge and know-how brought by foreign investors. To examine this question we control for investment (gross fixed capital formation) taking place in a given sector in a given country at time  $t-1$ . The data on investment come from the World Bank’s Trade, Production and Protection database (described in Nicita and Olarreaga 2007) and enter in the log form. As evident from Table 6, there is no statistically significant relationship

between lagged investment and unit values of exports, and the link between sectors targeted by investment promotion efforts and unit values of exports remains positive and statistically significant.

Our results are consistent with the presence of FDI leading to higher unit values of host country exports. Foreign companies can affect the quality of a sector's exports in several ways. First, they can move the sector along the intensive margin by exporting relatively larger quantities of higher valued products than domestic firms. Second, multinationals can induce movement along the extensive margin by producing higher quality/higher priced versions of the already exported product categories or by introducing new, higher value products to the country's export basket.<sup>24</sup> Third, multinationals can facilitate movement of local producers along either the intensive or the extensive margin through knowledge spillovers. As trade statistics available to us do not distinguish between exports by domestic and foreign companies, our analysis captures the sum of all the above effects.

The ability of multinationals to produce higher quality goods stems from their possession of intangible assets which can take the form of advanced technologies, established brand names or superior management techniques. According to UNCTAD (2005), multinationals are responsible for most of the world's research and development (R&D) activities. In 2002, 700 firms, 98 percent of which are multinational corporations, accounted for 46 percent of the world's total R&D expenditure and 69 percent of the world's business R&D. Considering that there are about 70,000 multinational corporations in the world, this is a conservative estimate. Similarly, more than 80 percent of global royalty payments for international transfers of technology in 1995 were made from subsidiaries to their parent firms (UNCTAD 1997).

Higher product quality can also be achieved by utilizing advanced management techniques. For instance, Sutton (2005) gives an example of organizational changes introduced by a foreign investor in its Chinese affiliate. A shift in work practices involved a move away from traditional notions of inspection at the end of the production line to a system in which each operator along the line searched for defects in each item as it arrived and as it departed. Such constant monitoring resulted in a lower share of defective items produced as it allowed for a quick identification and rectification of sources of defects. Sutton (2010, Box 1) reports that an executive based at the world headquarters of a multinational car seat maker remarked that he would expect to be able to achieve world-class quality standards at a greenfield plant in any country within one year of its establishment. If, however, he was operating in a joint venture with an established local seat maker, this process might take three years. The difference reflects the slowness of "relearning": if established routines are in place, it is hard to change them; beginning from scratch is easier.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> As mentioned earlier, the superior productivity of foreign companies documented in the literature (e.g., Arnold and Javorcik 2009) may manifest itself in their ability to produce higher quality products at equal cost.

<sup>25</sup> The figures collected by Sutton (2010, Box 1) support the increase in quality, though taking place at a somewhat slower pace. A multinational seat-maker operating on a greenfield site in India experienced an initial level of its external defect rate of 2085 parts per million (ppm) (as compared to a "world-class threshold" of 100 ppm). In its third year of operation, this rate had fallen to 65 ppm, close to the 50 ppm level regarded as "award class" by multinational seat makers.

To the extent that FDI in developing economics might be correlated with increased use of inputs from developed economies, unit values might rise as a result of input value rather than value added in the host country.<sup>26</sup> Could this scenario explain our findings? Although a full-fledged analysis of this question is beyond the scope of our study, we examined whether imported intermediate inputs tend to have higher unit values if they belong to a sector which is targeted by the investment promotion agency. This approach relies on the observation that most inputs are supplied *within* sectors if the sectors are defined at a relatively aggregated level, as is the case in our data set. We did not find robust evidence suggesting that targeted sectors attract imports of higher quality inputs in the developing country subsample.

### 3.2. What types of products are the most affected?

Next we examine whether the association between FDI and unit values tends to be stronger in differentiated products. Differentiated products are the goods lacking a reference price because of their intrinsic features or the goods whose price is not set on organized exchanges. Examples of differentiated products include women's skirts and blouses (SITC 8434 and 8435), while non-differentiated products include cement and printing paper (SITC 6412 and 6612). The classification of differentiated products was compiled by Rauch (1999) and is based on 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 classification. Rauch suggested two definitions, a conservative and a liberal one, in order to account for the ambiguities arising in the classification. The conservative definition minimizes the number of commodities that are classified as homogeneous goods, while the liberal definition maximizes this number. We employ the liberal definition. We hypothesize that differentiated products offer more room for quality upgrading and thus the effect of FDI could be stronger in those product categories.

The results in Table 7 show different patterns present in the developing and developed country subsample (columns 1-2 and 5-6, respectively). In developing countries we find no statistically significant difference between the effect of FDI on differentiated and homogenous products, while in the developed countries FDI matters only in the differentiated product category. A possible explanation for this finding is that in developed countries there is little room for upgrading of exported homogenous goods as these countries already have access to sophisticated technologies for production of goods such as cement or paper. In contrast, FDI inflows into developing countries may facilitate upgrading of both homogenous and differentiated products.

In columns 3-4 and 7-8 of Table 7, we ask whether the effects we attribute to FDI differ between exports of final goods, intermediate inputs and raw materials. To check this, we interact our variable of interest with an indicator for final goods compiled by the WTO Trade Policy Review Division.<sup>27</sup> Note that this classification differs from the one focusing on differentiated products. Not all final products are differentiated goods (beer and tomatoes are a case in point). Similarly, not all differentiated products are final goods (examples include silk yarn and leather). As

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<sup>26</sup> There exists micro evidence suggesting that producers acquired by multinational increase their reliance on imported intermediates (Arnold and Javorcik 2009), that firms that pay higher import prices offer higher export prices (Manova and Zhang 2009) and that larger plants charge more for their outputs and pay more for their material inputs (Kugler and Verhoogen 2010).

<sup>27</sup> We are grateful to Francis Ng from the World Bank for sharing with us the classification of products according to their state of processing.

evident from the table, FDI appears to be affecting mostly the unit values of final goods rather than unit values of all products exported from developing countries. If the seller's reputation matters more in the case of final products than in intermediates, it may be much easier for multinationals than for indigenous producers to obtain higher prices for products of equal quality and thus we would expect to see a more pronounced effect of FDI in final goods. As before, we find no statistically significant relationship for the developed country subsample.

### 3.3. Is transfer pricing a concern?

Anecdotal evidence and the existing empirical literature suggest that multinational corporations tend to engage in transfer pricing to shift profits to lower tax locations and to save on import duties (Swenson 2001; Clausing 2003; Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2006). Given this evidence, one may wonder whether the effect of FDI on unit values of exports could reflect transfer pricing activities of multinational corporations. We check this possibility by adding to the model an interaction between the host country's tax rate and the dummy for targeted sectors as well as the tax rate itself (see Table 8). We expect that higher tax rates would give multinationals an incentive to underprice their exports in order to shift the profits out of the country. The data on tax rates come from the World Tax Database available from the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan.<sup>28</sup> We use the highest corporate tax rate reported in the database. We find a positive correlation between the corporate tax rate and the unit value of exports, which is the opposite of what presence of transfer pricing would suggest. The interaction term does not reach conventional significance levels in three of four regressions. More importantly, controlling for tax rate strengthens our previous results on the positive link between FDI and quality of exports.

The statutory tax rates do not take into account special fiscal incentives that may have been awarded to foreign investors. To take fiscal incentives into account, we estimate a variant of the baseline specification in which we allow for an interaction between the *Sector targeted* variable and a dummy taking on the value of one if country  $c$  offered foreign investors tax holidays or reduced tax rates at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. The information on tax incentives comes from the IPA Census. The specification also includes the fiscal incentive dummy itself. The results, not reported to save space, produce no evidence suggestive of transfer pricing in developing countries. They also support our conclusion of a positive relationship between the presence of FDI and unit value of exports in developing countries.<sup>29</sup>

In an additional exercise, not reported to save space, we check whether our results are robust to controlling for tariffs in export markets. We augment the baseline specification with the average applied tariff faced by country  $c$  in the US or the EU or both at time  $t$  and with the interaction between the tariff(s) and the *Sector targeted* variable. The information on tariffs comes from the World Bank's WITS database. We still find strong evidence of a positive relationship between FDI and export quality in developing countries and less robust evidence for high income economies. While the interaction terms are never statistically significant in the former

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<sup>28</sup> See: <http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm>

<sup>29</sup> There is not enough variation in the data to allow us estimate a similar specification on the high income subsample.

subsample, the negative coefficients (though often insignificant) found in the latter are suggestive of transfer pricing taking place in high income economies.

