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The economy of certain Piedmontese noble families in the reign of Victor Amadeus II

by

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Note.

As many different currencies were in circulation in Piedmont in the period under study, their equivalents in Piedmontese lire have been stated in all calculations. The annual exchange-rates can be found in, D. Promis: Le monete dei Reali di Savoia, 2 vols., Turin, 1841, and F. Saraceno: Il corso delle monete seguito negli Stati di S. M. R. M. Il Re di Sardegna...nel Piemonte dal 1300 al presente..., Turin, 1782. The money of account until 1632 was the fiorino. In that year it was changed to the lira, equivalent to 15 fiorini (this proportion was only finally adopted in 1636). All calculations before 1632 have consequently been made in fiorini and then exchanged into lire at the above exchange-rate. As the lira was non-existent before 1632, this method has been adopted for the sole purpose of facilitating comparisons in the earlier and later periods. The Piedmontese lira was composed of 20 soldi, with 12 denari to the soldo. Its silver content was 1.28083 grammes, in each denaro.

Measurements are given in giornate, composed of 100 tavole, with 12 piedi to the tavola. The giornata is equivalent to 38.0096 square metres, or 94/100 of a statute acre. In the Duchy of Mantua, there were different measurements, mainly the moggia; all such measurements have been converted into giornate. See, B. Borghino: Nuovo Trattato sull'applicazione del sistema metricodecimale al commercio in generale e ad ogni ramo d'amministrazione, Turin, 1853. For the purposes of clarity,

all fractions of giornate, as well as of lire (and other moneys), have usually been omitted. Consequently, small differences in the totals of calculations may be noted.

All references citing only the mazzo and document are from the archive regarding the family under study, i.e., for the

Falletti di Barolo - Archivio Storico dell'Opera Pia Barolo.

Valperga di Rivara - AST III, art. 593.

Saluzzo di Paesana - AST I.

Abbreviations.

AST - Archivio di Stato

I,II, or III - Sezione prima, seconda, or terza

AC - Archivio Comunale

M. - Mazzo

M.A. - Mazzo d'addizione

R. - Registro

art. - articolo

c. - categoria

n. - number

f. - folio

a. - anno

Consegnamenti - Consegnamenti del Piemonte

Controllo - Patenti Controllo Finanze

Interinazioni - Interinazioni della Camera

Monferrato,Concessioni - Monferrato, Registro Patenti, Decreti, e Concessioni dei Duchi di Mantova

Monferrato, Suppliche - Monferrato, Suppliche e Decreti de' Duchi di Mantova

Patenti - Patenti del Piemonte

Saluzzo - Città e Provincia di Saluzzo

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Sclopis, Legislazione italiana - F.Sclopis: Storia della legislazione italianna, Turin, 1863-64.

Trifone - R.Trifone: Il fedecommesso. Storia dell'istituto in Italia, Naples, 1914.

B.S.B.S. - Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino.

B.S.S.S. - Biblioteca della Società Storica Subalpina.

B.S.P.C. - Bollettino della Società per gli studi storici archeologici ed artistici nella provincia di Cuneo.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the evident importance of the nobility a study of its economic and social position in Piedmont has so far never been attempted.

All previous studies of any value have been dedicated almost exclusively to the growth of the State. Such attention as has been paid to the aristocracy has consequently been limited to its relations to government policy. The importance of the nobility has always been neglected and perhaps under-estimated. The fundamental works of Einaudi and Prato on the finances and economy of Piedmont in the early 18th century form clear examples; the nobility is above all discussed for its immunities, and the final conclusion is that these immunities were remarkably limited. Einaudi, examining the 18.03% of ecclesiastical and feudal exemption in 1700, compares it to other countries: in the Kingdom of Naples in 1740 ⅔ of all landed revenues were in the hands of the clergy and nobility, all virtually immune; in the France of 1780 at least half the land was in some way exempt. At the same time, the Piedmontese nobility is judged as a fairly poverty-stricken class.(1)

While it is evidently true that the nobility in Piedmont was not so rich, nor so privileged as that of many other countries in Europe,

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(1) Einaudi, p.65 and passim. Prato, p.92, repeats these comparisons. Pugliese, p.69, also judges immune land very limited.

its importance within the State - where it represented the most powerful economic class - merits correct evaluation. Recent historians have shown a greater awareness of this dominant position of the nobility, supported and encouraged not only by its possessions (whether landed or personal), but even more by its tradition and prestige. But neither Bulferetti, examining the legal concept of the nobility at the time of Carlo Emanuele II, nor Quazza, discussing the effect of the reforms of the first half of the 18th century, have tried to examine the attitude and the policies of the noble families themselves. No detailed study has so far been made, either of the whole class of the nobility, or even of single families.

Such a study would also shed light on more general problems of Piedmontese finances so far unresolved through lack of State accounts at all complete. Not until the 1720s is it possible to find unbroken lists of the State taxes, the tassi and fogaggi with their alienations, nor even of alienations of royal demesne. Lists of investment in the monti or State securities, are to be found; but no accounts indicate the undoubtedly far greater movement of capital in private hands. The rise in prices, the fall in the real value of money, the whole economy of the 17th century has still to be studied.

A certain amount of light can be thrown on these questions by a study of the history of noble families. The types of investment, the question of inflation, the fall in the rate of interest were all problems of a direct and vital importance to the economy and prosperity

of all families. A study of their economic policies gives concrete, if limited, evidence as to how these problems were affronted. More directly, such questions as the sources of wealth, the struggle against feudal rights, the relations of the comunità with the feudataries, the contracts made by the latter with the peasants, all find clear illustration in the study of a noble family. Other problems, faced by all aristocratic families, such as the size of dowries, the position to be given to younger sons, the methods of conserving the patrimony - are met with in Piedmont as elsewhere in Europe, though with certain local peculiarities. The ineffectiveness of government policy was in large part due to the economic independence of the nobility. It is of importance to know to what extent this independence was maintained despite Vittorio Amedeo II's restrictive measures. Did an economically active middle class ever really exist in Piedmont ? Was the King successful in creating a new bureaucracy, fully dependent on himself ? And did this bureaucracy effectively misplace the old feudal nobility ? Is the drift of the nobility towards the Court in the 18th century really so widespread as has been imagined ? And did it always imply an abandonment of the land ? How does the so-called absenteeism relate to the increasing urge to build, seen so clearly all over Piedmont ? Above all - probably the fundamental question in the 18th century - how far had the position of the comunità improved ? Had the government failed completely ? or were the comunità growing more independent, and perhaps replacing the influence of the nobility in the provinces ? It is in an attempt to

answer these, and other, questions that the following study has been written.

An essential preliminary to the study of the economic and social position of the nobility in Piedmont in the 17th and 18th centuries must be the examination of single families. The following chapters represent an attempt to trace the development of three Piedmontese families. Their history necessarily begins with the restoration of Emanuele Filiberto in 1559, in order to clarify their economic and social standing during the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II.

The material for these studies has been found almost exclusively in family archives. With the exception of a very few outstanding medieval archives, an ample number of documents are only to be found from the mid-16th century, still leaving many gaps until towards the end of the following century. The dowries, wills, primogenitures, etc. provide a fairly complete picture of 'private' family affairs (besides often supplementing the inadequate printed genealogies).(2) The more

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(2) The main source for all genealogical tables is A. Manno: Il Patriziato Subalpino, of which the letters A-B were published at Florence, 1895-1905; the remainder is to be found in typewritten copies in the Biblioteca Reale and the Archivi di Stato in Turin. Manno, however, died before he was able to check what is, in effect, only a rough draft; the work is consequently full of errors. The best supplementary source is F. Guasco: Dizionario feudale degli antichi stati sardi e della Lombardia, B.S.S.S., 54-58, Pinerolo, 5 vols., 1911, which is far more reliable. Occasional information can be found in the classic P. Litta: Famiglie celebri di Italia, Milan, 1819-1923, the scrappy V. Spreti: Enciclopedia storico-nobiliare italiana, 8 vols., Milan, 1928-35, and the wholly untrustworthy Angius: Sulle Famiglie Nobili della Monarchia di Savoia, 4 vols., Turin, 1841-57.

general economic activities of a family are far more difficult to reconstruct because of the unexpected absence of family account-books.(3) The extent of feudal land can be traced through the consegnamenti of feudal land (supplemented by the copies in the State archives), which also help to bring out the importance of the great land survey, the perequazione. Most purchases and sales of land and censi (rent-charges) are to be found, as well as often a fairly rich series of agricultural contracts. Building activities, if at all on a large scale, can usually be traced in detail, as the families often compiled a special account-book. An immense amount of material is to be found in the interminable series of lawsuits, between different families, or members of the same family, against the Regio Patrimonio, private individuals, or the comunità, to defend the feudality of land, exact feudal dues, maintain religious patronage, claim unpaid dowries, etc..

Some additional information is provided by the State archives. For such general questions as the perequazione, they are of fundamental importance, especially for the valuation of land in the various zones of Piedmont. Lawsuits can be found, especially if relating to the Regio Patrimonio. The military or political careers of members of a family can be traced in the official records, where the correspondence and dispatches of diplomats are also to be found.

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(3) In a general survey of Piedmontese family archives, apart from the Savoia-Carignano family, under half a dozen other archives were found to possess series of account-books at all complete, and then only from the end of the 17th century. The earliest is that of the Roero di Guarene family, from the 1670s; the Ferrero della Marmora and the Solaro Del Borgo archives are also to be noted. Cf. S. Woolf, 'Una guida agli archivi nobili piemontesi', B.S.B.S., 1959.

Great hopes were placed on the communal archives. Unfortunately, the general lack of interest in their upkeep encouraged an apparently natural tendency towards disorder and dispersion (with certain noteworthy exceptions). The recent war, with the rising of the Resistance movement in Piedmont in 1943-45, also caused the complete or partial loss of a large percentage of these archives. The most valuable documents still usually found are the catasti or communal land-registers, which are of great importance for calculating the extent of allodial land owned by a family, especially after the perequazione. In addition a certain number of lawsuits and documents relating to the administration of the comunità can sometimes be found. The notarial archives are of particular use to trace the purchase and sale of lands and censi.

The choice of the families has to some extent been limited by the difficulties of access to private archives. Of the three family archives studied, two are to be found in the State archives and the third in a religious institute. But care has been taken to choose only families of the old feudal aristocracy, the class against which Vittorio Amedeo II directed his most radical reforms. The families have one thing in common: the antiquity of their descent. Their possessions lie in separate areas of Piedmont, accounting in part for their quite different development: but in their relations with both the State and the comunità certain common elements appear. It is on these elements that tentative conclusions are based. A widespread survey of the private archives of Piedmont has given grounds to believe in the validity of these conclusions, but in view of the lack of other studies of this type, they can only be regarded as tentative.

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I. Piedmont: a brief outline of its history and development, 1559-1748.

1. Political development: from Cateau-Cambrésis to Aix-la-Chapelle.

The possessions of Emanuele Filiberto at his restoration in 1559 represented a legacy from the Middle Ages. The geographical position of the Duchy of Savoy, straddling the Alps, closely resembled that of the Kingdom of Navarre. Nor did it seem probable that it could escape the same fate. Internal communications were equally difficult, the rival powers of France and Spain threatened its frontiers. Until the 16th century it was difficult to imagine on which side of the Alps the Dukes of Savoy would try to consolidate their possessions. The loss of Geneva was perhaps the first indication. Savoie[1] remained, but steadily declined in importance, falling into French hands at every war. The other states of the Duke of Savoy were hardly more closely united. The Valle d'Aosta lay nearer to Piedmont, but retained a great degree of independence and failed to present an effective barrier against the French. The county of Nice and principate of Oneglia formed the only outlets into the Mediterranean, but were divided from Piedmont by the Maritime Alps. Piedmont itself, by the second half of the 16th century the nucleus of the possessions of the Dukes, was far from forming a

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(1) The term 'Savoie' will be used throughout the present work to describe the possessions of the Dukes on the French side of the Alps, and to distinguish it from the word 'Savoy', used to describe the whole Duchy, and the family name of the ruling Dukes.

compact state. The neighbouring marquisates of Saluzzo and Monferrat, although admittedly much weaker than the Duchy of Savoy, were only finally absorbed by the beginning of the 18th century.

At the time of the Spanish Succession War the frontiers of Piedmont followed, for the most part, the line of the Alps: from the Colle di Cadibona above Savona they ran south-west and then north-west as far as the Colle della Maddalena, east of Cuneo (Alpi Marittime); then almost directly north to Mont Genevre and Mont Cenis (Alpi Cozie); north again along the Valle d'Aosta as far as Mont Blanc and the Col Ferret (Alpi Graie); and east as far as Monte Rosa (Alpi Pennine). At this point the frontier left the Alps and followed approximately the river Sesia as far as Vercelli; from there an artificial, heavily indented frontier was drawn south to Acqui. The acquisition of the Alessandrino, Lomellina, Novarese and Oltre Po in 1713 extended this eastern frontier further into Lombardy. With the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), Piedmont reached its furthest limits (until the 19th century) following the Ticino and Trebbia rivers.

The geography of Piedmont had great influence on its political history. The only open frontier was east and south-east into Lombardy and Liguria, the centre of Spanish power in Northern Italy. At the same time the easiest entry into Italy remained across the Piedmontese Alps. Charles VIII and Louis XII had both invaded across the Graie Alps. In the early years of the Valois-Habsburg struggle, Piedmont, together with Saluzzo and Monferrat, remained almost continuously under French

influence, serving as a base for expeditions both east and south. In the later period of the wars, with the increasing entry of the Swiss, pouring down from the Lepontine Alps into the Lombard plain, the geographical importance of Piedmont in Italy declined. But it remained of importance to Spain, at first to invade France, and in later years - with the possession of Milan and control of Genoa - to secure the long route to the Low Countries and the connection with the Empire. Saluzzo remained under French domination (and its marquis, Lodovico, even led an expedition to Naples in 1504), while Piedmont and Monferrat formed the battlefield of French-Spanish enmity. Finally, in 1536, the French conquered almost all Piedmont, while Carlo III retired under Spanish protection to the Vercellese.(2)

On his restoration in 1559, Emanuele Filiberto found the rival powers still in occupation. The marquisate of Saluzzo, with its frontiers extending as far as Dogliani to the south and Carmagnola to the east,

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(2) See the contemporary G. Cambiano: Historico Discorso in Mon.Hist.Pat. Script., t.II, Turin, 1839. Also E. Armstrong: 'Tuscany and Savoy', Cambridge Modern History, vol. 3, pp.383-421; F. Gabotto: Lo Stato Sabaudo da Amadeo VIII ad Emanuele Filiberto, vols.2,3, Turin, 1893; A.Tallone: 'Ivrea e il Piemonte al tempo della prima dominazione francese (1536-1559)' in Studi Eporediesi, B.S.S.S., 8, Pinerolo, 1900, pp.65-200; L.Romier: 'Les institutions françaises en Piémont sous Henri II', Revue Historique, 106, 1811, pp.1-26. For the marquisate of Saluzzo, see the contemporary 'Charnet' of Giovanni Andrea Saluzzo di Castellar, edited by V. Promis, Miscellanea di storia italiana, VIII, 1869. Also D. Muletti: Memorie storico-diplomatiche appartenenti alla Città ed ai Marchesi di Saluzzo, vol. 6, Saluzzo, 1833; A. Tallone: 'Gli ultimi marchesi di Saluzzo dal 1504 al 1548' in Studi Saluzzesi, B.S.S.S., 10, Pinerolo, 1901, pp.275-340.

only fifteen miles from Turin, had been annexed by the French on the death of the last marquis in 1548. In Piedmont itself the French still held Turin, Chieri, Chivasso, Villanova d'Asti and Pinerolo, while the Spanish kept possession of Santhià and Asti. To the east lay the Monferrat, from Casale to Acqui, under the jurisdiction of the Duke of Mantua since 1536, with so chaotic and disputable a frontier as to cause inevitable and continual conflicts. To the west of Acqui lay the Langhe, a region including nineteen fees under the jurisdiction of the Emperor and therefore independent of the Duke of Savoy; fifteen other fees in Piedmont came under papal jurisdiction. In the Biellese the Prince of Masserano exploited his independence. Even in Piedmont itself Savoyard jurisdiction was not supreme: with titles acquired at different periods and under varying conditions during the Middle Ages the Duke was unable to exercize an equal authority over all his subjects.(3)

But Emanuele Filiberto had the advantage of an unusually fresh start. The moderating influence of the Estates, strong in the unity of the nobles with the communes, had vanished; the communes were heavily in debt, the nobles compromised by the French occupation. After one assembly in 1560, the Estates were never called again. Emanuele Filiberto, the contemporary of Philip II, was able to act despotically, asserting his authority and forcing the country to obey. In 1562 he entered

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(3) Cf. the remarks of L. Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali' pp. 210-15.

Turin, and by his death in 1580 he had managed to recover all the occupied towns.(4)

The new Italy, as left by the Valois-Habsburg rivalry, had declined in importance. Half the peninsula lay in Spanish hands. Elsewhere Spanish influence dominated. Piedmont itself, for most of the 17th century, was unable to assert its independence.

But its position and prestige among the other Italian states had increased. Venice was still richer, but had closed in on itself; the Papacy, Genoa and the smaller states accepted and profited from Spanish leadership. Only the new Tuscany could rival Piedmont, and the diplomatic history of Italy until the late 17th century in large part consists of claims for precedence between these two rising states.(5)

It is Piedmont, and not the Duchy of Savoy, which rises. Already before the French occupation, the Dukes had virtually settled in Turin in preference to Chambéry, and were giving increasing representation to the Piedmontese element.(6) Emanuele Filiberto's policy was primarily

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(4) For Emanuele Filiberto, C.Rinaudo (ed.): Emanuele Filiberto, Turin,1928; P.Egidi: Emanuele Filiberto,II (1559-1580), Turin,1928; C.Patrucco (ed.): Lo Stato Sabaudo al tempo di Emanuele Filiberto, 3 vols., B.S.S.S., 107-109, 1928; Emanuele Filiberto, Studi pubblicati dalla R.Università di Torino al IV Centenario della nascita di Emanuele Filiberto - 8 Luglio 1928, Turin, 1928. For the Estates, H.G. Koenigsberger: 'The Parliament of Piedmont during the Renaissance, 1460-1560', Recueil des travaux d'histoire et de philologie, Université de Louvain, 3rd ser., fasc.45, 1952, pp.69-122,especially pp.116-20. Also M.C. Daviso: 'Considerazioni intorno ai Tre Stati in Piemonte',B.S.B.S.,1947,pp.13-41.

(5) E. Armstrong;op.cit. For more details, R. Quazza: La preponderanza spagnuola (1559-1700), 2nd ed., Milan, 1950.

(6) H.G. Koenigsberger, op.cit., pp.102-07; L. Marini: 'René de Lucinges Signor des Alymes. Le Fortune Savoiarde nello Stato Sabaudo e il Trattato di Lione (1601)', Rivista Storica Italiana, LXVII, 1955, pp.334-40; M.C. Daviso, op.cit., pp.13, 36-37.

l'Italian', concerned above all with his position "al di quà da li monti", Carlo Emanuele I (1580 - 1630), despite nostalgic plots against Geneva, confirmed his father's policy: with the conquest of the marquisate of Saluzzo and the war of 1600 - 01, the French possessions - "al di là dalli monti" - were deliberately sacrificed. Throughout the 17th century, Piedmontese influence increased, even disputing Savoyard influence over the Valle d'Aosta. Savoyard nobles holding important government posts became increasingly rare; and the few who existed (such as the Carron di San Tommaso, First Secretaries of State for four generations, and the Seyssel d'Aix, diplomats and soldiers) found it increasingly necessary to settle permanently in Piedmont. The secondary position of Savoie could be seen strikingly by the time of Vittorio Amedeo II's reforms: marchese Eleazar Wicardel di Fleury, Piedmontese ambassador at London in the first decades of the 18th century, suddenly lost his fees in the Biellese in the great confiscation of 1720. Disgusted with the House of Savoy, he bought new fees for his children in Savoie, and not in Piedmont; his subsequent departure to serve under the King of Poland merely confirmed his withdrawal from the Piedmontese scene (7).

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(7) For the whole problem of the relations of Piedmont with Savoie, see the detailed and illuminating studies of L. Marini: 'René de Lucinges', passim, and 'La Valle d'Aosta fra Savoia e Piemonte (1601 - 1730)', in La Valle d'Aosta, Relazioni e Comunicazioni presentate al XXXI Congresso Storico Subalpino di Aosta 9 - 10 - 11 Settembre 1956, v.2, pp.557 - 691. For the early 18th century, see the remarks of Quazza, pp.26 - 27. For Wicardel di Fleury, see F.Venturi: Saggi sull'Europa illuminista. Alberto Radicati di Passerano, Turin, 1954, pp.147 - 48.

Justification for this partiality could be found, if needed, in the weight of taxation paid by Piedmont in comparison to the other states. Whether cause or result of its leading position, Piedmont paid almost ⅔ of the cost of the Spanish Succession War as compared to a total of 6% paid by Savoy, Aosta, Nice and Oneglia together.(8)

Emanuele Filiberto owed his restoration to Spanish support. But in subsequent years he found himself almost entirely abandoned. Although able to recover his lands he was incapable of asserting his independence in any serious issue against either Spain or France. The attempts to claim the marquisates of Saluzzo and Monferrat proved virtual failures. A non-aggressive policy was fundamentally the only possibility. And at the same time it proved economically advantageous.

For Piedmont was very weak. When Carlo Emanuele I tried to exploit his position, playing France against Spain, he failed to take into account his limited resources. He was able to invade and conquer the marquisate of Saluzzo while France was handicapped by the religious wars. But in subsequent years he saw his whole country overrun by Henri IV, and was fortunate to be able to buy him off with possessions in Savoie (treaty of Lyon, 1601). He made schemes to recover Geneva and threatened the neighbouring republic of Genoa. His religious policy towards the Protestant Valdesi fluctuated according to his relations with foreign powers. He tried to conquer the Monferrat unsuccessfully in 1612, and finally, when

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(8) The remainder was paid for the major part by the subsidies from Great Britain and Holland. Einaudi, pp.342-59.

the death of the Duke of Mantua left a disputed succession (1628), he once more invaded the neighbouring state. But his rashness and his faithlessness to both France and Spain, combined with his lack of resources, led to his downfall. When he died in 1630 he left his country exhausted and overrun by the French. The devastations of war were completed by the ravagings of the great plague. His son, Vittorio Amedeo I (1630-1637), was forced to submit to the humiliating treaty of Cherasco (1630-31), which firmly established French control of Piedmont, with garrisons at Pinerolo and Casale.(9)

The whole economy of Piedmont was on the verge of collapse. Already under Emanuele Filiberto the influence of American gold and silver had begun to make itself felt. In 1562, Emanuele Filiberto had attempted to resolve the monetary chaos caused by the wars in the first half of the 16th century by a complete conversion of the currency, substituting the lira for the fiorino as the money of account and attempting to regulate the rate of exchange. But the reform had proved a dead letter, the fiorino remained the money of account and the real value of money continued to fall. By his death in 1580, the value of the scudo d'oro had risen from 8 fiorini 9 grossi to 10 fiorini 9 grossi, while prices had more or less

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(9) For Carlo Emanuele I, besides Armstrong, op.cit., R. Quazza, op.cit., and Marini, 'René de Lucinges', see C. Rinaudo (ed.): Carlo Emanuele I Duca di Savoia, Turin, 1891; Carlo Emanuele I, Miscellanea, 2 vols., B.S.S.S., 120-121, 1930; R. Bergadini: Carlo Emanuele I (1580-1630), Turin, 1932; For the Monferrat question: R. Quazza: La guerra per la successione di Mantova e del Monferrato (1628-1631), Mantua, 1926, and other works by the same author cited there. For Vittorio Amedeo I, see especially S. Foa: Vittorio Amedeo I (1587-1637), Turin, 1931.

doubled. As Braudel states, the influx of American money only really began in Italy in the late 1570s, with a somewhat delayed rise in prices. But the moderation and comparative restriction of the inflation under Emanuele Filiberto can be attributed in large part to his cautious policy of economic restoration. ((10) and Appendix I).

With the climax of the 'revolution in prices' throughout Europe from the 1590s to the 1610s, Carlo Emanuele I's responsibility for the complete collapse of the Piedmontese monetary situation may seem somewhat attenuated.(11) His policy of continual issues of debased silver and copper moneys of small titular value (coined primarily to gain the signoreggio or ducal percentage on all mintings) both flooded the country and created a general atmosphere of uncertainty, rendered the more acute by the disastrous lack of communications in Piedmont. But he was not responsible for the entry of even more debased foreign moneys, minted for the most part in the Monferrat and the independent fees of the prince

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(10) For a more detailed discussion of Piedmontese monetary problems, see Appendix I. F. Braudel: La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II, Paris 1949, pp. pp.413-15; see also A. Fanfani: Indagini sulla "Rivoluzione dei prezzi", Milan, 1940, pp.168-69. For the monetary reform of Emanuele Filiberto, see M. Chiaudano: 'La riforma monetaria di Emanuele Filiberto' in Lo Stato Sabaudo al tempo di Emanuele Filiberto, vol. 3, B.S.S.S., 109, 1928, pp.171-477. Also D. Promis: Le monete dei Reali di Savoia, vol. 1, Turin, 1841, pp. 190-217.

(11) Braudel, op.cit. pp.398-420; see also, F. Braudel and F.C. Spooner: Les métaux monétaires et l'économie du XVIe siècle', Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, 1956, Storia Moderna, vol. IV, Rome, 1955, pp. 233-64.

of Masserano. The geographical position of Piedmont made it peculiarly vulnerable to all such invasions, against which the continual bans of the dukes were wholly ineffectual. The effects of 'Gresham's law' were fully recognized by the Piedmontese financial experts, who tried - in vain - to prohibit all foreign currencies, except the internationally accepted monete grosse, such as the various scudi, doppie, ducatoni minted throughout Europe. But the damage was done and the price of gold and silver rose with all other prices. The government continually attempted to steady the exchange-rates of gold and silver moneys in money of account, but the exchange-rates of the market prevailed. Between 1580 and 1630 the gold scudo del sole rose from 11 fiorini 2 grossi to 26 fiorini 6 grossi, the silver ducatone from 10 fiorini 9 grossi to 19 fiorini 6 grossi.

Vittorio Amedeo I was initially more successful. Like his grandfather Emanuele Filiberto, he at once attempted a complete reform of the monetary system. The lira was again substituted for the fiorino as the money of account, this time with effect (1631-32). For almost two years the value of the gold doppia remained steady at L.6:4 and the silver ducatone at L.2:6. But with new threats of war, large issues of debased money were once more coined, causing the usual rise in the quotations of the monete grosse. On Vittorio Amedeo I's unexpected death in November 1637, Cristina his widow was forced to recognize the exchange-rate of the doppia at L.7:10 and of the ducatone at L.2:12.(12)

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(12) Promis, op.cit., vol.1, pp.218-63; A.Fossati: 'Elementi per uno studio del Corso e dell' Abbassamento delle monete d'oro sotto Carlo Emanuele I (1580-1630)' in Carlo Emanuele I. Miscellanea, B.S.S.S., 120, 1930, pp.47-92; G.Praj: 'La moneta piemontese ai tempi di Vittorio Amedeo I e di Carlo Emanuele II (1630-1675)', B.S.B.S., a.40,1938, pp.221-327.

Vittorio Amedeo I had given his country almost 7 years of peace. His only concrete gains - at the treaty of Cherasco - had been 74 terre (including Alba) in the Monferrat, settling to a large extent the continual frontier disputes. But the peace itself had been of even greater value, allowing the country a breathing space and a moment of repose. The improvement of economic conditions was reflected even in the more-or-less effective check to the headlong collapse of the monetary system.

But at his death, he left only two small sons, and upon the death of the elder the following year, the troubles broke out anew. The rule of his widow, Madama Cristina, sister of Louis XIII, implied almost inevitably an increase of French influence. The old anti-French feeling, which had manifested itself already in polemic writings in the later years of Carlo Emanuele I, had grown stronger during the reign of Vittorio Amedeo I, encouraged by the barely-hidden support of his brothers, cardinal Maurizio and prince Tommaso.(13) Disguising their personal ambitions under cries of patriotism, both brothers now disputed Cristina's claim to act as Regent, and backed their own claims with Spanish troops. The civil war that followed (1639-42) devastated the country more thoroughly than the wars of Carlo Emanuele I and left a deeper imprint. The compromise of 1642 left the country at peace, but

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(13) C. Patrucco: 'L'antifrancesismo in Piemonte sotto il regno di Vittorio Amedeo I', B.S.B.S., a.1, 1896, pp.158-73; idem: 'La partenza del principe Tomaso di Carignano dalle Fiandre secondo documenti inediti (Febbraio 1639)', B.S.B.S., a.1, 1896, pp.58-68; R. Quazza: 'Il pronunciamento antifrancese di Tommaso Savoia-Carignano', Convivium, n.5, 1936, pp.528-64.

wholly under French domination, except for the Spanish-occupied Vercellese.(14)

The monetary situation naturally deteriorated with the civil disorders, especially with the rival minting of money by Tommaso during the siege of Turin in 1640. By the end of 1642 the doppia was valued at L.11 and the ducatone at L.3:14. But with the ensuing peace the position somewhat improved. Cristina now ruled for her son until her death in 1663. Until 1647 new issues of debased money continued in small quantities, with the doppia rising to over L.12, but from that year an attempt was made to control the situation. No more debased money was issued for 9 years, the exchange-rate was controlled more strictly. The foundation of a public debt (called a Monte di Fede) in 1653, expanded in 1659, assisted the government finances and helped support its credit. The values of the doppia and the ducatone remained virtually stationary from 1652 to 1662, when quoted at L.13:13 and L.4:11 respectively.(15)

The stabilization of the monetary and economic situation was continued and developed by Carlo Emanuele II (1638-75) after his mother's

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(14) When the Spanish finally evacuated the Vercellese in 1656, it was so depopulated that it was exempted from taxes for over a quarter of a century. Pupliese, pp.55-56. For the civil war, see in particular: C. Quazza: 'Guerra civile in Piemonte, 1637-1642', B.S.B.S., a.57-58, 1959-60. C. Patrucco: 'La Duchessa di Savoia ed il Principe Tomaso di Carignano durante la guerra civile in Piemonte, 1637-1642', B.S.B.S., a.2,1897, pp.235-71, a.3, 1898, pp.212-53. For Tommaso di Savoia-Carignano, see R. Quazza: 'Come ebbe origine [illegible] la casa Carignano', Convivium, n.2, 1937, pp.171-92, and the other articles by the same author in Convivium, 1936-1937.

(15) Praj, op.cit., pp.251-300.

death. The period of the civil wars was over. Opposition was virtually non-existent and ducal authority steadily asserted itself. Throughout his reign, Carlo Emmanuele II attempted to revive the country economically. Together with his minister Trucchi, 'the Piedmontese Colbert', he began new industries and exploited all commercial activities: silk-weaving was developed, mining encouraged, communications improved and Jews favoured; plans were made to begin colonial companies and attract foreigners, and a commercial treaty with England was signed in 1669; new Monti di Pedo were created in an attempt to attract more investments and strengthen the nascent middle class. Until 1670, both money and prices remained stable and the semi-mercantilist policy of the government was aided by a temporary fall in the value of land, encouraging industrial-commercial investment.(16) But in that year Carlo Emanuele II began preparations for a coup d'etat against the republic of Genoa. The war in 1672 proved a disaster militarily, and Carlo Emanuele was only saved from serious consequences through the intervention of Louis XIV. Financially the monetary situation once more collapsed and the lira was again devalued. By Carlo Emanuele II's death in 1675, the doppia, valued at L.13:13 in 1662, had risen to L.15:10. But the situation was fully stabilized by Trucchi with the issue of a new lira in March 1675, which remained virtually unchanged until the end of the 18th century. Apart from the fluctuations caused by the issue of more debased coinage during the 1690-96 war, the

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(16) L. Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', p.157; Ibid, 'L'elemento mercantilistico', p.297.

monetary situation remained virtually stable until the great reform of 1755.(17)

The effect of Carlo Emanuele II's failure was to leave the country even more dependent on France. The new Regent, Maria Giovanna Battista di Savoia-Nemours, second wife of Carlo Emanuele II, was also French, but of less resolute character than her predecessor. Nevertheless, in her desire to marry the young Vittorio Amedeo II to his cousin the Infanta of Portugal, she showed signs of an attempted independence. The negotiations, which dragged on for a period of over four years, although they showed an awareness of the commercial advantages to be derived for Piedmont, formed a classic demonstration of the contemporary dynastic - as opposed to 'national' - ambitions of the rulers of Europe: the marriage, had it taken place, would have taken Vittorio Amedeo away from Piedmont, and reduced the whole Duchy of Savoy to the position of a province. Strong opposition at Court, secretly encouraged by Vittorio Amedeo himself, caused the negotiations to founder at the last moment. The opposition grew stronger, until three of the leading nobles (the

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(17) The most ample treatment of the reign of Carlo Emanuele II is to be found in the numerous, but widely-scattered articles of L. Bulferetti. Besides the op.cit. ('Considerazioni generali', 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', 'L'elemento mercantilistico'), see 'Sogni e realtà', and 'La feudalità'. See also the review-article of L. Marini: 'Nuovi orientamenti storiografici: gli studi di L. Bulferetti sul periodo di Carlo Emanuele II, Duca di Savoia', R.S.R.S., a.52, 1954, pp.171-83. For the political history, see G. Claretta: Storia del Regno e dei Tempi di Carlo Emanuele II Duca di Savoia, 3 vols., Genoa, 1877-78. For the monetary policy see Praj, op.cit., pp.300-27; L. Bulferetti: 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.65-67; 'Considerazioni generali', pp.183-85; Promis, op.cit., I, pp.266-90.

marchesi di Parella and di Pianezza and the latter's nephew, the conte di Druent) attempted to overthrow the Madama Reale. The exposure of the intrigue (1682) was due as much as anything to Vittorio Amedeo II's equivocal behaviour. But the complete failure of the nobles, with Parella's romantic flight into the Biellese mountains in an attempt to summon his subjects to arms, showed clearly the political ineffectiveness of the nobility.

The discontent in the country, however, was far more widespread. In 1681 a rebellion broke out in Mondovì against an increase in the salt gabelle. It was an expression of hatred not only against the weight of the taxes and their method of imposition, but against the interference of state officials with local liberties. It was almost the last quixotic assertion of a Piedmontese medieval commune against the continual encroachments of the State. Its long and increasingly ruthless suppression gave a clear picture of the social antagonisms cutting across the formation of the state. The submissive loyalty of the local nobility was exploited to chip away the authority of the commune, until its internal collapse became almost inevitable.(18)

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(18) For the negotiations with Portugal, see C. Contessa: 'Progetti economici della seconda Madama Reale di Savoia fondati sopra un contratto nuziale (1676-1682)', Miscellanea di storia italiana, vol. XLVIII, 1915, pp.123-76. For the coup of 1682 and the Mondovì salt war, see D. Carutti: Il primo Re di Casa Savoia. Storia di Vittorio Amedeo II, 3rd ed., Turin, 1897, pp.72-73, 81-103. M. Cordero di Montezemolo has some brief, but acute, remarks to make in her 'Cenni sul Comune di Mondovì nel periodo in cui si costituisce il Regno di Sardegna', B.S.P.S., n.s., n.28, 1950, pp.49-51.

Against both threats - from nobility and communes - the central power had asserted itself successfully. But the Madama Reale's hesitancy and lack of resolution caused her downfall. In 1684, Vittorio Amedeo II, although only aged seventeen, seized power for himself. His authority was extremely limited: the Mondovi war was still in progress; the French ruled at Pinerolo and had occupied Casale in 1681; Vittorio Amedeo was at once compelled to marry a French princess, Anne d'Orleans, and then, at Louis XIV's order, was forced to drive out the Valdesi, tolerated in Piedmont since the middle of the century. When the War of the League of Augsburg broke out in 1689, Vittorio Amedeo II was ordered to provide the French with three infantry regiments.

Any attempt to assert Piedmontese independence seemed foolhardy. When Vittorio Amedeo II joined the League of Augsburg in 1690 he was risking the welfare of his country and the future of his dynasty: the worst predictions seemed fulfilled with the disastrous defeat at Staffarda in 1691. Catinat overran the country as far as Carmagnola, and in 1693 inflicted another defeat on Vittorio Amedeo at Marsaglia. The devastations, especially in the Saluzzese plain, although not so severe as the notorious ravaging of the Palatinate, were long remembered.

But Vittorio Amedeo II's perseverance proved successful. He gained Pinerolo and the destruction of the fortifications at Casale; for the first time since Cateau-Cambrésis the Dukes of Savoy could feel free of French domination. Moreover, their prestige had grown. Already in 1696,

after his separate peace with Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo had been able to impose neutrality on the whole of Italy. Louis XIV was now prepared to pay a heavy subsidy to Piedmont for aid in the approaching war. Once more, in 1701, Vittorio Amedeo had little choice but to join the French. In 1703 he once again changed sides, exacting from the Allies the promise of considerable territorial gains. The immediate effect was almost a repetition of the previous war, with the French under Feuillades overrunning the whole of Piedmont. By the beginning of May 1706 only Turin remained and prepared for a long siege by the French, headed personally by the duke of Orléans. Throughout the summer the siege continued, until Eugene of Savoy finally arrived at the head of the Imperial troops and routed the French on the 7th September.

It was the turning point of the war in Italy. In 1708 already, Vittorio Amedeo II claimed his reward from the Emperor and was given the Monferrat, Valenza, the Alessandrino and Valsesia. As the unity of the Allies broke up, however, Vittorio Amedeo began to be excluded from the negotiations. At Utrecht he was given the Crown of Sicily, but his claims to the Vigevanasco and to Imperial investiture for the disputed fees in the Langhe were ignored. In 1718 he was forced to exchange Sicily for the less fertile Sardinia.

Vittorio Amedeo II had undoubtedly been humiliated, but his position was strong. Piedmont had asserted its independence and had established itself as the leading state in Italy. Only one more war was fought on

its soil before the French Revolution. In 1735, Novara and Tortona were gained as well as sovereignty over the Langhe fees. Its entry into the Austrian Succession War threatened invasion, but was in fact successful: the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 carried the Piedmontese frontier further east with the annexation of the Alto Novarese, the Lomellina and - finally - the Vigevanasco, and set the seal on the Kingdom of Sardinia's new position.(19)

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(19) For Vittorio Amedeo II, see, Carutti, op.cit. For Carlo Emanuele III, D. Carutti: Storia del regno di Carlo Emanuele III, 2 vols., Turin 1859. Piedmont's position in Italy can be clearly seen in the text-books of R. Quazza: Preponderanza Spagnuola, cit., and E. Rota: Le origini del Risorgimento (1700-1800), vol. 1, Milan, 1938. See also G. Quazza: Il problema italiano alla vigilia delle riforme (1720-1738) Rome, 1954.

2. The economy.

i. Agriculture

The wealth of Piedmont lay in its agriculture. The absolute predominance of an agricultural economy is attested unanimously by all contemporary evidence. The euphemistic picture of Piedmont given by Della Chiesa in the first half of the 17th century, the reports of the Venetian ambassadors, the accounts of all travellers in Piedmont, from Botero to Arthur Young, are all equally emphatic.(20)

Piedmont was a region covered by small towns, but lacking the urban economy of the great medieval centres of northern and central Italy. Some cities had old-established industries: Pinerolo, with its guild of wool merchants and two annual fairs, Vercelli with its cloth trade, and above all Chieri, with its merchant-bankers. But these industries had been almost wholly eliminated by the wars of the early 16th century. Most of the towns - such as Savigliano, Bra, Alba, Saluzzo, Fossano, etc., - and all the communes depended almost exclusively for their wealth on agricultural produce. As a result, they

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(20) Reports of the Venetian ambassadors in the collections of Alberi and Barozzi and Berchet; also in L. Cibrario: Relazioni dello Stato di Savoia negli anni 1574, 1670, 1743 scritte dagli ambasciatori veneti Molini, Bellegno, Foscarini, Turin, 1830. F.A. Della Chiesa: Relazione dello Stato del Piemonte... Turin, 1635; idem: Corona Reale di Savoia..., Turin 1655; G. Botero: Relationi di Piemonte, Venice, 1640. A Young: Travels in France and Italy during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789, London, 1915.

suffered all the more directly from wars fought on Piedmontese soil.(21)

It is still impossible to examine the development of Piedmontese agriculture in detail.(22) A very general examination would seem to indicate a revival of Piedmontese agriculture under Emanuele Filiberto, followed by a severe regression in the first half of the 17th century, with the wars of Carlo Emanuele I and the plague of 1630 culminating in the years of civil war. But from the middle of the 17th century a general development is to be seen, which continued, despite the temporary setbacks of the 1690-96 and 1700-13 wars, for most of the 18th century. The agricultural development, in general lines, paralleled the political history of the country.

The main forms of agriculture practised in Piedmont varied from region to region. Over half Piedmont was uncultivated even at the end of the 18th century, indicative of a lack of enterprise not fully explained by the large extent of mountain. The cultivated area could be divided

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(21) See the short but brilliant description of Piedmont in the mid-16th century by H.G. Koenigsberger, op.cit., pp.73-76. A. Caffaro: 'L'arte del lanificio in Pinerolo', Miscellanea di storia italiana, vol. XXX, 1893 pp.491-544; Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', pp.183, 191, 208-10.

(22) The only reliable work on Piedmontese economy (written over 50 years ago) is that of Prato: La vita economica. See also the brief remarks of Prato in, 'Uno sguardo storico al progresso dell'economia agraria piemontese', Italia agraria, n.7, July 1928.

in three main zones: the Alpine circle, the Po plain and the hilly region of the Monferrat. The circle of the pre-Alps stretches north from the Cuneese to the Saluzzese, then east to the Canavese, along the Valle d'Aosta and as far as Valsesia. The chief form of cultivation was of vines, while in the western part (especially in the Saluzzese) the main wealth was derived from the breeding of animals. In the higher regions, cultivation of any sort was difficult, and the large mountain flanks were used above all for pasturage. There was a great richness of woodland, despite the illegal disafforestation by the peasants for building and heating; the lords and communes, owners of these woods, attempted to protect them, but were only supported - ineffectively - by the government in the 18th century. The nature of the land excluded large farms, and almost all the property was owned in small holdings.

The change from mountain to plain was abrupt. The whole of the Po valley, centred on the Canavese and Saluzzese plains, was of immense fertility. By far the most important cultivation was that of cereals, of all types. Such cultivation was of varying intensity and quality, but, as Arthur Young noted, the soil was so rich as to permit a superficial exploitation. Except in rare instances, the cereal product yielded more than sufficient for the internal consumption of Piedmont. Vines were also grown in the plains, under the name of *alteni*: they constituted a widespread form of cultivation, but their product was recognised as of poorer quality than that of the hills.

The best wine area, famed even outside Italy, lay in the hills, above all in the Astigiano and the Langhe, to the south and south-east of Turin. The area, surrounding Asti, Alba, Bra and Cherasco, was subjected to an intense cultivation, in large part by smallholders. The cultivation was, perhaps, more professional and less superficial than in any other part of Piedmont.

Further east, in the Vercellese plain, the cultivation of rice had begun, despite the continual governmental prohibitions for sanitary reasons. Contrary to general opinion, however, at the beginning of the 18th century, the rice fields formed no more than 7% of the total area of the Vercellese.

The only other agricultural product of importance were the mulberry trees. Introduced into Piedmont at the end of the Middle Ages, their cultivation had been completely ruined by the wars of the early 16th century. They were now reintroduced by Emanuele Filiberto with great success, and Della Chiesa noted mulberry trees everywhere in Piedmont, above all in the western plain between Cuneo and Turin. Their product formed the basis for the production of silk, one of the

principal industries in the country.(23)

The whole of the lowland area, the plain even more than the hills, was dominated by the vast estates of the nobility and the Church. These holdings whether latifondi or smaller, were usually let out at mezzadria, the classic form of cultivation still prevalent in northern and central Italy. The division of the produce between padrone and mezzadro (massaro), was usually by half (with the exception of certain, specified items, such as mulberry leaves, deadwood, etc.) but the padrone's share might drop to as little as one quarter. But the late 16th century, however, the ratio was virtually stable, with changes, if at all, in favour of the padrone.(24)

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(23) For the forms of agriculture in Piedmont, see Prato, pp.31-214. For the geography and cultivation of the mountain areas, R. Blanchard: Les Alpes Occidentales, t.6: Le versant Piémontais, Paris,1952-54, especially, vol. I, pp.262-91, 304-19, vol.2,pp.395-492,533-625. Some useful and nearly contempoary information can be found in G.A.Denedio: Trattato dell'Agricoltura...,Turin,1779; G.A. Donadio: Dissertazione o progetti sovra il modo di tenere le viti secondo lo stile praticato da più periti Vignaiuoli nel Marchesato di Saluzzo, Turin 1774; G. Debernardi: Antifittuario della terra...,Vercelli, 1786; and Donaudi delle Mallere: Abbozzo ragionato di catastro politico, ms 1784, MS in Biblioteca Civica di Torino. For the plain, see G.Gabotto: 'L'agricoltura nella regione saluzzese dal secolo XI al XV' in Miscellanea Saluzzese, B.S.S.S., 15,1902, pp.III-CLIV, which also includes a long discussion as to the nature of the alteno, pp.LXV-LXIX. For the Vercellese, see the impressive study of Pugliese, passim; for the rice-fields,pp.41-52. For the annonary policy of the government, see L.Dal Pane: 'La questione del commercio dei grani in Piemonte nel secolo XVIII' in Studi in onore di Carlo Calisse, vol.3,Milan, 1939, pp.39-76; also Quazza, pp.205-33.

(24) It should be noted that the word mezzadria implied a division by half. Pugliese notes for the Vercellese (pp.146-57) that the labour services and gifts of chickens, eggs,etc. owed by the mezzadro to the padrone doubled between 1554 and 1750, while the latter's share of grain rose in the same period from 1/3 to 1/2, of cheaper cereals (marzaschi) from 1/3 to 2/5, and of rice from 1/4 to 2/3.
For an example of a contract of mezzadria,see A.Caffaro: 'Un documento di mezzadria del secolo XV con nota esplicativa', Annali della R. Accademia d'Agricoltura di Torino, vol.XXXV,1892. It is dated 1434 and relates to a farm near Pinerolo, but in form it is identical to contracts of the 16th to the 18th century: compare the contract printed in Appendix 8(a).

Besides mezzadria, a certain amount of land was still exploited directly (in economia). The size and location of such lands varied from region to region. In the mountainous lands, the nature of the land led to a prevalence of small-holdings, usually exploited directly by the peasant-owner. Elsewhere much depended on local tradition, and the social position of the owner. In very general terms, there was a tendency to exploit directly those lands lying nearest the centre of a latifondo.(25)

A small amount of land was still held by emphyteusis. The original grants, made by the Church in the centuries after the barbarian invasions, were in the form of perpetual or extremely long-term leases in return for a reasonably high initial payment (laudemio) and a nominal annual rent (canone); the reason for the grants lay in the undertaking by the enfiteuta to cultivate what was virtually wasteland. Such emphyteuses, which developed in Piedmont above all in the 13th and 14th centuries, survived throughout the Middle Ages, although regarded with disfavour, because of the ease with which the owner lost all rights over them. The struggle to exert authority and exact the canone could still be seen occasionally as late as the end of the 16th century. But even where payment continued, it virtually lost all value, especially if the fixed canone was paid in money. By the 17th century, the canoni were almost nominal, and were restricted to a few small areas immediately surrounding

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(25) Pugliese, pp.411-13.

the castle. The Church, however, still made some new grants, especially in times of extreme shortage of money and men: the Ospedale Maggiore of Vercelli created some emphyteuses as late as 1701-06. These grants were not perpetual, but restricted by papal order to a limited number of lives, while the canoni were raised to something more than a nominal figure.(26)

In the second half of the 18th century a new form of holding developed. An increasing amount of land, formerly given out at mezzadria, began to be hired (affittanza, in locazione). An intermediary class of speculators, merchants, bankers, lawyers, etc. entered the land market, offering the owners, usually nobles, the security of a steady rent without the responsibility of residence. These affittavoli then divided the land in small plots, either letting it out in mezzadria or exploiting it directly. Occasionally the padrone himself changed the contract of mezzadria to one of locazione, without the intervention of third parties. The new phenomenon, was strongly denounced by contemporaries: the old landlord-tenant relationship was vanishing, while a new agricultural proletariat of braccianti was being created.(27) Why such a change should have

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(26) Paul IV insisted on increased canoni in 1555; while perpetual emphyteuses were forbidden from 1650: see Pugliese, pp.137-45. Scipio, Antica legislazione, pp.330-34, notes that emphyteuses were most common in the plains, especially in the Vercellese. For the whole question, see V. Simoncelli: Della enfiteusi, Turin, 1922.

(27) See the attack of G. Debernardi: Antifitturio della terra...., Vercelli, 1786. Also Pugliese, pp.158-81; Prato, pp.210-14.

have occurred is by no means clear: was the attraction of the Court and the policy of the King (under Vittorio Amedeo II differing in this one respect from Louis XIV) now so powerful that the nobility felt compelled to display themselves and their wealth ? Or were there deeper economic motives, such as changes in the value or income of land, responsible for the increased absenteeism ? Moreover, was the change by the end of the 18th century in fact so widespread as contemporaries imagined, and as Prato maintained ? Until both the agriculture and social movements in Piedmont in the second half of the 18th century have been closely studied, it will be impossible to answer these questions.

The cultivation of these vast estates was notoriously less efficient than that of smallholdings. At the time of the general perequazione, in the first quarter of the 18th century, feudal lands formed 6.90% of the total area of Piedmont. But while the average revenue of the allodial lands (55.42% of the total area) was L.8:0:9 per giornata, that of the feudal holdings was only L.6:16:4. The accusation of poor cultivation carried great weight, but was probably not fully valid. The large feudal estates included great areas of non-cultivated lands, woods, pasturages and heathland. If only the land actually in cultivation had been taken into consideration the average revenue might well have proved as high as that from allodial land.(28)

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(28) Prato, pp.186-92; Einaudi, pp.55-65; Pugliese, pp.64-75.

ii. Industry and commerce.

By far the major income of both the State and of private individuals was derived from the land. But it was an insufficiently elastic income, liable to diminish in times of war, and incapable of any rapid expansion. The modern State, in the age of mercantilism, demanded larger, and more mobile, sources of wealth. An attempt was made to develop industry and commerce.(29)

The silk industry was already flourishing in the Astigiano in the 14th century. Revived by Emanuele Filiberto, it once more collapsed at the time of the 1630 plague, when Della Chiesa only noted Racconigi as a silk-producing centre. Carlo Emanuele II tried to revive it, and Vittorio Amedeo II transformed State intervention in private enterprise into a State industry. Formerly silks had only been semi-produced; now loans were made and factories established in an attempt to produce fully-finished silks. Carlo Emanuele III followed his father's methods.

Only one other industry was so pampered as the silk-trade. The woollen industry already existed in Piedmont in the 15th century, with centres at Pinerolo, Vercelli and in the Biellese. But it too was ruined by the wars, and only restored by Carlo Emanuele II, in the Biellese. Vittorio Amedeo II appointed an inspector in 1698, and gave continual loans and privileges, even guaranteeing large-scale military orders. The trade had the fortune of the support of many leading members of the

(29) Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', p.191.

government. The marchese d'Ormea, virtual ruler of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the early years of Carlo Emanuele III, had already founded a wool factory in 1724, and in 1726 an edict was passed, protecting the industry from foreign, especially English, competition. The opposition of the traditional silk interests, led by Saint-Laurent, was ineffectual and the protection continued. But already in 1732, there were signs of unemployment and an attempt was made to decentralize the industry. By the middle of the century there was complete stagnation.

Great hopes had been placed on the hidden mineral wealth of Piedmont. The first organic law on mining dated back to 1522. As all the subsoil belonged to the Demesne, the Dukes had a particular interest in its exploitation. Both Emanuele Filiberto and Carlo Emanuele I had tried to develop the industry, giving licences for mines all over Piedmont. Carlo Emanuele II had hopes of silver mines and attempted to exploit them personally. But the results were not in proportion to the capital invested, and Vittorio Amedeo II gave very little encouragement to the industry. Only in the second half of the 18th century was there a revival of interest, this time not monopolized by the search for silver.

No other industry was ever of great importance. The cloth industry was soundly based on the indigenous hemp and linen production, but consisted of small, private firms producing for home consumption. Carlo Emanuele II tried to expand it unsuccessfully, and Carlo Emanuele III limited himself to issuing regulations. Cotton was a traditional

industry at Chieri and of some importance at Vercelli. Dyeing and secondary textiles were to be found in the Biellese, and in the course of the 18th century elsewhere. Glass production was the monopoly of a Venetian settlement at Altare (Monferrato), dating back to the Middle Ages; in the 17th century, attempts were made to start production elsewhere, but they had all collapsed by the end of the century; Vittorio Amedeo II started a new factory in 1694, but also confirmed the privileges of the Altare guild.

The general lines of development can be followed. After the wars of the 16th century, Emanuele Filiberto had taken the first tentative steps towards the re-establishment of industry and the furthering of commerce. The fragile structure created by him collapsed in the half century following his death. A new, more determined effort was made by Carlo Emanuele II, with the advice of his minister, Trucchi. It was an attempt at 'state mercantilism', concentrating above all on the development of mines and maritime commerce. The Duke himself led the way and tried to attract the mobile wealth of the country. But it remained very much a lone effort: no more than a few dozen people were persuaded to invest their money in industry.

Carlo Emanuele II's policy was continued by his widow, the second Madama Reale, and then systematically developed by his son Vittorio Amedeo II. As early as 1676, the Madama Reale had tried to found a Consolato per il commercio; in 1687, Vittorio Amedeo II succeeded in Turin, and extended its authority to all Piedmont the following year. He gave continual direct

and indirect financial support, guaranteed orders and intervened with fiscal privileges and customs protection. At the same time, an attempt was made to develop the manufacturing class. It was all typical of the Colbertian brand of mercantilism, but in Piedmont was characterized by a fundamental empiricism.(30)

The results were limited. Piedmontese industry remained above all a local industry, employing small numbers and concentrated on few places, mainly in the province of Turin. The attempts to attract large-scale investments were not very successful. Nor was this surprising. Communications remained extremely bad, with not a single road that could be

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(30) For Emanuele Filiberto, see the unfortunately 'patriotic' and over-optimistic articles of A.Garino-Canina in Economia, a.V, vol.X, 1927 and Emanuele Filiberto, Turin, 1928. For Carlo Emanuele II, see the articles of Dulferetti, passim. For the second Madama Reale see C.Contessa, op.cit., Miscellanea di storia italiana, 1915, and also 'Aspirazioni commerciali intrecciate ad alleanze politiche della casa di Savoia coll'Inghilterra nei secoli XVII e XVIII', Memorie della R.Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, ser.II, a.LXIV, 1913-14, n.3, pp.1-50. For the 18th century, the most recent discussion is that of Quazza, especially pp.241-319, which supplements the classic, and somewhat liberal-biased, account of Prato, pp.215-328. Some interesting remarks are to be found in F.Venturi: 'Il Piemonte dei primi decenni del Settecento nelle relazioni dei diplomatici inglesi', B.S.P.S., a.54, 1956, pp.227-271. Some additional information in C. Prato: Il costo della Guerra di Successione Spagnuola e le spese pubbliche in Piemonte dal 1700 al 1713, in Le Campagne di Guerra in Piemonte (1703-1708) e l'assedio di Torino (1706), parte 3a, Miscellanea, t.IV, Turin, 1907, pp.351-364. For the silk industry, see G.Arese: L'industria serica piemontese dal secolo XVII alla metà del secolo XIX, Turin, 1922, and also G. Destefanis: 'Notizie sull'arte della seta e sulla "Università dei Filatoieri" in Racconigi nei secoli XVI, XVII, e XVIII', B.S.P.C., a.XIV, n.2, 1942, pp.53-75. For the mining industry, besides Dulferetti, some useful facts are given by M.Abrate: L'industria metallurgica in Europa nella prima metà del XIX secolo. Una valutazione piemontese, Turin, 1958, pp.6-25. For the woollen industry, see A.Caffaro, op.cit., Miscellanea di storia italiana, 1893. See also R.M. Borsarelli: 'Il naviglio di Cunne. (Storia di un progetto che mai divenne realtà)' B.S.P.C., n.s., n.36, 1955, pp.77-92.

regarded as safe and practicable for the whole of the year. Their maintenance was left by the government to the local communes and feudatories, who lacked, if not interest, certainly the financial means necessary to take care of their upkeep. The waterways were in little better condition. Commerce was hindered by the number of internal tolls (pedaggi), almost all in private hands; the government lacked the necessary means (and perhaps authority) to rebuy them, and as late as 1750 recognized almost 500 pedaggi in Piedmont and Nice, yielding an annual income of almost L.125,000. Commerce with other countries was subjected to industrial protection and agrarian policy, and was, in practice, almost entirely in the hands of Genoese, Lombard and Provençal merchants; small commerce was largely in the hands of Jews.(31)

It was not that the nobility were wholly unaware of the possibilities of industry. Investment in mining was traditional, and the collateral branch of the royal family, the princes of Savoie-Carignano, possessed a great number of mines in Savoie. Paper factories were almost exclusively owned by nobles. Other examples, besides the famous Ormea wool factory, can be found of noble investment in silk, wool and even glass factories, especially from the last decades of the 17th century.

But the number of nobles who invested in industry always remained extremely small. To a certain extent, investment in industry was dangerous. The comte di Balmour lost L.20,000 in an attempt to found a cotton veil

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(31) Prato, pp.260-62, 272-300; Quazza, pp.295-300.

factory (1732), which collapsed in the face of the Bolognese monopoly.(32) Communications were bad, transport was expensive, there was a complete lack of organisation, and a disastrous ignorance about the state of foreign markets. But even more important was the apparent indifference or prejudice of the nobility. The government, despite all edicts permitting noble entry into trade, despite all bribes to nobles (and others) who invested in industry, was unable to gain any real support: the greater number of those who invested in trade (such as Ormea and Salmour) were newly ennobled, created by the King, and dependent on the King for both their careers and their fortunes.(33)

iii. Capital and its investment.

Until the second half of the 17th century there had been few possibilities of investment. The amount of mobile capital was extremely limited, and the monetary disorders, accentuated by the impossible communications, encouraged immediate investment in land. If money was not employed in land, there were few other ways of investing it. There was the possibility of buying up State taxes, especially the land-tax (tasso), or of infeudating allodial land, so exempting it from future taxes. But it was a limited

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(32) Prato, pp.248-49.

(33) Prato, pp.267-73; Guazza, pp.283-84; Dulferetti: 'Sogni e realtà', pp.89-94.

outlet, especially as the government never indulged in a general sale of offices.(34) There was always the possibility of investing abroad, in 'safe' centres such as Lyon or Genoa; but only the more prominent families, and usually those with lands lying quite near the frontier, could really profit from such elaborate transactions. And there was the possibility of investing locally in loans guaranteed on landed possessions.

These loans - censi, fedri, livelli, ordinari, canoni, crediti, etc. - formed the main outlet for liquid capital until the later 17th century. In practice, they were almost identical to the English long-term rent-charge. Theoretically redeemable for a limited number of years (stipulated in the contract), in effect, they proved almost always perpetually redeemable. Easier to contract, and more flexible in terms than the English mortgage (of which little evidence has been found in Piedmont), they also avoided the accusation of usury.(35) Throughout

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(34) For a fuller discussion of alienation of State taxes, see below pp.53-54. For sales of offices in Piedmont, limited to certain offices in the magistrature and to some communal offices (notaio, speziarg, inquisitore), see, C.Dionisotti: Storia della magistratura piemontese, Turin, 1881,vol.II,pp.137,175,185-86,191-95; G. Claretta: Storia del Regno e dei Tempi di Carlo Emanuele II Duca di Savoia, Genoa, 1878, vol.2,pp.289-93; D.Carutti: Storia di Vittorio Amedeo II,3rd ed.,Turin, 1897,p.451; Einaudi,pp.245-64; Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', pp.188, 280-86; Quazza, pp.92-93; L.Marini: 'La Valle d'Aosta', p.578.

(35) For the English counterpart to the 'censo', see H.J.Habakkuk: 'The long-term rate of interest and the price of land in the seventeenth century', Economic History Review, 2nd series, n.1,1952,pp.26-45. For the importance of the mortgage and rent-charge in the economy of 16th-17th century English families, as a comparison to Piedmont, see M.Finch: The wealth of five Northamptonshire families, 1540-1640, Northamptonshire Record Society, vol.XIX,1956,e.g.,pp.31-34,83-87, 129-32,167-69. For further information on the censo, see Nani, pp.350-61; Pertile, pp.431-39, 597-601; Scalopis, Antica legislazione, pp.323-30.

the Middle Ages, the period of the greatest importance for the censo, the Church was in doubt as to its nature. The Council of Constance was unable to decide whether or not it constituted usury; Martin V allowed its legality, as did Calixtus III, while Nicholas V in 1452 greatly extended its scope. Finally, in 1568, Pius V defined its character, asserting its perpetual redeemability and insisting on a iustum pretium, or reasonable rate of interest.

The limitations of the bull, accepted formally in Piedmont (though not in the Valle d'Aosta), were virtually ignored in practice. The rate of interest in the 16th century remained extremely high, varying from 8 to 12%, only falling in the 17th century.(36) Only the perpetual nature of redemption would seem to have been effective.

The possibilities of such investment were always widespread. The weight of taxes, especially in the first half of the 17th century, was such as to force both the comunità and the peasants to continually create new censi. They had the advantage of being local, and hence easily exactable. But it was mainly the nobility who took advantage of them, while the Church held back, afraid of the accusation of usury, and not always confident of the reliability of the security.

From the middle of the 17th century there was a steady growth in prosperity, despite the wars at the turn of the century. The development

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(36) Cf., for instance, the examples given by M.Chiaudano: 'La riforma monetaria di Emanuele Filiberto', pp.361-63, 476; and for the reign of Carlo Emanuele II, Bulferetti: 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.26-27, 121-22, and especially 151-53.

of agriculture, as has been noted, was continual. The growth in population formed a marked contrast to the previous stagnation and even decline: the census made on the basis of the number of hearths (fuochi) for the salt gabelle in 1612 gave a total population of 677,246; by 1703 it had risen to 804,367, by 1734 to 1,496,390, and by 1750 to 2,379,949 (including, however, the newly acquired provinces). The average density of the population showed an equally marked rise: in 1580 there was an average population of 46 per square kilometre, which by 1612 had fallen to 39.13; by 1703 it had risen to 44.18, by 1734 to 56.54, and by 1750 to 67.10.(37) At the same time, after a stagnatory period in the 1660s, there was a steady rise in the price of land, perhaps increased by the fall in the purchasing value of money; this rise apparently continued even during the period of the wars.(38)

The foundation of Monti di Pede was indicative of an increased mobilization of liquid capital, which in turn it helped to stimulate. In

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(37) See Prato, pp.31-57; idem: 'Censimenti e popolazione in Piemonte nei secoli XVI, XVII, e XVIII', Rivista italiana di sociologia, a.X, fasc.3-4, 1906, pp.308-376; Quazza, pp.205-09, gives somewhat different figures for the density, but confirms the steady rise in the 18th century; while Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.166-67, 'L'elemento mercantilistico', pp.296-97, indicates a similar tendency for the second half of the 17th century.

(38) For the stagnation of the land market in the 1660s, general in all Italy, see Bulferetti: 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', p.157, 'L'elemento mercantilistico', p.297. For the rise in price from 1680, if not earlier, see Prato, pp.192-201; idem: Costo della guerra, pp.334-37; Einaudi, pp.426-31; Pugliese, pp.122-36.

the late 16th century already, local monti di pietà had sprung up in Piedmont: in 1573 at Vercelli, 1574 at Asti, 1583 at Cuneo and 1591 at Fossano; at Turin the Compagnia di San Paolo had been founded in 1579. But these were papal-sponsored foundations, lending at first with no interest, in an attempt to combat usury. There was no equivalent of the State Banks founded in Sicily, Venice, Rome and elsewhere from the second half of the 16th century.(39) The first attempt of the government was in 1653 with the foundation of a Monte di Pede: it had an immediate stabilizing effect on the monetary situation. In 1659, 1667 and 1668, three more foundations (grezioni) were made; then again in 1681 and 1689; and with the war crises in 1690 and 1692, with seven more grezioni during the Spanish Succession War. By 1736 there had been 16 grezioni.(40) The rate of interest grew stable and then began to fall, undoubtedly influenced by the security offered by the Monti: in the 1660s, it was still 6% (if not higher), by the 1710s it had fallen to 4%.(41)

Investment in the Monti was favoured above all by the capitalists of Turin; elsewhere there was a preference for alienated tasai, the local land-tax, which was easier to collect. The earliest Monti, under

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(39) Braudel: La Méditerranée, pp.404-07.

(40) For more details on the Monti, see Einaudi, pp.203-30; Bulferetti: 'La feudalità' pp.393-94, 589-94; Quazza, pp.199-202. For the early papal-sponsored Monti di pietà, see I.M. Sacco: 'Lineamenti storici del Monte di pietà in Fossano', B.S.P.C., a.XLII, n.20, 1941, pp.49-71.

(41) Prato: Costo della guerra, p.379 gives some examples.

Carlo Emanuele II, already showed an increase in the percentage of middle-class investors. The increase continued and developed, but the greatest amount of capital still came from the nobility and the Church. The elements of a middle class existed, encouraged by the efforts of Carlo Emanuele II and his son. But they were too small and too weak to form anything but a very secondary factor. There was no real middle class, consciously developed to counterbalance the power of the nobility, but only a bureaucracy, composed mainly of lawyers, who owed everything to the ruler and who could be relied upon to fully obey his orders. Their ennoblement was a reward, and did not signify any particular independence. The attractions of the only class with full social powers naturally remained supreme. As soon as possible, the successful bourgeois abandoned their commercial or banking activities, their legal careers, to buy land and titles and enter the ranks of the nobility. The government attacked the privileges of the nobility, but had no desire - and perhaps no power - to impeach its reputation. At the same time, the nobility remained the more important capitalist class in Piedmont.

By the middle of the 18th century, investment in land began to rival industrial profits. With the fall in the rate of interest to 3%, the income from land, especially with the development of agricultural techniques, became equally if not more profitable.(42) The constant demand for land

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(42) Pugliese, pp.158-81, 412-13; Prato, pp.210-14.

was increased by a wave of speculation, as a new class of middle-men entered the market. Where land could not be bought, it was hired. The slow drift of the nobility, with their vast landed incomes, towards Turin and the Court, accentuated the revolution. Land was being commercialized, and the position of the peasants depressed. Meanwhile, their feudal masters, now usually absentee landlords, began to display their wealth.

The increasing mobility of liquid capital showed itself in the higher standard of living. A greater, more widespread, luxury was felt in the 18th century. Its most prominent characteristic was the urge to build. Until the late 17th century, the building of churches and palaces was restricted almost entirely to ecclesiastical orders and to the ducal family. Some of the richer families improved their castles, but very few were prepared - or were in a position - to act as real patrons. But as the century drew towards its close, the ducal efforts to build up the capital began to bear their fruits. When Montaigne passed through Turin he could find little to admire. Emanuele Filiberto and Carlo Emanuele I had both hoped to create a new, impressive capital, but had achieved limited results. The real expansion of Turin only began with Carlo Emanuele II. As elsewhere in Europe, baroque, reflected and paralleled the growth of absolutism. Increasingly attracted by the Court, the nobility began to feel the need to maintain a social position. Already in the 1670s, the princes of Carignano began a palace of a grandeur rivalling that of the ruling house. The smaller families tried

to follow, and those who were unable to settle in the capital built themselves impressive palaces in the provinces. The urge to build proved contagious, and the whole of Piedmont was covered by new, or rebuilt, castles, churches, palaces. By the middle of the 18th century Charles De Brosses, exaggerating somewhat, could describe Turin as the most beautiful town in Italy, if not in Europe.(43) The regularity of its design, with its rich facades and courtyards, bore evidence not only to the remarkable flourishing of its own particular form of architecture, but also to a far greater wealth than seemed imaginable in the Piedmont of two centuries earlier.

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(43) "Turin me paraît la plus jolie ville de l'Italie, et, à ce que je crois, de l'Europe, par l'alignement de ses rues, la régularité de ses bâtiments et la beauté de ses places, dont la plus neuve est entourée de portiques.": C. de Brosses: Lettres familières sur l'Italie, Paris, 1931, vol.2, pp.574-75; M.M. de Montaigne: Journal du voyage...en Italie, par la Suisse et l'Allemagne en 1580 et 1581, Rome, Paris, 1774.
The most recent and impressive study of Piedmontese baroque is that of R. Wittkower: Art and Architecture in Italy, 1600-1750, Pelican History of Art, London, 1958, pp.267-288. For the development of Turin, see C. Boggio: 'Gli architetti Carlo e Amedeo Castellamonte e lo sviluppo edilizio di Torino nel secoloXVII', Atti della Società degli Ingegneri e degli Architetti in Torino, 1896, vol. 29, pp.27-58.

3. Administration and finances. The social structure of Piedmont.

1. The administration and magistracy.

The attempts to develop industry and commerce and attract large-scale investments gave evidence of an increasing activity on the part of the government. The relative failure was to some extent due to the lack of an adequate administrative organisation.(44) Throughout the 17th century the dukes were still unable to fully assert their authority, and even the later reform of the administrative and financial structure by Vittorio Amedeo II was forced to acknowledge certain limits.

Emanuele Filiberto had at once shown his determination to rule without restraint. The Parlements founded during the French occupation were retained (under the name of Senati from 1583) as supreme courts of appeal, with complete jurisdiction over all law suits relating to the Demesne. A second Camera dei Conti was established at Turin, with full authority over all matters relating to finances. No laws could be passed without the interinazione or registration of either Senato or Camera. A system of prefetture (and prefavendari) was established in the provinces, as courts of first appeal. But the abolition of the Estates left the communes without any form of representation, while the collection of laws published by Emanuele Filiberto in 1561-65 (based on

(44) Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', pp.215-18.

the Statutes of Amedeo VIII of 1430, 1433) represented an attempt to assert ducal authority over all local privileges and liberties.(45)

In the years following Emanuele Filiberto's death, the central authority weakened once more, Carlo Emanuele I was only partially able to follow his father's policy, limiting feudal rights of jurisdiction and ignoring the privileges of the comunità. After the conquest of the marquisate of Saluzzo, despite a promise to maintain all customary liberties, the communes were infeudated one by one; the Congregazione degli Eletti lost all power, and by 1701 the province even ceased to be distinguished by the title of marquisate.(46) But feudal privileges increased.

By the end of the 17th century, the attack on the anachronistic liberties of the communes had been virtually completed. The revolt of Mondovì was suppressed in 1681, and again in 1699. But as late as 1706, the rising of the city of Dra against its infeudation to the marchese di Caraglio(47) warned Vittorio Amedeo II that he still had to act with a certain discretion.

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(45) F. Patetta: 'La legislazione' in Emanuele Filiberto, Turin, 1928, pp.223-49. C. Dionisotti: Storia della magistratura piemontese, 2 vols, Turin, 1881; P. Bodo: Le consuetudini, la legislazione, le istituzioni del vecchio Piemonte, Turin, 1950, pp.99-106.

(46) G. Manuel di San Giovanni: Memorie storiche di Dronero e della valle di Maira, Turin, 1868, vol. 2, pp.113-292; C.F. Savio: Saluzzo marchesato e diocesi nel secolo XVII (1601-1635), Saluzzo, 1915, pp.9-18, 181-193; idem: Saluzzo. Storia dal 1635 al 1730, Saluzzo, 1928, p.163. F.E. Bollati di Saint-Pierre: Atti e documenti delle antiche assemblee rappresentative nella Monarchia di Savoia in Hist. Mon. Pat., tom.15, 1879.

(47) Quazza, pp.339-40.

Ecclesiastical and feudal privileges presented a greater problem. The civil war had shown up the limitations of ducal authority. Carlo Emanuele II was unable to insist on his absolute superiority. He only managed to assert his independence from the Holy Roman Emperor in 1664, when his rights were guaranteed by the treaties of Münster and the Pyrenees. He continually tried to assert his independence from the Papacy. But in his own territories he was unable to claim an absolute authority. The variety of his possessions, each held by a different title, as well as the continued existence of independent enclaves, limited his freedom of action. Thesauro, the theorist of ducal authority, made no attempt to claim divine right, or even any connexion with divinity: superiority over the nobility was justified by feudal law, over the clergy by canon law and papal confirmation, over the comunità by single accords made with each of them at the time of their submission. Distinguishing prince from tyrant, according to the Aristotelian scheme, he tried by concrete casuistry to find solutions based on juridical principles acceptable to all classes.(48)

Vittorio Amedeo II was in a far stronger position - especially after the acquisition of a Crown - and acted far more aggressively. The magistracy was virtually deprived of its independence. The two Camere were united in 1720; a special magistracy was created for lawsuits arising from the confiscation of fees; local, private, justice was attacked. An attempt was even made to deprive the Senate and the Camera of their right

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(48) Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', pp.210-15, 223-25, 228-32, 249-52; idem, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.7-18.

to register all laws: and in fact, royal edicts were exempted from the insinuazioni. The publication of the Royal Constitutions in 1723 and 1729 clearly stated the supremacy of the prince over all feudal and local laws and customs.(49)

The weakness of the administration in large part derived from its lack of centralization. The fifteen or more treasuries over-lapped and lacked effective supervision; too much power concentrated in the hands of the secretary of state, hereditary in the San Tommaso family for four generations. In 1717, a Consiglio di Stato was created, the post of Secretary of State was divided in two, and the financial organization was completely reformed. Intendants were established in all the provinces, with extensive powers, directed in large part against local feudal and ecclesiastical authority.(50)

ii. The finances.

The main sources of income at the restoration of Emanuele Filiberto were the demesne and the gabelles.(51) But most exploitable demesne had

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(49) Quazza, pp.76-84; M. Viora: Le Costituzioni Piemontesi (Leggi e Costituzioni di S.M. il Re di Sardegna) 1723 - 1729 - 1770, Milan, 1928, pp.23-225.

(50) Quazza, pp.55-95.

(51) For the description of the finances of Piedmont, see the brilliantly lucid account of Einaudi, especially pp.1-89, 119-40, 152-73. See also his description of the system of book-keeping before the reform of 1717 in: Le entrate pubbliche dello Stato Sabaudo nei bilanci e nei conti dei tesorieri durante la guerra di successione spagnuola in Le campagne di guerra in Piemonte (1703-1708) e l'assedio di Torino (1706), parte 3a, Miscellanea, vol.9, Turin, 1909, in particular chapter 1.

already been alienated. The main gabelle was for salt, but the bad quality of the official salt and the quantity imposed led to an immense traffic in smuggling; the tobacco gabelle met with similar resistance. Almost all the gabelles fell exclusively on Piedmont, as did most of the transit duties (dogana, tratta forranea). The traditional method of hiring out the gabelles, often all together, led to a considerable loss for the Treasury.

But the evident insufficiency of these revenues for the growing demands of the State necessitated a new form of imposition. The tasso was originally imposed by Emanuele Filiberto as an increase on the salt gabelle, to be paid annually by the individual comunità. Its permanency was only officially acknowledged in 1690. From its earliest days it betrayed its basic inequality: the total sum was divided among the twelve provinces of Piedmont, but each comunità within the province did not pay a percentage of the whole, calculated on the extent and wealth of its land, but an arbitrarily fixed sum negotiated directly between the comunità and the Treasury. When the marquisate of Saluzzo was conquered, it was held to pay 1/12 of the total tasso, suddenly changed to 1/14, and then commuted to a fixed sum, with little relation to the annually variable total of the tasso.

This inequality was aggravated by the impositions of other ordinary and extraordinary taxes on the basis of the tasso. The sussidio militare was first imposed by Carlo Emanuele II in 1659 for one year, to pay for military expenses arising from the peace of the Pyrenees. Like the tasso,

it was only declared permanent at the end of the century. The *imposta delle 300 mila lire* was first decreed in 1698 to pay for losses from the numerous infeudations, especially of the 1690-96 war. The *comparto del grano* was imposed in 1572, the only tax in kind, of 30,000 sacks of grain, to guarantee sufficient supplies for the army: but the immense fluctuations in the price of cereals led to great complications and finally to its abolition in 1720. Some slight attempt was made to gain a fairer total distribution of these taxes among the provinces by increasing or diminishing the *sussidio* and the *imposto* in ratio to the amount of the *tasso*. But the inequalities remained, and were aggravated by the extraordinary taxes paid in time of war: the *comparto del grano* was doubled, while the *quartiere d'inverno* was imposed as a percentage of the *tasso*.

These inequalities were even more serious when examined in detail. Each *comunità* possessed a *registro collettebile* of all the plots of land within its boundaries, divided somewhat arbitrarily according to qualities and assessed at a fixed number and fractions of *soldi di registro*; the total *lire di registro* owed by the *comunità* represented its share of the *tasso* imposed by the Treasury. The *comunità* distributed its taxes (*taglie, gurichi*) among the landowners in proportion to their number of *soldi di registro*, and was then responsible for paying both State and private impositions. But as the qualities of land were erroneously regarded as immutable, while no record was kept of changes in ownership, the *registri* soon grew outdated. The only method of distributing the taxes more fairly

was by the imposition of the tax on personal goods, the cotizzo on persons and the gio/atico on animals. But the richer landowners claimed they payed too much, and usually managed to shift all taxes onto the registro, where the full extent of their landed possessions was neither fully nor fairly represented.

Even more unfair was the immunity enjoyed by both Church and nobility. The total area of Piedmont at the beginning of the 18th century was measured as 3,454,668 giornate, with a revenue of L.20,634,812. Ecclesiastical lands with immunity 'through ancient endowment' formed 208,709 g., with a revenue of L.1,573,212; this area was swollen by lands bequeathed to secular orders, as well as by emphyteutic possessions to a total of 233,581 g. A further 150,577 g. only paid the tasso. It was difficult to prove how much was genuinely immune in the absence of documents for lands 'immune through ancient endowment', while lands which were temporarily granted immunity for one life often acquired perpetual exemption through continual new ordinations.

Feudal immunity was equally difficult to control. Lands claiming exemption were not entered in the registri but were to be found in the consegnamenti of all feudal possessions demanded by the government. The feudality of all land was legally proved by investitures and by the payment of the cavalcata. But there was no way of controlling the consegnamenti, which were only demanded irregularly and left flagrant opportunities for fraud. A large amount of land (of terza specie) was entered neither

in the registri as allodial nor in the consegnamenti as feudal. As early as 1606, Carlo Emanuele I had attempted to divide all land into either feudal or allodial, but the acquisition of new territories, especially in the Monferrat by the treaty of Cherasco (1630), led to new abuses. At the beginning of the 18th century 180,526 g. were registered as feudal, 13,729 g. as emphyteutic and exempt, and 45,684 g. as escaping both registro and consegnamento, a total of 239,940 g. with an income of L.1,635,946.

The chronic shortage of money of the government encouraged these privileges. Throughout the 17th century there was a continual alienation of State taxes. In 1624 already, Carlo Emanuele I had tried to revoke the alienation of royal demesne (due in large part to himself); the fouaggio or hearth-tax was almost entirely alienated to the nobility, as were the pedaggi. In 1688, of a total of 220,440 scudi owed for the tasso, 114,093:4:1 scudi had been alienated.(52) The extravagance of the rulers, especially of the two Regents, in lavishing gifts on their favourites, impoverished the Treasury still further. There was a continual alienation of fees and infeudation of lands. With the wars at the end of the century, the government was forced to create a whole series of new infeudations. At the end of the 17th century, it was calculated that of a total

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(52) Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.18-28.

L.3,375,000 owed for the tasso, sussidio militare and imposto delle 308 mila lire only L.1,984,307 reached the Treasury.(53)

The result was disastrous. The clergy and the nobility, already in a privileged position, were able - both legally and illegally - to extend their privileges at the expense of the rest of the population. Theoretically, feudal land owed the cavalcata, a cash commutation of military service, while lands of terza specie paid the quarta or mezza annata. But by the 17th century, the imposition of the cavalcata was extremely irregular and then of little weight. It was exacted in 1637-38, and again in 1652; the next - and final - occasion was in 1691; despite threats of escheat, the hostility was so strong, that the government was still claiming payment in 1715.(54)

iii. The reforms of Vittorio Amedeo II.

The close control of the King over all branches of the administration led to an even greater degree of centralization than in France. But the fundamental problem remained the distribution of taxes. The aim of the government was to distribute the taxes more fairly and diminish, if not eliminate, all privileges. Until the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II all efforts had proved in vain. Both Vittorio Amedeo I and Carlo Emanuele II had tried to begin a general measurement of the land (catasto) but without success. They had also attempted to control the legality of all feudal

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(53) Einaudi, pp.66-75.

(54) Einaudi, pp.86-87.

possessions, but achieved no more than the consegnamento of 1670.(55) In the meantime the alienations increased alarmingly. The conflict with Rome, which flared up intermittently throughout the 17th century, derived in part from ecclesiastical claims to immunity.

Vittorio Amedeo II proved more determined. As early as 1688, he made plans for a general measurement, or perequazione, of the land. During the 1690-96 war, an attempt was made to tap the mobile wealth of the country, with a tax of 1/6 on all censi owed by the comunità; the tax was never repeated, perhaps from fear of alienating the only class with capital.(56) But with the end of the war, new measures were taken. An edict of 12 June 1697 ordered the assessment of all ecclesiastical lands. The immediate opposition of the Archbishop of Turin developed into a far more general conflict with Rome over the legal position of papal fees and the enjoyment of vacant benefices. Vittorio Amedeo II opposed in every way possible except by open defiance. The Valdesi were favoured, suspected Jansenists employed, the Jesuit monopoly of school education was broken, and the University of Turin founded. With the Concordat of 1721, he partially won his point: all lands alienated to the Church after 1620 were - at least theoretically - subjected to the registro.(57)

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(55) Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.67-86.

(56) Einaudi, p.85.

(57) For the struggle with Rome, apart from Quazza, pp.136-41, 358-80, see the acute remarks of F. Venturi, Alberto Radicati di Passerano, especially pp.63-126. The general background can be found in P.C. Boggio: La Chiesa e lo Stato in Piemonte, Turin, 1854, vol.I, book 1.

The attack on the nobility was more violent. In 1690, new *consegnamenti* were demanded. An edict of 1701 ordered the payment of indemnities to the *comunità* for lands illegally withdrawn from the *registri*. In 1698 and 1700, all investitures and *consegnamenti* had to be produced. The Spanish Succession War interrupted all measures, but in 1715 and 1724 new *consegnamenti* were exacted. At the same time, all alienated fees and *tassi* were examined. Finally, by the edict of 7 January 1720 172 fees and *tassi* to the capital value of L.317,4777 were confiscated as alienated without valid title (such titles to be judged by the royal officials). It was an open attack on the nobility, affecting the oldest and richest families; the very ambassador to London, Ricardel di Fleury, suddenly found himself deprived of his two main fees. The nobility could justifiably complain of 'hard justice': the ablest lawyers were given governmental posts, a special magistracy was created to settle all disputes arising from the confiscation, while the Camera was packed with royal officials.(58)

Meanwhile the plans for a new *perequazione* went ahead. By 1711, the *misura generale*, begun in 1698, had been virtually completed. For the first time there was a real measurement of the land, divided according

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(58) Quazza, pp.164-74. The legal justifications of the confiscation are examined in the unpublished thesis of M.Torta: *La riunione al Demanio dei beni demaniali e feudali alienati sotto Vittorio Amedeo II, 1719-1721*. Università di Torino, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, March, 1958, which traces in detail the growing authoritarianism and unscrupulousness of Vittorio Amedeo II.

to qualities and titles of possession; all immunity had to be proved; lands of terza specie were subjected to the registro; all lands infeudated by the edict of 7 May 1706 (at the height of the war) lost their immunity, though receiving a full indemnity. At the same time, attempts were made to assess the value of the land, preparatory to a new, more accurate, imposition of the tasso. At the time of the misura generale, the royal surveyors made the first estimate (directly calculated on the produce of the land in kind), according to criteria carefully laid down by Vittorio Amedeo II in an attempt to solve the problem of fraudulent returns. In the following years, three successive estimates were made, based on figures provided by private information or by indirect calculations (as for instance the capitalization at 4% of prices found in contracts of land-sales over a period of 35 years). But in each case the value proved far inferior to that fixed by the agrimensori. In the final discussions, these later estimates were discounted as too conflicting and full of errors, and the first valuation was adopted.

By the edict of perequazione of 7 May 1731 a certain measure of equality was achieved. All extraordinary taxes were abolished, while the ordinary taxes remaining were distributed more fairly among the provinces. Large areas of land, formerly claimed as immune, were replaced in the registri. A total of 88,073 giornate or 31.5% of ecclesiastical lands formerly immune were now liable to taxes; no figures exist for the total amount of illegally feudal land now reclaimed, but

of the remaining 227,663 g. newly entered into the registri collettabili the larger amount undoubtedly entered into this category.(59)

The attack on privileges was undisguised. Yet though these privileges were diminished, they were not abolished. Feudal and ecclesiastical lands and rights remained and were acknowledged. The government attempted to limit the power of the nobility, but was incapable of replacing it.

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(59) Quazza, pp.144-63. The only study of the perequazione is the extremely brief outline given by F. Dindo: Il primo catasto geometrico-particellare, Legnago, 1904. See also remarks of Prato, pp.22-24.

4. Social structure: the nobility and the comunità in the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II.

Under Vittorio Amedeo II the old feudal nobility had been almost completely excluded from all important administrative posts. An attempt had been made to create a new class of lawyer-bureaucrats: between 1713 and 1742, the middle class (including those with newly-bought titles) possessed 84.16% of the higher and 98.41% of the less important offices.(60) At the same time the merchant-banking class had been actively encouraged with privileges and grants. In the provinces, an attempt was made to limit the local authority of the nobility. The intendants interfered to guarantee agricultural contracts and control prices. Vittorio Amedeo II even tried to take the problem of public assistance out of private hands, establishing ospedali and ospizi di carità in all centres.(61) But the nobility remained the most influential class in the State.

The increased importance of the Kingdom of Sardinia required an adequate representation at foreign courts. Only the nobility had sufficient resources and education, and it retained an almost exclusive monopoly of diplomatic posts.(62) The size of the army made even

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(60) Quazza, pp.91-95.

(61) Quazza, pp.313-19. Attempts to solve the problem of beggars existed from the end of the 16th century, but this was the first organic plan; see G. Prato: Il costo della guerra, pp. 347-51.

(62) Quazza, pp.97-102.

greater demands. The cost of the army was higher than in any other country in Europe, except Prussia: at the time of the Spanish Succession War it formed 57.7% of the total expenses; after the war, in the 1720s, it still formed 54.2%, which at the time of the Austrian Succession War rose to as much as 68.1%. These expenses represented an army of 24,000 men (rising to over 36,000 with the 1733 war), divided into 7 permanent regiments of 2 battalions, each of 10 companies, besides 2 smaller regiments and 10 provincial battalions. Apart from the artillery (among the most modern in Europe), and the provincial battalions, officers of all regiments of line were almost exclusively noble.(63)

Financially the government was also dependent on the nobility. Their predominant position in the purchase of luoghi di monte and alienated tassi, the attempts to draw them into industry, have both been noted. The account books of the royal house in the opening years of the 18th century indicate the shortcomings of the merchant class: jewels were even bought from members of the nobility when the merchant-jewellers proved incapable of supplying royal needs.(64) In the years of war, the

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(63) Quazza, pp.102-23. See also G. Quazza: Il problema italiano, pp.144-45, and for an interpretation of the whole social structure of Piedmont in these years, pp.124-59.

(64) In 1701 the jewellers, Stouper, Massano and Boggetto, together with the Jew Colonna, were unable to provide a large enough jewel for the ducal gift to the Spanish ambassador; in the end, one was bought from the conte di Brianzone; other purchases are found in these years from the marchese di Cirié (1702), the contessa di Scarnafigi (1711), and the marchese Ricardel di Fleury (1713). Cf. G. Prato: Il costo della guerra, pp.219-20.

nobility gave by far the great majority of short-term loans to the government.

