The King, the Jesuits
and the French Church,
1594–1615

Eric W. Nelson
Merton College

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil. in
Modern History in the Faculty of Modern History at the University of Oxford

November 1998
Approximate number of words: 98,000
This thesis offers a re-examination of the expulsion, return and subsequent integration of the Jesuits into France during the reign of Henry IV and the regency of Marie de Medicis (1594-1615). Drawing on archival material from Paris, Rome and London, it argues that in order to understand the Society of Jesus’s role in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century France one must understand the circumstances of their return. The critical moment for the Society in France, this study contends, was the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen in 1603, not their expulsion in 1594. The Edict and the royal goodwill which sanctioned it gave the Society a legal standing in France and established a set of conditions which formed the basis for a new Jesuit role in the French church and wider society. Moreover, the Edict of Rouen was more than just an attempt by Henry IV to bring peace to the Catholic church; it was also an important assertion of royal authority in the French church. Indeed, I argue that the return of the Society exclusively through royal clemency or grâce defined an important alliance between the monarchy and the Jesuits which was to be a significant feature of the French church for more than a century.

Although numerous historians have already looked at various aspects of this important topic, this thesis is the first to argue that the most important development of this period for our understanding of the Society’s position and role in France was the accommodation of the Society by the French church and French royal administrative structures after the king’s will was expressed in 1603. It also asserts that it was the reality of compromise not the rhetoric of conflict which should shape our understanding of the Society’s integration into France and their role in the French church in the seventeenth century.
The King, the Jesuits and the French Church, 1594-1615
Eric Nelson, Merton College
Faculty of Modern History, University of Oxford
D.Phil. November 1998

Long Abstract

This study re-examines the expulsion, return and subsequent integration of the Jesuits into France during the reign of Henry IV and the regency of Marie de Medicis (1594-1615). Although this topic is highly significant in the context of French political and religious history, and was the focus of considerable historiographical attention in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has been largely neglected by modern scholars, and the last book-length account to focus on this period in Jesuit history was published in the early 1920s. The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to re-examine this issue in light of new scholarship, particularly recent studies on the role of Henry IV in securing religious peace during the opening years of his reign. It contends that the nature of the Jesuit return through royal clemency and the legal confirmation of the king’s good will towards the Society in the Edict of Rouen defined the Society’s status in France for more than a century after 1603. These royal actions, along with Henry IV’s continued support during the remainder of his reign, transformed the Society into a legally sanctioned organisation in France. Henry IV’s death at the hands of an assassin in 1610 had the potential to threaten once again the Society’s position in the kingdom, but the Paris Parlement was not willing to act despite the renewal of attacks on the Society during the regency. From 1603 the Parlement sought to regulate the Society through the conditions defined in the Edict of Rouen and the Society was prepared to accept the Parlement’s jurisdiction.

This thesis acknowledges the important religious issues at stake in the debate surrounding the Society in France in 1594 and the resurfacing of these debates with reference
to the Society at various points during the remainder of the period considered. But in
contrast to previous works, which have placed primary emphasis on this development, this
study contends that this was only a subordinate factor. Far more important for our
understanding of the Society’s position and role in France during the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries was the accommodation of the Society by the French church and French
royal administrative structures in the period after 1603, an accommodation based on Henry
IV’s decision to bring the Society back exclusively through his royal clemency or grâce.
Accordingly, this thesis argues that it was the reality of compromise not the rhetoric of
conflict which should shape our understanding of the Society’s integration into France and
explain their establishment in the seventeenth century as an important French religious order.

The sources used to arrive at these conclusions will be familiar to scholars of the
period. The Society’s expulsion and return to France was an important issue which attracted
both domestic and international interest, and a large body of archival material has been
preserved in Rome, Paris and London. Diplomatic correspondence held in the Archivio
Segreto Vaticano, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and the Public Records Office have
provided significant material for this study. The collected correspondence and documents
held at the Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu were a second indispensable set of
manuscripts. Moreover, documents held in the Dupuy and Fonds Français collections at the
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, the Godefroy collection at the Bibliothèque de l’Institut
and the Prat collection at the Archives Françaises de la Compagnie de Jésus have also
provided important material for this study. Finally, the registers of the Paris Parlement held
at the Archives Nationales de France, printed tracts and collections of printed documents
have also been consulted. While most of this material was available to previous scholars,
this is the first study to consult all of these sources, and, through such a consideration, it
avoids over-reliance on individual sets of primary material which has restricted previous
studies of this subject. The various perspectives obtained from using multiple sources is an
important feature of this study’s approach. It has allowed me to uncover the reality of
compromise and accommodation between the Society and French institutions after 1603,
despite the rhetoric of outspoken, if unrepresentative, polemicists which often dominated the
One major premise of this study is that the Society’s position in France changed dramatically through the period considered. For this reason, this thesis is divided into five chronological chapters which are designed to explore different phases of the Society’s expulsion, return and gradual integration into French administrative structures. Chapter One sets the scene through a detailed consideration of the expulsion of the Society from much of France in December 1594. It examines the Catholic anti-Jesuit rhetoric which labelled the Society as minions of Spain and the chief promoters of religious war disorder. It argues that this rhetoric was first fully articulated in a University court case against the Society during the summer of 1594 and only became established in French polemic through the Society’s expulsion for their alleged complicity in the Chastell assassination attempt in December of the same year. But this chapter then balances the traditional emphasis placed on this rhetoric with the observation that the Society’s expulsion was only ensured by Henry IV’s acquiescence in his Parlement’s arrêt. It concludes that, whatever his motivation, Henry IV’s support for the Jesuit expulsion was an important factor in establishing the new Jesuit image.

Chapters Two and Three of this thesis provide a reconsideration of the Society’s return to France, by stressing how royal authority defined a new legal standing and role in the kingdom for the Jesuits. Chapter Two argues that Henry IV’s assertion of royal authority was the most important factor behind the Society’s return to France in 1603. It demonstrates that royal policy from 1598 supported the Jesuits’ return and that it was the king’s will which brought the Society back. Besides reinterpreting the Society’s return as essentially a royal initiative, this chapter also provides a study of royal policy in action through a consideration of both the king’s official edicts and his public and semi-public actions at court. This detailed analysis reveals that the Society was brought back through a careful reassertion of royal authority in which the Jesuits returned to the French church through the clemency of the king, not the justice of their case. Consequently, a second purpose of this chapter is to reveal the exact nature of the Jesuit return; specifically, to examine how royal clemency created the context in which the Society of Jesus could become an important feature of the
Chapter Three argues that, while Henry IV’s support of the Society’s return gave the Jesuits a legitimacy and legal standing in France which they had not enjoyed before their expulsion, it was continued royal favour during the final years of his reign which defined an important role for the Society in France and in the French church. This chapter focuses on how the Society became a significant feature of Crown-sponsored initiatives in royal foreign policy, royal policies for the renewal of the French nobility and royal policy towards the Huguenots. It also considers how the nascent seventeenth-century French Catholic renewal provided the Society with an active and supportive climate in which it could develop its position in the French church. Finally, this chapter examines how continued royal favour coincided with the near-disappearance of direct Catholic opposition to the Society’s presence in France. These developments did not reflect an end of hostility towards the Jesuits; but they did create a situation where the question of the Society’s right to participate in the French church dropped out of public debate.

Chapters Four and Five examine the Jesuits’ position in France during the regency of Marie de Medicis and the Estates General of 1614. This period is crucial for assessing the impact of Henry IV’s favour on the Society’s position in France, as the death of the king at the hands of the Catholic fanatic Ravaillac brought at least the potential for a renewal of efforts to expel the Society from France. Previous scholars of this period have often emphasised the renewed efforts to limit the Society’s activities in France and have argued that a series of controversies were used by opponents of the Jesuits to attempt to secure the Society’s expulsion. In one sense these scholars are correct. The Society did come under renewed public attack during this period and the rhetoric used in part reflected the rhetoric that had helped to secure the Society’s expulsion in 1594. Unlike previous studies, however, these two chapters argue that widespread pamphlet publications and other attacks produced by the Society’s opponents did not reflect the reality of the situation. In fact, these chapters argue that the actions of the regency and the Paris Parlement were in part defined by Henry IV’s previous pronouncements. The Society continued to receive the support of the Crown throughout the period and the Paris Parlement was content, as long as the Society was
willing to accept its jurisdiction, to regulate the Society in France through a strict interpretation of the Edict of Rouen.

Chapter Four reconsiders a series of controversies which the Society’s opponents attempted to use to undermine the Jesuit’s presence in France. It will argue that these controversies were a potentially serious threat to the Society’s position in the kingdom but that support from the regent and the Jesuits’ allies, along with the Society’s willingness to accept in part the Parlement’s jurisdiction, allowed the Jesuits to avoid any serious threat to their continued presence in France. The chapter will suggest a new interpretation of these controversies which emphasises a tentative accommodation between the Paris Parlement and the French Jesuits. This allowed the Society to distance itself from these conflicts through their willingness to disown a number of controversial texts by their foreign brethren, and, ultimately, through their willingness to take an oath which affirmed their support of the French king’s inviolability and his absolute authority in the temporal affairs of his kingdom.

Chapter Five will consider the Society’s position in France at the end of the regency to provide further evidence that it was the regulation and the accommodation of the Society which dominated the actions of the Parlement and Estates General in 1614. First, the chapter reassesses the condemnation of the Spanish Jesuit Suarez’s text in the Parlement and contends that far from threatening the Society’s presence in the kingdom, the condemnation in fact reaffirmed the tentative accommodation between the magistrates and the Jesuits which was established in the first years of the regency. Second, the chapter suggests a new interpretation of the first article of the Third Estate by arguing that this article was not directed specifically at the Society. Finally, the chapter will look at the wider debates in the Estates General, concluding that the Society was only directly addressed in a series of regulatory articles in the cahiers, which in itself implicitly reaffirmed their right to exist in the kingdom as granted by Henry IV.

By Pursuing these lines of enquiry, this thesis provides a new interpretation of an important subject in French history that has already received a great deal of scholarly attention. The originality of my contribution stems from the fact that it draws an important distinction between the rhetoric surrounding the controversies during this period and the
deeper reality of political and religious accommodation for the Society. Specifically, this thesis argues that it was the Jesuits’ return through the Edict of Rouen in 1603, not their expulsion in 1594, that was the defining moment for the Society in France. The Edict, and the royal good-will which produced it, gave the Society a legal standing in France and established a set of conditions which helped the Jesuits to integrate into the French church. The accommodation between the Society and the king (1603-1610) and the accommodation between the Society and the Paris Parlement (1610-1614) defined the Society’s presence in France for over a century. Moreover, the French Jesuits’ flexibility in accepting secular jurisdiction over their activities in France made their accommodation and regulation by the royal administration less confrontational. The Edict of Rouen was more than just an attempt by Henry IV to bring peace to the Catholic church, it was an important assertion of royal authority in the French church. Indeed, the return of the Society strictly through the clemency or grâce of the monarch marked the foundation of an important alliance between the Jesuits and the king in the French church. An alliance which his son was to reaffirm upon taking personal control of royal government, and an alliance which was to continue until the Society’s second expulsion from France in 1761.
This work is my own except where footnote references indicate otherwise.

Eric Nelson, Merton College.

9 November 1998.
Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to everyone who has advised and encouraged me over the course of researching and writing this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Jonathan Powis, for his invaluable direction and support. Innumerable new avenues of inquiry and helpful reworkings of the text came from his timely advice. I would also like to thank Guy Rowlands and Steven Casey for reading an earlier version of this thesis and providing useful criticism on both the style and structure. In addition, I owe special thanks to Steven for his help in printing the final draft of this thesis. In a more general sense the support of both Steven Gunn and Robin Briggs was much appreciated during my studies at Oxford. Finally, this project could not have been completed without the constant support of my wife, who willingly read endless versions of this thesis, and my parents, Jerry and Nancy.
Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter One
The development of anti-Jesuit rhetoric and the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France (1594–1595) 19
I. The University court case: changing arguments and changing contexts 21
II. The reception of the new anti-Jesuit rhetoric and the expulsion of the Society 40
III. Conclusion: the aftermath of the expulsion 52

Chapter Two
Royal authority and the return of the Society of Jesus to France (1603) 56
I. Royal policy during the war with Spain (1595–1598) 59
II. The establishment of conditions for the Jesuit return 70
III. The culmination of royal policy 78
IV. Opposition to the Edict of Rouen 91
V. The Edict of Rouen and the Society of Jesus 104

Chapter Three
Supporters and opponents:
The political position of the Society of Jesus (1604–1610) 113
I. The Society of Jesus, royal policy and the government of the realm 115
(a) Royal foreign policy and the Society of Jesus 116
(b) Royal sponsorship, Jesuit colleges and cultural renewal 122
(c) Royal policy, the Jesuits and the Huguenots 130
II. The Society of Jesus, Jesuit patrons and the French church 139
III. Changing patterns of opposition to the Society of Jesus in France 145
Chapter Four

Weathering the storm:
The assassination of Henry IV and the cementing of the Jesuit role in France (1610–1612)

I. The aftermath of Henry IV’s assassination: the issue of tyrannicide theory and the Jesuits
II. The threats to the Society of Jesus in the autumn and winter 1610
III. Continued controversy: the loyalty of Jesuit preachers and teachers

Chapter Five

The Society of Jesus during the final years of the regency and the Estates General (1613–1615)

I. The condemnation of the Suarez text in June 1614
II. The Estates General of 1614 and the Society of Jesus
   (a) The first article of the Third Estate and the Society of Jesus
   (b) Pamphlet literature, the Estates General cahiers and the Jesuits

Conclusion

Appendix: Pamphlet Literature 1614-1616

Sources and Bibliography


Abbreviations

AFCJ: Archives Françaises de la Compagnie de Jésus
AN: Archives Nationales
ARSI: Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu
AV: Archivio Segreto Vaticano
BI: Bibliothèque de l’Institut
BL: British Library
BN: Bibliothèque Nationale
BOD: Bodleian Library
PRO: Public Records Office
MS. Fr.: Fonds Français
ANG: Acta Nuntiatæ Gallicæ


Le mercure français, vol. 5. Giverny, 1620.

Introduction

This study is concerned with the position of the Society of Jesus in the French church between the submission of Leaguer Paris to Henry IV in March 1594 and the close of the Estates General in March 1615. The purpose of this study is to answer the question: 'Why was the Society of Jesus successfully able to integrate into the French church in the period between 1603 and 1615, despite being expelled from France in 1594 as a treasonous and subversive organisation for its role in an assassination attempt on the king?' A sceptical reader might question why another study of the political and religious controversies surrounding the Society of Jesus at the opening of the seventeenth century is required. After all literally hundreds of histories and political pamphlets, mostly published during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have recounted the events addressed in this thesis.1 However, the last book-length treatment of this classic subject in French history, Fouqueray’s monumental, but incomplete, Histoire de la Compagnie de Jesus en France des origines à la suppression (1528–1762) was published between

---

1 For an excellent modern critique of nineteenth-century anti-Jesuit historiography see G. Cubitt, The Jesuit Myth: Conspiracy Theory and Politics in Nineteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1993) pp. 188–196. The best single study of the Society during the reign of Henry IV and the regency of Marie de Medicis remains the first three volumes of H. Fouqueray, Histoire de la Compagnie de Jesus en France, (Paris, 1910–1922). Three other texts deserve special mention. Couzard’s study provides a careful analysis of the diplomatic exchanges between Paris and Rome during the negotiations for the Edict of Rouen, see R. Couzard, De Edicto Rothomagensi Jesuitas in Galliam Restituentie Die 1 Septembris 1603 (Paris, 1900). Further, Prat’s carefully researched but apologetic history of the Society during the life of Father Coton is of use to modern scholars, see P.J.M. Prat, Recherches historique et critiques sur la Compagnie de Jésus en France du temps du P. Coton 1564–1626, 5 vols. (Lyon, 1876–1878) Moreover, Perrens’s work on the church under Henry IV provides a useful overall account even if he is almost exclusively concerned with the struggle between papal interests as represented by the Cardinal Ubaldini and Gallican interests as represented by the Parlement of Paris, the University of Paris and the monarchy, see F.T. Perrens, L’église et l’état en France sous le règne de Marie de Médicis, (Paris, 1872–1873).
1913 and 1922. Fouqueray’s study remains the standard history of the Society during Henry IV’s reign and Marie de Medicis’s regency but its ambitious scope limited the amount of primary research that Fouqueray was able to undertake. Moreover, the work was written in the context of the nineteenth-century church controversies over the role of the Catholic church, the Pope and the Jesuits in French society. As a result, the text is in part a response to criticisms levelled against the Society’s historical role in France by its nineteenth-century opponents.

In light of new scholarship since Fouqueray’s publication, a re-examination of the Jesuit presence in France at the opening of the seventeenth century is well warranted. Archival research by A. Lynn Martin on the Society of Jesus during the French religious wars has revealed serious faults with the previously accepted interpretation of the Jesuits as important leaders of hard-line Catholics in France. Indeed, Martin’s study has suggested that the Society was divided in its attitude towards the League and thus can no longer be seen as the monolithic supporter of ultramontane Catholicism presented by previous scholars. The questions raised by Martin’s revision of the Jesuit role in the French religious wars invites a reconsideration of the historiography surrounding the Society’s role in post-League France.

Moreover, recent scholarship concerned with Henry IV’s reign has provided new insight into how the king was able to regain control over the Catholic church. Several studies of royal religious policy during Henry IV’s reign have produced important new accounts of Henry’s style of government and his relationship with the French Catholic church. Michael Wolfe in *The Conversion of Henri IV* examines the importance of

---

Henry IV's conversion to his successful brokering of religious peace in France. According to Wolfe, Henry IV was able to persuade individual Catholics to accept the sincerity of his conversion. In accepting the king's sincerity, Wolfe argues, Henry's subjects also accepted that God's work through the monarch was inscrutable: in other words that the king's conscience was shielded from public view, and, therefore, that his actions in the name of the church could not be judged by his subjects. Wolfe concludes that in this way Henry IV succeeded in replacing direct political action by private individuals with appeals to royal authority as the chief means of accomplishing one's goals on religious issues. Denis Crouzet in *Les guerriers de Dieu* argues the related point that the defusing of religious tension through the promotion of Henry IV as 'King of Reason' was an important aspect of Henry's policy throughout his reign. Thus, in recent scholarship Henry IV's renewal of royal authority over the French Catholic church has become an important factor in explaining why the French religious wars came to an end. Further, this new research emphasises the role Henry IV played in a Catholic church where public action was increasingly deferred to the royal will.

From their very different perspectives, Wolfe and Crouzet have drawn similar conclusions which have been further supported by Michael de Waele in his work on the Paris Parlement between 1589 and 1599. De Waele argues that the Paris magistrates...
were gradually persuaded by Henry IV to defer to royal authority in the religious sphere.⁶

He concludes, however, that the Parlement’s deference was only established once the magistrates were convinced that Henry IV was willing and able to uphold royal authority against the rival interests in the kingdom. De Waele also re-examines Henry IV’s policy of pacification: the exchange of obedience by Leaguer supporters for royal clemency and the ‘forgetting’ of past opposition to the monarchy.⁷ According to De Waele, a group of polemicists associated with the exiled Parlement at Tours objected to what they viewed as the surrender of royal justice and authority implicit in his clement acts. Nevertheless, the policy of pacification was a central feature of Henry IV’s successful bid to regain authority over the church. De Waele’s research has revealed an important discrepancy between the views expressed by some of Henry IV’s most vocal supporters and royal policy in action. This split over the punishment of former Leaguers was also evident in the debate over whether the Society of Jesus should be expelled from the kingdom in 1594. Hence, recent scholarship on Henry IV’s authority over the French Catholic church in the opening decade of his reign has emphasised Henry’s important role in brokering religious peace and the independence of royal policy even from the king’s allies.

In light of the new scholarship, this thesis will reconsider one of the most contentious controversies in the Catholic church during the reign of Henry IV: the

---


expulsion of Jesuits from much of France in 1594 and their return in 1603. The question of the Society’s return to France and their subsequent role in the church was punctuated by conflicts and debates which stretched from the first years of Henry IV’s reign to the close of Marie de Medicis’s regency. Thus, the Society’s return and reintegration into the French church under royal auspices provides a fruitful topic for exploring the renewal of royal authority in the Catholic church at the close of the French religious wars and its implications for the Society of Jesus. In a series of recent articles, Claude Sutto has noted that the Jesuits and the French monarchy, despite their stormy relations, shared interests which eventually brought the Society and monarch together. This thesis will not only confirm Sutto’s observations, but more importantly, it will provide a detailed analysis of the central issues for royal authority and the Society of Jesus which defined the Jesuit expulsion, return and subsequent reintegration.

While the primary purpose of this study is to provide a new understanding of the Society’s expulsion and reintegration into France between 1594 and 1615, it also aims to make a contribution to historical scholarship on the long-term expansion of state authority over the western institutional church, the clergy and the spiritual life of individual subjects. Earlier assertions of secular authority over the church are an important aspect of medieval historiography. Wolfgang Reinhard, for instance, has noted a general inclination of secular authorities, largely impressed by the sophisticated
administration of church law, to model their expanding bureaucracies on church 
organisations and, through time, to manipulate the church structures to enhance their own 
powers. Moreover, other scholars, like Ernst Kantorowicz and Jacques Krynen, have 
shown that medieval rulers actively sought to legitimate their authority in secular and 
ecclesiastical realms through the development of theories on their religious authority and 
the development of symbolic links between rulers and the church.

These general medieval developments were accelerated and redirected by the 
religious and political turmoil of the Protestant Reformation. The rejection of the 
universal church with the Pope as its leader presented secular authorities across western 
Europe with the opportunity to redefine the relationship between secular and religious 
authority in their states. The new church structures which Luther and later reformers 
promoted provided secular authorities with an important leadership role in the regulation 
of the church and its clergy. This development continued into the seventeenth century 
where secular authorities not only cemented their control over church structures and the 
clergy but also increasingly influenced the religious and social life of individual 
Christians in their states.

The growing ability of rulers to regulate the spiritual lives of their subjects has 
been most thoroughly explored by scholars of the Holy Roman Empire who have

---

10 E. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, 
1993); R. Jackson, *Vive le Roi: A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (Chapel 
12 The best examination of the concept of the rise of the confessional state in English is R. Po-chia 
Schilling, ‘The Reformation and the Rise of the Early Modern State’, in J.D. Tracy (ed.), *Luther and the 
Modern State in Germany*, (Kirksville MO., 1986); K. Blaschke, ‘The Reformation and the Rise of the 
emphasised the similarities between the development of confessional control in both Protestant and Catholic states.\textsuperscript{13} Greater secular control over the Catholic church in the Holy Roman Empire has parallels in the wider Catholic church. Indeed, A.D. Wright has interpreted 1550–1750 as the period when state-church structures established their preeminence over any conception of the international church in Catholic Europe.\textsuperscript{14} The international Catholic Reformation, as defined by the Council of Trent’s decrees in 1563, was implemented only with the consent of temporal rulers in the most important Catholic states of Europe. Thus, Philip II embraced the Council’s decrees but with a clause which protected royal authority in the Spanish church.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, the French and Venetian states, while encouraging the implementation of many of its teachings, never registered the Council’s decrees. The rise of state churches under the influence of their temporal sovereigns was a serious problem for popes intent on overseeing the international reform of the Church. It was also an important development for secular authority in the church as the Catholic and Counter Reformations were directed through state-church structures.