### **3.4. A further robustness check**

Our earlier work (Harding and Javorcik 2011) based on a difference-in-differences approach has convincingly shown that the sectors prioritized in investment promotion efforts receive more than double the amount of FDI inflows received by other industries. This gives us confidence that we can interpret our findings of a positive link between sector targeting and export unit values as consistent with FDI inflows leading to export upgrading. Nevertheless, as an additional robustness check, we perform an instrumental variable analysis in order to show that there is a positive relationship between the variation in FDI *attributable* to investment promotion efforts and unit values of exports.

The information on FDI presence at the required level of disaggregation is available only for the US and is much more limited in terms of the time period and the number of countries covered (we lose 40,000–60,000 observations in the developing country subsample). We consider several measures of FDI: the value of FDI inflows, the value of assets of US affiliates operating in each host country in a given sector, and the value of sales and employment of such affiliates. All data come from the BEA. We instrument for each measure of FDI using our *Sector targeted* dummy. As shown in the earlier version of this study, in 6 of 8 specifications, our instrument is positively and significantly linked to the FDI presence in a host country. The second stage regressions confirm our earlier conclusions. We find a positive and statistically significant link between FDI presence and unit values of exports in the developing countries, but not in high income economies. As these estimates represent the effect of FDI originating only from the US, they are not directly comparable to the earlier findings which capture the effect of investment promotion on FDI originating from all parts of the world.

### **3.5. Are our conclusions robust to using more disaggregated data?**

In a final set of robustness checks presented in Appendix B, we examine whether our conclusions are robust to using more disaggregated data, namely information on trade flows reported at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS). Having been collected by the same agency (US Customs), these figures are also more consistent across exporting countries than the SITC figures collected by national customs services that vary in terms of quality and the level of computerization. The higher level of disaggregation and greater consistency come at a price of restricting the analysis to exports destined only for the US market, as data at a similar level of detail are not readily available for other markets, and a slightly lower number of countries in the sample (76 developing and 23 high income countries).

The data are available from the NBER, are described in (Feenstra 1996, 1997; and Feenstra, Romalis and Schott 2002) and have recently been extended to 2006. The 10-digit HS classification includes 21741 codes, of which we observe 17720 codes in our sample spanning the 1989-2006 period. The higher level of disaggregation of the HS data (relative to the SITC data) means that it is not computationally feasible to include product-year fixed effects as was done in our baseline specification. Therefore, we normalize the unit value of exports by the

average price observed in a given year in the relevant country grouping. When we consider the developing country subsample, the relevant average unit values is calculated based on exports of developing countries, and in the case of high income country subsample the average is taken over exports of high income countries (see Appendix B for details). Our specification controls for the lagged exports to the US of a given product by a given country, sector targeting and country-level controls defined as in the baseline specification. We include country-sector fixed effects in the model and cluster standard errors at the country-sector-year level.

Although we expect results similar to those obtained before, we do not necessarily expect them to be identical. The key difference between this data set and the data set used previously (besides the level of aggregation) is the destination of exports. Our baseline data cover worldwide exports of each country destined for developed and developing country markets, while the current data are restricted to exports to one high income country.

The results based on the US import data are consistent with a positive impact of FDI inflows on the quality of exports originating in developing countries. The opposite pattern is found for high income economies (see Appendix B Table B1). As shown in Appendix B Table B2, in two of the “placebo” specifications (analogous to those in Table 5) estimated for developing countries, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of targeting is felt prior to the actual targeting taking place. For developed countries we are not able to reject the hypothesis in any of the specifications.<sup>30</sup> These placebo results suggest that endogeneity may be a problem, hence we instrument for the choice of targeted sectors. Our instruments rely on the assumption that national IPAs emulate the actions of their competitors in other countries (see Appendix B for details). The IV analysis confirms the positive relationship between FDI and the quality of exports in developing countries (see Appendix B Table B3). In the high income subsample, we find a negative link between FDI and the unit value of exports, though the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in lagged specifications (see Appendix B Table B4).

Finding a positive relationship between FDI and export upgrading in developing countries using two very different data set in terms of the agencies collecting the data, the export markets, the composition of exporters, the time period and, most importantly, the level of aggregation, gives us confidence in our findings. Our confidence is further strengthened by the robustness of our conclusions to the instrumental variable approach.

As for the high income subsample, we speculate that there are two competing effects. FDI can lead to upgrading of export quality (which manifests itself in higher unit values) and/or increasing production efficiency (which manifests itself in lower unit values of exports). Which of the two effects dominates depends on the set of countries and the export markets considered.

### **3.6. Does FDI bring exports closer to the quality frontier?**

We have demonstrated that FDI can contribute to increasing unit values of a country’s exports. But does it also contribute to closing the gap to the quality frontier? To answer this question, we consider the dependent variable expressed relative to the quality frontier. The frontier is

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<sup>30</sup> The latter was also true in Table 5, but there the effect of targeting was not statistically significant.

defined as the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of unit values of product  $p$  exported at time  $t$  by all countries in the in the data set. The new dependent variable is then defined as the log of the ratio of the unit value of product  $p$  exported by country  $c$  at time  $t$  to the frontier unit value at time  $t$ . The higher the value of the dependent variable, the closer the exporter is to the quality frontier. A positive coefficient on sector targeting would suggest that FDI brings exporters closer to the frontier.

In all but one specification presented in Table 9, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on sector targeting. For developing countries, the coefficient is significant at the one or the five percent level. In the high income grouping, the significant coefficient is found in three of four specifications, and the significance reaches the five or the ten percent level. These results suggest that FDI not only increases export quality in absolute terms but also helps countries close the gap to the quality frontier.

### 3.7. Does FDI increase export sophistication?

Previous work examining changes in a country's export basket distinguished between the quality and the sophistication of a country's exports (see Hausmann et al. 2006; Wang and Wei 2008). So far our study has focused on the quality aspect. In this subsection, we extend our analysis by examining the link between FDI and export sophistication.<sup>31</sup>

We do so first by following the approach of Hausmann et al. and constructing a measure of the "income level of a country's exports" (EXPY in the authors' terminology). In the work of Hausmann et al., EXPY is a country-level measure defined as a weighted average of the GDP per capita level associated with each product exported, where the weights are the value shares of each product in the country's total exports. In our paper, the variation in investment promotion activities is at the sector level, hence we have created a sector-level equivalent of EXPY. In other words, in our analysis, EXPY varies by country, sector and year. We experiment with two variants of this measure: (i) EXPY based on the GDP per capita level associated with each product as reported by Hidalgo et al. (2007),<sup>32</sup> (ii) EXPY calculated using the GDP per capita level associated with each product exported constructed using trade figures for 2000 from our data set.

We estimate the following equation:

$$\ln EXPY_{sct} = \alpha + \beta \text{Sector\_targeted}_{sct} + \pi \ln \text{Export\_value}_{sct-1} + X_{ct} \theta + \gamma_{cs} + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{sct} \quad (2)$$

which includes the same independent variables as the baseline specification (equation 1) as well as country-sector and year fixed effects.

We do not find any evidence of sector targeting being significantly correlated with the sophistication of the sectoral exports measured by EXPY. This is true for both variants of the measure, contemporaneous or lagged sector targeting (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> lag), and both the developing and high income country subsample.

<sup>31</sup> We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.

