Needs in the Philosophy of History:

Rousseau to Marx

Andrew Chitty

Thesis submitted for the degree of D.Phil. in Philosophy

University College, Oxford

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

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The thesis examines the role of the multiplication of human needs, the desires associated with them, and the capacities developed by human beings to satisfy those desires, in the philosophies of history of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx.

It presents an interpretation of Rousseau in which the historical multiplication of needs is both generated by and generates the development of *amour-propre*. In turn the development of *amour-propre* is necessary in order for human beings to develop the virtue of justice, and to participate as citizens in the society of the *Social Contract*.

It argues that in Kant's philosophy of history the expansion of needs and their associated desires, and the development of the means to satisfy them, brings about a 'culture of skill'. This in turn leads to the development of just civil societies and of the 'culture of discipline'. These together constitute the 'ultimate end of nature': that naturally produced circumstance which can maximally facilitate the moralisation of mankind.

It interprets sections of Hegel's systematic account of mind as providing a philosophical history of ordinary human motivation, in which the 'desire' of the isolated human being is superseded successively by the 'needs' of the person, the 'social needs' of the member of a civil society, and the 'duties' of the citizen of the modern state. This history provides an underpinning for Hegel's official account of history as the rise and fall of successive civilisations.

It argues that in Marx's early writings history is conceived as the development through private exchange of those needs, activities and products which are characteristically human, but in an 'estranged' shape which can only be overcome by the final abolition of private exchange itself. This conception of history survives in Marx's later writings and provides a basis for understanding direct producers' motivations for overthrowing a social form as derived from a sense of incompatibility between their conception of self and the economic relations under which they live. Marx's 'moral' condemnations of capitalism are understood in the light of this model of revolutionary motivation.

It is concluded that in each of these thinkers the process of multiplication of needs and their associated desires plays a central role in a conception of history as a process culminating in the establishment of the 'good society', and thus in humanity's self-realisation. It thereby plays an important though under-recognised role in the social and political thought of each of them.

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Abbreviations

Translations from French and German are generally my own, based on the standard English translations, which are cited below along with the edition used in the original language. Translations from Greek are taken directly from the English translation cited below. All emphases in translations are those of the author.

In citations of these works in the text of the thesis, normally the pagination of the original language text used is given first, followed by a slash (/) and then the pagination of the standard English translation. Where mentioned below, book and chapter numbers have also been given (for some of Rousseau's works), or the page number in the original language edition has been replaced by a paragraph number (for some of Hegel's works). Where no English translation exists, the page number in the original language edition has been given alone.

Other translations which have been consulted, but for which paginations are not given in the text, are also listed below.

For each writer, collected editions are listed first, followed by individual works. The dates given immediately after the title of each individual work are those of first publication in the case of those works published in the author's lifetime, and of the manuscripts from which the work was prepared in the case of posthumously published works.

(1) Rousseau

OC *Oeuvres Complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, 4 volumes, Bibliothèque de la Pléaide, Gallimard, Paris, 1959-69. Cited below and in the text by volume number.

OCE *Oeuvres et Correspondence Inédites de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. G. Streckeisen-Moultou, Michel Levy, Paris, 1861.

Also consulted: *Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings*, ed. & tr. D.A. Cress, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1987.

DOI *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondemens de l'Inégalité* (1755), in OC 3.

Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, tr. M. Cranston, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1984.

E1-5 *Emile ou de l'Éducation*, books 1-5 (1762), in OC 4.

Emile, or on Education, tr. A. Bloom, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991.

GM *Du Contrat Social (Première Version, Manuscript de Genève)* (1758-60), in OC 3. Known as the 'Geneva Manuscript'.

'The general society of the human race', in *The Social Contract and Discourses*, tr. G.D.H. Cole, rev. J.H. Brumfitt and J.C. Hall, Dent, London, 1973. This is a translation of book 1, chapter 2 of the Geneva Manuscript.

Abbreviations

N.B. The Geneva Manuscript is cited by book and chapter number before the page number of the French and (where existent) English translation.

LM *Lettres de la Montagne* (1764), in OC 3. LM is cited by the number of the letter before the French pagination.

N *Narcisse, ou l'amant de lui-même* (1752), in OC 2.

RJJ *Rousseau, Juge de Jean-Jacques: Dialogues* (1772-76), in OC 1.

Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues, tr. J. Bush, C. Kelly & R. Masters, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1990.

SC *Du Contrat Social* (1762), in OC 3.

The Social Contract, tr. M. Cranston, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968.

SC is cited by book and chapter number before the French and English pagination.

(2) Kant

PA *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and Akademie der Wissenschaften der Göttingen, 29 volumes, Walter de Gruyter (and previous publishers), 1910-83. Known as the 'Prussian Academy edition'. Cited below by volume number.

A,B *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (1781, 2nd ed. 1787), in PA 3,4. Cited by the pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions.

Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith, MacMillan, London, 1985.

CBH *Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte* (1786), in PA 8. Referred to in the text as 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History'.

Speculative Beginning of Human History, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, tr. T. Humphrey, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983.

CJ1-2 *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), in PA 5.

Critique of Judgment, tr. W. S. Pluhar, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987.

Also consulted: *The Critique of Judgement*, tr. J.C. Meredith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952

CPaR *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), in PA5.

Critique of Practical Reason, tr. L.W. Beck, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1956.

GMM *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1795), in PA 4.

Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, tr. H.J. Paton as *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson, London, 1948.

IUH *Idee zu einer allegemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), in PA 8.

Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, tr. T. Humphrey, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983.

MM *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797), in PA 6.

The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. M. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

PP *Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf* (1795), in PA 8.

Perpetual Peace, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, tr. T. Humphrey, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983.

RWL *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793-94), in PA 6.

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. T.M. Green & H.H. Hudson, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1960.

TP *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das Mag in der Theorie richting sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis* (1793), in PA 8.

On the Proverb: that may be True in Theory, but is of no Practical Use, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, tr. T. Humphrey, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983.

(3) Hegel

GW *Hegel: Gesammelte Werke*, Rheinische-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1968-. Cited below by volume number.

TW *Hegel: Werke: Theorie Werkausgabe*, 20 volumes, eds. E. Moldenauer & K.M. Michel, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1986. Cited below by volume number.

E1 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 1* (1817, rev. 1827, 1830), TW 8. Cited by paragraph (§) number. Additions (*Zusätze*) are indicated by 'A'.

The Encyclopaedia Logic, tr. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, & H.S. Harris, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1991.

E2 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 2* (1817, rev. 1827, 1830), TW 9. Cited by paragraph (§) number. Additions (*Zusätze*) are indicated by 'A'.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, tr. A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.

Abbreviations

E3 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 3* (1817, rev. 1827, 1830), TW 10. Cited by paragraph (§) number. Remarks are indicated by 'R'. Additions (*Zusätze*) are indicated by 'A'.

Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, tr. W. Wallace & A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971.

JS1 *Jenaer Systementwürfe I* (1803-04), eds. K. Düsing & H. Kimmerle, GW 6.

First Philosophy of Spirit, in *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. & tr. H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1979.

JS3 *Jenaer Systementwürfe 3* (1805-06), ed. R.H. Horstmann, GW 8.

Hegel and the Human Spirit, tr. L. Rauch, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1983.

NL *Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts* (1802), in TW 2.

Natural Law, tr. T.M. Knox, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1975.

PH *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1822-31), TW 12.

The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree, Dover Publications, New York, 1956.

PR *Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), TW 7. Cited by paragraph (§) number except for the preface which is cited by page number. Remarks are indicated by 'R'. Additions (*Zusätze*) are indicated by 'A'.

Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A.W. Wood, tr. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

Also consulted: *The Philosophy of Right*, tr. T. Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952.

PS *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), TW 3.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977.

PSS *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (1817-30), vols. 1-3, ed. & tr. M.J. Petry, D. Riedel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. This is a bilingual version of the major part of E3 (see above), with lecture notes by Kehler (1825) and dictations taken by an anonmymous student (1818) appended to some paragraphs, and some notes Hegel used in lecturing (1817-25) included in the commentary. Cited first by paragraph (§) number (identical to those of E3), then by volume and page number of the English text. Remarks are indicated by 'R'. Notes by Kehren are indicated by 'K'.

RH *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte* (1822-30), ed. J. Hoffmeister, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1955.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History, tr. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

SEL *System der Sittlichkeit* (1802), in *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. G. Lasson, 2nd edition, F. Meiner Verlag, Leipzig, 1923.

System of Ethical Life, in *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. & tr. H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1979.

SL1-2 *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812-16), vols. 1-2, TW 5 and 6. Cited by volume and then page number.

Hegel's Science of Logic, tr. A.V. Miller, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969.

SSN *Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen zum subjectiven Geist*, eds. F. Nicolin & H. Schneider, *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 10, pp. 11-77, Bonn, 1975

VRP *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie* (1818-31), 4 volumes, ed. K-H. Ilting, Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart, 1974. Cited by volume and page number.

(4) Marx

CW *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975-. Cited below by volume number.

MEGA *Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin. Cited in the text by volume number and page.

MESA *Marx-Engels Studienausgabe*, 4 volumes, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1966.

MEW *Marx Engels Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1957-68. Cited below by volume number.

SW *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in Three Volumes*, Progress, Moscow, 1970.

Also consulted: *Marx: Early Writings*, ed. L. Colletti, tr. R. Livingston & G. Benton, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975.

C1 *Das Kapital 1* (1867), Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1981.

Capital volume 1, tr. B. Fowkes, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1976.

C3 *Das Kapital 3* (1861-73), in MEW 25.

Capital volume 3, tr. D. Fernbach, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981.

CCPE *Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1859), in MEW 13.

Abbreviations

A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, tr. S.W. Ryazanskaya, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970.

CGP *Kritik des Gothaer Programms* (1875), in MEW 19.

Critique of the Gotha Programme, in CW 24.

CHPL *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts* (1843) in MEW 1.

Contribution to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, in CW 3.

CHPRI *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung* (1843) in MESA 1.

Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction, in CW3.

CJM *Auszüge aus James Mills Buch 'Élémens d'économie politique'* (1844), in MEW *Erganzesband*.

Comments on James Mill, 'Élémens d'économie politique', in CW 3.

CM *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei* (with Engels) (1848), in MEW 3.

Manifesto of the Communist Party, in CW 6.

EPM *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* (1844), in MEW *Erganzesband*.

Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in CW 3.

G *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1857-58), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1953.

Grundrisse, tr. M. Nicolaus, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973.

GI *Die Deutsche Ideologie* (with Engels) (1845-46), in MEW 3.

The German Ideology, in CW 5.

HF *Die Heilige Familie* (1844), in MEW 2.

The Holy Family, in CW 4.

OJQ *Zur Judenfrage* (1843), in MEW 1.

On the Jewish Question, in CW 3.

PP *Misère de la Philosophie* (1846-47), Editions Sociales, Paris, 1977.

The Poverty of Philosophy, in CW 6.

TF *Thesen über Feuerbach* (1845), in MEW 3, pp. 5-7.

Theses on Feuerbach, in CW 5, pp. 3-5.

The 'Theses on Feuerbach' are cited by the number of the thesis only.

(5) Other writers

FW Feuerbach, L. *Feuerbach: Sämmtliche Werke*, 10 volumes, eds. W. Bolin & F. Jodl, Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart, 1903-1910. Cited below by volume number.

EC Feuerbach, L. *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1842), in FW 6.

Feuerbach, L. *The Essence of Christianity*, tr. G. Eliot, Harper & Row, New York, 1957.

PPF Feuerbach, L. *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (1843), in FW 2. Cited by paragraph (§) number.

Feuerbach, L. *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, tr. M. Vogel, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1986.

R Plato, *Republic*, 2 volumes, bilingual edition, tr. P. Shorey, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, 1937. Cited by the standard pagination given in the margins.

The Republic of Plato, tr. A. Bloom, Basic Books, Harper Collins, 2nd edition, 1991 (first edition 1968).

SR Fichte, J.G. *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (1796) in vol. 3 of *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. J.H. Fichte, Mayer & Müller, Leipzig.

Fichte, J.G. *The Science of Rights*, tr. A.E. Kroeger, Truebner, London, 1889

Introduction

In book two of the *Republic* Plato begins his construction of the city with human beings who are individually incapable of meeting their own needs:

> 'Well then,' I said, 'a city, as I believe, comes into being because each of us isn't self-sufficient but is in need [*endeēs*] of much ... [W]hen one man takes on another for one need [*chreia*] and another for another need, and, since many things are needed [*deomenoi*], many men gather together in one settlement as partners and helpers, to this common settlement we give the name city, don't we?' (R 369b-c/45-6)

Initially Plato describes a 'city of utmost necessity [*anankaiotatē*]' in which a farmer, a housebuilder, a weaver and a shoemaker provide each other with the most essential human needs — food, shelter and clothing — in an elementary division of labour (R 369d/46). But in the thought experiment one need leads to another, and accordingly more professions are needed. At a certain point in this development we reach the 'true city' or 'healthy city' (R 372e/49). Perhaps this is the city of necessity although not of utmost necessity. When needs expand beyond this point, the city becomes 'feverish'. Now instead of the 'necessities' [*ta anankaia*] human beings need every kind of luxury, and those who can produce it for them (R 373a/50). They 'let themselves go to the unlimited acquisition of money, overstepping the boundaries of the necessary [*tōn anankaiōn*]', and the result is war with neighbouring cities (R 373d-e/50).

In other words, Western political theory virtually begins with a condemnation of those needs which go beyond the 'necessary', as sources of corruption and war. However, it is war that requires professional soldiers (R 374a-d/51), and it is in order that the soldiers do not abuse the power they have over civilians that they in turn, or at least those who rule them, must be philosophers (R 375b-e/52-3). So the multiplication of needs beyond

necessity is also the means whereby Plato brings philosophy into the world. At the same time what is obviously the genuinely good city for Plato, the city ruled by philosophers which he elaborates in the rest of the book, now becomes a possibility.

If Plato's construction is interpreted as a historical narrative, it could therefore be supplemented by a further assertion: that the historical multiplication of needs has a *purpose*, though one of which each individual concerned is ignorant, namely that of forcing men to turn to philosophy, which is for Plato the most valuable human activity, and of bringing into existence the good city. Such a view of the historical role of needs provides at least one interpretation that could be put on Aristotle's statement on the origins and purpose of the city: 'while it comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the sake of the good life' (*Politics* 1252b).[1]

Implicit in these passages, then, is this suggestion: that the multiplication of needs is the historical means whereby the true good for man (or, in Aristotelian terms, man's self-realisation) comes about. However, the valuation of needs beyond necessity remained overwhelmingly negative in the Western political tradition,[2] and it was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that such an idea was taken up, in particular by the four thinkers studied in this thesis — Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx — to form, as I shall argue, a central element in their progressive philosophies of history.

These thinkers were significantly anticipated in their positive revaluation of the multiplication of human needs by Bernard Mandeville, and by those English mercantilist

[1] In Aristotle's version of the successive derivation of the classes of the city, the move from economic to 'deliberative' functions is more direct than it is in Plato's, since it is not mediated by external war (*Politics* 1290b-1291a).

[2] See Sekora, *Luxury*, for a survey.

economists who first began to advocate 'free trade' in the late seventeenth century, whose ideas Mandeville generalised and popularised. For Mandeville, the multiplication of needs was to be encouraged as a source of national wealth and strength rather than condemned as a source of impoverishment and corruption.[3] However, in the interpretations I shall propose, the four thinkers to be discussed move beyond Mandeville and his precursors in two important ways. Firstly, the continuous expansion of needs is not seen simply as a feature which characterises a successful and wealthy nation, but as characteristic of the historical process as a whole.[4] Secondly, this expansion is seen not simply as bringing economic benefits to those concerned, but as contributing to the more comprehensive goal of humanity's self-realisation.

The subject matter of this thesis is the role of ordinary human needs and their multiplication in the philosophies of history of these four figures.[5] Specifically, its argument is that in each thinker the multiplication of such needs in the course of history leads to a progressive transformation in the nature of humanity and of human motivations, a transformation which makes possible at once the realisation of the human *telos* and of the 'good society' for man, although these goals and their interrelation are conceived

[3] See Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, and among the 'free trade' economists especially Barbon, *A Discourse of Trade*. Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England*, gives the fullest account of these economists and links their views to the successful development of the first 'mass markets', based on colonial trade, during the later 17th century. Mandeville's connections with them are demonstrated by Kaye, 'Introduction', and especially by Horne, *The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville*.

[4] There are intimations of this idea in volume 2 of *The Fable of the Bees*, especially in the third dialogue, pp. 100-147, but they are no more than intimations.

[5] Here, as throughout, 'philosophy of history' is understood broadly as the attempt to integrate an account of the historical process as a whole into the solution of broader philosophical problems, rather than as the investigation of the possibility and character of historical knowledge and historical explanation. In Walsh's terms, it is intended in the 'speculative' rather than the 'critical' sense (Walsh, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, pp. 15-29).

differently by each thinker.[6] It further argues that in each case this process plays a crucial though under-recognised role in the philosophy of history of the thinker concerned, and so indirectly in his social and political thought as a whole.

The claims made here are most surprising in the case of Rousseau. Although his *Discourse on Inequality* gives a dramatic portrayal of human history as essentially characterised by the continuous expansion of needs, it also depicts that history largely as a process of degeneration into political and psychological slavery. It seems to sit squarely in the tradition of thought that associates the multiplication of needs with corruption. However I shall argue that this represents only one strand of Rousseau's historical thought, and that implicit in his views on the interrelations between needs, *amour-propre* and the development of the sense of justice is a quite different view of the effect of the historical expansion of needs. According to this view, the expansion of needs, and the development of the *amour-propre* of which it is at once cause and effect, form the necessary means whereby human beings can be made sufficiently moral to function as citizens of the society of the *Social Contract*. Citizenship in such a society constitutes at least one of Rousseau's visions of human self-realisation. The argument hinges on a new interpretation of the nature of *amour-propre* and its implications, so in chapter 1, after introducing the problem of the moralisation of man, I develop this interpretation. In chapter 2 I then trace the connections between the expansion of needs, *amour-propre*, and the sense of justice, before arguing that Rousseau must look to a transformed version of *amour-propre* to provide the motivations of the citizen, and so that the historical multiplication of needs is an implicit prerequisite to the formation of such a citizen.

[6] I take the *telos* of a thing to be 'the form, state or condition towards which an entity develops by its nature, unless its development is interrupted' (Meikle, *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*, p.179). Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a: 'That which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing.' The realisation of the human *telos* means simply humanity's self-realisation.

Introduction

In chapter 3 I argue that Kant, in his writings on the philosophy of history, draws on an interpretation of Rousseau akin to that advanced in the first two chapters, one in which the multiplication of needs enables the moralisation of man. I do this by linking Kant's historical essays with his discussions of the 'highest good', the 'final end of creation' and the 'ultimate end of nature' in the second and third *Critiques*. I argue that for Kant, although the term 'needs' does not feature in his presentation, the multiplication of needs in the course of history is the means whereby his 'culture of skill' develops, and that in turn it is this development that brings about those inner and outer conditions (the 'culture of discipline' and the international system of just civil societies) which can maximally facilitate, although they can never guarantee, the moralisation of the human race as a whole.

In chapters 4 and 5 I draw on the interpretations of Rousseau and Kant developed above in order to suggest that Hegel's systematic account of mind can be read, at least in part, as providing a 'history of ordinary human motivation': a history which accounts for the developments in those ordinary motivations that his official philosophy of history presupposes yet fails to explain. In chapter 4 I argue that the official philosophy of history stands in need of such an account, and then show how the *Philosophy of Mind* provides a starting point for it through its derivation of mastery and servitude, as the historically original social condition, from an initial contradiction in the nature of mind. In chapter 5 I go on to interpret the development of 'universal self-consciousness' in the *Philosophy of Mind*, and the 'system of needs' in the *Philosophy of Right*, as historically successive forms of ordinary motivation, which result from transmutations of the same original contradiction. I argue that these successive forms of motivation are the key to explaining the historical emergence of the modern state and thus the self-realisation of mind which forms the goal of history for Hegel. Finally, I suggest that they can be mapped onto the major stages in Hegel's official philosophy of history.

Introduction

In the last two chapters I turn to Marx's early account of needs and its relationship to his theory of history. In chapter 5 I present Marx's 1844 account of the historical development of needs as a variation on the account of the development of the 'system of needs' in Hegel. However whereas for Hegel this development eventually culminates in the modern state, for Marx it must culminate instead in communism, that is, the abolition of private property. This is because the very relationship that enables the multiplication and development of needs, that of exchange between producers who own their own product as private property, simultaneously leads them to experience their own product, their own labour and their own needs as 'external' to them. Ultimately they must find this 'externality' or 'alienation' of aspects of themselves intolerable. In chapter 6 I suggest that this model of historical development survives in Marx's later work. I begin by showing that under the standard 'functionalist' interpretation Marx's theory of history has difficulties in accommodating the notion of moral motivation in the overthrow of capitalism. I then argue that the 'phenomenological' model already sketched in the previous chapter recurs in the *German Ideology* under different terminology, and provides an alternative interpretation to the relationship between the productive powers and relations of production, which can make a place for a form of moral motivation.

In conclusion, I argue that the idea that the multiplication of human needs transforms the nature of ordinary human motivation, and so makes possible human self-realisation in the 'good society', is central to the historical thinking of all four of these thinkers, although the means of transition to that goal and its nature are conceived differently in each case. I go onto summarise some of the major interpretive claims made in this study with regard to each of the four thinkers, and then note some of its necessary limitations and the lines of thought for future work that are suggested by them.

Introduction

While an implicit presupposition of this study is that each of the four thinkers it deals with drew on his predecessors' thought on needs and history in formulating his own, in what follows I have only pointed out the most obvious connections between their views.[7] My aim has not been to demonstrate detailed direct influences, but to use the idea that the development of a certain way of thinking about the relation between needs, history and human self-realisation can be discerned in these four thinkers in order to illuminate the thought of each in its own right.

So far, I have left the term 'needs' deliberately undefined. I conclude this introduction with a brief discussion of the concept. In recent analytical work, needs have been defined by saying that A has a need for (or needs) X if and only if A's having X is a necessary condition for the fulfilment of some purpose of A's, or else for A's preservation and well-being. The two cases have been distinguished: in the former, A is said to have an 'instrumental' or 'relative' need, in the latter an 'absolute' or 'fundamental' need, for X.[8] An instrumental need is always asserted relative to some particular purpose of the agent, whereas an absolute need is asserted independently of such particular purposes. When we say that George needs a ticket to get into the match we refer to a particular purpose of George's for which possession of the ticket is a necessary condition, but when we say that George needs a home we do not refer to any such purpose. He just needs it; it is a necessary condition of his well-being. In the former case we assert an instrumental need, in the latter an absolute one. From now on I shall use needs to mean absolute needs unless

[7] Of the last three, the only one who was not familiar with all the earlier ones from an early stage in his career appears to have been Marx, with respect to Kant. On Kant's knowledge of Rousseau, see Cassirer, 'Rousseau and Kant'. On Hegel's early reading of Rousseau and Kant, see Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 24, 28, 49-50, 83-87. On Marx's early knowledge of Rousseau and Hegel, see Labica, *Marxism and the Status of Philosophy*, pp. 379-84.

[8] See Wiggins, 'Claims of need', pp. 9-10, and Thomson, *Needs*, pp. 15-16.

stated otherwise.[9] X, the 'object' of the need, may be a physical object, a service, a state or an activity, and it may be a particular or a kind.[10] Generally, though, I shall be concerned with 'economic' needs, that is, needs for those products or services of other human beings which (unlike love, say) can in principle be bought, sold or bartered.

To assert that A (absolutely) needs X, then, is to assert that A's having X is a necessary condition for A's preservation and well-being. It is not, as such, to assert either that A either lacks X or desires X.[11] One can say that a child needs love without asserting that it is unloved, and a hunger striker may need food and yet not desire it. However when a need is also an enduring feature of an individual (as in the case of people's need for human company or clothing), rather than a result of particular circumstances (as in a patient's need for a blood transfusion), then whenever the individual lacks the object of the need — when the need is unsatisfied — the result is typically a desire for that object. Furthermore the desire concerned will usually persist until the individual obtains the object. It will not be the kind of desire that disappears when it becomes evident to the agent that its object is very difficult to obtain, for example. I shall call a desire for an object that recurs whenever the agent lacks that object, and that persists until that lack is made good, a 'persisting desire'. In so far as one can speak in the case of such desires of the same desire recurring on different occasions of lack, a 'persisting desire' can be said to be a feature of the agent even at times when he does not lack its object. At such times the desire would be dispositional rather than occurrent.

[9] As a reminder of this, I shall use the formula 'A has a need for', which is normally used in ordinary speech only to attribute absolute needs, rather than 'A needs', which is used to attribute either absolute or instrumental needs.

[10] Since it sounds odd to speak of 'having' a service, state or activity, strictly speaking the definition should be expanded: 'A has a need for X, or to ϕ, if A's having or obtaining or attaining X, or A's ϕ-ing, is a necessary condition ...'.

[11] See White, *Modal Thinking*, ch. 8.

Such a desire may arise directly from a need. This is how we imagine persisting desires like those of hunger and thirst to be connected to needs. However an agent may also develop such a desire for an object as a result of knowing that he has a need for that object. In this case occurrences of the desire may anticipate any actual lack, as in the desire to ensure that one has enough food for tomorrow. Furthermore, an agent may develop such a desire as a result of believing that he has a need for the object of the desire (as a result of having a 'perceived need' for it), even though he does not have an actual need for it.[12]

In fact it is possible in principle for an individual to develop such a desire in the absence of either an actual need or a perceived need for it. Certainly one could have such a desire in the absence of a perceived need, for to experience occurrences of such a desire is not as such to make a judgment about the necessary conditions of one's preservation or well-being. However if for any reason someone develops such a persisting desire in the absence of either an actual or a perceived need for its object, the desire can nevertheless be said to *give rise* to an actual need. For to suffer from the failure to satisfy such a desire is itself incompatible with well-being.[13] I shall call such needs 'desire-based' needs, and all other (absolute) needs 'desire-independent'. In such a case the agent will have a need whose object goes beyond not only what is necessary for his mere survival (Plato's 'utmost necessity'), but also beyond what is necessary for his well-being in so far as that well-being is defined independently of the satisfaction of his desires (Plato's 'necessity', perhaps).

[12] The agent would also of course sometimes have to believe that he lacked the object or that he was soon likely to lack it.

[13] Of course the desire will also give rise, trivially, to an instrumental need for the object of the desire, for the agent's obtaining the object of the desire is then a necessary condition of his satisfying the desire, and this is a purpose he has. But this is true of all desires. Here I am concerned with those desires which can give rise to absolute needs.

Such a persisting desire will also typically give rise to a 'perceived need', whether because the agent realises that the fact of having such a desire by itself makes the satisfaction of that desire a necessary condition of his well-being (in which case he would have a perceived desire-based need), or else because he assumes that he could not be experiencing such a desire unless it was the expression of a need which antedated the desire (in which case he would have a perceived desire-independent need).

Hence persisting desires are closely tied up with needs, and we could expect that as a general rule someone who has a persisting desire for an object will also have both an actual and a perceived need for that object. However the persisting desire is distinct from both the actual and the perceived need.

It will become apparent in what follows that in their social and historical thought Rousseau, Hegel and Marx often use the terms *besoin* and *Bedürfnis*, the terms which I consistently translate as 'need', to refer not only to individuals' actual and perceived needs, whether desire-independent or desire-based, but also to those persisting desires (or their occurrences) which typically express the former and give rise to the latter. Hence in English translations of their works *besoin* and *Bedürfnis* often appear as 'want' as well as 'need'.[14] When the concept of need is used in discussions of distributive justice or of human welfare, the usual contexts in which it is found today, it is clearly important to maintain a clear distinction between need and desire.[15] However when it is used in discussions of the historical transformations of human motivation, the distinction is less important. In such contexts, the developments of persisting desires, actual needs and

[14] There is one other German word which is sometimes translated as 'need': *Not*. It has more urgent and imperative connotations than *Bedürfnis*. Where it appears in quotations from Hegel and Marx I have translated it as 'necessity', or 'must'.

[15] For a contemporary example of such a discussion, see Doyal and Gough, *A Theory of Human Needs*.

perceived needs typically go hand in hand. The use of 'needs' in a broad sense to include all three phenomena is accordingly defensible. To accommodate this broad usage in the thinkers I discuss, I shall use the term 'phenomenological needs' as an equivalent for 'persisting desires', distinguishing these from 'actual needs' (i.e. needs in the ordinary, modal sense) and 'perceived needs'. Where the context makes it clear whether 'actual needs', 'perceived needs' or 'phenomenological needs' are in question, I shall simply speak of 'needs'.

1 Rousseau on *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*

Rousseau's account of the historical development of human needs in his *Discourse on Inequality* (1755) has generally been seen as an almost entirely negative one. For the development of needs and the associated transformation in human motivations takes man out of the happy innocence of the state of nature and reduces him to a state of servitude both to his own desires and to those with whom he becomes locked in economic interdependence, a servitude which culminates in the political despotism described in the last few pages of the *Discourse*. The implication appears to be that the best state for man was, if not the state of nature, at most that state of 'nascent society' which preceded the appearance of property and a division of labour (DOI 170-71/115). However the *Discourse* also contains another story, intertwined with this one: that of man's elevation, thanks to his 'perfectibility', from the imbecility of the state of nature to the status of an intelligent and moral being. One response to the presence of such different themes in the *Discourse* is to suggest that Rousseau was simply a contradictory thinker.[1] Another, the one I shall pursue in this chapter and the next, is to attempt to understand Rousseau as presenting a single coherent view of historical development, but one in which the same developments which are the historical causes of all human unhappiness are also the necessary conditions for man's final realisation as a moral being. Mankind has to 'extract from the evil itself the remedy which is to cure it' (GM 1.2 288/161), and in fact it is only through such a process than mankind's moral potential and his true good can be realised.

[1] Gay, 'Introduction', pp. 3-21, surveys the development of such an assessment of Rousseau's thought as a whole.

Rousseau on amour de soi and amour-propre

In this chapter I begin not with the *Discourse on Inequality* but with the *Social Contract* (1762). I raise the question of how men are to be made fit for the society that Rousseau describes there. I then prepare the ground for an answer by a reconstruction of Rousseau's philosophical anthropology, in which I analyse his *amour-propre* as a particular form that human *amour de soi* (self-love) can take once an individual sees another as assessing him as a possible object of love. In the next chapter I go on to show firstly that this *amour-propre* is developed in the course of history only through the multiplication of human needs, and secondly that it forms an essential component of the motivations of that man who can be converted into a citizen of Rousseau's republic.

1. The problem of moralisation

I begin with Rousseau's statement in the *Social Contract* that the 'passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a remarkable change in man', transforming him from a 'stupid and limited animal' into 'an intelligent being and a man'. Some of the changes involved in the transformation Rousseau describes are quantitative: the development of man's faculties and the enlargement of his mind. Those I shall focus on, however, are qualitative. They can be summarised by saying that as a result of the passage to the civil state for the first time man's actions become *moral*. The transition:

> substitutes justice for instinct in his conduct, and gives his actions the morality they previously lacked. Only then, when the voice of duty succeeds physical impulse, and right succeeds appetite, does man, who hitherto had considered only himself [*n'avoit regardé que lui-même*], find himself forced to act on other principles and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. (SC 1.8 364/64)

It is not entirely clear whether by the 'civil state' (*l'état civil*) here Rousseau means specifically the condition of being a member of the legitimate civil society described in the

Social Contract, or whether he means that of belonging to any political society governed by general laws under a contract, including the historical civil societies initiated by the deceitful contract between the rich and the poor in the *Discourse on Inequality*.[2] However the fact that two paragraphs later Rousseau adds that in the civil state one is in 'obedience to the law one prescribes to oneself' strongly suggests that it is a legitimate civil society he has in mind, and this is the interpretation I shall assume.

It is also not clear what the starting point is of the transition that Rousseau is describing. His references to a 'stupid and limited animal' suggest that it is the original state of nature. However for Rousseau a long historical process of socialisation must take place before men in the original state of nature can be in a position to form a legitimate civil society, if only because to form such a society they must have developed language, reason and foresight. So the question arises of whether the changes brought about by the transition from the state of nature to the civil state result from this lengthy prior process, or from the subsequent process of inauguration of the legitimate civil society, or from both. No doubt the *quantitative* changes are to be understood as resulting partly from each, but I shall assume that he intends the *qualitative* change of 'moralisation' to be taken as resulting mainly from the inauguration of the legitimate civil society.

If this is the case then Rousseau comes at least close to claiming that the process of moralisation is not just mainly but *entirely* the result of the inauguration of the legitimate civil society, so that he could as well have said that it is the passage from the state of society immediately preceding the legitimate civil state to that state itself that moralises man. This prior state of society is described in book 1 chapter 2 of the *Geneva Manuscript*, the first draft of the Social Contract. It is a 'general society' in which 'our'

[2] In the strict sense of 'laws' of the *Social Contract* such societies would not count as having laws, but the usage of the *Discourse on Inequality* is looser. See SC 3.12 425/136, 3.15 429-30/141; DOI 177-8/121-2.

needs have become so great that we have become both dependent on each other and hostile to each other: in which 'the same causes which make us wicked also make us slaves, and subject us in depraving us' (GM 1.2 282/155). It is the men of this society who are to be moralised by entering a legitimate civil society (GM 1.2 288-9/162). As we shall see below, this society is recognisably the contemporary society described at the end of the *Discourse on Inequality*, although with the significant absence of any reference to a political order. That Rousseau continued, at the time that he wrote the final draft of the *Social Contract*, to see modern civilised society and its inhabitants as the starting point from which to inaugurate the legitimate civil society, is at least suggested by the reference to 'taking men as they are' with which the final draft begins (SC 1.0 351/49).

For present purposes, then, I shall put aside Rousseau's statement elsewhere in the *Social Contract* that a legitimate civil society can only be inaugurated in the 'youth' of a people (SC 2.8 385/88-9), and assume Rousseau to be claiming that the men who will be moralised by coming to form a legitimate civil society are simply the inhabitants of the modern societies of his time. The obvious question is then: how can such men be moralised by forming a legitimate civil society?

Let us assume that 'modern men' are motivated by nothing but their own self-interest, where this is understood to mean that they always act in the way that they think will maximise their excess of pleasure over pain in the long run. This is what Rousseau implies by his statement that the principle of man's actions before his entry into civil society was that he 'considered only himself', even if Rousseau's references to 'instinct', 'impulse', 'appetite' and 'inclination' all suggest a less consciously self-interested form of action.[3] Then it is hard to see how the entry of any one such man into an already-

[3] See the distinction between self-love and conscious self-interest drawn on pages 27-28 below.

functioning legitimate civil society, or the formation of any number of them into such a society by their own collective decision, could lead to the moralisation that Rousseau describes.

To take up the possibilities briefly, if it is said that the laws of such a society embody morality and men are forced to obey these laws by the sanctions attached to them, then the response will be that this cannot constitute their moralisation in any serious sense. To adopt Kant's formulation, they may be forced to act *in conformity* with moral requirements, but this will not stop them from continuing to act *from* purely self-interested motives and 'moralisation' surely requires some transformation in the nature of one's motives.[4] If on the other hand it is said that these laws, as well as embodying morality, are their own legislative choice, and that knowledge of this fact will lead them to obey the laws, then the response is that there is no reason why they should be so led. For the circumstances of legislation are different from the circumstances of obedience and disobedience, and prudential rationality can quite well recommend voting for a law and then going on to disobey it.

In fact, this last point raises a further difficulty rather than resolving the initial one of how a legitimate civil society is to moralise men. For Rousseau assumes that in such a society citizens will not simply vote for that law, out of several alternatives, which they think will benefit them personally more than any other. Rather, he stipulates that when they vote they are not to be asked what they want, but what they think will embody the general will, which is always equitable (SC 4.2 440-41/153-4).[5] It is only thanks to this that their decisions can be equitable, for if everyone voted on the basis of personal self-interest then a majority would vote for a law which would have the effect of benefiting themselves at

[4] See GMM 390/55-6, 397/63.

[5] I assume that by 'equitable' is meant something like 'benefiting all impartially'.

the expense of a minority.[6] In fact to guarantee that equitable laws will be passed it would seem that everyone (or at least a majority) must be motivated by an impartial concern for the welfare of their fellow members in *general*, not just by a partial altruism. For an altruism that extends only to members of one subgroup in society will lead the individual to vote for laws that benefit that subgroup at the expense of the rest, rather than for genuinely impartial laws.[7] Yet even partial altruism is beyond purely self-interested individuals. By definition, they cannot be expected to vote in any other way than so as to maximise their own self-interest, regardless of what question is put to them. It therefore seems that, unless we can show how self-interested men will be moralised by their entry into a legitimate civil society, we cannot even show how such men will vote for what the general will requires, and so how even the *existence* of a legitimate civil society formed from such men can be sustained.

The suggestion I shall make here is that the question of how modern man can be moralised by entry into a legitimate civil society, and in turn that of how such a society can be sustained, can be answered by ceasing to think of 'modern man' as purely motivated by self-interest and by appealing to other sources of motivation in him, sources which are in themselves not moral but which enable him to *become* moral as a result of his entry into a legitimate civil society. It is usually assumed that Rousseau makes pity the source of moral motivations. However I shall argue that pity alone cannot make people moral, but must be supplemented by another source of motivation. This, paradoxically is Rousseau's '*amour-propre*', that competitive version of self-love which for Rousseau is

[6] Rousseau in effect acknowledges, by his stipulation, that the mere fact that the laws between which citizens vote must be general in form cannot guarantee an equitable result. This is despite a suggestion that it can guarantee such a result which he makes at SC 2.4 373/75.

[7] An exception, admittedly, would be a subgroup that cannot be distinguished by the shared possession of any characteristics and so cannot be singled out for beneficial treatment by the clauses of a general law.

the source of all human vices. It is only *amour-propre* that, in conjunction with the entry into legitimate civil society, can convert pity into moral motivation and so create citizens and make the society of the *Social Contract* sustainable.

2. The varieties of *amour de soi*

To show this, it will be necessary to show how Rousseau's notion of *amour-propre* is derived from his more general notion of *amour de soi* or *amour de soi-même* (self-love). For Rousseau, *amour de soi* is the source of all human motivation. As he puts it in *Emile* (1762):

> The source of our passions, the origin and principle of all the others, the only one born with man and which never leaves him so long as he lives — is *amour de soi* — a primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all the others are in a sense only modifications. (E4 491/212-3)

Sometimes, as in the passage to be discussed below (page 28), Rousseau calls *amour de soi* simply the desire to exist, but it is best characterised as a 'motivating force' which is a source of desires, rather than as a desire itself. In man in the state of nature the desires to which it gives rise are simply desires for the objects of his (actual) needs, for what he requires to preserve his existence and his well-being. I shall assume that his well-being is equivalent to his physical strength. He himself, being incapable of foresight and of a sense of identity over time, cannot conceive the preservation of his existence and strength into the future any more than he can conceive its opposite, his own future weakness or death (DOI 143/89, 144/90, 166-7/111). Thus he can hardly conceive that something is a necessary condition of that preservation and strength, or have a 'perceived need' for it. Yet his actual needs are expressed in desires that have the same content as those needs. However, once a human being develops the necessary foresight and sense of identity over

time, *amour de soi* can take the form of self-interest as we have defined it above (page 24).[8]

The desires of man in the state of nature are presumably also closely connected with his feelings of pain and pleasure. He must desire what brings pleasure and what relieves pain. This can be reconciled with the fact that his desires are for those things which will as a matter of fact preserve his existence and health if we assume that he experiences what tends to preserve his existence and health as pleasurable and what tends to weaken or destroy him as painful. On this assumption the very organisation of his, and our, sentience, our sensations of pleasure and pain, is expressive of an underlying urge to self-preservation. We may desire what is pleasurable, but we only find it pleasurable because, although we may not realise this, it tends to preserve us, or at least because the vast majority of things of its kind tend to preserve us.

In one unpublished fragment, however, Rousseau goes further than this, and says that man experiences what tends to preserve *and extend* his existence as pleasurable and what tends to destroy *or contract* it as painful. He thereby introduces an expansive element into *amour de soi*:

> The natural state of a passible and mortal being such as man is to delight [*se complaire*] in the sense [*sentiment*] of his own existence, to feel with pleasure what tends to preserve it and with pain what tends to destroy it; it is in this natural and simple state that one has to look for the source of our passions ... [O]ur passions are born from a present sentiment [*sentiment*], independent of our enlightenment; its development occurs with the help of reason, but the desire exists before it. What is this principle then? I have said it already: the desire to exist. Everything which seems to extend or affirm our existence gratifies us, everything which seems to destroy or shrink [*resserrer*] it afflicts us. This is the primitive source of all our passions. (OCE 356, quoted at OC1 1801)

[8] See the contrast between 'primordial *amour de soi*' and 'reflective *amour de soi*' drawn by Dent, *Rousseau*, pp. 91-8.

In a passage in *Emile* Rousseau appears to be describing the expansive aspect of *amour de soi* when he says that there is an 'active principle' in the heart of the child which:

> is superabundant and extends outward; he senses within himself, so to speak, enough life to animate everything surrounding him. That he do or undo is a matter of no importance to him; it suffices that he change the condition of things, and every change is an action. (E1 289/67)

This is why 'A child wants to upset everything he sees; he smashes and breaks everything he can reach' (ibid.). It is not an urge to destruction as such that motivates him, but an urge to expand his 'life' into his environment. Rousseau adds that later on in life this active principle subsides and 'nature asks no more of us than the movement necessary to our preservation' (E1 289/68), confirming that the child's effort to animate his world is an expression of *amour de soi*.

Despite the above example, in general Rousseau only speaks of the expansive aspect of *amour de soi* in contexts in which an individual human being finds himself in interaction with *other* individuals. Such an individual becomes conscious that others are sentient in the same way that he is, and this gives rise to a second kind of sentience, one which is 'predicated' on the sentience of the other. It is in this intersubjective kind of sentience that the expansive aspects of *amour de soi* are chiefly expressed. In a passage from the *Dialogues* (1772-76) Rousseau describes this second kind of sentience as 'moral':

> Sentience [*sensibilité*] is the principle of all action. A being, which, although animate, sensed nothing would not act at all: for what would be the motive of acting for it? God himself is sentient since he acts. All men are thus sentient, and perhaps to the same degree, but not in the same manner. There is a physical and organic sentience which, purely passive, appears to have for its end only the preservation of our body and that of our species by the directions of pleasure and pain. There is another sentience which I call active and moral which is nothing other than the faculty of attaching our affections to beings who are outside us [*qui nous sont étrangers*]. (RJJ 805/112)

The first kind of sentience, sensitivity to physical pleasure and pain, is the expression of the original form of *amour de soi*, the form that it takes in an isolated individual who has no relations with others. The second kind of sentience, as I shall interpret it, is the expression of a second form that *amour de soi* takes when an individual finds himself among others who, he realises, also have a sense of their own existence (and realise that he does). Rousseau calls it 'moral' in the broad sense in which he sometimes uses the word, in contrast with 'physical', to mean 'characteristic of the relations between sentient and willing beings who conceive each other as such'. I shall use the word 'intersubjective' as a shorthand for this phrase.[9] The explanation of the separation of 'moral' sentience from physical sentience is that it is a sentience which is constitutively related to the sentience of *another*. It is the 'faculty of attaching our affections to beings who are outside us'. Thus just as *amour de soi*, as I have described it so far, expresses itself in physical sentience, so we should be able to speak of an intersubjective form of *amour de soi* which expresses itself in the intersubjective kind of sentience: an 'intersubjective' *amour de soi* in contrast to ordinary 'physical' *amour de soi*. Now if physical pleasure and pain accompany the preservation or weakening of oneself conceived as a physical being, then by analogy this 'moral' or intersubjective pleasure and pain ought to accompany what preserves (or expands) and weakens (or contracts) oneself conceived as a 'moral' rather than as a physical being.

Since the only hold we have on this 'moral' self so far is the pleasure and pain which define its preservation and weakening respectively, and since this pleasure and pain are in turn constitutively related to one individual's awareness of the sentience of another, it seems that the sense of oneself as such a self can only appear when one finds oneself

[9] On Rousseau's broad sense of 'moral' see Noble, 'Freedom and sentiment', pp. 270-71 and Neuhouser, 'Freedom, dependence and the general will', p. 366n. Noble uses the term 'intersubjective' to explicate the broad sense of 'moral'.

among others whom one conceives as sentient beings. This moral self must be, as it were, intersubjectively constituted.

In the continuation of the passage Rousseau describes the 'action' of this intersubjective sentience, thus of the intersubjective *amour de soi* of which I have suggested that it be seen as the expression, as taking two different forms, depending on how the agent conceives his relations with others around him. In each case this action tends to expand the self, but in one case this is by a kind of identification with those others and in the other by an attempt to make them 'smaller'. One form of expansion is cooperation, the other is competition. The passage continues:

> This latter [i.e. moral sentience — AC], of which the study of pairs of nerves gives no knowledge, seems to offer a fairly clear analogy in souls to the attractive faculty of bodies. Its force is in proportion to the relations which we sense between ourselves and the other beings, and, according to the nature of these relations it acts sometimes positively by attraction, sometimes negatively by repulsion, like a magnet by its poles. The positive or attracting action is the simple work of nature which tries to extend and reinforce the sense of our own being; the negative or repelling, which compresses and contracts [*retrecit*] that of another, is a combination produced by reflection. From the first arise all the loving and gentle passions, from the second all the hateful and cruel passions. (ibid.)