The French church has received considerable attention with reference to these developments because seventeenth-century France provided much of the intellectual leadership for the European Catholic Reformation. Moreover, the French church has also attracted interest because it was the single most important and assertive state church in seventeenth-century Catholic Europe. As the century progressed Louis XIII and more spectacularly Louis XIV, while remaining Catholic and respectful of the Pope, aspired


\textsuperscript{14} A.D. Wright, \textit{The Counter Reformation: Catholic Europe and the Non-Christian World} (London, 1982).

to be absolute in the temporal affairs of the French church. The control of religious authority by the monarch through French church structures was an essential aspect of French absolutist government and had a profound impact on the political debate and culture in France to the Revolution and beyond. Dale Van Kley’s recent work on the religious origins of the French Revolution traces an important source of the monarchy’s difficulties preceding the Revolution to its success in allying with the church at the close of the French religious wars. According to Van Kley, the monarchy gained unprecedented control over the church, and this allowed the king to re-establish peace after thirty years of civil war. However, it also led to a monarchy that was unable or unwilling to distinguish between religious dissent and political challenges to its authority. The royal response to the French Reformation and the Catholic League, writes Van Kley, produced a ‘monarchy more absolute than ever before, not only in the rights it claimed over the individual conscience but in its pathological aversion to all autonomous partial or intermediate associations ... [in the Catholic church].’ This temporal control over the church was a central feature of the French monarchy until the Revolution and served to focus and unite a number of separate opponents to royal government in the century before the Revolution. Thus, royal control over the French church was an important feature both of the ancien régime’s success and of its eventual failure.

The subject of royal authority in the French church, and by implication the question of secular authority in the western church, will benefit from a careful consideration of the Society of Jesus in France at the opening of the seventeenth-century.

While French monarchs, since at least Philip the Fair in his dispute with Boniface VIII, were intent on increasing their authority over the French Catholic church, there is a strong case for viewing the opening of the seventeenth century as a crucial period in this long-term development. When Henry IV acceded to the French throne in 1589 the monarchy's authority over the French Catholic church was at a historic low point. His predecessor, Henry III, had witnessed the rise of the Catholic League which by 1589 had culminated in the rejection of the king's authority by nearly all the important Catholic towns of the kingdom, along with a substantial portion of the Catholic nobility and clergy. Further, Henry III's decision to assassinate the Cardinal de Guise at the Estates General of 1588 led to his excommunication by the Pope. Henry III's loss of authority was the result of thirty years of religious and political disorder; but his assassination by a supporter of the Catholic League in the summer of 1589 symbolised a new nadir for the monarchy in its relationship with the Catholic church.

Henry IV's accession did not immediately improve the monarchy's prospects of renewing royal authority. Henry IV, a relapsed heretic, had also been excommunicated by the Pope. Even after his reconversion to Catholicism in 1593, the king's sincerity, and thus the legitimacy which came with his conversion, was only gradually accepted by important factions within the church. Nevertheless, by his death in 1610 Henry IV had reasserted the monarchy's authority over the French Catholic church to a degree not seen since before the outbreak of the religious wars. A renewed alliance between the monarchy and Catholic church was built during this short period which was to prove an important basis for royal authority until the end of the ancien régime.

The development of one significant alliance in the French church at the opening of the seventeenth century, that between the Society of Jesus and the French monarchy, provides the principle focus of this study and is a useful subject with which to explore the renewal of the Crown’s authority in the French church. The Society of Jesus’s participation in the French church was one of the chief controversies within the Catholic church during the period. In 1594 the Society stood accused of fomenting opposition to the king. Moreover, polemicists portrayed the Society as leaders of the threat from within the Catholic church to the authority and security of the monarch. This interpretation was centred on criticism that the Society was outside the control of the French church and was actively working to promote disorder and conflict in France. Thus, in the period immediately following the collapse of the League, the Society of Jesus was used by some polemicists to define the threat to royal authority posed by unregulated religion in France. However, the Jesuit return under royal auspices in 1603 would transformed the Society into an important ally of the French monarchy in its attempt to reassert royal influence over the Catholic church. In the short period between 1603 and 1615 the Society, with the support of the monarchy and its allies, evolved itself from a religious Order with a doubtful legal existence in France into an Order with a strong presence and a legal position in the kingdom defined by the monarchy. This transformation of the Society into an important ally and advocate of the royal authority which sustained it, defined the Jesuits’s existence in France for the next century and a half. Thus, an examination of the Society of Jesus’s participation in the French church between 1594 and 1615 provides a study of the creation of one of the most important and

---

influential royal alliances in the French church of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

To recount, the purpose of this study is to re-examine the expulsion of the Jesuits
in 1594 and their subsequent reintegration into France between 1603 and 1615 with
special consideration given to Henry IV’s role in their re-establishment. Moreover, this
project will also make a contribution to the general field of scholarship concerned with
the growth of secular authority over the church in western Europe. These priorities mean
that other issues must be neglected. First, this thesis does not purport to be a general
history of the Society of Jesus during the period. Consequently, it makes only rare forays
into the history of the Society’s individual colleges or their participation in the local
religious life of France, although these subjects are important topics of scholarship in
their own right and have recently received scholarly attention.18 This thesis does,
however, have significant implications for scholarship devoted to the Society at the local
level because the political events examined here created the context in which the Society
was allowed to operate in France and thus defined the extent of the Society’s contribution
to local religious life.

In addition, this project recognises the important work by scholars such as Denis

---

18 A.L. Martin, The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France. (Ithica NY,
Vocations among Jesuits in France during the Sixteenth Century’, Catholic Historical Review, 71 (1986),
Century Journal, 13 (1982), 1–23. For an indication of the breadth of research on the Jesuits see Les
Jesuites parmi les hommes aux XVie et XVIIe siècles (Clermont Ferrand, 1987). For Jesuit educational
practice see P. Charnot, La Pédagogie des Jésuites (Paris, 1951). For Jesuit theatre, which had an
important impact on seventeenth-century French culture, see W.H. McCabe, Introduction to Jesuit Theater
(St. Louis, 1983). For the best general introduction to the Society see J.W. O’Malley, The First Jesuits
(Cambridge MA., 1993).
Crouzet and Barbara Diefendorf on the significance of religious belief as a motivation for political action during the French religious wars. Indeed, a premise of this thesis is that one of the most difficult issues facing Henry IV at the opening of his reign was that political action by private individuals and communities in defence of the their religious beliefs and the Catholic church threatened to undermine his religious and political authority. A second premise is that the period covered in this thesis witnessed a channelling of Catholic religious fervour away from an immanent spirituality, which had inspired political action amongst devout Catholics during the League, to an equally strong but more internal pious movement, which foreshadowed the piety representative of the seventeenth-century French Catholic renewal. This channelling of religious energy away from political action is an important over-arching consideration of any study of the religious situation in France at the opening of the seventeenth century. Unfortunately, this thesis does not have the space or scope to consider this issue in a systematic manner, but it will touch on it whenever the Jesuits were directly involved in the channelling of religious fervour.

Moreover, this study will not provide a detailed examination of Protestant attacks upon the Society except where they had an impact upon the Catholic anti-Jesuit debate. Protestant anti-Jesuit polemic is a feature of the period but it rarely had a significant impact upon debates among Catholics and was usually written to rally support in the Huguenot community against the Society’s missionary endeavours or to influence royal policy toward the Huguenots. Therefore, as this study is devoted to understanding the Society’s integration into the French Catholic church, a close consideration of Protestant

19 For example, see B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-
polemic would distract from its central purpose. Nevertheless, this thesis will consider these influences when Protestant polemic against the Jesuits was adopted by Catholic opponents of the Society or impacted upon the Society's position in Catholic France.

Finally, this study will examine the possible reasons and motivations behind royal policy decisions at points where the source material makes such an enquiry possible. The exact motivations for royal religious policy are rarely explicitly recorded in the sources and even where the royal government expressed its reasoning, the actual motivation of the monarch is often hidden from public view. Nevertheless, while royal motivation is of interest to this study of the Jesuits' position in France, it is less important than the reality of royal actions and the public purpose which was attached to their actions. It is these considerations which will remain the primary focus of this study. It is also important to establish that this thesis does not claim to be a biography of either Henry IV or Marie de Medicis and, therefore, it will not speculate on their religious beliefs or convictions, which in any case are not revealed in the sources.

Before we turn our attention to the structure of the thesis it is worth noting the sources employed. The controversy over the Society's presence in France was an important issue both within the kingdom and on the international stage, and a large body of archival material has been preserved in Rome, Paris and London. Diplomatic correspondence held at the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and the Public Records Office have provided significant material for this study. The collected correspondence and documents held at the Archivum Romanum Societatis

Lesu were a second indispensable set of manuscripts, although after 1600 the Jesuit headquarters in Rome no longer systematically preserved incoming correspondence which dramatically reduced the volume of documents held in the archives. Further, the collections of documents held in the Dupuy and Fonds Français collections at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, the Godefroy collection held at the Bibliothèque de l'Institut, and the Prat collection at the Archives Françaises de la Compagnie de Jésus also provide important material for this study. Finally, the Registers of the Paris Parlement held at the Archives Nationales de France, printed tracts from the period, printed correspondence and printed journals were also consulted. This brief summary touches on the most important sets of source material but other smaller collections were also consulted and are noted where appropriate. While this material will be familiar to those scholars who have previously looked at this classic issue in French history, this is the only study of the Society to consult all of these sources; and, through such a consideration, this study avoids the over-reliance on individual sets of primary material which has restricted previous studies of this subject.

The structure of this dissertation has been defined by the nature of the topic. An important premise of this thesis is that the accommodation which established the Society's presence in France after 1603 developed through time. Thus, this thesis is organised into five chronological chapters in order to explore the evolving position of the Society in France. Chapter One provides the context for the study through a close examination of the Society's expulsion from much of France in 1594. This chapter examines the French Catholic anti-Jesuit rhetoric which has dominated the considerations

---

20 For a useful introduction to the holdings of the Society's Roman archive see E. Lamalle,
of previous histories of the Jesuit expulsion.\textsuperscript{21} It argues that in 1594 this polemic for the first time labelled the Jesuits as minions of Spain, chief promoters of religious war disorder, and thus subversive to French society.\textsuperscript{22} However, this chapter balances the traditional emphasis on the importance of the new anti-Jesuit rhetoric with the careful consideration of a second important, but previously unconsidered, factor: royal support for the Society’s expulsion. It argues that a plausible interpretation for the royal change of policy which ultimately sanctioned the Society’s expulsion was the advantages it gave Henry IV in his impending war with Spain. The chapter concludes that, whatever his motivation, Henry IV’s support for the Jesuit expulsion established the new Jesuit image, an image which had initially met with strong opposition in France.

Chapter Two of this thesis argues that Henry IV’s assertion of royal authority was the most important factor behind the Society’s return to France in 1603. It demonstrates that Henry worked to facilitate a Jesuit return to the kingdom from 1598 and, crucially, that it was the king’s will which brought the Society back. Further, this chapter explores the particular circumstances that made the Society’s return an attractive option to the king from 1598. Aside from reinterpreting the Jesuits’ return as essentially a royal initiative, this chapter also provides a careful consideration of royal policy in action through both the king’s official edicts and his public and semi-public actions at court. This detailed

\textsuperscript{21} Most recently M. De Waele has helped to place this anti-Jesuit polemic in the context of the political situation as seen by many in the Paris Parlement. However, he does not address the role of the rhetoric in the actual expulsion of the Society in 1594. See M. De Waele, ‘Pour la sauvegarde du roi et du royaume. L’Expulsion des Jésuites de France à la fin des guerres de religion.’ Canadian Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes d’histoire 29 (1994) 267–280.

analysis reveals that Henry IV brought the Society back through a careful assertion of royal authority in which the Jesuits returned to the French church through the clemency of the king not the justice of their case. Therefore, the second purpose of this chapter is to examine the exact nature of the Jesuit return; specifically, to consider how royal clemency created the context in which the Society of Jesus could become an important feature of the seventeenth-century French church.

Chapter Three moves on to explore the final years of Henry IV’s reign. It argues that, while the king’s support of the Society’s return gave the Jesuits a legitimacy and legal standing in France which they had not enjoyed before their expulsion, it was continued royal favour during the remainder of his reign that defined the Society’s position in the French church and wider society. The chapter focuses upon how the Society became an important feature of Crown-sponsored initiatives in royal foreign policy, royal policies for the renewal of the French nobility and royal policy toward the Huguenots. It also considers how, after the Society’s return, the patronage of many in the French elite and the rapid development of the nascent seventeenth-century French Catholic renewal provided the Society with an active and supportive climate in which to develop its position in the French church. Finally, this chapter examines how continued royal favour coincided with the near-disappearance of direct Catholic opposition to the Society’s presence in France. These developments did not reflect an end of hostility towards the Jesuits, but they did create a situation where the question of the Society’s right to participate in the French church dropped out of public debate.

After Henry IV’s assassination in May 1610 the Society’s position in France was once again endangered by a series of controversies which provided their opponents with
the opportunity to revive the anti-Jesuit polemic of 1594. The final two chapters undertake a new interpretation of the conflicts surrounding the Society during the regency. They argue that the Society’s presence was less threatened in France during the regency and Estates General of 1614 than previous scholars have asserted.  

The regency period has been neglected by modern scholars, despite the fact that Henry IV’s renewal of the monarchy and royal authority hung in the balance during Marie de Medicis’s regency. J. Michael Hayden’s study of the Estates General of 1614, one of the few major modern studies of the period, emphasises the continuity in policy between the two governments and the success of the regent in maintaining at least the principle of royal authority in France. This interpretation correlates well with the experience of the Jesuits during the period. Indeed, the final two chapters suggest that the residual influence of Henry IV’s good will towards the Society was reflected both in the continued support of the regent and her advisers for the Jesuits and in the attitudes of their sympathisers and critics more generally.

Chapter Four of this thesis reconsiders a series of controversies during the regency concerned with Jesuit teaching rights in Paris and tracts on papal authority by foreign Jesuit authors. The chapter argues that these controversies were potentially a serious threat to the Society’s position in France but that support from both the regent

24 J.M. Hayden, France and the Estates General of 1614 (Cambridge, 1974). A second notable work on the Marie de Medicis’s regency is S. Mastellone, La reggenza di Maria De’ Medici (Florence, 1962). See also P. Blet, ‘Jesuites et libertés gallicanes en 1611’, Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu 24 (1955) 165–188. The only modern scholar to focus his research on the Society of Jesus during this period is Pierre Blet, see P. Blet, ‘L’article du Tiers aux Etats généraux de 1614,’ Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 2 (1955) 81–106. Blet’s arguments are meticulously documented; but, as will be argued later in this thesis, Blet is too inclined to see the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France as the primary motivation of royal magistrates during the regency. See also B. Zeller, La minorité de Louis XIII, Marie de Médicis et Sully (1610–1612) (Paris, 1892); B. Zeller, La minorité de Louis XIII, Maria de
and its allies, along with the Society’s willingness to meet some of its opponents’ demands, allowed the Jesuits to avoid any serious threat to their continued presence in the kingdom. The chapter suggests a new interpretation of these controversies which emphasises a tentative accommodation between the Paris Parlement and the French Jesuits. It argues that this accommodation allowed the Society to distance itself from these conflicts through their willingness to disown the texts involved and, ultimately, through their willingness to take an oath which affirmed their support of the French king’s sovereignty in temporal affairs.

Despite the turmoil of the princes’ rebellion and the Estates General in 1614, Chapter Five argues that the Society continued successfully to distance itself from the controversies over papal authority and tyrannicide theory. The chapter first reconsiders the condemnation by the Paris Parlement of the Spanish Jesuit Suarez’s text to argue that, far from being a serious threat to the Society’s continued presence in the kingdom, the condemnation in fact reaffirmed the tentative accommodation between the Society and Parlement established earlier in the regency. Second, this chapter explores the debates over the first article of the Third Estate at the Estates General. Previous scholars have considered the first article to be a surreptitious attempt to force the Society to withdraw from France. In contrast, this thesis will argue that this article actually served to reaffirm the accommodation most recently articulated in the Suarez condemnation. Finally, this chapter reconsiders the Society’s role in the wider debates at the Estates General to conclude that the implicit acceptance of its right to exist in France was reaffirmed at the meeting through a series of regulatory articles in the general cahiers of the Three Estates.

_Médecis et Villeroy_ (Paris, 1897).
In the Conclusion, this thesis has a brief epilogue which looks at the relationship between the Jesuits and the Bourbon monarchy from the personal reign of Louis XIII to the Society’s second expulsion from France in 1761.
Chapter One

The development of anti-Jesuit rhetoric and the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France (1594–1595)

On 22 March 1594, Henry IV entered Paris without opposition, almost six years after his predecessor Henry III had fled in haste during the ‘day of the barricades’ effectively handing control of the capital to the Catholic League. The Jesuit reaction to the pacification of Paris on 22 March 1594 mirrored that of other groups in the city. The Jesuits participated in victory celebrations and took swift action to transfer their members who had been most compromised by involvement in the League to houses outside the capital.\(^1\) The king had consistently promised clemency to all parties that were not directly implicated in the assassination of Henry III and were now willing to accept his authority.\(^2\) The Jesuits, like other groups in Paris, hoped that by removing their most suspect members and avoiding public attention they could quietly put their participation in the League behind them.

The Society of Jesus had reason to be optimistic. They had participated in the League but had not played a direct role in the worst excesses of the movement.\(^3\) Furthermore, the Jesuits received tacit support from the king when, after his entry into Paris, he ignored calls for the arrest of the Jesuit Father Varade over his alleged complicity in the Barrière assassination attempt of 1593. Instead of detaining the Father,

---

\(^1\) ARSI Galliae 93, fos 122–123: Dupuy to Aquaviva, 13 April 1594. This tactic continued ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 182: Codreto to Aquaviva, 25 June 1594.

Henry IV advised him to leave the city before the members of the Paris Parlement who had sat in exile at Tours arrived in the capital. Thus, the king’s actions indicated that the policy of clemency would be extended to the Jesuits.

Yet within nine months the Society of Jesus became the only organisation to be collectively expelled from France by royal order. The reason for the Society’s expulsion was a combination of new anti-Jesuit rhetoric, which labelled the Jesuits as chief promoters of the League, and a change in circumstances, which led to royal support for this rhetoric. The anti-Jesuit polemic was established in a well-publicised court case between the University of Paris and the Jesuit College of Clermont which continued without conclusion through the summer months of 1594. This conflict produced a new set of arguments against the Jesuit presence in France which labelled the Society as pro-Spanish, subversive to the French state and largely responsible for the past thirty years of religious war. Although the University’s case was suppressed in September 1594 by Henry IV, Jean Chastell’s attempted assassination of the king resulted in Henry’s support of the Society’s expulsion on 29 December 1594 for their alleged support of regicide, a central theme in the summer’s rhetoric. By January 1595 the Jesuit position in France had been transformed, although the Society still enjoyed significant support from important sections of the French Catholic church.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first considers the new anti-Jesuit rhetoric in France which developed during the University case. The second section investigates the reception of this new rhetoric in France and re-examines the Society’s eviction from much of France. The conclusion then provides an account of the aftermath.

to this expulsion.

I. The University court case: changing arguments and changing contexts

On 12 May 1594 Jacob Amboise, rector of the University of Paris, appeared before the Parlement to reactivate litigation against the Jesuit College of Clermont, a case which was to become a *cause célèbre* over that summer.⁵ According to the rector’s written complaint, the primary justification for the case was

> quae quidem cum omni tempore, tum maximè in his ultimis tumultibus partialem se prorsus ac fautreion præbuit factionis Hispanicae ad eversionem Regni huius idque non in hac tantum urbe Parisiensi, sed toto regno Franciae, atque extra regnum.⁶

Further, the University asked that ‘ut secta hæc non solem ex Universitate, verum etiam ex regno universo exterminetur.’⁷ Thus, the seditious nature of the Jesuits was to be the basis for a case which had as its objective the expulsion of the Jesuits from the entire French kingdom.