<sup>32</sup> Data downloaded from <http://www.nd.edu/~networks/productspace/proximity.htm>, February 2008.

Second, we use Wang and Wei's EDI-index to capture the lack of export sophistication. This index, adapted to the context of our study, measures the dissimilarity between the product structure of a country-sector's exports and that of the same sector in high income economies. It is defined as

$$EDI_{sct} = 100 \left( \sum_{p \in s} abs(s_{pct} - s_{pt}^{HI}) \right)$$

where  $s_{pct} = \frac{E_{pct}}{\sum_{p \in s} E_{pct}}$

where  $s_{pct}$  is the share of 4-digit SITC product  $p$  in the sector  $s$  exports from country  $c$  at time  $t$ .  $s^{HI}$  is the average share of 4-digit SITC product  $p$  in sector  $s$  exports from high income countries at time  $t$ . The greater the value of the index, the more dissimilar is the export structure of country  $c$  and high income countries. If country  $c$  and high income countries have identical export structures, the index will take on the value of zero. If there is no overlap between the two export structures, the index will be equal to 200. Thus the smaller the value of the index, the more sophisticated the export structure of country  $c$ . The average value of the index for developing countries in our sample is 84, while for high income countries it is 69. Following Wang and Wei, we take the log of the index.<sup>33</sup>

To examine the link between FDI and export sophistication we regressed the logged index on the set of explanatory variable listed in equation (2). The results, not reported to save space, indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation between *Sector targeting* and the export dissimilarity index. This is true for contemporaneous or lagged sector targeting (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> lag), and both the developing and high income country subsample.

The results of both exercises are consistent with the findings of Wang and Wei who analyze the overlap between China's export structure and that of high-income countries and also use the unit value to measure the quality of Chinese exports. They conclude that FDI plays no role in increasing the similarity of Chinese exports to those of advanced countries, even though it contributes to raising the unit values of Chinese exports.

To summarize, while the results of our study are consistent with FDI inflows leading to upgrading the quality of the host country's export basket, we find no evidence of FDI increasing the similarity between the developing and the high income export structure.

#### 4. Conclusions

The recent literature has postulated that the quality of a country's export basket has strong implications for its future economic growth (Hausmann et al. 2006). This view has given impetus to policy makers, particularly those in developing countries, to search for measures

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<sup>33</sup> As EDI takes on the value of 0 for some high income countries, we add one before taking the log.

helping exporters climb up the value added ladder. However, little evidence of successful interventions has been discovered.

This study argues that the policies aimed at attracting FDI inflows offer a potential recipe for upgrading export structure in developing countries. The results of our empirical analysis suggest there exists a positive relationship between FDI and export quality. The magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful. Sectors prioritized in national efforts to attract FDI are found to have 11 percent higher unit values of exported products than other sectors. These findings are robust to using two different data sets, including highly disaggregated figures on US imports, and to instrumenting for the choice of priority sectors.

Our findings are in line with the entry of foreign investors leading to an increase in the quality of exports in developing countries both in absolute terms as well as in terms of bridging the distance to the quality frontier. There is little indication, however, that inflows of FDI make a developing country's export structure more similar to that of high income countries. In sum, our findings suggest that attracting FDI inflows can be a viable strategy for low and middle income countries wishing to upgrade the quality of their export basket.

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**Table 1. Unit values of exports in 2000**

<b>SITC code</b>	<b>SITC code description</b>	<b>Median unit value for high income countries/ Median unit value for developing countries</b>	<b>90<sup>th</sup> percentile unit value/10<sup>th</sup> percentile unit value</b>
<b>Products with the highest ratio of the medians</b>			
9610	Coin (other than gold) not being legal tender	48.29	107
7914	Railway and tramway passenger coaches and luggage vans	15.19	839
6253	Tyres, pneumatic, new, of a kind used on aircraft	15.15	33
7938	Tugs, special purpose vessels, floating structures	11.12	454
5157	Sulphonamides, sultones and sultams	10.97	177
7612	Television receivers, monochrome	10.32	92
7126	Steam and other vapour power units, steam engines	9.67	89
7911	Rail locomotives, electric	7.11	722
7764	Electronic microcircuits	7.02	135764
5233	Salts of metallic acids; etc	6.64	432
<b>Products with the median ratio of the medians</b>			
8731	Gas, liquid, electricity meters	1.49	26
7423	Rotary pumps	1.49	33
<b>Products with the lowest ratio of the medians</b>			
6121	Articles of leather and of composition leather	0.51	9
6891	Tungsten, molybdenum, tantalum and magnesium, unwrought	0.50	21
5122	Cyclic alcohols and their halogenated derivatives	0.46	32
2117	Sheepskins and lambskins without wool on, raw	0.45	8
7761	Television picture tubes, cathode-ray	0.41	46
8830	Cinematographic film, exposed and developed	0.38	209
5414	Vegetable alkaloids, natural or reproduced by synthesis	0.33	88
2919	Materials of animal origin, n.e.s.	0.33	43
2652	True hem, raw or processed but not spun	0.26	33
2814	Roasted iron pyrites, whether or not agglomerated	0.19	162

Notes: n.e.s. stands for not elsewhere specified

**Table 2: Summary statistics**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<b>Developing</b>					
In Unit value	135489	1.029	1.848	-11.860	11.110
Sector targeted	135489	0.057	0.233	0.000	1.000
Length of sector targeting	135489	0.309	1.116	0.000	19.000
In Export value product	135489	5.569	2.025	-9.220	2.950
In GDP per capita	135335	7.717	0.897	4.455	9.413
In Population	135489	17.060	1.576	11.961	20.956
Inflation	135489	1.105	5.266	-0.176	237.731
Corporate tax rate	123343	34.175	8.610	15.000	75.000
<b>High income</b>					
In Unit value	150302	1.519	1.890	-9.634	11.252
Sector targeted	150302	0.032	0.175	0.000	1.000
Length of sector targeting	150302	0.249	0.887	0.000	21.000
In Export value product	150302	-4.449	2.246	-9.220	3.733
In GDP per capita	150302	9.742	0.524	7.737	10.708
In Population	150302	16.325	1.262	12.384	18.659
Inflation	150302	0.048	0.165	-0.032	3.738
Corporate tax rate	149963	35.081	8.913	9.800	55.000

