




RESEARCH ARTICLE

# Many of Us Are Not Like the Others: Country of Origin and Latino Voting Behavior in the United States\*

Francesco Bromo<sup>1</sup>, Lindsey P. González<sup>2</sup>, Manuela Muñoz<sup>3</sup> and  
Kristy M. Pathakis<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>University of Oxford, UK, <sup>2</sup>Texas A&M University, USA and <sup>3</sup>Texas Tech University, USA

**Corresponding author:** Francesco Bromo; Email: [francesco.bromo@bsg.ox.ac.uk](mailto:francesco.bromo@bsg.ox.ac.uk)

(Received 30 January 2025; revised 13 August 2025; accepted 18 August 2025)

## Abstract

In the United States, Latinos are often treated as a monolithic voting bloc, but this approach overlooks significant variation in political behavior across sub-groups from different countries of origin. This paper explores the role of country of origin (CoO) in shaping the partisanship and electoral choices of U.S. Latinos, arguing that national origin influences party identification and voting behavior. Using data from the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), spanning elections from 2008 to 2020, we examine how Latino voters from different countries differ in their partisanship and support for Republican and Democratic candidates. Our findings reveal substantial variation in vote choice and partisan identification based on CoO. We employ genetic matching to control for key covariates, revealing that aggregate country-of-origin differences show up repeatedly in elections over time. These results suggest that aggregating Latinos into a single voting bloc obscures meaningful political diversity and that a country-of-origin approach offers valuable insights into Latino electoral behavior.

**Keywords:** Latino politics; Partisanship; vote choice; country of origin

## Introduction

Latinos across the United States are often lumped together as one solitary group, sometimes referred to as a “Sleeping Giant,” overlooking the fact that the ethnic category consists of sub-groups from different countries with different political, social, and cultural contexts. Many Latino voters have emigrated (or have relatives and friends who emigrated) from regimes of socialist autocrats like Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Fidel Castro (Cuba), and Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua) or have

---

\*An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the 81st Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 4-7, 2024, Chicago, IL.

**Table 1.** Review of literature on electoral behavior of U.S. Latinos

	Articles on Partisanship	Articles on Turnout	Articles on Vote Choice	Incl. CoO as Predictor	% Incl. CoO (Total)
2001–2007	2	10	3	6	<b>40.0</b>
2008–2016	1	11	4	2	<b>12.5</b>
2017–2023	7	3	6	10	<b>62.5</b>
Total	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>38.3</b>

*Note:* The first three columns tabulate the total number of articles where the main outcome is partisanship, turnout, or vote choice in that period. The fourth column tabulates the total number of articles that include country of origin (CoO) as a predictor. The last column represents the share of articles that include country of origin (CoO) as a predictor in each period. We included top general-interest journals: the *American Political Science Review* (APSR), the *American Journal of Political Science* (AJPS), and *The Journal of Politics* (JOP), and five subfield journals: *Political Behavior* (PB), *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* (JREP), *Political Research Quarterly* (PRQ), and *Public Opinion Quarterly* (POQ).

experienced the massive migrations of Venezuelans, Cubans, and others to their countries as a consequence of unprecedented political and economic crises. Thus, while aggregating makes sense in a limited data environment, we are learning a lot about when that is and is not an appropriate approach. For example, in the 2022 midterm elections, only 60% of Hispanic voters cast their ballots for the Democratic candidate (Pew Research Center 2023), and in 2024, that proportion dropped to 56% (PBS News 2024), indicating that there is plenty of variation among Latinos to explore and explain. Consequently, while it is true that Latinos as a group vote majority Democratic, that margin is shrinking, and by aggregating all Latinos, we miss variation in their approaches to political participation and engagement.

We argue that aggregating Latinos and treating them as a unified voting bloc, while at times useful, misses important variation in what motivates their engagement and directs participation in politics. Specifically, we contend that the country of origin (CoO) is the producer of other identity cleavages, such as political ideology and religion, that shape political behavior, and, therefore, is an important but underappreciated predictor of Latinos’ electoral behavior. Not only are there institutional differences, but also cultural, social, and other difficult-to-measure factors common to those from the same country, but not to others from different countries. Table 1 shows the trends in the study of political behavior of U.S. Latinos over the last two decades (2000–2023). Although we observe growth in the absolute and relative number of articles including CoO as a predictor (or control) in the discipline’s flagship journals, overall, less than 40% (18) of articles have modeled country (CoO) as a factor influencing Latinos’ partisan identification, turnout, and/or vote choice.

Not only are Latinos the fastest-growing ethnic group in the United States (projected to reach over 100 million by 2050 and already the largest ethnic group in California, New Mexico, and Texas), but their countries of origin are also shifting rapidly. The fastest-growing groups come from Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras. While Mexicans are still the largest group overall, their growth rate was about 13% from 2010 to 2019, compared to growth rates of 126%, 49%, and 47% for the three countries named above over the same time period, respectively (Pew Research Center 2022). Despite sharing a common language and a number

of cultural, social, and economic factors rooted in colonization by the Spanish and the Portuguese, and the influence of the Catholic Church, countries in Latin America differ from one another in a number of respects. Therefore, how these immigrants behave politically once in the United States is likely to also be different. Multiple and simultaneous mechanisms can influence the political attitudes and behaviors of Latino immigrants and their descendants. First, political socialization in the CoO of Latinos and their ancestry can have a lasting imprint on individuals' orientations toward authority, institutions, and civic participation. Second, while country-of-origin influences persist, Latino political attitudes and behaviors can also be shaped by their differential exposure to host-country environments, particularly the local contexts in which they settle in the United States. Lastly, the reasons and characteristics that lead individuals to migrate can influence not only their social incorporation but also their political behavior.

We use data from the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), spanning elections from 2008 to 2020, with large samples of Latinos in the United States. Unprecedented in its focus on underrepresented groups, this dataset allows us to take a novel empirical approach to expose variation in political behavior. We employ genetic matching to control for key covariates that are directly related to electoral choices and partisanship. Our results suggest that not only do U.S. Latinos of different origins exhibit variation in political decisions and partisan identification across different groups, but also exhibit variation over time. For example, respondents with family or ancestry from the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) are more likely than any other group or CoO, except Cuba, to support a Republican candidate in the Presidential race, with stronger effects after 2016.

As we outline below, the variation in vote choice and partisan identification is at times lost to theoretical and methodological focus on pan-ethnicity. In fairness, this is likely a problem of data limitations rather than of the researchers. It is certainly not lost on us that we argue that countries matter, yet we group some countries together. This is because of the small sample sizes for many countries. Indeed, as we discuss in *Data and Research Design* Section, the dataset we use for our analyses is an important contribution to this line of research. The paper proceeds as follows. In *Partisanship, Voting Behavior, and Aggregation* section, we review current knowledge about Latino partisanship and voting behavior. In *The Case for Disaggregation: The Dynamic Latino Voter* Section, we propose a theory of country-of-origin socialization meant to augment the current understanding of the electoral behavior of U.S. Latinos. In *Data and Research Design* Section, we discuss the data and research design. In *Results, Discussion and Conclusion* Sections, we present our results and discuss some implications.

## Partisanship, Voting Behavior, and Aggregation

### *The Partisanship of U.S. Latinos*

The aggregation of Latino sub-groups into a single identity category has produced rich insights into racial and ethnic politics, including key differences in partisanship and vote choice between Latinos and other racial groups. At the same time, methods of disaggregation promoted in the past (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003; Hero 1992) have seen less theoretical innovation over time. While this approach has been

applied to the study of Latino politics, its scope remains limited due to small sample sizes. As such, most research highlights the behavior of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban populations in the United States. More recent studies that look to interpret recent voting patterns utilize the aggregate approach 2 (Geiger and Reny 2024; Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez 2023), although the observed changes in the Latino vote also prompt research into divides in identity and policy issues, outside of the CoO, that could drive this phenomenon (Corral and Leal 2024).

