Nietzsche and Proust

A Comparative Study
'Les connaissances philosophiques d'un auteur ne s'évaluent pas aux citations qu'il fait, ni d'après des relevés de bibliothèques toujours fantaisistes et conjecturaux, mais d'après les directions apologétiques ou polémiques de son œuvre elle-même.'

(Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie*)

'Einer hat immer Unrecht: aber mit zweiern beginnt die Wahrheit'.

(Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*)
Affinities between Nietzsche and Proust have been suggested by a variety of influential critics (Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, more recently Paul de Man, Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty), but this is the first full-length comparative study of the two writers. Proust was intimately familiar with nineteenth-century post-Kantian aesthetics, and indeed the narrator in *A la recherche du temps perdu* glosses his involuntary memories using an explicitly idealist philosophical vocabulary, but by developing Vincent Descombes's thesis that Proust's novel is more advanced than the philosophical interpretations it contains, I argue that Proust ultimately moves beyond the Schopenhauerian position which has often been imputed to him, and that he joins Nietzsche in an overcoming of dualistic metaphysics.

After first considering those critical works which have prepared the ground for a comparative study of the two writers — in particular Gilles Deleuze's *Proust et les signes*, whose Nietzschean contours I argue have been insufficiently appreciated — I then discuss the surprising amount Proust actually wrote about Nietzsche, in *A la recherche* and elsewhere, and focus on the theme of friendship, which is Proust's chosen terrain for his most extended engagement with the philosopher. In subsequent chapters I address 'Proust's perspectivism' in the light of Nietzsche's radical critique of traditional epistemology, and then turn to Proust's narrator's search for the self, which I argue culminates in an 'übermenschlich' aesthetics of self-creation. I use Deleuze's emphasis on the difference and repetition in Proustian 'essences' so as to read involuntary memory as the intimation not of an essential self, but of the eternal return. In my final chapter I then attempt to break open the two writers' metamorphoses of the circle by stressing the asymmetries of temporal structure in their work, their exploitation of postmodern 'logics of the future perfect'.
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Nietzsche

For the published works, all references are to section numbers or titles, and modernised orthography and punctuation are used for all quotations; for the Nachlaß, reference is made to Friedrich Nietzsche: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, 2nd edn, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: dtv; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988) (= KSA); for the correspondence, reference is made to Friedrich Nietzsche: Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 16 vols (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1975-84) (= KGB).

AC - Der Antichrist
EH - Ecce Homo
FaW - Der Fall Wagner
FV - Die fröhliche Wissenschaft
GD - Götzen-Dämmerung
GM - Zur Genealogie der Moral
GT - Die Geburt der Tragödie
JGB - Jenseits von Gut und Böse
M - Morgenröte
MA - Menschliches, Allzumenschliches
UB - Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen
WS - Der Wanderer und sein Schatten
Z - Also sprach Zarathustra

Proust

Volume and page references are to:


AD - Albertine disparue
CG - Le Côté de Guermantes
CS - Du côté de chez Swann
JF - A l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs
P - La Prisonnière
SG - Sodome et Gomorrhe
TR - Le Temps retrouvé

Others

BSAMP - Bulletin de la Société des amis de Marcel Proust et des amis de Combray
NS - Nietzsche-Studien
Introduction

I. Nietzsche and Proust? Nietzsche and Proust?

At the outset of this enquiry it is perhaps salutary to recall Walter Kaufmann's rather disparaging comment in the Preface to the third edition of his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, concerning precisely such comparative studies as this: 'Nietzsche can be, and has been linked with a vast variety of intellectual fashions - movements as well as men - but it is clear that any attempt to define his significance and meaning mainly in terms of one such juxtaposition is bound to be misleading. This is not to say that all "Nietzsche and X" titles are worthless, but...'. Kaufmann proceeds to give a catalogue of some twenty-five such 'X's (which concludes with those unlikeliest of men, women) taken just from his own select bibliography, and needlessly to say the list which he drew up in 1968 now looks distinctly modest, for in the meantime the growth of interest in Nietzsche, the proliferation of perspectives on his work (comparative and otherwise), has been phenomenal. B. Bryan Hilliard and Earl Nitschke's recent bibliographies just of Nietzsche scholarship written in or translated into English over the period since the publication of the *International Nietzsche Bibliography* (also of 1968) list some 1912 items² - 'How much is too much?' asks Richard Schacht in response.³ 'Nietzsche aujourd'hui'/"Nietzsche Now"/'Nietzsche heute'⁴ has been pluralised to a far greater extent than Kaufmann could ever have imagined, and even *The New Nietzsche*, David Allison's seminal collection of continental interpretations which first appeared in 1977, is starting to look uncomfortably monolithic.⁵ Moreover, to judge from just recent titles, 'Nietzsche and X' studies are still flourishing, despite Kaufmann's thinly-veiled scorn: *Nietz-
sche and Asian Thought, Nietzsche and Modern German Thought, Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue, Nietzsche and the Feminine, and so on."

So what of Nietzsche and Proust? Or, for that matter, Nietzsche and Proust? For the critical industry on the latter has been no less productive: 'Aucun écrivain du XXe siècle n'a suscité une telle bibliographie', writes Jean-Yves Tadié as he begins the unenviable task of surveying its contours. The need for a self-explanation in attempting a study like this has grown all the more imperative since Kaufmann's comments over twenty-five years ago, for we know how he would have responded: 'no study of that sort could possibly provide the key to Nietzsche. His house has many mansions, and any attempt to find the clue to everything in some nook, or in a similarity between a detail here and a trifle in another edifice, or in a guest glimpsed in the parlor, is simple-minded'. The present study is not so naive as to presume that it could possibly provide 'the key' to Nietzsche, or that it could use Nietzsche to provide 'the key' to Proust, but my aim in writing it has been rather to establish 'transversals' between the work of two of the major writers of our time, between Nietzsche's 'house' and Proust's 'cathedral' of a novel, A la recherche du temps perdu. My hope has been that the result will be not just a display of 'details' and 'trifles', but a demonstration of the often striking affinities between two writers who were in many ways exploring similar problems and developing parallel responses to them in the undoubtedly different, but in their cases overlapping fields of philosophy and literature.

At first sight a comparative study of Nietzsche and Proust might appear a somewhat unlikely exercise. Simply on the level of biography, there would seem to be little in common between a philosopher who unshackled himself from his earlier life as an academic and chose instead to enact the life of the
'free spirit' in his constant shuttling between Swiss mountains and Mediterranean Sea, and a novelist who traced a trajectory between two quite different poles: his early life as littératur and socialite, and subsequently his notorious self-sequestration in the Parisian metropolis. Not only do their mature vocations express themselves in markedly divergent lifestyles, but they even write under very different conditions: Nietzsche preferring to rise before dawn and take a brisk constitutional before breakfast, notebook in hand; Proust devoting himself to a more 'nocturnal muse'. Nietzsche follows Goethe in his preference for thinking and writing while standing up, and reacts to the 'nihilism' of Flaubert's 'On ne peut penser et écrire qu'assis' with 'Nur die ergangenen Gedanken haben Wert' (GD, IX, 34), so we can only imagine how much greater his hostility would have been towards a writer who wrote in bed! Surely Nietzsche would have dismissed Proust as just another product of the late nineteenth-century French culture of décadence, just another ascetic devoted to the vita contemplativa, 'ein Verhängnis mehr für das arme, kranke, willenskranke Frankreich' (GD, IX, 2)?

More pertinently, Nietzsche's heroic 'grand doctrines' of will to power and the eternal return, or his brainchild the 'Übermensch', the 'philosopher of the future' with his life of strenuousness, belligerence and danger, would seem to offer scant opportunity for any meaningful comparison with the aestheticizing introversion of the Proustian narrator à la recherche du temps perdu. Erich Auerbach summarily brackets Nietzsche from his magisterial study of Mimesis on the perfectly justifiable grounds that 'Nietzsche was not concerned with the realistic portrayal of contemporary reality', but Proust is preoccupied with the minutiae of superficial society life, and his novel is suffused with the sheer banality of the everyday. Malcolm Bowie has recently reasserted 'The Morality of Proust' — but how can this be reconciled with a
writer who so conspicuously situated himself "jenseits von gut und böse" and, fifteen years before Gide, was planning a book entitled Der Immoralist?

On the stylistic level, what kind of rapprochement is possible between, on the one hand, a novelist looking to emulate the amplitude of the Classical rhetorical period and to fashion a seamless 'roman fleuve' of a narrative (at one stage conceived in a single unbroken chapter), and, on the other, a philosopher who takes as his models Sallust and Horace (GD, X, 1), or 'the obscurity of Heraclitus', whose two more formally traditional books (Die Geburt der Tragödie and Zur Genealogie der Moral) are the exception rather than the rule, and whose ambition is 'in zehn Sätzen zu sagen, was jeder andre in einem Buche sagt - was jeder andre in einem Buche nicht sagt' (GD, IX, 51; cf. KSA 11, 579)?

Unlike Leibniz, or Schopenhauer, Schelling and the other German post-Kantian aestheticians to whom Anne Henry has linked Proust in her important series of studies, Nietzsche was not taught in French schools and universities during Proust's formative years for the simple reason that he was still alive, and Proust's first-hand familiarity with Nietzsche remained relatively slight, even if, as I shall argue in Chapter 1, it has been underestimated by criticism so far. Most significantly of all, in A la recherche itself Proust explicitly takes issue with Nietzsche on the question of friendship, specifically Nietzsche's erstwhile friendship with Wagner, and passes off a love of Nietzsche onto Saint-Loup precisely in order to distance the narrator from him. The apparent divergence of Proust from Nietzsche in these and other respects has in fact been stressed by a number of critics: James H. Reid contrasts the two throughout the course of an elaborate argument which construes a Nietzschean speech-act theory and a Proustian deconstruction of it; while in his study of Nietzsche's influence on modernist writers,
Heirs to Dionysus, John Burt Foster, Jnr. goes so far as to assert, however hesitantly: 'it might be possible to [...] locate a genuinely anti-Nietzschean current among literary modernists which would include figures like Joyce, Eliot and, perhaps, Proust.'

But just as one can find prima facie reasons for opposing the two writers, so one can as easily find prima facie similarities between the two: the game can be played both ways, even behind the moustaches. On the biographical level both writers were racked by illnesses, the debilitating effects of which were felt all the more acutely by two men whose passionate devotion to writing was otherwise so all-consuming. Both were brought up in a predominantly female environment, set great store by male-male relationships, and had older women confidantes in later life (on the one hand Malwida von Meysenbug, on the other Mme Straus) - both could be tactfully described as having an 'epistemology of the closet', in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's telling formulation.

Geographically speaking, the two writers shared a love of Venice and the coast - Proust even had an enjoyable trip to the Upper Engadine and Nietzsche's beloved Sils-Maria in 1893, only five years after Nietzsche had left it for ill - and despite their different ways of achieving it, both opted by preference for a solitary existence as a precondition for fulfilling their respective vocations, even if both also cultivated their various friendships assiduously. Both, indeed, conceived their activity as a 'vocation': the word occupies a key position in Le Temps retrouvé after the narrator's life-changing realisation (TR, IV, 478), and it is also stressed by Nietzsche in his attack on the debasement of educational values in contemporary Germany, the reduction of educational institutions which had previously striven for 'Bildung' as an end in itself to mere production lines disgorging 'vocationally' trained masses, to which he retorts: 'Eine höhere Art Mensch, mit
Verlaub gesagt, liebt nicht "Berufe", genau deshalb, weil sie sich berufen weiß' (GD, VIII, 5).

Taste(s)

A first step towards a more substantial comparison of Nietzsche and Proust can be made if we begin by examining some of their contexts and comparing their tastes in other writers. Here again, though, these tastes certainly differed in some respects. Where Proust devotes important essays to exploring the style of his 'precursors' Balzac, Baudelaire and Flaubert, Nietzsche's reception of all three was a good deal more muted, to say the least: Balzac, for example, he lumps together with George Sand, Victor Hugo and 'alle Romantiker' (sic: GD, IX, 6) as 'heraufgekommene Plebejer' (KSA 11, 591; cf. JGB 204, 256). Proust's goodwill towards Balzac allows him to excuse even what he recognises as his infelicities:

Balzac se sert de toutes les idées qui lui viennent à l'esprit et ne cherche pas à les faire entrer, dissoutes, dans un style où elles s'harmoniseraient et suggéreraient ce qu'il veut dire. Non, il le dit tout simplement, et, si hétéroclite et disparate (comme Renan, du reste, en cela) que soit l'image, toujours juste d'ailleurs, il la juxtapose. (CSB 296f.)

For Nietzsche, according to his celebrated definition in Der Fall Wagner (5), this 'Anarchie der Atome, Disgregation des Willens, [...] Unfähigkeit zum organischen Gestalten' is the symptom par excellence of literary décadence. Nietzsche's critique of the 'décadence' of Baudelaire and Flaubert is more overt, yet as one would expect from a writer who was also able to announce: 'Vohlan! Ich bin so gut wie Wagner das Kind dieser Zeit, will sagen ein decadent' (FaW, 'Vorwort'), his criticism is not unmixed with expressions of
respect. Nietzsche describes Baudelaire as 'jener typische décadent, in dem sich ein ganzes Geschlecht von Artisten wiedererkannt hat' (EH, II, 5), as 'eine Art R<ichard> W<agner> ohne Musik' (KSA 11, 476; cf. 11, 601) - with all the connotations of ambivalent fascination which that parallel has for him by the 1880s. He attacks Flaubert, 'der brave Bürger von Rouen' (JGB 218), for his 'nihilism' (GD, I, 34), yet still grants: 'er hat das klingende und bunte Französisch auf die Höhe gebracht' (KSA 11, 600), and sees him as 'kräftig genug um den gegenwärtigen Romanschriftstellern Frankreichs damit ein Vorbild zu geben' - a 'Vorbild' whose value Proust is of course keen to acknowledge.

In general one could say that Proust has a tendency to see the good in writers whom Nietzsche (in his published works, at least) simply dispatches with a stroke of the pen. Thus Proust defends Michelet, like Balzac (P, III, 666f.), on the strength of the 'retrospective unity' he imposes on his work, and sees 'les plus grandes beautés de Michelet' in his prefaces (P, III, 666); Nietzsche dismisses him peremptorily as 'die Begeisterung, die den Rock auszieht' (GD, IX, 1; cf. KSA 11, 602f.) and notes: 'Alles, was mir gefällt, ist ihm fremd' (KSA 11, 257). Nietzsche attacks George Eliot as a 'Moral-Weiblein' (GD, IX, 5), while Proust has much more sympathy for Eliot's 'sentiment de l'utilité de la souffrance, du progrès moral' (CSB 657).

On the other hand, though, Nietzsche praises Maupassant as 'einen von der starken Rasse [...], einen echten Lateiner, dem ich besonders zugetan bin' (EH, II, 3), while Proust, as Tadié notes, 'n'aura pas grand estime pour son oeuvre'. Indeed none of the writers Nietzsche includes among those 'so neugierige und zugleich so delikate Psychologen' whom he values most highly 'im jetzigen Paris' - 'die Herren [sic] Paul Bourget, Pierre Loti, Gyp, Meilhac, Anatole France, Jules Lemaitre', with Maupassant crowning the list (EH, II, 3; cf. JGB 218) - would be among Proust's enduring favourites,
although interestingly the list does match Proust's own early tastes quite faithfully, and he actually refers to it as a list of 'quelques écrivains de nos amis' in a letter to Robert de Montesquiou of March 1904 (CMP, VI, 353). Whereas Nietzsche has a particularly soft spot for Taine, Proust follows Nietzsche's own lead in his criticism of Michelet's 'Begeisterung', mocking Taine's 'désopilant enthousiasme' for Musset (CSB 634), and he criticises both Bourget and Taine, ironically enough, on account of their appreciations of the method of Sainte-Beuve (CSB 218, 220f., 225).

Ironically enough, for Nietzsche was also very much 'contre Sainte-Beuve' (cf. KSA 11, 257, 600; JGB 48; GD, IX, 3) - and indeed in their judgements on the writers who were most important to them there is a surprising amount of overlap. Proust's respect for Goethe never reaches the heights of Nietzsche's enthusiasm for his paragon of Dionysian affirmation (GD, IX, 49) - in his interview with Proust it is Bibesco who refers to Goethe as 'le plus grand auteur dramatique du XIXe siècle' (CSB 500), in *A la recherche* (TR, IV, 358) it is Charlus for whom Goethe is one of the two greatest Germans (Nietzsche being the other) - but Proust's admiration for *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* and *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* in particular is frequently apparent (cf. CSB 141, 479-81, 647-50 ("Sur Goethe"); CG, II, 475, 1155). The two other nineteenth-century prose writers on whom Nietzsche lavishes his greatest praise are Stendhal and Dostoyevsky, and Proust also responds to both very positively. As with Balzac, Proust notes Stendhal's stylistic infelicities and considers him 'un grand écrivain sans le savoir' (CSB 611), more because of the 'grande ossature inconsciente que recouvre un assemblage voulu des idées' than any effect consciously sought, but Proust learns much from Stendhal - he adopts Stendhal's ('proto-Nietzschean') critique of remorse (CSB 655) and his term for the 'cristallisation' of love (AD, IV, 4), as well as in
general defending him against Sainte-Beuve's criticisms (CSB 222f.). In *A la recherche* the narrator's early admiration for Stendhal (JF, II, 70) persists, and he singles out for high approval Stendhal's exploitation of altitude (P, III, 879; cf. CSB 611f., 654) — another very Nietzschean motif. Proust's appreciation of Dostoyevsky (cf. CSB 644f.) surfaces in his novel during the literary-critical discussion between the narrator and Albertine in *La Prisonnière*, where the former rhapsodises on 'la beauté neuve que Dostoievski a apportée au monde' (P, III, 880) and gives an exposition of Dostoyevsky's aesthetic of indirection, 'le côté Dostoievski de Mme de Sévigné', which marks out the Russian novelist as one of Proust's own most important models.  

Both Nietzsche and Proust had an abiding love for the writings of the French moralistes, especially Pascal, and a profound respect for the acuity of their psychological insights. Emerson, to whom Nietzsche gives practically the final word in *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* (UB, III, 8), and who has at last begun to be more widely recognised as an important precursor of his, is read 'avec ivresse' by Proust in 1895 (CMP, I, 363). Proust uses several quotations from Emerson's *Essays* as epigraphs for *Les Plaisirs et les jours* (JS 9, 38, 104, 156), and unlike France or Loti, Emerson retains a place of honour in Proust's estimation (cf. CSB 37, 91n., 112, 119n., 138, 311, 480, 540, 656). Above all, though, both Nietzsche and Proust were profoundly affected by their contact with Schopenhauer and Wagner. Bryan Magee, in his study of *Aspects of Wagner*, yokes the two together on this latter count: '[Wagner's] work seems to have a special appeal for the emotionally isolated or repressed: Nietzsche; Proust living alone in his cork-lined room [...]', and even if Proust explicitly criticises Nietzsche for abandoning (the) Wagnerian camp, I shall argue in Chapter 1 that his criticism is misplaced. Moreover, one of the aims
of this study as a whole is to qualify the claims made by a number of other critics for the defining role of Schopenhauer's influence on Proust, and to argue instead that Proust, like Nietzsche, reacted against Schopenhauer, having first gained an intimate acquaintance with his philosophy.

Of course such a list of pros and contras is almost infinitely extensible, but one feature which should by now have emerged is simply the extent of the cultural heritage the two writers shared, and specifically their deep immersion in the literary culture of late nineteenth-century France. In Proust's case this hardly needs explaining; in Nietzsche's it reflects an enduring fascination with French culture which persists even (indeed especially) into the contemporary period which was so afflicted, as he saw it, with the symptoms of décadence. Not only was Nietzsche - this arch-critic of newspapers and the newspaper-reading public - a devoted reader of the Journal des Débats, but he found the Journal des Goncourt a veritable 'bible of decadence', and his close reading of it in 1887 (cf. especially KSA 13, 117-23) left traces throughout his late works, in particular Götzen-Dämmerung (from which many of his more sardonic comments quoted above derive). A second, and more fundamental point about Nietzsche's and Proust's tastes, is the emphasis they both place on 'taste' itself (in all senses), and on the sureness of taste (or otherwise) as a guide to the psychology of a character. Both writers were aware that nothing speaks more eloquently but succinctly of a character's style than their tastes, and indeed one of the primary ways in which Proust gives depth to such figures as Bloch, Brichot or the narrator's grandmother is, indirectly, through the writer(s) they like best to quote. For Nietzsche the importance of taste, and his valorisation of French taste in particular, is most evident in the opening of section 254 of Jenseits von Gut und Böse: 'Auch jetzt noch ist Frankreich der Sitz der geistigsten und
raffiniertesten Kultur Europas und die hohe Schule des Geschmacks: aber man muß dies "Frankreich des Geschmacks" zu finden wissen'.

Psychology: 'La méthode de Sainte-Beuve'

A final point which needs to be raised here concerns Nietzsche's method of criticism, his fondness for honing his notes on a writer so as to make pithy and combative statements in print, of the kind: 'Ich las die ersten lettres d'un voyageur: wie alles, was von Rousseau stammt, falsch, gemacht, Blasebalg, übertrieben' (GD, IX, 6). Such lapidary abusiveness bears more than a passing resemblance to the kind of trenchant comment by Sainte-Beuve which Proust finds so unpalatable, and which he exemplifies, ironically enough, by quoting Sainte-Beuve on Stendhal: "Je viens de relire, ou d'essayer, les romans de Stendhal: ils sont franchement détestables" (CSB 222).

Now although Proust himself here (whether deliberately or otherwise) has taken two longer passages from Sainte-Beuve's Causeries du lundi and compressed them together for effect (cf. CSB 833), one would be justified in suspecting that Proust might have found Nietzsche's style of 'argumentation' unacceptably ad hominem.

Except that when Nietzsche writes: 'Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede große Philosophie bisher war: nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers' (JGB 6) he means this in a radically different way to Sainte-Beuve, and has as much contempt as does Proust for the superficiality of Sainte-Beuve in his pursuit of the biographical portrait for illuminating a writer's work. This passage continues: 'das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und eine Art ungewollter und unvermerkter mémoires' - Nietzsche understands by
'life', or 'the biographical', the play of unconscious, instinctual drives; his interest is in involuntary 'mémoires', the way in which 'die Grundtriebe des Menschen [...] als inspirierende Genien (oder Dämonen und Kobolde —) ihr Spiel getrieben haben mögen' — and his 'flair' is specifically genealogical and typological. It is this flair, I would argue, that gives Nietzsche's put-downs their purchase. His genius may be in his nostrils (EH, IV, 1), but it is also in the way he can respond to the pungency of offensive matter with the pungency of his own counter-offensives, a good case in point being his paragraph in Götzen-Dämmerung on Sainte-Beuve himself, which begins: 'Sainte-Beuve. — Nichts von Mann; voll eines kleinen Ingrimmes gegen alle Mannsgeister. Schweift umher, fein, neugierig, gelangweilt, aushorcherisch — eine Weibs-person im Grunde, mit einer Weibs-Rachsucht und Weibs-Sinnlichkeit' (GD, IX, 3). Proust delights in a similar, if usually less sustained, kind of 'biographical' shorthand (whether in his essays or in A la recherche itself), and even in a throw-away comment like 'la fausse supériorité d'un Sainte-Beuve, d'un Mérimée, d'une George Sand' (CSB 248), with the indefinite articles one can already detect his antonomastic move away from the biographical toward the typological.

Both writers had a fascination with the acerbic comments other writers passed on each other — with what might broadly be described as literary-political gossip — and were avid readers of correspondences, journals and Mémoires: in Nietzsche's case those of Galiani, Baudelaire and George Sand by preference; in Proust's those of Mme de Sévigné, Saint-Simon and Sainte-Beuve; in both their cases the Journal des Goncourt. Proust and Nietzsche, I would argue, had a similar understanding of what constitutes 'psychology' itself, so that where one might be tempted to dismiss their comments as superficial, instead I would argue that both knew the value in being 'oberflächlich — aus
Moreover, both had such a developed flair for rapidly grasping the psychological features of other writers and artists (often on the basis of quite slender material) that they were able to make telling use of their acute understanding not just in the polemics in which they both freely engaged (the very title Contre Sainte-Beuve recalls Nietzsche contra Wagner), but more especially by appropriating other writers' styles and recreating them productively in the pastiches and parodies which they both so evidently enjoyed. In his 'Affaire Lemoine' pastiches, or the cod piece of 'Journal des Goncourt' in Le Temps retrouvé (TR, IV, 287-95), to cite but the most obvious examples, Proust by turns pays affectionate homage to and distances himself from some of those who had the greatest effect on his own development as a writer, while Nietzsche, too, couches the work of which he was proudest, Also sprach Zarathustra, in a sustainedly mock-biblical style.

'Proust, Schopenhauer and Other Philosophers'

Given that on the one hand Nietzsche is the philosopher most closely associated with the term 'perspectivism', and on the other 'Proust's perspectivism' is a formula which has been tantalisingly asserted as a fait accompli by every generation of critics writing on A la recherche, from Ernst Robert Curtius to Anne Henry and Vincent Descombes, what seems positively perverse about existing Proust criticism is that it should have chosen not to examine the relationship between Proust and Nietzsche more closely. Peter Jones has a long chapter in his Philosophy and the Novel on 'Knowledge and Illusion in A la recherche du temps perdu', in which Nietzsche does not figure; Vincent Descombes, in his more substantial Proust: Philosophie du roman, devotes a
chapter to Proust's perspectivism (a chapter which he deems 'l'argument principal' in his book), but again makes no mention of Nietzsche in this regard.

Yet the roll-call of philosophers to whom Proust has been linked is certainly impressive enough, from the pre-Socratics, Plato and the neo-Platonics through Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, Locke, Kant and Hegel, to Kierkegaard and Emerson, Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Although there have been many case studies attempting to situate Proust in a philosophical context so far, the main candidates for comparison have undoubtedly been Bergson and Schopenhauer. Since the consensus that Proust was a profoundly Schopenhauerian writer has been particularly strong in recent times, I shall broach this question by way of introduction to my own argument in the section which follows. Patrick Gardiner writes that 'the kernel of Schopenhauer's account of the artist's approach to the world finds perhaps its most striking echo in the work of a novelist [Proust] who expressed in his chief book a view of art and its relation to life in many ways similar to that of the German writer'; he is echoed by Bryan Magee: 'Perhaps the greatest of all French writers to be influenced by Schopenhauer was Proust'; and for Clément Rosset 'la recherche des "essences" [chez Proust], la reconnaissance de souvenirs purs [...] semble directement issue de la doctrine de Schopenhauer'. I shall concentrate, though, on the Proust critic who has given the most substantial and penetrating accounts of his relation to Schopenhauer, Anne Henry, before discussing the arguments of the most recent analyst of 'Proust philosophe', Julia Kristeva.
In her first tour de force of a book, *Marcel Proust: Théories pour une esthétique*, Henry places Proust in the context of the whole tradition of nineteenth-century German idealist aesthetics and its French adherents, with the emphasis on Séailles's synthesis of Schopenhauerian and especially Schellingian ideas, but in her studies since then she has been focussing increasingly on Proust's Schopenhauerianism. In 'Proust du côté de Schopenhauer', for example, she argues: 'Comparé aux autres vitalistes, Proust est certainement l'écrivain qui a donné du *MVF* la traduction la plus fidèle, la plus équilibrée, la plus littérale, si l'on entend par là qu'il n'a jamais cherché à exploiter avec démesure telle de ses propositions'" — even if in the following paragraph she concedes that Proust also 's'est comporté en disciple libre'. So concerned is Henry to make the case for a Schopenhauerian Proust that her valuable series of studies can nevertheless be read, I would argue, as a repeated denegation of the possibility of a valid comparison between Proust and Nietzsche, a refusal to admit the possibility that Proust might have been reacting against Schopenhauer in the same way as Nietzsche — with the result that she ends up claiming as Schopenhauerian influence any potential Nietzschean parallels. Indeed Henry's arguments read at times as though she were trying to do the same for the other great mentor on whom Nietzsche turned his back as did the late nineteenth-century Wagnerians in their vain attempts to rehabilitate Nietzsche for the Wagnerian faith. Where Henry is prepared to argue that Flaubert did not know Schopenhauer but knew Kant and reached the same conclusions from his reading of Kant as did...
Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,* so I will argue that although Proust’s familiarity with Nietzsche was no more than passing, his knowledge of Schopenhauer formed the basis for a response similar to that of Nietzsche himself.

In her *Proust,* Henry paints a portrait of Proust at school remaining resolutely indifferent to the Nietzschean interest of his fellows: ‘Et pendant que ses camarades s’occupent de Nietzsche et d’Ibsen, entre un cours et une soirée, Proust broche aphorismes, essais et nouvelles.’ Instead, she sets Proust in the context of the revival of interest in Schopenhauer, arguing: ‘Vers 1880, c’est une traînée de feu qui embrase l’Europe. Pas un littéra­teur, pas un artiste important qui ne l’ait médité, que ses idées n’aient enfiévré.’ She continues by asking how it was that Schopenhauer’s philosophy proved so enticing to that particular generation of European writers:

Ont-ils admiré le cynisme d’un penseur qui admit la lutte comme un mode naturel de l’existence? Sa perspicacité qui dénonce le progrès de l’histoire humaine comme illusion dangereuse parce que la figure du temps est l’éternel retour du même? En un mot, est-ce le nihilisme ou au contraire le désir de fonder la vérité sur un sol plus sain, comme le déclarera Nietzsche dans un moment de reconnaissance pour son maître?

It is clearly going a step too far to claim Schopenhauer as the author of the eternal return of the same, but one can see why Henry feels the need to take this step by comparing this passage with an earlier one in her *Marcel Proust: Théories pour une esthétique:* ‘Pour exprimer ces transmutations (temporales) Proust reste prisonnier de la terminologie de Schopenhauer chez lequel il y a une confusion, non de fond, mais un flottement de vocabulaire; aucun concept séparé distinguant temps comme devenir, volonté, et le temps, catégorie de la représentation.’ Henry finds ‘chez Proust la reproduction en plus complexe encore, des termes schopenhauériens’ (p. 277), but Proust’s novel succeeds no
better in resolving the terminological ambiguities:

Toute l'ambiguïté provient d'ailleurs de l'obligation que s'assigne
notre romancier philosophe de parler un langage poétique, de mélanger
images et concepts, mais elle naît aussi d'une inéluctable confusion
entre la réminiscence, simple remémoration du passé et la reconnaissan­
ce, démonstration qui utilise l'alchimie de la mémoire pour établir
l'identité/opposition. (p. 277)

If we leave aside Henry's own confusion in arguing that "Toute l'ambiguïté
provient [...], mais elle naît aussi [...]", she seems to be admitting that
Schopenhauer was confused here, and claiming that Proust on the one hand
reproduces Schopenhauer's ideas but on the other confuses them even further by
writing a novel — by being a 'prisonnier de l'exigence romanesque' (p. 260, my
emphasis) — rather than trying to write a philosophical treatise which might
do his philosophical mentor the service of clearing up some of his
ambiguities. 57

This line of argument is surprisingly reminiscent of readings of Nietzsche
by those who are embarrassed at his more 'poetic' excesses — those like Arthur
Danto, who in the extraordinary Preface to his Nietzsche as Philosopher is
quite unashamed in regretting the 'total conceptual permissiveness' of
Nietzsche's 'piecemeal elaborations', 58 and in wishing that Nietzsche had
lived beyond his own ill-conceived 'Morgenröte' to witness the new dawn of
contemporary analytical philosophy in all its systematic splendour — when, had
he known what was good for him, he might well have signed up for some of Prof.
Danto's classes. Danto reaches his patronising peak in arguing:

because we know a good deal more philosophy today, I believe it is
exceedingly useful to see his [Nietzsche's] analyses in terms of
logical features which he was unable to make explicit, but toward which
he was unmistakably groping. His language would have been less
colorful had he known what he was trying to say. 59

The historical importance of Danto's book, like Kaufmann's before it, was to
establish conclusively that Nietzsche can and must be treated 'as philo-
sopher', although the success of both their enterprises depended on a severely reductive domestication of the term 'philosopher' itself. At least Danto feels that Nietzsche can be 'reclaimed as a predecessor' by the analytic movement, whereas Andrew Bowie clearly finds no reason to be (however patronisingly) so well-disposed towards him. In his *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche*, Bowie makes what are in many ways illuminating and helpful parallels between Nietzsche, especially the early Nietzsche, and the idealist and romantic traditions - but again, like Henry, he badly overstates his case. He begins by dwelling on *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, which he reads (with evident distaste) as 'an eclectic amalgam of many of the ideas we have looked at so far' (p. 221) and finds 'remarkably banal in relation to the inspiration and rigour of its philosophical ancestors' (p. 223), indeed 'tawdry, compared with the Idealist and Romantic philosophers'. Bowie then goes on to read even the later Nietzsche as merely an overrated epigone of Schelling, Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer: Nietzsche's only original contribution is that he 'continues aspects of Romanticism to their extreme' (p. 250f.), but by doing so he just unhelpfully re-problematises questions which his predecessors had already gone a great deal further towards answering. Where Heidegger reads Nietzsche as but the last (if heroic and challenging) thinker of metaphysics, Bowie reads him even less generously as but the last (confused) thinker of idealist and romantic aesthetics.

We must return to Henry, for at the opening of her long chapter on *À la recherche* in *Marcel Proust* she is prepared to give Proust more credit than we saw above:

Son coup de génie est d'avoir réussi à tirer une situation romanesque cohérente d'un système esthétique, d'en avoir scrupuleusement métamorphosé en structures scéniques chaque article démonstratif, créant une formule moderne où la théorie, dans son cas le criticisme romantique, constitue le sol de l'imaginaire.
Even here, though, it is clear that Henry can adopt her more charitable position only at the expense of denying Proust his originality, and that she imagines him sitting in his bed surrounded not by a welter of 'paperoles' and the fresh exercise books in which he was writing *A la recherche*, but rather by those old ones which he had used at school and university for taking notes from the philosophy classes of Darlu, Boutroux and Séailles, from which he then worked as if from a blueprint, taking their ideas and 'scrupulously metamorphosing' them into his novel.* Yet Proust's narrator never ceases to emphasise that in the process of artistic creation it is the ideas which come second - and we have no need to suspect his integrity here.* For Proust, as indeed for Nietzsche, 'l'imaginaire' is 'le sol de la théorie', and not the other way round.*

The line of argument which I am isolating in Henry's *Marcel Proust* is the one which Tadié highlights as 'la thèse essentielle de cet ouvrage capital', and which he counters with: 'aucun essai philosophique, aucune synthèse idéologique ne peuvent faire naître un roman: ils le paralyseraient plutôt'.* In turn, though, Descombes makes a more nuanced and defensible interpretation than Henry's the central claim in his study: 'le roman proustien est plus hardi que Proust théoricien. Par là je veux dire: le roman est philosophiquement plus hardi, il va plus loin dans la tâche que Proust assigne au travail de l'écrivain (éclaircir la vie, éclaircir ce qui a été vécu dans l'obscurité et la confusion).* Descombes' claim - itself an (unconscious?) elaboration on Genette's earlier (and much-quoted) observation: 'On pourrait dire de Proust ce qu'on a dit de Courbet, que sa vision est plus moderne que sa théorie' - takes the gap between the achievement of Proust's novel and the mere exposition or 'reproduction' of philosophical ideas, which Henry also
discerns but regrets and seeks ineffectually to excuse, and turns the greater philosophical sophistication of the novel into a positive benefit.71 Where Jacques Bersani bemoans the 'volumes inutiles' of Proust criticism produced by writers who have ignored 'la règle d'or fermement rappelée par Georges Blin: "L'expérience d'un homme reste inséparable des termes dans lesquels il en a rendu compte"',72 in this study I shall follow Descombes's line, arguing that the novel itself goes beyond the explicit philosophical statements contained within it, though I shall argue that this movement away from received philosophical ideas is also at the same time a movement in Nietzsche's direction.

Henry herself, as we have seen, later surreptitiously fills in what she had earlier analysed as a theoretical 'confusion' or aporia in Schopenhauer with the Nietzschean concept of the 'eternal return' - and quite rightly, as I shall attempt to show in Chapter 3, where, via Gilles Deleuze's emphasis on the 'difference and repetition' in Proustian 'essences', I shall argue that the complicated temporality of involuntary memory does indeed map the eternal return.73 Not that 'éternel retour' and 'nihilisme' are the only Nietzschean concepts which Henry anachronistically attributes to Schopenhauer - in the case of 'perspectivism', too, Nietzsche, for Henry, merely 'repeats' or 'confirms' Schopenhauerian subjective idealism.74 She concludes her portrayal of the Schopenhauerian Zeitgeist in late nineteenth-century France by noting:

La concurrence de Nietzsche à partir de 1890 ne nuit évidemment pas à la diffusion de ces idées [schopenhauériennes] destinées à supplanter celles qui pendant trois siècles ont justifié analyse introspective, classification des passions, lumière intérieure de la conscience, etc. Sa surenchère ne fait que les renforcer en rappelant violemment quel gouffre sépare deux pensées dans le plus simple raisonnement ou combien l'existence est tragique.75

For Henry, then, Nietzsche is just a Schopenhauerian 'surenchère', and she ignores Nietzsche's entirely different and radically innovative understanding
of 'the tragic sense of life', which he spells out in the 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik' of 1886 precisely in order to distance himself from his own early Schopenhauerianism:


The at times abject pessimism of many of the pronouncements made by Proust's narrator in *A la recherche* is undeniable, and Beckett, another profoundly Schopenhauerian reader of Proust, makes much of them in his study, but I shall read the kind of 'redemption' which the narrator achieves in *Le Temps retrouvé* - salvation in affirmative self-reinterpretation - as precisely such a peculiarly Nietzschean 'pessimism of strength', a strength which the narrator, like Nietzsche, derives by overcoming his earlier, more Schopenhauerian position. Interestingly, this is a conclusion which Henry herself ultimately cannot resist, and just as she rounds off *Marcel Proust* on a Nietzschean note, so in the upbeat ending to her *Proust* she admits the assertiveness of the final pages of *A la recherche* and chooses to close on an explicitly Nietzschean parallel:

Et il y a quelque chose de nietzschéen dans ce défi que jette au Temps, devant ce spectacle cruel, un homme seul conscient dans cette foule d'être juché comme les autres sur de tremblantes échasses, empilement des années - un homme qui voit le positif dans le négatif et accepte courageusement. 77

b) After Henry: Julia Kristeva

Julia Kristeva is the most recent commentator to compare Proust with Schopenhauer, in the chapter 'Proust philosophe' of her *Le temps sensible: Proust et l'expérience littéraire.* She (acknowledgedly) draws heavily on Henry (cf.
p. 309n. 1, pp. 316-25), although she also follows Descombes in distancing herself from the reductiveness of Henry's approach, in seeking to rescue and celebrate the specificity of Proust's achievement:

Des recherches concernant la formation philosophique de Proust révèlent l'importance que le philosophe allemand [Schopenhauer] a eue pour le jeune écrivain et pour le narrateur d'À la recherche, sans pour autant imposer la doxa d'un 'système' Schopenhauer-Schelling dans lequel Proust se serait miré toute sa vie. La spécificité de l'expérience proustienne s'éclaire davantage lorsqu'on tente de la dissonier du sol philosophique qui la nourrit mais dont elle se sépare. (p. 317f.; cf. p. 329f.)

At this point, however, she immediately goes on to substitute for 'la doxa d'un "système" Schopenhauer-Schelling' a similar binary of her own: 'les lignes majeures de son expérience [...] révèlent d'une part la présence massive de Schopenhauer par le biais de Séailles et, d'autre part, une connivence surprenante avec la lucidité de Gabriel Tarde' (p. 318; cf. p. 327). What she gains by nuancing Henry's methodology, she loses by actually narrowing down the 'resonances' (p. 327) of Proust's work in comparison with Henry, whom she is still following here despite seeking to imply that a recognition of the influence of Tarde on Proust is her own idea.²⁹

Kristeva's reading goes beyond Henry's in that she at least places her emphasis on Proust's creative response to Schopenhauer, and draws attention to the ways in which he develops both neo-Platonic and romantic aesthetics in the interest of his own purposes as novelist - specifically, his anchoring of idealist aesthetics in the material and the instinctual for the purpose of characterisation. Her reading of the Proustian narrator's responses to music is particularly persuasive here, and contrasts markedly with Anne Henry's interpretation of these passages as an ultimately (and necessarily) unsuccessful attempt on Proust's part to synthesise the Schellingian and Schopenhauerian systems. For Henry, Proust begins by opening his rather
well-thumbed copy of his trusty Schopenhauer, from which he then faithfully
transcribes, whilst at the same time adding in some embellishments of his
own in an effort to synthesise Schopenhauer and Schelling. Except that
these 'variations personnelles' turn out to be gleaned from Pater; but even by
'[mêlant l'apport de Pater et de Schopenhauer' Proust still meets with 'les
inévitables heurts théoriques'. Kristeva stresses a different kind of
'disloyal' departure from Schopenhauer:

De manière plus perfide, Proust mélange le sacré musical aux perversions érotiques. [...] L'hypostase romantique et idéaliste de la musique se trouve ainsi rabaissee, sinon battue en brèche. Du même mouvement, le culte musical s'enracine dans les drames de l'érotisme et obtient une réalité toute humaine. [...] Déviant de l'interprétation romantique, Proust se l'approprie et la sature par l'intensité aussi bien que l'inanité des drames sexuels.

The move which Kristeva perceives Proust to be making here takes him far
beyond simply tinkering with a Schopenhauerian aesthetic model or blueprint,
for it entails a rejection of the basis for that aesthetics in the Kantian
'disinterestedness' of aesthetic contemplation.

This move, I would argue, is precisely the one which Nietzsche makes, as
he rejects the Kantian-Schopenhauerian roots of his own early work, especially
_Die Geburt der Tragödie_. In his 'Le détour', Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe comes
to a conclusion about _Die Geburt der Tragödie_ which is surprisingly similar to
Anne Henry's claim about the passages on music in Proust: 'Mais on peut considérer que _La naissance de la tragédie_ n'est après tout que le commentaire ambigu de cette unique proposition de Schopenhauer [that music is the
'unmittelbares Abbild' of the Will], jamais admise sans réserves mais jamais
non plus vraiment contestée'. But even if we leave aside Paul De Man's
riposte to Lacoue-Labarthe that _Die Geburt der Tragödie_ is no such thing,
and if we also leave aside Nietzsche's 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', in which
he seeks retrospectively to justify his 'stammering' first-born on a number of
counts, it is clear at least by the time of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* that Nietzsche has reached a very different analysis of aesthetic experience. He announces the break programmatically in the opening section of this latter work, declaring the superiority over previous metaphysics of (and, implicitly, his conversion to) 'die historische Philosophie [...], welche gar nicht mehr getrennt von der Naturwissenschaft zu denken ist', since:

nach ihrer Erklärung gibt es, streng gefasst, weder ein unegoistisches Handeln, noch ein völlig interesseloses Anschauen, es sind beides nur Sublimierungen, bei denen das Grundelement fast verflüchtigt erscheint und nur noch für die feinste Beobachtung sich als vorhanden erweist. (MA I, 1)

Nietzsche stresses the basis of this new philosophy in the natural sciences so as to ensure that his new conception of 'sublimation' is not confused with previous (Kantian) aesthetics of the 'sublime' but instead recognised as a metaphor taken from chemistry (hence the title of this section: 'Chemie der Begriffe und Empfindungen'). In subsequent texts this overt enthusiasm for the scientific model (the enthusiasm of a new convert) will be considerably dampened as Nietzsche seeks to elaborate a more 'fröhliche Wissenschaft', but the importance which is given here to a historical ('genealogical') method will remain in place, and above all the emphasis here on the drives and their sublimations will become central to Nietzsche's deconstruction of the subject, which I shall address in detail in Chapter 3. That Nietzsche's 'Trieblehre' entails a complete rejection of Schopenhauerian aesthetics is apparent from the following passage in *Götzen-Dämmerung*, where he mischievously uses Schopenhauer's express enthusiasm for Plato in order then precisely to use Plato (an unwonted ally!) to 'refute' him:

Schopenhauer spricht von der Schönheit mit einer schwerwiegenden Glut [...]. Insbesondere preist er sie als Erlöserin vom 'Brennpunkte des Willens', von der Geschlechtlichkeit - in der Schönheit sieht er den Zeugtrieb verneint.... Wunderlicher Heiliger! Irgend jemand widerspricht dir, ich fürchte, es ist die Natur. [...] - Glücklicher-
weise widerspricht ihm auch ein Philosoph. Keine geringere Autorität als die des göttlichen Plato (— so nennt ihn Schopenhauer selbst) hält einen anderen Satz aufrecht: daß alle Schönheit zur Zeugung reize — daß dies gerade das proprioium ihrer Wirkung sei, vom Sinnlichsten bis hinauf ins Geistigste... (GD, IX, 22)

For Proust, then, as Kristeva demonstrates, aesthetic experience is a profoundly 'interested' activity, but Kristeva denies herself the possibility of recognising a Nietzschean parallel in this, for she follows Henry in treating Nietzsche as merely a conduit for Schopenhauerian ideas. And whereas Henry finds the need to impute unacknowledgedly Nietzschean notions to Proust's philosophical mentors in order adequately to explain his continued 'allegiance' to their systems, for her part Kristeva, crucially, makes use of one in order to explain Proust's divergence from them. Under the guise of using Tarde to offset Proust's Schopenhauerianism, Kristeva finds that she can only mediate between the two by resorting to 'la volonté de puissance':

L'imagination comme volonté révélée, comme essence du monde, assure la gravité de l'expérience car elle assouvit le désir de pouvoir. Si, par mon imaginaire, je suis le monde, par-delà le moi pensant et avec la sensation Je est tout. La volonté de puissance se réalise dans la démesure d'un panthéisme jubilatoire, douleur et enthousiasme, blasphème et gloire. Cependant, au sein d'un être ainsi capté, se déroule la mise en scène de l'Opinion, c’est-à-dire de la société qui se désagrège dans une compétition d'images. Le lien, religere, n'est que calque, imitation, somnambulisme. Sur la scène sociale, toute volonté de puissance — psychologique, amoureuse, clanique, politique — se trouble et se disperse comme un mirage. Le lien social est illusion; les croyances, des hypnoses résistantes. (p. 327f.)

If we begin to analyse the extraordinary number of convenient conceptual slippages in this passage, we can discern as its starting point a wholly distorted reading of Schopenhauerian subjective idealism, where 'volonte' is immediately replaced by 'volonté de puissance' — in other words, Schopenhauer becomes transformed into Nietzsche. In the third sentence of this passage (aside from the reference to 'panthéisme'), Kristeva in effect helpfully reinterprets in terms of Nietzsche's later philosophy the Dionysian experience
as portrayed in his *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, as though she were doing Nietzsche the favour of writing a second potted 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik' which reintegrates his earlier work even more effectively into his corpus as a whole. This interpretation of 'Schopenhauer' allows Kristeva then to move on to a 'Tardean' redefinition of 'un Etre ainsi capté' which — not surprisingly, given that she interprets 'la scène sociale', too, in terms of will to power — bears more than a passing resemblance to Nietzsche's empirical hypothesis. Now Nietzsche does not conceive will to power as an 'Etre' — in fact quite the opposite, as an eternal, agonal 'Werden' — but Kristeva acknowledges this position with her 'compétition d'images' which, translated into Nietzschean (and leaving behind the context of society and its 'Opinion', which Kristeva uses here in order to prise open and pluralise the unity of the Schopenhauerian will) becomes the conflict between perspectives which is the world as will to power (as interpretation). The genealogical unmasking of 'le lien social' as 'illusion', of 'les croyances' as 'des hypnoses résistantes', complements this Nietzschean interpretation; even the theatrical metaphor of the 'mise en scène' is Nietzschean — in section 78 of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Nietzsche writes of 'die Kunst, sich vor sich selber "in Szene zu setzen"' as a strategy for denying the 'foreground perspective' of the drives ('das Nächste und Gemeinstе'). But Kristeva is not only using a Nietzschean vocabulary without recognising that she is doing so; she also uses it without recognising what it means, and elides 'la volonté de puissance' with 'le désir de pouvoir'. Hence her claim: 'Sur la scène sociale, toute volonté de puissance [...] se trouble et se disperse comme un mirage.'

There is not space here to analyse in such detail the rest of Kristeva's account, and all the modulations through which her at once banal and gross misreading of Nietzsche passes in quick succession as she misguidedliy charts
the course of 'la volonté du monde' (p. 328) qua 'la volonté de puissance' through modernity. As 'volonté de puissance sociale' it is the form of alienated 'jouissance': 'Qu'il soit maître ou esclave, l'homme social rétrécit son intimité, se ferme à l'expérience et devient un enjeu des forces productives, du capital ou de la surenchère des images' (ibid.) — here Kristeva ignores Nietzsche's non-dialectical reading of the master/slave dynamic and reaches instead for the Marxist model in its specifically French inflections. As 'une volonté de puissance sur l'Opinion', it is apparently how all 'les successeurs allemands des romantiques ont infléchi la volonté de l'Être et pour l'Être' (ibid.). Most sinister of all, though, is Kristeva's claim: 'Pendant que les progrès techniques parvenaient à réaliser la volonté de puissance humaine sur la nature, la soif de domination sur les autres a imprégné tous les totalitarismes de notre siècle' (p. 329). In the face of such interpretations it is hardly surprising that the ghost of 'Nietzsche's Nazism' cannot be laid — the only surprise is to find Kristeva perpetuating it, however much we may charitably ascribe her choice of vocabulary here to a piece of inadvertence. Heidegger may have devoted much deliberation to the question concerning technology, and recent 'eco-friendly' Marxism may have stressed Marx's critique of the alienatingly technological appropriation of nature by bourgeois capital, but Nietzsche's task, on which I shall expand in Chapter 3, was also '[dlen Menschen nämlich zurückübersetzen in die Natur' (JGB 230). In its final modulation, will to power in Kristeva's account becomes 'une volonté de puissance dans la société sur l'Opinion' (p. 329), the (political, ideological, sociological, philosophical) realisation in our time of 'la recherche de jouissance' — which latter, for good measure (unless I am doing him a grave injustice myself), Stephen Bann interprets as French Freud tout court and translates as 'pleasure principle'.

3
Henry's and Kristeva's readings, though extreme in their avoidance of possible parallels with Nietzsche in Proust, are nevertheless typical of Proust criticism in general, which has consistently either ignored or denied such a possibility. (The main exception here is Deleuze's *Proust et les signes*, which is so thoroughly steeped in Nietzsche, as we shall see in the next section, that Deleuze chooses to obliterate the fact entirely - prompting Kristeva to a further, this time more comical display of critical myopia, when she repeatedly dismisses Deleuze's reading as *platonisant.* ) A covert use of Nietzschean vocabulary is not peculiar to the readings of Henry and Kristeva, either. Vincent Descombes refers repeatedly to Proust's 'renversement des valeurs' in an extra-Nietzschean context, and indeed his chapter on Proust's narrator 'Dans l'atelier d'Elstir' develops many further unacknowledgedly Nietzschean themes beyond those found in the chapter 'L'Optique des esprits' to which I have already referred. 'Proust conçoit l'impressionnisme comme un renversement des valeurs' Descombes writes here, and follows this with an analysis on *ne peut plus nietzschéen*:

La peinture impressionniste opère donc bien un renversement de valeurs, qui comprend, comme il se doit, deux temps: le temps nihiliste de l'égalisation de toute chose (il n'y a pas de choses plus ou moins précieuses) et le temps créateur de l'imposition d'une nouvelle table des valeurs (tout le prix est dans les regards du peintre). [...] La leçon que Proust tire de la peinture impressionniste est que le peintre exerce une souveraineté sur le visible. C'est lui qui assigne les rangs, les places, les dignités, en fonction d'un principe hiérarchique qu'il institue souverainement.

In the next section I shall turn to look at studies in which the comparison between Proust and Nietzsche has been rather more overt.
Introduction

II. Nietzsche and Proust: Towards a Comparative Study

Although the possibility of a Proust/Nietzsche connection has in general met with silence from Proust critics, nevertheless there are many sporadic hints in its direction to be found en passant in the work of critics with otherwise very different agendas. Firstly there are those early critics favourable to Proust's novel who in order to promote it do no more than cite Nietzsche together with a few other 'greats' with whom Proust merits compare (which itself testifies to the rapidity with which Nietzsche's reputation had become established). Thus Maurice Rostand, one of the earliest reviewers of A la recherche writing on Du côté de chez Swann in 1913, is already granting Proust membership of a 'fraternité sacrée': 'Fraternité étrange qui unit de Vinci à Goethe, Platon à Nietzsche, Dostoiewski à Shakespeare.' 1 Edmond Jaloux follows suit in 1923, though with a rather different list which comprises the moralistes, Stendhal, Constant, Dostoyevsky, George Eliot, Meredith, Henry James and Nietzsche. 2 Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle, finally, stresses the distinctly modern character of Proust's greatness (and in turn testifies to a perception of Nietzsche in England as already passé by 1931): 'we must recognise in Proust, it seems to me, one of the great minds and imaginations of our day, absolutely comparable in our own time, by reason both of his powers and of his influence, to the Nietzsches, the Tolstois, the Wagners and the Ibsens of a previous generation.' 3

Secondly there is the somewhat dubious tradition of Proust criticism in which an apparently apposite Nietzschean dictum is marshalled, or a sweeping general comparison is made, in neither case to very great effect. Edith
Wharton, for example, writes that 'Nietzsche's great saying, "Everything worth while is accomplished notwithstanding" [trotzdem], might serve as the epitaph of Proust.' Pierre F. Quesnoy's intention may be well-meaning, but the meaning of the chronology in his comparison seems to be feeling not at all well: 'As for that effort towards spontaneity, that quest for purity and sincerity, that desire to revise values and particularly the moral values that originate in the thinking of Nietzsche - Proust was one of the architects behind it all.' Milton Hindus blunders towards a comparison, though it turns out to be hardly worth his effort:

Nietzsche remarks somewhere in Zarathustra that he should not be able to believe in a god who did not dance. It would also be hard to take with the utmost seriousness a writer who did not condescend now and then to make his reader laugh. Proust presents no difficulties upon this score. He wants to enrich, but also to entertain.

Richard Macksey has to construe both Nietzsche and Proust as neo-Hegelians in order to argue: 'Like Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, Proust develops a pathetic (not an intellectual) dialectics, grounded in the moment: from perceptive immediacy to ecstatic immediacy. The Absolute is conceived more as intensity (of suffering or joy) than as totality: more as immediacy than as mediation.' Finally in this category there is Pierre Zima's interesting aside: 'Comme chez Nietzsche, dont la pensée joue un rôle important dans les romans de Proust, Musil et Hesse, l'ambivalence se substitue à l'ambiguïté dans la littérature romanesque moderne.' As I have argued elsewhere, I think Zima is essentially right here, although his attribution of an 'important role' to Nietzsche's thinking in Proust's novel is made quite unsubstantiatedly, and indeed it begs the question which this study is seeking to address.
Critical Convergences

If we turn now to Nietzsche (and Nietzsche-inspired) criticism, we find that the prospects for a Nietzsche/Proust comparison are much more promising, although the material is not to be found in studies of Nietzsche's reception by or influence on French writers: Geneviève Bianquis makes no mention of Proust in her *Nietzsche en France*; nor does Pierre Boudot in his more recent *Nietzsche et les écrivains français 1930-1960*, despite an opening chapter entitled 'Avant 1930: Panorama'.

Broadly speaking, there has been a discernible movement within Nietzsche criticism over the last thirty years to reinfuse Nietzsche with the kind of danger which more immediately post-war readings had (understandably enough) sought to deny. In the wake of the interpretations of Nietzsche given by writers such as Bertram and Ludovici, Oehler, Bäumler and Rosenberg - or after the War, and from a quite different ideological perspective, Lukács - it was indeed necessary to carry out some urgent repair-work on Nietzsche's reputation, to re-claim Nietzsche's merits, and the task was variously undertaken: in Germany by Thomas Mann and the 'three Karls' (Jaspers, Löwith and Schlechta), by Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink; in Britain by Frederick Copleston and F.A. Lea; in America by Kaufmann above all, but also by Danto, as we have seen, and (later in his career) Erich Heller; in France by Albert Camus, Geneviève Bianquis and Jean Wahl. 'Nietzsche: The Story of a Human Philosopher' came to a rather abrupt close, though, with the various 'New Nietzsches' which began proliferating in the 1960s, particularly in France and subsequently the United States.

In the last twenty years this movement has been matched by a similar one in Proust criticism. For all the earlier efforts of Maurice Blanchot and
in the early 1970s Philippe Sollers and Serge Doubrovsky can still quite justifiably state their comparable programmes for a reading of Proust (projected and actual, respectively) in terms of a provocatively forceful innovation:


Je crois qu’on a trop esthétisé, aseptisé Proust. J’aimerais lui rendre sa charge agressive, lui restituer sa violence.

For Sollers A la recherche itself, for Doubrovsky the received wisdoms about it, are just so many 'conceptual idols' which, to speak with Nietzsche, it is now necessary to question 'with a hammer' (cf. GD, 'Vorwort'). Malcolm Bowie follows more Doubrovsky's lead in 1978 with his revaluation of 'the profoundly unsettling view of human sexuality' enshrined in the three inner volumes of A la recherche.' And most recently, the critico-epistemic break which Margaret E. Gray seeks to enact with her Postmodern Proust requires her to repeat Doubrovsky's 'geste indécent' as she charts the 'misreading of Proust's audacity through previous generations of Proust critics, stressing their 'resistance to the daring of Proust's text'.

It is on this new 'audacious' Proust that a comparison with the new 'dangerous' Nietzsche finds its greatest purchase, even if till now, with the notable exceptions of Bataille and Paul de Man, the critical movements giving birth to these monsters have been largely out of phase. As early as 1943, Bataille's L'expérience intérieure includes a lengthy 'Digression sur la poésie et Marcel Proust' within its chapter on Nietzsche; Sur Nietzsche: Volonté de chance (1945) is also peppered with references to Proust, and Nietzsche even makes an appearance in the Proust section of La littérature et
le mal (1957). But Bataille’s work, to which I shall be returning periodically in the course of this study, has unfortunately found few resonances in later Proust criticism (hence, for example, Sollers’ injunction to read it in 1971), and although French Nietzscheans belatedly acknowledged its richness after the publication in 1970 of the first volume of Bataille’s Œuvres complètes, any Proustian context was invariably lost.

By contrast with the vicissitudes of Bataille reception, de Man’s immensely sophisticated interpretations in his Allegories of Reading (1979), on the one hand ‘allowing the [Proustian] text to deconstruct its own metaphors’, on the other demonstrating the reversibility of the rhetorical structures in Nietzsche’s ‘über Wahrheit und Lüge’ essay, have blazed the trail for a line of deconstructive Proust criticism which places the emphasis on rhetorical models for self-reflexivity – reading, interpretation and metaphor – and culminates in David R. Ellison’s The Reading of Proust. But Ellison’s only reference to Nietzsche comes when he cites Derrida, in ‘La mythologie blanche’, citing Nietzsche’s (in)famous passage on truth as ‘ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern […]’, which he in turn nuances before applying it to Proust by setting it against a Ricoeurian moment of ‘metaphore vive’. As a whole, Ellison’s argument here is couched in terms of (the later) de Man’s metaphorical binary of ‘blindness’ and ‘insight’, yet de Man’s Nietzsche has been replaced by a Nietzsche only dimly discernible through an accretion of new mediations.

Ellison’s study begins, like Gray’s after it, by pointing to the new tradition of Proust criticism ‘against the grain’, and he poses a version of the question towards which I have been moving here, especially in my above analyses of Henry and Kristeva:

If, according to these recent critical assessments, the Recherche is a
work whose antiquated idealist conception does not do justice to its far more 'modern' praxis, the curious reader might well wish to know, Is there a modern theory more adequate than Proust's own, more compatible with the intricacies of the novel's rhetorical displacements?26

But where Ellison frames his rhetorical question in terms of rhetorical displacements, and then goes on to explore The Reading of Proust in the light of competing rhetorical models, my aim in this study is rather to take the same premise and look at a number of other—specifically Nietzschean—ways in which Proust's "modern" praxis' can be reconceptualised. In the second half of Chapter 4 I shall unbracket Gray's particular mise entre guillemets of the term "modern" by developing what I shall in turn call a "postmodern" 'logic of the future perfect' in A la recherche, and arguing that it maps a similarly pervasive temporal structure in Nietzsche, a logic of 'untimeliness', which I shall have considered in the first half of the chapter.

Deconstructing Derrida's 'Proust'

In the wake of de Man, it is surprising that more has not been made of a Nietzsche/Proust link by others of the major Nietzschean post-structuralists. Jacques Derrida's only real engagement with Proust comes in his response to Jean Rouset's Forme et Signification,27 the 1963 essay 'Force et signification' which he strategically placed at the opening of L'écriture et la différence in order to mark his distance from the structuralist paradigm. Derrida's use of Proust here is highly problematic, to say the least, for although the essay as a whole is an attack on the reductiveness of Rouset's structuralist methodology, in the cases of Proust and Claudel Derrida is prepared to give Rouset's readings a good deal of credit because he argues
that they merely reinforce the metaphysics inherent in the texts which he is addressing: 'l'esthétique proustienne et l'esthétique claudélienne sont accordées en profondeur avec celle de Rousset.' On examination, however, this claim turns out to be based exclusively on a reading of Rousset, since Derrida gives no other evidence for 'Proust's metaphysics' than those passages from *Le Temps retrouvé* which Rousset himself quotes. The circularity of the argument is inescapable, and its flaw is particularly evident when Derrida is claiming to write of 'Proust lui-même':

Chez Proust lui-même - la démonstration qui nous en est donnée ne laisserait à ce sujet aucun doute si l'on en gardait encore - l'exigence structurale était constante et consciente, qui se manifeste par des merveilles de symétrie (ni vraie ni fausse), de récurrence, de circularité, d'éclaircissement en retour, de superposition, sans adéquation, du premier et du dernier, etc. La téléologie, ici, n'est pas projection du critique, mais thème de l'auteur. (p. 38)

Derrida quotes Rousset's claim that the structure of *A la recherche* as a whole is perfectly circular, and that the 'narrator' and the 'hero' coincide at the end of the book, which allows him to proceed to a comparison of Proust's novel with the organicist 'préformisme' of Hegel's *Phenomenology* (p. 38f.). Yet the 'teleology' of *A la recherche*, I would suggest, bears a greater resemblance to the path towards 'becoming himself' which Nietzsche traces when he re-reads his previous works in *Ecce Homo*, for it, too, is a second-order, 'second-reading' teleology which is imposed only retrospectively by Proust's narrator at the climax of *Le Temps retrouvé*. The oxymoronic character of a 'retrospective teleology' is reflected in the narrator's ambivalence at this point - 'Ainsi toute ma vie aurait pu et n'aurait pas pu être résumée sous ce titre: Une vocation' (TR, IV, 478) - and the fact that he compares his life not to a ripening seed but to 'cet albumen qui est logé dans l'ovule des plantes et dans lequel celui-ci puisse sa nourriture pour se transformer en graine' merely confirms the inappropriateness of Derrida's invocation of the
'logos spermatikos' (p. 39). On this 'reading' of 'récurrence', 'circularité' and 'retour' in Proust's novel, Derrida ought strictly to tax Nietzsche, too, with incorporating a structuralist metaphysics in his doctrine of the eternal return.

