

Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim
St. Cross College, University of Oxford
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Abstract

In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship is egoistic. Focusing on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I begin with VIII.2. Here Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only because of the lovable (φιλητόν), which divides into the useful, pleasant, and good. I argue that "because of (διὰ)" refers to at least the final cause and that "the lovable" refers to what appears to contribute one's own happiness (εὐδαιμονία); therefore Aristotle claims that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This result may seem incompatible with some types of concern Aristotle principally attributes to his normative paradigm of complete friendship: wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself. One might argue that these types of concern are altruistic, and so it cannot be the case that in all friendships, friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. I argue that these types of concern ultimately hinge on one's own happiness. The object is the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness), specifically the good instantiated by the other's virtue; further, what a virtuous person takes as valuable about another's virtue is how it facilitates her own virtuous activity, that is, her own happiness. From here I turn to Aristotle's notion of "another self." One popular interpretation of other selfhood defies the altruism/egoism divide. Here the essential feature of other selfhood is virtue, which allows for no prioritization among virtuous people; there is no prioritization of the other over oneself (as in altruism) nor of oneself over the other (as in egoism), since the relevant parties are equal in moral standing (they are virtuous). Assessing the instances of "another self" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.12, IX.4, and IX.9, I argue for an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. That is, what makes other selves valuable is how they facilitate one's own virtuous activity, one's own happiness. Finally, I address the doctrine of self-love in the *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.8. Again, some interpreters derive non-prioritization from the text; Aristotle claims that all virtuous people identify with the understanding (νοῦς), so, the non-prioritization interpretation goes, there can be no prioritization among virtuous agents, as they are identical in the relevant way. I argue for an egoistic interpretation of IX.8; Aristotle endorses praiseworthy self-love, which involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine (καλόν) for oneself over others. Moreover, such self-prioritization occurs precisely by gratifying the understanding, that which was supposed to ground non-prioritization.

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Table of Contents

- Introduction (5)
 - 1: Outline of the Argument (6)
 - 2: Clarifications (8)
- 1: Aristotle on the Lovable (19)
 - 1.1: The Lovable as That Which Promotes One's Own Happiness (20)
 - 1.1.1: "No Difference"—The Apparent Good's Appearance is Based on the Real Good (22)
 - 1.1.2: Is the Lovable the Apparent Good *for* Oneself or the Apparent Good *to* Oneself? (27)
 - 1.2: Is the Lovable the Final Cause of Aristotelian Love? (30)
 - 1.2.1: Does $\Delta\iota\alpha$ Refer to the Final Cause? (33)
 - 1.2.2: The Lovable and the Dissolution of Friendships (39)
- 2: Aristotle on Wishing Goods for the Other's Sake and Loving the Other for Himself (45)
 - 2.1: Loving x because of x himself, on account of x himself, for who x is (48)
 - 2.2: Wishing goods for x's sake (53)
 - 2.3: The Centrality of One's Own Activity (61)
- 3: Aristotle on Loving Other Selves (73)
 - 3.1: Parents, Other Selves, and the Centrality of Self-Actualization (78)
 - 3.1.1: Actualization and Other Selfhood (80)
 - 3.1.2: Full Virtue and Other Selfhood (85)
 - 3.1.3: Objections (92)
 - 3.2: Cognitive Self-Actualization with Other Selves (100)
 - 3.2.1: Why Does the Happy Person Need Friends? (102)
 - 3.2.2: The *Oikeion* Argument (107)
 - 3.2.3: The *Phusikōteron* Argument (114)
 - 3.2.4: The Argument from Continuity (122)
 - 3.2.5: The Argument from Living Together (126)
 - 3.3: From Activity to Egoism, From Egoism to Partiality (130)
- 4: Aristotle on Self-Love and Maximizing the Fine for Oneself (141)
 - 4.1: Self-Prioritization (142)
 - 4.1.1: Substantial Self-Prioritization (145)
 - 4.1.2: Self-Prioritization at the Level of Motivation (149)
 - 4.1.3: Self-Prioritization and Self-Sacrifice (151)
 - 4.2: The Fine (155)
 - 4.2.1: The Interpretative Options (156)
 - 4.2.2: NE9.7 as Background for Understanding the Fine in NE9.8 (158)
 - 4.2.3: Applications of the Fine-as-Actualization Reading (162)
 - 4.3: A Regress Problem and an Egoistic-Communitarian Solution (165)
- Conclusion (175)
- Works Cited (180)

Introduction

The central claim of Aristotle's ethical theory is that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is the ultimate end. Typically, commentators have construed this in terms of *one's own* happiness. This leads to an uncomfortable question: are we to value other people as mere means to *our own* happiness? This question is particularly pointed for Aristotle, who dedicates about one fifth of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth abbreviated "NE") to the topic of *friendship*. Aristotle makes abundantly clear that friendship is necessary for happiness; does he take friends as valuable¹ insofar as they contribute to *one's own* happiness, or as valuable independently of this?

In the past decades, it has been popular to push the latter answer as far as possible; in this dissertation, I argue for the former, that Aristotle's account is egoistic. This has implications for understanding Aristotle's ethics as a whole, for if his theory of love and friendship is egoistic, it is hardly likely that his ethics as a whole is non-egoistic.

Now, one might think that this intuition that egoism in love and friendship entails egoism in Aristotle's wider theory is based on a mistranslation of "love" and "friendship"; of course, if one's theory of love and friendship is egoistic, and if "love" and "friendship" are understood in the intimate and other-focused terms of contemporary English, then it is almost certain that the rest of one's ethical theory is egoistic. But if "love" and "friendship" are understood such as to cover any number of casual relationships of utility or pleasure, then it is less clear that taking such relationships as egoistic entails egoism in one's ethical theory as a whole. And indeed, the Greek verb φιλεῖν and noun φιλία, for which I use the translations "to love" and "friendship," respectively, carry just this broad semantic range that differentiates them from the more intimate English notions.²

¹ "Choiceworthy (αἰρετὸν)" is closer to the Aristotelian text, but in general contexts I use the more modern "valuable." See Footnote 11.

² Konstan (1996) and (1997).

Despite this semantic divide, I am going to retain “to love” and “friendship” as translations, for two reasons. First, this will make following the literature I engage with easier, as it mostly adopts these translations (if only as the least bad solutions). Second, my claims apply to what Aristotle calls “complete (τελείαι)” friendships or friendships “of the good/virtuous people (τῶν ἀγαθῶν),” where most would agree that the φιλία and their associated activities of φιλεῖν are actually very close to the English “friendship” and “to love.” This returns us to the point that raised these translation issues in the first place, that it is wrong to infer, from egoism about love and friendship, egoism *simpliciter* in Aristotle; I do not think anyone would take such an inference to be wrong, if the love and friendship in question is that which is relevant to *complete* friendship.

1: Outline of the Argument

My argument for an egoistic interpretation of Aristotelian friendship comprises four chapters. In the first chapter, “Aristotle on the Lovable” (§1), I assess Aristotle’s basic claim with which he frames his entire discussion of friendship: all friends love only because of the lovable. I argue that we must understand the “because of” as referring at least to the final cause, and “the lovable” as referring to one’s own happiness. In short, Aristotle claims that all friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. This sounds egoistic.

However, there are a couple obstacles to this conclusion. For some expressions Aristotle uses to principally describe complete friendships do *not* sound egoistic: wishing goods for another’s sake, loving another for himself, and loving another as another self. In “Aristotle on Wishing Goods for the Other’s Sake and Loving the Other for Himself” (§2), I address the first two expressions and argue that they refer to one’s own happiness; when one wishes goods for another’s sake or loves another for himself, the end is the friend’s virtue, which facilitates the virtuous activity that constitutes *one’s own happiness*.

In “Aristotle on Loving Other Selves” (§3), I take up the last expression mentioned above, “loving another as another self.” On one popular understanding of “another self” (ἄλλος/ἕτερος αὐτός), both altruism and egoism are rendered non-sensical. The egoistic interpretation understands oneself as prioritized over the other; but in the situation where one loves a friend as an other *self*, the other is identified with oneself, and so the egoistic interpretation understands oneself as prioritized over *oneself*. The altruistic interpretations are also rendered nonsensical on this reading; the other is prioritized over the *other* (identified with oneself). However, while this non-prioritizing model eliminates the altruistic models, supporters of the altruistic models would presumably prefer it to the egoistic model.

I save the egoistic model by arguing that other selfhood does *not* imply non-prioritization. Interpretations whereby other selfhood implies non-prioritization take the essential feature of other selfhood to be full virtue, which one shares with the other self; the relevant parties are treated in the same way for the same reason (their full virtue). I argue that other selfhood is defined not by full virtue, but by involvement in one’s own actualization (ἐνέργεια). This notion of other selfhood is hierarchical in a way that allows for the self-prioritization of an egoistic interpretation; y is x’s other self by contributing to x’s actualization, which is numerically distinct from y’s actualization.

NE9.8 is another major source of inspiration for non-prioritization interpretations, in particular the claim that the true self is the understanding (νοῦς); some argue that as fully virtuous people identify with the true self, there can be no prioritization among them. In “Aristotle on Self-Love and Maximizing the Fine for Oneself” (§4), I argue that NE9.8 encourages fully virtuous people to prioritize themselves over other fully virtuous people; they are to maximize the superlatively valuable fine (καλὸν) for themselves over others. Moreover, I argue that fully virtuous people prioritize themselves by gratifying the understanding—precisely what non-prioritization readings appeal to in order to *prevent*

prioritization. While it is clear that this gratification involves maximizing the fine for oneself, it is not immediately clear what the fine itself is. I argue that “the fine” refers to virtuous actualization. So when Aristotle constantly characterizes fully virtuous agents as acting for the sake of the fine, he means that they act for the sake of their own actualization—which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness. I end with two problems: a regress problem that arises for any reading of NE9.8 and the tension between my egoistic interpretation and Aristotle’s communitarianism. I solve the first problem by solving the second; the regress is blocked by interpreting Aristotle’s communitarianism egoistically.

2: Clarifications

Before proceeding, I will make some important clarificatory remarks. (1) What do I mean by taking my claims to be about “Aristotelian” friendship? For one thing, I mean for my claims not to concern contemporary views of friendship. So when I speak of “friendship” *simpliciter*, I am referring specifically to *Aristotelian* friendship. Furthermore, by describing the “Aristotelian” position, I mean to primarily describe the position recorded in NE, rather than the considered, composite position of the three ethical treatises in the Aristotelian tradition: NE, the *Eudemian Ethics* [EE], and the *Magna Moralia* [MM]. Determining the considered composite view would require a background theory of how the three treatises relate, but this would require more space than I have.

One could still execute comparative treatments without attempting to develop a composite view, but even this less ambitious project runs into problems. MM’s status as a genuine work of Aristotle’s is widely disputed. Further, EE, while generally taken as a genuine work of Aristotle’s, is not particularly useful for the topics laid out above. EE does not feature the expression loving because of ($\delta\iota\alpha$) or on account of ($\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$) the other himself and only briefly discusses goodwill or wishing goods for the sake of the other; this hampers a

comparative treatment of these expressions in §2. As far as the discussion of other selves in §3, comparing EE to the assessed NE passages (8.12, 9.4, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, and 9.12) would be difficult. For one thing, EE lacks a substantial parallel to NE8.12. Further, while EE *does* have parallels to NE's 9.4 (EE7.6), 9.7 (EE7.8), 9.9 (EE7.12), and 9.12 (EE7.12), its versions are in major textual disarray. In any case, the notion of another self is only weakly developed in EE (and MM).³ As far as the topic of §4, self-love, EE lacks a parallel to NE9.8. While I occasionally address passages in EE and MM that run parallel to NE's, I do so not for the sake of my arguments, but for the sake of reference.

(2) What do I mean by "altruism" and "egoism"? I will consider two sorts of the former.⁴ (A) Pure altruism. If x loves y and this contributes to x's happiness, x's own happiness is yet not the final cause or end of the love; only y is.⁵ This differs from (B) mixed altruism, where's x's own happiness *is* an end; x's own happiness *and* y are both ultimate ends of x's loving y, but y is prioritized.⁶ (C) Egoism holds, against pure altruism, that one's own happiness is an end in loving another. And against mixed altruism, egoism holds that one's own happiness is an ultimate end that is prioritized over the other, either because one's own happiness is the *only* ultimate end (pure egoism) or because it is an ultimate end that takes priority over the ultimate end of the other's happiness (mixed egoism).

I will also explore a position that falls under neither altruism nor egoism: (D) non-prioritization. In the altruistic models, the other is prioritized *over* oneself, and in the egoistic model, oneself *over* the other; on non-prioritization, there is no prioritization between the ultimate end of oneself and the ultimate end of the other.⁷ I should note here that these

³ In agreement with Belfiore (2001) 118.

⁴ I am loosely following the framework in Kraut (2016) §1.1.

⁵ Stern-Gillet (1995) argues that virtue friendship is "disinterested," which is contrasted with seeking one's own welfare (59-76); Konstan (1997) argues that virtue friendship is "disinterested" (13); McKerlie (1991), Whiting (2006); Schollmeier (1994).

⁶ Irwin (1987) seems to adopt mixed altruism, arguing for "altruism" in Aristotelian friendship while also emphasizing the importance of the friend's role in one's own "self-realization" (394).

⁷ Of proponents, only Pakaluk designates his reading as neither altruistic nor egoistic (Unpublished). Other proponents seem to include: Kahn (1981) 39, Kraut (1989) 142, Miller (2014) 346, and Schroeder (1992). Price

categorizations are primarily about the ultimate ends and not results of loving; giving up one's own life might be extremely other-regarding yet egoistic if the ultimate end is one's own happiness (specifically one's own virtuous activity).

I will not attempt to decisively arbitrate between mixed and pure egoism, as my aim is only to eliminate altruism and non-prioritization as interpretative options. Such arbitration goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I think we have some evidence for thinking that Aristotle is a pure egoist, *per* Footnotes 87 and 230.

(3) A couple points about my formulations above. First, what do I mean by an “ultimate end” or “ultimate final cause”? A good of this category is what NE1097a30-1097b6 labels “choiceworthy always on account of itself and never because of something else (καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι’ ἄλλο).” This differs from goods that are choiceworthy *only* on account of something else and those that are both choiceworthy on account of themselves and something else. Now the idea of an *ultimate final* cause might appear redundant and the corresponding idea of a *non-ultimate final* cause paradoxical, but this is perhaps due to the “final” label. By “final,” commentators tend not to mean that the final cause in question is *globally* ultimate, but only *locally* ultimate, i.e. ultimate relative to some subordinate ends or means. Similarly, when writers talk of “ends,” they do not mean to invoke in every instance the end of *everything*, but the end of some subordinate ends or means.

How does this apply to pure altruism, mixed altruism, egoism, and non-prioritization? Pure altruism holds that in loving another, one's own happiness is not an ultimate end. This might seem implausible as an interpretation of Aristotle, but the suggestion here is that when Aristotle says happiness is the ultimate end, he leaves open *whose* happiness is referred to.⁸ Mixed altruism holds that both one's own happiness and the other's happiness are ultimate

(1989) argues that Aristotle “dissolves the obstinate dichotomy between egoism and altruism” among the fully virtuous (106) but also later attributes to Aristotle a “notional egoism, directed at my own *eudaimoniā*” that nevertheless amounts to “practical altruism, since my *eudaimoniā* and his overlap” (124).

⁸ McKerlie (1998), Whiting (2002) 274.

ends. As both are ultimate ends, one is not for the sake of the other; yet mixed altruism holds that the other's happiness is somehow prioritized. Mixed egoism holds that both one's own happiness and the other's are ultimate ends, but that one's own happiness is prioritized. Pure egoism denies that the other's happiness is an ultimate end, holding that only one's own happiness is an ultimate end. Non-prioritization holds that both one's own happiness and the other's happiness are ultimate ends and that there is no prioritization of one over the other.

(4) What do I mean by “happiness” in my formulations of altruism and egoism? Here I am referring to εὐδαιμονία, synonymous with “living well” or “doing well” (εὖ ζῆν, εὖ πράττειν; NE1095a17-20, 1098b21). This is what Aristotle takes as the ultimate end of human agents. There is a long-standing controversy about the constituents of happiness. Some commentators suggest that Aristotelian happiness consists exclusively in virtuous activity (moral or intellectual). Others suggest that it also includes external goods. In what follows, I will not presuppose either reading. It might be thought that the latter option is incompatible with my conclusion that *one's own* happiness and *not* the friend is the prioritized ultimate end, since the latter option holds that the friend just is a part of one's own happiness. I will argue that it is only *as a part* of x's own happiness (i.e. only as being good for x) that the friend is loved by x. So even if the friend's happiness is a part of x's happiness, it is only because the friend's happiness is *connected to x's happiness* that x loves the friend.

(5) What is meant by “oneself” in my formulations of altruism and egoism? There are two notions of selfhood that come up in the literature and which are not always clearly distinguished. Consider the fact that NE9.3 recommends that we should stop loving an individual who turns incurably vicious, after having previously loved that numerically identical individual when he was virtuous (§1.2.2). Apparently, concern for the numerically

identical individual is not that important;⁹ Aristotle points to goodness or virtue as the condition for maintaining the relationship, not the numerical distinctness of the individual. This “goodness” tracks *normative* identity, a specific type of qualitative identity. This seems to be Aristotle’s idea when he takes the rational part, with which human virtue accords, as the *best* part of a human and so that which a human *is* most of all (NE1166a22-3). The human is probably not *numerically* identical to *just* his rational part, but to a compound of the rational part and other parts (NE1.13); still, Aristotle takes human *normative* identity to center on this part. The notion of selfhood that is relevant to my formulations of altruism and egoism is that of numerical identity; it is the numerically distinct self that is prioritized or subordinated.

(6) What do I mean by “virtue (ἀρετή)”? There are four different ways to understand “virtue.” The first two ways are to understand virtue as an activity or state, as Aristotle explicitly distinguishes in NE8.5: “Just as in the case of virtues some people are called ‘good’ in regard to state and others in regard to activity, so also in the case of friendship (Ὡςπερ δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ’ ἑξῆς οἱ δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας)” (1157b5-7). To illustrate the difference between state and activity, I will use the example of the human capacity for language. Aristotle would say that every human has the potentiality (δύναμις) for language at every stage of existence. But this is short of *acquiring* language. As children interact verbally, they have a “first actualization” of language, its acquisition. However, humans do not always *use* language, for example, when they sleep. Yet the acquisition is not lost when they sleep, receding to the status of mere potentiality. To make room for the distinction here, *De Anima* 2.1 posits “second actualization.” This accounts for actively engaging first actualization, as when one talks.

⁹ Particularly relevant is the line where Aristotle says that if a friend becomes curably vicious, we must pay greater attention when their character is at stake than when their livelihood is at stake (εἰς τὸ ἥθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν; 1165b19-20).

There is some terminological variation in how Aristotle discusses the above distinctions. In *De Anima* 2.1, it is the Greek ἐντελέχεια that “actualization” tracks; but translators often use “actualization” for ἐνέργεια as well, which in turn might be used in the broader sense of “activity.” While broader, “activity” is still very closely related to “actualization”; engaging in virtuous *activity* just amounts to one’s own virtuous *actualization*. Another terminological variation is worth noting; Aristotle sometimes uses “state (ἔξις)” for *De Anima* 2.1’s “first actualization,” contrasting this with “activity (ἐνέργεια),” second actualization. For this paper, I will mostly use “state” instead of “first actualization” or “actualization” *simpliciter*; “actualization” *simpliciter* on the other hand refers solely to second actualization. This is to avoid too much repetition of “actualization” and to sharpen the contrast between state (first actualization) and activity (second actualization). In any case, NE talks solely in terms of “state,” not “first actualization.”

So virtue can be spoken of in terms of activity and in terms of state. When spoken of in terms of state, there are further distinctions that are relevant to my discussion. Most of the time, when the literature speaks of “virtue (*qua* state),” *full* (κυρία) virtue is the implied referent. This is the virtue of Aristotle’s “good (ἀγαθός)” or “practically wise (φρόνιμος)” person, the virtue that comes with *phronēsis* (NE6.13). It is on this full virtue that the notion of “normative identity,” described above, conceptually depends. In a way, though, it is misleading to use “virtue” to designate full virtue. For one thing, Aristotle posits a whole spectrum of virtues that approximate full virtue and does not hesitate to label them “virtues”; these seem to include family virtue (NE8.12), natural virtue (NE6.13), and human virtue in general (*Politics* 1.13). Further, Aristotle sometimes uses “virtue” in a collective sense and other times to demarcate the individual virtues of character; somewhat confusingly, full virtue (in the collective sense) includes all the full virtues (in the individual sense), for *each* individual full virtue requires *phronēsis*, which in turn requires *all* the individual full virtues

(NE6.13). While Aristotle often does indeed mean “full virtue” when he speaks just of “virtue,” I will use “full virtue” and not “virtue” to designate full virtue (in a collective sense). As for those who are not fully virtuous (nor vicious), I will use the label “non-fully virtuous.”¹⁰

(7) What do I mean by “complete friendship”? Aristotle divides friendship into six classes. There are three classes according to the three lovable objects: the useful, the pleasant, and the good (NE8.2). For these friendships, I use the following labels: “utility friendships” and “pleasure friendships,” which count as “lower friendships,” and “virtue friendships,” respectively. These three classes further subdivide into friendships between equals and friendships between unequals (NE8.7). Complete friendship seems to be a type of virtue friendship between equals, where the equality most probably involves full virtue (NE1157b36-1158a1, 1158b1-11). This particular class of friendship will be my focus throughout the dissertation, since it is the primary piece of evidence for non-egoistic interpretations.

(8) What reasons and kinds of reasons are encapsulated by my account of the “value” of friends?¹¹ I will argue that Aristotle gives an egoistic answer as to (A) why one *initiates* a friendship with a person and (B) why one *maintains* a friendship with a person. Namely, the reason lies in one’s own actualization. These are *the* reasons for friendship that I account for; what *kind* of reasons are they? I will argue that the answers to (A) and (B) are reasons not only at the level of (C) explanation, but also at the levels of (D) justification and (E) motivation. As Price suggests,¹² it is perhaps a bit anachronistic to apply the “reasons for

¹⁰ Aristotle is not precise about his labels for the morally imperfect. But we might think that most of the adults depicted in NE8.12’s account of family friendships are neither vicious nor fully virtuous.

¹¹ One might wonder about how I am relating reasons and value. I do not have space to give a general account of these distinctions in Aristotle. But I think that they are not too far apart. “Value” is the rather modern translation I have used for αἰρετός, also translated as “choiceworthy,” which is sometimes used interchangeably by Aristotle with “pursuit-worthy” (διωκτός). These *values* seem closely connected to *reasons* for action; the diction indicates that something is worthy of *selecting* or *pursuing*.

¹² (2011) 1.

action” conceptual schema to Aristotle; but the literature over the past fifty years has collectively invoked all the above distinctions in an effort to purge Aristotle of egoism as far as possible. So an egoistic interpretation of Aristotle would best account for them. I will now briefly preview how my chapters do so.

(A) and (C) are relatively uncontroversial; insofar as one establishes that self-actualization is a reason for friendship (as each chapter does), then it is safe to assume that self-actualization is in at least a bare sense explanatory (A) of friendship and provides some kind of reason for getting into friendship (C). Controversy arises with (B), for one might think there is something objectionable in *maintaining* a relationship with another person on the grounds that this contributes to one’s own actualization. I suggest this is the message we get from Aristotle. It is the message of NE9.3, where Aristotle endorses breaking off a friendship when the prospect of actualization dissolves (§1.2.2, §2.3). And it is also the message of NE9.9; Aristotle’s answer for why the happy person needs friends addresses not only the question of why he should *get into* friendship but also why he should *continue* the friendship (§3.2). *Continuous* self-actualization is the answer for both.

But as long as we stay at the level of *explanation* (C), we might save Aristotle from taking this potentially objectionable picture as *normative*. I argue, however, that the egoistic picture operates at the level of *justification* as well (D); that is, Aristotle takes one’s own happiness as justifying an agent’s getting into friendship and maintaining it. For Aristotle’s claims apply to the complete friendship of the fully virtuous, and even though the claims are often couched in merely descriptive terms, presumably Aristotle *endorses* the behavior described. This inference from descriptions of the fully virtuous to justifications is made in all the chapters.¹³

¹³ §1’s claims apply to all friendships, including the complete friendships of the fully virtuous. §2’s claims apply to types of concern that are particularly operant in complete friendships. §4 describes the self-love of the fully virtuous. §3 is slightly more complicated. The primary texts in question are NE8.12, 9.4, 9.7, 9.9, and 9.12. Aristotle’s answer as to why the happy person needs friends, spread across NE9.9 and 9.12, applies to the fully

But there is still the further question of whether I take Aristotelian friendship to be egoistic at the level of *motivation* (E). It has been popular for interpreters, even those who admit that Aristotelian moral philosophy is egoistic at the level of *justification*, to say that it is not so at the level of *motivation*; this trend is especially pronounced when it comes to friendship, for it seems particularly unpalatable here for the motivation of loving another person to lie in one's own happiness. In each chapter, I establish that one's own actualization is also the motivation for friendship; that is, one's own actualization is taken as a good reason *by the agent* for loving another.¹⁴ However, I should make clear that the invocation of motivation risks anachronism, depending on how strong the invocation is. At the level of most particular actions, the motivations of fully virtuous agents will correspond to the proximate goals: doing the brave thing, helping the friend.¹⁵ And it is plausible to think that in many cases, the fully virtuous agent will simply act out of habit. But it is clear that on a *global* level, when the fully virtuous agent steps back to assess how a friendship is going for example, the motivations lie in one's own happiness, and it is upon these motivations that the more proximate motivations lie.

There might be some question about the role of obligation in all this; I do not think that Aristotle is very interested in what is *required* of friendship. For his account of

virtuous person (as suggested by the fact that the person in question is a candidate for *Aristotelian* happiness, which requires full virtue); so we seem to have justifications here. Aristotle's descriptions of how the friendly attributes work (NE9.4-9.7) seem to amount to *prescriptive* descriptions of how they *should* work; so we have justifications here as well. The complicated case is that of NE8.12, where Aristotle discusses family friendships and where it seems less plausible to assume that all the relevant agents are fully virtuous. As I will argue, other selfhood in family friendship is justified by other selfhood among the fully virtuous, so we have justifications here as well (§3.1.2).

¹⁴ The categorization of reasons seems to be a very lively topic of debate, and so not all may accept the schema that I have adopted; in any case, it is unclear what schema writers on Aristotelian friendship adopt. Perhaps questionably, I am following the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on "Reasons for Action" by Alvarez (2017); I assume that the entry represents an account that gives an overview of the field that is both up to date and not severely controversial. Perhaps most controversial is her preclusion of desires and goals as motivating reasons, which rather count as explanatory reasons (§3.1). This differs, for example, from Crisp (2006), who uses desires as examples of motivating reasons (38); what Crisp associates with "decision procedures" (24) seem closer to Alvarez's "motivating reasons."

¹⁵ Price (2011) 203-5, 222, 234.

friendship overwhelmingly focuses on how the other is good for oneself.¹⁶ I defend this point mostly in §4, where I assess NE9.8's claim that self-love is not unqualifiedly deplorable and that we should pursue a praiseworthy form. NE9.8 does not seem to develop the possibility of altruism via disinterested duties; rather, it seems that Aristotle is taking egoism as a starting point and showing how it is compatible with behavior that is nevertheless (very) other-regarding.

(9) One might wonder whether I am giving an account of the value of *friends* or of *friendship*. For my dissertation's title suggests the former, but in some of my comments thus far I may have been construed as suggesting the latter. As should be clear from the preceding, the controversy surrounding Aristotelian friendship has to do with how *persons* are valued, whether or not the happiness of a numerically distinct friend is prioritized over one's own happiness. And as should also be clear, this is precisely the controversy that I am interested in. So I may have talked about the value of *friendship* or the reasons for *friendship*, but the ultimate issue is about the value of *friends*. That is, in talking about the value of friendship, I am talking about the value of friends, the *persons* in friendship, and in talking about the reasons for getting into or maintaining a friendship, I am talking about the reasons for beginning to love or persisting in loving a *person*. My thought is that friends (persons in a friendship) are valuable because of the way in which they *qua* friends (persons in a friendship) contribute to one's own happiness.

(10) Lastly, a word about texts and translations. My citations of Aristotelian texts are based on the Oxford Classical Texts. All translations are my own (unless otherwise noted), with NE translations guided to varying degrees by Crisp (2014 Rev), Irwin (1999), Pakaluk

¹⁶ I am not here following Anscombe's (1958) denial to Aristotle of the modern moral "ought"; nor am I arguing with Crisp (2006) 27-35 that Aristotle *did* have access to it. Aristotle may indeed have had access to something like the modern moral "ought," but my point is that he is preoccupied with reasons for friendship as *positively* linked to one's own happiness, and less (if at all) preoccupied with reasons for friendship as *negative* constraints.

(1998), Reeve (2014), and Rowe (2002); EE translations are guided to varying degrees by Inwood/Woolf and Kenny (2011).

1: Aristotle on the Lovable

It is common for modern interpreters to argue that Aristotelian friendship is altruistic.¹⁷ The key piece of evidence for these altruistic interpretations are types of concern (to be explored in §2) that especially operate in virtue friendships: wishing goods for the sake of (ἔνεκα) x and loving x (i) because of (διὰ) x himself, (ii) on account of (κατὰ) x himself, or (iii) for who x is (ᾧ ὁ ἐστίν). The idea is that when Aristotle says that a virtue friend y wishes goods for x's sake, or loves x for who x is, x contributes to y's own happiness—but y's own happiness is not the end of this love. Or y's own happiness *is* an end, but one that is not prioritized over x.

The problem with these altruistic interpretations is that they pay insufficient attention to the way Aristotle frames his entire discussion of friendship. At the beginning of the exposition of his own theory, Aristotle claims that all friends love *only because of the lovable*. In this chapter, I will argue that this means that friends love *only for the sake of their own happiness*; Aristotelian friendship is therefore egoistic. In the first section, “The Lovable as That Which Promotes One's Own Happiness” (§1.1), I assess NE8.2's claim that all friends love only because of the lovable. Aristotle asks what the lovable is, and I argue that he answers that it is what *appears* good for oneself, which is based on what *is* good for oneself (§1.1.1). Further, I argue that Aristotle understands “good for oneself” as that which contributes to one's own happiness (§1.1.2). So we must understand Aristotle's fundamental principle as follows: one loves only *because of* the lovable, what appears to contribute to one's own happiness.

This may seem to immediately secure an egoistic understanding of Aristotelian friendship, but another step remains. For “because of” might track something other than the final cause; one loves another *in response* to how the other has contributed to one's own

¹⁷ Adkins (1963) is a notable exception.

happiness, but one might not love another *for the sake of* contributions to one's own happiness. Hence we might still have pure altruism; one's own happiness is not an end, while the other's is. I resist this conclusion in "Is the Lovable the Final Cause of Aristotelian Love?" (§1.2). First, I argue that "because of (*διὰ*)" in the formula "loving only because of the lovable" does not exclusively refer to the efficient cause; the preposition also refers to the final cause, leaving open the reading whereby the lovable is the final cause of love (§1.2.1). Second, I argue that Aristotle's account of friendship dissolutions shows that the lovable *is* the final cause of love; friends stop loving if the prospect of the lovable does, and the only way to explain the friends' responses is to appeal to the lovable as the final cause (§1.2.2).¹⁸ So when Aristotle says that friends love "because of" their own happiness, he means that they love "for the sake of" their own happiness; one's own happiness *is* an end, against pure altruism. Further, Aristotle says friends love *only* because of the lovable, their own happiness, which means that one's own happiness is the sole or primary ultimate end. This denies mixed altruism, according to which the *other* is the primary ultimate end. Only egoism remains.

1.1: The Lovable as That Which Promotes One's Own Happiness

In this section, I argue that the lovable, that because of which Aristotelian friends love, is what appears to contribute to one's own happiness. Aristotle takes the lovable to be what appears good for oneself (alternatively translated as "*the apparent* good for oneself")¹⁹ (§1.1). He then says that what *appears* good for oneself is not different from what *is* good for oneself. By this puzzling claim he means that the appearance of the *apparent* good for oneself (the lovable) is due to the *real* good for oneself (§1.1.1). Since "the lovable" then

¹⁸ Aristotle's discussion of friendship dissolutions is a rich resource for the debate about the causal role of the lovable, yet has been under-used by commentators. An exception is Alpern, who uses the discussion to show that there is no pure altruism in *lower* friendship.

¹⁹ Many translators use "what appears good," translating the Greek definite article τὸ as the English relative pronoun "what," instead of translating more literally as the English definite article "the." Sometimes "what

refers to the good for oneself, I turn to the “good for oneself” and argue that it means “that which contributes to one’s own happiness” (§1.1.2). I challenge a disinterested interpretation of the “good for oneself” whereby it means “what *seems* good to one apart from one’s own happiness”; this interpretation fails because it ignores the distinction between the apparent and real good explored in §1.1.1. Thus, when Aristotelian friends love because of the lovable, they love because of what appears to contribute to their own happiness.

Let us begin by laying out the basic mechanics of Aristotelian love found in NE8.2:

(A) It seems that not everything is loved, but only the lovable, and this is good or pleasant or useful; (B) but the useful seems to be that because of which some good or pleasure arises, with the result that the good and the pleasant are lovable as ends. (C) Do people then love *the* good or the good *for themselves*? (D) For these things sometimes clash. Likewise also concerning the pleasant. (E) But *each person* seems to love the good for himself, (1) and *the* good on the one hand is lovable *simply*, (2) but the good *for each* on the other hand is lovable *for each*.²⁰ (F) But each loves not the *real* good for himself but the *apparent* [good for himself].²¹ (G) But this will make no difference, for the lovable will appear [good for himself]. (H) And so there are three things because of which people love...

(A) δοκεῖ... οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· (B) δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλει. (C) πότερον οὖν τὰγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; (D) διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. (E) δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, (1) καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν, (2) ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω· (F) φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. (G) διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. (H) τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν... (1155b18-27)

What does this passage have to say about the lovable? (H) clearly takes the lovable to be that *because* of which people love; the lovable is the cause of loving or, as put elsewhere, the

appears good” flows better with the context; other times, “the apparent good” does. So I will use both translations as suits context.

²⁰ In (E2) I supply “the good for each” when the Greek only has “the... for each (τὸ ἐκάστω).” I am here following Reeve (2014), Rowe (2002), and Stewart (Volume 2) 273 in taking “the good for each” as subject and “lovable for each” as predicate; Crisp (2014 Rev), Irwin (1999), and Pakaluk (1998) reverse this. Reeve, Rowe, Crisp, Irwin, and Pakaluk all agree in translating the preceding (E1) “εἶναι ἀπλῶς... τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν” as something along the lines of my translation, “the good is lovable simply.” This is to take the definite article τό (“the”), abbreviated here to τ’, and the substantive adjective ἀγαθόν (“good”) together as the subject, φιλητόν (“lovable”) as the predicate. Then comes the contended (E2), “ἐκάστω... τὸ ἐκάστω (to each... the x to each),” which omits the substantive adjectives ἀγαθόν and φιλητόν that were included in (E1) and thus leaves it to the translators to supply them. Now it would seem most natural to take ἀγαθόν as the implied subject modified by τὸ ἐκάστω, which is in subject position, and to take φιλητόν as the implied predicate, taking it together with the first ἐκάστω, which is in predicate position. For in the previous phrase (E1), ἀγαθόν is taken together with τὸ and is subject, whereas φιλητόν lacks the article and is predicate. But Crisp, Irwin, and Pakaluk would have us take ἀγαθόν and φιλητόν to reverse the roles that they play in the immediately preceding (E1) and, as implied, without any warning. This would seem to be misleading on Aristotle’s part.

²¹ One might wonder about the material I supply in (F) and (G), the “good for himself.” In (F), Aristotle contrasts the real good for himself with the apparent *something*; I think the natural candidate for this something is the “good for himself.” (G) picks up the same contrast.

basis of friendships.²² From (A) we get the idea that there are three kinds of lovable things: the pleasant, useful, and good.²³

But what is the lovable *itself*? To answer this question, we need to get clear on how many times the lovable is actually talked about in this passage. The lovable (τὸ φιλητὸν) does not show up in (C) and (F) but I think that Aristotle is describing it in these sections. This is suggested by (A)'s statement that not *everything* is loved, but the lovable. Following most translators, I think the idea is that *only* lovable things are loved, that love is caused *only* by the lovable. So when (C) and (F) are talking about what people love, they must be talking about the lovable, because only the lovable is loved. While (C) reads, “do people then love the good or the good for themselves,” we might then understand “is the *lovable* the good or the good for oneself.” And while (F) reads, “but each loves not the real good for himself but the apparent good for himself,” we might then understand, “the *lovable* is not the real good for oneself but the apparent good for oneself.” This straightforwardly answers our question about what the lovable itself is: the lovable, the cause of love, is not the *real* good for oneself but the *apparent* good for oneself.²⁴

1.1.1: "No Difference"—The Apparent Good's Appearance is Based on the Real Good

²² For the general point that the lovable causes affection or friendship in that differences in the lovable entail a corresponding difference in the affection or friendship, see: NE1156a6-9, 1156b19-24, 1158a18-33, b15-19, EE1236a10-32, b3-26, 1244a32-35.

²³ There is a discrepancy between the lovable and the choiceworthy; 1104b30-1 lists three choiceworthy objects, but instead of the good we get the fine (τὸ καλὸν) and instead of the useful we get the expedient (τὸ συμφέρον). I follow Crisp (2014) 234 in thinking the useful and the expedient are equivalent and that, in context, the good that is lovable is equivalent to the fine that is choiceworthy. See Footnote 116 and §4.2 for more discussion.

²⁴ This understanding of the lovable as the apparent good for oneself might seem to render (E) nonsensical; (E) ends with “*the lovable* for each/oneself,” which would expand to “*the apparent good for oneself* for oneself.” However, I take it that by the end of the passage it is clear that “the lovable” is shorthand for “the lovable for oneself.” Aristotle begins by asking what the lovable is in (A) and concludes in (C)-(D) that what is important about the value here (good/lovable) is that it is relativized (the good/lovable for oneself) rather than not (*the* good, or the lovable *simply*). The idea then is that, strictly speaking, it is the lovable *for oneself* that is the apparent good for oneself; but since Aristotle is not interested in the lovable *simply*, he uses the abbreviated “the lovable” instead of “the lovable *for oneself*.” So “the lovable” in (A) that Aristotle asks about turns out to just be “the lovable for each” in (E); Aristotle is not relativizing “the lovable” by adding “for each” to it in (E).

But immediately after claiming that the lovable is the *apparent* good for oneself and not the *real* good for oneself, Aristotle claims that this distinction does not make a difference (G). What does he mean by this? There are significant implications for our understanding of the lovable. One might take (G) to say that it does not matter whether the real or apparent good is the cause of love, since the two are the same. This is a radically subjectivist thesis where mere appearances dictate what an agent loves, regardless of the connection between appearance and reality. Aristotle, however, probably rejects this thesis; his comments here about the lovable apply to every kind of love, including those of fully virtuous agents, for whom Aristotle does not seem to suggest subjectivist norms.

Alternatively, we could follow most commentators in taking (G) to say: the lovable may be the *apparent* good and not the *real* good, but this will not make a *practical* difference because the *apparent* good somehow tracks the *real* good. However, developments of this interpretation rest on misunderstandings of the text; let us see if we can secure this interpretation while avoiding the misunderstandings.

I take “the lovable (τὸ φιλητὸν)” as the subject of the verb “will be (ἔσται),” whereas Crisp (2014 Rev), Irwin (1999), Pakaluk (1998), Reeve (2014), and Rowe (2002) all take “the lovable” in the predicate, taking the entire phrase “the apparent lovable (τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον)” as the predicate.²⁵ But to get “the apparent lovable” in one unit, as is required for the phrase as a *whole* to be the predicate, we should expect φαινόμενον (“apparent”) to be in attributive position to τὸ φιλητὸν (“the lovable”). But φαινόμενον is in none of the three viable attributive positions: τὸ φαινόμενον φιλητὸν, φιλητὸν τὸ φαινόμενον, or τὸ φιλητὸν τὸ

²⁵ They disagree on the implied subject. Crisp (2014 Rev), Pakaluk (1998), and Rowe (2002) leave their translations open-ended, taking “this” or “it” as the subject, but their translations imply that “what is [really] good for the person” is the subject. Irwin (1999) and Reeve (2014) explicitly supply in their translations what they take to be the implied subject; Irwin (1999) supplies “what appears good for him” and Reeve (2014) supplies “what is lovable.” From what I can gather from his compressed remarks, Burnet (1900) takes “the apparent lovable” as the subject; but he refers to τὸ φαινόμενον φιλητὸν, which does not appear in the passage; only τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον does (353-4).

φαινόμενον. Rather, φαινόμενον is in *predicate* position: τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. So I suggest that φαινόμενον is the predicate and τὸ φιλητὸν is the subject of ἔσται (“will be”).²⁶

While this translation makes sense of the grammar, there is a question of whether it makes sense of the *ideas*. Given that φαινόμενον is the predicate, there are at least two ways to render it. One is to translate it as a substantive; φαινόμενον is an abbreviated reference to “the apparent good” as mentioned in the immediately preceding (F). However, by taking “the apparent good” to occur in (G) as it does in (F), Aristotle would be making an unclear claim (I assign variables to each element for clarity): (F) it is more accurate to say that (x) the lovable is (y) the apparent good for oneself, not (z) the *real* good for oneself, (G) but this will not matter, for (x) the lovable just *is* (y) the apparent good for oneself. It is unclear what this last clause would add; the difference between x being y not z does not matter because x just *is* y. For the difference between y and z to be *explained* (as the “for,” γὰρ, in (G) suggests), z must not be merely dismissed; it must be related to y.

Another way of rendering φαινόμενον obtains just this relation. The translation would go: “(F) each loves not the real good for himself but the apparent [good for himself]. (G) But this will make no difference, for the lovable will appear (φαινόμενον) [good for himself].” This is to treat the participle φαινόμενον somewhat like an indicative verb (“will appear”), so one might wonder why Aristotle does not straightforwardly just use the indicative. Here I appeal to Smyth,²⁷ who says that a conjunction of forms of εἶναι, “to be” (here, ἔσται), and the perfect participle (here, φαινόμενον) can be used for a periphrasis (i.e. indirect locution), especially when the participle has an adjectival character (as φαινόμενον seems to here). Literally, this periphrasis renders: “the lovable will be apparent as/appearing [good for himself].” A smoother translation renders the combination of the adjectival participle

²⁶ This is the exact same pattern as in (D), where the subject ταῦτα comes after its verb and γάρ. Whereas the aforementioned translators do not hesitate to make ταῦτα the subject in (D), they for some reason hesitate in making τὸ φιλητὸν the subject in (G), taking the subject as instead implied.

²⁷ (1956) 1961.

“apparent/appearing” and form of εἶναι “will be” as an indicative “will appear”: “the lovable will appear [good for himself].”

How does this periphrastic reading explain the difference between the real good for oneself and the apparent good for oneself? Again, the issue with the *substantive* rendering of φαίνόμενον is the double appearance of (y) the apparent good, which leads to (G)’s passing over (z) the real good and therefore an explanation for why there is no difference between (y) the apparent good and (z) the real good: (F) (x) the lovable is (y) the apparent good for oneself, not (z) the real good for oneself, (G) but this will make no difference because (x) the lovable just *is* (y) the apparent good for oneself. With the periphrastic reading, it is not (y) the *apparent* good that occurs twice in the passage, but (z) the *real* good; rather than an abbreviation of (F)’s τὸ φαίνόμενον [ἀγαθόν] (“the apparent good”), φαίνόμενον in (G) is the verb of the subject τὸ φιλήτὸν (“the lovable”), and connects this subject to “the real good,” which is implied from (F). Hence the translation, with implied material in brackets: (F) (x) the lovable may strictly be (y) the *apparent* good for oneself not (z) the *real* good for oneself, (G) but this will make no difference because (x) the lovable [i.e. (y) the apparent good for oneself] will appear (φαίνόμενον in a periphrastic construction) [as (z) the *real* good for oneself]. The difference between x being y not z does not matter, for x/y will appear as z.

We therefore have a grammatical basis for the majority reading of (G), whereby the apparent good tracks the real good; the periphrastic reading of φαίνόμενον links the two. There is no practical difference between the apparent and real good, for the lovable, what *appears* good for oneself, will be an appearance of, will appear as, what *is* good for oneself. So the apparent good is based on the real good, but in what way? A straightforward solution appeals to the efficient cause; the real good *sets in motion* an appearance of goodness. However, I do not think Aristotle is positing an efficient causal link; it would be a fairly weak causal link, for the apparent good and the real good often come apart. The weakness of this

link fits ill with the indicative construction, that the apparent good *will appear* as the real good. Further, invoking this efficient causal link would serve to accentuate the difference between the apparent good (the lovable) and the real good, rather than to show that there is “no difference.” Aristotle claims that x is lovable for y if and only if x appears good for y. But clearly, what *is* good for y does not always efficiently cause a corresponding appearance, and what *appears* good for y can be efficiently caused by what *is bad* for y. None of this is promising for explaining away the difference between the apparent and real good; the lovable is the apparent good, not the real good, but this will make no difference even though in terms of the efficient cause the apparent good and the real good are only shakily linked.²⁸

In basing the apparent good on the real good, I think Aristotle must have in mind a *final* causal link, whereby the apparent good is loved ultimately *for the sake of* the real good. That is, when one loves what appears good for oneself, it is not this mere *appearing* of goodness that makes the thing lovable, but rather the *goodness* that appears, the goodness upon which the appearing of goodness is based.²⁹ This seems to be the dynamic at the end of NE3.4; Aristotle explains that in many cases of moral error, “the deception seems to arise because of the pleasure (ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι), for although it is not good it appears good (οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται)” (NE1113a4-b1). So people choose pleasure as appearing good, but this is not the ultimate ground; the relevant agents were *deceived* into

²⁸ If it *is* an efficient causal link that is at stake, it seems better to go with Stewart’s (Volume 2) explanation of there being no difference between the apparent and real good; instead of the apparent good tracking the real good, the real good tracks the apparent good, for “τὸ ἀγαθόν is *always* given as τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν” (273, emphasis mine). It is difficult to ascertain how Stewart construes the rest of the passage, and therefore how he construes this particular part. But perhaps he means that the lovable is the apparent good not the real good, but that this will not make a difference since the real good is always accessed by the subject as the apparent good. It is not clear how the logic is working. Something is lovable if and only if it is an apparent good. If a real good x is accessed by a subject then x is an apparent good for the subject. But while this efficient causal explanation basing the real good on the apparent good is true, it runs into the same problem as the efficient causal explanation whereby we base the *apparent* good on the real good; it still *accentuates* the difference between the apparent and real good. The real good for the subject, as sufficient but not necessary for being an apparent good for the subject, is sufficient but not necessary for the lovable; the apparent good, on the other hand is both sufficient and necessary for the lovable. To *downplay* the difference, we must look beyond the efficient cause.