Amboise’s oration, which accompanied the written complaint, provided the rationale for this far-reaching attack upon the Jesuits. According to Amboise, the Jesuits were responsible for promoting parricide and regicide in the name of a single church:

> ‘Cùm nulli sint qui coniurationum preteritarum & parricidiorum authores magis & suasores laudari aut potius damnari debeat ....’⁸ They were also guilty of abusing the

---

⁴ AFCJ Prat 30, p. 171: Mena to Aquaviva, 19 July 1603.
⁵ While it is not my purpose in this thesis to speculate on Amboise’s motivations for pursuing this novel case, it may be linked to the University’s efforts in this same period to put its participation in the League behind it. The University by declaring its teachings orthodox and blaming the Society of Jesus for fomenting rebellion may well have hoped to remove attention from the declaration by the Sorbonne in 1589 which declared Henry III deposed and urged armed resistance to the king.
⁷ ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 27: idem..
sacraments for seditious reasons:

Qui auriculari confessione & venerabilibus Ecclesiae Catholicae Romanae, (quae sola hoc nomen meretur) sacramentis ad infatuandas mentes abusi sunt. Quod vos qui Augustae Turonum praefuistis, in instrumentis litium vidistis, iij verò qui in hac vrbe conciones, seditionum tubas audistis, & Commoletium adlatrantem detestati estis, meminisse potestis nimium.\(^9\)

Further, the Jesuits were foreign:

sciatque Curia, vt testis atque iudex, nullam abhinc quadraginta annis conspirationem sine illis natam aut educatam, nulos Hispanos, Parthenopeos aut Belgas sine illis in hanc vrbe introductos, Non alibi arcanas literas fabricatas, non alibi Mendosam, Feriam aut Feram consilia pestilentissima agitasse ....\(^10\)

The substance and purpose of this oration were these general attacks on the Society and its involvement in the sedition of the religious wars. Jesuit teaching at the College, which had in the past been the chief inspiration for University litigation against the Society, does enter into Amboise’s argument, but the issue was not centred on the University’s teaching privileges, rather: ‘arguent adolescentum tenella ingenia Hispanico felle imbuta: arguent Panici terrores ab illis concitati, bellorum faces ab illis accensae.’\(^11\)

Amboise placed the University with its grand tradition in opposition:

Nemo ante hae celtim tempora viderat aut legerat Gallias a semel suscepta religione, vel latum vnguem aberrantes, nemo suis regibus rebellantes. Noua haec de fide & intestina diffidia Germanis & Allobrogibus, de regno Lotharenis & Hispanis debentur. Aliquid mali per vicinos.\(^12\)

Although Amboise’s litigation was ostensibly a reactivation of a 1564 University case against the College of Clermont, his arguments differed significantly from the mid-century dispute between the University and the College. In the mid-century conflict the Paris Parlement, University and secular clergy had all perceived the Company of Jesus

\(^{9}\) Ambosii, \textit{Orationes}, p. 7.
\(^{10}\) Ambosii, \textit{Orationes}, p. 7.
\(^{11}\) Ambosii, \textit{Orationes}, p. 10.
as another active religious order without legal recognition in France and they therefore addressed the question of Jesuit admittance into the kingdom in the context of the long, bitter conflict between the mendicant friars and the French church. The substance of their objections had been presented on 25 January 1552 when Pierre Séguiier, avocat général at the Paris Parlement, offered the first official reaction to royal lettres patentes which granted the Jesuits legal recognition in France. Séguiier based his opposition on the argument that the lettres were contrary to the acts which had brought a stable compromise with the friars: ‘ils ne trouvoient l’erection de cette congregation seulement non necessaire, mais superflue, car les constitutions canoniques qui ont esté faites il y a quatre ou cinq cens ans ont estimé qu’il y avoit assez de religion reprimant les nouvelles.’ Further, when in 1554 the Parlement requested judgements on the Society from the University of Paris and Bishop Eustache du Bellay of Paris, it merely received more detailed arguments drawn from standard anti-friar polemic. Indeed, aside from their objection to the title Society of Jesus, on the grounds of arrogance, all the arguments offered can be traced directly back to traditional grievances against the friars. Even in

12 Ambossii, Orationes, p. 11.
13 Several scholars, including H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895), i, 390; G. De Legarde, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge (Vienna, 1934–1946), iii–iv; and C. Thouzellier, ‘La Place du “du Periculis” de Guillaume de St. Amour dans les polémiques universitaires de xiie siècle’, Revue historique, 156 (1927), 69–83, have argued that Gallicanism’s roots can be found in the polemics surrounding the mendicant versus secular struggle. Even the more cautious Y. Congar agrees that the seed of future Gallican concerns were present although he argues that the primary concern at the time was authority in the church: Y. Congar, ‘Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et séculiers’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 28 (1961), 35–151. Although the purpose of this thesis is not to chronicle this controversy, it is important to note that the anti-Jesuit arguments were defined by this long-term conflict between two rival ecclesiological systems in the Catholic church.
15 The conclusions of Eustace du Bellay have been printed in J.A. Gazaignes, Annales de la société des soi-disans Jésuites; ou recueil historique-chronologique, (Paris, 1764), i, pp. 4–6. The conclusions of the faculty of theology are recorded in AN MM 249, fos 29v°–37. The faculty of theology’s
1564, when the University brought its case before the Parlement to prohibit teaching at
the Jesuit College of Clermont, the focus of opposition remained on disputes over
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This is perhaps best shown by the Consultation prepared for
the University by the vehement polemicist Charles Du Moulin. Despite his hatred of the
Jesuits, du Moulin never strayed from a strictly juridical set of objections. The issues
at stake in the mid-century conflicts had been those of jurisdiction and privilege, not
subversion and foreign influence.

In 1594 Amboise was arguing something new. The objective of his oration—the
expulsion of the Jesuits from the whole kingdom—and his rhetoric which stressed order,
disorder and foreign influence within French institutions, took its inspiration from the
concerns of a group of strongly anti-Jesuit polemicists many of whom were associated
with the Paris Parlement. Thus, in order to understand why the Society of Jesus was the
subject of such far-reaching and dangerous attacks during the University case one must
consider the developments in the anti-Jesuit polemic during the first years of Henry IV’s
reign.

conclusions have also been printed in Gazaiinges, Annales, i, 7–9.

16 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 84–86v°: Consultation of six avocats, 24 March 1564.
17 C. Du Moulin, Consultatio super commodis et incommodis novae sectae seu fictitae religionis
jesuitarum, in Oeuvres complètes de Du Moulin (Paris, 1681), v. For the intellectual context of this tract
Pasquier’s plaidoyer for the University in 1564 is the one tract that may have come from this period which
at times portrays the Jesuits in a similar manner to the court case in 1594. However, it is difficult to
determine whether the earliest surviving copies of the plaidoyer, which were printed in 1594, are true to
the original manuscript. If the text was not reworked before publication then it had no effect on
contemporaries in 1564 and indeed Pasquier in his own private correspondence does not use the rhetoric
of his 1594 edition when explaining the Jesuit case. For a history of the plaidoyer see D. Thickett,
Bibliographie des Œuvres d’Estienne Pasquier (Geneva, 1956), pp. 55, 118. For evidence that Pasquier’s
arguments had little influence upon contemporaries in the 1560s see Gazaiinges, Annales, i, 83 and passim.
These documents recount the only major court case involving the Jesuits between 1564 and 1594. No hint
of Pasquier’s distinctive arguments are present in the plaidoyers presented in this case. For Pasquier’s own
neglect of his distinctive arguments in his correspondence see E. Pasquier, Lettres historiques pour les
Anti-Jesuit rhetoric developed in response to royal policy. From his accession to the throne in 1589, Henry IV promoted a policy of pacification in which his disobedient subjects offered their obedience in exchange for royal clemency. Henry IV’s abjuration of the Protestant faith on 25 July 1593 removed an important barrier between obedience to him and the consciences of his Catholic subjects. After his abjuration Henry IV was able to accept the obedience of his Catholic subjects who professed that their concern for the Catholic faith had defined their previous opposition to the king. Thus, from the summer of 1593 Henry IV redoubled his campaign to pacify the League through a mixture of persuasion and force. The king based his campaign of douceur on the traditional royal attribute of clemency or grâce to reassure Leaguers and reinforce his claim to the throne by displaying royal judgement and justice. Royal clemency provided Henry IV with a flexible means with which to transcend the letter of the law in order to provide him with the authority to pardon those patently guilty of opposing his rule. Henry IV drew upon a long tradition of royal sovereignty. For instance, Jean Bodin in his Les six livres de la republique presents royal clemency or grâce as a true mark of royal sovereignty by citing Cicero’s request for imperial grâce from Caesar:

le Magistral n’a cunoissance que du fait, estant la peine reserue a la loy, & la grace au souuerain. C’est pourquoy Ciceron demandant à Cesar la grace de Ligarius, l’ay, dit il, souuent plaide avec vous deuant les iuges, mais ie ne dy iamais pour celuy que ie defendois, pardonnez huy, messieurs, il a failly, il n’y pensoit pas, si iamais plus, &c. c’est au pere a qui on demande pardon mais deuant les iuges, on

20 For a discussion of clemency’s the role in the royal mystique see N.Z. Davis, Fiction in the Archives (Stanford, 1987), pp. 52–53.
dit que le crime est forgé par envie, l'accusateur calomnieux, les témoins faux. où il monstre que César étant souverain, avoit la grâce en son pouvoir, ce que n'ont pas les juges.  

Thus, Henry IV chose to employ this powerful component of the royal mystique, which could be used by the monarch alone, as a basis for pacifying the kingdom.

Although by the summer of 1594 the king’s campaign had broken Leaguer resistance, it had also raised important questions for many of his allies and supporters.

De Waele has recently shown that an important group of polemicists, many of whom were based in the Navarrese parlements of Tours and Châlons during the League, were deeply concerned that Henry IV’s clemency, if offered from a position of weakness, would undermine royal authority. The author of the *Satyre Ménipée* expressed these concerns when he wrote:

> Or ce que j’ay diffé, à dire, qui me semble luy manquer, est-ce de quoi vous & moy luy sommes plus tenus: c’est qu’il nous traite trop doucement, & nous choye trop: La clemence en laquelle il est superlatif & excessif, est une vertu fort louable, & qui porte enfin de grands fruits & de longue durée, encor qu’ils soient longs, & tardifs à venir. Mais il n’appartient qu’aux victorieux d’en user, & à ceux qui n’ont plus personne qui leur resiste: aucuns l’attribuent à courdise & timidité, plustost qu’à vaillance & générosité.

As Henry IV’s power increased and as more Leaguers made their submissions to their clement monarch, loyal supporters of the king became increasingly concerned that no one would be punished for the treason and disorder of the League.

---


For many of his supporters the king's clemency was unacceptable if it was not combined with retribution at least for those most responsible for the League. Even moderate loyalists like Pomponne de Bellièvre, whose work *Advertissemnt sur la conversion de Henry de Bourbon III* used the king's conversion to provide a rationale for reintegrating League opponents, felt the need to provide a responsible party to shoulder the blame for the worst of Leaguer excesses. For this role Bellièvre chose Spain, the traditional enemy of France. The Spanish menace, which had a long pedigree in the discourse, dominated the literature by 1593. Indeed, important polemicists like Antoine Arnauld published a series of tracts which shifted the blame for the League almost exclusively onto the king's Spanish enemies. Many of these polemicists also wished to punish Spain's leading allies in France. Their unease increased as it became apparent that Henry IV was disinclined to punish any individuals willing to accept his authority. The concern of many of those who claimed to speak for Navarre, therefore, came to be reflected in their desire to find a responsible party to label as the chief proponents of the League in France. From late 1593 a series of circumstances led many French polemicists to label the Society of Jesus as a symbol of Spanish influence in France. The development of the Catholic anti-Jesuit rhetoric, which was intended to present the Jesuits as chief proponents of the League, began only in that year. De Waele summarised the situation well when he noted that 'Si, avant 1593, l'on retrouvait ici et


26 Wolfe, *Conversion*, p. 170. For instance see *La fleur de Lys. Qui est vn Discours d'vn Francois retenu dans Paris, sur les impiete, & desguisemens contenu au Manifeste d'Espagne, publie au mays de Iamnter, 1593* (Lyon, 1594). See also *Coppie de l'anti-Espagnol faict a Paris. Defendu par les rebelles de Sa Maiesté* (Lyon, 1594). These copies are reprints of tracts which were originally published in 1593.

27 For example see A. Arnauld, *Coppie de l'Anti-Espagnol faict a Paris* (Lyon, 1594). Also attributed to A. Arnauld is *La Fleur de Lys* (Lyon, 1594).
l'a quelques remarques ou critiques sur l'implication de certains membres de la Société dans des guerres civiles, la Compagnie dans son ensemble n'était pas accusée d'être la principale responsable des troubles.  

28

It is impossible to trace the inspiration behind the theories of Jesuit responsibility for the League. The participation of individual Jesuits in the League was well known to contemporaries, and some Protestant literature did present a leadership role for the Society of Jesus in the movement; but the first public effort in Catholic literature to link the Jesuits directly with the leadership of the League focused upon Pierre Barrière’s plot to assassinate the king. Barrière, a former soldier in the League from the Orléanais, was arrested on 27 August 1593 in Melun on suspicion of plotting to assassinate the king and was executed four days later. Estienne Pasquier, the avocat who had defended the University against the College of Clermont in 1564, interrogated Barrière for the king and published a short pamphlet which accused the Jesuit rector in Paris, Father Varade, of actively encouraging Barrière:

et l'ayant trouvé lui découvrit sa mauvaise volonté et intention, que ledit Jésuite loua, lui disant que c'estoit une belle chose, avec autres propos semblables, et l'exhortant d'avoir bon courage, d'estre constant, et qu'il se falloit bien confesser et faire ses pasques. Et après l'avoir excité de continuer, et assuré qu'il gagneroit Paradis, ledit Jésuite lui bailla sa bénédiction, disant qu'il eust bon courage, qu'il priast bien Dieu, et Dieu l'assisteroit en son entreprise. 29

This publication was the first to present the Jesuits as actively encouraging and abetting the assassination of the king. Estienne Pasquier’s previous opposition to the Jesuits in 1564 and his continued interest in related topics made him one of the most astute observers of the religious wars and the Society of Jesus in France. Therefore, Pasquier’s

29 E. Pasquier, Bref discours du proces criminel fait à Pierre Barrière, dit la Barre, natif d’Orléans, in M. Cimber and F. Danjou (eds), Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusque à Louis
letter, stating that he only realised in 1593 that the Jesuits had played an important role in fomenting the disorder of the League, was a remarkable reflection of the rapidly changing context in which anti-Jesuit rhetoric operated: ‘En cette opinion, vesquis-je jusques en l’an 1593. ne m’informant point de leur taisible cabale; mais voyant des troubles introduits premierement sous le nom de la Ligue, & continuez sous celuy de la Saincte Union.’

In the second half of 1593 a new interpretation of the Jesuit role in the religious wars was developing rapidly in the minds of some polemicists who were particularly concerned for the maintenance of royal authority in France.

That Pasquier’s evolving view of the Jesuits was shared by others was reflected in a text entitled *La fleur de lys* first published in late 1593 and attributed to the polemicist and avocat at the Paris Parlement, Antoine Arnauld. This tract does not mention the Jesuits by name but includes one passage which betrays their growing role in the perceived Spanish plot against France. According to Arnauld, the Spanish king:

> a aussi de longue main enuoye des hypocrites vrayes colonies d’Espanols, qui ont respandu le venin de leur conspiration soubs ombre de saincteté, (quel estrange artifice) & ont abusé de la deuotion des François, qu’ils ont obligez à leur ligue par serments secrets. Et apres au lieu d’instruire le peuple en nostre Religion Catholique ont esté les trompettes de guerre, flambeaux de sedition, protecteurs & defenseurs de massacres & volleries, bref ont seruy de leuain estranger pour en aigrir la paste de nostre France, & changer sa fidelite en desloyaute & rebellion, conduisans si bien les desseins de leur maistre, qu’ils ont remply de feu, & de sang, tout ce Royaume auparauant si florissant....

While *La fleur de lys* was not primarily concerned with the Society of Jesus, like Pasquier’s piece it promoted a new leadership role for the Jesuits in the League.

By the spring of 1594 the Jesuits were an established subject of the polemic at the

---

* XVIII, (Paris, 1st ser., 1837), xiii, 368.
* 30 E. Pasquier, *Les Œuvres D’Estienne Pasquier* (Amsterdam, 1723), ii, 686. This letter is undated but was written after the death of Henry IV in 1610.
* 31 *La fleur de lys*, passim.
exiled Parliament in Tours and some important members of the court discussed punishing the Society for being promoters of the League. Indeed, the Jesuit Father de Mena reported that, upon hearing the news that Paris had been recovered by the king, the premier président Achille de Harlay 'dit tout haut en plein Parlement que résolument les Jésuites en sortiroient.' Harlay’s statement was not just rhetoric, as shown by the fact that members of the Parlement soon after their arrival in Paris attempted to force the Jesuits to take a loyalty oath to the king: 'croyans que nous le refuserions, parce qu’il n’estoit point encore réconcilié avec le Saint-Siège, afin de prendre de là un spécieux prétexte de nostre expulsion.' Although this initiative was blocked by Jesuit supporters, the intention of many within the Parlement was reflected in this action.

The development of this anti-Jesuit rhetoric coincided with the greatest successes of Henry IV’s policy of pacification. The spring of 1594 brought the submission of Paris and with it the reintegration of the Leaguer Parlement of Paris with the parlements in exile at Tours and Châlons. For the Navarrist magistrates at the parlements in exile the need to find an acceptable framework for reintegration of their Leaguer colleagues may have provided a further reason to label the Jesuits as the chief proponents of the League. The return of the loyalist magistrates from Tours and Châlons to Paris in late March 1594 was potentially a moment of extreme tension in Henry IV’s policy of pacification. Many parlementaires who had supported the king by joining the exiled parlements argued that Henry IV’s decision to reintegrate members of the Leaguer Paris Parlement with the two exiled parlements was scant reward for their loyalty. Moreover, the

32 La fleur de lys, pp. 9–10.
33 AFCJ Prat 30, p. 171: Mena to Aquaviva, 19 July 1603.
35 See Lettres patentes de Roy. Pour le restablissement de la Cour de Parlement de Paris (Lyon, 1594).
reintegration of Leaguer and Navarrist officials across the kingdom brought endless conflict over precedence and rank which fuelled tension. One result of this difficult situation was the shared interest of many groups in France in shifting responsibility for the religious wars and the League onto a third party.

A number of factors drew the Society of Jesus into the debate over responsibility for the League in the summer of 1594, while Amboise's decision to frame the University's grievances through this new anti-Jesuit rhetoric also brought the University litigation to the centre of the anti-Jesuit polemic. Yet, Amboise's arguments moved beyond the concern to protect University teaching rights which had provided his initial mandate to conduct the litigation against the Society, and during the two month delay between his oration and the pleading of the case on 12 and 13 July 1594 much of his support in the University disappeared. Indeed, during the final days before the case was pleaded consensus publicly collapsed within the University with the theology faculty, the arts faculty and three of the four procureurs des nations signing decrees condemning the litigation. These setbacks are striking since before Amboise presented his arguments these important corporations and officials in the University had given support for the litigation. While many in the University were willing to sanction a case against Jesuit teaching in Paris, they were not willing to countenance an attack on the right of the Society to exist in France. Amboise's strong statements against the Society were


36 The Jesuits and their allies felt that Amboise's arguments would drain away his support in the University. For more information on the Society's campaign to delay the case see ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 150: Dupuy to Aquaviva, 15 May 1594; ARSI Galliae 93, fos 182–183: Codreto to Aquaviva, 25 June 1594.

unwelcome to many in the University who felt that such provocative action in uncertain times was unwarranted and potentially disruptive. Indeed, by the date that it was pleaded the University case had lost much of its initial backing and relied for its continuation on support amongst those in the Parlement who had advocated the anti-Jesuit polemic on which Amboise based his case.

Thus, the case heard in the Parlement had lost its original purpose and had become a platform on which the new anti-Jesuit rhetoric focused. Antoine Arnauld, the avocat for the University, took this opportunity to provide the most fully articulated version of anti-Jesuit rhetoric to date. Arnauld was noted as an eloquent and promising avocat at the Paris Parlement before the League and as a Navarrist pamphleteer during the League he made his reputation as a defender of French interests against Spain. Arnauld’s discourse went far beyond the remit of the University case. The question of Jesuit teaching privileges in Paris was merely one aspect of a polemic which demanded that the Jesuits were expelled from the kingdom as they were incompatible with the French church and state. For Arnauld, religious-war disorder could only be driven from France through the just punishment of its most guilty proponent, the Society of Jesus. The opening lines of Arnauld’s plaidoyer justified the University’s case by

---

asserting:

Les lesuites s’estans maintenus contre plusieurs poursuites de l’Vniuersité [sic], par le support de ceux qui avoient affaire d’eux, pour executer leurs grandes & malheureuses entreprises: en fin depuis le iour des Barricades commanderent imperieusement dans Paris: & allumèrent la sedition en toutes les principales villes du Royaume, blasphemans sans cesse en leurs sermons & confessions contre la memoire du feu Roy, & contre la maiesté du Roy regnant, qu’ils ont blessee de toutes les façons qui se peuvent excogiter: & pour comble de leurs impietez se sont efforcez de faire assasiner le Roy, par Barriere executé à Melun, qui l’aa ainsi deposed à la mort.  

For Arnauld the Society of Jesus was guilty of rejecting, indeed polluting, the very foundations of the French state. The opening statement set the agenda of this plaidoyer which was to prove that the Jesuits, under the direction of their Spanish masters, were responsible for the last three decades of French troubles. Arnauld chose to repeat this theme at several points, for instance: ‘Parlez au sieur Marquis de Pisani il vous tesmoignera que depuis l’an 64. quil traite comme Ambassadeur les affaires de France en Espagne & Italie, il n’a iamais eu vn grand affaire qu’il n’ait trouve vn lesuite en teste.’  

In a later passage Arnauld stated ‘Iamais les lesuites n’ont veu en France vn temps qui leur ait esté plus agreable que celuy de ces dernieres guerres, qu’ils eussent volontiers appelé comme Commodus, la siecle d’Or.’ The Jesuits, according to Arnauld, were a real, potent threat to French political, religious and moral traditions. It is impossible to do justice to Arnauld’s relentless use of detail to reinforce this theme. Through a flurry of historical examples the Jesuits were labelled as leaders of the
League, minions of Spain and seducers of the people.\footnote{For instance Arnauld, \textit{Plaidoyé}, fos 2, 3v°, 46.} Arnauld singled out the Jesuits as promoters of assassination plots against Henry III and Henry IV of France, Edward VI of England and many others.\footnote{Arnauld, \textit{Plaidoyé}, fos 19–21. Further, the Jesuit Barny, in his response to Arnauld, indicates that in his oration before the Parlement Arnauld included even more examples of Jesuit assassination plots later dropped from his published version. Du Boulay, \textit{Historia}, vi, 882–884.} A sense of Arnauld’s vehemence can be found in his summary of the Jesuits’ motivations: ‘Toutes leurs pensees, tous leurs desseins, toutes leurs actions, tous leurs sermons, toutes leurs confessions n’ont autre visee que d’assujettir toute l’Europe à la domination Espagnole.’\footnote{Arnauld, \textit{Plaidoyé}, fo. 18v°.} The purpose of Arnauld’s \textit{plaidoyer} was to link the Jesuits with the Spanish and the disgraced political and religious agenda developed by radical French Catholics.

Arnauld also pressed the argument that the Jesuits were guilty of fomenting disorder for the whole of the religious wars. He reinterpreted the original confrontation between the University and the Jesuits to emphasize that the Jesuit danger was identified and well understood even in the mid-sixteenth century. The friar controversies are not mentioned by name and nearly all his commentary concentrates on an innovation first fully presented in the 1564 court case: that the Jesuits were foreign and dangerous to French ecclesiastical structures. Arnauld took the concerns voiced in 1564—that the Jesuits were a foreign body within the French church—and relocated this concern in the body politic as a whole. For example, in 1564 the University stated its opposition to Jesuit recognition in the kingdom by using arguments drawn from previous conflicts with the mendicant orders. In the most vehement rhetoric of the submission to the Parlement, the University summarized its opposition as:

\[\text{dominos tam temporales quàm Ecclesisticos suis iuribus iniustè priuat,}\]
perturbationem in vtraque politia, multas in populo querelas, multas lites, diffidia, contentiones, amulationes, rebelliones, variaque Schismata inducit. Itaque his omnibus atque alijs diligenter examinatis & perpensis, hæc Societas videtur in negotio fidei periculosa, pacis Ecclesiae perturbatia, Monasticæ religionis euersiuæ & magis in destructionem quàm in ædificationem. 46

While strongly stated, this passage was concerned with stability within ecclesiastical institutions, and was not of the same inspiration as Arnauld's summary:

la Cour voulut auoir l’aduis de la Sorbonne, laquelle assemblee par quatre diuers iours (presidant sans doute entre eux le saint Esprit) par vn instinct vrayement diuin les preueut & iugea tres-dommageables & tres-pernicieux pour l’estat du Royaume, & pour la Religion: & qu’ils jetteroient infinies querelles, diuisions & dissensions parmy les Francois. Et à fin qu’il ne semble qu’on y adiouste rien, voicy les propres mots du decret de la Sorbonne, qui en peu de paroles descrit le mal que nous auons receu de ceste nouuelle & dangereuse secte. 47

Arnauld implied in this passage that the University saw the Company of Jesus as a danger to the French nation and not just unsuitable for integration into the French institutional church.