**Table 3: Unit values and sector targeting**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.103***</b> [0.017]				0.013 [0.017]			
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.084***</b> [0.018]				<b>0.029*</b> [0.017]		
L2. Sector targeted			<b>0.069***</b> [0.021]				<b>0.037*</b> [0.019]	
L3. Sector targeted				<b>0.047**</b> [0.021]				<b>0.044*</b> [0.024]
L. Export value	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	0.019*** [0.002]	0.019*** [0.002]	0.020*** [0.002]	0.021*** [0.002]
L. GDP per capita	0.143*** [0.012]	0.142*** [0.012]	0.141*** [0.011]	0.138*** [0.012]	0.237*** [0.020]	0.237*** [0.020]	0.228*** [0.020]	0.217*** [0.019]
Population	-0.657*** [0.068]	-0.639*** [0.068]	-0.609*** [0.067]	-0.627*** [0.070]	-0.335*** [0.068]	-0.339*** [0.068]	-0.349*** [0.067]	-0.330*** [0.068]
Inflation	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.000]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.008 [0.015]	0.008 [0.015]	0.010 [0.015]	0.006 [0.014]
Observations	135489	135489	119526	112255	150302	150302	143094	140047
R-squared	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 4: Unit values and the length of sector targeting**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Length of sector targeting	<b>0.072***</b> [0.012]				0.016 [0.012]			
L. Length of sector targeting		<b>0.065***</b> [0.014]				<b>0.024*</b> [0.015]		
L2. Length of sector targeting			<b>0.063***</b> [0.019]				0.029 [0.020]	
L3. Length of sector targeting				<b>0.047**</b> [0.021]				0.025 [0.028]
L. Export value	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.002]	0.019*** [0.002]	0.019*** [0.002]	0.020*** [0.002]	0.021*** [0.002]
L. GDP per capita	0.143*** [0.012]	0.142*** [0.012]	0.142*** [0.011]	0.138*** [0.012]	0.238*** [0.020]	0.238*** [0.020]	0.228*** [0.020]	0.217*** [0.019]
Population	-0.659*** [0.068]	-0.642*** [0.068]	-0.617*** [0.068]	-0.632*** [0.070]	-0.335*** [0.068]	-0.338*** [0.068]	-0.348*** [0.067]	-0.330*** [0.068]
Inflation	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.000]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.008 [0.015]	0.008 [0.015]	0.010 [0.015]	0.006 [0.014]
Observations	135489	135489	119526	112255	150302	150302	143094	140047
R-squared	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Length of sector targeting is the number of years the country-sector cs has been targeted by the country's IPA in year t. Length of sector targeting equals zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Length of sector targeting, export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 5: Are sectors with higher unit values of exports chosen for targeting?**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.059***</b> [0.020]	<b>0.059***</b> [0.020]	<b>0.057***</b> [0.021]	<b>0.061***</b> [0.021]	0.019 [0.019]	0.019 [0.019]	0.020 [0.019]	0.017 [0.020]
1 year before sect. targ.	-0.018 [0.036]				-0.031 [0.031]			
1 and 2 years before sect. targ.		-0.011 [0.021]				-0.011 [0.026]		
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ.			-0.014 [0.018]				-0.001 [0.021]	
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ.				0.002 [0.017]				-0.012 [0.019]
L. Export value	-0.005** [0.002]	-0.005** [0.002]	-0.005** [0.002]	-0.005** [0.002]	0.005** [0.002]	0.005** [0.002]	0.005** [0.002]	0.005** [0.002]
L. GDP per capita	0.104*** [0.009]	0.104*** [0.009]	0.104*** [0.009]	0.104*** [0.009]	0.232*** [0.014]	0.232*** [0.014]	0.232*** [0.014]	0.232*** [0.014]
Population	-0.009 [0.007]	-0.009 [0.007]	-0.009 [0.007]	-0.008 [0.007]	0.110*** [0.017]	0.110*** [0.017]	0.109*** [0.017]	0.110*** [0.017]
Inflation	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.041*** [0.015]	0.041*** [0.015]	0.041*** [0.015]	0.041*** [0.015]
Observations	135489	135489	135489	135489	150302	150302	150302	150302
R-squared	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82
Test of equality of coeffs F-stat	4.33	8.36	10.77	7.80	2.21	1.01	0.67	1.46
p-value	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.01</b>	0.14	0.32	0.41	0.23

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The variable "1 and 2 years before sect. targ." is a dummy variable equal 1 in year t-1 and t-2 if targeting of sector started in year t, and 0 otherwise. The other versions of this variable are defined in an analogous way. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 6: Is it about FDI or any investment? Controlling for gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in the sector**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.116***</b> [0.017]				0.021 [0.018]			
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.077***</b> [0.017]				<b>0.039*</b> [0.021]		
L2. Sector targeted			<b>0.063***</b> [0.018]				<b>0.055**</b> [0.024]	
L3. Sector targeted				<b>0.055***</b> [0.021]				<b>0.075**</b> [0.033]
L.GFCF	-0.001 [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	-0.002** [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	-0.002** [0.001]	-0.002** [0.001]	-0.002** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]
L. Export value product	0.061 [0.068]	0.061 [0.068]	0.033 [0.061]	0.050 [0.067]	0.098*** [0.017]	0.098*** [0.017]	0.105*** [0.017]	0.117*** [0.017]
L. GDP per capita	0.132*** [0.014]	0.129*** [0.014]	0.115*** [0.014]	0.114*** [0.014]	0.230*** [0.022]	0.231*** [0.022]	0.231*** [0.020]	0.217*** [0.020]
Population	-0.848*** [0.073]	-0.811*** [0.073]	-0.781*** [0.073]	-0.822*** [0.076]	-0.317*** [0.072]	-0.329*** [0.073]	-0.346*** [0.071]	-0.312*** [0.072]
Inflation	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	0.003 [0.015]	0.002 [0.015]	0.005 [0.015]	0.002 [0.014]
Observations	79281	79281	70543	66799	112062	112062	106624	104192
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.82	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.86

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. GFCF, export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 7: Are the effects stronger for differentiated products and final goods?**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.077***</b>				<b>-0.032*</b>			
	[0.021]				[0.017]			
Sect targ* <b>diff product</b>	0.025				<b>0.045*</b>			
	[0.025]				[0.027]			
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.066***</b>				-0.024		
		[0.021]				[0.018]		
L. Sect targ* <b>diff product</b>		0.009				<b>0.065**</b>		
		[0.027]				[0.028]		
Sector targeted			<b>0.039*</b>				0.007	
			[0.022]				[0.018]	
Sect targ* <b>final product</b>			<b>0.097***</b>				0.019	
			[0.027]				[0.025]	
L. Sector targeted				0.023				0.015
				[0.023]				[0.018]
L. Sector targ* <b>final product</b>				<b>0.092***</b>				0.030
				[0.028]				[0.024]
L. Export value	-0.004*	-0.004*	0.019	0.018	0.014***	0.014***	0.179***	0.179***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.017]	[0.017]
L. GDP per capita	0.143***	0.143***	0.142***	0.141***	0.210***	0.211***	0.236***	0.235***
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Population	-0.633***	-0.612***	-0.652***	-0.632***	-0.348***	-0.349***	-0.301***	-0.308***
	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.068]	[0.068]
Inflation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.009
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Observations	111498	111498	135489	135489	130693	130693	150302	150302
R-squared	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.85	0.85	0.83	0.83

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. The dummy for differentiated products takes the value 1 if Rauch (1999) classified the 4-digit SITC code as a differentiated product according to the liberal definition, and 0 otherwise. The dummy for final goods is defined at the 4-digit SITC level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 8: Controlling for the effects of the corporate tax rate**

	Developing countries		High income countries	
	1	2	3	4
Sector targeted	<b>0.156<sup>**</sup></b>		<b>0.425<sup>***</sup></b>	
	[0.064]		[0.110]	
Sector targeted x Tax rate	-0.000		-0.012 <sup>***</sup>	
	[0.002]		[0.003]	
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.235<sup>**</sup></b>		<b>0.229<sup>**</sup></b>
		[0.104]		[0.114]
L. Sector targeted x Tax rate		-0.004		-0.006
		[0.003]		[0.003]
Tax rate	-0.000	-0.000	0.001 <sup>**</sup>	0.001 <sup>**</sup>
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
L. Export value product	0.018	0.019	0.178 <sup>***</sup>	0.179 <sup>***</sup>
	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.018]	[0.018]
L. GDP per capita	0.215 <sup>***</sup>	0.213 <sup>***</sup>	0.242 <sup>***</sup>	0.239 <sup>***</sup>
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Population	-0.177	-0.111	-0.290 <sup>***</sup>	-0.299 <sup>***</sup>
	[0.122]	[0.123]	[0.071]	[0.071]
Inflation	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.010
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Observations	123343	123343	149963	149963
R-squared	0.77	0.77	0.83	0.83

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Tax rate is defined as the highest corporate tax rate prevailing in country c at time t. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table 9: Does sector targeting bring countries closer to the quality frontier?**