²⁹ This particular expression of the majority reading closely follows Pakaluk (1998) 59 and more generally follows Aquinas (1556 in Litzinger, 8.2.62-66 in Leonine).

choosing the apparent good when they were ultimately after the real good. As Aristotle immediately goes on to conclude, “people then choose the pleasant as good, and flee pain as bad (αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺν ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν)” (NE1113b1-2). The point is that people are deceived into choosing the pleasant as good when it is merely the apparent good; still they choose it as what *is* good, not what merely *appears* good. In the rest of this chapter I will follow Aristotle in taking there to be “no difference” between the *apparent* good and the *real* good; when I say an agent loves because of what *appears* as good for herself, I take this to basically amount to loving because of what *is* good for herself. Axiologically, the former depends on the latter.

1.1.2: Is the Lovable the Apparent Good *for* Oneself or the Apparent Good *to* Oneself?

So the lovable is the *apparent* good for oneself (F), which tracks the *real* good for oneself (G). How are we to understand the “good for oneself”? Of the lovable (i.e. apparent good for oneself) things, the useful teleologically reduces to the good or the pleasant (B); one pursues the useful ultimately for the sake of the good or the pleasant. Now, it is difficult to understand x’s being useful to y without its contributing to y’s happiness. And if the useful is simply a means to the ends of the good and pleasant, we should understand the good and pleasant as contributing to y’s happiness or living well. That is, if what is useful contributes to happiness, and if what is useful ultimately contributes to what is good and pleasant, then it is hard to see how the good and the pleasant to y have nothing to do with y’s happiness. It seems then that all the lovable things are good for oneself in the sense of contributing to one’s own happiness.³⁰ However, one might argue that the useful is for the sake of only a *subset* of good and pleasant things, those that contribute to one’s own happiness, so this

³⁰ Thus Aquinas takes the matter at hand to be about “man’s genuine good (*verum bonum hominis*), which belongs to reason” (trans. Litzinger; 1552 in Litzinger, 8.2.34-35 in Leonine edition).

leaves room for good and pleasant things that do *not* have to do with happiness. The genus of these three lovable things, the lovable, then is *not* good for oneself in the sense of contributing to one's own happiness.

This question about interpretation raises a question about translation: an agent takes as lovable that which appears good for himself, where I have taken “for himself” to render the Greek dative αὐτῷ. We might instead render the dative as “to himself,” which might be understood as referring to a point of view rather than to happiness: that is good *to* me, i.e. appears good to me, as opposed to that is good *for* me, i.e. contributes to my happiness.³¹ So this is what *appears to oneself* as good, with the “to/for oneself” modifying “appears,” as opposed to what appears as *good for oneself*, with the “to/for oneself” modifying “good.” This leaves room for lovable things like the pleasant and good to be good to me in the sense of good in my point of view, without being taken as contributing to my own happiness.

There are two problems with this point-of-view reading. First, Aristotle cannot understand the *pleasant* to x as having no connection whatsoever to x's happiness.³² And as the good is conjoined to the pleasant as one of the ultimately lovable things, we might think it strange that “the pleasant” refers to our happiness and “the good” not—especially because Aristotle seems to explain the pleasant by further appeal to the good.³³ The second problem with taking the “good to x” as referring not to x's happiness but to x's point of view is that of redundancy when speaking of apparent goods; what *is* good to x taken in this point-of-view sense seems no different from what *appears* good to x. This conflation not only contradicts

³¹ The options might be labeled the dative of reference and the dative of advantage, respectively.

³² There is of course the Kantian notion of disinterested *contemplative* pleasure, where one takes pleasure in some aesthetic experience without having any interest in one's own happiness (Zangwill [2005] 75). However, it is unclear that the ancients conceive of pleasure as being detachable from happiness. Indeed, Aristotle in particular makes a great effort to show how pleasure contributes to one's own happiness, and he does this no less in the book on contemplation (NE10), suggesting a difference of opinion with Kant regarding contemplative pleasure.

³³ For example, NE1170a21-2 says that the good by nature is good to decent people, and derives from this fact (διόπερ) that it is pleasant. 1170b1-2 claims that perceiving that one lives is pleasant on account of itself on the grounds (γὰρ) that life is good by nature. 1170b4-5 grounds (γὰρ) the claim that being is good and pleasant on the claim that one is pleased *by* the good on account of itself.

Aristotle's explicit distinction between the good to x and what appears good to x, but also leads to an infinite regress: as "good to x (αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν)" in the point-of-view sense unpacks into "what appears good to x," "what appears good to x (τὸ φαινόμενον [αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν])" becomes "what appears what appears good to x," etc. We avoid this infinite regress by respecting Aristotle's distinction between the good for oneself and what appears good for oneself; per the previous section, the "lack of difference" between the two does not mean that they are the same. Indeed, the apparent good is *based* on the real good, so by conflating them we destroy the axiological grounds for the former.

What then does the "good for oneself" track? Consider NE1157b33-34, which forces us to distinguish between the good for oneself and the apparent good for oneself. After discussing the lovable in the context of virtue friendship (1157b25-29), Aristotle says: "And the ones loving the friend love the good for themselves (καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν), for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for whom he is a friend (ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος)." Even if we concede that a good person y *seems* good to x *without* connection to x's happiness, we might still ask what explains this extra stage, when x loves y,³⁴ of *becoming* a good *for* x? The most obvious suggestion is that the person y who becomes x's friend is now a good for x in the sense of contributing to x's happiness or living well.³⁵

Let us sum up. The lovable is what *appears* good for oneself, and this is practically no different from what *is* good for oneself, for the apparent good is axiologically based on the *real* good (§1.1.1). Further, "the good for oneself" refers to what contributes to one's own

³⁴ In the words of the passage: "y becomes x's friend."

³⁵ As Aspasius 172.32-173.5 and Aquinas (1605 in Litzinger, 8.5.123-144 in Leonine) seem to agree; they explain how it is that one becomes a good to another by appealing to a mutual exchange of goods. Pangle (2003) 37 seems to agree with this general thought; Adkins (1963) as well, arguing that the same "selfish" pattern runs through all three forms of friendship where the one who is a friend loves the friend on account of that which is lovable to oneself (39-43); so too Gill (1998) in suggesting that Aristotle is operating with Homeric reciprocity values (317-322).

happiness, not what is good in one's point of view apart from one's own happiness (§1.1.2).

So when Aristotle says "friends love only because of the lovable," he means that they love only because of what appears to contribute to their own happiness.

1.2: Is the Lovable the Final Cause of Aristotelian Love?

So when Aristotle says that friends love only because of the lovable, what appears good for themselves, this means they love only because of their own happiness. But how are we to understand the "because of (*διὰ*)"? Commentators have debated whether the "because of" denotes both final and efficient causation, or just efficient causation. What is at stake is this. If Aristotle takes loving because of one's own happiness to mean that love is only *efficiently* caused by the lovable, that is, love is only set in motion by past or present contributions to one's own happiness, then Aristotle does not designate one's own happiness as an end. This retrospective reading whereby love *responds* to the lovable yields the pure altruism interpretation; the end is the *other's* happiness and *not* one's own. However, if Aristotle takes friends loving only because of the lovable to mean that their love is only *finally* caused by the lovable, what appears to contribute to their own happiness, this means that they love only *for the sake of* what contributes to their own happiness. This prospective reading whereby love points forward to the lovable as its end entails that love is not purely altruistic, for one's own happiness (the lovable) is an end of loving the other. Further, it entails that love is not mixed altruistic; as one loves *only* for the sake of one's own happiness, one's own happiness is at least the prioritized, if not the only, ultimate end.

This chapter argues *against* the idea that "loving because of the lovable" means that the lovable is only an efficient cause and *for* the idea that the lovable is at least a final cause. §1.2.1 assesses the causal preposition "because of (*διὰ*)"; some interpreters take the use of *διὰ* by itself to entail the exclusively efficient causal reading, since *διὰ* exclusively refers to the

efficient cause. I deny this, arguing that the preposition does *not* exclusively refer to the efficient cause and sometimes refers to the final cause. §1.2.2 assesses Aristotle's account of friendship dissolutions to show that Aristotle takes the lovable as at least the final cause of love (at least in the context of virtue friendship). As the lovable is the end of loving and as the lovable is, per §1.1, what appears to contribute to one's own happiness, one's own happiness is an ultimate end; and as one loves *only* for the sake of one's own happiness, it seems to be the primary or sole ultimate end.³⁶

One might question this line of argument as adopting a couple dubious assumptions: (1) that διὰ refers consistently to some cause or causes and (2) the only relevant options for these causes are final or efficient causes, excluding the rest of Aristotle's four causes (material and formal). I do not make these assumptions. I am arguing that διὰ, in the relevant contexts (loving because of the good as happens in virtue friendships), refers to at least the final cause, where this "at least" and "in the relevant contexts" are important qualifications. The "at least" qualification leaves open διὰ referring to any of the other three causes as well. The "in the relevant contexts" qualification leaves open διὰ *not* referring to the final cause when Aristotle is discussing outside the context of loving because of the good.

Before proceeding, it is worth expanding upon what is meant by "retrospective" and "prospective," and how these terms are related to the efficient and final causes, respectively. "Retrospective" and "prospective" are terms that I simply adopt from earlier discussions of this topic, in Cooper's paper, "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship," and in Whiting's

³⁶ One might think that the present section is unnecessary for securing the final causal status of the lovable; for Aristotle clearly says that friends love because of the lovable and §1.1.1 has secured that the lovable, that is, the apparent good, is *finally* caused by the real good. So one might think that however we understand "because of" in the formula "loving because of the lovable," the lovable's being finally caused by the real good suggests that the loving that is caused by the lovable is *also* finally caused by the real good. This inference is too quick. Let us illustrate with an example of utility friendship. The relevant friends love because of apparent utility, but clearly they do so under the assumption that the appearance of utility tracks the reality of utility; they would not be contented with the mere appearance of utility. But this is compatible with their love being efficiently and not finally caused by utility; they love *in response* to how the other appears to contribute to their own utility, where such a response is predicated on this appearance of utility tracking the reality of utility. So love might be only

chapter, “The Nicomachean Account of *Philia*.”³⁷ These pieces do not feature dedicated discussion of these terms, simply using “retrospective” in descriptions of the *efficient* cause and “prospective” in descriptions of the *final* cause. This is what I think Cooper and Whiting have in mind, and it is this idea that I will be assuming. The efficient cause is what Aristotle takes to set things into motion or into change. For example, when billiard ball x bumps into billiard ball y and sends y rolling across the table, x is the efficient cause of y’s motion. The reason why one should describe this model as “retrospective” is that y’s motion *responds* to x’s contact. Phrased in terms of love, x’s loving y is a *response* to y’s present or past utility (for example) to x.³⁸ There are no prospective concerns here, and hence the model is retrospective; x’s loving y at time t is a response to y’s granting x utility at t-1 or t, and is not contingent on y’s granting x utility at t+1. If one turns to the final cause, there *are* prospective concerns; if x loves y *for the sake of* utility, x’s loving y at t *is* contingent on y’s granting x utility at t+1.

All this is not to suggest that prospective and retrospective concerns cannot be combined, and that one and the same thing cannot be both the efficient and final cause at the same time. Rather, it is to suggest that if the lovable is the efficient cause of love, then we have at least a retrospective model, and if the lovable is *exclusively* the efficient cause of love, then we have an *exclusively* retrospective model.³⁹ I will go on to argue that Aristotle’s model of love features prospective concerns. This has two results: (1) We do not have an exclusively retrospective model, and therefore the lovable is not exclusively the efficient

efficiently caused by the real good, even though it is caused by the lovable, the apparent good, which is itself finally caused by the real good.

³⁷ Cooper (1999.14) 323, Whiting (2006) 285. Pakaluk (1998) seems to have a similar distinction in mind, using “antecedent” and “consequent” (87).

³⁸ This conjunction of “present” and “past” is important, for it indicates a distinction between Aristotle’s efficient cause and the Humean (and modern) version of it. Returning to our example of the billiard ball, Hume would say that x’s contact with y is a cause that temporally *precedes* and does *not* temporally coincide with y’s motion that it causes. Aristotle seems to suggest that the efficient cause is not temporally divorced from its effect (Shields [2014] 77-9).

³⁹ However, I do not take the converse to be true. That is, it is not the case that if we have a retrospective model, then we are talking of efficient causation; we could be talking about the material or formal causes instead.

cause of love. (2) As prospects are irrelevant to the material and formal causes just as they are to the efficient cause, this requires an appeal to the only other cause remaining: the final cause.⁴⁰

1.2.1: Does Διὰ Refer to the Final Cause?

Whiting thinks that “because of (διὰ)” indicates only efficient causation; so when Aristotle says that one loves *because of* the lovable, he means that the lovable is only the efficient cause.⁴¹ That is, loving is set into motion only as a response to present or past instantiations of the lovable. However, I think that διὰ does not refer exclusively to the efficient cause in all contexts. Irwin (1999) and Price (1989) support this by arguing that διὰ refers not only to the efficient cause but also to the final cause.⁴² Price gives many examples in the context of friendship where ἔνεκα and διὰ are basically interchangeable: *Rhetoric* 1361b37, 1380b37, EE1240a25, NE1157a26-8, 1164a8-10, 1167a16-18.⁴³ And to quote Irwin: διὰ “most probably... refers to both; since the remark that [the lovable] are the causes of love summarizes the account of how they are the objects of love, ‘causes’ ought to include the aim of the friendship as well as the origin; NE1156a31, 1172b21 associate ‘*dia*’ clearly

⁴⁰ The soul and body of a human not being present at t+1 makes no difference for the human’s being a human at t. One wonders whether the formal and material causes are even relevant to an activity like love.

⁴¹ Whiting (2006) is clear about the exclusiveness of διὰ referring to the efficient cause (285). She claims to follow Cooper (1999.14), but Cooper is less certain. He claims that a retrospective reading of διὰ is “in itself *more* plausible” than a prospective reading, but also says that “understanding the ‘because’ in this causal way makes it *at least as much* retrospective as prospective” (323, emphasis mine). But in what Cooper goes on to say, he seems to suggest that διὰ *can* refer *just* to the efficient cause, and that it *does* (as opposed to merely *can*) would seem required for his overall argument: that wishing goods for the other’s sake features in pleasure and utility friendships. That is, it is unclear that pleasure friends can wish goods for each others’ sakes in a disinterested sense when the love constitutive of their relationship takes their *own* pleasure as the *end*. I take it this is why Whiting, who supports this overall argument, argues that διὰ refers *exclusively* to the efficient cause. Konstan (1998) follows Cooper’s general approach (285-6, 286n14).

⁴² Stewart (Volume 2) writes of loving because of (διὰ) the other person himself that “the expression δι’ αὐτοῦς marks the two friends regarded as each the *final object* (hence διὰ) of the other’s love” (279). It is unclear whether in these contexts Stewart thinks διὰ refers exclusively to the final cause, or to the efficient cause as well; see Footnote 50 for supposing the former. Similarly, Walker (2014) argues that διὰ refers at least to the final cause, without clarifying whether he thinks it refers to the efficient cause as well (155).

⁴³ 151. Walker (2014) follows (155). Whiting does not address these examples.

with the final cause.”⁴⁴ Whiting specifically addresses both NE1156a31 and NE1172b21 and argues that in them διὰ connotes only efficient causation; let us visit each passage and Whiting’s analyses in turn.⁴⁵

Here is NE1156a31-33: “the friendship of the youthful seems to be because of pleasure (δι’ ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ), for these ones live according to passion and most of all pursue the pleasant for themselves and what is present.” Whiting argues that we can interpret this passage as suggesting that a youth can do good for those he finds pleasant, at least as much for their sake as for his own. In support of this she appeals to this common experience: the youth do things for the sake of their friends without calculating their own interests. Thus the youth here love with the other, not pleasure, as the final cause. But Whiting makes the crucial concession that such friends may do goods to those they find pleasant for the sake of these at least as much as for the sake of themselves, “only as long as they continue to find one another pleasant.”⁴⁶ This would suggest that pleasure *is* the final cause of the relationship. Indeed, it is hard to understand otherwise in light of what Aristotle has said just a half Bekker page before (NE1155b20-21): the pleasant and the good are lovable (φιλητὰ) as *ends* (ὡς τέλη), which Aristotle commonly glosses as final causes.

The fact that Whiting still denies that pleasure is the final cause suggests that she wrongly associates final causes with calculation. Her thought is that because the youth do not calculate, their relationships do not take pleasure as the *end*. Yet it is unclear that calculation is necessarily linked to final causes, for reasons Whiting herself gives in 2002:

[In situations in which the agent chooses things for the sake of eudaimonia], the agent can be said to be choosing things for the sake of (her own) eudaimonia even though she does not intentionally aim in choosing these things at her own eudaimonia. And this is plausible given Aristotle’s general teleology, which admits many cases where things happen for the sake of ends without anyone or anything ever aiming intentionally at those ends—for example, cases where nutritive processes occur for the sake of growth. (284)

⁴⁴ 274.

⁴⁵ (2006) 284-7.

⁴⁶ (2006) 286. Aspasius emphasizes that the survival of such friendship hinges completely on the pleasure involved (166.10-17).

In short, Whiting (2002) claims that intentionality is not a necessary condition of final causation. The subject here is “intentionality” and not, as in Whiting’s analysis of 1156a31-33, “calculation” of interests; but the reasoning she employs to deny that *intentionality* is required for final causation would seem to block the idea that *calculation* of interests is required for final causation. That is, we can imagine cases where things happen for the sake of ends without anyone or anything ever calculating about “those ends—for example, cases where nutritive processes occur for the sake of growth.” Thus one reason for denying the idea that the final cause requires calculation or intention: Aristotle takes natural objects to have final causes, where calculation and intention do not seem involved.⁴⁷

But perhaps a reason closer to the realm of moral action would be more convincing; here we can turn to Aristotle’s characterization of the mean as the target (σκοπὸς) at which virtuous agents aim (NE1106b30-34) and his suggestion that knowledge of the ultimate good would make possessors like archers who have a target (σκοπὸς) to aim at (NE1094a22-24). It does not seem that these targets, which are presumably final causes, are always calculated or intended; it would be strange for Aristotle to think that at every instance of the virtuous action or at every *moment* of virtuous action the virtuous agent is running the mean or her conception of the good through a calculus or through her mind as an intention.

Given these two reasons for thinking that final causation does not require calculation or intention, I would suggest then that youthful love has pleasure at least as an *implicit* final cause (that is, without intentions or calculation of interests).⁴⁸ For pleasure is clearly a final cause (NE1155b20-21) and the youth terminate their pleasure friendships if pleasure ceases.

⁴⁷ We might doubt that Aristotle has a notion of “intention” that neatly maps onto ours; Price (2011) likens decision (προαίρεσις) to it (309-10). What Whiting means to deny is some form of *conscious* striving towards one’s own good.

⁴⁸ But even if there were a necessary link, I would argue that Aristotle still thinks the lovable is the end of these relationships, even if he might admit that the friends in question only have limited awareness of this. That is, the fact of the friends’ limited awareness would not prevent Aristotle from explaining their behavior in terms of final causes, just as the limited awareness of animals does not prevent Aristotle from explaining their behavior

In the next section, I will elaborate on Aristotle's characterization of friendship as a system of exchange; such a characterization suggests that even with youthful love, pleasure is not always in the implicit background.

Now Whiting might concede that pleasure is a final cause in some contexts, but she might object to the idea that just because the youth terminate their pleasure friendships if pleasure ceases means that pleasure is the final cause. She might argue that this line of reasoning wrongly assumes that the final cause monopolizes the sustaining role (friendships continue only because of the final cause).⁴⁹ The lovable *qua* efficient cause might also take on a sustaining role; the lovable stops persisting and in *response* the loving stops.

This may be so, but presumably there is a further reason for responding in this way, unless, implausibly, loving is completely mechanistic. And it would seem that the best candidate for the further reason for responding in this way is that the lovable is the *end*. Let me illustrate this. Accounting for the relevant background conditions, we might say that a person's exerting force on a cart is the efficient cause of the cart's motion. When the force yields, in response, the cart stops moving. That seems to be a complete picture, explanatorily speaking; the efficient cause perhaps gets us by. Now, the question is whether it is right to think of love in the same way. When the lovable object runs out, the human stops loving. This is where Whiting's exclusively efficient causal model leaves us. But I would suggest that this is explanatorily incomplete because we want to know not just *that* the human stops loving in response to the lovable stopping; we want to know further *why* the human responds *in this way*. And it seems that the reason is to be found with the final cause; the human was loving for the sake of the lovable.

in terms of practical syllogisms (*Motion of Animals* 7; thanks to Karen Margrethe Nielsen for pointing out this last connection).

⁴⁹ This seems to be Joachim's (1951) line of reasoning when he infers from the fact that "A wishes well to B *only so long as* B's society gives him pleasure" the fact that "in friendship *for the sake of* pleasure desire for the friend's well-being is [not] disinterested" (249, emphasis mine).

Let us move on to the next passage that Irwin cites as showing διὰ refers to at least the final cause (NE1172b20). I quote a little more than Irwin actually cites, 1172b20-23: “(A) That is most of all choiceworthy which we choose not because of another or for the sake of another; such a thing pleasure has been agreed to be (μάλιστα δ’ εἶναι αἰρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι’ ἕτερον μηδ’ ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ’ ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν); (B) for no one asks for the sake of what (τίνος ἕνεκα) one is pleased, (C) because pleasure is choiceworthy on account of itself (ὥς καθ’ αὐτὴν οὖσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν).” Whiting suggests that Irwin mistranslates the μὴ... μηδ’ construction in (A) as “not... or,” yielding the epexegetical reading: “not because of another or [that is] for the sake of another.”⁵⁰ Whiting suggests instead that a proper translation requires a “neither... nor” construction that disallows the epexegetical reading; just as we might be disinclined to interpret the phrase “x is neither y nor z” as taking z as merely epexegetic of y, we might also be disinclined to interpret the phrase “neither because of another nor for the sake of another” as taking “for the sake of another” as merely epexegetic of “because of another.” And thus the final cause (“for the sake of”) and efficient cause (“because of”) are kept apart. However, while it is standard for μηδὲ... μηδὲ to indicate a “neither... nor” construction, it is unclear that it is standard, as opposed to merely admissible, for μὴ... μηδέ.⁵¹ So Irwin’s epexegetical reading remains viable; διὰ and ἕνεκα can be read as interchangeable and as the latter refers uncontroversially to the final cause, so too can the former (at least here).

Interestingly, neither Irwin nor Whiting explore the wider context, stopping short of the mention of pleasure in (A); let us see if the rest of the passage supports either. Aristotle cites pleasure as an example of something that is chosen “not because of another, that is, not

⁵⁰ Stewart (Volume 2) adopts this epexegetical reading, taking the “for the sake of another” to have been “added merely as an alternative for the former. They seem to have exactly the same meaning” (406). Aquinas glosses the disjuncts as “chosen not (*non*) because of another accidental to it, nor (*neque*) for the sake of something as an end” (1968 in Litzinger, 10.2.58-60 in Leonine edition). He thus appears to leave open the epexegetical reading, as only “*neque... neque*,” not “*non... neque*,” requires the translation “neither... nor.”

⁵¹ As pointed out by Irwin in conversation. LSJ.

for the sake of another” (per Irwin) or “neither because of another nor for the sake of another” (per Whiting). When he extrapolates this example in (B) and (C), Aristotle uses different prepositions than in (A); in (A) we get διὰ (“because of”) and χάριν (“for the sake of”), whereas in (C) we get κατὰ (“on account of”) and in (B) ἔνεκα (“for the sake of”). But the γὰρ (“for”) that starts (B) suggests that (B) and (C) are supposed to explain what precedes, so I think it would be strange if the causal prepositions κατὰ and ἔνεκα in (B) and (C) have nothing to do with the causal prepositions διὰ and χάριν in (A). Indeed, there is strong evidence that κατὰ and διὰ are interchangeable in at least some contexts and that ἔνεκα and χάριν are interchangeable in basically all contexts.⁵²

With this interchangeability in mind, we would seem to get circular reasoning on both readings: (A) pleasure is not choiceworthy because of something else (we do not choose it because of something else) that is/nor for the sake of something else, (B) for pleasure is not for the sake of something else, (C) because it is choiceworthy because of itself. On either reading, Aristotle seems to claim that pleasure is not choiceworthy because of something else or for the sake of something else because it is not for the sake of something else or choiceworthy because of something else. This is not how Aristotle is reasoning. Rather, he is saying that we do not choose pleasure because of something else that is/nor for the sake of something else, and we can find evidence for this in common linguistic practice. Namely, *people do not ask* what pleasure is for the sake of, and the grounds that *they give* is that pleasure is choiceworthy because of itself. So Aristotle is not arguing, “x because x.” He is arguing, “x because of empirical evidence that x.”⁵³

⁵² Διὰ and κατὰ appear interchangeable at NE1156b11, 20, 1157b4. Χάριν and ἔνεκα appear interchangeable at NE1166a5, 17, 1168a31, 34, b3.

⁵³ That the empirical evidence is a matter of linguistic practice is highly suggested by the causal particle ὥς in (C). (B) says no one asks what pleasure is for the sake of, and then in (C) we get ὥς plus the circumstantial participle οὔσαν. Now the combination of these two elements, the ὥς and the circumstantial participle, translates causally: “since being” or “since it is.” This gives us the reading: “no one asks what pleasure is for the sake of, since (ὥς) pleasure is (οὔσαν) choiceworthy because of itself.” But there is a further nuance to this. Aristotle could have used ἄτε or οἷα instead of ὥς, which would also translate as “since being.” But the difference between ἄτε and οἷα on the one hand and ὥς on the other is that the former indicate that the writer herself is

How does this apply to our reading of *διά*? (B) and (C) suggest that pleasure is chosen for the sake of (*χάριν=ἔνεκα*) itself, because it is choiceworthy because of (*κατὰ=διά*) itself. To avoid a tautology, we must distinguish between *χάριν=ἔνεκα* and *κατὰ=διά*. This does not mesh well with an exegetical reading of (A), whereby *ἔνεκα=χάριν* is interchangeable with *διά=κατά*. So Whiting might argue that since *διά* picks out something different from what *ἔνεκα* picks out, and since *ἔνεκα* most probably picks out the final cause, *διά* most probably does *not* pick out the final cause. But then it would be unclear what *διά* *does* pick out. It is claimed that pleasure is *choiceworthy* because of or on account of itself. “Because of” and “on account of” probably refer to the final cause, for it would be strange to say that we choose pleasure *not* for the sake of pleasure and *only* because of past pleasure. So we must distinguish *χάριν=ἔνεκα* and *κατὰ=διά* in a different way. Perhaps Rogers (1994) is right in associating the former with the choosing agent and the latter with the object chosen;⁵⁴ (B) associates *ἔνεκα* with the *agent’s* being pleased and (C) associates *κατὰ* with the pleasure.⁵⁵

In this section, I have argued that we should not take *διά* as referring exclusively to the efficient cause. For *διά* seems to refer straightforwardly to at least the final cause in the relevant cases. This paves the way for the next section, which moves beyond the meaning of *διά* in Aristotle’s doctrine that one loves because of (*διά*) the lovable and assesses Aristotle’s illustration of how this doctrine plays out.

1.2.2: The Lovable and the Dissolution of Friendships

asserting the causal relationship; *ὥς* indicates that the writer is reporting a causal relationship that was *alleged by someone else* (Smyth [1956] 2086). And this fits perfectly with the context; Aristotle is making a claim on the grounds of linguistic practice, where his report of linguistic practice is phrased in terms of alleged causation. The thought then is this: we can see that *x* is choiceworthy because of itself by appealing to common discourse about choice; people do not ask what pleasure is further for the sake of, allegedly on the grounds that it is choiceworthy because of itself.

⁵⁴ 292n3.

⁵⁵ Even if Whiting is right in disassociating *διά* from the final cause here, this does not entail that *διά* never tracks the final cause; per Price’s examples in §1.2, *διά* is sometimes interchangeable with *ἔνεκα*, which tracks the final cause. Further, the present example is not terribly relevant to friendship; it is not an example of loving because of the lovable.

I will now argue, using NE9.3's analysis of virtue friendship dissolutions, that the lovable is at least the final cause of love; for the *prospect* of the lovable matters. After discussing the dissolution of pleasure and utility friendships, NE9.3 turns to virtue friendships:

(A) If one accepts [a friend] as good (ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν), and [this friend] becomes and seems vicious, must he still be loved? Or is this not possible, if nothing is lovable but the good? Neither is the evil lovable nor should it be; for it is necessary that one not be a lover of evil, nor to become similar to the base; and it has been said that similar is a friend to similar. (B) Then must it be dissolved immediately? Or not in all cases, but only in the cases of those incurable in respect to vice (τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν)? If [the relevant parties] are correctable (ἐπανόρθωσιν) they have greater need to be aided in reference to their character than to their livelihood (εἰς τὸ ἥθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν), to the extent that this is better and more akin to friendship. (C) But it would seem that the one having dissolved the friendship does not do anything strange; for he was not a friend to such a sort (οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φίλος ἦν); therefore when being unable to restore the person having changed, he leaves (ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται). (1165b13-22)

Aristotle suggests that when a good friend becomes vicious, we should try to restore him, but if this vice is incurable, then we should dissolve the friendship; the virtue friendship dissolves because the prospect of the lovable does. This suggests that if the lovable (here, the good instantiated by the friend's goodness, i.e. virtue) is the efficient cause, it is not *just* the efficient cause. If the good is relegated to just an efficient causal role, it is unclear why its *prospects* should matter; all that matters is its *past* and *present* setting of the love in motion.

But the prospect of goodness *does* matter, as suggested by two points. First, Aristotle refers to *incurability* in (B) and (C) as grounds for dissolving the friendship; this modal claim must concern the prospect of goodness. Second, Aristotle clearly indicates that central to maintaining the relationship is *preserving* a lovable quality *into the future*, which again suggests prospective concerns. He answers the question of whether a person should be loved by explaining what kinds of qualities are lovable (A); the following lines then emphasize the importance of preserving these qualities into the future. (B) prioritizes the *preservation* of the person's virtue over the preservation of the person ("their livelihood"). And (C) suggests that

the virtuous person was not a friend to a person of such a kind; so when the person *changes* and the relevant lovable quality is not preserved, the friendship is dissolved (C).⁵⁶

The efficient cause then fails to complete the explanatory picture. Loving stops when the lovable does, but this falls short of explaining the phenomenon at hand; there is another question that goes beyond the fact *that* the agents respond in this way to the cessation of the lovable, namely *why* they respond in this way. The answer is that the lovable is the end or final cause of the relationship. That is, the cessation of loving is not mechanistic like the cessation of a cart's motion in response to the cessation of force; loving is (at least implicitly) for the sake of something, namely the lovable. And if this interest is no longer viable, as when the person becomes incurably vicious, the friendship dissolves. It seems then that the lovable (here, the good) is the final cause of love; at any rate, we are left with no other options, as prospects are irrelevant to the two remaining causes, the material and formal causes.

In the above, I have characterized the lovable as some kind of reason for friendship; it is worth specifying what reasons and kinds of reasons are implicated. Is Aristotle appealing to the lovable as a reason for (1) why agents *get into* friendships or (2) why they *maintain* friendships? Is Aristotle going beyond explanations to (3) motivations or (4) justifications? (1) is at stake; the friend is *accepted* as good, lovable. And as the lovable is the cause of love, we might think that it is at least the reason for *getting into* friendship. (2) is also at stake; it seems that *maintaining* the friendship hinges on the preservation of the lovable.⁵⁷ Further, Aristotle is describing the behavior of fully virtuous agents and is therefore providing justifications (4); in (A), the friend is accepted as “good (ἀγαθόν)” and presumably the

⁵⁶ Michael of Ephesus (476.26-32) and Aquinas (1792 in Litzinger, 9.3.95-99 in Leonine) both unflinchingly understand the passage in this straightforward way.

⁵⁷ I have thereby been arguing for what Price (1989) thinks “seems a category-mistake,” that what Aristotelian friends love is not an individual person “but a complex of repeatable qualities and irrepeatable relations” (98). To see how this model works, see §2.3 and §3.2.5.

person who accepts such a friend on these grounds is himself good. As Aristotle interchangeably refers to “complete (τελεία) friendship” as “friendship of the good,” and the former clearly involves fully virtuous people, it is highly likely that the “good” here refer to the fully virtuous.

Finally, it seems that the lovable is also the motivation for friendship (3). The calculation surrounding the preservation of the lovable implies this; agents seem to take preservation of the lovable as a reason favoring love. Further, we must not forget Aristotle’s characterization of friendship as an equal exchange of the lovable. In the passage immediately succeeding 1165b13-22, Aristotle claims that if adequate amounts of the lovable cannot be maintained, the friendship dissolves (see §2.3 for discussion of this passage). Aristotle says this claim was “previously mentioned” (1165b31), presumably in a very similar remark at NE8.7.1158b33-35, 1159a3-5. Noteworthy is the fact that this last passage exemplifies a principle stated in the immediately preceding 1158b23-33, that the lovable must be equalized in friendship.⁵⁸ When the principle first arises in NE,⁵⁹ it is clear that this equalization manifests in a system of exchange:

(A) And the ones loving the friend love the good for themselves, (B) for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a good for whom he is a friend. (C) Each therefore also loves what is good for himself, and they exchange the equal in wish and in what is pleasant; (D) for friendship is called equality, and these things obtains most of all in friendship of the good people.

(A) καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν, (B) ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὃ φίλος. (C) ἑκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ’ ὑπάρχει. (1157b33-1158a1)

We already assessed (A)-(B) in §1.1.2, where I argued that the friend is good for oneself in the sense of contributing to one’s own happiness. Aristotle elaborates on this in terms of exchanging the equal (C), and the grounds for this interaction in friendship is that (D)

⁵⁸ Virtue and good fortune are presumably examples of the good and the useful, respectively (1158b33-34).

⁵⁹ An analogous principle occurs earlier, when NE5 constantly claims justice is underpinned by equality. The sharing of this principle perhaps explains the co-extensiveness of friendship and justice (see Conclusion for more discussion).

friendship is an equality, where the equalizing exchanges (“these things”) obtain most of all in complete friendship (“friendship of the good people”). In short then, friendship is a system of equal exchange of the lovable. But it is difficult to conceive of a system of exchange as not involving the agents taking a return of the lovable as a good reason for engaging in the system of exchange. Such a motivation operates at least at the level of the friendship *as a whole*; this seems to be at stake with friendship dissolutions, when one party steps back to see whether the lovable is being sufficiently equalized. And perhaps the motivation of a return of the lovable occurs in the case of some individual actions *within* the friendship as well. It is therefore difficult to conceive of the lovable not being the motivation of friendship.⁶⁰

To sum up the chapter, virtue friendships dissolve if the prospect of one party being virtuous fades; the lovable (specifically the good) is considered at least prospectively as the end. This result of §1.2.2 is in keeping with §1.2.1, where I argued against the idea that the meaning of $\delta\iota\alpha$ (“because of”) would restrict the lovable to an efficient causal role; it turns out that Aristotle sometimes takes $\delta\iota\alpha$ to refer to the final cause or to be interchangeable with $\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ (“for the sake of”), which connotes the final cause. As “the lovable” refers to one’s own happiness (§1.1), this means that x loves y *for the sake of* x’s happiness. As one’s own happiness is the *end* of loving, Aristotelian love cannot be purely altruistic.

And as one loves *only* for the sake of one’s own happiness, Aristotelian love cannot be mixed altruistic. Mixed altruism holds that both oneself and the other are ultimate ends but that the other is prioritized. Let us see how mixed altruism fares with stronger and weaker versions of Aristotle’s basic formula, “loving *only* for the sake of one’s own happiness.” The stronger version takes this formula to indicate that one loves the other *if and only if* this appears to⁶¹ contribute to one’s own happiness. This seems straightforwardly incompatible

⁶⁰ Pace Pakaluk (1998) 75-6.

⁶¹ Recall that the lovable is technically what *appears* good for oneself, not what *is* good for oneself (§1.1). Aristotle claims that there is no difference, because the former is based on the latter. But we can see now why Aristotle bothers to distinguish the two, and designate the apparent good as the cause of love. For it would be

with the other being an ultimate end that is prioritized over oneself. Let us see if we can achieve compatibility with a weaker version of the formula: one loves the other *only if* this appears to contribute to one's own happiness. The prospects for compatibility are grim; it is unclear how loving another prioritizes the other if a necessary condition of this love is the promotion of one's own happiness. It seems then that Aristotelian friendship is egoistic; one's own happiness is the sole ultimate end, or it is an ultimate end that is prioritized over the ultimate end of the other's happiness.

strange for what *is* good for oneself irrespective of its *appearing* good for oneself, to cause love; we could love an object that is good for us even if we do not notice this.

2: Aristotle on Wishing Goods for the Other's Sake and the Loving the Other for Himself

In the previous chapter, I argued that Aristotle's principle that all friends love only because of the lovable is to be understood as "all friends love only for the sake of their own happiness." An egoistic interpretation of Aristotelian friendship would seem secured, but major obstacles remain: the types of concern that makes up the key piece of evidence for the altruistic interpretations. First, there is wishing goods to *x* for the sake of (ἔνεκα) *x* (co-extensive with having goodwill for *x*). Second, there is loving *x* for himself, where "loving *x* for himself" is my umbrella expression for three co-extensive expressions: (i) loving because of (διὰ) *x* himself, (ii) loving on account of (κατὰ) *x* himself, and (iii) loving *x* for who *x* is (ἢ ὁ ἐστίν). These types of concern, on the surface, do not seem to have anything to do with one's own happiness. And as Aristotle takes these types of concern to occur principally in virtue friendships, we might then think that his normative theory of friendship is altruistic.

I will argue that we should understand these types of concern egoistically; they track concern for the lovable (what appears to contribute to one's own happiness). First, I argue that when *y* loves *x* for himself, this is explained by *y*'s loving *x* because of the lovable, specifically the good instantiated by *x*'s goodness, that is, virtue (§2.1).⁶² Second, I argue that when Aristotle says that *y* wishes goods for *x*'s sake, this is explained by *y*'s wishing goods for the sake of the good, instantiated by *x*'s virtue (§2.2). Loving the other for himself and wishing goods for the other's sake are thus finally caused by one's own happiness; for they are finally caused by the lovable and the lovable, per §1, is that which appears to contribute to one's own happiness. Lastly, I address an important objection to this interpretation (§2.3). I am suggesting that we should understand "wishing goods for the other's sake" and "loving

⁶² Aristotle seems to speak interchangeably of "good people" and "virtuous people," but I sometimes use "goodness" in this chapter because of its clearer connection to the lovable object that is "the good" (§1.1). "Virtue" does not necessarily refer to full virtue in this chapter; when *full* virtue is meant, "full virtue" will be invoked.

the other for himself” as referring to one’s own happiness, but many interpreters would suggest that this misses the whole point of these expressions: to refer rather to the *other’s* happiness. I argue that the ultimate end of these types of concern is *one’s own* virtuous activity, which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness.

Before proceeding, I will make some important clarificatory remarks. (1) I take concern because of (διὰ) x himself, on account of (κατὰ) x himself, and for who x is (ᾧ ὃ ἐστίν) as coextensive, for a couple reasons. First, they all center around the same thing and oppose the same things. Aristotle *contrasts* loving on account of accident or because of one of the accidental lovable qualities with loving the friend for who he is (NE1156a14-21), loving on account of the friend himself (NE1156a11), *and* loving because of the friend himself (NE1156b10, 1157a18, b1-5). And as we will see, all three expressions refer to virtue, the cultivation of the rational essence of humanity. Second, Aristotle takes κατὰ and διὰ as interchangeable when appending these prepositions to friendship language (NE1156b11, 20, 1157b4, and MM1209a19-29, especially 28-29). This seems to be at play when Aristotle speaks of loving (φιλεῖν) διὰ one of the lovable qualities and of friendship (φιλία) κατὰ one of the lovable qualities (NE1158b7, 1161a23, 1162b5, 1163a21, 1164a35, EE1237a10, 1238a31, MM1209a14, 1210a9). In this chapter, then, when I speak of one expression or of the umbrella expression “loving x for himself,” I am speaking of all three.

(2) However, when invoking one of these three expressions, I am not thereby automatically invoking “goodwill to x” or “wishing goods for x’s sake.” The distinction between the former three expressions and the latter is not always clear in the literature. For example, virtually all commentators agree that only virtue friendship features wishing goods to/loving x *on account of* x himself, while some suggest that lower friendships feature wishing goods to x/loving x *for the sake of* x. In the relevant debates, it is not always clear when commentators are using passages about *loving* x on account of himself to make claims

about *wishing goods* to x on account of x himself, etc.⁶³ However, “for the sake of” rarely pairs with “loving,” as “because of x” and “on account of x” rarely pair with “wishing.”⁶⁴ I have divided discussions of loving and wishing to keep the issues clear; hopefully this new approach to how the various prepositions and concern words relate will clarify future discussion.

(3) There may be some doubt about the co-extensiveness of being good-willed to x and wishing goods for x’s sake. The relevant words are the noun “goodwill” (εὐνοία), verb “being good-willed” (εὐνοεῖν), adjective “good-willed” (εὐνους), and verbal phrase “wishing goods” (τάγαθὰ βούλεσθαι). I take it that goodwill towards x entails a specific type of wishing goods, namely that for x’s sake. NE1155b32 suggests that the ones who wish goods “thus (οὕτως)” are called “good-willed,” and “thus” would most naturally refer to the immediately preceding “for the sake of that one” (NE1155b31). Merely wishing goods to x does *not* count as goodwill, for NE1155b29-31 says that friendship requires wishing goods for the sake of the friend, which goes over and above merely wishing goods to someone, which can be just⁶⁵ for the sake of oneself. A result of this is worth mentioning; “for the sake

⁶³ For example, Cooper (1999.14) in one paragraph makes a point about wishing goods (329). He ends the paragraph with three quick references to support his point, but these references do not mention wishing goods at all (instead mentioning “being friends,” “being fond,” or “loving”).

⁶⁴ Of all relevant instances in the friendship books, διὰ (“because of”) occurs only six times with wish cognates like βούλησις and βούλεσθαι (NE1156a5, 1236b30, 1240a25, 26, 1241a6, 7) and most often with love cognates (e.g. φίλος, φιλεῖν, φιλία). Κατὰ (“according to” or “on account of”) occurs only with love cognates. Ἔνεκα (“for the sake of”) occurs six times with wish cognates (NE1155b31, 1156b10, 1157b32, 1159b10, 1166a4, 1168b3), thrice with action cognates like πράξις and πράττειν (NE1166a16, 1168a34, 1169a19), once with “community” (κοινωνία) (NE1160a20), and once with φιλεῖν (NE1164a10). Χάρτιν, a synonym of ἔνεκα, occurs twice with wish cognates (NE1166a5, EE1240a25), twice with action cognates (NE1166a17, 1168a31), and once with “community” (NE1160a12).

⁶⁵ The “just” here is important. Some commentators appeal to *Rhetoric* 2.4 as opposing wishing goods for the sake of the other and for the sake of oneself. But the ethical treatises never endorse this opposition (in fact, NE9.8.1168a34-5 repudiates it; see §4.1 for more discussion). Rather, they endorse only the opposition between wishing goods for the sake of the other and *just* for the sake of oneself. This more limited opposition makes sense, for we want to make room for shared ends, where x’s promoting an end she shares with y would seem to be an instance of wishing goods both for the sake of y and for the sake of herself. Indeed, we might think that emphasis on wishing goods for the sake of the other and *not* for the sake of oneself risks a relationship that Aristotle takes to hold between master and slave (*Politics* 1255b9-10, 1328a28-33) or a relationship of charity (NE8.14). As for the *Rhetoric*, we have two options. (1) We must abandon its doctrine, as we must abandon the many doctrines that it noncommittally presents that are often contradictory both with other doctrines in the *Rhetoric* and with doctrines in the ethical treatises. Or (2) we must read an implicit “just” into “wishing goods for the sake of oneself” that it opposes to “wishing goods for the sake of the other.” Pakaluk (Unpublished)

of (ἔνεκα)” must designate the end and not merely the beneficiary (to utilize a distinction from *De Anima* 415b20-1). For acting on wishing goods presumably benefits the other, but Aristotle tells us this does not count as wishing goods *for the sake of the other*.

Hadreas (1995) tries to drive a wedge between “goodwill” and “wishing goods for the sake of another,” pointing to NE1156a3-5 where Aristotle says of friends that it is “necessary that they be good-willed to one another and wish goods (δεῖ... εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ).” Hadreas thinks that we should not translate εὐνοεῖν and its related cognates as “goodwill” because this volitional translation brings the cognates too close to “wishing goods,” which Aristotle must here be distinguishing from the goodwill cognates lest the line be “redundant or unnecessarily epexegetical.”⁶⁶ I do not think there is anything particularly wrong with reading the “and (καὶ)” as epexegetical here, as the vast majority of translators and commentators have understood. But even if Hadreas is right, I do not think there is much effect on my arguments. That is, even if being good-willed to another and wishing goods for the sake of another are not *co-intensive*, they do not seem like they can come apart.⁶⁷ In what follows, I speak primarily of wishing goods for x’s sake, as my primary concern is explicating the “for x’s sake.” But given the apparent co-extensiveness of goodwill to x and wishing goods for x’s sake, I speak of “goodwill to x” and “wishing goods for x’s sake” interchangeably.

2.1: Loving x because of x himself, on account of x himself, for who x is

pursues a similar thought, rejecting the standard disinterested reading of *Rhetoric* 2.4 and suggesting that what is at stake is identification with the other in regard to shared interests (especially 3-4).

⁶⁶ 394.

⁶⁷ NE9.4 discusses various friendly attributes one displays towards oneself and others; NE9.5-7 seem to elaborate on these specifically in relation towards others. But NE9.4 speaks principally of wishing goods and never mentions goodwill, and NE9.5 talks principally of goodwill and only once of wishing goods (1167a8). So either goodwill and wishing goods do not come apart, or we should give up the relationship between NE9.4 and NE9.5-7 described above; but there is little reason to go with the latter.

In this section I will argue that when y loves x for himself, y loves x because of the lovable, specifically the good instantiated by x's virtue; as *lovable* to y, this virtue is taken by y to contribute to y's own happiness. This is in keeping with the combined claim of §1.1 and §1.2 that all love is at least finally caused by one's own happiness. I will also address an objection against this model, that love for individuals is obliterated.

The only illuminating positive instance of “loving because of the person himself”⁶⁸ seems to refer to the good:

(A) The base will be friends because of pleasure or because of the useful, being similar in this way, (B) but the good will be friends because of [the friends] themselves, (C) for [they are friends] insofar as they are good. (D) These latter therefore are friends simply, but the former are friends according to accident and by being similar to the latter.

