Points of Contact: Engaging with Classical Authors in Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*

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Abstract

This thesis investigates allusions to classical authors in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius. I focus upon select tragedies of Seneca, Lucan's *Bellum Civile*, Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, Vergil's *Georgics*, Horace's *Odes*, and Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*. Allusions to these works appear throughout the *Consolatio*. I also suggest that the two speaking characters of the work—Philosophy incarnate and Boethius as he depicts himself in prison—tend to voice allusions to these classical authors differently. Frequently, Philosophy corrects the classical text and posits the influence of a monotheistic God. In contrast, the prisoner tends to identify with the classical work and sometimes also with its author. Readers can better understand the *Consolatio* through close attention to the ways its characters employ allusions to the classical past. First, we can appreciate the influence of the late antique world on the composition; it is interested in classical models, but deviates from their examples. Second, we can more fully appreciate the dialogic character of the work; there is a secondary level of debate between the characters in the different ways in which they allude to classical poets. Third, we gain a sharper sense of the poetic texture of the work.

Dedication

For Lucy R. Minor—we miss you.

Introduction

1. Premise

This thesis investigates allusions to classical authors in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* of Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.[1] Within this project, I define an allusion through three specifications. First, I focus on lexical similarity between the *Consolatio* and the given classical text. A suitably learned reader, whether in the sixth century or today, could be sensitive enough to such similarities to recognise an allusion to a classical text. Second, I provide a justification for Boethius turning to each of the classical authors examined. The poets to whom Boethius alludes fit with his circumstances in various ways; I see biographical similarity, generic modelling, and literary inspiration as justifications. Third, the lexically similar phrases or sequences indicated have a limited attestation in extant Latin literature before Boethius, and at times only in the author to whom I suggest Boethius alludes.

For instance, there are only two attestations of ***radix*** in close proximity to ***diffundo*** in all extant Latin literature: once at Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* 1.352-3, and once at *Consolatio* 3.11.21. At other times, there are three or four attestations of the diction which I focus upon. For example, there are four attestations of ***flebilis modus*** in Latin literature. Horace writes *tu semper urges* ***flebilibus modis*** "you, however, never cease…with tearful verses" (*Odes* 2.9.9). Perhaps responding to Horace, Seneca writes, *tunc solamina cantibus* / *quaerens* ***flebilibus modis*** / *haec Orpheus cecinit Getis:* "then looking for solace in song Orpheus in

[1] The text of the *Consolatio* is taken from Moreschini's Teubner edition (2005), while the base translation is Walsh's Oxford World's Classics version (1999), drawing an occasional phrase from the translations of Slavitt (2008), or Stewart and Rand's Loeb edition (1918), revised by Tester (1973). At times, the Loeb translation sounds dated, whereas Slavitt renders a more readable translation for a modern audience but also sacrifices some closeness to the Original. On the whole, I find Walsh to be the most balanced. He also tends to translate the poetic sections into a form of rhyme, thus retaining some sense of the many metres of the *Consolatio*. I have occasionally modified his version; if the diction I highlight is the same in the *Consolatio* and the classical text, I make sure that the translation uses the same word to reflect the parallel. Finally, unless otherwise specified, text and translation of all classical authors is taken from their individual Loeb editions.

tearful measures sang these themes to the Getae:" (*Herc.O.* 1090-1096). Cicero, after quoting some lines of Pacuvius, writes *haec cum pressis et **flebilibus modis**, qui totis theatris maestitiam inferant, concinuntur, difficile est non eos, qui inhumati sint, miseros iudicare* "such words when chanted in the tearful mode, suited to inspire whole audiences with sadness, make it difficult to avoid the thought that all who are unburied are wretched—" (*Tusc.* 1.106.6).[2] Finally, Boethius writes *quondam funera coniugis* / *vates Threicius gemens,* / *postquam **flebilibus modis*** / *silvas currere mobiles,* / *amnes stare coegerat* "of old, the Thracian poet mourned his wife's unhappy death; his tearful lays had earlier forced woods to shift at speed; made streams to linger in their course;" (*Cons.* 3m.12.5-7). Whether the phrase or diction appears just once, or several times, before Boethius, I assign significance to analogous context in addition to lexical similarity. In the example of ***flebilis modus***, I see the closest contexts as the three poetic attestations of the phrase. Boethius and Seneca discuss the example of Orpheus along with the overlapping diction, and Horace depicts his addressee as a similar eternal mourner. Due to these similarities, I would like to see an instance of multiple reference around *Odes* 2.9.9, *Hercules Oetaeus* 1090-1096, and *Consolatio* 3m.12.5-7, which I shall explore further in subsequent chapters. However, I would not see an allusion to Cicero as likely in this case. Aside from writing in prose, Cicero is not discussing Orpheus or a similar eternal mourner. Rather, he is describing the manner in which Pacuvius' tragedy was recited to elicit a certain reaction from the audience. I shall return to the significance of the *Tusculanae Disputationes* below.

There are clear pitfalls to my approach. First, the loss of so much Latin literature, and second, the possibility that Boethius makes such allusions in an unconscious manner. First, on the loss of literature; because of this loss, we cannot know whether other examples of the phrases which I isolate once existed and hence could have been known to Boethius and his

[2] Text and translation are from the Loeb edition of King (1927).

readership. Recognising this drawback, I have only included passages which meet all three of the conditions which I stated on page 3. Namely, lexical similarity between the *Consolatio* and the given classical text, rationale for Boethius to turn to the classical author (such as biographical similarity or generic modelling), and limited (or exclusive) attestation of the lexically similar phrases in authors preceding Boethius. My goal is not, and indeed could not be, to 'prove' that these were allusions intended by Boethius or definitively recognised by his readers. Rather, I hope to elucidate the effect which noticing such allusions has on our understanding of the *Consolatio*, its characters, and its form. Second, it is possible that Boethius does not intend to allude to a given author but rather unconsciously echoes an earlier work. As I shall discuss presently, Boethius experienced an exemplary education and, in addition to his political career, was a dedicated scholar. It is thus likely that, in building an in-depth familiarity with classical poets, he could employ similar wording to them without trying to implicate a particular work as a model. This is an inescapable reality, but I have tried to account for it in setting the conditions mentioned above for what I consider to be an allusion.

Moreover, it is also possible that ancient and modern readers were reminded of the passages which I put in conversation. Thus, even if we cannot say that Boethius, as the creative author of the *Consolatio*, intended to make these associations, contemporary readers might have done so, and might have understood the *Consolatio* in a new way as a result. Indeed, while such intertextualities do not constitute the dominant voice of this late antique text, my goal is to bring together the fragments of classical authors within the *Consolatio* to gain a better understanding of the ways this lesser voice can impacts the work's interpretation.

Before moving forward, I would like to highlight a further element of my argument. In genre and form, the *Consolatio* is clearly a dialogue between Boethius as he depicts himself

in prison, and Philosophy, the superhuman incarnation of the discipline, who comes to console the prisoner in his time of need. Beyond the apparent dialogic form, I see a further layer of debate below the surface of the text through the allusions. By analysing passages which I consider instructive, I shall show that the two speaking characters of the work, Philosophy and Boethius, allude to classical authors in internally consistent, but often divergent ways. In general, when Boethius makes an allusion to a classical figure, he adopts the stance or worldview of that author. In contrast, when Philosophy refers to a classical author, she tends to correct his perspective, especially by contrasting the polytheistic source with her own monotheism. Thus, through allusion, Boethius and Philosophy react to classical sources in different ways. Once again, it is impossible, and indeed not my intention, to 'prove' that Boethius has engineered this dynamic. However, I do believe we as readers can better understand the layers of dialogue within the *Consolatio* by noticing it. Specifically, highlighting different approaches to classical poetic allusions can be seen as Boethius rigorously evaluating what his past learning—from pagan poetry, to philosophical dialogue, to Christian theology—offers to his dejected mental state.

To distinguish between the extradiegetic author Boethius and the intradiegetic character of Boethius as he depicts himself in in prison, I shall refer to the former as the authorial-Boethius and the latter as the prisoner-Boethius. This is not just a distinction in terms but reflects the core of how I read the *Consolatio*. If we recognise it as the creative work of the authorial-Boethius, we can say that the author chooses which speaker voices a given sentiment. An extension of this is that there may be meaning to which speaker voices a given allusion. Relatedly, the way in which a speaker voices a given allusion—adopting the stance or image, correcting it, etc.—is worthy of further analysis. I shall say more about this in the following sections but for now I turn to Boethius' education. Since I am suggesting that he

could allude to classical authors in this sophisticated manner, it is necessary to examine how he would have gained this familiarity.

Initially, I provide a brief historical background to contextualise Boethius' life, major works, and fall from grace. I then locate the *Consolatio* within its Christian literary context and within the history of dialogue. Next, I situate my approach to allusion in the *Consolatio* within the theory of allusion and provide an overview of my methodology. I conclude with a close reading of a *Consolatio* passage which is relevant to my method.

2. Background

A) Boethius' Education and Major Works

The details of Boethius's education remain obscure, but it is clear that his guardian, the aristocratic Quintus Aurelius Memmius Symmachus, provided for his exemplary philosophical instruction.[3] Boethius is also likely to have read the major Latin poets in the course of his education, as well as mastering Greek.[4] I focus on readerly recognition of allusion rather than authorial intention, which is harder to reconstruct. Nevertheless, I do make educated deductions about possible authorial intent based upon what we know Boethius read in the course of his education. It is also useful to reflect upon Boethius' literary ambitions—ambitions which were cut short by his death sentence.

Boethius planned to translate and harmonize all of Plato and Aristotle.[5] Of course, his death sentence meant that he could not complete this ambitious project. However, he was able to make significant progress, especially in the *De Differentiis Topicis*, which translates Aristotle's logical works.[6] This translation is just one example of a work devoted to logic;

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[3] O'Donnell (2022, 75-76).
[4] Marenbon (2003, 11). Boethius likely did not study in Greece proper, though he spoke as if he had, according to Moorhead (2009, 29).
[5] De Rijk (1964, 144), Marenbon (2003, 17).
[6] Marenbon (2003, 18) says that Boethius is likely to have translated all of the logical works, though a translation of the *Posterior Analytics* does not survive in the Middle Ages.

Boethius also produced translations and commentaries on logical problems.[7] One such commentary was on Cicero's *Topica*, which I shall say more on below. It is also worth mentioning Boethius' instrumental impact upon medieval education. Boethius coined the term *quadrivium*, indicating the study of the four primary liberal arts: arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy.[8] Today, we possess only the textbook on arithmetic, the *De Arithmetica*, in full, and most of the *De Musica*. Alongside the commentaries, translations, and educational texts, Boethius produced five theological treatises and the *Consolatio Philosophiae*. In order to contextualise the significance of the theological treatises, or *Opuscula Sacra*, clearly, it is necessary to turn to the sources on Boethius' fall. This is because there was once a debate about Boethius' authorship of these treatises until the discovery of a new source on Boethius' demise: the *Anecdoton Holderi*.

B) Sources on Boethius's Fall

The events surrounding the demise of Boethius c. 524-526 will never be transparent. What we do know is that Boethius fell dramatically out of favour with King Theodoric, the Ostrogothic ruler of Italy, and was sentenced to death.[9] While some have suggested that Boethius only faced house arrest, or was not imprisoned at all, it is a premise of this dissertation that Boethius wrote the *Consolatio* from prison in Pavia.[10] Because of his death sentence, Boethius knew that the *Consolatio* would be his final work. These extreme circumstances must have influenced his choice of allusive texts for the *Consolatio*.

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[7] Conte (1994, 715), Marenbon (2003, 14).
[8] O'Daly (1991, 11).
[9] An informant called Cyprian seems to have brought false witnesses against Boethius after he supported a senator, Albinus, against the charge of undermining Theodoric to the Emperor Justin. However, as Reiss (1981, 38) notes, contemporary sources, such as Procopius' *History of the Gothic Wars*, or Cassiodorus' *Variae Epistolae* provide very limited material, and may have been influenced by the account of events as narrated within the *Consolatio*.
[10] Reiss (1981, 46) does not believe Boethius was imprisoned. Courcelle (1967, 332) and Harpur (2006, 46) suggest that Boethius was under house arrest. Chadwick (1981, 225-226) argues that Boethius was imprisoned in a cell, which Shanzer (1984, 365) agrees is the most likely option.

Scholars have attempted to explain Boethius's downfall through a variety of causes. Part of the difficulty in understanding his fall from grace lies in the paucity and quality of sources which discuss his fate. One major, but fraught, source is the *Anonymus Valesianus* II, a chronicle which mentions Boethius in chapters 85-92. As these chapters cover Boethius's downfall and death, *Anonymus Valesianus* II must have been written after 526 but is difficult to date more specifically within the sixth century.[11] According to the author of this text, Boethius was jailed for providing legal counsel to another senator, Albinus. This Albinus had been falsely accused by Cyprian, an informant, of colluding with Byzantium against Theodoric's rule in the West. Boethius took up the cause of senatorial freedom and, according to the text, made a dramatic statement which sealed his fate, *tunc Boethius patricius, qui magister officiorum erat, in conspectu regis dixit: "falsa est insinuatio Cypriani; sed si Albinus fecit, et ego et cunctus senatus uno consilio fecimus; falsum est, domine rex"* "the patrician Boethius, who was master of ceremonies, said in the king's presence: 'the charge of Cyprianus is false, but if Albinus did that, so also have I and the whole senate with one accord done it; it is false, my Lord King'" (*AV* 2.85).[12] The document goes on to explain that Cyprian produced false witnesses against Boethius and Albinus, which provided Theodoric with a pretext to imprison both men. While *Anonymous Valesianus* II provides an account of Boethius's downfall, it is a strongly biased work, written by a professed Catholic who provides a religious explanation for events, identifies as Roman (and thus against Gothic rule), and employs a one-sided viewpoint throughout.[13] Thus, while it is a valuable testament to those who viewed Boethius as a martyr for the senatorial, Roman cause, it is unreliable in its account of Boethius's fall due to its own biases.

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[11] Burns (1982, 100) argues for composition c. 540, while Navarro and Hernando (2009, 252) do not specify further than the sixth century.
[12] Text and translation from Rolf (1934).
[13] Croke (2003, 357).

Two other crucial sources are the *Variae Epistulae* of Cassiodorus, and his now-lost *Gothic History*. As has long been noted, Cassiodorus makes no mention of Boethius's fall in either source. These writings are noteworthy for this very absence, however, which has itself been interpreted in opposite ways. Some argue that Boethius was a relative of Cassiodorus, while others contend that the latter was directly involved in Boethius's downfall.[14] If Cassiodorus and Boethius were related, the former opinion goes, then Cassiodorus engages in a "conspiracy of silence" meant to suppress any unfavourable blowback from his relative's fall by omitting Boethius's demise from his work. For those who take the opposite approach and believe that Cassiodorus had a hand in Boethius's dramatic shift in fortune, his absence from Cassiodorus' works indicates the propagandistic intent of the *Variae*, which can also be detected in the letters written by Cassiodorus to Boethius after his death, which only mention moments of the latter's support for Theodoric.[15] Indeed, Cassiodorus is likely to have taken over the offices of *magister officiorum* immediately after Boethius's demise, perhaps therefore indicating that he was willing to toe the party line of Theodoric's court.

Cassiodorus' now-lost *Gothic History* is only preserved by Jordanes' summary in the *Getica*. Even in this condensed form, the work covers enormous ground from the legendary Gothic king Berig (circa 2nd c. C.E.) to Belisarius' defeat of the Ostrogoths c. 539 C.E. Despite including this period including Boethius's rise and fall, he is never mentioned. Thus, as with the *Variae*, any inference about Boethius, or Cassiodorus' relationship to him, is necessarily an *argumentum ex silentio*. We can assume that Boethius's death was a polarizing issue with enormous consequences upon court life, but it is impossible to judge Cassiodorus' relationship to Boethius from these texts alone.

[14] O'Donnell (1979, 29) and Shanzer (1984, 355) believe he was probably a relative.
[15] Bjornlie (2012, 163).

Likewise, whether the *Ordo generis Cassiodororum*, also known as the *Anecdoton Holderi*, was written by Cassiodorus or not, it represents another crucial source on Boethius's downfall. As mentioned above, it is also significant in our understanding of the works Boethius wrote before the *Consolatio*, specifically the *Opuscula Sacra*. The *Anecdoton* is an excerpt from Cassiodorus' memoirs. It does not mention the *Consolatio Philosophiae* by name, but it attributes the authorship of the *OS* (also known as the *Tractates*) to Boethius. This attribution makes it impossible to believe that Boethius did not write both the *Consolatio* and the *Opuscula Sacra*, the five short theological treatises noted above. They might have been intended for his inner circle rather than a wider audience and seem to have been published by John the Deacon (elected Pope John I in 523).[16] The treatises are as follows: *OSI, De Trinitate*, *OSII, Utrum Pater et Filius*, *OSIII, Quomodo Substantiae*, *OSIV, De Fide Catholica* and *OSV, Contra Eutychen*. Marenbon has shown that Boethius's chief innovation in the *OS* was his application of Aristotelian logic, as advanced by Neoplatonists, to theological problems.[17] The *OS* were influential from the dawn of the Middle Ages down to the twelfth century as reference texts and centres of philosophical debate.[18] The question of Boethius's private faith is connected to the authorship of these treatises and shall be addressed below, but I now return to the debate over their authenticity.[19]

The discovery of the *Anecdoton Holderi* by Alfred Holder, and its subsequent publication by Hermann Usener in 1877, effectively ended the debate over the authorship of the *OS*, as the fragment clearly ascribes to Boethius the composition of …"*librum de sancta trinitate"*, i.e. the *De Trinitate*. Before its publication, the almost universal position of nineteenth-century scholars was that the two worldviews, one explicitly Christian (*OS*) and one omitting

[16] Marenbon (2003, 66). It is also possible that John I published the *Tractates* after Boethius' death as a counterpoint to the more pagan *Consolatio* and to show that Boethius was a committed Christian.
[17] Marenbon (2003, 68).
[18] Erismann (2009, 155-156).
[19] For the most recent treatment of the history of this debate, see Moreschini (2024, 68-81).

explicit Christian allusion (*Consolatio*), could not be reconciled and that thus the two works must have been written by two different authors.[20] Once again, scholars are divided over what the *Anecdoton Holderi* tells us about Boethius's relationship to Cassiodorus. However, the *Anecdoton Holderi* confirms Boethius' authorship of the *Opuscula Sacra*. As a result, the *Anecdoton Holderi* is a landmark source in Boethian studies.[21] This discovery continues to hold relevance today, including for the argument which I shall advance. O'Daly provides an apt discussion of this matter:

> It is not surprising that, as a layman from a Christian intellectual family, he [Boethius] should compose theological treatises which address questions of Christology, the doctrine of the Trinity, the historical content of Christian faith, and the nature of goodness. … But it is no more surprising that much of Boethius' literary activity should have concerned itself with the non-Christian tradition. It was not an activity motivated by any need to achieve a synthesis between secular and Christian literature and thought. The two elements—the Christian and the secular—were seen as complementary. The value of classical literature in the education of the Christian was perceived and accepted: it alone provided the training in eloquence and literary style which was prized and necessary for social and political success, as well as for a clerical career. Classical philosophy is the counterpart, not the rival of Christian theology, and both cultivate spiritual liberation and intellectual illumination.[22]

Before the *Anecdoton Holderi*, scholars believed that the *Consolatio* was not Christian enough to have been written by the author of the *OS*. The supposed division between pagan and Christian work was a problem of modern interpretation and was not indicative of how Boethius saw his own intellectual activity. Indeed, this fact has strong relevance to my reading of the *Consolatio*, since, with Boethius' authorship of the *OS* and *Consolatio* established, we can better understand the mingling of classical and Christian, theological and

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[20] As Chadwick (1980, 551-552) notes, Nitzsch is emblematic of this view, expressed in *Das System des Boethius und die ihm zugeschriebenen theologischen Schriften: eine kritische Untersuchung* (1961). Stewart (1891, 139) in "Boethius, an essay" adopted a milder approach, believing that only the fourth tractate was not genuine, a view which he revised by 1918, with the publication of his Loeb edition.

[21] Shanzer (1984, 358).

[22] O'Daly (1991, 9-10).

philosophical views in the author's final work. By speaking with Philosophy incarnate, Boethius (as the prisoner and as the author) is not rejecting his faith; rather, we can see him exploring the insights of his philosophical learning to determine their use to him in the extreme circumstances he faces.

So far, I have surveyed the most important sources which could shed light on Boethius's downfall, the *Anonymus Valesianus*, *Variae*, *Getica*, and *Ordo generis Cassiodororum* / *Anecdoton Holderi*. As I hope to have made clear, none of these works elucidates the facts surrounding Boethius's demise, leaving scholars to propose different explanations of the particulars. Some argue that the Albinus affair was a useful pretext for Theodoric, who had grown (or long been) jealous of Boethius.[23] Moreover, Boethius's own family, the Anicii, had long been Catholics who were in conflict with Gothic Arianism. Through his marriage and close association with the Symmachi, Boethius might have inadvertently made himself a target of Theodoric.[24]

It has also been suggested that Boethius may have worked as an emissary to Byzantium. While this role would have presumably been to benefit Theodoric's court, it also strengthened Boethius's connections to the rival seat of power and could have made Theodoric feel that he was being endangered by Boethius's Roman, senatorial ties.[25] Some have also suggested that the premature death of Theodoric's son-in-law, Eutheric (in 522), and the subsequent unease surrounding his successor, made him turn on supposed enemies within.[26] Along these lines, Chadwick has argued that the election (in 523) of Pope John I, to whom Boethius was close, could have stoked Theodoric's fears of a reunification of the empire under Catholic orthodoxy.[27] While none of the historical accounts surveyed provide a clear picture of

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[23] Bjornlie (2012, 138-144). He also suggests (147) that Boethius was imprisoned with Albinus, who could have been responsible for the subsequent publication of the *Consolatio*.
[24] Bjornlie (2012, 134).
[25] Matthews (1981, 29), O'Daly (1991, 2).
[26] Bjornlie (2012, 139).
[27] Chadwick (1981, 53), if John I is the same deacon to whom Boethius dedicates his *Tractates*.

Boethius' downfall, we should nevertheless understand that the *Consolatio* existed in a late antique time period which saw no trouble in mixing Christian and classical texts. To this end, I shall now investigate some of the most important literary influences upon the work: contemporary Christian literature and the tradition of philosophical dialogue.

C) The Impact of Christian Literature on the *Consolatio*

Boethius lived in a distinctive period, during which the classical era as usually defined had ended, but the conventions of the medieval future had not yet solidified. One area in which we can see this dynamic is the realm of education; routinely, classical learning was adopted in the education of Western Christians without conflict.[28] At the same time, early Christians reflected the cultural and religious shifts of the time in their own literary activity. By the time Boethius composed the *Consolatio*, a new tradition of Christian literature had already been developing for three hundred years. Thus, while my focus is upon allusions to a sample of classical texts, we need to examine the impact of early Christian writers upon the *Consolatio*.

First, we can consider the general environment of Late Antiquity. Like O'Daly and Chadwick, Donato sets the *Consolatio* in the context of a late antique world which was used to combinations of Christian and pagan thought. Donato's interpretation of the end of the *Consolatio* is especially important for my reading of the work. He believes that Philosophy is aware of the limitations of her discipline: even she cannot access the perspective of God.[29] By demonstrating these limitations to the prisoner, Philosophy shows him that he can pray to attain the next life with the One, even if her reasoning alone cannot facilitate this goal. According to Donato's interpretation, Philosophy is not making her limitations known in an ironic spirit, as Relihan has argued. Relihan reads the influence of Menippean satire in the

[28] Fox (1986, 275-278).
[29] Donato (2013, 188-189).

prosimetric *Consolatio* as an invitation to see irony in general, and the failure of philosophy in particular (I shall return to Relihan's perspective below).[30] In contrast to Relihan's view, Donato believes that Philosophy remains an authoritative and respected figure. I would follow Donato's view and his emphasis upon the coexistence of 'pagan' and Christian literature, or in my terms, between classical and monotheistic literature.

Second, we can search for individual early Christians who impacted Boethius. Among early Christians, Augustine was the most important literary predecessor for Boethius, and there is no doubt that Boethius was intimately familiar with many of Augustine's works. As Chadwick notes, *OSIV,* the *De Fide Catholica*, is clearly indebted to various writings of Augustine, but especially to his *City of God* and *Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love*.[31] Given the evidence of Boethius' deep appreciation for Augustine in the *Tractates*, it is unsurprising that some have argued for Augustine's influence upon the *Consolatio*, too.[32] On this count, Reiss has argued that the progression of the *Consolatio* is indebted to the *Confessions*: "in its movement from the personal to the universal and from passion to reason, the *Consolation* may be seen in terms of a familiar pattern, found, for instance, in the well-known *Confessions* of Augustine, written at the turn of the fifth century."[33] Similarly, Upsher has recently argued that the closest model for Philosophy is to be found in Monica, Augustine's mother.[34] Crabbe goes beyond the *Confessions*, seeing the influence of (and perhaps a challenge to) Augustine's *De Ordine* and *Contra Academicos* in the *Consolatio*.[35] Boethius then seems to have known and been influenced by Augustine both in his theological *Opuscula Sacra* and in the philosophical *Consolatio*. Beyond Augustine, we have limited evidence of the impact of other early Christian figures. In fact, Marenbon and Bradshaw

[30] See Relihan's *The Prisoner's Philosophy* (2006) for this view.
[31] Chadwick (1981, 175).
[32] Silk (1939, 19-39) argues that the *Consolatio* is the sequel to Augustine's *Soliloquia*.
[33] Reiss (1982, 88).
[34] Upsher (2009, 93-125).
[35] Crabbe (1981a, 254).

argue that Boethius did not read any of the church fathers aside from Augustine.[36] We can be sure that Boethius knew Macrobius, who is probably better classed as a Christian Neoplatonist. Boethius and Symmachus commented upon a manuscript of Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis.*[37] While their commentary is now lost, Boethius seemed to have been interested in Macrobius' Neoplatonic reading of the dream.[38] Clearly, though, there is limited evidence of other individual early Christian writings upon the *Consolatio*. As a result, we need to contextualise the work from a generic perspective, and in particular the tradition of philosophical dialogue of which the *Consolatio* is an inheritor. In addition to exploring the ways the *Consolatio* adheres to and modifies the origins of the genre in Plato, I shall also touch upon early Christian dialogue to better understand where the *Consolatio* fits in the late antique literary tradition.

D) The Dialogic Form of the *Consolatio*: Plato, Cicero, Minucius Felix and Augustine

Dialogue as a tool for philosophical discussion originates with Plato. Goldhill's *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity* (2009) surveys literary dialogue from the 5th c. BC to 6th c. AD.[39] Averil Cameron's *Dialoguing in Late Antiquity* (2014) attests to the continuity of the tradition of dialogue, in Greek, in the late antique world. On the Latin side, Seth Lerer's *Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in the Consolation of Philosophy* (1985) focuses upon the tradition of Latin dialogue, especially how that tradition informs our reading of the *Consolatio*. Brian Stock also surveys the late antique Latin expression of the tradition of dialogue, but his focus is on Augustine; his *Augustine's Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity* (2010) and *The Integrated Self: Augustine, the Bible, and Ancient*

[36] Marenbon (2003, 13-14), Bradshaw (2009, 109).
[37] Marenbon (2003, 11). The extent of Macrobius' faith is still disputed. See Jones (2014, 151-157) for a summary of the debate. He concludes that Macrobius might have been a Neoplatonist during the philosophy's revival by the scholarch Plutarch.
[38] Marenbon (2009, 2015).
[39] See Cooper and Dal Santo within this volume (2009, 179-181) on the ways Boethius shows awareness of his audience.

Thought (2017) link Augustine's *Soliloquia* with the earlier Latin dialogue tradition. Further, Catherine Conybeare's *The Irrational Augustine* (2006) explores Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues from a similar perspective, stressing the ways in which they rewrite the model of Cicero.

I draw heavily upon Lerer, Stock, and Conybeare's analysis in what follows. Building upon existing treatments of the late antique Latin tradition, I also consider the importance of Greek dialogues which influence elements of the *Consolatio*. Hence, in this section, I shall explore the significance of four key figures: Plato, Cicero, Minucius Felix, and Augustine. Surveying their different approaches will expose the Greek roots of the form before turning to its Republican, and Christian / late antique expressions. Furthermore, given my biographical justification of the authors to whom Boethius alludes, I shall also briefly discuss the lives of Socrates and Cicero in this section.

Plato*: Timaeus, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Meno*

Boethius can be understood to have two points of contact with Platonic dialogue. As mentioned above, we know that Boethius planned to translate all of Plato, indicating his direct knowledge of the corpus. We can also see a second, mediated engagement with Plato through Boethius' interest in Neoplatonism. Both types of contact with Plato, and specifically with the form of the Platonic dialogue, appear within the *Consolatio*. I highlight four of Plato's dialogues, *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Meno*, which influence both large and small elements of the *Consolatio*.

We shall begin with *Timaeus*, as Boethius makes an explicit mention of this dialogue in the voice of Philosophy:

> *Sed cum, uti in **Timaeo** Platoni, inquit, nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus divinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem repperire mereamur? — Invocandum, inquam, rerum*

> *omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium. — Recte, inquit; ac simul ita modulata est:*
>
> 'But since', she added, 'as my dear Plato maintains in his *Timaeus*, support from heaven should be invoked even in the smallest matters, what do you propose that we do now, so that we may deserve to discover the abode of that supreme good?' 'We must invoke the Father of all things,' I replied, 'for if this were not done, we should not base our search on the appropriate first step.' 'Well said,' she replied. With that she hymned the following verses:
>
> (*Cons.* 3.9.32-33)

When a character of the *Consolatio* cites a Platonic dialogue, we can feel confident that the authorial-Boethius knew of the work, and we can perhaps also suggest that he wrote with an audience with a knowledge of the dialogue in mind. Beyond this citation of the *Timaeus*, others have noted that Philosophy's cosmology is essentially that of Plato's dialogue.[40] Indeed, 3m.9, the 'verses' implied by *ac simul ita modulata est*, summarise the *Timaeus*.[41] Some scholars have suggested that 3m.9 is the central poem of the *Consolatio*, drawing upon two primary arguments. First, it represents the point at which the discussion becomes positive and thus can be seen as a turning point in the prisoner's healing.[42] Second, the majority of the metres of the *Consolatio* (seven of the thirteen) appear in verse sections which seem to be arranged around 3m.9, though 3m.5 represents the numerical centre of the work.[43] If one accepts the centrality of the poem, then its overt reliance upon one of Plato's dialogues reiterates this element of the *Consolatio*'s generic identity at a crucial juncture within the narrative.

Indeed, the prose section following 3m.9, 3.10, may be influenced by the depiction of the soul's fall in the *Phaedrus*.[44] Another section of the *Consolatio* apparently indebted to this

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[40] Claassen (2007, 2).
[41] Chadwick (1981, 233), Crabbe (1981a, 258).
[42] Crabbe (1981a, 258).
[43] See Gruber on 3m.9 as the centre (2006, 275-277) but Blackwood against Gruber on 3.5 as the central poem (2015, 142-157).
[44] O'Daly (1991, 166).

dialogue is 4m.1, which imagines the ascent of the soul past mortal, human limits.[45] Reiss makes a separate but crucial point, connecting the *Phaedrus* myth to Ratio in Augustine's *Soliloquia*, on which more below.[46] Beyond the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*, there is also likely influence from the *Phaedo*. One problem which this dialogue poses for a Christian is its depiction of the transmigration of souls; Boethius cannot adopt this doctrine literally.[47] He seems to apply the doctrine allegorically instead, suggesting that men who do not live up to their human capability become animalistic even if they cannot literally transform into animals.[48] While Boethius needs to adapt this element of the *Phaedo* to his Christian worldview, there are other concepts which he sems to apply without modification. For instance, he depicts life as a kind of imprisonment (clearly appropriate to his situation) in ways which recall *Phaedo* 62b and 82e, especially in 1m.7, 3m.5, and 3m.12.[49] Such similarities extend to prose, when, for example, 3.1.3 might recall *Phaedo* 60bc in the way it depicts imprisonment within a cage and cave.[50] Reiss and Claassen also suggest a more diffuse influence of the *Phaedo*, where it is not tied to specific passages, but can be seen in Philosophy's insistence that the prisoner's way forward is to look within and recollect teachings he had once known.[51]

We see a similar type of influence from the *Meno*. This dialogue, along with the *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Phaedo*, advances the theme of *anamnesis*, or recollection, which is central to Philosophy's method. Socrates claims that mankind once inherently knew the philosophical truths for which it strives.[52] Thus, education is a process of recollection and striving to remember the knowledge which the soul once possessed. This view of education is

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[45] Crabbe (1981a, 259), O'Daly (1991, 163; 169; 201).
[46] Reiss (1982, 141).
[47] O'Daly (1991, 218).
[48] O'Daly (1991, 67; 207-220).
[49] O'Daly (1991, 97).
[50] O'Daly (1991, 155). Of course, the cave also recalls the cave of *Republic* VII, 514a–520a.
[51] Reiss (1982, 118), Claassen (2007, 2).
[52] Allen (1959, 165), Scott (1987, 346).

clearly applicable to Philosophy's approach to the prisoner, albeit with relevant differences. Philosophy encourages the prisoner to once again act as the highly educated philosopher he once was. For instance, 1m.2 bewails the prisoner's loss of mental ability as soon as Philosophy arrives on the scene. The prisoner thus needs to undergo a kind of double recollection: he once attained something close to full recollection of philosophical truths through his intense study. Now that he is imprisoned and preoccupied by grief, he has lost the insights he once knew along with any future ability to access them through his weakened mental state. Philosophy thus must re-educate the prisoner by encouraging him to recommit to her teachings. Beyond elements of her education which implicate the specific dialogues mentioned, the overarching interaction between the prisoner and Philosophy clearly reflects Platonic dialogue more generally. Philosophy, like a Platonic Socrates, is the dominant, authoritative voice of the dialogue, and the interlocutor, like the prisoner, mostly assents and dissents rather than engaging in independent philosophizing.[53] Of course, as I shall explore in what follows, dialogue continued to be a crucial form for the Latin-speaking / writing world. Thus, we cannot say that the authorial-Boethius draws from Platonic dialogue more than from a Latin dialogue predecessor. However, we can suggest that Boethius, given his intimate knowledge of Platonic dialogue, was in a better position to model his *Consolatio* upon the original conventions of dialogue than other late antique writers who might not have had access to Greek.

Cicero: *De Finibus, Tusculanae Disputationes*

Having examined the general influence of Platonic dialogue upon the authorial-Boethius and suggested some points of influence between specific dialogues and *Consolatio* passages, it is now time to investigate the way this Greek genre made its way to the Latin west. We

[53] Rendall (1977, 166); he explores how *Gorgias* defies these conventions when Socrates turns to monologue at the conclusion of the work.

must then turn to Cicero, the transmitter of the Greek genre to Latin audiences. Levine summarises the transformation which Cicero accomplished thus:

> The literary dialogue provided Cicero with the necessary instrument to propagate Greek thought among his fellow-citizens, and, though this was itself a Greek creation, it became in his hands a highly effective means to Romanize foreign material sufficiently to satisfy domestic standards of propriety that obtained in the case of intellectual pursuits.[54]

Cicero acted as initial transmitter and Romanizer of Greek philosophy and the form in which it was communicated: dialogue.[55] While Cicero wrote much of his philosophy in the genre and format of dialogue, I shall focus upon two works, the *De Finibus* and *Tusculanae Disputationes*. I select these dialogues for two reasons: structure and scope. In terms of structure, both works are five books long, and Crabbe has suggested that the *Consolatio* may owe something of its five-book structure to these dialogues of Cicero.[56] In terms of scope, the *De Finibus* and *Tusculanae Disputationes* address major moral issues, which relates to the ways in which the *Consolatio* addresses major questions of theodicy and human free will.

The importance of the *De Finibus* for the *Consolatio* is indirect; it is difficult to prove that Boethius models specific elements of the *Consolatio* upon the work. Nevertheless, it is a crucial predecessor for the *Consolatio* in several ways. First, the dialogue justifies itself by explicating its ability to edify others.[57] We can relate this concern with the work's educative value to the didactic approach of Philosophy. Second, on the structural level, we see Cicero exploring the arguments of the Epicureans and Stoics before committing himself to Academic Scepticism. This is not dissimilar from the way in which Philosophy depicts Epicureans and Stoics as only getting partially to the truth which Neoplatonic philosophy alone can reveal.[58]

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[54] Levine (1958, 146).
[55] Hösle (2008, 160) argues that Cicero vied with Plato, seeing Roman culture as an improvement upon Plato's depictions of Greek society.
[56] Crabbe (1981a, 243).
[57] See Lerer (1985, 119) on this point.
[58] See *Cons.* 1.3.7ff when Philosophy describes how her garment is disheveled due to philosophical schools grabbing pieces of it.

In the *Tusculanae Disputationes* in particular, we might relate what we know of Cicero's biography to Boethius' circumstances. Cicero's dialogue seems to have been written at his Tusculum villa after the death of his daughter Tullia. In the most general sense, Cicero was a grieving man turning to philosophical learning as a balm for his suffering, not dissimilar from Boethius turning to philosophy in his time of need. Of course, there are obvious differences between the death of one's child and the death sentence Boethius faced, but the impulse to address one's personal concerns through a retreat into philosophizing, especially in a five-book dialogue, is present. Furthermore, Stull has recently suggested that the first Book of the *Tusculans* conspicuously displays deference to Plato's conception of the immortality of the soul.[59] Following this reading, we can see Plato, Cicero and Boethius in an unbroken chain of dialogue from its Greek to Latin and late antique manifestations.

Indeed, Lerer suggests that the *Tusculanae Disputationes* "dramatize the problems of pedagogical authority in a way which looks forward to the dialogues of Augustine and Boethius".[60] According to Lerer, Cicero does not shy away from the limits of human argument but showcases them; the *Tusculans* are texts which show the instability of writing in the form of dialogue. There is a particular tension between dialogue and monologue, especially for the student in the *Tusculans*, who is not convinced of Cicero's method of delivery. For instance, Lerer points to a moment at which the student asks Cicero to clarify his beliefs: *Uberius ista quaeso. Haec enim spinosiora prius ut confitear me cogunt quam ut adsentiar* "explain more fully; for your last remarks are somewhat intricate and compel me to agree before I am convinced" (*Tusc. Disp.* 1.8.132-133). As Lerer suggests, while Cicero would like to continue the exchange of ideas with his interlocutor, the student is confused by the intricacy of Cicero's remarks and prefers for Cicero to deliver a monologue instead. We

[59] Stull (2012, 38).
[60] Lerer (1985, 41).

can connect this relationship to that between the prisoner and Philosophy: the prisoner's silence toward the end of the dialogue does not necessitate his passive fading but can instead be seen as his willingness to become the type of silent reader, in Lerer's terms, which Philosophy encourages.[61]

Minucius Felix: *Octavius*

Before we turn to Augustine, we should contextualise Augustine's influence through a cursory glance at Minucius Felix (c. 2nd / 3rd cn. C.E.) and his single extant work, the dialogue *Octavius*. While the tradition of Latin dialogue had been developed for centuries, Boethius' *Consolatio* is most indebted to the ways Christians developed this literary tradition. Hence, Minucius Felix is crucial; while not nearly as influential or widely-read as the *Soliloquia*, the *Octavius* is the first extant dialogue written by a Christian apologist. The dialogue dramatizes the conversion of the pagan Caecilius after debate with Octavius, a Christian. Minucius Felix himself appears in the dialogue as the judge of the men's speeches. Even if Boethius did not know of the *Octavius*, it is significant as an attestation to the existence of the dialogue form in Latin, and its concern with Christian themes, centuries before the composition of the *Consolatio*. Now to Augustine.

Augustine*: Soliloquia*

Augustine is the most influential transformer of dialogue for the Christian world. As O'Daly has noted, an overarching parallel between the *Consolatio* and the *Soliloquia* is evident in the premise of internal dialogue: Augustine converses with his own reasoning (Ratio) not dissimilarly from the way in which Boethius converses with his own philosophical beliefs in the figure of Philosophy.[62] Augustine depicts himself as the inferior

[61] Lerer (1985, 123).
[62] O'Daly (1991, 22-23).

pupil of Ratio; Lerer has suggested that this depiction is indebted to Cicero.[63] However, there are clear ways in which Augustine goes beyond Cicero within the *Soliloquia*. One notable difference is the way in which Augustine imagines his discussion with Ratio as a silent meditation. Lerer encapsulates the innovation: "he [Augustine] claims to have invented a genre whose achievement was to internalize the process of dialogue by writing fictions of the mind in conversation with itself".[64] This is clearly relevant for Boethius, both as the creative author and as the character of the prisoner within the *Consolatio*. For instance, we hear from the start of the work that Boethius is writing silently; after delivering 1m.1, the author comments *haec dum me cum* ***tacitus*** *ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem* ***stili*** *officio signarem* "these were the silent reflections which I nursed in my heart. My dutiful pen was putting the last touches to my tearful lament…" (*Cons.* 1.1.1). From the beginning of the *Consolatio*, then, Boethius depicts an internal process of silent, written meditation in line with the premise of Augustine's *Soliloquia*.

Furthermore, Conybeare's *The Irrational Augustine* makes an essential point for my understanding of the characters of the *Consolatio*. While she acknowledges that Augustine's patrons might have expected him to write in the form of dialogue, she suggests that Augustine ultimately chooses this form in order to expresses his own liminal position socially and intellectually.[65] Understood in this way, Augustine utilises the instability of the genre to reflect his beliefs as author. For instance, Conybeare notes that, "…within the logic of the genre, he [Augustine] repeatedly resists the authoritative position, staging (as we shall see) a dialectic of subversion".[66] Conybeare is referring to another one of the early dialogues, the *De Academicis*, but we can relate Augustine's authorial positioning to the *Consolatio*. By

[63] Lerer (1985, 49).
[64] Lerer (1985, 51).
[65] Conybeare (2006, 20; 26-27).
[66] Conybeare (2006, 26).

engaging in the genre of dialogue, Boethius mobilizes the form to present and debate different points of view. Philosophy and his prisoner-self reflect different mindsets, and by discussing these mindsets with an interlocutor, the authorial-Boethius can better see the promises and limitations of adopting them.

Conybeare also highlights the Ciceronian context (including the *Tusculanae Disputationes*) of Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues; this speaks to the continuity of the genre in Christian Late Antiquity.[67] At the same time, Augustine goes beyond Cicero, in for instance, his willingness to depict common, ordinary characters from his own time in his dialogues, quite differently from Cicero's inclination to depict interlocutors as realized and famous figures, including those from earlier generations.[68] Augustine's innovations in the genre of dialogue are sure to have influenced Boethius; following Conybeare's reading, Augustine utilises the genre of the work, not just its content, to convey his ideas. Similarly, I suggest that the authorial-Boethius could be utilising the genre of dialogue to stage a second level of debate, through allusion, in which we can continue to see the dialogic form influencing the ways the characters interact.

Stock builds upon Conybeare's analysis in presenting Augustine as aware of and deliberately showcasing the limits of dialogue as a tool to acquire knowledge.[69] Stock suggests that human cognition, as opposed to the superior knowledge which only God can possesses, ultimately fails; this is not dissimilar to the way in which Philosophy cannot lead the prisoner to the truths which only God can reveal after death. Moreover, Stock analyses two strains of inner dialogue at work within the *Consolatio* which are worth repeating: consolation and protreptic. According to Stock, "Book I of Boethius's work is a 'consolation,' in which Lady Philosophy offers the author spiritual 'medicine' to strengthen his soul in the

[67] Conybeare (2006, 24).
[68] Conybeare (2006, 47-48).
[69] Stock (2010, 118-120).

face of adversity. Books 2 to 5 comprise a loosely organized 'protreptic,' in which a number of the traditional themes of this genre are touched upon, including the concepts of freedom, necessity, and providence".[70] Stock's classifications show some of Boethius' originality with the genre of dialogue. If we understand Boethius modelling his inner dialogue on Augustine's *Soliloquia*, we can see a point of departure in Boethius' eclecticism. For, Boethius seems to mix Greek and Latin examples of dialogue, along with consolation literature and protreptic, to transcend his models. In other words, the amalgamation of several generic influences creates a new whole. Nor does the Latin dialogue tradition end with Boethius. O'Donnell has shown that Gregory I's *Dialogues*, through their overtly Christian content, can be seen to develop the dialogue form into a fully Christian expression.[71] Although much later, in the 11th and 12th centuries, perhaps Anselm and Abelard's contributions to the genre are better contextualised as part of an enduring tradition of Christian Latin dialogue. Anselm's dialogues see him converse with a student, thus continuing the tradition of Latin dialogue while foreshadowing Scholastic *disputatio*.[72] Likewise, Abelard's now fragmentary *Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum* attests to the continuity of the genre well into the Early Middle Ages.

Biography and Dialogue: Socrates and Cicero

Before turning to the next section, I would like to conclude this one with some considerations on the biographies of Socrates and Cicero in light of the foregoing analysis. It

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[70] Stock (2016, 122). Boethius also likely cites Aristotle's *Protrepticus* fr. 105D, in the *Consolatio*: *Quodsi, ut Aristoteles ait, Lyncei oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum visus obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis visceribus illud Alcibiadis superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum videretur? Igitur te pulchrum videri non tua natura, sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas* "If, to quote Aristotle, men had the use of Lynceus' eyes, enabling them to see through solid obstacles, would not the celebrated physique of Alcibiades, so very handsome on the surface, seem totally ugly once his inner parts came into view? So what makes you handsome is not your native appearance, but the weak eyes of those who gaze at you" (*Cons.* 3.8.10).
[71] O'Donnell (2005, 205).
[72] Novikoff (2011, 389ff).

is safe to say that the *Consolatio* is indebted to the Socratic method of interactive exposition preserved in the Platonic dialogues and their descendants. We have also seen that Boethius draws inspiration from the *Phaedo*, which notably includes an account of Socrates' death. Socrates is the original philosophical martyr, as even Philosophy herself notes. The prisoner asks Philosophy why she has come to visit him, and she replies:

> *Nunc enim primum censes apud improbos mores lacessitam periculis esse sapientiam? nonne apud veteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certavimus eodemque superstite praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae victoriam mortis me astante promeruit?*
>
> "Do you imagine that this is the first time that philosophy has been assailed by perils in the court of corrupt behaviour? You surely know that in days of old, before the time of my dear Plato, there were many occasions when I launched full-scale warfare on presumptuous stupidity? That in Plato's own day I stood side by side with his mentor Socrates, when he triumphed over an unjust death?"
>
> (*Cons.* 1.3.6)

When Philosophy asks this series of rhetorical questions, she portrays her advent to the prisoner as the natural concomitant of his unjust treatment. Philosophy, as here presented by the authorial-Boethius, also depicts the prisoner as one in a long line of philosophical martyrs beginning with Socrates, the very progenitor of her discipline. If he faced death for his beliefs; the prisoner, as a lover of wisdom and in pursuit of the truth, is facing the same perils with which those before him already contended. It would go too far to suggest that Philosophy is encouraging the prisoner to seek the same end as Socrates. However, by naming him, Philosophy seems to highlight the biographical similarities between the prisoner and the philosopher. This adds credence to my search for autobiographical rationale in the classical authors to whom Boethius alludes; his characters give hints of biographical identification between the prisoner and literary / historical predecessors.

Turning to a Roman context, I would also emphasise parallels with Cicero. As mentioned above, Boethius commented upon Cicero's *Topica*; we have also seen the likely

influence of two of his dialogues, the *De Finibus* and the *Tusculanae Disputationes,* upon the structure and the themes of the *Consolatio*. I shall not investigate any of Cicero's works on the level of allusion in what follows. However, the analysis above should indicate that Cicero's transfer of the dialogue genre to Latin audiences contextualises Boethius' late antique Latin application of this form. Furthermore, his commentary on the *Topica* would indicate that he esteemed Cicero's philosophical pursuits which did not take the form of dialogue. Given such influence, we should dwell a moment upon Cicero's biography. In addition to his literary innovation as the originator of the Latin dialogue tradition, we possess ample evidence of Cicero's death. Having been executed on Antony's orders, Cicero can be seen as a political victim of a tyrant-figure. Moreover, Cicero provides a parallel cultural model to Boethius as both a key intellectual leader and a practitioner of high politics which led to his execution.[73] After Cicero, Minucius Felix, and more importantly, Augustine, Boethius helped to rewrite Latin dialogue for his Christian world.

E) Current Literary Debates on the *Consolatio*

Now that I have located the *Consolatio* within the contexts of early Christian literature and dialogue, I would like to briefly examine ongoing debates within literary studies of the work which form the overall framework for my study.[74] As mentioned above, there was once a stronger question regarding Boethius's authorship of the *Consolatio*, which the *Anecdoton Holderi* effectively ended. Tied to this question is one which still remains, that of Boethius's personal faith. It has been seen as a surprise that Boethius would compose a work in his final days which makes no explicit mention of Christ and turns, as its title suggests, to philosophy over monotheistic religion.[75] However, as others have argued, and as my brief survey of

[73] See Wright (2001, 452).
[74] Scheible's commentary (1972) and Gruber's (first edition 1978) commentary as well as O'Daly's monograph (1991) have explored allusivity in the *Consolatio*.
[75] Shanzer (1984, 358; 362).

Christian literature and dialogue shows, there is no problem with Boethius holding a personal Catholic faith but writing a dialogue with Philosophy as his interlocutor. We need only turn back to the *Soliloquia*, in which Augustine converses with his own *ratio* for a precedent. While Philosophy is of course a different figure, she nonetheless represents a part of the prisoner. In some sense, she could bring any female deity to mind, as other scholars have noted.[76] Thus, instead of trying to argue that Philosophy is modelled upon one figure over another (for instance Hera, Wisdom, Mary etc.), we could instead focus on the role she plays: that of interlocutor in a Platonic-style dialogue. Focusing on the absence of Biblical allusions in the text obscures a delicate ambiguity. For, while there are no mentions of Christ, nothing Philosophy describes contradicts his existence, either.[77] Rather, her particular version of monotheism is equally compatible with Christianity and Neoplatonism. Most recently, Relihan has argued that Philosophy exposes the failings of a pagan worldview and thus impels the prisoner toward a specifically Christian faith,[78] but most have suggested that there is intentional ambivalence.

My view of how Boethius alludes to classical predecessors informs my belief in his continued Catholic faith. As mentioned, I read the authorial-Boethius crafting a subtle debate between Philosophy and his prisoner-self; the disparate ways in which they employ allusions to classical authors consistently reveals Philosophy's monotheistic view in contrast with the prisoner's tendency to identify with classical literary figures. According to my understanding of the text, then, the authorial-Boethius treats pagan, philosophical, and faith-based consolations seriously by contesting them. By seeing where these worldviews overlap, but also by pushing them to their limits, Boethius exploits the full consolatory ability of these

[76] Gruber (2006, 62-71).
[77] Chadwick (1981, 249).
[78] Relihan (2007, 130-136).

systems of interpreting the world. In this way, the authorial-Boethius utilises the genre of dialogue to debate types of consolation in his time of need.

This interpretation also reveals my view on the question of the status of the poems of the *Consolatio*. Until recently, the poems were seen mostly as ornament and decoration for the prose sections which were thought to carry the weight of the philosophical argument.[79] O'Daly and Blackwood's monographs have now shifted focus to the poems.[80] Following this turn and because I attach great importance to Boethius's technique of allusion, I too see the poems as integral to the *Consolatio*, and not mere decoration for its prose. I would not even see them as "refreshment" for the prisoner, as others have, but rather believe they represent a second locus of debate between the two characters, and indeed the traditions and beliefs which they embody.[81]

Indeed, the genre of the work represents another notorious area of debate. I have highlighted dialogue in its pagan and Christian manifestations. At the same time, the prosimetric form of the *Consolatio* has led some to understand it within the tradition of Menippean satire.[82] Varro's *Saturae Menippeae* (now preserved in a highly fragmentary state) introduced the genre into Latin. In its original Greek form, Menippean Satire employed philosophical topics paired with an overtly ironic tone to add humour.[83] Indeed, we have evidence of a late antique prosimetric text with an ironic tone in Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* (c. 420-490). The work imagines that Mercury gives each of the seven liberal arts as servants to his bride Philology; each personified figure then explains her area of expertise to Philology.

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[79] Blackwood (2015) sees a delicate patterning in the *metra* of the *Consolatio* which is integral to the prisoner's healing.
[80] O'Daly *The Poetry of Boethius* (1991); Blackwood *The Consolation of Boethius as Poetic Liturgy* (2015).
[81] Curley (1987, 362) sees the poems as refreshment.
[82] This alternation, as Relihan (1993, 17) notes, is one of the most obvious formal features of Menippean satire.
[83] Relihan (1993, 49), who notes the same effect in Seneca (1993, 19).