	Dependent variable: $\ln(\text{Unit value}_{\text{pct}} / 95^{\text{th}} \text{percentile Unit value}_{\text{pt}})$							
	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeting	<b>0.103<sup>***</sup></b> [0.018]				0.020 [0.018]			
L. Sector targeting		<b>0.084<sup>***</sup></b> [0.019]				<b>0.035<sup>**</sup></b> [0.017]		
L2. Sector targeting			<b>0.069<sup>***</sup></b> [0.022]				<b>0.042<sup>**</sup></b> [0.020]	
L3. Sector targeting				<b>0.048<sup>**</sup></b> [0.022]				<b>0.049<sup>*</sup></b> [0.025]
L. Export value product	0.018 [0.043]	0.017 [0.043]	-0.004 [0.042]	0.000 [0.043]	0.178 <sup>***</sup> [0.018]	0.179 <sup>***</sup> [0.018]	0.179 <sup>***</sup> [0.018]	0.186 <sup>***</sup> [0.018]
L. GDP per capita	0.142 <sup>***</sup> [0.012]	0.141 <sup>***</sup> [0.012]	0.141 <sup>***</sup> [0.012]	0.138 <sup>***</sup> [0.012]	0.236 <sup>***</sup> [0.021]	0.235 <sup>***</sup> [0.021]	0.225 <sup>***</sup> [0.020]	0.214 <sup>***</sup> [0.020]
Population	-0.655 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]	-0.636 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]	-0.608 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]	-0.626 <sup>***</sup> [0.073]	-0.301 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]	-0.307 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]	-0.317 <sup>***</sup> [0.070]	-0.297 <sup>***</sup> [0.071]
Inflation	-0.000 [0.001]	-0.000 [0.001]	-0.000 [0.000]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.009 [0.016]	0.009 [0.016]	0.011 [0.016]	0.006 [0.015]
Constant	7.461 <sup>***</sup> [1.067]	7.195 <sup>***</sup> [1.069]	6.861 <sup>***</sup> [1.047]	6.946 <sup>***</sup> [1.096]	0.606 [0.908]	0.689 [0.905]	0.932 [0.897]	0.649 [0.896]
Observations	135489	135489	119526	112255	150302	150302	143094	140047
R-squared	0.51	0.51	0.55	0.56	0.55	0.55	0.57	0.58

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t to the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution of unit values of product p exported by all countries in the data set in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

## Appendix A: Additional summary statistics and robustness checks

**Table A1: Number of products by sector**

No	NAIC S97	NAICS97 description	Developing countries					High income countries					
			Mean	Std dev	Min	Max	No. of obs.	Mean	Std dev	Min	Max	No. of obs.	
1	221	Utilities*	1.0	0.0	1	1	16	1.0	0.0	1	1	94	
2	311	Food Manufacturing	38.2	21.2	1	76	18604	59.6	17.9	3	82	16196	
3	312	Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing	4.7	2.1	1	8	1644	6.4	1.6	1	9	1763	
4	313	Textile Mills	19.7	8.9	1	34	7685	26.5	7.6	1	39	8019	
5	314	Textile Product Mills	9.9	4.4	1	17	3931	12.6	3.1	1	17	4057	
6	315	Apparel Manufacturing	20.3	6.3	1	30	10537	23.5	4.4	1	30	7995	
7	316	Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing	7.8	3.4	1	13	3633	9.9	2.8	1	13	3243	
8	321	Wood Product Manufacturing	8.8	4.1	1	16	4124	12.7	2.9	1	16	3842	
9	322	Paper Manufacturing	11.1	4.4	1	17	3865	14.7	3.2	1	17	4819	
10	323	Printing and Related Support Activities	4.4	1.6	1	6	1549	5.5	1.1	1	7	1877	
11	324	Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing	5.9	2.2	1	9	2289	7.4	1.5	1	10	2376	
12	325	Chemical Manufacturing	63.5	29.5	1	104	20630	88.2	22.3	1	112	23351	
13	326	Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing	9.5	3.8	1	15	3224	12.5	3.2	1	18	3925	
14	327	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	19.3	8.3	1	29	5684	24.8	5.7	1	33	7227	
15	331	Primary Metal Manufacturing	25.2	10.8	1	42	9284	35.0	9.1	1	45	9628	
16	332	Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing	20.0	8.0	1	30	6968	24.9	5.7	2	31	7620	
17	333	Machinery Manufacturing	49.3	23.4	1	79	13720	70.6	16.5	1	90	21226	
18	334	Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing	23.8	12.4	1	41	7124	35.0	8.9	1	47	9433	
19	335	Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing	11.1	4.9	1	19	3826	15.9	4.0	1	22	4222	
20	336	Transportation Equipment Manufacturing	16.7	8.9	1	33	6252	27.0	7.7	1	38	8356	
21	337	Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing	1.9	0.4	1	3	748	2.0	0.3	1	3	632	
22	483	Water Transportation* Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries	1.0	0.0	1	1	52	1.0	0.0	1	1	182	
23	512	Industries	1.0	0.0	1	1	100	1.0	0.0	1	1	219	
Total							13548						15030
							9						2

Note: The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum are measured across country-sectors and years

\* NAICS sector 221 covers utilities; in the study we use only one product from this sector SITC 3510 Electric current

\* NAICS sector 483 covers Water transport; in the study we use only one product from this sector SITC 7933 Ships, boats and other vessels for breaking up

**Table A2: Number of observations by country**

Developing countries									
No.	Country	Years		No. of sectors		No. of products		No. of observations	
		First	Last	Min	Max	Min	Max	Total	Targeted
1	Albania	1992	2000	8	18	24	73	467	0
2	Algeria	1984	2000	13	19	32	91	1132	0
3	Argentina	1984	2000	19	21	241	491	6932	0
4	Armenia	1994	2000	2	14	2	38	152	0
5	Bangladesh	1987	2000	2	5	2	12	83	0
6	Belize	1984	2000	4	10	6	23	219	0
7	Benin	1993	2000	3	9	5	14	62	0
8	Brazil	1984	2000	19	22	445	566	9140	0
9	Bulgaria	1986	2000	19	21	227	385	4541	0
10	Burkina Faso	1999	2000	1	1	1	1	2	0
11	Cambodia	1995	2000	6	10	21	39	194	194
12	Cameroon*	1984	1999	7	12	19	33	437	0
13	Central African Republic*	1984	2000	1	6	1	8	82	0
14	Chad*	1984	2000	1	2	1	5	38	0
15	Chile	1984	2000	17	20	91	358	4266	169
16	China	1987	2000	20	23	504	602	8093	0
17	Colombia	1984	2000	13	14	82	209	2589	0
18	Congo, Dem. Rep.	1984	2000	4	9	12	27	329	0
19	Congo, Rep.*	1986	2000	2	7	5	17	154	0
20	Costa Rica	1984	2000	11	21	45	151	1562	155
21	Czech Republic	1994	2000	18	19	433	440	3059	163
22	Côte d'Ivoire	1984	2000	11	19	41	72	964	396
23	Djibouti*	1986	1986	1	1	2	2	2	0
24	Ecuador	1984	2000	12	20	41	174	1687	0
25	Egypt, Arab Rep.	1984	2000	14	21	63	263	3093	0
26	El Salvador	1984	2000	7	15	14	63	637	44
27	Equatorial Guinea*	1986	2000	1	2	2	3	40	0
28	Ethiopia*	1984	2000	5	9	15	24	355	0
29	Fiji	1984	2000	3	12	14	53	527	196
30	Gabon*	1984	2000	3	8	6	17	183	0
31	Gambia, The	1984	2000	1	3	1	5	56	0
32	Georgia	1995	2000	7	14	13	64	269	0
33	Ghana	1984	2000	5	12	12	41	401	31
34	Guatemala	1984	2000	8	18	32	102	1206	0
35	Guinea-Bissau	1988	2000	1	9	1	14	51	0
36	Guyana	1996	2000	1	2	1	3	9	0
37	Haiti*	1984	2000	8	18	12	71	550	0
38	Hungary	1984	2000	15	16	234	353	5450	0
39	Iran, Islamic Rep.	1984	2000	6	21	18	257	1599	0
40	Jamaica	1985	2000	1	4	1	12	88	0
41	Jordan	1984	2000	10	19	24	108	1104	438
42	Kazakhstan	1994	2000	13	20	68	272	1155	349
43	Kenya	1984	2000	10	18	40	71	895	0
44	Korea, Rep.	1984	2000	19	22	391	550	8728	0
45	Kyrgyz Republic*	1996	2000	11	19	39	89	332	0
46	Lao PDR	1995	1999	1	4	1	4	9	0
47	Latvia	1993	2000	11	14	61	158	929	0
48	Lebanon	1989	1994	18	20	80	116	587	0
49	Libya*	1984	2000	6	13	11	46	467	0
50	Lithuania	1993	2000	18	21	122	278	1715	919
51	Macedonia, FYR	1994	2000	17	19	121	160	1026	0
52	Madagascar	1984	2000	5	11	12	57	586	0
53	Mali*	1989	2000	1	9	4	15	110	0
54	Mauritania	1986	2000	1	4	2	7	64	37
55	Mauritius	1984	2000	6	19	16	76	860	0
56	Mexico	1984	2000	20	21	278	531	7476	0
57	Moldova	1995	2000	7	7	21	39	176	0
58	Mongolia	1994	2000	6	9	16	35	165	146
59	Mozambique	1986	2000	5	12	12	35	356	39
60	Nicaragua	1984	2000	1	11	4	36	279	0
61	Oman	1991	2000	15	20	61	138	984	236
62	Pakistan	1984	2000	18	20	106	193	2592	581
63	Panama	1984	2000	8	8	41	111	1488	0
64	Peru	1984	2000	16	20	107	230	2783	0
65	Poland	1986	2000	7	8	87	112	1531	0
66	Romania	1991	2000	20	21	264	405	3579	0
67	Samoa	1984	2000	1	2	1	6	52	2
68	Senegal	1984	2000	4	10	16	26	358	19
69	Slovak Republic	1994	2000	20	21	451	480	3261	0