(A) Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες, (B) οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· (C) ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. (D) οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τοῦτοις. (NE1157b1-5)

In (A), we see that the base are friends because of one of two lovable things, pleasure or utility. (B) might then surprise us, for we are told that the good are friends because of *themselves*, instead of the last remaining lovable thing, the good. However, (C) explains (B); they are friends insofar as they are *good*, suggesting that parallel to the base, the good are friends because of one of the posited objects of love, the good.⁶⁹ The good here seems to be instantiated by the friend's virtue.

In assessing what Aristotle means by loving *because of* or *on account of* the other himself, most commentators take the causal prepositions to track the essence of the object;⁷⁰ this is one of the options *Metaphysics* 5.18 gives us for understanding καθ' αὐτό. Generally,

⁶⁸ NE does not have other positive and illuminating extrapolations of the phrases “loving because of another himself,” “on account of another himself,” and “for who one is.” The other instances are contrasted with loving because of/on account of accidental qualities, like pleasure or utility (see point 1 in the introduction to this chapter for these instances). Two other positive instances are not particularly illuminating. NE1171a19, discussed below, is very brief. NE1156a10-14 parallels loving because of the other himself and loving the other for being a certain sort (τῷ ποιούσιν τινας εἶναι), but does not elaborate on what this certain sort is.

⁶⁹ Aquinas anticipates this in his analysis of NE1156b12, attributing the reason for loving to goodness (1577 in Litzinger, 8.3.190-196 in Leonine). See also MM1209b11-15, 27, 30.

⁷⁰ With Badhwar and Jones (2017) §1, Burnet (1900) 360, and Stern-Gillet (1995) 73.

commentators immediately infer that the essential feature is the friend's virtue.⁷¹ But Payne and Price are right in thinking this is not quite accurate; the essential feature of humans is not virtue, but rationality.⁷² Essential features are necessary features; if virtue is the essential feature of a human, if any individual human loses virtue, that human ceases to exist.⁷³ But Aristotle conceives of humans losing virtue (e.g. NE9.3) *without* ceasing to exist. This suggests that virtue is not essential to humans. So, *strictly speaking*, if love on account of x himself tracks the human essence, it cannot track virtue.

Nevertheless, I believe commentators are right in thinking that loving x on account of himself track's x's virtue, which is still related to essence. Consider the fact that the human essence might manifest itself in very minimal ways; it could be expressed in sheer rational *capacity* that is below virtue, the *cultivation* of that capacity. But it is clearly virtue that Aristotle has in mind as the object of loving because of the other himself; such concern occurs in friendships because of *virtue*, as distinguished from friendships because of the pleasant and friendships because of the useful. So while it is true that the human essence is being a rational animal and not being virtuous, it is virtue, the *cultivation* of the human essence of rationality (NE1.7), that is the object of loving the other for himself. Therefore, I think that when Aristotle says "it is impossible to be many people's friend because of their virtue and because of themselves" (NE1171a19), "because of their virtue" and "because of themselves" are co-extensive.

But while co-extensive, they are not co-intensive, with "because of virtue" being explanatorily prior. To understand this, I think it is important to distinguish between normative and numerical identity (discussed in the Introduction). Virtue is defined in

⁷¹ We see the mutual glossing of "essence," "virtue," and "goodness" in Aspasius, Cooper (1999.14) 324-5, and Walker (2014) 155. Aspasius suggests that virtue friends love their virtuous friends "on account of themselves (for they love insofar as they are good) (καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν [ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ φιλοῦσιν])," contrasting this with the accidental love of lower friends (167.6-7).

⁷² Payne (2000) 60, Price (2010) 190.

⁷³ Price (2011) 238, Shields (2014) 122.

reference to rational activity (NE1.7) and the rational part is who a human is most of all, “who he is” or “the sort that one is (ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν)” (NE1166a22-3). But while virtue makes up a person in the sense of being central to what I have called one’s *normative* identity, virtue is not related to one’s identity such that pointing to it will pick out only that one *numerically* distinct person.⁷⁴ This distinction is important, lest we bump into a puzzle concerning NE9.3: loving x for *himself* strangely amounts to loving x for something that he can lose, his virtue, but even if he loses his virtue, he is still *himself*, i.e. the same individual.⁷⁵ I agree that x who has lost his virtue is still himself, regarding *numerical* identity, but it is not this numerically distinct person that virtue friends love when they love x for himself. Rather, loving x for himself takes as its object the *normative* person, which x *does* lose when he loses his virtue.

One might think that my account of loving x for himself leaves no room for loving *numerically* distinct individuals. For it is unclear that you can individuate normative persons; there is really just one normative person that all members of a natural kind at least potentially instantiate⁷⁶ and so it seems virtue friends are replaceable with all equally virtuous people.⁷⁷ Indeed, Aristotle rarely talks about the uniqueness of equally virtuous people, only of their similarity and oneness of mind (see especially NE9.6 on concord); this ultimate concern with goodness rather than individuality was hinted at far before the discussion on friendship, when Aristotle claims that in every situation there is only *one* truly good action to take, with all other alternatives missing the mark somehow (NE1106b30-35).⁷⁸ The preoccupation with

⁷⁴ Millgram (1987) 372-3. My distinction is similar to that between “numerical” and “moral” identity found in Schollmeier (1986) 383-4, 387-8, (1994) 61, and Schwarzenbach (1992) 252. Irwin (2001) distinguishes between two aspects of self, the aims that one actually has versus the ways a self is capable of organizing aims; I take the former to map onto “numerical identity,” the latter onto “normative identity” (92; see also [1987] 395-6 for similar ideas). Price (1989) speaks of the self as subject *of* choices and the self constructed *from* choices (105). I take the former to map onto “numerical identity,” but the latter does not perfectly map onto “normative identity.” For Price elaborates upon his “self constructed from choices” as referring to a complex set of choices that is non-uniform across fully virtuous agents (124, 130), whereas my “normative identity” refers to the full virtue that one shares *uniformly* with all other fully virtuous agents.

⁷⁵ Bostock (2000) 171, Price (2010) 190.

⁷⁶ Miller (20140) 344.

⁷⁷ As Annas (1977) complains (549-50).

⁷⁸ Aristotle says, “doing the correct thing is singular (τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς)” (NE1106b30-1). It is interesting that here there is no phrase relativizing to people, as in the doctrine of the mean—all this despite

uniqueness and alternatives, this concern with the raw individual, rather seems to be a feature of *modern* theories of human value.⁷⁹

I have just argued that individuality is not ultimately valuable to Aristotelian friendship,⁸⁰ but this is not to say that it is not valuable at all. To illustrate, I will differentiate my understanding of Aristotelian friendship from Badhwar's (1987) Aristotle-inspired model of friendship. Badhwar's model takes the irreplaceably unique individual as ultimately valuable, and this on the grounds that concern for the lovable qualities of the individual is inextricable from their historical instantiations.⁸¹ I agree that the lovable qualities of a friend and therefore concern for the qualities are inextricable from their historical instantiations, but I do not think this makes these historical instantiations independently valuable. What *is* ultimately valuable about the lovable qualities is the activity they facilitate (§2.3) and the efficiency of this facilitation is highly dependent on the historical instantiation; I will argue in §3.2 that sufficient actualization obtains only in living together, which involves unique partners with whom one has developed a unique mode of operation. So individuality is valuable, but not ultimately so.

In summary, I have argued that loving x for himself is a case of loving because of the good, instantiated by x's virtue. This loving because of the good is just one case of loving because of the lovable; in §1, I argued that "loving because of the lovable" amounts to "loving for the sake of what appears to contribute to one's own happiness." So loving x for

Aristotle's mentioning the doctrine of the mean just two lines later (33-34). I think that this proximity of the doctrine of the mean and of the idea that the correct action is singular, combined with the latter's lack of relativization to agents, supports Brown (1997); the mean's being relative to us entails relativization not to individual agents, but to the natural kind of humans. Thus, *pace* Stern-Gillet (1995) 29, we should not appeal to the mean's being determined "relative to us" to import notions of individuality into Aristotle's theory of selfhood and thus friendship.

⁷⁹ As observed by Stern-Gillet (1995) 62-3 and Konstan (1997) 15-16, 76. As some commentators put the contrast between moderns and Aristotle, moderns seem to characterize altruism as promoting the other's good as the *other* sees it, whereas Aristotle requires that the end promoted be shared by oneself (Gill [1998] 319-20, O'Connor [1990] 110; see also Price [1989] 125-6, 130).

⁸⁰ In agreement with Benson (1990) 64-5, *pace* Badhwar and Jones (2017) §2.

⁸¹ 22-3.

himself is a case of loving for the sake of what appears to contribute to one's own happiness.⁸² I addressed the objection that such love leaves no room for loving individuals; I conceded that individuality is not ultimately valuable here but made some suggestions as to how individuality is still crucial for Aristotelian friendship.

2.2: Wishing goods for x's sake

Now, *how* we can understand loving because of *another's* goodness as amounting to loving what contributes to *one's own* happiness must wait until §2.3. In this section, I will argue that when y wishes goods for x's sake, y does this for the sake of the lovable (the good instantiated by x's virtue), which contributes to y's happiness.⁸³ Analogous to §2.2, this is simply the claim *that* such concern tracks one's own happiness, which does not yet explain *how* we are to understand this. I will first assess passages that take the lovable as the final cause of goodwill. I will then argue that while the other is a final cause of goodwill, as we wish goods for the sake of *the other*, there is a more fundamental final cause: the lovable.

Let us begin with some passages that straightforwardly take goodwill to center on the lovable. NE1156a4-5 says friends “are good-willed to one another and wish good things (not being unaware of this) because (δι') of some one of the things having been spoken about,” most probably the three lovable things “because of which people love (δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν)” just mentioned at NE1155b27.⁸⁴ Aristotle here seems to cite lovable qualities of persons, not the persons themselves, as *causes* of goodwill; and as I argued in §1.2, διὰ probably refers at least to the *final* cause. Indeed, the fact that Aristotle points only to the qualities of persons as

⁸² I think a similar analysis applies to choosing virtuous actions because of themselves. The thought would be that virtuous actions make up (at least a dominant part of) one's own happiness, so choosing virtuous actions because of themselves amounts to choosing happiness because of itself. See §4.2.3 for more.

⁸³ This is similar to Walker's (2014) claim that “to love *the friend* for his own sake, as an end, is to love the friend *for the sake of his virtue*” (155).

⁸⁴ Aristotle seems to make the same point when he says that friends “wish goods to one another in that manner in which they love (βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτη ἣ φιλοῦσιν)” (NE1156a9-10). “The manner in which they love” seems to refer to the lovable objects.

causes of goodwill (NE1167a19-21) and also says that goodwill can arise suddenly and without any prior familiarity with the individual (NE1166b34-5) suggests goodwill could hardly be aimed at anything beyond those qualities—for example, the irreducibly unique bearer of those qualities.⁸⁵ In sum, the object of goodwill does not seem to be the other, but rather the *qualities* of the other.⁸⁶

Yet it is not quite right to deny that the other is the object of goodwill. For Aristotle explicitly says we wish goods for the sake of the *other*, and this “other” seems to refer to a numerically distinct person; when Aristotle depicts virtuous person x wishing goods for the sake of virtuous person y, it is most probable that Aristotle envisions two distinct parties at play. In what follows, I argue that while the other person *is* a final cause of goodwill, the numerically distinct person is not the *ultimate* final cause; the lovable qualities that the other embodies (the normative person) are more fundamental final causes and explain why the (numerically distinct) other is a final cause in the first place.⁸⁷ So in wishing goods for x’s sake, concern for the lovable explains concern for the other.

Let us see how this reading holds in the face of several passages, starting with NE1156b7-12:

⁸⁵ See also EE1241a1-14. Aquinas (1829 in Litzinger, 9.5.114-123 in Leonine), Michael of Ephesus 487.19-21, and Schollmeier (1994) 40 take goodwill to exist because of a person’s virtue; in Schollmeier, we get an explicit appeal to the *final* cause.

⁸⁶ In agreement with Schroeder (1992) 210-1 and Rogers (1994) 292-3. I am in disagreement with Konstan (1997) 76 here; while he is right in suggesting that Aristotle’s theory of friendship lacks a modern fixation on the unique, Konstan wrongly suggests that the ultimate object of goodwill is not qualities but the bearers of qualities.

⁸⁷ Cooper (1999.14) 322 and Kraut (1989) 137 worry about a situation in which one wishes goods for the sake of another, for the sake of oneself; this seems incoherent, as opposed to the coherent situation of wishing goods *both* for the sake of oneself *and* for the sake of another. The assumption is that “for the sake of another” and “for the sake of oneself” both track *ultimate* ends; this is why it is absurd to subordinate the former to the latter. However, I would deny this assumption; “for the sake of another” tracks a non-ultimate end that is subordinated to the ultimate end of oneself. Cooper thinks that wishing goods is *contingent* upon one’s own interests (324-5, 328-9), but nevertheless takes this wishing of goods to be explanatorily basic. However, this “contingency” suggests that “wishing goods for the sake of the other” is elliptical for “wishing goods for the sake of the ends the other shares with oneself”; in turn this full expansion suggests that the ultimate end is one’s own happiness after all. This mediation through one’s own interests seems to be at stake when Aristotle says that fully virtuous people display the friendly attributes to themselves because they are fully virtuous, but display the friendly attributes to their virtue friends because these are other *selves*—not because they are fully virtuous (§3.1.2). Full virtue is apparently insufficient for meriting one’s friendly attributes; the other has to first be related to oneself.

(A) The friendship of good people similar in virtue is complete, (B) for they similarly wish goods to one another insofar as they are good, and they are good on account of themselves. (C) And the ones wishing goods to the friends for the sake of those ones are most of all friends, (D) for it is because of [the friends] themselves that they are so disposed, and not accidentally. (E) Their friendship, therefore, lasts as long as they are good, and virtue is a stable thing.

(A) Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· (B) οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ κατ' αὐτούς. (C) οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· (D) δι' αὐτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· (E) διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον.

This characterization of complete friendship is very compressed. Aristotle begins by claiming that the friendship of good, that is, fully virtuous, people is complete (A).⁸⁸ The reason for the friendship's completeness is that the parties wish goods to one another because the other is good, where the other is good on account of himself (B). The inference from (B), wishing goods because of goodness that arises because of the other himself to (A), the completeness of the friendship in question, is opaque. (C) and (D) elaborate on this inference and make clear that the two elements in (B), wishing goods because of goodness and being good because of oneself, are not coordinate, as (B) made them appear. (C)'s claim that the one wishing goods for the other's sake is most of all a friend is *dependent on* (D)'s claim that this wishing of goods is directed at the essence of the friend ("because of the friend himself"). How does this clarify the inference from (B) to (A)? Aristotle understands the completeness of friendship (in the language of A) or, alternatively, being a friend "most of all" (in the language of C) to follow from wishing goods for the sake of the other (C), and what makes such wishing goods so special is that it is directed at the friend's essential and not accidental features (D). What about the essential feature merits the "complete" label? The essential feature tracked by "because of himself" points forward to virtue; (E) immediately concludes from this essence-centered wishing of goods that the friendship in question lasts as long as the parties are *good*. The immediately following 1156b12-15 suggests that the goodness

⁸⁸ One might question the assumption that mention of good people amounts to a mention of fully virtuous people. For Aristotle suggests elsewhere that only the labels "fully good (ἀγαθὸν... κυρίως)" (1144b31) and "good simply (ἀπλῶς... ἀγαθός)" (1145a1) apply to cases of full virtue. Ultimately, it will come down to

virtue involves is *both* good simply *and* good relatively.⁸⁹ This dual goodness is why at least some kind of friendship because of virtue is complete.

I think this passage shows that the lovable (specifically the good) is the final cause of wishing goods for the other's sake. We can see this by relating (C) to the surrounding premises. If I am right in taking (C) (and D) to elaborate on the elements of (B), Aristotle has shifted from talking of "wishing goods to one another insofar as they are good" (B) to "wishing goods to the friends for the sake of those ones" (C); the two expressions are co-extensive, suggesting that the lovable (the good) is the ultimate final cause tracked in both.

We can also show this by relating (C) to (D). (C) says those who wish goods to their friends for the sake of their friends are friends most of all *because* they are so disposed (i.e. wish goods) because of the friends themselves, not accidentally (D). The fact that something, (D), further explains (C), the idea that friends who wish goods for the sake of the other are friends to the highest degree, suggests that wishing goods for the sake of the other is not *ultimately* explanatory of why such friendship is complete or of the highest degree.⁹⁰ Such friendships are complete only because the object of wishing goods here is further specified as that which the friends are on account of themselves, not that which is an accidental feature (D).⁹¹ What is important about wishing goods for the sake of the other is that the object of

context. Here, it seems most plausible to take the agents to be fully virtuous, for we have little reason to believe that complete friendship features imperfectly virtuous people.

⁸⁹ More precisely, they are good simply (*ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ*) and *helpful* for one another (*ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι*) (1156b14). However, Aristotle clearly has in mind the distinction between the good simply and good for oneself, because he immediately goes on to talk about how these friends are "pleasant simply and for one another (*ἀπλῶς... ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις*)" (1156b15); this seems to be another instance of NE's frequent contrast of the good/pleasant simply and the good/pleasant for oneself.

⁹⁰ This reverses Walker's (2014) claim that being loved because of oneself is explained by being loved for the sake of oneself (155). Walker only shows that the two are co-extensive, not that one is explanatorily prior to the other. That one explains the other is suggestive against Stewart's (Volume 2) claim that "for the sake of the other" and "because of the other" have "exactly the same meaning" (406).

⁹¹ Commentators still argue that wishing goods for the other's sake obtains in lower friendship while also conceding that this is not because of the other himself; apparently then Broadie's (2002) point (410) has not been recognized that wishing goods *for the sake of* the other is explained by wishing goods *because of* the other (this is stronger than the claim that the two are co-extensive; see Adkins [1963] 39, Alpern [1983] 308, Irwin [1999] 275-6, Price [1989] 108, Walker [2014] 155). (C) indicates the topic here is wishing goods for the other's sake *simpliciter*; the construction "the ones wishing goods for the sake of the other" implies "*whoever* wishes goods for the sake of the other." Pace Nehamas (2010) 226, 244-5 and Whiting (2006) 281-3, then, we

wishing goods here is the other's virtue.⁹²

NE9.4 provides further evidence for the view that wishing goods for the sake of x is explained by wishing goods for the sake of x's goodness. At the beginning of the chapter, Aristotle suggests that friendly attributes (φιλικά) towards others seem to have been derived from those towards oneself (1166a1-3), where one of these is wishing and doing "good things, or what appear to be good things, for *that* person's sake" (1166a3-4). That the good person wishes goods for his own sake *follows* from the fact (γὰρ) that he is *good*, that "he agrees with himself and desires the same things with his entire soul" (1166a14). So again, virtue seems to further explain wishing goods for x's sake.⁹³

Aristotle goes on to elaborate on this goodness, this agreement in the soul. It entails wishing...

...for himself both good things and things that appear to be good, and he acts (for it is characteristic of a good person to cultivate what is good) for the sake of himself (ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα) (for he does so for the sake of his thinking part, which in fact each person seems to be [τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ]) (1166a15-17).

Here we see Aristotle explanatorily gloss "for the sake of himself" as "for the sake of his thinking part." The thinking part is then immediately identified as the human essence, that which the person is.⁹⁴ The immediately following lines expand upon this thought, taking the thinking part as somehow being the real person, that is, who the person is most of all:

He wishes for himself to live and to be preserved, and [wishes] this most of all to that by which he thinks (ὃ φρονεῖ). For being is good to the excellent person, and each one wishes goods to himself, but no one chooses to have all things on the condition of becoming someone else (for even now god has the good) but on the condition of being whatever he is

cannot read the present passage as explaining why the *fully virtuous in particular* wish goods for the other's sake by appeal to virtue, leaving open kinds of wishing goods for the other's sake that are *not* explained by appeal to virtue.

⁹² So while "wishing goods for the sake of the other" and "wishing goods because of the other himself" mean different things, Aristotle uses the latter to explain what is important about the former, not to separate them, *pace* Badhwar and Jones §1, Cooper (1999.14) 329, Nehamas (2010) 224-5, and Whiting (2006) 287. This is to suggest, with Alpern (1983) 310, Kraut (2017) §9, Pakaluk (1998) 61-3, and Price (1989) 150 *pace* Badhwar and Jones (2017) §1 and Nehamas (2010) 220-1, that Aristotle's initial characterization of *all* friendship as entailing wishing goods for the other's sake in NE8.2 is only a provisional statement; the considered view, which seems fairly explicit in NE9.5, is that such wishing of goods obtains only in virtue friendship.

⁹³ This is in agreement with Aquinas, who says that the friendly attributes belong to a person insofar as the person thinks himself to be virtuous (1802 in Litzinger, 9.4.60-74 in Leonine).

⁹⁴ See *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030a3 and Shields (2014) 120 for the connection between ὅπερ and essence.

(ὅν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν); and each would seem to be the thinking thing (τὸ νοοῦν) or that most of all. (1166a17-22; c.f. 1178a2-4)

The good person wishes himself to live, and wishes this most of all for his rational part. In one sense, the person probably cannot be identified with his rational part; in terms of numerical identity, *he* also comprises of a *non*-rational part. But there is a sense in which he can be so identified if we identify people with their most important part. And this is the kind of normative identity that Aristotle has in mind in the last part of the passage: “each would seem to be the thinking part, or that most of all.” The parenthetical comment about god is obscure and has received many different interpretations, but it seems again that one’s essence is at stake; no one chooses goods if having such goods means changing into something other than what one is. Again, while the concern here gravitates around essence, strictly speaking, the previous section and what we have seen so far in this section suggest that something more specific is at stake: virtue, the *cultivation* of a human’s essential feature.

Reading further in NE9.4 confirms that wishing goods for the sake of the other is explained by wishing goods for the sake of the other’s goodness:

(A) It appears that the things having been mentioned (τὰ εἰρημένα) [i.e. the φιλικὰ] obtain also in the case of the many, although they are base (πολλοῖς... καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοις). (B) Then is it insofar as they are pleased with themselves and consider themselves to be decent (ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπαικεῖς εἶναι) that they share in these things, (C) since of the very base and impious (κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν) at any rate these things do not obtain at all, nor appear to? (D) Nor, more or less, do they in the case of the base (σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις); (E) for they differ from themselves, and they have appetites for things other than that which they wish for, (F) for example, as the akratic people (οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς); (G) for they choose instead of things that seem good to them pleasant things that are harmful; (H) and others in turn because of cowardice and laziness flee from doing that which they think is best for themselves. (I) And those by whom many and terrible things have been enacted are hateful because of vice (οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται), flee living, and destroy themselves. (J) The vicious (οἱ μοχθηροὶ) both seek those with whom they may spend time and flee themselves; (K) for they remember many distressful things, and they expect other things of this sort, when being by themselves, and they forget these when being with others. (L) Nor bearing anything lovable do they feel any friendly attribute towards themselves (οὐδὲν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτοῦς). (M) Indeed neither do such people rejoice together nor grieve together with themselves; (N) for the soul of them is in strife and, because of vice (διὰ μοχθηρίαν), one part grieves at holding back while the other part is pleased, and one drags in this direction, the other in the other direction, just as to tear the soul apart. (O) And if it is not possible to grieve and be pleased at the same time, after a little while at any rate he is grieved because he was pleased, and does not wish these things to become pleasant to him; (P) for the base are full of regret

(μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν). (Q) Indeed the base person does not appear to be situated in a friendly way towards himself because of his not bearing anything lovable (οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν). (1166b2-26)

There are a lot of issues in this passage, but they do not affect my main point: “the things having been mentioned” (A), the friendly attributes (of which wishing goods is most emphasized) arise because of goodness, that is, “insofar as... [people] consider themselves to be decent” (B). If Aristotle distinguishes between the base and the very base, we get the conclusion that people wish goods to themselves only insofar as they are good; the base do so to the extent that they think they are virtuous (B), and the very base do not since they have nothing lovable about themselves, where this presumably reflects their complete baseness or lack of goodness (L, Q). If Aristotle means for (B) to be a preliminary statement and (L, Q) to be his final word about *all* base people, then we still have the idea that such people do not wish goods to themselves, and this on account of their lacking goodness.⁹⁵ The much-debated issue about NE7.6 does not affect this analysis either. In that chapter, Aristotle seems to depict the vicious person as in some way unified and, unlike the akratic person, non-regretful. NE9.4 seems to depict the vicious person, however, as closer to the akratic person, disunified and regretful.⁹⁶ Whatever Aristotle’s considered view of vice or akrasia, my point about NE9.4 still holds: wishing goods for x’s sake is ultimately to wish goods for the sake of goodness. One cannot wish goods for x’s sake if there is no goodness to wish goods for the sake of, and one can wish goods for x’s sake to only a limited extent if there is only limited goodness to wish goods for the sake of (whether the limited goodness is akrasia, NE7.6’s viciousness, or a new kind of viciousness).

⁹⁵ See next paragraph for thinking Aristotle admits self-directed goodwill to the base. Regarding the present passage (1166b2-26), this requires us to read the “more or less (σχεδόν)” in (D) as suggesting that the case of “the very base and impious” (C) applies only “approximately” and not exactly to the case of the moderately base; see Reeve (2014) 329-330 for this reading.

⁹⁶ The contradiction may only be an apparent one. For a recent solution that helpfully assesses previous solutions, see Nielsen (2017).

Before closing, I would like to emphasize the preceding point about degrees of goodwill. Such concern centers on the good, but this need not preclude the non-fully virtuous. Indeed, the “virtue” that is designated in NE9.5 as the object of goodwill must include incomplete virtue,⁹⁷ for two reasons. First, NE9.5 gives the example of contestants or others that we know extremely little about (no prior familiarity is required), so it is probable that goodwill is not necessarily directed at full virtue; it seems hard to believe that in having goodwill for a person we have very little knowledge of, that this very little knowledge includes the fact that this person is *fully* virtuous (i.e. has all the individual virtues of character). This leaves room for non-fully virtuous friends who are in friendships because of the good.⁹⁸ Another reason for thinking that goodwill must include incomplete virtue as an object is that NE9.5 claims that in lower friendships, most of which presumably comprise of the (moderately) base, the friends have goodwill not for each other but towards themselves (εὔνοος... εἶναι... ἐαυτοῖς; 1167a15-17). This suggests that NE9.4 *does* after all admit *intrapersonal* goodwill to the non-fully virtuous; the cause of this is (some degree of) virtue. As far as *interpersonal* goodwill in lower friendships, there does not seem to be any; NE9.5 suggests that this is because the cause of such friendships is not virtue.

In §2.2, I have addressed the question of what causes wishing goods for x’s sake. Two candidates presented themselves: the other person and the lovable thing that the other person embodies. I argued that while the other, numerically distinct person is indeed a final cause of wishing goods for the sake of x (we wish goods for the sake of *that other person*), the lovable is also the final cause. Furthermore, the lovable is the more fundamental final cause; we have seen that one wishes goods for the sake of a person (another or oneself) *because* that person

⁹⁷ Perhaps like *natural* virtue. The distinction between natural (φυσική) virtue and full (κυρία) virtue is that the former does not require *phronēsis* (and therefore all the individual virtues of character); such natural tendencies can inhere in children and animals (NE6.13).

⁹⁸ Cooper (1999.14) 319-20, Irwin (1987) 398, Price (1989) 158.

is good.⁹⁹ Now, there is still a sense in which the *person* is the fundamental final cause, since the *normative* person is identified with her good qualities; but this still does not allow for the *individual* person to be the fundamental final cause, for normative personhood does not individuate between members of a kind but between kinds.

2.3: The Centrality of One's Own Activity

So loving and wishing goods are both finally caused by the lovable, what appears to contribute to one's own happiness. The question still remains as to *how* we are to understand wishing goods for *another's* sake and loving the *other* for himself as hinging on the other's contribution to *one's own* happiness.¹⁰⁰ To begin, I will argue that such concern directed *at oneself* hinges on oneself contributing to one's own happiness. I then show how we are to understand wishing goods for x's sake and loving x for himself, when directed towards *others*, as being ultimately for the sake of one's own happiness; such concern centers on virtue, which facilitates one's own activity, which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness.

Let us begin with wishing goods for x's sake. A number of interpreters would take my reading to miss the whole point of Aristotelian goodwill: its other-directedness. However, goodwill is not essentially other-directed, as NE9.4 discusses the case of wishing goods for x's sake where x is *oneself*. I will now show that goodwill towards oneself is directed at one's own happiness.

NE9.4 (fully discussed in §2.2) suggests that one wishes goods for the sake of oneself to the extent that one is good. This might suggest that one's own character state, virtue, is the ultimate end. But I think that something more fundamental is at stake: the virtuous *activity*

⁹⁹ In agreement with Annas (1988) 4 and Schollmeier (1994) 54.

¹⁰⁰ The mainstream view, as represented in Price (1989) 104, holds that loving someone for himself is to be contrasted with loving someone for how he relates to oneself.

(facilitated by the virtuous *state*) that is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness. While Aristotle's language of wishing goods and loving because of the *good* may have led us to believe that virtuous character states were ultimately at issue, Aristotle was in fact clear from the beginning that virtuous character states are valuable for something further: the promotion of virtuous activity. As early as NE1155b20-21, Aristotle says that the good, unlike the useful, is lovable as an *end*. Presumably, Aristotle means an "*ultimate end*," for we might think that the useful can be loved as an end, just an intermediate one. But if "the good" refers to the ultimate end, it cannot refer to the *state* of virtue as distinguished from the *activity* of virtue (see NE1157b5-7). For Aristotle makes clear that virtue falls short of the ultimate end of happiness, which further requires the *activity* of virtue (NE1095b30-1096a2, NE1098a16-18).¹⁰¹ So when Aristotle speaks of "friendships because of virtue," he does not mean that the friendship gravitates around the *state* of virtue, as opposed to the *activity*. He is speaking in shorthand in these cases, as at NE1158b34-5; here he says that loving (τὸ φιλεῖν), which we might think is an activity, seems to be a *virtue* (ἀρετὴ) of friends.

All this is important for understanding Aristotle's characterization of goodwill towards oneself. If it is virtue *qua state* that is fundamentally at stake with goodwill, we cannot make sense of NE9.4's descriptions of the non-fully virtuous. Aristotle says wishing goods for the sake of oneself is limited to the extent that one does not consider oneself good. If *being* good is what ultimately explains goodwill, this seems *ad hoc*; the vicious person

¹⁰¹ Aristotle also says that the pleasant is loved as an (ultimate) end. The types of pleasant things are manifold, however, so what type or types does Aristotle have in mind as being loved as ultimate? To cohere with his remarks that happiness, the ultimate end, is activity, he must have in mind pleasure that is associated with activity (in what way it is associated is another question involving the complicated issue of whether pleasure *is* the activity, per NE7, or *supervenes on* the activity, per NE10). This is also required to reconcile NE8.6's claim that happy people need pleasant friends (τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς; 1158a25) and NE9.9's claim that the happy person does not need friends because of pleasure (τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ; 1169b25). In NE8.6, context makes clear that the pleasure involved is that which is required for living together, characterized as sharing activity in NE9.12. NE9.9 does not deny this; rather it seems to deny the necessity of pleasure friends where the relevant pleasure is external to activity. All this does not deny the fact that people *do* pursue utility and lower pleasures as ultimate ends; rather, it denies that such ends are *in fact* ultimate.

might scoff at (L) in 1166b2-26, Aristotle's claim that they do not display friendly attributes to themselves because they are not lovable at all.

What is so important about virtuous character that goodwill hinges on it?¹⁰² The answer I think lies in virtue's facilitating virtuous activity (achieving one's own happiness). That is, one has limited goodwill for oneself to the extent that one is not lovable; given §1's result that the lovable is what appears to contribute to one's own happiness, this means one has limited goodwill for oneself to the extent that one does *not* contribute to one's own happiness. The base have limited goodwill towards themselves because the achievement of their base aims leads to objective self-harm (NE9.8.1169a11-15). While the base might shrug off the idea that they lack goodwill towards themselves because of their base *character*, they would probably be more hesitant in shrugging off the idea that they lack goodwill towards themselves because they fail to be happy.

If we turn from wishing goods to love, we see again that contributions to one's own happiness are at stake. Recall that NE9.4 correlates not only *wishing goods* for the sake of oneself with virtue, but also the other friendly attributes towards oneself. Since the friendly attributes are components of *love*, we might think that NE9.4 correlates self-love with virtue. Applying the preceding points about goodwill, it seems that one also *loves* oneself to the extent that one contributes to one's own happiness. Of course, NE9.4 does not strictly invoke "loving x for himself" in its discussion of self-concern; the closest Aristotle gets to applying the expression "loving x for himself" to cases of self-concern is in NE9.8. Here Aristotle explicates self-love, loving "that which each is (ὅτι... ἑκαστός ἐστιν)" (NE9.8.1169a2), in terms of loving the understanding (νοῦς).¹⁰³ As loving the understanding manifests itself in

¹⁰² McKerlie (1991) 95-6, Schroeder (1992) 211, and Whiting (1991) 6 say that both self-concern and other-concern are *ultimately* justified by appeal to character.

¹⁰³ Similarly, NE9.4 explicates wishing goods for "the sort that one is (ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν)" in terms of wishing goods for "that which understands (τὸ νοοῦν)" (1166a22).

executing virtuous actions, in which one's own happiness principally consists, self-love also seems to center on contributions to one's own happiness.

We can now turn to the question of how wishing goods for the sake of *others* and loving *others* for themselves are directed at one's own happiness. Let us begin with wishing goods. After opening with the idea that friendship towards others is derived from friendly attributes displayed towards oneself (1166a1-2), NE9.4 suggests that wishing goods to oneself and displaying the other friendly attributes towards oneself are for the sake of one's own happiness (as we just explored). Aristotle then closes by saying that friendship towards others is based on these friendly attributes that one displays towards oneself (1166a30-33). This seems to be a reiteration of the opening remark that (A) friendship towards others is *derived from* (B) the friendly attributes displayed towards oneself. Given that (B) aims at contributing to one's own happiness via virtuous activity, so too (A).¹⁰⁴

Let us now turn to loving the other for himself. We have seen that this centers on the other's virtue. What does this have to do with one's own happiness? Consider NE1165b15-17:

(A) Nor should the wicked be lovable; (B) for it is necessary that one not be a lover of the wicked, nor to become similar to the base; (C) as it has been said before that similar is friend to similar.

(A) οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· (B) φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· (C) εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον.

Note that Aristotle prohibits loving the wicked on the grounds of what *oneself* becomes: one becomes similar to that which one loves, which here involves being wicked. As being wicked involves unhappiness (§2.2), Aristotle is here appealing to one's own happiness; one should not love the wicked, for one will become wicked and therefore unhappy. Conversely, one should love the virtuous (love because of the other himself), for one will become virtuous and

¹⁰⁴ The soundness of this argument crucially depends on how we interpret "other selfhood." Aristotle here says the fully virtuous display the friendly attributes to themselves because they are fully virtuous, that is, contribute to their objective happiness, and display them to friends because the friends are other selves. In §3, I argue that other selves are valued as facilitating one's own virtuous actualization, that is, one's own happiness.

therefore happy. Again, it is virtuous *activity*, at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness, that is at stake; the process of *becoming* virtuous simply amounts to *acting* virtuously (NE1103b13-22, 1112a1-3).

In the face of remaining skepticism about valuing others' virtue for one's own activity, I will return to the topic of friendship dissolutions. We have already assessed NE9.3's claim that fully virtuous agents dissolve friendships if the final cause, the lovable, does (§1.2.2). Immediately after that passage, Aristotle claims that virtuous agents dissolve friendships when the prospect of *sufficiently equal levels* of the lovable does:

(A) But if one remains (εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένει) but the other becomes more decent and greatly changed in respect to virtue (ὁ δ' ἐπικέσσερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ), is it necessary for the latter to be a friend to the former? Or is this not admissible? (B) In the case of a great distancing it becomes most of all clear (ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται), for example among childhood friendships; for if one remains in respect to his thinking a child (ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς) but the other is a man of the best sort, how could they be friends when they do not take pleasure, rejoice, or are pained regarding the same things? Nor do these things obtain for them concerning each other, and without these as was said there are no friends; for they are not able to live together (συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε). And concerning these things it has been spoken. (1165b23-31)

Before assessing the doctrine of the passage, it is important that we set the scene. First, what kind of friendship is being considered? By this point, NE9.3 seems to have moved on from the other two classes of friendship, utility and pleasure friendships, to the third class of friendship, friendship because of the good; the immediately preceding 1165b13-22, discussed in §1.2.2, at any rate is about the friendship of “good” people.

The second preliminary question: the lovable is clearly a reason for friendship, but a reason for what in particular about friendship and what kind of reason? As the cause of all love, a necessary condition for it, the lovable can be credibly designated a reason for *getting into* friendship. And as the question at hand is about whether one should *maintain* the friendship, the lovable also seems to be a reason for maintaining the friendship.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ I have thereby been arguing for what Price (1989) thinks “seems a category-mistake,” that what Aristotelian friends love is not an individual person “but a complex of repeatable qualities and irrepeatable relations” (98). Price argues that such confusion arises by conflating the object of love with its ground (98, 109) but adds that Aristotle himself invites such confusion by identifying “‘each man’ with a moral persona” (109). My arguments

So far, it is safe to say that these reasons are explanatory; are they motivational or justificatory? It seems motivation is implicated. The calculation surrounding the preservation of the lovable implies this. Further, we must not forget Aristotle's characterization of friendship as an equal exchange of the lovable. The present passage claims that if adequate amounts of the lovable cannot be maintained, the friendship dissolves. Aristotle says this claim was "previously mentioned" (B), presumably in a very similar remark at NE8.7.1158b33-35, 1159a3-5.¹⁰⁶ Noteworthy is the fact that this last passage exemplifies a principle stated in the immediately preceding 1158b23-33, that the lovable must be equalized in friendship. §1.2.2 has already discussed the implications of this characterization of friendship as a system of equal exchange; friends are motivated by receiving a return of the lovable, for it is difficult to conceive of a system of exchange as not involving agents who take a return as a good reason for engaging in the system.

Whether or not the lovable is a *justificatory* reason for getting into and maintaining friendship is more difficult to establish. The immediately preceding 1165b13-22 was about fully virtuous people,¹⁰⁷ so we could infer normativity there; can we do so here? The general picture that Aristotle is considering is in (A), where there is a gap in virtue. If the superior party is *fully* virtuous and is partly responsible for dissolving the friendship, then Aristotle presumably endorses the dissolution. But it is not immediately clear that (A)'s superior party *is* fully virtuous. Even though the superior party in (B) is clearly fully virtuous, as he is "a man of the best sort," the dissolution here involves a fairly extreme case, where the inferior party lacks full virtue (the inferior party thinks like a child and children cannot be fully

suggest that Aristotle made such an identification precisely in order to make clear that the good is both the object and ground of love.

¹⁰⁶ Here, distances in virtue entail terminations of virtue friendship. That it is again the *prospect* of sufficiently equal virtue that is at stake is suggested by the example of an *insurmountable* distance: that between god and (presumably) humans.

¹⁰⁷ The passage discusses "friendship of the good"; this is interchangeable with "complete friendship," which features fully virtuous agents.

virtuous). The *extremity* of this example blocks an immediate application to (A)'s general case of *some* gap in virtue.

However, I do not think that we need to secure full virtue for (A)'s superior party to show that Aristotle *endorses* the superior party's dissolving the friendship with the inferior party. For NE9.3 endorses the behavior it describes, and the present passage does not seem to be an exception. (A) asks if a superior party should dissolve a friendship with an inferior party. (B) grants that the decision may be complicated and is clear only in extreme cases. But it would be strange for the conclusion to be that one should *not* dissolve a friendship with a greatly inferior party. Aristotle clearly endorses the opposite course of action.

A final question before delving into the doctrine of the passage: is the inferior party virtuous (whether fully or not)? An affirmative answer would be disconcerting for altruistic interpretations. It might be understandable for friendship that prioritizes the other to dissolve if the inferior party is *vicious* (as occurs in the immediately preceding 1165b13-22, discussed in §1.2.2). But it is less understandable for friendship to prioritize the other if the abandoned party is *virtuous*.

One piece of evidence that the inferior party is virtuous rests on the passage's comparative language: (A) says the superior party becomes more "decent," that is, more virtuous.¹⁰⁸ We are told that the first person remains in some unspecified way but that the other becomes more virtuous than the first person. But for the comparative language to make sense, both people must have been virtuous before this change took place;¹⁰⁹ if both friends were previously non-virtuous, and one remains so but the other becomes virtuous *simpliciter*, it would be more accurate to say just this, that the latter becomes "virtuous," not "more" so.

¹⁰⁸ In the present passage, Aristotle uses the comparative form of "decent," ἐπιεικής: ἐπιεικέστερος. This word sometimes marks the fully virtuous person and is often interchangeable with "good (ἀγαθός)" and "excellent (σπουδαῖος)," as is especially apparent in NE9.9. This marks a departure from EE8.3, where the "good (ἀγαθός)" person falls short of the genuinely virtuous "fine and good (καλὸς καγαθός)" person.

¹⁰⁹ Pace Cooper (1999.14), who suggests that "*both* parties are quite deficient with respect to their appropriate excellences" (319).

Indeed, (A) suggests that one party becomes “greatly changed in respect to virtue,” presumably pre-existing virtue. So the inferior party is virtuous, whether the relevant virtue is full virtue, the natural virtue that is open to even children (NE6.13), or some virtue in between. In fact, it might very well be the case that *full* virtue is at stake; (A) seems to simply assume the subject matter of the immediately preceding passage, which discussed virtue friendship between fully virtuous agents.¹¹⁰

So to summarize the scene of the passage before turning to its doctrine: Aristotle endorses a person of some kind of virtue breaking off a virtue friendship with another person of some kind of virtue, on the grounds of insufficiently equal virtue. This is a stronger claim than dissolving the virtue friendship on the grounds of vice, the claim in the immediately preceding 1165b13-22 (§1.2.2). But there is a key similarity between the two claims: they are both about prospects. In the previous passage, the friendship dissolves if the prospect of virtue *simpliciter* dissolves; here, the friendship dissolves if the prospect of *sufficiently equal* virtue dissolves. That the *prospect* of sufficiently equal virtue is at stake is suggested by Aristotle’s depicting the gap as *insurmountable*; if the gap was surmountable, why not exhort the advanced friend to improve the static friend, or exhort the static friend to try to catch up?¹¹¹ Since the prospect of the lovable (here, the good instantiated by virtue) matters, the

¹¹⁰ There are various reasons for doubting that the subject here is that of a fully virtuous agent outstripping another fully virtuous agent. First, it might seem strange for there to be degrees of full virtue. But degrees of full virtue are what Aristotle seems to have in mind when taking magnificence as larger-scale generosity (NE4.1-2) and taking the happiness of moral virtuous activity as “second (Δευτέρως)” to the happiness of intellectual virtuous activity (NE10.8.1178a9). The second reason for doubting that both agents are fully virtuous is the example in (B) of childhood friendships. As children cannot be fully virtuous (NE1099b33-1100a3, 1144b1-9), one might think that for it to be relevant to (A), (A) must not be talking about the fully virtuous. However, (B) does not have to be about full virtue to be relevant to a point about full virtue. (A) could be asking how one decides to break off a friendship with a fully virtuous person, and then (B)’s suggestion is that it is easiest to answer this question in cases where the gap closely approximates that between a fully virtuous person and a person who has not achieved full virtue, a person who thinks like a child. So (B) does not have to involve two fully virtuous people but can still illuminate a case involving two fully virtuous people.

¹¹¹ One could deny that prospects are at stake by suggesting that Aristotle is not depicting a friendship’s development over time; so the question is not so much about the future (where is this friendship going?) but about the present or past, with Aristotle framing this question as a thought experiment. However, I think the passage depicts a diachronic development, not a synchronic thought experiment, for three reasons. First, the passage constantly mentions one party “remaining” while the other “changes” or “becomes.” Second, Aristotle cites childhood friends as an example. The thought seems to be about what one does in *actual* situations in

lovable must be at least a final cause of love; if the lovable is just the efficient, material, or formal cause, prospects should *not* matter (§1.2). So the friend loves *for the sake of* the lovable, the good.

How does this account of friendship dissolutions bear on the question of altruism? I think it shows that in friendships, virtuous agents are not altruistic. For if they *were* altruistic, it is unclear why they should dissolve the friendship when the other party fails to be *equally* virtuous. This is different from the scenario in 1165b13-22 when the other party fails to be virtuous *simpliciter*. There, dissolving the friendship is straightforwardly compatible with an altruistic outlook; for the vicious other has immoral ends. But in the present passage, the friend who is left behind is not left behind for being vicious; she is left behind for not being sufficiently equal in virtue. It is unclear that this elitism is compatible with prioritization of the other.

Is it compatible with *self*-prioritization? If we understand Aristotelian friends as non-instrumentally valuable, we are left with a fairly crude picture: Aristotle is telling virtuous agents to break off a relationship that is presumably beneficial for the inferior virtuous party, on the grounds that this party is not good enough for oneself. However, aside from being crude, this picture does not seem to go deep enough; it focuses on virtue *qua* state where we might think that virtue *qua* activity is ultimate (as discussed earlier in the section). I think, then, we should turn to virtue *qua* activity; the ultimate focal point is not the other's character, but rather the associated activity that is at least the most important part of one's own happiness. This shift leads to a fuller picture: Aristotelian friends are *instrumentally* valuable for activity, rather than non-instrumentally valuable objects of admiration. Indeed, our passage in NE9.3 hints at this by suggesting that the reason why virtue friendships hinge

which one was once in a childhood friendship with someone but outstrips him over time. Third, the immediately following 1165b31-36 clearly refers to an actual past relationship which “occurred (γενομένης)” and of which we have a “memory (μνείαν).” Apparently, the discussion of the dissolving virtue friendship is referring to a development of an actual relationship across time, not to a synchronic thought experiment.

on distance of virtue levels is that sufficient distance denies the possibility of living together (συμβιῶν; B in NE1165b23-36),¹¹² which NE9.12 characterizes as a superlatively beneficial form of sharing activity.¹¹³

So *pace* Cooper,¹¹⁴ it does not seem too unnatural after all to understand loving διὰ the good as loving a friend for the sake of preserving and boosting the friend's goodness;¹¹⁵ we can now imagine the importance of preserving and boosting (to some adequate level) the virtuous *state of one's partner* so as to facilitate the virtuous *activity of oneself*.¹¹⁶ The idea is that happiness consists in superlatively choiceworthy activity that one shares with others, but one needs an adequately virtuous partner to adequately engage in this superlatively choiceworthy activity. Consider this analogy, which is not too far off from NE9.8's depiction of virtue competitions. Say that x takes tennis to be his ultimate end. But tennis, at least adequately executed tennis, must be shared, so x forges a friendship with a tennis partner. Since it is the activity of tennis that is ultimately choiceworthy, the concern for the tennis friend here manifests itself in preserving and boosting the tennis friend's tennis skill, to match the level of play.¹¹⁷

Let me sum up the chapter. I argued previously that we should understand the lovable as at least the final cause of love and that it is that which appears to contribute to one's own happiness (§1). As Aristotle says that all friends love only because of the lovable, this amounts to all friends loving only for the sake of their own happiness. In §2.1-2 I showed *that* this framework can accommodate wishing goods for another's sake and loving another

¹¹² In agreement with Badhwar and Jones (2017) §2 and Kraut (2017) §9. Pangle (2003) makes a similar point, but in reference to shared activity, not shared life (139).