Thus, at least in this one instance, we can say that the original tone of Menippean satire continued into Late Antiquity. At the same time, scholars likely go too far in suggesting that the *Consolatio* falls into this category. While it is true that the form of the work is prosimetric, this characteristic alone does not mean that the work is meant to be a Menippean satire, nor that readers are invited to hunt for irony within the work. For the overtly ironic tone needed to understand a work within the genre of Menippean Satire is famously absent from the *Consolatio*. Some have suggested in response to this that by the late antique period, some elements of Menippean satire were played down, particularly overt satiric expression.[84] Some shifting in generic conventions surely occurred over the centuries, but the *De nuptiis* suggests that the ironic tone was still apparent. Thus, my view is as follows: we should appreciate the prosimetric structuring of the *Consolatio* without overvaluing this element to the exclusion of others. On its own, the prosimetric form does not compel me to see the work as Menippean in character, and thus I do not feel inclined to search for irony within the *Consolatio*, either. Relihan is the most vocal exception to this view, as he interprets the aid of Philosophy as an ironic account of her failures and thus reads it as an expression of Christianity's superiority. In contrast, Magee has most recently suggested that the form of the *Consolatio* does not prescribe its content.[85]

Another possible explanation for the prosimetric form of the *Consolatio* is the contemporary view of elements of Christian scripture as prosimetric. Indeed, with the Vulgate more widely accessible by the late fourth and earth fifth centuries, perhaps Boethius was reacting to the Book of Job, which was thought by Jerome to combine poetry and prose.[86] While this is a contested point among modern scholars of the Hebrew text, for my purposes,

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[84] While Herren (2018, 241-242) does not classify the *Consolatio* as a Menippean Satire, he makes the case that by the late fifth century, Menippean Satires had sufficiently departed from those examples in classical antiquity to cohere into a new genre.
[85] Magee (2024, 12-13).
[86] Boethius may have known of Jerome's preface to the Book of Job, in which Jerome discussed its apparent combination of prose and verse.

the crucial point is that Jerome, whom Boethius likely read, held this opinion. Astell has explored the ways in which Boethius, an 'unjustly' suffering man not unlike Job, may have been inspired by this account, perhaps making the Bible a more likely source of inspiration.[87] At the same time, any analysis of the generic character of the *Consolatio* depends on what we emphasise. I have decided to privilege the genre of dialogue over Menippean Satire, as the overall impact of the work, as a conversation between two interlocutors, is more important to our interpretation than the prosimetric form of its delivery.

To conclude, we should also not lose sight of the extraordinary circumstances under which Boethius composed the *Consolatio*. Quite differently from any of his predecessors, Boethius wrote his final work as he was facing a death sentence. His suffering was not hypothetical, and his circumstances meant that he could put the whole range of the teachings and texts he had encountered to the ultimate practical test. We could argue then that some of the uncertain generic identity of the work is due to these unique circumstances; Boethius deploys his literary models through an eclectic mixing of various genres and literary traditions.

3. Allusion Theory

A) History of Allusive Theory

To contextualise my approach to allusions implicating classical texts within the *Consolatio*, it is useful to survey some of the studies foundational to the field of allusion, intertext, and reference. White, a renaissance scholar, demonstrated that imitation was a chief criterion in classical literary theory.[88] Following on, Pasquali's seminal "Arte allusiva" articulated, through a focus on Vergil, that allusions, distinct from mere reminiscences, produce the effect which the author desires only by pointing to specific earlier passages, with

[87] Astell (1994), especially pp. 41-69.
[88] White (1935, 5).

the intent of being evocative.[89] Although he was concerned with Alexandrian poets' allusions to Homer, Giangrande's terminology *oppositio in imitando* or "opposition in imitation" (first coined by Koenraad Kuiper in 1896), explicitly builds upon Pasquali's observations and has been applied to Latin poetry.[90] In the context of analysis of Hellenistic poets engaging with their epic models, *oppositio in imitando* for Giangrande was a literary feature which displayed a reference to a predecessor (imitation) while consciously deviating from it (opposition). Thus, he underscores the same ideas of borrowing and influence. Williams placed the emphasis differently, focusing on how the reader of highly allusive texts would have reacted to the new version of "great scenes from past literature".[91] West and Woodman's influential volume focuses upon *imitatio*, understanding it as a core tenet of Latin literature.[92]

Conte made a crucial distinction in his categorisation of allusion when he distinguished between allusions to specific passages of texts, termed Exemplary Models, and allusions to the Model as Code, which can recall a broader range of ideas or a genre.[93] In this way, Conte turned away from authorial intention, which he maintains is harder to reconstruct, laying the key emphasis on the role of the reader in recognising intertextuality. Thomas further enriched studies of allusion through his terminology of "window reference," which has been developed by Burrow et al. from a subgenre of correction into allusive clusters which enable readers not just to see through a text but to see its layers in new ways.[94] Conte and Barchiesi diverge from Pasquali's emphasis on the author over the reader and note that allusive contact occurs after the poetic model has already become a *topos*.[95] Farrell also made a significant

[89] Pasquali (1942, 275-276).
[90] Giangrande (1967, 85).
[91] Williams (1968, 576).
[92] See for example, Russell's introduction (1979, 1-16) to the volume.
[93] Conte (1986, 31).
[94] Thomas (1986, 188), Burrow et al. (2020, 4).
[95] Conte and Barchiesi (1989, 114).

innovation in his study of the *Georgics* both by revealing Vergil's complex allusive strategy, and by linking this strategy to literary history.[96]

Lyne points to the difficulty of teasing out authorial intentions and thus advocates for intertext over allusion. In the case of *Aeneid* 6.458-460 and Catullus 66.39-40, he argues that an allusion to a light moment of Catullus at a tragic moment within the *Aeneid* can reverse the sense of the *Aeneid* scene, foregrounding irony and subversion.[97] Fowler favours intertextuality over allusion, arguing that authorial intentions are inherently unrecoverable and that the literary system is inherently multiple.[98] Hinds again shifted the emphasis away from authorial intentions by showing the difficulty of demonstrating deliberate and meaningful reference.[99]

Edmunds also focuses upon the reader and the associations he or she makes. Further, he underscores the difference between an authorial persona and the actual author of the text, which is crucial to my understanding of the *Consolatio*, whereby the prisoner-Boethius, although depicting himself in light of his historical circumstances, is not identical with the historical, authorial Boethius.[100] Conversely, Farrell later pointed to a network of intertexts which can reproduce an author's intentions.[101] Harrison has shown the importance of generic signposts especially in Vergil and Horace, and how these depend on the capacity of readers to recognise them, rather than guessing authorial intentions.[102] Most recently, Conte has revised some of his earlier views while maintaining his original outlook. For instance, he has argued

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[96] Farrell (1991, 17).
[97] Lyne (1994, 187). For a counter to this view, see Kraggerud (2017, 212-216): "the original context, *if remembered* should exert no power to change the meaning of Vergil's own context" (author's emphasis, p. 215).
[98] Fowler (1997, 15-16).
[99] Hinds (1998, 48-50).
[100] Edmunds (2001, 63-64).
[101] Farrell (2005, 105-106). See below on Mayer's critique of modern persona theory as applied to ancient texts.
[102] Harrison (2007, 13).

for text as a structural arrangement or system which does not necessarily lose originality in making new meaning.[103]

B) My View of Allusion Within the *Consolatio*

My personal theory of allusion is a liberal one, but for this project, I am interested in readerly recognition of allusions based on what I define as strict lexical resemblance. I have several reasons for this approach: temporal distance, cultural change, Boethius's education, and Boethius's audience. Boethius is often regarded as the last late antique author before the dawn of the Middle Ages. The *Consolatio* was composed between 524-526 AD, some five centuries after the authors to whom I suggest Boethius refers. This temporal distance is compounded by the dramatic cultural change which the late antique world of Boethius's day experienced. The seat of empire had long since moved to the East, and the rapid spread of Christianity had, for 300 years, inaugurated new texts, audiences, and readerly expectations which conflicted with the classical literary past.[104] Boethius was unusual in his time for his mastery of Greek along with Latin, allowing him to access the philosophical and literary traditions of the ancient Greek world in the original.[105] Although he rose to political heights as *magister officiorum* in Theodoric's court, Boethius was a scholar, and as already mentioned, the great project of his life was to translate and harmonize all of Plato and Aristotle.[106] Though his imprisonment would make it impossible to fulfil this goal, Boethius's religious treatises and educational theory, especially the *quadrivium*, nonetheless had a lasting impact on the Middle Ages.[107] It is clear that the target of much of his pre-imprisonment work was an elite, highly educated audience of his peers, and thus we can

[103] Conte (2017, 39).
[104] Stenger (2021, 238).
[105] Moorhead (2009, 15).
[106] Reiss (1982, 53-54; 77; 147) and Chadwick (1981, 135-140). See Marenbon (2003, 17) for a full description of his commentary and translation projects. More recently, see Magee (2024, 28) for the ways these projects can be seen as reflected in the *Consolatio*.
[107] Marenbon (2003, 7).

assume that Boethius also wrote his final work, the *Consolatio*, with an educated audience in mind.[108] As I have shown above, Christians frequently incorporated classical authors into their education. Thus, Boethius' audience—educated contemporaries—could be sensitive to classical allusions in his works.

Of course, as already mentioned, I recognise that not all lexical resemblance is conscious, and that it is impossible to fully recover an author's intentions. However, I shall discuss the possibility of authorial intent throughout this project. My reasoning for this approach is twofold. First, generic or thematic similarity coupled with lexical resemblances which are rare or unparalleled can plausibly suggest that Boethius could have intentionally alluded to one of a limited number of earlier attestations of the phrase. Second, there is a subspecies of career studies as applied to classics evident in these allusions: classicists have shown that Roman poets modelled their careers upon esteemed predecessors, and I see something similar, but separate, in the way the *Consolatio* engages with the careers of the authors to whom it refers.[109] Specifically, I contend that Boethius tends to focus upon moments of different authors' careers which align with his circumstances, as opposed to taking stock of an author's entire literary trajectory. In this way, the authorial-Boethius engages in a kind of autobiographical role-playing.

For example, in my mind Boethius does not just allude to Ovid because the poet ended up in exile; Boethius refers particularly to Ovid's exilic works, which highlight this particular moment in the poet's biography. Thus, the common experiences of displacement and fall from monarchical favour are emphasised by the choice of author and, in Ovid's case, the work to which Boethius refers. While Ovid overlaps with Boethius in this special way, I shall also present rationale for allusions to other authors and works examined in this project. For

[108] Moorhead (2009,15) demonstrates that Boethius was regarded as a man of intellectual distinction.
[109] See Hardie and Moore's *Classical Literary Careers and their Reception* (2010).

example, Seneca's exile and later suicide at imperial urging provide a parallel with Boethius's imprisonment, and his death sentence at the hands of a tyrannical figure. While exile is not completely parallel to imprisonment, we can think of Ovid's relegated status (*relegatus*) as confining him in a similar way. In contrast with the case of Ovid's exilic poetry, one cannot say that Seneca wrote all his tragedies in response to exile or after his implication in the Pisonian conspiracy. Nevertheless, in arguing that Boethius could deliberately choose to allude to Seneca *tragicus* over Seneca *philosophus*, I would posit that the grim tone of the tragic genre, and its depiction of difficult human experiences, provides a rationale. Rather than the moral writings which are concerned with ways through grief, in alluding to tragedy, Boethius highlights the tragic end of the author himself. I am not the first to note that Boethius tends to allude to works or authors who share biographical elements with him.[110] However, I am the first to make this a core element of my sustained engagement with allusions to classical authors in the *Consolatio*.

I focus on allusions to Seneca, Lucan, Lucretius, Vergil, Horace and Ovid, arguing that the works and / or the lives of the authors who composed them, inspired the authorial-Boethius. Joachim Gruber's *Kommentar zu Boethius* De Consolatione Philosophiae (1978, second edition 2006) is a foundational source for my investigation. Indeed, he indexes everything from literary tradition to lexical overlap in his commentary, necessarily leading to concise remarks. All of the allusions which I discuss at length have been identified as some type of borrowing by Gruber; he most often comments something brief such as '*wie*', '*vgl*.,' or '*nach*'. In contrast, in my project, I apply the restrictive conditions stated above coupled with close reading and detailed analysis. In these ways, despite an overlap with Gruber in identification of my cases, my analysis is original.

C) My Methodology

[110] Crabbe (1981, 242).

I have relied upon a number of search engines to ensure, as far as possible, that I have taken into consideration all sources before stating that the allusive phrase is attested only twice in Latin literature. The most important engine for my research has been the BREPOLiS Library of Latin Texts' Advanced Search. Unlike the PHI Latin Library database of texts, which effectively ceases at 200 A.D., the BREPOLiS engine has two late antique sections, *Aetas patrum I* and *Aetas patrum II*, which go down to 500 A.D. and 735 A.D., respectively (and actually continue through *Medii aevi scriptores* and *Recentior latinitas* all the way until 1965). Thus, the allusions which I present take into account other late antique writers. I have used a secondary search engine to corroborate the results of these inputs, most often the PHI Latin Library, as all the classical authors to whom Boethius alludes fall within its chronological bounds.

This is crucial to the validity of my argument. If a phrase is rare in the pagan tradition but conventional in Christian writing, I would be less inclined to see it as an allusion, and more likely to think that the authorial-Boethius had unconsciously employed a Christian element which happened to have an earlier attestation in a pre-Christian text. Along these lines, it is also of the utmost importance that my search engine included Augustine, whose influence on Boethius has been discussed above. If Augustine's influence upon the *Consolatio* could lead to classical phrases also attested in both Augustine's and Boethius' writings, it would be harder for me to argue that Boethius intended to allude to a classical author rather than to Augustine. Thus, I have attempted to account for Boethius unconsciously employing language normal in late antiquity: where there are no further late antique attestations of the relevant phrase, I think it is more likely that readers could have seen classical allusions.

Despite these efforts, it is of course possible that I have missed a source and that my third stated condition, that the allusive phrase only occurs three or fewer times in all of Latin literature, is untrue. Of course, the loss of much Latin literature is again a chief issue.

Likewise, however slim the chance, the discovery of a new text, previously neither preserved nor digitized, could result in another attestation. However, I hope that the two other conditions upon which I rely, that of strict lexical overlap, even if it is not absolutely exclusive to the two authors I have identified, and the thematic similarity of context, could still be persuasive.

Another two crucial elements of my methodology are the applications of narratology and the philosophy of literature to Classics. I shall now highlight the ways in which I have utilised these theories and draw attention to classical scholars operating from similar premises. In the chapters which follow, as mentioned, I draw a key narratological distinction between the prisoner-Boethius (the intradiegetic character within the narrative and first-person speaker of the text) and the authorial-Boethius (the extradiegetic writer of the text outside the narrative).[111] This is crucial to my interpretation of the *Consolatio* broadly and more specifically to how I see allusions operating within it. Boethius the historical figure clearly draws upon his own biography when composing the *Consolatio*, but the work is not autobiographical. Rather, he has chosen to depict a version of himself in the character of the prisoner. Likewise, Philosophy is the prisoner's interlocutor and the other character of the work. While the historical Boethius has created these characters within the text, they are not mere mouthpieces for his own feelings. While the speakers must reflect his sentiments, they do so in nuanced ways. Thus, we as readers may distinguish between two layers of interaction by conceiving of the prisoner-Boethius and Philosophy as characters. On one level, we can see that the authorial-Boethius created the narrative and controls which character voices an allusion at a given moment. On another level, though, this does not diminish the agency of the characters within the text. Clearly, Philosophy is the divine incarnation of all schools of philosophical thought. Of course, as the figure which the

[111] De Jong (2014, 26).

authorial-Boethius has invented, she cannot know more than he does when writing her "lines". But at the same time, within the literary world of the *Consolatio*, there is every reason to believe that this spectacularly knowledgeable and superhuman figure has read all of the authors to whom she refers. The same is true regarding the prisoner-Boethius; although he is stylised and dramatized as a character, he is clearly based upon the historical man and thus of course has 'read' the authors to whom he refers.

To clarify my perspective, I shall present an allusion which I have chosen not to include in my analysis. At this moment in the *Consolatio*, Philosophy and the prisoner are discussing fame. According to Philosophy, even the greatest men have a limited reputational reach. Given the meagre extent of worldly fame, it is not a true good, nor is it something which the prisoner should strive to attain. My reading of the scene which follows is this: as Philosophy makes her argument about fame, she refers to Ovid. If we, or a learned and sensitive audience, recognise(s) the allusion, Philosophy's message becomes complicated. To turn to the allusion itself, Philosophy tells the prisoner:

> *ubi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricii manent,*
> *quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?*
> *signat* ***superstes fama*** *tenuis pauculis*
> *inane nomen litteris.*
> *sed quod decora novimus vocabula*
> *num scire consumptos datur?*
>
> where are the bones of trusty Fabricius now gone?
> Brutus, stern Cato have no place.
> the meagre glory that outlives men marks you down,
> as ciphers, in few letters read,
> does bare acquaintance with illustrious names alone
> impart real knowledge of the dead?
>
> (*Cons.* 2m.7.15-18)

Philosophy asserts that men from the historic past are now unknown, even those who tried to prolong their fame by recording their deeds. On the surface, then, Philosophy seems to dismiss records of one's reputation, as they are ultimately paltry when considered from the

providential and long-term perspective. While this is one message of the lines, Philosophy's language may remind us of the same phrase as it appears in Ovid's *Tristia*, a context which complicates the message.

In contrast to Philosophy, Ovid says that he believes his fame will outlive him, *me tamen extincto* ***fama superstes*** *erit* "yet when I am dead my fame shall survive" (*Tristia* 3.7.50). This same phrase also appears in Horace's *Odes*, which I shall discuss further below. When Philosophy uses Ovid's words, she argues for the opposite outcome to that which he urged, suggesting that records of one's life are valuable. If a reader saw an association with Ovid, he or she could be reminded of Ovid's confidence in his poetry's capacity to leave a lasting record. Of course, there are several ways to interpret this dynamic. It could be that Philosophy has attempted a correction of Ovid. By employing his language within an explication of her monotheistic worldview, she can surpass the insights which Ovid could access and reveals all human glory and suffering as meaningless in comparison with God's eternity. On the other hand, it is also possible that the allusion could make one consider Philosophy's point at the same time as a challenge to it drawn from Ovid's exilic context.

In the former interpretation, Philosophy could want readers to recognise her allusion but to see that she had improved or corrected Ovid's understanding of the world. Thus, a deliberate call-back to his context would overpower Ovid's original, divergent message. In the latter interpretation, we need to consider the allusion on the extra-diegetic level. Specifically, we can see something that Philosophy or the prisoner-Boethius as characters cannot: the authorial-Boethius has (according to my view) chosen for Philosophy to voice this allusion. If we as external readers do not think that she has made a successful correction of Ovid's text, then we may say that the authorial-Boethius intends for readers to question Philosophy's advice by weighing it against a contrasting perspective. This view is not wholly negative for Philosophy; Boethius may be balancing two different perspectives in order to

demonstrate more fully the way in which Philosophy is superior to Ovid, and his polytheistic worldview. However, it is also possible that such an allusion allows the reader, and his or her interpretation of fame, to take the authoritative position. In this reading, the authorial-Boethius leaves it up to the audience to decide how to understand fame: he or she can adopt Philosophy's message at face value, can agree with her message while appreciating the ways in which it overcomes Ovid, or could even read 'against the grain' and side with Ovid's view of everlasting fame over Philosophy's view of its meagre extent.

Moving beyond Ovid, we could also see the same lines as an allusion to the *Aeneid* if we emphasise elements other than *fama superstes*. Specifically, there are dictional overlaps with the start of *Aeneid* Book 7:

> *tu quoque litoribus nostris, Aeneia nutrix,*
> *aeternam moriens* ***famam****, Caieta, dedisti;*
> *et nunc servat honos sedem tuus,* ***ossa****que* ***nomen***
> *Hesperia in magna, si qua est ea gloria,* ***signat****.*
>
> You, too, Caieta, nurse of Aeneas, have by your death given eternal fame to our shores; and still your honour guards your resting place, and in great Hesperia, if that be glory, your name marks your dust.
>
> (*Aeneid* 7.1-4)[112]

Instead of highlighting ***fama superstes***, I have set in bold typeface the words which overlap with other parts of the *Consolatio* passage (2m.7.15-18):

> *ubi nunc fidelis* ***ossa*** *Fabricii manent,*
> *quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?*
> ***signat*** *superstes* ***fama*** *tenuis pauculis*
> *inane* ***nomen*** *litteris.*

Depending upon which elements from the *Consolatio* poem we emphasise, both are allusions which a reader could notice. As was the case with my reading of an allusion to the *Tristia*, I

[112] Text and translation are taken from the Loeb edition, revised by Goold (1916).

also see a contrasting perspective in the *Aeneid* allusion: there, even a humble nurse can win everlasting fame.[113] As such, the preservation of Caieta within the epic would seem to present a perspective on fame opposed to that which Philosophy subscribes.

As stated, I have chosen not to include an allusion to *fama superstes* in my chapter on Ovid for several reasons. First, *fama superstes* occurs in classical Latin outside its attestation at *Tristia* 3.7.50. For instance, Horace uses the exact same phrase at *Odes* 2.2.5 and the context does not, to me, point to Ovid over Horace: Horace is describing the lasting fame of the virtuous Proculeius. I do not think one could convincingly argue that, with the diction and tone being similar, Boethius could expect an audience to recall one first-person poet over the other. Second, as just mentioned, it is also possible for a reader to see an allusion to the *Aeneid* as well as the *Tristia* within the same lines by focusing upon different words. Once again, then, it would be difficult to argue that Boethius intended a reader to see an allusion to the *Tristia* without also discussing an allusion to another, and indeed better-known text, the *Aeneid*.

At the same time, this example raises another point in my methodology of allusion. There is a case to be made for a triadic or tetradic reading in which the authorial-Boethius intends to recall Horace and Ovid (triadic, as the three texts of the *Consolatio*, *Odes*, and *Tristia* are implicated), or to recall Horace, Ovid, and Vergil (tetradic). Each of the classical contexts could be read as a counterpoint to the worldview which Philosophy presents, as each author attests to fame lasting through the ages. In order to address such a reading, I shall sporadically make use of window allusion / multiple reference, or such triadic / tetradic relationships. In those examples, however, there is more diction involved and / or there are generic similarities between the texts being alluded to. For all of these reasons, then, I have chosen to omit analysis of an allusion to *fama superses*.

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[113] Horsfall (2000, 47).

One additional example is useful. In this case, I shall demonstrate an idea which is compelling from the perspective of narratology, but impossible to see as a specific allusion. Here, Philosophy is influenced by a common Lucretian turn of phrase, especially Lucretius' description of a man or principle wandering *a vera longe ratione* "far from true reason." Lucretius repeats versions of this sentiment throughout the *DRN*; each time the phrase caps an example of the infeasibility of a non-Epicurean explanation for the universe.[114] One instance of this phrase appears early in Book 2, as Lucretius is debunking the idea that atoms can stand still. He says if you believe this is true, *avius a vera longe ratione vagaris* "you are astray and wander far from true reasoning" (*DRN* 2.82). Lucretius' use of *vagari* in this iteration of the phrase is telling; someone with a mistaken belief can come to this misunderstanding by wandering to the wrong conclusion.

Thus, the wrong course can be righted through the correct direction of a philosophical teacher like Lucretius. Philosophy uses similar language when she determines the cause of her patient's sickness, clarifying that he has misdirected his own mind, *sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem pulsus es sed aberrasti!* "but this distance you have travelled from your native land is the outcome not of expulsion, but of your wandering astray!" (*Consolatio* 1.5.3). Philosophy's *aberrare* recalls Lucretius' *vagari* as her use of *procul* recalls *longe*. Though these words are not direct matches, the concept is the same; a philosophically confused man drives his own mind away from correct reasoning. The remarks also both address someone in the second person and share the imagery of philosophy as a path. Philosophy could thus be drawing inspiration from Lucretius in a general sense. But, since this is a common Lucretian phrase, it would be wrong to point to a distinct context as the source of her inspiration. Rather, it seems that Philosophy, inheriting Lucretius' role as philosophical doctor, is borrowing a Lucretian technique. Thus, there is something

[114] 1.635, 1.850, 2.229, 2.645, 5.406, and 6.767.

meaningful to be said about Philosophy voicing this example. If the prisoner voiced this phrase, we could still make an argument; perhaps he comes across more clearly as a recovering devotee of philosophy when he is able to voice a Lucretian idea as if he were the instructor. While there are likely relevant meanings and influences, without diction pointing to a unique context—as opposed to a Lucretian tag or characteristic phrase—I am not compelled to see a deliberate choice by the authorial-Boethius. In contrast, I think that readers may want to see Lucretius in the background, adding general colour.

I hope that these examples have demonstrated that I have set strict conditions for what I class as an allusion, but am sensitive to subtler dynamics and do incorporate the idea of triads as well as "glances" in other directions / texts, making use of narratology's application to classical studies. I shall now turn to a few authors who have discussed narratology and related theories in their work to further situate my project. I focus on Susanna Braund's persona theory of satire, Jack Winkler's analysis of the Golden Ass, and some recent scholarship on Ovid's *Heroides*. I shall briefly summarise the authors' respective projects and discuss the implications I see for my reading of the *Consolatio*.

Susanna Braund's contributions to persona theory, first in Juvenalian satire followed by the genre of satire more broadly, presents a model for my approach.[115] In *Beyond Anger*, Braund emphasised the distinction between "…Juvenal the poet and the voice we hear speaking in the Satires, whom Anderson, following Kernan, calls 'the satirist' but whom I prefer to call 'the speaker,' in order to underline the dramatic quality of satire: we should regard Juvenal's poems as a series of dramatic monologues delivered in the first person".[116] For the application of Braund's persona theory to the *Consolatio*, I would underscore her

[115] Braund *Beyond Anger* (1988) and Braund *Roman Satirists and their Masks* (1997). In contrast, Mayer (2003, 55-80) argues that Roman audiences did not conceive of persona and author in the sharply distinguished terms which modern scholars employ.
[116] Braund (1988, 1).

understanding of Juvenal's satires as dramatic. We can clearly apply a similar characterization to the speakers of the *Consolatio*. The prisoner-Boethius is not the same person as the historical Boethius, nor is he just a mouthpiece for the authorial-Boethius's thoughts. Rather, he is a character whom the authorial-Boethius manipulates, having him voice certain ideas, in order to make subtle points.[117] Like the characters in a drama, the prisoner-Boethius is given "lines" by the author.

Braund's theory can also help elucidate the famously complex genre(s) of the *Consolatio*. In a close analysis of Juvenal's sixth satire, Braund elucidates the ways in which the misogynistic persona is subtly undermined by his own exempla. Braund concludes:

> Does this then amount to an oblique exhortation to marriage by Juvenal? Nothing so positive or explicit. It is a characteristic of satire to explore an issue in apparently black-and-white terms through an extremist character and to undercut that character without taking sides. In this way the author of satire has it both ways. He uses his extremist character to deliver an invective against an individual or group of victims, be they women, foreigners, homosexuals, social climbers, or *nouveaux riches*—generally 'out-groups' or the ex-powerful—and at the same time renders the extremist the victim of his own more subtle type of attack.[118]

Again, Braund's theory can be mapped onto the *Consolatio*. We could say that Philosophy incarnate represents the moralist of *Satire* 6 as both are speaking, instructor figures who claim knowledge of all details of their given topics. The authorial-Boethius, like the authorial-Juvenal, uses this character to advocate for a specific interpretation of the world. Philosophy is obviously not advocating against women as in Juvenal's satire, but she does impel the prisoner to return to her teachings. In this way, the tones are not too distinct for a comparison.

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[117] According to Mayer's critique of persona theory (2003, 55-80), then, we would believe that the readers of the *Consolatio* were inclined to see the authorial-Boethius as the ultimate voice of the opinions expressed. While Mayer provides a useful caveat, I would still suggest that Philosophy tends to represent a monotheistic worldview whereas the prisoner tends to identify with classical literary predecessors. These two views are often contradictory, and, in that conflict, I see the authorial-Boethius staging a debate between disparate perspectives.

[118] Braund (1992, 86).

However, there are also allusions which set Philosophy's authority against the opinions of a classical source. According to my reading, Philosophy is able to overcome such contrary perspectives the majority of the time. However, the authorial-Boethius might get to "have it both ways" by speaking one sentiment in Philosophy's voice, and at the same time having her implicate a counter-view through a classical allusion.

Likewise, Winkler's *Auctor & Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius's "The Golden Ass"* is another case with relevance to the *Consolatio*. He argues that Apuleius draws a deliberate distinction between Lucius-author and Lucius-actor, or narrator and character; he also separates these figures from the audience.[119] This multiplicity of perspectives bears clear relevance to my interpretation of the *Consolatio*, whereby I see the prisoner-Boethius and Philosophy as characters with distinct perspectives. Precisely because these perspectives are orchestrated by the authorial-Boethius, we can be sensitive to their divergences. Winkler makes a more specific point about readers of *The Golden Ass* which is also crucial:

> A scrupulous reader, according to the role that Apuleius has scripted, is one who closely observes details and will object to inconsistencies. Note that the scrupulous reader does not call upon his own suppositions or deductions about what must have happened but simply uses the narrator's own words—"as you say," *ut adfirmas*. Scrupulosity in reading requires therefore no imagination, no positive contribution to the text, but only an acute scrutiny of what is already there. We might even call it scholarly.[120]

As already mentioned, Boethius could have intended to send readers to certain passages through the device of prominent literary allusion. In doing do, a sensitive reader, or as Winkler says, a "scrupulous" one, would pick up on the inconsistencies of the different voices—that of the source text and the perspective of its redeployment or adaptation in the *Consolatio*. Winkler's point about "acute scrutiny," whereby the reader only has to assess the

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[119] Winkler (1985, 320). For Mayer's (2003) counterview, see pages 65-66 on persona theory applied to Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*.
[120] Winkler (1985, 61).

full potential of what the author chooses to present, is similar to my understanding of how allusions operate within the *Consolatio*. A sensitive reader who notices differences between Philosophy and prisoner-Boethius' perspectives might as a result question which of the two characters better reflects his / her own view.

Recent scholarship on the *Heroides* also offers a helpful parallel. As Fulkerson has articulated, the "Ovidian heroines—*puellae doctae*—are excessively literary and so self-consciously fashion themselves as alluding authors influenced by what they read."[121] Fulkerson's observation has great significance for my interpretation of the characters of the prisoner-Boethius and Philosophy. As mentioned above briefly, we should think of Philosophy and the prisoner-Boethius having the agency to read and allude to earlier texts as any knowledgeable reader would be able to. As Farrell notes with regard to the *Heroides*, however, we must address the male author lurking behind the scenes.[122] Nonetheless, this does not detract from the abilities of the female characters and their agency as authors. I would apply Farrell's analysis to the *Consolatio* in suggesting that we need not take everything Philosophy says as inherently true just because she is the embodiment of her discipline. Rather, we should remember that the 'author lurking behind the scenes', the authorial-Boethius, has "scripted" her dialogue. By noticing this dynamic, we can remain open to the possibility that the authorial-Boethius has left room for readers to notice and assess the multiplicity of perspectives which a phrase may draw forward.

To conclude this introductory chapter, I would like to call attention to a very recent remark by Renato de Filippis regarding the lack of overtly Christian language in the *Consolatio*. As mentioned, this aspect of the work has long been noted and debated. While not entirely agreed upon, most scholars see a secure allusion to the Bible in only one place:

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[121] Fulkerson (2005, 2).
[122] Farrell (1998, 311).

3.12.22. At this point, Philosophy says: *est igitur summum, inquit, bonum quod **regit cuncta fortiter suauiterque disponit***. "'it is therefore the highest good,' she said, 'which rules all things firmly, and sweetly disposes them'" (3.12.22). Many believe this is a paraphrase of Wisdom 8.1, *attingit [sapientia]. . . **fortiter** et **disponit** omnia **suauiter***, "[Wisdom] mightily reaches…and disposes all things sweetly". Beyond the overlapping diction set in bold typeface, a further case for seeing a Biblical allusion appears in the prisoner's response to Philosophy's remark:

> *"Tum ego: 'quam,' inquam, 'me non modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, **verum multo magis haec ipsa quibus uteris verba delectant**, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna lacerantem sui pudeat!' 'Accepisti,' inquit, 'in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed visne rationes ipsas invicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra quaedam veritatis scintilla dissiliat.' 'Tuo,' inquam, 'arbitratu.'"*
>
> Then I remarked: 'What gives me such pleasure is not just the way your arguments have turned out, but much more the words you employed to express them. Now at last I am ashamed of the stupidity which has inflicted such wounds on me. 'One of the stories', she said, 'with which you are familiar tells of the Giants who laid siege to heaven; appropriately enough, they too were put in their place by a kindly but firm hand. Now how about making the arguments themselves collide head on? Perhaps such a clash will cause a splendid spark of truth to fly out. 'Then proceed at your discretion,' I said.
>
> (*Cons.* 3.12.23-25)

Most recently, de Filippis has remarked "the paraphrase of Wisdom 8:1 can thus be considered as a wink to the educated readers of the *Consolatio*, who might easily recognise it. In this crucial passage, Boethius supports the 'very words' (*ipsa verba*) Lady Philosophy uses, giving a sign of approving their biblical origin."[123] If we follow de Filippis' interpretation, it is also possible to apply this attitude of close reading to classical allusions within the *Consolatio* more broadly. From this passage, we can say that the characters in the *Consolatio* encourage each other, and thus readers, to pay attention to the 'words themselves.'

[123] de Filippis (2024, 86).

Indeed, Philosophy explicitly characterises such an encounter as a type of debate with the prisoner: *sed visne rationes ipsas invicem collidamus?* The 'collision' she discusses could produce a beautiful spark of truth; this suggests that the result of a debate can be a clearer apprehension of the topic. In a way, Philosophy opposes herself to the prisoner and seems to indicate a strategy of reading her words for a hidden message. Of course, this is just one sequence in the middle of the *Consolatio*; I do not mean to suggest that it alone justifies an investigation of allusions. However, I do think it provides an indication, from within the text, that the words of the speakers contain hidden meaning which is open for interpretation. If one follows my reading of this passage, it is also significant that Philosophy employs the example of the 'Giants' in her message. I see Philosophy in the position of 'heaven' and the prisoner in the position of the Giants; he is trying to access a superior position, and it is up to Philosophy to put the prisoner in his proper place, or as she says about the Giants *uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit*. This type of relationship between the characters can also tells us something important about how they employ classical allusions.

Philosophy is undoubtedly in the superior position to the prisoner. She knows more than he does, she is superhuman where he is mortal, and she is his teacher, healer, and guide. As a result, I would not suggest that the prisoner's challenges to Philosophy can ultimately be successful; like the Giants, he will have to concede the superior authority. Recognising this, I assert that we can better appreciate the texture of the *Consolatio* by noticing such disagreements. Hence, in what follows, I am chiefly interested in the echoes of classical authors visible in the *Consolatio*, recognising that they are not the dominant voice of the dialogue.

Allusions to Seneca: *Phaedra*, *Hercules Furens* and *Hercules Oetaeus*

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall investigate allusion to select tragedies of Seneca the Younger.[1] Most attention paid to Seneca's influence upon the *Consolatio Philosophiae* has occurred in one of two forms. On the thematic level, scholars have evaluated passages which show the influence of Stoic philosophy, drawing especially upon Seneca's letters.[2] The other centre of attention occurs at 3m.12.40-41, in which the authorial-Boethius all but quotes *Hercules Furens* 582, the moment at which Pluto allows Orpheus to lead Eurydice from the underworld. Schieble (1972, 119-120), Lerer (1985, 160ff), O'Daly (1991, 197), and Claassen (2007, 12-17) have expounded the ways in which the authorial-Boethius relies upon and adapts the Senecan model at this moment. However, beyond this particular lexical debt, there has not been a broad evaluation of Seneca's tragic material in the *Consolatio*, nor of the motivations for the authorial-Boethius to allude to it. In response, the authorial-Boethius alludes to three of the tragedies: *Phaedra*, *Hercules Furens* and *Hercules Oetaeus.* It is my contention that the authorial-Boethius has Philosophy adapt Senecan material to address the prisoner's suffering. However, where the characters in Seneca's tragedies face undeserved misery and have no hope to overcome their tragic fates, Philosophy provides the inspiration which allows the prisoner-Boethius to escape his circumstances. As such, I consistently read Philosophy as adopting Senecan themes but leading the prisoner to a more hopeful conclusion through her intervention.

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[1] Text and translation of the three Senecan tragedies is taken from Fitch's Loeb edition, revised in 2018. His translation is close to the Latin while remaining readable. As is my preference, his Latin text is more conservative than Zwierlein's bolder and slightly more dated Oxford Classical Text (1986).

[2] For instance, O'Daly (1991) shows the influence of the *Epistles* on Boethius's depiction of nature (166) and mythical narratives (187), and Crabbe (1981a, 243) adduces the exiled Seneca as a model for the prisoner.

In *Phaedra*, we find Hippolytus struck down by the mad queen's immoral desire. She confides her feelings for her stepson to her nurse before exposing them to Hippolytus, who rejects her with disgust. In retaliation, Phaedra and her nurse accuse Hippolytus of rape. When Theseus returns from the underworld to this accusation, he calls upon Neptune to kill Hippolytus for the alleged crime, the fulfilment of which a messenger recounts to him in graphic detail. Overcome by guilt, Phaedra reveals her lie before committing suicide. The prisoner-Boethius at first aligns himself with the figure of Hippolytus in *Phaedra*. Not dissimilarly from the queen falsifying a charge which ends Hippolytus' life, king Theodoric seems to have trumped up charges of senatorial conspiracy to imprison and execute Boethius.[3] Thus, in both cases we find men suffering under a deranged royal. There is also an emphasis on the undeserved nature of this suffering: Hippolytus and the prisoner are both innocent victims who did not realize they had provoked life-ending disfavour. While the prisoner-Boethius might see his circumstances reflected in those of Hippolytus, Philosophy's intervention prevents the prisoner from dwelling on his victimhood.

In *Hercules furens*, we again find a sympathetic character facing persecution: Juno is enraged that Hercules has overcome all the labours she set for him, most recently the retrieval of Cerberus from the underworld. She unjustly infers that Hercules will now try to literally overcome death by becoming immortal and taking up an undeserved place among the gods. As a result, she sends madness to Hercules and he kills his wife and children, mistaking them for the usurper Lycus and Juno, respectively, in his rage. When he wakes to the reality of his crimes, he contemplates suicide, from which his father Amphitryon dissuades him. Philosophy presents Hercules as an alternative tragic exemplum to Hippolytus. While both men face persecution, Hercules is a better model for the prisoner, as he heroically endures his suffering in the mortal world.

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[3] See section B) in the introductory chapter, "Sources of Boethius' Fall".

Similarly, in *Hercules Oetaeus*, we find Hercules deified for his labours.[4] While he is away sacking Oechalia, Deianira grows jealous of Hercules' affection for Iole and sends him a robe covered in a supposed potion meant to restore his love. Deianira has been deceived by the centaur Nessus, who had in reality given her poison. Tragically, Deianira realizes her mistake too late; the hero suffers under the poison's effects, and she commits suicide.[5] Hercules orders a pyre to be built on Mount Oeta, where he endures great physical pain before gaining apotheosis. At the close of the tragedy, he speaks down to his mortal mother Alcmene from his new position in the heavens. This is a particularly apt tragedy for Philosophy to allude to; we find Hercules receiving the rewards of his heroic, mortal endurance through an eternal life, precisely the same goal toward which Philosophy leads the prisoner.

It is also worth noting that in all three tragedies, the suffering figures are much more sympathetic than some characters in other Senecan dramas. The undeserved nature of Hippolytus's and Hercules's suffering is thus naturally a better model for the authorial-Boethius when depicting his fall from grace as unearned. Finally, Seneca's own exile under Claudius, as a victim of monarchical power himself, may have provided yet another reason for Boethius to allude to the tragedian.[6] Thus, the authorial-Boethius turns to Seneca not just because the tragic genre reflects his catastrophic shift in fortune, but also because the author of these particular tragedies faced an exile subsequent to association with power. While the focus of this chapter is how Boethius may be drawing upon relevant Senecan contexts

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[4] Questions of authorship surrounding *Oetaeus* are beyond the remit of this dissertation. The play was known to the authorial-Boethius, as Gruber (2006, 507) attests, and thus a study of allusions to the work is viable. Differently, O'Daly (1991, 195) argues that it cannot be demonstrated that Boethius knew and used the *Hercules Oetaeus*.

[5] Phaedra and Deianira are the direct sources of the respective male protagonists' suffering. Thus, their respective suicides may also provide an indirect hope that the source of Boethius's suffering, Theodoric, suffer in the way the "wicked" characters from Seneca's tragedies had to pay for their crimes.

[6] As Magee (2007, 4) notes.

through shared diction, the biographical similarity might comfort the prisoner by providing a mirror for his own experience.

First, I shall explore the prisoner's identification with Hippolytus. Then I shall analyse the ways in which Philosophy counters this identification by presenting Hercules in his mortal and immortal guises through allusions to *Hercules furens* and *Hercules Oetaeus*, respectively. As a result, Philosophy offers a model of salvation through the figure of Hercules. In each of the allusions explored below, these specific contexts could have been in the authorial-Boethius's mind and/or in the minds of his readers. Analysing the implications of these allusions thus enriches our understanding of the authorial-Boethius's artistry and helps elucidate the dynamics of the dialogue between Philosophy and the prisoner.

2. Undeserved Suffering: *Phaedra* and *Hercules Furens*

In this section, I shall focus on the depictions of undeserved suffering exemplified by Hippolytus in *Phaedra* and by Hercules in *Hercules furens*. The first context which I read as alluding to Senecan tragedy occurs at 1m.3.3ff. This is one of only four poems in the *Consolatio* which the prisoner-Boethius voices and is thus emphatic.[7] Philosophy has just wiped the prisoner's eyes with her robe, literally drying his tears and metaphorically dismissing tearful elegiacs as a cure for her patient's downcast state. The prisoner then delivers 1m.3, in which he uses a simile to remark upon the quickness with which Philosophy proffers her cure, *ut cum praecipiti* ***glomerantur*** *sidera* ***Coro*** / *nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus* "as when the north-west wind sweeps headlong by, / foul weather gathers, rain-clouds[8] clothe the sky" (*Cons.* 1m.3.3-4). We find this same language describing Corus, the northwest wind, in *Phaedra*: *fugit insanae similis procellae,* / *ocior nubes* ***glomerante Coro***

[7] In total, the prisoner voices 1m.1, 1m.3, 1m.5, and 5m.3.
[8] As O'Donnell (1990, 12) notes, the text is obscure: "*sidera* may mean 'bad weather,' but some emend to *nubila*".

"his flight was like a frenzied gale, swifter than Corus massing clouds…" (*Phaedr.* 736-737).[9] This is the moment at which Phaedra has revealed her improper desire to Hippolytus, and he flees, appalled at her admission. The chorus then brings the second act to a close with their ode, a lament on Hippolytus' fortune and how his beauty will lead to his destruction.

We can see this opening allusion operating on two levels. On the dictional level, it enriches the authorial-Boethius's expression through a learned mention of the northwest wind and the way it represents quick flight in Seneca. On the thematic level, the prisoner stresses the power of Philosophy's healing intervention. Specifically, the comparison to the northwest wind exhibits poor thoughts leaving the prisoner's mind with Philosophy's aid. It is also worth considering the timing of this image. Philosophy wipes the prisoner's eyes before their dialogue has properly begun. In this way, Philosophy is shown to be a powerful figure, as she can impact the prisoner-Boethius just through her touch.

If we focus on the broader context of *Phaedra* at this moment, we can add further depth to the picture. We should consider, for instance, the ways in which Hippolytus and the prisoner face similar experiences. Due to no fault of their own, both men endure persecution. Indeed, in the *Phaedra* scene to which Boethius alludes, we see Hippolytus flee the mad queen. However, there are crucial differences. First and foremost, Hippolytus has no ally with whom to face his undeserved suffering. While he can run away from Phaedra, her false accusation of rape will lead to his tragic end. We find the exact opposite image in the *Consolatio*. Where Hippolytus has no support, the prisoner-Boethius finds inspiration in Philosophy. Indeed, where storm clouds gather over Hippolytus, who must face his undeserved suffering alone, the allusion to this section of the *Phaedra* shows that

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[9] Coffey and Mayer (1990, 157) have also seen this as an adaptation of Horace 1.16.23 *agente nimbus ocior Euro*. Silius presents a closer parallel with *aduerso* ***glomeratas*** *turbine* ***Corus*** / *in media ora niues fuscis agit horridus alis* at *Punica* 3.523-524. However, Gruber (2006, 102) and O'Daly (1991, 121) make a connection between the language as presented in *Phaedra* and the *Consolatio* passage, which I follow. Gruber comments *Sie stützt sich auf* Sen. *Phae*. 737 and O'Daly offers a broader analysis.

Philosophy's intervention will drive away the same kind of storm clouds surrounding the prisoner. Not only is she the prisoner's ally, but he depicts the moment of her intervention as quick, efficacious and powerful. In other words, Philosophy's intervention balances the rapid disaster depicted in Senecan tragedy with equally rapid aid to the prisoner, inverting the original context. Thus, while the prisoner's unjust persecution seems to put him in the position of Hippolytus, as an unduly persecuted victim, unlike that tragic figure he can rely on the aid of Philosophy to overcome these circumstances.

I read the next allusion to *Phaedra* in a similar way. In this case, Hippolytus has just died in the gruesome attack of Neptune's bull. The chorus then reflects on the shifts of Fortune (personified at *Phaedr.* 1124), stating that a downturn in fortune is worse for the mighty, *non capit umquam magnos motus* / ***humilis*** *tecti plebeia* ***domus***; / *circa regna* ***tonat*** "great upheavals are never felt by a commoner's house with its lowly roof; but around thrones it thunders" (*Phaedr.* 1138-1140). Similar diction to describe a lowly home and a storm appears at 2m.4.15-16, when Philosophy tells the prisoner,

> ***humili domum*** *memento*
> *certus figere saxo.*
> *Quamvis* ***tonet*** *ruinis*
> *miscens aequora ventus,*
> *tu conditus quieti,*
> *felix robore valli*,
> *duces serenus aevum*
> *ridens aetheris iras*.[10]
>
> Above all, don't forget / to build your house on rock deep-set. / Enclosed by your walls' silent strength, / you'll live untroubled for the length / of all your days; and by and by / smile at the anger of the sky.[11]
>
> (*Cons.* 2m.4.15-22)

[10] While the text here, as throughout, is taken from Moreschini's edition (2005, 41), I have chosen to indent odd-numbered lines in the Latin where Moreschini did not. This better reflects the metre, which is an alternation of iambic dimeter catalectic with pherecratics.

[11] This union is not unique in all Latin literature, as there are attestations in, for example, Horace, *Odes* 3.1.17 and Juvenal *Satires* 11.171. However, there is a connection between the passages in the *Phaedra* which connects this phrase to the ***glomero***…***corus*** language and thus still present this as an allusion. Gruber (2006, 198) notes the similar diction and comments '*vgl.*'

Philosophy and the chorus agree that a man is less likely to face ruin if he lives a simple life. However, the usage of the words in bold typeface is not parallel. In the *Consolatio*, *humili* agrees with *saxo*, specifying a low rock. In the *Phaedra* example, *humilis* qualifies *tecti*, with the humble roof signifying a low home. Thus, we see a 'home on a low rock' compared to a 'low home'. As a result of this difference, we require another element which would make a connection between the passages more possible. Indeed, we could connect the imagery of *aetheris iras* in the *Consolatio* with *tonat* in *Phaedra* as similar depictions of a celestial threat (Jupiter / the wind) to be weathered. In both cases, the storm surrounds the powerful, which is contrasted with a humble home. The scenes thus express a similar sentiment, to aim for stable simplicity. However, where Hippolytus cannot accomplish this goal, the prisoner can. Hippolytus had no way of escaping the royal life into which he was born. Ironically, he actively shunned his association with power, preferring the wilderness and a solitary existence. Phaedra and her nurse even discuss Hippolytus' preferences openly. They say,

> *exosus omne feminae nomen fugit,*
> *immitis annos caelibi vitae dicat,*
> *conubia vitat: genus Amazonium scias.*
>
> *Hunc in nivosi collis haerentem iugis*
> *et aspera agili saxa calcantem pede*
> *sequi per alta nemora, per montes placet.*
>
> He hates and shuns all that is called woman, implacably devotes his youth to a celibate life, and avoids marriage: you would know his Amazon breeding.
>
> Though he lingers on the ridges of snowy hills and treads jagged rocks with nimble feet, I intend to follow him across deep forests, across mountains.
>
> (*Phaedr.* 230-235)

Despite pursuing a celibate life and steering away from power, Hippolytus was still struck down. However, where Hippolytus's circumstances are inescapable, Philosophy's intervention provides the prisoner with hope to overcome his fate. Like Hippolytus, Boethius

had power in a royal court. Also like Hippolytus, Boethius experienced firsthand the ways in which ill fortune thundered around him. Unlike Hippolytus, though, the prisoner can metaphorically return to a solid, low home by recommitting to Philosophy's teachings. By doing so, he will be able to weather the storm of his downfall from within her walls, reversing the tragic outcome which Hippolytus faced.

Indeed, despite the similar diction, the position of the addressee—Hippolytus versus the prisoner—is opposed in the two scenes. In the *Phaedra* context, the thundering of poor fortune is menacing, as it encircles the powerful, *circa regna* ***tonat*** (*Phaedr.* 1140). While the chorus acknowledges that Hippolytus would not have faced such a storm within a lowly plebeian home, there is no chance that he could have achieved such a state. However, the same verb, *tono*, does not threaten the prisoner in the *Consolatio*. Rather, he is depicted safe within Philosophy's walls where the poor weather/ill fortune cannot reach him, *quamvis* ***tonet*** *ruinis* / *miscens aequora ventus,* / *tu conditus quieti,* / *felix robore valli*… (*Cons*. 2m.4.17-20). If the authorial-Boethius has the *Phaedra* scene in mind, then he has metaphorically accomplished the flight to a low, solid home which Hippolytus could not. Indeed, Philosophy even presents the prisoner as smiling at the storm, ***ridens*** *aetheris iras*, underscoring the strength of her shelter. To my mind, the crucial difference is that Hippolytus was doomed by birth to be royal, whereas Boethius, although by force, can escape his association with Theodoric's court by returning to Philosophy's teachings. By alluding to the tragic scene, the authorial-Boethius affirms philosophy as a means of weathering misfortune and steers his prisoner-self away from association with Hippolytus.

Moreover, the placement of 2m.4 further supports Philosophy's intervention with the prisoner. With the *metrum* she concludes her application of gentle remedies and declares her intention to move on to stronger medicines, *sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo validioribus utendum puto* "but now that the warming applications of my

arguments are penetrating more deeply below your skin, I must, I think, make the dressings stronger" (*Cons.* 2.5.1). This is the line immediately following the end of 2m.4 and marks a crucial step on the prisoner's healing journey. Whereas Hippolytus's story ends tragically, Philosophy promises that she can lead the prisoner to safety. In what follows below, I read Philosophy presenting Hercules as a superior tragic model for the prisoner-Boethius.

First, I shall examine an allusion to *Hercules furens* and discuss the way it depicts unearned suffering. Throughout the tragedy, Hercules comes across as a model of endurance, which would naturally appeal to Philosophy when encouraging the prisoner to persevere. In addition, within *Hercules furens*, the hero may be able to find a way out of his suffering by expiating his sins in Athens. At the conclusion of the tragedy, Theseus tells Hercules, …*illa te, Alcide, vocat,* / *facere innocentes terra quae superos solet* "that land summons you, Alcides, which customarily restores gods to innocence" (*Herc.f.* 1343-1344). The purification which Theseus hints at suggests that Hercules may reach some conclusion to his suffering in the mortal world.

The allusion to *Hercules furens* appears at the start of Book 2, as Philosophy tells the prisoner that the severity of his condition is due to the total reversal of his fortunes: *verum omnis subita mutatio rerum non sine quodam quasi* ***fluctu*** *contingit* ***animorum****; sic factum est ut tu quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres* "but no sudden change of circumstances occurs without causing some mental turmoil, which is why even you for the moment have abandoned your usual serenity" (*Cons*. 2.1.6). The combination of *fluctus* and *animus* recalls a moment from *Hercules furens*.

> *pelle insanos* ***fluctus animi****;*
> *redeat pietas virtusque viro.*
> *vel sit potius*
> *mens vesano concita motu,*
> *error caecus qua coepit eat:*
> *solus te iam praestare potest*
> *furor insontem;*

> *proxima puris sors est manibus*
> *nescire nefas.*
>
> drive the waves of madness from your mind, may the hero's goodness and heroism return. Or rather may your mind still race with insanity; may blind error continue as it began: the only thing now that can offer you innocence is madness; after pure hands, the next best fate is ignorance of the evil
>
> (*Herc.f.* 1092-1099)[12]

At this moment, the chorus is torn between two wishes for Hercules. On the one hand, they hope for Hercules' typical heroism to return. On the other, they suggest that in a case as extreme as Hercules's, it might be preferable to remain mad than to realise that he has killed his whole family. Philosophy could be responding to the Senecan image by reframing the diction. When the chorus describes Hercules' mindset, they say that he is facing waves of insanity: *insanos* ***fluctus animi***. Hercules is the victim of this madness, which Juno sent to him. Differently, when Philosophy describes the prisoner's suffering in the same terms, alluding to this scene, her diagnosis is much less severe. While the prisoner also faces the waves of his misfortune, Philosophy clarifies, *tu quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres*. Philosophy thus affirms that the prisoner can once again attain a tranquil mindset.