A second example is also revealing. One important question which exercised Jesuit opponents in 1564 was whether the Jesuits were regular or secular clergy. 48 The original conflict centred on the friar controversy, where the innovations of the friar devotional routine were opposed on grounds of tradition. 49 Arnauld, on the other hand, reinterpreted this issue. He explained the distinctions between regular and secular and then stated ‘Nous faisions (dy-ie) en ce temps-là de grandes admirations, mais maintenant tout cela cesse. Pourquoï? parce qu’en vn mot ils ne sont ny reguliers ny seculiers.

46 Du Boulay, Historia, vi, 573.
47 Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fo. 41–41v°.
49 This theme is reflected in the collection of documents in Gazaignes, Annales, i, 2–29.
Quoy donc? vrais espions d'Espagne ....'50 The friar issue had disappeared from the explanation to be replaced by the central theme of Arnauld’s *plaidoyer*. These examples asserted what Arnauld had often implied throughout the *plaidoyer*: that in 1564 good French Catholics already understood the dangerous threat that the Jesuits posed. By reinterpreting the original confrontation and emphasising that the Jesuit danger was understood in 1564, the Jesuits could be held responsible for disorder throughout the religious wars. Arnauld’s rhetoric changed the debate. The Jesuits were no longer just incompatible with French church structures but rather were politically and morally subversive to the nation both as individuals and as a unit. Thus, the Jesuits were not like the other Leaguers that the king had pardoned. Arnauld argued:

> de voir qu’encores ces traistres, ces scelerats, ces Assassins, ces meurtries des Rois, ces confesseurs publics de tels parricides, sont entre nous, ils vivent, ils hument l’air de la France: comment ils vivent? ils sont dans les palais, ils sont caressez, ils sont soutenus, ils font des ligues, des factions des alliances & associations toutes nouvelles!°51

The Jesuits were the embodiment of religious, political and social disorder in France.

Arnauld’s *plaidoyer* held the Jesuits responsible for the religious wars and thus helped to provide a rationale for the rehabilitation of French participants in the League. The Jesuits were presented as responsible for persuading good Frenchmen to abandon their king on grounds of religion. This point addressed the concerns held over the king’s clemency toward Leaguers by presenting French Leaguers as deceived by the Jesuits and therefore still potentially able to be reintegrated into French society if Jesuit influence was removed from the scene. Thus, in the opening pages of the *plaidoyer* Arnauld asserts that good Frenchmen, who had resided in Paris during the League, had rallied to

---

Jesuit culpability allowed compromised members of the League to reintegrate into the ranks of loyal Frenchmen. The Jesuits were to be expelled both in order to symbolically break with the past three decades of radical Catholicism and to provide a rationale for the reintegration of League participants.

Arnauld asserted that good Frenchmen, even those who had been temporarily misled by the subtle Jesuits, naturally shared a love for their king and country. Indeed, according to Arnauld many Leaguers were not responsible for their actions as they were seduced as children when they attended Jesuit colleges. In this argument Arnauld addressed the fact that many individuals had openly supported and continued to support the Society in France. Arnauld used his appeal before the Parlement to argue that these members of the French nobility and office holders could still symbolically break with the League through their rejection of the Jesuits:

Courage donc, braue & indontable Noblesse Françoise, continuez de vous reioindre tous en vn mesme corps d’armee: Dieu protecteur des Royaumes, Dieu qui a toujours jetté son oeil de commiseration sur la France en ses plus grandes afflictions,

---

52 Arnauld, *Plaidoyé*, fos 4v°-5.
54 Arnauld, *Plaidoyé*, fo. 23.
plantera sans doute au milieu de vous l’amour & la concorde. Il vous remplira le front d’horreur, le bras de vigueur: il vous enuoyera ses Anges pour vous fortifier, à fin que vous exterminiez bien tost des Gaules tous ces infets & superbes Castillans....De mesmes il y a plusieurs personnes qui en apparence sont seruiteurs du Roy, & sçauent bien faire leur profit particulier de sa bonne fortune: mais au dedans ils sont tous rouges, tous Espagnols. Ces gens icy qui ont affaire des Jesuites pour executer leurs malheureuses entreprises, n’osent pas neantmoins dire ouuertement qu’il les faut laisser en France ....

Arnauld provided an opportunity for individuals to positively break with the past and support a cause which defined them as loyal Frenchmen. By placing the blame for the League exclusively on the Jesuits and their Spanish patrons, Arnauld constructed an acceptable theoretical framework for the reintegration of former Leaguers into French society in a way in which the king might have desired. Arnauld provided a scapegoat for a section of society who were patently guilty of participation in the League.

Arnauld argued that the Jesuits by their very nature were not able to integrate into French society. However, good Frenchmen who had participated in the League were able to reintegrate into French society through their natural love of French custom and the French monarch. This theme was the culmination of Arnauld’s attacks: the Jesuits provided a symbol of what was not acceptable in post-League France. The most important theme emphasised by Arnauld was that the monarchy was the essence of the French state. Disorder during the religious wars was the result of disobedience to the king. The Jesuits were, for Arnauld, the chief purveyors of tyrannicide theories and therefore the symbolic antithesis of the French state. According to Arnauld, individual Frenchmen, like Jean Boucher, who were proponents of tyrannicide theory were products of the Jesuit education system. Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fos 9v–10.

---

55 Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fo. 29.
56 Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fos 9v–10.
good Frenchmen were essential for the re-establishment of peace in the realm. Arnauld also stressed that good Frenchmen instinctively valued the king’s life over all else: ‘où il y va de la vie, du salut, & de la conservation de ceste personne si sacree, si necessaire à la France, sans laquelle c’etoit fait de l’Estat, il estoit couuert de perpetuelles tenebres, & fust maintenant l’vne des provinces d’Espagne.’ All that was required to return France to its tranquil past was to remove the subversive foreign influence of the Jesuits. Without the Society’s presence all good Frenchmen would naturally respect the monarch.

The subversive influence of the Jesuits, however, could not be overcome without expulsion. While good Frenchmen naturally supported the social hierarchy with the French king at the top, the Society of Jesus opposed it. The Jesuits were presented as subversive to even the most basic conceptions of hierarchy in France. To make this point Arnauld drew on sensational court cases to present the Jesuits as dangerous to good order in the family. For instance, Arnauld cited a famous cause célèbre in which Ayrault, lieutenant criminel of Angers, went to court to regain custody of his son who had entered the Society of Jesus. Undermining the family had symbolic parallels with Jesuit efforts to destabilise the monarchy. Arnauld also argued that the Society, due to its loyalty to the Pope, could never integrate into the French hierarchy. Indeed their belief system was summarized as ‘VN DIEV, VN PAPE, ET VN ROY DE LA CHRESTIENTÉ, le grand Roy Catholique & vnuiersel.’ This phrase again emphasised Jesuit rejection of even the most sacred foundations of French society, in this case incompatibility with the traditional French belief in une loi, un roi, une foi.

---

57 Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fo. 22v°.
In the conclusion Arnauld returned to his two major themes: the centrality of the monarch to peace in France and the promise of tranquillity which would accompany the Jesuit expulsion. Arnauld turned to the king’s empty chair in the Parlement and pleaded that the king must not be clement towards the Jesuits as the entire nation was reliant upon his leadership to protect the kingdom from renewed disorder and subversion. The punishment of the Society was the key to tranquillity and unity in France. Within this concluding passage he addressed for a final time the possibility of the reintegration of former Leaguer Catholics and what punishing the Jesuits could offer:

SIRE, si vostre generosite ne vous permet de craindre pour vostre personne aumoins apprehendez pour vos serviteurs. Ils ont abandonné femmes, enfans, biens, maisons, commoditez, pour suture vostre fortune: les autres demeurez dans les grandes villes se sont exposez à la bourrelerie des seize, pour vous ouvrir les portes.  

These carefully chosen and powerfully articulated arguments presented the Society of Jesus as the antithesis of the Gallican church. That many of the arguments presented by Arnauld had only tenuous links with reality is irrelevant. In his attacks upon the Jesuits, Arnauld created an explanation for the religious wars, a rationale for the reintegration of Leaguer Catholics into French society, and an example of what should not be tolerated within the post-League French Catholic church.

Arnauld’s criticism of the Jesuits as minions of Spain was not original. Protestant anti-Jesuit rhetoric from France, England, the Dutch Republic and elsewhere provided material for Arnauld’s plaidoyer. Moreover, some of the accusations in the

---

59 Arnauld, *Plaidoyé*, fo. 18v°.
61 Remarkably little scholarly attention had been given to anti-Jesuit polemic in Protestant Europe. However, the influence of Protestant polemic upon Arnauld is apparent in his choice of examples. Malescot provides a useful example of the Protestant publications from which Arnauld could have drawn
_plaidoyer_ had been foreshadowed in earlier publications attributed to both Arnauld and Estienne Pasquier. Yet this text was the first full articulation of such a radical new interpretation of the Jesuits in the French Catholic context. Arnauld and his supporters consciously raised the stakes in the debate. The Jesuits were transformed into the chief cause of discord within the French Catholic church and the chief seducers of good Frenchmen. In Arnauld’s rhetoric the Jesuits became a potent threat to the French Catholic church and French institutions in general.

II. The reception of the new anti-Jesuit rhetoric and the expulsion of the Society

Arnauld’s arguments were meant for wider consumption than the confines of the Parlement. Arnauld’s _plaidoyer_ was published shortly after it was presented and joined a flood of other pamphlets against the Society of Jesus.⁶² In the public campaign, as in Arnauld’s _plaidoyer_, Jesuit guilt provided the justification for reconciliation within the French Catholic church. The University case was a _cause célèbre_ in Paris and the Jesuit image as foreign and subversive was one important focus of the French Catholic debate during the summer of 1594.

Arnauld’s _plaidoyer_ was not intended to contradict royal policy. For Arnauld and his sympathizers, primarily amongst the _parlementaires_ who had sat in the exiled Parlement at Tours, the expulsion of the Jesuits would assist the royal policy of _douceur_ upon, see E. Malescot, _Morologie des Jesuites_ (Caen, 1593).

⁶² _Advis et resolution de messieurs de l’assemblee du Clergé de France tenu à Poissy en l’an 1561_ (n.pl., 1594). See also C. Du Moulin, _Consullatio an Jesuitae sint recipiendi in regno Franciae et admittdi in Universitate Parisiensisi_ (n.pl., 1594). See also _Determination dela faculte de theologie de Paris conclue le premier jour de Decembre 1554_ (n.pl., 1594). See also E. Pasquier, _Le Plaidoyé de M. Pasquier pour l’Université de Paris_ (Pairs, 1594). See also Du Mesnil, _Plaidoie de fev: M. L’advocat du Mesnil, en la cause de l’Vniversité de Paris & des Jesuites_ (n.pl., 1594).
toward participants in the League. Nevertheless, Arnauld's articulation was a radical departure from Henry IV's clement approach toward Leaguer groups and was rejected by many in France. The Jesuits received strong support from their patrons, including the Cardinal de Bourbon and the duc de Nevers, who wrote on their behalf to the Parlement. Moreover, even many of Arnauld's natural allies were disturbed by his wilder assertions. Indeed, for some opponents of the Jesuits Arnauld's arguments brought the threat of renewed religious disorder rather than peace. For instance, on 12 July 1594 the memoirist Estoile commented:

Que si à son [Antoine Arnauld's] plaidoïé il eust apporté plus de modération et moins de passion, laquelle ordinairement est subjecte au controle et à l'envie, il eust esté trouvé meilleur de ceux mesmes qui n'aiment pas les Jésuistes, et qui les souhaittent tous aux Indes, à convertir les infidèles.

Estoile was a long-standing critic of the Jesuits, but he saw in Arnauld's arguments the heated rhetoric of the religious wars. For Estoile, Arnauld's desire to expel the Jesuits was not appropriate in the climate of fragile and incomplete peace which Henry IV had barely started to establish. Arnauld's proposals brought the possibility of renewed religious conflict as implied by the public support for the Jesuits from the duc de Nevers and the Cardinal de Bourbon during the trial. Arnauld's clear and forceful articulation of Jesuit guilt failed to resonate with many in his audience, even those who were inclined to distrust the Jesuits, as Arnauld's arguments threatened to disturb the tenuous peace.

---

63 It is impossible to identify exactly who supported Arnauld's arguments. P. De Mena in a letter implies that premier président Achille de Harlay and other parlementaires supported the arguments expressed by Arnauld: see AFCJ Prat 30, pp. 171–179: Mena to Aquaviva, 19 July 1603. It is also interesting to note that J.-A. de Thou offers a very sympathetic description of Arnauld's arguments in his Histoire Universelle, viii, 465–493.
64 Du Boulay, Historia, vi, 819–821.
65 De Thou, Histoire, viii, 466–468. See also ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 230: Dupuy to Aquaviva, 6 August 1594.
67 De Thou, Histoire, viii, 467.
Moreover, many in the Parlement, including several présidents and a majority of the gens du roi, worked to suppress the case soon after Arnauld’s plaidoyer was presented, because such strong criticism of the Jesuits undermined royal policy towards the Pope and royal attempts to pacify the kingdom.\textsuperscript{68} In September 1594 Henry IV intervened directly to suppress the deadlocked case, which had left the Parlement divided since Arnauld’s plaidoyer on 12 July 1594. The actions of the gens du roi at the Parlement emphasized that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Crown rather than the Parlement.\textsuperscript{69} Henry IV had a number of reasons to suppress the case in the manner in which he did. For the king, alleged Spanish responsibility for the religious wars allowed him to pardon virtually all the individuals and groups who participated in the League without having to punish any single group within France. Further, clemency was a use of the royal mystique which the Parlement did not have the competency to understand. To grant clemency to individuals patently guilty of treason was a royal prerogative the exercising of which Arnauld’s proposed expulsion would prevent. Henry IV actively discouraged political action, especially on issues with religious implications, by any of his subjects. As J.-A. de Thou wrote in a letter on behalf of the king: ‘toutesfois vous voiez le nom de Dieu aujourd’hui pris en vain par ceux, qui se disent protecteurs dela religion, & servir de masque & de pretexte a leur ambitions.’\textsuperscript{70} De Thou concludes this letter with Henry IV’s solution to the problem: ‘il est prealable d’establir la paix, & la reconnaissance du souverain & legitime majesté en ce roiaume, que la


\textsuperscript{70} BN Dupuy 706, fo. 128: Minute of a letter by J-A. De Thou, 1592.
The University case took the initiative in religious affairs from the king. Moreover, the need for absolute royal control over the terms of pacification was emphasised in correspondence written by De Thou on behalf of the king. Without strong royal leadership De Thou raised the spectre of: 'un grand schisme en l'Estat, qui naistra dela paix, pire de la guerre mesme.' Indeed, the king's decision to suppress the case without providing justification was noted by the Jesuit Father Provincial Dupuy. Thus, Henry IV's suppression of the case served to emphasise royal determination to control any action regarding the Jesuits or other religious organisations.

Although the exact procedure which was used to suppress the University case is not recorded, the well informed Dupuy indicated in a letter to Aquaviva that the case was removed from the public stage on 6 September 1594. Chancellor Cheverny remarked in his Mémoires that the king's action meant that the Jesuits 'demeurèrent eschappez des artifices de leurs ennemis, et de la grande animosité qu'il y avoit contr'eux audit Parlement.' However, while royal suppression brought an end to the University case, opposition to the Jesuits did not disappear and indeed caused continued concern for the Society. For instance, in a letter dated 25 October 1594, Dupuy warned the Father General that the case could be renewed in a different form after the Parlement returned.

---

71 BN Dupuy 706, fo. 129: idem.
72 BN Dupuy 706, fo. 136v°: J-A. De Thou to La Trémoille, 10 October 1593.
73 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 281: Dupuy to Aquaviva, 1 October 1594. Dupuy reports that no one knows exactly why the king made his decision.
74 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 281: idem.. For the date see AN X1a, fo. 363: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 6 September 1594.
75 P. Cheverny, Mémoires de Messire Philippe Huraiat, Comte de Cheverny, Chancelier de France, in Michaud and Poujoulat (eds.), Nouvelle collection des Mémoires relatif à l'histoire de France, (Paris, 1854), x, 639 [sic].
from recess. Arnauld’s attacks remained in the public consciousness but were neither firmly established nor accepted, even among many who disliked the Society of Jesus. This situation was to change, with catastrophic implications for the Jesuits, following the attempted assassination of the king in December 1594.

On 27 December 1594 Henry IV returned to Paris from Picardy where he had travelled to oversee the advanced preparations for war with Spain. Henry arrived at the Hôtel de Schomberg, Gabriel d’Estreé’s residence, where Jean Chastell, a young man around twenty years old, took the opportunity to enter the palace among the king’s retinue. Chastell was a devout but deeply disturbed Catholic who planned to atone for his sins through the assassination of the relapsed heretic, Henry IV. However, while Chastell found his opportunity to strike in the Hôtel de Schomberg, his attempt to slash the king’s throat failed and he only succeeded in lightly wounding Henry on the lip and breaking a tooth.

Despite Chastell’s failure, the event had a profound effect on contemporaries. For many the event represented an all-too-real reminder of how fragile political stability was in France and of the kingdom’s reliance upon Henry IV’s continued occupation of the throne. Many Frenchmen had foreseen this crisis. Catholic publicists had written numerous texts and orations which emphasised how dependent the peace was on the well being of the king. Similar sentiments can be discerned in less rhetorical writings. For

---

76 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 302: Dupuy to Aquaviva, 25 October 1594.
78 These tracts were produced by a variety of Catholic writers. For instance, Antoine Séguier, a strong supporter of the Jesuits, produced a harangue in 1593: BN Dupuy 313, fos 63–69: Harangue of Antoine
instance, De Thou in a letter to the duc de la Trémoille stated: ‘pour assurer l’Estat &
la personne du chef de l’Estat, bien iuge l’on, que les remedes qui ont esté estimes
necessaires pour le bien de l’un, sont aussi necessaires pour le salut de l’autre.’

For the Jesuits the Chastell assassination attempt was a dangerous turn of events.

To those already inclined to distrust the Jesuits, Chastell’s actions were a tangible
example of the potential dangers of tyrannicide which would remain in France until the
Jesuits were expelled. The religious outlook which had driven Chastell to attempt the
assassination combined with his past attendance of a Jesuit college seemingly confirmed
Arnauld’s concerns over the promotion of Jesuit piety and education in France.

Moreover, direct evidence was actively sought to prove Jesuit involvement in the affair.

As Mousnier has noted, the questioning of Chastell was consistently ‘insidieux et d’une
confusion regrettable’, in part because of his inquisitors’ determination to discover the
identities of his presumed accomplices. For instance, the multiple facets of the
questions made the exact meaning of Chastell’s answers uncertain:

Enquis s’il n’avoit pas esté en la Chambre des meditations ou les Jesuites
introduisaient les plus grands pécheurs qui voyent [sic] en icelle chambre les
portraits de plusieurs Diables de diverses figures espouentables sous couleur de les
reduire en meilleure vie pour esbranler leurs esprits et les pousser par telle
admonition a faire quelque grande cas.
A Dit qu’il avoit esté souvent en cette Chambre des meditations.

It is difficult to tell from Chastell’s answer whether he was admitting to meditating at the
Jesuit college or to being driven to assassinate the king through pressure from the

Séguier at Tours, 13 November 1593. Arnauld in his plaidoyer against the Jesuits also emphasized the
importance of the king’s well-being to the kingdom: Arnauld, Plaidoyé, fo. 51–51v°.
79 BN Dupuy 706, fo. 135v°: J.-A. De Thou to La Trémoille, 10 October 1593.
80 AFCJ Prat 30, pp. 179–183: Mena to Aquaviva, 19 July 1603. For more information on Chastell’s
attendance of a Jesuit college see BN MS. Fr. 15798, fo. 199v°: Interrogation of Jean Chastell.
81 Mousnier, L’Assassinat, p. 203.
82 BN MS. Fr. 15798, fo. 201–201v°: Interrogation of Jean Chastell.
Society. But in the form presented in the official transcript, Chastell’s comment could be construed to imply Jesuit complicity in the affair. Further, only hours after the attempted assassination the Parlement sent investigators to arrest all the Jesuits in Paris and to scour the College of Clermont for evidence of Jesuit complicity. Despite their best efforts these investigators could only uncover a few letters by the Jesuit Father Guignard, written at the time of Henry III’s assassination, in which he discussed the theory of tyrannicide. The zealousness, or perhaps overzealousness, of the investigators was noted by the Chancellor Cheverny who wrote that ‘où ils trouvèrent veritablement, ou peut estre supposerent, ainsi que quelques uns l’ont cru, certains escrits particuliers contre la dignité de tous les roys en general ....’ While this material did not implicate the Jesuits as directly as their opponents might have liked, it did confirm the most important claims of Arnauld’s *plaidoyer* and allowed the Society to be persecuted as a group alongside Chastell. The investigators consequently presented Chastell as the product of Jesuit education and spiritual guidance.

The crucial concern for the Society, however, was the king’s actions, since only the reversal of Henry IV’s support for the Jesuits in September would ensure their expulsion. Henry’s decision to change his policy toward the Jesuits and allow the Parlement to expel the entire Society from France on 29 December 1594 was a decisive blow to the Society’s position in France. This decision was taken in light of the Society’s alleged complicity in the assassination attempt and thus seemed to link the Jesuits directly to an act of regicide which confirmed the rhetoric of Arnauld’s University.
Consequently, royal support for the punishment of the Society in the aftermath of this dramatic event legitimised the polemic surrounding the University case from the summer.