What follows confirms the supposition made earlier, that the intersubjective kind of sentience should be the expression of an intersubjective kind of *amour de soi*. For Rousseau goes on to describe each of the two forms of intersubjective sentience as the expression of a kind of self-love, although confusingly he refers to one of these simply as '*amour de soi*'. The other is *amour-propre*:

> Recall, sir, the distinctions made in our first conversations between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*, the manner in which one and the other act on the human heart. The positive sentience derives immediately from *amour de soi*. It is very natural that he who loves himself [*s'aime*] should seek to extend his being and his enjoyments, and to appropriate by attraction what he senses must be a good for

him: this is a pure affair of sense [*sentiment*] into which reflection does not enter at all. But as soon as this absolute love degenerates into comparative *amour-propre* [*amour-propre et comparitif*] it produces the negative sentience; for as soon as one gains the habit of measuring oneself against others and of transporting oneself outside oneself to assign oneself the first and best place, it is impossible not to take an aversion to everyone [*tout*] who surpasses us, everyone who lowers us, everyone who compresses us, everyone who being something prevents us from being everything. *Amour-propre* is always irritated or discontented, because it would like each to prefer us to everyone and to himself, which is impossible … (RJJ 805-6/112-3)

We have already identified *amour de soi* as the principle of all human activity, and divided it into a physical form and an intersubjective form, corresponding to the two kinds of sentience. When Rousseau in turn subdivides the intersubjective kind of sentience into two forms it is natural to expect a further subdivision of *amour de soi*, and this in fact is what he gives us. The confusion arises because one of these subdivisions is again named '*amour de soi*'. To distinguish *amour de soi* in this narrower sense from *amour de soi* in general and intersubjective *amour de soi* as a whole, I shall call it 'inclusive *amour de soi*'. We therefore have the following divisions of *amour de soi*:



Rousseau's contrast between *amour-propre* and *amour de soi*, then, must be understood as a contrast between *amour-propre* and one *variety* of *amour de soi*. This in fact is the only

way of reconciling it with Rousseau's explicit statement that *amour de soi* is 'the source of all our passions'.[10]

3. Inclusive *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*

I begin by discussing inclusive *amour de soi*. This is love of the self which is also transposed onto others, thus love of the self extending to include others. Its impulse is to identify with others, and this is manifested in the individual being pleased by the pleasure of another and pained by the pain of another, and in desires to give some 'service' to the other, by which I mean to help the other in some way to achieve his desires, to increase his pleasures or relieve his pain. Basic to it is the sense that the other is another self or 'I', just like myself, a 'fellow I'. This identification with the other, and the desires and actions that result from it, constitute a kind of expansion of the 'I' to include others: an expansion of the 'I' into a 'we'.

Much of what Rousseau says here about this inclusive *amour de soi*, and the positive version of intersubjective 'moral' sentience which expresses it, matches what he elsewhere describes under the head of 'pity'. Thus in *Emile* Rousseau calls pity 'the expansive force of [a young man's] heart', and speaks of giving it objects 'which swell the heart, which extend it to other beings, which make it find itself everywhere outside itself' (E4 506/223). He says that pity develops when Emile 'begins to feel himself in his fellows', that it excites 'all the attractive and gentle passions' (E4 506/223), and that we pity an

[10] In insisting that *amour-propre* must be understood as a variety of *amour de soi* I follow Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau*. See pp. 16, 21, 27. However, Charvet fails to make the distinction between broader and narrower senses of *amour de soi* which such a view requires.

animal by 'transporting ourselves outside of ourselves and identifying with the suffering animal, by leaving, as it were, our own being to take on its being' (E4 505/223).[11]

However, inclusive *amour de soi* also appears to take another form in Rousseau, that of *love*. In fact love (*amour*) is the most natural term for *amour de soi* when it is extended to others. The difference between love and pity, however, is that love is a sentiment (and a corresponding disposition to action) based on a comparison between various other persons, the conclusion of which is that one of them in particular has certain characteristics to a higher degree than the others. Following Rousseau's analogy with the magnet, I shall call such characteristics 'attractive' to the individual who loves. Assuming that love is a form of inclusive *amour de soi*, they will be characteristics that attract his inclusive *amour de soi*, so that it is then concentrated on one person rather than on others. Love then presupposes a *preference* for one person over others, by which is meant a judgment that one person possesses certain characteristics that make him a more appropriate object of love than those others.[12]

Rousseau ties love to preference in the *Discourse on Inequality* and *Emile*. Love in the full sense is fixed 'exclusively on one single object' or at least has 'a greater degree of energy for this preferred object'. It 'is founded on certain notions of beauty or excellence [*mérite*] that a savage is not in a position to have, and on comparisons he is incapable of

[11] I discuss pity further in the next chapter. It should be noted that in the earlier *Discourse on Inequality* pity is treated as a fundamental motive independent of and alongside *amour de soi*. Correspondingly *amour de soi* is not conceived as having an expansive quality. In *Emile* and the *Dialogues* Rousseau derives pity, like every other passion, from *amour de soi* and accordingly its expansive quality is stressed.

[12] I follow what I take to be Rousseau's own usage in using 'prefer' and 'preference' to refer to an inner act of judgment, and not to the resulting overt actions. In modern, behaviouristic definitions of preference this distinction tends to be elided.

making'.[13] Thus the savage is incapable of love, and 'for him any woman is good' (DOI 158/102-3, cf. DOI 169/114). Hence: 'One loves only after having judged; one prefers only after having compared' (E4 493/214). Rousseau makes these points in order to distinguish between love and the indiscriminate sexual instinct of the savage (or, in a terminology that Rousseau also uses, between love in the full sense, which he says is both physical and 'moral', and its merely physical aspect). However the same points as these apply to the distinction between love and pity. Love, I suggest, is to be understood not only as an individuated version of sexual desire, but also as an individuated version of pity.[14]

Thus the person motivated by the sentiment of love will prefer one person to another and will in consequence transpose his *amour de soi* to that person rather than the other and provide that person rather than the other with his services. If inclusive *amour de soi* in general is based on a sense of the other as a fellow 'I', and if, as I have suggested, love is to be understood as a species of intersubjective *amour de soi*, then love too must be based on the sense of the other as a fellow 'I'. Hence the lover who finds certain characteristics attractive must conceive those characteristics as indications that the person who possesses them is in some way more genuinely a 'fellow I' than the person who does not possess them.

[13] Here and below I translate *mérite* as 'excellence' rather than 'merit' because the context does not suggest that Rousseau has any normative notion of worth or desert in mind.

[14] I leave aside here the difficult question of how these two aspects of love are to be related to each other. For an indication of Rousseau's awareness of the problem, see the unpublished passage cited in Bloom's translation of *Emile*, pp. 488-9. It should be noted that the conception of pity and love as expressions of the same fundamental urge, inclusive *amour de soi*, which I attribute to Rousseau here, can date only from *Emile*. For, as pointed out above (footnote 11, page 34), in the *Discourse on Inequality* pity is treated as an independent source of motivation.

To summarise, the expansiveness of *amour de soi* expresses itself chiefly in what I have called intersubjective *amour de soi*, which underlies our intersubjective or 'moral' sentience, our faculty for experiencing pleasure and pain through an awareness of the feelings of others. The natural, positive version of this intersubjective *amour de soi* is inclusive *amour de soi*, which is expressed in our experience of pleasure in other's pleasure and pain at another's pain. This in turn takes the forms of pity and love.

However, intersubjective *amour de soi* and 'moral' sentience exist in another, negative version. This is *amour-propre* and the sentience based on it, which Rousseau introduces in the last few lines of the passage from the *Dialogues* (page 32). In the first part of that passage, Rousseau said that whether our 'moral' sentience took a positive or negative shape depended on 'the nature of the relations' which we sense between ourselves and other beings, and also that the negative version of this sentience is 'a combination produced by reflection' (page 31). Putting these together, we can suggest the following account of *amour-propre* and its genesis. The natural form of intersubjective *amour de soi* is inclusive *amour de soi*. It arises out of conceiving (however inchoately) the relation between oneself and the other as: 'this is a fellow 'I'' (in the case of pity), or: 'this is more genuinely a fellow 'I' than others are' (in the case of love). However an alternative form of intersubjective *amour de soi* can arise when one reverses the perspective and instead conceives the relation as: 'this is a being which may (or may not) conceive *me* as an 'I'', that is, 'which may or may not transpose its *amour de soi* onto me'.

In fact, this alternative form arises more specifically when the agent conceives the relation as a triadic one between himself and two other beings: 'this is a being which may conceive me as an 'I' but which may also conceive this other being as an 'I''. Let us say that the first being is then thought of as a 'conceiver', i.e. as a being who has a

conception of the agent or forms a judgment about the agent's nature, and the second as an 'alternative'.

If one conceives one's relations with others in this way, then one may take the further step and adopt the perspective of the 'conceiver' as one's own. In this case one will conceive oneself as whatever one is conceived as in his attitudes, as expressed in his actions. To the extent that he conceives one as an 'I', and so transposes his *amour de soi* onto oneself, and provides one with services, one will experience *oneself* as more genuinely an 'I', hence as 'expanded'. To the extent that the other does not, one experiences oneself as diminished.[15] If the other fails to do so altogether one experiences oneself as not existing at all as an 'I'. In this perspective one exists as an 'I' only to the extent that the other conceives one, and so treats one, as such. I shall say that to adopt the perspective of another on oneself in this way is to think of the other as a 'judge'. It is, so to speak, to accept the other's judgement as authoritative with respect to the question of what one is. I shall postpone the question of what could lead an individual to thus adopt the perspective of someone they think of as a 'conceiver' until the next chapter (pages 52 ff.). Here instead I shall concentrate on drawing out the consequences of such an adoption. The most basic of these is that one's *amour de soi* will take the form of a desire that those whom one conceives as judges should treat one as more rather than less of an 'I'. For now to feel oneself treated as an 'I' is to feel oneself preserved and expanded, whereas not to be so treated is to feel oneself made smaller and potentially destroyed. *Amour de soi* that takes this form is *amour-propre*.[16]

[15] The silent assumption here is that one will experience this 'genuineness' or absence of it in terms of the size of one's 'I'.

[16] I owe the insight that *amour-propre* is essentially a concern for the preservation of the self as it is conceived by others to Charvet, *The Social Problem*. See especially pp. 15-21. I indicate my differences from Charvet in chapter 2 below.

Similarly, one's 'moral' sentience will now take the form of experiencing pleasure to the extent that one senses that others are treating one as an 'I', and pain to the extent that one senses that they are not doing so. Of course, when another transposes his *amour de soi* onto oneself and so provides one with services, one will also experience greater physical pleasure or reduced physical pain. So when one is helped in this way one will feel pleasure in two distinct ways: a physical pleasure that derives from the physical effect of the other's actions, and an 'intersubjective' pleasure that derives from experiencing oneself as being treated as an 'I' in those actions. This second pleasure depends on the 'meaning' of the actions rather than on their physical effects.

4. The characteristics of *amour-propre*

I now show how some of the major characteristics which Rousseau associates with *amour-propre* can be derived from this basic conception of it as a particular form of *amour-de soi*: a form in which the 'self' that is to be preserved and, if possible, expanded, is the self as it is conceived by certain others, and in which the expansion of that self consists in the individual in question being conceived by those others as more genuinely an 'I' than those he sees as alternative objects of such a conception.

(1) To begin with, *amour-propre* as I have understood it will be an inherently *competitive* sentiment. The conception of 'alternatives', other possible objects of a 'judge's' inclusive *amour de soi*, as competitors is built into the idea that this inclusive *amour de soi* can only be expressed in services, for the judge will only have a limited amount of services that he can provide to others. In addition, if the judge's inclusive *amour de soi* takes the form of love then it will be channelled in accord with his preferences anyway, for that is the nature of love. This means that if I want to be the object of another's *amour de soi*, and see a third party as an alternative object of it, then I must see this third party and myself

as in direct competition for the very sense of our existences as 'I's. The same thing which will expand his 'I' will contract mine. Accordingly, from now on I shall describe the individual that an agent sees as an alternative object of the inclusive *amour de soi* of someone who is for that agent a 'judge', as a 'competitor'.[17]

Amour-propre is thus competitive in the general sense that it sets the interests of each in counterposition to those of his 'competitors', and that they experience each other as obstacles to attaining their own good. Furthermore, it is also competitive in the more specific sense in which we talk of competing for a prize, a sense which presupposes someone who stands outside the competition and decides who counts as the winner. For this is in effect what the 'judge' does. Here, though, the 'prize' for which agent and competitor compete is the very sense of their own existence as an 'I'.

(2) Secondly, and as a result of its peculiar competitiveness, *amour-propre* gives rise to *self-comparison* with others, and to a pleasure in finding oneself in some way superior to them. To see how, let us assume that I confront someone whom I conceive as a judge, J, and someone whom I conceive as a competitor with respect to that judge, C. Assume further that I cannot force J to provide me with those services which I will be able to understand as expressive of J conceiving me as an 'I'. Accordingly to be in the grip of *amour-propre* is to find myself quite dependent on the will of J for the treatment as an 'I' that I crave. However if I realise that J will tend to give these services to those who have in greatest degree the characteristics he finds attractive, all the energies of my *amour-propre* will be diverted into a preoccupation with these characteristics. I will try to see which of these characteristics C has to a higher degree than I do. If I find no such

[17] Strictly speaking, another is never a competitor *tout court* but always a competitor with respect to some particular individual that both he and the agent conceive as a 'judge' for whose inclusive *amour de soi* both are in competition. In what follows I shall assume that this point is taken for granted.

characteristics I will feel reassured that J will probably 'favour' me over C, that is, will give his services to me rather than to C.[18] If I do find such characteristics, though, I will become anxious and will try to develop those characteristics in myself.

We can summarise the connection between *amour-propre* and self-comparison with others by saying that *amour-propre* begins simply as the desire that the agent, rather than a competitor, should be the recipient of another's services, for it is in, and only in, being so favoured that the agent experiences himself as being conceived as an 'I'. It then becomes the desire to have or acquire those characteristics which guarantee that the agent will be preferred to his competitors. It begins as the desire to be preferred and becomes the desire to be preferable. The transition is encapsulated in Rousseau's description of the first emergence of Emile's *amour-propre* at his adolescence, a description that explicitly grounds *amour-propre* in a triadic relationship between agent, lover and competitors:

> One wants to obtain the preference that one grants. Love must be reciprocal. To be loved, one has to make oneself lovable. To be preferred, one has to make oneself more lovable than every other, at least in the eyes of the beloved object. This is the source of the first looks at one's fellows; this is the source of the first comparisons with them; this is the source of emulation, rivalries, and jealousy. (E4 494/214)[19]

Here, Rousseau assumes that an individual will conceive the object of his love as a judge on the grounds that 'one wants to obtain the preference one grants'. But this is less

[18] Just as I use 'prefer' to indicate exclusively an inner act of judging one person more attractive than another (page 34, footnote 12), so I use 'favour' to indicate exclusively an overt act of providing one person with services rather than another.

[19] Rousseau makes it clear that he is talking about the origins of *amour-propre* in the next paragraph: 'Extend these ideas, and you will see where our *amour-propre* gets the form we believe natural to it' (E4 494/215).

important than the point that once the other *is* conceived as a judge a desire to be preferable to one's competitors follows.

The same derivation of the desire to be preferable from love is implicit in the parallel passage in the *Discourse on Inequality*, where Rousseau describes the first appearance of love in the full sense (as opposed to the 'physical love' of savages). Speaking of young men and women in the first settlements, he says:

> They become accustomed to consider different objects and to make comparisons; they acquire imperceptibly the ideas of excellence [mérite] and beauty which produce the sentiments of preference. By dint of seeing each other, they can no longer do without seeing each other again. A tender and sweet sentiment insinuates itself into the soul, and at the least opposition becomes an impetuous fury: jealousy awakens with love; discord triumphs, and the sweetest of passions receives sacrifices of human blood. (DOI 169/114)[20]

Here, the 'tender and sweet sentiment' is simply the sense that one is preferred to others, and thus that one is preferable to them.

It should be noted that there is a slide here in the thinking of the individual of *amour-propre*, as I have understood it. The reason I want J's services is because I simply assume that his provision of them expresses the fact that J conceives me as a fellow 'I'. Yet I also notice that J gives his services to those who are, say, good-looking. So I try to become good-looking. But I might instead wonder whether J's services to another individual really are based on his conception of that other as an 'I', i.e. whether they really are an expression of inclusive *amour de soi*, or whether instead they are derived from some other aspect of his *amour de soi* altogether. The uncritical assumption that someone who gives one his services is motivated by inclusive *amour de soi* seems to be characteristic of *amour-propre*.

[20] I discuss this passage more fully in the next chapter (pages 58-59 below).

(3) The peculiar competitiveness inherent in *amour-propre* in turn explains how it can give rise to a third characteristic: *hatred* of others and a pleasure in their evil, (that is, their being badly off), rather than in their good. Returning to the example above, if J shows signs of giving his services to C instead of to me, and if I find that I can do nothing to further acquire the characteristics attractive to J, my aversion to C will increase. I will experience him as a threat to my very existence as an 'I'. I will be motivated to deprive C of those attractive characteristics which he has in greater degree than me, or I may try to get rid of him altogether. I will be as pleased at his loss of those attractive characteristics as I will be at my own acquisition of them, for each will have the same effect on the chances that I rather than he will gain J's attentions. Hence Rousseau's summary description of *amour-propre* elsewhere in the *Dialogues* as:

> a relative sentiment by which one compares oneself, which demands preferences, whose enjoyment is purely negative, and which does not seek to satisfy itself anymore through our own good, but solely through the evil [*mal*] of the other. (RJJ 669/9)[21]

Rousseau's use of 'the good' and 'the evil' here signals another important characteristic of the individual of *amour-propre*: his preoccupation with how he and his rivals score on an interpersonal measure of 'the good'. An individual who had never experienced *amour-propre* could form a conception of his own good and that of another's in terms of the degree of their happiness, i.e. the overall satisfaction of their desires. But it is only *amour-propre* that makes the question of the relative extent to which the agent and his competitors realise this good into something of vital concern to him, for he will naturally assume that, like himself, they will only be happy to the extent that they believe they possess attractive characteristics in exceptional degree. Therefore their happiness is an

[21] See also Rousseau's description of 'liaisons of gallantry' in which the lover, as a result of the effect of *amour-propre* 'hates his rivals far more than he loves his mistress' (E5 798/430).

index of the degree to which they possess such characteristics in higher degree than he does, and such possession must be a source of unhappiness to him. Thus *amour-propre* leads him to stand outside himself and ask himself not just whether he possesses 'attractive' characteristics in higher degree than others, but also in general whether he is better-off than others or not. Furthermore, the conception of 'the good for a man' that he employs will not simply be 'that man's happiness'. He will see the good as partly *consisting in* something which lies behind a man's happiness and is the basis of it: his possession in exceptional degree of those characteristics that will bring public esteem. Thus *amour-propre* leads him to form a conception, even if a mistaken one, of the human good as consisting in the attainment of certain objective conditions, that is, conditions which can obtain independently of the beliefs of the individual concerned.

(4) Fourthly, beyond a pleasure in the evil of others, *amour-propre* can give rise to an actual *pleasure in dominating* them, where by 'dominating' another I mean the acquisition and exercise of a direct authority over another, a capacity to get the other to obey one's commands unconditionally. For one characteristic which any judge will almost certainly find attractive is power, in the sense of the ability to provide services to others or to harm them. In turn, an obvious source of power is direct authority over other people. Suppose I can succeed in acquiring such direct authority over another (I leave aside for the present the question of how this can be accomplished). Then I will demonstrate my power to anyone I conceive as a judge. Best of all, if I can dominate my competitors with respect to that judge then I can simultaneously demonstrate my power and their powerlessness. The very act of acquiring and demonstrating direct authority over a competitor can become pleasurable, since it is an act in which one experiences directly one's own possession, and the competitor's lack, of a characteristic attractive to a judge, namely power. Since every other human being is at least a potential competitor, the individual of *amour-propre* can come to take pleasure in domination of others as such, regardless of their current status as

competitors. Rousseau directly states that such pleasure in domination originates in *amour-propre* when he says that Emile's education:

> not having fomented *amour-propre* and a high opinion of himself, has diverted him from seeking his pleasures in domination and in another's unhappiness. (E4 545/251)[22]

Furthermore, if an agent motivated by *amour-propre* can take pleasure in dominating other people, then by the same token he can find being dominated by them painful. That is, he can come to think of his own *freedom*, the absence of subordination to the will of another, as a component of his good in a new and more important way than before. It is true that even someone unmoved by *amour-propre* might dislike having to obey the arbitrary orders of another because it would interfere with his pursuit of the satisfaction of his own desires, but here such subjection is disliked in a more intense way and for a different reason: because it is a sign of one's own powerlessness, and in particular one's powerlessness relative to another. It is *humiliating*. Accordingly, the man of *amour-propre* values freedom (that is, thinks of it as a component of the good) insofar as it is a sign of the absence of such relative powerlessness. This point will become important in the discussion below of the positive uses to which Rousseau puts *amour-propre* (page 70).

5. Public *amour de soi*

The further characteristics of amour-propre become explicit when an individual comes to desire to be preferred, not just by a single individual, but by everyone in his society. I shall call the resulting form of *amour-propre* 'public *amour-propre*'.

[22] This unhappiness must however be understood specifically as unhappiness which is expressive of the other's 'evil' as described above: his lack of an attractive characteristic.

Rousseau on amour de soi and amour-propre

In both *Emile* and the *Discourse on Inequality* Rousseau treats the move from individual *amour-propre* to public *amour-propre* as the effect of a natural extension of the triadic relationship between agent, beloved and rival suitors. In *Emile* he summarises the whole development in a few lines:

> From the need for a mistress is soon born the need for a friend. He who senses how sweet it is to be loved would want to be loved by everyone; and all could not want preference without there being many malcontents. With love and friendship are born dissensions, enmity and hate. From the bosom of so many diverse passions I see opinion raising an unshakeable throne, and stupid mortals, subjected to its empire, basing their own existence on the judgments of others. (E4 494/215)

The same progression occurs in less compressed form in the *Discourse on Inequality*. After describing the origin of the desire to be found preferable by an individual of the opposite sex and of sexual jealousy, in the passage already quoted (page 41 above), Rousseau immediately goes on to describe the public equivalents of these desires. He describes 'men and women' singing and dancing together and engaging in the collective equivalent of one person finding another sexually attractive and in turn wanting to be found so by the other:

> Each one began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a value [*eut un prix*]. The one who sang or danced the best, the most handsome, the strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most considered [*consideré*][23], and this was the first step toward inequality and, at the same time, towards vice. From these first preferences were born on the one hand vanity and contempt, and on the other shame and envy. (DOI 169-70/114)

Apart from the plurality of those by whom the agent now desires to be preferred, the novel element here is the development of a desire for 'esteem' or 'consideration' as opposed to simply preference and favour. It can be explained as follows. Because of the plurality of those by whom I now want to be treated as an 'I', I will become preoccupied

[23] This might also be translated as 'highly regarded'.

not only by whether they prefer me in their judgements, and so favour me in their actions, but additionally with what they *say* to each other about me, with public opinion about my preferability. That is, I will become preoccupied with the public's opinion on me with regard to those characteristics that are publicly agreed to be attractive, those that will lead people in general to extend their *amour de soi* in some way or another to me.[24] I will come to desire not just that people should think, but that they should say to each other publicly, that I possess these characteristics. For what they say publicly will both express and in turn form their individual thinking on the matter. This publicly expressed consensus that an individual possess the characteristics that the public finds attractive is what Rousseau calls 'esteem' or 'consideration'.

To gain the esteem of the public is to ensure that people will tend to make one the object of their inclusive *amour de soi*, thus treat one as an 'I'. So being the object of public esteem *in itself* comes to be experienced as being treated as an 'I' by the public, and becomes the chief goal of the individual of public *amour-propre*. Accordingly the characteristics that the public find attractive will come to have an intense significance for this individual. His sense that he possesses those characteristics, and possesses them in a greater degree than his competitors, will tend to become bound up with his sense of his own existence as an 'I', since possession of those characteristics is what will guarantee that the public will in fact treat him as one. With them, he is 'somebody'; without them, he will be a 'nobody'.

Rousseau summarises this dependence on the opinion of others that is characteristic of public *amour-propre* at the end of the *Discourse on Inequality*:

[24] Dent, *Rousseau*, p. 44, points out the twofold character of the dependence on opinion involved here.

> social man, always outside himself, only knows how to live in the opinion of others, and it is, so to speak, from their judgment alone that he derives the sense of his own existence. (DOI 193/136)

The complete dependence on others of the individual motivated by the public form of *amour-propre* explains the extravagance of his desires for the attentions of the public. Even if I am the object of the public's inclusive *amour de soi*, I have no way of making sure that things will stay that way and that a competitor will not divert the public's attentions away from me. My competitors will be constantly working to acquire more power, learning or wealth than I have, and I must constantly struggle to gain more to stay ahead of them. But the only real guarantee I could have would be if everyone in society transposed their *amour de soi* onto me *in toto*, so that it, so to speak, belonged to me, rather than being fundamentally theirs and only derivatively extended to me. Hence *amour-propre* 'would like each to prefer us to everyone and to himself, which is impossible' (RJJ 806/113, quoted above, page 32).

Public *amour-propre* gives rise to another important characteristic: a conception on the part of the agent of himself as having 'value' or 'worth'. If the public esteems an individual, and accordingly readily extends its services to him, then from his point of view it is, in its words and actions treating him as an 'I'.[25] If it does this to a greater extent for one person than for another then it is treating the first person as more genuinely 'I' than the other. The public by its relative esteem for each individual in society therefore implicitly treats each as having a greater or lesser degree of 'I-ness', just as by its relative willingness to pay for different commodities in the market it treats each commodity as having a greater or lesser economic value. The public's words and actions constitute for the individual a judgment on his degree of 'I-ness', on his degree of 'personhood' or

[25] I assume that the individual has the naivety about the public's motives which I have said is characteristic of *amour-propre* (page 41 above).

'personal value', and the public 'rank' of individuals which Rousseau attributes to *amour-propre* (DOI 174/119) is at bottom a ranking in such estimates of 'personal value'. Now the individual of *amour-propre*'s desire that others prefer him even to themselves can take a normative form, that of feeling that his personal value is *in fact* greater than anyone else's and demanding that the public recognise this fact in its treatment of him. This sense of the superiority of one's own 'true personal value', or, as I shall say, of one's 'personal worth', is normative.[26] If one feels one is of objectively greater 'worth' than anyone else, then one will feel that it is objectively 'fitting' that the public should esteem one and extend its *amour de soi* first and foremost to oneself, or that one has a 'right' that they do so. One will feel this to be so regardless of what the public may currently be doing.

When Rousseau says, in the passage from the *Dialogues* which I quoted initially (see page 32), that *amour-propre* leads one 'to assign oneself the first and best place', this is not in the ordinary sense of putting one's own preservation before anyone else's but in the normative sense of asserting one's superior worth to anyone else. It is this idea of worth to which, I suggest, Rousseau is referring when he talks of 'importance' in his earliest explicit definition of *amour-propre* in a note to the *Discourse on Inequality*:

> *Amour-propre* is only a relative, artificial sentiment born in society, which leads each individual to attach more importance to [*faire plus de cas de*] himself than to anyone else, which inspires all the evils that men do to each other, and which is the real source of honour. This being well understood, I will say that in our primitive state, in the real state of nature, *amour-propre* does not exist; for since each particular man regards himself as the only spectator who observes him, as the only being in the universe who takes an interest in him, as the only judge of his own excellence [*mérite*], it is not possible that a sentiment which has its source in

[26] Here I deliberately use 'worth' as an equivalent for 'true value', taking advantage of the closeness in meaning of the two words in ordinary usage.

> comparisons which he is not in a position to make could germinate in his soul. (DOI 219/167)[27]

In the state of nature, as Rousseau elaborates a little later 'men do not know how to evaluate [*s'apprecier*] or compare themselves' (ibid.). They do not even know how to compare their physical characteristics with others'. So they cannot be in a position to imagine that they have a superior 'worth' to everyone else, let alone to construe other people's actions as manifesting a recognition or failure to recognise this superior worth.

To summarise, then, we began by characterising *amour-propre* as the desire to be preferred, and so to be preferable. In public *amour-propre* this develops into the desire to be esteemed above others, which in turn is expressed as the assertion of one's own superior worth.[28]

This concludes my sketch of Rousseau's philosophical anthropology. Before turning to an account of the historical development and positive role of *amour-propre*, I summarise the relations for which I have argued between the various sources of motivation and passions in Rousseau in a fuller version of the diagram already given:

[27] Again (see footnote 13, page 35), it seems gratuitous to translate *mérite* as 'merit' here for in the savage state man has no moral notions and cannot judge his own merit, his degree of moral deservingness, although he can judge that for example he is more intelligent than the animals he traps (DOI 165-6/110).

[28] I have passed over two further important characteristics of public *amour-propre*: its tendency to give rise to a disposition to deceive (see DOI 174/119) and its connections with sensitivity to offence or insult (see DOI 219-20/168, 170/114). The former follows naturally from dependence on public opinion, for if one lacks the characteristics the public finds attractive an obvious recourse is to feign them. The latter is to be derived from the sense of one's own worth, for offence or insult is to be understood as treating another as not having the worth he attributes to himself. In turn, anger would be the sentiment that one feels towards someone who has so treated one. I forego a development of these points here.

Rousseau on amour de soi and amour-propre



2 Rousseau on needs, *amour-propre* and citizenship

In this chapter I draw on the interpretation of *amour-propre* and its place in Rousseau's picture of human motivation developed in chapter 1 in order to show how for Rousseau *amour-propre* develops historically in interaction with the multiplication of human needs. I then show how *amour-propre* plays a crucial role in the development of the virtue of justice in *Emile*. Finally I argue that Rousseau's account makes it natural to expect a similar development of the virtues of the citizen out of *amour-propre* in the course of history. I conclude that although Rousseau's overt attitude to the historical multiplication of needs is as hostile as his attitude to *amour-propre* in many passages, his historical thinking makes room for a view of this multiplication as a necessary means to the moralisation of man. He thereby significantly anticipates the far more unambiguously positive role attributed to the multiplication of needs in the philosophical histories of Kant and Hegel.

1. Dependence and the origins of amour-propre

I start with the question of why at root *amour-propre* develops. In the *Dialogues* Rousseau says that *amour-propre* arises 'as soon as one gains the habit of measuring oneself against others' (see page 32 above). In the definition in the *Discourse on Inequality* he says that it 'has its source in comparisons' (see pages 48-49 above). Yet, as I have tried to show, the disposition to make such comparisons is itself best understood as a product of *amour-propre* and so cannot explain its origin. Even the fact of comparing oneself with others in terms of characteristics which one thinks will lead a given individual to provide others with his services cannot give rise to the phenomenon of *amour-propre*. This remains the

case even if one thinks of this individual as what I have called a 'conceiver', as someone who may or may not conceive one as an 'I', and even if one takes his services to others to be indications that he conceives those others as 'I's. For what is crucial to *amour-propre* is that one's *own* sense of one's own existence as an 'I' becomes dependent on the extent to which one feels treated as an 'I' by the 'conceiver', that one adopts the putative perspective on oneself of the 'conceiver' and makes this perspective one's own: in other words that one thinks of him not just as a 'conceiver' but as what I have called a 'judge'.[1]

Yet why should one adopt another's perspective in this way? It will normally be physically pleasant to be the object of another person's services, for one's pleasure, the relief of one's pain, and the satisfaction of one's desires is just what another's service, as I have defined it (page 33), aims at. Yet this provides no reason in itself to adopt the other's perspective. From the fact that it is physically pleasant to be served by another, it does not follow that it must be pleasant in the sense of preserving or expanding one's sense of oneself as an 'I'.

The question of why the agent should adopt the perspective on himself of another, which I postponed in my exposition of *amour-propre* (page 37), must then now be addressed. The explanation I shall propose here for this adoption is that it occurs when the agent finds himself in a state of *dependence* on the other. *Amour-propre* itself engenders dependence, for in it the agent is dependent on the judge in order to maintain his sense of his existence as an 'I'. But this dependence does not bring about *amour-propre* in the first place. Rather

[1] Charvet, *The Social Problem*, rightly argues that the propensity to make comparisons cannot by itself generate *amour-propre*. See especially pp. 28-31. However he does not engage with the question of how a 'conceiver' becomes a 'judge', but rather assumes that, for Rousseau, to realise that another has an opinion of one is automatically to become enthralled to that opinion.

amour-propre originates from a prior physical dependence on another. It then has the effect of supplementing this prior dependence with a new kind of dependence, and so compounding it.

The notion of dependence presupposes that of needs, specifically that of 'phenomenological needs', persisting desires.[2] I become dependent on another individual when that individual has the power to provide me with, or withhold from me, an object of my persisting desire (particularly if that desire is also a strong one), and where I can do nothing to force the other to provide me with that object. If the persisting desire in question is a desire for physical goods, then we can call the resulting dependence 'physical dependence'.

Now suppose an agent is physically dependent on another whom he thinks of as a 'conceiver'. His dependence places him in a position of complete passivity. He has a persisting desire, yet he can do nothing to satisfy it. By contrast he sees that the conceiver is quite able to take action to satisfy it. The agent may then be reduced to *imagining* the other taking that action, to inhabiting the perspective of the other and vainly willing from that perspective that the other should take the action which will satisfy his persisting desire. My simple proposal on Rousseau's behalf is that in so inhabiting the other's perspective the agent also tends to adopt that perspective with respect to his sense of himself as an 'I'. He comes to see himself through the eyes of the 'conceiver', and to see his own existence as an 'I' in terms of the other's recognition of that existence. In other words, the 'conceiver' becomes a 'judge' for him.

[2] Neuhouser, 'Freedom, dependence, and the general will', pp. 374-8, sees dependence as presupposing perceived needs. However, when persisting desires come apart from perceived needs it is the former that generate dependence.

This tendency is exacerbated if the conceiver on whom the agent depends takes advantage of the situation in order to force the agent to do his will, for example so as to satisfy his own requirements for physical preservation and strength more easily.[3] The conceiver offers to give the agent what he desires but only if the agent obeys the conceiver's commands. The relationship between them now becomes that of command and obedience, master and slave, based, as it always is for Rousseau, on the slave's need for something that only the master can provide (DOI 161-2/104-5). Now the agent finds himself in a position of having to act as the 'body' of his master, satisfying the master's own desires in order to be given what he needs. If he is desperate enough, he will try to anticipate the master's desires and satisfy them without the master even having to give orders, in the hope that such anticipatory obedience will lead the master to give him what he needs. He will become 'servile'. Such a servile attitude will lead the slave to look at the world more and more through the master's eyes, and thus to adopt the master's perspective even on himself.

Finally, even if the conceiver does not actually dominate the agent in this way, the *possibility* of establishing some such relationship, whereby the agent does something for the conceiver in return for being given what he needs, may lead the agent to adopt the same 'servile' attitude. He may begin to try to work out what thing or service the conceiver wants, in order to be able to offer it to the conceiver in exchange for the thing that he needs from him. Again, this will lead him to adopt in some measure the perspective of the conceiver, to think of the conceiver as a 'judge'.

When he does so, his dependence will be compounded. For he now has a new kind of persisting desire, based not on his *amour de soi* but on his *amour-propre*. This is the

[3] The conceiver might have other motives of course, including the pleasure of domination derived from his own *amour-propre* (pages 43-44 above).

desire to be conceived as an 'I' by another, namely the judge. Yet, like his original physical desire, this desire is one which the judge has the power to satisfy and which he cannot force the judge to satisfy. Therefore he is dependent in a new way on the judge, for the object of a new kind of desire. I call this second kind of dependence 'psychological dependence'.[4]

This account of the origins of *amour-propre* is supported by the way that Rousseau in *Emile* associates the development of *amour-propre* in the child with its dependence on the will of the adults around it. He says that dependence on men 'engenders all the vices, and by it master and slave are mutually corrupted' (E2 311/85), and since vice and corruption are the products of *amour-propre*, this is tantamount to saying that *amour-propre* originates in dependence. In order to prevent this development, Emile is brought up without ever having the *experience* of dependence on others. Of course he is as a matter of fact dependent on others, but he never experiences this dependence as such, for when Rousseau allows or refuses him something he never presents this allowance or refusal as the consequence of a decision on his part, but simply as a statement of fact about whether something is available or not:

> Let his haughty head at an early date feel the harsh yoke which nature imposes on man, the heavy yoke of necessity under which every finite being must bend. Let him see this necessity in things, never in the caprice of men. (E2 320/91)

Rousseau adds: 'The phrase "There is no more" is a response against which no child has ever rebelled unless he believed that it was a lie' (ibid.). By being forbidden and permitted in this way, the young Emile experiences himself as dependent only on nature, and never on the will of another, for satisfying his persisting desires. He is kept 'in dependence only

[4] I have adopted the term 'psychological dependence' from Neuhouser, op. cit., p. 377.

on things' (E2 311/85).[5] Furthermore, the specific aim of preventing Emile from experiencing himself as dependent on Rousseau is to prevent the establishment of a relationship of domination between them, in which Emile may adopt a servile attitude.[6]

2. *Amour-propre* and the development of needs

If we turn from Rousseau's account of the origins of *amour-propre* in the child in *Emile* to his account of the interrelated development of *amour-propre* and needs in human history in the *Discourse on Inequality*, we get further confirmation that *amour-propre* originates in dependence on the will of others, a dependence which it in turn compounds. The persisting desires of a man in the state of nature expressed only his actual needs for his preservation and strength: 'his desires do not go beyond his physical needs' (DOI 143/89). Rousseau also puts this by saying, 'he felt only his true needs [*vrais besoins*]' (DOI 160/104). The distinction between 'true' and 'false' needs which is implicit here is best understood as a distinction between actual needs and persisting desires, or more accurately those persisting desires that do not express any (prior) actual needs. 'False needs' would then be needs only in the phenomenological sense.

The savage was able to satisfy these 'true needs' easily by himself (DOI 134-6/81-3). He was therefore independent of every other individual. However through a series of subsequent accidents, humans were forced to develop new technologies, discovered how to

[5] See also Rousseau's statement that children should 'find resistance only in things and never in wills' (E1 287/66).

[6] Rousseau is also concerned to prevent the establishment of a relationship of the opposite kind, in which the child dominates the adult (E2 311-15/84-88). However, since he elsewhere says clearly that it is only *amour-propre* that produces a pleasure in domination as such (E1 284-90/64-8), and since on the interpretation I am giving *amour-propre* itself only arises from being dominated by another, I conclude that Rousseau's first concern should be to prevent domination of the child by the adult.

build huts in which they took to living in families, and then used their leisure time to produce new conveniences for themselves (DOI 164-8/109-13). While 'the first man who made himself clothing and lodging provided himself with things that were hardly [*peu*] necessary, since he had done without them up to that time' (DOI 140/86), nevertheless in the course of time such conveniences became 'true needs':

> For not only did such conveniences continue to soften both body and mind, they almost lost through habitual use their pleasure [*agrément*], and as they had at the same time degenerated into true needs, being deprived of them became much more cruel than the possession of them was sweet, and people were unhappy in losing them without being happy in possessing them. (DOI 168/113)

Here 'true needs' can again be understood to mean actual needs, in contradisinction from persisting desires which express no such actual needs.[7] So those actual human needs began to differ for the first time from the actual needs of men in the state of nature. The reason is that individuals became used to certain conveniences. As a result, being deprived of them made them unhappy. Those conveniences therefore became necessary conditions of their well-being (although not of their physical preservation and strength).[8] So they became actual needs. I shall call such needs 'habit-based needs'.[9]

[7] In fact Rousseau describes as needs what are in fact the objects of needs. This is a common shorthand: instead of saying that human beings have needs for food, shelter and clothing, we say that their needs 'are' food, shelter and clothing.

[8] Rousseau suggests that they may also have become necessary conditions of their physical preservation and strength, for he speaks of the softening of both mind *and* body. I ignore this latter 'softening'.

[9] The way in which the habituation produces unhappiness when the desire is not satisfied may be by giving the desire a particular strength or persistence, as a result of which the mere fact of living with its continual occurrences without being able to satisfy it makes one unhappy. In that case the need will be 'desire-based', as well as 'habit-based'. Nevertheless, the more fundamental *explanans* of the need would be the fact of the habit, not the quality of the desire.

However human beings remain mutually independent. The first form of dependence which develops between them also gives rise to the first symptoms of *amour-propre*. This dependence is the dependence of a man on the woman (or vice versa) in a love relationship where there are other possible rivals. It is treated most clearly in the passage on the origins of sexual jealousy in the *Second Discourse*, which I have already quoted (see page 41), and which I now discuss more fully.

As I said in my discussion of love (pages 34-35), in the state of nature man is incapable of making comparisons between different women, therefore of preference and of the individuated sentiment of love. His sexual desire is no more than the equivalent of hunger or thirst, equally satisfiable by any woman. Sexual intercourse is simply the satisfaction of this transient occurrence of a persisting desire, and of the actual physical need that the desire expresses. Even when men and women later form families and build huts for themselves, the 'conjugal and paternal love' which results does not seem to be based on comparisons but rather on the absence of any present alternative (DOI 168/112), at least as long as these families are isolated. To a certain extent the woman of the family remains just 'woman', the man just 'man'. It is only when young men and women grow up near each other in a stable settlement where they can re-identify different individuals from one occasion to the next that 'the transient intercourse demanded by nature leads to another one, no less sweet and more permanent' (DOI 169/114-5), namely one of love in the full, individuated sense (cf. DOI 157-8/102). For this 'transient intercourse' leads them to begin to compare each other for sexually attractive characteristics and to form a preference for some one person. Love in the full sense then arises when two people mutually prefer each other. In turn, this leads each to develop a need for the presence of the other. To quote the passage again:

> They become accustomed to consider different objects and to make comparisons; they acquire imperceptibly the ideas of merit and beauty which produce the sentiments of preference. By dint of seeing each other, they can no longer do

> without seeing each other again. A tender and sweet sentiment insinuates itself into the soul, and at the least opposition becomes an impetuous fury: jealousy awakens with love; discord triumphs, and the sweetest of passions receives sacrifices of human blood. (DOI 169/114)

Here what is crucial is that each is in a position of dependence on the other. From the man's point of view, he has become used to the physical pleasures of this particular preferred woman, in the same way as he became used to the conveniences mentioned above. This habituation leads him to develop a habit-based need and correspondingly a persisting desire, for her attention. So he becomes physically dependent on her. This initial dependence in turn, I suggest, is what leads him to adopt her perspective on him, and to sense his own existence as an 'I' only insofar as she continues to prefer him. So he develops a persisting desire for her preference *as such*, independently of his desire for the particular physical pleasures that result for him from her preferring him.[10] Yet he cannot be sure that she will continue to prefer him. There is always a chance that she will change her preferences and take up with another man instead. If she does, he risks losing the sense of his existence as an 'I'. But his desire to maintain this sense is expressed as a belief that he has a right that she should prefer him. Hence his anger at any prospect of her changing her mind.[11]

[10] The desire to be preferred is not mentioned explicitly in this passage but, as pointed out above (page 40), it features in the equivalent passage in *Emile*, and in the paragraph which immediately follows the present passage in the *Discourse*, the paragraph in which individual *amour-propre* is generalised into public *amour-propre* through singing and dancing together (DOI 169-70/114).

[11] On anger, see footnote 28, page 49 above. It is tempting to see his persisting desire for her attentions as *arising* from the fact that he understands her attentions as an indication that she thinks of him as a uniquely an 'I'. But this would be to presuppose that he already sets some store by her conceiving as opposed to not conceiving of him as an 'I', as opposed to her merely giving him physical pleasure, and it is just this adoption of her perspective on him which needs to be explained.

Rousseau on needs, amour-propre and citizenship

As discussed above (page 45), the next stage in Rousseau's account of *amour-propre* in the *Discourse* is its transformation into public *amour-propre*, where publicly expressed preferences based on sexually attractive characteristics become the object of everyone's desires. The subsequent development of public *amour-propre* hinges on the development of the social division of labour and the resulting establishment of property in land. In brief, Rousseau's account of these is that iron-working was discovered by accident, and then led to the production by some of implements that others desired. At the same time this production meant the iron-workers could not spend so much time finding their food. Those who desired the implements therefore found that if they had more than enough food for themselves they could exchange some for the iron implements, and this gave them the incentive to stake out a piece of land and to produce a surplus of food by farming (DOI 172-3/115-7). Once the social division of labour between iron-workers and farmers had come into existence, then those who happened to be stronger, more adroit or more ingenious, or who happened to benefit from shortages and surpluses in the market for food and implements, became richer, while the others became poorer. Once one lives in a society with a social division of labour, everyone depends on others in order to satisfy his persisting desires, whether those desires express needs for physical preservation and strength, or habit-based needs, needs resulting from having become used to having some convenience which has been produced as a result of the division of labour itself.

At this stage Rousseau's argument is less than clear, for he simply asserts that such a market gives rise to the symptoms of *amour-propre*, and specifically to the pursuit of wealth as a means of attracting public esteem, rather than simply to satisfy needs for preservation and strength or habit-based needs. He describes how *amour-propre* stimulates pride and 'the rank and destiny of each man [is] established', especially by the 'quantity of his possessions' (DOI 174/118-9), and he speaks of 'a devouring ambition, the burning passion to enlarge one's relative fortune, not so much from real need [*veritable besoin*] as

to put oneself ahead of others' (DOI 175/119).[12] But he does not explain how the division of labour and the market gives rise to these developments.[13] However in the same passage Rousseau does provide the resources for an argument which we can reconstruct as follows. The relationship of dependence is now reproduced in every market interaction, with the agent in a position of having a persisting desire for what the other can provide. Every market agent is 'enslaved to', that is, dependent on the will of, his source of the commodities or services he persistently desires:

> [B]ehold man, who was formerly free and independent, diminished as a consequence of a multitude of new needs into subjection, one might say, to the whole of nature and especially to his fellow men, men of whom he has become the slave, in a sense, even in becoming their master; for if he is rich he needs their services; if he is poor he needs their aid; and even a middling condition does not enable him to do without them. (DOI 174-5/119)

Hence the market constantly tends to make agents adopt the perspective of the source of the commodities which they persistently desire as their own, and thereby to tend to derive the sense of their own existence as an 'I' from the fact of being favoured by their sources of commodities over those who are in competition with them to buy the same commodities.[14] At the same time, in the market the supreme attractive characteristic is wealth. Everyone wants to do business with a rich man, for he will always be able to pay more generously. Therefore the market will have the effect simultaneously of exacerbating *amour-propre*, and of establishing wealth as the principal attractive characteristic which the man of *amour-propre* desires to possess. The fact that one's material wealth, unlike

[12] If he does not have a real need then presumably he has an unreal need. Such an unreal need must, like the false needs referred to above, be a need in the phenomenological sense: specifically a persisting desire which does not express any prior actual need.