The differences in context are also noteworthy. The Oechalians do not wish to help Hercules but only comment upon his mental suffering. Conversely, Philosophy actively intervenes on the prisoner's behalf, assuring him that recommitting to his former beliefs will restore his tranquil state of mind. As a result, I see an allusion to *Hercules furens* accomplishing two things at this moment. First, Philosophy presents Hercules as an

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[12] This combination is attested twice elsewhere in Latin literature. Once in Seneca's *De Tranquilitate Animi* (10.6.10), and once in Paulinus of Nola (*Epistulae* 23, 11.29) (which is subsequently quoted by Caesar Arelatensis). In the case of another attestation in Seneca's corpus, this only makes the phrasing more distinctively Senecan. As for the attestation in Paulinus, the context rules out a clear allusion to his letter. He describes the importance of men subjugating their feminine element, which he likens to flesh, to their male element, which he likens to Christ. This openly Christian, non-literary but rather allegorical letter is far removed from the *Consolatio* context. Gruber (2006, 171) notes the overlapping diction with Seneca, and remarks '*vgl.*'.

exemplum of heroic endurance with whom the prisoner should identify. Hercules also faced a disturbance of his mind, one even more severe than the prisoner, yet he was able to overcome it. Second, through this identification, the prisoner can see the ways in which he is better off than Hercules. In the hero's case, the mighty Juno actively conspired against Hercules by sending him true madness. While he might be able to overcome his guilt in Athens, he does not have an ally in that process. Differently, the prisoner-Boethius does not have a divine figure conspiring against him and does not face literal madness. In fact, his dialogue with Philosophy means that he can reap the benefits of his supernatural healer's method.

Beyond this particular scene, there are other reasons why Philosophy would encourage the prisoner to identify with Hercules as Seneca depicts him in *Hercules furens*. As mentioned, Hercules is encouraged to avoid suicide and seek expiation for his guilt. The desires to expiate sin and avoid suicide certainly have Christian parallels. Thus, Philosophy wishes to depict Hercules' madness as parallel to the goal for the prisoner to overcome his "blindness" and "foolishness" in forgetting her teachings, which are in no way opposed to Christian doctrine. In this way, Philosophy implicitly depicts Hercules as a model for the prisoner; if he follows Hercules' heroic example, he too can hope for a life where his mortal suffering is rendered meaningless through endurance. This endurance stands in contrast to the pathetic Hippolytus, who has no hope of enduring the violent attack which kills him.

Indeed, there is a further danger in the prisoner identifying with Hippolytus over Hercules for Philosophy's monotheistic worldview. In *Phaedra*, the queen was driven to suicide out of guilt. Thus, there was no expiation of her wickedness; rather, she compounded one sin with another. Hippolytus' suffering was acknowledged through her death, but it did not lead to a glorious outcome for anyone involved. In contrast, as horrible as Juno's wrath is, Hercules is exemplary for enduring it. Indeed, this very endurance is recognised in Christian

Late Antiquity.[13] Given this contrast, Philosophy wishes for the prisoner to identify with Hercules both for his endurance and because he rejects suicide and works to atone for his sins.

3. Modes of Salvation: The Oechalian Women

In the previous section, the prisoner initially identified with the tragic suffering of Hippolytus whereas Philosophy advocated for the prisoner to see a model for his sorrow in Hercules. In *Hercules furens*, the hero does not achieve an apotheosis, but in *Hercules Oetaeus*, he does. I see allusions to both Hercules tragedies and would like to read them as working together to paint Hercules as Philosophy's preferred model for the prisoner. In my reading, *Hercules furens* models the way a mortal can endure. Building upon this, by implicating *Hercules Oetaeus*, Philosophy can show the prisoner that there is an eternal life beyond mortal suffering.

In this section, I shall focus on two moments from *Hercules Oetaeus*: a pair of allusions which centre around Hercules' almost total invulnerability. In the opening allusion, we see the Oechalian women lamenting Hercules' superhuman strength, as it only brings them suffering. Temporarily, it might seem that the prisoner is in the same position as these lamenting women. However, the allusion paired with it describes Hercules' heroic struggle on the pyre in many of the same terms. As a result, Philosophy wishes for the prisoner to identify positively with Hercules' strength and give up any association with the Oechalian women.

The pair of allusions occurs in 1m.4 as Philosophy is exhorting the prisoner to return to his philosophical learning. Although the allusions occur in the *Consolatio* in a close context, they are drawn from two far-separated moments of *Hercules Oetaeus*; the first is to

[13] Eppinger (2015, 106-156) surveys a range of late antique poetic and philosophical sources which depict the hero. Ultimately, his affair with Omphale disqualifies him as a hero for church fathers (121-127), though his endurance won him admiration from late antique writers, including Ausonius (130), Dracontius (132), and Boethius (136-138), who sees him as close to the embodiment of virtue itself.

107ff, and the second is to lines 1265ff, at the end of the third act. In both cases, the authorial-Boethius links the prisoner's suffering to figures enduring hardship in *Herc.O.* My reading of both allusions is as follows: adherence to philosophy can overcome the states of suffering described. Where the Oechalian women have no hope to change their fate, Philosophy provides a way out. Similarly, though Hercules may suffer, he will reach apotheosis and escape his mortal circumstances. In this way, the state of the women does not match that of the prisoner, and he should seek to identify with the victorious Hercules over them.

In the first of the two allusions, the chorus of Oechalian women bewail their misfortune; Hercules has killed their king and sacked Oechalia. In the face of such misery, they wish for death.

> *Par ille est superis cui pariter dies*
> *et fortuna fuit; mortis habet vices*
> *lente cum trahitur vita gementibus.*
> ***quisquis sub pedibus fata*** *rapacia*
> *et puppem posuit fluminis ultimi,*
> *non captiva dabit bracchia vinculis*
> *nec pompae veniet nobile ferculum:*
> *numquam est ille miser cui facile est mori.*
>
> "Equal of the gods is one whose days and fortunes end equally; but a life dragged slowly on, amid laments, becomes a kind of death. Once a person has set beneath his feet the rapacious fates, and the boat that sails the final river, he will not yield his wrists to chains as a prisoner, nor walk in a victor's parade as a signal trophy: one for whom dying is easy need never suffer."
>
> (*Herc.O.* 104-111)

We find a close lexical link in 1m.4.1-2, as Philosophy tries to convince the prisoner to return to philosophical principles.[14]

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[14] This language shall also be explored in my Lucretius and Vergil chapters. At *Georgics* 2.491-492, we find a beatitude on a man who, *inexorabile fatum* / ***subiecit pedibus*** *strepitumque Acherontis avari* "has cast beneath his feet all fear and fate's implacable decree, and the howl of insatiable Death." This remark seems to respond to Lucretius' depiction of Epicurus in the figure of serene philosopher who overcomes Superstition, *quare religio* ***pedibus subiecta*** *vicissim* "therefore Superstition is now in her

> ***Quisquis*** *composito serenus aevo*
> ***fatum sub pedibus*** *egit superbum*
> *fortunamque tuens utramque rectus*
> *invictum potuit tenere vultum*,
>
> "He who keeps composure in a life well-ordered,
> who crushes underfoot fate's arrogant incursions,
> confronts with integrity both good and evil fortune,
> succeeds in maintaining an undefeated outlook—"
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.4.1-4)[15]

Both passages remark on the best way for one to employ a philosophically-driven belief system in the face of adversity. The Oechalian women focus on overcoming the fear of death through suicide, seeing this as the pinnacle of a Stoic self-mastery. In this way, they console themselves through acceptance of their victimization, but do not see a way, other than suicide, to overcome their status. In contrast to this hopeless image, Philosophy feels that she can restore the prisoner's agency to deal with his grief over his present situation. As a result, Hercules is a natural model of the goal Philosophy sets for the prisoner, as he is nearly invulnerable to physical attacks in the mortal world (the poison on the coat of Nessus being the exception), and his apotheosis provides hope that there is another life.

We can see the contrast between the hopeless Oechalians' fate and the prisoner's circumstances in the ways in which they discuss death. In his own words in the opening poem, the prisoner says, (*sc. Mors*) *eheu, quam surda miseros avertitur aure* / *et flentes oculos claudere saeva negat!* "alas, Death turns deaf ears to my sad cries, / and cruel, will not close my weeping eyes" (*Cons.* 1m.1.15-16). This recalls *felices sequeris, mors, miseros fugis* "death attends the fortunate, but shuns the wretched" (*Herc.O.* 122). Beyond this moment, we

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turn cast down and trampled underfoot" (*DRN* 1.78). While these two passages are in conversation, the Senecan, Stoic context has independent implications for the prisoner.

[15] This is the only attestation of this union in all surviving Latin literature. Gruber (2006, 117) remarks on general similarity with '*wie*'.

see a further similarity between the chorus' remarks and the prisoner's status in the shared use of chain-imagery.

> *Par ille est superis cui pariter dies*
> *et **fortuna** fuit; mortis habet vices*
> *lente cum **trahitur** vita gementibus.*
> ***quisquis sub pedibus fata** rapacia*
> *et puppem posuit fluminis ultimi,*
> *non captiva dabit bracchia vinculis*
>
> "Equal of the gods is one whose days and fortunes end equally; but a life dragged slowly on, amid laments, becomes a kind of death. Once a person has set beneath his feet the rapacious fates, and the boat that sails the final river, he will not yield his wrists to chains as a prisoner…
>
> (*Herc.O.* 104-109)

In addition to the already-examined diction ***quisquis sub pedibus fata***, we see a further lexical overlap and similarity with *fortuna…trahitur…*and the image of chains: *vinculis*.[16] Philosophy and the chorus mention Fortuna closely with their respective deployments of the *quisquis sub pedibus* image. The chain-imagery is also present in both sections. The chorus says that one who can overcome his emotions *non captiva dabit brachia vinculis* "will not yield his wrists to chains as a prisoner" (*Herc.O.* 109) to be led in a victory parade. Again, we can see this echoed in Philosophy's advice to the prisoner at the end of 1m.4.

> *at quisquis trepidus pavet vel optat,*
> *quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,*
> *abiecit clipeum locoque motus*
> *nectit qua valeat trahi catenam.*
>
> "But he who all atremble is fearful or desirous, through lack of inward staunchness or self-mastery, he has thrown away his shield, and deserted his station. He forges the chains which confine his shackled progress."
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.4.15-18)

[16] Gruber (2006, 314) notes some similarity between the *Hercules Oetaeus* and *Consolatio* diction with '*wie*' and '*vgl.*'.

The authors use two different Latin words, but the imagery of chains is consistent. Furthermore, the chorus' description of a prisoner of war in a victory parade is also echoed in Philosophy's *valeat trahi.* Indeed, the repetition of *quisquis* in 1m.4 stresses that there are two opposed ways to endure. One who does not look to Philosophy in times of suffering all but ensures the status of captive and becomes the victim of those who wish to chain and confine him. On the other hand, the person who has applied Philosophy correctly can crush Fate or Fortune and overcome suffering.

Temporarily, then, these similarities could encourage readers to see the prisoner as aligned with the chorus of suffering women. However, where their Stoic worldview means that they cannot escape their misfortune, Philosophy's teachings show the prisoner that there is an end to his suffering that does not necessitate suicide. Specifically, if he returns to her teachings, he will remember his faith in an eternal life with God which will render his present suffering meaningless. Now that Philosophy has countered an association between the suffering Oechalians and the prisoner, she substitutes Hercules as a preferable tragic figure with whom the prisoner should identify.

Indeed, we can see Hercules providing a positive model to the prisoner in the second allusion to *Hercules Oetaeus* in 1m.4. This allusion centres around Hercules' near perfect invulnerability. According to the lamenting chorus, part of what makes Hercules so threatening is that he seems physically unconquerable. No weapons stand a chance against him, and his pursuit of a place among the gods means he even challenges death, *...fataque neglegit* / *et mortem <u>indomito pectore</u> provocat* "he scorns the power of fate and challenges death with his unconquered breast" (*Herc.O.* 154-155). The chorus presents Hercules' strength in physical terms. However, when Philosophy alludes to this scene, I see her perform a transformation. In her adaptation, Hercules' invincibility is taken more metaphorically; it

can be seen as a model for the mindset she would like the prisoner to possess.[17] Of course, the prisoner is not a semi-divine hero like Hercules and cannot resist physical attacks in the mortal world as Hercules does. But, if the prisoner-Boethius aims for a similarly unconquered mentality, Hercules provides a point of inspiration for being nearly impervious to mortal travails.

To return to the dictional overlaps which could have triggered this association, we should notice Philosophy's portrayal of an "unconquered head," in 1m.4, *fortunamque tuens utramque rectus* / ***invictum*** *potuit tenere* ***vultum****...* "confronts with integrity both good and evil fortune, succeeds in maintaining an undefeated outlook— (*Cons.* 1m.4.2-4). If the allusion to ***quisquis sub pedibus fata*** mentioned above activates a link to the Oechalian chorus's speech, then Philosophy's ***invictum****...****vultum*** could more easily remind us of Hercules' *indomito pectore* in their speech (*Herc.O.* 155). Moreover, the phrase *invictus vultus* is found also at *Hercules Oetaeus* 1265-1269. At this point Hercules has been unknowingly exposed to poison which causes him unbearable suffering, and as he lies dying on the pyre, he addresses himself with disgust.

> *unde iste fletus? Unde in has lacrimae genas?*
> ***invictus*** *olim* ***vultus*** *et numquam malis*
> *lacrimas suis praebere consuetus (pudet)*
> *iam flere didicit. quis dies fletum Herculis,*
> *quae terra vidit? siccus aerumnas tuli.*
>
> "But why this weeping? Why tears on these cheeks? This face, once invincible and never given to bestowing tears on its troubles, has now learned—shame on me!—to weep. What day, what land has seen Hercules in tears? I bore my hardships dry-eyed."
>
> (*Herc.O.* 1265-1269)

[17] We see a similar sentiment in some of Horace's poetry, for instance the beginnings of *Odes* 1.22 and 3.3 describe the way a philosophically driven man can attain an undisturbed mentality.

At this moment, Hercules cannot help but suffer despite his efforts to remain invincible. Although he berates himself harshly for showing emotion, he is compelled to cry in agony and feels special shame for this since he was *siccus* against all former challenges.[18] When Hercules reproaches himself, he draws special attention to his previously unconquered state, remarking, ***invictus*** *olim* ***vultus*** "this face once invincible…" (*Herc.O.* 1266). Hercules is acutely aware that his suffering, specifically his tears at physical pain, are uncharacteristic. Indeed, he would like to return to his previous state of nearly total physical invulnerability. There is a strong verbal parallel between Hercules' depiction of his previously unconquered countenance and Philosophy's aspirations for the prisoner at 1m.4.3-4.

> *Quisquis composito serenus aevo*
> *fatum sub pedibus egit superbum*
> *fortunamque tuens utramque rectus*
> ***invictum*** *potuit tenere* ***vultum***,
>
> "He who keeps composure in a life well-ordered,
> who crushes underfoot fate's arrogant incursions,
> confronts with integrity both good and evil fortune,
> succeeds in maintaining an undefeated outlook—"
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.4.1-4)

If *Hercules Oetaus* 1266 is in the background, then Philosophy has interpreted Hercules' situation metaphorically; the hero's *invictus vultus* becomes a mental state rather than a physical condition. In other words, we see Philosophy make Herculean invincibility the prisoner's goal. However, in his case, this invincibility means making one's mind "unconquered" by the shifts of fortune. Philosophy encourages the prisoner to experience good and poor fortune, *fortunamque tuens utramque rectus*, without being impacted. As mentioned earlier, Hercules' endurance was singled out as a Christian trait in Late

[18] We see a similar admonition from Philosophy at 2.4.9: *quare* ***sicca*** *iam lacrimas* "so come now, dry your tears".

Antiquity.[19] As a result, if the authorial-Boethius has Philosophy allude to a suffering Hercules, he may be tapping into a wider late antique interpretation of Hercules which celebrated his superhuman endurance.

As Hercules continues to describe his tears, he draws a comparison with his former strength, saying, *…durior* ***saxo*** *horrido* / *et* ***chalybe*** *vultus…* "this face, harder than rugged rock or steel…" (*Herc.O.* 1272-1273). Hercules' description recalls the language the chorus used to describe him, *…lentior est* ***chalybs****;* / *in nudo gladius corpore frangitur* / *et* ***saxum*** *resilit,* "…steel is too soft; a sword is shattered on his unarmed body, a rock rebounds" (*Herc.O.* 152-154). In addition to these lexical overlaps, we can also see Hercules remark, *…unde nunc fulmen mihi?* "where is the thunderbolt to strike me?" (*Herc.O.* 1278), as an echo of the Oechalian women's contemplation of suicide, *vitam qui poterit reddere protinus,* / *solus non poterit naufragium pati* "one who can yield his life without delay is the only person immune from suffering shipwreck" (*Herc.O.* 117-118). With these lexical matches and the shared imagery of *indomito pectore* (*Herc.O.* 155) with *invictus…vultus* (*Herc.O.* 1266), the two scenes to which the authorial-Boethius alludes are already linked in Seneca. I thus would like to read these scenes together at *Cons.*1m.4.[20]

In the moment of his suffering, Hercules momentarily reverses the same images of his indomitability which the chorus had remarked upon earlier in the tragedy. Despite his temporary anguish, later in *Hercules Oetaeus*, he will exemplify Stoic endurance, with his final labour being a battle with the flames of the pyre.[21] Indeed, *Hercules Oetaeus* is more explicit in depicting Hercules' apotheosis than Sophocles' *Women of Trachis* or Euripides' *Herakles*. By his speaking down to Alcmene, readers can be sure that Hercules has achieved

[19] See note 12.
[20] Larsen (1991, 44) also sees a link between these passages.
[21] Astell (1994, 67) remarks on this as the final labour, and Herold (1994, 45) notes how a self-immolating hero can be seen as a Christian martyr.

his immortal existence. As a result, while Hercules does suffer briefly, the hero has not been permanently conquered. The similarity of expression between the suffering chorus and suffering Hercules underscores the differences in their experiences. The women cannot escape their fate; even if they commit suicide there is no hope of a second life for them. Hercules and the women face a kind of victimhood in the tragedy. The Oechalians are the victims of Hercules, and Hercules is the victim of Juno. In total contrast to the Oechalians, Hercules overcomes his victimhood. Indeed, through his apotheosis, he bests the situation of the women and becomes a model for the prisoner-Boethius.

In addition to presenting the prisoner with a clear model, I also see Philosophy presenting her own methods as absorbing or defeating Stoic ideals such as *constantia*, as the two moments of *Hercules Oetaeus* which are alluded to showcase the limitations of practicing this belief. In my reading, this also betrays Philosophy's monotheistic worldview. For, she presents her own philosophy, surely informed by a mix of Christian doctrine and Neoplatonism, as more beneficial to the suffering prisoner than a single, isolated philosophy such as Stoicism.[22] Through this pair of allusions, then, I see Philosophy overcoming any associations which the prisoner might make between his state and that of the Oechalian women.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have evaluated specific contexts from a selection of Senecan tragedies which could have been in the mind of the authorial-Boethius and/or in the minds of his readers. In the first allusion, I see the prisoner identifying with the figure of Hippolytus. However, Philosophy's first curative gesture of wiping the prisoner's eyes literally and metaphorically dismisses this identification. Hippolytus is not an effective figure for the

[22] See note 54 in the introduction.

prisoner to see himself in, as he comes to a hopelessly tragic end and has no ally in his fight against persecution. Likewise, when Philosophy alludes to *Phaedra* in 2m.4, she again pushes the prisoner away from identifying with the powerless figure. In addition to dismissing Hippolytus, I see Philosophy push the prisoner toward identifying with Hercules' mortal suffering through an allusion to *Hercules furens*.

While promoting Hercules as a model for the prisoner, Philosophy dismisses the chorus of Oechalian women. Though the women share some elements of suffering with the prisoner, in *Hercules Oetaeus*, the clear depiction of Hercules' apotheosis aligns strongly with Philosophy's depiction of the next, immortal life. This immortality at once supports Christian and Neoplatonic conceptions of a return to God/the One. Thus, while Hercules is clearly joining a pantheon of gods in the Senecan context, it is not difficult to see him as a saviour in monotheistic terms. Indeed, Eppinger focuses upon the different interpretations of Hercules as adopted by writers of the Late Antique world, including Boethius.[23] According to her, Boethius presents Hercules as a positive moral exemplum in line with contemporary Neoplatonists, supporting my reading of Hercules as Philosophy's preferred tragic exemplum for the prisoner-Boethius.

To conclude, it seems fair to say that the authorial-Boethius builds upon one common view of Hercules in Late Antiquity. At the same time, the way in which he expresses this view is worthy of further comment. According to my reading, Philosophy is successfully able to overcome Hippolytus and the Oechalian chorus as other tragic exempla with whom the prisoner might identify. Philosophy does not just dismiss these exempla, but also, in my reading, actively shows the prisoner where these other figures fall short. In this way, she takes classical tragedy seriously as a source of consolation for the prisoner but ultimately defeats it with her own monotheism.

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[23] Eppinger (2015, 136-138).

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter)

Senecan Tragedy	***Consolatio***
Phaedra 736-737	1m.3.3-4
Phaedra 1138-1140	2m.4.15-22
Hercules furens 1092-1099	2.1.6
Hercules Oetaeus 104-111 *Hercules Oetaeus* 1265-1269	1m.4.1-2 1m.4.3-4

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in the *Consolatio*)

Senecan Tragedy	***Consolatio***
Phaedra 736-737	1m.3.3-4
Hercules Oetaeus 104-111 *Hercules Oetaeus* 1265-1269	1m.4.1-2 1m.4.3-4
Hercules furens 1092-1099	2.1.6
Phaedra 1138-1140	2m.4.15-22

Allusions to Lucan: *Bellum Civile*

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall investigate allusions to Lucan's *Bellum Civile*.[1] There are similarities in the historical lives of Boethius and Lucan which could have encouraged the authorial-Boethius to allude to the *BC*. Specifically, both Lucan and Boethius were defenders of senatorial liberty against tyrannical autocracy. Lucan was elevated by Nero and enjoyed a successful political and poetic career despite his young age.[2] However, participation in the Pisonian conspiracy sealed his fate, and he was forced to commit suicide. Indeed, while much remains uncertain surrounding Boethius' downfall, it is clear that he was imprisoned on king Theodoric's orders.[3] Although we have no evidence of a conspiracy against Theodoric, Boethius occupied a vulnerable position. While a successful philosopher, author, and even *magister officiorum* at Theodoric's Amal court, his senatorial Anicii family historically had extensive contact with the East, as did the Symmachi family into which Boethius married.[4] The divisions between Ravenna and Constantinople, Roman Catholic and Arian Goth were always in the background and may have threatened Theodoric.[5] In this way, both for Boethius and for Lucan, when Italian politics fell apart, their lives were brought to an end by royal disfavour in the figures of Theodoric and Nero, respectively. A further historical factor worth consideration is Lucan's familiarity with Stoicism.[6] While Boethius' philosophy is more

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[1] The text is taken from the Loeb edition of Duff (1928), while I opt for Braund's Oxford World's Classic translation (2008) for its readable quality.
[2] Ahl (1976, 36-37). Being the nephew of Seneca the Younger, Nero's adviser and tutor, surely helped Lucan's ascent.
[3] See the Introduction chapter, section B).
[4] Bjornlie (2012, 134).
[5] Further, O'Daly (1991, 6) and Magee (2010, 789) point to growing distrust between Theodoric and the Senate, perhaps fanned by Pope John I's election and the prospect of ecclesiastical unity with the East, which could undercut Gothic rule in the West. Rousseau (1979, 883) believes Theodoric would have seen Boethius' philosophical learning as "pretentious," engendering mistrust.
[6] Due (1970, 204) and Lapidge (1979, 344) see the influence of his Stoic uncle Seneca and his Stoic tutor Cornutus as likely entrance-points to the philosophy. George (1988, 340) argues for Stoic influence evidenced by literary elements of the *BC*; he sees Caesar as a Stoic fool and foil for Cato,

heavily indebted to Neoplatonism than Stoicism, we see a dedication to a philosophical school colouring the poetic works of both men. Boethius, then, may have seen his circumstances—a devotee of philosophy who meets a violent end under his ruler—reflected in Lucan's life. As was the case with Seneca, Boethius might have turned to the *BC* partially on account of this biographical similarity. That is, Lucan is not just renowned for his *BC*. Rather, he is also known for the unresolved conclusion of the epic due to his suicide from persecution by Nero. This situation is not dissimilar from Boethius' death sentence from Theodoric.

I analyse four distinct allusions which the authorial-Boethius makes to the *BC*. The first two allusions concern the adaptation of supernatural figures in the *BC*. Specifically, the prisoner aligns Philosophy with Caesar, who can be considered a divine figure, as he was deified by Lucan's time. Similarly, Philosophy may allude to, and indeed overcome, Julia's appearance to Pompey in a dream. In both allusions, Philosophy is likened to a supernatural actor. At the same time, I also believe that Philosophy improves upon the supernatural figures by presenting her own abilities and teachings as superior.

Similarly, through a second set of allusions, Philosophy defeats the disorder of Lucan's epic world with her monotheism. First, I see Philosophy allude to a scene of extreme depravity but correct it with a famous Platonic metaphor. Then, Philosophy cites a part of the *BC* to paint philosophical martyrdom as noble. In each of the four allusions, the authorial-Boethius responds to foundational elements of the *BC*, such as its lack of Olympian gods and its depictions of a grossly disordered world.[7] By 'correcting' these elements of the epic,

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the Stoic wise man. Martindale (1977, 376) takes the same approach but focuses on the depiction of Sextus Pompey's interaction with Erictho. Gorman (2001, 288) sees the strongest Stoic influence in the ethics of the *BC.* Feeney (1991, 283) argues for the strong presence of the Stoa in the *BC*'s ethics, cosmology, and physics, but notes that Lucan rejects the belief of the gods' providence toward men.

[7] Ahl (1974, 566) argues that the absence of the traditional Olympian gods amounts to a rejection of the power of those gods. Feeney (1991, 285) argues that Lucan keeps the gods out of his epic in order to express the aporia and incomprehension of civil war. Wiener (2010, 1) argues that superhuman influence is still present, even with the absence of the gods, particularly in the *BC*'s divination scenes.

Philosophy improves upon Lucan's understanding of the universe. In my reading, this is not just a literary phenomenon. Rather, Philosophy demonstrates to the prisoner-Boethius that his own world, seen through the lens of monotheism, is a stark improvement upon Lucan's. Specifically, whereas Lucan's epic was devoid of divine influence and expressed gross disorder, the prisoner lives in a world regulated by a single, beneficent God.

2. Lucan's Supernatural Figures in the *Consolatio*

The first allusion to a supernatural figure occurs in 1m.3.1. In the previous chapter on Seneca, there was an allusion to his tragedy *Phaedra* at 1m.3.4. I shall set both allusions in bold typeface to make their proximity clearer. I shall also offer some thoughts on this proximity at the conclusion of this chapter.

> *tunc me **discussa** liquerunt **nocte** tenebrae*
> *luminibusque prior rediit vigor*
> *ut cum praecipiti **glomerantur** nubile **Coro***
> *nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus*
>
> then darkness left me. Dispelled was the night;
> vitality of old renewed my sight.
> As when the north-west wind sweeps headlong by,
> foul weather gathers, rain-clouds clothe the sky…
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.3.1-4)

As discussed in the Seneca chapter, Philosophy has just wiped the prisoner's eyes with her garment.[8] The prisoner then comments upon the effect of this gesture in 1m.3. In the first four lines, he likens the clearing of his vision to darkness being dispelled and then to a storm being swept away. There is a close verbal parallel for 1m.3.1 at *BC* 5.700-702, which Philosophy could be alluding to.

At this moment, Caesar and his men are arguing over the general's recklessness. Caesar had secretly traveled to Italy without his men and during a raging storm. His troops

[8] See the Seneca chapter, note 7.

criticise his actions, arguing that he is too important a figure to take unnecessary risks. They remark, *cum tot in hac anima populorum vita salusque,* / *pendeat et tantus caput hoc sibi fecerit orbis,* / *saevitia est voluisse mori…* "when the life and safety of so many peoples hinge on this your soul, when the world so great has made you its head, willingness to die is cruelty" (*BC* 5.685-687). As the soldiers voice their concerns, they witness a shocking natural phenomenon. The scene reads,

> "*hine usus placuere deum, non rector ut orbis*
> *nec dominus rerum, sed felix naufragus esses?*"
> *talia iactantes* ***discussa nocte*** *serenus*
> *oppressit cum* <u>*sole*</u> *dies, fessumque tumentes*
> *conposuit pelagus ventis patientibus undas*
>
> 'are you content to use the favour of the gods to be not ruler of the world nor master of the state but survivor of a shipwreck?' As they hurled such remarks, with night dispelled, the day came on them cloudless with the sun, and the weary sea with winds permitting calmed the swollen waves.
>
> (*BC* 5.700-702)

Both passages remark upon the quick and miraculous dispersal of night/a storm. In the *BC* context, the unnaturally rapid diffusion of the storm justifies Caesar's actions, making it seem like he has even nature on his side, or that the gods have intervened on his behalf.[9] Caesar can thus point to this occurrence as a portent, countering any reservations of his men. In addition to the overlapping diction, *discussus* and *nox*, the prisoner describes the sun later in the same passage, *emicat et subito vibratus lumine* <u>*Phoebus*</u> / *mirantes oculos radiis ferit* "and Phoebus' sudden brilliance with his rays / presents his orb to our astonished gaze" (*Cons.* 1m.3.9-10). While there is no direct dictional overlap, clearly the rays of Phoebus in the *Consolatio* can be connected to the sun (*sol*) in the *BC* passage, presenting a similar image of light returning after the night/storm.

[9] We might compare Neptune's stilling of the storm at *Aeneid* 1.142ff.

If this scene from the *BC* is being alluded to, then the authorial-Boethius performs a transformation; in the *BC* there is a natural storm, whereas the storm in the *Consolatio* is metaphorical, representative of the prisoner's troubled mentality. O'Daly has discussed natural metaphors in the *Consolatio*, including within 1m.3. He demonstrates that the authorial-Boethius frequently employs natural metaphors to describe his mental state.[10] Building upon his analysis, we gain new insight by focusing upon the fact of the prisoner voicing this poem, including the allusion to the *BC* in its first line. Specifically, through a focus on the prisoner's voice, we can see the ways in which he approximates the condition of Caesar's men, and Philosophy approximates the position of Caesar. Like the soldiers, the prisoner is a mortal figure experiencing a kind of storm. Also like the soldiers, the intervention of a divine figure drives away the storm. As mentioned above, Caesar was considered divine by the time Lucan wrote the *BC* and thus can be compared to Philosophy. In addition to this general background, we can see the way the weather responds to his actions as foreshadowing his divinity, demonstrating that he has the gods on his side, or indicating that he himself may already be more than human. Philosophy, like Caesar, is also clearly a superhuman figure. This is apparent from the prisoner's description of her arrival.[11]

> *Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem adstitisse mihi supra verticem visa est mulier reverendi admodum vultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum valentiam perspicacibus, colore vivido atque inexhausti vigoris, quamvis ita aevi plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis ambiguae.*

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[10] See O'Daly (1991, 120-122) for this particular metaphor, and his section, "Nature in the Poetry of the *Consolation*" (1991, 104ff) for further examples.

[11] Philosophy's appearance to the prisoner could be compared to many divine epiphanies from the classical and late antique literary traditions. For close late antique examples, see Augustine's description of the appearance of *continentia* at *Confessions* 8.11.27. Augustine describes his conversation with *continentia* in the following way, *ista controversia in corde meo non nisi de me ipso adversus me ipsum* "this debate took place within my heart; it was myself arguing against myself" (*Conf.* 8.12.28). This is similar to the premise of the *Consolatio*, in which the prisoner and Philosophy help the authorial-Boethius articulate his ideas through the dialogic form. Likewise, see Augustine's desire to embrace personified Wisdom at *Soliloquia* 1.11.22. The *Soliloquia* also approximate the position of the prisoner, as Augustine engages in a dialogue with his own *ratio*, as discussed in the Introduction chapter.

> *Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc vero pulsare caelum summi verticis cacumine videbatur; quae cum altius caput extulisset, ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum frustrabatur intuitum.*
>
> These were the silent reflections which I nursed in my heart. My dutiful pen was putting the last touches to my tearful lament, when a lady seemed to position herself above my head. She was most awe-inspiring to look at, for her glowing eyes penetrated more powerfully than those of ordinary folk, and a tireless energy was reflected in her heightened colour. At the same time she was so advanced in years that she could not possibly be regarded as a contemporary. Her height was hard to determine, for it varied; at one moment she confined herself to normal human dimensions, but at another the crown of her head seemed to strike the heavens, and when she raised it still higher, it even broke through the sky, frustrating the gaze of those who observed her.
>
> (*Cons*. 1.1.1)

When Philosophy first appears, the prisoner can only identify her as a *mulier*. Even in this confused state, he describes Philosophy's supernatural appearance in detail. Indeed, the prisoner provides three different descriptions of ways in which Philosophy surpasses human ability. He first describes her eyes as superhuman, *oculis ardentibus et* ***ultra communem hominum valentiam*** *perspicacibus*, then her ability to change her height, *nam nunc quidem* ***ad communem*** *sese* ***hominum mensuram*** *cohibebat, nunc vero pulsare caelum summi verticis cacumine videbatur*. Finally, he notes that the full extension of her height reaches beyond human vision, *respicientiumque* ***hominum frustrabatur*** *intuitum*. In each case, we see the prisoner contrast Philosophy on the one hand with the abilities of men ('*hominum*') on the other. Thus, despite being unable to recognize Philosophy, he is nonetheless sure that she is beyond human. A reader could have thought of Caesar's divinity as similar to Philosophy's divinity. If one follows this reading, then the prisoner occupies a similar position to that of the soldiers. Like the men, the prisoner appears to be comforted by the actions of a divine guide.

In addition, an allusion to this scene also demonstrates the ways in which Philosophy's divinity surpasses Caesar's divinity. Specifically, where Caesar's men only find temporary relief, Philosophy promises to have a greater impact upon the prisoner. Caesar's

men are thankful that their leader has returned safely. However, many dangers lie ahead for Caesar and for the men who follow his command. Differently, when Philosophy clears the prisoner's clouded vision, he is literally able to recognise her, and metaphorically able to turn to philosophical consolations for his grief. In this way, although Caesar and Philosophy are both linked to the dismissal of a storm, in Philosophy's case, this dismissal is more impactful and more permanent, too.

Indeed, one could also argue that the goal Philosophy sets for the prisoner surpasses that which Caesar sets for his men. While they are at the mercy of their divine guide sending them into battle, Philosophy's mission is to lead the prisoner to his afterlife through reunion with the One/God. Thus, implicitly, Philosophy holds out the promise of elevating the prisoner to a similar state of divinity to that which she already occupies. While Caesar's men are grateful that he seems to be supernaturally protected, there is no hope that they will be elevated to a similar state. Rather, they can only benefit from Caesar's abilities through association. Likewise, where Caesar's men question his actions, the prisoner-Boethius does not, only feeling relief that he understands the figure who has come to visit him. As a result, if we notice that the prisoner is the voice of the allusion, we gain a deeper understanding of the imagery. Thus, the authorial-Boethius is not just remarking upon the quickness of Philosophy's intervention. Rather, he may also be demonstrating the ways in which Philosophy's goals for his prisoner-self differ from those that are possible within Lucan's perverse epic world.

In the next case study, I again see an allusion to a supernatural figure from the *BC*. This allusion occurs in the *Consolatio* prose section immediately after 1m.3 just analysed: at 1.3. At this point, through clear eyes, the prisoner can recognize Philosophy. However, as soon as he realises the identity of his healer, he asks her why she has come to him:

> *Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam, cuius ab adulescentia laribus obversatus fueram, Philosophiam. Et: Quid, inquam, tu in has exsilii nostri solitudines, o omnium magistra virtutum, supero cardine delapsa venisti?*
>
> Thus as I eyed her with unblinking gaze, I recognized the one whose dwelling I had attended from youthful years, my nurse Philosophy. 'Teacher of all virtues, why', I asked, 'have you come gliding down from the pole of heaven to visit me in the solitude of my exile?'
>
> (*Cons.* 1.3.2-3)

In response to the prisoner's confusion, Philosophy replies that she has frequently attended philosophers on trial; Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Seneca are just a few of the figures she cites to demonstrate that studying philosophy often leads directly to persecution. She says:

> *quodsi nec Anaxagorae fugam nex Socratis venenum nec Zenonis tormenta, quoniam sunt peregrina, novisti, at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos, quorum nec pervetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud* ***in cladem detraxit*** *nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum dissimillimi videbantur*
>
> Perhaps you have not learnt of the flight of Anaxagoras, of the poison forced on Socrates, of the torturing of Zeno, for these took place abroad; but at any rate you have been able to acquaint yourself with such figures as Canius, and Seneca, and Soranus, for the tradition about them is still fresh and famous. They were dragged down to disaster for no other reason than that they were schooled in my ways, and showed themselves utterly at odds with the unprincipled.
>
> (*Cons.* 1.3.9-10)

Philosophy tells the prisoner that she is used to her followers being persecuted. Just as has occurred with many notable figures before, so will Philosophy remain by the prisoner's side during his own oppression. She reassures one of her devotees that she will not forsake him in his distress. However, I see an allusion to the figure of Julia in the *BC* adding further detail to her reassurance. In my reading, Philosophy does not just comfort the prisoner but also bests a supernatural figure from the *BC*. The allusion is to the start of *BC* Book 3. We find Pompey sailing from Italy and falling asleep. Lucan narrates,

> *Inde soporifero cesserunt languida somno*
> *membra ducis; diri tum plena horroris imago*
> *visa caput maestum per hiantes Iulia terras*
> *tollere et accenso furialis stare sepulchro*
>
> Then the leader's weary limbs give way to drowsy sleep; then he dreamt that Julia, a phantom full of dreadful horror, raised her mourning head through gaping earth and stood upon the flaming pyre like a Fury.
>
> (*BC* 3.8-11)

From the first description of Julia, it is clear that she is a supernatural figure coming to torment Pompey. This ominous advent is matched by her vengeful remarks to him. She tells Pompey that, without her, his best days are behind him, *coniuge me laetos duxisti, Magne, triumphos:* / *Fortuna est mutata toris, semperque potentes* / ***detrahere in cladem*** *fato damnata maritos* / *innupsit tepido paelex Cornelia busto* "while I was your wife, Magnus, you led happy triumphs home: your fortune changed with your marriage-bed and that paramour, Cornelia, condemned by Fate to drag her mighty husbands down always to disaster, married into a warm tomb" (*BC* 3.20-23).[12] Julia says that Pompey's association with Cornelia 'dragged him into disaster'. This is the same phrasing we see when Philosophy tells the prisoner that philosophers before him had been 'dragged into disaster,' *quos nihil aliud* ***in cladem detraxit*** *nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum dissimillimi videbantur*. Through the overlapping diction, we find someone is being 'dragged down' from a former height.

If this scene informs Philosophy's language, then she could be alluding to the *BC* context in order to correct it. When Julia appears to Pompey, the destruction she describes is ruthless. Far from trying to help Pompey through his present and future suffering, she comes only to torment him further. Although the prisoner began his dialogue with Philosophy in a confused state, her first gesture was clearly one of care and comfort. There is thus a pointed

[12] The two citations represent the only attestations of this phrase in Latin literature. Gruber (2006, 113) makes a comparison by remarking '*wie*'.

contrast between the two appearances of supernatural female figures. To focus on the diction itself, when Philosophy says devotion to her is destined to drag the prisoner down, she paints this destruction as a martyrdom, and noble fate which befalls good men. Indeed, it is honouring to the prisoner to be likened to figures like Seneca. This also reverses the context of the *BC*; Julia promises to be a menace to Pompey, both while he is alive and while he is dead. Lucan describes Julia as a fury, *et accenso furialis stare sepulchro*, a vengeful chthonic figure. She also promises that she will torment Pompey as he wages war, …*veniam te bella gerente* / *in medias acies*… "when you are waging wars I shall come into the middle of the ranks" (*BC* 3.30-31). Likewise, Julia correctly predicts that Pompey will die because of the civil war, threatening, …*te faciet civile meum* "civil war will make you mine" (*BC* 3.34). Julia does not depict anything positive coming from Pompey's death. Rather, it will return him to her, in the culmination of their inescapable association. Through these descriptions, Julia seems to promise Pompey a horrible life in the underworld with her.

In opposite terms, Philosophy promises the prisoner salvation in a life after death. Thus, if Philosophy is alluding to this scene, she presents herself as the opposite of the vengeful Julia. Instead, she is the prisoner's committed guide to a hopeful and peaceful future. Of course, the prisoner can only experience the truth of Philosophy's reasoning in the next life, that is, after he has died.[13] But unlike Pompey, the prisoner is aware that he will die imminently, and he is aware that he cannot change his death sentence. Nevertheless, through the aid of Philosophy, he can meet this necessary future unafraid, trusting in a better second existence. Through an allusion to Julia's appearance, I see Philosophy as besting the supernatural Julia. She will allow the prisoner to meet death with less fear, unlike Julia, who encourages terror in Pompey. By making this allusion then, Philosophy does much more than

[13] Relihan argues that Philosophy provides a consolation of death (2007, 78) which is paltry and thus implicitly pushes the prisoner to Christianity (2007, 91-92).

reassure the prisoner that she is by his side. Rather, she implicitly demonstrates that he will attain a second life in a way that Pompey could not. Philosophy (indeed, the authorial-Boethius) also elevates the prisoner by comparing him to the other famed philosophical martyrs she names.

In the allusions examined in this section, Philosophy bests two of the supernatural figures of the *BC*. In the first case, the prisoner alludes to Caesar; this allusion also demonstrates the ways in which Philosophy offers a miraculous path forward. Through association with Caesar, Philosophy's plan for the prisoner is depicted as effective. However, I see Philosophy besting even Caesar's relationship with his soldiers, promising to deliver the prisoner to a kind of immortality in the next world. The allusion to the Julia episode likewise shows Philosophy surpassing another supernatural figure from the *BC*. In this case, Philosophy's depiction of life after death completely contrasts with the bitter figure of Julia, underlining the ways she will proffer effective aid to the prisoner. We can also recall that the *BC* is famed for its lack of Olympian gods. Given this quality, it is more emphatic for the authorial-Boethius to allude to sections of the *BC* in which there is any supernatural element. Thus, when Philosophy overcomes even these figures, we can see the ways in which her powers defeat the divinities and supernatural actors of the *BC*.

3. The *Bellum Civile*'s Disorder in the *Consolatio*

In this section I shall analyse two allusions to the grossly disordered world of the *BC*. In both cases, my reading is that Philosophy contrasts her belief in a world regulated by God with Lucan's depictions of an unregulated and chaotic world. Through such a contrast, Philosophy corrects the *BC*'s depiction of disorder and demonstrates the supremacy of her monotheism. In the first allusion we find the application of a Platonic metaphor influencing both the *Consolatio* and the *BC*. Where Lucan demonstrates the failings of human nature in the context of civil war, Philosophy rehabilitates the Platonic metaphor, indicating that it

supports her understanding of the universe and the One/God. In the second allusion, Philosophy cites the *BC*. Through this citation, she points to and elevates philosophical martyrdom.

The first allusion is to *BC* 4. At this point in the epic, Caesar has reached Spain, where the generals Afranius and Petreius are commanding Pompey's forces. Petreius flees the town of Ilerda, but Caesar blocks his escape through the Pyrenees. As a stop in the fighting ensues, the two sides pitch their camps. Lucan depicts the soldiers being able to recognize each other due to their close proximity. He narrates:

> *Illic exiguo paulum distantia vallo*
> *castra locant. Postquam spatio languentia nullo*
> *mutua conspicuos habuerunt lumina voltus,*
> *[hic fratres natosque suos videre patresque,]*
> *deprensum est civile nefas. Tenuere parumper*
> *ora metu, tantum nutu motoque salutant*
> *ense suos. Mox, ut stimulis maioribus ardens*
> *rupit amor leges, audet transcendere vallum*
> *miles, in amplexus effusas tendere palmas.*
>
> There with a tiny rampart, they pitch their camps a little way apart: after their eyes, undimmed by distance, had each others' faces in full view, they grasped the crime of civil war. For a moment they restrained their voices out of fear; only with a nod or movement of the sword they greet their friends; soon, when burning love with its more powerful spurs broke the rules, the soldiers dare to climb across the rampart, to stretch their hands wide for embraces.
>
> (*BC* 4.168-176)

In the opening of this scene, we see that *amor* proves too strong for the men, who rush to reunite. Lucan describes the men giving in as a kind of breaking of norms, …*stimulis maioribus ardens* / *rupit amor leges*. This reunion also allows the men to realise the extent of their crimes, *nefas*. However, the reunion does not last long. The Pompeian general Petreius is disgusted by the good-feeling and rouses his men to resume the battle. Lucan does not present the return to the fight neutrally but highlights the horror of the resumption through an epic simile in which he compares the men to animals that return to their bloodlust.

…sic fatur et omnes
concussit mentes scelerumque reduxit amorem
sic, ubi desuetae silvis in carcere cluso
mansuevere ferae et voltus posuere minaces
atque hominem didicere pati, ***si*** *torrida parvus*
venit in ***ora cruor****,* ***redeunt*** *rabiesque furorque,*
admonitaeque tument gustato sanguine fauces;
fervet et a trepido vix abstinet ira ***magistro****.*
Itur in omne nefas, et, quae Fortuna deorum
invidia caeca bellorum in nocte tulisset,
fecit monstra fides…

So he speaks and shook every mind and brought back their love of wickedness. Just so the wild beasts unlearn the ways of the woods and grow tame in the locked prison, dropping their threatening looks and learning to submit to man, but if their parched mouths find a little gore, their rabid frenzy returns and their throats swell at the memory of the taste of blood; their anger seethes, hardly sparing the trembling keeper. They proceed to every guilt and their loyalty commits horrors which if Fortune had inflicted them in battle's blind night would have been to the gods' discredit.

(*BC* 4.235-245)

Lucan describes a complete transformation in the soldiers following Petreius' goading; desire to reunite has turned to desire to commit the heinous crimes of civil war, *scelerumque reduxit amorem*. In both cases, *amor* dictates the actions of the soldiers; in the first part of the scene this *amor* impels them to positive actions of reunion and in the later part of the scene toward worse depravity.[14] Thus, the speech of Petreius is like blood in the mouths of lions, and the men return to the very crimes which they had just regretted, *itur in omne nefas*… (*BC* 4.243) echoing *deprensum est civile nefas* (*BC* 4.172).

The authorial-Boethius alludes to this scene at 3m.2. The theme of this poem is that all things return to their source. Philosophy first announces her theme (*Cons.* 3m.2.1-6) before providing a catalogue of examples. She describes how lions will return to their

[14] Lapidge (1979, 366) argues that the image of cosmic love holding the universe together has Stoic roots. He traces mentions of Aphrodite depicted in this way back to Cornutus and Philodemus and argues that Lucan would have been influenced by their doctrines to conceive of *amor* in the same way. In the *BC* scene, when *amor* goes awry, so the men resort to animalistic violence.

bloodlust (*Cons*. 3m.2.7-16), how caged birds will long for freedom (*Cons*. 3m.2.17-26), how saplings, when bent, will snap straight back (*Cons*. 3m.2.27-30), and finally how the sun will always rise after setting (*Cons*. 3m.2.31-33). In her final section (*Cons*. 3m.2.34-38), she concludes that all elements of God's creation seek the end which nature ascribes to them.[15] As she reiterates, these are the firm laws which nature establishes, ...(*sc. natura*) *quibus immensum* / *legibus orbem provida servet* "the laws by which her providence preserves the world's unbounded sphere" (*Cons.* 3m.2.2-3). The verbal similarity occurs in the first example from Philosophy's catalogue, describing lions returning to their savage bloodlust as soon as they are freed from captivity:

> *quamvis Poeni pulchra leones*
> *vincula gestent manibusque datas*
> *captent escas metuantque trucem*
> *soliti verbera ferre* ***magistrum****,*
> ***si cruor*** *horrida tinxerit* ***ora****,*
> *resides olim* ***redeunt*** *animi*
> *frementique gravi meminere sui,*
> *laxant nodis colla solutis*
> *primusque lacer dente cruento*
> *domitor rabidas imbuit iras.*
>
> though Punic lions proudly wear their handsome chains, accepting food which human hands for them prepare, as cowed by their harsh lord, they brood, inured to bear his savage blows, yet pride, long dormant, then revives should blood besmear their bristly jaws. Deep roars awake their earlier lives; constraining bonds they fiercely burst, no halters now their neck engage; with bloodstained teeth they mangle first their tamer, roused to furious rage.
>
> (*Cons.* 3m.2.7-16)[16]

Arguably, Philosophy's comparison of the men to savage lions betrays Platonic colour. In addition to Boethius' clear knowledge of Platonic philosophy, the *Consolatio* displays intense

[15] Lerer (1985, 141) shows that the strings of Philosophy's lyre mimic the bonds of the universe.
[16] O'Daly (1991, 160) and Gruber (2006, 245) adduce Lucan as a source, but do not go beyond commenting on the possibility of echoes. However, the highlighted dictional elements are only shared by these two attestations in all extant Latin literature.

Platonic colour in both large and small-scale elements.[17] As a result, we can argue that the lion imagery is meant to draw us to a specific Platonic metaphor.[18] At *Republic* 9.588d-e, Plato fashions a metaphor to explain his conception of the soul's tripartite division. In this metaphor, man represents τὸ λογιστικόν, or reason, a hydra represents τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, or appetite, and a lion represents τὸ θυμοειδές, or spirit. This spirit can be checked by reason or can be driven by appetite. The details of Philosophy's image would seem to support the metaphor; the captive lion, *thumoeides*, when not checked by the man, *logistikon*, returns to his natural bloodlust, *epithumetikon*. According to the metaphor, if a man cannot control his spirit, he gives in to a worse part of his nature. If we consider the *BC* scene through the lens of the Platonic metaphor for the soul, we find additional grotesque detail. The soldiers, by indulging their lower impulses, have become animalistic.[19] Although endowed with a higher nature, they have been conquered by their appetite, *epithumetikon*, and have no reason, *logistikon*, to check their violence.

Through an allusion to the *BC*, Philosophy wishes to contrast her application of the Platonic metaphor with Lucan's battle scene. Specifically, where Lucan clearly depicts the Pompeian soldiers as debased, Philosophy assures the prisoner that he lives in a world controlled by the law of nature. Lucan describes the way *amor* impels two opposite reactions, highlighting the instability of human behaviour: …*stimulis maioribus ardens* / *rupit* <u>*amor*</u> *leges* (*BC* 4.174-175) gives way to <u>*scelerumque*</u> *reduxit* <u>*amorem*</u> (*BC* 4.236). In other words, the laws between the men are not fixed. In contrast, Philosophy assures the prisoner that nature has established unbreakable bonds for the universe:

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[17] For example, see Shanzer (1984, 361) on the importance of Platonic principles to the prisoner's self-understanding. Likewise, Heijer (2014, 442) investigates Boethius' indebtedness to Platonic cosmological thought and to more specific concepts such as anamnesis (448). On anamnesis in the *Consolatio* see further O'Daly (1991, 158) and Claassen (2007, 1-35).
[18] See O'Daly (1991, 161) for analysis of the caged bird in Philosophy's catalogue as a metaphor for the soul's captivity.
[19] Asso (2010, 162).

quantas rerum flectat habenas
natura potens, quibus immensum
legibus orbem provida servet
stringatque ligans inresoluto
singula nexu, placet arguto
fidibus lentis promere cantu.

It is my whim on pliant strings / to hymn these themes in tuneful song: / the strength which potent Nature brings / to reins which guide the world along; / the laws by which her providence / preserves the world's unbounded sphere; / how she enchains the elements / enmeshed in bonds that must cohere.

(*Cons.* 3m.2.1-6)

For Philosophy's worldview to overcome Lucan's, it is crucial that the laws governing her monotheistic universe are unbreakable. By partaking in the crime of civil war, Lucan shows that there are no such unbreakable bonds between the soldiers. This extreme example of broken laws provides a stark contrast with the regulation and control which nature establishes for all elements in God's creation. As a result, an allusion to this scene underlines the contrast.

Furthermore, Philosophy improves upon the *BC* imagery by suggesting that the prisoner can follow his nature, but to the higher level. Indeed, in the surrounding prose and poetic sections Philosophy makes the point explicitly that mankind, like the lion, bird, sapling, and sun, is also compelled to follow his nature, but to the enlightened element, or τὸ λογιστικόν. She thus draws a distinction between man and lion/animal not just on the metaphorical level of its relation to Plato's conception of the soul, but also in the natural world, where mankind is distinguished from all other beings by his ultimate heavenly home. More immediately, we can also look to the final section of 3m.2 for this sentiment.

repetunt proprios quaeque recursus
redituque suo singula gaudent
nec manet ulli traditus ordo,
nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum
stabilemque sui fecerit orbem.

all things in nature thus retrace the paths acknowledged as their own;

> they gladly then regain their base.
> Assigned to them is this alone,
> to seek as end their starting-place,
> and make the world a stable zone.
>
> (*Cons.* 3m.2.34-38)

Through this final section, Philosophy argues that nature preserves the order of the world by making all its element revert to their origins. By concluding the poem in this way, Philosophy inverts the *BC* imagery. During civil war, the soldiers are so corrupted that they give in to the lower part of their nature. In total contrast, Philosophy assures men that they too follow their nature, but to a different end than animals. Instead, good men like the prisoner can hope to return to the One/God, who controls the universe in an unbreakable order. In this way, Philosophy's monotheism overcomes Lucan's world.