In the provinces, the power of the nobility was both more open and more complete. The position of the comunità was disastrous. The feudal rights owned by the lord were numerous and often heavy: mills, tolls, ovens, oil-presses were all the monopoly of the feudatary; the tithes had often been alienated to him by the ecclesiastical lords; he had full civil jurisdiction, and the exclusive right of hunting and fishing; the comunità usually paid him an annual fee (censo, fodro, etc.) and was forced to accept his pôdestà and judge. Many of the smaller dues had already been transformed in the Middle Ages into cash payments; but certain duties of guard-service and work on the lord's estates still existed. In addition, the comunità and their members had fallen increasingly into debt in the course of the 17th century under the weight of the ever-increasing taxes, and were forced to sell censi over their few remaining communal lands and incomes, usually to the feudatary. The corruption of the communal officials, often embarking on unnecessary and expensive lawsuits, to the mutual profit of themselves and their lawyers, increased the chaos of the communal finances. The benevolent attitude of the provincial officials towards the local feudataries annulled all efforts of the central government. In 1704 the government itself sold the office of mayor (sindaco).

Carlo Emanuele I had attempted to prevent abuses by communal officials as early as 1618, and had tried to control them under central

gratori at Turin. Carlo Emanuele II made even greater efforts. By 1670, the debts of the *comunità* were so great that the leading councillors were asked to find means of restoring their finances, while a commission was appointed to supervise their administration. The second Madama Reale ordered the examination of the *registri* and of all debts since 1640.(65)

Vittorio Amedeo II had tried to aid the *comunità*. Not only feudal land, but all feudal rights were called in question and their legal possession had to be proved; an attempt was made to decide all outstanding lawsuits between the feudataries and the *comunità*, especially those relating to tax impositions; a tariff was even imposed to regulate the gains from the exercise of private jurisdiction, often turning what was formerly a profitable source of income into a loss (1725, 1729).

The *perequazione* tried to decide the method of imposition of landed and personal taxes. The personal taxes (*testatico, gio/atico, cotizzo*) were often used by the *comunità* in an attempt to counter the inequality of the *registro*. But the ability of the richer landowners to pass on the burden to the poorer members of the *comunità* had to a certain extent cancelled out the hard-won advantage. The instructions of the 21 June 1711 and 7 March 1712 sent by Groppello to the *comunità* were based on the principle that personal taxes should cover all local expenses, while State taxes should fall on the landed *registro*. The principle was sound, but in practice proved ineffective. In 1731 the government decided to

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(65) Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.87-179.

take drastic measures to suppress all abuses, and forbade the imposition of the testatico to help pay state taxes. An immediate storm of protests showed clearly the even greater injustice and led to the revocation of the decision in 1732.

A final attempt to solve the problem of the comunità was made by the government with the comprehensive edict of 29 April 1733. The method of election to communal offices was completely regulated, as were the duties of the local administrators; a new registro was to be formed, while all public documents were to be collected in the communal archives, with an inventory at Turin; no lawsuit was to be undertaken without previous consultation with the advocate-general; the validity of all censi and crediti was to be examined by a special commission. Subsequent laws in 1742 and 1755 on the completion of the balance-sheets (causati) and the preservation of the registri merely perfected this regulation of local government.

The edict was for the most part unsuccessful. One third of the comunità in the province of Turin did not have their balance-sheets in order. An enquiry in 1736 showed that only 313 out of 787 comunità had registri at all complete. The finances remained chaotic, the lawsuits continued and the local oligarchies retained their power. Chieri was dominated by the Balbiano, Benso, Balbo and Balmour families; Biella continued to be misruled by a clique composed of the Terango, Bertodano, Riccardi, Bertodano and Artaldi familes. The smaller comunità were

in an even worse position.(66)

In the course of two centuries, the government had steadily increased and centralized its power. The royal power was now supreme, the State finances greatly improved. The liberties of the comunità and the political independence of the nobility had both been broken. But the social prestige and the economic power of the nobility remained virtually intact. The attempts of Vittorio Amedeo II to create a strong bureaucracy and broaden the social base on which the monarchy rested had not proved very successful. For only the aristocratic class possessed full powers. There was a continual, inevitable, assimilation of all enterprising bourgeois into the ranks of the nobility. In 1738, three leading State officials, all lawyers (Caissotti, Riccardi and Dani) attempted to define the concept of nobility and justify ennoblement for uffizi di dignità. The merchants, bankers, lawyers, industrialists, all aimed at the same goal: to acquire lands and titles through their own ability or royal favour, and pass them on to their sons.(67)

Government interference in the provinces failed to eliminate the social contrasts and economic tension. In the small towns there was much unemployment and under-employment among the artisans; in the

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(66) For the whole problem of the comunità, see G. Quazza, pp. 73-76, 81-83, 147-57, 332-38. For the method of imposing the testatico, see also Einaudi, pp. 51-55.

(67) Quazza, pp.341-46; ibid, Il problema italiano, pp.128-29.

countryside the smallholders were at the mercy of the rich landowners. There were frequent clashes between the comunità and its members and the local oligarchies, forcing the intendants to intervene. Public ceremonies and religious functions were used as pretexts to protest against feudal privileges.(68)

But there was no organized resistance at all. So long as the government accepted the principle of immunity and failed to insist on the equality of all subjects before the State the nobility was able to maintain its position. But, in comparison to the 17th century, there was an undoubted improvement in the position of the comunità. All opposition was still isolated and sporadic, but it seemed probable that if ever the comunità gained a political consciousness, and the government failed to intervene, a clash with the nobility would be inevitable.

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(68) Quazza, pp.321-41. See also F. Venturi: Alberto Radicati di Passerano, pp.28-36 for a typical example of a conflict between a comunità and the feudatories.

II. The Falletti di Barolo.

1. The position of the Falletti di Barolo in the mid-16th century.

i. The origins of the family.

The origins of the Falletti family are obscure. Documents of the 18th century state the antiquity of the family, as "...una delle più antiche et illustri...", and even give references to an 8th century chronicler. They claim the origins of the family to be in Flanders, then moving to Lombardy, where it was in possession of Imperial fees; in the 12th century, a branch of the family was to be found at Avignon, which later settled in Languedoc; a contemporary Provençal poem praises the family for its conduct during a siege. However, it is interesting to note that Ducange, in his dictionary of medieval Latin, states under the name Faleti: "...dicebantur Usurarii quidam Lombardi et Itali saeculo XIV adversus quos exstat Edictum Johannis Francorum Regis anno 1353...".

The establishment of the family in the Langhe can be dated at least to 1340, when Pietro Falletti bought the fee of La Morra from king Robert of Sicily for 3000 fiorini.(1)

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(1) M.212,ns.8,9,17; M.A.17,n.4; M.A.20,n.6; Biblioteca dell'AST, M.1,n.1: 'Notizie di alcune famiglie estratte da documenti per ordine alfabetico - atti a formare alberi genealogici', fasc.1, quaderno 11, fasc.2 quaderno 13 (circa 1645), pp.13-17; AST 1, Paesi per A e B, s.v. 'Serralunga', n.1; Casalis, v.XI, s.v. 'La Morra', pp.434-44; F.Guasco, index, s.v. 'Falletti'; Ducange: Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis, 1733, v.3, p.307, s.v. 'Faleti'.

The nucleus of the family estates was formed by the fee of Barolo, situated to the south-east of Bra, together with the adjoining fees of La Morra and Serralunga. Until the early 16th century, the family owned part of the fees of Rodello and Borgomale, south of Alba, but these were confiscated by the Emperor Charles V in 1530, for Antonio Falletti's support of the French, and only partially recovered at the end of the century. In addition, they also owned certain lands and rights in Castiglion Falletto and Pocapaglia.(2)

The region between Alba, Bra and Cherasco lies in the heart of the Langhe, one of the great wine-producing areas of Piedmont. The continual ranges of steep hills are particularly adapted for the cultivation of vines, while the intervening valleys also prove extemely fertile, yielding rich grain crops. The remarkably complete series of *mezzadria* contracts to be found in the family archives shows clearly the forms of cultivation, conserved without change throughout the period under examination. The maintenance of the vineyards went hand in hand with that of the ploughed fields: a sufficient number of animals were kept to fertilize the fields, with a certain amount of meadow land set aside for grazing and hay, while in most farms some woodland was preserved, for heating and building. Great attention was paid to the plantation of both fruit and willow trees, the latter of great importance to bind the vines. As elsewhere in

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(2) M.170,n.2; M.212,n.1; M.217, n.24; Guasco, s.v. 'La Morra', 'Rodello', 'Borgomale'.

Piedmont, mulberry trees were also grown (although no documents indicate the cultivation of silk-worms).(3)

But not all areas were equally fertile. The estimates made by the royal assessors at the time of the perequazione gave a clear illustration of the enormous variation in quality of lands in an extremely limited area; while the average income for allodial land at Castiglion Falletto was calculated at L.11:7:1 per giornata, at Borgomale (perhaps deriving its name from its unfortunate location?) the average income was only L.1:14:5.(4) In large part, the purchases of land by the Falletti di Barolo in the Langhe can be explained by such geographical factors.

ii. The duties of fealty.

The Langhe lay on the frontier between Piedmont and the Monferrat. The fealty of the local signori was consequently often divided according to the location of their lands. Only with the treaty of Cherasco in 1630 was the frontier clearly defined, with the cession of Alba and many smaller communes to the house of Savoy. Until this date the

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(3) For the mezzadria contracts, see in particular: M.218. For an example of a contract, see: Appendix 8(a). By the middle of the 18th century, Barolo, Serralunga and Castiglion Falletto were all noted as wine centres; they were particularly favoured by their situation, with easy communications; see Prato, pp.137-38.

(4) AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21, ns.47, 305-15.

Falletti di Barolo owed fealty and homage, first to the Marquis of Monferrat, and then to the Duke of Mantua, for their fees of Barolo, Rodello and Borgomale, but to the Duke of Savoy for the fee of Serralunga.(5)

The bonds of feudal duty were no longer so strong as in the Middle Ages, but, with wars between the two rival states, the family found itself in an embarrassing position. Relations with Mantua were extremely distant (although by no means non-existent), while nearby Savoy grew increasingly powerful. In 1618, Carlo Emanuele I once more invaded the Monferrat. Two years later, Giacomo Falletti and his wife acquired Piedmontese patents of naturalization.(6) With the treaty of Cherasco, all their Monferrat fees came under Savoyard jurisdiction.

But the feudal loyalties of the family were still divided by the possession of the Imperial fee of La Morra, and - at least theoretically - by the mediated jurisdiction of Pocapaglia. Fealty was owed to the Bishop of Asti for the fractional rights in Pocapaglia. But as the

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(5) In all investitures, the fee of Barolo is coupled with the fee of Volta, an area immediately adjoining Barolo, and, as not a commune itself, subject to its jurisdiction. The signorato di Volta was without real substance, and merely used to amplify the number of titles of the family, signifying in practice the fee of Barolo.
Most investitures are to be found in: M.182-84, and M.172,n.12; see also: M.A.14,ns.5,11,16; M.A.15,ns.1,5-7. For Pocapaglia: M.205,ns.3-8,12,14,16-19.

(6) M.206,n.15. For the problem of conflicting loyalties in the Monferrat, see the more detailed discussion in the following chapter on the Valperga di Rivara.

republic of Asti had submitted to the house of Savoy in the 14th century, in practice there was no conflict of loyalties.(7)

La Morra was a greater problem. Together with the other Imperial fees of the Langhe, it owed fealty to the Emperor, and came under the jurisdiction of Milan. But this dependence was strongly contested by the Dukes of Savoy. All disputes were settled by delegates of both Savoy and Milan, while oaths of fealty and investitures were in theory owing to both. Usually, such oaths were given in preference to Savoy, but avoided whenever possible. The difficulties of the situation were clearly illustrated in a letter of Carlo Lodovico to his eldest son, Gerolamo, on the occasion of the death of Charles II of Spain. Gerolamo was an officer at Turin, with access to the Court, and was to ask Vittorio Amedeo II's advice about how to reply to the order from Milan to pay homage to the new king of Spain.(8)

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(7) In fact, in 1658, all feudataries subject to the Bishop of Asti were ordered to pay homage and take investitures from Carlo Emanuele II; see Duboin, t.24, lib.XII,tit.12,cap.i.pp.293-94.

(8) The letter is dated 26 August 1701 (M.206,n.14), and states:

> "...Ogni qualvolta si è fatto luogo alla Successione d'un nuovo Re alla Corona di Spagna, sono sempre stati mandati gl'ordini da Milano per l'investitura e giuramento di fedeltà ai Feudatarij della Morra...Ma si come l'alto dominio d'esso feudo resta ancor in contesa tra le due Corone di Spagna, e Savoia, fra quali è perciò seguita conventione che intanto non si debbi innovare cos'alcuna, così ogn'uno d'essi Feudatarij in vece di prestar il detto giuramento, a prender l'investitura, ha sempre in simili occorrenze, havuto raccorso con memoriali dal tenore come nel giù giunto foglio, il che si vede essersi similmente pratticato in tali contingenze verso la real Corona di Savoia..."

The whole question of the disputed jurisdiction is to be found in: M.177,n.4; M.180,n.17; M.203,n.52; M.204,ns.9,15; M.206,ns.2-5,8, 9,11,14,16,18,25; M.210,n.7; M.212,n.12; M.217,ns.17,24; M.A.73,n.3; M.A.75,n.2; AST II, 1a archiviazione, Feudi e Giurisdizioni, M.11, ns.1,3,4,12; AST I, Feudi delle Langhe, s.v. 'La Morra'; AST III, Patenti, R.134,1702 in 1706,f.245; AST III,art.599,1,M.2,n.79; art. 780,ns.1-6,8-10,15-17,19-30.

Vittorio Amedeo II himself had tried for a long period to acquire sovereignty over all the Imperial fees. The importance he placed on their possession could be seen in a proposal of 1685 (never carried out) to buy all the Falletti di Barolo's part of the fees of La Morra.(9) But the dispute continued till 1736, when the Emperor finally ceded the fees to Carlo Emanuele III. Only from this date could the House of Savoy exact the undivided fealty and homage of the Falletti di Barolo.

iii. The fragmentation of fees.

The possessions of the family in the mid-16th century were extremely fractionized. On the death of Scipione, about 1556, Gerolamo and Bonifacio inherited 7/12 of the fee of Barolo, 1/12 of the fee of La Morra, 1/2 of Serralunga and 1/80 and a quarter of 1/80 of Pocapaglia.(10)

The continual subdivision of rights and possessions (so closely resembling late Norman England) found its origin - as elsewhere in Italy - in the prevalence of Longobard law. 'Feudal law' was based on the 12th century Libri feudorum, and in its main features followed the

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(9) M.196,n.3; M.212, n.12; AST I, Feudi delle Langhe, s.v. 'La Morra', M.2,n.10.

(10) From investitures and consegnamenti in: M.170, n.12; M.183,n.1; M.205,n.5.

Lombard ius commune, reinforced by local statutory law.(11)

Longobard law, in contrast to Salic, allowed the succession of all males, though limiting the possibilities of alienation outside the family. The prevalence of the Roman institution of the legittima, or right of all children to a varying (but substantial) portion of the inheritance, as well as the existence of the dowry increased the possibilities of subdivisions within the family group. In so feudal

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(11) In theory, sovereign edicts had supreme authority. But the legality of the communal statutes was usually recognized, even if in conflict with royal edicts, because of the original, contractual nature of the submission (dedizione) of the towns to the prince. In defect of these two sources, the decisions of the supreme bodies of magistrates (the Senato and the Camera dei Conti) assumed the force of law, and in defect of all three, the diritto comune was followed.

In practice, however, the edicts of the princes nearly always accepted the authority of local custom (a mixture of statutory law and diritto comune). Throughout the 17th century, the attempts to assert the supremacy of royal authority over all other sources of law grew stronger; but only in 1723, with the Royal Constitutions, was such a claim openly stated; and even after the Constitutions, the Valle d'Aosta retained its own code of laws (the Coutumier), while the local peculiarities of certain other regions denied the universality of the new royal law.

For the sources of law in Piedmont, see M. Viora: Le Costituzioni Piemontesi, pp.23-42; G. Salvioli, pp.160-162; C. Astuti: 'Legislazione e riforme in Piemonte nei secoli XVI-XVII', in La Monarchia Piemontese nei secoli XVI-XVII, Rome, 1951, pp.81-84.

a state as Piedmont, the results were quickly felt.(12)

By the 16th century, however, the concepts of inalienability and indivisibility were growing stronger. In statutory law (following Roman law), dowries were kept small to avoid too great a splintering of the family patrimony.

The quarta Trebellianica and the Falcidia, resembling the legittima in the guarantee to all heirs of a definite portion of the inheritance (and also originating from Roman law), began to lose their effectiveness, and could be prohibited by the testator. The right of alienation depended increasingly on the conditions of the original investiture, and by 1503 Filippo II could attempt to interpret investitures in favour of inalienability. By the mid-16th century,

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(12) Sclopis, Antica legislazione, p.433, affirms that there were about 1800 vassals under Emanuele Filiberto; he does not state his source, but the figure seems reasonable. F.S. Leicht: s.v. 'Feudo' in the Enciclopedia Italiana, and the anonymous articles, 'Feudalità' in the Nuovo Digesto Italiano, v.5,1938, pp.1090-96) noted that Piedmont, the most directly influenced by France, was the most feudal State in Italy, though - unlike France - there were still certain lands not under feudataries, but directly dependent on the sovereign. For the whole question of the influence of Longobard law on the formation of feudal law in Italy, especially in Northern Italy, see: Sclopis, Legislazione italiana, v.1, pp.81-95, v.2,pp.162-73; Leicht: Il diritto privato, v.1, pp.74-77, v.2, pp.124-29, 162-262. A great deal of useful information can be found in: Nani, pp.20-31, 582-88, and Fertile, v.3, pp.138-56, v.4, pp.11-30, 57-75. See also, Calisse, v.2, pp.118-50.

both legal commentators and sovereign laws were pronouncing strongly against the alienability of feudal possessions.(13)

But the authority of statutory law and the ius commune remained effective. In the Monferrat, fees were alienable, and even hereditary through women. The legal tracts written in support of Carlo Emanuele I's claims to the Monferrat found it to their advantage to uphold the authority of the local customary law, so compromising the position of

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(13) The different types of fees were innumerable: in the liber feudorum, 44 different types were described (Leicht, Il diritto pubblico, p.154). The most common form was the nazionato ("ex pacto et providentia"), granting the fee only to the descendants of the first investee ("tibi et filiis, tibi et liberis"), thus prohibiting alienation outside the family. The fee was "retto, proprio e semplice", i.e., with no special services, only the general feudal obligations; it was also usually "nobile", as held by a nobiluomo, "antico", as held for a long time (though by the 17th century this was often untrue and purely symbolical), and "paterno", as inherited from the father. By the late 16th century, the jurists maintained that any fee "retto e proprio, antico e paterno", which had been in the family for four generations, was inalienable; see O. Cacherano d'Osasco: Decisiones Sacri Senatus Pedemontani..., Turin, 1569 (1599,1608), decis.163, n.3; A. Thesauro: Novae Decisiones Senatus Pedemontani... Turin, 1590 (Milan 1608), decis.99, ns.7,8. Filippo II, in his Statute of 1503, maintained that investitures "pro se, haeredibus suis et successoribus universis", the normal formula of inheritance, which seemed to imply alienability, were not different in their nature from the ordinary fee "retto, proprio e semplice", and were therefore inalienable. By the time of the Royal Constitutions in 1729 (lib. VI, tit 3, cap.1,i) all fees were considered "retti e propri", unless otherwise stated in the original investitures. The text of the 1503 statute can be found in Duboin, t.24, lib.XII,tit.2, cap.i, pp.205-06.
A discussion of the different forms of fees can be found in Sclopis, Antica legislazione, pp.388-492; idem, Legislazione italiana, v.1, pp.93-93; Pertile, v.4, pp.139-40. See also the remarks made by Trifone, pp.92-94.

future princes; even Vittorio Amedeo II and his son were forced - reluctantly - to respect the right of alienability.(14) Consequently, no legal obstacles stood in the way of an increasing subdivision of the Falletti possessions.

But the realization of the dangers of fragmentation led to attempts to avoid further dispersion. The expedients adopted and developed by the Falletti di Barolo reflected the increasing preoccupation of all families to preserve their patrimonies. The problem remained how to reconcile the transmission of the family wealth and titles to one son, with the provision of suitable dowries and allowances for the daughters and other sons. If the affections of the father proved stronger than pride in the family name - or if the legal expedients proved inadequate - a careful policy of conservation could be ruined at his death.

The methods of preserving the patrimony were numerous and increasingly complicated, but can be divided into two main categories. In the first

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(14) At the end of the 18th century, T.M. Richeri, in his Tractatus de feudis ex legibus seu usibus feudorum et municipalibus, Turin, 1791, t.1, lib.II, tit 30, cap.ii, still accepted the alienability of fees in the Monferrat, whatever the wording of the original investitures. Numerous examples can be given of the arguments used in favour of alienability, during the period of Piedmontese claims to the Monferrat (1536-1630). See, for example, D.Octaviani Cacherani...responsorum, quae in causis arduis, et Illustribus reddidit Feudalibus..., Turin, 1624: "causa Marchionatus Montisferrati" (pp.1-61); Lorenzo Silvano: Consilia...nunc primum in lucem emissa...Lyon, 1551, lib.2, consil.LXV, xviii; A.Bagnasacco: Responsorum in eadem causa Montisferrati..., Turin, 1624, consil. VI.

instance, if the possessions were already broken up, the members of the family could agree to hold all their portions undivided, and so present a legal unity of ownership in their relations both with the government and with the comunità; such ownership in common could be formed by the possessions of as few as two brothers, or by those of a large consortile, consisting of numerous branches of the same family. In the second instance, attempts could be made to prevent further fragmentation by the creation of primogenitures and fedecommessi, with prohibitions to alienate. It is the second category which developed most fully from the 16th century.

As early as 1512 Scipione Falletti di Barolo and his brother Giacomo made a transaction to hold all their possessions in common. When Giacomo died in 1542 without legitimate heirs, he left two farms at La Morra and Verduno and a censo in primogeniture to Scipione. Two clear examples had been given of the methods of conserving a family patrimony.(15) But

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(15) The transaction of 1512 stated:

> "Et primo quod bona ipsorum fratrum usque quando per eos deveniatur ad ipsorum divisionem deveniatur stare debeant communia inter se se et quod usufructus dictorum bonorum suorum tam beneficiorum quam feudalium et rusticalium coiter percipi debeant..."

M.176,ns.12-14; AST III, art.599,i,M.1,n.10.
In his will, Giacomo left 1200 scudi to his illegitimate son, Giacometto. As the two farms and the censo under primogeniture were only valued at 1270 scudi, it was hardly a 'conservation' of the patrimony. However, Giacometto was paid in money, while all the lands were placed under a primogeniture:

> "...nec possit dictus dominus heres alienare aliquid de bonis feudalibus...nec etiam de alodialibus et rusticalibus domini testatoris..."

M.188,n.7; M.169, n.1.

Scipione proved incapable of continuing his brother's policy. To extricate himself from his debts, he immediately sold the *censo* and one of the two farms he had inherited, and shortly afterwards gave the other farm to his wife, as partial guarantee of her dowry. His son, Gerolamo, opposed both sale and guarantee, as forbidden by Giacomo's primogeniture, and finally forced Scipione to compensate him with another farm of equal value.(16)

The details of this dispute showed the effectiveness of a primogeniture. If Gerolamo was unable to regain the alienated possessions, he was at least partially compensated with another farm. But it also showed the need of a conscious policy of conservation. Scipione either did not realize the need, or was unwilling to carry out such a policy, and when he died, he once more broke up the family patrimony, only leaving Barolo intact to Gerolamo II, and dividing his La Morra and Serralunga possessions between both his sons. Only their immediate decision to hold almost all the inheritance in common saved the patrimony from still further fragmentation.(17)

iv. The feudataries and the comunità.

The division of a family patrimony not only represented a danger to the future position and even survival of the family, but also accentuated the difficulties of its relations with the comunità. Throughout the

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(16) M.169,ns.1,3; M.170,ns.7,9; M.175,n.6; M.176,n.26; M.188,n.7.

(17) The only possession the brothers divided was the fee (and lands) of Serralunga: M.176,n.26.

Middle Ages both feudal rights and tithes, as well as emphyteuses, were mostly paid in kind, and not in money. The continual fragmentation of these rights led to increasing trouble in their exaction. In some instances, the collection of feudal dues proved more expensive than their actual value: the rights of the Falletti di Barolo for their 1/80 and a quarter of 1/80 of the fee of Pocapaglia were valued at 1 1/4 scudi. Moreover, disputes often broke out between different branches of the same family, especially over jurisdictional rights. The comunità as a body, and all its members individually, attempted to avoid payment, and often succeeded: after Gerolamo II bought 1/12 of the fee of Borgomale, the family was forced to acknowledge the comunità's usurpation of their fraction of the feudal rights.(18)

Attempts were made to assure continued possession by converting the various payments in kind into one annual cash payment. From a long-term point of view, the feudataries might perhaps have realized that it was a mistake, as the real value of cash payments would almost certainly drop with the increasing inflation. But it had the advantage of confirming and guaranteeing regular payments.

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(18) The Pocapaglia rights (which were only preserved through the support of the chief owners, the Falletti di Pocapaglia) are to be found in: M.205,ns.5-7, 9, 10, 13, 15; M.179,ns. 16,17; M.218, f.3; M.A.16, n.3, M.A.80,n.22; AST III, Consegnamenti, R.365,ff.270-278; and other consegnamenti. The loss of the Borgomale rights is stated in: M.179, ns.13,15; M.218, f.6; and the consegnamenti.

Agreements were reached with most of the comunità in the early 16th century. In a period when the government was too weak to enforce obedience, the comunità and feudataries usurped legal authority, and regulated their own affairs by private transactions. The comunità of Barolo made three transactions between 1546 and 1585 with the different branches of the Falletti di Barolo family, abolishing the tithes and other dues in exchange for annual censi, valued at 60 scudi. The comunità of Serralunga made a similar transaction in the first half of the century.(19)

So long as the transactions only regulated private, communal debts, the government could never claim the right to interfere. But in many cases, the comunità agreed to grant exemption from taxes for the feudataries' allodial possessions in return for the abolition of feudal dues, or even - in times of emergency - in return for a single cash payment by the feudatary. The comunità of Barolo granted such exemption,

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(19) The comunità of Barolo made a transaction with Scipione in 1546, agreeing to pay a censo of 33 scudi: M.176, n.20; M.183, n.1. A further transaction was made with Manfredo in 1550, to pay 16 scudi and also 8 sacks of grain annually (an interesting example of the survival - on a small scale - of payments in kind): M.A.16, n.10. In 1585, a transaction was made with Giovanni to pay 11 scudi for the 5/24 he had inherited from Lodovico: M.177, ns.6, 9, 10; AST III, art.599,i, M.1, n.19. In 1553 (confirmed in 1560), the comunità of Serralunga agreed to pay a fodro of 18 scudi, in exchange for the tithes: M.170,n.12; M.176, ns.27,28; M.210, n.3; M.A.76, ns.27,28; AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21, n.271.

and the Falletti claimed a similar privilege for their allodial lands at La Morra and Serralunga. Even more striking was the arrangement at Vergne: both the feudataries and the *comunita* of Barolo owned a large area of land in this region, which, although adjoining the commune's borders, fell under the jurisdiction of the city of Cherasco; in 1527, a transaction was made with Cherasco, exempting the whole area from taxes in return for an annual *canone* of 33 scudi, gradually increased (in 1564 and 1634) to 55 scudi.(20)

The government was apparently powerless to intervene. The transactions were illegal, for no exemption to a State tax could be given without state permission. At the time of the transactions, the feudataries had taken advantage of the weakness of the government. But in future years, as the authorit of the State increased, the *comunita* could protest against the illegalities of the exemptions, and appeal to the government for their annulment. At the same time, they could try to confuse the various types of transactions, and impeach the legality of the feudal dues. The never-ending lawsuits between the *comunita* and the feudataries kept alive the hostility and increased the tension.

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(20) For the Barolo transaction, see note (19).
The *comunita* of La Morra agreed to the immunity of the 'Rivalta' farm: M.188, n.7; M.204, n.6.
The 1524 Vergne transaction is to be found in: M.176, n.18; with a confirmation of 1558 in: AST III, art.599,i.M.1,n.14; M.2,n.137; and the transaction of 1564 in: M.176,ns.17,18; M.201, n.4; and that of 1634 in: M.210,ns.9,10. The 1564 transaction is also noted in F. Voersio: *Historia compendiosa di Cherasco*, Monteregale, 1618, pp.156-57.

v. The problem of dowries.

The difficulties of preserving the unity of the patrimony were still further increased by the need to provide dowries. The legittima, which had safeguarded the position of younger children, slowly lost its effectiveness, and by the 16th century could be greatly limited, if not completely ignored. Already by the 15th century, the concept of the indivisibility of feudal possessions had taken root, and an attempt was being made to extend the practice to allodial lands; with the success of the law of Toro in Spain (1505), allowing the erection of primogenitures on allodial lands, the fedecommessi in Italy quickly expanded, emphasizing still further the exclusion of younger sons.(21)

But the dowry remained protected. The daughter's right to the legittima was replaced by the dowry, in return for which she renounced all other claims. But as the dowry took the place of the legittima, there was an absolute duty to dower, which fell primarily on the father, but in his absence on the mother, or even on the brothers. Moreover, the dowry had to be congrua, or in accordance with the position of the family; and while the father was generally allowed to judge the congruity of

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(21) The concept of the indivisibility of feudal possessions was already fully developed in Italy. In the 15th century, Socino had tried to extend the practice to allodial lands. Spanish influence was not responsible for fedecommessi in Italy, but only for their expansion. However, the legittima was never completely eliminated, and could still be claimed for maternal inheritances. See Trifone, pp.95-111; L. Trin: Il fedecommesso nella legislazione e nella dottrina dal secolo XVI ai nostri giorni, Milan, 1945, pp.38-46; Leicht, Il diritto privato, v.2, pp.251-62.

the dowry, other relations were not usually left so great a freedom. If the allodial possessions were insufficient, the dowry could even be formed from feudal possessions or lands tied down under a fedecommesso.

In addition to the dowry, the husband (or father-in-law) guaranteed the bride an aumento dotale, or jointure, calculated on the basis of the dowry itself, to be paid in the event of the husband's death. The size of the jointure varied from commune to commune, but was generally accepted in Piedmont as 1/3 of the dowry for nobles and 1/4 for all other classes.

During the marriage, the administration and enjoyment of the dowry belonged to the husband. But on his death, the widow might be given the choice of half the jointure or the usufruct of the whole amount. In either event, both dowry and aumento were guaranteed to the children on the mother's death, as well as (usually) if she married a second time. If there were no children, the widow's possession was assured, but the inheritance of the dowry and jointure after her death was less clear; an increasingly important school of lawyers maintained, contrary to Roman law, that the dowry should not return to the widow's family.

If the wife died first, the procedure was by no means well defined. The dowry (according to Roman law) belonged to the children; but in the Monferrat, Germanic influence was strong enough to allow the husband to enjoy the dowry, even in preference to his sons, while his possession was virtually assured if there were no children. Statutory law tried to limit the rights of the husband, even in the absence of children,

allowing him only a part of the dowry, usually regarded as half. But in most cases, usufruct of the dowry remained in the possession of the husband after his wife's death. The only clear point was that the dowry did not return to the wife's relatives.(22)

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(22) Statutory law was most concerned to protect the dowry, and was followed by sovereign edicts. In 1475, Duchess Iolanda allowed the alienation of feudal possessions to guarantee a dowry or aumento; Duchess Bianca extended this permission in 1491. Even the daughter who married against her father's will, or beneath her rank, had to be dowered (though by the 18th century, the father, in these and certain other cases, was no longer obliged to provide a dowry). Moreover, the dowry had to be of a fitting size, for, as A. Fabro pointed out (Codex Fabrianus Definitionum Forensium et Rerum in Sacro Sabaudiae Senatu Tractarum..., Lyon, 1615, and continually reprinted), it was used to exclude daughters from all future successions. If brothers had to provide the dowry, statutory law even appointed delegates to judge the congruity. The aumento, which found its origins in Byzantine law and Germanic custom, was strictly dependent on the dowry, and if the latter was not paid, the former was not owing. In most cases the aumento was calculated as a sum of money.
The bride's trousseau (fardello) usually - though not always - formed part of the dowry, and an inventory was often made; it was restored on the husband's death. Gifts of jewels to the bride were not obligatory, but, if given, returned to the husband's heirs. The marriage contract(instrumento dotale) was proof both of the constitution and of the payment of the dowry; it was usually preceded by capitoli, defining the essential parts of the contract, followed by a credit note by the father to the bridegroom, and then quittances by the latter to the former. But quittances (confessio dotis), were often anticipated, causing later disputes as to their legality.
The most recent and complete discussion of these problems in Piedmont is that of M.A.Benedetto: Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali tra coniugi nello stato sabaudo, Università di Torino, Memorie dell'Istituto Giuridico, serie II, n.XCVI,1957,passim. A great amount of information on Piedmontese custom, especially in the (later) 18th century can be found in Bertolotti, v.2,pp.156-208. A. Alberti: Appunti per una storia del diritto privato statutario piemontese, Turin,1934,pp.49-73, notes the rulings of statutory law. Solopis, Antica legislazione, p.320 makes some interesting observations. More general information can be found in: Nani,pp.169-96; Pertile,v.3,pp.320-61,v.4,pp.57-65; Calisse, pp.95-109; Leicht: Il diritto privato, v.1, pp.194-219.

The importance of dowries to the wealth of a family was always evident. Statutory law attempted to keep dowries small, so as to avoid too great a diminution of the patrimony, while at the same time insisting strongly on the absolute renunciation by the daughter of all further claims. The dowry could be paid in any form of possessions, but in Piedmont was usually paid in money, to keep the estates intact. But in an age of limited capital, the difficulties of finding a substantial sum of money usually led to payment by instalments, often causing disputes about guarantees for the real value of the money in an age of inflation. A family fortune could be made or ruined by marriages, and the fondest father might feel obliged to condemn 'superfluous' daughters to the life-sentence of a nunnery. But even then the spiritual dowry - especially in favour of a fashionable nunnery - formed no small expense.(23)

Scipione's difficulties were in part caused by dowries. In 1527, on his marriage to Gasparda Bolleri De Monte, he had received a dowry of 950 scudi, which he only increased by a jointure of 200 scudi, or less than 1/4 of the size of the dowry. He apparently did nothing to guarentee this dowry until after his brother Giacomo's death (1542). At this point, his finances seemed weak, and he may have felt obliged to safeguard his wife's position. He had already alienated one of the two farms left

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(23) Spiritual dowries followed the practice of ordinary dowries, with perhaps greater emphasis laid on the trousseau, while a small annual pension was usually also provided. But the size of the dowry depended not on the position of the family, but on the demands of the monastery, and could consequently be comparatively expensive. See Bertolotti, v.2, pp.201-02.

by Giacomo under primogeniture, and now assigned Gasparda the other one, at Verzne, as well as giving her back the farm near Savigliano, which she had brought as part of her dowry.(24)

His son, Gerolamo, tried in vain to invalidate the alienation, but it was upheld, as made to guarantee a dowry. All Gerolamo could do was to claim a compensation for the value of Giacomo's primogeniture, and so force Scipione to give him yet another farm of equal value. But after Scipione's death, Gerolamo and his brother, Bonifacio, were not only unable to regain their mother's dowry when she married a second time, but were ordered by the law-courts to pay her the 100 scudi still owing from her jointure (1560). The law was apparently still uncertain as to the fate of a dowry on a widow's second marriage: less than 20 years earlier, Elisabetta, Giacomo's widow, had repaid her brother-in-law, Scipione, her dowry of 1800 scudi, on the occasion of her second marriage. Scipione's children were now unable to reclaim the dowry from their own mother, although they were direct heirs. The only grounds on which they could continue the lawsuit was the claim of all relatives to redeem possessions

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(24) For Gasparda's dowry in 1527: M.174, n.2; M.177, n.3; M.188, n.7.
(25) The guarantee in the 1540s first consisted of the 'Rocca' farm at La Morra (later given to Gerolamo as compensation), and was subsequently changed to the 'Fontanile' farm of lesser value, bequeathed by Giacomo: M.169,n.1; M.174, n.7; M.175, n.6; M.176, n.26; M.204, n.7.
Scipione's difficulties were apparently acute, for, when Gerolamo married Caterina Roncoli in 1544, Scipione owed Caterina's father 1200 scudi, and probably used his daughter-in-law's dowry of 1000 scudi. This could be extremely dangerous, as it merely passed on the burden of guaranteeing the dowry to Gerolamo, who in this respect might be considered extremely fortunate in Caterina's early death: M.174, ns.5,9; M.203, n.8.

alienated outside the family without permission; and finally, in 1577, they managed to repurchase the Savigliano farm from Gasparda and her second husband, Bernardino Paglia.(25)

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(25) The details of the dispute over Gasparda's dowry can be found in M.174, n.9; M.175, ns.7, 11; M.177, n.3; M.204, n.8. The repayment by Elisabetta to Scipione is to be found in: M.174, n.3.

2. Gerolamo II (1556 - 1596).

The claims of each generation on the family patrimony formed a continual threat to the maintenance of its unity. No family could ignore these claims, for it would find the patrimony broken up, perhaps beyond possibility of reconstruction. The provision of dowries and the settlement of the claims of younger sons represented an equal, if not a greater, danger to the preservation of the family possessions than the extravagance of the head of the family; for, while fortunes might occasionally be lost by excessive indulgence in some eccentric, but expensive, pastime, they were continually reduced by the presence of an over-numerous family.

It required a conscious realization of these problems from each successive head of the family to ensure survival. Whatever forms such consciousness assumed, they all ultimately represented an active reaction against a passive, but ever-present, threat.

The most obvious method of conserving the patrimony - encouraged by a developing body of law - was by attempting to tie down an inheritance and prevent its alienation or division. A more effective method was by investing all surplus income in the expansion of the patrimony itself.

i. The investments.

Scipione had shown himself incapable of settling his children's claims, and had alienated a large portion of his patrimony. Both his son, Gerolamo, and his grandson, Giacomo, attempted to overcome the same problems. In 1556 there was no reason why the Falletti di Barolo should

not have disintegrated like so many other local families; by 1624, the fortunes of the family had been made, and the basis laid for future expansion.

Both Gerolamo II and Giacomo invested their income almost entirely in land. But at the same time, an attempt was made to recover the various fractions of feudal rights. The unity of the fee was obviously regarded as equally important as the acquisition of new territories. The immediate advantage was in the increase of influence over the comunità, an influence which in turn eased the future purchase of lands within the communal boundaries. But at the same time, the consolidation of feudal rights raised the family's reputation with its neighbours, and asserted its claims to recognition in the State.

The growing concepts of feudal inalienability and indivisibility helped the attempts to re-unite the fees. No feudal possessions could be alienated outside the family, except in exceptional circumstances; and if a noble was forced to sell, the family was always given the first possibility of acquisition. When Lodovico and Giovanni Falletti della Morra offered to sell their 1/8 of the fee of Serralunga in 1530, Scipione immediately bought it, increasing his share of the fee to 1/2. In 1585, Bonifacio bought another 1/6 of the fee of Serralunga and 1/9 of La Morra from Giovanni Stefano Falletti di Rocapaglia. And in 1586, Gerolamo II finally managed to acquire 5/24 of the fee of Barolo from his distant cousin, Manfredo.

This last purchase illustrates clearly the growing tendency to

unify the ownership of feudal rights: the 5/24 of Barolo had been left to Gerolamo's son, Giacomo, with all his other possessions by Lodovico Falletti di Barolo, when he died childless in 1566. Lodovico's nephew, Manfredo, claimed his right to succeed, as a closer relative than Giacomo. After a lawsuit lasting 12 years, Manfredo finally managed to redeem the feudal (though not the allodial) possessions, paying Gerolamo 300 scudi compensation. But the difficulty of exacting this fraction of the feudal rights was apparently so great that his son, Giovanni, after transacting the payment of an annual censo by the comunita, sold it to Gerolamo in the following year.(26)

Both Gerolamo and his brother, Bonifacio, had shown that they realized the dangers of fragmentation, in their immediate decision to

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(26) Scipione paid 4100 fiorini (512 scudi) for the 1/8 of Serralunga: M.183, n.1; M.A.97, n.7. Bonifacio also acquired 53 giornate with his 1/6 of Serralunga; he paid a total of 1543 scudi: M.170, n.12; M.172, ns.12,13; M.183, n1; M.190, ns.2,3; M.191, n.3; M.212, n.12; M.A.97,ns.11-18.
The details of the lawsuit for Lodovico's inheritance are to be found in: M.185, n.4; M.186, n.1; M.188, ns.2,3,6; M.203, n.7; M.204, n.14; M.206, ns.7,8; M.210, n.4; M.212, n.12; AST III, art.599, i, M.1, n.19. Lodovico had also left Giacomo a small fraction of the fees of La Morra and Serralunga, which also returned to Manfredo as feudal. When Giovanni sold the annual censo of 11 scudi in 1586, he capitalized it at 3½% (314 scudi), which in an age of low rates of capitalization (with interests at 7 to 8%) was indicative of the sense of security in feudal dues, as a permanent and not a temporary source of income: M.177,ns.6,9,10. The right of prelazione, allowing relations to force the purchaser of illegally alienated possessions to sell them back, was already strong in Piedmont; see Pertile, v.3, pp.414-29; Leicht: Il diritto privato, v.2, p.121; Alberti, op.cit., pp.114-27.

hold their possessions at La Morra in common, and only divide Serralunga. Gerolamo owned about 345 giornate at Barolo, as well as a further 180 g. at Vergne, and a few giornate of feudal land at Castiglion Falletto and Focapaglia; between them, the brothers owned 350 giornate at Serralunga, and about 450 giornate at La Morra. The inheritance, in all, totalled about 1350 giornate, while Gerolamo's holding (assuming the division of both the Serralunga and La Morra lands), was about 1000 giornate. (See Appendix 11(a) and (b)).(27)

Gerolamo immediately tried to repurchase the farm his father had alienated. His first wife, Caterina Roncoli, had died, and he now used the dowry of his second wife, to rebuy the farm at La Morra, left by his uncle, Giacomo, under primogeniture. Fifteen years later, he managed to recover the Savigliano farm from his mother. But he was never able to rebuy the remainder of his father's alienations.(28)

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(27) For details of these measurements, and the problems involved in their calculation (which necessitates a varying margin of error), see Appendix 11(a) and (b).
Gerolamo's half of Serralunga equalled 175 giornate; at La Morra he owned the farm Scipione had been forced to give him in return for the alienation of Giacomo's primogeniture, of 120 g., and half the remaining lands, of probably 165 g. This made his inheritance 1008 giornate.

(28) For details of these, and all other, purchases by Gerolamo and Bonifacio, see Appendix 2.
Besides the other farm left by Giacomo in 1542 (at Vergne), Scipione had alienated a farm at S.Albano: M.177, n.7.

Both brothers now began a conscious policy of expansion. The nucleus of the family possessions at Barolo, La Morra and Serralunga was consolidated by the continual purchase of small areas of land as soon as offered for sale. At the very end of his life, Gerolamo seized the occasion to buy half the fee of Rodello and 1/12 the fee of Borgomale, with 175 giornate. The fees had formerly belonged to the Falletti and were situated conveniently near their other possessions.

Immediately following the recovery of the Savigliano farm, Bonifacio had bought two other farms in the same area; in later years, Gerolamo bought yet another farm. In 10 years, between 1577 and 1587, a new and compact centre of nearly 250 giornate had been acquired for the family. The lands were all allodial, but as Savigliano acknowledged no lords, except the house of Savoy, there was no possibility of acquiring feudal jurisdiction.

The purchase of a small farm on the hills above Turin, which completes the list of Gerolamo's acquisitions, might be explained by the newfelt need to possess a residence in the distant capital; the purchase of a house in the city itself would not only have proved excessively expensive, but would have yielded no returns.

In 30 years, Gerolamo had purchased 525 giornate, as well as jurisdiction in three fees, at an expense of over L.14,000 (17,750 scudi). His brother, Bonifacio, in the same period, had bought over 150 giornate and jurisdiction in two other fees for an expense of over L.2000 (3000 scudi). Between them, they had increased the size of the family

patrimony by over 50% as well as consolidating the jurisdiction in their fees of Barolo, Serralunga and La Morra, and acquiring further jurisdiction in the same region. Gerolamo had increased the size of his own holdings by over 52%. (Appendix 2 and (29)).

ii. Capital income and expenditure.

At the same time as he made his purchases, Gerolamo had had to provide dowries for his six daughters. He had already given a dowry of L.550 (950 scudi) to his sister, Angela. Two of his daughters, Giulia and Argia, became nuns, and were given small spiritual dowries. A third daughter, Eleonora, had entered a nunnery, but had then married against her father's will, and beneath her rank, receiving only a nominal dowry; but at her second marriage, Gerolamo had been forced to give her a larger dowry of L.270 (200 scudi). The other daughters married into local gentry families, and were given increasingly large dowries, totalling L.2940 (4200 scudi): the expense was not excessive, and Gerolamo was fortunate in the large intervals between the marriages, spread over a period of 15 years. But, added to the cost of his purchases, the dowries increased Gerolamo's expenditure to probably

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(29) The purchases of the two brothers of 682 giornate represented 50.5% of their inheritance of 1350 giornate. Gerolamo purchased 525 giornate, or 52.5% of his own inheritance. These areas, however, cannot be regarded as too accurate (see Appendix II (a)).

nearly L.19,000 (23,500 scudi).(30)

As against this expenditure, increases of capital were extremely limited haphazard. The dowry of Gerolamo's first wife had been used by his father, Scipione, to pay debts. Gerolamo himself received his second wife's dowry, and a small sum from Manfredo Falletti di Barolo, paid in compensation for the 5/24 of Barolo inherited from Lodovico; he was also able to use the dowry his son, Carlo, received in 1590. In all, Gerolamo's increase

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(30) M.174,ns.11-14,16; M.175,n.10;M.211,n.3. No evidence exists for the size of the two spiritual dowries; they can be calculated, however, as at least 400 scudi or L.267 for the two daughters. Eleonora had only received a nominal dowry of L.17 (25 scudi) when she married Lodovico Solaro, for

"esser essa uscita da tal monastero et maridatosi ignobilmente, il tutto senza consentimento di esso Signor Testatore [che] l'haverebbe poduta legitimamente esereditare" : M.211, n.3.

The cost of the dowries was as follows:

1550s	Eleonora (to L. Solaro)	L. 17	(25 scudi)
1559	Angela (to A. Fissore)	L. 557	(950 scudi)
1570	Ginevra (to L. Randoni)	L. 493	(800 scudi)
1576	Bianca (to cav.C.Fermondo)	L. 961	(1400 scudi)
1585	Caterina (to C. Lumello)	L.1487	(2000 scudi)
1588	Eleonora (to C.Maresealco)	L. 140	(200 scudi)
?	Two spiritual dowries	L. 267	(400 scudi)
		L.3922	(5775 scudi)

It is interesting to note the size of the dowry of Gerolamo's sister, Angela, as compared to that of his daughter Ginevra; it seems a clear example of the legal protection given to a woman, when the dowry was provided by her brothers. The increasingly large dowries of Gerolamo's daughters Ginevra, Bianca and Caterina, can probably be explained in part by the rising importance of the family. However, the fall in the value of money (the scudo rose from 9 to 11 fiorini in these years) should also be taken into account.

of capital amounted to about L.3000, mainly from dowries - a smaller sum than he himself spent on his daughters' dowries.(31)

No elements exist to evaluate the size of Gerolamo's annual income or expenditure. His expenditure was apparently covered by the income from his lands, with a small, supplementary income from feudal rights. In his early years, there is evidence of certain difficulties. His only means of paying for the farm at La Morra in 1557 was with his wife's dowry; he paid his sister's dowry by instalments between 1559 and 1562; and when he had to raise a dowry of nearly L.500 (800 scudi) for his daughter, Ginevra, in 1570, he paid three quarters in sacks of grain. After this date, there is no further evidence until near the end of Gerolamo's life, when the need to find as much as L.6000 (about 6800 scudi) to pay for his acquisitions in Fodello and Borgomale forced him to borrow L.800 (1300 crossoni), and to raise a censo on his farm near Turin for another L.880 (1000 scudi).

In all probability these were not the only examples. Income from land was insufficient to create large capital sums for investment; the fact that the land was mostly let out at mezzadria, with its income

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(31) The dowry of Gerolamo's first wife had been L.520 (1000 scudi): M.174,ns.5,6. The dowry of his second wife, Caterina Falletti di Pocapaglia, was L.728 (1400 scudi), paid between 1554 and 1557: M.169,n.2; M.174, n.8; M.211, n.3. The payment by Manfredo in 1576 was of L.206 (300 scudi). Carlo, on his marriage to Eleonora Riccio di Solbrito in 1590, received L.1500 (1800 scudi), paid by the end of the following year: AST III, art.599,i,M.1,n.28. Gerolamo thus received a total L.3014.

almost exclusively paid in kind and not in money, possibly raised a new problem of the prompt conversion of this income into liquid capital. Nevertheless, Gerolamo had managed to raise over L.14,000 from the income of his land, an annual average of over L.350.(32)

It was significant that Gerolamo continued to purchase more land, and refused to buy censi, a more flexible form of investment, involving smaller capital sums, and yielding an undoubtedly higher rate of interest. His decision, whether or not conservative, was indicative of the greater security of land.

iii. Gerolamo's wills.

Gerolamo had shown himself conscious of the need for an active policy of expansion. For most of his life, he seemed equally concerned about the conservation of the patrimony. As early as 1565, Gerolamo had already guaranteed the dowry of his wife, Caterina, with the usufruct of the farm he had bought at La Morra. In 1582, he guaranteed it to her again, but was evidently worried that it might be contested by his sons, on the grounds of Giacomo's primogeniture of 1542 (as he himself had disputed its alienation by his father). In the event of opposition, he arranged for its substitution by another farm at La Morra, but stated clearly

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(32) For the purchase of the 'Rivalta' farm at La Morra: M.175,ns.8,9; M.176, n.24; M.203,n.9; AC della Morra.
For Angela's dowry: M.175,n.10. For Ginevra's dowry, M.174,n.11.
For further details, see Appendix 2.
The loan from marchese Giovanni Francesco Ceva di Lesegno of L.802 (1300 crosoni), in 1595, was repaid by Gerolamo the following year.
The censo on the farm at the Maddalena, near Turin, was left to Giacomo to redeem in 1598: M.169,n.10; M.203, n.20.

that whatever farm his wife owned as her dower was to return to his eldest son on her death. It was a clear statement of an ever more common legal practice. The widow had to be given her dower, which on her death would normally be divided among her heirs. By restricting her ownership to a usufruct, the testator could avoid this division, and ensure the restitution of the dower to the family patrimony.(33)

When Gerolamo made his first will in 1585, he tried to compromise between conserving the unity of the patrimony and making provisions for his younger sons. Already before the 16th century, effective means had been evolved of keeping the patrimony undivided. The will of the testator was regarded as sacred, and a prohibition of alienation as perpetually binding. At the same time, a fedecommesso ensured the conservation of the possessions, by transforming the rights of the heir from permanent ownership into a temporary usufruct, with the duty to restore the trust intact at his death. The fedecommesso was strongly influenced by both feudal law and emphyeutic custom, encouraging the right

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(33) The guarantee, in the 1596 will, stated:

> "...perche così esso Signor Testatore intende che esse doti materne, e Massaria sopra per esso per le soe doti legata habbi ad essere, et venir insolidum, et in tutto dopo la morte di detta Signora soa Consorte all'infrascritto suo herede universale, o soi figlioli".

By arranging for the usufruct of the farm, Gerolamo allowed his widow no possibility (as permitted by statutory law) of choosing whether she preferred a cash payment or lands, nor of selecting her own lands; see, Alberti, op.cit., pp.70-73. However, by the mid-16th century, the leading jurists - Porporato, Thesauro, Sola, etc. - fully approved the use of the usufruct; cf. Sclopis, Antica legislazione, p.320; also Benedetto, op.cit., pp.121-22.
For the 1565 and 1582 guarantees: M.175, n.12; M.177,n.8; AST III, art.599, i,M.1, ns.15,23,26.

of primogeniture. But while the conservation of the patrimony was assured, it was still necessary to fix the order of succession, so as to secure its indivisibility. The rights of all secondary claimants to the inheritance were to a large extent diminished: the Trebellianica and Falcidia could be forbidden by the testator; the legittima, although not eliminated, was greatly weakened; and women were excluded from all further claims by the payment of an adequate dowry. At the same time, a system of substitutions was developed, replacing one relative by another, should the first be unwilling or unable to inherit. The different forms of substitutions were almost innumerable, but all had the same intention of conserving the patrimony within the family, and regulating its succession according to a fixed order. Whether it was possible to regulate the succession in perpetuity was greatly disputed, but it was certainly effective until at least the fourth generation. By the 16th century, the fedecommesso was fully developed, and under Spanish influence now began to expand. In Piedmont, however, the expansion was delayed: Carlo Emanuele I had restricted fedecommessi in Savoie to four generations as early as 1598; but only in the 17th century did they become really common.(34)

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(34) For a full discussion of the fedecommesso see Trifone, passim; also L. Tria, op.cit., especially pp.10-66. Sclopis, Antica legislazione, pp.312-13, notes justly (citing L. Muratori: Dei difetti della giurisprudenza, Venice, 1742, cap.17) that in Piedmont the fedecommesso only really spread in the 17th century. The limitation to 4 generations was only extended to Piedmont with the 1729 Constitutions: Duboin, t.7,lib VI,tit.8, pp.165-78. See also: Pertile, v.4, pp.151-63, 597-99; Calisse, v.3, pp.160-65; and also the articles of Trifone in the Nuovo Digesto Italiano, v.5,s.v. 'Fedecommesso'; and of L. Cosattini, v.12, part i, s.v. 'Sostituzione fedecommessaria'.

Gerolamo seemed fully aware of the legal possibilities of conserving the patrimony. By his will of 1585, he left the eldest son, Giacomo, the entire inheritance, except for three farms, bequeathed to Enrichetto, Carlo and Francesco Maria. However, even these bequests were made with the condition that they would return to the eldest son or his heirs, should any of their owners die without male children. It was not an openly stated fedecommesso, but by the prohibition to alienate and the substitution of one male heir for another, it ensured the possession of the farms within the family, and gave the eldest son the possibility of reuniting the patrimony.(35)

Just before his death in 1596, Gerolamo II made a second will. By now his possessions were considerably larger, and perhaps he felt in a position to deal more generously with the various members of his family. He left legacies of about L.1770 (2000 scudi) to both of his younger sons, Carlo and Francesco Maria. One of his farms at Savigliano was given to his brother, Bonifacio, and the other to Francesco Maria. All his acquisitions in Rodello and Borgomale were rather surprisingly left to Carlo. At this point, he apparently abandoned all his attempts to build up a patrimony, and divided the traditional family jurisdictions at La Morra and Serralunga in three equal portions between Giacomo, Francesco Maria and Carlo's son, Scipione. Giacomo was left the traditional possessions at Barolo, Castiglion Falletto and Pocapaglia, besides the lands at La Morra and Serralunga, the farm near Turin, and 1/3 of the jurisdiction at La Morra and Serralunga (with the promise of the return of one farm

(35) For the will of 6 September 1585: M.211, n.3.

at La Morra on his mother's death). Only half of Gerolamo's landed acquisitions were left to his eldest son.

It is difficult to explain Gerolamo's sudden change of attitude. His concern seemed less with maintaining the unity of the patrimony, than with assuring its conservation within the family group. For, while he divided the possessions, he also prohibited all alienations, on pain of their equal division among the co-heirs. Yet at the same time, he forbade all the legatees to create any difficulties for Giacomo, his universal heir, and threatened disobedience with the confiscation of their inheritance, to be given to Giacomo, while they would only receive their legittima. Moreover, all Giacomo's possessions were placed under a primogeniture, with the usual prohibitions to alienate.(36) Gerolamo was apparently uncertain

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(36) Gerolamo II died on 17 December 1596: M.211,n.40. His last will is dated 29 November 1596: M.211,n.3; M.212,n.12; AST III,art.599,i, M.1,n.58; M.'F'-lo,n.353,f.1. The clause binding the inheritance stated:

"...prohibendo si ad esso Signore Giacomo, che alli altri soi figlioli particolarmente instituiti l'alienazione delli beni da lui Testatore lasciati in modo tale che nè per contratto, nè per debito possino quelli transferirsi in altra persona, che nelli Discendenti luoro figlioli, e caso che alcuno di essi procuri, o voglj alienar qualche cosa di essi beni dichiarandoli lui Testatore inalienabili, e volle detto Testatore, e comanda, che essi beni, che si cercheranno di alienare vadino, et si aplichino alli altri coeredi sudetti senza pagamento di prezzo veruno, inibendo in tutto, et pertutto ad essi particolari Heredi instituiti ogni, e qualonque molestia in qualonque maniera si voglij al detto suo universale herede sopra tutti, e qual minima parte d'essi beni, in qual detto Testatore l'ha instituito sotto pena che chiunque d'essi particolari heredi verrà a dare, o inferire detta molestia resti, et si intendi solamente instituito in Scuti mille da fiorini otto per ragione di soa legitima, et

(cont'd. on next page)

of the effectiveness of a fedecommesso: he bequeathed large areas to all his relatives, to be sure that no further claims would be made on the inheritance before he established a primogeniture. But in achieving this, he alienated a large portion of his acquisitions.

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(36) (cont'd.)

"il sopra più resti devoluto, et aplicato al detto herede universale, e mancando a qualunque tempo si voglij esso Signore Giacomo suo herede universale, senza figlioli legitimi, e naturali ad esso è subetituito il più vecchio figliolo del signore Carlo sudetto, il quale ottenghi la ragione della primogenitura...[then to Francesco Maria's eldest son]...in modo che essi beni sempre restino successivamente di grado in grado nel più vecchio, o sij Primogenito da detti figlioli Discendenti legitimo, e naturale, comandando che si habbino da osservare tutte le Ragioni, Transazioni, e Scritture delli Signori suoi Antecessori, che parlano di Primogenitura...."

3. Giacomo (1596 - 1624).

Giacomo inherited a surprisingly restricted patrimony from his father. He owned 19/24 of the fee of Barolo, with about 577 giornate; only 1/3 of 1/24 of La Morra (for Bonifacio held 1/24, and Giacomo's brothers the remaining 2/3 of his 1/24), with about 310 giornate; only 1/3 of 1/4 of Serralunga (divided in the same manner as La Morra), with about 190 giornate; a small farm of 30 giornate near Turin; and the traditional and - from an economic viewpoint - worthless possessions in Castiglion Falletto and Pocapaglia. (Appendix 11(b) and (37)).

The feudal rights were more fragmentary than ever. Although the jurisdiction in Barolo had been increased (with the purchase of Lodovico's fraction in 1585), in Serralunga and even more in La Morra, the rights were now so fractional as to have lost most of their value. The only possibility of recovering them lay in the final clauses of Gerolamo's will, which guaranteed their reversion to the main line in the event of the extinction of any of the cadet branches.

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(37) The 7/12 of Barolo had been increased by Lodovico's 5/24, bought in 1586.
Giacomo's lands consisted of the 345 giornate at Barolo and 182 giornate at Vergne, inherited by his father, as well as 20 g. bought by Gerolamo during his life; and 30 g. inherited from Lodovico. At La Morra and Serralunga, Giacomo owned half the area his father and Bonifacio had owned in common, i.e, 165 g. and 175 g. respectively (see note (29) for Gerolamo's inheritance), as well as a total 145 g. bought by Gerolamo in La Morra and 15 g. in Serralunga. Including the farm near Turin, and the Castiglione and Pocapaglia possessions, a total of 1128 giornate. See Appendix 11(b).

But although Giacomo's rights of jurisdiction were almost reduced to the fee of Barolo, his landed possessions were still large. He inherited about 1125 giornate, which in 1603, on his mother's death, increased to about 1250 giornate.(38) The farms he inherited were for the most part immune from taxation, besides forming a compact estate in the adjoining fees of Barolo, La Morra and Serralunga, so facilitating the administration.

It was evident both from the size and the situation of Giacomo's lands that they were sufficient to yield him an income large enough to cover his normal expenditure and still provide a surplus. Gerolamo II had inherited a smaller estate in 1556, but had immediately begun to expand. Giacomo soon followed his father's example.

i. Giacomo's acquisitions.

In ten years, between 1600 and 1609, Giacomo bought six farms of over 650 giornate, besides a palace at Bra, at a cost of almost L.38,000 (40,000 scudi) (Appendix 3). His first purchases had been at Villafalletto, where he probably had the advice and aid of his wife's family; with the usufruct of his brother-in-law's farms there, at one point he probably owned as much as 400 giornate. In subsequent years, he bought other farms

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(38) M.211,n.4; AST III, art.599,i,M.1,n.46.
On Caterina's death, Carlo and Francesco Maria disputed the usufruct clause of Gerolamo's will:
"...dicendo che tal disposizione paterna non può di raggione sussister in pregiudicio luoro per haver detto fu signor luoro Padre disposto dell'heredità d'un vivente...".
Giacomo managed to win the case, but thought it advisable to pay his brothers their legacies of 2000 scudi each: AST III, art.599, i, M.1, n.58.

at Fossano and Centallo, nearer to the Langhe. At the same time, he made small acquisitions at La Morra, and then began to enlarge his holding at Verzne, with the purchase of two farms of 200 giornate. The acquisitions at Verzne, which consolidated his inherited possessions there, had the additional advantage of immunity from taxes, gained by the transaction of 1564 with the city of Cherasco; when he began to acquire more land at the end of his life, it was once more at Verzne.

In one year (1609), Giacomo bought a palace, two farms and other lands for a total of nearly 250 giornate, at a cost of over L.15,000 (14,500 scudi). Even though the payment was spread over a few years, the strain was too great for his finances: he was unable to pay completely for one of the Verzne farms, and was forced to borrow L.4135 (4000 scudi) to pay for the Centallo farm, creating a censo at the high rate of interest of 7%.

Two years later, Giacomo himself bought a censo in La Morra, paying L.215 (200 scudi), and receiving 7% interest. It is difficult to explain why he never bought any other censi. In these same years, his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brothers, Carlo and Francesco Maria, were all investing heavily in censi as well as in land. Bonifacio had invested about L.2000 by the time of his death in 1616, Carlo at least L.2500 before he died in 1628, and Francesco Maria bought increasingly throughout his long life.(39) Part of the reason probably lay in the immense strain on

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(39) For details on the acquisitions of Bonifacio, Francesco Maria and Carlo, see Appendix 4.

Giacomo's finances after the large purchases of his early years, especially as he had to provide dowries for his daughters. But at the same time, he was increasingly occupied by his efforts to recover the various fractions of feudal rights scattered throughout the family.

ii. The developing concept of inalienability.

Giacomo made his purchases for the most part in areas outside the traditional family fees. These purchases were almost always of allodial land. The possibilities of acquiring feudal holds grew increasingly restricted, as the government took measures to protect noble patrimonies. At the same time as the rulers attempted to restrict the feudal and economic privileges of the nobility, they became increasingly concerned to preserve the genuine feudal core of noble patrimonies. The need to restrict feudal privileges and abolish feudal abuses was clearly realized by Emmuele Filiberto, but at no time, not even under Vittorio Amedeo II, was a radical enough solution envisaged: the privileges were attacked in their particularity, but the actual right to possess such privileges was not put in question. And in fact the concept of feudality was encouraged once there no longer existed any danger from the nobility. For the nobility formed an ornament to the Crown. The contemporary writings of Francesco Agostino Della Chiesa reflected this attitude to the nobility: in 1635, his description of Piedmont, praising the virtues of the old feudal families, maintained that "li feudi et ricchezze

antiche siano anco necessarie a formare una vera nobiltà".(40)

The obstacles hindering the sale of feudal land increased, not only through the prohibitions of alienation and the erection of fedecommessi, but also because of the need for royal permission and the interinazioni of both the Camera and the Senato. Alienations were only allowed for 'necessary' causes, such as the provision of dowries; and even then only if there were no allodial possessions to sell.

Madama Cristina, in 1648, regulated the alienation of fees for the provision of dowries:

> "...in modo, che non venga a produrre dannose conseguenze a pregiuditio del patrimonio di S.A.R. et alla conservatione degl'istessi feudi ne'gli Agnati, e discendenti de' primi acquisitori...volendo...conservare il decoro della antica vecchia nobiltà..."

Carlo Emanuele II, in another edict of the same year, went even further,

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(40) Francesco Agostino Della Chiesa, bishop of Saluzzo, came from one of the oldest Saluzzese families, noted not only for the part it played in the political history of the marquisate, but also for the writings of many of its members. Carlo Emanuele I thought so highly of his uncle, Lodovico (d.1621), that he ordered all the State archives to be opened to him; in 1608, Lodovico published: Dell'Historia di Piemonte, libri tre..., Turin, republished in 1777. Francesco Agostino himself became Vittorio Amedeo I's historiographer. As early as 1614, he published a Catalogo de' Scrittori Piemontesi, Savoiardi, e Nizzardi, (Turin). His Relazione dello Stato presente del Piemonte was published in Turin in 1635 (and republished by Derossi in 1777). Francesco Agostino also wrote a Fiori di Blasoneria, per Ornar la Corona di Savoia con i fregi della Nobiltà (Turin, 1655) and the Corona Reale di Savoia o sia relazione delle provincie e titoli ad essa appartenenti, (Cuneo, 1655).
See: G.Saluzzo: Biografie Saluzzesi, Saluzzo, 1905, pp.14-31; G. Claretta: Sui principali storici piemontesi e particolarmente sugli storiografi della R. Casa di Savoia: Memorie della R. Accademia delle Scienze, s.II,t.30 (1878), pp.357-73. For the concept of the nobility as an ornament to the Crown, see Bulferetti, 'La feudalità', pp.425-441.

and allowed the creation of primogenitures, for:

> "...la divisione de' feudi habbia non poco scemato lo stesso splendore nelle principali, e più nobili famiglie di questi Stati di quà da monti, e di là da colli, e nodrite fra gl'incommodi de'consortili quelle discordie, le quali per lo più sogliono nascere dalla necessaria, e perpetua communione...".

To avoid these difficulties, all owners of feudal jurisdictions or properties would henceforth be allowed to create primogenitures (though only with ducal approval and the normal interinazioni), and even over-rule the rights of other relatives, permitted by the original investitures; for Carlo Emanuele II felt that:

> "...quanto a noi convenga il mantenere, et accrescere lo splendore della nobiltà, massime di quelli i quali come baroni e titolati vassalli, e possessori di giurisdittioni, e beni feudali rappresentino, e constituiscono il principale ornamento della nostra Corona....".

The nobility was no longer feared, and now had to enhance the prestige of the throne. The result was to accentuate the problem of providing for younger children.(41)

The complications of this ducal 'protection' were clearly illustrated by Giacomo's attempts to gain his wife's dowry. In 1586, Giacomo had married Maria Falletti di Villafalletto, yet another example of a marriage within the family group (for his own mother was a Falletti

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(41) For the edicts of 2 January and 16 July, 1648, see: Duboin, t.24, lib.XII, tit.2, cap.i,pp.280-87.

di Pocapaglia), partially explained by the lack of suitable marriages in so restricted and local a society. Maria's dowry was L. 13,013 (4000 scudi), still unpaid after her father's death, when Giacomo began a lawsuit (1592). In 1594, Maria's brother, Melchiorre, arranged with Giacomo to cede a feudal farm in Villafalletto in payment of the dowry. The Senato refused its permission, on the grounds that Melchiorre possessed sufficient resources to pay the dowry without the alienation of feudal land. As a result, Giacomo was only able to come to an agreement with Melchiorre in 1607, when he was paid a quarter of the dowry in money, and granted the usufruct of two of Melchiorre's farms at Villafalletto for a sufficient number of years to pay for the remainder.(42)

These obstacles in the way of feudal alienations contrasted with the ease of acquiring allodial lands in these years. The devastations of Carlo Emanuele I's wars, and the burden of taxes, forced much land onto the market. The comunità undoubtedly suffered the most from the wars, but even the nobility and clergy were compelled to make increasingly frequent 'loans', while the feudataries were also called upon to serve in the armies, at considerable personal expense. There is evidence of an obviously forced loan paid by Giacomo in 1597, and of another one paid by Bonifacio in 1614. But the family was extremely fortunate: its lands, situated on the most disputed frontier of Piedmont,

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(42) M.169,n.15; M.174,ns.15,17. The farms were given to Giacomo in usufruct for four and fourteen years respectively.

escaped devastation. In the years when many families were forced to sell their estates, the Falletti di Barolo found themselves in a position to buy. And with the rapid inflation spreading through the country the safest policy was to invest in land.(43)

iii. The recovery of the jurisdictions.

Geroloamo II had left the possibility of reuniting the fragmented jurisdictions in the event of the extinction of any of the cadet lines. At the time of the will, the number of males in the family rendered such a prospect improbable. Both Carlo and Francesco Maria were married with children, while their distant cousin, Giovanni Falletti di Barolo, was also married. Only their uncle, Bonifacio, was unmarried, and Giacomo could hardly hope for more than a third share of his inheritance.

When Bonifacio didd in 1616, he left a large inheritance of over 700 giornate, concentrated in the fees of La Morra and Serralunga, but

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(43) Until the 1670s, documents are lacking for the amount of land placed on the market. Until the notarial archives are studied, it will be dangerous to draw any general conclusions. But while it is impossible to judge the real effects of Carlo Emanuele I's wars on the land market, researches on the families studied here, as well as on several others, seem to indicate a fair activity. The forced loans of Giacomo and Bonifacio were both extremely small, each of 200 ducatoni, equivalent to about L.160:M.203,n.22; AST III, Controllo,a.1597 in 1601,ff.23,26;a.1614 in 1616,f.124. In 1597, Giacomo and Bonifacio were repaid a loan of 200 ducatoni made by Scipione and his brother Giacomo to the Infanta Caterina of Austria; it is difficult to say whether this was also a forced loan or some more private arrangement: AST III, art.599,1,M.'F'-2°,n.374. Perhaps the family was never called on to serve Carlo Emanuele I in his wars because it owed loyalty to both Savoy and Mantua; Giacomo only took Piedmontese nationality in 1620.

with lands even in Savigliano and Fossano, besides liquid assets of almost L.3500. He showed the same concern as Gerolamo II to maintain the inalienability of his patrimony - once he had made his own initial divisions. Almost all his legacies were bound under primogenitures, and he continually insisted on obedience:

> "...qual volontà e Testamento vole e intende esso signor Testatore, che sij inviolabilmente et sinceramente osservato gravandone perciò tutti gl'infrascritti signori heredi, e Legatarij infrascritti quali quando contravenessero (il che non crederà mai) a questa sua volontà, ch'essi sieno, di tanta ingratitudine, tenuti darne Conto alla divina giustitia, e saranno contravenuti alla divina giustitia, e saranno contravenuti alla volontà di chi ha procurato farsi beneficio, et utile."

He left legacies to both his natural sons, as well as to Carlo and Francesco Maria, but he made Giacomo his universal heir. Giacomo was left all the possessions at La Morra and Serralunga, which Bonifacio had inherited from his father, Scipione, in 1556, besides Bonifacio's own acquisitions of a further part of the same jurisdictions in 1585, all strictly bound under a primogeniture.(44)

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(44) M.211,n.5. The primogenitures contained the normal prohibitions of alienations or detractions for the Trebellianica, Falcidia, or even legittima:

> "...Prohibendo detto signor Testatore a tutti li soprad.etti legatarij et heredi particolari et universale l'alienatione di tutti o parte delli sudetti beni stabili sotto qualsi voglij pretesto o Colore, come anche prohibisse ogni detrattione di legittima Tabell.ra [Trebellianica] e Falcidia, nè per qual sivoglij debito, eccetto nelli riservati dalla legge quando peccassero contro il Serenissimo Prencipe (il che non crederà mai esso signor Testatore che cadino soi posteri in tant'errore) ...nè diminuirai per qual si voglia contratto o distratto; perchè vole, et intende che tutti essi soi beni restino perpetualmente et in infinite nell'agnatione e fameglia son,

(continued on next page)

The validity of the will was immediately disputed by the Patrimoniale Generale, claiming on behalf of the Demesne that the inheritance (at least the feudal part) should escheat to the Crown in the absence of legitimate male sons. The lawsuit continued until after Giacomo's death, and in the end (1627) Bonifacio's will was upheld, on the grounds of the existence of male heirs (who need not necessarily be sons). It was indicative of both the force of a primogeniture and of the limits of ducal authority: in matters of civil law, the will of a private testator, in favour of the succession of male relatives, could be asserted against the claims of the Crown.(45)

A similar dispute over the inheritance of Giovanni Falletti di Barolo emphasized the rights of male heirs. Giovanni had already sold Gerolamo II the 5/24 of Barolo, which his father had successfully claimed as the nearest male heir of Lodovico. In 1616, shortly before his death, Giovanni

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(44) (cont'd)
"et in primogenitura come sopra...sotto pena della privatione delli beni lasciati a colui che vorrà contravenire, e contradire, qual pena e privatione vole, et intende esso signor Testatore ch'incorre ipso Jure et facto, tal Contraveniente salvo però nelli beni feudali, quali restarono come di ragione spettarono..."

(45) The lawsuit is to be found in: M.170,n.12; M.190,ns.2,3; M.191,n.3; M.212,n.12; M.211,ns.5,6; M.A.97,ns.25,27,29; M.A.98,ns.1,3-6,9; AST III, art.599,i,M.1,n.48-2o; M.'F'-1o,n.345;art.780,n.7; Controllo, a.1627-2o,f.144.
The Demesne claimed all the feudal possessions that Bonifacio had inherited, his purchases from Giovanni Stefano Falletti di Roccapaglia in 1585, as also feudal; and lands in Serralunga formerly allodial, but declared feudal by the new law of 1606, which tried to divide all lands into either allodial or feudal, eliminating those of terza specie.

made a transaction with Giacomo to exchange his remaining possessions in Barolo (including the other 5/24 he had inherited from his father), as well as the small area of land he owned in Serralunga, in return for Giacomo's farm at Fossano. After Giovanni's death, the validity of the transaction was disputed by his widow, Anna di Clavesana, as well as by Carlo and Francesco Maria. Simultaneously, all three brothers disputed Giovanni's will, by which all his inheritance was left to his widow, Anna, on the grounds that women could inherit even feudal possessions according to Monferrat law.

The will was disallowed, as the right of female succession only took effect when there were no males in the family to succeed, besides in any case usually referring only to female descendants of the original investee. As a result, all three brothers divided Giovanni's feudal possessions in La Morra, each taking 1/9 of the jurisdiction, while the allodial possessions remained with Anna. The validity of the transaction took longer to decide, but was finally upheld by the Monferrat Senate in 1626, on the grounds of its own approval at the time of exchange.(46)

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(46) Giovanni's natural son, Ascanio, was legitimized in 1626, and recognized as his father's successor, but by then the inheritance had evidently already been divided: AST III, Interinazioni, R.1625 in 1626,n.61,f.238. The two lawsuits were naturally closely connected, and the documents cannot be separated; both suits can be reconstructed from: M.169,n.25; M.177,ns.12,14; M.189,n.3; M.203,n.25; M.212,n.12; M.A.98,n.2; AST III, art.599,i,M.2,n.76-2o; M. F-lo,n.347.
The favourable sentence of the Senate was undoubtedly aided by the large bribe of 1000 scudi, offered by Giacomo (M.203,n.25):

"Io Antonio Falletti, a nome del Signor Giacomo Falletti cosignor di Barruolo, per il qual faccio caso...prometto di pagare alla Camera Ducale per recognitione, a S.A. Serenissima scudi mille da grossi 100 in bona moneta d'oro et argento ad valor corente della piazza, fra otto giorni, doppo che si sarà riportata da questo Eccellentissimo Senato la sentenza favorevole nella causa feudale con li signori suoi fratelli nel rimedio di supplica alla qual somma e pagamento non dovrò esser tenuto, caso che non seguissi la revocatione del p[redett o] ordinato."

The concept of the inalienability and indivisibility of feudal possessions was clearly asserted in both these lawsuits. When Carlo's only son, Scipione, died without heirs in 1622, the precautions taken by Gerolamo in his will at once came into effect, and Scipione's share of La Morra and Serralunga returned to Giacomo. When Francesco Maria agreed to restore his own third part of Gerolamo's inheritance, the feudal jurisdiction was fully reunited.

The full fruits of these inheritances were only enjoyed by Giacomo's son, Gerolamo III. The feudal possessions of the family were almost wholly reunited in his person, and with the primogenitures tying them down, it was almost impossible that they would again be divided. Gerolamo owned the whole fee of Barolo, 2/3 of Serralunga and 11/36 of La Morra. On the death of his uncle, Carlo, in 1628, his possessions of La Morra increased to 15/36, while he recovered his grandfather's acquisitions of 1/2 Rodello and 1/12 Bergemolo, held in common with his uncle, Francesco Maria.(47) His rights of jurisdiction formed a solid basis for his territorial possessions.

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(47) M.211,n.8; AST III, art.599,i,M.2,ns.97,106,107; M. 'G in L', n.379, f.278. Scipione's will is not to be found in the family archive, nor is there any document of the transaction between Francesco Maria and Gerolamo III, restoring the remaining 1/3 of Gerolamo II's division of Serralunga and La Morra in 1596. But by 1637, Gerolamo III was invested with 2/3 of Serralunga (i.e.,from Bonifacio the 1/4 he had inherited, plus the 1/6 he bought in 1585; and the 3 parts of 1/4 divided between Giacomo, Francesco Maria and Scipione) and 15/36 of La Morra (i.e., from Bonifacio the 1/24 he had inherited, plus the 1/9 he bought in 1585; 1/9 inherited from Giovanni in 1616; the 3 parts of the 1/24 divided as above; and the 1/9 inherited by Carlo from Giovanni in 1616): M.212,n.12.

iv. Dowries

Giacomo had had the fortune of a single son, and hence had never been forced to make settlements on younger sons. However, his two daughters, Caterina and Lodovica, had both required dowries. Moreover, Giacomo's claims to a new social position necessitated far higher dowries than those his father had given to his own sisters. In 1609, Giacomo spent over L.2250 (2200 scudi) to buy a palace at Bra; he did not yet feel himself in a position to buy a town-house in the capital, but obviously the family castles in Barolo and the adjoining fees were insufficient for a man of his position. The following year, he arranged for his daughter, Caterina, to marry a leading noble at the Court of Mantua, Traiano Corba, conte di Visone. Corba's fees, near Acqui, were sufficiently near the Falletti possessions to continue the tradition of local marriages; his position as Gran Scudiere to the Duke of Mantua satisfied Giacomo's growing ambitions. Giacomo was prepared to offer a dowry of L.21,000 (20,000 scudi), ten times his sister Caterina's dowry in 1585. Even taking into account the devaluation of approximately 40% in the exchange rate of the scudo in the same 25 years, the dowry still represented a large increase.

Corba died within a month of the marriage, and his brother and heir acknowledged the debt of the only instalment of the dowry paid,

as well as of the jointure of 3000 scudi, or 1/7 of the dowry.(48) Six years later, in 1616, Caterina married again, Andrea Valperga, conte di Monteu, a lieutenant in the cavalry and gentiluomo di camera at the Court of Carlo Emanuele I. The dowry, with the increase in the exchange rate, was apparently equally large: L.21,600 (18,000 scudi) which Valperga increased by a jointure of 1/3. But Giacomo agreed to make good any devaluations in the value of money caused by the disastrous war of the Monferrat; by the time of his death he had paid an additional L.3500 (2900 scudi).(49)

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(48) M.174,ns.18,19. The jointure of 1/7 seems very small, and may be indicative of Giacomo's willingness to accept bad conditions for a socially advantageous marriage; this would seem confirmed by Lodovica's jointure in 1621 of little over 1/6. But Gerolamo II had also only guaranteed his second wife, Caterina Falletti di Pocapaglia, a jointure of 1/7 in 1558 (M.174,n.8); possibly in the Monferrat, jointures were about 1/7 the size of the dowry, and in Piedmont 1/3. Corba only agreed to repay the first instalment of the dowry (2000 scudi) and the jointure (3000 scudi) after the normal lawsuit; in theory, the money belonged to Caterina, but her father certainly used it, in her name.
The palace in Bra was bought from a local family of nobles, the Guerra: M.169,n.19; A.C. di Bra (information provided by Prof.E. Mosca).

(49) Caterina's marriage: M.169,ns.25,28; M.174,ns.20,21,23; AST III, art.599,i,M.2,n.120.
The first 5000 scudi of the dowry were paid with the debt owed by Corba in 1618; in 1622-23 another payment of 7000 scudi was made. By this time, Giacomo had paid an additional 2912 scudi (L.3494) to cover the loss in value. After Giacomo's death, Gerolamo III paid the remaining 6000 scudi in 1629, apparently without any increase against loss in value: he probably claimed that the agreement only applied to his father, while he was only liable for the remainder of the dowry.
All Giacomo's payments were placed in censi over communità, and the communità were forced to guarantee them against any taxes on censi which the government might impose in the future; while this was undoubtedly a wartime scare, it also indicated a real fear of an unquestioned governmental authority. The clause stated:

(Cont'd on next page)

Giacomo's financial difficulties increased with the marriage of his second daughter, Lodovica, to Giovanni Giacomo Scarampi, conte di Camino, in 1621. The dowry was L.31,333 (20,000 scudi), increased by Scarampi by a jointure of only 3500 scudi, or little over 1/6: Giacomo apparently had to accept unfavourable terms for socially advantageous marriages. But Giacomo himself was unable to find all the money, despite his wife's inheritance from her mother in 1617 of L.1950. He bought two farms at Vergne, but was forced to sell one within a year, while failing to complete payment of the other. He sold three censi over his lands to raise a further L.4500. But when he died in 1624, he had still only managed to pay 2/3 of Caterina's dowry, and under half that of Lodovica.(50)

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(49) (cont'd)

"...Piu hanno convenuto come sopra che venendo S.A. Serenissima o suoi Illustrissimi Magistrati imponer per l'avenire qualche Carico sovra li Censi, et che detta S.A. dimandasse la quarta o altra parte di detti Censi per qualonque Censo tanto volontario che necessario etiandio per causa di guerra che detta Communità e particolari debbano far bona a detti signori Valperga, o a chi havrà ragione da essi detta quarta, o altra Cosa che gli convenisse pagare o rillevar li Indenni in modo che habbino il suddetto censo franco senza diminutione alcuna..." (M.169,n.25).

(50) For Lodovica's dowry and its payment: M.174,n.22.
For details of Giacomo's sales, see Appendix 3.
By 1624, Giacomo had paid only 8000 scudi of Lodovica's dowry.
In 1615, confirmed in 1617, the Senato awarded Giacomo's wife, Maria, half her mother's inheritance as her legittima. Her brother, Melchiorre, was ordered to pay her 5% annual interest since the date of her mother's death (1601). The total sum owing was calculated by the Senato as 29,250 fiorini (L.1950): M.191,n.2; M.193,n.1; M.210, n.8; AST III, Sentenze del Senato, v.92,a.1617,f.119.

v. The patrimony in 1624.

Giacomo left his son debts of over L.33,000, two thirds consisting of dowries. In the course of his life, he had spent nearly L.73,000 between his acquisitions and the partial payment of his daughters' dowries, while in the same period, his increase of capital had been under L.10,000 from his wife's dowry and her inheritance, as well as the jointure from Caterina's first marriage. In 28 years he had thus raised about L.63,000, or L.2250 a year, from his lands, over and above his normal living expenses. Giacomo had inherited 1250 giornate, which he increased by a further 690 giornate, or 55%, before his death; with the legacies left by Bonifacio, Giovanni and Carlo, his son Gerolamo inherited a further 500 giornate, expanding the patrimony to almost 2500 giornate. At the same time, the feudal right owned by the family had been reunited and enlarged. (see Appendix 3).

Before he died in 1624, Giacomo ordered the family archives and wrote a memorandum on future policy for the use of his successors. He warned them to take their investitures as soon as owing, so as to avoid the risks of confiscation; the family archives should be kept in good order, being of the utmost value in the continual lawsuits; nor should they ever be shown to any outsider "dovendo la persona prudente pensare non solamente al presente, ma all'avvenire". Giacomo himself had undoubtedly thought seriously about the future; like his father, he had failed to take into account an indisponsibility of liquid assets, accentuated by the rapid devaluation of his later years; he found it impossible to raise two large dowries of over L.30,000 in five years. But his debts, although large,

did not detract from his realization of the possibilities of expansion. The transformation of the economic and social position of the family was in large part due to Giacomo. When he died in 1624, he completed his work by binding all his possessions under a primogeniture.(51)

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(51) For details of Giacomo's purchases, sales and debts, see Appendix 3. Giacomo's will is dated 11 March 1609, but was never changed before his death: M.212,n.12.
The memorandum (M.218) is notable for its clarity and concision:

"Copia di memoria di Giacomo Signor di Barrollo, tradotta qui per maggior intelligenza li ... dell'1676 in Torino.

Memoria a' posteri di prender l'Investiture per i feudi a' debiti tempi, e non trascurare per che vi sono esempj di molti Vassolli, che havendo lasciato passar il tempo destinato ad'ottener dette Investiture hanno perso i feudi. Ricordarsi anche di chiamar in tempo i testimoniali di dilligenza, nullum currere tempus per le nostre portioni del feudo di Roccapaglia dal Vescovo d'Asti, e per il feudo della Morra durante l'Interim tra le Corone a Millano, e Torino.
In questo libro vi sono molte memorie, massime per i redditi de nostri feudi e Cassine, che perciò si dovrà leggere dilligentemente.
Occorrendo qualche novità, o litte converrà vedere le scritture che sono nell'archivio, per che ivi si troverà tutto quello [che] sarà spediente essendovi le Transationi con le Comunità, Testamenti, Instrumenti di compre, Investitube, Atti di molte cause, e liti già superate, e tutto le altre Scritture necessarie e cossì occorrendo qualche caso massime di rillevo converrà visitarle ben minutamente, perchè o in un luogo, o nell'altro si troverà infallibilmente tutto ciò si desiderarà. Avertendo però di non lasciar vedere dette Scritture massime da Sudditi o da quelli che possono havere, e sperare qualche interesse per che rara fides Dovendo la persona prudente pensare non solamente al presente, ma all'avvenire, e non fondarsi sul credere, hora questo è molto amico, e ben affetto, per che variano i tempi, e può diventar contrario: Per rimediar a questo pericolo conviene studiare molto, e quando, per mala sorte non si possi esser in dilligente abastanza in tal caso procurar di trovar qualche persona d'integrità, e dotta che possi istruire delle sudette scritture ed altri affari. Initium sapientiae est timor domini...."