[13] Dent, *Rousseau*, pp. 83-4, criticises Rousseau on this point.

[14] It might be said that when I exchange commodities (or commodities for money) with someone I am as much a source for him as he is for me. Rousseau's response would surely be that this does not undo my sense of dependence on him.

one's ability to sing or one's handsomeness, is something that can be increased by deliberate effort, means that the man of *amour-propre*'s desire for wealth will not remain an idle wish, for it is a desire which he sees that he can satisfy. So it will drive him to a dedicated pursuit of self-enrichment, a pursuit which in fact is endless since his competitors will be engaged in the same pursuit and what he wants is not wealth per se but *more* wealth than his competitors. Hence the 'devouring ambition' to become wealthier than others. Since wealth takes a multitude of forms, the result is a further multiplication of persisting desires and thus of the actual needs that arise from them (cf. DOI 203/148-9).

This entire development is summarised in Rousseau's brief description of the origins and character of 'general society' at the beginning of the *Geneva Manuscript*. Its result is a society in which men's economic dependence on each other sets them against each other, and their rivalry in turn increases their dependence. To quote more fully a passage to which I have already referred (page 24):

> Man's strength is so proportionate to his natural needs and to his primitive state that when this state changes and these needs increase, however slightly, the help of his fellows becomes necessary to him, and when, finally, his desires encompass the whole of nature, the co-operation of the whole human race is hardly sufficient to satisfy them. Thus the same causes which make us wicked also make us slaves, and subject us in depraving us; the sense of our weakness stems less from our nature than from our cupidity: our needs bring us together in the same measure as our passions divide us, and the more we become enemies of our fellows the less we can do without them. (GM 1.2 281-2/155)

This mutually reinforcing interaction between dependence and hostility is central to Rousseau's description of modern society.[15] It is intelligible only through the mechanism of *amour-propre*, although the term itself is not mentioned here. Economic dependence on

[15] See Rousseau's direct repudiation of the idea that economic interdependence leads each to benefit others in order to further his own interests at N 968, DOI 202/148, GM 1.2 284-5/158.

one's sources of commodities generates *amour-propre* with its attendant hostility to competitors and its psychological dependence. *Amour-propre* produces persisting desires for ever more commodities, for the possession of these is the chief 'attractive characteristic'. Finally the persisting desires (and the actual needs that arise from them) for more commodities intensify economic dependence. Thus dependence, *amour-propre* and new persisting desires (and thus actual needs), reinforce each other in an endless cycle.

3. The problem of justice in *Emile*

With this account of the nature and historical development of *amour-propre* in hand, we can now turn to the account of how the child is to be educated to morality in *Emile*. The principle of this education is the extension of his inclusive *amour de soi*, specifically in the form of pity, to others, not only his fellow citizens but his fellow men in general. The question is exactly how this is to be achieved. My aim will be to show that although Rousseau constantly emphasises the necessity of preventing the growth of Emile's *amour-propre* in this process, he at the same time implies that such growth is in fact necessary in order for Emile to become moral.

As a child, Emile is incapable of morality, i.e. of moral feelings and motivations:

> Inflict no kind of punishment on him, for he does not know what it is to be at fault. Never make him beg pardon, for he could not know how to offend you. Devoid of all morality in his actions, he can do nothing which is morally bad and which merits either punishment or reward. (E2 321/92)[16]

[16] I ignore here the passages in which Rousseau seems to contradict this general statement about the pre-adolescent child. In one, he describes a young baby as already having a sense of justice (E1 286/66). In another, Emile as a child is led to develop a sense of property (E2 330-34/98-101).

The reason is that the basis for moral motivation does not develop until adolescence. This is pity, the most immediate form of inclusive *amour-propre*. It consists in the capacity to feel others pleasures and pains as one's own and accordingly the tendency to try to serve others, particularly to relieve those in pain:

> The child, not imagining what others feel, knows only his own ills. But when the first development of his senses lights the fire of imagination, he begins to feel himself in his fellows, to be moved by their complaints and to suffer from their pains. (E4 504/222)

The role of Emile's educator is to facilitate the translation of pity into the activity of beneficence, of doing well by others:

> To excite and nourish this nascent sensibility, to guide it or follow it in its natural inclination, what is there to do but offer the young man objects on which the expansive force of his heart can act — objects which swell the heart, which extend it to other things, which make it find itself everywhere outside itself ... (E4 506/223)

The crucial question now is how the practice of beneficence can lead Emile beyond an urge to help out particular suffering individuals to the development of *conscience*, the motivation to conform to rules of moral behaviour as such, rules which will benefit others in general as opposed to any particular set of others. In other words, how can Emile's inclusive *amour de soi* be 'generalised'?[17] Rousseau expresses this transition by a contrast between the 'sentiments' and the 'notions' of good and evil:

> So long as his sensibility remains limited to his own individuality there is nothing moral in his actions. It is only when it begins to extend outside of himself that it takes on first the sentiments and then the notions of good and evil [*du bien et du mal*] which truly constitute him as a man and an integral part of his species. (E4 501/219-20)

[17] This problem is outlined by Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*, pp. 48-51. Cf. Dent, *Rousseau*, pp. 126-42. For Hume's treatment of the problem see *Treatise* 482, and for a contemporary reference to it, Williams, 'Egoism and altruism', p. 265.

It is only with the acquisition of the 'notions' of good and evil that 'finally we enter the moral order' (E4 522/235).[18]

Initially Emile's pity will extend only to 'those with whom he has relations, those whom habit has made dear or necessary to him', and those who think and feel in the same way that he does, thus those 'whose nature has a more manifest identity with his own and thus make him more disposed to love himself'. It is only subsequently that it can extend to include all men as such:

> It will only be after having cultivated his nature in countless ways, after many reflections on his own sentiments and on those he observes in others, that he will be able to get to the point of generalising his individual notions under the abstract idea of humanity and to join to his particular affections those which can make him identify with his species. (E4 520/233)

There is a qualitative difference between pity for other particular individuals, no matter how widely extended, and the extension of *amour de soi* to *mankind as such*. It is when Emile's extended *amour de soi* takes as its object mankind as such that it is for the first time informed by a general notion, and so made rational and principled. For Rousseau, it thereby becomes moral virtue, or rather the particular moral virtue of justice, for 'love of mankind is nothing other than love of justice' (E4 547/252).

If we accept this last equation for the time being, then the development of Emile's *amour de soi* to the point where it becomes the love of mankind will *be* the development in him of a moral conscience, one whose promptings are formulated in the rules of justice, or natural law. And in fact it is shortly after the passage on generalising pity to humanity as a whole that Rousseau introduces the notion of conscience substantively for the first time.

[18] Dent, *Rousseau*, pp. 136-9, emphasises the significance of the transition from 'sentiments' to 'notions' at this point in the text, but understands the way in which Rousseau makes this distinction differently from the way I do.

He says that the voices of conscience 'arise out of the first movements of the heart' and that justice and goodness 'are true affections of the soul enlightened by reason'. Explaining himself in a footnote, he adds that:

> it is not true that the precepts of natural law are founded on reason alone. They have a base more solid and sure. Love of men derived from *amour de soi* is the principle of human justice. (E4 523n/235n)[19]

Thus the development of love of mankind as such is the development of the virtue of justice, which in turn is effectively identified with the acquisition of a moral conscience.[20]

To make this transition from pity for individuals to the moral virtue of justice is to abstract from the consideration of whether any particular person will be harmed or helped by an action one contemplates. To become just is in many cases to overrule the promptings of pity as they are directed to particular individuals, and so in a certain sense to harden oneself. As Rousseau says at a later point:

> To prevent pity from degenerating into weakness, it must, therefore, be generalised and extended to the whole of mankind. Then one yields to it only insofar as it accords with justice, because of all the virtues justice is the one that contributes most to the common good of men. For the sake of reason, for the sake of love of ourselves [*amour de nous-mêmes*], we must have pity for the species still more than for our neighbour, and pity for the wicked is a very great cruelty to men. (E4 548/253)[21]

[19] For a defence of the view that Rousseau relies on a concept of natural law (*droit naturel*) see Derathé, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science Politique de son Temps*, especially pp. 151-71, 386-97.

[20] Presumably justice is not the whole of morality for Rousseau. Rather his view must be that the virtue of justice is the most basic moral virtue.

[21]Clearly 'men' here must be understood to mean 'men in general, mankind as a whole'.

The question that Rousseau has to answer, then, is that of how Emile is to make the transition from pity to justice, when justice is a virtue which often has to overrule pity itself.

4. *Amour-propre* and the value of freedom

For his answer Rousseau resorts to the very *amour-propre* whose development until now he has been concerned to prevent.[22] Immediately after introducing the question of generalisation, Rousseau appeals to *amour-propre*, suggesting for the first time that it may have a *positive* role to play in Emile's moral development.[23] He says:

> Since my Emile has until now looked only at himself, the first look he casts on his fellows leads him to compare himself with them. And the first sentiment aroused in him by this comparison is the desire to be in the first position. This is the point where love of self [*amour de soi*] turns into *amour-propre* and where begin to arise all the passions which depend on this one. But to decide whether among these passions the dominant ones in his character will be humane and gentle or cruel and malignant, whether they will be passions of beneficence and commiseration or of envy and covetousness, we must know what position he will feel he has among men, and what kinds of obstacles he may believe he has to overcome to reach the position he wants to occupy. (E4 523-4/235)

We must beware of assimilating this passage to the one already quoted from the *Dialogues* (page 31 above). There Rousseau derived 'all the loving and gentle passions' from (inclusive) *amour de soi* and 'all the hateful and cruel passions' from *amour-propre*. Twenty pages prior to the present passage in *Emile* he expresses himself in almost

[22] In seeing a positive role for *amour-propre* in Emile's education, and in Rousseau's philosophy as a whole, I follow Dent, *Rousseau*. However Dent bases the possibility of redeeming *amour-propre* on a distinction between 'equable' and 'inflamed' *amour-propre* (see his ch. 2), for which I find no evidence in Rousseau's texts.

[23] Charvet, *The Social Problem*, p. 80, notes the novel turn in Rousseau's argument at this point. The only previous positive statement in *Emile* that *amour-propre* may have beneficial consequences is one at E2 322/92 on *amour-propre* in an 'extended sense'.

identical terms, saying that 'the gentle and affectionate passions are born of *amour de soi*' and 'the hateful and irascible passions are born of *amour-propre*' (E4 493/214). Yet in the present passage he differentiates *within* the passions born of *amour-propre* between the cruel and the gentle. We must conclude that the other two statements are generalisations which he here modifies by introducing a special category of benevolent *amour-propre*-derived passions. The context suggests, and I shall argue, that the principal passion in question is the love of justice. His use of the same broad terminological opposition between 'gentle' and 'cruel' to make the original distinction and then to qualify it is lazy, but it is not fatal to his meaning.

The key to Rousseau's programme here is Emile's tendency to compare himself with others. This tendency results from his *amour-propre*, which has begun to develop alongside love and pity at adolescence, as a result of the triadic relation between self, loved one and potential rival in which he finds himself (page 40 above). Rousseau's project is now to transform pity into the love of justice by turning this tendency to self-comparison towards other ends. More specifically, I shall argue that it involves a reformation of the idea of 'the good' which *amour-propre* develops. *Amour-propre* naturally leads to a conception of the good, of what makes one person better off than another, as whatever will bring public esteem (see pages 42-43). Rousseau will replace this with a conception of the good as consisting essentially in freedom from domination by another's will or opinions.

This reform is to be brought about in Emile by concentrating on the question of 'what position he will feel he has among men'.[24] Instead of judging the relative goodness of his and other people's positions in society by the standards of prevailing opinion, he is to be

[24] Ten pages later Rousseau reiterates the importance of this question, saying that the issue with regard to Emile's *amour-propre* is 'to know in what rank among his fellows he will put himself after having examined them' (E4 534/243).

brought to see it as consisting chiefly in freedom from subjection to those very standards. This is the 'measure of natural and civil inequality' (E4 524/235) on which Emile and his educator now embark.

To achieve this, the educator shows him those who have gained what are ordinarily considered goods: political power, learning and wealth. He reveals them as in fact pursuing these goods, or the appearance of having them, only as a means to gaining superior esteem, and as engaged in constant and desperate competition to obtain this superior esteem. He shows how all who engage in this competition, even those who lead, are in a sense 'enslaved to' those on whose arbitrary opinions they depend for valuation, for they are forced to do whatever it is that will lead those people to esteem them over their competitors. They are effectively dictated to by the prejudices of others. By comparison Emile is led to see his own freedom in this respect from others' arbitrary opinions as infinitely preferable:

> For him, all that he desires is within his reach. Sufficient unto himself and free of prejudices, on whom will he be dependent? He has arms, health, moderation, few needs, and the means of satisfying them. Nurtured in the most absolute liberty, he conceives of no greater ill than servitude. He pities these miserable kings, slaves of all that obey them. He pities these false wise men, chained to their vain reputations. He pities these rich fools, martyrs to their display. (E4 536/244)

In fact pity is not the real point here. The aim is not to give Emile new objects of pity but to get him to see the emptiness of the goals to which men devote themselves. Rousseau sums up the general conclusion that Emile is to reach about them as: 'You are mad' (E4 535/243). The aim of the exercise is to transform Emile's incipient conception of 'the good', which sees it as consisting in what will bring popular esteem, into a conception which sees it as consisting chiefly in his own freedom, and specifically his freedom from dependence on the opinion of others.

Amour-propre, then, initially provides Emile with the idea of an objective measure of the human good, of what will make human beings happy. This measure for the man of *amour-propre* is possession of characteristics that are attractive in the public's opinion. But in Emile, through the very observation of the effects of *amour-propre* in producing unhappiness in others, this measure is replaced by another one, namely freedom, as the absence of compulsion to act in accord with the arbitrary commands or opinions of others. As I argued in Chapter 1 (page 44 above), *amour-propre* already leads to a valuation of freedom as the absence of subjection to another's arbitrary commands. Here that conception of freedom is extended.[25] Through the operation of his own and others' *amour-propre*, Emile learns the value of freedom not only from another's arbitrary command but also from another's arbitrary *opinion*.[26] Furthermore, freedom in this sense becomes not just a component of the good for him, but in effect the whole of the good.

Of course some degree of surplus of physical pleasure over physical pain is also a necessary condition of happiness, but for Rousseau the overwhelming cause of men's unhappiness is their mutual enslavement, and accordingly freedom supplants the surplus of physical pleasure over pain as the central component of the human good. By contrast most people can only conceive the human good in terms of the particular conditions, such as power or wealth, which they think will make them valued in the eyes of the multitude. Even those who consider freedom as (an important component of) what is worthwhile in human life misconceive its nature, for they think of it as something which one person can

[25] In other words, we are talking here essentially of the 'negative freedom' of political philosophy, the absence of human constraints on an individual's actions (see Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty'; MacCallum, 'Negative and positive freedom'). The difference is that in the extended conception of freedom, which Emile now gains, these constraints can be applied not only through threats to the individual's physical well-being, but also through threats to his superior esteem.

[26] In one sense this undermines *amour-propre* itself, for the very basis of *amour-propre* is dependence on the opinion of another as to one's own nature. Rousseau's hope is evidently that the notion of an objective human good and the 'spirit of comparison' generated by *amour-propre* can survive the disappearance of this dependence.

gain at the expense of another by dominating the other, so that the other obeys the commands of the first, while the first does not have to obey the command of the other. Instead Rousseau's view is that the very attempt to dominate another is typically driven by *amour-propre*, and so is a sign of psychological dependence on others and hence enslavement to their opinions. In the particular case of domination through holding political power, its possessor may be enslaved in an additional way to the opinions of his very own subjects. For he can only maintain that power for as long as the mass of them hold him in sufficient esteem to be willing to extend their inclusive *amour de soi* to him, in the shape of passive or active collaboration with the apparatus of power which he in turn uses to force any particular individual to obey him. So to stay in power he will be forced to act in accord with their opinions as to what characteristics are attractive, in order to maintain their conviction that he is of sufficient 'worth' to be supported. Although they are individually subjected to his commands, he is subjected to their collective opinion. Thus, 'Even domination is servile when it depends on [*tient à*] opinion, for you depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudice' (E2 308/83). As Rousseau writes elsewhere, somewhat hyperbolically:

> Freedom consists less in doing one's own will than in not being subjected to that of another; it consists further in not subjecting another's will to our own. Whoever is master cannot be free and to reign is to obey. (LM 8 842)

Rousseau must mean: 'it *depends* further on not subjecting another's will to our own'. Freedom is something which I can only attain for myself insofar as I simultaneously abstain from subjecting others. Freedom, in short, is 'indivisible'.

5. *Amour-propre* and justice

Returning to the text of *Emile*, Rousseau has now enabled Emile to gain the conviction that the human good consists essentially in freedom and accordingly that he, being free

from the opinions of others, is better off than anyone in the human society that he surveys. After an interlude in which Rousseau arranges for Emile to be tricked by swindlers so as to prevent his conviction that he is better-off than anyone else from becoming a conviction that he is intrinsically of greater worth, 'of a more excellent nature' than them (E4 536-42/244-9), Rousseau then proceeds to draw out the consequences of Emile's recognition of freedom as what is valuable in human life. Once he has come to this recognition, his pity can no longer be limited to relieving the immediate physical suffering of others. He will also naturally want to change situations in which one man is oppressing another. He will want to direct his beneficence not only to those who are in pain but also to those who are subjected. To do this, he must gain 'admission into the affairs of the world' (E4 542/249) and, instead of simply relieving the physical suffering of the poor by giving them alms, he must intervene to mitigate their oppression by the rich. He will 'obtain justice' for 'the oppressed' and will go, 'if necessary, to the foot of the throne to make heard the voice of the unfortunates to whom all access is closed by their poverty' (E4 544/250).

At this point, Rousseau has introduced the motive of 'justice' for the first time into Emile's conduct. It may be objected that in doing so he has slipped across the line between pity for individuals and principled conduct. However, although it is true that Emile now considers the good of others to consist not just in the absence of physical suffering but also in their freedom *vis à vis* others, so that his pity for someone will now lead him to try to relieve that person's subjection as well as his physical suffering, that pity remains a sentiment directed to individuals. Accordingly the question remains of how it is to be transformed into an urge to act in accord with rules of justice *as such*.

Rousseau gives his answer to this question in a paragraph which I shall quote in full, before offering an interpretation of it:

> Let us extend *amour-propre* to other beings. We shall transform it into a virtue, and there is no man's heart in which this virtue does not have its root. The less the object of our care is immediately involved with us, the less the illusion of particular interest is to be feared. The more one generalises this interest, the more it becomes equitable, and love of mankind is nothing other than love of justice. Do we, then, want Emile to love the truth; do we want him to know it? In his activities let us always keep him at a distance from himself. The more his cares are consecrated to the happiness of others, the more they will be enlightened and wise and the less he will be deceived about what is good or bad. But never let us tolerate in him a blind preference founded solely on favour towards persons [*acceptions de personnes*] or on unjust bias. And why would he hurt one to serve another? It is of little importance to him who gets a greater share of happiness provided that it contributes to the greatest happiness of all. This is the wise man's first interest after his private interest, for each is part of the species and not of another individual. (E4 547-8/252-3)

A quick way with this paragraph is to assume that Rousseau mistakenly wrote '*amour-propre*' when he meant '*amour de soi*'. But the paragraph was originally more condensed and Rousseau rewrote the latter part (from 'But never let us tolerate …') in one of the later manuscripts of *Emile*, so it would be surprising if he had failed to notice such a mistake and correct it.[27] Furthermore if the paragraph is read in this way then Rousseau appears to be saying that the extension of *amour de soi* to the whole human race is what generates the love of justice, in which case he would simply be assuming away the problem of how the transition is made from taking any number of individual men as one's object to taking mankind as such.

If instead we assume that '*amour-propre*' is what Rousseau meant to write, it becomes possible to see him as arguing in the opposite way: when he says the extension of *amour-propre* to others will 'convert it into a virtue', he means the virtue of loving justice, and it

[27] See Burgelin's notes to *Emile*, OC4 1492.

is then through the love of justice that Emile arrives at the love of the human race.[28] This is the interpretation which I suggest. In detail, the argument goes as follows.

It was *amour-propre* that first led Emile to stand outside himself and ask whether he was better off than others, which made it possible for him to ask the question of the human good, and which finally made it possible for him to answer this question correctly by realising that the human good consists essentially in freedom.

Now Emile, motivated by pity, extends this concern for freedom to other people. If one wants to be free oneself, one only has to escape from compulsion from others, and if one wants another person to be free one only has to help that person to escape from compulsion by third parties. But as soon as one wants *two* other persons to be free the possibility arises of having to arbitrate between them, of having to establish what constitutes compulsion of one by another. The obvious solution to this question is to think of each person as having a sphere of personal possessions and actions which are that person's 'own', and to say that arbitrary interference with that sphere by another constitutes an infringement of that person's freedom. But the idea of leaving 'each to his own' is precisely one traditional definition of justice.[29]

Therefore by extending his concern with freedom to other people who are in potential conflict with each other Emile will be forced to formulate some elementary notion of justice, and some rules defining what counts as 'one's own', and to give this notion a

[28] The passages in which Rousseau says that love of mankind 'is the principle of' (page 66) or 'is nothing other than' (page 65) the (love of) justice must then be understood in this sense.

[29] Again, I ignore here Rousseau's introduction of a notion of property rights into Emile's earlier education, since it is inconsistent with his denial that the pre-adolescent is capable of any moral sentiments. See footnote 16, page 63 above.

degree of weight in his interventions on behalf of others. The more widely he concerns himself with others, the more he will be forced to rely on such rules, as opposed to relying on his immediate empathy with particular individuals' subjection. He will gradually be forced to reformulate his pity for the subjected in general terms, as indignation against those who violate the rules of justice he has formulated. The concern for justice will therefore be generated by Emile's practice of beneficence towards the subjected, in combination with his new-found conception of the objective good for man as consisting essentially in freedom, and by the conflicts that this practice generates in him.

Since his initial interest is in the happiness of others, and he is interested in freedom because he sees that it is the central requirement for their happiness, the rules that he formulates will be rules designed to maximise the overall happiness of the parties involved in some particular conflict.[30] When he finally comes to look for a general justification for those rules, he will have to couch it in terms of the happiness of *any* men who happen to be affected by them, and thereby in terms of the happiness of men *in general*. In this indirect way he will finally be brought to understand his love of justice as a love of mankind as such.

Emile's moralisation, then, has been accomplished in two stages. Firstly his nascent pity has been *developed* by giving it objects and allowing him to help people who are suffering. Secondly, it has been *generalised* into a sense of justice which is identical with a feeling for the happiness of mankind-in-general. In this second stage Emile's *amour-propre*, with its spirit of comparisons, is recruited. However this requires that *amour-*

[30] Hence in the paragraph previous to the one under discussion Rousseau emphasises how Emile's practice of beneficence and his reflection on it teaches him to weigh up the effects of different practices on men's happiness so that he can 'evaluate what can contribute to or detract from men's happiness more accurately than can those who are interested in no one and never do anything for others' (E4 547/252).

propre be purged of two features which essentially characterise it in its 'natural' form. Instead of identifying 'the good' with whatever brings the esteem of the multitude (which consists only of a mass of particular individuals), Emile is brought to see it as consisting chiefly in freedom, meaning the absence of domination by the arbitrary will *or* opinions of another. Instead of seeing 'worth' as something which he possesses in greater degree than anyone else, he is led to see himself as of equal worth with any other man. In each case, this represents the replacement of a 'particularist' conception (of the good, of worth) with one which is more general.

In the same way the subordination of *amour-propre* itself to pity is the subordination of a sentiment whose language is 'I' to one whose language is 'we', whereas the natural tendency of *amour-propre* is, by setting each individual in competition with his fellows, to stifle the sentiment of pity.[31] Emile's moralisation can be understood as a 'proper ordering' of the passions of his soul, and specifically an ordering which gives the more general passions precedence over the more particular ones.[32]

6. Civil society and the moralisation of man

I will not investigate the extent to which Rousseau can be said to have solved the problem of generalising pity into the virtue of justice by introducing into it a rationalised form of *amour-propre*. One point of attack would be that Emile has had to rely on the prior existence of laws of the state in order to develop an idea of justice, even if he is

[31] On the stifling of pity in civilised man, see DOI 155-6/101.

[32] See Rousseau's statement that wisdom in the use of the passions is 'to order all the affections of the soul' in accord with the 'true relations of man' (E4 501/219). There are clearly overtones of Plato's doctrine of justice in the city and the soul here, especially since Rousseau's view of a rightly ordered state is one in which the universal (the people as a whole) predominates over the particular (the government).

subsequently able to replace this 'positive' conception by one based on the maximisation of happiness.[33] Instead I shall now present an argument on Rousseau's behalf to show that the entry of men of *amour-propre* into civil society can in fact moralise them, in a way analogous to, although distinct from, that in which Emile, thanks to his *amour-propre*, acquires the virtue of justice.

The key to this moralisation is the elimination of dependence of individuals on the will of other individuals. As we saw, Rousseau makes this elimination a central plank of Emile's education up until adolescence. Emile must be dependent only on things, not on the wills of men. But in the same section in which he says this, he also says that such absence of dependence on the wills of men must be the principle of the state. The fundamental problem of our social existence is that we are 'no longer able to do without others'. In this respect we resemble children. Rousseau does not advocate the abolition of this mutual dependence by a return to the state of nature, but instead a transformation in its *nature*:

> There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for men and to arm the general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will. If the laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no human force could ever conquer, dependence on men would become dependence on things again; in the republic all the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state[34] and freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him to virtue. (E2 311/85)

[33] In one passage Rousseau suggests that living under even the 'simulacra' of laws is a necessary condition for developing morality and virtue. See E5 858/473.

[34] This is obviously intended in the loose sense (see pages 22-23 above).

When read carefully, Rousseau is not saying here that arming the laws with 'real strength' would *substitute* dependence on men by dependence on things, but that it would give dependence on men the *character* of dependence on things. That is, in such a state, although men are dependent on each other, they are not dependent on each other's arbitrary wills, for the relations between each citizen and the next are mediated by laws which no one individual can change.[35] However, of course, these laws are not laws of nature, for the sovereign (i.e. the citizenry acting together) can change them. Thus we are not dealing with dependence on things here but rather with a dependence on the body politic as a whole.

In other words, those means by which one individual can, in modern society, be in a position to provide or withhold from another something which the other needs are to be eliminated by law. With regard to economic needs, the laws would have to ensure that no-one has to depend on another individual for his livelihood. Rather, things would be so arranged by law that each could have a sure way of gaining his livelihood in some way from the common wealth of society. Rather than enter into a discussion of what kind of economic system could achieve this end, I want to concentrate on the effects of such a 'dependence on the whole' on the psychology of the individual member of the body politic. My general contention is that it will convert the individual's intersubjective *amour de soi* into civic virtue, that is, into a species of moral motivation, and that this will enable him to vote for laws which are in the common interest and to abide by those laws.

In fact these two kinds of decisions, the decision as to what law to vote for and the decision as to whether to obey a law, the decision of the individual acting as a citizen and as a subject, place the individual in situations in which it is natural to conceive his fellow

[35] I owe this element of my understanding of the dependence advocated by Rousseau to Neuhouser, 'Freedom, dependence and the general will', p. 386.

members of the body politic in the two basic ways which I originally distinguished: as 'other 'I's' in the first case and as 'others who may consider me as an 'I'' in the second.

To begin with the citizen deciding whether to vote for one law rather than another, such a citizen thinks of the members of the body politic as subjects, as people who will be subjected to whichever law he (in conjunction with the others in their role as citizens) chooses, and thus as people who will be affected by his action. So this is a situation in which it is natural for him to think of subjects as 'other 'I's' and so for his intersubjective *amour de soi* to express itself as pity, leading him to choose laws which will benefit all of them. Since the laws must be general, they will not be able to discriminate against any one person by name, and the 'bluntness' of the instrument of legislation will itself tend to make him think in terms of the interests of 'people in general' rather than of any one group.[36] However, as pointed out already (pages 25-26 above) this formal character of laws will not guarantee by itself that he will choose laws which are equitable, i.e. genuinely impartial between all subjects. One solution to this problem seems to lie in Rousseau's conception of the human good as consisting essentially in freedom, along with his view that freedom is 'indivisible', i.e. is a good which one person can never obtain at the expense of another. Once citizens realise this, they will realise that the choices before them are always choices between a situation in which all will be more free and one in which all will be less free. The distributive problem simply never arises. What is unclear is how entry into legitimate civil society by itself is to give citizens this insight into the nature of the human good. Another solution may lie in the virtue of justice which Emile was led to develop. I discuss this after looking at the motivations of the individual considered as a subject.

[36] Thus an act of legislation has some of the same effect as that of beneficence.

As a subject deciding whether to obey a law or not, the individual thinks of the members of the body politic in a very different way. For the laws are the product of their will, and his decision as to whether to obey this law is a decision as to whether to conform to their will. He will look at them as citizens, as those who have collectively decided on the laws and its penalties and are in a position of being able to affect *his* fate far more than *vice versa*. Insofar as they are capable of collectively enforcing the laws, he is dependent on them, for it is thanks to the enforcement of these laws that he is able to earn his livelihood. This dependence which he experiences on the citizenry as a whole will tend to have the same effect on him as the experience of dependence on another individual: he will tend to think of the citizenry as 'others who may conceive me as an 'I', and who may or may not give me what I physically need', and he will thus tend to derive his sense of himself as an 'I' from the way that he imagines he is conceived as an 'I' by them.

Yet he knows exactly to what extent they are prepared to conceive him as an 'I', for they have already declared this explicitly in attaching the penalties which they have to the law. If he conforms to the law they will treat him as an 'I', they will try to ensure that he can gain his livelihood. If not, they will try to punish him. Now even if he cannot be sure that they will succeed in each instance, he knows that this is what their intentions will be. Therefore he has a reason for obeying the law independent of fear of the physical pain of punishment, for to disobey will be to become less of an 'I' in the eyes of the citizenry, and therefore, given his overall dependence on the citizenry, in *his own eyes*. This effect can be present even if he can break the law with impunity. Therefore his *amour-propre*, or rather the analogue of *amour-propre* in a situation of dependence not on the opinion of a mass of individuals but on a united citizen body, will lead him to abide by the laws, for

it is by so abiding, and only by so abiding, that he can maintain the sense of his existence as an 'I'.[37]

I conclude that, just as Rousseau can give Emile a love of justice thanks to his *amour-propre*, a legitimate civil society can moralise Rousseau's modern men to the extent necessary to obey the law thanks to the fact that they are men of *amour-propre*.[38] It can also lead them to vote for the general will as long as this matches the promptings of their own self-interest and pity. But it cannot moralise them to the extent of being able to reliably vote for the general will. For this they must come to the recognition that the human good consists essentially in the 'indivisible' possession of freedom. *Amour-propre*, in providing a conception of the human good, and a valuation of freedom as part of that conception, goes part of the way towards achieving this recognition. But it seems that it can only be fully achieved as a result of experiences such as those that Emile's tutor provides him with. Without such experiences, men would then be able to be good subjects of the civil state but not good citizens of it. The education of Emile would be the education of a ruler, or rather the education of a citizen, for here every citizen is a co-ruler.

Rousseau himself has relied on *amour-propre* in order to develop the virtue of justice in *Emile*. The logic of Rousseau's thinking would therefore suggest that it is to the same quarter that he should look to answer the question with which I began chapter 1, that of how modern man can be moralised by his entry into civil society. Here I have argued that

[37] Rousseau hints at an analogy between *amour-propre* and civic virtue in several passages. Just as *amour-propre* is a 'relative' sentiment, so he describes the sentiments of 'civic man' as relative (E1 249/39-40). They have a common social orientation. At N 970n and SC 3.4 405/113 he also suggests that when dependence on the whole changes into personal dependence in a state, then its people's civic virtue becomes converted into *amour-propre*.

[38] It should be noted that the use of dependence on the whole in order to 'redeem' *amour-propre* is absent in Emile, who is never dependent on the whole.

by using modern man's *amour-propre* we can indeed provide at least a partial answer to this question. Since *amour-propre* in turn develops historically as a result of the multiplication of (actual and phenomenological) needs, even as it fosters that development, I conclude that Rousseau's thinking makes room for a positive interpretation of that multiplication. The expansion of needs in the course of history may contribute to man's miseries, but it also can also be seen as the means of his education to citizenship.

3 Kant on culture and freedom

In his essay *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), Kant reconciles what he calls the 'seemingly contradictory' claims of Rousseau:

> In his works *[Discourse] on the Influence of the Sciences* and *[Discourse] on Inequality among Men*, he displays entirely correctly the inevitable conflict between culture and the nature of the human race as a *physical* species, in which every individual ought to fully achieve his determination. But in his *Emile*, in his *Social Contract*, and in other works he seeks to solve this more difficult problem: how must culture progress so as to develop the capacities [*anlagen*] of humanity in its determination as a *moral* species so that this should not conflict with that [his determination] as a natural species? (CBH 116/54)

Kant's term 'determination' (*Bestimmung*) can also be translated as 'destiny' or 'vocation', suggesting that it should be understood teleologically. Humanity's determination would be those essential characteristics that make a creature a human being, but that are unrealised in human beings as we know them. They therefore not only identify human beings as human, but also constitute an inherent 'end' towards which they tend: namely the full realisation of those characteristics. Humanity's determination is its *telos*. 'Culture' (*Kultur*) meanwhile, serves here as a general term for everything about human beings that they acquire in society, and that would be absent in Rousseau's state of nature: their technical, intellectual and moral 'educatedness'.[1]

In this case, Kant is here outlining an interpretation of Rousseau's historical thinking which broadly corresponds to that presented in the last two chapters. According to such an interpretation, Rousseau's depiction of the historical process of man's civilisation in the *Discourse on Inequality* is a depiction of an uncompleted process. The means whereby

[1] I address the meaning of Kant's 'culture' in more detail below.

mankind can realise its *telos* is not through reversing the process of civilisation but through a 'progress' of culture, and both *Emile* and *The Social Contract* are conceived as depictions of what the process of civilisation has now made possible, rather than of routes that mankind should have taken instead of the one that it did.

The context makes it clear that Kant endorses Rousseau's project, with the implication that the philosophical history he outlines in this essay, and in his *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784), written two years earlier, is an attempt to carry that project further.

In this chapter I outline that philosophical history and then place it in the context of Kant's discussion of the 'highest good' and of the 'final end of creation', especially in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). I argue that economic development, and the multiplication of needs that is part and parcel of it, plays a central role in Kant's conception of history, bringing about in the course of history two kinds of freedom, internal and external, which make possible the realisation of man's moral *telos*.

1. The development of culture and constitutionality

In the *Idea for a Universal History* Kant tries to show how the spontaneous development of culture in the course of history has led mankind to a position in which it can now, through conscious action, progressively move towards the realisation of its moral *telos*. The basis of the mechanism whereby culture develops is what Kant calls man's 'unsocial sociability':

> He has an inclination to *associate* [*sich vergesellschaften*], for in such a state he feels himself more a man, i.e. the development of his natural capacities. He also has, however, a great tendency to *isolate* himself [*sich vereinzelnen*], for he finds in himself the unsociable characteristic of wanting everything to go according to

> his wishes and therefore anticipates resistance everywhere, just as he knows about himself that for his part he tends to resist others. (IUH 20-21/32)

In a way that Kant does not fully explain, this combination of an urge to associate with others (sociability) and a urge to have one's own way (which we could call 'self-assertiveness') gives rise to three forms of what might now be called 'status seeking': the pursuit of honour, of power, and of possessions (*Ehrsucht, Herrschsucht, Habsucht*). It is in the pursuit of these ends that men develop culture. The passage continues:

> Now this resistance awakens all man's powers, brings him to overcome his tendency to laziness, and, driven by the pursuit of honour, power and possessions, to secure a rank for himself among his fellows, whom he does not *suffer* well, but cannot *leave*. In this way the first true steps from rawness [*Rohigkeit*] to culture, in which the unique social worth of man consists, now occur; all talents are gradually developed, taste is formed [*gebildet*], and through progressive enlightenment he begins to establish a way of thinking that can in time transform the crude natural capacity for moral discrimination into determinate practical principles, and thus a *pathologically* enforced agreement [i.e. one enforced through feelings — AC] into a society and finally into a *moral* whole. (IUH 21/32)

Kant hints here at a two-stage development: from rawness to culture through a blind process of competition for status within society, and then from such a culture on to a moral collective life through 'enlightenment', that is, through conscious rational effort.[2] For the first stage to take place, men must live together in society, and for Kant this means that they must live under a political constitution. Furthermore, the *kind* of political constitution which they establish will determine the degree to which the development of culture described above actually takes place. The ideal constitution from this point of view is what Kant describes as a 'universal civil society administering right [*Recht*]', a society:

[2] Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, pp. 153-4, argues that for Kant the second stage can begin with the Enlightenment of his own time.

> that combines the greatest freedom, and thus a thoroughgoing antagonism among its members, with the most precise determination and protection of the boundaries of this freedom, so that it can coexist with the freedom of others ... a society in which one will find *freedom under external laws* combined in the highest possible degree with irresistible power, i.e. a perfectly *just [gerechte] civil constitution*. (IUH 22/33)[3]

In a version of Smith's invisible hand argument, Kant says that it is through competition with each other within such a society, that the 'culture and art that adorn mankind' are forced to develop, in the same way that trees are forced to grow straight by competing with each other for sunlight (IUH 22/33). In fact he goes on to argue that such a society must in turn be a member of a world federation of states whose laws reproduce, on a larger scale, those of the just civil society (IUH 24-5/34-5).

But how does such a society, let alone such a federation, come into existence? At some points Kant writes as if he thinks that men are forced to establish a perfectly just civil constitution in order to associate with others at all, given their self-assertiveness. His full view, however, seems to be that a variety of more or less just (i.e. free) constitutions are possible. The fully 'just civil constitution' is both the most effective at enabling men to live together despite their self-assertiveness, and the most conducive to the development of culture. All other constitutions are more or less 'deficient' by comparison with it in both respects. Furthermore, the three characteristics appear to run in parallel. The more effective a constitution is at containing self-assertiveness, the more just (or free) it is, and the more productive it is of culture. Men, then, begin by developing any constitution that provides some kind of solution to the problem of association, and then replace it by ones that are successively more adequate for that purpose. These will also be successively more just (free) and successively more conducive to culture. This process provides the broad outline for the philosophical history that Kant proposes in the essay. Examining the history of Europe from the Greeks up to the present, he suggests,

[3] Cf. Kant's definitions of 'right' at TP 290/72 and of 'justice' at MM 312/124.

> one will discover a regular course of improvement in state constitutions on our continent (which will in all likelihood eventually give laws to all others). By focusing everywhere only on civil constitutions and their laws and on the relations among states — in so far as both, through the good which they contained, served over long periods of time to elevate and glorify peoples (and along with them the arts and sciences), but, through the deficiencies which were attached to them, [served] to overthrow them again, so that nevertheless a seed of enlightenment always remained behind that developed more with each revolution, preparing a following and yet higher stage of improvement — one will, I believe, discover a guiding thread that can serve to clarify the confused play of human affairs … (IUH 30/38-9)

This guiding thread will also clear the way for:

> a comforting view of the future, in which we represent from afar how the human species finally works its way up to that condition where all the seeds which nature has planted in it can be fully developed, and its determination here on earth can be fulfilled. (ibid.)

This passage, which contains the elements of both Hegel and Marx's philosophies of history, leaves obscure the mechanisms by which one state constitution is replaced by another, so as to finally bring about a world federation of just civil societies. But elsewhere in the essay Kant makes it clear that the chief mechanism he has in mind is *war*, which occurs between states in the same way as it does between individuals if they attempt to coexist without any civil constitution:

> All wars are accordingly so many attempts (though not in the aim [*Absicht*] of men, yet in that of nature) to bring about new relations among states, and by the destruction, or at least dismemberment of old ones, to form new bodies, which however will in turn not be able to maintain themselves, either in themselves or in relation to one another, and must undergo similar revolutions, until finally — partially through the best possible internal organisation of the civil constitution, partially through common external agreement and legislation — a condition similar to a civil community is established and can maintain itself automatically. (IUH 24-5/35)

Externally, Kant says, states are driven to federate by the costs of war and of preparation for war (IUH 24/34). Meanwhile, internally, they are driven towards a gradual improvement in their constitutions by the fact that the freer the constitution of a state is the more apt its citizens are to generate both the culture and the wealth which is necessary in order to sustain a state's power in its competition with other states. This pressure for reform appears to become stronger the more the relative power of a state depends on such 'created' factors, as opposed to, for example, geographical advantages. Thus, speaking of the present situation, Kant says:

> States now stand in such artificial relations to one another that none can allow a decline in its internal culture without losing power and influence relative to others; thus at least the maintenance, if not the progress of this end of nature is fairly well assured by these states' honour-seeking [*ehrsuchtigen*] aims. Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without feeling after-effects in all occupations, especially trade, in which event a state's power in its external relations will diminish. [Thus] this freedom is gradually expanding. If one hinders the citizen [*Bürger*] from pursuing his well-being in whatever ways he pleases, consistent with the freedom of others, one hampers the liveliness of the general enterprise [*Betriebes*] and, along with it, the power of the whole. (IUH 27-8/37)

So the rulers of competing states have an interest in allowing as much freedom as possible to their individual citizens.[4]

Since culture conduces, in a way which is yet to be explained, to the realisation of humanity's moral *telos*, these mechanisms help indirectly to bring about this realisation, so that Kant feels free to describe this realisation as an 'end' or 'aim' of nature, using a teleological language which he will only fully justify several years later, in the *Critique of Judgement*.

[4] Kant does not fully separate the argument with respect to culture from that with respect to wealth. The latter argument has a strong affinity to one put forward by James Steuart. See Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, ch. 1.

To summarise, then, because of their self-assertiveness, men have to form some kind of political order in order to associate. Once they do so, competition and war break out between the states which they have formed. Externally, the costs of war push states gradually towards a world federation. Internally, those states with the freer constitutions are more successful in war, because such constitutions are more conducive to the development of wealth and culture. So, whether through the elimination of more despotic states in war or through reforms by their rulers in order to avoid such elimination, freer constitutions tend to gradually displace more despotic ones. In free constitutions, culture develops. Furthermore, the further culture in general develops, the more the power of any one state relative to its neighbours depends on its own level of wealth and culture, and the stronger the pressures on it to liberalise. So there is a mutually reinforcing *interaction* between the development of culture and the development of freer constitutions: an interaction between culture and 'constitutionality', as I shall call it.

While he sees culture and constitutionality as conducive to man's moral self-realisation, in the *Idea for a Universal History*, Kant strongly implies that no matter how far they were developed in their present form, they could not *constitute* this realisation. He says that realising a world federation of perfect civil societies would be 'no more than half way in man's development [*Ausbildung*]' (IUH 26/36). And he describes culture as we know it ('civilisation') as qualitatively different from a culture that could be directly associated with man's moral self-realisation:

> We are, to a high degree, *cultivated* [*kultiviert*] through art and science. We are *civilised* [*zivilisiert*] to the point of excess in all manner of social politeness and propriety. But we are a long way from being able to regard ourselves as *moralised*. For although the idea of morality belongs to culture, using this idea only in reference to semblances of morality, such as love of honour and outward propriety, constitutes mere civilisation. (ibid.)

The distinction between culture and morality that Kant draws here reflects his view of moral action. For Kant, genuinely moral action is autonomous action, that is, action which is motivated by pure reason alone.[5] Action done ultimately in order to satisfy inclinations or desires which we simply find in ourselves as 'given' cannot be genuinely moral action, even if the action in fact conforms to the moral law. Such action belongs rather to the realm of nature rather than to that of freedom.[6]

This poses an immediate problem for the idea that the development of culture and constitutionality can conduce to the realisation of mankind's moral *telos*. For the entire development of culture and constitutionality as Kant has described it has remained within this realm of nature. The raw inclinations that motivate men initially are gradually transformed into the civilised inclinations of men seeking honour, domination, possessions or propriety, but their status remains 'natural' in the sense of 'given'. Acting in order to satisfy them is not acting autonomously. Culture may improve men's skill in using their instrumental reason, and constitutionality may alter the consequences of their acts for the satisfaction of their inclinations (because of legal sanctions), but again these can make no difference to the case. It follows from the very definition of morality as action motivated independently of inclinations, that neither culture nor constitutionality as such can make men moral.[7] How then can they help to realise mankind's moral *telos*?

[5] See GMM 390/55 and GMM 397/63. Kant in fact defines autonomy somewhat more narrowly than this. He defines it as 'self-legislative action' rather than 'action motivated by pure reason alone'.

[6] Although of course not in the same sense that the movements of animals belong to the realm of nature.

[7] Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, p. 95, makes the point for constitutionality. Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, pp. 170-75, extends it to culture, which he, in contrast to the interpretation presented here, construes as *including* what I have called constitutionality.