The table continues on the next page

**Table A2 continued**

No.	Country	Years		No. of sectors		No. of products		No. of observations	
		First	Last	Min	Max	Min	Max	Total	Targeted
70	Slovenia	1993	2000	20	20	431	452	3529	1398
71	South Africa	1984	2000	20	22	233	540	6538	0
72	Sudan*	1984	2000	3	9	14	25	321	0
73	Suriname*	1984	2000	2	8	7	14	159	0
74	Thailand	1984	2000	6	8	49	158	2057	0
75	Togo*	1984	2000	1	8	2	11	116	0
76	Tunisia	1984	2000	17	18	69	256	3272	871
77	Turkey	1984	2000	20	21	193	518	7188	0
78	Uganda	1984	2000	1	4	4	12	120	6
79	Uruguay	1984	2000	16	20	125	257	3450	0
80	Venezuela, RB	1984	2000	15	21	95	297	3835	1386
81	Zambia	1986	2000	4	11	9	27	262	0
82	Zimbabwe	1984	2000	1	9	1	51	295	0
<b>Total</b>								<b>135489</b>	<b>7775</b>
<b>High income countries</b>									
1	Australia	1984	2000	20	21	349	565	8695	1803
2	Canada	1984	2000	22	23	513	581	9553	187
3	Cyprus	1984	2000	17	21	69	159	2071	0
4	Denmark	1984	2000	18	20	292	388	6325	0
5	Finland	1984	2000	20	22	344	532	8133	0
6	France	1984	2000	12	13	281	304	4921	0
7	Greece	1984	2000	21	22	240	463	6440	1322
8	Iceland	1984	2000	10	19	39	91	1016	128
9	Ireland	1984	2000	12	13	185	249	4079	0
10	Israel	1984	2000	16	18	155	268	4042	0
11	Italy	1984	2000	22	23	590	644	10489	0
12	Japan	1984	2000	22	22	574	599	9991	0
13	Kuwait*	1984	2000	16	21	45	214	1494	0
14	Malta	1984	2000	18	20	50	127	1758	0
15	Netherlands	1984	2000	15	16	449	515	8476	0
16	New Zealand	1984	2000	18	21	180	398	5027	0
17	Norway*	1984	2000	21	23	327	491	7590	0
18	Portugal	1984	2000	19	21	299	517	7792	0
19	Saudi Arabia	1984	2000	18	22	64	359	3775	0
20	Singapore	1984	2000	20	22	373	555	8719	0
21	Sweden	1984	2000	22	23	484	584	9596	1315
22	Switzerland	1984	2000	21	22	504	597	9645	0
23	United Kingdom	1984	2000	22	23	615	658	10675	0
<b>Total</b>								<b>150302</b>	<b>4755</b>

Note: \* denotes countries with no IPA in 2004.

**Table A3: Unit values and sector targeting, excluding lagged export value as control variable**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.103***</b> [0.017]				0.017 [0.017]			
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.084***</b> [0.018]				<b>0.033**</b> [0.017]		
L2. Sector targeted			<b>0.069***</b> [0.021]				<b>0.040**</b> [0.020]	
L3. Sector targeted				<b>0.048**</b> [0.021]				<b>0.047*</b> [0.025]
L. GDP per capita	0.143*** [0.012]	0.142*** [0.012]	0.141*** [0.011]	0.138*** [0.012]	0.239*** [0.020]	0.239*** [0.020]	0.229*** [0.020]	0.218*** [0.019]
Population	-0.655*** [0.068]	-0.637*** [0.068]	-0.607*** [0.067]	-0.626*** [0.070]	-0.321*** [0.068]	-0.327*** [0.068]	-0.337*** [0.068]	-0.317*** [0.068]
Inflation	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.000]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.010 [0.015]	0.010 [0.015]	0.012 [0.015]	0.008 [0.014]
Observations	135489	135489	119526	112255	150302	150302	143094	140047
R-squared	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table A4: Clustering standard errors on country-sector combinations**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.103***</b> [0.026]				0.020 [0.025]			
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.084***</b> [0.025]				0.035 [0.026]		
L2. Sector targeted			<b>0.069**</b> [0.029]				0.042 [0.029]	
L3. Sector targeted				<b>0.048*</b> [0.026]				0.049 [0.031]
L. Export value product	0.018 [0.090]	0.017 [0.090]	-0.004 [0.087]	0.000 [0.087]	0.178*** [0.044]	0.179*** [0.044]	0.179*** [0.043]	0.186*** [0.043]
L. GDP per capita	0.142*** [0.019]	0.141*** [0.019]	0.141*** [0.019]	0.138*** [0.019]	0.236*** [0.036]	0.235*** [0.036]	0.225*** [0.037]	0.214*** [0.035]
Population	-0.655*** [0.115]	-0.636*** [0.116]	-0.608*** [0.116]	-0.626*** [0.116]	-0.301*** [0.116]	-0.307*** [0.116]	-0.317*** [0.120]	-0.297** [0.115]
Inflation	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	0.000 [0.001]	-0.001 [0.001]	0.009 [0.019]	0.009 [0.019]	0.011 [0.020]	0.006 [0.018]
Observations	135489	135489	119526	112255	150302	150302	143094	140047
R-squared	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the unit value of exports of the 4-digit SITC product p from country c in year t. The sample covers the years 1984-2000. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. Export value is at the 4-digit SITC level and is measured in current USD. GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars and inflation in percent. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include product-year and country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector level.

**Table A5: Regression on collapsed residuals**

	Developing countries	High income countries
	1	2
Sector targeted	<b>0.195*</b> [0.117]	0.038 [0.244]
Observations	378	73
R-squared	0.01	0.00

## Appendix B: Robustness checks based on 10-digits HS US import data

In this appendix, we examine the robustness of our findings to using more disaggregated trade figures. The finest possible level of aggregation can be found in data for US imports. The NBER Trade Database compiled by Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) classifies US imports by country of origin and type of good at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HS). For each of these categories and source countries, the database provides information on the customs value and quantity of US imports, and the units in which quantities are measured. Examples of 10-digit categories are presented in the table below.