At an aggregate level, the partisanship of Latinos was previously thought to be much less stable than that of White Americans (Hajnal and Lee 2011), yet recent work by Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez (2023) finds that their partisanship has shown relative stability, at least during the early years of Donald Trump's presidency, which should be a difficult test of partisan stability, given the anti-immigrant and anti-Latino rhetoric employed by Trump since 2016. In terms of vote choice, Latinos have typically voted Democratic. However, recent elections call this pattern into question. Hopkins, Kaiser and Pérez (2023) find that, although working in opposite directions, education and income predict shifts in partisanship, with higher education and lower income predicting a shift toward the Republican party for Latinos. This research reveals that the predictors of partisanship for the general population (e.g., income and education) do not drive Latinos' partisanship in the same direction as for other Americans (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003). In new work, analyzing surveys covering 1989 to 2023, Wakefield, Fraga and Fisk (2025) find that younger Latinos are increasingly identifying as independent, whereas older, US-born Latinos are shifting toward Republican identification. They do find national sub-group differences consistent with ours; however, their data limit them to sub-group analyses of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and the rest get grouped together, so they are limited in how they study national origin groups. Additionally, issue positions and identities were found to influence support for the Republican candidate in 2016 and 2020. Corral and Leal (2024) show that being an immigration restrictionist, along with gender and religious divides—particularly among men and evangelical Christians—also helps explain Donald Trump's success with Latino voters. While this research elucidates predictors of partisanship, the current literature, as well as the media, still questions why a growing number of U.S. Latinos left the Democratic Party over the last decade.

Alvarez and García Bedolla (2003) suggest that inter-generational transmission of party attachment should function the same for Latinos as other identity groups in the United States, "making Latino partisanship less variable over time and across generations" (p. 45). Recognizing the importance of CoO in their study, the authors suggest that studying how the determinants of partisanship are transmitted across generations would be important in the years to come. However, recent studies of immigrant incorporation and acculturation (Hickel Jr. et al. 2020; Jiménez 2010) may lead to the assumption that the effects of historical political experiences can only explain the partisanship of the immigrants, and subsequently wash away after multiple generations. Given the capacity that researchers now have to answer these questions using resources like the CMPS and other specialized samples of Latinos, we can more accurately assess whether country-of-origin-based disaggregation is a research approach worthy of heavier theoretical investment. As we discuss below, the internal composition of the Latino population in the United States is rapidly

changing. Different countries of origin are now contributing more to the population than traditional sources, and research is beginning to recognize the implications of these demographic changes (Ocampo and Ocampo 2020). How much is this shift responsible for some of the puzzling patterns we observe when analyzing on an aggregate level?

### ***The Role of Pan-Ethnicity in Latino Political Behavior***

In making the case for disaggregation by CoO, we do not overlook or dismiss the role of pan-ethnic attachment, which rivals the relevance of national origin identities for many Latinos in the United States. Early studies in political science defined the significance of Latino pan-ethnicity, highlighting that Latino identity is seen as more than just “instrumental,” or solely to build political clout (Calderón 1992; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Pan-ethnic identity represents a significant primary or secondary identity among Latinos, related to political and cultural similarities between country-of-origin groups. Fraga et al. (2010a) further support this point in an updated exploration of pan-ethnic attachment among Latinos.

Using National Survey of Latinos data from the early 2000s, Fraga et al. (2010a) observed an overall increase in attachment to Hispanic and Latino identifiers across time. These updates to the literature confirmed that attachment to pan-ethnic identifiers was driven not only by political goals but also by the perception of shared commonality among Latino sub-groups. The strong link between perceived cultural and political commonality and pan-ethnicity enhanced the importance of pan-ethnicity in Latino politics research. Its significance also became more evident in the political arena. In recent decades, parties have increased their investment in Latino voters in response to population growth. For example, parties are increasingly targeting Latino voters with Spanish language advertising (Mann, Michelson and Davis 2020) and in-person canvassing (Matland and Murray 2012; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016), resulting in participation gains among these voters, though potentially conditional on identity strength (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016) and propensity to vote (Matland and Murray 2012). We also know that co-pan-ethnic candidates may indeed be attractive across different Latino-origin groups (Barreto 2010; Zárate, Quezada-Llanes and Armenta 2024).

Latino identity is undoubtedly tangible and consequential in American society. American Latinos often concentrate geographically, and this has been shown to increase group attachment for those living near what Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) calls “ethnic stimuli.” Furthermore, the racialization of Latinos in the United States often disregards national distinctions. People of Latin American descent experience the consequences of racial hierarchy in relatively similar ways. The racial hostility that sparked mass immigration protests like those seen in 2006 remains capable of activating Latino group identity and influencing political behavior across Latino sub-groups (Gutierrez et al. 2019; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013).

The importance of pan-ethnicity notwithstanding, we find notable differences in voting patterns across Latino sub-groups and over time. We believe that, parallel to Fraga et al. (2010a), which demonstrates that national origin remains a significant identity for Latinos, our findings indicate that CoO persistently plays a role in voting

behavior. This evidence, along with more recent work on the acculturation and sub-group particularities of Latinos, motivates this exploration into national origin identity (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Ocampo and Ocampo 2020; Wakefield, Fraga and Fisk 2025).

### ***Disaggregation and Population Dynamics***

How assessments of disaggregation apply to an increasingly native-born population of Latinos is unclear. Based on the acculturation literature, one may argue that generational status should eliminate national origin identification and, with it, the relevance of home country experiences for partisanship and voting behavior. This would negate the argument we make here that grouping people by their national origin can reveal significant implications for Latino political behavior. While some studies find that, by the third generation, descendants of immigrants are significantly acculturated (Fraga et al. 2010b), more recent literature has deemed acculturation a slow and non-linear process among Latinos (Pedraza 2014; Pérez and Cobian 2024). There also exists a monotonic decrease in attachment to national origin descriptors by generational status (Fraga et al. 2010a). Do these patterns in attachment to identity translate to the influence of CoO? This question remains unclear as few recent studies explore how changes in the size and concentration of CoO groups influence what knowledge of individual home countries is carried over between generations, and how this impacts vote choice and partisanship.

The increased number of Latinos from all 33 Latin American countries provides a reason to investigate whether population changes sustain the political relevance of one's CoO. Ocampo and Ocampo (2020) explore the relevance of disaggregation as it pertains to Colombians, arguing that this particular sub-group is one of the "new Latinos," constituting further exploration into the capacity for the growth rate in Colombians to shape what is currently known about Latinos across several political dimensions. In their study of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, Alvarez and García Bedolla (2003) argue that Latinos are more influenced by social and political factors than economic factors, and they find that CoO is a significant predictor of party identity. They attribute this to commonalities in the political integration process, for which nationality is a proxy. Similar to these approaches, we expect the CoO to be a significant identity cleavage, made more complex and important by recent changes in Latino migration patterns.

De La Garza (2004) highlights some instances of politically relevant variation by country-of-origin group, and also affirms that survey researchers should make efforts to incorporate relevant institutional variables that differentiate Latinos' political experiences, such as exposure to civil conflict, instead of attempting to diversify Latino survey samples by national origin group. He cautions that treating national origin as an independent influence can result in "making ethnicity an unchanging attribute rather than a fluid characteristic, and conceals or distorts historical and ongoing relations between Hispanics and American political institutions" (p. 103). We agree that ethnicity is fluid, but also argue that there are factors from one's past that influence attitudes and behavior. Institutional influences are only part of the story, and another part can be meaningfully captured by a person's origin. While we do not explicitly test the specific mechanisms in the

home country, we do show that there is something to be gained by its incorporation into the larger story about Latino political behavior. Indeed, we see in the literature plenty of room for an explanation of the variation in vote choice and partisanship that goes beyond institutional factors, and we offer a discussion of what we see as promising potential mechanisms.