To answer this question, we need to break it down into two. Firstly, given Kant's account of moral action as autonomy, in what exactly does the realisation of man's 'determination as a moral species', mankind's moral *telos*, consist? And secondly, how exactly do the development of culture and constitutionality take man towards that realisation? I shall take the following route in reconstructing Kant's answers to these questions. Firstly, I explain why Kant in part 2 of the *Critique of Judgment* thinks that we have to think of biological organisms as produced for an end. Secondly, I address his idea that we also have to think of the universe as a whole as produced for a single end. I do this by examining his concept of the 'highest good', as the end which the moral law commands us to promote. This highest good turns out to constitute man's objective final end, i.e. mankind's moral *telos* (thereby answering the first question). In order for its realisation to be practicable we are forced to think of the universe as a whole as having been produced for its sake. So the highest good turns out to be not only the final end of mankind, but also what we must think of as the final end of the universe as a whole. Thirdly, I examine Kant's views on the way in which culture and constitutionality can contribute to the realisation of this final end, answering the second question.

2. The concept of an end of nature

For Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* the language of 'ends' or 'purposes' (*Zwecke*) is strictly applicable only to the behaviour of intentional agents, such as human beings. When Kant uses it he always has in mind an intentional agent, an 'intelligent efficient cause', who represents this end to himself in his mind and acts so as to realise it in reality:

> Where the representation of an effect is at the same time the determining ground of an intelligent efficient cause to its production, the effect so represented is termed an *end*. (CJ2 426/313)

It is only for the products of such an agent that we can answer the question 'what is this for?' by citing the end or purpose the agent had in mind when he produced them. Yet, as we have seen, in sketching the philosophical history of *Conjectural Beginning* and *Idea for a Universal History* Kant had appealed to the idea of a human moral determination which historical events tend to realise, although the realisation of this determination is not a conscious end of any of the human actors involved at least through most of history. Furthermore, he expressed this vision by talking of the development of culture and constitutionality as ends of nature, with the implication that nature had as a further end man's moral realisation. Given his strict conception of an end, how can Kant make sense of such an 'end of nature'?

Kant's answer is to provide a critical reformulation of the idea of an end of nature. He begins by explaining that we can attribute ends where there are no intentional agents that we know of, if, given the cognitive faculties which we have, we find it necessary to do so in order to make the existence of certain things in nature intelligible to ourselves. Such an attribution will be not 'determinative' but 'reflective'. It will state, not that the thing 'is only possible through the agency of a cause that determines itself to action with aims [*Absichten*]' but that:

> *by the peculiar constitution of my cognitive faculties* the only way I can judge of the possibility of these things and of their production is by conceiving for them a cause working with an aim and consequently, a being whose causality is analogous to the causality of the understanding. (CJ2 397-8/280)

In Kant's example, we cannot make intelligible 'even the genesis of a blade of grass' if we appeal only to 'natural laws which no aim has ordered' (CJ2 400/282-3). We can only make the development of such a highly organised entity intelligible if we see the blade of grass as having been intentionally produced by an agent analogous to ourselves. This agent must have made the development of the grass into its mature state its end, and, in Kant's usage, this is to say that the (mature) blade of grass is itself an 'end'. By conceiving it in

this way we can make intelligible the way in which it grows *towards* its mature state. Every organised being is such an 'end' in the reflective sense.

Of course the intentional agent might have only created the blade of grass in order to realise some further end it had in mind, perhaps the creation of a cow. In that case the blade of grass would be an end which is also a means to the cow as a further end. Or, in another of Kant's usages, the grass would be an end but would also *have* an end outside itself. On the other hand, if the agent had no further aim in mind beyond the creation of the grass, then it would be 'not merely an end but also a *final end* [*Endzweck*]' (CJ2 426/313). For, 'A *final end* is an end that requires no other end as a condition of its possibility' (CJ2 434/322). That is, a final end is an end which is not also a means to any further end for the intentional agent concerned.

3. The highest good

Although this kind of 'argument from design' can force us to assume, for reflective purposes, the existence of an intentional agent responsible for the production of the biological organisms in nature, it does not warrant us in assuming that this agent has produced the whole of the universe in order to realise one single end (CJ2 454-5/344-5).[8] Nevertheless we are also forced to make this latter assumption, though not in order to be able to make *intelligible* to ourselves the existence of certain things in nature, but in order to understand as *practicable* the end which the moral law sets us.

[8] Kant does say in the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* that to think of nature as a whole as intelligible to us we have to assume, reflectively, that it has been produced in accord with a single end, namely its human comprehensibility. So we have to assume the '*purposiveness [Zweckmässigkeit] of nature* in its multiplicity' (CJ1 180-81/18-20). However he does not speak here of nature as having been produced *in order* to realise that end. Rather he thinks of the end in question as a subordinate end of the creator.

To see this, we need to investigate the end which the moral law sets us. For Kant, the moral law does not just require that, in the pursuit of ends derived from natural inclinations, we limit the maxims of our action to those which we can universalise. It also proposes to us an end of its own, and this is the promotion of the 'highest good'. It must do this because men, even men acting morally, need some kind of end for their actions. The highest good provides this end:

> The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, obligates us of itself, independently of any end as a material condition. But it also determines for us, and does so a priori, a final end [*Endzweck*], and makes it obligatory upon us to strive after it: this is the *highest good in the world* possible through freedom. (CJ2 450/339)

Just as the moral law gives the formal characteristics of a pure will, so the highest good, which is derived from it, gives the end of such a will. So we could discover the nature of the highest good by the following procedure, which Kant describes in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793):

> Take a man who, honouring the moral law, allows the thought to occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of world he would *create*, under the guidance of practical reason, were such a thing within his ability, a world into which, moreover, he would place himself as a member. (RWL 5/5)

Such a man would 'make the very choice, which the moral idea of the highest good brings with it' (ibid.).[9] Since the first principle of his own willing is the moral law, we might expect that he would will a world in which everyone necessarily and invariably acts from the moral law, in other words in which everyone's will is holy, and this does seem to be Kant's conception of the highest good at some points in the *Critique of Practical Reason*

[9] This 'intuitive' derivation of the content of the end which the moral law proposes to us obviously cannot substitute for a theoretically rigorous derivation. For reconstructions of such a rigorous derivation in Kant, see Zeldin, 'The *summum bonum*', pp. 49-50, and Silber, 'The importance of the highest good', pp. 183-94.

(1788).[10] But man, as a sensuous creature, is incapable of making his will completely holy. In this life:

> all the moral perfection to which man can attain is virtue, i.e. a law-conforming disposition [*Gesinnung*] out of *respect* for the law and therefore consciousness of a continuous propensity to transgress or at least to a defilement, i.e. to an admixture of many spurious (not moral) motives to obedience to the law ... (CPaR 128/133)

As a sensuous creature with inclinations, man always has the possibility of action motivated independently of respect for the moral law, and this is to say that, in this world at least, he can never become holy, but only at most perfectly virtuous. In fact, as we have seen, in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant qualifies the concept of 'the highest good' as 'the highest good possible in the world through freedom' (page 94), and with this qualification it should consist not in universal holiness but in universal virtue.[11] In fact Kant says in both texts that the prime component of the highest good is virtue. Accordingly I shall interpret the 'highest good' as the highest good possible for sensuous beings, those in whom sensuous motivation always remains a possibility.[12]

Although Kant makes virtue the primary component of the highest good, he does not make it the only one. When he first introduces the idea with the *Critique of Practical Reason* he

[10] Notably in his proof of the immortality of the soul, which rests on the idea that an eternity would be needed for the will to become holy, and therefore for the highest good to be fully realised (CPaR 122/126-27).

[11] On the equivocation between the two conceptions in Kant, Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, p.172 (and p.164), and Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 268-9. Given Kant's occasional equation of the highest good with the kingdom of God (CPaR 128/133, 130/135, RWL 134-5/125-6), the contrast between a 'holiness' and a 'virtue' conception of the highest good can plausibly be aligned with that between 'the kingdom of God in heaven' and 'the kingdom of God on earth'. For two views of the relation between the highest good and the kingdom of ends in the *Groundwork*, see Korsgaard 'Two distinctions', p.181, and Zeldin, 'The *summum bonum*', p.49.

[12] Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, pp. 29-80, argues persuasively for the importance of this more practicable conception of the highest good for Kant's philosophy of history.

says that virtue, although it is the 'supreme [*oberste*] good', is not also by itself the highest good. The highest good must also include happiness, because:

> to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it and yet not to partake of it cannot be in accord with the perfect volition of an all-powerful rational being, if we assume such a being only for the sake of the argument. (CPaR 110/114-5)

In other words, a moral will must will not only that men be virtuous, but also that, to the extent that they are virtuous, they be happy. This combination of virtue and happiness then constitutes the highest good:

> Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person, and likewise happiness, in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy), constitutes the *highest good* of a possible world. (CPaR 110/115)[13]

In the definition of the highest good, then, happiness enters in as a secondary but necessary component:

> [The] highest good is formed by the union of the greatest welfare of the rational beings in the world with the supreme condition of their good, or in other words, by the union of universal happiness with the strictest morality. (CJ2 453/343)[14]

If the highest good were fully realised, men would all be fully virtuous, they would all also be happy, and they would be happy *because* they were virtuous. This 'because' has to be understood correctly. Kant is not saying that, as a matter of analytical truth, happiness in such a world would consist simply in a consciousness of one's virtue. Defining happiness in terms of consciousness of virtue is the error he accuses the Stoics of making

[13] Kant here uses the idea of a 'possible world' to make the distinction between a collective conception of the highest good from an individual one, whereas, as I interpret him (page 95 above), he uses the idea of what is 'possible in the world' to make the different distinction between a 'virtue' conception and a 'holiness' one.

[14] More exactly, if the highest good only includes others' happiness in proportion to their virtue then it is only the *deserved* satisfaction of other's ends that the moral law commands us to further. See Silber, 'The importance of the highest good', pp. 192-4.

(CPaR 111/115). For Kant happiness is 'the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum' (GMM 399/64), the satisfaction of the sum of desires, wishes and urges which arise naturally in us and which we experience as simply 'given'. It is this ordinary happiness which is to result from people's virtue, in that world which realises the highest good.[15]

At first sight it might seem that a world characterised by such a 'reward mechanism', as one commentator unhappily puts it,[16] could not be one in which men acted morally. If to act morally is to act independently of all inclinations, it seems impossible that there could be a world in which acting morally was precisely the *way* in which people satisfied their inclinations. But the objection trades on an ambivalence in the sense of 'way'. Kant's position is logically tenable. It is possible for the satisfaction of inclinations to *result* from one's acting morally, even regularly, without this satisfaction coming to constitute a *motivation* for acting morally, and it is only this last eventuality which Kant's definition of moral action rules out as impossible. People could act morally in the happy expectation of the satisfaction of their inclinations, and yet remain *motivated* solely by respect for the moral law, so that if they ever found themselves presented with a choice between moral action and their own happiness they would unhesitatingly choose the former. It is an excessively ascetic interpretation of Kant that says that for him an action of moral worth must be motivated not only independently of the inclinations but also in direct *opposition* to them.[17]

[15] See also the definition of happiness as 'the satisfaction of all our desires' at A 806/B 834. In holding to this 'ordinary' definition of happiness I differ from Zeldin, who finds a redefinition of happiness in the second *Critique* as 'the moral autonomy of each in a world system' ('The *summum bonum*', pp. 51-3). This would effectively identify Kant's position with the Stoic one which he criticises. Incidentally, the inclusion of happiness in the ordinary sense in the highest good seems to preclude the definition of its primary component as holiness, since presumably a holy will lacks natural inclinations and desires.

[16] Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, p. 69.

[17] For a defence of the view taken here, see Herman, 'On the value of acting from the motive of duty', especially pp. 369-71, 376-82.

4. Mankind's final end and the final end of creation

The highest good, then, is the universalisation of virtue supplemented by deserved happiness. This is the end which the moral law proposes to us, one analogous to the everyday ends of non-moral action. It differs from those ends only in its source. The source of an ordinary end is the inclination which we hope to satisfy through realising that end. The source of the highest good as an end, by contrast, is exclusively the moral law. What counts as the highest good is defined by the moral law, and we adopt the highest good as an end *because*, and only because, of our respect for the moral law.[18] It follows that in attempting to realise the highest good we cannot possibly use immoral means, since to do so would be to abandon the respect for the moral law on which our very adoption of the highest good as an end is founded.[19]

Thus by deriving an end from the moral law Kant does not fall into the principle of heteronomy, the derivation of the content or motivation of moral action from some source external to pure reason. He would only do this if he had defined the highest good independently of the moral law, and then defined morality as that which produces it. For Kant, by contrast, what motivates the moral will is a conception of the highest good which it has derived *from* the moral law. The moral law is 'included and thought' in this conception (CPaR 110/114). This conception in the mind of the moral agent then functions as the 'determining ground' of the agent's will (the motivating reason for this action) in the same way as the representation of an ordinary end does, without violating the principle

[18] In willing the highest good it is true that I also will my own future happiness, but only in so far as it is true that I will in fact act morally in the future and because the moral law poses as an end that people should be happy as a result of being moral. I do not will the highest good *in order* to ensure my future happiness. So willing this end is quite compatible with Kant's requirements for the moral will.

[19] Silber, 'The highest good', p. 194, and Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, p. 34n, both make this point.

that the fundamental determining ground of autonomous action must be the moral law itself:

> [I]t is self-evident not merely that, if the moral law is included as the supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good is then the *object*, but also that the concept of it and the representation of its existence as possible through our practical reason are likewise the *determining ground* of the pure will. This is because the moral law, included and thought in this concept, and no other object, determines the will, as required by the principle of autonomy. (CPaR 109-10/114)[20]

This end posed by the moral law is a 'final end', an end which is not also a means. A moral will does not will it as a means to bring about some further end, but simply as a direct expression of the moral law itself. Furthermore, Kant says that any end dictated by the moral law is not only an end of a moral will, but also an end of every rational being, that is, an end of every being which is capable of being motivated by respect for the moral law. It is the end of every rational being, not in the sense that it actually figures as an aim directing every such being's actions (as it does those of a moral will), but in the sense that it *ought* so to figure. In Kant's terms, it is an end not in the subjective but in the objective sense.[21] Since men are rational beings, it follows that this *final end* dictated by the moral law is *mankind's final end* (in the objective sense).

[20] Thus Yovel (*Kant and the Philosophy of History*, p. 34) must be wrong to say that in general Kant sees the representation of this end 'not as a determining ground of the will', but only as an a regulative idea that 'places the isolated acts in a broader perspective and allows the agent to see them as contributing to the moral progress of the universe'. Such a weak, purely interpretive, conception of an 'end' could not support the use that Kant makes of it to give a direction to the moral will. In the texts Yovel cites in support of his view (e.g. RWL 4/4, CPaR 109/113) Kant only asserts that the representation of the highest good is not a determining ground of the moral will antecedent to that will's acceptance of the moral law.

[21] See GMM 427/90 and RWL 6n/6n for definitions of the idea of an 'objective end'.

With this notion of an objective final end, Kant connects his moral theory with the teleological formulations of the *Conjectural Beginning* and the *Idea for a Universal History*. The realisation of the 'moral determination of the human species' described in those essays turns out to be the realisation of the objective end of humanity, which in turn is the highest good described in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgement*. We have thus answered the first of our two questions (page 91 above): 'what does the realisation of the moral determination of humanity consist in?' But whereas in the Aristotelian view man, like every being, tends to realise his *telos* 'by nature', Kant's conception of the relation of the objective end of humanity to 'nature' must be quite different. It is an end commanded by a moral law which obliges us to act in a way *unmotivated* by our natural inclinations.

The fact that the highest good is mankind's (objective) final end explains why we are forced to assume that the universe itself has been produced for a single final end, namely a *creator's* final end, or, in Kant's idiom, a final end of creation. I said that for Kant we are forced to assume this only because we have to in order to conceive the end set by the moral law as practicable (page 93). We can now see how this argument works. The moral law commands that we adopt the highest good as an end. To take something as an end means to direct one's actions so as to realise it. And if the moral law commands that we act to realise something then it must be possible for us to realise it. But the radical incommensurability between the motivations of virtue and the inclinations whose satisfaction constitute happiness make it impossible for us to see how we could bring about a world in which happiness was the invariable accompaniment of virtue. So unless we want to abandon the moral law altogether, we are forced to assume a creator of the universe who has so ordered nature as to make such a connection possible. This would be a *moral* creator of the universe (CPaR 122-5/126-30). As Kant summarises this argument:

> It was our duty to promote the *highest good*; and it is not merely our privilege, but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, to *presuppose* the possibility of this *highest good*. Since this can be only under the *condition* of the *existence of God*, its presupposition is inseparably bound up with duty. That is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. (CPaR 125/130)[22]

In order to make *intelligible* to ourselves the production of biological organisms we had to assume the existence of an intentional agent which had created those things as realisations of its ends. Now, by contrast, in order to make *practicable* for ourselves the realisation of the highest good commanded by the moral law, we have to assume the existence of an intentional agent who has produced the universe in such a way as to make this realisation practicable. Presumably, then, the production of the universe in this way would figure for this intentional agent as a means towards a further end: the realisation of the highest good itself. The motivations of such an agent would be moral at least in a weak sense, and Kant assumes that it must be a moral being in a strong enough sense that we can call it God.

I shall take it that Kant also assumes that the realisation of the highest good would have to be not just the *further* end for which he produced the universe in this way, but also the *final* end for which he produced the universe at all. In this case *God's* (actual) final end in producing the universe, the final end of creation, would be identical with *mankind's* (objective) final end.

In this case the highest good not only provides a final end for human moral action, but also justifies us in assuming that that *same* highest good is a final end of the universe as a whole, that is, that it is the answer to the question, 'what does the universe exist for?'

[22] The argument is repeated at CJ2 447-53/336-42. Note that by 'possible' here Kant means 'possible for us to bring about'. I use the term 'practicable' for this. He does not mean 'possible' in the earlier sense of 'possible in the world' (page 95 above), i.e. compatible with our status as sensuous beings.

5. Final ends and ultimate ends

Admittedly there is a problem here. For Kant, moral action is action motivated by the thought of the moral law alone, and this means that it must be chosen freely. The person who acts morally must always be in a position where he could have done otherwise. Even the adoption of a virtuous disposition must be the result of a similarly motivated and so similarly free 'decision' (RWL 47/43).[23] It would follow, at least as far as we are capable of understanding things, that God cannot make men moral, and therefore that he cannot by himself realise the highest good, which is the end for which he has created the whole universe.

This problem becomes explicit in §87 of the text of the *Critique of Judgment* when Kant finally comes to characterise the final end of creation in detail. Until this point he has only said, vaguely, that this final end must be the existence of man 'considered as noumenon', of man 'as a subject of morality', of man 'as a moral being' (CJ2 435/323 and 436n/323-4n) or of rational beings 'under moral laws' (CJ2 444/333). Now he says again that it can only be man, or any rational being, 'under moral laws', and then adds in a footnote:

> I say deliberately: *under* [*unter*] moral laws. It is not man *in accordance with* [*nach*] moral laws, that is to say, behaving in conformity with [*gemäss*] such laws, that is the final end of creation. For to use the latter expression would be to assert more than we know, namely, that it is in the power of an author of the world to ensure that man should always behave in accord with [*angemessen*] the moral laws ... It is only of *man under moral laws* that we are able to affirm, without overstepping the limits of our insight, that his existence constitutes the final end of the world. (CJ2 448-9n/338n)

[23] See also the passage in the *Doctrine of Virtue* where Kant explicitly denies that virtue can consist in a habit of acting in accord with the moral law, where habit means 'a uniformity of action which by frequent repetition has become a necessity' (MM 407/207-8).

So Kant goes on to characterise this less ambitious end for God:

> According to our concepts of free causality, good or bad conduct depends upon ourselves. But we place the supreme wisdom in the government of the world in that the occasion for the former, and the result following from both, be ordained according to [*nach*] moral laws. In this last consists, properly speaking, the glory of God, which is therefore not inappropriately termed by theologians the *ultimate* end [*letzte Zweck*] of creation. (CJ2 449n/338n)

The construction I put on this passage is as follows. God's attainable end is now defined as that order of things in which virtue is proportionately rewarded with happiness. This is then the meaning here of 'man under moral laws'.[24] But this cannot be God's *final* end, an end that is not a means to anything else. Rather it is a means to, or more exactly a contributing component of, what really is God's final end, which is the highest good. It is the most that God, by himself, can do towards the realisation of the highest good, which is his final end. Kant signals this by calling it the ultimate end [*letzte Zweck*] rather than the final end [*Endzweck*] of creation. An ultimate end, then, would be distinguished from a final end in this way: while a final end is an end which is not also a means to any further end of the intentional agent concerned (page 93 above), an ultimate end is an end which is not a means to any further end of the intentional agent concerned that the agent can bring about *alone*, but which is nevertheless a means to some further end of the agent that the agent cannot bring about alone.

Thus the fact that the nature of the final end of creation is such that God *cannot* realise it by himself is recognised in the definition of a subordinate end as the most which God *can* do by himself, in his role as creator, towards realising the final end of creation. 'Man under moral laws', i.e. happiness in proportion to virtue, is now the ultimate end of creation, while the highest good is the final end of creation. Yet Kant fails to revise his

[24] However see the somewhat different meaning that seems to attach to the phrase 'under moral laws' at GMM 447/108, 450/111.

original statement that the final end of creation 'can only be *man* (or any rational being in the world) *under moral laws*' (CJ2 448/338). So the two ends are not properly distinguished, as I have attempted to distinguish them here. This incomplete distinction is characteristic of Kant's discussion of the end of creation in the *Critique of Judgment*.[25]

6. Culture, constitutionality and freedom

Nevertheless, once the distinction between the final end of creation and the ultimate end of creation is clear, a second distinction of Kant's, which he does consistently maintain, is easier to understand. This is the distinction between the final end of creation and the ultimate end of *nature*. The ultimate end of *creation* was the most that God could do, in his capacity as creator *as such*, to bring about his (and mankind's) final end. Similarly, the ultimate end of *nature* is the most that God can do, in his capacity as creator of *nature*, to bring about this same final end. The two concepts are not identical because what God creates is not only nature, the world of phenomena, but also the world of noumena. It is in his capacity as joint creator of both worlds that he can bring about the correspondence between virtue (which belongs to one) and happiness (which belongs to the other), which we identified as the ultimate end of creation. But there is an independent contribution which he can make to the realisation of his final end through the way in which he organises the world of nature alone, and the furthest possible extent of *this* contribution is what Kant calls the ultimate end of nature.

[25] The clearest failure to distinguish the two occurs when he says that 'the final end of creation is such a constitution of the world as harmonises with what we can only definitely specify according to laws, namely with the final end of our pure practical reason' (CJ2 455/345). On any reasonable reading this makes 'final end of creation' into a means towards the realisation of mankind's final end. But a final end which is a means is not a final end at all. Kant should have said 'the *ultimate* end of creation …'.

What made the distinction between the final end of creation and the ultimate end of creation necessary was only that we could not see how God, even in his full role as creator of both worlds, could make us moral. By contrast the distinction between the final end of creation and the ultimate end of *nature* is based on stronger grounds. Even if there were some way, beyond 'the limits of our insight' (page 102 above) whereby God could makes us moral, he could not do it in his role of creator of nature alone. This is because moral actions are actions motivated by respect for the moral law alone, and for Kant this means that they originate in reason alone, and not in any prior natural causes. Their 'causality' is that of freedom not that of nature. As such they cannot be produced by the operations of nature:

> Morality, or a causality according to ends that is subordinate to morality, is absolutely impossible through natural causes. (CJ2 436n/323n)

It follows directly that God cannot bring about the final end by creating nature in a certain way. At best, the operations of nature can do no more than make it possible for men to become virtuous through their own free action. However, given the prior assumption of a God who does take the highest good as a final end, we would expect him to do everything possible towards that end *qua* creator of nature. So we are entitled to search for that natural product which goes as far as is possible, given the character of the natural, towards facilitating men's adoption of virtue. This product will be the ultimate end of nature. Introducing this concept, Kant says that to discover it, 'in man at any rate', we must:

> seek out what nature can supply for the purpose of what he himself must do in order to be a final end (CJ2 431/318-9),

where, by 'be a final end', Kant must mean 'realise the final end, namely the highest good, in his actions'.

The operations of nature include all those actions of men that are motivated 'empirically', by the inclinations rather than by pure reason and the moral law. *En masse*, these actions produce the blind mechanism of historical movement which Kant outlined in his two historical essays. And it is to this part of the operations of nature that Kant looks now in order to identify the ultimate end of nature. After briefly considering and dismissing the possibility that the ultimate end of nature might be human happiness, he identifies it instead as one of the twin products of the mechanisms of history, as those mechanisms were portrayed in the *Conjectural Beginning* and the *Idea for a Universal History*, namely *culture*. At the same time, he now for the first time defines culture explicitly:

> We are left, out of all of [man's] ends in nature, only with a formal, subjective condition, namely that of the aptitude in general for setting ends before himself, and (independent of nature in his determination of ends) for employing nature as a means conforming to the maxims of his free ends in general. This alone remains as what nature can effect with regard to the final end which lies outside it, and as what may therefore be regarded as its ultimate end. The production in a rational being of the aptitude for ends of its own choosing in general (consequently in its freedom) is *culture*. Hence it is only culture which can be the ultimate end that we have reason to attribute to nature in respect of the human race. (CJ2 431/319)

In other words, the ultimate end of nature can only be culture, or, to give another definition of it which Kant offers, 'the aptitude and skill for all manner of ends for which [man] may employ nature (both external and internal)' (CJ2 430/317).

With this, the argument that began with the derivation of the highest good as the end which the moral law proposes to humans finally joins up with the sketches of the historical process that Kant gave in the two historical essays. For the highest good to be practicable we had to assume a God who makes this highest good his end. Such a God could not bring it about that men act morally. But he could so order creation to ensure the proportionality of happiness to virtue (the final end of creation). And he could so order nature to bring about those circumstances that would facilitate moral action by men as far

as it is possible for natural circumstances to do this (the ultimate end of nature).[26] Those circumstances are now identified as culture, and since it is the mechanisms of history that produce culture, history turns out to be that part of nature through which its ultimate end (which we therefore also call the ultimate end of history) is accomplished. Discovering that there are mechanisms in history whereby this ultimate end is in fact produced provides us with indirect empirical evidence that the highest good is in fact practicable, and so enables us to attempt to promote it with full seriousness. At the same time the argument from the highest good gives us the basis for asserting that this product of the mechanisms of history is not an accidental effect of history but is the 'end' (in the sense of 'purpose') for which those historical mechanisms exist.

So defined, culture is clearly a characteristic of individual human beings, rather than a feature of their social or political environment. However Kant goes on to distinguish two aspects of culture, the 'culture of skill' and the 'culture of discipline'. The culture of skill is the technical ability to realise chosen ends while the culture of discipline is the ability to choose those ends at will. The two together constitute the 'aptitude for ends … in general'. Of these two aspects, the first is associated with the development of a just political order, while the second is not.

7. The culture of skill

The 'culture of skill' is technical ability. This seems to have been the major sense of culture in Kant's arguments in the two historical essays for a positive interaction between culture and constitutionality. But here Kant (writing in the first years of the French Revolution) hints at a new account of the positive political effects of culture in the sense of technical ability. The development of the culture of skill, that is, of the arts and

[26] This of course assumes that it is possible, given Kant's moral psychology, for natural circumstances to do this *at all*. See below, footnote 32, page 114.

sciences, is associated with an increasing inequality between the rich, who actually undertake this development, and the poor, on whose menial labour they depend for the necessaries of life. This inequality leads finally to the introduction of a just civil constitution, which in turn further facilitates the development of the culture of skill:

> With the progress of [the culture of skill] — whose culminating point, where the tendency to what is superfluous becomes detrimental to what is indispensable, is called luxury — misfortunes increase equally on both sides, on the one through alien violence, on the other through internal insatiability. Yet this splendid misery is bound up with the development of natural capacities in the human species, and the end of nature itself, though it is not our end, is thereby attained. The formal condition under which alone nature can realise this final aim [*Absicht*] is a constitution regulating the relations of men with one another so that damage to the freedom of individuals striving against one another is opposed by a lawful power in the whole, which is called a *civil society*. For it is only in such a constitution that the greatest development of natural capacities can take place. (CJ2 432/320)

A careful reading shows that Kant has not strictly committed himself to the thesis that the growth of inequality tends to give rise, through a dynamic internal to the society (so distinct from that of war between societies described on pages 87-88), to a just and free civil constitution. But he has certainly given this impression.[27] In this case Kant, while agreeing with Rousseau in connecting the development of the arts and sciences with increasing inequality, makes the political upshot the opposite of that in the *Discourse on Inequality*, where personal economic dependency leads on to political despotism. He follows this with a rehearsal of his argument, described already, that war between states tends eventually to bring about a world federation (ibid.).

Kant does not explain properly how all this shows that the culture of skill conduces to the realisation of the highest good. He seems to have two lines of thought in mind, neither of

[27] A literal reading of the text would be that the gap between rich and poor directly facilitates the further development of culture, but only in the context of a just civil constitution. In this case Kant would have abstained from saying anything about how such a constitution tends to come about.

which he states with full clarity. The first is that the development of the culture of skill leads, through the mechanisms just mentioned, to constitutionality within a world-wide 'morally founded system' of civil societies (CJ2 433/320), and this political order is directly conducive to human virtue. The second is that the culture of skill, although alone it does not constitute the ultimate end of nature (CJ2 431/319), nevertheless gives rise to the other component of culture, the 'culture of discipline', which is again directly conducive to human virtue.

What I plan to argue is that Kant intends these two lines of thought to be complementary. For men to act morally, and thus to bring about the primary component of the highest good, it is necessary that they should act in *conformity* with the moral law, but it is also necessary that they should act *from* the moral law. In order to act in *conformity* with the moral law they must have the ability to perform actions that are required by it rather than actions that transgress it, while in order to act *from* the moral law they must have the ability to adopt respect for the moral law rather than any of their inclinations as their motivation. These two abilities correspond to what Kant calls, respectively, external and internal freedom. Both are defined in terms of human constraint. External freedom is the absence of constraints by others on one's performing any action in general. Internal freedom is the ability to constrain oneself to act on one particular motive (namely respect for the moral law), rather than on any of the inclinations (MM 396/199).[28]

[28] In the terms introduced by Taylor, 'What's wrong with negative liberty', internal and external freedom are both 'opportunity concepts' rather than 'exercise concepts'. To be free in either sense is to have a certain capacity rather than to exercise it. External freedom corresponds to the concept of 'negative freedom' in contemporary political philosophy (see footnote 25, page 70 above). Internal freedom corresponds (more loosely) to that of 'free will'. In two well-known passages (GMM 446-7/107-8 and MM 213-4/42) Kant divides internal freedom into a positive freedom (the capacity to act on pure reason alone) and a negative freedom (the capacity to act independently of inclinations), but for Kant these are properly speaking only two aspects of the same capacity.

8. Constitutionality and external freedom

Kant's first line of thought refers to external freedom. A just constitution, such as the culture of skill helps to bring about, maximises external freedom, by constraining individuals as much as is required to prevent them from constraining each other, that is, by constraining them to act in accord with 'right' (MM 231-2/57). Sometimes human constraint takes the form of physical prevention, but usually it takes the form of coercion. The state prevents one from doing something by threatening one with harm if one does it. But in either case the state can only make one's action conform to right. It cannot make one adopt the moral law as one's motive for action. Indeed in the case of coercion it actually *relies* on one being motivated by one's inclinations, since the threat is precisely a threat to prevent the satisfaction of those inclinations.

Nevertheless, Kant says in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) of civil law:

> Not only does it provide a veneer of morality (*causae non causae*), but, by placing [citizens' inclinations towards violence against one another] behind bars, it also actually makes it easier to develop the moral capacity towards direct and immediate respect for right. Everyone believes of himself that he would truly venerate and abide by the concept of right, if only he could expect the same from everybody else, which it is the government's part to insure; and by this means a large step towards morality is taken (although it is still not a moral step). (PP 375-6n/131n)

What Kant must have in mind is that although constitutionality cannot by definition provide individuals with inclination-based motives for acting morally, it can *remove* inclination-based motives for acting in a way that *violates* right, namely that aspect of the moral law which requires that individuals allow each other the maximum of external freedom. It cannot make them moral, but it can make it easier for them to conform externally to the moral law by ensuring that the decision to do so does not mean huge

sacrifices for them.[29] And it does this precisely by ensuring their external freedom: by protecting them against the violence of *other* individuals, by coercing those others into conforming their action to right.[30]

9. The culture of discipline and internal freedom

Kant's second line of thought refers to internal freedom. It appears not in his section on the culture of skill but in the discussion of the 'culture of discipline' which follows it. The culture of discipline:

> consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, whereby, attached to certain natural things, we are rendered incapable of choosing for ourselves. (CJ2 432/319)

Thus the culture of discipline gives us an ability to choose our ends for ourselves, an ability which we can then use to choose to act from the moral law. Now the development of the arts and sciences, which we have identified with that of the culture of skill, produces just this liberation. It may create and diffuse amongst men 'a mass of insatiable inclinations', with evil consequences, but:

> while that is so, we cannot fail to recognise the end of nature: to prevail ever more and more over the rudeness and violence of inclinations that belong to the animality in us and are most contrary to our training [*Ausbildung*] for a higher determination (inclinations towards enjoyment), and to make room for the development of our humanity. Fine art and the sciences, by conveying a pleasure which admits of universal communication, and by introducing polish and refinement into society, do not make man morally better. But they do make him civilised [*gesittet*], do much to overcome the tyranny of sensuous propensities, and

[29] Constitutionality here plays a similar role to happiness at one point in the *Groundwork*, where Kant says that assuring one's own happiness is a duty, since 'discontent with one's state, in a press of cares and amidst unsatisfied needs, might easily become a great *temptation to the transgression of duty*' (GMM 399/64).

[30] The role that Kant attributes to the just constitution is formally similar to that which, in the interpretation of Barry, 'Warrender and his critics', Hobbes attributes to the sovereign.

> so prepare man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power. (CJ2 433/321)

In other words, the development of the culture of skill multiplies, refines and 'socialises' our (phenomenological) needs, but it also thereby introduces an element of choice and will into our efforts to satisfy those needs. It is this will that we may then use to make the transition to a moral existence. The mechanism of history in history cannot bring about this moral existence by itself, but it can, and does, bring us to its threshold through producing a culture of discipline in us. So we can discern:

> nature striving purposively to give us that training [*Ausbildung*] that will make us susceptible to ends higher than those which nature itself can supply. (ibid.)

The passage from which I have taken the last three quotes relies heavily on political metaphors (e.g. the despotism of desires, the tyranny of sensuous propensities, the sovereignty of reason), and it is evident that Kant sees the culture of discipline as somehow performing an internal role analogous to the external role played by constitutionality. There the issue was external actions; here it is internal motivations. Where constitutionality gave us external freedom from the power of other individuals, and so made it easier for us to act in external conformity to right, the culture of discipline gives us internal freedom from the power of particular inclinations, and so makes it easier for us to adopt respect for the moral law as a motivation.

So after initially stating simply that the ultimate end of nature is culture (page 106 above), Kant has gone on to a more complex position. The ultimate end of nature is now dual: constitutionality on the one hand and the culture of discipline on the other.[31] Behind both

[31] The duality corresponds to the central division established in the *Groundwork* between conformity to the moral law and motivation by respect for the moral law, as well as to the division of the moral theory of the *Metaphysics of Morals* between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue.

stands the culture of skill, which plays a central role with regard to each: developing in positive interaction with the former (as described by the two historical essays and summarised and extended here) and directly generating the latter.

With this account, we have finally given an answer to the second of the questions with which we began: 'How exactly do the development of culture and constitutionality take man towards the realisation of his moral *telos*?' (page 91 above).

10. Rousseau, Kant and Hegel

Thus, in the realm of psychology just as much as that of politics, Kant replaces Rousseau's ambivalence as to the effects of the natural mechanisms of history with optimism. While in one element of Rousseau's thought the multiplication and socialisation of persisting desires and actual needs progressively reduces man to an inner equivalent of political unfreedom, an 'enslavement to his own desires', in Kant it has the opposite effect. It may leave him with more persisting desires, but it reduces their individual strength and equips him with an ability to choose between them, an ability which he can then use to choose the moral law as his motivation and so to initiate a genuinely moral existence.

Both in his description of rising inequalities and in that of multiplying needs, then, Kant accepts Rousseau's description of the tendencies of human history but draws more unambiguously optimistic conclusions. In the *Discourse on Inequality* the overwhelming picture is of a historical tendency to political and psychological enslavement, and it is only in the context of Rousseau's later works that it is possible to understand these developments as preparing the way for human self-realisation. Kant instead sees history as systematically tending to produce political and psychological freedom, and thereby the

possibility of the highest good which is man's final end. Similarly, where *Emile* and *The Social Contract* themselves stood in an ambiguous relation to Rousseau's conjectural history, Kant can place his successor to their vision unambiguously in a future which history is in the process of making possible.

While Kant's treatment of the role of needs in the historical development of human freedom looks back to Rousseau, it also looks ahead to Hegel. This is particularly clear in the arguments regarding internal and external freedom discussed in the last two sections. In terms of Kant's own metaphysics, both external and internal freedom ought to be capacities that are inherent in us as rational beings. Their reality should be derived, in the one case as much as the other, from the moral law, on the principle that what we recognise ourselves as obliged to do, we must consider ourselves able to do. Other people cannot prevent us by threats from acting in conformity with the moral law, just as our own inclinations cannot prevent us from acting out of respect for the moral law. Yet Kant's account in the *Critique of Judgment* implicitly historicises both of these freedoms. Formally, both of them have always belonged to us, and changes in natural circumstances, whether internal or external, can make no difference to them. But in practice it is only the development of constitutionality and of the culture of discipline that makes them effective and real for us, in that they can be exercised without grossly unrealistic efforts of will. From here it is not a long step to defining freedom in such a way that it is *constituted*, as opposed to merely made usable, in the process of human history, and this is the step that Hegel takes.[32]

[32] The assertion that the way in which Kant's theory of history makes natural circumstances facilitators of morality is incompatible with his absolute dichotomy between freedom and nature, and the suggestion that this dilemma 'points' in the direction of a Hegelian solution, have both been made by a number of commentators. For example: Fackenheim, 'Kant's concept of history'; Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, pp. 271-306; Pompa, 'Philosophical history in Kant and Hegel'.

Furthermore, the central (if obscured) role of the culture of skill, Kant's version of the development of the 'arts and sciences' in Rousseau, anticipates that of its successor-concepts in Hegel and Marx: *Bildung* and the development of man's productive powers (the 'forces of production'). For Kant, anticipating both Hegel and Marx, development in the realm of economic production plays a key role in the historical realisation of the 'realm of freedom'. In this sense at least, Kant's interpretation of history can be called an economic one.

4 Hegel and individual motivation in history

In this chapter I approach the question of the role of needs in Hegel's philosophy of history in an indirect way, by raising a difficulty about the mechanism whereby history is supposed to move towards its final end, namely the self-cognition and so self-realisation of mind. I shall argue that this mechanism must be understood as driven by the unconscious motivations of ordinary individuals in history. However in his summaries of his philosophy of history Hegel gives no explanation of how these motivations develop. I then propose a reading of sections of Hegel's systematic account of mind as providing just such an account. These sections will then be understood as providing a history of ordinary motivation which runs parallel to and provides 'microfoundations' for Hegel's official account of history as the rise and fall of civilisations. I go on to carry out such a reading for Hegel's account of the struggle for recognition, understanding it as a description of the process whereby human beings first entered into some form of state and so initiated history.

In chapter 5 I pursue this reading through Hegel's sections on 'universal self-consciousness', personality and property, and the system of needs. I argue that the history that emerges is one in which ordinary human motivations are successively driven to become more universal by versions of a single underlying contradiction, until they culminate in the ethical motivations of the citizen of the modern state. It is this increasing universality of ordinary motivation, I suggest, that must be understood as underlying the rise and fall of civilisations in Hegel's official philosophy of history. In this underlying historical process the concept of needs plays a pivotal role.

1. History as the self-realisation of mind

Hegel's philosophy of history is inseparable from his philosophy of mind, as is obvious when his *Geist* is translated in the traditional way as 'mind' rather than in the more recently predominant way as 'spirit'. For as he says in *Reason and History* (1822-30), the introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of history, 'the universal end' of world history is 'that the concept of mind should be satisfied' (RH 86-7/74).[1] History is the temporal process in which mind realises its concept, or its essence, its essential nature, in a process analogous to the plant's development from seed to its mature form.[2] The concept or essence of mind is therefore its *telos*. The essence of mind is freedom:

> [F]reedom is the substance of mind. It is immediately obvious to everyone that freedom is one of the various attributes of mind; but philosophy teaches us that all the attributes of mind exist only by virtue of freedom, that all are merely means of attaining freedom, and that the sole object which they all seek and to whose realisation they all contribute is freedom. Speculative philosophy has shown that freedom is the one authentic property of mind. (RH 55/47-8)[3]

Mind, in whatever shape it may exist, is thus always characterised by freedom in a minimal sense, but in order for it to become properly free, it must *realise that* its essence is freedom:

[1] See also Hegel's reference later in the same passage to 'the ultimate end [*letzte Zweck*] of history, the concept of mind' (RH 87-8/74). Hegel usually speaks of the 'final end' (*Endzweck*) (RH 29/28, 48/43, 63/55, 73/63, 80/69, 171/141, 181/149, E3 §549/277) of mind, history, the world, world history or mankind. The distinction between the 'ultimate end' and the 'final end' is a distinction forced on Kant by his radical opposition between nature and freedom, an opposition which Hegel aims to overcome.

[2] The equation of the 'concept' of mind with its 'essence' can only be approximate, given the complexity of Hegel's doctrine of the concept, but I believe it is justified by what Hegel has to say about both in the present context. Hegel uses the plant analogy at RH 58/50, although to make a more elaborate point. Cf. PSS §379A/1:19.

[3] Cf. PSS §382/1:48: 'The *essence* of mind is therefore formally *freedom*'. Also PSS §377K/1:5: 'It is of the essence of mind that it be free'.

> Everything depends on mind's self-awareness; if mind knows that it is free, it is altogether different from what it would be without this knowledge. For if it does not know that it is free, it is in the position of a slave who is content with his slavery and does not know that his condition is an improper one. It is the sensation of freedom alone which makes mind free, although it is in fact always free in and for itself. (RH 56/48)

An individual may be free in the sense of capable of self-determination, but in order to exercise this capacity he must realise that he has it. So until he realises that he has it he is still not properly free. We could say that he has the capacity to determine himself, but he does not have the capacity to exercise that capacity. What Hegel says here is similar, but he applies it to 'mind' in general rather than to a particular individual mind. Furthermore, when Hegel says that mind must know that it is free in order to realise its freedom, he means that it must know that it is *essentially* free, that freedom is its essence, not just a property it happens to have. Hegel occasionally describes this recognition on the part of mind of its own essence as freedom, a recognition that in turn realises its freedom, as 'self-consciousness' (e.g. RH 59/51), but he makes it clear that he does not have in mind individual self-consciousness, to be discussed below (RH 61/53). I shall refer to this recognition as mind's 'self-cognition'.

For Hegel, the distinction between mind which is free only in its essence and mind which has realised that essence and become free in its actuality is just this difference between mind which does not know, and mind which does know, that its essence is freedom. Hence in this case at least his well-known use of the contrast between 'in itself' (*an sich*) and 'for itself' (*für sich*) to differentiate potential and actual qualities has a point. Mind is always free 'in itself' or potentially; it is when, and only when, it becomes free 'for

itself', when it knows that its essential quality is freedom, that it becomes actually free.[4] It follows that the final end of history can be described either as the realisation of mind's freedom, or as mind's knowledge that it is (essentially) free. Hegel relies on the second formulation when he says that 'world history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom' (RH 63/54).

In order to know its essence, mind must 'make itself its own object' (RH 56/48).[5] It must embody its essence, freedom, in a world. According to Hegel this world consists first of all in the form of state and of 'ethical life' shared by a people, where a state consists in a legal system and a political constitution, and a form of ethical life consists in an associated set of shared moral norms or mores (*Sitte*).[6] Together these make up a 'system of right' or a form of 'objective mind'. Secondly it consists in the system of beliefs and practices in which mind is conceived and worshipped as a divine being that together make up religion:

> Mind is primarily its own object; but as long as it is this only for us, and has not yet cognised [*erkennt*] itself in its object, it is not yet its own object in the true sense. Its goal, however, is the attainment of knowledge; for the sole endeavour of mind is to know what it is in and for itself, and to reveal itself to itself in its true form. It seeks to create a mind-like [*geistig*] world in accordance with its own concept, to fulfil and realise its own true nature, and to produce religion and the state in such a way that it will conform to its concept and be truly itself ... (RH 61/53)

[4] When Hegel says that mind is always free 'in and for itself' in the last quotation the phrase must be understood as an alternative locution to 'in itself'. On Hegel's use of these terms, see Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, pp. 133-6.

[5] See Taylor, *Hegel*, pp. 80-94, for an explication of the 'expressivist' idea that mind can only know its own nature through experiencing its own expressions.

[6] My definition of 'state' here matches what seems to be Hegel's normal usage in *Reason and History*. However at RH 114/96 he says that he intends to include within 'the state' not only an 'external' (moral, legal and political) side but also an internal side: the art, religion and philosophy of a people. He refers to this usage again at RH 135/113, but it remains exceptional. By contrast in the *Philosophy of Right* 'the state' is used very narrowly, to describe only the political constitution of a society.