In the second example of this section, I offer an interpretation of a noted citation of the *BC* at *Consolatio* 4.6.33. We find ourselves in the longest prose section of the work, which deals with the connection between fate and providence. At the point of the citation, Philosophy is arguing that the reason events seem confusing to mankind is because he cannot conceive of the world in the way that God can. Thus, she says to the prisoner, it is a mistake to doubt God's control over the universe: the problem lies in mankind's inability to perceive His mechanisms. As she makes this point, she cites Lucan as part of her evidence that mankind, while enlightened, does not possess the ability to understand God.

> *Nam ut pauca, quae ratio valet humana, de divina profunditate perstringam, de hoc, quem tu iustissimum et aequi servantissimum putas, omnia scienti providentiae diversum videtur. Et* ***victricem*** *quidem* ***causam dis****,* ***victam*** *vero* ***Catoni placuisse*** *familiaris noster* <u>*Lucanus*</u> *admonuit. Hic igitur quicquid citra spem videas geri, rebus quidem rectus ordo est, opinioni vero tuae perversa confusio.*
>
> Let me touch upon a few examples such as human reason can grasp of God's profundity. Take a man whom you regard as supremely just, totally upholding the right; he appears to all-knowing Providence in a different light. Lucan, a poet of our persuasion, has reminded us that the cause of the victor was pleasing to the gods, but that of the vanquished to Cato. So all that in this case

> falls short of your expectation in fact occurs in due order, whereas to your thinking it appears a topsy-turvy shambles.
>
> (*Cons.* 4.6.32-34)

This is a clear citation of ***victrix causa deis placuit****, sed* ***victa Catoni*** "if the victor had the gods on his side, the vanquished had Cato" (*BC* 1.128).[20] The tone of the *BC* is perhaps ironic at this moment. If the victor in the civil war—Caesar—had the gods on his side, then Cato's moral rectitude is in doubt. As Cato was renowned for his Stoic beliefs, culminating in his suicide, it seems unlikely that Lucan, himself a devoted Stoic, displays an entirely sincere tone in suggesting that Cato did not act correctly. When Philosophy cites this line, she presents Lucan's words as a lesson. As a result, some commentators, chiefly O'Donnell (84, 1984) and Gruber (354, 2006), argue that Boethius has missed Lucan's irony. I would instead build upon O'Daly's and Chadwick's analysis of this moment. O'Daly (1991, 71) suggests that Boethius may be aligning himself with Cato to suggest that his death was noble. Similarly, Chadwick (1981, 243) argues that even when things seem wrong, they are nevertheless right when understood from God's vantage point. Thus, Cato was the real hero even though it seems he suffered more than Caesar by committing suicide. Building upon these observations, I would emphasise the fact of Philosophy voicing this sentiment and its citation.[21]

According to my reading in the first section of this chapter, the prisoner aligns Philosophy with Caesar's divinity, though Philosophy overcomes Caesar (and the supernatural Julia) with her own, superior monotheism. I see the same type of defeat in this case. If we advance an ironic reading of the *BC* sentiment, then Lucan suggests that the gods

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[20] Roche (2009, 89) believes the favouring of Caesar by the gods also equates to abandonment and condemnation of Pompey. This is a citation, not an allusion, which Gruber notes (2006, 354).
[21] Thomas (2010, 1) briefly argues that Boethius is problematizing Philosophy's argument but not through the lens of narratology. Rather, she believes that Lucan's *sententia* breaks with orthodox Stoicism and thus undermines Philosophy.

of the *BC* favoured the wrong side. Philosophy would have to present Lucan as straightforwardly correct to miss this irony. However, I do not read her presentation of the *BC* citation in this way. Instead, I would emphasise the way in which Philosophy introduces Lucan's judgement. Right before citing him, Philosophy says, …*quem tu iustissimum et aequi servantissimum putas, omnia scienti providentiae diversum videtur…* "take a man whom you regard as supremely just, totally upholding the right; he appears to all-knowing Providence in a different light" (*Cons.* 4.6.32). Philosophy shows the prisoner that mortal judgement is impaired; while the prisoner may think someone is morally upright, he does not necessarily appear this way to God. Taking this context into consideration, I read Lucan as a pair with the prisoner. Although both are devotees of philosophy, they are nevertheless limited by their mortal knowledge; they cannot possibly grasp the truth of universe, as it is only fully apparent to God. Indeed, in the line immediately following the citation, Philosophy tells the prisoner, *hic igitur quicquid citra spem videas geri, rebus quidem rectus ordo est, opinioni vero tuae perversa confusio* "so all that in this case falls short of your expectation in fact occurs in due order, whereas to your thinking it appears a topsy-turvy shambles" (*Cons*. 4.6.34). We can thus understand Philosophy as challenging the prisoner to see the limitations of Lucan's worldview, which is necessarily perverse and confused (*perversa confusio*) by nature of being mortal and also by forsaking the divine.

If understood in this way, then Philosophy's citation subtly undercuts Lucan's understanding of the universe. For, if Lucan is being ironic, then he is also suggesting that the gods overseeing the universe made the wrong choice. The absent and fallible Olympians contrast markedly with Philosophy's creator God. Philosophy's beneficent monotheism is thus presented as an improvement upon Lucan's world and the gods controlling it, as everything is seen as correct from God's vantage point, as Chadwick noted. Whereas the pantheon of gods neglected to favour Cato, the prisoner can be sure that, even if he endures

hardship, this does not mean that the One/God disfavours him. In fact, shortly after Philosophy's citation, she tells the prisoner that Providence sometimes intentionally inflicts difficulties upon good men so that they can be tested. While painful, this process is educative and thus in the end for the best. Philosophy explains:

> *alii plus aequo metuunt quod ferre possunt, alii plus aequo despiciunt quod ferre non possunt; hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit. Nonnulli venerandum saeculis nomen gloriosae pretio mortis emerunt, quidam suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt invictam malis esse virtutem; quae quam recte atque disposite et ex eorum bono quibus accedere videntur fiant, nulla dubitatio est.*
>
> some men's fears about their powers of endurance are greater than they should be, while others show too much contempt in the face of what they prove unable to bear. Providence imposes harsh experience on them, to allow them to put themselves to the test. There are some who at the cost of a glorious death have purchased fame and reverence from posterity; others, by their refusal to cave in before tortures, have proved to the world that virtue is unconquered by evils. Of the justice and apt order of such treatment, and of the benefit it confers on those seen to experience it, there can be no doubt.
>
> (*Cons.* 4.6.41-42)

Given this context, we do not have to see Philosophy missing irony in the *BC*. Rather, we can read her as overcoming the limits of human knowledge through her providential perspective.

Furthermore, Philosophy completes this sentiment by telling the prisoner that others before him have had to die for their principles. She says, …*quidam suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt invictam malis esse virtutem* "others, by their refusal to cave in before tortures, have proved to the world that virtue is unconquered by evils" (*Cons.* 4.6.42). Of course, she does not advocate for the prisoner to commit suicide after the example of the Stoic Cato, or Lucan. Rather, she clarifies that death can be the ultimate proof of virtue for a philosopher. In this way, Philosophy is able to elevate the idea of philosophical martyrdom without advancing a Stoic suicide as the prisoner's ultimate goal. Rather, the prisoner can simply accept death as a Stoic might. The crucial difference is that, through

Philosophy's aid, the prisoner can also have faith in a second existence beyond his mortal demise.

4. Conclusion

In the two groupings of this chapter, I have suggested that the authorial-Boethius draws upon a pair of elements in the *BC*: its depiction of supernatural figures (in Caesar and Julia), and its images of a disordered world (through an allusion to battle and through a citation of the *BC*). The prisoner associates Philosophy with Caesar at a moment which shows his miraculous ability. Likewise, Philosophy is able to successfully overcome the depiction of Julia's supernatural status. In both cases, Philosophy's monotheism gains authority by surpassing these figures. Likewise, in the latter two allusions, Philosophy demonstrates her ability to overcome the damaged world of the *BC*.

I would like to conclude by returning to the first allusion, 1m.3.1-4:

> *tunc me **discussa** liquerunt **nocte** tenebrae*
> *luminibusque prior rediit vigor*
> *ut cum praecipiti **glomerantur** nubile **Coro***
> *nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus*
>
> then darkness left me. Dispelled was the night;
> vitality of old renewed my sight.
> As when the north-west wind sweeps headlong by,
> foul weather gathers, rain-clouds clothe the sky,
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.3.1-4)

As noted earlier, according to my reading, this poem contains two separate allusions. The first, at 1m.3.1, is to *BC* 5.700-702, and the second, at 1m.3.3, is to Seneca's *Phaedra*, *fugit insanae similis procellae,* / *ocior nubes **glomerante Coro*** "his flight was like a frenzied gale, swifter than Corus massing clouds…" (*Phaedr.* 736-737). Of course, it is impossible to say whether a reader would have noticed either or both of these allusions. Even so, I would like to offer an additional level of interpretation; in the case of the first allusion, *discussa* and

nocte, we may find an instance of multiple reference. For, this phrasing also occurs outside of Lucan, in Seneca's *Hercules furens*.[22] At the point in the tragedy of the allusion, Juno is voicing her opening, angry monologue against the hero. One of her complaints is that Hercules, by overpowering Dis, seems to be trying to attain immortality. Juno says, *vidi ipsa, vidi* ***nocte discussa*** *inferum* / *et Dite domito spolia iactantem patri* / *fraterna…* "with my own eyes I watched him, after he had shattered the gloom of the underworld and subdued Dis, as he showed off to his father spoils won from that father's brother" (*Herc.f.* 50). The 'night' in the tragedy is a metonymy for the underworld whereas the 'night' which the prisoner refers to is a natural-world metaphor describing his grief. Although the images are different, the language overlaps. It is therefore possible that a reader could have seen allusions to both the tragedy and the epic. If this is the case, then, we have a multiple reference within 1m.3.1.

Above, I stated that Philosophy overcame Caesar's quelling of the storm through her own more permanent intervention. If the *Hercules furens* context adds further background to 1m.3.1, then we could also see Philosophy overcoming Juno. The goddess is angered by Hercules and convinced that his return from capturing Cerberus foreshadows his immortality. While Hercules will not achieve an immortal state in this tragedy, I have argued that Philosophy wishes to depict Hercules as a model for the prisoner-Boethius. Furthermore, in *Hercules Oetaeus*, as discussed in the previous chapter on Seneca, Hercules does achieve an immortal state. Thus, if we notice a multiple reference at 1m.3.1, we can also see Philosophy's encouragement, for the prisoner to turn toward Hercules, playing out within a single line. Beyond the multiple reference within 1m.3.1, 1m.3.4 could also allude to *Phaedra*. In other words, in the first four lines of the poem, it is a possibility that the authorial-Boethius combines diction drawn from Seneca and Lucan, blood relatives who

[22] Gruber (2006, 110) notes the similarity by remarking '*wie*'. There is a further attestation of this phrase by Apuleius (2.1.17).

shared a commitment to Stoic philosophy. This belief-system colours the tragic works surveyed in the previous chapter and the *BC* analysed in this chapter.

Within 1m.3, the allusions build upon, but ultimately dismiss, the Stoic worldview. *Hercules furens*, *Phaedra*, and the *BC* provide only a limited mirror for the prisoner's experience; unlike Hippolytus, the prisoner can overcome his persecution through Philosophy. Similarly, while Caesar is a divine figure by the time Lucan is writing, only Philosophy can lead the prisoner out of the storm of his grief to a reunion with the eternal God/the One. This final step, of belief in a second life, demonstrates Philosophy surpassing the Stoic worldview.

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter and in the *Consolatio*)

Bellum Civile	***Consolatio***
5.700-702	1m.3.1
3.22-23	1.3.10
4.237-242	3m.2.7-16
1.128	4.6.33

Allusions to Lucretius: The *De Rerum Natura*

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall investigate six allusions to Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* in the *Consolatio*.[1] As was the case with Seneca and Lucan, there are similarities between Lucretius and Boethius's lives which could have contributed to the employment of the *DRN* in the *Consolatio*. The dating of the *DRN* is uncertain, with differing views especially of the phrase *hoc patriai tempore iniquo* "for in this time of our country's troubles" (*DRN* 1.41). Scholars have argued for a range of dates for the composition of the epic depending upon which troubles Lucretius refers to; some see a connection to domestic wars, others to foreign ones.[2] The domestic strife could allude specifically to disorder following the First Triumvirate after 59 BC, to the civil war of Pompey and Caesar in 49-48, or perhaps to this vexed period in general.[3] Whether or not Boethius had a specific historical circumstance in mind, the crucial similarity between the *DRN* and *Consolatio* is composition during a period of unstable political reality in ancient Italy impelled by internal rivalries. As mentioned, Boethius was a high-ranking member of Theodoric's court before his fall from favour.[4] In this way, we can see the uncertainty surrounding the future of Rome as evocative of the circumstances under

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[1] Gruber (2006, 487) notes possible Lucretian echoes. Likewise, O'Daly (1991, 35) notes Lucretian resonance but does not see specific allusions. Alfonsi (1951) and Milanese (1983) are the only scholars, to my knowledge, to discuss Boethius as intentionally alluding to the *DRN*. Alfonsi (221) is only lukewarm, admitting only that we cannot rule out allusions to Lucretius. Milanese is more convinced, arguing for the presence of two specific allusions; 1m.4.1-2 with 2.1093 (139ff) and 2m.4.18 with 2.1ff (142ff). For 1m.4.1-2 and 2.1093, there are more dictional overlaps in my analysis, which connects 1m.4 with the first proem of the *DRN*. For 2m.4.18 with 2.1ff, Milanese does not use overlapping diction to connect two specific passages. The text and translation are taken from the Loeb edition of Rouse revised by Smith (1924).

[2] Hutchinson (2001, 152-153) argues for association with Pompey and Caesar's Civil war and suggests a date of composition between March of 49 and August of 48 BC. Conversely, Rebeggiani (2020, 457) argues that the three episodes comprising the opening sequence refer to foreign wars of conquest in the East and identifies the addressee as C. Memmius L.f., praetor of 58, thus projecting a composition date closer to 58.

[3] For an allusion to the First Triumvirate, see Harrison (2015, 30). For a discussion of political language recalling the 60s and 50s, see Rebeggiani (2020, 441-463).

[4] See the Introduction section B) "Sources on Boethius's Fall".

which Lucretius wrote.[5] Thus, it is not only because Lucretius is a poetic, didactic philosopher that Boethius turns to him, but also because his own unstable political reality is lightly reflected in the *DRN*'s context of composition amid political upheaval.

Likewise, the two works present philosophical solutions to political problems. During a period of political upheaval, Lucretius turns to Epicurean philosophy, expressed through poetry, as an aid. In the *DRN*, he assumes the role of teacher, hoping to lead the named addressee Memmius, and the larger Roman audience, to the equanimity of ataraxia.[6] Likewise, Philosophy is a teacher who employs poetry, and hopes to lead her adherent to a state of detachment from suffering.[7] In addition to assuming the role of a didactic, poetic-philosopher, a further similarity occurs in the employment of medical language throughout the *DRN* and *Consolatio*. The comparison between a philosophical investigation and an interrogation by a physician can be traced back to *Gorgias* 475d-e.[8] Thus, Philosophy can again be seen as an inheritor of the dialogue tradition when she presents herself not just as the prisoner's guide, but as his doctor.[9] Philosophy positions herself in this way from her first encounter with the prisoner, in which she dismisses the elegiac muses her patient has turned to for her own muses, *...meisque eum Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite!* "leave him to be tended and healed with the help of the Muses that attend me (*Cons.* 1.1.12). Philosophy conceives of her goals for her patient as equivalent to restoring him to health, underscoring her medical approach. She also fashions her cure through a stage of intensifying medical

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[5] O'Daly (1991, 6), Magee (2010, 789).
[6] See 1.41-43 for a connection to the troubles of contemporary Rome, 1.935-50 (and 4.10-25) for the justification of poetry, and 2.29-36 (and 5.1392-1396) for the *locus amoenus* enjoyed by Epicureans.
[7] Moreover, as Shanzer (1984, 361) has argued, Boethius fears death; while he might not seek to overcome this fear through Epicureanism, Lucretius' diatribe against this fear fits the prisoner's circumstances.
[8] Heijer (2014, 448). Nussbaum (1994, 14) argues that philosophy was seen by Epicureans as a type of therapeutic medicine for the soul. Likewise, Moes (2001, 48-53) sees Platonic dialogue as comparable to conversations of cognitive therapy. As Philosophy is the inheritor of these traditions, it is easier for us to see her philosophical teachings as a form of medical treatment.
[9] Donato (2012, 10).

interventions, described at 2.1.5-8. For instance, she first applies a metaphorical bandage to the prisoner's philosophical wound (his forgetfulness of philosophy) before she attempts to heal him with more difficult arguments, *sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo validioribus utendum puto* "but now that the warming applications of my arguments are penetrating more deeply below your skin, I must, I think make the dressings stronger" (*Cons.* 2.5.1). Moreover, the prisoner calls Philosophy *medicans* at 1.3.1 and she identifies herself with this same word at 1.4.1. Similarly, Lucretius uses the language and imagery of medical practice throughout his work.[10] Most famously, Lucretius' programmatic honeyed cup simile justifies his employment of poetry, which was outright rejected by Epicurus.[11] In this simile, Epicurean philosophy is equated to bitter wormwood, a medicine ingested to restore health.[12] I shall suggest that the prisoner alludes to this simile below.

There are other examples of Lucretius' use of medical terms outside of the simile, such as the way that he depicts the addressee as a sick patient in need of a cure from an Epicurean healer.[13] Memmius, first identified at 1.26-27 *quos ego de rerum natura pangere conor* (sc. *versibus*) / *Memmiadae nostro* "which I essay to fashion on the Nature of Things, for my friend Memmius…" acts as a generic addressee of the *DRN*. He is mentioned by name in Books 1, 2, and 5, and may be implied within clusters of second-person verbs in books 3, 4, and 6.[14] At the same time, Lucretius may not mean to specifically call Memmius to mind. Indeed, Memmius' presence significantly fades after 5.164, and he does not appear through a direct address in any part of Book 6.[15] While Memmius is a named addressee, Lucretius

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[10] Kilpatrick (1996, 69).
[11] Classen (1968, 77), Lienhard (1969, 346), Cook (1994, 193), Asmis (2016, 439).
[12] *DRN* 1.935-50, 4.10-25.
[13] Mitsis (1993, 124).
[14] In addition to 1.26 (named) already cited, he appears at 1.411 (named), 1.1052 (named), 2.143 (named), 2.182 (named), 5.8 (named), 5.93 (named), 5.164 (named), 5.867 (named), 5.1282 (named), 6.1257 (implied through second person verb), and 6.1268 (implied through second person verb). Memmius does not have to be the 'real' addressee of the work but can simply act as its generic addressee.
[15] Townend (1978, 281).

means to convert a wider Roman audience.[16] In this way, Lucretius employs Memmius as an addressee and implied audience for his philosophical teachings much like we see Philosophy speak to the character of the prisoner. Of course, there are generic differences; Lucretius is the inheritor of didactic epic and diatribe whereas Philosophy inherits philosophical dialogue and consolation literature.[17] Nonetheless, there is a shared sense of a patient (who is addressed directly) receiving a philosophical cure that is described in medical terms present in both works.

In addition to the similarities in medical language, we also see shared techniques. For instance, Boethius employs the literary device of prosopopoeia in a way which points to Lucretius. While this is a device numerous philosophers use, there are features which make a Lucretian inspiration more likely. For instance, Lucretius and Boethius both use a prosopopoeia with a female, divine figure. Throughout 2.2 (discussed further below) Philosophy speaks in the guise of Fortuna, and at 3.931-971, Natura, the divine, female embodiment of the concept, speaks to men against the fear of annihilation. In addition to the employment of the device in the mouth of a similar figure, I would also add that Natura and Fortuna are deployed in a similar context; in both cases the author uses the device to further the application of philosophy as a therapy. Lucretius includes this device in his diatribe to help free men from fear of death by realizing it is nothing to them in Epicurean terms. Not dissimilarly, Philosophy utilizes the device to convince the prisoner that his shift in fortune means nothing since he can look forward to a second, eternal life with God after death. Thus, while Philosophy's message is clearly at odds with Lucretius', Boethius seems to look directly to the *DRN* in deploying this rhetorical technique.

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[16] Clay (1983, 213).

[17] Wallach (1976) demonstrates that 3.830-1094, while containing consolatory topics, is indebted to the stylistic traits (p. 32, 100), rhetorical questions and tone (p. 54, 104), and recourse to an interlocutor (p. 56, 94) which characterise diatribe.

Despite these similarities in historical context, addressee, medical language, and even techniques, there is a clear divergence between the goals of the two teachers. According to Lucretius, fear of the gods interfering in human life and fear of death can both be dispelled by Epicurean reasoning. His philosophy teaches a proto-atomic theory which is founded on the belief that random combinations of matter created the universe, not the will of the gods. This entails important conclusions; if the gods exist but dwell far from mankind, they will never interfere in human affairs and so do not need to be propitiated with superstitious practices. Also, since man is just the product of many atoms, death is nothing to him, as the dissolution of his corporeal material means that he will feel nothing upon death. As a result, there is no afterlife. Lucretius wishes for his Roman audience to take in this doctrine to free themselves from the bonds of traditional values. Of course, Philosophy's monotheistic worldview directly conflicts with Lucretius' portrayal and subversion of religiosity as a fundamental issue for his Roman audience, and she must work to fit his diction to the different goal which she has set for the prisoner.

Philosophy employs the related techniques of selective citation and expansion to correct Lucretius' worldview and present her own monotheistic, Neoplatonic beliefs as the superior way of understanding the universe. Specifically, in each allusion, Philosophy extracts elements of a Lucretian proof but adds the influence of a single god where Lucretius had elided any divine power. Through this technique, Philosophy accomplishes something similar to what Gale (2000, 116) has termed "re-mythologization", a phenomenon in the *Georgics* in which Vergil borrows language from Lucretius but attributes the causes of the phenomenon in question to the gods where Lucretius had tried to reason against divine influence. Similarly, in Philosophy's adaptation of Lucretian material, she consistently attributes to God what Lucretius had reasoned was the result of the natural world devoid of the divine. At the same time, the re-mythologization which Vergil achieves is different than

that which Philosophy enacts. Specifically, Lucretius and Vergil understand the universe to contain a pantheon of gods. While they may disagree over the gods' level of interference in human affairs, their worlds are fundamentally polytheistic. Philosophy rejects a belief in multiple divinities through her monotheistic position. Indeed, she is consistently oriented to one goal: to make the prisoner believe in God's supreme power. According to her worldview, he is the creator of the universe, oversees it, and will receive the souls of mankind which return to him after death.[18]

Indeed, Philosophy engages in a kind of re-mythologization to show that a single philosophy, such as Epicureanism, only gets part of the way to explaining the true conception of human life and its relationship with the divine, whereas her worldview, the embodiment of all philosophies but also significantly emphasizing a monotheistic, Neoplatonic one, encapsulates the whole truth and thus offers the prisoner the most effective path through his suffering. In the two previous chapters, we saw engagement with the poetry of Seneca and Lucan. At times, Stoic philosophy seemed to influence the passages being alluded to. There are elements of Stoicism which conflict with Philosophy's Neoplatonism, especially the lack of a belief in an afterlife. Epicureanism shares this feature with Stoicism, and thus conflicts with a core element of Philosophy's belief system. In fact, Philosophy singles out Stoics and Epicureans as philosophical schools which contain only a fragmented version of the truth at the beginning of the *Consolatio*. At the moment of Philosophy's advent, the prisoner notices that her garment is tattered; he describes it in this way: *eandem tamen vestem violentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant* "but the robe had been ripped by the violent hands of certain individuals, who had torn off such parts as each could seize" (*Cons.* 1.1.5). Shortly thereafter, the prisoner recognises Philosophy (1.3.1-2)

[18] See 1.5.3, 3.12.9, 4.1.9, and 5.6.46-48.

but is still uncertain why she has come to him. Philosophy clarifies her reasons and reveals why her clothes are ragged. She says,

> *nunc enim primum censes apud improbos mores lacessitam periculis esse sapientiam? nonne apud veteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certavimus eodemque superstite praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae victoriam mortis me astante promeruit? Cuius hereditatem cum deinceps* ***Epicureum vulgus ac Stoicum*** *ceterique pro sua quisque parte raptum ire molirentur meque reclamantem renitentemque velut in partem praedae traherent, vestem quam meis texueram manibus disciderunt abreptisque ab ea panniculis* ***totam me sibi cessisse credentes abiere****. In quibus quoniam quaedam nostri habitus vestigia videbantur, meos esse familiares imprudentia rata, nonnullos eorum profanae multitudinis errore pervertit.*
>
> do you imagine that this is the first time that philosophy has been assailed by perils in the court of corrupt behaviour? You surely know that in the days of old, before the time of my dear Plato, there were many occasions when I launched full-scale warfare on presumptuous stupidity? That in Plato's own day I stood side by side with his mentor Socrates, when he triumphed over an unjust death? Thereafter the mobs of Epicureans, Stoics, and the other schools each did their best to plunder his inheritance. As part of their loot they dragged me off, in spite of my protestations and resistance; they ripped apart the gown that I had woven with my own hands, and they departed bearing the ragged pieces which they had torn from it. They imagined that all of me had passed into their hands; and because they bore traces of my clothing about them, foolish men regarded them as my devotees, and more than one of them were brought to ruin through being misled by the uninitiated.
>
> (*Cons.* 1.3.6-8)

In this description, Philosophy's garment represents the whole of philosophical thought and the full truth of existence. In contrast, the scraps of fabric, Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, can lead an adherent toward only a portion of this truth. Philosophy casts herself in opposition to these schools which only possess fragments of her garment, or part of the full knowledge with which she is endowed. While this is a powerful image in itself, Philosophy's portrayal of the Epicureans at the start of the *Consolatio* shapes her adaptation of Lucretius' *DRN*. Specifically, as we also saw in the previous two chapters dealing with Stoic ideology, Philosophy must add in the crucial missing element: belief in a second life.

In each of the allusions which Philosophy voices, she performs a consistent procedure. First, she employs diction which could allude to a specific portion of the *DRN*. Then, she corrects that proof or image by applying her monotheistic worldview. In this way, I see Philosophy present monotheism as overcoming Epicurean beliefs. I shall explore five instances in which I see Philosophy alluding to the *DRN*, and one instance in which I see the prisoner make an allusion. I shall treat the allusions in the order of their appearance in the *Consolatio* and offer concluding remarks on their possible cumulative effect.

2. Allusions

1) Forgetfulness and Lethargy

In the first allusion, the language of the *DRN* serves as a stepping-stone for Philosophy, who corrects the original argument to advance her own, opposite worldview. This allusion is to a proof that Lucretius makes about the soul. According to him, since the soul can be seen to decay along with the physical body, reason would dictate that, like the mortal body, it also experiences death. Therefore, the soul is mortal. As he describes readily visible signs of physical decay, he says, *adde furorem animi proprium atque* ***oblivia*** *rerum,* / *adde quod in nigras* ***lethargi*** *mergitur undas* "add madness which is peculiar to the mind, and forgetfulness of all things, add that it is drowned in the black waters of lethargy" (*DRN* 3.828-829). According to Lucretius, forgetfulness and lethargy are two symptoms of the ailing soul which indicate its decay and presage its death. Philosophy alludes to this passage when she makes her first diagnosis of the prisoner's condition. As she sits on his bed and touches his chest, she tells the prisoner, *nihil, inquit, pericli est,* ***lethargum*** *patitur, communem illusarum mentium morbum. Sui paulisper* ***oblitus*** *est*, "but his condition is not dangerous. He is suffering from loss of energy, a weakness common to duped minds. He has

forgotten for the moment who he is…" (*Cons.* 1.2.5-6).[19] Through her touch, Philosophy diagnoses the prisoner with a similar condition to what Lucretius describes; the prisoner's mind is ailing, resulting in experiences of lethargy and forgetfulness. However, if the Lucretian context is in the background, then Philosophy has adapted the Epicurean's language to fit her monotheistic beliefs. For, she clarifies that the prisoner's lethargy is a result of an *illusa mens* and that he is forgetful not just of things (*rerum*, *DRN* 3.828) but rather of himself (*sui*, *Cons.* 1.2.6). Crucially, because the prisoner has forgotten his former self, he does not remember defining elements of his being. This includes that he possesses an immortal soul, a teaching of Philosophy's Neoplatonic/Christian worldview.[20] As Philosophy explains in the rest of the prose section, lack of philosophical conviction is the cause of the prisoner's mental sickness. She is sure that once she reminds him of his previous devotion to her teachings, he will recover.[21]

We see a multi-faceted adaptation of the *DRN* proof. If there is a specific alllusion, then Philosophy has borrowed the description of symptoms in Lucretius but has applied them to a curable, metaphorical illness. Lucretius was describing concrete, physical symptoms which led to lethargy as the physical body decayed with age. Philosophy adapts this image when she describes the prisoner's lethargy as a by-product of his *illusa,* "deluded," beliefs. We can thus understand Philosophy making a correction in this case, as she shifts the diagnosis; where Lucretius argues that the symptoms indicate a soul on the brink of death,

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[19] The diction in bold typeface only appears in these two contexts in all Latin literature. Gruber (2006, 98) also makes this connection, but only remarks '*vgl*.'.

[20] At 1.6.18, Philosophy asks the prisoner a series of questions to determine where to begin her healing. This inquiry reveals that the prisoner has forgotten his immortal soul, as he can only tell Philosophy that he is a rational animal, as O'Donnell (1990, 19) notes.

[21] Crabbe (1981a, 315ff) and O'Daly (1991) believe that the authorial-Boethius recalls the Platonic version of recollection, anamnesis, in 3m.9 and 3m.12. Crabbe sees the Orpheus myth in 3m.12 through the lens of anamnesis and highlights the influence of Plato's *Timaeus* upon 3m.9. O'Daly believes 3m.9 (1991, 168) and 3m.12 (1991, 200) engage with the theme of anamnesis directly. While this concept may appear in Book 3, as the prisoner recollects specific Platonic teachings, this early moment in Book 1 does not seem to show the prisoner engaged in anamnesis.

Philosophy corrects this understanding by arguing that it indicates a mind which is not adequately devoted to philosophy. Through this adaptation, Philosophy also elides Lucretius' belief in the mortality of the soul. For, as soon as the prisoner is able to recall his teachings, he will remember his soul's immortality. Through this adaptation, Philosophy turns Lucretius' argument for the mortality of the soul into its opposite. For, when she implies that mankind possesses an immortal soul, she necessarily includes God, to whom the soul will return after death, in her belief-system. Thus, Philosophy adapts the *DRN* in two ways: she adds in the influence of divinity where Lucretius dismissed it (the re-mythologization, in Gale's terms), and then also makes this divinity into a single God in a "monotheization".

2) The Praise of Epicurus

In the second allusion, I shall examine the proemium to *DRN* Book 1, lines 62-79. In this encomium, Lucretius describes how Epicurus defied personified *religio*, who had oppressed mankind so much that they lay grovelling underfoot. Epicurus offered a reason-based explanation for the natural workings of the universe, meaning that mankind no longer had to fear gods who had no material impact on their lives. Lucretius depicts Epicurus' philosophical victory in martial terms, establishing the philosopher as a hero.[22] As I shall mention many parts of the episode, I first quote it in full:

> *humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret*
> *in terris oppressa gravi sub religione,*
> *quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat*
> *horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,*
> *primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra*

[22] West (1969, 60-61) notes that Lucretius combines two images, that of oppression and that of Roman triumphal imagery; he suggests that this language would have been striking to Roman religious consciousness. Kenney (1974, 22-24) also underscores the imagery of military conquest in the encomium, noting that Epicurus' gaze back at the enemy, *religio*, is a specifically epic and martial trait, and that the knowledge he brings to mankind is comparable to the spoils of war. Likewise, Buchheit (1971, 314) underscores the martial aspect of the imagery and adds that Lucretius depicts Epicurus' victories as outdoing even those of Alexander the Great. Finally, Gale (2000, 121 n.16) notes that Epicurus' assault draws on imagery of the gigantomachy, anchoring Epicurus in the world of martial conquest.

est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra,
quem neque fama deum nec ***fulmina*** *nec* ***minitanti***
murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem
inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta
naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret.
*ergo vivida vis animi per****vicit****, et extra*
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque,
unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri,
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens.
quare religio ***pedibus sub****iecta vicissim*
obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo.

when man's life lay for all to see foully grovelling upon the ground, crushed beneath the weight of Superstition, which displayed her head from the regions of heaven, lowering over mortals with horrible aspect, a man of Greece was the first that dared to uplift mortal eyes against her, the first to make stand against her; for neither fables of the gods could quell him, nor thunderbolts, nor heaven with menacing roar, but all the more they goaded the eager courage of his soul, so that he should desire, first of all men, to shatter the confining bars of nature's gates. Therefore the lively power of his mind prevailed, and forth he marched far beyond the flaming walls of the world, as he traversed the immeasurable universe in thought and imagination; whence victorious he returns bearing his prize, the knowledge what can come into being, what can not, in a word, how each thing has its powers limited and its deep-set boundary mark. Therefore Superstition is now in her turn cast down and trampled underfoot, whilst we by the victory are exalted high as heaven.

(*DRN* 1.62-79)

In his praise, Lucretius singles out Epicurus' mental strength; he was able to oppose *religio* because he used reasoning to understand the natural world. For example, he was not influenced by signs of bad weather such as thunderbolts (***fulmina***, 68) and the threatening (***minitanti***, 68) sky, typically interpreted as signs of Zeus/Jupiter's disfavour. Rather, he could see these elements for what they truly were: nothing more than natural phenomena. By freeing mankind from the need to attribute ominous weather to divinity, Epicurus lifted mankind to the sky, and cast *religio* underfoot, reversing its former crushing of mankind.[23] As Lucretius says, *religio* ***pedibus sub****iecta vicissim* /*obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo* (*DRN*

[23] Edwards (1990, 465) notes that the novelty Lucretius ascribes to Epicurus' rationality is a mythopoeic commonplace.

1.78-79). Philosophy may allude to Lucretius' praise of Epicurus when she is convincing the prisoner to face his circumstances with her aid. Again, I shall quote the poem in full, as I mention many elements within it:[24]

quisquis composito serenus aevo
fatum ***sub pedibus*** *egit superbum*
fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
invictum *potuit tenere vultum,*
non illum rabies ***minaeque*** *ponti*
versum funditus exagitantis aestum
nec ruptis quotiens vagus caminis
torquet fumificos Vesaevus ignes
aut celsas soliti ferire turres
ardentis via ***fulminis*** *movebit.*
quid tantum miseri saevos tyrannos
mirantur sine viribus furentes?
nec speres aliquid nec extimescas:
exarmaveris impotentis iram;
at quisquis trepidus pavet vel optat,
quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,
abiecit clipeum locoque motus
nectit qua valeat trahi catenam.

he who keeps composure in a life well-ordered,
who thrusts underfoot fate's arrogant incursions,
confronts with integrity both good and evil fortune,
succeeds in maintaining an undefeated outlook—
he will not be moved by the wild threats of ocean
spilling out and churning up waves from deep recesses;
nor by Vesuvius, exploding from its forges,
issuing its smoking fires over wide expanses;
nor by the thunderbolt, which often blazing fiercely,
reduces to rubble the loftiest towers.
Why, then, do wretched men stand awe-struck at tyrants?
Savage though they be, their mad rage has no real power.
If we renounce all fear and expectation,
intemperate anger will be stripped of all its weapons.
But he who all atremble is fearful or desirous,
through lack of inward staunchness or self-mastery,
has thrown away his shield, and deserted his station.
He forges the chains which confine his shackled progress.

[24] I also analyse this poem in the Seneca chapter. Specifically, 1m.4.1-2 (through the overlapping diction of *quisquis…fatum sub pedibus*) dismissed the Oechalian women as a model for the prisoner and that 1m.4.2-4 (through the overlapping diction of *invictus vultus*) transformed Hercules' physical indomitability into an aspirational mental state for the prisoner.

(*Cons.* 1m.4.1-12)

As Philosophy explains to the prisoner, if he can crush his mortal anxieties underfoot, he will cultivate the ability to remain unmoved by adversity. Thus, in Lucretius' context and in Philosophy's repurposing, there is the general similarity of using a philosophical lens to reconceive one's mortal troubles. Furthermore, there are overlapping dictional elements which could point to the praise of Epicurus; indeed, Philosophy could be alluding to three parts of the Lucretian episode.[25]

First, the image of mankind being trampled underfoot and then trampling his fears underfoot; her *Fatum* ***sub pedibus*** *egit* (*Cons.* 1m.4.2) echoes Lucretius' *quare religio* ***pedibus subiecta*** (*DRN* 1.78). Philosophy draws on Lucretius' image of trampling a personification of a mortal anxiety (*religio* and *Fatum*, respectively). But while the diction of trampling is parallel, Philosophy has adapted the personified figure and the context to make the scene applicable to the prisoner's circumstances. Lucretius depicted the mortal anxiety which man faced as *religio*, since his Epicurean worldview taught that religious fear plagued mankind. In contrast, Philosophy is clear in her belief in a single, beneficent God who oversees the universe. As such, Philosophy cannot deny the interference of God in the lives of men, as Lucretius does. This could be why the image of being crushed underfoot is parallel between the passages, but *Fatum* and *Fortuna* take the place of *religio* in the *Consolatio* passage. In this case, then, we see Philosophy employ Lucretius' diction selectively in order to make her own, contradictory claim.

Second, beyond the imagery of trampling a mortal concern underfoot, we see Philosophy alluding to some of the same elements of the natural world as Lucretius. As

[25] O'Daly (1991, 42) sees the praise of Epicurus reflected in 1m.2, Philosophy's poem of astonishment at how far her former pupil has fallen. 1m.2 and 1m.4 are connected in their respective descriptions of the prisoner's state but an allusion to 1m.4 over 1m.2 seems more likely given the overlapping diction set in bold typeface. Gruber (2006, 116f) makes a general connection between the encomium and 1m.4 but without close dictional analysis.

mentioned, Epicurus was able to see bad weather, specifically thunderbolts (***fulmina***, *DRN* 1.68) and the threatening (***minitanti***, *DRN* 1.68) sky, as natural world occurrences and not as symptoms of Zeus' ill will. Philosophy echoes both of these details in her description of a philosophically minded man, *non illum rabies* ***minaeque*** *ponti…ardentis via* ***fulminis*** *movebit* "he shall not be troubled by the rage or threats of the sea…nor by the blazing thunderbolt" (*Cons.* 1m.4.5, 10). Philosophy may thus be drawing upon Lucretius' diction to portray the benefits of her worldview; if the prisoner can trample his worldly anxieties underfoot, then he will be able to remain unmoved by the same phenomena which Epicurus overcame.

There is also a third point of similarity: the description of the state which philosophy allows a man to reach. Lucretius ends his encomium by telling his audience that in overcoming *religio*, Epicurus elevated mankind, *quare religio* ***pedibus sub****iecta vicissim* / *obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo* "therefore Superstition is now in her turn cast down and trampled underfoot, whilst we by the victory are exalted high as heaven" (*DRN* 1.78-79). Epicurus' triumph is a victory, *victoria*, for all mankind, which is raised to the sky through the power of his philosophy. Similarly, Philosophy wishes for the prisoner to follow her teachings to achieve an unconquered countenance, *quisquis composito serenus aevo* / *fatum* ***sub pedibus*** *egit superbum* / *fortunamque tuens utramque rectus* / ***invictum*** *potuit tenere vultum* "he who keeps composure in a life well-ordered, / who thrusts underfoot fate's arrogant incursions, / confronts with integrity both good and evil fortune" (*Cons.* 1m.4.1-4). Therefore, we can see ***victoria***, *DRN* 1.79 (as well as *per****vicit*** *DRN* 1.72 and ***victor*** *DRN* 1.75) echoed in Philosophy's use of ***invictum****…vultum.* In both cases, we see commitment to philosophy described as a victory of man over worldly fears. In addition to this diction, Philosophy has adapted Lucretius' description of metaphorical elevation to the sky (…*nos exaequat victoria caelo DRN* 1.79). Those who follow the example of Epicurus will not literally tread a pathway to the sky. Rather, Lucretius wants men to experience the state of *ataraxia*, which entails

separation from worldly concerns. This separation enables an elevated, peaceful existence in the mortal world. In an adaptation of this image, Philosophy wishes for the prisoner to tread a literal pathway to the sky where he will return to dwell with God in the afterlife.[26]

From the three instances of adaptation, we see that the goals which Philosophy sets for the prisoner could be modelled from those which Epicurus already achieved for mankind. At the same time, Philosophy seems to recontextualize Lucretius' diction to fit her needs in conversing with the prisoner, such as her elision of Lucretius' anti-divine rhetoric. We also see Philosophy adapt Lucretius' tone at the end of 1m.4. Where Lucretius concludes his encomium on a positive note, telling mankind that they may rejoice because of Epicurus' victory, Philosophy ends her poem with a cautionary comment. She warns the prisoner that if he is not able to use her reasoning to overcome his worldly anxieties, he will be like a man who submits to captivity, *nectit qua valeat trahi catenam* "he forges the chains which confine his shackled progress" (*Cons.* 1m.4.18). The chain imagery thus might pick up the *-lig-* stem of *religio*, suggesting that superstition can 'bind' one.[27] In addition to a shift in tone from Lucretius' encomium, this final line adapts the original goal of the *DRN*. As mentioned, Lucretius encourages men to turn to Epicureanism to live a better life in the mortal world. In contrast, Philosophy inspires the prisoner to use her teachings to detach himself from the mortal world and look forward to the next life with God.

As in the case of the first allusion, here too I see Philosophy taking Lucretius' imagery one step further, performing expansion, when she includes the word *catenam* in the final line of her poem. Specifically, Philosophy hints at the belief that mankind is bound by the chains of the mortal world which exist below the perfection of reunion with God or the One.[28] By

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[26] See especially the end of the *Consolatio*, 5.6.46-48.
[27] Maltby (1991, 523) notes Lucretius' etymology of *religio*, citing *religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo* "I proceed to unloose the mind from the close knots of supersition" (*DRN* 1.932). Likewise, De Vaan's *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages* (2008) suggests *religio* as a derivative of *ligo*.
[28] This draws forth associations with *Phaedo* 82e.

alluding to these concepts, which she will soon discuss with the prisoner in more detail, she anchors the poem in the world of Neoplatonic thought. This way of conceiving of the universe is opposed to Lucretius' worldview. Where Lucretius stopped at Epicureanism elevating man's single, mortal life, Philosophy adds that there is a next, immortal one. Thus, we see Philosophy perform the same type of double adaption already mentioned. First, she "re-mythologizes," adding in divine influence, then she makes that divine presence monotheistic.

3) Infantile Helplessness

In this allusion, I see Philosophy again borrow Lucretian diction; additionally, she draws inspiration from Lucretius' use of the technique of prosopopoeia. At this point in the *DRN*, Lucretius uses the helplessness of newborns as evidence that the gods do not look after mankind. Lucretius says,

> *tum porro puer, ut saevis proiectus ab undis*
> *navita,* ***nudus*** *humi iacet, infans, indigus* ***omni***
> *vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras*
> *nixibus ex alvo* ***matris natura profudit***
>
> then further the child, like a sailor cast forth by the cruel waves, lies naked upon the ground, speechless, in need of every kind of vital support, as soon as nature has spilt him forth with throes from his mother's womb into the regions of light…
>
> (*DRN* 5.222-225)

Lucretius underscores the helpless nature of new-born man by comparing him to a shipwrecked sailor.[29] Due to the overlapping diction, it is possible that Philosophy refers to this particular image. At the point of the allusion in the *Consolatio*, Philosophy employs the technique of prosopopoeia, as she speaks all of 2.2 to the prisoner as if she were *Fortuna*

[29] Kinsey (1964, 122) remarks upon the complexity of this image. On the one hand, the example of a helpless new-born is contrasted with the young of animals who are born more readily self-sufficient, suggesting that nature was not created to foster mankind since it lacks so much when born. On the other hand, there is a deceptive quality to the argument, as babies do not cry from awareness of life's troubles.

herself.[30] This is a rhetorical strategy which she employs in order to make her points more emphatic. In the guise of Fortune, she says, *cum te* ***matris*** *utero* ***natura pro****duxit,* ***nudum*** *rebus* ***omnibus*** *inopemque suscepi, meis opibus fovi* "when nature brought you forth from your mother's womb, I adopted you; you were naked then, and bereft of everything. I nurtured you with my resources…" (*Consolatio* 2.2.4).[31] In addition to the overlapping diction set in bold typeface, we may also compare Lucretius' *auxilium* with Philosophy's *foveo* as words which denote aid, and *utero* as an obvious equivalent to *alveo*. If this is a specific allusion, then as before, we once again see Philosophy copy exact wording from Lucretius but place it into a new context to argue for a different conclusion. Lucretius' comparison of newborns to shipwrecked sailors is just one of several examples he employs to demonstrate that the universe is not of divine origin. According to his logic, creator gods would never make new-borns intentionally helpless if they had a plan for the world. This belief is diametrically opposed to Philosophy's worldview; her goal is to convince the prisoner that a monotheistic God oversees the universe in a benevolent manner. In this case, Lucretius was already debating the role of the gods, so Philosophy does not have to add a divine presence into the picture. Nevertheless, it is clear that the God to whom Philosophy refers is at odds with those Lucretius mentions. This is not just because Lucretius' world is polytheistic, but also because Lucretius imagines that such gods do not care for humankind. In contrast, Philosophy argues that, though a man's fortunes may change, he nonetheless lives in a cosmos overseen and controlled by a single, good God.

Furthermore, we should note the highly biblical nature of Philosophy's description. We find very similar language to her *cum te* ***matris utero*** *natura pro****duxit,*** *nudum rebus omnibus inopemque* ***suscepi****, meis opibus fovi* in the Vulgate's Psalms. To provide just two

[30] As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the authorial-Boethius is inspired by Lucretius' use of prosopopoeia at 3.931ff, where Natura, a female divinity comparable to Fortuna, appears.
[31] Gruber (2006, 178) is undecided on the presence of Lucretian influence at this moment.

examples, see Psalm 21:10-11, *quoniam tu es qui extraxisti me de ventre spes mea ab uberibus **matris** meae* / *in te proiectus sum ex utero de ventre **matris** meae Deus meus es tu…* "for thou art he that hast drawn me out of the womb: my hope from the breasts of my mother I was cast upon thee from the womb. From my mother's womb thou art my God..." and Psalm 138:13, *quia tu possedisti renes meos; **suscepisti** me de **utero matris** meae* "for thou hast possessed my reins: thou hast protected me from my mother's womb".[32] Philosophy's wording thus may bring forward multiple resonances. On the one hand, the language is evocative of the Psalms, and on the other, the language points to Lucretius' *DRN*. We can see a microcosm of my reading of the *Consolatio* within a moment like this. That is, while the authorial-Boethius is undoubtedly steeped in a Christian tradition and possesses deep sensitivity to biblical language, according to my reading, he is using diction which, at the same time, intentionally points to Lucretius. An allusion to this classical source by no means dismisses the Bible but rather demonstrates the convergence of literary traditions in Late Antiquity. We can also underscore that the Psalms are a poetic section of the Bible. As these poetic sections are surrounded by prose, there is a prosimetric character to the Old Testament. As has been noted, the *Consolatio* alternates prose and poetic sections. It may be, then, that the authorial-Boethius utilises the prosimetric form in part due to an evident prosimetric model in the Vulgate.

4) Honey and Wormwood

The previous allusion occurred at *Consolatio* 2.2; the next allusion occurs shortly after, in the subsequent prose section, at *Consolatio* 2.3. Philosophy opens the prose by asking the prisoner whether he objects to any of her arguments in the voice of Fortune. She says, *his igitur si pro se tecum Fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contra hisceres non haberes; aut si*

[32] Text is taken from Jerome's Vulgate, certainly known to Boethius. Translation is the Douay-Rheims Version.

quid est quo querelam tuam iure tuearis, proferas oportet, dabimus dicendi locum, "so if Fortune were to argue a case like this against you, you would not be able to utter a word in reply—or if you *can* adduce some justification for your complaint, now is the time to come out with it, for the opportunity is yours" (*Cons.* 2.3.1). The prisoner makes his reply:

> *tum ego: speciosa quidem ista sunt, inquam, oblitaque rhetoricae ac musicae* ***melle dulcedinis*** *tum tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant, sed miseris malorum altior sensus est; itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror praegravat. Et illa: ita est, inquit; haec enim nondum morbi tui remedia sed adhuc contumacis adversum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam sunt.*
>
> then I said: 'true, these are plausible arguments. Thickly smeared as they are with the sweet honey of rhetoric and music, they afford momentary pleasure as we listen to them. But when people are unhappy, awareness of their misery runs deeper, so once these words cease to echo in our ears, the grief implanted in our hearts outweighs them.' 'I grant that,' she rejoined. 'The fact is that as yet, such words are no cure for your sickness. At this stage they serve merely as a poultice for the pain which stubbornly resists all healing.'
>
> (*Cons.* 2.3.2-3)

The prisoner's use of *musicae* ***melle dulcedinis*** likely takes inspiration from Lucretius' famous honeyed cup metaphor. Specifically, the prisoner's characterisation refers to the way Lucretius concludes the metaphor, when he says, …*volui tibi suaviloquenti* / *carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram* / *et quasi musaeo* ***dulci*** *contingere* ***melle****…* "I have chosen to set forth my doctrine to you in sweet- speaking Pierian song, and as it were to touch it with the Muses' delicious honey" (*DRN* 1.945-947, 4.20-22).[33] Since the epithet of sweetness, *dulcis*, for honey, *mel*, is conventional, we cannot say that this is a distinctively Lucretian phrase. However, one could be inclined to think of Lucretius given the broader context, which discusses the different ways of applying a philosophical cure to a misguided patient.[34] Likewise, *musaeo* in the *DRN* could be influencing *musicae* in the *Consolatio*, with *musica* as

[33] Gale (1994, 5) has argued against Mewaldt's (1908, 286) belief that the repetition of this simile was accidental. However, Deufert (2019, 137-138) deletes the repetition in his edition.
[34] Alfonsi (1951, 226) discusses a Lucretian echo here, as does O'Daly (1991, 35).

a version of *musa.* Indeed, we saw that as soon as Philosophy dismissed the elegiac muses (though not entirely, as she will employ the elegiac metre at 5m.1), she quickly substituted her own *...meisque eum Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite!* "leave him to be tended and healed with the help of the Muses that attend me" (*Cons.* 1.1.12). I see two separate points worth commenting upon. First, the implications of an allusion to Lucretius' famed simile, and second, the implications of the prisoner singling out the rhetorical nature of Philosophy's argument. The highlighted diction brings the broader context of the Lucretian simile to mind; in its entirety, it reads,

> *sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes*
> *cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum*
> *contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore,*
> *ut puerorum aetas inprovida ludificetur*
> *labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum*
> *absinthi laticern deceptaque non capiatur,*
> *sed potius tali pacto recreata valescat,*
> *sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur*
> *tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque*
> *volgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti*
> *carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram*
> *et quasi musaeo **dulci** contingere **melle**,*
> *si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere*
> *versibus in nostris possem, dum perspicis omnem*
> *naturam rerum qua constet compta figura*
>
> as with children, when physicians try to administer rank wormwood, they first touch the rims about the cups with the sweet yellow fluid of honey, that unthinking childhood be deluded as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink up the bitter juice of wormwood, and though beguiled be not betrayed, but rather by such means be restored and regain health, so now do I: since this doctrine commonly seems somewhat harsh to those who have not used it, and the people shrink back from it, I have chosen to set forth my doctrine to you in sweet-speaking Pierian song, and as it were to touch it with the Muses' delicious honey, if by chance in such a way I might engage your mind in my verses, while you are learning to see in what shape is framed the whole nature of things.
>
> (*DRN* 1.936-950; 4.10-21)

If the prisoner is alluding to this simile, then he seems to put himself in the position of the children receiving the medicine; Philosophy then plays the role of the doctor administering

the medicine/doctrine. At the same time, the prisoner has made modifications. Chiefly, although his grief has made him forget, the prisoner was once a masterful student of Philosophy's teachings, far more advanced than the children in the Lucretian simile. In fact, when the prisoner singles out the rhetorical nature of Philosophy's cure—her prosopopoeia as Fortune—he may be objecting to this very detail. Unlike the children, who need to be tricked into taking in philosophy, the prisoner is a lapsed adherent wanting to be led to his former beliefs. As a result, through this allusion, the prisoner may be telling Philosophy that he is ready for her stronger medicines.