The arguments we propose are not of identity and political behavior alone, but of collective histories and the influence of sub-group concentrations across the United States. We agree with Alvarez and García Bedolla (2003) that nationality alone does not move important attitudinal and participatory outcomes. The unique political, social, and cultural experiences in one's home country should influence political engagement in the United States. This relationship may be sustained by frequent contact with members of their national origin group, given these changes to the composition of Latino communities across space and time (Masuoka 2008; South, Crowder and Chavez 2005).


### **The Case for Disaggregation: The Dynamic Latino Voter**

Certainly, there are many similarities among Latinos from different countries of origin. Most Latin American countries share a history of Spanish colonization, resulting in, among other things, widespread adoption of the Spanish language and the Catholic religion. Sharing a language with people from a variety of countries once in the United States certainly facilitates collective action. Similarly, immigration bonds many Latinos. Experiences with discrimination have inspired collective action efforts under a shared Latino identity (Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013). Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that the processes of information gathering, identity formation, and ideology acquisition are different for groups that do not have a history of socialization in the United States. They find that, for Whites, traditional accounts of partisanship fit rather well, whereas for racial and ethnic minorities, the pattern is not as clear. After all, these Latino Americans are not leaving their countries of origin with the same “suitcase” of political socialization, so why should their political socialization once here be the same? And not only do they come from different places, but they also settle in different places once in the United States (e.g., UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Institute 2022). For example, Mexicans tend to migrate to California and Texas, whereas South Americans land in Florida and New York.<sup>1</sup>

Immigrants from Latin America bring with them different political knowledge and experience. For example, a Mexican immigrant is familiar with regular elections and a routine, smooth transfer of power. In contrast, a Salvadoran immigrant does not have the same political experience, having lived in a more volatile political environment. Trust in politicians and parties is likely to be vastly different for these two immigrants, and may influence political decisions. Figure 1 shows support for the Republican presidential candidate for the elections of 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. What is evident is that Latinos from different countries and regions have different preferences about the presidency. Additionally, these Latino-origin groups identify as Independents at very different frequencies, as the figure demonstrates.

Theoretically, our argument is simple: the CoO has a significant effect on vote choice and partisanship and is the producer of identity cleavages that shape political





**Figure 1.** Differences among Latinos of different origin. *Note:* “Central America” includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. “Andean Countries” includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. “Southern Cone” includes Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil.

behavior. It is an important but overlooked predictor of Latinos’ electoral choices. While we do not directly test mechanisms here, we propose that socialization and cultural factors differ between countries, and although there are certainly shared factors among Latin Americans, it is not enough to explain the variation in these important political variables. A second mechanism that we propose is the influence of where immigrants live once in the United States. In the discussion below, we develop these potential mechanisms more fully and propose that these are important next steps in understanding how variation in CoO may interact to affect how Latinos approach politics. We test the following hypothesis through a genetic matching approach as a starting point for what we hope will be a rich exploration into the dynamics of Latinos’ political engagement.

**Hypothesis 1:** *Party identification and vote choice among U.S. Latinos vary based on their CoO.*

**Potential Mechanisms**

While we are somewhat limited in our ability to test a direct causal path from CoO to political behavior, here we discuss and propose tests for what we believe are three potential mechanisms that we hope will be more completely explored in future work. Three pathways that we think are worth investigation include (1) how political socialization in the home country influences behavior once in the United States, (2) how it interacts with where they land and their political socialization in



the U.S, as well as (3) structural and individual reasons for moving to the United States.

### *Home Country Socialization*

Immigrants' political orientations are often rooted in formative formal and informal political experiences in their countries of origin, shaping how they interpret and engage with politics in the host country. The concept of political socialization—where early exposure to political regimes, norms, and civic life molds enduring political attitudes—suggests that pre-migration experiences can leave an indelible mark on individuals' democratic expectations, political trust, and political attitudes (Almond and Verba 1963; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 2014). For instance, immigrants from countries with authoritarian or clientelist political systems may carry with them skepticism toward political institutions or exhibit lower political efficacy and engagement in politics (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Wals and Rudolph 2019). Older Cuban Americans who lived under the Castro regime are significantly more likely to exhibit strong anti-authoritarian attitudes, which in turn structure their partisan preferences in the United States (Alvarez and García Bedolla 2003). Incumbent government ideology (Irizarry 2024) and previous partisan attachments (Wals 2011) in the home countries can shape party identification among Latino immigrants in the United States. Thus, as the fast-growing demographics of Latinos are heavily populated by immigrants who are born outside the United States, or whose parents or grandparents were, home country socialization provides a critical lens through which Latino immigrants interpret and respond to the U.S. political system.

### *Host Country Socialization*

The way that the “suitcase” from the home country gets unpacked once in the United States will undoubtedly follow a different trajectory depending not only on the immigrant's origin, but also on where the immigrant lands. A Mexican immigrating to San Diego, California, is likely to have a very different experience than a Mexican who lands in Lexington, Kentucky. Likewise, a Panamanian settling in San Diego is likely to experience political incorporation differently than a Mexican immigrant moving to San Diego. The “context of reception” framework highlights how local institutional structures, inter-group relations, and policy climates condition social and political incorporation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Existing research emphasizes the role of spatial and institutional heterogeneity across U.S. localities in influencing Latinos' civic engagement and partisanship. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) find that naturalization rates vary significantly by state-level integration policies and community demographics, and that living in areas with Spanish-language ballots does not increase the likelihood of voting among first-generation Latinos. Partisan context at the county-level also influences political behavior, particularly for Latinos not born in the United States or first-generation (Fernandez and Dempsey 2017). Neighborhood characteristics and geographic proximity to co-ethnics also matter. Rocha et al. (2011) show that Latinos living in areas with higher co-ethnic concentrations and pro-immigrant policies are more likely to participate in politics, as these

environments foster civic networks and reduce perceived barriers to participation. Overall, US-based socialization is not uniform but is mediated by place-based exposures to institutions, racialization, and opportunity structures that vary across destinations.

### *Who Moves and Why?*

A third mechanism shaping the political attitudes of Latino immigrants involves the selection processes underlying migration itself. Migrants are not a random sample of the populations from which they originate; rather, they are often positively selected on characteristics such as education, political interest, or risk tolerance—traits that have implications for political behavior in the host country (Auer and Schaub 2024). For instance, Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet (1989) find that Latino immigrants who were politically engaged prior to migration are significantly more likely to participate in U.S. politics, indicating that pre-migration civic capital contributes to post-migration engagement. Beyond individual traits, the structural reasons for migration—whether economic opportunity, political asylum, or family reunification—also correlate with political attitudes. Cuban Americans, for instance, have historically exhibited higher rates of political participation and Republican partisanship, largely influenced by their anti-communist political socialization and favorable status as Cold War-era political refugees (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Salvadorans offer yet another trajectory: many fled civil war and state violence during the 1980s, leading to strong anti-authoritarian orientations among first-generation immigrants, but they often lack the institutional and legal supports (e.g., refugee status, early pathways to citizenship) that aided Cuban political incorporation (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Taken together, the motivations and characteristics that lead individuals to migrate—or are selected by migration regimes—help shape not only their social incorporation but also potentially their political trajectory in the host country.