More accurately, the mind-like world in which mind embodies itself includes not only a form of state and a religion but also a form of art and a philosophy.[7] Hegel sees art and philosophy as expressing the same fundamental insights into the essential nature of mind as religion but in more sensuous and conceptual form respectively (RH 123/103, 124-5/104-5).[8] Thus for Hegel religion, art and philosophy must each be considered *both* as a shared practice alongside those of ethical life and the state, in which mind can embody itself, *and*, in contrast to ethical life and the state, as a mode of cognition.

I pass over the exact relation between the state on the one hand and religion and art on the other.[9] What is important here is that Hegel thinks that mind can initially embody only an inadequate, and specifically a particularistic, conception of its freedom in the kind of state, ethical life and associated art, religion and philosophy which appears in one historical people. Hegel calls mind as so limited and embodied the 'national mind' (*Volksgeist*) of the people in question. The conception of mind's freedom which it embodies is the 'principle' of the national mind. This process of embodiment is the process of historical development of a major civilisation. Once this process is complete, the national mind, in the shape of the people's artists, scientists and philosophers, is driven to discover the underlying rationale of the people's religious practices, legal and political arrangements, and ethical life. Through systematising them it unearths the principle implicit in them all and makes this principle, which is its own principle, fully explicit to itself. Thus in

[7] His fullest list of the various 'powers' in which mind embodies itself also includes a form of trade, industry, warfare, science (which for Hegel includes philosophy) and relationship to other peoples (RH 120/101). See also the lists at RH 65/56, 67/58, 75/65.

[8] In fact sometimes Hegel uses 'religion' in a broad sense to include all three (RH 127/107, E3 §554/292).

[9] On religion and the state, see RH 126-9/105-8. Jaeschke, 'World history and the history of the Absolute Spirit', usefully discusses the relationship between the histories of the state ('world history') and those of art, religion and philosophy.

Sophocles and Aristophanes, Thucydides and Plato, 'the Greek mind comprehended itself through representation [*Vorstellung*] and thought' (RH 177/145-6). Similarly, speaking of his own philosophy of ethical life and the state, Hegel says that philosophy is 'its own time apprehended in thoughts' (PR Preface p. 26/21). But just in virtue of making this principle explicit, mind begins to sense that it is inadequate as an expression of mind's essential nature, or in Hegel's words that it is 'particular' (RH 71/61). Out of the very sense of this particularity, mind begins to develop a more universal principle, a more universal conception of freedom than this civilisation has been able to express: 'particularity passes over into universality' (RH 180/148; cf. 72/62). Thus on the one hand the forms of the existing civilisation begin to lose their authority over people, the civilisation begins to decay, and individuals retreat into philosophical reflection and private life. On the other hand a new civilisation is founded, one whose form of state and ethical life (and of art, religion and philosophy) will embody the newly sensed conception of freedom. In Hegel's imagery history progresses through the process of life, death and new birth of successive national minds (RH 69-73/60-63, 178-80/146-8).[10]

The result is a series of world-historical civilisations, each informed by a 'national mind' — that is to say, by mind in the process of embodying and making explicit to itself a certain conception of its own essential nature, freedom. In these successive conceptions freedom is understood as increasingly universal. In Oriental states the norms of the state and ethical life attribute all freedom to a single despot. In ancient Greek states they attribute it to the community of citizens thought of as a unitary collective. In ancient Rome they attribute it at once to private individuals and to an alien and impersonal state which rules over them. Finally in modern European ('Germanic') states they attribute it to

[10] The whole process is characterised at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a succession of cycles of the 'externalising' (*Entäusserung*) and then 'inwardising' (*Erinnerung*) of mind, and its goal, 'mind knowing itself as mind', is called 'absolute knowledge' (PS 590-91/492-3).

individuals who at once understand themselves as citizens (RH 156-7/130-31, PR §§355-8/377-9). This is, so to speak, the true state, which Hegel purports to describe in its essentials in the *Philosophy of Right*. Its corresponding religion is Protestant Christianity and its philosophy is Hegel's own.[11]

Hegel's conclusion is then that the process of history is that of mind embodying its essential characteristic of freedom in a true state, and in the corresponding art, religion and philosophy, in which and through which it can then finally recognise that freedom, come to know itself as essentially free, and so *become* actually free, thereby realising itself. He summarises everything that has been said so far in two sentences:

> We have defined the goal of world history as consisting of mind's development towards self-consciousness, or in its making the world conform to itself (for the two are identical). It might equally be said that mind produces its own concept out of itself, objectifies it, and thus becomes the being of its own concept; it becomes conscious of itself in the objective world so that it may attain its salvation: for as soon as the objective world conforms to its inner requirements, it has realised its freedom. (RH 74/64)

Mind, then, can be said to *create itself* in the course of its history, both in the sense that it objectifies its essence in the world of the true state and in the sense that by doing so it becomes conscious of itself, ultimately in the true form of philosophy, as having this essence and so realises itself. So 'mind is essentially the product of its own activity' (RH 72/63; cf. 181/150).

[11] However, just because the true state is the final realisation of freedom, as Hegel asserts that it is, it cannot be simply based on a (revealed) religion in the same way that earlier states were, for this would involve heteronomy. See PR §270R/291-302 for Hegel's attempt to say in what sense the true state is and is not based on religion.

2. The cunning of reason as unconscious drive

In spite of some of the formulations in summaries of his philosophy of history, Hegel's 'mind' is not to be understood as a super-individual with purposes or ends akin to those of an individual. Rather when Hegel speaks of mind in world history, he must be understood to mean 'mindedness in general', a quality which is exhibited in the actions of individual human beings but also in all large-scale social phenomena. By the ends or purposes (*Zwecke*), or the drive (*Trieben*) of mind he must mean those tendencies which are endemic to mindedness as such, and which exhibit themselves in the motivations of individual human beings interacting with each other. Mind realises itself in the course of history only through the actions of individual human beings, and these individuals must be motivated to act in such a way as to bring about the historical developments which Hegel describes (RH 81-2/70). Yet human beings, particularly insofar as they contribute to bringing about historical change, appear to be largely motivated solely by 'passions, private interests, and the satisfaction of selfish drives' (RH 79/68). The question that arises, then, is how individuals so motivated can bring about such a grandiose result as the self-realisation of mind through its embodiment and then recognition of its essential nature, freedom. In short, Hegel's theory of history as presented so far lacks an explanation rooted in individual human psychology of how the large-scale changes it describes have come about. In contemporary terminology, it lacks 'microfoundations'.[12]

A popular way to understand Hegel's philosophy of history is to say that he simply assumed that things were so ordered that individuals, in pursuing their selfish drives, would bring about the historical realisation of freedom as an unintentional but beneficial consequence of their acts. Hegel's theory of history is then made analogous to the theory of the functioning of a market society in Adam Smith. If there is a difference, it is that

[12] For an articulation of the demand for microfoundations in a Marxist theory of history see Roemer, 'Methodological individualism and deductive Marxism'.

here the 'ordering of things' includes the production, at appropriate points in history, of individuals who have the particular ambitions that are required in order to bring about the final end of history. A natural retort to Hegel, so interpreted, is that such an 'ordering of things' so as to bring about a final end, tacitly presupposes an intentional agent in whom this final end figures as a conscious purpose, and who 'orders things' in order to realise that end: in other words, it collapses into a simplistic providentialism. Since for Hegel God, properly understood, appears to be simply another term for fully realised mind,[13] the result is that 'mind' has to be construed as a single intentional agent with Godlike powers which manipulates the actions of individual human beings in history in order to bring about its own self-consciousness, a feat that appears nearly unintelligible. Or else, if such an interpretation of 'mind' is rejected, as I have suggested it should be, the appropriate ordering of things in order to bring about the final end of history becomes an 'action without an actor', and Hegel's philosophy of history becomes a providentialism shorn of the superintending intentional God which alone can make providentialism coherent.[14]

This interpretation relies heavily on a single passage in *Reason in History* in which Hegel speaks of 'the realisation of the universal' through the 'particular interests of passion':

> Particular interests contend with one another, and some are destroyed in the process. But it is from this very conflict and destruction of particular things that the universal emerges, and it remains unscathed itself. For it is not the universal Idea which enters into opposition, conflict and danger; it keeps itself in the background, untouched and unharmed, and sends forth the particular passions to fight and wear themselves out in its stead. It is what we may call the *cunning of*

[13] See Taylor, *Hegel*, pp. 87-102 for the identification of God with mind. In Taylor's reading, however, the identification tends to take the form of a reduction of the latter to the former.

[14] For the latter view, see Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, pp. 108-9.

> *reason* that it sets the passions to work in its service, so that the agents by which it gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer the loss. (RH 105/89)

It is true that here and in two or three other passages Hegel invokes the image of reason, or mind, using individuals as tools to bring about its ends, so that their actions 'produce an effect altogether different from what they themselves intend and accomplish'.[15] But these passages do not themselves accurately represent Hegel's overall view of the relation between individual intentions and the realisation of freedom which is the end of history; rather they are best understood as somewhat unfortunate attempts to provide a vivid depiction of that view. The view which Hegel spells out in detail is that the drive towards the realisation of freedom is present in every individual mind, but that throughout most of history it is present in an *unconscious* form. We will it, but we do not yet know that we will it:

> [I]n the actual process of world history, seen as something as yet incomplete, we find that the subjective element or consciousness is [not] yet in a position to know the true nature of the ultimate end of history, the concept of mind. For the latter has not yet become the content of its needs and interests; and although the subjective consciousness is still unaware of it, the universal substance is nevertheless present in its particular ends and realises itself through them. (RH 87-8/74-5)

In other words, the end of world history exists as an end within individual minds, but it is initially 'an inner, innermost unconscious drive, and the whole occupation [*Geschäfte*] of world history is … a constant labour to bring it to consciousness' (RH 87/74). The end of history is related to the particular ends of individuals, not as the end of a manipulating agent is to that of a manipulated one, but as an unconscious underlying end or drive which

[15] The term 'cunning of reason' itself originates in the *Science of Logic*, where it is used to characterise the use of tools (SL2 453/746-7).

is shared by all individuals is related to the particular conscious ends of those same individuals.[16]

The unconscious status of the drive to realise freedom, together with the necessity for a series of successive civilisations in order to fully embody freedom, explains the role of the 'world-historical individuals' in Hegel's theory of history. These are the individuals who are responsible for overthrowing civilisations that are no longer an adequate embodiment of freedom for their inhabitants and for founding new ones. As long as what the drive to freedom requires is the further elaboration of the present civilisation, then the drive to freedom can simply express itself in individuals' sense of their existing ethical, political and religious duties. They are absorbed in the collective project of elaborating the principle of their civilisation (PR §344/373) and the 'substance' of the will of each is simply 'the will which his people demands' (RH 95/81). However when the social and political forms of a civilisation are fully elaborated, cognised, and in turn felt inadequate as an expression of freedom, then the same drive for freedom leads ordinary individuals to begin to feel a vague negative dissatisfaction with the present social and political world. Mind in its embodiment in ordinary individuals 'no longer finds satisfaction in this world, but this kind of dissatisfaction has not yet found what it wants' (RH 99/84). It is at this point that the world-historical individual plays a role. He is simply an individual in whom the drive to realise freedom, which is intrinsic to all human beings, is more conscious.[17]

[16] Taylor, *Hegel*, pp. 392-3 suggests that Hegel relies on a theory of unconscious motivations, expressed by the terms 'immanent drive' and 'instinct' (to which I would add 'substance'), rather than on a supra-individual manipulating subject, to explain the movement of history towards its end. What remains unexplained is why he thought that the idea of tool-using illuminated the relation between unconscious and conscious ends. I can only suggest here that the tool provides an example of an end which is 'built into' a natural object without featuring as a conscious purpose within that object. See Hegel's use of the idea that human beings are 'ends in their own right' at RH 106/90.

[17] See Hegel's comment that through the comprehension of great human personalities, 'the true nature of man is brought into view [*Anschauung*] with untroubled clarity' (PSS §377A/1:9).

That drive is more conscious to the point that instead of being simply negatively dissatisfied with the present, 'he wants something of a positive nature' (ibid.). He formulates, albeit still vaguely, the project to establish a new world which will satisfy the drive to realise freedom in a way that the present one cannot and so will assuage the common sense of dissatisfaction. In this sense 'it is the world-historical individuals who were first to tell men what they wanted' (ibid.).

This capacity to express the common and currently frustrated drive for freedom in the form of a positive project is the source of the unprecedented authority of world-historical individual over others. Those others follow him, or acquiesce in his actions, because:

> There is a power within them which is stronger than they are, even if it appears to them as something external and alien and runs counter to what they consciously think they want. For mind which has stepped on to the next stage is the soul of all individuals, although an unconscious inner sense until great men bring it to consciousness for them. It is nevertheless what they really want, and for this reason it exerts a power over them to which they surrender even against their own conscious will. (RH 99/84-5)

The world-historical individual simply formulates an ambition which answers to the 'universal unconscious instinct of mankind'. Hence others follow him, for 'he shows them their own immanent drive and carries it out' (RH 90/76).[18]

[18] Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, pp. 226-31, glosses over this essential connection between the consciousness of the world-historical individual and that of the rest of the people of his time in portraying the former as no more than an arch-criminal whose actions happen to benefit mankind. It should be noted that even in the world-historical individual the drive to freedom is only conscious to the degree that it enables him to formulate in outline the kind of political structure that is called for by the discovery of the inadequacies of the present one. He simply recognises 'the next universal to emerge'. He cannot see beyond the world he dedicates himself to establishing, as the philosopher (at least in retrospect) can, and recognise that it is itself only a 'moment' of an entire and necessary historical progression (RH 98/83). I take it that this limitation explains Hegel's remark to the effect that even for world-historical individuals the 'substantial deed' of world mind is not their end (PR §348/375).

3. The problem of ordinary motivation

For Hegel, then, the ordinary human mind, has intrinsic to it an unconscious drive towards the realisation of freedom. It is this drive that is the real motor of history. The world-historical individuals who bring about history's great changes only gain their support from others because they represent that drive in more conscious form, and only achieve anything because of that support. Hegel explicates this drive as a product of the contradiction between mind's essence and its existence. At the beginning of history mind:

> contains its absolute content [*Gehalt*] as something in itself, as the end and goal which it only attains in its result, when it is for the first time its actuality. (RH 157/131)

It is 'imperfect' in that it is in a state of contradiction between its essential freedom and its natural biological existence. It is this contradiction that expresses itself as the drive to realise its freedom:

> Thus the imperfect, as the opposite of itself within itself, is a contradiction, which although it exists, is just as surely superseded and resolved, [hence] the drive and impulse [*Impuls*] of mind-like life within itself to break through the rind of naturalness and sensuousness, of estrangement from itself and to come to the light of consciousness, i.e. to itself. (ibid.; cf. RH 151-2/126-7)

But if this is accepted, Hegel still needs to explain: (1) how the individual human being overcomes its 'estrangement', how its conscious will comes to express its underlying drive to realise its freedom, or in Hegelian terms how that will becomes 'substantial', and (2) how ordinary human beings with such a will are motivated, to establish (through their

support for world-historical individuals) and then maintain institutions which culminate in those of the 'true state', in the course of history?[19]

My thesis is that Hegel's answer to these two questions is to be found in his systematic account of all the phenomena of mind, in the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind* (1817-30) and (in part) in the *Philosophy of Right* (1821). This account moves from the faculties and motivations of the individual embodied mind (subjective mind) to the norms and institutions of the true state and its associated ethical life (objective mind), and then onto mind's successively more adequate modes of self-cognition, namely art, religion and philosophy (absolute mind). It aims to develop all the phenomena of mind — subjective, objective and absolute — by re-enacting the process in which mind itself must realise its own concept. Hegel introduces his account in the *Philosophy of Mind* by saying that it will:

> allow that which makes up the particular parts of the science of mind to unfold itself purely from the concept of mind. Just as in the living being in general everything is already present in an ideal manner in the germ and is brought forth by this itself, not by an alien power, so all particular forms of living mind drive themselves forth from its concept as their germ. Our thought, moved by the concept, remains therefore entirely immanent within the object, which is similarly moved by the concept; we, as it were, only observe the object's own development, and do not change it through mixing in our own subjective representations and fancies. (PSS §379A/1:18-19)[20]

Furthermore, the process in which mind realises its own concept is described, as in *Reason in History*, as a process which begins with nature and ends in freedom. Human

[19] A third question, which I shall not attempt to address, is that of whether this set of institutions, once its principle is philosophically cognised, finally satisfies the drive for freedom, that is, whether Hegel thinks that in his own time the end (i.e. aim) of history has been substantially achieved. See Kojève, *Introduction*, pp. 88-99 and pp. 158-62, and Inwood, *Hegel*, pp. 509-19 for affirmative answers to this question. Hegel at least makes it clear that historical progress 'is not an indeterminate advance ad infinitum, for it has a definite end [*Zweck*] — namely that of returning to itself' (RH 170/140).

[20] Cf. PSS §442R/3:92-3, PR §31R/60.

mind is 'the middle between two extremes: nature and God', of which one is 'the starting point for men, the other is the absolute final end', and the second extreme is immediately redescribed as the unity of self-cognition and realised-freedom which constitutes mind's self-realisation:

> Mind begins in nature in general. One must not think merely of external nature, but also the sensuous nature of man himself, his sensuous, bodily being, sensing, relating to other objects (mere sensing belongs only to animals). The extreme to which mind goes is its freedom, infinity, being in and for itself ... the nature of mind is this absolute livingness, this process of being itself, of going out of naturalness [and] immediacy, of superseding [and] quitting its naturalness, and of coming to itself, and freeing itself. It is only as having come to itself, as a product of itself; its actuality is only that it has made itself into what it is. (PSS §377K/1:7)[21]

The movement of mind from nature to freedom which is to be re-enacted in his philosophical derivation in the *Philosophy of Mind* has the same starting point and end point, then, as that of mind in history. However it is quite unclear whether Hegel understands the former movement as taking place in time. The standard view is that it does not.[22] However this leaves Hegel in the position of attributing *both* a non-temporal *and* a temporal development to mind, both with the same starting points and endpoints: one of them re-enacted in the systematic account of mind and the other in the lectures on the philosophy of history.[23] The alternative I shall suggest here is that *both* developments

[21] Cf. 381A/1:35-7, 382A/1:53. For somewhat different formulations of the initial contradiction that gives rise to this process, see PSS 379A/1:19, 385A/1:67.

[22] See, for example, Petry, introduction to *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, pp. xxv-xxvi.

[23] See Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, pp. 276. Hegel himself appears to endorse such a position at PS 591/493, with regard to phenomenology ('the science of appearing knowledge') on the one hand and history on the other. In this period 'phenomenology' covers for Hegel most of the same ground, and in roughly the same order, as the subsequent systematic account of mind.

must be understood as temporal. The systematic account is an account of the successive forms of (cognitive and practical) activity in which the ordinary human mind is successively driven to engage in the course of history, and commensurately of the successive cognitive and practical capacities it is driven to develop. It represents a 'history of the ordinary mind', and in particular a 'history of ordinary motivation', which can provide answers to the two questions raised above (page 128). The question of the relationship between Hegel's systematic account of mind and his philosophy of history then becomes a question of how the epochs of such a history of ordinary motivation are to be mapped onto those of the official philosophy of history.

To be plausible, either as a view of Hegel or of historical development, such an interpretation has to make two concessions. Firstly, as Hegel's official philosophy of history makes clear, *some* form of ethical life, state, art, religion and philosophy has existed throughout most of history. If the systematic development is meant to reproduce a historical one, it can only be a development of the 'true' or 'genuine' forms of these phenomena of mind. In fact this is how Hegel does proceed. For example, his account of the family is an account of the 'true' family, not a generalisation across all forms of family life throughout history (PR §32/61). Secondly, the interpretation cannot hope to suggest that in every single case the historical order in which human capacities (even in their 'true' form) are supposed to have developed matches the systematic order in which they are described. The interpretation can only hope to suggest a general mapping from systematic order to historical order.

In fact in this chapter and the next I shall attempt to derive a 'history of ordinary motivation' only from certain sections of Hegel's systematic account, chiefly his section on consciousness (E3 §§413-39/153-78) and that on the 'system of needs' (PR §§189-

208/227-38).[24] In this chapter I shall deal with those sections of this history which are, in Hegel's terms, pre-historical: the transition from animal need to human desire and the constitution of the first social relationships — those of mastery and servitude — out of the interaction between desiring individuals. In the next chapter I will address the history of the motivation of human beings in society, that is, in intentional interaction with each other.

4. From animal need to desire

For ease of reference, I begin by summarising the major stages of Hegel's systematic account of mind in the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind* and the *Philosophy of Right*, along with the paragraph numbers in each work at which each stage begins (fig. 1).

Hegel's most general term for a motivating force is 'drive' (*Trieb*). All living organisms, including plants, have some form of drive, for they all maintain themselves in a unity, subordinating their parts to the whole, and drives recur at every level of mind.[25] Hegel's most general characterisation of drives is that 'all drive begins from a contradiction which is to be resolved' (PSS §425G/3:321), and in the case of animals a drive is the effect of a sense of contradiction between the animal's unity and its internal differentiation or 'difference'. The result is a four-stage cycle, which Hegel describes in the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Nature*.[26] Initially the contradiction takes the form that the

[24] I shall also occasionally refer to those parts of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) which contain a parallel development. However I shall consider the account contained in the *Philosophy of Mind* and the *Philosophy of Right* as canonical.

[25] See Petry, notes to *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, vol. 3, pp. 447.

[26] See E2 §§359-66/384-409. The cycle is summarised at PSS §381A/1:31-3. At RH 56-7/49 Hegel describes the cycle in the human being, considered simply as an animal.

Fig. 1. THE STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S ACCOUNT OF MIND

E3	PR	
377		Mind
387		1. Subjective mind
388		A. Soul (anthropology)
391		a. Natural soul
403		b. Feeling soul
		i. Feeling soul in its immediacy
		ii. Self-feeling (*Selbstgefühl*)
		iii. Habit
411		c. Actual soul
413		B. Consciousness (phenomenology)
418		a. Consciousness as such
424		b. Self-consciousness
		i. Desire (immediate self-consciousness)
		ii. Recognising self-consciousness
		iii. Universal self-consciousness
438		c. Reason
440		C. Mind [mind as such] (psychology)
445		a. Theoretical mind (intelligence)
469	4	b. Practical mind (will)
481	21	c. Free mind (free will)
483	27	2. Objective mind
488	34	A. Right (abstract right)
488	41	a. Property
493	72	b. Contract
496	82	c. Wrong
503	105	B. Morality (*Moralität*)
513	142	C. Ethical life
518	158	a. Family
523	182	b. Civil Society
		i. System of needs
		ii. Administration of justice
		iii. Police and corporation
535	257	c. State
		i. Internal constitutional law (*Staatsrecht*)
		ii. External constitutional law
		iii. World history
553		3. Absolute mind
556		A. Art
564		B. Revealed religion
572		C. Philosophy

Note: Headings in parentheses are alternative headings provided by Hegel himself or terms that he uses for the content of the section in question. The heading in square brackets ('mind as such') is introduced to disambiguate the subject matter of section 1C from that of the whole account.

animal's unity smothers its differentiation, which cannot properly express itself within this unity. So the differentiation expresses itself as a differentiation of the animal's experience into experience of an external thing and experience of an inwardness contrasted to the external thing. In Hegel's terms, the animal 'posits difference'. The external thing that Hegel thinks of here is an item of the kind that counts as food for the species of animal in question, and the act of 'positing difference' is presumably that in which an animal first recognises that item as food. In a second stage the animal continues to feel that the external thing is a part of it, so the contradiction is not eliminated. Rather, now it takes the form that the animal's unity becomes unsustainable in the face of the difference between inwardness and outer object. It is at this point that the animal first properly experiences the contradiction, and it experiences it as a sense of 'need' (*Bedürfnis*) or 'lack' (*Mangel*) (E2 §359/384, §359A/387). Here 'need' can only be meant in the phenomenological sense, and accordingly when I speak of 'animal need' in what follows I shall assume that 'need' is understood in this sense. In a third stage the animal's confidence that its unity is more 'valid' than the difference, a confidence that Hegel identifies with its sense of self-preservation, in turn gives rise to a determination on its part to overcome the difference and restore its unity by physically consuming the external object. This determination is the animal's 'drive':

> Need, lack, the negative together with the absolute certainty of the nullity of this is drive, the activity of superseding the need, of establishing peace again, so that division and difference will no longer exist. (PSS §426G/3:325; cf. E2 §359/384-5).

In a fourth stage, the animal experiences the restoration of its unity as 'satisfaction'. But this returns it to its original position, in which its internal difference is smothered by its unity. Hence animal life is a ceaseless alternation between the supremacy of its unity and the supremacy of its difference, which expresses itself as the cycle of difference-positing, need, drive and satisfaction.

However the development of mind does not begin in animals, but in human beings:

> [M]an ... cannot have developed out of animal insensibility but he may well have developed out of human insensibility. Animal humanity is quite different from animality. Mind makes a beginning; it is initially in itself, it is natural mind; nevertheless the character of humanity is already imprinted on it throughout. The child has no rationality, but it has the real potentiality [*Möglichkeit*] to become rational. The animal by contrast has no potentiality to become conscious of itself. (RH 161/133)

Accordingly, Hegel begins his systematic account of mind not with 'animality' but with 'animal humanity' or 'human insensibility', with the mental life of a creature which has the same capacities as an animal but which in addition, already has the 'potentiality' to become conscious. This is the initial stage of the human mind, the 'soul'.[27] Hegel speaks of the 'animal soul' as well, but this follows the human soul, the soul proper, only a certain distance in its development towards consciousness. Both are capable of the elementary sense of self that Hegel calls 'self-feeling' (*Selbstgefuhl*), in which the organism obscurely senses a distinction within some particular sensation or drive between the self which is the subject of the drive and the drive itself, or the object at which it aims in the world (PSS §396A/2:105, §407G/2:323-4). This initial sense of self is bound up with the particular drive in question (PSS §409/2:387). The animal soul 'remains sunken in the singularity and limitedness of sensation' (PSS §412/2:429). In it there is merely the 'transition from one sensation, which fills its whole soul, to another which dominates it with equal exclusiveness. It is man who first raises himself above the singleness of sensation to the universality of thought, to self-knowledge, to the apprehension of his subjectivity, his I' (PSS §381/1:49). Accordingly, 'thinking of himself as an I is the root

[27] Hence Hegel's description of the science of the soul as 'anthropology'. Cf. Petry, notes to *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, vol. 2, p. 431.

of the nature of man' (RH 57/50). It is only the human soul that develops to the sense of self as an 'I'.

The sense of oneself as an 'I', as a disembodied active self contrasted to an entire external world which is conceived as passive matter or corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*, literally 'bodily-ness'), is what Hegel calls in general 'consciousness' (PSS §412-412A/2:425-9, §413/3:3; cf. 389A/2:9). In the initial form of consciousness, 'consciousness as such', the 'I' remains in the background as an implicit contrast to the world of objects before it. In the second form, 'self-consciousness', the 'I' itself is conceived as such an object. Although this usage of 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' may not match the everyday sense of the English terms I shall adhere to it in what follows. In self-consciousness the relation between the 'I' and its object is simply the relation between the 'I' and itself. So in its relation to its object it is not determined by anything outside itself, and accordingly for Hegel self-consciousness entails freedom, albeit only of an initial, abstract kind (PSS §424/3:37).

Self-consciousness as it initially emerges is called 'immediate self-consciousness'.[28] For Hegel, immediate self-consciousness transforms the nature of need. It takes the form of what he calls 'desire'. Previously need could only be the expression of a contradiction between the internal differentiation and the obscurely felt unity of the biological organism. Now this is replaced by the contradiction between the sense of the 'I' as an object and its characterisation as a 'subject', as just that which is not-an-object, that which is abstracted

[28] In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the term that Hegel uses for immediate self-consciousness is 'self-certainty'. See PS 137/104.

from and counterposed to all objectivity.[29] Just as the animal experiences its internal contradiction as a contradiction between its unity and the 'difference' between its inwardness and that external item on which it characteristically feeds, so the self-conscious human being experiences its internal contradiction between 'I' as 'subject' and as 'object' as an opposition between a subjective, abstract self and an independent external object which confronts it. This sense of contradiction then expresses itself as a sense that the opposition must somehow be overcome, and then in a determination to expand the abstract 'I' into the external object, or equally to abolish the independence of the object and thereby reduce it to subjectivity. This sense and this determination, which are the human parallels to animal need and animal drive, are what Hegel calls 'desire' and the drive associated with it[30]: Like animal need, desire is a sense of lack, a feeling that the object is not genuinely other to the self and should be united with it

> The self-conscious subject knows itself to be *in itself identical* with the external object. It knows that this object contains the *possibility* of satisfying desire, it *conforms* to the desire, and that this is precisely why the desire is stimulated by it. The relation with the object is therefore necessary to the subject. The subject sees its *own lack*, its own one-sidedness, in the object — its sees in the object something which belongs to its own essence yet which it lacks. (PSS §427A/3:47)[31]

[29] Sometimes Hegel expresses this by saying that desire arises from a contradiction between self-consciousness and consciousness (PSS §425/3:39): self-consciousness entails an 'I' which is itself an object, consciousness entails an 'I' which is counterposed to all objects.

[30] I shall ignore Hegel's occasional references to 'animal desire', for example at E2 §359A/387-8. Even setting these aside, Hegel's use of 'desire' is unfortunately loose. He fails to make the distinction between 'desire' and 'the drive associated with desire' with the same consistency as the equivalent distinction between animal need and animal drive. The term 'desire' sometimes seems to stand duty for both. I shall understand it as I have defined it here on his behalf.

[31] The parallelism between desire and animal need is also implicit at PSS §427A/3:47-9 and 426G/3:325-6.

Similarly, like animal drive, the drive associated with desire attempts to overcome the opposition between subject and object:

> Self-consciousness in its immediacy is *singular* and is *desire* — the contradiction of its abstraction, which ought to be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and ought to be subjective. (PSS §426/3:43-4; cf. §427G/3:327)

In introducing desire Hegel says nothing about its content. This does not mean that human desire is directed indiscriminately at every external object. Hegel must assume that the objects of human desires are initially the same as those of the animal needs of the pre-conscious human being — food and water for example. They are simply given by human beings' biological nature. The transition from animal need to desire, its human equivalent, is not initially a transition from a need for one kind of object to another but a change in the underlying source of there being any sense of lack at all, a change which in turn results from a transformation that takes place in the very nature of a being that becomes self-conscious.

This said, Hegel does implicitly suggest that the transition from animal need to desire gives rise to a change in the objects of the sense of lack. For just as the sense of oneself as an 'I' is the sense of oneself as counterposed to an entire external world of objects, rather than to the object of a particular need, so a human being's desire must in principle be able to direct itself to *any* object, whereas an animal's need is fixed onto just that kind of object on which it characteristically feeds.[32] Hence desire, although it is 'singular' in that it always focuses on a particular object, already contains an element of universality and freedom which is absent in animal need. The transition from self-feeling to self-consciousness, and the corresponding transition from animal need to desire, is the first

[32] Hegel makes this point about the difference between humans and animals at E2 §359A/387-8 and at PR §190A/228-9. Rousseau makes it at DOI 141/87.

proto-historical stage of the cultivation (*Bildung*) of humanity which culminates in the formation of the citizen of the modern state.

5. Mastery and servitude

Although Hegel does not say what kind of thing the object of desire must be, he does say that desire always gives rise to a drive to annihilate the object. For self-consciousness in the 'immediate' form in which we have it at present cannot be satisfied by a mere transformation of the object. Thus desire does not lead the individual to form the object in any way, but only to consume it:

> The independence of the object is destroyed by the satisfaction of the self-consciousness constrained within desire, since this does not yet have the strength to endure the independence of the other. (PSS §428A/3:51)[33]

Desire is purely 'destructive' (PSS §428/3:51). Thus the act in which the self proves that the object is nothing but itself is also the act whereby it destroys the object. Hence desire fails to resolve the basic contradiction in self-consciousness between 'I' and 'object' and, as with animal need, its satisfaction only gives rise to a new desire (ibid.).

The self's failure to unite subjectivity and objectivity by annihilating the object must eventually force it to relate to its object in a new way: as something which is independent but which it can at the same time somehow recognise as 'itself'. In other words, it must relate to the object as *another I*, or, as Hegel also puts it, as a 'free object', a self-determining object.[34]

[33] Hegel briefly considers the possibility of a formation of the object which is driven by desire alone in the sentence immediately before the one cited, and also at PS 154-5/119.

[34] Cf. PS 148/113, where Hegel says that an individual's self-certainty can only have 'truth' if its 'being-for-self' presents itself to it 'as an independent object'.

Self-consciousness that relates to its object in this way has made the transition from immediate self-consciousness to what Hegel calls 'recognising [*anerkennende*] self-consciousness', self-consciousness that has 'filled the other with I, made it from something self-less into a free, self-like object, another I' (PSS §429A/3:53).

Hegel assumes that a necessary condition for the appearance of recognising self-consciousness is that two self-conscious individuals encounter one another; he does not consider the anthropomorphic possibility of a single individual relating to an inanimate object or an animal as 'another I'. Thus the urge of each self-conscious individual to recognise 'itself' in an existent object outside it is what draws individual human beings together and forms the fundamental bond between them. This is Hegel's version of the idea of natural human sociability, and the transition to recognising self-consciousness initiates the exit of human beings from a state of nature in which they do not exist for each other except as corporeal objects in the world. The moment of treating the other as 'another I' is, as Hegel puts it in his notes to §429 of the *Philosophy of Mind*, the 'origin of society in respect of consciousness'[35].

Recognition is, in its initial form, simply the identification of another external being as in some sense 'myself'. As such, it resolves the contradiction inherent in self-consciousness, for now the self has 'I' existing as an object in the world. But this only leads to the reappearance of the contradiction in another form. For to the self as we presently have it, 'I' *means* myself, in counterposition to everything that is outside me. Hence the idea of an 'other' which is simultaneously 'I' is a contradiction in terms:

[35] SSN 44, cited Petry, notes to *Hegel: The Berlin Phenomenology*, p. 161. Hegel's note is attached to that paragraph which becomes §429 in the third edition of the *Philosophy of Mind*. See also Hegel's contrast of such 'recognitive ties' to those of need at PSS §431A/3:57.

> In the other as an I, I immediately intuit myself, but also an immediately existing independent [*selbständig*][36] other object as an absolute I opposite me. (PSS §430/3:53)

Confronted with the body of such another:

> I intuit in it immediately myself and at the same time something other than I am, so that this externality is still a wholly other unyieldingness. The object is I within itself; it is the same as me and [yet] something absolutely other. This is the relation and the question is how this contradiction resolves itself. (PSS §430G/3:331)

This may not seem contradictory to us, but it is for the self-conscious individual at this stage, for this individual has no room for the idea of another 'I' which is qualitatively identical to but numerically distinct from itself. It has not yet made any distinction between 'I' and 'I-ness in general'. For it there can only be one 'I' in the world. Thus the contradiction can be expressed concisely as a contradiction between identity and distinctness:

> [T]hereby the highest contradiction is posited, on the one hand the clear identity of both, and on the other hand this complete independence of each. (PSS §430G/3:329-31)

Since 'I' means what is active and determining, this is also to say that there can only be one centre of action in the world. To the extent that one individual sees another as an independent (*selbständig*) centre of action outside itself, autonomously determining some part of the world, even its own body, then the first individual must see its own status as a centre of action diminished (PSS §430K/3:331n). Hegel summarises these points by saying that at present self-consciousness is still 'singular' (*einzeln*) (PSS §431G/3:333). This is the condition of man as he begins to emerge from the state of nature.

[36] Literally 'self-standing'.

The way in which Hegel argues that this contradiction must expresses itself in the self-conscious individual is as a drive to make its own characteristic freedom physically present to the other self:

> This contradiction gives the drive to *display* oneself as a free self and to be *there* [*da zu sein*] as such for the other — the process of recognition. (PSS §430/3:52)[37]

The 'desire' that gives rise to this drive is what has become known, following Kojève, as the 'desire for recognition'.[38] However Hegel does not use this phrase (he speaks of the *process* of recognition) and it can be misleading in two ways. Firstly, 'desire' must not be understood in the specific sense Hegel gives to the word, for in that sense we have moved beyond desire; for Hegel desire originates in a different contradiction to the present one and aims to annihilate a physical object rather than to produce a state of mind in another self. Accordingly I shall speak of the 'demand' rather than the 'desire' for recognition.[39] Secondly, what the self seeks from the other is not simply recognition in the initial sense in which the self already recognises the other. The contradiction that Hegel describes is in no way resolved if the individual knows that the other individual recognises it in this initial sense. Instead what the first individual seeks from the second is that the second should experience the body of the first as the incarnation, as the existence or being-there

[37] The interpretation of the struggle for recognition and of the master and servant relation which follows is historical and anthropological, in the tradition of Kojève's *Introduction* and in contrast to recent literature which has attempted to see the narrative as part of an ahistorical epistemological argument (see for example Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*, pp. 81-112, and for a survey of other interpretations pp. 299-301, 304-7). Virtually all the literature concentrates on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* version of this narrative, which because of its placing is more amenable to an epistemological interpretation.

[38] See Kojève, *Introduction*, pp. 5-7.

[39] See Gadamer, 'Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness', p. 62, for a criticism of Kojève's (and Hyppolite's) use of 'desire' here.

(*Dasein*) for it of freedom or self-determination.[40] That is to say that it demands that the second individual should conceive the first not just as 'I' but as '*the* I', as that which alone is the source of action, or is free.[41]

If it can bring this about then the contradiction between identity and distinctness will have been resolved by establishing that there is after all only one 'I'. The second individual will experience 'I' as residing outside itself, in the acting body of the first. Consequently it will relinquish its independence and become directly disposed to carry out the wishes of the first individual. Such a stance on the part of the second individual to the first is what Hegel calls 'immediate' recognition (PSS §432G/3:339).[42] It is the demand for recognition in *this* sense from the other that results from the initial contradiction in there being two 'I's in the world. Each individual, as a 'singular' self-consciousness, can only resolve the contradiction by proving to both that it itself, and not the other, is 'I'. Each 'must resist recognising another as free, just as on the other hand each must concern itself with demanding to be recognised in the other's self-consciousness' (PSS §431G/3:335). Each must demonstrate to the other that it is *the* I, that which is alone is free, that is to say, it must gain immediate recognition from the other.

[40] Hegel's *Dasein* means not simply existence but the existent *presence* of something, or an existence which is *for* someone: '*Dasein* as determinate being is essentially being for another' (PR §71/102; cf. SL 127/119). Hence the demand to be recognised as free by another always takes the form of the urge to give one's freedom a *Dasein*.

[41] This is the first point at which self-consciousness conceives itself as free, presumably because it is the first time that it takes the perspective of another and looks at itself *as* a self-consciousness, rather than simply being self-conscious. 'Immediate self-consciousness has still only I as its object, not yet I = I, therefore it is only free for us, not for itself, it knows nothing of its freedom …' (PSS §424A/3:39).

[42] This is something of a misnomer on Hegel's part, since, as I have argued, it is not the *initial* form that recognition takes, but the second one.

These mutually incompatible demands are what give rise to the 'struggle for recognition', in which each attempts: (1) to demonstrate his freedom to the other by giving it an existent presence or *Dasein* for the other in his own acts: specifically to demonstrate that it is impossible in principle to coerce him by acting so as to put his own life in danger, for such action shows that he is prepared to die rather than be determined by another; (2) to demonstrate the other's unfreedom to himself by giving that unfreedom a *Dasein* for him in the other's acts: specifically to force the other to submit and so show that the other can be coerced.[43] The result is a life-and-death struggle.

Although the struggle involves a mutual attempt at coercion, it would be mistaken to suggest that it is an attempt on the part of each to *force* the other to recognise him. For, as I have understood it, recognition is a way of conceiving another being, and one cannot be forced to conceive another being in a certain way.[44] Rather the role of coercion is demonstrative. Each attempts to coerce the other and to resist coercion in order to demonstrate to the other that it itself is uncoercible (free) and that the other is coercible (unfree). When one submits then the demonstration has been made. It is not as if the individual who submits makes a tacit or explicit contract with the other, promising that it will recognise the other if the other will let it live. It is that its very act of submission shows to a 'singular' self-consciousness that it is not, as it had thought it was, 'the I', but that rather the other is. This realisation on its part then *constitutes* its recognition of the other. In turn, the defeated party in the struggle is not coerced into then serving the victor

[43] Thus the initial form that the idea of one's being free or self-determining takes is that of one being such that another cannot determine what one does. This goes beyond the 'negative freedom' of political philosophy — Kant's external freedom (see footnote 28, page 109) — in that freedom is thought of not as an accidental condition but as part of one's nature. However there is no idea yet of being free in the sense that one's desires cannot determine what one does — Kant's internal freedom.

[44] Nor is the struggle an attempt on the part of each, driven by Hegel's 'desire', to simply annihilate the other, as Williams, *Recognition*, pp. 148, 159, claims. Desire has already been superseded by the demand for recognition.

for fear of being punished or killed if it does not. Rather its service is a direct expression of its immediate recognition. To think of the other as 'the I' *is* to be spontaneously disposed to enact the wishes of the other. It serves the other because it has, so to speak, given up its 'I' to the other.

It is this condition on the part of one individual of seeing another outside it as 'the I', as the one which is alone free, and so the one which is entitled to take decisions and give orders, that is the essence of the relation of master and servant (*Herr und Knecht*), or mastery and servitude, that ensues after the resolution of the struggle for recognition. This characterisation of the relation goes back to some of Hegel's earliest writings. In the *Natural Law* essay (1802-3) Hegel quotes Plato on the reduction of the barbaric and base to a 'servile [*knechtische*] class' and then immediately paraphrases Aristotle's definition of a slave: 'that which by its nature is not its own but is another's is that which relates [to the other] as the body to a mind' (NL 490/101). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he characterises master and servant essentially as 'being-for-self' and 'being for another' (PS 150/115).[45] The servant is 'consciousness in the form of *thinghood*' (ibid.) while 'for servitude the master is the essence' (PS 152/117). Here in the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind* he says that 'in so far as there is now only one will, that of the master … to that extent the servant is an instrument, not an end in himself' (PSS §435G/3:343), and that 'the self-will of the servant gives itself up to the will of the master, and receives as its content the end of the commander' (PSS §433/3:65).

I have said that this relation of immediate recognition resolves the contradiction between identity and distinctness. It also resolves the earlier contradiction, between the 'I' as

[45] It should be noted that 'being for another' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not mean what it does in the mature system, where to be for another is to be recognised, especially as free or authoritative (e.g. PSS §431A/3:56-7; PR §71/102, §331/366-7). Instead there to be for another is to depend on another for one's purposes, as the servant does.

subject and as object. For these two contradictory aspects of the 'I' are now divided between the master and the servant, so that neither has to experience both at once. For the servant, the 'I' resides outside him, as the acting body of the master, an object among other objects. It is purely objective. For the master, the 'I' resides within him, but he does not need to experience the 'I' as an object, for the actions of the servant in spontaneously serving him shows him that he is being so experienced by another self-consciousness. So the master can experience himself, 'I', purely as subject. The two individuals, so to speak, divide the labour of experiencing the 'I'. The servant experiences the 'I' as an object 'on behalf of' the master, while the master experiences the 'I' as a subject 'on behalf of' the servant.

The moment in which one individual 'gives up his self-will' and treats another as master establishes the most primitive human relationship.[46] It is also the moment at which the human individual first goes beyond purely self-oriented action, and so is the starting point of humanity's moralisation. This is 'the necessary and justified moment of transition from self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to universal self-consciousness' (PSS §433R/3:63). The servant's renunciation of his will to the master is thus Hegel's alternative to the act in which men in an original state of nature alienate their will to the sovereign or the community in social contract accounts of the historical origin of society. The struggle for recognition as Hegel presents it 'can only take place in the state of nature, where men are simply singular' (PSS §432A/3:59).[47] With its resolution human

[46] Cf. SEL 442/125, where Hegel says the relation between a plurality of individuals is immediately mastery and servitude: 'There is no need for transition or conclusion here, as if some further ground or reason were still to be exhibited for it.'

[47] A struggle for recognition is the means of exit from the state of nature in JS1 307-8/235-6 and JS3 214-5/110-12, 218-22/114-8 (although the result there is not mastery and servitude), but not in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

beings emerge from the state of nature into the first kind of state, through the establishment of a relationship of mastery and servitude between a founder and his people:

> The struggle of recognition and subjection under a master is the *appearance* through which the association of men, as a beginning of *states*, has come forth. (PSS §433R/3:63)[48].

But for Hegel, history properly only begins with the formation of the first states (RH 162-3/134-5, PR §349/375). Accordingly the motivations of individuals related to each other as master and servant are the motivations of individuals at the beginning of history proper.

[48] Cf. PS §435G/3:341, SEL 442/125-6, JS3 257-8/154-5, PR §349R/375.

5 Hegel and the history of needs

In this chapter, I propose a reading of Hegel's account of the transition from mastery and servitude to universal self-consciousness, and then his account of the 'system of needs', as a history of the major transformations of ordinary human motivation in the period between the establishment of the first state and that of what I have called the 'true state', the state of the *Philosophy of Right*. Broadly, the view of this history that I shall suggest is implicit in these sections is one in which the urge to freedom that is endemic to mind becomes progressively more conscious through the substitution of motivations which are initially 'singular' by motivations which have a progressively more 'universal' content — a process which Hegel characterises in general as 'cultivation' (*Bildung*) and which has already been prefigured in the transition from animal need to desire. In brief, 'desires' are superseded successively by 'common needs', 'social needs' and finally by 'duties' (meaning sensed duties), where 'supersession' (Hegel's *Aufhebung*) means that the earlier form of motivation is not eliminated but is subordinated to the later form in the individual psyche.[1] Needs therefore play a central role in this historical process of cultivation.