4. Gerolamo III (1624 - 1664)

1. Landed and capital investments.

Gerolamo III had inherited a large patrimony, created by the expansionist policies of both his father and his grandfather. During his 40 years as head of the family, he continued the development, though in a less energetic manner. The first 20 years after Giacomo's death corresponded to the worst period of the wars in Piedmont; the last, disastrous years of Carlo Emanuele I gave way to a short period of peace under Vittorio Amedeo I; but civil war broke out after his death in 1637, and ravaged the country until 1642. Almost all Gerolamo's activities occurred during the last period of his life, but even then there is no consistent policy of expansion, but rather piecemeal, haphazard acquisitions. The five years of civil war had ruined the agriculture of vast areas of Piedmont, and Gerolamo's income was undoubtedly diminished. He seemed reluctant - or was unable - to buy land in Piedmont, and he only made small purchases in the old family fees, especially at Barolo and Castiglione Falletto. His main purchase in the Langhe (probably in the late 1640s) was of a farm of 128 giornate at Neive, immediately north-east of Alba.(52)

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(52) The purchases at Castiglion Falletto between 1633 and 1644, which totalled 19 giornate, are to be found in: M.170,n.13; M.210,n.11; M.179,n.3; M.184,n.1; M.A.13,n.3. Between 1642 and 1651, Gerolamo acquired about 10 giornate in Barolo: M.180,n.6. He possibly made some purchases in La Morra (see Appendix 11(a), note (16)).
The Villafalletto farms also increased from 200 g. to 238 g. between their purchase in 1600 and 1670: M.A.122,n.17; it has proved impossible to find more details of these acquisitions, so that it is doubtful whether Giacomo or Gerolamo III were mainly responsible; they have therefore been omitted from all calculations. The first mention of the Neive farm is in 1651: M.A.16,n.3.
The comparative restriction of Gerolamo III's activities is reflected in the relative lack of documents for these years, compared to the wealth of documentation for both the preceding and the subsequent period.

For the first 5 years following Giacomo's death, Gerolamo was fully occupied in paying his father's debts of over L.38,000. For almost ten years after he had completed these payments there is virtually no evidence of further activities. When he finally began to employ his surplus capital, it was in cash investments rather than in land. The strain of the wars, as always, fell on the comunità and their members, who were forced to sell ever more censi, as well as alienate the communal lands. The continual billeting of troops proved ruinous, and in 1637 Gerolamo had even agreed to help pay:

> "...l'eccessive tasse da essa Comunità, et homini fatte per causa di detti alloggiamenti contro l'espressa disposizione delli ordini di S.A.R. e prescritto modo..."

hastily adding, however, to protect his own immunity, that:

> "...non tanto perchè come Signore, e per il privilegio di sua persona...intendesse a quello esser tenuto" [but to] "...rimostrarli il solito, paterno affetto si sia contentato d'ammetterli [the taxes] per ora, senza pregiudicio di conseguenza....".

Four years later, he spent L.5000 in the purchase of censi in La Morra and Barolo.(53)

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(53) For Giacomo's debts, see Appendix 3.
The agreement to help pay for the billeting of 1637 is to be found in: M.A.[14],n.s.6,7. In 1641, a new loan of L.550 (50 doppie) was made to the comunità of Barolo for the same reason, for:
"...con prontezza bisogna aver denari per pagare la contributione da questa Comunità pretesa dal regimento di Monsù Bordarj alloggiato al presente villaggio di Castiglione Falletto...": M.203,n.26.
The censo sold in the same year by 7 members of La Morra was of a capital of L.4400 (400 doppie), yielding at 7% L.308 (28 doppie) annually: M.169,n.29.

But his investments in Piedmont were limited. The insecurity of these years, and the continuing inflation, led him to seek safer investments outside the frontiers of Piedmont. The nearest centre to his own possessions, which also guaranteed an absolute security, was the Banca di San Giorgio at Genoa. The rate of interest was only 3½% (which dropped by 1664 to 2½%), as compared to the 6-7% paid by most censi. But its payment was guaranteed, while the capital invested (in monete grosse) would almost inevitably increase in terms of money of account in a period of such acute inflation. In 1638-39, Gerolamo invested a total of over L.15,500, while between 1656 and 1662 he made nine more deposits for over L.49,000. It was a decision showing great originality, when compared to the traditional family policy. Any surplus income had to be invested, if it was not to depreciate over the years. But, before Gerolamo, investments had always been in land, with, in later years, a small amount invested in local censi. Gerolamo apparently realized (or the state of the country forced him to realize) that the destruction and taxes caused by the wars would diminish, if not wholly eliminate, any real income from land, while rendering the exaction of local censi extremely precarious. The interest paid by the Banca di San Giorgio was not great, but was at least secure, and could be left to accumulate. By the time of Gerolamo's death in 1664, he had probably received about L.27,750 in interest. Meanwhile, his capital investments, which had cost him L.64,500, had also risen in value to over L.75,000. (Appendix 5 and (54)).

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(54) The memorandum on the Genoa deposit is to be found in: M.212,n.3. For more details, see Appendix 5.

ii. The Monferrat fees.

But Gerolamo's interests were not confined to Genoa. His sound economic position permitted him to look beyond the provincial Piedmontese society for a socially advantageous marriage. In 1633, he married Cornelia, daughter of conte Guido Biandrate di San Giorgio, one of the 15 Cavalieri dell'Annunziata (the highest order in the Savoyard states), general of the armies of the Pope and governor of Bologna; Cornelia's mother came from the renowned Trivulzio family.

The marriage could be regarded as a social coup for the Falletti di Barolo. In itself it signified an almost official recognition of the new economic status of the family, while it could be used as an entry to the centre of all social and economic power - the Court. There is no evidence that Gerolamo resided at Turin, but it is extremely probable that he spent some time there, especially after the end of the civil wars. He had paid a high price for the connection with the Biandrate: Cornelia had only brought a dowry of 6000 scudi equal to L. 18,600 - compared to his own sisters' dowry of 20,000 scudi - to which he had added an extremely large jointure of L.9300 (3000 scudi), or half the size of the dowry. But he must have regarded it as a good investment, fully guaranteed by his father-in-law's position.(55)

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(55) For the marriage with Cornelia Biandrate, and the payment of the dowry: M.174,n.24; M.212,n.17; see also A.Dufour: La famille des Seigneurs de Barol, Turin, 1884, pp.18-19. The lands - 312 moggia, equivalent to 266 giornate - were valued at L.20,150 (3250 doppie) or L.1550 (250 doppie) more than the dowry, which Gerolamo paid his father-in-law.

The payment of the dowry also signified the beginning of a new policy. Instead of the normal payment in cash, Gerolamo received three farms of 266 giornate at Montiggio and San Saluto, an area lying between Ozzano and Pontestura, slightly west of Casale. The alienation of land for a dowry was unusual in Piedmont; perhaps it signified a temporary (or even the beginning of a permanent) economic embarrassment of the Biandrate family. For the Falletti di Barolo, it meant the acquisition of land far away from all their other possessions, with a completely different type of agriculture. The steep hills were apparently not so fertile as the Langhe, and covered with pasture-land. Ten years after Gerolamo's death, his son Carlo Lodovico gained patents for the privilege of sheep-farming,

> "...di poter tener pecore nel tenimento di Montiggio e San Saluto...essendo sopra detti Beni molti pascoli per il godimento de quali e solito tener diverso pecore..."

The innovation was important. The advantages of keeping a certain number of sheep was quickly realised, and by the 1720s flocks had been introduced - albeit on a very restricted scale - onto farms at Rodello, Vergne and La Morra. However, the traditional forms of cultivation by mezzadria remained predominant.(56)

The dowry also meant the acquisition of lands in the Monferrat, beyond the Piedmontese frontier. It is possible that the conte di

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(56) The patents of 1674 are to be found in: AST I, Monferrato, Suppliche, v.X,f.69. Sheep were introduced in Rodello already in 1676:M.218,n.5; on the 'Murata' farm in Vergne, at least from 1721 to 1739; and on the 'Rivalta' farm at La Morra by 1738: M.173,n.7.
For a discussion of mezzadria, see pp.195-199.

San Giorgio had close connections with the Dukes of Mantua, with many of his possessions under Mantuan jurisdiction. When Gerolamo began to acquire new fees in the Monferrat, he was certainly on good terms, and perhaps a creditor, of the Duke of Mantua, Carlo II. In 1652, Gerolamo bought the county of Rocchetta Palafea, and in successive years, 3/4 of the fee of Cassinasco; in 1661, he purchased the marquisates of Cavatore and Castagnole Monferrato. The fees were much nearer his Langhe possessions than Montiggio, three of them lying slightly west of Acqui, with Castagnole immediately north-east of Asti. But all of them were under Mantuan jurisdiction, and had, for the most part, been purchased directly from Carlo II.(57)

Gerolamo had taken the precaution of gaining permission from Carlo Emanuele II in 1656 to purchase fees from vassals in the Monferrat.(58)

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(57) For details of the Monferrat fees, see Appendix 11(a). Very little is know of Gerolamo's connections with the Court of Mantua. The archives of the Monferrat were moved from Mantua to Turin at the time of its acquisition by Piedmont (1706), but many documents were lost. It has been impossible to find more evidence in the archives at Turin, Mantua or Milan. It is possible that Carlo II owed Gerolamo a large debt, for Gerolamo only paid about L.2000 (150 doppie) of the L.11,000 (800 doppie) for the fee of Cavatore; but this may also have been a debt to Gerolamo of the previous owner of the fee, marchese Ferdinando Guarini; see M.169,n.32; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.32,n.32; AST I, Monferrato, Suppliche, v.5,f.143; v.6,f.158; Concessioni, R.11, f.167.

(58) For the 1656 permission: M.206, n.15. Giacomo had taken Piedmontese letters of naturalization in 1620.

But the very fact that a Piedmontese subject should wish to buy fees consistently outside Piedmont is perhaps indicative of the weakness of ducal authority, after the years of civil war.

Gerolamo's reasons for these purchases are difficult to explain. It seems probable that they were, at least in part, a security measure, dividing the possessions in order to protect them against the incidents of war and climatic disturbances. With the end of the war of succession in Mantua, the Monferrat might seem less likely to be disturbed than Piedmont itself. Undoubtedly the eagerness of the needy Duke, Carlo II, to sell fees to all comers, offered the chance of a good bargain. But a significant feature of all the purchases was the meagre amount of land attached to the fees. Gerolamo spent over L.45,000, but acquired only 174 giornate, of which 125 giornate were at Rocchetta Palafea. The value of the fees lay elsewhere, in the income to be gained from feudal rights and in the increased reputation of their owner. The comunità of Castagnole paid an ordinario of 283 scudi annually, worth over L.2600 at the time of purchase, and guaranteed against depreciation by its exaction in moneta grossa; various monopolies, such as mills and ovens, and a large number of emphyteuses (especially in Cavatore) were owned in the other fees. Gerolamo seemed reluctant to extend his landed possessions, and preferred to invest in more easily exactable feudal dues. At the same time, he was buying new titles to improve his social standing. In Piedmont he was only count of Barolo, in the

Monferrat he was marquis of Cavatore and Castagnole. Gerolamo II and Giacomo had founded the economic prosperity of the family; Gerolamo III now assured it social recognition.(59)

iii. Disputes with the comunità.

From a long term view-point, the purchase of feudal dues in the new fees proved a mistake. There is no evidence of disputes with the comunità, but by the 1730s the family recognized that the mills and ovens had virtually lost all value, while the emphyteuses, for the most part, had been usurped by their owners; even at Cavatore, where over 40 emphyteuses were still owned at the time of the perequazione, the income for what was probably a large area of land was under L.50. The ability of the Monferrat comunità to free themselves from feudal dues paralleled the renewed opposition of the Piedmontese comunità.(60)

The frequent disputes and transactions in the second half of the 16th century had been followed by an almost complete lack of activity on the part of the comunità in the early decades of the 17th century.

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(59) Other examples of the division of possessions can be found, such as the great Lombard family of the d'Adda, with 2/3 of their lands in Lombardy and 1/3 in the Monferrat, probably consciously divided to counteract the risks of war and climate; see A. De Maddalena: 'I bilanci dal 1600 al 1647 di una azienda fondiaria lombarda. Testimonianza di una crisi economica', Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali, Sept.-Dec.1955, p.12.

(60) These details can be found in the consegnamenti, e.g. that of 1734: AST III, Consegnamenti, R.375, ff.76-96.

After Giacomo's death, the comunità once more began to react against feudal privileges. In 1634, the city of Cherasco had again managed to increase the canone paid for the exemption from taxes of lands in Verzne. The comunità of Rocapeglia refused to pay Gerolamo his fraction of the fodro, valued at 1 1/4 scudi, until ordered to do so by the Senato in 1646. The comunità of Serralunga similarly opposed the transactions of 1553 and 1560 until Gerolamo successfully appealed to the Senato in 1664.

But the comunità of Barolo and La Morra created even greater opposition. La Morra had always been reluctant to pay feudal dues, while also claiming taxes for allodial lands. In 1642, it finally forced both Gerolamo and Francesco Maria to pay nearly L.6000 for the partial exemption of their allodial possessions. Barolo seemed equally successful. At the time of the transactions with the comunità of Barolo, Scipione had bought the communal taxes (daciti), exacted on the production and sale of the main local products (wine, grain and oil, probably from nuts). The payment of the feudal censi and daciti was continually disputed by the comunità: in 1619, after the comunità had refused to pay for four years, Giacomo had begun a lawsuit; by 1636 the rights had been owing for ten years. A compromise in 1637, when Gerolamo agreed to help pay for the billeting of troops, proved ineffective. In 1638, Gerolamo was forced to yield even more; he abandoned all claims to past

debts (estimated at L.1500), and gave back to the communità both the daciti and the smaller censi formerly paid to Giovanni Falletti di Barolo (valued at over 27 scudi annually, or more than L.100 in 1638); in return he was confirmed in his possession of the main censo of 33 scudi, and was also granted exemption for all his allodial lands.(61) The communità of Barolo and La Morra had once more been forced to grant tax exemptions to the feudataries. But for the first time they had managed to successfully oppose the payment of feudal dues. The Falletti di Barolo, also for the first time, had been unable to maintain their traditional rights, and had been forced to make substantial concessions.

The success of the communità proved of short duration. The disasters of the civil war bore so heavily on the communità, that by 1642 Barolo was forced to sell the daciti back to Gerolamo, and, in 1650, add to them the communal oven (forno), as well as one of the mills.

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(61) The Cherasco transaction of 1634: M.210,ns.9,10. The dispute with Pocapaglia: M.179,ns.16,17; M.205,ns.9,10; AST III, art.599,1, M.2,n.145. With Serralunga: M.177, n.28; M.218, f.3. With Barolo (1619): M.204,n.17; M.A.14,n.10; and in 1636, with the 1637 transaction: M.A.14,ns.6,7; in 1638: M.177,n.25; M.179, ns.5,6,9,13. The transaction with La Morra, 1642: M.203,n.27; Gerolamo ceded his diritto di vino and paid L.2090 (190 doppie). In the late 16th century, La Morra was continually opposing the feudataries. As early as 1547 it was claiming taxes; in 1558 it disputed the exemption of the 'Rivalta' farm; in 1573 it claimed the diritto di macello; and in 1577 it tried - ineffectively - to carry out a measurement of the Falletti lands; in 1582 it finally forced Gerolamo II to pay 80 scudi for taxes: M.176,n.25; M.188,n.7; M.203,n.12; M.204,n.6; AST III, art.599,1,M.1,n.13; M.'M in P', n.389; A.C. della Morra.

The comunità of La Morra found itself equally helpless. In 1647, five years after the previous transaction, it agreed to grant tax exemption for the remainder of Gerolamo's lands, in return for a payment of L.10,200 (850 doppie). In a remarkable document, the council of the comunità explained its desperate financial position, and stated in the plainest of terms the impossibility of continuing the struggle:

> "...perchè era facile con la comodità de dinari, che ha detto signore, e può avere nell'avvenire, che tutti detti beni cadino nelle di lui mani, e così resti la Comunità priva d'una così gran parte di registro...."

The most the comunità could attempt to do was to make Gerolamo promise to restrict his purchases, and so limit future tax exemptions. But three years later, it was forced to allow the enfranchisement of yet more land in return for the payment of another L.200 (16 doppie).(62)

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(62) For the agreements with Barolo in 1642 and 1650: M.177,n.25; M.A.14, n.10; Gerolamo paid L.2200 (200 doppie) for the daciti and L.510 (40 doppie) for the oven. For the purchase of the mill (for L.200): M.170,n.16. Two other mills were bought in near-by Narzole in 1659 for L.4050 (300 doppie), and sold in 1667: M.177,ns.15,21,22; M.202,n.2. Gerolamo partially paid the comunità in 1647 with the censi he had bought for 450 doppie in 1641; for the transaction, see: M.169,n.29; M.178,n.1; M.A.75,n.4; AST III, art.599,i,M.3,n.172; For the enfranchisement of 1650: M.A.75,n.5. Francesco Maria was also forced to compromise for tax exemptions in La Morra in 1649, paying nearly L.10,000, formed of censi owed him by the comunità: AST III, art.599,i,M.3,ns.161,176; M.'M in P', n.390, ff.5,25,28,40, passim.
The transaction of 1647 gives an amazing picture of the conditions at La Morra (as probably elsewhere) immediately after the civil war. The council felt obliged to justify itself, and the preamble to the transaction stated:

> "...ritrovandosi la comunità screditata, ed in stato di non poter trovar dinari nè con l'imposizione per la povertà degli abitanti, nè in altra maniera, e sendo in questo

(cont'd on next page)

Gerolamo's success seemed complete. The opposition of the comunità had collapsed, and he could even claim to have maintained his rights against the hostility of the Demesne. For, at the time of the 1638 transaction with the comunità of Barolo, he had tried to strengthen a legally private contract by obtaining the intermazione of the Camera. The ducal official concerned, the Patrimoniale, immediately protested against the legality of the exemption from taxes, in an attempt to weaken the validity of the transaction in future years:

> "Il Patrimoniale dice che il Signor Vassallo rimette l'immunità de suoi beni allodiali, dalla quale il Prencipe non riceve alcuna utilità, perciò conclude non esservi luogo all'approvazione supplicata."

But the Camera still gave its approval.

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(62) (cont'd)

> "sollicetata da' suoi creditori con minacce d'esecuzioni, eziandio personali, e ne' bestiami atti all'agricoltura, quando questo contratto restasse irresoluto, e non potessero gli Agenti di essi valersi del prezzo convenuto, verrebbero gli Abitanti di questo Loco ad esser privati delli loro pochi bestiami, da che ne seguirebbe, che il finaggio resterebbe in breve per la maggior parte incolto, e se ne sentirebbero danni notabilissimi, ed irreparabili; Il che noi sappiamo come de' più vecchj, e pratici degli affari, ed interessi di questo Pubblico, nè poter esser altrimenti, che non lo sapessimo...."

After which the council stated the weakness of the comunità in the clearest of terms:

> "...perchè li beni rusticali, quali oggidì possede il signore di Barolo sottoposti a' carichi non eccedono giornate cento ottanta circa, per le quali la Comunità gli accorda l'esenzione, e può col beneficio della transazione nel presente instrumento designata, la qual è in antica, e continua osservanza, giunta la comodità, che ha, e può avere di denari acquistarne nelle fini convenzionate per detta transazione giornate cinque, o seicento, e più, le quali pervenute a sue mani restano affatto immuni, e così la Comunità priva di tal registro molto maggiore di quello, per il quale se gli è accordata l'immunità...perchè sempre si tratta del difficile di poter esigere taglie, e carichi dovuti da Signori del loco senza contradizione....".

But both the opposition of the comunità and the protest of the Patrimoniale were indicative of the underlying weakness of the family position. If ever the comunità were able to reorder their chaotic finances, they would be in a far stronger position to oppose the feudataries. Moreover, as ducal authority increased, the State would interfere increasingly - if only to protect its own rights - in local administration. As yet, Gerolamo had been able to preserve, if not to increase, his rights against the attacks of the comunità. But, in Pocapaglia and Serralunga, he had only been able to maintain his position through the support of the Senato, while he himself had thought it necessary to gain the interinazione of the Camera for the transaction with Barolo. The final decision over all disputes and transactions ultimately rested with the central authorities. Once their power had been clearly asserted, it was unlikely that attempted usurpations by the feudataries would be viewed with a favourable eye.

iv. The administration of the estates.

Gerolamo himself was undoubtedly worried by the opposition of the comunità. It probably explaines the smallness of his acquisitions in the old fees, as well as partially accounting for his sales. The primogeniture established by Giacomo applied to all the feudal possessions, but only in part to the allodial lands. As early as 1642, Gerolamo sold most of the 'Roretto' farm in Vergne for L.11,000 (1000 doppie), probably to help pay a legacy of his wife Cornelia to his niece,

Isabella Scarampi, of L.26,000 (4000 scudi). In 1655 he sold the remainder of the farm, and a year later sold the farm at Centallo for as little as L.4000 (300 doppie di Francia).

But the sales were probably also explained by the poor returns of the farms in these years. The Centallo farm yielded barely sufficient to cover the costs, as Gerolamo showed in 1644 when he hired out the farm for nothing, provided the taxes were paid; two years later he hired the farm to the *comunità* for only L.200 a year, merely to gain payment of a communal debt; soon after, the farm was flooded.(63) The money raised from the sales was deposited at Genoa in 1656, only to be withdrawn between 1660 and 1662 to pay for the new Monferrat fees.

Both the diminished returns and the continual disputes with the *comunità* were probably responsible for Gerolamo's new policy of hiring out the farms, instead of directly exploiting them, or letting them out at *mezzadria*. It seemed as if he was trying to free himself of the worries and difficulties of administering his estates. In 1650, he hired out the oven (*forno*) and toll (*pedaggio*) of Pocapaglia for L.2 annually. In 1655, he began a disastrous policy of hiring out his farms

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(63) The last part of the 'Rovetto' farm was sold in 1655 for L.3135 (230 doppie di Spagna): M.169,ns.31,33; M.170,n.13.
For the dispute with Cherasco: M.185,n.9. For the Centallo farm: M.195,n.1; M.A.34,n.7; M.A.35,ns.1,4,7,9; see also: M.196,n.7; M.A.34,ns.8-10; M.A.122,ns.6,7,15.
For the legacy of Cornelia in her will of 1636 to Isabella, daughter of Lodovica Scarampi, Gerolamo's sister: M.174,n.4. It is interesting to note that the debt was partially paid in grain, and not in money; this may be due to the limited resources of Gerolamo at the end of the civil war.

and feudal rights in groups. Following a lawsuit with the city of Cherasco over the taxes, Gerolamo hired out three farms in Verzne (330 giornate) for only L.80 a year, provided the tenant paid the taxes. In 1662, a group of farms in Verzne and Barolo, of 340 giornate, were hire for L.1445 (105 doppie) annually, while at the same time all possessions, lands and feudal rights in Rodello, Borgomale and Serralunga were hired out for only L.1375 (100 doppie). Gerolamo had managed to free himself from personal preoccupations over his lands, but probably at a great loss of income. Carlo Lodovico, his son, made one similar contract, immediately after Gerolamo's death, but then hastily abandoned the scheme. At the back of all these contracts a note was added, probably soon after by the family estate agent, clearly showing the disastrous effect on the family income:

> "Affittamenti fatti in molto danno del Padrone, a poca sua avertenza che servi di memoria a posteri di non mai più farlo, massime a prezzi cosi tenui e bassi constando della lesione più che enormissima." (64)

Absentee landlordship, with no control, in the middle of the 17th century, was evidently extremely unprofitable.

v. The patrimony in 1664.

Gerolamo III left no will, but he was fully aware of the testamentary dispositions of his ancestors. When Gaspardo, Bonifacio's illegitimate son, attempted to alienate his palace in La Morra to Francesco Maria's son,

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(64) M.A. 15, n.14.

Scipione, Gerolamo opposed the sale as violating the primogeniture, and finally arranged to buy the palace himself, in 1650, to maintain the conditions of Bonifacio's will. The following year, when his own illegitimate son, Antonio, became a priest, Gerolamo tried to arrange for him to have the usufruct of the farm he had acquired at Neive. In Savoie, Emanuele Filiberto had confirmed an edict of Henri II (when Savoie was in French hands), limiting the right of ecclesiastical bodies to succeed, but in Piedmont no such restrictions existed. Fully aware of the dangers of mortmain, Gerolamo stipulated carefully that the farm was to return to the patrimony on Antonio's death. Carlo Lodovico was guaranteed the full inheritance.(65)

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(65) For the dispute over the La Morra palace, for which Gerolamo paid L.3825 (300 doppie): M.203,n.30; M.204, n.18.
For the usufruct: M.211, n.9. The terms of the usufruct were stated clearly:

> "...in modo che seguita la morte del sudetto signor Antonio che solo s'intende esser usfruttuario sua vitta natural durante la sudetta Cascina e bene s'intenderanno sempre compresi nell'Eredità del detto signor constituente...."

In the end, the usufruct was never carried into effect, as the comunità of Neive opposed it on the grounds that it would be unable to exact taxes while the farm was in ecclesiastical hands; (it was probably also afraid that such exemption would continue after the farm returned to the family).
No study has been made of the laws of mortmain in the Duchy of Savoy. Some information can be obtained from: Nani, pp.326-27; Pertile, v.4,pp.386-95; Bertolotti, v.1,p.403; F. Ruffini: 'Lo Stato e la Chiesa in Italia' in E. Friedberg: Trattato del diritto ecclesiastico cattolico ed evangelico, Turin, 1893, pp.90-131, especially pp.116-20; Viora, op.cit., pp.93-94, 349-61.

Gerolamo III had inherited about 2500 giornate, and left at his death 2850 giornate. In addition, he had acquired four new fees, and gained the title of marquis. After his father's death, Gerolamo had been forced to pay over L.38,000 for debts he inherited; his son, Carlo Lodovico, was not only left no debts, but also inherited an investment in Genoa worth over L.27,500 in 1664, and guaranteed against depreciation in future years. Perhaps most important of all, the tax exemption of allodial lands, at least in the oldest family fees of Barolo and La Morra, had been maintained against the attacks of the comunità. (Appendix 6 and (66))

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(66) For details of Gerolamo's acquisitions, see Appendix 6.
For the Genoa investments, see Appendix 5.
Carlo Lodovico inherited from Gerolamo III, as his eldest brother, Bonifacio, was mentally ill; he died in 1679; M.212, n.17.

5. Carlo Lodovico (1664 - 1705).

i. The social position of the family.

The vast fortunes inherited by Carlo Lodovico placed him in the leading ranks of the nobility. He had inherited not only a position of economic power, but equally of social importance. As yet, the Falletti di Barolo had taken no part in the administration of the State; not a single member of the family had served the Dukes of Savoy either in a military or in a political capacity. But if Carlo Lodovico himself took no official position, it was not for lack of close connections with the Court at Turin. His mother came from one of the oldest and most important families in Piedmont, while both his aunts had married into distinguished Piedmontese families with long histories of service to the house of Savoy. At the same time, he himself had inherited his father's friendly relations with the Court at Mantua.

His marriage, in 1666, to Anna Cristina Lodovica Birago di Vische, was worthy of his position. Her father, conte Lorenzo San Martino Birago di Vische, was a captain in the royal guards (guardie del corpo), and (like Carlo Lodovico's maternal grandfather) a Cavaliere dell'Annunziata. Her mother, Paola Cristina Provana di Druent, came from one of the richest Piedmontese families, ever more noted for the prominent political part it played in the life of the country. Anna Cristina herself was appointed a Dama d'onore to the second Madama Reale in 1676.

The dowry Carlo Lodovico received, of L.27,000 (6000 ducatoni), showed surprisingly little increase over that paid to his father over thirty years before. Although the social position of the Falletti di Barolo improved from generation to generation, the dowries they received apparently remained considerably smaller than the dowries they paid to marry off their daughters. As Carlo Lodovico had no sisters (and hence no contemporaneous marriages can be used as comparison), it is difficult to estimate the real value of this dowry. The importance of his wife's family, and her own appointment at Court soon after, emphasized the social standing of the Birago di Vische. Moreover, the relative smallness of the dowry (paid for the first time in a silver rather than a gold coin) may be in part a general reflection of the greater stability of the exchange-rate, guaranteeing the dowry against depreciation in future years. But at the same time, the dowry may equally have signified an attempt by the Birago to sell their social standing as a partial substitute for a weakening economy. Only 5/12, or 2500 ducatoni, of the dowry were paid at once, with the remainder promised within five years at 5% interest. Fourteen years after the marriage, Anna Cristina's father died, with part of the money still owing (1680); Anna Cristina began a lawsuit, but only obtained the final payment after a further period of fourteen years (1694).(67)

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(67) The dowry included the fardello of 1000 ducatoni, paid in 1666 in jewellery and linen; Carlo Lodovico guaranteed the whole 6000 ducatoni with the normal aumento of 1/3, or 2000 ducatoni: M.174,ns.25, 26,29; M.212,n.15; a mention of the marriage is also to be found in Dufour, op.cit.,p.21; D. Carutti: Storia di Vittorio Amedeo II, 3rd edition,Turin,1897,p.99. There is no evidence of the sums paid between 1666 and 1694, so that it is impossible to verify if any interest was actually paid, and if so, how much it amounted to.

ii. The conservation of feudal rights.

In the early years after his father's death, Carlo Lodovico seemed contented with his economic position. Gerolamo, in his last years, had been hiring out groups of farms for grotesquely small rents. Carlo Lodovico made one similar contract, and then hastily abandoned his father's policy, to resume the personal administration of the family estates. In 1670, Carlo Lodovico was ordered to submit a consegnamento of all his feudal possessions to the State authorities. Immediately after, between 1672 and 1676, he carried out a full measurement of all his lands, which he collected in an apposite book of revenues, together with the description of all his feudal rights; he prefaced the book with the memorandum left by his grandfather, Giacomo, over fifty years before. Although no attempt was made to compile an actual book of accounts, it was the first time any member of the family had tried to find out the full extent of the family possessions. Previously, the only measurements had been for the consegnamenti, when the feudal lands were enlarged as much as possible, in order to diminish the area of taxable land; any attempt by the comunità to measure the allodial lands (as at La Morra) had been fiercely resisted. Carlo Lodovico, learning perhaps from Carlo Emanuele II's plans for a general perequazione, carried out the first step towards a more

efficient administration of his patrimony.(68)

During the same years as the measurement, Carlo Lodovico began a lawsuit to recover the Centallo farm sold by his father in 1655. According to statutory law, in certain instances, the relatives of the alienator could force the new owner to sell his purchase back to them, if it had been sold without their knowledge. Carlo Lodovico claimed that the right of prelazione was equally valid for an alienation made beneath the real value of the land. Whatever the rights of the case, after two years of the lawsuit, the middle-class owners of the farm agreed to resell it to Carlo Lodovico:

> "...riflettendo massime alle rigorosissime spese già fatte, e da farsi, ed il solito dubbioso evento delle liti..."

The farm had not only been much improved in quality, but its size had been increased by over 50%. In the transaction of 1676, the price was correspondingly increased from L.4000 (300 doppie di Francia) to L.18,850 (1300 doppie d'Italia). Despite all improvements to the farm, this vast increase in the price not only showed Gerolamo II's mistake

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(68) In 1664, Carlo Lodovico let two farms at Barolo and Vergne (the 'Fossati' and the 'Pallice'), as well as his possessions in Rodello, held in common with Francesco Maria, for only L.856 (82 doppie): M.A.15, n.14.
The book of revenues is to be found in : M.218.
For Carlo Emanuele II's plans for a perequazione, see Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.67-86.

in selling, but also Carlo Lodovico's concern to build up his patrimony.(69)

This determination to conserve all rights was demonstrated even more clearly by the quarrel which broke out in 1666 between Carlo Lodovico and Francesco Maria's sons, Bonifacio and the Arciprete Michele Antonio. The dispute was over possessions owned in common by both branches of the family, and even more about the rights of jurisdiction and the appointment of the pâdestà in La Morra. As early as 1616, Francesco Maria had begun a lawsuit against his brother, Giacomo, for the same rights. Bonifacio was evidently of a more impatient temperament than his father, and when he failed to win his cause by argument, he determined to back it up by force. At the head of his bravi, he suddenly invaded the disputed farm, beat up the mezzadro, burnt the palace, and devasted the land, causing damage calculated at over L.35,000. But Carlo Lodovico, with a following of apparently 200 armed bravi, could hardly boast of his innocence; soon after Bonifacio's attack, Carlo Lodovico's illegitimate son, Benedetto, shot the Arciprete Michele Antonio in the arm and stomach,

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(69) The increase in price can only be slightly accounted for by the rise in the exchange-rate of the doppia, which in 1655 was worth L.13:10:0, and in 1676 L.14:10:0. The farm was of 215 giornate when it was rebought. The lawsuit is to be found in: M.169,n.33; M.195,n.1; M.196,n.7; M.A.34,n.7; M.A.35,ns.1,4,7,9.
For the right of prelazione in statutary law, see: Alberti,op.cit., pp.114-27.
In 1696, after Emanuele Francesco Falletti di Rodello (Francesco Maria's grandson) left his inheritance to Vittorio Amadeo II, Carlo Lodovico made an attempt to acquire the 1/4 of the possessions in Rodello and Borgomale left by Emanuele Francesco. But the attempt apparently came to nothing, as their incomes are to be found in the Conti del Tesoriere Generale throughout the years of the Spanish Succession War. See: AST III, art.599,i,M.4.ns.295-313; iv,n.472; art.754.,M.2'B',n.94; and for the Conti of 1708-13: Einaudi: Le entrate pubbliche, cit., pp.90-135.

and the rival podestà in the knee! The ducal authorities finally decided to intervene, and a contemporary document states that when the news of the quarrel had reached Carlo Emanuele II himself:

> "...gli habbi sugerito motivo, non meno per vedere gli animi di detti Signori congionti di sangue, che per vedere stabilita la tranquilità, e concordia nel medemo luogo della Morra, di comandare alle Eccellenze de Signori D.Gabriel di Savoia e Marchese Del Borgo, di fraporsi et intromettersi fra detti signori per stabilirli in pace..."

The lawcourts apparently lacked sufficient authority, and the only means of achieving peace was by appointing the Duke's own uncle and one of the leading nobles at the Court to intervene. But after they had completed their thankless task, the quarrel broke out once more, and was only finally settled four years later, in 1673, with the division of the disputed lands, and the payment of damages to the injured tenant.(70)

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(70) Perhaps Vittorio Amedeo II's proposal in 1695 to buy Carlo Lodovico's possessions in La Morra can be interpreted as a determination to maintain the peace, as well as to gain a firmer footing in the disputed Imperial fee: M.196,n.3; M.212,n.12; AST I, Feudi delle Langhe, s.v. 'La Morra', M.2,n.10. Only in 1690 was Vittorio Amedeo II given the right to buy the Imperial fees by their feudal overlord, the Emperor; cf. Carutti, op.cit., pp.145-46, 224-25. For the dispute in 1616: AST III, art.599,i,M. 'P' -1o, ns.344,351-52; M. 'P' -2o, ns.363-66, 370-75, 471, 473; M.3,n.227; M.4,n.257. For the 1666-73 'war': M.175,n.16, M.177,ns.17,31; M.185,n.8; M.203,n.28; M.217,ns.8, 23,25; M.A.75,n.8; AST I, Materie Criminali, M.5; Feudi delle Langhe, s.v. 'La Morra', M.1,n.22; G. Claretta: Storia del regno e dei tempi di Carlo Emanuele II, Turin, 1878, v.2, pp.38-40.
Bonifacio is an early example of a member of the Falletti family taking State employment: he was made a referendario of Turin, auditore generale di guerra, auditore delle porte e cittadella di Torino, and in 1641 conservatore generale degli ebrei, with a wage of L.200. His position undoubtedly yielded much more, as could be seen in 1673, when he received L.600 to give a daughter a spiritual dowry: AST III, Controllo, a.1639 in 1641,f.133; a.1676 -2o, f.181; Patenti, R.58, 1640 in 1642, f.70.

(note cont'd on next page)

Note (70) cont'd.

The description of the damage caused by Bonifacio in 1669 is a revealing document in a period of superficial social harmony: M.185,n.8:

" Narra Fascione Ferrero della Morra che nell'Anno mille seicento sessanta sette nel Mese di Giugno e Luglio il Referendario Bonifacio Falletto con squadriglia d'uomini armati si portò alla Casa del suplicante posta nel borgo della Morra detto Basabella e con opere di fatto e di propria autorità con violenza la saccheggio e fece esportare da detta Casa tutte le robbe in quella esistenti cioé quantità di Mobili, grano, vino, farina, oglio, formaggi, lingieria, stagni, arami e diversi altri effetti del valler di livre Cinque milla cento otto tutti proprij del Suplicante indi fece demolir detto Palazzo di vallor di livre sedici milla e non contento di questo fece esportare via le Materie e usò molte minaccie alli Massari quali tenevano massaritio nella Cassina e beni del Suplicante poste sovra le fini della Morra reggione detta nella Bovaglia e li Massari per causa di dette minaccie hanno ^ causato di danno più di livre cinque milla sendo andati li beni gerbidi hanno di più detto Referendario fatto tagliare e depopollare bona parte delli vitti et arbori frutiferi et altri boscami e causatoli di Danno per più di livre Mille in oltre si è rimesso di fatto per opera de suoi seguaci nella goldita di un'alteno di giornate quattro circa posta in dette fini reggione detta Roncaglia coherenti gl'heredi di Marco Aureglio Voersio Sebastiano Genesio la via publica e l'esponente per altri beni più d'un pezo di Campo di giornate una circa nella reggione detta di Santa Lucia coherenti....più d'una peza di prato o sia giardino in dette fini reggione di Basabella di giornate o stare tre coherenti ....e quelli ha usurpato e perciuto li frutti per l'ammontar di livre Due Milla inoltre per opera come sopra ha ferito gravemente l'esponente per la qual ferita ha patito di danno per più di livre tre milla per causa della perseguzione di detto referendario Falletto e convenuto al Suplicante star fuori di Casa durante Anni sei et gl'ha causato di Danno per piu di Doppie cento l'Anno e la Cassina dava di reddito Annuo doppie Cento Cinquanta Le onde Desiderando d'esser risarcito de Danni come sopra Causateli da detto Referendario Falletto...."

^ abandonate la coltura di detta Cassina e beni e gl ha

The dispute with Bonifacio and Michele Antonio had been more concerned with prestige than with economic advantages, for rights of jurisdiction, when so fragmentary as in La Morra, could hardly have yielded more than a trifling income. Carlo Lodovico's determination to protect these rights showed the value he placed on their possession. The family patrimony was not merely equal to its economic possibilities, but constituted the guarantee of its owner's social reputation. Gerolamo III had realized this when he bought the fees of Castagnole and Cavatore with the title of marquis. Carlo Lodovico felt the need to establish his position even more strongly, and late in his life, in 1700, he appealed successfully for the recognition of his Monferrat titles by the House of Savoy. His son, Gerolamo IV, increased the prestige of the family even further, by the erection of the country of Barolo into a marquisate in 1730.(71)

Throughout his life, Carlo Lodovico showed an active interest in the administration of his patrimony. The acquisitions of Giacomo and Gerolamo III, in large part, consisted of allodial lands, subject to taxes. In the old family fees - such as La Morra - much of this land could be claimed as exempt, by transaction with the comunità. But a great number of the new farms lay in areas where the family possessed no feudal rights at all, and hence could make no claims to exemption. It has proved impossible to estimate the amount of taxes paid by Carlo Lodovico, but

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(71) For the 1700 recognition of the titles: M.206,n.22; AST III, Patenti, R.131,1699 in 1701, f.68.
For Barolo, 1730: M.209,n.2.

he undoubtedly thought it worth his while to gain permanent exemption. When war broke out against France in 1690, Vittorio Amedeo II began to raise money as quickly as possible. The traditional and most effective method was by the infeudation of allodial land in return for the payment of an intrangio. Carlo Lodovico responded at once to the edicts of 10 March and 3 August 1690, and infeudated virtually all his allodial possessions, except those already exempted by transactions with the comunità. He spent over L.22,000 to infeudate about 650 giornate, mainly in Villafalletto, Centallo and Neive, but spreading over 7 different comunità. His success was shortlived, as in 1698 Vittorio Amedeo II revoked all infeudations made since 1690. But the decision to spend so large a sum is evidence of the importance he placed on gaining exemption for his lands. He was not only saving money on future taxes, but at the same time emphasising his privileged position in his relations with the comunità.(72)

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(72) The infeudations of 1690 and the disinfeudation of 1698 can be reconstructed from: M.122,ns.8,11,19; M.171,n.5; M.A.15,n.15; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.32,ns.4,5; M.A.35,ns.4,6,8,9; M.A.78,n.5; M.A.98, ns.11,12; AST II,1a archiviazione, Alienazione de' Demaniali, M.1,ns.5,11; AST III, Controllo, a.1690,ff.105,110; a.1692 in 1693, f.216. For the edicts of 1690, March 10 and August 3 (followed by others in 1690, Sept.11, 1691, March 21; 1692, June 20; 1693, June 14 and 23, July 3 and Oct. 23; 1694, June 24 and Oct. 24; 1695, March 13 and Dec. 20; 1696, March 23) and the disinfeudation of 1698, March 24, see: Duboin, t.20,lib.XI,tit.2,cap.ii,pp.1289-1310; t.21,lib.XI, tit.5, p.44; t.24,lib.XII,tit.2,cap.i,pp.348-67. For the imposto delle 308 mila lire created in 1698, see above, chap.1,p.51.
The only method of calculating the taxes on land is based on the amount to be paid per giornata decided on by the comunità each year. Unfortunately, documents for the 17th century are almost non-existent in the communal archives of the Langhe.

iii. Investment of liquid assets.

An examination of Carlo Lodovico's monetary (asopposed to landed) investments clearly shows their importance in the maintenance of control over the comunità. The position of the comunità had so deteriorated, that in 1670 Carlo Emanuele II appointed a commission to examine the problem of communal debts. The commission considered the possibilites of reducing the interest on censi to 4%, and freeing the comunità of all debts owing for back-payments on censi:

> "sul fondamento che li carichi habbino ecceduti li frutti de fondi sopra quali sono stati imposti essi censi...".

It seemed clear that the comunità would have welcomed the intervention of the prince, in the form of a genral edict, though it would have signified a further reduction of their already weakened autonomies. But there were great indecision as to the powers of the prince; in matters of publica utilitas, he was recognized as absolute, but:

> "...cade...in questione se il principe possa con la sua autorità levar le raggioni de' tertij, assolvendo le communità dal pagamento dei decorsi, e fare, come in greco, un'Amenestia".

The commission made no decision, and Carlo Emanuele II abandoned the comunità to their fate. His widow, the second Madama Reale, once more confronted the problem, and made an enquiry as to the nature and size of all communal debts since 1640. But the position remained unchanged, and the debts continued to increase.(73)

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(73) See Bulferetti, 'Assolutismo e mercantilismo', pp.87-131, especially pp.99-104.

Without doubt, the failure of the war against Genoa in 1672, as well as the wars against France after 1690, were largely responsible for the rapid increase of the communal debts. At the same time, the stability of the currency, deriving from the long years of peace after the end of the civil war, encouraged the feudataries to invest in censi as well as in land. Whether or not the total amount of currency in circulation had grown, it had undoubtedly increased in mobilisation, with great rapidity. Perhaps the numbers of contracts stipulated in lire, and not in the traditional gold or silver monete grosse, was indicative of the increasing stability. Certainly these new conditions were clearly reflected in the fall in the rate of interest.

In the 16th century, the rate of interest occasionally rose as high as 12%, although Thesauro only recognised a legal maximum of 10%. Carlo Emanuele I, in 1627, attempted to reduce all communal censi to 6%; six years later, his son, Vittorio Amedeo I, ordered all censi of 8% to be reduced to 6%. It is doubtful whether the edicts were very effective. The evidence of the censi bought by all the members of the Falletti family (especially Francesco Maria) between the 1630s and 1650s is unanimous in asserting a rate of interest of 7%, and often of 8%. But in the following years, the more settled state of the country, and more effective ducal measures, led to a real fall in the rate of interest, to an average 5%; alienated State taxes, such as the tasso, as well as the monti di pietà, yielded even less, usually 3½ or 4%. In some

instances in the 1670s and 1680s, individual censi were even reduced to 4%, although this figure was only fixed by the Senate as the legal maximum as late as 1771.(74)

In these conditions, it is hardly surprising that Carlo Lodovico preferred to invest his money in censi rather than in continuing his father's policy of investment at the Banca di San Giorgio (where the interest fell in the 1660s from 3 to 2½%). Censi were rarely rebought by the comunità, and began to pass from hand to hand, indicative of the increased mobility of capital. Not only did they yield a higher cash income, but their acquisition, where jurisdictional rights or lands were possessed, consolidated the power of the feudataries, and enabled them to enforce their will upon the comunità more easily.

Carlo Lodovico began to buy censi as early as 1675, only purchasing in areas where he already possessed lands or feudal rights. Although private censi yielded a higher rate of interest, he was prepared to buy up credits of all types, whenever the occasion offered. In 1680-81, he bought two alienated tassi, at 3½ and 4% interest, over the comunità of Serralunga, and Barolo from prince Emanuele Filiberto di Savoia-Carignano, for over L.21,500. In 1687, when the interest was reduced

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(74) No research has yet been carried out on the rate of interest in Piedmont in the 16th and 17th centuries. Some information can be found in Bulferetti, op.cit., pp.24-26, 121-22; Salopis, Antica legislazione, pp.323-30, citing the 154th decisione of A. Thesauro: Decisiones Senatus Pedemontani..., Milan, 1608; Nani, pp.357-61; Pertile, v.4, pp.598-99, 610; Bertolotti, v.2, pp.532-33. The edicts of Carlo Emanuele I and Vittorio Amedeo I can be found in: Duboin, t.7,lib.VI,tit.18,p.292,n.1; Borelli, lib.XII, tit.1,2,9, pp.1136-54, 1157-58.

on many private censi by transaction with the Patrimoniale Generale, he bought a credit over the communità of Serralunga of L.1077, reduced from 5 to 4%. In 1685, after yet one more dispute with the city of Cherasco over the exemption of the Vergne lands, Carlo Lodovico even arranged to avoid further arguments, by the purchase of the canone of 55 scudi. The investment could hardly have been regarded as remunerative, except from a long-term point of view, for the canone was legally defined as a perpetual emphyteusis, and not a redeemable censo, and therefore capitalized at the extremely low rate of 2%. But Carlo Lodovico not only insured the future immunity of his lands at Vergne, but also acquired yet another credit over the comunità of Barolo. (Appendix 7(b) and (75)).

By the time war broke out against France in late 1690, Carlo Lodovico had spent over L.39,000 in cash investments, yielding an annual income of L.1230. In the following years, he showed himself to be in

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(75) For Carlo Lodovico's cash investments, see Appendix 7(b).
The tasso over Barolo was resold to prince Emanuele Filiberto in 1689. For the dispute with Cherasco, 1682-1685: M.201,n.2; M.210, n.12; M.218,ff.1-4,8. The transaction of 1685 gained the interinazione of both the Camera and the Senato. It should be noted that in practice, Carlo Lodovico probably received less than an annual 2% of his L.20,625 capital outlay, as probably half the lands in Vergne were already in his possession, so that he only received the canone for the remaining lands.
For the 1687-88 negotiations with the Patrimoniale Generale, for the partial reduction of the rate of interest, see: AST I, Materie Economiche, Demanio, donativi, e sussidi, M.4, ns.5,6; AST II, la archiviazione, Alienazioni de Demaniali, M.2, n.5, noted in the unpublished thesis of M.Torta: La riunione al Demanio dei beni demaniali e feudali alienati sotto Vittorio Amedeo II,1719-1721, Università di Torino, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, March 1958,pp.10-11.

possession of even more disponible capital, and invested ever more heavily until his death. The wars from 1690 to 1696 and 1701 to 1713 ravaged the country, and once more increased the weight of royal taxes on the comunità. As always, it was the already burdened, and not the privileged, who suffered. An examination of Carlo Lodovico's economic position in these years seems to indicate that the effect of the war was to strengthen rather than weaken the privileged classes, by increasing the indebtedness of the comunità towards them. The devastations of both enemies and allies undoubtedly affected Carlo Lodovico's possessions as well. He himself stated in his consegnamento of 1691 that:

> "...quanto alli Feudi del Monferrato, per molti anni a venire per esser rovinnati et esausti dalla guerra, non ne puotrà esiger li rediti ordinari..." (76)

But while Carlo Lodovico gained tax exemption by the infeudation of his allodial lands, the comunità and the peasants, who also suffered the devastations, still had to pay the royal taxes. In a desperate effort to raise the money, an increasing number of censi were offered for sale. By the time of his death in 1705, Carlo Lodovico had acquired 25 more censi at a cost of L.15,000, besides the expenditure of L.22,000 for the 1690 infeudations.

The financial subjection of the comunità was completed by the disinfeudations of 1698. With the end of the war, Vittorio Amedeo II

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(76) For the 1691 consegnamento: M.A.15,n.11.

tried to reorder the disastrous conditions of his finances. By the edict of 24 March 1698, all the infeudations of 1690 and the following years were revoked. As a result, 650 giornate of Carlo Lodovico's possessions were once more replaced in the registri, subject to taxes. But the government was unable to pay back the capital, and decided to guarantee it by the creation of a new tax over the comunità. The full weight of the L.22,170 spent by Carlo Lodovico in 1690 thus fell on the seven comunità concerned, who were ordered to pay an interest of 5%, until the capital could be rebought. The government itself felt little difference: it lost some taxes, but regained the allodiality of the land. But for the comunità it was more serious, placing them even more heavily in debt to the feudataries. There were only two fees (Pocapaglia and Bergomale) where Carlo Lodovico had lands or feudal rights, where he did not also possess credits over the comunità. In the other comunità he owned sums, varying from the L.329:10:0 capital owed by the comunità of Rodello (yielding an annual L.16:9:6) to the L.21,325 capital owed by the comunità of Barolo (yielding L.440:10:0 annually). His credits over the comunità amounted to a capital of nearly L.75,000, representing an annual income of over L.3000. (Appendix 7(b)).

The capital invested by Carlo Lodovico was clear evidence of his financial resources. The payment of a forced loan in 1695 illustrated their remarkable elasticity. On 6 September 1696, Vittorio Amedeo II announced the foundation of a società dei grani for the provision of

grain to the troops. Carlo Lodovico was ordered to pay L.30,000 to the società. He was obviously unprepared (as he himself stated), and slightly short of capital through the recent infeudations, the expenses of the marriage of his eldest son, and a series of bad harvests. He withdrew almost L.16,000 (2400 crosoni), representing almost half of his remaining account at Genoa, while at the same time he created a censo, guaranteed on the 'Murata' farm at Verzne, of L.10,000, which he was forced to sell at the unusually high rate of interest of 6% to conte Ottavio Maria Blancardi. But it was only a temporary embarrassment, and did not seriously harm his finances. As early as January 1696, he managed to raise the whole L.30,000, and in the following year he was already able to rebuy his censo. In 1700-01, he was guaranteed repayment of the whole loan by the government on the income of the gabelles, among the securest of State taxes. In effect, it had become yet one more investment, yielding by 1700 an interest of 5%, or L.2220.(77)

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(77) M.169,n.38;M.212,n.3;M.216,n.1; AST III, Patenti, R.131, 1699 in 1701, ff.86-88. Carlo Lodovico stated his incapacity to raise the sum at once:

> "havendo l'infrascritto Signor Marchese di Barollo Consegnor del presente Luogo havut'ordine di S.A.R., per qual gl'incariga di ritrovar la somma di livre trenta milla per convertirla nella società espressa in detto Ordine, conforme a quale, restandoli presentemente impossibile l'haver detta somma attese l'eccessive spese già fatte attorno l'infeudazione, et altre, gionta la notoria fallanza di tutti li raccolti, desiderando tuttavia eseguire la mente dell'Ordine sudetto in tutto ciò le sarà possibile..."

When the loan was repaid in 1700-01, Carlo Lodovico received an additional L.2000 through the increase in the value of money, to make a total of L.32,000.
For the edict of 1695, see: Dubois, t.11,lib.VII,tit.15,cap.2, pp.560-67.

iv. Dowries

In the course of his life, Carlo Lodovico spent nearly L.105,000 in cash investments, besides nearly L.19,000 on the repurchase of the Centallo farm. Besides this, he had to find a large sum of money in the 1690s for the marriages of his daughter and his eldest son.

In February 1697, the social position of the Falletti di Barolo was confirmed by the appointment of Carlo Lodovico's daughter as damigella d'onore to the Madama Reale. Twenty years earlier, her mother had already been appointed dama d'onore. In June of the same year, Paola Cristina married marchese Francesco Giovanni Tommaso Mossi di Morano, a high official at the Court of Mantua. The marriage seemed to indicate the maintenance of the close relations with Mantua established over 40 years before. Mossi's father had been a gentiluomo di camera of duke Carlo II, his maternal uncle, conte Baldassar Fassati, was a member of the Consiglio Supremo of Mantua, and other uncles were senators and Court officials. With so powerful connections, it was a marriage worthy of the position of the Falletti di Barolo. The dowry of L.45,000 (9000 ducatoni), increased by a jointure of 1/3 by the husband, was of an equally fitting size.

It was agreed that 2/3 of the dowry would either be paid with the forced loan of 1695, or else within 3 years, at 5% interest; but although the loan was repaid in 1700-01, payment of the dowry was only completed in the following years. In the meantime, the outbreak of the Spanish Succession War confirmed the foresight of Gerolamo III and his son, Carlo Lodovico,

in maintaining friendly contact with foreign courts; as the French overran Piedmont, Carlo Lodovico was cut off from his Monferrat fees, but his son-in-law, Mossi, took over the administration and continued to exact all rights and incomes.(78)

The expenses of Gerolamo's marriage were even greater. As Carlo Lodovico stated in the will, he had spent at least L.30,000 on Gerolamo's education and career in the army: after a training at the Accademia Reale at Turin, Gerolamo had been sent on a journey to Nice with the Court in 1689, and subsequently equipped as an officer in the Guards.(79)

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(78) M.174,n.31 contains an account of Mossi's administration of the Monferrat fees between 1701 and 1706. As late as 1713, Mossi was still acting for Gerolamo IV in the Monferrat: M.204,n.10.
In the Archivio di Stato di Mantova, a letter of Gerolamo IV (1702, October 7) is to be found, acknowledging thanks for the assegni he had sent to the duke of Mantua through his brother-in-law, marchese Mossi: E.XIX.3.n.738.
The marriage contract of 1697 clearly stated that the normal jointure in Piedmont was 1/3 the size of the dowry: M.174,n.31:

> "Il predetto signor Marchese Francesco Giovanni Tomaso Mossi inseguendo la lodevole consuetudine del Piemonte, e stille praticato fra Cavaglieri, e nobili, in risguardo della stima, che fa di detta Madamigalla sua futra sposa, fa alla medema di contradote, osia donatione per le nozze Ducatoni tre milla simili da pagarsi....secondo le consuetudine, osia statuto della Città di Torini Metropoli del Piemonte...."

(79) The expense of Gerolamo's education is stated by Carlo Lodovico himself in his will of 1705: M.211,n.19.

By now, the Falletti di Barolo formed one of the leading Piedmontese families, and Carlo Lodovico began to arrange for Gerolamo's marriage to a daughter of the marchese di San Tommaso, third successive member of his family to occupy the position of First Secretary of State. The negotiations were broken off somewhat mysteriously, through the insistence of conte Ottavio Provana di Druent that Gerolamo marry his only daughter and heiress, Elena Matilde. According to Carlo Lodovico, the new negotiations had only been agreed upon in principle, when the conte di Druent announced the engagement at Court, and so forced the hand of Carlo Lodovico, who:

> "...restò molto turbato, e sorprese, e dimostrò spiacere dell'impegno per detto Signor Conte Druent contratto senza di lui consenso".

Conte Ottavio's action was in keeping with his reputation. The last male member of an old and remarkably distinguished family, he had been imprisoned together with his uncle, marchese di Pianezza, for his part in the plot to end the Regency in 1682. On Vittorio Amedeo II's seizure of power, he was restored to favour, and in 1690, just before war broke out, nominated ambassador to France. 'Monsù di Druent' soon acquired a reputation for eccentricity. In the early 1690s, he turned all his enthusiasms to the building of a new palace, employing one of the most fashionable Piedmontese architects, Giovanni Francesco Baroncelli.

Despite the unorthodox engagement, preparations went ahead to celebrate the most important marriage of the decade between the heirs

of two vast inheritances. On 3 February 1695, the marriage took place in the presence of the Duke and Duchess of Savoy. In the middle of the reception following the wedding, the great staircase of the newly built palace suddenly collapsed.(80)

After so unfortunate a beginning, Gerolamo and his wife took up their residence in Ottavio's palace. But financial disputes soon arose. Ottavio had promised Elena Matilde a dowry of 15,000 ducatoni, equivalent to L.75,000, to be increased to 20,000 ducatoni, should Ottavio subsequently have a son and heir. Carlo Lodovico, for his part, had guaranteed Elena Matilde a jointure of L.30,000 (2000 doppie), besides giving her jewellery and presents at the time of the wedding, for a value of L.22,500 (1500 doppie). In addition, he had promised Gerolamo an annual pension of L.10,000, which he paid him in the first year. As Carlo Lodovico stated in his will of 1705, the marriage had cost him in all L.50,000:

"con molto incomodo suo, e pregiudicio degl'altri...fratelli".

The expense of Gerolamo's marriage and Paola Cristina's dowry taxed Carlo Lodovico's resources severely. In 1698, he had such urgent

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(80) The vicissitudes of Gerolamo's marraige can be reconstructed in remarkably close detail from the documents in: M.174,n.33; M.175, n.17;M.192,ns.1-3;M.211,n.19:M.A.82,n.19;M.A.122,n.22; Dufour, op.cit., pp.24-29. For the traditional - and not very accurate-accounts of the marriage, see: Carutti,op.cit.,p.99, note (1); L.Cibrario: Storia di Torino, Turin, 1846,v.2,pp.318-20; and for contemporary accounts of Matilde's death: A.Manno: 'Pietro Mucca ed il Generale Conte Solaro della Margarita. Ricerche terze sull'assedio di Torino del 1706', Miscellanea di storia italiana, serie 2a,v.XXI, (1883),pp.419-21; F.L. Soleri: Giornale di memorie in Torino, 1682-1721, MS in Biblioteca Reale di Torino, Storia Patria 230.

need of money that he sold the remainder of his account at Genoa for nearly L.16,000, under par at 95, for a loss of over L.800. In the following years, he used the repayment of the forced loan of 1695 for Paola Cristina's dowry, and at the same time raised a further L.13,400 by creating two censi over his own lands. In four years, between 1698 and 1701, Carlo Lodovico had been forced to raise nearly L.61,500 to pay for the marriages, and at the end of his life, he left Gerolamo a debt of over L.8000 to rebuy the alienated censi.

Four years after Gerolamo's marriage, in 1699, he and his father Carlo Lodovico, claimed Elena Matilde's dowry. Ottavio Provana immediately counter-claimed the payment of the L.10,000 annual pension promised by Carlo Lodovico in 1695, but only paid for one year. As the lawsuit grew more embittered, Gerolamo left his father-in-law's home, and tried to force his wife to follow. When she refused and showed a more active resistance than Gerolamo obviously expected, he threatened to carry away their children. Matilde fell ill, and never fully recovered. On the morning of the 24th of February 1701, she threw herself out of her bedroom window in despair, and died, to the great scandal of all Piedmontese society. The lawsuit continued, and at least for the last three years of his life, Carlo Lodovico paid Gerolamo his L.10,000 annual pension. Finally, in 1710, a compromise was reached, by which

the dowry was now calculated as L.40,000, immediately paid by Ottavio to Gerolamo.(81)

v. The family income at the beginning of the 18th century.

In 41 years, between 1664 and 1705, Carlo Lodovico had invested over L.123,500, of which over L.67,000 had been spent after 1690. He had raised a further L.155,000 for the education and marriages of Gerolamo and Paola Cristina, of which L.125,000 had also been concentrated in the last 15 years of his life, forcing him to use the repayment of the State loan of 1695 (by 1701, valued at L.32,000). In the whole period, Carlo Lodovico had spent over L.248,500, and between 1690 and 1705 over L.162,000.

Besides the income from his lands and investments, Carlo Lodovico's capital resources had increased by nearly L.73,500 between his wife's dowry, and the sale of his deposit at Genoa, and of censi on his own lands, still alienated at the time of his death. Almost 3/5 of this sum was raised after 1690. Deducting this from his expenditure, he had raised over L.175,000 from the income of his lands and investments during the 41 years, and about L.120,000 after 1690, equivalent to an annual

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(81) For the sale at Genoa: M.212,n.3. For the censi: M.211,n.19; M.216, n.1; M.A.15,n.17. The censi were sold in 1701 for L.10,000 and L.3,400 at 5% interest, the latter to the same conte Biancardi who had bought the censo from Carlo Lodovico in 1695; only L.5,000 had been paid by Carlo Lodovico's death in 1705, and the remainder was rebought by Gerolamo IV before 1710.
For the payment of the pension, 1703-05: M.A.122,n.22. For the 1710 agreement: M.174,n.33; M.A.82,n.19.

average of over L.4270 for the whole period, and L.8000 for the last 15 years. (see Appendix 7(a)).

The difficulties of assessing the income from land in the absence of family account-books have proved overwhelming for the whole of the 16th and 17th centuries. As the officials of the perequazione realised only too clearly, great differences in the value of land existed not only between provinces, but equally between communità within the same province, especially in such hilly areas as the Lenghe.

The consegnamenti - on the few occasions that they stated the income of the land - were always false, while the estimates of the communal registri, on which all taxes were based, were hopelessly out of date, and by the 17th century, purely conventional. Not until the years of the perequazione has it proved possible to estimate the income from land. In the long discussions leading to the perequazione of 1731, the first of the many inquests was finally adopted as the most accurate, and also the most honest. This misura generale had been carried out by the royal agrimensori between 1698 and 1711, following criteria carefully laid down by Vittorio Amedeo II in an attempt to solve the problem of fraudulent returns. The estimate was for the dominical part of the land only, with all expenses deducted. It was divided into an estimate for each legal form of tenure (i.e. allodial, feudal, ecclesiastical patrimony temporarily exempt, beni antichi of the Church, exemption for fathers of 12 children, communal lands, etc.), and so permits an even closer

estimate to be made, by the division of lands - and hence of their incomes - into feudal or allodial, according to the decision of the perequazione. The care and detail, in both the planning and the execution of the misura generale, as well as the fact that it was finally accepted by the government as the basis for the reform of the royal taxes, are sound reasons for its utilization to calculate the value of the land. At the same time, it is the only available source on which such an estimate can be made.

At the beginning of the 18th century, Carlo Lodovico owned over 3050 giornate. Of this, over 2200 giornate, or over 72%, were claimed as feudal, and were effectively exempt from taxes. The total revenue from his landed possessions, according to the estimate of the misura generale, was over L.27,800 from the lands, L.3200 from feudal rights, and nearly L.600 from emphyteuses, in all L.31,600. The average annual expenditure of L.4270 (calculating both investments and extraordinary capital expenditure for dowries) thus represented only 13.5% of Carlo Lodovico's income from landed possessions during the 41 years following his father's death. In the last 15 years of his life, the L.8000 spent annually constituted 25.3% of his landed income, though this figure is probably exaggerated, as he was receiving from the cash investments a substantial income (which rose to L.3000 by 1705), reducing the expenditure to about 23% of his total income. The size of his expenditure in these last years can be explained by the high capital expenses for

the dowries and the pension following his eldest son's marriage. If these are deducted, his investments fall to little over L.3000 a year, representing about 9.5% of his average income.(82)

The remainder of Carlo Lodovico's income was apparently consumed by normal living expenses. Not only did he find it impossible to save more during the years, but by the end of his life, he was even unable to rebuy the _genuai_ he had alienated in 1701, leaving a debt of over L.8000. The enormous annual expenditure, of almost L.27,350, was a significant indication of the high cost of living of an important noble family. It is impossible to estimate the landed income, and hence the living expenses, of Carlo Lodovico's predecessors; but the proportion of their investments seems to be considerably larger. As the importance of the family grew, it rose above the restrictions of local, noble society, and was increasingly attracted by the natural centre, formed by the Court. Carlo Lodovico possessed no palace at Turin, but obviously took an active part in Court life; at the same time, he had to pay for the ambitious military and ecclesiastical careers of his sons. The price of his new social position was the size of his expenditure, and the comparative smallness of his investments.

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(82) For the size of the family patrimony and the landed income, see Appendix 11 (b) and (c).
The total area of 3189 giornate, stated in Appendix 11 (c), which refers to the date of the _perequazione_ (1731) must be reduced to 3063 giornate for the period up to Carlo Lodovico's death (1705), as 126 giornate were subsequently bought in Serralunga, between 1707 and 1730. The income from Serralunga consequently falls from L.5490 to L.4313, and the total income from land from L.29,024 to L.27,846; the total landed revenue, including feudal dues and emphyteuses, thus falls from L.32,841 to L.31,663.

vi. Carlo Lodovico's wills.

Carlo Lodovico left a vast patrimony, which required careful conservation. As early as 1 April 1675, he made his first will. On 11 January 1690, he made a new testament, with a codicil on 28 November 1695, and on 25 October 1705, just before his death, he made a final will.(83) Each successive will stated clearly the intentions of the testator. The clauses binding the possessions under primogeniture and fedecommesso were increasingly comprehensive and exhaustive. The possessions left to the universal heir were in each instance carefully stated in detail worthy of a conservamento.

First the dowries of his widow and daughter were assigned. In addition, following the example of his great-grandfather, Geralamo II, Carlo Lodovico left Anna Lodovica the usufruct of two farms at Volta, to return to the primogeniture at her death; in successive wills, he arranged for her to enjoy the usufruct of other farms, should this clause of the will be opposed; and in 1705, he added that, should his widow demand the whole capital of her dower, instead of its annual interest, his eldest son should be allowed to alienate sufficient lands to raise the sum, despite all prohibitions.(84)

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(83) M.211,ns.14,15,19.

(84) The possibility of the widow claiming the whole capital of the dower, instead of a usufruct, as well as the ability of the heir to alienate in order to pay her, were fully recognised by Piedmontese private law; Carlo Lodovico was thus making no innovation, but merely ensuring that the dower was fully paid. See C.F. Porporato: Praeses in consilio ducali Sabaudiae, Responsum pro eodem Serenissimo Duce Sabaudiae in causa marchionatus Montisferrati (s.l.,s .a., but 1536), consilia 400, n.2; A. Thesauro: Decisiones Senatus Pedemontani..., Milan, 1608, decis.183,n.4; A. Sola: 'Decretum de feudis', Commentaria...ad decreta antiqua ac nova novasque constitutiones Serenissorum ducum Sabaudiae ..., Turin, 1607; see also: Sclopis, Antica legislazione, p.320.

Restrictions of the patrimony by donations to members of the family who intended to enter the Church were strictly limited. In 1690, he stated quite clearly that, should Paola Cristina become a nun, she was to receive a spiritual dowry and an annual **livello** of only 2 0 ducatoni:

> "...protestando detto Illustrissimo Signor Marchese Testatore, che a detta retrittione di dottatione nel caso sudetto è devenuto, non per ritrahor dette signore sue figlie [in the event of the birth of more daughters] dalla vita, e Matrimonio spirituale ma perchè sa, che in tal stato pubino honoratamente sostenersi, et congruentemente mantenersi, et che sarebbe superfluo, et contro lo stato religioso d'assignarli di più, et anche per conservar il splendore, e decoro della sua Illustrissima Casa, e descendenza, con l'unione delle sue facoltà ne' Primogeniti, come sin hora per gratia del Signor Iddio, si è conservata, et attesa massime la numerosa prole, che Sua Divina Maestà si è compiacciuta concederli...."

His son Antonio, who had become a Jesuit, was to receive only 50 ducatoni a year by the 1705 will, while Padre Lodovico Maurizio arranged for the same pension when he took orders in 1697, to be increased to 70 ducatoni on Carlo Lodovico's death. The furthest Carlo Lodovico was prepared to go was seen in the 1695 codicil, when he allowed Paolo Costanzo, a secular priest, to have the usufruct of the Villafalletto farms, infeudated in 1690 (with the taxes to be paid by the

universal heir, should they be infeudated).(85) But by 1705, he had abandoned this scheme as well.

All the clauses were bound by and subjected to a primogeniture, framed in the most comprehensive and strictest terms known to the notary drawing up the will, and Carlo Lodovico rested secure that such clauses would prove unbreakable and fully binding. As a final guarantee, he not only declared every alienation to be automatically invalid, but subjected the alienator to a fine of 1000 ducatoni (equivalent to L.5500), to be divided among the other brothers.(86)

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(85) The guarantee against disinfeudation showed great doubt as to the permanence of the infeudation and is indicative of the increasingly authoritative attitude of Vittorio Amedeo II in regard to the increase of privileges at the expense of the Demesne:

"...ove in l'avvenire venisse ad esser annullata, suppressa, o in parte ristretta detta Infeudatione, o per volere di S.A.R., e de suoi Ac.ggij [sic] successori, o in qualsivoglia altro modo, caso, et evento, o che in tutto, o in parte detti beni (senza pure colpa d'esso Signore Paolo) venissero di nuovo a soggettersi al pagamento de' carighi: In tal caso...il suletto Signor Herede universale... [and his heirs] ...sijno tenuti per la rispettiva immunità cessante al total rilevo verso il predetto Signor Paolo Costanzo con sostener, e mantener esse cascine, e beni durante l'usufrutto sudetto nel istesso Privileggio d'immunità...."

(86) The clauses governing the primogeniture are again extremely clear. In the 1675 will, the normal notarial terms are used to define the primogeniture, repeating continually:

"...substituendo tutti gl'altri figliuoli maschij primigeniti nasciturі da primogeniti pro tempore in Infinitate...substituendo gl'uni, agl'altri vulgarmente pupilarmente, et per perpetuo fidecommesso, servando sempre, et in Infinitate l'ordine, grado et prerogativa di primogenitura de maschij e non altrimenti confirmando tutti li Testamenti transationi, ragioni, et ultime volonta delli Illustrissimi signori soi predecessori toccanti l'ordine, et prerogativa di primogenitura...talmente che il primo genito maschio descendere dal primogenito sempre

(cont'd on next page)

All these clauses could be regarded as a natural development of the means of conserving the patrimony already adopted by Carlo Lodovico's ancestors. Where Carlo Lodovico innovated was in his method of providing for his younger sons, without dividing his lands. Instead of bequesting either lands or capital sums, whether in perpetuity or for life, he arranged for his younger sons to be paid an annual income by their eldest

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(86) (cont'd)

"resti signore et Padrone di detti beni, feudi, e ragioni feudali, et allodiali nel modo sopra espresso."

By 1690 Carlo Lodovico added the penalty of a fine:

"...prohibendo a tutti gli provenienti da lusro nelle Signorie, e possesso di sudetti beni, e Feudi l'alienatione di tutto, o parte d'essi per qualonque pretesto, o colore... sotto pena di Ducatoni mille applicabili ipso facto agl' altri fratelli ripartitamente, che pro tempore si ritroveranno...".

At the same time he rigidly excluded all ecclesiastics:

"...volendo che detta sua heredità passi di primogenito in primogenito successivamente, et in infinitum, esclusi sempre gl'ecclesiastici di qualsivoglia sorte, et in caso che vi siano secolari, quali saranno sempre preferti agl'ecclesiastici, tanto secolari, che regolari, et non s endovi alcuno della descendenza, l'ultimo puotrà disponer et s'intenderanno affatto esclusi gl'ecclesiastici Regolari, in modo, che in nessun tempo, nè in nessun caso, la presente heredità pervenir puossi ad ecclesiastici Regolari...."

brother. Each younger son who did not enter a religious order was to receive 100 ducatoni a year; in addition, if he did not live with his brother, he was to receive an extra 100 ducatoni a year, for his living expenses; likewise, if he married, he could claim the equivalent capital in place of such an income, but had to allow the universal heir 4 years to pay, so as not to ruin the patrimony. If one brother died, his pension was to be divided among all the other brothers, including the eldest son. When only one younger brother was living, his pension was to be doubled. These were the conditions of the 1675 will. By 1690, the younger brothers were given more security for their pensions, and allowed to exact them for themselves, should the heir refuse to pay them.(87) In 1695, the pensions were increased by 100 ducatoni, as one brother (Pietro Ottavio) had died, while other arrangements had been made for Paolo Costanzo. By the time of the last will of 1705, there were four brothers to receive a pension of 300 ducatoni each, assuming that none of them lived with the eldest brother, Gerolamo IV.

The size of the Patrimony permitted the establishment of appanages. The total landed income was L.31,600, and even without the two Volta

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(87) "...caduno d'essi puossi a sua ellettione pagarsi, tanto per li ducatoni cento d'appanaggio, che per altri ducatoni cento per caduno per la spesa cibaria come sopra, sovra li frutti delle Cassine, e redditi, di qualsivoglia fondo, e beni presenti, et futturi di detto Signor Testatore, nessuno eccettuati, che più le parerà, e piacerà per la corrente quantità di detta somma, senza ch'il detto signor herede universale primogenito infrascritto, puossi in alcun modo contradire, et oppor per qualunque causa, pretesto, o colore si sij..."

farms of 141 giornate, given in usufruct to Anna Lodovica Birago, for a value of over L.1365 annually, Gerolamo IV still received an annual income of over L.30,200. In addition, the income from the cash investments yielded L.3000 annually, raising Gerolamo's revenue to over L.33,200. From this total, Gerolamo was required to pay almost L.7000 annually to the 5 brothers still living at the time of Carlo Lodovico's death. The appanages represented nearly 23% of his annual income. The method of assigning a cash income for life to the younger children was certainly not original: in principle, it hardly differed from the creation of a usufruct for the widow's dower; in Naples, daughters were given a dowry, calculated on the income of the fee. But it was unusual for a noble to make such provisions for his younger sons. The whole tendency of private law in Piedmont was to exclude such right to such claims, and to emphasize the unity of the patrimony. It was only the Crown which felt itself in a position to create such appanages for younger (and illegitimate) children. For such pensions formed a positive, and continual, danger to the conservation of the patrimony, failing to take into account the possibilities of a series of bad harvests, or the disasters of future wars. The 23% of Gerolamo's income reserved for his younger brothers was, in fact, considerably larger than the amount of money spent by his father in investments, and even equal to the total extraordinary expenditure of Carlo Lodovico's last 15 years. In this light, Carlo Lodovico's will might be regarded as partially responsible for the

restricted expansion of the patrimony during the 30 years of Gerolamo IV's independent life.(88)

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(88) For the Neapolitan 'dote di paraggio', see Salvioli, pp.446-47.

Gerolamo was required to pay the following pensions to his brothers each year:

Giovanni Battista, Paolo Costanzo, Teodoro, Giuseppe, 300 ducatoni each	1200 ducatoni	- L.6300
Antonio	50 "	- L. 262:10
Lodovico Maurizio	70 "	- L. 367:10
	1320 "	- L.6930

6. Gerolamo IV. (1705 - 1735).

i. The careers of the Felletti brothers.

Carlo Lodovico died at the height of the second war against Louis XIV. In both the wars, but particularly in the second, his sons took an active part. For the family was a military one. Although diplomacy was still the monopoly of the old aristocracy, it remained by tradition in the hands of a limited number of families. The only really open careers were the church and the army. The family was now established as among the most important in Piedmont. With the support of a large income and powerful contacts at Court, all the sons had brilliant careers.

Antonio was born in 1671, and was at once destined for the Church. At the age of twelve, he was sent to the Jesuit College at Turin. After following the normal courses of rhetoric, philosophy and theology, he became a professor at the College in 1705. Three years later, he was appointed Rector of the Jesuit College of Mondovì, and in 1717 was transferred back to Turin as Rector. His nomination was probably approved of by the Court, for in 1721 he was sent by Mellarède, Minister for Internal Affairs, to Sardinia as visitatore generale dei Collegi. The appointment came at the height of the struggle with Rome over ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Sardinia: Antonio's task was to find some compromise solution for the excommunication of the civil assessor by the acting-bishop

of Oristano. His success, after long negotiations, confirmed his reputation at Turin. Antonio had managed to combine the family tradition of loyalty to the throne with the Jesuit tradition of loyalty to the Pope. Soon after, he acknowledged royal supremacy, by asking permission to build a new Jesuit college at Nurri. In 1723, he was appointed Padre Provinciale of the province of Milan, but he was by now so completely trusted by Vittorio Amedeo II, that in the following years he was entrusted with the scheme to replace the Spanish language by Italian in Sardinia.(89)

Antonio's younger brother, Paolo Costanzo, was also sent into the Church. He soon showed his ability, and by 1724, at the age of 49, he was appointed acting-bishop of Alba, and, shortly after, _almoniere generale_. An appeal for the vacant priorate of S. Benedetto di Camagna failed, but his powerful connections at the Court ensured his appointment as royal almoner. His new position proved to be only a stepping stone. In 1726, an agreement was finally reached with the Papacy, by which Vittorio Amedeo II's right to the patronage of churches in Sardinia was recognized, with the power to appoint to vacant benefices. All the vacant bishoprics were

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(89) For Antonio's career, see Dufour, _op.cit._, pp.29-30; R. Palmarocchi: _Sardegna Sabauda_, Cagliari, 1936, pp.96-98, 121, 192; X. Filia: _Sardegna Cristiana_, Sassari, 1929, v.3, pp.21-23, 36, 48-49. The documents relating to the dispute over jurisdiction can be found in: Archivio di Stato di Cagliari, Segretaria di Stato, serie 1a, M.1. In the Jesuit archives at Rome (Archivio Romano della Societa di Iesù, the stages of Antonio's education can be traced: Assist. Italiae, Mediolan., Catal. Triennal., 1711-1714, pp.229, n.16, 146, n.1; 1717-1720. Although annual reports were made by the Jesuit Colleges in Sardinia to Rome, no trace of Antonio's presence can be found. However, as only eight letters cover the period 1716-36 (Assist. Hispaniae, Sardinia, v.11, 1650-1772, ns.XLV-LII), it seems probable that another source exists, which, however, it has proved impossible to trace.

immediately filled by Piedmontese, headed by Paolo Costanzo as Archbishop of Cagliari (1727). The appointment was primarily intended to assert royal supremacy over the church in Sardinia, and as such was a clear recognition of Paolo Costanzo's loyalty. Unlike many of the Piedmontese, Paolo Costanzo seemed genuinely concerned about his diocese, and carried out regular pastoral visits; he stayed in Sardinia - apparently contented - until his death in 1748. Throughout his long rule, he controlled the Church as effectively as possible; in 1732, when the threat of a Spanish invasion aroused doubts as to the loyalty of the Sardinian clergy, Paolo Costanzo proposed to write letters to all the parish priests of his diocese:

> "...in termini efficaci a poter insinuare a' Popoli la fedeltà, et affetto che devono a Vostra Maestà...."

His loyalty was recognized in Turin, and in 1735, on the death of his brother, Gerolamo, he was even appointed Viceroy of Sardinia in the interim period before the arrival of a new Viceroy.(90)

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(90) For Paolo Costanzo's career, see: M.209, ns.5,7; Dufour, op.cit., p.32; Filia, op.cit., pp.12-14, 22.27, 37-45, 53, n. Paolo Costanzo's letters can be found in: AST I, lettere Particolari, lettera 'B', M.10; lettera 'C', M.41 (1720-26). The appeal for the priorate in 1724 is in: lettera 'B', M.10, 1724, October 11. At Cagliari, references to Paolo Costanzo are to be found throughout the administrative documents of the period; see, in particular: AS Cagliari, Segreteria di Stato, serie 1a, M.720, M.721, M.729 (1732, March 5, April 14, May 6); Bolle Brevi, M.81, f.97. In 1735, Carlo Emanuele III praised "lo zelo e l'applicazione di detto Prelato" to his brother, Gerolamo (Segretaria di Stato, serie 1a, M.5, 1735,...June), and shortly after, nominated him Viceroy (M.5, 1735, 21 September). For this appointment, see also: P.C.Galli: Cariche del Piemonte e Paesi Uniti, Turin, 1798, v.2, Appendix, part 1, pp.5-6. See also: Archivio Romano della Societa di Iesu, Assist. Hispaniae, Sardinia, v.11, 1650-1772, n.XLVIII; and in the Archivio Arcivescovile di Cagliari, M.179: 'Escrituras varias de mansenor Falletty - 1748', and M.208: 'Spoglio dell'arcivescovo Paolo Costantino Falletti 1748'. For Paolo Costanzo's death, see: T.Langasco: Orazione funebre in lodo di monsignor Gio. Guiseppe Paul Costanzo Falletti, arcivescovo di Cagliari, vicere del regno, Turin, 1753.

The careers of the brothers who entered the army were even more brilliant and even more closely linked to the throne. Pietro Ottavio had reached the grade of lieutenant-colonel, when he was killed at the age of 18 at the battle of Staffarda in 1690. His four brothers all took an active part in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Gerolamo, a cornet in the Guardia del Corpo, successfully defended Alba against the French in 1703, and was appointed colonel; towards the end of the war, he was even employed by Vittorio Amedeo II to make journeys to Naples to protect Piedmontese interests. Cavaliere Giuseppe, a captain in the regiment of Saluzzo, captured the fort of Galliera near Nice in 1704. Teodoro, in the same regiment of Saluzzo, rose to the rank of major. Giovanni Battista fought a brilliant battle near Chieri in 1712, and was rewarded by his appointment as major and an increase in pay.

In the years following the peace of Utrecht, all the brothers were rewarded and were employed in ever more important positions. Gerolamo IV was immediately appointed governor of Pinerolo in 1713, then of Casale in 1715, and finally, in September 1731, was appointed Viceroy of Sardinia; contemporaneously, he was raised to the highest posts in the army (generale di battaglia, tenente di maresciallo, luogotenente di cavalleria). Giuseppe rose to the rank of brigadier by 1744, but in the same year was mortally wounded at the battle of Guastalla, as was Gerolamo's son, Giacinto. Teodoro took part in the fighting in Sicily in 1717-18, and was captured by the Spanish at the battle of Milazzo. By 1735, he had reached the rank of

maresciallo di campo and now took part in the new war: for his able conduct, he was appointed governor of Alessandria, and given as reward the commenda of the Ospedale maggiore of Ivrea, as well as being appointed cavaliere gran croce of the Ordine Mauriziano. In 1736, he was sent to Sardinia, as governor of the city and castle of Cagliari and commander-general of the royal troops. In 1745, he became governor of Tortona, an important garrison through its vicinity to the frontier, which he was in fact soon forced to defend against the French in the new war. Finally, to end a long and distinguished career (already in 1750 the first of his family to be nominated Cavaliere dell'Ordine della SS. Annunziata), he was appointed governor of Turin, at the age of 78. In the meantime, his brother, Giovanni Battista, retired from the army in 1723 to become Governor of prince Eugenio, son of prince Emanuele di Savoia-Soissons, and subsequently primo gentiluomo di camera; his merits were recognized by his appointment as cavaliere gran croce of the Ordine Mauriziano.(91)

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(91) The military careers of the brothers can be traced in the family archives, State patents, and private letters.
For Pietro Ottavio, see: Dufour, op.cit., p.30; M.207, n.13; AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'F', M.11, 1689, September 14, October 7.
For Giovanni Battista: M.207, ns.3, 19-25, 28-30, 32; M.208, n.1, Dufour, op.cit., pp.23-24; AST III, Controllo, Patenti 4, 1724 al 25, ff.11, 142; Patenti 9, 1731 al 32, f.187; Patenti 23, 1750, f.100; Patenti 26, 1753 al 54, f.25.
For Giuseppe: M.209, ns.4, 6.8; AST III, Controllo, Patenti 11, 1734 al 35, f.17; Patenti 12, 1735 al 36, f.10; Patenti 18, 1743 al 45, f.34; AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'B', M.10; lettera 'F', M.11; Dufour, op.cit. pp.35-36; Casalis, v.11, p.441.

(cont'd on next page)

The family had fully emerged from the obscurity of the provincial nobility to take an active part in the government of the country. Carlo Lodovico's decision to divide the careers of his sons between the church and the army was not surprising. They were the traditional careers of the nobility all over Europe. Moreover, in the Piedmont of Vittorio Amedeo II, it was increasingly difficult for members of old noble families to gain employment in high State offices. Vittorio Amedeo II's hostility to the privileges of the old feudal nobility, which could be seen in the plans for the perequazione at the very beginnings of his reign, grew ever more

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(91) (cont'd)
For Teodoro: M.203,ns.1-10; AST III, Controllo, Patenti 1, 1717 al 1720, f.77; Patenti 5, 1725 in 1727, f.46; Patenti 7, 1729 al 30, f.167; Patenti 10, 1732 al 34, f.102; Patenti 12, 1735 al 1736, ff.14,22; Patenti 16, 1743 al 45, f.34; Patenti 19, 1743 al 45, ff.10,72; Patenti 27, 1754 al 55, f.123; AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'B', M.10; lettera 'F', M.11; Dufour, op.cit., pp.33-34; Onsalis, v.11,p.441; Galli, op.cit.,v.2, Appendix, part 1, pp.23-24; G. Ferrari: 'L'assedio di Serravalle nel 1745' Rivista di storia, arte, archeologia della Provincia di Alessandria, 1913, pp.3-30.
For Gerolamo: M.207,ns.4-6,8,10; AST III, Controllo, a.1712 in 1713, f.116; Patenti 9, 1731 al 32, ff.71, 87; Patenti 12, 1735 al 36, f.73; AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'C', M.40, M.41; lettera 'F', M.10; Dufour, op.cit.,pp.24-29; Galli, op.cit.,v.2, Appendix, part 1, pp.4-5.
The Orders of S. Maurizio and S. Lazzaro were united by Emanuele Filiberto, with the double scope of continuing the traditional duties of the Knights of St. John (two ships were sent to Lepanto in 1572), and at the same time, of creating an order to reward faithful service, without expense to the Treasury. There were two ranks, the Cavalieri di giustizia who had to prove their nobility to obtain admission; and the Cavalieri di grazia, nominated by the Duke (gran mastro of the Order) without any proof of nobility. They were awarded either the gran or the piccola croce. The comanda, or parts of the Order's properties, were given as rewards for public services. See C.Claretta: Dell'Ordine Mauriziano nel primo secolo della sua ricostituzione e del suo Gran'Ammiraglio Andrea Provana di Leyni, Turin, 1890; Carutti, op.cit.,pp.20-22.

overt after the peace of Utrecht. Important political posts were withheld from old, wealthy families, and given to new nobles, the creations of the monarchy. At the same time, the judicial posts were (traditionally) held by the newer nobility and the middle class. A new class of lawyers and bureaucrats replaced the feudal aristocracy in all administrative posts; between 1713 and 1742, the middle class and newly entitled possessed 84.16% of the higher and 94.41% of the less important offices.(92) In the face of the persistent, and increasingly hostile, opposition of Vittorio Amedeo II, the hopes of a successful career in the administration were few.

But it was strange that Carlo Lodovico trained none of his sons for a diplomatic career. For the nobility retained its control of diplomacy: only the old landed families had sufficient wealth and (usually) education to undertake such a career. Moreover, Carlo Lodovico's relatives had set an example, and could have been expected to assist any young diplomat from their own family. Carlo Lodovico's mother, Cornelia Biandrate, had come from a leading diplomatic and political family, not only in Piedmont, but also employed in the Papal States. His daughter, Paola Cristina, married into one of the most important political families in Mantua in the 17th century. His daughter-in-law's father, Ottavio Provana di Druent, had had an extremely important, if fluctuating, political career.

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(92) Cf. Quazza, passim, especially v.1, pp.91-95.

Perhaps the example of Ottavio's career had served as a warning to Carlo Lodovico. Perhaps the expenses of a diplomatic career had seemed too heavy. Almost certainly, the concept of the church and the army as the traditional careers for younger sons had had great influence on him.

For the army was the natural career for such a family. The Falletti di Barolo were bound by the tightest bonds of loyalty to the monarch. With its lands on the disputed frontiers between the states of Savoy and Mantua, complicated still further by the existence of the Imperial fees, the family had chosen the Piedmontese side in the years of the Monferrat wars: as early as 1620 Giacomo and his wife, Caterina, had been granted letters of naturalization by Carlo Emanuele I. The attitude of both Paolo Costanzo and Antonio, despite the latter's Jesuit orders, were notably favourable towards royal claims; the military careers of the other brothers followed naturally.

Vittorio Amedeo II had need of such nobles in these years of expansion. The Falletti brothers were consciously used as a body, for their close family relationship ensured the maintenance of control without friction. Giuseppe not only followed Teodoro into the Saluzzo regiment, but took over his position as colonel, on the latter's appointment as governor of Alessandria in 1735.