In Chapter 4 I shall argue (contra Rousset) that the conclusion of *A la recherche* hinges precisely on the non-coincidence of 'narrator' and 'hero' (indeed the impossibility of their coincidence), but for the moment it is sufficient to note that, in the case of Proust, Derrida unfortunately never escapes the parameters of the kind of reading which, elsewhere in 'Force et signification', he is so keen to attack. 'Cette esthétique qui neutralise la durée et la force, comme différence entre le gland et le chêne, n’est pas autonome chez Proust et chez Claudel. Elle traduit une métaphysique' (p. 40), Derrida continues, quoting Proust's narrator's pronouncements on the metaphysics of involuntary memory, but his uncritical acceptance of Rousset's Proust means that he fails to acknowledge any disparity between such reflections and Proust's own achievement as a novelist. Where Rousset himself opposes 'le vrai Proust' to 'Proust romancier', Derrida is content simply to deride Rousset's positive evaluation of the former (p. 43), and he leaves unexplored the potential in the latter for subverting the neat self-sufficiency of Rousset's 'ultra-structuraliste' account.

It is Derrida's methodological slippage in this essay which leads him to discount Proust as a 'metaphysical' writer and to banish him from his own preferred canon (ironically, the essay concludes on a stirringly Nietzschean note), so that when he returns momentarily to Proust in 'Freud et la scène de l'écriture' it is in order to contrast Proustian metaphysics with the radical novelty of the Freudian 'trace' in its 'Nachträglichkeit':

La métaphore du chemin frayé, si fréquente dans les descriptions de
Freud, communique toujours avec le thème du retardement supplémentaire et de la reconstitution du sens après-coup, après un cheminement de taupe, après le labouret souterrain d'une impression. Celle-ci a laissé une trace travailleuse qui n'a jamais été perçue, vécue dans son sens au présent, c'est-à-dire en conscience. Le post-scriptum qui constitue le présent passé comme tel ne se contente pas, comme l'ont peut-être pensé Platon, Hegel et Proust, de le réveiller ou de le révéler dans sa vérité. Il le produit.\(^\text{31}\)

It is extraordinary that Derrida should seek to oppose Freud and Proust here, when his description of 'le labouret souterrain d'une impression' - couched, let us note, in terms of Nietzsche's 'mole' (cf. M, 'Vorrede', 1) - accords so well with the 'nachträglich' effect of the Proustian 'impression'. In the case of Proust, at least, Derrida is right to undermine his own argument by prefacing his list with a 'peut-être', for if he had been prepared to treat Proust, too, with the indulgence he grants Freud over 'Nachträglichkeit' - 'le thème, formidable pour l'histoire de la métaphysique, que Freud nous appelle à penser à travers une conceptualité inégale à la chose même'\(^\text{32}\) - he might have found him a rather more conducive thinker.\(^\text{33}\)

In the case of Derrida it is particularly surprising that he should not want to address Proust, given one of the emphases of his recent work, in which his thinking on the gift has taken an explicit turn towards temporality. *Donner le temps 1. La fausse monnaie\(^\text{24}\)* is devoted to a typically sparkling analysis of one of Baudelaire's *Petits poèmes en prose*, 'La fausse monnaie', and Derrida questions what Baudelaire's narrator might mean by 'mon misérable cerveau, toujours occupé à chercher midi à quatorze heures' in the light of 'la forme logique et chronologique de l'impossible simultanéité de deux temps, de deux événements séparés dans le temps et qui donc ne peuvent être donnés en même temps'.\(^\text{35}\) Understanding 'l'impossible simultanéité de deux temps', the time given to the narrator in the experience of involuntary memory, is of course the focus of some of the most crucial passages in Proust's novel, yet
Derrida makes no mention of Proust (or, for that matter, Gide's Les faux-monnayeurs), and concentrates instead on Baudelaire. In my Chapter 4, by contrast, I shall use the temporality of Derridean différence, the 'don sans présent' which emerges from his analysis of Baudelaire, to argue that such a temporality is precisely what is at stake in Proust's 'problematic present'.

Sarah Kofman's references to Proust are, like Derrida's, extremely rare, and from the long footnote in L'enfance de l'art which she devotes to glossing a series of passages from Le Temps retrouvé by way of comparison with Freud, it is clear that she, like Derrida, and unlike a considerable number of other writers who have fruitfully explored the relationship between Proust and Freud, finds little that is challenging in the novelist: 'Proust semble être, plus que Freud, tributaire de la logique traditionnelle du signe. De plus, une transcription volontaire du passé ne le "joue" plus. Les processus primaires inconscients ne doivent plus intervenir. Dans ce cas peut-on encore parler d'oeuvre d'art?' However, this does not prevent Serge Doubrovsky in turn from privileging Proust's novel - which he argues demonstrates 'l'indépassable vérité' of the Freudian structure of neurosis - over (Kofman's reading of) Freud's occasional claims that 'la "création artistique" évite la névrose et sert de substitut à une cure psychanalytique'.

The most overt moves towards a Nietzsche/Proust parallel within Nietzsche(-inspired) criticism have been made not by French but by American Nietzscheans. In 1985, Erich Heller advances the claim:

It is a chronological mishap that Nietzsche could not know Proust. He who excitedly discovered for himself Stendhal and Dostoevsky would have deeply and critically appreciated Proust's enchanted and all but monstrous attempt to recall the wholeness of a life's experience: A la recherche du temps perdu.

But it is Alexander Nehamas's Nietzsche: Life as Literature, published in the same year as Heller's essay, which has undoubtedly been most influential in
alerting Nietzsche criticism to possible affinities with Proust. Nehamas follows George D. Painter, in the second volume of his seminal Proust biography, by taking as the epigraph for his book: 'Et je compris que tous ces matériaux de l'oeuvre littéraire, c'était ma vie passée' (TR, IV, 478). In the main body of the book he goes on to discuss Proust in several contexts, notably when arguing that Proust's novel provides the best model for Nietzsche's ideal of self-creation and for the eternal recurrence:

The model for the eternal recurrence is [...] not to be found in Nietzsche's superficial reflections on thermodynamics but in his deep immersion in writing. In thinking of his ideal life on the model of a story, we would do well to think of it in the specific terms supplied by Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*.

I shall address in Chapter 3 the important implications here for Nietzsche's and Proust's aesthetics of self-creation, as well as the arguments of Richard Rorty, who in his *Contingency, Irony, Solidarity* takes up where Nehamas leaves off and views both writers as paradigmatic figures within our 'ironist culture'. For the moment let us note that Nehamas has been followed by a number of other Nietzsche commentators who also explore parallels with Proust of this kind - Gary Shapiro, Alan White and, most recently, Genevieve Lloyd.

**Explicating Deleuze's Proust**

One thinker remains to be addressed whose work has done most to prepare the way for this study, Gilles Deleuze, whose pioneering *Nietzsche et la philo-sophie* of 1962 was followed in 1964 by the first edition of his equally pioneering *Marcel Proust et les signes* (in later editions simply *Proust et les signes*). In neither book does he even mention the other writer, yet the implicit bridge between them which his readings construct has in many ways
served as my starting point. I mentioned above that in Le monde sensible Julia Kristeva gives a wholly inaccurate representation of Deleuze’s Proust et les signes, and it is with an analysis of her mistake that I shall conclude this introductory overview of previous criticism in the field.

Pointing out that in Proust’s novel, ‘au travers des “idées” et des “signes”, c’est encore le tissage des impressions que l’écrivain recherche’, Kristeva proceeds to an appraisal of Deleuze as follows: ‘La magnifique lecture que Gilles Deleuze a proposée de Proust met l’accent sur la dématérialisation que ces signes infligent aux personnes réelles auxquelles ils renvoient, et le philosophe y voit la preuve d’un platonisme proustien.’ In a footnote she elaborates: ‘Proust et les signes […] privilégie le rôle des “signes” et des “idées” de Platon dans l’art “sériel” de Proust. Alors que plus vraisemblablement l’idée devant laquelle s’incline Le Temps retrouvé rappelle celle de Winckelmann, via Schopenhauer et ses interprètes français.’

This last insight, the ‘correction’ of Deleuze, is, as one might suspect from my earlier analysis, borrowed directly from Henry. Kristeva’s earlier references to Deleuze’s reading of Proust in a number of other contexts have already made her antagonism towards it abundantly clear; she then reasserts the ‘Platonism’ of Deleuze’s reading later on, as she prepares to move into her ‘Schopenhauerian’/’Tardean’ model: ‘Pas plus qu’elle ne se réduit à Platon comme le veulent Curtius et Deleuze, l’expérience proustienne ne coïncide avec la pensée de Schopenhauer’.

Ernst Robert Curtius was the critic who first coined the term ‘Proust’s perspectivism’, although this apparently progressive Nietzscheanism is indeed sold short as his Marcel Proust veers off course into a straight Platonic conclusion. To link Deleuze with Curtius as Kristeva does, though, is precisely to miss the specificity of Deleuze’s own more successfully Nietzschean negotiation of ‘Proust’s
Kristeva's repeated references to "signes" in the first section of her 'Proust philosophe' are evidence enough that its main agenda is in fact an attack on Deleuze, specifically Deleuze's privileging of 'les signes de l'Art' over 'les signes sensibles' in the typological hierarchy of signs in *A la recherche* which he establishes from the opening chapter of his study. In a book which more than any other since Jean-Pierre Richard's *Proust et le monde sensible* seeks to anchor the experiences of Proust's narrator in the sensible world, it is no surprise that Kristeva strenuously and repeatedly inverts Deleuze's hierarchy, as in the following three paragraph openings:

Proust ne cesse de 'déchiffrer', mais son monde n'est pas fait de 'signes'. En tout cas, ce ne sont pas des signes-mots ni des signes d'idées, encore moins des signifiants ou des signifiés.

Contrairement à ce qu'on a pu croire, ce ne sont pas des 'signes' mais des 'impressions' que Proust recherche et déchiffre.

Univers de signes? Non. Plénitude repliée de différences, la musique est l'Etre. Elle est la nature.

The last passage is particularly instructive here, for not only would 'plénitude repliée de différences' be an excellent definition of Nietzsche's world of will to power, but Kristeva seems here to be trying (unwittingly?) to use Deleuze to argue against himself. 'Repliée' is a word which itself is replete with Deleuzian resonances, and nor is it just in his *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque* that Deleuze develops them, for in *Proust et les signes* he is already borrowing - and, as I shall argue below, developing in an important way - the neo-Platonists' 'mot profond' 'complication'. In fact Deleuze would have no trouble in holding both the positions Kristeva mutually opposes, 'univers de signes' and 'plénitude repliée de différences', for that is precisely what he does hold: 'Qu'est-ce qu'une essence, telle qu'elle est révélée dans l'œuvre d'art? C'est une différence, la Différence ultime et
absolue' (p. 53). The similarity between Deleuze's and Kristeva's (Deleuzian) responses to their respective questions here is hardly surprising, since both are glossing the same passage, the passage from *La Prisonnière* (P, III, 781) on the narrator's reaction to hearing Vinteul's septet ('Le monde des différences n'existant pas à la surface de la Terre [...]'). The difference between their responses, though, is that it is Deleuze and not Kristeva who already goes beyond an ontologising (Platonic, Schopenhauerian, Heideggerian, etc.) reading - he, it should be noted, capitalises 'Différence', not 'Etre'.

This initial characterisation by Deleuze of Proustian 'essences' is but the prelude to his breathtakingly original analysis of them, for at this point in his study it now becomes clear that his account initially privileged 'les signes de l'Art' only because of the world of 'essences' to which they give access. We need to follow Deleuze as he goes on to make a number of moves in characteristically quick succession, the first being to question the extent to which 'Proust est leibnizien' (p. 54), taking his cue from an apparent Proustian monadology. Deleuze reads this Leibnizian solution as but 'une première approximation de l'essence' for Proust, since he also recognizes the importance of 'les textes où Proust traite les essences comme des Idées platoniciennes et leur confère une réalité indépendante' (ibid.). Here again, though, Deleuze immediately qualifies this Platonism, enlisting the help of the terms 'explication' and 'implication' (cf. pp. 25, 109, 140f.) in order better to describe this subjacent order of essences: 'Ce n'est pas le sujet qui explique l'essence, c'est plutôt l'essence qui s'implique, s'enveloppe, s'enroule dans le sujet' (p. 56). The neo-Platonism of such vocabulary is then explicitly acknowledged, and he focuses on the other dimension of neo-Platonic 'expression', 'la complication, qui enveloppe le multiple dans l'Un et affirme l'Un du multiple' (p. 58).
As Ronald Bogue points out in his penetrating reading of Proust et les signes, 'the concept of expression' is 'a concept implicit throughout Deleuze's reading of Proust', although its (for Deleuze) Spinozistic specificity will only be fully developed in his later Spinoza et le problème de l'expression. But the decisive move in Deleuze's analysis of Proustian essences comes when he in turn complicates the neo-Platonic/Spinozistic notion of complication - when 'l'essence est en elle-même différence' (p. 62) modulates into: 'différence et répétition sont les deux puissances de l'essence, inséparables et corrélatives' (p. 63). It is at this point that the Nietzschean outline of Deleuze's interpretation emerges, for difference and repetition, as Deleuze himself has already argued in Nietzsche et la philosophie, are conjointly the modes of both the eternal return and of will to power:

C'est pourquoi nous ne pouvons comprendre l'éternel retour lui-même que comme l'expression d'un principe qui est la raison du divers et de sa reproduction, de la différence et de sa répétition. Un tel principe, Nietzsche le présente comme une des découvertes les plus importantes de sa philosophie. Il lui donne un nom: volonté de puissance.

It is in this sense, I would argue, that the primacy of hypostatised (but immanent) Proustian 'essences' in Deleuze's account can be best understood - the sense, indeed, of his definition of Nietzschean 'essence' in Nietzsche et la philosophie: 'l'essence est seulement le sens et la valeur de la chose; l'essence est déterminée par les forces en affinité avec la chose et par la volonté en affinité avec ces forces'. It is in this sense that 'essence precedes existence' - just as Deleuze in Nietzsche et la philosophie addresses 'L'essence du tragique' (pp. 19-22: 'L'affirmation multiple ou pluraliste, voilà l'essence du tragique' (p. 19)) before 'Le problème de l'existence' (pp. 22-25) - even if Nietzsche's 'übermensch' also demonstrates a more 'Sartrean' possibility.
In *Différence et répétition* itself, Deleuze will later develop his thinking on what are for him increasingly crucial categories, and Paul Patton, in a recent reading of this text significantly entitled 'Anti-Platonism and Art', provides an excellent demonstration of the way in which the kind of project which Deleuze elaborates in *Différence et répétition*, where he defines the task of modern philosophy as being precisely a 'renversement du platonisme', takes its cue from Nietzsche's understanding of an 'umgedrehter Platonismus' - an 'Umdrehung' which is both an inversion and an overturning.

In *Proust et les signes*, the emphasis on difference and repetition in Proustian essences becomes a full-blown Nietzschean semiotics of (will to power as) interpretation. Again, though, Kristeva fails to appreciate Deleuze's subtlety here, since the site she chooses for contesting his interpretation is absurdly inapt: the body. Quoting from Proust's important essay 'Contre l'obscurité' (CSB 390-95), she writes:

> L'écriture devrait être en quête d'une expression physique, vitale, rebelle à la quiétude des signes policés: 'le vigoureux et expressif langage des désirs et des muscles, de la souffrance, de la chair pourrissante ou fleurie.' Des accents romantiques apparaissent ici, qui éloignent l'écritain de la sémioleogie, du platonisme, et le rapprochent d'une 'philosophie' dynamique, instinctive.

This time Kristeva at least acknowledges her borrowing from Henry with a footnote, but if we recognise that 'la sémioleogie, [le] platonisme' is Kristeva's (at this point still undeclared) shorthand for *Proust et les signes*, it becomes clear that, instead of recognising the Nietzschean accent in Deleuze's account, which is in fact surprisingly faithful to Proust's early formulation, she wants to argue that Deleuze's misguided reading of Proust spirits away the body in a puff of neo-Platonic smoke.

Let us analyse next, then, what Deleuze actually says about the body in Proust, a passage which comes at the end of his chapter on 'Le pluralisme dans
le système des signes' :

Il n'existe pas de choses ni d'esprits, il n'y a que des corps: corps astraux, corps végétaux... La biologie aurait raison, si elle savait que les corps en eux-mêmes sont déjà langage. Les linguistes auraient raison s'ils savaient que le langage est toujours celui des corps. Tout symptôme est une parole, mais d'abord toutes les paroles sont des symptômes. 67

This is not yet the 'Body without Organs', 68 but nor is it a platonisant semiotics - rather, a Nietzschean one bearing all the hallmarks of Deleuze's semiotic reading of Nietzsche (and in general the new French readings of Nietzsche which Deleuze's Nietzsche et la philosophie did so much to inspire):

'Un phénomène n'est pas une apparence ni même une apparition, mais un signe, un symptôme qui trouve son sens dans une force actuelle. La philosophie entière est une symptomatologie et une séméiologie.' 69 Such is Deleuze's reading of 'Le sens' in Nietzsche, which is his generalisation on the basis of a passage in Götzen-Dämmerung:


Kofman follows Deleuze's lead in her Nietzsche et la métaphore, where she complements Deleuze's emphasis on this passage by drawing attention as well to a further metaphorical characterisation of the task of the genealogical philosopher: to occupy himself with deciphering 'die ganze lange, schwer zu entziffernde Hieroglyphenschrift der menschlichen Moral-Vergangenheit' (GM, 'Vorrede', 7). 70 When Deleuze writes in his Proust et les signes, immediately before the passage quoted above: 'Nous ne sommes pas physiciens ni métaphysiciens: nous devons être égyptologues [...]. Tout est impliqué, tout est compliqué, tout est signe, sens, essence. Tout existe dans des zones obscurtes
ou nous pénétrons comme dans des cryptes, pour y déchiffrer des hiéroglyphes et des langages secrets', he is understanding Proust's figure of the 'égyptologue' not in the sense of Anne Henry's 'tombeau égyptien', but in Nietzsche's. The passage in which he addresses this figure is itself in any case immediately preceded by a direct (if unacknowledged) Nietzsche paraphrase: 'Nous avons tort de croire aux faits, il n'y a que des signes. Nous avons tort de croire à la vérité, il n'y a que des interprétations'. Deleuze, I would argue, reads the 'dématérialisation' in Proust (of 'tous ces matériaux de l'oeuvre littéraire') not in the name of a Platonic metaphysics, but rather in the name of Nietzschean will to power - a heritage which is also displayed by the most prominent of our contemporary Nietzschean 'immatérialistes', Jean-François Lyotard, when he writes: 'L'énergie est immatérielle. L'esprit et le corps de l'homme n'échappent pas à cette analyse. L'homme ne serait rien sans le flux continu d'interactions qui relie l'homme et les choses.'

So what remains of Deleuze's 'Platonising' reading of Proust? At the end of the section 'L'image de la pensée', with which the first edition of Marcel Proust et les signes as a whole concluded (and which echoes the similar section title in Nietzsche et la philosophie, 'Nouvelle image de la pensée'), Deleuze returns to Plato, though the operations he has by now performed on Platonic i/Ideas mean that there can be no 'retour à Platon' in Curtius's sense, or even an 'Aufhebung' of Plato. Not that one would immediately sense this, for instead Deleuze baldly reasserts: 'Proust est platonicien'. What happens next is twofold: firstly Deleuze produces, as if out of a hat... semiotic Plato: 'Le Banquet, le Phèdre et le Phédon sont les trois grandes études des signes' (p. 123). Then, by stressing Proust's humour, specifically Proust's 'humour juif contre l'ironie grecque' (p.
he prises Proust and Plato apart one last time to reach a grand Nietzschean climax:

Nous avons vu comment cette différence avec le platonisme en entraînait beaucoup d'autres. Il n'y a pas de Logos, il n'y a que des hiéroglyphes. Penser, c'est donc interpréter, c'est donc traduire. Les essences sont à la fois la chose à traduire et la traduction même, le signe et le sens. Elles s'enroulent dans le signe pour nous forcer à penser, elles se déroulent dans le sens pour être nécessairement pensées. Partout le hiéroglyphe, dont le double symbole est le hasard de la rencontre et la nécessité de la pensée: 'fortuit et inévitable'. (p. 124)

The only element in this picture for which I have not yet provided a Nietzschean parallel is the last, on which I shall elaborate in Chapter 3, comparing Nietzsche's conflation of chance and necessity in the 'self-styling' response of the 'übermensch' to the eternal return ('amor fati') with Proust's forging of the chance occurrences that are involuntary memories into 'les anneaux nécessaires d'un beau style'.

The fate of *Marcel Proust et les signes* (1964) itself is an interesting one, for in the second edition, *Proust et les signes* (1970), the earlier essay is 'supplemented' (with all the Derridean force of the term) by a long new section entitled 'Antilogos', and again in the fourth edition (1976) by a shorter piece on 'Présence et fonction de la folie: L'araignée'.\(^{78}\) Margaret Gray has perceptively noted:

*Proust et les signes*, through successive revisions and additions, presents an increasingly postmodern Proustian text [...]; the inquisitive, desiring *Bildungsroman* hero of the 1964 edition has, by 1976, become an absent postmodern character, himself a baffling and baffled effect of the text's 'antilogos'.\(^{79}\)

While agreeing with her verdict on the 1976 edition, I would nevertheless argue that she underplays the originality of the 1964 edition in order to emphasise the contrast, for the *Bildungsroman* presented in the first edition is far removed from *Wilhelm Meister*. When Deleuze writes: 'les "hommes supérieurs" ne lui apprennent rien: même Bergotte ou Elstir ne peuvent lui
communiquer aucune vérité qui lui éviterait de faire son apprentissage personnel', it would seem to me that the 'Bildungsroman' he has in mind is Also sprach Zarathustra (cf. Z, IV, 'Vom höheren Menschen') - which ends, let us not forget, under the sign of 'Das Zeichen' (Z, IV).

If any more proof were needed that Deleuze's interpretation of Proust is not a Platonic one, then the very title of his new 1970 section, 'Antilogos ou la machine littéraire', certainly provides it. Here he takes up the remark made at the end of the previous edition ('Il n'y a pas de Logos, il n'y a que des hiéroglyphes') and develops Proust's opposition to Platonism in an even more overtly Nietzschean manner: 'Partout Proust oppose le monde des signes et des symptômes au monde des attributs, le monde du pathos au monde du Logos'. This opposition, as Deleuze formulates it, is crucial to Nietzsche's conception not only of what he calls the 'pathos of distance' (cf. JGB 257; GM, I, 2; AC 43), but of will to power as a pathos, too, which Deleuze recognises when in Nietzsche et la philosophie he quotes Nietzsche's note: "La volonté de puissance n'est pas un être ni un devenir, c'est un pathos". In 'Antilogos', then, Deleuze's interpretations of Proust and Nietzsche continue to overlap, and here again he follows a trajectory from Plato to Nietzsche similar to the one which I outlined above: 'Nous avons vu pourtant qu'il y avait un platonisme de Proust' is followed by 'Mais une différence évidente intervient', which again leads on to a consideration of Proust's Leibnizianism (p. 133), a reprise of the semiotic Plato (p. 135), a more explicit comparison with Spinoza (p. 135f.) and an attention to 'complication' (p. 141), leading to a paraphrase of another key Nietzschean notion, that of (will to power as) 'un pur interpréter' (p. 155).

The tenor of 'Antilogos', though, is indeed different from the earlier parts of Deleuze's book, for his trajectory now passes beyond Nietzsche -
through Freud (pp. 170f., 192) and Kafka (pp. 158-60), a writer who will become increasingly important to him, and up to... Deleuze and Guattari.

The successive stages of (Marcel) *Proust et les signes*, I would argue, bear the traces of Deleuze's own philosophical genealogy, and it is in 'Antilogos' that distinctively 'Deleuzoguattarian' (the term is Bogue's) elements begin to emerge - especially their thinking on the 'maching', as signalled by Deleuze's subtitle and developed in his section on (what became in the third edition (1975) the separate chapter entitled) 'Les trois machines' (pp. 174-92), where Proust's 'instants privilégiés' become 'l'effet d'une machine littéraire' (p. 184). Although the final section (chapter) is devoted to an analysis of style, Deleuze's interpretation here is carried out in non-Nietzschean - indeed anti-Nietzschean - terms ('jamais le style n'est de l'homme, il est toujours de l'essence (non-style)': p. 200f.), just as in the later 'Présence et fonction de la folie: l'Araignée' he develops both 'folie' and 'araignée' - which earlier might both have given him Nietzschean points of departure - in a quite different context. In this last essay the pathos/logos binary reappears - 'Charlus, maître du logos' (p. 208) is opposed to the 'pathos' of his discourse (p. 209) - but the narrator-spider is now 'un énorme Corps sans organes' (218), and by 'madness' Deleuze now means his and Guattari's own specific articulation of 'la conscience moderne de l'anti-logos' (p. 158), 'l'univers schizolide' (p. 210).

Unfortunately it is not just Kristeva who has misrepresented Deleuze's *Proust et les signes*, for although there has been general agreement that it is one of the most important works of Proust criticism to have appeared, nevertheless a number of other Proust critics have been quick to distance themselves from it. In 1971 both Jacques Bersani and Jean-Yves Tadié published collections of excerpts from previous criticism, attempting to give an
overview of the history of Proust reception to mark his centenary, and both reproduce sections from the 1964 edition of Marcel Proust et les signes. Bersani describes the first edition as "capitalissime", and he himself adopts Deleuze's characterisation of *A la recherche* as an 'apprentissage des signes', but he is less convinced by 'Antilogos', which he finds 'beaucoup plus discutable'. Tadié again acknowledges *Proust et les signes* as 'un des meilleurs ouvrages sur Proust', but is evidently unsure as to quite what to make of it:

"son auteur réussit ce tour de force de paraître tenir sur *A la recherche du temps perdu* un discours qui n'avait jamais été tenu: il faudra rechercher si cette nouveauté est due à des découvertes dans l'œuvre, ou à la projection sur celle-ci d'une philosophie qui n'est pas la sienne, si Deleuze dévoile Proust, ou si ce dernier vient occuper, comme un voyageur, un compartiment de la pensée deleuzienne."

Tadié recognises the anti-Platonism of Deleuze's Proust (p. 182), and also anticipates Kristeva by making a parallel of his own between Deleuze's reading and Merleau-Ponty (p. 182f.), but he nevertheless isolates 'un Proust "leibnizien"' (p. 181) as characteristic of Deleuze's account, and ends his assessment both more patronisingly, by implying that, after all, Deleuze's 'sémiologie de Proust' (p. 183) merely reflects a critical fad, and more apodictically, with the remark: 'Ce que le philosophe peut découvrir dans la *Recherche*, c'est, en définitive, victoire ou limite, l'image de la pensée' (p. 183).

Tadié reprises his commentary in 1983 for the 'Bilan critique' section of his *Proust*, where he is still referring to *Proust et les signes* (1964, 1970) and seems unaware of the expanded 1976 edition.

Where Proust criticism has in general found the later editions of *Proust et les signes* an embarrassment, with Deleuze criticism the situation is reversed. Tadié's doubt, formulated in 1971, as to whether in the end Proust 'vient occuper, comme un voyageur, un compartiment de la pensée deleuzienne'
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- a question which is left unresolved, as he omits the passage from his 1983 Proust - is only possible in the wake of the emergence of a distinctively Deleuzian project in 1968, when he began speaking 'davantage [...] pour son compte',** and the focus in Deleuze criticism, understandably enough, has been on Différence et répétition, Logique du sens and beyond. So Constantin V. Boundas's recent Deleuze Reader contains only (a translation of) 'Présence et fonction de la folie: l'Araignée' as representative of Deleuze's work on Proust,** and in the recent spate of publications on Deleuze as he is 'launched' in the Anglo-American world, none of the others addresses his Proust et les signes at all.** Even Ronald Bogue quotes Bersani's disapproval of Deleuze's later material and seems to want to distance himself from such assessments by 'Proust scholars',** before proceeding to give an excellent interpretation which is yet based on the first edition alone, relegated to a moment in the development of 'Deleuze before Guattari'. André Colombat also bases his account of Proust et les signes on (Robert Mauzi's review of) the first edition:** like Bogue, Colombat notes some of the Nietzschean co-ordinates of Deleuze's study, especially the Nietzschean sense in which Deleuze insists on the primacy of interpretation in Proust's novel,** but he himself insists on Proust's (neo-)Platonism - for Colombat, it is Deleuze's reading alone which effects its 'renversement'.** Like Bogue, Colombat reads Proust et les signes as a staging-post in the development of Deleuze's thought - as itself 'tourné vers le futur et les progrés de l'apprentissage' - except that, unlike Bogue and Michael Hardt, he does not see Deleuze as following an 'Apprenticeship in Philosophy', and it is his strong emphasis on the continuities in Deleuze's work which allows him to read Deleuze on Proustian time in conjunction not with his account of the eternal return in Nietzsche et la philosophie,** but with Le bergsonisme.**
Conclusion: Some Methodological Principles

The study which follows, then, is an attempt to build on the kind of parallels between Nietzsche and Proust which have been established - more or less tentatively and implicitly - by Bataille and Deleuze, de Man, Nehamas and others. Even though in each aspect of my exposition Nietzsche precedes Proust, mindful of all Kaufmann's caveats about 'Nietzsche and X' studies I have attempted to give not just a reading of Proust's novel in the light of the great (late-)Nietzschean themes - perspectivism and interpretation, will to power, eternal return, the 'übermensch' - but also a reading of Nietzsche which attends to the eminently Proustian problematics of involuted temporality and involuntary memory, the experience of transcendence ('moments bien-heureux') and the status of 'essences'.

In Proust's case I have used examples from the correspondence, notebooks and other (published and unpublished) writings where appropriate, although I have essentially limited myself to *A la recherche* itself, and indeed I have concentrated on the experiences and self-analyses of Proust's narrator within the novel. In Nietzsche's case, although I fully accept Bernd Magnus's point that the *Nachlaß* should be treated with great caution, I freely acknowledge having drawn on unpublished notes throughout this study, especially when seeking to trace the chronological development of Nietzsche's ideas, since the critical edition provided by Colli and Montinari has at last allowed this kind of operation to be attempted (even if Colli himself rather absurdly places a ban on using any Nietzsche quotations in the service of one's own exegeses).

As has already been indicated, this is no influence study. What scope there is for a 'positivistic' comparison of the two writers is explored in
Chapter 1, where I consider the surprising amount Proust actually wrote about Nietzsche, in *A la recherche* and elsewhere, and focus on the theme of friendship, which is Proust's chosen terrain for his most extended engagement with the philosopher. In Chapter 2 I first examine Nietzsche's perspectivism in the context of his persistent reformulation of Pilate's question 'What is truth?', before going on to deal with the central issue of 'Proust's perspectivism', arguing that it is not just aesthetic contemplation which for both, as we saw in the first part of this Introduction, is a profoundly 'interested' activity, but also cognition itself. Chapter 3 takes some more, central themes: an elaboration on Nietzsche's deconstruction of the self and an analysis of some of Proust's descriptions of his narrator's self-fragmentation lead via a consideration of 'Proust's idealism' to a discussion of the status of the body for both, especially in the 'mystical' moments of Dionysian ecstasy and involuntary memory, and of the way in which both attempt to resolve the question of the self through an aesthetics of self-creation. In my final chapter I then seek to break open the apparently hermetic circularities of Preacher and Noosed ('circulus vitiosus deus' (JGB 56)/'les anneaux nécessaires d'un beau style' (TR, IV, 468)) by stressing the asymmetries of temporal structure in the two writers' 'logics of the future perfect'. 
Chapter 1. Proust's Nietzsche

'I was struck to find many more traces of Nietzsche in Proust than assumed'.
(de Man, p. 103n. 1)

In this chapter I shall mainly be examining 'Proust's Nietzsche' within *A la recherche* itself, the image which Proust gives of Nietzsche in the novel and his function within it, the ideas and attitudes he is made to represent. Before turning to *A la recherche*, though, I shall briefly consider Nietzsche's early reception in France, the milieu of early French Nietzscheanism in which Proust moved, and then the ways in which Nietzsche figures in Proust's writings in the period leading up to the novel, in his earlier published writings as well as in his correspondence. Proust's German was not good enough for him to read Nietzsche in the original, but in the last decade of the nineteenth century there was an explosion of interest in Nietzsche in France which resulted in the rapid translation into French of the majority of his works and the dissemination of some, at least, of his main ideas within Parisian intellectual circles.

This success was one which Nietzsche never knew during his philosophically active lifetime, for initially his work was very slow to be translated into any other language, and in the case of French this was particularly distressing to a writer who, as we have seen, set such store by French writers and culture in general. The first French translation of a work of Nietzsche's to be produced was a version of *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* in 1875 (cf. KGB II/5, 39f.) by Marie Baumgartner-Köchlin (mother of one of Nietzsche's students in Basel, the historian Adolf Baumgartner), but despite the efforts of Nietzsche's Chemnitz publisher Schmeitzner, and of his friend Malwida von Meysenbug, no publisher was found for it (cf. KSA 15, 61). Undeterred,
Baumgartner went on to translate Richard Wagner in Bayreuth in 1876, and although again no Parisian publisher was found, this time Schmeitzner himself agreed to publish it, and it appeared in early 1877 - to Nietzsche's evident delight (cf. KGB II/5, 218) - as the first of his texts in French, indeed the first translation into any language. The reception and corresponding impact of the book were severely limited by its being published in Germany, though - Geneviève Bianquis reports that its readership was restricted to the Suisse romande - and no significant amount of interest in Nietzsche among French readers materialised. Baumgartner's Richard Wagner à Bayreuth was then followed by a long hiatus and was to remain the only work of Nietzsche's to appear in French translation until the end of his intellectual career in 1889.

Nietzsche's increasingly desperate attempts to arrange French translations for his works during the year before his breakdown may have proved fruitless in the short term, and in a questionnaire on Franco-German cultural relations published by the Mercure de France in 1895 Nietzsche is mentioned only four times, but in an equivalent questionnaire in 1902 the number has leapt up to twenty-three. Nietzsche was by now 'in the air', and as André Gide writes in the Lettre à Angele dated 10 December 1898: 'l'influence de Nietzsche a précédé chez nous l'apparition de son oeuvre'. Yet at the same time translations were appearing by this stage, and one of the principal reasons for the rise in Nietzsche's reputation was the series of articles and translations produced by Henri Albert for the Mercure de France. But even before he began his series in 1893, the second text of Nietzsche's to be translated into French had appeared the year before. Since Nietzsche's reputation in Paris was above all as a Wagnerian apostate who went mad (and the two were linked), it is hardly surprising that the second work of Nietzsche's to be published in French should have been Der Fall Wagner. It is also appropriate since it is
the text which Nietzsche himself was keenest to see translated into French, and he repeatedly emphasises it in the correspondence as being the text he believes will best appeal to a French readership."

**Nietzsche - Halévy, Dreyfus, Gregh - Proust**

The translators of *Le Cas Wagner* were the young Parisian Wagnerians Robert Dreyfus and Daniel Halévy, and what is especially interesting about these two in the context of the present study is that they were both very close friends of Proust's from his schooldays. 1892 is also the year, for example, in which Proust, Dreyfus and Halévy, together with a number of other friends (Fernand Gregh, Louis de la Salle, Jacques Bizet and Horace Finaly)" founded the journal *Le Banquet*. Looking back at the *Banquet* year in his *Souvenirs sur Marcel Proust*, Dreyfus notes that from its inception the journal was interested in proselytising for Nietzsche: 'À l'antipode de la *Revue blanche*, Maurice Pujo, dans l'*Art et la Vie*, lançait au Quartier Latin un néo-romantisme: son grand homme était le mystique Novalis. Au *Banquet*, le notre fut un autre poète et moraliste allemand, Frédéric Nietzsche'." The second issue was particularly noteworthy in this respect, as Dreyfus recalls:

> le n° 2 du *Banquet* 'fit sensation' grâce à un article intitulé *Frédéric Nietzsche*, qui projetait les premières lueurs qu'on ait reçues en France sur le philosophe-poète dont l'originalité parut aussitôt si forte et si émouvante: cet article, dû à la collaboration de Daniel Halévy et Fernand Gregh, était suivi de fragments de Nietzsche, traduits par les deux amis."

This issue came out in April 1892 and also contained a review and four 'études' by Proust (CSB 346-47; JS 38, 39, 40, 41-43). In subsequent numbers of *Le Banquet*, Dreyfus, Halévy and Gregh continued to beat the drum for
Nietzsche with a series of articles and reviews, while at the same time Proust continued to publish further 'études' and reviews, as well as a short story and a report on the proceedings of 'La conférence parlementaire de la rue Serpente'.

As Christopher E. Forth has pointed out, even before Albert's work began to have an impact on the Parisian scene: 'The efforts of the writers of Le Banquet and others contributed in mid-1892 to a noticeable Nietzsche vogue in Paris'. Whether or not Proust intended it to be the case, then, his 'débuts littéraires' were closely bound up with the fate of the foremost Nietzschean journal of the time. When Le Banquet folded in early 1893, Proust, Dreyfus and Halévy all moved over to La Revue blanche, each to continue publishing in a similar vein to before. Moreover, Proust also contributed to other journals and newspapers which carried pieces on Nietzsche over the same period (La Revue hebdomadaire, Le Figaro and especially the Mercure de France), while Halévy in particular contributed pieces on Nietzsche to other journals and newspapers which Proust read or contributed to (La Revue de Paris, L'Opinion, the Journal des Débats).

Proust's friendship with Halévy (1872-1962) dates back to their schooldays together at the Lycée Condorcet, and although, as Laurent Lesage writes, '[their friendship was not without its moments of tension; in fact even as schoolboys they seem to have had their differences]', their correspondence, published after Lesage's study was written, in fact begins with a love-letter which Proust wrote to Halévy during a school philosophy lesson (pace Henry!) in 1888 (CMP, I, 121f.). Their first literary collaborations date from the year before, on the magazine Lundi, which was followed in quick succession by the Revue de seconde, the abortive Revue verte and the Revue lilas (cf. CSB 868f.), and even after co-founding Le Banquet they continued for a while with
further collaborative projects: in the summer of 1893, Proust, Halévy, Gregh and de la Salle began an epistolary novel together after the manner of La Croix de Berny by Gautier et al. Halévy had discovered Nietzsche (Morgenröte) in 1891, and his series of Nietzsche translations and articles culminated in the publication in October 1909 of his biography of the philosopher (the first in French), La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche, a copy of which he sent to Proust.17

Nietzsche thus figured very largely in the intellectual concerns of Proust's circle of friends, and indeed his friends were among the prime movers in establishing Nietzsche's reputation in France, even if, as we shall see in the next section, his engagement with Nietzsche in his own writings is at this stage strictly limited.

Proust on Nietzsche Before *A la recherche*

Proust first mentions Nietzsche in the two obituaries he wrote for Ruskin in early 1900, published shortly after the latter's death on 20 January. In both cases it is Nietzsche's madness that Proust refers to, but in both cases his tone is nevertheless respectful. In the opening paragraph of the article 'John Ruskin' (CSB 439-41), he writes of Nietzsche's madness with an evident sense of loss felt on a European scale: 'Ruskin est mort. Nietzsche est fou, Tolstoï et Ibsen semblent au terme de leur carrière; l'Europe perd l'un après l'autre ses grands "directeurs de conscience"' (CSB 439). Then in 'Pèlerinages ruskiniens en France' (CSB 441-44) he goes further and turns Nietzsche's madness into a positive quality, a mark of 'wisdom': 'Ruskin est mort après avoir, dit-on, souffert comme d'une maladie mentale; car c'est une caractér-
These first two mentions show Proust respectfully, regretfully comparing Nietzsche to his cherished Ruskin, and ranging him alongside some of the other contemporary European 'greats'. By the same token, they are also significant in that Proust should choose to make his case for Ruskin's importance by yoking his name to that of a writer whose growing general recognition in France he is thus implicitly acknowledging. It is presumably on the basis of these mentions that Bernard de Fallois writes of 'Nietzsche, que Proust admira jadis, au temps des Plaisirs et des Jours'. In a letter of 15 January 1904 to Mme de Noailles it is still Nietzsche's madness which attracts Proust's comment, and the tone is this time (understandably) more informal, at once both more flattering in ascribing a 'superhuman' achievement to Nietzsche (and in using such a Nietzschean word to do so), and more bathetic in his description of Nietzsche's fate: 'Mais vraiment il semble que tous ceux qui ont été trop surhumains, qui ont commis le crime de Prométhée ou de Nabuchodonosor, doivent finir par manger de l'herbe comme Nietzsche [sic]' (CMP, IV, 38; cf. 39n. 7). (Proust's misspelling of Nietzsche's name here is not unusual for him - the same fate befalls 'Shopenhauer', for example, in Jean Santeuil and indeed even Nietzsche's early champions in France (or their typesetters) found themselves orthographically challenged by his name. Teodor de Wyzewa, author of one of the first French articles on Nietzsche (to which Dreyfus and Halévy's 'Frédéric Nietzsche' was largely a response), writes of 'la philosophie de Nietzsche', and Dreyfus and Halévy's translation of Der Fall Wagner also appeared as 'Frédéric Nietsche, "Le Cas Wagner"'.)

In another letter of 1904, this time to Robert de Montesquiou (CMP, VI,
353), Proust refers to the passage in *Ecce Homo* where 'Nietche' appraises the contemporary French literary-psychological scene (EH, II, 3): 'nous pouvons lire [...] dans Nietzsche qu'un siècle qui a produit (quelques écrivains de nos amis que je n'ose citer) est le plus grand de tous les siècles'.\(^2\)\(^3\) As Philip Kolb notes, the passage from *Ecce Homo* is quoted by Henri Lichtenberger, the author of the first French critical study on Nietzsche's philosophy,\(^2\)\(^4\) in his article 'La France et l'Allemagne jugées par Nietzsche', published in *La Revue de Paris* in 1900,\(^2\)\(^5\) which is where Proust must have read it, since *Ecce Homo* was not published in German until 1908, while Henri Albert's French translation did not then follow till a year later.\(^2\)\(^6\) Quoting Nietzsche at second hand like this, as we shall see, is Proust's standard strategy.

Undoubtedly the most intriguing reference to Nietzsche in Proust's correspondence comes in April 1909, when he is in the midst of work on his series of pastiches on the 'Affaire Lemoine'. Here, perhaps surprisingly, he promises Robert Dreyfus a (private) Nietzsche pastiche: 'entendu pour Nietzsche [sic!], quand j'irai mieux, mais pour toi seul' (CMF, IX, 75). Proust is responding to a recent article by Dreyfus in *Le Figaro*, in which he tells an anecdote about the assistant to the Parisian bookseller who had witnessed Lemoine's arrest, who himself had been unable to help an inquisitive reporter, answering him simply with:

>'M. Lemoine, qui est-ce?' étonné, notre confrère lui demanda s'il ne lisait jamais les journaux et reçut cet aveu nonchalant 'Non! je ne lis que des livres...' De fait, l'enfant tenait un volume de Nietzsche, qui semblait lui suffire et lui plaire. [...] A la série de Pastiches qu'il a si heureusement entreprise, M. Marcel Proust ne joindra-t-il pas bientôt quelques 'aphorismes' prétendus de Frédéric Nietzsche? - Souhaitons-le, pour notre plaisir, et pour l'édification du tranquille petit surhomme qui travaille chez M. Puzin, libraire.\(^2\)\(^7\)

Unfortunately the Nietzsche pastiche seems never to have materialised,\(^2\)\(^8\) so one can only speculate on what it might have been like, and on Proust's
reasons for not writing it despite his expressed intention of doing so. The latter are easier to reconstruct, and one need not read too much into the non-appearance of the piece, for by the summer of 1909 Proust was in any case rapidly going off the idea of pastiches and wrote to Dreyfus in July: 'Merde pour les pastiches!' (CMP, IX, 135). One can only regret its failure to materialise, for although there have been humorous treatments of Nietzschean themes over the years, and the 'Übermenschen' vogue of the 1890s in particular produced a number of parodies in response,²⁹ a piece by such a consummate pasticheur as Proust can only be sorely missed.

Apart from explicitly referring to Nietzsche, Proust is not averse to dropping the occasional Nietzschean term into his writings, too — 'surhumain' in the above passage being a case in point. More explicit is another example, again in the context of Ruskin, from his review of a monograph on the critic, first published on 2 January 1904 (CSB 478-81). Here he discusses a disagreement of Ruskin's with Goethe, taking the side of the former and arguing that one should not go over the top in praising Goethe's work, which after all has its limitations. Proust cites Wilhelm Meister in illustration of this last point, and characterises it here a little dismissively as 'human, all too human', as a corrective to the lavish praise bestowed on the work by Emerson and Carlyle, who saw it as containing 'toute la nature' (CSB 480): "Humain, trop humain", serions-nous tenté de redire devant ce livre admirable, sans nous soucier d'ailleurs de donner à ces mots insolents et sublimes le sens qu'ils gardent dans le livre qui les a rendus fameux' (CSB 480). Proust is right to note here that he is using the phrase in a rather different sense to Nietzsche, but while thus to a certain extent distancing himself from Nietzsche's formulation he is also prepared to recognise its power and appositeness.
Proust's references to Nietzsche in his writings outside of *A la recherche* are certainly relatively sparse, then, and his recognition of Nietzsche was undoubtedly muted in comparison with the enthusiasm of his friends, although it would be hard to deny that through those friends and their work he had a degree of contact with Nietzschean ideas. Still, Proust's familiarity with Nietzsche was no more than passing, and his conception of the philosopher is derived almost exclusively at second hand - which is why, if we turn now to *A la recherche* itself, we find what might charitably called a 'creative misrepresentation' of Nietzsche, verging on the wilful caricature. For reasons which I shall now seek to analyse, Proust here adopts a somewhat unusual angle on Nietzsche - he is mentioned most often in connection with the theme of friendship, for he is the favourite reading-matter of the narrator's one true friend, Robert de Saint-Loup. Indeed Proust sets up a whole constellation of themes within which Nietzsche is situated and which includes friendship, the characterisation of Saint-Loup, the relative values of the intellect and the imagination, the responsibility of the artist to his creative self, and finally Wagner. I want to tease out these various strands by analysing the passages where Nietzsche is explicitly discussed, and where we shall find Proust's judgement on him is invariably unfavourable. I shall argue, however, that Proust's opposition to Nietzsche amounts to little more than a prejudice based on insufficient knowledge, and that 'Proust's Nietzsche' is a rather hybrid creation of his own, a straw man.

That Proust was a committed Wagnerian is evident from *A la recherche* itself (cf. P, III, 664-67) and has been amply explored by Emile Bedriomo and others, so Nietzsche, the most vehement of anti-Wagnerians, had the dice
loaded against him from the start. Indeed Bedriomo echoes Enrico Guaraldo's argument that Proust's Wagnerianism was at least to some extent a consciously anti-Nietzschean position: 'Sostenere la causa di Wagner essendo a giorno della notissima polemica nietzschiana, significa difendere a viso aperto le ragioni dell'Estetismo'. As we have already seen, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth and Der Fall Wagner were the first two works of Nietzsche's to be translated into French, so at least as far as the Paris of the 1890s was concerned, Nietzsche's own prediction regarding his and Wagner's names was fulfilled: 'Das, worin wir verwandt sind, daß wir tiefer gelitten haben, auch aneinander, als Menschen dieses Jahrhunderts zu leiden vermöchten, wird unsre Namen ewig wieder zusammenbringen' (EH, II, 6). Except that the relation between the fortunes of Nietzsche and Wagner in Paris at that time was to a large extent one of inverse proportion. As Jacques Le Rider points out, the machinations of the Wagnerian anti-Nietzscheans such as Catulle Mendès, Judith Gautier and Gabriel Monod ensured that the Wagner vogue kept his erstwhile disciple turned renegade out of the limelight for over a decade, but on the other hand: 'L'étoile de Nietzsche monte à l'horizon des intellectuels français à mesure que celle de Wagner décline."

Proust's animus against Nietzsche, I would argue, stems principally from this pro-Wagnerian 'hidden agenda': it is largely responsible for the distortions in his image of the philosopher, and moreover when it comes to the surface it produces a contradiction. Whereas in general Proust criticises Nietzsche for placing too high a value on friendship, in the case of Wagner he criticises him essentially for not caring enough, and for precipitating the notorious split on the wrong grounds, a difference of opinion; Nietzsche is criticised both for having the friendship in the first place and then for abandoning it. In basing his criticism on a few biographical facts gleaned
from secondary reading, Proust chooses quite the wrong ground on which to pick
a quarrel with Nietzsche, for had he been able to look beyond such material
then he might have realised not only that Nietzsche’s views on friendship are
a good deal more complex and ambivalent than he gives him credit for, but that
in fact they have much in common with his own acknowledged ambivalence on the
question. In his own case Proust makes a distinction between his whole-
hearted practice of friendship and his theoretical objections to it; in
Nietzsche’s he fails to give him the benefit of the doubt, and in the latter
half of this chapter I shall discuss Nietzsche’s pronouncements on friendship
in order to point up their similarities.

What Use are Philosophers?

In all there are six passages in A la recherche where Nietzsche is referred
to, which is quite significant given that one of the most intriguing aspects
of the novel is the way in which, although he was phenomenally well read,
Proust rarely acknowledges his sources and mentions explicitly the past think-
ers he is addressing. Indeed a ‘league table’ of references to philosophers
in the novel reveals that the number of times Proust chooses actually to
mention them is comparatively tiny. Plato is mentioned most often, with ten
references; then come Pascal with eight; Nietzsche six; Socrates, Voltaire and
Kant five; Aristotle, La Rochefoucauld and Leibniz four;33 Diderot three;
Rousseau and Schopenhauer two; and a whole host on one including Descartes,
Spinoza, Hegel, Mill and Emerson. And that is in a novel of over 3,000 pages,
let us not forget. Even Bergson, the subject of such a large proportion of
the philosophical ‘Proust and X’ studies, is referred to in only one passage
of a couple of pages (SG, III, 373f.), where his views are related to the
narrator by an unnamed 'Norwegian philosopher' who reports an anecdote which
his colleague Boutroux said Bergson had told him about a colleague of his. In
other words Bergson's opinions are inferred via no fewer than three inter-
mediaries, enclosed in as many sets of brackets which Proust uses in order
deliberately to distance himself from a head-on engagement with a pre-
established body of ideas. And as if that is not enough, the narrator reminds
us that his friend is Norwegian and may have got the wrong end of the stick
anyway! Proust's sense of mischief is unmistakeable when he adds the rider:
'Je ne sais si cette conversation entre M. Bergson et M. Boutroux est exacte.
Le philosophe norvégien, pourtant si profond et si clair, si passionnément
attentif, a pu mal comprendre' (SG, III, 373).

This game of hide-and-seek is but an extreme case of the way in which
Proust plays with the reader when philosophers - and indeed any historical
figures - make an appearance in the fictional world of the novel, which has
such integrity and substance of its own that it is such elements from the
'real' world which have to excuse themselves and wipe their feet whenever they
tentatively make an entrance. Tadié describes this ploy particularly
effectively:

les personnages historiques n'occupent jamais dans la Recherche une
place de premier plan: ceux qui l'avaient dans de premiers états, on la
leur a ôtée. Loin de vouloir décrire directement la réalité, ou de
faire directement les Mémoires de Saint-Simon de son époque; loin
encore de confondre, comme il a été reproché à Balzac, l'art et la
réalité, Proust, ayant séparé l'art de la réalité, peut se permettre au
contraire ces incursions: elles raniment la force de persuasion de
l'imaginaire.

A la recherche is (among many other things) a novel of ideas, but its ideas
are not imported wholesale from outside and grafted on to the fictional world
by means, for example, of relatively artificial discussions between characters
(the narrator's literary discussion with Albertine (P, III, 877-83) is one of the rare exceptions). Proust is searching all the time to avoid the cliché, and for him the term extends to include all recognisably ready-made ideas from pre-existent philosophies, which he generally prefers to mention in passing rather than to engage with or combat directly. When Swann refers to 'la hiérarchie des arts' (CS, I, 96), the narrator does not subject this key aesthetic principle to philosophical scrutiny, but merely notes Swann's habit of taking an ironic distance from any such 'sujet important' through his intonation. Anne Henry has shown the extent to which Proust was schooled in nineteenth-century German aesthetics, but his text itself-withholds the evidence, and any putative connections remain obdurately beneath the surface.

One of the great strengths of Proust's novel, then—and the mark of his achievement in transforming Contre Sainte-Beuve into A la recherche as we know it—is the way in which the ideas which it presents grow out of the novelistic situations in which they are organically embedded. The corollary to this, though, is that philosophers and their pre-established positions are used primarily as no more than tokens, and Proust rarely goes further into any kind of discussion. Indeed his explicit engagement with Nietzsche is one of his most extended, for even though the statistical sample provided by my league table is far too small to yield results of any great value, nevertheless one can deduce from it a kind of inverse proportion operating in the novel between the number of explicit references Proust makes to a philosopher and the degree to which he approved of or could be said to have been 'influenced' by them. Proust mentions philosophers rather than using them, and yet by simply mentioning them he manages to put them to a variety of uses which serve his main interest as a novelist, the development of his narrative. Proust's tangential references to philosophers are subservient to this aim and
function in one of three ways: either they provide him with illustrative biographical anecdotes, or their philosophies serve as repositories of images, or their names are cited in support of characterisations.

An example of the first case is his use of Socrates, whose homosexuality is referred to repeatedly in the context of discussions of 'inversion', in *Sodome et Gomorrhe* and beyond (cf. SG, III, 18, 344; P, III, 710). Examples of the second case, of Proust's 'raiding' philosophies for good images, include his uses of Leibniz and Kant. The narrator likens the Parisian salons to monads (CG, II, 769), and describes how the pleasurable routine of having tea at Odette's is nevertheless dependent on an apparently whimsical, if in fact ritualistic, decision of Gilberte's: 'comme l'univers nécessaire de Kant, suspendu à un acte suprême de liberté' (JF, I, 497). Nor is it just the narrator who uses this technique: Swann also refers to Kant, making a throwaway comment on the First *Critique* (JF, I, 505), while Saint-Loup applies the Leibnizian notion of 'la richesse du monde des possibles par rapport au monde réel' to the art of military planning in Doncières (CG, II, 413), and later remarks: 'La guerre [...] n'échappe pas aux lois de notre vieil Hegel. Elle est en état de perpétuel devenir' (TR, IV, 331). Proust deliberately turns academic philosophy into casual metaphor, and the reductive effect of his cocktail-party wit here is one of comic incongruity between the loftiness of the metaphysical systems evoked and the banality of the objects of comparison.37

Proust's use of philosophers in the interest of characterisation can be divided into two types, according to whether it is the characters themselves who lay claim to a philosopher or the narrator who associates the two. He often pokes fun at a character's inflated self-image or pretentiousness by having him show off and name-drop philosophers - Brichot, the flat-footed
Sorbonne professor, chalks up a good many. Proust also uses this technique to highlight the philistinism and superficiality of salon life, as when the dowager duchesse de Gallardon manifests her ignorance by mixing up Aristotle with Aristophanes (CG, II, 739). In contrast with such gratuitous name-dropping by his secondary characters, Proust actually goes in the opposite direction when it comes to his narratorial analyses, and prefers to excise references if they threaten to be superfluous. Thus his one reference to Montaigne, who was also to have figured in the discussion of homosexuality (cf. SG, III, 950, 1810f.), is sacrificed, as are his allusion to the *Discours de la méthode* (TR, IV, 967) and two further references to Nietzsche in the context of Saint-Loup's reading *Also sprach Zarathustra*.

Otherwise, and more subtly, Proust makes familiarity with a particular philosopher into a character trait and 'attaches' philosophers to certain characters, usually by making them the character's favourite reading-matter. He trades on what he presumes will be the reader's knowledge of the figure in question, whose name is used metonymically to symbolise the philosophy as a whole, without its needing to be explicitly 'unpacked'. Thus Schopenhauer is mentioned only twice (TR, IV, 318, 569), each time in relation to Mme de Cambremer, who impresses the narrator by her knowledge of him. Nietzsche, too, is first used in the novel as such a symbol, but whereas Mme de Cambremer gains in intellectual respectability through her extensive knowledge of Schopenhauer, Dr Cottard on the other hand is described as intellectually lacking because he is unable to talk with his colleagues about Nietzsche and Wagner (JF, I, 425). Nietzsche is here a representative of the 'avant-garde', of 'progressive' thought, an example of a relatively demanding intellectual topicality. Someone who does make the grade intellectually is the narrator's friend Saint-Loup, and it is to their relationship that we must
now turn, to see 'Proust's Nietzsche' develop from a symbol into something rather more complex.

Robert (Fénelon Halévy) de Saint-Loup

Even before he arrives on the scene in Balbec, Saint-Loup's principal qualities are described to the narrator by his aunt (Mme de Villeparisis) as being 'intelligence' and a 'bon coeur' (JF, II, 87). The 'bon coeur' cuts him out for a close friendship with our hero, but his intellectualism, which is repeatedly stressed over the next few pages (cf. e.g. JF, II, 91), is what builds the main tension into their relationship. We saw him quoting Leibniz and Hegel above, although it is Nietzsche with whom he is more usually associated, and from the outset. The narrator's initial characterisation of Saint-Loup is as follows:

"Ce jeune homme qui avait l'air d'un aristocrate et d'un sportsman dédaignex n'avait d'estime et de curiosité que pour les choses de l'esprit, surtout pour ces manifestations modernistes de la littérature et de l'art qui semblaient si ridicules à sa tante; il était imbu, d'autre part, de ce qu'elle appelait les déclamations socialistes, rempli du plus profond méfi pour sa caste et passait des heures à étudier Nietzsche et Proudhon. C'était un de ces 'intellectuels' prompts à l'admiration qui s'enferment dans un livre, soucieux seulement de haute pensée. Même, chez Saint-Loup l'expression de cette tendance très abstraite et qui l'éloignait tant de mes préoccupations habituelles, tout en paraissant touchante m'ennuyait un peu. (JF, II, 92)"

The reason "'intellectuels'" is in quotation marks here is because it is a relatively new coinage in this substantive sense, first applied to a group of intellectuals who signed a Dreyfusard manifesto in 1898 (to which I shall return), although it evidently has a pejorative flavour, too. The narrator is at the point in his life where he is just beginning to leave behind the
seriousness of his youth and enter the superficial world of social frivolities and 'temps perdu', so Saint-Loup's earnestness is rather unwelcome to him. He explains how he would have preferred it if Saint-Loup had been prepared to tell him all about 'le roman démodé' of his father's life, but instead he is disappointed that his new-found friend 'se fût élevé jusqu'à l'amour de Nietzsche et de Proudhon' (JF, II, 92). 'Et pour ce qui était de moi,' he continues:

si je trouvais Saint-Loup un peu sérieux, lui ne comprenait pas que je ne le fusse pas davantage. Ne jugeant chaque chose qu'au poids d'intelligence qu'elle contient, ne percevant pas les enchantements de l'imagination que me donnaient certaines qu'il jugeait frivoles, il s'étonnait que moi [...] je pusse m'y intéresser. (JF, II, 93)

The relationship between Saint-Loup and the narrator is set up from the beginning in terms of a tension between philosophy and the novel, the intellect and the imagination, and Nietzsche is enlisted in each case on the side of the former, which is adjudged inferior. There is a certain disingenuous perversity about the narrator's criticisms of Saint-Loup here, though, for not only is he the one who always has his nose in a book until he arrives in Balbec and enters into adolescence ('l'âge ridicule', as he terms it, of which the main feature is that 'on n'y consulte pas l'intelligence' (JF, II, 89f.)), but also Proust himself (along with his Lycée Condorcet/Le Banquet friends Jacques Bizet, Robert Dreyfus, Fernand Gregh and Daniel Halévy) was one of the signatories to the 'Intellectuals' Manifesto'.

This ambivalence about Saint-Loup, the narrator's concern that his intellectualism in general and his intellectual interests in particular represent a barrier to their friendship, mirrors similar qualms Proust had over his relationship with his friend Bertrand de Salignac-Fénelon (1878-1914), one of his models for Saint-Loup, to whom he had been introduced by Antoine Bibesco in 1901 (cf. III, 1438). Fénelon is actually given a place
in *A la recherche* in his own right, rather later on, where we find the narratorial aside: 'moi-même [...] ayant pour ami le plus cher l'être le plus intelligent, bon et brave, inoubliable à tous ceux qui l'ont connu, Bertrand de Fénélon' (*SG*, III, 168). By the time Proust was writing this Fénélon was dead, having been killed at the Front in 1914 — hence the elegiac tone and the unwonted praise for Fénélon's intelligence. Even during Fénélon's lifetime, though, Proust evidently felt he was losing touch with him, and as early as 1902 he writes to Bibesco (prefiguring his narrator's concern with Saint-Loup's 'tendance très abstraite et qui l'éloignait tant de mes préoccupations habituelles'): 'Mais je suis triste de me sentir si loin de tout ce que Bertrand aime en littérature' (*CMP*, III, 145f.). By August 1907 he is musing with regard to Fénélon: 'Je me demande parfois si je n'ai pas passé à côté du seul ami que j'aurais dû avoir, dont l'amitié eût pu être féconde pour l'un et pour l'autre'.