Of course, it is uncertain how visible or significant an allusion to Lucretius' simile might be, though of course it was very famous and much imitated. Recognising this limitation, I would still suggest the possibility of a broader implication. It is possible that we can see the prisoner's comment betraying his view of poetry's role throughout his healing process. Philosophy clearly wishes for poetry to support her doctrine, as we saw when she called her muses to the prisoner's bedside, and indeed in the alternation of prose and poetry throughout the work. But at this moment, the prisoner seems to suggest that poetry should not just be a sweet means of delivering philosophical truth. This is not the same way in which Lucretius depicts poetry's function in his simile; for him, it is the means of delivering something bitter. In contrast, in the prisoner's adaptation, he depicts poetry as a milder form of Philosophy's teachings. Curley (1987, 358-359) also argues that Philosophy portrays poetry as a milder form of her teaching, but he places an allusion to Lucretius' simile at *Consolatio* 1.5.11-12, when Philosophy states that she will apply her cure in stages.[35] Building upon this

[35] *Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus incubuit diversumque te dolor ira maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es, nondum te validiora remedia contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur, ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt ad acrioris vim medicaminis recipiendam tactu blandiore mollescant* "This welter of disturbed emotions weighs heavily upon you; grief, anger, and melancholy are tearing you apart. So in your present state of mind, you are not as yet fit to face stronger remedies. For the moment, then, I shall apply gentler ones, so that the hard swellings where the emotions have gathered may soften under a more caressing touch, and may become ready to bear the application of more painful treatment" (*Cons.* 1.5.11-12).

observation, I would draw attention to the fact of the prisoner voicing an allusion to the Lucretian simile at this moment compared to Philosophy alluding to Lucretius in Book 1. From Curley's observation and Philosophy's statement, it is clear that she has a plan for employing poetry for curative means. However, through an allusion to the simile in the prisoner's voice, we can see him accepting his healer's method and encouraging her to progress to the next stage of his healing.

5) Origins

In the penultimate allusion, Philosophy seems to employ a similar strategy as mentioned in the preceding examples; she expands upon and recontextualizes positions in the *DRN*. At the point of allusion, Lucretius is describing a part of his atomic theory; he has already stated his belief that chance combinations of matter produced the natural world, and in this passage goes on to describe how all features of that world live and die. A crucial part of his explication is the eternal recycling of matter, which is the common building block of mankind and the natural world. Lucretius explains, *denique caelesti sumus* ***omnes*** *semine* ***oriundi****; /* ***omnibus*** *ille* <u>*idem*</u> ***pater est***... "lastly, we are all sprung from celestial seed; all have that same father" (*DRN* 2.991-2). At this point, Lucretius has a moment that can be read as monotheistic, as he attributes the seed of mankind to a heavenly father. Philosophy alludes to this moment at 3m.6[36], when she says, ***omne*** *hominum genus in terris simili surgit ab* ***ortu*** */* <u>*unus*</u> *enim rerum* ***pater est****, unus cuncta ministrat* "all human kind on earth arises from the same origin; / there is one Father of all things, one who looks after all" (*Consolatio* 3m.6.1-

[36] There are 12 poems in Book 3, which begins with a prose section. Thus, the gap between 3m.6 and 3.7 marks the halfway point of Book 3's content. Blackwood (2015, 143) believes that the centre-point of the work thematically is 3m.12, while the precise mathematical midpoint of the poems is 3m.5 (1991, 148). Differently, Gruber (2006, 275) and O'Daly (1991, 161-165) argue that 3m.9—which O'Daly and Chamberlain (1970, 92) call the "*Timaeus*" poem—is the true centre of the *Consolatio.* O'Daly argues that Philosophy's direct invocation of a Platonic muse, and clear inspiration from the *Timaeus* single the poem out for its philosophical character.

2).[37] Since Philosophy is trying to convince the prisoner that he should look forward to a reunion with a single God in the next life, the adaptation of this particular passage is more seamless, as Philosophy has to replace the figure (God, compared to Lucretius' characterisation of the sky as *pater*), but can maintain the same phrasing. On the surface, she accomplishes this transplanting of Lucretius' Epicurean understanding. However, there are several underlying conflicts.

If we return to the Lucretian image, we see a contradictory worldview. While Philosophy alludes to Lucretius' mention of a celestial father, the full context of the passage is the belief in a sky father and earth mother.[38] The lines read, ***omnibus*** *ille* *idem* ***pater est****, unde alma liquentis* / *umoris guttas* *mater* *cum terra recepit* "all have that same father, from whom our fostering mother earth receives liquid drops of water" (*DRN* 2.992-993). Right away, then, we see that Lucretius did not intend to describe a god at all but rather was providing an allegorical interpretation of rain.[39] Since Philosophy wishes to correct Lucretius' worldview, she must allude to selective dictional elements, as the full Lucretian context is opposed to her monotheistic view.

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[37] Gruber (2006, 262) notes Lucretian influence with '*vgl*'. However, the combination of *pater est* with a form of *orior* appears once elsewhere in Latin literature at Ovid, *Met.* 13.148-149, *sed neque materno quod sum generosior* ***ortu****,* / *nec mihi quod* ***pater est*** *fraterni sanguinis insons…* "but I do not claim the arms lying there, because I am nobler on my mother's side, nor because my father is innocent of a brother's blood". At this moment, Odysseus is speaking about why he deserves Achilles' armour over Ajax. As this context is not discussing origins in the way the *Consolatio* and *DRN* are, it is difficult for me to see a specific allusion to the *Met.*

[38] The notion of the earth mother and sky father is also found at *DRN* 1.250-261.

[39] And as West (1969, 104) importantly notes, when Lucretius' discusses the Earth Mother at 2.598-603, shortly before the passage just analysed (2.992-993) "Lucretius does not believe in this allegory, and he makes this explicit by stating several times in this passage (612, 616, 641), that these allegories are what was meant by the *poets*. He has not soiled his own mind with these superstitions. But it is wholly in accordance with the empathetic genius of this poet, with the virulence of his polemic and with his own penchant for word play to mimic the ingenuity of this allegorizing technique". Thus, if Philosophy alludes to a Lucretian allegory of the Earth Mother, she can be understood to be correcting Lucretius' rejection of the allegory and to be going a step further in turning the allegory into a truth, whereby it demonstrates faith in a non-allegorical God.

In addition to the elision of the earth mother, an allusion would also mean that Philosophy has expanded upon Lucretius' original. If we compare each element of the respective phrases, we find that the first two are quite similar; all mankind is sprung from the same origin, and all have a father in the sky. However, where Lucretius moves on to describe the earth mother who receives the seed (rain) of the heavenly father, Philosophy adds a novel idea when she expands the two similar moments with the statement *unus cuncta ministrat* "one who looks after all" (*Cons.* 3m.6.2). This addition goes to the heart of Philosophy's overall adaptation of Lucretius through allusion. As mentioned, Lucretius' Epicureanism states that the atomic building-blocks of the universe randomly combine and disperse. This forms the endless cycle of union and dissolution of atoms, all of which occurs without divine influence. Philosophy, in contrast, insists upon the notion that there is one God who also governs (*ministrat*) the universe. Through this expansion, Philosophy affirms two beliefs which contradict Lucretius. First, she believes that there is a single God where Lucretius' world was polytheistic. Second, she advocates that that this single God takes the active role of overseeing the universe where Lucretius believes that the gods dwell far from humans and play no active part in their lives. Through the strategy of expansion, Philosophy builds upon her technique of selective allusion to make a monotheistic argument.

There are other elements of the passage which Philosophy seems to respond to through the strategy of correction. A few lines after the phrase which Philosophy alludes to, Lucretius describes the recycling of matter in the following terms, *...et quod missumst ex aetheris oris, / id rursum caeli relatum templa receptant* "what fell from the borders of ether, that is again brought back, and the regions of heaven again receive it" (*DRN* 2.1000-1001). As is consistent with his view of the recycling of atomic matter, we see that Lucretius believes in a passive process where atomic material returns to the sky, *referri*, when death disperses it. This passivity conflicts with the conclusion of 3m.6, in which Philosophy exhorts

the prisoner to seek his heavenly origin as a kind of moral imperative, *quid genus et proavos strepitis? si primordia vestra* / *auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat,* / *ni vitiis peiora fovens proprium deserat ortum* "why boast so loud of forbears and proud race? / Reflect on your beginnings, and God's place / as source of all. No man's bereft of worth, / save if through vices he betrays his birth" (*Cons.* 3m.6.7-9). Where Lucretius depicted the passive union and dissolution of matter occurring without a divine plan, Philosophy paints an opposing view in which the heavenly part of man should seek to return to his proper origin with God. The use of *ortu* in final position in the first and last lines of the poem contributes to the idea of return for which Philosophy advocates.[40] We could even argue that through this repetition, Philosophy adapts the cycle which Lucretius depicted. In her monotheistic version, the material of mankind cycles back to its creator rather than endlessly joining and dissolving in the mortal world. Likewise, in the context of these passages interacting, we can see Philosophy's use of *primordia* as a Lucretian "tag". At first, the reader may recall Lucretius' use of *primordia rerum* and atoms. However, this is swiftly countered by *auctoremque deum* which shows us that Philosophy has used the presence of God to refute atomic theory. In this allusion to Lucretius, then, we see Philosophy correct his belief that the world operates through the random recycling of atomic material. As was the case in the third allusion, here too Lucretius is already discussing divinity. Thus, Philosophy does not have to add it in herself. Instead, through an allusion, she can adapt Lucretius' allegorisation of divinity to reflect her view of an active, monotheistic divine presence in the universe.

6) Distribution

In the final allusion, Philosophy again adapts a Lucretian proof to argue that mankind seeks a reunion with God. Philosophy alludes to a portion of the first book of the *DRN* in

[40] Scheible (1972, 93) argues that *ortu* reminds us of Platonic anthropology as represented in *Timaeus* 41e.

which Lucretius is discussing the existence of matter and void. To illustrate the concept of void, he provides several examples from the natural world which show that seemingly solid objects still possess some element of emptiness. One of the examples which he draws upon is that of the spread of nourishment from the roots of trees. As he explains, while the roots seem to be solid, there must be some element of void present, as trees would otherwise not be able to absorb nutrients through them. Lucretius says, *quod cibus in totas usque ab* ***radicibus*** *imis* / ***per*** *truncos ac* ***per*** *ramos* ***diffunditur*** *omnis* "because their food is distributed all over them from the lowest roots through trunks and through branches" (*DRN* 1.352-353). By making observations in the natural world, Lucretius hypothesizes about how trees use their roots to absorb food. On the small scale of a specific example, and in service of a broader point, Lucretius has applied a purely rational perspective. When Philosophy alludes to this passage, she does so in a way which radically departs from its original purpose.

When the overlapping diction occurs, Philosophy is also using a chain of reasoning to explain a concept to the prisoner; she draws upon examples in the natural world to demonstrate her idea, and logical reasoning is at the core of her method of delivery. But unlike Lucretius, Philosophy is trying to prove that the good and the One (God) are the same. She says, *quid quod omnes velut in terras ore demerso trahunt alimenta* ***radicibus*** *ac* ***per*** *medullas robur corticemque* ***diffundunt****?* "then again, don't they all thrust their mouths, so to speak, into the earth, imbibe nourishment through their roots, and dispense energy throughout their pith and bark?" (*Consolatio* 3.11.21).[41] The overlapping imagery of diffusing nourishment is present, but in an altered context. In Philosophy's adaptation, the way trees gain nourishment does not demonstrate void but rather is employed to illustrate how every living thing seeks what is best for its survival. According to Philosophy, providence and

[41] Similar language appears in one far different context; as Varro discusses spreading roots (*Res Rustica* 1.37.5.2) *aliae enim* ***radices*** *angustius* ***diffundunt***. Gruber (2006, 300) says '*vgl*.' to compare only the Lucretius passage.

nature (both controlled by God) determined what was best for every living thing. Thus, every living thing seeks the good. Since she has already identified the good with God, she argues that everything seeks God by its nature.

Once again, then, we see Philosophy use selective dictional elements to accomplish a monotheistic end; she only draws upon a portion of the *DRN* image and shifts the context and tone entirely to reflect her belief in one supreme God. Whereas Lucretius' vignette about the roots of trees was one of a number of examples proving a scientific hypothesis, Philosophy only mentions a single detail. This selectivity not only helps her isolate details which are then easier to adapt but also prevents her from inadvertently adopting Lucretius' rationalistic outlook. For, when he makes a proof, he often draws on observable reality to illustrate his concept.[42] This strategy is a crucial element of Lucretius' method; where other men attribute natural causes to the gods, those who employ Epicurean reasoning can see through these mythological explanations and approach the same phenomena with rationality. Philosophy's worldview is opposed to Lucretius', and thus she cannot risk adopting his methods by employing a similar set of observable experiences. In this case, Philosophy works against Lucretius' rationalism by alluding to only one part of his description.

Philosophy also seems to add anthropomorphizing detail, such as in her use of *os*. Comparing the roots to the mouth draws an association between the two mechanisms for ingesting nutrients between plants and humans. At the same time, this word, when paired with the context of striving for what is good, i.e. God, takes on more significance as an anthropomorphized aspect. The application of these features shifts the tone from its original, technical one, to one that is full of wonder, specifically at God's workings in the natural world. This is another way in which Philosophy has adapted the Lucretian context. Indeed, Philosophy and Lucretius come to opposed conclusions. Philosophy argues that just as plants

[42] West (1969, 15-18; 74-78; 92-93).

and trees seek what is good for them, so too does mankind, and therefore it seeks God. This conclusion is far removed from Lucretius' original argument and is again in conflict with an Epicurean worldview in which the gods do not interact with human life. Thus, we see another example of the pattern already identified; Philosophy expands upon an element of Lucretius' proof in a way which allows her to attribute the workings of the world to a single God.

3. Conclusions

Through the five examples of Philosophy speaking an allusion to Lucretius, and the one instance of the prisoner voicing an allusion, a clear pattern emerges; Philosophy attributes to divine influence what Lucretius had used Epicurean reasoning and atomic theory to explain as natural phenomena. Sometimes, Philosophy seems to reverse the conclusion of a theme or proof, as when she used Lucretius' language to argue for the immortality of the soul where he determined that it died along with the mortal body. Frequently, Philosophy inserts divine influence where Lucretius reasoned against it, arguing that a single, beneficent God created and controls nature, that mortals are made from his material, and that the immortal soul seeks to return to him after death.[43] Sometimes, if Lucretius is already debating divinity, Philosophy's adaptation is different, as she only has to shift the divinity to God rather than adding divinity to the imagery herself.

While Philosophy seems to adopt Lucretius' role as a teacher who suggests philosophical remedies for the plight of man, she consistently advocates for a monotheistic explanation of the universe, which Lucretius' rationality explicitly elides. In this way, Philosophy "re-mythologizes" the reward of Epicureanism, turning the *summum bonum* of *ataraxia* into a monotheistic goal to reunite with God in the peace of heaven. Lucretius and

[43] Segal (1990, 105) reminds us that Lucretius also depicts the world as mortal. The dissolution of the mortal world further separates men from reaching the immortal gods, a conclusion which Philosophy reverses, framing the prisoner's access to the immortal world as a rightful return.

Philosophy both wish to free the minds of men, but where Lucretius saw freedom from superstition as a goal in itself, leading mankind to a blissful separation from mortal anxieties while alive, Philosophy makes reunification with God after death the object of her teachings. In this way, her monotheism overcomes Epicureanism. Or, to use the imagery which Philosophy herself employed at 1.3.6-8, her 'garment' can only be whole when its Epicurean portion is woven into the fabric of monotheistic beliefs.[44]

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter and in the *Consolatio*)

De Rerum Natura	***Consolatio***
3.828	1.2.5-6
1.68	1m.4.1-12
5.222	2.2.4
1.945-947; 4.20-22	2.3.2-3
2.992	3m.6.2
1.352	3.11.21

[44] We can also note that only two of the allusions to Lucretius occur in poetic sections. In other words, the authorial-Boethius does not always transfer Lucretius' verse to his own *metra*. The scholarly tradition had not identified an allusion to Lucretius in 3m.9 (composed in dactylic hexameter). This is notable, as it reverses the strategy which Lucretius first employed. That is, Lucretius turned Epicurus' original philosophic prose into didactic verse. In the authorial-Boethius' reception of Lucretius, he reverses this, and the majority of the time turns Lucretius' philosophic, didactic verse back into philosophic prose.

Allusions to Vergil: The *Georgics*

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall investigate allusion to the *Georgics* of Vergil.[1] As in previous chapters, here too I present a rationale for Boethius' turn to the *Georgics*. In this case my focus is not on autobiographical similarities between Vergil and Boethius but rather on the premise of the *Georgics* itself. The poet of the *Georgics* provides a didactic message which enables the addressee to better cope with adversity.[2] Similarly, Philosophy provides a didactic program to help the prisoner through his fall from grace. In addition to the didactic approach, the message of the *Georgics* can be understood to reflect the prisoner's situation. I interpret the message of the poem as follows: natural disasters occur in the world and render the hard work and constant attention of human labour futile, but divine intervention can solve these calamities and thus represents the best way out of suffering.[3] This worldview is compatible with Philosophy's urging for the prisoner to look to eternity with God as his goal, thus seeing the divine as his way out of catastrophic mortal grief.[4] In addition to these overarching similarities, we should also note the parallels between the *Consolatio* and the episode involving Cyrene and Aristaeus in the fourth *Georgic*. In this narrative, we also see a female, divine consoler, much like Philosophy, helping a suffering, lone male facing disaster. One could also describe Philosophy as maternal. While this is literally true for Cyrene, Aristaeus' mother, Philosophy exhibits a similarly maternal trait in her care of the prisoner.

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[1] Text and translation of the *Georgics* is taken from the Loeb edition revised by Goold (1999). As is the case throughout this thesis, text of the *Consolatio* is from Moreschini's edition (2005) and translation is taken from Walsh (2008).
[2] Freudenburg (1987, 59). Horne (2018, 125) interprets a lack of justice as a condition of the world of the *Georgics* which cannot be explained.
[3] Wender (1969, 432) and Conte and Harrison (2007, 139).
[4] Conte and Harrison (2007, 140) note that Aristaeus "resolves to learn" in searching for the cause of the death of his hive.

I shall analyse seven allusions to the *Georgics* which occur throughout the *Consolatio*. Six of the allusions are spoken by Philosophy and one is spoken by the prisoner-Boethius. In my analysis of allusions voiced by Philosophy, there are two types of adaptation which I see her employing. In the first type, Philosophy draws inspiration from a description of nature or a natural element in the *Georgics* and turns it into a metaphor in the *Consolatio*. In the previous chapters, I discussed the application of natural-world imagery to the prisoner's mental state, such as depictions of his 'clouded' mindset.[5] We see a similar transformation in these allusions.[6] In the second type of allusion voiced by Philosophy, she reacts against pessimistic passages within the *Georgics*. In doing so, she also posits the influence of a monotheistic God, in opposition to the polytheistic world of the *Georgics*. Through this opposition, Philosophy shows the prisoner the ways in which her monotheism overcomes cynical elements of Vergil's didactic poem.

In the previous chapter, I found that Philosophy voiced all but one allusion to the *DRN*, inheriting the role of a philosophical teacher employing poetry to guide the audience to a particular worldview. In this chapter, Philosophy assumes a similar role, but with a crucial difference. In the allusions to the *DRN*, Philosophy often added a divine influence (a "remythologization" in Monica Gale's terms) and then made this influence monotheistic.[7] Differently, in the *Georgics*, there is a clear presence of the divine; it appears as heavenly wrath expressed in a storm and in individuals like Cyrene and Proteus. As a result, in allusions to the *Georgics* Philosophy does not need to add in the notion of divine influence.

Furthermore, while Philosophy appearing to Boethius can be seen as a parallel to Cyrene appearing to Aristaeus, I read Philosophy as successfully outdoing the nymph's powers and

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[5] See the chapter section "Lucan's Supernatural Figures in the Consolatio".
[6] Moreover, Briggs notes a related phenomenon whereby Vergil adapts natural comparisons from the *Georgics* in the *Aeneid*. He demonstrates how Vergil reworks natural comparisons (1980, 4), whether as similes (14) or as part of a broader narrative (30), drawn from the *Georgics* in new ways in the similes of the *Aeneid*.
[7] Gale (2000, 116).

those of other divine figures in the *Georgics*. Men in the poem seek divine intervention to address their travails; however, there is no hope for a second existence. Differently, Philosophy teaches the prisoner that he should disregard his mortal suffering as a better, immortal life awaits. In these ways, Philosophy also shifts the focus and goal of divine intervention in the *Georgics*. The farmers, viticulturists, and beekeepers depicted in the poem live within a world in which random calamity befalls them despite their labour. To some extent, this is similar to Boethius' condition; his imprisonment and death sentence seem to be the random acts of Fortune. At the same time, when Philosophy intervenes, she does not attempt to right the wrongs done to the prisoner. Instead, she encourages him to reconceive of his struggles as transient, and even as an indication of God testing his good character.[8] Thus, the focus of her consolation is not on how to restore the prisoner's fortunes in this world, but rather on how he can change his perspective to see how unimportant his suffering is in the grand scheme of God's plan for his life.

To focus upon the example of Aristaeus again, we see that he appeals to his divine mother Cyrene in order to restore his hive. Through his visit to Proteus, Aristaeus learns the ultimate cause of his hive's failure. His pursuit of Eurydice inadvertently contributed to her death; while fleeing Aristaeus, the nymph was bitten by a snake and died. Thus, there was a clear cause for Aristaeus' suffering which he could only make sense of through divine intervention. This is similar to the prisoner-Boethius' state but with key differences. In Aristaeus' case, as soon as he learns the true cause of his suffering, he is able to restore his beehive, effectively reversing his misfortune. Philosophy's goals for the prisoner are different. She wishes to remind him that events which are confusing when viewed from his mortal perspective may only make sense from God's divine vantage point. The prisoner should trust that God's care

[8] This perception of suffering is similar to what we find in the story of Job. Indeed, Astell (1994, 92) has suggested that medieval readers associated Job and Boethius as innocent sufferers.

for all his mortal creations means that there is a future existence waiting for him. Thus, while Philosophy voices almost every allusion, much like in the *DRN* chapter, her method of adaptation reflects the different depictions of the divine in the *DRN* and *Georgics*, respectively.

In each of the six allusions which Philosophy voices, she employs diction which points to a specific *Georgics* passage. Consistently, Philosophy adopts most of what a given scene describes before positing the influence of a benevolent, monotheistic divinity. Through this addition, Philosophy betrays her Neoplatonic, monotheistic worldview, which sharply conflicts with the polytheism of the *Georgics*. Likewise, where divine aid in the *Georgics* aims to right the wrongs done to a mortal, Philosophy instead aims to show the prisoner that his suffering can be conceived of differently from the providential perspective. Through these adaptations, Philosophy wishes to present her divine intervention as overcoming that of Cyrene and Proteus specifically, and that of the polytheistic world more broadly. For, in addition to offering the prisoner hope in a second life, Philosophy's monotheistic God is also benevolent, a major departure from the divine in the *Georgics*, which is often punitive and callous towards human labour for no clear reason. I shall begin my analysis with the allusion voiced by the prisoner before turning to analysis of the six allusions voiced by Philosophy, and finish with a section of conclusions.

2. The Prisoner's Allusion to the *Georgics*

Where the allusions voiced by Philosophy have not received attention outside Gruber's commentary, the prisoner's allusion to the *Georgics* has long been noted.[9] It occurs in the opening couplet of the *Consolatio*; we find the prisoner dejected by his fall from grace and turning to elegy to soothe his emotions. He says, ***carmina qui*** *quondam* ***studio florente***

[9] See Alfonsi (1942, 723), Scheible (1972, 12), Crabbe (1981a, 247-248), O'Daly (1991, 36-37), Most (2000, 357-358), Gruber (2006, 51), and Fielding (2017, 129).

peregi, flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos "I who with zest penned songs in happier days, / must now with grief embark on sombre lays" (*Cons.* 1m.1.1-2).[10] This language has been understood as an allusion to the *envoi* of the fourth Georgic, with two separate, parallel phrases.

> *illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat*
> *Parthenope,* ***studiis florentem*** *ignobilis oti,*
> ***carmina qui*** *lusi pastorum audaxque iuventa,*
> *Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi*
>
> In those days I, Vergil, was nursed by sweet Parthenope, and rejoiced in the arts of inglorious ease—I who toyed with shepherds' songs, and, in youth's boldness, sang of you, Tityrus, under the canopy of a spreading beech.
>
> (*G.* 4.563-566)[11]

At the end of Vergil's second work, we find him looking back on his youthful composition as the first step in his rising authorial career. Vergil progresses from the *Eclogues* to the *Georgics* and can look forward to the *Aeneid*. Understanding Vergil's poetic output in this way is drawn from the application of career studies to classics. The introduction to Hardie and Moore's volume (2010) defines the approach as follows:

> Writers are acutely aware of the career patterns of great writers of the past, and motivated by that awareness to emulation, or in some cases conscious avoidance, of the paths of their predecessors. This is a particular, and particularly large-scale, example of the rivalry, *aemulatio*, that characterizes many intertextual relationships. An author's sense of his or her literary career is traced through statements or hints, explicit or implicit, in an oeuvre that point to a developmental relationship between the individual works in the oeuvre.[12]

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[10] While attention has been focused upon an allusion to the *Georgics*, there are other resonances which we can see in this opening couplet. Specifically, *cogor inire* repeats Ovid, *Rem.* 578, *... ignotas* ***cogor inire*** *vias* "I am forced to travel ways I know not". Likewise, there is a possible echo of Propertius 1.1.8 *adversos* ***cogor*** *habere deos*.

[11] This is a noted allusion, including by Gruber (2006, 55). The four overlapping elements only appear in Latin literature in these two citations.

[12] Hardie and Moore (2010, 2).

This framework can be fruitfully applied to the *Consolatio*'s opening allusion. As Hardie notes, "once the Virgilian model for a literary career is available, the elegiac anti-career can also represent itself as a (forced) alternative to the Virgilian career".[13] The notion of Vergil's career progression was formalised in the middle ages as the *rota Vergilii*, but even in antiquity, the pattern was the same; the *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Aeneid* have a "perceived upwards progression…a drive to achieve progressively more ambitious goals in the genres of bucolic, didactic, and epic".[14] We should notice that the prisoner opens the *Consolatio* in the elegiac metre and alludes to a point in the *Georgics* at which Vergil comments upon his literary progression. Taking these two elements together, we can understand the prisoner presenting himself as forced into elegiacs in an alternative to the Vergilian career. Most recently, Fielding has demonstrated that the prisoner does not believe that he will progress from his elegiacs.[15] Indeed, the authorial-Boethius' imminent death guarantees that the *Consolatio* will be his final work. As a result, the prisoner's allusion to the *Georgics* enriches our understanding of his sorrow; he had greater literary aspirations, specifically the translation and harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle.[16] Through an allusion to the end of the *Georgics*, then, the prisoner grieves for his lost literary ambition.

As I shall now show, when Philosophy comes to the prisoner, she too makes allusions to the *Georgics*. However, where the prisoner seems to paint his life as an inversion of the progress of a Vergilian career, Philosophy's allusions consistently adopt elements of the *Georgics,* while at the same time correcting the world depicted therein with her belief in a monotheistic God.

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[13] Hardie and Moore (2010, 5).
[14] Hardie and Moore (2010, 5). See Faral (1924, 86-89) on the formalisation of the *rota*.
[15] Fielding (2017, 129).
[16] See the Introduction to this thesis for a discussion of Boethius' attempt to translate and harmonize all of Plato and Aristotle.

3. Descriptions of Nature in the *Georgics* as Metaphors in the *Consolatio*

The first allusion which Philosophy makes to the *Georgics* occurs in 1m.7. This poem is part of Philosophy's response to 1m.5, in which the prisoner voices his belief that the heavens are ruled by an established order, but the earthly realm is not. The prisoner expresses his confused view at the conclusion of 1m.5,

> *O iam miseras respice terras,*
> *quisquis rerum foedera nectis!*
> *operis tanti pars non vilis*
> *homines quatimur fortunae salo.*
> *rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus*
> *et quo caelum regis immensum*
> *firma stabiles foedere terras!*
>
> God, who nature's parts hast wed,
> cast eyes upon this wretched earth;
> man, in creation no mean worth,
> is buffeted on Fortune's main.
> These headlong waves, we pray, restrain;
> to earth that steadfast law apply
> with which you rule the boundless sky.
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.5.42-48)

From 1m.5, we see that the prisoner believes God oversees the heavens but does not extend this same control to his earthly creations. In 1m.7, Philosophy tells the prisoner that his view is misguided and attempts to convince him that he can see the true order governing the universe by returning to her teachings. Throughout Book 1, Philosophy employs natural-world imagery to express her doctrine; for instance, she compares the prisoner's fallen mindset to dark and stormy weather, and portrays the healthy mind as a light.[17] We can see from the portion of 1m.5 cited above that the prisoner himself also conceives of his fortune in natural terms, such as in his description of the 'waves' of misfortune.

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[17] For instance, when she first comes upon the prisoner, Philosophy uses the imagery of a dark storm contrasting with the light of good reason *heu quam praecipiti* ***mersa*** *profundo / mens hebet et propria* ***luce*** *relicta / tendit in externas ire* ***tenebras*** "dull-witted is his mind, alas! Sunk in steep depths below…" (*Cons.* 1m.2.1-3).

Philosophy reiterates the connection between her doctrine and natural-world imagery in 1m.7. Specifically, she likens the prisoner's lack of philosophical conviction to a river that has been dammed by a barrier of stone. She says, *…quique vagatur* / *montibus altis* / *defluus amnis* / *saepe resistit* / *rupe soluti* / ***obice saxi***, "rocks torn from high crags / oft stem a stream's force, / as it pours down the mountains / in wandering course" (*Cons.* 1m.7.14-19).[18] The combination of *obex* and *saxum* could allude to the *Georgics*, specifically the moment at which Cyrene is describing the seer Proteus' hidden dwelling. Explaining its appearance to Aristaeus, she says, *...est specus ingens / exesi latere in montis, quo plurima vento / cogitur inque sinus scindit sese unda reductos, / deprensis olim statio tutissima nautis; / intus se vasti Proteus tegit* ***obice saxi*** "there is a vast cavern, hollowed in a mountain's side, wither many a wave is driven by the wind, then separates into receding inlets—at times a haven most sure for storm-caught mariners. Within, Proteus shelters himself with the barrier of a huge rock" (*G.* 4.418-422).[19] The passages present related images of a stone barrier hiding a source of knowledge. In the *Georgics*, this knowledge is the magical insight of the supernatural seer Proteus. Similarly, Philosophy describes a metaphorical stone barrier blocking the prisoner's former philosophical insights. If the dictional overlaps indicate that this passage is being alluded to, then Philosophy has adapted the *Georgics* image in two ways.

First, Philosophy has taken a *Georgics* description of something in nature and made it metaphorical in the *Consolatio*. In Proteus' case, the barrier of rock is literal, separating his dwelling from the outside world. In the prisoner's case, the barrier of rock is metaphorical, signifying his impeded thinking. We can also note that Aristaeus must accomplish physically difficult tasks: he needs to access the stone barrier and overpower Proteus (which I shall discuss below). In contrast, though a mentally difficult task, the prisoner only has to recall

[18] *et addiderat / fossas* ***obicesque saxorum*** appears in Tacitus, but the union of *obex* and *saxum* appears only in poetry in Boethius and Vergil.
[19] These are the only two attestations of this union in Latin literature. Gruber (2006, 165) says '*wie*'.

truths he once knew. Second, Philosophy has adapted the source of the blocked knowledge. The goal of getting beyond the rock barrier in the *Georgics* is to access Proteus' powers; he has a perspective which Aristaeus cannot reach on his own. Differently, in the *Consolatio*, the goal is to remind the prisoner of knowledge he has only forgotten. By recalling his former beliefs, the 'stream' of the prisoner's worldview can once again flow unobstructed. Through the allusion, then, Philosophy replaces the mystical abilities of the seer with her own Neoplatonist, monotheistic truth. In this way, the prisoner possesses more agency than Aristaeus; where the beekeeper could never understand the death of his hive through recollection, Philosophy tells the prisoner that he was once able to understand his dire circumstances but has just forgotten how to access this knowledge. Thus, while both men rely on the aid of a supernatural teacher to access a stronger perspective, in the prisoner's case, the restoration of his memory suggests a greater level of self-sufficiency than that of which Aristaeus could be capable.

In addition, by evoking a detail from Cyrene's speech, Philosophy seems to align herself with some elements of the nymph. Indeed, she and Cyrene are both females imbued with divine power; both women also guide their respective male protégés in seeking the true reason for the respective disasters they face. While there are points of connection, Philosophy's allusion subtly expands upon and corrects the Vergilian scene, thus also outdoing Cyrene. When Philosophy intervenes on behalf of the prisoner, she encourages him to shift his focus entirely from the mortal world and the suffering he endures within it. According to Philosophy, the full truth of existence lies in faith in man's second life with God. Thus, in comparison with Aristaeus' quest for the causes of a mortal calamity, the prisoner's search for truth leads him to the greater goal of gaining access to the next life by recalling his immortal soul. As a result, Philosophy corrects the notion that one can find truth through a seer, framing adherence to her principles as an improvement upon Proteus'

knowledge. In this way, her monotheistic worldview outdoes Cyrene and Proteus as well as the polytheism depicted in the *Georgics*.

Before turning to the next example, I would like to offer a final comment upon the river imagery in 1m.7. Previously, in 1m.5, we saw that the prisoner liken his state to being at sea. Indeed, he asked God to calm the 'waves' of his misfortune, *rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus* (*Cons.* 1m.5.46). The prisoner feels like he is weathering extreme waters and is 'lost at sea'. In 1m.7, Philosophy also describes the prisoner's mental state using water imagery; however, in her description, the water is a stream, not a mighty wave. Philosophy may be responding directly to the prisoner's description of water in 1m.5; where he depicts himself as the victim of waves in a vast and merciless sea, she reduces the body of water to a river and suggests that the water's might is indicative of the prisoner's mental strength. Thus, the prisoner is not a victim tossed on mighty waves but instead controls his own flood of comprehension.

The description of a blocked river may also recall Achilles' battle with the river Scamander at *Iliad* 21. Scholars have noted points of connection between Achilles and Thetis and Aristaeus and Cyrene.[20] Thus, an allusion to Aristaeus in the *Consolatio* could conceivably also activate an association with the *Iliad*. As mentioned above, Aristaeus must physically overcome Proteus before the seer will reveal his knowledge. Vergil depicts this fight as follows:

> *cuius Aristaeo quoniam est oblata facultas,*
> *vix defessa senem passus componere membra*
> *cum clamore ruit magno, manicisque iacentem*
> *occupat. ille suae contra non immemor artis*
> *omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum,*
> *ignemque horribilemque feram fluviumque liquentem.*
> *verum ubi nulla fugam reperit fallacia, victus*
> *in sese redit atque hominis tandem ore locutus …*

[20] Crabbe (1978, 11). In addition to the wrestling of a river, Achilles is alone on the seashore before the encounter with Thetis, as is Aristaeus when Cyrene becomes aware of his despair.

> Soon as the chance came to Aristaeus, he scarce suffered the aged one to settle his weary limbs, before he burst upon him with a loud cry and surprised him in fetters as he lies. On his part, the seer forgets not his craft, but changes himself into all wondrous shapes—into flame and hideous beast and flowing river. But when no stratagem wins escape, vanquished he returns to himself, and at last speaks with human voice …
>
> (*G.* 4.437-444)

This struggle between Aristaeus and Proteus recalls its likely model at *Iliad XXI*, when Achilles fights with the Scamander river:

> Ἦ, καὶ Ἀχιλλεὺς μὲν δουρικλυτὸς ἔνθορε μέσσῳ
> κρημνοῦ ἀπαΐξας· ὃ δ᾽ ἐπέσσυτο οἴδματι θύων,
> πάντα δ᾽ ὄρινε ῥέεθρα κυκώμενος, ὦσε δὲ νεκροὺς
> πολλούς, οἵ ῥα κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἅλις ἔσαν, οὓς κτάν᾽ Ἀχιλλεύς·
> τοὺς ἔκβαλλε θύραζε, μεμυκὼς ἠΰτε ταῦρος,
> χέρσονδε· ζωοὺς δὲ σάω κατὰ καλὰ ῥέεθρα,
> κρύπτων ἐν δίνῃσι βαθείῃσιν μεγάλῃσι.
>
> He spoke, and Achilles, famed for his spear, sprang from the bank and leapt into the middle of the stream; but the river rushed on him with surging flood, and roused all his streams tumultuously, and swept along the many dead that lay thick within his bed, whom Achilles had slain; these he cast out on to the land, bellowing like a bull, and the living he saved under his fair streams, hiding them in eddies deep and wide.
>
> (*Iliad* 21.233-239)[21]

While the wrestling with a personified river is parallel, I would focus upon the reason Scamander is angered with Achilles in the first place; Scamander's anger could connect to the river Philosophy depicts at *Consolatio* 1m.7. As Scamander speaks to Achilles, he says:

> "ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, περὶ μὲν κρατέεις, περὶ δ᾽ αἴσυλα ῥέζεις
> ἀνδρῶν· αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἀμύνουσιν θεοὶ αὐτοί.
> εἴ τοι Τρῶας ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς πάντας ὀλέσσαι,
> ἐξ ἐμέθεν γ᾽ ἐλάσας πεδίον κάτα μέρμερα ῥέξε·
> <u>πλήθει γὰρ δή μοι νεκύων ἐρατεινὰ ῥέεθρα,</u>
> <u>οὐδέ τί πῃ δύναμαι προχέειν ῥόον εἰς ἅλα δῖαν</u>
> <u>στεινόμενος νεκύεσσι, σὺ δὲ κτείνεις ἀϊδήλως.</u>
> ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δὴ καὶ ἔασον· ἄγη μ᾽ ἔχει, ὄρχαμε λαῶν."

[21] Text and translation is taken from the Loeb edition revised by Wyatt (1925).

> "Achilles, beyond men are you in might, and beyond men you do deeds of evil; for ever do the gods themselves protect you. If the son of Cronos has granted you to slay all the men of Troy, at least drive them out of my stream, and do your grim work on the plain. For full are my lovely streams with the dead, nor can I in any way pour my waters out into the bright sea, being choked with the dead, while you ever slay ruthlessly. But come now, leave off; amazement holds me, leader of men."
>
> (*Iliad* 21.214-221)

Scamander tells Achilles that his streams are blocked, στεινόμενος , by the masses of soldiers Achilles has slain. I am not suggesting that there is a specific allusion to this scene from the *Iliad*, nor that the rock barrier of Philosophy's description relates directly to the blockage of the Scamander. However, Philosophy's imagery is enriched by noting a model for the *Georgics* passage to which she alludes. The *Iliadic* model is also focused upon the blockage of a river. In the epic, the blockage is the mass of dead men, in the *Georgics* it is a barrier to Proteus' dwelling, and in Philosophy's description it is a metaphor for a blocked stream of philosophical thought. There may thus be an indirect engagement with the *Iliad*. In the next subsection, I shall analyse a quotation of *Iliad* 1.71-72. Given this quotation, and Boethius' excellent education, we can feel secure in his knowledge of the epic. This may then make a window allusion, whereby the *Georgics* allusion leads to an earlier model, more possible.

The next allusion occurs as Philosophy is responding to the prisoner's complaints against Fortune. As discussed in the previous chapter, part of Philosophy's strategy is to employ the technique of prosopopoeia to show the prisoner that fortune's nature is to change, and thus that he was wrong to rely on her for constancy (*Cons.* 2.2). The prisoner complains that Fortune has taken away his worldly goods, such as the honour of his high office, leaving him with nothing. In due course, Philosophy will show the prisoner that worldly goods never allow one to attain true happiness. However, before progressing to this more difficult point, Philosophy attempts to counter the prisoner's complaint by showing him that he does retain some goods in the mortal world. Specifically, Philosophy notes that the prisoner's father-in-

law (*Cons.* 2.4.5), wife (*Cons.* 2.4.6), and sons are all safe (*Cons.* 2.4.7-8). These members of his family prove that he has some remaining good fortune. After noting that all good fortune is not lost, Philosophy exhorts the prisoner, *quare sicca iam lacrimas; nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium valida* ***tempestas incubuit****, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae nec praesentis solamen nec futuri spem <temporis> abesse patiantur* "so come now, dry your tears. Fortune does not yet direct her hatred against all your household. The storm which has gathered over you is not too hard to endure, for your anchors still hold fast, and their grip is such that they do not allow present consolation or future hope to disappear" (*Cons.* 2.4.9). As in the prior example, here too we see Philosophy draw upon a natural-world metaphor to demonstrate her point; the prisoner is weathering a metaphorical storm, but one that he will be able to overcome. When Philosophy compares the prisoner's troubled mind to a storm, she draws upon a conventional image.[22] However, the way in which Philosophy adapts this tradition is distinct and may allude to the *Georgics*: a dictional match for Philosophy's message occurs in *Georgics* Book 2. Vergil is explaining the care of vines in a series of prohibitions, and says:

> *nam saepe incautis pastoribus excidit ignis,*
> *qui furtim pingui primum sub cortice tectus*
> *robora comprendis, frondesque elapsus in altas*
> *ingentem caelo sonitum dedit; inde secutus*
> *per ramos victor perque alta cacumina regnat,*
> *et totum involvit flammis nemus et ruit atram*
> *ad caelum picea crassus caligine nubem,*
> *praesertim si* ***tempestas*** *a vertice silvis*
> ***incubuit****, glomeratque ferens incendia ventus.*
> *hoc ubi, non a stirpe valent caesaeque reverti*
> *possunt atque ima similes revirescere terra;*
> *infelix superat foliis oleaster amaris.*
>
> For oft from thoughtless shepherds falls a spark, which, lurking at first unseen under the rich bark, fastens on the trunk, and, gliding to the leaves aloft, sends to heaven a mighty roar; then, running on, reigns supreme among all the boughs and high treetops, wrapping all the grove in fire, and belching skyward

[22] Scheible (1972, 25-26), O'Daly (1991, 107).

> black clouds of thick pitchy darkness; most of all, if a tempest from above has swooped down upon the woods, and a favouring wind masses the flames. When this befalls, the trees are without virtue in their stock and when cut down cannot revive or from the earth's depth resume their olden bloom: the luckless oleaster with bitter leaves alone survives.
>
> (*G.* 2.303-314)

This passage presents the opposite image to what Philosophy tells the prisoner. Where she is certain that he can weather the metaphorical storm he faces, as it is not oppressing him too greatly, the *Georgics* passage depicts a real natural disaster from which it is impossible to recover. Once again, then, Philosophy has turned a literal description of nature in the *Georgics* into a metaphorical description in the *Consolatio.*

We should also note the way in which this adaptation reverses the tone of the *Georgics* passage being alluded to. When considering the context of the *Georgics* passage, we see that the imagery is devastatingly negative. Despite the farmer's diligent effort, a chance occurrence of the wind catching a spark destroys his entire vineyard. The weather is unhelpful, fanning the flames of the fire so that it destroys his crop. Furthermore, the speaker of the *Georgics* clarifies that the land cannot be rescued after the devastation of the fire and will be unsuitable for all future cultivation. Thus, in the world of the *Georgics*, a man may suffer the total reversal of his fortunes from a chance occurrence, and the weather, a divine element, may even contribute to his suffering.

Philosophy could be responding directly to the suffering depicted in the *Georgics* passage. Let us return to her exhortation to the prisoner, focusing on the second half of her statement, *quare sicca iam lacrimas; nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium valida* ***tempestas incubuit****, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae* *nec praesentis solamen nec futuri spem <temporis> abesse patiantur* "so come now, dry your tears. Fortune does not yet direct her hatred against all your household. The storm which has gathered over you is not too hard to endure, for your anchors still hold fast, and their grip is such that they

do not allow present consolation or future hope to disappear" (*Cons.* 2.4.9). In the latter part of her encouragement, Philosophy notes that the prisoner may access a consolation for his current feelings and feel hope for the future: *praesentis solamen* and *futuri spem temporis*, respectively. These two details emphasise Philosophy's mission. By recommitting to a philosophical viewpoint, the prisoner can reconceive of his mortal troubles as meaningless (his present consolation), and he can have faith in a second life (his hope for the future). In the world of the *Georgics*, the farmer is totally overcome by the breeze. Differently, the metaphorical stormy weather does not overwhelm the prisoner. Likewise, we should remember that weather in the *Consolatio* is an element of the natural world, thus created by God and under his control. Even poor weather is guided by his beneficence. While the prisoner faces a 'storm', these trials are part of God's plan for his life. The same cannot be said for the farmer of the *Georgics*, who suffers without any recourse. Through this allusion, then, Philosophy turns the brutality and misery of the destruction which the storm in the *Georgics* effects on its head, employing the same diction in service of her monotheistic view of the universe.

In the final discussion of this section, we find a similar correction of a *Georgics* passage. In the section of the *Georgics* alluded to, we are at a transition point; Vergil has just described the idea that bees are immortal, then moves on to a more practical and didactic description of the best way to gather honey from their hive. The first lines of this new section read *si quando* ***sedem augustam*** *servataque mella* / *thesauris relines, prius haustu sparsus aquarum* / *ora fove…* "whenever you would break into the august dwelling and the honey hoarded in their treasure houses, first with a draught of water sprinkle and rinse your mouth…" (*G.* 4.228-230). Vergil describes the hive as the august seat of the bees.[23] Of

[23] In 4.228 some modern scholars, like Thomas (1988, 188), prefer *angustam* (the reading of R), but Boethius clearly interacts with *augustam*, also an ancient reading, present in MP, and printed, e.g. by Conte (2013, 200).

course, the hive is not literally an august seat. However, I include it in this section for a few reasons. First and foremost, the description is applied to the hive itself, an element of the natural world like the barrier of rock or tempering breeze which we saw in the previous examples. Second, when Philosophy alludes to this section of the *Georgics*, she performs the same type of transformation which I have noted above, turning a description of something in nature into a metaphor in the *Consolatio*. Third, I see the surrounding contexts of the overlapping language as related.

First, to the allusion itself: Philosophy recalls the descriptor *sedem augustam* in 3m.9, the *Consolatio*'s "Timaean hymn". As has been mentioned, Philosophy employs her personal muses for the prisoner's healing from 1m.2 forward, having dismissed the elegiac muses at 1.1.11. However, 3m.9 is distinct among the poems which Philosophy voices, as she explicitly calls upon a Platonic, monotheistic divinity to aid her composition:

> *Sed cum, uti in Timaeo Platoni, inquit, nostro placet, in minimis quoque rebus divinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem repperire mereamur? — Invocandum, inquam, rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium. — Recte, inquit; ac simul ita modulata est:*
>
> 'But since', she added, 'as my dear Plato maintains in his *Timaeus*, support from heaven should be invoked even in the smallest matters, what do you propose that we do now, so that we may deserve to discover the abode of that supreme good?' 'We must invoke the Father of all things,' I replied, 'for if this were not done, we should not base our search on the appropriate first step.' 'Well said,' she replied. With that she hymned the following verses:
>
> (*Cons.* 3.9.32-33)

Following this introduction, the overlapping diction occurs in the middle of 3m.9, when Philosophy says, *da, pater,* ***augustam*** *menti conscendere* ***sedem***, / *da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta* / *in te conspicuos animi defigere visus*, "let my mind rise to your august abode, / and there, dear Lord, survey the source of good. / Then grant that, once I have attained the

light, / my inward eye I may direct on You" (*Cons.* 3m.9.22).[24] Philosophy's tripartite use of *da* brings the poem to a climax and makes explicit that the prisoner's goal is reunification with God. Indeed, Philosophy generalizes this worldview, arguing that all souls should seek a return to their creator. …*tu namque serenum* / *tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,* / *principium, vector, dux, semita, terminus idem* "You are calm brightness and the rest of peace. / men aim to see You as their starting-point / their guide, conductor, way, and final end" (*Cons.* 3m.9.26-28). This imagery recalls the context immediately before ***sedem augustam*** in the *Georgics* as Vergil describes the immortal afterlife of the bees.

> *...deum namque ire per omnia,*
> *terrasque tractusque maria caelumque profundum;*
> *hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum*
> *quemque sibi tenuis nascentem arcessere vitas;*
> *scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri*
> *omnia, nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare*
> *sideris in numerum atque alto succedere caelo.*
> *si quando **sedem augustam** servatque mella*
> *thesauris relines…*
>
> …for God, they saw, pervades all things, earth and sea's expanse and heaven's depth; from him the flocks and herds, men and beasts of every sort draw, each at birth, the slender stream of life; to him all beings thereafter return, and, when unmade, are restored; no place is there for death, but still quick, they fly unto the ranks of the stars, and mount to the heavens aloft. Whenever you would break into the august dwelling and the honey hoarded in their treasure houses…
>
> (*G.* 4.221-229)

These lines, which attribute an immortal afterlife to the bees, immediately precede the description of their earthly hive as an *augusta sedes*. Thus, if Philosophy adopts the language of the *augusta sedes* but transfers it to the heavens which man can reach, she combines and corrects two images in the *Georgics*. Just as the bees make a return to their hive and the sky,

[24] Gruber (2006, 284) remarks *verändert nach Verg.* for this allusion, which is otherwise once attested in all other Latin literature by Statius *et paupere clavo* ***augustam sedem*** (*Silvae* 5.2.17) in which his praise for Crispinus includes the mention of the senate as a literal august seat, quite different from the hive in the *Georgics* or realm of heaven/the next life in the *Consolatio*.

she assures the prisoner that he too will return to the august seat or home befitting his soul: an eternity with God. Through this allusion, Philosophy employs a Neoplatonic worldview to shape an already heavily theist portion of the *Georgics*. At the same time, her aim is correction. Clearly, her modification deemphasizes the idealization of the bees compared to mankind. In the original description, the bees naturally and consistently attain immortality in the heaven. Philosophy also describes one reaching heaven, but reacts against the notion that bees could be immortal when she replaces them with mankind's eternal soul. She turns the description of a natural hive in the *Georgics* into an allegory for the prisoner's soul reaching his creator. Through the transformation, Philosophy underscores that an admirable and exemplary society is not to be found on earth but rather exists in the next life with God.

In the three examples presented in this section, we have seen Philosophy transform literal descriptions from the natural world of the *Georgics* into metaphors within the *Consolatio*. Specifically, she turned the image of a rock barrier into a metaphor for the prisoner's blocked mind, transformed the image of a breeze favourable for a fire into a metaphor for overcoming a figurative storm, and transformed the description of a beehive into an allegory for the soul's return to heaven. In each case, she engages in a form of correction. Specifically, her insights overcome the divine role of Proteus, demonstrate that her world has a beneficent presence of divinity seen through the weather, and show that the august seat she offers exists is a future, eternal life which surpasses even idealised mortal rewards. I shall now turn to examples of her non-metaphorical repurposing of the *Georgics*.

4. Non-Metaphorical Allusions to the *Georgics*

The first allusion I examine in this section occurs in 5m.2, as Philosophy advances the view that only the monotheistic creator God is truly omniscient. In the passage, Philosophy compares God's knowledge with Phoebus', whom Homer describes in the *Iliad* as possessing omniscience. Indeed, Philosophy opens the poem with a citation of *Iliad* 3.277, *Πάντ'ἐφορᾶν*

καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούειν "sees all and all things hears" (*Cons.* 5m.2.1). Through the citation, Philosophy points precisely to the moment when Homer claims this power for Phoebus. However, she corrects this notion, following up with *qui* (*sc. Phoebus*) *tamen intima viscera terrae* / *non valet aut pelagi radiorum* / *infirma perrumpere luce.* / *haud sic magni conditor orbis*: "yet his rays are not so bright / to pierce the depth of earth and sea. / Not so enfeebled are the eyes of him who made this world so grand" (*Cons.* 5m.2.4-7). The opening citation and response set up a contrast between an Iliadic depiction of omniscience compared to the power of the *conditor orbis.*

I interpret a correction in Philosophy's citation, specifically in her wording *conditor orbis*. *Conditor orbis* is a highly Christian term for the creator, as we can see from, for example, Ambrose's hymn *Aeterne rerum conditor*. Prudentius also employs this title for God. For instance, in his *Apotheosis*, he says *solus labe caret peccati conditor orbis,* / *ingenitus Deus, Pater et Patre natus* "only the creator of the world is free from the stain of sin, God unbegotten and begotten, the Father and He that was born of the Father" (*Apotheosis* 894-895).[25] Indeed, it is possible that Philosophy chooses to activate Christian associations without explicitly naming Christ to create the link between the classical tradition and the Neoplatonic, monotheistic beliefs she would like the prisoner to follow. As a result, Philosophy shows a desire to correct a polytheistic conception of divinity from her opening remarks; Phoebus, a member of a pantheon of gods, is set in opposition to the one true God.

Following the quotation of the *Iliad*, a reader could be more likely to see an allusion to the same epic later in 5m.2. Philosophy is still describing God's omniscience when she says, ***quae sint, quae fuerint veniantque*** / *uno mentis cernit in ictu;* "what is, what has been, what will be / a single glance of mind discerns" (*Cons.* 5m.2.11-12). The idea of a supernatural figure who knows the past, present, and future can be traced back to the *Iliad*,

[25] Text and translation, with editing, is taken from the Loeb edition of Thomson (1949).

specifically to the description of Calchas, who is identified with this phrasing in the assembly of Achaeans, …τοῖσι δ᾽ ἀνέστη / Κάλχας Θεστορίδης οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ᾽ ἄριστος, / **ὃς ᾔδη τά τ᾽ ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα**, "and among them rose up Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of diviners who had knowledge of all things that were, and that were to be, and that had been before" (*Iliad* 1.68-70). As the lines that follow reiterate, Calchas' powers of divination come from Phoebus, καὶ νήεσσ᾽ ἡγήσατ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω / ἣν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν οἱ πόρε **Φοῖβος** Ἀπόλλων "and who had guided the ships of the Achaeans to Ilios by his own prophetic powers which Phoebus Apollo had bestowed upon him" (*Iliad* 1.71-72). Thus, since Philosophy quotes one section of the *Iliad*, she also alludes to this passage since it has the same formula for divine knowledge and mentions Phoebus Apollo. Before we consider the allusion in the *Georgics*, then, we already see Philosophy correct the Iliadic depiction of Phoebus and his disciples' omniscience twice, as she first applies the power to a single god and then usurps the phrase entirely, applying it to a monotheistic God.