This psychological development occurs alongside, and in interaction with, a development in the fundamental ways in which human beings treat one another, or, otherwise put, the fundamental intentional relationships which they establish between one another. In brief, mastery and servitude gives way to consensual exchange between persons, and then to solidarity between citizens, with each relation 'superseding' the previous one.

[1] Hegel defines *Aufhebung* as a process of simultaneous annulment and preservation at E1 §96A/154.

Hegel and the history of needs

My proposal is that the resulting history of ordinary motivation be understood as providing the underpinnings at the level of individual motivation which I argued in the last chapter are missing from Hegel's official philosophy of history. At the same time I shall suggest that this alternative history, which has visible roots both in the philosophical history that I have attributed to Rousseau and in Kant's philosophy of history, provides the starting point for Marx's theory of history.

1. Needs and the transition to universal self-consciousness

The first major transformation in the motivations of social human beings that Hegel describes is that from mastery and servitude to the 'universal self-consciousness' which has already been mentioned (page 146 above). Hegel names two consequences of the master and servant relationship in §434 and §435 of Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind* (E3 §§434-5/174-6) which together enable this transition. The first is that the master now has to take responsibility for ensuring that the servant's *needs* are met, for unless they are the master will lose the recognition he wants from the servant. The master 'must care for the servant as a living being' (PSS §435G/3:343).[2] Here for the first time an individual formulates the idea of the (actual) need of another, as the requirements that another individual has in order to stay alive and be able to serve the master.[3] The master has to make decisions for the benefit of the servant as well as himself. If he accumulates several servants then he has to make decisions for the benefit of all of them. So he comes to conceive them all as having *common* needs. Furthermore the fact that he has to think about the satisfaction of the needs of others forces the master, for the first time, to raise

[2] Cf. PSS §433A/3:65.

[3] For it is only by the servant's actually serving him that the master knows that the servant recognises him. See PSS §431G/3:337 and note.

his eyes beyond the present, as he has to raise them beyond his own desire.[4] He has to think about how these needs are going to be met *into the future*. It is not enough to provide for the servant's need here and now. Some permanent 'means' must be produced which will ensure that the servants and master will have something to consume on a regular basis: whether it be a stock of consumables, like food, or a more or less lasting use-object, like an item of clothing. This production is a new way of relating to the objects of the physical world, distinct from consumption which was the way in which singular self-consciousness related to them. The relationship between master and servant becomes a three-way one, in which the servant works on objects in order to produce a lasting 'means' for the satisfaction of the common needs of the master and for himself, all under the supervision and instruction of the master. Thus work (or labour) is introduced for the first time. These various implications of the idea of common needs are summarised in §434:

> On the one hand, since the servant, the means of the master, must be preserved in his life, this relation is *commonness* [*Gemeinsamkeit*][5] of need and concern for the satisfaction of this. In the place of crude destruction of the immediate object, there enters the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as something mediating, in which the two extremes of independence and dependence [master and servant — AC] unite themselves. The form of universality in the satisfaction of needs is a *lasting* means and a care which takes the future into account and secures it. (PSS §434/3:65)

What is crucial here is the last sentence, in which Hegel states that the commonness of need introduces a universal quality into the motivation of the master. He now desires the

[4] For the way in which Hegel sees these two 'beyonds' as connected, see PSS §435G/3:341.

[5] Literally 'the quality of being held in common'.

production of what will satisfy all, or at least of all who belong to the community made up of himself and his servants. The object of his desire is thereby 'universal'[6]:

> In general, desire and need give rise to what is common. This is the object of desire and it is therefore something *universal*, not something which has being only for the being-for-self of the singular [individual]. Although the other self-consciousness [the servant — AC], which is a moment here, is only a means, it is at the same time also an end, at a more comprehensive level. (SSN 47, cited Petry, notes to *Hegel: The Berlin Phenomenology*, p. 170)

So the will of the master 'is already something universal, it is not only the will of this self, it is a will which has broadened out' (PSS §435G/3:341). The master acquires 'universal desires', where a universal desire is a desire which can only be satisfied by the production of a means which can satisfy a need common to all.[7] He thereby acquires the beginnings of a general will, a will which is universalised across many individuals.[8]

The second consequence of the master and servant relation is much better known. It is that the servant learns to resist his desires as he works for the master, and so becomes capable of freedom in a new sense, that of the capacity to act independently of his desires rather than being determined by them. The servant 'works off his singular- and self-will in service to the master' and 'supersedes the inner immediacy of desire' (PSS §435/3:67). However it is quite unclear how the fact of surrendering one's actions to the arbitrary

[6] Equivalents to the contrast between immediate desire and what I have here called 'universal desire' play an important part in Hegel's Jena lectures. The contrast corresponds to that between 'practical feeling subsuming the concept' (need and enjoyment) and 'subsumed under the concept' (labour) at SEL 418-21/104-6; that between 'animal desire' and 'human desire' at JS1 299/229-30; and that between the 'desire' of animals and the 'drive' of humans at JS3 203/101.

[7] This is stretching the meaning of 'desire' beyond its specific Hegelian sense. The justification for doing so is that such 'desires' are visibly the direct descendants of desire in that specific sense.

[8] Hegel's translation for Rousseau's 'general will', *allgemeiner Wille* (e.g. at PR §258R/277), uses the German word which I translate as 'universal'.

commands of another does any more than substitute one kind of determination by another. Hegel himself acknowledges this, when he says that the discipline of work by itself does not produce freedom in the servant, or at least not the freedom that he claims arises from the master-servant relationship, a freedom which involves not just this absence of determination by desire but the positive acquisition of something like a Kantian 'rational will':

> As has been said, this servile obedience forms only the *beginning* of freedom, for that to which the natural singularity of self-consciousness submits is not the truly *universal* rational will *existing in and for itself*, but the *singular*, *contingent* will of *another* subject. What emerges here is merely *one* moment of freedom, the *negativity* [i.e. negation — AC] of self-seeking singularity. (PSS §435/3:69)

The '*positive* side of freedom' can only be realised when:

> servile self-consciousness disengages itself from the singularity of the master just as much as from its own singularity, and apprehends what is *in and for itself rational*, in a *universality* which is independent of the particularity of the subject. (ibid.)

Hegel fails to explain how the servant accomplishes this transfer of loyalty from the particular will of the master to what is 'in and for itself rational', but I suggest that he has by now provided the materials for an explanation. The servant already treats the master as 'the I' and so spontaneously carries out his will. But the will of the master turns out not to be arbitrary but to be a will to ensure that the needs of all are met. When he realises this, the servant has a criterion for telling what the master's will is independently of the master's instructions to him. He may then come to construe this criterion as a criterion of the 'essence' of the master's will, of which the master's direct instructions are only expressions. This makes it possible for the servant to reconstrue his loyalty as a loyalty to this essence. He will then become disposed to act in accord with this essence as such. In effect, the servant will have internalised this essence. It will have become an autonomous principle of his own activities. As a result of understanding the principle underlying the

master's actions, he will have acquired the master's 'essential will' himself at second hand. Now he will obey the master only insofar as he finds that the master's commands are a genuine expression of this principle. Through this process he will become a 'man', in the sense that Hegel uses the term when he says that 'men do obediently what they themselves are inclined to do, and this is what is in and for itself universal' (PSS §435G/3:343).[9]

In turn, the master will find that he has to act in accord with this 'essential will', not simply in order to keep his servants alive so that they can continue to serve him, but in order to retain his authority over them at all. Further, the 'essential will' on which he acts ceases to be something personal to him and becomes a will which, he realises, all his servants possess too. He is thereby brought 'to submit his self-seeking will to the law of a will existing in and for itself [*an-und-für-sich-seyenden*]' (PSS §435A/3:69).

The servant, in making the master's 'essential will' into the authoritative principle of his own actions, will so to speak have recovered the 'I' that he lost when he lost the struggle for recognition, but in a new and different form. For this essential will is a will which is not unique to himself but which he has in common with the master. Equally, the principle of the master's actions is no longer an 'I' which resides exclusively in the master's body, but an essential will which the servant shares with him. The master becomes no more than the executor of a will which is incarnated as much in any of his servants as in himself.

This is not to say that the two individuals now think of themselves as a single entity. Each of them distinguishes himself from the other in that he has desires which are peculiar to himself. However each of them must now think of himself as a dual being: on the one hand as an essential will which is identical with the essential will of all others, and on the

[9] Cf. E2 §365A/397.

other hand as desires which are unique to himself. The interaction between master and servant has led to a process of cultivation (*Bildung*) as a result of which *both* individuals now subordinate the desires which they have as particular individuals to an essential will which they share. In effect, they have each reproduced a kind of 'master and servant relation' within themselves.[10] Thanks to this internal division, they are no longer in the position that led to the struggle for recognition, that of having to treat the other as an 'I' and yet being unable to acknowledge the possibility of any other 'I' apart from oneself. In effect, they have succeeded in distinguishing 'I-ness' from 'this I'. Each can at once see himself (his own essential will) in the other and treat the other as distinct from himself (with different desires), for each has made this internal division within himself. In fact when Hegel first set the scene for the struggle for recognition he emphasised precisely the inability of 'singular' self-consciousnesses to make such a division between universal and particular aspects of the self. At this stage, he said, 'the immediate singularity of my self-consciousness and my freedom are not yet separated' (PSS §431G/3:333) or 'I have not yet renounced [my] particularity, I have not yet distinguished it from myself, separated it off from myself … I have not yet discarded it, have not yet raised the self-consciousness of my freedom to universal self-consciousness' (ibid.).[11] Because the individual could not distinguish himself from his own desires or see such a distinction in the other, to recognise the other as 'I' would be to subordinate his whole self to the whole self of the other. 'Here it is still the case that if I recognise someone as free I am thereby unfree' (ibid.).[12]

[10] Kelly, 'Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage'', has drawn attention to this internal aspect of the master and servant relation.

[11] See also the whole passage in Hegel's text immediately preceding this quotation.

[12] Again, the contrast described here has extensive precedents in Hegel's Jena lectures, where the attitude of what is here called singular self-consciousness is often described in terms of 'totality'. See SEL 454/136-7, 474-5/155; JS1 307/235-6, 310/239, 325-6/249-50.

2. Universal self-consciousness

Now that this distinction has been made, however, each individual can recognise the essential will of the other as his own will without losing his own separateness and independence. This relationship of mutual recognition is what Hegel calls 'universal self-consciousness':

> *Universal self-consciousness* is the affirmative knowing of oneself in the other self, each of which as a free singularity has *absolute independence*, but, on account of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not differentiate itself from the other. (PSS §436/3:71)

Originally, the 'I' required recognition by another in order to be an object. That recognition is still required, but now the 'I' that is recognised is an 'essential I' that all have in common. Its objectivity is sustained by the fact that each of its bearers recognises it in each of the others. That is, each individual, as a bearer of this essential I, recognises that same I in all the others. Thereby it sustains the objectivity of the essential I in them, and makes it possible for them to recognise it in turn. Hegel continues:

> [Each is] universal and objective and has real universality as reciprocity, in that it knows itself to be recognised in the free other, and knows this in so far as it recognises the other and knows it as free. (ibid.)

Mutual recognition, then, is Hegel's third kind of recognition, a kind which is very close to the recognition on which Fichte founded his political philosophy in the *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (SR 17-56/31-83). Fichte derived the necessity for mutual recognition by an argument to show that self-consciousness presupposed agency, and agency presupposed such mutual recognition. In turn he understood mutual recognition by two individuals as free as entailing the willingness on the part of each to allow the other a sphere of external freedom, and so in turn derived the necessity of private property rights from that of mutual recognition. The form of Hegel's argument, as I am interpreting it, is not

regressive but genetic, but I shall argue that the derivation of private property from mutual recognition remains.

In Hegel's early discussions of recognition this derivation is very clear. The struggle for recognition is always a struggle over possessions, and mutual recognition issues more or less immediately in private property rights[13] (from here on I shall understand by 'property' private property unless otherwise mentioned). In the mature system, by contrast, the issue of property is scarcely mentioned in describing the struggle for recognition.[14] Nor is property immediately derived from mutual recognition. Rather mutual recognition leads in turn to 'reason', 'intelligence', and 'will', before will gives its own freedom an existence (*Dasein*) in property. It is only in the transition to the second stage of property, contract, that Hegel explicitly connects the idea of recognition with that of property (PR §71R/102-3). Throughout the intervening sections the link between the development of the human mind and its relations with other minds which has been central throughout the section on 'self-consciousness' seems to disappear. We appear to be following the development of an isolated individual mind which relates only to nature.

Nevertheless Hegel states explicitly of universal self-consciousness, 'this universal reflecting [*Wiederscheinen*] of self-consciousness', that it is the 'substance of all essential mindedness, of the family, the fatherland, the state, but also of all the virtues — of love, friendship, courage, honour, fame' (PSS §436/3:71). In Griesheim's lecture notes he adds 'right' to the list (PSS §436G/3:345).[15] Taking this view at face value, I shall argue here that Hegel's description of 'reason', 'intelligence' and 'will' is simply an elaboration of

[13] See JS1 307-26/235-50, JS3 213-27/110-23.

[14] It is mentioned however twice at PSS §431G/3:333-5.

[15] Cf. 436A/3:73 where this self-consciousness is said to form (*bilden*) 'the substance of ethical life'.

the way in which the individual human mind that has achieved universal self-consciousness relates to the physical world. This elaboration will tell us what form mutual recognition must actually take, and its conclusion is that it must take the form of mutual respect for private property rights. So the will which at the conclusion of this elaboration has given to its freedom an existence (*Dasein*) in property is simply the will of the mutually recognising individuals of universal self-consciousness. Thus Hegel's derivation of property in the *Philosophy of Right* does not begin with an ahistorical human will but with one which has already been cultivated by the historical experience of servitude to the point of universal self-consciousness and mutual recognition. In turn, universal self-consciousness arises only through labour for common needs. The development of the idea of common needs is therefore a necessary condition for the development of property. To make this case, I briefly trace the route by which Hegel travels from universal self-consciousness to the will and then property in the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind* and the first part of the *Philosophy of Right*.[16]

Its first step is 'reason'. 'Reason' is, to begin with, simply universal self-consciousness as detached from any one of the individuals in whom it is incarnate, who are thought of as instantiations of that one reason. It is the objective 'being in and for self' of universal self-consciousness (PSS §437-437A/3:75, §437G/3:347). So far, reason simply makes explicit what is implicit in universal self-consciousness, as I have explained it, from its inception. The individual who attains to reason is the mutually recognising individual who explicitly conceives himself as animated by a single underlying principle which also animates the other individuals that he recognises and by whom he is recognised.

[16] The *Philosophy of Right* begins at the transition from 'intelligence' to 'will', and gives a more detailed treatment of 'will' as well as of the stages of objective mind that follow it than the Encyclopaedia *Philosophy of Mind*. However the last edition of the Encyclopaedia is some nine years later than the *Philosophy of Right*. I assumed that both texts are attempts to expound a substantively identical position.

However, reason also has a second aspect. It involves the confidence or 'certainty' that in general the subjective and the objective are at bottom identical (PSS §439/3:77). In the mutual recognition of universal self-consciousness it is just such an identity of object and subject which is achieved; the other is simultaneously subject (identical to myself) and object (different from myself) (PSS §437/3:75). Reason, however, represents the confidence that such an identity holds true between subject and object *in general*. It is as if the individual who attains to reason conceives the underlying principle which animates himself and his fellow mutual recognisers as a principle that also underlies the physical universe. That is, he takes the identity of subject and object achieved in his relations with other self-conscious individuals, and becomes confident that this identity holds true for his relations with the physical world as well. He becomes, in Hegel's terms, an idealist.[17]

Here I bracket the question of both the psychological plausibility and the rational (in the ordinary, non-Hegelian sense of reason) justification of this move, and simply follow Hegel's explication of its consequences. On the one hand the individual is confident of his underlying identity with the physical world. Yet at the same time this world presents itself as something independent of the individual and alien to him, contradicting this identity. So the individual is compelled to attempt actively to make the underlying identity explicit, to realise it. It is when engaging in this activity that the individual for the first time becomes mind in the proper sense (what I shall call 'mind as such'), and the activity of attempting to realise one's own identity with the world, is just the characteristic activity of mind as such (PSS §441A/3:87).

Hegel's most general term for this activity is 'idealisation'. It is an activity that can take either a cognitive or a practical form, and the two forms correspond to the two divisions of 'mind as such'. In its cognitive form, 'intelligence' (or 'theoretical mind'), the

[17] On this transition, see Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, pp. 154-71.

individual attempts to understand the world as governed by regularities which are at bottom identical to the regularities of his own free mentation, thereby rendering the objective subjective. In its practical form, 'will' (or 'practical mind'), the individual attempts to objectify his own freedom in the world.

In line with its derivation from universal self-consciousness, intelligence is characterised internally by a thoroughgoing universality. It renders the world 'subjective' by progressively transforming its singular intuitions of the world into representations (*Vorstellungen*), which are more general, and then thoughts, which are more general still (PSS §446-68/3:117-229). Through this process, intelligence assimilates the world, and the confidence that the world can be so assimilated, that it is at bottom subjective in character, is the basis for the practical form of mind as such that Hegel derives next: will.[18]

3. Will, personality and property

Will, consequently, has a parallel structure to animal need and animal drive on the one hand, and to desire and its associated drive on the other. In fact Hegel introduces will too as involving a form of (phenomenological) 'need' (PSS §472/3:241) and 'drive' (PSS §473/3:247). As with the other two forms of motivation, the ultimate source of motivation is a sense that what is other to the self is not really other but is at bottom identical with it, and that this identity must be made explicit. However will is characterised by universality to a degree which is absent in those other forms of motivation, even in the 'universal desire' which I associated with the master.

[18] By introducing 'will' at this stage Hegel implies that master and servant did not have will. Nevertheless he uses the term freely to characterise them in his lectures, as I have, although he admits that this is strictly incorrect (PSS §435G/3:343). So we have to distinguish loose and strict senses of the term. It is the latter that is now in question.

Firstly and most obviously, the will involves a capacity to refrain from acting on any particular need or drive, a capacity which according to Hegel animals do not have (RH 57/50, VRP3 127, cf. PR §11A/45). As a result the possessor of a will typically finds himself choosing between a plurality of needs and drives rather than wholly taken up with a single one. This will 'stands above' its drives' (PR §14/47).

Secondly, for Hegel the needs and drives of the will are themselves general. Whereas desire 'is something *singular* and seeks only the *singular* for a *singular* momentary satisfaction', a drive of the kind that belongs to the will 'embraces a series of satisfactions and is something *whole*, *universal*' (PSS §443A/3:95). It can be 'actualised and satisfied' in 'separate ways' (PR §14/47; cf. PR §12/46). That is, presumably, it can be satisfied in different ways on different occasions, and in different possible ways even on the same occasion. The same must be true of the needs of the will. Hegel suggests as much in his use of 'need' at PR §59A/89. The needs of the will then have an affinity in this respect with the 'universal desires' of the master in the master and servant relation.

Thirdly, and most importantly, will belongs to an individual who has attained universal self-consciousness, that is, who belongs to a community of 'mutual recognisers'. Since each of the steps in Hegel's systematic derivation of the phenomena of mind is meant to presuppose the previous ones, it is natural to expect that this should be the case. Furthermore, Hegel directly implies that it is, in his initial introduction of will in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the *Philosophy of Right*. There he states that will involves an 'I' which is universal and abstracted from every content (PR §5/37), but which gives itself an existence (*Dasein*) by investing itself in some determinate content (PR §6/39), and which retains its abstractedness even as so determinate (PR §7/41). Interpreters of these paragraphs have tacitly assumed that the 'I' which Hegel is talking of is an individual 'I', and that he is simply referring to the capacity of the individual who has a will to refrain

from acting on any particular drive.[19] But Hegel states explicitly that the 'I' associated with the will is one that abstracts from the particular individual as well as from his various drives:

> I is thinking, thought, conceptualising in general, I is the universal, the completely universal, there is nothing more universal. When each one says 'I' he means himself as a particular, but each is I, and in the higher sense the universal, wholly abstractly the universal. I is wholly abstract; in the I, I leave out of account every particularity, my particular character, temperament, knowledge, age. (VRP4 105, cf. PR §4A/35)

This I is 'I-ness in general', not attached to any particular individual. Accordingly, the second moment of will is not just a matter of choosing to do one particular thing, but that of the *individual* differentiating himself as one particular individual, with particular characteristics, from the universality and indeterminacy of I-ness. Hence Hegel calls this moment the '*particularisation* of the I' (PR §6/39). The will, consisting of the unity of these two moments, then involves the capacity for seeing oneself both as 'I-ness in general' and also as 'this particular I'. This makes sense of Hegel's otherwise unintelligible assertion that friendship and love constitute examples of the freedom that belongs to the will:

> We already have this freedom in the form of sensation, for example in friendship and love. There one does not will, and is not, one-sidedly within himself, but limits oneself in relation to another, yet knows oneself as oneself in this limitation. In determinacy man does not feel himself determined, instead he has his own self-feeling in considering the other as another. (VRP3 119-20, cf. PR §7A/42)

This is nothing other than a redescription of universal self-consciousness.[20]

[19] See for example Schacht, 'Hegel on freedom'; Maletz, 'The meaning of 'will' in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*'.

[20] On Hegel's early understanding of love as involving an apparently paradoxical combination of identity with and difference from the other, and its connection with his later concept of mutual recognition, see Harris, 'The concept of recognition', esp. pp. 229-34, and Williams, *Recognition*, pp. 77-81.

The way in which the universal 'I' particularises itself into this particular 'I' is through the *decision* by the individual as to which of the various 'drives, desires and inclinations' (PR §11/45) that he finds within himself to act to satisfy:

> By deciding, the will posits itself as the will of a determinate individual which separates itself out from another [individual]. (PR §13/46)

In other words, in every act of deciding to act to satisfy certain drives and not others, the universal 'I' in me, which I share with all my fellows in recognition, differentiates itself into a particular 'I' that is distinct from all the other particular 'I's.

The individual may find these drives as simply 'given', but as a 'universal I' he can abstract from any one of them. Hegel expresses this capacity by saying that I look on the drives as '*my own*' (PR §11/45):

> The animal too has such drives, but the animal has no will, it must obey the drive if nothing external prevents it. Our will consists in the fact that I as wholly indeterminate stand over the drives, and can determine the drive as my own [*das Meinige*], and posit myself as my own. (VRP3 127, cf. PR §11A/45)

The will, as Hegel understands it, is thus a faculty which unites the individual, with his particular drives and needs, with the 'universal I' in which he participates with his fellows in recognition, and which enables him to abstract from any one of those drives and needs.

Hegel's transition from the will to property now proceeds in three stages. In a first stage, the individual, as capable of abstracting from any one of his drives and needs, and so of choosing arbitrarily between them, experiences himself as radically free, yet at the same time, since in the end those drives and needs are simply given to him and he can only choose between them, he also feels determined. He experiences a contradiction between 'free reflection, which abstracts from everything, and dependence on an inwardly or

externally given content and material' (PR §15/48). As this contradiction of freedom and determination he is what Hegel calls a *person*:

> It is inherent in *personality* [*Persönlichkeit*] that, as *this* person, I am completely determined in all respects (my inner arbitrariness, drive, and desire, as well as in relation to my immediate existence [*Dasein*]), and that I am finite, yet totally pure self-reference, and thus know myself in my finitude as *infinite*, *universal* and *free*. (PR §35/67-8)

In a second stage, the person attempts to resolve this contradiction by an act of possession. In fact it already treats its drives and inclinations, the content of its will, as 'its own', but according to Hegel it 'simultaneously encounters this content as an external world immediately confronting it' (PR §34/67). Consequently it experiences the contradiction as a contradiction between its freedom, and the givenness of the physical world which confronts it, and the act of possession is one in which it turns this stance of 'my own' out towards the objects of the physical world:

> [T]he personality of the will stands in opposition to nature as *subjective*. But since personality within itself is infinite and universal, the limitation of being merely subjective is in contradiction with it and is *null and void*. Personality [*Persönlichkeit*] is that which acts to supersede this limitation and to give itself reality — or, what amounts to the same thing, to posit that existence [*Dasein*] as its own. (PR §39/70)

The act in which the person engages in this act of possession constitutes a piece of nature as what Hegel calls 'property'. In effect, the relation between the person and the thing (*Sache*) which he arrogates as his property is the analogue of the master and servant relation, for when the thing becomes my property it 'acquires my will as its substantial end (since it has no such end within itself), its determination and its soul' (PR §44/75). That is to say, the person treats his property simply as the bearer of his own freedom: 'I, as free will, am objective to myself in what I possess' (PR §45/76-7). The relationship of property as Hegel defines it involves no reference to a second person. It is simply a

relationship between a person and a piece of nature, in which in effect the person 'relates only to himself' (PR §40/70).

In a third stage, however, since the 'I' which makes someone a person is a universal 'I' which he shares with his fellows in recognition, he must treat any direct expression of that 'I', whether in himself or in others, as authoritative. For to recognise someone as 'I' is simply to treat him as authoritative, as the source of action and decision. Thus he must treat any genuine act of another person, acting *as* a person, as authoritative, where by 'acting as a person' I understand acting in a way which is made necessary by one's conscious status as at once a universal and particular 'I'. I take it that such treatment is what Hegel intends when he says that a person 'must respect others as persons' (PR §36/69). Since the act of possessing a piece of nature counts as such a genuine act of another person, this is to say that he must respect other persons' property. In turn, this gives point to the other's act of possession, for now that act of possession becomes not just a transaction between himself and nature, but the means whereby he is recognised as a fellow-bearer of a universal I by others, so that his freedom has an 'existence' (*Dasein*) for those others. Indeed Hegel now speaks as if this was the whole point of the original act of possession:

> As the existence [*Dasein*] of the will, [property's] existence for another can only be *for the will* of another person. This relation of will to will is the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its existence. (PR §71/102)

In other words, when the person originally gave his freedom an existence (*Dasein*) in a piece of nature by possessing it, he was doing something that would have no point unless that property was respected by others. It is in contract that one person genuinely manifests respect for the property of another, not merely by an omission (that of refraining from invading the other's property) but by an action (that of giving up his own property in return for the use of the other's). Accordingly Hegel goes on to derive 'contract' as a

necessary supplement to his conception of property as a relationship between isolated person and nature.

At the end of a long argument, then, Hegel has derived the form of recognition which is necessitated by universal self-consciousness. Just as the struggle for recognition was initiated by the determination on the part of each individual to '*display* itself as a free self and to be *there* [*da zu sein*] as such for the other' (page 142 above), a determination that could only be realised through gaining immediate recognition from the other, thereby reducing it to servitude, so the person's freedom gains an existence (*Dasein*) for another person in property, so that he is recognised in a mediated way, through the other's respect for his property. In effect, the enslavement of the thing by the person turns out to be the means whereby the person could become recognised by another person without either of them being having to reduce the other to servitude. The thing (*Sache*) is the necessary medium through which two persons can recognise each other. Persons relate to each other and have existence (*Dasein*) for each other 'only as property owners' (PR §40/70).

4. The system of needs

The conclusion we have reached is that mastery and servitude generates common needs and labour for their satisfaction, that these eventually undermine mastery and servitude itself, in favour of mutual recognition, and that this recognition must take the form of the mutual respect of private property owners for each other's property, as expressed in their acts of reciprocal contractual exchange. I shall not attempt to rehearse Hegel's derivation of the set of dispositions which Hegel calls morality (*Moralität*) as a direct consequence of the relations between persons. Instead in this section I shall suggest that Hegel's account of the 'system of needs' in part 3 of the *Philosophy of Right* forms a natural continuation of the 'history of ordinary motivation' which I have traced up to this point. Hegel's

introduction to the system of needs virtually summarises the position that we have reached so far:

> Particularity, in its primary determination as that which is opposed to the universal of the will in general ... is *subjective need*, which attains its objectivity, i.e. its *satisfaction*, by means of (a) external things [*Dinge*], which are likewise the *property* and product of the needs and *wills* of others and (b) activity and work, as the mediation between the two aspects. (PR §189/227)

In other words, whereas in mastery and servitude the servants worked for the master, who in turn used their products to satisfy their needs, now as persons all work to produce things which they exchange with others so that each can satisfy his own needs. The division of labour between master and servant is replaced by a division of labour between persons who differentiate themselves from each other by their different 'subjective needs'.

Since, as I have argued, Hegel's view is that the way in which the individual particularises himself is by acts of decision, he must mean by 'subjective needs' not merely phenomenological as opposed to actual needs, but also needs which the individual has some part in bringing into existence. In fact Hegel's conception of needs in his section on the 'system of needs' relies heavily on this idea. For it is characteristic of this system that individuals' needs are in a process of constant multiplication and differentiation:

> The ways and means by which the *animal* can satisfy its needs are limited in scope, and its needs are likewise limited. Though sharing this dependence, *man* is at the same time able to transcend it and show his universality, first by multiplying his needs and means, and secondly by *dividing* and *differentiating* the concrete need into individual parts and aspects which then become different needs, *particularised* and hence *more abstract*. (PR §190/228)

The human being, or at least the mutually recognising human being, is 'universal' in that he can abstract from any one of his drives or needs, and this is at least closely related to the capacity to form new phenomenological needs.

Hegel and the history of needs

This gets us part of the way to explaining the multiplication of needs, but it does not yet give us a motor to explain this multiplication. The idea that Hegel appeals to here is that of an urge for 'universal' recognition:

> Needs and means become as real existence [*Dasein*] a *being* for *others*, by whose needs and work satisfaction is mutually conditioned. That abstraction which becomes a quality of needs and means also becomes a determination of the mutual relations between individuals; this universality as *recognised-being* is the moment which makes needs, means and modes of satisfaction in their isolation and abstraction into *concrete*, as *social* ones. (PR §192/229)

In short, the possession of the means to satisfy a given need becomes a source of recognition by all others: recognition not now in the sense of immediate recognition or the mutual recognition of persons, but in the sense of a 'universal' recognition which attaches to those who possess some given item. In so far as people seek this universal recognition, they will develop needs for just those objects which will attract such recognition from others. In other words, they will develop needs based on popular opinion, and this is what Hegel has in mind by 'social needs' (PR §194/230).

We still need to know what this universal recognition consists in and how it could develop from the simple processes of contractual exchange between persons, and here Hegel gives little help. However an explanation to which he might have assented would be this. Whenever I engage in exchanges with others my freedom is recognised, through the mediation of respect for my property. But on each occasion my freedom is only recognised by *one* other person. The particularity of this recognition stands in contradiction to the universal character of the freedom of which I see myself, as a person, as a representative. I cannot simultaneously engage in a contract with all other persons, but I can at least try to acquire, by labour and exchange, goods which I know I *could* in principle exchange with any other person. Such goods, however, will be just those goods which others are currently trying to acquire. Hence if a sufficient number of persons

become interested, for whatever reason, in acquiring one particular kind of good, then each of the remainder of those engaged in exchange will develop an interest in acquiring that same type of good, *just because* so many people are already interested in acquiring it. They will develop a 'social need', a need based simply on the opinion of others. The greater the proportion of individuals interested in acquiring this good, the greater the interest the remainder will have in also acquiring it. At the limiting point where everyone develops such an interest, those who already possess the good are in a position in which they could exchange the good with anyone at all, and this willingness on the part of all others to give you something in exchange for your good constitutes, I suggest, the universal recognition Hegel describes.

This account is derived from standard explanations of the origin of money.[21] The difference is that on the present account goods which are universally exchangeable are not sought as an instrumental means to acquiring whatever other goods the individual wants, but because the universal exchangeability of a good directly constitutes universal recognition for its owner.

Thus the urge for universal recognition leads individuals to form (phenomenological) needs for things which they know that others already have a need for. Yet the person, as a unity of particular and universal, needs not only to be recognised by all others as a bearer of the same universal I, but also to differentiate himself as a particular I from others as particular 'I's. This leads him in exactly the opposite direction, to form needs for things which he knows that others do *not* need. The alternation of these two tendencies is what Hegel offers as his explanation of the multiplication of needs. The moment of social needs:

[21] For example, von Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit*, pp. 30-32.

> immediately involves the demand for *sameness* in this respect with others. On the one hand, the need for this sameness, together with making oneself the same [as others], *imitation*, and on the other hand the need for *particularity* which is just as much present here, to assert itself through some distinctive quality, themselves become an actual source of the multiplication and spreading of needs. (PR §193/230)

Hegel says '*an* actual source' here, but he mentions no other. In turn, he clearly intends it to be understood that at the root of this alternation between the pursuit of sameness and the pursuit of difference is the contradiction at the heart of the person, as a 'universal I' who is simultaneously a 'particular I'.

5. *Bildung* and citizenship

As a consequence of the multiplication and differentiation of needs, participants in the system of needs become increasingly dependent on each other, and are forced to think increasingly in terms of the interactions between their own actions and those of others. This is the source of the process of cultivation or formation (*Bildung*) through which individuals in the system of needs gradually acquire a universality of outlook and thus a 'political disposition'. This is a willingness to sacrifice their personal welfare for the good of the people to which they belong as a whole, a people that is organised through the state (PR §§268-9/288-90). Thus the system of needs is the principle means whereby human beings are formed into citizens.

Hegel's clearest definition of *Bildung* is in *Reason in History*:

> A *gebildete* man is one who knows how to impress the stamp of universality on all his actions, who has renounced his particularity [*Partikularität*], who acts in accord with universal principles. *Bildung* is the form of thinking, and its basis is that man knows how to restrain himself and does not merely act on his inclinations and desires, but instead collects himself. (RH 65/56-7)

Or again, '*Bildung* can therefore be defined quite simply as the imposition of a universal quality upon a given content' (RH 66/57).[22] Clearly, the process whereby the servant attains to a universal self-consciousness through labour in the service of the master is a case of *Bildung*. However in the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel associates *Bildung* specifically with the sphere of civil society, at whose heart lies the system of needs:

> Individuals, as citizens of [civil society], are *private persons* who have their own interest as their end. Since this end is mediated through the universal, which thus *appears* to them as a *means*, they can attain it only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing, thinking and doing in a universal way and make themselves into *links* in the chain of this *interconnection*. (PR §187/224)

In other words through the very pursuit of their particular ends they are raised 'to *formal freedom* and formal *universality of knowing and willing*' and this is the '*Bildung* of subjectivity' (ibid.).

Specifically, self-seeking individuals in the market are forced to produce things which others will be willing to buy (PR §192A/230), and to work in standardised ways in order to produce such things (PR §198/232). This provides the basis for the widening of the outlook of the market agent, but that widening is only accomplished as a result of the tendency of the market to impoverish individuals or even whole masses in ways beyond their individual control. Experience of this inadvertent impoverishment leads individuals to form and support mutual-benefit professional associations ('corporations') and to support a centralised system of economic intervention (a 'police') in order to safeguard their livelihoods in the face of the uncertainties and crisis tendencies of the market (PR §§230-

[22] For other characterisations of *Bildung* see PR §107A/136-7, §187A/226, §217R/249. For another view of its role in Hegel, see Schmidt, 'A *paideia* for the '*Bürger als bourgeois*''.

56/259-74).[23] Thus the market and its self-seeking mentality give rise endogenously, and as an unintended consequence of the actions of individual market actors, to institutions which partially transcend the market and to a mentality which partially transcends self-seeking. Because the police and corporation are variously inadequate to support the well-being of all (PR §249/269-70, §256/273), this process culminates in Hegel's transition to the state, and the 'political disposition' or patriotic mentality which underlies it (PR §260/282, §§267-268R/288-9).[24] The sense amongst all those involved in a system of needs that the welfare of each is entwined with that of others leads them to support a state which has the power to overrule all other rights and duties should the common good require it, though only because that state itself recognises their individual right to pursue their own private ends.[25]

In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel does not present the process of *Bildung* which leads from the system of needs to the state as a historical one. Rather he seems to envisage each individual being gradually 'formed' by his experience in the market into a citizen characterised by 'political disposition'. Nevertheless I suggest that the process can also be understood as the culminating stage in the history of ordinary motivation which I have been reconstructing from sections of Hegel's systematic account of mind. With the

[23] They also support a judicial system through which individual property rights can be enforced, but this is to protect against theft and fraud rather than market uncertainty (PR §§209-29/240-59).

[24] For an account of political disposition, see O'Malley, 'Hegel on political sentiment'.

[25] This process provides the closest analogue in Hegel to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', but it also differs importantly from it. In Hegel, the operation of the market does not always make everyone better off than they would have expected on the basis of their individual calculations, so that, in Mandeville's terms, 'private vice' can substitute for 'public virtue'. It may have the opposite effect. Yet it is in part precisely because of the tendency to market failure that the market transforms 'private vice' *into* 'public virtue' amongst its participants. For some doubts as to whether the market can ever have such an effect, see Plant, 'Hegel on political economy'.

development of political sentiment individuals have come to the point where they are psychologically disposed to support the state as well as the institutions of private property, the administration of justice, the police and the corporations: in other words the whole institutional structure of right with the exception of the family, a discussion of which I omit here. The development of such psychological dispositions is precisely the development of a sense of one's duties as a member of civil society and of the state.

6. Ordinary motivation and the stages of history

Hegel's history of ordinary motivation is then a history of its development from the singular desires with which isolated human beings begin, through the 'universal desires' of the master based on the common needs of master and servant, to the general needs of the will, the demand for respect for property and the willingness to give it of the person, the social needs of the participant in the system of needs and finally the duties of the citizen.

The essence of the development is a successive reformulation of the underlying contradiction of which desire is the first expression: the contradiction between the sense of the self as self-determining and its experience of itself as being in some way determined by what is outside it, or the contradiction between self-consciousness and consciousness. Each new formulation of the contradiction is the result of a form of relationship amongst human beings, and between human beings and nature, which in turn is the result of their actions driven by the previous formulation of the contradiction. Thus the first stirrings of human desire already contain in embryo the motivations which will ultimately demand and support the establishment of the institutions of the modern state.

The question of the ultimate coherence of such an account of ordinary human motivations as the expressions of an underlying contradiction which takes successively different forms

in history cannot be properly addressed here. My aim has simply been to suggest the plausibility of interpreting Hegel as providing such an account, one which could in principle explain the historical appearance in ordinary individuals of the motivations necessary to establish the system of modern political institutions, and thus the success of world-historical individuals in establishing those institutions.

Nevertheless, the question of the possibility of mapping this history of ordinary motivation onto Hegel's official philosophical history must be considered. I have already argued that the initiation of the master and servant relation can be identified with the founding of the first states (pages 146-147 above). I now briefly claim that in addition the following correspondences can be detected between the two histories:

(1) The mastery and servitude (*Knechtschaft*) relation itself corresponds to the historical subordination of subjects to a single despot in the Oriental world, and to the historical institution of classical slavery (*Sklaverei*) in the Greek world. The evidence for this is that Hegel associates servitude and slavery in several places.[26] He also characterises the slave as someone who is not conscious that he is essentially free, and who is thought of as a natural entity,[27] and this is in effect the condition of the servant, for he has 'renounced' his sense of his own freedom along with his sense of himself as an 'I'.

(3) Universal self-consciousness, personhood and property correspond to the Roman world, specifically the Roman Empire. The evidence here is that Hegel says that the sense

[26] E.g. PSS §433A/3:65, PR §57R/87-8. At §435A/3:69 the two terms are used interchangeably. I ignore one passage in which Hegel makes an explicit distinction between the two, saying that the slave unlike the servant has (i.e. presumably experiences) no rights or duties (PSS §435G/3:343).

[27] For the first point, see E3 §482R/240, PR §21R/53, §26A/57, §57A/88; cf. Maletz, 'The meaning of 'will' in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*', p. 208. For the second point, see PR §57R/87.

of oneself as intrinsically free characterises personality. He associates it with the principle (or right) of subjectivity (or subjective freedom), the principle that an individual cannot be the property of another (PR §124R/151-2, §185R-185A/222-3). But he also says that this principle arose 'in an external form' in the Roman world (PR §185R/222-3).[28]

(4) The system of needs corresponds to the German world, during the period of which the modern, 'true' state has arisen. The argument here is that the system of needs presupposes that each participant is an owner of private property, so it must postdate slavery. Furthermore Hegel several times speaks of the system of needs, and the realm of civil society for which it provides the basis, as a product of the 'modern world' (PR §189R/227, §182A/220).

Of course such a mapping must allow for overlaps. Ancient slave society, for example, must already have involved some property, for individual masters held their slaves as private goods. Similarly Hegel thinks of medieval property arrangements as only incomplete realisations of genuine property (PR §63A/93; cf. §61/90). Nevertheless I suggest that there is textual evidence that justifies at least a provisional identification of the major stages of the history of ordinary motivation which I have elicited from a reading of his systematic account of mind with those of his official philosophy of history.

I conclude that this ordinary history provides the most promising source in Hegel's work for an answer to the question of 'microfoundations' which I raised in the last chapter. At the same time, the concept of needs, as the mediating form of human motivation between

[28] He adds that this principle arose 'in an inward form' in Christianity (ibid.; cf. E3 §482/240, PR §62R/92). On the account I have given Jesus must then be treated as a kind of world-historical figure (although not a political one), who articulated a consciousness which was already present in inarticulate form amongst both slaves and masters in the late phases of the institution of slavery, namely that universal self-consciousness in which each thinks of himself as a person.

the desires of those men who first enter into relations of mastery and servitude and the sense of duty of the citizens of the modern state, plays a key role in this history. It therefore deserves to be recognised as a concept central to a full reconstruction of Hegel's philosophy of history.

6 The early Marx on needs and property

Marx's theory of history is standardly understood as operating entirely at the level of large-scale social factors, namely the forms of society or sets of 'social relations of production' on the one hand and the general level of development of human productive powers on the other. In interpretations of the theory little is said about qualitative changes in the way in which individual agents experience themselves and their relations to each other in the course of history, and about the effects of such changes on the survival or overthrow of social systems.

In these two chapters, by contrast, I outline an interpretation of Marx's theory of history, or rather of one aspect to his thinking on history, in which such changes in individual self-conception play a major role in mediating the relationship between the development of human productive powers and the changes in social forms in history. The interpretation I shall offer limits itself to the period of development of capitalism and its overthrow in favour of communism, and it leaves some major issues unaddressed. Nevertheless I hope to show that it represents an important though neglected side of Marx's historical thinking. At the same time, the development of human needs plays a central role in the account of historical development provided by this interpretation.

Marx and Engels tied history directly to the expansion of needs when they wrote in the *German Ideology* that:

> the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs; and this creation of new needs is the first historical act. (GI 28/42)

The early Marx on needs and property

Yet Marx says little about the development of needs in his general sketches of his 'materialist conception of history'.[1] By contrast in his 1844 writings Marx is extensively preoccupied with the question of human needs. A common, if implicit, conclusion drawn by commentators has been that what Marx has to say on needs in 1844 has little relevance to his theory of history. Indeed the 1844 writings are thought of as belonging to a period in which he had not yet formulated that theory.[2] Accordingly Marx's account of needs there tends to be understood chiefly as an account of actual needs, human beings' actual requirements for well-being, which is part of a condemnation of capitalism for its failure to meet those needs. By contrast I aim to show that the idea of needs plays an important role in the historical thinking of the 1844 writings, and accordingly that it is centrally an account of phenomenological rather than actual needs. In turn I shall argue that the historical thinking of the 1844 writings has more in common with that of Marx's later writings than is normally acknowledged.

In this chapter I investigate Marx's concept of needs in his *Comments on James Mill* (1844) and the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844).[3] I aim to show that Marx has a conception of 'estranged' (or 'alienated') needs alongside his conception of 'estranged labour' and 'estranged property', and that he sees all three as developing together in the course of a history which he conceives as one of the ever widening extension of relations of private economic exchange. For Marx, this threefold estrangement is what must ultimately make relations of private exchange intolerable to individuals and lead them to overthrow such relations in favour of communism. In chapter

[1] The most important of these are the first chapter of the *German Ideology* and the 1859 Preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.

[2] The fact that the general sketches referred to fall on the other side of the 'epistemological break' which Althusser discerned as taking place in Marx's development from the 1844 writings has undoubtedly made it more difficult for commentators to see the relevance of these writings to his later historical thinking. See Althusser, *For Marx*.

[3] I shall refer to these two texts collectively as 'the 1844 manuscripts'.

7 I aim to show that such a conception of the historical process survives in Marx's later writings, concentrating especially on the *German Ideology* (1845-46) and some passages from the *Grundrisse* (1857-58). I attempt to show that Marx's apparent moral condemnations of capitalism can be more easily reconciled with such a conception than they can with the 'functionalist' conception of history normally attributed to Marx.

1. Human activity as species activity

A sense of the importance of the concept of need to Marx's philosophical anthropology in the 1844 manuscripts can be gained from his statement there that man's essence is *constituted* by his needs:

> [T]he need for a thing is the most obvious, irrefutable proof that that thing is part of *my* essence. (CJM 452/218)

Accordingly, Marx's concept of need in these writings has to be understood in the context of his philosophical anthropology. Marx's way of developing his philosophical anthropology is first of all to derive the most essential characteristics of man, or the human being, by contrasting man to the animals. Then he tries to show that in man as we know him these characteristics are only realised in a self-stultifying way. This enables him in turn to contrast man as we know him with man as he could be, if those characteristics were realised properly. As a result, he can portray man's present condition as 'inhuman' without resorting to an entirely arbitrary conception of what counts as 'genuinely human'.[4]

[4] Whether in general it is legitimate to derive a normative conception of human nature from those features that distinguish human beings from animals is a question I shall not address here. For some doubts, see Benton, 'Humanism = speciesism'.