A comparison of the initial characterisation of Saint-Loup in *A la recherche* with the much longer portrait of his fictional forebear Bertrand de Réveillon in Jean Santeuil (*JS* 447-55) reveals the economies in description which Proust can make by the simple means of attaching his character to a pair of proper names. The pairing of Nietzsche and Proudhon — both being yoked together under the sign of socialism as Saint-Loup's favourite reading-matter — itself deserves comment, since it is not so odd as it may seem at first sight. One could certainly class Saint-Loup as eclectic, and Nietzsche himself would of course have been horrified: one might perhaps have expected Nietzsche's politics of 'aristocratic radicalism' (the description is Georg Brandes's (*KGB* III/6, 120), the emphasis mine) to appeal rather more to an unreconstructed nobleman than to the Saint-Loup Proust is trying to depict here, whose 'aspirations socialistes' (*JF*, II, 97) lead him to throw off his
class background and seek out badly-dressed students in order to have his credentials respected. Yet the linking of Nietzsche and Proudhon reflects a widespread current of left-wing political opinion in turn-of-the-century Europe which was prepared to accept and promote Nietzsche's philosophy as compatible with socialist thinking. R. Hinton Thomas has demonstrated how in Germany during this period it was precisely to socialists that Nietzsche was appealing above all, and in France the picture was very much the same, for as Jacques Le Rider points out, it was not only the right-wing 'Action Française' movement of Charles Maurras that espoused Nietzsche, but figures like Jean Jaurès and Georges Sorel, too.

In fact it is quite likely that Proust, by associating Saint-Loup with both Nietzsche and Proudhon, is intending his readers to 'place' his character in a very specific context, namely that of the short-lived anti-democratic revolutionary movement known as the 'Cercle Proudhon'. Pierre-André Taguieff, in his exhaustive overview of 'Nietzsche dans la rhétorique réactionnaire', draws attention to this movement by focussing on the writings of 'Jean Darville' (pseudonym of Édouard Berth):

La référence à Nietzsche s'ajoutera, par exemple dans la pensée d'Édouard Berth, aux références à Marx, à Proudhon et à Sorel, instituant cet espace syncretique où surgira l'expérience du Cercle Proudhon (décembre 1911-1913), 'confluent des deux mouvements nationaliste et syndicaliste'.

Most likely of all is that the association of Nietzsche and Proudhon in Proust's mind is attributable once more to Daniel Halévy, whose Essai sur le mouvement ouvrier en France had appeared in 1901, and who indeed followed up his La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche of 1909 with La jeunesse de Proudhon in 1913.
The Question of Friendship

From the first three references to Nietzsche in *A la recherche*, he emerges as simply a philosopher of difficult ideas, a yardstick of intellectual acumen, but the narrator is unimpressed for he will always privilege the imagination over the intellect, and thus Nietzsche’s fate is sealed. The association Saint-Loup/Nietzsche/the intellect is joined shortly by the theme of friendship, for the narrator is embarrassed by the warmth of Saint-Loup’s affection, which he feels he cannot genuinely reciprocate. Friendship causes him problems because it needs to be worked at; it orientates the self outwards, towards the surface and superficial communication through conversation, which he dismisses as a waste of time, a failure to live up to one’s responsibilities — significantly, one’s responsibilities as an artist:

> Les êtres qui en ont la possibilité — il est vrai que ce sont les artistes et j’étais convaincu depuis longtemps que je ne le serais jamais — ont aussi le devoir de vivre pour eux-mêmes; or l’amitié leur est une dispense de ce devoir, une abdication de soi-même. La conversation même qui est le mode d’expression de l’amitié est une divagation superficielle, qui ne nous donne rien à acquérir. (JF, II, 260)²

There is, of course, an element of disingenuousness again about the narrator’s telling us he was sure that he was never going to be an artist. The implication of the artist in this thematic configuration, his duty to himself and to the expression of his inner world — which will strike the narrator with such force in *Le Temps retrouvé* — has already been formulated on the narrator’s first visit to Elstir’s studio in Balbec, when, on realising Elstir had previously led the dissipative life of the salons as ‘Monsieur Biche’, the narrator tells us: ‘un artiste pour être tout à fait dans la vérité de la vie spirituelle doit être seul, et ne pas prodiguer de son moi, même à des disciples’ (JF, II, 218). The opposition of art and friendship is
apparent from the narrator's early contact with Saint-Loup, though, for we are
told that he can only salvage something from their time together by treating
his friend as a work of art (JF, II, 96), once he discerns the more general
quality of 'noble' in him. All in all, the narrator does not make a very good
friend for he has such blatantly double standards. On the one hand he fends
off Saint-Loup repeatedly when it does not suit him to spend time with him
(without taking advantage of the time to get down to any of the work he has
promised himself he will do), but on the other his tune changes when he wants
to take advantage of Saint-Loup - he has no qualms about cynically making
approaches to him in Doncieres when he wants to exploit his connections to
gain access to Oriane, with whom he is currently infatuated.

When he is back in Paris and Saint-Loup comes to visit him unexpectedly,
the narrator returns to a meditation on these themes and we are told:

J'ai dit [...] ce que je pense de l'amitié: à savoir qu'elle est si peu
de chose que j'ai peine à comprendre que des hommes de quelque génie,
et par exemple un Nietzsche, aient eu la naïveté de lui attribuer une
certaine valeur intellectuelle et en conséquence de se refuser à des
amitiés auxquelles l'estime intellectuelle n'était pas été liée. Oui,
cela m'a toujours été un étonnement de voir qu'un homme qui poussait la
sincérité avec lui-même jusqu'à se détacher, par scrupule de con-
science, de la musique de Wagner, se soit imaginé que la vérité peut se
réaliser dans ce mode d'expression par nature confus et inadéquat que
sont, en général, des actions et, en particulier, des amitiés, et qu'il
puisse y avoir une signification quelconque dans le fait de quitter son
travail pour aller voir un ami et pleurer avec lui en apprenant la
fausse nouvelle de l'incendie du Louvre. (CG, II, 689)

Before analysing in detail the complexities of this richly allusive passage, I
should point out that after this meditation it transpires the narrator is
actually quite happy to see Saint-Loup, for he has just seen his plan to take
Mlle de Stermaria to dinner fail, and so he admits that friendship does have
the merit of acting as a restorative when the self's resistance is low: 'Mais
quelle que fût mon opinion sur l'amitié, [...] il n'est breuvage si funeste
qui ne puisse à certaines heures devenir précieux et réconfortant en nous
apportant le coup de fouet qui nous était nécessaire, la chaleur que nous ne
pouvons pas trouver en nous-même' (CG, II, 689). The poisoned loving-cup of
friendship, it seems, can have pharmaceutical properties after all.  

Despite Proust's faint praise, in the passage quoted above, for
Nietzsche's honesty with himself, he shows his hand here and brings the key
question of Nietzsche's friendship with Wagner into focus, as well as
cementing the link already established between Nietzsche, the intellect and
the theme of friendship. The commentary given on it in the 'Pléiade' edition
is certainly too sweeping to give an adequate explanation for Proust's motives
in making these links: 'Nietzsche consacra une grande partie de son œuvre à
l'examen de l'amitié. En dehors d'Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, le thème
apparaît dans Humain trop humain (1878), Aurores [sic] (1881), Le Gai Savoir
(1883 [sic] -1887)' (II, 1731).

There is in fact a very early version of the passage to be found in
Le Carnet de 1908, a source which shows the context in which the whole complex of
themes on which I have been concentrating originates. Here it reads:

On sait ce que je pense de l'amitié; je la crois si nulle que je ne
suis même pas exigeant intellectuellement pour elle, et q' Nietzsche dit
(Journal des Débats du 17 Aout 1909) qu'il n'admet pas une amitié où il
n'y ait pas esatime intellectuelle cela me semble bien mensonger pour ce
détructeur de Wagner 'génie de mensonge' (même journal). D'ailleurs sa
visite à ... sur la destruction du Louvre est bien menteuse aussi. Que
peut nous faire ce qui n'est pas en nous. Que signifie pour exprimer
q.q. chose une action (aller voir, signer une liste) etc. (Le Carnet de
1908, pp. 38v-39)

The article Proust is referring to here is Daniel Halévy's 'Mlle de Meysenbug
et Frédéric Nietzsche' (which actually appeared in the edition of 18 August
(p. 3)). The Journal des Débats was the only newspaper Nietzsche himself
admitted to reading, and Jean Bourdeau, a 'collaborateur intermittent' on
the paper (cf. KGB III/6, 419), had not only been as good as his word when he
promised Nietzsche a short review of Der Fall Wagner by Gabriel Monod in the
January 1889 number (KGB III/6, 403), but he had also continued to ensure that the paper carried pieces on Nietzsche thereafter. Halevy's article quotes Nietzsche's distinction, in a late letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, between Wagner as a 'Genie der Lüge' and himself as a 'Genie der Wahrheit' (KGB III/5, 452), which prompts Proust's sarcasm. The anecdote about the Louvre (which was reputed to be ablaze in May 1871, sending Nietzsche out onto the streets of Basel in search of his friend and colleague Jacob Burckhardt to bewail the destruction of Western civilisation as they knew it) is also reported by Halevy, in the full biography. Most importantly, though, the characterisation of Nietzsche as an unforgiving intellectual turns out to be Halevy's main line of interpretation. In the article which Proust quotes, Halevy contrasts Malwida von Meysenbug, of whom he writes: 'sa longue experience d'amitie lui avait appris à ne jamais confondre l'ordre des pensees avec l'ordre du coeur', with Nietzsche: 'il avait rompu avec maint camarade: l'amitie virile sans l'accord spirituel, jugeait-il, est indigne.'

It is significant that Proust's example of political action in his notebook entry is 'signer une liste', which implicitly refers back to the 'Intellectuals' Manifesto' again, although he glosses over the inconsistency and continues by congratulating himself on his intellectual independence, expanding on the worthlessness of friendship. He comes back to Nietzsche a couple of pages on:

Approfondir des idees (Nietche, philosophie) est moins grand qu'approfondir des reminiscences parce que comme l'intelligence ne cree pas et ne fait que debrouiller non seulement son but est moins grand mais sa tache est moins grande.

Aucun homme n'a jamais eu d'influence sur moi (que Darlu et je l'ai reconnue mauvaise). Aucune action exterieure à soi n'a d'importance: Nietche et la guerre, Nietche et Wagner, Nietche et ses scrupules. La realite est en soi. (Le Carnet de 1908, p. 40) 

This is perhaps the most interesting of Proust's judgements on Nietzsche.
because it is the most cursory and extreme, verging on a defence of solipsism. It is also notable that this is all Proust extracts from Halévy's biographical writings on Nietzsche - this is 'Proust's Nietzsche' already fully formed, and all that is left is to attach him to the character of Saint-Loup, which he also immediately does in this early notebook. 

Again there are contradictions in this passage, for Nietzsche stands accused on account of being both an arch-intellectual, a man of ideas, and a man of action - he cannot win. 'Nietzsche et la guerre' presumably refers to Nietzsche's service as a medical orderly during the Franco-Prussian War, when he lasted only three weeks before he himself came down with dysentry and diphtheria and had to be hospitalised. 'Nietzche et Wagner, Nietzsche et ses scrupules' are conflated in the version in the novel, as we have seen, and when Proust returns to the theme in La Prisonnière his aversion to Nietzsche reaches its deliciously satirical apogee:

> Je n'avais, a admirer le maître de Bayreuth, aucun des scrupules de ceux qui, comme à Nietzsche, le devoir dicte de fuir, dans l'art comme dans la vie, la beauté qui les tente, qui s'arrachent à Tristan comme ils renient Parsifal et, par ascétisme spirituel, de mortification en mortification parviennent, en suivant le plus sanglant des chemins de croix, à s'élever jusqu'à la pure connaissance et à l'adoration parfaite du Postillon de Longjumeau. (P, III, 665)

Highly amusing though this lampoon may be, it is quite clearly a travesty: if anything, Proust is here caricaturing not Nietzsche but a cross between the Kantian ('pure connaissance') and above all Schopenhauerian ideals. The irony and bathos of the last section in particular cast a new light, in retrospect, on the narrator's original description of Saint-Loup, who 'se fût élevé jusqu'à l'amour de Nietzsche et de Proudhon' (JF, II, 92), but if we return for a moment to the context of that earlier passage we can now note a number of further parallels.

In the earlier passage, as we have already seen, the narrator-protagonist
on the brink of entering the social world showed a greater interest in the
t Affairs of Saint-Loup's father, the society figure M. de Marsantes, than (in) Saint-Loup himself. But in the earlier episode the older, more 'worldly wise' narrator also intervenes to criticise Saint-Loup's dismissive attitude towards his father for more profound reasons. Saint-Loup's father 'étaient lui-même un homme intelligent', the narrator pleads, and he conjectures that the father might well have applauded the son's efforts to better himself intellectually: 'il l'eût admiré, se fût réjoui qu'il délaisse ce qui avait fait ses minces divertissements pour d'austères méditations' (JF, II, 92). Saint-Loup's father is the true noble, we are led to understand, not because of the superficiality of his 'minces divertissements', which he would freely have acknowledged, but because of the depth of his unrequited love for his son, who ungenerously fails to recognise his father's qualities in return:

Robert de Saint-Loup parce qu'il était de ceux qui croient que le mérite est attaché à certaines formes d'art et de vie, avait un souvenir affectueux mais un peu méprisant d'un père qui s'était occupé toute sa vie de chasse et de course, avait bâillé à Wagner et raffolé d'Offenbach. Saint-Loup n'était pas assez intelligent pour comprendre que la valeur intellectuelle n'a rien à voir avec l'adhésion à une certaine formule esthétique. (JF, II, 92f.)

In aesthetic terms, then, Saint-Loup and Nietzsche are actually presented as moving in opposite directions, but in both cases the narrator suspects a lack of integrity, and in both cases it is Wagner who is the touchstone. The narrator criticises Saint-Loup for liking Wagner for the wrong reasons (his respect is too dependent on intellectual snobbery), and he criticises Nietzsche for rejecting Wagner for the wrong reasons (he allows intellectual considerations to intervene). In both cases what is ironised is the self-image implied by 's'élever'/‘se fût élevé': the narrator criticises the ethos of spiritual strenuousness and self-overcoming which Saint-Loup ('austères méditations') and Nietzsche ('ascétisme spirituel') are both made to
represent, unmasking it in the one case as petty prejudice, in the other as a more convoluted piece of psychological perversity, but in both cases as leading to a misguided denigration of something which ought rather to be at least tolerated, if not celebrated.

Nietzsche, Offenbach, Bizet, Wagner

Proust presumably knew how mischievous he was being in portraying Nietzsche as a self-abnegating Catholic saint, and his satire at Nietzsche's 'adoration parfaite' of a minor comic opera by Adolphe Adam (the creator of Giselle) is particularly barbed in the light of the working title he gave to his narrator's epiphanies in Le Temps retrouvé, 'Adoration perpétuelle'. Once again, a source for the passage in La Priseuse can be found in Halevy's biography, where, describing Nietzsche in Turin in the autumn of 1888, Halevy reports how his musical taste developed to embrace works at the opposite pole from Wagner's music dramas: 'Il entend des opérettes françaises: rien ne lui semble si parfait que ce genre léger, "paradis de toutes les finesse".' The quotation here is actually from the French operetta composer Edmond Audran, whom Nietzsche himself quotes in a letter to Köselitz of 18 November 1888 (KGB III/5, 478), but Halevy's point is nonetheless valid, and it is borne out by Nietzsche's letters and notebooks of the period. He had heard Audran's La Mascotte in Turin in the September of 1888, and describes it glowingly in an earlier letter to Köselitz: 'Diese in keinem Punkte gemein werdende Musik, mit soviel hübschen, geistreichen kleinen Melodien, gehört ganz in die idyllische Art Sein, die ich jetzt Abends nöthig habe' (KGB III/5, 444). In fact, though, Nietzsche discovered the delights of French operetta a good year
earlier, at the time Der Fall Wagner was gestating, and ironically enough it is not Adam but Offenbach by whom Nietzsche is captivated.

As we saw above, Saint-Loup criticises his father for preferring Offenbach to Wagner, and the narrator goes on to report his condescension: "'Etre né dans le faubourg Saint-Germain et avoir vécu à l'époque de la Belle-Hélène, cela fait cataclysme dans une existence. Peut-être, petit bourgeois fanatique du 'Ring', eût-il donné tout autre chose'" (JF, II, 93). In 1887-88, though, Nietzsche shows no such scruples and, himself 'raffolé d'Offenbach', reverses Saint-Loup's evaluation. In his notebooks from the autumn of 1887, he develops a characterisation of Offenbach as a (French, Jewish, comic) counter-Wagner:

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die Juden haben in der Sphäre der Kunst das Genie gestreift, mit H. Heine und Offenbach, diesem geistreichsten und übermächtigsten Satyr, der als Musiker zur großen Tradition hält und für den, der nicht bloß Ohren hat, eine rechte Erlösung von den gefühlsmalen und im Grunde entarteten Musikern der deutschen Romantik ist. (KSA 12, 361)```

He conveys this new enthusiasm to Köselitz in March 1888 (KGB III/5, 275), and plans to include his Offenbach material in both Der Wille zur Macht (cf. KSA 13, 195, 197) and Ecce Homo (cf. KSA 13, 619), but in the end the only reference to Offenbach he makes in print is, surprisingly, when he includes him in his 'Catalogue Aria' of decadent types ('Meine Unmöglichen') in Götzen-Dämmerung: 'Les frères de Goncourt: oder die beiden Ajaxe im Kampf mit Homer. Musik von Offenbach' (GD, IX, 1). In Der Fall Wagner he quotes obliquely and ironically from La Belle Hélène ('"auf nach Kreta! auf nach Kreta!..'': FaW, 'Nachschrift'), but in this work he mounts a much more open and sustained attack on Wagner in the name of Bizet (FaW, 1-3).

If Proust's sarcasm is provoked by Nietzsche's 'championing' in Der Fall Wagner of Carmen (a work with which he was unfamiliar), then he misses altogether the irony behind Nietzsche's ploy, which he points out in the
Preface and makes even more explicit in a late letter to his friend the
musician and musicologist Carl Fuchs: 'Das, was ich über Bizet sage, dürfen
Sie nicht ernst nehmen; so wie ich bin, kommt Bizet Tausend Mal für mich
nicht in Betracht. Aber als ironische Antithese gegen Wagner wirkt es sehr
stark [...]. Zu alledem war Wagner rasend neidisch auf Bizet' (27 December
1888; KGB III/5, 554; cf. III/5, 481). Nietzsche was aiming to shock in
professing an exclusive admiration for Carmen - he certainly never 'tore
himself away from Tristan', which in Ecce Homo (EH, II, 6) he praises as 'das
non plus ultra Wagners' and in the same letter to Fuchs calls 'das capitale
Werk und von einer Fascination, die nicht nur in der Musik, sondern in allen
Künsten ohne Gleichen ist.' 'When all is said and done', Nietzsche signals to
the reader of Der Fall Wagner, 'André Musiker kommen gegen Wagner nicht in
Betracht' (FaW, 'Zweite Nachschrift'), and in the section on Der Fall Wagner
in Ecce Homo, Bizet is not even mentioned.

As far as Nietzsche's turning his back on Parsifal is concerned, the
overwhelming effect the 'Prelude' has on him when he eventually allows himself
to hear it in Monte Carlo at the end of December 1886 (i.e. four and a half
years after the first performance, when Wagner had been dead for three and a
half years and the piece was already firmly installed in the concert repertoire)
is abundantly clear from his notebook. He has just formulated the
title 'Zur Genealogie der Moral' for the first time, and sketched out an
initial plan for the book, to include an essay on 'das asketische Ideal' (KSA
12, 198), when Wagner's music suddenly irrupts into his thoughts:

Vorspiel des Parsifal, größte Wohlthat, die mir seit langem erwiesen
ist. Die Macht und Strenge des Gefühls, unbeschreiblich, ich kenne
nichts, was das Christentum so in der Tiefe nähme und so scharf zum
Mitgefühl brächte. Ganz erhoben und ergriffen - kein Maler hat einen so
unbeschreiblich schwermütigen und zärtlichen Blick gemalt wie Wagner
[...]
Sonderbar! Als Knabe hatte ich mir die Mission zugedacht, das
Mysterium auf die Bühne zu bringen; -- -- (KSA 12, 198f.)

Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth was evidently so delighted to find this passage of unalloyed pro-Wagnerian enthusiasm in her brother's late notebooks that she forged it into a letter from Nietzsche to her in Paraguay. But Nietzsche typically applies the antidote to this dangerous dose by immediately returning to the matter in hand - 'Kritik des christlichen Ideals' (KSA 12, 199) - and he works an extended critical response to Wagner's pursuit of the ascetic ideal in *Parsifal* into the Third Essay of *Zur Genealogie der Moral* itself (GM, III, 2-4). In the spirit of his initial response, though, he writes a eulogy on *Parsifal* to Köselitz in January 1887: 'rein ästhetisch gefragt: hat Wagner je Etwas besser gemacht? [...] Dergleichen gibt es bei Dante, sonst nicht' (21 January 1887; KGB III/5, 12f.). Nor does he merely praise *Parsifal* 'in purely aesthetic terms', for he even confesses in this letter to having felt 'sympathy' ('Mitleiden') with the action of the opera, and in *Der Fall Wagner* he makes his admiration for it apparent in print: 'Ich bewundere dies Werk, ich möchte es selbst gemacht haben' (FaW, 'Nachschrift').

Both Nietzsche's letter to Köselitz and the forged 'letter to Elisabeth' are quoted by Halevy, although the context in which he sets them is misleading, for in order to reinforce his thesis that Nietzsche was torn apart by his love-hate relationship with Wagner till the end of his life, Halevy misquotes another letter of Nietzsche's to Köselitz immediately beforehand. Halevy writes: "J'ai aimé Wagner, écrivait-il en septembre à Peter Gast, je l'aime encore..." (p. 485), whereas in fact Nietzsche had written: 'ich bin nicht grob genug dazu, um mich von Menschen trennen zu können, die ich geliebt habe. Aber es ist geschehn: und ich lebe noch' (13 September 1886; KGB III/3, 247) - 'ich lebe noch' rather than 'ich liebe noch' (cf. p. 688n. 6). Halevy comes back to misquote this letter again in relation to *Der Fall Wagner,*
commenting: 'Est-ce ce même Nietzsche qui, deux ans plus tard, rédige un pamphlet? Certes non, c'est un autre homme, à travers les violences duquel nous percevons, dans l'entreligne, les mots qui ne sont pas écrits: J'aime encore' (p. 556).

Nietzsche's break with Wagner was nevertheless sealed by *Parsifal's* Schopenhauerian-Christian message of renunciation and redemption - all the more absurd, then, are the mock-religious terms in which Proust couches the 'betrayal' of Wagner by 'those like Nietzsche'. Proust seems to be trying to turn against Nietzsche himself his own criticisms of Wagner, in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* and especially *Der Fall Wagner*, as 'ein ganz großer Schauspieler' (FaW 8), 'Dieser Klingsor aller Klingsore!' (FaW, 'Nachschrift') in pursuit of the Christian ascetic ideal. But Nietzsche's self-mockery in *Der Fall Wagner* already pre-empts Proust's accusation: 'Wagner den Rücken zu kehren war für mich ein Schicksal', he announces in the Preface, and he then deflates the apparent portentousness of such a claim by continuing in a heavily ironic tone at his own expense: 'Einem solchen Ziele - welches Opfer wäre ihm nicht gemäß? welche "Selbst-überwindung"! welche "Selbst-Verleugnung"!'

In Nietzsche's last period, then, he uses Offenbach and Bizet as agonal jousting partners for Wagner, but this does not preclude his continued attachment to the latter's music, and I shall argue below that Halévy, despite his misreading of Nietzsche's stated position, is actually quite right to insist on Nietzsche's enduring love for Wagner himself. For Proust, too, Wagner and Offenbach need not be mutually exclusive - indeed from the narrator's criticism of Saint-Loup we can deduce that they must not be. Proust was no blinkered Wagnerian in his musical allegiances, but he does criticise Nietzsche for being what he mistakenly thought was a blinkered *anti*-Wagnerian: it is a pity that Proust was not more attuned to the sheer
complexity of Nietzsche's response to Wagner, and that his barbs should therefore fail to stick.

**Nietzsche and/on Friendship**

If we return to Proust's two main attacks on Nietzsche, in *Le Côté de Guermantes* and *La Prisonnière*, it is necessary to correct one further misconception, namely Nietzsche's supposed insistence on the intellectual value of friendship.

There were indeed intellectual reasons for Nietzsche's break with Wagner, and important among them were the latter's abhorrent political opinions, his nationalistic pan-Germanism and anti-Semitism, which is particularly ironic considering Proust's own Jewishness. Halévy's account of their rift is a somewhat free interpretation, marred by one or two 'creative errors', and in Proust's hands it becomes a wild exaggeration for comic effect. Halévy implies that Nietzsche had some sort of 'devil within him':


It is this element of apparent perversity which Proust picks up on and turns into the ascetico-religious Schopenhauerian distortion we saw above. Stemming from Halévy's presentation of Nietzsche's break-up with Wagner is Proust's image of him as some kind of rational monster, the embodiment of hypertrophied reason concerned only to 'approfondir des idées', but this misses the whole thrust of Nietzsche's attack on the presumptions of rationalism which begins with the notion of 'der theoretische Mensch' in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. 
Admittedly, at the time of his break-up with Wagner (1874-76) Nietzsche was in transition from the world of Die Geburt der Tragödie and the Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen to that of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, and the transition is evident in Richard Wagner in Bayreuth itself, where Nietzsche is already to some extent distancing himself from his mentor, but Proust had no inclination to explore these nuances for himself by reading Nietzsche's works at first hand.

On the key question of friendship, Proust seems to imply that intellectual respect was Nietzsche's only criterion, and that after satisfying himself on this score he was amicably promiscuous, whereas anyone who truly applied their intellect to the question of friendship itself would realise what a sham it actually is: ‘(les amis n'étant des amis que dans cette douce folie que nous avons au cours de la vie, à laquelle nous nous prêtons, mais que du fond de notre intelligence nous savons l'erreur d'un fou qui croirait que les meubles vivent et causerait avec eux)’ (TR, IV, 454). The main problem here lies again with the partiality of Proust's knowledge of Nietzsche, for it was gleaned not just from a biography, but from a biography which contains only the most peremptory discussions of Nietzsche's work, and is structured instead around Nietzsche's two great friendships with Wagner and Burckhardt.

Now before we begin an examination of Nietzsche's published views on friendship, with which this chapter will conclude, we can certainly note that he appreciated his own various friendships as an indispensable ingredient in his feeling of spiritual well-being. Walter Kaufmann writes in the context of Nietzsche's break with Wagner:

The battle with Wagner [...] should not be viewed merely as an instance of Nietzsche's 'transcending' - and certainly not as proof of his incapacity for any lasting human attachments. Nietzsche retained Overbeck's friendship until the end; few philosophers have written more eloquently in praise of friendship than Nietzsche; and while he was
surely a 'difficult' person, the inference that he was incapable of lasting friendship seems unwarranted. 72

This inference, though, is precisely the one which is surprisingly drawn by Christopher Middleton, translator and editor of Nietzsche's Selected Letters, who argues 'how absent Nietzsche was from his friends'. 79 '[T]o judge by his letters,' Middleton continues, 'this most dynamic cultural psychologist never really warmed to a single individual human being wholeheartedly enough to confide in her or him'. On the contrary, I would argue, to judge by Nietzsche's letters - which are for the most part remarkably free of the barbed irony of his writing generally, and serve as the vehicle for communicating some of his most genuine and heartfelt emotions - Nietzsche was an unusually considerate and solicitous correspondent, who invested a great deal of time and effort in keeping up his friendships and cherished the circle of friends he had. Friendship itself is often thematised in his letters, which are full of paeans to the 'Götternektar der Freundschaft' (Letter to Rohde, 10 January 1869; KGB I/2, 357) and protestations of the strength of his fond feelings towards his friends. One early letter to Rohde reads like a rewriting of 1 Corinthians 13, transposed from a rhapsody on caritas in general into an equivalent for 'die Liebe der Freunde': 'Und so ist es mit der Liebe der Freunde: ohne Mahnung, ohne Rütteln, in aller Stille fällt sie nieder und beglückt. Sie begehrt nichts für sich und gibt alles von sich' (7 October 1869; KGB II/1, 62).

The period of Nietzsche's break with Wagner in the mid-1870s, as we might expect, was one in which he was setting greater than usual store by friendships, for the break also severed him from many other erstwhile 'friends' in the Wagner circle. But this is also the period in which a number of his other close friends are moving away from him in one way or another: he takes
Romundt's conversion to Catholicism very badly, for example, and sees it as a personal slight on their friendship (Letter to Rohde, 28 February 1875; KGB II/5, 27f.). He writes to Gersdorff on 1 April 1874: 'Ja wenn man keine Freunde hätte! Ob man's noch aushielte? ausgehalten hätte? Dubito' (KGB II/3, 216), but some of his other closest friends are drifting off over the horizon in a different sense, into marriage - Pinder and Krug (Letter to Gersdorff, 4 July 1874; KGB II/3, 238), Rohde and Overbeck (Letter to Rohde, 18 July 1876; KGB II/5, 176), and even Gersdorff himself, who is hoping to get engaged (Letter to Rohde, 7 October 1875; KGB II/5, 120).

Charles Andler writes of Nietzsche in the period 1874-76: 'jamais il ne fut plus sociable', and he recounts how on every second Tuesday the Basel University staff had a get-together at one of their homes, when 'Overbeck et Nietzsche [...], philosophes très désabusés, n'en étaient pas moins les boute-en-train les plus gais de ces réunions.' This is the period, towards the end of 1874, when Nietzsche composes his 'Hymn to Friendship' (cf. Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, 2 January 1875; KGB II/5, 7); his notes from this period also reveal that he was planning a section entitled 'Freundschaft' for Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (cf. KSA 8, 345, 351, 368), and indeed of all Nietzsche's texts this is the one which bears the most traces of his preoccupation with the theme. The unrealised 'Freundschaft' section survives in various ways: 'Der Mensch im Verkehr' incorporates a large number of reflections concerned with questions of friendship (MA, I, 296, 305, 327, 352, 354, 360, 368) and concludes with the especially important section 'Von den Freunden' (MA, I, 376), to which I shall return below; the first Book is rounded off with a 'Nachspiel' poem entitled 'Unter Freunden', and a further concentration of reflections on the theme is to be found in Book Two (MA, II, 231, 241, 242, 252, 259, 260, 263).
Aside from the particular biographical circumstances surrounding the period of Nietzsche's break with Wagner, there are more general reasons for his valorisation of friendship. In a letter to Louise Ott he makes it clear how much he appreciates his circle of friends because of his ill health (16 December 1876; KGB II/5, 204f.), but the most important factor is surely that which he mentions in the following early letter to Erwin Rohde, where he indicates the value of friends to him as a compensation for his awareness of spiritual isolation:

Wer sich als Einsiedler zu fühlen gewöhnt hat, wer mit kalten Blicken durch alle die gesellschaftlichen und kameradschaftlichen Verbindungen hindurchsieht und die winzigen und zwirnfadigen Bandchen merkt, die Mensch an Menschen knüpfen, Bändchen so fest, daß ein Windhauchchen sie zerblast: [...] wer einsam ist vermöge einer Naturmarotte, vermöge einer seltsam gebräuten Mischung von Wünschen Talenten und Willensstrebungen, der weiß, welch ein unbegreiflich hohes Wunder ein Freund ist. (10 January 1869; KGB 1/2, 357; cf. II/1, 106)

The close correlation between these two sides to Nietzsche's character, on the one hand a human need for friendship and simple companionship, on the other a passionate advocacy and pursuit of heroic solitude, is an aspect which Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche stresses in her biography of her brother, and in his biography Daniel Halévy, too, actually brings out quite clearly this essential tension: 'En même temps que, prosateur, il écrit un hymne à la solitude, à la bravoure d'un penseur [Schopenhauer als Erzieher], musicien, il compose un hymne à l'amitié: "Je le chante pour vous tous", dit-il à Rohde'.

Even at stages in his life when Nietzsche was relatively gregarious, then, his ideal of friendship would always remain that of a one-to-one conversation rather than any kind of group activity. The passage quoted above, in which he contrasts the riches of a good friendship with 'alle die gesellschaftlichen und kameradschaftlichen Verbindungen', makes this clear, and it is spelt out in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches in a revealing passage from 'Der Mensch im
Verkehr' entitled 'Das Zwiegespräch':

Das Zwiegespräch ist das vollkommene Gespräch, weil alles, was der eine sagt, seine bestimmte Farbe, seinen Klang, seine begleitende Gebärd in strenger Rücksicht auf den anderen, mit dem gesprochen wird, erhält, also dem entsprechend, was beim Briefverkehr geschieht, daß ein und derselbe zehn Arten des seelischen Ausdrucks zeigt, je nachdem er bald an diesen, bald an jenen schreibt. Beim Zwiegespräch gibt es nur eine einzige Strahlenbrechung des Gedankens: diese bringt der Mitunterredner hervor, als der Spiegel, in welchem wir unsere Gedanken möglichst schön wiedererblicken wollen. (NA, I, 374)

Conversation with one partner is the ideal because it allows one to adopt a persona and tailor one's words to suit the particular interlocutor; in this respect it mimics most closely what is revealed as Nietzsche's paradigm of social interaction, letter-writing. But with more than one interlocutor the effect is lost: 'Deshalb wird der Mensch im Verkehr mit mehreren gezwungen, sich auf sich zurückzuziehen, die Tatsachen hinzustellen, wie sie sind, aber jenen spielenden Äther der Humanität den Gegenständen zu nehmen, welche ein Gespräch zu den angenehmsten Dingen der Welt macht'. This makes for idle, egoistic talk among men, and women in such society lose their 'geistige Liebenswürdigkeit' and 'geistige Anmut' altogether, Nietzsche tells us. In the light of such a passage, Bernard de Fallois is surely mistaken in expanding on Proust's denunciation of Nietzsche and friendship in Le Carnet de 1908 by associating the philosopher with: 'Le mensonge de l'amitié, ce goût des petits cercles intimes qui l'agaçait déjà dans Sainte-Beuve et qui lui a inspiré le petit clan des Verdurin'. Not only does Proust himself not go this far - he and Nietzsche at least mean the same thing by friendship - but even when Nietzsche is writing in praise of friendship, he is still a very great distance from advocating the spirit of the 'petit clan'. 
In the Foreword to his Second Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung, Nietzsche refers to himself as a 'Zöglings älterer Zeiten, zumal der griechischen', and it is here that we must begin in fleshing out Nietzsche's own position on friendship. For Nietzsche's defense of friendship is quite evidently informed by his admiration for the ancient Greeks and their ideal of 'Platonic' friendship among men, as when he writes to Rohde of creating 'eine neue griechische Akademie' (15 December 1870; KGB II/1, 165), or when he writes in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft 'Zu Ehren der Freundschaft', stressing 'daß das Gefühl der Freundschaft dem Altertum als das höchste Gefühl galt' (FW 61).

Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche quotes with approval the early critic Leo Berg, who seizes on this aspect and goes so far as to make it the cornerstone of Nietzsche's philosophy:

Friedrich Nietzsches ganze Philosophie ist gewissermaßen ein großartiger Freundschaftskult. Auch darin gleicht er Plato. [...] Der Freund wird der Inhalt und das Ziel seiner Philosophie, zu seiner Verherrlichung hat er den übermenschen erdacht und die ewige Wiederkunft geträumt. Er ist der Sinn aller seiner Schriften, der letzte Zweck der Kultur.

Walter Kaufmann, too, writes in this connection scarcely less rhapsodically:

'It seems as if Nietzsche had purposely left behind our entire civilisation to travel back through the centuries to ancient Athens to join the company at Plato's Symposium. Perhaps no other modern philosopher has tried so hard to re-experience the spirit of Socrates and his disciples.' What is interesting about Kaufmann's account, though, is that he addresses the obvious corollary, that Nietzsche was homosexual, and balks at the notion (suggested in a 1917 article by Wilhelm Stekel), dismissing it flatly:

Stekel suggests that Nietzsche was a homosexual without himself knowing it. This claim, justly repudiated or ignored in the rest of the literature, seems based on the flimsiest knowledge of Nietzsche. His
intellectual celebrations of male friendship notwithstanding, the overheated and strained heterosexual imagery of Zarathustra, especially in its poems, and Nietzsche's later requests for women in the asylum seem proof that his dreams were of women. 61

Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, for one, is not convinced by this line of argument, and by 'looking at Nietzsche through a Wildean optic' in her Epistemology of the Closet, she gives a brilliantly provocative reading of Nietzsche's inscriptions of homoerotic desire. 82 For Sedgwick: 'It seems patent that many of Nietzsche's most effective intensities of both life and writing were directed toward other men and toward the male body; it's at least arguable [...] that almost all of them were' (p. 133). She develops this opening position by way of a link with Proust:

A phrase index to Nietzsche could easily be confused with a concordance to, shall we say, Proust's Sodome et Gomorrhe, featuring as it would 'inversion', 'contrary instincts', the contra naturam, the effeminate, the 'hard', the sick, the hyper-virile, the 'décadent', the neuter, the 'intermediate type'. (p. 134)

Where Kaufmann invokes 'the overheated and strained heterosexual imagery of Zarathustra', Sedgwick examines Nietzsche's image of male pregnancy and finds 'a sexy thematics of ripeness, fructification, mess, ecstatic rupture, penetration between men' (p. 136). Sedgwick's argument is highly nuanced, though: she concedes that 'you would have to describe him as the man who tried to put the hetero back into Ecce Homo' (p. 161), and she resists the temptation to argue 'that the ostensibly heterosexual and antisentimental Nietzsche was, like, Wilde, [...] "really" homosexual, and at the same time "really" sentimental' (p. 154f.). Instead she reads male same-sex desire as a charge which energises Nietzsche's writing and problematises the apparently straightforward 'virility' in the name of which he denounces 'effeminate' weakness and reaction. Her reading of Nietzsche's relation to Wagner is particularly persuasive: citing Freud's list of 'the possible eroto-grammatic-
al transformations that can be generated in contradiction of the sentence, unspeakable under a homophobic regime of utterance, "I (a man) love him (a man)"", she argues that Nietzsche's 'own most characteristic and invested grammar for this prohibited sentence' is: "I do not love him, I am him". I do not desire, let us say, Wagner; I am Wagner' (p. 161). Sarah Kofman points similarly to the repressed relation in Ecce Homo, stressing the strategy of indirection Nietzsche adopts: 'Ecce Homo, dans sa volonté de souligner la continuité de l'œuvre et de l'unifier, oubliant "le rapport" érotique réciproque ne met l'accent que sur le rapport rhétorique: Schopenhauer et Wagner auraient été seulement des métaphores de lui-même dont il se serait emparé à son usage.'

Whatever position one ultimately adopts on the question of Nietzsche's own sexuality, though, it is nevertheless clear that he views the (Christian) idealisation of heterosexual love as a debasement of the Greek ideal, for it entails the superficialising intervention of woman (cf. M 503). Nietzsche argues that friendship is superior to marriage (cf. MA, I, 378; KSA 8, 325), to familial love (cf. MA, I, 354; Letter to Rohde, 10 January 1869; KGB I/2, 357), indeed to love in general (cf. KSA 8, 326), and that we should be seeking what he refers to in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft as 'eine Art Fortsetzung der Liebe, bei der jenes habsüchtige Verlangen zweier Personen nach einander einer neuen Begierde und Habsucht, einem gemeinsamen höheren Durste nach einem über ihnen stehenden Ideale gewichen ist: aber wer kennt diese Liebe? wer hat sie erlebt? Ihr rechter Name ist Freundschaft' (FW 14). He applies the Greek ideal to his own friendship with Rohde, whom he asks to compare 'die scheußlich-gierige Geschlechtsliebe mit der Freundschaft!' (7 October 1869; KGB II/1, 62), although in the mid-1870s that does not prevent him from being on the look-out for a wife, too, as he tells Malwida von
Meysenbug (25 October 1874; KGB II/3, 269), and he proposes unsuccessfully to Mathilde Trampedach in April 1876 after knowing her for only three days (11 April 1876; KGB II/5, 147).

It is Zarathustra who is most outrageous in his disparagement of women, in this context as in every other. In the section 'Vom Freunde' we are told: 'Allzulange war im Weibe ein Sklave und ein Tyrann versteckt. Deshalb ist das Weib noch nicht der Freundschaft fähig; es kennt nur die Liebe', and: 'Noch ist das Weib nicht der Freundschaft fähig: Katzen sind immer noch die Weiber, und Vögel. Oder, besten Falles, Kühe' (Z, I, 'Vom Freunde'). But contrary to Proust's image of him, Nietzsche is under no delusions about the possibility or value of (male) friendship, either, and he is quite prepared to admit, with Proust, that the friend also superficialises. 'Noch ist das Weib nicht der Freundschaft fähig. Aber sagt mir, ihr Männer, wer von euch ist denn fähig der Freundschaft?', Zarathustra continues, while earlier in 'Vom Freunde' Zarathustra echoes Nietzsche's early letter to Rohde and calls the friend the cork which periodically buoys back up to the surface the conversation between the two voices within the hermit's self-making that conversation endurable.

Nietzsche thus recognises the value of the 'superficiality' of friendship in a more positive way than does Proust with his rather begrudging admission that friends can simply help cheer up the despondent individual when his muse deserts him.

"Freunde, es gibt keine Freunde!": Discipleship and Creative Independence

More importantly, though, Nietzsche is just as adamant as Proust that the independence of the creative (and especially self-creative) individual must
not be trammelled by friendships. In *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* he likens 'Väter, Lehrer, Freunde' to a railing against which one should never need to lean, and which could not support one's weight in any case, but which simply gives enough reassurance by its presence to enable one to go one's own way: 'sie geben die beruhigende Empfindung des Schutzes in der Nähe' (*MA*, I, 600). It is Zarathustra who makes this point most categorically again, for he knows from his own experience with his followers that a friendship where there is an inequality between the participants - where one is the disciple of the other - is unstable and cannot be maintained indefinitely to the satisfaction of both. As Nietzsche's great 'Lehrer', Zarathustra must resort to paradox in order to make his disciples realise this, detaching them from himself and preparing for his withdrawal from the world at the end of the First Part. 'Wahrlich, ich rate euch: geht fort von mir und wehrt euch gegen Zarathustra!' he urges:

> Der Mensch der Erkenntnis muß nicht nur seine Feinde lieben, sondern auch seine Freunde hassen können. Man vergilt einem Lehrer schlecht, wenn man immer nur der Schüler bleibt [...].
> Ihr hattet euch noch nicht gesucht: da fandet ihr mich [...].
> Nun heiße ich euch, mich verlieren und euch finden. (Z, I, 'Von der schenkenden Tugend'; EH, 'Vorwort', 4)

This sentiment is echoed in *A la recherche* by Elstir, who urges the narrator in the same way to go off and discover his own truths, to tread the path of the artist: "on ne reçoit pas la sagesse, il faut la découvrir soi-même après un trajet que personne ne peut faire pour nous, ne peut nous épargner, car elle est un point de vue sur les choses" (*JF*, II, 219). Even the paradoxical formulation of the principle is the same, for in each case the wisdom of the advice needs to be accepted before the disciple can disown the master and go his own way - thus, ironically, continuing to carry out the programme which the master has set."
For both Nietzsche and Proust, then, discipleship is a necessary phase in the development of the (artistic/(self)-creative) individual, but just as necessary is its ultimate overcoming. In Nietzsche’s case this new categorical imperative is certainly given a more urgent and heroic inflection than in Proust’s, but one must remember that when Proust’s narrator encounters Elstir in Balbec he is at this stage still in the position of the disciple who has yet to learn his master’s truth, whereas Nietzsche and his Zarathustra are in the position of the master, fully aware of what is at stake. In the context of his admiration for Shakespeare’s Brutus (but surely also with an eye to his own break with Wagner), Nietzsche argues in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft that no sacrifice is too great in the interest of spiritual independence: ’Unabhängigkei der Seele – das gilt es hier! Kein Opfer kann da zu groß sein: seinen liebsten Freund selbst muß man ihr opfern können, und sei er noch dazu der herrlichste Mensch, die Zierde der Welt, das Opfer ohnegleichen’ (FW 98). By spending too long listening to his master’s voice, the pupil risks nothing less than his integrity as an individual; it is only by striking out on his own way and turning his back on his master – indeed killing the master on the road – that the budding Buddha can not only find himself but also, ironically, realise the true meaning of friendship. Nietzsche gives this paradox its full weight by reducing it to Aristotle’s apostrophe ‘”Freunde, es gibt keine Freunde!”’ (MA, I, 376), which Derrida has recently so richly explored.

The qualification for being a good friend in Nietzsche’s book(s) is thus a good deal more complex than that which Halévy and in turn Proust implies, namely the ability to cope with high-table small talk:

Ja es gibt Freunde, aber der Irrtum, die Täuschung über dich führte sie dir zu; und Schweigen müssen sie gelernt haben, um dir Freund zu bleiben; denn fast immer beruhen solche menschlichen Beziehungen darauf, daß irgend ein paar Dinge nie gesagt werden, ja daß an sie nie gerührt wird. (MA, I, 376)
This amounts to a development on the notion of the superficiality of friendship which we saw Zarathustra propounding above: there must be a kernel of unrevealed knowledge withheld from (and by) even the closest friend in order for the friendship to survive, and not only must friends be kept at a distance but they must keep themselves at a distance and settle for a 'limited engagement', Nietzsche asserts. It is in this context, of an inevitable and unbridgeable gap even (especially) between friends, that Zarathustra continues by arguing one should treat one's friends as one's closest enemies - and love them accordingly. The one thing a friend must not do is pity: 'Hast du aber einen leidenden Freund, so sei seinem Leiden eine Ruhestätte, doch gleichsam ein hartes Bett, ein Feldbett: so wirst du ihm am besten nützen' (Z, II, 'Von den Mitleidigen'; cf. KSA 8, 333; MA, I, 499). As Kaufmann puts it: 'Nietzsche thought that friends should be educators to one another; and educators must not be sentimental', but 'educator' must be understood here in its specifically Nietzschean sense of 'Erzieher', as in the fourth Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, Schopenhauer als Erzieher, where the educator is portrayed as an exemplar who 'draws out' the pupil and acts as a catalyst to the process of his self-overcoming. Against the Christian injunction to 'love thy neighbour' ('Nächstenliebe'), Zarathustra preaches 'Fernstenliebe': 'Nicht den Nächsten lehre ich euch, sondern den Freund. Der Freund sei euch das Fest der Erde und ein Vorgefühl des Übermenschen' (Z, I, 'Von der Nächstenliebe'). The ultimate form of friendship for Nietzsche, then, is that between 'Übermenschen', but it is a form which by no means neutralises conflict and still harks back to the Greek, agonistic model: it is based on respectful rivalry, with the acknowledged tensions subsumed under a common and productive quest for self-overcoming.
Conclusion

The features of 'Proust's Nietzsche', then, bear little resemblance either to Nietzsche's own practice of friendship or to his published views on the subject (although that has not prevented a number of Proust commentators from accepting his line on Nietzsche uncritically). Whereas the most important artist figures in A la recherche are fictionalised constructs based on real figures like Whistler or César Franck, for example, Proust fails to acknowledge that he is using Nietzsche in essentially the same way, as another fictional character. At times he is skating on very thin ice (to use a Nietzschean metaphor) and should perhaps have called Nietzsche, too, 'a Norwegian philosopher', given the poetic licence which he grants himself. Joyce uses Nietzsche in a very similar way to Proust in his Dubliners short story 'A Painful Case', where his main character, Mr Duffy, invests in 'two volumes by Nietzsche: Thus Spake Zarathustra and The Gay Science' after he has broken with his mistress, in an apparent attempt to console himself in his loneliness. Nothing more is said of these volumes other than that they stood on Mr Duffy's shelves - Joyce 'attaches' Nietzsche to his character just as Proust attaches the philosopher to Saint-Loup - but at least Joyce uses Nietzsche to represent something more characteristic of his philosophy as a whole, if only in order gently to ironise the character's pretensions to heroic isolation.

In an important sense, Nietzsche is Proust's paradigmatic philosopher, for he is made to represent the most ruthless case of a figure in search of 'intellectual' truth, and vehemently rejected as a consequence by a writer for whom such 'truths' could never be other than superficial. That Proust's attack on this image of Nietzsche as philosopher should be linked to an attack
on friendship is perfectly consistent, as Deleuze points out:

Dans philosophe, il y a 'ami'. Il est important que Proust adresse la même critique à la philosophie et à l'amitié. [...] C'est que la philosophie, comme l'amitié, ignore les zones obscures où s'élaborent les forces effectives qui agissent sur la pensée, les déterminations qui nous forcent à penser.31

What Proust fails to recognise, though, is that this is also Nietzsche's own position. Moreover, Proust writes in a letter to Jacques Rivière: 'Notez du reste que si théoriquement je suis un athée de l'amitié, je la pratique avec beaucoup plus de ferveur que tant d'apôtres de l'amitié.'32 This is the complex position which he is unwilling to grant Nietzsche because of his break with Wagner, but which I would argue applies to Nietzsche's ambivalence on friendship just as much as to Proust's own. And where Halévy reads Nietzsche's Der Fall Wagner as a veiled 'j'aime encore' to Wagner, so by the same token one could read Proust's attack on Nietzsche as a veiled 'j'aime encore' addressed to Bertrand de Fénelon33 or to Halévy himself, from both of whom Proust had gradually moved away on eminently intellectual grounds,34 in Halévy's 'case' after his love-letter of May 1888 (ironically enough, the same month as Nietzsche's 'Turiner Brief').35

A rejection of philosophical enquiry in its received definition, and concomitantly a deeply-rooted ambivalence concerning the value of friendship, are just two of the many positions which Proust and Nietzsche share, and which it is the purpose of the remainder of this study to explore. Not only does Nietzsche frequently adopt a homosexual subject-position when writing on friendship, but in the case of both writers one can see friendship find its place within a similar configuration of themes: a distrust of the value of human inter-relations in general and of language as a vehicle for adequate self-expression in particular, a valorisation of art as the most effective means of communication, and an advocacy of heroic individualism, especially
that of the artist. Had Proust been better informed and less prejudiced against Nietzsche from the start, he might have been more sympathetic to the philosopher and acknowledged their common ground.
Chapter 2. Epistemoptics: Proust's Perspectivism

'il n'y a pas de vrai; il n'y a que des manières de voir'  
(Flaubert)

In the previous chapter I allowed Proust to set the agenda for my comparison, but it is time to begin afresh. 'De l'avis général, Proust se propose d'écrire un roman perspectiviste', writes Vincent Descombes, and indeed 'Proust's perspectivism' has become something of a critical commonplace by now, a formula which has been accepted by every generation of critics writing on A la recherche since Proust's own time. Gérard Genette mentions 'le perspectivisme' de la description proustienne' only to dismiss the topic as a fait accompli which has ceased to be interesting: 'Ne revenons pas sur ce sujet, d'ailleurs bien connu'; but it will be the task of this chapter to question exactly how 'bien connu' 'Proust's perspectivism' is, since, for all the frequency of its reassertion, the link it establishes between Proust and Nietzsche, whose philosophy of perspectivism introduced the term into European critical discourse, has remained implicit and unanalysed.

In one sense, of course, Genette is right, for there have indeed been a great many studies of Proust's novel which have focussed on his manipulation of narrative perspective, the slipperiness of the Proustian 'je' and the unreliability of a narrator whose point of view is so systematically relativised through irony and inversion — what Doubrovsky highlights as the 'perspectivisme de la présentation des personnages par rapport au je percevant'. In Proust criticism, the term initially applied to his multiplication and manipulation of points of view in A la recherche was not 'perspectivism', though, but 'relativism', or rather 'relativity'. Roger Allard, reviewing the first volume of Sodome et Gomorrhe for the Nouvelle Revue Française in 1922, remarks: 'Le mot de relativité se présente naturellement à quiconque réfléchit
à la portée de cette découverte psychologique.' The 'naturalness' with which the word 'relativity' should spring to mind reflects the currency of Einstein's general theory, published only seven years previously, and others were quick to follow Allard in making the Proust/Einstein comparison.

The first critic to make the move from 'perspektivische Relativität' to 'Perspektivismus' was Ernst Robert Curtius, in his ground-breaking study Marcel Proust, begun while Proust was still alive and published in 1925, before the final volumes of A la recherche had even appeared. It is no coincidence that the term should first be applied by a German critic, although Curtius makes no mention of Nietzsche in this context, despite his in many respects highly Nietzschean critical position (to which I shall return at the end of this chapter). Instead, he derives 'perspectivism' from the Spanish philosopher whose work popularised the term in this period, Ortega y Gasset (who in turn claimed to be borrowing it not from Nietzsche but from Leibniz), and his study as a whole, as I have already mentioned, ends by asserting Proust's Platonism. Curtius's study appeared in French translation in 1928, and it is here that Samuel Beckett picks up the term 'perspectivism', which he uses in the opening paragraph of his Proust, first published in 1931. Beckett writes that the 'dualism in multiplicity' which he discerns in A la recherche 'will be examined more closely in relation to Proust's "perspectivism"', but again he makes no mention of Nietzsche here, and proceeds instead with a thoroughly Schopenhauerian reading of Proust, returning to the topic of '"perspectivism" towards the end of his study only to sneer at Curtius's "Heidelberg laboratory." Since Beckett's time, as Genette indicates, 'Proust's perspectivism' has generally been treated as more of a narratological than an epistemological issue, although there have been a few critics, notably Louis Bolle and Anne Henry, who have also sought to treat it in its
philosophical context. Louis Bolle's *Marcel Proust ou le complexe d'Argus* is the most sustained analysis of this question, but Bolle's is a Leibnizian Proust ('Le paragraphe 57 de la *Monadologie* annonce déjà toutes les descriptions perspectivistes de Proust'), while Anne Henry, as one would expect, links Proust's 'perspectivisme narratif' to Schopenhauer. In this chapter I shall pursue a comparison between Proust's epistemology and Nietzsche's, arguing that 'Proust's perspectivism' can be understood in its fullest Nietzschean sense.

'Proust drew on an incredibly rich repertory of metaphors,' writes Roger Shattuck: 'But it is principally through the science and the art of optics that he beholds and depicts the world. Truth - and Proust believed in it - is a miracle of vision.' The importance of the visual in general and optical imagery in particular was one of the earliest themes to be explored by Proust criticism, and it has remained one of the most frequently considered topics. Indeed one could pursue a comparison simply between Nietzsche's and Proust's uses of imagery relating to optical instruments - on the one hand 'Mikroskopiker der Seele' (*GM*, I, 1) and the *camera obscura* (*GD*, IX, 7), on the other the magic lantern and the kaleidoscope, the photographic camera, 'Proust's binoculars', and the many other similar images to which Proust criticism has drawn attention. Optical imagery will necessarily feature in this chapter, but I intend to concentrate on the relation between point of view and truth which Shattuck foregrounds, and which we saw Proust's Elstir also highlighting at the end of the last chapter with his assertion: 'la sagesse [...] est un point de vue sur les choses'.

Before we can consider 'Proust's perspectivism', though, we need first to examine how Nietzsche uses the term; moreover, since it does not appear in his philosophy until the mid-1880s in response to many of the problems which he
has been working on right from the early 1870s, it will be necessary to begin
further back and consider the question to which 'perspectivism' becomes
Nietzsche's answer. So I shall start by examining the way Nietzsche problem-
atises truth in his early philosophy, before moving on to consider how his
philosophy of perspectivism proper develops in the mid-1880s out of his
ongoing language criticism, at which point I shall turn to an extended
consideration of what I shall term Proust's 'epistemoptics' in the light of
the Nietzschean model. 'Proust's perspectivism', I shall argue, amounts to a
good deal more than merely experimenting with narrative point of view.

'Was Ist Wahrheit?': Nietzsche and Pilate

'Im ganzen neuen Testament kommt keine einzige Bouffonerie vor: aber damit
ist ein Buch widerlegt', writes Nietzsche in a note from the autumn of 1887
(KSA 12, 416). Before him, Francis Bacon (whom Nietzsche honoured as the
author of Shakespeare's plays (EH, II, 4)) had found at least one joke in it,
even if he himself did not find it funny: 'What is truth? said jesting Pilate,
and would not stay for an answer.' 17 Bacon has little respect for those who
revive Pilate's question in modern times, and he continues:

Certainly there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to
fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting.
And though the sects of philosophers of that kind be gone, yet there
remain certain discoursing wits which are of the same veins, though
there be not so much blood in them as there was in the ancients.

Nietzsche would undoubtedly be loth to characterise his 'free spirit' in
Bacon's terms as a 'free-will in thinking' (and he would certainly want to
claim that he has at least as much blood in his veins as the ancients!), but
nevertheless he must surely rank as one of the foremost among the 'discoursing
wits' who have continued to address Pilate's question. Indeed he problem-
atises truth as a self-conscious heir to Pilate. Not only does Nietzsche
appropriate for himself Pilate's other most famous line, 'ecce homo', but he
echoes his formulation 'What is truth?' throughout his philosophical career
(cf. WS 66, M 93; AC 8). When Pilate is explicitly invoked in his notes and
published works it is invariably in the context of this question, and
Nietzsche, equally invariably, treats him with respect. The most celebrated
case is in Der Antichrist:

Habe ich noch zu sagen, daß im ganzen Neuen Testament bloß eine einzige
Figur vorkommt, die man ehren muß? Pilatus, der römische Statthalter.
Einen Judenhandel ernst zu nehmen - dazu überredet er sich nicht. Ein
Jude mehr oder weniger - was liegt daran? ... Der vornhere Hohn eines
Römers, vor dem ein unverschämter Mißbrauch mit dem Wort 'Wahrheit'
getrieben wird, hat das Neue Testament mit dem einzigen Wort bereich-
ert, das Wort hat - das seine Kritik, seine Vernichtung selbst ist:
'was ist Wahrheit!'... (AC 46)

Even if Nietzsche takes Pilate's question seriously and does not consider it a
'Bouffonnerie', its effect in refuting the New Testament - i.e. in denying the
possibility that Christ can be 'the way, the truth, and the life' (John 14. 6)
- is still as devastating. Indeed in his note for this passage Nietzsche
makes it clear that he is actually conflating two biblical incidents to give
his version greater effect, for whereas in the Bible 'I am the way, the truth,
and the life' is Christ's answer to Thomas's question 'how can we know the
way?' during the Last Supper, Nietzsche moves it forward to the time of his
interrogation by Pilate: 'Es wird erzählt <daß> der berühmte Stifter des
Christenthums vor Pilatus sagte "ich bin die Wahrheit"; die Antwort des Römers
darauf ist Roms würdig: als die größte Urbanität aller Zeiten' (KSA 11,
100)."^

Nietzsche, then, turns the biblical scene into a more dramatic conflict
(he turns Pilate's question into an exclamation), and he reads the encounter
agonally, as a typological confrontation — between the pagan Roman and the Judaeo-Christian traditions. He reads Pilate as an antagonist of Christ, a denier of Christ — as the first 'Antichrist', indeed, the first in a long line of figures with whom Nietzsche 'takes sides' and identifies. The 'giddiness' which Nietzsche thematises is that of the murderers of God ('Stürzen wir nicht fortwährend? Und rückwärts, seitwärts, vorwärts, nach allen Seiten? Gibt es noch ein Oben und ein Unten?' (FW 125)), and so it is no coincidence that when he replays the Pilate/Christ confrontation parodically in Also sprach Zarathustra, it should be at the point where Zarathustra chances upon 'der Mörder Gottes', 'der häßlichste Mensch', who took exception to Christ's immodesty and presumption:

Zarathustra himself is figured here as Peter, the thrice-denier of Christ, and takes his place in the noble line of descent from Pilate: Zarathustra vs. Christ, or in the concluding words of Ecce Homo, 'Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten' (EH, IV, 9).

But God lives on in the Western philosophical imagination, for many are those, besides Christ, who have claimed 'I am the truth'. Plato, for one — or Spinoza, according to the two versions of the section entitled 'Wie die "wahre Welt" endlich zur Fabel wurde' in Götzten-Dämmerung (GD, IV; KSA 14, 415). Nietzsche senses the theological grounding of Western metaphysics hitherto, just as he now 'smells' 'die göttliche Verwesung' (FW 125), but Nietzsche the Antichrist knows the wiles of his Christian antagonists — like that 'crafty Christian', Kant (GD, III, 6), or like those who have reclaimed even Pilate
for Christianity, as 'Advokat Christi' (MA, II, 8). Nietzsche knows, above all, that we will not get rid of God until we dispense with the deceptive metaphysics of language, until we stop believing in grammar: 'Die "Vernunft" in der Sprache: oh was für eine betrügerische Weibsperson! Ich fürchte, wir werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an die Grammatik glauben ...' (GD, III, 5). For language will always smuggle a divinity back into the order of things.