The sudden change of policy by the king has been the subject of speculation by historians. Many scholars have concluded that the king must have believed that the entire Society was culpable for the attempt on his life. While this conclusion is plausible, it has a number of drawbacks. Under the circumstances it is remarkable that Henry IV would decide to sanction the expulsion of the entire Society from France on the inconclusive evidence of the Parlement in order to avenge his wounds, as it put at risk important policy goals. Henry IV had worked over the past several years to improve his standing amongst both important French aristocrats and at Rome but the persecution of the Jesuits threatened to undermine much of this good work. Further, support for the Jesuits in the south of the kingdom remained solid even after the expulsion as the ultimate refusals of the Toulouse and Bordeaux Parlements to register the banishment decree attest. Thus, strong support for the Jesuits meant that any attempt to expel the Society from France on the questionable evidence of their enemies in the Paris Parlement brought the potential of fierce opposition. The expulsion also undermined the entire royal policy of pacification as the prosecution of the Jesuits made other League participants unsure of the security of their own positions in France.

Even if the king had judged that some Jesuit complicity was involved, the

---

85 See Arrest de la Cour de Parlement contre Jean Chastel eschofier estudiant au College des Iesuites, pour le parricide par lui attenté sur la personne du Roy (Paris, 1595). See also Edict et declaration du Roy sur le bannissement des Iesuites, avec l'arrest de la Cour de Parlement de Rouen sur la verification d'iceluy (Caen, 1595).

86 For instance see A. Droin, 'L'expulsion des Jésuites sous Henri IV et leur rappel', Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 3 (1901), 19-20.
indiscriminate expulsion of the whole Order from France, rather than the punishment of those Jesuits implicated in the affair, was a decision which could be interpreted by observers as extreme. To punish the guilty was an acceptable role for a king but to expel a whole Catholic order from France might be seen as persecution. 87 A number of important figures in the royal judicial administration expressed their unease over the prosecution of the Society. For instance, the Chancellor Cheverny, in his Mémoires, noted that ‘En cette sorte lesdits jesuites furent chassez de Paris, non sans estonnement de beaucoup, et regret de plusieurs, qui eussent bien désiré que l’on eust corrigé le mal qui estoit aux particuliers ....’ 88 Further, the procureur général rejected the arguments for the punishment of the whole Society and concluded that ‘au simple bannissement et à l’amende honorable’ of Father Guignard was the most acceptable punishment ‘comme il y a grande apparence que s’il ne fust venu à mauvaise heure, comme on dit, qu’il en eust esté quitte pour cela.’ 89 Finally, the procureur général’s brother, président Séguiier, was also willing to publicly question the process, despite the difficult atmosphere in Paris. The Jesuit Father de Mena reports that président Séguiier ‘leur remonstra que le fait de Chastell estoit tout clair et notoire, et qu’il falloit donner facilement l’arrest contre luy, réservant par après à voyr si on trouveroit rien contre les Jesuistes.’ 90 These individuals questioned both the decision to prosecute the Society alongside Jean Chastell and the decision to prosecute the Jesuits collectively for a crime in which only Guignard was in any sense implicated. Thus, there were important voices in Paris willing to question the case presented by the Society’s opponents; and the punishment of innocent

87 For more information on how the decision to prosecute the Society of Jesus with Chastel was made see De Thou, Histoire, viii, 535.  
88 Cheverny, Mémoires, p. 542.  
89 Estoile, Mémoires, vii, 5.
Jesuits along with the guilty was to be the chief complaint of Jesuit supporters for years to come.\(^91\)

While Henry IV may have chosen to disregard the danger involved in pursuing the Jesuits so vigorously in order to punish an Order which he believed had plotted to take his life, there is little evidence of the king’s continued hostility after the initial expulsion order was issued. In the period between 1595 and 1597 Henry IV spurned numerous opportunities to punish the Society through the enforcement of the expulsion decree.\(^92\) Moreover, from 1598 Henry IV reversed his policy towards the Society and promoted their return to France.\(^93\) Thus, if Henry IV was angry with the Society in December 1594 there is little evidence that he continued to act on this anger. Therefore, there is reason to question whether Henry IV’s alleged ire towards the Society is the only possible explanation for his actions in late December 1594. A plausible alternative explanation for the specific course of action chosen by the king does exist; namely, that the expulsion order was taken with reference to his decision to go to war with Spain, a factor not considered by previous scholars.

While there is no conclusive evidence as to why Henry IV chose to punish the whole Society there is significant evidence that foreign policy considerations could have played an important role in the king’s decision. By the end of December 1594 the collapse of the League had made open war with Spain an increasingly attractive option for the French Crown. Many of Henry IV’s influential Huguenot advisers advocated the policy which they argued would help to bring the kingdom together in a war of national

\(^{90}\) AFCJ Prat 30, pp. 195–197: Mena to Aquaviva, 19 July 1603.

\(^{91}\) For instance see D'Ossat Lettres, i, 469–470: D'Ossat to Henry IV, 16 February 1595.

\(^{92}\) See pp.52–55.

\(^{93}\) See pp. 67–69.
enterprise reminiscent of Henry II’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{94} Moreover, it was argued that a war against Spain would serve to link more closely Henry’s Leaguer opponents with the traditional national foe. In any case, Henry IV and his advisers knew that action against Spain was required as Spanish troops continued to sustain the League in Brittany and Languedoc, and intercepted dispatches from Philip II revealed that the Spanish monarch was seriously considering another invasion of northern France in the hopes of rallying the remaining Leaguer nobles.\textsuperscript{95} In addition, an open declaration of war, if his Catholic subjects were willing to support it, brought the opportunity for Henry to reassure his international Protestant allies that his foreign policy toward Spain had not changed with his religion. While many devout Catholics would require a just cause for a war against a fellow Catholic monarch, the possibility of fanning popular anti-Spanish sentiment in France at the close of the League remained a tempting prospect for Henry IV.

The assassination attempt came shortly after the king’s decision to go to war and as preparations were being finalised for the first campaign. De Thou dates the royal decision to go to war from the opening of December 1594.\textsuperscript{96} This date correlates with evidence from diplomatic correspondence.\textsuperscript{97} This date, some six weeks before the formal declaration of war on 15 January 1595, is also consistent with the king’s efforts to marshal his forces in preparation for the conflict. Thus, the attempted assassination corresponded with Henry IV’s intense preparations for war and may have been viewed

\textsuperscript{94} For a general discussion of the Protestant position see M. Greengrass, \textit{France in the Age of Henri IV}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn. (London, 1995), pp. 237–238.


\textsuperscript{96} De Thou, \textit{Histoire}, viii, 530–531.

\textsuperscript{97} For instance, see PRO SP France 78/34, fo. 283–283v:\ Henry IV’s declaration to those on the frontiers of France who are friendly to Spain or neutral, 7/17 December 1594. See also D’Ossat, \textit{Letres},
with reference to the pressing requirements of the impending conflict. In this context, it is plausible that Henry IV may have been prepared to risk compromising the central strategy of his pacification policy in order to use the assassination attempt to rally the nation for war with Spain. The expulsion of the Society did offer the king a potentially powerful cause for war. Chastell’s attempt upon the king’s life, paired with the symbolic Spanish Jesuit minions of Arnauld’s *plaidoyer*, provided an emotive reason for people to rally to the monarch against the traditional Habsburg enemy. Without Arnauld’s presentation of alleged Jesuit influence over Frenchmen, Chastell was merely a religious fanatic with an incomprehensible desire to murder the king. However, by accepting the Jesuits as portrayed by Arnauld in his *plaidoyer*, Chastell’s attempt became a political act which struck at the foundations of French institutions and sovereignty. Jesuit institutional complicity was the proof of continued Spanish subversion directed against France and its new royal line. This was a strong rationale for good Frenchmen to rally to Henry IV’s cause against the foreign enemy, Spain. Thus, it is likely that Henry IV chose to allow the entire Society to be banished in order to utilise the same traditional enmity for Spain that polemicists had used to attack the Jesuits in the summer of 1594. Henry was exploiting disquiet with the Jesuits and the attempt on his life in order to win domestic sympathy for an important policy initiative: open war against Philip II. This theory will be advanced further in the following chapter where it will be shown that the king’s increasing good will toward the Society coincided with the return of peace with Spain.

The Jesuit expulsion was the result of the coming together of a number of

---

i, 311–312: D’Ossat to Henry IV, 5 December 1594.
circumstances. The new anti-Jesuit rhetoric articulated in the summer had initially been rejected by the king, but this royal position changed and the same anti-Jesuit rhetoric rejected in September was seemingly accepted by the Crown when it sanctioned the Society's expulsion. Whatever the reason for this change in royal attitude, it had a profound impact on the Society of Jesus. While the Society could still count on the support of important individuals and groups in France, royal support for its expulsion on the grounds of tyrannicide gave legitimacy to Arnauld's arguments.

III. Conclusion: the aftermath of the expulsion

French Catholic anti-Jesuit rhetoric developed rapidly in the period between the summer of 1593 and December 1594. The image of the Jesuits as a subversive Spanish threat to the French church and state who bore responsibility for much of the disorder of the religious wars was first voiced amongst some polemicists associated with the Parlement in exile at Tours in the summer of 1593 and found its fullest articulation in Arnauld's plaidoyer for the University in the summer of 1594. While this conception entered the public consciousness through the efforts of these polemicists, the new image of the Jesuits was a radical departure from previous Catholic anti-Jesuit rhetoric and the new conception was met with great unease, even by many of the polemicists' natural allies. Thus, when Henry IV suspended the University case in September 1594 the new more virulent anti-Jesuit image associated with it might have disappeared from the public debate. However, the attempted assassination of Henry IV by Jean Chastell provided a new context in which Arnauld's anti-Jesuit rhetoric resonated in France and, indeed,
gained the monarch’s public support. Royal policy gave legitimacy to the rhetoric and resulted in an arrêt which ordered the expulsion of the Society from all of France.

By January 1595 the expulsion of the Jesuits had transformed the image of the Society in France. The monarch’s public acceptance of the Society’s guilt was vital to the issue. For many of the parlementaires in Paris, Henry IV’s decision made the issue into one of public law and enforcement. Nevertheless, despite the important public triumph of the Jesuits’ opponents, the position of the Society in France was not decided in December 1594. The Jesuits were quickly expelled from the jurisdictions of the Paris, Rouen, Rennes and Dijon Parlements, but there was little further progress towards the exclusion of the Jesuits from the whole of France.99 Despite the king’s success by 1597 in bringing political peace to the provinces of Languedoc and Guienne, he did not press for the expulsion of the Jesuits from the jurisdictions of the Bordeaux and Toulouse Parlements. Indeed, Jesuit influence increased outside the Paris Parlement’s jurisdiction as local support for the foundation of new Jesuit colleges in Tulle, Brive and Limoges attest.100 Further, the Parlement’s decrees were thwarted by a portion of the Parisian elite, including the procureur-général of the Paris Parlement, through the practice of sending their children to Jesuit colleges outside the immediate jurisdiction of the Parlement.101

These enforcement problems resulted in a series of arrêts designed to regulate aspects of the expulsion decree. For instance, on 21 August 1597 the Parlement renewed the expulsion decree of 29 December 1594 with added stipulations which denied students


99 The dates for these expulsion orders were as follows: Paris (29 December 1594), Rouen (21 January 1595), Rennes (11 February 1595) and Dijon (16 February 1595).


101 AN XIa 1758, fo. 3: Registers of the Paris Parlement.
from Jesuit colleges the right to matriculate at the University of Paris. Further, on 1 October 1597 the Parlement issued an arrêt demanding that the comte de Tournon expel the Jesuits from their college at Tournon. Finally, on 16 October 1597 the Parlement issued a decree forbidding the former Jesuit, Porsan, from taking up the post of rector at the Lyon municipal school.

Despite their strong tone, these arrêts were not the work of confident magistrates enforcing an established decree but rather reflected a growing concern among members of the Paris Parlement that royal support could not be counted on to enforce the expulsion of the Society. De Thou, in his Histoire Universelle, explained the Parlement’s concerns as:

Les Gens du Roi, envoyés à la Cour par le Parlement, avoient souvent pressé Sa Majesté de donner une Declaration, pour enjoindre aux autres Parlemens de France de faire publier dans leur ressort l'Arrêt rendu contre les Jésuites. La chose avoit été résolue déjà deux fois dans le Conseil, mais sans aucun effet, par les intrigues des amis de la Société qui étoient auprès du Roi. C’est pourquoi les Gens du Roi, voulant empêcher que la force de cet Arrêt ne fût entierement éludée, & pour contribuer de tout leur pouvoir à le faire exécuter, représenterent au Parlement l’injure que ces retardemens faisoient à l’autorité de cet illustre Corps; & ayant demandé qu’il fût défendu, sous des peines rigoureuses, aux villes, aux colleges & aux Universités, de laisser prêcher ou d’admettre aux fonctions ecclésiastiques aucuns Jésuites, ni de leur confier l’éducation des enfans en public ou en particulier, sous prétexte qu’ils auroient quitté la Société.

De Thou expressed the unease of many magistrates over the lack of enforcement for the expulsion arrêt. Without royal support the arrêt could not be fully implemented. Moreover, if the king was influenced by the Jesuits’ powerful allies the whole expulsion arrêt was in danger of being reversed. The importance of royal support was reflected in

---

102 AN X1a 1758, fo. 180: idem.
103 AN X2b, fo. 185: Collections of Parlementary arrêts.
104 AN X2b, fo. 181: idem. See also S. Marion, Plaidoyers de Simon Marion, Baron de Drvy, cy Devant advocat en Parlement (Paris, 1598).
the ineffectiveness of the three arrêts issued by the Parlement in 1597. The Parlement’s arrêts were only successful in excluding Porsan from the position of rector at the Lyon municipal school. Thus, as De Thou implied in his account, royal support for the implementation of the edict was sought by the Parlement, but the allies of the Jesuits were willing to defend the Society and the king was not inclined to support his magistrates’ efforts. Royal support had assured the success of the expulsion arrêt in December 1594 but continued support was required to fully implement the edict and this was not forthcoming.

The concerns of the Paris magistrates reflected a new situation in France. The image of the Jesuits as a subversive threat to French society became established; indeed, anti-Jesuit polemicists for the next four centuries would return to the rhetoric of 1594 to define the Jesuit threat to France. Nevertheless, the extraordinary events of 1594 which brought about royal support for the Jesuit expulsion did not necessarily reflect the long-term interests of the monarch. Indeed, when war with Spain concluded with the Peace of Vervins on 2 May 1598, new post-war requirements made it possible for the Crown to view Jesuit participation in the French church in a very different light.

---

105 De Thou, Histoire, ix, 118–119.
Chapter Two

Royal authority and the return of the Society of Jesus to France (1603)

The expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France in December 1594 seemed to confirm their image as a subversive foreign threat to the French church and state. However, the Jesuits’ return to France in 1603 under the auspices of Henry IV produced the conditions in which an alternative image of the Society could develop. Through royal support the Jesuits resumed an active role in the French Catholic church with both a political legitimacy and legal standing that the Society had not enjoyed before its expulsion. This new context was to provide the basis for Jesuit participation in French political and religious life for the next century and a half.

Interpreting royal policy during this period has proved unusually problematic for scholars. French Gallican historians, who have had the greatest influence upon scholarship to date, have often searched for an explanation as to why the great national figure Henry IV seemingly betrayed French interests by allowing the Society of Jesus to return. The historian A.M. Droin is typical when he argues that by 1598 the king disliked the Jesuits: ‘c’etaient des rebelles qui, loin de meriter sa bienveillance, continuaient a le braver, entretenant le feu de la Ligue et s’alliant a ses ennemis. Henri IV songeait moins a les rappeler qu’a les expulser totalement.’ Nevertheless, according to Droin: ‘La mauvaise volonte de Henri IV à l’égard des Jésuites n’avait d’égale que l’ardeur du Pape

---

à obtenir leur rappel.'

Thus, for Gallican scholars like Droin the Jesuit return was an unpalatable necessity, a pragmatic political decision by Henry IV to set aside his personal dislike for the Jesuits in order to broker a deal with the Pope. Pro-Jesuit scholars, on the other hand, have often attributed Henry IV's change of opinion to the good work of the Society's allies who showed the king the piety of the Jesuits, the value of the Company to the French church and the value of Jesuit colleges to French society.

While both of these historiographical traditions rightly note Henry IV's central role in facilitating a Jesuit return, the argument presented in this chapter rejects both established interpretations of royal motivation. This chapter will argue that the Jesuit return was not the result of direct outside pressure. There is no evidence that Henry IV was so constrained by the external environment that he had to act in this manner. Rather, the factors at work were more subtle. Specifically, the available evidence suggests that the logic of royal foreign and domestic policy left the king inclined to sanction a Jesuit return. The Peace of Vervins, signed with Spain in May 1598, largely displaced the competition between the Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties from a struggle for military supremacy to a struggle for influence at the courts of Europe and for Catholic opinion in general. Thus, continued hostility to the Jesuits became a liability in French attempts to gain influence at Rome and with important Italian and German Catholic principalities.

Further, at home the return of the Society would potentially provide Henry IV with a

---

2 Droin, 'L’expulsion', p. 20.


4 For a good summary of the competition between France and Spain after the Peace of Vervins see G. Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598–1648 (Brighton, 1980), pp.115–130. See also H. Trevor-Roper,
platform with which to assert his own authority over the French church and an important ally within it.

This chapter will also argue that Henry IV used royal authority and royal clemency to ensure that the Society returned in a manner which both reinforced his claim to authority over the French Catholic church and drew the Jesuits into a close relationship with the monarchy which relied upon his continued good will. Thus, unlike previous accounts, this chapter will focus on the careful assertion of royal authority which brought the Jesuits back into the French church by examining royal policy and its interaction with both sympathetic and hostile interests in France during the period 1595–1604. The opening section will examine royal policy toward the Jesuits between their expulsion and the months following the peace with Spain in 1598. The second section will consider events between 1599 and 1601 which redefined the relationship between Henry IV and the Jesuits. The third section will look at the sustained initiative in the spring and summer of 1603 which culminated in the official return of the Jesuits under the conditions promulgated in the Edict of Rouen. Section four will focus on the issues raised by opponents of the Jesuits in an effort to prevent the Jesuit return. The final section will examine how the French Jesuits came to embrace the Edict despite initial opposition from the Jesuit Father General. Each of these sections will contribute to the argument that an assertion of royal authority defined the Society’s return to the kingdom and established the context in which the Jesuits could build a new and quite different image in France from the one which resulted in their expulsion.

I. Royal policy during the war with Spain (1595–1598)

The purpose behind royal policy toward the Society of Jesus in the years following their expulsion was difficult for contemporaries to interpret. The royal order to expel the Jesuits in 1594 appeared to be a clear statement of royal disfavour towards the Society. However, the king’s lack of interest in enforcing the expulsion decree in jurisdictions where it was not immediately registered provided some encouragement to patrons and supporters of the Society. While the king’s ambiguous stance towards the Society resulted in a wide range of speculation at the time, access to Henry IV’s diplomatic correspondence provides us with information which makes royal policy and royal actions during this period more intelligible.

The king’s actions in the months following the Jesuit expulsion inspired lively speculation about Henry IV’s religious policy. In the first months of 1595 many interpreted the royal order to expel the entire Society of Jesus from France as an event which signalled the king’s abandonment of a general policy of pacification. On 10 January 1595, Cardinal Gondi wrote a letter to the Vatican which warned that other religious orders, including the Capucins and Minimes, might be expelled for the same reasons as the Jesuits.5 Two months later, Cardinal d’Ossat, the king’s unofficial ambassador to the Pope, reported the spread of a rumour around the Vatican that the Jesuit expulsion was the first phase of a secret Huguenot plot which included a purge of

---

5 AV Francia 37, fo. 259v°: Cardinal Gondi to Aldobrandini, 10 January 1595.
the other religious orders, the secular clergy and important magistrates. Thus, in the first months of 1595 the possibility of a general persecution of Catholics was articulated in both Paris and Rome.

These rumours proved unfounded. In a letter to Bélièvre on 16 March 1595 the king stated that he planned to leave other religious orders undisturbed. The king’s true concern was emphasised in the remainder of the letter which focused upon the strategy for subduing unruly nobles in Provence. Henry IV was determined to pacify the kingdom politically and militarily before he addressed the more intractable problem of a religious settlement. The expulsion of the Jesuits was not the beginning of a new religious policy but one element in a more general effort to pacify the kingdom.

While it quickly became apparent that the Jesuit expulsion did not reflect general royal policy on religious issues, many still believed that the expulsion did reflect royal policy toward the Society of Jesus. Observers assumed the king’s continued hostility toward the Jesuits throughout the war with Spain. This is not surprising as during this period Henry IV prosecuted a carefully balanced policy toward both the Jesuits and other important interests in the Catholic church. Contemporaries voiced numerous interpretations of royal policy since Henry IV never provided a clear statement of his intentions toward the Society.

Nevertheless, the king’s policy toward the Jesuits throughout the period was consistent even if contemporaries had difficulty interpreting it. For the modern scholar the correspondence of Cardinal d’Ossat provides important insights into royal policy from the perspective of a well-informed adviser. D’Ossat was an experienced diplomat

---

who had co-ordinated and presented royal policy in Rome from 1595 to 1598. His command of policy towards the Society is revealed in a letter to Henry IV dated 5 March 1598. In this dispatch D’Ossat responded to rumours in papal circles that Henry, through his conseil privé, had ordered the general expulsion of all Jesuits in France. No such royal action was in fact undertaken, but D’Ossat’s unusually forceful letter to the king amounts to a subtle discussion of Henry IV’s policy toward the Society of Jesus by a trusted adviser bewildered by apparent policy reversals.

D’Ossat rejected any further persecution of the Jesuits as counter-productive and provided a vivid picture of the potential damage that such a policy could inflict on both the monarch’s international standing and his position in France:

Des Princes & Potentats catoliques étrangers, ceux qui sont bien afectionnez envers le Roi, & ont conceu bonne esperance de lui, & des choses de la France, y deviendroient plus froids & plus lents, & perdroient une partie de la bonne opinion qu’ils ont de la personne de S.M. & du succés de ses afaires. Au contraire, le Roi d’Espagne, le Due de Savoie, & leurs adherans, entreroient en nouvelles esperances de pouvoir faire trouver meilleure leur cause envers tous ceux-là, & de pratiquer & soulever les sujets de S.M. dans le Royaume même, où il y a encore trop de gens, qui d’eux-mêmes, sans autre suggestion des Espagnols, pourroient faire trop mal leur profit de cete ocurrence.

This statement was sustained by a series of examples aimed at driving home the point that a hostile policy towards the Society would bring the loss of influence in Catholic Europe and the renewal of Catholic unrest within the kingdom.