What then distinguishes man from the animals? Marx's most fundamental answer is, his *universality*. In the terminology of the 1844 manuscripts, man is a *Gattungswesen*, that is, a 'species-being'. Indeed he is the only species-being, or at least Marx never expresses the thought that there may be non-human races of species-beings. *Gattung* means species, but also type or kind, so we could equally translate *Gattungswesen* as a 'type-being' or a 'kind-being'.[5] *Wesen* means 'essence', but *ein Wesen* also means 'an entity' or 'a being' (as opposed to 'being' in the generic sense of 'existence'). Presumably it means specifically a being that has an essence, since otherwise the use of the same word would be fortuitous.[6] I shall follow tradition in translating *Wesen* as 'essence' and *ein Wesen* as 'an essence' or 'a being', but it is important to remember that 'a being' must then always be understood as having an essence (whatever exactly it is to have an essence). It seems natural to assume that if a *Wesen* always means a being with an essence, then a *Gattungswesen* would mean a being whose essence is 'species-ness', i.e. universality of some kind.[7]

[5] In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1843) Marx occasionally contrasts *Gattung* with *Art* as genus to species (e.g. CHPL 231/30), but he does not seem to intend such a contrast in the 1844 writings.

[6] Similarly in *Capital* Marx uses 'a value' to mean not only a value in the ordinary sense, i.e. a certain magnitude of value, but also a thing that has such a value. See, for example, C1 17/126, 20/128.

[7] A 'human being' (*menschliche Wesen*) would similarly be a being that possessed the human essence, and (depending on the exact meaning of 'essence') this might be distinct from a 'man', in the sense of mere member of the human race (*Mensch*). However Marx never suggests such a distinction and in fact when he uses the term *menschliche Wesen* (or the near-equivalent *Menschenwesen*), he always means by it the human essence in general, rather than an individual with that essence (e.g. CHPRI 17/175, CJM 451/217, CJM 459-60/225, TF 6, GI 167/184). Accordingly, I shall use 'man' (meaning member of the human race, of either gender) and 'human being' as synonyms in my discussion, although in quotations from Marx I will translate *Mensch* consistently as 'man'.

In fact the idea of universality is at the heart of Marx's exposition of the idea of a species-being. This can be illustrated by taking the three-point definition of a species-being that he gives in asserting that man is a species-being:

> Man is a species-being, not only because [1] he practically and theoretically makes the species — both his own and those of other things — his object, but also — and this is simply another way of saying the same thing — because [2] he relates [*sich verhält*] to himself as the present, living species, because [3] he relates to himself as a *universal* and therefore free being. (EPM 515/275)

I shall concentrate on the practical rather than the theoretical side of this preliminary definition, that is, on what Marx elsewhere calls species-*activity*.[8] Species-activity means the activity characteristic of a species-being. I shall take the three parts of the definition of species-activity in an order different from Marx's, so as to show how they are connected to each other. Since the term I have translated as 'relates' (*sich verhält*) above could equally be translated as 'treats', the three parts can be summarised by saying that a species being: (1) relates to or treats himself as the species, (2) relates to or treats himself as a free being, (3) makes the species his object.

(1) Species-activity is first of all 'relating to oneself as the species', that is, I take it, participating in the life of the species as a whole by producing something for other human beings and in turn enjoying what others have produced for you:

> The *interchange* [*Austausch*][9] both of human activities in the course of production and of *human products* with each other is equal to the species-activity and the species-spirit whose real, conscious and true existence consists in *social* activity and *social* enjoyment. (CJM 450-51/216-7)

[8] Here I only follow Marx, who says elsewhere that the whole character of a species 'is contained in the character of its life-activity' (EPM 516/276).

[9] Marx evidently does not mean to limit this interchange to the conditional exchange of private property, to be discussed below.

So for Marx, species-activity consists in mutual production and consumption. More specifically, it consists in the production of objects for others as part of a totality of individuals, ultimately one consisting of the whole species, all of whom produce for each other, rather than as part of a dyad or a small enclosed group. Such a totality is what Marx means by 'society' and accordingly he calls the production and consumption he has in mind here '*social* activity and social *enjoyment*'. The fact that species-activity is social in this sense already gives it a certain universality.

(2) However species-activity is not merely social production and consumption. If it were it could be said that ants engage in some form of species-activity, and Marx would deny this. What is unique about human species-activity, for Marx, seems to be that the activities of production are *directed*. That is, men not only act on nature, but they act on their own actions. Hence their actions are free, and indeed consciously free. Those actions involve 'relating to oneself as free':

> The animal is immediately one with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from it; it *is* that activity. Man makes his life-activity itself into an object of his willing and consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. It is not a determination with which he immediately merges. Conscious life-activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life-activity. Only because of that is he a species-being … Only because of that is his activity free activity. (EPM 516/276)[10]

So species-activity is firstly the activity of producing things for other human beings in general and enjoying the products of other human beings, and secondly it is activity which is consciously directed, and thus free. Marx never really clarifies the link between these first and second aspects of the idea of species-activity, but it seems to be that, in the case of humans, unlike that of ants, individuals are not assigned by their own nature to any one particular productive activity. Therefore on the one hand they must be capable of a whole

[10] Cf. EPM 516/276: 'free conscious activity is the species-character of man'.

range of alternative productive activities, yet on the other they must have some way of singling out one of those activities as the one to engage in, at any one time, in order to coordinate with other individuals. The way they do this is by language, and language brings in its train consciousness and the conscious direction of activities. Here is how Marx and Engels sketch the connection in *The German Ideology*:

> Language is as old as consciousness, language *is* practical, real, consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, first arises from the need, the necessity [*Notdurft*], of intercourse with other men. (GI 30/44)

In that activity is consciously directed it can again be said to possess 'universality', in the sense that once an agent is free, in the sense of capable of redirecting his activity, he can in principle redirect it over and over again. He can turn his hand, in principle, to the production of anything:

> It is true that animals also produce. They build nests and dwellings, like the bee, the beaver, the ant etc.. But they produce only what they or their young immediately need [*bedarf*]; they produce one-sidedly, while man produces universally; they produce only under the domination of immediate physical need, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom from such need. (EPM 517/276)[11]

(3) Such consciously directed activity also involves another kind of universality, which I shall call 'generality', and which pertains to each particular activity, as opposed to the sum of such activities as a whole.[12] If the conscious direction of activities requires language, and language uses general concepts, then this conscious direction will have to be a direction in accord with those general concepts. Those concepts will be constitutive of

[11] The antecedents of this view have already been mentioned. See footnote 32, page 138 above.

[12] In what follows, I distinguish 'generality', as a particular kind of 'universality'. I leave the meaning of 'universality' vague and inclusive, while attaching a specific meaning to 'generality'. Marx, like Hegel, uses only a single word, *Allgemeinheit*, for universality and generality, which accordingly I translate as 'universality'.

the activity itself. Specifically this means that, when human beings act on things, they do not act on them as unique particulars, but *as examples* of the kinds (or species) under which they classify them using their general concepts. Their action on a thing is 'mediated' through their concept of the kind of which they are treating (or 'relating to') the thing as an instance. I suggest that this is what Marx means by the third aspect of his definition of species-activity, the idea that it is activity which involves 'making the species one's object'.[13] If I burn a log for warmth I am treating it as an instance of 'firewood', my action on the log is mediated through the concept of 'firewood', and the intentional object of my activity is the log *as* a piece of firewood. If instead I sit on it I am treating it as 'a stool', if I throw it away I am treating it as 'rubbish', and so on. In this sense species-activity is activity which takes 'general objects', where taking a 'general object' is taking as object a particular conceived as a member of a kind. I assume that when Marx says that man 'makes the kind his object' he means that he makes 'general objects' in this sense, rather than Platonic entities of any kind, into his object. An activity that takes such general objects can itself be called 'general'; this is what I shall mean by a general activity from now on. So we can say that species-activity is 'general'.[14]

[13] The idea that man can be distinguished from animals because he makes the species his object comes from Feuerbach, who originated the term 'species-being'. 'The positive difference between man and the animals is only this: that man's species is an object for him' (*Philosophy and Christianity*, FW7 70, cited by Wartofsky, *Feuerbach*, p. 164). It is also present in Hegel (see PSS §381A/1:34-5), and is anticipated by Fichte (SR 39/60-61). However in these passages it is only a question of taking the species to which the being in question belongs as an object, so that this species becomes, in Hegelian terms, a 'species for itself'. For Marx as I interpret him, a species-being takes species or kinds *in general* as objects.

[14] If a bird eats a worm (rather than a stick) does it treat the worm as food and so have a general object? Perhaps Marx would have said that for the bird to 'relate to' or 'treat' the worm as food in the sense in which he intends the phrase, it would have to have the linguistic concept of food, and so would have to be a language user and therefore conscious. See also the assertion in the *German Ideology*, although made in a different context, that 'the animal does not '*relate*' [*sich verhält*] to anything, it does not [relate] at all' (GI 30/44).

To summarise, the unifying characteristic of species-activity is what can loosely be called its 'universal' quality. It is universal in that: (1) it is socially productive and consumptive, i.e. involves production for other members of one's species and consumption of what others have produced, (2) it is free, and so is capable of indefinite redirection, and (3) it is general, i.e. is mediated by general concepts and takes 'general objects'.

2. Man's essential objects as human property

For Marx, the essence of man consists in the first instance in his characteristic activity, namely species-activity. From this starting point, it is possible to see how the essence of man could also consist in his characteristic *needs*. An activity can be defined partly by its objects, by what it is activity *on*: the objects which the agent uses, consumes, or produces in engaging in the activity. It can also be defined by its motivation, by what it is activity *for*. So if we can talk of the 'essential activities' of a being, those activities which are definitive of its essence, we also can talk of its 'essential objects' (the typical objects of those activities) and also of its 'essential motivations' (the typical motivations of the agent). I suggest that it is this idea of essential human motivations that Marx tried to convey with the term 'needs'. Thus, in the terms introduced in the Introduction, the human needs that Marx talks of in the 1844 manuscripts are principally 'phenomenological' needs, persisting desires, rather than actual needs, although of course they may reflect or give rise to actual needs. It is in this sense that I shall normally understand 'needs' in discussing Marx. They are 'essential', not in the sense that they are requirements that absolutely must be satisfied if a human being is to survive, but that they are persisting desires that are specific to human beings and characterise their essence.

Need, essential activity and essential object, in other words, must be understood to form a single complex for Marx. Need is the subjective component of activity, just as the object

is its objective component. This means that just as human activity is distinguished from animal activity by its universality (and specifically its generality), and its objects by their generality, so human *needs* should be distinguished from animal needs by their generality. As a starting point to elucidating the idea of human needs as general needs, I now say something more about the objects of species-activity, for if human needs are the motivations of species-activity then those objects will also be the objects of human needs.

I said that an agent treats a thing as a 'general object' in that he treats it as an example of a kind, as when I use a log as a stool. Here the generality is purely 'intentional': a matter of what I treat the log as or use it for. Characteristically, though, human beings impose this generality onto the *physical structure* of the things which are the objects of their activity. For example, we construct a chair. Now the generality which characterises the log considered as the intentional object of an individual who uses it to sit on has been *built into* the chair. It characterises the chair considered as a physical object. A chair embodies in its structure a certain potential activity, that of 'using it as a chair', and this activity is a general one. The physical structure of the chair, which is what it has (broadly) in common with all other chairs, gives it an objective generality which the log does not have. I shall call such an object an 'objectively general object'.[15]

Furthermore, the general activity for which the structure of the chair is objectively suited, namely that of using things as chairs, is an activity which, since it is mediated by a concept which is shared by all users of a language, is such that in principle any user of the language could engage in it. Hence in principle any human being, or at least anyone with a language which has the concept of 'chair', could use the chair. Thus 'objectively general objects' are just the kind of things that one human being could produce for another's use.

[15] The idea that human artefacts have an objective 'ideality' is advanced on Marx's behalf by Ilyenkov, 'The concept of the ideal'. For antecedents of the same thought in Hegel, see footnote 17, page 186 below.

Conversely when men produce things for each other's use, they typically produce objects which in principle anyone could use, and they do so by producing objects which have a structure that 'suits' them to activity mediated by concepts common to all, that is by producing 'objectively general objects'.[16]

Thus man's essential objects can be understood as universal in two senses. Firstly they are 'objectively general', i.e. each embodies in its structure a class of objects which can be used for the same purpose (in the case of the chair, the class of things which can be used as chairs), and secondly each can be used in principle by any one of the class of human beings.[17]

Now, according to Marx, through working on nature to create a world of such universal objects, and so, as it were, 'humanising nature', man progressively 'objectifies' his own inherent universality, that is, 'objectifies' himself as a species-being:

> It is therefore in his working-up [*Bearbeitung*][18] of the objective world that man really proves himself to be a *species-being*. This production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is therefore the *objectification of the species-life of man*: for man doubles [*verdoppelt*] himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and

[16] Accordingly, such production partakes of the quality of universality to a higher degree than does the activity of consumption, even the consumption of 'objectively general objects'. It does not simply treat objects in terms of general concepts but *creates* an objective kind of generality. This seems to be Marx's rationale for thinking of species-activity primarily as production rather than consumption.

[17] In his Jena lectures of 1802-6 Hegel said something similar about tools. For example: 'In the tool the subjectivity of labour is raised to something universal. Anyone can make a similar tool and work with it. To this extent the tool is the persistent rule of labour' (SEL 428/113). See also his reference to the tool as 'singularity and universality, and a middle between them' (JS3 205/103; the footnote that follows makes it clear that he has tools in mind). Hegel's reference to the universality of the 'lasting means' of labour (page 150 above) carries this thought over to his mature writing.

[18] Alternative translations are 'fashioning', 'cultivation', or 'processing'.

> actually, and therefore looks at himself in a world he has created. (EPM 517/277)[19]

Such universal objects, objects in which mankind objectifies his own universality, are what Marx calls 'human property, 'true property', or 'inner property', terms which have a positive not a negative meaning for him. Human property is the objectification of the human essence in the physical world. It is the objects used, produced, and consumed by species-activity. It is, as he puts it, 'the *existence* [*Dasein*] of *essential* [*wesentlich*] objects for man, both as objects of enjoyment and of activity' (EPM 563/322).

Thus human property will be the objects of human needs. This is made clearest in a passage part of which I quoted from at the start. Here Marx contrasts this 'inner property' to ordinary private property. He describes two private property owners each of whom experiences a need for the other's object:

> The longing for each of these objects, i.e. the need for them, shows each private-property-owner [*Privateigentümer*], makes him conscious, that he has another *essential* relation to the objects apart from that of private property, that he is not the particular being [*Wesen*] which he takes himself to be but a *total* being, whose needs stand in a relation of *inner* property to all products, including those of another's labour. For the need for a thing is the most obvious, irrefutable proof that that thing is part of *my* essence, that its being is for me and that its *property* [*Eigentum*] is the property, the peculiarity [*Eigentümlichkeit*] of my essence. (CJM 452/218)[20]

[19] Cf. EPM 541/301. By 'man' in these passages Marx should be understood to mean 'the human race as a whole' rather than any individual man. It is those characteristics which belong to human beings in general rather those which are unique to any particular individual which are embodied in this 'objective world'. 'Man' plays the same role as Hegel's 'mind'.

[20] Regrettably the translation in *Marx: Early Writings*, ed. Colletti, p. 267, loses the crucial phrase 'inner property'. Marx also casts the contrast between what he here calls inner and outer property as one between 'true property' and exclusory property (CJM 461/226-7), between 'truly human and social property' and private property (EPM 521/281), and between 'the meaning of private property' and the estranged form in which it exists (EPM 563/322). See also the reference to the 'essence of private property' at EPM 446/212.

On the assumption that the needs that human property can satisfy are common to all human beings, a piece of human property does not 'belong' to any one individual. Rather it 'belongs' to every human being, for it 'belongs' to each in virtue of the needs he has which it can satisfy, and these are needs which he shares with all other human beings. By contrast a piece of private property belongs exclusively to the individual who owns it.

3. Human needs as essential motivations

To say that human property is the object of human needs already provides a partial characterisation of such needs, for those needs will be general in the sense of having 'objectively general objects' as their objects, as that which can satisfy them. However for Marx human needs are also universal in other ways than this. In so far as man is characteristically human, his activity is motivated by needs which are not simply fixed by his physical constitution (see the passage quoted on page 182 above). They are not 'immediate'. Instead they are mediated by species-activity itself and the world of objects it produces. In the course of history, the social interchange of productive activities and products becomes more complex, and human needs *develop* along with the new objects which are produced. Following directly in the footsteps of Hegel, Marx calls this the 'cultivation [*Bildung*] of the senses':

> [N]ot only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, the *human* sense, the humanity of the senses — all these come into being only through the existence [*Dasein*] of *their* objects, through *humanised* nature. The *cultivation* [*Bildung*] of the five senses is the work of all previous world history. *Sense* which is trapped by crude practical need has only a *restricted* sense. For a man who is starving the human form of food does not exist, only its abstract existence [*Dasein*] as food does. (EPM 541-2/301-2)

Obviously Marx is not saying here that the mere production of a new object gives rise to a need for it. His picture must be of needs, activities and objects developing in close

interaction with each other, and it does not commit him to any one of them providing the motor of development. His point is that they are interdependent. It is easy to see that the objects we produce depend on the needs we experience. Marx is arguing that the dependence goes the other way as well: whether we can experience a need depends on whether the objects that correspond to that need have become available to us.[21]

The result of this whole process is that needs tend to become refined. They become less like the hungry man's need for food and more like the musically cultivated person's need for music. At the same time, needs tend to diversify and multiply. Man's needs become 'many-sided' along with the diversification of production (CJM 454/220), and this eventually results in what Marx calls 'the rich man and rich human need' (EPM 544/304). This is man in whom the human essence is fully realised:

> *[D]eveloped* society produces man in all the wealth of his essence, the *rich* man who is *profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the senses* as its constant reality. (EPM 542/302)[22]

Marx does not really explain why it is that human needs should multiply and become refined in this way. Whatever the underlying mechanism, however, the result is that they become more and more thoroughly needs for *human products*, needs which can only be satisfied by the products of other human beings, by the objectification of species-activity. Human needs thereby tie human beings more and more closely to each other. They give us needs (now in the actual, rather than the phenomenological sense) for each other. Marx connects this idea with a conception of human need as *expressive*. He says that:

[21] In the 1857 introduction to the *Grundrisse* Marx does seem to go further than this, asserting that although products and needs presuppose each other, 'production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment' (G 15/94).

[22] 'Developed society' is socialist society, as we shall see below (page 192). This is also the context of the description of the 'rich' man in the next quote.

> The *rich* man is simultaneously the man *in-need-of* [*bedürftige*] a totality of human life-expression; the man in whom his own realisation exists as inner necessity [*Notwendigkeit*], as a *must* [*Not*]. (EPM 544/304)

Human beings express themselves through the creation of universal objects, so the need for human life-expression must be the need to create such objects for other human beings, i.e. to create objects that can in principle satisfy the needs of any human being. Thus it is the need to satisfy other people's needs as such, regardless of who those people are. Properly human need is the need to satisfy the needs of others. This does not mean that the individual becomes a universal altruist, but that he experiences the creation of a universal object, one which can in principle satisfy the needs of any human being, as a need in itself, indeed as his overriding need. An inventor or a scientist could serve just as much as a present day example of such expressive need as an artist. More generally, Marx suggests that a point could be reached at which all labour results from such an '*inner essential* necessity [*innere notwendige Not*]' (CJM 463/228).[23]

For Marx, then, human needs, by which I have suggested he means persisting desires, are constitutive of our essence as human beings. This contrasts with the tradition of thought that goes back to the Stoics, in which desires were antithetical to our essence as free and rational beings, and the multiplication of persisting desires associated with civilisation meant only the multiplication of ways in which man's true will was controlled and unfree. Kant belongs to this tradition, in that for him motivation by desires and inclinations is heteronomy, and the genuinely rational will determines itself in abstraction from all such motivations. This remains true even if, as we have seen, in his philosophy of history Kant relied on the multiplication of desires and actual needs to facilitate the development of such a genuine will. Even Hegel, to whose account of the implications of the

[23] In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875) Marx says that in the higher phase of communism labour becomes 'life's prime need' (CGP 21/87).

multiplication of needs (understood as phenomenological needs) Marx is obviously indebted, ultimately understands these needs as simply the estranged expression of an urge for freedom. This urge ultimately overcomes its estrangement and becomes self-conscious thanks to the multiplication of needs, so that this multiplication has a vital role to play in human self-realisation, but ultimately it is that of a ladder which can eventually be discarded. For Marx instead the refinement and diversification of (phenomenological) needs is of the essence of man, and accordingly his freedom *consists* in this elaboration.[24] It is only social conditions that make us experience things otherwise. Marx and Engels make this clearest in a discussion of the categorical imperative in the *German Ideology*:

> The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh and 'desires [*Begierden*] as a driving force' was because it regarded our flesh and our desires as something alien to us; it wanted to free us from natural determination only because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us. For if I myself am not nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural character, do not belong to myself — and this is the doctrine of Christianity — then all determination by nature — whether through my own natural-character [*Natürlichkeit*] or through so-called external nature — appears to me as a determination by something alien, as a fetter, as a compulsion used against me, *as heteronomy as opposed to autonomy of the spirit*. (GI 237/254)[25]

The reason that we experience our phenomenological needs, our persisting desires, as an external imposition on us is that social conditions, 'worldly relations', are such as to frustrate them, and so 'fix' them:

[24] For the idea that a conception of freedom depends on a conception of the self see MacCallum, 'Negative and positive freedom'.

[25] Geras, *Marx and Human Nature*, p. 62, sees Marx and Engels as operating with a 'physiologically given' concept of human nature here, but the passage is also consistent with the view I have derived from the 1844 writings, in which the human essence appears in the progressive universalisation and social mediation of needs which may be initially simply physiologically based urges.

> Whether a desire becomes 'fixed' or not, i.e. whether it obtains exclusive [power over us] ... depends on whether material circumstances, 'bad' worldly relations, permit the normal satisfaction of this desire and on the other hand the development of a totality of desires. This latter in turn depends on whether we live in circumstances that allow us an all-sided activity and thereby the full development [*Ausbildung*] of all our capacities [*Anlagen*]. (GI 237/255)[26]

It is circumstances that allow such development that communists aim at. They 'strive to achieve an organisation of production and intercourse which will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs, i.e. a satisfaction which is limited only by the needs themselves' (GI 239/256).[27]

4. Conditional exchange and labour-for-acquisition

The fact that present 'worldly relations' prevent this normal satisfaction of (phenomenological) needs, and makes us experience them as external to our essence and opposed to our freedom shows that what has been said so far about species-activity, human property and human needs can only be half of the story for Marx. In fact I have been forced to draw partly on his descriptions of a future socialist society in order to fill out his general account of them.[28] The most central point he attempts to make in the 1844 manuscripts is that all these three aspects of the human essence have come into existence in a way which is self-contradictory: in an 'estranged' (or 'alienated') (*entfremdt*) or in an 'externalised' (*entäussert*) way.[29] This is because they have come

[26] The interpolations in this passage are due to the editors of *Marx Engels Werke*.

[27] This last passage was crossed out in the text, but it is quite consonant with what has preceded it.

[28] See footnote 22, page 189.

[29] On the distinction between these two terms see Arthur, *Dialectics of Labour*, pp. 147-49.

into existence through what Marx calls 'exchange' (*Tausch*) or 'barter' (*Tauschhandel*). The point about 'exchange', as opposed to the more general concept of 'interchange' (*Austausch*), which was used in introducing species-activity (page 180), is that it is *conditional*. It is the interchange of products between two parties in which each gives his product to the other only on condition that the other does likewise. In what follows I use 'exchange' or 'conditional exchange' strictly to mean this kind of transaction.[30]

Conditional exchange is the way that species-activity comes into existence, principally because it allows the interchange of products to take place outside the narrow range of the family or the primitive tribal community. What one can exchange with one person, one can in principal exchange with anyone else, acquaintance or stranger, so that exchange can ultimately establish an interchange of products between the whole of the human race. But just this capability of establishing an interchange with strangers while continuing to treat them as strangers, as alien, introduces a contradictory quality into conditional exchange, and it is this that makes the form of species-activity it introduces 'estranged'.

Marx expresses this in the *Comments on James Mill* by describing a transition from an apparently solitary 'man for himself — in a state of savage barbarism' (CJM 459/224),

[30] Marx implicitly contrasts *Tausch* (exchange) and *Tauschhandel* (barter) to *wechselseitiger Austausch* (mutual interchange) at CJM 455/220. But his usage is not entirely stable, since at CJM 451/218, 459/275 and 462/227 he uses *Austausch* where he evidently means conditional exchange. It might be said that any kind of interchange of products must be conditional in some sense. A response would be that when my production for others becomes in itself a need for me, then it becomes conditional on others producing for me only in the sense that unless they do I will not survive, or at least not as a person motivated by such a need. It is not conditional in the sense that I make it an explicit condition of my being prepared to produce for others that they produce for me.

producing purely for his own needs, to man producing for conditional exchange.[31] When he produces for his own needs his labour is not species-activity, any more than that of a beaver is. No universality is involved. The object produced by his labour is at the same time the object which he uses. When he begins to produce for exchange, his activity becomes, potentially at least, species-activity. But although it is species-activity in that it is the production of objects which will satisfy the needs of other human beings, this is not the producer's primary *purpose* in engaging in it. His primary purpose is to satisfy his own needs, only now indirectly through exchanging his products for the products of other people. If he adopts the purpose of producing objects which will satisfy their needs, this is only a derivative purpose, an aim which he adopts because he must attain it in order to attain his primary aim. Since for Marx an activity is partly defined by its purpose, he expresses this by saying that the producer's activity has changed its character. Whereas before it was simply labour for subsistence now it has become 'labour-for-acquisition': 'When the relation of exchange [*Tausch*] is presupposed, labour immediately becomes *labour-for-acquisition* [*Erwerbsarbeit*]',[32] for 'its end [*Zweck*] and existence [*Dasein*] have become different' (CJM 454/219-20). Marx qualifies such labour as 'estranged' (*entfremdete*): 'Labour-for-acquisition involves ... the estrangement of labour from the labouring subject and its contingency for him' (CJM 454/220). It is estranged in that its objective character as species activity is at odds with the subjective purpose of the individual doing it. Accordingly he does not experience his labour as the expression of his own essence, as something which he has a direct need to engage in, but as something

[31] If this is a historical transition it suggests an original state of nature in which human beings produce for themselves in isolation from each other. This would contradict Marx's usual view that 'the more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole' (G 6/84). In his later works Marx thinks of conditional exchange as starting on the borders of such early societies. See, for example, G 117/204, C1 66/182.

[32] Alternative translations might be 'labour for an income', 'labour for a living' or 'labour for gain'.

other than and external to him, in which he engages only as an instrumental means to 'acquisition' in order to meet his basic needs for his own self-preservation:

> [T]o the labourer the preservation of his individual existence appears as the *end* of his activity; his actual doings count for him only as a means. He thus activates his life to acquire [*erwerben*] the *means* of life.[33] (CJM 454/220)

5. Private property and domination by the object

Just as the producer's activity now has a different character, so does the object which he produces. Previously it was produced simply as an individual means of subsistence. It was not human property at all in Marx's sense. Now it is produced for other human beings, so it has become human property. Yet from the point of view of the producer it is produced simply as a means of exchange. Previously the producer produced in isolation from other individuals — they did not appear on the scene at all for him. Now he produces for them, but since he produces his product as a means of exchange he must also produce it as something *actively withheld* from them. If my exchange is conditional I must withhold my product from you until you agree to give me yours in return, and you must do likewise. Marx expresses this by saying that the object is now produced as 'private property'. It is private property in that it is human property which is at the same time *privatus*, excluded from the use of the other.[34] Thus private property as object is the counterpart of labour-for-acquisition as activity (along with its ancillary activity, the activity of exchanging). It has the same estranged or externalised character as that activity:

[33] In the German text *Leben-* in *Lebensmittel* is italicised rather than *-mittel*. However the intention is obviously to contrast the activity of life with the means of life.

[34] See the contrast between human property and private property in texts cited at footnote 20, page 187 above.

> *[E]xchange* or *barter* is the social act, the species-act, the community, social intercourse and the integration of man within *private* property, and for that reason it is the external, *externalised* [*entäusserte*] species-act. It appears as *barter* just because of this. Just because of this it is the opposite of a *social* relationship. (CJM 453/219)

Furthermore, when the product is produced and exchanged as private property, the conditionality inherent in exchange gives the product, in a certain sense, a *power* over its own producer. Suppose A and B engage in conditional exchange with each other, in which each (phenomenologically) needs the product of the other. Then by A's making his act of giving B his product conditional on B doing the same, A uses his product as a means to gain control over B's activity. On the other hand B does just the same thing to A. This means in turn that A's attitude is not whimsical or malicious: it is *only* by both offering to give B his product and threatening to withhold it, that A can get B's product from him. Unless A has something which B needs to offer in exchange for B's product, A's need does not constitute an 'effective demand' for that product, as economists have put it since Adam Smith[35]. So A must use his product as a means by which to exert power over B, thanks to its capacity to satisfy B's needs. B is in the same position with respect to A.

> What gives your need for my thing [*Sache*] a *value*, a *worth*, and an *effect* for me is solely your *object*, the *equivalent* of my object. Our reciprocal product, therefore, is the *means*, the *mediator*, the *instrument*, the *recognised power* of our mutual needs over each other. (EPM 461/226)

Since each party uses his own product as a means of exerting power over the other, each is in turn reduced to a means for the other to produce what he needs. Each is forced by the other to produce his own product, in the sense that unless he does so he cannot satisfy his *own* need for the other's product. The instrumentality inherent in conditional exchange makes instruments of the exchangers as well as of their products. The last stage in this

[35] See Marx's contrast between need and effective demand at EPM 565-6/325.

argument is that, because I use my product as a power over you, a means of forcing you to produce your own product, your *own product* in turn becomes, in a sense, a power over you. That is, you find yourself in a position where, in order to satisfy your need for my products, you *must* produce your own product.

> [I]n your eyes your product is an *instrument*, a *means* whereby to master my product and hence to satisfy your needs. But in my eyes it is the *end* of our exchange. You count for me rather as the means and instrument for the production of this object which is an end for me, just as conversely you stand in the same relation to my object. But (1) each of us really *does behave* in the way the other regards him. You have really turned yourself into the means, the instrument, the producer of *your* own object so as to master mine. (2) Your own object is merely the *sensuous husk*, the *hidden form* of my object. For its production *signifies*, seeks to *express*, the acquisition [*Erwerb*] of my object. Thus you have really become a *means*, an *instrument* of your object even for yourself ... (CJM 462/227)

or, in summary form:

> [T]he *means* is the *true power* over an object and hence we each reciprocally regard our products as the *power* each has over the other and over himself, i.e. our own product has stood up on its hind legs against us: it seemed to be our property, but in reality we are its property. (CJM 461/226)

So just as the producer for conditional exchange experiences his own labour as external to him, he also experiences his own product as external to him, indeed as something which dominates him. Of course his product does not actually compel him to produce it. But nevertheless he *is* compelled to produce it if he is to satisfy his needs, and the product itself can seem to demand of him that it be produced. As long as there is only one fellow transactor, he can see through this illusion relatively easily, but when his product is sold on an open market, then he cannot identify any one individual who compels him to produce his product, on the threat of depriving him of their own. Yet he is so compelled. Furthermore, if he belongs to a complete social division of labour then his compulsion to produce his product becomes intense, for he now produces nothing at all for himself, but

instead produces one product, and has to satisfy *all* his needs by exchanging that one product:

> The more production becomes many-sided, thus the more needs become many-sided, the more by contrast the activity of the producer becomes one-sided, the more completely labour falls into the category of *labour-for-acquisition* until, finally, no other meaning is left to it ... (CJM 454/220)

In such conditions his sense that it is somehow his product itself which compels him to produce it must become more powerful. Nor is this sense completely illusory. Although the individual in such a system is not compelled to produce his own product by his product, he does find himself compelled, as does everyone else in the market. So they could be said to be compelled by the system of market relations or the division of labour itself, something over which none of them individually has any power and which has a 'thinglike' quality. This is the way Marx and Engels describe the situation of the producer within a naturally evolved division of labour in the *German Ideology* (GI 33/47). The individual's own product, as a physical object, could then 'represent' such a 'thinglike' social order to the individual producer.[36]

It might be argued against Marx that the exchangers, whether or not they belong to a complete social division of labour, are only 'compelled by their product' in the sense in which a human being is when he is in the 'savage state' producing entirely for his own (animal) needs. After all he too is in a situation where he can only satisfy his needs by producing his products. So he too finds himself compelled to produce his product in order to satisfy his needs. Why should the fact that the chain of necessary conditions, which begins with the satisfaction of his needs and ends with his having to produce, passes via the product and the need of the *other* individual make things different?

[36] The line of thought that I attribute to Marx here obviously anticipates his discussion of commodity fetishism in chapter 1 of *Capital* (C1 50-62/163-177).

An answer that could be given on Marx's behalf is that the satisfaction of a being's intrinsic needs does not constitute a compulsion on that being. On the contrary, it is that being's essential activity. To say that beavers are 'compelled' to build dams by their need for fish supposes, as it were, that there is something else which they would rather be doing, that they have some other inner urges which are more essential to their nature than dam-building. The separation between means and ends which makes it possible for the means (the activity of producing) to appear as compelled by the ends (the satisfaction of needs) simply does not exist for the animal, or for man 'in the savage state', producing for himself. In order for means to separate out from and stand in opposition to ends for me, the two have to be incarnated in objects to which I take different attitudes, and it is just this separation which conditional exchange achieves. If I produce something for my own needs, there is no clear line between production and consumption. Suppose I am living directly off the fruits of nature and I have to peel a fruit before eating it, it is quite unclear whether the peeling constitutes an act of production of 'peeled fruit' or a part of the consumption of the fruit. Is gathering fruit, or hunting for game, a separate act of production or an initial phase of consumption? On the other hand, when I satisfy my needs indirectly through conditional exchange with others, production and consumption are clearly defined by their different objects. Production is what I do to the object which I am going to exchange, consumption is what I do to the object which I get in return. Conditional exchange also makes my productive activity 'instrumental' in a quite new way, for the object which I produce no longer has any inherent connection with my needs. It is connected to them only insofar as others are willing to give me something in exchange for it which will satisfy my needs, thus only via the wills of other people. With the development of exchange:

> It becomes wholly contingent and inessential whether the relationship between producer and product is one of immediate enjoyment and personal needs, and whether the *activity*, the act of working, involves the fulfilment of his personality, the realisation of his natural talents and spiritual goals. (CJM 454/220)

So my production of my product becomes completely separate from my satisfaction of my need.

When in addition the means to the satisfaction of a need is in the possession of another consciousness who is deliberately using it to force me to act in accord with his will rather than mine, then I can come to experience producing my own product in order to gain that means as a 'compulsion'.[37] The relation of compulsion between individuals will be reflected in an experience of the relation between each individual and his product as one of compulsion.[38] Similarly, it is only because the other person uses my activity in an instrumental way to produce the object which he needs, that I come to use my *own* activity in an instrumental way too, and so become estranged from it. As Marx says, 'each of us really *does behave* as the other regards him' (CJM 462/227).

So the compulsion with respect to his own object which each party experiences in the exchange relationship is not simply the consequence of a compulsive quality of his own needs which is transmitted through a chain of necessary conditions for the satisfaction of those needs, a chain ending with his production of the object. Rather, the compulsion is constituted *in* the relationship of conditional exchange itself. The inherent mutual externality of the conditional exchange relationship, the way in which each relates to the other as at once user and used, is reproduced in an 'externality' in the way in which each exchanger relates to his own product, and to his own activity.

[37] Subsequently individuals might transfer the same sense of compulsion to those areas of life in which they continue to produce for themselves (cooking for example).

[38] The attempt to see a relationship of mastery and servitude between human beings as connected to a parallel relationship between humans and objects also characterises some of Hegel's earlier thought. See PS 152-5/117-9 and ETW 243-4/182.

6. Egoistic need as estranged need

If for Marx conditional exchange means that species-activity and its products, human property, both come into existence in an 'estranged' or 'externalised' form, then it has similar effects on the way that human need comes into existence. Human needs come into existence as 'egoistic' or 'self-interested' need, that is, as need which is actively *counterposed* to the needs of others. While an animal's need bears no relation to the needs of other animals, in that the animal is not even conscious of those needs, and properly human need is the need to satisfy the needs of other human beings, egoistic need is the need of an individual who is conscious of the needs of others, but only as something alien to his own needs. Egoistic need is the counterpart of estranged labour and private property. It is human need as it is experienced within an exchange economy.

Egoistic need develops alongside the social division of labour mediated by conditional exchange, in other words alongside the increasing transformation of activity into labour-for-acquisition. Labour-for-acquisition means:

> the determination of the labourer by social needs which are alien to him and a compulsion on him, to which he submits from egoistic need, from necessity [*Not*]; for him they mean only a source of satisfaction of his pressing-need [*Notdurft*] while for them he is only the slave that satisfies their needs ... Thus the greater, the more developed the social power appears within the private property relation, the more man is *egoistic*, unsocial and estranged from his own essence. (CJM 454/220)

The association of egoistic need with 'necessity' in the last quote connects egoistic need with the idea of compulsion by one's own object. The exchange relation results in each person experiencing the production of his own object as a kind of compulsion. His need for the object which he produces is a 'compulsive need', in a way in which that of the animal or the man who Marx imagines producing for himself is not. It is a need which he himself experiences as impinging on him externally, as compelling him. So need as it is

experienced under circumstances of conditional exchange is not just egoistic but also 'estranged' (or 'alienated'), in the same way as labour-for-acquisition and private property are. It is experienced as something cut off from and external to the agent.[39]

Human need within conditional exchange has a third characteristic, for Marx. Since my need for my own product is not based on my direct use of it but on my ability to exchange it for others, this compulsion also takes the form of needing to *have* the product, to hold it exclusively. The 'fundamental presupposition of private property' is that man 'only produces in order to *have*' (CJM 459/224).[40] Exclusive possession is the absolute prerequisite of conditional exchange. Once barter has developed into exchange mediated by money, my compulsive need for my product becomes subordinate to my compulsive need for the money for which I can sell it, so that Marx can say that 'the need for money is ... the true need created by the modern economic system, and the only need it creates' (EPM 547/307).

When in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* Marx extends his analysis from production for exchange to capitalism, he develops two forms of this need for money. Capitalism is essentially conceived as production for exchange in which one section of society (the capitalists) come to personify money and its power, while the rest (the workers) personify labour-for-acquisition or estranged labour. Correspondingly, egoistic need in the capitalist becomes the need to accumulate money as such, while in the worker it becomes reduced to the need for enough money just to maintain himself as a worker (EPM 510-18/270-78, 546-50/306-9, 562-7/322-6). Yet despite this asymmetry, both conceptions of need are simply developments of the basic idea of egoistic need as

[39] I owe the formulation 'alienated needs' to Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx*, ch. 2.

[40] Cf. MEW 540/300: '*All* the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple estrangement of *all* these senses — the sense of *having*.'

constituted in simple exchange: the need to produce one's own object considered as an exchangeable good, a need which is made compulsive through one's relation to another with whom one hopes to exchange it.

When Marx with Engels talks of 'worldly relations' being responsible for the fixing of our needs as an alien power over us (pages 191-192), I suggest that it is the exchange relation that he has principally in mind. For Marx, human need is constituted historically, through the development of conditional exchange, but in an estranged form, just as species-activity and its objects, human property, are. The multiplication of human needs through the development of the market is the realisation of a universality which is inherent in human needs. It is the humanisation of those needs themselves. Yet at the same time it leads to human beings experiencing their own needs, like their activity and the products of that activity, as something alien to them — as something which is only contingently connected with them rather than an expression of their own essence. In Marx's 1844 writings it is this sense of estrangement, rather than one of injustice, that is the obvious candidate for a motivation sufficient to lead human beings to overcome exchange society in favour of communism. Accordingly, Marx's positive descriptions of communism concentrate above all on its non-estranged character (CJM 462-3/227-8, EPM 536-8/296-8).

Accordingly, in Marx's description of human needs in his 1844 writings it is possible to discern the sketch of a philosophical history which has some affinity with that history of ordinary motivation for which I have argued in Hegel. In this history human beings begin as isolated, at least from any but the narrowest circles of their fellows. Through conditional exchange they break out of this isolation and in the course of history their needs develop and become progressively more universal, as do both their activity and the products of that activity, products which become more and more the objects of their needs. Human beings thereby become cultivated (*gebildete*). They develop in the direction

of universality, which constitutes in some sort a *telos* of humanity in these early writings. However the counterposition of interests which is inherent in the relation of conditional exchange itself means that at the same time they experience their activity, the products of that activity, and even their own needs as standing in an external and contingent relation to them. Eventually they must reach a point at which, perhaps as a result of their own cultivation in the course of history, this externality becomes intolerable to them and they demand the overthrow of those relations of conditional exchange which are responsible for it. Accordingly, where Hegel understands the cultivation produced by the system of needs as providing human beings with the motivations that fit them to become citizens of the modern state, the early Marx understands it as providing them with the motivations to demand communism.[41]

Marx's basic conception of the historical process in the 1844 manuscripts is underdeveloped and leave many questions unanswered. In particular the underlying explanation for the historical multiplication and refinement of needs is quite unclear. In this chapter my interest has been simply to show the relevance of the concept of needs and of the idea to this conception. In the next chapter I attempt to show that a similar picture of the historical process to that outlined here forms at least one strand of Marx's later writings.

[41] Berki, 'Through and through Hegel: Marx's road to communism', argues persuasively that Marx's early notion of communism is a transformation of Hegel's notion of the true state.

7 Marx on needs, the self and history

The model of the overthrow of capitalist social relations in favour of those of communism which was implicit in the conception of history elicited from Marx's 1844 manuscripts in the last chapter could be called 'phenomenological' in that it tacitly appealed to the sense of estrangement on the part of the economic producer from his own activity, his own products, and even his own desires, as the source of that motivation which would enable him to abolish those relations in favour of communism. In this chapter I defend the view that such a phenomenological model of historical change persists in Marx's later writings, alongside the better-known functionalist model. Simultaneously, I try to show that this model is in principle compatible with Marx's apparent moral condemnations of capitalism, in a way that the functionalist model does not appear to be.

I start by outlining the functionalist model in what has become its standard form. I then argue that it confronts a difficulty in finding a place for moral motivation in its picture of history, in other words, broadly, for those motivations that derive from a sense of rights, justice or fairness rather than from prudential considerations. Accordingly it is difficult to reconcile with Marx's apparent moral condemnations of capitalism. I then go on to develop the alternative model, showing that the notion of 'estrangement' recurs in the *German Ideology* under the title of 'contingency'. I suggest that a natural way to connect the phenomenological model with Marx's undoubted insistence that the development of human productive powers is ultimately responsible for the overthrow of capitalism is by appealing to the multiplication of needs, which is associated with that development, as the source of this sense of contingency. Finally, I sketch an interpretation of Marx's views on

morality and right under which his 'moral' condemnations of capitalism can be reconciled with the 'phenomenological' version of his account of historical change.

1. The problem with moral motivation

Following the summary formulations of the 1859 Preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (CCPE 8-9/20-21), Marx's theory of history is standardly seen as centred on the growth of human productive powers, and as explaining the rise and fall of social systems (or sets of social relations of production) by their tendency to develop or prevent the development of these productive powers, that is, by whether or not they are 'propitious' for developing those powers.[1] In the latter case the socio-economic system is said to 'fetter' the development of the productive powers, or (equivalently) to fetter the productive powers themselves.[2] Such an interpretation is 'functionalist' in that the existence of the socio-economic system is explained by its propitiousness for developing the productive powers, its 'functionality' for their maximal development.

It is usually acknowledged, however, that such a functional explanation stands to some extent in need of an 'elaboration', a description of the mechanism through which what is functional is supposed to come into existence, specifically one operating at the level of the motivations and intentions of individual actors, providing the theory with

[1] Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, has presented what has become a canonical version of this interpretation.

[2] To simplify the argument, I assume that these two cases exhaust the possibilities. I have generally translated Marx's *Produktivkräfte* as 'productive powers' rather than the usual 'productive forces', in order to emphasise that they should be seen first and foremost as human capacities rather than as masses of tools or machinery.

'microfoundations'.[3] When such an elaboration of the theory is attempted, those individuals are typically seen as motivated 'economically', i.e. by the desire for economic goods for themselves. Specifically they are thought of as motivated by the desire to benefit from the wealth created by the productive powers.

This is not surprising, for if the explanation of the replacement of one social system by another is that the old system has ceased to be propitious for the development of human productive powers, and if the means of the transition is a class struggle, then the natural way to 'elaborate' the explanation is by saying that when an old system is no longer propitious, and an alternative is available which *is* propitious, this fact eventually becomes obvious to everyone in the society.[4] They realise that the further development of the productive powers possible under this alternative system would make society as a whole, and thus all or most of its members, materially richer. This realisation weakens the motivations of the class which sustains the old system, strengthens those of the class which is struggling to institute a new system, and leads other classes to switch their allegiance from the former to the latter.[5] Such an elaboration works by showing how the fact that the old system is now fettering the productive powers can make a difference to individuals' economic motivations, rather than to their moral motivations. In the case of the transition from capitalism to communism, it is the widespread realisation that capitalism has become a fetter on economic development, not the realisation that it is

[3] The degree to which Marx's theory of history, construed as a functionalist theory, requires such an elaboration is debated by Elster, 'Marxism, functionalism and game theory'; Cohen, 'Reply to Elster on 'Marxism, functionalism and game theory''; and Elster, 'Further thoughts on Marxism, functionalism and game theory'.

[4] To simplify again, I assume that the theory's position is that whenever a social system comes to fetter the productive powers, such an alternative is in fact available.

[5] Cohen suggests this kind of elaboration of the theory in *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, p. 292.

unjust, that will guarantee that the working class, and other classes which are its potential allies, will gain the necessary motivation to overthrow it.