Language, Truth and... Lies: 'über Wahrheit und Lüge'

'Die Wahrheit! Schwärmerischer Wahn eines Gottes!
Was geht die Menschen die Wahrheit an!'
('Über das Pathos der Wahrheit'; KSA 1, 759)

So Nietzsche's attack on the metaphysics of truth is intimately bound up with his critique of language, which finds its most sustained expression in the powerful early essay 'über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne' (1873), a relentless attack on human hubris, in particular the presumptions of conceptual language. Here Nietzsche develops the earlier dualism from Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) of a Dionysian 'Ur-Eine' and a world of Apollinian fictions in a more specifically linguistic direction, and the correspondence theory of truth collapses under the weight of its sheer arrogance in claiming to encompass the world within its linguistic representations. Delving back into putative prehistory, Nietzsche characterises man's aboriginal relation to the world of becoming in Heraclitean flux as a 'metaphorical' one, for the 'Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen' is a 'Trieb zur Metapherbildung' (KSA 1, 887), but this 'private language' of metaphors proved unsustainable under the pressure of man's socialisation, and the volcanic stream of metaphors 'hardened' into concepts: Nietzsche writes of 'das Hart- und Starr-Werden einer ursprüng-
lich in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem Urvermögen menschlicher Phantasie hervorstromenden Bildermasse' (KSA 1, 883). It is only by forgetting this prehistoric process that man can claim conceptual 'knowledge' of the world at all: he 'forgets' that conceptual truths are mere 'Conventionen der Sprache' (KSA 1, 878), anthropomorphic projections which in fact ('in truth') have nothing to tell us about the world. Man imagines his projections are inherent in Nature 'Herself', and devises such notions as the 'Gesetzmassigkeit der Natur' (KSA 1, 885), forgetting that the 'empirical world' is merely an anthropomorphic one (KSA 1, 886), forgetting his own role as 'künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt' (KSA 1, 883).

'Die Gesetzgebung der Sprache' (KSA 1, 877) thus results in a wholly unwarranted fixation of reality for the sake of man's convenience - it is a process of 'Gleichschaltung', indeed, since '[j]eder Begriff entsteht durch Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen' (KSA 1, 880). Language divides up the flux of reality arbitrarily into discrete units which give man's intellect an apparent purchase on it, and he then prides itself on 'describing' the reality he has thus parcelled out, so that nothing is more absurd than the tautological, analytical 'truths' of language, which Nietzsche thoroughly debunks:

Wenn ich die Definition des Saugethiers mache und dann erkläre, nach Besichtigung eines Kamelis: Siehe, ein Saugethier, so wird damit eine Wahrheit zwar an das Licht gebracht, aber sie ist von begrenztem Werthe, ich meine, sie ist durch und durch anthropomorphisch und enthält keinen einzigen Punct, der 'wahr an sich', wirklich und allgemeingültig, abgesehen von dem Menschen, wäre. (KSA 1, 883)

In this early essay, in short, 'truths' are dismissed as falsifications - or as Nietzsche puts it in the contemporaneous essay 'über das Pathos der Wahrheit', pushing the point to its paradoxical extreme, man must recognise '[d]ie Wahrheit, ewig zur Unwahrheit verdammt zu sein' (KSA 1, 760). But if one asks what man is falsifying, what Nietzsche's definition of 'die Welt' or of
'Natur' is, against which man's congenitally falsifying intelligence is ranged, then we find that at this stage in Nietzsche's career he is still using markedly dualistic, indeed Kantian terms. He writes of 'das rätselhafte X des Dings an sich' (KSA 1, 879) or 'das Wesen der Dinge' (KSA 1, 879, 880, 884), and he defines 'die Natur' as 'ein für uns unzugängliches und undefinierbares X' (KSA 1, 880).\textsuperscript{22}

Nietzsche left these essays unpublished, and his descriptions of a 'real' world structurally beyond our ken will be superseded by the perspectivistic/will to power model, as we shall see, but for the moment, as a way of summing up his early position in 'über Wahrheit und Lüge', let us allow Nietzsche to give his celebrated first response to Pilate's question:

Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauche einem Volke fest, canonisch und verbindlich dienken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen in Betracht kommen. Wir wissen immer noch nicht, woher der Trieb zur Wahrheit stammt: denn bis jetzt haben wir nur von der Verpflichtung gehört, die die Gesellschaft, um zu existieren, stellt, wahrhaft zu sein, d. h. die usuelen Metaphern zu brauchen, also moralisch ausgedrückt: von der Verpflichtung, nach einer festen Convention zu lügen, scharenweise in einem für alle verbindlichen Stile zu lügen. (KSA 1, 880f.)

Not only are 'truths' merely habitual conveniences, then, 'Conventionen der Sprache' or (here) the most usual metaphors which people have forgotten are such, debased coin worn away by 'usus',\textsuperscript{23} but truth-telling (what Nietzsche will later characterise as 'der Wille zur Wahrheit' (JGB 1)) is also a mere habit fostered by society as a way of taming man's natural predisposition to 'Verstellung' (KSA 1, 876). Ironically, though, because man likes being deceived ('Der Mensch selbst aber hat einen unbesiegbaren Hang, sich täuschen zu lassen' (KSA 1, 888)), he allows himself to accept this state of affairs:
the habit which is our linguistic representation of reality in the first instance is in turn reinforced by social interaction.

**Nietzsche's Perspectivism**

Nietzsche's basic position on the ontologically primal state of 'becoming' (which problematises the very status of 'ontology' itself), persists after *Die Geburt der Tragödie*,'über Wahrheit und Lüge' and his other texts from the early 1870s into his later philosophy. A passage like the following, from *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882), continues the critical project of unmasking the anthropomorphisms inherent in our conception of nature: 'Hüten wir uns, zu denken, daß die Welt ein lebendiges Wesen sei. [...] Der Gesamtcharakter der Welt ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos, nicht im Sinne der fehlenden Notwendigkeit, sondern der fehlenden Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten heißen' (FW 109). This section indeed radicalises and completes that project by undermining the vestigial anthropomorphism of Nietzsche's own earlier position, where the world was still conceived as an organic entity.

Nietzsche's critique of language persists throughout his later work, as well, and he will continue to expand on the essay 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' in his campaign against the metaphysical underpinnings of truth-in-language, against the superficiality and social constructedness of both consciousness and language, as in the following further passage from *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: 'Wir haben eben gar kein Organ für das Erkennen, für die "Wahrheit": wir "wissen" (oder glauben oder bilden uns ein) gerade so viel, als es im Interesse der Menschen-Herde, der Gattung, nützlich sein mag' (FW 354). But
Despite the persistence of the problem of 'Erkenntnis' for Nietzsche, by this time (1887) he is conceiving the relation between language and 'truth' in rather different terms to those of the early essay 'Über Wahrheit und Lüge'. By this stage the vocabulary and indeed the whole tenor of Nietzsche's analysis has changed, for he has shifted from a denunciation of the 'metaphorical' and trivially tautologous nature of truth to his mature position, where 'perspectivism' makes its appearance. The change in Nietzsche's approach can be seen from his reformulation of Pilate's question in a notebook entry of 1886, where he gives an answer somewhat different to the celebrated passage in 'Über Wahrheit und Lüge': 'Was ist Wahrheit? (inertia, die Hypothese, bei der Befriedigung entsteht, geringster Verbrauch von geistiger Kraft, usw.)' (KSA 12, 125). Here Nietzsche expands on his opening position of 'truth' as habit, a sign of laziness, a path of least resistance (cf. KSA 11, 635), but expresses it now in terms of the expense of energy and the satisfaction of instinctual drives - in terms of will to power.

'Perspectivism' makes its appearance, then, in the period 1886-87, during the 'Umwertungszeit' when Nietzsche was working on the book which was not to be, but which his philosophical executors would publish as Der Wille zur Macht. It is in Nietzsche's notebooks of this period that one finds him developing his philosophy of perspectivism most extensively, and interestingly he is still developing his thinking in response to the question 'Was ist Wahrheit?'. For a time he was planning to devote a whole division of Jenseits von Gut und Böse to the question, as his notes reveal (KSA 12, 51, 52, 125), but this idea was shelved as Der Wille zur Macht began to take shape and he began to think of the material as belonging more properly there instead. Unusually, the plan which was taken as the basis for their edition of the book by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Peter Gast is actually dated: 'entworfen
den 17. März 1887, Nizza' (KSA 12, 318), so it is quite clear that it was superseded by the plan which Colli and Montinari establish as the last Nietzsche was to make before abandoning the whole idea of the project, dated 'Silis Maria am letzten Sonntag des Monat August 1888' (KSA 12, 246; 13, 537f.), and in which "was ist Wahrheit?" (as a quotation) figures as the title for the First Book. Indeed the notes of the period 1886-87 are actually arranged according to this plan (KSA 12, 246-97; 323-36). Neither the section in Jenseits nor the Book of Der Wille zur Macht materialised in the end, but Nietzsche's work on the question of perspectivism leaves noticeable traces in the works which he did publish during this period: Jenseits von Gut und Böse itself (1886), the new prefaces to the second editions of his earlier books (1886-87), Book V of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1887), and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887).

'Der Wille zur Wahrheit als Wille zur Macht'

The OED defines 'perspectivism' as: 'The theory that knowledge of a subject is inevitably partial and limited by the individual perspective from which it is viewed; also, the partiality and limitation inherent in knowledge on this view'. In the section which follows, though, I shall seek to demonstrate that for Nietzsche 'perspectivism' entails a great deal more than this: perspectivism is deliberately formulated as a way of superseding traditional theory of knowledge ('Erkenntnistheorie'), for Nietzsche's relativisation of the whole process of cognition is such that the 'object' of which the 'knowledge' is to be procured is in fact created by the 'subject of knowledge'. What is more, although with the term 'perspectivism' Nietzsche privileges an optical meta-
phor to express limited 'point of view' - a relatively traditional metaphor indeed, hence the confusion between Nietzsche here and Leibniz and Schopenhauer - at the same time he relativises the importance of the visual by developing the optical metaphor in tandem with a philological one. For in his later work he may no longer celebrate originary 'metaphorical' language as he did in 'über Wahrheit und Lüge', but he recasts his earlier position and writes in equally philological terms of 'text' and 'interpretation'.

Firstly on the 'ontological' level, then, the perspectivism of the second half of the 1880s is developed in response to what Nietzsche dismisses as the futility of the natural scientists' attempts to tie down the 'essential' flux of the world in the name of eternal, unchanging truth (Being), through such notions as the 'atom'. Perspectivism is formulated 'Gegen das wissenschaftliche Vorurteil' (KSA 12, 141), 'Gegen das physikalische Atom' (KSA 12, 314; cf. 13, 302, 373), and in section 12 of Jenseits Nietzsche duly follows Boscovich in declaring war on man's 'atomistisches Bedürfnis'.

*Der Perspektivismus* may be 'nur eine komplexe Form der Spezifizität' (KSA 13, 373), but it is the mode of this complexity which is crucial, for it applies just as much to the human world as to the physical, and the result is that 'der Mensch' is now figured as a site of competing forces, the 'subject' being deconstructed into a mere 'Kraftcentrum' (KSA 13, 373).

On the 'epistemological' level, 'truth' is still just a certain species of error (KSA 11, 506, 598), still just a trick of language: 'Wir stellen ein Wort hin, wo unsere Unwissenheit anhebt, - wo wir nicht mehr weiter seh'n können z.B. das Wort "ich", das Wort "thun", das Wort "leiden": das sind vielleicht Horizontlinien unserr Erkenntnis, aber keine "Wahrheiten"' (KSA 12, 185). But in comparison with 'über Wahrheit und Lüge', where Nietzsche was primarily concerned to launch a frontal attack on the status of truth itself and
denounced truth-telling ('Wahrhaftigkeit') as merely a habitual convenience fostered by society, his emphasis in the 1880s shifts to a more profound questioning of the will to truth and its value. This shift is indicated programmatically by the opening section of *Jenseits*, which poses 'Das Problem vom Werte der Wahrheit', and asks: 'Was in uns will eigentlich "zur Wahrheit"?' (JGB 1; cf. FW 344; GM, III, 24, 27). Perspectivism, then, is predicated on an unmasking of man's 'Wille zur Wahrheit', which is now revealed as nothing but 'Wille zur Macht' (cf. KSA 11, 699; 12, 352). This theme is announced as early as *Also sprach Zarathustra*, where Zarathustra quotes life saying to him: "'wahrlich, mein Wille zur Macht wandelt auch auf den Füßen deines Willens zur Wahrheit!'" (Z, II, 'Von der Selbst-Überwindung'), and in section 211 of *Jenseits* Nietzsche reduces this genealogical truth to a straight equation, when writing of the true philosophers whose 'Wille zur Wahrheit ist - Wille zur Macht'. But it is in his notebook that he works out most thoroughly the implications of this discovery:

The infinitely renewed process of forcing the world to accept the designations we give it, which we conveniently call "'Wahrheit'" but which is in fact a kind of creation, is revealed here in all its violence - 'knowing the truth' becomes simply a sustained belief in the power of one's projection, of one's 'perspective', for truth is a work of art. The 'künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt' of 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' is now no longer unmasked as merely a
purveyor of lies, a falsifier of the true world, but relativised by being
infinitely pluralised - 'externally' and 'internally'. The corollary of this
position is that the 'objective' world of Being and beings, of stable
'things', is exploded into myriad competing projections/perspectives, each one
of which acts merely as a 'support' for its projector. So if one is still in
search of truth it is not even possible to define one's terms:

Das 'was ist das?' ist eine Sinn-Setzung von etwas Anderem aus gesehen.
[...] Zu Grunde liegt immer 'was ist das für mich?' (für uns, für
alles, was lebt usw.)

Ein Ding wäre bezeichnet, wenn an ihm erst alle Wesen ihr 'was ist
das?' gefragt und beantwortet hätten. Gesetzt, ein einziges Wesen, mit
seinen eigenen Relationen und Perspektiven zu allen Dingen, fehlte: und
das Ding ist immer noch nicht 'definirt'. (KSA 12, 140)

Perspectivism and Interpretation

'Truth' is relational, then, and has nothing to do with any putative 'An sich'
(KSA 13, 303); pluralised in this way it ceases to have any exclusive
validity, and 'knowledge' must be replaced by a notion of 'interpretation',
the primacy of which (as 'Auslegung', 'Ausdeutung' or 'Interpretation')
Nietzsche asserts over the supposed (scientific) 'explanation' of truth.

'Welt-Auslegung, nicht Welt-Erklärung' (KSA 12, 39) is his watchword in the
notes of this period (cf. KSA 12, 98, 100, 104). The fixed point of 'über
Wahrheit und Lüge', the 'für uns unzugängliches X' against which man's
anthropomorphisms can be denounced as falsifications, is abandoned. Similarly
the temporal dynamic governing that earlier essay and Die Geburt der Tragödie
- a prehistoric, aboriginal 'Dionysian' or 'metaphorical' world which has an
'Apollinian' mask overlaid onto it or hardens into concepts - is developed
from a 'mythological' into a more psychological, 'genealogical' conception (in
Nietzsche's new sense of the term), which asserts that there is no recourse to a historical fixed point or origin prior to 'falsification'. Habit or custom is no longer to be denounced as falsification, but genealogised, for as Nietzsche writes in an important passage in the Second Essay of Zur Genealogie der Moral:

'alle Zwecke, alle Nützlichkeiten sind nur *Anzeichen* davon, daß ein Wille zur Macht über etwas weniger Mächtiges Herr geworden ist und ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion aufgeprägt hat; und die ganze Geschichte eines Dings, eines Organs, eines Brauchs kann dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen-Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und Zurechtmachungen sein. (GM, II, 12)

'Der interpretative Charakter alles Geschehens' is repeatedly asserted in these notes: 'Es giebt kein Ereignis an sich. Was geschieht, ist eine Gruppe von Erscheinungen *ausgelesen* und zusammengefaßt von einem interpretirenden Wesen' (KSA 12, 38). And if one asks who or what this 'interpretirendes Wesen' might be, Nietzsche's answer is emphatic: 'Man darf nicht fragen: "wer interpretirt, denn?" sondern das Interpretiren selbst, als eine Form des Willens zur Macht, hat Dasein (aber nicht als "Sein", sondern als ein *Prozeß*, ein *Werd*en) als ein Affekt' (KSA 12, 140). With his empirical hypothesis of will to power, Nietzsche passes definitively beyond the kind of Schopenhauerian dualism of 'will' and 'idea', of 'will' and its 'objectifications', or the residually metaphysical readings of the natural scientists, for the will-to-power model erases the distinction between 'interpreter' and 'interpreted' and avoids establishing any such new dualisms through this notion of the continuously occurring process of 'interpretation'. If 'diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht - und nichts außerdem' (KSA 11, 611), and 'der Wille zur Macht interpretirt' (KSA 12, 139), then there can be nothing outside interpretation - in this textualised world-view 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte'. As Jean Granier points out, interpretation is 'à la fois l'acte d'interpréter et le
Le texte lui-même est un devenir! et l'interprète, lui aussi, est un devenir! Le phénomène de l'interprétation est donc cet événement insolite qui a lieu, pour ainsi dire, à l'entrecroisement des séquences du devenir dont les unes se déterminent comme 'sens' et les autres comme 'activité de déchiffrage.'

So although Nietzsche's earlier epistemological model based on (a deconstruction of) the distinction between 'metaphor' and 'concept' has been superseded, his mature perspectivistic philosophy, based on a hyper-inflation of the semiotic, represents a persistence of the philological model. And it is within this global textual conception that the optical metaphor of 'perspectivism' finds its place, for just as the distinctions between 'knower' and 'known' or 'interpretation' and 'text' are erased, so is that between 'viewer' and 'viewed'. Each 'point of view', by this model, is what Kofman refers to as a 'provisional centre of perspective', a specific site for an event of interpretation. And just as there is no extra-text, it is idle to attempt to establish anything outside of a perspectivistic framework (cf. FW 374; KSA 12, 188).

Nietzsche gathers together these strands of the argument so far in a note from Spring 1887, where he argues against both the positivistic spirit of his age and Schopenhauer's 'subjective idealism':


Soweit überhaupt das Wort 'Erkenntnis' Sinn hat, ist die Welt erkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne 'Perspektivismus'.

Unsre Bedürfnisse sind es, die die Welt auslegen: unsre Triebe und deren Für und Wider. Jeder Trieb ist eine Art Herrschsucht, jeder hat seine Perspektive, welche er als Norm aller übrigen Trieben aufzwingen möchte. (KSA 12, 315)
Epistemoptical Illusion

Just as Nietzsche's perspectivism is a response to the question of 'Wahrheit', then, it is equally a response to what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls 'the question of Verhelt'. The 'ego' is reduced in Nietzsche's analysis to a mere 'Construktion des Denkens' (KSA 11, 526), 'eine begriffliche Synthesis' (KSA 12, 32); the human subject is deconstructed into a plurality of competing drives, better expressed not in terms of 'Seelen-Atomistik' but rather 'Seele als Subjekts-Vielheit' or 'Seele als Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte' (JGB 12; cf. KSA 10, 165, 324; 11, 168, 434, 631f.; 12, 104). In human terms, then, it is these drives or affects which interpret ('Wer legt aus? - Unsere Affekte' (KSA 12, 161)) rather than consciousness, which is but a surface (cf. FV 11, 54, 354; KSA 11, 117; EH, II, 9), a late development: 'Das Bewußtsein spät, kümmerlich entwickelt, zu außer Zwecken, den größten Irrthümern ausgesetzt, sogar essentiell etwas Fälschendes, Vergrößerndes, Zusammenfassendes' (KSA 12, 294). In the light of his radical deconstruction of the subject, Nietzsche can only reject the very term 'Erkenntnistheorie' itself and replace it with a term more adequate to the perspectivistic nature of 'knowledge' as he understands it: 'An Stelle der "Erkenntnistheorie" eine Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte' (KSA 12, 342).

Consciousness may be prey to 'den größten Irrthümern', but that is not to say that the drives themselves are somehow immune from error, indeed as Nietzsche makes clear especially in the published works of this period (Jenseits and the second-edition prefaces), where he addresses the practical consequences of perspectivism, perspectivism is synonymous with the necessity of human limitation, and hence error. For the plurality of truths leads to the partiality of any one point of view, and truth can no longer be opposed to
'lie' because with this pluralisation each truth is but a species of 'lie'. What we have, then, is an optics of truth which accounts for man's capacity for error, indeed its inevitability, by his susceptibility to what one might call 'epistemoptical' illusion: 'Vordergrunds-Schätzungen', 'vorläufige Perspektiven', even 'Froschperspektiven' (all JGB 2) are the order of the day; 'alles Leben ruht auf Schein, Kunst, Täuschung, Optik, Notwendigkeit des Perspektivischen und des Irrtums' (GT, 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', 5). 'Das Perspectivische' - defined as 'das Nichtwissen, das Im-Großen-und-Groben-Sehen, das Vereinfachen und Fälschen' (KSA 11, 638f.) - is essential to life itself (JGB, 'Vorrede', 34, 188), and this 'Perspektiven-Optik des Lebens' (JGB 11) is in turn an 'Optik der Werthschätzung' (KSA 12, 423), for every perspective, every interpretation posits a value: 'bei aller Werthschätzung handelt es sich um eine bestimmte Perspektive' (KSA 11, 181). Every perspective (generated by the drives) is an evaluation because, as Nietzsche argues in a crucial passage of genealogical analysis, the drives themselves are merely effects of evaluation: 'Triebes sind die Nachwirkungen lange geheteter Werthschätzungen, die jetzt instinktiv wirken, wie als ein System von Lust- und Schmerzurtheilen. Zuerst Zwang, dann Gewöhnung, dann Bedürfnis, dann natürlicher Hang (Trieb)' (KSA 11, 135). Even here, then, Nietzsche resists any essentialising definition of 'human nature': the drives are no 'letzte Instanz', no ultimate explanatory principle, no 'text', for they are an interpretation (in the nominal and verbal senses). Even the drives are merely will to power - the drives themselves have become.

Nietzsche's perspectivistic deconstruction of truth can perhaps best be summed up with a last passage from his notebook of 1886:

'Daß der Werth der Welt in unserer Interpretationen liegt (- daß vielleicht irgendwo noch andere Interpretationen möglich sind als bloß menschliche -) daß die bisherigen Interpretationen perspektivische
Schatzungen sind, vermöge deren wir uns im Leben, das heißt im Willen zur Macht, zum Wachsthum der Macht erhalten, daß jede Erhöhung des Menschen die überwindung engerer Interpretationen mit sich bringt, daß jede erreichte Verstärkung und Machterweiterung neue Perspektiven aufthut und an neue Horizonte glaubt – dies geht durch meine Schriften. Die Welt, die uns etwas angeht, ist falsch d.h. ist kein Thatbestand, sondern eine Ausdichtung und Rundung über eine magere Summe von Beobachtungen; sie ist 'im Flusse', als etwas Verendes, als eine sich immer neu verschiebende Falschheit, die sich niemals der Wahrheit nähert: denn – es gibt keine 'Wahrheit'. (KSA 12, 114; cf. KSA 12, 191f.)

So Nietzsche's ultimate answer to Pilate's question is that there simply is no truth, there is no objective knowledge in the scientists' sense. There are only foreground interpretations, "vorläufige Wahrheiten" (KSA, 11, 133), 'perspectival' truths for me (JGB 231) – and 'my' name is legion, for 'we' are many (cf. JGB 202). Truths are merely those evaluations which have emerged as (provisionally) dominant in the hierarchy of the interpreting drives.

**Proust's Perspectivism: An Apprenticeship in Epistemoptics**

It is in the light of this characterisation of Nietzsche's mature perspectivistic philosophy that I think we can now begin to approach the question of 'Proust's perspectivism', and I shall argue that Proust's narrator ultimately comes to adopt Nietzsche's epistemological position – or rather, his new definition of epistemology itself as a 'Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte'.

It should immediately be pointed out, though, that there are inevitable and important differences of emphasis between the two writers. Firstly, it is fundamental to the epistemological structure of *A la recherche* that only over the course of its immense trajectory does the narrator come to appreciate the full significance of so many things which formerly he failed to grasp. Proust's novel, in other words, is a *Bildungsroman* – indeed it is a *Selbst-
überwindungsroman, in the sense that the narrator is continually forced to abandon and overcome earlier positions, to reinterpret past events and re-evaluate his opinions of other characters (for 'Coup de barre et changement de direction dans les caractères' (II, 1490), read 'Umwertung aller Werte'). So what we have seen Nietzsche flatly asserting, Proust's narrator has to learn over the course of a series of painful and disillusioning experiences, the first of which cause him to shed his initially naïve belief in the power of language. Whereas Nietzsche's extreme linguistic scepticism is in place from early in his philosophical career, Proust's narrator in Combray is of the age 'où on croit qu'on crée ce qu'on nomme' (CS, I, 89), and the mere invocation of a name has magical significance for him. His 'amour de la vérité' (JF, I, 496) is at first predicated on precisely the kind of belief in linguistic 'aeternae veritates' which Nietzsche so roundly condemns (MA, I, 11), and only as he passes from 'L'âge des noms' through 'L'âge des mots' to 'L'âge des choses' (Proust's original section-divisions for the novel) does the narrator come to recognise that neither place-names nor personal names are rigid designators, that 'les noms sont des dessinateurs fantaisistes' (JF, I, 538).

Of course Nietzsche himself also abandons and overcomes earlier positions, and he acknowledges as much in the 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', for example, but as far as 'knowing the truth' is concerned he is sceptical from the start, as we saw in our examination of 'über Wahrheit und Lüge', and it is only the terms of reference which will change. Whereas Nietzsche is radically anti-essentialist throughout his philosophical career, then, Proust's narrator, by contrast, remains in search of 'essences' even after his onomastic dogmatism has been abandoned. Elstir may tell the narrator in Balbec already that wisdom (and - pace Shattuck - precisely not truth) is a 'point de vue sur les
chooses' (JF, II, 219), but he has to come to appreciate it for himself in order to adopt it as his own conviction.

Secondly, and more specifically, whereas Nietzsche relativises truth from the start and comes to express his epistemological scepticism in optical terms only latterly, with Proust this order of priority is reversed. Proust figures knowledge in optical terms from the beginning of his novel, right from the kaleidoscope (CS, I, 4), kinetoscope (CS, I, 7) and magic lantern (CS, I, 9) in the opening pages of 'Combray': truth is always characterised as an image of the other or of the world ('Weltanschauung'), and the narrator reaches his perspectivistic position by coming to appreciate how infinitely susceptible any one such image is to relativisation by rival images, by competing perspectives. What the narrator has to learn is the inevitability of 'les erreurs d'optique', in Nietzsche's terms the necessity of perspectival error: 'Cette perpétuelle erreur qui est précisément la "vie"' (AD, IV, 154). In the section of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches entitled 'Ungerechtsein notwendig', Nietzsche writes bleakly of the 'necessary injustice' in human relations: 'Keine Erfahrung zum Beispiel über einen Menschen, stünde er uns auch noch so nah, kann vollständig sein, so daß wir ein logisches Recht zu einer Gesamtabschätzung desselben hätten; alle Schätzungen sind voreilig und müssen es sein' (MA, I, 32). In the later Preface to the second edition of the same book, he recasts this assertion in perspectivistic terms, spelling out indeed how to be a good perspectivist:

Du solltest das Perspektivische in jeder Wertschätzung begreifen lernen - die Verschiebung, Verzerrung und scheinbare Teleologie der Horizonte und was alles zum Perspektivischen gehört [...] Du solltest die notwendige Ungerechtigkeit in jedem Für und Wider begreifen lernen, die Ungerechtigkeit als unablösbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als bedingt durch das Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit. (MA, I, 'Vorrede', 6)

It is precisely this 'Lernprozeß' that Proust's narrator has to undergo, and
he will learn his lessons in perspectivism pre-eminently through his inter-relations with other characters in the novel.

Thirdly, then, whereas for Nietzsche 'Erfahrung über einen Mensch' is merely one instance used to illustrate an argument which is pitched at a higher level of generality — knowing the other is just a specific case of knowledge in general, the human world is just a special case of the world in general — the specificity of Proust's exploration of the problem of knowledge is that he is exploring it in a novelistic context, the very precondition of which (at least before, say, Finnegans Wake or L'innommmable) is the inter-relation of characters. Although A la recherche begins with the narrator reconstructing his world from the vantage point of his bed, then, unlike Beckett's Malone he does not stay there for the rest of the novel but goes out into the world, and even though in retrospect he at times bitterly regrets his 'temps perdu' on the superficial level of conversations with friends and social interaction in general, large sections of the novel are devoted to precisely such activities.

Proust, in other words, was not a writer of philosophical tracts. But then again neither was Nietzsche, and one of the specificities of Nietzsche's philosophy is the bewildering variety of voices he adopts, the frequency with which he turns philosophical problems into dramatic vignettes. He is not interested in resurrecting the Platonic dialogue like Berkeley or Hume, but he parodies the dialectical form incessantly and exploits the imaginary conversation as the most economical way of representing conflicting perspectives, from the dialogue between Der Wanderer und sein Schatten through the exchanges between 'A' and 'B' in Morgenröte and Die fröhliche Wissenschaft to Also sprach Zarathustra (which has indeed been turned into a stage-play). And that is quite apart from the 'quotations' from everyday life which he so often
introduces in order to subject them to ruthless psycho-genealogical scrutiny, and the snippets or paraphrases from earlier philosophers which he quotes so as to be able to argue with them 'man to man', debunking and deriding his absent interlocutors.

It is not, however, a 'man to man' relationship in Nietzsche's dramatised philosophy that is of greatest relevance to the present study, but rather the 'man to woman' relationship which he establishes with the opening words of thePreface to *Jenseits*, and which so uncannily sets up the primary epistemological dynamic of Proust's novel: 'Vorausgesetzt, daß die Wahrheit ein Weib ist -'. Was there ever a more comprehensive instantiation of this assumption than *A la recherche*? It may be the narrator's apprenticeship to Elstir which allows him to glimpse the potential for an aesthetic solution to his epistemological problem, but it is his 'apprenticeship' to Albertine which allows him to comprehend the full extent of that problem. Moreover the retrospective narrator, equipped with the answers his earlier self was at times so desperate to discover, flirts in turn with his readers till the end of the novel, teasing us coyly all the while with his incessant announcements that he (and we, more often than not) will not find out 'x' till later, kissing and telling only that there is more to tell.

Proust, then, like Nietzsche, acknowledges that the will to truth, far from being a disinterested pursuit, is but a product of the drives, a mask for desire, and that 'knowing' is but an effect of that desire for knowledge (in Freudian terms a libidinal investment). Both writers respond to the problem of knowledge as traditionally formulated with an optics and an erotics of truth. As we saw in the last chapter, though, Nietzsche does not confine himself to exploring the erotic relationship in merely its heterosexual inflection, which is why his greatest eroticist of truth is Socrates, and his
favourite Platonic text, from the earliest years of his interest in philo-
sophy, is the *Symposium* (the same *Banquet*, indeed, which Proust and his
friends took as the title for their fledgling journal).*1 From *Die Geburt der
Tragödie* through to *Götzen-Dämmerung*, Socrates is for Nietzsche (among many
other things)^*2 'ein großer Erotiker' (GD, II, 8), and Nietzsche is most
complimentary towards Plato when discussing the 'philosophical erotics' which
is dialectics as presented in this, his most 'seminal' text:

*Nichts ist weniger griechisch als die Begriffs-Spinneweberei eines
Einsiedlers, amor intellectualis dei nach Art des Spinoza. Philosophie
nach Art des Plato wäre eher als ein erotischer Wettbewerb zu definier-
en, als eine Fortbildung und Verinnerlichung der alten agonalen
Gymnastik und deren Voraussetzungen ... Was wuchs zuletzt aus dieser
philosophischen Erotik Platos heraus? Eine neue Kunstform des
griechischen Agon, die Dialektik. (GD, IX, 23; cf. IX, 22; GT 13)

In Proust's case, too, it is paradigmatically the lover who generates the
epistemological enquiries in *À la recherche*: it is the narrator in love who
first realises that his initial, comfortably 'atomic' view of other
characters falls woefully short of the mark, and proceeds to explore the
consequences; it is the jealous lover (initially Swann, subsequently the
narrator himself) who becomes a veritable factory for the production of
hypotheses.*3 Tadié remarks on a certain 'donjuanisme du Narrateur' in
Proust's novel,*4 but the epistemophiliac narrator is also in Nietzsche's
sense a 'Don Juan der Erkenntnis':

_Eine Fabel._ - Der Don Juan der Erkenntnis: er ist noch von keinem
Philosophen und Dichter entdeckt worden. Ihm fehlt die Liebe zu den
Dingen, welche er erkennt, aber er hat Geist, Kitzel und Genuß an Jagd
und Intrigen der Erkenntnis - bis an die höchsten und fernsten Sterne
der Erkenntnis hinauf! (M 327)
The Narrator as Scientist

In Die Geburt der Tragödie the 'great eroticist' Socrates is presented as the exemplary 'theoretischer Mensch', masking the true nature of his enquiry by officiating at the birth of supposedly 'scientific' method (cf. GT, 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', 1). We have seen how in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches Nietzsche himself argues that philosophy should take its cue from the natural sciences with their potential for historical relativisation, but we have also seen the distance which he later takes, with his philosophy of perspectivism, from the atomism of the physicists and the prevailing scientific paradigm of the late nineteenth century, 'objective truth'. Proust's narrator comes to share Nietzsche's disaffection with such scientific method, for he is styled as a variety of scientist figures in the course of the novel and comes to appreciate the limitations of each, but given the epistemoptical context of the present chapter it is on the narrator as astronomer in search of 'Sterne der Erkenntnis' that I shall concentrate in the next section.

In his observation of the 'petite bande' of 'jeunes filles en fleurs' - also referred to as 'la bande zoophytique' (JF, II, 210) - it is the narrator's talents as human botanist and zoologist which are initially called upon. Here he brings to bear his 'curiosité de naturaliste humain' (JF, II, 165) and feels 'une satisfaction de botaniste' (JF, II, 156) when they seem to conform to a law of nature. It is this conformity to laws which is the attraction of the scientific model to Proust's narrator with his legislating impulse: to him, science means above all the reassuring inductive process of deriving the 'laws' of human behaviour so as to give himself a predictive power to tame the future and thus compensate his insecurity. The drawback with the natural historian's taxonomic model, though, is that it is too static, so in order to
At Rivebelle the law of motion of the restaurant waiters is disclosed relatively unproblematically to the observing narrator (JF, II, 168), but more work is required to derive the laws governing the appearances of the 'petite bande' on the beach at Balbec:

Combien d’observations patientes, mais non point sereines, il faut recueillir sur les mouvements en apparence irreguliers de ces mondes inconnus avant de pouvoir être sûr qu’on ne s’est pas laissé abuser par des coïncidences, que nos prévisions ne seront pas trompées, avant de dégager les lois certaines, acquises au prix d’expériences cruelles, de cette astronomie passionnée! (JF, II, 188)

Astronomy here represents regularity of movement and reliability - just as the narrator switches to the astronomical metaphor in Rivebelle when he begins to sense an order and harmony in the restaurant scene before him (JF, II, 167), and M. de Vaugoubert's life is ascribed 'une poésie presque astronomique' (SG, III, 43) because of the predictability of his fickleness. In Balbec the narrator's scientific zeal is thwarted, however, for the only law which his 'expériences cruelles' allow him to formulate is a law that there are no 'lois certaines'. 'Les lois psychologiques ont comme les lois physiques une certaine généralité' (CG, II, 524), the narrator tells us in Le Côté de Guermantes, yet the uncertainty of the qualifier 'certaine' becomes all too apparent to him, for both kinds of law rest ultimately only on the 'laws' of probability (P, III, 520). Particularly apposite in this context is Nietzsche's attack on the physicists' superstitious belief that by seeking rules they can protect themselves from the dangerous uncertainty of the real world:

Deshalb ist die Regel suchen der erste Instinkt des Erkennenden: während natürlich mit der Feststellung der Regel noch gar nichts 'erkannt' ist! - Daher der Aberglaube der Physiker: wo sie verharren können d.h. wo die Regelmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen die Anwendung von abkürzenden Formeln erlaubt, meinen sie, sei erkannt worden. Sie fühlen 'Sicherheit': aber hinter dieser intellektuellen Sicherheit steht die Beruhigung der Furchtsamkeit: sie wollen die Regel, weil sie die Welt der Furchtbarkeit entkleidet. Die Furcht vor dem Unberechen-
For Proust's narrator the astronomical paradigm has its uses, but in the end star-gazing merely frustrates him because the astronomer-observer is so utterly remote from the object of his investigation that he can never be quite sure he is interpreting correctly the signs he sees (JF, II, 152). Moreover, in the case of the loved one in particular, astronomical observation proves inadequate in extracting any kind of normative truths: 'car le monde des astres est moins difficile à connaître que les actions réelles des êtres, surtout des êtres que nous aimons, fortifiés qu'ils sont contre notre doute par des fables destinées à les protéger' (P, III, 696).

The narrator may become disillusioned with astronomy, but he does not vacate his observatory: the imagery in *Sodome et Gomorrhe I* is predominantly derived from botany and zoology, but the platform from which the narrator views Charlus and Jupien's mating ritual has already been described at the end of *Le Côté de Guermantes* as 'mon observatoire' (CG, II, 860), like his room in Doncières before it (CG, II, 395). The narrator comments admiringly on Stendhal's frequent use of high places as settings, like the bell tower-observatory in *La chartreuse de Parme* (P, III, 879), for such perches allow the observer to look back down to earth as well as up to the sky. Louis Bolle has convincingly demonstrated Proust's narrator's own taste for the bird's eye view, which has a certain superiority over all others in his hierarchy of perspectives, and this preference is shared by Nietzsche, who not only celebrates the 'commanding' perspective from Sils-Maria, '6000 Fuß über Bayreuth' (EH, I, 4), but also constantly seeks to occupy the metaphorical high ground, the kind of position from which he can pronounce, echoing Goethe, 'Hier ist die Aussicht frei' (GD, IX, 46). Faced with the fundamental unpredictability of other characters, though,
Proust's narrator as seeker of 'lois certaines' has to content himself with the 'law' of 'intermittence', the law that there are no laws, that one must expect the unexpected. Just as Nietzsche remarks on how 'der Mensch im ganzen geworden und wandelbar und selbst der einzelne Mensch nichts Festes und Beharrendes ist' (MA, I, 222), so Proust's narrator is forced to realise that with time the other changes and can exhibit a seemingly inexhaustible array of different characteristics, so that the search for knowledge of the other by training a telescope on them is bound always to be frustrated:

ce n'est qu'après [al]voir reconnu non sans tâtonnements les erreurs d'optique du début qu'on pourrait arriver à la connaissance exacte d'un être si cette connaissance était possible. Mais elle ne l'est pas; car tandis que se rectifie la vision que nous avons de lui, lui-même, qui n'est pas un objectif inerte, change pour son compte, nous pensons le rattraper, il se déplace, et, croyant le voir enfin plus clairement, ce n'est que les images anciennes que nous en avons prises que nous avons réussi à éclaircir, mais qui ne le représentent plus. (JF, II, 229)

Perspectival Shifts

What the inadequacy of the astronomical metaphor ultimately reveals to Proust's narrator is the inadequacy of any monoperspectival epistemological model, so in order for him to overcome 'les erreurs d'optique' his telescope must become at the very least, as Roger Shattuck argues, a set of binoculars. This is brought home to him by an incident in Le Côté de Guermantes which is in one sense a typical moment of recognition, when he realises he has been duped and has to reorder his mental world, but which is at the same time one of the most telling in terms of its epistemological implications since it is the first, and therefore the narrator explicitly dwells on them.

The scene is set in a far-off time when the narrator still believed in
propositional truth: 'À cette époque-là je me figurais encore que c'était au
moyen de paroles qu'on apprend aux autres la vérité' (CG, II, 365), we are
told. But the narrator is given no better 'object lesson' in the relativis-
aton of the object of knowledge than when he hears from Jupien what Françoise
apparently says about him behind his back, which immediately dispels his
habitual image of her and rudely awakens him to the possibility that Françoise
is not so utterly devoted to him as he had previously imagined:

Ces paroles de Jupien tirèrent aussitôt devant moi, dans une teinte
inconnue, une épreuve de mes rapports avec Françoise si différente de
celle sur laquelle je me complaisais souvent à reposer mes regards et
ou, sans la plus légère indécision, Françoise m'adorait et ne perdait
pas une occasion de me célébrer, que je compris que ce n'est pas le
monde physique seul qui diffère de l'aspect sous lequel nous le voyons;
que toute réalité est peut-être aussi dissemblable de celle que nous
croyons percevoir directement et que nous composons à l'aide d'idées
qui ne se montrent pas mais sont agissantes, de même que les arbres, le
soleil et le ciel ne seraient pas tels que nous les voyons, s'ils
étaient connus par des êtres ayant des yeux autrement constituées que
les nôtres, où bien possédant pour cette besogne des organes autres que
des yeux et qui donneraient des arbres, du ciel et du soleil des
equivalents mais non visuels. (CG, II, 366)

At one stroke the narrator's benign world of certainty, of Combray, character-
ised by the naïve image he had entertained of Françoise, is cut from beneath
him, and he is cast adrift in a world of deceptive appearances. The image
which Proust uses here - that of the artist pulling a new proof - is particu-
larly apt, for it symbolises the only kind of 'proof' he is granted in his
quest for the truth which, in this 'roman policier', he comes to appreciate
is overdetermined and approximates to a composite picture, a work of art
pieced together by accumulating and superimposing ever different points of
view, by working through ever new states of a lithographic print.

Jupien's words immediately lead the narrator to relativise his entire
understanding of the knowledge-gathering process by speculating on how the
world might look from an extra-human perspective, a speculation which finds an
exact parallel in Nietzsche's *Morgenröte*:


As it is, Proust's narrator follows 'B's advice and returns from these giddy heights to the human world, drawing out the consequences of his discovery for 'les rapports sociaux' and for 'l'amour':

Telle qu'elle fut, cette brusque échappée que m'ouvrit une fois Jupien sur le monde réel m'épouvanta. Encore ne s'agissait-il que de Françoise dont je ne me souciais guère. En était-il ainsi dans tous les rapports sociaux? Et jusqu'à quel désespoir cela pourrait-il me mener un jour, s'il en était de même de l'amour? C'était le secret de l'avenir. (CG, II, 366)

What kind of 'monde réel' is it that Jupien reveals to him, then? Does he gain a glimpse of the world of Ideas or of will, in Platonic or Schopenhauerian terms? On the contrary: 'le monde réel' is a world of error and delusion, and the superior epistemological position of the retrospective narrator is used here to full effect to indicate in advance the truths which his younger counterpart was still in the process of finding out. The narrator continues his reflections in this passage by stressing already the significance of this initial 'mise en perspective', which heralds all the others in the novel:

je compris l'impossibilité de savoir d'une manière directe et certaine si Françoise m'aimait ou me détestait. Et ainsi ce fut elle qui la première me donna l'idée qu'une personne n'est pas, comme j'avais cru, claire et immobile devant nous avec ses qualités, ses défauts, ses projets, ses intentions à notre égard (comme un jardin qu'on regarde, avec toutes ses plates-bandes, à travers une grille), mais est une ombre où nous ne pouvons jamais pénétrer, pour laquelle il n'existe pas de connaissance directe, au sujet de quoi nous nous faisons des croyances nombreuses à l'aide de paroles et même d'actions, lesquelles les unes et les autres ne nous donnent que des renseignements insuffisants et d'ailleurs contradictoires, une ombre où nous pouvons tour à tour
The narrator now has to live with two irreconcilable perspectives on Françoise, neither of which can be assumed to be the correct one, not only because they are mutually exclusive, but more especially because by the very fact that they relativise each other they cause him to recognise the extent of his personal input into each, the work of the intelligence in fabricating the reality 'que nous croyons percevoir directement et que nous composons à l'aide d'idées qui ne se montrent pas mais sont agissantes'. The narrator, in other words, at last learns a lesson which the reader has been afforded very early on in the novel in the context of Swann, who provides the first social occasion in the book by coming to dinner in Combray, and allows the narrator to meditate on two very contrasting images of him. Here we are immediately introduced to the notion that our 'vision' of another person is in large part a product of our own 'injections':

Sans doute le Swann que connurent à la même époque tant de clubmen était bien différent de celui que créait ma grande-tante, quand le soir, dans le petit jardin de Combray, après qu'avaient retenti les deux coups hésitants de la clochette, elle injectait et vivifiait de tout ce qu'elle savait sur la famille Swann, l'obscur et incertain personnage qui se détachait, suivi de ma grand-mère, sur un fond de ténèbres, et qu'on reconnaissait à la voix. Mais même au point de vue des plus insignifiantes choses de la vie, nous ne sommes pas un tout matériellement constitué, identique pour tout le monde et dont chacun n'a qu'à aller prendre connaissance comme d'un cahier des charges ou d'un testament; notre personnalité sociale est une création de la pensée des autres. Même l'acte si simple que nous appelons 'voir une personne que nous connaissons' est en partie un acte intellectuel. Nous remplissons l'apparence physique de l'être que nous voyons de toutes les notions que nous avons sur lui, et dans l'aspect total que nous nous représentons, ces notions ont certainement la plus grande part. (CS, I, 18f.)

Swann's appearance here as an 'obscur et incertain personnage' 'foreshadows' the later image of the other as 'une ombre où nous ne pouvons jamais pénétrer', but here it is Swann who 'pénétre dans le jardin', which does not
offer a contrast to his obscurity as 'un jardin qu'on regarde, avec toutes ses plates-bandes, à travers une grille', but rather accentuates it as 'un fond de ténèbres'. The fact that Swann's voice is all the narrator's great-aunt has to go on in accomplishing her 'acte intellectuel' as he emerges out of the darkness emphasises just how much intellectual effort is required in order for her to fill in the gaps in her mental image of him. And to convey the full extent of that process of interpretation the narrator switches from an optical to a textual metaphor, turning the act of seeing another person into an engagement with a text which, moreover, cannot simply be perused like a legal document but is inevitably (over)'written' afresh by every new interpretation. The narrator realises that no person is an unambiguous, homogeneous text, and that the truth about the world, particularly the human world, cannot simply be gleaned as from a legal document and taken as read; it is not just waiting to be found, but rather it is created by our interpretations. Even if one is faced with an apparently unambiguous sign there can be no unbiased interpretation of it, and the notion of an 'objective viewpoint' is a delusion; furthermore, the temporal dynamics of truth are such that any privileged interpretation can only maintain its status provisionally and is constantly verging on the untruth, ultimately to be unseated entirely and relativised in the light of a new interpretation.

For Proust, vision - whether in the literal sense or the figurative, epistemological sense - is much more an act of creation than one ordinarily acknowledges, which is why when the narrator at Balbec is embellishing his image of the 'petite bande' with 'quelque ravissante épaule, quelque regard délicieux dont je portais toujours en moi le souvenir ou l'idée préconçue' (JF, II, 155), this is also likened to a process of reading: 'ces déchiffreages rapides d'un être qu'on voit à la volée nous exposant ainsi aux mêmes erreurs
que ces lectures trop rapides où, sur une seule syllabe et sans prendre le temps d'identifier les autres, on met à la place du mot qui est écrit, un tout différent que nous fournit notre mémoire' (JF, II, 155). Here the 'lectures trop rapides' are given as an example of a parapraxis, a failure to 'read' the girls 'properly', but in Combray the narrator has already demonstrated how utterly normal and indeed inescapable this process is, and when he later realises he has misread 'Gilberte' as 'Albertine' on the former's telegram to him in Venice, he acknowledges once and for all that a 'proper reading' exists only in the realm of fantasy: 'On devine en lisant, on crée; tout part d'une erreur initiale; celles qui suivent (et ce n'est pas seulement dans la lecture des lettres et des télégrammes, pas seulement dans toute lecture), si extraordinaires qu'elles puissent paraître à celui qui n'a pas le même point de départ, sont toutes naturelles' (AD, IV, 235).

For Nietzsche, too, the process of 'textual embellishment' is a metaphor which can be applied to all our 'sense-deception':


Once more, then, the truth is a work of art, created by our sense-apparatus ('unsre Sinne lernen es spät, und lernen es nie ganz, feine, treue, vorsichtig-ige Organe der Erkenntnis zu sein'), just as Proust's narrator in La Prisonnière remarks: 'Le témoignage des sens est lui aussi une opération de l'esprit où la conviction crée l'évidence' (P, III, 694; cf. JF, I, 538).
Nothing could be further from Schopenhauer arguing: 'Die einfachste unbefangene Selbstbeobachtung, zusammengehalten mit dem anatomischen Ergebnis, führt zu dem Resultat, daß der Intellekt wie seine Objektivation, das Gehirn nebst diesem anhängendem Sinnenapparat nichts anderes sei als eine sehr gesteigerte Empfindlichkeit für Einwirkungen von außen'. It is precisely in order to move away from this notion of 'simple, unprejudiced observation' that Proust and Nietzsche qualify their optical metaphors with a textual one.

The textual metaphor of decipherment and interpretation is particularly appropriate when it comes to analysing other people, for the instability and multi-facetted nature of objects in the world which Proust's narrator experiences on waking, when his own intellectual and affective input is most in evidence (CS, I, 3-9, 183f.), is further complicated in the case of the human world since people are constantly generating new 'text', and not only do they change over time, but they consciously dissemble and they lie. What Proust and Nietzsche highlight as the structural falsity of our relation to the world - the problem of language in general and the 'lying' nature of our intellect coupled with the crudity of our sense-perceptions - is compounded in the case of the human world by deliberate deception. When the 'text' to be deciphered is that of another person, reading between the lines is a case of reading between the lies, and it is here, with its inexhaustible analysis of the lie in human interaction, that Proust's novel really comes into its own.

Proust's narrator is alerted by 'les paroles de Jupien' to the fact that he cannot always believe what he is told, and his dilemma is made all the more acute in this instance because he cannot be certain whether it is Françoise or Jupien who is lying. His presentiment that dissemblance and lying in 'les rapports sociaux' and 'l'amour' might be 'le secret de l'avenir' is indeed well-founded, for his awakening to a suspicion of the other's lie opens the
Pandora's box out of which his epistemological 'evils' spring for the rest of the novel. The reservation he expresses with 'toute réalité est peut-être aussi dissemblable de celle que nous croyons percevoir directement' is banished as the society scenes play themselves out, the disappointments and deceptions accumulating for him in the microcosmic world of the 'mondains', but it is with Albertine in La Prisonnière that the problem of how to deal with lies becomes particularly intractable.

Where the Truth Lies: Albertine in Default

The narrator's jealousy regarding Albertine is defined as a 'soif de savoir' (P, III, 593), and although Proust sets up a parallel between the narrator's 'besoin de savoir' about Albertine and his earlier need to know about Gilberte (P, III, 604), with his love for Albertine, 'ce plus vaste amour' (P, III, 757), the stakes are far higher and his epistemophilia develops into an epistemological obsession. In Sodome et Gomorrhe the narrator already has a foreboding of what lies (are) in store when Albertine tries to call off her visit, and he senses that she is one of those 'êtres existences disposées sur cinq ou six lignes de repli' who resist definitive interpretation. 'Pour Albertine,' he concludes:

je sentais que je n'apprendrais jamais rien, qu'entre la multiplicité entremêlée des détails réels et des faits mensongers je n'arriverais jamais à me débrouiller. Et que ce serait toujours ainsi, à moins que de la mettre en prison (mais qu'elle s'évade) jusqu'à la fin. Ce soir-là, cette conviction ne fit passer à travers moi qu'une inquiétude, mais où je sentais frémir comme une anticipation de longues souffrances. (SG, III, 131)

This 'premonition' that even if he were to put Albertine in prison she would escape is of course more than borne out by the events in La Prisonnière.
itself. Shortly after this passage the narrator blithely asserts that he has long since abjured scientific method in his search for the truth about women, science represented this time not in the form of astronomy but of mathematics: 'j'avais depuis longtemps cessé de chercher à extraire d'une femme comme la racine carré de son inconnu, lequel ne résistait pas souvent à une simple présentation' (SG, III, 151). However, in *La Prisonnière* he fantasises that he can always reliably decipher Albertine's lies simply by mechanically applying an algorithm (consulting an inversion table) to convert them back into truths. By this time he has become so accustomed to Albertine's lies that he can characterise her as a congenital liar, 'par nature menteuse' (P, III, 605), and so in deciphering the meaning of her words he generally assumes she is lying, that Albertine's 'default setting' is to default on the truth. 'Les paroles de Jupien' turn his cosy world upside down, as we have seen - the perspectival shift which they impart to his world of Combray is a perspectival inversion, the epistemological equivalent of all the other inversions in the novel - but even inversion proves to be unreliable, and hence inadequate, as a method for 'translating' or 'transmuting' Albertine's lying words back into truth.

The possibility of such an inversion/conversion process is raised much earlier on in the novel: when Elstir fails to introduce the narrator to 'la petite bande' in Balbec, he gives a variety of excuses ("Pourquoi restez-vous à des lieues?", "Elles étaient pressées") which the narrator finds lame, and in interpreting Elstir's words he wonders whether 'de telles paroles, qui doivent en quelque sorte être lues à l'envers puisque leur lettre signifie le contraire de la vérité' might be 'l'effet nécessaire, le graphique négatif d'un réflexe' (JF, II, 215). With Albertine, this possibility develops into a general hermeneutic principle which transcends even her relatively localised
'nature menteuse': 'y a-t-il besoin de savoir un fait? Ne sait-on pas d'abord
d'une façon générale le mensonge et la discretion même de ces femmes qui ont
quelque chose à cacher? Y a-t-il là possibilité d'erreur?' (P, III, 604).

This method, we are told, can indeed produce the desired result:

Parfois l'écriture où je déchiffrais les mensonges d’Albertine, sans
être idéographique, avait simplement besoin d'être lue à rebours; c'est
ainsi que ce soir elle m'avait lancé d'un air négligent ce message
destiné à passer presque inaperçu: 'Il serait possible que j'aille
demain chez les Verdurin, je ne sais pas du tout si j'irai, je n'en ai
guère envie.' Anagramme enfantin de cet aveu: 'J'irai demain chez les
Verdurin, c'est absolument certain, car j'y attache une extrême
importance'. (P, III, 598)

Reading Albertine's words as 'anagrams' - or, perhaps better, 'antograms' -
may be child's play, but the 'parfois' here betrays the fact that this is
still no reliable method for countering Albertine's strategy of indirection
and deriving that 'grande loi' which might allow him systematically to explain
her behaviour (i.e., in Nietzsche's terms, to 'explain' rather than simply to
'interpret' it). For in interpreting the lie there is always people's lack of
self-knowledge or lack of honesty with themselves to contend with - the
possibility that a person can give away more of the truth than they intend
even while they think they are lying (P, III, 857). 'Many a true word is
spoken in lie', the narrator realises, and one can reach the truth by a very
different path than that which one intended (P, III, 839f.), but the relation
between truth and lie also changes over time. Albertine may be 'par nature
menteuse', but she is also 'si changeante d'ailleurs que même en me disant
echaque fois la vérité sur ce que, par exemple, elle pensait des gens, elle eût
dit chaque fois des choses différentes' (P, III, 605). Lies can subsequently
become truths quite independently of the speaker's intention (P, III, 529; AD,
IV, 44), but because the narrator can never know until after the event whether
this will be the case he is no further forward in his quest.
Even were the narrator to confront Albertine with the contradictions in her statements, derived by a process of 'astronomical' reasoning, he realises that this would not take him any nearer to the truth:

This is indeed exactly what happens in the interrogation scene at the end of La Prisonnière, when Albertine's partial admission of her lies (including some he had not even suspected), combined with her partial admission of the truth (including some truths he had assumed to be lies), brings about 'l'anéantissement de tout ce que j'avais tellement cru vrai' (P, III, 839). His would-be scientific 'système invariable' (P, III, 849) is reduced to a 'roman' (P, III, 852), in turn to ashes (P, III, 854), and he is thrust back into the total epistemological scepticism of the start of their relationship:

The scene represents the definitive defeat of the paradigm of scientific analysis, for the narrator realises that his algorithms can only ever yield an 'équation approximative à cette inconnue qu'était pour moi la pensée d'Albertine' (P, III, 850, my emphasis), and in any case science only ever raises as many questions as it answers: 'L'inconnu de la vie des êtres est comme celui de la nature, que chaque découverte scientifique ne fait que reculer mais n'annule pas' (P, III, 893).
The picture of Albertine which emerges from the narrator's endeavours to attain the truth about her, then, is decidedly complex. Other people in general may be 'comme Janus' (P, III, 686), but the situation is much worse than that with the loved one, who is the site of an impossible dissemination:

Et je comprenais l'impossibilité où se heurte l'amour. Nous nous imaginons qu'il a pour objet un être qui peut être couché devant nous, enfermé dans un corps. Hélas! Il est l'extension de cet être à tous les points de l'espace et du temps que cet être a occupés et occupera. Si nous ne possédons pas son contact avec tel lieu, avec telle heure, nous ne le possédons pas. Or nous ne pouvons toucher tous ses points. Si encore ils nous étaient désignés, peut-être pourrions-nous nous étendre jusqu'à eux. Mais nous tâtonnons sans les trouver. (P, III, 608; cf. P, III, 862)

Epistemological enquiry is once more reduced to a series of 'tâtonnements', a fumbling in the dark out of which the true picture, if it emerges at all, emerges only after the event and cannot be extracted by any reliable means at the time. The questing narrator's camera obscura cannot produce the truth by inverting the lie, but even when he equips himself with the latest in photographic dark-rooms to try to 'freeze' the object of his desire in a snapshot, he realises that such a method, like his use of the equally monoperspectival astronomical telescope, is also doomed to partiality, obsolescence and error:

je conclus à la difficulté de présenter une image fixe aussi bien d'un caractère que des sociétés et des passions. Car il ne change pas moins qu'elles, et si on veut cliquer ce qu'il a de relativement immuable, on le voit présenter successivement des aspects différents (impliquant qu'il ne sait pas garder l'immobilité, mais bouge) à l'objectif déconcerté. (P, III, 830)"'

'Hélas! Albertine était plusieurs personnes' (P, III, 840), the narrator cries despairingly, and the only stability which she can be afforded 'n'est que fictive et pour la commodité du langage' (P, III, 573). After her death this fragmentation becomes absolute: 'ce fractionnement d'Albertine en de nombreuses parts, en de nombreuses Albertine' becomes 'son seul mode d'existence en moi' (AD, IV, 110); 'l'idée de son unicité' becomes 'un a posteriori
The narrator realises that in order to be able to 'fix' Albertine successfully he would have to be no longer in love with her (P, III, 573f.), but the irony of such indifference lies precisely in the fact that its achievement would mean he would no longer be interested enough in her to be concerned to undertake the exercise.

**Experimental Indifference**

We seem to have reached degree zero for truth in Proust's novel with this infinitely fragmented picture of Albertine: the convergence of desire and knowledge is destined to remain for ever deferred. Truth gives way to truths, and monoperspectival method, whether astronomical or photographic, is shown to be inadequate, but even the binocular method of juxtaposing one picture (of Françoise, of Albertine) and its inverted image is still unsatisfactory. So what strategy can be adopted?

Nietzsche has at least a partial solution to the problem of perspectival error, which involves accepting the human, all too human limitations on our 'vision', revaluing and affirming them. For Nietzsche, the 'knower' can seek to overcome perspectival limitation by giving the greatest possible diversity of interpretations, and for him to be able to do so it is incumbent upon him to adopt as many subject-positions as possible, to don as many 'eyes' as possible. Nietzsche is using this metaphor in his notebooks as early as 1881, where we find him giving himself a perspectivistic prescription:

Aufgabe: die Dinge sehen, wie sie sind! **Mittel:** aus hundert Augen auf sie sehen können, aus vielen Personen! Es war ein falscher Weg, das Unpersönliche zu betonen und das Sehen aus dem Auge des Nächsten als
moralisch zu bezeichnen. Viele Nachste und aus vielen Augen und aus lauter persönlichen Augen sehen - ist das Rechte. (KSA 9, 466)

In this sense of having a hundred eyes, then, perspectivism has a more positive potential for Nietzsche than being simply a doctrine of the inevitability of error. It is an exercise in self-discipline, for it involves weaning oneself off those values one most cherishes, those in which one has the most invested, and (artificially at first, if need be) pluralising one's perspectives. It is a philosophy of strength, and it is also a pre-eminently experimental method, for this radical pluralisation involves an experimental self-othering, an experimental 'indifference', as Nietzsche puts it in an important note from 1881:

Philosophie der Gleichgültigkeit. Was früher am stärksten reizte, wirkt jetzt ganz anders, es wird nur noch als Spiel angesehen und gelten gelassen (die Leidenschaften und Arbeiten) als ein Leben im Unwahren prinzipiell verworfen, als Form und Reiz aber ästhetisch genossen und gepflegt, wir stellen uns wie die Kinder zu dem, was früher den Ernst des Daseins ausmachte. Unser Streben des Ernstes ist aber alles als werdend zu verstehen, uns als Individuum zu verleugnen, möglichst aus vielen Augen in die Welt sehen, leben in Trieben und Beschäftigungen, um damit sich Augen zu machen, zeitweilig sich dem Leben überlassen, um hernach zeitweilig über ihm mit dem Auge zu ruhen; die Triebe unterhalten als Fundament alles Erkennens, aber wissen, wo sie Gegner des Erkennens werden: in summa abwarten, wie weit das Wissen und die Wahrheit sich einverleiben können - und in wiefern eine Umwandlung des Menschen eintritt, wenn er endlich nur noch lebt, um zu erkennen. - Dies ist Consequenz von der Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis. (KSA 9, 494f.; cf. 441, 444, 480)

For Proust, a complete picture of the loved one can be achieved only from the viewpoint of an indifference which marks the point at which the relationship is over and the ex-lover no longer has any interest in the knowledge he might obtain, but for Nietzsche 'indifference' towards the object of knowledge can at least be experimentally attempted. Man's 'Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis' may be recognised as a mask for his 'Wille zur Macht', but Nietzsche does not seek thereby to deny it, in Schopenhauerian fashion: passion for knowledge is revalued aesthetically, with the emphasis on an element of play, but
Schiller's 'Spieltrieb' becomes for Nietzsche a 'Spiel der Triebe' which reproduces the childlike innocence of becoming, of Heraclitus's Zeus.\footnote{161} Moreover, for all its 'innocence' this is (in Schiller's terms) no 'naive' procedure but a highly 'sentimental' one,\footnote{132} for, as Beda Allemann points out,\footnote{133} Nietzsche's 'Philosophie der Gleichgültigkeit', his 'pathos of self-distancing', opens up the 'Spielraum' of irony - precisely that ironic self-distance which Proust's narrator will exploit to such effect.