¹¹³ See §3.2.5 for this point.

¹¹⁴ (1999.14) 323.

¹¹⁵ Pakaluk (1998) 72.

¹¹⁶ As I mentioned in §1.1, I think the good that is lovable maps onto the fine that is choiceworthy (1104b30-1). In §4.2 I will argue that "the fine" refers to virtuous actualization. All these claims would be supported by our findings in §2; loving because of the good seems to amount to loving because of virtuous actualization (=fine).

¹¹⁷ The primacy of activity over the friend reflects the analysis of NE9.12; people take various activities as the ends of their lives and *then* choose friends to partner in these antecedently selected activities.

for himself; these types of concern center on the good, which is a case of the lovable, that which appears to contribute to one's own happiness. In this last section, I have illustrated *how* to understand loving another's goodness or wishing goods for the sake of another's goodness as concern for *one's own* happiness. In both wishing goods for the sake of the other and loving the other for himself, the final cause is the virtue that contributes to one's own virtuous activity, which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness.

An egoistic interpretation of Aristotelian friendship seems then to prevail over an altruistic one, for in wishing goods for the other's sake of and loving the other for himself, one takes the other's goodness as good for oneself.¹¹⁸ Now this might seem morally abhorrent, but it is perhaps easier to digest with a shift in perspective. Let us assume that I have *disinterested* concern for a person x and am assessing x's choice of friends. Let us assume that I take virtuous activity as the most important component of the good life. It seems not completely problematic for me to want x to have a friend who is as good as she is, so as to facilitate her moral flourishing. Further, while I want x, as a virtuous agent, to wish and do goods for the sake of her friend, I want x to prioritize her own moral flourishing and not compromise her virtue. As NE9.3 suggests, the unfortunate situation may arise that the friend loses his virtue; but if such a friend becomes incurably vicious, I would not want x to prioritize the numerically distinct person. Or let us suppose that x drastically outstrips her friend in virtue. I might be fine with x maintaining a modern "friendship" with its occasional contact or a Facebook "friendship" with its insubstantial contact. But I might be less fine with her maintaining an Aristotelian virtue friendship with the vastly inferior person, whereby she lives together with the friend and spends the majority of her waking hours with him.

¹¹⁸ This straightforwardly explains why Aristotle's function argument seems to shift from the goodness of humans to the good for humans (Glassen [1957], Whiting [1988]). A virtuous person x's goodness is good for x as going hand in hand with achieving x's objective happiness; and it is good for a normatively identical but numerically distinct person y, because of the activity involved. This is incompatible with Stern-Gillet's (1995) assertion that "moral goodness cannot be either the object or the ground of egoistic desire," insofar as Stern-

Does this thought experiment render (my interpretation of) Aristotle's theory of friendship morally palatable? If so, would this palatability suddenly dissipate if we substitute ourselves for x? If so, why? These are questions for another day.

3: Aristotle on Loving Other Selves

Is Aristotelian friendship egoistic or altruistic? If it is egoistic, one friend prioritizes (in some way) her own happiness over the other; if it is altruistic, one friend prioritizes (in some way) the other's happiness over her own. Both of these options face a major obstacle, however: Aristotle's crucial notion of "another self."¹¹⁹ When Aristotle says x loves y as another *self*, presumably some kind of identification obtains. But understood in one way, the identification involved in other selfhood renders non-sensical *both* egoism *and* altruism. Egoism presumes that one prioritizes oneself over the other, but in the case of other selves, this might amount to prioritizing oneself over oneself (where the other has been identified with oneself). And similarly with altruism, where one prioritizes the other over oneself, we might get the prioritization of the other over the other (where oneself has been identified with the other). No prioritization between other selves seems permissible here. Assuming Aristotle's account of other selfhood is normative, if other selfhood implies non-prioritization, then Aristotle's normative theory of friendship is neither egoistic nor altruistic.

In this chapter, I explore two interpretations of "another self," as the notion occurs in NE. One such interpretation fits the non-prioritizing model of Aristotelian friendship mentioned above; it is what I will call the "Non-Prioritizing Reading of Other Selfhood" (henceforth abbreviated as "NPOS"). The idea here is that the essential feature of other selfhood is full virtue, which is shared by the relevant parties; x loves y as another self for y's full virtue, which is shared by x. The shared identity in full virtue denies prioritization: x treats himself in one way because of full virtue, and treats y in the same way because of full virtue. It is important to emphasize that the virtue in question is the full (κυρία) virtue of the φρόνιμος (NE6.13), and that the virtue must be shared in the sense of "equally activated"; for

¹¹⁹ There are three formulations of this: (1) ἄλλος/ἕτερος αὐτὸς ("another self") at NE1161b28, 1166a32, 1169b6, 1170b6, EE1245a30, (2) διαίρετὸς αὐτὸς ("separate self") at EE1245a35, and (3) ἄλλος/ἕτερος ἐγὼ ("another I"), three times in MM1213a10-25. Even though Michael of Ephesus, whom I will mention in some footnotes, is commenting on NE, he once uses MM's formulation (515.7-19).

non-prioritization is meant to obtain here, but Aristotle repeatedly says the worthier person should be prioritized (NE4.3, 5.3).¹²⁰

Another interpretation of other selfhood, one that fits an egoistic model of Aristotelian friendship, is what I will call the “Egoistic Reading of Other Selfhood” (henceforth, “EOS”). Here, the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one’s own actualization (ἐνέργεια), which for Aristotle is at least the most important part of one’s own happiness or living well (εὐδαιμονία). This implies self-prioritization: x loves y as another self in that y contributes to x’s own actualization, which is *distinct* from y’s actualization.

Two interrelated sets of distinctions illuminate the difference between EOS and NPOS: the distinction between numerical and normative identity, and the distinction between virtue *qua* state and virtue *qua* activity (both sets of distinctions were elaborated upon in the Introduction). Let us begin with the first set of distinctions. NPOS understands the *selfhood* of other selves in terms of *normative* identity: y is x’s other self because of full virtue, the *normative* identity that x and y share. Since x and y are normatively *identical*, primacy of oneself or of the other is impermissible and both the altruistic and egoistic interpretations of friendship are therefore wrong. EOS understands the selfhood of other selves in terms rather of *numerical* identity: y is x’s other self in that y promotes x’s virtuous activity, which is *numerically distinct* from everyone else’s virtuous activity. This focus on one’s own numerically distinct actualization suggests egoism.

Another set of distinctions that clarifies the difference between NPOS and EOS is that of virtue *qua* state versus virtue *qua* activity or actualization. NPOS suggests that what makes y x’s other self is the full virtue that y shares with x, while EOS suggests what makes y x’s

¹²⁰ I discuss the relationship between full virtue and equal virtue below. One might wonder why it is not *equal* virtue, whether or not it is *full* virtue, that should be the basis for NPOS. The lack of support for this position might be due to the dim prospects for non-prioritization being displayed among non-fully virtuous agents. Irwin (1987) 398 and Whiting (2006) 289-90 present a distinct view, whereby it is not equal virtue that is essential for other selfhood but some kind of virtue that is or approximates full virtue that is essential. But both seem to go for some sort of altruistic interpretation, not a non-prioritization one.

other self is y's involvement in the actualization of x's virtues. When NPOS takes other selfhood to center on full virtue, it refers to virtue *qua state*. EOS, on the other hand, takes other selfhood to center on virtue *qua activity*. Given the dual reference of "virtue," proponents of EOS could also say that other selfhood centers on virtue. But to make the distinction clear, I reserve "virtue" for virtue *qua state*, and "virtuous activity" for virtue *qua activity*.

As mentioned, the distinction between normative identity and numerical identity and the distinction between virtue and virtuous activity are related. Namely, the way NPOS and EOS differ on the first distinction depends on the way they differ on the latter distinction. Non-prioritization manifests itself in prioritizing those who are normatively identical to oneself (the fully virtuous person in question and all her colleagues); and prioritizing the normatively identical follows from using virtuous state as a criterion for valuing people (including oneself), for the virtuous state is *shared* between the normatively identical. Egoism manifests itself in prioritizing those who are numerically identical to oneself (only oneself); and prioritizing the numerically identical follows from using virtuous activity as a criterion for valuing people, for virtuous activity is unique to individuals and cannot be fully shared between numerically distinct individuals. The interrelations here receive more discussion in §3.3.

In this chapter, I will argue for EOS. In the first section, "Parents, Other Selves, and the Centrality of Self-Actualization" (§3.1), I discuss the first two instances of "another self." In the first instance (NE8.12.1161b28), we are told that children are other selves of parents. In the second instance (NE9.4.1166a32), we are told that fully virtuous people display all the friendly attributes (φιλικὰ) towards themselves, and so too towards their friends on account of these friends being other selves. An analysis of various passages suggests that children are other selves because, as products of the parents, they are actualizations of the parents' own

being (τὸ εἶναι); the special concern that parents show towards them is special because of this fact.¹²¹ I argue that it is this involvement in one's own actualization, not full virtue, that is essential for other selfhood. Indeed, NE9.4's example of children as other selves of parents suggests that full virtue is not even necessary for other selfhood. All this suggests that NPOS is incorrect, because other selfhood does not center on the normative identity of full virtue. Rather, other selfhood centers on numerically distinct actualization; children are other selves of a parent in that they contribute to the parent's actualization, which is *numerically distinct* from that of everyone else's.

"Cognitive Self-Actualization with Other Selves" (§3.2) turns to NE9.9, where we get our final two instances of "another self" (NE1169b6, NE1170b6). Here Aristotle focuses on other selves among the fully virtuous and argues that the happy person needs a virtue friend, on the grounds that this virtue friend is another self. Again, Aristotle represents the essential feature of other selfhood as involvement in one's own self-actualization; having discussed self-actualization in terms of production (NE9.7) and action (NE9.8), Aristotle now elaborates upon self-actualization in terms of cognition (NE9.9), suggesting that happy people need other selves for this cognitive self-actualization. Aristotle brings this all together in NE9.12, where he explains why it is that we need another self to actualize ourselves: self-actualization occurs in the easy and continuous ways required for happiness only in living together, which requires another self. I will argue that while EOS makes sense of Aristotle's arguments for why the happy person needs friends, NPOS cannot.

¹²¹ The connection between other selves and self-actualization is not well-explored, though my argument bears some similarity to Benson (1990) 58-9, Carreras (2012) 325-6, Millgram (1987) 366-8, Reeve (1992) 181 (largely following Millgram), Schollmeier (1986) 387-8, and Scott (2001) 227-8. My account breaks new ground in that it offers much more textual detail on this connection; after all, this entire chapter is dedicated to this connection, whereas in the aforementioned papers the connection is not the main issue and receives, at most, several pages of attention. Further, none of the aforementioned writers argue that Aristotle's account of other selves is instrumental (with the exception of Reeve).

In sum, we have reason to accept EOS. “From Activity to Egoism, From Egoism to Partiality” (§3.3) draws some general conclusions, showing how Aristotle’s prioritization of virtue *qua* activity grounds egoism and how Aristotle’s egoism in turn grounds partiality.

Before proceeding with the argument, I would like to make three clarificatory remarks. First, it is important to make clear what EOS does *not* entail. EOS does not take full virtue to be the essential feature of other selfhood, but this does not entail that virtue, full or not, is irrelevant to other selfhood. Virtue is relevant, for EOS takes the other self to be involved in one’s own *second* actualization (activity), which builds on first actualization (state). The first actualization in question is virtue of a certain sort, whether full virtue or virtue that only approximates full virtue; such approximately full virtue seems to be what Aristotle has in mind with family virtue (NE8.12), natural virtue (NE6.13), and human virtue in general (*Politics* 1.13). This dependence of the relevant second actualization on first actualization, and the dependence of the relevant first actualization on full virtue suggests that the model of other selfhood is normative. This will become clearer in §3.1.2.

Second, unlike NPOS, which defines other selfhood in terms of the virtue of the *other* (what makes the other another self is the fact that the *other* is fully virtuous), EOS defines other selfhood in terms of the virtuous actualization of *oneself* (what makes the other another self is the fact that the other is involved in *one’s own* virtuous actualization). But while EOS does not define other selfhood in terms of the virtue of the other, the virtue of the other is still relevant; there are good reasons to believe that the virtue of the other is relevant to the way in which the other is involved in one’s own actualization (a fully virtuous other self seems to be involved in one’s own actualization to a higher degree than a non-fully virtuous other self, as we see in the accounts of shared activity in NE9.9 and NE9.12). But EOS does not feature the virtue of the other in its definition of other selfhood.

My final clarificatory remark involves the relationship between full virtue and non-prioritization. Many assume that (1) having full virtue implies (2) being equally virtuous to all other fully virtuous people, which implies (3) non-prioritization among fully virtuous people. However, I think (1) and (2) come apart. As assessed in §2.3, NE9.3 suggests that one fully virtuous person disbands a friendship with another fully virtuous person on the grounds that insufficient virtuous activity obtains with a less fully virtuous person. In this paper, I argue against interpretations of other selfhood that assume (1) implies (2), even though I reject this implication. This is not to say that my argument *requires* an opponent who accepts this implication. Even if (1) does not imply (2), NPOS proponents would still take (2) to imply (3). Now, (2) is clearly relevant to NE9.8 and NE9.9, which seem to consider *equally* fully virtuous agents. But I will argue that self-prioritization occurs regardless in both NE9.8 (to be discussed in §4) and NE9.9 (§3.2).

3.1: Parents, Other Selves, and the Centrality of Self-Actualization

In this section, I assess the first two instances of “another self,” both of which are connected to the examples of parents. The main question here is whether the same use of “another self” is operating in both passages, or if NE9.4’s instance takes full virtue as essential, while NE8.12 takes involvement in one’s own actualization as essential. Some interpreters pass over the *prima facie* distinction; Annas (1977), Kahn (1981), McKerlie (1991), Miller (2014), Schroeder (1992), and Stern-Gillet (1995) for example talk of other selves in terms of fully virtuous people. Belfiore (2001)¹²² and Schollmeier (1994)¹²³ address the *prima facie* differences and posit two essentially different kinds of other selfhood. In contrast to passing over the distinction or saying that there is an essential distinction, Price

¹²² 121-2, 130-1.

¹²³ 8, 28-29.

(1989)¹²⁴ recognizes the *prima facie* distinction but rejects it; he argues that Aristotle's labeling children "other selves" amounts to the children being prospective but not actual other selves; these can only be other selves once they become fully virtuous adults. Like Price, I observe the *prima facie* distinction between familial and non-familial other selves and reject that there are two distinct kinds, but unlike him I do not take the former as a merely prospective predication of "other selfhood." Rather, I argue that there is really just one kind of other self operating in both NE8.12 and NE9.4, and that involvement in one's own actualization, not full virtue, is essential. In short, the first two instances of other selfhood confirm EOS and deny NPOS.

I will begin with NE8.12, arguing that a child is another self of the parent in that it is a product coming from the parent (§3.1.1). I take NE9.7 to expand upon this point, and so turn there to the analysis of production as self-actualization; I argue that it is this self-actualization that explains why the other self is choiceworthy. I then turn to the second instance of "another self," found in NE9.4 (§3.1.2). There Aristotle says that fully virtuous people display friendly attributes towards themselves and that they display these towards their friends because their friends are other selves. It would seem then that full virtue is the essential feature of other selfhood; it is full virtue that explains equality of treatment (displaying the friendly attributes) for oneself and the friend (the other self). However, the mention of mothers as paradigm instantiations of some of the friendly attributes complicates this. For it is unclear that mothers displaying friendly attributes to their children because these are other selves has anything to do with the full virtue of either party. Against NPOS, full virtue seems unnecessary for other selfhood; NE9.4's instance of another self then seems to rely on the account developed in NE8.12, where involvement in one's own actualization is essential for other selfhood. I close with some objections to the above account (§3.1.3).

¹²⁴ 164-5.

3.1.1: Actualization and Other Selfhood

Let us now turn to our first instance of “another self,” in NE8.12’s discussion of family friendships:

(A) And familial [friendship] seems to have many species, but all [friendship] depends on fatherly [friendship]; (B) for parents are fond of children since these are something of themselves, and the children are fond of the parents since [the children] are something from these. (C) And the parents know the ones from themselves more than do the ones having been born that [they are] from the [parents], (D) and the thing from which more regards as its own the one having been born than the one having become [regards as its own] the one producing; (E) for a x from y is [regarded as] one’s own by that y from which [the x] came, as teeth, hair, and things of this sort [are regarded as one’s own] by the possessor; but the y from which [a x comes is regarded as one’s own] by that x not at all or to a lesser degree. (F) [These points apply] also in respect to the quantity of time; for the [parents] straightaway are fond of the things having become, but the [children are fond of] the parents [only] with time having passed, when they have obtained comprehension or perception. (G) From these [observations] it is also clear why mothers love more. (H) Therefore parents love children as themselves, (I) for the things from them are as other selves, [other] in respect to having been separated.¹²⁵

(A) καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· (B) οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὥς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὥς ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. (C) μᾶλλον δ’ ἴσασι οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, (D) καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· (E) τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ’ οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς θριζὶς ὅτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ’ οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ’ οὗ, ἢ ἥττον. (F) καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσις ἢ αἴσθησις λαβόντα. (G) ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι’ ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. (H) γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὥς ἑαυτούς (I) (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι). (NE1161b16-29)

The passage opens by saying that all family friendships depend on friendship with the father

(A), because (γὰρ) the fondness between parents and children is rooted in the children being from (genitive, ἀπὸ) the parents (B). (C) and (D) then claim that there is greater knowledge¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Something along the lines of “other in respect to having been separated” is the translation adopted by the modern mainstream for τῷ κεχωρίσθαι (following Burnet [1900] 390), understanding the articular infinitive as a dative of respect. However, Stewart (Volume 2) thinks that this infinitive does not explain ἕτεροι in this way but is actually conjoined to it, to emphasize the paradoxical conjunction of “other” and “self”; the thought is that, while other *and* separated, the child is still a self of the parent (321-2). It is not clear how this conjunction makes sense of the dative case of τῷ κεχωρίσθαι. Indeed, Stewart admits this reading yields overdetermination: “Τῷ κεχωρίσθαι qualifies αὐτοὶ paradoxically—though indeed the paradox is already contained in the application of ἕτεροι to αὐτοί.”

¹²⁶ Aristotle has already discussed knowing in connection to mothers. In NE8.8.1159a27-33, he takes friendship to consist more in activity, and the only piece of evidence he cites for this in context is a mother’s love, which is content in activity without passivity (being loved in return). What is interesting about this example is that the activity in question is knowing. The mother has given up care of the child to someone else and presumably has very limited contact with the child, and thus the activity of loving here seems limited to knowing; mothers are content with merely knowing (εἰδυῖαι) and seeing (ὁρῶσιν) that the child is doing well. EE and MM feature parallels. EE1239a34-40 says loving (φιλεῖν) is closer to friendship (φιλία) than being loved (φιλεῖσθαι) is; being loved is closer rather to the lovable (φιλητόν). The evidence for this is that if a friend cannot both know

and sense of ownership of the other, respectively, on the part of the parents; this is because (γὰρ) the children are from (ἐκ, ἀπὸ) the parents (E).¹²⁷ (F) then returns to fondness, the topic of (B), and correlates it with temporal duration. What about this duration matters? It seems that something cognitive is at stake, since the child only becomes fond when it has acquired comprehension or at least perception.¹²⁸ This reminds one of (C), which says that x's better *knowledge* of y results from y's being from x. Note that in all these cases, the common element is this "being from" relation: (1) fondness connects with being from oneself (A, B), (2) knowledge connects with being from oneself (C, E), and (3) ownership connects with being from oneself (D, E).¹²⁹

(G) and (H) then draw conclusions from these claims. (G) refers to the previous remarks as explaining why maternal love in particular is so great.¹³⁰ And (H) begins with a "therefore" that points to the preceding remarks; these ground its claim that parents love children as they do themselves.¹³¹ But (H) seems overdetermined, for (I) also grounds it; the "for (γὰρ)" that begins (I) suggests that (I) grounds (H). But Aristotle is not saying, x (A-G)

and be known, he prefers just to know. MM1210b3-13 parallels the activity of loving, knowing, and benefiting, taking these to be superior to being loved, being known, and being benefited, respectively.

¹²⁷ One might wonder whether the "for (γὰρ)" clause (E) is meant to explain both (C) and (D) or just (D). I think it is best to take it as explaining both, given the parallel "more (μᾶλλον)" in both, and the "and (καὶ)" connecting both.

¹²⁸ Pakaluk (1998) thinks what matters about the duration is greater activity (130-1). This should answer his puzzlement about (D-E); he assumes that ownership is reciprocal, such that the parent should have no different relationship towards the child as the child towards the parent on this score. However, I think Aristotle takes ownership (perhaps it is better to say, "a sense of ownership") here to follow from activity—this is why Aristotle bothers invoking the general type "the one making (τῷ ποιήσαντι)" in addition to the token (in context, the parent), to highlight the *active* party. This answers another worry of Pakaluk's concerning (C), that it is unclear why better knowledge should imply greater loving (see Footnote 126). The parents' knowledge is better because of the activity involved, and as we will see in NE9.7, greater activity implies greater loving.

¹²⁹ The categorization of (F) is not straightforward, but I think it takes up (1) and (2), connecting them; parents are fonder (1) in less time than children because of their superior cognitive standing (2), which results from the children being from the parents.

¹³⁰ This is probably comparing mothers to fathers (Belfiore [2001] 127). For (F) has already compared parents in general to children and (G) is making a new comparative claim concerning mothers in particular. At NE1168a24-7 Aristotle also compares mothers to fathers while only mentioning the former, suggesting that mothers love children more than fathers because of the greater effort involved in reproduction.

¹³¹ (H) probably does not point back just to (G). This would suggest that (H) concludes just from (G); however, (H) seems to be a conclusion for the *whole* passage.

therefore (H), (H) because something different from x (I); rather, (I) is summarizing the main points of the preceding.

We can see this by reconstructing the reasoning. Aristotle seems to explain greater levels of fondness, knowledge, and ownership by appealing to the relation of being *from* oneself. Then he tells us that parents love children as they do themselves (H). The “love” here, if it does not encapsulate fondness, knowledge, and ownership, at least parallels them. Now, to show that parents love children as they do *themselves*, Aristotle relates children to the parents *themselves* by labeling the children as other *selves* (I). And what justifies labeling children as other selves of the parents is the fact that they are *from* (ἐξ) the parents (I). In short, the ultimate explanation for (H)’s claim that parents love children as they do themselves is that the children are *from* the parents, which is the same ultimate explanation for the various types of concern mentioned in the preceding remarks. Hence, (I) summarizes the preceding remarks and in explaining (H) does not overdetermine it. The “therefore” beginning (H) refers to the ultimate explanation used for the preceding remarks, which is then explicitly raised in (I); the special concern of parents for children is explained by the children being other selves, which is explained by the fact that the children are *from* the parents.

What then does “being from oneself” invoke? It arguably refers to a production relation; “children being from the parents” clearly refers to the children being reproductive products of the parents and probably also refers to more general production, as NE8.12 later calls parents “causes” of their children’s being, nourishing, and education (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφεῖν αἷτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι; 1162a4-7).¹³² But “being from” refers to something more ultimate than production; as I will now show of NE9.7, this production (“being from oneself”) relation that underlies other selfhood points ultimately to

¹³² The link between “children being *from* parents” and “parents being *causes* of the children” is reinforced by Reeve’s (2016) observation that “from (ἐκ)” is associated with the material *cause* (311n237).

actualization. This suggests that the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization.

At the beginning of NE9.7, Aristotle asks why benefactors love beneficiaries more than vice versa. One answer is that benefactors and beneficiaries are like creditors and debtors; benefactors love beneficiaries more than vice versa because of the expectation of receiving what is owed. However, Aristotle rejects this model, suggesting an explanation that is more natural (φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἷτιον):

(A) Benefactors love and cherish the ones having been benefited even if they are neither useful nor will become [useful] at a later time. Which also applies in the case of craftsmen; for every craftsman cherishes his own work more than [the work] would cherish [him], under the hypothesis that the work become ensouled. And this holds most of all perhaps concerning poets; for these ones exceedingly cherish their poems, just as being fond of [their own] children. (B) The case of benefactors indeed also seems to resemble such a case; for the one having been benefited is the work of these ones [i.e. the benefactors]; thus they cherish this one more than the work [cherishes] the one producing. (C) The cause of this is that being is to everyone choiceworthy and lovable, and that [it is] in actualization that we are being (for [it is] in living and acting [that we are being]). (D) The work is somehow the one producing, in actualization; thus he [i.e. the one producing] is fond of his work, because [the work] is also [his] being. (E) And this is natural; for what he [i.e. the one producing] is in potentiality, this the work points to in actualization.

(A) οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας καὶ μηδὲν ὧς χρησιμοὶ μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου· μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. (B) τοιοῦτῳ δὲ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. (C) τούτου δ' αἷτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητὸν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργεῖα (τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν). (D) ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ πῶς· στέργει δὲ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. (E) τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μὴνύει. (NE9.7.1167b31-1168a9)¹³³

Let us examine the argument. (A) tells us that benefactors love their beneficiaries even if no utility accrues to themselves as a result. Aristotle says that the same is true of craftsmen, but it is unclear that the same point is operating in the description of craftsmen that immediately follows. For he makes no mention of utility, but goes on to talk about works: craftsmen love their *works*, poets do this “most of all (μάλιστα),” as if (ὥσπερ) the *works* were their own children.¹³⁴ For the same point to carry on from the first example of benefactors, the thought

¹³³ See also EE7.9 and MM2.12, which explain the greater love of parents by appeal to their greater activity.

¹³⁴ The parents-children relation seem to be a paradigm of the poets-poems relation, which in turn seems to be a paradigm of the craftsman-work relation, to which the benefactor-beneficiary case is likened. That parents and

must be that there is something choiceworthy about the craftsman's work independent of utility.

(C)-(E) argue that the craftsman's own being is the reason: (1) being (τὸ εἶναι) is choiceworthy (C), (2) one accesses being ("we are being") in activity (ἐνεργεῖα) (C), and (3) a work counts as activity (D and E). (D) is clear that the value here lies in the being being *one's own*; the work just is *the producer*, in respect to activity. (E) also suggests this. The work is in activity (ἐνεργεῖα) what *the producer* is in potentiality (δυνάμει); the producer has the state (here characterized as potentiality)¹³⁵ of producing, but it is only in actively producing a work where the producer gets (second) actualization. Again, the focal point is *the producer's* being.

This argument suggests that involvement in one's own actualization is the essential feature of other selfhood. Going beyond NE8.12's point that other selves are products of oneself, NE9.7 suggests that something further is at stake: actualization. This is clearest in (D), which suggests the product just is the producer in respect to actualization. There are two points worth drawing out. First, the product is *identified* with the producer, is an other *self* of the producer.¹³⁶ Second, this identification is cashed out in terms of actualization.

Numerically, the product and the producer are distinct. But they are identical in respect to *the producer's actualization*; the product is an other self in virtue of being *the producer's self-*

children are brought together with these very general kinds of production suggests again that the way that children are *from* the parents, the way that they are products of the parents, refers to something more general than reproduction. Still, reproduction takes center stage; just after the quoted passage, 1168a21-27 again raise the example of mothers, using them as an example for how loving (τὸ φιλεῖν) and friendly attributes result from greater activity and effort; NE8.12's point about the mother's greater knowledge than the child is also raised. This greater activity, effort, and knowledge would seem associated with the unique activity of pregnancy.

¹³⁵ Aristotle's using *potentiality* here to characterize state, i.e. first *actualization*, reflects the multiplicity of the contrasts that are at play. Actualization in the sense of *second* actualization contrasts with actualization in the sense of *first* actualization, in a way similar to how first actualization contrasts with potentiality. That is, second actualization is the *active use* of something, first actualization the *inactive possession* of something, which is somewhat similar to the inactivity of potentiality. As there are two types of actualization, I think Aristotle is here distinguishing them by characterizing first actualization as "potentiality," in the sense of "possession of a capacity."

¹³⁶ Here I follow Benson (1900) 58 and Scott (2001) 228 in thinking that "other selfhood" is implied, even though the phrase does not appear.

actualization. As noted above, this is what makes the other self valuable, regardless of utility; the other self is a form of activity through which one can access one's own being. This notion of other selfhood then suggests not the non-prioritization implied by NPOS's focus on *normative* identity, but the prioritization implied by EOS's focus on *numerical* identity; for what makes the other self valuable is clearly *one's own* actualization as *numerically* distinct from the other self's. The notion of other selfhood here is the inherently hierarchical one of EOS: y is x's other self because y contributes to x's actualization.¹³⁷

Let us sum up our findings from NE8.12 and NE9.7. NE8.12 based greater levels of fondness, knowledge, and a sense of ownership on being *from* oneself. The passage closes by saying parents love children as they do themselves, because these children are as other selves, and they are other selves as being *from* oneself. I argued that this "being from" that was repeated throughout the passage refers to production. And per NE9.7, this production is ultimately choiceworthy because of the actualization of the producer. Putting this together: other selfhood is underpinned by the other being from oneself, which points to production, which points to one's own actualization. We have secured EOS; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in *one's own* actualization.

3.1.2: Full Virtue and Other Selfhood

So far, we have seen that the child is the parent's other self because it is involved in the parent's self-actualization. Children are other selves of parents because they are from the parents and this "being from" involves the actualization of the parents in both reproductive and non-reproductive activity (§3.1.1). Is this what Aristotle still means when he next

¹³⁷ One might object to my taking NE9.7's claim that the other self is ultimately *choiceworthy* because of actualization to suggest that the other self is *defined* in terms of actualization. That is, it might seem problematic to shift between what feature makes something valuable and something's essential feature. However, this shift is at least implicit in all interpretations of other selfhood. NPOS for example argues that since Aristotle suggests other selves are choiceworthy because of their full virtue, that full virtue is the essential feature. In any case, we

invokes “another self,” at NE9.4.1166a32? Let us develop some context, assessing the beginning of the chapter, just a half Bekker page before:

(A) The friendly attributes (τὰ φιλικὰ) towards neighbors and by which friendships are defined seem to be drawn from the ones towards oneself. (B) For people have established that the friend is one wishing and doing goods or apparent goods for the sake of that one, (C) or wishing that the friend be and live for the sake of that one; which is what mothers have done towards their children, as well as what those [among friends] having previously argued [have done towards each other]. (D) And they [say that the friend] is the one spending time and choosing the same things, (E) or the one grieving and rejoicing together with the friend; and this holds most of all concerning mothers. (F) And people define friendship by some of these things. (1166a1-10)

Having listed various friendly attributes, Aristotle goes on to argue that the decent person has all these in relation to himself because of his virtue, where this virtue is most probably full virtue (1166a10-29). He then concludes with our instance of “another self”:

(G) Thus since¹³⁸ each of these things [i.e. the friendly attributes] obtains in the case of a decent person towards himself, and he bears towards the friend just as towards himself, for the friend is another self, (H) friendship also seems to be some of these things [i.e. the friendly attributes], and friends [to be those] for whom these things obtain.
(G) τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπικεκῆι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), (H) καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. (1166a30-33)

The fully virtuous (“decent”)¹³⁹ person displays various friendly attributes towards himself and bears in the same way towards his friend because the friend is another self. This does not seem too helpful in explicating the notion of another self because the clause “the friend is another self” seems to act as a premise which is not itself explained. I think there is no

might think that when a feature of x is pointed to as making x *especially* choiceworthy, this feature has to do with what x *essentially* is.

¹³⁸ I follow Crisp (2014 Rev), Irwin (1999), Pakaluk (1998), and Rowe (2002) in taking (H) to follow from (G) in this way. These translators seem to recognize that (A) and (H), which flank remarks about fully virtuous people, make the same claim. The most natural way to construe (H) is to take the remarks about fully virtuous people to support the overall claim. Otherwise, (H) is just attached as an after thought, which is precisely the rendering of Reeve (2014), the exception to the modern translators. Here is a rough rendering of the resulting thought process: Aristotle claims the friendly attributes towards others are derived from those towards oneself, lists the friendly attributes, claims that the fully virtuous display these towards themselves insofar as they are fully virtuous and towards their friends as other selves, and then claims that “in fact, friendship seems to be one or other of these features.” This last is awkwardly pasted in as an afterthought, instead of being better integrated with the text.

¹³⁹ The passage uses “decent (ἐπιεικής),” which Aristotle sometimes uses interchangeably with the fully virtuous “excellent (σπουδαῖοι)” people (most obviously in NE9.9). But Aristotle sometimes labels non-fully virtuous people as “decent” (1162a26 is a presumable example). Here, however, he must have the fully virtuous in mind, for it is unclear otherwise how he can designate the decent as the “measure,” as we will discuss later in this section.

explanation because the notion of another self has already been substantially explained in NE8.12 (§3.1.1).¹⁴⁰ Indeed, NE9.4's claim, that the fully virtuous person is related towards his virtue friend just as he is towards himself because his virtue friend is another self, unavoidably recalls NE8.12's claim that parents love children as they do themselves because the children are other selves.

However, there is an alternate reading whereby NE9.4 *implicitly* explains "another self." Such a reading would go as follows: the fully virtuous person displays the friendly attributes towards himself insofar as he is fully virtuous and the fully virtuous person is so related to his friend because the friend is another self *in the relevant respect*, that is, *in respect to full virtue*. So while the claim that the friend is another self is unexplained *grammatically*, the preceding lines about the fully virtuous person displaying all the friendly attributes towards himself because he is fully virtuous *imply* that the friend is another self in that he is also fully virtuous. Thus we have a *contextual* explanation of other selfhood, one that appeals to the full virtue the relevant parties share.

If full virtue explains other selfhood, presumably full virtue is necessary for other selfhood. But the example of mothers and children brings into question the necessity of full virtue. Consider three points of the passage: (1) The fully virtuous person displays the friendly attributes to himself because he is fully virtuous (G, and passages between F and G). (2) The fully virtuous person displays the friendly attributes to the friend, where the explicit reason is not (a) the friend is fully virtuous, but rather (b) the friend is another self (G). (3) A

¹⁴⁰ Of course, one might deem this line of thought problematic, because I use NE9.7 to elaborate upon NE8.12, while taking NE9.4, which comes *before* NE9.7, to fully presuppose NE8.12. However, note that I used NE9.7 to elaborate upon the "being from" notion underlying other selfhood, not other selfhood itself. Further, I take NE9.7 to not *explain* "being from" but to *elaborate* on it in terms of self-actualization. This means the basic core of other selfhood is fully at play in NE8.12 ("being from oneself") and only supplemented by NE9.7 (with its references to actualization). Still, this might seem an overly convoluted story of how Aristotle develops other selfhood; but Aristotle's texts (perhaps lecture notes) often develop ideas piecemeal, not, as is typical in modern texts, finishing one piece completely before moving on to the next.

mother displays friendly attributes to a child,¹⁴¹ because the child is another self (C, E). Since children cannot be fully virtuous (NE1099b33-1100a3, 1144b1-9), (3) shows that another self does not have to be fully virtuous. The mother displays some friendly attributes to the child who is not fully virtuous but *still another self*.

It is worth pausing on (2) and (3). Regarding (2), one must emphasize the mediating role that the self plays between oneself and the fully virtuous other. While displaying the friendly attributes towards *oneself* is explained straightforwardly by reference to one's own full virtue, Aristotle clearly does not take displaying the friendly attributes towards *another* as sufficiently explained by reference to that person's full virtue; a person apparently can be fully virtuous without automatically meriting another's friendly attributes, or at least not all of them. Rather, Aristotle takes as necessary the relation of another *self*. So it is hardly the case that full virtue explains the relation of another self; attraction to another's full virtue is *explained by* the relation of another self. This required mediation of oneself suggests prioritization of the self's full virtue over another's. It should be noted that we have already seen Aristotle make this move. He secures the claim that parents love children as they do themselves *by* relating the children to the parents themselves (the children are other selves).

¹⁴¹ The word order suggests that mothers instantiate wishing life and sharing joy/pain (C, E). It is less clear that they wish and do goods for the sake of the children (B) and that they spend time and choose the same things as the children (D). Regarding (D), while spending time with the children does not seem implausible, this is conjoined to choosing the same things, which *does* seem implausible. Indeed, we might think that spending time with the children is not just spending time with them, but that this somehow involves choosing the same things (note NE1170b12-14's assertion that living together for humans is not just, as it is with animals, grazing in the same place). However, we might take Belfiore's (2001) line in suggesting that the same things are chosen insofar as mothers choose what is best for the children and insofar as they share a common life (127). Regarding wishing and doing goods for the sake of the children (B), NE9.5's assertion that wishing goods for the other's sake only occurs because of virtue (1167a12-14) might seem incompatible with wishing goods for the sake of children, who cannot be fully virtuous (NE1099b33-1100a3, 1144b1-9). But we might think that NE9.5 cannot have full virtue in mind, for two reasons. First, it gives the example of contestants or others that we know extremely little about (no prior familiarity is required), so it is probable that *natural* virtue can be an object of goodwill; it seems hard to believe that in having goodwill for a person we have very little knowledge of, this very little knowledge includes the fact that the person is *fully* virtuous (i.e. has all the virtues). Second, NE9.5 suggests that in lower friendships, most of which presumably comprise of the *non-fully* virtuous, the friends have goodwill only towards themselves (εὖνοῦς... εἶναι... ἑαυτοῦ; 1167a15-17). Returning to the present problem, we can imagine mothers displaying *all* the friendly attributes to their children. But even if there is a discrepancy in quantifiers here between how many friendly attributes the mother and fully virtuous person display towards their other selves, I do not think much hinges on this. What matters is that the displaying of friendly attributes, however many, is explained by other selfhood.

As far as (3), the point requires more establishing; it is explicit *that* mothers display friendly attributes towards their children, but it is not explicit *why*. It is probable though that the reason for this concern is that the child is another self, given the passages we assessed from NE8.12 and NE9.7; there we saw Aristotle take mothers as specially concerned for their children because of these latter being from them, where this “being from” amounts to other selfhood. And again, NE9.4’s point about bearing towards the friend just as towards oneself because the friend is another self is extremely similar to NE8.12’s point that parents love children as they do themselves because children are as other selves. It would be natural to construe NE9.4’s point to apply to its example of mothers, as the parallel point obviously does in NE8.12.

In any case, the immediate context forces us to infer that the reason for mothers displaying friendly attributes towards their children is that these are other selves; the flow of the argument implies this. The claim Aristotle wants to argue for is (A), that friendship towards others (in the case of the mother, towards the child) is derived from friendly attributes towards oneself. Before reiterating this in the conclusion (H), Aristotle gives one last piece of evidence, (G): fully virtuous people bear towards the friend as they bear towards themselves (i.e. displaying all the friendly attributes) because the friend is another self.¹⁴² It seems that Aristotle takes the model in (G), by which one bears towards the friend as towards himself because the friend is another self, to apply inclusively to friendships among the fully virtuous and those that are not. For (H)’s point about friendship between people in general, which seems to be a reiteration of (A)’s point about friendship between people in general, *follows* from (G). That is, it is the fact that the *fully virtuous* person displays the friendly attributes towards the friend as towards himself on the grounds that the friend is another self

¹⁴² Annas (1988) claims that Aristotle’s invoking (G)’s idea that the friend is another self would be begging the question if he is trying to *derive* friendship towards others from the friendly attributes displayed towards oneself; that is, Aristotle would be saying that friendship towards others is grounded on a relation with oneself,

that entitles us to the conclusion, introduced in (A) and reiterated in (H), that friendship towards others is composed of these friendly attributes that one displays towards oneself (whether or not the friends are fully virtuous).

The immediate complication here is that (G) mentions only *fully virtuous* people and supports (A) and (H), but (A) and the rest of the passage (A) introduces are more inclusive in scope. However, Aristotle's sliding from the fully virtuous to everyone else makes more sense if we take into account other parts in NE9.4 that display an interest in *justification*:

(I) And each of these things [i.e. the friendly attributes] obtains towards oneself in the case of the decent (J) (and in the case of the remaining people, insofar as they consider themselves to be such [i.e. as the decent person]; (K) as it would seem, just as has been said, that virtue and the excellent person are the measure of each thing).

(I) πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῶ ἐπεικεῖ ὑπάρχει (J) (τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι· (K) ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)· (1166a10-13, between [F] and [G])

(L) It seems that the things [i.e. the friendly attributes] having been mentioned obtain also for the many, although they are base. (M) Do they then in this way share these things [i.e. the friendly attributes] insofar as they please themselves and seem to be decent?¹⁴³

(L) φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοις. (M) ἄρ' οὖν ἢ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; (1166b2-4, after [H])

Both passages infer facts about the non-fully virtuous from facts about the fully virtuous.

“These things” in (I) and “the things having been mentioned” in (L) clearly refer to the friendly attributes, so Aristotle is claiming that the non-fully virtuous display these towards themselves insofar as they are fully virtuous (or “decent”) per (J) and (M). (K) backs this up by appealing to an earlier claim, probably in NE3.4, that the fully virtuous person is the measure and a standard of behavior for all. In short then, it is not so problematic for Aristotle to infer from a claim about fully virtuous people (G) a claim about people in general (A, H). This dependence on a claim about the fully virtuous suggests that these more general claims are not merely explanatory, but also justificatory.

because friends are other selves (related to oneself) (I). This seems too quick; the notion of another self is robust and fills in precisely *how* others are related to oneself.

¹⁴³ The answer to (M) is presumably “yes.” See Footnote 141 for thinking that the friendly attributes, particularly wishing goods for the sake of x (the focus of NE9.4), extend to the non-fully virtuous.

What implications does this have for (3), the claim that mothers display friendly attributes towards their children *because* these children are other selves? Recall that while it is clear *that* mothers display friendly attributes towards their children, the passage does not explicitly state the *reason*; I am trying to establish that the *implicit* reason is that children are other selves. Mothers are clearly examples of the claim opening the argument (A) that friendships are composed of friendly attributes that one displays towards oneself. This claim is reiterated in the conclusion at (H), by which we have encountered the linchpin (G), that one displays the friendly attributes to others insofar as they are other selves. This last *supports* the claim in (H) that friendships are composed of displaying the friendly attributes that one displays towards oneself. As mothers are upheld as paradigms of displaying the friendly attributes towards others (A/H), they must then be examples of doing so because the children are other selves (G). As children are non-fully virtuous, what this means is that full virtue is not necessary for other selfhood, and thus not essential for other selfhood. NPOS does not hold in NE9.4.¹⁴⁴

But while full virtue is not required for other selfhood, it is relevant. NE9.4 uses the model of a fully virtuous person treating his friend as he does himself because the friend is another self as justification for similar behavior among the non-fully virtuous. This specifies the kind of actualization that the other self facilitates as *virtuous* actualization. Now the associated first actualization of virtue here might not be full virtue; this seems to be what Aristotle has in mind for at least one of the parties in a virtue friendship between unequally virtuous agents. Nevertheless, non-full virtue approximates the “measure” that is full virtue, which is defined by the essential human good of rational activity (NE1.7). Two results are worth reflecting on. First, the notion of other selfhood is normative; Aristotle justifies other selfhood by appeal to other selfhood among the fully virtuous. Second, other selfhood only

¹⁴⁴ The fact that the model of other selfhood in (G) justifies a conclusion (A/H) about friendships including the non-fully virtuous by itself suggests that other selfhood does not require full virtue. But the fact that *children* are

occurs in friendship because of the good; for only virtue friendship or friendship because of the good is for the sake of virtuous actualization (§2.3), as other selfhood is.¹⁴⁵

All this suggests that Aristotle is *not* using two different senses of “another self” between NE8 and NE9. In NE8.12, and as elaborated upon in NE9.7, we get the idea that the child is another self as “being from” the parent, or being a product and therefore an actualization of the parent. The essential feature of other selfhood then is involvement in one’s own actualization (§3.1.1); none of this necessarily involves full virtue on the part of either the child or parent. In NE9.4, the point about other selfhood *seems* to center on full virtue; however, the repeated case of a mother’s relationship towards her child suggests that full virtue is not even necessary, let alone essential, for other selfhood. The lack of a distinct development of other selfhood and the invocation of NE8.12’s example of other selfhood suggests that NE9.4 is relying on NE8.12’s notion of other selfhood. Thus there is *one* kind of other selfhood based on self-actualization, of which the familial instantiation is as genuine as the paradigmatic instantiation between fully virtuous friends. Aristotle here perhaps echoes the *Symposium*’s claim that the desire for immortality inheres in all living organisms¹⁴⁶ and that there are specific ways of fulfilling this desire. One is through *physical* reproduction, the other, which is unique to humans, is through *intellectual* reproduction (208e-209a). So too with Aristotle’s theory of love there is one ultimate desire for self-actualization, but there are different expressions of it.

3.1.3: Objections

other selves here presents a stronger case, for children *cannot* be fully virtuous.

¹⁴⁵ This implies that the friendship of a mother towards her child is a friendship because of the good. I am sympathetic to Price’s (1989) view that family friendships are friendships because of the good (166-7) but also recognize the various difficulties with this; in general, it is not perfectly straightforward to bring Aristotle’s threefold classification scheme of friendships because of the good, pleasant, and useful, together with his other classifications based on various types of communities (NE8.9-12).

¹⁴⁶ The *Politics* follows along, labeling such striving as “natural (φυσικόν)” (1252a29); *De Anima* 415b3-7, noted by Schwarzenbach (1992) in connection to the *Symposium* (252), also remarks on reproduction as a way of achieving immortality. For more parallels to Plato, see Price (1989) 163.

Before proceeding to the last two instances of “another self” in NE, it is worth pausing on some objections.