Thus the theory naturally invites an explanation of social change by appealing to the economic motivations of individuals. Yet in the case of the transition from capitalism to socialism it is difficult to claim that Marx's *justification* for making the transition is simply that capitalism has become a fetter on the development of human productive powers, a justification that would appeal to the economic motivations of workers. For in many passages Marx appears to condemn capitalism on moral grounds, for its exploitation and oppression.[6] In so far as these condemnations are addressed to the working class, and are intended to make a contribution to the transition to socialism, to engage in them seems to presuppose that workers can bring about that transition at least in part through moral, rather than economic, motivations. Accordingly they seem to contradict the model of revolutionary motivation naturally associated with the theory.

It might seem that in principle the theory could make a place for moral motivation in revolutionary change by expanding its natural elaboration into one which operates by showing how the fact of fettering makes a difference to the moral, as well as to the economic, motivations of individuals. Yet this modification is not so easy. An individual's economic motivations for supporting or opposing the replacement of a social system can be altered by that system coming to fetter the productive powers, so that its replacement would be economically beneficial for the whole society and thus in all likelihood for that individual. All that is needed is for the individual to realise that this is the case and to believe that he would belong to the majority in question. But it is not obvious how the fact of fettering could alter an individual's *moral* motivations on the matter. Furthermore, if there were some mechanism whereby a social system's coming to fetter the development

[6] For citations of Marx's texts see Geras, 'The controversy about Marx and justice'.

of the productive powers led to the appearance, or activation, in an individual of convictions that condemn the system as morally unacceptable, then the recognition by the individual that these convictions had been brought about by this fact, a fact that is irrelevant to the truth of the convictions, would undermine their strength.

It might be said that workers' feeling for the interests of their fellow-workers counts as a moral reason for overthrowing capitalism, and that this provides a motivation which will become stronger as workers become more convinced that an alternative system would serve the interests of workers in general better than the present one, and thus as capitalism comes to fetter the development of the productive powers. It might also be said that concern for the well-being of members of society as a whole provides a moral reason for overthrowing a system which has come to fetter development. However I would deny that reasons of collective interest in members either of a class or of society as a whole count as moral reasons. They are rather collective prudential reasons.[7]

The difficulty can be illustrated by looking at a passage in Engels' *Anti-Dühring* in which he says that:

> So long as a mode of production is still in the rising stage of its development, it is enthusiastically welcomed even by those who come off worst from its corresponding mode of distribution ... Only when the mode of production in question has already described a good part of its descending curve, when it has half outlived its day, when the conditions of its existence have to a large extent disappeared, and its successor is already knocking at the door — it is only at this stage that the constantly increasing inequality of distribution appears as unjust, it is only then that appeal is made from the facts which have had their day to so-called eternal justice. (p. 180)

Here what leads to the perception of injustice is not the 'constantly increasing inequality of distribution as such' but (setting aside the other conditions that Engels mentions) the fact

[7] I neglect reasons of concern for future generations here.

that the system is in its 'declining phase', which presumably means that it has begun to fetter human productive powers. Yet there is no reason why the mere fact that a system has come to fetter the productive powers should lead workers to consider it more unjust than they did previously. For justice is a distributive matter, and the presence or absence of economic development as such says nothing about the distribution of goods. It would only be if the fact of fettering had a tendency to produce absolute impoverishment on the part of one class, or increasing inequality between different classes, that it could be expected to lead to an increase in workers' sense of injustice. Yet although Marx and Engels sometimes suggest that capitalism leads to an absolute immiseration of the working class,[8] they do not provide an argument to show why in general the fact that a social system has come to fetter human productive powers should lead either to such absolute impoverishment or to increasing inequality.

So Marx's apparent moral condemnations of capitalism pose a problem for the standard interpretation of his theory of history. They imply a project to awaken moral motivations in the working class for overthrowing capitalism, yet if such moral motivations became powerful enough to make the difference between failure and success in the attempt at such an overthrow, then the theory lacks an elaboration which could make this overthrow explicable.

One solution to the difficulty in reconciling Marx's apparent moral condemnations of capitalism with the standard interpretation of Marx's theory of history would be to claim that Marx did not in fact condemn capitalism as unjust in his own voice. For example, the suggestion might be that he himself was motivated to support the overthrow of capitalism for the sake of the development of the productive powers, and he then used moral

[8] Engels makes such a suggestion himself a few pages after the passage from which I have quoted, at pp. 188-9.

language to whip up moral feeling in the working class in order to get them to act. This view can be supported independently by pointing to Marx's repeated characterisations of the ideas of justice, rights and morality as artefacts of capitalist social relations.[9] However, Marx's assertions that capitalism is a disguised form of slavery, in which the capitalists coerce workers into giving them a portion of their labour power for nothing, are too widespread and central to be dismissed as being not in his own voice, or else as purely personal opinions extraneous to his work as a socialist theoretician.[10] As a result the problem of reconciling Marx's moral condemnations with his theory of history remains unresolved.[11]

2. The worker's sense of self

I take it as undeniable that Marx's works provide a textual basis for the standard interpretation of his theory of history. However I now propose to argue that there is also a strand of Marx's thought on historical change in the *German Ideology* and in his later works that suggests a different view of the process of historical change, one which attributes a greater role to moral motivation and which is accordingly more compatible with Marx's moral condemnations of capitalism. This strand carries forward into Marx's

[9] See Lukes, *Marxism and Morality*, pp. 5-8 for some examples. This aspect of Marx's thought is discussed further below.

[10] For this argument see Geras, 'Bringing Marx to justice', pp. 45-6.

[11] It can be argued that the problem recurs implicitly the work of the 'analytical Marxists' of the last fifteen years, who have typically attempted to combine the functionalist interpretation of Marx's theory of history with a condemnation of capitalism as unjust (specifically by standards of distributive fairness). See especially the attempt to marry the two in Roemer, *Free to Lose*, chs. 8 and 9. Roemer simply asserts, without argument, that each form of society called into being in the course of history by its current propitiousness for productive development (pp. 108-112) will also be characterised by the absence of one of the major forms of inequality present in its predecessor (pp. 131-47, esp. 144).

later works the conception of history as a process of the development, in estranged forms, of human activity, property and needs, which he sketches in his 1844 writings.

I begin with a passage from the *Grundrisse* in which Marx seems clearly to make moral convictions the source of historical change. Marx contrasts 'living labour' (the activity of labour) to 'labour capacity' (the worker) and says that under capitalism 'living labour itself appears as *alien* to living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose own life-expression it is' (G 366/462). That is, labour capacity experiences its own labour, as well as the materials and instrument of production which it uses, as not its own. Similarly, it also experiences the product of its labour as 'something not belonging to it [*nicht ihm Gehörigem*]': 'the product appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien instrument and alien labour — as *alien property*' (ibid.). This is clearly a description of the estranged labour and estranged property of the 1844 manuscripts. Marx continues:

> The recognition [*Erkennung*] of the products as its own, and the judgment that its separation from the conditions of its realisation is improper [*ungehörigen*], coercively [imposed] — is an enormous consciousness, itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's consciousness that he cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, slavery is reduced to a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production. (G 366-7/463)

Marx reproduced this whole passage almost verbatim in the 1861-63 manuscript *On the Critique of Political Economy*, but for the words 'improper, coercively imposed' he substituted 'a wrong [*ein Unrecht*], a coercive relationship [*Zwangsverhältnisses*]' (MEGA ll 3.6 2284-7).

The passage, in its two versions, is one of those which has been used as evidence that Marx thought that capitalism was unjust.[12] Yet if this means that Marx is appealing here to a transhistorical, absolute standard of justice, and describing a process whereby the worker comes to recognise the validity of this standard, then it appears inconsistent with Marx's derisory references to 'eternal justice' and 'natural justice' as standards by which to condemn capitalism.[13]

Instead I suggest that what Marx says about the change in consciousness of the modern worker in this passage must be interpreted in the light of the parallel which he draws there with the change in consciousness of the slave. Marx identifies the slave's consciousness 'that he cannot be the property of another' with his 'consciousness of himself as a person', that is (following Hegel's usage of the term 'person'), as a self-determining individual agent, who is free to do what he chooses with his own body and with some part of the external world which is his (his property). For someone to think of himself as a person is for him to see the possession of this kind of freedom as part of his own nature.[14] So it is to find conditions in which he is denied this freedom intolerable, not because they frustrate any of his ordinary desires, but because they contradict his sense of what he is. Specifically, it is to see conditions in which he is himself treated as the property of another as intolerable. Thus to see oneself as a person is necessarily to be motivated in a new way. A being which sees itself as a person is a being which in view of its own self-conception cannot but will its own freedom. Clearly what Marx says here on the slave

[12] See for example: Husami, 'Marx on distributive justice', pp. 53-4; Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, pp. 106, 219; Lukes, *Marxism and Morality*, p. 51.

[13] On eternal justice (*justice eternelle*) see PP 64/127, 88/144, and C1 63n/179n. On natural justice (*natürliche Gerechtigkeit*) see C3 351-2/460-61.

[14] The freedom in question must be negative freedom, the absence of coercion by others (see footnote 25, page 70 above). I set aside the question of how one could see freedom so defined, as opposed to 'freedom of the will', as part of one's nature. See footnote 43, page 144 above on a similar 'intrinsic negative freedom' in Hegel.

echoes rather closely what Hegel says about the end of slavery (see the discussion on pages 173-174 above, and the passage quoted on page 118).

If we now turn to the modern worker, Marx's choice of words in the two versions of the passage I have quoted suggests that he conceives the transformation of the consciousness of this worker as akin to that of the slave who first begins to think of himself as a person. If the motivational source for demanding and respecting the individual rights of the person is the sense of oneself as free, then the paradigmatic case of a wrong (*ein Unrecht*), a violation of such rights, would be coercion, the direct denial of freedom.[15] It is in exactly the same terms that Marx describes the modern worker as coming to experience his condition: as a condition of wrong and coercion. So by his wording Marx implicitly suggests that, as in the case of the slave, it is through coming to see himself as free in a new way that the modern worker comes to experience his conditions as coercive, in that they contradict this freedom, and so as a wrong. At the root of the change, he implies, is a change in the worker's self-conception, a change that involves coming to see the self as intrinsically free in a more demanding sense of 'freedom' than that associated with the conception of the self as a person. This is a sense of freedom such that the condition of wage labour is a direct denial of that freedom, and so contradicts the worker's sense of self, just as the condition of enslavement contradicts the slave's sense of himself as a person.[16] This sense of self, in so far as it brings with it a sense of existing social

[15] In fact Hegel names coercion (*Zwang*) as the culminating form of wrong in the *Philosophy of Right*. 'Force [*Gewalt*] or coercion [*Zwang*], taken in the abstract, is therefore *wrongful* [*unrechtlich*]' (PR §92/120).

[16] For evidence that Marx associated a particular idea of freedom with a particular idea of the nature of the self, see his description of 'materialist freedom' in *The Holy Family* (written with Engels): 'If man is [free] in the materialist sense, i.e. is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality [*Individualität*]... each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his essence [*für seine wesentliche Lebensäusserung*]' (HF 138/131).

conditions as fundamentally incompatible with it, constitutes a kind of 'revolutionary consciousness'.[17]

As what kind of being, exactly, is it that the modern worker comes to see himself, in this picture? One obvious suggestion might be that it is as a 'self-owner', meaning someone who is free to do what he wants with himself and with all the products of his own labour. The 'wrong' which violates this freedom would then consist in wresting control of these products from the worker. Yet if this was the case, it would most naturally move the worker to overthrow capitalism not in favour of communism, but rather in favour of a society of 'petty commodity production', in which people individually owned or hired the means of their own production and their own raw materials, with which they produced goods for sale on the market — and this was a prospect which Marx repeatedly scorned.[18] I therefore suggest the following alternative: the worker comes to see himself as a being that is free to organise its own productive activity: in other words, as a 'person' in a qualitatively new sense, a sense that stands in contradiction to the worker's lack of control over the entire process of production in which he is engaged.

On the understanding that production means production for others, such control can only be exercised collectively, by all the producers in an economy. Individual workers engaged in petty commodity production would still find themselves dictated to, in their decisions as to what and how to produce, by the impersonal forces of the market economy. The freedom to organise one's own productive activity could only be realised by producers

[17] Obviously there is a kinship here with the sense of the incompatibility of an old form of civilisation with their own freedom which individuals experience in Hegel's account of historical change, as I have understood it (see page 126 above).

[18] See, for example, his attack on Proudhon at G 158-60/247-9.

collectively taking control of the means of production and deciding how and what to produce, and this is a nutshell description of Marx's communism.[19]

My suggestion, then, is this: in the passage under discussion Marx is asserting that the consciousness on the part of slaves of themselves as persons in a minimal sense (I shall say, as 'individual persons') led to the overthrow of slavery, and that the sense on the part of modern workers of themselves as persons in a fuller sense (I shall say, as 'social persons') must similarly lead to the overthrow of capitalism.[20] Furthermore, in each case this sense of 'what one is' incorporates freedom as an essential attribute of the self, and is expressed in a sense that certain conditions, conditions which contradict this freedom, constitute a 'wrong', an *Unrecht*. To change these conditions becomes a necessity if individuals are to be able to remove this contradiction between what they feel themselves to be and the life they lead.

Furthermore, the idea that the motivation for revolution comes from a contradiction between workers' sense of what they are and the form of the life that they have to lead is not unique to the above passage. In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels say that:

> If millions of proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their 'being' [*Sein*] does not in the least correspond to their 'essence' [*Wesen*], then, according to [Feuerbach], this is an unavoidable misfortune, which must be

[19] It might be said that if producers organise their production collectively then each is still 'dictated to' by a collective decision over which he has minimal individual control. But if the decision-making process is one in which each has an individual veto, then none can be said to be dictated to, and if it approximates as closely as is practicable to including such a veto (for example, through incorporating a process of public rational debate) then at least there will be no more such 'dictating' than that minimum which is practically ineliminable.

[20] A possibility that I have not considered is that in the passage quoted Marx claims only that these psychological transformations were epiphenomenal signs of the coming overthrow of the respective social systems, rather than causes of it. Such an interpretation of the passage would be a strained one, however.

> borne quietly. These millions of proletarians or communists, however, think quite differently and will prove this in time, when they bring their 'being' into harmony with their 'essence' in a practical way, by means of a revolution. (GI 42/58)

In spite of the ironic tone, the idea recurs here that it is a sense of what they are that is crucial to workers' motivations for overthrowing capitalism.[21] Accordingly the account of revolutionary motivation implicit in the *Grundrisse* passage cannot be dismissed as an aberration on Marx's part.

3. The personal and the contingent

Yet how can such an account of the motivations for the overthrow of social systems be squared with Marx's account of history as the growth of human productive powers? With regard to the overthrow of slavery I do not have an answer to this question, but with regard to the overthrow of capitalism I believe that one can be given. Doing so will provide a way of demonstrating the continuity of Marx's post-1844 conception of historical change with that of the 1844 manuscripts.

The starting point is the connection between the *Grundrisse* passage and Marx and Engels' discussion of the emergence of a contradiction between the 'personal' and the 'contingent' in the *German Ideology*. In this work Marx and Engels describe human societies as structured by the ownership of property. Human beings, as owners of property in means of production and in their own or others' labour power, produce for each other.[22] They

[21] In the earlier *Holy Family* (1844) Marx and Engels make a similar point: 'It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment *regards* as its aim. It is a question of *what the proletariat is*, and what, in accordance with this being [*Sein*], it will historically be compelled to do' (HF 38/37).

[22] Property here is understood in the ordinary sense as rights over things, not in Marx's 1844 sense of human property.

fall into a division of labour: a division of society into classes which are distinguished from each other by the kind of property which they own and therefore the kind of work which they have to do in order to earn a living.[23]

The division of labour has arisen without any collective conscious plan and presents itself to individuals as something which is impervious to any efforts they may make to change it, as 'thinglike' (*sachlich*). The process whereby it arises, from the piecemeal adjustments of individual human beings to each other's actions, is a process whereby a system of human activity 'becomes independent' (*sich verselbständigt*) with respect to the individual actors in it. It forces each individual within it to continue with the kind of work that corresponds to the kind of property which that individual owns (GI 33/47, 74-5/77-8, 54/86).

As a result of the way in which the division of labour dictates the class position of each:

> there appears a difference between the life of each individual [*Individuum*] in so far as it is personal [*persönlich*] and in so far as it is subsumed under some branch of the division of labour and the conditions pertaining to it. (GI 76/78)

This is essentially a divide between two aspects of the self. On the one hand there is the self considered as the owner of a certain kind of property, and accordingly as occupying a certain role in the division of labour, working with a certain kind of means of production (the 'conditions' of that individual's labour) and engaged in a certain 'form of intercourse', i.e. a certain kind of economic interchange, with other individuals similarly defined by their property ownership. This is the self as a 'class' individual. On the other hand there is the self considered in abstraction from such ownership and such intercourse. This is the self as a 'personal' individual. When the two come apart then it is the latter

[23] Rattansi, *Marx and the Division of Labour*, has pointed out that Marx did not clearly distinguish the division of labour in society from the division of ownership (i.e. of classes) until his later works.

which is experienced as the 'real self'. Under tribal and feudal forms of property this division is 'as yet concealed' (ibid.), because an individual's ownership and class status remains with him throughout his life, so that he thinks of it as an essential property of his individual self. However, with the emergence of a capitalist class on the one hand and a class of wage-labourers selling their own labour power to capitalists on the open market on the other, the division becomes explicit for the latter. In particular, the wage-labourer's class status comes to be experienced as 'contingent' to his real self, his 'personality'.[24] This separation off of a part of what he had conceived as himself as only contingently connected to him is reflected in a sense of the external conditions under which he lives as similarly contingent. Marx and Engels describe both kinds of contingency as resulting from the emergence of a capitalist/wage-labourer relation:

> [A] nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner is always a commoner, a quality inseparable from his individuality [*Individualität*] irrespective of his other relations. The difference between the personal individual and the class individual, the contingency [*Zufälligkeit*] of the conditions of life for the individual appears only with the emergence of the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. Competition and the struggle of individuals among themselves first create and develop this contingency as such. (ibid.) [25]

[24] The immediate source of the personal-contingent contrast appears to be Max Stirner's complaint in his *The Ego and Its Own* (1845), pp. 261-4, that success in economic competition depends on the possession of things (chiefly, money), something contingently related to the self, rather than on personal powers. 'The *means* for competing are not at every one's command, because they are not taken from personality, but from contingency' (p. 264). See Marx and Engels' commentary on this passage of Stirner's book at GI 359/375-6. The section of the *German Ideology* in which they develop their own version of the contrast (GI 49-77/63-93) was originally written as a digression from their critique of Stirner (see the editors' notes at CW5 588).

[25] I have consistently translated *zufällig* and *Zufälligkeit* as 'contingent' and 'contingency'. English translations of the *German Ideology* render the former variously as 'contingent', 'extraneous' and 'accidental', and the latter variously as 'contingency', 'accidental quality', and 'chance'.

From here on I shall concentrate on the 'contingency' of external conditions. The development of this contingency needs to be separated into two stages, which Marx and Engels tend to elide, and to which correspond weak and strong senses of 'contingency'. In the first stage, the worker comes to 'disentangle' his sense of self from the particular work he does. He comes to see his work and its conditions as an inessential feature of his existence, something that just happens to be attached to the self, but might as well not have been. Here work and conditions become contingent in the sense of *inessential* to the self. This is the weak sense of 'contingency'.

For Marx, this disentanglement of the self from its particular economic role is part and parcel of the emergence of the opposing classes of capitalists and wage-labourers themselves from the middle ages. Its key component is the process, mentioned in the *German Ideology* and extensively treated in Marx's later works, whereby workers are separated from (that is, lose their property rights in) their means of production, as an indirect result of the expansion of the market.[26] The peasant loses his land, and the urban craftsmen his workshop and tools, and both are forced instead to sell their 'labour power' (that is, the use of their capacity to work) for money wages, to capitalists who have gained control of such means of production.[27] The worker's relationship to the particular means of production with which he works is now precarious, and can end as soon as the capitalist, himself subject to constant market pressures, decides to terminate the contract. So the worker is forced to become mobile between different employers and even different kinds of work. Hence he inevitably comes to see the particular kind of work he is doing at any one time as 'contingent' to his self, in the weak sense of inessential to it. The same

[26] See especially the section on 'primitive accumulation' in *Capital* volume 1, C1 659-715/873-940.

[27] For a discussion of this process of separation as described by Marx, see Cohen, 'The dialectic of labour in Marx'. For some doubts about the capacity of the market to bring about such changes, see Brenner, 'The social basis of economic development'.

becomes true for the particular form of intercourse with others that is associated with this work: 'With money, every form of intercourse, and intercourse itself, becomes contingent for the individuals' (GI 66/85).

In the second stage, the worker comes to see his work not just as inessential to his self, but as a positive imposition, preventing him from engaging in 'self-activity', that is, in activity which is consonant with and expressive of his own nature as he conceives it. Furthermore this applies not just to the particular kind of labour in which he is engaged, but to *labour as such*, where 'labour', following Marx and Engels, means productive activity performed under the compulsions established by an autonomous division of labour.[28] To experience one's productive activity in this way is to be in the condition described in the passage from the *Grundrisse* with which I began. In the terminology of the 1844 manuscripts, it is for that activity to be 'estranged' from oneself. Here work and conditions become contingent in the sense of *incompatible* with the self. This is the strong sense of 'contingency'. It is this strong sense that is in play when Marx and Engels say that for the proletarians:

> their condition of life, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence of modern society, have become something contingent for them, something over which individual [*einzelnen*] proletarians have no control and over which no *social* organisation can give them control, and the contradiction between the personhood [*Persönlichkeit*] of the particular proletarian and the condition of life forced upon him, labour, becomes evident to him ... (GI 77/79)

[28] 'Labour' is tacitly defined in this way when Marx and Engels equate it with 'the subsumption of the individual under the division of labour, under a determinate activity forced upon him' (GI 50/64). See also GI 32/45, 69-70/52, 54/77, and Arthur, *Dialectics of Labour*, pp. 12-19. This provides a reason for following the tradition of translating *Arbeit* as 'labour' in Marx, although as 'work' in Hegel. In his later writings Marx ceases to confine the term 'labour' to productive activity in class societies and speaks of labour in communist society, as when he talks of labour there of becoming 'life's prime need' (CGP 21/87).

4. Contingency and the productive powers

I have suggested a way in which the development of wage-labour can make an individual's work contingent in the weak sense of inessential. However it is Marx's account of the historical development of contingency in the strong sense that is of interest here. For it is contingency in this sense that characterises the worker who has developed a revolutionary consciousness in the passage from the *Grundrisse*, and it is his presumed role in overthrowing the 'form of intercourse' under which he lives that has to be squared with an explanation of the historical change by the development of the productive powers (see page 217.

What Marx and Engels say about the development of contingency in the strong sense is that in the course of history 'the conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other … are conditions belonging to their individuality, in no way external to them'. They are 'conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity' (GI 71-2/82). That is, normally individuals do not find their form of intercourse — the relations of economic interchange in which they engage on the basis of the current property structure, what Marx later calls their 'social relations of production' — contingent in either the strong or the weak sense.[29] They then go on to say that, at a certain point in historical development, a given form of intercourse comes to be experienced by individuals, no longer as a 'condition of self-activity', but as a 'contingent fetter' (*zufällige Fessel*) (GI 72/82), therefore as contingent in the second sense of incompatible with the self.

[29] For evidence that 'form of intercourse' becomes the later (set of) 'social relations of production', see the description of the 'contradiction between the productive powers and the form of intercourse' at GI 74/74, which makes the same points as are made using the later terminology at CCPE 9/21.

To explain the appearance of this 'contingency' Marx and Engels invoke the development of human productive powers, specifically the fact that these productive powers have developed to the point where the existing form of intercourse no longer 'corresponds' to but is in 'contradiction' with them (GI 71-2/81-2). It has become a fetter on the productive powers, apparently in the sense defined at the beginning of this chapter of preventing their further development, and this fettering is expressed in the individuals' experience of their conditions as what Marx and Engels call a 'contingent fetter', as incompatible with the self. To distinguish the two senses of fettering in play here, I shall refer to the first as 'real fettering' and the second as 'ideal fettering'. Accordingly I interpolate 'real' or 'ideal' in the explanation which Marx and Engels give of how the latter arises:

> These various conditions, which appear first as conditions of self-activity, later as [ideal] fetters upon it, form in the whole development of history a coherent series of forms of intercourse, the coherence of which consists in this: an earlier form of intercourse, which has become a [real] fetter, is replaced by a new one corresponding to more developed productive powers and, hence, to the advanced mode of self-activity of the individuals — a form which in its turn becomes a [real] fetter and is then replaced by another. Since these conditions correspond to the simultaneous development of the productive powers, their history is at the same time the history of the evolving productive powers taken over by each new generation, and is therefore the history of the development of the powers of the individuals themselves. (GI 72/82)

This attempt at an explanation is inadequate as it stands. If ideal fettering, the experience of the conditions of one's existence as inimical to one's sense of self, is to be explained by an independently defined real fettering (and this is the only really consistent reading of this passage), then some reason has be given why the former should result from the latter. Instead of doing this, Marx and Engels try to suggest that somehow the two are simply the same thing. This is what they effectively assert when they say that 'the relation of the productive powers to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or activity of the individuals' (GI 71/82).

There seems to be an unsuccessful effort here on the part of the authors of the *German Ideology* to unite two different strands in Marx's thinking on history, specifically to assimilate the 'phenomenological' strand which I have been tracing in this chapter, for which what brings about the overthrow of a form of society is its incompatibility with individual workers' sense of self, into a 'functionalist' strand, for which what brings about this overthrow is its incompatibility with the further development of the productive powers. Yet the two strands conceive the incompatibility, or 'contradiction', that leads to the overthrow of a form of society, specifically capitalism, in a different way. Stretching the word 'fettering' so as to make it cover both conceptions cannot bridge the gap between them.

Instead what the phenomenological model requires, if it is to base itself in the development of human productive powers, is to show how this development can lead to the contradiction as the phenomenological model conceives it. In the case of capitalism, it needs to show how that development can create in individuals a conception of the self, and of what counts as the activity of the self, which is inherently incompatible with the capital/wage-labour 'form of intercourse', creating a situation in which those individuals must attempt to overthrow this form of intercourse, not so as to increase the rate of development of the productive powers, but so as to 'be what they are'. In other words, it needs to show how the development of the productive powers leads to a sense of the self as a 'social person', as an individual free to organise its own productive activity in conjunction with others, and thus as a being whose existence is incompatible with the wage-relationship as such, regardless of the economic development which that relationship may foster.

How can the development of the productive powers lead to such a result? The most obvious place to look for an answer to this question is in Marx's thought on the

'civilising' effects of capitalism. Capitalism, because of the drive to accumulate profits which is built into it, constantly increases the education and the scientific outlook of workers (G 312-3/408-10, 439-40/541-2). This is the central way in which it develops human productive powers. At the same time it also ceaselessly widens the range of workers' interdependencies and needs. 'In the place of old needs, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new needs, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes' (CM 62/488). These new needs are specifically the product of capitalism:

> [T]he transformation of what was previously superfluous into what is necessary, as a historically created necessity — is the tendency of capital. The general foundation of all industries comes to be general exchange itself, the world market, and hence the totality of activities, intercourse, needs etc. of which it is made up. (G 426/528)[30]

A natural way of connecting this theme with that of the estrangement described in the *Grundrisse* passage and the second form of 'contingency' in the *German Ideology* would be to argue that the wider workers' range of understanding and interdependence, the broader their outlook must become, and the more they are likely to think it natural that they, indeed that human beings in general, should freely organise their own productive activity: the more, therefore, a system of production in which they are forced to sell their labour power to employers in order to live must come to seem constraining and incompatible with their sense of themselves, and with the freedom that it seems natural for them to assume. That is, the more likely they are, in the terminology introduced above, to come to see themselves as 'social persons'. Eventually they must come to find that system as intolerable as the system of slavery. To the extent that this happens it becomes true that the relations of capitalism are 'fettering' the productive powers of humanity, whatever the

[30] Cf. G 73-80/156-62, 198/287, CM 62/488.

growth rate of the productive powers may be. For fetters, in English as in German, are the chains that bind slaves.

5. The self and right

On the interpretation I have offered here, Marx sees the essential development that leads from capitalism to the threshold of communism as a development in the way that human beings, and first of all the working class, conceive themselves. It is a development that leads from an 'individual' conception of personhood and freedom that is entirely compatible with capitalist relations of production to a 'social' conception that is incompatible with them.

Thus, I claim, Marx grounds the revolutionary motivations of the worker, as Kant grounds moral motivation, in more or less explicit reflection on the nature of the self, and specifically on its nature as essentially free.[31] I now briefly outline an interpretation of Marx's views on morality and right, in order to show: (1) that Marx could have seen the motivations of the individual who finds his sense of self contradicted by the social conditions in which he lives as a form of moral motivation, (2) that it would have been consistent with his view of his own role to give voice to such feelings on the part of workers, and (3) that at the same time he would have had reason to avoid the language of morality and right in doing so.

On the view of morality and right that I attribute to Marx, these phenomena are expressions of the second conception of the self which I contrasted to that of the self as a

[31] For Kant, see for example GMM sec. 3, especially 446-8/107-9.

'personal individual' in the *German Ideology*.[32] This is the conception of the self as defined by its ownership of property and its corresponding position in the system of economic interaction, the self as 'class individual'. In the case of capitalism, this means the self as a private property owner engaged in competitive exchange with others in civil, i.e. capitalist society, who sees 'in other men not the *realisation* of his own freedom but the *barrier* to it', who must therefore act egoistically and must think of himself as an egoist, and yet who is also incorporated into a state which is necessary in order to provide the public goods which members of civil society cannot provide themselves (OJQ 365/163). For Marx, this conception of the self is reinforced by the social relations of capitalist society, whereas as I have argued the conception of the self as a 'social person' develops along with the productive powers.

In turn Marx suggests that it is this latter conception of the self which generates the ideas of right and morality that dominate the existing world.[33] This conception is itself dual. The individual is reduced 'on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and on the other hand to a citizen, a moral [*moralische*] person' (OJQ 370/168). On the one hand, the rights of man 'are nothing but the rights of a *member of civil society*, i.e. the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community' (OJQ 364/162), while on the other hand morality is nothing but the morality of the citizen who abstracts from everything particular about himself and thinks as a citizen, and as nothing else. Human motivation is bifurcated into self-interest and self-sacrifice (GI 33-4/46-7, 194/213, 227-30/245-8, 424-5/439). Furthermore,

[32] I understand 'right' here to mean either individual rights (what Marx usually calls 'private right', *Privatrecht*) or else the 'right' by which the state and its organs act (what Marx usually calls 'public right', *öffentlich Recht*).

[33] This interpretive assertion must remain unargued here. A starting point for justifying it would be the connection which Marx draws between the idea of the self as a rights-bearing person and the activity of commodity exchange at G 155/243, and implicitly at C1 62-3/178.

because the content of ideas about right and morality is dictated by the necessities of a social process of production that is out of anyone's control, people systematically attribute an autonomous power to those ideas, a mistake that Marx and Engels call (with respect to right) the 'juridical illusion' (GI 63-4/91, 312-3/330, 346-7/362-3).

I suggest that Marx largely avoided using the explicit language of morality and right in describing (and articulating) workers' motivations for overthrowing capitalism, so as to avoid confusion with the ideas of morality and right generated by the relationships of capitalist society, with respect to both their content and their metaphysical connotations. Nevertheless these motivations can be thought of, from Marx's point of view, as the successors of conventional moral motivations: similar to them in deriving their source from a certain sense of self rather than from prudential thinking, although unlike them because of the different character of that sense of self.

On this account, we can reconcile Marx's 'moral' condemnations of capitalism with his conception of historical change, at least on the 'phenomenological' understanding of that conception. For if that understanding is accepted, it is plausible to assume that Marx saw his role as a socialist theoretician as that of articulating workers' own developing understanding of the world, and of their own nature. This was an understanding that for him would be immediately practical in its implications, since, as I have argued, a conception of what one is can directly entail the necessity to act in certain ways.[34] Since the historical movement of transition from capitalism to communism is essentially a matter of the working class coming to a certain kind of consciousness, Marx could see his own work as part and parcel of that movement without contradiction. With regard to an understanding of the world, his explication of exploitation in *Capital* can be seen as an

[34] For a similar view on the practical import of Marx's theory, see McCarney, *Social Theory and the Crisis of Marxism*, ch. 6.

extended effort to overcome the ways in which the wage relationship disguises itself as a relation of exchange between equals. With regard to an understanding of workers' own nature, his characterisations of the wage system as a form of slavery can be seen as expressions of that self-conception for which wage-labour is as intolerable as slavery is for the slave who first thinks of himself as a person.[35]

Marx's essential view of right would then be parallel to Feuerbach's view of religion: it expressed, in an alienated and unselfconscious form, a truth about our own nature.[36] Accordingly he looked on the arguments of early socialists who appealed to the right to the full product of one's labour as initial expressions of the self-conception he expected to see develop among workers: expressions which are still couched in the concepts associated with the conception of the self as a private property owner (where the property in this case is one's own labour), but which at the same time play a role in articulating a different conception of the self. The proletarians arrive at unity:

> only through a long process of development, in which the appeal to their right also plays a part. Incidentally, this appeal to their right is only a means of making them take shape as a 'they', as a revolutionary, united mass. (GI 305/323)

Once workers realise, though, what they had been expressing with the language of right, that language becomes superfluous. Marx's own resort to the language of right in his condemnations of capitalism should be seen in the same light.[37]

[35] I assume that Marx thought that this later self-conception was more objectively true or adequate than the earlier one.

[36] Hence his early parallel between his own 'critique of right' and Feuerbach's critique of religion: 'the critique of heaven turns into the critique of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of right' (CHPRI 18/176).

[37] Again, this parallels Feuerbach's view of religion. For Feuerbach, men could become conscious of their essence in the first instance only by conceiving that essence in the alienated form of a God. Subsequently that religious expression could be, and had to be, discarded. '[R]eligion is man's *first and also indirect form of self-consciousness* ... Man initially locates his essence *outside himself, before* he finds it *in himself*' (EC 16/13).

Given such views, it is intelligible that Marx should have simultaneously derided the contemporary language of morality and right and yet appealed to notions that look recognisably moral in his condemnations of capitalism. More importantly for the present purpose, we can see how he need have seen no contradiction between those condemnations and his conception of historical change, if that conception is understood as a 'phenomenological' one. For in making those condemnations he would simply have been articulating, in the only language available, the sense of self which he saw anyway emerging amongst workers as a result of the development of the productive powers under capitalism, and so facilitating that emergence.

In this chapter I have advanced an interpretation of Marx's post-1844 thinking on history, or at least one strand of it, which is recognisably a continuation of the themes of the 1844 manuscripts. In both cases, what ultimately makes capitalism unsustainable is a sense of 'estrangement' (or 'contingency' in the strong sense) on the part of workers, and in both cases it is plausible to see Marx as attributing the development of this sense of estrangement to the historical development of needs which goes hand in hand with the development of human productive powers. Accordingly, it can be argued that this historical development played a role in Marx's historical thinking even after he ceased to write on needs in the extensive way in which he did in 1844.

It remains to signal two major gaps in the conception of historical development that has been advanced on Marx's behalf in this chapter. Firstly, if it is the development of needs and of human productive powers that transforms the workers' conception of self, nothing has been said about the reasons for which this development itself takes place. Secondly, I have only been able to develop the conception for that part of history which lasts from the initiation of capitalism to the threshold of communism. In that period, the expansion of needs can plausibly be seen as producing a sense of the self as a 'social person' which is

incompatible with an absence of control on the part of the individual over his productive activity. Yet it is harder to see how a similar process could have led to that development of the self as an 'individual person' which would have been incompatible with slavery, although not with wage labour. An attempt to generalise the 'phenomenological' model presented here to the transitions between other major social forms (for example, from the Asiatic mode of production to ancient slave society) looks even less likely to succeed.

Conclusion

This study has been an interpretive effort to understand the role of needs (actual and phenomenological) in the historical thinking of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. I believe it has shown that a general conception of the historical process is discernibly common to all these thinkers, despite the major differences between them. In this conception the multiplication of needs provides a means whereby the motivations of human beings are gradually transformed in the course of history, in such a way that they eventually acquire the motivations necessary to sustain, if not to demand the establishment of, the 'good society' which is in turn a condition of human realisation. The details of the process, and the conceptions of human realisation and of the good society, vary widely from one thinker to the next, but a common underlying conception remains.

In the case of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, this historical transformation of motivations is bound up with transformations in individuals' self-conceptions and in particular in the ways in which the individual's sense of self is connected to his economic (i.e. need-satisfying) relations with others. The relationship between need, economic interaction and self-conception therefore provides a major subsidiary theme of the thesis.

In this conclusion I briefly review some of the more specific interpretive claims for which I have argued, and then point to the limitations of this study.

Firstly, I have claimed that despite the strong vein of historical pessimism in Rousseau's writings a progressive philosophy of history can be discerned there, one which culminates in the society of the *Social Contract*. Correspondingly, the multiplication of human needs,

and the development of *amour-propre* that goes hand in hand with it, are not unmitigated evils but rather are the necessary means for bringing into existence human beings who can be moralised by entering the society of the *Social Contract*.

Secondly, I have argued that although Kant does not make use of the term 'needs', his progressive philosophical history is predicated on the same multiplication of needs as that which I have attributed to Rousseau. For Kant this multiplication, and the associated development of a 'culture of skill', are central to the historical mechanism that brings about the 'ultimate end of nature', i.e. the furthest point to which processes driven by natural causality and by intentional action based on the satisfaction of desires and inclinations can take mankind towards its moralisation and the achievement of its final end, the 'highest good'.

Thirdly, I have tried to show that large parts of Hegel's systematic account of mind (*Geist*) can be understood as presenting a history of ordinary human motivation distinct from that of his lectures on the philosophy of history: a history which can be mapped onto that official history and which can in principle fill a major lacuna in it, namely the absence of 'microfoundations' or explanations of change at the level of the motivations of ordinary human individuals. The driving force of this history is not so much an ambition on the part of 'world-mind' to become self-conscious as a contradiction inherent the experience of any self-conscious being between a sense of itself as a subject and as an object. This basic contradiction takes a series of successive forms in the course of Hegel's history of ordinary motivation. Meanwhile human motivations take on an increasingly 'universal' quality in the course of that history, until they finally take the form of (felt) duties to the (true) state.

Conclusion

In the course of this exposition I have given what I believe to be novel interpretations of the essential nature of the master and servant relation, of the nature of the will with which the *Philosophy of Right* begins, of Hegel's derivation of property, and of the underlying motivations of participants in the 'system of needs'. Most importantly, however, I have attempted to show that 'needs' play a crucial role the history of ordinary motivation which I have attributed to Hegel, in that they represent motivations which are a necessary intermediate form between the 'desires' of isolated human beings and the universal (felt) 'duties' of citizens.

Fourthly, I have argued that Marx's writings, both before and after 1845, show evidence of a conception of the historical process which is rather different from the functionalism now usually attributed to him. In the 1844 version of this conception, human needs multiply (along with the development of human capacities for satisfying them) and gain the universality that makes them characteristically human through the historical development of conditional exchange. Yet at the same time conditional exchange 'estranges' human beings from their own needs, as well as from their activity and the products of that activity. Eventually this estrangement must become intolerable to them, and this provides the motivation for them to overthrow the system of conditional exchange.

In the later version of the same conception, the development of human capacities for satisfying multiplying needs becomes the development of human productive powers (*Produktivkräfte*). Conditional exchange is generalised into the 'form of intercourse' (later again, 'the social relations of production') between individuals. The sense of estrangement becomes a sense on the part of the worker of the 'contingency' of this form of intercourse to his self, which I interpret as a sense of its incompatibility with the kind of freedom that he sees as essential to his nature. I have sketched an interpretation of Marx's thought on

morality and right and argued that, given this interpretation, his 'moral' condemnations of capitalism can be made compatible with the account of historical change ascribed to him here.

Five major kinds of limitations to this study can be noted. Firstly, it has limited itself to setting out a particular interpretation of each thinker's conception of the historical process, without attempting to counterpose that interpretation systematically to major alternatives in the literature. A fuller exposition of any given interpretation would require such a counterposition, in order to judge whether it deserves to supplant those others, whether it is less tenable than one of them, or whether finally it should be understood as representing one genuine strand among others in the totality of the thinker's historical thought, a totality which would then have to be considered as at least partly contradictory. In the case of the interpretations proposed here of Rousseau and Marx, especially, the third possibility has to be acknowledged.

Secondly, a complete study of any of these thinkers' conceptions of history would have to show how that conception is related, if it is related, to the rest of that thinker's social and political thought. Here it has not been possible to do this in any detail. Some major questions on this score, which have been either passed over or addressed only inadequately in this study, are: Is the positive role attributed to *amour-propre* in this study compatible with the detail of Rousseau's political theory? What is the relation of Kant's view on the historical role of culture to his aesthetic theory? Can his view of history as a whole be reconciled with his conception of human freedom in the first and second *Critiques*? How does Hegel's theory of *Moralität*, i.e. individual morality conceived in abstraction from the mores of the community, relate to the 'history of ordinary motivation' ascribed to him here? How exactly can the description of the source of the

worker's discontent with capitalism put forward here be connected with Marx's critique of capitalist exploitation? What is its relation to his theory of ideology?

More generally: how are these conceptions of history to be related to their authors' approaches to the justification of social and political institutions? How are they related to what each has to say on women and on the domestic sphere?

Thirdly, the method used in this study of juxtaposing the historical thought of several figures, although I believe it enables each to illuminate aspects of the thought of the others, tends to make mutually 'assimilating' interpretations of these thinkers more plausible than they would be if presented in isolation. In particular, it could be argued that this study has presented variously Hegelianised versions of Rousseau, Kant and Marx, and a Rousseauian-Marxist version of Hegel, and that the persuasiveness of each of these interpretations depends at least partly on a tacit appeal to the others juxtaposed to it. A fuller defence of any particular interpretation would need to rely more exclusively on its capacity to make intelligible what the thinker in question said, independently of whether it makes it easier to see him as a descendant or forerunner of others.

Fourthly, on the grounds that a serious criticism of a thinker's views can only take place after a sympathetic reconstruction of them, the goals of this study have been largely limited to such reconstruction. Only the most obvious difficulties with the particular way of conceiving the historical process attributed to each thinker have been noted. Accordingly, a more comprehensive study of any of them would need to examine the conception in question more critically than it has been possible to do here for its internal consistency and completeness. It would also need to ask whether the view of the development of human needs that forms part of that conception has any relevance to the use of the concept of needs in contemporary normative theory. And as well as this, it

would have to assess the plausibility of the conception as a whole as an actual interpretation of the historical process.

Finally, and taking up from this last point, the present study has bracketed what has now become a standard set of objections, not just to any of the particular conceptions of history examined here, but to the very idea of a complete interpretation of history, and especially a progressive one with a prospective 'happy ending', as these are.[1] The implication of these objections is that such conceptions can no longer be defended with any intellectual seriousness, and that a study of them, even of those developed by the most important thinkers, can only have an antiquarian interest for us today.

The objections can be summarised as follows. If such complete interpretations of history are understood as exercises in historical explanation, then they are conducted at too great a distance from an empirical investigation into history, and are generally too strongly motivated by wish-fulfilment, to be of any scientific value. Furthermore, in that they see history as progressive, they must all rely ultimately, if covertly, on a teleological model of explanation which is no longer credible.

If instead they are understood as exercises in 'justifying' the historical process itself (as a kind of 'theodicy'), then: (a) history needs no justification, for, not being an intentional agent, it cannot be held responsible for its 'actions', (b) such a justification is morally objectionable, for it invariably justifies (albeit retrospectively) the involuntary sacrifice of the well-being of those who have suffered evils in the course of history for the sake of the greater well-being of future generations, and (c) it is also in bad faith, for it implicitly denies that it is up to us to decide what form of life and society to attempt to bring about,

[1] For two influential earlier versions of some of these objections, see Nietzsche, 'On the uses and disadvantages of history' and Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*.

and instead reassures us that such questions have already been settled for the best by a benign and all-powerful mechanism.

If again the aim of such complete interpretations is to justify the effort to establish a certain form of human life or of society, then demonstrating that history is tending (whether ineluctably or not) towards the production of such a form can provide no such justification. For such a tendency, if it exists, is simply an empirical fact, and empirical facts alone cannot provide good reasons for action.

It is impossible to reply adequately to such a series of objections here. However one general point can be made in response to them. This is that most of them assert or assume that the conceptions of history which they attack are secular versions of providentialism, in which a mechanism of some kind takes the place of God in ensuring that the historical process leads in the direction of human fulfilment. Yet in a providentialist conception of history the intentional agent that is responsible for historical progress is external to ordinary human beings. His desires and ends are quite distinct from ours. By contrast, in the conceptions of history which I have reconstructed in this study the motor of history is in every case ordinary human desires, and if history is progressive it is thanks to an immanent tendency in those desires to go beyond the limited and singular forms they initially take. This is most obviously true for the conception of historical progress I have ascribed to Hegel, but I believe it can be demonstrated in the other cases too. Accordingly, in these conceptions the source of progressive historical change is not an agency 'outside us' in the way that it is in providentialism, and objections that fail to take account of this difference are misplaced.

Of course this can be no more than the first step in a counter-argument. An immediate rely to it might be that such an 'immanent tendency' can itself only be another God-

substitute. Nevertheless the fact that the first step can be made, and that it can be made only after a reconstruction of how some of the major progressive conceptions of history actually work in detail, shows that such a process of reconstruction itself may sometimes be necessary before responses can be found to arguments that purport to show that it has no value.

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