This urge to acquire as many eyes as possible finds expression in Nietzsche's published works only later, in the texts of the more explicitly perspectivistic period. In section 211 of *Jenseits*, 'der wirkliche Philosoph' must learn to be able to look 'mit vielerlei Augen' (for only then can he become adequate to his task of creating values), but Nietzsche's most celebrated development of the theme is in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*: 'Es gibt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches "Erkennen"; und \textit{je mehr} Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, \textit{je mehr} Augen, verschiedene Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, umso vollständiger wird unser "Begriff" dieser Sache, unsere "Objektivität" sein' \textit{(GM, III, 12)}. 'Objectivity' for Nietzsche is thus very different from Kantian disinterested contemplation, or the kind of objectivity for which science strives and of which he is otherwise so critical - it can be approached by this perspectivistic procedure, but that is the best we can do, for only through such a pluralistic 'knowing' can we be in any sense adequate to reality.
One of the most memorable scenes in *A la recherche*, and one of the classic instances of its perspectivism, occurs at the opening of *A l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs*, when the narrator on his way to Balbec is obliged to dash between the windows on opposite sides of his train in order to piece together a composite picture of the dawn (*JF*, II, 16). Nietzsche, too, describes his experimental attitude using the metaphor of 'looking out of different windows': 'Gegen die erkenntnistheoretischen Dogmen tief mißtrauisch, liebte ich es, bald aus diesem, bald aus jenem Fenster zu blicken, hüttete mich, darin festzusetzen, hielt sie für schädlich' (*KSA* 12, 143). More usually he uses the metaphor of 'donning many eyes', but this is one which Proust's narrator also adopts, in *Le Côté de Guermantes*, in the scene where he first takes advantage of his permission to kiss Albertine. Here we find that what Nietzsche wills happens for Proust's narrator of its own accord, involuntarily:

Les dernières applications de la photographie [...] - je ne vois que cela qui puisse, autant que le baiser, faire surgir de ce que nous croyions une chose à aspect défini, les cent autres choses qu'elle est tout aussi bien, puisque chacune est relative à une perspective non moins légitime. Bref, de même qu'à Balbec, Albertine m'avait souvent paru différente, maintenant, comme si, en accélérant prodigieusement la rapidité des changements de perspective et des changements de coloration que nous offre une personne dans nos diverses rencontres avec elle, j'avais voulu les faire tenir toutes en quelques secondes pour recréer expérimentalement le phénomène qui diversifie l'individualité d'un être et tirer les unes des autres, comme d'un étui, toutes les possibilités qu'il enferme, dans ce court trajet de mes lèvres vers sa joue, c'est dix Albertines que je vis. (*CG*, II, 660)

In his rhapsodic gloss on this passage, Curtius could not point up more effectively the parallel with Nietzsche's new perspectivistic definition of 'Objektivität', and he makes very strong claims indeed for the import of 'Proust's perspectivism':

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**Proust's 'New Objectivism'**

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Curtius is keen for this Proustian relativism not to be misunderstood, though, for it is not a 'universal relativism' of a despairing or 'faute de mieux' kind: 'Sie könnte so verstanden werden, als besage die Relativität alles Seins eine Wertindifferenz, als hebe sie Bedeutung und Qualität der Dinge auf' (p. 113). Instead, he proposes a much more affirmative interpretation:


Although Curtius has already explicitly rejected any comparison of Proust with 'Nietzschescher Vitalismus' (p. 17), the very terms of his analysis here recall Nietzsche's 'Derselbe Text erlaubt unzählige Auslegungen: es gibt keine "richtige" Auslegung' (KSA 12, 39), and especially the passage quoted earlier: 'die Welt [...] hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne "Perspektivismus"' (KSA 12, 315). Curtius's elation at the prospect of 'die Unendlichkeit möglicher Perspektiven' is also a very Nietzschean elation, of the kind Nietzsche shows in section 374 of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, where he affirms the value of life and the world (rather than God) as 'Unser neues "Unendliches"': 'Die Welt ist uns vielmehr noch einmal "unendlich" geworden: insofern wir die Möglichkeit nicht abweisen können, daß sie unendliche Interpretationen in sich schließt.'

Curtius here even shows an acute understanding that perspectivism — Nietzsche's spiritual training programme,
his experimental 'Philosophie der Gleichgültigkeit' - marks a strategic moment in the 'revaluation of values' and is formulated precisely in response to the late nineteenth-century 'Vertindifferenz' (nihilism) which he so exhaustively analysed. For Curtius, Proust's 'neuer Objektivismus' (p. 116), his 'Perspektivismus' (p. 116), is an 'Anzeichen einer Bewusstseinswende' (p. 117): 'Durch den Perspektivismus wird das werdende Bewusstsein des 20. Jahrhunderts den Relativismus des 19. überwinden' (p. 116).

Samuel Beckett does not share Curtius's Nietzschean enthusiasm, though, and he criticises Curtius' positive representation of 'Proust's relativism' towards the end of his Proust: 'Curtius speaks of Proust's "perspectivism" and "positive relativism" as opposed to the negative relativism of the late nineteenth century, the scepticism of Renan and France. I think the phrase "positive relativism" is an oxymoron, I am almost sure that it does not apply to Proust, and I know that it came out of the Heidelberg laboratory.'

Contra Curtius, Beckett asserts that Proust's relativism is 'as pessimistic and negative as that of France, and employed as an element of comedy. [...] Proust is positive only in so far as he affirms the value of intuition.' Beckett certainly has a point here, for Curtius is surely jumping the gun. When the narrator is kissing Albertine for the first time he is far from elated as it is a profoundly disappointing experience for him, and the reader cannot help but feel that Proust is poking fun when he has his narrator cry: 'hélás! [...] tout d'un coup, mes yeux cessèrent de voir, à son tour mon nez, s'écrasant, ne perçut plus aucun odeur, et sans connaître pour cela davantage le goût du rose désiré, j'appris, à ces détestables signes, qu'enfin j'étais en train d'embrasser la joue d'Albertine' (CG, II, 660f.). His temporary ability to hold the multiple images of Albertine in simultaneous suspension, his snapshot genealogy of their relationship, is revealed as nothing more than
an intellectual conjuring trick, and he is brought unceremoniously back down to earth by the physical impact of her body.

Already in *Le Côté de Guermantes*, then, the narrator has gathered enough perspectives on Albertine to be bewildered by their momentary assemblage: in *La Prisonnière* he gathers many more. When he tries again there to put his 'photographs' of Albertine together to make a composite picture, he still ends up with a discontinuous series of fragmentary snapshots which can only approximate to the lability of Albertine herself: 'je ne possédais dans ma mémoire que des séries d'Albertine séparées les unes des autres, incomplètes, des profils, des instantanés; aussi ma jalousie se confinait-elle à une expression discontinue, à la fois fugitive et fixée, et aux êtres qui l'avaient amené sur la figure d'Albertine' (P, III, 655). The 'soif de savoir' which is jealousy achieves at best such a perspectivistic collage, but it is not the kind of objective truth for which the narrator is looking: 'Combien de personnes, de villes, de chemins, la jalousie nous rend ainsi avides de connaître! Elle est une soif de savoir grâce à laquelle, sur des points isolés les uns des autres, nous finissons par avoir toutes les notions possibles sauf celle que nous voudrions' (P, III, 593). Moreover, after Albertine's disappearance and death, when she is no longer there to provide any further corroboration (of however problematic a kind), the narrator finds that his 'intelligence' spins off into even more uncontrollable flights of fancy, and in *Albertine disparue* the number of his desperate hypotheses about her increases exponentially.

Even if he transforms himself into the hundred-eyed Argus, then, Proust's narrator is left 'thirsty' for an essential truth about Albertine. As Louis Bolle writes: 'la disparité des aspects, loin de permettre, par le jeu des contrastes, une reconstitution de l'être d'Albertine [...], empêche Marcel d'atteindre son essence. [...] L'émiettement multiplie l'être, mais il ne nous
Far from joining Nietzsche in celebrating perspectivism and perspectivistic error, Proust's narrator enters an elegiac mode whenever he considers the lifeless accumulation of 'snapshot' perspectives with which the Argus experience provides him. Such experiences are for him merely a confirmation of both the extreme fragmentation of the 'object of knowledge' when considered from myriad points of view, and the corresponding fragmentation of the observer. 'Le but de Proust, on le sait, est d'écrire un roman perspectiviste grâce à l'introduction de la "dimension du temps" dans la narration', writes Descombes, but 'la dimension du temps' has so far produced only an extreme dissemination. The narrator has come half-way towards recognising Elstir's truth that 'la sagesse [...] est un point de vue sur les choses', but for the moment, with his multiplicity of 'points de vue', he feels none the wiser, indeed infinitely emptier.

Yet it is Elstir who will also give the narrator a hint of the possibilities which still remain to him for overcoming perspectivistic fragmentation, for in *A la recherche* there is an affirmative version of the 'Argus experience', too, and it is the artistic achievements of Elstir and Vinteuil that provide it. In the midst of the narrator's profound pessimism in *La Prisonnière* about ever understanding Albertine fully, he hears Vinteuil's septet and gains an intimation of the solution to his problem, speculating:

> Le seul véritable voyage, le seul bain de Jouvence, ce ne serait pas d'aller vers de nouveaux paysages, mais d'avoir d'autres yeux, de voir l'univers avec les yeux d'un autre, de cent autres, de voir les cent univers que chacun d'eux voit, que chacun d'eux est; et cela nous le pouvons avec un Elstir, avec un Vinteuil, avec leurs pareils, nous volons vraiment d'étoiles en étoiles. (P, III, 762; cf. TR, IV, 474)

This potential which artistic creation provides the narrator with for piecing together his experiences will be addressed in the next chapter, which will consider how his elegiac tone modulates into a more Nietzschean, affirmative
one which can celebrate the creativity involved in perspectivistic interpretation, for if 'truth' is a work of art, then a work of art can also be 'truth'. The trigger for this insight is provided by involuntary memory, which returns the narrator to the kind of 'binocular' epistemoptical model which we have so far seen to be unsatisfactory as a method of juxtaposing conflicting images in order to derive a truth from their mutual relativisation. But the binocular experience of involuntary memory reaches its triumphant vindication at the conclusion of Proust's novel because it is different from an inversion of the lie in two important respects: it is a bodily trigger, and it pertains to the self, the true locus of the narrator's recherche, to which we must now turn.
Chapter 3. In Search of the Self

In this chapter I shall turn from Proust's narrator's search for reliable knowledge of the external world, and of the other in particular, to consider his search for the self. For whereas on Nietzsche's perspectivistic model a pluralised self and a pluralised world are implicated in each other in the event of interpretation, Proust's narrator is loth to accept the perspectivistic fragmentation of the self as an ultimate truth and embarks instead on a quest for the 'essence' of self, prompted by an intuition of it early on in the novel. Again, the majority of this undertaking takes place in an elegiac mode, for he is only too conscious of the periodic death of his various fragmentary selves, but after I have considered the ways in which the self is problematised in the novel in the context of Nietzsche's genealogy of the error of personal identity (the essential self as a void), I shall turn to examine those moments in *A la recherche* where the narrator falls into the opposite assumption (the self as everything) and succumbs to the temptation of idealism. By analysing conflicting passages from *Le Temps retrouvé* in particular, I shall show that Proust's narrator's text-interpretation model for our engagement with the world takes him beyond any dualistic, subjective idealist paradigm, for he recognises that there is a 'real world', even if it is in a sense created by one's own multiple perspectives 'on' it.

Returning to Nietzsche, to his foregrounding of the body and its drives (what he calls the 'Grundtext homo natura') as the generator of those perspectives, I shall argue that in Proust's novel, too, the text of the body is a privileged signifier - especially the narrator's own body, in the experience of involuntary memory. Following Blanchot and others in discounting the
narrator's own intellectualised interpretation of the essences which involuntary memory affords, I shall argue that their affective power reveals the narrator's complicated self to be not a transcendent abstraction, but a bodily effect. Such a self-revelation is only half the story, though, for I shall use Deleuze's analysis of the difference and repetition in Proustian essences to argue that the complicated temporality of involuntary memory can be compared to Nietzsche's conception of the eternal return, and that by writing his autobiographical novel, Proust's narrator affirms the necessity of his chance revelations in the same sense as the *amor fati* of Nietzsche's self-creating 'Übermensch' affirms the necessity of the eternal return. At the end of Proust's novel his narrator overcomes his epistemoptical pessimism by revaluing as positive the creativity of interpretation in an art of self-creation, and after comparing the self thus created with the Nietzsche who 'becomes what he is' in *Ecce Homo*, I shall conclude the chapter with a consideration of some of the aesthetic principles which the binocular perspective of involuntary memory allows Proust's narrator to derive for his 'artwork of the future'.

'Der Mensch als Vielheit': Nietzsche on Personal Identity

We saw in the previous chapter how Nietzsche's perspectivism, in redefining epistemology as a 'Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte', acknowledges a radical pluralisation of the 'subject', which he deconstructs into a 'perspektivische innere Vielheit' (KSA 12, 41). 'Der Mensch als Vielheit' (KSA 11, 276) becomes his watchword - 'Der Einzelne enthält viel mehr Personen, als er glaubt' (KSA 11, 108), he argues - and in place of the 'Seelen-Atomistik' of
Christianity, he substitutes (provisional, heuristic) notions such as "Seele als Subjekts-Vielheit" or "Seele als Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte" (JGB 12). Even in the texts before the perspectivistic period, though, Nietzsche is commonly stressing the fundamental divisibility of the self, in passages like section 57 of the First Book of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, entitled 'Moral als Selbstzerteilung des Menschen', where he anticipates his analyses in Zur Genealogie der Moral by arguing that so-called 'altruistic' or 'unegoistic' actions are in fact 'multi-egoistic', for they reveal not how the self can efface itself, but rather how the self can be divided against itself and indeed sacrifice a part of itself to the 'greater good' of... another part of itself: 'In der Moral behandelt sich der Mensch nicht als individuum, sondern als dividuum' (MA, I, 57).

From the early 1880s, as we have seen, Nietzsche is trying to teach himself willingly to affirm this perspectivistic plurality with the epistem-optical metaphor of donning as many different eyes as possible, and in his pre- (or perhaps better proto-)perspectivistic period he also explicitly uses the Argus motif, in section 223 of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, Book Two (1860), entitled 'Wohn man reisen muß'. 'Die unmittelbare Selbstbeobachtung reicht lange nicht aus, um sich kennen zu lernen' is Nietzsche's premiss here: 'Wir brauchen Geschichte, denn die Vergangenheit strömt in hundert Wellen in uns fort; wir selber sind ja nichts als das, was wir in jedem Augenblick von diesem Fortstromen empfinden.' In order for us to achieve this historical awareness, he recommends a programme of travelling, for travelling in space can be also a kind of time travel, since it can bring one into contact with other, more sheltered and less 'developed' nations, 'festgewordene ältere Kulturstufen, auf die man sich stellen kann'. Moreover one need not even travel in order to gain this desired contact:
The aim of all this literal and metaphorical travel is an immense expansion of the 'werdenden und verwandelten ego': 'das Reisen' transforms the subject into 'der Riese' Argus with his hundred eyes/Is, and 'Selbst-Erkenntnis' is thereby transformed into 'All-Erkenntnis':


Mere 'external' travel is turned here into an inner adventure which grants the spirit the ultimate in freedom, allowing it to enrich itself by taking a distance from itself and gathering in all that others have hitherto experienced. Once Nietzsche has thus dissolved 'dieses werdende und verwandelte ego' into a (Dionysian) 'All-Erlebnis', as he develops his notions of perspectivism and will to power in the 1880s he can dispense with it altogether and write of the self as merely a plurality of interpreting forces. But although Nietzsche treats it as a gross fallacy to persist in believing in personal identity, and although he dismisses the search for any 'essential ego', or even a 'principle of unity', as a wholly misguided enterprise, our erroneous belief in such a self, like all erroneous beliefs for Nietzsche, has a genealogy - and it is one which he is particularly interested in exploring.

In section 13 of the First Essay in Zur Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche argues that is is our mistaken belief in causality which gave rise to the
error of the self in the first place:

Ein Quantum Kraft ist ein ebensolches Quantum Trieb, Wille, Wirken - vielmehr, es ist gar nichts anderes als ebendieses Treiben, Wollen, Wirken selbst, und nur unter der Verführung der Sprache (und der in ihr versteinerten Grundirrtümer der Vernunft), welche alles Wirken als bedingt durch ein Wirkendes, durch ein 'Subjekt' versteht und mißversteht, kann es anders erscheinen. [...] Aber es gibt kein solches Substrat; es gibt kein 'Sein' hinter dem Tun, Wirken, Werden; 'der Täter' ist zum Tun bloß hinzugedichtet - das Tun ist alles. (GM, I, 13; cf. KSA 12, 391)

The 'Grundirrtum der Vernunft' is to believe in the necessity of there being a 'doer' 'behind' every 'deed', then, and once again it is the pernicious effect of language to compound this fundamental error, 'petrifying' it with its subject-object grammar (JGB, 'Vorrede', 54; KSA 11, 632f., 635f.). The duality occasioned by this primal act of differentiation is subsequently fortified and maintained by the spurious unification of the inner self in the shape of the "Ich" which, for Nietzsche, is just a Wirkendes Wort, a "Horizont-Linie" (KSA 12, 91, 185), or as he goes on to write in Götzendämmerung: 'das Ich! Das ist zur Fabel geworden, zur Fiktion, zum Wortspiel: das hat ganz und gar aufgehört, zu denken, zu fühlen und zu wollen!' (GD, VI, 3; cf. KSA 12, 398). But it is on the basis of this 'älteste und längste Psychologie', he argues here, that man has anthropomorphically projected onto the world the concepts of 'Sein', 'Atom' and 'Ding', 'Gar nicht zu reden vom "Ding an sich", vom horrendum pudendum der Metaphysiker!' (GD, VI, 3).

Belief in the "Ich" is an aboriginal belief which has vitiated our entire philosophical understanding of the world, Nietzsche argues, and having unmasked the "Subjekt" in the First Essay of Zur Genealogie der Moral, in section 16 of the Second Essay he goes on to analyse (away) in similar fashion the whole of our subjacent "innere Welt". Here he describes the process by which 'die ganze innere Welt, ursprünglich dünn wie zwischen zwei Häute eingespannt' becomes extended - distended - by 'Verinnerlichung' (GM, II, 16),
the internalisation of instinctual drives frustrated in their discharge (the 'Freudian' language is striking), and 'damit wächst erst das an den Menschen heran, was man später seine "Seele" nennt'. The 'inner world' as a whole is thus a parasitical (non-)entity, and its growth just one more erroneous dualism: like the dualism of metaphysical 'wahre Welt' and 'scheinbare Welt' which Nietzsche so mischievously deconstructs in the 'Fabel' of Götzen-Dämmerung IV, so too he deconstructs the duality of '([d]iese "scheinbare innere Welt"' and 'die "äußere" Welt' (KSA 13, 53).

'Die "innere Welt" ist voller Trugbilder und Irrlichter', Nietzsche warns us (GD, VI, 3), and yet we generally find ourselves unable to acknowledge this, persisting in the delusion of an inner world with an inner unity. The fiction of the self arises out of the essentialising impulse of language, but belief in its immutable character is then reinforced in various ways. Firstly by socialisation, for not only do language and consciousness derive from a 'Mitteilungsbedürfnis', as we have seen Nietzsche claiming in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (FW 354), but our notion of the enduring self, our 'feste[r] Ruf' (FW 296) is also derived from our being in the world of social interaction (one is tempted to say, after La Rochefoucauld, that 'on n'aurait jamais eu de moi, si on n'en avait jamais entendu parler'). Secondly, belief in the enduring self is perpetuated by philosophical prejudice: 'Glauben nicht die meisten an sich wie an vollendete ausgewachsene Tatsachen? Haben nicht große Philosophen noch ihr Siegel auf dies Vorurteil gedrückt, mit der Lehre von der Unveränderlichkeit des Charakters?' (M 560). (The main target here is of course the Cartesian cogito, which Nietzsche attacks and parodies as recurrently as he does the Kantian 'Ding an sich'.) Thirdly, though (and of greatest significance for a comparison with Proust), such a misconceived doctrine has its basis in the relatively short human lifespan. In the section
of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* entitled 'Der unveränderliche Charakter', Nietzsche produces the following thought experiment:

Dachte man sich aber einen Menschen von achtzigtausend Jahren, so hätte man an ihm sogar einen absolut veränderlichen Charakter: so daß eine Fülle verschiedener Individuen sich nach und nach aus ihm entwickelte. Die Kürze des menschlichen Lebens verleitet zu manchen irrtümlichen Behauptungen über die Eigenschaften des Menschen. (MA, I, 41)

Were we truly to understand the nature of man's 'absolut veränderlichen Charakter' then we would also understand its corollary, that the self is not an enduring entity, an immortal soul, but a mortal one. This last idea is one which Nietzsche develops in *Jenseits* (JGB 12) and in his notebook of August-September 1885 (KSA 11, 631f., 647, 650), but again it is first to be found in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, where he considers the 'Glück des Historikers' to be the realisation that he is 'einer [...], der, im Gegensatze zu den Metaphysikern, glücklich darüber ist, nicht "eine unsterbliche Seele", sondern viele sterbliche Seelen in sich zu beherbergen' (MA, II, 17).

"Viele sterbliche Seelen": The Experience of Self in *A la recherche*

Proust's narrator is of course not taken in by the illusion of having an 'immutable character', and his experience is, on the contrary, of having an 'absolut veränderlichen Charakter', of what Nietzsche terms 'die beständige Vergänglichkeit und Flüchtigkeit des Subjekts' (KSA 11, 650). Perspectivistic fragmentation of the subject is apparent from the outset of the novel, when the narrator's self is dissolved in dream into the 'subject' of the book he was reading immediately before falling asleep: 'il me semblait que j'étais moi-même ce dont parlait l'ouvrage: une église, un quatuor, la rivalité de François 1er et de Charles Quint' (CS, I, 3). Furthermore, this belief
momentarily invades his waking world, as well, until memory succeeds in
constructing the narrator's self for him, taking its materials not merely from
his own past life but, extraordinarily, from the whole history of
civilisation:

le souvenir - non encore du lieu où j'étais, mais de quelques-uns de
ceux que j'avais habité et où j'aurais pu être - venait à moi comme un
souvenir d'en haut pour me tirer du néant d'où je n'aurais pu sortir
tout seul; je passais en une seconde par-dessus des siècles de civili-
sation, et l'image confusément entrevue de lampes à pétrole, puis de
chemises à col rabattu, recomposaient peu à peu les traits originaux de
mon moi. (CS, I, 5f.)

On waking at the opening of the novel, then, Proust's narrator involuntarily
follows Nietzsche's travel programme quite precisely, surfacing from sleep
through 'die letzten drei Jahrhunderte in allen ihren Kulturfärbungen und
strahlenbrechungen', travelling through all the previous layers of civilisa-
tion in order for his self to be constituted as an 'expanded ego' on
Nietzsche's world-historic scale.°

So the primary fact which Proust's narrator registers is precisely the
plurality and diversity of his selves - he finds no Cartesian 'ego' or Kantian
'unity of apperception' at the heart of the self and available to introspec-
tion. The self as an 'object of knowledge', he finds, is as frustratingly
evasive and fragmentary as the other, but unlike Nietzsche, who teaches
himself to celebrate this state of affairs - to be 'glücklich darüber, viele
sterbliche Seelen in sich zu beherbergen' - Proust's narrator sets out on a
quest to try and unify his selves in some way other than through the kind of
perspectivistic assemblage which, in the case of Albertine, we have seen him
find so profoundly disquieting and unsatisfactory. The narrator's quest is to
secure a unified, inalienable, essential individuality: in the Sartrean terms
of Georges Poulet, *À la recherche* is 'le roman d'une existence à la recherche
de son essence.' To anchor his existence, the narrator seeks a spiritual
centre within the mysterious inner recesses of the personality, and he is spurred on by the intuition of an 'essence of self' which the madeleine affords, but which at first he can neither justify nor explain to himself. His experience with the madeleine generates a feeling of inner certainty and truth, 'une joie pareille à une certitude' (TR, IV, 446) as he later describes it; it gives him privileged access to a 'vérité [...] en moi' (CS, I, 45), the 'essence précieuse' ('elle était moi' (CS, I, 44)) which steals up on him and leaves him simply wondering why it makes him feel so happy.

Such fleeting moments of 'self'-awareness only highlight the essential problem of the self, however, the mortifying cleft which exists between the self which he feels and the selves which he knows by experience. The radically self-estranged narrator is only too aware, then, that 'on n'est jamais tout un' (SG, III, 412), only too aware of the different selves which co-exist within him at any one time, each performing a separate function: '[cle serviteur interne' (SG, III, 108) who is responsible for reminding him of his engagements, for example; 'ces nombreux secrétaires que [l'habitude] s'adjoint' (SG, III, 136), who write his tedious letters; or, even more usefully, '[c]et autre que soi-même qui vit en nous et sur qui on est toujours si content de se décharger du fardeau de penser' (JF, II, 261). The apparent felicity of this division of labour finds its darker side, though, in the pessimism which comes so often to the fore with the narrator's acute awareness of the wedge between self and self, a wedge which precludes any form of self-knowledge other than an ironic admission of powerlessness before one's own self-deception (SG, III, 271). 'Die gewöhnlichste Lüge ist die, mit der man sich selbst belügt', writes Nietzsche in Der Antichrist (AC 55), and it is not only Albertine who lies to Proust's narrator, for he is an adept at lying to himself.
The narrator's schismatic, prismatic perspective on his (syn)chronically divided self is in turn compounded through the agency of time, for throughout the novel the juxtaposition of present and past selves through memory lays bare the equally (dia)chronic fragmentation of the self into 'personnalités successives' (JF, II, 225), 'les êtres contradictoires, le méchant, le sensible, le délicat, le mufle, le désintéressé, l'ambitieux, qu'on est tour à tour chaque journée' (AD, IV, 221). '[Celui que nous avons été autrefois' (CG, II, 682) is perceived wholly externally, as a reified object, and the sense of alienation which this brings is epitomised by the almost Rimbaudian 'Je suis un autre' (AD, IV, 221)." From the viewpoint of the retrospective narrator no sense of continuity can be felt; he is conscious only of an intermittent succession, and surveys a soul-destroying battlefield on which lie the corpses of his myriad dead 'moi's like skins which he has sloughed off.

More than 'just' a quest for self-knowledge, then, the narrator's quest is also a struggle against death, against 'la mort de soi-même' which 'se consomme à notre insu, au besoin contre notre gré, chaque jour' (AD, IV, 66). At times he can be optimistic about this inevitable process, for in his relationships with Gilberte and Albertine he often wants the self in pain from jealousy or chagrin to be put out of its misery and allowed to die, and he feels positively relieved when he realises it has happened, welcoming the deliverance. In one of the most striking images for this phenomenon, he writes of time-fate intervening with one of its 'moi de rechange que la destinée tient en réserve pour nous et que, sans plus écouter nos prières qu'un médecin clairvoyant et d'autant plus autoritaire, elle substitue malgré nous, par une intervention opportune, au moi vraiment trop blessé' (AD, IV, 174). But the fact remains that contact with the loved one only ever
aggravates the 'serial alterity' of the self, since the self becomes indissolubly attached to the image of the other (JF, II, 299) and must endure its intermittence, its peripeteias, its death (AD, IV, 71).

To make things even worse, we are occasionally told of others' opinions of the narrator, and in each case they diverge markedly from his own. Yet when Jupien reports Françoise's apparent denigration of him - 'elle disait que je ne valais pas la corde pour me pendre et que j'avais cherché à lui faire tout le mal possible' (CG, II, 366) - the narrator dwells on the consequences for his knowledge of others, as we saw in the last chapter, but he refuses to allow it to relativise and problematise his knowledge of himself, too. Far from simply accepting the validity of such opinions and conceding that his own view of himself may be open to question, both the narrator-protagonist and the retrospective narrator consistently reject the possibility that the other can play any part in establishing the identity of his 'true self'. Whereas in the case of Swann, and the other in general, the social constructedness of the persona is paramount, the narrator never wavers from the belief that true self-knowledge can be vouchsafed only through self-examination, and that to follow any other path is but an indulgence of the superficial. 'Being in the world' and 'être mondain' are synonymous for him, and both fall under the sign of 'temps perdu' in its more pessimistic sense of 'wasted time': the inner world/outer world dichotomy is one of the most pervasive themes in A la recherche, the contrast between 'ma vie intérieure' and 'ces heures mondaines où j'habitais mon épiderme' (CG, II, 817), between 'le néant de la vie de salon (CG, II, 709) and 'cette expérience de soi-même, qui est la seule vraie' (SG, III, 312).

Paul de Man has convincingly demonstrated how that inner/outer dichotomy can be collapsed, and in the narrator's case 'le néant de la vie de salon'
echoes within the deepest confines of the self, although he does sometimes sense that at least one of his 'moi's has remained impervious to decay - 'ce "moi" que je ne retrouvais qu'à des années d'intervalles, mais toujours le même, n'ayant pas grandi depuis Combray, depuis ma première arrivée à Balbec' (CG, II, 381) - and indeed against his awareness of being a divided self the narrator sets a prelapsarian image of his childhood to bolster the inexplicable feeling of selfhood, now so besieged by doubt. We are constantly aware that Combray is his real 'paradis perdu', his fond memories of its unchanging values and seemingly fixed characters encapsulated by the tremendous weight of the imperfect tense which so dominates his depiction of it in Du côté de chez Swann. Reminiscences of a childhood self tend only to exacerbate an awareness of loss, however, when he contemplates the fragmented selves which have accumulated since then, through time, and the rupture is most accentuated when he actually returns to the scene of his childhood at the end of Albertine disparue and the beginning of Le Temps retrouvé.

Proust's Idealism

'Notre moi est fait de la superposition de nos états successifs' (AD, IV, 125), Proust's narrator reflects, and he is frequently led to conclude that the self, like the other, is just a perspectival assemblage after all, no more than the sum of its parts. But by contrast with this sense of the 'essential self' as a void, at times he is also tempted by the opposing belief, that the self is all - the temptation of (subjective) idealism,' or even solipsism, what Bataille calls 'l'absurde ruée de l'ipse voulant devenir le tout'. Marcel Raimond points to the opening pages of the novel as an example of this
impulse, arguing: 'Les premières pages de la Recherche mettent en évidence un solipsisme proustien qui, avec l'expérience et la multiplication des points de vue, aura tendance à s'éclipser.' But as the narrator comes to learn his lessons in perspectivism and to realise that 'perceived reality' is no straightforward phenomenon, that all impressions are subject to 'un acte intellectuel' and affective investment, the temptation of idealism is never entirely banished. For if we actively participate in fabricating the truth as a work of art anyway, then it is but a short step to holding that the outside world itself is simply a mental construct.

Throughout the novel, the narrator in fact oscillates uneasily between realism and idealism. In A l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs he reflects on 'la Gilberte que je portais en moi', 'ma Gilberte fictive', and recognises already the distorting input of the lover's perspective, yet he is still able to contrast 'his' Gilberte(s) with 'l'autre, la réelle', whose actions continually confound him (JF, I, 616f.). Later in that book he sounds a positively Berkeleian note, though, when he claims: 'Chaque être est détruit quand nous cessons de le voir; puis son apparition suivante est une création nouvelle, différente de celle qui l'a immédiatement précédée, sinon de toutes' (JF, II, 270). We have seen how in Le Côté de Guermantes, at the moment when the narrator first kisses Albertine, her 'real presence' is temporarily eclipsed by the narrator's photograph collection, and in La Prisonnière, where the despairing narrator wonders whether he will ever be able to reach a truth about Albertine, he writes of 'un rideau de mensonges que nous prenons pour la réalité' (P, III, 890). In Albertine disparue, though, he emphasises that whatever the temptations of idealism, it is a doctrine constantly refuted simply by our contact with the outside world:

Les êtres ont un développement en nous, mais un autre hors de nous (je
l'avais bien senti dans ces soirs où je remarquais en Albertine un enrichissement de qualités qui ne tenait pas qu'à ma mémoire) et qui ne laissent pas d'avoir des réactions l'un sur l'autre. [...] Si bien que cette longue plainte de l'âme qui croit vivre enfermée en elle-même n'est un monologue qu'en apparence, puisque les échos de la réalité la font dévier, et que telle vie est comme un essai de psychologie subjective spontanément poursuivi, mais qui fournit à quelque distance son 'action' au roman, purement réaliste, d'une autre existence, et duquel à leur tour les péripéties viennent inféchir la courbe et changer la direction de l'essai psychologique. (AD, IV, 82; cf. P, III, 577)

In this passage, which Tadié terms one of the most important texts in Proust's oeuvre,' we rediscover the contrast between 'philosophie' and 'roman' which we saw in Chapter 1 in the characterisation of the 'Nietzschean' Saint-Loup, and once more Proust's narrator comes down on the side of the latter. It is idealism which is the representative philosophical doctrine here, and which Proust's narrator, like Dr Johnson kicking a stone, wants to refute by asserting the brute fact of the independent existence of the 'novel' of reality, which intervenes to dispel our idle philosophical speculations. Not that this prevents the narrator from later lapsing into precisely such speculations on 'la vie réelle, qui est mentale' (AD, IV, 122), or on the extent to which love reinforces the solipsistic model: 'Certains philosophes disent que le monde extérieur n'existe pas et que c'est en nous-même que nous développons notre vie. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'amour, même en ses plus humbles commencements, est un exemple frappant du peu qu'est la réalité pour nous' (AD, IV, 146).

The split between a subjective inner world and an objective outer reality is re-emphasised in Le Temps retrouvé - 'toute impression est double, à demi engainée dans l'objet, prolongé en nous-même par une autre moitié que seul nous pourrions connaître' (TR, IV, 470) - but during the 'Matinée chez la princesse Guermantes' the narrator is again tempted by a more extreme interpretation of the meaning of his past experiences as he adopts (at least temporarily) a position which is acknowledgedly idealist. Raimond argues: 'A
certains moments, l'idéalisme proustien est absolu: ce n'est pas Marcel qui est dans le monde, mais c'est le monde qui est en Marcel', and this is indeed the case here:

De ma vie passée je compris encore que les moindres épisodes avaient concouru à me donner la leçon d'idéalisme dont j'allais profiter aujourd'hui. Mes rencontres avec M. de Charlus, par exemple, ne m'avaient-elles pas, même avant que sa germanophilie me donnât la même leçon, permis, mieux encore que mon amour pour Mme de Guermantes ou pour Albertine, que l'amour de Saint-Loup pour Rachel, de me convaincre combien la matière est indifférente et que tout peut y être mis par la pensée. (TR, IV, 489)

But the position of Proust's narrator remains ambivalent even here, for although shortly afterwards he develops this notion that 'tout peut y être mis par la pensée' ('Je m'étais rendu compte que seule la perception grossière et erronée place tout dans l'objet, quand tout est dans l'esprit' (TR, IV, 491)), and indeed he reverts to solipsism, writing of the 'caractère purement mental de la réalité' (TR, IV, 493, my emphasis), nevertheless between these two passages he again stresses: 'ce que je remarquais de subjectif dans la haine comme dans la vue elle-même n'empêchait pas que l'objet pût posséder des qualités ou des défauts réels et ne faisait nullement s'évanouir la réalité en un pur relativisme' (TR, IV, 492).

The contradictions in these passages can be partly attributed to the fact that Proust was unable to rework them satisfactorily before his death, but that in itself is revealing. He seems to have been particularly unsure about where to place the observation 'seule la perception grossière et erronée place tout dans l'objet, quand tout est dans l'esprit', with the result that the 'Pleiade' editors feel obliged to give it twice, and the incongruity of its second occurrence only highlights the narrator's confusion here, for it is appended to the passage which concludes his retrospect on 'les leçons de la vie', and his theoretical induction of a lesson in idealism at this point.
flatly contradicts what is now a patently more Nietzschean analysis:

J'avais vu dans l'Affaire Dreyfus, pendant la guerre, dans la médecine, croire que la vérité est un certain fait, que les ministres, le médecin, possèdent un oui ou un non qui n'a pas besoin d'interprétation, qui fait qu'un cliché radiographique indique sans interprétation ce qu'a le malade, que les gens du pouvoir savaient si Dreyfus était coupable, savaient (sans avoir besoin d'envoyer pour cela Roques enquêter sur place) si Sarrail avait ou non les moyens de marcher en même temps que les Russes. Il n'est pas une heure de ma vie qui n'eût servi à m'apprendre que seule la perception plutôt grossière et erronée place tout dans l'objet quand tout au contraire est dans l'esprit. (TR, IV, 493)

The narrator's emphasis here on the need to qualify all absolute knowledge-claims, and on the absurdity of asserting truth to be 'a certain fact' without recognising the facticity of interpretation, is strikingly Nietzschean. Nietzsche's response to the 'es gibt nur Thatsachen' of the positivists, as we have seen, is to assert 'nein, gerade Thatsachen gibt es nicht, nur Interpretationen' (KSA 12, 315), and his retort to Gradgrindian historians is similar: 'Facta! Ja Facta ficta!' (M 307). The example of medics interpreting an X-ray, which Proust's narrator uses here in order to unmask the presumption of scientific reason, implicitly gives the lie to his own previous attempts to attain the truth by the application of scientific analytical methods - the narrator figured as botanist and zoologist, astronomer and mathematician, but also, precisely, as 'radiographer' (cf. TR, IV, 297) - and it echoes Nietzsche's attack on the scientists' interpretation of the world as being the poorest of all: 'Eine "wissenschaftliche" Welt-Interpretation, wie ihr sie versteht, könnte folglich immer noch einer der dümsten, das heißt sinnärmsten aller möglichen Welt-Interpretationen sein' ('Wissenschaft als Vorurteil', FW 373). Having thus successfully 'read' these situations using a Nietzschean text-interpretation model, however, Proust's narrator shrinks from a Nietzschean conclusion and proceeds to throw his hands in the air, lapsing back into the vocabulary of subjective idealism for a conclusion which is by now a
non sequitur.

In his 1886 preface to the second edition of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', Nietzsche chastises himself for using Kantian and Schopenhauerian language when his philosophy had outgrown it, and in the context of these confused deliberations in *Le Temps retrouvé* I would argue that one might say the same of Proust, whose narrator's ambivalence and contradictoriness here betrays the fact that the old vocabulary of 'subjective idealism' no longer suffices to describe his actual experiences of 'relativity'.

Proust's narrator is faced with the problem of how to understand the element of creativity involved in our perspectivistic engagement with the world without having to dismiss it as mere self-deception, the creation of an intermittent illusion which is banished as soon as 'le monde réel' supervenes (the self as nothing), but without lapsing on the other hand into 'un pur relativisme' (the self as all). When Nietzsche works through this same problem, his answer, as we saw in the previous chapter, is to supersede the dualistic, subjective idealist model (while at the same time avoiding the temptation of solipsism), by arguing that in our engagement with the world an event of interpretation takes place, will to power 'interpreting' will to power. But where does that leave 'us'? Nietzsche may deconstruct the subject and unmask the 'individuum' as a 'dividuum', but he does not thereby spirit away the self altogether, and nor does his strategy leave him prey to 'un pur relativisme', for he reinterprets the self as a hierarchised plurality of drives constantly shifting its 'centre of perspective': Nietzsche's 'Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte' revalues our 'identity' and resituates it in the body.
Nietzschean 'Semiotics': Reading the Body

In a celebrated passage in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, Nietzsche writes of his task as being 'den Menschen nämlich zurückübersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen Grundtext *homo natura* gekritzelt und gemalt wurden' (JGB 230; cf. WS 17), and he performs this task by unmasking consciousness with its ego as precisely such a presumptuous 'scrawl': as early as *Morgenröte* he is arguing that 'all unser sogenanntes Bewusstsein ein mehr oder weniger phantastischer Kommentar über einen ungewussten, vielleicht unwissbaren, aber gefühlten Text' (M 119; cf. JGB 22). Nietzsche's aim, then, will be to assert the primacy of this 'gefühlten Text': his doctrine of will to power is not a dematerialisation of the body (pace Kristeva on Deleuze's Nietzschean Proust), but an absolute affirmation of it.

Moreover, Nietzsche's 'Aufwertung' of the body is intimately bound up with the very model of interpretation which he proposes, 'semiotics' - which, after all, is primarily a medical term (symptomatology). Thus Nietzsche the philologist and Nietzsche the 'Arzt der Cultur' meet in the 'semiotic' model of interpretation which he proposes in the *Götzen-Dämmerung* passage which I quoted in the Introduction as being central to Deleuze's reading:


All 'phenomena' (i.e. evaluations), Nietzsche suggests, need to be interpreted ('read'), as a physician interprets a body: they should not be taken 'literally', but at 'face value' - their value is as symptoms which the
philosophical physiognomist reads like the experiences etched on a face ('oberflächlich – aus Tiefe').

When Nietzsche proposes a 'semiotic' model, then, he is stressing that he will philosophise 'Am Leitfaden des Leibes', that his will be an 'Ausgangspunkt vom Leibe', as he continually reminds himself in his notebooks.

Nietzsche, too, 'X-rays' the body, like Proust's medics, but unlike them he recognises (with Proust's narrator) that symptomatology is a 'science' of interpretation. For all the clinicians' efforts to decipher the body by applying rigorously 'objective' techniques, no amount of X-rays will produce a truth about it, ironically enough, because the scientists ignore the fact that it is the bodily drives which are interpreting the images produced. Dr Nietzsche runs a very different kind of critical clinic to theirs, for his new model of 'objectivity' is 'Affekte zu Worte kommen lassen' (GM, III, 12).

But Nietzsche recognises that the bodily drives themselves are no definitive text beneath interpretations, that they are themselves constituted and are the residue of former evaluations. The bodily, affective 'text' may be recoverable beneath misinterpretations, but it is not a text 'beneath all interpretations: the 'Grundtext', as Kofman points out contra Granier, is not some new metaphysical absolute but itself constructed as an interpretation.

In an important section of Also sprach Zarathustra, 'Von den Verächtern des Leibes', Zarathustra retorts to the child who says '"Leib bin ich und Seele": 'der Erwachte, der Wissende sagt: Leib bin ich ganz und gar, und nichts außerdem; und Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe. | Der Leib ist eine große Vernunft, eine Vielheit mit einem Sinne' (Z, I, 'Von den Verächtern des Leibes'). He continues by distinguishing between the self, which is the body, and the ego, which it mocks:

'Ich' sagst du und bist stolz auf dies Wort. Aber das Größere ist,
woran du nicht glauben willst – dein Leib und seine große Vernunft: die sagt nicht Ich, aber tut Ich.

Hinter deinen Gedanken und Gefühlen, mein Bruder, steht ein mächtiger Gebieter, ein unbekannter Weiser – der heißt Selbst. In deinem Leibe wohnt er, dein Leib ist er. (Z, I, 'Von den Verächtern des Leibes')

So the body is the site of a kind of personal identity, and as such it substitutes for any essentialised conception of the 'Ich' – Nietzsche rejects 'I think, therefore I am' in favour of 'kinaesthetic sensations occur, therefore "I" am'. But the body is no unitary substance, it is rather (in Deleuze's sense) a 'complicated' aggregate of will to power – 'Das Studium des Leibes giebt einen Begriff von der unsäglichen Complikation', Nietzsche remarks (KSA 11, 434; cf. 12, 205f.) – it is a hierarchy of competing forces not so much sited in the body as constituting it, so that even though it is the privileged interpretational interface it must still be 'read' pluralistically, agonally:


Nietzsche's 'Grundtext' must also be read genealogically, though, for the body is the ultimate intertext, and it bears the traces of its descent (KSA 11, 565). The body changes imperceptibly and decays over time; it can even be set against itself when decadent and diseased (JGB 200), so there can be no question of an absolute value for 'human nature'. To read the body and its genealogy, what is required is a practised eye: 'Ein geübtes Auge, um aus der vielfach überschriebenen Handschrift der menschlichen Züge und Gebärdten die
Vergangenheit deutlich lesen zu können' (KSA 8, 400). In order to 'translate man back into nature' we must use our critical faculties to the full and master the art of interpretation (GM, 'Vorrede', 8): the kind of 'schlechte Interpretations-Künste' or 'schlechte "Philologie'" (JGB 22) practised by most scientists and all theologians must be unmasked, and we must learn 'die Kunst, gut zu lesen' (AC 52).

The Proustian Body

Although Proust, too, recognises the primacy of the bodily text and its interpretations, and his narrator eventually acquires the kind of practised hermeneutic eye which Nietzsche recommends, he learns his lesson only long after experience has initially spelled it out for him. As with perspectivism, it takes him a while to come round to Nietzsche's point of view, for Nietzsche takes his 'Ausgangspunkt vom Leibe', but in this respect, as ever, Proust's narrator takes his 'Ausgangspunkt von der (Eigen)Liebe'.

In Le Côté de Guermantes, 'les paroles de Jupien' open the narrator's eyes to the world of lies, but immediately before the passage on which I concentrated in the previous chapter the narrator reflects on an important lesson which he could have learned from the look of pity with which Françoise greeted his humiliations — the disjunction between any words and the greater truthfulness of involuntary bodily expression — but his own conceitedness, his unwillingness to admit to himself that he also often lies to himself, prevented him from realising this at the time. The immediate context for this discussion of the semiotics of the body is, appropriately enough, a medical one — the narrator asserts that the strength of his belief in the truthfulness of words
was at the time comparable to that of Françoise’s belief in the potential
efficacy of quack panaceas:

Mais la première, Françoise me donna l’exemple (que je ne devais comprendre que plus tard quand il me fut donné de nouveau et plus douloureusement, comme on le verra dans les derniers volumes de cet ouvrage, par une personne qui m’était plus chère) que la vérité n’a pas besoin d’être dite pour être manifestée, et qu’on peut peut-être la recueillir plus sûrement, sans attendre les paroles et sans tenir même aucun compte d’elles, dans mille signes extérieurs, même dans certains phénomènes invisibles, analogues dans le monde des caractères à ce que sont, dans la nature physique, les changements atmosphériques. J’aurais peut-être dû m’en douter, puisqu’à moi-même, alors, il m’arrivait souvent de dire des choses où il n’y avait nulle vérité, tandis que je la manifestais par tant de confidences involontaires de mon corps et de mes actes (lesquelles étaient fort bien interprétées par Françoise). (CG, II, 365)

Françoise is the better hermeneut at this stage, then, for she knows that words are ‘nie wörtlich zu nehmen’, and that the involuntary language of expression and gesture is a surer guide to a person’s character than any words they may choose in order to express themselves. But by the time of La Prisonnière, the narrator has also come to appreciate that the omnipresence of the lie in social interaction requires him to adopt more indirect methods of interpretation:

moi qui pendant tant d’années n’avais cherché la vie et la pensée réelles des gens que dans l’énoncé direct qu’ils m’en fournissaient volontairement, par leur faute j’en étais arrivé à ne plus attacher, au contraire, d’importance qu’aux témoignages qui ne sont pas une expression rationnelle et analytique de la vérité; les paroles elles-mêmes ne me renseignaient qu’à la condition d’être interprétées à la façon d’un afflux de sang à la figure d’une personne qui se trouble, à la façon encore d’un silence subit. (P, III, 596)

Even the inverted lie, as we have seen, is no guarantee of truth, which can only be approached when it is betrayed involuntarily, wordlessly, and by chance. Even then, however, there is an inevitable temporal disjunction between such betrayals—Gilberte’s vulgar gesture at Tansonville, Charlus’s first glance in Balbec—and their adequate decipherment, which can only (if ever) take place retrospectively, as the narrator realises when he reviews the
'etymology' of his various relationships and recovers his first impressions of characters during the 'Bal de têtes' in *Le Temps retrouvé* (TR, IV, 549).

A glance may ultimately yield the greatest truth quotient, then, and Proust's emphasis on the involuntary, bodily, chance nature of truth in this regard will pave the way for his narrator's recognition of the greatest truth of all in the experience of involuntary memory. But the narrator is aware that the significance of the other's glance still inevitably escapes him at the time, which is why his hopes are highest for finally 'possessing' Albertine when her eyes are closed, when he catches her napping in *La Prisonnière.* Here we are given a kind of counter-pole to the narrator's experience of the fragmentation of Albertine in the episode of their first kiss, for no sooner has he recapitulated on her multiplicity - now acknowledged as double, consisting not only in the narrator's 'images successives' of her, but also in her 'multiplication d'elle-même', which he recognises to have taken place independently of him - than he chances upon her asleep. Only now, when she is a recumbent, unconscious body in front of him, does he feel that she is truly his 'prisoner':

> Son moi ne s'échappait pas à tous moments, comme quand nous causions, par les issues de la pensée inavouée et du regard. Elle avait rappelé à soi tout ce qui d'elle était au dehors; elle s'était réfugiée, enclose, résumée, dans son corps. En le tenant sous mon regard, dans mes mains, j'avais cette impression de la posséder toute entière que je n'avais pas quand elle était réveillée. <P, III, 578>

However, this 'impression' is only achieved because in falling asleep she has divested herself not only of all her otherwise errant and elusive selves, but at the same time of her very humanity, becoming a kind of plant ('une longue tige en fleur') and thereby even more foreign to the narrator than when she is conscious. ^26^ Confronted with Albertine's body, the narrator promptly dematerialises it: 'Ce que j'éprouvais alors c'était un amour devant quelque
chose d'aussi pur, d'aussi immatériel, d'aussi mystérieux que si j'avais été
devant les créatures inanimées que sont les beautés de la nature' (P, III,
578). Her body becomes a blank slate on which the narrator feels he can write
at will - it becomes not just a plant, but a marine landscape, and more:

Moi qui connaissais plusieurs Albertine en une seule, il me semblait en
voir bien d'autres encore reposer auprès de moi. [...] Des races, des
atavismes, des vices reposaient sur son visage. Chaque fois qu'elle
depliait sa tête elle créait une femme nouvelle, souvent insoupçonnée
de moi. Il me semblait posséder non pas une, mais d'innombrables
jeunes filles. (P, III, 580)²⁷

Ironically, then, this contemplation of Albertine's body generates just as
many fantasies on the narrator's part as when she later disappears and dies,
and it is no coincidence that when he chances upon her asleep again later in
La Prisonnière, her body represents for him this time not some vegetable vital
force but a lifeless premonition of death (P, III, 862).

When Albertine is asleep and her body is delivered up to the narrator for
scrutiny, the task of deciphering her actually becomes an impossible one, and
her inert body - 'ce corps insignifiant' (P, III, 862) - has no meaning except
those which he imputes to it. Even when she speaks in her sleep he is unable
to interpret her words, and has to draw delusory comfort from her bodily
movement: 'Je ne m'inquiétais pas des mots qu'elle laissait parfois échapper
en dormant, leur signification m'échappait, et, d'ailleurs, quelque personne
inconnue qu'ils eussent désignée, c'était sur ma main, sur ma joue, que sa
main, parfois animée d'un léger frisson, se crispait un instant' (P, III,
581). When she is awake and speaking, the narrator's old frustrations return,
and he wishes that he could decipher her body better in order to arrive at
something of her own past and future rather than just his projected fantasies:
'Et maintenant qu'elle m'avait dit un jour: "Mlle Vinteuil", j'aurais voulu
non pas arracher son robe pour voir son corps, mais, à travers son corps voir
tout ce bloc-notes de ses souvenirs et de ses prochains et ardents rendez-vous' (P, III, 601). But the narrator will never find such a 'bloc-notes' in the body of another — it is only in his experience of his own body that he gains access to the 'Wunderblock' he desires.

When the narrator focuses on his own body, the impression he gains is not of a plant-like existence, but rather of that of an animal, as in the opening scene of the novel: 'j'avais seulement dans sa simplicité première le sentiment de l'existence comme il peut frémir au fond d'un animal' (CS, I, 5).

Anne Henry, comparing Proust's portrayal of waking with Schopenhauer's, emphasises the role of the body in the establishment of the narrator's bearings at the beginning of A la recherche, even before the intervention of conscious memory: 'La pensée du narrateur qui hésite à se glisser dans une forme, dans une époque, avant d'avoir identifié la chambre où il dort, signifie son émergence du néant et c'est le corps, c'est-à-dire l'organe de l'espace, qui assure la reconnaissance'. She concludes: 'Proust dépasse même Schopenhauer en désignant le caractère passif d'une telle réinsertion', and yet the body is far from 'passive' in Proust's analysis, for what the narrator stresses about the body in his own case is its 'memory'. He contrasts the memory of 'ma pensée' with the more effective affective memory of 'mon corps': 'mon corps, le côté sur lequel je reposais, gardiens fidèles d'un passé que mon esprit n'aurait jamais dû oublier' (CS, I, 6).

Just as Nietzsche stresses the importance of somatic stimuli in dreams (MA, I, 13; GD, VI, 4), so for Proust's narrator the slightest change of body posture during sleep generates new memories and associations (CS, I, 4), but Proust takes this phenomenon even further and describes how one's sleeping position can affect the world one constructs on waking, too: the narrator experiences a sense of 'dépaysement' on waking in unfamiliar bedrooms, but even when one wakes in one's own
bed, he tells us, something as minimally uncustomary as a raised arm blocking out the sun will suffice to produce the same sense of 'bouleversement' when one wakes up (CS, I, 5).

In his article 'Corps du texte/texte du corps', Serge Doubrovsky has powerfully argued for the primacy and dynamism of the narrator's body from the outset of Proust's novel:

Au commencement des commencements n'est pas le Verbe, mais le corps. Ce qui 'cherche', ce qui 'induit', ce qui 'repère', ce qui garde la 'mémoire', c'est cette ténèbre sous-jacente à ma conscience, à mon inconscient, à mon langage et irréductible à eux: mon existence corporelle. [...] Le principe chercheur, le moteur de la Recherche, ce qui 'orienté' ou 'imagine', mieux encore, le support du langage, son déclencheur est notre être-au-monde physique. 31

Doubrovsky concentrates on the incipit of A la recherche, on the moment at which 'le corps du texte assume et transmue le texte inconnu du corps', 32 but he also stresses that the body returns to reassert its primacy at the end of the novel, during the 'Bal de têtes' in Le Temps retrouvé. 33 It is, however, in the narrator's experiences of involuntary memory that his own bodily existence reasserts itself in the final book as the 'principe (re)trouveur' of A la recherche as well as its 'principe chercheur', and it is to involuntary memory that we must now turn, for the Time which involuntary memory allows Proust's narrator ultimately to regain is a time wholly inscribed in the body.

Involuntary Memory, 1) Proust, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche

From the tea-soaked madeleine in Du côté de chez Swann to the rest of the 'moments bienheureux' in Le Temps retrouvé, the narrator's involuntary memories are triggered by his senses, and the memories 'moving' within him, as well as the joy which he subsequently feels, are also very much physical
sensations. Moreover, as Michel Butor points out, these 'sensations', unlike his earlier 'impressions', are all provoked by senses other than vision - in the last resort Proust, like Nietzsche, deliberately inverts the traditional hierarchy of the senses so as to privilege the other senses over sight, generally conceived as the most 'spiritual' of all. Yet the narrator himself believes that the essential element in involuntary memories is spiritual, and he dismisses the material element in them as secondary. This order of priority is apparent from the moment he trips over the paving-stone in the Guermantes courtyard, a particularly complex example of the phenomenon because it is a doubly double experience: on one level it suddenly jolts him back into the same search for a lost memory as he undertook before, when tasting the madeleine, and he dismisses the difference between the two experiences as 'purement matérielle' (TR, IV, 445); on a deeper level it eventually takes him back to his similar experience with the stones of Venice, but again he dismisses his attempts to prompt the memory by rocking up and down on the uneven paving-stones: 'Chaque fois que je refaisais rien que matériellement ce même pas, il me restait inutile' (TR, IV, 446).

I want to argue that the narrator's order of priority, his privileging of the spiritual over the material and bodily, needs to be reversed, and that the body is in fact (by the narrator's own admission) a stronger candidate for the 'moi permanent' as guardian of the personality than the abstraction with which he ultimately satisfies himself. But before we can explore the bodily nature of involuntary memories, it is first necessary to consider what the narrator himself thinks he can derive from them, namely a (most un-Nietzschean) 'moi profond'. I shall problematise this abstraction in the section which follows by analysing Proust's narrator's interpretation of involuntary memory in the context of passages in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche which treat similar
Patrick Gardiner has pointed to Schopenhauer's interest in 'the quality of "will-lessness" [...] characteristic of some kinds of memory-experience' as proto-Proustian, but if we examine for a moment Schopenhauer's conception of involuntary memory, important differences in comparison with Proust's will become apparent. In *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Schopenhauer writes of involuntary memory as follows:

The image which Schopenhauer uses to describe the effect of involuntary memory, that of the lost paradise as a deliverance from life's travails, is unmistakably similar to Proust (cf. TR, IV, 449). Yet Schopenhauer is essentially critical of this experience, for he writes of the delusory 'charm' of memories and of one's 'self-deception' in gaining comfort from them. For Schopenhauer, the notion that the past is a 'verlorenes Paradies' is an illusion because we do not also recollect the suffering 'Subjekt des Willens' who had the experiences, in other words because we believe that we were essentially different then compared to now, instead of recognising the immutable core of our existence, which is will-ful suffering. Schopenhauer's interpretation of involuntary memory can thus be seen to stand in opposition
to Proust's, although we can also see from this quotation that in Schopenhauer's conception there is a certain blurring of the distinction which Proust makes between voluntary and involuntary memory, for although he is ostensibly referring to 'willenloses Anschauen', nevertheless there is an element of will involved. He believes that our memories reassert themselves particularly when we are in need of comfort - it is the exigencies of our present situation which in a way call them forth as well as distorting them - and we could therefore be accused of unconsciously seeking to deceive ourselves.

Compared to Schopenhauer's conception of 'involuntary' memory, Proust's is undoubtedly more will-less, as indeed is Nietzsche's, for Nietzsche does not deny the phenomenon - indeed he writes of all memory as somehow involuntary: 'das Erlebte lebt fort "im Gedächtniß"; daß es "kommt", dafür kann ich nichts, der Wille ist dafür unthätig, wie beim Kommen jedes Gedankens' (KSA 11, 644; cf. 11, 595). Whereas Schopenhauer calls involuntary memory a delusion because we believe we were 'essentially' different in the past, though, and Proust's narrator claims it reveals we were 'essentially' the same - for him, the 'Seeligkeit des willenlosen Anschauens' can be attributed precisely to its revealing a kind of 'Seele' - Nietzsche maintains that we cannot draw any conclusions from such involuntary comparisons, and he is adamant that however one explains the recurrence of memories, no 'essential self' should be derived from them. 'In Betreff des Gedächtnisses muß man umlernen: hier steckt die Hauptverführung eine "Seele" anzunehmen, welche zeitlos reproduziert, wiedererkennt usw. [...] Es geschieht etwas, dessen ich mir bewußt werde: jetzt kommt etwas ähnliches -- wer ruft es? weckt es?' (KSA 11, 644; cf. KSA 11, 175; 11, 645f.).

Proust's narrator believes that there is a (single) 'vrai moi' (TR, IV, 451) which rises above the débris of his personality in the 'epiphanies' of Le
Temps retrouvé, but for Nietzsche this sense of an enduring personality or 'soul', the prime temptation of memory, is a temptation which must be resisted. To derive a 'moi profond' from involuntary memory is misplaced, Nietzsche would argue, for it is not only another case of the superstitious belief in the need for an agent to explain every action, but it is also simply to derive another 'fact' (WS 11) by the 'Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen' (KSA 1, 880). Nietzsche echoes Schopenhauer in dismissing the similarity of present and (remembered) past selves as illusory, but he does so for a different reason: 'Unser Gedächtnis beruht auf dem Gleichsehen und Gleichnehmen: also auf dem Ungenaesehen; es ist ursprünglich von der größten Grobheit und sieht fast alles gleich an' (KSA 9, 493). So if Proust's narrator's 'vrai moi' is condemned to be a mere epiphenomenon on the terms of Nietzsche's analysis, what is it that involuntary memory reveals? To answer this question we must consider in more detail what Proust's narrator actually claims it to reveal, namely an 'essence', indeed a number of 'essences'.

Involuntary Memory, 11) 'Essences'

Involuntary memory allows Proust's narrator - or rather, '[l]'être qui était rené en moi' (TR, IV, 451) - to contemplate (TR, IV, 454), enjoy (TR, IV, 450) and 'feed himself' (TR, IV, 451) on 'l'essence permanente et habituellement cachée des choses' (TR, IV, 451), derived from the two sensations which seem momentarily to coexist within him. The narrator himself describes his essences as 'à la fois dans le présent et dans le passé, réels sans être actuels, idéaux sans être abstraits' (TR, IV, 451), and it is this 'complication' which leads Deleuze to qualify the serenity of the narrator's own
Platonising account of the phenomenon, as an experience of the normally hidden world of Ideas, by suggesting a more neo-Platonic parallel. But Deleuze goes further and stresses the agonal quality of the involuntary memories: 'Même quand le passé nous est redonné dans l'essence, l'accouplement du moment présent et de l'ancien ressemble plus à une lutte qu'à un accord, [...] deux sentiments qui s'épousent ne le font qu'en luttant, et forment dans cette lutte un corps irrégulier de peu de durée.'