### **Data and Research Design**

We evaluate whether the CoO of U.S. Latinos predicts significant differences with respect to electoral behavior. We use individual-level data from the CMPS, covering election years from 2008 to 2020. While this is not a panel survey, which limits some of the conclusions we can draw, it does give us a combined sample of almost 9000 Latino respondents (see Table 2). The CMPS gathers information from a nationally representative sample and includes a survey design that enables generalizability to the population (Barreto et al. 2018). The 2008 survey interviewed registered voters by telephone (landline or mobile), and the 2012 sample was obtained from probability-based web panels, recruited through phone and email contacts. In 2016 and 2020, the samples included both registered and non-registered voters, taken from a national database of registered voters and online panels, respectively. Each year, respondents were able to take the survey in English or Spanish. In addition to asking a variety of political questions, public policy perceptions, and standard socio-demographic variables, the survey asks respondents to which country in Latin America they trace their family or ancestry. We code the responses to this question

**Table 2.** CMPS sample size by region and year

	2008	2012	2016	2020	Total
Andean Countries	84	55	213	386	<b>738</b>
Central America	114	54	180	366	<b>714</b>
Cuba	71	57	160	278	<b>566</b>
Dominican Republic	42	16	107	176	<b>341</b>
Mexico	759	415	1498	2014	<b>4686</b>
Puerto Rico	162	110	491	681	<b>1444</b>
Southern Cone	24	11	53	156	<b>244</b>
Total	<b>1256</b>	<b>718</b>	<b>2702</b>	<b>4057</b>	<b>8733</b>

Note: “Central America” includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. “Andean Countries” includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. “Southern Cone” includes Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil.

as our main predictor. Our outcomes of interest are vote choice in Presidential and House elections and party identification. Below, we present further details on how we operationalized our variables and our empirical strategy.

### Country of Origin

As we have discussed, studying the Latino population as a monolith may pose disadvantages for some research questions, due to its diverse and distinctive features (Affigne 2000). The consolidation of Latinos as a single identity group is normalized across disciplines and also bolstered by the United States’ conception of the term “Hispanic,” which the Census Bureau recognizes as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Central Americans, South Americans, Cubans, and other Hispanics (Read, Lynch and West 2021).<sup>2</sup> In response to these issues, we disaggregate Latinos by CoO and, when necessary, by cultural and geographic characteristics. This ensures that smaller groups, which empirically cannot be studied on their own, are still included in this inquiry.

The relatively recent, rapid increase in the study of Latinos as consequential political actors has given rise to better surveying of this population. Five waves of Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Surveys (CMPS) have featured diverse samples of Latinos, namely respondents from countries outside of Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, and, in some years, have over-sampled this population. These innovations respond to an increased need to understand minority politics.

The CMPS affords us the ability to create several country-of-origin sub-groups for comparison. It is, again, not lost on us that we advocate studying countries, yet we combine some countries into regions. We are optimistic that future research will include surveys with enough respondents from more countries to draw adequately powered conclusions. Our final sample includes Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and three cultural-based groupings. Latinos who descend from *Central America* (Hondurans, Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, and Salvadorans)

comprise one group, the second and third groups include South Americans, who were divided into two subsets: Latinos who descend from *Andean Countries* (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), and Latinos who descend from the *Southern Cone* (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay).

These groupings are made based on the U.S. classification of countries of origin (National Research Council 2006). In the case of South America, the two subsets of countries were split up based on analogous political histories during colonial times and similar European migration patterns in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (Centeno 2002). With these seven sub-groups, we disaggregate the Latino monolith in a way that allows us to better understand the political choices of Latinos living in the United States. In Table 2, we report the CMPS sample size by region and year.<sup>3</sup>

### Covariates

The covariates in our models represent factors that research has shown to be correlated with political behavior and that are relevant to the study of Latino political behavior in particular. As explained below, we balance the sample of respondents from CMPS over 12 covariates broadly grouped into two categories, as shown in Table 3. Individual socio-demographic characteristics refer to variables correlated with political participation and partisan identification. For example, as age and education increase, and when Americans become homeowners, they are more likely to turn out to vote. Employment, gender, and income are correlated with partisanship. Recent studies show that while Latino partisans are already sorted, lower-income Latinos are more likely to remain independent and be persuaded by economic appeals (Wakefield 2025). Ideology and religion (i.e., being catholic) are also strong and important factors driving partisan preferences. Recent literature has shown an increased partisan alignment of Catholic and ideologically conservative Latinos with the Republican Party (Fraga, Velez and West 2025).

In terms of contextual factors, given the strong immigrant ties of the Latino population in the United States, extensive previous research has argued that Latinos are more prone to support immigrant rights and pro-immigration policies, resulting in an increase in Democratic support and a decrease in Republican support among Latinos (Barreto and Collingwood 2015; Pérez and Cobian 2024). Thus, we want to be able to hold constant observable factors that expose individuals to immigrants, immigration rhetoric, and policy. These variables include whether a respondent lives in a Southern border state (Arizona, California, Florida, New Mexico, and Texas), lives in a highly Latino neighborhood, and lives in a rural area.

Some of the research we mentioned above argues that institutional features explain political differences among Latinos of different countries of origin. One key institutional feature is regime type. Between 1930 and 1990, all countries in Latin America had different democratic experiences and trajectories (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994). Some countries, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, experienced long decades of democratic years; others, such as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, were under a military dictatorship at some point between

**Table 3.** Dependent and independent variables

Variable	Description	Coding
Presidential Election	Respondent declared support for Republican candidate	0=Dem, 1=Rep
House Election	Respondent declared support for Republican candidate	0=Dem, 1=Rep
Party ID	Respondent identifies as Republican	0=Dem, 1=Rep
<i>Individual Socio-Demographics</i>		
Age	Respondent is above the age of 40	0=No, 1=Yes
US Born	Respondent was born in the U.S.	0=No, 1=Yes
Gender	Respondent identifies as female	0=No, 1=Yes
Homeownership	Respondent is a homeowner	0=No, 1=Yes
Ideology	Respondent is conservative (self-reported)	0=No, 1=Yes
Income	Respondent earns more than \$60k/year	0=No, 1=Yes
Education	Respondent has a high school diploma	0=No, 1=Yes
Employment	Respondent is employed	0=No, 1=Yes
Catholic	Respondent identifies as catholic	0=No, 1=Yes
<i>Contextual Factors</i>		
Border State	Respondent lives in a border state*	0=No, 1=Yes
Gray Latino Neighborhood	Respondent lives in a mostly Hispanic neighborhood**	0=No, 1=Yes
Rural	Respondent lives in a rural area/small town	0=No, 1=Yes

\*AZ, CA, FL, NM, TX.

\*\*Self-reported (2008, 2012) / share of Latino residents equal to or above state average (2016, 2020).

the late 1960s and early 1990s. Others, like Mexico, had extended constitutional stability and operated under a one-party authoritarian regime.

While we acknowledge the importance of this variable, we do not include it. The most important reason for this omission is that (with notable exceptions like Venezuela) regime type does not vary much, if at all, in the countries we study *in the years the surveys cover*. Appendix D in the Supplementary Materials offers data from the Polity5 Project, V-Dem, and Freedom House, demonstrating that these scores change very little, if at all.

Overall, these factors need to be accounted for when we conduct the matching strategy detailed below so that we can be as certain as possible that we match the important characteristics of the respondents and can attribute the differences to the CoO. Finally, a note of caution. While we believe our choice of controls, driven by theory and the existing literature, is exhaustive, we cannot peremptorily claim that we accounted for *all* possible factors that affect electoral outcomes. One limitation of our approach is that it does not capture potential unobserved confounders (see VanderWeele 2019).

### Empirical Strategy

In a researcher's ideal world, we would randomly assign CoO (Rubin 1974) to isolate its causal effects on respondents' vote choice and partisanship. In the potential outcomes framework, the causal effect of the CoO could be estimated by comparing the observed outcomes produced by a set of individuals from country Z at time  $t$  to the outcomes that would have been observed if, all else equal, the *same* set of individuals had *not* been from country Z. This is, of course, not possible. We, therefore, attempt to quantify the effect by "matching" survey respondents.