Now to the *Georgics* context. At this point in the text, Cyrene describes Proteus' powers to Aristaeus, noting that he is venerated by the Nymphs because of his omniscience. She says, *...novit namque omnia vates* / ***quae sint, quae fuerint****, quae mox* ***ventura*** *trahantur*; "for the seer has knowledge of all things—what is, what hath been, what is in train before long to happen" (*G.* 4.392-393).[26] The nymph Cyrene is herself divine. However, she recognises Proteus' superior knowledge as omniscience itself. In this case, Philosophy corrects the *Georgics* context by improving upon the power of the divinity mentioned; she says that omniscience is the exclusive power of a monotheistic God. This corrects the notion that Apollo (to Calchas) or Neptune (to Proteus) can bestow omniscience.[27] I have already suggested that Aristaeus' fight with Proteus, modelled upon Achilles' fight with Scamander,

[26] These are the only two uses in all of Latin literature of this precise diction, though as I note the idea goes back at least to the *Iliad*. Gruber (2006, 378) also refers to this *topos*.
[27] *Quippe ita Neptuno visum est* "for so has it seemed good to Neptune," (*G.* 4.394).

could be understood as a window allusion to the *Iliad*. In this case, too, we could see a window allusion. Philosophy expresses her belief in God's unique omniscience with the same formula that texts from a polytheistic worldview employed. In his way, she shows her worldview besting the knowledge of divinities from Homer to Vergil.[28]

In the second allusion in this section, at 2m.5, Philosophy describes the golden age. As is conventional in such descriptions, she idealises this past era. Her positive tone is evident from the opening line, *felix nimium prior aetas…* "happy indeed, those earlier days" (2m.5.1). Philosophy is trying to show the prisoner that worldly goods have no true value; she focuses upon the golden age as a time before mankind put stock in such goods, specifically in riches. As she describes, before the corrupting influence of luxuries, mankind enjoyed a healthier existence. She lists several elements of this earlier age which made it simpler,

felix nimium prior aetas
contenta fidelibus arvis
nec inerti perdita luxu,
facili quae sera solebat
ieiunia solvere glande.
non ***Bacchica munera*** *norant*
liquido confundere melle
nec lucida vellera Serum
Tyrio miscere veneno.

Happy indeed, those earlier days
When faithful fields made men content;
no idle luxury sapped their ways;
acorns at hand, when day was spent,

sated their hunger. None then knew
the liquid honey to apply
to Bacchus' gifts; nor to imbue
the sheen of silk with Tyrian dye.

[28] We see a similar formula elsewhere. For instance, Hesiod discusses his own poetic inspiration as drawn from the omniscience of the Olympians. ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν / θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι **τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα**, / καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, / σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν. "and they breathed a divine voice into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before, and they commanded me to sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are, but always to sing of themselves first and last" (*Theogony*, 31-34). Text and translation from the Loeb edition of Most (2018).

(*Cons.* 2m.5.1-9)

Philosophy describes the absence of luxury positively; men had a rustic diet and wore simple clothes. These images are conventional and underscore Philosophy's view that indulgence in extravagant food and clothing is worthless. Having specified the ways in which the golden age was devoid of luxury, Philosophy next describes the effect of this simplicity upon early man. She says, ***somnos*** *dabat herba* ***salubres,*** / *potum quoque lubricus amnis,* / *umbras altissima pinus* "men slumbered restful in the glade; / their drink the gliding river gave, / the towering pine afforded shade" (*Cons*. 2m.5.10-12). Philosophy shows how golden-age man's connection to nature made his life healthier; without the anxiety caused by luxuries, they were able to enjoy a sound sleep. Furthermore, rather than sleeping in a bed they were comfortable just in the grass. Likewise, rather than using an elaborate cup, they used the river to slake their thirst.

Although descriptions of the golden age are well attested in Latin literature, Philosophy may be making a specific allusion to the *Georgics*.[29] We find the same pairing of images and parallel lexical units. Vergil says, *pocula sunt fontes liquidi atque exercita cursu* / *flumina, nec* ***somnos*** *abrumpit cura* ***salubris***, "their cups are clear springs and rivers racing in their course, and no care breaks their healthful slumbers" (*G.* 3.529-530).[30] If we just compare the diction, the passages seem closely matched; we find a description of running water providing for one's thirst and the image of healthy sleep described as a *somnus saluber*. However, Philosophy performs a correction of the *Georgics* passage; this is evident if we

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[29] Brisson (1992) explores the prevalence of the golden age myth in Republican and Imperial writers, including Lucretius, Catullus, Horace, Vergil, and Ovid. Reckford (1958, 79-87) takes a similar approach, but focuses upon the mediating influence of Posidonius and the Middle Stoa. Perkell (2002, 3-4) discusses the ways in which Vergil's depiction of the golden age myth is contradictory among his three works.

[30] Augustine employs this phrase in a sermon where he describes God's ability to raise the dead through resurrection, *Illi putantes aegri* ***somnum salubrem****: si dormit, inquiunt, domine, saluus est* (*Sermo* 98 "Trium mortuorum resurrectio"). Even if this sermon was not known to the authorial-Boethius, we cannot discount the Christian resonances of this phrase. Gruber (2006, 207) only draws a connection to Vergil.

examine the surrounding context of the idealised depiction. Specifically, where Philosophy is describing early man, Vergil is describing a bull. As a result, we can read Vergil's tone as ironic: by transferring the imagery typically applied to men to an animal, he complicates the conventional image.

Indeed, the tone of this passage is grim, depicting the gory death of the animal: *ecce autem duro fumans sub vomere taurus* / *concidit et mixtum spumis vomit ore cruorem* / *extremosque ciet gemitus…* "but lo, the bull, smoking under the ploughshare's weight, falls; from his mouth he spurts blood, mingled with foam, and heaves his dying groans" (*G.* 3.515-517). Vergil does not stop at these pathetic details, but uses the death of the bull to ask a series of rhetorical questions:

> *quid labor aut benefacta iuvant? quid vomere terras*
> *invertisse gravis? atqui non Massica* ***Bacchi***
> ***munera****, non illis epulae nocuere repostae:*
> *frondibus et victu pascuntur simplicis herbae,*
> *pocula sunt fontes liquidi atque exercita cursu*
> *flumina, nec* ***somnos*** *abrumpit cura* ***salubris***.
>
> Of what avail is his toil or his services? What avails it, that he turned with the share the heavy clod? And yet no Massic gifts of Bacchus, no feasts, oft renewed, did harm to him and his. They feed on leaves and simple grass; their cups are clear springs and rivers racing in their course, and no care breaks their healthful slumbers.
>
> (*G.* 3.525-530)

Through extensive anthropomorphizing detail, the bull exhibits features of a golden age lifestyle. In addition to the 'healthful sleep' we can also notice the overlapping description of wine as a 'gift of Bacchus', ***Bacchica*/*Bacchi munera***. Furthermore, while the diction is not precisely parallel, we see further similarities between the passages. Both describe cultivation of the land (*arvis Cons.* 2m.5.2; *terras G.* 3.525); and the simple sating of hunger (*ieiunia Cons.* 2m.5.5; *epulae*, *pascuntur G.* 5.527-528). However, the tones of the respective descriptions are opposite. Philosophy depicts the golden age in splendid idealisation.

Although this age is lost, she holds its principles out to the prisoner as an example to strive for in his own life. In stark contrast, Vergil depicts the golden age ironically, both by applying its characteristics to the life of a bull, not a human, and by undermining the value of this life by showing the ways in which it failed to profit the bull.

Philosophy's allusion attempts to correct Vergil's ironic depiction of the golden age. Philosophy returns the details of this bygone age to mankind and depicts its characteristics in an aspirational light. These corrections underscore the differences between the passages. While the bull only dies a gruesome, and seemingly senseless death, mankind can aspire to the golden age in their own lives. Where the bull could not gain any benefit for living like a golden age man, the prisoner, by striving for the same ideals, has hope for a less troubled future. Furthermore, we should not lose sight of Philosophy's monotheistic message. A crucial element of her worldview is that mankind possesses an immortal soul which will return to God, its creator, upon death. In this way, we could even argue that the golden age for which mankind strives on earth will be fulfilled in heaven. At first glance, Philosophy could just be drawing upon the *Georgics* for conventional imagery of the golden age. However, a closer look reveals that she has corrected its ironic depiction of this time.

In the final example of this section, through an allusion in 3m.6, Philosophy tells the prisoner that the father of all things is a single God, diverging from the worldview expressed in the *Georgics*. In the previous chapter, on Lucretius, I analysed a different part of 3m.6, noting an allusion to the *DRN*. To demonstrate the proximity of these allusions I shall quote them together. The first line of 3m.6 alludes to the *Georgics*. Philosophy says, ***omne hominum genus in terris*** *simili surgit ab ortu* "all men on earth from one source take their rise" (*Cons.* 3m.6.1). Every element of Philosophy's diction is repeated in the *Georgics*, ***omne*** *adeo* ***genus in terris hominumque*** *ferarumque,* "every single race on earth, man and beast…" (*G.* 3.242). At the same time, there could be an instance of multiple reference

implicating the *DRN*. This multiple reference involves the first and second lines of the *Consolatio* poem, ***omne hominum genus in terris*** *simili surgit ab* ***ortu****: / unus enim rerum* ***pater est****, unus cuncta ministrat,* "all men on earth from one source take their rise; / one Father of the world all things supplies" (*Cons.* 3m.6.1-2). If we isolate the words in bold typeface which are not underlined, we can see the allusion to Lucretius analysed previously, ***omnibus*** *ille idem* ***pater est****, unde alma liquentis / umoris guttas mater cum terra recepit* "all have that same father, from whom our fostering mother earth receives liquid drops of water" (*DRN* 2.992-993). As I stated earlier, Philosophy's allusion to Lucretius corrects his allegorical approach to divinity. Lucretius does not argue for a divine origin of mankind and believes that any divinities who might exist have no care for mankind. Clearly, this is the opposite worldview from that to which Philosophy subscribes; she holds that mankind has a celestial origin from a beneficent and monotheistic God. We can see this view explicitly in the following lines of 3m.6, which read,

> ***omne hominum genus in terris*** *simili surgit ab* ***ortu****:*
> *unus enim rerum* ***pater est****, unus cuncta ministrat.*
> *Ille dedit Phoebo radios, dedit et cornua lunae,*
> *ille homines etiam terris dedit et sidera caelo;*
> *hic clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos;*
> *mortales igitur cunctos edit nobile germen.*
>
> All men on earth from one source take their rise;
> one Father of the world all things supplies.
> To Phoebus, rays; horns to the moon on high,
> to earth its men, as starlight to the sky.
> To lodge in bodies, souls from heaven He leads;
> all mortals thus are sprung from noble seeds.
>
> (*Cons.* 3m.6.1-6)

In addition to correcting the *DRN* at 3m.6.2, Philosophy corrects the *Georgics* at 3m.6.1. As in the previous allusion, at first glance, Vergil and Philosophy provide nearly identical descriptions: Philosophy's ***omne hominum genus in terris*** *simili surgit ab* ***ortu*** could be inspired by Vergil's ***omne*** *adeo* ***genus in terris hominumque*** *ferarumque*. However, the

context of the *Georgics* passage provides a point of distinction. The full description reads, ***omne*** *adeo* ***genus in terris hominumque*** *ferarumque,* / *et genus aequoreum, pecudes pictaeque volucres,* / *in furias ignemque ruunt: amor omnibus idem* "every single race on each, man and beast, the tribes of the sea, cattle and birds brilliant of hue, rush into fires of passion: all feel the same love" (*G.* 3.242-244). Vergil describes how every living creature experiences *amor*. This passage itself echoes the proemium of the *DRN*, when Lucretius addresses Venus:

> *nam simul ac species patefactast verna diei*
> *et reserata viget genitabilis aura favoni,*
> *aeriae primum* ***volucres*** *te, diva, tuumque*
> *significant initum perculsae corda tua vi.*
> *inde* ***ferae****,* ***pecudes*** *persultant pabula laeta*
> *et rapidos tranant amnis: ita capta lepore*
> *te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis.*
> *denique, per maria ac montis fluviosque rapacis*
> *frondiferasque domos avium camposque virentis,*
> *omnibus incutiens blandum per pectora* ***amorem****,*
> *efficis ut cupide generatim saecla propagent.*
>
> for as soon as the vernal face of day is made manifest, and the breeze of the teeming west wind blows fresh and free, first the fowls of the air proclaim you, divine one, and your advent, pierced to the heart by your might. Next wild creatures and farm animals dance over the rich pastures and swim across rapid rivers: so greedily does each one follow you, held captive by your charm, whither you go on to lead them. Then throughout seas and mountains and sweeping torrents and the leafy dwellings of birds and verdant plains, striking alluring love into the breasts of all creatures, you cause them greedily to beget their generations after their kind.
>
> (*DRN* 1.10-20)

The progression of the *DRN* passage and some of its diction overlaps with the *Georgics* passage, making a Lucretian inspiration for the *Georgics* likely.[31] As a result, the *DRN* passage may be visible through the allusion to the *Georgics*' depiction of *amor*.

[31] Gale (1991, 419).

If Vergil is responding to the *DRN* passage, he does so ironically. For, where Lucretius depicts love as a driving force of all creation, leading to its infinite renewal, Vergil instead focuses upon the destructive power of this force. Specifically, where *amor* in the *DRN* ensures that all creation produces offspring, thus ensuring its survival, in the *Georgics*, *amor* has the opposite effect. Rather than acting as a benefit, its power draws all living things away from the labour which they must accomplish and is thus destructive. According to the *Georgics* narrative, man and beast alike (…*hominumque ferarumque*) cannot overcome this passion. I shall return to the idea of a multiple reference / window allusion implicating the *DRN* in a moment but now turn back to the *Georgics* and *Consolatio* allusion.

Once again, Philosophy is making a correction of the *Georgics* imagery. The context of 3m.6 contributes to this reading; Philosophy is trying to convince the prisoner that he has the agency to act nobly. According to the poem, God has endowed all humans with an eternal soul, and it is their responsibility to live up to their heavenly origin through correct action. If there is an allusion, Philosophy has made two distinct modifications to the imagery from the *Georgics*. First, Philosophy reverses the negative presentation of love and instead posits God as the ultimate driving force of the universe. God's creation of man and his control over them within the poem implies a divine love, and indeed Philosophy describes this benevolent love in detail at 2m.8.[32] Philosophy reverses the tone of the *Georgics* passage when she presents God, a positive force, as the ultimate controlling element of the world as opposed to the destructive love of the *Georgics*. Indeed, she even implies a distinct kind of love to the one which the *Georgics* presented, countering destructive love with a beneficent creator's love for his creations.

[32] *O felix hominum genus, / si vestros animos* ***amor*** */ quo caelum regitur regat*, "how happy is the human race, / if Love, by which the heavens are ruled, / to rule men's minds is set in place!" (*Cons.* 2m.8.28-30).

Second, Philosophy corrects the notion that men and beasts are ruled by the same impulses. The *Georgics* passage was clear that all living beings can be overcome by love and neglect their respective labours as a result. Aside from the parallelism of the phrase which introduces the passage (*G.* 3.242), the details which follow confirm the similarity in reaction. For example, the poet switches from descriptions of animals struck by love to men, *quid iuvenis, magnum cui versat in ossibus ignem / durus amor?* "what of the youth, in whose marrow fierce love fans the mighty flame?" (*G.* 3.258-259). By transitioning between descriptions of men and beasts seamlessly, the reader has the impression that these two groups share the controlling impulse of destructive love and simply express it differently. In contrast, the central tenet of 3m.6 is that mankind alone among all creatures has a divine soul. Thus, where the *Georgics* passage demonstrated the similarities between human and animal behaviour, Philosophy's repurposing makes a further correction in which mankind possesses a special characteristic which separates him from the animal kingdom.[33] Philosophy goes further than the *Georgics'* negative presentation of love, dismissing the notion that it is the driving force of the universe. Instead, she posits God as the driver and implies his beneficent love as the positive force which holds it together.

I shall now return to the idea of a multiple reference implicating the *DRN*. As was the case in the allusion to the golden age, here too we see that Vergil may be responding to Lucretius. Thus, it is possible that Philosophy's allusions to certain *Georgics* passages also implicate one of the poem's models. As mentioned in the Lucretius chapter, scholars like Monica Gale (1994) have shown the deep intertextual relationship between the *DRN* and *Georgics*. It is possible, then, that the authorial-Boethius also recognised this engagement. I hope that the allusions I have noted in this and the previous chapter at least demonstrate the

[33] Indeed, Philosophy continues this line of reasoning in 5m.5, where she again calls on the prisoner to remember his biological imperative to reunite with his creator.

likelihood of the authorial-Boethius' knowledge of the *DRN* and *Georgics*. Whether or not Boethius saw the intertextual engagement between the works, they are related at least by their shared genre. As a result, I would like to suggest, at a minimum, that the authorial-Boethius knew that these works could be seen as related and appreciated their intertextual links. Thus, when the authorial-Boethius alludes to the *Georgics*, it is at least possible that he continues this literary interplay in his own didactic composition.

5. Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown that Philosophy's correction of allusions to the *Georgics* has a consistent monotheistic bent. I see Philosophy adopt language from the *Georgics* but adapt the premise to reflect God's power. In this way, she may be showing the prisoner that her views of God are compatible with the works which he has read and been inspired by throughout the course of his education. In this way she goes beyond simply attempting to appropriate the language of the original, polytheistic source and shows the prisoner that his internal beliefs are already in some sense aligned with the worldview she is advancing. Philosophy may feel it is an ineffective strategy to tell the prisoner to have faith, but by framing his prior convictions through a more overtly religious lens, she can push him toward this conception of the world in a subtler fashion. In this way the status of the *Georgics* as a type of handbook is also significant; a didactic work or manual on how to achieve a better life promises some type of resolution to those who follow its advice. Noticing this, we can return to the window allusion which implicates the *DRN*. In the example, drawn from 3m.6, I suggested that ***omne hominum genus in terris*** *simili surgit ab* ***ortu****:* / *unus enim rerum* ***pater est****, unus cuncta ministrat* (*Cons.* 3m.6.1-2) recalls ***omnibus*** *ille idem* ***pater est****, unde alma liquentis* / *umoris guttas mater cum terra recepit* (*DRN* 2.992-993). At the same time, we could see an allusion to the *Georgics* ***omne*** *adeo* ***genus in terris hominumque*** *ferarumque* (*G.* 3.242). I have shown that Philosophy corrects the *Georgics* context in this case, as she

restores love to its positive characterisation, undoing the image of destructive love in the *Georgics*. However, if we take my reading of Lucretian allusions from the previous chapter into consideration, a more nuanced picture emerges. That is, Philosophy does not simply undo the pessimism of the Vergilian images in order to agree with Lucretius. Rather, she goes a step further in improving upon the shared premise with the *DRN* (that love guides the universe in a positive fashion) by positing the influence of a monotheistic, beneficent God as its source. If there is a kind of window allusion at play, then it is different from the model of correction Philosophy employed when correcting Lucretius directly. In this case, Philosophy, and readers, can only access Lucretius indirectly, through the window of the *Georgics*.

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter)

Georgics	***Consolatio***
4.563-566	1m.1.1-2
4.418-4222	1m.7.14-19
2.310-314	2.4.9
4.228-230	3m.9.22
4.392-393	5m.2.11-12
3.529-530	2m.5.10-11
3.242	3m.6.1

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in the *Consolatio*)

Georgics	***Consolatio***
4.563-566	1m.1.1-2
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3.529-530	2m.5.10-11
3.242	3m.6.1
4.228-230	3m.9.22

4.392-393	5m.2.11-12

Allusions to Horace: *Odes*

1. Introduction

In earlier chapters, I contended that Boethius might have been motivated to allude to the works of Seneca and Lucan due to elements of their biographies; he could have seen his own death sentence at the hands of Theodoric reflected in their respective deaths under the despotic Nero. I also suggested that he identified with certain tragic figures in Seneca's dramas and that Philosophy corrected the disordered natural world of Lucan's *Bellum Civile*. Regarding allusions to Lucretius' *DRN* and Vergil's *Georgics*, the authorial-Boethius displays a methodological interest in these didactic works, but Philosophy improves upon the world as depicted in both works by positing the influence of a beneficent, monotheistic God. In this chapter, I focus upon Horace.[1] Unlike Seneca or Lucan, Horace's poetic output, up to and including his latest works, the fourth book of *Odes* and the second book of *Epistles*, is evidence of the lyricist's close ties to the imperial court of his day in his latest works.[2] Thus, rather than turning to Horace because of a shared biographical element, the authorial-Boethius refers to Horace because the lyricist represents the epitome of Roman literary culture, particularly the moral tradition. Unlike the *DRN* and *Georgics*, Horace's *Odes* are not explicitly didactic works. Rather, Horace uses philosophy to encourage peace of mind, without adhering explicitly to a particular philosophical school.[3] Despite the presence of moralizing themes in Horace's other works, Boethius refers to the *Odes* more than to any

[1] Gruber (2006, 486) has gathered an expansive list of parallels between the *Consolatio* and *Odes*, while I would classify only a small number of these correspondences as allusions. For the sake of completeness, I have cited those who have noted the presence of Horace in the *Consolatio* at any level. Text and translation are taken from the Loeb edition of Rudd (2004).
[2] Bowditch (2010, 72) notes that Horace's panegyric of Augustus becomes more fulsome in these later works, including the *Carmen Saeculare*. Lowrie (2007, 86) notes the same increase in mentions of Augustus in the later works, which departs from the tone of *Odes* 1-3.
[3] Moles (2007, 179-180). Krenkel (1972, 11) describes Horace's general philosophical approach, which emphasises, but does not solely rely upon, Epicureanism.

other Horatian collection.[4] Thus, Horace's moral code and advice represent aspirations for the prisoner.

I have divided the allusions which I examine into two categories: those which I would classify as instances of multiple reference, and those which seem to implicate Horace's *Odes* alone. I have also discussed the possibility of multiple reference in previous chapters. In the Lucan chapter, there are two distinct, but related, allusions: one to the *BC* (1m.3.1) and one to Seneca's *Phaedra* (1m.3.4). I suggested that our understanding of 1m.3 was enriched by reading these allusions together, as examples of a Stoic worldview without one work responding to the other. Differently, we know that the *DRN* was a model for the *Georgics*.[5] As a result, *G.* 3.525-530 recalls *DRN* 5.970-976 and *G.* 3.242-244 recalls *DRN* 1.10-20. In both examples, I saw Vergil responding to a known generic predecessor. Differently, in this section, I shall examine instances of multiple reference / window allusion which implicate the *Odes* and *Hercules Oetaeus* or the *Odes* and *Phaedra*. A multiple reference involving Horace and Seneca *tragicus* is different from the other kinds of multiple reference which I have identified. Horace and Seneca are not related (like Lucan and Seneca), do not share a philosophical viewpoint (like the Stoic beliefs of Lucan and Seneca), nor do they write in the same genre (like Lucretius and Vergil).

2. Multiple Reference: Seneca and Horace

Recently, scholars have argued that Seneca responds to Horace, including by recasting diction drawn from the *Odes* in his tragedies.[6] Building upon such analyses, I shall make two

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[4] Gruber (2006, 482-483).
[5] See the discussion of multiple reference in the Vergil chapter.
[6] See Trinacty on Seneca's reception of Augustan poets, and on Horace's *Odes* in particular (2014, 127-185). Likewise, see especially section two, "Horatian Verse in Senecan Tragedy", in the edited volume of Stöckinger, Winter, and Zanker (2017), as well as Littlewood's contribution, "Seneca, Horace and the Poetics of Transgression" in the volume of Frangoulidis, Harrison, and Manuwald (eds.), *Roman Drama and its Contexts*. Although there has been much recent attention, the intertextual relationship between Horace and Seneca has long been noted; see for instance Spika's *De imitatione Horatiana in Senecae canticis chori* (1890).

related arguments. First, I shall present my view of the ways in which Seneca responds to Horatian lyric in *Hercules Oetaeus* and *Phaedra*. Second, I shall suggest that Seneca's adaptations exert a bidirectional influence within the *Consolatio*. I do not just see Seneca reacting to Horace's odes; instead, Seneca's adaptations could have impacted the way the authorial-Boethius understood the *Odes* themselves. Specifically, I contend that Philosophy utilises *Hercules Oetaeus* to modify the prisoner's reading of Horace, *Odes* 2.9.9, and that Philosophy utilises the *Phaedra* to exemplify a contrast with Horace's moralizing in *Odes* 2.16. This is a 'bidirectional' interpretation because the authorial-Boethius appears to recognize the distinct uses of the same diction in the *Odes* and in a Senecan tragedy and weighing which one better serves his prisoner-self. Through the following examples of multiple reference, I read Horace's moralizing as being more important than Seneca's tragic figures as exempla for the prisoner, affirming the lyricist's moral code as an aspiration.

1) Tearful Mode 1: *maestus modus* + *flebilis*

The first allusion I turn to appears almost verbatim in two separate *Consolatio* contexts. First, at 1m.1.2, the prisoner says, ***flebilis**, heu, **maestos** cogor inire **modos*** "I must now with grief embark on sombre lays" (*Cons.* 1m.1.2). In this case, the measures are sombre, and the prisoner approaches them in a tearful way; *flebilis* is an adjective describing the prisoner's state, while *maestus* and *modus* agree. A closely related, but not identical, phrase appears at a second *Consolatio* context: 3m.12.7. This poem, the final one of Book 3, is voiced by Philosophy and concerns the figure of Orpheus. Philosophy narrates, *quondam funera coniugis* / *vates Threicius gemens,* / *postquam **flebilibus modis*** / *silvas currere mobiles,* / *amnes stare coegerat* "of old, the Thracian poet mourned / his wife's unhappy death; / his tearful lays had earlier / forced woods to shift at speed; / made streams to linger in their course;" (*Cons.* 3m.12.5-7). Unlike the example of 1m.1.2, in which '*maestos*' modified

'*modos*', in this case the adjective *flebilis* modifies *modus*. Put another way, in 1m.1, the prisoner was tearful in his composition of sombre poetry, whereas in 3m.12 the poetry itself is described as tearful. The difference is not insignificant. The prisoner, awaiting death, is entirely dejected in 1m.1, whereas Orpheus does not face his own death but copes with a shocking romantic loss. In fact, the magical impact of Orpheus' poetry means that he actually overcomes death, albeit only temporarily, in winning Eurydice back from the underworld.

Despite these clear differences, scholars have long compared 1m.1.2 and 3m.12.7; these are the only two points in the *Consolatio* in which a form of *flebilis* (*flebilis* at 1m.1.2, *flebilibus* at 3m.12.7) appears close to (1m.1) or modifies (3m.12) the noun *modus*. Thus, the scholarly consensus has been that, at 1m.1.2ff, the prisoner states an intention to embark upon sombre poetry, whereas at 3m.12.7ff, Philosophy encourages the prisoner to dismiss this same type of poetry by adducing the negative exemplum of Orpheus and his eternal grief.[7] I shall also explore the poetry represented by *flebilis* and elegiacs further in the subsequent chapter on Ovid, as several scholars have noted the way Boethius' deployment of the adjective *flebilis* in a poem in elegiac couplets points to Ovid's statement from exile, ***flebilis*** *ut noster status est, ita flebile carmen,* / *materiae scripto conveniente suae* "mournful is my state, mournful therefore is my song, for the work is suited to its theme" (*Tristia* 5.1.5-6).[8] But first, in this section, I shall explore the multiple reference between Seneca and Horace as distinct from the example of Ovid, who does compel us to think of a song as *flebilis*, but who does not place *flebilis* and *modus* in close proximity. First, I shall examine how the prisoner's use of *maestus modus* with *flebilis* could allude to Horace, *Odes* 2.9. Then, I shall present a secondary allusion, through the window of Horace, to Seneca, *Herc.O.* 1090.

[7] For the two most recent treatments of this view, see Claassen (2007, 13) and Fielding (2017, 137).
[8] O'Daly (1991, 38), Gruber (2006, 55), Fielding (2017, 128-132).

At *Odes* 2.9, Horace is addressing his elegist friend Valgius after the death of Mystes, likely a slave (2.10).[9] Horace begins from exempla in the natural world before involving Valgius directly. He opens, *non semper imbres nubibus hispidos* / *manant in agros…* "not forever does the rain pour down from the clouds onto the bedraggled fields" (*Odes* 2.9.1-2). While the weather always changes, Valgius' grief for Mystes does not: *tu semper urges* ***flebilibus modis*** "you, however, never cease…with tearful verses" (*Odes* 2.9.9).[10] Horace juxtaposes his friend's endless grief with the constant changes of weather in the natural world. The contrast is underlined by these two phrases occurring as the first line of their respective stanzas, and by the placement of *semper* in second position in both cases.[11] There is also an iconic effect in this word order, where the second use of *semper* in the same position draws the reader's eye downward, perhaps mimicking falling rain or the elegist's tears. Likewise, through the similarity of the clauses to each other, I see the *imbres* (1) reflected in Valgius' tears, also hinted at in his choice of the tearful, *flebilis* (9), metre of elegy; while the rains do not pour forever, Valgius' tears and elegies do. As Horace shows Valgius through a contrast with changing weather, his grief is unnatural and excessive.

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[9] Esteve-Forriol (1962, 34) argues that Horace alludes to a lengthy, now lost, elegy which Valgius must have written for Mystes. Murgatroyd (1975, 69-71), following Quinn (1963, 160f), does not believe Mystes has died but rather has been stolen by an erotic rival. However, Harrison (2017, 124) adduces *ademptus Hector* in 2.4.10 as a parallel where death, not erotic disruption, is imagined.

[10] Crabbe (1981a, 248) mentions joint Horatian and Ovidian influence, believing that Boethius frames his behaviour in turning to elegiac lament as disgraceful. Gruber (2006, 55) notes the overlapping language but does not comment further, only saying *vgl.* In Latin literature, this phrase also appears in Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes* (1.44.106) *–Haec cum pressis et* ***flebilibus modis*** and in a letter of Seneca's (88.9.9-10) *Monstras mihi, qui sint* ***modi flebiles****; monstra potius, quomodo inter adversa non emittam flebilem vocem.* Cicero is quoting a line of Pacuvius and his combination of *flebilis* with *pressis* shifts the emphasis away from the simpler *flebilis modus*. Seneca's letter to Lucilius presents a closer context; he explicates his belief in the pursuit of vocation and describes how a philosopher studies greater things, like the soul's harmony, than a music teacher, who focuses only on the harmony of notes. While the context is distinct enough to make me believe the allusion is to the *Odes* and *Hercules Oetaeus*, the fact that two attestations occur in Seneca (since Boethius treated the *Oetaeus* as Senecan) suggests that the phrase has Senecan colour. *Maestus modus* does not have a pre-Boethian attestation.

[11] As long noted by, for example, Syndikus (1972, 395), Nisbet and Hubbard (1978, 143), and Harrison (2017, 120).

The prisoner could allude to Horace's depiction of tearful measures in 1m.1, as he describes his tearful state in his cell. Grieving the loss of his freedom, he seeks comfort in elegiac composition, turning to the sorrowful metre (*maestus* ***modus***) in tearful fashion (***flebilis***). The message of *Odes* 2.9 is for Valgius to stop writing elegiacs on Mystes, as they are not helping him move past his grief but rather are prolonging it excessively. Thus, as soon as the prisoner makes a statement of authorial intent, announcing that he must turn to the sombre mode in tears, the allusion to Horace's deployment of the same phrase undercuts elegy, the traditionally 'tearful' metre through its association with lament, as a beneficial means of comfort. According to the advice of ode 2.9, shifting weather reminds us not to grieve unnaturally long. In this way, Horace's moralizing encourages the prisoner to forestall his turn to an elegiac remedy for his grief. Through this allusion, the prisoner assumes the position of Valgius: a grieving man attempting to cure his emotional turmoil through elegiac poetry.

Pressing the association further, I see Valgius and the prisoner in similar emotional positions. Just as Valgius keeps himself trapped in grief through constant elegiac composition, the prisoner also risks being unable to move past his circumstances by attempting to resolve his emotions with Valgius' chosen metre. I would even compare Philosophy's dismissal of the elegiac Muses with a few of Horace's rhetorical moves in *Odes* 2.9.[12] First, Horace's ode is in Alcaic stanzas, and he can be understood to model the different type of lyric composition which he recommends for Valgius. This is similar to the way Philosophy continues to use poetry, even the elegiac metre (at 5m.1), in subsequent sections, so long as it is the regulated type of composition which she deems is not harmful to the

[12] In the very next section of the *Consolatio*, Philosophy appears to the prisoner and dismisses the elegiac Muses, because, as she says, they are unable to free men from their woes, *hominumque mentes adsuefaciunt morbo, non liberant* (*Cons*. 1.1.9). Philosophy's rationale and Horace's moralizing agree on the dangers of employing elegy.

prisoner's state. Likewise, Horace refers to Mystes as *Mysten ademptum* "lost Mystes" (*Odes* 2.9.10). I understand the passive participle as a reflection of Horace's stern moralizing content; by pairing the only instance of Mystes' name with an indication of loss, he reminds Valgius that Mystes is gone forever, while his grief should not continue. Horace furthers this sentiment when he tells Valgius to take up new topics *...et potius nova* / *cantemus Augusti tropaea* / *Caesaris*… "and let us rather sing of Augustus Caesar's latest victories…" (*Odes* 2.9.18-20). Horace's ode forestalls the prisoner twice; first by painting the tearful mode as the wrong type of cure, and second by suggesting that a grieving man should turn to new topics rather than wallowing in his circumstances. As a result, the authorial-Boethius employs ode 2.9's moralizing point of view as an aspiration for his prisoner-self. When the prisoner turns to elegy, the ode encourages him to seek consolation in a different metre and to apply Horace's advice to Valgius to his own circumstances: *desine mollium* / *tandem querelarum* "do put a stop to these unmanly lamentations" (*Odes* 2.9.17-18).

Horace's advice to Valgius can easily be transferred to the prisoner. However, an instance of multiple reference at this point further complicates the picture. I recognise that *maestus modus* with *flebilis* nearby is not the same as the phrase *flebilis modus*. However, there are clear similarities in meaning, *modus* only appears close to or modified by *flebilis* in these two *Consolatio* contexts, and, as I shall demonstrate, both of these contexts are concerned with elegiac poetry. I thus now examine the only other poetic attestation of the phrase *flebilis modus* outside the *Odes*, arguing that we can relate this diction to *maestus modus* with *flebilis* which we find at *Cons.* 1m.1. This attestation occurs at a fraught moment concluding the third act of Seneca's *Hercules Oetaeus*.[13] Having donned the poisoned

[13] As I noted in the Seneca chapter, although *Hercules Oetaeus*' authorship has been debated, it is all but certain that Boethius knew the tragedy, making questions of its authenticity beyond the remit of this dissertation. See, for instance, Herold (1994, 45) on the ways in which the authorial-Boethius demonstrates knowledge of the *Oetaeus*.

garment, Hercules' former physical prowess begins to fail. The chorus of Oechalian women, used to seeing Hercules as the indomitable destroyer of their homeland, take the hero's suffering as a sign of his impending death. This induces them to conclude *aeternum fieri nihil* "nothing is made for ever" (*Herc.O.* 1035). The context in which the chorus communicates this belief is markedly different from that of *Odes* 2.9; Horace is addressing Valgius directly to encourage him to stop his excessive grief, while the chorus draws a lesson from unfolding events, which they then communicate to the audience. Despite these divergent contexts, the central message of the respective works is similar; the chorus' message *nothing lasts forever* echoes Horace's *grief should not last forever*.

The way the chorus frames this lesson has broader implications for elegy as a tool for the grief-stricken. In the opening of their song, the chorus introduces the origin of this moral lesson: Orpheus. They say, *verum est quod cecinit sacer* / *Thressae sub Rhodopes iugis* / *aptans Pieriam chelyn* / *Orpheus, Calliopae genus,* / *aeternum fieri nihil*, "the holy man sang true to his Pierian lyre below Rhodope's heights in Thrace—Orpheus, Calliope's child—that nothing is made for ever" (*Herc.O.* 1031-1035). According to the chorus, after Orpheus lost Eurydice for the second time, he communicated the lesson *nothing lasts forever* to the Getae, which the chorus then applies to Hercules' physical failing. It is within this context that the phrase *flebilis modus* appears. After they have described Orpheus' loss of Eurydice, the chorus remarks *tunc solamina cantibus* / *quaerens* ***flebilibus modis*** / *haec Orpheus cecinit Getis:* / *leges in superos datas* / *et qui tempora digerens* / *quattor praecipitis deus* / *anni disposuit vices;* "then looking for solace in song Orpheus in tearful measures sang these themes to the Getae: laws are established for heaven, even for the god who arranges the seasons, and sets in order the headlong year's four changes" (*Herc.O.* 1090-1096).[14] I see a

[14] Bernays (1999, 137) was the first to describe Boethius' indebtedness to *Hercules Oetaeus* at 3m.12. Also, the mention of the Getae recalls Ovid's elegiac exile poetry, in which he mentions the Getae numerous times, and thus there is a specific allusion to elegy here.

mixed application of Horace's advice. Orpheus is the quintessential figure of eternal elegy, grieving for Eurydice past typical measure both because of his quasi-divine capacity for elegiac poetry, and because he mourns her twice as much as any mortal could when she, extraordinarily and unnaturally, dies twice. Indeed, his choice to turn back to the same tearful mode with which he was grieving her first death exemplifies the way this metre traps him in a cycle of endless grief. As a result, he is the archetypal figure of failure who cannot adopt Horace's advice in 2.9, as even Valgius, despite his seemingly endless grief, cannot lose Mystes twice in the magical and extreme way in which Orpheus lost Eurydice.

While Orpheus' life is incompatible with this element of Horace's advice in ode 2.9, the lesson which Orpheus communicates to the Getae is in line with Horace's moralizing and draws upon the natural world as the exemplum of the moral lesson, just as Horace had. The chorus employs imagery of the shifting seasons to make their point. They say that there are four changing seasons (*quattor…anni…vices*, 1095-1096) which compel us to believe that nothing last forever, while Horace reminds Valgius that inclement weather, such as rains (*imbres*, 1), winds (*procellae*, 3; *Aquilonibus* 2.9.6), and ice (*glacies*, 2.9.5), does not last forever. In the chorus' remarks, the stress is on the indomitability of death, which conquered Eurydice despite Orpheus' magical abilities with song, and seems likely to conquer Hercules as his strength gives out.[15] Thus, while Orpheus is the emblem of eternal grief, he can be said to take a moralizing approach when he uses his life experiences as a lesson which he communicates to the Getae. It is also a Horatian stance to communicate this lesson through the lens of seasonal change. As a result, Orpheus is introduced implicitly through the Senecan allusion, whereas Horace did not mention him in *Odes* 2.9.[16] As a result, readers can see

[15] Of course, Hercules achieves an apotheosis in this tragedy, so the chorus' pronouncement is not fully correct; Hercules will continue living as a god, even if his mortal self does die. However, in the choral ode, Hercules does not achieve this immortality. Rather, he seems like Eurydice or Mystes, both subject to death.

[16] While I am concerned with the phrase *flebilis modus* in Seneca and Horace, Lowrie (1994, 386) argues that *Odes* 2.9.10-12 alludes to *Georgics* 4.464-466, drawn from the episode on Orpheus and

Valgius and the prisoner as Orpheus-like figures who run the risk of trapping themselves in eternal grief by relying on elegy, the *flebilis modus*.

This first example of multiple reference complicates and enriches the straightforward advice from Horace to Valgius, and in indeed how I see the authorial-Boethius employing this loaded language. Although elements of Orpheus' life are tragic, the chorus highlights a moral lesson which he transmits. Thus, through the window which Seneca opens, the reader is reminded of a particularly moralizing moment in *Hercules Oetaeus*. While the chorus does not condemn Orpheus for his elegiac composition in the way Horace faults Valgius for his, the primary foci of the sources upon which the authorial-Boethius draws are that of 1) a figure engaged in lengthy lamenting composition (Orpheus and Valgius) and 2) an external interpreter of this figure (the chorus and Horace) who produces a lesson for the reader based upon the figure's conduct. Indeed, the presence of Orpheus connected to *flebilis modus* through Seneca seems to anticipate the second appearance of this phrase in the *Consolatio*, where Orpheus reappears directly in Philosophy's moral lesson. While this section has focused upon *maestus modus* + *flebilis*, I shall now turn to *Consolatio* 3m.12, in which we find *modus* itself described as *flebilis*.

2) Tearful Mode 2: *flebilis modus*

Philosophy presents Orpheus explicitly as a moral exemplum in 3m.12. While her use of the phrase *flebilis modus* is not parallel to the prisoner's use of *maestus modus* with *flebilis* in close proximity (1m.1.2), as mentioned above, I shall still compare these moments. The conjunction of *flebilis* and *modus* in agreement appears in three contexts: *Consolatio* 3m.12, *Hercules Oetaeus* 1090, and *Odes* 2.9. However, due to the shared figure of Orpheus, 3m.12 is more closely aligned to *Hercules Oetaeus* 1090-1096 than to *Odes* 2.9.

Eurydice. Thus, Horace may be subtly engaging with the figure of Orpheus through allusion even though he does not explicitly mention Orpheus as the prototype of endless elegy.

In my analysis of 3m.12, I make a distinction between Orpheus' mortal emotions (which compel him to look at Eurydice) and his immortal poetry, which conquers death in overcoming Pluto and buying Eurydice a second chance at life. Thus, I suggest that Philosophy presents Orpheus as a moral exemplum of dwelling on emotions too long, while also lending emphasis to his exceptional poetry impacting the natural world and underworld alike. Through this balanced perspective, I see Philosophy resisting a pure dismissal of Orpheus' lament as ineffective. At the second appearance of *flebilis* in close proximity to *modus* (and the only appearance of *flebilis modus* in the *Consolatio*), Philosophy is delivering the final poem of Book 3. She refracts Orpheus' myth through the lens of her monotheistic beliefs, arguing that his life indicates that one's mind should be turned to higher things (faith in a next, eternal life with God) not lower ones (dwelling on the hardships of this mortal life). Because Orpheus was turned to "lower things" (Eurydice behind him, in the underworld), he lost sight of the "high things" (her freedom in the upper world).[17] Philosophy connects this tale to the prisoner when she cautions *vos haec fabula respicit…* "to you this tale refers…" (*Cons.* 3m.12.52), perhaps punning on *respicit* in its meaning of learning a lesson as well as Orpheus' fatal turning back to look at Eurydice.[18] However, the plural *vos* suggests an audience beyond the prisoner; perhaps Philosophy is advising that all men should heed her advice. Whether she is focused specifically upon the prisoner or upon mankind in general, Philosophy adopts a clear moralizing stance. Thus, while this phrase connects Orpheus with elegiacs as the poetry of mourning, there is equal emphasis lent to the supernatural ability of his song to impact the typical cycles of the natural world, as the actions of trees (which should stand) and rivers (which should run), switch places.[19]

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[17] Gruber (2006, 312).
[18] *OLD* 7. Ovid uses this same verb at *Met.* 11.66 in his telling of the Orpheus tale.
[19] See further detail of the impacts in the natural world and underworld in my Seneca section.

Indeed, while Orpheus breaks the condition of Eurydice's release, this is the result of his mortal passions, not a failure of his supernatural poetry to effect change. Philosophy confirms this when she says, *quis legem det amantibus?* / *maior lex amor est sibi.* / *heu, noctis prope terminos* / *Orpheus Eurydicen suam* / *vidit, perdidit, occidit* "yet who for lovers can prescribe? / Love has its greater law. / Alas, his dear Eurydice / quitting Night's boundary / Orpheus beheld, lost, was undone" (*Cons.* 3m.12.47-51). Philosophy isolates Orpheus' love for Eurydice as distinct from his poetry, which was indeed able to overcome Pluto and purchase Eurydice's escape (*emptam carmine* "bought by his song", 3m.12.43).[20] While there can be no doubt that Orpheus' poetry did not have the same affective, disordering impact on his own person, every other natural element (3m.12.8-9), animal (3m.12.10-13), and underworld figure (3m.12.29-39), including Pluto himself (3m.12.40-41), is conquered by his songs, which create ruptures in otherwise eternally fixed behaviours and routines.[21] As a result, I do not see Philosophy condemning the poetry of lament entirely, as she dwells upon its power in nature and the underworld. Rather, the moralizing lesson she communicates is that the prisoner should not dwell on his emotions, specifically grief at his downturn in fate, as this is one of the "lower" concerns that distract him from his next life in heaven.[22] This is a different moral from *do not use elegy to overcome grief*. Indeed, we should remember that Philosophy will use the very elegiac metre she dismissed in Book 1 at the start of Book 5 (I shall analyse this repetition in detail in the Ovid chapter).

I would like to conclude this section by identifying a complex pair of multiple references / allusions involving the three instances of *flebilis modus* and one example of

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[20] Wiltshire (1972, 218) sees Orpheus as a failed figure not because of his endless elegy but because he yields to temptation by looking back at Eurydice while Boethius, she argues, succeeds because he has just comprehended the concept of divine love, which is greater than Orpheus' erotic love.
[21] *nec qui cuncta subegerant / mulcerent dominum modi* "the measures that subdued all else could not assuage their lord" (*Cons*. 3m.12.16-17).
[22] Indeed, Claassen (2007, 12) notes that the movement from the dark underworld to the light of day mirrors Plato's allegory of the cave, where truth can only be found by upward travel.

maestus modus near *flebilis*. According to my analysis, 1m.1.2 (*maestus modus* with *flebilis*) recalls *Odes* 2.9.9 (*flebilis modus*): in both poems, elegy is entirely dismissed. In contrast, 3m.12.7 refers more closely to *Herc.O.* 1090. In my reading, the presence of Orpheus contributes to this linkage. Furthermore, 3m.12 and *Herc.O.* 1090 both develop a more nuanced view of elegiac poetry than 1m.1 or *Odes* 2.9. The context of 3m.12 and the context of the tragedy show the power of this metre rather than suggesting that it must be entirely dismissed. Of course, due to the overlapping diction of *flebilis modus* in *Herc.O.* 1090 and *Odes* 2.9.9, it is possible that Philosophy also refers to Horace's poem. However, her use of elegiac poetry in 5m.1 works against Horace's advice to Valgius to dismiss the metre. I see the influence of the *Odes* more in her moralizing stance than in the specific advice of ode 2.9.

Consequently, the cluster around *maestus modus* with *flebilis* or *flebilis modus* allows readers to weigh interconnected perspectives of the "tearful mode". The dialogue between ode 2.9.9 and 1m.1.2 is to turn away from excessive elegy toward new topics. In contrast, the interaction between *Odes* 2.9.9 and *Cons.* 3m.12.7 notes that the right type of poetry, whether on a new topic (*Odes*) or by an exceptional figure (*Herc.O.*, *Cons.*), can be powerful and effective. The right type of poetry is likely to help Valgius out of his grief and was shown to accomplish unprecedented inversions in the mortal world and underworld when deployed by Orpheus. Likewise, the Senecan window allusion furthers the depiction in 3m.12 of Orpheus' ability to create a special impact. As a result, Horace's moralizing represents an aspiration for the prisoner. In 1m.1.2, through an allusion to *Odes* 2.9.9 he can subtly express his desire to leave elegy behind. At the same time, in 3m.12, Philosophy affirms the ability of elegy to have some powerful effects if human emotions are not excessive. In this way, Philosophy can modify the prisoner's stance by suggesting that regulated poetic lament can be an effective tool for grief. Thus, Philosophy does not presents Orpheus in a purely negative light; rather, she shows the prisoner that a firm moral code, on the model of Horace's *Odes*, is necessary to

keep his emotions in check. As a result, Horace's moral code is more relevant and effective than Orpheus' song to the prisoner, while at once remaining an example of the impact of the poetry of lament when deployed within certain limits.

3) Stars Hidden in the Dark Night

In the last example of this section, a *Consolatio* passage alludes to a particularly moralizing portion of a Horatian ode while also implicating a Senecan tragic context. Philosophy is delivering the final poem of Book 1: 1m.7. I have analysed a separate portion of 1m.7 in the previous chapter, on Vergil; there '*obice saxi*' recalled *Georgics* 4.418-422. I shall return to this point in a moment but first turn to the multiple reference occurring in a different portion of the poem. Philosophy is reiterating her diagnosis; the prisoner's mind is foggy and blocked and he will be unable to see the truth until he can think clearly. In making this point, Philosophy draws extensively upon imagery from the natural world. She provides strong direction to the prisoner, saying,

> *quique vagatur*
> *montibus altis*
> *defluus amnis*
> *saepe resistit*
> *rupe soluti*
> *obice saxi.*
> *tu quoque si vis*
> *lumine claro*
> *cernere verum,*
> *tramite recto*
> *carpere callem,*
> *gaudia pelle,*
> *pelle timorem*
> *spemque fugato*
> *nec dolor adsit.*
> *nubila mens est*
> *vinctaque frenis*
> *haec ubi regnant.*
>
> rocks torn from high crags
> oft stem a stream's force,
> as it pours down the mountains

in wandering course.

Your case is like these.
If you wish to behold
the truth in clear light,
and to take the straight road,
forgo empty joys,
dismiss every fear,
renounce idle hope,
let grief come not near.

The mind is befogged,
imprisoned in chains,
when emotions like these
wield monarchical reins.

(*Cons.* 1m.7.14-31)

Philosophy compares the mental energy of a healthy man to a rushing river. Since the prisoner's mental energy is unhealthy, his mind is like a river whose flow has been obstructed by fallen rocks. Likewise, Philosophy compares the fogginess of the prisoner's mental process with a cloudy sky: *nubila mens est…* (1m.7.29). Through these examples, Philosophy establishes a vocabulary of referring to the prisoner's mind through natural exempla. In this vein, at the beginning of the poem, Philosophy compares the prisoner's mental state to stars hidden by a stormy night, ***nubibus atris*** / ***condita*** *nullum* / *fundere possunt* / ***sidera*** *lumen* "when black clouds envelop / stars which shone bright, / they can no longer / pour forth their light" (*Cons.* 1m.7.1-4). Philosophy says that the prisoner's mind was strong, but has languished, like the stars which are hidden behind the dark clouds of a storm. While she knows that the prisoner's learning has not vanished, she cannot see it based on his current condition. The comparison to hidden stars is rich in its connection to *Odes* 2.16.

One message of that ode is that a man seeks a peaceful life, something which cannot be bought.[23] Horace demonstrates this concept in the opening scene, *otium divos rogat in*

[23] Konstan (2023, 48-49) argues that Horace's *otium* is best understood as the technical equivalent to ataraxia in Epicurean ethics, as Horace refers to *otium* when he describes an inner state of mental security.

patenti / *prensus Aegaeo, simul* ***atra nubes*** / ***condidit*** *lunam neque certa fulgent* / ***sidera*** *nautis*, "a quiet life is what a man prays the gods to grant him when caught in the open Aegean, and a dark cloud has blotted out the moon, and the sailors no longer have the fixed stars to guide them" (*Odes* 2.16.1-4).[24] Horace imagines a literal storm in which sailors could not use the stars as guides. Philosophy employs the same imagery as Horace but applies it metaphorically, as an indication that the prisoner should clear his mind.[25] Despite the different applications, Boethius' imagery is quite similar to Horace's. Aside from the four dictional matches, in both cases the description of dark clouds providing cover occurs before the identification of the stars as the hidden object. In addition to this sequence, the comparisons both span the first four lines of their respective poems. Moreover, the description of stars hidden by bad weather precedes further moralizing content. Specifically, Horace counsels Grosphus to aim for a simple life (2.16.13-14), as anxieties and cares trouble even the rich man (2.16.21-24), and no one knows exactly how long he will live (2.16.25-32). Though Philosophy has a different focus from Horace, she also begins with a metaphor of hidden stars before continuing to her moralizing content about clearing the prisoner's mind. Likewise, a central theme in both poems is the search for what will make one truly happy. Philosophy argues that this object is the restoration of philosophical reasoning to the prisoner. Differently, Horace advocates for a quiet life. While these are distinct goals, both poems employ the simile of stars hidden in a stormy night to express the inability to attain the goal; the prisoner's mind is stormy and sailors cannot achieve a peaceful mindset during a storm.[26]

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[24] Gruber (2006, 164) and Scheible (1972, 43) note the similarity of the language to Horace's ode 2.9, but argue that Philosophy's language is unpoetic and commonplace, more characteristic of diatribe.
[25] As Harrison (2017, 184-186) shows, this passage recalls *DRN* 2.1-13, as well as Catullus 51.13-16.
[26] Philosophy and the prisoner himself both describe an ailing mind as a drowning mind. The prisoner says, *at ego cuius acies lacrimis* ***mersa*** *caligaret nec dinoscere possem quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae auctoritatis*… "my eyes were suffused and blinded with tears. I could not identify this woman who wielded such imperious authority…" (*Cons.* 1.1.13). Likewise, Philosophy replies *heu quam praecipiti* ***mersa*** *profundo* / *mens hebet*… "dull-witted is his mind, alas! Sunk in steep depths below…" (*Cons.* 1m.2.1-2).