Where Proust's narrator emphasises the essential sameness which can be abstracted from the repetition, then, Deleuze emphasises the difference in the repetition, interpreting Proustian essences as (he does) Nietzschean will to power: 'Les essences sont à la fois la chose à traduire et la traduction même, le signe et le sens.' Deleuze is able to make this move because Nietzsche himself describes will to power as the 'essence' of the world. Understandably enough for such a thoroughgoing anti-essentialist, Nietzsche rarely uses the word 'Essenz' at all, but in Jenseits von Gut und Böse he writes of 'einer Welt, deren Essenz der Wille zu Macht ist' (JGB 186), and in a notebook entry of the same period he elaborates on what this might mean: 'Die "Essenz", die "Wesenheit" ist etwas Perspektivisches und setzt eine Vielheit schon voraus' (KSA 12, 140). In one note, indeed, Nietzsche even relents in his dismissal of (involuntary) memory as simply analogising and assimilating away difference, thus opening up the possibility for a comparison with precisely the kind of difference within repetition that Deleuze stresses in the essences which Proustian involuntary memories incorporate:

Alles Denken, Urteilen, Wahrnehmen als Vergleichen hat als Voraussetzung ein "Gleichsetzen", noch früher ein "Gleichmachen". Das Gleichmachen ist dasselbe, was die Einverleibung der angeeigneten Materie in die Amöbe ist. Erinnerung spät, insofern hier der gleichmachende Trieb bereits gebändigt erscheint: die Differenz wird bewahrt. Erinnern als ein Einrubriziren und Einschachteln, activ — wer? (KSA 12, 209)
If we follow Deleuze in interpreting Proustian 'essences' as will to power, though, (where) does the individual fit into this picture? In one sense, of course, the individual (as the kind of unitary essence of self which Proust's narrator is seeking) is dispensed with on Nietzsche's will-to-power model: there is no 'core' to the self, and the notion of an 'essential self' is in fact a contradiction in terms. The 'Grundtext homo natura' (JGB 230) is synonymous with will to power (KSA 12, 132): will to power is above the person, beneath the deepest 'moi', since 'Der Individualisms' is merely its 'bescheidenste Stufe' (KSA 12, 503). Proust's narrator himself writes of 'notre vrai moi' as 'l'homme affranchi de l'ordre du temps' (TR, IV, 451), as 'l'homme éternel' (TR, IV, 497), in other words not a realm of the individual at all. As Deleuze argues, the essence is primary and transcends subjectivity: 'L'essence n'est pas seulement individuelle, elle est individualisante.' It is this essence which is at work in the experience the narrator describes at the outset of Proust's novel, of the dispersed personality being instinctively 'read' into a self: 'Un homme qui dort, tient en cercle autour de lui le fil des heures, l'ordre des années et des mondes. Il les consulte d'instinct en s'éveillant et y lit en une seconde le point de la terre qu'il occupe, le temps qui s'est écoulé jusqu'à son réveil' (CS, I, 5). If one asks 'who' is doing the reading then one is faced with an aporia - which the narrator himself admits when he modifies his position for the similar scene in Sodome et Gomorrhe: 'Alors du noir orage qu'il nous semble avoir traversé (mais nous ne disons même pas nous) nous sortons gisants, sans pensées: un "nous" sans contenu' (SG, III, 371). Deleuze comments here:

On ne demandera pas qui choisit. Certes aucun moi puisqu'on est soi-même choisi, puisqu'un certain moi se trouve choisi chaque fois que 'nous' choisissons un être à aimer, une souffrance à éprouver, et que ce moi n'est pas moins surpris de vivre ou de revivre, et de répondre à l'appel, non sans se faire attendre. [...]. En vérité, il existe une
But if Proust's "nous sans contenu" is pure interpretation, i.e. will to power, then in Nietzsche's terms this pure interpretation nevertheless invests itself in the body as 'der leibhafte Wille zur Macht' (JGB 259). Just as love renders 'le temps sensible' (cf. P, III, 887), and the 'Bal de têtes' allows the narrator to appreciate 'le temps incorpore' (TR, IV, 623), so involuntary memories embody essential time as difference and repetition, and their complication is the complication of the body as will to power. Deleuze argues that the two affects locked in an agonal embrace in the experience of involuntary memory 'forment dans cette lutte un corps irrégulier de peu de durée', but both are generated within the hierarchic structure of the 'greater' body, the body which, as Zarathustra points out, 'sagt nicht Ich, aber tut Ich.'

Involuntary Memory, iii) Will to Power, The Body and Eternal Return

At the beginning of La Prisonnière, Proust's narrator is 'communing with his soul' — 'en tête à tête avec le petit personnage intérieur, salueur chantant du soleil' (P, III, 522) — and this important passage shows him actually realising that his body undercuts the essentialising impulse of his intelligence, although he prefers not to expand on the consequences of the body's 'greater truth':

De ceux qui composent notre individu, ce ne sont pas les plus apparents qui nous sont le plus essentiels. En moi, quand la maladie aura fini de les jeter l'un après l'autre par terre, il en restera encore deux ou trois qui auront la vie plus dure que les autres, notamment un certain philosophe qui n'est heureux que quand il a découvert, entre deux oeuvres, entre deux sensations, une partie commune. Mais le dernier de
tous, je me suis quelquefois demandé si ce ne serait pas le petit bonhomme fort semblable à un autre que l'opticien de Combray avait placé derrière sa vitrine pour indiquer le temps qu'il faisait. (P, III, 522)

So beneath all the moribund 'moi's, and, most importantly, beneath the 'moi philosophe', the synthesising 'moi' of Le Temps retrouvé who is here revealed (pre-emptively, in the future perfect) to be just another perishable 'moi', a 'moi' of the intelligence, lies 'le petit bonhomme barométrique'. The 'bonhomme' inverts the sophistication of the philosophical 'moi', for he represents a reversion to the animal sensation which marks the very first discussion of waking in the novel. The 'bonhomme' is total responsiveness, pure instinct, and it is he who testifies to the fact that beneath all the Schopenhauerian pessimism in the narrator there is an inalienable potential for joy in life. This is the 'moi' who feels indifferent to death because the sun comes out, and the Platonising philosopher cannot hope to plumb his depths, or indeed those of his cousin in Le Côté de Guermantes, the 'simple bonhomme de plomb' to whom the narrator punningly likens himself on waking from 'un sommeil de plomb' (CG, II, 387). What better figure could Proust have used for the corporeal basis of his narrator's perspectivism than this 'bonhomme' standing outside an optician's shop?

The body needs to be recognised, then, as that which persists through the generations of fleeting 'moi's of the mind, including the spiritualised 'moi' which the narrator derives from involuntary memory. At the opening of Le Temps retrouvé, the narrator indeed stresses that the involuntary memory of the body is more profound and retentive yet than the involuntary memory of the mind, although again he ignores the implications and seeks to dismiss the bodily version (in Platonic terms) as but a 'pale copy': 'il semble qu'il y ait une mémoire involontaire des membres, pâle et stérile imitation de...
l'autre, qui vive plus longtemps, comme certains animaux ou végétaux inintelligents vivent plus longtemps que l'homme. Les jambes, les bras sont pleins de souvenirs engourdis' (TR, IV, 277). Even by the end of the novel, it seems, the narrator has not learnt quite all the lessons which were preemptively vouchsafed to him earlier in the book: 'Proust romancier' describes a very different kind of experience from that which his alter ego, 'Proust philosophe', analyses in a superannuated vocabulary of 'essences'. As Maurice Blanchot writes: 'Cette interprétation qui a été la raison d'être de l'œuvre de Proust et à laquelle celle-ci a apporté une justification glorieuse, dépasse, cela n'est pas douteux, ce que son expérience proprement dite lui offrait dans sa pureté immédiate.'

Deleuze's emphasis on the difference and repetition of Proustian essences allows them to be interpreted in Nietzschean terms as embodied will to power, but as Ronald Bogue points out, it also allows for an interpretation of their complicated temporality in equally Nietzschean terms - in terms of the eternal return:

In large part, the originality of Deleuze's reading of Proust lies in his interpretation of Proustian essences as absolute internal differences. This characterization of essences allows Deleuze to rescue Proustian essences from a realm of murky mysticism and to make them the centre of the Recherche as a whole. It also affords Deleuze a means of effecting a rapprochement of Nietzschean and Proustian themes, for in the eternal return, as in Proustian essences, the controlling concepts are those of difference and repetition.

One does not need Bogue's gloss on Deleuze's reading of Proust to arrive at this conclusion, though, for it is sufficient to consider the very section in *Also sprach Zarathustra* where the eternal return strikes Zarathustra, the section 'Vom Gesicht und Rätsel' in the Third Book. No sooner has our hero explained his 'abgründlichen Gedanken' to the dwarf here than immediately afterwards he is struck by an involuntary memory which Nietzsche gives as its
parabolic representation:


Hörte ich jemals einen Hund so heulen? Mein Gedanke lief zurück. Ja! Als ich Kind war, in fernster Kindheit:
- da hörte ich einen Hund so heulen. Und sah ihn auch, gesträubt, den Kopf nach oben, zitternd, in stillster Mitternacht, wo auch Hunde an Gespenster glauben:
- also daß es mich erbarmte. [...] Und als ich wieder so heulen hörte, da erbarmte es mich abermals. (Z, III, 'Vom Gesicht und Rätsel')

This link between involuntary memory and the eternal return is crucial, for it opens up the possibility of moving beyond the bodily self revealed in the epiphanic moment of involuntary memory to become the kind of self which Nietzsche's 'ubermensch' creates in his affirmation of the eternal return.

But who is Nietzsche's 'ubermensch'...?

Dionysus, The 'God Within': Nietzsche's 'Moment bienheureux'

'L'expérience de Proust a toujours paru mystérieuse par l'importance qu'il lui prête, fondée sur des phénomènes auxquels les psychologues n'accordent aucune valeur d'exception, bien que ces phénomènes eussent peut-être déjà dangereusement transporté Nietzsche.'

(Blanchot, Le livre à venir, p. 22)

Let us return for a moment to Bogue's realm of 'murky mysticism'. In A la recherche, involuntary memory involves the mind’s opening up to a vast expanse of felt truth, a bodily feeling of what Doubrovsky calls 'déjà senti' accompanied by a quasi-orgasmic pleasure. This surge of simultaneity, the wordless unity of mind and body, is a fleeting intuition of the perfect personality which at the same time spills over into the impersonality of the realm of essences. Its closest model is indeed the experience of mystical ecstasy, and as Bogue notes, there have been many who have given readings of
Proust in the light of mysticism, just as there have been those who have claimed to find 'les pages mystiques de Nietzsche'. But I would agree with Tadié, who remarks curtly of Pommier's *La mystique de Proust* that the term does not apply to Proust, a writer outside the religious sphere; I would argue that it cannot strictly apply to Nietzsche, either, and would follow Bataille in substituting for both writers a less metaphysical, more neutral but ultimately equally rich conception of 'inner experience'.

In section 50 of *Morgenröte*, Nietzsche dismisses mystics as 'schwärmische Trunkenbolde', and he is likewise dismissive of the mystics' experience of 'Rausch': 'Der Rausch gilt ihnen als das wahre Leben, als das eigentliche Ich' (cf. M 87, FW 126). But Nietzsche himself gives 'Rausch' a central place in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, and indeed the conflation of past and present during the narrator's 'blessed moments' of involuntary memory in *A la recherche* bears a close resemblance to the fusions which Nietzsche describes in the depiction of Dionysian ecstasy in his first book. Here that ecstasy is portrayed in terms of 'die Vernichtung des Schleiers der Maja, das Einssein als Genius der Gattung, ja der Natur' (GT 2), with a consequent reabsorption of the part into the whole: 'Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete, feindliche oder unterjochte Natur feiert wieder ihre Versöhnung mit ihrem verlorenen Sohne, dem Menschen' (GT 1).

Now although Nietzsche subsequently condemns *Die Geburt der Tragödie* for its metaphysical language, nevertheless the task he later sets himself, as we have seen, is still to 'translate man back into nature'. The continuity between Nietzsche's representation of the creative 'Rausch' of the Dionysian artist in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and his later position is clearest when in *Ecce Homo* he describes his own most precious 'Augenblick', the moment of
'inspiration' for Zarathustra which came over him in August 1881 as he was walking beside Lake Silvaplana:

Der Begriff Offenbarung, in dem Sinn, daß plötzlich, mit unsäglicher Sicherheit und Feinheit, etwas sichtbar, hörbar wird, etwas, das einen im Tiefsten erschüttert und umwirft, beschreibt einfach den Tatbestand. Man hört, man sucht nicht; man nimmt, man fragt nicht, wer da gibt; wie ein Blitz leuchtet ein Gedanke auf, mit Notwendigkeit, in der Form ohne Zögern — ich habe nie eine Wahl gehabt. Eine Entzückung, deren ungemeine Spannung sich mitunter in einem Tränenstrom auslässt, bei der der Schritt unwillkürlich bald stürmt, bald langsam wird; ein vollkommenes Außer-sich-sein mit dem distinktesten Bewußtsein einer Unzahl feiner Schauder und Überrieselungen bis in die Füßehen; eine Glückstiefe, in der das Schmerzlichste und Düsterste nicht als Gegensatz wirkt, sondern als bedingt, als herausgefordert, sondern als eine notwende Farbe innerhalb eines solchen Lichtüberflusses. (EH, III, 'Z', 3)

Aside from the fact that in life both Nietzsche and Proust experienced their intense revelations on the shores of Swiss lakes, the parallels between Nietzsche’s description here and Proust’s accounts of involuntary memory are, I think, striking: the religious vocabulary of epiphanic revelation ('Offenbarung'), the synaesthesia of the experience, and indeed its sheer bodiliness ('Schauder und überrieselungen bis in die Füßehen', its 'rhythm'), the feeling of certainty ('Sicherheit', 'Tatbestand') and the consequent pleasure it gives ('Entzückung', 'Glückstiefe'); cf. SG, III, 155: 'cette félicité traversée par la certitude'; TR, IV, 446: 'une joie pareille à une certitude'). Its overwhelming effect ('etwas, das einen im Tiefsten erschüttert und umwirft') recalls the 'Bouleversement de toute ma personne' (SG, III, 152) which overtakes Proust’s narrator when he returns to Balbec and truly experiences his grandmother’s death for the first time; there, too, the narrator’s momentary understanding of 'les intermittences du coeur' leads him to burst into tears (SG, III, 153: 'des sanglots me secouèrent, des larmes ruisselèrent de mes yeux'). When Nietzsche writes of his experience in a letter to Köselitz of 14 August 1881, he emphasises that his tears were 'nicht sentimentale Thränen, sondern Thränen des Jauchzens' (KGB III/1, 112),
although it is clear from his description in *Ecce Homo* that his pleasure is not without admixture of pain, for it derives precisely from his ability to affirm that pain, the Dionysian 'Entsetzlichkeiten des Daseins'. What Nietzsche is presenting here, in other words, is that 'Pessimismus der Stärke' which he analysed in the tragic drama of the Greeks, and which he has at last achieved for himself.

Himself? Given that the experience Nietzsche describes here is that of 'ein vollkommnes Außer-sich-sein', one is quite justified in asking 'who "he"?'. Nietzsche indeed prefices the passage by admitting that this experience might well appear similar to one of mystical possession by a divine inspiration from without: 'Mit dem geringsten Rest von Aberglauben in sich würde man in der Tat die Vorstellung, bloß Inkarnation, bloß Mundstück, bloß Medium übermächtiger Gewalten zu sein, kaum abzuweisen wissen.' And the passage continues by asserting that the experience is one which gives a certain sense of 'the god within': 'Alles geschieht im höchsten Grade unwillig, aber wie in einem Sturm von Freiheits-Gefühl, von Unbedingtsein, von Macht, von Göttlichkeit ...' (cf. SG, III, 152f.: 'ma poitrine s'enfla, remplie d'une présence inconnue, divine'). In *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* Nietzsche devotes two sections to a critique of the 'Glaube an Inspiration' (*KA*, I, 155–56), but the Nietzsche of *Ecce Homo* is a 'believer'—a believer once again, for the god he now reasserts in his moment of transfiguration is the artist-god Dionysus: his experience of perfectly divine 'Außer-sich-sein' is the experience of the Dionysian artist 'auf jener Höhe der Selbstentäußerung' (*GT* 2) in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*: 'als Gott fühlt er sich, er selbst wandelt jetzt so verzückt und erhoben, wie er die Götter im Traume wandeln sah' (*GT* 1).

But the divine quality which is most frequently emphasised in Nietzsche's
account of his inspiration in *Ecce Homo* is the necessity of his experience, specifically the way in which its involuntariness ('unwillkürlich'), its freedom ('Freiheits-Gefühl'), translates into a feeling of necessity ('mit Notwendigkeit'; 'ich habe nie eine Wahl gehabt'; 'eine notwendige Farbe'). Nietzsche's experience takes him beyond the realm of human contingency because he appropriates for himself the divine property of self-grounding necessity: in the inspirational moment he wears not just the mask of Dionysus, but the mask of the Promethean 'übermensch' as well. For it is the 'übermensch' who, after the death of God, reclaims for himself all the properties which mankind had previously projected onto the divinity, and it is the 'übermensch' who, specifically, usurps the divine prerogative of becoming himself, creating himself, in the conflation of chance and necessity which is his 'Jasagen' to the eternal return, *amor fati*.

**The 'übermensch' and *Amor fati*: Chance, Necessity, Self-Affirmation**

The 'formula' of *amor fati* is not simply a blind, fatalistic acceptance of 'whatever fate might have in store', but rather an active affirmation of existence or 'Life' in its totality. In the section 'Zum neuen Jahre', the impassioned New Year's resolution which opens the Fourth Book of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Nietzsche explains:

> Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Notwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen - so werde ich einer von denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. *Amor fati*: das sei von nun an meine Liebe! Ich will keinen Krieg gegen das Häßliche führen. Ich will nicht anklagen, ich will nicht einmal die Ankläger anklagen. *Vegsehen* sei meine einzige Verneinung! Und, alles in allem und großen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Jasagender sein! (FW 276)

Significantly, *amor fati* is described here in fundamentally aesthetic terms -
even what is necessarily ugly can be deemed to be beautiful, for one can transform and transfigure it through a 'universal love', in other words by assuming another of the properties of the traditional Christian divinity. Such a love asserts this world as beautiful by affirming it in all its Dionysian atrocity rather than by veiling it with the 'schöner Schein' of traditional idealist (Apollinian) aesthetics. Nietzsche describes amor fati as the 'höchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreichen kann: dionysisch zum Dasein stehn' (KSA 13, 492): in the absence of God, man's aspiration for Nietzsche remains that of becoming godlike, but the 'Übermensch' has a new god in 'Dionysos philosophos' (KSA 12, 224). The Christian 'Fabel vom lieben Gott' (M 130), of the 'divine watchmaker' - 'der zwar die dunklen, krummen und wunderbaren Wege liebe, aber zuletzt doch alles "herrlich hinausführe"' - is superseded, and the Greek Moira is restored to the highest reaches of the heavens, as 'jene eisernen Hände der Notwendigkeit, welche den Würfelbecher des Zufalls schütteln'. Man's task becomes that of mastering the game of dice and learning to play well: the divine law-giver, having been deprived of his omniscience in the new post-metaphysical climate of indeterminacy, is rejected in favour of the 'laws' of probability, and in the absence of 'ein allwissender, rechnender Verstand' (MA, I, 106), 'das Rad der Welt' runs unchecked.

With his great 'Ja' to the contingency of the world, it is the 'Übermensch' who thereby assumes the cosmic responsibility of affirming the necessity of all things, for as Deleuze writes: 'Ce que Nietzsche appelle nécessité (destin) n'est donc jamais l'abolition, mais la combinaison du hasard lui-même. La nécessité s'affirme du hasard pour autant que le hasard est lui-même affirmé.'

That the affirmation of the totality of Life which is amor fati means the affirmation of past, present and future is made clear when Nietzsche restates
the theme in *Ecce Homo*:

Meine Formel für die Größe am Menschen ist *amor fati*: daß man nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das Notwendige nicht bloß ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen - aller Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem Notwendigen -, sondern es lieben ... (EH, II, 10)

So it is no coincidence that the thought of *amor fati* should strike Nietzsche at the same time as that of the eternal return, in 1881, for the relation between the two is a necessary one. Moreover, in affirming the eternal return, Nietzsche's 'übermensch' affirms and accomplishes his own eternal return, too, for only he who can tolerate the 'most abyssal thought', he who would be willing to relive every moment of his own life eternally, is worthy of returning. Nietzsche's 'formula' of *amor fati* is thus the ultimate formula for 'becoming what one is' (cf. Z, IV, 'Das Honig-Opfer'): the 'Jasagen' of the 'übermensch' replaces the recursive logic of the self-grounding *ens causa sui* as the justification and celebration of his own circular necessity:

das Ideal des übermütigsten, lebendigsten und weltbejahendsten Menschen, der sich nicht nur mit dem, was war und ist, abgefunden und vertragen gelernt hat, sondern es, so wie es war und ist, wieder haben will, in alle Ewigkeit hinaus, unersättlich *da capo* rufend, nicht nur zu sich, sondern zum ganzen Stücke und Schauspielen, und nicht nur zu einem Schauspiel, sondern im Grunde zu dem, der gerade dies Schauspiel nötig hat - und notig macht: weil er immer wieder sich notig hat - und notig macht -- Wie? Und dies wäre nicht - *circulus vitiosus deus*?

*Uersättlich da capo rufend*, Nietzsche's 'übermensch' becomes the new 'redeemer': willing nothing to have been different and affirming all the elements of his past life, he re-deems them as having been necessary. As Zarathustra comments (Z, II, 'Von der Erlösung'), resentment at time's "Es war" (regret, the retrospective abandonment of an element of the self) is the ultimate destruction of the self, for there can be no self to return without a recognition and affirmation of all the self's past, including all the errors
which befell one along the way. By the same token, though, the self-redemptive act of the 'übermensch' is the act of self-creation par excellence, the resurrection of the dismembered Dionysus: 'Und das ist all mein Dichten und Trachten, daß ich in Eins dichte und zusammentrage, was Bruchstück ist und Rätsel und grauser Zufall' (Z, II, 'Von der Erlösung'). The 'übermensch' is Nietzsche's paradigmatic 'Dionysian artist', an artist of the self.

'Les anneaux nécessaires': The Aesthetics of Self-Creation

If we return at this point to Proust's narrator and his experience of involuntary memories, I would suggest that the self-creative potential of Nietzsche's 'yea-saying' 'übermensch' yields a paradigm in terms of which one can understand both why Proust's narrator feels a sense of necessity in his involuntary memories, a sense of self rescued from the world of human contingency, and why the self-revelations of involuntary memory should lead him on to a work of art - a 'metaphorical' art of self-creation.64

The madeleine episode gives the narrator the pleasure it does, we are told, because it gives him an exhilarating feeling of relief from contingency - 'J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel' (CS, I, 44). But only in Le Temps retrouvé is this peculiar sense of necessity understood as deriving precisely from the chance nature of the memories' recurrence, for as the narrator reflects after stumbling in the Guermantes courtyard and being reminded of Venice: 'je sentais que ce devait être la griffe de leur authenticité. Je n'avais pas été chercher les deux pavés inégaux de la cour où j'avais buté' (TR, IV, 457). Involuntary memory is a revaluation of all values, and it is a definitive valorisation of indifference, since the narra-
tor's whole past becomes equally important to the whim of fate, 'la mémoire indifférente' (P, III, 864), which can 'choose' to rescue any moment from time's destruction. Moreover, it is because 'l'artiste, le Temps' (TR, IV, 513) allows the narrator - by chance - to focus his binocular vision on his own life (a kind of minimal Argus experience), that involuntary memories provide him with the impetus towards realising his artistic vocation in an art of self-creation, for their explication is figured as a dynamic process of 'reading' a self-text: 'Quand au livre intérieur de signes inconnus [...], pour la lecture desquels personne ne pouvait m'aider d'aucune règle, cette lecture consistait en un acte de création où nul ne peut nous suppléer ni même collaborer avec nous' (TR, IV, 458).

With the creative/interpretative 'decipherment' of his 'livre intérieur de signes inconnus', Proust's narrator takes upon himself and internalises the task of 'reading' the self which the waking man is forced to accomplish only externally, contingently and imperfectly as he 'lit en une seconde le point de la terre qu'il occupe, le temps qui s'est écoulé jusqu'à son réveil' (CS, I, 5). And this self-creation is to be effected literally by an act of writing which will enable the narrator to turn the recognition of the necessity of chance in his life into the decisive affirmation of *amor fati*. For the narrator realises that the artist can seize the eternity experienced in the fleeting moment of involuntary memory and 'translate' it into a work of art which can be the apotheosis of the 'objective laws' of indifferent chance synthesised with the artist's subjective viewpoint in a death-defying dual affirmation. His book will be quite unlike the conventional realist novel, 'la littérature qui se contente de "décrire les choses", d'en donner seulement un misérable relevé de lignes et de surfaces' (TR, IV, 463), for his narrative will draw on the material provided by chance reminiscences crafted into
metaphors, 'les anneaux nécessaires d'un beau style' (TR, IV, 468), which he explicitly contrasts with 'le rapport unique de la loi causale dans le monde de la science', the 'rapport unique' which breaks his life up into an arid and meaningless succession of '"instantanées"' (TR, IV, 444).

It is only by going beyond the linear 'loi causale' in his work of art that the narrator can restore to his life a sense of organic continuity, so the most adequate, the most 'literal' translation of the 'livre intérieur' will be, paradoxically, the most metaphorical one. For the difference and repetition embodied in the narrator's experiences of involuntary memory lend a metaphorical character to the textuality of the 'livre intérieur' itself: the 'literality' of the body-text is always already effaced by the irresolvable but productive tension between the two poles of a 'métaphore réciproque'. Metaphors are inherently circular in structure, since they set up an endless hermeneutic relation of mutual implication - of what Proust's narrator, describing 'les carafes de la Vivonne', terms 'allitération perpétuelle' (CS, I, 166). Proustian metaphor, which thus reproduces what Foucault calls the 'perpétuel jeu de miroirs' of post-Nietzschean interpretation, is itself the perfect metaphor for the eternal return.

Alexander Nehamas, writing of 'Proust's narrator, who creates himself, out of everything that has happened to him, in his own writing', comments: 'the ambiguous relation between discovery and creation, which matches exactly Nietzsche's own view, also captures perfectly the tension in the very idea of being able to become who one actually is'. But not only do Proust's 'anneaux nécessaires' parallel the necessity of Nietzsche's 'Übermensch', or the experience of Zarathustra, 'brünstig [...] nach dem hochzeitlichen Ring der Ringe - dem Ring der Wiederkunft!' (Z, III, 'Die sieben Siegel'); the link which Proust's narrator makes between the necessity of affirmed chance
and artistic self-expression in metaphors is also one which Nietzsche makes. The experience of Dionysian 'Rausch' portrayed in Die Geburt der Tragödie, as Kofman points out, is the moment when the transfigured artist, transposed 'outside of himself', becomes a 'metaphor' for the totality, so it is hardly surprising that the Dionysian artist, like Proust's narrator, should in turn respond by seeking to express himself in 'metaphors', in a mobilisation of all the symbolic faculties of the body, which becomes expression itself:

Im dionysischen Dithyrambus wird der Mensch zur höchsten Steigerung aller seiner symbolischen Fähigkeiten gereizt; etwas Nieempfundenes drängt sich zur Außerung [...] . Jetzt soll sich das Wesen der Natur symbolisch ausdrücken; eine neue Welt der Symbole ist nötig, einmal die ganze leibliche Symbolik, nicht nur die Symbolik des Mundes, des Gesichts, des Wortes, sondern die volle, alle Glieder rhythmisch bewegende Tanzgebärde. (GT 2)

And what Nietzsche himself finds most striking about his moment of 'inspiration' is that here, too, the ineffable ('unsäglich') experience issues into necessary metaphorical expression. After a reflection on rhythm, the passage from Ecce Homo quoted above continues:

Die Unfreiwilligkeit des Bildes, des Gleichnisses ist das Merkwürdigste; man hat keinen Begriff mehr, was Bild, was Gleichnis ist, alles bietet sich als der nächste, der richtigste, der einfachste Ausdruck. Es scheint wirklich, um an ein Wort Zarathustras zu erinnern, als ob die Dinge selber herankämen und sich zum Gleichnisse anbieten. (EH, III, 'Z', 2)

Like Proust's narrator, then, Nietzsche, too, translates his moment of inspiration into a writing and 'gives birth' to a book, Also sprach Zarathustra, the most metaphorical of all his books, which he himself considers stylistically the best precisely because in it he succeeds in rendering the Dionysian 'Gesamtentfesselung aller symbolischen Kräfte' in a 'dancing' written style, a style of bodily self-expression:

Nietzsche ends the section in *Ecce Homo* on the inspiration for Zarathustra with: 'Dies ist meine Erfahrung von Inspiration; ich zweifle nicht, daß man Jahrtausende zurückgehn muß, um Jemanden zu finden, der mir sagen darf "es ist auch die meine". '-' (EH, III, 'Z', 3). I would argue, though, that one need move forward only a few decades to find its parallel in Proust, whose novel, as Gabriel Josipovici writes, 'is in the end less about spots of time or moments of true being than about uniting the lost fragments of the body through the act of writing which tells of the dispersal of such fragments.'

But *A la recherche* does not just mirror Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra* in its emphasis on the Dionysian primacy of bodily metaphor; it also mirrors the text in which Nietzsche achieves the heights of 'übermenschlich' self-creation for himself, *Ecce Homo*. After all, what is *Ecce Homo* if not a case of Nietzsche's looking back over his life, like Proust's retrospective narrator at the end of *A la recherche*, and affirming that all was necessary (even if this involves a judicious amount of selective 'Vegsehen')? To take one example: although Nietzsche asserts in *Ecce Homo* that his experience of inspiration was without parallel over the previous centuries, in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* he himself had previously attributed precisely this kind of inspiration to Wagner. But *Ecce Homo* is a testament to Nietzsche's own ability, 'alles "Es war" umzuschaffen in ein "So wollte ich es!"' (Z, II, 'Von der Erlösung'), and, as Kofman again has shown, this is nowhere more the case than with his reappropriation of his earlier 'incarnations' such as Schopenhauer and Wagner as 'metaphors' for himself. It is this ability that allows Nietzsche to entitle the final chapter of *Ecce Homo* 'Warum ich ein Schicksal
in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche exerts that 'rückwirkende Kraft' which in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (34) he attributed to every great man who has history rewritten in his wake; Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's last testament to his will, to his achievement of the amor fati which in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (276) was posited as his highest aspiration.

'LIFE AS LITERATURE'?

For both Proust’s narrator and the Nietzsche of Ecce Homo it is thus possible to bestow on one’s life the kind of retrospective aesthetic unity which the former discerns in Wagner’s Ring, with its ‘thème retrospectivement nécessaire’ (P, III, 666), and in Balzac’s Comédie humaine, with its Preface conferring on it an ‘[u]nité ultérieure, non factice’ (P, III, 667); both, moreover, demonstrate how self-creation as a work of art 'translates' into the creation of a work of art of the self. Comparing A la recherche and Ecce Homo in this way, I would follow Nehamas in contending that Nietzsche’s ideal is indeed 'Life as Literature', just as, for Proust’s narrator: 'La vraie vie, la vie enfin découverte et éclaircie, la seule vie par conséquent réellement vécue, c’est la littérature' (TR, IV, 474).

Now Nehamas has been rightly criticised on a number of counts over the ten years since the appearance of his groundbreaking book: Gary Shapiro, for example, rejects his 'Hegelian' reading of Proust for the same reasons I criticised Derrida’s ‘reading’ in my Introduction,77 while Richard Schacht and Alan White have proposed other creative arts (respectively, painting and dance) as more pertinent models for Nietzsche’s conception of ‘Life’.78 The most incisive criticisms have come from those who have disputed the success of
Nietzsche's self-unifying project in Ecce Homo and accused Nehamas of being taken in by Nietzsche's rhetoric. Thus Henry Staten argues that Nehamas's account of "Nietzsche as a literary character" both ignores the texture of Nietzsche's text and sidesteps too neatly the question of Nietzsche's being the 'comedian of the ascetic ideal'; Daniel V. Conway, too, reads Nietzsche against the grain, taking a hammer to Nehamas's 'idol of the Serious Nietzsche' and emphasising the elements of self-parody in Ecce Homo; and most recently, James J. Winchester has argued that 'instead of unifying his entire life and work within one literary character, Nietzsche offers us a carnival of characters.'

In the light of these criticisms I would argue that Nehamas's model of 'Life as Literature' can still be sustained, but only if one makes two important modifications to his account and recognises, with Magnus, Stewart and Mileur, that 'Nehamas draws up short of cashing out his own insight.'

Firstly it is essential to bear in mind the notion of 'literature' to which I have been arguing both Nietzsche and Proust subscribe, namely a metaphorical text which could never serve as a model of hermetic hermeneutical self-sufficiency or yield a totalised literary character as its 'hero', but which is dynamic and unstable, for both the text itself and any interpretations 'of' it are the product of unconscious selection by the bodily drives. In his conception of the identity of a literary character Nehamas stresses the unifying thread of narrative continuity, but this is a thread with which neither Nietzsche nor Proust sees fit to tie up the necessity of the literary self. Genevieve Lloyd rightly responds to Nehamas by pointing to the work which metaphor is made to do in Proust's text, although she does so only in order to argue that Proustian involuntary memory 'transcends' the 'paradoxes' in Nietzsche's account of eternal return, whereas I have been arguing here
that the two are more closely comparable."

A second rider which needs to be added to Nehamas's account is the importance of maintaining a careful separation between author and literary character in the cases of both Nietzsche and Proust. For the unified 'Nietzsche' who has become what he is in Ecce Homo is just as much a textual construct as is Proust's narrator, and their ideal lives, their totalising gestures, their dreams of giving birth to themselves remain fantasies of control - a point which is made by Doubrovsky (contra Deleuze) and Malcolm Bowie with regard to Proust's novel, and by Pierre Klossowski and Alphonso Lingis with regard to Nietzsche." As Kofman has argued, the perils of seeking to enact such a fantasy are demonstrated all too poignantly by Nietzsche himself, whose lapse into madness occurs at precisely the point when he succumbs to the temptation to erase the metaphorical distance from his identificatory figures." Which is why it is highly dangerous to conflate these fictional characters with their authors, as Richard Rorty does when he glibly remarks: 'We [ironists, crassly naive literary critics] do not bother to distinguish Swift from saeva indignatio, Hegel from Geist, Nietzsche from Zarathustra, Marcel Proust from Marcel the narrator, or Trilling from the Liberal Imagination. We do not care whether any of these writers managed to live up to their own self-images.' Rorty's irresponsibility in this respect leads him to posit 'Nietzsche' and 'Proust' as exemplary 'ironists', yet he himself admits that in his account of Proust he is 'skating on pretty thin ice', while his Heideggerian account of a Nietzsche who oversteps a notional 'private/public' dividing-line and sells short his perspectivism with his later 'metaphysics' has been duly pilloried in recent Nietzsche criticism."
Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that both Nehamas and Rorty miss 'the self-doubt, the fear and trembling, the contempt and the horror, and above all, the mocking tones of self-parody in Nietzsche's presentation of his authorship', and Paul Ricoeur, similarly, stresses the anxiety which remains even at the conclusion of Proust's novel: 'Ce n'est pas, en effet, sur un cri de triomphe que se clôut la Recherche, mais sur "un sentiment de fatigue et d'effroi". [...]. La Recherche n'a engendré, selon le mot de H.R. Jauss, qu'un temps interrim, celui d'une œuvre encore à faire et que la mort peut ruiner.' In the next chapter I shall return to the two writers' apparently hermetic and self-contained circular structures, arguing that their (self-)texts remain, in Eco's sense, 'open works of art' which ultimately, and necessarily, elude authorial control. But our discussion of Proust's narrator's revelations in Le Temps retrouvé remains to be concluded, for although we have seen that the work he will write will be based on his own life, which he will recreate through the 'anneaux nécessaires' of privileged metaphors, the 'revaluation of all values' in Le Temps retrouvé provides him with a number of other aesthetic principles for his 'artwork of the future' which we must briefly address.

The narrator realises in retrospect the wisdom of Elstir's advice that 'la sagesse [...] est un point de vue sur les choses', and he can only do so after the event because that ultimate 'point de vue' is the complex retroperspective which involuntary memory affords. It allows him to look back over his whole life and assert that even the false steps were necessary, concurring with Nietzsche that there is a positive danger in 'understanding oneself' too soon:

So Proust's narrator can now understand in retrospect the purpose of Elstir's technique - 'l'effort d'Elstir de ne pas exposer les choses telles qu'il savait qu'elles étaient mais selon ces illusions optiques dont notre vision première est faite' (JF, II, 194; cf. CG, II, 712) - and of the analogous 'côté Dostoievski de Mme de Sévigné' (P, III, 880). For just as the impressionist painter Elstir represents the illusions which are one's first impressions, so Proust's narrator will present us with his erroneous first interpretations and privilege them, because as errors they already presuppose a further interpretation, an inversion, an epistemological dynamic. As the narrator found out from Albertine in La Prisonnière, the truth is only ever to be found somewhere between the lie and its inversion, and it is his realisation in Le Temps retrouvé that bipolar metaphors span that epistemological no man's land which allows him to accomplish his apprenticeship and accede to interpretative competence.  

The narrator's onomastic project in the early books of A la recherche fails because he wastes his creativity in filling out others' names with his own arbitrary projections, but he learns from Elstir in Balbec that the artist must assume the divine right of bestowing his own names: 'si Dieu le Père avait créé les choses en les nommant, c'est en leur étant leur nom, ou en leur donnant un autre qu'Elstir les recréait' (JF, II, 191). Elstir is in this sense the perfect Nietzschean artist figure, for Nietzsche himself revalues the 'Gesetz-Gebung der Sprache' which he had criticised in 'über Wahrheit und Lüge', and comes to praise precisely the kind of legislative originality which
Proust's narrator finds in his paradigmatic painter: 'Was ist Originalität? Etwas sehen, das noch keinen Namen trägt, noch nicht genannt werden kann, ob es gleich vor aller Augen liegt. Wie die Menschen gewöhnlich sind, macht ihnen erst der Name ein Ding überhaupt sichtbar. - Die Originalen sind zumeist auch die Namengeber gewesen' (FW 261).²⁴

By writing his novel, then, Proust's narrator, unlike the scientist who searches for pre-existing 'laws of nature', will become the divine artistic legislator - and self-legislator, the 'Sich-selber-Gesetzgebende[r]' (FW 335) who says 'fi-am' (GM, III, 7). But the narrator's self-creation will also be a self-communication: indeed he explicitly wants to make his 'un égoïsme utilisable pour autrui' (TR, IV, 613).²⁵ The 'égoïsme' of the artist is his achievement of an 'ego', a unique identity or 'perspective', the self-becoming which Nietzsche imputes to Goethe - 'er disziplinierte sich zur Ganzheit, er schuf sich' (GD, IX, 49) - or to himself in Ecce Homo, and it is made 'utilisable pour autrui' by being translated into a work of art which, through its unique style or taste (FW 290), can serve as an example to others of one possibility of self-realisation - one perspective (one 'universe'), one path, but no more than that. Such is the lesson which the narrator learns from Elstir's painting and Vinteuil's music (P, III, 762); it is the recipe for writing which Nietzsche gives in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: 'Schreiben sollte immer einen Sieg anzeigen, und zwar eine Überwindung seiner selbst, welche andern zum Nutzen mitgeteilt werden muß' (MA, II, 152); and it is also, finally, the lesson of Nietzsche's great educator Zarathustra, parodying Christ yet again: "Das - ist nun mein Weg - wo ist der eure?" so antwortete ich denen, welche mich 'nach dem Wege' fragten. Den Weg nämlich - den gibt es nicht!' (Z, III, 'Vom Geist der Schwere'). By stressing in this way the communicative, educative function of their projects, both Nietzsche and
Proust, I would argue, accord them a public, in the broadest sense 'political' purpose, and, weak though this sense may be, it allows them to avoid the accusation that their celebrations of aesthetic autonomy bracket the political entirely, an accusation which has justly been levelled at Nehamas and Rorty's misrepresentations of them."

The perspectivistic 'epiphanies' at the end of *A la recherche* furnish Proust's retrospective narrator with the aesthetic principles for his 'livre à venir', then, but since this artwork of the future will be an affirmation and 'redemption' of the narrator's past, a future perfect temporality is set up. Nor is it just at the conclusion of Proust's novel that the future perfect emerges as a privileged temporal structure, and indeed we have already encountered it earlier on in the novel, in the case of the hardiest 'moi' which the narrator in *La Prisonnière* feels sure will remain long after all the others, 'quand la maladie aura fini de les jeter l'un après l'autre par terre' (P, III, 522). In the next chapter I shall explore this particular form of complex temporality in greater detail, arguing that the 'logic of the future perfect' is actually the dominant temporal logic in *A la recherche*. Moreover, just as Proust's narrator's novel 'will have been' his salvation from time's destruction, so the figure whom Nietzsche calls his philosopher of the future 'will have redeemed' the nihilism of contemporary culture on his advent in the time beyond the cataclysmic singularity of mankind's 'Untergang', in the future beyond the future which Nietzsche calls the 'übermorgen', the untimely time of the 'übermensch'.

Chapter 4. Logics of the Future Perfect

In the previous chapter I argued that the complex temporality of involuntary memory in *A la recherche* can be compared to Nietzsche's conception of the eternal return, and that the successful resolution of the search for the self in Proust's novel involves an act of self-creation which puts his narrator in the position of the Nietzschean 'übermensch'. *A la recherche*, like *Ecce Homo*, emerges as a celebration of the superior point of view from 'after the event' which allows an appropriation of the past - but in Levinasian terms 'un passé qui n'a jamais été présent' - through retrospective ('nachträglich' or 'après-coup') reinterpretation. However, for both Nietzsche and Proust's narrator the neo-'mystical' epiphanic moments of 'inspiration' or involuntary memory (which precisely are not experiences of 'real presence') involve not just a conflation of present and past but an attention to the future as well, since both kinds of experience open out onto a creation, on the one hand *Also sprach Zarathustra*, on the other *A la recherche* itself, both works having the character of a *Bildungsroman* in that they trace the development of the hero along his crooked path towards finding his own true way.

Since his narrator looks forward to the future as a redemption of the past, Proust actually inscribes the looped temporality of the eternal return in the conclusion to *A la recherche* itself, as a future perfect movement, but in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, too, not only does the overdetermined 'Augenblick' serve as a *mise en abyme* of Nietzsche's great temporal short-circuit (Z, III, 'Vom Gesicht und Rätsel'), but Zarathustra's intimation of the eternal return is set in the context of an overarching temporality which is prospective in character - his anticipation of the philosopher of the future, the 'übermensch', to whose redemptive, future perfect perspective he is constantly
appealing (cf. Z, II, 'Von der Erlösung'). And although in Ecce Homo Nietzsche himself adopts the perspective of the 'übertmensch', he is nevertheless still writing for the benefit of his future readers, other 'übertmensch', who (he hopes) will grant him his 'posthumous birth'.

In this sense both Also sprach Zarathustra and Ecce Homo demonstrate what I want to argue in this chapter is the dominant temporality in Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, a temporality of 'untimeliness'. For Nietzsche is seemingly determined to be considered the untimely philosopher, from the four Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (1873-76), originally intended to be the first in a long series of thirteen such 'counterblasts', to the 'Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemäßen' in Götzen-Dämmerung (1888). Over this span he is constantly aware of his own writing as occupying an anomalous, often cultivatedly ambivalent position in time, which he seeks to resolve by means of an appeal to posterity for his readership that is one of the most idiosyncratic but strategically important aspects of his philosophy. His distaste for his own time is indeed such that he elevates the concept of untimeliness into a structural feature of any philosophy worthy of the name.

In this concluding chapter, then, I want to consider in more detail the question of temporal structure in my two writers, exploring in particular the ways in which both have recourse to the logic of the future perfect as a response to the present time which they both conceive as problematic. I shall begin with Nietzsche, who exploits the virtual perspective of the future perfect as an opportunity both to critique the nihilism of contemporary culture and to celebrate the redemptive potential of the 'übertmensch'. In the second half of the chapter I shall turn to Proust, who explores the future perfect on a more microcosmic and psychological level, for it is a temporality which permeates and vitiates the narrator's experience of any present moment,
but which ultimately offers him, too, the possibility of redemption, when it is revalued at the conclusion of the novel.

**Nietzsche's Problematic Present**

From his early polemics through *Zarathustra* and beyond, Nietzsche develops a sophisticated critique of contemporary Germany in particular and 'modernity' in general, as he strikes at the heart of European nihilism. In *Ecce Homo* he writes of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*: 'Dies Buch (1886) ist in allem Wesentlichen eine Kritik der Modernität' (EH, III, 'JGB', 2), and indeed especially in *Jenseits* he directs a constant stream of abuse at 'Menschen der "modernen Ideen"' (JGB 202; cf. 222, 241, 282), while Zarathustra is no less critical of 'die Herren von heute' (Z, IV, 'Vom höheren Menschen', 3; cf. 'Der Zauberer', 2; 'Vom höheren Menschen', 8–9). In *Der Antichrist*, Nietzsche makes himself particularly clear on this point: 'Und damit ich keinen Zweifel darüber lasse, was ich verachte, wen ich verachte: der Mensch von heute ist es, der Mensch, mit dem ich verhängnisvoll gleichzeitig bin' (AC 30).

Nietzsche's and Zarathustra's today is a falling-off, an epigonal age unworthy of producing greatness and indeed incapable of doing so (Z, IV, 'Der Zauberer', 2), for the modern period lacks decisiveness and resolution: 'nichts ist so sehr zeitgemäß als Willensschwäche' (JGB 212). One of the most important repercussions of the collective akrasia which Nietzsche diagnoses in contemporary culture is the way it has jaundiced the temporal awareness of the age, so that its poverty is exacerbated by the fact that even when it looks outside of itself it cannot but taint the past and the future with its inadequacy. The result is thus an 'inauthentic' approach to the past and to
historiography (on which Nietzsche concentrates towards the beginning of his philosophical career, in the Second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung), compounded by a lack of clear vision of the future as well, which in the long run emerges as the more serious affliction since it affects the present's ability to act at all.

Belief in futurity is for Nietzsche the criterion par excellence for judging the 'Dionysian' health of a culture (FW 370), and it is associated with all that he cherishes (AC 16, 43; EH, 'FaW', 2); the other side of the coin is that he judges a lack of a sense of the future as one of the surest symptoms of a breakdown in cultural well-being. As he argues in Zur Genealogie der Moral, in an age when the educated 'Gelehrten' have come to the fore - ignoring the irony that for a time he himself was undeniably one of their number, as he acknowledges* - 'Zukunfts-Gewißheit' inevitably goes by the board (GM, III, 25; cf. GD, IX, 39). In Nietzsche's eyes we have simply lost the belief in our ability to carve out our own destiny and lay claim to the future as our future (M 155), and the single most important reason for the decline, in this as in so many other contexts, Nietzsche claims to be Christianity, which runs counter to 'alles [...] was dem Leben Zukunft verspricht' (AC 58).

The only antidote to the reflective, reactive 'Gelehrten' - and 'die Guten', those self-righteous reactionaries who have too much invested in the prevailing system of Christian, 'slave' morality and too much to lose from its overthrow, Nietzsche's revaluation (Z, III, 'Von alten und neuen Tafeln', 26; JGB 260; GM, 'Vorrede', 6; EH, IV, 4-5) - is the 'affirmative action' of the future-shaping philosopher with a purpose. The only option for Nietzsche is to recuperate the future, to salvage it from denigration and abuse at the hands of the imprudent present - therein will lie his untimeliness. As he
defines the term in the Foreword to the Second Unzeitgemäße Betrachtung:
'unzeitgemäß - das heißt gegen die Zeit und dadurch auf die Zeit und hoffent-
lich zugunsten einer kommenden Zeit'.

'Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemäßen'

Nietzsche sets himself up as a man provocatively out of step with his time, in
which he considers himself unfortunate to have happened to be born: his
version of the 'gadfly' role is to appeal to the future for his self-justi-
fication, and the last thing he wants is to be associated with his own period,
considered a 'man of his time'. Indeed in one amusing passage from Ecce Homo
he recounts with some dismay how the Nationalzeitung described Jenseits von
Gut und Böse, of all his books, as a 'sign of the times' (EH, III, 1). His
response is a belly-laugh: 'vielleicht, daß, wenn auch nichts von heute sonst
Zukunft hat, doch gerade unser Lachen noch Zukunft hat!' (JGB 223). Nietzsche
makes it out to be a feature of the philosopher's lot to be in contradiction
to the norms of his day (JGB 212) - his own ideal is to transcend his time
and to be at least one step beyond it, 'über seine Zeit hinaus' (FW 380; cf.
FaV, 'Vorwort'). As he puts it in a section of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft
entitled 'Wir Heimatlosen': 'Wir Kinder der Zukunft, wie vermöchten wir in
diesem Heute zu Hause zu sein! [...] wir ziehen es bei weitem vor, auf Bergen
dezu leben, abseits, "unzeitgemäß", in vergangenen oder kommenden Jahrhunderten'
(FV 377; cf. FW 382).

Nietzsche's urge to live outside his time is so strong that he can often
extend the ambit of the term 'untimely', as here, by having recourse to the
past as well as the future. Classical studies, in the Foreword to the Second
Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, serve as his example in the very definition of an 'untimely' discipline, and of course he will continually raid the past for identificatory figures and paradigms of humanity, like Goethe and the Greeks, Napoleon, Cesare Borgia and all the rest. In Menschliches, Allzumenschliches he develops this theme of using the past as an escape, a vantage point from which to gain critical leverage on the present, at the same time introducing one of his favourite extended metaphors for time-travelling - seafaring:

Der Gegenwart entfremdet. - Es hat große Vorteile, seiner Zeit sich einmal in stärkerem Maße zu entfremden und gleichsam von ihrem Ufer zurück in den Ozean der vergangenen Weltbetrachtungen getrieben zu werden. Von dort aus nach der Küste zu blickend, überschaut man wohl zum ersten Male ihre gesamte Gestaltung und hat, wenn man sich ihr wieder nähert, den Vorteil, sie besser im ganzen zu verstehen als die, welche sie nie verlassen haben. (MA, I, 616)

As Nietzsche argues in the Second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, though, the past must always be in the service of the future (UB, II, 4), so it is in this direction that Nietzsche's 'untimely' critiques will inevitably propel him. In order to reinforce his critique of the present he often adopts the heuristic strategy of conjuring up a virtual image of the future so as to argue that its putative, future perfect judgement on the present would be unfavourable. In this he recognises a debt to Goethe, whose words to Eckermann he quotes in the first Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung:

'Wir Deutschen sind von gestern. Wir haben zwar seit einem Jahrhundert ganz tüchtig kultiviert; allein es können noch ein paar Jahrhunderte hingehen, ehe bei unseren Landsleuten so viel Geist und höhere Kultur eindringen und allgemein werde, daß sie gleich den Griechen der Schönheit huldigen, daß sie sich für ein hübsches Lied begeistern und daß man von ihnen werden sagen können, es sei lange her, daß sie Barbaren gewesen.'

Nietzsche makes this same Goethean future perfect move at the expense of the present in the Second and Third Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (UB, II, 10; III, 4), and again in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, where he opens the section entitled 'Die zukünftige "Menschlichkeit"' by transporting himself into the
future in order to look back on the present with disdain: 'Wenn ich mit den Augen eines fernen Zeitalters nach diesem hinschau, so weiß ich an den gegenwärtigen Menschen nichts Merkwürdigeres zu finden als seine eigentümliche Tugend und Krankheit, genannt "der historische Sinn"' (FW 337). Zarathustra adopts this virtual vantage point in an arresting passage of *Also sprach Zarathustra*, when he relates an almost time-machine-like flight into the future at the opening of 'Vom Lande der Bildung' in the Second Part:

Zu weit hinein flog ich in die Zukunft: ein Grauen überfiel mich.
Und als ich um mich sah, siehe! da war die Zeit mein einziger Zeitgenosse.

Not that it is all 'plain sailing' for Zarathustra once he gets back to the present after this dramatic opening, however, for his new perspective allows him to see through and mock the 'buntgesprenkelt' men of the present who are mottled with historical paradigms from which they are unable to choose.

The future is of interest to Nietzsche not just because of the critical perspective it provides on the present, though - as he argues in *Jenseits* 210, critics are but the handmaidens of the true philosophers - for it also has its own integrity as a 'pure' future, with all the enticements that can provide in the shape of the 'philosophers of the future'. Nietzsche's judgement on *Jenseits* in *Ecce Homo*, which was quoted in part above, continues: 'Dies Buch (1886) ist in allem Wesentlichen eine *Kritik der Modernität* [...], nebst Fingerzeigen zu einem Gegensatz-Typus, der so wenig modern als möglich ist, einem vornehmen, einem jasagenden Typus' (EH, III, 'JGB', 2). Whereas the 'wissenschaftliche Arbeiter' (JGB 211) simply process the past, this 'neue Gattung von Philosophen' (JGB 42) have as their raw material the future and so
they are doubly 'unzeitgemäß', doubly 'philosophers of the future', for not only are they products of the future but they fashion the future in their turn and embody the renaissant principle of futurity which modern times lack. The role of the new philosophers is: 'Dem Menschen die Zukunft des Menschen als seinen Willen, als abhängig von einem Menschenwillen zu lehren und große Wagnisse und Gesamt-Versuche von Zucht und Züchtigung vorzubereiten' (JGB 203). In their sense of purpose and presence of will they are an 'antidote' to the present and contrast forcefully with the 'Willensschwäche' which Nietzsche finds so characteristic of his time.

Yet Nietzsche's present is not utterly blinkered and does have a view of the future, it is just one which he cannot brook - 'die Zukunft als Fortschritt' (KSA 12, 411), where: 'Der "Fortschritt" ist bloß eine moderne Idee, das heißt eine falsche Idee' (AC 4; cf. GD, IX, 48). The problem for Nietzsche is that the future as seen from this perspective is too closely associated with the present (as a mere projection or extrapolation from it) and not sufficiently different. 'Moderne Menschen' have quite effectively colonised the future already and mapped it all out, so that its 'new seas' (FV, 'Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei', 12) are no longer uncharted enough for him: the future is not what it used to be. It is not just the present which belongs to the 'Herden-Mensch' in Nietzsche's eyes, then, but the future, too, and because the present is culpable in so many other ways, the fact that 'Die Verbesserer der Menschheit' (GD, VII) should not seek to abolish humanity entirely but rather just fine-tune the same old model makes it even more loathsome in his eyes: 'Das letzte, was ich versprechen würde, wäre, die Menschheit zu "verbessern"' (EH, 'Vorwort', 2). The present does not have the good grace to see when it should make itself scarce, but Nietzsche himself has no such qualms about dispensing with humanity altogether: because he pretends
to see the shape of things to come, he is impatient to get beyond future prospects already, so in place of what he sees as an insidious continuity, he advocates rupture. 'Der Mensch ist etwas, das überwunden werden soll' (Z, 'Vorrede', 3) is the first theme Zarathustra sounds when addressing his crowd at the very beginning; in a number of carefully delineated stages, Nietzsche then extrapolates the development of humanity (in decline) beyond the 'höherer Mensch', via the 'letzter Mensch' and 'der Mensch, der untergehen will', and ultimately to the collapse of nihilism with man's nihilistic collapse.10

Beyond the Future: 'Übermensch' and 'Übermorgen'

'Wagt's mit meiner Kost, ihr Esser!
Morgen schmeckt sie euch schon besser
Und schon übermorgen gut!'
(FW, 'Scherz, List und Rache', 1)

The only way for humanity to 'progress', as far as Nietzsche is concerned, is via its self-abolition, for the immediate future of humanity is circumscribed by the poverty of its projections from the present. Only after the final stage in the demise of man has been reached and the last remnants of current and (merely) future thinking have been swept away can the 'übermensch', who is to be a different order of being, emerge in a dazzling singularity inaugurating the new millennium beyond the future (as envisaged by the herd), 'das Zarathustra-Reich von tausend Jahren' (Z, IV, 'Das Honig-Opfer').11 The point of articulation at which this singularity occurs is marked by a protective boundary which acts as a prophylactic against any 'infection' of the time of the 'übermensch' by our and our future's time - for the barrier is not easily breached and the 'übermensch' cannot simply be broken through to from 'diesseits'. Nietzsche exploits the temporal disjunction which marks the
horizon of the future as it can be mapped out from the point of view of the present, and proclaims that the 'übermenschen' lies 'always ever' beyond it, in the uncharted waters off the map like the sea monsters of old.' As a creature of the 'Jenseits', the 'übermenschen' is to be untainted by modern decadence and 'Ressentiment': the time of the 'übermenschen' is the 'übermorgen', the day after tomorrow, which, as Nietzsche is arguing already in Schopenhauer als Erzieher, lies beyond the patience of short-sighted and selfish modern man (UB, III, 4; cf. KSA 11, 12). In the 'übermorgen' the present will not even figure as a bad dream, a dark age of civilisation in the 'übermenschen's history books, for it will have been healthily forgotten in the manner laid out in Zur Genealogie (GM, II, 1). The 'übermenschen' will emerge from a sort of chrysalis which will have protected him from the collapse of European civilisation as we know it - the new age dawns in the future perfect.'

In his most far-sighted moments, then, Nietzsche the seer foretells the coming of the 'new philosopher' or 'übermenschen', but no matter how qualitatively different Nietzsche would like this character to be, he is still a function of the present and is to function on the present - as its redemption. In Zur Genealogie, Nietzsche leaves us in no doubt about what we are to expect:

irgendwann, in einer stärkeren Zeit, als diese morsche, selbstzweiflerische Gegenwart ist, muß er uns doch kommen, der erlösende Mensch der großen Liebe und Verachtung, der schöpferische Geist [...]. Dieser Mensch der Zukunft, der uns ebenso vom bisherigen Ideal erlösen wird als von dem, was aus ihm wachsen mußte, vom großen Ekel, vom Willen zum Nichts, vom Nihilismus, dieser Glockenschlag des Mittags und der großen Entscheidung, der den Willen wieder frei macht, der der Erde ihr Ziel und dem Menschen seine Hoffnung zurückgibt, dieser Antichrist und Antinihilist, dieser Besieger Gottes und des Nichts - er muß einst kommen... (GM, II, 24)

So the decadence of the present is in the end hardly material, even though
Nietzsche has a litany of grievances to lay at its door, for it is simply an interim period, a staging-post in the grand narrative of redemption which stretches between past and future. What is more, the present has the very specific task of effacing itself before the redemptive power of the future over the past, and as such can be termed the self-excluding middle. All that matters is that there will soon be upon us a race of individuals who can 'digest' the past (their past) adequately and who will be able to redeem us and our inauthentic temporal awareness through their new 'attitude and art'.

Nietzsche's own role in this process is somewhat ambivalent, for although in one sense he himself is a 'philosopher of the future', in keeping with a strong sense of the term he (reluctantly) has to side with the free spirits in the present, the 'Herolde und Vorläufer' (JGB 44) who are merely preparing the way for the 'true' philosophers to come. Indeed Nietzsche recognises this straight after the rhapsodic passage from *Zur Genealogie* quoted above, at the end of the Second Essay: 'Aber was rede ich da? Genug! Genug! An dieser Stelle geziemt mir nur eins, zu schweigen: ich vergriffe mich sonst an dem, was einem Jüngeren allein freisteht, als ich bin, einem "Zukünftigeren", einem Stärkeren, als ich bin – was allein Zarathustra freisteht, Zarathustra dem Gottlosen …' (GM, II, 25). And Zarathustra in turn (when not parodying Christ) explicitly mimics the prophetic tone of John the Baptist: 'Wer bin ich? Ich warte des Würdigeren; ich bin nicht wert, an ihm auch nur zu zerbrechen' (Z, II, 'Die stillste Stunde'; cf. III, 'Von alten und neuen Tafeln', 20). Ironically enough, Nietzsche is in many ways all too timely, and he freely recognises the fact, with the result that the characterisations 'wir Modernen' and 'wir modernen Menschen' become as common in his writing as 'wir freien Geister'.' In the Preface to *Der Fall Wagner*, for example, he pre-empts his unparalleled polemic against the Wagnerian 'névrose' (FaW 5),
the decadence of Wagner's 'modernity', by frankly admitting: 'Wohlan! Ich bin so gut wie Wagner das Kind dieser Zeit, will sagen ein decadent'.

Having acknowledged his own decadence, though, Nietzsche immediately continues: 'nur daß ich das begriff, nur daß ich mich dagegen wehrte. Der Philosoph in mir wehrte sich dagegen', and nowhere is this resistance more in evidence than in his particular kind of love of the future. For the role of Nietzsche, Zarathustra and the free spirits in relation to the philosophers of the future is not merely a passive one, and although the new philosophers are a 'destiny', nevertheless the more help they can be given to emerge the better. As Nietzsche explains in Der Antichrist, his concern is with: 'welchen Typus Mensch man züchten soll, wollen soll, als den höherwertigeren, lebenswürdigeren, zukunftsgewissern' (AC 3), and it is the job of the free spirits to concern themselves with 'die Umstände, welche man zu ihrer Entstehung teils schaffen, teils ausnutzen müßte' (JGB 203). Not content, then, just to sit back and await the arrival of the new breed of philosophers (JGB 2), in the Preface to the First Book of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches Nietzsche explains his consciously more active approach: 'Ich sehe sie bereits kommen, langsam, langsam; und vielleicht tue ich etwas, um ihr Kommen zu beschleunigen, wenn ich zum voraus beschreibe, unter welchen Schicksalen ich sie entstehn, auf welchen Wegen ich sie kommen sehe?' (MA, I, 'Vorrede', 2). It is Zarathustra, as usual, who is most forthright about urging that the 'üermensch' be prepared for and worked towards, that he should be set up as a goal and used to provide humanity with a prescription: 'Der üermensch ist der Sinn der Erde. Euer Wille sage: der üermensch sei der Sinn der Erde!' (Z, 'Vorrede', 3).

But Zarathustra will have no part to play in the new regime once it is instituted - he will have to have bowed out by that stage and gone under
('Untergehen'), along with the 'higher men', so that his 'going down' ('Untergang') at the end of the book is symbolic of his eventual demise.'