Matching is a popular statistical technique to increase precision and attenuate the bias that stems from the absence of random assignment of treatments in observational studies. Broadly speaking, the fundamental idea of matching is to retrieve the "missing" potential outcomes by imputation, i.e., using the observed outcomes of "paired" units, or by selecting subsets of units from the original data such that the treatment and the other covariates are unrelated (Abadie and Imbens 2006; Ho et al. 2007). Substantively, this amounts to comparing the differences in electoral behavior of two Latino voters who differ in terms of the respective CoO (e.g., one is Puerto Rican, the other is not) but are balanced on other attributes that might influence their behavior (e.g., both are females, college-educated, in their 30s, etc.). Setting up this kind of comparison should bring us closer to estimating the "causal" effect of U.S. Latinos' countries of origin on political decisions (Rubin 1973).

In practice, the process of achieving this balance and generating robust matching estimators is neither straightforward nor bulletproof. The more basic matching methods do not necessarily (or automatically) enhance balance and might even result in *worsened* balance and increased bias as a consequence of misspecification (see Drake 1993; Greifer and Stuart 2021). We employ the "genetic" matching procedure described by Sekhon (2011) and Diamond and Sekhon (2013) using four waves of the CMPS. The main characteristic of this approach is that it relies on an evolutionary search algorithm to check and improve covariate balance, overcoming some of the pitfalls of non-iterative propensity score matching.

Genetic matching operates by minimizing the generalized Mahalanobis distance (GMD) between the  $\mathbf{X}$  covariates for treated and control units  $i$  and  $j$ . We borrow from Diamond and Sekhon (2013: p. 934) in formalizing this as:

$$\text{GMD}(x_i, x_j, \mathbf{W}) = \sqrt{(x_i - x_j)^T (\mathbf{S}^{-\frac{1}{2}})^T \mathbf{W} \mathbf{S}^{-\frac{1}{2}} (x_i - x_j)}$$

Where  $\mathbf{W}$  is a  $k \times k$  positive-definite matrix containing a scaling factor  $w$  for each covariate,  $\mathbf{S}^{-12}$  is the Cholesky decomposition of the sample covariance matrix  $\mathbf{S}$ , and  $\mathbf{X}^T$  is the transpose of  $\mathbf{X}$ .<sup>4</sup> Through a pre-specified number of "generations" (500 in our case), the algorithm finds the scaling factors that optimize balance as measured by a given loss function. We employ the default imbalance measure in Ho et al. (2011), the smallest p-value in covariate balance tests among the covariates.  $\mathbf{W}$  is then used to perform nearest-neighbor matching (with replacement) with the inclusion of a propensity score estimated via logistic regression as a covariate, following Diamond and Sekhon's (2013) recommendations.

Although relatively more computationally expensive, an important advantage of genetic matching is the quality of the balance it achieves. In the Supplementary


Materials (Figures A1-A7, Appendix A), we plot two covariate balance metrics contrasting the matched and unmatched samples for each country/region (absolute standardized mean differences and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics). In nearly all cases, the algorithm produces a balanced matched sample. This makes us more confident that the effect of the CoO we compute on the basis of the matched samples is net of the matching covariates. In the next section, we present our results.

## Results

We report the marginal effect of U.S. Latinos' CoO, computed as the change in probability of supporting a Republican candidate in Presidential and House elections or identifying as a Republican by election year. Third-party voters and independents are excluded from the analysis. Each group is matched on education, ideology, gender, age, income, living in a rural area or small town (as opposed to urban areas and larger cities), homeownership status, employment status, living in a Southern border state, living in a mostly Hispanic neighborhood, being born in the United States, identifying as catholic, and propensity score. We then run linear probability models with the matched data for each dependent variable and compute the change in predicted probability of voting for a Republican for President, House, or identifying as a Republican for those from a given country or group compared to those not from that country or group by election year. Summary statistics for the full dataset are available in Table B1 in the Supplementary Materials (Appendix B). Figure 2 displays the marginal effects, along with 90% confidence intervals, by the outcome and election year. The dashed red line indicates the 0% mark. Dots above the red line indicate a positive difference in the predicted probability of supporting the Republican Party or identifying as a Republican between the treatment and control group (e.g., a treatment group of Dominicans matched to a control group of non-Dominicans who are balanced in terms of all the other covariates). Conversely, dots below the red line indicate a negative difference in probability. The marginal effects with standard errors are available in Table C1 in the Supplementary Materials. We note that the sample size of groups of U.S. Latinos whose CoO is not sampled as widely (e.g., Southern Cone) might pose some power limitations (see Table 2). In what follows, we discuss country-specific trends and make some general observations.

For the Andean Countries, we find a consistently positive effect of CoO on the political decisions of Latino voters. With respect to the probability of supporting a Republican Presidential candidate in the 2008 election, the difference between a group of respondents from the Andean Countries and a matched group of U.S. Latinos from other Latin American countries/regions is eight percentage points, increasing to a 10- and 9-percentage-point difference in the 2016 and 2020 elections, respectively. This means that, between 2008 and 2020, respondents whose CoO is located in the Andean regions were, on average, 8.5 percentage points more likely to support a Republican candidate in the Presidential race than other Latinos. These effects are statistically significant at the conventional levels. The effects are likewise significant at the conventional levels for the House elections, though lower in magnitude (a five-percentage-point increase in all four years). The effect of CoO on





**Figure 2.** Marginal Effect of Country of Origin by Outcome and Year (90% CIs).

partisanship is similar to the House elections, reaching statistical significance only in 2012 and 2016.

As stated previously, the CMPS datasets are not panel data, so these conclusions are limited to aggregate changes and do not represent changes for individuals. That limitation notwithstanding, these results are notable for a couple of reasons. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few (see Irizarry 2024) empirical works testing the effect of CoO from the Andean region in South America (i.e., Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). Second, unlike other large groups of Latinos, such as Mexicans or Puerto Ricans, individuals with ancestral ties to Andean countries are fairly more likely to identify as Republicans and support Republican candidates for the national executive and legislative offices. In fact, it does not seem that there has been a noticeable backlash against Republicans during the Trump years. We observe a slight increase in the probability of supporting a Republican for the White House in 2016 and 2020 compared to other origin groups.

Moving on to Central America, we detect a relatively weak, negative effect of CoO on vote choice in both Presidential and House elections, as well as party identification. The effect peaks at a statistically significant negative five percentage points in the 2020 presidential election. In other words, Central American respondents were five percentage points less likely to support the Republican presidential candidate in that year compared to respondents not from Central America. No other effect reaches statistical significance at the conventional levels. While it is difficult to untangle the factors driving this peak effect in 2020 for Central American countries, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala consistently receive the largest number of deportees from the United States relative to their population each

year (Ambrosius and Velásquez 2024). Thus, it is possible this group might have reacted more negatively towards Trump's candidacy and rhetoric around stronger anti-immigration policies.

Cuba is by far the country where we observe the strongest, most consistently positive effect in terms of the differences between the treatment and control groups. All the effects are statistically significant at the conventional levels. For the Presidential elections of 2012, 2016, and 2020, we find a difference of 15 percentage points. This difference was slightly higher (17 percentage points) in 2008. A similar pattern can be detected in the case of the House elections, with a difference of 18 percentage points between 2008, which decreases to 17, 16, and 14 percentage points in 2012, 2016, and 2020, respectively. With respect to party ID, we find a difference of 16 percentage points in 2008 and 2012, decreasing to 15 percentage points in 2016 and 2020. These results suggest that while respondents with Cuban ancestry remain more Republican than other national origin groups, rates of Democratic support and identification have increased slightly over time, particularly for the House Election, suggesting Cuban voters might have in mind different considerations beyond partisanship when it comes to picking House candidates.