The use of the family in Sardinia was even more striking. Between 1721 and 1748, four of the brothers held leading positions in Sardinia. After the early years of mutual suspicion and hostility, accentuated by the tactlessness of the first Viceroys, the Piedmontese government tried to introduce a more conciliatory policy, and made full use of the Falletti di

Barolo. Gerolamo was sent out to keep peace in the island, and in his relations with the ecclesiastics, to act as protector of the Church. Paolo Costanzo's position as Archbishop of Cagliari undoubtedly played a large part in the choice of Gerolamo. The close contact and co-operation between the brothers was clearly shown throughout the four years of Gerolamo's rule. In January, 1732, 52 prisoners escaped from Cagliari prison, and claimed asylum in the Jesuit Seminary; Paolo Costanzo, as Archbishop, allowed the prisoners to be arrested and the most dangerous to be sent back to prison, while the remainder were given back to ecclesiastical hands - but in the form of the Castle church, to impede any further attempts to escape. After Gerolamo's death, followed by that of the governor of Cagliari, Paolo Costanzo ruled the island, as the only Piedmontese with sufficient authority. The appointment of Teodoro in the following year as comandante generale and governor of Cagliari merely confirmed the confidence and reliance of the royal government in the ability of the family.(93)

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(93) The position of the Falletti family in Sardinia (as indeed the whole history of the early years of Piedmontese rule) has still to be studied. An immense amount of material is to be found in AS Cagliari. For Gerolamo's dispatches to Turin, see: Segreteria di Stato, serie 1a, M.279, M.280, M.390, M.391, with the complementary dispatches from Turin in: M.3-5, M.186-88; for the internal administration, see in particular: M.519, M.720, MM.794-96, M.932-36. The Archivio Comunale also contains 'Carte viceregali' (M.36).
For the escape of the prisoners in 1732: Segreteria di Stato, serie 1a, M.279, letter of 15 January, 1732.
For Gerolamo's appointment, see: L. La Rocca: 'Istruzioni al marchese Falletti di Castagnole vicere di Sardegna dal 1731 al 1735', in essays In onore di Federico Ciccaglione, part 3, 1909. Gerolamo died from malaria: M.215, n.7; and the contemporary descriptions in: AS Cagliari, Segreteria di Stato, serie 2a, M.49, E.A. De La Vallée: Descrizione del funerale del marchese vicere Girolamo Falletti di Castagnole e di Barolo, morto in Cagliari il 5 luglio 1735, Turin, 1736; and the anonymous: Descrizione delle funzioni funebri per le esequie del marchese Girolamo Falletti, vicerè del regno di Sardegna, defunto in Cagliari, Turin, 1736; see also: G. Manno: Storia di Sardegna, Turin, 1827, v.4, p.133.

It is difficult to state whether the military careers of Gerolamo and his brothers were remunerative as well as successful. Montesquieu, visiting Piedmont in 1728-29, noted that the wages paid to royal officials were extremely small. But, within Piedmont itself, the pay of military officers was only second to that of diplomats, who had correspondingly higher expenses. Certainly the possibilities of increasing the official pay by casuali were more limited than in judicial posts; but the rights of officers over the payment of wages to a company, or in the purchase of horses for the cavalry, besides the opportunities of booty, both abroad and in Piedmont itself, probably yielded a by no means negligiable income. Nor were the official stipends always so small: Giovanni Battista only received L.3000 as governor of a royal prince and primo gentiluomo di camera at the very end of his life, while Giuseppe, in 1735, was only paid L.3000 as a colonel. But Teodoro's income rose from L.3000 as governor of Alessandria, to L.10,000 as commander-general and governor of Cagliari, although it subsequently fell to L.6000 when he returned to Piedmont; but in addition, the commenda he had been given by Carlo Emanuele III yielded a further L.1500. Gerolamo himself was paid the customary L.3000 as governor of Pinerolo and Casale, but as Viceroy of Sardinia he was given L.10,000 in Piedmont, and a further L.32,000 paid from the Sardinian budget to account for his expenses.(94)

(94) For the wages of the brothers, see the patents in note (91), and also Quazza,v.1,p.107. The L.32,000 paid to Gerolamo was exclusive of the L.10,000 he received in Piedmont:AS Cagliari,Bilanci di Sardegna, 1733-1736; Intendenza Generale. Spogli.1735.

It is impossible to tell whether or not these wages, together with their unofficial supplements, were in fact sufficient to cover the expenses of such positions. Virtually no documents exist to illustrate the expenses. But one clear indication is given by the appeal of Paolo Costanzo to his brother, Gerolamo, on his appointment as Archbishop of Cagliari, to lend him L.40,000 for the expenses of his appointment and instalment at Cagliari.

Gerolamo's reply sheds light on the fundamental reason why all the brothers had been so active in taking up careers. He was prepared to raise the money, even by the alienation of his lands (if royal permission to violate the primogeniture was granted), both for the:

> "...dignità al detto signor Abbate di lui fratello conferta che per il decoro, e qualità della famiglia..."

The honour acquired by the family was worthy of financial sacrifices, and Gerolamo wrote to Vittorio Amedeo II to thank him for the choice of his brother:

> "...Non puosso esprimere il mio giubbilo nel vedere continuata la somma Grazia di Vostra Real Maestà nella mia Famiglia...." (95).

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(95) For the loan to Paolo Costanzo: M.203,n.4. For the letter of thanks to Vittorio Amedeo II:AST I Lettere Particolari,lettera 'C',M.41, letter of 3 December,1726.

Paolo Costanzo's expenses as Archbishop of Cagliari can, at least on part, be traced in the Archivio Arcivescovile di Cagliari,M.233: 'Spoglio delle spese occorse per l'interna amministrazione del palazzo arcivescovile di Cagliari.1727-1736'; more information is probably to be found in MM.89-91; 'Libre de la administracion de totes les entrades y exides del Rever. Capitol e Comunitat de la present Sen. di Caller.1721-1730.1731-1740. 1741-1750.' Unfortunately, the archive was in the process of being re-ordered at the time of the present writer's visit to Cagliari (spring 1959), and the archivist was unable to find the mazzi; nor has it been possible to gain further information since that date.

ii. The investments.

The new positions aspired at, and possessed by, the Falletti di Barolo in the administration of the country, explain, at least in part, the comparative restriction of their economic activities. Whenever a lull in his political duties gave him time, Gerolamo IV continued to take an active interest in the family estates. But he was unable to embark on any ambitious policy of expansion, similar to those of his predecessors. He had the fortune of an extremely able mother, still capable of administering the estates at the age of 85; as early as 1703, Gerolamo had given Cristina Birago power of attorney, when he left for the war; he repeated this in 1731, on his appointment in Sardinia. But his frequent absences hindered any consistent policy of development.(96)

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(96) For the power of attorney in 1703: M.202,n.15; and in 1731:M.204,n.13. A panegyric written after Cristina Birago's death in 1734 noted her remarkable ability as an administrator (M.204,n.13):

"...l'altro motivo di tenerai ferma in quel Castello fondossi nella sollecitudine che aveva, di poter meglio attendere al bene di sua famiglia. Era essa Dama di grande vivacità, ma composta,dottata di perspicace ingegno, e di singolare Prudenza,d'onde aveva acquistato una singolare esperienza nel maneggio de Feudi, et azienda Domestica,al cui bene sì come aveva prima sempre invigilato, così ha sempre continuato a darvi una somma attenzione, sino all'estremo, così desiderando il Marchese suo Primogenito, e più particolarmente in occasione d'allontanarsi dal Paese per andare Vice Rè in Sardegna, e così ancora gli altri Figliuoli suoi, e Nipoti, tutti sempre collegati, et uniti vicendevolmente tra Loro..."

Between 1703 and 1735, Gerolamo spent little more than ten years at home. From 1703, he was fully engaged in the war, and in 1710-12 he was sent on annual journeys to Naples; from 1713 he was sent as governor to Pinerolo, and than in 1715 to Casale. It was only in the years of the 1720s that he seems to have been reasonably free.

The main expense of Cervelamo's early years (after rebuying the alienated _gerni_ of L.8400 left by Carlo Lodovico) was the purchase of the last third of the fee of Serralunga. The offer was unexpected, as the difficulties in the way of feudal alienations continued to increase.

Vittorio Amedeo II showed the same realization as his father of the value of the nobility as an ornament to the Crown. Once he had succeeded in subjecting a certain part of feudal wealth to State needs, he was prepared to support, and indeed encouraged, the social standing of the nobility. For Vittorio Amedeo II had need of the nobility, not only for their money and military qualifications, but also for the prestige they gave to the throne. His son, Carlo Emanuele III, went still further, and attracted the nobility to Turin, creating a revolution in the traditional social-relations between _padrone_ and _mezzadro_, and establishing a new, less happy tradition of absentee landlords. But to live up to a title required a solid economic basis. Although no qualifications of wealth were laid down for the various grades of nobles, they were encouraged to preserve an adequate patrimony, centred on the traditional family estates, and were hindered in their attempts to alienate such property. Only in exceptional circumstances were alienations of feudal land allowed.

Conte Carlo Maurizio Falletti di Pocapaglia had attempted at first to hire out all his possessions in La Morra and Serralunga to conte Giovanni Maria Alfieri di Sevigliano for L.6200 a year, but the expedient proved insufficient. His castle at Pocapaglia had been sacked by the

French; the expenses of the war, especially equipping his eldest son, were accompanied by a series of bad harvests, and by 1707 he owed nearly L.7000, as well as L.19,000 for the dowry of his daughter, Fulvia. He appealed to Vittorio Amedeo II for permission to sell his possessions in Serralunga, despite the prohibition of alienation of his ancestor, conte Andrea, of 1662; and after a thorough examination of his finances by the government delegate, conte di Cavoretto, such permission was given.(97)

Gerolamo IV paid L.26,000 for 93 giornate and the remaining 1/3 of the jurisdiction of Serralunga. The sale was made in 1707, during the worst years of the war, and Gerolamo was unable to raise so large a sum at once. Between 1707 and 1709, he alienated three censi, for a total of L.23,000, with the interest to be paid at 5%. One of the creditors came from a middle class family. In February 1710, when conte Ottavio Provana di Druent was finally forced to pay the remaining L.32,500 owing for his daughter's dowry, all three debts were repaid.

But by 1713, Gerolamo was forced to sell back a censo of L.3100 to the comunità of Castagnole, as well as alienate yet another censo of L.3000 to the chemist of the prince of Carignano. The presence of middle class creditors in these years is significant. There was little parallel to the large Tiers Etat in France, but a new class was being encouraged, to

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(97) M.169,n.39; M.172,ns.17,18; M.180,n.15; M.203,n.31; M.206,n.23; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.80,ns.18-20; M.A.98,n.11.
For the repurchase of the two alienated censi left by Carlo Lodovico of L.5000 and L.3400, see note (80).

provide both an enlarged administrative body, and a new economic force within the State. An examination of the monti di pietà in these years shows an increasing participation by the middle class, supported (even if ineffectively) in their commercial and trading activities by the king. Hitherto, almost all censi, sold by the Falletti di Barolo, had been to noble creditors; Gerolamo's loans were still mainly from members of his own class, but middle class creditors can be seen forming an increasingly large minority.(98)

With the end of the war, an increased activity is to be seen in the acquisition and administration of the land. The inflation throughout Europe in the years following the peace of Utrecht also affected Piedmont, though to a lesser extent. The government attempted to defend the value of money in circulation, and to fix the rate of exchange: the French monetary legislation of 1704-16 was carefully examined, many plans were presented for a new coinage, and even the advice of John Law was sought. In 1717, an edict unified the lira of Piedmont as the only money of account in the territories of the kingdom of Sardinia, while in 1733, another edict tried to establish definitively the exchange-rate of the monete straniere in circulation. The government, in fact, failed to wholly eliminate

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(98) Two of the three censi of 1707-09, sold to conte Renato Birago di Borgaro and to Anna Cristina Vittoria Isnardi di Caraglio, marchesa di Pianezza, were for a total of L.21,000; only L.2000 were borrowed from the Busca family: M.203,ns.9,32; M.A.15,n.15. The 1713 censo which was sold at 5% interest, was only rebought in 1720; at that date, Gerolamo managed to have the interest reduced to 4½%, as the general rate of interest had fallen to 4% in those years: M.203, ns.33,42. For Gerolamo's sale of censi, see Appendix 9.
For the increasing financial importance of the middle class, see Quazza, v.1, pp.195-203; v.2, pp.241-319.

speculation on the exchange of currencies, but it was for the most part successful in stabilizing the value of money.(99)

The effect of the inflation on the Falletti di Barolo in these years was basically a 'return to the land'. In 1709, Gerolamo had bought a censo in Barolo of L.300. But there is no evidence of further investments of liquid capital in the purchase of censi or tassi. On the contrary, there was an evident desire to dispose of Carlo Lodovico's investments, whenever the comunità wished to rebuy them, or else to raise money for the purchase of land or for unexpected expenses: such was the case at the marriage of Gerolamo's son, Antonio Teodoro, to the distant family relative, the duchessa Falletti di Cannalunga, in 1724, for which Gerolamo sold censi and tassi of at least L.4600, and possibly of over L.6000. At the same time, the expenses of a military career proved a steady drain on Gerolamo's resources: the censo alienated in 1713, another censo of L.6000 sold to the Jesuits in 1717, and a third censo of L.3000 alienated to a middle class family in 1732, can probably be attributed to the expenses of Gerolamo's position, first as governor, and then as viceroy.(100)

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(99) Cf. Quazza, v.1, pp.178-81.

(100) For the alienated censi, see Appendix 9.
For the 1724 alienations of censi of value L.2700 and a tasso of L.2400 see: M.A.16, n.3. For the censo of 1717 (sold at 4%), guaranteed on the 'Murata' farm at Vergne, which was only rebought in 1730, see M.171, n.9.
Teodoro's bride was the last Falletti di Cannalunga; the marriage was arranged as she was to receive 2/3 of her father's inheritance if she married in the Falletti family: it was a clear example of the policy of conserving the family patrimony (Dufour, op.cit, p.39; M.207, n.25).

The extent to which Gerolamo's money was employed elsewhere - in the pensions he owed to his brothers, in the undoubtedly higher cost of living, with ever more important political positions - was clearly shown in 1727, when his brother, Paolo Costanzo, appealed to Gerolamo for a loan of L.40,000 on his appointment as Archbishop of Cagliari. Gerolamo was fully in agreement with the need to raise the money, but the only way he could manage it was by royal permission to alienate some allodial farms, despite the ties of primogeniture and fedecommessi. When he was unsuccessful in his attempt to sell some land to prince Eugene of Savoy, he was forced to create censi, guaranteed on all his lands: he borrowed L.20,000 from the conte di Campigliano, and an equal amount once more from middle class royal officials, Filiberto Garrone, the contrellore della Casa di Sua Maestà, and Giovanni Batteglieri, the avvocato-generale dei poveri. The danger to the family possessions was lessened, as Paolo Costanzo immediately took over the guarantee, first of Garrone's credit, and then of the others, on the income of his own diocese, and repaid all (or nearly all) the debts by 1730.

But the significance of the incident lay in Gerolamo's inability to raise so large a sum of money without alienating some of his lands, or asking for loans. The amount required was certainly large, but in 1695, at the height of the war, Carlo Lodovico had not only raised L.30,000 for a forced loan, but had rebought his much smaller censo within one year.

Gerolamo, apparently, had virtually no capital at his disposal, and had to borrow the whole L.40,000, guaranteeing the annual interest - L.1600 - on his own lands, until Paolo Costanzo was able to take over the debt. The contrast between Gerolamo's limited resources and those of his predecessors seems evidence of the strain both of the annual pensions paid to the brothers, and of the expenses of a military career.(101)

iii. The preparations for the perequazione.

In the meantime, the work of the perequazione steadily progressed, threatening the exemption of all lands illegally claimed as feudal. The misura generale had been completed, and the successive measurements were now in course. In the face of the increasing royal activity, Gerolamo himself carried out a new measurement of all his lands in 1724, basing himself on the previous measurement of Carlo Lodovico in 1672-76.

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(101) For the loan in 1727, see Appendix 9.
Paolo Costanzo himself fully realized the dangers of raising money in this way, and after Gerolamo's death, made a donation to his nephew, Ottavio, of all the debts his brother (and hence Ottavio as heir) still owed him. As he stated (M.175,n.19):

"...il quondam Eccellentissimo Signore Marchese Gerolamo Falletti suo Fratello Primogenito già Vicerè di questo Regno in occasione di detta Promozione si fosse reso cauzione al detto Monsignore per impermutare come impermutò la somma di L.40,000 moneta di Piemonte che gl'erano necessarie per la spesa delle Bolle, provisione de Mobili, Argenteria e viagj, come altresì per mantenersi in Prelatura sin a tanto che potesse cavar rendite dalla sua Mitra, considerando il medesimo Prelato che detto Signore suo Fratello si era esposto a pericolo di soccomber in buona parte del proprio in ordine a detti debiti se succedeva il caso di sua morte ne primi anni del suo Pastoral Governo, massimamente che detto suo Fratello per lasciarli luogo a soccorrer i poveri in anni calamitosi, non l'aveva sollecitato a pagar detti debiti...".

At the same time Vittorio Amedeo II threatened other of the economic privileges of the nobility. The wars had clearly demonstrated the insufficiency of the royal finances. Barely enough in times of peace, they proved hopelessly inadequate for the added expenses of war. The primary object of the perequazione was to increase the amount of taxable land and distribute the burden more fairly. The continual alienations of royal demesne, as well as of royal taxes, tasai and focagni, had seriously restricted the theoretical total to be derived from the traditional taxes. Already in 1559, Emanuèle Filiberto had found most exploitable demesne alienated. Carlo Emanuele I's proposal to revoke such alienations was never carried into effect, and by the 1660s most of the normal taxes had also been lost to the Treasury.

Vittorio Amedeo II reacted violently against the generosity of his ancestors. Already early in his reign, he insisted on the payment of the cavalcata, the only tax owed by feudal land. The Falletti di Barolo had paid the cavalcata on most of the irregular occasions when it had been demanded in the 17th century, though always with great reluctance. In 1691, at the renewed demand, Carlo Lodovico paid for Serralunga and Barolo, but denied that the cavalcata was owing for La Morra, as the jurisdiction was still disputed. In 1701, a payment was made for the Rodello and Castiglion Falletto possessions. In 1706, Gerolamo IV paid for Barolo, Volta, Serralunga and Rodello. But in

1708, he was humiliated by Vittorio Amedeo II, and forced to pay the cavalcate still owing for Pocapaglia for 1637 and 1638.(102)

At the same time, Vittorio Amedeo II demanded full consegnamenti of all feudal possessions. In 1690, Carlo Lodovico made the due returns, but without specifying the amounts of land he held, and deliberately under-estimating their value at L.5-6000 a year, with the Monferrat fees stated to be valueless for some years to come, through the devastations of the wars.

In 1715 and 1724, after royal edicts stating the exact manner to describe all feudal possessions, Gerolamo returned full consegnamenti, with the normal notarial reservations against omissions or mistakes through oversight.(103)

By now it was a rearguard action. It was obvious that the royal finances could not be restored without drastic measures. The wars of 1690-96 and 1701-13 had led to renewed alienations and infeudations, and the government was unable to pay the capital required for their repurchase. The disinfeudations of 1698 brought no advantage to either government or communità: all lands infeudated between 1690 and 1696 were

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(102) Cavalcate were paid for Serralunga in 1614; for Castiglion Falletto in 1647 and 1663; for Barolo and Volta in 1646 and 1652; M.A.14,n.3; M.A.15,n.16; M.206,n.21; M.210,n.13; AST III, Controllo a.1700 in 1701,f.119; a.1706 in 1707,f.73; a.1707 in 1708,f.179; Patenti R.110,1688 in 1691,f.214.

(103) The 1690 consegnamento is to be found in: M.A.15,n.11; those of 1715 and 1724 in: M.179,n.15; M.A.16,n.3.

once more subjected to the land taxes, but a new tax was imposed on the comunità, equivalent to the capital paid by the infeudators. The new war immediately caused further alienations. As a result, by 1719, the increase of the State income since 1680 was counterbalanced by a proportional loss through alienations.

Vittorio Amedeo II now began to adopt new methods, openly hostile to the nobility. As early as November 1713, in a letter to Mellarède, the Secretary for Internal Affairs, Vittorio Amedeo II outlined a plan for the confiscation of all illegally alienated State taxes and fees. In 1715, an edict ordered new investitures and consegnamenti to be made, from which the royal authorities compiled lists of all dubious titles. In October 1717, all owners of tassi were given the choice of selling back the tassi to the Demesne, or accepting a reduction of interest to 4%. Finally, in June 1719, a special Delegation was appointed (with its members carefully chosen by Vittorio Amedeo II himself) to examine the validity of 183 tassi, claimed by the Demesne as illegally alienated.

The result was a shock to the Crown. By September of the same year, only three cases had been discussed, and the Delegates were unable to agree on a definition of the rights of the Demesne. It was doubtful whether a prince could revoke concessions made by his predecessors; moreover, even if such revocations were possible, there remained the problem of indemnity to the owners, often promised in the original concessions, and confirmed by the interinazione of the Camera.

Vittorio Amedeo II immediately prepared two new edicts. The Camera was dissolved, and a new Camera appointed, composed of faithful supporters of the Crown. At the same time, the 'edict of reunion' ordered the confiscation of all tassi and fees alienated by private concession (though not by public edicts, in cases of 'public necessity'), with the burden of proof now on the owners, and not on the royal Patrimoniale. In effect Vittorio Amedeo II had asserted the authority of the Crown over all theoretical discussions, by maintaining that the Demesne formed part of the patrimony of the State, and not of the Prince, and was consequently inalienable.(104)

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(104) For a complete discussion of the legal aspects of the confiscation, see: M.Torta: La riunione al Demanio dei beni demaniali e feudali alienati sotto Vittorio Amedeo II.1719-1721, unpublished thesis, Università di Torino, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza,1958,passim; also Quazza,v.1,pp.164-74.
The edict of 7 January 1720 stated the royal justification in the preamble:

> "Essendo pertanto fatte inalienabili le giurisdizioni non solo per disposizione dell'huomo, ma dalla legge delle genti e pubblica, non può il regnante pro tempore dispensarsi dall'osservanza, il che se gli permette solamente ne' casi che resista all'alienatione la legge edittale, ma non quando vi concorre la prohibitione della legge publica e commune."

The edict was in fact a compromise, for all tassi alienated by public edicts, or to guarantee investments in the monti di pietà, or even given to royal princes as appanages, were excluded. Similarly, the vast majority of fees (about 600) were never called into question, as infeudated before the passing of any prohibitory edicts, or because they formed part of the Monferrat, where there was no law against alienation, or of the marquisate of Saluzzo (regarded as an appanage), or simply because the original investitures were never found! All disputed confiscations were discussed before the Camera, while if the evicted owners claimed compensation from the family of the original investee, the lawsuits were judged by the Senato.

The Falletti di Barolo were among the families affected, though only to a comparatively small degree. The tasso Carlo Lodovico had bought over the comunità of Serralunga in 1680 from prince Emanuele Filiberto di Savoia-Carignano was confiscated for a loss of nearly L.7000.(105)

The increasing activity of the government encouraged the comunità to try once more to free themselves from the power of the feudatories. They began to usurp various feudal rights, especially where they were only owned for a fractional part: by 1734, the comunità of Serralunga had usurped the staro di vino, while the comunità of Borgomale no longer paid either the 1/12 it owed for the fodro and pedaggio, or the canoni for the emphyteuses. The comunità of La Morra, in defiance of the feudatories, published its own bandi campestri as early as 1685.

The Falletti di Barolo were forced to defend their rights, and a series of lawsuits began. In Serralunga, the right to the fodro was confirmed by the Senato in 1681. In La Morra, in the 1670s, the comunità disputed the feudataries' right to the dacito della carne, as well as the exaction of the emoluments from the administration of justice at 5%, instead of at 2½%. The comunità of Pocapaglia was twice condemned to pay the fodro for the 1/80 and a quarter of 1/80 it owed (1697, 1730). Both Barolo and Serralunga objected to Gerolamo IV's right to exact a pedaggio in the 1720s. While long disputes arose over the feudataries'

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(105) M.A.16,n.3. Gerolamo made no attempt to claim damages from the prince as original investee, almost certainly because he belonged to the ruling house.

claim to the monopoly of the hunting and fishing rights, by the publication of bandi campestri, in Barolo, Volta, Verone, and Serralunga. The comunità of Barolo published its own bandi campestri in 1674, and again in 1728 and 1733; in 1736, all these comunità, as well as that of Rocchetta Palafea, were forbidden to publish them by the Senato. Two years later, the same prohibition was repeated, but this time the comunità were allowed the right of chase. Although Ottavio bought back the right in 1745, the power of the family was undoubtedly shaken by these attacks.(106)

iv. The effects of the perequazione.

As an attack on privileges, the perequazione was undoubtedly successful. It strengthened the comunità in their struggle against the feudataries, and lessened the burden of feudal rights. In 1727, the comunità of Barolo claimed the allodiality of 445 giornate owned by Gerolamo IV. The royal delegate, conte Giacinto Nomis di Cossila, allowed the allodiality of the 139 giornate of the 1638 transaction,

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(106) The usurpations of the Serralunga and Pocapaglia comunità can be found in the 1734 conservamento; AST III, Consegnamenti, R.375, ff.76-96,318; M.180,n.13. For La Morra's bandi campestri, 1685: M.217,n.26; M.A.75,n.11. And for the disputes over the dacito della carne and the judicial profits: M.217,ns.7,10,13,23. The condemnations of Pocapaglia, 1697,1730: M.205,ns.13,15.
The dispute over the bandi campestri can be followed in: M.196,n.3; M.198,n.2; M.213,n.6;M.204,n.12. When new war-time alienations were made in 1745, Ottavio paid L.750 to buy the right of chase from the R.Finanze: M.206,n.26; AST III, Controllo, Patenti 18, 1743 al 45, f.185; Patenti, R.182,1743 al 45, f.208. For the condemnation of Serralunga, 1681: M.177,n.28; M.197,n.3; M.A.16,n.2.

but stated that the remainder of the disputed lands were to be feudal, as the comunità was unable to bring sufficient proof of their previous subjection to taxes. At the same time, he supported Gerolamo's counter-claim, and increased the annual feudal censo from 33 to 50 scudi, to compensate for the loss in the real value of money.(107)

With the edict of perequazione of 7 May 1731, the comunità could at last claim that justice had been done. This time it was the feudatories who had to prove the feudality of their lands and rights, or else lose all immunity.

All the Vergne lands were at once subjected to the registro, and Gerolamo's canone, bought by his father in 1685 at such great expense, was instantly lost without immunity. Disputes immediately broke out with the city of Cherasco over the rate of taxation to be imposed. In Barolo itself, of 444 giornate, only 93 giornate, representing the consegnamenti of 1585-89, were recognized as feudal. Of a total 842 giornate, 769 giornate, or over 87% were declared allodial.

At the same time, all feudal rights over the comunità of Barolo (consisting mainly of the censo and the dacciti) were at once abolished. For even though Gerolamo III had gained the interinazione of the Camera in 1638, all private transactions negotiated without the permission of the royal authorities were judged legally invalid. It was a new, extremely partial, interpretation of the law, closely resembling the

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(107) M.193,n.2; M.204,n.12.

justification of the 1720 confiscations. Gerolamo IV immediately protested against the illegality of the royal decision, and claimed his re-establishment, or at least an indemnity. As in 1719, the leading jurists showed themselves uncertain about the royal interpretation, and in 1734 the Senate pronounced in favour of Gerolamo. But the comunità appealed, and the lawsuit continued. By now, the validity of the claims of the Crown was increasingly acknowledged, as the Royal Constitutions demanded acceptance as the first, and supreme, source of law. After a lawsuit lasting ten years, the Senate reversed its decision, and condemned Ottavio Falletti di Barolo to the loss of all his feudal rights.(108)

In the other fees, the effect of the perequazione was hardly less disastrous. In La Morra, all Gerolamo's 629 giornate, previously exempt from taxes, were now brought under the jurisdiction of the comunità. At Serralunga, only 35% of the land claimed as feudal was recognized, while by 1740 a censo of over L.1000 was declared invalid, on the grounds that the annual interest had more than repaid the capital.

At the date of the perequazione, Gerolamo IV owned about 3190 giornate; of this total, 2306 giornate, or 72% were claimed as feudal, but only

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(108) The feudal rights consisted of the tasso and the diritti: the forno, osteria, pannateria, torchî di vino, and da olio, and sestaro di vino. Their values were usually stated in the consegnamenti; ignoring the brief increase of the censo from 33 to 50 scudi, the total value of the feudal rights can be calculated as L.487:10:0. The pedaggio of L.66 remained in the possession of the family. For the dispute over the censo in Barolo, 1731-44: M.170, n.12; M.177, n.25; M.180, n.13; M.206, n.24; M.A.14, ns.8-10; M.A.16, n.2. For the lawsuit over the Verzne lands: M.201, n.5; M.202, ns.4,5; M.210, ns.25,28. For the loss of feudality of the family lands, see Appendix 11(a),(c).

660 giornate, or 21%, were accepted. In addition, by the time all the lawsuits had finished, the family had lost a capital of over L.28,500 invested in censi, and an annual income from feudal rights of nearly L.500. (Appendix 11(c) and (109)).

Yet despite the great reduction of their privileges, the Falletti di Barolo remained in firm possession of their hold over the comunità, and in some respects even strengthened it. For in the same years of the perequazione, the family began to buy land at every available opportunity consolidating their possessions in their oldest fees. The slight drop in the value of money during the years of Vittorio Amedeo II's reign was more than counterbalanced by a steady increase in the price of land. The prices varied from province to province, and even more from region to region: in the province of Alba, the average price of a giornata rose from L.127 between 1680 and 1685 to L.178 between 1711 and 1717; in Barolo the price rose from L.155 in the former period to L.269 in the latter, while in Serralunga, there was a proportional rise from L.73 to L.122. But the general increase, which continued, with hardly an interruption even in the period of the wars, reflected a similarly increase in the

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(109) The censo over Serralunga of L.1077 capital had been bought by Carlo Lodovico in 1687 from its previous owner, when the comunità wished to reduce the interest from 5 to 4%. It was unpaid from 1721, and the comunità claimed its abolition in 1731, together with that of another censo of L.300 bought in 1704. In 1735, the comunità was condemned, and owed over L.2400 between arrears and the costs of the lawsuit. But in 1740, Ottavio was condemned, and had to pay back nearly L.400 for interests paid since 1731; he ceded the other censo of L.300 in part payment of this: M.171,n.1; M.172,n.16; M.196,n.5; M.204,n.23; M.218,f.3; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.98,ns.15,16.

income to be derived from land, and probably explained the renewed activities of the Falletti. Possibly, an unexpected result of the perequazione was to place still more land on the market, as small landowners - formerly enjoying tax exemption - found themselves in financial difficulties. Certainly Gerolamo IV and his son found it worth their while to make continual, small acquisitions.(110)

In Serralunga, after the purchase of the last third of the fee in 1707, Gerolamo continued to buy land, and by 1735 had made 35 purchases for a total of over 57 giornate. In Barolo, between 1730 and 1737, 29 purchases were made for over 19 giornate; while 7 purchases were made in Castiglion Falletto in the same years, for over 12 giornate. In all, Gerolamo IV and Ottavio bought nearly 89 giornate in the three fees, at an expense of almost L.16,000. The very few figures existing for later periods in the 18th century would seem to indicate that the development was continued at least until the middle years of the century.(111)

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(110) The question of prices in Piedmont - like that of the value of money - has so far never been studied. Prato has printed tables for the average prices of land for five periods between 1680 and 1717, carried out at the time of the perequazione, and to be found in AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21,ns.292-303. The figures for Barolo and Serralunga have been worked out from the table in n.293. These averages, which were based on the notarial documents of sale, can almost certainly be regarded as reliable in this instance, because of the precautions taken by the royal officials; cf.Prato,pp.193-201; ibid., Costo della guerra, pp.334-37; more - scattered - information on prices can be found throughout the latter book, especially pp.199-213, 295-97; and in: Vita economica,pp.147-65; See also: Einaudi, pp.419-23; ibid., Entrate pubbliche, pp.194-231; Quazza, v.1,pp.226-29, merely bases himself on Prato.

(111) The purchases have been reconstructed from: M.170,n.16;M.171,ns.1,2; M.172,n.16;M.196,n.1;M.A.32,n.16;AC di Castiglion Falletto.

These purchases were made systematically, according to a definite policy. In Barolo, 14 of the 29 purchases, representing over 70% of the total area bought, were made in one particular area, lying on the boundary with the comunità of Novello; in Serralunga, 12 of the 35 acquisitions, of over 20 giornate, were bought at the 'Cascinotta' farm from the family cultivating Carlo Lodovico's farm as mezzadri together with their own lands.

Moreover, the policy of acquisition was becoming more ruthless. For the first time, as far as the documents show, land was being exacted from the mezzadri (who apparently - and most unusually - had their own small possessions) when they proved unable to pay their debts to the padrone. No evidence exists of the notorious practice adopted by many families later in the century, who allowed the debts to mount up in the years of good harvests, to demand their complete payment in the years of shortage. But the wording of the documents is not explicit enough to rule out such a possibility. In these years, there were 7 such dattioni in pegno, all but one in Barolo. (Appendix 8(b) and (112)).

v. The administration of the estates.

This picture of a gradual change from an almost paternal rule of the land to a more business-like efficiency, with less personal contact, is borne out by an examination of the contracts of mezzadria in these years.

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(112) The contracts for payments of debt in land can be found in: M.171, n.1; M.196,n.1. For an example, see Appendix 8(b).

Large numbers of these contracts or capitolationi are to be found, especially from the last quarter of the 17th century. Their form is almost always the same. The mezzadro or tenant is given the farm, both buildings and land, with the agricultural implements, often with some head of stock, as well as the necessary seed for the first year. These are to be returned at the end of the contract. He cultivates the land, and divides its fruits with the padrone, on a 50% basis, taking the seed for the following year, however, from his own half. In addition, the padrone is entitled to keep certain fruits (in this region, usually the leaves of the mulberry trees), and allows the mezzadro to keep certain others, such as the vinaccia or grapeskins (used after the wine-pressing to form the basis of a second, extremely watery wine), usually in return for a small payment. The mezzadro may also be allowed to keep one or two pigs, but is usually to give one of these, or else a cash payment, each year to the padrone. Besides this, he is held to plant a certain number of trees each year, and also to carry out certain labour-services (such as carrying 20 carts of wood to the castle, and grinding a sack of corn for the padrone at his own expense) as well as making payments in kind (usually of a certain number of fowl and eggs), to be given at set times of the year. For the hire of the fields, often adjoining or even held in common between the farms, he pays a fixed sum of money. Besides this, there are many clauses regulating the rights of the mezzadro and the maintenance of the farm. (Appendix 8(a)).

As virtually no documents exist stating the amount of produce each year from each farm, it is impossible to use these contracts as the basis

for an annual, or even an occasional, estimate of their revenue. But despite their insufficiency in number, they are useful in pointing out certain tendencies in the agrarian policy of the family, especially when taken together with the purchases made by the family in these years.

The earliest contract is to be found for the 'Fornace' farm in Barolo in 1541; its form differs little from those of 150 years later. The contracts are to be found in consistent numbers only from the last quarter of the 17th century. In 1676, after the measurement of all his lands, Carlo Lodovico compiled a register of all his possessions, consisting of a large folio volume with a description of all feudal rights and emphyteuses, followed by an enumeration of the farms in each fee. This is followed by the latest contract for each farm, usually of that year. In following years, further information was added, with entries dating up to 1800. The whole book was preceded by a copy of Giacomo's memorandum to his successors.(113)

It is from the compilation of this register that contracts are to be found regularly. They were mainly for 3 or 4 years, as the danger of a fixed contract for too long a period was realised (in 1697, the 'Bosco grande' in Barolo had been hired for 15 years at only L.3 a year). The phraseology remained virtually unaltered, not surprisingly as the contracts were drawn up with increasing regularity by bailiffs, and in the

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(113) The contracts of mezzadria are to be found in: M.218,passim; with some additional contracts in: M.171,n.1; M.173,ns.1,7,8; AST III, art.599,M.'F'-lo,n.353,f.98. For an example see Appendix 8(b).

early 18th century usually by the same bailiff, while their terms were based on earlier contracts. The only difference lay in the tendency to stipulate the various services in increasingly minute detail. A consistent preoccupation was the necessity to plant trees, especially willows and fruit trees: excluding the Monferrat foes, over a thousand trees were to be planted each year in 24 farms.

From the 1670s until the turn of the century, the capitolationi were not only the same in form and content, but usually to the same tenants. But in the 18th century, the cash payments for the hire of the meadows (and to a lesser extent the regalia, or obligatory gifts in kind) began to show a sharp rise. The rise did not occur on all the farms, and was very rarely an abrupt change, but usually a steady increase; nor was it always successful. But undoubtedly an attempt was being made by Carlo Lodovico and his son to keep level with the rise in the value of land of these years, and counteract any possible fall in the purchasing power of money. In 13 of the 24 farms such an increase can be seen. The earliest example is at the 'Rivalta' farm in La Morra, with the payment of L.132 in 1676 and of L.200 in the next existing contract of 1702, as also in the successive one of 1713. The most convincing picture is given by the 'Casail' farm at Centallo, where the rent for the fields rose from 14 doppie di Spagna in 1696 to 15 doppie in 1708, 16 doppie in 1709, and 17 doppie in 1720 and 1724. In most other farms, the rise takes place between 1725 and 1735, the very years of the perequazione, when the family was actively engaged in acquiring more lands: at the

'San Ponzo' farm at Barolo, the rent rose from L.37:10:0 in 1698 to L.100 in 1734 and 1743; at the 'Carpanea' farm in Verzne, from L.60 in 1676 and 1686 to L.130 in 1725; at the 'Buttagliolo' farm at La Morra, from L.15 (2 scudi) in 1676 to L.100 in 1732 and 1739; at the 'Bosco d'Ariste' farm at Serralunga, from L.25 in 1695 and 1706 to L.61 in 1727. At the 'Pillone' farm at Barolo, a similar attempt apparently failed: the rent of L.65 in 1684 and 1692, rising to L.67 in 1731, was increased to L.100 in 1735, but by 1746 had dropped back to L.64.

The tendency was clear. The family was again embarking on a policy of acquisition. But in the face of the State attack against their privileges, and of the increasing activity of the comunità, the new policy took on a more purposeful, slightly ruthless aspect. The effect of Vittorio Amedeo II's exercise of his authority over the nobility led to a similar demonstration of authority on the part of the nobles over their subjects.

vi. Gerolamo IV's wills.

When Gerolamo IV died on 5 July 1735, the family patrimony had been enlarged and probably rendered more economically fruitful, despite the restrictions of Vittorio Amedeo II's reforms. The effect of the reforms had been to diminish the enormous capital invested in censi and tasse (by 1740) from L.74,700 to L.38,800, yielding only L.1940 instead of L.3000. Similarly, by 1744, Ottavio had lost his feudal rights in Barolo, valued at an annual L.490, diminishing the income he received

from feudal rights from L.3290 to L.2800. But the total area owned by the family had been increased from 3065 giornate to 3245 giornate. And the contracts of mezzadria would seem to indicate a more profitable exploitation of the land.(114)

Gerolamo had drawn up his will immediately after his father's death, on 6 November 1705, and made no later alterations. It was almost a repetition of Carlo Lodovico's will. Once again the heir was bound to preserve the patrimony under prohibitions of alienation, fedecommessi and primogenitures. Only the last surviving male heir was free to dispose of the inheritance as he wished.(115) And once again, the younger sons were given cash pensions and no land.

By this will, Ottavio was to continue the pensions to his uncles at the same rate as they had been paid by his father, besides paying his two brothers an annual pension of L.750 (50 doppie). If one uncle died, the brothers were to receive an extra L.162 (12½ doppie) each. In effect, Ottavio was to pay L.8150 a year in pensions to his uncles and brothers, while his father, Gerolamo, in 1705, had paid L.6930. Gerolamo IV had

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(114) For the reduction of the censi, see Appendix 9. For the value of the feudal rights in Barolo, see above, note (108).
Gerolamo IV had bought almost 94 giornate in Serralunga in 1707, and nearly 87 giornate in subsequent years in Serralunga, Barolo and Castiglion Falletto, making a total of 3244 giornate.

(115) M.211,n.20:
"...e che l'ultimo secolare chiamato a detta primogenitura nel caso solamente della totale mancanza de Descendenti Maschij d'esso Signor Testatore possa disporre di detta eredità, e beni....".

undoubtedly had difficulties, and some pensions were still owing at the time of his death. But the income from land in the intervening 30 years had certainly increased more than the rise in the pensions. It had not been the pensions in themselves which had so embarrassed Gerolamo, but their cost added to that of an ambitious career. Although the cost of living was high for an important noble, taking an active part in Court life, and almost permanently resident at Turin, Ottavio could certainly hope to cover the cost of the pensions (which would diminish with the deaths of his uncles) by an apparently increasing income from his lands.(116)

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(116) Ottavio was required to pay in pensions:

Giovanni Battista, Paolo Costanzo, Teodoro, Giuseppe, L.1500 each	L.6000
Teodoro and Giacinto, L.750 each	L.1500
Antonio and Lodovico Maurizio, ducatoni 50 and 70, equals 120	L. 650
	L.8150

For Gerolamo's income, see above note (82).

7. Ottavio (1735 - 1747)

1. The dispute over the Provana inheritance.

Already before Gerolamo IV's death, the family patrimony had been enlarged by the inheritance of Ottavio Provana di Druent.

As early as 1682 (when Elena Matilde was under 10 years old), Ottavio Provana had made a primogeniture in his only daughter's favour, allowing her the immediate enjoyment of all his possessions, in return for an annual pension of L.15,000 (1000 doppie). In 1687, Elena Matilde accepted the primogeniture, apparently without realizing its terms. For in 1694, probably at the instigation of her future husband, she renounced the whole inheritance, on the grounds that she had been unaware of the conditions, while the pension was impossible to pay.(117)

After Matilde's death, the lawsuit over her dowry continued, until in 1710 Ottavio Provana was forced to pay Gerolamo the L.32,500 still

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(117) For the 1682 primogeniture: M.174,n.27; and the1687 confirmation: M.174,n.28; and the 1694 renunciation: M.175,n.30. The renunciation stated that:

> "....detto Signor Conte suo genitore gl'habbia più, e più volte negl'anni andati richiesto il pagamento delle doppie mille in detto Instromento riservatesi, e la conveniente mantentione di lui, et di detta Signora Contessa sua moglie, luoro servitù e Treno di scuderia senza che detta Madamigella siasi mai fermata a rifflettere la cagione di tal domanda come non Intervenuta in detto Instromento; Onde ultimamente detto Signor Conte Padre l'habbia certificata del contenuto in esso accio deliberasse su l'accettatione della donatione de qual in quello con li carichi, e pesi prescritti, e la medema dopo haver fatto li convenienti rifflessi, e consultatasi sovra del medemo habbia deliberato di non accettar detta donatione, ma di rifiutarla come che mai sin hora quella habbi accettata, ne per la stipulatione in di lei nome fatta siasi potuto tal donatione in lei conferire..."

owing. Ottavio then broke off all relations with Gerolamo, and retired to his country estates. In 1724 he changed his will, and tried to limit the rights of the Falletti di Barolo as the only male heirs. Gerolamo, his son-in-law, was (rather naturally) completely excluded from all claims, while his grandchildren were left only about half the inheritance; the Congregazione della Dottrina Cristiana was named as universal heir, with the condition that it found a Collegio dei Nobili. To try and strengthen the legal validity of the will, Ottavio (following the custom of many leading nobles) placed a copy in the archives of the Senato. Three years after he had drawn up this will, on 17 August 1727, Ottavio Provana di Druent died.(118)

A large number of claimants immediately contested the will. The royal Patrimoniale maintained that all feudal possessions should escheat to the Demesne, as Ottavio Provana had died without direct male heirs. Ottavio Falletti di Barolo, as Matilde's eldest son, claimed his right to the full inheritance, as heir to the various primogenitures and fedecommessi placed on the lands in the 16th and 17th centuries; his brothers, Teodoro and Giacinto, counter-claimed for an equal division of the estates, as co-heirs of their mother, Matilde. Other, more distant, relatives made claims to various parts of the patrimony.

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(118) For details of the will, and of the whole inheritance, see Appendix 10.

The size of the inheritance left by Ottavio Provana increased the zeal of the claimants. In the middle of the 17th century, the Provana di Druent had inherited the enormous estates of the family of Emanuele Filiberto's Chancellor, Tommaso Langosco (which also included the patrimony of the Parpaglia family, previously extinct). Ottavio, at the time of his death, owned lands and feudal rights in 11 different fees, near Turin, in the Vercellese, and near Mondovì. He possessed at least 8000 giornate of land, of which over half was claimed as feudal, besides a further 5500 giornate of emphyteuses. The quality of the lands was for the most part extremely poor, with vast areas of barren wastelands and woods, but the annual income (including feudal rights and censi) in the last 25 years of Ottavio's life, averaged nearly L.37,000.

Gerolamo IV had at once renounced all claims on the inheritance in favour of his sons. At first, the Falletti di Barolo brothers based their claim on the primogeniture of 1682 and its acceptance in 1687. Then, acknowledging the renunciation of 1694, Ottavio claimed the inheritance without the burden of the pension of L.15,000 a year.

But the largest part of the patrimony was adjudged to the Demesne, while Ottavio, as the eldest son, was to be compensated for all repairs and improvements to the lands made by Ottavio Provana, as well as for the dowries of various members of the Provana family; he was also given most of the legacies left by Ottavio in his will of 1724.

Teodoro and Giacinto immediately claimed their share of their mother's inheritance. At the same time, they also claimed the inheritance

of their maternal grandmother, Anna Cristina Doria Del Maro, Ottavio Provana's wife, according to her will of 1716, naming all three brothers as co-heirs. The decision was finally made by marchese Granari, president of the Senato, on 12 August 1730. As Matilde had left no will, all three brothers were to inherit equally for the legittima normally owing to heirs. After this statement of normal civil law, Matilde's inheritance was evaluated. Both of the younger brothers, Teodoro, duca di Cannalunga and cavaliere Giacinto were to receive L.40,000, which was to include, however, their third of their mother's dowry, paid to their father, Gerolamo, in 1710. The dowry was also L.40,000, or L.13,333 to each of the three brothers. The remaining L.26,667 was to be paid to Teodoro and Giacinto by Ottavio, with interest at 3% for the past years since Ottavio Provana's death, and 3½% for all future years. Besides this, they were to receive 1/3 of Matilde's jewels and furniture, or their equivalent in cash. In addition, all three brothers were to divide the inheritance of their grandmother, Anna Cristina,(deducting all her legacies), calculated at L.20,000 each. In return for all these payments, the two younger brothers were to renounce all further claims.

Ottavio Falletti was thus left with a debt towards his brothers of L.106,500, which increased in 1735, when he took over his father's debt, by L.26,667 owing for Matilde's dowry. At the same time, he found himself liable for all the debts left by Ottavio Provana, which amounted to

nearly L.74,500. To complete his embarrassment, on the death of his paternal grandmother, Anna Lodovica Birago di Vische, in 1734, he found himself once more universal heir, with legacies of L.26,000 to pay.(119) Ottavio thus found himself owing over L.241,500 in return for his inheritances.

It was small wonder that Ottavio hesitated to accept the Provana inheritance. If the possessions proved insufficient after his acceptance, he would be liable for all debts on his own patrimony. If he renounced the inheritance, he would have a prior claim, together with his brothers, over all other debtors, for his mother's dowry, and then an equal claim for the remainder of his mother's inheritance. But as the dowry had been paid to Gerolamo, and was hence owing from the Falletti patrimony - now his own - this proved little consolation. The only method of limiting his liability was by accepting the Provana inheritance with the benefice of an inventory: in this manner, he would only be liable for debts to the value of the actual inheritance, without endangering his own possessions.(120)

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(119) Anna Lodovica Birago made her first will in 1707, with a codicil in 1721, and then a second will in 1734: M.211,ns.21,23. She left the following legacies:

Giovanni Battista, Paolo Costanzo, Teodoro, Giuseppe, L.4000 each	L.16,000
Antonio, 60 ducatoni	L. 300
Lodovico Maurizio, 40 ducatoni	L. 200
The 4 sons of her daughter, Paola Cristina Mossi, 650 ducatoni	L.3,250
Teodoro di Cannalunga, 500 scudi	L.3,750
Giacinto, 500 ducatoni	L.2,500
	L.26,000

(120) See Appendix 9.

The social stigma of such a solution made its acceptance extremely improbable. Moreover, the Provana inheritance, even after a large part had escheated to the Demesne, was evidently of sufficient value to cover the debts. Between 1727 and 1730, Ottavio Falletti paid all Provana's debts of nearly L.74,500, only borrowing L.9000 from his uncle, Giovanni Battista. Within one year of the 1730 decision, he had paid his brothers over half their credits, over L.53,000, as well as all past interests, only leaving another L.53,000 to be paid. But with the inheritances from Gerolamo IV and Anna Lodovica Birago, the debts now rose to L.114,000, besides the L.9000 Ottavio owed his uncle, and a liability of over L.8000 a year in pensions, to pay to his uncles and brothers.

At this point, the members of the family agreed to help Ottavio. In a transaction of 5 August 1735, president Granori arranged for Ottavio to accept the inheritances and pay all future pensions. To pay for the debts still owing, he was to sell all the possessions left by Gerolamo IV in Sardinia. If these did not prove sufficient, his uncle, Giovanni Battista, and his brother, Teodoro, agreed to renounce all further claims. In the following year, Archbishop Paolo Costanzo renounced all claims to both past and future pensions, as well as to his inheritance of L.4000 from his mother, Anna Lodovica Birago, and to various small debts owed him by Gerolamo IV.(121)

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(121) For the claims of debtors, and the right of the heir to limit his liability to the inherited patrimony, see: RR. Costituzioni, 1723, lib.V,tit.6; Pertile, v.4, pp.128-38; F. Degni, s.v. 'Successioni testamentarie', Nuovo Digesto Italiano, v.12,part 1, pp.1056-66.

The wealth of the patrimony was quickly shown. The pensions almost vanished with the deaths of Ottavio's uncle, Lodovico Maurizio, in 1739, and of his brother, Giacinto, and his uncle, Giuseppe, in 1744. At the same time, apart from small legacies to Teodoro, his uncles and brother left Ottavio their inheritances.(122)

By 1737, Ottavio was in a position to buy two *censi* for L.14,000. At his death in 1747, he left so large a liquid capital, that his son's tutor was able to take advantage of the new war (following Carlo Lodovico's example) to invest L.70,000 in the purchase of *tassi* over the *comunità* of all the main family fees.(123)

ii. *The position of the family in the mid-18th century.*

With Ottavio, the evolution of the Falletti di Barolo seemed complete. After his early years, Ottavio himself took little interest in the expansion of his possessions. The administration of the estates was apparently left entirely in the hands of bailiffs, while Ottavio resided almost permanently in Turin in the great Provana palace. Ottavio's

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(122) Giuseppe, in his will of 1739, left everything to Teodoro, and in the event of his line dying out, then to Ottavio: M.211,n.25. Giacinto, in his will of 1744, left everything to his brother Teodoro:

> "qu'il est celluy de toute la famille, qui est peut-être le moins en Etat de se maintenir avec un certain Eclat...". M.211,n.27.

Both Teodoro and Giovanni Battista, Ottavio's uncles, gave legacies to the duke of Cannalunga, and then bequeathed to each other, to pass to Carlo Gerolamo if their lines died out: M.211,n.29.

(123) For the 1737 *censi*: M.171,n.13. For the *tassi* of 1747: M.218,ff.1,4, 7,11. The *tassi* were bought over the *comunità* of Barolo, Serralunga, Castiglion Falletto, Neive, Cherasco, Alba, Villafalletto, Centallo, Castagnole Monferrato, and Rocchetta Palafea.

decision was an early example of the growing tendency of the great families to leave the countryside in favour of the capital. But virtually no evidence exists to indicate whether Ottavio's absence was paralleled by a change in the methods of cultivation.

A contract for the 'Zonchea' farm at Barolo in 1747 (repeated almost verbatim in 1751) seems to indicate that the old form of mezzadria had had been abandoned.(124) The peasant was instructed in minute detail about the work he was required to do, with a far greater amount of time now to be spent on the cultivation of the demesne lands. In return, the padrone paid him a certain wage, in addition to the normal pay in kind. It was a clear example of a contract of schiavenza strongly attacked by contemporaries in the later part of the century. It may only have reflected a temporary shortage of labour, necessitating the increased employment of the mezzadri; it might also have been indicative of an increasingly direct exploitation of the land, left ever more under the control (and probable profit) of the bailiff, slowly eliminating the former hiring out of farms at mezzadria.

Ottavio, in the meantime, took an active part in the life of the Court at Turin. His marriage, in 1730, to Maddalena Carron di San Tommaso, was perhaps of even greater importance than had been that of his father, thirty-five years before. Maddalena's father, Giuseppe Gaetano Carron, a Cavaliere dell'Annunziata and gran croce of the

(124) M.218,f.18.

Ordine Mauriziano, had been the last Secretary of State, a position monopolized by the family throughout the 17th century. The marriage confirmed the position of the Falletti di Barolo, while the prompt payment of the not excessively large dowry of L.35,000 avoided future disputes.(125)

Ottavio's major efforts were spent in the enlargement of his palace at Turin, with the aid of the royal architect, Benedetto Alfieri. An enlightened, cultivated and religious man, he left clear instructions as to the future development of the family in his will of 23 June 1747.(126)

He saw little reason for the further increase of the family possessions. Enormous legacies were left for religious and philanthropic purposes: the Ospedale della Carità in Turin was given L.40,000, while Carlo Gerolamo was ordered to carry out the will of the Provana ancestor, the gran cancelliere Langosco, to found a religious house, as well as that of Ottavio Provana, for the celebration of masses in his name.

Until Carlo Gerolamo came of age, he was given an income of L.17,000 a year, and placed under the tutelage of conte Bonaventura Nomis di Pollone.

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(125) M.174,n.34.
Carlo Gerolamo's marriage in 1752 to Maria Josephina Wicardel di Fleury was an equally important social union (M.175,ns.21,22). Moreover, as Gerolamo IV's descendents gained a large increase in the family patrimony through the Provana inheritance, so Carlo Gerolamo assured a further large increase by his marriage to an heiress. The inheritances of the Provana family itself (mainly from the Langosco family, and thus indirectly from the Stroppiana) confirmed how a family fortune might be made by carefully chosen marriages. However, all these examples also illustrate how such marriages were more likely to be arranged between socially (if not also politically) important families, rather than among the small, provincial nobility.

(126) For the employment of Alfieri to enlargen the palace, see G.Fenoglio: 'Il palazzo dei marchesi di Barolo', Torino Rivista Mensile, 1928, pp.364-76. Ottavio also left a legacy to Benedetto Alfieri in his will of 1747: M.211,n.28.

The details of the will were above all concerned with the education of Carlo Gerolamo: no books were to be sold from the library, which was to be set in order, leaving apart all books proscribed by the Index. The salone was to be painted by Milanese artists, as Ottavio had already arranged. Carlo Gerolamo was to keep his two boxes at the theatre, under penalty of a fine of L.1000. Finally, the executor, conte Nomis, was advised to employ all surplus income, until his son came of age, in acquisitions; but:

> "tra questi acquisti, il più utile, e vantaggioso [was of the house adjoining] al Palazzo proprio, ed abitato dal predetto Signor Marchese Testatore...ed all'opposto vien dal medesimo giudicato per inopportuno, e di nessun vantaggio l'acquisto del Feudo di Druent, per esservi già troppi Feudi nella Famiglia, e per esiggere il detto Feudo di Druent gravissime spese in riedificare il castello. Il che per altro non potrebbe mai riuscire alla perfezione..."

It was a long cry from the establishment of a fedecommesso by Giacomo in 1542.


ASTI
ALBA
SALUZZO
Fossano
Racconigi
Carmagnola
Carignano
Poirino
Villanova d'Asti
Canale
Nizza
Incisa
Canelli
Cortemilia
Mondovì
Cherasco
Bra
Savigliano
Cavallermaggiore
Sommariva del Bosco
Moretta
Villafalletto
Busca
Verzuolo
Lagnasco
Scarnafigi
Vigone
Pancalieri
Candiolo
Volvera
Orbassano
Rivoli
Avigliana
Susa
Bussoleno
Chivasso
Settimo Torinese
Torino
Moncalieri
Chieri
Carmagnola
Racconigi
Cuneo
Saluzzo
Fossano
Alba
Asti
Nizza Monferrato
Canelli
Acqui Terme
Ovada
Novi Ligure
Tortona
Alessandria
Casale Monferrato
Vercelli
Ivrea
Pinerolo
Susa
Bardonecchia
Sestriere
Cesana Torinese
Oulx
Rivoli
Avigliana
Giaveno
Lanzo Torinese
Ceres
Venaria Reale
Rivarolo Canavese
Cuorgnè
Ciriè
Chivasso
Volpiano
Leinì
Settimo Torinese
Brandizzo
Crescentino
Trino
Casale Monferrato
Valenza
Mortara
Vigevano
Novara
Arona
Stresa
Verbania
Domodossola
Omegna
Borgomanero
Gattinara
Biella
Cossato
Trivero
Oropa
Andorno Micca
Mongrando
Valle Mosso
Coggiola
Varallo
Borgosesia
Serravalle Sesia
Romagnano Sesia
Ghemme
Sizzano
Fara Novarese
Briga Novarese
Oleggio
Galliate
Trecate
Cameri
Novara
Vespolate
Tornaco
Garlasco
Gambolò
Vigevano
Mede
Lomellina
Valle Staffora
Voghera
Tortona
Novi Ligure
Serravalle Scrivia
Arquata Scrivia
Gavi
Ovada
Acqui Terme
Strevi
Cassine
Rivalta Bormida
Predosa
Alessandria
Frugarolo
Bosco Marengo
Felizzano
Quattordio
Masio
Solero
Sezzadio
Castelnuovo Bormida
Cassine
Strevi
Acqui Terme
Ponzone
Cartosio
Melazzo
Terzo
Bistagno
Rocchetta Palafea
Nizza Monferrato
Incisa Scapaccino
Castelnuovo Calcea
Agliano Terme
Costigliole d'Asti
Mombercelli
Vinchio
Belveglio
Cortiglione
Bergamasco
Castelletto d'Orba
Silvano d'Orba
Basaluzzo
Pozzolo Formigaro
Tortona
Serravalle Scrivia
Arquata Scrivia
Gavi
Novi Ligure
Pozzolo Formigaro
Basaluzzo
Bosco Marengo
Frugarolo
Alessandria
Predosa
Bergamasco

Falletti di Barolo

Simondino

Giacomo
2 generations

Antonino
3 generations

Emanuele

Oddone

Giovanni

Teobaldo
m.... San Martino d'Agliè (1480)

Gaspare

Giovanni Bartolomeo

Giancarlo

Gerolamo I
b. 1484

Guglielmo
o.s.p.

Emanuele
o.s.p.

Manfredo
d. before father

Giacomo
d. 1542

Giacometto

Scipione
d. before 1556
m. Gasparda de Monte (1527)

Michele
monk

Elena
nun

Dorotea
nun

Gerolamo II
b. 1531 (?) d. 1596
m. (i) Caterina Roncoli (1547 ?)
(ii) Caterina Falletti di Pocapaglia (1558)

Angela
m. Andrea Fissore (1559)

Bonifacio
d. 1616

Gaspardo

Gerolamo

Giulia
nun

Giacomo
b. 1559 d. 1624
m. Maria Falletti di Villafalletto (1586)

Antonio
monk

Enrichetto
o.s.p. 1588

Eleonora
nun
then m. (i) L. Solaro
(ii) C. Marescalco (1588)

Ginevra
m. L. Randoni (1570)

Bianca
m. cav. Fermondo (1576)

Caterina
m. G. Lomello (1585)

Argia
nun

Carlo
d. 1628
m. Eleonora Riccio (1590)

Francesco Maria
d. 1665
m. Eleonora Del Carretto (1609)

Caterina
b. 1595 d. 1670
m. (i) conte Corbà (1610)
(ii) conte Valperga di Monteu (1618)

Gerolamo III
b. 1601 d. 1664
m. Cornelia Biandrate (1663)

Lodovica
b. 1605 d. 1683
m. conte Scarampi di Camino (1621)

Bonifacio
b. 1634 o.s.p. 1679

Antonio
monk

Carlo Lodovico
b. 1637 d. 1705
m. Cristina Birago di Vische (1666)

Scipione
d. before 1622

Laura
nun

Angela Caterina
nun

Scipione
d. 1661

Michele Antonio
o.s.p. 1694

Caterina
nun

Bonifacio
d. 1682

Carlo Maurizio
o.s.p. before 1665

Maurizio Antonio

Rodello line

Vittoria
nun

Clara

Emanuele Francesco
o.s.p. 1695

Giovanna
nun

Anna Maria

Giovanni Battista
monk

Tomaso
b. 1668 d. 1668

Gerolamo IV
b. 1669 d. 1735
m. Matilde Provana di Druent (1695)

Antonio
b. 1671 d. 1760
Jesuit

Pietro Ottavio
b. 1672 o.s.p. 1690

Giovanni Battista
b. 1674 o.s.p. 1754

Paolo Costanzo
b. 1675 d. 1748
Archbishop of Cagliari

Teodoro
b. 1677 o.s.p. 1763

Lodovico Maurizio
b. 1679 d. 1739
monk

Giuseppe
b. 1681 o.s.p. 1744

Paola Cristina
b. 1682
m. marchese Pallavicino Mossi di Morano (1697)

Benedetto

Ottavio Giuseppe
b. 1696 d. 1747
m. Maddalena Carron di San Tomaso (1730)

Teodoro
b. 1697 d. 1775
m. duchessa Falletti di Cannalunga (1724)

Giacinto
b. 1698 o.s.p. 1744

Carlo Gerolamo
b. 1731 d. 1800
m. Anna Maria Wicardel di Fleury (1752)

Francesco
b. 1733 d. 1739

Ottavio
b. 1735 d. 1739

Giuseppe

Gian Lodovico

Giancarlo
o.s.p.

Giovanni

Lodovico
d. 1566

Manfredo
d. before 1585

Giovanni
d. 1616
m. Anna Ceva di Clavesana

Giovanni

Ascanio

III. The Valperga di Rivara.

After so complex a study of the economic development of one family, it is unnecessary to trace the development of others in such detail. Consequently, the following two studies have been limited to an examination of only the more important aspects of the families' economy.

1. The rise of the Valperga di Rivara.

i. The possessions of the family.

The Valperga were one of the oldest and most important political families in Piedmont in the Middle Ages. Together with the San Martino and Castellamonte families, the Valperga traced their descent from Arduino, King of Italy, in the 11th century. In the succeeding centuries, the Rivara branch of the family gave active support to the Emperor in the struggle with the Papacy.(1)

The Castellata lies directly north of Turin, at the very edge of the Canavese plain, on the foot of the pre-Alpine range. Both Busano

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(1) M.I: 'Serie genealogiche del Re Arduino', in particular n.9:'Compendio Dell'Origine di Arduino Marchese d'Ivrea Ultimo Re D'Italia Imperadore Eletto Progenitore De Conti Di Valperga Divisa in Due Parti Nella Prima L'Origine e Vitta D'Esso Nella Seconda La Sua Descendenza. Fatto in Valperga MDCXLVIIII', by Francesco Valperga. More information on the early genealogy of the family can be found in, Angius: Sulle famiglie nobili della Monarchia di Savoia, v.I,pp.289-401; and V.Spreti, Enciclopedia storico-nobiliare italiana, v.6, pp.799-802; v.7,pp.649-50. Pola (v.1,facing p.704), gives a complete genealogy of the family, but makes numerous errors. F.A. Della Chiesa: Relazione dello stato presente del Piemonte, Turin, 1635, pp.58-59, gives a few useful details. The genealogy of the present study has been constructed from documents in the family archive.

and Rivara (under two miles north-west of Busano), although already at a height of over 1000 feet, still form part of the plain; but the two miles separating Forno from Rivara rise steeply to a height of over 1800 feet. Levone, to the south of the Castellata, is at approximately the same height as Rivara.

The physical characteristics of the region determined the forms of agriculture. Although in the lower lying areas there was a fairly intense cultivation of cereals and vines, the pasture and woodland remained widespread. In the more mountainous communes, there were large areas of uncultivated land, with great tracts of pasture-land and chestnut woods: in the first half of the 18th century, 500 of the total 1275 giornate of the commune of Levone were covered by chestnut woods; of the 4370 giornate within the boundaries of Forno, over 200 giornate formed an uncultivated area of steep mountainous land, let out for pasturage at a nominal rent, while a further 650 giornate were covered by chestnut woods. The great abundance of walnuts throughout the region yielded a small, but steady, income from the manufacture of oil. Despite the intense cultivation, almost exclusively by small proprietors, the bad irrigation and occasional floods hindered a really profitable exploitation of the land. In the more mountainous areas, there was insufficient employment, and the peasants of Forno were even forced to come down to the plains to find sufficient work. The only form of industry in the

region was the manufacture of lime; however, the limestone quarries were only fully exploited in the later 18th century.(2)

ii. The problems of a consortile.

The Castellata was owned in common by all the male members of the family. After the death of Tomaso in 1335, the family was divided into two branches, referred to (from the location of their two castles) as the Castello Superiore and the Castello Inferiore. By the middle of the 16th century, the Castello Inferiore was subdivided into two branches, while the Castello Superiore underwent a similar subdivision in the early 17th century.

With the presence of so many feudal lords, the only method of avoiding the loss of the family possessions (especially of the feudal rights) through continual fragmentation, was by the formation of a consortile to hold all rights and lands in common, and prohibit alienations outside the family. In legal terms, such a corporative association of males - extremely common in Piedmont - constituted a juridical personality in all relations with both State and private citizens. In practice, the

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(2) For the cultivation of the pre-Alpine areas, see Prato, pp.31-214, 250-54. His description of agricultural conditions in the mid-18th century is confirmed - at least for the Castellata - for the 16th and 17th centuries by the consegnamenti and purchases and sales of land by the feudataries. For the chestnut woods, see Prato, pp.101-04; for the irrigation and floods, pp.84-95; for the condition of the Forno peasants, p.55; for the manufacture of lime, p.253; and MM. 63-65. The mountainous area of Forno was measured at the time of the perequazione as 205 giornate: M.62, passim, especially nn.24,32. The areas of the communes, at the same date, can be found in: AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21, n.305.

degree of unity varied according to the terms of the original foundation of the consortile. Legally, there is no evidence of, and no document recording, the formation of a consortile by the Valperga di Rivara, and in fact, the members of the different branches of the family continued to give their oaths of fealty individually, and not as a consortile, to the Dukes of Mantua and Savoy. But there are frequent examples of the males of a single branch of the family agreeing to hold all possessions in common; while it was clearly accepted that the jurisdiction could be neither divided nor alienated outside the family group.(3)

The difficulties of complete agreement over rights of ownership and administration were continually demonstrated. Disputes easily broke out even between members of the same branch of the family. In the Castello Inferiore, all eight sons of Massimo Antonio had agreed to hold their quarter of the Castellata in common, with each son on his death to bequeath his rights to the surviving brothers; this unity was affirmed in 1590 when all the brothers guaranteed the augmento of Daniele's

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(3) For the legal definition of a consortile, see Salvioli, p.335; see also, F. Venturi: Alberto Radicati di Passerano, p.29. An example of the legal formation of a consortile is to be found in the agreement of the various members of the Valperga di Valperga family in 1603 (M.209,n.5):

> "nella quale hanno transatto che perpetuamente non si possa fra di loro devenire alla divisione della giurisdizione del contado di Valperga, o valle di Pont, nemeno si possa in avvenire aggregar alcuno in detta giurisdizione il quale non sia del cappo lineale, e famiglia Valperga sotto pena chiunque d'essi contraverrà detta transazione di scudi 2 milla d'oro applicandi al consortile."

bride, Caterina San Martino, on their own allodial lands, should Daniele's possessions prove insufficient. But two years later, on the deaths of Leonardo and Lodovico, Daniele and his brothers quarrelled and went to law over the inheritances.(4)

A more striking example of the problems created by a consortile was given in the long dispute which broke out in the same years between the two branches of the Castello Inferiore. Giovanni Antonio, son of Gaspare, demanded from the sons of Massimo Antonio the exact division by half of all lands, jurisdictions and rights belonging to the Castello Inferiore. The lawsuit, which began in 1578, only ended in 1592, when the peasants of the Castellata owing fealty to the Castello Inferiore were equally divided (according to the size of both their land-holdings and their families) between the two branches of the family; even after this date, quarrels broke out over the division of a disputed building.(5)

In 1634, Idovico claimed from Gaspare (both members of the Castello Inferiore), the division of all annual canoni and other payments made for emphyteuses.(6) In 1619, a virtual war broke out between

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(4) For the inheritances: M.12,ns. 19,20; M.20,n.8; Durando, pp.251, 255; Pola, v.2, p.496. For the guarantee of the sumento: M.6,ns.42, 43, 45; M.7, c.i, n.2.

(5) M.9,c.i,ns.2,3,16-26; c.ii,n.2; M.12,ns.16,21,22; M.13,n.8; M.14,c.i, n.7; M.25,n.7; M.46,c.ii,n.3; M.50,ns.19,20; M.52,n.33.

(6) M.9,c.i,n.28.

Lodovico and his brother Giulio Massimo, of the Castello Inferiore, and Pietro Francesco, of the Castello Superiore, over disputed rights in the Castellata; even after Lodovico married Pietro Francesco's daughter, Bianca Benedetta, in 1628, the quarrel continued, and was only finally settled in 1647. The following year, Lodovico and Bianca Benedetta began a new lawsuit against Pietro Francesco's son, Giovenale Maria, to exact the remainder of Bianca Benedetta's dowry, still owing twenty years after the marriage; a final settlement was only arranged in 1664, almost ten years after Lodovico had died, and the very year of Bianca Benedetta's death.(7) Three years later, Giovenale Maria started another lawsuit against his nephew, Giovanni Battista, of the Castello Inferiore, on the same grounds as Giovanni Antonio at the end of the 16th century: Giovenale Maria insisted that fealty should not be sworn by representatives of the comunità to the whole consortile, but personally by each individual subject to his respective lord.(8) In the same years, Giovenale Maria disputed the claims of Carlo, of the other branch of the Castello Superiore, to the inheritance of Arduino, their common uncle: the lawsuit began in

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(7) For the quarrel between Pietro Francesco and Lodovico: M.8,n.23; M.13, ns.9,10; M.129, 1619 July 19; 1620 Jan.4; with numerous other letters in M.129, M.130, M.209; AST I, Monferrato, Feudi, M.59, s.v. 'Rivara', ns.5,6; AC Rivara, V.63, Inv. Cat. 10, vol.1, Registro dei parcellari; Pola, v.2, pp.498,508. For the marriage of Lodovico and Bianca Benedetta: M.7,c.i,n.4. For the lawsuit over the dowry: M.7,c.i,ns. 4,9; M.8,n.18; M.10,ns.6,7; M.11,n.1; M.13,n.4; M.14,c.i,n.15; M.17, n.12; M.26,n.48; M.219,1662 Feb. 7; AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'V', M.8, letters from 1660 to 1668; Pola, v.1,p.412; v.2, p.508.

(8) M.9,c.ii,n.1; M.50,n.4; M.205,1668 Feb. 28; Pola, v.2,p.514.

1657, and was still unsettled by 1680.(9)

Even in the 18th century, when there were far fewer members in the consortile, and when the Valperga di Rivara were faced by more serious problems, common to them all, disputes occasionally broke out. In 1733, the heads of the only two surviving branches of the family, Ignazio Maria, of the Castello Superiore, and Ignazio Filiberto, of the Castello Inferiore, went to law over the nomination of officers to administer seigneurial justice in the fee of Rivara.(10)

Such disputes between the members of the consortile, although numerous and frequently bitter, reflected only one - and possibly the less important - aspect of the difficulties created by the existence of a consortile. Far more serious was the problem of the relations of the consortile with the comunità.

A striking example of the difficulties created by the presence of so many feudataries was given by the appeal made by the owners of emphyteutic lands in the neighbouring comunità of Pertusio to Emanuele Filiberto in 1569:

> "nella quale narrono che in seguito alla pluralità de consortili signori di Rivara, e per essere quasi sempre assenti da Rivara, e la maggior parte minori, ed infanti non sanno a chi di loro debbano pagare li fitti de beni che possiedono enfiteotici, così chiedono dichiararsi essi beni non incorsi nella caducità." (11)

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(9) M.8,n.28; M.12,ns.28,31; M.13,ns.17-20; M.14,c.i,n.2; M.25,ns.3,9; M.62,ns.18-20; M.221, 1680 Oct.30; Pola,v.2, pp.509-13; ASF I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'V', M.8.

(10) M.12,n.30. In 1739, there was another dispute over the rights of the two families to a garden-door: M.12,n.32.

(11) M.55,n.9.

The same difficulties arose over the swearing of the oath of fealty, especially when one member of the consortile (such as Gaspare Antonio in 1578, or Giovenale Maria in 1667) insisted that the oath be sworn individually by each member of the comunità.

The significance of these disputes lay in the possibilities open to the comunità of limiting, or even overthrowing, the authority and power of the feudataries. Thus, in 1574, the comunità of Forno tried to usurp the 200 giornate of barren mountain-land owned by the feudataries, by refusing to pay the nominal rent, and claiming possession of the mountain; while in 1581, the comunità of Rivara attempted to exploit the differences at the moment existing between the feudataries, and deny the feudal monopoly of the chase.(12)

A more complicated example of the difficulties of maintaining authority was given by the long dispute over the exaction of the tithes. The Valperga di Rivara had been invested by the Archbishop of Turin with the jus patronatus and the tithes in Rivara, Forno and Levone as early as 1286. In 1526, the comunità of Rivara and Forno denied the legality of the lay exaction of tithes. With the occupation of Piedmont by the French, the lawsuit was suspended, but in 1559 began again, with the appeal of the comunità to the Sacra Rota at Rome. The feudataries were determined to maintain their rights even by force, and their sack of the communes in 1565-66 is witnessed by the bitter reference of a communal

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(12) For the dispute over the 'Alpi di Pian de Bovi, Montesoglio, e Rognosa': M.62,ns.5,6. For the lawsuit over the rights of jurisdiction in Rivara: M.52,n.27.

document to the "guerra di Rivara e Forno". Tomaso, Massimo Antonio's son, was sent to Rome to oppose the claims of the comunità, and lived there for 26 years. Between 1561 and 1577, the comunità were condemned 7 times, only agreeing in 1577 to pay all future tithes, besides a capital payment of 4000 scudi each for unpaid tithes. The importance and value of the tithes undoubtedly explained the bitterness of the dispute: by 1576, the Valperga di Rivara calculated that they had spent over 10,000 scudi on the lawsuit, but in the same period had managed to exact nearly 19,000 scudi in tithes, besides the 8000 scudi still claimed as owing. In this instance the comunità had failed, but only in the face of the determined - and united - opposition of the feudataries.(13)

(13) For the original investitures: M.39,passim. For the beginning of the struggle: M.41,n.2; Pola,v.2,p.536. For the citation to Rome: M.46, c.i,n.3. For Tomaso's residence there: M.9,c.ii,n.2; M.25,n.7; M.44, ns.12,16,18. For the reference to the 'war' of 1565: M.43,c.i,n.7. The condemnations were in 1561, twice in 1564, in 1565, in 1567, in 1572, and in 1577: M.43,c.ii,ns.2-7; M.46,c.i,ns.4-6. For the expenses of the lords: M.44,ns.12,16,18; also M.1[illegible],c.i,n.8. The submission of the comunità is to be found in: M.43,c.i,n.8. More relevant information can be found in: M.42,ns.1-8; M.46,c.i,ns.1,3-12; c.ii,ns.1-11; M.67,ns.7,9,10-12; M.87,ns.16,17; M.59,n.27; MM.129-130; Pola, v.2,pp.535-92.
Besides Rivara, Forno and Levone, the jus patronatus was owned in the nearby communes of Rocca and Corio: M.39,c.i,ns.17,27. In Levone, similar disputes had been settled in a transaction in 1559:M.72,n.6; but new quarrels broke out, e.g., in 1602-03 (M.42,n.12; M.46,c.i,ns.13 14;Pola,v.2,p.591) and 1608 (M.45,c.i,n.21). Likewise in Rivara and Forno, after the submission of 1577, there was a renewed lawsuit in 1581, leading to another transaction in 1583: M.42,n.10; M.43,c.i,n.9. In Busano, the tithes were owned by the nunnery of Belmonte: M.42,n.5. As a result, the positions were reversed, and instead of the feudatories claiming from the comunità, this time it was the nunnery - as feudal lord and owner of the dominio diretto-who successfully claimed the tithes from the Valperga di Rivara (1588). After a second lawsuit in 1590, the feudataries reached a compromise in 1592: M.29,c.i,ns.7, 18,27,28,30; c.ii,ns.1-3; Pola, v.2,pp.486-87.

Where the resistance of the consortile proved less tenacious, and its unity less determined, the comunità and their members were more successful. In the course of the 16th and early 17th centuries, the feudataries quickly lost control of their large emphyteutic possessions. Investitures for emphyteuses were still frequent in the late 16th century (at least 18 exist for the years from 1559 to 1595), but rapidly died out after the turn of the century, with the last investiture to be found in 1634. The huge libri di consegnamenti, or returns of emphyteutic lands made by all owners to the Valperga di Rivara, filling nearly 20 mazzi in the family archive, date from the Middle Ages to the 16th century, but die out in the 1590s.(14) The greatest family subject to the Valperga di Rivara - the Mollo consortile, which owned the Castello and nearly 400 giornate in Busano - set the example: in 1572-73, the Mollo were still making consegnamenti and paying the annual canoni; ten years later, they attempted (unsuccessfully) to change their fealty to the probably lazier jurisdiction of the nunnery of Belmonte; in 1601, and again in 1611, the Valperga di Rivara had to go to law to force the Mollo to take investitures, make consegnamenti and pay their annual dues; but in 1636, the Mollo once more attempted to assert their independence, and refused to pay the feudataries their share of the feudal cavalcata. In the consegnamenti of 1691, the Valperga di Rivara still claimed rights (ragioni) over the retrofeudi of the leading families of the Castellata,

(14) For the investitures: M.86. For the consegnamenti: MM.86-107: 'Enfiteusi'; See also, MM.55-56: 'Caducita'; and Pola, v.2,p.292; v.3, pp.42-43, 48-50.

the nobili Mollo, Collo, Vignola, Mantello and Morutto, but it was an empty claim. Despite attempts by the whole Rivara consortile to exact investitures and consegnamenti from the Mollo consortile in the early 18th century, by the time of the perequazione in 1731, the very existence of emphyteutic land was denied.(15)

The relative ease with which the comunità opposed, and even usurped, the feudal rights of the consortile probably explained the value that Massimo Antonio, of the Castello Inferiore, placed on his undivided possession of the fee of Levone. Massimo Antonio, by exchanges and purchases, had managed to gain the investiture of the fee in solidum by 1549. Four years later, however, his son, Giovenale Giorgio, illegally granted 1/6 of the fee to Giorgio, of the Castello Superiore, in order to guarantee a loan of 1000 scudi; Giorgio's nephew, Tomaso, immediately took possession of this part of the fee. The details of the subsequent lawsuit are obscure, but Massimo Antonio's violent reaction reflected clearly his concern to maintain his undivided possession of the jurisdiction. An agreement was reached in 1565, by which Massimo Antonio was even prepared to cede the homage of six of his subjects (valued at 1000 scudi)

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(15) For the 1572 submission: M.34,n.3. For the lawsuit of 1583-84, ending in the condemnation of the Mollo by the Senato di Casale in 1588: M.29,c.i,ns.7,17,18,20,21. For the disputes of 1601 and 1611: M.32,ns.2,3; and of 1636-37: M.32,n.5. For the consegnamenti of 1691: AST III, Consegnamenti, 1691 in 1692 (Marelli), pp.170-77, 227-31, 235-38, 292-93. For the lawsuit against the Mollo in 1716-20, which also states the size of their possessions as 390 giornate: M.12,1716 June 18; M.34,n.4. A communal document of 1731 (AC Rivara, Volume contenente procure...) notes:

> "senza che consti vi sij nel Territorio di questo luogo di Rivara alcun fondo enfiteotico".

in order to regain the alienated fraction of the fee. But a final settlement was only arranged in 1615 by representatives of the other 'neutral' branches of the consortile, Pietro Francesco and Arduino for the Castello Superiore, and Giovanni Antonio for the Castello Inferiore.(16)

This unity of possession of Levone undoubtedly strengthened the position of the feudatary in all relations with the comunità. Even in 1559, during the years of dispute, Massimo Antonio was able to enforce his authority, and compel the comunità of Levone to acknowledge its duty to pay both tithes and annual canoni for the emphyteuses. While in 1648, Bianca Benedetta, as guardian of her son Giovanni Battista, was the first member of the consortile to make a transaction with the comunità, exchanging all claims over tithes and emphyteuses in Levone for an annual payment of 40 scudi.(17)

iii. The economic rewards of political careers.

In the middle of the 16th century, the political careers of the Valperga di Rivara placed them among the most prominent Piedmontese families. Pietro Valperga di Rivara, of the Castello Superiore, had fought for Spain in both Flanders and Germany, and in 1547 had been

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(16) For Massimo Antonio's investiture: M.13,n.3; Durando, pp.246-47. For the dispute: M.9,c.ii,n.3; M.12,n.3; M.25,n.7; with more details in: M.9,c.i,n.s2,3; Pola, v.1,pp.153-57.

(17) For the 1559 transaction: M.72,n.6; M.12, 1559 May 17. For the 1648 transaction, which apparently confirmed a previous transaction of Lodovico with the comunità of Levone in 1640: M.72,n.14; M.12, 1648 March 30; M.15,c.ii,n.10; M.47,n.23; Pola, v.2,pp.284-85.

awarded the highest of all Imperial honours, the Golden Fleece; Tomaso, his brother, had also fought with Emanuele Filiberto in Flanders in the years before the restoration. Already before Cateau-Cambrésis, both brothers had been amply rewarded: Tomaso had been nominated governor of the castle, and then of the whole county of Nice, besides his honorary position as chamberlain at Court, and in 1573 was appointed cavaliere gran croce of the newly-founded Ordine Mauriziano; while Pietro had been given the high (if somewhat honorary) position of Gran Scuiiere of Savoie.(18)

These positions had brought definite economic advantages, both directly in the form of gifts, and indirectly from the increased possibilities resulting from the growth in social prestige. Tomaso received frequent gifts from Emanuele Filiberto: in 1570, his pay was increased to an annual 1200 scudi d'Italia, which was to be paid according to the market, and not the official, exchange-rate; in 1575, as cavaliere of Ordine Mauriziano, he was given the commenda of S. Margherita di Tronzano; about 1577, he was given another gift of 3000 scudi. At the same time, as a leader of the pro-Spanish faction at Court, he probably received pensions, or at least occasional payments from Spain: immediately after his death, his son, Carlo, was awarded an annual pension of 400 scudi by Philip II:

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(18) For the careers of both Pietro and Tomaso, much information can be found in the patents cited below, notes (19) and (20). See also: Pola, v.2, pp.624-28; Guasco, index, s.v. 'Valperga', p.2181. For Tomaso, see also: M.3, n.3.

" in vista de buoni servigli prestatigli dal fù signor conte Tomaso di Rivara suo padre, nella qualita di governatore della città a contado di Nizza" (19)

Contemporaneously, the growth in social prestige of the brothers, which both resulted from, and in turn increased, their political importance, enabled them to extend their influence and to contract better marriages. Pietro's marriage to an illegitimate daughter of the Emperor Maximilian formed the most outstanding coup. Even though Anna d'Austria was a widow (with a probably smaller dowry than for her first marriage), Pietro still received a dowry of 8000 Imperial lire, guaranteed over Habsburg possessions in Flanders; while at the same time, he obviously enjoyed an extremely privileged position in the Duchy of Savoy. Tomaso's marriage, though less spectacular, was also important: the Ponzone d'Azeglio were an important Piedmontese family, and were prepared to give their daughter, Bianca, the probably large dowry of 2600 scudi (equivalent to L.1460).(20)

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(19) For Tomaso's increase in pay: AST III, Controllo, a.1577 in 1578, f.180. For the commenda: M.36,n.53. For the gift: AST III, Controllo, a.1577 in 1578,f.121. For the pension to Carlo: M.3,ns.1,2. The brothers were apparently of sufficient importance to induce Carlo San Martino, conte di Frossasco, to make them a donation of the tasni he owned over Santhià and the neighbouring S.Agata, yielding over 330 scudi a year (representing a capital of over 6600 scudi) in return for "li grati servigij fatti da detti fratelli". There is no further evidence as to the nature of these services. But on the death of the conte di Frossasco in 1571, Emanuele Filiberto confirmed the donation, as yet another gift to the brothers: AST III, Patenti, R.6,ff.267-68; R.11,ff.161-62; M.14,c.i,n.5.

(20) For Pietro's marriage: M.6,ns.19-25,28,33. It seems doubtful whether Pietro managed to obtain half his wife's dower from her first marriage, of 15,000 Imperial lire. The dowry he received was paid at an annual interest of 6⅔%, of L.500. For Tomaso's marriage: M.6,n.36.

The ambitious political careers of Tomaso's descendents were not surprising. The family had a strong military tradition, and Carlo's career was undoubtedly assisted by the influence of both his father, Tomaso, and his uncle, Pietro. After taking part in the conquest of Saluzzo in 1588, as colonel of a militia company, Carlo was appointed colonel of a regular infantry company, and Governor of Fossano and then of Pinerolo, where he resisted an attack of Lesdiguères; he took part in Carlo Emanuele I's campaign in the Dauphiné, and died fighting at the siege of Montmélian.(21) At the same time, the members of the Castello Inferiore led active military careers: Giovanni Giorgio and Daniele, the sons of Massimo Antonio, both fought at the battle of Lepanto in 1572; and ten years later, Giovanni Giorgio and his brother, Francesco, died fighting in Flanders for the Spanish, under Alessandro Farnese.(22)

But the careers of Carlo's sons formed even clearer examples of the possibilities of political employment. At first, the pro-Habsburg

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(21) Carlo was appointed captain of the archibuggieri in 1595, with the pay of 600 scudi. For his career: M.3,ns.4-7; M.44,n.10; AST III, Controllo, a.1588 in 1589,f.12; a.1595 in 1596, f.248; a.1604 in 1606, f.155. References to the part he took in Carlo Emanuele's campaigns can be found in S. Cambiano: Historico Discorso, coll.1238, 1297; S. Guichenon: Histoire généalogique de la royale maison de Savoye, Lyon,1660,v.1,livre II, pp.717-18. See also, Pola, v.2,p.636. Carlo was given a gift of all his rights over San Martino (valued at the time of their alienation in 1602 at 11,500 scudi or L.10,150), by conte Arduino di San Martino: M.207,s.v. 'S.Martino': AST III, Controllo, a.1588 in 1589,f.1; a.1601 in 1602,f.113. Carlo Emanuele I, as a sign of his appreciation of Carlo's services, let him off the payment of the laudemio, a due paid on the alienation of all feudal possessions.