The only other place in Latin literature where this same diction occurs is in one of Seneca's tragedies; in this case, at *Phaedra* 674. At this crucial moment of the plot, Phaedra has just confessed her love for Hippolytus. Repulsed by this admission, he replies by wishing for a cataclysmic event.[27]

> *...magne regnator deum,*
> *tam lentus audis scelera? tam lentus vides?*
> *et quando saeva fulmen emittes manu,*
> *si nunc serenum est? omnis impulsus ruat*
> *aether et* ***atris nubibus condat*** *diem,*
> *ac versa retro* ***sidera*** *obliquos agant*
> *retorta cursus…*
>
> …great monarch of the gods, do you listen to crimes so calmly, see them so calmly? And when will your fierce hand launch the thunderbolt, if now the heavens are clear? Let the whole sky collapse in ruin and bury the daylight in black clouds, let the stars turn back and veering run their courses awry…
>
> (*Phaedr.* 671-677)

Hippolytus' circumstances represent a perversion of the moralizing advice Horace provides. Like the sailor caught in the open Aegean in ode 2.16, Hippolytus is facing something horrifying and turns to prayer in his distress. Unlike the sailor, though, Hippolytus begs for the very same weather which Horace's sailor prayed to dismiss. As Hippolytus says, he hopes to be struck down because he feels guilt at attracting Phaedra, although unknowingly, *in me tona, me fige, me velox cremet* / *transactus ignis: sum nocens, merui mori:* / *placui novercae*, "hurl your thunder at me, transfix me, let the swift fire pierce and consume me. I am guilty, I deserve to die: I have attracted my stepmother" (*Phaedr.* 682-684). As in the prior example concerning Orpheus, once again the Senecan tragic figure implicated in the allusion is unable to live up to Horace's advice from the *Odes*. Also, I understand Hippolytus' wish as a way in which he tries to make sense of his world. Since his stepmother feels attraction toward him,

[27] As Braden (1970, 26) notes, this is similar to Thyestes' comment upon recognition of his cannibalism, *agnosco fratrem. sustines tantum nefas* / *gestare, Tellus?* "I recognize my brother. Earth, can you bear to support such a weight of outrage?" (*Thyestes* 1006-1007).

he expects that the universe should fall apart to match this perversion of the normal order of his family.[28]

Hippolytus is unable to escape his royal circumstances, which then prevent him from attaining Horace's moralizing goal. In a typically tragic way, Hippolytus makes every attempt to flee the royal life into which he was born, escape his duties, and live the simple life for which Horace advocates (*Odes* 2.16.9-16) to no avail. For example, in reply to Phaedra's nurse compelling Hippolytus to spend time with women, rather than always hunting alone, he replies: *non alia magis est libera et vitio carens* / *ritusque melius vita quae priscos colat,* / *quam quae relictis moenibus silvas amat*, "no other life is more free and blameless, or better cherishes the ways of old, than that which abandons city walls and loves the forests" (*Phaedr.* 483-485). Despite Hippolytus' efforts to live as Horace suggested, he is unable to escape his tragic end. Thus, Hippolytus represents a failure to apply Horace's advice to his own life. In the Seneca chapter, Philosophy attempted to move the prisoner away from association with Hippolytus. In that chapter, my argument was that she held Hercules out as a different tragic exemplum with whom the prisoner could identify. If one follows my reading of this allusion, then we see a similar strategy; Philosophy pushes the prisoner away from identifying with Hippolytus. However, rather than holding Hercules out as an alternative, in this case I see Philosophy utilising Horace's *Odes* as a counter, which checks the tragic identification. In this way, through a multiple reference / window allusion, Horace's moralizing establishes a contrast with the tragic perversion of his imagery in the case of Hippolytus' suffering.

The broader context of ode 2.16 also returns to the motif of first-person poetry (here lyric, not elegiac poetry) having an exceptional impact. In the cluster united by *maestus modus* with *flebilis* or *flebilis modus*, Orpheus' poetry of lament could be understood as separate from his mortal suffering and in this way its effect was not presented in a purely negative light.

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[28] Henry and Henry (1966, 236).

Indeed, when Horace counselled Valgius to stop using elegiacs, he did not tell his friend to give up all poetry, but rather to turn to new topics in continuing his literary pursuits. In ode 2.16, too, Horace's moralizing implicates his lyric undertaking. Horace remarks on his addressee Grosphus' wealth (2.16.33-35), employing triple *te* (*te* 2.16.33, *tibi* 2.16.34 and *te* 2.16.35) to contrast Grosphus' way of life with his own, *mihi* (2.16.37).[29] Horace remarks: *…mihi parva rura et* / *spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae* / *Parca non mendax dedit et malignum* / *spernere vulgus* "to me the Thrifty One that does not belie her name has given a small estate, a slight puff of inspiration from the Graeco-Roman Muse, and a scorn for the resentful mob" (*Odes* 2.16.37-40). Of course, Horace cannot have the same impact as Orpheus with his poetry. Nevertheless, he depicts the ways in which his special literary talent elevates him from the common man.

I would like to end this section by returning to my earlier analysis of 1m.7 in the Vergil chapter. For clarity, I shall quote 1m.7 in full.

> ***nubibus atris***
> ***condita*** *nullum*
> *fundere possunt*
> ***sidera*** *lumen.*
> *Si mare volvens*
> *turbidus Auster*
> *misceat aestum,*
> *vitrea dudum*
> *parque serenis*
> *unda diebus*
> *mox resoluto*
> *sordida caeno*
> *visibus obstat,*
> *quique vagatur*
> *montibus altis*
> *defluus amnis*
> *saepe resistit*
> *rupe soluti*
> ***obice saxi****.*
> *Tu quoque si vis*
> *lumine claro*

[29] Harrison (2017, 195).

cernere verum,
tramite recto
carpere callem,
gaudia pelle,
pelle timorem
spemque fugato
nec dolor adsit.
Nubila mens est
vinctaque frenis
haec ubi regnant.

When black clouds envelop
stars which shone bright,
they can no longer
pour forth their light.

If the stormy south wind,
assaulting the sea,
stirs up the salt-surge,
the waves that lay free
and were glassy, encalmed
as unclouded days,
are fouled with dredged mud
and opaque to our gaze.

Rocks torn from the high crags
oft stem a stream's force,
as it pours down the mountains
in wandering course.

Your case is like these.
If you wish to behold
the truth in clear light,
and to take the straight road,
forgo empty joys,
dismiss every fear,
renounce idle hope,
let grief come not near.

The mind is befogged,
imprisoned in chains,
when emotions like these
wield monarchical reins.

(*Cons.* 1m.7)

My argument is that 1m.7.1-4 contains an allusion to *Odes* 2.16.1-4 and *Phaedr.* 671-677, while 1m.7.19 contains an allusion to the *Georgics*. The context of the *Georgics* is Cyrene

explaining Proteus' dwelling: *...est specus ingens / exesi latere in montis, quo plurima vento / cogitur inque sinus scindit sese unda reductos, / deprensis olim statio tutissima nautis; / intus se vasti Proteus tegit* ***obice saxi*** "there is a vast cavern, hollowed in a mountain's side, wither many a wave is driven by the wind, then separates into receding inlets—at times a haven most sure for storm-caught mariners. Within, Proteus shelters himself with the barrier of a huge rock" (*G.* 4.418-422). I see the allusion showing Horace's moralizing overcoming Seneca's Hippolytus. Likewise, I read the allusion to the Aristaeus epyllion as Philosophy overcoming Proteus' knowledge. In turn, I would like to read these allusions together, arguing that Philosophy refers to several instances in which men have sought aid; Hippolytus, a sailor, and Aristaeus. As we are only in Book 1, Philosophy has not yet applied her cure to the prisoner. Thus, I think we could see a contrast between these images of distress and the consolation which Philosophy plans to enact. Specifically, although *Phaedra*, the *Odes*, and the *Georgics* represent a wide range of worldviews, Philosophy could be implicitly setting her monotheistic consolation against the tragic world, Horace's moralizing, and Vergil's pessimism. At the same time, I recognise that such a reading runs the risk of over-analysing the poem.

4) Conclusions: Multiple Reference: Seneca and Horace

In this section, I have analysed three instances of multiple reference / window allusion. To conclude, I would like to argue for the bidirectional reading of Seneca's reworking which I mentioned at the start of this section. Specifically, seeing the ways in which Seneca reworks *Odes* 2.9 and 2.16 allows us to read the *Odes* within the *Consolatio* differently. One similarity of these instances of multiple reference is that both tragic figures implicated (Orpheus in *Hercules Oetaeus*, Hippolytus in *Phaedra*) represent a perversion of Horace's moralizing advice in the given ode. Orpheus continues to utter elegiac-style lament despite Horace's recommendation to Valgius in *Odes* 2.9 to move to a new metre. Similarly,

Hippolytus' circumstances make it impossible to live up to Horace's advice in ode 2.16. In this way, Horace provides a moral code for the prisoner against which the Senecan tragic figures fail.

Furthermore, both phrases draw readers to a major moment of action in their respective tragic settings. The chorus delivers their song about Orpheus because they see Hercules, formerly supremely strong, physically break down; this is the catalyst for his apotheosis. Likewise, in the allusion to *Phaedra*, the phrase brought us to Hippolytus' reaction to Phaedra's declaration of love, the crucial conflict of the drama. Through allusions to such central moments of the tragedies, there is a contrast between some of the most dramatic and memorable moments from each plot compared with some of the most moralizing, sober, and balanced advice in the *Odes*. At the same time, the authorial-Boethius does not allude to odes which are exclusively moralizing in their content. While there is a clear moral statement in *Odes* 2.9 and 2.16, neither the prisoner nor Philosophy allude to, for example, ode 2.10, in which the focus is the golden mean, an overtly moralizing topic. Instead, the authorial-Boethius refers to moralizing moments within odes that are not exclusively 'philosophical'. By isolating moralizing phrases in this way, the process of allusion is subtler and highly artistic. As a result, the authorial-Boethius could be depicting Horace and his moralizing as a counterpoint to Seneca's tragic figures at crucial junctures. Thus, through the device of multiple reference, Horace's moral code is affirmed as an aspiration for the prisoner and can be seen to overcome Seneca's tragic way of depicting the world.

3. Single Reference: Boethius and Horace

In this section I shall explore two phrases within the *Consolatio* which could point to Horace's *Odes*. In both cases, there is a single reference, or specific allusion, to Horace, unlike the window allusions of the previous section. In those previous allusions, I saw Horace's moralizing outlook overcome Seneca's tragic perspective. By contrast, through

these specific allusions Philosophy attempts to improve upon Horace's moralizing. In both examples, Philosophy underscores the similarities between Horace's and the prisoner's views. At the same time, she demonstrates that her worldview provides a better source of consolation than Horace's advice. In this way, her monotheistic beliefs surpass the insights which Horace's *Odes* could offer to the prisoner while at once affirming Horace's moralising outlook as aspirational.

1) The Highest and Lowest Change Places

At *Consolatio* 2.2 Philosophy employs the technique of prosopopoeia.[30] She speaks to the prisoner in the guise of Fortune in order to debate his reaction to his downturn in fate more directly and emphatically.[31] Through this guise, Philosophy tells the prisoner that it is Fortune's nature to shift. She says: *haec nostra vis est, hunc continuum ludum ludimus: rotam volubili orbe versamus,* ***infima summis****,* ***summa infimis mutare*** *gaudemus*, "this power that I wield comes naturally to me; this is my perennial sport. I turn my wheel on its whirling course and take delight in switching the base to the summit, and the summit to the base" (*Cons.* 2.2.9). Philosophy tries to convince the prisoner that Fortune must change and thus he should not be surprised that his high position has given way; when he reached such prosperity, he could only expect for his luck to shift, as Fortune's wheel always rotates.[32] As Philosophy clarifies, the prisoner should not find fault with Fortuna; rather, he should recognise that she exists in the One's/God's universe. Thus, even though his circumstances

[30] See also the Lucretius chapter for the suggestion that Philosophy's prosopopoeia alludes to *DRN* 5.222-225.
[31] Blankfield (2022, 248) notes that this technique can be traced to the Aristotelian sense of character as a means of persuasion. Refini (2023, 32) points to the influence of Demetrius' conception of prosopopoeia's lively, forceful, and dramatic element at *De elocutione* 266.
[32] While this is a philosophical commonplace as Gruber (2006, 180-181) notes, the precise way in which it is articulated could make us connect Horace and Boethius.

have shifted, from the view of Providence, nothing is disordered.[33] We see a similar emphasis upon one's perspective shifting in *Odes* 1.34, where overlapping diction appears.

Ode 1.34 does not contain an addressee but rather recounts one of Horace's supposed personal experiences.[34] The lack of addressee could make a connection to the *Consolatio* stronger, as the account is similar to the prisoner's internal dialogue. Through the ode, Horace comes to terms with a contradiction in his beliefs. He suggests that he had been so engrossed in philosophical explanations of the universe that he had not adequately worshipped the gods, *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens* / *insanientis dum sapientiae* / *consultus erro…* "I was a stingy and infrequent worshipper of the gods all the time that I went astray, expert that I was in a mad philosophy…" (*Odes* 1.34.1-3). From this introduction, Horace establishes an opposition between philosophy and belief in the gods. While Horace was devoted to philosophical explanations of the universe, lightning appearing in a clear sky prompted him to question this view. Horace takes the natural phenomenon as an indication of Jupiter's power: *…namque Diespiter,* / *igni corusco nubila dividens* / *plerumque, per purum tonantis* / *egit equos volucremque currum…* "for Jupiter, who normally splits the clouds with his flashing fire, drove his thundering horses and flying chariot across a clear sky…" (1.34.5-8).[35] While philosophers might have described the same phenomenon as just an unusual weather sign, Horace equates the appearance of lightning in a clear sky with Jupiter, thus underscoring a conception of the universe which privileges divine control. Indeed, Horace even envisions Jupiter driving his chariot as it thunders. Through this explanation of the experience, he questions philosophical justifications of the same phenomenon. After

[33] As Dirado (2024, 152) has recently stated.
[34] Barber (2012, 508) argues that 1.34 and 1.35 should be read as one poem.
[35] As Tarrant (2007, 68) notes, Horace implicates Epicureanism specifically in the ode. Indeed, in a proof about the nature of thunder, Lucretius asks *denique cur numquam caelo iacit undique puro / Iuppiter in terras fulmen sonitusque profundit?* "why again does Jupiter never cast a bold on the earth and sound his thunder, when the heaven is clear on all sides?" (*DRN* 6.400-401), which Horace could be responding to directly.

recounting this event, Horace employs a familiar moralizing tone, encapsulating a lesson of his experience, …*valet* ***ima summis mutare*** *et insignem attenuat deus* "…god has the power to cause the highest and the lowest to change places" (*Odes* 1.34.12-13). Horace's renewed belief in the gods means that he attributes the shift from high to low circumstances to god/Jupiter (*Diespater*, 1.34.5 and *deus*, 1.34.13), not Fortune.[36] By attributing this agency to a god, Horace underscores his faith in a polytheistic pantheon and rejects a purely philosophical explanation of the universe.[37]

In addition to the dictional overlaps with Boethius (*summus*, *mutare,* with *ima* replaced by its synonym *infima*), I see a further similarity in the next stanza of ode 1.34. As he continues to discuss Jupiter's power and the unpredictability of life, Horace says, …*hinc apicem rapax* / ***Fortuna*** *cum stridore acuto* / *sustulit, hic posuisse* ***gaudet*** "…with a piercing scream rapacious Fortune snatches the crown from one head and likes to place it on another" (*Odes* 1.34.14-16). Horace's employment of the verb *gaudere* with the image of Fortune changing one's circumstances can be connected to Philosophy's statement, in the guise of Fortune, ***infima summis summa infimis mutare gaudemus*** "I take delight in switching the base to the summit, and the summit to the base" (*Cons.* 2.2.9). Through the same verb *gaudere*, Philosophy and Horace characterize Fortune is a similar way; she enjoys changing the individual human condition. In this case, Philosophy alludes to Horace because he models the same type of shift in beliefs which she would like to effect in the prisoner. She too encourages the prisoner to realise Fortuna's limitations and to believe in divine control over the universe. However, where Horace's god is part of a polytheistic world, Philosophy believes in a monotheistic God/the One. This God's beneficence could be seen as an

[36] As Reckford (1966, 528) suggests, it is unusual for Horace to appeal to the natural world in a way which does not allay anxiety, as is common in other contexts, such as *Odes* 1.7 or 1.9 and epode 13.
[37] Though, as Nisbet and Hubbard (1970, 377) and Griffin (1997, 66) note, the tone of the poem is not entirely serious. Even so, the authorial-Boethius could have read it as such and thus, even if Horace was delivering content with a wink, when the authorial-Boethius receives it, he makes a transformation.

improvement upon Jupiter. Moreover, Philosophy can be seen to defeat Horace's moral code with her own monotheism when she reconciles the two approaches—philosophy and faith—which Horace separated within the ode. Unlike Horace, Philosophy has no trouble leading the prisoner toward faith in a monotheistic God by means of philosophical teachings. In this way, Philosophy can undo Horace's characterisation of the intellectual discipline she embodies as *insaniens* (1.34.2).[38] Thus, while Horace's moralizing presents a similar sentiment to Philosophy's explanation for why one's fortunes shift, she shows that her own consolation is more helpful to the prisoner than Horace's moralising.

2) Power Itself Falls

In this final allusion, I again argue that Philosophy paints Horace's moral code as an aspiration for the prisoner before improving upon that code with her monotheistic beliefs. The allusion occurs at *Consolatio* 3.5, as Philosophy denies the notion that association with kings and their influence can make one truly powerful. Since power cannot be absolute (3.5.4) nor dispel cares (3.5.7), Philosophy argues, it must not be powerful in itself but only seem to be so. Similarly, she says, there are historical examples of men who, once they had come close to power, tried to get rid of it, but were unable to do so, again exemplifying the dangers of power. Specifically, Seneca (3.5.10) and Papinian (3.5.10) were unable to renounce their respective associations with power and faced death because of mere proximity to it.[39] Philosophy says, *atqui uterque potentiae suae renuntiare voluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam suas tradere Neroni seque in otium conferre conatus est; sed dum* ***ruituros moles ipsa*** *trahit, neuter quod voluit effecit* "yet both wanted to renounce their power; Seneca even

[38] As Mayer (2012, 204) notes, an oxymoron, as *sapientia* is the Roman name for philosophy, and Lucretius had appropriated it for Epicureanism specifically.
[39] I have noted elements of Seneca's biography which Boethius could have identified with in my Seneca chapter. Papinian is another distinguished intellectual who was a victim of a tyrannical ruler in the figure of the emperor Caracalla.

tried to hand his wealth over to Nero and to retire. But while they stood on the brink and their very greatness drew them down, neither achieved what he wished" (*Cons.* 3.5.11). Philosophy paints a futile picture of men suffering against the force of great rulers. Even when Seneca and Papinian realized that association with tyrannical figures would be detrimental to them, they were unable to rid themselves of the association and were condemned to death. Through these examples, Philosophy argues that power is truly an evil and that mere association with influential figures is destined to drag one down. She may also be hinting that the prisoner will after death become part of the list of those who had nobly struggled against great power.

Again, the language which Philosophy employs to convey her message points back to Horace. In this case, I see an allusion to *Odes* 3.4, which presents a vision of power, specifically of force.[40] After an introduction (3.4.1-8), and description of the special relationship he has enjoyed with the Muses since childhood (3.4.9-36), Horace turns to a description of Augustus' relationship with the Muses (3.4.37-64).[41] Within this section Horace draws upon the Gigantomachy to illustrate his belief that effective leadership combines force and *consilium*. In concluding the story of the Gigantomachy, Horace says *vis consili expers* ***mole ruit sua*** "power without good sense comes crashing down under its own weight" (*Odes* 3.4.65). Lines 65-68 are comprised of three *sententiae*, and thus firmly place readers in the moralizing sphere. Indeed, the idea of power dragging someone down is well attested in Latin literature.[42] However, the context of ode 3.4 closely relates to Philosophy's argument. In the first *sententia*, Horace affirms that power, when directed appropriately, can be efficacious and wielded well. As Horace argues, the gods of Olympus possessed a

[40] Miller (1998, 546) and D'Angour (2012, 58) note how ode 3.4 alludes to Pindaric odes and exemplifies their structure.
[41] Hornsby (1962, 101) argues that through Augustus, the Muses will also refresh the state and its citizens.
[42] Gruber (2006, 257-258).

combination of force and counsel in their battle against the giants, while the giants only employed force, and thus were doomed to failure.[43] Horace's view of power affirms Philosophy's perspective; evil rulers like Nero and Caracalla wielded power poorly, whereas a beneficent God (in Horace's case, gods) can rule well.

Moreover, the broader context of ode 3.4 stresses Horace's poetic calling and describes how it can confer magical protection upon him, again emphasising the power of certain types and uses of first-person poetry. As a favourite of the Muses, he was granted access to their dwellings (3.4.6-8) and was kept from harm by their intervention while only a child (3.4.9-20). His relationship with the Muses also extends into adulthood and far-flung localities (3.4.21-36). This special association affirms Horace's poetic calling as a means by which he can achieve singular treatment and proximity to divinity. In addition to the association of the Muses with Horace, he also envisions their close ties to Augustus (3.4.37-64). One striking example is the following, *vos* (sc. *Camenae*) *lene consilium et datis et dato / gaudetis almae* "you in your kindness give him gentle advice, and are glad to have given it" (*Odes* 3.4.41-42). Thus, the poetic muses are not confined to aiding poets like Horace but are also participants in politics. Indeed, they provide some of the *consilium* with which Augustus balances force to rule well. In this way, the Muses comprise an integral part of a good ruler's actions. Philosophy's view of divinity conflicts with Horace's at this point; she believes that only the monotheistic God possesses the type of power which Horace attributes to the muses and to the Olympian pantheon. As a result, we can again see Philosophy's monotheistic God defeating the muses and Olympians. At the same time, Horace's belief in using power wisely affirms Philosophy's view that unchecked power is always corrupting. Thus, as in the prior

[43] Buchheit (1966, 98-99) notes that even before Augustus, Jupiter's victory over the giants was connected with Rome's victories, and thus Horace is enlarging the tradition by implicating Augustus directly.

example, I read Horace's moralizing outlook as an aspiration for the prisoner, while Philosophy's advice overcomes that which the *Odes* can offer to the prisoner.

4. Conclusions

Through the two sections of this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that the authorial-Boethius employs two distinctive strategies in alluding to the *Odes* of Horace: multiple reference, involving the *Consolatio*, Senecan tragedy and the *Odes*, and single reference / specific allusion between the *Consolatio* and *Odes* alone. There is a strong moralizing element in each of the odes to which the authorial-Boethius alludes. The different lessons can be summarised as follows: ode 2.9: do not grieve endlessly; ode 2.16: aim for a simple life; ode 1.34: sometimes religious faith is advisable; ode 3.4: only use force coupled with *consilium*. Horace's *Odes* express philosophical content in the elevated poetic form. Indeed, the variety of metres which the lyricist employs could have been an inspiration for the authorial-Boethius's prosimetric work.

Of the authors examined thus far in this thesis, Horace undergoes the least intrusive correction from Philosophy. Indeed, I see her modifying elements of the *Odes* only mildly without shifting the overall message of a given ode. This is different from the ways in which Philosophy employed Lucretius' diction but corrected it to lead the prisoner to the opposite conclusion. Fundamentally, Philosophy cannot endorse Horace's belief in a polytheistic world. However, Horace has attractions: his worldview is broadly philosophical and artfully expressed in a variety of metres, and he is the first of the poets examined who employs a consistent first-person perspective. Through this combination of factors, I read the prisoner and Philosophy turning to the *Odes* as a source of sound advice which can be modified to be useful from the perspective of monotheistic beliefs.

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter)

Odes	***Consolatio***
2.9.9	1m.1.2
2.9.9	3m.12.5-7
2.16.1-4	1m.7.1-4
1.34.12-16	2.2.9
3.4.65	3.5.11

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in the *Consolatio*)

Odes	***Consolatio***
2.9.9	1m.1.2
2.16.1-4	1m.7.1-4
1.34.12-16	2.2.9
3.4.65	3.5.11
2.9.9	3m.12.5-7

Allusions to Ovid: *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*

1. Introduction

This chapter explores Boethius' reception of Ovid's exilic poetry.[1] As noted in the prior chapters, there is a biographical similarity between Boethius and some of the authors to whom he refers, and Ovid's life indeed provides a parallel trajectory to Boethius' own circumstances.[2] Ovid once enjoyed imperial favour and social prominence, but after his *carmen et error*, Augustus banished Ovid to Tomis. From exile Ovid writes poetry, especially the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*. This is not dissimilar from the way in which Boethius received the favour of king Theodoric before his catastrophic fall from grace, imprisonment in Pavia, and composition of the *Consolatio* while awaiting death. Of course, the experiences of exile and imprisonment are distinct. Nevertheless, they share major attributes, such as deprivation of liberty, lack of freedom of movement, and absence from one's home, making a comparison between Ovid's and Boethius' respective later years plausible.[3] Boethius and Ovid both use poetry to bemoan and cope with their respective exiled positions, and both died without being restored to their respective former statuses.

As briefly mentioned in the prior chapter on Horace, Ovid's influence upon the *Consolatio* has long been noted. At the same time, Ovid's influence has also been underappreciated, as most scholars have confined his impact to the first poem, 1m.1.

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[1] I shall not discuss the *Ibis*, though Gruber (2006, 491) notes a single connection between *Ibis* 391ff and 4m.7.25, when both works mention Hercules' slaying of the giant Antaeus. There is no shared diction aside from the giant's name, and indeed Gruber cites Pindar *Isthmian* 3.70ff as another mention of the giant, making a specific allusion to this exilic composition unlikely. Text and translation are taken from Wheeler's Loeb edition revised by Goold (1924).

[2] Crabbe (1981a, 242) also notes this. In previous sections I suggest that Lucan and Seneca's respective deaths after the Pisonian conspiracy resemble Boethius' fall from favour and death sentence. In contrast, Vergil and Horace remained close to the seat of power through the ends of their respective lives. Thus, I suggest that the prisoner could see the statuses of these authors as aspirational.

[3] Claassen (1999, 244) links Ovid and Boethius as exiles. Specifically, she identifies Boethius' state as one of inner exile, which furthers the comparison with Ovid's status.

Specifically, many have noted that Boethius' ***flebilis*** *heu maestos cogor inire* ***modos***, *"*I must now with grief embark on sombre lays" (*Cons.* 1m.1.2) seems to look to Ovid's statement, ***flebilis*** *ut noster status est, ita flebile carmen,* / *materiae scripto conveniente suae* "mournful is my state, mournful therefore is my song, for the work is suited to its theme" (*Tristia* 5.1.5-6).[4] As I noted in the previous chapter on Horace, the prisoner describes his state as *flebilis* at 1m.1.2, and he composes *maestos modos* as he faces his death sentence. Similarly, Ovid describes his exiled state (*status*) as *flebilis* as well as his *carmen* from exile as *flebilis*. Both Ovid and the prisoner write in elegiac couplets and make the link between the traditionally tearful nature of elegy and their own respective mournful lives apparent. However, an example of multiple reference, which also implicates Horace, *Odes* 2.9.9, complicates the picture. While I agree with prior scholars that there is an allusion to Ovid's *Tristia* at 1m.1.2, I have built upon this reading by noting the resonances which *Odes* 2.9 draws out. Beyond this particular moment, I also see Ovidian influence in several subsequent *Consolatio* contexts. I divide these allusions into two sections: those drawn from the *Tristia* (three in total) and one from the *Epistulae ex Ponto*. In addition, Ovid exerts an underappreciated structural influence upon the *Consolatio*, which is only visible if we read the two poems in elegiac couplets in the *Consolatio* together: 1m.1 and 5m.1. I shall begin with allusions to the *Tristia* before moving to the allusions to the *Epistulae ex Ponto*.

2. Allusions to Ovid's *Tristia*

1) *Consolatio* 1m.1.2, 5m.1 and *Tristia* 5.1.5

As just mentioned, when the prisoner bewails that he is forced to write in elegiac couplets, ***flebilis*** *heu maestos cogor inire modos* "I must now with grief embark on sombre lays" (1m.1.2), he seems to look back to Ovid's statement, ***flebilis*** *ut noster status est, ita*

[4] Crabbe (1981a, 244-249), Curley (1987, 254), O'Daly (1991, 38-39), Claassen (1999, 244-251), Claassen (2007, 6-7), Gruber (2006, 55), Fielding (2017, 129), Most (2000, 354).

flebile carmen "tearful is my state, tearful therefore is my song" (*Trist*. 5.1.5). The repetition of *flebilis* in emphatic first position in a poem in elegiac couplets demonstrates the prisoner's Ovidian stance. Through this allusion, the prisoner implicitly states his intention to follow Ovid and seek comfort for distress in elegiac composition. However, immediately after the prisoner delivers this poem, Philosophy appears to him and dismisses the elegiac Muses standing at his bedside.[5] Given their dismissal, the prevailing interpretation of the scene is as follows: adducing Ovid as a model, the prisoner tries to use elegy as a cure. Philosophy argues against this use, including by replacing the elegiac muses with her own muses, thus rejecting Ovid and the elegiac mode as effective remedies for the prisoner-Boethius.[6]

I shall interrogate this reading with three main points. The first is that, as noted in the previous chapter, we can see an allusion to Horace, and perhaps also to Seneca, within 1m.1.1-2. A multiple reference thus complicates the way we interpret an allusion to Ovid. The second point is that Philosophy employs the elegiac metre at 5m.1, the first poetic section of the final book. It is quite surprising that Philosophy turns to elegy after her dismissal of the elegiac Muses at the beginning of the *Consolatio*. Clearly, the elegiac Muses have not been completely excluded. Furthermore, if 5m.1 has received any comment at all, it has typically been to dismiss a connection with 1m.1 given the affinities of 5m.1 to epigram.[7] In contrast, we can only appreciate Ovid's influence in the *Consolatio* fully if we analyse these poems, the only ones in elegiac couplets, as a pair. The third point is that *Tristia* 5.1.5 does not

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[5] *sed abite potius, Sirenes usque in exitium dulces, meisque eum Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite!* "off with you, you Sirens! Your charms entice men to their destruction. Leave him to be tended and healed with the help of the Muses that attend me" (*Cons.* 1.1.11).
[6] For this view, see, for example, O'Daly (1991, 38), Gruber (2006, 55) and Fielding (2017, 128-132).
[7] Claassen (1991, 38-39) mistakenly stated that 1m.1 was the only *Consolatio* poem in elegiac couplets, but later corrected this view (1999, 244-251) and subsequently argued that the second use of elegiacs signals book 5 as a new beginning of the *Consolatio* (2007, 29 n. 32). Gruber (2006, 395) also calls 5m.1 and 1m.1 counterparts, though he does not explore their connections further. O'Daly (1991, 39) agrees with Schieble (1972, 157 n. 2) that elegy is not literally absent from the rest of the *Consolatio* given the presence of 5m.1 but argues that 5m.1 shares features with epigram and thus is not parallel to 1m.1 (174 n. 229). Blackwood (2015, 85ff) is the only scholar who has treated, in depth, 1m.1 and 5m.1 as a pair. I build upon his crucial analysis in what follows.

present the elegiac metre as exclusively devoted to mourning and reading it as such obscures its ability to provide consolation. Indeed, in the two allusions to the *Tristia* which occur after 1m.1, I also see elegy as a powerful tool which is not exclusively devoted to mourning.

I shall begin with the first point, that 1m.1.2 contains a multiple reference. As I previously argued, the proximity of *flebilis* to *maestus…modus* in 1m.1.2 points to Horace's employment of the phrase *flebilis…modus* in *Odes* 2.9, where the lyric poet uses this same phrase to divert his friend and addressee Valgius away from excessive grief as a response to a shift in fortune: *tu semper urges* ***flebilibus modis*** "you, however, never cease…with tearful verses" (*Odes* 2.9.9).[8] In the Horace chapter, we also saw a window allusion to add to *Odes* 2.9, to Seneca's *Hercules Oetaeus*, *tunc solamina cantibus* / *quaerens* ***flebilibus modis*** / *haec Orpheus cecinit Getis* "then looking for solace in song Orpheus in tearful measures sang these themes to the Getae" (*Herc.O.* 1090-1092). In the previous chapter I suggested that the mention of the Getic shore—Ovid's place of exile—could bring the exiled poet to mind indirectly. The opening couplet would bring all of Horace, Seneca, and/or Ovid to mind. While I have analysed Horace and Seneca's use of *flebilis…modus* in the previous chapter, in this section I shall shift my focus to the ways in which *flebilis* with *maestus…modus* recalls Ovid's *flebilis status* / *flebilis carmen*. Before I do so, it is worth reiterating that there is a distinction between the prisoner's use of *flebilis* in close proximity to *maestus…modus*, Horace's and Seneca's uses of *flebilis…modus*, and Ovid's use of *flebilis…status/flebile…carmen*. Recognizing that these examples are similar phrases, it is possible that the authorial-Boethius sets different views of elegy, expressed in similar language, against each other. On the one hand, Horace advises turning to a new metre, away from the *flebilis…modus*, whereas Ovid affirms that a *flebilis…status* is appropriate to vent within a

[8] Alfonsi (1942, 1) and Gibson (1980, 248) mention that this phrase is employed by Horace and Ovid, but do not offer analysis of what such an overlap could signify.

flebile…carmen and should not be entirely dismissed. Thus, while I agree with scholars that the prisoner presents himself in the guise of Ovid in 1m.1, it is equally important in my view that this self-presentation is paired with a counter-narrative drawn from Horace (which implicates *Hercules Oetaeus* as well). Through this multiple reference, I see the authorial-Boethius balancing two different views of elegy (positive and negative) as expressed by Horace and Ovid, respectively. Thus, prior analysis, which has seen an allusion to the *Tristia* while not including an allusion to the *Odes,* has obscured the balancing of perspectives which a multiple reference could reveal. If he is in the background, then Horace counters Ovid's devotion to elegy. As a result, the prisoner-Boethius could be debating the best application of the elegiac couplet: should he follow Horace's advice or Ovid's advice? To me, then, when Philosophy dismisses the elegiac muses, we do not have to see the total dismissal of Ovid. Rather, we can see the continuation of the debate over how to use elegy effectively.

Building upon this reading, I shall now turn to my second point, which is that 5m.1, Philosophy's use of the elegiac metre, should be read with 1m.1 in forming our view of the metre within the *Consolatio.* The first poem of book 1, and the first poem of book 5 (already an emphatic placement in the opening and closing books of the *Consolatio*) are, as already noted, the only two poems written in elegiac couplets. In addition, 1m.1 and 5m.1 are the only book-opening poems in the same metre, with 2m.1, 3m.1, and 4m.1 all in different *metra*.[9] Another unique connection is as follows: elegiac couplets is the only metre which Philosophy and the prisoner voice one time each. Other *metra* appear more than once in the *Consolatio*, but only elegiac couplets appear only twice and once voiced by the prisoner and once voiced by Philosophy.[10] Thus, aside from their emphatic placements as opening poems,

[9] Scazons (2m.1), meiuric dactylic tetrameter (3m.1), and dactylic tetrameter alternating with iambic dimeter (4m.1).
[10] Voiced by the prisoner: 1m.3 (dactylic hexameter alternating with dactylic tetrameter), 1m.5 and 5m.3 (anapestic dimeter). Voiced by Philosophy: 1m.6, 2m.8, 3m.12, 4m.3, 5m.4 (glyconic), 2m.5 and 3m.5 (anapestic dimeter catalectic), 2m.1 and 3m.11 (scazons).

and their shared metre, the way in which they are voiced further sets them apart; I interpret 1m.1 and 5m.1 as responding to each other in a unique, dialogic way among *Consolatio* poems. Thus, while I agree with previous scholars that 5m.1 clearly has affinities to epigram, I do not believe that these affinities negate a meaningful association between 1m.1 and 5m.1.

On the contrary, 1m.1 and 5m.1 represent two opposed reactions to apparently chance circumstances.[11] In 1m.1 the prisoner presents an emotion-based reaction vented through elegy and in 5m.1, Philosophy presents a faith-based reaction voiced in the same elegiacs but with a monotheistic and providential viewpoint. In this way, 1m.1 and 5m.1 are representative of the two major traditions which the authorial-Boethius draws upon in composing the *Consolatio*: classical consolatory poetry (exemplified by the multiple reference to Ovid's Horace's, and Seneca's respective poetic projects) and providential monotheism (exemplified by Philosophy's worldview, indebted to Christian and Neoplatonic viewpoints). Thus, comparing 1m.1 and 5m.1 allows us to assess not only how Philosophy and the prisoner engage, but also to see how the two disparate traditions these characters draw from conflict in offering advice to the prisoner in his time of need.

Now to compare 1m.1 and 5m.1. In 1m.1, the prisoner conceives of his fall from grace as a chance circumstance. Specifically, he blames fortune for this shift:

> *dum levibus male fida bonis fortuna faveret,*
> *paene caput tristis merserat hora meum:*
> *nunc quia fallacem mutavit nubila vultum*
> *protrahit ingratas impia vita moras.*
>
> while fickle Fortune transient goods did show,
> one bitter hour could almost bring me low;
> now she's put on her clouded, treacherous gaze,
> my impious life spins out unwanted days

[11] Most (2000, 354) briefly remarks that through the elegiac metre's reintroduction at 5m.1, the authorial-Boethius saves this type of poem philosophically. I take this reading further through the narratological importance I place upon Philosophy voicing the second appearance of elegiacs. Specifically, Philosophy and the prisoner use the same metre in different ways, perhaps indicating that they agree on its efficacy, just in different forms.

(*Cons.* 1m.1.17-20)

The prisoner admits that he was wrong to think his good fortune would last forever. Now that Fortune has abandoned him, he realises how transient his happiness was. Similarly, Philosophy deals with what appears to be a chance circumstance in 5m.1. However, in contrast to the prisoner, her response is premised upon a monotheistic and providential worldview. The central theme of her poem is that events which seem to be subject to chance actually occur in accordance with God's will. Philosophy uses the example of rivers to demonstrate this belief. Even though the Tigris and Euphrates might seem to flow in random courses, God has established laws governing their routes:

> *Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resolvunt*
> *et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.*
> *si coeant cursumque iterum revocentur in unum,*
> *confluat alterni quod trahit unda vadi,*
> *convenient puppes et vulsi flumine trunci*
> *mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos;*
>
> Tigris, Euphrates rise from single source.
> They then diverge; each takes its separate course.
> Should they then merge again, united flow,
> should what their waters bear, together go,
> then ships would meet, uprooted trunks combine,
> their mingled streams on random routes entwine.

(*Cons.* 5m.1.3-8)

Philosophy employs the natural exemplum of the Tigris and Euphrates to demonstrate her point. If God had not determined where the Tigris and Euphrates would flow, their random flowing together would cause chaos. Thus, even if it seems like that mere chance prevents their flowing together, chance itself is ruled by causation and thus is under God's control. She makes the connection between apparent chance occurrences and God's control over the universe explicit in the final lines of 5m.1:

> *quos tamen ipsa vagos terrae declivia casus*

> *gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit.*
> *sic quae permissis fluitare videtur habenis*
> *fors patitur frenos ipsaque lege meat.*
>
> yet such chance wanderings both sloping land
> and downward course of gliding stream command;
> so chance, which seems to float on slackened reins,
> endures the bridle; law its course constrains.
>
> (*Cons.* 5m.1.9-12)

According to Philosophy, even if one cannot understand how chance events are perforce under God's control, the only response is to believe that they are ordered by him. This is a central element of her worldview and a point which she has been inducing the prisoner to believe throughout the preceding books. Understood in this way, then, 5m.1 both describes and models the way in which one should respond to the same type of chance circumstance which the prisoner reckoned with in 1m.1, but from an opposed angle.[12] Rather than bemoaning his shift in fortune, the prisoner-Boethius should realize that even those events are controlled by God and base his reaction on this conception of the world. Although admittedly an *argumentum ex silentio*, it would not therefore be unexpected for Philosophy to so reject the prisoner's earlier Ovidian persona that she does not allude to that poet in her poem in elegiac couplets.

Additionally, Blackwood notes that *modos* appears at 1m.1.2 and 5m.1.8 as the final word of pentameter lines, which further encourages one to see an especially close connection between these poems.[13] I would like to add to Blackwood's reading by comparing three contexts. First, *flebilis heu maestos cogor inire* ***modos*** (*Cons.* 1m.1.2), then *mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda* ***modos*** (*Cons.* 5m.1.8), and finally *flebilis ut noster status est, ita*

[12] Davisson (1983, 178) argues that by rejecting traditional elements of philosophical consolation, Ovid shows his mastery of the genre while emphasising his unique level of suffering. Fish (2004, 869) notes that Ovid employs poetry as a consolation despite recommending against this in the *Remedia Amoris*. This new strategy demonstrates Ovid's dire circumstances, and how he envisions poetry helping him to endure them.
[13] Blackwood (2015, 95).

flebile carmen (*Tristia* 5.1.5-6). If a reader noticed the repetition of *modos* in final position in the two *Consolatio* poems, it is also possible that he or she could be sensitive to a relation between *flebilis* and *fortuitos*. That is, where the prisoner expresses the tearfulness of a sad song, Philosophy employs the elegiac metre to show the prisoner that chance (things that seem to be *fortuitus*) does not properly exist under God's control. Of course, we must recognise that *flebilis* does not modify *modos*. Even so, the similarity in word form—an adjective beginning with *F*—could have been perceptible to a reader. Philosophy's message may also implicate the allusion to the *Tristia* in 1m.1.2, where Ovid says that his status and song will reflect each other. When evaluated from Philosophy's worldview, though, the *flebilis status* places too much emphasis upon apparent chance. Even a downturn in fortune occurs in a world overseen by God and thus is not really a chance occurrence. Put another way, without belief in a beneficent, monotheistic God such as the prisoner can access, Ovid cannot recognise his tearfulness as part of God's plan. In contrast, Philosophy urges the prisoner to realise that a *fortuitus modus*, a 'way/mode of chance' or a twist in his life, is ultimately part of God's intentions for his existence. Thus, to me, the differences between 1m.1 and 5m.1 speak to the fundamentally opposite worldviews which they express; the prisoner's mindset is too *flebilis*, or characteristically elegiac, for Philosophy, who encourages him to adjust this mistaken conception through her own belief system. Through this transformation, Philosophy's elegy lacks the term *flebilis* or any mournful language, turning the elegiac metre to philosophizing instead of lament.

I agree with prior analysis that 5m.1 has affinities to epigram. First and foremost, the elegiac metre and length of the poem are significant. 5m.1 is 12 lines, whereas 1m.1 is 22 lines. Thus, from length alone it is clear that 1m.1 cannot be easily classed as an epigram,

whereas 5m.1 can be.[14] Gruber also suggests that 5m.1 leads to a punchline in a characteristically epigrammatic way.[15] However, 1m.1 also builds to a epigram-style final punchline; the prisoner realizes that his footing (i.e. good fortune) was never as stable as he had imagined: *qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu* "he who fell, was not on a stable footing" (*Cons*. 1m.1.22).[16] The prisoner's 'step' is cut short in the final word of the line, much like the dactylic hexameter is cut short to form the pentameter. Furthermore, 5m.1 follows late antique conventions in its rhetorical rigidity and moralistic tone, which was in line with the scholastic application of the genre.[17] Thus, it is debatable how much Boethius had the classical character of epigram in mind while composing 5m.1. In my view, the best evidence for 5m.1's epigrammatic character is the argument regarding length. At the same time, this affinity does not preclude a comparison between 5m.1 and 1m.1 but rather reinforces the disparate sources from which Philosophy and the prisoner-Boethius seek to approach the same problem.

To come to the third point, the predominant reading of the Ovidian allusion in 1m.1 devalues elements within the exile poem itself which afford agency to Ovid, or to the prisoner in his stance. For instance, within the elegy, Ovid provides examples of times when venting emotion served a suffering individual:

> *"at poteras" inquis "melius mala ferre silendo,*
> *et tacitus casus dissimulare tuos,"*
> *exigis ut nulli gemitus tormenta sequantur,*
> *acceptoque gravi vulnere flere vetas?*
> *ipse Perilleo Phalaris permisit in aere*
> *edere mugitus et bovis ore queri.*
> *cum Priami lacrimis offensus non sit Achilles,*
> *tu fletus inhibes, durior hoste, meos?*
> *cum faceret Nioben orbam Latonia proles,*

[14] Of course, there is also a counter to this view, as Martial 9.59 and 9.61 have 22 lines, and 9.101 has 24.
[15] Gruber (2006, 373).
[16] In this case, translation is taken from Fielding (2017, 129), as Walsh's first-person translation does not clearly reflect the Latin in this instance.
[17] Mondin (2018, 581).

> *non tamen et siccas iussit habere genas.*
> *est aliquid, fatale malum per verba levare:*
>
> "but," you say, "you might better endure your sorrows by keeping silent, and in silence hide your misfortunes." Do you demand that no groans should ensue upon torture, and when a deep wound has been received, do you forbid weeping? Even Phalaris allowed Perillus within the bronze to utter bellows of torture through the mouth of the bull. When Priam's tears did not offend Achilles, do you, more cruel than an enemy, restrain me from weeping? Though Latona's children made Niobe childless, yet they did not bid her cheeks be dry. 'Tis something to lighten with words a fatal evil;
>
> (*Tristia* 5.1.49-59)

Ovid lists figures from the mythical past who lamented in the face of adversity. As the cap on the list, Ovid draws the following lesson, *est aliquid, fatale malum per verba levare:* "tis something to lighten with words a fatal evil;" (*Tristia* 5.1.59). Based upon this lesson, Ovid portrays elegiac poetry as a source of temporary comfort. While he is aware that his poems cannot remove his cares entirely, they do help to lighten them and allow him to better endure his exile. Indeed, Ovid even presents himself as akin to the mythical, heroic sufferers he lists. If even they, in their legendary circumstances, wept, then Ovid, only a man, should also be allowed to vent his grief. In this way, when Ovid states at 5.1.5ff that his elegiac metre suits his tearful fate, he presents poetry as an efficacious tool; it allows him to grieve and perhaps even feel heroic in doing do. After the list, Ovid continues:

> *strangulat inclusus dolor atque exaestuat intus,*
> *cogitur et vires multiplicare suas.*
> *da veniam potius, vel totos tolle libellos,*
> *si mihi quod prodest hoc tibi, lector, obest.*
>
> a suppressed sorrow chokes and seethes within, multiplying perforce its own strength. Indulge me rather, or else away with all my books, if that, reader, which helps me harms you.
>
> (*Tristia* 5.1.63-66)

Ovid will vent his emotional hurt, even at the expense of a wider audience. To me, this again speaks to the ability of his poetry as a tool to combat grief; venting one's emotional state

through the appropriate metre can have a positive effect. Thus, within the *Tristia* and at 1m.1 and 5m.1, I read the elegiac metre as suited to more than just lament. While 1m.1 dwells on the prisoner's shift in fortune, the allusion to *Tristia* 5.1 and *Odes* 2.9.9 shows the efficacy of venting emotional hurt within certain limits. Likewise, 5m.1 shows Philosophy contemplate issues of vital importance to the prisoner's healing in the metre. Due to these varied applications of elegy, 1m.1 and 5m.1 show the elegiac metre operating in the *Consolatio* in a more nuanced way than has been previously argued. Indeed, focusing upon the differences between 1m.1 and 5m.1 shows us that the elegiac metre can be used for elevated philosophical reasoning.

To conclude this section, I would like to return to the imagery of the Tigris and Euphrates flowing together in 5m.1. If, as I have suggested, we understand 1m.1 and 5m.1 as responding to each other, then we can see the separate courses of the Tigris and Euphrates mimicking the prisoner's and Philosophy's use of the same metre in two different ways or in two different 'rivers'. When understood from the human perspective, the Tigris and Euphrates seem to be separated randomly. Likewise, the prisoner and Philosophy seem to use the elegiac metre in two opposed ways in 1m.1 and 5m.1, respectively. However, when seen from the divine perspective, the apparent chance courses of the rivers are seen to be regulated. Likewise, though they may take different topics and perspectives, the prisoner and Philosophy employ the elegiac couplet as a tool to understand the world. The crucial difference between their respective usages, in my mind, is that Philosophy seems to expand upon the use of the metre in 1m.1, mostly devoted to lament, with 5m.1, devoted to philosophical reasoning. The prisoner, through an allusion to Ovid's *Tristia* and Horace's *Odes*, recognises the potency and danger of elegy in venting emotional turmoil. Reacting against elegy used only for lament, Philosophy turns the metre to philosophical contemplation. Through 1m.1, the prisoner expresses his complaints about his situation,

while Philosophy, through 5m.1, shifts the prisoner's perspective, encouraging him to see that philosophical contemplation on earth is the best avenue to move beyond this hurt. Unlike prior analysis, then, I do not believe that Philosophy totally rejects elegy, or even Ovid's use of it: her employment of elegiacs shows that she believes in their efficacy if they are not devoted exclusively to lament. If we see a structural significance between 1m.1 and 5m.1, then, we can better appreciate the ways in which Philosophy modifies Ovid's view of elegy without dismissing Ovid's chosen metre.

2) *Consolatio* 2.8.1 and *Tristia* 1.1.110

In the prologue piece of the *Tristia*, 1.1, Ovid imagines his poem travelling to Rome when he cannot. As in the previous example, this rich vision depicts elegiac poetry as much more than grieving verses. Ovid traces the imaginary journey of his book. He envisions it coming across some remaining supporters (1.1.27ff), passing by the emperor's home (1.1.69ff) and arriving at the bookshelves in Ovid's home (1.1.105ff), where it will find its "brothers" (*fratres*, 1.1.107) arranged in bookcases. Ovid draws a stark contrast between the works which he wrote besides the infamous *Ars Amatoria*, and those three scrolls containing it.

> *cetera turba palam titulos ostendet apertos,*
> *et sua **detecta** nomina **fronte geret**;*
> *tres procul obscura latitantes parte videbis,—*
> *sic quoque, quod nemo nescit, amare docent.*
>
> the rest of the band will display their titles openly, bearing their names on their exposed edges, but three at some distance will strive to hide themselves in a dark place, as you will notice—even so, as everybody knows, they teach how to love.
>
> (*Tristia* 1.1.109-112)

Ovid anthropomorphizes all of his writings, but the seclusion of the *Ars* in a dusky corner is particularly notable, mirroring Ovid's own banishment to the Black Sea region.[18] Ovid further characterizes the differences between his works by the way in which they display their titles.[19] While those which brought Ovid fame exhibit their names openly, the three "guilty scrolls" will be found not just concealing their titles within the bookcase but in a type of exile within the library itself.[20]

Building on this imagery just a few lines later, Ovid also describes the way in which his shift of fortune would fit into his collection. He says that the fifteen scrolls of the *Metamorphoses* would be a suitable home for his changed fate, *his* (*sc. voluminibus*) *mando dicas, inter mutata referri* / ***fortunae*** *vultum corpora posse meae*, "to these I bid you say that the aspect of my own fate can now be reckoned among those metamorphosed figures" (*Tristia* 1.1.119-120).[21] Ovid anthropomorphises his downfall by referring to his fortune as a face, *vultus*, which has shifted, not dissimilarly from the way in which his scrolls bear faces through their titles.[22] The reaction to the *Ars*, which (along with the uncertain *error*) caused Ovid's exile, means that he conceives of his shift in circumstances as a downturn in his life, and from his dejected state relies upon poetry to characterize his suffering and vent his

[18] Hinds (1985, 17) refers to the scrolls of the *Ars* as the "black sheep" of the family. Mordine (2010, 540) also highlights the emphasis Ovid places on concealment in his description of the *Ars*.
[19] Luck (1977, 23) says that the *tituli* hang in such a way as to make the contents of the scrolls easily readable as they protrude from their container. Blum (2017, 516) argues that the contrast in the arrangement of the books suggests that those labelling the *Ars* may have been removed. Such a quasi *damnatio memoriae* further personifies books in Ovid's exilic world.
[20] Mordine (2010, 542) argues that Ovid shifts some blame to the book itself by asking it to say that the *Ars amatoria* is the *praeceptor amoris*, and should be punished, while Ovid as the author is not guilty and thus should be recalled.
[21] Hinds (1985, 20-21) notes that the metamorphosis to which Ovid refers encompasses both the "aspect" of his fortune as well as his prediction for eternal poetic immortality at the end of the *Met*., which Ovid's downfall reversed. Fielding (2017, 131) also notes this.
[22] *namque ea dissimilis subito est effecta priori,* / *flendaque nunc, aliquo tempore laeta fuit* "for that aspect has on a sudden become quite different from what it was before—a cause of tears now, though once of joy" (*Tristia* 1.1.121-122).

emotions. In Ovid's description, we see a discussion concerning Fortuna as well as the words *detectus*, *frons*, and *gero* in close proximity.