The fourth country we study is the Dominican Republic. The effect is consistently negative in both the Presidential and House elections, meaning that Latino voters of Dominican origin were, on average, less likely to support a Republican candidate than non-Dominican Latinos. The difference between treatment and control groups averages a negative 4.5 in the Presidential races between 2008 and 2020. However, these differences are not statistically significant at the conventional levels, and it is worth noting that, other than the Southern Cone countries, the surveys yield the fewest respondents from the Dominican Republic. The differences, also not statistically significant, are less pronounced in the case of House elections and party identification, averaging negative 0.5 and negative 1.25 percentage points, respectively, in the same period.

When we compare U.S. Latinos of Mexican origin to matched groups of Latino voters from other countries or regions, we find a consistently negative difference in the probability of supporting a Republican candidate or identifying as a Republican. Specifically, our estimates indicate that respondents of Mexican origin were, on average, 4.5 percentage points less likely to support a Republican Presidential candidate. The difference peaks in 2012 and 2016 at negative five percentage points. The effect is very similar for House races and party ID, averaging 4.25 percentage points between 2008 and 2020. Interestingly, Mexican Americans increased their support for House Republicans and were more likely to identify as Republicans in 2016, and we see their support for the Republican presidential candidate catch up in 2020. All the differences are statistically significant at the conventional levels. As the quintessential example of Latino Democrats in the United States, it is interesting to note that while there has not been a drastic variation in party identification over time, respondents with Mexican ties did not exhibit a pronounced anti-Republican backlash in 2020, as respondents with origins in Central American countries did. Therefore, rather than becoming more inclined to support Republican candidates, Latinos of Mexican origin might be increasingly adopting independent views over time.

The effect of CoO is consistently negative across all three outcomes in the case of Puerto Rico. Voters of Puerto Rican origin were, on average, 4.25 percentage points less likely to support a Republican candidate in the Presidential race between 2008 and 2020. The largest difference is in 2016 at negative five percentage points, decreasing by one percentage point in 2020. The differences are statistically significant at the conventional levels in all four years. The effect is slightly more pronounced in the House races, averaging negative 5.75 percentage points. The differences also reach statistical significance at the conventional levels for all four House elections. Moving on to party ID, we observe an average negative difference of 1.75 percentage points, peaking at negative three percentage points in 2016. Differences in party identification, however, do not reach statistical significance at the conventional levels.

The last region we focus on is the Southern Cone. While no difference is statistically significant at the conventional levels, we retrieve mixed estimates in the Presidential races (0 in 2008 and 2012, negative 1 in 2016, and 2 in 2020). The estimates are all negative, albeit just as small, in the case of House elections and partisan identification. Interestingly, the respondents whose CoO is located in the Southern Cone were the least likely to identify as Republicans compared to U.S. Latinos from other countries or regions in 2016. For each year of the survey, the Southern Cone produces the fewest respondents.

Before turning to a more substantive discussion of these results and their implications, we briefly highlight three trends. First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the effect of CoO on the electoral behavior of U.S. Latinos, whether positive or negative, appears to climax in many cases after Donald Trump made his way onto the political scene in 2016. Although these changes are not drastic, we observe some of the most radical shifts in the magnitude of our estimates around 2016. Second, the estimates represent what we believe is important preliminary evidence that not only do groups of U.S. Latinos of different origins exhibit *over time* variation in political decisions and partisan identification, but they also exhibit non-negligible variation *across* different groups. Third, our findings also suggest the possibility of some split-ticket voting, given the discrepancies in magnitude and, at times, the direction of the estimated effects on Presidential versus House vote choice for groups that share a country or region of origin over time and across different outcomes.

### **Robustness Checks and Additional Evidence**

Despite our limited ability to test a direct causal relationship between CoO and political behavior, in this section, we present a number of robustness checks and additional estimates to test some of the mechanisms proposed in the theory section (see Appendix C in the Supplementary Materials).


Given that, theoretically, each CoO has its own agency, and our interest is to compare each country group against the others, in Tables C2-C4, we present estimates from linear probability models including a binary indicator comparing a given country-of-origin group (e.g., Andean Countries) to the remaining country-of-origin groups, as well as all the other covariates, without matching. Additionally, we replicate the results from Tables C2-C4 (see Table C8) by applying jackknife resampling (see Wu 1986), which allows us to systematically recompute our

estimates, leaving out one country-of-origin group at a time from the sample, boosting our confidence that our results are stable and unbiased by the inclusion of different groups. As observed, our main findings are consistent with the results of these two robustness checks.

Moving on to the mechanisms through which CoO can influence political behavior and partisan identification, we test whether the strength of country-of-origin effects persists or attenuates over time, based on length of residence in the United States. Our sample includes both first-hand immigrants and individuals who did not immigrate themselves, but have family who did, so transmission of *home country socialization* is likely to be absent or weakened for those who did not themselves immigrate. Ideally, we could capture some of these dynamics by exploring how the number of years lived in the United States moderates the effect of CoO, if at all. Unfortunately, the available data on length of residence suffers from several problems, making us unable to match respondents on this variable.<sup>5</sup> Yet, as a loose test, we manually excluded seemingly problematic responses, and interacted the number of years of living in the United States with CoO. Figure C1 in the Supplementary Materials plots the marginal effect of CoO by length of residence with 90% confidence intervals, showing non-statistically significant effects, except for the Andean countries. Thus, at least for this latter group, it seems that as the socialization effects in the receiving country increase (i.e., time of residence), the effect of CoO is attenuated.

To account for the potential heterogeneity associated with state of residence and *host country socialization* effects, that is, the extent to which the context matters for political participation once in the United States, we took a few steps to look for clues of this mechanism. First, we estimated a battery of linear probability models in which we omit the border state variable and add state fixed effects to account for unobservable state-specific characteristics.<sup>6</sup> The country-of-origin estimates are displayed in Tables C5-C7. Even after including state dummies, our main findings about the effect of CoO on voting preferences and party identification hold. Upon comparing estimates with and without the inclusion of state-of-residence dummies, we can see that, in most cases, the effect of CoO is attenuated ever so slightly. Second, from the linear probability models in Tables C2-C4, including a control variable related to the Latino composition of respondents' neighborhoods, we can see that the estimates suggest that socialization in the United States matters for how respondents reported voting in the House and Presidential races and how likely they are to identify as Republicans. Specifically, regardless of the CoO, as the Latino composition of the neighborhood increases, Latino respondents are less likely to identify as Republican or vote for a Republican candidate.

A further mechanism to explore is *who moves and why*. Structural and individual reasons can motivate people to migrate to a different country. Satisfaction with the regime and government economic and social performance are factors that could drive migration to the United States and subsequently affect people's political behavior in the host country. Hence, matching on regime type seems like a good undertaking. However, as Figures D1-D3 show, regime type exhibits very little variation in the years covered in our study. We default to exploring whether self-reported reasons to migrate to the United States vary substantially across different country groups descriptively. Figure 3 plots the percentage of respondents in the



**Figure 3.** Reasons for moving to the United States by country of origin. *Note:* The bars show the percentage of CMPS respondents (2020) who were not born in the United States that reported a given reason as their first or second reason for moving to the United States.

2020 wave who were not born in the United States who reported a given reason as their first or second reason for moving to the United States. As observed, and not surprisingly, the first and second most important reasons for migrating have to do with economic opportunities. Additionally, we do not see much variation across countries, except for Cuba, which remains the quintessential example of political migration. Between 1959 and 2023, an estimated 2.9 million Cubans emigrated due to the political and economic situation on the island. Further research should explore in greater detail if/how reasons for migration to the United States affect political behavior, with larger samples from countries with similar dynamics, such as Venezuela or Nicaragua. While political instability may be driving the economic problems and social unrest, we are not able to disentangle whether respondents blame the economy on the regime.