(22) For the permission to fight at Lepanto: AST I, Monferrato, Concessioni R.2,f.53. For the fighting in Flanders: M.44,n.10; Pola,v.2,p.638.

tendencies of the Valperga di Rivara prevailed. In the opening years of the century, Tomaso accompanied Carlo Emanuele I's sons on a mission to Spain.(23) At the same time, the tie with the Imperial Habsburgs was maintained: in 1605, Giacomo Antonio and Filiberto led a company of troops from Mantua to fight against the Turks in Hungary; and after the expedition came to a miserable end, with Filiberto's death and Giacomo Antonio's capture, the connection with the Habsburgs was still strong enough for Tomaso to travel to Vienna and appeal for aid in 1606.(24)

But the growing hostility of Carlo Emanuele I against the Duke of Mantua began to affect the careers of the Rivara brothers. The possession of fees on the frontier of the Monferrat, where disputes continually broke out, forced the members of the consortile to choose sides. Carlo's eldest son, Giacomo Antonio, had married Sulvia Gonzaga as early as 1596, and after his ransom from the Turks settled definitively at Mantua. In 1612, when Carlo Emanuele I invaded the Monferrat, Giacomo Antonio was sent to Casale as governor of the citadel, where he remained until 1620; two years later, he was appointed Governor-General of the Monferrat. In 1627, with the renewed threat from Carlo Emanuele I, he was once more sent as governor of the citadel of Casale, and in recognition of his loyal services, appointed cavaliere of the Ordine del Redentore, the

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(23) AST III, Controllo, a.1602 in 1603, f.267.

(24) A letter outlining the appeal to be made by Tomaso, and enumerating all the services of the family, can be found in: M.44,n.10, printed by Pola, v.2,pp.638-40. This document describes the expedition in Hungary. Giacomo Antonio was only ransomed for 3000 scudi in 1608: AST I, Monferrato, Feudi, M.59, s.v. 'Rivara', n.4. Tomaso fell ill and died at Vienna.

highest award in the Mantuan states; throughout the long siege he successfully defended Casale. After the cession to Savoy of his family possessions by the treaty of Cherasco in 1630, he took investiture from Vittorio Amedeo I, but to all effects became a Mantuan subject. In 1633, on the birth of Giacomo Antonio's son, Carlo, the Duke of Mantua acted as god-father, and established a life-pension of 400 scudi on Carlo in reward for his father's services.(25)

Giacomo Antonio had been followed by his brother Ottavio, who was appointed Governor of Pontestura, and then Lieutenant-General of the Monferrat and Governor of the important fortress of Trino, where he died fighting in 1619.(26) But Arduino had enlisted under Carlo Emanuele I.

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(25) The pension in 1633 was given:
"per l'antica servitù prestata da lui Giacomo Antonio a Serenissimi nostri predecessori, in diversi cariche principali e particolarmente a noi nei due passati assedij di Casale havendo nella longhezza dell'uno e strettezza dell'altro havuto largo campo di manifestarci la sua sofferenza in'ben servirci, e il valor suo in diffendere, com'ha fatto virilmente la sodetta piazza..."
The details of Giacomo Antonio's career can be reconstructed from: AST I, Monferrato, Concessioni, R.8,ff.2,266; R.9,f.88; R.10,f.48 (for the pension to Carlo); Monferrato, Materie economiche, M.13,nn. 46,60; M.14,n.26; AS Mantova, D.III,32; E,XIX,1,1610 Aug. 30; E,XLV,3, 1561; E,XXI,3,789; V,II,6,3496; Raccolta D'Arco: Delle Famiglie Mantovane, s.v. 'Valperga di Rivara': Gunsco, index,s.v.'Valperga', p.2181. References to Giacomo Antonio can be found in, R.Quazza: La guerra per la successione di Mantova e del Monferrato (1628-1631), Mantua,1926,v.i,pp.22,119,326,385,410-15; Guichenon,op.cit.,v.1, livre II, p.846; Segarizzi: Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, v.1,Bari,1912,p.173. More, unreliable,details are given by Pola,v.2,p.637;v.3,pp.13,23,92-93.

(26) AST I, Monferrato,Concessioni, R.8,ff.41,119. See also, Gunsco,index s.v. 'Valperga', p.2181; Pola,v.2,pp.637-38.

During the first 30 years of the century, he took part in all Carlo Emanuele I's most important campaigns, and by 1620 had risen to the rank of captain in the corazze; two years later, he was also appointed Primo Scudiere at Court. After Carlo Emanuele I's death, Arduino served Vittorio Amedeo I faithfully, and by 1637 was recognized as one of the most loyal supporters of the Court. The following year, Cristina showed her confidence in Arduino's abilities and loyalty by appointing him governor of Nice; at the same time, he was nominated cavaliere gran croce of the Ordine Mauriziano, and cavaliere of the Ordine della SS. Annunziata. In 1639, he was among the small group of supporters of Madama Reale defending Turin against Prince Tommaso's surprise siege. At the end of the civil war, Arduino was nominated to accompany the princess Maria Luisa on her journey to Nice, where her uncle and bridegroom, Maurizio, awaited her. For the rest of his life, he was given increasingly important posts: Governor of Fossano in 1643, during Carlo Emanuele II's residence there; Comandante-Generale and Governor of Turin after Carlo Emanuele II's return.(27)

Pietro Francesco had begun his career by following his brother, Ottavio: in 1615, he was Alfiere in Ottavio's company, and by 1626 he

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(27) The details of Arduino's career can be reconstructed from: AST III, Controllo, a.1620, f.126; a.1623-18, f.160; 1626-2°, f.23; a.1638-1°, f.253; a.1642 in 1643, f.74; a.1643 in 1644, ff.20-30; a.1646 in 1647, f.17; Interinazioni, R.1643, n.90, ff.27,87; Patenti, R.60, f.142; AST I, Lettere Particolari, s.v. 'Rivara', M.38; G.Claretta: Storia della Reggenza, v.3, pp.259,262; Guichenon, op.cit., v.1, livre II, pp. 878,920,936,960,989; P.Gioffredo: Storia delle Alpi marittime, Tv 1839, v.6, p.608; M. Bernardi (ed.): Il Castello del Valentino, T 1949, pp.124,126; Pola, v.3, pp.206-58.

acted as lieutenant to the Governor of Trino. But at the same time he was also gentiluomo di camera at the Piedmontese Court. When Giacomo Antonio returned to Casale in 1622, Pietro Francesco seemed the most suitable person to invite him to acknowledge the Savoyard claims. In successive years, Pietro Francesco abandoned his military career, and settled down on the family estates in the Canavese. After playing an ambiguous part during the civil war, he took advantage of Arduino's powerful position at Court to gain his appointment as Maggiordomo of the Madama Reale.(28)

The economic advantages of such careers undoubtedly seconded political ambitions. Virtually no documents have been found of gifts or donations to Giacomo Antonio, but he either bought or was given part of the marquisate of Solonghello, near Casale; while the dowry he received on his marriage to Fulvia Gonzaga in 1596 was 10,000 scudi, with probably as large a dowry on his second marriage to Laura Gonzaga in the 1620s. Moreover, his son Carlo received a large life-pension of 400 scudi on his birth, and largely through his father's merits, was appointed Governor of Casale, and cavaliere of the Ordine del Redentore.(29)

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(28) M.3,n.8; M.8,n.12; AST I, Monferrato, Concessioni, R.8,f.118; R.9, f.52; Lettere Particolari, s.v. 'Rivara', M.38; Claretta,op.cit., v.3,p.282; Pola, v.3,p.253.

(29) For the marquisate of Solonghello: AST I, Monferrato, Suppliche, R.6, f.132; R.9,ff.40,50; Monferrato, Protocollo, R.81,f.334; R.84,f.1. For the 1596 marriage: AS Mantova, E,III,32. For the pension, see above, note (25). For Carlo's subsequent career: AST I, Monferrato, Concessioni, R.12,f.84,where it is stated that Giacomo Antonio:
"...ha meritato ricevere non solamente per se stesso, ma per la sua posterità ancora vivi contrasegni di gratitudine..."

Arduino's long career was rewarded by continual gifts from the ducal house. As early as 1620, when he was appointed capitano di corazze, his wage was increased to that of a captain in the Guards. By the time of his death in 1654 he had received gifts in cash of L.20,000, and at least one payment in kind, besides gifts of land where he already owned possessions, in Genola, Entraque and Pont; in addition, he was given the rich commenda of Stupinigi in 1638; while he probably received many other donations which were never registered. By the end of his life, his annual (official) income as Governor of Turin, Maresciallo di Campo and Comandante Generale was L.7000. (30)

Besides this, all three of his daughters were appointed damigelle d'onore at Court, receiving on their marriages doti di Corte of a total value of over L.52,000. Arduino himself, on his marriage to Leonora Della Rovere in 1633, received her dote di corte as damigella d'onore of L.8600 (4000 ducatoni). His three marriages reflected his growing importance: Marianna Valperga di Valperga brought a dowry of lands scattered throughout the Canavese, probably equivalent to a dowry of 12,000 scudi; Leonora Della Rovere belonged to a politically more eminent family,

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(30) The gifts to Arduino can be found in: AST III, Controllo, a.1620, f.126; a.1622, f.36; a.1627-2°, ff.15,77; a.1627-3°, f.26; a.1630 in 1631, f.45; a.1631 in 1632, f.91; a.1632 in 1633, f.191 (and M.7, c.1, n.5); a.1637 in 1638, f.103; a.1641 in 1642, f.49; a.1642 in 1643, f.252; a.1643 in 1644, ff.20-30,56; a.1647 in 1648, f.109; a.1648, f.120; a.1649, f.16; a.1651, f.147; a.1653, f.43. See also: a.1633-2°, f.90; a.1638-1°, f.245; a.1646 in 1647, f.250. For the gift of the commenda of Stupinigi: Claretta, op.cit., v.3, p.262. For Arduino's income: AST III, Controllo, a.1642 in 1643, f.74; a.1646 in 1647, f.17. Pola (v.3, p.248) gives details of other incomes, bringing the total to over L.10,000, citing, however, non-existent sources.

closely attached to the Court; while Isabella Ferrero-Fieschi, whom Arduino married at the end of his life, about 1650, was widow of the Prince of Masserano, a small, independent State in the Biellese. Even before Carlo Emanuele I's death, Arduino had bought the marquisate of Entraque, a clear sign of his social ambitions; the purchase of a palace in Turin was equally natural. At the same time, his expenses increased: his daughters were married to members of leading Piedmontese families, and given increasingly large dowries of 8000, 12,500 and 14,000 ducatoni, in large part still unpaid by 1654. But in the liquidation which followed Arduino's death, his patrimony - excluding his share of the Castellata - was valued at L.180,000.(31)

The importance of the economic rewards of political careers shows up even more clearly when contrasted to the restricted resources of the family patrimony in the Canavese. The consegnamenti of 1588-89, which represented all, or almost all, the lands owed by the consortile in the Castellata, only stated the possession of 605 giornate. Of this area, 358 giornate were inherited by the eight sons of Carlo, of the Castello Superiore, while in the Castello Inferiore, Giovanni Antonio, Gaspare's son, owned 128 giornate, and the eight sons of Massimo Antonio the

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(31) For the dowries of Arduino's daughters: M.7,c.i,ns.6,8;M.23,n.4;M.24, ns.2,9. Francesca, in 1635, and Anna Maria, in 1651, were given doti di corte of 4000 ducatoni (L.8600 in 1635; L.17,600 in 1651); Cristina, in 1649, received 4000 scudi di Spagna, against the extremely strong opposition of the Camera, overridden by three giussioni of the Madama Reale: AST III,Interinazioni, R.76,ff.393-409; Controllo,a.1649,f.23; a.1651,ff.32-33. For more details of Arduino's patrimony, see Appendix 12.

remaining 119 giornate, with little more than 10 giornate in Levone. At the beginning of the 17th century, even when Daniele, as the only surviving brother, had united the quarter of the jurisdiction bequeathed by Massimo Antonio, there were at least 10 members in the consortile; a generation later, the lands owned by the Castello Superiore were subdivided between the heirs of Giacomo Antonio and Pietro Francesco.(32)

In all probability, it was as much the insufficiency of the patrimony as the military tradition of the family that impelled the Valperga di Rivara to seek State employment. Even though the income from land was considerably increased by the exaction of tithes and feudal rights, and even though very few of the male members of the family married, the possessions of the Castellata were probably insufficient to maintain the members of the consortile.

At the same time, the successful careers of the various members of the family strengthened the feudataries in their relations with the comunità. The absence of active opposition by the comunità in the first half of the 17th century was undoubtedly in large part due to the crushing pressure of taxes, and to the exposed position of the Castellata on the Monferrat frontier. In 1603, the peasants of Levone fled "per sfuggire alle persecuzioni dei nemici sabaudi"; in 1613-14, a body of Imperial troops was billeted on the Castellata, leaving the comunità

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(32) The consegnamenti can be found in: M.76,1589 July 17 for Carlo; 1588 Jan.27 for Daniele; 1589 July 10 for Giovanni Antonio. Copies, with slight changes, dated 1601 (except Giovanni Antonio's,1588), are to be found in: M.104, 'Sommarj de beni...'.

with a debt of over L.14,000, still unpaid by 1637; in 1617, all four communes were ravaged; in 1626 and 1630, Perno was sacked. At the same time, extraordinary taxes were imposed by both the Dukes of Mantua and Savoy. Even after the treaty of Cherasco, by which the Castellata passed under the jurisdiction of Savoy, with the outbreak of the civil war, new billetings occurred and new exactions took place. Transactions were still being made by the comunità late in the 17th century to extinguish the debts of these years.(33)

It was in these very years that the influence and importance of the feudataries increased. The Valperga di Rivara not only were able to avoid paying all taxes to the comunità, but could use their position to buy up more land and censi whenever the comunità and their members were particularly pressed for money. In 1590, the comunità of Rivara began a lawsuit to force the feudataries to pay taxes, but it failed completely; in 1612, it made another appeal to Carlo Emanuele I. After this date no new attempts were made until after the death of Arduino, not only because of the weakness of the comunità, but equally because of the overbearing position of the leading feudatary.(34)

In the same period, between the 1570s and the 1630s, the Valperga di Rivara made frequent acquisitions in the Castellata. The documentation

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(33) For all these details, and a useful picture of the condition of the comunità, see: Pola, v.3, pp.8-231.

(34) For the 1590 lawsuit: M.61,n.15. For the 1612 supplica: M.79,n.1.

is fragmentary, but seems fairly conclusive. Land was purchased and exchanged exceedingly frequently by both branches of the family, especially by Tomaso and his brother Pietro, of the Castello Superiore, between 1560 and 1570, and by Tomaso's grandson, Pietro Francesco, between 1615 and 1625; and by Daniele (and to a small extent by his brother, Lodovico) of the Castello Inferiore from the 1570s to the 1600s; after 1631, no more purchases or exchanges are recorded until the 18th century. At the same time, frequent loans were made to both the peasants and the comunità; at least two loans of Tomaso are recorded in the 1560s; between 1574 and 1594, Lodovico and Daniele loaned over 400 scudi (L.320), while in the four subsequent years, 1595-99, Daniele made at least 13 more loans for nearly 500 scudi (L.420). Account-books for the years between 1608 and 1616 show Daniele's widow, Caterina, and his son, Lodovico, continuing the same policy. At least eight censi were bought by Pietro Francesco, of the Castello Superiore, and Lodovico, of the Castello Inferiore, over the comunità of the Castellata between 1616 and the early 1640s, for a total expenditure of over L.10,500. After this date, there is once again no evidence of any further acquisition of a censo by the family.(35)

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(35) The purchases of land are to be found in: M.71,c.i,ns.18-86,M.19,n.8. For the exchanges of land: M.71,c.ii,ns.2-18; M.84,1587 Sept. 12; M.78, 1620 Feb.28. For the loans to peasants: M.16,c.i,ns.8-11, 14-19,22-24,26,27,29,30,50,51,56,57; with the account-books in: M.14,c.i,ns.10-12. An account-book of Bianca Benedetta of 1651 records some loans between 1616 and 1645 still owing: M.16,n.72. For details of the censi bought from the comunità, see Appendix 13.

There would seem to be little distinction between the acquisitive capacities of the two main branches of the consortile. In both branches, when there were numerous brothers, one brother (Daniele, Pietro Francesco) seems to have acted as administrator of the family estates. But all the evidence of acquisitions belongs to the period of the political importance of the family. After the death of Arduino, the acquisitions apparently stopped, while the comunità once more began to show active resistance.

2. The decline of the Valperga di Rivara, c. 1650 - c. 1750.

i. The value of immunity from taxes.

In 1655, less than one year after the death of Arduino, the comunità of Rivara began a lawsuit before the Camera against the feudataries, to :

> "...obbligare detti Signori al pagamento delle taglie di diversi beni, che essi Signori tengono, e possiedono nel territorio di Rivare, catastrati nei catastri di detta Comunità, a registri delli particolari che già quelli possedevano, prima che tali beni passassero a mani di detti Signori Conti..."

As evidence, the comunità produced inventories of all the land it claimed as allodial, to be verified by comparison with the original catasti. In all, the comunità demanded that 200 giornate owned by the Valperga di Rivara should be subjected to the normal land taxes.

The Camera appointed a commission to judge the case, headed by its Primo Presidente, conte Francesco Giovanni Cauda di Caselette. But the comunità of Rivara appealed to Carlo Emanuele II against the appointment, as Giovenale Maria, of the Castello Superiore, was Caselette's son-in-law. By the time a new commission had been appointed, consisting of conti Bellezia and Nomis, both Presidents of the Senato, and conte Giovanni Giacomo Trucchi, President of the Camera, four years had elapsed since the original appeal of the comunità.

The feudatories - Giovenale Maria and Carlo of the Castello Superiore, Gaspare and his brothers, and Bianca Benedetta for her son, Giovanni Battista, of the Castello Inferiore - denied their liability, on the grounds that:

> "...tali beni sono feudali, immuni da Carighi, e come tali li possedono, et sono stati posseduti da gl'antecessori d'essi Signori da tempo immemorabile, ne mai la Communità aversante ha preteso di conseguir per essi alcun Carigo..."

They supported their claim with the production of investitures and privileges, above all the concession of Emperor Sigismund of 24 July 1430, implying perpetual exemption in the Monferrat to the Valperga, Montiglio and Del Carretto families. Simultaneously, they asserted that since all the disputed land had formerly been granted as emphyteuses by the feudatories, it was ipso facto exempt when it returned to its original owners:

> "...quando anche cessasse come non cessa il detto privileggio che nè più nè meno detti signori Conti per li beni che possedono devono giuire dell'Immunità, tutto che possi constare esser stati altrevolte descritti nel pubblico Cattastro della medema, poiche, quelli che come descritti l'hanno possedutti, l'hanno possedutti come emphiteutici come se moventi dal diretto Dominio del Castello di Rivara, o sia da signori Conti d'esso luogho, e che per conseguenza essendosi riunito il dominio uttile con il diretto hanno ripigliatto l'antico luogo libertà dell'essentione da cerichi come feudali...."

At the same time they counterclaimed for the exaction of their seigneurial rights:

> "...per obbligar la Commità a pagare i diritti signorili dovutigli, ed a prestargli le solite servitù..." (36)

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(36) It was an argument directly based on feudal law, by which the real ownership (or diretto dominio) lay with the sovereign, and only the right to the products (dominio utile) with the possessor; very soon it was to be used by the Dukes against the nobility itself. Cf. Bulferetti, 'Considerazioni generali', pp.223-25.

By 1665, the feudataries had succeeded in delaying a decision for ten years, and Carlo Emanuele II ordered the case to be brought to an end. In the following year, the judges pronounced in favour of the feudataries, without specifying their reasons.(37)

At this point, Giovanni Battista, of the Castello Inferiore, thought it worth his while to come to an agreement with the comunità. Already in 1648, his mother, Bianca Benedetta, had made a transaction with the comunità of Levone, abolishing all claims over emphyteuses in return for an annual payment of 40 scudi. In 1667, Giovanni Battista tried to make a transaction, on behalf of the whole consortile, with the comunità of Rivara. But the unity of the feudataries was broken:

> "...principalmente per qualche sconcerto seguito tra detti Illustrissimi signori Conti volendo gli uni condurre all' aggiustamento; et altri opponendo talmente che fu tralasciato il trattato dell'aggiustamento generale con detti signori, restando però in piedi con l'Illustrissimo signor Conte Giovanni Battista per la sua quarta parte...".

Giovanni Battista himself exchanged his quarter of the tithes and feudal rights for an annual payment of 25 scudi, and agreed at the same time to pay taxes for an area of his land not exceeding the value of one soldo di registro. A new registro of the same year gave an entry valued at 1 soldo for Giovanni Battista. But even this transaction subsequently

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(37) Documents on the dispute are legion. The acts of the lawsuit are to be found in: M.82, ns.4,7; M.67, n.4; M.86, 1659 June 17; AST III, art. 501, M.1, 'R', ns.19,20. More details can be found in: M.82, ns.3,9; M.79,ns.8,10; M.42,n.15; M.19,c.1,n.6; M.25, ns.18,31; AC Rivara, Volume contenente procure...;Pola,v.1, pp.295-96; v.2, pp.510-11.

failed, and the new registro of 1685 contained no entry for any of the feudataries.(38)

In 1687, the comunità began a new lawsuit against Carlo Antonio, of the Castello Inferiore. But the renewed attack only really began in 1699, before the ducal delegates appointed to examine the state of the registri. The feudataries tried to obstruct the proceedings by bringing a new lawsuit before the Senato of Casale, claiming that the whole territory of Rivara was feudal and its inhabitants consequently subject to all the dution of emphyteuses. But the comunità was equally prepared to magnify its claims, and this time presented new inventories of land claimed as allodial, in addition to the inventories of the first lawsuit, which increased the total area stated to be allodial by 85%, to 372 giornate. The additions consisted of numerous repetitions, in a different order, of items already listed in the earlier inventories; in the course of the lawsuit, comparison with the original registri quickly showed up the differences, as well as the addition of forged pages in the registro, to the great indignation of the feudatarries.(39)

In 1711, the consortile and comunità finally made a transaction, exchanging all claims over emphyteuses for an annual payment of L.400.

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(38) For the transaction of 1648: M.72,n.14; M.12,1648 March 12. For that of 1667: M.72,n.16. For the registro of 1667: M.108,1667 June 11; M.74,n.27. For that of 1685: M.74,n.22.

(39) For the abortive appeal of 1687: M.79,n.11. For that of 1699-1725: M.67,ns.4,20; M.81,ns.6,9; M.79,ns.11-14; M.82,n.3; M.83,ns.1-4; M.47,ns.8,10,11; M.15,c.ii,n.2; M.25,n.18; AST III,art. 501, M.1,'R', n.19; AC Rivara, Registro dei causati...; Durando,pp.263-64; Pola, v.1,pp.297-99.

In 1751, after the edict of perequazione, Carlo Emanuele III ratified the transaction. But two years later the comunità tried unsuccessfully to dispute its validity, and avoid payment of the annual canone. In 1725, the royal delegate, intendant Chiaverotti, decided against the feudataries and declared 200 giornate allodial.

This adverse decision was an undoubted blow to the already weakening economic position of the Valperga di Rivara. In 1690 and 1716 (in response to Vittorio Amedeo II's orders), the consortile had returned consegnamenti, claiming a total of slightly over 700 giornate of feudal land. Chiaverotti's decision, recognizing the allodiality of the 200 giornate originally claimed by the comunità, represented a loss of immunity of almost 29% of the family lands.(40)

In terms of family income, the loss of immunity was extremely serious. At the beginning of the 18th century, the average annual income of the family lands in the Castellata was only about L.3400. The 200 giornate now subjected to taxes represented 35 soldi di registro, out of the total 359 soldi, for all the allodial land in the Castellata. In the 20 years between the peace of Utrecht and the Austrian Succession

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(40) For the 1690 consegnamenti: AST III, Consegnamenti, 1691 in 1692 (Marelli), pp.170-77,227-31,235-38,292-93; with copies in: M.19,n.6; M.25,ns.19,25; M.71,n.3;M.81,n.6 (this last document was compiled between 1710 and 1716, and gives a completer list of the Castello Superiore's lands than the actual consegnamento). For the 1716 consegnamento: M.76,n.7;1716 June 23; with copies in M.25,n.29; M.74,n.37. And that of 1733: M.76,n.3; with copies in M.25,n.17; M.76,1734 Aug. 3. The exact area recognized as feudal was 504:15:0 giornate, with 202 giornate, or 28.6%, as allodial: AC Rivara, Volumo contenente procure... For details of these consegnamenti, see Appendix 14.

War (1715-1734), the total annual amount of taxes exacted by the comunità was assessed at an average of almost L.20 per soldo di registro. The Valperga di Rivara were thus paying almost L.700 a year, or 21% of their landed income.(41)

ii. Attempts to conserve the patrimony.

In the same years as the lawsuit over the feudality of the land, the feudal rights of the Valperga di Rivara were also threatened. After the great struggle to exact the tithes, the consortile unexpectedly found its possession disputed by the Mensa Arcivescovile of Turin. In 1596-97, and again in 1603-08, the feudataries had been maintained in their rights. But in 1659 the Mensa won its case, and despite appeals by the consortile in 1667 and 1670, was adjudged the tithes. When the comunità of Rivara and Forno later made a transaction with the Mensa, the value of the tithes was calculated at 56 scudi (L.380), increased by the 1690s to 68 scudi (L.1000).(42)

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(41) For the estimate of landed income: AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21, n.305. The registro of the feudataries is to be found with the inventories produced during the lawsuits. The total registro of the comunità (ms. 359:10:½) is found in: AC Rivara, Registro dei Causati...; with the annual rate of taxation in the same volume, and in: Conti esattoriali dall'anno 1716 al 1752. Between 1715 and 1734, the rate varied from L.25:10:0 to L.15; as compared to this, during the war of 1691-96, the average rate was L.55:10:0, with a maximum in 1695 of L.72.

(42) For the earlier lawsuits: M.42,ns.13,14; M.43,c.ii,n.8; M.44,n.10. For the 1656-59 dispute: M.42,n.16; M.43,c.ii,ns.11,12; M.45,c.ii,n.12; M.46,c.i,n.2. For the later appeals: M.42,n.16; M.45,c.i,n.32; Pola, v.2,p.577. For the transactions of 1671 and 1693 with the Mensa: Pola,v.2,pp.578-81. In 1739,the comunità tried to resist paying the tithes again: AST II, 1a archiviazione, Provincia d'Ivrea, M.1,n.9.

By the beginning of the 18th century, the feudatories had also finally abandoned all claims to emphyteuses and certain other seigneurial rights: transactions were made with the comunità of Rivara, Forno and Busano for annual payments, totalling L.900 (besides the L.290 paid by the comunità of Levone since the transaction of 1648).

But the consortile still tried to preserve its rights against the encroachments of both State and comunità. In reply to governmental demands of consegnamenti, every possible feudal income was exploited: the iron forge (fucina di ferro) noted in the 1589 consegnamento, and abandoned by 1690, was rebuilt and hired out by 1716; likewise the pesting-mills for hemp (pista da canapa); the oil-press for nuts (torchio da olio) at Forno was first mentioned in the 1716 consegnamento; what remained of the monopoly over the ovens, after the continual alienations of the 17th century, was carefully stated in 1716 and 1733. In the same manner, the income from the large, but nearly valueless, so-called 'Alps' at Forno was carefully assessed at the end of the 17th century; the possession was entered in all the consegnamenti, and at the time of the perequazione was successfully claimed as feudal. The determination of the Valperga di Rivara to resist all attacks on their rights (so similar to the reactions of the Falletti di Barolo) was symbolised by the claim of the Castello Superiore in the consegnamento of 1733 to "la raggione di riunire e rivendicare" a wood sold by the family in 1604.(43)

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(43) For more details on the feudal rights, see Appendix 15. For the consegnamenti, see note (40). The annual payments by the comunità are clearly stated in: M.25,ns.15,16; for Forno, see also: M.15,c.ii,n.14. For the 'Alps': M.62,ns.24,32; in 1734, they were measured as 205 g.

Part of the reason for this fierce resistance undoubtedly lay in the economic importance to the family of the feudal rights. Besides the actual diritti signorili - or rights of jurisdiction, monopoly of the bandi campestri, payment of dues by the comunità, etc. - the feudatories derived a large income from their monopoly of the mills and limestone quarries (cave di calce). The four mills (with six wheels) in the Castellata were hired out in the 1730s for L.2000 a year; a fifth mill (of two wheels) in Levone yielded a further L.400. Feudal dues were paid on all excavations (pisoni, ampiazioni) of lime stone in the family fees, which, together with the hire of the quarries exploited by the feudatories themselves, yielded an annual L.2250 in the 1730s. At the time of the perequazione, the total annual income from all feudal rights and monopolies was over L.6500, or nearly double the income derived from the land.(see Appendix 15 and (44)).

Already before the date of the perequazione, the problems of divided jurisdiction - and hence of conserving the patrimony - had almost disappeared. Before his death in 1701, Giovanni Battista, of the Castello Inferiore, tried to prevent a further subdivision of his possessions by the erection of a primogeniture over the fee of Levone and his quarter of the Castellata (1698).(45) In 1702, the only other representative of the Castello Inferiore, Carlo Antonio, died without heirs. The inheritance

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(44) For the mills, see: M.48,passim; AST I, Torino e Provincia, M.25, s.v. 'Rivara', n.3; Durando,pp.206-07; Pola,v.1,pp.186-90,v.3, pp. 684-85. For the quarries: M.63-65,passim. The income from rights can be calculated from a contemporary estimate: M.25,ns.15,16, (Appendix 15); for the value of the quarries, see also: M.63,n.78.

(45) M.5,c.ii,ns.3,5.

was claimed both by the Demesne and by Carlo Antonio's sister, Elena; after a lawsuit of five years, the Camera adjudged the non-feudal possessions to Elena, but all the feudal rights and lands in the Castellata to Giovanni Battista's sons, so reuniting one half of the jurisdiction.(46)

The other half of the Castellata was divided between Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio, Giovenale Maria's sons, and Carlo, Giacomo Antonio's son. Carlo's residence at Mantua hindered his taking an active interest in the administration of his possessions in the Canavese. As early as 1655, he was searching for a bailiff to run his estates, while in 1706 he gave power of attorney to Giovanni Battista's widow, Cristina. Soon after Carlo's death, his son Ferdinando decided to sell his quarter of the Castellata; after a series of secret negotiations (1708-10), Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio finally managed to acquire Ferdinando's share (including 100 giornate) for L.10,000.(47)

At the date of the perequazione, Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio and Ignazio Filiberto shared between them an income from the Castellata of under L.11,000. Ten years later, the marriage of their children promised the future unity of their possessions. But although the problem of the divided rule of a consortile had virtually resolved itself, with the consequent increase of income for the surviving males of the family, a more serious problem of the provision of dowries had already taken its place.

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(46) Durando, pp.186-213; M.20,n.14; Pola, v.2, pp.519-21.

(47) For 1655: M.129, 1655 Nov. 25. For the 1706 procura: M.8,n.32. For the sale: M.48,n.28; M.218, 1708 April 12.

iii. Capital expenditure.

With the death of Arduino in 1654, virtually all supplementary income and increase of capital from State office ceased. The careers and marriages of the members of the Castello Superiore had resulted in a notable increase of their family patrimony. Tommaso and Pietro had gained a tasso over the comunità of Santhià and the adjoining S. Agata of an annual 331 scudi, representing a capital of 6620 scudi. Carlo's wife, Carlotta di S. Giuliano di Fossano, had inherited a large estate in Fossano and Genola, which had been further increased by purchases by Carlo and Arduino, and ducal gifts to Arduino; all these possessions - over 430 giornate in Fossano, and 1/32 of the jurisdiction and 110 giornate in Genola - had been divided between Carlo's sons. In addition, Carlo had been given certain feudal rights over the fee of S. Martino in the Canavese.(48) Arduino, by his marriage to Marianna Valperga di Valperga had gained rights over fees scattered throughout the Canavese; while his marriage to Leonora Della Rovere brought a censo over the comunità of Carignano and tassi over the Castellata of 361 scudi annually. Both Carlo and Arudino had bought a palace in Turin, while Arduino had acquired

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(48) For the Santhià tasso, see note (19). The Fossano-Genola inheritance can be reconstructed from: M.216, 1568 Aug.29,1577 March 20, 'Descrizione de' mobili...'; M.5,c.i,1577 March 4; M.9,c.i,n.27. For Carlo's purchase in 1588: M.216, 1588 Jan. 10, 1589 Nov. 7; Pola,v.1,pp.129-34. For that of Arduino: M.216,1606 Jan. 29; M.24, n.9. For the gift to Arduino in 1632: AST III, Controllo, a.1637 in 1638, f.103. On his death, Carlo tried to bequeath all the feudal possessions in Fossano and Genola to Giacomo Antonio in primogeniture, but as they had belonged to his wife, his will was not upheld: M.5,c.i, 1593 Jan.13; M.9, c.i,n.27; Guasco, s.v. 'Genola'. For the San Martino gift, see note (21).

the marquisate of Entraque. Giacomo Antonio, in all probability, had made acquisitions on a similar scale in the duchy of Mantua.(49)

But even in this period of undoubted expansion, the expenditure of the family taxed its resources. As early as 1578, Tommaso had been forced to alienate almost 1/3 of the tasso over Santhià to pay for the dowry of his sister, Francesca. Carlo's sons apparently had greater expenses. Giacomo Antonio's ransom from the Turks (1605-08) cost the brothers L.2800 (3000 scudi), despite an attempt to make the comunità of the Castellata pay part; while the dowries of their two sisters, Silvia and Francesca, amounted to at least L.8500 (8000 scudi). Already in 1602, Giacomo Antonio had sold his possessions in S. Martino for L.10,150 (11,500 scudi); between 1606 and 1611, a further L.11,550 (11,200 scudi) were raised by the sale of the remaining tasso over Santhià, of a farm at Fossano, and the creation of a censo over the palace at Turin.(50)

The cost of the dowries was extremely heavy. Arduino, who naturally married his daughters into the most distinguished Piedmontese families, promised them dowries amounting to nearly L.135,000 (34,500 ducatoni); he was forced to alienate his fee of Entraque, but still owed more than

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(49) For Arduino's marriages, and the marquisate of Entraque, see pp.231-32 and Appendix 12. For the palaces at Turin: M.28,nn.2-5,7-10; M.129, 1644 Aug. 23; M.12,n.31. Arduino was also given lands at Pont in the Canavese, and in his fee of Entraque: AST III, Controllo, a.1637 in 1638, f.103; a.1647 in 1648, f.109.

(50) For the sale of the tasso of Santhià: M.212,s.v.'Santhià'; M.213, s.v. 'S.Agata'. For the ransom: M.9,c.i,n.27; AST I, Monferrato, Feuli, M.59,s.v., 'Rivara',n.4. For the dowries and the sale at Fossano: M.7,c.i,n.3;M.216,1611 June 3; Pola,v.1,p.412. For the Turin censo: M.28,n.7.

half the total at the time of his death. Arduino's reflected glory probably also played a part in the important marriage of Pietro Francesco's son, Giovenale Maria, to the daughter of the Primo Presidente of the Senato, conte Canda di Caselette. But Pietro Francesco naturally gave smaller dowries, more in fitting with his less important social position; moreover, the decision to send three of his five daughters to nunneries (albeit fashionable nunneries), limited the size of his expenditure. But he still had to find over L.16,250, and was forced to alienate a censo over the comunità of Forno of over L.700 (114 doppie), while leaving a debt of at least L.3000 for Bianca Benedetta's dowry at the time of his death.(51)

The position was far worse for the Castello Inferiore. The successful careers of Arduino and Giacomo Antonio had undoubtedly protected the whole consortile, closely linked by the marriage of Bianca Benedetta, of the Castello Superiore, to Lodovico, of the Castello Inferiore. Arduino had even guaranteed Bianca Benedetta's dowry, while he later secured the appointment of her son, Giovanni Battista, as page at the ducal court. In a similar manner, Carlo, Giacomo Antonio's son, was probably responsible for the appointment of Giovanni Battista's sisters, Giuliana and Anna, as damigelle d'onore to Margherita di Savoia, Duchess of Mantua.(52)

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(51) For the dowries of Arduino's daughters, see note (31). For those of Pietro Francesco's children: M.7,c.i,ns.10,13,14;c.ii,n.1; M.15,c.i, ns.3,4,6,7;c.ii,ns.1,11-13;M.210, s.v.'Cuorgnè'; Pola, v.2,p.482; and note (7). For the alienation of Entraque: M.213,s.v.'Entraque',n.28.

(52) For Arduino's guarantee: M.7,c.i,n.4. For Giovanni Battista: M.219, 1657 July 6; M.222,1653 March 17. For his sisters: M.219,1656 Sept.18; M.222,1661 April 13; M.210,s.v.'Cuorgnè'; M.8,n.29; Pola,v.2,pp.509, 515-16. The sisters were left legacies of 4000 ducatoni each by Margherita, 2/3 of which were left to Giovanni Battista.

But no member of the Castello Inferiore had played an important political role, and the family had not extended its possessions outside the Castellata. All capital expenditure hence had to be raised from its own limited resources. At the same time, the influence of the important representatives of the Castello Superiore may have been responsible for the ambitious marriages of Giovanni Battista and his sisters. Giovanni Battista's marriage into the prominent Tana family in 1667 brought a large dowry of over L. 19,000 (2800 scudi). But he had only been able to cover the costs of his two sister's dowries of L.10,000 in 1664 with the final, long-delayed payment of his mother's dowry. Undoubtedly, Maria Violante's marriage to the important banker, conte Turinetti di Pertengo, had increased Giovanni Battista's credit; and Turinetti at once took over the management of Giovanni Battista's affairs, frequently reprimanding his brother-in-law's extravagance. But even without this ill-timed extravagance, the resources of the Castello Inferiore - even when replenished by Cristina's opportune inheritance of a tasso over Cercenasco and censi and lands in Candiolo and Chieri - seemed insufficient.(53)

By the end of the 17th century, the position had considerably deteriorated. Both Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio, of the Castello Superiore,

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(53) For the marriages: M.7,c.i,ns.15-17; M.11,n.2; M.14,c.i,n.15. For Turinetti's management: M.129,1658 May 10, and many other letters in MM. 130,219,223. For Cristina's inheritances: M.8,n.3½; M.9,c.i, n.5; M.26,n.54; M.213,s.v. 'Cercenasco', 'Candiolo', ns.7-9,12,14; s.v. 'Chieri', ns.23-28; M.81,n.34; M.220, 1677 Dec. 21.

and Ignazio Filiberto and his brothers, of the Castello Inferiore, had embarked on military careers. But their expenses exceeded their stipends, and in 1691, Giovenale Maria was only able to pay for his son's equipment by the alienation of his palace at Fossano. During the 1690-96 war, Cristina, of the Castello Inferiore, administered the estates for her sons, and was forced to alienate her tasso over Cercenasco and sell censi to raise over L.17,000. In the following war, she borrowed at least L.17,750 between 1703 and 1714, and sold her land in Candiolo and Chieri - over 100 giornate - between 1713 and 1719 for probably considerably more than L.10,000. At the same time, the provision of dowries for Giovanni Battista's daughters, Angelica Vittoria and Teresa, in 1700 and 1708, cost L.20,000, of which over L.12,500 were raised by further loans and alienations. The inheritance of Carlo Antonio's share of the Castello Inferiore in 1704 involved yet another capital payment of nearly L.30,000 for his sister, Elena's claims; in 1715, over L.24,000 were still owing.(54)

Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio, of the Castello Superiore, also began to feel the strain. A document written soon after his death in 1731 praised his careful management of his estates: but his income was only

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(54) For the military careers: M.3,ns.12-14;M.4,ns.1-12; AST III, Controllo, s.1698 in 1699,f.76; Patenti 5, f.136; Patenti 9,f.143;Patenti 12,f.17; Patenti 13,f.39; Patenti 17,f.167. For the Fossano alienation: M.216, 1691 March 20. For Cristina's alienations: M.8,ns.33,35;M.13,n.28; M.14,c.i,ns.6,20;M.15,c.ii,n.9;M.16,ns.77-82,84-87;M.17,n.14;M.18, ns.1,31;M.26,n.66; M.48,ns.23,25-27; M.129,1703 May 9; M.130, 1693 Nov.21; M.213,s.v. 'Cercennasco', 1691 May 16; M.210 s.v. 'Cuorgne', 1698 Jan.8, 1700 Feb,19; AST III, Controllo, s.1708-20,ff.90-92. For the payment to Elena: M.20,n.14; M.213,s.v.'Chieri',ns.36,37;s.v. 'Candiolo',ns.12,13;M 218,1709 June 19

calculated at 100 doppie a year (approximately L.1550), although he apparently left 1000 doppie (L.16,000) in cash when he died. Between 1695 and 1700, he had had to provide dowries for his seven sisters; even though three of the sisters became nuns, while the other four married into not very distinguished families, receiving small dowries, his capital expenditure had been over L.35,000, of which 2/3 had been raised by the alienation of his remaining possessions in Fossano and Genola. In 1710, he had been unable to find the L.10,000 required for the purchase of Ferdinando's share of the Castello Superiore, and had been forced to hire out his mills in the Castellata. After Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio's death, his son, Ignazio Maria, was forced to borrow the whole L.9000 for the dowry of his sister, Barbara Amedea, and guarantee his mother's dower of L.1200 a year (representing a capital of L.28,650) over his possessions in the Castellata.(55)

In 1715, the financial position of Giuseppe Lodovico, of the Castello Inferiore, was so desperate that he appealed to his mother and brothers to settle the debts he had run up for his ordinary living expenses, amounting to over L.7000. When he died in 1716, his brother and successor, Ignazio Filiberto, found the primogeniture in large part mortgaged, and in very bad condition. Within one year, he had to find

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(55) For the estimate of income: M.11,n.3,ff.15-16. For the dowries and alienations: M.7,c.i,ns.1,20-23; c.ii,ns.3-5; M.18,n.3; M.216, 1696 Feb.8; AST III, Controllo, a.1694 in 1695, f.67; a.1699,f.121. For the 1710 purchase: M.48,n.28. For Barbara Amedea's dowry, 1732: M.7,c.i,n.27; M.11,n.5. For the dower; M.11,ns.3,4.

L.10,000 for the dowry of his sister Teresa. During the remainder of his life, he contracted a long series of debts, with increasing difficulty as his credit grew smaller. Only at the end of his life did his position improve, with the unexpected inheritance of the Chioatero possessions, on the death of his nephew, Giuseppe Emanuele. The large estates at Carignano and Piobesi were sold to his cousin, conte Turinetti, in 1740, for L.82,000, spent entirely on liquidating debts of his own and of the Chioatero inheritance. But on his death in 1743, Ignazio Filiberto's debts - apart from the unpaid L.15,000 dowry of his daughter, Maria Cristina - were still calculated at over L.15,000.(56)

The last male heir of the Castello Inferiore, Maurizio, tried to repudiate both the Rivara and the Chioatero inheritances. With his forced acceptance, he became liable, not only for his brother's debts, but also for his sister-in-law's dower, calculated by the Senato at L.56,500. The sale of the remaining Chioatero possessions - a vineyard at Rivalba, and the fee (with a vineyard) of Cosrazze in the country of Nice - only raised a further L.28,000.(57)

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(56) For Giuseppe Lodovico: M.5,c.ii,n.2; M.20,n.14. For Teresa's dowry: M.7,c.i,n.24. For Ignazio Filiberto's debts: M.8,c.i,n.18; M.14,c.i, ns.9,22; c.ii,n.4; M.16,ns.90-95,99,101; M.18,ns.5-8; M.212, 1743 Sept.1; M.218, 1739 July 26. For the Chioatero inheritance: M.14, c.i,ns.22,25,26; M.130, 1677 May 16; M.129, 1743 Dec.30, 1744 Feb.17, and passim; M.212. For Maria Cristina's dowry: M.7,c.i, 1741 July 28.

(57) For the acceptance: M.129, 1743 June 28. For the Chioatero inheritance, see note (56). For the dower: M.7,c.i,ns.25,28-30; M.14,c.i,n.15; AST III, Patenti, R.208,f.59.

On Maurizio's death in 1744, the possessions of the Valperga di Rivara were finally reunited. But Ignazio Maria had little reason to be satisfied: the dowries of his maternal aunts, Angelica and Isabella, and of his sister, Rosa Angelica, between 1748 and 1759, cost a further L.32,000. In 1762, the mills of the Castellata were hired out for 8 years for L.4000 to raise Teresa's spiritual dowry. In 1764, Vincenzo Ignazio Domenico inherited debts of over L.30,000 apart from unpaid dowries. When his sister, Tecla, married in 1767, Vincenzo Ignazio Domenico made a last, desperate appeal to Carlo Emanuele III for permission to mortgage his remaining estates in the Castellata for 10 years, to raise the dowry of L.12,000.(58)

The crisis of the Rivara economy was undoubtedly caused by the size and number of dowries. Between 1695 and 1767, there had been 16 daughters, whose dowries had cost L.122,300. In the same period, only three male members of the family had married, one of them within the family consortile; the wives of both the other two had survived their husbands, gaining as their dowers a capital of probably over L.70,000.(59)

At first, the sale of possessions outside the Castellata, especially by the Castello Superiore, covered, for the most part, this capital

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(58) For the dowry: M.7,c.i,ns.31-34, 1759, Nov. 19; c.ii,ns. 6-8; AST III, Patenti, R.208,f.59.

(59) For the dowries, see notes (53) - (58). The dower of Rosa Caterina Pastoris was L.56,500 (note (57)), paid as a capital sum; that of Paola Lodovica was L.28,650, of which the usufruct was paid at 4%, or L.1200 a year.

expenditure. The presence of enteryrising local capitalists in the Castellata facilitated the feudataries' credit. Between 1691 and 1710, Giovanni Battista Oberto spent nearly L.38,000 in loans to and purchases from various members of the consortile; he acquired part of the Fossano-Genola possessions, almost bought Ferdinando's quarter of the Castellata, and bought or hired most of the Castellata mills from the family. Giovanni Battista Mollo hired most of the mills as early as 1686; in 1703, he was given power of attorney by Cristina for her lands in Chieri; in subsequent years, he made continual loans to the family in return for the hire of the mills.(60) But there were limits to the credit of even these, extremely interested, capitalists. The continual alienations soon reduced the family resources to the possessions in the Castellata. The effect of the perequazione was to reduce still further this income. With the mortgage of the Castellata lands and rights, the Valperga di Rivara were on the verge of bankruptcy.

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(60) For Oberto: M.7,c.i,n.22; M.16,ns.79-82; M.48,ns.23-28,39; M.210, s.v. 'Cuorgnè', 1698 Jan.8; M.216, 1691 March 20; AST III, Controllo, a.1699, f.121. For Mollo: M.7,c.ii,ns.6-8; M.8,n.31; M.16,ns.75, 93; M.48,ns.26,39,56; M.213, s.v. 'Chieri', n.35.


TORINO
VERCELLI
ASTI
Chivasso
Ivrea
Moncalieri
Carmagnola
Carignano
Venaria
Collegno
Rivoli
Orbassano
Nichelino
Volpiano
Caluso
Cigliano
Santhià
Crescentino
Trino
Casale
Moncalvo
Poirino
Villastellone
Carmagnola
Pancalieri
Vinovo
Candiolo
Piobesi
Virle
Vigone
Cavaglià
Oldenico
Quinto
Oleggio
Romagnano
Gattinara
Borgosesia
Varallo
Serravalle
Fontanetto
Palazzolo
Balzola
Morano
Frassineto
Lauriano
Rondissone
Montanaro
Foglizzo
Settimo
Leini
Druento
Almese
Avigliana
Rosta
Buttigliera
Riva
Andezeno
Arignano
Pecetto
Chieri
Pino
Villanova
Castelnuovo
Montafia
Roatto
Cortazzone
Cellarengo
Valfenera
Isolabella
Portacomaro
Castagnole
Scurzolengo
Maretto
Moransengo
Grana
Montemagno
Casorzo
Penango
Ottiglio
Calliano
Rocchetta
Misto
Abrazia
Felizzano
Quattordio
Alessandria
Casale
Vercelli
Novara
Torino
Milano
Genova
Cuneo
Aosta
Pavia
Asti
Alba
Ivrea
Biella
Lanzo
Susa
Pinerolo
Saluzzo
Fossano
Mondovì
Ceva
Savona
Imperia
Sanremo
Ventimiglia
Nizza
Grenoble
Briançon
Modane
Chambéry
Lyon
Marseille
Milano
Genova
Bologna
Firenze
Roma
Napoli
Bari
Palermo
Catania
Messina
Reggio
Cagliari
Sassari
Trieste
Venezia
Verona
Mantova
Brescia
Bergamo
Como
Lecco
Sondrio
Trento
Bolzano
Udine
Gorizia
Pordenone
Belluno
Treviso
Padova
Rovigo
Ferrara
Ravenna
Forlì
Rimini
Pesaro
Ancona
Macerata
Ascoli
Teramo
Pescara
Chieti
Campobasso
Foggia
Benevento
Caserta
Salerno
Potenza
Matera
Taranto
Brindisi
Lecce
Cosenza
Catanzaro
Crotone
Vibo
Reggio
Trapani
Marsala
Mazara
Agrigento
Caltanissetta
Enna
Ragusa
Siracusa
Augusta
Noto
Pozzallo
Gela
Licata
Sciacca
Menfi
Castelvetrano
Partanna
Salemi
Gibellina
Alcamo
Castellammare
Monreale
Palermo
Bagheria
Termini
Cefalù
Milazzo
Barcellona
Patti
Lipari
Vulcano
Stromboli
Filicudi
Alicudi
Salina
Panarea
Ustica
Favignana
Levanzo
Marettimo
Pantelleria
Lampedusa
Linosa
Malta
Gozo
Comino
Tunisi
Bizerta
Biserta
Tabarka
Annaba
Bona
Algeri
Orano
Mostaganem
Tenes
Cherchell
Tipaza
Blida
Medea
Aumale
Setif
Constantine
Batna
Biskra
Touggourt
Ouargla
Ghardaia
El Golea
In Salah
Tamanrasset
Adrar
Beni Abbes
Colomb Bechar
Tlemcen
Nemours
Oujda
Taza
Fes
Meknes
Rabat
Sale
Casablanca
Mohammedia
Kenitra
Larache
Tetuan
Ceuta
Tarifa
Algeciras
Gibilterra
Cadice
Jerez
Siviglia
Huelva
Ayamonte
Faro
Lagos
Sagres
Capo San Vincenzo
Capo Finisterre
Vigo
Oporto
Coimbra
Lisbona
Setubal
Sines
Beja
Evora
Portalegre
Castelo Branco
Guarda
Viseu
Aveiro
Braga
Viana do Castelo
Valença
Monção
Melgaço
Orense
Zamora
Salamanca
Ciudad Rodrigo
Caceres
Merida
Badajoz
Almendralejo
Zafra
Huelva
Sevilla
Carmona
Ecija
Cordoba
Puente Genil
Lucena
Antequera
Malaga
Torremolinos
Fuengirola
Marbella
Estepona
Gibilterra
Algeciras
La Linea
San Roque
Ronda
Arcos
Jerez
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Pedrera
Marchena
Fuentes de Andalucia
Arahal
Paradas
Morón de la Frontera
Olivares
Alcalá de los Gazules
Medina Sidonia
Chiclana
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IV. The Saluzzo di Paesana.

1. The Saluzzo di Paesana, until the later 17th century.

i. The political importance of the Saluzzo di Paesana.

The family of the Saluzzo di Paesana originated with the grant of an appanage to Azzone by his brother Tommaso, Marquis of Saluzzo, in 1363. The appanage consisted of the fee of Castellar, in the valley of Bronda, a few miles to the south-west of Saluzzo, and of the fees of Paesana, Oncino, Ostana and Crissolo, in the upper valley of the Po.(1)

The Saluzzo di Paesana, like all the other collateral branches of the ruling family, played an important part in the history of the marquisate during the last two centuries of its existence. An important account of the disastrous years following the invasion of Charles VIII was written by Giovanni Andrea Saluzzo di Paesana. As a member of the Consiglio of the marquisate, ambassador to Charles VIII and Louis XI, to Lodovico il Moro and other despots, and close companion and follower of marquis Lodovico II, Giovanni Andrea was well-placed to record the tragedy of the opening years of the 16th century. His violent

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(1) The original grant also consisted of the fees of Sanfront, in the Po Valley, between Paesana and Saluzzo, and of Monasterolo, slightly north-west of Savigliano; both these fees were soon alienated. The creation of the appanage is printed in G.B. Moriondo: Monumenta Aquensia, Turin, 1789-90, v.2, p.493, n.226; see also D. Muletti: Memorie storico-diplomatiche appartenenti alla Città ed ai Marchesi di Saluzzo, Saluzzo, v.3, (1830), p.391; v.4, (1830), pp.47-48, 317.

opposition to the pro-French policy of Lodovico's widow, Margherita di Foix, led to his exclusion from power and virtual exile in the final years of his life.(2)

Not only Giovanni Andrea, but most of the old courtiers and members of the Saluzzo family, were ousted from political power by Margherita di Foix. The eldest branch of the Paesana family, however, probably supported the French. No love was lost between Giovanni Andrea and Agostino, and political differences were surely coloured by personal feelings. After the French annexation of the marquisate in 1548, Agostino's son, Baldassarre, became Ecuyer of Henry II, and bought the fee of La Morra di Saluzzo; when Gian Lodovico, the last Marquis of Saluzzo, died, it was not Baldassarre, but Giovanni Andrea's son, Gian Michele, who claimed the marquisate from the French, as the nearest relative and heir (1563). The only result was Gian Michele's imprisonment in France by Henry II, until he renounced his claims; the formal act of protest which he drew up on his return to Saluzzo served little but his pride.(3)

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(2) The Charnet, or diary, has been printed by V. Promis: 'Memoriale di Gio. Andrea Saluzzo di Castellar dal 1482 al 1528', Miscellanea di storia italiana, t.8,1869,pp.409-625. See also, C. Colombo: 'Giovanni Andrea Saluzzo di Castellar', Studi Saluzzesi, B.S.S.S., v.10, Pinerolo, 1901, pp.243-74; Muletti, op.cit., v.6 (1833), p.412.

(3) Muletti (v.6, p.195) judges Margherita di Foix's policy. Giovanni Andrea in his diary described Agostino as his "dappoco e malvagio cugino" (Colombo,op.cit., p.251), and, on noting his death in 1521, wrote: "mio cusino Custino era malissimo voluto da tuti li subditi per essere più che tiranno...; fece testamento, et lo fece bestiale". (Muletti, op.cit., v.6, pp.394-95).
For Baldassarre: M.ll; Manno, s.v. 'Saluzzo di Paesana'.
Gian Michele's protest is printed in, Muletti, op.cit., v.6,pp.298-99; C.F. Savio: Saluzzo, Storia dal 1635 al 1730. Saluzzo, 1928, p.167,n.

The French policy of selling lands and titles tended to create a new class of nobles. After the conquest of the marquisate by Carlo Emanuele I in 1588, the same policy was continued and accelerated. The rights and liberties of the communes, as expressed by their deputies in the Congregazione Generale, were ignored or denied. A part of the old Saluzzese nobility, headed by Michelantonio Saluzzo della Manta and many members of the Della Chiesa family, was won over, by its confirmation in office and by the donation of new fees; a host of new - Piedmontese - nobles arose, with titles and lands in the Saluzzese. By 1630, the only terra of the marquisate still not infeudated were the capital, Saluzzo, and the important centres of Carmagnola, Dronero and Revello; fifteen years later, both Revello and Dronero had lost their independence.(4)

The effect of these new infeudations was probably to create a certain coldness and detachment on the part of the old, unfavoured, aristocracy. Time was needed for the most ardent supporters of the independent (and subsequently French) marquisate to adapt themselves to the rule of their former enemy, the Duke of Savoy; especially when this new rule meant a subordination of positions of importance and

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(4) No study has yet been made of the administration of the marquisate under Savoyard rule. Some details can be found in, C.F. Savio: Saluzzo marchesato e diocesi nel secolo XVII (1601-1635), Saluzzo, 1915, pp.9-26, 69-70, 147-52, and especially, pp.181-93; id., Saluzzo nel secolo XVIII (1730-1792), Turin, 1941, pp.51-61; F.E. Bollati di Saint-Pierre: Atti e documenti delle antiche assemblee rappresentative nella Monarchia di Savoia, v.2 (1560-1706), Hist. pat. mon., t. 15, 1879; G. Manuel di San Giovanni: Memorie storiche di Dronero e della valle di Macra, 3 vols., Turin, 1868.

influence, guaranteed by blood-ties with the ruling house, to a new status of provincial nobility.

When Carlo Emanuele I failed in his invasion of Provence in 1592, Agostino Saluzzo di Paesana, together with many other Francophile, important Saluzzese nobles, began a rebellion in the marquisate, and invited Lesdiguères to invade. Even after his pardon, Agostino refused to reconcile himself to Savoyard rule, and retired to Alba, in the Monferrat, where he died fighting against Carlo Emanuele I, in 1613.(5)

For the other members of the Paesana family, submission was probably not so difficult. With the death of the last marquis, the subjection of the state to a foreign ruler was inevitable. At the same time, the Saluzzo di Paesana were supported by the Dukes of Savoy in their traditional persecution of the Protestant Valdesi. A large group of Valdesi lived at Paesana, spreading its influence over the whole valley of the Upper Po. From 1509 until 1514, Giovanni Andrea, with his cousins Agostino and Giorgio, had attempted to stamp out the heresy. Its survival, encouraged by the Huguenots in neighbouring France, was witnessed by the sack of Crissolo in 1551; in 1579, the Valdesi at Paesana were sufficiently strong to storm the castle at Paesana and kill Baldassarre's brother, Enrico. By 1620, the danger was judged so serious, that a Capuchin

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(5) Giuchenon, op.cit., livre II, pp.741-42, 748; P. Litta: Famiglie celebri italiane, s.v. 'Marchesi di Saluzzo', disp. 170-72, 174, 176, (1873-74).

mission was established at Paesana. When Vittorio Amedeo I renewed the persecution in 1633, Carlo, as feudatary of Paesana, took an active part in expelling the Valdesi. His failure was clearly shown in the second sack of Crissolo by the Valdesi in 1655.(6)

The support of the Dukes of Savoy in the struggle against the Valdesi, as well as their more general encouragement of the feudataries at the expense of the liberties of the comunità, probably played a large part in securing the loyalty of such an important family as the Saluzzo di Paesana. Gian Giacomo, Gian Michele's son, would appear to have played no part in the administration of the marquisate. But his son, Carlo, embarked on a military career, and took part, as a cavalry colonel, in the campaigns of Carlo Emanuele I and Vittorio Amedeo I. Carlo's son, Giovanni Giacomo, was a page at the court of Vittorio Amedeo I; while a grandson even wrote a panegyric of Carlo Emanuele II on his death in 1675.(7) The loyalty of the Saluzzo di Paesana was undoubted. But with the end of the marquisate, the family had lost its political importance.

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(6) Most details are to be found in Litta, op.cit., who also states that Agostino was suspected of Calvinism; this would help explain his opposition to Carlo Emanuele I. See also, Savio: Saluzzo marchesato e diocesi, pp.217-18, 251-52. For the Valdesi, see G. Jalla: Storia della riforma religiosa in Piemonte durante i regni di Carlo Emanuele I e Vittorio Amedeo I (1580-1637), Torre Pellice, 1936, who discusses the persecution of 1633 in v.2, pp.660-64.

(7) For the careers: Litta, op.cit.; and M.ll: 'Arbori genealogici'. The panegyric would seem to have been written by Giovanni Giacomo's namesake and youngest son at the age of 16: La Corte delle Virtù Reali al seguito di Carlo Emanuele Secondo, Dal Trono alla tomba..., Saluzzo, 1675.

Despite its undoubted wealth and great tradition, no member of the family held any administrative post until the end of the 17th century.

ii. The economic importance of the Saluzzo di Paesana.

In the last years of the marquisate, the possessions of the Saluzzo di Paesana were divided between the three branches of the family. In 1546, on the death of Giorgio, Gabriele, Marquis of Saluzzo, had ordered a new division of their fees. Two years later, when Giorgio's son, Gian Francesco, died without children, his fractional possessions were divided between the other two branches of the family. When Giorgio's brother, Gioffredo, died in 1579, this minor branch of the family became extinct.(8)

Baldassarre, of the senior branch of the family, had partially divided his possessions with his brother, Enrico, prior of Pagno. But by his will of 1564, Baldassarre established a primogeniture, in the first instance to his posthumous son, Agostino, otherwise to his brother, Enrico; only if all the male members of the family died, were the possessions to pass to the collateral branch.(9)

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(8) For the division; M.8, 1546 April 17; a previous division was made in 1502: M.8, 1502 Feb. 9. Giorgio's will can be found in: M.7, 1545 Sept. 20. When Gian Francesco died, his brother, Luchino, claimed the inheritance, but was excluded as he had taken orders: M.4, 1548 Jan 30; Feb. 1, 3; 1555 Dec. 28, 30; 1556 July 1; M.8, 1548, Jan.29; Feb.3; 1555 Nov. 20; 1557 Jan. 16; M.12, 1548 Jan.31; AST I, Saluzzo, M.8, s.v. 'Paesana', n.10. For the division of Gioffredo's inheritance: M.9, 1579 Dec. 9; 1581 May 2.

(9) For Baldassarre's division: M.4, 1556 Nov. 7; AST I, Saluzzo, M.8, s.v. 'Paesana', n.13; s.v. 'Pagno', n.5. His will is in: M.7, 1564 Aug. 28.

Already in 1497, Giovanni Andrea's inheritance from his father, Antonio, had been fully guarded against further division by the establishment of a primogeniture, with prohibitions of alienation and an elaborate system of substitutions. Giovanni Andrea's will of 1519 reiterated the same clauses. But when Gian Michele died without leaving a will, both his sons, Gian Andrea and Gian Giacomo, inherited together. Soon after, Gian Giacomo ceded his half of Paesana to his brother in return for an annual income, but on Gian Andrea's death in 1582, recovered the whole inheritance.(10)

On the death of Enrico in 1579, his nephew, Agostino, (Baldassarre's son), had recovered Enrico's possessions, despite the latter's attempt to bequeath them outside the family. Although Agostino's sister, Anna, married Gian Giacomo in 1582, relations between the brothers-in-law were extremely hostile, and probably aggravated by Agostino's political tendencies. In 1592, Agostino alienated a part of the fee of Oncino outside the family; ten years later, he alienated his fee of La Morra di Saluzzo, as well as his half of the fees of Paesana and Castellar. Gian Giacomo immediately claimed the nullity of a sale of inalienable fees, and was upheld by the Senate, forcing Agostino to rebuy his share of Paesana and Castellar. But when Agostino died in 1613, he tried once more to alienate his possessions outside the family, bequeathing them to

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(10) For Giovanni Andrea's inheritance, Colombo, op.cit., p.245. For his will of 1519: M.7, 1519 Feb. 22; 1520 Aug.23; Colombo, op.cit., pp.271-74. For Gian Giacomo's cession of 1575, in return for an annual 38 scudi: M.9, 1575 Jan.11; M.12, 1575 Jan.11.

his brother-in-law, conte Costanza di Costigliole. Giacomo's son, Carlo, at once protested, asserting at the same time the invalidity of the alienation of Oneino:

> "...qual non era statta fatta per alcuna necessità, ma solo per frodare detto Carlo che nel detto tempo era fanciullo, e suo padre non hebbe ardire d'opporsi al desiderio del detto fù Agostino pensando che più amorevole dovesse essere verso il Nepote, che non era stato verso il Cognato...".

Despite the claims of the Demesne that the fees escheat, Carlo won his case, and was invested with full possession of all three fees.(11)

From this date, the danger that the possessions of the family would again be divided rapidly diminished. When Carlo died in 1651, he left his possessions under primogeniture to his son Giovanni Giacomo. Both Giovanni Andrea and Nicolino made claims on the inheritance, and Giovanni Giacomo felt obliged to cede the latter 1/3 of the jurisdiction of Paesana and the former the allodial lands in Castellar, as well as part of the annual censo owed by the comunità of Paesana. But, by 1676, all the feudal rights had been recovered, including Nicolino's alienation of 1/6 of the fee of Paesana. Carlo Maria had been confirmed in the primogeniture by his father, Giovanni Giacomo, and

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(11) For Enrico's inheritance: M.8,1560 April 23; M.9, 1584, Oct. 3; M.12, 1579 Aug. 22; 1584 Oct.23; AST I, Saluzzo, M.8, s.v. 'Paesana', n.19. For the 1592 alienation: Gunsco, s.v. 'Oneino'. For that of 1602, to conte Ercole Negro di Sanfront: M.9, 1602 Jan. 26; M.36, 1602 May 8; M.4, 1602 Jan.26; AST II, la archiviazione, Feudi e Giurisdizione, M.1, n.12.For the 1613 dispute: M.4, 1613 July 10; M.9, 1613 Aug.15; M.36, 1613 Aug. 2; M.42, 1613 July 10; M.5, 1613, Aug. 3; Nov. 8; 1615 May 2; M.6, 1619 Feb. 5.

assured the future integrity of the fees, by formal renunciations from all male relatives taking holy orders.(12)

In the later 16th century, there are certain indications that the financial resources of the family were limited. Giovanni Andrea, after paying two dowries and four spiritual dowries for his daughters, as

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(12) For Carlo's will (of 1637): M.7, 1637 Aug.5. Immediately after Carlo's death, Giovanni Andrea had asserted his rights, despite his orders, and in 1652 Giovanni Giacomo felt obliged to pay him L.5300 (800 scudi d'Italia), besides the lands and censo. On the death of their mother, Lucrezia, in 1660, Giovanni Andrea inherited a further L.500 (M.7, 1660 Aug. 2). But his financial position was obviously precarious, and in 1674 he ceded all his lands and inheritances to his nephew, Carlo Maria, except for his palace at Pagno, in return for an annual income of L.400 (M.9, 1674 Oct. 31). The following year, he bequeathed all his possessions to the Jesuits in Chieri; but the inheritance was so overburdened with debts, especially to Carlo Maria, that the Jesuits preferred to renounce it (M.7, 1652 Junell; M.21, 1676 March 17).

Nicolino's position was even worse. After the cession of 1654 (M.9, 1613 Aug.15; 1664 Nov. 30; M.5, 1654 June 1), his debts accumulated so rapidly that in 1657 he alienated 1/6 of the fee for L.8000; Giovanni Giacomo appealed unsuccessfully for the annulment of the alienation (M.5, 1657 Jan.16, 25). Soon after, Nicolino was imprisoned for his debts - probably at his nephew's request (AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'S', M.22, 1660 Oct. 9. For the ability of a family to imprison temporarily a relative for debts, or other reasons, see V. Venturi: Alberto Radicati di Passerano, p.21,n.2). By 1664, Giovanni Giacomo made Nicolino a further payment of L.4000 (300 doppie d'Italia), besides promising him an annual income of L.300 (M.9, 1664 Nov.30). But Nicolino was apparently incorrigible: in 1674, Giovanni Giacomo's son, Carlo Maria, agreed to take over a debt of L.2800 to the comunità, besides another debt of L.500, in return for his annual pension (M.9, 1671 May 12; 1674, Oct.31; M.36, 1673 Jan.10; M.40, 1655 Oct.19). In 1676 Carlo Maria rebought the alienated 1/6 of Paesana for L.5800 (M.12, 1676 Feb. 3).

For Giovanni Giacomo's will: M.7, 1659 Jan.14. For the renunciations: M.9, 1679 April 15; 1690 Nov. 7; 1702 July 20; M.7, 1713 May 4.

well as another three spiritual dowries for a sister and two aunts, had already warned his successors against such expenses.(13)

In the 1580s, both Agostino and Gian Giacomo clearly found the capital expenditure of dowries extremely embarrassing. Agostino's finances were probably already weak. His mother and guardian, Cassandra, had sold a farm to her brother for 800 scudi in 1572. The unsuccessful rebellion against Carlo Emanuele I perhaps had economic repercussions. In the year of the rebellion, 1592, Agostino alienated part of Oncino; in 1598, he sold his palace at Saluzzo; in 1602, he sold the fee his father had bought at La Morra di Saluzzo, besides attempting to alienate his half of Paesana and Castellar, for a total 20,000 scudi. When his sister, Anna, married Gian Giacomo in 1582, Agostino was unable to raise the dowry of 4000 scudi, and only paid for it in 1595 with the alienation of a farm at Cervignasco.(14)

Gian Giacomo's position was probably little better. When his own sister, Ester, married Claude de Comiers in 1584, the 4350 scudi owing for her dowry, as well as for the legittima of their mother's dowry, were beyond his resources: he was forced to give her his fees of Crissolo and

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(13) Colombo, op.cit., p.256,n.4:
"et se lo faranno se ne pentiranno perchè non glie religioni ne religiosse più tenaci che sono questi frati..."

(14) For 1572: M.12, 1572 July 23. For the Oncino alienation: M.42, 1613 July 10; Guasco, s.v. 'Oncino'. For the sale of the palace: M.26 bis, 1598 July 28. For the 1602 alienation: M.9, 1602 Jan.26; M.4, 1602 Jan.26; M.22, 1602 March 21; M.36,1602-03; AST II, la archiviazione, Feudi e Giurisdizioni, M.1, n.12. For the dowry: M.9, 1595, June 3; M.20, 1595 Aug.21.

Ostana, and two mills at Castellar and Paesana. Soon after, in 1589, his only method of paying another debt of 4000 scudi was by hiring out his lands at Castellar for 13 years; while the following year he temporarily alienated half these lands to the tenant.(15)

But the embarrassment was probably of short duration. Gian Giacomo's son, Carlo, was able to raise nearly L.27,000 for the dowries of his daughters between 1631 and 1650, with no apparent strain on his finances. Moreover, the larger size of the dowry received by his son, Giovanni Giacomo (L.16,000), in comparison to those paid to the two daughters who married (L.9000 and L.15,225), was possibly indicative of his stronger economic, and social, position: Carlo may have been able to impose his own terms.(16) At all events, already from the early 17th century, the finances of the Saluzzo di Paesana probably showed a favourable balance, and no further signs of strain are to be found.

The possessions of the Saluzzo di Paesana lay for the most part in the mountainous region of the Saluzzese. Only Castellar, at a height of 1200 feet, still forms part of the plain. The fertile land yielded rich cereal crops, besides a certain quantity of vines (alteni), and mulberry trees; a substantial income was derived from the large herds

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(15) For the dowry: M.8, 1544-1582; M.9, 1586 May 27; 1588 Jan.30; 1589 July 6; M.21, 1594 Dec.12; M.35, 1613 May 28; M.39 'Confronto che si fa...'. For the hire: M.14, 1589 Feb. 8; M.39, 'Memoria delle misure...'. For the alienation: M.14, 1590-1592; M.6, 'Atti...'.

(16) For the dowries: M.7, 1637 Aug.5; M.9, 1667-1668; M.10, 1639 Feb.19; 1646 Jan. 9, 29; 1650, May 16; 1678 Nov. 10.

of cattle. In the early 17th century, the Saluzzo di Paesana owned about 200 giornate, almost entirely feudal, besides a further 80 giornate of woodland, on the boundaries of Castellar and Saluzzo.(17)

The commune of Paesana, at a height of over 1600 feet, was in large part covered by meadows and woods. Apart from a supplementary income from mainly poor-quality cereals, chestnuts and walnuts, its main wealth was derived from its livestock. The Saluzzo di Paesana owned only about 14 giornate of feudal land, besides a wood of 250 giornate, with the disputed possession of 150 giornate of pasture-land in the more mountainous part of the commune. However, a large additional income was derived (especially in the 18th century) from the exploitation of marble-quarries, as well as of small deposits of iron (-ore) and lime (stone).(18)

Oncino and Ostana are already in the Alps, at a height of 4000 feet; the land consisted almost entirely of meadows and woods, with the main income from the large number of cattle; in the 18th century, small deposits of marble, iron (-ore) and lime (stone) may have been exploited. Crissolo, over 4100 feet, included within its boundaries a large part of the great

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(17) For the measurements: M.6, 1611, 'Atti tra il sig.r conte Carlo Saluzzo...'; 1621 Sept.9; M.39, 'Memoria delle misure...'; 1627 Sept.27. For the agriculture, G. Nandi: Statistica della provincia di Saluzzo, Saluzzo, v.1 (1833), p.226.

(18) M.6, 1611, 'Atti...'; 1621 Sept 9; M.21, 1594 Dec.12; AST III, Consegnamenti, R.197, f.454. Nandi, op.cit., v.1, pp.67-69, 73, 193-95; v.2 (1835), pp.52-53. For the marble-quarries: M.40, 'Redditi spettanti al Feudo di Paesana'; 1756 Jan.10; 1762 Jan.27; 1765 Jan.5; 1771 Aug.19.

Monviso mountain and the source of the Po; the land was even less cultivable than at Cucino and Ostana, and the commune depended for its income on its livestock. But in all three of these mountain villages, the peasants were forced to migrate annually to the plains. The land was almost worthless, and in fact, the Saluzzo di Paesana claimed no possessions, except a large meadow (Pian del Re) at Crissolo.(19) In all probability, the family owned herds of cattle, which - apart from the feudal rights - constituted its main income.

The income from the feudal rights was considerable, especially in the principal fees of Paesana and Castellar. All the comunità except Castellar owed annual payments, amounting to nearly L.3000 at the end of the 17th century; in addition, the feudataries possessed the monopoly of the communal mills and tolls (pedaggi), besides receiving payments for the right to pasture and to cut wood in the forests. At the time of the perequazione, the total income from rights, monopolies and emphyteuses was at least L.7000. (Appendix 16).

The inevitable, periodic disputes between feudataries and comunità broke out over these monopolies, with the resistance of the comunità growing weaker in the early 17th century. In Paesana, the feudataries continually asserted their monopoly of the mills (1522-1580), besides exacting 'toleration' payments from the Valdesi (1549-1579). In Castellar there was a long dispute over the bandi campestri, in particular

(19) M.21, 1594 Dec.12; M.6, 1611, 'Atti...'; 1621 Sept.9; 1691 May 5. Bandi, op.cit., v.1, pp.67-69, 73, 197.

over the rights of pasturage (1577-1613), while Carlo claimed his right to celebrate mass in his own private chapel (1611, 1643). But the longest and most serious quarrels were, inevitably, over the payment of the annual dues. In the 1630s and 1640s, the comunità of Oneino was continually in debt for its annual censo of 52 2/3 ducati, and tried fitfully to reduce the payment in its conversion to money of account. In Paesana, the dispute which began in the 1540s was only finally settled after the rerequasione, in 1738. Paesana (like the whole marquisate) was severely depopulated by the plague of 1630; it also suffered from the expulsion of the Valdesi in 1633. Already by 1618, the comunità owed over 7000 scudi for arrears of censi. In 1636, the total communal debt was calculated at over L.40,500; a proposal was made to alienate all the communal lands (5000 giornate only fit for pasturage and 365 giornate of cultivated land), though in the end only 200 giornate of meadow-land were alienated to Gian Giacomo. But by 1651, the arrears of the feudal censo were once more 6000 scudi.(20)

The position of the comunità, overburdened by taxes, was certainly weak. In 1612, Carlo bought a censo over the comunità of Paesana of

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(20) For Paesana: M.28, 1522-23; M.13, 1524 Feb.1; 1525 Aug.30; 1580 July 26 (mills). M.13, 1549 Nov.3; 1579 March 24; and the consegnamenti in note (14) (Valdesi). M.13, 1606 Dec.30; 1614 July 8; 1618 June 9; 1668 April 29; 1673 July 11; 1730 Dec.30; 1738 Aug.22; 1760 Aug.29; 1761 July 9; 1769 Oct. 10; M.25, 1715 Jan.27; M.28,1546-1646; M.29, 1611 'Atti...'; M.30, 1614-1619; 1636 Aug.5; 1647-1649; 1673 June 14; 1674 Jan.19; 1732 Jan.14; M.40,1627 Nov.23; 'Transatione...'; AST III, art.472, s.v. 'Paesana', 1649 (censo); For Castellar: M.32, 1577-1613; 1607 Jan8; M.15, 1607 March 17 (bandi campestri). M.15, 1611 April 23; 1643 Jan.21 (chapel). For Oneino: M.16, 1562-1563; 1633-1645; 1639 Dec. 22; 1645 Dec.27; 1645-1647; M.35, 1646 Nov.23.

L.440 (200 doppie di Spagna); in 1629 and 1631, two more censi were bought for L.1750 (600 scudi and 181 1/2 doppie di Spagna); in 1645, a new loan was made to pay for the quartiere d'inverno. In the 1640s and 1650s, over L.1600 were loaned to the comunità of Castellar, to help pay for the tasso, sussidio militare, and quartiere d'inverno, while in 1658 an old censo, at the high rate of interest of 8%, was bought for L.1370 (200 scudi). In 1645 and 1664, two censi, created in the early 17th century, were bought over the comunità of Oneino for a capital of over L.1250. In 1657, four censi, created in the late 16th century, were bought over the comunità of Pagno and the neighbouring Brondello for L.2900.(21)

But relations between the feudataries and the comunità - to judge from the documents in the family and communal archives - would seem to have been less strained than elsewhere. The lawsuits in this period were both less frequent and less violent than in the Langhe or the Canavese. The censi bought by the feudataries, although clearly showing their economic control over the comunità, were surprisingly few in a period of nearly a century. Even if the comunità were as weak as the increasing

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(21) For Paesana: M.13, 1705 July 19; 1629 Sept.10; 1631 Sept.1; M.30, 1636 Aug.5. For Castellar: M.32, 1725 Nov.28; M.40, 1731 June 6; M.15, 1672 Dec.20; 1658 Sept.6; 1603 March 24. For Oneino: M.16, 1631 July 16; 1633 April 28; 1643 Sept.22; 1645 April 29; Dec.27; M.40, 'Rubrica, e Sommario....'. For Pagno: M.23, 1657 Feb.8; Oct.4; M.15, 1596 March 18; 1597 June 26; 1598 Aug.22; 1599 Jan.4; 1622 March 14; 1733 Aug.12; 'Liquidazione tra la comunità di Pagno...'; M.33, 1622 Jan.14; M.25, 1659 Feb.20.

burden of State taxes apparently indicates, the Saluzzo di Paesana do not seem to have exploited their predominant position excessively (unlike so many other feudataries), but merely to have insisted on the continued exaction of their traditional rights. They were even prepared to compromise on certain occasions: in 1607, Carlo agreed to register his allodial land in Castellar, and at the same time ceded the comunità the right of the hunt, and certain, limited, rights of pasturage. In 1674 Carlo Maria, once he had gained recognition of his right to acquire allodial lands in Paesana, as well as of the payment of the annual censo, agreed to pay taxes for all allodial possessions, and, even more important, to limit his acquisition of censi over the comunità to the total amount he owed in taxes.(22)

Why the feudataries did not display a more aggressive attitude is difficult to explain. Perhaps their own resources were too limited in this period. There is no method of calculating their income, but if they received any surplus, they may have preferred to reinvest it in their possessions (especially in livestock); perhaps they only took a limited interest in the administration of their fees, and preferred simply to lead the normal life of important nobles in their palace at Saluzzo.

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(22) For Castellar: M.15, 1607 March 17. For Paesana: M.40, 1674 Jan.19.

2. The expansion of the family economy in the late 17th century.

i. Carlo Maria's economic activities, 1659-1715.

When Giovanni Giacomo died unexpectedly in 1659, he left as heir a child of little more than 10 years. Until about 1670, the family possessions were administered by Carlo Maria's mother and guardian, Caterina Marzia Gandolfi di Ricaldone. When Carlo Maria, still a minor, married in 1665, his mother signed the marriage contract.(23)

Undoubtedly, the ten years or more of administration in the interests of a minor, carefully regulated and controlled by the Courts, benefited the family economy. Expenditure was limited to the necessary minimum compatible with the dignity of the family, while all surplus income accumulated or was safely invested.(24)

The family economy, at least from the middle years of the century, had shown no signs of strain. But equally there had been little indication of extraordinary wealth. The Saluzzo di Paesana seemed a provincial noble family with comfortable, but (at least superficially) not outstanding, resources. Nor could ten years of careful administration have radically changed their condition. Hence, it is difficult to account for the large capital resources utilized by Carlo Maria from the 1670s

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(23) M.10, 1665 May 5.

(24) Nani, pp.238-44; Pertile, v.3, pp.396-414; Leicht, Il diritto privato, v.1, pp.240-44.

until the end of his life. The rise in the price of land in this period probably reflected a similar increase in the prices of all produce. The landed possessions of the family were extremely limited in 1659: in Paesana, apart from a wood of 250 giornate, and 150 giornate only fit for pasturage, only 14 giornate of cultivable land were owned; in Castellar, there were 200 giornate of cultivable land, besides 80 giornate of woodland on the boundaries of Saluzzo; in Crissolo, virtually no land at all. In the absence of clear evidence, the only possible explanation would seem to be that the Saluzzo di Paesana derived their wealth not from the possession of land, but of livestock, dependent on the meadows and woods both owned and (probably) hired by the family. The existence of such livestock cannot be proved, as the family kept no account books, while the consegnamenti recorded only landed possessions. But there is no reason to doubt that the Saluzzo di Paesana, like most other proprietors in the Saluzzese (especially in the more mountainous areas) owned large herds of cattle. This main income (which certainly increased with the general rise of prices in this period) was supplemented by incomes from the more fertile lands of Castellar, the marble-quarries of Paesana and probably Oncino, and the feudal rights.(25)

Carlo Maria's resources were clearly reflected in his ability to pay L.17,500 into the società dei grani in 1695, even after the devastation

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(25) Prato, p.185, notes a very probable rise in the price of livestock in the 18th century.

of the Saluzzese by the French in 1691 and 1693, and the consequent loss of revenue.(26) But even more indicative of his liquid assets were the loans he made to the military Treasury in the 1680s and again in 1702, repaid subsequently by his personal exaction of the tasso and sussidio militare owed by the comunità in the marquisate. The irregularity of the procedure led to an enquiry in 1726 into the conduct of the tesoriere generale di milizia, Antonio Bernardo Bagnolo, accused of defrauding the Treasury of almost L.500,000. Baldassarre, as Carlo Maria's heir, was ordered to account for a total of L.66,370, but successfully justified his father's conduct, stating that the loans were made:

> "...per poter proveder, come con tal mezzo ha in buona parte provisto, li denari necessarij per poter anticipare come ha anticipato le paghe alle truppe di Sua Maestà nel tempo e tempi che non poteva ancor esigere, et aver esatti dalle Città e Communità li fondi dalle Regie Finanze d'ordine di Sua Maestà assignatili..."

and adding that:

> "...quanto alle partite, che detto fù Signor Conte Mio Padre ha conseguito per sua indennizazione di detti partiti con qualche trasporto di tempo ciò è stato a causa della guerra, et accidenti della medema, che rendendo giornalmente la Cassa della Tesoreria di detto Signor Bagnolo in bisogno di ricever nuovi fondi per fare le necessarie anticipate delle paghe de soldati posero in necessità detto Signor Bagnolo di pretendere, et il detto mio Signor Padre di soffrire cossi astretto dalla necessittà del Regio Servizio li detti trasporti."

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(26) Accounts of the devastations and grave loss of income can be found in: M.12, 1693 May 2; M.16, 1693 May 2; AST III, art.472, s.v. 'Paesana', 1694; 'Pagno', 1692, 1693,1694; 'Saluzzo', 1691. Carlo Maria's palace at Paesana, valued at L.28,500, was burnt by the French.

Evidently, the organization of the State finances, especially in times of war, was by no means satisfactory, and government authorities were sometimes compelled to appeal for assistance to the richest local feudataries.(27)

Carlo Maria's acquisitions were in keeping with his financial resources. As early as 1668, he had tried to revendicate the fee of La Morra di Saluzzo as direct heir of the Marquises of Saluzzo, former owners of the fee. In 1685, he rebought the fee of Crissolo from its owner, conte Francesco Maria Losa, for L.20,000, and began a lawsuit to reclaim the other fee of Ostana, alienated by Gian Giacomo in 1588.(28) Between 1671 and 1714, he bought over 60 giornate in Paesana and Castellar, besides 3 mills and a pestling-mill in Oncino, for nearly L.12,500. At the end of his life, in the 1710s, he bought 3 farms of 380 giornate in the nearby Barge, as well as a few giornate in Saluzzo and Villanovetta, at a cost of probably L.48,000. Already in 1687, he had bought a second palace in Saluzzo, and in 1694 he confirmed his social position by the purchase of a house in Turin for L.11,000 (Appendix 17). In 1683, he apparently even invested in a silk factory in Saluzzo.(29)

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(27) M.37, 1659 July 19; 1726 May 5; M.38, 1730 June 19; AST III, art.496, M. 'B'-1, ns.13-17; art. 454, M.'B' - 1; Quazza, v.1, pp.61,72; Einaudi, Le entrate pubbliche, pp.154-58.

(28) For La Morra: M.21,1668 Sept.28. For Crissolo: M.17, 1676 July 11,12; 1685 Aug.27; 1686 Aug.26; M.39,1686 Aug.26; M.16, 1693 May 2; M.5, 1688 April 3; AC Crissolo, M.54,C.4. For Ostana: M.34,1685 Aug. 2.

(29) The patent is mentioned and partially printed in Savio: Saluzzo: Storia dal 1635 al 1730, p.99; id. Saluzzo nel secolo XVIII, p.93 n.1; F. Roggero-Bargia: Saluzzo, Saluzzo, 1885, p.172.

At the same time, he invested heavily in the purchase of tassi and censi. During the war, in 1696-97, he invested almost L.57,500 in the purchase of tassi over his fees of Pecetto, Oneino and Crissolo; in 1710, he bought another tasso in time of war over the city of Saluzzo for L.43,500. Even after the government rebought part of the tassi in 1699, Carlo Maria had still invested a capital of L.98,000, which, as calculated in scudi, would probably increase with the rise in the exchange-rate. in 1704, he bought a censo from the city of Turin for L.60,000; soon after, he loaned one of the most important banking companies in Turin L.100,000. At the time of his death in 1715, he left credits of over L.405,000, yielding an annual income of nearly L.19,000. Arrears of interests, and cash found at his death (over L.77,000) brought his liquid assets to a total of over L.500,000, besides nearly 1600 ounces of jewellery (Appendix 17).

The marriage of Carlo Maria's son, Baldassarre, in 1679, to Costanza Camilla Arborio di Gattinara, was of fitting importance. As widow of marchese Balbis, Costanza received the interest of half her first dowry and aumento, calculated at L.580 a year; as dama d'onore, she was given a dote di corte of L.25,000 (5000 ducatoni); as dowry, she was promised L.27,500 (5500 ducatoni). The dowry of Carlo Maria's daughter, Cristina Maria, in 1706, was somewhat smaller: L.25,000; the other five daughters were sent to fashionable local nunneries, with spiritual dowries of a total L.11,500.(30)

(30) For Baldassarre: M.10,1679 April 15; 1702 March 15; M.9, 1724 July 10. For Cristina Maria: M.7,1713 Oct.24; M.9,1724 Nov.7. For the nuns: M.10,1683 June5; 1684,June9;1688 June 26;1700 May 7; 1701 March 2.

Carlo Maria's total capital expenditure between 1670 and 1715 can hardly have been much less than L.600,000, representing an annual average of over L.13,000.(31)

In his will of 1713, Carlo Maria gave his wife the usufruct of his tasso of L.43,500 and of his palace in Saluzzo. His second son, Tomaso Adalberto, was given the usufruct of the farms at Barge, of certain other censi, and of his widow's usufruct after her death. All the other possessions - including the credits, of which an inventory was to be made - were placed under a primogeniture. Tomaso, an abbot, was also advised to marry:

> "...per assicurarsi al meglio che può la continuazione, e progresso di sua famiglia."

As an added inducement, he was offered full possession of all his usufructs, should Baldassarre's son, Carlo Tomaso, have no male heir by the end of 1722.(32)

ii. The limited effect of the perequazione.

The increased activity of Vittorio Amedeo II, especially towards the end of Carlo Maria's life, created the same reactions among the feudataries and comunità of the Saluzzese as among those of the Langhe or the Canavese.

An attempt by the royal Patrimoniale in 1717 to claim the pedaggio in the fees of Paesana, Castellar, Crissolo and Oncino was successfully

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(31) Even if the L.13,500 Carlo Maria received for his wife's dowry in 1665 (M.10,1665 May 5), and the L.10,500 he received for his mother's dowry between 1672 and 1677 (M.23,1672 Feb.18) are deducted, the total of L.612,600 falls to little under L.590,000.