A set can be found in Pakaluk (1998).¹⁴⁷ (1) Loving another person because that person constitutes one’s own activity is incompatible with loving the friend because of himself, as Aristotle claims occurs between virtue friends, for this seems to be loving the friend for something other than himself.¹⁴⁸ (2) Loving another person because that person constitutes one’s own activity is also incompatible with loving *oneself*, as one loves oneself because of one’s own goodness, but this is due to training and therefore constitutes *another’s* activity. A related problem is (3) that loving another for one’s own activity does not explain why it is better to love persons rather than *things*, since things also constitute the activity of persons. To answer (1): as I argue in §2.1, loving the friend because of himself is explained by loving the friend because of the friend’s goodness, and as I argue in §2.3, the friend’s goodness is good for oneself in that it contributes to one’s own activity. It is important to emphasize that we do not stop at goodness, that is virtue *qua* state; we must specify that what makes virtue valuable is how it contributes to *one’s own activity*. This helps answer (2); for while one’s own goodness might be partially due to another’s activity, Aristotle is clear that what makes virtue valuable, either in oneself or another, is that it facilitates *one’s own* activity. Regarding (3), we will see in §3.2 that shared, mutual activity is important because of its facilitating adequate levels of ease and continuity in the activity; mere things cannot be partners in this shared, mutual activity, and so it is better to love people than things.

Here is another objection to the account I have been developing. How does EOS make sense of NE9.4’s claim that one bears towards another in the same way as he does himself because the other is another self, that is, because the other is related specially to oneself? One might object that by bearing towards someone as choiceworthy *in relation to oneself*, one

¹⁴⁷ 187.

¹⁴⁸ See also Broadie (2002) 422 and Whiting (2002).

cannot bear towards the other self in the same way one bear towards oneself. The reason for this is that one does not bear towards *oneself* as choiceworthy *in relation to oneself*.¹⁴⁹ However, I think that Aristotle holds that one *does* bear towards oneself as choiceworthy in relation to oneself. This is at the core of Aristotle's reasoning for why the non-fully virtuous only have limited goodwill for themselves; they devalue *themselves* because they do not achieve *their own* genuine good (I defend this view in §2.2). So the thought is that x values x to the extent that x contributes to x's actualization *and* values another y as another self because of y's contributing to x's actualization. NE9.8 is relevant; in §4, I will show that self-love manifests itself in engaging in virtuous activity. So just as loving an *other* self centers around self-actualization, so too loving *oneself*. This result regarding love towards oneself is crucial, for it would hardly make sense for loving an *other* self to center around the actualization of the numerically distinct self if loving *oneself* centers around something, like the state of full virtue, that is not unique to the numerically distinct self.

A third objection argues that NPOS must be right, given NE9.8's claim that the true self is identified with the understanding (νοῦς).¹⁵⁰ From this claim it follows that for all x, x identifies with the true self if and only if x identifies with the understanding. In addition, all fully virtuous people identify with the true self, and therefore with the understanding; Aristotle's characterization of identification with the true self as obeying the rational part in everything (1169b28-34) seems to amount to a characterization of full virtue.¹⁵¹ This means that fully virtuous people A and B both identify with the true self; so A is another (true) self

¹⁴⁹ Millgram (1987) 364. Pakaluk (1998) 208.

¹⁵⁰ By "identified with," I do not mean to invoke numerical identity. NE1168b35-1169a2 claims that each *is* (ὄντος, ἐστίν) the understanding. But surely NE9.8 is *defining* selfhood in terms of the understanding, not *identifying* (strictly speaking) the self with the understanding. For if the human is identified with the understanding, and if the human is hungry for food, then the understanding is hungry for food, but food is the object of appetite (ἐπιθυμία), which is explicitly contrasted with the understanding in NE9.8. This move from "x is defined by y" to "x is y" is made in the next chapter, NE9.9; Aristotle firsts defines living by perceiving or thinking (1170a16-19) and then reinvokes this by claiming that living *is* perceiving or thinking (1170a33-1170b1). We will discuss NE9.9 in §3.2.3.

¹⁵¹ And as 1169a17-18 says, "the decent person submits to the understanding (ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ)."

of B, and B is another (true) self of A. In sum, fully virtuous people are other (true) selves since they identify with the understanding; that is, identifying with the understanding is the essential feature of other selfhood (and selfhood *simpliciter*). This is basically NPOS, for as all fully virtuous people identify with the understanding, we might just as well say that *full virtue* is the essential feature of other selfhood.

I have three replies. First, NE9.8 is a poor candidate for securing non-prioritization in NE9.4. In terms of NE9.4, both oneself and the other self are fully virtuous and should be treated equally. In parallel terms of NE9.8, both oneself and the other self are identified with the true self, the understanding, and so neither can be prioritized. But as I will show in §4, NE9.8 encourages virtuous people to prioritize themselves above everyone else, and precisely in order to gratify the true self, the understanding—that which was supposed to ground *non*-prioritization. In short, using NE9.8 to support NPOS in NE9.4 fails; instead of appealing to the true self to ground non-prioritization, Aristotle appeals to it to show that praiseworthy love of self takes *one's own* self-actualization as ultimate.

Second, it is not clear that the notion of “selfhood” in NE9.8 applies to the notion of selfhood in NE9.4; that is, it is not clear that the true *self* discussed in NE9.8 is the same as the other *self* in NE9.4. For one thing, even one NPOS interpreter concedes that NE9.4’s arguments work perfectly well without relying on the idea that the understanding is the true self.¹⁵² Secondly, we might expect αὐτός to appear in NE9.8’s discussion of the true *self*, insofar as we expect “another self” and “true self” to be used as technical terms—but it does not. The idea we get instead is that the person *is*, or *is* most of all, the understanding.¹⁵³ A third reason for doubting that NE9.8’s notion of selfhood applies to NE9.4’s notion is that

¹⁵² Kahn (1981) 29.

¹⁵³ It is true that I argued NE9.7 invokes other selfhood without mentioning αὐτός, but I think context makes the connection clear in a way that is absent in NE9.8. That is, NE9.7 takes the product to just *be* the producer, where children and parents come up as examples; in NE8.12, we have been told that children are other *selves* of the parents. NE9.8 tells us that the person *is* the understanding, and according to NPOS, this has been prepared

αὐτὸς refers to the *numerically* identical self in both the NE8.12 and NE9.4 instances of other selfhood, but NE9.8's notion of the true self refers to *normative* identity. The basic formula in both NE8.12 and NE9.4 is that x treats y as x treats x's self-1, because y is another self-2. The question here is what notion of selfhood is invoked by "self-1" and "self-2." "Self-1" clearly invokes numerical identity; Aristotle is claiming that x treats a numerically *distinct* y in the same way as x treats her numerically *distinct* self. Now the most obvious way for Aristotle to establish his claim is by suggesting "self-2" also invokes numerical identity; x treats y as x treats x's numerically distinct self, because y is related to x's numerically distinct self.

But NPOS understands normative identity to be at stake with self-2. There are two ways to achieve this. NPOS could avoid committing Aristotle to equivocation; "self-1" and "self-2" both refer to the numerically distinct self, but there are important qualifications appended to self-2. That is, x treats y as x treats x's numerically distinct self, because y is related to x's numerically distinct self *in the relevant respect, that is, full virtue*. Or put another way, x treats y as x treats x's numerically distinct self, because y is related to *the normative identity that x's numerically distinct self identifies with*. However, the suppressed qualifications here seem far too important to suppress; and if my arguments in the previous section were correct, the qualifications are not even warranted. Further, NPOS would be admitting that αὐτὸς refers just to numerical identity, so it is not clear how NE9.8's notion of selfhood bears on NE9.4's notion of another αὐτός. For one thing, NE9.8 does not even utilize αὐτὸς. For another, NE9.8's idea of a "true self" clearly refers to normative and not numerical identity.

Another way for NPOS to take normative identity to be at stake with self-2 is to concede that Aristotle equivocates between "self-1" and "self-2," shifting from numerical

by NE9.4's instance of another self. But as I argued in regards to this instance, other selfhood is unexplained in context and requires importing the conceptualization from NE8.12.

identity to normative identity. So x treats y as x treats x's numerically distinct self, because y is x's normative self; all the information relating x's numerically distinct self to x's normative self would be suppressed. But this would be misleading on Aristotle's part; he would not only be suppressing information that is far too important to be suppressed (as mentioned above) but would also be equivocating on αὐτὸς without explanation.

And of course, using NE9.8's notion of selfhood to elaborate on other selfhood runs into NE8.12. NE8.12's depiction of children as other selves of parents suggests a broad picture, capturing situations in which: (1) the parent is fully virtuous and her undeveloped child is not fully virtuous, (2) the parent is not fully virtuous but the adult child is, (3) neither the parent nor the child is fully virtuous, and (4) the parent is fully virtuous and the adult child is as well. Using NE9.8's notion of the true self as the understanding to fill out the notion of other selfhood restricts the related parties to the fully virtuous, since those who identify with the understanding are fully virtuous. This means NE8.12's formula of children being other selves of the parents captures only (4); but there is little reason to think that NE8.12's general discussion of familial friendship and other selfhood is restricted to fully virtuous parents and fully virtuous children. So it seems wrong to assume that if the true self is the understanding, then the other self is the understanding.¹⁵⁴

A final objection however would entail that NE8.12 *does* capture only (4): despite the appearances of NE8.12, the child *qua* child is *not* another self of the parent. This means that there is no positive doctrine of other selfhood outside of NE9.4 (and NE9.9). Let us revisit the NE8.12 lines in question: “(H) Therefore parents love children as they do themselves (γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς) (I) for the things from them are as other selves,

¹⁵⁴ If this is so, it is wrong to take the relationship between other selves as involving *mutual* awareness of the understanding (Schroeder [1992] 217, Belfiore [2001] 121) or some kind of reflexive and symmetrical relationship (Stern-Gillet [1995] 28). For even if two parties having *full* virtue implies their having *equal* virtue (which I have given reasons to doubt in the introduction to this chapter), two parties having only approximately full virtue clearly does not imply their having equal levels of virtue; it is then unclear that there must be mutual awareness, reflexivity, or symmetry. The child might have some kind of approximate virtue, but not engage in

[other] in respect to having been separated (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κευχώρισθαι) (1161b27-29). One might appeal to the οἷον, which I follow a number of translators in rendering as “as” (i.e. “as it were”), and suggest that we should render it as “a sort of,” with the idea being that children are only *approximately* other selves. But Aristotle uses the claim about children as other selves to ground the claim that parents love children as (ὥς) they do themselves.¹⁵⁵ This inference about the parents treating the children *as* they do themselves would seem faulty if children are only *approximately* related to the parents themselves, are only *approximately* other selves.

There are other ways to deny children other selfhood here. Price claims that the child’s being labeled an “other self” points forward to the child’s becoming an adult, at which point the child can *actually* be the parent’s other self.¹⁵⁶ This is supposed to follow from the fact that the child is another self, other in respect to being *separated* (NE1161b27-9), but that the child is *part* of, and therefore not other in respect to being separated from, the father until it ages and only thereupon separates (NE1134b11). Further, Aristotle says friendship is coextensive with justice (NE1155a26-8, 1159b25-1160a8, 1161a30-b10, 1162a29-33, MM1211a6-7, EE1241b10-14, 1242a19-28). So when NE1134b11 denies justice between

mutual awareness with the parent and not have a reflexive relationship with the parent; and it is hardly likely that all child-parent relationships are symmetrical.

¹⁵⁵ “As they do themselves” seems a better way to render the ὥς than “as [the children] are themselves” or “as [the children] are [from] themselves,” as (H) would then seem overdetermined in a redundant way. Consider one option: “(H) Parents love children *as they are from* themselves, (I) for the children are from themselves.” This is obviously redundant. Consider another option: “(H) Parents love children *as they are* themselves, (I) for the children are from themselves.” This may not seem immediately redundant until we remember NE9.7’s elaboration of the product being from the producer as the product (child) *being* the producer (the parent) in respect to actualization. So we get the redundant: “(H) Parents love children *as they are* themselves, (I) for the children *are* themselves.”

¹⁵⁶ (1989) 165, (2001) 219-220, (2010) 187-8. Price argues that in the case of parents and children, the other self “relation is partly biological, partly moral.” But if we are arguing that children are not other selves until they are moral, we should jettison the biology condition (hence my suggestion in §3.1 that Price does not follow Belfiore and Schollmeier in distinguishing between two basic kinds of other selves, the biological case and the case that occurs between fully virtuous friends). For it would be misleading for Aristotle to replicate NE8.12’s formula of treating another in the same way as oneself on the grounds that the other is another self in NE9.4’s case of other selfhood between fully virtuous agents, if a biological connection is necessary in the first instance but not the latter. So the biological connection is not a necessary condition; but neither is it a sufficient condition, since the child has a biological connection but on this reading does not count as another self until the moral condition has been met. As the biological connection is neither necessary nor sufficient, it seems better to do away with its relevance on this reading.

fathers and children on the grounds that children are parts of the father, this implies that there is no friendship (at least of the sort relevant to other selfhood) on the same grounds.¹⁵⁷

I have three replies. First, it is unclear that NE1161b27-9 is talking about the kind of separation mentioned in NE1134b11. The latter seems to refer to independence of *προαίρεσις*; with the former, it seems that the separation referred to is merely physical. Aristotle is trying to make a claim about parents loving children in general, not about parents loving children only after they have grown up. Indeed, the whole passage centers around the period of giving birth; 1161b25-9 characterizes the parents' fondness as happening "straightaway (*εὐθὺς*)" and the separation of the children as having *already* happened, given the perfect tense of the infinitive "having been separated (*κεχωρίσθαι*)."¹⁵⁸ It might also be quickly noted that parthood and separation are not mutually exclusive; Aristotle speaks of the slave as a "separated part (*κεχωρισμένον... μέρος*)" (*Politics* 1255b12), utilizing the same verb "to separate (*χωρίζειν*)" as when he characterizes the other self as "separated."

Second, it is true that both EE and NE take friendship to be coextensive with justice. But it might be too quick to use EE's point about justice to show something about NE's account of friendship—assuming with Kenny (1978) that NE1134b11 along with the rest of the common books (NE5-7=EE4-6) were originally from EE. In their separate treatments of friendship, both EE and NE claim that friendship and justice are coextensive and both treatises share the same account of justice (the first of the common books, NE5=EE4). This would lead us to think their accounts of friendship are the same, but they are not. The solution to this discrepancy is unclear, but before it is found, we cannot unquestioningly use the common books to make a point about NE's theory of friendship.

But setting aside the complicated relationships between EE and NE, we might think that the kind of justice that is denied to children is not the kind of justice that is coextensive

¹⁵⁷ Price (1989) 110-111.

with the friendship towards children. That is, NE1134b11 occurs in a discussion of *political* justice—a kind of justice presupposing equality between the related agents (NE1134a24-28).

But perhaps that is not the justice Aristotle has in mind as co-extensive with friendship. This indeed seems implied by NE8:

And just things also differ. For they are not the same for parents towards children and for brothers towards one another, nor for companions and citizens, and likewise in the case of the other friendships. Therefore, different are the unjust things towards each of these, and they [i.e. the unjust things] increase the more [the relevant parties] are friends, for example, it is more terrible to bereave a *companion* of goods than a *citizen*, and to not help a *brother* than a *stranger*, and to strike a *father* than just any other person. Naturally, the just increases to the same extent as the friendship, since they are in the same things and extend equally. (8.9.1159b35-1160a8)

As to how a man must conduct life towards wife and generally as a friend towards a friend, this would appear to be nothing other than asking how a man might be just; for what is just does not appear to be the same thing for a friend towards a friend, stranger, companion, and classmate. (8.12.1162a23-33)

Justice here seem relativized to agents and not to require equality.

3.2: Cognitive Self-Actualization with Other Selves

From the first two instances of other selfhood in NE, we have seen EOS prevail; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization. I will now argue that EOS continues in NE9.9, which contains our final two instances of “another self.” NE9.9 addresses the question of why the happy person needs friends. The chapter differs crucially from the passages we have just assessed, narrowing the scope of enquiry to complete (τελεία) friendship; Aristotle is trying to show why the happy life, which leaves nothing lacking, needs friendship, and the ensuing argument makes it clear that only *complete* friendship would suffice. Importantly, complete friendship involves *equally* fully virtuous agents. This means the picture here is justificatory (as we might have guessed by the fact that the achievement of *Aristotelian* happiness is at stake). It also means that if NPOS is to succeed anywhere, it should succeed here. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, many interpreters problematically infer from the mere *full* virtue of other selves the *equal* virtue of

other selves; from that they infer non-prioritization. In NE9.9, this problematic inference is irrelevant; we have a case where there is already *equal* full virtue. I will show, however, that even here there is no non-prioritization; the other self is valued only *approximately* as oneself, and is valued for her involvement in *one's own* actualization.

I begin with an analysis of NE9.9's opening sections, which include one instance of "another self" (1169b6) (§3.2.1). I argue that Aristotle understands the question of why the happy person needs friends, and his answer, in instrumental terms; according to Aristotle, we need friends or other selves for instrumental reasons. This immediately eliminates NPOS, for it is unclear how x's instrumentalizing y involves prioritizing y as much as x; the rest of the section focuses on EOS. What I will call the "*Oikeion* Argument" suggests that the particular role other selves play has to do with cognitive self-actualization (§3.2.2). In short, the argument is that happy people decide to contemplate the actions in which their happiness consists, are better able to contemplate such actions in the case of others, and therefore need friends.

This argument leaves open many issues, which are picked up by the arguments that follow it.¹⁵⁸ First, the *Oikeion* Argument merely assumes that happy people decide to contemplate; what I will call the "*Phusikōteron* Argument," argues that somehow contemplation of action and not mere action itself is required for happiness; here we get our last instance of "another self" (1170b6) (§3.2.3). A second issue with the *Oikeion* Argument

¹⁵⁸ The relationship between the various arguments in NE9.9 is not the primary topic at hand, but my claim that they relate in this way is substantial and seems to have gone unnoticed. For example, Cooper (1999.15) suggests that the *Phusikōteron* Argument and the Argument from Continuity are "mutually independent attempts" to answer the question of why the happy person needs friends (337); I argue that both of them support the *Oikeion* Argument. Cooper also claims that the assumption that the happy person decides to contemplate virtuous action goes unargued for (341, 344-5); I argue that the *Phusikōteron* Argument's implicit appeal to NE1.7's function argument amounts to accounting for this assumption. Reeve (1992) suggests that the *Phusikōteron* Argument and the *Oikeion* Argument rely "essentially on the same ideas" (182); again, I argue that the former supports the latter. Pakaluk (1998) understands the *Phusikōteron* Argument as filling in two deficiencies of the *Oikeion* Argument: its inability to show why friends are a type of good required for happiness and how friends are non-instrumentally valuable (203, 207-8). This is very different from my characterization of the arguments: friends are instrumental goods without which the adequate activity required for happiness does not obtain.

is that it leaves unanswered why happy people should need another person at all for contemplating the virtuous actions in which their happiness consists. What I will call the “Argument from Continuity” suggests that, without the help of others, the activity of this self-contemplation will not reach the levels of ease and continuity required for happiness (§3.2.4). Finally, the *Oikeion* Argument leaves unanswered why happy people should need fully virtuous *friends* over fully virtuous *strangers* for self-contemplation; it would seem that all that matters is that the partner is fully virtuous. The Argument from Living Together suggests that not only is a consistent partner required for adequately continuous and easy activity going into the future, but also a person who has shaped you and has been shaped by you in the past (§3.2.5). This past shaping leads to an epistemic advantage for future continuous activity; a child best learns or grows up, for example, if the teacher or parent is not constantly cycled. As Aristotle suggests a friend is needed *because* of being another self, the aforementioned ways of filling out why a *friend* is needed suggest that what makes *another self* choiceworthy is the role that she plays in one’s own self-actualization. In the final analysis, EOS and not NPOS seems to be the correct interpretation of other selfhood.

3.2.1: Why Does the Happy Person Need Friends?

NE9.9 opens with the question of whether the happy person needs friends:

(A) And it is disputed concerning the happy person, whether there will be need of friends or not. (B) For they say that there is no need of friends for blessed and self-sufficient people; (C) for [all] the goods obtain in their case; (D) therefore since being self-sufficient, [these people] need nothing added in addition, (E) but a friend, since being another self, supplies things which by oneself one is unable [to supply]; (F) whence [the saying] “When the god gives well, why is there need of friends?”

(A) Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. (B) οὐθὲν γὰρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· (C) ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· (D) αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, (E) τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι’ αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· (F) ὅθεν “ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῶ, τί δεῖ φίλων;” (1169b3-8)

Aristotle presents a view that says one does not need friends if one is happy or blessed (A). In such a case one does not need friends (B) because, as being self-sufficient, the happy or

blessed person has *all*¹⁵⁹ the goods (C, D) and a friend is understood as one who supplies another person who *cannot* obtain all the goods (E). Thus the parable (F) fits into the reasoning like so: if a friend is just one who supplies needs one cannot supply for oneself, but god allows one to supply for all one's own needs, why does the happy person need friends?

In this section, I will answer two related questions. First, what does the notion of other selfhood in (E) amount to and is it Aristotle's? Second, what exactly is the question under dispute in (A)?

While commentators almost virtually agree that Aristotle rejects the conclusion of the common opinion that happy people do not need friends (B, F), it is less clear that they take Aristotle to reject the notion of another self used in (E). Now (E) takes the other self as one who supplies (πορίζειν) what one cannot obtain by oneself. That seems to be a straightforwardly instrumental account of other selfhood. But Aristotle might be citing just a common notion of other selfhood, not his own.

Whether or not Aristotle understands the other self in instrumental terms depends on how we understand the question he raises in (A), which brings us to the second question of what exactly is being disputed. The answer is not as straightforward as it appears. First, there might be some confusion about the subject matter: is the dispute about friends, other selves, or both? I take it that Aristotle is ultimately interested in the more specific notion of other selves; he shifts from asking about friends in (A) and (B) to answering in terms of other selves in (E). What this means is that the question about friends is really a question about

¹⁵⁹ One might question my supplying of "all" in (C), given the lack of the corresponding Greek word (e.g. πάντα). However, (D)'s point about the happy person needing *nothing* added in addition follows from (C), which claims that they "have goods." This "having goods" then must entail that the person in question has *all* the relevant goods. This echoes NE1.7's discussion of the criteria of happiness; one such criterion was that of self-sufficiency, mentioned in (B) and (D), whereby anyone who is happy needs nothing added, implying that such a person has all the relevant goods (1097b16-20).

other selves; as we will see, this appears to be the case not only here but also for the rest of NE9.¹⁶⁰

Given that the dispute is ultimately about other selves, there is the question about what it is about other selves that is being disputed. Aristotle is asking why happy people δεῖν friends. In my translation, I have used “to need” for δεῖν, and so the question is: “why do happy people *need* friends?” This translation of “need” implies that friends are choiceworthy for *instrumental* reasons, which fits well with (E)’s notion of other selves as *suppliers*. However, there is another translation of δεῖν, which yields another interpretation of the disputed issue: “why *should* happy people have friends?” Instead of the instrumental reading of “need,” we have a non-instrumental reading that makes way for the following understanding of NE9.9: fully virtuous friends are pleasant (in the same or similar way as one takes one’s own being to be pleasant), and this is why fully virtuous people *should have* friends.¹⁶¹ Such a non-instrumental reading is required by NPOS; the essential feature of other selfhood, what makes other selves valuable, is their full virtue and not how they facilitate something else.

¹⁶⁰ Note that this distinction between “friends” and “other selves” is crucial for NPOS. As NPOS holds that the essential feature of other selfhood is full virtue, this means that all fully virtuous people count as other selves. But Aristotle clearly denies that all fully virtuous people count as friends (NE1171a8-10 suggests that one should not seek as many virtue friends among the fully virtuous [τοὺς... σπουδαίους; 1170b29] as possible but only as many as are needed for living together; this suggestion implies that there are more viable candidates, more fully virtuous people, than are needed for living together; and if we follow through with Aristotle’s suggestion, there will be fully virtuous people who are not our virtue friends). Thus, NPOS must hold that other selfhood is necessary but not sufficient for virtue friendship. EOS, on the other hand, can hold that other selfhood is sufficient for virtue friendship. One might wonder about my qualifying “friendship” here as “*virtue* friendship”; see §3.1.2 on the restriction of other selfhood to virtue friendship and §3.2.5 for more discussion.

¹⁶¹ As proposed by Joachim (1951) 259-60, Mansini (1998) 413-416, Pakaluk (1998) 209-210, 216, and Whiting (2006) 294-7. Additional proponents include Schroeder and Walker, whom I will discuss in the next footnote. Price (2001) perhaps also goes with this option. While he doubts some of Pakaluk’s exposition, Price seems to accept Pakaluk’s idea that “a good man needs friends with whom to enjoy shared perception,” which involves more actualization than merely reflexive perception and is thereby more choiceworthy (222). It seems as if Price follows Pakaluk in thinking that this is an account of what is *non-instrumentally* choiceworthy; he assesses Pakaluk’s idea that shared and reflexive perception are similar and raises a problem, that “the more similar the value of shared perception is to that of reflexive perception, the less the happy man would seem to *need* it in addition” (223). This seems to presuppose that the choiceworthiness here is non-instrumental, for the problem would immediately dissipate if the choiceworthiness is instrumental; friends are needed to facilitate shared perception, which is required for the cognitive actualization required for happiness. In any case, Price (2010) seems to straightforwardly reject the idea that the need for friends here centers on instrumental facilitation of

Which translation of δεῖν is correct? If we go with an attenuated reading of δεῖν (“should have”), it is unclear how the dialectic is working. The passage invites us to imagine that we have *all* other resources, so the question cannot be merely why *should* we have friends. Rather, the passage is asking, “*despite* having all other resources, why do we *need* friends?” So if Aristotle gives his answer using “should have” for δεῖν, he is talking past his interlocutors, who are using “need” for δεῖν.

This is a point about the immediate dialectic, but we can expand the scope to the entirety of NE9.9. If the question is about why the person who has all other goods *needs* friends, then it is perhaps understandable why Aristotle musters up the most complicated arguments in NE. But if the question is about why the person who has all other goods *should have* friends, it would seem that only a sentence is required: happy people obviously *should have* friends, because these friends are choiceworthy and as such improve life, even one supplied with all other resources. I think therefore that we need to go with a stronger reading of δεῖν to the effect that happy people *need* friends, and I think this entails an instrumental reading.¹⁶² This implies that Aristotle accepts the instrumental notion of other selves in (E), as “suppliers”; this answers our first question, about what other selfhood amounts to here and whether or not Aristotle accepts the account. This is not promising for the non-instrumental reading of “should have” and the associated non-instrumental notion of other selfhood upon which NPOS depends.

So Aristotle is asking why the happy person *needs* friends or other selves. Is Aristotle asking why people who are *already* happy need friends, or about why people who are *not* already happy need friends *to become* happy? The most straightforward reading of the text

self-awareness and instead thinks that it centers on the non-instrumentally valuable “special pleasure in contemplating the actions of our friends” (196).

¹⁶² As suggested by Pangle (2003) 50 and Reeve (1992) 183. Whiting (2006) agrees that a stronger reading of δεῖν entails the instrumental reading, but rejects the instrumental reading (297). It is important not to conflate instrumentality with utility, as seen in Schroeder (1992) 204, Walker (2014) 161, and even Pangle (2003) 51.

suggests that the question is about *already* happy people. (B)-(D) suggest that the happy person under discussion is self-sufficient and already has all the goods. However, as is clear from Aristotle's going on to argue for *why* the happy person needs friends (1169b8-22), Aristotle clearly thinks *that* the happy person needs friends. So how can it be that the question is asking whether *already* happy people, who by definition have *all* goods, need something *in addition*, friends?

The answer is that the happy people under discussion *in this opening* text are understood in colloquial terms. Aristotle agrees with common opinion that the happy person, as self-sufficient, has all the goods (C, D). But what "all the goods" refers to depends on one's conception of happiness. And this is where Aristotle differs from common opinion. In NE1169b23-7, Aristotle suggests that a person who has "all the goods" (according to common opinion) will not need useful friends, "since the goods obtain in his case (ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ)." Nor will the person with all the goods need pleasure friends, "for [his] life, since being [in itself] pleasant, is in need of no externally adorning pleasure (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπιδάκτου ἡδονῆς)." At this point, common opinion would suggest that the person in question is *already* happy and thus does not need friends. But Aristotle suggests that this *colloquially* happy person is actually *not yet* happy and thus *does* need friends. For Aristotle, happiness is an activity (this is literally stated in the *Oikeion* Argument, assessed next). Merely having all the goods of fortune, which suffices for colloquial-happiness, does not suffice for the activity of Aristotelian happiness; friends are needed.¹⁶³ So NE9.9 is preoccupied with the question of why friends are needed by the person who is already colloquially happy but not happy in an Aristotelian sense; I will show,

For since Aristotle disconnects δεῖν from utility in the case of happy people (1169b23-7), he would then disconnect δεῖν from instrumentality; as I have argued, this would make Aristotle talk past his interlocutors.

¹⁶³ My language here leaves open whether or not happiness includes more than activity. The point here is that the activity of Aristotelian happiness needs friends in as strong a sense as colloquial happiness needs goods of fortune, whether or not we take this activity as fully constitutive of Aristotelian happiness.

however, that Aristotle's answer also applies to the question of why the person who is *already* happy in an Aristotelian sense has an *ongoing* need for friends.¹⁶⁴

Let us sum up. The opening of NE9.9 presents a common opinion: the happy person does not need friends because friends, as other selves, supply the goods of happiness—which the *happy* person already has. I have argued that Aristotle accepts the instrumental terms of the debate; he accepts that the question is why the happy person *needs* friends or other selves and will go on to answer accordingly. Further, Aristotle accepts the instrumental notion of another self as a supplier (E), but disagrees with common opinion about what happiness is, and therefore what needs other selves supply. To achieve Aristotelian happiness, happiness *qua* activity, one cannot stop at colloquial happiness; one needs friends, other selves, to facilitate this activity. This suggests EOS.

3.2.2: The *Oikeion* Argument

Indeed, that the disagreement between Aristotle and common opinion about why friends are needed boils down to a disagreement about happiness is apparent from the way that Aristotle begins his first substantive argument for why the happy person needs friends. What I will call “the *Oikeion* Argument” (so-called because of its using *oikeion* three times, in two different ways) begins by appealing to Aristotle's conception of happiness

(NE1169b30-1170a4):

- 1) Happiness is some activity (ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν)
- 2) Activity comes into being, as opposed to just belonging (as in the case of possessions) (ἡ... ἐνέργεια... γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι)
- 3) If (εἰ)
 - a. Being happy is in living and being active (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν)

¹⁶⁴ In a way, then, Cooper (1999.15) and Kosman (2004) are both wrong. Cooper (1999.15) understands the question to be about one who is not yet happy in an Aristotelian sense (337). Kosman understands the question to be about one who *is* already happy in the Aristotelian sense (135). Aristotle seems to open with Cooper's version of the question, but it turns out that Aristotle answers *both* versions of the question.

- b. And activity of the good person is excellent and pleasant on account of itself¹⁶⁵ (τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδέϊα καθ' αὐτήν)
- c. And the **οἰκεῖον** is of the class of pleasant things (ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων)
- d. And we are more able to contemplate neighbors rather than ourselves, and the actions of those [neighbors] rather than **οἰκεῖα** actions (θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας)
- e. i) And the actions of excellent friends are pleasant to the good people (αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς), for ii) they have both/both have the pleasant by nature things (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα)¹⁶⁶
- 4) Then the blessed person will need such friends (ὁ μακάριος¹⁶⁷ δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται) if (εἴπερ)
 - a. The blessed person decides to contemplate actions decent and **οἰκείας** (θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας)
 - b. And the actions of the good friend are such as these (τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος).

Before assessing the argument, it is important to get clear on its terms. Throughout the *Oikeion* Argument, Aristotle alternates between “good,” “decent,” and “excellent” for the sake of variety; instead of using “good” twice, (3b) labels the agent as “good” and his action as “excellent,” (3ei) labels the agent as “excellent” and the observer as “good,” and (4a) and (4b) label the action “decent” and the agent “good.” In this section, I will utilize just “good” for the sake of clarity.

Another terminological issue involves οἰκεῖον in (3c), (3d), and (4a). Aristotle seems to use the word differently across these premises. Sometimes οἰκεῖον means something normative like “fitting/proper to one or one’s type.” NE10.5 is instructive here; it speaks of pleasures contributing to and completing their οἰκεῖον activities (1175a21-b24). 1176a3-5 then says that “it seems that for each animal there is also an οἰκεῖον pleasure, just as there is also a function; for the pleasure accords with the activity (δοκεῖ δ’ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle claims that this premise “has been mentioned in the beginning (ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶρηται).” This would seem to refer to NE1’s discussion of the pleasant on account of itself, to be assessed in Footnote 174.

¹⁶⁶ (3eii) is grammatically ambiguous. What is clear is that “the pleasant by nature things” is a direct object of the verb “have”; it is a neuter plural, which as subjects (in Attic Greek) take singular verbs, but “have” is plural in form. It is unclear as to whether “both” is the subject of “have” or an adjective modifying the direct object. Michael of Ephesus (512.15), Fritzsche and Zell (reported by Stewart [Volume 2] 386) hold the former; “both” is the *subject*, referring to the deeds of the person and of the person’s friend (Michael of Ephesus) or the person and the person’s friend (Fritzsche and Zell). For reasons that I expound upon soon, I think the argument makes most sense by taking “both” to modify the direct *object*, “the pleasant by nature things.”

¹⁶⁷ The fact that happiness is discussed earlier in the argument, and here the *blessed* person is discussed, suggests interchangeability between the happy (εὐδαίμων) and blessed (μακάριος) person (at least in context).

ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν).” To summarize (all too briefly), that which is οἰκεῖον appears to contribute to the well-functioning of some natural kind. Aside from this normative use, the *Oikeion* Argument (henceforth abbreviated “OA”) also seems to employ a descriptive use captured simply by the translation “one’s own.”

In (3d), the descriptive use arises, for the contrast between actions of neighbors and οἰκεῖον actions parallels the contrast between neighbors and ourselves. We can argue negatively for this conclusion as well; the contrast here cannot be between the fittingness and non-fittingness of the action, as the neighbor is evidently a *fully virtuous* person, whose actions are presumably fitting.¹⁶⁸ Yet while (3d) states that we have difficulty in viewing οἰκεῖον actions as *opposed* to the actions of an *other*, in (4a) the actions of the good friend, an *other*, are described as οἰκείας. So in (4a) οἰκεῖον cannot mean “one’s own” (the descriptive use). What of (3c), where we are told that the οἰκεῖον is pleasant? For the premise to contribute to the conclusion that fully virtuous *others* are needed, we must employ the normative use. It is unclear, adopting the *descriptive* use, how a premise stating that things belonging to *oneself* are pleasant would contribute to an argument about the necessity of *others*. Further, it would be strange for Aristotle to say that the class of things belonging to oneself is pleasant and then immediately go on to say in (3d) that we are better able to contemplate our neighbors’ actions rather than our own actions.¹⁶⁹

Despite the contrast between the descriptive “one’s own” and the normative “fitting,” the normative use of οἰκεῖον does not totally abandon the notion of “one’s own.” For the fittingness in question is relative to a particular party; the οἰκεῖον attribute is one that *belongs*, normatively, to that kind.¹⁷⁰ This is different from how Aristotle treats “good (ἀγαθός).” With

¹⁶⁸ The relevant neighbor turns out to be the friend the happy person needs. The happy person is fully virtuous and it is the relevant virtuous actions he wants to contemplate. The friend, who is “excellent” (3ei) and “good” (4b), executes such actions. It is highly improbable that the friend here is not fully virtuous.

¹⁶⁹ For similar understandings of how οἰκεῖον operates in this passage, see Stewart (Volume 2) 385.

¹⁷⁰ So we might translate οἰκεῖον as “belonging” in both usages (Irwin in conversation). Οἰκεῖον might then be homonymous, but in a core-dependent way, to borrow Shields’ (1999) terminology. A core-dependent

“good,” the good simply (ἀπλῶς) and the good for someone (τινι) can overlap, for what is good simply *is* good for someone in the case of a healthy fully virtuous person. But sometimes they do *not* overlap; the good simply is *not* good for someone in the case of the vicious or unhealthy (NE1129b1-6, 1152b26-33). The reason the normative οἰκεῖον does not work like this (splitting into the οἰκεῖον ἀπλῶς and the οἰκεῖον τινι) is that this would collapse the distinction between the descriptive and normative use, which distinction is operating clearly at least between (3d) and (4a). If we say that the normative οἰκεῖον is just what belongs to *someone* whoever that might be, it is unclear how this distinguishes it from the descriptive οἰκεῖον, which would also belong to someone whoever that might be. Rather, the normative οἰκεῖον relativizes *specifically* to fully virtuous agents, in a way that “good” does not; the latter is normative but requires further linguistic modifications for determinateness. So Aristotle never says something is (normatively) οἰκεῖον *to someone*; this relativization is contained in the adjective itself. As will become clear, this distinction between “good” and “fitting” is important for the argument; the good on account of itself must be supplemented by the fitting for Aristotle’s argument to go through.

Having gotten clear on the terminology, we can now run the argument. (1) and (2) seem to elucidate the first of five protases (3a); (1) takes happiness to be an activity and (2) distinguishes activity from state,¹⁷¹ and (3a) then takes being happy as being active. The next three protases are, in the context of the argument, bare premises. (3b) takes the activity of the good person to be good and pleasant on account of itself. (3c) posits the normatively οἰκεῖον

homonym can be spoken of in various senses, but with all the accounts of these various senses necessarily making reference to and asymmetrically depending on some core account, i.e. these various senses are *focally related* to some core account, to adopt the phrasing of the literature (58); for examples, see MM1209a20-37, EE1236a17-33, 1244a20-26. The claim here then is that “belonging” is not homonymous in the sense that a furniture “table” and a graphical “table” are, where there is no relation between the accounts of the two instances of “table”; rather, the non-interchangeable normative “belonging” and descriptive “belonging” are related by reference to some core case of “belonging.”

¹⁷¹ “State” normally translates the Greek ἔστις. (2) features instead κτῆμα (“possessions”), but like ἔστις the word connotes “having.”

as pleasant. (3d) suggests we are more able to contemplate neighbors/their actions rather than ourselves/descriptively οἰκεῖον (i.e. our own) actions.

Next, (3ei) says that the actions of good friends are pleasant to the good because (3eii) they have the pleasant by nature things. I think (3ei) presupposes the claim about goodness in (3b) and the claim about the relativizing normativity of οἰκεῖον in (3c). Without (3b), the claim about the activity being good *on account of itself*, it is unclear that Aristotle could make a non-accidental claim,¹⁷² as he seems to be doing, in (3ei). Without (3c), the claim about the activity normatively belonging to oneself, it would not be clear that the activity of the good person, which is itself good (3b), is pleasant to the good *observer*.¹⁷³ For something's being designated as pleasant on account of itself leaves open to *whom* it is pleasant; an activity's being good and pleasant *on account of itself* does not entail that it will be pleasant *to a good human*.¹⁷⁴ For example, we can imagine something that is good on account of itself (e.g. some kind of music) not being pleasant to all fully virtuous people (e.g. some might not like that kind of music).¹⁷⁵ But NE doggedly affirms that the good is pleasant to the good (e.g. 1099a7-11), and it seems that (3c) is the argument's representative of this affirmation; (3c) plays the necessary relativizing role by saying that the normative οἰκεῖον is pleasant, where the normative οἰκεῖον tracks what befits *all* well-functioning fully virtuous people. As I argued above, NE10.5 suggests the normative οἰκεῖον is that which befits well-functioning

¹⁷² Aristotle often contrasts what is x “on account of itself (καθ’ αὐτὸν)” with what is x “on account of accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκός).”

¹⁷³ The importance of this “belonging” to oneself is not to be underestimated; after all, Aristotle puts the lovable (φιλήτων) at the center of his theory of friendship, and this is nothing other than what appears good *for oneself* (NE1155b18-27; for more discussion see §1.1).

¹⁷⁴ I think Aristotle takes the good/pleasant on account of itself to be necessary but not, as we see here, sufficient, for the good/pleasant to the good person. The two work in tandem, with the good on account of itself explaining something about an object's being choiceworthy, and the good to the good person explaining how people come to take that object as choiceworthy. Aristotle takes it to be very important that we somehow relate intrinsically choiceworthy objects to things external to the objects; he does so in the passage under discussion, and in his explication of the pleasant by nature as being *both* pleasant on account of itself *and* pleasant to the good person (NE1099a14-15).

¹⁷⁵ This seems to be Bostock's (2000) complaint: “Aristotle appears to be presupposing that all good men share the same pleasures, and there is surely no reason to agree with this. For example, some may prefer listening to Bach, some to Bartok, some to Bernstein, and some to the Beatles” (148).

members of a natural kind; for the natural kind human, these are the healthy, fully virtuous members.

To sum up, (3ei) claims that the actions of good friends are pleasant to the good. But the non-accidentality of this claim presupposes (3b), that such activity is good on account of itself. Further, the relativization of (3ei), that such activity is pleasant *to the good*, presupposes (3c), that such actions, as normatively οἰκεῖον, are pleasant to the good. (3eii), I take it, points out just this dependence of (3ei) on (3b) and (3c). This is to follow Broadie, Burnet, Grant, Irwin (1999), Reeve (2014), and Stewart¹⁷⁶ in taking the “both” in (3eii) as referring to (3b) and (3c) in the way just described; it is the *actions* that are the implied subject of the verb “have” in (3eii), and the two pleasant by nature things that the actions have are the good on account of itself¹⁷⁷ (3b) and the normative οἰκεῖον (3c).

So far we see that (1) and (2) contribute to (3a), and (3b) and (3c) contribute to (3e). The rest of the argument, (4), a two-protasis conditional, follows relatively smoothly: if (4a) the happy person as such decides to contemplate actions that are good and belong (οἰκεῖας) in a normative sense to him and (4b) the actions of the good friend are such, then (4) the happy person needs such friends. (3e) gives us (4b), the idea that the actions of good *friends* are such as the ones mentioned in (4a), that is, good and normatively οἰκεῖον; we established that the “both” things that the actions of good friends have are the good on account of itself and the normatively οἰκεῖον.

Now the question is why, per (4a), the happy person will decide to *contemplate* good and οἰκεῖον actions. (3a) says happiness requires activity, where it is probable that good and

¹⁷⁶ Broadie (2002) 426, Burnet (1900) 426, Grant (1885) 303, Irwin (1999) 149, Reeve (2014) 335, and Stewart (Volume 2) 386. Strictly, Burnet, Grant, and Stewart do not cite the good, but the decent/excellent. I gave reasons near the beginning of this section for thinking that “good,” “decent,” and “excellent” are used interchangeably in this argument.

¹⁷⁷ One might think that I have illicitly dropped out the *pleasant* on account of itself, which was conjoined to excellence in (3b). However, I do not think that by “both” Aristotle is referring to pleasantness on account of itself (*pace* Stern-Gillet [1995] 135), along with either goodness or οἰκεῖον-ness; Aristotle would then be tautologously saying that the pleasant by nature includes in its set the pleasant on account of itself, when the pleasant by nature is by definition pleasant on account of itself (see Footnote 174).

οἰκεῖον actions count as such activity. And as Aristotle says happiness is that for the sake of which we choose everything, we can understand why the happy person will decide on the good and οἰκεῖον actions that constitute the activity of happiness. But this is one step short of the happy person's deciding to *contemplate* such actions. Here we must appeal to (3d), the other place in the argument where contemplation (θεωρεῖν) occurs.

(3d), though, seems to come out of nowhere; it claims that we are better able to contemplate another's actions than our own, but it is unclear why one should care about contemplating action at all. This question is important, for (3d)'s point about contemplating actions is what gets us the whole argument's conclusion of needing friends. That is, (3d)'s point about being more able to contemplate the actions of *others* than our own is what presumably gets us the *needing* of friends (i.e. others) mentioned in (4). One decides to contemplate actions that are good and οἰκεῖον (4a) and such are the actions of the good friend (4b), but we might very well wonder why one should not stop at just one's own good and οἰκεῖον actions. It is only with (3d)'s idea that we are *better* able to contemplate *others* that we go from here to the conclusion in (4), that we need to go beyond ourselves and to the friend.¹⁷⁸ But again, that one should care about *contemplating* actions is merely assumed.

Let us sum up OA. Happiness is an activity and as the happy person decides to engage in this activity, as it is the ultimate end, she will decide to contemplate the actions that constitute it. But we are better able to contemplate such actions more in the case of others' than our own. And as it is fully virtuous friends who engage in such actions, the happy person will need fully virtuous friends.

There are three issues with this argument. As mentioned, it merely assumes that happy people will decide to *contemplate* virtuous actions. Second, we might wonder whether the happy person *needs* anyone to contemplate his own virtuous actions. (3d), the linchpin of

¹⁷⁸ Pakaluk (1998) 207.

the argument for this need, is at the same time the linchpin of our doubt; it suggests that we are *more* (μᾶλλον) able to contemplate the good actions of others,¹⁷⁹ leaving open that we *can* still do it to our own actions.¹⁸⁰ Assuming we *do* need others, it is unclear, finally, that the happy person will need *friends* for this contemplation; fully virtuous *strangers* might do just as good a job as fully virtuous friends in helping fully virtuous people contemplate fitting actions.¹⁸¹

The immediately following arguments address all these issues. I will first assess the *Phusikōteron* Argument, which argues for the assumption that the happy person decides to contemplate action (§3.2.3). The Argument from Continuity addresses the question of why anyone at all is needed for this contemplation (§3.2.4). Finally, the Argument from Living Together addresses the issue of why fully virtuous *friends* as opposed to fully virtuous *strangers* are needed (§3.2.5).

3.2.3: The *Phusikōteron* Argument

Let us first turn to what I have labeled “the *Phusikōteron* Argument” (henceforth abbreviated “PA”). I have applied this label because Aristotle introduces this argument as suited “to ones enquiring from a more natural perspective (φυσικώτερον...

¹⁷⁹ Aristotle makes a similar move in *Politics* 1283a17-22; he suggests that a city *needs* (δεῖ) justice and courage in order to operate *finely* (οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς), as opposed to operate *simpliciter*.

¹⁸⁰ Michael of Ephesus 512.5-17, 515.7-16, Stern-Gillet (1995) 134-5, and Price (1989) 121-2 suggest we *cannot*; this seems to follow MM1213a13-26 and EE1245b14-19, which are much more explicit than NE in taking contemplation of one’s own actions to be impossible. *Politics* 1280a14-16, 1286a24-31, and 1287b8-35 would suggest this as well, stating that (even good) individuals are insufficient judges when alone.

¹⁸¹ Pakaluk (1998) 207. Reeve (1992) answers this by suggesting the οἰκεῖον in question is used more than in a “weak” sense, which would amount to the action being merely virtuous, the sort that a fully virtuous person would do; that is, more than the normative οἰκεῖον (180-181). For more than any old fully virtuous person to fulfill one’s needs here, the οἰκεῖον, according to Reeve, must be read in a “strong” sense; the action is one’s own in the sense of one’s being partially or wholly responsible for it (Price [2001] seems to offer a similar interpretation at 222). This is where “another self” comes in; we are partially responsible for a fully virtuous friend’s actions because we are responsible for constructing the other self who the fully virtuous friend is. The problem with this interpretation is that it applies one sense of οἰκεῖον to the whole argument (180-181) when we have seen that οἰκεῖον must shift senses across it. And it seems that it is because Reeve sees the strong sense of οἰκεῖον as applying throughout the entire argument that he brings in “another self” at this point. But this seems too early (to point out a second problem), as the answer for why friends are needed would seem to end here; a

ἐπισκοποῦσιν).”¹⁸² Below, I break the text into premises. Some of these premises repeat, as with (1) (the first instance I label “1.1”, the second, “1.2”); sometimes these repetitions are highly compressed, as when (12-16.1) seems to repeat the reasoning of premises (12)-(16). In this section, I will argue that PA confirms EOS and secures OA’s assumption that the happy person will decide to *contemplate* her own virtuous actions.