## Discussion and Conclusion

This article addresses a debate in the literature on Latino politics over whether and when it is appropriate to aggregate Latinos into one group and when it makes more sense to disaggregate by CoO. While we recognize that, when looked at in the aggregate, patterns in political behavior emerge, there is also evidence that these patterns are shifting. For example, in the 2024 election, the Democratic majority among Latinos narrowed. As the countries of origin of Latinos are shifting rapidly, with the fastest-growing groups not being Mexico, Cuba, or Puerto Rico, we argue that disaggregating Latinos by their origin countries or groups of countries can give us a better picture of how these increasingly influential voters engage in political activity.

We find that the patterns among different country-of-origin groups are not uniform when it comes to vote choice for presidential and House candidates, nor for party identification. While it is not surprising to learn that Mexican Americans have strong Democratic leanings and Cuban Americans show up for Republicans, we do not know as much about the rapidly growing groups of “new” immigrants. In addition to differences in vote choice and partisanship, we observe differences over time as well, with support growing or eroding from one election to the next, particularly after the 2016 election. We take this as clear evidence that CoO reveals a more nuanced picture of how these Americans vote and identify.

In this paper, we establish that there are important differences by CoO; however, we do not interrogate the mechanisms. This is where we hope to encourage more research from related fields. For example, comparative scholars of Latin American politics are best positioned to develop new theories regarding the important influences brought from the home country into the American context. The aggregation of countries may obscure the differences in political and cultural environments that drive some of the differences we observe in our findings. Additionally, scholars of transnationalism and cross-border communication can add to our understanding of where Latinos get information, and how communication from one’s home country can be influential to political attitudes. How these communication channels continue to shape the political orientation of first, second, and third-generation immigrants who keep in contact with relatives located across Latin America can help uncover consequential sources of variation. The concentration of people from the same country may affect both political socialization in the United States, as well as how enduring the communication with and ties to the home country are.

We also recognize that, in addition to the influences that come with migrants, there are important characteristics once in the United States that likely affect political behavior. For example, where an immigrant lands can impact what kind of information is available and what kinds of people they interact with, among other things. We think these kinds of questions invite scholars of American political identity formation as well as those studying minority politics to theorize about these, and other, potential mechanisms, and extend them to other immigrant or immigrant-adjacent groups such as Muslim Americans and Asian Americans, to elucidate previously hidden patterns that will help us understand their political engagement better as well, perhaps leading to a more systematic evaluation of the theoretical and practical foundations behind disaggregation.

Those studying group dynamics and coalitional politics should consider how these compositional changes may alter intra- and inter-group dynamics among traditional and new immigrant groups. Analyses of meta-perceptions about the differences between country-of-origin groups are also warranted, given these demographic shifts. What Latinos understand about each other’s politics has transformed over time, and new information on Latino sub-groups will be continually updated due to media and elite focus on the consequences of the Latino vote.

In sum, we hope that we have both provided important new information about why aggregating Latinos misses important differences among groups and inspired other researchers, from a variety of fields, to further investigate the mechanisms

driving these differences and provide clearer guidance on when disaggregation is most appropriate and what kinds of political questions this approach helps to answer across disciplines.

**Supplementary material.** The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2025.10025>

## Notes

- 1 [https://depts.washington.edu/moving1/map\\_latinx\\_migration.shtml](https://depts.washington.edu/moving1/map_latinx_migration.shtml). Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- 2 See also: “Why We Ask Questions About . . . Hispanic or Latino Origin” (United States Census Bureau). <https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/ethnicity/>. Last accessed: 26 May 2025.
- 3 We report the CMPS sample sizes by year and individual (not grouped) country of origin in Table B2 in the Supplementary Materials (Appendix B). In some cases, the sample size for a given country/year is either 0 or close to 0 (e.g., Brazil and Paraguay), making grouping necessary for statistical reasons.
- 4 For formulas and notations, see also Weymann, Chan and Regier (2023).
- 5 First, the scale of the question for length of residence in the 2008 CMPS wave is different, compared to the other waves. Instead of asking about the specific year, respondents report a time window in which they migrated to the U.S. (e.g., 1970–1974). Second, quite a few respondents reported that they have been living in the U.S. longer than they have been alive. For non-U.S.-born respondents in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 CMPS waves, 38.1% reported that they had been living in the U.S. for over 90 years. 28.7% of respondents who were 40 years old or younger reported having lived in the U.S. for over 90 years. All these issues raise questions about the quality and reliability of this variable. This is on top of a large portion of missing data.
- 6 In our main models, we match respondents based on whether they reside in a Southern border state or not, but we do not consider all U.S. states. This is due to sample size limitations, given that there are many cases of states with either zero or very few respondents, which would severely limit the possible matching combinations (see Table B3 in Appendix B).

## References

- Abadie A and Imbens GW. (2006) Large sample properties of matching estimators for average treatment effects. *Econometrica* 74(1), 235–267.
- Abrajano MA and Alvarez RM. (2010) Assessing the causes and effects of political trust among US Latinos. *American Politics Research* 38(1), 110–141.
- Affigne T (2000) Latino politics in the United States: an introduction. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 33(3), 523–528.
- Almond GA and Verba S. (1963) Political Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.”.
- Alvarez RM and García Bedolla Lisa. (2003) The foundations of Latino voter partisanship: evidence from the 2000 election. *The Journal of Politics* 65(1), 31–49.
- Ambrosius C and Velásquez A. (2024) Large-Scale Deportations May Have Unintended Consequences. Migration Policy Institute, 2 October 2024. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/deportations-unintended-consequences>. Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- Auer D and Schaub M (2024) Mass emigration and the erosion of liberal democracy. *International Studies Quarterly* 68(2), sqae026.
- Barreto MA (2010) *Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Barreto MA and Collingwood L (2015) Group-based appeals and the latino vote in 2012: how immigration became a mobilizing issue. *Electoral Studies* 40, 490–499.
- Barreto MA, Frasure-Yokley L, Vargas ED and Wong J. (2018) Best practices in collecting online data with Asian, Black, Latino, and white respondents: evidence from the 2016 collaborative multiracial post-election survey. *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6(1), 171–180.
- Calderón J (1992) “Hispanic” and “Latino”: the viability of categories for panethnic Unity. *Latin American Perspectives* 19(4), 37–44.