**Table: Examples of 10-digit HS products within two 4-digit SITC categories**

<b>4-digit SITC:</b>	<b>6522</b>	<b>COTTON FABRICS,WOVEN,BLEACH.MERCERIZ.DYED,PRINTED</b>
10-digit HS:	5209420020	WOV FAB COT >=85% COT >200 & <=360 G/M2 YR D C B
	5209420040	WOV FAB COT >=85% COT >360 G/M2 YR DF CL BLUE DENM
	5209420060	WOV FAB COT =>85%, OTHER DENIM, >200 BUT <360 G/M2
	5209420080	WOVEN FABRIC =>85% COTTON,OTHER DENIM, >360 G/M2
<b>4-digit SITC:</b>	<b>6539</b>	<b>PILE &amp; CHENILLE FABRICS,WOVEN OF MAN-MADE FIBRES</b>
10-digit HS:	5801310000	WOV PILE & CHENILLE FAB OF M-MADE FIBER UNCUT PILE
	5801320000	WOV PILE & CHENILLE FAB OF M-MADE FIB CUT CORDUROY
	5801330000	WOVEN PILE & CHENILLE FABRICS OTHER WELT PILE FAB
	5801340000	WOV PILE & CHENILLE WARP PILE FAB EPINGLE (UNCUT)
	5801350010	WOV PILE & CHEN WARP PILE FAB CUT >271 GRAM METER
	5801350020	WOV PILE & CHENLE WARP PILE FAB CUT, <=271 G/M2
	5801360010	WOV PILE CHENILLE M-MADE FABRICS YRN ONE SIDE ONLY
	5801360020	W P F & C F OT F HD 5802 & 5806 MMF C F W C Y 1 SD

Note: There are 361 10-digit HS categories in the 4-digit SITC code 6522 and 8 in 6539 in our sample. The concordance and descriptions are from [www.internationaldata.org](http://www.internationaldata.org).

The 10-digit HS classification includes 21741 codes, of which we observe 17720 codes in our sample covering the 1989-2006 period (these are all the years for which the data are available at the HS 10-digit level, as posted on [www.internationaldata.org](http://www.internationaldata.org)). The sample includes 76 developing and 23 high income countries. The higher level of disaggregation of the HS data (relative to the SITC data) means that it is not computationally feasible to include product-year fixed effects as was done in our baseline specification (equation 1). Therefore, rather than controlling for the average price of a given product in a given time period, we normalize the unit value of exports by the average price of a given product observed in given year. More specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$\ln \text{Relative\_unit\_value}_{pct} = \alpha + \delta \text{Sector\_targeted}_{sct} + \pi \ln \text{Export\_value}_{pct-1} + X_{ct} \theta + \gamma_{cs} + u_{pct}$$

where

$$\ln \text{Relative\_unit\_value}_{pct} = \ln \left( \frac{\text{unit\_value}_{pct}}{\frac{1}{C} \sum_{all\ c} \text{unit\_value}_{pct}} \right)$$

The dependent variable  $Relative\_unit\_value_{pct}$  is defined as the unit values of 10-digit HS product  $p$  exported by country  $c$  to the US at time  $t$  normalized by the average unit value of product  $p$  exported to the US at time  $t$  by all countries in the relevant sample. Thus, when we consider the developing country subsample, the relevant average unit values is calculated based on exports of developing countries, and in the case of high income country subsample the average is taken over exports of high income countries. The specification controls for the lagged exports to the US of product  $p$  by country  $c$ , sector targeting and country-level controls defined as before. As in equation 1, we include country-sector fixed effects in the model and cluster standard errors at the country-sector-year level.

Although we expect results similar to those obtained before, we do not necessarily expect the results to be identical. The key difference between this data set and the data set used previously (besides the level of aggregation) is the destination of exports. Our baseline data cover worldwide exports of each country (which includes developed and developing country markets), while the current data are restricted to exports destined only for the US market.

The estimation results, presented in the first four columns of Table B1, confirm our earlier conclusions in the developing country subsample. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the sector being targeted by an investment promotion agency and the relative unit values of exports. The coefficient on sector targeting is statistically significant at the one percent level in the first three specifications and at the five percent level in the fourth model. The magnitude of the effect is about half the size of the magnitudes found in the baseline Table 3. These results are consistent with a positive impact of FDI inflows on the quality of exports originating in developing countries.

Our previous conclusions do not hold, however, for high income countries. While before we found a positive (though not very robust) relationship between sector targeting and quality of exports from high income countries, the data on exports to the US suggest the opposite pattern. The regression results presented in the last four columns of Table B1 are consistent with FDI inflows being correlated with lower unit values of exports from industrialized countries. Thus rather than indicating quality upgrading, these results are in line with the presence of multinationals leading to more efficient production allowing exporters to sell their products at more competitive prices.

One may be concerned about a potential correlation between changes in export unit values and the likelihood of an industry being chosen as a priority sector by an investment promotion agency. To examine this possibility, we repeat the exercise presented in Table 5. We modify the baseline specifications from Table B1 by adding an additional regressor which takes the value of one for the year immediately preceding the first year of targeting sector  $s$  by country  $c$ , and zero otherwise. In the second column, we repeat the exercise asking whether targeted sectors exhibit higher unit values during the two-year period preceding targeting. In the next two columns, we consider the three- and the four-year period prior to targeting. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the additional dummy variable would indicate that targeted sectors had higher unit values (relative to other sectors) even before targeting started.

The results for developing countries, presented in the first four columns of Table B2, provide some support for our concern about sectors with higher export unit values being chosen as priority sectors by investment promotion agencies in developing countries. We find that the dummy variables for the period prior to targeting bear the same sign as *Sector targeted* and are statistically significant in three of four specifications. In the first two specifications, the F-test reported at the bottom of the table

indicates that the hypothesis of no difference between the coefficients on the dummies and *Sector targeted* cannot be rejected. In contrast, in column 3 and 4, we reject the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients, which suggests that targeting does make a difference. When we consider high income countries (columns 5-8), we again find that dummy variables for the period prior to targeting bear the same sign as *Sector targeted* and are statistically significant in all four specifications. Although the coefficients on the dummies are smaller than the coefficients on *Sector targeted*, the difference is not statistically significant. Given these mixed results, we take the endogeneity concern seriously and implement an instrumental variable approach.

To implement the IV approach, we need an instrument that would affect the choice of targeting but would not affect the unit values of exports directly. We believe that investment promotion agencies learn from each other's experiences, and hence we built our instrument set based on the decisions of other IPAs on whether or not to target a particular sector. We use the third lag of the decisions and weight the choices made by other IPAs by how similar they are to the country in question in terms of geographic location, income or language. The rationale for doing so is that IPAs are more likely to mimic the actions of other agencies in countries that are more similar in terms of the level of development and geographic location or countries with which they share linguistic ties. They may also pay more attention to the targeting decisions of more populous countries. Being concerned about the diversion effects of investment promotion policies, we excluded neighboring countries when building the instrument set. Our instruments are constructed as follows:

$\ln(\text{No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by the income gap})_{cst-3} = \ln(\sum_{\text{all } k \text{ in the same region}} \text{Same target}_{ckst-3} * (\text{GDP per capita}_{kt-3} / \text{GDP per capita}_{ct-3}))$

where  $\text{Same target}_{ckst} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if countries } c \text{ and } k \text{ both target sector } s \text{ at time } t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\ln(\text{No. of countries with the same official language targeting the same sector, weighted by distance})_{cst-3} = \ln(\sum_{\text{all } k} \text{Same target}_{ckst-3} * \text{Same official language}_{ck} * \text{Distance}_{ck})$

where  $\text{Same official language}_{ck} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if countries } c \text{ and } k \text{ both have the same official language} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$\text{No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by population})_{cst-3} = \sum_{\text{all } k \text{ in the same region}} \text{Same target}_{ckst-3} * (\text{Population}_k / \sum_{\text{all } k \text{ in the same region}} \text{Population}_k)$

Data on the bilateral distance (simple distance between most populated cities, expressed in kilometers), contiguity and common official language are from CEPII.<sup>34</sup> Geographic regions are defined based on the World Bank classification and include: Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and high income countries. Real GDP per capita figures in constant prices (Laspeyres) is from the Penn World Table 6.3.