Here is PA:

And it would seem to the ones inquiring from a more natural perspective (φυσικώτερον δ’ ἐπισκοποῦσιν) (1.1) that the virtuous friend is choiceworthy by nature to the virtuous person. (2) For it was said that the good by nature is to the virtuous person good and pleasant on account of itself. (3) And living is defined for living things by the capacity of perception, and for humans, of perception or thought (τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ’ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως); (4) and the capacity is led up into the activity (ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται), (5) and the full thing is in the activity (τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ). (6.1) Therefore it seems that living is, fully, perceiving or thinking. (7.1) And living is of the things on account of itself good and pleasant (τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων), (8) for it is definite, and the definite is of the nature of the good (ὀρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ’ ὀρισμένον τῆς ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως). (9) And the good by nature is also [good] for the decent person; that is why it would seem to everyone to be pleasant; (Interlude 1) and it is necessary not to consider the life vicious and corrupted, nor the one in pains; for such [a life] is indefinite, just as the things belonging in it. And it will be more apparent in the following sections concerning pain. And (7.2) if living itself is good and pleasant (and this would seem from the fact that everyone desires it, and most of all the decent and blessed, for for these life is most choiceworthy, and the living of these is most blessed), and (10) if the one seeing perceives that he sees and the one hearing that he hears and the one walking that he walks and likewise in all the other cases there is some perceiving that we are active, with the result that [when] we perceive, [we perceive] that we perceive and [when] we think, [we perceive] that we think, and (11) if [perceiving] that we think or perceive [is to perceive] that we are being, (6.2) (for it was [earlier proposed] that being is perceiving or thinking) (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), and (12) if perceiving that one lives is of the things pleasant on account of itself (13) (for living is by nature good, and perceiving good inhering in oneself is pleasant), and (14) if living is choiceworthy and most of all to the good people, (15) because being is good for them and pleasant (16) (for the ones perceiving together are pleased by the good on account of itself), and (17) if just as the virtuous person holds towards himself he also holds towards the friend (ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον) (18) (for the friend is an other self) (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν); (19) then just as being itself

point about continuity is added, but then the later *Phusikōteron* Argument at 1170a13-b19 is rendered redundant (as Reeve states, 182) and there does not seem to be a crucial place for living together.

¹⁸² What does Aristotle mean by “natural,” and what is this argument more natural than? One wonders whether Aristotle is stepping into natural philosophy, set aside at the beginning of NE8 (1155b1-16). What matters at present is establishing what this argument’s perspective is more natural than, which presumably implies what the argument is supposed to supersede. I do not think this argument is more natural than OA. That argument also centers on activity, which seems to be the trademark of “natural” arguments (Joachim [1951] 255 and Stewart [Volume 2] 373). As we saw in §3.1.1, Aristotle introduces his model of benefaction in NE9.7 as “more natural” than the model that focuses on external goods. It would seem that for both that argument in NE9.7 and PA here in NE9.9, the arguments that are more natural are those that characterize happiness as activity, and those that are less natural are those that characterize happiness as a collection of external goods (as we saw in §3.2.1). This is in line with the thought that the nature referred to is that which indicates something’s nature or function (Miller [2014] 338, Price [2010] 197; for more views, see Hitz [2011] 8n23).

is choiceworthy to each, thus also or approximately the friend's being (οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως). And it was [earlier proposed] (12-16.1) that being is choiceworthy because of perceiving one's self being good, and such perception is pleasant on account of itself. (20) Therefore it is necessary also to perceive together the friend that he is, (Interlude 2) and this would seem to arise in living together (ἐν τῷ συζῆν) and communing in conversations and cogitations, for it seems that living together (τὸ συζῆν) is thus spoken of in the case of humans, and not just grazing in the same place, as is in the case of pasture animals. (12-16.2) Therefore if being is choiceworthy on account of itself to the blessed person (since being good by nature and pleasant) (17-19) and approximate also is the being of the friend (παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν), (1.2) then the friend is of the choiceworthy things. (21) But that which is choiceworthy for him, it is necessary for it to belong to him, or he will be lacking in some way (ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται). (C) Therefore there will be need, for the person about to be happy, of virtuous friends (δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων). (1170a13-1170b19)

Let us work the argument backwards, keeping in mind that for the argument to go through, Aristotle must take the “happy,” “blessed,” “decent,” “excellent,” and “good” person talked about to refer to the same person.¹⁸³ The conclusion of this argument is that the happy person needs (δεήσει) excellent friends (C). This is because the happy person must possess what is *choiceworthy* for him, so as to fulfill the self-sufficiency criterion for happiness of lacking nothing (21). Now, the excellent friend is *choiceworthy*¹⁸⁴ (1.2) on two grounds: being is choiceworthy on account of itself for the happy person (12-16.2) *and* the friend's being is similar to the happy person's being (17-19), where this last claim is grounded on the claim that the friend is another self (18; here is NE's last instance of “another self”). As we noted about Aristotle's opening remarks in NE9.9 (§3.2.1), Aristotle shifts from a question about *friends* to an answer about *other selves*.

So the happy person needs friends because the friend's being is similar to his own, and his own being is choiceworthy on account of itself. Why is *being* choiceworthy on

¹⁸³ This marks a departure from EE8.3, where the “good (ἀγαθός)” person falls short, at least in comparison to the “fine and good (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός)” person. In any case, all the predications here make it most probable that the person is fully virtuous. And as it is most probable that Aristotle has in mind complete friendship as that which makes the happy person's life complete, the friend is *equally* fully virtuous; for complete friendship features equally fully virtuous friends. Given all this, we can secure that the picture here is justificatory. Further, friendships between equally fully virtuous agents present the most clear-cut case for non-prioritization, so if non-prioritization does not work here, it is unlikely to work elsewhere.

¹⁸⁴ To connect this to (21), we must secure that choiceworthiness *for the happy person* is at stake. The context implies that the excellent friend is choiceworthy *for the good person*, since the immediately preceding and following premises talk about the good person. As “the good person” is interchangeable with “the happy person” in the argument, the connection has been secured.

account of itself to the happy person? Note first that (3)-(6.1) define *living* in terms of perception or thought.¹⁸⁵ (6.2) then says *being* is perception or thought, saying this was proposed earlier, presumably at (3)-(6.1).¹⁸⁶ So we may take “living” and “being” as interchangeable (in this context). (15) tells us that living/being is choiceworthy for the good person because it is good and pleasant for the good person (15), and that it is good and pleasant for him is explained by the fact that it is good and pleasant on account of itself¹⁸⁷ (16).¹⁸⁸ (7.1) explains that living/being is good and pleasant on account of itself because it is *definite*, which is of the nature of the good (8). Now in NE, it is the end (τέλος) that *defines*. This is clearly stated at NE1115b22: we can infer from bravery’s being fine that the end of bravery is fine, since every x is defined (ὀρίζεται)¹⁸⁹ by its end. As definiteness is explicated in terms of ends, we might say that in seeking definiteness, an organism is seeking its end. This would seem to be nothing other than seeking self-actualization.¹⁹⁰

In short, the happy person needs virtue friends¹⁹¹ because (A) virtue friends are

¹⁸⁵ NE speaks of perceiving (αἰσθάνεσθαι) and thinking (νοεῖν). EE, while also speaking of perceiving, speaks of knowing (γινώσκειν) instead of thinking (e.g. 1244b24-6).

¹⁸⁶ This equation of being to perception or thought might seem problematic, for (12-16.1) suggests that being is choiceworthy because of a certain type of perception, which might appear tautological: perception (=being) is choiceworthy because of a certain type of perception. Strictly speaking, this is not tautological, for perception is distinct from a *type* of perception. Further, the “equation” that occurs in (6.2) must be understood in terms of the definition relation to which it refers, in (3)-(6.1). Being is *defined* by perception or thought, so Aristotle cannot mean in (6.2) to take being as the same as perception or thought. So the idea in (12-16.1) is that being is choiceworthy because of the activities that define it.

¹⁸⁷ This confirms the idea in Footnote 174 that the good/pleasant for the good person is partially explained by the good/pleasant on account of itself.

¹⁸⁸ Strictly, they are “pleased” by the good on account of itself. However, I take (16) to also make a claim about what is pleasant on account of itself, with the idea expressed by “x is *pleased* by the good on account of itself” being that the good on account of itself is *pleasant* on account of itself to x. This reading of the good and pleasant as running parallel (which nevertheless takes the good as explanatorily prior to the pleasant) better fits the fact that (16) explains (15), which straightforwardly takes the good and pleasant as running parallel.

¹⁸⁹ From ὀρίζειν, the same word of which ὀρισμένον in PA Premise (8) is a form.

¹⁹⁰ Broadie (2002) 427, Burnet (1900) 428, Hitz (2011) 21-22, Pakaluk (1998) 210-1, Pangle (2003) 190. We can get this conclusion by a quicker route. I would argue that “the definite” here refers to what *Metaphysics* 1078a31-b1 labels one of the forms (εἶδη) of the fine (τοῦ... καλοῦ); in §4.2, I argue that “the fine” refers to actualization; therefore, “the definite” refers to actualization.

¹⁹¹ Strictly, Aristotle refers to “virtuous friends” (or interchangeably, “excellent friends”), not “virtue friends” (i.e. friends because of the good). The former picks out a quality of the person (he is virtuous), the latter the type of friend the person is (he is my virtue friend, not my utility or pleasure friend). However, Aristotle is clearly arguing that the happy person needs a particular type of friend, a virtue friend. For PA is preoccupied with the question of why the happy person needs friends, but Aristotle denies before PA that the happy person needs pleasure or utility friends (1169b23-7), leaving only virtue friends.

choiceworthy, (B) virtue friends are choiceworthy¹⁹² because their being is similar to one's own being (since they are other selves), and (C) one's own being is choiceworthy because it is definite, which refers to actualization.

This immediately confirms EOS: the essential feature of other selfhood is self-actualization, for the need of other selves is justified by the choiceworthiness of the definition, or actualization, of one's own being. A subtle qualification in PA also confirms EOS. (19) says the friend's being is as choiceworthy, or *approximately* (not equally) choiceworthy, as one's own; by the time we get to (17-19), Aristotle seems to have settled with just approximation. This suggests the self-prioritization of EOS, self-prioritization that has been developed by the immediately preceding chapters. NE9.8 endorses prioritizing oneself over everyone else (and therefore even another self) (to be explored in §4.1). And NE9.4 says one's displaying the friendly attributes towards oneself is automatically achieved by one's self being fully virtuous, whereas in the case of a fully virtuous *other*, mediation through oneself is required for all the friendly attributes to obtain (§3.1.2).¹⁹³ In any case, if our establishment of EOS in the earlier instances were correct (§3.1), it would be surprising for PA to differ, for PA's formula of other selfhood closely echoes its predecessors. (17)-(19)'s claims that the virtuous person treats the friend as he does himself because the friend is another self repeats NE9.4's formulation, which in turn mirrors NE8.12's claim that parents love children as they love themselves because children are other selves.

¹⁹² One might think I have committed an equivocation between the "choiceworthy" in (A) and the "choiceworthy" in (B). The former expands to "choiceworthy on account of itself for the happy person" (12-16.2), whereas the latter expands merely to "choiceworthy for the good person" (14; see also (2)'s instance of double predication: "good and pleasant on account of itself to the virtuous person"). Note though, that (12-16.2) is a compression of premises including (14); its double predication of something being choiceworthy on account of itself to the happy person reflects the fact that both predicates "choiceworthy on account of itself" and "choiceworthy to the happy person" occur in (12)-(16). As stated in Footnote 174, I take it that the choiceworthy on account of itself partially explains what is choiceworthy to the good person, so (14)'s mention just of what is choiceworthy to the good person implicitly refers to the choiceworthy on account of itself.

¹⁹³ EE unqualifiedly denies that the friend's being is *as* choiceworthy as one's own. 1244b33-34 says it is "well-said that perceiving oneself and knowing [oneself] is most choiceworthy," where it is clear in context that this is a comparative claim between perceiving/knowing oneself and perceiving/knowing another; just before this, 1244b32-33 distinguishes between "another person instead of oneself knowing, [which is] similar to another person instead of oneself living."

The overall form of PA also suggests self-prioritization. The fact that Aristotle takes the friend's being as choiceworthy by reference to *one's own* being makes it difficult to accept Mansini's (1998) argument that what is central here is not cognition of the self but cognition of the other,¹⁹⁴ or the claim made by Whiting (1991), McKerlie (1991),¹⁹⁵ and McKerlie (1998)¹⁹⁶ that friendship and self-concern are both *equally* basic and grounded on character. Pakaluk (Unpublished) argues that in friendships, friends identify with each other such that "the monikers of 'egoism' and 'altruism' are inappropriate... I am neither pursuing my own good to the neglect of his, as I take as my own good something good for him, nor am I pursuing his good to the neglect of mine, because I take his good as mine."¹⁹⁷ While it is true that a friend may take the other's good as good for herself, there is still the question of what takes priority in this concern: the other or (the other's relation to) oneself. The form of PA, which argues for the choiceworthiness of the friend by reference to the choiceworthiness of one's own being, suggests the latter is prioritized. While the activity here is shared, what makes the shared activity valuable is the actualization of *oneself* that is involved; as in NE9.7, both the product and the producer are actualized in the production, but the axiological focal point is the *producer's* actualization.

I am now going to show how PA justifies OA's assumption that the happy person decides to contemplate virtuous actions, over and above just executing them. (10) states that if we are active in any way, then we perceive we are active in this way. This straightforwardly means that the perception of action, which is a way of being active, is a necessary condition for action. But where does the higher order cognitive activity of *contemplation* come in? While PA applies axiological language only to *perception* (12, 13, 16, 12-16.1) and not to *thinking*, (3) clearly indicates that perception is for the sake of

¹⁹⁴ 413.

¹⁹⁵ 95-100.

¹⁹⁶ 547.

¹⁹⁷ 5.

thought.¹⁹⁸ There Aristotle says that for animals, living is defined by perception, but for humans, living goes beyond this to thinking. This should remind us of the function argument in NE1.7, where Aristotle takes humans to share the capacity for perception with other animals, but to be unique in their rational activity. Given this uniqueness, the function argument claims that happiness consists in this rational activity. And that seems to be the point in PA. While human living consists in both perceiving and thinking, it would fall short of happiness to stop at perceiving, which is shared with animals (3).¹⁹⁹ So this is why OA says the *happy* man will decide to *contemplate* action; *happiness* is activity according to the unique human function, *thinking*.²⁰⁰

It is worth reflecting on the relationship between action and its necessary condition of perceiving on the one hand, and higher-order cognitive activity on the other; in doing so, we can reply to some criticisms of PA. For example, Cooper (1999.15) suggests that it is unsatisfactory to argue that one should get into friendships in order to obtain the ability of self-awareness; agents just are self-aware.²⁰¹ For this reason he thinks that NE's argument here, which focuses on *self-awareness*, is inferior to the parallel argument in MM2.15, which

¹⁹⁸ This seems to be the thought in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle backs up the claim that everyone desires to *know* (τοῦ εἰδέναι) by the fact that everyone desires to *perceive* (τῶν αἰσθήσεων) (980a20-21). Given perception's axiological dependence on higher-order cognition, there may be some reason to doubt that there are cases of perception that "do not connect with acting well [i.e. happiness], and yet transiently enhance a life" (*pace* Price [2011] 52).

¹⁹⁹ Liu suggests what is at stake is the subjective experience or "feeling" of happiness that she takes commentators on Greek ethics to overly ignore (588). Stewart (Volume 2) thinks that the matter at hand is that of pleasure; to experience the relevant actions as pleasant, one has to contemplate them (385). Mere perception would seem sufficient for the subjective feelings described, however.

²⁰⁰ This paragraph has employed three words for cognition: contemplation, thinking, and thought. "Thinking" is my translation for the Greek verb νοεῖν and "thought" for the Greek substantive νόησις; these two are cognates and function interchangeably in Aristotle's arguments. "Contemplation" tracks θεωρία, with the verb "to contemplate" tracking θεωρεῖν. These two words do not appear at all in PA, so one might wonder about how I am using PA's claims about thinking/thought to support OA's claim about contemplation. The doubt here rests on how strongly I am construing contemplation in OA. If I construe it as the very specific activity that NE10 develops as constituting the highest kind of happiness, then there may be doubts about how claims about thought/thinking support claims about this stronger notion of contemplation. However, I am not assuming a very specific notion of contemplation here. I regard it simply as a cognitive activity that constitutes cognition at least more advanced than mere perception—which is precisely how PA seems to regard thought/thinking. At any rate, OA cannot be discussing NE10's contemplation. For OA speaks of contemplating one's own *actions*, whereas NE10.7-8 speak of contemplation as not requiring the resources that one's own action does; but if one is contemplating one's own actions, this would also require the resources that one's own action does.

²⁰¹ 339-41.

focuses on self-*knowledge*. This is because it is easier to accept that one should need others for the stronger condition of self-knowledge. However, if I am right here, this argument *is* focused on this stronger condition; perception is *for the sake of* higher order activity, thinking (which seems to implicate *knowledge*).

Further, we might question the assumption that grounds Cooper's argument: agents just *are* self-aware to begin with. It is unclear that Aristotle holds this Cartesian assumption. Whereas Descartes takes self-awareness as foundational for sense perception and as not requiring other people, Aristotle seems to take perception as foundational for self-awareness and as being a social activity. So Aristotle is within his rights to ground the need for friends in one's inability to be adequately self-aware.²⁰²

Finally, it is important to emphasize that Aristotle is going beyond the claim that doing virtuous action without thinking about it falls short of happiness; he is also claiming that doing virtuous action without thinking about it falls short of full virtuous action. That is, *pace* Cooper (1999.15)²⁰³ it is not just self-knowledge in virtuous activity that is at stake here, but also the virtuous activity itself. Aristotle seems to assume that an important part of engaging in the activity is being aware of it; this is suggested by PA's constant references to layered perception, which I have argued is ultimately for the sake of higher-order cognition.

²⁰² See Price (1989) 115 and Stern-Gillet (1995) 18-24 for this contrast between Aristotle and Descartes. It is possible that Price may have not pushed this distinction far enough to push away some of his doubts concerning this argument. In (2001) 222 he doubts PA on the grounds that shared perception, which brings in the requirement for friends, involves more actualization than reflexive perception, which can be done by oneself. We might say that the reflexive perception in question falls short of the cognitive actualization required for happiness unless it is shared. By (2010) 196, Price seems to have jettisoned the idea that PA is pushing a non-Cartesian line and it is clear how this move contributes to even more doubts about PA. The particular worry this time is Premise (21), the idea that the happy person must not lack anything choiceworthy. Price suggests that it is practically impossible to have *everything* that is choiceworthy to oneself and so that we must re-interpret this as meaning that the happy person has every *kind* of good that matters. But to secure this interpretation of (21), we must show that "consciousness of one's own life is insufficient" (197). But, according to Price, the claim in (17-19) that the friend's being is similar to one's own suggests that a different kind of good is *not* at stake; this is similar to (2001)'s idea that shared perception does not really add anything beyond reflexive perception. It now becomes especially apparent why we need to understand the need for friends instrumentally (see Footnote 174); *pace* Descartes, we cannot engage sufficiently in self-cognition without friends. In §3.2.5 I show how we can understand the *similarity* of one's friend's being as instrumentally valuable.

²⁰³ 344-5.

All this equips us to counter Kraut's (2017) claim that Aristotle's argument here fails.²⁰⁴

Kraut argues that political life provides superior opportunities for virtuous activity than private life, including friendship; the question then arises as to why one needs friendship. One cannot appeal to benefit, since friendship is more about activity than receptivity. Kraut thinks Aristotle does not have an answer to this, but I think Aristotle would say that the benefit of friendship *is* activity; further, it is a kind of activity, the contemplation of self, that relatively impersonal political interactions do not provide.

In §3.2.3, I have argued that PA secures OA's assumption that the happy person decides to contemplate actions. The argument suggests that perceiving is a necessary condition of acting; if one does anything, then one perceives that one does this something. But PA also suggests that perceiving falls short of the thinking that is unique to humans, a uniqueness that was previously established in NE1.7. So OA's assumption that the *happy* person will decide to *contemplate* action makes sense; *happiness* constitutes activity of the unique human function, the rational activity of thinking, and to stop at the perceiving of action would thus be to stop short of happiness. We have also found that the "definite" in the argument's claim that being is choiceworthy because it is definite, is meant to refer to actualization. Given that the value of friends is justified by their being other selves, and the value of other selves is justified by their connection to one's own being, and one's own being is choiceworthy because of actualization, EOS prevails here; the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one's own actualization.

3.2.4: The Argument from Continuity

There are still two questions from OA that PA does not answer. The first is that it is unclear why fully virtuous *friends*, over and above fully virtuous *strangers*, are needed to

²⁰⁴ §9.

contemplate one's own actions. The second is why *anyone* is needed at all, given OA's admission that we are merely *more* able to contemplate the actions of others than our own; this leaves open our being able *simpliciter* to contemplate our own actions.²⁰⁵ This latter question gets taken up by the argument immediately preceding PA and immediately succeeding OA, what I will call "the Argument from Continuity" (henceforth abbreviated "AC"). After OA's conclusion that the happy person needs friends, Aristotle says:²⁰⁶

(A) It is necessary for the happy person to live pleasantly. (B) Therefore (οὖν) life by oneself is difficult; (C) for it is not easy to be active continuously by oneself (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς), but it is easier with others and in relation to others. (1170a4-6)

There are several underlying assumptions here. First, we must recall NE9.9's constant assertion that happiness is an activity. Second, we must keep in mind Aristotle's assertions both before and after NE9 that pain (1100b28-1101a8, 1153b9-25, 1174b14-33), the opposite of pleasure, impedes activity. Third, we must take Aristotle as connecting difficulty with pain; this is clear from (A)'s contrasting living pleasantly with (B)'s living difficultly.²⁰⁷ Putting these assumptions together, this means that the happy person, as happy, is active; but to be active, he has to live pleasantly, since living painfully amounts to inactivity, or impeded activity. So working the argument backwards: being active continuously is difficult by oneself (C), therefore living by oneself is difficult (B), and as the happy person must live

²⁰⁵ EE's treatment of this makes clearer than NE that the fully virtuous person values friends because of the inability to be active by oneself. Aristotle considers the idea that since god does not need friends, so too the person who is very godlike. Aristotle does not reject the former, but does reject the latter; he says that if the fully virtuous person is by himself, "he will not, by this line of reasoning, even think. For the god bears well not in this way, but in being better than anything else other than himself about which he thinks. The reason [for the difference between the god and us] is that for us happiness is with something other [than ourselves], but with [the god] he himself is his own happiness" (1245b14-19). The idea seems to be that gods do not need friends because their happiness is achieved by themselves, but insofar as one is a human, even a godlike human would need friends, because her happiness is achieved by something outside of herself. This is perhaps NE's point about the self-sufficiency of happiness not being one that obtains in an isolated life (NE1097b8-9).

²⁰⁶ The following quote begins with "and people think (οἴονται τε δεῖν)," which might lead one to doubt whether Aristotle endorses the point. The argument here seems to be augmenting Aristotle's immediately preceding argument (OA), as the "and (τε)" indicates; further, context highly suggests Aristotle's own endorsement.

²⁰⁷ This might seem to contradict §3.1.1's claims about *more effort* of the mother resulting in more love (see Footnotes 130 and 134). I think, however, there is a distinction between effort and difficulty, with the former implying activity and the latter implying frustration of that activity. If there is no distinction between the two, Aristotle should not reject the claim that the ultimate end is the state of virtue (NE1.5), a state that is compatible with eternal inactivity (therefore eternal lack of effort=difficulty).

pleasantly (A), not difficultly/painfully, the happy person must live or be active²⁰⁸ with others.

Recall that it was unclear that OA secures for us the conclusion that the happy person *needs* friends; Aristotle takes this conclusion to follow from the claim that we are *better* able to contemplate the actions of others than our own actions, not that we are *not* able to contemplate our own actions. However, we can see here that *adequate* activity, including contemplation, has to be continuous and easy. While it might be possible to engage in activity by oneself, it is unclear that one can engage in *adequate* activity by oneself; the activity might be continuous, but painful, or it might not even be continuous, since the pain impedes it.

I think then this is how we should understand the “better” claim in OA. While one *can* contemplate one’s own actions by oneself, to do so by oneself is difficult or painful, and perhaps not continuous as a result. This is clearly inadequate. Therefore a friend is *needed*, to achieve a “better” level of contemplating actions, a level of ease and continuity that is *needed* for the unimpeded activity of happiness.²⁰⁹ Once more, EOS prevails; the value of other selves lies in their facilitation of actualization, specified by AC as *adequate* actualization.

²⁰⁸ One might question this disjunction. That is, I am trying to interpret AC as suggesting why one needs a partner in *activity*, while it only seems to suggest why one needs a partner in *life*. However, Aristotle himself shifts between living and activity at the end of NE10.4: “As to whether we choose living (τὸ ζῆν) because of pleasure, or pleasure because of living (τὸ ζῆν), let the question be set aside at present. For these two things appear to be yoked together and not open to separation; for without activity (ἐνεργείας) no pleasure occurs, and pleasure completes every activity (ἐνέργειαν)” (1175a18-21). I think recognition of this shift between living and activity (Crisp [1994] 129, 133) may solve a puzzle Price (1989) aims at the *Lysis* but that is relevant to formulations of eudaimonism generally (253). The *Lysis* posits the ultimate end of the “first dear” and what Price labels “P1”: “what is really dear is not dear for the sake of anything” (220b4-5). Price then invokes an Aristotelian P2: “any constituent of a desired whole is valued as such both for its own sake and for the sake of the whole.” Price claims that the conjunction of P1 and P2 entails that the first dear has no parts; this eliminates the most plausible candidate for the first dear, happiness, for we might think that happiness, as “*living well*,” has parts. I think this criticism assumes that by “*living*” Aristotle means to invoke something akin to “*life*” understood in colloquial English. But perhaps by “*living*” Aristotle means simply to invoke, as he does in NE9.9 and NE10.4, “*being active*.” And it is open for activity to be part-less in a way that life cannot.

²⁰⁹ This differs from Joachim (1951), who thinks fully virtuous agents need others because they are absorbed in action and therefore cannot grasp “the full significance and value” of their action (258). Such an interpretation must understand these friends assisting in *post facto* grasping, for if the fully virtuous agent is too absorbed in the action *in the present*, then it is unclear that she will be able to pay attention to the friends who are assisting her in grasping the action. But if it is *post facto* grasping that is concerned, Aristotle’s argument is open to contingencies. We might think, for example, that a fully virtuous agent could rely on a video camera to aid in

Respecting this demand for continuity helps us to fully grasp PA; it is perhaps for this reason that AC occurs before PA in the text.²¹⁰ PA's basic argument is that the happy person needs friends because one's own being is definite, and the friend, as being another self, is similar to one's own being. If we understand this as a retrospective synchronic claim, this gives the impression that one needs a friend because one's own being is/was definite at a certain point in time. This sounds odd, for "need" is extrapolated exclusively in efficient causal terms, divorced from the final cause; that is, it sounds strange for one to *need* something which *has already been obtained*.²¹¹ Rather, Aristotle's emphasis on continuity suggests that we should read the claim in a prospective diachronic way; one needs a friend because one values one's own being as definite, actualized, and a friend facilitates this actualization.²¹² This makes more sense; need is extrapolated in terms of a final cause. So we read final causally, "we need friends *in order to* perceive our being definite"; we do not read (merely) efficient causally, "we need friends *because* our being already is/was definite to perceive."²¹³ It is the importance of this continuity, raised in AC, that explains why an already happy person should go on needing a friend. One needs a friend for happiness

post facto grasping of the action (Whiting [2006] 301); perhaps less anachronistically, the fully virtuous agent could rely on a dramatization.

²¹⁰ I have assessed PA before AC in my analysis for ease of exposition.

²¹¹ This is the problem with Millgram's (1987) construing other selfhood in retrospective terms, rather than in prospective terms. While he recognizes, as I do, the importance of one's own actualization in regards to other selves, he suggests that this is not an instrumental relationship; rather, one is valued as another self because of *past* causation of one's own being (368-72). I have given reasons for rejecting purely retrospective models of Aristotelian friendship (§1.2), and I think we have reason for rejecting it here; it is not clear how this retrospective model does justice to the demand for activity that *continues into the future*. Note that the problem is less severe if we translate δέῖν as "should have": we should have friends because their being is/was definite. But I have already argued that this non-instrumental rendering of δέῖν has Aristotle talk past his interlocutors. In any case, OA would straightforwardly deny that happiness' requirement of friends is grounded in something that is *obtained*; for happiness is an activity that cannot be obtained like a possession (Premise 2).

²¹² Michael of Ephesus seems to have recognized this. He claims that Aristotle's conclusion that one needs a friend because the friend's being is like one's own, which is choiceworthy, only unclearly follows; one needs to insert the premise that the activity in question is better and more pleasing when continual. It is for *this* level of activity that a friend is required (514.34-515.7, 516.6-10).

²¹³ Stern-Gillet (1995) disagrees, saying: "Since self-awareness cannot occur in the absence of an object of cognition, neither can the specific kind of self-realization brought about by friendship be aimed at from the friendless state. Aristotelian agents therefore simply could not seek virtue friends in order to secure a good they would be unable even to conceive in their absence" (141). It is unclear why the conceiving is impossible before engaging in friendship. After all, Aristotle is providing such a conception for students who presumably lack the

because happiness requires continuous actualization.²¹⁴ This shows that actualization is the grounds not only for *entering* friendship, but also for *maintaining* it.

3.2.5: The Argument from Living Together

While AC makes clear that happiness requires *others* for adequately continuous activity, answering one issue left over from OA, it is still unclear that happiness requires *friends* in particular; if it is just about sharing activities²¹⁵ or sharing *and grasping* activities,²¹⁶ we might just be continuously active with random fully virtuous people.²¹⁷ To answer this, we must appeal to Aristotle's notion of living together (συζῆν). In short, the Argument from Living Together is this: the adequately easy continuous activity mentioned in AC occurs only in the mutual shaping of living together (συζῆν); but the mutual shaping of living together just is what obtains between other selves;²¹⁸ so this is why the happy person needs friends, other selves.

experience. Further, when seeking a good we have never experienced before, we presumably do this without a clear conception of it.

²¹⁴ NE10.4's relation of pleasure and activity bolster this diachronic reading. We are told that pleasure completes the activity as supervening on it (1174b31-33); as such, humans cannot enjoy pleasure continuously because they cannot do activity, upon which pleasure supervenes, continuously (1175a3-10). Further, people choose pleasure as completing the activity (1175a15-17). Now, what is this notion of completeness about? It seems to be about being complete through all times (1174a13-b14). In summary, happy people want to complete their being, the activity they take as choiceworthy; as pleasure completes the activity, this amounts to aiming at pleasure (so as to complete the activity); but as pleasure is complete through all time, such an aim is diachronic.

²¹⁵ Hitz (2011) 11-14.

²¹⁶ Price (1989) 118-124. In (1989) 266-7 and (2010) 188-9, Price does eventually appeal to mutual shaping. But he does so in terms of "education," which may bring friendship too close to moral education; this point also applies to those who take Aristotle's argument about why the happy person needs friends to be a point about helping the happy person recognize choiceworthy things as appropriately choiceworthy (see Cooper [1999.15] 347-8 and Liu [2010] 591-2). It would seem that the friends in NE9.9 are fully virtuous and thus do not need friends to help them with such recognition; otherwise, to the question of "why need friends," Aristotle would give the very easy answer of "for the purpose of acquiring full virtue" instead of the complicated one that he does. The acquisition of full virtue seems to be the purpose rather of moral education (NE10.9), which is presumably passive in nature, not of friendship, which Aristotle emphasizes is active in nature (e.g. 1159a27-33). See EE1245a16-18, which seems to deny education to complete friendship.

²¹⁷ Kraut (2017) §9. Or even enemies (Cooper [1999.15] 340-1, Bostock [2000] 183-4). This suggests that Aristotle has in mind something more specific than merely extending the scope and range of one's own activities (*pace* Cooper [1999.15] 349; Irwin [1999] 299, [1990a] 92, 94). For we might think that we can maximally extend the scope and range of our activities by maximizing our relationships with random fully virtuous people.

²¹⁸ See Carreras (2012) for arguments linking other selfhood to reciprocal shaping (325-9).

What is the nature of this living together? We get a brief mention in NE9.9, (Interlude 2) of PA; living together is characterized as involving shared perception. The next chapter, NE9.10, takes the criterion of living together as paramount when answering how many friends one should have (only as many as are required for living together). While NE9.10 does not elaborate much on the notion, it at least reveals that living together is not something one can do with many people (1170b33-1171a4, 8-10). The last chapter of the book, NE9.12, focuses on the notion, so let us now consider the majority of that chapter:

(A) Thus also is living together most choiceworthy to friends; (B) for friendship is community, and as one bears towards himself, thus also towards the friend; (C) but concerning oneself the perception that he is is choiceworthy, (D) and thus also concerning the friend; (E) and activity of this [perceiving] occurs in living together, with the result that [friends], suitably, seek this. (F) And whatever is to each [his] being or for the sake of which living is chosen, [it is] in this that they choose to spend time with friends; (G) for which reason some drink together, others play dice together, still others do gymnastics together and hunt together, or do philosophy together, each spending time in that thing which he cherishes most of all of the things in life; (H) for since wishing to live together with friends, they do these things and share these things in which they think their life [consists].²¹⁹ (I) The friendship of the base then becomes vicious (for they share in base things, being unstable, and since becoming similar [ὁμοιοῦμενοι] to one another they become vicious), (J) but the friendship of the decent becomes decent, since increasing together in interactions; and they seem to become better since being active (ἐνεργοῦντες) and correcting one another; (K) for they shape (ἀπομάττονται) one another in ways that please them, whence [the saying] “noble from noble things.” (1171b32-1172a14)

The line of thought seems to be that living together involves sharing the activities that define life (A-H), which echoes all three previous arguments’ comments about sharing activity. But beyond shared activity, living together involves mutual shaping. (I) and (K) suggest that in living together friends become “similar” and “shape one another.”²²⁰ This “becoming similar” implicates other selfhood; x shapes y and in this way y is a product, another self

²¹⁹ Bywater reads συζῆν. But the repetition of “live together” is awkward, as it gives us the following translation: in living together, friends share the activities in which they think they live together. This awkwardness is well-noted: Stewart (Volume 2) 401 reads ἐν οἷς οἰοῦνται εἶναι τὸ ζῆν, Kb and Burnet (1900) 436 read ὥς οἶόν τε, and Bekker conjectures εἶ ζῆν instead of συζῆν. In short, it would make better sense to say that in living together, friends share the activities in which they think they live, rather than live *together*.

²²⁰ This is not the first time that Aristotle has invoked mutual shaping. NE1165b13-17 suggest that one should not love (and therefore, one should not be a friend) to someone who becomes vicious, at least partly because one becomes similar to what one loves. In a friendship relation then, one becomes similar to the other friend. In PA (17-19), Aristotle says a friend’s being is approximate (παραπλήσιον) to one’s own or approximately choiceworthy to one’s own, on the grounds that the friend is another self. Again, there is a becoming similar, an approximation, where this seems to occur specifically with other selves.

involved in x's actualization.²²¹ It is this mutual shaping of other selves in living together that sets apart fully virtuous *friends* from fully virtuous *strangers*. The happy person needs a virtuous partner to facilitate adequately continuous and easy activity; but cycling in random virtuous people will not make for the same experience, just as we might suggest with Aristotle and against Plato,²²² that cycling in random but perhaps equally well-endowed parents will not make for the same parenting or upbringing experience. This would be epistemically disadvantageous. What is further needed is another self, a distinct product of one's own shaping with whom one can share one's life;²²³ it is this metaphysically unique relationship that facilitates the epistemic advantage.

It is worth sorting out what is ultimately choiceworthy here. I am claiming that there is something choiceworthy about the individuality involved in living together, but unlike Badhwar I do not think that individuality is what is *ultimately* choiceworthy. The uniqueness of the relationship, which comes out because of mutual shaping, is choiceworthy because it amounts to an epistemic advantage for something that *is* ultimately choiceworthy, self-actualization; per EOS, the essential feature of other selves, what makes them valuable, is their involvement in one's own actualization.²²⁴ According to Aristotle, one does not achieve

²²¹ We therefore have another reason for rejecting NPOS. No one denies that living together involves other selves. But NPOS must deny that if x and y are other selves, then they live together; for NPOS holds that x and y are other selves if and only if x and y are fully virtuous, but it does not follow from the fact that x and y are fully virtuous that they live together. However, NE9.12 shows that if x and y are other selves, then they live together. For (1) if x and y are other selves of each other, then both are involved in each other's actualization, (2) if x and y are involved in each other's actualization, then they mutually shape each other, either through virtuous activity directly or by reinforcing the associated virtuous state, (3) if x and y mutually shape each other, then they live together, for mutually shaping seems to be what makes living together, as opposed to merely sharing activity, unique. Therefore, if x and y are other selves, then x and y live together. But this is false if, per NPOS, x and y are other selves if and only if x and y are fully virtuous, for it is false that if x and y are fully virtuous, then they live together.

²²² *Politics* 2.2-5. See §3.3 for more discussion.

²²³ Millgram (1987) 366-72, Sherman (1987) 602.

²²⁴ It is important that we do not stop at the epistemic; it is not merely knowing the other person very intimately that is ultimately choiceworthy. For it seems implausible to think that a mother, for example, would treat all other children in the same way as her own if she knew them all as well as her own child, even if they are similar in character. Rather, a metaphysical fact is relevant; the mother would still treat her child differently, preferentially, because she has produced the child, that is, the child is her actualization (per NE9.7). Now, this is not to suggest that Aristotle thinks mothers should treat their children preferentially at all times. NE9.2 is relevant here, for it addresses the issue that while one is most indebted to parents, this does not imply that one must do everything for parents.

happiness in a state of eternal rest (NE1095b31-33), but in activity that is as continuous as is humanly possible. And this is epistemically facilitated by a partner (another self) with whom one has developed a mode of operation in an established relationship of mutual shaping (living together).

I will now sum up §3.2, where I have assessed the final two instances of “another self.” These occur in NE9.9, where Aristotle asks the question of why the happy person needs friends. In §3.2.1 I assessed Aristotle’s introduction of the question, concluding that he understands it in instrumental terms. The *Oikeion* Argument (§3.2.2) suggested that we need friends for cognitive reasons (self-contemplation). But this argument left open many questions. First, it left open why happiness requires contemplation of virtuous actions, beyond the mere actions. Second, it left open why we *need* others for self-contemplation, for the argument only says that we are *less* able to contemplate our own actions than of others, not that we are *not* able to contemplate our own. Third, the *Oikeion* Argument left open why we should need a friend over a stranger for self-contemplation; it would seem that all we need is some other *fully virtuous* person to aid this. The *Phusikōteron* Argument (§3.2.3) took care of the first issue by arguing that happiness requires higher order cognitive activities. The Argument from Continuity (§3.2.4) suggested that for happiness to obtain, the activity in question must be adequately easy and continuous, and it can only be adequately easy and continuous with the help of a partner; this answers the question of why *others* are needed for self-contemplation. The Argument from Living Together (§3.2.5) answered the final issue, of why a *friend*, over just any other fully virtuous person, should be needed for this. Living together involves not only a consistent partner, but also a person who has shaped you and has been shaped by you in the past and will continue to do and be so. The retrospective factor of past shaping amounts to an epistemic advantage for continuous activity, just as we might think a child best learns or grows up if the teacher or parent is not constantly cycled. The fact

that all these arguments ground the need for friends in one's own activity suggests EOS, not NPOS, is correct.

3.3: From Activity to Egoism, From Egoism to Partiality

As mentioned in the chapter's introduction, the egoism of EOS, the prioritization of the *numerically* identical self rather than *normatively* identical selves, is grounded in the prioritization of the *activity* of virtue rather than the *state* of virtue. In my closing remarks, I will return to these distinctions and elaborate on how Aristotle's prioritization of activity grounds egoism; further, I will show how egoism grounds partiality in Aristotle's theory of friendship.

Let us begin by visiting Aristotle's comparison of virtue and friendship in NE8.5-6. Aristotle clearly characterizes friendship as a virtue, comparing it with virtue being spoken of in two respects, state and activity (1157b5-7).²²⁵ Regarding the *activity* aspect of friendship, Aristotle constantly refers to living together or spending time together (NE1157b7, 15, 18, 20, 22, 1158a9). What is the *state* aspect of friendship? NE1157b17-19 and 1158a7-10 suggest it is goodwill or wishing goods for the sake of the other. But while goodwill may be friendship *qua* state, it is not friendship; as NE9.5.1167a10-11 puts it, it is inactive friendship and friendship only metaphorically.

It is clear that Aristotle prioritizes activity over state. For one thing, there is definitional priority of the active over the passive. The beginning of *De Anima* 2.4 suggests that if one wants to study a potentiality of the soul, one must study the corresponding actualization, because the actualization is definitionally prior (πρότεραι κατὰ τὸν λόγον; see also *Metaphysics* Θ.8). And there is also axiological priority of the active over the passive. In

²²⁵ This dual reference of friendship perhaps explains the otherwise confusing idea that loving (τὸ φιλεῖν) is characterized at NE1159a34-5 as the "virtue" of friends. If we understand "virtue" here as referring to "state," this claim makes little sense, for we might think that "loving" refers to an activity. But if "virtue" here refers to "activity," then the claim makes more sense.

NE1.5's discourse about the ultimate end, Aristotle considers virtue as a candidate. But he rejects it on the grounds that it is an open possibility for someone "having virtue to be asleep or inactive throughout life (καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου)" (1095b32-33). Aristotle thinks that virtue *qua* state (ἔξις) or first actualization is not sufficient for the ultimate end. What is further required is virtue *qua* activity (ἐνέργεια) or the *second* actualization: the *use* of the state. It is this second actualization that constitutes the ultimate human end. In short, we see that regarding both definition and value, there is a ladder progressing from passivity to activity.

I am now going to show how Aristotle grounds the ultimacy of the numerically distinct self (i.e. egoism) on the ultimacy of activity. There are two pieces of evidence for this. When one is discussing who is going to do the action, there is a necessary distinction that has to be made between numerically distinct agents; at the end of the day, it is one agent and not another that is executing some action.²²⁶ NE9.8 (to be explored in §4) makes this clear in its talk of giving up opportunities to act to others; such talk is predicated on the distinction between numerically distinct agents.²²⁷ This is very different from the case of states, where everyone can share equally in virtue without any required discussion of numerical identity.²²⁸

²²⁶ Mansini (1998) 414, Price (1989) 267-8, (2010) 198. Activity may be shared, but as noted in §3.2.3, what makes the shared activity valuable is the actualization of *oneself* that is involved. Price (2011) agrees that this focus on action leads to a focus on numerically distinct selves, for the relevant responsibility for action is "a responsibility that one *cannot* have for the free actions of others" (41; see also 238). Yet he contrasts this "moralized form of... self-concern" (238n58) with "the partiality of an egoist" he thinks is "alien to Aristotle" and super-imposed by inclusivist interpretations, that is, interpretations that take happiness to include all intrinsic goods (41-2). I suppose I am going for the partial/egoist model Price opposes, but I do not think I am presupposing inclusivism; per the Introduction, I have tried to stay neutral to debates about the constituents of happiness. I take my partial/egoist model to follow from the fact that virtuous activity is the most important part of happiness, whether or not happiness has other things as its parts, or whether or not it includes *all* intrinsic goods. In footnotes (41n11, 238n58) Price hints that the decisive text for debunking or confirming the partial/egoist model is NE9.8, which I will explore in §4.

²²⁷ Maher (2012) 773-4.

²²⁸ A more general and less ancient point can be made. I am here suggesting that Aristotle's *eudaimonistic* axiom is to be understood egoistically; it is *one's own* happiness that is the ultimate end. However, one can also posit a *eudaimonistic* axiom where it is *everyone's* happiness that is the ultimate end. But this version of the axiom seems to require understanding happiness in terms of states, for these can be shared. As Crisp (2006) describes his "dual-source view," it seems that we have a reason for promoting our own happiness, understood

So a focus on activity forces a focus on numerical identity; does it also force *prioritization* between numerically distinct agents? I think it does. If the action's being one's own is of secondary value to a fully virtuous agent, there is nothing wrong with the fully virtuous agent simply spectating others' virtuous actions. But time and time again Aristotle emphasizes that the fully virtuous agent is *himself* active. Now, one might seize upon NE9.8's example of giving up opportunities to act as evidence against my position; activity can be prioritized, but does not this example show that *others* are prioritized, not *oneself*? I do not think so. For Aristotle suggests that in so giving up the opportunity to directly act, a person actually does greater activity *herself* by *causing* the other to act (1169a32-4). Had Aristotle omitted this, we could make activity ultimate without prioritizing the self, for one could promote the activities of others without promoting one's own activity and thereby promote the ultimate end of others without so doing for oneself. But Aristotle depicts promoting the activity of others precisely *as* promoting one's own activity, and to a greater extent than occurs when directly engaging in the relevant action.

There is another piece of evidence suggesting that Aristotle derives priority of the numerically distinct self over others from prioritization of activity. In NE1.5's discussion of the candidates for happiness, Aristotle considers honor. He rejects this candidate on the grounds that honor depends more on the ones conferring it than the ones receiving it, which contradicts intuitions that the ultimate end is "something that is our own and hard to take away (οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι)" (1095b26). What does Aristotle mean by this? Οἰκεῖον here clearly means something that belongs to the numerically distinct self as opposed to others, given the immediately preceding point about honor being more up to the conferrer than the numerically distinct receiver. I take it that the feature of being hard to take away

as enjoyment of our own individual capacities for consciousness, and that we have a reason for promoting the happiness of others, "since others *also* have such capacities" (141, emphasis mine). It seems that it is this *sharing* of a capacity, of a state, that grounds impartial concern for happiness.

goes hand in hand with the feature of being one's own; not only does the ultimate end belong to *oneself*, it is such as to be difficult to take away from *oneself*.