(32) M.7,1713 May 4; M.25,1715 Jan.28; Feb.1; 1741 Aug. 8.

defeated by Carlo Maria.(33) At the same time, he was forced to defend his feudal rights against the renewed opposition of the comunità. At Oneino, Carlo Maria had successfully claimed his possession of the mills and even as early as the 1670s. In Castellar, in 1707, he asserted his right to the monopoly of the woods. At Paesana, he and his son, Baldassarre, found themselves involved in a seemingly endless series of disputes over all the feudal rights. In 1682, and again in 1698 and 1711, the comunità tried to usurp the right to pasture on the mountainside. From 1698 until 1711, and then again from 1715, the comunità claimed the right to cut wood in the forests; despite condemnations by the Camera in 1727 and 1734, the same claim was asserted in 1762 and 1780. From 1703 until 1712, and again in 1726-27, the feudataries had to defend their monopoly of the mills; condemnations by the Camera from 1727 until 1762 seemed wholly ineffective. In 1721, the appointment of the podestà was disputed, and Baldassarre admitted the comunità's right to approve appointments every two years. In 1726, it was the turn of the feudal monopoly of fishing in the Po.(34)

But by far the most violent dispute was over the payment of the feudal censo. As at Oneino, the quarrel centred on the method of

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(33) M.5, 1717 June 12.

(34) For Oneino: M.35,1672 Jan.15; M.16,1644-1678. For Castellar: M.40, 1707. For Paesana, pasturage: M.30,1682 June 5; M.40,1711 May 28. Woods: M.40,1698 Dec.14; 1707; 1709 Oct.29; 1711 May 28; 1727 June 25; M.13,1715 July 5; 1725 June 12; 1734 April 16; M.31,1727 Nov.9; 1762 July 10; 1780 Jan.24; M.35,1727 June 10. Mills: M.30,1703 July 22; 1705 July 10; 1712 Feb.22; M.31 1726 Aug.18;1749 March 28; M.13, 1727 Jan.28; Aug.14; 1745 May 25; 1757 Sept.7;1762 July 10; Sept.13; 1786 March 28; 1788 Sept.17. Podestà: M.30,1721 Jan.15; Feb.4. Fishing: M.40,1726.

calculating the long-obsolete fiornini and ducati in which the censi had originally been paid. The lawsuit had been carried on intermittently throughout the 17th century. In 1709, the Senato had condemned the comunità of Paesana to pay L.2005 in place of the 300 fiorini. In 1711 the comunità had appealed to the royal delegates: but, in 1730, the censo was liquidated as L.2250. When the comunità refused to accept the decision, and to apply to the Camera for its interinazione, Baldassarre began a new lawsuit. By 1736,

> "riflettendo la comunità alla grave spesa che prevedeva ancor necessaria..."

Carlo Tomaso was able to make a definitive transaction (1738): the censo was calculated as L.2100; in recognition of its annual payment, Carlo Tomaso abolished the duty (roide) of carrying wood to his palace, ceded the 'Alpe di Pian Crovesio' as a perpetual emphyteusis to the comunità (reserving his own rights to pasture), and gave limited rights to pasture (though not to cut wood) in the forests.(35)

Contemporaneously, the Saluzzo di Paesana made increasing claims in their consegnamenti. The right to redeem the mills at Crissolo was stated in 1691, while the meadow of Pian del Re was claimed in the consegnamenti of 1701 and 1717. The right to all the mills, to a palace alienated to the comunità in 1655, and to 1/4 of all wild animals killed

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(35) For Oncino: M.40,1731 Oct.15. For Paesana: M.13,1730 Dec. 30; 1738 Aug.22; 1760 Aug.29; 1761 July 9; Oct.10; M.28, 1546-1646; M.31, 1732 Jan.14; M.40, 'Transatione...'; AST III, Interinazioni, R.1760, 2°, n.253, f.58; R.1761, 2°, n.255,f.94; Patenti, R.199,f.34.

by the peasants was claimed at Oncino in 1691; in 1701 and 1717, the monopoly of the bandi campestri was added. The monopoly of pasturage at Castellar was first stated in the 1691 consegnamento, while the emphteuses were carefully described in 1701 and 1717. A detailed description of all feudal rights in Paesana was made in 1691, amplified by a careful description of the monopoly of the woods in 1701 and 1717; in the same period, list of emphyteuses and estimates of the capital value of the mills were drawn up.(36)

None of these claims was apparently disputed by the royal officials at the time of the perequazione: the consegnamento of 1734 was a virtual repetition of that of 1717. Except for part of the wood on the boundaries of Saluzzo, all the land claimed as feudal by the Saluzzo di Paesana was duly accepted.(37) Moreover, the feudataries were upheld in nearly all the disputes with the comunità over feudal rights.

The meagre results - from the view-point of the comunità - would seem to indicate the limitations of the perequazione. The validity of the feudal rights was recognized because of their exaction already in

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(36) For 1691: M.6,1691 May 5. For 1701: M.6, 1701 May 28. For 1717: M.42,1717 Sept. 6; AST III, Consegnamenti, R.315,f.487; see also: M.25,1715 Jan.27. For the Paesana emphyteuses and mills: M.12, 1670 Jan.11; 1677 July 31; 1689 Nov.28; 1696 July 24; 1702 Sept.16; 1726 Aug.19; 1729 Oct.29; 1734 Aug.29; M.13, 1701 April 23; M.6, 1701 May 28; M.40, 1727; 1712 Nov.16; 1717 Nov.11; 1733 Nov.20. The alienation of the palace at Oncino in 1655 is described in a plaque on the parish church of Oncino.

(37) AST III, Consegnamenti, R.371,f.405.

the 14th and 15th centuries: there were no transactions between feudatories and comunità in the 17th century which could be called in question by the royal authorities. At the same time, the paucity of lands owned by the Saluzzo di Paesana, acknowledged as feudal since at least the 15th century, enabled them to escape the full attack of the perequazione, just as the independence of the family from Court and ducal favours in the 17th century had enabled it to escape the confiscation of fees and tassi in 1719-21. The families which were most affected by the perequazione were those whose income was mainly derived from cultivable lands; woods and lands fit only for pasturage yielded little income, and paid correspondingly small taxes. Families who owned livestock had always tended to escape the normal taxes, based as they were on the registri of allodial land. The comunità had tried to restore the balance, by imposing heavier personal taxes (cottizzo and giostico) in relief of the landed taxes. Government intervention, forbidding the imposition of personal taxes except for local communal expenses, only accentuated the inequality.(38) As a result, the effect of the perequazione had been to strengthen rather than weaken the position of the Saluzzo di Paesana.

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(38) See pp.62-63; Quazza, v.1, pp.154-57; Einaudi, pp.51-55, who notes that in 1700 the Camera ordered the comunità to make a list of all men and animals, for the imposition of a cotizzo of L.2 and a giostico of L.5. But no further measures seem to have been taken to fully tax livestock.

3. The crisis of the family economy in the 18th century.

i. The cost of building a palace.

The economic resources of Carlo Maria formed a solid base for the political ambitions of his son, Baldassarre. In 1692, when the financial exigencies of the war compelled the government to offer certain posts for sale, Baldassarre bought the life-office of Senator for L.10,400. Five years later, his initiative and abilities led to his appointment as Intendant of the province of Asti. His active part in the administration of the country could be seen in his appointment as royal delegate in 1717, to investigate the coining of false moneys in the small provincial town of Canelli. When Vittorio Amedeo II formed his special magistracy to examine the validity of alienated _tasai_ in 1719, Baldassarre was appointed one of the seven members. His conduct showed a certain independence of judgement, despite the direct pressure exerted by Vittorio Amedeo II: Baldassarre's was the deciding vote against royal pretensions in one of the only three cases brought to a conclusion. After the dissolution of the commission, Baldassarre's public career apparently came to an end, although he retained his office of Senator.(39)

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(39) For the purchase of office in 1692, when Baldassarre paid in all L.10,417: M.11, 1692 May 15; AST III, Interinazioni, R.1691 in 1692, n.138, f.99. For his letters as Intendant: AST I, Lettere Particolari, lettera 'S', M.22. For the mission to Canelli: AST III, Patenti, R.148,f.1. For his part in the 1719 tribunal: M. Torta: _La riunione al Demanio dei beni demaniali_, pp.29-66.

As early as 1699, Baldassarre had bought a farm of 90 giornate at Piobesi, near Carignano. His income of L.1500 a year as Intendant was insufficient to cover the capital expenditure of L.3000, and he borrowed L.5000 from his father. But, by 1705, Baldassarre's resources were apparently sufficient to allow him to buy tassi over the comunità of Carrù and Trinità, to the south-east of Fossano.(40)

On the death of his father in 1715, Baldassarre inherited a vast fortune. Even after the deuction of legacies and expenses, and of the usufruct which his brother, Tomaso Adalberto, acquired fully in 1722, (consisting of Carlo Maria's landed acquisitions in Barge and Saluzzo and tassi and censi worth over L.78,000), Baldassarre inherited a capital of over L.360,000, apart from the traditional family fees. The whole of this inheritance was bound under primogeniture (Appendix 18).

He immediately showed the size of his ambitions by the purchase of the barony of Fenis (in the valley of Aosta) for L.86,000, from its impecunious owner, conte Challant.(41) At the same time, he continued his father's lawsuit to revendicate the fee of Ostana. In subsequent years, he tried to assert his rights to the marquisate of Saluzzo as legitimate successor of the last marquis, and - more modestly- to the

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(40) For Piobesi: M.21, 1699 Dec.22; M.23, 1715 Jan.7. For the tassi: AST III, Controllo, R.1704 in 1705, f.120.

(41) M.18, 1715 May 31; M.19, 1715 July 6,10; 1718 March 4; 1720 Nov.28; 1721 March 8; Aug.6; 1722 June 5; 1728 Aug.30; 1729 May 21; J.Bosco: Le Château de Fénis, Novara, 1953, pp.11-12.

fee of Sanfront, besides offering L.80,000 for the fee of La Morra di Saluzzo.(42) But Baldassarre's main efforts turned to the construction of a palace at Turin.

After his return from Sicily in 1714, Vittorio Amedeo II began the third, and most extensive, expansion of Turin. The royal architect, Juvarra, enlarged the quarter begun by Carlo Emmuele II, south-east towards the rive Po, and designed a whole new quarter north-west, in the direction of the Susa Valley, following the traditional, rigidly rectangular, plan of the capital. Baldassarre immediately bought the central block (isolato) of the 18 forming the new quarter. Besides his father's house, Baldassarre had already bought two adjoining houses in the same quarter in 1708-09. In 1715 and 1719, he bought the site of nearly 1 1/2 giornate (over 61,000 square feet) from the Treasury; the purchase of another house in 1720 completed his acquisition of the area. He had spent nearly L.46,000 merely on the site. (Appendix 18 and (43)).

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(42) For Ostana: M.34,1685 Aug.2; 1727 Jan.14. For the marquisate: AST I, Marchesato di Saluzzo, c.4,M.12,n.9; Lettere Particolari, lettera 'S', M.22,1723 June 27. For Sanfront: M.21,'Dissertazione...'. For La Morra M.22, 'Consulto fatto al conte Pacsana...'.

(43) For Carlo Maria's purchases, see Appendix 17. For those of Baldassarre M.23,1709 Jan.12; M.26 bis, 1707 June 22; 1708 Jan.13; Nov.19; 1712 Dec.5;1713 Jan.15; 1715 July 8; Sept.27; 1717 Sept.12; 1719 Jan.23; May 11; 1720 March 11; see also: M.26 bis, 1721 July 12;1731 July 7, 31;1735 March 2; 1757 April 23. Further information on the palace can be found in A.Cavallari-Murat: 'Gian Giacomo Plantery,architetto barocco', Atti e Rassegna Tecnica della Società degli Ingegneri e degli Architetti in Torino, n.s., a.11,n.7 (July 1957); P.R. Deville: Il Palazzo Saluzzo Paesana, Turin, 1913; P.Viotto: 'La contrada di Dora Grossa', Atti e Rassegna Tecnica, ns., a.7, n.4 (April 1953).

(footnote cont'd on next page)

Baldassarre at once appointed a leading Piedmontese architect, Gian Giacomo Plantery, to build one of the most grandiose palaces in Turin. The major part of the construction was carried out between 1715 and 1717, but building continued at least until 1722. The internal decoration of the great palace, also executed under the personal supervision of Plantery, was barely finished by the time of Baldassarre's death.(44)

Even Baldassarre's huge fortune was insufficient to cover the enormous expenses. By 1722 he had spent over L. 242,000 on the palace:

> " ... e comeche il denaro ritrovato in eredita del fu Conte Carlo Maria padre del sudetto Baldassare non ha potuto supplire alle gravi spese fatte per la detta Fabbrica, in supplemento.... Baldassarre dovette prender in prestito da varj Particolari egreggie somme...."

At this date, Baldassarre had borrowed nearly L. 183,000, and was paying at least L.6000 a year in interests. By 1724, when he drew up a consegnamento of his primogeniture, he had spent a further L. 59,000 on the palace, while his debts had risen to L. 214,000; of this sum, he had used L. 50,000 from the dowries of his wife and daughter-in-law, besides borrowing a further L. 3200 from his own architect, Plantery. In the

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(43) (cont'd)
The 1:47:0 giornate bought by Baldassarre were equivalent to about 5700 square metres, not 5000, as stated by Cavallari-Murat (pp.322, 330,n.(23)); nor was Baldassarre Cavaliere of the Ordine della SS. Annunziata. Baldassarre bought another house, probably in the same quarter, in 1730 from conte Mazzetti di Saluggia, for L.5600: M.26 bis, 1730 June 14.

(44) The purchases of land and expenses of Baldassarre are almost conclusive proof that the palace was not completed in 1717 (as Deville states), but at the earliest in 1722, while its internal decoration continued into the 1730s. Plantery drew up an inventory of the palace in 1741, in which he stated his personal control of all stages of building: M.25, 1741 Aug.8.

following years, Baldassarre's expenditure diminished considerably, but in 1730 he still owed L.193,000. He now made an effort to repay these debts by the sale of the smaller part of his palace to marchese Giuliers del Vernante for L.61,000. By the time he drew up his will in 1731, he had repaid over L.50,000 and reduced the debt to L.142,850. (Appendix 18).

But in the five years until his death in 1736, Baldassarre's position deteriorated. Although the death of his wife, Costanza Camilla, in 1732 gave Baldassarre possession of her dowry, he found himself liable for legacies of over L.42,000. He had already constructed a new parish church at Castellar at considerable expense, and in the 1730s spent large sums on the improvement of his palace at Saluzzo by Plantery, and on the building of a novitiate house at the church of S. Bernardino in Saluzzo. In 1733-34, he also bought a vineyard at Moncalieri, on the boundaries of Turin (Appendix 18).

In the 21 years after his father's death, Baldassarre had spent nearly L.112,000 on the purchase of Fenis, the Moncalieri vineyard and other, smaller possessions. He had spent at least L.347,000 on his palace in Turin, and L.58,000 for the dowries of his two daughters and the part of his wife's legacies he paid before his death. In addition, he probably spent a fairly large sum on his palace at Saluzzo, and the building of the parish church at Castellar, and S. Bernardino at Saluzzo. His expenditure could not have been much under L.550,000, or over L.26,000 a year. Even if the debts he left in 1736, of L.73,000 plus

L.50,000 for the dowries of his wife and daughter-in-law, are subtracted, his total expenditure still amounted to L.427,000, or over L.20,000 a year, compared to the L.13,000 of his father, Carlo Maria (Appendix 18).

In 1735, Baldassarre suddenly decided to marry a second time. His first choice fell on contessa Bradamante Rasini, widow of marchese Leopoldo Mercurino (a close relative of Baldassarre's wife, Costanza Camilla), and of conte Benso di Cavour; but she died before the marriage could be arranged. Undeterred, Baldassarre once more searched for a bride in his late wife's family, and in January 1736 married the 35-year-old widow, Angela Ghilini Balbis, promising her a dower of L.2000 a year. In June of the same year, Baldassarre died, at least 65 years of age, leaving his son Carlo Tomaso, a large inheritance, crippled by debts.(45)

ii. The primogeniture as a hindrance to economic recovery.

In 1724, Baldassarre had estimated the value of the primogeniture established by his father over his liquid assets as L.325,350, after the normal deductions allowed by the law-courts for legacies, dowries and necessary improvements to the family estates. He accounted for this sum by the purchase of Fenis and the building of his palace,

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(45) For Rasini: M.10, 1735 July 18; M.21, 1735 Sept.20; M.36, 1736 March 10.
For Angela: M.10, 1736 Jan. 22.

regarding the value of four of the six apartments of the later as more than sufficient to cover the remaining value of the primogeniture.(46)

By his will of 14 July 1731, Baldassarre established a second primogeniture over the barony of Fenis and all six apartments of his palace to cover any increase in value since his father's primogeniture. He acknowledged debts of L.92,850, as well as L.56,000 for the dowries of his wife and daughter-in-law; the whole of this sum was to be paid for with the L.30,000 still owed by marchese Giuliera, with L.15,000 owed for the long-term hire of the Paesana mills, with the exaction of his remaining credits (which Baldassarre valued at L.45,000), and by the sale of the Piobesi farm and jewellery and furniture. The palace at Turin was thus to be left intact under primogeniture.(47)

By the time Baldassarre died, his debts had increased to so great an extent, that at first his son, Carlo Tomaso, tried to refuse the inheritance, except with the benefit of an inventory, so as to limit his liability. The credits from both marchese Giuliera and the Paesana mills had been exacted, while the remaining credits were now worth only L.35,000. Baldassarre had left unpaid debts of L.33,000, as well as creating new ones of over L.40,000. Besides the dowry of L.30,000 still owing to Carlo Tomaso's wife, Marta Maria Balbiano, new bequests

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(46) M.25,1724 May 24; with the draft of this consegnamento in: M.39, 'Consig.o a tenor della R. a Const.e...'.

(47) M.7, 1731 July 14.

had been made (including the dower of Baldassarre's widow, capitalised at 5% for L.40,000) of over L.57,000. A further L.22,500 were still owing for the legacies of Carlo Tomaso's mother, Costanza Camilla. Other expenses brought the debts of the inheritance to over L.200,000 (Appendix 18).

> "Premendo però al Conte Carlo Tommaso di conservare il buon nome della famiglia, e di procurare la soddisfazione di tutti i creditori, prescindette dall'intrapreso giudizio, e pose ogni suo studio, ed attenzione per soddisfare li creditori...." (48)

The Piobesi and Moncalieresi possessions were at once sold for L.39,000, and a palace at Saluzzo for L.9,500. A credit of L.10,000 was exacted to establish a chaplaincy at Paesana, according to Baldassarre's will. An agreement was made to exact the L.23,100 still owing for the 1679 dowry of Costanza Camilla. By 1744, Carlo Tomaso had probably paid nearly L.140,000, leaving debts (apart from those owed to his wife and himself) of only about L.15,000.(49)

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(48) M.14, 1785 Sept. 9. For the question of inherited debts: Pertile, v.4, pp.128-38.

(49) For the sales: M.24, 1737 Feb. 2; July 6; M.26 bis, 1743 Nov. 5; M.25,1741 Aug. 8. For the chaplaincy: M.24, 1737 Dec.14; 1738 March 21. For the dowry: M.21, 1736 May 11. For the repaid debts: M.24, 1734 April 27; 1736 May 6; 1737 March 11, July 6; 1738 April 12; 1741 Feb.2; Aug.2; 1742 Feb.2; 1744 Jan.17;1767 July 10; M.26 bis, 1744 Jan.13; M.25,1741 Aug.8; M.40, 1786 Jan.9. Carlo Tomaso repaid L.25,900 of Baldassarre's old debts (leaving the L.7500 owed to the Congregazione dei Mercanti); L.32,552 of the post-1731 debts (leaving L.7500 owed to Ruffini; the other L.2500 were probably only paid in 1767); all the bequests of L.57,325; Costanza Camilla's legacies (except to himself) of L.12,550; and the other small debts and expenses of L.11,407: a total of L.139,334. Apart from his wife's dowry of L.30,000, and the debts to himself of L.17,500, he owed only about L.15,000. (Appendix 18.)

Carlo Tomaso now drew up new inventories of the inheritance, and appealed to the Senate in 1744 to break his father's primogeniture. He claimed that, after the deduction of all credits, the remaining debts and his own legittima should be deducted from the value of the two (originally free) apartments and the adjoining stables of the palace, which he estimated at L.250,000. After this deduction from Baldassarre's primogeniture, all the remaining value of the apartmentment - L.122,000 - would be tied down by Carlo Tomaso under yet a third primogeniture. Despite these arguments, the Avvocato Generale decided against Carlo Tomaso, not judging his reasons sufficient to break a primogeniture.(50)

Carlo Tomaso's position, in fact, was not so grave as he made out. As he had finally accepted the inheritance as universal heir, without the benefit of an inventory, he had no further claims to a legittima. He had also managed to extinguish most of the debts - even if at personal inconvenience by hiring most of the palace - without touching the primogeniture. Two years after his father's death, he apparently had sufficient resources to buy a farm of 60 giornate at Pagno for L.18,000, while in these same years he made further small acquistions in Castellar. Finally, in 1745 he successfully revendicated the fee of Ostana, together with an annual censo from the comunità of L.240.(51)

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(50) M.25, 1736 Aug.17; 1741 Aug.8; 1744 Dec.29; M.14,1785 Sept. 9.

(51) For Pagno: M.14,1738 Aug.9; M.40,1786 Jan.9. AC Pagno, c.1, cl.9. For Castellar: M.14,1737 Jan.9; 1743 March 17; 1748 Dec.6; M.42, 1737 Jan.9; M.40, 1786 Jan.9; For Ostana: M.34, 1727 Jan.14; 1745 Nov.8-9; 1747 Jan.7; M.16, 1746 'Atti...'; M.39, 1750 April 17; AST III, Patenti, R.182,f.227; r.185, f.31. For the hire of the palace: M.38, 1739 Jan.30; M.21, 1740 Nov.10; 1745 Oct. 8.

But the need to provide dowries for his daughters once more endangered Carlo Tomaso's economic stability. Between 1739 and 1762, he had to find L.168,500 for five normal and one spiritual dowry. The dowries, which ranged from L.35,000 for his eldest daughter, Maria Costanza, to L.30,000 for Cristina, were notably larger than the L.20,000 (and jewels to the value of L.5,000) received by his son, Cesare Federico (1753), probably reflecting Carlo Tomaso's declining prestige. Apart from this dowry (which Carlo Tomaso almost certainly utilized), he raised L.8,000 by the sale of the 'Croce' farm at Paesana, and still owed L.23,500 for Felicita's dowry in 1763. Carlo Tomaso raised L.89,000 of the remaining L.117,000 by the sale of censi, but by 1763 had managed to rebuy over half, leaving a debt of L.43,000.(52)

Carlo Tomaso was undoubtedly worried by his position, and embarrassed by the primogeniture over virtually all his possessions. In 1763, he made a new appeal to break his father's primogeniture, presenting the same inventories as in 1744. The Senato felt unable to make a decision on the basis of these inventories, already rejected in the previous appeal, but allowed the validity of alienations for dowries. Carlo Tomaso was given permission to sell the smaller part of the palace for L.56,500, as

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(52) Maria Costanza also received L.10,000 as a dotal gift from her maternal grandmother. For the dowries: M.10,1739 Sept.15; 1747 July 19; 1749 Feb.11; 1755 Nov. 9; 1757 June 22; M.10, 1739 Sept.15; 1762 April 19. For that of Cesare Federico: M.10, 1753 April 28. For the debt (and repayment) to Turinetti: M.24, 1747 March 1; 1751 Nov. 8. For the Paesana sale: M.12, 1749 Jan.7,27. For the debt (and repayment) of L.16,000 to sig. Giordano: M.24, 1762 April 9; For the debts of L.10,000 to sig. Giordano and L.33,000 to conte Cotti di Brusasco: M.26 bis, 1763 Jan.29.

well as to borrow a further L.6500 (guaranteed on his allodial possessions) from its purchaser, Gringia, in order to pay his debts of L.43,000 and L.20,000 towards the dowry of Felicita di Castellalfero. At the same time, he was allowed to borrow a further L.15,750, guaranteed on his palace, to pay for the remainder of Felicita's dowry, the expenses of his son's equipment as officer, and part of his debt to Gringia.(53)

Soon after, in 1768, Carlo Tomaso made his will, bequeathing dowries to his two grand-daughters of L.33,000 each, and setting an annual pension of L.5750 on his ten grandsons, as well as a single payment of L.3000 to each, for the expenses of military careers. The whole of the inheritance - including all acquisitions - was tied under a new primogeniture.(54)

When Carlo Tomaso died in 1777, Cesare Federico consequently found himself with a large inheritance, of which he was unable to alienate any part without the special permission of the Senate, and at the same time liable for dowries and legacies of L.96,000, besides the annual pension. When his daughter, Maria Brigida, married conte Brucco di Bordevolo, in 1779, he was given permission to borrow L.30,000 for her dowry, guaranteed if necessary on the primogeniture. Two years later, he tried to evade

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(53) For the 1763 appeal: M.25, 1763 Aug.19; 'Atti per le detrazioni...'; M.14, 1785 Sept.9. For the sale (and debt) to sig. Gringia: M.26 bis, 1756 June 29; 1763 Jan.29; Dec.15; this last document gives details of the employment of the L.63,000. For the debt of L.15,750: M.24,1775 Oct.7.

(54) M.7, 1768 Aug. 27; M.14, 1785 Sept. 9.

the strangling effect of the primogeniture by enfranchising the comunità of Fenis in return for a pyament of L.52,000, spread over 25 years: the Camera gave its approval, but only subject to the employment of the money in new investments, as still bound under the primogeniture.(55)

The paradoxical effect of a primogeniture created to conserve the prosperity and prestige of a family, but effectively impeding all its efforts to reach solvency, was clearly shown after the death of Cesare Frederico (1783). The capital value of the patrimony was valued at L.1,284,000, apart from the L.52,000 owed by the comunità of Fenis.(56) But when the marriage of Gabriella to barone Bianco di San Marcello was arranged in 1785, Carlo Ignazio was unable to give sufficient guarantees to raise a loan for her dowry of L.33,000; only through a special appeal to Vittorio Amedeo III was he allowed to borrow L.15,000 from the patrimony of prince Carlo Emanuele Savoia di Carignano, to be repaid within 6 months. Apart from the dowry and Carlo Tomaso's legacies, Carlo Ignazio also owed L.15,000 for Baldassarre's debts, and a further L.40,000 for loans in the previous decade. An appeal to the Senato to alienate possessions bound under the primogenitures to pay for dowries

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(55) For the dowry of Maria Brigida, and the new debts: M.10,1779 July 5; M.20, 1786 April 27. For Fenis: M.20, 1781 Feb.24; M.39, 1781 May 22; 'Reddito annuale...'.

(56) M.20, 1786 April 27. The palace was valued at L.800,000 or more, yielding an annual L.24,000; the adjoining stables at L.10,000, with an income of only L.350; the palace at Saluzzo and the vineyard at [illegible] L.24,000, yielding L.500; and the other fees and possessions at L.450,000, with an income of L.16,000. The total income was thus under L.41,000.

and inherited debts could hardly be refused. But at the same time the L.52,000 owed by the comunità of Fenis (of which L.20,000 had already been paid) could only be used to make further purchases. Consequently, the only method to raise the money required - which would probably prove inadequate - would be to sell the allodial lands in Pagno, Castellar and Saluzzo, after the Senato's approval, and then rebuy them (after the Camera's approval) with the money from Fenis.

To avoid an unnecessary expenditure of money and time in applying for permission to both the Senato and the Camera, Carlo Ignazio appealed directly to Vittorio Amedeo III. For:

> "...assurda cosa sembra il devenire per una parte alla vendita d'effetti primo geniali per la soddisfazione di detti debiti, e per altra parte fare acquisti, ed impieghi per convertire in esse le L. 52 mila esatte in parte, ed in parte da esiggersi da detta Comunità di Fenisio, e Viviera."

The only means of achieving solvency was both by the employment of the credit from Fenis to pay the debts, and by the sale of allodial lands. In view of the exceptional circumstances, such permission was granted.(57)

Whatever the sources of its wealth, by the later 17th century, the Saluzzo di Paesana had emerged as an economically eminent family. The

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(57) M.14, 1785 Sept.9; M.20, 1786 April 27; AST III, Patenti, R.245,f.42; Consegnamenti, R.417, f.6; M.10,1785 July 14; 1787 Jan.28. Baldassarre's debts were L.7500 to the Congregazione dei Mercanti and L.7500 to the banker Ruffini. Apart from the L.15,000 to the Savoia-Carignano patrimony, the other debts were: L.18,000 to barone d'Avise; L.2750 to Cringia; L.8000 to president Sclarandi; L.6000 to Chiaudan; and L.5000 to Podio; a total L.39,750. The L.15,750 debt of 1763 may also still have been owed.

political career of Baldassarre followed naturally. At the same time, the rapid expansion of Turin, with the active participation of so many noble families, was an incitement to construct a palace worthy of the new position of the family. The huge cost of the palace was probably far above Baldassarre's original estimates, and despite the alienation of its smaller wing, Baldassarre still left the patrimony heavily burdened by debts. The history of the family for the remainder of the 18th century was a continual effort to regain economic equilibrium, an effort hindered by the presence of a primogeniture tying down almost all the family patrimony, and sabotaged by the need to provide numerous, large, dowries.


Orbassano
Moncalieri
Cumiana
Volvera
Candiolo
La Loggia
Stupinigi
Nichelino
Cambiano
Vinovo
Nichelino
Piobesi Torinese
Brassi
Nole
Villastellone
Carignano
Castagnole Piemonte
Scalenghe
Osasio
Virle Piemonte
Vigone
Lombriasco
Carmagnola
Bancalari
Casalgrasso
Racconigi
Sommariva del Bosco
Cavour
Bricherasio
Torre Pellice
Lusernetta
Campiglione
Barge
Paesana
Envie
Revello
Sanfront
Saluzzo
Savigliano
Marene
Cherasco
Verzuolo
Genola
Venasca
Sampeyre
M. Nebin
M. Rasciàs
M. Birrone
Costigliole Saluzzo
Villafalletto
Fossano
Levaldigi
Vottignasco
Lagnasco
Scarnafigi
Torrazzo
Rifreddo
Martiniana Po
Bricherasio
Buriasco
Pinerolo
Cavalloni
Castagnole Piemonte
Scalenghe
Osasio
Virle Piemonte
Vigone
Bancalari
Casalgrasso
Racconigi
Carmagnola
Lombriasco
Cavour
Barge
Paesana
Envie
Revello
Sanfront
Saluzzo
Savigliano
Marene
Cherasco
Verzuolo
Genola
Venasca
Sampeyre
Fossano
Levaldigi
Vottignasco
Lagnasco
Scarnafigi
Torrazzo
Rifreddo
Martiniana Po
Bricherasio
Buriasco
Pinerolo

ovanni Galeazzo
priest

Laura
nun

Gian Francesco
o. s. p. 1548

Luchino
d. after 1555
abbot

B

Ester
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Comiers (1584-85)

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776
e Ceva
an Vitale (1755)

anigi
75 o. s. p. 1860

V. Conclusions.

After the study of these three families, what sort of conclusions can be drawn, and to what extent do they appear valid for the nobility in general?

The fullest information provided by the families relates to problems of primogenitures, dowries and provisions for younger sons. The legal background to these settlements can be traced in fair detail, while the effect of such recurrent expenditure on the family economy can be calculated, at least in part. At the same time, the cost of building can be estimated for one family, and can be supported by the figures provided by other families. Certain, more general, conclusions can be drawn about the average size of family incomes, and the cost of normal living expenses.

It is more difficult to reach general conclusions about problems of investment. Preliminary investigations would be necessary into the amount of land available on the market, and its price, at any one period of time. Certain, tentative, suggestions can be made about both the reasons and the methods of purchasing and selling lands and feudal rights. But very few indications are available as to the development and administration of the land. Cash investments, both in

the State (tassi, monti di pietà) and private (censi), are equally difficult to assess. Problems arise about the reasons for the expansion of the censo, the rate of interest compared to the income from land, and the effect of the monetary inflation on cash investments. Some suggestions can be made as to the reasons for investing in both land and censi. Certain conclusions can be drawn as to the position of the nobility as an economic force in the State, based on estimates of their landed wealth, and their part in cash investments, both State and private. The problem arises of the extent of noble participation in industry and commerce.

Some tentative conclusions can be reached about the availability and profits of office, and the effect of holding office on the economy and social prestige of noble families, both before and under Vittorio Amedeo II. At the same time, the effect of Vittorio Amedeo's reforms can be estimated, not so much on the relations of the nobility with the State (already studied by Quazza), as on those between nobility and comunità.

1. Capital expenditure

i. Recurrent expenditure: younger sons, dowries

By the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II, the legal methods of protecting family patrimonies would seem to have been well

developed, and to a certain extent standardized. The widespread formation of *consortili* counteracted any tendency to alienate possessions outside the family. These *consortili* were probably almost all formed by the early 17th century.(1) At the same time, all feudal possessions were protected against alienation, if not against division, by State law. The development of the *fedecommesso*, prohibitions of alienation, and primogenitures, ensured the conservation of the patrimony according to a fixed order of succession.

The primogeniture was certainly adopted in Piedmont as early as the 15th century, as can be seen from the inheritance of Giovanni Andrea Saluzzo di Paesana in 1497. But it seems doubtful whether this settlement was, in fact, fully effective against subsequent alienations. Moreover, the close relationship of the Saluzzo di Paesana to the ruling house of Saluzzo suggests that, at this date, it may have been adopted only among the most important political families. By the mid-16th century, however, the far more effective

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(1) The Valperga di Rivara, as well as the Valperga di Valperga (p. 215 , n.(3)) and the Radicati di Passerano (Venturi, Alberto Radicati di Passerano, p. 29), form clear examples. Other instances could easily be found in the contemporary descriptions of F.A. Della Chiesa, and in the investitures and *consegnamenti* in the State archives.

fedecommesso was already being used by such a small provincial family as the Falletti di Barolo. The Scarampi di Camino, a Monferrat family of the same social standing as the Falletti, had established a primogeniture in 1568 and a fedecommesso in 1646, while the Provana di Druent had made similar settlements in the 16th century.(2) Even without further research, the ducal edicts seem to confirm the impression that primogenitures and fedecommessi were already widely adopted by the 17th (if not by the late 16th) century: in 1648, Carlo Emanuele II allowed the erection of perpetual primogenitures; in 1680, the second Madama Reale carefully regulated their succession.(3) By the beginning of the 18th century, primogenitures could evidently be created not only on real estate, but even on liquid assets. But the late erection of a primogeniture by only one branch of the Valperga di Rivara, in 1698, would seem to indicate that by no means all noble estates, even of the old feudality, were tied down

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(2) For the Scarampi, see A. Sisto: 'L'archivio Scarampi-Tizzoni', Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato, a.18, n.3 (1958), pp.389,401. It should be noted that very little trace is to be found of the term maiorascato, so common in the Spanish provinces.

(3) In Aosta and Savoie, such settlements seem to have been used even by middle class families: in 1582, the Stati of Aosta tried to limit the fedecommesso to peers (Pertile, v. 4, p.160), while the 1598 edict for Savoie, limiting fedecommessi to four generations, made the same prohibition (Duboin, t.7,lib.VI, tit.8, pp.165-68). It was apparently prohibited in Piedmont for the first time in the Constitutions of 1729. For the 1648 edict, see above, pp. 105-06, for that of 1680: Duboin, t.24,lib.XII, tit.2, pp.323-33.

by strict settlements, even under Vittorio Amedeo II.

What proportion of the land in Piedmont was bound under primogeniture, and hence withdrawn from the land-market, is still unknown. An examination of the consegnamenti of primogenitures (ordered by Vittorio Amedeo II and continued by his successors) would probably give a reasonably accurate estimate, although the distinctions between feudal and allodial land - at least until the perequazione - would be for the most part false. The larger patrimonies were probably also those most fully bound. It seems not unlikely that, together with ecclesiastical possessions, at least 20% of all land in Piedmont was not available for purchase.(4) It also seems extremely probable that the area bound by primogeniture increased during both the 17th and the 18th centuries.

Vittorio Amedeo II was probably aware of the danger of so large a proportion of the land strictly tied under settlement. In the preparations for his Constitutions, he asked the opinion of the leading Dutch lawyers about the limitations which could be imposed on fedecommessi. In the 1723 Constitutions, he carefully stated the right to break such settlements for the payment of dowries. In 1729, the Constitutions

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(4) For a more detailed discussion of the ownership of land, see below, pp. 343-44.

went even further, and permitted alienation "per gli alimenti puramente necessari"; at the same time, the validity of these settlements was only recognized if a full inventory had been made, while all primogenitures on allodial lands were restricted to four generations. By 1770, Carlo Emanuele III not only limited primogenitures to real estate, but restricted all settlements (on allodial or feudal possessions) to a maximum of four generations.(5)

The pernicious effects of primogenitures, on both the market in land and the economy of families, were clear to see. Not only were the rights of younger sons greatly weakened, but even the eldest son was hindered by his life-tenancy from carrying out the drastic cures sometimes necessary to revivify a sick economy. The cause of the ill could be diagnosed as the ability of a remote ancestor to settle his possessions in perpetuity. The resulting infection showed itself, as with the Saluzzo di Paesana, in the paradox of a large patrimony insufficient to guarantee

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(5) Besides the Leggi, e Costituzioni di S.M., 1723, 1729, 1770 (lib.V), see Viora, Le Costituzioni Piemontesi, pp. 339-46, 364-66. For the attacks on the fedecommesso of the Piedmontese 'Enlightenment' writers at the end of the 18th century, see the brief reference of C. Calcaterra: "Il Nostro Imminente Risorgimento", Turin, 1935, p.310.

a comparatively small loan.[6]

The original creation of a settlement probably assisted the family economy by restricting the extravagance of the heirs. But if the primogeniture was too strict, and covered all the family possessions, the heir might sometimes find himself with large - but untouchable - capital assets, yielding only an extremely small income; if, at the same time, his expenditure increased (for example in a period of a general rise in the cost of living), his position could become extremely embarrassing. The debts of Giuseppe Lodovico Valperga di Rivara showed that the erection of a primogeniture was not even necessarily effective against extravagance. The debts of Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana showed that the creation of a universal primogeniture over new acquisitions not previously bound could seriously impede all attempts to restore economic equilibrium.

While the creation of a primogeniture could sometimes paradoxically endanger the economic stability of a family, the provision of settlements for younger sons and daughters presented an equally heavy burden. Settlements for younger sons were apparently never obligatory in Piedmont. Where no primogeniture existed, all the male heirs inherited the

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(6) The Scarampi di Camino (and probably many other families) found themselves in a similar position in the later 18th century; cf. Sisto, op.cit., pp.405-07.

family estates in common, unless the testator divided them in his will. The example of the Valperga di Rivara was probably by no means unique, even in the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II. However, the bequest of both capital sums and estates to his younger sons and brother by Gerolamo II Falletti di Barolo in 1596 was probably far more common: while the nucleus of the family patrimony was left to the eldest son, the outlying possessions were settled on the younger males of the family. After the inheritance in primogeniture of Giovanni Giacomo Saluzzo di Paesana in 1651, the successful appeals of his younger brothers indicate that at this date even primogenitures did not eliminate such claims. What is not at all clear is when the primogeniture and fedecommesso became sufficiently strong to defeat the claims of younger sons. The tendency of private law in Piedmont was to emphasize the unity of the patrimony. But the care taken by both the Falletti di Barolo and the Saluzzo di Paesana in the late 17th century to obtain formal renunciations from sons taking holy orders suggests that settlements may never have been sufficiently strict to wholly eliminate the right to the legittima. This was certainly so for maternal inhertances, to which even daughters (such as Giacomo Falletti di Barolo's wife, Maria di Villafalletto) could successfully assert their claims.

By the early 18th century, it would appear to have been customary to settle pensions on younger sons (though both capital sums and estates, in usufruct or in full possession, were also still given, as to Tomaso Adalberto Saluzzo di Paesana). Pensions were undoubtedly given much earlier (as, for instance, to Carlo Saluzzo di Paesana's sons)(7), but their general adoption would seem to be much more common in the 18th century. Their payment obviously presented a varying item in the family budget: Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo was held to pay 23% of his annual income, but Cesare Federico Saluzzo di Paesana only 14%.(8) If the family income was mainly derived from land, the proportion paid in pensions in years of bad harvests (such as the early 1690s) would naturally rise. The maximum permitted by the Senato, however, was 33%, and only 25% of the income from the fees for less than four younger brothers. Moreover, the general increase in the value of land in the early 18th century probably lessened this proportion, while the deaths of uncles and brothers not only extinguished their pensions, but (in the event of their dying without heirs) might also lead to

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(7) In the late 1650s, Louis Félix Wicardel di Fleury was paying an annual L.5333 in pensions, in part to male members of the family: Archivio Barolo, M.124, n.6.

(8) Cesare Federico's income was about L.41,000, and the pension L.5750 (p. 292 , and note (56)).

profitable inheritances (such as from the brothers of Carlo Lodovico Falletti di Barolo).

The provision of dowries was far more clearly determined. Dowries were always guaranteed by law, and if allodial possessions proved insufficient, they could be raised from feudal possessions, or even from parts of the patrimony bound under fedecommessi and primogenitures. Most dowries were paid by capital sums, usually spread over a period of time; by the reign of Vittorio Amedeo II, there are frequent examples of dowries raised by the creation of censi. There are occasional instances of the payment of dowries with allodial land, possibly to be explained by the distance of the estate from the main family possessions (such as the Montiggio farm received by Gerolamo III Falletti di Barolo, or the Fossano - Genola lands alienated by the Valperga di Rivara), or by an inability to raise credit (because of either the notorious financial straits of the family, or a temporary stringency in the market). The sale of lands to raise dowries usually reflected weak financial resources. The money received from dowries was usually invested in land (or, later, in censi), although there was no legal ruling as to its employment; its utilization to pay debts was extremely hazardous, as the bride might survive her husband and claim her dower.

The aumento, or jointure, was entirely dependent on the dowry. By the later 17th century, the relationship of the jointure to the dowry was 1:3. In the earlier 17th century, there are instances of jointures of 1:7, but this may have been local, Monferrat, custom. Where a smaller proportion of jointure was offered, it probably reflected the strong bargaining power (usually social) of the bridegroom's father. On the other hand, a father who was able to offer a large jointure (indicative perhaps of a large gross income), was in a position to obtain a more advantageous marriage for his son.

If the wife survived the husband, the dower was calculated on her portion and aumento, with no reference to the income which may have been settled on the husband at the time of the marriage. The only example of such a settlement is that of Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo: it seems likely that, if at all common, it was to be found among the leading families, and probably only from the late 17th century. The dower consisted of half the portion and half the aumento, usually paid as an annual pension, or as the usufruct of certain estates stipulated by the husband in his will. However, if she preferred, the widow had the right to claim a capital sum. It would seem that in certain instances, the widow retained her dower even after a second marriage

(e.g. Paola Lodovica, widow of Filiberto Guiseppe Antonio Valperga di Rivara).(9)

While a marriage market undoubtedly existed,(10) there is little information as to its conditions. Problems of supply and demand may well have existed (especially during periods of war), but, on the basis of evidence so far available, such problems would seem to have been primarily personal or local. For the great majority of provincial families, the supply of the local market was extremely important. Much obviously depended on the number of daughters, as

(9) Another example is given by the widow of Gasparo Valperga di Rivara, Anna Francesca, on her marriage to Conte Tommaso Birago di Vische in the 1670s: Archivio Rivara, M.7, c.i, ns.18,19.

(10) A letter of 30 October 1708 from a member of the Valperga di Rivara family (M.221) shows the preliminary negotiations for a marriage:

> "...mi vien resa altra lettera a me diretta del Signor Conte Pastoris di Borgho Cognato del Signor Conte Vagnone, nella quale doppo havermi discorso delle belle qualità di madimagella di Rivara, mi dice che il sudetto signor Conte Vagnone è stato da lui, et li ha fatto instanza di fraporsi per negotiar a suo favore il matrimonio di madimagella sua figlia richiedendomi di più di sapere si da V. S. Illustrissima che dal signor Conte di Levone se havranno per grata la domanda che li verrà fatta...Nell'ultime linee della lettera del predetto Signor Borgo Cognato del futuro sposo scorgo che oltre le L.4000 contanti al rogito dell'istromento, et le L.6000 doppo il decesso di V. S. Illustrissima facienti in tutto livre die ci milla pare che si pretenda un conveniente Fardello di livre mille...".

Many other examples could be found.

well as on the ambitions of the father. Harassed parents, with too many daughters, could cut their costs by sending some to nunneries. The existence of nunneries composed entirely of members of noble families, with probably laxer discipline, rendered such an alternative more tolerable. The cost of spiritual dowries (at least by the late 17th century) was usually little more than 1/10 that of normal dowries.(11) At the same time, distant relatives might often provide a useful outlet in the search for husbands.

But if the ambitions of the family rose above the limitations of the local market, the horizons widened - and the expenses increased. It is impossible to state whether any standards existed for the size of dowries. At the provincial level it seems extremely probable. But at the intermediate level, where was to be found the greatest fluidity, personal ambitions probably eliminated all, except a most generic, idea of 'standard' dowries. Gerolamo III Falletti di Barolo

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(11) E.g., the L.3500 given to Luisa, with L.35,000 to Maria Eleonora Saluzzo di Paesana in 1715-16 (Appendix 18). All three families give numerous examples of such nunneries. The Valperga di Rivara daughters were sent mostly to the nunneries of SS. Caterina e Margarita at Chieri, S.Clara at Carignano, SS. Benedetta e Scolastica at Cuorgnè, and S. Croce at Turin; the Falletti daughters to S. Caterina at Alba, and nunneries at Alessandria and Chieri. The Saluzzo daughters to the famous nunneries of Rifreddo and Revello in the Saluzzese.

was prepared to offer an aumento of 1/2. The Valperga di Rivara tried to balance their ambitions by 'prestige' marriages of the male members to such traditional, politically eminent families as the Tana, and more fruitful marriages of the female members to newly ennobled banking families, such as the Turinetti. Whether such a policy yielded dividends may be doubted: the expense of dowries always seriously embarrassed the family resources. Probably the surest measuring-rod would be to compare the size of dowries received by sons to those paid for daughters. In this case, Gerolamo III Falletti di Barolo certainly paid for his ambitions, while Giovanni Battista Valperga di Rivara had achieved his aims. The frequent ennoblements of the 17th century may also have affected the market, by an increase in the number of marriageable daughters with sizable dowries. It would be interesting to see how many of the older families tried to restore their finances by such matches, and how great a lapse of time (if any) was needed for these new families to be accepted.

Among the most important families, there may have been some concept of a 'standard' dowry by the end of the 17th century. In the 1690s, Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo was promised a dowry of L. 40,000, while his sister, Paola Cristina, was given L. 45,000. At a slightly earlier

date (1679), Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana was promised L. 27,500, but also received a dote di corte of L. 25,000. His sister, Cristina Maria Angela, marrying into a less important family, received only L. 25,000 in 1706. In the following decade, Carlo Tomaso Saluzzo di Paesana received L. 20,000 and a dote di corte of L. 16,500, while his sister, Maria Eleonora, was given L. 35,000. Between 1739 and the 1760s, Carlo Tomaso's children received dowries varying from L. 25,000 to L. 35,000.(12) The standard may well have been about L. 30 - 40,000, while if a dote di corte was also paid, the size of the dowry would seem to have been smaller.

Among these families, the possibility of inheritances from heiresses was probably higher. Such a possibility had always existed at all levels: Giacomo Falletti di Barolo's wife, Maria, had received nearly L. 2,000 as half her mother's inheritance in 1617, while Giovanni Battista Valperga di Rivara's wife, Cristina, had inherited estates and censi in Candiolo, Chieri and Cercenasco, at the end of the century. But at the highest level, such inheritances assumed impressive proportions: at the beginning of the 17th century,

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(12) The L.45,000 received by Maria Costanza (1739) included a gift of L.10,000 from her maternal grandmother. Similarly, Maria Eleonora received a supplement of L.10,000 (increasing her dowry to L.45,000) on her mother's death in 1724.

Arduino Valperga di Rivara and his brothers inherited from their mother over 500 giornate at Fossano and Genola. In the 1730s, Ottavio Falletti di Barolo increased his already large patrimony by probably 50% through the Provana inheritance, while the marriage of his son, Carlo Gerolamo, to another heiress brought a further large increase in the second half of the century. However, under Vittorio Amedeo II the size of such inheritances may have diminished, as the Demesne asserted the right of escheat to all feudal possessions.

The size of dowries increased immensely during the 17th century. Giacomo Falletti di Barolo's sister, Caterina, received 2,000 scudi in 1585, while he gave his daughters dowries of 18-20,000 scudi in 1616-21. This was probably an extreme example, reflecting both Giacomo's ambitions and a period of great inflation. But Carlo Saluzzo di Paesana received L. 1875 (2000 scudi) in 1606, and his son, Giovanni Giacomo, L. 16,000 (4000 ducatoni) in 1646. The inflation of the first half of the century was certainly extremely great, but it seems improbable that by itself it accounted for an eight- to ten-fold increase in the size of dowries. Perhaps the contemporaneous fall in the rate of interest had some influence, as a greater capital would be needed to yield the same returns.

In the early period, it is also impossible to correlate this rise with an increase in the family income. In the

early 18th century, the dowries of the Falletti di Barolo daughters represented 3/4 to 1 1/2 years' income. In the 1730-50s, those of the Saluzzo di Paesana formed 3/4, or slightly more, of the annual income. If a standard dowry existed in this period, the proportion may have varied considerably. But it seems not unlikely that the average income of a leading Piedmontese family was about L. 35-45,000. However, as dowries were sometimes already fixed by the grandfather in this period they might bear little relationship to the family income at the time of payment. At the same time, the payment of dowers, if exacted as a capital sum, represented 2/3 of the size of the original dowry, or at least half the family income of one year. At a lower level, the proportion of the dowry to the family income was probably higher. In the early 18th century, the two branches of the Valperga di Rivara received only about L. 5000 a year each from their possessions in the Castellata. Filiberto Guiseppe Antonio's sisters received dowries of L. 4-6000 (1696-1700), or 4/5 to 1 1/5 the size of his annual income; Giovanni Battista's daughters were given dowries of L. 10,000 (1700-1717), equivalent to two years' income. The expense of dowers would also seem to be considerably higher, as the male members of at least this family usually made successful matches: Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio received L. 22,000 in

1706, and Ignazio Filiberto L. 44,000 in 1721; in both instances, the repayment of the dower represented several years' income.

ii. Building expenditure

Besides such recurrent capital expenditure for dowries and younger sons, by the late 17th century many families would seem to have spent large sums on building. Although the history of the development of Turin is well known, so far no research has been made into the expenses of building. Even less is known about non-ecclesiastical building in the provinces.

Already in the early 17th century, Carlo Emanuele I had tried to encourage nobles to participate in his development of Turin by the free grant of sites to all who intended to build a palace, as well as by the ability to force the owners of existing houses to rebuild or sell their sites within a limited period of time. When galleries were built around the main square in 1606 to celebrate the marriages of Carlo Emanuele I's daughters, they were given to the owners of the palaces, with the stipulation that they build a third floor above the galleries, according to the uniform design of the ducal architect, Vittozzi. The same policy was continued by Madama Cristina and Carlo Emanuele II for most of

the century. Both nobles and rich merchant and legal families were encouraged to build, but only within the rigid framework laid down by the ducal architects.(13)

By the end of the 17th century, the centre of the town had been constructed. Many of the most important noble families - such as the Dalpozzo della Cisterna, S. Martino d'Aglie, Villa, Tana, and probably (Arduino) Valperga di Rivara - had enlarged existing, or built new, palaces. Other newly ennobled families - such as the Turinetti di Priero, Genteri and Trucchi di Levaldigi - had also built new palaces. But all these families were closely attached to the ducal Court, and resided in Turin. There are no indications as to the expenses of such building, nor of their effect on family economies.

Under Vittorio Amedeo II, the fashion of building rapidly spread, led by the ducal family and the collateral branch of the Savoia - Carignano. Ottavio Provana di Druent had built his palace between 1690 and 1720, at a cost of L. 135,000. The total expenditure represented 13% of his annual income,

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(13) For the development of Turin, see P. Gribaudi: 'Lo sviluppo edilizio di Torino dall'epoca romana ai giorni nostri', Rivista Mensile "Torino", Aug. 1933; C. Boggio: 'Gli architetti Carlo e Amedeo di Castellamonte e lo sviluppo edilizio in Torino nel secolo XVII', Atti e Rassegna Tecnica, 1896; and the articles cited in p. 283, note (43).

but in the years of the most intensive building, between 1692 and 1694, he had spent over L. 55,300, or almost L. 18,500 a year, over 50% of his annual income. A probably large proportion of his debts of L. 70,000 derived from the building of this palace (Appendix 10).

In the early 1680s, the Asinari di San Marzano, a distinguished family from Asti, had employed the important architect, Garove, to build a palace in Turin. The total cost of the construction and decoration of the palace came to L. 267,000.(14) No figures are available of the family income, and it may well have been considerably higher than that of the Provana or the Falletti di Barolo.(15) But even calculating it as L. 60-65,000, or almost double that of Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo, the cost of the palace still

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(14) Archivio Asinari di San Marzano, c. XCII, n.2. The archive is in the possession of the family at Rome, to whom I owe grateful thanks for permission to examine the catalogue.

(15) In 1734, a list was made of nobles most able - and most likely - to contribute in a forced loan. The marchese di San Marzano headed the list, together with conte Turinetti di Pertengo, with an assessment of L.50,000 (Bulferetti, 'I Piemontesi', pp.47-48). This list was extremely local and incomplete, and is not by any means confirmed by others of the same years. In a list of the capital values of fees, drawn up about 1720 (printed by Bulferetti, 'La feudalità', pp.415-24) those of the San Marzano are not among the most valuable. This does not exclude their possession of large, extra-feudal resources.

represented four years' income.

In the absence of figures for other palaces, it would be dangerous to draw firm conclusions. What is certain is the construction of palaces at Turin by numerous other families in the half-century of Vittorio Amedeo II's reign. Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana's palace was certainly among the greatest, and in the late 1720s was the first of a short list of "the finest buildings in this city" drawn up by a visiting German;[16] the expense of its construction must have been notorious, for the same visitor stated that it cost 50,000 luigi, or L. 775,000. In fact, the total cost (even including the expense of decorations, for which the existing figures are probably incomplete) was probably only about half, or L. 350,000. But, as has been seen, the expense was far too great for the family resources, and half the sum was raised by the sale of one wing of the palace and loans still unpaid at Baldassarre's death.[17] In the second half of the century, the family income was calculated at L. 41,000; even if this figure is accepted as Baldassarre's

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(16) J.G. Keysler: Travels through Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, Switzerland, Italy and Lorraine..., London, 1760, v.1, p.324.

(17) The debts must include not only the L.70,000 still owing in 1736, but the L.50,000 dowries borrowed from Camilla Costanza and Marta Maria; together with the L.60,000 from the sale of the wing of the palace, they make a total of L.180,000.

income (and it was almost certainly smaller), the cost of the palace still represented over eight years' income.

Other palaces probably cost considerably less, and may have been more proportioned to family resources. But it seems extremely likely that the final expenditure was usually considerably higher than the original estimates, especially in such environment of emulation as must have existed in the Turin of these decades, an environment which may well have incited families with comparatively limited resources (and often newly bought titles, such as the Bonaventura di Cigliano) to exceed their modest possibilities. The size and splendour of the palaces built by Juvarra, Plantery, Garove, Baroncelli, Alfieri and numerous others - such as the palazzi Birago di Borgaro, Guarene, Richa di Covasolo, Novarina di S. Sebastiano, Capris di Ciglie, Grameri, Isnardi di Caraglio, Solaro della Chiusa and so many more - hardly suggest a more cautious frame of mind than that which inspired the Provana and San Marzano palaces, even if not so rash as that which inspired the Passana palace.

(18) It would be interesting and revealing to relate the construction of palaces in Turin and in the hills surrounding it to the political careers and social ambitions of their owners. Vittorio Amedeo II had no policy of attracting the nobility to Court, and the building of these great palaces

would seem to reflect both the attempts to magnify their social standing of many successful, newly ennobled families, and the desire of older families (often holding some honorific post at Court) to affirm their pre-eminence in some concrete, and indisputable, manner. In the subsequent period, under Carlo Emmanele III, the conscious attraction of nobles to the capital almost certainly encouraged the continual building.

But even without political ambitions or royal encouragement, building was very probably regarded as a constant factor in the expenditure of a family. Marchese Solaro Del Borgo evidently considered the expenditure of from L. 1000 to over L. 5000 for improvements to, and furnishings for, his palaces at Turin, as a normal charge on his budget.(18)

The building outside Turin was even more indicative. Many of the great families with palaces in Turin also enlarged or rebuilt their palaces and castles in the provinces, and financed the construction of chapels and churches. Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana's expenditure on his palace at Saluzzo, enlarged by the same architect, Plantery, responsible for

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(18) The figures range between L.636 and L.5605 for the period 1740 - 1749, for an average L.2600: Archivio Solaro Del Borgo, account books, 1740-50. The archive is in the possession of the family at Rome, to whom I owe grateful thanks for their kind hospitality.

the Turin palace, and his construction of the parish church at Castellar (also by Plantery?), and the novitiate-house at S. Bernardino at Saluzzo form a clear example. The Alfieri palace at Asti, the great castle at Agliè (sold to the royal family in 1765 for L. 860,000)[19], the castle at Guarene, were all built by families with palaces at Turin. Even families who felt unable, or without desire, to move to Turin felt the same urge, or need, to build. The huge castle of the Biandrate at S. Giorgio in the Canavese was built in the late 1720s to celebrate a marriage with a Wicardel di Fleury.[20] The palaces of the Della Chiesa d'Isasca at Saluzzo, the Mazzetti di Frinco at Asti, the Gozzani di Treville at Casale, the Audifredi at Cuneo (to chose at random palaces more noted for their architects than for their former owners) all belong to the early 18th century; castles and churches throughout the countryside bear witness to the great fervour for building.

How far this evidently general fashion of building reflected an increase in wealth remains to be seen. In the countryside, and probably for the most part in the small

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(19) Archivio San Martino d'Agliè, M.345. The archive is in the possession of the family at Campiglione (prov. Turin), to whom I owe grateful thanks.

(20) G. Ricci: 'Appunti per la storia del castello di San Giorgio Canavese', Bollettino della Societa Piemontese di Architettura e Belle Arti, n.s., a.6-7, 1952-53, pp. 172-82.

provincial towns, such expenditure yielded no returns. In Turin, however, the cost of building was not necessarily regarded as a capital loss. No palace of large dimensions was built exclusively as a residence for the family. The upper floors, and, in such a huge palace as that of the Racconis, most of the main apartments, were hired out.(21) In the later 18th century, the income derived from the Racconis palace was calculated as an annual L.25,000, or nearly 7% of the original cost; at this date, however, the palace was valued at over L.800,000, so that the annual income was little over 3%. No figures are available for other palaces, but it may be doubted whether their income equalled that of more 'normal' investments.

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(21) Cavallari-Murat (op.cit.) and F. Cognasso (Storia di Torino, 2nd. ed., Turin, 1959, p.337) have also noted the hiring of the larger part of the palaces.

2. Income and investments

1. Income and current expenditure of individual families

Without research into the economy of other families, very few conclusions can be reached concerning the incomes and possibilities of investment of the nobility. Nevertheless, certain tentative suggestions may be made on the basis both of the families so far studied, and of the reasonably frequent - if sometimes conflicting - estimates of private wealth drawn up by the royal officials under Vittorio Amedeo II.

The first problem to be faced is whether or not many noble families had sufficiently large resources to cover their current expenditure and still make capital investments. The small income of such a family as the Valperga di Rivara - L. 5000 for each branch - was probably insufficient even for current expenditure, and was far too small to cover the cost of dowries. Even a careful administration, such as that attributed to Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio, could hardly achieve more than balance the family budget, while his income as an officer would seem barely to have covered his expenses.(22)

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(22) For a more detailed discussion of income from offices, see below, pp.352-59.

Probably many families - especially *consortili* - had incomes little larger than that of the Valperga di Rivara, and were fully occupied in finding the necessary money for dowries. When there were fewer daughters, a small surplus may have been left, sufficient to purchase occasional pieces of land in the family fees, or invest in *luoghi di monte* or *censi*. Alberto Radicati di Passerano's income was calculated as L.6-7000 in 1727, and included four *luoghi* purchased between 1707 and 1719, yielding L. 376 annually, equivalent (at the 5% paid by the *monti* in these years) to a capital of about L. 7520. He apparently had no dowries to pay in those years, and had managed to save about L. 580 or 9% of his income in these 13 years.(23) But after the *perequazione*, the taxes paid on allodial land - 19% of the Valperga di Rivara's landed income, and 7% of their total income - probably reduced even this possibility.

Among the wealthier families, the position would seem to have been quite different. In the absence of any figures for families with an income of L. 15-20,000, not even tentative

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(23) Venturi, *op.cit.*, pp.130-32. Radicati's finances were evidently insufficient: in 1718, he sold personal property left by his father to pay for his wife's funeral expenses (p.24,n.(2)). When he fled Piedmont in 1725, he could only raise money at the extremely high short-term interest of 12% (p.156); even though this was in part due to his unwillingness to search for better offers, it also undoubtedly reflected his insecure financial position.

conclusions can be reached. But if Radicati, with his far smaller income, occasionally had a surplus, it seems probable that those families were in a position to invest, at least modestly.

Among the wealthiest families, the Falletti di Barolo and the Saluzzo di Paesana present interesting examples. Carlo Maria Saluzzo di Paesana had to provide only one normal and five spiritual dowries, an expense of L. 86,500. In under 50 years, from about 1670 to 1715, he was able to buy 460 giornate, one and one-sixth fees, certain feudal rights, a palace at Saluzzo and a house at Turin, at a cost of over L. 93,000. He also acquired censi and tassi of a capital value of over L. 405,000, and left L. 77,000 in cash at his death. The investments and cash represented an average of L. 12,800 a year. No figures are available as to the size of his annual income, but his almost exclusive residence in the provinces (for the house at Turin was probably bought for use by his son) certainly diminished the size of his current expenditure. Baldassarre's investments give a completely different picture. He inherited a net capital of L. 325,000 in 1715. He spent L. 58,000 for dowries and such of his wife's legacies as he paid before his death. He also paid about L. 170,000 of the total cost of the palace from his own income, and spent L. 112,000

on the purchase of Fenis and over 50 giornate of land. Even calculating his other building expenses as L. 50,000, the total cost of his investments amounted to little more than the capital he inherited. The only possible explanation would seem to be an enormous increase in the cost of living of an important noble with a large family and a position of prestige to maintain, pursuing an active political career at Turin. If Baldassarre's general expenses were as rash as his construction of the palace suggests, this might account for such an increase in current expenditure as about L. 13,000. His father's income could hardly have been less than L. 25,000, equivalent to the size of Baldassarre's current expenditure. In the late 18th century, Carlo Ignazio Saluzzo di Paesana stated his income as L. 41,000, which, like his personal property, was "... appena sufficienti all'uso decoroso della di lui famiglia..."(24)

Carlo Lodovico Falletti di Barolo had invested L. 123,500 between 1664 and 1705, representing about 9.5% of his annual income at the end of his life (though probably more in the earlier years, as his income undoubtedly rose). The marriages of his oldest son and daughter cost L. 95,000, equal to three years' income, or little over 7% of his income over the whole 41 years. His current expenditure

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(24) Archivio Paesana, M.20, 1786 April 27.

would seem to have been over L. 27,000 a year, accounted for by his long residences at Turin and the ambitious careers of his sons.

Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo was held to pay 23% of his income to his younger brothers. In the 30 years between 1705 and 1735, even without dowries to pay, he spent little more than L. 30,000 on the purchase of the last third of Serralunga and small acquisitions in his fees. The remainder of his income, about L. 25,000, as well as the income from his military posts (from L. 3000 to L. 10,000) was apparently consumed by current expenditure.

The figure of L. 25-30,000 for annual current expenditure is confirmed by the account-book of the Solaro Del Borgo, one of the richest families in Piedmont. Between 1740 and 1749, the average expenses of the family were L. 33,000. The marquis was governor of the citadel of Turin for many of these years, and the family lived for the most part in their large palace in the capital, but also passed part of the summer in their palace at Pianezza.

The vast income of this family confirms the statement of the traveller, Keysler, that Del Borgo was one of the four richest nobles in Piedmont.(25) In the 1740s, his average income was over L. 122,000, so that his current

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(25) Keysler, op.cit., p.274.

expenditure represented no more than about 28% of his income. He was able to invest L. 31,700 or 26% of his income, besides spending an average L. 2600 (2% of his income) on building, and paying in pensions over L. 7300. (Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo, at the beginning of the century, paid an equal amount in pensions, but it represented 23% of his income, as compared to 6% of that of the marchese Del Borgo.) It would seem that, whatever the size of his income, the normal annual expenditure of a leading Piedmontese noble was about L. 30,000.

The difference between the incomes of the Solaro Del Borgo and the Falletti di Barolo and Saluzzo di Paesana clearly illustrates the vast diversity of resources among the most important families. In the absence of information about the incomes of other families, it is difficult to establish any clear gradations. Besides the marchese Solaro Del Borgo, Keysler named as the richest nobles in Piedmont the marchesi S. Martino di S. Germano, Biandrate di S. Giorgio (both with most of their possessions in Savoie) and Tana d'Entraque.(26) A crude measuring-rod of comparative

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(26) Loc.cit. The last of these nobles is called "the marquis de Entreyves". While it is possible that he referred to the Valdostan family of the Passerin d'Entrèves, it seems more probable that he meant the Tana d'Entraque, who figure in most contemporary lists as among the wealthiest families (while the d'Entrèves are never mentioned).

wealth would seem to be provided by the lists drawn up by royal officials for the purposes of taxation from the early 18th century. However, these estimates are always incomplete and usually refer to Turin, to families nearest the Court, and hence most easily - and most willingly - taxed; even contemporary lists do not by any means correspond, owing most probably to different methods of assessment (or guesswork?) and aims of taxation.

Thus, in a list of 1704,[27] both the Saluzzo di Paesana and the Falletti di Barolo are stated for a value of L. 50,000, with only five others at a higher valuation of L. 75-200,000; together with these two, nine other families are estimated at L. 50,000, while eleven others are estimated at L. 30,000.

In later estimates of 1734, the Saluzzo di Paesana are not to be found again, while the Falletti di Barolo only appear once, for a much lower valuation of L. 20,000, with 11 other families at higher estimates of L. 30-60,000. Nor is the marchese di S. Giorgio to be found, despite his reputed wealth. In one list of 1734, restricted to Turin, Solaro Del Borgo is second after conte Turinetti di Pertengo (whose valuation is L. 100,000), with an estimate of L. 50,000; Tana follows immediately after, with one other noble, at

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(27) Einaudi, p. 202, n.(1).

L. 40,000, while a few other important families are included, with valuations varying from L. 10,000 to L. 25,000. In another list of the same year for a forced loan, Tana appears, this time for L. 30,000, after four other families (from L. 40-60,000), while no mention is made of Del Borgo. In only one list does S. Germano appear, and then only in the fifth category, among 172 persons taxable for L. 300 each. The value of these estimates is obviously limited by the restricted information available to the royal officials, and vitiated by their predominant interest in the taxability of the families; almost certainly they referred to those with the most easily realizable assets. The marchese Ricci di Acqui, who figures in most lists, apparently had an income of only L. 30,000, but was reputed to spend only L. 5-6000, and was consequently a suitable contributor to a forced loan. Likewise, the marchesi Gozzani, with an income of L. 30,000, and marchese Ardizzone, with L. 50,000 (though, with three daughters to dower, a less suitable choice).(28) These examples serve to show that no attempt can be made to closely correlate the estimates with the size of family incomes. At most, they form a useful picture of people noted for their resources, even though the comparative

(28) For these lists (and the individual incomes), Bulferetti, 'I Piemontesi', pp. 43-55; also, Quazza, v.1, pp.197-98.

gradation of those resources was extremely confused.

A limited, but probably truer, approach would be to base comparisons on the capital value of the fees, estimated at the time of the confiscations of 1719-21.[29] This would obviously fail to take into account all liquid resources, and may not even include allodial lands. But all feudal possessions - which certainly represent a large, if not a major part, of noble wealth - were probably calculated in the valuation. According to this list, the capital value of only Barolo, Serralunga and half Rodello amounted to L. 259,000. The value of the Saluzzo di Paesana fees of Castellar, Paesana, Oncino and Crissolo was L. 240,000. As compared to this, Rivara, Forno and Busano were valued at only L. 72,000, while, of the Del Borgo fees, Dogliani alone was estimated at L. 240,000. Of the Il Provana fees, Bastia, Borgaro, Druent, Pianezza and Altessano Superiore were valued at L. 548,000.

Certainly these capital values cannot be related too closely to annual incomes. But a similar comparison of other fees would probably reveal a fairly small group of nobles with fees valued at L. 250,000 or more, with the majority about the value of those of the Falletti di Barolo or Saluzzo di Paesana. The income of these two families,

(29) Printed in Bulferetti, 'La feudalità', pp.415-24.

as well as of the Provana di Druent, and the Ricci, Gozzani and Ardizzone noted above, all averaged about L. 30,000, rising at most to L. 50,000. It seems likely that this would also be the income of other families with fees of approximately the same capital value. Nobles who lived in the capital probably consumed most of an income of this size, especially if engaged in political or military careers. Families with larger incomes, even living in Turin, had a substantial surplus, especially if not obliged to provide numerous pensions or dowries. Even families with incomes of about L. 30,000 could save considerable sums, if - like Carlo Maria Paesana at Saluzzo, and marchese Ricci di Acqui at Casale - they lived in the provinces.

How were those savings invested?

ii. Landed and cash investments

The history of the three families so far studied shows two main forms of investment - in land (and fees), and in censi (and similar forms of cash investments). The problems involved in employing capital assets obviously concerned far more than the single class of the nobility, and are closely related to the economic conditions of the whole country. In the absence of almost any research on these problems, the

evidence of the three families can provide only a few, limited, indications.

The amount of land available for purchase probably diminished during the 17th century, through the increase of mortmain (witnessed by the subjection to taxes by the perequazione of 88,000 giornate of ecclesiastical lands acquired after 1619);[30] and the development of primogenitures and fedecommessi. A small quantity of waste-land may have been reclaimed in the same period, but such reclamations usually occurred in the 18th century. However, a certain amount of non-ecclesiastical land, previously tied down by settlement, reappeared on the market. If a primogeniture was established over all the family possessions, without description, the alienability of any part might seem possible, even though disputed; the same applied to settlements implied, but not explicitly stated, in the testator's will. Such general, or assumed, settlements were forbidden by Vittorio Amedeo II's Constitutions.

A far more common reason for the reappearance of bound land on the market was the breaking of settlements to pay for dowries, dowers, aumenti, or even debts. Despite the complications and expenses of obtaining permission from the Senate or Camera (or both), the numerous examples suggest

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(30) Quazza, v.1, p.159.

that by the 18th century settlements were broken comparatively frequently for these reasons; the Constitutions of 1729 clarified and probably encouraged the tendency.(31)

Finally, if the primogeniture came to an end, as limited to a certain number of generations, or through the death of all male members of the family, the land also became free. However, collateral branches of the family had strong claims to inherit (e.g. Giacomo Falletti di Barolo to the inheritance of Bonifacio in 1816, and the sons of Giovanni Battista Valperga di Rivara to that of Carlo Antonio Valperga di Rivara in 1702). The rights of the Demesne (above all to feudal possessions) probably grew stronger by the 18th century, especially if the private claim was based on female descent: this was the situation, at least, with the Provana inheritance (1727). But land which escheated to the Demesne was often resold.

No figures are available as to the price of land until the later 17th century. An apparent stagnation in the 1660s was followed by a general increase until at least the

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(31) A preliminary investigation into the reasons for breaking a settlement could easily be made by an examination of the pleas to the Senate. This would indicate numerically the probable increase in appeals, as well as (usually) the size of the proposed alienations. It would then be possible both to relate this to the size of the settlements, and to set it against the general increase of such settlements.

middle of the 18th century. The purchases of the Valperga di Rivara, and even more of the Falletti di Barolo, seem to indicate an active land-market from the late 16th century. Not even tentative conclusions, however, can be made about the price of land. A preliminary investigation would be necessary into the method of calculating the price.(32) If there was a certain convention about the price of land, and a constant demand keeping the price at its maximum, the result would probably have been a stable land-market. The cost of feudal land was certainly higher than that of allodial, but it seems quite possible that there was a conventional increase. The effect of the wars, however, both through devastations and increased taxes, probably affected the income from land. A steady price in the first half of the century would consequently signify a real increase in terms of diminished income. At the same time, the effect of the inflation, increasing the price of land, would make its purchase a more secure investment.

Land was purchased both for economic and for social motives. Small acquisitions were made not only to consolidate estates, but also to strengthen the feudatory's

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(32) For the contemporary method in England, H.J. Habakkuk: 'The long-term rate of interest and the price of land in the seventeenth century', Economic History Review, 2nd series, n.1, 1952, pp.26-45.

power over the comunità. At the same time, there was a greater possibility of making small purchases (especially in times of war) from peasants overburdened by taxes. In general, it was easier to acquire allodial than feudal land: such an enterprising noble as Giacomo Falletti di Barolo made vast purchases of allodial land, both in and outside his fees, in the early years of the 17th century. Acquisitions were for the most part made in one region, although farms might be purchased far from the family estates (as by the Falletti di Barolo), probably to avoid the effects of war devastations and climatic disturbances; the example of the Falletti di Barolo, however, suggests that this might have been more common in the earlier rather than the later period.

Besides land, feudal rights and fees were bought. If the feudal rights were at all complete, the investment could be regarded as economically sound. No indications exist as to the method of calculating the purchasing price of feudal rights. When such rights were fractional, they were obviously often bought to consolidate the fraction already owned, probably with little regard to their actual value. In other cases - as with the purchase of fees - they were bought to gain the title.

The acquisitions of fees at all times must have been to some extent a question of prestige. When the fees included rights and (usually feudal) land, the price was probably high. Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana paid L. 86,000 for Fenis in 1715, and offered L. 80,000 for the fee of La Morra di Saluzzo. Giovanni Battista Valperga di Rivara in 1700 wanted L. 40,000 for Levone, with its numerous feudal rights.(33) Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo paid L. 26,000 for 93 giornate and one-third of the fee of Serralunga in 1707; the capital value of the third of the fee was L. 11,666 (according to the royal estimate of about 1720); the price of the land (according to the average for Serralunga from 1706-10) was about L. 10,820: the remaining L. 3,500 were probably paid for the extremely small feudal rights, and as a premium for the acquisition of a title.

But the actual price of fees, with little land and few rights, would seem generally to have been small. Gerolamo III Falletti di Barolo acquired two marquisates and two counties in the Monferrat for only about L. 45,000 in the 1650-60s. Tomaso Adalberto Saluzzo di Paesana bought the fee of Mombarone for L. 9,000 and that of Casteldelfino for L. 12,000 in the 1730s. After the great confiscation of 1719-20, the resale of the fees showed a similar

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(33) Archivio Rivara, M.223; Pola, v.1, p.157.

distinction between the prices of those with and those without valuable feudal rights. The number of hearths (fuochi) apparently had little importance (unlike in Lombardy), and if feudal rights were not important, titles could be bought at no great expense.(34)

Whether there was a conscious long-term policy of investment naturally depended on the successive heads of each family. The Falletti di Barolo certainly seem to have followed such a policy, and showed that an income from land was sufficient to rise substantially in wealth. But in the earlier period, investment in land was probably not only profitable, but also the most obvious method of employing capital assets. At the same time, land always had great prestige value. Sales of estates rarely occurred, except when a family was hard-pressed; if a family was forced to sell, the first to go were estates far from the family fees, with high costs of administration (as can be seen in the Valperga di Rivara). The farms at Montiggio given to Gerolamo III Falletti di Barolo as his wife's dowry were probably alienated by the Biandrate for this reason. When

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(34) For Tomaso Adalberto: AST III, Controllo, Patenti 8, f.131; a. 1734 al 35, f.57. The sales of 1722-23 can be found in A. Manno: Il Patriziato Subalpino, v.1, Florence, 1895. Bulferetti, ('I Piemontesi', p.49, n.(2)) has also noted the apparent disregard of the number of hearths in calculating the price of fees.

a noble began to alienate part of his family fees - such as the Falletti di Pocapaglia at Serralunga in 1707, or conte Challant at Fenis in 1715 - it was a clear sign of an extremely precarious financial position, and large debts.

Very few indications are available about the administration of estates. For the most part, the land was cultivated at mezzadria, involving close control by either the owner or a bailiff. The Falletti di Barolo administered their estates directly for most of the 17th century, with one disastrous lapse into hiring out farms in the 1650s; towards the end of the century, they began to employ bailiffs. But even so enterprising a family as this one seems to have had no intentions of exploiting the land directly, or making large-scale improvements or experiments. The only significant change was the introduction of sheep onto the Langhe farms, and even this was on an extremely limited scale. The Valperga di Rivara seem to have cultivated their land directly to some extent, but no records have survived to illustrate their methods or success. At the same time - like the Saluzzo di Paesana - they hired out the exploitation of their mineral resources. In none of the three families is much evidence to be found of large-scale development of the land. At most, the interest of the landlord extended to the mezzadria contracts, which in the case of the

Falletti di Barolo tend to increase the *regalie* and cash payments by the *mezzadro*.

In the 18th century, the Falletti di Barolo, the Valperga di Rivara, and also the Solaro Del Borgo, employed bailiffs. The income, however, was still paid in kind, and not changed into an annual rent. Only in the middle of the century did the Falletti di Barolo change from *mezzadria* to *schiavenza*. At this date, the estates were run by bailiffs, and the change does not necessarily signify a more direct - and ruthless - exploitation of the land by the owners, but may only reflect the bailiff's effort to gain more complete, and independent, control of the administration: with the cultivation of the demesne in return for cash payments, the bailiff was in a far better position to cheat the tenant, if not also the owner. While the use of bailiffs would seem to be widespread already from the early 18th century, these families give no indications of the introduction of middle-men, paying cash incomes to the owners and ruthlessly exploiting the peasants. With the rising incomes from land in the 18th century, it was certainly against the interest of even absentee landlords to change from *mezzadria* to annual rents. Even in the absence of further research, the widespread existence of such middle-class entrepreneurs

may be doubted, at least so early as the middle of the 18th century.(35)

Investments in censi increased throughout the 17th century. All three families show the purchase of censi from both the comunità and peasants from the earliest years. By the later 17th century, censi were being sold by members of all classes. The vast increase in the number of censi from this period probably resulted from the more settled political conditions of the country, and an increased mobilization of capital; at the same time, it may also have reflected a technical development of the censo into a more effective long-term method of holding wealth, saving the costs of changing from one to another short-term loan. Censi were widely bought and sold by the nobility. But their sale cannot be used as a method of calculating financial weakness, as it did not necessarily signify more than a temporary shortage of liquid assets: in the 1740s, the marchese Del Borgo, with his vast income and continual

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(35) For this view, see G. Prato: L'evoluzione agricola del secolo XVIII e le cause economiche dei moti del 1792-98 in Piemonte, Turin, 1909. Prato notes, however (Vita agricola, pp.210-11), that the change was mainly from the 1750s, and that in the provinces of Alba and Saluzzo mezzadria remained predominant. Venturi (op.cit., pp. 129-30) also noted the employment of an agent by Radicati.

acquisitions, was still paying over L. 11,000 a year interest on alienated censi, probably created for the financing of his palace. He apparently did not regard their extinction as a matter of primary importance.

The decision to invest in censi (or in State taxes, such as the tassi, or even outside the State, at Genoa), rather than in land, obviously depended on the preferences of the family, influenced by short-term considerations of the market. The purchase of censi within the family fees naturally had the added advantage of strengthening the position of the feudatary. In the early period (until about the 1650s), the extremely high rate of interest, to be related to the limited mobilization of capital, was an evident attraction. To the purchaser, it probably represented a premium against the insecurity of such loans (especially from inflation); the seller perhaps hoped to redeem a theoretically long-term loan in a short period of time.

It is difficult to relate the long-term rate of interest to the income from land. The sharp fall in the rate of interest from the late 16th to the late 17th century would seem to reflect a growth in security; at the same time, it probably also signified an increase in wealth (reflected perhaps in an increase in exports?), as well as an improved organization of capital. At the end of the 17th century,

the dominical income from land was recognized (officially) as 4%, falling by the mid-18th century to about 3%.(36) It seems likely that for most of the 17th century this income was calculated as 5%. If this were so, the additional interest on censi was probably the premium for risk, with the interest on the securer State tassi and monti di pietà naturally always lower. As political security increased, legal procedure developed, and capital became more mobilized, the rate of interest tended to fall. It also seems likely that the legal maximum had a retarded effect on the reduction of interest. By the 1680s, even the comunità were able to reduce the interest on old communal censi from 8% to 6%, and sometimes even lower. However, the purchase by the Saluzzo di Paesana (often at lower prices than the current exchange-rate) of communal censi created in the early 17th century, which had subsequently changed hands on more than one occasion, suggests that there were still opportunities of gaining returns considerably higher than the current interest on censi; even with the inevitable prospect of a lawsuit leading to a reduction of interest

(36) Einaudi, p.425, notes the capitalization of land at 4% at the beginning of the 18th century; Prato, p.201 (and Quazza, v.1, p.227) notes that the income was calculated at about 3% by the middle of the century.

(and perhaps also loss of capital), it might still be regarded as an advantageous investment.(37) In general, however, by the end of the century, the wide gap between the income from land and the rate of interest had considerably diminished, with a 4% income compared to 5-6% interest; the same fall continued in the early 18th century.

By this period, the effect of the monetary inflation had for the most part disappeared. Even when censi (and all other financial transactions, such as dowries) were calculated in monete grosse, their value in purchasing power probably fell during the century. The extinction of such payments as feudal censi, often calculated in archaic fiorini and ducati, gave a clear illustration of an ever-present problem. It seems likely that there was a fairly close relationship between the high rate of interest and the monetary inflation. As the latter grew less important, interest tended to fall. But in the absence of figures on prices and wages, such a relationship cannot be definitely established.

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(37) Examples of such censi are those bought by the Saluzzo di Paesana over the comunità of Castellar, Oncino and Pagno (see p. 460, n.(28)), with interests usually at 8%. In 1700, Carlo Maria gained a censo of 1200 scudi (equivalent to L.6500) over Crissolo; in 1705, he agreed to sell it to the comunità for L.1500, to be paid over 15 years without interest. At the time of his death in 1715, there were lawsuits with the comunità of Castellar and Oncino over similar censi (see Appendix 17, notes (23), (28)).

By the 18th century, nobles invested heavily in both land and *censi*. The lower income from land was probably made up for by its greater prestige, if not by hopes of a rising income; the *censo* represented a convenient method of investing capital assets, which could be realized at short notice. In the absence of studies on other families, it is difficult to see if there was any pattern in noble investment. In the 1730-40s, the Falletti di Barolo made continual acquisitions of land, but also bought up *tassi* during the war years. The Solaro Del Borgo for the most part acquired *censi*. Probably land was acquired when possible, usually to consolidate estates; when suitable land was not available, surplus capital could be employed in *censi* and *tassi* as the most convenient form of investment. But in both the land-market and the movement of capital, the nobility took a leading part.

iii. The nobility as an economic force in the State

There seems little question that throughout the 17th century the nobility formed the most powerful economic class within the State. Under Vittorio Amedeo II, their landed possessions, their income from land, and their capital resources all confirm their predominance.

It is extremely difficult to estimate how much land was in the hands of the nobility in the early 18th century. Before the perequazione, there were almost 240,000 giornate of feudal land, representing 6.90% of the total area, or 7.67% excluding the waste-lands. Compared to this, there were 384,000 giornate of ecclesiastical lands exempt from taxes, representing 11.13% of the total, or 12.28% excluding land without an income. The feudality of virtually all the lands of the Saluzzo di Paesana, as well as the claims to feudality of the Valperga di Rivara, suggest that in many instances the consegnamenti of these years represented all the landed possessions of the families. But the large, acknowledgedly allodial, possessions of the Falletti di Barolo, 28% of their estates up to 1731, are clear evidence of a considerable area of land not entered in the consegnamenti, but owned by noble families. It seems extremely improbable that the allodial lands of the nobility (especially of the old feudality) were often as large as those claimed as feudal. But the total area of land owned by the nobility was most probably at least 25% more than the declarations of the pre-perequazione consegnamenti, thus representing 8.60% of the total area of Piedmont, or 9.59% of all lands with an income. It is not unlikely that ecclesiastics owned a similar proportion of allodial lands, increasing their

holdings to 13.91%, or 15.35% of the more limited area. At this date, there were probably about 3000 noble families in Piedmont, or about 15,000 persons, and a maximum of 20,000 ecclesiastics, in a population of approximately 1,000,000. The nobility, 1.5% of the population, thus held nearly 10% of all exploited lands, while the greater part of these possessions - as shown by the great latifondi - were concentrated in the hands of relatively few families (almost certainly under 1/3 of the total). The nobility and ecclesiastics together, 3.5% of the population, owned almost 25% of all exploited lands.(38)

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(38) Bulferetti ('I Piemontesi', pp.42-43) states that the allodial lands of the nobility were probably equal to their feudal lands, but gives no examples; Venturi (op.cit., pp. 130-32) seems to suggest the same. But in view of the present examples, an increase of 100% seems greatly exaggerated.
The Falletti di Barolo claimed 2306 giornate feudal land, and 883 giornate allodial (Appendix 11 (c)).
The total areas immune from taxes (pre-1731) are given by Einaudi, pp.58-65. The waste-lands were 326,427 g., or 9.46% of the total; as they were always measured separately from other types of land (and hence were not included in feudal or ecclesiastic holdings, which certainly also contained a certain amount of waste-land), it seems fair to deduct them. For the list of the principal latifondi: Quazza, v.1, p.228; Prato, pp.189-90.
The population of Piedmont is given by Prato (pp.31-33), on the basis of the fuochi in 1700-01, as 804,000, with 20% to be added for beggars and children under 5. Bulferetti (op.cit., p.43) states the probable figure of 3000 noble families, but calculates their total number as 10,000, when a multiple of five seems far more probable; his figure of 20,000 ecclesiastics (based on a 1714 estimate) seems convincing.

The total dominical income from land was calculated as L.20,635,000. Feudal income represented 7.93% and ecclesiastical income (exempt from taxes) 15.50%, in all 23.43% of the total net income from land. With the increase of a minimum 25% for the allodial lands owned by the nobility and the ecclesiastics, the nobility's proportion of net landed income increases to 10.28%, and that of the ecclesiastics to 19.27%, a total of 29.55%. Nearly one-third of the income from land was thus owned by 3.5% of the population, and one-tenth by the nobility (1.5%). Compared to other countries (such as France or Naples), the proportion might seem limited. But within Piedmont itself, the smallholdings of all other proprietors gave the nobility and ecclesiastics a marked predominance.(39)

The capital resources of the nobility confirm this impression. Leaving aside for the moment the question of noble participation in industry and commerce, some clear indications are provided by an examination of capital

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(39) The income (and percentage) of land is given by Einaudi, p.64. Bulferetti (op.cit., pp.41-43) arrives at a total of half the landed income, by doubling the allodial lands of the nobility and clergy; but his conclusions about the predominance of the privileged classes remain true. The 25% increase has naturally been calculated on the basis of the average income for allodial land.

expenditure. In the first place, although newly ennobled bureaucrats, lawyers, bankers and merchants constructed large palaces, mainly in Turin, by far the greater part of such building would seem to have been carried out by members of the old 'feudal' aristocracy. Another indication is provided by an examination of the royal estimates made in 1734, for the purposes of taxation: the nobility were held to pay 88-89%, compared to 11-12% to be paid by the middle class.(40) However, as the nobility also includes the 'new' nobles of 1722-23, these figures cannot be regarded as too reliable.