D’Ossat also noted that any hostile action against the Jesuits would make the pacification of the Huguenots even more difficult. D’Ossat wrote his dispatch at precisely the same time as the Edict of Nantes was finalised, and in this context he

---

8 D’Ossat, Lettres, iii, 22–43: D’Ossat to Henry IV, 5 March 1598.
showed a strong grasp of the possible linkage between royal policy towards the Huguenots on the one hand and a hostile policy towards the Jesuits on the other. For D'Ossat the persecution of the Jesuits at the same time as the monarch provided legal recognition for the Huguenots would be disastrous:

Que s’il advenoit, qu’environ le même temps le Roi s’élargît, ou se fût élargi de quelque chose envers ceux de la Religion P.R. (comme il y en a qui pensent, que pour éviter un plus grand mal il y pourroit être contraint) le bannissement des Jesuites donneroit d’autant plus belle couleur à ceux, qui voudroient faire quelque remuement dans le Royaume, & feroit aussi d’autant plus grande impression en l’esprit du Pape & de toute cete cour, & de tous Princes, Seigneurs, & peuples catoliques, tant dehors, que dedans la France: & ne pourroit-on leur persuader, que ledit élargissement procedât de la necessité du temps, ni leur ôter hors de la fantaisie, que le Roi n’eût un mauvais dessein d’acroître le parti des Huguenots, & de diminuer & afoiblir celui des Catoliques. 10

This theme of balance in policy-making was emphasised throughout D’Ossat’s letter and reflected his concern that royal policy must be considered as a whole. D’Ossat returned to this theme towards the conclusion of his letter in order to remind the king that the persecution of the Society contrasted sharply with the clemency received by others: ‘s’il tenoit son cœur contre ces gens-ci après un si long-temps, sa rigueur seroit d’autant plus mal interprétée, & prise du Pape, & d’infinis autres, pour un signe certain d’une haine particulière contre les plus fermes catoliques, & encore de quelque mauvais dessein contre la Religion Catholique.’ 11 D’Ossat argued that for all these reasons and others any persecution of the Jesuits would impact adversely on Henry IV’s entire policy and that the monarch would suffer ‘à son propre repos, & pourvoyance pour l’avenir, au bien de ses affaires tant loin que près, & tant dehors que dedans son Royaume; & enfin (qui sera pour un million de raisons à un Prince si genereux) à sa clemence & bonté incomparable,

9 D’Ossat, Letres, iii, 30: idem..
qui lui a aquis louange & gloire immortelle.'

For D'Ossat, Henry IV's religious policy needed to rely upon the monarch's careful assertion of his own authority and the uniform application of his policy of pacification.

D'Ossat's letter offered strongly worded advice from a well-informed counsellor who was worried that Henry IV was reversing his policy. While the rumoured policy change was false, D'Ossat's defence of the Society, for which he had no particular affection, amounts to a cogent critique of royal policy from both a domestic and an international perspective. D'Ossat's statement emphasises that important domestic and international considerations made it imperative that the king was not directly linked to the persecution of the Society. Henry IV's actions between 1595 and 1598 were consistent with D'Ossat's reasoning. The Jesuit expulsion had served its purpose in 1595 and after the initial eviction of the Society from the jurisdictions of the Paris, Rouen, Rennes and Dijon Parlements the king took little interest in enforcing the Jesuit expulsion. Rumours arose on occasion of further royal action against the Society but none was initiated. Indeed, in private Henry IV provided positive signals to those who sympathized with the Society by indicating that when circumstances changed the Society might be allowed to return. For instance, the king presented a pragmatic picture of the situation in France to the Pope when the papal legate, Cardinal de Medicis, requested that

---

10 D'Ossat, Lettres, iii, 30: idem..
11 D'Ossat, Lettres, iii, 41: idem..
12 D'Ossat, Lettres, iii, 43: idem..
13 D'Ossat, Lettres, iii, 27: idem..
14 The only Parlement that Henry IV pressured to register the expulsion arrêt was the Dijon Parlement which had recently been pacified and was still considered unreliable. For more on Dijon see: J.-G. Gossel, 'Un contre-coup de la Ligue en Bourgogne, L’expulsion et le retour des Jésuites de Dijon (1595–1603)', Analecta Gallica/Revue de l'histoire de l'église de France, 1 (1910), 513–532, 641–655. It is striking that the monarch did not press for their expulsion in the south of the kingdom where the sovereign courts, perhaps because of the proximity of large Huguenot congregations, were publicly sympathetic to the Society.
the Jesuits be allowed to return in 1596. The king underlined the difficulties in re-establishing order within France and repeated his reasons for the expulsion of the Society.\(^\text{15}\) Nevertheless, Henry IV was willing to grant audiences to the legate on this subject and implied that in the future, when the political and religious situation stabilised, the issue could be discussed.\(^\text{16}\) In a letter dated 20 April 1597, D'Ossat implied that this message was consistently presented to the Pope when he stated: 'Aussi lui rament eûs-je ce que je lui avois dit autrefois, qu'il n'étoit encore temps de parler du rapel des Jesuites, & le disposai à avoir patience, & à reserver cette instance à un autre temps.'\(^\text{17}\) Thus, Henry IV's actions reflect d'Ossat's summary of royal policy. The king did not enforce the expulsion *arrêt* beyond the areas where it was already in effect but neither did he actively support the Society's return.

The policy was maintained until the summer of 1598 when the Jesuit issue took on a renewed importance in royal considerations. The change in royal policy coincided with a series of important political realignments. First, the Catholic Leaguer movement was effectively brought to an end with the submission of the last important unreconciled Leaguer noble, the due de Mercoeur in March 1598.\(^\text{18}\) Second, the Edict of Nantes was signed in April 1598 which provided the basis for a lasting political and religious understanding between the Crown and the Huguenot minority.\(^\text{19}\) Third, the Peace of Vervins, signed on 2 May 1598, concluded hostilities with Spain.\(^\text{20}\) The new political and

\(^{15}\) For instance see ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 75: Cardinal de Medicis to Clement VIII, 1596; AV Francia 44, fo. 48: Cardinal de Medicis to Cardinal Aldobrandini, 24 November 1596.

\(^{16}\) For instance see AV Francia 45, fos 26–28: Cardinal de Medicis to Clement VIII, 8 March 1597.


\(^{20}\) For more information on the Peace of Vervins see M. Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri*
religious context created by these agreements transformed important foreign and
domestic disputes and brought other issues, such as the future of the Jesuits in France.
back onto the royal agenda. The difficulty in finding a solution for the Jesuit issue and
the important interests involved in the dispute resulted in royal policy toward the Society
remaining ambiguous for a number of months. Nevertheless, the Jesuits’ new relevance
to royal policy was reflected in a number of contradictory actions and comments made
by the king on the subject of their position in France.

On 23 June 1598 the king, for the first time since the expulsion order of January
1595, took action under his own name against the Jesuits. The conseil privé sent an order
to the Parlement in Bordeaux which demanded that the Jesuits be expelled from the
town.21 This order was reflected in other royal actions. Thus, on 18 August 1598 the
Parlement took action on the dormant arrêt against the Jesuit College of Tournon without
royal interference.22 Moreover, two letters dated 2 July and 17 August 1598 from Henry
IV to his ambassador in Rome, the due de Piney-Luxembourg, refer to the king’s hostile
public comments at court about the Jesuits.23 The fact that Henry was inclined to report
these statements in detail to his ambassador indicates that he wanted the statements to be
noted as policy by foreign observers. Papal officials duly interpreted his actions as
hostile to the Society and were particularly unsettled as, for the first time, the monarch

---

21 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 135: François d’Escoubleau de Sourdis to the Rector of the Jesuit College
of Bordeaux, 24 June 1598.
22 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 150: ‘La Cour du Parlement: arrest 18 August 1598 contre le Sieur de
Tournon’.
23 Xivrey, viii, 710–711: Henry IV to due de Piney-Luxembourg, 2 July 1598; Xivrey, v, 15:
idem., 17 August 1598.
was clearly the source for some of the attacks upon the Society.24

Yet this apparently hostile policy toward the Jesuits was mitigated by a number of other royal actions during the same period. On 4 May 1598, two days after the Peace of Vervins was signed, the king ordered his ambassador in Rome to thank the Pope for his help in negotiations and to promise to continue ‘à rebattre doucement les poursuites des jesuites pour leur restablissement en mon royaume.’25 Furthermore, from the end of August the king chose not to continue the various actions against the Jesuits and did not press the Bordeaux Parlement to register his expulsion order when it sent remonstrances in support of the Society.26 Finally, in December the king effectively reversed the policy of August when he suppressed the Tournon affair and granted passports to Jesuit representatives who were sent to discuss the difficulties preventing the Society’s return to France.

Thus, royal policy toward the Jesuits was active, if ambiguous, from the summer of 1598. The reason for the fluctuations in royal policy is not fully revealed in the sources but may have reflected a previously unconsidered factor: the changing requirements of royal foreign policy. The most important royal initiative against the Society during the period, the order to expel the Jesuits from Bordeaux, coincided with the king’s need to improve relations with the Dutch Republic after signing the Peace of Vervins.27 There is evidence that the expulsion order may have been directed at a Dutch

25 Xivrey, viii, 705. Henry IV to due de Piney-Luxembourg, 4 May 1598. The same conversation is recorded from the nuncio’s perspective in ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 89: Cardinal de Medicis to Pope, 1598.
26 For more on the Bordeaux opposition see DN Dupuy 63, fo. 65: premier président of the Bordeaux Parlement Daffis to Henry IV, 20 July 1598.
27 While Kermaignant does not mention the Jesuits in his account of the English reaction to Vervins he does note Henry IV’s interest in appeasing his Protestant allies, see Kermaignant, Mission de Jean de Thumery, i, 121–226.
audience, since the public reason for the expulsion decree was the alleged complicity of
the Bordeaux Jesuits in an assassination attempt on Prince Maurice of Nassau, Captain-
General of the Dutch Republic’s armies. It is unlikely that the king accepted the
truthfulness of this tale, which consisted of Bordeaux Jesuits travelling to the Spanish
Netherlands specifically to convince the would-be-assassins of the practical and celestial
advantages of such an attempt on Maurice’s life. Even Estoile, who was rarely inclined
to support the Jesuits, indicated in his journal that he believed the story to be false.
However, whatever the merits of the rumour, the Treaty of Vervins had left the Dutch to
fight the Spanish on their own and the Jesuit expulsion from Bordeaux was a grand, if
relatively risk free, gesture of continued support for the Dutch against Spanish
aggression. The king’s actions support the theory that Henry IV could have been
concerned with the short-term political situation when he issued the expulsion decree.
After issuing the orders, which gave the gesture of support he desired, the king did not
pressure the Bordeaux Parlement to register the edict; and within six months allowed a
Jesuit delegation to be sent to open a dialogue with him on the subject of their return to
France. The expulsion order did not reflect an important shift in royal policy toward the
Jesuits but may have been a response to the changed international situation in Europe
after the Peace of Vervins.

28 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 135: François d’Escoubleau de Sourdis to Richeome, 24 June 1598; ARSI
Galliae 60, fo. 136: The Jesuit Father Provincial for the Spanish Netherlands Oliverius to Aquaviva, 8 July
1598.

29 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 136: Oliverius to Aquaviva, 8 July 1598.

30 Estoile, Mémoires, vii, 117. Furthermore, the most authoritative contemporary tract gives no
indication that Bordeaux Jesuits were involved: S. Goulart (ed.) La conspiration faite par les pères
Jesuites de Douay, pour assassiner Maurice, Prince d’Orange, Comte de Nassau in Mémoires de la Ligue,
Goulart (ed.), (Geneva, 1599), vi, 717–723. It is important to note that there is no evidence that the
situation in Bordeaux inspired the king’s actions see: C. Jullian, Histoire de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1895),
pp. 454–462. For an account of the Jesuit presence in Bordeaux between 1595 and 1598 see H.
Fouqueray, Histoire, ii, 489–496.
This hypothesis is neither confirmed nor denied by contemporary reaction. The expulsion decree left observers uncertain as to Henry IV’s intentions. For instance, François d’Escoubleau de Sourdis, who interceded for the Jesuits, feared that Henry had ordered the Society’s expulsion from Bordeaux because of both pressure by the Paris Parlement and false rumours. Sourdis was no political outsider. He came from an important old aristocratic family with extensive court and Navarrist connections and had recently been nominated to become the next archbishop of Bordeaux. Yet despite Sourdis’s connections he was uncertain about Henry IV’s attitude towards the Society. Sourdis’s uncertainty does not confirm the theory that Henry was concerned with foreign policy but it should be noted that Henry’s attitude toward the Society had to remain ambiguous for any intended gesture to his Dutch allies to be effective.

Whatever Henry IV’s motivation for his decree against the Bordeaux Jesuits any hostile policy towards the Society was short lived as a shift to a more favourable royal attitude toward the Jesuits became apparent in the final months of 1598. This shift was gradual, but from the summer the king did provide indications that he could be persuaded of the Society’s merits. For instance, when Sourdis defended the Bordeaux Jesuits in an interview with the king in August 1598, the king was responsive to his arguments and asked to be given a copy of the Jesuit Father Richeome’s recent tract in defence of the Society. Moreover, the king began to suggest that he was open to persuasion on the subject of the Jesuits. In an interview with the papal nuncio he ‘ingeniously’ argued that he could not allow the Society to return as he had only one life to risk and the Jesuits had

31 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 135: François d’Escoubleau de Sourdis to Richeome, 24 June 1598; ARSI, Galliae 60, fo. 141: Sourdis to Richeome, 1598; ARSI Galliae 61, fos 26–27: Copy of a letter from Sourdis to unknown, 8 August 1598.
32 ARSI Galliae 61, fos 26v–27: Copy of a letter by Sourdis to unknown, 8 August 1598.
not shown themselves trustworthy. Henry IV’s use of the word ‘ingenuement’ in his account of the interview supported an intended sub-text of the statement: that the Jesuits might one day show themselves to be trustworthy.

The king’s policy in the final months of 1598 reflected the changing context of international Catholic politics. The Peace of Vervins resulted in the French and Spanish monarchies competing for influence in Catholic Europe rather than on the battlefield. As Henry IV attempted to re-establish French influence on the international stage, Jesuit exclusion became a liability, especially in Rome. Clement VIII had harboured hopes since 1595, when he absolved Henry IV, that France under a Bourbon dynasty could balance Spanish power in Rome and Italy. Active courting of the papal hierarchy promised Henry IV a renewed influence in Rome, but at the end of 1598 Clement left Henry in no doubt that he desired a Jesuit return to France.

Moreover, Henry IV’s policy also reflected the changing circumstances within the French church. Peace with Spain allowed Henry IV to attempt to construct a more stable framework through the Edict of Nantes for resolving disputes between the Huguenot minority and the Catholic majority in France. While Henry IV granted legal recognition to the Huguenots, he also promised his Catholic subjects that he would work to convert the Huguenots to the Catholic faith. The Jesuits, who were one of the most active elements of the Catholic reformation in the south of France, were one possible way

---

33 Xivrey, v, 15: Henry IV to duc de Piney-Luxembourg, 17 August 1598.
34 For a discussion of the new challenges in Europe see Parker, Europe in Crisis, pp. 115–130. See also H. Trevor-Roper, ‘Spain and Europe’, pp. 261–271.
36 For instance see ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 68–68v°: Clement VIII to Henry IV, 25 November 1598. Moreover, there is some evidence that the Jesuits hoped to receive support from other Catholic princes when Henry IV initiated discussions for a Jesuit return: see ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 131: Aquaviva to the Duke of Bavaria, 20 June 1599.
for the king to fulfil his undertaking to the Catholic majority. Further, genuine support
for Jesuit religious activities was apparent in the correspondence of the period and in the
actions of important nobles, like the comte de Tournon who continued to defy the
Parlement's order that he close the Jesuit college of Tournon. 37

Some historians have argued that the Society's return was sanctioned by the king
as a concession to Catholics opposed to the Edict of Nantes. While there is surely an
element of truth in this connection, no direct relationship emerges from the source
material. 38 The Peace of Vervins forced Henry IV to address the difficult issue of
Huguenot recognition in France and after such a difficult concession to the Huguenots
the king needed to address the concerns of his Catholic subjects. Therefore, in a general
sense the Edict of Nantes brought the Jesuit issue back to the forefront of royal
considerations. However, to argue that Henry IV allowed the Jesuits to return simply to
placate his Catholic subjects is to ignore the fact that he waited over five years until 1603
before sanctioning readmission and that even then the Jesuits returned under a very
specific set of royal conditions. While the changed internal and international situation
made a Jesuit return advantageous to the king, the Society could only return if the
conditions suited royal policy. In December 1598 the situation was positive enough for
Henry IV to invite a Jesuit representative to the French court to establish the groundwork
for the Society's return. 39

---

37 For examples of correspondence see AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 171–173: Les grands viceiares
capitulaires de Bordeaux to Henry IV, 23 July 1598; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 103–109: Bishop Nicholas de
Villars of Agen to Aquaviva, 6 January 1598. For the comte de Tournon see ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 150:
'La Cour du Parlement: arrest 18 August 1598 contre le Sieur de Tournon'.
38 For instance see A. Droin, 'L'expulsion', pp. 5–28. While Droin implies that the reaction to
the Edict of Nantes and the need for the Pope to annul Henry IV's marriage inspired the royal decision to
allow the Jesuits to return to France, he does not offer clear evidence that this was the case.
II. The establishment of the conditions for the Jesuit return

The basis of Henry IV’s campaign to facilitate a Jesuit return through royal policy was established in the spring and summer of 1599 after the arrival of the experienced Jesuit diplomat Father Maggio at court. The circumstances under which the Society of Jesus returned to France were central in shaping their participation in the church. Royal support for the Jesuits was a defining factor, as were the conditions which Henry IV placed on the Jesuit return. In the weeks following Maggio’s arrival at court in July 1599, Henry IV revealed what he required before a Jesuit recall could be sanctioned.

First, the king asserted that the Jesuits could only petition the king through a request for clemency. As the king told the new Papal Nuncio Gasparo Silingardi, bishop of Modena: ‘il neg.o arduo bisognava procedere con molta maturità, lasciandosi intendere d’haverné a trattare col Parl.am.to sopra di che gli fui risposto, che questo favore [i.e., the Jesuit return] si domandava pergratia, e non per giustitia, e che Sua M.ta poteva gratificarne senza il Parlamento.’ The nuncio clearly understood this distinction as he emphasized to the Pope, in the summary of a later meeting with Henry IV, that the Jesuits should ask, like others guilty of offences during the League, for ‘questa clemenza c’haveva mostrata con tutti gli altri.’ From his first meetings with the nuncio and Maggio, Henry IV indicated that the Jesuits would return only under the protection of the king’s pardon. The facts alleged in the banishment decree were not to be questioned and the past was to be forgotten through the good offices of the clement monarch.

Second, Henry IV indicated to Maggio that only obedience could bring the king’s...

---

[40] AV Francia 47, fo. 99: Bishop Gasparo Silingardi of Modena to Cardinal Aldobrandini, 20
clemency. The king provided the Jesuits with an appropriate gesture to reassure him of their intended obedience. Rumours had spread during the summer that the Jesuits were operating in provincial towns like Agen and Dijon from which they were officially banished. Villeroy reminded the Jesuits that their presence in such places made it appear as if ‘far si poco conto dell’autorita regia, e l’essorto; che vi pigliasse qualche provisione & facilitare il neg.o della restitutione.’ Maggio promised the king that the Jesuits would put a stop to such actions and a campaign was initiated with a number of public letters sent to the king by provincial royal officers which denied the veracity of the rumours. More important to the king were two direct orders from the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva to his French provincials. The first ordered that all Jesuits withdraw from the towns in question, while the second ordered that the French Fathers refuse to open any colleges without the king’s approval. The Father General’s quick, positive response had important implications, as noted by Henry IV in a letter to Aquaviva:

En quoy vous avez faict paroistre votre bon iugement et la [sic] desir que vous avez qu’en semblables choses, il ne soit rien entrepris contre ce qui est deub à mon auctorité de quoy ie vous ay bien voulu remercier ... et vous dire que ce tesmoignage de votre inclination à ce qui est de mes intentions m’a esté bien agreable, et ne sera inutile à ceulx de votre ordre.

Aquaviva made it clear in his response to this letter that he understood that the Jesuits could only return to France ‘come frutti della sua solita è tanto lodata clemenza ....’

Henry IV’s vocabulary and purpose in 1599 were clear to the Jesuits and their...
Roman allies. The French monarch expected obedience in exchange for his clemency. While a dialogue was initiated no negotiations in a strict sense were conducted. Appeal to royal clemency precluded negotiations as it was the king’s judgement rather than any understanding of justice or injustice on the part of the petitioner which was the authority behind a Jesuit return.47 This exchange was very similar to the series of dealings between the king and various Leaguer corporations which had been central to the pacification of the country.48 Numerous individuals and corporate groups who had supported the Catholic League had already exchanged an oath of allegiance in return for the forgetting of past wrongs. Nevertheless, the Jesuit exchange was more complex. During the political pacification of the country in the early 1590s Henry IV had rejected the idea of a pardon which implied guilt and instead emphasised the oubliance or the consigning of the past to oblivion.49 However, in this new exchange in 1599 the question of guilt was not forgotten but rather deemed irrelevant. The king’s clemency alone was the authority behind the Society’s return. Henry IV maintained these criteria throughout the next four years and it is this assertion of royal clemency that was to define the terms of the Jesuit return to the French church.

In the course of 1600, Henry IV was distracted from the Jesuit issue by a series of political events including war with Savoy and his marriage to Marie de Medicis. These events reflected the rapidly changing political and religious balance in Catholic


Europe following the Peace of Vervins of which Henry IV’s renewed interest in the Jesuits was only one component. The possibility of immediate action on the Jesuit issue receded; nevertheless, the question remained a significant, if dormant, subject of royal interest. Henry IV’s commitment to restore the Society in France through his own authority was only renewed in December 1600. After months of inaction, the king returned to the same themes of obedience and clemency in his final interview with Maggio before the Jesuit Father withdrew from the royal court in order to carry out his responsibilities as visitor in France.\(^50\) The king graciously accepted Maggio’s request to leave court and welcomed into his retinue Father Gentil, provincial for Lyon, who was to serve as the Jesuit representative in Maggio’s absence. Maggio’s account of his final meeting with Henry IV before his departure offers an opportunity to examine Henry IV’s continued commitment to a specific understanding with the Jesuits centred on the exchange of obedience for royal clemency.

Henry IV used this interview to remind the Society of Jesus of his requirements. The king asked Gentil whether he was a French subject, what region he came from, and how long he had been in the Company of Jesus. Henry then used these friendly questions to assert that he would be willing to deal with any Jesuit who acknowledged: ‘Reges enim a deo instituntur, atque ipsius dei vero sunt imagine.'\(^51\) Maggio and Gentil assured the king that all French Jesuits regardless of where they resided were his obedient servants and accepted his authority. The king then continued his discourse by asserting that he strove to deal with all his loyal subjects, including the Jesuits, ‘cum benignitate

---

\(^{50}\) ARSI Galliae 61, fos 194v-200v: Maggio to Aquaviva, 20 December 1600.