Now, it is true that Aristotle is citing intuition here, but there is no evidence to believe that he ever rejects the principle that the ultimate end is our own and hard to take away from us. And if he does not reject this principle, it is unclear how he can take activity as ultimate without also prioritizing the numerically distinct self over others. For it would seem that prioritizing others' activity as much as or more than one's own activity actually makes this activity *not* one's own and *easier* to take away. That the activity would not be one's own is obvious; the proposed reading whereby the other's activity is just as important or more important than one's own is prioritizing the activity of the numerically distinct *other*. It is also clear that the activity would be easier to take away. In NE10.7, Aristotle promotes contemplative happiness over moral happiness. This is partly due to moral virtuous activity being more dependent on external circumstances, since it requires resources to execute (1177a27-b1). But prioritizing the activities of *others* (*simpliciter*, or to the same degree as one's own activity) would only increase dependency on external circumstances and thereby increase ease of deprivation.²²⁹

So the prioritization of activity grounds the prioritization of the numerically distinct self.²³⁰ In turn, the prioritization of the numerically distinct self grounds partiality.²³¹ I will begin my argument for this last point by illustrating NPOS's position. Instead of the

²²⁹ I am not suggesting that Aristotle endorses a minimalistic, perhaps Cynic, position, whereby one should minimize one's goals so as to insulate them from the effects of fortune. I am simply suggesting that if activity is the most important thing, then one must prioritize oneself over others, for prioritizing others over oneself or as much as oneself entails *relying* on others in a way that undercuts activity.

²³⁰ I think this suggests that Aristotle is a pure egoist and not a mixed egoist; that is, one's own happiness is prioritized not, *per* mixed egoism, because it is an ultimate end that is prioritized over the ultimate end of the other's happiness, but, *per* pure egoism, because it is the only ultimate end.

²³¹ Crisp (2006) cites NE9.4 as an example of arguing "for reasons grounded on special relations through an analogy with one's relation to oneself" (142). He suggests that "this analogy... fails to take sufficient note of the ethical significance of the separateness of persons," that "however close I am to some other person, she will always be another person" (142-3). The following development should show how Aristotle's grounding of partial concern through an analogy with one's relation to oneself leaves room for robust separateness of persons. I suspect that Crisp's accusation against Aristotle is grounded on a NPOS understanding of NE9.4, whereby it is

prioritization of activity grounding the prioritization of the numerically distinct self, NPOS begins with the prioritization of *state*, which in turn grounds equal treatment between *normatively identical* agents who share in the state. What justifies friendship here is full virtue, the *state* that is shared equally among all fully virtuous people and as such does not admit of personal variation; what matters is the *normative identity* of all fully virtuous people, not their *numerical distinctness*. As Whiting puts it: “The point about good agents is that they value virtuous action *for itself* and *not* (either not simply or not primarily) *insofar as it is their own*.”²³²

There are various problems with this. While Whiting rightly contrasts her prioritization of the *state* of virtue with prioritization of numerically distinct ownership, she wrongly implies that Aristotle prioritizes state. Aristotle clearly thinks that virtue *qua* state justifies not friendship, but friendship *qua* state, that is, goodwill, which is only friendship metaphorically. And friendship *qua* state, just like virtue *qua* state, is not ultimate; friendship *qua* activity and virtue *qua* activity are ultimately choiceworthy. But even if we pass over this textual problem of taking state as foundational, there is a philosophical problem with a model of friendship that starts with a focus on state and ends with prioritization of the normatively identical: as McKerlie (1991) and Whiting (1991) note, there is a difficulty in accounting for the concern friends have for *particular* people over and above all the fully virtuous people who share their character. In the end, Whiting posits, on Aristotle’s behalf, merely accidental explanations; we will be concerned for particular people by way of “pragmatic” and not “intrinsic” justification, due to “historical and psychological accident.”²³³ McKerlie simply cites living together as the reason why fully virtuous people will not be friends with just any

a feature that does not distinguish between fully virtuous agents that grounds indistinct treatment of oneself and the other in question.

²³² (2006) 292. See also (1991) 10.

²³³ 23.

other fully virtuous person; however, he does not thoroughly investigate what is so important about living together.²³⁴

So McKerlie and Whiting claim that there is no justification for partiality in friendship—in briefer and more familiar terms, “the personal element” in friendship. Rather, there is only *explanation* for partiality in friendship: historical accident and pragmatic constraints. The only thing that justifies any relationship is the full virtue shared by all fully virtuous people, and this does not admit of partiality. Passing over this odd philosophical result that friendship is, to use Whiting’s words, “impersonal,” I will now turn to two interpretative problems. First, NPOS highly suggests a *Platonic* model of relationships: spouses, children, and all other relationships should be indiscriminately shared. But Aristotle explicitly rejects Plato on this score and constantly emphasizes numerically distinct ownership in *Politics* 2.2-5.²³⁵ He suggests that absent from Plato’s community are two things that “most of all make men take care and love (κήδεσθαι... φιλεῖν),” namely “being one’s own and being cherished (τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν)” (1262b22-23). Soon afterward, Aristotle claims that pleasure in x is “uncountably (ἀμύθητον)” more if x belongs to oneself in a substantive way; the reason he gives for this is that self-love is “natural (φυσικόν)” and “not in vain (οὐ μάτην)” (1263a40-1263b1). This utter emphasis on the personal in these presumably normative criticisms of Plato makes little sense if McKerlie and Whiting are right in thinking Aristotle posits no justification for the personal.

Some passages local to the friendship discussion would also make little sense. When Aristotle imagines a virtue friend losing his virtue, he asks whether one must...

... then bear himself towards that friend no more differently than if he had never been a friend? Or is it necessary to bear a memory (μνείαν) of the familiarity that occurred (γενομένης), and just as we think it necessary more in the case of friends than strangers to be favorable, thus also in the case of ones having been [friends] something must be apportioned

²³⁴ Given that (continuous, easy) actualization of the *self* seems at stake, this appeal to living together does not sit well with McKerlie’s overall assertion that *altruism* is the foundational concern here (99-100).

²³⁵ For discussion of this contrast, see Price (1989) 188-191.

because of the friendship that occurred before (προγενομένην) (when the dissolution does not occur because of excess of vice). (NE1165b31-6)

On the McKerlie-Whiting impersonal reading, we might say on their behalf that “Aristotle does not explain why, given his theory of friendship, it is reasonable for us to retain this concern.”²³⁶ That is, if loving centers around the *state* of full virtue, it is unclear why we should retain concern, just for old time’s sake, for someone who has lost this state, where it does not seem that this concern requires a connection to pleasure or utility friendship. Or consider NE9.2’s suggestion that, while we should not give everything to our parents...

... It would seem that it is necessary to supply support, as it is owed, to parents most of all, since it is finer to supply the causes of [our] being than ourselves regarding these things.
...δόξειε δ’ ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστα ἑπαρκεῖν, ὥς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὃν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ’ ἑπαρκεῖν. (1165a21-24)

Again, it is unclear on the impersonal state-based reading why this preferential treatment should be shown to parents over fully virtuous friends (we are to give to parents “most of all”), and given that it is unlikely Aristotle is claiming that all parents are fully virtuous.

This points to a more general problem. It is unclear how NPOS, which centers around full virtue, can account for a fully virtuous person’s concern for a non-fully virtuous person; particularly problematic are the claims in NE8.12 and NE9.7 where the superior loves the inferior *more* than vice versa, where the inferior party presumably includes the non-fully virtuous (it is perhaps then no coincidence that NPOS tends to ignore the instance of other selfhood in NE8.12).²³⁷ Non-Prioritization suggests one does not prioritize another or oneself

²³⁶ Irwin (1999) 291.

²³⁷ Pakaluk (1998) worries that this contradicts Aristotle’s earlier statement (NE1158b25) that the inferior person should love the superior more than vice versa (129). One could say that this earlier prescription regards the affection (φίλησις) component of loving, as Aristotle seems to ground the prescription by reference to affection according to worth (NE1158b27); and so the thought in NE8.12 is that parents love children more than vice versa in regards to a different component of loving, *wishing goods*. This has some immediate appeal, for we might think that inferiors, being less well-endowed (in some sense) than superiors, cannot wish goods and act on these wishes to a greater degree than their superiors; if Aristotle recommends that inferiors love their superiors more than vice versa in regards to wishing goods, he is giving an impractical prescription. The problem with this reading, however, is that Aristotle’s conclusions about superior loving (φιλεῖν in G and H; 1161b27, 28) seem to follow statements that speak exclusively of “being fond” (στέργειν in B and F; 1161b18, 25), and being fond seems closer to affection than it does to wishing goods (affection seems to be central to NE9.7’s benefactor/beneficiary case as well; Pakaluk [1998] 183-4). Perhaps then the thought is that while inferiors *should* love more than their superiors love them, they cannot, due to the imbalance of activity in the

on the grounds that both are equally fully virtuous; this implies that prioritization occurs if there is a discrepancy in virtue, and Aristotle suggests that the superior should be prioritized (NE4.3, 5.3). How then do we account for the fully virtuous loving the non-fully virtuous more than vice versa? Since we are trying to account for concern in the context of friendship, we cannot appeal to justice.²³⁸ Nor can we appeal to obligation specifically in the context of friendship. For on top of displaying a lack of interest in building obligation into his theory of friendship, Aristotle in fact tries to remove it. At the beginning of NE9.8, he rejects two common opinions, that self-love is unqualifiedly deplorable and that the better a person is the more he “sets aside what is for himself (τὸ δ’ αὐτοῦ παρίησιν)” (1168a35). Aristotle then goes on to endorse a self-love that maximizes the fine, which is more valuable than anything else (even life), *for oneself*.

All these problems with NPOS dissipate with the partial, self-actualization-based reading that I am proposing. Partiality is straightforwardly grounded in egoism, which is grounded in the ultimacy of activity. As suggested by OA, PA, AC, and the Argument from Living Together, we love other selves because of the *actualization* of *oneself*. Aristotle makes clear that in living together, the activity aspect of friendship, there *is* personal variation and numerical distinctness *does* matter. Aristotle says one lives together not with just any virtuous person, but with other selves, and the relevant point of distinction that I have suggested is a personal one: the adequately continuous and easy activity in living together requires the epistemic advantage that a distinct, mutually shaping partner provides. It is the facilitation of one’s own activity that justifies the personal element.

While Aristotle’s arguments focus on continuing and future actualization, his overall framework suggests that we also show preferential treatment because of *past* contributions to

relationship; this does not amount to a contradiction, for Aristotle says that one should only make a return according to her ability (NE1163b15-17, 1164b5, EE1243b10-11).

²³⁸ This is even if we appeal to the justice Aristotle claims is co-extensive with friendship, for the account would then be circular (see Conclusion for more discussion).

the actualization of oneself.²³⁹ NE9.2's passage above about filial partiality should remind us of NE8.12's passage about parental partiality. NE8.12 labels children as "other selves of the parents," on the grounds that the parents are causes of the children's being (§3.1.1).

Connecting this to NE9.7, we saw that parents show special concern for inferiors, their children, as being their own self-actualization. Now we see some reciprocity; children treat their parents preferentially given the role of their parents in their actualization, being causes of their being.²⁴⁰ And such is the case with the ex-virtue friend, who had a hand in our virtuous self-actualization; one shows preferential treatment in light of her contributions to one's own superlatively choiceworthy actualization.²⁴¹

Aristotle seems to have the right descriptive picture; it does seem like we value family members and friends specially because they are *ours*. Now one might object that this model whereby love increases to the extent that the beloved is connected to oneself is narcissistic; whether we should follow Aristotle in *normatively* endorsing this partiality and the egoism upon which it is based, is a debate that must wait for a full treatment. However, it is worth some brief comments.

Nehamas claims that Aristotle's model of friendship wrongly treats friendship as a moral phenomenon; friendship is *not* a moral phenomenon because it is an essentially partial relationship, where it is assumed that morality implies *impartiality*.²⁴² If this is right, we have a dilemma, at least for the Western liberal mainstream. Friendship (and I suppose family) is not a moral phenomenon, or the moral is not essentially impartial. If we accept the former,

²³⁹ One might argue that this is a demand of justice. However, the preferential treatment described seems to be supererogatory and to go beyond the demands of justice. Further, it might be wrong to contrast justice and the obligatory with friendship and the supererogatory; for Aristotle says that friendship and justice are co-extensive (see Conclusion for more discussion).

²⁴⁰ Price also notes the reciprocal model in (1989) 266 and (2010) 188.

²⁴¹ Crisp (2006) argues that close social or biological relations are "unstable grounds for reasons" (143). The worry is that there is a danger of unjustified bias. But this may not be an issue for Aristotle, for the partiality that he endorses is grounded on the contribution of close associates to one's *virtuous* actualization, which precludes unjustified bias (see Footnote 224).

²⁴² In an interview with Julie Beck (2016).

we seem to have a fairly schizophrenic picture, with the life of morality on the one side, and the life of whatever other values that friendship involves, be it the aesthetic or the prudential, on another side. Aristotle seems to reject the moral as essentially impartial and on the way seems to unify the moral, the prudential, and the aesthetic; maximizing the fine (καλὸν most literally translates “beautiful”) seems to amount to maximizing the moral, prudential, and aesthetic (to be further explored in §4).²⁴³ This might seem an alien model of morality, but it seems like the only alternative to ousting partial relationships from the moral realm.

Perhaps the real worry is not that Aristotle’s reasons for initiating and maintaining friendship are egoistic at the level of justification, but that they are egoistic at the level of *motivation* as well. In this paper, I have not discussed motivation in detail. But insofar as Aristotle could have grasped these distinctions, he must have meant his claims about other selfhood to implicate motivation. In NE9.9 he is giving an argument for why happiness requires other selves, and it is hard to believe that the reasons he provides will not be taken by the agent (listening to Aristotle’s lectures) as favoring the initiation and maintenance of a relationship with another self.

Let me now summarize the whole chapter. I have argued for EOS and against NPOS. NPOS holds that the essential feature of other selfhood is full virtue. Here, there is no difference in treatment with fully virtuous people because there is no difference in virtue; the relevant parties are *normatively* identical. EOS holds that the essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in one’s own actualization. Here, there *is* a difference in treatment; oneself is prioritized, for what makes the *other* self valuable is how the other self is involved in the actualization of *one’s own* virtue, where this actualization is *numerically distinct* from the other’s actualization. §3.1 assessed the first two instances of “another self,” in NE8.12 and NE9.4. I argued for EOS, that it is involvement in one’s own actualization that is the

²⁴³ This suggests that Aristotle takes his various values to flow together without conflict (Crisp [2014] 240-1, Kraut [Unpublished] 2, 13-14).

essential feature of another self; against NPOS, full virtue is not even necessary for other selfhood. §3.2 assessed the last two instances of “another self,” in NE9.9. I argued that EOS again prevails; Aristotle answers the question of why the happy person needs other selves by appealing to their facilitation of adequate self-contemplation, which is required for one’s own happiness. In this last section, I drew some general conclusions from the development of EOS. As EOS suggests, the ultimacy of activity entails the ultimacy of the numerically distinct self; in turn, the ultimacy of the numerically distinct self entails partiality.

4: Aristotle on Self-Love and Maximizing the Fine for Oneself

In this chapter, I discuss Aristotle's analysis of self-love in NE9.8. Some have used NE9.8's claim that the true self is νοῦς (henceforth, "the understanding") to develop a non-prioritization model of Aristotelian ethics. The idea here is that fully virtuous agents identify with the true self, the understanding, and so no prioritization among fully virtuous agents is admissible; for they are identical in moral standing or, to use terminology from the Introduction, normatively identical. This precludes altruism, where the numerically distinct *other* is prioritized; it also precludes egoism, where the numerically distinct *self* is prioritized.

I argue that NE9.8 must be interpreted egoistically. First, I assess NE9.8's claim that virtuous self-love consists in gratifying one's true self, the understanding, by maximizing the fine for oneself (§4.1). I argue that fully virtuous people in this way maximize their own good above others; this straightforwardly supports an egoistic vision of Aristotelian friendship, against a non-prioritizing one. This argument implicates another major theme of NE9.8, the fine (τὸ καλόν). I argue that "the fine" refers to actualization; so NE9.8's depiction of virtuous self-lovers maximizing the fine for themselves and acting for the sake of the fine amounts to their maximizing actualization and acting for the sake of actualization, respectively (§4.2). Finally, I address two problems for my reading of NE9.8. One is a regress problem that arises for any interpretation of the fine; the other is a tension between egoism and Aristotle's communitarianism, which might be thought to prioritize the community over oneself (§4.3). I solve the regress problem by solving the latter problem; the regress is stopped if we interpret Aristotle's communitarianism egoistically.

Before proceeding, I would like to clarify what I mean by "communitarianism." I do not mean anything theoretically loaded; the notion for my purposes is very bare and requires only that the community be prioritized in some way. That Aristotle holds some version of communitarianism is evidenced by NE9.8's suggestion that praiseworthy self-lovers will

sacrifice themselves for the common good and NE1094b10's claim that it is "finer and more divine [to achieve the good] for a people and cities" than for an individual.

4.1: Self-Prioritization

I will begin by arguing this: NE9.8 claims that praiseworthy (and therefore normative) self-love is self-prioritizing (§4.1). There are some obstacles to inferring egoism from this self-prioritization, however. First, one might argue that the self-prioritization is only nominal; in §4.1.1 I show that it is substantial. Second, one might grant that the self-prioritization is substantial, but argue that it is not operant at the level of motivation; in §4.1.2 I show that the self-prioritization *is* operant at the level of motivation. Finally, one might argue that positing substantial self-prioritization here makes nonsense of the self-sacrifice depicted; in §4.1.3, I show how a self-prioritizing interpretation can make sense of self-sacrifice.

NE9.8 begins with a rejection of two common opinions, that self-love is unqualifiedly deplorable and that the better a person is the more he "sets aside what is for himself (τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν)" (1168a35). This shows that Aristotle is not interested in developing the possibility of altruism by way of disinterested duties (e.g. "setting aside what is for himself"). Rather, he is taking egoism as a given and trying to show how this is compatible with behavior that is other-regarding.²⁴⁴

Aristotle continues:

(A) They say²⁴⁵ that it is necessary to love most of all the one who is a friend most of all, (B) and the one who is a friend most of all is the one wishing for the sake of that one to whom he wishes good things (even if no one will know); (C) but these things obtain most of all for one in relation to oneself, (D) and so too are all the other remaining attributes by which a friend is defined; (E) for it has been said that all the friendly attributes extend from one and towards others. (1168b1-6)

²⁴⁴ See Price (2010) 185-187 for a similar understanding.

²⁴⁵ That Aristotle accepts this endoxic statement is suggested by (C), where he apparently runs with the idea.

We are told that we should love most of all the person who is most of all a friend (A), where this friend is one who most of all wishes goods for us (B). This immediately obscures any attempt to take concern for friends as having little to do with one's own happiness; one should wish goods to others precisely to the extent that these others wish goods to *oneself*.²⁴⁶ Further, the extent of displaying this friendly attribute (C) along with the rest (D) seems to be maximal in regards to oneself (C).²⁴⁷

Aristotle then goes on to contrast the blameworthy self-lover with the praiseworthy self-lover. The former overreaches for the “advantageous (τοῦ... συμφέρειν)” (1169a6), i.e. “the biggest share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures” (1168b16-7), in order to gratify the appetite (ἐπιθυμία). The *praiseworthy* self-lover seemingly also overreaches, but for the fine (καλὸν) instead, in order to gratify the most controlling part, the understanding (νοῦς; 1168b29-1169a3).²⁴⁸ Aristotle describes the latter at length:

(A) It is true concerning the excellent (τοῦ σπουδαίου) that he enacts many things both for the sake of friends and of fatherland, and will die on their behalf if necessary; (B) for he will set aside money, and honors, and contested goods in general, saving up the fine for himself; (C) for he will choose to be intensely pleased for a short time over slight pleasure for a long time, and to live finely for a year than many years of whatever quality, and one great fine action than many small [actions]. (D) And this holds in the case of those dying on behalf of others;

²⁴⁶ McKerlie (1991) understands precisely the opposite, asking why Aristotle would appeal to the analogy between self-concern and *other*-concern if “our ultimate concern is just the quality of our own lives” (93). The reason why I think Aristotle mentions other-concern is that the chapter is explicating the notion of self-love, and an important point (or at least illuminating contrast) lies in figuring out how one relates this to other-concern. Further, the immediately preceding NE9.7 has just suggested how *the other* (specifically the beneficiary) is identified with and ultimately choiceworthy because of *one's own* activity, which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness (§3.1.1). So it is hard to understand, as McKerlie does, how the present passage has little to do with one's own happiness.

²⁴⁷ As Pakaluk (1998) understands (189-190). It might be thought odd that I pass over (E), a line that is particularly debated in the literature on Aristotelian friendship. I ignore it precisely for this reason and hope that my conclusions do not rely on this particularly controversial line. In any case, a straightforward reading of (E), combined with the preceding and succeeding arguments, makes it somewhat hard to accept Cooper's (1999.15) understanding that it is only by means of “loving and valuing the other person for his own sake” that “one becomes able to love and value oneself” (354). Indeed, Aristotle's first discussion of the friendly attributes in NE9.4 would seem straightforwardly incompatible with Cooper's assertion. Aristotle describes the miserable self-hatred of the vicious and then says, “If to bear thus is exceedingly miserable, vice must be fled with all strain and to be decent must be attempted; for thus can one bear the friendly features towards oneself and become a friend to another (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸ ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο)” (1166b26-29). Aristotle says it is by becoming virtuous that one will display the friendly attributes towards oneself and love another, not that it is by loving another that one will display the friendly attributes towards oneself.

²⁴⁸ *Politics* 2.5's notion of self-love is different from NE9.8's; blameworthy selfishness is identified as *excessive* self-love, making the difference between good and bad self-love one of degree, rather than, as in NE9.8, of kind (blameworthy self-love takes the self to be the appetite, praiseworthy self-love, the understanding; but both maximize the good for oneself).

these indeed choose a great fine thing for themselves. (E) And they send away money in the case in which their friends will take up more [as a result]; (F) for money arises for the friend, but for himself, the fine; (G) thus he portions out the greater good for himself. (H) And [so also] the same mode of operation both in the case of honors and in the case of ruling opportunities; (I) for he sends off all these things to the friend; for this is for him fine and praiseworthy. (J) Suitably then he seems to be excellent, since choosing the fine in place of everything (εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν). (K) But it is also possible to send away actions to the friend, and to become a cause for the friend [to act] is finer than oneself acting (καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πράξει τὸ αἷτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι). (L) In all praiseworthy things then the excellent person appears to distribute more of the fine to himself (ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων). (M) Thus on the one hand it is necessary to be a self-lover, just as has been said; but as the many [depict self-lovers], one must not be [a self-lover of such a sort]. (1169a18-b2)

This is a self-prioritizing depiction of the self-lover. It seems fully virtuous people are no exception to the earlier stated rule that “each person wishes goods most of all to himself (αὐτῷ... μάλισθ’ ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθά)” (1159a12); as NE9.8 puts it, each “apportions to himself the finest and best goods (ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ’ ἀγαθά)” (1168b29-30).²⁴⁹ This superlative claim appears comparative; the virtuous self-lover wishes the *best* good, the fine, to himself *more* than to others. He gives up utility to others (including friends) in order to get the fine for himself (B); dies for others to get the fine for himself (D); gives money to friends (E) where this means money for the friend but the fine for himself (F), which is a greater good for himself (G); gives honor and opportunities to friends (H, K) to get more of the fine for himself (I, L). In each case, the praiseworthy self-lover gives either (1) a lesser kind of good (utility) to his friend, presumably a virtue friend who will put it to good use, in order to get a greater kind of good (the fine) for himself, or (2) a lesser degree of the same kind of good to his friend (the fine that is received in actually doing a virtuous action) in order to get a greater degree of the same kind of good for himself (the fine that is received in giving up the opportunity to do the virtuous action).

²⁴⁹ For a straightforward self-prioritizing maximization reading of this passage, see Wielenberg (2004) 278-86, and, I think, Aquinas (1858, 1881-2 in Litzinger, 9.8.34-45, 9.9.172-192 in Leonine) and Joachim (1951) 256-7. Salmieri (2014) argues for a maximization reading while remaining neutral on egoism (102-3).

It should be clear that this self-prioritization is not only explanatory, but also justificatory. Aristotle presumably endorses the behavior of the fully virtuous, and it seems that these are the agents in question; Aristotle refers to the σπουδαῖοι here. Or if one doubts that “the σπουδαῖοι” refer to the fully virtuous in all contexts, (J) and (L) seem to define “the σπουδαῖοι” as those who act for the sake of the fine, and it is hard to believe that the fully virtuous are not being referred to here. In the end, (M) clinches the case for justification; Aristotle says we *must* be self-lovers of the praiseworthy sort.

It is also worth noting that Aristotle is describing not only the fully virtuous, but the *equally* fully virtuous as well; there is no reason for thinking the context excludes the equally fully virtuous. This is important, for if non-prioritization is meant to obtain in Aristotelian friendship, it would have to obtain where the relevant parties are *equally* fully virtuous. But even here, it is *self*-prioritization that obtains, not *non*-prioritization.

4.1.1: Substantial Self-Prioritization

So NE9.8 both describes and prescribes self-prioritization. Yet, this falls short of egoism in two ways. First, the self-prioritization might only be nominal, and so while this attenuated self-prioritization is justified, *substantial* self-prioritization is not, and so *egoism* is not justified. Second, even if substantial self-prioritization and thus egoism *are* justified, they may be absent at the level of motivation. I will now deal with the first issue, arguing that the self-prioritization here is substantial; that is, there is a competition with winners and losers where the winners secure a greater good than the losers. As the most literal reading of NE9.8 suggests this, I will support this point mainly by denying its detractors.

Stern-Gillet (1995) argues that there is no competition at all. For what distinguishes virtue friendship from the other sorts is that its object, the fine, cannot be an object of competition. And the fine cannot be an object of competition because it cannot be an object

of barter.²⁵⁰ However, it is unclear why the fine has to be an object of barter to be an object of competition and, in the first place, why it is an object of barter. Whiting (1996) also denies that NE9.8 describes a competition, on the grounds that Aristotle contrasts seeking the fine with seeking “contested (περιμάχητα)” goods (1169a21).²⁵¹ But then NE9.8 would be somewhat confusing, given all the competitive language in the passage, competitive language Aristotle has gone out of his way to utilize. It seems better to think that Aristotle is paralleling two kinds of contests, just as he is paralleling two kinds of self-love.

Others accept that there is a competition, but remove any substantial competitiveness. For example, Annas (1988) takes Aristotle to be reinterpreting the notion of competition as cooperative, suggesting that everyone is an equal winner in this competition.²⁵² However, if anything, Aristotle seems to be modeling his competition on the conventional Homeric model, as evidenced by what is probably a parallel to Achilles: the preference of a short grand life to a long middling one (C).²⁵³

In general, such interpretations as Annas’ whereby NE9.8 does *not* depict a zero sum game are dubious. Let us assess two potential expansions of Annas’ interpretation. Politis (1993) thinks that one cannot infer from the claim that one should love oneself *most of all*, the claim that one should love oneself *more than others*. For the goods involved in loving oneself most of all, fine things, are inexhaustible and so procuring as much as possible for oneself is compatible with aiming to procure at least as much of the fine for the other.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ 69-70. Stern-Gillet argues that the increased share of the fine that results from giving up the opportunity for virtuous action must be understood as “disinterested,” not “self-interested”; otherwise, this would mistake “the fine for some kind of after-life reward for the sake of which one might be prompted to act decently in this life” (71). She goes on to say that the fully virtuous agent here desires “*the* good rather than *his own* private good” (71). I think however that it is open to us to think that maximizing the fine is “self-interested” yet *not* a matter of interest in the afterlife; we should follow Politis in thinking that the fine is a personal good in that aiming at it involves virtuous activity in *this* life, where this activity is at least the most important part of one’s own happiness (160); for more on the fine, see §4.2.

²⁵¹ 174.

²⁵² 8.

²⁵³ Pakaluk (1998) 197, Price (2010) 199. Adkins (1963) suggests that Aristotelian friendship is heavily influenced by Homeric competitive values. Gill sees heroic ideals of reciprocity operant in NE9.8 (321-2).

²⁵⁴ 162.

However, it seems that opportunities to acquire the fine and the resources upon which such acquisition is based, are not unlimited so as to allow for this non-zero sum model of competition (per Kraut).²⁵⁵ Indeed, the limited nature of the opportunities is what allows Aristotle to conceive of giving up actions (K). Giving up actions would be superfluous were the opportunities unlimited.

Another version of the non-zero-sum interpretation involves denying that the competition is interpersonal. Here I turn to Whiting (1996); though I mentioned above that she denies that a competition obtains at all in NE9.8, her denial of *interpersonal* competition could be used for those who interpret NE9.8 as depicting a competition that is not zero sum. Whiting suggests that the alternatives here are not between awarding the greater of two goods to oneself and awarding the lesser of two goods to oneself; the latter is impossible, since one can only achieve the fine for oneself and so cannot award that to anyone. So regarding the fine, there is no interpersonal competition, because the fine is only indirectly transferable (by giving up opportunities) between persons. Rather, there is an *intrapersonal* competition, with the following alternatives: in getting more of the fine for himself, the agent is getting more of the fine than *he himself* would get were he to act in another way.²⁵⁶ However, (K) does not fit well with Whiting's claim that one cannot award the fine to another; giving up an opportunity is to *cause* the friend to achieve the fine, which seems to amount to awarding the fine to another.²⁵⁷ And if one *can* award the fine to another, it is telling that Aristotle never recommends maximizing the fine for *others*, only for *oneself*.

But even if we *do* accept Whiting's claim that the fine is not awardable in that it is only indirectly transferable, the passage poses another problem; it recommends maximizing

²⁵⁵ (1988) 21. See also Maher (2012) 773-4.

²⁵⁶ 175-6; see also Broadie (2002) 424 and Irwin (1999) 297.

²⁵⁷ Politis (1993) agrees (169); against my thesis, however, he thinks this example contradicts loving oneself most of all, which is somewhat strange since Aristotle characterizes this assignment of the fine as actually assigning more for oneself.

the fine for oneself, and it would seem that if we are successful at this, we will have more of the fine *than others*. This amounts to a reply to another claim by Politis. He takes Aristotle to hold the Priority Thesis, that one should love oneself more than anyone else. But he thinks Aristotle illicitly infers the Priority Thesis from the Weak Supremacy Thesis, that one should love oneself as much as possible.²⁵⁸ I have just suggested why this is not an illicit inference: if one should love oneself as much as possible (Weak Supremacy), then one should love oneself more than others (Priority); for aiming to succeed at the former entails aiming to succeed at the latter.²⁵⁹

So the self-prioritization of the praiseworthy self-lover is not merely nominal. Indeed, Aristotle claims that the praiseworthy self-lover is even *more* of a self-lover than the blameworthy self-lover, on the grounds that the praiseworthy self-lover identifies with the *true* human self:

Such a person would seem to be more of a self-lover [than the blameworthy self-lover]. At any rate, he portions out for himself the finest and best things, and obliges the most ruling part of himself, and obeys this in respect to all things; and just as a city and any other system seem to be most of all the most ruling part, thus also a human; and thus most of all a self-lover is this one who cherishes and obliges this part. And the continent and akratic are so-called in respect to their understanding ruling or not, since this is what each person is; and they seem to have enacted voluntarily those actions that are most of all with reason. Therefore this is what each person is or is most of all, not unclearly, and this is what the decent person most of all cherishes. For this reason he is most of all a self-lover, according to a different form than the one being censured, and differing as much as living according to reason [differs] from [living] according to passion, and as much as desiring the fine from [desiring] what seems to be advantageous. (NE9.8.1168b28-1169a6)

All this echoes NE9.4's depiction of the good person's relation with himself as that which centers on preserving his own rationality: "he wishes for himself to live and to be preserved, and [wishes] this most of all to that by which he thinks," where "each would seem to be the thinking thing or that most of all" (1166a17-24). In NE9.8 we see the praiseworthy self-love of the virtuous person operating in the same way. Ultimately, while the praiseworthy self-lover gives up certain interests, he still conforms to the following principle: "every

²⁵⁸ 153-4.

²⁵⁹ Price makes a similar remark at (1989) 269 and (2010) 202.

understanding chooses what is best for itself (πᾶς... νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ), and the decent person submits to the understanding” (1169a17-18).²⁶⁰ For the fully virtuous person here described, what is “best” is the fine, as opposed to the advantageous.

4.1.2: Self-Prioritization at the Level of Motivation

One might grant that the self-prioritization in NE9.8 is substantial, and not merely nominal; so the justification of self-prioritization turns out to be a justification of egoism. But we would not have secured a fully egoistic picture; there may be no egoism at the level of *motivation*.²⁶¹ However, even one such proponent of this view highlights Aristotle’s use of the language of self-advancement and that Aristotle could have easily described it otherwise.²⁶² Therefore it is better to take the competition to be operating at the level of motivation, as it is only then that we can take the competition image seriously; surely when entering a competition, competitors take winning as a good reason for competing. In addition to this last point, Tutuska provides an abundance of reasons for thinking that the competition in NE9.8 is operating at the level of motivations.²⁶³

This is suggested by the very context of the passage; self-love is the ultimate issue here, and this passage is meant to provide a portrait of the highest kind of self-love. But a self-love that does not deliberately seek the good for itself but only incidentally receives it is a very strange sort of self-love... It is also hard to see how such a disinterested reading could fit with Aristotle’s claim here that intellect chooses what is best for itself (1169a17), which seems to entail that the decent, who follow their intellect, are choosing under the aspect of that which is good for themselves. Finally, Aristotle’s claim that the σπουδαῖοι choose to die so as to have the greatest pleasure and to live nobly rather than randomly is hard to interpret as anything

²⁶⁰ The conjunction of “every (πᾶς)” and the singular “itself (ἑαυτῷ)” suggests the individualizing translation I have given.

²⁶¹ Annas (1988) 12-13, Broadie (2002) 424, Pakaluk (1998) 196, 201, Stern-Gillet (1995) 70-1. Crisp (2014) argues for egoism at the level of justification but *not* at the level of motivation; for this last claim he appeals to the expression “wishing goods for the sake of the other” (240). I have given reasons in §2 however for thinking that the concern this expression tracks is actually understood by Aristotle as egoistically motivated. This does not mean that the agent is thinking about his own happiness always or even most of the time; see Footnote 264.

²⁶² Pakaluk (1998) 192-3.

²⁶³ See also Price (2001) 221. It is important to distinguish between being motivated by x to do A and knowing that by doing A you gain x. Per Price (2010) 200 and Wielenberg (2004) 285, Aristotle cannot here be saying that the fully virtuous person, the *practically wise* person, does not know that he is gaining his good by doing an action. Per Pakaluk (1998) 201, the agent may yet know he is gaining his good but not take such a gain as a good reason for acting.

other than a statement about motivations, and shows that this motivation is strongly self-regarding. (169)

We might add, finally, that if Aristotle denies maximizing the fine for oneself as a motivation, we must read NE as pedagogically malicious. Aristotle is trying to instruct his readers on how to become virtuous, and claims they should aim to maximize the fine for themselves. If he rejects the maximization of the fine as a *motivation* here, this would amount to him telling his students: “You all *should* act for the sake of the fine. But don’t you dare take the fine as a reason for favoring the action.” Winning, maximizing the fine for oneself, then seems to be a reason the competitor takes as favoring virtuous action.²⁶⁴

This has far-reaching implications. For *self-love* is expressed in loving *others*, and doing virtuous actions generally; Aristotle suggests that all cases of virtuous action are cases of self-love, that is, gratifying the rational part of the soul.²⁶⁵ Presumably, the virtuous actions in question are only those done for the sake of themselves; doing virtuous actions for the sake of profit presumably does not gratify the rational part of the soul. What this means is that doing a virtuous action because of itself (of which loving the other for himself is presumably a case) is egoistically motivated; for it is a case of self-love, which is egoistically motivated. So Aristotle’s theory of moral action (including loving others) is egoistic not only at the level of justification, but also at the level of motivation.

²⁶⁴ This does not entail that the competitor is explicitly *thinking* about winning at every moment of the competition. At the very least, however, the competitor probably explicitly thinks about winning at the level of the competition as a whole, if not probably during *some* moments *within* the competition. See Clarifications (Introduction) and Conclusion for more discussion of proximate and global motivations.

²⁶⁵ Aristotle’s characterization of self-love as loving one’s own understanding suggests that the fully virtuous person operates on the principle of self-love all the time (at least *de re*), insofar as an action is virtuous if and only if it is rational. Schollmeier (1994) disagrees. His thought is that while Aristotle is here describing a person acting out of self-love in a friendship relation, this person “need not always perform an act of friendship out of self-love. We may also act out of love for another. A good friend does, in fact, so act” (50). Such action is for the sake of advancing the happiness of another, where there is only accidental advancement of one’s own happiness. However, this cannot be right if the fully virtuous agent always acts out of *self-love*, which seems to be the case, insofar as the fully virtuous agent is rational (i.e. fully virtuous) and rational activity just is self-love (i.e. loving one’s rationality). This analysis also applies to Pangle’s (2003) comment that one’s own actualization merely *can* be a reason for benefaction, but does not always have to be, with the desire of the other’s happiness also being a viable reason (162).

4.1.3: Self-Prioritization and Self-Sacrifice

The last resort for a *non*-prioritization interpretation of NE9.8 is to argue that the foundation of the egoistic interpretation, substantial self-prioritization, is incompatible with the self-sacrifice NE9.8 depicts. Let me show how self-sacrifice and substantial self-prioritization are compatible.

It is important to frame the situation being described in NE9.8 lest we think that the self-sacrificial person prioritizes others over himself given that he sacrifices *future* actualization (in short, his own happiness).²⁶⁶ Note first that Aristotle says that there is only one (μοναχῶς) truly good action to take in any given circumstance, with everything else missing the mark (NE1106b28-35).²⁶⁷ Yet NE1109b12-23 suggest that erring from the mean is permissible within certain ranges of perception. I take it that in NE9.8's high-stake situations of self-sacrifice, the alternative to self-sacrifice is drastically different from self-sacrifice, and being drastically different, would count as erring outside the permissible range just mentioned. And according to *Politics* 1325a34-1325b7, one cannot recover happiness by virtuous successes, however great, from violating virtue in order to maximize those virtuous successes.²⁶⁸ So in these situations of self-sacrifice, I understand Aristotle as giving the virtuous person two options, self-sacrifice or viciously hiding or running away. In doing one of the latter vicious options the ex-fully virtuous person will never be able to recover, no matter how much future moral or intellectual virtuous activity she engages in. So the sacrifice

²⁶⁶ Madigan (1991) 79, McKerlie (1991) 92, (1998) 544.

²⁶⁷ I think this suggests, *pace* Price (2011), that Aristotle *does* hold a general “view that, when it is right to act in a certain way, [this] silences any reasons for acting otherwise” (66). Price does however admit the fine as an “overriding” motivation (68); on my reading of the fine (to be explored in §4.2), this is just another way of saying that when it is right to act one way, reasons for acting otherwise are silenced, for the fine is co-extensive with virtuous actualization (acting rightly).

²⁶⁸ Aristotle is here considering the hypothesis of seizing power in order to do the greatest number of fine actions possible. See Price (2011) 79-80 for a similar point about not being able to recover happiness by contemplation, however great. Εὐδαιμονία does not actually appear in *Politics* 1325a34-1325b7, but the most choiceworthy of things (τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώτατον; 1325b1-2) and what is best of all things (πάντων ἄριστον; 1325a34) is what is being aimed for in context.

does not preclude self-prioritization; the sacrifice avoids an irrevocable loss of *one's own* happiness.

There are at least two objections to this way of framing the self-sacrifice scenario. The first is that it contradicts Aristotle's doctrine that the fully virtuous person who has lost his happiness can recover it by achieving "great and fine things (μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν)" (NE1101a13). My reading does not contradict this text. Aristotle clearly distinguishes the fully virtuous person who has lost his happiness from the miserable person (ἄθλιος), which only *vicious* people can be (NE1100b33-1101a7). The idea is that the fully virtuous person can lose her happiness because of external circumstances, but will never be miserable, since never doing vicious actions. In recovering her happiness, the fully virtuous person is recovering from the loss of *external goods*, not from the loss of *virtue*; she is precluded from misery, precisely because she cannot lose her virtue.²⁶⁹

The second objection to framing the sacrifice as opposing virtuous action to vicious action is this. Sacrificing life simply cannot be viewed here as an alternative to doing the wrong thing, because the point of the passage is to contrast self-preference with other-preference. If sacrificing life *is* viewed as an alternative to doing the wrong thing, then it is simply a case of doing the right thing, not of prioritizing oneself over others.²⁷⁰ However, it seems that Aristotle is trying to show that one prioritizes oneself *by* doing the right thing, so his depicting the agent as doing the right thing leaves open his simultaneously contrasting self-preference and other-preference.

So, how are we to understand self-sacrifice as compatible with self-prioritization? Negatively, the agent who gives up her life prioritizes herself because, in this situation, the alternative leads to a vicious action, which amounts to the negation of happiness (particularly,

²⁶⁹ The complication must be noted, however, that Aristotle at least takes as conceivable the loss and recovery of virtue, as discussed in his accounts of friendship dissolutions in NE9.3 (see §1.2.2). While he takes these situations as *conceivable*, however, it is unclear that he takes them as *possible*.

²⁷⁰ Pakaluk (1998) 196-7.

virtuous self-actualization). Positively, we might think that the agent is maximizing her self-actualization, even though she is giving up future opportunities for actualization; Aristotle claims that the good person will prefer a single large action to many small ones (C; 1169a24-5), echoing Achilles' choice of a grand action to a forgettable long life.

So the sacrifice is deemed better for the agent; either vice is avoided or maximal self-actualization is achieved.²⁷¹ Now, the idea of a "sacrifice" being "better" for oneself is not as implausible as it might sound. I take it that it is plausible to conceive of a good parent who would rather die for her child; the parent takes this sacrifice as better for herself than the situation in which she lives but the child dies. Or let us use a similar example that Aristotle himself brings up:

Friendship seems to be more in loving than in being loved (ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι). A sign of this is that mothers rejoice in loving; for some have given away their own to be raised [by others], and they love while knowing, but do not seek to be loved in return, if both options are not open (ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται); but it seems sufficient for them that they see their children doing well (εὖ πράττοντας), and they love them even if those ones [i.e. the children] do not, because of ignorance, portion out things due to a mother. (NE1159a27-33).

As we might expect, Aristotle claims that the *activity* of loving is more valued than the *passivity* of being loved. This is *exemplified* by the mother *giving up future opportunities for activity* (being directly engaged in the child's life). This might seem contradictory, but giving up future opportunities for activity is doubly compatible with the supremacy of activity, as we have seen in the case of sacrificing one's life. Negatively, the alternative to giving up the child is a vicious option (subjecting the child to an impoverished existence); positively, this sacrifice of something precious amounts to superlative actualization.

²⁷¹ For these reasons, I think we should reject Tutuska's (2013) arguments claiming that NE3-4 depict the fine as contrasted with one's own good (163-5); the fine is contrasted only with a *subset* of goods, a subset that the fine outweighs in regards to one's own good (i.e. happiness). One might wonder whether Aristotle thinks there is a situation in which the loss of this subset outweighs the fine. It seems that he does not; the amount of the fine gained seems proportional to the subset of goods lost. See Salmieri (2014), who argues that to interpret Aristotle as taking the virtuous action to be a sacrifice amounting to what is worse for the agent is to miss the point about the value of virtue.

Let us sum up. In §4.1 I argued that NE9.8 depicts fully virtuous people as maximizing the fine for themselves, over others, in a competition that is both substantial (§4.1.1) and operating at the level of motivation (§4.1.2). I showed how this is compatible with self-sacrifice (§4.1.3). All this self-prioritization in regards to virtuous activity fits perfectly with an egoistic model of Aristotelian friendship. It fits less well with a non-prioritizing model. Such a model takes identity with the true self, the understanding, to entail equal treatment. However, we have seen that self-prioritization in terms of the fine, that is, *unequal* treatment, is a manifestation of gratifying the understanding—precisely what non-prioritization readings appeal to in order to *prevent* self-prioritization.²⁷² This suggests that the entailment relation is wrong, or that the parties in question who violate equal treatment do not identify with the true self. However, NE9.8's moral competition presumably involves those who identify with the true self. So it seems that unequal treatment is left standing.

Indeed, the preceding and succeeding chapters should lead us to this conclusion. In NE9.4.1166a29-32, we saw that the fully virtuous person displays all the friendly attributes towards himself simply because he is fully virtuous, but that Aristotle says that the fully virtuous person displays all the friendly attributes towards the other person because the other person is *another self*; Aristotle does not say that the fully virtuous person displays all the friendly attributes towards the other because the other person is *fully virtuous* (§3.1.2).²⁷³ Apparently then there is already a prioritization of the friendly attributes towards oneself; being fully virtuous is sufficient for treating *oneself* in this way, but to treat *another* this way, the other must first be related to oneself. By NE9.9.1170b8, this gap between oneself and

²⁷² Some remarks by Price elucidate the matter at hand. He (2010) suggests that the praiseworthy self-lover here, as putting “his *nous* first is preferring the least individual part of himself” (191). Yet Price immediately afterwards says this does not lead to “an indiscriminate love of one’s neighbour” (192) and later suggests Aristotle does not imply “any merging of identities” ([1989] 268, [2010] 198). So, in agreement with Price, while it is true that praiseworthy self-love involves loving a part of oneself that insubstantially distinguishes oneself from others, this is compatible with an individualistic manifestation.

²⁷³ For these reasons it is unlikely that NE9.8's doctrine of the true self can be used to show that NE9.4's doctrine of another self is non-prioritizing; rather, NE9.4 seems to be preparing the way for NE9.8's *egoism*.

another self becomes explicit; Aristotle suggests that we treat the other self only “approximately” to the way we treat ourselves.

4.2: The Fine

I have just argued that virtuous self-lovers prioritize themselves, and they do so by maximizing the fine for themselves. To fully show that this maximization of the fine for oneself is indeed self-prioritizing, I must account for what “the fine” refers to. First, I will reject one account that is incompatible with egoism (§4.2.1). Then, I will use NE9.7 to develop an egoistic reading of “the fine” such that it refers to one’s own actualization or activity (ἐνέργεια); so when Aristotle says virtuous agents act for the sake of the fine or distribute the fine for the themselves, this means they act for the sake of actualization or actualize themselves (§4.2.2).²⁷⁴ Finally, I will show how this reading makes sense of NE9.8’s depiction of moral competition and of three axiological expressions that are important to Aristotle: acting for the sake of happiness, for the sake of the fine, and because of the action itself (§4.2.3).

It is worth emphasizing that this section is primarily occupied with the *extension* of “the fine,” specifically when it is aimed at by fully virtuous agents. I address the *intension* of “the fine” in assessing an opposing interpretation (§4.2.1) and briefly develop a positive account in the §4.2.3. In the end, it may be less useful to focus on the intension of the fine, for the following reasons. First, as Nielsen (2017) suggests,²⁷⁵ the morally imperfect states *each* have their own conception of what is fine, which muddles up any attempt to list

²⁷⁴ This confirms a claim made in Footnote 23, that the good that is lovable maps onto the fine that is choiceworthy; per §2.3, the former seems to refer to virtuous actualization.