As before, the specifications include country-sector fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered on country-sector-year combinations.

<sup>34</sup> The data can be downloaded at: <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm>

Starting with the regressions for developing countries, the first stage results in the top panel of Table B3 indicate that IPAs are more likely to choose as a priority industry a sector that is targeted by other countries located in the same geographic region. As expected, we find that IPA choices are more likely to be affected by the actions of countries at the similar level of development and more populous countries. Further, the choice of priority sectors also seems to be influenced by the choices of countries that share the same official language. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the one or the five percent level in all the specifications. The F-statistics suggest that our instruments are good predictors of the targeting choices. Hansen's J test does not cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. Moving on to the second stage, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the *Sector targeted* variable (contemporaneous or lagged) and quality of exports in all eight specifications. In all cases, the estimated effect is statistically significant at the one percent level.

The IV approach confirms the OLS finding for the high income country subsample, though the targeting effect is found to be less robust when we take endogeneity into account. In all regressions, presented in Table B4, we find a negative coefficient on targeted sectors, but it is statistically significant only when the contemporaneous effect is considered. Again the F-statistics indicate that the instruments are good predictors of the targeting choices, and the Hansen test does not reject the validity of the instruments.

**Table B1: Baseline specification: 10-digit HS imports to the US**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeted	<b>0.040</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.013]				<b>-0.051</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]			
L.Sector targeted		<b>0.046</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.013]				<b>-0.030</b> <sup>**</sup> [0.013]		
L2.Sector targeted			<b>0.045</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.015]				<b>-0.023</b> <sup>*</sup> [0.013]	
L3.Sector targeted				<b>0.034</b> <sup>**</sup> [0.015]				-0.019 [0.014]
Observations	389462	428478	353872	306130	781805	840778	730342	650611
R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the relative unit value of exports of the 10-digit HS product p from country c in year t to the United States. The trade data are available for 1989-2006. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. All specifications control for lagged exports at the 10-digit HS level measured in current USD, lagged GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars, population size and inflation. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. All regressions include country-sector fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table B2: Are sectors with higher unit values of exports chosen for targeting?**

	Developing countries				High income countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sector targeting	<b>0.046</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	<b>0.053</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	<b>0.061</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.015]	<b>0.061</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.016]	<b>-0.056</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	<b>-0.064</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	<b>-0.079</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	<b>-0.090</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.015]
1 year before sect. targ.	0.024 [0.018]				<b>-0.033</b> <sup>*</sup> [0.020]			
1 and 2 years before sect. targ.		<b>0.029</b> <sup>**</sup> [0.014]				<b>-0.050</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.015]		
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ.			<b>0.035</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.012]				<b>-0.073</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.014]	
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ.				<b>0.029</b> <sup>**</sup> [0.012]				<b>-0.078</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.012]
Observations	389462	389462	389462	389462	781805	781805	781805	781805
R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Test of equality of coeffs Fstat	1.36	2.32	3.47	5.61	1.18	0.77	0.17	0.76
p-value	0.24	0.13	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.02</b>	0.28	0.38	0.68	0.38

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the relative unit value of exports of the 10-digit HS product p from country c in year t to the United States. The trade data are available for 1989-2006. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The variable "1 and 2 years before sect. targ." is a dummy variable equal 1 in year t-1 and t-2 if targeting of sector started in year t, and 0 otherwise. The other versions of this variable are defined in an analogous way. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. All specification control for lagged exports at the 10-digit HS level measured in current USD, lagged GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars, population size and inflation. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. All regressions include country-sector fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level..

**Table B3: Instrumental variable approach. Developing countries**

	First stage dependent variable							
	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
L3. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by the income gap	<b>-0.027**</b> [0.013]				<b>-0.056***</b> [0.017]			
L3. No. of countries with the same official language targeting the same sector, weighted by distance	<b>0.114***</b> [0.020]		<b>0.066***</b> [0.019]					
L3. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by population			<b>1.022***</b> [0.252]		<b>1.904***</b> [0.310]		<b>1.331***</b> [0.247]	
L4. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by the income gap		<b>-0.033**</b> [0.013]				<b>-0.059***</b> [0.017]		
L4. No. of countries with the same official language targeting the same sector, weighted by distance		<b>0.118***</b> [0.020]		<b>0.070***</b> [0.019]				
L4. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by population				<b>0.961***</b> [0.249]		<b>1.885***</b> [0.310]		<b>1.284***</b> [0.246]
	Second state dependent variable: ln(relative unit value)							
Sector targeted	<b>0.747***</b> (0.173)		<b>0.646***</b> (0.135)		<b>0.520***</b> (0.118)		<b>0.559***</b> (0.141)	
L. Sector targeted		<b>0.509***</b> (0.142)		<b>0.525***</b> (0.122)		<b>0.589***</b> (0.127)		<b>0.558***</b> (0.144)
Observations	246109	238136	246096	238120	246096	238120	246096	238120
F- test	<b>78.66</b>	<b>17.37</b>	<b>84.28</b>	<b>18.84</b>	<b>93.60</b>	<b>18.74</b>	<b>89.41</b>	<b>27.35</b>
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Hansen test	0.09	0.13	1.36	0.19	0.28	0.13	n.a.	n.a.
p-value	<b>0.77</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.67</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.72</b>	n.a.	n.a.

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable in the second stage is the log of the relative unit value of exports of the 10-digit HS product p from country c in year t to the US. The trade data are available for 1989-2006. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. All specifications control for lagged exports at the 10-digit HS level measured in current USD, lagged GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars, population size and inflation. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

**Table B4: Instrumental variable approach. High income countries**

	First stage dependent variable							
	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted	Sector targeted	L. Sector targeted
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
L3. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by the income gap	<b>0.106</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.012]				<b>0.092</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.030]			
L3. No. of countries with the same official language targeting the same sector, weighted by distance	0.005 [0.012]		0.013 [0.013]					
L3. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by population			<b>1.094</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.220]		0.213 [0.412]		<b>1.122</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.219]	
L4. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by the income gap		<b>0.101</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.012]				<b>0.086</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.029]		
L4. No. of countries with the same official language targeting the same sector, weighted by distance		0.000 [0.012]		0.007 [0.013]				
L4. No. of countries within the same geographic region targeting the same sector, weighted by population				<b>1.058</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.217]		0.219 [0.406]		<b>1.070</b> <sup>***</sup> [0.216]
	Second state dependent variable: ln(relative unit value)							
Sector targeted	<b>-0.106</b> <sup>*</sup> (0.063)		<b>-0.209</b> <sup>**</sup> (0.092)		<b>-0.118</b> <sup>*</sup> (0.066)		<b>-0.203</b> <sup>**</sup> (0.094)	
L. Sector targeted		-0.105 (0.071)		-0.093 (0.092)		-0.103 (0.073)		-0.091 (0.092)
Observations	548934	531038	548916	531015	548916	531015	548916	531015
F- test	<b>152.56</b>	<b>36.94</b>	<b>152.07</b>	<b>12.57</b>	<b>152.40</b>	<b>33.85</b>	<b>151.98</b>	<b>24.63</b>
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Hansen test	2.30	0.24	0.75	0.29	3.78	0.09	n.a.	n.a.
p-value	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.62</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.77</b>	n.a.	n.a.

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable in the second stage is the log of the relative unit value of exports of the 10-digit HS product p from country c in year t to the US. The trade data are available for 1989-2006. Sector targeted is a dummy taking one if the country-sector cs was targeted by the country's IPA in year t, and zero if the sector was not targeted in year t or if the country did not have an IPA in year t. The targeting information is available at the 3-digit NAICS 1997-level. All specifications control for lagged exports at the 10-digit HS level measured in current USD, lagged GDP per capita is measured in current US dollars, population size and inflation. Export value, GDP per capita and population all enter in natural logs. LX means lagged X periods. All regressions include country-sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-sector-year level.