\(^{51}\) ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 195: idem..
tamen atque suavitate'. In this audience, the king reasserted, after months of silence, that he required the Society’s obedience and loyalty before he would sanction a Jesuit return.

Henry IV also asserted in the interview that the Society was to return through his clemency alone. Thus, Henry voiced his concern that, while he was anxious to support the Society, he had heard rumours that the Jesuits continued to give support to Spain: ‘Jesuitas enim studare ut Regem Hispaniae promoveant, & conscios illorum fuisse, qui in suam vitam conspiraverant.’ The Jesuits denied this allegation vigorously but the king maintained his silence. When Henry IV did respond he stated that he realised that the Jesuits had done much to rectify the situation. This statement reinforced the king’s desire to avoid any dispute over the truth of the alleged facts in the Parlement’s original expulsion decree. The Jesuits were to return to the kingdom through the king’s clemency alone not through the justice of their claim. This point was reinforced when the king concluded: ‘Hoc ergo curate, Rex ait, mihique subditi fideles, me etenim faustum habebitur de amicum.’ Henry IV emphasised that the Jesuits were not to rely upon intercessors but rather to come directly to him for protection and favour. The king offered an example from Aquitaine of the Society’s use of intercessors at court to present the Jesuit case to the king. He concluded this point when he ordered that in the future the Society should come directly to him for his favour.

The king brought the interview to an end by affectionately embracing Maggio and promising that he would call the Father to Paris where he would arrange for the

---

52 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 195v°: idem.  
53 ARSI Galliae 61, fos 196v°–197: idem.  
54 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 197v°: idem.  
55 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 197v°: idem.
Jesuits’ return after he had overcome the Parlement’s opposition. Henry IV’s purpose in this interview was to restate what he expected and required from the Jesuits and to emphasize that the French Jesuits must remain obedient and loyal if they were to receive his clemency. Furthermore, he once again established that the revocation of the Jesuit banishment was to be obtained from the monarch alone.

On 24 December 1600, two days after Maggio’s interview with Henry IV, Villeroy informed Maggio that the king had publicly reproached a preacher for accusing the Jesuits of meddling in the affairs of state. This public defence of the Jesuits, along with the king’s interview with Maggio and Gentil, marked the return of Henry IV’s attention to the Jesuit issue. In a letter from Maggio to Aquaviva dated 22 January 1601 the Father stated that ‘il Rè gli ha promesso, che in ogni modo gli restituira, è ne farà la spedizione fra termine di due mesi, nel qual tempo disporrà le materie, è quelli del Parlamento di Parigi.’ Henry IV actually took until August to invite Maggio back to court but Maggio’s delayed arrival in November was a formality. As Henry IV had emphasized since 1599 the Jesuits were reliant upon royal clemency and, therefore, there was no question of negotiating over the format of the Jesuit return. Indeed, Maggio had no idea what exact conditions Henry IV planned to impose on the Society to sanction their recall.

Maggio was not the only uninformed individual. The new Papal Nuncio Bufalo

---

56 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 197vo: idem.
57 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 200vo: idem.
58 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 203: Maggio to Aquaviva, 24 December 1600.
59 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 391: Maggio to Aquaviva, 22 January 1601. Indeed, Henry IV returned to the Jesuit issue just days after peace was concluded.
60 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 216: Bérulle to Maggio, 8 July 1601; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 369–371: Maggio to Aquaviva, 16 August 1601; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 363–367: Maggio to Villeroy, 27 July 1601; BN MS. Fr. 3484, fo. 23vo: Henry IV to Philippe de Béthune, 12 October 1601; BN MS. Fr. 3484, fo. 30: Henry IV to Philippe de Béthune, November 1601.
was also kept completely ignorant of the king's intentions towards the Jesuits and failed to discover anything from his contacts in Paris and at court. In the drafting of conditions for a Jesuit return, Henry IV avoided the active participation of any interest group outside his close circle of advisers, as royal policy required that the conditions were founded strictly on the royal will. The entire course of Jesuit relations with the king since Maggio's arrival in 1599 indicated that Henry wished to pursue Jesuit reintegration in the same manner as the integration of other Leaguer corporations. Past wrongs were to be ignored. Moreover, obedience to the monarch was to be the chief requirement for reintegration. The papal nuncio, with whom Henry IV had a good working relationship, was excluded from the process since the king viewed the issue as strictly between himself and a group of his subjects. Acceptance of the king's will would offer the Society rights guaranteed by the monarch in exchange for obedience and loyalty.

Nevertheless, Henry IV felt it prudent to inform the Pope of his decision in advance. In a letter dated 18 November 1601 he forwarded his conditions to the French ambassador in Rome, Philippe de Béthune. These stipulations, which were to remain the substance of Henry IV's conditions when the Edict of Rouen was promulgated on 1 September 1603, were given to the Pope and the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva. The draft document addressed a variety of concerns but nearly all of the conditions conveyed the same purpose: to assert that the Jesuit return was sanctioned by royal authority alone. Béthune reported to the king that the Pope had received the conditions favourably and that Henry IV could soon expect his approval. Indeed, the Jesuit return, even with royal

---

61 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 407: Maggio to Aquaviva, 20 November 1601.
62 ANG, iv, 206, 225: Bufalo to Clement VIII, 20 November 1601 and 30 December 1601.
63 BN MS. Fr. 3484, fos 38-40v°: Henry IV to Philippe de Béthune, 18 November 1601.
64 ARSI Germaniae 122, fo. 130: Maggio to Aquaviva, 27 March 1602.
restrictions, served the dual purpose in papal diplomacy of promoting the Catholic faith and boosting Henry IV’s credentials with reference to his Habsburg rivals in the international Catholic church.\textsuperscript{65} However, the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva informed the Pope that he had grave misgivings about the conditions as they threatened the corporate identity of the Society by restricting the Order’s privileges as granted by the Pope: an issue which was to continue to trouble the Father General in the future.\textsuperscript{66} With the Jesuit hierarchy in Rome unwilling to countenance some of the conditions, the Vatican maintained a pragmatic silence and Henry IV was once again distracted by a political crisis in the form of the Biron conspiracy.\textsuperscript{67} This conspiracy was potentially the most serious threat to Henry IV’s rule since the collapse of the League, as the due de Biron successfully drew upon latent religious and political grievances amongst the French nobility to foment unrest in significant areas of the kingdom. The Jesuits were not involved in the conspiracy but the renewed threat of internal disorder absorbed much of the king’s political energy until the spring of 1603.\textsuperscript{68}

III. The culmination of royal policy

By 1603 the broad outlines of royal policy toward the Society of Jesus were well known.

\textsuperscript{65} Trevor-Roper, ‘Spain and Europe’, iv, 262–263.
\textsuperscript{66} ARSI Galliae 60, fos 212–213v°: Aquaviva’s response to Clement VIII on the conditions sent by Henry IV, 12 January 1602.
\textsuperscript{67} See for instance BN MS. Fr. 3492, fo. 18v°: Philippe de Béthune to Henry IV, 8 January 1602; BN MS. Fr. 3492, fo. 26: Philippe de Béthune to Henry IV, 8 February 1602; BN MS. Fr. 3484, fos 84–85: Henry IV to Béthune, 11 March 1602; BN MS. Fr. 3484, fo. 81–81v°: Henry IV to Béthune, 25 March 1602.
However, the sustained royal effort in the summer and autumn of 1603 provided for the first time a precise definition of royal policy which both inspired opposition to the Jesuit return and defined Jesuit reintegration into the French Catholic church. A royal visit to the strongly Catholic and strategically sensitive eastern frontier of the kingdom in the spring of 1603 provided the forum in which the Jesuit issue was reopened.\(^{69}\) In an interview arranged by the Society’s supporters at court, the Jesuit Father Provincial Armand offered the king an eloquent discourse on the loyalty of Jesuits as natural born Frenchmen.\(^{70}\) This choice of topic was not selected by chance but rather was designed to re-emphasise the status of French members of the Society as loyal and obedient subjects.\(^{71}\) Henry IV graciously received this speech and purported to be so moved that he requested a copy of the discourse. The sub-text of the whole meeting was the public renewal of the 1599 offer of Jesuit obedience in return for royal clemency.\(^{72}\)

Henry IV used this public meeting to reopen his long-standing interest in the Jesuits. In the days following the oration the king made clear his wish to resolve the question of Jesuit exclusion and invited three Jesuits, Fathers Coton, Armand and Alexander, to return with him to Paris. The king was also careful to display his intentions toward the Jesuits at court. A week after the oration he singled out a Jesuit in a crowded ante-chamber, called the Father over to him and exchanged friendly words.\(^{73}\) Later, when Fathers Coton and Armand arrived at Fontainebleau on 29 May 1603, the

---

\(^{69}\) For a full description of Henry IV’s movements in early 1603 see Buisseret, Henry IV, p. 118.

\(^{70}\) BI Godefroy 15, fo. 75–75v°: Father Charles de la Tour to Martin, Doctor of Medicine, 24 April 1603; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 360–360v°: Armand to Maggio, 5 April 1603.

\(^{71}\) ARSI Galliae 61, fos 361–362: Oration offered to the king at Metz, 27 March 1603.

\(^{72}\) P.V. Palma-Cayet, Chronologie septenaire de l’histoire de la paix entre les Roys de France et d’Espagne (Paris, 1605), fo. 387v°.

\(^{73}\) ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 156: Armand to Aquaviva, 3 April 1603.
These initial displays of royal good will were important to the Jesuits. Every action taken by the king in the environment of the court had political implications as the monarch embodied policy. However, it was the sustained interaction between Armand, Coton and Henry IV in June, July and August 1603 which provide a revealing perspective on how the king presented and justified his will in the environment of the court.

The most important of Henry IV’s initiatives at court provided the Jesuits with an opportunity to convince the king that they should be allowed to return. In many ways this initiative echoed the Henry’s own conversion, where Catholic clergy had convinced him through rational debate that the Catholic church represented the only true faith. The royal conversion had established Henry IV’s ability to make choices about faith and the church. However, in one important aspect the Jesuit issue was different from Henry IV’s previous assertions of knowledge in church matters. Whereas at his conversion Henry IV had made an essentially personal decision, in 1603 Henry, as head of the French Church, rejected the advice of important French interests in order to make a decision for the whole Church. The implications of this assertion for royal power and authority were important and thus success for the Jesuits was tied to the success of the king in asserting his authority.

Henry IV used public and semi-public events at court to define his support for the Society of Jesus and his authority to pass judgement on whether the Society should participate in the French church. One important environment where Henry IV publicly supported the Jesuits and their doctrine was through the sponsorship of court preaching.

---

74 Palma-Cayet, *Chronologie septenaire*, fo. 436v°.
The memoirist Palma-Cayet notes that the king was very affectionate to Father Coton from the moment they met and the king assured that: 'Il prescha à Fontaine-bleau premierement (lieu propre pour mieux estre veu de toute la Cour)....'\textsuperscript{75} Palma-Cayet perceptively notes the king's concern that all at court should see and hear Coton in the royal chapel. The king's support of Coton's preaching continued throughout the summer and by mid-July the king had commissioned Coton to preach on all the feast days and Sundays.\textsuperscript{76} Further, after a sermon on 14 June the king publicly stated that 'il n'avoiat jamais rien ouy de semblable, et que, si ses affaires le luy permettoient, il me voudroit ouyr une heure tous les jours.'\textsuperscript{77}

Whether the king was as completely moved as observers indicated was less important than the fact that he gave this impression. The ability of eloquent preaching to move and persuade the soul of the listener was a common belief in the theory of late-Renaissance and Baroque rhetoric. Thus, the public reactions of Henry IV to Coton's preaching drew upon a powerful line of contemporary thought to provide a rationale for the royal policy to sanction the return of the Jesuits.\textsuperscript{78} Henry IV's enthusiastic response to Coton's sermons provided a foundation on which the king could both be convinced and then publicly convince others of Jesuit merits.

Aside from sponsoring and approving Coton's preaching, the king held public discussions with the Jesuits. Henry IV discussed important topics like the Jesuit

\textsuperscript{75} Palma-Cayet, \textit{Chronologie septenaire}, fo. 436v°.
\textsuperscript{76} AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 581, 587: Coton to Baltazar, 24 June 1603; AFCJ Prat 32, p. 591: Coton to Baltazar, 3 July 1603. See also Palma-Cayet, \textit{Chronologie septenaire}, fo. 436.
\textsuperscript{77} AFCJ Prat 32, p. 591: Coton to Baltazar, 3 July 1603. See also ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 9: Armand to Aquaviva, 22 June 1603. For more about Coton's preaching obligations see AFCJ Prat 32, p. 591: Coton to Baltazar, 3 July 1603.
constitutions, finances and teaching practices in the very public forum of the king’s dinner table and then pronounced his satisfaction with the Society to those present. 79

Public discussions could also advertise the king’s good will in a less specific manner. For example, Coton wrote that ‘Le Roy nous parla diverses fois aux Tuilleries, devant et après sa messe, et tousjours avec beaucoup de bienveillance, une fois notamment qu’il nous tint avec soy plus de demy-heure, en présence des principaulx de sa cour et de Paris.’ 80

These public acts were accompanied by more direct pressure when the king publicly defended the Jesuits from their detractors. By the end of June 1603 Coton reported that ‘Tous les princes, prélats, seigneurs nous affectionnent, et il n’y a plus personne qui ose en Cour parler mal des Jésuites ....’ Coton felt that ‘La cause principale en est le Roy luy mesme ....’ 81 In another letter to the Jesuit Father Baltazar, Coton noted that Henry IV was personally promoting the Jesuit cause. For instance, in front of a large crowd at court the king asked a Huguenot woman why she had not attended Coton’s sermon. When she responded that ‘elle ne se pouvoit accommoder avec les Jesuites’, Henry IV replied ‘Ni moy avant que je les cogneusse, mais j’ay bien changé d’opinion et d’affection depuis; cognissez-les et vous ferez comme moy.’ 82 Coton also recorded that when a group of gentlemen spoke badly of the Jesuits the king criticized them: ‘Taisez-vous, dit le roy; vous en parlez par animosite et sans les cognoistre.’ 83 These examples are telling. Henry IV asserted his authority over the issue in two ways. First,

79 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 587: Coton to Baltazar, 24 June 1603.
80 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 581: idem... For more examples see AFCJ Prat 32, p. 591: Coton to Baltazar, 3 July 1603; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 593–599: Coton to Baltazar, 18 July 1603.
81 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 585: Coton to Baltazar, 24 June 1603.
82 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 595: Coton to Baltazar, 18 July 1603.
83 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 597: idem..
he presented himself as personally well informed on the Jesuit issue. Second, Henry asserted that he possessed a special understanding of religious questions through his position as the anointed first son of the Catholic church and Clovis’s successor. This was a powerful combination of knowledge and judgement which was difficult to overtly question. In these public and semi-public events at court Henry IV asserted his intention to use his special role in the French Catholic church to make an important decision for the entire French church. This assertion of royal authority as displayed at court was the authority which facilitated the Jesuit return.

Many at court understood the king’s purpose. Indeed, when the king asked the Prior of a Carthusian house what the differences were between the Carthusian and Jesuit Constitutions, a member of the king’s household broke in and said ‘Sire, il y a entre eux ceste différence que les Chartreux mattent l'esprit par le corps, et les Jesuites, le corps par l’esprit. Response qui fut trouvé belle et subtile par tous ceux qui l’ouyrent, et par le roy particulièrement.’ This reply indicates that the king’s actions had made clear to courtiers that he was sympathetic to the Jesuit cause.

By August 1603, Henry IV had established his support for the Society of Jesus through his actions at court. On 1 September 1603 the king promulgated the Edict of Rouen which officially sanctioned the Jesuit return. However, when the Parlement of

---

86 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 601: Coton to Baltazar, 23 July 1603.
87 Although there is no evidence as to why Henry IV chose to promulgate the Edict in the Parlement of Rouen, he may have chosen this venue as a warning to his magistrates in Paris who intended
Paris reconvened in early November the registration of the Edict resulted in a series of public and semi-public confrontations between the king and his magistrates which stretched into early January 1604. Throughout this period Henry continued to link his will publicly to the Jesuit cause, as he had in the summer.\(^8^8\) During his confrontation with the Parlement in December over the registration of the Edict of Rouen the king often used the public stage at court to make his will clear. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this continued public approval occurred on 21 December 1603 when Henry IV:

\[\text{accompagnée de toute la fleur de la France, le fifre et tambour sonnant, et costoyée de ses gardes, Suisses, Francoises, et Escossoises se transporta a notre Dame de Paris pour ouir la predication qu’elle auroit commandée au Pere Cotton de faire, ou pour avoir place estoient arrivez les principaux tant du Parlement que de l’Université, des le matin et ce fut alors que le Pere Cotton remercia S.M. en la meilleure forme de dire que luy a veu encor tenir de tant d’obligations que votre compagnie ....}^{8^9}\]

Henry IV used his presence at this official court occasion attended by members of the Parlement to display his personal support for the Jesuits.

Henry IV also used the public platform at court to clarify more specific points concerning his personal will. For instance, on 7 December, after hearing Coton preach, the king called the Father over and stated:

\[\text{scavez vous ce que l’on dict de vous par Paris, quelques uns font courir le bruit que ce que ie fay pour vous aultres n’est à bon escient, que l’importance de Rome me le fait faire, & que ie seray bien aise quand la Cour de Parlement s’y opposera. Ce sont artifices de certains esprits qui pensent descouvrir par cela leur desobeissance. Mais ie leur feray bien coignoistre que ie ne suis ny dissimulé ny flatteur, & que ie n’ay esté importuné que de la raison, & que ie me veuls servir de vous.}^{9^0}\]

This harangue was followed by the king’s promise of 2000 écus for the construction of to oppose the registration.

\(^8^8\) For example see AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 623–625: Coton to Chenevoux, 20 September 1603.

\(^8^9\) BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 316: Dossier on the Jesuit re-entry into France.

\(^9^0\) BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 252: idem.
a new Jesuit noviciate at La Flèche. Such public statements were in effect statements of
the royal will which emphasised the fact that support for the Jesuits emanated directly
from Henry.

Henry IV is often noted for his deft use of public display but only rarely does the
source material offer the scholar an opportunity to piece together his actions in such
detail. Henry IV used traditional royal attributes and his public role at court to signal a
change in policy toward the Jesuits. This assertion of royal authority had important
implications for the king’s influence in the church. With reference to the Jesuits, the
royal assertion of authority linked the king’s judgement and will to the Society’s return.
While the exact stipulations attached to the Jesuit recall remained secret until 1
September 1603, the royal inclination to allow the Society to return and the assertion of
royal authority which justified a final decision were apparent long before their formal
promulgation to those who observed the king’s relations with the Jesuits at court. Thus,
the royal initiative to sponsor the Jesuit return centred on the personal judgement of the
monarch. The Jesuits were to be re-established through the authority of the king.

Henry IV’s assertion of royal support was an important development for the
Jesuits. Nevertheless, for the Society of Jesus to receive full legal recognition in France
an Edict had to be proclaimed to sanction their official return. As in 1599, Henry IV did
not wish to deny the facts alleged in the Parlement’s original expulsion decree; rather he
preferred to supersede its effects through royal clemency. The authority which Henry IV
wished to assert required that the guilty Jesuits be allowed to return through royal
clemency. Thus, a careful balance between the assertion of royal authority and respect
for the Parlement’s *arrêt* against Jean Chastell dominated considerations when the Edict of Rouen was drafted.

By August 1603, the king’s inner council had reviewed the conditions for a Jesuit return which had been sent to the Pope in 1601 and presented the draft to a council of important notables. While the source material does not discuss the views of individual councillors, Sully in his *Economies royales* was intent on emphasising his own personal deference to royal authority. According to Sully the council agreed that such decisions were strictly the king’s prerogative. Sully argued during the proceedings:

> je vous diray qu’en maitiere de Religion nuls hommes ne sont mes oracles, mais la seule parole de Dieu, non plus qu’en affaire politiques & d’Estat ie n’en ay point d’autres que la voix & la volonté du Roy; De laquelle ie veux estre particulierement informé avant que de rien conclure sur vne affaire de telle importance & sujette à variété d’accidens ....

This statement expressed the essence of what the king wished to assert: that important decisions in the French church had to emanate from royal authority. While some counsellors, particularly Protestant advisers, almost certainly opposed the Society’s return, the Council was intent on presenting in public a uniform front in support of the king’s decision.

In principle the return of the Jesuits was a matter for Henry IV, but the stipulations required to make a Jesuit return acceptable to parties outside the king’s direct control, without undermining the royal assertion of authority, proved a delicate problem. Henry IV’s advisers had addressed this problem in 1599 and maintained similar

---

91 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 609: Coton to Baltazar, 14 August 1603. See also Sully, *Memoires des sages et royales economies d’estat domestiqves, politiques et militaires de Henry le Grand* (Amsterdam, 1640) ii, 293[sic].
92 Sully, *Economies*, ii, 293[sic].
stipulations when the Edict of Rouen was promulgated on 1 September 1603. As Henry had asserted at the very opening of discussions with the Jesuits in 1599, the monarch was prepared to welcome the Jesuits back into his kingdom but only if the Jesuits were prepared to accept his authority in the French Catholic church. Moreover, as in 1599 Henry IV was unwilling to address Jesuit guilt in the Chastell assassination attempt. Henry IV was only willing to allow the Society to return though his clemency. Thus, because of their previous subversive actions, the king included conditions in the Edict which placed the Jesuits under the regulation of the king and the French church in order to protect France from foreign subversion.

Many of the conditions which Henry IV attached to a Jesuit return in the Edict of Rouen were designed to underline the monarch's important position in the French Catholic church. One set of stipulations restricted Jesuit activities in France. The Jesuits would be formally recognised in the towns and cities where they currently operated, as well as Lyon, Dijon and the town of La Flèche. However, no further foundations could be made without the king's permission. Moreover, all members of the Society operating in the kingdom were to be native French citizens unless the king granted a dispensation. In addition, one member of the Jesuits, who had the authority to answer for the whole Society, was always to be resident at court. Finally, the inheritance rights of

---

93 For proof that the council had been considering this mode of action for a considerable length of time see BI Godefroy 15, fos 155–156v°: Antoine Seguier to Henry IV, 29 December 1599.
94 For a copy of the stipulations sent to Rome in 1601 see BN MS. Fr. 3484, fos 38–40v°: Henry IV to Philippe de Béthune, 18 November 1601.
95 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 324–324v°: Dossier on the Jesuit re-entry into France. Another copy of the conditions for re-establishment can be found in BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 99–101v°.
individual Jesuits and the property rights of the Society as a whole were to be subject to French laws. These stipulations limited Jesuit activity in France and addressed several concerns voiced against the Society when it had been expelled. However, they also reinforced the royal control over the extent to which the Jesuits would participate in the French church, as decisions concerning the opening of new colleges and the entry of foreign Jesuits were entirely within the king’s authority.