A more accurate picture is provided by investments in the State *monti di pietà*. In all 16 erections, from 1653 to 1733, the old nobility, although numerically about 20% of the subscribers (with middle-class, including the newly ennobled, from 40 to 50%, and ecclesiastics 28-38%) represented 30% or more of the total capital. In the purchase of alienated *tassi* and infeudation of land during the Spanish Succession War (1704-09), the 'old' nobility invested 23 and 32% of the total capital, (including 73% of the *tasso* of 1706), while the middle-class (including newly ennobled) invested 53 and 73%; in 1734-36, both classes

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(40) Quazza, v.1, pp.196-98.

invested about 40% of the capital. It would seem that the Turin capitalists preferred luoghi di monte, while in the provinces there was a preference for the more easily exactable tassi, over near-by comunità.(41) There was an undoubted increase in middle class investments, both numerically and in size. But the old 'feudal' nobility continued to take a leading part, responsible for about 30% of the total capital invested throughout the period.

All these indications may be regarded as somewhat limited, in view of the apparently far greater movements of capital in private censi, shown by the three families studied (and by the Solaro Del Borgo). Until some research into censi has been carried out, no conclusions can be made. However, the following figures, based on a sounding of the notarial archives for the city of Turin, may serve as an indication.(42) In only the first six months of 1718, over L. 540,000 were loaned as censi at Turin. As compared to this, the 7 monti of 1706-13 represented a total capital of L. 3,550,000, and the alienated tassi of the same years

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(41) These figures can be found in Einaudi, pp.218-30, 270-76; Quazza, v.1, pp.199-201.

(42) AST II, Copie d'insinuazione notarile di Torino, a.1718, libri 1, voll.i-ii; 2, i-ii; 3, i-ii; 4, i-ii; 5, i-iii; 6, i-ii; 7, i-iv; 8, i-iii.

L. 2,287,000, while the sixteenth monte and alienated tassi of 1734-36 yielded L. 10,678,000. If the total censi throughout Piedmont were calculated, it seems virtually certain that such private loans would appear as of far greater importance than State investments. Of the total L. 540,000, L. 245,000, or 46%, was loaned by the nobility, L. 136,000, or 25%, by ecclesiastics (usually monasteries), and L. 159,000, or 29%, by middle-class. Nearly all loans by nobles were of large sums, and in most cases nobles who borrow money did so from members of their own class. In all, 31 loans were made by nobles, 42 by the middle-class and 24 by ecclesiastics. The general impression from such extremely limited evidence is that, although the middle class was taking a large part in the private movement of capital (probably more at Turin than elsewhere), the nobility was still the source of at least nearly half the capital.

A considerable amount of recent research has been dedicated to the part played by the nobility in the development of industry and commerce.(43) Of the three families studied,

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(43) See the various articles of Bulferetti, op.citt. Quazza, v.2, pp.241-319, and Prato, pp.215-328, also discuss the extent of noble participation in commerce and industry.

the main indication is the reference to Carlo Maria Saluzzo di Paesana's part in a proposed silk-factory at Saluzzo in 1683. Apart from this, the only industrial activities of these families were the extremely small lime, chalk and iron mines and quarries exploited by the Valperga di Rivara and Saluzzo di Paesana. In comparison to their other sources of revenue, these mines yielded only a minute portion of the family incomes. There are no indications at all of commercial activities.

Examples can certainly be found of old 'feudal' nobles who participated in industry and commerce. Such families as the Savoia-Carignano and Challant exploited mines in Savoie and the Valle d'Aosta. When a commercial company was set up in 1681 with the monopoly of all trade with Portugal, such families as the Pianezza, Pallavicino, Piossasco, Morozzo, San Tommaso, Amoretti and Prichignono contributed a substantial part of the capital.(44) But such examples would seem to form a very small minority, and usually consisted of nobles closely attached to the Court.

For the most part, the nobles who engaged in such

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(44) C. Contessa: 'Progetti economici dello Seconda Madama Reale di Savoia fondati sopra un contratto nuziale. (1678 - 1682)', Miscellanea di storia italiana, v.48, 1915, p.149, n.(4).

activities were former bankers, merchants, lawyers, and bureaucrats, who had bought, or had been given, their titles by the sovereign. It is not surprising to find such nobles as Trucchi, Turinetti, Groppello, Gamba, Olivero, and many others of lesser importance, participating in industries and commercial companies directly sponsored and warmly encouraged by the ruler. Some of these nobles, such as the famous marchese Ferrero d'Ormea, could claim descent from old families of landed gentry. But the great majority sprang from the small, but developing, middle class, and had gained their positions through their abilities and the favour of the King. A clear distinction should be made between the old feudal families and those with newly acquired titles, even though the latter quickly tried to assimilate themselves by the purchase of fees, feudal rights and lands. The older nobility certainly tried to make the newcomers aware of the differences, and spoke contemptuously of their wives as "countesses de l'année 1724".(45) The dukes had never been successful in their attempts to encourage the nobility to enter into trade and commerce. It seems probable that this very absence of 'feudal' resources had considerable influence on the slowness and restricted nature of the development of industry and commerce in the country. The nobility

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(45) Keysler, op.cit., p.362.

certainly represented an extremely strong economic force in the State; but its resources were devoted almost exclusively to land and cash investments, not to trading or industry.

3. The effect of royal policy on the position of the nobility.

i. The possibilities of office

The question of offices - political, administrative or judicial - and of careers - diplomatic, military or ecclesiastic - is closely related to any study of the economic position of the nobility.

Under Vittorio Amedeo II, royal control of both offices and careers was certainly stronger than under any of his predecessors. The sale of offices in Piedmont had never been widespread. Only small, unimportant positions, such as those of the notary, keeper of notarial archives (insinuatore) and pharmacist (speciaro) were sold in perpetual reversion; real public offices were always excluded, except in the Pinerolese, where the French system of the paulette existed. The reversion for one life of more important administrative posts was allowed under Vittorio Amedeo II, but the highest positions of Primo Presidente of the Senato and the Camera, and Generale delle Finanze were always excluded. The sale of office for life only (as to Baldassarre Saluzzo di Paesana) was probably more widespread, but in all cases the final choice rested with the King. In general, the widespread sale of offices was only seriously proposed in

times of war.(46) Diplomatic and military positions were not sold, but certainly implied personal expenditure by the holder.

It is difficult to state whether family influence played an important part in appointments to office. In certain fields, such as diplomacy and the army (and probably the Church), family connections probably counted for a great deal, even under Vittorio Amedeo II. This may also have applied to certain judicial posts, and would account for the successful careers of members of such families as the Martina di Cornegliano and Porporato di Piasco. The famous example of the four marchesi Carron di San Tommaso, successive secretaries of State, shows that even the highest administrative posts could be hereditary during the 17th century. But under Vittorio Amedeo II, such influence certainly diminished with the increasing centralization.

Patronage probably also grew less important under Vittorio Amedeo II. It seems unlikely that many offices held the right to patronage, and these only at the highest

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(46) See Einaudi, pp.245-54, and for further bibliography on the sale of offices, p. 39 , n.(34). Quazza (v.1, p.93, n.(42)) notes the sale of the offices of tesoriere delle città e comuni in 1694, of tesoriere provinciale in 1699, and of sindaco in 1704.

level. Probably, patronage was most widespread in the Church, where the King had least control.

Ducal control of the administration had increased steadily throughout the 17th century, except during the two Regencies. Little distinction was made between political posts and the civil service, as all were servants of the Duke. The difference was one of degree rather than quality, with the higher posts assuming a more political character. Under Vittorio Amedeo II, the full effect of royal control was seen in the replacement of the old feudal families by bureaucrats and lawyers from the middle class: between 1713 and 1742, 84.16% of the higher administrative posts, and 98.41% of the lower were held by members of the middle class or newly entitled nobles. In diplomacy and the army, however, the nobility managed to preserve its predominance. Such nobles as the Del Borgo, Provana, di Broglio, San Tommaso and Roero di Cortanze continued to represent the King of Sardinia in the most important European capitals. Officers were drawn primarily from the nobility, while military governors were almost exclusively from old, feudal families (such as the Falletti di Barolo).(47)

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(47) For the whole structure of the administration, diplomacy and the army, see Quazza, v.1, pp.55-123. Prato: Il costo della guerra, p.272, gives a list of governors at the beginning of the 18th century.

Even outside diplomacy and the army, a certain independence could be found in the judiciary. The Camera had often attempted to oppose wholesale alienations of the Demesne in the 17th century. Under Vittorio Amedeo II, the royal delegation over the confiscation of tassi (1719) showed an open attitude of independence in judging the legality of royal claims. However, the subsequent dismissal of the Camera, with the appointment of more loyal members, and the restriction of its right of interinazione effectively increased royal control.

The pay of all offices, except in diplomacy and the army, was lower than in most European States, even including the traditional supplements. At the highest level - grand chancellor, viceroy of Sardinia and secretaries of State - the total pay of over L. 20,000 was undoubtedly high. At the level below - Tesoriere Generale, Presidents of the Senate and Camera, and leading Court officials, such as Grando Elemosiniere, Gran Scudiere, Gran Mastro and Gran Ciambellano - the annual income was never under L. 4,500 and might rise to over L. 6,000. Below this, however, the pay fell rapidly from L. 4,000 to L. 1,000 or less. Diplomatic pay was far higher, from L. 10,000 at The Hague to L. 49,000 at Paris, besides extra expenses. Such posts, however, often cost their holders more than they received. Military pay never

exceeded L. 4,000 (and then only for a Staff-colonel), while even the governor of Turin only received L. 6,800.(48)

In general, profit from office would only seem to have been substantial at the very highest level of the administration. Diplomats and officers almost always paid for their careers out of their own pockets. At the lower level of the administration, the income from office was extremely small, compared to that of important noble families (who sometimes hold such posts as Intendants, and more often as Senators), although it may have made a substantial difference to small nobles such as the Valperga di Rivara. Positions at Court, which were almost exclusively the monopoly of old feudal families and might be regarded as sinecures, may well have yielded substantial profits. But it was significantly the pay of these posts that was drastically diminished by Vittorio Amedeo II in 1703.(49) At the same time, such gifts as the doti di corte were probably also almost entirely eliminated.

The holding of office probably had greater social than economic results. The army and Church certainly provided useful outlets for younger sons, especially in the less

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(48) See the tables of pay in Quazza, v.1, pp.88-89, 101-02, 107.

(49) Quazza, v.1, p.108.

wealthy families, who were unable to provide substantial pensions. If the eldest son was also successful in his career (such as Gerolamo IV Falletti di Barolo), he might often have been able to help his younger brothers. If he took an active part in Court life, he was probably also able to assist his brothers.

In general, a successful career probably resulted in a rise in social rank. This would certainly seem to be true in the 17th century, in such different fields as the judiciary and the army. Such families as the Caselette and Porporato, were given, or were able to buy, their titles because of their successful legal careers. Arduino Valperga di Rivara and the first marchese Wicardel di Fleury were representative of a great number of nobles who rose in social rank through successful military careers. This rise might take the form of ennoblement for a middle class family, or the conferring of a higher title on a noble. In either case, the title (which often included the grant of lands as well) represented a more lasting gain than the direct financial remunerations of office.

Under Vittorio Amedeo II, the acquisition of titles from office was almost exclusively the monopoly of the middle class administration. As the old feudal nobility formed so small a percentage of the administration, this is not in

itself surprising. What is more significant is that titles no longer appear to be given for successful careers. Appointment to the Ordine Mauriziano, or at most to the Ordine della SS. Annunziata, would appear to be the maximum aspiration of a military officer (and probably also of a diplomat); such appointments were naturally for life only. At the same time, service under foreign rulers, especially the Emperor, was limited as far as possible.

In the lights of Vittorio Amedeo II's distinctly anti-noble policy, this restriction of a formerly widespread practice is not surprising. The nobility was kept out of political, administrative and judicial office, while the rewards of diplomatic and military careers were severely restricted. The prohibition of the use of titles by nobles who only possessed a fractional part of a fee was in accordance with the same restrictive policy.

In general, it would appear that Vittorio Amedeo II was successful in limiting the possibilities of office of the old feudal nobility; even where it retained its predominance, the rewards of office were reduced to an often lower degree than the expenses of such positions. The fact that the nobles continued to embark on military (or administrative) careers reflected rather their social ambitions and, probably, sense of duty, than hopes of more material gains.

ii. State, nobility and comunita

When Vittorio Amedeo II succeeded his father in the late 17th century, the local power of the old feudal families was extremely strong. The possession of feudal rights and large estates was in itself sufficient to assure the feudatary's predominance in all relations with the comunità. For the most part, already by the early 17th century, the less easily exactable rights, such as labour duties, payments in kind, and often tithes, had been transformed into annual cash payments. The monopoly of the mills, tolls and rights of hunting and fishing confirmed the comunità's subjection, while his right of primary jurisdiction, and his appointment of the podestà guaranteed the lord an important part in the actual administration of the commune. At the same time, the feudatary had often managed to gain exemption for his allodial lands.

The effect of the wars in the 17th century had been to weaken the position of the comunità still more. The frequent lawsuits of the late 16th and early 17th centuries appear to grow less in number during the middle decades of the century. When such quarrels still broke out, the feudatary usually emerged victorious: his rights were confirmed and the exemption of his lands often extended. The most a comunità

could hope to achieve was to limit the feudatary's future acquisitions; the history of the Falletti di Barolo and the Valperga di Rivara seems to indicate that even such limitations were ineffective. Contemporaneously, the feudatary was able to acquire both alienated tassi from the State and censi from the communità and its members, increasingly weighed down by the pressure of taxes (and billetings). By the later 17th century, most communità were not only feudally subject to the lord, but usually greatly indebted towards him.

The policy of Vittorio Amedeo II, from his earliest years, was to limit the privileges of the nobility and strengthen the position of the comunità. Both the confiscation of feos and tassi, and the perequazione were steps towards the same end, the former directed more against the privileged position of the nobility, the latter intended to reduce the unfair burden on the communità. At the same time, the validity of certain existing feudal rights was called in question, while such rights (especially of jurisdiction) were restricted with the grant of new fees. The legality of private transactions between feudataries and communità, allowing immunity for allodial lands, was also open to dispute on the grounds of usurpation of State prerogatives. Once

the transactions themselves were under discussion, even such strictly 'private' clauses, as those arranging for annual feudal payments, could be impeached.

The financial needs of the wars, in the first half of Vittorio Amedeo II's reign, enabled the feudataries to extend their privileges, with the acquisition of yet more *tassi* and the infeudation of allodial land. But with the end of the wars, most infeudations were revoked and many of the *tassi* rebought. From the peace of Utrecht, the attack on the privileges of the nobility developed without further interruption.

The determination of royal policy clearly stimulated both feudataries and *comunità*. All three of the present studies show identical reactions from both sides. In response to royal demands for completer *consegnamenti*, the feudataries made new claims to rights previously non-existent or long in disuse. The *consegnamenti* also show that by this period the *comunità* had often been successful in usurping (usually fractional) feudal rights.

At the same time, the *comunità* were encouraged into renewed opposition to feudal claims. The continual lawsuits were concerned with almost every sort of feudal right, from the *bandi campestri* and monopoly of the mills to the appointment of the *podestà* and the celebration of mass in

the family chapel. But the longest and most bitter disputes were naturally over the annual feudal censo and the immunity of lands.

With the perequazione, the success of the royal policy could be judged. Not only was much illegally feudal land subjected to taxes, but many feudal rights were also condemned as illegal and abolished. The effect of the reforms of these years on all three families was further to be seen in the abolition of many censi over the comunità, on the grounds that the original capital (usually acquired in the early 17th century) had been more than repaid by the high annual interest.

Undoubtedly, the royal policy seriously affected the economy of many families. The example of marchese Eleazar Wicardel di Fleury, Sardinian ambassador at London, is often cited. The full gravity of the confiscation of his two fees of Trivero and Mortigliengo in 1720 can be seen in an account he drew up in 1724, before his departure in disgust for Poland. After stating baldly that:

> "Pendant ces quattre malheureuses années, ce qui aida à M.r le Marquis de Trivié à faire face, fût les ressources qu'il puisa dans l'affection de Madame la Baronne de Belmont"

he estimated the size of his debt as L. 107,000.(50) As the result of the confiscation, his income fell short of his annual expenditure by nearly L. 27,000. More generally, it seems probable that the less important families (such as the Valperga di Rivara) suffered more than the great nobles from the reforms, as the new taxes represented a significant proportion of their income.

Nevertheless, the feudataries still remained in firm control of the comunità. The Falletti di Barolo (and to a lesser extent the Saluzzo di Paesana) began to purchase land extensively in and near their family fees. At the same time, they still possessed the larger part of their feudal rights, and had now received the added confirmation of government recognition. The censi owed by peasants, as well as some of those owed by the comunità, had hardly been touched, even if some tassi had been lost. The comunità could claim the extension of the area of allodial, taxable land, but their finances remained insufficient, and liable to lapse into chaos with the advent of a new war.

The problem was far deeper than the abolition of certain, legally unjustifiable, privileges. So long as the principle

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(50) Archivio Barolo, M.124, n.6. For Wicardel di Fleury, see Venturi, op.cit., pp.147-48.

of privilege itself was not called in question, the nobility would retain its economic and social predominance in the provinces, and in the whole social structure of the country.

Appendices.

Appendix 1: Piedmontese moneys .

Monetary problems in Piedmont resembled those faced by most European states. The basic difficulty lay in the simultaneous circulation of two different currencies, the so-called moneta grossa and moneta piccola. Gold and silver moneys were used for international commerce, and necessarily maintained an essentially stable intrinsic content. The moneta piccola, consisting of small coins of mixed silver and copper (biglione), with less than 50% silver, was restricted to the internal economy of the State, for small-scale payments. The need for a unity of measure had been solved in the Middle Ages by the system of 'money of account', which represented both a fixed multiple of the monete piccole and a unit in which to count the monete grosse. But while the precious moneys retained a stable gold or silver content, the monete piccole were continually debased. Consequently the exchange-rate of monete grosse in terms of monete piccole - and therefore in terms of its fixed multiple, the money of account - steadily rose. The great problem of the 16th and 17th centuries was to stabilise the relationship. Already before the 17th century the moneta piccola had been so far debased as to have a titular value far higher than its intrinsic value. The two currencies were no longer separate, for the moneta piccola acted as no more than a fractional money, subsidiary to - and no longer distinct from - the monete grosse, while silver coins belonging to the moneta grossa group were by now used in everyday affairs. But as the moneta piccola formed the effective basis of the money of account,

the problem of the fluctuating exchange-rate remained. The effect of the continual rise in the exchange-rates of precious moneys was to diminish the real value of all incomes calculated in money of account; not only State revenues, but also all private incomes (such as emphyteuses, hire of lands, etc.) and all contracts were affected (1). The government attempted to intervene and establish a legal rate of exchange lower than that current in commercial transactions. But the abbassamenti were almost always ignored after a short period, and the quotations of precious moneys continued to rise.

The relationship of moneta grossa to moneta piccola was not, however, entirely governed by their intrinsic values (especially as the moneta piccola was over-valued in respect to its intrinsic). The influx of America silver changed the relationship of gold to silver,

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(1) One of the great legal problems, discussed by leading jurists all over Europe, including in Piedmont, was the rate at which the repayment of debts, contracted in money of account, should be calculated. For a general description of the monetary system, see C.M. Cipolla: Mouvements monétaires dans l'Etat de Milan (1580 - 1700), Centre de Recherches Historiques, Paris, 1952, pp. 13-27; ibid.: Moneta e civiltà mediterranea, Venice, 1957, pp. 40-65. For the concept of the money of account, L. Einaudi: 'Teoria della moneta immaginaria dal tempo di Carlo Magno alla Rivoluzione Francese', Rivista di storia economica, vol. I, pp. 1-35. For a more general discussion, see F. Braudel and F.C. Spooner: 'Les métaux monétaires et l'économie du XVIe siècle', Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, 1956, Storia Moderna, vol. IV, pp. 233-64.

and consequently the exchange-rates of gold and silver moneys. This change in the gold-silver ratio varied - to a small extent - from country to country, depending for the most part on the supplies of precious metals. In Piedmont, no figures are as yet available for the change of ratio, but it could hardly have differed much from the position in Milan. The following figures show the increasing value of gold in terms of silver, both in Milan and generally in Europe; as can be seen, the major change is in the 1600-1650 period with a slight relapse in Milan at the end of the century (2):

Milan		Europa	
		1581-1600	1:11.8
1600	1:11.1	1601-20	12.2
1605	11.9	1621-40	14.
1650	14.9	1641-60	14.5
1675	15.7	1661-80	15.
1700	15.1	1681-1700	15.
		1701-20	15.2

Equally important was the lack of control over the coinage of the monete piccole. Mints were hired out for profit, with the prince receiving a seigniorage (signoraggio) on all issues of money; it was frequently more profitable to coin monete piccole than monete grosse. As a result the country was flooded with far

(2) A. De Maddalena: Prezzi e aspetti di mercato in Milano durante il secolo XVII, Milan, 1949, p. 76.

more small money - increasingly debased - than could be absorbed by petty commerce. At the same time, small neighbouring States deliberately coined similar, but even more debased, moneys which soon circulated with the national coins. The effect - fully realized by contemporaries - was to lead to the disappearance of the better moneys in the face of the more debased. Piedmont suffered acutely from the invasion of small moneys from the mints of Monferrat, Masserano, Crevacuore, Guastalla, Monaco, etc., which continued to circulate, despite governmental prohibitions. But it was the Dukes themselves who were largely responsible for flooding the market with monete piccole in order to gain the seigniorage. Not until the 18th century did they realize the need to limit the quantity and guarantee its full convertibility. (3)

The total amounts of money coined in Piedmont have not yet been calculated. A number of mintings have been noted by Promis, but the series is too incomplete to form any conclusions. He has shown clearly, however, the almost continual devaluation of the monete piccole. The following moneys have been chosen as those most commonly used in Piedmont in the two centuries following the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis; the figures are for the silver content of each coin (4):

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(3) For various possible reasons for debasing the moneta piccola, see C.M.Cipolla: Le avventure della lira, Milan, 1958, pp. 54-57, 65-66.

(4) D.Promis: Le monete dei Reali di Savoia, vol. I, pp. 508-510.

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	pezzo da soldi 5	bianco da soldi 4	soldo	mezzo-soldo	quarto-soldo
1561	—	den.1.17.12.12/37	0.10.9.3/37	—	0.2.7.23/31
1580-1	—	1.12.11.13/25	0.8.16.16/43	—	0.1.17.3/5
1631-2	1.20.10.2/3	—	0.8.20.44/65	0.3.20.4/25	0.0.16
1638-9	—	1.1.8.32/53	0.5.16.8/15	—	—
1645-7	1.0.0.	—	0.4.6.2/5	0.1.4.4/5	0.0.8
1688-91	0.23.0.24/25	—	—	0.3.3.36/105	—
1709	—	—	0.4.0	—	—
1717	—	—	0.3.20.28/31	—	—
1735	0.22.3.9/13	—	—	—	—
1741-44	0.20.22.38/55	—	0.3.17.30/129	—	—

•/. The intrinsic of both gold and silver moneys was measured in a marc of 8 once, each of 24 denari, each denaro of 24 grani, each grano of 24 granotti, and each granotto of 24 granottini. The moneys given in the above table are in denari, and its fractions. The denaro was equivalent to 1,28083 grammes.

Not only the monete piccole, but even silver coins of the moneta grossa group were devalued. The most important of these was undoubtedly the ducatone, which experienced the following changes. As can be seen, the devaluations all occurred during the reign of Carlo Emanuele I. (5):

1566	den.26.16.12.1/2
1581	26.17.10.
1587	25.9.22.122/181
1589	23.21.12.12/77
1594	23.21.3.9/14
1595	23.19.7.1/2
1650	23.19.19.19/23
1666	23.20.20.20/23

Few studies have as yet been dedicated to the problem of Piedmontese moneys. Apart from the fundamental Promis, which gives a wealth of information about the various coins, their intrinsic content, and their exchange-rates (not all, however, of equal reliability), only three articles of real value have so far appeared. (6) Chiaudano's study of the monetary reform of Emanuele Filiberto is remarkably wide in its breadth of vision, and despite certain small errors of calculation represents a safe guide to the difficult early period (1560-80). Besides the study of the reform itself, he examines the exchange-rates, the

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(5) Promis, op.cit., I, 492.

(6) Promis, op.cit. M.Chiaudano: 'La riforma monetaria di Ema-

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total amount of money coined (though not dividing it into the various issues), and the rise in prices in the same period. Fossati's study of the moneys under Carlo Emanuele I, the period of the greatest fluctuations, is unfortunately restricted to the exchange-rates, ignoring all questions of monetary issues, the changing gold-silver ratio, or the intrinsic value of the coinage. Praj examined the subsequent period until the death of Carlo Emanuele II, and showed clearly the continual issues of debased moneys, with the inevitable disastrous effect on the quotations of the monete grosse. Both Einaudi and Quazza briefly discussed the monetary policy of Vittorio Amedeo II, but neither had the aim of examining the whole question.

As yet no comprehensive study exists of the general economic evolution of Piedmont in all its complexity. Apart from Chiaudano's researches, limited to Turin during the reign of Emanuele Filiberto, and a list of corn prices in Turin from 1630 to 1740,(7) no figures exist for the movement of prices before the 18th century;

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nuele Filiberto', in Lo Stato Sabaudo al tempo di Emanuele Filiberto, vol. III, B.S.S.S., vol. 109, pp. 171-477. A. Fossati: 'Elementi per uno studio del Corso e dell'Abbassamento delle monete d'oro sotto Carlo Emanuele I (1580-1630)', in Carlo Emanuele I. Miscellanea, B.S.S.S., vol.120, pp.47-92. G.Praj: 'La moneta piemontese ai tempi di Vittorio Amedeo I e di Carlo Emanuele II (1630-1675)', B.S.S.S., a.XL, 1938, pp.221-327. See also, Einaudi, pp.254-70; and G.Quazza, pp.178-87.

(7) Chiaudano, op.cit., pp.345-477; Prato, pp. 160-61.

Prato's work on the first half of the 18th century, as well as that of Pugliese on the Vercellese, provide a certain amount of material, not however sufficiently elaborated. (8). Both authors gives some figures as to wages, but these are insufficient. (9). Until further research on these problems, and on their relationships, has been carried out, it is impossible to make any generalizations.

The following graph has the limited purpose of illustrating the rise in the exchange-rate of the most important gold and silver moneys - the doppia d'Italia and the ducatone. It is based on the tables given by Chiaudano (pp. 259-263), Fossati (pp. 53-56) and Praj (pp. 324-326), supplemented for the post-1675 period by Promis (vol. II, 1675-1730) and V.Saraceno, an 18th century, remarkably reliable, book on exchange-rates.(10) Where the tables were incomplete before 1675, Saraceno has also been used, though occasionally it has seemed more advisable to break the line of the graph, given the impossibility of determining the exact year of the change of value (e.g. doppia d'Italia 1629, 1662, 1664-65, 1667-68, 1670; ducatone 1629, 1669). The ducatone, although

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(8) Prato, pp.147-65, and passim; ibid.: Il costo della guerra, cit., pp. 295-301; Pugliese, pp. 257-406.

(9) Prato, pp.451-63; Pugliese, pp.182-256. See also Quazza, pp. 226-33.

(10) V. Saraceno: Il corso delle monete seguito negli Stati di S.S.R.M. Il Re di Sardegna... nel Piemonte dal 1300 sino al presente... Turin, 1782.

theoretically coined in 1566, only really appears in 1586, when valued at 10 fiorini 5 grossi. The doppia d'Italia, like all the other doppie, is first coined as a double scudo of the same name: until 1632, when the doppia d'Italia appears, the exchange-rates for the scudo d'Italia have been doubled. (11)

Until 1632 (apart from Emanuele Filiberto's unsuccessful attempt in 1561) the money of account was the fiorino. In that year it was changed to the lira, and various exchange-rates were given for the liquidation of the fiorino. In 1568 the lira had been valued at 3 fiorini; in 1632 it varied from 8⅓ to 9 fiorini (for the purpose of liquidating contracts in fiorini), and by 1636 it was valued at 15 fiorini. In practice, the commercial (as distinct from the legal) exchange-rate in 1632 was virtually 1 to 15. This proportion has been adopted. However, it should be remembered that before 1632 such a proportion is purely hypothetical.

The graph shows clearly the rise in the quotations of both moneys, which parallel each other to a remarkable degree. The steeper rise of the doppia is probably due in part to the changing gold-silver ratio. However, the fluctuations of the intrinsic content of the ducatone should be noted; the doppia remained stable, with an intrinsic weight of 6.62 grammes until 1726. (12)

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(11) For 1630-32, Praj mistakenly uses the scudo del sole, which is, in fact, equal to the scudo d'Italia in 1632 (both valued at L.3:2:0), but which is valued in almost all other years at a slighter higher rate, like its double, the doppia di Spagna. The values in fiorini of account for 1630-32 for the 'scudo d'Italia' have therefore been used.


(12) Cipolla: 'Les mouvements monétaires', p. 53.

The official attempts to lower the exchange-rates are easily seen. In 1578 Emanuele Filiberto successfully reduced the over-quoted gold moneys, including the scudo d'Italia, which dropped from 11 fiorini to 10 fiorini 8 grossi. Carlo Emanuele I, with remarkable regularity, attempted abbassamenti in 1587-88, 1607-08 and 1627-28, but none of them lasted for very long. With the change of the money of account, the fiorino lost all importance and value; both the doppia and the ducatone doubled in value between 1630 and 1632, in terms of fiorini (doppia from 52 to 100 fiorini, ducatone from 19⅓ to 34 fiorini), but were reduced in practice with the new exchange-rate in lire: the doppia fell from an exchange equivalent to L.6:14:0 to L.6:4:0, while the ducatone, over-valued at L.2:6:0, did not rise again until 1636. Attempted abbassamenti in 1636 and 1637 were wholly ineffectual, and the rise continued with the civil war. The sharp fall in 1640 was for once due to natural causes, with the end of the siege of Turin. After 1640 the rise lessened in intensity until 1670. The abbassamento of 1671 was again ineffectual, but this time the exchange-rate remained level. The main disturbances were in the 1690-1696 war, with the renewed coining of large quantities of debased moneys; the government tried two abbassamenti in 1695 and 1696, and in fact partially succeeded in lowering the exchange-rate. With the monetary reform of 1717, both ducatone and doppia d'Italia virtually disappeared, with the ducatone quoted at L.5:5:0, and the doppia d'Italia at L.15:15:0, rising, however, to L.16:4:0. (13)

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(13) For the abbassamenti see Chiaudano, op.cit., pp.335-37; Fossati, op.cit., passim; Praj, op.cit., passim.

Exchange-rate of the doppia d'Italia and the ducatone in fiorini and lire of account, c.1660 - c.1730.


Fiorini
Lire
20
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
doppia d'Italia
ducatone
105
90
75
60
45
30
15
10
1550
1600
32 32
1650
1700

Appendix 2. Purchases by Gerolamo II and Bonifacio, 1556-1596.

Gerolamo II made the following acquisitions:

1557 'Rivalta' farm, La Morra	130 giornate	L. 793 (1400 scudi)	(1)
1571 'Croce' farm, Savigliano	50 g. (?)	L. 397 (640 ")	(2)
1581 'Porcheria' farm, Turin	30 g.	L.1290 (1800 ")	(3)
1586 5/24 Barolo	—	L. 237 (314 ")	(4)
1587-91 'Sprina' farm, Savigliano	90 g.	L.4280 (5400 ")	(5)
1594 1/2 Rodello	123 g.	L.4822 (5459 ")	(6)
1595 1/12 Borgomale	52 g.	? ?	(6)
1566-96 land in Barolo	20 g.		
Serralunga	15 g.		
La Morra	15 g.		
	50 g.	L.1071 (1435 ")	(7)
	525 g.	L.12890(16448 ")	

The lands at Borgomale were worth very little (see p.68, but calculating them at 1/3 the cost of the Rodello lands, they must have cost at least:

(1) M.175,ns.8,9; M.176,n.24.
(2) M.174,n.9; M.204,n.8.
(3) M.169, n.10.
(4) M.174,ns.6,9,10; AST III,art.599,i,n.19.
(5) M.203,ns.14,16,17.
(6) M.211,n.3; AST III,art.599,i,ns.30-32,35; AST I, Paesi per A e B,s.v.'Serralunga',n.1; Feudi del Monferrato,M.8,s.v.'Borgomale',ns.1,2; Guasco,s.v.'Rodello','Borgomale'.
(7) M.169,ns.4,6,11,16; M.176,ns.13,14;M.A.14,n.4

		L. 1185	(1340 ")
Making a total of :		L.14075	(17778")
To this must be added the cost of the dowries:		L. 3922	(5775") (8)
But from this figure must be deducted the censo	// Total:	L.17997	(23553")
Gerolamo II left his son to pay over the Turin farm.		L. 883	(1000 ") (9)
Leaving a total expenditure of:		L.17114	(22553 ")
Gerolamo received in extraordinary income:		L. 3014	(3500 ") (10)
Leaving the income he spent from his own lands:		L.14100	(19053 ")

Representing an annual average of annual average of L. 352.

Naturally these figures cannot be regarded as fully accurate, and have their main value as indicative of the value of land; probably at least a 10% margin of error should be allowed.

In the same period Bonifacio made the following acquisitions:

1577-80	2 farms at Savigliano	100 g.	L. 1011 (1431 scudi)	(11)
1585	1/6 La Morra, 1/9 Serralunga	57 g.	L. 1147 (1543 ")	(12)
Making a total of :		157 g.	L. 2158 (2974 ")	

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(8) See note (30).
(9) See note (32).
(10) See note (31).
(11) M.203,ns.11,13.
(12) M.172,ns.12,13.

Appendix 3. Expenditure and acquisitions of Giacomo, 1596-1624.

Giacomo's expenditure was considerably greater than his father's, and he left far more debts.

Until 1609, he made the following acquisitions:

1600	Two farms, Villafalletto	200 giornate	L. 7685 (8700 scudi)	(1)
1603-04	Farm, Fossano	106 g. "	L. 6888 (7798 ")	(2)
1607	'Murata' farm, Vergne	110 g.	L. 8213 (8800 ")	(3)
1609	'Roretto' farm, Vergne	88 g.	L. 6097 (5900 ")	(4)
	Lands in La Morra	15 g.	L. 789 (764 ")	(5)
	'Casail' farm, Centallo	144 g.	L. 5995 (5802 ")	(6)
	Palace, Bra	—	L. 2273 (2200 ")	(7)
Making an expenditure of:		663 g.	L.37940(39964 ")	

During the rest of his life, he only made a few more purchases:

1611	Censo, La Morra		L. 213 (200 ")	(8)
1620	'Carpanea' farm, Vergne	95 g.	L. 8694 (5670 ")	(9)
	Another farm, Vergne	28 g.	L. 2617 (1685 ")	(10)
Making his total acquisitions:		786 g.	L.49464(47519 ")	

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(1) M.A.121, ns.10, 11; M.A.122, n.13.
(2) M.169, n.18; M.170, n.11
(3) M.170, n.13.
(4) M.170, n.13; M.171, n.1; M.A.39, n.1.
(5) M.170, n.12.
(6) M.213, n.2; M.A.33, n.2; M.A.34, n.7; M.A.35, n.1.
(7) M.169, n.19
(8) M.169, n.20.
(9) M.170, ns.13-15.
(10) M.191, ns.7, 8.

In 1616, Giacomo exchanged his farm at Fossano for Giovanni Falletti's possessions at Barolo and Serralunga: 5/24 and about 50 g. of the former , besides about 20 g. in the latter. He also sold his last acquired farm in Vergne within a year, at cost price. The farm at Turin, of 30 g., was also certainly sold, as no evidence is to be found after 1603. Deducting these sales his acquisitions were 692 g., or 55.2% of the patrimony he inherited.

The inheritances from Bonifacio (1616-27), Giovanni (1616-26), and Carlo (1628), further enlarged the patrimony by the following areas:

Bonifacio:	Serralunga	232 g.	
	La Morra	165 g.	
Giovanni :	La Morra	19 g.	
Carlo:	Rodello	62 g.	
	Borgomale	26 g.	
		88 g.	88 g.
			504 g. (See Appendix 11 (a)).

Thus, the patrimony inherited from Gerolamo II of 1248 g., at the beginning of the 17th century, had been enlarged to 2444 g. by 1628 (see Appendix 11 (b)).

As it is impossible to calculate all purchases and sales exactly, while the inheritances leave an even greater margin of error, these figures cannot be regarded as too exact.

Besides the acquisitions, Giacomo had certain other expenses:

1598 Repurchase of censo left by father	L. 883	(1000 scudi)	(11)
1609-14 Interest, 7%, on censo of 4000 scudi, sold over Centallo farm, 280 scudi annually	L.1493	(1400 ")	(12)
1611 Payment to Carlo and Francesco Maria of legacies left by Gerolamo, 1596	L.4267	(4000 ")	(13)
1623-24 Interest, 7%, on 2 censi over Vergne farms, 1000 doppie capital, 70 doppie p.a.; plus censo, 900 scudi, 7 3/4% interest, 70 scudi p.a. approximately	L. 313	[200 "]	(14)
	L.6956	(6600 ")	

Giacomo also paid the following sums for dowries:

1616-24 Caterina	L.14400	(12000 scudi)	(15)
Increase on dowry	L. 3494	(2912 ")	(15)
1621-24 Lodovica	L.12533	(8000 ")	(16)
	L.30427	(22912 ")	

Giacomo's total expenditure may thus be summarized :

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(11) M.169,n.10.
(12) M.213,n.2.
(13) AST III,art.599,i,M.1,n.58.
(14) M.169,ns.26,27; M.203,n.24.
(15) M.169,ns.25,28;M.174,ns.20,21,23.
(16) M.174,n.22.

Purchases	L. 49464	(47519 scudi)
Other expenses	L. 6956	(6600 ")
Dowries	L. 30427	(22912 ")
	L. 86847	(77031 ")

But, to calculate his real expenditure, it is necessary to deduct the sums he raised from the sale of censi and lands, besides the amounts still owing for his purchases at the time of his death:

1622	Sale of last farm at Vergne	L. 2640 (1685 scudi)	(17)
1623	Two censi, 1000 doppie	L. 3133 [2000 "]	(18)
1624	Still unpaid for 'Murata' and 'Carpanea' farms	L. 5013 (3200 ")	(19)
	Turin farm, undoubtedly sold after 1603. The land was good, and can be compared to the Vergne, farms. Taking an average of 70 scudi per g. (based on the Vergne purchases, 1609-20), the 30 g. were probably sold for about:	L. 3220 (2100 ")	
	Making a total of :	L. 14006 (9985 ")	

The censo of 400 scudi he sold over his Centallo farm in 1609 was rebought in 1614 (20); a censo of 900 scudi in Vergne, sold in 1623, was rebought the following year (21).

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(17) M. 170, ns. 13-15; M. 191, ns. 7, 8.
(18) M. 169, ns. 26, 27.
(19) M. 170, ns. 14, 15; M. 191, ns. 7, 8.
(20) M. 213, n. 2.
(21) M. 203, n. 24.

If the above total, from the sale of lands and censi, is deducted from Giacomo's total expenditure,his real expenditure is left as: L.72841 (87046 scudi)

As against this, Giacomo's increase of capital may be calculated as:

1607	Dowry of wife (including usufruct of farms)	L. 4667 (5000 scudi)	(22)
1610	Jointure,Caterina's marriage	L. 3150 (3000 ")	(23)
1618	Wife's inheritance from mother	L. 1950 (2437 ")	(24)
	Making a total of:	L. 9767 (10437 ")	

If this is deducted from Giacomo's real expenditure, the income he raised from his own lands is left as :

L.63074 (56609 scudi)

Representing an average for the 28 years of L.2252:13:0 a year).

Gerolamo III was left to pay the following debts:

1626	For 2 Vergne farms	L. 5013 (3200 scudi)	(25)
1629	Two censi,1000 doppie	L. 3333 [2200 "]	(26)
	Plus interest,7%,1624-29	L. 1110 [700 "]	
1624-29	Lodovica's dowry	L.18800 (12000 ")	(27)
1629	Caterina's dowry	L.10000 (6000 ")	(28)
		L.38256 (23900 ")	

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(22) M.169,n.15;M.174,ns.15,17.
(23)M. 174,ns.18,19.
(24) M.191,n.2;M.193,n.1;M.210,n.8.
(25) M.170,ns.14,15; M.191,ns.7,8.
(26) M.169,ns.26,27
(27) M.174,n.22.
(28) M.174,n.23.

Appendix 4 (a). Bonifacio's acquisitions, 1556-1616.

Many documents are missing about Bonifacio's career. But the evidence that exists is sufficient to show a similar expansion through acquisitions and inheritances.

By the time of Gerolamo II's death in 1596, Bonifacio had bought about 100 giornate at Savigliano at the 'Croce' farm, and 1/6 of La Morra and 1/9 of Serralunga, with about 57 g. (1).

Bonifacio inherited from Gerolamo II the 'Sprina' farm at Savigliano of 90 g., which he bequeathed the following year (1597) to his natural son, Gerolamo (2).

Between 1598 and 1603, Bonifacio bought extensively, almost entirely in La Morra; in all, he bought over 67 g., including the 'Monteirone' farm, at an expense of about L.3613 (4090 scudi). In addition, he bought a censo of L.617 (1000 crosoni) over the comunità of La Morra, and another censo of L.265 (150 doppie) over the city of Cherasco. His total expenditure in these years, in investments, was L.4495. In 1609, when Francesco Maria married, Bonifacio bequeathed all these purchases to him (3).

In 1612, Bonifacio bought another farm, the 'Manescotto', at La Morra, of about 100 g., for L.5360 (5025 scudi). He also bought four censi, sold by peasants of La Morra, between 1608 and 1614, for a total capital of L.380, besides a censo over the comunità

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(1) R.172,ns.12,13; M.203,ns.11,13. See Appendix 2.
(2) AST III,art.599,M.'F'-1°,n.348,f.38.
(3) AST III,art.599,i,M.1,ns.39,42,45,51-2o.

of Roddi of L.315 (300 crosazzi) (4).

Further details about Bonifacio's acquisitions can be found in his will of 1605, and in a transaction made by his heirs after his death, for all his acquisitions after 1605 (5). Another censo over La Morra of L.383 (500 ducatoni), and a mill he bought there in 1601 for L.1237 (1400 scudi), were left for religious purposes; other bequests, totalling L.275, were made. Bonifacio's natural son, Gerolamo, was left the farm of 38 g. at Fossano, which Bonifacio had bought in 1604 for L.2386 (2701 scudi), instead of the 'Sprina' farm at Savigliano. The other natural son, Gaspardo, inherited the 'Croce' farm at Savigliano of about 100 g., and Bonifacio's palace at La Morra, both under primogeniture; by the subsequent transaction of 1616, Gaspardo was given as his share of the acquisitions after 1605, the 'Manescotto' farm at La Morra, of 100 g., and the four censi over La Morra, of L.380. Bonifacio's nephew, Carlo, was left the 'Sprina' farm at Savigliano, of 90 g., also under primogeniture; while Francesco Maria, his other nephew, was confirmed in the donation of 1609, i.e., over 67 g. at La Morra and 2 censi of capital value L.882. In addition, Francesco Maria divided with his brother, Giacomo, and the illegitimate Gaspardo the censo of L.315 over the comunità of Roddi. Giacomo himself inherited Bonifacio's original patrimony, left him by Scipione in 1556, and the acquisitions of 1585.

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(4) M.169,n.2;M.177,p.13;M.203,n.4; AST III,art.599;M.1,ns.50,51-1°, 53,57-2o,60-62,73;M.'F'-2o,n.369,f.49.
(5) M.170,n.12;M.211,n.5.

It is extremely probable that Bonifacio made more acquisitions. But even if no evidence can be found of these, the purchases outlined above show clearly the size of his investments. The following summary has been made to show the relative importance of landed and cash investments, as well as the total spent by Bonifacio:

	Land		Censi
1577-85	157 g.	L. 2168	----
1598-1603	67 g.	L. 3613	L. 882
1601	(mill)	L. 1237	L. 383
1604	38 g.	L. 2386	----
1608-14	100 g.	L. 5360	L. 695
	362 g.	L.14764	L.1960

Total expenditure: L.16724

Bonifacio had inherited about 340 g. (see Appendix 11 (b)),which he more than doubled by the time of his death, 60 years later. His expenditure, in the same period, represented an annual L. 278:14:8, compared to Gerolamo II's average of L.352. However, as Bonifacio had no expenses for dowries (though, likewise, he received no increase of capital from dowries) all his extraordinary expenditure was in acquisitions, while Gerolamo had to spend a certain amount on dowries. If the evidence for Bonifacio was complete, his acquisitions would probably be as great as those of Gerolamo.

Appendix 4 (b). Carlo's acquisitions, 1596-1628.

The documentation on Carlo's acquisitions is even more fragmentary than for Bonifacio, but the importance of inheritances clearly emerges, while once more a member of the Falletti family is to be seen actively investing in *censi*.

In 1596, Gerolamo II left Carlo, his son, 1/2 Rodello and 1/12 Borgomale, with 175 giornate. In 1616, Carlo was also left the 'Sprina' farm at Savigliano of 90 g., by Bonifacio. In 1595 already, he had been compensated for his claims on the inheritance of his maternal grandmother, Lucrezia Isnardi Malabaila, with a payment of L.767 (1000 ducatoni). In 1611, his brother, Giacomo, was forced to pay him L.2134 (2000 scudi) for a legacy left by their father, Gerolamo II (1).

In addition, his wife, Eleanora Riccio di Solbrito, brought a dowry of L.1560 (1800 scudi), on their marriage in 1590(though this was probably used by Gerolamo II) (2).

Carlo thus received through inheritances and dowries a total L.4462, with 265 giornate. His only major expense was for the spiritual dowries of his daughters, Angela and Laura, who entered the monastery of Santa Chiara at Chieri in 1605: the dowries totalled L.1546 (1750 scudi) (3).

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(1) For Gerolamo II's will: M.211,n.3. For Bonifacio's will: M.211,n.5. For the 1595 payment: AST III,art.599,i,M.1,n.34. For the 1611 payment, *id.*,n.58.
(2) *Id.*, n.28.
(3) *Id.*, n.48.

Between 1612 and 1627, Carlo bought numerous censi:

1612 over comunità of Lequio	L. 373 (175 doppie)		
"	L. 853 (800 scudi)		
	L.1226		L. 1226
1615 over peasants of Serralunga	L. 233 (200 scudi)		
" "	L. 233 (200 scudi)		
1627 over comunità of Serralunga	L. 77 (50 scudi)		
	L. 543		L. 543
1613 over comunità of Diano	L. 213 (200 scudi)		
1620 " "	L. 153 (100 scudi)		
1624 " "	L. 270 (doppie,crosazzi,crosoni)		
	L. 636	:	L. 636
			L.2405. (4)

Carlo undoubtedly bought other censi, as well as some land. For in his will of 19 March 1628 (5), he left all his censi and crediti over the comunità of Rodello to his daughter, Angela, as well as his allodial lands there, both inherited and purchased; moreover, Gerolamo III was given all his censi over the comunità of Barolo, as well as those of Serralunga.

Gerolamo III and Francesco Maria were left in common the feudal possessions in Rodello and Borgomale. But the will was contested by Angela's nunnery of Santa Chiara, and the Falletti heirs were finally forced to pay it in compensation L.2250 (500

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(4) M.175,n.15;M.A.97,n.26;AST III,art.599,i,M.1,ns.63-65,70; M.2,ns.74,75,84,94,101,104.
(5) AST III, art.599,i,M.2,ns.106-07.

ducatoni) (6). The comunità of Lequio also resisted paying the censi to Gerolamo and Francesco Maria, and the lawsuit (begun by Carlo in 1622) continued until 1645 (7).

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(5) AST III,art.599,i,M.2,ns.106-07.
(6) M.169,n.30;M.211,n.10.
(7) AST III,art.599,i,M.3,ns.166-67;M.'G' in 'L', ns.379-82.

Appendix 4 (c). Francesco Maria's acquisitions; the Falletti di Rodello.

Sufficient evidence exists of Francesco Maria's acquisitions to confirm the wealth of the Falletti family, and its power over the comunità, especially in the years of war in the middle of the century.

In 1596, Francesco Maria inherited the 'Frassinetto' farm at Savigliano (probably part of the 'Croce' farm), and 1/3 of Gerolamo II's rights in La Morra and Serralunga. On his mother's death in 1609, he forced his brother, Giacomo, to pay him the legacy left by Gerolamo of L.2134.(It is possible that he also forced Giacomo to share the 'Rivalta' farm with him for some time). Bonifacio, in 1616, left him over 67 giornate in La Morra, and L.987 in censi over the comunità of La Morra, Cherasco and Roddi. Finally, in 1628, on Carlo's death, Francesco Maria inherited with Gerolamo III 1/12 of Borgomale and 1/2 of Rodello, with 175 giornate, as well as censi over the comunità of Lequio and Diano, valued for his part at L.3035 (1). Thus, like Carlo, Francesco Maria was extremely fortunate in his inheritances, receiving altogether at least 155 g. in thre comunità, fractional rights in 4 different fees in the Langhe, and cash censi of a capital value of L. 6165; in all probability, he owned considerably more land. In addition to this, his wife, Eleanora Del Carretto

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(1) For Gerolamo II's will, see pp.98-99. For the legacy, see Appendix 3. For Bonifacio's inheritance, see Appendix 4(a). For Carlo's inheritance, see Appendix 4(b).

di Gorzegno, brought a dowry of L.2450 (3500 crosoni), paid between 1609 and 1619 (2).

By 1628, Francesco Maria had made at least 11 purchases of land in La Morra of over 66 g. (as well as two houses) at an expense of L.6581, besides buying 5 censi sold by peasants of La Morra for L.733 (3).

For the rest of his long life, Francesco Maria steadily acquired land and censi, taking advantage of the wars. By the time of his death in 1665, he had bought another 52 g. in La Morra for L.14550, as well as a farm of 53 g. in Candiolo for L.5250, a farm in Savigliano of 85 g. for L.4681 and land in Roddi. At the same time, Francesco Maria had invested L.6813 in the purchase of 29 censi sold by peasants of La Morra (4). Between 1628 and 1665, he had invested L.24,481 in land, and L.6813 in censi; in the whole period of his life, his purchases of land (over 250 g.) had cost L. 31,062 and of censi L.7546. The proportion of 4 to 1 is clear enough proof of the great value placed on land, but the size of the liquid investments (especially in the later period of Francesco Maria's life) seems to indicate a greater mobility of capital.

The only expenditure, apart from these investments, seems to have been for the spiritual dowry of Francesco Maria's only daughter, Caterina, in 1629, of L.532 (420 ducatoni) (5).

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(2) AST III,art.599,i,M.2,ns.76-1°,81,111,139,141,146;M.3,n.179-2°; M.'V'-1°,n.423,f.63;M.'V'-2°,n.424,f.2.

(3) AST III,art.599,i,M.1,ns.55,57-1°,58,68,71;M.2,ns.78,80,82,85-91,95,96,98,102,105,108-10;M.'F'-2°,n.364,f.53.

(4) AST III,art.599,i,M.2,ns.113-16,118,119,121-23,126,128-31,133, 134,136,138,142,149,150,153;M.3,ns.156-60,163-65,171,173-75,177, 178-1°,180,185,187,188,191,192,194-98,201-202,206-08;M.'M in P', n.386,f.4;M.'R in T',n.416,f.1.

(5) AST III, art.599,i,M.2,n.117.

Francesco Maria's inheritance was divided among both his sons, Bonifacio and Michele Antonio, and Scipione's son, Maurizio Antonio, (Francesco Maria's grandson), after long disputes (6).

There are few documents for the later 17th century, but at least Bonifacio continued the expansion, especially outside the Langhe, gaining a farm of 62 g. at Virle, in place of a debt of L.4354, and land in Verduno and Diano, besides a great number of censi (7).

The wealth of this branch of the family was seen on the death of Emanuele Francesco in 1695; relations between the two branches of the Falletti di Rodello family were probably not very good, and instead of reuniting the patrimony, Emanuele Francesco left all his possessions to Vittorio Amedeo II. Over 350 g. were left in La Morra, Serralunga, Vergne, Castiglion Falletto, Verduno, Borgomale, Rodello, Virle and Candiolo, besides censi and feudal rights. The total income from all the lands, rights and censi was calculated at L. 6534:10:0 annually, and capitalized at 3% for a total (including mobiles) of L. 56,145 (8).

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(6) AST III, art.599,M.'F'-1°,ns.353-56.
(7) AST III,art.599,i,M.3,ns.214-17,219-24,229,231-33; M.4,ns. 234,239; M.'R in T',ns.410,f.27,416,f.1;M.'V'-2°,n.430,f.21.
(8) AST III,art.599,i[illegible],n.472.

Appendix 5. The deposits of the Falletti di Barolo at Genoa.

The Banca di San Giorgio at Genoa (after the Middle Ages) was not primarily a deposit and exchange-bank. It was only in the late 16th century that such a bank was begun. But even then, deposite were only allowed in certain monete grosse, to solve the problem of the fluctuating exchange-rate, while at the same time, attempts were made (ineffectively) to fix the exchange-rate. In 1586, deposits were allowed in scudi d'oro in the cartulario de numerato moneta d'oro. In 1606, the cartulario argento was opened for deposits in scudi di Genova (in Piedmont normally called crosazzi). In 1625, a cartulario moneta da reali was opened for pezzi da otto reali di conio spagnuolo (equivalent to the silver crosone). The limitations of these restricted cartularii for the enormous commerce of Genoa were soon felt, and in 1629 a proposal was made to found two Banks, the monti di San Giovanni Battista, and di San Bernardo, to accept deposits in all forms of money, with the choice left to the depositor of repayment in the original money or at the official exchange-rate. These proposals were rejected, but the banks were still founded (1). It was in these monti that Gerolamo III invested all his silver money until, on their extinction in 1666, Carlo Lodovico transferred them to a new monte della Nostra

(1) For the origins of the deposit banks, see H.Sieveking: 'Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel Medioevo e in particolare sulla casa di S.Giorgio', Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, v.35,1907,part 2,pp.232-54. Sieveking states that if the monti di San Giovanni Battista e San

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Signora (2).

In 1638, Gerolamo III invested 3600 scudi d'argenti, or crosazzi. In the following year, he made two deposits of 12,511 reali, or 1564 pezzi da otto reali (crosoni). Both deposits were later united as 4689:11:8 crosazzi. At the time of their deposit, they were worth (according to the Piedmontese exchange-rate) L.15,555. Until an uncertain date in the 1650s, they yield 3 1/2%, equivalent to 164:2:8 crosazzi (or L.544:8:9 of their purchase value); the interest was then reduced to 3%, yielding only 140:13:9 crosazzi (or L.466:13:3 of their purchase value).

In 1656, after the sale of the 'Roretto' farm in Vergne and the Centallo farm, Gerdamo made 7 further deposits in the cartulario d'oro for a total 6834:17:3 scudi, equivalent to L.46,989:13:7;the interest was 2 1/2%, yielding 170:17:5 scudi (equal to L.1174:14:10 in 1656).

At the very end of his life, in 1662, Gerolamo made two last, small deposits in the silver account, for 339:8:2 crosazzi, equal to L. 1866:15:0. But the market at Genoa was booming at the time, and Gerolamo was forced to pay above par at 113 and 114, for an extra cost of L. 251:14:4. Together with the 1638-39 deposits, Gerolamo had now invested a total of 5028:19:10 crosazzi, at a cost of L. 17,673:17:4, which at 3% yielded 151:17:5

./. Bernardo were founded at all, they led a very ephemeral existence. However, all the Falletti investments in silver moneys are to be found in these banks until their extinction, although the gold scudi were probably invested in the cartulario of the Banca di San Giorgio itself.

crosazzi (or L.522:13:4).

In the meantime, Gerolamo began to withdraw money from his gold account, to pay for his new acquisitions in the Monferrat. In 1660, he withdrew 1100 scudi, equal to L.7562:10:0, while adding various small interests to the remainder of his capital to make a total of 5808:19:1 scudi. The whole of this sum was sold in 1662,when a small fraction was reinvested in the silver account (see above). At the moment of the sale, Gerolamo realized L.39,936:11:2.

By the time of his death (1664), Gerolamo had gained about L.20,500 from the annual interests of these capital investments. But their capital value had also risen high, with the increase in the exchange-rate. At the time of their investment, the deposits had cost Gerolamo L.64,663:10:11. At the time of their sale (or for those still invested, at the time of Gerolamo's death), their value had risen to L.75,158:10:9 (3).

After Gerolamo's death, Carlo Lodovico made no new deposits. In 1666, when the monti di San Giovanni Battista e di San Bernardo were extinguished, he reinvested the 5028:19:10 crosazzi, although the rate of interest had fallen to 2½%; the following year, there was a further reduction to 2 1/4%.

In 1694, in the middle of the war, Carlo Lodovico sold 2400

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(2) All the evidence for the Falletti deposits is to be found in: M.212,n.3.

(3) The 1662 investment has been calculated at the actual purchase price above par, as this was the real figure that Gerolamo paid.

crosazzi, worth L.15,960. Finally, in 1698, when very short of money, he sold the remainder of the account, 2628:19:10 crosazzi, under par at 95 for a loss of 131:9:9 crosazzi (L.841:10:5); the sale yielded L.15,868:16:0.

The rise in the exchange-rate between 1664 and 1694-98 had increased the value of the deposit in money of account from L. 27,659:9:7 to L. 31,828:16:0. In the same years, Carlo Lodovico had received L. 20,420 in interest.

Appendix 6. Gerolamo III's acquisitions and expenses.

Gerolamo III left the family patrimony considerably enlarged. He had inherited about 2500 giornate (see Appendix 11 (b)), to which he added his acquisitions in the Monferrat. At Montiggio, Gerolamo had been given as dowry 266 giornate, for which he paid an additional L.1550 (250 doppie) (1). In 1652, he bought the fee of Rocchetta Palafea, with 125 g. for L.13100 (2000 doppie di Spagna) (2). In the same year, be bought half the fee of Cassinasco, with only 9 g. and few rights, from Carlo II of Mantua for 250 doppie di Spagna, and in 1654 a further 1/4 from the Bigliani family for 100 doppie di Spagna, in all L. 4625 (3). In 1661, he bought the marquisate of Cavatore, with 35 g. and over 40 emphyteuses; the price was L.10,920 (800 doppie), but Gerolamo only paid L.2048 (150 doppie), as the remainder was owed for a debt (4). Finally, in the same year, Gerdamo bought the fee of Castagnole Monferrato, with only 5 g. of woodland, but a feudal censo of 283:10:0 scudi annually (equivalent, in 1661, to L. 2126): he paid Carlo II L. 8412 (620 doppie) for 1/2 the fee, and probably an equal sum to the Lanzone family for the other half (5).

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(1) See note (55).
(2) M.A.16,n.3;M.A.32,n.16;M.A.38,n.8; AST I,Monferrato, Concessioni,R.1,f.92;R.3,f.15.
(3) See note (55);also,AST I, Paesi per A e B,M.30,s.v.'Cassinasco', n.4.
(4) See note (57).
(5) M.182,n.26;M.A.16,n.3; M.206,n.22;M.A.32,ns.12,13,15,16,22; AST I,Monferrato,Concessioni,R.7,ff.49,220,315.

In all, Gerolamo acquired 440 g. in the five new communes. He also bought about 19 g. in Castiglion Falletto between 1633 and 1644, at an expense of L.1222, about 10 g. in Barolo, and a farm of 128 g. at Neive, first mentioned in 1651 (6). No document records the price or the exact year in which the Neive farm was bought, but calculating its value at 15 doppie per giornata (slightly above the almost definitely under-valued 'Roretto' farm in Vergne, sold in the same years), it must have cost 1920 doppie, which (at an average exchange-rate of L.12 per doppia in the 1640s) equalled L.22,040. Similarly, the Barolo purchases are measured, but no price is given; they have been calculated according to the average price of the Castiglione purchases (for small purchases of land always cost much less than whole farms), at L.815 per giornata.

From these acquisitions of 598 g., Gerolamo's sales must be deducted: the 'Roretto' farm at Vergne of 88 g. was sold between 1642 and 1655, and the Centallo farm of 144 g. in 1656 leaving a total increase of 366 g. (7). Gerolamo thus increased the size of the patrimony from 2444 g. to 2818 g. Between 1600 and 1670, a further 38 g. were also acquired in Villafalletto by Giacomo and Gerolamo III, making a total of 2848 g. (8).

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(6) See pp. 118 and note (52).
(7) See pp. 130-31.
(8) See note (52) and Appendix 11 (a) and (b).

Gerolamo spent a total of L.62,326 on his purchases of land (9). He raised L.18,225 by his sales of land. He thus spent a net total of L.44,101, representing an annual average of L.1102:10:0 for the 40 years after his father's death.

In addition, Gerolamo paid over L.38,256 for debts left by his father. He also spent a further L.22,717 on the purchase of censi, mills, etc., and in payments for tax exemptions to the comunità of Barolo and La Morra (10); and paid a legacy of L.26,000 left by his wife (11). Between 1638 and 1662, he invested L.64,664 at Genoa, but his withdrawals in 1660 and 1662 were worth L.47,499, leaving a total invested of L.17,165 (12). His total expenditure of L.148,239, represented an average during the 40 years of L.3706. However, he received L.30,231 as interest of the censi he had bought in 1641 and of the investments at Genoa (see table below). Thus, the income Gerolamo derived from his lands and feudal rights, over and above his normal living expenses, was reduced to L.118,008, or an annual average of L.2950.

The problem remains of how much Gerolamo gained or lost with the rapid inflation of these years. It was a problem facing

(9) The value of the dowry (L.18,600) and the debt of L.8,872 for Cavatore have been deducted from the total cost of the Monferrat fees.

(10) For the debts left by Giacomo, see Appendix 3. The actual total Gerolamo spent on small purchases and transactions was L.28,229, but L.5512 were raised, in the 1647 payment to La Morra, by the repayment of the censi he had bought in 1641; see table below.

(11) See pp. 130-31.

(12) See Appendix 5.

all the members of this (and every) family; the years from 1624 to 1664 showed the sharpest rise in the exchange-rate, or fall in the value of the monete piccole. Examples have already been given, such as the rise in the capital value of the deposits at Genoa from L.64,664 to L.75,159 (see pp. 120 and Appendix 5). Similarly, Gerolamo had to pay a larger sum for his father's debts in the years from 1624 to 1629 than Giacomo had received in the actual years he had created the debts (see Appendix 3). The censi bought in 1641 were worth L.4950, but by the time of their sale in 1647 their value had risen to L.5512.

However, it is impossible to sum up the increases and simply calculate the gains (and rare losses) of these years. For many, if not most, of the payments were made in monete grosse to avoid the effects of the inflation: as Gerdamo both bought and sold the censi as 450 doppie in 1641 and 1647, the rise in their value in money of account is purely fictitious. Moreover, even where payments were made in lire, or in differing monete grosse (with varying, unco-ordinated, exchange-rates), the increase had its main significance in its relationship to the fall in the purchasing power of the money; only if the latter were known, would it be really possible to calculate the profits or losses incurred through the inflation.

As so far no study has been made of prices or wages in 17th century Piedmont, the following table has been constructed purely to show the effects of the inflation on the actual monetary position of a family, without taking into account the

simultaneous fall in the purchasing power of money. All extraordinary expenditure and increases of capital (i.e., excluding living expenses and income derived from land) have been calculated according to a base-year to estimate their deflated value, without any increase in the exchange-rate; at the same time, they have been calculated at the market exchange-rate in the actual year of their appearance. The base-year chosen has been 1632, which is not only the first year with the lira (in place of the fiorino) as the money of account, but also has the advantage of preceding all Gerolamo's financial transactions, except for the payment of his father's debts. As these debts (paid 1624-29) were in fact smaller than the 1632 figure, their calculation according to the deflated year exchange-rate would have caused an inflation; consequently, the real exchange-rates between 1624 and 1629 have been adopted. Where payments were actually made in lire, they have been calculated back, according to the market exchange-rate, and then recalculated for the deflated value; all such estimates of doppie have been indicated by square brackets.

From the table it clearly appears that while increase of capital covered 52.2% of Gerolamo's expenditure, according to the market exchange-rate, it only covered 44.4% in terms of deflated revenues, an apparent gain of 7.8% through inflation. In the first instance, L.118,008 excess expenditure over capital increase was apparently raised from Gerolamo's lands, representing

an annual expenditure of L. 2950; in the second instance, L.85,779 was so raised, representing only L. 2144 a year. Thus, between 1624 and 1664 (or more precisely between 1632 and 1664) there had been an increase of average annual income from land of 37%, in terms of money of account.

Expenditure

			Market exchange		Base-year	
			Lire	Lire	Lire	Lire
1633	Montiggio	(doppie 3250)	20150		20150	
1652	Pocchetta	(" di 1000)	13100		6200	
1652-54	Cassinasco	(" di Spagna 350)	4625		2170	
1662	Cavatore	(doppie 800)	10920		4960	
1661-63	Castagnole	(" 1240)	16926		7688	
1633-44	Castiglione lands	[" 155]	1222		960	
1641-52	Barolo lands	[" 8]	315		50	
1640s	Neive, 128 g., at least 15 doppie per g.	[" 1920]	22040		11904	
			89798	89798	54082	54082
1641	Barolo censi	(doppie 450)	4950		2790	
1642	Barolo daciti	(" 200)	2200		1240	
1642	La Morra transaction	(" 190)	2090		1178	
1647	La Morra trans.	(" 850)	10200		5270	
1650	La Morra trans.	(" 16)	204		99	
1650	Barolo forno	(" 40)	510		248	
1650	Barolo mill	[" 16]	200		99	
1650	La Morra, palace	(" 300)	3825		1860	
1659	Narzole mills	(" 300)	4050		1860	
			28229	28229	14644	14644
1638-62	Genoa deposits	(crosazzi 5029 scudi 6835)		64664		34763
1624-29	Debts inherited	(scudi 23900)		38256		38256
1653	Legacy to niece	(doppie 2000)		26000		12400
				246947		154145

Capital increase

			Market exchange		Base-years	
			Lire	Lire	Lire	Lire
1633	Dowry	(doppie 3000)	18600		18600	
1642	Sale, part of 'Roretto' farm	(" 1000)	11000		6200	
1655	Sale, remainder 'Roretto' farm	(" di Spagna 230)	3135		1426	
1655	Sale, Centallo farm	(" di Francia 300)	4090		1860	
1662	Debt owed, Cavatore	(doppie 650)	8872		4030	
			45697	45697	32116	32116
1647	Censi of 1641, given in payment	(doppie 450)	5512		2790	
1641-47	Interest 7% (doppie 31½ p.a.)	(" 220)	2475		1367	
			7987	7987	4157	4157
1660	Genoa sale	(scudi 1100)	7562		3410	
1662	Genoa sale	(scudi 5809)	39937		18008	
1638-64	Interest, Genoa (see App.5)	(c.scudi 1000) crosoni 4208)	27756		10675	
			75255	75255	32093	32093
				128939		85779

Appendix 7(a). Carlo Lodovico's expenditure and acquisitions.

Between 1661 and 1689, Carlo Lodovico spent the following sums:

1676	Centallo farm (1)		L.18,850	
1685	Vergne canone (2)	L.20,625		
1675-89	Censi and tassi (2)	L.18,611		
		L.39,236	L.39,236	
			L.58,086	L. 58,086
				L. 30,000
1669-89	Gerolamo's education (3)			L. 88.086

In 1681, a further L.14,625 was spent on a tasso over Barolo, but was sold again in 1689. Between 1690 and 1705, Carlo Lodovico's investments were the following:

1690-1705	Censi	L.15,027	
1691-98	Infeudations	L.22,171	
		L.37,198	L.37,198

In the same period, the censi bought before 1690 were reduced to L.37,481

So that the total cash investments were:	L.74,679	L.74,679
Which, with the Centallo purchase of		L.18,850
Made a total investment of		L.93,529

In 1695 a further L.30,000 were paid as a forced loan, to make a

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(1) See note (69).
(2) See Appendix 7(b).
(3) M.211, n.19.

total of L.123,529, but the sum was subsequently used to pay for Paola Cristina's dowry. The marriage expenses were:

1695 Gerolamo's marriage	L.50,000		L.93,529
1697 Paola Cristina's dowry	L.45,000		
1703-05 Gerolamo's pension	L.30,000		
	L.125,000	L.125,000	
Plus Gerolamo's expenses before 1690		L. 30,000	
		L.155,000	L.155,000
			L.248,529

Thus Carlo Lodovico spent L.248,529 in the 41 years, and in the 15 years from 1690 to 1705 L.162,198.

As against this expenditure, Carlo Lodovico received as increase of capital:

1667 Sale of Narzole mills, price unstated, at cost price, 300 doppie di Francia	(4)	L. 4,125	
1666-94 Dowry of wife, Anna Birago	(5)	L.27,000	
1694-98 Sale of deposit at Genoa	(6)	L.31,824	
1701 Increase of exchange-rate on L.30,000 forced loan, 1695	(7)	L. 2,000	
		L.64,949	L.64,949
To which must be added the censi still alienated in 1705	(8)		L. 8,400
			L.73,349

(4) M.177, ns.15,21,22.
(5) See note (67).
(6) See Appendix 5.
(7) See note (77).
(8) See note (80).

Of this, only the sale of the mills and the dowry (in large part) were received before 1690, leaving over L.42,000 received between 1690 and 1705.

Carlo Lodovico thus raised from his own income L.175,180 in the 41 years, representing an annual average of L.4272:13:7. In the period after 1690, he raised about L.120,000, or an annual average of L.8000. If the expenses for Gerolamo and Paola Cristina are deducted, the L.123,529 invested represented an annual average of L.3012:18:0.

Appendix 7(b). Cash investments of Carlo Lodovico.

The censi have been divided by comunità to demonstrate the full weight of Carlo Lodovico's purchases on each comunità. They are divided into censi over the comunità, over members of the comunità, and tassi given for disinfeudations in 1698. To simplify the table, all moneys have been converted into lire, and the original moneys omitted.

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(1) M.218,f.8.
(2) M.218, f.8.
(3) M.A. 16,n.3.
(4) M.A. 16,n.3.
(5) M.218, f.7.
(6) M.A.16, n.3.
(7) M.A.16, n.3.
(8) M.204,n.10; M.218,f.11; M.A.16, n.3.
(9) M.204,n.10; M.218,f.11.
(10) M.A.16,n.3.
(11) M.A.16, n.3.
(12) M.218, f.2.
(13) M.201,n.1; M.210,n.12.
(14) M.210,n.24; M.218,f.1; M.A.16, n.3.
(15) M.218, ff.3,4.
(16) M.204,n.23;M.196,n.5; M.172,n.16.
(17) M.204, n.23.
(18) See note (72). These infeudations were all in 1698.
(19) M.171, n.1; M.218, f.1.
(20) See note (77).
(21) M.169,ns.34,35,37; M.218, f.1.

	Comunità			Members			Disinfeudation			Total		
	Capital	%	Interest	Capital	%	Interest	Capital	%	Interest	Capital	Interest	
Cassinasco												
1675,1677,1679 L.	2250: 0: 0	5	112:10: 0									(1)
1686	750: 0: 0	5	37:10: 0									(2)
1698 (2 censi)	1220: 0: 0	5	61: 0: 0									(3)
1698–1702 (10 censi)				5371: 0: 0	5	268:11: 0						(4)
	4220: 0: 0		211: 0: 0	5371: 0: 0		268:11: 0				9591: 0: 0	479:11: 0	
Rocchetta												
1686	750: 0: 0	5	37:10: 0									(5)
1692–3 (2 censi)	2231:16: 3	5	111:12: 0									(6)
1689–1705 (10 censi)				1820: 0: 0	5	91: 0: 0						(7)
	2981:16: 3		149: 2: 0	1820: 0: 0		91: 0: 0				4801:16: 3	240: 2: 0	
Castagnole												
1685 (reduced 1691)	2925: 0: 0	4¼	146: 6: 0									(8)
1691	3100: 0: 0	5	155: 0: 0									(9)
	6025: 0: 0		301: 6: 0							6025: 0: 0	301: 6: 0	
Cavatore												
1691	630: 0: 0	5	31:10: 0									(10)
1702				354: 0: 0	5	17:12: 0						(11)
	630: 0: 0		31:10: 0	354: 0: 0		17:12: 0				984: 0: 0	49: 2: 0	
La Morra	1500: 0: 0	5½	82:10: 0							1500: 0: 0	82:10: 0	(12)
Barolo												
1685	20625: 0: 0	2	412:10: 0									(13)
1687	700: 0: 0	4	28: 0: 0									(14)
	21325: 0: 0		440:10: 0							21325: 0: 0	440:10:0	
Serralunga												
1680	6903:15: 0	3½	243:15: 0									(15)
1687	1077: 0: 0	4	43: 1: 0									(16)
1704	300: 0: 0	5	15: 0: 0									(17)
	8280:15: 0		301:16: 0									
							122: 8: 0	5	6: 2: 5			(18)
							122: 8: 0		6: 2: 5	8403: 3: 0	307:18: 5	
Alba (for 'Cascinotta' farm, Serralunga)							866:16: 3	5	43: 6:10	866:16: 3	43: 6:10	(18)
Castiglione							455: 8: 0	5	22:15: 5	455: 8: 0	22:15: 5	(18)
Rodello							329:10: 0	5	16: 9: 6	329:10: 0	16: 9: 6	(18)
Neive							2260: 0: 0	5	113: 0: 0	2260: 0: 0	113: 0: 0	(18)
Villafalletto							14218: 4: 5	5	710:18: 3	14218: 4: 5	710:18: 3	(18)
Centallo							3919: 2: 6	5	195:19: 1	3919: 2: 6	195:19: 1	(18)
T o t a l	44962:11: 3		1517:13: 0	7545: 0: 0		377: 3: 0	22171: 9: 2		1108:11: 6	74679: 0: 5	3003: 8: 6	

The 1685 censo over Castagnole was originally: (Comunità) 4275: 0: 0 5% 146: 6:0 (8)
The forced loan of 1695, repaid in 1700–01 was: " 30000: 0: 0 5% 2219: 5:0 (19)
A censo was bought in 1686 and sold in 1694: " 405: 0: 0 5% 20: 5:0 (20)
A tasso was bought over Barolo in 1681 and sold in 1689: " 14625: 0: 0 4% 585: 0:0 (21)

Appendix 8(a). Example of a contract of mezzadria (M.218,f.20).

Capitoli da osservarsi da Giovanni Vincenzo Nicolino massaro della Cassina di S. Ponzo cual sarà tenuto habitar in essa Cassina con Fameglij a sufficienza, e bestiami per far bene detta Cassina, e consumar le paglie, e fieni de quali non potrà esportar fuori di detta Cassina.

Seminarà al 4° solco conducendo i Lettami, ove sarà di bisogno.

Le sementi si metteranno per mettà, eccetto del Canenoso [?] che lo mettrà tutto i massari.

Si spartirà ogni cossa per mettà, e condurrà la parte dominicale ne Castelli di Barollo e Volta.

Le foglie, de morri saranno tutte del Padrone.

Farà ogn'anno 200 provane aggiustandolo come si deve, e pianterà ogn'anno 50 piante di sallice, e qualche altri arbori.

Facendosi ricoprire il massaro somministrerà la spesa ai mastri.

Condurrà ogn'anno in Castello 20 Carra di bosco, e la mettà de scalozzi, e sermentoni.

Condurrà ogn'anno al Mollino un carro di grano, e ricondurrà la farina in Castello a sue spese, e parimente due Carra di fieno dai prati di Rochabianca.

Darà ogn'anno al padrone un saccho di grano di sua parte in cambio del vino per le rappe.

Darà ogn'anno all'estade dodici pollastri, dodeci caponi a Natale, e dodeci donzine d'ovi mettà a Pasqua, e mettà all'Agosto.

Non potrà tener alcun animale nocivo alla Cassina eccetto due porchi, de quali sarà tenuto darne uno al Patrone annualmente di rubbi 12 e mancandovi lo pagherà in danari.

Pagarà ogn'anno al S.Martino al Padrone per i fitti de prati scuti cinque d'oro o sia livre d'argento sedici.

Potrà il Padrone metter un Airatore a spese del massaro per assister alle messi.

Non potrà il massaro tagliar alcun arbore, eccetto le broppe de quali manzandone si spartiranno per mettà.

Per rimediare ad alcun inconvenienti, che per colpa, e mala

consuetudine abusivamente introdotta da massari in detrimento tanto de medemi che del Padrone si aggionge alli sovraespressi capi li seguenti da osservarsi inviolabilmente.

Primo si è convenuto, che il sudetto massaro non possi tenere Capre né altri animali nocivi alla Cassina, et ove pure in qual si voglia modo venisse a tener porchi, o sia allevami di più del sovra stabbillitto come anche, ocche e birribirri che si debbano spartire comunemente col sudetto Padrone.

2° Non potrà il sudetto Massaro tagliare, ne cimare alcun arbore, vender boschi di qualsi voglia sorte, broppe, o sia palli, senza espressa licenza del Padrone sotto pena oltre al ristoro de danni, e di pagarli il doppio del valore di ciò constarà aver venduto d'esser immediatamente et senza alcuna eccezione rimosso, e licentiato dalla detta Cassina; come anche non potrà far alcuna fornace di calcina, e mattoni, nè alcun Carretto senza licenza come sopra, sotto l'istesse pene, et in specie di pagare al sudetto Padrone il terzo di quello rillevarà ogni Carretto, de quali però per sovvenirsi potrà farne... all'anno senza incorso d'alcuna pena.

3° detto massaro sarà obligato mantenere i fossi netti, massime i laterali delle strade, in modo che l'acqua non danifichi, e mancando, potrà il Padrone farle accomodare lui a spese di detto massaro.

4° Disgerberà tutti i beni con stadicare affatto le spine e buschi.

5° Il Padrone sarà tenuto rimetterli il forno ben aggiustato et in buon stato per cocere il pane, et il massaro n'havrà la dovuta cura, massime di non porvi dentro boschi grossi a seccare, et venendosi a guastare detto forno per il dentro la bocca, et il sternito, o sia parrimente sarà detto massaro tenuto farlo accomodare a sue proprie spese.

6° Non potrà il sudetto massaro affittire, o in qual si voglia modo dar a fare ad altri alcuno de beni di detta Cassina senza espressa licenza del Padrone sotto le pene, come sopra.

Non potrà detto massaro per se, nè per interposta persona sotto qualsi sia prettesto massime per haver bisogno di farsi del vino nuovo, e per qualsi voglia altra occasione raccoglier uve senza espressa licenza del padrone et sotto le pene come sopra.

Appendix 8(b). Example of a payment of land for debts by a mezzadro. (M.171,n.1).

(4 December 1736) "... Ad'ogn'uno sia manifesto che Bartolomeo Nicolino del fù Giovanni Vincenzo delle fini di questo Luogo, ritrovandosi debitore dell'Illustrissimo Signor Marchese D.Ottavio Falletti Langosco marchese di questo Luogo della somma di L. 964:9:10 per debito di fitti di Cassina detta di S.Ponso statta fatta a Colonia dal predetto Nicolino nell'anni antecedenti granaglia vasaglie et altre robe statte sominstratte al medesimo in tempo di detta sua Colonia per cui somma sij statto esso Nicolino condanato nell'officio della Prefetura di Cherasco al pagamento indi patito due esequzioni con ordine giudiciario sovra diversi bestiami mobili et altri effetti, che posia si sono esposti venali al pubblico Incanto e per atto di deliberamento delli 15 scorso 9mbre siassi ricavato dalla vendita di detti bestiami e mobili solamente la somma di L.596:10:4 dedotte però le spese dell'officio della prefetura, siche esse dedotte sia restato esso Nicolino anchor indebito di L.377:10:6 a quali si devono agiongere livre quatro per condotta e ritorno delli Vasi vinarij pure esequtativi ch'indi si sono rimessi e restituiti al medemo Nicolino sopra la richiesta fatale dal medesimo Nicolino et livre venti sette valor di detti vasi vinarij bronsi et arranii come sopra restituitili, come di livre dodeci spese della Condana sudetta statte anticipatamente pagate per parte di dett'illustrissimo Signor Marchese alli signori officiali di giustitia ch'in tutto formano la somma di Livre quatro Cento e dieci soldi diecinove denari sei compresa però in detta total partita diversi fitti resaglie et altre imprestanze dependenti dalla Cassina di Carpanetta pure propria di dett'illustrissimo Signor Marchese, e parimente fatta a colonia dal predetto Nicolino e suoi figlioli indivisi, oltre a simil somma sia pur esso Nicholino anchor indebito verso esso predetto Illustrissimo Signor della somma di livre Cento trenta tre, cioè livre 91 per resto del fitto della detta Cassina di Carpaneta scadente anno 1736 et L.42 per rubbi 12 Carne animal porchino pur corrente anno regolato di buon

Consenzo a L.3:10 cad' rubbo ch'unite queste a quele formano il total debito di detto Nicolino alla somma di livre Cinque Cento quaranta tre soldi dieci nove denari 6; qual somma intendendosi per parte di dett'Illustrissimo Signor Marchese in primo Luogo si dovesse procedere a nova esequtione per la restante somma di L.410:19 di Condana sudetta, e successivamente far seguir nova Condana contro del medemo di detta somma di L.133 d'ultimo debito di presente maturato sia ciò statto inteso dal predetto Bartolomeo Nicolino, unitamente a Giovanni Vincenzo e Domenico fratelli Nicolini suoi figlioli indivisi, quali tutti come ben informati di detto Loro debito come legittimo e esegibile, habino passata richiesta al Magnifico Illustre Signor Francesco Cotta del fù Signor Alessandro del luogo della Pieve residente in questo luogo agent'e Procuratore generale di dett'illustrissimo Signore Marchese di sospendere in loro odio a dett'atti per sparmiarli delle spese che devono farsi, che s'offeriscono pronti far una dation in paga a favor di dett'illustrissimo Signor Marchese di detta somma una loro Terra Coltiva infra designata e coherenziata per la somma di Livre 200 la giornata et per la restante somma darle parimente in pagamento l'infrascritti bestiami e mobili per suplemento di detta somma e ciò sospendere dett'atti...".

Appendix 9. Gerolamo IV's sale of censi.

The extent to which Gerolamo IV was forced to utilize his liquid assets can be clearly seen in his sale of censi.

(i) Censi inherited from his father and sold:

1713 Castagnole (bought 1691)	L.3100	(1)
1724 Villafalletto (disinfeudation tasso, 1698)	L.2400	(2)
by 1724 Cassinasco (bought 1679,1686)	L.1050	(3)
by 1724 Rocchetta (bought 1686)	L. 750	(4)
	L.7300	

There is no evidence of other sales, though these may well have occurred.

(ii) Censi alienated, but rebought by Gerolamo:

(a) Guaranteed on his own lands:

	Sold to		Rebought	
1707 Bussa family	L.2,000			
1708 conte Birago	L.16,000			
1709 marchesa Isnardi	L.5,000			
	L.23,000	L.23,000	1710	(5)
1713 Sig. Tana		L. 3,000	1720	(6)

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(1) M.204, n.10.
(2) M.171,n.5; M.A.16,n.3.
(3) M.218,f.8; M.A.16,n.3.
(4) M.218,f.7; M.A.16,n.3.
(5) M.203, ns.9,32; M.A.15,n.15; see note (98).
(6) M.203,ns.33,42;see note (98).

1717 Jesuits		L. 6,000		1730	(7)
1727 c.Campigliano	L.20,000				
Garrone	L.15,000				
Battaglieri	L. 5,000				
	L.40,000	L.40,000		by 1735	(8)
		L.72,000	L.72,000		
(b) 1725 disinfeudation tasso			L. 2,258	by 1729	(9)
(c) Censi left alienated by Carlo Lodovico			L. 8,400	by 1710	(10)
			L.82,658		
(iii) Censo alienated, but not rebought by 1735			L. 8,000		(11)

Gerolamo thus raised a capital of :

(i) L. 7,300
(ii) L.82,658
(iii) L. 8,000
L.97,958.

Of this sum, only L. 7300 or 7.5% was raised by the sale of his inherited censi. As compared to this, Carlo Lodovico had raised 12.5% (L.31,824) of his total expenditure of L.248,529 by the sale of the investment he inherited at Genoa (see Appendix 7(a)). Gerolamo IV had raised L.82,658, or 84%, from the income from

(7) M.171,n.9.
(8) M.203,ns.34-36,38,48; see p.183.
(9) M.171, n.6.
(10) M.216,n.1; M.A.15,n.17.
(11) M.203, n.49.

his lands. If his normal living expenditure and the pensions he paid his brothers (which, although in arrears at the time of Gerolamo's death, can still be calculated as about L.200,000 (12)), are taken into account, the percentage he raised from his lands would naturally be much higher. As against this, however, it would be necessary to calculate the income he gained from his service in the army. So that the 68%, which represents the proportion of Carlo Lodovico's total expenditure (apart from his normal living expenses) derived from the income of his lands, is not a very clarifying parallel.

Of the L.74,679 that Gerolamo inherited in the form of censi, he only sold L.7,300. But he also lost through confiscations:

1720 Serralunga tasso	L. 6,904	(13)
1731 Vergne canone	L.20,625	(14)
1740 Serralunga censo	L. 1,077	(15)
	L.28,606	

Ottavio was consequently only left with L.38,773, or 52%, of his grandfather's investments.

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(12) See pp.163-65.
(13) M.A. 16, n.3.
(14) See note (106).
(15) See note (109).

Appendix 10. The Provana inheritance.

The lawsuit for the payment of Elena Matilde's dowry and Gerolamo's annual pension began in 1699, and was suspended without decision in 1706. In 1710, a new lawsuit begun before the Senato, and Ottavio Provana was ordered to pay the dowry of 15,000 ducatoni, which were calculated, however, as only L.40,000 (according to the current exchange-rate, the value was L. 75,000); of this L.7,500 had already been paid, and the remainder was raised by the sale of a censo over the Provana palace at Turin (1).

On 24 August 1724, Ottavio Provana made a new will (2). Gerolamo was excluded from all legacies to the Falletti grandchildren:

> "...senzacchè il signor Marchese Faleti loro signor Padre possa pretendere d'ingerirsi in cosa alcuna, meno godere dell'usufrutto, e comodità di dette cose a caduno d'essi da me lasciate, ne di qualunque altra lascita... privando Io detto Signor Marchese loro Padre,come lo privo intieramente d'ogni usufrutto, e comodità delle suddette lascite fatte, ed ogni altra, che Io fossi per fare a detti miei signori Nipoti senza qual condizione non sarei alcerto devenuto a tutte le lascite da me fatte a favore de' miei signori Nipoti, ma averei meramente istituiti li medemi nella sola, e semplice legittima, che a caduno di essi avesse potuto di ragione spettare, e competere...".

At the same time, Ottavio attempted to limit the rights of

(1) M.192,ns.1-3; M.211,n.19; M.A.82,n.19; M.A.122,n.22. For the 1710 transaction: M.174, n.33.
(2) M.19,n.20; M.177,n.23.

the three brothers, by only leaving them carefully described legacies. Ottavio Falletti, as the successor in the primogeniture, was given all the liquid capital to pay all the debts and to guarantee the dower of Provana's wife (who died soon after); he was also given the half of the fee of Bastia acquired in 1688, and therefore not subject to any primogeniture, the possessions of Leynì (except for one farm), and rights in the fees of Druent, Rubianetta and Altessano Inferiore; finally, he was given the palace in Turin, and advised to hire out the appartments which he would not use, for the palace:

> "...per la sua struttura,ed ampiezza si trova non solamente capace di servire per l'abitazione di quello de' miei signori Nipoti, che ne sarà il Possessore, e di sua famiglia, ma pur anche disposto in maniera tale da poterne ricavarne annualmente ragionevoli proventi con dare in affitto li appartamenti, che saranno sovrabbondanti, e non necessarj all'uso di sua persona, e di sua famiglia..."