- Centeno MA** (2002) *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Corral, AJ and Leal DL**. (2024) When demography is (not) destiny: exploring identity and issue cross-pressures among Latino voters in the 2020 presidential election. *Social Science Quarterly* **105**(4), 1239–1252.
- De La Garza RO** (2004) Latino Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* **7**(1), 91–123.
- Diamond A and Sekhon JS**. (2013) Genetic matching for estimating causal effects: a general multivariate matching method for achieving balance in observational studies. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* **95**(3), 932–945.
- Drake C** (1993) Effects of misspecification of the propensity score on estimators of treatment effect. *Biometrics* **49**(4), 1231–1236.
- Fernandez KE and Dempsey MC**. 2017) The local political context of Latino partisanship. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* **2**(2), 201–232.
- FitzGerald DS and Cook-Martín D** (2014) *Culling the masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration policy in the Americas*. Harvard University Press.
- Fraga BL, Velez YR and West EA** (2025) Reversion to the mean, or their version of the dream? Latino voting in an age of populism. *American Political Science Review* **119**(1), 517–525.
- Fraga LR, Garcia JA, Hero RE, Jones-Correa M, Martinez-Ebers V and Segura GM** (2010a) The Evolving Latino Community and Pan-Ethnicity: Explorations into the Confluence of Interactions, Networks and Identity. In *Latino Lives in America: Making It Home*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, pp. 145–176.
- Fraga LR, Garcia JA, Hero RE, Jones-Correa M, Martinez-Ebers V and Segura GM** (2010b) *Latino Lives in America: Making It Home*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Geiger JR and Reny TT** (2024) Embracing the status hierarchy: How immigration attitudes, prejudice, and sexism shaped non-white support for Trump. *Perspectives on Politics* **22**(4), 1015–1030.
- Greifer N and Stuart EA** (2021) Matching methods for confounder adjustment: an addition to the epidemiologist's toolbox. *Epidemiologic Reviews* **43**(1), 118–129.
- Gutierrez A, Ocampo AX, Barreto MA and Segura G** (2019) Somos Más: how racial threat and anger mobilized Latino voters in the trump era. *Political Research Quarterly* **72**(4), 960–975.
- Hajnal ZL and Lee T**. (2011) *Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hartlyn and Valenzuela A**. (1994) Democracy in Latin America since 1930. Number 10 Duke-University of North Carolina Program in Latin American Studies.
- Hero RE** (1992) *Latinos and the US Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Hickel Jr. FR, Alamillo R, Oskooii KAR and Collingwood L**. (2020) The role of identity prioritization: why some latinx support restrictionist immigration policies and candidates. *Public Opinion Quarterly* **84**(4), 860–891.
- Ho DE, Imai K, King G and Stuart EA**. (2007) Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference. *Political Analysis* **15**(3), 199–236.
- Ho DE, Imai K, King G and Stuart EA** (2011) MatchIt: nonparametric preprocessing for parametric causal inference. *Journal of Statistical Software* **42**(8), 1–28.
- Hopkins DJ, Kaiser CR and Pérez EO** (2023) The surprising stability of Asian Americans' and Latinos' partisan identities in the early trump era. *The Journal of Politics* **85**(4), 1321–1335.
- Irizarry GC** (2024) The influence of country of origin in the process of party identification acquisition. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* **9**(1), 80–98.
- Jennings MK and Niemi RG**. (2014) *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and their Parents*. Princeton University Press.
- Jiménez TR** 2010. *Replenished Ethnicity: Mexican Americans, Immigration, and Identity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jones-Correa M and Leal DL** (1996) Becoming hispanic: Secondary panethnic identification among Latin American-origin populations in the United States. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* **18**(2), 214–254.

- Kesler C and Bloemraad I.** (2010) Does immigration erode social capital? The conditional effects of immigration-generated diversity on trust, membership, and participation across 19 countries, 1981–2000. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de science Politique* **43**(2), 319–347.
- Mann CB, Michelson MR and Davis M** (2020) What is the impact of bilingual communication to mobilize Latinos? Exploratory evidence from experiments in New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia. *Electoral Studies* **65**, 102132.
- Masuoka N** (2008) Defining the group: Latino identity and political participation. *American Politics Research* **36**(1), 33–61.
- Matland RE and Murray GR** (2012) An experimental test of mobilization effects in a Latino community. *Political Research Quarterly* **65**(1), 192–205.
- Niemi RG and Jennings MK.** (1991) Issues and inheritance in the formation of party identification. *American Journal of Political Science* 970–988.
- National Research Council** (2006) *Hispanics and the Future of America*. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
- Ocampo AN and Ocampo AX** (2020) Disaggregating the Latina/o/x umbrella: The political attitudes of US Colombians. *Latino Studies* **18**(3), 390–419.
- PBS News.** (2024) Interactive: How Key Groups of Americans Voted in 2024. 7 November 2024. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/interactive-how-key-groups-of-americans-voted-in-2024-according-to-ap-votecast>. Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- Pantoja AD and Segura GM** (2003) Fear and loathing in California: Contextual threat and political sophistication among Latino Voters. *Political Behavior* **25**(3), 265–286.
- Pedraza, Francisco I.** 2014. “The Two-Way Street of Acculturation, Discrimination, and Latino Immigration Restrictionism.” *Political Research Quarterly* **67**(4):889–904.
- Pew Research Center.** (2022) A Brief Statistical Portrait of U.S. Hispanics. 14 June 2022. <https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2022/06/14/a-brief-statistical-portrait-of-u-s-hispanics/>. Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- Pew Research Center.** (2023) Voting Patterns in the 2022 Elections. 12 July 2023. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/07/12/voting-patterns-in-the-2022-elections/>. Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- Portes A and Rumbaut RG.** (2001) *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Univ of California Press.
- Pérez E and Cobian J.** (2024) Latino opinion and action in the struggle for America’s political future. *Annual Review of Political Science* **27**, 87–106.
- Ramakrishnan SK and Espenshade TJ.** (2001) Immigrant incorporation and political participation in the United States. *International Migration Review* **35**(3), 870–909.
- Read JG, Lynch SM and West JS.** (2021) Disaggregating heterogeneity among non-hispanic whites: evidence and implications for U.S. racial/ethnic health disparities. *Population Research and Policy Review* **40**(1), 9–31.
- Rocha RR, Longoria T, Wrinkle RD, Knoll BR, Polinard JL and Wenzel J.** (2011) Ethnic context and immigration policy preferences among Latinos and Anglos. *Social Science Quarterly* **92**(1), 1–19.
- Rubin DB** (1973) Matching to remove bias in observational studies. *Biometrics* **29**(1), 159–183.
- Rubin DB** (1974) Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. *Journal of Educational Psychology* **66**(5), 688–701.
- Sekhon JS** (2011) Multivariate and propensity score matching software with automated balance optimization: the matching package for R. *Journal of Statistical Software* **42**(7), 1–52.
- South SJ, Crowder K and Chavez E.** (2005) Migration and spatial assimilation among US Latinos: classical versus segmented trajectories. *Demography* **42**(3), 497–521.
- UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Institute.** (2022) A Mosaic, Not a Monolith: A Profile of the U.S. Latino Population, 2000–2020. 26 October 2022. <https://latino.ucla.edu/research/latino-population-2000-2020/>. Last accessed: 23 May 2025.
- Uhlaner CJ, Cain BE and Kiewiet DR.** (1989) Political participation of ethnic minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior* **11**, 195–231.
- Valenzuela AA and Michelson MR.** 2016) Turnout, status, and identity: mobilizing latinos to vote with group appeals. *American Political Science Review* **110**(4), 615–630.
- VanderWeele TJ** (2019) Principles of confounder selection. *European Journal of Epidemiology* **34**(3), 211–219.

- Wakefield D** (2025) It's the economy: the effect of economic policy appeals on Latino independents. *Political Behavior*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10004-y>.
- Wakefield D, Fraga BL and Fisk CA.** (2025) Partisan change with generational turnover: latino party identification from 1989 to 2023. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2025.31>.
- Wals SC** (2011) Does what happens in Los Mochis stay in Los Mochis? Explaining postmigration political behavior. *Political Research Quarterly* **64**(3), 600–611.
- Wals SC and Rudolph TJ.** (2019) Lost in Acculturation? Premigratory exposure to democracy and immigrants' political trust in the United States. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* **31**(1), 70–92.
- West, Stephen G., Heining Cham, Felix Thoemmes, Babette Renneberg, Julian Schulze and Matthias Weiler.** 2014. "Propensity Scores as a Basis for Equating Groups: Basic Principles and Application in Clinical Treatment Outcome Research." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* **82**(5):906–919.
- Weymann D, Chan B and Regier DA.** (2023) Genetic matching for time-dependent treatments: a longitudinal extension and simulation study. *BMC Medical Research Methodology* **23**, 181.
- Wilcox-Archuleta B** (2018) Local origins: context, group identity, and politics of place. *Political Research Quarterly* **71**(4), 960–974.
- Wu C-FJ** (1986) Jackknife, bootstrap and other resampling methods in regression analysis. *the Annals of Statistics* **14**(4), 1261–1295.
- Zepeda-Millán C and Wallace SJ.** (2013) Racialization in times of contention: how social movements influence latino racial identity. *Politics, Groups and Identities* **1**(4), 510–527.
- Zárate MG, Quezada-Llanes E and Armenta AD.** (2024) Se Habla Español: spanish-language appeals and candidate evaluations in the United States. *American Political Science Review* **118**(1), 363–379.