²⁷⁵ 10-11, 18-19.

necessary and sufficient conditions of the fine. For the fine is apparently indeterminate enough that it can be individually assigned in this way yet still merit the label of “fine.”²⁷⁶

Second and relatedly, Aristotle and his predecessor, Plato, give us reasons for thinking that what makes something fine is unintuitive. In *Republic* V.452c-e, Plato discusses the development of a training program, and brings up the issue of nakedness in physical exercise. Socrates claims that such a practice was initially deemed shameful, but then on reflection the practice was deemed good and thereupon deemed fine, rather than shameful. In *Parts of Animals* 1.5, Aristotle suggests that we should not refrain from studying less honorable animals (ἀτιμότερον), even though in contemplating them there is no charm to the sense (μὴ κεχαρισμένοις... πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν) (645a6-8). For among all natural things there is something fine (τινὸς... καλοῦ) (23, 25), where this seems to refer to teleological ordering. Now the fine in these passages may not exactly be the fine that fully virtuous agents strive for; but what these examples show is that what makes something fine is not immediately obvious. For what actually *is* fine may appear shameful, dishonorable, and ugly.

So giving an account of the intension of “the fine” may not be promising. The more important question, and one that seems more amenable to an answer, is what the *extension* of “the fine” is when the fine is invoked as the end of fully virtuous agents.

4.2.1: The Interpretative Options

There are roughly three mainstream accounts of the fine. On one reading, “the fine” refers to that which promotes the common good.²⁷⁷ On an aesthetic interpretation, “the fine”

²⁷⁶ It might be immediately objected that such individual assignments for the *good* do not prevent developing an account of the intension of “the good.” The cases seem somewhat different, however. Aristotle unhesitatingly links what is good to an agent’s well-being, and it does not seem like common opinion disagrees with this intensional account of the good; representatives of such opinion only disagree on the *extension* of “the good.” With “the fine,” however, not only is there disagreement about its extension, but also its intension, with Aristotle giving no clear statement of what he *or* others think on this score.

²⁷⁷ Irwin (1985, 2010, 2011) clearly defends this position (followed by Jenkins [1999] 463).

refers to certain aesthetic properties; in acting for the sake of the fine, agents act for the sake of instantiating these properties.²⁷⁸ Finally, there is an activity-based interpretation whereby “the fine” refers to virtuous activity.²⁷⁹

It should be clear that the common good interpretation is incompatible with egoism. For the fine seems to be the ultimate end of fully virtuous agents, and if the fine refers to the *common* good, it is unclear how *one’s own* good is the sole ultimate end or the ultimate end that is prioritized over others.

I will list a couple reasons for doubting the common good interpretation.²⁸⁰ First of all, it renders NE9.8 difficult to understand; Aristotle depicts fully virtuous agents as maximizing the fine for themselves, which would amount to their maximizing the *common* good for *themselves*. It is not clear why, if “the fine” refers to the *common* good, NE9.8 should emphasize maximizing the fine for *oneself*. Second of all, it would make the scarcity of “the fine” in Aristotle’s account of justice even more difficult to understand than it already is. We might think that justice is the most clearly other-regarding of the virtues and therefore that the fine *qua* common good should feature prominently in its account. It turns out, however, that “the fine” only appears twice in the entirety of NE5, where one of these seems to be a colloquial use (1135b25) and the other is particularly puzzling for the common good reading (1136b22). We are told that the decent person *seems* to take less than his share, but that he *actually* overreaches (πλεονεκτεῖ) for some other good, like the simply fine (τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ). Getting the fine is depicted as getting more of the good for *oneself*, which would be odd if “the fine” refers to the *common* good. Further, Aristotle speaks of

²⁷⁸ Cooper (1999.11), Lear (2006).

²⁷⁹ Crisp (2014), Owens (1981). Both suggest that the fine *includes* activity (Crisp 240, Owens 272-3).

²⁸⁰ Others can be found in Rogers (1993) 362-9.

overreaching for the fine, which would have to be understood as overwrought irony (if it is understandable at all), if “the fine” refers to the common good.²⁸¹

4.2.2: NE9.7 as Background for Understanding the Fine in NE9.8

What is the best way for an *egoistic* interpretation to account for the fine? In this section I will give reasons from NE9.7 for believing that the activity-based interpretation of the fine is the one the egoistic interpretation should adopt. NE9.7 is often neglected in favor of NE9.8 in assessing the fine, but I think this preceding chapter crucially informs the latter.²⁸²

NE9.7 begins by arguing that producers love their products more than vice versa because of the actualization the producer acquires (1167b31-1168a9; assessed in §3.1.1). Immediately after this, Aristotle seems to slide interchangeably between “the fine” and “actualization”:

(A) At the same time (ἄμα) the thing [i.e. the work] in respect to the action is fine (καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πράξιν) for the well-doer, with the result that this one rejoices in him [whom he did the work]; (B) but to the one passively receiving there is nothing fine (οὐδὲν καλὸν) in the one doing, but if anything, [only] the advantageous; and this is less pleasant and lovable [than the fine]. (C) But the actualization (ἡ ἐνέργεια) of the present on the one hand is pleasant, and hope of the future, and memory of the past; but most pleasant on the other hand is the thing according to actualization (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν), and likewise it is [most] lovable. (D) On the one hand then (οὖν) the work remains for the one having done it (for the fine [τὸ καλὸν] is long-lasting), but for the person having been acted upon, the useful passes away. (E) And memory of fine things (τε... τῶν... καλῶν) is pleasant, but of useful things, not at all or less. (1168a9-19)

(A) is apparently introducing a new focus, given the introductory phrase “at the same time.”

There are at least two candidates for what is new. Aristotle could be introducing action

²⁸¹ One thinks of NE8.13, which may be previewing the competition depicted in NE9.8. NE8.13 suggests accusations and complaints will not occur in friendship because of virtue; those contesting (ἀμιλλωμένων) in regards to good deeds will not complain against those doing them a good turn but will rather “retaliate by doing good (ἀμύνεται εἰς δρῶν)” (1162b6-11). If Aristotle really does mean to depict altruism or non-prioritization here, this image of “retaliation” only obfuscates the message. See Price (2010) 200-201 for similar thoughts.

²⁸² A notable exception is Rogers (1993) 366, who notes that what is fine for the producer is the producer’s own actualization. This is weaker than my claim that Aristotle takes “the fine” and “actualization” as co-extensive in the passage.

(*πρᾶξις*), as contrasted with the just-discussed notion of production (*ποίησις*).²⁸³ Or he could be introducing the fine (*καλόν*), as contrasted with the just-discussed notion of actualization (*ἐνέργεια*).

It seems that Aristotle is introducing a new aspect of production, action; hence my translation for *κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν*, “in respect to the action.” Indeed, Aristotle cannot be introducing the fine as contrasted with actualization, given the procession of the passage.²⁸⁴ (A) explains that the benefactor’s action is *fine* for him, with pleasure resulting from this; (B) says that the beneficiary does not detect anything fine in the agent, detecting only the advantageous, which is apparently less pleasant and lovable than the fine. (C) apparently expands upon this difference between the fine and the advantageous; but it is important to note that (C) speaks in terms of *actualization* (*ἐνέργεια*, *ἐνέργειαν*) and not in terms of the fine, telling us that the most pleasant and lovable thing is *actualization*. Just previously Aristotle has taken the fine to be more pleasant and lovable than the advantageous (B), so by “actualization” in (C) he is probably referring to “the fine.” Otherwise, it is unclear how (C) is relevant at all to (A) and (B).

Continuing, (D) and (E) *follow* from (C)’s statements about the pleasantness of *actualization* in respect to time; this is suggested by the “therefore (*οὖν*)” opening (D) and the “and (*τε*)” connecting (E) to (D). Yet (D) and (E) speak of “the fine” and not, as (C) does, of “actualization”; the *fine* is long-lasting (D) and the memory of the *fine* is pleasant (E). For there to be a continuous line of thought, again, it would seem that “actualization” and “the fine” are interchangeable; (A) and (B) slide from “the fine” to “actualization” (C), and (C) slides from “actualization” to “the fine” (D, E). So it seems the two are coextensive.

²⁸³ This is not to say that Aristotle has not discussed the distinction before; see NE1145b6-7 (c.f. *Metaphysics* E1.1). Rather, he is introducing the distinction in the context of the present argument.

²⁸⁴ I could still grant that Aristotle is contrasting the fine and actualization while maintaining my thesis that they are coextensive. Here, they would be contrasted in regards to intension; actualization is valued *as* fine. See §4.2.3 for more discussion.

There is another reason for thinking “the fine” refers to actualization. (A) and (B) suggest that the benefactor detects the fine because of his own action and that the beneficiary, even though he is involved in this very same action, does not detect anything fine, only the advantageous.²⁸⁵ It seems, then, that the fine is tied to *internal* actualization and not the *external* features of the action; if one describes an external action as fine, it is only as mediated through its relation to *internal* actualization. Indeed, fully virtuous people do virtuous actions for the sake of the fine and non-fully virtuous people can do the same virtuous actions but *not* for the sake of the fine, and thus without these actions being fine (1144a13-20, 1115b22).²⁸⁶

Before applying all this to NE9.8, it is worth pausing on two points. First, it is instructive to note that Aristotle does not talk about doing a *fine* action without doing the action for the sake of the fine as he does talk about doing a *virtuous* action without doing it for the sake of the virtuous action (e.g. 1144a13-17). We might think this is because the possibility of an action’s being fine without being for the sake of the fine is compatible with the following conclusion that Aristotle is likely to reject: the depraved tyrant does a fine action, say, the magnificent one of constructing a beautiful city, while not aiming for the fine (and in fact aiming at his depraved ends). The fine then seems to be an internal affair having to do with one’s aims; “the fine” is a gloss of actualization and actualization only occurs when one is executing one’s rational function in the proper way. This does not occur in the person who does the *same* external action as the fully virtuous person but *not* for the sake of the fine.

²⁸⁵ This line is a particular problem for common good interpretations of the fine. For if “the fine” refers to the common good, it would seem that the beneficiary should also detect something contributing to the common good; indeed, it is not clear why the fine should be contrasted with the advantageous, for the *common* good *includes* the beneficiary’s advantage.

²⁸⁶ This latter passage suggests that we can infer from bravery’s being fine that its end is fine. This suggests that an action must be for the sake of the fine for itself to be fine (Irwin [1999] 212).

Second, the activity-based interpretation of the fine helps answer a regress problem posed by Price.²⁸⁷ At level 1 of the regress, the benefactor acquires the advantageous for the beneficiary and thereby gets the fine. But as the beneficiary has been involved in the benefactor getting the fine whereas he (the beneficiary) has only received the much less valuable advantageous, this greater generosity earns the *beneficiary* more of the fine (level 2). But now it turns out that the benefactor has not only acquired the advantageous for the beneficiary but has also caused the beneficiary to gain the fine, and so gets more of the fine than at level 2 (level 3). The amounts of the fine pile up *ad infinitum*. Price (1989) argues that we can block the regress at level 2 if we deny that the relevant kind of merit accrues to the beneficiary's being (passively) benefitable. I think an interpretation of the fine as internal actualization achieves this. The beneficiary's merely being involved in the benefactor getting the fine is insufficient for acquiring the fine; the beneficiary must have had an *active* hand in arranging this opportunity for virtuous action, but this does not always occur.

Price (2010) would still complain that this distorts the notion of generosity, for how can x's action A count as generous if x consciously gains more by A?²⁸⁸ The notion of generosity seems distorted only if generosity presupposes altruistic motives or aims; but Aristotle does not seem to think that the concept of generosity or of any other particular virtue comes with motives or aims built-in at all.²⁸⁹ As mentioned above, Aristotle thinks it is coherent for one to say that x did a virtuous action even if this was not for the correct end. Ends and motives seem irrelevant to predications of "generous" or "courageous" to particular *actions*; what *are* relevant are the results. And so we may call an action "generous" if it is sufficiently *other-regarding*, whether or not it is *altruistic*.

²⁸⁷ (1989) 116, (2010) 202-3. This is different from the one that will be discussed in §4.3.

²⁸⁸ 202.

²⁸⁹ Consider Price's (1989) phrasing of the paradox: "my moral sacrifice is at the same time, if moral generosity is indeed a virtue like material generosity, a moral gain" (112). The way out seems to be to deny the possibility of moral sacrifice and leave only the possibility of moral gain; as I will argue in the next section, Aristotle seems to allow only for sacrifice in respect to a certain subset of goods, but not in respect to the fine.

4.2.3: Applications of the Fine-as-Actualization Reading

Let us now apply what we have developed from NE9.7. First, let us see how the fine in NE9.7 illuminates what immediately follows in NE9.8. NE9.8 depicts fully virtuous self-lovers as trying to acquire the fine for themselves, and this manifests itself in action that sacrifices certain goods including life for others and the common good. How is it that the fine is acquirable? In NE9.7 we saw that benefactors achieve the fine and are actualized in their benefaction, where Aristotle slides between “the fine” and “actualization.” Here, the focus was on production, but there was still mention of *action*; the benefactor found something fine in the production “in respect to the action” (1168a10, A). NE9.8 focuses on this respect; I think that the self-sacrificing agent acquiring the *fine* amounts to *actualizing* herself in the act of self-sacrifice. This reading of the fine suggests egoism; for maximizing the fine for oneself amounts to maximizing one’s own actualization, which is at least the most important part of one’s own happiness.

If we turn from NE9.8, the results from NE9.7 answer two questions that apply to the rest of NE. So far, I have argued that “the fine” refers to actualization, which is to make a point about the *extension* of the fine; but one might wonder about the *intension* of the fine, that is, about what *makes* something fine. Second, one might wonder about how acting for the sake of the fine, for the sake of happiness, and because of the action itself, are related. I will address the second issue first, and in so doing address the first issue.

Of the expressions “for the sake of the fine,” “because of the action itself (καθ’ αὐτήν),” and “for the sake of happiness,” Aristotle takes the first two as co-extensive; he indiscriminately says that a virtuous agent executes virtuous actions because of themselves and for the sake of the fine.²⁹⁰ I argued in §2.1 that loving a friend *because of himself* is a

²⁹⁰ Lear (2006) 116-7.

case of loving because of the good, which centers on the virtue of the individual in question. But Aristotle clearly understands what is ultimately valuable about the *state* of virtue to be the *activity* of virtue. Further, Aristotle understands the value of the other's virtue to lie in *one's own activity*; NE9.3 suggests that if a virtuous person vastly outstrips the virtue of his friend, he should dissolve the friendship because of the inhibition of activity that the gap causes. And so it seems that choosing something because of itself amounts to choosing something because of actualization.

Let us now relate acting for the sake of the fine and acting for the sake of happiness. As we have seen, acting for the sake of the fine is co-extensive with acting for the sake of actualization. And acting for the sake of actualization is co-extensive with acting for the sake of happiness.²⁹¹ This last clearly follows from an understanding of happiness as constituting just virtuous activity. But it also follows from an understanding of happiness as constituting *more* than virtuous activity. For even interpreters who suggest that happiness constitutes more than virtuous activity would agree that virtuous activity is the most important part of happiness; from here we can use Aristotle's move of shifting from "x is y most of all" to "x is y *simpliciter*" (NE1166a22-3).²⁹² In any case, NE1.8 directly connects happiness to the fine:

Therefore happiness is best, finest, and most pleasant... for all these things obtain in the best activities; and it is these or the best of these, that we say happiness is.
 ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδίστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία... ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἥ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.
 (NE1099a24-25, 29-31).

²⁹¹ Price (2010) argues that the praiseworthy self-lover acts for the sake of his rational part "in two ways," by realizing a consistent conception of happiness and by taking his prime value to be the fine (191). My conclusion is incompatible with Price if by "two ways" he means to distinguish between the *extension* of the actualization of happiness and of the fine; however, my conclusion may be compatible if he means to distinguish *intensions*. On intension, see the next paragraph.

²⁹² However, while happiness is sufficient for the fine, the fine is not sufficient for happiness; Aristotle illustrates fully virtuous agents who, due to difficult circumstances, are not happy yet display the fine (NE1100b30-33). This does not contradict the fact that acting for the sake of the fine is a necessary and sufficient condition for acting for the sake of happiness, for presumably the former act aims not merely at any kind of actualization, but sufficient actualization of the sort that obtains with happiness.

If we act for the sake of the fine, and happiness is finest, then presumably we act for the sake of happiness. And NE9.8 has given us reason to interpret this eudaimonistic axiom individually; for it emphasizes that we want to maximize the fine *for ourselves*.

However, the co-extensiveness of “acting for the sake of happiness,” “acting because of the action itself,” and “acting for the sake of the fine” falls short of co-intensiveness; each formula emphasizes a different aspect. “Happiness” emphasizes the *content* of the ultimate end; it is rational activity, as NE9.9 asserts and NE1.7 argues. “Because of the action itself” emphasizes the *formal* aspects of the ultimate end, the ultimacy of the end in question; this is the formal criterion that NE1.7 claims everyone holds for happiness *qua* concept, regardless of what they think happiness actually consists in.²⁹³ As the etymology of καλὸν suggests, “the fine” emphasizes the aesthetic aspects of the ultimate end, both internally in the soul of the virtuous agent and externally in the community affected,²⁹⁴ that supervene on internal actualization; I think these aesthetic aspects are what *Metaphysics* 1078a31-b1 labels the forms (εἶδη) of the fine: the definite (τὸ ὁρισμένον), order (τάξις), and symmetry (συμμετρία). Here I follow various authors who have connected the definite, order, and symmetry to proper functioning.²⁹⁵

²⁹³ Of course, the word “happiness” by itself does not immediately bring to mind Aristotle’s specific notion; by itself, it only invokes the formal criterion of being the ultimate end. But in invoking it, especially in NE9, Aristotle means to invoke the content of his specific notion of happiness.

²⁹⁴ The reference to both the internal and external perhaps answers two worries from Crisp (2014, 2015). The first (2014) is that there is a tension in understanding the fine egoistically, for “on the face of it, the value of the noble, understood as moral praiseworthiness, is independent of the value of well-being. The admirability of the noble is phenomenologically quite different from the desirability of something that would advance one’s own happiness” (240). The fine (or noble) tracks two sides of the same coin, one’s own happiness and the effects of its exercise. The second (2015) worry is that I am trying to define what one should do by appeal to what is virtuous, when an action’s being virtuous simply amounts to being what should be done (266-7). This is not what I am trying to do; I take the virtuous action to aim at the fine, which is to be understood as a rational ordering that obtains in the soul, which requires a corresponding rational ordering of external factors.

²⁹⁵ Allan (1971) 64-65, 70, Lear (2006) 117-122, Rogers (1993) 355, 357-8. One might now doubt the distinction between the aesthetic interpretation of the fine and the activity-based interpretation. The crucial difference is this. According to the aesthetic interpretation, in acting for the sake of the fine, the agent acts for the sake of various aesthetic properties. According to the activity-based interpretation, the agent acts for the sake of actualization (which manifests itself in various aesthetic properties) but not for the sake of the aesthetic properties themselves.

Let us sum up §4.2. I have argued for an interpretation of the fine that is compatible with an egoistic reading of NE9.8. In §4.2.1, I addressed one interpretation that is *not* compatible with such a reading, whereby “the fine” refers to the common good. In §4.2.2, I suggested that NE9.7’s constant sliding between “the fine” and “actualization” suggests that the two are co-extensive. In this final section, I reflected on some results of this. First, NE9.8’s depiction of the praiseworthy self-lover as maximizing the fine for himself can be understood as a depiction of the fully virtuous person as maximally self-actualizing. Second, we can better understand the relationship between some fundamental axiological expressions in Aristotle: acting for the sake of the fine, acting for the sake of happiness, and acting because of the action itself are co-extensive. In each case, one acts for the sake of virtuous actualization, which is at least the most important part of Aristotelian happiness.

4.3: A Regress Problem and an Egoistic-Communitarian Solution

Two problems remain for an egoistic interpretation of NE9.8. First, there is a regress problem that applies to any reading of the fine. Second, there is an apparent tension between egoism (prioritization of self) and Aristotle’s communitarianism (prioritization of community over self). My solution to the former relies on a solution to the latter; engaging in a communal system of sharing activity solves the regress and prioritizes the community in one sense (in terms of external goods) while prioritizing oneself in another (in terms of actualization).

The regress problem is as follows.²⁹⁶ If (1) giving up opportunities of virtuous action to a friend is finer than actually doing the virtuous action oneself²⁹⁷ and (2) virtuous agents want to maximize the fine for themselves, then it would seem that we would end up with an

²⁹⁶ Price (1989) 112-13, 268-9; Pangle (2003) 124.

²⁹⁷ (K) from NE9.8.1169a18-b2 (§4.1).

infinite regress of giving up opportunities of virtuous action, leading, presumably, to the loss of the opportunity. We might block this by suggesting that while Aristotle says it is finer to give up an opportunity to virtuous action, he never goes beyond that; that is, he never says it is finer than virtuous action to give up the opportunity *to give up* an opportunity to virtuous action. In any case, we might say a person with *phronēsis* would not give up the opportunity so many times so as for the opportunity to be lost.

Yet Aristotle's superlatively virtuous magnanimous person "does not enter into matters of commonly honored things, nor into that where others lead; for he is both lazy and delaying, except where there is a great honor or task, and on the one hand he is active in few things (ὀλίγων... πρακτικόν), but on the other hand [he is active] in great and renowned things" (NE1124b24-6). We can imagine the magnanimous person giving up the opportunity to give up the virtuous action, etc... and even perhaps letting the opportunity to virtuous action be lost; he might prefer the long line of giving up the opportunity over finally succumbing to the inferior execution of the action itself. After all, the magnanimous person "does not enter... where others lead."

How do we account for the magnanimous person so as to block the regress of giving up the opportunity to virtuous action? Consider this description of magnanimity: it "is in magnitude, just as fineness is in a large body, and small people can be elegant and symmetrical, but not fine (ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ)" (NE1123b6-8). The fine somehow has to do with size. This may remind us of *Poetics* 1450b34-1451a3:

To be fine (τὸ καλόν), a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order (τεταγμένα) in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude (μέγεθος). For the fine is a matter of size and order (τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν), and therefore impossible either in a very minute creature, since our perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity, or in a creature of vast size—one, say, 1,000 miles long—as in that case, instead of the object being seen all at once, the unity and

wholeness (τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ὅλον) of it is lost to the beholder. (trans. Bywater, with modifications)²⁹⁸

Before applying this to magnanimity, it is worth addressing an immediate problem: the passage suggests, against my reading, that the fine is fundamentally about something *external* rather than internal (the actualization within the agent). This is surely the case in the *Poetics* example. But while I believe that there is a closer connection between beauty and morality in the ancient mind than in today's, I do not think they are totally conflated in Aristotle's use; there may be different senses of the fine, with some aspects of one sense informing some aspects of the others.²⁹⁹ Further, if it is external size that matters in regard to moral acts, apparently it is important that some audience sees this; this, at any rate, is the point of the *Poetics* passage in suggesting the art piece must be neither too large nor too small. But Aristotle never says that an audience is a requirement for moral action. And presuming that the external size of an action refers to the action's result, it is unclear that even the agent herself is a required audience; Aristotle highlights self-sacrifice as particularly virtuous, but it is unclear that the deceased here will be around to observe the result.³⁰⁰

So the fine has to do with size, and the size relevant to moral actions is not *external* size; how are we to conceive of *internal* size? I think the idea is that there are degrees of actualization;³⁰¹ Aristotle seems to have this in mind when he takes magnificence as larger-scale generosity (NE4.1-2) and takes the happiness of moral virtuous activity as “second (Δευτέρως)” to the happiness of intellectual virtuous activity (NE10.8.1178a9).³⁰²

²⁹⁸ For another interesting passage connecting the fine to size, see *Politics* 1326a33-35: “it is necessary that a city, in which the aforementioned boundary obtains with magnitude (μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει), is finest (καλλίστην).” We are told that the size must be just right for the proper functioning, we might say actualization, of the city.

²⁹⁹ Irwin (2010), (2011).

³⁰⁰ So I do not agree with Lear (2006) 122-3 in taking the fine as distinctive from the good in respect to its visibility; though see Footnote 302 for how visibility might *supervene* on the fine.

³⁰¹ And so happiness might be something that cannot be added to (1097b17-22) but might yet be improved; it is not being improved into another kind of good but is being improved *qua* happiness (Crisp [1994] 133).

³⁰² This suggests a solution to a problem posed by NE1178b1-3 and other passages connecting fine actions to external goods (see Irwin [1990b] 63 and Lear [2006] 122-23 for more passages): “for actions there is need of many [external goods], and to the extent that the actions are greater and finer, the need is greater (πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ᾖσι καὶ καλλίους, πλείονων).” This passage might be taken to

Applying this to the magnanimous person, we can now understand the reasons for his delaying. The magnanimous person is preoccupied foremost with the fine, and size is a relevant factor. But this delaying is compatible with the magnanimous person being fairly active; indeed, we might think that the magnanimous person is happy, but Aristotle contrasts the activity of happiness with the inactivity of sleep (NE1.5). In what way then is the magnanimous person fairly active? I think the great actions for which the magnanimous person delays include an activity, like political or wartime activity (think Achilles again), that is a composite of many actions.³⁰³ This would suggest that the magnanimous person could be busy, just with many tasks that amount to one great, unified whole; that is, the magnanimous person is lazy and delaying “*except* where there is a great honor or task.” The way the magnanimous person delays is by avoiding picking up every mundane virtuous opportunity that arises, opportunities that do not contribute to a greater whole.³⁰⁴

But will not fully virtuous people even let these big opportunities go by so as to take credit for giving up these and gain more of the fine, and so on? I do not think so. Much better than the inevitable loss of the opportunity that is constantly given up is a system that allows for *both* the uptake of these opportunities *and* constantly giving them up. This is just

suggest that the fine tracks the visible scale of the project, and so the finer the project, the more external goods are required. Now something greater in terms of visibility might *supervene* on the fine, but I think the magnanimous man’s preoccupation with size might provide us a way to understand the passage as still taking the fine as internal actualization. The idea is that practical works that require more internal actualization are those that are more complicated and ambitious, and such as these require more external goods.

³⁰³ Pace Price (2011) 56, I think this *does* mean that the notion of *πρᾶξις* in *Poetics* 1450b24-7, 1451a16-19, 30-2 as a sequence of actions is at least sometimes operant in Aristotle’s ethical theory. NE1124b24-6 has told us that the magnanimous person is *πρατικόν* in few things but it is implied that as superlatively happy, he is very active; if *πρατικὸς* implies action, then the “few things” must be composite actions. Otherwise the magnanimous person would not be very active, and therefore not superlatively happy, since he will only be doing a few *atomistic* actions.

³⁰⁴ NE1142a2 would seem to counter this argument, as it suggests that “politicians seem busy (οἱ... πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες),” literally, “many-affaired”; on the surface this seems to scuttle my proposal that the magnanimous person, active in few things (ὀλίγων... πρακτικόν), might engage in political activity. However, in context Aristotle is citing common opinion, as his inferring a Euripides quote from this statement suggests (1142a2-6). This implies that the politician being talked about is the actual one of the day, not the ideal one Aristotle has in mind. What this in turn leaves open is for the magnanimous person to be politically involved without being, like the actual politician, *overly* busy; the system of taking turns, to be assessed next, would provide just this situation.

Aristotle's political model of ruling by turns (*Politics* 1259b4-6, 1287a16-18, 1332b23-7).³⁰⁵

And so Aristotle's communitarianism makes its entrance; it is from this perspective of the whole that the fully virtuous agent makes decisions, including those of giving up opportunities. The regress is solved, for agents take turns doing the action and giving up the opportunity to act. And the fine is maximized for each, for agents cyclically give up the opportunity to act.

Further, communitarianism maximizes the fine not just by cycling the opportunities to give up the opportunity to act; engaging in the communal system *itself* leads to greater amounts of the fine (i.e. actualization). As we noted concerning the magnanimous person, we can conceive of actions amounting to a greater whole; a greater whole is in play when exchanging actions in a *communal* system. Making this whole run smoothly is engaging in a larger project which involves more actualization than trying to just actualize oneself in isolation. This seems to be NE1094b10's point: it is "finer and more divine [to achieve the good] for a people and cities" than for an individual.³⁰⁶ All this explains why exchanging ruling roles is not so much of a sacrifice in Aristotle's ethical and political theory; one's

³⁰⁵ I am here developing a solution suggested by Price (1989) 269. It is worth noting that my appeal to taking turns answers an objection to my interpretation of NE9.8 as a competition. NE9.6 suggests that concord is not just about everyone wanting the same thing, which would result in conflict, but everyone wanting the same people to have the same thing; one might think that the situation Aristotle deplores, of everyone wanting the same thing and therefore being in conflict, encapsulates my interpretation of NE9.8. Yet Aristotle clearly thinks that the competition will lead not to conflict, but to the promotion of the common good. I think that the system of taking turns makes this concrete; everyone wants to maximize the fine for himself, but this involves concord about who takes which roles.

³⁰⁶ This would be my answer to Irwin's (1990a) question as to what is particularly fine about sharing rule (80). A number of commentators argue that this line straightforwardly suggests altruism; the good of the community is deemed greater than the good of oneself (McKerlie [1991] 87; see also [1998] 542). Yet interestingly the line in question is the consequent of the (perhaps hypothetical) antecedent that the good "for an individual and the city are the same (ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει)" (NE1094b7-8). The difference between the good of oneself and of the community then is not in kind but in degree, so we should not use the consequent (if Aristotle accepts the antecedent at all) to make claims about the *content* of one's own good, because the difference in question is not about the content of one's own good. See also Stewart's (Volume 1) comments that the good of an individual human is in a social context, so that, again, the contrast is not between two kinds of good (23-4). This raises another issue with the common good reading; it is not clear how "finer" and "more divine" can go together, for the fine is social and moral but the divine is not (NE10.8.1178b8-23). We can easily account for this by my reading, however; Aristotelian divinity seems characterized by the rational, and it seems that there is more rational activity involved in achieving the good for many than for few.

giving up of opportunity actualizes oneself not only by itself, but also by being a contribution to the running of a greater whole.³⁰⁷

It should be clear how this communitarianism is compatible with egoism. The communal system is valuable insofar as it maximizes the fine for the individual members. First, it serves the purpose of cycling virtuous action and giving it up, which maximizes the fine. Second, the communal system is further valuable because of the larger-scale actualization that occurs. But in what way is this communitarianism anymore; in what way is the *community* prioritized? For one thing, the ultimate end of self-actualization is maximized only by taking on the communal perspective. For another thing, this prioritization of oneself in respect to the fine manifests itself in prioritization of the community in respect to other goods.³⁰⁸ It is worth highlighting this dual prioritization that is prevalent in Aristotle's practical philosophy. *Politics* 1278b30 depicts one's turn in office as looking after the interest of others, and one's turn *out* of office as involving one's interest being looked after. This seems to parallel NE9.8, where doing the fine thing (taking a turn in office) involves giving up the expedient (one's time and energy) for the expedience of others (their care). See also Aristotle's claim that the just ruler seems to get no profit for ruling (NE1134b3-8); he receives honor and privilege, but Aristotle claims that honor is not very worthy

³⁰⁷ This amounts to a response to Kraut's claim that NE9.8 is *not* depicting maximizing behavior. Kraut (1989) claims instead that while NE9.8 is indeed depicting competition, it is of a sort constrained by justice (83-5), and so one that is not dictated by the principles of maximization. However, I would argue that doing just actions counts as the kind of fine activity virtuous self-lovers are supposed to maximize (Price [2010] 201, Salmieri [2014] 113-5, Wielenberg [2004] 286-294), and this manifests itself in taking turns. For similar reasons, I reject Kraut's suggestion that taking turns amounts to *not* maximizing one's own good (98-101, 119-120; see also Irwin [1990a] 84, who, when assessing Aristotle's position on giving up the opportunity to rule, contrasts what is "simply a demand of justice" with what is "directly related to [one's own] happiness") and Price's (2011) suggestion that doing what one might call "obligatory" actions does not directly enhance one's own happiness (72-3).

³⁰⁸ So this is not to deny Irwin's (1985) claim that Aristotle associates the fine with the common good. However, this *is* to deny Irwin's claim that to aim at the action as fine is to aim at the common good *without* reference to one's own happiness (136); I am suggesting that aiming at the fine just is to aim at one's own actualization (and so one's happiness). In a later paper, Irwin (2010) claims that "though the magnificent person need not aim directly at the common good whenever he spends money, the common good guides him nonetheless. He builds a large house for himself, not for the common good, but he considers the effect of a large house on the common good" (394). It is unclear how one can do a virtuous act, like a magnificent one, *for the*

(NE1124a20).³⁰⁹ The ruler seems motivated instead by the fine, which he “overreaches for” (NE1136b15-23). This image of overreaching should again remind us of the moral competition in NE9.8.³¹⁰

Before closing, I will make a clarificatory remark and then reflect on some wider implications. I have discussed communitarianism because it seems to strain my egoistic interpretation of friendship, but it might not be clear how this discussion of large-scale community applies to friendship. While the specific example here is of political rule by turns, we can easily draw an analogy to friendships. Shared activity instead of isolated activity leads to greater actualization insofar as it contributes to a system of shared activity. Further, NE9.9 and 9.12 explicitly suggest that happiness *requires* shared activity, for isolated activity fails to obtain in the easy and continuous way required for happiness. This is why the happy person needs friends: actualization, which occurs adequately only in living together (explored in §3.2.5).

Now, for some wider implications; I think that appealing to the communal perspective might help us engage with the classic interpretative problem of reconciling NE1-9 with NE10. The first nine books seem to suggest that happiness involves primarily moral activity, the tenth book rather that it involves primarily intellectual activity. From the perspective of an individual, there is then a difficult question of which to prioritize. From the perspective of the community, this problem does not arise. The question of what kind of happiness *I* should engage in comes second to the question of what kind of happiness *the community* would have me engage in. The community requires some intellectuals, but it is unlikely to run very well

sake of the fine, where this is understood as *for the sake of* the common good, if one does not act “for the common good.”

³⁰⁹ Privilege (γέρας) is probably similar to honor; it is not utility, as the whole point is that the ruler does not profit.

³¹⁰ The analysis in this chapter suggests an answer to Pangle’s (2003) puzzlement about the dubious effectiveness of Aristotle’s honor compensation system (this permeates her book; e.g. 61-4, 130). The system’s maintaining a relationship between a superior and inferior is dubious enough, but there are additional questions about why the superior should even want to pursue a relationship with the inferior in the first place (Foster

if all citizens primarily engage in what NE10 alleges to be the highest kind of happiness. On the flip side, instead of allowing for the deaths of top scientists on the frontlines (e.g. Henry Moseley), the Aristotelian polis will rather take up *Politics* 7.9's policy of dividing up practical and theoretical labor according to natural capacity.³¹¹

In some sense, then, the community dictates what individuals do. But this is not to subordinate the happiness of the individual to the happiness of the community. To make this point, I will discuss Kraut's (1989) position on the matter. Kraut rejects (1) "that if you are capable of leading a philosophical life, then you should in all circumstances do so, and that you should reject all requests that you serve the community instead," opting instead for (2) "that *if* one is free (as many people are) to pursue" the superior philosophical life to the inferior political life, "then one should do so."³¹² Kraut offers a *negative* prescription in regards to the communitarian perspective (not to ignore it, 1) but does not offer a *positive* prescription in regards to the communitarian perspective, taking the communitarian perspective rather as merely regulative (2). This suggests that the communitarian perspective is linked to obligation and sacrifice. I would instead argue that it is rather the *positive* basis of a fully virtuous person's decision-making; it is this involvement with the bigger picture that leads to "finer and more divine" actualization. As Price (1989) suggests, this claim suggests human virtue is essentially civic/city-involving; this is not to say "that government action alone has a value of its own... nor simply that the city provides the background conditions of individual achievement," but "rather that many human values are essentially civic, and can be realized only in the context of a political community."³¹³ This is perhaps Aristotle's point in

[2002] 83). As I have suggested throughout this dissertation, inferiors (the primary example being one's own children) are opportunities for self-actualization.

³¹¹ Irwin (1990a) also brings the *Politics* to bear on the problem of the two types of happiness (80-81). However he concludes that the complete life will include both political and contemplative activity, without fully resolving which to prioritize.

³¹² 104.

³¹³ 203-4.

suggesting that happiness involves self-sufficiency “not for one living a solitary life (τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην), but also for parents and children and wives and in general friends and citizens, since the human is political by nature” (NE1.7.1097b9-11).

Understanding Aristotle in this way, as taking communal involvement as a *positive* source of actualization rather than a *negative* constraint on actualization, is important lest we conflate his position with Plato’s. In *Republic* 420c-d, Socrates claims that his theory maximizes the good for the city and *not* for any one group or individual. This principle is reinvoked at 519e, in connection with forcing the philosopher away from his superior contemplative activity to inferior practical affairs. Of this policy Socrates says that each of the philosophers “will spend most of his time with philosophy, but, when his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city’s sake, not as if he were doing something fine, but rather something that has to be done” (540, trans. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve). From what I have just argued, Aristotle disagrees with all of these claims. Instead of showing that the common good and *not* the individual’s good is maximized, NE9.8 shows that the individual’s good is maximized *by* maximizing the common good. And instead of communal concerns being merely regulative and obligatory, necessary and not fine, they are positive sources of actualization/fineness.³¹⁴

Let us sum up the chapter. I have defended an egoistic interpretation of NE9.8; self-love involves prioritizing oneself in regards to the superlatively valuable fine. After developing this reading of NE9.8 against a non-prioritizing reading (§4.1), I argued that “the fine” refers to actualization (§4.2); in acting for the sake of the fine, then, fully virtuous agents act for the sake of their own actualization. I then showed how this egoistic

³¹⁴ I am not arguing that these passages involve a sacrifice of happiness on the part of the philosopher in the sense of a loss of happiness; as Price (2010) puts it, such an interpretation of the *Republic* would frustrate “the general purpose of the investigation, which is to refute the assertion (assumed to lead to immoralism and not to moral heroism) that justice is another’s gain and one’s own loss” (185). Rather, I am arguing that according to these passages happiness is not maximized and that serving the community is viewed as an obligation (as Price admits is the case with the *Republic*; [2011] 70, 70n54, [1997] §6).

interpretation of the fine is compatible with communitarianism by combining the two to solve a regress problem (§4.3). Aristotle suggests that one gets more of the fine by giving up an opportunity to act, which would seem to result in a regress of inaction where fully virtuous agents constantly give up the opportunity so as to attain more of the fine. I argued that Aristotle's communitarianism offers a solution; one maximizes the fine for oneself by engaging in a system of turns, as this system not only allows for constantly taking turns giving up the opportunity to act but creates activity that is greater in virtue of being part of systematic whole.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I argued that Aristotelian friendship is egoistic. In §1 I argued that Aristotle's principle that all friends love only because of the lovable is egoistic. "The lovable" refers to one's own happiness (§1.1) and "because of" refers at least to the final cause (§1.2); so friends love only for the sake of their own happiness. In §2, I argued how this interpretation of the principle accommodates several key expressions that do *not* sound egoistic: "wishing goods for the other's sake" and "loving the other for himself." I showed *that* these fall under Aristotle's principle of loving because of the lovable; the more fundamental final cause in each kind of concern is the good, one of the lovable objects, that is, one of the objects that appears to contribute to one's own happiness (§2.1-2). I then explained *how* we are to understand these types of concern as ultimately self-regarding; the virtue centered on is important because of its contribution to one's own activity, the most important part of *one's own happiness* (§2.3).

Altruism was eliminated at this point, for it is unclear how loving only for the sake of one's own happiness is compatible with the other being the only or prioritized ultimate end of love. But Aristotle's key doctrine of other selfhood remained an obstacle for the egoistic interpretation. For it might be thought that the other self cannot be distinguished from oneself in the relevant ways so as to prioritize oneself over the other self. I addressed this issue in §3. I assessed the first two instances of other selfhood in NE, in 8.12 and 9.4, and argued that an egoistic interpretation of other selfhood prevails over a non-prioritizing interpretation (§3.1). The essential feature of other selfhood is involvement in *one's own* actualization; in line with egoism, it is involvement in one's own actualization, one's own happiness, that is what makes the other self valuable. Against non-prioritization, full virtue is not even necessary let alone essential for other selfhood; that is, the grounds for non-prioritization, normative identity in full virtue, is not necessary for other selfhood. I then showed how the last two

instances of another self in NE, in NE9.9, support the egoistic reading of other selfhood (§3.2). It turns out that Aristotle grounds the value of other selves in their contributions to one's own *cognitive* self-actualization; that is, Aristotle suggests the happy person needs other selves on the grounds that without them, the adequately continuous and easy activity that is required for happiness does not obtain. In §3.3, I argued that the egoism just explored follows from Aristotle's prioritization of activity, and how Aristotle's endorsement of partiality follows from his egoism.

In §4, I assessed NE9.8's theory of self-love. I argued that this theory straightforwardly endorses self-prioritization that is both substantive and operant at the level of motivation; an egoistic model emerges, whereas the non-prioritizing model fades (§4.1). The self-prioritization in question involves maximizing the superlatively valuable fine for oneself; to completely show that this is egoistic, I addressed the issue of what "the fine" refers to, arguing that it refers to actualization (§4.2). This means that when praiseworthy self-lovers maximize the fine for themselves, they maximally self-actualize. Finally, I addressed two problems (§4.3). The first was a regress problem facing any interpretation of the fine; giving up an opportunity to act is finer than acting, so we might think that those trying to maximize the fine for themselves would endlessly give up the opportunity to act. The second was the tension between Aristotle's communitarianism, which involves some kind of prioritization of the community, and his egoism, which involves some kind of prioritization of oneself. I solved the first problem by solving the second problem; that is, I interpreted Aristotle's communitarianism egoistically to block the regress. Instead of endlessly giving up opportunities, praiseworthy self-lovers take turns giving up and executing actions in a communal system; this maximizes their individual actualization by allowing the constant cession of virtuous activity and by making each cession and uptake of virtuous activity even finer by being part of a larger systematic whole.

So Aristotle's theory of friendship is egoistic. I will now reflect on some implications for Aristotle's wider ethical theory and what might seem objectionable about egoistic friendship.

Let us start with the latter. I take it that the worry with an egoistic theory of friendship is that it endorses reprehensible selfishness and narcissism. But Aristotle suggests that maximizing one's own virtuous actualization results in maximizing the *common* good. And while other selves are valuable in that they contribute to one's own actualization, note that they contribute to one's own actualization to the extent that *they* are actualized; children are *products* of the parents, friends are *shaped* by each other. The fear of narcissism is also perhaps exaggerated. For while one's own actualization is the fundamental reason for friendship, this will not always be reflected on. Most of the time, the fully virtuous agent will act from habit; and serious reflection on one's own actualization will usually occur at the global level, when reflecting on the moral competition that is the fully virtuous person's life or when stepping back to assess the exchange system that is an Aristotelian friendship.

In the Introduction, I hinted that egoism in Aristotle's theory of friendship implies egoism in Aristotle's ethical theory as a whole; by this point, the implication should be clear. In §1-2 we have seen that the final cause of loving others is one's own happiness. In §3, we have seen that people love others as they do themselves on the grounds that these are other selves who contribute specially to one's own happiness. Now some might argue that all this shows is that the special concern we show for those close to us is egoistically grounded, and that this is unsurprising; the special concern we have for family members, for example, is presumably grounded in the special way they are connected to our lives. But it might be questioned what this shows about the majority of our relationships that lie *outside* these close circles.

To this, I make three replies. First, §4 showed that virtuously-executed actions in general are egoistic, for they are cases of self-love, gratifying one's rational part of the soul. This suggests that virtuous actions directed at less intimate circles are egoistic.

Friendships that are *not* because of the good, mostly sidelined for this dissertation, play a prominent role in my second point. In the Introduction, I considered a conditional: if friendship is egoistic, so too the rest of the relevant ethical theory. I raised a complaint: if "friendship" tracks a wide range of relationships that includes obviously self-serving ones as utility and pleasure friendships, then it is not clear that this implies egoism in one's ethical theory as a whole; for some friendships would be only descriptively egoistic. However, I showed that *complete* friendship is egoistic; this means that Aristotle's normative theory of friendship is egoistic, and as such, that the rest of his ethical theory is egoistic. Now while Aristotle does not have a robust normative theory of utility and pleasure friendships, I take it that if complete friendship is normatively egoistic, then pleasure and utility friendship must be egoistic in whatever sense interests us. What this means is that the vast majority of human relationships are egoistic, for it would seem that most (if not all) of our even most distant relationships would fall under civic friendship, friendship among humans (NE1155a19-21, 1161b5-8), or some kind of pleasure or utility friendships.³¹⁵ So our results about friendship because of the good do have implications far outside our inner circles.

This is shown by a third point that also appeals to the wide extension of *φιλία*. We might think the wide extension of *φιλία* just described brings it so close to the point of impersonality that we are instead talking of justice. And perhaps this is not misguided. For Aristotle says the two are co-extensive; there is no justice without friendship and vice versa,

³¹⁵ There might be some controversy about whether one is instantaneously a civic friend with all one's fellow citizens or a humanity friend with all one's fellow humans. Annas (1990) argues that civic friendship *can* arise among *some* citizens in a city (248); I find persuasive Price's (1999) arguments suggesting that civic friendship just *obtains* among *all* citizens in a city (7).

to ask how to be a friend is to ask how to be just, justice extends as far as friendship, etc.³¹⁶

Unsurprisingly then, there are correspondingly narrow and wide circles of justice:

As to how a man must conduct life towards wife and generally as a friend towards a friend, this would appear to be nothing other than asking how a man might be just; for what is just does not appear to be the same thing for a friend towards a friend, stranger, companion, and classmate. (1162a23-33)

So far, we have seen that friendship *narrowly* conceived is egoistic and that friendship *widely* conceived is egoistic; given that friendship widely conceived blurs into just relations, and given that friendship and justice are co-extensive, we seem to have good reason for taking Aristotelian justice to be egoistic as well. We can make the same point about partiality; §3.3 showed that egoism in friendship grounds partiality in friendship and given that friendship and justice are co-extensive, we would expect egoism to ground partiality in justice as well. Indeed, the just-quoted 1162a23-33 characterizes justice as sensitive to the class of humans related to and thus as partial. But if Aristotelian justice and friendship are partial and egoistic, it is most probable that the rest of his ethical theory is. For now, I can only gesture at my dissertation's consequence for Aristotle's theory of justice and his wider ethical theory; a conclusive discussion belongs to another day.

³¹⁶ NE1155a26-8, 1159b25-1160a8, 1161a30-b10, 1162a29-33, MM1211a6-7, EE1241b10-14, 1242a19-28.

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