Philosophy could allude to this portion of the *Tristia* when she discusses good and poor fortune with the prisoner. Philosophy's argument is that good fortune is always deceitful, as it conceals the evil shifts which must follow. In contrast, poor fortune is transparent in demonstrating its true fickle nature. Philosophy introduces this concept to the prisoner at the start of 2.8. She says, *sed ne me inexorabile contra* ***fortunam gerere*** *bellum putes, est aliquando cum de hominibus fallax illa [nihil] bene mereatur, tum scilicet cum se aperit, cum* ***frontem detegit*** *moresque profitetur*, "but I would not have you think that I am waging pitiless war against Fortune. There comes a time when she does not deceive, and thus deserves well of men—I mean when she manifests her true self, removes her mask, and proclaims her ways" (*Cons.* 2.8.1).[23] We must note the differences between Philosophy's and Ovid's usages of the words set in bold typeface. In the *Consolatio*, the object of '*gerere*' is *bellum*, whereas in the *Tristia*, the object of '*geret*' is *nomina*. From just the verb *gero*, then, it would be impossible to argue for an allusion to the *Tristia*. Without discounting this distinction, we can also note the similarities. Specifically, though the diction in the *Consolatio* passage is more separated than that in the *Tristia*, we find *detectus* and *frons* in a discussion of Fortuna, plus the verb *gero* in a nearby clause. Given the overlapping context of a discussion of Fortuna, I shall still compare these passages.

Much like Ovid, Philosophy describes personified Fortuna and characterizes a shift in circumstances as different faces of the goddess. Philosophy says,

> *etenim plus hominibus reor adversam quam prosperam prodesse fortunam; illa enim semper specie felicitatis, cum videtur blanda, mentitur, haec semper vera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat. Ilia fallit, haec instruit; illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absolvit;*

[23] Gruber (2006, 226) notes the dictional connection '*detego frons*'.

> my opinion in fact is that adverse Fortune benefits people more than good, for whereas when good Fortune seems to fawn on us, she invariably deceives us with the appearance of happiness, adverse Fortune is always truthful, and shows by her mutability that she is inconstant. The first deceives, the second instructs; the first, with her manifestation of deceitful blessings, shackles the minds of those who enjoy them, whereas the second frees them through making them realize the frailty of happiness.
>
> (*Cons.* 2.8.3-4)

Philosophy argues that, although poor fortune appears undesirable, it can be instructive, and thus its transparency is to be preferred to good fortune's deceit. If Philosophy is responding to Ovid's *Tristia*, I see her correcting Ovid's view. Ovid depicts his former fortune as a true good, and something which he still desires. The anthropomorphizing of the scrolls and of Fortuna's face contributes to this depiction; Ovid's former life continues to exist in a sense in Rome, and he is just too far away to enjoy it. To combat his separation from Rome, Ovid turns to the power of his mind, expressed through elegiac poetry. Toward the beginning of the poem, Ovid says *vade, liber, verbisque meis loca grata saluta:* / *contingam certe quo licet illa pede* "go, my book, and in my name greet the loved places: I will tread them at least with what foot I may" (*Tristia* 1.1.15-16). The play on words between the two types of feet, metrical and human, expresses a fundamental element of agency which Ovid gains through his composition.[24] While he is physically in exile, the power of his mind can transcend exile and accomplish a return to Rome. This is a visionary, transient homecoming, as Ovid himself confirms in the final elegiac couplet, *...nobis habitabitur orbis* / *ultimus, a terra terra remota mea* "I shall continue to dwell at the edge of the world, a land far removed from my own" (*Tristia* 1.1.127-128). Even so, I would emphasise the way in which Ovid depicts elegy as much more than just mournful verse; it is a tool for imagining himself back in Rome and overcoming his exile.

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[24] Geyssen (2007, 378) also notes that *liber* puns on "free"; the book is 'free' to go to Rome at will, unlike Ovid, its author.

While Ovid can accomplish a visionary homecoming with the power of his mind, Philosophy improves upon Ovid's imaginative homecoming by promising the prisoner a second life with God. If Fortune's nature is to change, then good fortune is neither a stable good, nor something to which the prisoner should aspire. Rather, he should put his faith in true unchangeable goods, such as faith in a next existence with God. By attaining this true good, after death, the prisoner will be able to see that his poor fortune in the mortal world was meaningless. Philosophy's perspective corrects Ovid's; the poet cannot see any edifying value in his poor fortune. Without belief in an immortal, second life, Ovid cannot shift his perspective in the way that the prisoner can. In this way, Philosophy's providential monotheism overcomes Ovid's employment of elegy.

3) *Consolatio* 3.12.15 and *Tristia* 4.2.61

In the final allusion to the *Tristia* examined in this section, I once again read Ovid's portrayal of elegy as bestowing agency upon its author. The allusion concerns the imagery of directing one's gaze. For the prisoner, the direction of his gaze is literal: Philosophy wants him to look upward, anticipating the next life with God. In contrast, for Ovid, the directing of one's gaze is metaphorical, allowing him to return to Rome through his mind's eye. To clarify Philosophy's imagery, it is necessary to examine the ways she describes the prisoner's gaze beyond the allusion to *Tristia* 4.2.61. Hence, I shall also briefly examine the imagery surrounding the prisoner's gaze at *Consolatio* 1.1, 1.3, 1m.5, and at 3m.12. I shall also devote special attention to *Consolatio* 1.3 and 3.12; the diction which could indicate an allusion to the *Tristia* occurs in both of these *Consolatio* sections. Indeed, I see them as related to each other.

At the point of allusion, Philosophy is delivering 3.12, a prose section dedicated to the belief that God's goodness rules the world. The issue of God's goodness in the mortal world appeared earlier in the *Consolatio*, specifically in 1m.5. In this poem, the prisoner states that

he did not believe God rules the affairs of mankind with the same goodness with which he orders the natural world.

> *O iam miseras respice terras,*
> *quisquis rerum foedera nectis!*
> *operis tanti pars non vilis*
> *homines quatimur fortunae salo.*
> *Rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus*
> *et quo caelum regis immensum*
> *firma stabiles foedere terras!*
>
> O God, who nature's parts hast wed,
> cast eyes upon this wretched earth;
> man in creation no mean worth,
> is buffeted on Fortune's main.
> These headlong waves, we pray, restrain;
> to earth that steadfast law apply
> with which you rule the boundless sky.
>
> (*Cons.* 1m.5.42-48)

Returning to this debate at the end of the third book, Philosophy asks the prisoner if he has revised his position and now believes that God's goodness rules the world. The prisoner says, *vehementer assentior, inquam, et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione prospexi. Credo, inquit; iam enim, ut arbitror, vigilantius ad cernenda vera* ***oculos deducis****.* "'I emphatically agree' I said, 'and a moment ago I was anticipating what you were about to say, though my suppositions were vague.' 'I believe you,' she said, 'for as I see it you are now focusing your eyes more keenly to discern the truth'" (*Cons.* 3.12.15-16).[25] Philosophy tells the prisoner that he has set his eyes on the truth of her philosophical teachings in a new way. In the context of 3.12, 'turning one's eyes' to the truth means adopting the appropriate philosophical viewpoint. Indeed, the prisoner's use of *prospicio* in this context is also telling; he is following Philosophy's chain of reasoning so clearly that he is able to anticipate what

[25] Also noted by Gruber (2006, 106). The two instances in the *Consolatio* and the one attestation in Ovid are the only three examples of *oculos deduco* in the proximity of *patria* in all of Latin literature.

she is going to say. This is a good indication that the prisoner has progressed beyond his initial state. Notably, the authorial-Boethius expresses this progression in terms of vision.

Indeed, the focus upon where one directs his sight closely connects with *Consolatio* 3m.12, the poem which follows this prose section and concludes Book 3. As discussed in the previous Horace chapter, in this poem Philosophy refracts the Orpheus myth through the lens of her monotheistic teachings; she reads Orpheus' turning to look at Eurydice as analogous to men turning their attention to lower concerns. Philosophy narrates Pluto's instructions, *fas sit lumina flectere* "he shall not turn his gaze" (*Cons.* 3m.12.46) and explains the lesson of Orpheus' failure with the same language:

> *nam qui Tartareum in specus*
> *victus lumina flexerit,*
> *quicquid praecipuum trahit*
> *perdit, dum videt inferos*
>
> For he who, conquered, turns his eye
> into hell's cave below,
> forfeits such merit as he won,
> by gazing on the dead.
>
> (*Cons.* 3m.12.55-58)

As in 3.12, in 3m.12 the direction of one's gaze correlates to one's ability to adopt the correct philosophical viewpoint. Orpheus is overcome by grief and cannot turn his gaze upward, whereas the prisoner can look to heaven, and aspire to return to God.

We can better appreciate the progress which the prisoner has made by 3.12 if we compare the direction of his gaze at 3.12 to his gaze as described at 1.1. When Philosophy first came upon the prisoner, his eyes were literally fixed on the earth and metaphorically turned toward lower concerns, *meumque intuens vultum luctu gravem atque in humum maerore deiectum*, "she gazed on my face, which was heavy with grief and bowed to the ground with sorrow," (*Cons.* 1.1.14). The direction of the prisoner's sight at this opening moment of the *Consolatio* clearly contrasts with the position of his gaze, or adoption of a

philosophical viewpoint, in 3.12. Indeed, when the prisoner was looking down, he was also unable to identify Philosophy. In other words, without the aid of Philosophy, the prisoner was unable to look to heaven and his next life with God. However, immediately after Philosophy began speaking to the prisoner, he said: *itaque ubi in eam* ***deduxi oculos*** *intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam, cuius ab adulescentia laribus obversatus fueram, Philosophiam* "thus as I eyed her with unblinking gaze, I recognized the one whose dwelling I had attended from my youthful years, my nurse Philosophy" (*Cons.* 1.3.2). At the start of the *Consolatio*, the prisoner is so turned away from philosophy that he does not even recognize the embodiment of the figure standing before him. But, as soon as he recognizes his healer, there is hope that he can use her wisdom to turn his mind to higher concerns once more. Thus, when in 3.12 the prisoner begins to anticipate Philosophy's questions, the authorial-Boethius engineers a deliberate 'call back' to this earlier moment to show the prisoner's progress due to Philosophy's teachings. As mentioned, while the direction of the gaze appears throughout the *Consolatio*, these are the only two moments in the work which pair *oculus* and *deduco*. I would thus like to read the moments together as indicative of Philosophy's progress in shifting the prisoner's mindset. Indeed, these two *Consolatio* appearances of the phrase *oculos deduco* plus its presence at *Tristia* 4.2.61 are the only attestations of this combination in all Latin literature. Now that we have seen how this phrase (and its related imagery) operates in the *Consolatio*, we must examine its appearance in the *Tristia*. At this point, Ovid is dealing with similar themes but from a different angle.

In *Tristia* 4.2, Ovid imagines the triumph that would occur in Rome following Tiberius' subduing of certain Germanic tribes.[26] As we saw in *Tristia* 1.1 and 5.1, here too Ovid portrays the power of his mind, expressed through elegy, as a tool which allows him,

[26] According to Luck (1977, 238), this poem celebrates the end of Tiberius' three German campaigns (those of 9-7 BC, 4-5 AD, and 10 AD).

however artificially and transiently, to escape his exile and reach his homeland.[27] Toward the close of the letter Ovid resumes this theme and says,

> *haec ego summotus qua possum mente videbo:*
> *erepti nobis ius habet illa loci:*
> *illa per inmensas spatiatur libera terras,*
> *in caelum celeri pervenit illa fuga;*
> *illa meos **oculos** mediam **deducit** in urbem,*
> *immunes tanti nec sinit esse boni*
> *invenietque animus, qua currus spectet eburnos;*
> *sic certe in patria per breve tempus ero.*
>
> All this I, an exile, shall see in my mind's eye—my only way; for my mind at least has a right to that place which has been torn from me. It travels free through measureless lands, it reaches the heaven in its swift flight, it leads my eyes to the city's midst, not allowing them to be deprived of so great a blessing; and my mind will find a place to view the ivory car,—thus at least for a brief space I shall be in my native land
>
> (*Tristia* 4.2.57-62)

Once more, Ovid depicts his mind's ability to travel to a fatherland which he cannot physically reach; his elegy expresses his magical thinking.[28] By deploying poetry in his time of need, he does not lose all contact with his homeland through Augustus' decision to banish him from it.

If the *Tristia* passage is recalled, then I see Philosophy correcting Ovid's viewpoint. Specifically, she improves upon the visionary type of homecoming which Ovid describes through her monotheistic teachings. Philosophy tells the prisoner that applying her precepts correctly will allow him to realize how inconsequential his present suffering is in comparison with his return to his true homeland with God. Indeed, she is so pleased with the prisoner's progress that half a page before the allusion, ***oculos deducere***, she says, *…parvam mihi*

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[27] Rosati (1979, 110-111) argues that in this passage, Ovid's poetry takes over the functions of philosophy. This reading supports my analysis of the allusion: Philosophy and Ovid approach a similar theme, but from two opposed views.

[28] As Heyworth (1995, 145-146) notes, Ovid centres the scene around his own absence, at once emphasising his distance from Rome while drawing attention to the ways he can imagine himself into the city.

restare operam puto, ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes revisas "…I think that little remains for me to do to ensure that you return in safety and happiness to your homeland" (*Cons.* 3.12.9). Philosophy cannot literally bring the prisoner to his homeland, as this will only occur after death. However, by encouraging him to direct his gaze in the appropriate direction, or to adopt the correct philosophical viewpoint, she can lead him to utilise philosophical thinking in this life. At *Tristia* 4.2.57f, Ovid also strives for a homeland. However, he depicts a return to Rome as his ultimate goal. Philosophy improves upon this perspective by telling the prisoner that he can look forward to a greater homecoming in the eternal world. Especially at 3.12, Philosophy is clear that she wants the prisoner to look to the truth, which her teachings reveal, in order to seek the eternal life which awaits him in his heavenly home.[29] Thus, once again, her monotheistic worldview improves upon Ovid's world, which did not grant him access to a second life and true homecoming with the divine.

As in the prior allusion, there is no doubt that Ovid is aware of the limitations of his visionary homecoming. In the couplet following the description of his mind's power, he admits, *vera tamen capiet populus spectacula felix, / laetaque erit praesens cum duce turba suo* "yet the real sight will belong to the happy people, the throng will rejoice in the presence of their own leader" (*Tristia* 4.2.65-66). Celebrating his ability to imagine the events really occurring at Rome at once underscores Ovid's separation from them.[30] Although his circumstances set clear limits on his agency, we once again see elegy suited to the contemplation of serious themes. In this case, Ovid's elegy does not just lament his absence

[29] These are central Neoplatonic ideas, as Bussanich (1996, 38: 51), Lloyd (1998, 170) and Remes (2008, 113) all show.

[30] Oliensis (2004, 308) notes that Horace *Odes* 4.2 (the same number as this *Tristia* poem) also discusses a triumph over Germany, in that case Augustus's over the Sygambri. As she argues, Horace performs a *recusatio*, leaving the description of the triumph to his addressee Iullus Antonius: *concines maiore poeta plectro / Caesarem, quandoque trahet feroces / per sacrum clivum merita decorus / fronde Sygambros* "you, a poet of larger quill, will celebrate Caesar when, decorated with a well-earned wreath of bay, he drags the fierce Sygambri up the Sacred Hill" (*Odes* 4.2.33-36). In contrast, Ovid is more than willing to take on the triumph poem for Tiberius as a "pragmatic strategy of ingratiation."

from Rome but inserts him in the crowd celebrating the triumph. In this way, the description of the power of Ovid's mind complements the freedom which Philosophy promises to the prisoner.[31] At 4.1 and 4m.1, she tells him that she will equip his mind with wings on which he will fly beyond the sky into heaven, to his true *patria*. She closes 4.1 by saying *pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in* ***patriam*** *meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam vehiculis revertaris* "I shall also equip your mind with wings to enable it to soar upward. In this way you can shrug off your anxiety, and under my guidance, along my path, and in my conveyance you can return safely to your native land" (*Cons.* 4.1.9). Indeed, Ovid's description of his mind flying over the distance between Tomis and Rome closely matches Philosophy's description, *illa per inmensas spatiatur libera terras,* / *in caelum celeri pervenit illa fuga;* "it travels free through measureless lands, it reaches the heaven in its swift flight;" (*Tristia* 4.2.59-60). Philosophy wants the prisoner to direct his gaze (*deducere oculos*) to the truths which her teachings can reveal, especially that his heavenly *patria* awaits him. Likewise, Ovid stresses the power of his mind to lead his imagination (*deducere oculos*) to his earthly *patria* back in Rome. Both Philosophy and Ovid envision a homecoming in the same language and rely upon the power of the mind to reach this goal. However, Philosophy advocates for the prisoner to direct his gaze toward a monotheistic homecoming focused on reunion with God, thus improving upon Ovid's transient vision.

In this section dedicated to allusions to the *Tristia*, I have argued that the authorial-Boethius refers to moments from the collection in which Ovid presents elegy as much more than a metre which compounds and expresses grief. In the first allusion, which connected

[31] In addition to 4.1 and 4m.1, at 1m.2.6ff, Philosophy reminds the prisoner of his former mental ability, which she likens to wandering the paths of the heavens. Philosophy and Ovid share a vision of the mind being free enough to fly to locations which the imprisoned/exiled body cannot. Philosophy recommends her discipline to help the prisoner achieve this mental capacity, whereas Ovid exclusively relies upon his elegiac poetry for this effect.

flebilis with *maestos modos* (1m.1.2) with Ovid's *flebilus status*/*flebile carmen*, we saw Ovid explain his desire to write elegy to comfort himself, depicting it as a tool to relieve his emotional state. Similarly, in the allusion involving *detegere frontem*, we saw Ovid reach Rome, specifically his own library, and thus use his writing to overcome his exiled position. Finally, in the allusion just analysed, we saw Ovid's imagined return to Rome and the way he can participate in recent military victories despite physical and temporal distance from them. Ovid does not pretend that his fantasy escapes are anything but transient and imagined. However, alluding to these specific moments within the *Tristia*, I see the authorial-Boethius presenting Ovid's elegy as a viable tool to combat grief. It is not just to be dismissed as something which prolongs suffering but can provide comfort and allow one to escape exile/imprisonment through the mind's imaginative ability when the author is physically confined. If elegy is deployed appropriately, such as in Philosophy's hands at 5m.1, it is possible to use Ovid's metre to reach Philosophy's monotheistic ends.

3. An Allusion to Ovid's *Epistulae ex Ponto*

In this section I shall analyse one allusion to Ovid's other major exilic work, the *Epistulae ex Ponto*. As in the prior section, here too Ovid presents elegy as a tool for managing his grief, but I see the authorial-Boethius alluding to a moment from the *ex Ponto* in which Ovid uses non-philosophical exempla to characterize and cope with his emotions. Specifically, Ovid presents epic poetry and classical mythology as two sources of comfort for his grief. Once again, then, we see elegy applied to more than just lament, and we see Ovid utilise a different source for consolation than the teachings of Philosophy.

1) *Consolatio* 3m.2.18ff and *ex Ponto* 1.3.39f

In *ex Ponto* 1.3, Ovid writes a letter of thanks to his friend Rufinus who had recently attempted to aid Ovid with consolation literature, *reddita confusae nuper solacia menti* /

auxilium nostris spemque tulere malis “the consolation that but now you sent to my distressed heart brought aid and hope to my woes” (*Pont.* 1.3.3-4). Although Ovid expresses thanks, he admits that in the same way physicians cannot always heal their patients, Ovid is not sure that Rufinus’ consolation will be able to overcome the sadness which Ovid feels, *non est in* ***medico*** *semper relevetur ut aeger:* / *interdum docta plus valet arte malum* “’tis not always in a physician’s power to cure the sick; at times the disease is stronger than trained art” (*Pont.* 1.3.17-18). Ovid elaborates on this belief by mentioning Aesculapius, *afferat ipse licet sacras Epidaurius herbas,* / *sanabit nulla vulnera cordis ope*, “let the Epidaurian in person bring holy herbs, he will have no skill with which to heal wounds in the heart” (*Pont*. 1.3.21-22). These images leading into the allusion can be linked with the premise of the *Consolatio* itself. Philosophy is a divine healer who brings a consolation to her ailing patient. Indeed, the prisoner calls Philosophy *medicans* at 1.3.1, *haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam* ***medicantis*** *faciem mentem recepi* “in just this way the clouds of my melancholy were dispelled. I drank in the clear air of heaven; recovery of my wits had enabled me to identify my healer’s face” (*Cons.* 1.3.1). Similarly, she calls her own discussion a “medicine,” *sed quoniam haec quoque te nosse quaedam* ***medicinae*** *tuae portio est…* “but it is a part of your medicine that you should come to know these things as well… (*Cons.* 4.6.4). Through the connection of Philosophy and her method with the terms *medico*/*medicus*, a reader might be more inclined to identify Philosophy as parallel to Ovid’s *medicus.* Thus, the way in which Ovid describes the healing god Aesculapius can be seen as parallel to Philosophy and her divine consolation.

Ovid continues his letter by explaining why he fears Rufinus’ consolation may be ineffective, employing the classical trope of the caged songbird; *cum bene sit* ***clausae cavea*** *Pandione natae,* / *nititur in* ***silvas*** *illa redire suas* “though Pandion’s daughter may be well off in her cage, she strives to return to her own forests” (*Pont*. 1.3.39-40). Ovid compares his

desire for Rome, his homeland, to Philomela's desire for her woodland dwelling. While she may be safe and physically comfortable in captivity, she cannot feel true happiness being away from her natural home. Likewise, while Ovid's spirits may be lifted by the comfort of Rufinus' consolation, he cannot feel true happiness in exile, as he will always long for his true home in Rome. Philosophy also exploits the imagery of a caged bird in discussing a return to a homeland and the acquisition of true happiness. At *Consolatio* 3m.2, she delivers a poem stating that all animals, including man, seek to return to their source. As in the *ex Ponto* context, Philosophy also refers to the image of Philomela's desire for her home to express mankind's innate desire for his homeland.

> *quae canit altis garrula ramis*
> *ales* ***caveae clauditur*** *antro;*
> *huic licet inlita pocula melle*
> *largasque dapes dulci studio*
> *ludens hominum cura ministret,*
> *si tamen arto saliens texto*
> *nemorum gratas viderit umbras,*
> *sparsas pedibus proterit escas,*
> ***silvas*** *tantum maesta requirit,*
> ***silvas*** *dulci voce susurrat.*
>
> the bird who whistled without end
> while she sat perched on branches high,
> now in a cage's depths is penned.
> Though people sport with her, and vie
> in fond devotion to provide
> cups smeared with honey, and rich fare,
> once she green-shaded groves has spied,
> as she hops in her prison there,
> her food she spatters all around
> and tramples beneath her feet.
> 'The woods!' she whispers with sweet sound,
> the woods alone she longs to greet.
>
> (*Cons.* 3m.2.17-26)

Philosophy, like Ovid, depicts a caged songbird rejecting the physical comforts of captivity, such as human attention and plentiful food, in favour of her native home.[32] However, unlike Ovid, Philosophy depicts mankind's true home as heaven. As in prior examples, Philosophy links her imagery to a teaching. In this case she clarifies the lesson for the prisoner in the final lines of the poem, *repetunt proprios quaeque recursus* / *redituque suo singula gaudent* "all things in nature thus retrace / the paths acknowledged as their own; / they gladly then regain their base" (*Cons.* 3m.2.34-35). Thus, while the authorial-Boethius does not explicitly Platonize the image, there is implicit Platonic colour linking the bird's return to its homeland with the return of man's soul to his heavenly home.[33] The overlapping diction could suggest that the prisoner-Boethius has based his imagery upon Ovid's example. If so, then Philosophy performs another correction.

Ovid and Philosophy agree that all living things seek to return to their source. However, Ovid's conception of the universe means that he sees himself reflected in the animal world and in mythical tales. Specifically, he compares himself to a bird, the metamorphosed Philomela. In contrast, it is a tenet of Philosophy's consolation to the prisoner that he is different from all other animals in God's creation: mankind alone possesses an immortal soul. Due to this soul, man will return to God as his source, a homecoming which surpasses that of all other creatures. Thus, while Ovid and Philosophy employ similar imagery to discuss the way natural impulse encourages a return to one's homeland,

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[32] The caged bird is paired with another exemplum often exploited for its philosophical ramifications—that of the tamed lion which returns to its bloodlust. I examine the lion in this poem in my earlier Lucan chapter. Here the authorial-Boethius approaches the exemplum of the bird differently, in a less overtly philosophical mode. Scheible (1972, 82), O'Daly (1991, 160), and Gruber (2006, 246) briefly remark upon this passage. Scheible argues that the most important source is not Ovid but Dracontius. O'Daly mentions Epictetus and Seneca but does not expand upon dictional overlaps with Ovid. Gruber alone believes that the literary impetus for the passage likely comes from Ovid but does not expand further.

[33] O'Daly (1991, 160-161).

Philosophy's homeland—with God in the next life—improves upon the bird's woodland home or Ovid's home in Rome.

I would also argue that Philosophy has improved upon the broader context of Ovid's letter to Rufinus. As mentioned, Ovid expresses some suspicion of the consolation which Rufinus offers. Although his friend has the right intentions, Ovid believes that his suffering might resist a cure, *interdum docta plus valet arte malum* "at times the disease is stronger than trained art" (*Pont.* 1.3.18). On a political level, Rufinus is not powerful enough to reverse Ovid's fate, and thus he cannot physically return him to Rome. On a more metaphorical level, Rufinus' communication with Ovid is not powerful enough to even grant a visionary homecoming to his friend. In contrast, Philosophy improves upon Rufinus' abilities. Like Rufinus, Philosophy cannot reverse the prisoner's circumstances. However, the knowledge with which she can equip him is stronger than Rufinus' consolation; she can hold out a homeland with God as the prisoner's reward, whereas Rufinus may not even be able to bring Ovid temporary comfort. Thus, while Ovid may find limited comfort in classical mythology as parallel to his emotional state, this polytheistic world does not stand up against Philosophy's monotheistic teachings.

4. Conclusions

Through the two sections of this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that Ovid's exile literature appears in the *Consolatio* beyond the single noted allusion to the *Tristia* in 1m.1. By seeing Ovid's exile poetry echo in further *Consolatio* contexts, we can adjust our reading of the elegiac poet, and indeed of the elegiac metre, within the *Consolatio* as a whole. When Philosophy dismisses the elegiac muses at the prisoner's bedside, she reacts against their single-minded devotion to lament. When Philosophy replaces the elegiac muses with her own muses, she does not entirely dismiss the associated metre, as she herself will employ it at 5m.1. Within her elegiac poem, and again at 2.8.1, 3m.2.18, and 3.12.15, I see Philosophy

incorporating elegy, and reminiscences of Ovid's exilic literature, to shape her consolation to the prisoner.

It is also worth noting that Ovid is another first-person author to whom the authorial-Boethius alludes. Alongside Horace in the *Odes*, Ovid in the exilic works writes from his individual perspective and in the first person. Of course, Vergil's first person passage at the end of the *Georgics* is also echoed in 1m.1.2. However, outside of this *envoi*, the work does not employ the first person, hence my comparison of Horace and Ovid's respective works. In Ovid's case, the first-person perspective may underscore the biographical similarities between Boethius and Ovid. In previous chapters, the prisoner identified with characters from different authors' works: Seneca's Hippolytus and Hercules, or Vergil's Aristaeus. Similarly, the prisoner might see Philosophy as outdoing Lucan's depiction of Julia and Caesar, and Lucretius' depiction of divinities like Venus. Thus, while elements of shared biography might have induced Boethius to turn to Seneca, Lucan, and Lucretius, it was the premises of their works and the figures and characters within them with whom he identified. In contrast, in the case of Ovid, his poetry and elements of his biography are one, allowing Boethius to find the closest form of literary and biographical identification with the exiled poet.

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in this chapter)

Exilic Ovid	***Consolatio***
Tristia 5.1.5	1m.1.2, 5m.1
Tristia 1.1.110	2.8.1
Tristia 4.2.61	3.12.15
Ex Ponto 1.3.39f	3m.2.18ff

Table of allusions (in order of appearance in the *Consolatio*)

Exilic Ovid	***Consolatio***

Tristia 5.1.5	1m.1.2
Tristia 1.1.110	2.8.1
Ex Ponto 1.3.39f	3m.2.18ff
Tristia 4.2.61	3.12.15
Tristia 5.1.5	5m.1

Conclusion: The *Consolatio* and the Classical Past

It has been the mission of this dissertation to investigate alluions to classical poetry within the *Consolatio Philosophiae*. It has also been understood that these echoes of the classical past are the non-dominant voice of the work; Philosophy and her monotheistic, providential worldview are consistently able to correct the classical sources alluded to. In this concluding chapter, I would like to offer some remarks on how the foregoing analysis can enrich our understanding of the *Consolatio*. I shall examine all the allusions to classical poetry voiced by the prisoner that I have discussed, return to the topic of genre surveyed in the introduction, and conclude with a look at the ways the classical past remains active in modern carceral settings.

1. Allusions Voiced by the Prisoner

According to the view advanced in prior chapters, Philosophy and the prisoner voice allusions to classical poets in different ways; Philosophy tends to correct the worldview(s) thus expressed, demonstrating a monotheistic God's superiority. In contrast, the prisoner tends to identify with the author and/or context of the allusion. Admittedly, I am already arguing for a subtle dynamic, believing that the two characters of the work operate on two levels of dialogue. First, there is the apparent dialogue of their conversation; second, below the surface, the very words the two interlocutors speak to each other engage with classical authors from internally consistent but disparate perspectives. Given the subtle impact of this reading, it is quite easy to overread further. For instance, it would be an almost impossible task for a reader to track the way Philosophy alludes various classical poets throughout the *Consolatio*. Since she is the dominant voice of the work, I do not think even the most highly educated and sensitive reader could keep track of these threads, without a commentary to aid him or her, if they were even consciously known to the authorial-Boethius.

In the case of the prisoner, however, the circumstances are different. The prisoner-Boethius voices only four poems in the work: 1m.1, 1m.3, 1m.5, and 5m.3. Outside of these poems, of course, the prisoner and Philosophy speak to each other in the prose sections. Even then, however, Philosophy is clearly the expert voice; she enacts her plan of healing the prisoner by guiding their conversation and administering her dialogic cure. Thus, it seems fair to say that when the prisoner speaks, especially in a poetic section, a reader might pay special attention to the rather rare instance of his voice in comparison to Philosophy's. Hence, while I have discussed allusions which the prisoner voices throughout the previous six chapters, I would like to examine them here as a group. For clarity of presentation, I offer a table, like those in previous chapters, which provides the *Consolatio* section and the classical work alluded to:

Classical Author and Text	***Consolatio***
Seneca, *Phaedra* 736-737	1m.3.3-4
Lucan, *BC* 5.700-702	1m.3.1
Lucretius, *DRN* 1.945-947; 4.20-22	2.3.2-3
Vergil, *Georgics* 4.563-566	1m.1.1-2
Horace, *Odes* 2.9.9	1m.1.2
Ovid, *Tristia* 5.1.5	1m.1.2

This table is organised based upon the order of the previous chapters. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall examine the allusions in the order of their appearance within the *Consolatio*. I emphasise that I am not suggesting that a reader would naturally track these allusions; rather, we can better appreciate the prisoner's voice if we consider these six instances as a group. I return to each of these six contexts with a special eye toward the ways the prisoner identifies with the author and/or context implicated. As is clear from the table, the first three allusions which the prisoner voices occur in the opening lines of the first poem. I shall quote these lines for clarity: *carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,* / *flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos.* "I who with zest penned songs in happier days, / must now with grief embark on

sombre lays." (*Cons.* 1m.1.1-2). Turning to the first line of the couplet, we find an allusion to the envoi of Vergil's fourth Georgic; ***carmina qui*** *quondam* ***studio florente*** *peregi* recalls:

> *illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat*
> *Parthenope,* ***studiis florentem*** *ignobilis oti,*
> ***carmina qui*** *lusi pastorum audaxque iuventa,*
> *Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi*
>
> In those days I, Vergil, was nursed by sweet Parthenope, and rejoiced in the arts of inglorious ease—I who toyed with shepherds' songs, and, in youth's boldness, sang of you, Tityrus, under the canopy of a spreading beech.
>
> (*G.* 4.563-566)

In the Vergil chapter this allusion shows the authorial-Boethius using Vergil's literary ascent to describe himself as undergoing a literary descent. While Vergil was able to anticipate the *Aeneid* at the end of the *Georgics*, the prisoner-Boethius can no longer look forward to rising literary ambitions. Instead, the prisoner writes in elegiac couplets, a metre rooted in lament. Turning to the second line of the opening couplet we find: *flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos*. I have argued at length about allusions in this line in the Horace and Ovid chapters. To briefly recapitulate: ***flebilis*** *heu maestos cogor inire* ***modos*** recalls *tu semper urges* ***flebilibus modis*** "you, however, never cease…with tearful verses" (*Odes* 2.9.9). At the same time, if we focus upon *flebilis* and the use of the elegiac metre in 1m.1, ***flebilis*** *heu maestos cogor inire modos* could make us think of Ovid: ***flebilis*** *ut noster status est, ita flebile carmen,* / *materiae scripto conveniente suae* "mournful is my state, mournful therefore is my song, for the work is suited to its theme" (*Tristia* 5.1.5-6). As I have said earlier, the authorial-Boethius could be balancing Horace's and Ovid's different approaches to elegiac couplets and poetry devoted to lament. On the one hand, the prisoner is in the position of Valgius and may want to apply Horace's stern advice to turn away from poetic lament. On the other hand, like Ovid, the prisoner may feel that writing in a metre suited to his mental state is therapeutic.

If a reader was sensitive to each of these three allusions, then there is more to say about their possible cumulative effect. I have already stated that the prisoner may identify with Vergil insofar as the prisoner paints his own literary career as a perversion of Vergil's authorial progress. Likewise, the prisoner may feel 'torn' between the 'advice' which the *Odes* and *Tristia* contexts offer to him: should he listen to Horace's advice to Valgius and turn away from elegy, or double down on it like Ovid? In all three cases the prisoner utilises the author, including elements of his biography, as well as the broader poetic context, to debate his best way forward. The allusion to the *Georgics* is to the conclusion of the work, emphasising that Vergil will next compose the *Aeneid*, the national epic of the Romans, whereas the prisoner is an enemy of the very government he had served (and which also ruled Rome). Likewise, the allusion to the *Odes* showcases the dangers of writing too much lamenting poetry. The authority of this statement is perhaps advanced by Horace's position as master of the lyric genre. Finally, Ovid remarks upon his exiled position to justify his turn to the poetry of lament; while he had of course written in elegiacs before, the type of elegiac composition found in the *Tristia* returns the metre to its tearful origins. If a reader were coming to the *Consolatio* for the first time, he or she could—arguably—see the authorial-Boethius allude to some of the most famous classical poets as well as the various genres in which they wrote within the opening two lines of his *Consolatio*. The *Georgics* of course represent epic-didactic poetry, the *Odes* lyric poetry, and the *Tristia* elegiac poetry. If one follows this reading, then within a single couplet, the authorial-Boethius has mined three works, representative of three great classical literary traditions, for the ways in which they can comfort him in his extreme circumstances.

I see something similar in the three remaining allusions. As the allusions to the works of Lucan and Seneca both occur in 1m.3, I shall treat them first before concluding with the prisoner's allusion to Lucretius. Again, for clarity, I shall cite the opening of 1m.3:

tunc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebrae
luminibusque prior rediit vigor,
ut cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro
nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus

then darkness left me. Dispelled was the night;
vitality of old renewed my sight.
As when the north-west wind sweeps headlong by,
foul weather gathers, rain-clouds clothe the sky…

(*Cons.* 1m.3.1-4)

If we focus upon the first line, *tunc me* ***discussa*** *liquerunt* ***nocte*** *tenebrae*, we might recall a context from the *Bellum Civile:*

"*hine usus placuere deum, non rector ut orbis*
nec dominus rerum, sed felix naufragus esses?"
talia iactantes ***discussa nocte*** *serenus*
oppressit cum sole dies, fessumque tumentes
conposuit pelagus ventis patientibus undas

'are you content to use the favour of the gods to be not ruler of the world nor master of the state but survivor of a shipwreck?' As they hurled such remarks, with night dispelled, the day came on them cloudless with the sun, and the weary sea with winds permitting calmed the swollen waves.

(*BC* 5.700-702)

At this moment Caesar's men are concerned that he has acted rashly; a natural portent assuages their fears as Caesar is shown to be a trustworthy guide and perhaps even favoured by supernatural forces controlling nature. We can see the prisoner identifying with Caesar's men in this instance; like them, he is worried that his guide, Philosophy, may not be leading him effectively. Also like the men, the prisoner can look to Philosophy's supernatural powers for comfort; she possesses exceptional knowledge of all schools of thought and can access something close to the providential perspective. In this case, then, I see the authorial-Boethius utilising a context from the *BC* to give voice to his apprehensions, specifically how they are then dispelled by the supernatural abilities of Philosophy much like the soldiers' cares are dispelled by Caesar's apparent divine favour.

Other resonances may appear if we focus upon the third and fourth line of the prisoner's poem: *ut cum praecipiti* ***glomerantur*** *sidera* ***Coro*** / *nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus* recalls a context from the *Phaedra* of Seneca: *Phaedra*, *fugit insanae similis procellae,* / *ocior nubes* ***glomerante Coro*** "his flight was like a frenzied gale, swifter than Corus massing clouds…" (*Phaedr.* 736-737). At this moment, we see Hippolytus flee Phaedra, who has just admitted her attraction. Once again, the prisoner may be identifying with the classical figure rather than attempting to perform a correction through the allusion; he sees himself in the position of Hippolytus. Like Hippolytus, Boethius has lived an upright life but, through no fault of his own, he faces unjust persecution from a tyrannical figure like the mad queen Phaedra.

The biographies of the authors may also be at play; Lucan and his uncle Seneca were both forced to commit suicide on Nero's orders. As devotees of Stoic philosophy, their respective deaths can also be viewed as philosophical martyrdom. Boethius, a devoted scholar of Neoplatonism, might then see his death sentence as a type of philosophical self-sacrifice: in the introductory chapter and in the Lucan chapter I have suggested ways in which Philosophy frames the prisoner as a philosophical martyr.[1] In these cases of allusions to works of Seneca and Lucan, then, we see the authorial-Boethius utilising the *BC* and *Phaedra* contexts to give voice to two different sentiments. First, in the *BC* context, the prisoner is anxious (at least for the moment) about the efficacy of his guide's cure. Second, in the *Phaedra* instance, the prisoner highlights that his persecution is unjust in the first place;

[1] For instance, see Philosophy compare the prisoner's circumstances to those of Socrates: *Nunc enim primum censes apud improbos mores lacessitam periculis esse sapientiam? nonne apud veteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certavimus eodemque superstite praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae victoriam mortis me astante promeruit?* "Do you imagine that this is the first time that philosophy has been assailed by perils in the court of corrupt behaviour? You surely know that in days of old, before the time of my dear Plato, there were many occasions when I launched full-scale warfare on presumptuous stupidity? That in Plato's own day I stood side by side with his mentor Socrates, when he triumphed over an unjust death?" (*Cons.* 1.3.6).

his life is tragic in the sense that his shift in fortune was sudden and undeserved. We also see the authorial-Boethius employing two additional genres beyond those previously discussed: the *BC* is representative of epic poetry without the didactic focus of the *Georgics*, and the *Phaedra* is representative of tragedy. As in 1m.1, here too the prisoner has identified with the contexts and authors of the works to which he refers, utilising classical literary predecessors to give expression to his own circumstances.

To turn to the final allusion voiced by the prisoner, we come to a prose section of the *Consolatio*. Philosophy has been encouraging the prisoner to recommit to her teachings and most recently has employed a prosopopoeia, speaking as if she were Fortuna herself. After she has delivered her content in Fortune's voice, she asks the prisoner whether he finds her arguments plausible:

> *tum ego: speciosa quidem ista sunt, inquam, oblitaque rhetoricae ac musicae* ***melle dulcedinis*** *tum tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant, sed miseris malorum altior sensus est; itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror praegravat. Et illa: ita est, inquit; haec enim nondum morbi tui remedia sed adhuc contumacis adversum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam sunt.*
>
> then I said: 'true, these are plausible arguments. Thickly smeared as they are with the sweet honey of rhetoric and music, they afford momentary pleasure as we listen to them. But when people are unhappy, awareness of their misery runs deeper, so once these words cease to echo in our ears, the grief implanted in our hearts outweighs them.' 'I grant that,' she rejoined. 'The fact is that as yet, such words are no cure for your sickness. At this stage they serve merely as a poultice for the pain which stubbornly resists all healing.'
>
> (*Cons.* 2.3.2-3)

In this case, the prisoner's comparison of rhetoric to honey seems to recall Lucretius' celebrated description of the honeyed cup of wormwood: poetic 'honey' is necessary to ease the way to philosophical learning, represented as bitter medicine within the cup. At the conclusion of the metaphor, Lucretius explains: …*volui tibi suaviloquenti* / *carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram* / *et quasi musaeo* ***dulci*** *contingere* ***melle****…* "I have chosen to set forth my doctrine to you in sweet- speaking Pierian song, and as it were to touch it with the

Muses' delicious honey" (*DRN* 1.945-947, 4.20-22). In this instance, we can see the interaction of the prisoner's and Philosophy's different approaches to 'poetic honey'. In Philosophy's case, she utilises rhetoric as a persuasive tactic to convey her doctrine. For instance, in the specific context around *Cons.* 2.3., she deploys the device of prosopopoeia to better engage the prisoner in a discussion of fortune's shifts. However, when the prisoner reacts to this approach, he arguably shows some reservations towards his philosophical teacher. Unlike the boys in Lucretius' simile who need honey to be deluded into drinking the cup of philosophical medicine, the prisoner was once a master of his chosen philosophy, or, to put it in the terms of the Lucretian simile, he was once the doctor administering the medicine/philosophy. As such, he is not automatically moved by Philosophy's use of techniques like prosopopoeia and looks for a less transient application of rhetorical 'honey'.

While these six examples are scattered across the first two books of the *Consolatio*, I think it is fair to argue that a reader could pay special attention to the prisoner's voice given how rarely we hear it within the work, and especially within the poetic sections. If a reader noticed these allusions, he or she could see the prisoner utilising a range of classical literary works, and the genres in which they are composed, just under the surface of the *Consolatio*. We see epic-didactic in the *Georgics* and *DRN*, epic in the *BC*, the tragic genre in the *Phaedra*, and two strains of first-person poetry in Horace's lyric *Odes* and Ovid's elegiac *Tristia*. In my view, the prisoner voices an allusion to each of these works and genres in the same type of way: he is sensitive to the classical exempla and sees his own life reflected in the literary traditions preceding him. Through this eclecticism, Boethius is also innovative; I shall now argue for some ways in which the melding of various literary traditions shapes the genre of the *Consolatio* itself.

2. Boethius' Innovation in Philosophical Dialogue

As discussed in the introductory chapter, there is debate over the genre of the *Consolatio*, as it contains elements from a range of genres and literary traditions. I have decided to focus upon the influence of philosophical dialogue and return to that focus here. In the previous section of this chapter, the authorial-Boethius glances toward other genres through allusions to works emblematic of them. As stated at the start, I recognise that these allusions are not the dominant voice of the *Consolatio*; rather, I see Philosophy and her teachings as the prevailing influence. However, Boethius has chosen to write his dialogue in a prosimetric form. The poems interspersed with prose create a new framework which surpasses philosophical dialogue in prose only. Given this, it is also fair to say that the texture of Boethius' dialogue is enriched by verse allusions within poetic and prose sections. The verse allusions voiced by the prisoner occur primarily in the poems (those to Vergil, Horace, Ovid, Lucan and Seneca), though there is a verse allusion in a prose section (the allusion to Lucretius).

Through such verse allusions, Boethius is going beyond literary decoration. I do not see him presenting highlights of the classical literary tradition just to show his learning, for instance. Instead, Boethius is taking each of the works his prisoner-self alludes to seriously as a source of consolation when facing a death sentence. In my mind, the narratological element—focusing on which allusions are voiced by which speakers and in what ways they adapt their sources—can help us to see the generic innovations of the creative author. In the case of dialogue, Boethius has been innovative in staging a secondary level of dialogue beneath the primary arguments. While Philosophy tends to correct allusions to the classical past, exemplifying her monotheistic worldview, the prisoner tends to act in the opposite direction, identifying with the same authors and works.

3. Classics in Modern Carceral Contexts: Prison Education and Prison Literature

While Boethius lived 1,500 years ago, and the *Consolatio* is not now as popular as it was in the Middle Ages, a central element of the work—that one imprisoned might turn to the

classical past for therapeutic value—has not been forgotten. The use of classical texts within prisons or similarly dislocated contexts shall be the focus of this conclusion's final section. I would like to begin with the University of Northampton's Impact Case Study for the 2014 UK Research Excellence Framework (REF), "Alan Smith's Philosophy for Prisoners".[2] Smith, a journalist, novelist, and academic who taught in prisons, wrote a memoir *Her Majesty's Philosophers* (Waterside Press, 2013) discussing his experience. The memoir covers an array of authors and works, not all of them classical. However, a major commonality between the premise of the *Consolatio* and Smith's work is that education has a role to play even for, or especially for, some of the most isolated members of society. Smith's well-received articles in the *Guardian*, especially "In prison, education is a route to self-respect" (8 April 2018), encapsulate this sentiment. In this article, Smith adds a relevant detail, "education was a relief, a route to self-respect." Similarly, in the REF study, it is stated that his goal is to "create a space within his classroom that was as un-carceral as possible".

Smith does not mention Boethius in *Her Majesty's Philosophers*, but there are clear overlaps between Smith's pedagogical statement and the way in which Boethius depicts Philosophy as a teacher and a healer. Philosophy tells the prisoner that he has "forgotten himself" (*sui paulisper oblitus est*, *Cons.* 1.2.6) when she first comes upon him and attempts a type of philosophical resuscitation in which he will recall that he is a man with an immortal soul. Of course, this is a different goal from Smith's "relief" or "self-respect". However, both could be said to stress self-knowledge or self-actualisation in the face of a prison setting which isolates and dehumanises. Philosophy's first complaint upon seeing the dejected prisoner is that he used to employ the power of his mind to approach philosophical questions which transcended his mortal condition (*Cons.* 1m.2). In trying to return the prisoner to this level of learning, in which philosophical beliefs provide an escape, she, like Smith, creates a

[2] Accessible here: https://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies/CaseStudy.aspx?Id=39969.

world outside of the carceral experience. For instance, see 4m.1, in which she promises wings to the prisoner which will allow him to escape beyond his earthly confinement.[3]

Another case of scholarship which was focused on impact, sponsored by the Institute of Classical Studies (ICS) in London, was James Corke-Webster's 2023 "Letters of Refuge" project. Corke-Webster employed classical and early Christian literature, specifically epistolary collections, to help the mental health of modern refugees in Calais. Specifically, he used ancient letter collections as an inspiration and encouraged refugees to produce letters on typewriters after learning about the relevant ancient models. Some refugees kept the letters as mementos, other attempted to mail them to their intended recipients. Corke-Webster's method was to use ancient history as a "safe space" in which participants could write narratives in letter format. He then exhibited these letters in partnership with the charity Art Refuge.[4] He describes "letters and emotional impact" as well as "letters as monuments." For instance, he connects his case study to the affective turn in scholarship, namely the focus on emotion and the body. Speaking to the significance of letters as a genre or form, he highlights that letters imply a dialectic or respondent.

Much of this is relevant to the *Consolatio*. As already stated, a premise of my reading is that Boethius turns to the classical past as a means of consoling himself in his extreme circumstances. While classical antiquity was much closer to Boethius than to the modern-day participants in Corke-Webster's study, we should not discount the tension Boethius felt between his public life in the political sphere, and his private pursuits in the realms of philosophy, education, and literature. Boethius turns to the literary world, and alludes to the works he had read in the course of his education, as a relief from his difficulties in ways not

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[3] *Sunt etenim pennae volucres mihi* / *quae celsa conscendant poli;* / *quas sibi cum velox mens induit* / *terras perosa despicit,* "for I have wings equipped to fly / up to the high vault of the sky. / Once these are harnessed, your swift mind / views earth with loathing, far behind" (*Cons.* 4m.1.1-4).
[4] Corke-Webster's project is featured here: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/letters-of-refuge.

dissimilar to the use of the ancient world as a 'safe space' in Corke-Webster's project. Corke-Webster's description of letters as monuments also points to a motivation of writing the *Consolatio*; 'monumentalisation' or memorialisation can be effective coping strategies. Indeed, Corke-Webster described how some refugees kept their letters rather than mailing them. Likewise, Boethius describes a desire to state his case for posterity, perhaps indicating the *Consolatio* itself, *cuius rei seriem atque veritatem, ne latere posteros queat, stilo etiam memoriaeque mandavi* "I have committed the sequence of events, and the truth about them, to paper for later scrutiny, so that they cannot be hidden from posterity" (*Consolatio* 1.4.25). Smith's and Corke-Webster's studies do not replicate Boethius's circumstances. Smith touches upon classical philosophy, though it is not his only focus, and uses the setting of a prison. Corke-Webster focuses on refugees, closer to an experience of exile than imprisonment, but he does explicitly allude to classical and early Christian letter collections. Together, both projects demonstrate the prospect of employing the *Consolatio Philosophiae* in a related study.

While Smith's and Corke-Webster's projects were focused on the United Kingdom and Calais, a recent edited volume by Emilio Capettini and Nancy Rabinowitz, *Classics and Prison Education in the US* (Routledge, 2021), demonstrates the same methodology in the United States. The volume is divided into three parts: the first focuses on classroom-carceral teaching, the second on teaching done through the mail and in staging a performance (Michael Morgan's *The Odyssey Project*), and the third, which presents critical and frank analysis of the benefits, impacts, and drawbacks of the approaches undertaken.[5] Every contribution in this volume has direct relevance to my reading of the *Consolatio*; each project introduces at least one classical text in a didactic and therapeutic way in a prison setting. However, I would highlight Felson and Todorović's chapter "Dialogic pedagogy as a model

[5] Find the Odyssey Project here: https://www.michaelmorgan.online/odyssey.

for teaching classics in prison" (pp. 32-42). Felson and Todorović employed the practice of dialogic pedagogy as advocated by Paolo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.[6] The dialogic method bears clear relevance to the genre of dialogue, a clear influence upon the *Consolatio*. Furthermore, Felson and Todorović conceive of pedagogy as a "humanizing venture for both teachers and students, where 'being human' is a process that requires constant vigilance".[7] The notion of vigilance seems especially relevant to the way Philosophy describes the prisoner. As we saw earlier, in Philosophy's estimation, the prisoner has misdirected his own mind, *sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem pulsus es sed aberrasti...* "but this distance you have travelled from your native land is the outcome not of expulsion, but of your wandering astray!" (*Cons.* 1.5.3). Philosophy's educative presence is needed to keep the prisoner on the right path, aware of his human identity and immortal soul. Even an accomplished philosopher such as Boethius is susceptible to wandering from his beliefs and needs to be vigilant to recall them.

I would also highlight Felson and Todorović's term "third space", which they use to describe the area "between inside and outside," thus not the same as a traditional classroom and obviously distinct from life outside of the prison world. The third space can be created from a prison community[8] and can grant power to learners.[9] The focus on an individual's interior experience in this third space is particularly relevant to my interpretation of the prisoner-Boethius and Philosophy, respectively, as "characters" invented by the authorial-Boethius for therapeutic reasons. Indeed, the *Consolatio* can be likened to a third space; by creating a literary world, Boethius is able to achieve a mental release from his prison cell.[10]

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[6] Freire's original (1968), has been translated by Ramos (2005).
[7] (2021, 35).
[8] As explored by Novek (2017, 39).
[9] Muth (2008, 270).
[10] As Jürgasch (2024, 154) suggested recently, Boethius achieves the consolation of intellectual insight and so can be said to achieve an inner freedom (168).

To conclude this section, I would like to turn to a final example of modern prison literature. Prison literature represents a recognised genre, spanning the writings of activists such as Gandhi, Mandela, James Baldwin, Martin Luther King Jr., and Alexei Navalny to novels written from prison, such as *Don Quixote*, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, or E.E.Cummings' *The Enormous Room* as well as postcolonial works such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *The Buru Quartet* or Behrouz Boochani's *No Friend but the Mountains*. I would like to briefly highlight the case of Brittney Griner. This Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) star was arrested and imprisoned in Russia for alleged drug charges in February of 2022. Griner wrote a letter to the then President Joseph R. Biden while imprisoned, and her opening sentence is eerily similar to the opening sequence of the *Consolatio*. Griner writes: "As I sit here in a Russian prison, alone with my thoughts and without the protection of my wife, family, friends, Olympic jersey, or any accomplishments, I'm terrified I might be here forever." Let us examine the similarities.

- As I sit here in a Russian prison / …*in has exilii nostri solitudines…* (1.3.3)
- alone with my thoughts / …*haec dum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem…* (1.1.1)
- and without the protection of my wife, family, friends, Olympic jersey, or any accomplishments, / *nunc quingentis fere passuum milibus procul muti atque indefensi ob studium propensius in senatum morti proscriptionique damnamur. O meritos de simili crimine neminem posse convinci!* (1.4.36)[11]

Quite accidentally, Griner's missive is reminiscent of the themes and language which open the *Consolatio*.[12] This speaks to the unfortunately timeless experience of imprisonment and should impel our close attention as readers to the communications which men and women compose from such extreme environments.

[11] "But here I am, five hundred miles away, condemned to death and loss of property, unable to speak a word in my own defence, an all for my overzealous support of the senate! Surely no one could be rightly condemned on a charge like this!"

[12] Brittney Griner attended Baylor University as an undergraduate and thus there is a slight chance that she was exposed to the *Consolatio* during her time there.

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