Zarathustra's (and a fortiori humanity's) 'überwindung' is a necessary precondition for the advent of the 'übermensch' in the 'übermorgen', but of course Zarathustra (-Nietzsche) wants it both ways: he accepts that he will have to be cast aside, and indeed welcomes it, for at the same time he is looking forward to rising up again phoenix-like in the future (cf. M 568), the other side of having been forgotten. Were Zarathustra not to die he would run the risk of being 'untimely' in the less appealing sense of 'behind the times', and the last thing he wants to do is to outlive his present unpopularity: 'Stirb zur rechten Zeit; also lehrt es Zarathustra' (Z, I, 'Vom freien Tode'). Zarathustra's death, although implicit, is nevertheless essential to the promotion of his philosophy, for not only does his philosophy run counter to 'the ideal of today' during his lifetime, but it acts like a 'sleeper', and he intends that in the long run the loser will win more than a Pyrrhic victory. In the distant future he 'knows' he will be rediscovered, his philosophy 'activated' and appreciated by those who by that stage will have 'ears to hear', retrospectively reinterpreting him as a precursor. It is in this sense that Nietzsche talks of being born posthumously, most notably in the Foreword to Der Antichrist:


The 'übermorgen', then, is also the time of Nietzsche's own posthumousness: his master plan for being read in the future involves millennial aspirations for his new breed of masters: 'Ich schreibe für eine Gattung Menschen, welche noch nicht vorhanden ist: für die "Herren der Erde"' (KSA 11, 50)."
Ecce Homo and Its Future Readers

By the time of Ecce Homo, as we have seen, Nietzsche himself claims to have become his fate and reached the stage which in his works up till this point he has been heralding as the redemptive perspective of the 'Übermensch'. He has become that great Siegfried figure, the blacksmith 'forging' his own fate, whose coming Zarathustra prophesies: 'Ein großer Gewalt-Herr könnte kommen, ein gewitzter Unhold, der mit seiner Gnade und Ungnade alles Vergangene zwänge und zwängte: bis es ihm Brücke würde und Vorzeichen und Herold und Hahnen- schrei' (Z, III, 'Von alten und neuen Tafeln', 11). He indeed acknowledges as much, for when he now describes his overcoming of decadence he characterises himself as 'ein wohlgeratner Mensch' (EH, I, 2), to which type he in turn ascribes the name of 'Übermensch': 'Das Wort "übermensch" zur Bezeichnung eines Typus höchster Wohlergenheit, im Gegensatz zu "modernen" Menschen, zu "guten" Menschen, zu Christen und andren Mihilisten' (EH, III, 1).

But Nietzsche knows that his time has not yet come and that he is still 'untimely', that he is mapping out unheard-of possibilities for overmankind-to-come. In Ecce Homo he has no qualms about referring to 'meine Göttlichkeit' (EH, I, 3) - he has become Dionysus ('gegen den gekreuzigten') - but Dionysus will have (to have) a second coming, for Zarathustra's truths are still falling on deaf ears:


Even when he has become his fate and announces the fact as loudly as he does
in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche still needs to create the competence of his future readers — other 'Übermenschen' — who will read him aright.' He still needs to proclaim his gospel, for only after him will there be the means to describe his destiny, his task, the like of which there has not yet been: 'Ich bin ein früher Botschafter, wie es keinen gab, ich kenne Aufgaben von einer Höhe, daß der Begriff dafür bisher gefehlt hat; erst von mir an gibt es wieder Hoffnungen' (EH, IV, 1). *Ecce Homo* opens, indeed, with the words 'In Voraussicht', for in the more immediate future he is expecting to proclaim the Umwerthung aller Werthe: 'In Voraussicht, daß ich über kurzem mit der schwersten Forderung an die Menschheit herantreten muß, die je an sie gestellt wurde, scheint es mir unerläßlich, zu sagen, wer ich bin' (EH, 'Vorwort', 1).

So *Ecce Homo*, like *A la recherche*, is turned towards the past and the future — Nietzsche wears the mask of Janus: 'An diesem vollkommenen Tage, wo alles reift und nicht nur die Traube braun wird, fiel mir eben ein Sonnenblick auf mein Leben: ich sah rückwärts, ich sah hinaus, ich sah nie so viel und so gute Dinge auf einmal.' These two perspectives — 'hinaus' and 'rückwärts' — meet in the opening of the final section, where Nietzsche's 'posthumous birth' is explicitly framed in future perfect terms, as a memory in the future:

Ich kenne mein Los. Es wird sich einmal an meinen Namen die Erinnerung an etwas Ungeheures anknüpfen — an eine Krise, wie es keine auf Erden gab, an die tiefste Gewissens-Kollision, an eine Entscheidung, heraufbeschworen gegen alles, was bis dahin geglaubt, gefordert, geheiligt worden war. Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit. (EH, IV, 1)

So the inaugural singularity which gives birth to the monstrous future of the 'Übermorgen' will already have taken place, because Nietzsche himself is the explosive force cleaving history in two, the parodic Socrates, the parodic Christ: 'er bricht die Geschichte der Menschheit in zwei Stücke. Man lebt vor ihm, man lebt nach ihm' (EH, IV, 8). Aside from the contingent fact that
Ecce Homo itself was 'born posthumously' in that it was not published until after Nietzsche's death, in 1908. Nietzsche himself is a time bomb, acting at a distance (cf. FW 60), and it is the gift-giving 'übermensch' who is to give him a late birthday present, the present of a late birthday (his birth to presence).²

Times of the Sign in A la recherche

A great deal is at stake in Nietzsche's use of the future perfect, then, for his whole destiny hangs on its logic, and if we return to A la recherche at this point, we shall see that when Proust dwells on that same logic no less is at stake for his narrator. In the previous two chapters I concentrated on Proust's narrator's relation to his past, specifically on his experience of the mutual relativisation of present and past, but for the rest of this chapter I want to reorientate the discussion and examine the relation between the narrator's present and the future - which we shall see has an equally relativising effect. For whereas Nietzsche feels able to abandon both the problematic present and the impoverished future which it projects, leapfrogging over to 'the day after tomorrow', the 'pure' future beyond, once again Proust's narrator finds that what Nietzsche advocates is by no means so straightforwardly achieved. Our analysis of Nietzsche's untimeliness produced two distinct types of future perfect strategy, a first type where the past in the future simply is the present, which the future perfect allows Nietzsche to critique, and a second type where what lies in the past from the perspective of the future is a threshold, a Rubicon whose crossing has led to the 'Zarathustra-Reich' beyond. It is this latter type which Nietzsche makes
distinctively his own as he almost routinely appeals to the 'future beyond the future', but Proust's analysis is concentrated on the first type, and for the most part he denies his narrator any such temporal transcendence. The future perfect in Proust's novel emerges as a profoundly disquieting temporal structure - the past in the future can never be 'simply' the present for his narrator, and the future perfect is not so much the answer to his problematic present as the problem with the present itself.

In *Proust et les signes*, Deleuze is writing against the grain of previous criticism by those such as Beckett who give paramount importance to the role of involuntary memory in interpreting *A la recherche*, and he seeks to correct the impression that the essential movement of the novel is towards the past, by inverting its temporal hierarchy. He argues for a model of *A la recherche* which is fundamentally prospective, and where the importance of memory is deliberately played down so as to privilege the narrator's 'apprentissage des signes'. 'Si important que soit son rôle', he writes, 'la mémoire n'intervient que comme le moyen d'un apprentissage qui la dépasse à la fois par ses buts et ses principes. La Recherche est tournée vers le futur, non vers le passé.' In order to privilege the future in *A la recherche*, Deleuze emphasises the prospective nature of the sign, and the importance of the deferred interpretation of the sign to the epistemological orientation of the novel has since become generally acknowledged. Genette, for example, derives a 'principe de la signification différée ou suspendue', and refers to Tadié; Tadié, in turn, writes that 'le lecteur est sans cesse tendu vers l'avenir du récit, parce qu'il est l'avenir de la connaissance', concluding that 'le futur n'est nulle part aussi présent que dans ce roman du passé', and referring to 'la primauté du futur', quoting Deleuze.

By developing an analysis of the temporal implications of the sign for the
'presence' of the present, however, I shall argue that its future orientation is really only 'half the story', and that Deleuze's revisionist account itself needs to be modified, for the past and the future are equally important to the narrator, but the importance of both is relative to that of the problematic present. I shall argue that *A la recherche* is not primarily about the past or the future, but that its main concern is with the status of a Janus-like present which is irremediably compromised by a centrifugal movement towards both future and past at the same time, a future perfect movement which vitiates the notion of a central presence at all. The 'attenuation of actuality' in modernist literature has long been a critical commonplace, but here I shall attempt to consider Proust's relativisation of the 'presence' of the present in a new(er) light: in the context of Derrida's notion of 'différence' and, in conclusion, Lyotard's exposition of 'le postmoderne' in his essay 'Réponse à la question: qu'est-ce que le postmoderne?'. I shall argue that the temporal structures of *A la recherche* are already pointing towards a 'postmodern' grammatology, if not a full deconstruction of the 'metaphysics of presence'. If the novel is 'A la recherche du temps perdu', then the 'temps perdu' is the present (tense).

I shall begin on Deleuze's lowest level of semiotic activity, with 'le signe mondain', for in the social world of *A la recherche* everything is a sign because every thing has been swallowed up by the voracious activity of giving signs. As Deleuze describes it: 'Le signe mondain ne renvoie pas à quelque chose, il en "tient lieu", il prétend valoir pour un sens. Il anticipe l'action comme la pensée, annule la pensée comme l'action, et se déclare suffisant. D'où son aspect stéréotypé, et sa vacuité.' The social sign replaces genuine thought or action with a void of meaning, yet this void is nevertheless filled by the 'pretence' of its claim to sense and is thus of a
highly specific type. For the sign does have, if not a plenitude, then at least a 'perfection rituelle' in its formal properties, in the structure of its pretence, as Deleuze himself notes: '[Ces signes] sont vides, mais cette vacuité leur confère une perfection rituelle, comme un formalisme qu'on ne retrouvera pas ailleurs.' The form of the 'signe mondain' is such that it does not look back ('renvoyer') to the presence of any pre-existing signified, whether thought or action, but it substitutes itself for that presence ('il en tient lieu') as well as anticipating any actions or thoughts by its deferred interpretation in the future. The sign thus banishes the past, usurps the present and seeks to command the future, but Deleuze's inverted commas immediately undermine its pretence to presence by removing its mask. Its 'presence' is of a purely formal nature, and depends wholly on the imaginary realm of the virtual, existing only by virtue of the interpretation of the sign in the future - the deferral of its meaning - and the subsequent, but retrospective inferral of the 'present moment' of signification. The tense par excellence of the social sign is the future perfect, for it succeeds not only in displacing and relativising 'present' reality, but in eclipsing the present altogether by this double strategy.

As an example of the social sign, let us consider an incident which takes place during Mme de Villeparisis's reception in Le Côté de Guermantes (CG, II, 551-60). Here the narrator's conversation with Mme de Guermantes, with whom he is currently in love, is punctuated by embarrassing silences, and despite Saint-Loup's diplomatic intervention she is soon distracted. Perfect socialité that she is, however, she does make a half-hearted effort to rescue the occasion herself, and she offers the narrator something to eat or drink: '"Vous ne voulez pas que je vous donne une tasse de thé ou un peu de tarte, elle est très bonne"', me dit Mme de Guermantes, désireuse d'avoir été aussi
aimable que possible' (CG, II, 560). Odette's entry is sufficient for Oriane to forget herself, though, and she dispels once and for all even this pretence at solicitude as she beats a hasty retreat - 'désireuse de ne pas l'avoir rencontrée', one might say. The only impression which she succeeds in making on the narrator is one of rudeness: 'Et elle se leva sans me dire adieu.'

At the most basic level, then, Mme de Guermantes' words represent nothing more than a social manoeuvre, for she is not so much concerned about the narrator's true well-being (she makes no effort to show real interest in him, to go beyond observing the social niceties) as simply to create an impression, although the vacuousness of her words is in this case betrayed by her subsequent actions. The scene is thus typical of the society scenes in A la recherche, where characters 'act' just as Mme de Guermantes does here, adopting the mask of a social persona and deferring to the demands of etiquette by using what Genette terms 'le langage indirect', a semiotic feint. The indirection is compounded here by the tense usage, though, for the description of Mme de Guermantes as 'désireuse d'avoir été aimable' makes explicit the fact that the present is deferring to the authority of the moment of retrospective interpretation in the future. The 'ulterior motive' masked by Mme de Guermantes' words is that they should have an illusory a posteriori effect - the narrator's believing that 'Mme de Guermantes was pleasant to me' - after a fact that has never been. She wishes her benevolence to be born posthumously, but all that is noted by the narrator, from his retrospective viewpoint, is the implicit deception of a strategy which he had evidently seen through.30

Mme de Guermantes seeks to gain something for nothing, as she attempts to lead the narrator into inferring an illusory desire from the words and behaviour he observes, but, unfortunately for her, he is quite familiar with the ploy.31 She simply goes too far, then, or perhaps not far enough - either
way, the unmasking of this little social strategy has profound implications for the character of the present moment, which emerges as always already lost from the point of view of the projected retrospective which is invoked by this elaborate circumlocution. The status of the present here is not so much that of a void left in the wake of the displacing movement of the sign, as that of the Derridean 'trace' in the movement of 'différence': 'ce qui s'efface ou d'avance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même dont il se retire - l'ici présent - dont il faudrait tenir compte.' 32

Derrida's essay 'La différence' is perhaps the best exposition of this crucial 'deconstructive turn', the move from semiotics to grammatology. Here his initial, recapitulative description of 'la structure classiquement déterminée du signe' is phrased in terms which are familiar to us from Deleuze:

Le signe, dit-on couramment, se met à la place de la chose même, de la chose présente, 'chose' valant ici aussi bien pour le sens que pour le référent. Le signe représente le présent en son absence. Il en tient lieu. Quand nous ne pouvons prendre ou montrer quelque chose, disons le présent, l'étant présent, quand le présent ne se présente pas, nous signifions, nous passons par le détour du signe. Nous prenons ou donnons un signe. Nous faisons signe. Le signe serait donc la présence différée. 33

The movement of 'différence' liberates the sign from any presence as signified, however, with the result that 'cette sémiologie classique' no longer obtains. With the 'opposition' of the movement of 'une différence "originale"' to any conception of 'the here and now' ('l'ici présent') as signified, from which the deferred interpretation of the sign will always be derivative and to which the sign inevitably defers in the hierarchy of signification, the economy of the sign is superseded by the operation of the 'trace', 34 and the 'détour du signe' becomes a 'détournement' of signification itself: 'on ne pourrait plus comprendre la différence sous le concept de
If we now turn to look at some of the other future perfect strategies in *A la recherche*, I shall try to show that the structure of the social sign is replicated on what Deleuze treats as the higher semiotic level of 'les signes de l'amour'. Already in *Les Plaisirs et les jours*, Proust writes a 'Critique de l'espérance à la lumière de l'amour', in which he recommends the disappointments of love as the best antidote to the misguided optimism of human nature:

A peine une heure à venir nous devient-elle le présent qu'elle se dépoille de ses charmes, pour les retrouver, il est vrai, si notre âme est un peu vaste et en perspectives bien ménagées, quand nous l'aurons laissée loin derrière nous, sur les routes de la mémoire. [...] Mais certains hommes réfléchis et chagrins qui rayonnent plus ardemment encore que les autres à la lumière de l'espérance découvrent assez vite qu'hélas! elle n'émane pas des heures attendues. (JS 139)

In *A la recherche*, as psychoanalytic critics have pointed out, the narrator gains one of his principal pleasures from the 'fort-da' rhythm of deferring the gratification of desire in order to enjoy all the more the sense of conscious mastery he has when he can finally choose to grasp an opportunity. The case of Mlle de Stermaria shows that such deferral is hazardous and can mean that the desire is never fulfilled at all, but the case of Albertine makes it readily apparent that even – especially – the fulfilment of his desire proves disappointing. When the narrator realises that she is willing to give herself to his first kiss (i.e. after she has already deferred it in Balbec (JF, II, 285f.)), he tells her: ‘Si vraiment vous permettez que je
Différer en ce sens, c'est temporiser, c'est recourir, consciemment ou inconsciemment, à la médiation temporelle et temporisatrice d'un détour suspendant l'accomplissement ou le remplissage du 'désir' ou de la 'volonté', l'effectuant aussi bien sur un mode qui en annule ou en tempère l'effet.  

How far deferring the execution of the will and the gratification of desire in *A la recherche* ultimately 'en annule ou en tempère l'effet' can be seen when it does eventually come to the realisation of the narrator's desire to kiss Albertine, and he finds the 'present moment' variously tempered. Not only, as we saw in Chapter 2, does his celebrated, 'photomontage' retrospect of all his previous images of her, immediately before the kiss, result in his not actually noticing that he is kissing her at all until he has already started;  

we also meet the curious but crucial notion of 'la "primultimité" de la première fois' at work in this episode, a term which Genette takes from Jankelevitch in referring to the paradigmatic quality of initiations, and glosses thus:  

le fait que la première fois, dans la mesure même où l'on éprouve intensément sa valeur inaugurale, est en même temps toujours (déjà) une dernière fois - ne serait-ce que parce qu'elle est à jamais la dernière à avoir été la première, et qu'après elle, inévitablement, commence le règne de la répétition et de l'habitude.  

Here we find another future perfect move, then: each inauguration in *A la recherche*, the dislocatory singularity of the first occurrence, is at the same time tinged with the projected nostalgia of the retrospective future viewpoint for the loss of the previous habit.  

This pre-emptive nostalgia counteracts what Derrida calls 'la prétention inaugurale de [...] tout incipit',  

and indeed Genette's 'toujours (déjà)' formula provides an explicit link to the Derridean 'trace'. Genette quotes as examples of the phenomenon this moment when the narrator first kisses Albertine, as well as the scene where Swann
possesses Odette for the first time (CS, I, 230), yet both are prefigured by the primal kiss, 'le baiser de maman' at the beginning of Du côté de chez Swann. Here, because the kiss is achieved at the expense of a hollow victory over his mother's will, its pleasure is totally destroyed by the narrator's awareness that a change has occurred and a new régime has been installed:

J'aurais dû être heureux: je ne l'étais pas. Il me semblait que ma mère venait de me faire une première concession qui devait lui être douloureuse, que c'était une première abdication de sa part devant l'idéal qu'elle avait conçu pour moi, et que pour la première fois, elle, si courageuse, s'avouait vaincue. Il me semblait [...] que cette soirée commençait une ère, resterait comme une triste date. (CS, I, 38)

The devaluing of the present at the hands of the future perfect is a problem not just confined to the 'première fois', though, and indeed it is felt just as acutely when the narrator knows what to expect and can anticipate his disappointment, when an event conforms to habit rather than representing a complete rupture. We can see this illustrated in the same episode of 'le baiser de maman' where, for example, 'le seul d'entre nous pour qui la venue de Swann devint l'objet d'une préoccupation douloureuse, ce fut moi' (CS, I, 23), because the narrator knows from experience that when Swann comes to dinner it is simply an obstacle in the way of the fulfilment of his desire for the kiss. He is even able to anticipate the disappointment of fulfilment, in this episode, for although the circumstances of the particular kiss on which he concentrates are such that its eventual outcome is a 'première fois', beforehand, because the kiss is such a regular occurrence, he is armed with a foreknowledge of what the kiss is usually like, and, especially, of the disappointment he usually feels after it. We are told:

ce bonsoir durait si peu de temps, elle redescendait si vite, que le moment où je l'entendais monter [...] était pour moi un moment douloureux. Il annonçait celui qui allait le suivre, où elle m'aurait quitté, où elle serait redescendue. (CS, I, 13)

Habituation allows the narrator to see beyond the immediate future, and hear-
When his mother comes up the stairs to kiss him, it is already a sad moment because he is already oppressed by thoughts of when she will have left him. Whereas his anticipation of first kissing Albertine is pleasurable, here he can no longer 'look forward' to kissing his mother because as a result of habit his expectation is soured by the future perfect (here rendered as a conditional perfect in accordance with the sequence of tenses). This phenomenon recurs throughout *A la recherche*, for the narrator is generally looking to get one step ahead of himself in order to temper his pleasure in advance. Such a distancing is a form of irony, a refusal to give himself totally to the moment, and it betrays his need always to step back and set things in perspective, a need which is so deep-seated that even if he does not have any experience on which to draw for the context in which to set an event (i.e. if it is a 'première fois'), such a perspective must usually be manufactured, by the conceit of the virtual future perfect viewpoint. His highly developed, obsessive sense of self-preservation leads him to be his own killjoy for fear of some unpleasant surprise coming to mar his pleasure for him - he feels the need to tame the future by treating it as the past: 'forme de l'instinct de conservation des meilleures parties de nous-mêmes, ce désir qu'on a toujours de ne pas avoir été déçu' (CS, I, 174).

If we follow the development of the novel's 'primal scene', we see that this recognition of the inevitable disappointment to come, the narrator's pre-emptive delimitation of his pleasure, leads him to try to take greatest advantage of his heightened awareness of the interim, the 'pas encore', given that this time he cannot use his power to defer his mother's arrival, but can only hasten it. Thus the passage continues: 'De sorte que ce bonsoir que j'aimais tant, j'en arrivais à souhaiter qu'il vint le plus tard possible, à ce que se prolongât le temps de répit où maman n'était pas encore venue.'
The pleasure of anticipation becomes here an anxious, powerless wish for deferral, since what one would expect to be the moment of true pleasure - the kiss itself - is relativised in advance to such an extent that only the moments leading up to it can be enjoyed, and even then only negatively, as the time when she has not yet come, with the narrator haunted by a premonition of afterwards, a sense of unease and temporariness.\textsuperscript{43}

**Beyond the Future: Intermittence, Indifference and the Afterlife**

One of the most significant aspects of this whole episode is the way it highlights the discrepancy between the relatively trivial, because predictable, disappointment which the narrator habitually experiences and for which he can thus steel himself to a certain extent, thanks to his foreknowledge, and the far more powerful sense of disappointment occasioned by 'la première fois'. What gives the inaugural moment here its effect is its revelation of the incipient structure of intermittence as one of the dominant temporal structures in the novel: the narrator is not happy when he eventually gets his way because it is no longer his way, the way of his present 'moi' when he gets it, but rather the fossilised remnant of a previous 'moi' to whom, and especially to whose plans and predictions, he is now a stranger. As Deleuze writes: 'Le temps de l'amour est un temps perdu, parce que le signe ne se développe que dans la mesure où disparaît le moi qui correspondait à son sens.'\textsuperscript{44}

The same episode of 'le baiser de maman' thus demonstrates both the types of future perfect which I isolated above in Nietzsche, but in each case Proust's text inverts Nietzsche's positive evaluation of the structure. With the first type the double movement towards the past in the future leads here
to a complete cancellation of the (pleasure in the) present, and with the
second type, which represents the attempted projection beyond the future,
Proust's narrator's strategy is aimed not at liberation but at damage limi-
tation, and even then it inevitably fails. Not only is the present compromised
by the future perfect, but on Proust's terms the future is falsified by it,
too. The 'première fois' shows up the signal inability of the present - even
by means of the 'détour' of the future perfect - to prepare adequately for
whatever surprises the future 'will have' held in store; it initiates a shift
of perspective which would need to have been taken into account in any
envisaging of a time 'beyond the future', but which this example shows can
never be pre-empted. The narrator's experience of the way intermittence
defeats the inadequate plans of the future perfect to tame the future is best
illustrated by 'l'interruption du coeur' in his romantic engagements, so it
is to these that I now return.

Deleuze seeks to establish the essentially prospective nature of 'les
signes de l'amour' in A la recherche by stressing that not only does each of
the narrator's relationships repeat ('répète') his past ones, especially his
love for his mother, but each is also all the while rehearsing ('répète')
its own end:

Here again, then, we are presented with Deleuze's central argument that A la
recherche is 'tourné vers le futur': 'cette répétition tournée vers le futur,
cette répétition de l'issue'. The picture he gives resembles that of
Montaigne philosophising himself into the right frame of mind for death — 'aimer, c'est apprendre à mourir'. Yet, once more, an analysis of this passage reveals a future which issues into the future perfect and is thereby compromised. Firstly, 'les signes de l'amour' reveal the present as 'le temps perdu à l'état le plus pur' because, again, it is always already lost once the realisation that the relationship is not eternal has struck and the narrator has to bear in mind this permanent relativisation. Secondly, though, we find that the future is not even a 'pure' future anyway, and for two reasons. Deleuze's double use of 'répétition' implies a repetition of that which has already taken place (repeatedly) in the past, as well as a 'rehearsal' for that which has not yet taken place — but which, therefore, will have always already taken place, and of which the first 'performance' will always be a repeat performance. The future is thus 'tamed' once more. Finally, though, the impulse to 'mimer la rupture' only arises from the desire to go further beyond it in the future, not when it 'will be achieved', but when it 'will have been achieved', in the course of attempting to imagine being able to show indifference to one's loved one after the relationship is over.

Nietzsche is interested in experimenting with a 'philosophy of indifference' because the German term 'Gleichgültigkeit', literally 'treating as of equal validity', lends itself to being explored in the context of a philosophy of evaluation, but when Proust thematises 'indifférence' it is primarily allied to the temporal structure of 'intermittence'. We have seen that the narrator finds the present moment at the inauguration of his relationship with Albertine tinged with projected nostalgia, and during the course of their relationship his jealousy prompts periodic anticipations not only of its end, but of the state of indifference which he hopes to enjoy after it. Yet the law of 'l'intermittence du coeur' is such that true indifference no longer
cares to express itself, for such a wish is associated only with the stage when the expression of one's indifference would make a difference, and by definition that stage has already been passed. It is Swann, the precursor of the narrator in this respect as in so many others, who first makes the discovery, which the narrator explains thus:

Mais alors qu'autrefois, il avait fait le serment, si jamais il cessait d'aider celle qu'il ne devinait pas devoir être un jour sa femme, de lui manifester imparcablement son indifférence, enfin sincère, pour venger son orgueil longtemps humilié, ces représailles qu'il pouvait exercer maintenant sans risques [...], ces représailles il n'y tenait plus; avec l'amour avait disparu le désir de montrer qu'il n'avait plus d'amour. (JF, I, 516)

The narrator sums it up with his rather gloomy generalisation in La Prisonnière that being indifferent means not caring about someone even enough to flaunt that indifference: 'Autrui nous est indifférent et l'indifférence n'invite pas à la méchanceté' (P, III, 618). He has the experience of Swann to draw on, but he soon finds out the inadequacy of this strategy for himself, retrospectively, with Gilberte: 'quand le but que nous nous proposions deviendra accessible, il aura cessé d'être un but pour nous' (JF, I, 617f.).

In the case of Albertine, though, because her physical death precedes the death of their relationship, what he is left with is the persistence of his jealousy. After the death of the self in love, then, we must consider the death of the loved one, for here a different logic comes into play, which this time shows up the inability of the future perfect to project beyond physical death. The narrator's gloss on the paradoxical situation in which he finds himself after Albertine's death - finding out things about her which he wishes he could let her know he knows, while at the same time realising that had she not been dead he would doubtless not have found them out in the first place - runs as follows:

C'était là encore une des conséquences de cette impossibilité où nous
sommes, quand nous avons à raisonner sur la mort, de nous représenter autre chose que la vie. [...] Quand nous raisonnons sur ce qui se passera après notre propre mort, n'est-ce pas encore nous vivant que par erreur nous projetons à ce moment-là? [...] les regrets de ma jalouse rétrospective n'en procédaient pas moins de la même erreur d'optique que chez les autres hommes le désir de la gloire posthume. (AD, IV, 101)

We are later told: 'Il y a des erreurs optiques dans le temps comme il y en a dans l'espace' (AD, IV, 173), and the 'optical illusion' engendered by the desire to envisage the afterlife is a prime example. Just as future indifference, although it can and must be expected, can never be adequately conceived of by means of an extrapolation in the future perfect, so too, if one tries to imagine the afterlife, one cannot but fail to take into account the full implications of death, for one cannot but imagine, theologise or philosophise about it from the perspective of life.

Tadié writes: 'Le futur, c'est moins l'absence du rêve que l'absence fondamentale de la mort [...] contre laquelle lutte le rêve de la vie', and this 'rêve de la vie' is nowhere more apparent than in the future perfect strategy - when we try to imagine what it will be like when we 'will have died'. We have seen Nietzsche and his Zarathustra confidently laying claim to their own philosophical 'afterlives', but Proust's novel lays bare the presumption of any such claim and reveals this use of the future perfect to be the biggest confidence trick of all that we play on ourselves. Just as the structure of indifference denies the future death of the relationship its finality, so the future perfect envisaging of the afterlife denies death any status as a boundary, or nec plus ultra, precisely because it transforms death into a threshold which it pretends to have gone beyond. The nature of the future perfect is such as to elide the crossing of the threshold and leave it as understood - the movement through the barrier is glossed over, and what one is left with is the state of having emerged and of being on the other side,
looking back from beyond. The future perfect in Proust's novel is not only a tense of wistful pre-emptive nostalgia, but it also restores a misplaced, impossible optimism. It remains an 'illusion d'optique' because it fails to take into account the 'paradigm shift' of intermittence, and makes only some of the necessary parameter changes. Poulet sums up what is at stake in this ultimate illusion:

l'être humain tel que le dépeint Proust, se sent hanté par l'angoisse de cette substitution de soi à soi qu'est pour lui la mort. Contre cette angoisse il n'y a qu'un recours: se donner l'assurance d'une survie, croire qu'au delà on pourra se retrouver. Or, cette foi, il est impossible de se la donner quant au futur, puisqu'on n'y peut retrouver rien d'imaginable, puisque ce futur est le présent de l'être monstrueusement inconcevable en qui la mort nous aura changé. De ce côté, du côté de la mort à venir, le fossé est infranchissable. L'avenir est clos par la mort, et devant cet avenir clos il y a notre angoisse.\textsuperscript{3}

The attempt to imagine the 'au-delà', whether it be beyond the death of the self, the death of love, or physical death, is bound to fail, and the future is 'monstrueusement inconcevable' from the point of view of the present because even the imagination cannot adequately project beyond the boundary of death. The result is that the future will always inevitably surprise, and it is in this sense that we can see how, as Proust frequently emphasises, our conception of the future is inadequate because it is always necessarily derived from the present and the past: 'nous nous représentons l'avenir comme un reflet du présent projeté dans un espace vide, tandis qu'il est le résultat souvent tout prochain de causes qui nous échappent pour la plupart' (P, III, 824; cf. AD, IV, 27; TR, IV, 451).
If the would-be optimism of the future perfect with future residue - in the attempt to imagine the afterlife - is thus thwarted by a fundamental inability of the imagination to cope with and pre-empt the surprises and disappointments which the future inevitably brings, then it would seem that Proust is critical of precisely the strategy which Nietzsche seeks to adopt, and that he would dismiss the 'übermorgen' of the 'übermensch' on the same grounds which Nietzsche uses for dismissing the impoverished perspective of the (merely) futural - that it suffers from the inescapable distortion of being projected on the basis of the present, which falsifies its radical, monstrous novelty. Yet the first reaction of Proust's narrator to his first involuntary memory is a feeling that the future no longer holds any terrors for him - 'toute inquiétude sur l'avenir, tout doute intellectuel étaient dissipés' (TR, IV, 445) - because at the end of A la recherche the narrator, too, succeeds in breaking through to the afterlife, an afterlife which he constructs by means of his artwork of the future perfect. Deleuze is right when he argues that 'les signes de l'art' occupy the highest place in Proust's semiotic hierarchy, because by producing such signs his narrator will revalue their future perfect temporality (which has proven so problematic on the other semiotic levels) and assure himself, too, a posthumous birth.

Only at the end of the novel can the reader now see that the narrator's literary vocation is to have been the 'teleology' which ties up the whole, because it is a unity which the narrator himself can only confer on his life in the 'nouvelle lumière' of his own belated recognition: 'je me trouvais avoir vécu pour elle sans le savoir' (TR, IV, 478). When he uses a botanical image for his life so far, as we saw in the Introduction, he chooses to
compare it not to the ripening of a seed ('le blé en herbe'), but to the gradual constitution of the seed itself out of 'cet albumen qui est logé dans l'ovule des plantes' - in other words, the ripening of the seed will only come about when he begins to write, when the narrative can give birth to itself retrospectively. As Gérard Cogez comments: 'l'écriture du roman va transformer [l'existence du Narrateur] progressivement en ce qu'elle aura été en fait, une longue gestation (signification conférée après coup, au futur antérieur).'

The narrator's vocation lies in finding his vocation all over again: 'Ainsi toute ma vie jusqu'à ce jour aurait pu et n'aurait pas pu être résumée sous ce titre: Une vocation' (TR, IV, 478).

But it is the reader who is required to intervene at this point and turn the novel just read into the one which the narrator will have written, ensuring that 'les extrêmes se rejoignent' (P, III, 825) and thus establishing the recursive structure of the whole. The reader is the necessary midwife to the birth of the text, and of the 'writing presence' of the posthumous narrator along with it, a presence which cannot be generated by the text itself, for the intratextual movement from the narrated time towards the future which is the 'present time' of narration is asymptotic. The future of the one and the present of the other can never coincide and there is always a future residue needed to bridge the irreducible gap between them - all one can say is that they 'will have coincided' (must have coincided) before one can have a novel to read, at all. As Tadié writes: 'Ainsi, l'avenir dans le récit aura pris, grâce à sa conclusion, la forme même de l'avenir de l'œuvre, et le temps du héros sera devenu, d'un même mouvement, celui de l'écrivain et du lecteur, du relecteur.'

It is not only the narrator and the text who are born posthumously, then, for the reader is, too - as a re-reader.
Vallette, as early as 1909 when he was still thinking in terms of *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, Proust writes: 'quand on aura fini le livre, on verra (je le voudrais) que tout le roman n'est que la mise en œuvre des principes d'art émis dans cette dernière partie, sorte de préface si vous voulez mise à la fin' (CMP, IX, 155). He thus dispenses with what he calls in *A la recherche* 'le langage insincère des préfaces et des dédicaces' (TR, IV, 489) by including within the text what amounts to a preface to the first re-reading." By revealing both the narrator's vocation and the aesthetic principles which the narrator 'will have been' observing, the end of *A la recherche* takes the reader right back to its beginning in order to reassess and re-read the whole (especially all those moments at which the narrator had doubted that he would ever make the grade as a writer), armed with an 'après-coup' foreknowledge of the narrator's vocation. It is now that the reader can savour all those proleptic 'annonces' and 'amorces' which Proust's narrator has embedded in his narrative, the points of interference by the 'Erzählzeit' in the 'erzählte Zeit' which are so typical of *A la recherche* as a whole, and which serve further to disrupt and complexify its temporality from the point of view of the reader, who is each time privileged with a higher-level knowledge which adds to the relativisation of the narrator-protagonist's viewpoint. Just as Nietzsche seeks to educate his future readers who might then be adequate to the task of interpreting him, so Proust's narrator aims to create the competence of his future re-readers, who will be not just 'les propres lecteurs d'eux-mêmes' (TR, IV, 610), but better readers of him, too.

At the very least in the context of these multiple future perfect movements, then, I would argue that one can legitimately speak of 'postmodern Proust' and 'Nietzsche as postmodernist', in the strict, structural sense of which Lyotard writes:
L'artiste et l'écrivain travaillent donc sans règles, et pour établir les règles de ce qui aura été fait. De là que l'oeuvre et le texte aient les propriétés de l'événement, de là aussi qu'ils arrivent trop tard pour leur auteur, ou, ce qui revient au même, que leur mise en œuvre commence toujours trop tôt. Postmoderne serait à comprendre selon le paradoxe du futur (post) antérieur (modo).

By seeking to educate their readers, to programme the future, both Nietzsche in Ecce Homo and Proust's narrator at the end of A la recherche make one final attempt to legislate for their reception, to lay down the law in Lyotard's sense, 'établir les règles de ce qui aura été fait'. But by invoking the paradoxical logic of the future perfect they are bound to fail, for the 'postmodern' age is destined to elude their grasp. Both Nietzsche and Proust's narrator recognise that the future will always be monstrously other than one can envisage, but in the last resort neither can accept this indeterminacy, and both attempt to fill the gap with the construction of a redemptive reader. Yet by doing so both also acknowledge that their future is out of their hands, and both ultimately surrender its control. For as good disciples educated in the art of reading well, we know that we must beware of their prescriptions and overcome them, that our fidelity to their texts must always be a betrayal. Their texts 'become what they are' only when they become what they are not and never can be on their own - our texts, produced by our interpretations. So it only remains for us to read them, and to re-read them, critically and creatively: "Relisez ces chefs-d'oeuvre! Ah! oui, ça, par exemple, il nous faut le faire."
Conclusion

Le texte proustien est une substance superbe pour le désir critique. C'est un véritable objet de désir pour le critique, car tout s'épuise dans le fantasme de la recherche, dans l'idée de chercher quelque chose chez Proust, et, par là même, aussi, tout rend illusoire l'idée d'un résultat de cette recherche. La singularité de Proust c'est qu'il ne nous laisse rien d'autre à faire que ceci: le réécrire, qui est le contraire même de l'épuiser.'

Perhaps, then, following Roland Barthes, it only remains not for us to re-read Proust but for me to acknowledge that I have rewritten him. The violence of this operation remains to be assessed - whether 'der Text unter der Interpretation verschwand' (JGB 38), whether my 'research' has necessarily been a 'recherche d'un résultat illusoire'. But I hope at least to have avoided the dangers which Jean Sarocchi courts when he seeks to account for the violence of Proust's own attacks on Nietzsche by speculating: 'peut-être, en refusant Nietzsche violemment (et légèrement), non sans emprunter par ailleurs quelques-uns de ses chemins, Proust accomplit-il, bien mieux qu'un Gide, le voeu nietzschéen selon lequel le disciple doit jeter le livre, et même, ajouterions-nous, en différer à jamais la lecture.' Such an argument seems to me untenable, and far from seeking to claim that Proust was a 'disciple' of Nietzsche, in however 'Zarathustran' or Gidean a sense, I have sought instead to argue that A la recherche represents a break with the philosophical theories on which its author was nurtured, and that precisely because Nietzsche's philosophy was not among them it is all the more 'Nietzschean' a novel.

I hope, too, that I have made a modest contribution to the more general debate on what Danto terms 'philosophy and/as/of literature'. 'Die Romane sind die sokratischen Dialoge unserer Zeit', writes Friedrich Schlegel in one
of his most famous fragments, and although Nietzsche — unlike his precursor Lichtenberg — hardly considered himself to be a novelist manqué (even in his youth he seems never to have attempted such a project), nevertheless by translating his metaphor for perspectivism, 'seeing with many eyes', into the plurality of competing 'voices' in his writings, he acknowledges that philosophical systems are as dead as the God they covertly house, and that philosophy needs to adopt some of the practices more usually associated with poetry, drama or narrative fiction if it is to survive and enliven. Proust approaches this same question from the opposite direction, and if I do not share Rorty's view that Proust's perspectivistic novel succeeds where Nietzsche fails, lapsing back into metaphysics with his philosophy of will to power, I would nevertheless go so far as to argue that the philosophy of perspectivism finds its most appropriate expression in fictional terms, and that the vicissitudes of the Proustian narrator on his own 'neuer Weg zum "Ja"' show Proust to be taking full advantage of the opportunities which his chosen form permits for exploring its possibilities.

In her essay 'Fictions of the Soul', Martha C. Nussbaum sets Proust against Plato in order to vindicate his claim that novels can attain a certain kind of knowledge which is different from, and irreducible to, philosophical knowledge:

The claim that only a novel can convey psychological truth is not just the claim that it can get around certain impediments more cleverly than a philosophical text; it is the claim that there is at least some knowledge, some important human knowledge, that it provides just in virtue of its being a novel, that is to say a work that leads its reader into laughter and into suffering, that cannot even in principle be provided in a more intellectual way.

To grant this claim is not to say that narrative fiction can safely dispense with philosophical reflection in or on it (and indeed Nussbaum insists on this point when she returns to Proust rather more critically in 'Love's Know-
nor is it to say that, in Rorty's terms, philosophy should aspire to being just another 'kind of writing'. It is, however, no surprise that Nietzsche's philosophy in particular should have been, and should continue to be, such a potent force in spurring the literary creativity of novelists, poets and dramatists since his time. Proust was certainly no 'Nietzschean' in this sense, but perhaps my study, by setting up its own dialogue between the two writers, will have established that a comparative reading of Nietzsche and Proust can be more productive than either might themselves have conceded.
Notes

Introduction I. Nietzsche and Proust? Nietzsche and Proust?


14. One of the books planned for the Umwertung aller Werthe. Cf. KSA 13, 194, 545f., 589, 604, 607, 613. Cf. also EH, IV, 2: 'Ich bin der erste Immoralist'.


physics: Nietzsche, Joyce and the "excess of history'", in O'Hara, pp. 187-207.


25. Only a few years after Ecce Homo was written in 1888, the young Proust writes that his 'auteurs favoris en prose' are 'Aujourd'hui Anatole France et Pierre Loti' (CSB 337); Loti, Lemaitre, Bourget and France all figure in the 'Mondanité' section of 'Mondanité et Mélomanie de Bouvard et Pécuchet', from 1893 (JS 58-59), and Proust successfully approaches France to write the Preface to Les Plaisirs et les jours in 1896 (JS 3-4). His increasing distance from France and Bourget is reflected/refracted in the narrator's changing relation to Bergotte in A la recherche (cf. Jean Levaillant, 'Notes sur le personnage de Bergotte', Revue des Sciences Humaines, 65 (January-March 1952), 33-48), while his move away from his early 'profonde admiration' for Lemaitre (CSB 236) is also evident in one of the sketches for A la recherche (II, 'Esquisse XI', 1091f.).

26. Apart from here, Proust mentions Bourget only in the context of his novels Le disciple (CSB 348) and L'étape (CSB 487, 572), whereas Nietzsche was interested above all in his Essais de psychologie contemporaine (1883) and the Nouveaux essais (1885). Giovanni Macchia attempts to situate Proust 'Tra Taine e Bourget', despite his critical remarks about both men (cf. Proust e dintorni (Milan: Mondadori, 1989), pp. 15-28).

27. Cf. KSA 11, 598 ('Stendhal, das letzte große Ereignis des französischen Geistes'); JGB 39; GD, IX, 45; and EH, II, 3, on Stendhal as 'einer der schönsten Zufälle meines Lebens'. Cf. also Kofman, Explosion I, pp. 317-20.
gesagt, von dem ich etwas zu lernen hatte'); AC 31.


35. Nietzsche seems not to have read the work which more customarily attracts this designation, Huysmans' A rebours (1884), although it would undoubtedly have fascinated him, and indeed the fact that its author later entered a Trappist monastery merely confirms Nietzsche's analysis of the décadents as 'Naturen, die la Trappe nötig haben, im Gleichnis gesprochen (und ohne Gleichnis -)' (GD, V, 2). Cf. Mazzino Montinari, 'Aufgaben der Nietzsche-


37. In the notebook version of this section (KSA 11, 598-604), which Nietzsche also drew on subsequently for Götzén-Dämmerung and Ecce Homo, he comments on Baudelaire: 'Im übrigen war Baudelaire der Mensch eines vielleicht verdorbenen, aber sehr bestimmten und scharfen, seiner selbst gewissen Geschmacks' (KSA 11, 601), and proceeds to take Baudelaire's taste as his own guide, contrasting him for example with 'Victor Hugo, ein "Esel von Genie" - der Ausdruck ist von Baudelaire - welches immer den Muth zu seinem schlechten Geschmacke gehabt hat' (KSA 11, 601). For Nietzsche's display of his tastes in French literature in EH, II, 3, cf. Kofman, Explosion I, pp. 301-20 ('Re/créations').

38. The published version of this passage is even more distilled than the notebook version, which is terse enough: 'Ich las die ersten lettres d'un voyageur: wie Alles, was von Rousseau stammt, falsch, von Grund aus, moralistisch verlogen, wie sie selbst, diese "Künstlerin'' (KSA 13, 14).

39. Cf. CSB 578f., where his tone this time is bitingly satirical: 'Sainte-Beuve nous dit: "La Chartreuse de Parme n'est pas l'oeuvre d'un romancier." Vous pouvez l'en croire, il a un avantage sur nous, il dinait avec l'auteur, lequel d'ailleurs, homme de bonne compagnie s'il en fut, eût été le premier à vous rire au nez si vous l'aviez traité de grand romancier' (CSB 578).

40. Cf. Parkes, pp. 8-14 ('Philosophy as Autobiography').

41. Not that this prevents the judgements of either writer from falling wide of the mark on occasions (and all the more interestingly for that). In Proust's case, I shall argue in Chapter 1 that this applies to his judgement on Nietzsche himself; in Nietzsche's case, I have explored a specific prejudice in my forthcoming 'Nietzsche's Orientalism'. For Nietzsche's cultivation of 'profound superficiality', cf. Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' (in Deleuze, pp. 183-92), p. 186f.


44. For the pre-Socratics, cf. n. 15, above. For Plato, cf. especially Ernst Robert Curtius, Marcel Proust (Berlin and Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1952), pp. 123–33 (‘Platonismus’). In his Proust et les signes, 7th edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (‘Perspectives critiques’), 1986), Deleuze suggests a number of Platonic and neo-Platonic parallels (pp. 10, 51, 55, 58, 81, 122f., 135f.) which I shall be addressing in the second part of this introduction. For the neo-Platonics, cf. also Macksey, p. 106, and Cattaui, pp. 95f., 250f.


45. To cite only the most notable contributions to the Proust/Bergson debate, cf. Kurt Jäckel, Bergson und Proust. Eine Untersuchung über die weltanschaulichen Grundlagen von ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’ (Breslau: Friebsch,...


51. Schopenhauer et la création littéraire en Europe, p. 83.

52. Proust, p. 28.

53. Ibid., p. 60.

54. Ibid., p. 61.

55. I would also want to argue that Nietzsche's emphasis on the agonal basis of existence throughout his philosophical career, from the early unpublished essay 'Homer's Wettkampf' (KSA 1, 783-92) through to the notes for Der Wille zur Macht and beyond, better qualifies him for the title of 'un penseur qui admet la lutte comme un mode naturel de l'existence' than Schopenhauer, the originality of whose conception of 'Wille' as fundamental reality lies precisely in its unifying the potentially conflicting array of Platonic Ideas, and for whom only the objectifications of Will are continually at odds with one another.
56. Henry, *Marcel Proust*, p. 276. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.

57. A claim which Henry actually makes with respect to Proust's response to Séailles, whose work, she argues 'lui a révélé le système dans lequel il va se mouvoir toute sa vie, quitte à en réaménager quelques articles et à revenir, ce qui est tout à son mérite de penseur, à une orthodoxie plus stricte' (p. 86f.).


59. Ibid., p. 13. In the light of such a claim, it is supremely ironic that Danto should more recently round on those who make it of other philosophers: 'a good bit of the writing on Descartes is by way of chivying his argumentation into notations we are certain he would have adopted had he lived to appreciate their advantages, since it is now so clear where he went wrong' ('Philosophy as/and/of Literature', Presidential Address, APA Eastern Division, 28 December 1983, cited in Bernd Magnus, *The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power* (in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 218-35), p. 219).

60. Cf. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, p. 14: 'it is for the [analytic] movement to reclaim him as a predecessor'.

61. Cf. Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), e.g. p. 236: will to power is 'little more than a Vitalist replacement of a Kantian metaphysical position'; p. 246: 'in many ways Nietzsche says little that is fundamentally new on subjectivity: much that we saw in Schopenhauer recurs'. Bowie's favourite piece of reductivism is to argue that Nietzsche's positions are 'not that far from the Romantics' (cf. pp. 234, 246, 250). All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.

62. A distaste which seems, however, to be primarily political: 'Nietzsche's vision is that of a petit-bourgeois elitist and it has a more than problematic subsequent history' (p. 224).

63. Cf. e.g. p. 247, on how Nietzsche might have come up with a better answer to the problem of self-consciousness if he had paid more respect to Schleiermacher's view of individuality. Cf. also Bowie's *Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 181: 'the later Schelling is still philosophically important, precisely because of his avoidance of some of the traps into which Nietzsche and his precursors, from Schopenhauer to Feuerbach, fell, and into which Nietzsche's successors continue to fall'. Bowie follows Henry in ignoring Nietzsche's crucial difference from Schopenhauer on the question of the agonal basis of existence – 'Nietzsche's "interpretation" [...] is founded on an agonistic view of nature of the kind we saw in Schopenhauer' (Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p. 249) – but here, too, he typically wants to assert the primacy of a Schellingian paradigm: 'Schelling demonstrably [but, alas, undemonstratedly]
sets the scene for the agonistic universes of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud and their epigones' (Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, p. 13).

64. Henry, Marcel Proust, p. 258.

65. Emblematic of his desire to achieve the opposite is the way in which for A la recherche he jettisons the chapter of Jean Santeuil ('La première classe de M. Beullier') devoted to the schoolboy hero’s philosophy teacher (a thinly-veiled representation of Darlu - cf. Henry, Marcel Proust, p. 78). As Tadié comments: 'Ses études supérieures ne sont plus retracées, comme si, là encore, Proust avait voulu fuir l’autobiographie et la tentation d’une inutile transposition' (Jean-Yves Tadié, Proust et le roman: Essai sur les formes et techniques du roman dans A la recherche du temps perdu (Paris: Gallimard ('Tel', 98), 1986), p. 25).

66. Cf. e.g. TR, IV, 459: 'L’impression est pour l’écrivain ce qu’est l’expérimentation pour le savant, avec cette différence que chez le savant le travail de l’intelligence précède et chez l’écrivain vient après.'

67. A metaphor which Nietzsche indeed frequently uses when tracing the genealogy of a movement or an idea back to the ‘soil’ from which it emerged and in which it is rooted. Cf. GD, IX, 23, and especially his comments on the noxious plant of Christianity (GD, IX, 35). Cf. also Kofman, Nietzsche et la métaphore, 2nd edn (Paris: Galilée ('Débats'), 1983), pp. 159-63, and Parkes, pp. 171-203 ('Husbanding the Soul: Vegetal Propagation').


69. Descombes, p. 15.

70. Genette, ‘Proust palimpseste’ (in Figures I (Paris: Seuil ('Points', 74), 1976), pp. 39-67), p. 53. The recent fate of this important insight has been all too unfortunate: although David R. Ellison, for example, acknowledges its importance in opening the way to a 'reevaluation of the novel’s metaphorical praxis or productivity' (The Reading of Proust (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 2), Margaret E. Gray misreferences it to ‘Néonymie chez Proust’ (Postmodern Proust (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 3), and Descombes, presumably because it ‘uncannily’ pre-empts his own argument, occludes it entirely. Instead, in a sustained polemic against Genette’s position in ‘Discours du récit’, Descombes (p. 78) prefers to quote Genette there writing (effectively against his earlier self)

71. Malcolm Bowie applies the same argument in a psychoanalytic context: 'we shall be obliged to look beyond the smooth psychological speculations of Proust's narrator, to distrust his masterful voice and to ask whether an alternative psychology - more unstable, more dialectical and more discontinuous - may not also be ingrained in Proust's text' (Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 71).


73. In Marcel Proust (p. 86), Henry argues that Schopenhauer had in fact merely borrowed the concept of eternal return from Schelling, and she refers to 'Schopenhauer qui emprunte à Schelling son concept de force, d'éternel retour' (cf. Proust romancier, p. 86: 'Qu'on se rappelle le symbole de la roue qui passe de Schelling à Schopenhauer, puis à Nietzsche'). If this is what she means in arguing that 'l'obéissance à Schelling gouverne l'aboutissement du roman' (Marcel Proust, p. 302), then I would certainly agree with her, except that Schelling's mythological stage of 'rotating movement' is overcome (cf. Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, pp. 113 and 198n. 21). Moreover, when Schopenhauer writes: 'Wir können die Zeit einem endlos drehenden Kreise vergleichen' (Sämtliche Werke, 3rd edn, ed. Arthur Hübecher, 7 vols (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1972), II, 329 (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, 54)), this is no grand cosmological hypothesis but simply an aid to conceptualising the extensionless present as 'der untheilbare Punkt, der die Tangente berührt', and it is Nietzsche who will take the image seriously, dramatising it in the section of Zarathustra entitled 'Vom Gesicht und Rätsel' (Z, III).

Deleuze is prepared to link the Dionysus of Die Geburt der Tragödie with Schelling and Schopenhauer (cf. Difference et répétition, 2nd edn (Paris: presses Universitaires de France ('Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine'), 1972), p. 354), but on the question of eternal return he makes the highly pertinent point: 'Nietzsche oppose "son" hypothèse à l'hypothèse cyclique. [...] Comment lui, connaisseur des Grecs, serait-il fondé à estimer sa propre pensée prodigieuse et nouvelle, s'il se contentait de formuler cette platitude naturelle, cette généralité de la nature bien connue des Anciens?' (ibid., p. 14; cf. p. 312f. and 'Conclusions: Sur la volonté de puissance et l'éternel retour' (in Deleuze (ed.), Nietzsche, pp. 275-87), pp. 280-84). For Deleuze, the eternal return is a 'cercle toujours déplacé' (Difference et répétition, p. 363): cf. the Nietzschean 'grand finale' to Difference et répétition (pp. 379-89); Nietzsche et la philosophie, 7th edn (Paris: presses Universitaires de France ('Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine'), 1988), p. 32f.; Nietzsche, p. 37n. 1; and my discussion of eternal return in Chapter 3.

Europe, p. 83.


78. Kristeva, pp. 307-37. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


81. Cf. ibid., p. 302f.: 'la seule partition que Proust déchiffre ici est celle de Schopenhauer à laquelle il rattache toutes ses variations personnelles'.

82. Cf. ibid., p. 302: 'Sa présentation de la musique va donc tenter la synthèse de Schopenhauer et de Schelling'.

83. Ibid., p. 305.

84. Ibid., p. 302.


91. Although even while he is later unmasking "Wissenschaft" als Vorurteil in FW 373, he is simultaneously sketching out explanations of the will to power in terms of a (presciently relativistic) physics of 'Machtquanta' (cf. KSA 13, 257-59).

92. Cf. Kristeva, p. 318: 'Par l'intermédiaire de Hartmann, de Wagner et de Nietzsche, la pensée de Schopenhauer se propage en France à partir de 1880'. It is surprising that Kristeva should adopt Henry's dismissive attitude towards Nietzsche so unquestioningly here, since although she could hardly be classed as a Nietzschean thinker, she at least found Nietzsche's early critique of language a good deal more interesting (if contestable) earlier in her career. Cf. Semeiotike: Recherches pour une sémanalyse (Paris: Seuil ('Tel Quel'), 1969), pp. 8n. 1, 91, 93, 160, 163, 249n. 9, and the Nietzsche epigraphs, pp. 7, 90. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to Le temps sensible.


95. Ibid., p. 276. Cf. also Malcolm Bowie, The Morality of Proust, p. 6: 'Abstract talk about vice becomes its own exercise in seduction, and in the process a massive transvaluation of values may occur.'

96. Descombes, pp. 276, 278. In Chapter 3 I shall return to Elstir and characterise him as a paradigmatic Nietzschean artist figure.

Introduction II. Nietzsche and Proust: Towards a Comparative Study

1. Maurice Rostand, 'Quelques lignes à propos d'un livre unique', Comoedia, 26 December 1913, 1.


6. Hindus, p. 255f. The passage he is groping for is in Z, I, 'Vom Lesen und Schreiben', where Zarathustra remarks: 'Ich würde nur an einen Gott glauben, der zu tanzen versteünde'.


18. Gray, p. 2; cf. also pp. 15-37 ('Criticism, Violence, and Desire').

19. Cf. Sollers, 'Le monde au télescope' (in Borel), p. 177. Neither Bersani nor Tadie include any Bataille in their selections from previous Proust criticism, both also published in 1971 (respectively, Les critiques de notre temps et Proust and Lectures de Proust (Paris: Armand Colin)). Tadie refers to Bataille in one footnote (p. 144n. 2), as the reviewer of Prétet's L'aliénation poétique, and even in the 'Bilan critique' section of his Proust (p. 170f.) he discusses only La littérature et le mal.


22. Ibid., pp. 103-18 ('Rhetoric of Tropes').


24. Cf. Derrida, 'La mythologie blanche', p. 258 (also cited by de Man, p. 110f.).


26. Ellison, p. 3.


28. Derrida, 'Force et signification', p. 38; cf. pp. 39, 41, 43. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.

29. For Nietzsche's opposition to teleology, cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, 'Nietzsche's


32. Ibid., p. 314.

33. Splitter (p. 29) in fact borrows arguments from 'Freud et la scène de l'écriture' and 'La parole soufflée' in order precisely to weave together Proust, Derrida and Freud; Malcolm Bowie similarly suggests that one of Proust's narrator's accounts of conscious thought in *Albertine disparaite* can be directly compared to Freud's 'Wunderblock' model of consciousness (*Freud, Proust and Lacan*, p. 69).


35. Ibid., p. 51f.

36. Cf. Kofman, *Nerval*, p. 31f. (quoting Proust on Nerval in *Contre Sainte-Beuve*), and most recently 'Nietzsche et Wagner: Comment la musique devient bonne pour les cochons' (*Furor*, 23 (May 1992), 5-28), 27n. 34, where she compares Nietzsche and Proust on the necessity for the artist to 'forget' the genesis of the work of art.


43. Ibid., p. xiii; cf. Painter, II, title page.

44. Nehamas, p. 167.

45. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 98. Nehamas acknowledges his discussions with Rorty as having had a direct bearing on Nietzsche: Life as Literature itself (p. ix); Rorty in turn devotes a whole chapter to 'Self-creation and Affiliation: Proust, Nietzsche and Heidegger' (pp. 96-121), taking Nehamas's thesis as his starting-point.


47. Kristeva, Le temps sensible, p. 312f.

48. Ibid., p. 313n. 1.

49. Cf. Henry, Marcel Proust, p. 89: 'Et si par un reste de winckelmannisme Schopenhauer utilisait le terme d'idées, il l'entendait à son insu au rebours de Platon pour désigner, à l'opposé d'une essence intellectuelle, les principes de production d'un univers mouvant.'

50. Cf. ibid., pp. 111 (a particularly patronising dig), 119, 248, 252.

51. Ibid., p. 317.

52. Cf. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, pp. 18-21.


55. Cf. Deleuze, Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque (Paris: Minuit ('Critique'),
56. Deleuze, *Proust et les signes*, p. 58. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


60. By a strong reading of p. 75: 'L'essentiel, c'est la différence intérieuri-


62. Cf. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, p. 31: 'Notre problème concerne l'essence de la répétition'.


67. Deleuze, *Proust et les signes*, p. 112f. Cf. his question 'Qu'est-ce que le corps?' in *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, which he answers with the same generalisation of 'corps': 'Ce qui définit un corps est ce rapport entre des forces dominantes et des forces dominées. Tout rapport de forces constitue un corps: chimique, biologique, social, politique' (p. 45).

68. For a helpful analysis of the development in Deleuze's thinking on the body, from *Nietzsche et la philosophie* to his collaborations with Guattari, cf. Dorothea Olkowski, 'Nietzsche's Dice Throw: Tragedy, Nihilism, and The Body without Organs', in Boundas and Olkowski, pp. 119-40.

69. Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, p. 3 (cf. p. 84f.). Cf. also Jean-Michel Rey, *L'enjeu des signes: Lecture de Nietzsche* (Paris: Seuil ('L'ordre philosophique'), 1971), p. 32n. 15; and Kofman, *Nietzsche et la métaphore*, pp. 93 (especially n. 1) and 126-33. Foucault nuances Deleuze's point in his 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', arguing that Nietzschean hermeneutics (an endless interpretation) should be opposed to semiology 'proper' (which remains anchored to the sign), although the strong terms in which he couches his argument ('l'herméneutique et la sémiologie sont deux farouches ennemis': p. 192) do not prevent Deleuze himself from acknowledging its validity (cf.
'Conclusions', p. 277). Barthes, too, subsequently adopts Foucault's distinction (cf. 'Table ronde', p. 94).

70. Cf. Nietzsche et la métaphore, p. 128. Kofman also analyses Nietzsche's other 'Egyptian' metaphors, the mummy and the pyramid (pp. 96-101).

71. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 112 (cf. p. 10).


75. Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, pp. 118-26; cf. also Différence et répétition, pp. 169-217 ('L'image de la pensée').

76. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 122. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.

77. Kofman deconstructs this opposition by demonstrating how Nietzsche manages to figure Socrates even as Jewish (cf. 'Socrate juif', in Socrate(s) (Paris: Galilée ('La philosophie en effet'), 1989), pp. 311-18) - but then he is still ('just') Nietzsche's-Socrates: 'Nietzsche par-devant, Nietzsche par-derrière et [chimère] au milieu' (Kofman, Explosion I, p. 25). Only in the sense of this 'Platonic Nietzsche', I would contend, might it be possible to begin arguing for a 'Platonic Proust'.

78. Cf. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. v ('Avant-propos de la troisième édition').

79. Gray, p. 4.

80. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 42.

81. Cf. Georges Cattaui, who cites this title alone as proof of Deleuze's anti-Platonism and his distance from Curtius (Proust et ses métamorphoses, p. 250n. 8; cf. p. 95n. 10). Although Kristeva (erroneously) cites Deleuze's book as 'Proust et les signes, 1964' throughout Le temps sensible, it is clear from her page references that she is actually using the fourth edition.

82. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 131.

83. Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p. 71.
84. Deleuze, *Proust et les signes*, p. 131 (cf. pp. 10, 81). All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.

85. Cf. KSA 12, 139: 'Der Wille zur Macht interpretirt'; KSA 12, 140: 'Man darf nicht fragen: "wer interpretirt, denn?" sondern das Interpretiren selbst, als eine Form des Willens zur Macht, hat Dasein'. Deleuze glosses both these passages in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (p. 60).


87. A development of the earlier claim: 'Le style n'est pas l'homme, le style, c'est l'essence elle-même' (p. 62). Kristeva evidently finds this highly provocative interpretation of Proust's style beyond the pale, citing Deleuze in conjunction with Céline and 'l'image caricaturale que certains se sont plu à donner de Proust' (Le temps sensible, p. 252n. 2). Sarocchi also takes issue with Deleuze on this point (p. 28), although his preferred alternative ('"le style, c'est l'âme"') hardly seems to me to advance our understanding.