All three brothers were left their mother's dowry of L.40,000, and the possessions in Villarboit and Monformosa, unless one brother (presumably Ottavio) wished to keep them, in which case he was to pay the other brothers an annual income of L.1000 each. Teodoro and Giacinto were given a farm in Leynì, while Ottavio was to pay Teodoro L.5000.

The patrimony left by Ottavio can be reconstructed for the most part on the basis of the numerous consegnamenti he made between 1716 and 1724, and the descriptions in the subsequent

lawsuits (3). He owned all the rights in 8 fees, almost 23/24 of Borgaro Torinese, 1/2 of Altessano Superiore, and 3/16 of Leynì. His possessions in giornate, according to the above consegnamenti were the following, divided into allodial, feudal and emphyteuses:

	Allodial	Feudal	Emphyteuses	Total
Druent	47	299	381	727
Leynì	?	470	-	470
Altessano Inf.	?	980	429	1409
Altessano Sup.	?	?	?	?
Pianezza	26	6	-	32
Rubianetta	-	-	3600	3600
Villarboit	2521	31	971	3523
Monformosa	588	2341	-	2929
Stroppiana	224	?	-	224
Borgaro Torinese	164	241	35	440
Bastia Mondovì	?	140	3	143
	3570	4508	5419	13497

These areas are certainly incomplete. In addition to his income from the land, Ottavio derived a (probably) large income from feudal rights and censi bought over the comunità. However, the size of the lands is no indication of their value. Of the total,

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(3) M.6, ns.9,10; AST III, Consegnamenti, R.319,f.391; R.337,ff. 53,78; R.341,f.81; R.344,ff.184,201,210,220; M.193,n.5; M.A. 64,n.8,pp.36,72,78,131-34,191-92,255-61.

6,676 g. lay in the Vercellese fees of Villarboit, Monformosa and Stroppiana, for the most part extremely barren: in Monformosa, 1820 g. of the feudal lands were uncultivated. In the fee of Rubianetta (west of Turin, near the Susa valley) woods covered 2218 g. of the total area owned by the family.

Druent, Leynì, Altessano Inferiore and Superiore (all lying near Turin) and Rubianetta were all fees of the Provana family; Villarboit, Monformosa, Stroppiana, Borgaro Torinese and 1/2 Bastia (near Mondovì) were inherited from the Langosco family, by the will of Maria Margarita Langosco Parpaglia di Druent, in 1665 (4).

Without extended research (beyond the scope of the present study), it would have proved impossible to calculate the value of the patrimony. However, in 1733, Lodovico Giuseppe Fava, the administrator of the estates, accounted for what is probably the full income received between 1707 and early 1731 (5). The total amounted to L.883,435, equivalent to an annual average income of L.36,810. The capital value of the patrimony was, in fact, probably about L.925,000, capitalizing the annual income at the normal rate of 4%, adopted by the royal officials during the perequazione (6). Ottavio had spent L.135,000 on the building of

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(4) M.211,n.25.
(5) M.203,n.47.
(6) See: AST II, 2a archiviazione, Capo 21,ns.195-206; Prato,pp. 22-24.

the palace, between 1692 and 1720, an average of L.4600 a year, or 13% of his income; however, the building mainly took place between 1692 and 1694, when he spent over L.55,300, and 1711 and 1714, when he spent L.27,600 (7). It is the building expenses which probably account for the debts he left at his death.

It has proved impossible to work out the exact amount Ottavio Falletti inherited. After the lawsuit, ending in 1728 (8), the Demesne was apparently adjudged the fees of Druent, Rubianetta, Bastia, Borgaro, Stroppiana and Altessano Superiore; Ottavio Falletti was compensated for all improvements and certain acquisitions of Ottavio Provana, and also given (probably quite large) payments for the dowries of certain members of the Provana family. He also claimed compensation for the L.10,000 paid in 1688 for the acquisition of half the fee of Bastia (9). The Provana di Leynì were adjudged 1/8 of the 3/16 of the fee of Leynì (10). Ottavio himself was given Altessano Inferiore, Monformosa, Villarboit and 1/16 of Leynì (11).

In the meantime, the death of Anna Costanza Doria Del Maro,

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(7) M.117,ns.2,5, and passim.
(8) M.181,n.7; M.193,ns.5,8; M.194,n.1; M.197,n.6; M.204,n.22; M.A.64,n.8. For an examination of the titles of the Provana to the various fees: AST I, Materie economiche, Demanio, donativi, sussidi, M.7,n.1,ff.7,33,91,93. For Gerolamo's renunciation in favour of his sons: M.211, n.20.
(9) M.193,n.7.
(10) M.193,ns.5,6,8; M.A.82,n.17.
(11) M.183,ns.12,13; M.194,ns.3,4; M.193,ns.5,6,8; M.A.82,n.17.

Ottavio Provana's wife, presented the problem of her inheritance. By her will of 24 January 1716 (12), the three brothers were left as co-heirs, after the deduction of certain legacies. Her inheritance included not only her dowry, but also the traditional dote di Corte of 4000 ducatoni given to damigelle d'onore (until abolished by Vittorio Amedeo II), and two gifts from Carlo Emanuele II and princess Ludovica, of over 2000 ducatoni. The size of these royal gifts provides an excellent example of the immense alienations in the 17th century.

Anna Costanza also carefully excluded Gerolamo Falletti from the inheritance:

> "... senza che il Signor Marchese Faletti loro Signor Padre possa pretendere d'ingioirsi, meno gioire dell'usufrutto, e commodità di detta sua heredità..."

After the deduction of the legacies, the brothers were left L.20,000 each.

Teodoro and Giacinto now made their claims (13). By the transaction of 12 August 1730 (14), Ottavio agreed to pay them the following sums:

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(12) M.19,n.19.
(13) M.193, n.3.
(14) M.177, n.23.

	each	together
legittima, excluding mother's dowry	L.26,667	L.53,333
inheritance of Doria grandmother	L.20,000	L.40,000
jewels of Matilde, sold by her father	L. 4,357	L. 8,713
value of Matilde's other jewels	L. 1,665	L. 3,330
value of Matilde's furniture	L. 560	L. 1,120
	L.53,249	L.106,498

Within one year, Ottavio had paid L.53,333, as well as all past interests (15).

But at the same time, Ottavio had to pay the debts left by Ottavio Provana. A legacy of Ottavio Provana's will had left L.1500 each to three of his nephews:

> "ad effetto d'essere impiegate nel promuoverli tutti tre al cavalerato de Santi Maurizio e Lazaro...".

These L.4500 were paid in 1728. Of Provana's debts, a censo of L.13,040 (800 luigi) had been sold on the income of the palace at Turin in 1710, as part of the effort to raise the L.32,500 still owing for Matilde's dowry. Another debt resulted from the confiscation of tassi in 1720: in 1673, Ottavio Provana had sold a tasso of 100 scudi a year over the comunità of Verzuolo, to pay for the dowry of his sister, Giovanna Cristina; when the tasso was confiscated, the purchaser claimed compensation, and Provana agreed to pay back the capital of L.14,900; in 1722, he paid L.9000, leaving the remainder still owing at the time of

(15) M.177, ns.23,24; M.203, n.46.

his death. The complete list of Provana's debts, paid by Ottavio Falletti, was:

Date owing		Date repaid	
1722	Remainder tasso to Senator Grondana	1727	L. 5,900 (16)
1727	Legacy to nephews	1728	L. 4,500 (17)
1716	Remainder censo to marchese Seyssel	1728	L. 8,333 (18)
1697	Censo to marchese della Marmora	1729	L. 9,600 (19)
1724	Censo to sig. Giaveno	1729	L.10,000 (20)
1718	Remainder censo to marchese Buschetto	1729	L.12,000 (21)
1725	Censo to nuns, S.Margarita, Chieri	1729	L. 9,000 (22)
1710	Censo to contessa Cumiana	1730	L.13,040 (23)
			L.72,373

Ottavio also paid the interest owing on these capitals, of at least L.2000. Only one of these censi had been sold to a middle class family, one to an ecclesiastical body, and all the others to nobles. It was a clear reflection of the capital resources of the nobility. The 1729 payment to the nuns was made with the indemnities Ottavio received for his rights in the fees of Rubianetta, Druent and Bastia; he probably received more than

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(16) M.203,n.37; M.A.19,n.3; M.A.119,n.3; AST III,art.491,lettera 'G', fasc.12.
(17) M.203,ns.40,41.
(18) M.203,ns.39,43.
(19) M.203,n.45.
(20) M.203,n.44.
(21) M.203,n.43; M.A.82,n.8.
(22) M.171,n.7.
(23) M.171,n.10; M.172,n.21; M.174,n.33.

the L.9000 paid to the nuns.

The whole of this debt had been paid by 1730. But Ottavio was also forced to borrow L.9000 from his uncle, Giovanni Battista. After Ottavio's death in 1747, Giovanni Battista agreed to change the debt (by now L.10,000, through unpaid arrears of interests) into an annual pension of L.600 (equivalent to 6% interest); his death, six years later, meant that less than half the loan had actually been repaid (24).

By the time of Gerolamo's death, Ottavio had succeeded in reducing the total debt to L. 53,164, besides the L.9000 he owed his uncle. But he then inherited Gerolamo's debt of Matilde's dowry, of L.26,667, besides a censo of L.8000 alienated, and not redeemed, by Gerolamo before his death (see Appendix 9). At the same time, he had to pay L. 26,000 for legacies left by his grandmother, Anna Lodovica Birago (see p.206 and note (119). Ottavio's debt thus rose to L.122,830.

There is no evidence as to how much of this debt was covered by Gerolamo IV's credits in Sardinia. But after the transaction of 1735 (25), Ottavio apparently only paid L.8000 among the legacies left by Anna Lodovica to her sons (for Paolo Costanzo had renounced his inheritance) and was then completely freed from his debts, except for the annual pensions (26).

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(24) M.171,n.10; M.172,n.21; M.175,n.20.
(25) M.177,ns.26,27. And for Paolo Costanzo's gift of 1736: M.175,n.19.
(26) M.203,ns.46,50,51.

In 1740-41, Ottavio's brothers began a new lawsuit, claiming a larger part of the Provana inheritance, on the grounds of Matilde's renunciation of 1694. But the claim was rejected, as even though the renunciation of 1694 was later than the acceptance of the primogeniture of 1687, the latter was still legally valid in continuing the existence of the primogeniture, and hence Ottavio's right to succeed to the paternal inheritance; while the brothers had already been compensated for the maternal (Matilde's) inheritance (27).

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(27) M.193, n.3.

Appendix 11(a). The landed possessions of the Falletti di Barolo.

It is difficult to give exact figures for the amounts of land held by the Falletti di Barolo in different periods in the various fees. The fundamental documents for the 16th and 17th centuries are the consegnamenti, produced irregularly, but with increasing frequency from the last quarter of the 17th century. In addition to these, lists of land are sometimes to be found in the transactions with the comunità, usually arranging for tax exemption; these, however, are not always complete lists of the allodial lands in the fee. Other lists of land are occasionally found in the continual lawsuits, while the family measurements of 1672-76 and 1724, though not complete, provide valuable information. The difficulties are increased by the conflicting figures usually given in different copies of the same document. Only in the 18th century does the position become clearer, with the preparation of the perequazione: frequent measurements were carried out by the royal assessors, by the comunità, and by the family itself. Not only can the total area be calculated, but in Barolo (and in varying degrees in the other fees) this area can even be divided into farms. However, the measurements cannot be regarded as too accurate until the later 17th century. In the 16th century, a margin of error should be allowed, of at least 10%.

The earliest measurements for Barolo and Vergne are very

infrequent, and leave many gaps. In a consegnamento of 1556, Scipione stated his possession of 79 g. (1). The earlier transaction of 1546 had given tax exemption for a further 209 g., which probably represented all the allodial possessions, entered in the 1524 registro of the comunità as 201 g. (2). There is no evidence of Scipione's undoubted acquisitions in Barolo (besides his inheritance from his brother, Giacomo), but calculating by a process of subtraction from the later measurements and acquisitions, they were probably about 57 g. So that at Scipione's death, Gerolamo II inherited about 345 g. in Barolo.

In Vergne, Scipione was stated to own 217 g. before 1550 (3). However, he alienated the 'Fontanile' farm which he had inherited from Giacomo, of probably about 35 g., leaving about 182 g. at his death. Gerolamo II thus inherited a total of about 527 g. in Barolo and Vergne.

In the course of his life, Gerolamo II made continual small purchases in Barolo, totalling about 20 giornate (see Appendix 2). His son, Giacomo, also inherited the allodial lands of Lodovico Falletti di Barolo, after the lawsuit with Manfredo from 1556 to

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(1) M.183, n.1.
(2) 1546 transaction: M.179, ns.5,6; M.A. 14, n.10. 1524 registro: M.180,n.1; AC Barolo, registri of 1524,1535. Both lists are confirmed in an inventory of 1577: M.180,n.4; M.188,n.7.
(3) From a list made in the lawsuit of 1682, which states 216:4:10 g. local measurement, equal to 216:58:0 g. Piedmontese measurement: M.202, n.1.

1578; these consisted of 10 pieces of land in Barolo and 5 in Vergne, but no measurements were made; they have been calculated at a minimum average of 2 g. each, to equal 20 g. in Barolo and 10 g. in Vergne (4). Thus, Giacomo inherited, on Gerolamo II's death in 1596, about 385 g. in Barolo, and about 192 g. in Vergne, a total of 587 g.

Giacomo concentrated his purchases on Vergne, where he had the security of tax exemption. He bought four farms, selling one before his death, increasing the family possessions by 293 g. to a total in Vergne of 485 g. (see Appendix 3). At the end of his life, he also exchanged his Fossano lands for Giovanni Falletti di Barolo's possessions in Barolo (1616-24): these were measured as 16:84:0 g. feudal land, from a consegnamento of 1585, and 33:43:0 g. allodial, exempted by a transaction of 1550, making a total 50:27:0 g. (5). In 1624, Gerolamo III thus owned 435 g. in Barolo, which with the 485 g. in Vergne made a total of 920 g.

Gerolamo III apparently only acquired about 10 g. in Barolo in the course of his life, increasing the family holding to 445 g.

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(4) M.204, n.14. These figures are purely arbitrary, for the purposes of calculation. However, between this inheritance and Scipione's acquisitions, the family possessions were increased by about 87 g.; if the inheritance was larger, both Scipione's purchases in Barolo and his alienations will have been smaller.

(5) For the 1585 consegnamento: M.179,n.4. For the 1550 transaction: M.179,n.6. Once again, it is possible that Giovanni owned more land; if so, the earlier figures would be diminished, to give the sum of the definitely accurate, later 17th century totals.

But he also sold the 'Roretto' farm at Vergne, of 88 g., diminishing the area to 397 g. (see pp.130-31). These possessions remained unchanged until after the perequazione.

After Gerolamo III's death, the first measurements of the family possessions began to be made. In the 1670 consegnamento (repeated in 1685), Carlo Lodovico only declared 350 g. as feudal, mainly consisting of the consegnamenti of 1585 and 1589, the transaction of 1546, with parts of that of 1638, but omitting the allodial lands gained in 1616, and the other acquisitions (6). However, the division between Barolo and Vergne was not too strict, and the lands not entered may have been regarded as forming part of Vergne. This may also be the explanation of an estimate of about 1680, stating Carlo Lodovico's possessions in Vergne as 325 g.; while in 1724, Gerolamo IV's own measurement gave 410:50:0 (including some Barolo lands); in this latter measurement, the lands in Barolo were stated as 419 g., making a total of 829 g., admittedly an approximation (7).

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(6) The consegnamenti can be found in: M.179, n.13; M.A.15,n.9. Their details can be compared to the 1585-89 consegnamenti in: M.179,n.4; M.210,n.26. For the 1546 transaction, see above, note (1); and for that of 1638: M.179,n.9; M.169,n.9.

(7) The 1680 estimate: M.A.76,n.8; AS Cherasco, catasto of 1681. The 1724 measurement: M.A.16,n.3. The 1655 registro in the communal archive of Barolo contains no entries for the feudataries, perhaps because all allodial lands were claimed as exempt by transaction; at the same time, they would not be entered in the consegnamenti, as so-called lands of terza specie.

In 1715, the consegnamento in reply to Vittorio Amedeo's demands for greater details, claimed 443:38:4 g. in Barolo, and in 1718 444:42:0 g., confirmed by the secretary of the perequazione in 1742; while in Vergne, a measurement by royal officials in 1732 gave 397:45:0 g. (8).

After the perequazione, a further 10 g. were bought in Barolo (see p.194).

In Serralunga, there is only one partial measurement of 1577 of Scipione's lands, giving 301 g. (9). At Scipione's death, the lands were divided between Gerolamo II and Bonifacio. At this date, there must have been about 350 g., leaving Gerolamo with 175 g. By the time of his death, Gerolamo had bought a further 15 g., making 190 g., while Bonifacio bought 57 g., with 1/6 of the fee of Serralunga in 1585 (see Appendix 2). On Bonifacio's death in 1616, both the acquisition and the inheritance returned to Giacomo, making a total of 232 g. (see pp.108-10). At the same time, he gained little more than 20 g. in Serralunga by his exchange with Giovanni Falletti di Barolo (10).

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(8) For the 1715 consegnamento: M.179,n.15. And for that of 1718: AST III, Consegnamenti, R.287,ff.7-14. The 1742 confirmation can be found in: M.198,n.2. For the Vergne measurement: M. 202,n.4.

(9) M.188,n.7.

(10) There is no evidence of the exact size of Scipione's possessions. But the total owned after Giacomo's death was unchanged until the new purchases of the 18th century. The figure of

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In 1676, Carlo Lodovico's measurement of the land stated 442:27:11 g. for Serralunga (11). In 1707, Carlo Lodovico bought a further 93:60:0 g., with the last 1/3 of the fee, and by the 1724 measurement over 32 g. more, making 568:42:7 (12). After the perequazione another 24 g., were bought to make a total of 592 g.

As La Morra was an Imperial fee, it was never entered in a consegnamento, nor measured during the perequazione; nor, rather surprisingly, was it measured by the family in 1672-76 or 1724; while no catasti are to be found in the communal archive later than 1549.

In 1733, the Falletti holding was measured as 628:94:6 g., all allodial (13). Before the perequazione, all the land (or almost) had been claimed as feudal.

Scipione must have owned about 450 g. However, he was forced to give his son, Gerolamo II, the 'Rocca' farm, of about 120 g.(14).

(/.) 442 g. thus represents Gerolamo III's inheritance, of which the only sure figures are the 15 g. bought by Gerolamo II (M.A.14,n.4) and the 57 g. acquired by Bonifacio. The description of Giovanni's inheritance, however, though never measured, indicates a small figure, probably of about 20 g.; for the references, see note (47).

(11) M.A.98,n.11; M.180,n.9. The 1670 consegnamento gave 196 g. as feudal: M.179,n.13.

(12) For the 1707 purchase, see pp.179-80. For the subsequent purchases, till 1735, see note (111).

(13) M.A.76,n.8.

(14) From a later measurement, to be found in: M.177, n.8.

The remaining 330 g. were hold in common by Gerolamo II and Bonifacio: Gerolamo thus owned a total 285 g. In 1557, Gerolamo II also bought back the 'Rivalta' farm of 130 g., from his mother, while during the rest of his life he acquired a further 15 g. He thus left an inheritance of about 430 g. (15).

Gerolamo II left his wife the 'Rocca' farm until her death. It then returned to Giacomo, who by 1603 owned the full inheritance. In 1609, Giacomo bought a further 15 g. at La Morra (see Appendix 3), increasing the area to about 445 g. On Bonifacio's death in 1616, the inheritance of Scipione was reunited; the acquisition of these 165 g. increased the holding to about 610 g. (see pp.108-10 and Appendix 4(a)). Also in 1616, after Giovanni Falletti's death, Giacomo inherited a third of his feudal possessions, in La Morra, including about 10 pieces of land; there is no evidence of their size, which was probably between 15 and 20 g. (16). Gerolamo III possibly also bought a few giornate in La Morra, in the years when he claimed exemption (16).

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(15) For these purchases, see pp.90-91 and Appendix 2. The size of the 'Rivalta' farm is given in: M.175, n.12.

(16) The inheritance from Giovanni can be found in: M.204,n.14; M.217,n.20; M.218,f.2. There is no evidence of Gerolamo III's purchases, but in 1650 he gained exemption for more land, after the 1647 transaction, when the comunità stated that it hoped to restrict his future purchases; see pp.62-63 . At all events, by the 1660s, the later total of 629 g. was already reached, and no further purchases of land were made; between 1670 and 1733, four houses were bought, all hired out at once: M.170,n.12; M.171,n.11.

At Castiglion Falletto, about 19 g. were bought by Gerolamo III between 1632 and 1744, to make the perequazione total of 31:89:0 g.(17). After the perequazione, a further 12 g. were bought (see p.194). The size of the possessions before Gerolamo III can thus be calculated as about 13 g.

At Pocapaglia, no acquisitions were made. A wood of 7:74:5 g. was declared in all the later consegnamenti.

The possessions in Rodello and Borgomale were bought by Gerolamo II, and then left to Carlo. On Carlo's death, they were bequeathed to Giacomo and Francesco Maria in common. Gerolamo III thus owned for his share approximately 62 g. in Rodello and 26 g. in Borgomale (18).

Gerolamo II bought a farm of 30 g. hear Turin, sold by Giacomo (see Appendices 2 and 3); and 2 farms of 140 g. at Savigliano, left in 1596 to Carlo and Bonifacio (see Appendix 2 and pp.90-91).

Giacomo bought 200 g. at Villafalletto, which by 1670 had risen to 238 g. (19); a farm at Centallo of 144 g., sold by Gerolamo III, and rebought by Carlo Lodovico, when its area had

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(17) For Gerolamo III's purchases, see pp.118 , and note (52). The perequazione total is to be found in: M.A.16,n.3.

(18) For the original purchases, see p.91 and Appendix 2; for their alienation in 1596, see p.98 ; and for their recovery, p.112 and Appendix 4(b).

(19) See note (52).

increased to 215 g. (20); and a farm of 106 g. at Fossano, exchanged in 1616 for Giovanni Falletti di Barolo's lands (see Appendix 3).

Gerolamo III bought a farm at Neive, of 128 g., and lands in the fees of Rocchetta Palafea, Cassinasco, Cavatore and Castagnole Monferrato, besides receiving in dowry lands in Montiggio (see Appendix 6).

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(20) For the purchase, see Appendix 2; for the sale, p.131 and Appendix 6; for the repurchase, p.138.

Appendix 11(b). The size of the family patrimony, c.1556-1735.

The following table forms a summary of the preceding description of the lands, with the size of the family patrimony at different periods from Scipione's death. To show the effects of the divisions following the deaths of various members, two columns have been made for 1556 and 1596,(i) before, and (ii) after the deaths of Scipione and Gerolamo II. A column had been inserted for c. 1628 to show the increase through the inheritances of 1616-28. All figures are for giornate, but without fractions.

	1556 (i)	1556 (ii)	1596 (i)	1596 (iii)	1624	c.1628	1664	1705	1735
Barolo	345	345	365	385(2)	435(5)	435	445	445	464
Vergne	182	182	182	192(2)	485	485	397	397	397
Serralunga	350	175	190	190	210(4)	442	442	442	592
La Morra	450	285(1)	430	430(3)	445	629(5)	629	629	629

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(1) Apart from the 'Rocca' farm, Gerolamo II and Bonifacio held the remaining lands at La Morra (330 g.) in common. In practice, Gerolamo thus owned only half, or 165 g. For reasons of clarity, they have been divided in 1556, and not - as actually happened - on Gerolamo's death in 1596.
(2) Including Lodovico's inheritance to Giacomo.
(3) Reduced to 310 g. between 1596 and 1603, as the 'Rocca' farm was owned in usufruct by Giacomo's mother.
(4) Including the exchange with Giovanni, of about 50 g. in Barolo and 20 g. in Serralunga.
(5) Including Giovanni's inheritance, calculated at 19 g.

	1556 (i)	1556 (ii)	1596 (i)	1596 (iii)	1624	c.1628	1664	1705	1735
Castiglione	13	13	13	13	13	13	32	32	44
Pocapaglia	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Rodello	—	—	123	—	—	62	62	62	62
Borgomale	—	—	52	—	—	26	26	26	26
Turin	—	—	30	30	—	—	—	—	—
Savigliano	—	—	140	—	—	—	—	—	—
Villafalletto	—	—	—	—	200	200	238(6)	238	238
Centallo	—	—	—	—	144	144	—	215	215
Neive	—	—	—	—	—	—	128	128	128
Montiggio	—	—	—	—	—	—	267	267	267
Rocchetta	—	—	—	—	—	—	125	125	125
Cassinasco	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	9	9
Cavatore	—	—	—	—	—	—	35	35	35
Castagnole	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	5
	1348	1008	1533	1248	1940	2444	2848	3063	3244

(6) The increase of 38 g. occurred between 1600 and 1670; see note (52).

Appendix 11(c). Areas of land at the time of the perequazione.

The land of each fee has been divided into the total, the amount claimed feudal, the amount recognized as feudal, the % loss, and the amount of allodial land after 1731; where known, the total area of land in each comunità has been given. In the case of the Monferrat fees, the measurements have been converted into giornate.

Comunità	Total in comunità	Total	Feudal claimed	Recognized	% loss	Allodial after 1731
Barolo	g. 1505:65:0	841:87:0	841:87:0	93:27:0	87	748:60:0
Serralunga	2195:15:0	568:42:7	289:33:6	98:14:7	65	470:28:0
La Morra	?	628:94:6	628:94:6	—	100	628:94:6
Castiglione	1200: 0:0	31:89:3	17:17:0	17:17:0	—	14:72:3
Pocapaglia	4485:65:0	7:74:5	—	—	—	7:74:5
Rodello	2107:42:5	62: 0:0	62: 0:0	16:24:6	74	45:75:6
Borgomale	1931: 7:0	26:12:9	26:12:9	26:12:9	—	—
Villafalletto	7245:57:5	238:39:7	—	—	—	238:39:7
Centallo	11096:21:0	215:23:0	—	—	—	215:23:0
Neive	5274:17:0	128: 0:0	—	—	—	128: 0:0
Montiggio	?	266:47:0	266:47:0	266:47:0	—	—
Rocchetta	?	124:98:0	124:98:0	98:36:1	37	26:61:11
Cassinasco	?	9:27:0	9:27:0	9:27:0	—	—
Cavatore	?	35:11:0	35:11:0	30: 6:0	18	5: 5:0
Castagnole	?	4:49:0	4:49:0	4:49:0	—	—
Total		3188:95:1	2305:76:9	659:60:11	72	2529:34:2

Appendix 11(d). Incomes of land after the perequazione.

The income of land has been calculated from the misura generale and divided into income from feudal and allodial land, followed by the total. The income from feudal dues and emphyteuses has been calculated from numerous documents, especially the consegnamenti (1).

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(1) For the income from land, see pp.157-58 and the indications given there. Besides the consegnamenti (see Appendix 11 (a)), the following documents have been used. For Barolo; M.170,n.16; M.171,n.1; M.173,n.7; M.177,n.16; M.179,ns.13,15; M.180,n.8; M.210,n.24; M.218,f.1; M.A.15,n.4; M.A.16,n.3. For Serralunga: M.172,n.16; M.179,n.15; M.180,n.13; M.183,n.1; M.190,n.2; M.218,f.4; M.A.15,n.4; M.A.16, n.3; M.A.98,n.2. For La Morra: M.173,n.8; M.177,n.12; M.217,n.20; M.218,f.2; M.A.15, n.4; For Pocapaglia: M.179,ns.9,16,17,20; M.205,ns.5-7; M.218,f.3; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.32,n.22; M.A.80,n.22. For Rocchetta: M.A.16, n.3; M.A.32,n.22. For Cassinasco: M.A.32, n.16; M.A.38,n.8. For Rodello: M.170,n.12; M.179,ns.13,15; M.210,n.29; M.211, ns.3,8; M.218,f.5; M.A.15,n.3; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.32,n.22. For Cavatore: M.A.32,n.22; M.218,f.9. For Castagnole: M.204,n.10; M.A.16,n.3; M.A.32, ns.13,15,16,18,19,22,24.

	Feudal	Allodial	Total land	Dues	Emphyteuses	Total
Barolo	L. 666:10:2	L.7261: 8:6	L.7927:18:7	L.553:10:0	L.425:0:0	L.8906: 8:7
Serralunga	762:13:9	4727: 5:7	5489:19:4	301:10:0	63:10:0	5854:19:4
La Morra	—	6069: 7:4	6069: 7:4	50: 0:0	40: 0:0	6159: 7:4
Castiglione	191: 6:2	167: 3:4	358: 9:6	—	—	358: 9:6
Pocapaglia	12:10:0	—	12:10:0	9: 7:6	—	21:17:6
Rodello	55:12:9	266: 6:10	21:19:7	38: 3:9	—	360: 3:4
Borgomale	55: 1:8	—	55: 1:8	—	—	55: 1:8
Villafalletto	—	2057: 2:3	2057: 2:3	—	—	2057: 2:3
Centallo	—	2868:16:0	2868:16:0	—	—	2868:16:0
Neive	—	1031: 8:6	1031: 8:6	—	—	1031: 8:6
Montiggio	2200: 0:0	—	2200: 0:0	—	—	2200: 0:0
Rocchetta	328: 0:0	?	328: 0:0	90: 0:0	—	418: 0:0
Cassinasco	—	—	—	45: 0:0	10: 0:0	55: 0:0
Cavatore	287: 0:0	?	287: 0:0	15:10:0	49:10:0	352: 0:0
Castagnole	16: 0:0	—	16: 0:0	2126: 0:0	—	2142: 0:0
Total	4574 :14:6	24448:18:3	29023:12:9	3229: 1:3	588: 0:0	32840:14:0

Appendix 11(e). Division of the Falletti possessions in farms.

By the later 17th century, it is possible to divide the possessions into farms, with a fair probability of accuracy. This division shows a policy of continual redistribution of lands in ajoining farms, and occasionally the creation of emphyteuses from lands within the farms. Consequently, the sizes of the farms vary at different dates, sometimes startlingly. The main figures are from the 1672-76 and 1724 measurements (1); earlier figures are less reliable.

(a) Barolo and Volta. Vergne.

		Barolo	Vergne	Total
S.Ponzo	1672	g. 65:67: 7	g.38:64: 9	g.104:31:11
	1715	65:67: 2	36:40: 0	102: 7: 2
	1724	65:67: 2	32:21: 8	97:88:10
Fossati	1672	?	8:50: 8	?
	1724	23:84: 0	6:28: 3	30:12: 3
	1731	?	9:63: 0	?

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(1) The 1672-76 and 1724 measurements can be found in: M.180, ns. 8-10; M.A.16, n.3. For Serralunga, see also: M.A.98, n.11. For the consegnamento of 1670: M.179, n.13; and for that of 1715: M.179, n.15. For the measurement of 1731: M.180, n.13; and for that of 1732 (Vergne): M.202, n.4. For the measurement of about 1600: M.180, n.6.

			Barolo	Vergne	Total
Zonchea	1672		g. 63:39: 1	g. —	g. 63:39: 1
	1715		68:92: 1	—	68:92: 1
	1724		63:93: 3	—	63:93: 3
Fornace	1672		48:63:11	8:51: 9	57:15: 8
	1724		indivisible		63:34: 3
Carpanea	c.1600		—	114:84: 0	114:84: 0
	1672		—	90:25: 3	90:25: 3
	1724		—	90: 2: 1	90: 2: 1
	1731		—	80:65: 0	80:65: 0
Murata	c.1600		—	146:82: 0	146:82: 0
	1672		—	130:71: 9	130:71: 9
	1724		—	120:16: 1	120:16: 1
Pallice	1724		4:43: 0	16: 5: 0	20:48: 0
Pillone	1670		25:68: 0	—	25:68:0
	1724		16:34: 0	3:47: 0	19:81: 0
Volta (3 farms)	1672	I	18:12: 9	56:91: 1	75: 4: 0
		II	20:42:10	45:87: 4	66:36:3
	1670	III	indivisible		47: 2: 0
					188:42: 3
	1724	all 3	117:23: 0	120:60: 2	237:83: 2
	1715	I	56:88: 0	18:89: 0	75:77: 0
	1732	II	46: 3: 4	19:87: 0	65:90: 4
		III	100:34: 0	12:66: 0	113: 0: 0
					254:67: 4

(b) Serralunga:

Bosco d'Ariete	1672	132:21: 0	Favorita	1672	20:81: 6
	1724	148:68: 0		1724	29:26: 5
Cascinotta	1672	72:75: 1	Grande	1672	141:20: 5[a]
	1724	80:30: 2		1724	141:30: 5
Piccola	1672	75:29:11	Lands of conte di Pocapagli		
	1724	75:27: 1		1724	93:60: 6

Appendix 12. Arduino's patrimony.

From his first marriage in 1616 to Marianna Valperga di Valperga, Arduino received as dowry lands and censi in the Valpergato, Canischio, Prascorsano and Pratiglione, and probably in Valsoana, Oglianico and Favria, all in the Canavese. His aumento of the dowry was 4000 scudi, probably one-third of the value of the dowry. Marianna also brought as inheritance 2/9 of the fees of Pont and Valli and 1/6 of Rivarossa. (1)

His second wife, Leonora Della Rovere, brought as dowry in 1633 a cash payment of nearly L. 10,000 and a censo of 60 sacks of grain to be paid by the comunità of Carignano (capitalized in 1664 at L. 5,500). In addition, after payment of half the dote di corte of 4000 ducatoni (L. 9,200), Vittorio Amedeo I increased the remainder to a total 7225 scudi del sole (L. 22,400), as a gift to Arduino, to be paid from tassi over the comunità of the Castellata (2); the ducal patent gave clear evidence of Arduino's position :

> "... la fedele, et affettuosa servitù, che il Conte Arduino Valperga Gentilhuomo di nostra Camera, et Capitano delle Corazze di nostra guardia, sino da soi primi anni ci ha reso intutto l'occasioni del nostro Servitio, è talmente a noi gradita che non solo vogliamo assicurarli la soddisfattione de suoi haveri ma insieme gratificarlo inmodo, che con effetti conoscendo la gratitudine dell'animo che gline conserviamo, possa con maggior commodità in quella continuare per l'avvenire...".

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(1) M.24, n.9; M.211,s.v.'Pont e Valli'.
(2) M.7,c.i.,ns.5,7; AST III,Controllo,a.1632 in 1633, f.191.

No document exists to show the value of the dowry of Arduino's third wife, Isabella Ferrero Fieschi di Masserano.

After Arduino's death in 1654, a long lawsuit began over his inheritance. His only son, Giovanni Battista, had become a monk in 1634, and died in 1648 (3). By his will of 6 February 1653 (4), Arduino left his widow, Isabella, her dowry and all her jewellery (which was recovered after her death), and the remainder of her dowry and a payment of 1,000 ducatoni to his daughter, Anna Maria, contessa di Cumiana:

> "... quali cose medianti non potrà detta contessa di Cumiana mia figlia pretender altro nei beni et heredità mia et di detta sua madre per qual si voglia causa..."

All his other possessions were left equally to his other two daughters. But the feudal lands of the Castellata could not descend through females, while all other feudal possessions were also claimed by Giovenale Maria and Carlo, Arduino's nephews. In 1664, the Senato decided that Francesca should inherit her mother Marianna's dowry, despite her renunciation of Arduino's inheritance in 1635, when part of her dowry was paid (5); for she was still the heir to Marianna's inheritance through the cession made by her brother Giovanni Battista in 1634. The feudal

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(3) Durando, p. 257; Pola, v.1, p.421.

(4) AST III, Testamenti del Senato, R.8, f. 55.

(5) M.209, s.v.'Valperga', ns.8,9. For the division between Giovenale Maria and Carlo: M.12, n. 31.

lands of Marianna's inheritance, however, were to go to the nearest male relatives and were divided between Giovenale and Carlo. The dowries of the two other sisters were to be completed from the allodial possessions of Arduino, if necessary supplemented up to 2,000 scudi each from his feudal possessions. The feudal possessions both in the Castellata and elsewhere were to be divided between Giovenale Maria and Carlo.

A number of conflicting liquidations were made of Arduino's inheritance (6). The following reconstruction has been made after careful comparisons:

Allodial possessions

Palace at Fossano, for 2/3 owned by Arduino	L. 5,466:13: 4
Lands at Fossano ('Brantonio' farm , at L. 65 the giornata)	L. 8,666:13: 4
Lands at Fossano ('Vernetta' farm, 30 giornate and 3 wine-vats)	L. 1,998: 0: 0
Vineyard ('Vigna Nuova') at Valperga	L. 1,800: 0: 0
Tassi over Rivara, Forno, Busano, Levone (capital, scudi del sole 7225)	L. 49,671:17: 6
Various credits owed by the Duke and comunità	L. 4,971: 8: 2
Palace at Torino	L. 27,500: 0: 0
Furniture at Valperga and Torino	L. 22,276: 11:0
Arduino's improvements to Valperga, estimated at L. 15,347:4:8, but as a final settlement accepted as	L. 7,200: 0: 0

(6) M.23,n.4; M.24,ns.2,9; see also: M.204, s.v.'Rivarossa',1646 May 23.

Furniture sold by Francesca San Giorgio	L.	604:15: 0
Jewellery, furniture left to the widow Isabella Ferrero Fieschi di Masserano and recovered after her death	L.	15,879: 6: 6
Total	L.	146,035: 4:10

Feudal possessions.

Lands in Fossano and Genola ('Vernetta', 'Brantonio' farms, 66:13:4 giornate)	L.	5,763: 6: 8
Lands in Fossano (retrofeudali, 32 giornate)	L.	6,080: 0: 0
1/32 jurisdiction of Genola	L.	1,500: 0: 0
Fee of Entraque (valued and subtracted from Cristina's dowry, though already sold to her in 1651)	L.	15,000: 0: 0
500 doppie owed by conte Mombasilio	L.	6,875: 0: 0
1/6 and 1/18 of jurisdiction over Valperga, Pont and Valli	L.	——
1/8 and 1/12 of jurisdiction over Rivarossa, temporarily allenated in 1650	L.	——
222 emine of fodder over Oglianico and Favria	L.	——
Feudal possessions in the Castellata	L.	——
Total	L.	35,218: 6: 8 plus.

The dowry of Francesca San Giorgio was 8,000 ducatoni; of this, Arduino paid 1.735 ducatoni, valued at L. 9,913, in 1635. This sum was subtracted from the value of Marianna's allodial possessions, leaving a total owing of L. 10,593:3:6.

The dowry of Anna Maria Cumiana was 9,000 ducatoni, increased however by Arduino who promised to pay 4,000 ducatoni as his share,

though only debited (after estimating the maternal dowry at 8,537 ducatoni) with 463 ducatoni. The total dowry was thus 12,537 ducatoni, of which 1,055 ducatoni had been paid in jewels. The remaining 11,481 ducatoni were calculated with interest as L. 54,330:11:3.

Cristina Tana's dowry was 14,000 ducatoni, of which 4,000 ducatoni had been paid. The remainder was calculated, including interest, as L. 42,356:8:4, from which only L.15,000 were subtracted: Arduino had alienated his marquisate of Entraque to his son-in-law, Tana, in 1651, for 10,000 ducatoni (7), which were calculated in the liquidations at L.15,000, leaving a total owing of L.27,356:8:4. The expenses of the liquidation and the law-suit were estimated at L.10,596:3:6 (an eloquent figure!), to make an overall total of L.102,737:14:7. The excess left in allodial possessions - L. 43,277:10:3 - was divided unequally between Cristina and Anna Maria. Apart from the lands in the Castellata and the fee of Entraque, already sold, Giovenale Maria and Carlo inherited the remaining possessions, valued at over L. 20,218:6:8.

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(7) M.213, s.v.'Entraque', n. 28.

Appendix 13. Censi bought by the Valperga di Rivara over the Castellata.

	Feudatary	Comunità	Capital		Interest %	
1616	Pietro Francesco	Forno	114 doppie d'Italia	L. 4104	7	(1)
1626	Lodovico	Levone	300 scudi	L. 470	8	(2)
1630	Lodovico	?	500 scudi	L. 866	8	(3)
1631	Lodovico	Forno	125 doppie di Spagna	L. 1625	8	(4)
1641	Lodovico	Busano	200 doppie Spagna	L. 2000	8	(5)
1641	Lodovico	Forno	50 doppie Spagna	L. 500	8	(5)
?	Bianca Benedetta	Rivara	100 doppie d'Italia	L. 1000 (?)	7	(6)
1617	Pietro Franc.(?)	Forno	?	?	?	(7)
				L.10565		

(1) M.15, c.i, ns. 3,4,6,7; c.ii, ns.1,11,12.

(2) M.15, c.ii,n.3; M.16, n.72; AC Rivara. Rivara Comunità. Titoli alla medema appartenenti. Dal 1671 al 1799, v.2°.

(3) M.15,c.ii,n.9; AC Rivara. Registro carte relative alle Decime della Mensa Arcivescovile. Dal 1354 al 1788.

(4) M.15, c.ii, n.6; M.16, n.72.

(5) M.15, c.i, n.5; c.ii,n.7; M.16,n.72; AST III, Controllo, a.1660 in 1661, f.120, n.6.

(6) M.15, c.i, n.2.

(7) M.72, n. 19.

Appendix 14. Consegnamenti of the Valperga di Rivara.

The following table gives the total areas returned by the Valperga di Rivara in their four consegnamenti. The four branches of the family are represented as:

(1) Castello Inferiore - descendants of Massimo Antonio.

(2) Castello Inferiore - descendants of Giovanni Antonio.

(3) Castello Superiore - descendants of Giacomo Antonio.

(4) Castello Superiore - descendants of Pietro Francesco.

For the references, see notes (32) and (40). All measurements are in giornate.

	1589	1691	1716	1734
(1)	128: 5: 0	180:77:2	189:60:4	249:21:0
(2)	119:35: 8	113:98:4	109:56:3	———
Total	247:40:8	294:75:6	299:16: 7	249:21:0
(3)	...	122:80:1	100:33:3	
(4)	...	272:70:0	302:37:1	251:12:2
Total:	357:87:0	395:50:1	402:70: 4	251:12:2
Total:	605:27:8	690:25:7	701:86:11	500:23:2

Appendix 15. Feudal rights.

A document, to be dated from internal evidence between 1734 and 1743, gave an estimate of the income to be derived from feudal rights for the Castello Inferiore (1) :

Stato de beni, e feudi del signor conte Ignazio [Filiberto] Valperga di Rivara.

Tre feudi per metà delli feudi di Rivara, il forno di Rivara, e Buzano.	
Levone in solidum in Primogenitura	
Mollini in commune per la metà componente Ruote numero 7 in affitti L. 2000	L. 1000
Mollino di Levone Ruote numero 2 in affitto	L. 400
Li Crosi, et Ampiggione di Rivara, e Levone	L. 1000
Per altro Crosio del fù Conte Carl'Antonio, migliorato quest'anno, a per l'anno venturo di reddito	L. 300
Per fitti minuti, terze vendite, e caducità transatte con la Communità di Levone	L. 290
Pedaggio, Vigna di Levone, come ne risulta da Capitulazione	L. 50
Communità del Forno per Transatione seguita sia per fitti minuti, terze vendite, caducità, Royde, et per metà L. 300	L. 150
Communità di Rivara per Transatione seguita sì per terze vendite, caducità, fitti minuti, caccia e pesche, et per metà L. 400	L. 200
Communità di Buzano li Nobili Molli, che non ha anchor transatta, ma disposta a transiggere per i medesimi dritti signorili L.200, per metà	L. 100
Podestaria, e segretaria di Rivara, Forno e Buzano per metà L. 160	[L. 80]
Podestaria, e segretaria di Levone	L. 64
Condanne delli quatro feudi, et accuse de Bandi campestri per sua portione	L. 250

(1) M.25,n.15, with a copy, differing slightly, in: M.25, n.16.

La Communità del Forno come per Transatione seguita per l'aqua per trasporto della Terra del Crosio del Forno

L. 19

L. 3903

Numerous valuations were made of the mills. There were two mills, comprising 3 wheels in Rivara (2), one mill of 2 wheels in Busano and one mill of one wheel in Forno, with a new mill of one wheel constructed in Forno by Ignazio Filiberto and Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio between 1714 and 1716. In Levone there was one mill of 2 wheels (3). The value placed on these mills was shown by the construction of a new mill, and by Carlo Antonio's improvements to the mills of the Castellata, valued at L.1000 (4). These mills were hired out and show great fluctuations in value. An almost ten-fold rise can be calculated from about 1640 to 1740. Using the Busano mill of 2 wheels (for which the fullest

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(2) In 1589 there was also a third mill in Rivara, and a nut-press (batanderio), neither of which appear in the other consegnamenti.

(3) In addition, there was a nut-press, which fell out of use between 1716 and 1733, when only the right to construct a new one was mentioned.

(4) All relevant figures are to be found in: M. 48, especially ns. 9,11,14,28,30,35,37,40,47,50-53,56; also, AST I, Torino e Provincia, M.25, s.v.'Rivara', n.3. Pola, v.1, pp.186-90, v. 3, pp.684-85, contains some useful, if (as customarily) unverifiable, facts. For Carlo Antonio's improvements: Durando, pp. 206-07.

figures exist) to estimate the general value of all 6 (and later 7) wheels, the value can be calculated in 1646 as L. 240 per annum, in 1650 as L. 300, in 1662 as L. 456. In 1691 a consegnamento of the mills estimated their income as about L. 1390. With the sale of Ferdinando's share in 1710 and the attempt of a contractor - Gian Giacomo Oberto, described as "affittavolo generale dei beni dei Conti di Rivara" (5) - to secure the monopoly of all the mills from about 1705 till 1720, the prices soared to as much as L. 1600 for the mill of Busano and L. 2000 for the two mills of Rivara in 1719. These prices subsequently dropped to L. 1864 for all the 7 wheels of the Castellata in 1739, a figure confirmed by the L. 2000 of the estimate. The Levone mill was sold temporarily in 1708 for L. 4000 and its hire valued in 1729 at L. 300 and in 1740 at L. 400 annually.

The values of the feudal dues for the lime (stone) quarries is difficult to estimate, as they were often hired out together with the mills. In 1664, 1/2 soma of lime per kiln was owed, yielding L. 62; in the 1716 consegnamenti 2 some per kiln were owed. The exploitation of the quarries yielded far more: in 1662, they were hired out for L. 900; in 1709 Giudeppe Lodovico hired out his half share for L. 2000 for ten years; in 1733 Ignazio Filiberto was owed L.931 for his half; while the estimate of 1734-43 gave L. 1000 as the yield of the quarries of Rivara and Levone (6), with the addition of Carlo Antonio's quarry valued at L. 300 (7). The revenue from the

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(5) Pola, v.3, p.340.
(6) M. 63, ns. 10, 78.
(7) This quarry was not held in common with the co-feudatary of the

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lime-stone-quarries may therefore be calculated at L. 2000 to L. 2250.

Certain other, minute, incomes were not entered in the estimate. The ovens were steadily alienated to the comunità, leaving the Conti with only a varying number of weeks' use. In 1636 Giovenale Maria hired out his two weeks for L. 30; Bianca Benedetta hired her part in 1651 for L. 15; Filiberto Giuseppe Antonio hired his part for L. 40 (8); the 1716 consegnamenti gave the Castello Superiore 18 weeks of the forno sottano and 6 weeks of the forno soprano, and the Castello Inferiore 1/4 or 13 weeks of the forno sottano, while the 1733 consegnamenti mention 1/4 of each oven. The total value of the ovens was certainly not above L. 50.

The iron forge was hired out for 4 chickens and 16 libbre of iron in 1716 and 1733. The pestling-mills in Rivara and Forno were hired for 2 chickens for each mill. The hire of the oil-press in Forno was 4 chickens, or 6 soldi. The 'Alps' were hired for 4 rubbi 8 libbre and 4 grossi. The total value of all these possessions could hardly have been more than L. 10.

With the addition of these figures, the income from feudal rights may be summarized as:

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Castello Inferiore, as it was entired in the 1691 consegnamento as: "Il Crosio di Pesemonte, da dove si estrahe la pietra per fare Calcina tutto proprio di detto signore Consignante".

(8) M.51, c.i, n.4; M.16, n.72; Pola, v.1, p. 194.

Revenue from jurisdiction	L. 500
Seigneurial rights - transaction with Levone, 1648	L. 290
Seigneurial rights - transaction with Rivara, 1711 (without Ferdinando's quarter, sold to the *comunità*)	L. 300
Seigneurial rights - transaction with Forno, 1714	L. 300
Seigneurial rights - transaction with Busano	L. 200
Revenue for the Podesteria and Segreteria for Rivara, Forno and Busano	L. 160
Revenue for the Podesteria and Segreteria, Levone	L. 64
Mills of Rivara, Forno and Busano	L. 2000
Mill of Levone	L. 400
Lime-(stone quarries) of Rivara and Levone (estimating those of the Castello Superiore as equal in value to those of the Castello Inferiore)	L. 2000
Additional lime-(stone quarry) of Carlo Antonio	L. 300
Pedaggio and vineyard of Levone	L. 50
Additional payment of Forno for use of water	L. 19
Income from ovens and small extra incomes	L. 60
	L. 6643

Appendix 16. Income from feudal rights, 1727 (1).

Redditi spettanti al Feudo di Paesana.

Primo il Censo Giurisditionale che si paga repartitamente lire 1002:10 al S.Giovanni Battista, ed lire 1002:10 al S. Martino	L. 2005
Piu li due Mollini Cioe quello di Santa Maria paga annualmente Emine 382 Segla, et emine dieci formento inclusa la resiga	
Piu il mollino di Santa Margherita Emine 243 Segla et emine 10 formento et L.30 per il Battitore si deve vedere il tempo della scadenza del pagamento,	
Fatta una Comune	L. 1000
Piu il Troglio delli Signori eredi Valentino Borgia paga annualmente il canone	L. 40
Piu il Troglio che era affitato a Christoffero Borgia annualmente questo troglio attualmente Corre ad economia del Agente	L. 45
Giovanni Antonio De Rebaudino paga un Canone annuo d'un Capone per li beni enfiteotici dipendenti dal Castello	L. 1
Giuseppe Muthio paga pur annualmente per li beni emphiteotici del Castello un Capone	L. 1

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(1) M. 40. The document is an estimate of all feudal incomes from Paesana, Oncino and Crissolo, though not Castellar. The details of the income from Oncino and Crissolo were added after the final total, as rough notes; their totals have been included in the following table, with the description of their nature.

Heredi Giovanni Pietro Biglione pagano un Canone annuo per il fitto del Sito ove altre volte c'era il troglio vicino il mollino di Santa Margherita	L. 2:10
Heredi Bartolomeo Pelleoni devono per beni emphiteotici dipendenti dal Castello l'annuo Canone d'un Capone	L. 1
La Segreteria del Tribunale	L.500
Chiaffredo Falco deve per li beni emphiteotici del Castello un annuo Canone di	L. 4: 6: 8
Heredi Valentino Borgia sodetto pagano un annuo Canone per la metà della fodina	L. 3:15
Giacomo Biolle paga per l'altra mettà di detta fodina	L. 3:15
Bartolomeo Bonetto deve Canone annuo per la fodina nuova	L. 8
Signor Giovanni Pietro Richatti deve un Canone annuo per la fodina sovra il troglio	L. 10
Antonio Perotti per la fodina della Ghisola deve Canone annuo	L. 7:10
Deve il Sig. Ricatto per il fitto delle fodine e Fornello	L. -
M.r Bartolomeo Bonino per il fitto del palatolto deve annualmente	L. 45
Giovanni Battista Rocca paga per il fitto del Pascolo di Pian Croesio per l'anno corrente 1727	L. 75
Giovanni Domenico Ferrero deve un Canone annuo per li beni del Castello	L. 2:10
Carlo Giud.e e Giuseppe Solaro per il fitto della marmoreria pagano annualmente	L. 50
Prato l'adrito feudale fito annue Corrente Brasse 11 fieno fatta una Commune rilleva L.72:10 et oltre il fieno pagano L.16	L. 88:10

Bilia Manetta paga per fitto di prato detto Danno osij Marttero annualmente L.12 et 2 Brasse fieno che si Calcolano L.12 in tutto		L. 25	
Giovanni Matheo Cerrato deve per li beni del Castello un Capone annuo		L. 1	
		L. 3919:16:8 (2)	
Casina fatta una Commune detrate le lugle [?]		L. 200	
		L. 4119:16:8	L.4119:16:8
Si deve aggiunger il Reddito delle fodine e forni di fondite di ferro			L.1000
Oncino, censo Giurisdizionale		L. 430	
Oncino, mollini, emine 110		L. 137:10	
Crissolo, censo giurisdizionale		L. 438:15:8	
		L. 1006: 5:8	L.1006: 5:8
Oncino e Crissolo, segreteria del tribunale			L. 100
			L.6226: 2:4

(2) In the document, the total is given as L.3921:6:8. The following additions have also been corrected.

Appendix 17. Carlo Maria's acquisitions.

Carlo Maria's purchases were:

Crissolo	1674	iron mines	?	(1)
Crissolo	1685	fee	L. 21,500	(2)
Paesana	1676	1/6 fee	5,800	(3)
Paesana	1672-73	22 g.	1,500	(4)
Paesana	1671-1714	33 g.	3,640	(5)
Castellar	1679-1711	5 g.	856	(6)
Oncino	1672-75	mills	650	(7)
Villanovetta	1690-98	11 g.	1,606	(8)
Saluzzo	1687	palace	300	(9)
Saluzzo	1710	9 g.	1,071	(10)
Barge	c.1710	380 g.	45,220	(10)
Turin	1694	house	11,000	(11)
			L. 93,143	

(1) M.17, 1676 July 11,12.

(2) This figure includes L.1,500 to the previous owners, the Amedei, for their claims; see text, note (27).

(3) M.12,1676 Feb.3.

(4) M.12,1672 Sept.2; 1673 Dec.4.

(5) M.12,1671 Sept.25;1672 Dec.14;1673 Oct.10;1674 Nov.5;Dec.12; 1675 Aug.25;1678 May 17;1679 Aug.18;Sept.20;1681 Nov.19;1682 Nov.30;Dec.4;1684 Dec.14;1685 Feb.14;Nov.18;1688 March 5,28; 1694 Jan.28;1696 Jan.10;1714 Sept.8. In 1708, Carlo Maria tried to sell the farm he had bought in 1672: M.12,1708 Jan.17;M.25, 1715 Jan.27.

(6) M.14,1679 May 24;1684 Sept.23;1703 Nov.28;1711 Jan.21.

(7) M.16,1672 Sept.16; 1675 March 23.

(8) M.21,1690 March 25; 1698 Aug.25.

(9) M.26 bis, 1687 Aug.1.

(10) There are no documents recording the purchase of these lands, but they are measured in the 1715 inventory: M.25,1715 Jan.27 (see also the will: M.7,1713 May 4), with 1 giornata in Barge bought in 1714: M.21,1714 July 19. Their value has been calculated as L.119 per giornata, the average price of land in the province of Saluzzo between 1706 and 1717: AST II,2a archiviazione, Capo 21,ns.292-303; see Prato,pp.196-97.

Carlo Maria's purchases of *tassi* and *censi* were listed in the inventory of 1715 (12). They have been divided into acquisitions from nobles, from non-nobles and from *comunità*, followed by the cash left by Carlo Maria and the arrears from *censi*:

From nobles:

		Capital	Interest	
1692	marchese Della Chiesa di Roddi	L. 4,000	5%	L. 200
1697	contessa Scaravalle di Scarnafigi	4,350	5%	217:10
1697	conte Rovere di Revello	14,000	6%	840 (13)
1700	marchese Della Chiesa di Roddi	5,000	5%	250
1700	marchese Della Chiesa di Roddi	1,500	5%	75
1700	president Borgera	12,000	5%	600
1708	conte Vacca di Piozzo	5,000	5%	250
1712	cav.Roero di Monticello	400	5%	20
?	conte Viale di Saluzzo	3,000	5%	150
1699	son,Baldassarre,to buy Piobesi farm	5,000	-	-
		L.54,250		L.2602:10

(11) M.26 bis, 1694 Nov.9; Dec.14; 1695 Dec.6; 1696 May 29. The price was L.11,500, and Baldassarre paid the remaining L.500 in 1717: M.26 bis, 1717 Sept.12.

(12) M.26 bis, 1715 Jan.7,27. Information relating to specific credits is to be found in the following notes (13) to (27). Where no interest was given, it has been calculated at 5%, except for the loan to the bankers of Turin, almost certainly at 4% because of its size; all such instances have been noted in square brackets.

(13) M.23, 1697 April 10.

From non-nobles:

1680	Orlana and Cavassa	L. 2,350	[5%	L. 117:10]	
1687	Simondi	500	[5%	25]	
1688	Morello, Magnano, Moresco	405	[5%	20: 5]	
1697	Bosso	3,500	[5%	245]	(14)
1697	Boarello	4,500	5½%	247:10	
1699	Castelli	2,500	[5%	125]	
1699	Calza	1,500	[5%	75]	
1699	Minaudo	1,000	6%	60	(15)
1699	Blanchetto	1,860	6%	111:12	(16)
1700	Bonansea	250	[5%	12:10]	
1700	Picha	800	[5%	40]	
1702	Ferrero	1,000	[5%	50]	
1707	Armitano	644	[5%	32: 4]	(17)
1708	Reggio	1,500	[5%	75]	
1709	Boschero	650	4%	26	
1710	arciprete Bussono	1,695	5%	84:15	(18)
1710	Gomasero	4,000	[5%	200]	
1710	Giriodi	3,878	[5%	193:18]	
1712	Bonansea, Berardo	4,586	[5%	229: 6]	
1712	capitano Calza	5,500	4%	220	
1712	Bonansea, Bonetto, Borgia	1,000	[5%	50]	
1713	Guano	500	[5%	25]	
1714	Chiobrando	2,000	[5%	100]	
1714	medico Boglione	1,000	[5%	50]	
1714	Giriodi	6,000	[5%	300]	
1714	Armando, Bastonero	506	4%	20: 5	

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(14) M.23, 1697 March 22.
(15) M.23, 1699 Aug.13; 1701 Dec.12; 1702 July 13.
(16) M.23, 1699 July 28.
(17) M.37, 1715 March 6.
(18) AST I, Paesi per A e B, lettera 'S', M.4, s.v.'Saluzzo', n.32.

1714	Priore Calza	100	[5%	5]	
?	Parasso, Viscardi	600	[5%	30]	
?	book of small debts (37)	3,700	[5%	185]	(19)
?	bankers Colomba, Calcina, Ruffino	100,000	[4%	4000]	
		L.158,024		L.6955:15	

From comunità:

1687	censo, Paesana	3,000	5%	130	(20)
1697-99	tassi, Paesana, Oncino, Crissolo	57,400	5-6%	2,844	(21)
1699	Segretaria Criminale, Saluzzo	?	?	?	(22)
1703	censo, Crissolo (annual liquidation)	100	—	—	(23)
1704	censo, Turin	60,000	4%	2,400	(24)
1710	tasso, Saluzzo	43,500	5%	2,175	(21)
1713	tasso, Saluzzo	3,000	5%	150	(25)
?	part of mills, Saluzzo	21,017	5%	1,100	(26)
?	canone, abbacy of Staffarda, 25 scudi	[3,745	5%]	187:10	
?	4 piazze da notaio	1,800	6 2/3	120	(27)
		L.193,562		L.9,106:10	
Making a total:		L.405,836		L.18,664:15	
Cash found at Carlo Maria's death:		L. 77,113:7			
Arrears of censi and tassi		22,330:15			

(19) M.12,1670 Jan.14; M.37,1715 March 6.
(20) M.12,1687 Sept.4; M.13,1734 Jan.28.
(21) M.13,1703 Jan.21; M.5,1699 Aug.22; 1716 Sept.12; M.39,1703 Feb.13; AST III, Controllo, R.1696,2°,f.47; R.1697,f.88; Interinazioni, R.1696,2°,n.143,f.134.
(22) M.21, 1699 Jan.12; AST III, Patenti, R.121,f.236.
(23) M.23,1700 Aug.2; 1705 Feb.19.
(24) M.23, 1704 April 16.
(25) M.23,1694 May 8; 1696 May 7; 1697 May 7; 1709 May 2; 1713 Nov.12.
(26) AST III, Patenti, R.133,f.193; R.136,f.78; R.144,f.119.
(27) M.21,1680 Jan.18; 1715 Feb.17.

Carlo Maria's expenditure may thus be summarized:

Purchases	L. 93,143
Credits and cash (excluding interests)	482,949
Dowries (see text, p.275 and note (30))	36,500
	L. 612,592

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(28) Carlo Maria also owned *censi* over the *comunità* of Castellar and Oneino, disputed at the time of the inventory: M.15, 1733 Dec.4; 1734 Feb.8; Aug.14; M.40, 'Rubrica...'; 1731 June 6; M.42, 1735 June 4; 1737 Nov. 28; 1787 May 31.

Appendix 18. Baldassarre's expenditure

In 1724 (1), when Baldassarre made an inventory of his primogeniture, in accordance with the new Royal Constitutions of 1723, he stated his credits as:

Censi, exacted	L. 291,410
Money found in 1736	77,113
Interests owing, 1736	20,239
	L. 388,762

He had also given his brother, Tomaso Adalberto, the following credits, besides 389 giornate in Barge and Saluzzo:

Conte Viale di Saluzzo	L. 3,000
Boarello, 1697	4,500
Saluzzo tasso, 1710	43,500
Saluzzo tasso, 1713	3,000
Saluzzo mills	21,017
Saluzzo, segreteria criminale	?
Staffarda, canone	3,745
	L. 78,762

which increased the total cash assets left by Carlo Maria to L. 467,524, or L. 37,756 less than the total credits, cash and interests stated in the 1715 inventory (2). This figure was in

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(1) M.25, 1724 May 24; M.39,'Consig.o a tenor della R.a Const.e...'. In these inventories, a mistake in adding the sums gives a total of L. 378,862.

(2) In 1741, his son, Carlo Tomaso, recalculated the inheritance as L.421,376 (in the actual inventory, a mistake in adding made a total of L.411,376) as well as Tomaso Adalberto's share, or L.32,605 more than Baldassarre's calculation. But

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part unexacted, in part unexactable.

Baldassarre deducted from the credits of L. 388,762

Legacies	L.11,050		
Funeral expenses,etc.	7,057		
Improvements to estate	7,150		
	L.25,257	L.25,257	
Dowries:			
to mother		L.15,750	
to daughter		22,400	
		L.63,407	L. 63,407
leaving a primogeniture over credits of			L. 325,355 L.325,355
The purchase of Fenis, and two small pieces of land for			L. 88,025
reduced the remainder of the primogeniture to be accounted for to:			L.237,330

This was entirely covered by four of the six apartments in his palace at Turin.

Baldassarre spent on his acquisition of the site at Turin(3):

1708	house	L. 2,700
1709	house	5,500
1715	1:34:0 giornate	32,128
1719	0:13:0 giornate	3,900
1720	house	2,800
		L. 47,028.

But he only paid half the first sum, leaving L. 1350 to be

./. he includes a second time L.3000 given to Tomaso Adalberto, and omits 4 other credits of L.1000 (hence falling within the primogeniture), so that his total should be L.424,871: M.25, 1741 Aug. 8.

(3) For references, see text, note (43).

paid by Carlo Tomaso, and reducing his actual expenditure to L. 45,678.

In 1722, Baldassarre drew up an account of his expenditure for the construction of the palace (4). The capomastri acknowledged payment of L. 242,223. He had borrowed:

			Interest rate	Interest	
	Dowry wife, Costanza Camilla	L. 30,000	-	-	
	Dowry daughter-in-law, Marta	20,000	-	-	
1708	conte Cacherano	1,000	5%	L. 50	(5)
1715-22	Monastero della Visitazione	10,000	4%	400	
1717	contessa Cassotti di Ceresole	3,000	4%	120	(6)
1717	avvocato Perucca	15,000	[5%	750]	(7)
1717	signora Dumani	1,000	4%	40	(8)
1719	conte Daremberg	12,000	[5%	600]	(9)
1719	signor Viale	13,773	[5%	689]	(10)
1719	conte Broglia di Casalborgone	10,000	5%	500	(11)
1719	signor Mestraletto	8,000	5%	400	(12)
1721	conte Frichignono di Castellengo	13,000	4%	520	(13)
?	signor Re	12,000	[4%	480]	
?	signor Conetto	8,000	[4%	320]	
?	Monastero del Crocefisso	11,000	[4%	440]	
?	signor Petri	12,000	[4%	480]	
?	signor Plantery	3,200	[4%	128]	
		L.182,973		L. 5917	(14)

(4) M.26 bis, 1722 Jan.3. For other references, see below, notes (5)-(13).
(5) M.23, 1710 Sept. 7.
(6) M.23, 1717 May 22.
(7) M.23, 1717 Aug.17.
(8) M.23, 1717 Aug.25.
(9) M.23, 1730 Nov.2.
(10) M.23, 1719 March 28.
(11) M.23, 1719 Aug.14.
(12) M.23, 1722 May 11.
(13) M.23, 1721 Sept. 5.
(14) Baldassarre had also sold a censo of L.4000 at 5% to contessa

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By 1724, Baldassarre had repaid:

	sig. Viale, 1719	L. 4,000	5%	200 (15)
	sig. Mestraletto, 1719	8,000	5%	400 (16)
		L.12,000		L.600

But he had madre new debts:

1722	sig. Brunengo	L. 15,000	4%	L. 600 (17)
1723	sig. Viale	6,431	4%	257 (18)
1723	Congregazione di S.Paolo,Turin	12,000	4%	480 (19)
1724	Congregasione de' Mercanti,Turin	7,500	4%	300 (20)
1724	medico Settimo	2,000	4%	80 (21)
		L. 42,931		L.1717

The size of his debts thus increased by L. 30,931 to L. 213,904, not about L. 100,000, as Baldassarre stated in his consegnamento. He was paying at least L. 7034 in annual interests. At the same time, he had spent at least L. 58,920 on the palace (22), which, with the purchase of the site and the previous expenditure, came to L. 346,821.

./. Torrini di Quincinetto in 1712, which he rebought in 1717 with contessa Cassotti's censo (originally of L. 8000, with L. 5000 rebought by 1722): M.23,1712 May 12.
(15) M.23,1721 July 6.
(16) M.23, 1722 May 11.
(17) M.23, 1722 May 11; 1729 May 11.
(18) M.23, 1723 March 31.
(19) M.23, 1731 March 5.
(20) M.23, 1724, March 28.
(21) M.23, 1724 Dec. 2.
(22) M.26 bis, 1722 July 2,27; Sept.10; Dec.2,23.

By the time Baldassarre sold part of the palace, in November 1730, he had diminished his debt. He had taken new loans:

1725	contessa Saluzzo della Manta	L. 9,000	4%	L. 360	(23)
1728	conte Romagnano di Pollenzo	3,000	4%	120	(24)
1729	signori Re	16,000	3 1/2%	560	(25)
		L.28,000		L.1040	

But he had repaid (26):

contessa Cassotti, 1717	L. 3,000	4%	L. 120
sig. Dumani, 1717	1,000	4%	40
conte Broglia, 1719	6,500	5%	325
conte Frichignono, 1721	1,000	4%	40
sig. Brunengo, 1722	15,000	4%	600
sig. Viale, 1723	6,431	4%	257
medico Settimo, 1724	2,000	4%	80

and probably:

sig. Plantery	3,200	4%	128
sig. Petri	2,000	4%	80
sig. Conetto	8,000	4%	320
conte Cacherano, 1708	1,000	5%	50
	L.49,131		L.2040

(23) M.23, 1725 May 26.
(24) M.23, 1728 Feb.7.
(25) M.23, 1729 May 11.
(26) Most of these repayments can be found in: M.23,1726 Jan.4; Dec. 29; 1728 Feb.7; 1729 May 11; Aug.17; 1730 March 19. The others have been calculated by a process of deduction from the debts still existing in 1731 and 1736.

The debt thus diminished by L. 21,131 to L. 192,773, paying L.6034 annual interest. The sale of new censi to rebuy older ones was almost always to gain a lower rate of interest.

With the sale of part of the palace to marchese Giuliers, Baldassarre raised a further L.61,000. By the time he made his will (14 July 1731), he had received L.31,000 and reduced his debts to L.92,850 (plus the L.50,000 dowries used before 1720, to make a total L.142,850). He certainly repaid (27):

conte Daremberg, 1719	L. 12,000	5%	L. 600
Monastero della Visitazione, 1715-22	10,000	4%	400
sig.Viale, 1719	9,723	5%	489
Congregazione di S.Paolo, 1723	12,000	4%	480

and probably:

conte Broglia di Casalborgone, 1717	3,500	5%	175
conte Romagnano di Pollenzo	3,000	4%	120
	L. 50,223		L.2264 (28)

By 1736, Baldassarre had rebought the following censi (29):

contessa Saluzzo della Manta, 1725	L. 3,500	4%	L. 140
avv. Perucca, 1717	15,000	5%	750
sig. Re, 1729	8,000	3½ %	280

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(27) M.23, 1730 Nov.2; 1731 March 5,20; May 21; M.26 bis, 1730 May 6; Nov.9.

(28) The deduction of this L.50,223 from the previous total of L.192,773 leaves L.142,550, or L.300 less than Baldassarre stated in his will. It has proved impossible to gain greater accuracy.

(29) M.26 bis, 1731 Dec.4; M.24, 1731 Oct.16; 1738 April 12.

and probably:

sig.Marchetto (formerly Re)	12,000	4%	480
sig.Petri	10,000	4%	400
Monastero del Crocefisso	11,000	4%	440
	L. 59,500		L.2490

He left unpaid:

contessa Saluzzo della Manta, 1725	L. 5,500	5%	L. 275
Congregazione dei Mercanti, 1724	7,500	4%	300
sig. Re, 1729	8,000	3⅓%	280
conte Frichignono di Castellengo, 1721	12,000	4%	480
	L. 33,000		L.1335 (30)

At the same time, Baldassarre sold new censi (31):

1731	Tomaso Adalberto	L. 15,000	4%	L. 600
1733	sig. Tibaldi	4,500	4%	180
1736	banker Ruffini	10,000	5%	500
1736	marchesa Alfieri San Marzano	6,000	4½%	270
1736	banker Audifredi	1,524	6%	91
1736	Tomaso Adalberto	3,028	4%	121
		L. 40,052		L.1762

(30) The addition of these sums (L.50,500 and L.33,000) makes a total of L.92,500, or L.300 short of Baldassarre's statement in 1731. Possibly one of the debts repaid before 1736 had been increased by this figure. For the unpaid debts; M.25, 1741 Aug. 8.

(31) Besides M.25, 1741 Aug.8, also: M.24, 1731 Oct.16; Dec.11; 1733 July 30; 1736 Feb.4; March 30; May 6. Another censo was sold in 1735 to the banker Colomba for L.5000 at 6% (probably indicative of Baldassarre's difficulty in obtaining credit), but rebought in 1736: M.24,1735 Jan. 8.

Baldassarre thus owed for old censi:		L.	33,000
and for new censi :			40,052
He also ordered the payment of the dowry of Marta Maria as:			30,000
And bequeathed to Teresa di Virle (32)	L. 4,000		
to Maria Eleonora (33)	3,325		
for a chaplaincy at Paesana (34)	10,000		
as dower to his widow, L.2000 p.a., capitalized at 5% (35)	40,000		
	L.57,325		57,325
And left unpaid part of the legacies of Costanza Camilla:			
to Carlo Tomaso	L.10,000		
to Maria Eleonora	10,000		
to Marchese Balbis	1,000		
to her daughter by first marriage	1,000		
to chiesa del Carmine, Turin	550		
	L.22,550 (36)		22,550
Carlo Tomaso claimed for half the hire of the Paesana mills:			7,500
Baldassarre also left debts:			
for the Turin house, 1708	L. 1,350		
for the Moncalieri lands, 1734	1,000		
	L. 2,350		2,350

(32) M.24, 1735 Sept.1.
(33) M.24, 1737 Feb.2, not noted in the 1741 inventory.
(34) M.24, 1738 March 21; M.27, 1739 April 18.
(35) M.10, 1736 Jan.22.
(36) M.7, 1727 Sept.10; M.9, 1732 July 9; 1733 March 2; M.21, 1732 Jan.14; M.24, 1734 March 26; 1744 Jan.17; M.27, 1733 March 31.

Funeral expenses, small debts, interests,etc. came to: 9,057

making a total debt over the inheritance of L.201,834 (37)

Baldassarre had acquired:

1715	Fenis		L. 86,000	
	Furniture in Fenis		1,500	
	Laudemio for Fenis (38)		6,412	
			L. 93,912	L. 93,912
1733-34	Moncalieri (39)	26 g.	8,555	
1733	Pagno (40)	1 g.	27	
1732-33	Castellar (41)	15 g.	2,929	
1717-32	Paesana (42)	9 g.	890	
1730	Turin house		5,600	
			L.111,913	L.111,913

Which,together with the expense of the palace: 346,821

L.458,734 L.458,734

Made:

Baldassarre had spent in dowries (43):

1715	Maria Eleonora	L.35,000	
1716	Luisa (spiritual dowry)	3,500	
		L.38,500	L. 38,500

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(37) All these debts, except the bequest to Maria Eleonora (note (33)) are to be found in the 1741 inventory: M.25,1741 Aug.8.

(38) All these purchases are to be found in the 1724 inventory: M.25,1724 May 24,with the laudemio in: M.19,1716 Aug.27.

(39) M.24,1733 July 30; 1734 April 27. The total price was L.9555, but L.1000 were unpaid in 1736.

(40) M.14,1735 Oct.10.

(41) M.14,1732 April 9; Sept.16; Oct.27; 1733 Nov.5,15.

(42) M.12,1717 May 13;1723 March 9;1732 Jan.21;Aug.8;M.25,1724 May 24.

(43) M.10,1715 Feb.23; 1716 Oct.13; 1717 Oct.27; 1727 Nov.20.

And had paid part of the legacies of Costanza Camilla (44):

to marchese Balbis	L. 9,000		
to conte Romagnano di Virle	10,000		
to chiesa del Carmine, Turin	450		
	L. 19,450	L.19,450	
		L.57,950	L.57,950

making his total expenditure: L.516,684

He had also spent probably considerable sums on his palace at Saluzzo (45), on the construction of the parish church at Castellar (46), and on the novitiate house of S. Bernardino at Saluzzo (47).

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(44) See above, note (36).
(45) M.26 bis, 1733 Oct.8; 1735 March 2.
(46) Arch.Parrocchiale di Castellar, 1722 Oct.18,22. C.Beltrami: I Marchesi di Saluzzo e i loro successori, Turin, 1885, pp. 37-38.
(47) F.Macconio: Il Collegio Serafico dei Frati Minori della Provincia di Torino, San Bernardino da Siena - Saluzzo, Turin, 1923, p. 64.

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I. Original materials.

1. At Turin.

a. Archivio di Stato.

i. Sezione Ia.

ii. Sezione 2a.

iii. Sezione 3a.

b. Opera Pia Barolo.

2. At Cagliari.

a. Archivio di Stato.

b. Archivio Comunale di Cagliari.

c. Archivio Arcivescovile di Cagliari.

3. At Mantua.

Archivio di Stato.

i. Archivio Gonzaga.

ii. Archivio D'Arco.

4. At Rome.

a. Archivio Romano della Società di Iesu.

b. Archivio Solaro Del Borgo.

c. Archivio Asinari di San Marzano.

5. In Piedmont.

a. Barolo. Archivio Comunale.

b. La Morra. Archivio Comunale.

c. Cherasco. Archivio Comunale.

d. Castiglione Falletto. Archivio Comunale.

e. Bra. Archivio Comunale.

f. Rivara. Archivio Comunale.

g. Castellar.

i. Archivio Comunale.

ii. Archivio Parrocchiale.

h. Paesana. Archivio Comunale.

i. Crissolo. Archivio Comunale.

j. Oncino. Archivio Comunale.

k. Pagno. Archivio Comunale.

II. Contemporary documents.

1. Descriptions of Piedmont.

a. Reports of ambassadors.

b. Contemporary Piedmontese descriptions.

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2. Public documents.

3. Legal treatises.

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5. Catalogues of writers.

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III. Reference and bibliography.

1. Catalogues.

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   b. Legal studies.

   c. Institutions.

   d. Baroque.

   e. Others.

3. Studies of nobles.

4. Regional studies of Piedmont.

5. Histories of Italian law.

I. Original materials.

1. At Turin.

a. Archivio di Stato (AST)

The Archivio di Stato in Turin is divided into two main parts, the Sezione Prima and the Sezioni Riunite (Seconda, Terza and Quarta). The archives of noble families are more or less equally divided between the two parts.

i. Sezione Ia.

The archive of one of the three families studied is to be found here:

Archivio Saluzzo di Paesana

This consists of 43 mazzi, with a remarkably complete catalogue. The following categories (all with catalogues) were also used:

Lettere Particolari

Paesi per A e B

Materie economiche, Demanio, donativi, e sussidi

Feudi delle Langhe, s.v. 'La Morra'

Ducato di Monferrato

Monferrato, Feudi

Monferrato, Registro Patenti, Decreti, e Concessioni dei Duchi di Mantova

Monferrato, Suppliche e Decreti de' Duchi di Mantova

Monferrato, Materie Economiche

Monferrato, Confini

Marchesato di Saluzzo, 4a categoria

Città e Provincia di Saluzzo

ii. Sezione 2a.

The following sources (all with catalogues) were used:

Ia archiviazione, Feudi e Giurisdizione

" Alienazione de' Demaniali

" Provincia di Ivrea

2a archiviazione, Capo 21, Perequazione generale del Piemonte

Copie d'insinuazione notarile di Torino, a.1718

iii. Sezione 3a.

The archives of one of the three families, and part of that of another family, are to be found here:

art. 593. Archivio Valperga di Rivara

This consists of 247 mazzi, including, however, the archives of some other families. The mazzi consulted were:

1 - 125, 131 - 173, 204 - 229

The only catalogue is in the Inventario Generale, which gives the titles of the mazzi, without any details of individual documents; these titles are often misleading.

art. 983, vol. 254

This consists of the lawsuit for the succession to the Rivara possessions, after the death of the last male in 1797.

art. 599 Archivio Falletti della Morra e di Rodello

This consists of 25 mazzi, with a nearly complete catalogue (n.772)

art. 780. La Morra

This consists of a single mazzo relating to La Morra

The following categories (mostly with catalogues) were also used:

art. 687. Patenti del Piemonte

art. 688. Interinazioni della Camera

art. 689. Patenti Controllo Finanze

These three categories often repeat each other, but taken together record the great majority of all private financial and feudal transactions with the Princes, requiring interinazioni.

art. 454. Scritture diverse di Comunità, Particolari e Contabili

art. 472. Danni sofferti da varie Comunità e particolari per guerre, pesti, ecc.

art. 496. Atti di lite. R. Patrimonio contro Particolari

art. 619. Sentenze della Camera

art. 737. Consegnamenti del Piemonte

art. 908. Monferrato. Atti civili tra particolari

art. 961. Monferrato. Atti di lite tra comunità e feudatari

Sentenze del Senato

Testamenti del Senato

b. Opera Pia Barolo.

The archive of the Falletti di Barolo is to be found here. By kind permission of the Opera Pia, the writer was able to examine the whole archive, which consists of 348 mazzi (including, however, the archives of ten other families). There are two very complete catalogues, one for the main series of mazzi, the other for mazzi d'addizione. The mazzi consulted were:

MM. 16- 21, 167 - 225; MM.A. 1 - 9, 14 - 25, 32 - 35, 39, 40, 64 - 67, 73 - 76, 78, 80, 97 - 98, 110 - 118, 121 - 122.

2. At Cagliari.

a. Archivio di Stato.

The following categories were consulted:

Segretaria di Stato,serie Ia, MM. 3 - 5, 186 - 188, 279,
280, 390, 391, 519, 720, 721, 729, 794 - 796, 932 - 936.

Segretaria di Stato,serie 2a, M.49,E.

Bolle Brevi

Bilanci di Sardegna, 1733 - 1736

Intendenza Generale. Spogli. 1735

A complete catalogue is to be found in F. Loddo-Canepa: Inventario della R. Segretaria di Stato e di Guerra del Regno di Sardegna (1720 - 1848), Rome, 1934.

b. Archivio Comunale di Cagliari.

M.36. Carte Viceregali

c. Archivio Arcivescovile di Cagliari.

The writer was unable to see the archive, as it was in the process of being reordered at the time of his visit to Cagliari. But the following mazzi are indicated, as of evident bearing on the career of Paolo Lodovico Falletti di Barolo:

MM. 89 - 91. Libre de la administracion de totes les entrades y exides del Rever. Capitol e Comunitat de la present Sen. da Caller. 1721-30. 1731-40. 1741-50.

M. 179. Escrituras varias de monseñor Falety - 1748.

M. 208. Spoglio dell'arcivescovo Paolo Costantino Falletti.1748.

M. 233. Spoglio delle spese occorse per l'interna amministrazione del palazzo arcivescovile di Cagliari. 1727 - 1736.

The mazzi are catalogued in M. Pinna: L'Archivio del Duomo di Cagliari, Cagliari - Sassari, 1899.

3. At Mantua.

Archivio di Stato.

i. Archivio Gonzaga.

The following categories were consulted:

Busta D.III.32. Affari di famiglia.

Busta D.IV.1 - 2d.16. Affari di famiglia. Beni allodiali.

Busta D.V.1 - 3. Affari di famiglia.

Busta D.XII.8. Affari diversi della Corte.

Busta E.XIX.1.3,ns. 737, 738. Esteri. Affari in Savoia.

Busta F.II.8. Interim. Legislazione e sistemazione del governo.

Busta H.II.2. Finanze. Tesoreria.

Busta H.III.1. Finanze. Ragioneria.

Busta H.IV.1. Finanze. Crediti e Debiti.

Busta H.V.1 - 3. Finanze. Beni Camerali.

Busta H. VI. Finanze. Beni vacanti, e devoluti, confische, multe, e condanne.

A partial catalogue is to be found in P. Torelli: L'Archivio Gonzaga di Mantova, Milan, 1920.

ii. Archivio D'Arco.

Documenti Patria, n.141. Storia del Duca Carlo II di Mantova.

Delle Famiglie Mantovane.

4. At Rome.

a. Archivio Romano della Società di Iesu.

The following categories were consulted:

Assist. Italiae, Mediolan., Catal. Triennal., 1711 - 1714, 1717 - 1720.

Assist. Hispaniae, Sardinia, v.11, 1650 - 1772.

b. Archivio Solaro Del Borgo.

This archive, still in the possession of the family, is not catalogued. The writer only used the (printed) account-books.

c. Archivio Asinari di San Marzano.

Only the catalogue of this archive (still in the possession of the family) was examined by the writer.

5. In Piedmont.

Nearly all the communes,where the families under study had fees, have been visited. But only archives which still possess relevant documents are listed here:

a. Barolo. Archivio Comunale.

b. La Morra. Archivio Comunale.

c. Cherasco. Archivio Comunale.

d. Castiglione Falletto. Archivio Comunale.

e. Bra. Archivio Comunale.

f. Rivara. Archivio Comunale.

g. Castellar.

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L.Cibrario: Relazioni dello Stato di Savoia negli anni 1574,1670, 1743 scritte dagli ambasciatori veneti Molini, Bellegno e Foscarini, Turin, 1830.

M. Foscarini, in: N. Barozzi and G. Berchet: Le relazioni degli stati europei lette al Senato dagli ambasciatori veneziani nel secolo XVII, s. III, v. 1, Torino, Venice, 1862.

A. Blondel: 'Memorie annedottiche sulla Corte di Sardegna sotto i Re Vittorio Amedeo II e Carlo Emanuele III', ed. V.Promis, Miscellanea di storia italiana,v.13,1871.

'Relazione del Piemonte del Segretario francese de Sainte-Croix', ed. A.Manno, Miscellanea di Storia italiana, v.16, 1877.

b. Contemporary Piedmontese descriptions.

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Most biographies are political studies, with no reference to the economy of the family. The only exception is the short article:

A.Sisto: 'L'archivio Scarampi-Tizzoni', Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato, a.18, 1958.

Of great value, with a wealth of information on Piedmont under Vittorio Amedeo II, is:

F.Venturi: Saggi sull'Europa illuminista. I. Alberto Radicati di Passerano, Turin, 1954.

The most useful other studies are:

G.Tonello: Memorie storiche sul marchese di Pianezza, ed alcuni suoi congiunti, Turin, 1922.

A.Ferrero della Marmora: Le vicende di Carlo di Simiane, marchese di Livorno, e poi di Pianezza tra il 1672 ed il 1706, Turin, 1862.

G.Claretta: Il presidente Gian Francesco Bellezia torinese, Turin, 1866.

C.Gallina: 'Le vicende di un grande favorito (Filippo di S.Martino d'Agliè)', B.S.B.S., a.21 - 22, 1919 - 1920.

G.Colombo: 'Giovanni Andrea Saluzzo di Castellar', Studi Saluzzesi, P.S.S.S., v.10, Pinerolo, 1901.

Great numbers of studies have been made of the genealogies of the various families, usually in private editions, often by members of the family. For the most part, they are concerned with the origins of the family and its history in the Middle Ages. The only work listed here is for its relevance to the present study:

A.Dufour: La famille des Seigneurs de Barol, Turin, 1884.

4. Regional studies of Piedmont.

There are innumerable studies of the regions, towns and communes of Piedmont. Only works directly relating to the families have been listed:

F.Voersio: Historia Compendiosa di Cherasco, Monteregale, 1618.

G.C.Pola-Falletti: La Castellata di Rivara e il Canavese, Casale, 1945 - 1949, Turin, 1950.

D.Puletti: Memorie storiche-diplomatiche appartenenti alla Città ed ai Marchesi di Saluzzo, Saluzzo, 1833 (v.6).

C.F.Savio: Saluzzo e i suoi vescovi (1475 - 1601), Saluzzo, 1911.

C.F.Savio: Saluzzo marchesato e diocesi nel secolo XVII (1601 - 1635), Saluzzo, 1915.

C.F.Savio: Saluzzo, Storia dal 1635 al 1730, Saluzzo, 1928.

C.F.Savio: Saluzzo nel secolo XVIII (1730 - 1792), Saluzzo, 1941.

F.Roggero-Bargis: Saluzzo, Saluzzo, 1885.

G.Sandi: Statistica della provincia di Saluzzo, Saluzzo, 1833-1835.

G.Manuel di San Giovanni: 'Notizie storiche di Pagno e Valle Bronda presso Saluzzo', Miscellanea di storia italiana, ser. 2a, t.12, 1889.

G.Manuel di San Giovanni: Memorie storiche di Dronero e della valle di Macra, Turin, 1868.

F.Boson: Le Château de Fénis, Novara, 1953.

5. Histories of Italian law.

A.Pertile: Storia del diritto italiano, 2nd ed., Turin, 1893-1903.

C.Nani: Storia del diritto privato italiano, Turin, 1902.

C.Calisse: Storia del diritto italiano, Florence, 1891 - 1903.

P.S.Leicht: Storia del diritto italiano. Il diritto privato, Milan, 1941 - 1948.

P.S.Leicht: Storia del diritto italiano. Il diritto pubblico, 3rd ed., Milan, 1950.

G.Salvioli: Storia del diritto italiano, 8th ed., Turin, 1921.

F.Solopis: Storia della legislazione italiana, 2nd ed., Turin, 1863 - 1864.

F.Ruffini: 'Lo Stato e la Chiesa in Italia', in: E.Friedberg: Trattato del diritto ecclesiastico cattolico ed evangelico, Turin, 1893.

R.Trifone: Il fedecommesso. Storia dell'istituto in Italia, Naples, 1914.

L.Tria: Il fedecommesso nella legislazione e nella dottrina dal secolo XVI ai giorni nostri, Milan, 1945.

Nuovo Digesto Italiano.

Enciclopedia Italiana.