88. Whereas Deleuze bases his interpretation of the spider in Nietzsche on the section 'Von den Taranteln' in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (Z, II), and reads it as a metaphorical representation of 'l'esprit de vengeance' (*Nietzsche et la philosophie*, p. 31; *Nietzsche*, p. 44), he introduces the spider into *À la recherche* as a metaphor for the narrator: 'Le Narrateur-araignée, dont la toile même est la Recherche en train de se faire, de se tisser avec chaque fil remué par tel ou tel signe: la toile et l'araignée, la toile et le corps sont une seule et même machine' (*Proust et les signes*, p. 218). The spider in this sense of textual producer does, however, accord well with the readings of the spider in Nietzsche put forward by Kofman (*Nietzsche et la métaphore*, pp. 101-06) and Derrida (*éperons: Les styles de Nietzsche* (Paris: Flammarion ('Champs'), 1978), p. 82). Deleuze returns to the metaphor of the spider in Nietzsche, this time in the context of the Ariadne myth, in 'Mystère d'Ariane selon Nietzsche 1' (Critique et clinique (Paris: Minuit ('Paradoxe'), 1993), pp. 126-34), p. 129.


92. Bersani, p. 147.

93. Cf. Deleuze, _Proust et les signes_, p. 11, and Bersani, p. 12. Others who have adopted the formulation include Barthes (p. 125) and Doubrovsky (p. 23), although there has also been a good deal of resistance to a reading of _À la recherche_ as _Bildungsroman_: cf. Blanchot, _Le livre à venir_, p. 26; Sarocchi, p. 74; de Lattre, I, 16-19; and Ricoeur, p. 270.


95. Tadié, _Lectures de Proust_, p. 180. Talié is evidently unsettled by Deleuze's 'underhandedness' in not signalling his debt to previous criticism: 'Notons que Deleuze, sauf dans son dernier chapitre, ne cite pas de critiques: on ne sait donc s'il doit quelque chose à Poulet, à Blanchot (qui n'en citent pas non plus d'ailleurs), proches de lui à certains égards' (p. 183n. 1). All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


97. Cf. Tadié's criticism of Henry, cited in the first part of this Introduction. Genette seems to share this disparaging view of Deleuze and his ilk - in all his writing on Proust he cites Deleuze's study only once, at the outset of 'Proust et le langage indirect' (in _Figures II_ (Paris: Seuil, 'Points', 1979), pp. 223-94), p. 223n. 1; in 'Discours du récit: essai de méthode', the most exhaustive of all structuralist readings of Proust (in _Figures III_ (Paris: Seuil ('Poétique'), 1972), pp. 65-273), he cites Tadié copiously while ignoring Deleuze's study entirely. Deleuze is more generous in return (cf. _Proust et les signes_, pp. 147n. 1 and 217n. 1), although each is keen to stress his agreement with the other's interpretation during the 1972 'Table ronde' (cf. pp. 99, 103f.).


99. Cf. Deleuze's own classification of his work on the inside cover of his _Dialogues with Claire Parnet_ (Paris: Flammarion, 1977): 'des monographies, où il essayait de se donner une méthode particulière [...]; des études où il pensait davantage parler pour son compte [...]; une collaboration avec Félix Guattari'.


101. This is especially puzzling in the case of Michael Hardt's _Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy_ (London: UCL Press, 1993), which focusses exclusively on Deleuze's early work. Cf. also the special issue of _PLI, Deleuze and the Transcendental Unconscious_, ed. Joan Broadhurst (October 1992), and Boundas and Olkowski.


103. Cf. André Colombat, _Deleuze et la littérature_ (New York, Berne, Frankfurt

104. Cf. Colombat, pp. 13-54 ('Qu'est-ce qu'interpréter? (Proust, Nietzsche)'), especially pp. 17 and 49-51. Cf. also p. 41 (on Deleuze's 'Le sens des signes est une essence affirmée dans toute sa puissance'): 'Remarquons ici que "affirmer" et "puissance" sont pris dans un sens nietzschéen selon lequel toute volonté de puissance est volonté d'affirmer la différence, la puissance d'un "oui" dionysiaque contre le "non" hégélien.'

105. Cf. ibid., pp. 14, 23, 39, 41, 48 ('pour Deleuze, Proust est platonicien'), 60.

106. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 36.


108. This is Bogue's reading, to which I shall return in Chapter 3.


110. Cf. Magnus, 'The Uses and Abuses of The Will to Power'.


Chapter 1. Proust's Nietzsche


2. Cf. ibid., p. 10f.


6. Cf. KGB III/5, 419f., 421, 426, 447, 531, 534. I analyse these and other letters in my forthcoming 'Nietzsche und seine französischen Leser. In memoriam Sarah Kofman'.


9. Ibid., p. 79f. Dreyfus exaggerates with the claim that the article 'projetait les premières lueurs qu'on ait reçues en France sur le philosophe-poète', since pieces by Jean Bourdeau, Eugène de Roberty and Teodor de Wyzewa had already preceded it (cf. Bianquis, p. 4f.).

10. The first issue of Le Banquet (March 1892) had contained Proust's review 'Un conte de Noël' (CSB 343-46). Subsequent issues of the journal contained the following pieces:
   No. 3 (May 1892): Dreyfus, 'La philosophie du marteau' (article on Götzen-Dämmerung: 65-74); Proust, 'L'irreligion d'état' (review: CSB 348-49) and five 'études' (JS 40f., 41, 42f., 43, 43f.).
   No. 4 (June 1892): Fernand Girégh, 'Varia' (review: 125-28).
   No. 5 (July 1892): Proust, three 'études' (JS 110f., 111f., 125).
   No. 6 (November 1892): Dreyfus, 'Frédéric Nietzsche et Peter Gast' (article: 161-67); Fernand Girégh, 'Varia' (review: 191-92); Proust: 'Tel qu'en songe par Henri de Régnier' (CSB 354f.), and two 'études' (JS 142-44, 166f.).
   No. 7 (February 1893): Proust, 'La conférence parlementaire de la rue Serpente' (report: CSB 355-57); 'Violante ou la mondanité' (short story: JS 29-37).


12. Dreyfus and Halévy's publications in the Revue blanche were as follows:
   August-September 1892: 'Frédéric Nietzsche, Fragments', tr. Daniel Halévy (95-100).
   November 1892: 'Frédéric Nietzsche, Fragments', tr. Daniel Halévy (251-60).
   No. 12, 1897: Daniel Halévy and Robert Dreyfus, 'Frédéric Nietzsche: étude et fragments' (57-68: Biographie de Nietzsche', 57-61).

13. The principal articles by Halévy which appeared during Proust's lifetime were as follows: 'Nietzsche et Wagner, 1869-1876' (La Revue de Paris, November and December 1897, 302-27, 649-74), 'L'enfance et la jeunesse de Nietzsche' (La Revue de Paris, 1 May 1907, 105-20; 15 May 1907, 372-94), 'Nietzsche et l'Empire allemand, 1870-1872' (La Revue de Paris, 1908), Le travail du Zarathoustra (Paris: Cahiers de la Quinzaine (10/12), 1909 (pamphlet)), 'Mile de Meyenbug et Frédéric Nietzsche' (Journal des Débats, 18 August 1909, 3), 'Sur un ami de Frédéric Nietzsche' (L'Opinion, 10 April 1920, 408-09).


18. Albert, and all French translators after him (Alexandre Vialatte, Jean-Claude Hémery, éric Blondel), translate the section of *Ecce Homo* entitled 'Varum ich so weise bin' 'Pourquoi je suis si sage'. Even in 1922, Proust is still referring to Nietzsche as a 'sage' (cf. CMP, XXI, 301ff.).


22. Cf. Forth, 100n. 1.

23. Although this remark is intended as a criticism, the context is actually a defence of Nietzsche who, here again, is cited together with Ruskin (as well as Goethe, Stendhal and Tolstoy). Proust's overall argument being that great writers should not be discounted simply because of their occasional misjudgements (cf. 'Tolstoi contre Shakespeare', CSB 523f.).


30. After 1904 Proust makes no further mention of Nietzsche in his published writings outside of *A la recherche*, and after 1909 he mentions Nietzsche only twice more in the correspondence, both times in passing (CMP, XX, 521; XXI, 301f.), although the aside in his letter of 10 November 1921 to Jacques Boulenger does reveal the extent to which by this stage he thinks it will be clear that he is not a Nietzschean: "Or dans la dernière N.R.F. à la "Revue des Revues", on a cité un Fragment de Suares sur Nietzsche (ou naturellement ni moi ni Germain ne sommes visés!)" (CMP, XXI, 521).

31. Proust's references in his other published writings to philosophers besides Nietzsche are equally sporadic and, for the most part, gestural. Cf. CSB 392: "les Kant, les Spinoza, les Hegel, aussi obscurs qu'il sont profonds, ne se laissent pas pénétrer sans des difficultés bien grandes"; CSB 624: "Et de grands métaphysiciens purent faire une histoire de la philosophie universelle sans prononcer une seule fois les noms abordés de Leibnitz, de Kant et de Hegel, sans compter les autres". The two exceptions here are Descartes, who merits a long footnote in "A propos du style de Flaubert", where Proust writes that "j'essaye dans mes romans de me mettre à son école" (CSB 586n. 1), and Kant, with whom he favourably compares Flaubert: "Et la révolution de vision, de représentation du monde qui découle – ou est exprimée – par sa syntaxe, est peut-être aussi grande que celle de Kant déplaçant le centre de la connaissance du monde dans l'âme" (CSB 299, cf. 586).


34. Le Rider, p. xlii; cf. Forth, 102.

35. The total for Plato includes Brichot's reference to the *Symposium* (P, III, 786); that for Pascal includes the narrator's reference to the *Penseées* (AD, IV, 124) and Saint-Loup's allusion to *Le Mémorial* (CG, II, 401); that for
Leibniz includes Saint-Loup's allusion to the Monadology (CG, II, 413).


37. Cf. also JF, II, 57, where Françoise is compared to Plato and John the Baptist.

38. Cf. especially SG, III, 438ff., where he and Cottard vie with each other; F, III, 786; TR, IV, 371.

39. These are when Saint-Loup is at Doncières: 'Sur sa table il y avait des livres de travail et Ainsi parla Zarathoustra' (II, 1126, 1561) and at the Front during the War: 'Il lira Ainsi parlait Zarathustra devant les Boches et leur sifflera le XVe quatuor' (IV, 1377; cf. IV, 1249).

40. Here again, Proust excises material which would have further characterised her. In JF, 'Esquisse XXXVIII', we find a description of her 'ancestor': 'Mme de Chemisey passait toute sa matinée à lire des ouvrages tels que les Premiers principes d'Herbert Spencer, Matière et mémoire de Bergson et certains ouvrages de Guyau' (II, 914).

41. As Charlus points out, though, this does not prevent him from denigrating Nietzsche and including him in his sweeping anti-German statements during the War: 'Qu'il s'agisse du plus grand Allemand, de Nietzsche, de Goethe, vous entendrez Cottard dire: "Avec l'habituel manque de psychologie qui caractérise la race teutonne"' (TR, IV, 358).

42. Cf. the celebrated opening of Contre Sainte-Beuve: 'Chaque jour j'attache moins de prix à l'intelligence' (CSB 211). Saint-Loup remains associated with Nietzsche to the very end of his life: from the Front he sends letters to the narrator in which he does not shrink from making risqué allusions 'à une page de Romain Rolland, voire de Nietzsche' (TR, IV, 334).


44. Georges Cattaui notes the similarity between the two names 'Robert de Saint-Loup-en-Bray' and 'Bertrand de Fénelon' (Marcel Proust: Proust et son temps, Proust et le temps (Paris: Julliard, 1952), p. 104n. 1), although he also notes that the syllable is shared by 'Albertine', 'Gilberte', and Proust's friend Edgar Aubert. Jean-Francis Reille (Proust: Le temps du désir. Une lecture textuelle (Paris: éditeurs Français Réunis, 1979)) goes much further than Cattaui, reading Saint-Loup as one of the ciphers for Proust's brother Robert (p. 211) and remarking: 'On est surpris du nombre de ROBERT ou de -BERT- qui entourent Proust dans la vie, de très près et souvent dans un contexte d'homosexualité', citing another eight such names besides Fénelon and Aubert (p. 211-12n. 1; cf. Jean-Pierre Richard's 'petit circuit sur les noms' (specifically 'le groupe br') in Proust et le monde sensible, pp. 114-16n. 3). Serge Gaubert(!) takes this 'jeu de l'Alphabet' to an absurd extreme: 'Or ne trouve-t-on pas dans le nom du marquis toutes les lettres du prénom de la jeune fille [Albertine]? Et n'est-il pas étonnant que celles qui restent soient précisément celles qui, composées, forment le nom Proust? "Robert Saint-Loup" = "Albertine" + "Proust" ('Le jeu de l'Alphabet' (in Recherche de

45. Malcolm Bowie, in drawing attention to the passage in Le Temps retrouvé where the narrator reveals that the Larivières are the only characters in his novel who are 'gens réels, qui existent' (TR, IV, 424), is right to invoke 'those who would hasten to point out that such protestations themselves belong straightforwardly enough to the rhetoric of fiction, that a visible work of ironic self-construction is still going on here even as irony is disclaimed' (The Morality of Proust, p. 15), for the narrator has already falsified his own assertion, not only by the teasing 'disclosure' of the identity of Charles Haas as one of the models for Swann (P, III, 705), but also by this earlier episode. Roger Shattuck is thus simply wrong in claiming (of the same passage which Bowie highlights): 'There is nothing like it elsewhere in the Search' (Proust (London: Fontana/Collins ('Fontana Modern Masters'), 1974), p. 27). In all three of these cases, 'Proust seemingly steps outside the confines of his own fictional text' (Bowie, ibid., p. 14) in order to pay homage to people in his own life for whom he felt a particular affection.

46. Saint-Loup's continued enthusiasm for Proudhon, as for Nietzsche, is plain: he is sent into raptures when the narrator's grandmother makes him a present of some original Proudhon letters (JF, II, 221), and subsequently at Doncières he assures the narrator: '"Son Proudhon ne me quitte pas"' (CG, II, 372).


48. Cf. Le Rider, pp. xlix-111i, and Bianquis, pp. 89-95 ('Le socialisme nietzschéen').


d'après ses carnets inédits (1843-1847) (Paris: Sequana, 1944) and Le mariage de Proudhon (Paris: Stock, 1955). Cf. Alain Silvera, Daniel Halévy and His Times: A Gentleman-Commoner in the Third Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966): 'It is no doubt significant that the two subjects of Halévy's biographical labors, to which he returned repeatedly in the course of a long writing career, should have been Nietzsche the aristocrat, and Proudhon the plebeian - two men of radically different temperaments who, when seen through Halévy's biographical prism, appear linked by striking similarities' (p. 75). Philip Kolb entirely overlooks the possibility that Halévy served Proust as a model for Saint-Loup, and presumes Fénelon must have been attracted by socialism (cf. CMP, XIV, 73n.).

51. For the negative connotations of friendship and conversation in A la recherche, cf. especially Bonnet, Le progrès spirituel, I, 167-77 ('L'amitié').

52. The metaphor which Proust's narrator uses here for friendship, 'breuvage', is also applied to the involuntary memory-generating infusion in Combray (CS, I, 45). In my forthcoming 'Proust's Pharmacy' (Q/W/E/R/T/Y, 1996) I draw on Derrida's analysis of the pharmakon in Plato (cf. 'La pharmacie de Platon', in La dissemination (Paris: Seuil ('Tel Quel'), 1972), pp. 69-196) to discuss Proust's 'original' madeleine episode during the narrator's childhood (CS, I, 50f.), the significance of M. Rapin's pharmacy in Combray (from which the infusion is bought), and the later description of memory as 'une espèce de pharmacie' (P, III, 892).

Proust's early text 'L'Amitié' (JS 120) is in very much the same vein as this passage in Le Côte de Guermantes, though it exploits a different metaphor: 'Il est doux quand on a du chagrin de se coucher dans la chaleur de son lit (...). Mais il est un lit meilleur encore, plein d'odeurs divines. C'est notre douce, notre profonde, notre impénétrable amitié. Quand il est triste et glacé, j'y couche frileusement mon coeur.'

53. Cf. EH, III, 1 ('ich selbst lese, mit Verlaub, nur das Journal des Débats'); KGB III/5, 528, 531, 535, 556. In A la recherche the character who sits on the Champs-Élysées and talks to Gilberte about her parents every day while the narrator looks on enviously, Mme Blatin, has an equally proprietor-ial feeling towards Nietzsche's 'Blatt': 'Pendant que ses petits-enfants jouaient plus loin, elle lisait toujours les Débats qu'elle appelait "mes vieux Débats"' (CS, I, 390). Proust's use of reading-matter as a means of characterisation extends to include newspapers as well as books, and his mentions of the Journal des Débats are in all but one case (JF, I, 426) linked to Mme Blatin, who after this first, relatively detailed reference is referred to simply as 'la vieille lectrice des Débats' (CS, I, 398), 'la dame aux Débats' (CS, I, 399), and 'la vieille dame qui lisait les Débats' (CS, I, 406).

54. Bourdeau himself also wrote on Nietzsche in the Journal des Débats: these various articles were collected in Les maîtres de la pensée contemporaine: Stendhal, Taine, Nietzsche (Paris: Alcan, 1904), pp. 108-46.

55. La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche, p. 104; or p. 154f. in the edition (Nietzsche (Paris: Le Livre de Poche ('Pluriel', 8307), 1977)) to which all further references are made.
56. 'Je n'admets les autres que comme indicateurs excitants [...]. Mensonge de l'amitié parce que rien dans les autres' (Le Carnet de 1908, pp. 39-39).

57. In denigrating philosophy, Proust turns his back here on Darlu, his philosophy teacher at the Lycée Condorcet, whom he had cited together with Boutroux, his philosophy professor at the Sorbonne, as his two 'héros dans la vie réelle' in the questionnaire which he completed in his twenties (CSB 337), and whom he had referred to in 1894 as 'le grand philosophe dont la parole inspirée, plus sûre de durer qu'un écrit, a, en moi comme en tant d'autres, engendré la pensée' (JS 8). Cf. André Ferré, Les années de collège de Marcel Proust, 5th edn (Paris: Gallimard (Vocations', 8), 1959), pp. 199-252 ('Disciple de Darlu (1888-1889)'); Bonnet, Alphonse Darlu: Maître de philosophie de Marcel Proust (Paris: Nizet, 1961); and Robert Coq, Alphonse Darlu: Professeur de Marcel Proust (Bordeaux: Bergerac, 1963).

58. Even though Saint-Loup's name emerges from a later change, the context remains remarkably consistent: 'visite Parent-Montargis qu'on ne savait pas à Paris, comme gaie lanpe' (Le Carnet de 1908, p. 39). Proust continues to draw on Halévy for years after Le Carnet de 1908: a further example of his using Nietzschean terminology is the expression "égoïsme sacré" which occurs in his letters of 31 May 1918 to Mme Straus (CMP, XVII, 270) and of 26 January 1920 to Jacques Rivière (CMP, XIX, 98), and which, as Kolb notes, was borrowed from Halévy's (somewhat strained) translation in his biography of the term 'Selbstsucht' in Nietzsche's last letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé (cf. CMP, XVII, 272n. 6). Cf. also n. 60, below.


60. Cf. letter to Paul Morand, 12 April 1920 (CMP, XIX, 206f.): 'Ce qui me désole surtout, [...] c'est de voir des gens de l'intelligence de Daniel Halévy mettre le goût avant tout, ou du moins ce qu'ils nomment tel, et nier d'avance tout ce que produisent les âges "barbares" (l'adjectif est de lui) qui vont venir.' Kolb suggests that the phrase 'âge barbare' is taken from Halévy's 1920 article on Burckhardt, 'Sur un ami de Frédéric Nietzsche' (cf. CMP, XIX, 208n. 12).

61. Proust is also criticising Saint-Loup more subtly for being a Wagnerian fashion victim. Not only does the narrator refer to 'le roman démocré' of M. de Marsantes's existence (JF, II, 92), as we have seen, but Saint-Loup himself also dismisses his father's taste in literature "puisque ce qu'il entendait par littérature se compose d'œuvres périmées" (JF, II, 93). His enthusiasm for Wagner, the narrator implies, is as shallow as that shown by Odette (qui n'était pas capable de faire de différence entre Bach et Clapisson': CS, I, 296) seeking to hire one of Ludwig II's Bavarian castles for the Verdurin clan during the Bayreuth season, or the enthusiasm which Proust suspects was shown by his own classmates, who greeted even Wagner's more insipid pieces with indiscriminately rapturous applause simply because the composer was 'alors honoré' (CSB 623).

62. Compagnon (p. 66) points out that the 1912 version of this passage was even more cruel, adding to the comparison Gustave Drot's comedy of manners Monsieur, Madame et Bébé.


66. Cf. 'Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche, 22 January 1887' (Friedrich Nietzsche's Gesammelte Briefe, ed. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, 5 vols (Berlin and Leipzig, Schuster und Löffler; Leipzig: Insel, 1900-09), V/2, 710f.).

67. Nietzsche here tries (valiantly but unsuccessfully) to read Parsifal as Wagner's parting satyr play — in Offenbach, as we have seen, he finds a more conducive satyrist. Cf. Kofman, 'Nietzsche et Wagner'.

68. Halévy, Nietzsche, p. 486f. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


70. Halévy, Nietzsche, p. 214. In the article 'Mlle de Meysenbug et Frédéric Nietzsche' he writes: 'Il semblait que deux hommes s'affrontaient en lui, deux génies hostiles qui s'exaltaient l'un l'autre', and does Nietzsche no favours in dismissively excusing his 'génie de mensonge' comment by arguing: 'Mlle de Meysenbug aurait été moins sévère si elle avait prévu le désastre imminent: trois mois après, Nietzsche était fou.'


72. Kaufmann, p. 36.


75. Cf. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Der einsame Nietzsche (Leipzig: Kröner, 1922), pp. 385-401 ('Freundschaft'). In this context (exceptionally) I would give Elisabeth more credit than does Erich Podach, who dismisses '[die] von der Schwester ausgeheckteC1 Legende vom edlen und idealen Freund Nietzsche, der am schönen Verhalten seiner Freunde so schwer gelitten habe' (Erich F. Podach, Ein Blick in Notizbücher Nietzsche's: Ewige Wiederkunft, Mlle zur Macht, Ariadne. Eine schaffensanalytische Studie mit 4 Abbildungen (Heidel-


77. De Faltos, p. 41.

78. As Kaufmann points out (p. 365), Nietzsche shifts in this respect from the position he adopted in the notes for *Die Geburt der Tragödie*: 'Das Höchste, was die bewußte Ethik der Alten erreicht hat, ist die Theorie der Freundschaft: dies ist gewiß ein Zeichen einer recht queren Entwicklung des ethischen Denkens, Dank dem Musageten Sokrates!' (KSA 7, 25).


81. Ibid., p. 34n. 10.

82. Sedgwick, p. 132. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


84. Sarocchi (p. 78) compares Proust with Nietzsche on precisely this point: 'Nietzsche et Proust semblent très proches: tous deux refusent la méthode, la pédagogie au sens traditionnel, et lui substituent ce que les Grecs nommaient paideia, c'est-à-dire la culture dans le sens d'une violence faite à la pensée. Ce thème exclut la pleuse image du maître et du disciple'. His reference is to Heidegger, but he seems actually to be paraphrasing Deleuze's *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, p. 124.


86. Cf. also MA, II, 231, 241, 242, and 252: 'Silentium. - Man darf über seine Freunde nicht reden: sonst verredet man sich das Gefühl der Freundschaft'. In the 'Nachspiel' to the First Book of *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, 'Unter Freunden', 'Schön ists, miteinander schweigen' immediately modulates to 'Schöner, miteinander lachen', but only because laughter bares the teeth.

87. Kaufmann, p. 368.


89. Cf. Beckett, p. 64f.; de Fallois, p. 41; and Reid. Descombes likens Saint-Loup to 'Nietzsche et les autres panégyristes de l'amitié' (p. 303), but he at least acknowledges the tensions in Nietzsche's position when he writes that 'Saint-Loup, en bon intellectuel lecteur de Nietzsche [...] conçoit lui aussi le sens de la vie comme à trouver dans la réalisation d'un soi individuel' (p. 299).


91. Deleuze, *Proust et les signes*, p. 116; cf. p. 41. Bogue notes that 'Deleuze brings Proust closest to Nietzsche [...] in his analysis of Proust's relation to philosophy' (p. 44f.); cf. also Colombat, pp. 15-37 ('La critique de l'intelligence, de la bonne volonté et de l'amitié').


94. For Proust and Halévy's intellectual differences, cf. Lesage, p. 45, and Jean-Pierre Halévy, pp. 19-29. The latter argues that the two men had more in common than they acknowledged, and he stresses that (in theory at least) they both shared a distrust of the intellect (p. 10); Richard Macksey even manages to compare Proust with Halévy's (other) hero Proudhon (p. 108).

95. 'Entre ces deux grands esprits, mais alors si jeunes, que s'est-il passé de si fort pendant leurs années communes (1887-1889) au lycée Condorcet qu'ils ne l'oublient jamais, malgré toutes leurs différences, tous leurs éloignements?' muses Jean-Pierre Halévy (p. 9). Speculation aside, one can at least characterise their relationship as a 'Sternen-Freundschaft' in Nietzsche's sense: 'Wir waren Freunde und sind uns fremd geworden. Aber das ist recht so, und wir wollen's uns nicht verhehlen und verdunkeln, als ob wir uns dessen zu schämen hätten. [...] Daß wir uns fremd werden müssen, ist das Gesetz über uns: eben dadurch sollen wir uns auch ehrwürdiger werden! Ebendadurch soll der Gedanke an unsere ehemalige Freundschaft heiliger werden!' (FW 279).
Chapter 2. Epistemology: Proust's Perspectivism

1. Descombes, p. 47. This claim is later strengthened—'la Recherche [...] est, pour reprendre les propres termes de Proust, un roman perspectiviste' (p. 225) —but here Descombes goes too far, since Proust himself never used the term.


3. Nehamas points out that the term was actually coined by Nietzsche's Basel colleague Gustav Teichmüller in his Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt of 1882 (cf. 'Immanent and Transcendent Perspectivism in Nietzsche' (NS, 12 (1983), 473–90), 474 and n. 7), and indeed 'Perspektivismus' does not occur in Nietzsche's writings until after he reads Teichmüller in 1883 (cf. KSA 10, 292, 310, 528, 590). The vocabulary of 'perspective' is still absent from (all four parts of) Also sprach Zarathustra (1883–85); from the Spring of 1884 Nietzsche's notebooks begin to feature the terms 'Perspektiven' (KSA 11, 38, 57), 'Perspektiv-Apparat' (KSA 11, 99) and 'perspektivisch' (KSA 11, 146f.), although for the abstract noun he favours 'das Perspektivische' (KSA 11, 659; 12, 188; MA, I, 'Vorrede', 6; GT, 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', 5), and it is not until late 1886/early 1887 that he begins to write of 'Perspektivismus' (KSA 12, 303). Notably, one of the first instances of the term (KSA 12, 315) is enclosed in inverted commas, and Nietzsche's remark at FW 354 ('Dies ist der eigentliche Phänomenalismus und Perspektivismus, wie ich ihn verstehe') would suggest that it already had some currency when he was writing (1887). However, it is undoubtedly Nietzsche's work which gave the term its wider currency in Germany (it does not occur in Grimm when the relevant volume of the Deutsches Wörterbuch is published in 1889), and it is through translations of Nietzsche that, as 'perspectivism', 'perspectivisme', 'perspectivismo' (etc.), it passed into other European languages. Thus the first citation for the term 'perspectivism' in the OED is from Thomas Common's 1910 translation of FW 299; 'perspectivisme' is defined in the Dictionnaire historique de la langue française (ed. Alain Rey (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1992), p. 1489) as follows: 'terme de philosophie (1913), est emprunté à l'allemand Perspektivismus (chez Nietzsche)' (the date 1913 here is actually rather late, given that Henri Albert's translations of GM (1900), FV (1901), and JGB (1903) all came out at least a decade earlier).

4. Doubrovsky, p. 197. To cite only the most notable examples, cf. Louis Martin-Chauffier, 'Proust et le double "je" de quatre personnes', Confluences, 3 (July–August 1943), 55–69; Brian Rogers, Proust's Narrative Techniques (Geneva: Droz, 1965); Marcel Muller, Les voix narratives dans 'La recherche du temps perdu' (Geneva: Droz, 1965); Raimond, pp. 331–43 ('Les significations du point de vue'); Tadié, Proust et le roman, pp. 34–60 ('Point de vue et perspectives'); and Genette, 'Discours du récit', pp. 203–24.

5. Roger Allard, 'Sodome et Gomorrhe ou Marcel Proust moraliste', Nouvelle Revue Française, 1 June 1922, 644f.


11. Ibid., p. 85.

12. Bolle, p. 30. One should perhaps say that Bolle's is an ostensibly Leibnizian Proust, for I shall show in the next chapter that, like Henry, he draws Nietzschean parallels at important stages in his argument.

13. Cf. Henry's two chapters on 'Le perspectivisme narratif', in *Proust* (pp. 201-06) and *Schopenhauer et la création littéraire en Europe* (pp. 82-87).


18. In the Bible the relevant passage for the later inquisition scene with Pilate actually runs: 'Jesus answered, [...] for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the

19. Cf. KSA 12, 381: 'Pilatus die einzige honnête Person im neuen Testament, sein dédain vor diesem Juden-Geschwätz von "Wahrheit", als ob solch Volk mitreden dürfte, wenn es sich um Wahrheit handelt'.


The debate surrounding 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' has been extensive and intense, especially in recent American criticism. It was Danto who first read Nietzsche's account of nihilism as 'a highly dramatised rejection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth' (p. 33), and focussed on 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' as containing an answer 'that he never saw fit to modify in any essential respect' to 'the old, cynical question, What is truth? [...] that occupied him throughout his entire philosophical life' (p. 38). John T. Wilcox ('Nietzsche Scholarship and "The Correspondence Theory of Truth": The Danto Case' (NE, 15 (1986), 337-57)) rejoins that 'the Correspondence Theory of Truth' itself, as Danto defines it (or, more precisely, fails to define it) is ultimately mystificatory, although I am more in agreement with Maudemarie Clark (Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ('Modern European Philosophy'), 1990), pp. 85-90) that 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' subscribes to a 'metaphysical correspondence theory' which Nietzsche later rejects. As will become apparent in the course of this chapter, however, I disagree strongly with Clark's claim (p. 134f.) that Nietzsche's perspectivism can be classed as just another, weaker ('minimal', 'neo-Kantian') kind of 'correspondence theory' - a claim which Brian Leiter has recently echoed ('Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals', in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 334-57). The account of the relation between 'über Wahrheit und Lüge' and Nietzsche's later work with which I am most in agreement is that given by Alan D. Schrift, who argues that the 'strategy of linguistic deconstruction makes up an essential aspect of the Nietzschean transvaluation' (Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 141).

23. Nietzsche's term 'usuell' invites this gloss, since it is itself a highly
unusual word for 'usual' in German, and there is a remarkable similarity here with the passage in Du côté de chez Swann where Proust's narrator reflects: 'Les mots nous présentent des choses une petite image claire et usuelle' (CS, I, 380). For the link between 'use', 'usury' and the metaphor of the effaced effigy, cf. in particular the opening of Derrida's 'La mythologie blanche'.


27. Cf. the 'deconstructive' (fluxist) position which Socrates temporarily adopts in Plato's Theaetetus (157a-b): 'nothing is in its own right, but is always being generated in some relation. The verb "to be" should be deleted from all contexts, despite the fact that habit and ignorance often force us to employ it' (tr. Robin A.H. Waterfield (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 40).


30. Ibid., pp. 90, 121f., 143f.


33. Cf. KSA 12, 550, and Nehamas, pp. 42-73 ("Untruth as a Condition of Life").
34. Cf. Splitter, pp. 1-19 ("Marcel in Wonderland, or the logic of magical thinking").

35. For the dispelling of the narrator's 'illusion sémantique' regarding both personal and geographical names, cf. Genette, 'Proust et le langage indirect', pp. 240-47. Just as Nietzsche uses etymology as an important means of historically ('genealogically') relativising moral and metaphysical concepts (GM, I, 4-5; KSA 11, 613), so Proust uses competing etymologies to expose his narrator's earlier illusion, when the appropriateness of the curé de Combray's etymologies in Du côté de chez Swann (CS, I, 101-05) is relativised by Brichot's alternative versions in Sodome et Gomorrhe for the place-names in the region around Balbec (SG, III, 280-84).


37. Deleuze characterises Nietzsche's 'méthode tragique' in general as a 'méthode de dramatisation' (Nietzsche et la philosophie, p. 89), and the premise of Kofman's Nietzsche et la scène philosophique is 'l'affinité essentielle, perçue par Nietzsche, entre le théâtre et le théorique' (p. 11). Cf. also Peter Sloterdijk, Der Philosoph auf der Bühne. Ein Versuch über Nietzsches dionysischen Materialismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp ('Edition Suhrkamp', 1353), 1986).


40. Cf. also the 'Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei' poem 'Im Süden': 'Im Norden - ich gestehs mit Zaudern - / Liebt ich ein Weibchen, alt zum Schaudern: / "Die Wahrheit" hieß dies alte Weib'.

41. 'Symposion' figures in Nietzsche's list of his most-read books of 1863 (Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke, ed. Karl Schlechta, 3 vols (Munich: Hanser, 1956), III, 112), and in 'Mein Leben', his autobiographical sketch from 1864, he refers to it as his 'Lieblingsdichtung' (ibid., III, 118).

42. Cf. Kofman, Socrate(s), pp. 289-318 ('Les Socrate(s) de Nietzsche: "Qui"
est Socrate?


45. For Proust's scientific metaphors, cf. Reino Virtanen, 'Proust's Metaphors from the Natural and the Exact Sciences', FMLA, 69 (1954), 1038-59; Victor E. Graham, The Imagery of Proust (Oxford: Blackwell ('Language and Style'), 2): 1966), pp. 139-51; and Cattaui, 'Proust et les sciences: Les métaphores scientifiques de Proust', in Proust et ses métamorphoses, pp. 243-61. In my 'Chemical Solutions', I have attempted to demonstrate that for both Proust and Nietzsche the most privileged scientific metaphors are ultimately (al)chemical.

46. No astronomer is mentioned by name in Proust's novel, but one of his very first literary productions, the schoolboy essay 'L'éclipse' from March 1886 (CSB 325-27), tells the story of a figure dear to Nietzsche, Columbus, and it is Columbus's knowledge as a scientist, specifically as an astronomer, that Proust chooses to make the essence of his heroism. Cf. Marie Miquet-Ollagnier, 'Christophe Colomb, héros mythique d'un apprenti écrivain', études françaises, 28, 2/3 (Autumn 1992-Winter 1993), 179-86, and my 'Nietzsche and the Figure of Columbus', forthcoming in NS, 24 (1995). Although Nietzsche denounces all 'theologische Astronomic' (GM, III, 25), the Polish astronomer Copernicus remains an important identificatory figure for him (cf. UB, III, 6; JGB 12) as he seeks to emulate Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' and to assert his own descent from Polish nobility (cf. Kofman, Explosion II, pp. 189-213 ('Une généalogie fantastique')).

47. Cf. Genette's analysis of this passage in terms of the narrator's 'recherche angoissée d'une loi de récurrence' ('Discours du récit', p. 155).


49. Cf. Bolle, pp. 43-67 ('Le jardin de la Raspélieure ou la villa d'Hadrien').


52. Cf. Shattuck, Proust, pp. 29-31 ('An Overdetermined Universe'); Valerie

53. Cf. Genette, 'Proust palimpseste', and Kasell, pp. 60-80 ('The Textuality of Albertine').

54. Schopenhauer, VI, 50 (*Parerga und Paralipomena*, II, 33).

55. For Proust's similar use of the imagery of 'algebra' in this context, cf. Gray, pp. 85-87.


p. 188.

64. Curtius, p. 112f. All page references given in the main text in the section which follows are to this work.


67. Ibid., p. 85f. Cf. also Shattuck (Proust, pp. 62-68), who treats this scene as a paradigmatic illustration of Proust's 'comic vision'.


70. Descombes, p. 48.

71. Shattuck manages to claim that this passage 'has a desperate ring' (Proust, p. 105), and that it illustrates a certain (hopeless) 'pathos of self' (p. 106). I would argue, rather, that it illustrates the more positive Nietzschean possibility of a 'pathos of self-distance'.

Chapter 3. In Search of the Self

1. For the 'politics of the soul', cf. Thiele, especially pp. 51-65 ('The Soul as a Plurality'), and Parkes, especially pp. 346-62 ('Ordering the Psyche Polytic').

2. Nietzsche returns to the question of 'egoism' periodically throughout the early 1880s (cf. KSA 9, 513f., 528, 557f.; FW 14, 162), but increasingly in the period 1886-87, where passages such as the 'Geschichte der Vermoralisierung und Entmoralisierung' at KSA 12, 485-90 (cf. KSA 12, 319, 349) are by now the preparatory stages for his grand critique of so-called 'unegoistic actions' in his analysis of the ascetic ideal in Zur Genealogie der Moral (cf. GM, I, 2, 3; II, 18; III, passim).

3. Giuliano Campioni finds sources in Emerson for a number of Nietzsche's ideas and images in 'Wohin man reisen muß' (cf. 'Wohin man reisen muss.' über Nietzsche's Aphorismus 223 aus Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche', NS, 16 (1987), 209-26), and he points out (223n. 19) that two of the fragments which Nietzsche wrote in his copy of Emerson's Essays (KSA 9, 619: 13 [5] and 13
(7) thematise 'seeing with many eyes', although it is clear from the example which he gives in order to try and demonstrate that the actual Argus image is 'nochmals von Emerson stammend' (222n. 18), and where Argus is conspicuously absent, that it is not Emerson's image but Nietzsche's.


5. Cf. FW 276; JGB 16, 17, 54; KSA 11, 637-41; KSA 12, 549. Cf. also Bernard Pautrat, Versions du soleil: Figure et système de Nietzsche (Paris: Seuil ('L'ordre philosophique'), 1971), pp. 246-56 ('La décomposition du cogito'), and Kofman, Nietzsche et la scène philosophique, pp. 227-61 ('Descartes piégé').

6. Cf. Roger Shattuck's striking description of this scene, 'in which the Narrator puts himself together like Humpty-Dumpty out of fragmentary impressions of waking and dreaming', vainly attempting to achieve 'self-creation ex omnibus' (Proust, p. 30).


8. Cf. Henry, Proust romancier, pp. 175-203 ('Je est un autre').

9. Cf. de Man, pp. 57-78 ('Reading (Proust)').

10. Cf. Friedrich Krotz, Das Kind und Combray in Marcel Prousts "À la recherche du temps perdu" (Heidelberg: Winter, 1990), especially pp. 84-119 ('Combray, eine Mentalität').


15. Raimond, p. 333.

16. De Lattre shows how Proust's preoccupation with psychological relativity is far removed from any Kantian transcendental idealism (II, 176), but only in order then to develop a comparison between Proust's 'idéalisme subjectif, conçu dans le niveau de la croyance' (II, 180) and Spinoza. Descombes ironically dismisses such accounts as constructions of 'la philosophie du pseudo-Marcel', 'un philosophe inconnu, dont les pensées de Marcel (le personnage de la Recherche) sont comme l'écho' (p. 34).

17. By stressing the primacy of the bodily in Nietzsche I am following Kofman
(Explosion I, pp. 34-43) in rejecting Heidegger's reading, which seeks to abstract Nietzsche from his 'alleged biologism' (cf. Nietzsche, I, 517-27, 590-602), and Daniel W. Conway, who adopts a similar position in response to Rorty (cf. 'Disembodied Perspectives: Nietzsche contra Rorty', NS, 21 (1992), 281-89). My argument is intended as a corrective to the reading of Nietzsche which Martin Jay gives in his breathtakingly synoptic Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993), for although Jay stresses the importance of both Proustian 'binocular vision' (pp. 184-86, citing Shattuck) and Nietzschean perspectivism (pp. 186-92) in subverting the dominant (Platonic) monocular tradition, he nevertheless argues: 'It was not [...] until Bergson that the rights of the body were explicitly set against the tyranny of the eye. Going beyond the residually visual implications of perspectivism, he developed a fundamental critique of ocularcentrism that outdistanced even that of Nietzsche' (p. 191f.).

18. Nietzsche restates the primacy of the semiotic in Ecce Homo, when he argues that the 'Schopenhauer' and 'Wagner' of which he was writing in his early Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen should be read in 'semiotic' terms as ciphers for himself: 'Dergestalt hat sich Plato des Sokrates bedient, als einer Semiotik für Plato' (EH, III, 'UB', 3).

19. For philosophising 'Am Leitfaden des Leibes', cf. KSA 11, 282, 565; KSA 12, 92, 106; for 'Ausgangspunkt vom Leibe', cf. KSA 11, 635. On the importance of the body in general, cf. also KSA 10, 284f., 286f., 653-56; KSA 11, 43, 576-79; KSA 12, 112.

20. Cf. Deleuze, Critique et clinique.

21. Cf. Kofman, Nietzsche et la métaphore, pp. 173-206 ('Généalogie, interprétation, texte'). Kofman's argument here could also be used against Pautrat who, like Granier, reads Nietzsche's appeal to the 'Grundtext' in JGB 230 as (however 'strategically') metaphysical (pp. 272-75).


23. Cf. Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p. 45: 'Qu'est-ce que le corps? Nous ne le définissons pas en disant qu'il est un champ de forces, un milieu nourricier que se dispute une pluralité de forces. Car, en fait, il n'y a pas de "milieu", pas de champ de forces ou de bataille. Il n'y a pas de quantité de réalité, toute réalité est déjà quantité de force.' Cf. also Paul Patton, 'Nietzsche and the body of the philosopher', in Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and Robyn Ferrell (London: Allen and Unwin, 1991), pp. 43-54, especially pp. 44-49 (a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of 'Bodies and Powers').

24. For the genealogy of the body in Nietzsche, cf. especially Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire', in Hommage à Jean Hyppolite


The textuality of the body has received a great deal of attention in French Nietzsche criticism: apart from the arguments of Deleuze, Foucault and Kofman already cited, cf. also Rey, pp. 152-71 ('Le corps et le texte'); Blondel, Nietzsche, le corps et la culture, pp. 275-319 ('Le corps et les métaphores'); and Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, 2nd edn (Paris: Mercure de France, 1975), pp. 37-87 ('Les états valétudinaires à l'origine d'une sémiotique pulsionnelle') and 357-67 ('Note additionnelle sur la sémiotique de Nietzsche').


27. The fantastic implications of this passage are explored in greater detail by Leo Bersani (p. 79f.) and Gérard Cogez (Marcel Proust: À la recherche du temps perdu (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France ('études littéraires', 24), 1990), pp. 116-22).


29. Shattuck (Proust, pp. 143-45) draws a strong parallel between Proust's affective memory and Bergson's 'souvenir spontané' (cf. Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit, 36th edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France ('Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine'), 1941), pp. 83-96 ('Les deux formes de la mémoire')); de Lattre counters by arguing that the body plays a much greater role in Proust's conception of involuntary memory than in Bergson: 'C'est donc indirectement que le corps, chez Bergson, est l'instrument de la restitution du souvenir, tandis que c'est directement, chez Proust, qu'il en garantit le rappel, puisqu'il en est le seul dépositaire' (I, 148; cf. II, 239f.).


32. Ibid., p. 67.

33. 'La quête de l'identité, de l'ipséïté, en un mot, la Recherche, malgré les tentations idéologiques de l'idéalisme, dont Proust n'est pas indemne, ne saurait renvoyer, au terme du parcours qu'à un Temps enraciné dans le corps [...], visible sur les squelettes qui paradent à la matinée Guermantes' (p.


38. Cf. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 76.

39. Ibid., p. 148.

40. Ibid., p. 124.

41. Cf. Henri Birault, 'La béatitude chez Nietzsche' (in Deleuze, pp. 13-28), p. 19f.: 'L'essence, on le voit, n'est donc point ici logée au cœur des choses, elle n'a rien d'eidétique ou d'ontologique; elle est au contraire le résultat d'une certaine submersion, d'une certaine schématisation, d'une certaine imposition [...]. C'est pourquoi, bien loin d'être l'en-soi ou le vrai, elle est une vue, une perspective, une position prise sur la chose à partir de quelque chose d'autre qu'elle-même'.

42. Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 56.

43. Ibid., p. 155.

44. Blanchot, 'L'expérience de Proust' (in Faux Pas), p. 57. Bataille makes this same point in a number of places: cf. On Nietzsche, tr. Bruce Boone (London: Athlone Press, 1992), p. 55; 'Marcel Proust', 4; and L'expérience intérieure, p. 163f. Cf. also Emmanuel Levinas, 'The Other in Proust', tr. Sean Hand (in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 161-65), p. 161: 'the minute analysis which we once thought so marvellous is no longer enough in our eyes, while the "explanations" often added by Proust to his analyses are no longer always so convincing'.

45. Bogue, p. 44. Cf. also Louis Bolle's Nietzschean interpretation of the 'Bal de têtes': 'Il ne s'agit pas de juxtaposition, de surimpression, de vision stéréoscopique, mais d'une ré-affirmation. Répétition (ou retrouvaille) qui mesure une durée (vingt ans), et qui, surtout, énonce le thème de l'éternel retour. Le message de la musique de Vinteuil, de l'Ange d'or du campanile, des oiseaux de Saint-Marc: que tout doit revenir, se réalise enfin, le cercle se ferme' (p. 154).

46. Doubrovsky, La Place de la madeleine, p. 107.


50. Cf. Bataille, *L'expérience intérieure*, p. 15: 'je songe moins à l'expérience confessionnelle, à laquelle on a dû se tenir jusqu'ici, qu'à une expérience nue, libre d'attaches, même d'origine, à quelque confession que ce soit. C'est pourquoi je n'aime pas le mot mystique.' Bataille himself later writes of Nietzsche's experiencing the eternal return 'sous une forme à proprement parler mystique, en confusion avec des représentations discursives' (p. 40), although it is clear that by this stage he has widened his definition of the term well beyond the initial distinction. In this sense both Nietzsche and Proust betray the purity of the inner experience by delivering it over to 'la manie discursive de connaître' (p. 162). Cf. also Bataille's response to Sartre's designation of him as 'Un nouveau mystique', 'Reply to Jean-Paul Sartre (Defense of Inner Experience)' (in *On Nietzsche*, pp. 179-87).


52. On the importance of 'Rausch' to an appreciation of Nietzsche's 'Physiologie der Kunst' in general, cf. Heidegger, I, 109-26 ('Der Rausch als ästhetischer Zustand') and 135-45 ('Der Rausch als formschaffende Kraft').


57. Cf. Birault, p. 15: 'Nietzsche perçoit l'abîme qui sépare le vrai bonheur (Glück) de la béatitude (Seligkeit). Le vrai bonheur (non pas le bonheur du dernier homme - forme abâtardie de la béatitude) relève de la chance, du hasard, de l'accident, de l'événement, de la fortune, du fortuit'.


59. 'Alles, was tief ist, liebt die Maske', Nietzsche writes in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (JGB 40), but here he is more like the Wanderer from later in the same book, crying "Eine Maske mehr! Eine zweite Maske" (JGB 278). Nietzsche's thought comes to him 'wie ein Blitz', and as Zarathustra points out: 'dieser Blitz aber heißt übermensch' (Z, 'Vorrede', 4).

60. Cf. Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie*, pp. 29-31 ('Le coup de dés').

61. Ibid., p. 30, echoed by Birault (p. 31f.) when he responds to de Gandillac in the discussion following his paper.


63. Cf. Klossowski, pp. 89-112 ('L'expérience de l'éternel retour').

64. Cf. Girard, 'Introduction' (in Girard, pp. 1-12): 'This consequence of "God's death" ["that humanity must assume the attributes of divinity"], seen clearly only by Nietzsche and Dostoevski before Proust's time is perhaps obscurely at work among those characters in the novel who are constantly seeking mystical union with a pseudo-divinity and must therefore be, at least subconsciously, committed to self-divinization' (p. 5).

65. Bolle establishes a particularly strong parallel with Nietzsche here, by unacknowledgedly drawing on Deleuze's analysis of the Nietzschean 'coup de dés': 'Comment l'épiphanie proustienne, laquelle ne se produit jamais à volonté et demeure soumise à caprices du hasard, peut-elle, de ce hasard,
tirer le double-six? [...] Le dernier Nietzsche [...] voit son salut dans une réduplication, une réaffirmation de l'affirmation: Dionysos est un miroir dans son miroir. À l'âne (le chercheur) chargé de mémoires et de reliques et à son ia-ia, il oppose le créateur qui dit oui deux fois. Pour Marcel Proust, l'œuvre se bâtissant, grandissant, ouvrant autour d'elle un réseau de routes de plus en plus riche, s'affirme aussi comme une grande Mémoire, anamnèse salvatrice, miroir dans le miroir qui redouble et répète' (p. 32).


68. Cf. Proust's celebrated aside in his essay 'A propos du style de Flaubert': 'la metaphore seule peut donner une sorte d'éternité au style' (CSB 586). What Genette calls Proust's 'ivresse de l'itération' ('Discours du récit', p. 153) also lends itself to comparison with the eternal return, as Genevieve Lloyd demonstrates (p. 146).

69. Nehamas, p. 188.

70. Cf. Deleuze, 'Mystère d'Ariane selon Nietzsche', p. 134: 'L'éternel retour est actif et affirmatif; il est l'union de Dionysos et d'Ariane. C'est pourquoi Nietzsche le compare, non seulement à l'oreille circulaire, mais à l'anneau nuptial.'


72. As Wood astutely points out (p. 28), writing intrudes even on the 'Augenblick' which Nietzsche thematises in Z, III, 'Vom Gesicht und Rätsel': 'Der Name des Torwegs steht oben geschrieben: "Augenblick"'.


76. Cf. n. 18, above, and Kofman, *Explosion I*, pp. 22-25; *Explosion II*, pp. 158-74 ('Accessoires').

77. Cf. Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives*, p. 89, and also his effective counter to Nehamas's reading of *Ecce Homo*: 'Nehamas's claim should be revised by representing Nietzsche not as a self-created character but as a text' (p. 161).


82. Magnus, Stewart and Mileur, p. 137.


87. Rorty, p. 79.

88. Ibid., p. xi.

Chapter 4. Logics of the Future Perfect


2. As Georges Poulet shows, the episodes where Proust does use the phrase 'présence réelle' (CS, I, 13; CG, II, 432) are fraught with absences (cf. L'espace proustien, p. 63f.).

3. Poulet indeed stresses that this futurity is reborn in the moment of involuntary memory itself (cf. 'Marcel Proust', in études sur le temps humain IV. Mesure de l'instant (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 299-335). He emphasises the 'orientation prospective' of the narrator's childhood hopes and dreams (p. 305), so that when it comes to the involuntary memories: 'Le temps perdu et retrouvé n'est donc pas seulement le passé, mais comme dit Proust, la capacité longtemps perdue d'avoir foi en un futur' (p. 326).

4. In MA, II, 'Vorrede', 1, Nietzsche writes: 'Meine Schriften reden nur von meinen Überwindungen [...]. Insofern sind alle meine Schriften, mit einer einzigen, allerdings wesentlichen Ausnahme, zurück zu datieren - sie reden immer von einem "Hinter-mir"'. The exception can only be Zarathustra, precisely because it is the work which depicts Nietzsche-Zarathustra's odyssey as he works his way up to his present level and becomes his destiny.
5. Cf. the various lists of (always thirteen) projected titles which he drew up over the period 1873-76 (KSA 7, 699-700, 744f., 755; KSA 8, 9-10, 289).


11. Cf. Ansell-Pearson, 'Toward the comedy of existence: On Nietzsche's new justice' (in Ansell-Pearson and Caygill, pp. 265-81), especially the section 'Living beyond (über)'' (pp. 272-77), in which Nietzsche's injunction to 'grow accustomed to "living beyond (über)"' (p. 273) is assimilated to Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller's definition of 'postmodernity'. I shall return to the question of the postmodern (in Lyotard's sense) at the end of this chapter.

12. For the 'monstrousness' of the future, cf. Derrida's 'Exergue' to De la grammaïologie (Paris: Minuit ('Critique'), 1967), pp. 11-14: 'L'avenir ne peut s'anticiper que dans la forme du danger absolu. Il est ce qui rompt absolument avec la normalité constituée et ne peut donc s'annoncer, se présenter, que sous l'espèce de la monstruosité. Pour ce monde à venir et pour ce qui en lui aura fait trembler les valeurs de signe, de parole et d'écriture, pour ce qui conduit ici notre futur antérieur, il n'est pas encore d'exergue' (p. 14).

13. Here I am in agreement with Rorty, who argues that 'what [Nietzsche] itches for is a historical sublime, a future which has broken all relations with the past, and therefore can be linked to the philosopher's redescriptions of the past only by negation' (p. 105f.).

14. Cf. e.g. GT, 'Versuch einer Selbstkritik', 1; UB, II, 7; MA, II, 'Vorrede', 3; JGB 215, 224 ('Wir modernen Menschen, wir Halbbarbaren'), 247; FW 372, 375; GN, II, 6, 19, 24; GD, IX, 37.

15. Also sprach Zarathustra was to have concluded with Zarathustra's death in any case, after a repeat cycle of 'Untergang' and preaching (cf. KSA 11, 341, 541).
16. Uncannily presaging the date of his own 'going-under', Nietzsche has no doubts that his own personal 'übermorgen' will dawn after the turn of the new century (JGB 214, FW 371), which parallels and portends the turn of the new, 'Zarathustran' millennium.

17. Cf. Ansell-Pearson, 'Toward the übermensch', 124. Carl Pletsch compares *Ecce Homo* with Kierkegaard's *The Point of View for my Work as an Author* on account of 'their peculiar and even obsessive concern with the reader' ('The Self-Sufficient Text in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard' (Yale French Studies, 66 ('The Anxiety of Anticipation'), 1984, 160-88), 164), but although he argues that the auto-interpretative 'self-sufficiency' of *Ecce Homo* is a narcissistic fantasy (187ff.), he ignores the possibility that Nietzsche might have another (future) 'ideal reader' in mind.

18. Cf. also EH, III, 1, where Nietzsche describes 'die Originalität meiner Erfahrung'. He comes closest in these passages to Rorty's Wittgensteinian characterisation of a poet: 'His new vocabulary makes possible, for the first time, a formulation of its own purpose. It is a tool for doing something which could not have been envisaged prior to the development of a particular set of descriptions, those which it itself helps to provide' (p. 13).


25. Ibid., p. 310.

26. Ibid., p. 312.


31. Later, the narrator catches himself trying to carry out the same deception on himself: 'Si donc on prouve sa préférence par l'action qu'on accomplit plus que par l'idée qu'on forme, j'aurais aimé Albertine' (P, III, 658). Again, though, he is not taken in - even by himself - and refuses to derive illusory causes from observed effects.


34. As Ricoeur notes (p. 282), the narrator's descriptions of the 'livre intérieur de signes inconnus' are permeated by this 'problématique de la trace': 'De quelque idée laissée en nous par la vie qu'il s'agisse, sa figure matérielle, trace de l'impression qu'elle nous a faite, est encore le gage de sa vérité nécessaire. [...] Le livre aux caractères figurés, non tracés par nous, est notre seul livre. [...] Seule l'impression, si chétive qu'en semble la matière, si insaisissable la trace, est un critérium de la vérité' (TR, IV, 458).

35. Derrida, 'La différence', p. 10. I am in full agreement with Wood (p. 31f.), who argues for a Nietzschean 'deconstruction of time' by applying the temporality of 'différence' to Nietzsche's 'Augenblick' - in a similar manner to Derrida's own analysis of the term in Husserl (cf. *La voix et le phénomène: Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France ('Quadrige', 156), 1993), pp. 67-77 ('Le signe et le clin d'œil')). The most exhaustive account of Nietzsche's deconstruction of the sign remains Rey's *L'enjeu des signes*.


37. Cf. Ellison's penetrating analysis of this passage as demonstrating 'the prefigurative pattern of Proustian "love" as such' (pp. 112-32).


39. Cf. Shattuck, *Proust*, p. 67: 'At the crucial moment, he literally loses his senses. She vanishes. Consciousness cannot track experience to its lair. It must wait outside while another being, blind but active, performs a deed that the consciousness then reconstructs *ex post facto* from flimsy evidence.'

40. 'Discours du récit', p. 110. Jankélévitch uses the term in *L'irréversible et la nostalgie* (Paris: Flammarion, 1974), where in Chapter 1, §7 (pp. 36-41) he deals with 'L'irréversibilité de l'instant: primultimité'. It is also alluded to by Tadié (*Proust et le roman*, p. 294).

41. Cf. Sanford S. Ames, 'The Ruse of a Condemned Man: First Writing in *À la Recherche*' (in Caws and Nicole, pp. 47-53): 'The unsettling "first time", when the strangeness of the new, the unread, catches the unprepared attention, is a beginning that paradoxically can only be claimed in a second "take", a rereading' (p. 53).

6.

43. I would disagree here with Splitter (p. 5), who interprets this passage as indicating that 'he substitutes pleasurable anticipation for anxiety'.

44. Deleuze, *Proust et les signes*, p. 106.

45. Cf. ibid., p. 89.

46. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

47. Ibid., p. 28.

48. Cf. the equivalent structure at AD, IV, 221: 'l'oublieux ne s'attriste pas de son manque de mémoire, précisément parce qu'il a oublié'.


50. This whole procedure, and the effort of imagination which it represents, is mirrored by those products of twentieth-century scientists' imaginations, the hypothetical 'tachyon' particles, which, although they cannot be accelerated through the speed of light (in accordance with Einstein), have been posited as never decelerating below the speed of light in order to account for the reversed time causality of quantum physics. Cf. Paul Davies, *God and the New Physics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 39.


52. Cogez, p. 60.

53. It is for this reason that I would disagree with those who compare the recursive structure of *A la recherche* to Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* (cf. Moss, p. 121f.; Macksey, p. 115).

54. The evocation of the Bois de Boulogne 'aujourd'hui' at the end of *Du côté de chez Swann* (CS, I, 414-20) is the closest this movement comes (cf. Genette, 'Discours du récit', p. 107). Marcel Muller (p. 50) agrees that 'si le Héros rejoint le Narrateur, c'est à la façon d'une asymptote: la distance qui les sépare tend vers zéro; elle ne s'annulera jamais'; Genette takes an altogether less problematic line and places the emphasis simply on the hiatus rather than the movement: 'il y a simplement arrêt du récit' ('Discours du récit', p. 237).


57. The narrator raises the question of the paradoxical nature of conventional prefaces in relation to Michelet (P, III, 666), but it is Derrida in our time who has undoubtedly explored the paradox to greatest effect, especially in 'Hors Livre', where he highlights the problem from the outset: 'Ceci (donc)
n'aura pas été un livre' (p. 9). Derrida's tactic of using the future perfect in this context is extremely widespread: cf., for example, the 'Exergue' to De la grammaalogie (cited above); 'Quel Quelle: Les sources de Valéry' (in Marges de la philosophie, pp. 325-63), p. 327; Glas, 2 vols (Paris: Denoël/ Gonthier ('Bibliothèque Méditations', 203-04), 1981), 1, 1; and Eperons, p. 27.

58. Cf. Genette, 'Discours du récit', pp. 105-15; Poulet, L'espace proustien, p. 159; and Ricoeur, p. 256f. Pautrat argues that the 'quelques points incertains et inaperçus' in Nietzsche's text have a similar (after-)effect: 'C'est autour d'eux que se construit le texte à venir, autour de leur mise au jour qui occupe une certaine histoire; alors, et alors seulement, dans l'après-coup, ils pourront apparaître comme des "germes" déjà souterrainement au travail, porteurs d'un sens où s'autorise une seconde lecture, retardée et comme en réserve, comme des "anticipations"' (p. 45).


Two resistant accounts of Proust's relation to the postmodern are given by Descombes (p. 153f.) and Compagnon (Les cinq paradoxes de la modernité (Paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 160-64). I am more in agreement with Brian McHale's argument in his Postmodernist Fiction (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), that A la recherche is a transitional text which makes the 'crossover from modernist to postmodernist writing' (p. 18), in his terms the shift from an epistemological to an ontological 'dominant' (p. 9f.) which, retrospectively, can be seen to have been reflected in my own shift between chapters 2 and 3.

The question of Nietzsche's relation to the postmodern has received a good deal more attention in recent criticism: apart from the essays in Koelb, cf. also Daniel Charles, 'Nietzsche et la post-modernité', in Nouvelles lectures de Nietzsche, ed. Dominique Janicaud (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme ('Cahiers L'Age d'Homme', 1), 1985), pp. 138-59; Wilfried van der Will, 'Nietzsche and Postmodernism' (in Ansell-Pearson and Caygill, pp. 43-54); and Ansell-Pearson, 'Toward the übermensch', 126: 'I would go so far as to claim that the key to understanding the "post-modern" Nietzsche lies in grasping the significance of the "über" in the notion of the übermensch' (which I have attempted to do in this chapter).

60. Lyotard, 'Réponse à la question: Qu'est-ce que le postmoderne?', p. 31. For a discussion of the link between the future perfect and postmodernity in Lyotard and Derrida, cf. Andrew J. McKenna, 'Postmodernism: It's Future Perfect', in Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy, ed. Hugh J. Silverman and Donn Welton (Albany: State University of New York Press ('Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy', 13), 1988), pp. 228-42. McKenna advances many of the same arguments (and adduces many of the same quotations) in his essay 'Proust's Apocalypse Now' (in Caws and Nicole, pp. 297-312), which concludes by arguing 'now contra Derrida's 'il n'est plus temps de dire la vérité sur l'apocalypse' that the future perfect is also the temporality of the Proustian 'last Judgement'. Such an argument would bring A la recherche even closer to Nietzsche's explosive 'fin de l'homme', although I am not persuaded that in Proust's case such an apocalyptic tone is warranted.

61. Cf. TR, IV, 569 (with apologies to Mme de Guermantes).
Conclusion

1. 'Table ronde' [Roland Barthes], p. 88.

2. Sarocchi, p. 80n. 79.


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