A second set of conditions addressed concerns about French royal sovereignty and authority along with the rights of the French Church hierarchy. Thus, all Jesuits were to make an oath of loyalty to the king upon entering a French Jesuit foundation. Furthermore, the king required that the Jesuits would be subject to all the laws of the kingdom and answerable to royal officers as was the case with other clergy in France. In addition, the Jesuits were to be subject to Gallican church discipline through the bishops. This condition specified that the Jesuits could not prejudice current privileges of French institutions nor administer the sacraments without permission. Regulation of the Jesuits was to be accomplished through established French civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies with the king as final arbiter.

An understanding of the royal strategy in drafting these conditions can be gained from a report written in 1599 by Antoine Séguier, the French ambassador in Venice. Séguier, président of the Paris Parlement, former moderate Leaguer and important member of a leading robe family which was to produce a Chancellor of France in the next generation, was well known for his sympathy toward the Catholic reformation and

---

90 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 324v°: Dossier on the Jesuit re-entry into France.
97 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fos 324v°-325: idem..
98 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 324v°: idem..
99 BN MS. Fr. 15871, fo. 325: idem..
96 BN MS. Fr. 15871, fo. 325: idem..
the Society of Jesus.\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, his appointment as ambassador to Venice shortly before the Edict of Nantes was sent to the Parlement for registration has been widely viewed as a tactic by Henry IV to remove this outspoken and well-respected Catholic magistrate from the kingdom before the debate over legal recognition of the Huguenots began.\textsuperscript{102} Whatever the reason for Séguiér's departure, his influence on the drafting of the conditions for a Jesuit return was considerable. In a dispatch from Venice dated 29 December 1599 Séguiér suggested a series of conditions based on his knowledge of Jesuit participation in the Venetian church which closely parallel the conditions in the Edict of Rouen.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, Séguiér's dispatch provides a cogent discussion of the advantages of certain conditions for royal policy which is also reflected in later royal actions.

In his dispatch Antoine Séguiér argued that the Jesuits should not be given the right to return 'pur, simple et absolu' but rather under conditions which assured that Jesuit participation in the French church was dependent on royal favour.\textsuperscript{104} By this course of action Séguiér argued that the Jesuits would always be in 'les mains de V.M.' Indeed, the Jesuits

\begin{quote}
seroient soigneux de la contenter ... et de se retenir de tous ce qu'ils penseront les desagreer car bien qu'en quelque forme qu'ils fussent restablis, il soit tousiours en la puissance de V.M. de les envoier ... V.M. par cette forme demeure tousiours en plus de liberte pour apporter cela a telles regles et modifications qu'elle iugera estre a propos desdites Jesuites.'\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

Thus, according to Séguiér, if the Jesuits were to return under the specific conditions that

\begin{itemize}
\item BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 325: idem..
\item See pp. 48, 166.
\item BI Godefroy 15, fós 155–156v°: Antoine Séguiér to Henry IV, 29 December 1599.
\item BI Godefroy 15, fo. 155v°: idem..
\end{itemize}
he witnessed in Venice, then their presence in France would strengthen royal leadership in the church.

Séguier's dispatch explicitly discussed several important conditions which would subsequently become articles in the Edict of Rouen. For instance, he presented the advantage of demanding royal approval for the opening of Jesuit colleges by highlighting the Venetian success in controlling Jesuit participation in the university town of Padua.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, Séguier used a description of the Jesuit position in the Venetian church hierarchy with regard to the administering of the Sacraments and other contentious issues to explain how the Jesuits could operate within a national church structure.\textsuperscript{107}

Séguier's dispatch also foreshadowed the final Edict of Rouen as it promoted the general assertion of royal authority which is expressed in the Edict. Thus, as Séguier suggested, the Edict was ambiguous on points which suited the monarch and clear on others. The document left unresolved a number of issues which would be crucial to the regulation of the Society. In effect the king, as Séguier had suggested, reserved the right to make decisions on a number of conditions at a later date. Perhaps the most important of these unresolved issues was the monarch's decision to leave the possibility of future Jesuit foundations open to royal approval.\textsuperscript{108} Through such stipulations the king only consented to admit the Society back into his kingdom. The extent of their activity was left to his judgement and will.\textsuperscript{109} Henry IV offered his Parlement the reassurance of restrictive stipulations on the work of the Society, but Henry IV's enforcement of various

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} BI Godefroy 15, fos 155v°–156: idem..
\item \textsuperscript{106} BI Godefroy 15, fo. 156: idem..
\item \textsuperscript{107} BI Godefroy 15, fo. 156: idem..
\item \textsuperscript{108} BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 99v°. Copy of the Edict of Rouen, 1603.
\item \textsuperscript{109} ARSI Galliae 94, fos 15–16: Armand to Maggio, 11 August 1603; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 378–378v°: Coton to Maggio, 4 September 1603.
\end{itemize}
conditions would in fact decide the extent of Jesuit activity in France.

While several stipulations were purposefully ambiguous on questions of regulation, others were explicit on the issues of royal authority and sovereignty. The powers of royal officials and the privileges of the French church were defined by detailed articles. Thus, article seven stated ‘Seront aussi ceux de ladicte Société subietes en tout et partout aux loix de nostre Royaume et Justiciables de nos Officiers au cas et ainsy que les autres Ecclesiastiques et Religieux y sont subiected.’ Moreover, article eight demanded that ‘ceux de ladicte Compagnie et Société entreprendre ne faire aucune chose tant au spirituel que au temporel au preiudice des Euesques et Chappitres, Cures et Vniuersites de ce Royaume ny des autres Religieux ains se conformeront au droict commun.’ These two articles provided for the regulation of the Society under royal officials and the French church hierarchy.

Furthermore, article four required: ‘Que tous ceulx qui sont a present en nostre dict Royaume et qui seront cy apres receus en ladicte Société feront serment par deuant nos officiers des lieux de ne rien faire ny entreprendre contre nostre service la Paix publicque et repos de nostre Royaume sans aucune exception ny reservation.’ The oath of loyalty reflected an important development in French political life during the religious wars. The purpose of the religious-war oaths which accompanied pacification decrees was to assert royal jurisdiction over sectarian conflicts. During the religious wars,

---

110 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100v°: Copy of the Edict of Rouen, 1603.
111 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100v°: idem.
112 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100: idem.
113 No scholar has addressed the important topic of oaths in a French context. However, the importance of oaths in European political thought at the opening of the seventeenth-century and their importance to questions of loyalty to the state has been addressed in a recent article by M.C. Questier, ‘Loyalty, Religion and State Power in Early Modern England: English Romanism and the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance’, The Historical Journal, 40 (1997), 311–329.
oaths had essentially been concerned with convincing those who had to implement the royal pacification edicts that the monarch possessed the authority to decree such an edict. In 1603 the Jesuits were required to publicly accept the French monarch’s authority and thus the ecclesiastical hierarchy that he represented. The oath asserted royal authority over the Jesuit return but also served to recognise the authority of royal officers and the Gallican hierarchy. Thus, the oath was designed to define royal authority and the accepted order in the Gallican church. The Jesuits were able to return to France only if they were willing to accept royal authority in the French Catholic church.

For the king, the Jesuit return provided an issue on which to base the royal claim to authority over the church. For the Jesuits the royal assertion of authority also had important implications. Royal sponsorship of the Society legitimised their participation in France and facilitated their integration into the French church after the events surrounding their expulsion in 1594 which had labelled the Society of Jesus as subversive and foreign. In addition, the opposition to the Jesuits was to result in an even closer relationship between Henry IV and the Society.

IV. Opposition to the Edict of Rouen

While the Edict of Rouen was carefully constructed to avoid direct confrontation with the Paris Parlement’s arrêt against Chastell, opposition in French legal circles to the royal decision to sponsor the Jesuit return was evident from 1599. It was Henry IV’s ability to overcome this opposition which both secured the Jesuit return to France and affirmed the Society’s new, close relationship with the monarchy. Thus, to understand how the Jesuits integrated into the French church after 1603, one must address the conflict
between Henry IV and those opposed to the Society’s return.

In the years before the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen in September 1603, Henry IV consulted the Paris Parlement about a Jesuit return only once, in January 1600.\textsuperscript{114} Even during this consultation, which came early in the dispute, Henry IV was careful to define the Jesuit question as fully within his sovereign authority. Thus, as Henry noted in a letter to Nicholas Brûlart, sieur de Sillery:

\begin{quote}
Je m’approche exprès de Paris pour en conférer avec ceux du Parlement car, encore que telle grâce doive venir de moy toutesfois je désire bien en prendre leur avis, afin qu’ils n’aient occasion de se plaindre que j’aye négligé le soing qu’ils ont montré en ceste occasion avoir de ma personne et de mon autorité, et aussi que toutes choses soient faites avec plus de considération et de poids.\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

Henry IV had no doubt that the ‘grâce’ which brought the Jesuits back came from ‘ma personne et mon autorité’ through his role as King of France rather than private individual. In this statement Henry highlighted his role as the protector and interpreter of the public good in France which was contrasted with the Paris Parlement’s competence only to advise the king on questions of law. Thus, Henry IV did not negotiate with important interests in the church and state but rather consulted his servants to consider their advice as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{116}

The Chancellor Bellièvre, who spoke as the king’s representative at the consultation, also emphasised the numerous considerations which Henry IV had to balance when making policy toward the Society.\textsuperscript{117} Bellièvre noted that the Pope had

\textsuperscript{114} ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 172–172v°: Minutes of the meeting between Villeroy, Bellièvre and a delegation from the Paris Parlement, January 1600.

\textsuperscript{115} Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères: Rome correspondence 18, fo. 408–408v°. Reprinted in H. Fouqueray, Histoire, ii, p. 529.

\textsuperscript{116} For the issues at work here see: E. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, 1957), pp. 364–372.

\textsuperscript{117} ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 172: Minutes of the meeting between Villeroy, Bellièvre and a delegation from the Paris Parlement, January 1600.
originally made an annulment of the king's marriage to Marguerite de Valois contingent on a Jesuit return but that the prudence of the Pope's negotiators had removed the direct link between the two issues. Nevertheless, Henry IV was now honour bound to allow a Jesuit return. While Bellièvre's speech was in part designed to soften the blow of the policy change, it also emphasised that the monarch's concerns extended far beyond the legal considerations of the Parlement.

The Parlement responded to Bellièvre's speech by fulfilling its duty in advising the king, from a legal viewpoint, against a Jesuit return. However, as the king's ministers only presented his broad claims to authority on the issue rather than detailed conditions for the return, the members of the Parlement decided that they could not pass judgement before the king's exact intentions were presented before them. This conclusion reaffirmed the royal initiative in the affair, and Henry IV did not officially consult his Parlement again until the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen on 1 September 1603.

While the opponents of the Jesuits lacked an official channel through which to express their concerns, the magistrates remained interested in the Jesuit issue and used informal channels of communication to voice their concerns. Perhaps the single most important set of material to survive from this opposition was the printed pamphlets and tracts which appeared from late 1602 until 1604. Estiene Pasquier's Le Catechisme des Iesvites, first published in 1602, was the most substantial tract from the period. The tract was encyclopaedic in its chronicle of supposed Jesuits misdeeds and this probably accounts for its continued importance as a source for anti-Jesuit polemic well into the eighteenth century. However, Pasquier's work did not merely chronicle previous

118 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 172v°: idem.
polemic. Pasquier also addressed the changing circumstances in France as he redefined the Jesuit threat to emphasize the Society's independence from the Habsburg dynasty. However, despite the *Catechisme*’s importance and continued influence, we must look elsewhere to trace the development of a number of new themes which Pasquier chose not to address in his tract.

A series of tracts published between late 1602 and 1604 provide evidence that the French authors who published these works were not just concerned with a Jesuit return but also the king’s conception of royal authority implicit in his actions in support of the Jesuits. Antoine Arnauld in his *Le franc et veritable discours au roi Henri IV* was the polemicist who best understood the concerns of his contemporaries. As in Pasquier’s *Catechisme*, Arnauld’s tract recounted numerous examples of Jesuit subversion and indeed a number of his arguments were drawn from his earlier *plaidoyer* in favour of the Jesuit expulsion in 1594. Nevertheless, the rhetorical purpose and approach was very different. Arnauld no longer called loyal citizens to action but rather took the king as his audience. The word *Franc* in the title emphasised that Arnauld intended to participate in the tradition of counsel which Henry IV possessed a reputation for tolerating: that of offering unpleasant advice for the sake of the king’s well being. This in itself was an important indication of the king’s success in reviving the monarch’s role in these events. However, the reason that Henry had become the centre of the polemic was that the issue had also changed. As in 1594 the polemicists still rejected Jesuit participation in France,

---

but in 1603 these writers perceived the most potent threat to the enforcement of the banishment Edict to be the ill-informed or misconceived use of royal authority.

For Arnauld the full enforcement of the Parlement’s edict was the only choice for the king:

Il est juste, SIRE, que les Arrêts de votre Parlement, de votre grand Parlement, du Parlement de France, soient exécuté en France. En cela gît la principale force de votre Etat. Qui est donc celui qui vous conseille, SIRE, de vous couper votre bras droit à vous-même? En effet, sous noms empruntés c’est le Roi Philibbes qui le desire, qui le poursuit, qui le veut. 121

Here was the gist of Arnauld’s central theme: French institutions offered the king a proven record of loyal service. This service was constantly opposed to the duplicity and foreign outlook of the Jesuits. Arnauld argued that only one policy toward the Jesuits could be contemplated: ‘Il est done juste, SIRE, il est très-juste de faire exécuter l’Arrêt de votre Parlement; c’est la justice même. On ne se peut fourvoyer en suivant ce grand chemin, chemin frayé par tous vos Ancêtres, qui ont été plus jaloux de l’exécution des Arrêts de leur Parlement, que de chose du monde.’ 122 Arnauld’s text was a defence of the king’s loyal servants as well as an attack upon the Jesuits. The purpose of the tract was to remind Henry IV of the implication of the monarch’s apparent rejection of the king’s traditional advisers. 123

Arnauld’s tract expressed the fear of many magistrates, royal officials and members of French legal circles that the solution to the religious wars, which was closely linked to the just punishment of the Jesuits as the most guilty leaders of the League, would be destroyed by their return. The king’s misuse of clemency was the chief source of this potential trouble. Printed tracts throughout this period showed particular concern

121 Arnauld, Franc, p. 693.
for Henry IV’s use of the royal attribute of clemency. Arnauld perhaps most eloquently expressed the general unease when he wrote: ‘je ne dis pas la clémence, qui est toujours louable étant accompagnée de jugement, autrement elle ne seroit plus vertu ....” 124 A number of other tracts also expressed concerns on this same issue. *La Sibille Francoise ov derniere remonstrance au Roy* did not shy from arguing that Henry IV’s over-clement disposition could be dangerous for the nation:

Et flateurs exalter vostre douce Clemence,  
C’est pour mieux vous piper, les hommes plus mauvais,  
Ont les mots les pl’doux: au pris d’eux vous n’auez  
Rien de si volontaire, & rien de plus capable  
D’auancer de l’estat la cheute deplorable ....125

Moreover, the *Prosopopee* argued that clemency had to be used in moderation:

Si est-ce que vous blasmer de trop de clemence c’est vous loüer d’vne bien grande vertu, si elle n’est trop grande: La clemence a sa mesure, comme les autres vertus: et combien qu’vn homme ne sceust jamais estre trop vertueux, il peut neantmoins souuent estre trop clement, d’autant que le trop pardonner aux mauvais, nuist aux bons ....126

While the monarch’s right to grant clemency to the Society of Jesus was the topic which these authors focused upon, wider questions over royal authority in the French Catholic church were also addressed in the texts.

These tracts accepted the king’s theoretical right to grant a Jesuit return but they also argued that to do so would question the authority of the king’s decrees in Parlement; and undermine the religious and political compromise which had allowed many Frenchmen to accept the reintegration of their Leaguer counterparts. Henry IV’s religious pacification policy had been greeted with suspicion by many magistrates in the

---

121 Arnauld, *Franc*, p 678.  
125 *La Sibille*, p. 7.
early 1590s when fears were voiced that the king’s clemency might be mistaken for weakness. The Jesuit expulsion in 1594 had offered a method of addressing the worst misgivings of his supporters, in that the Society’s punishment could be seen as retribution for their alleged role as leaders of the League. In 1602 Arnauld and other authors returned to this theme to question Henry IV’s use of the same clement interpretation of royal authority to make decisions for the whole French church. These authors continued to oppose the Jesuits, but found themselves in the awkward position of criticising the interpretation of royal authority which justified the Society’s return.

When the Parlement reconvened in early November 1603 the magistrates would have been well acquainted with the arguments put forth in the pamphlet literature. The parlementaires would also have been aware of Henry IV’s promulgation of the Edict of Rouen on 1 September 1603 and the royal favour which had been shown to the Society. From the outset Henry IV defined the issue of the Parlement’s registration of the Edict as a question of his authority over the church: an authority which the pamphlet polemicists granted the king in principle if not practice. Thus, the king steadily increased the pressure on the Parlement to register the Edict through messengers and meetings with important members of the Parlement.\textsuperscript{127} The king’s message was consistent. His judgement, based on careful consideration of the attributes of the Jesuit Order, was theologically and politically sound. Only the king could rise above the haze of prejudice at the end of the religious wars to provide unbiased judgement. On a more subtle level, Henry IV reminded the magistrates that to question his judgement on the Jesuits was to question his judgement on other Leaguer enemies recently pardoned and, indeed, his own

\textsuperscript{126} Prospopee, pp. 5–6.
Henry IV's pressure did not have its desired effect as it became clear that many members of the Parlement, chief among them the premier président Achille de Harlay, did not accept the king's initiative. On 22 December 1603 the Parlement considered the Edict in committee and voted to present remonstrances to the king as was their traditional right and duty.128 This formal opposition to the royal will led to Henry IV's formal defence of the Jesuits and his own authority.

Henry IV's decision to call his Parlement before him in the Louvre to give their remonstrances set the stage for one of the most dramatic scenes of the post-League religious debate. The subject of the remonstrance was the Jesuits. However, as was foreshadowed in the anti-Jesuit literature since 1602, the assertion that the king's authority in the church could be used to sanction the Jesuit return was the underlying subject of the remonstrance. Harlay moved beyond the question of a Jesuit return to warn the king against rejecting the counsel of French institutions and the just punishment of an organisation guilty of lèse-majesté in France. Harlay opened with and continued to emphasise his central objection: that the Jesuits had been consistently opposed by important French institutions. According to Harlay, the French church and the Paris Parlement had consistently resisted the Jesuit presence in France since the early 1560s. Harlay justified their concern as: 'nous avons jugé importer au bien de vos affaires et au salut publicq qui despend de vostre conservation ....'129 Using a series of well-worn arguments, Harlay asserted that the Jesuits had clearly failed to share these concerns. He

---

127 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 315–315v°: Dossier on the Jesuit re-entry into France.
128 BN MS. Fr. 15781, fo. 316–316v°: idem. For more on the duty of the Parlement to present remonstrances see: Roelker, *One King*, pp. 67–91.
129 R. Couzard and A. Chamberland, 'Les Remonstrances du Parlement de Paris contre les Jésuites
concluded: ‘Ils veulent subvertir les fondements de vostre puissance et autorité royalle.’

The safety of Henry IV was the chief concern of all good Frenchmen. Peace could only be maintained through a strong monarch so the Parlement’s opposition to the subversive and dangerous influence of the Jesuits was well warranted in terms of its own responsibility to advise the crown.

While Harlay spoke with conviction that the loyal French institutions were right to remind the king of the implicit dangers of allowing such a subversive organisation to return, he avoided any claim to assert that the king’s advisers in Parlement had a right of veto over the king’s will. For instance, Harlay stated: ‘Sire vous estes Roy et grand Roy, qui jugés mieulx ce qui est juste que tous vos subiectz ensemble; vostre parolle est la justice mesme.’ Still, despite recognizing the king’s ultimate authority, Harlay made clear that it was not appropriate for a king to ignore such universally strong advice against the Jesuits.

Henry IV’s reply made it clear that both the monarch and his advisers understood the political implications for royal authority of a Jesuit return. Henry IV questioned the participation of the Parlement in religious debate from the outset. The Parlement’s arguments were well known and already considered by the king:

Je vous scay bon gre du soing qu’avez de ma personne et de mon Estat bien que fort peu vous en ayez sceu avoir pour l’un et encores moins pour l’autre. J’ay toutes vos conceotions et cervelles dans la mienne mais vous n’avez pas la mienne dans les Vostres, vous m’avez propose des difficultes qui vous semblent grandes et considerables et n’avez sceu considerer que tout ce que vous avez dict a esté consideré et pesé par moy ....

---

132 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 108: Response of Henry IV to the remonstrances of the premier président Achille de Harlay, December 1603.
This powerful piece of rhetoric on the king’s public role and responsibilities emphasised Henry IV’s authority over the issue. Henry IV respected the Parlement’s duty to advise the king but the Parlement’s partial understanding of the issue is a central theme of this statement. In opposition to the Parlement’s partial knowledge is Henry IV’s authority to speak for a form of general will.\textsuperscript{133} Thus, the public persona or public body of Henry IV as King of France was emphasised by the king through references to thoughts and considerations in his head. Henry IV asserted that only he had the ability to balance the partial interest and particular concerns of different groups in France. Thus, by implication only the king had the authority and ability to judge what was appropriate for the kingdom as a whole. Henry’s statement was an important reassertion of royal authority in religious affairs which had been established in late medieval French political thought. Henry IV had worked since his accession to revive the authority of the French monarchy. Indeed, Harlay had heard a very similar set of royal arguments expressed when the Parlement was called before Henry IV on 7 January 1599 to remonstrate on the Edict of Nantes.\textsuperscript{134}

Henry IV also defended the Society of Jesus from attack. The king systematically rejected Harlay’s accusations against the Jesuits by questioning the fundamental premise behind their expulsion in 1594: that the Jesuits were peculiarly dangerous and ambitious leaders of the League. Indeed, Henry IV played down Jesuit involvement by asserting that the Jesuits participated in the League ‘avec moins de

\textsuperscript{133} For more on the ‘general will’ as reflected in the monarch see E. Meiksins Wood, ‘The State and Popular Sovereignty in French Political Thought: A Genealogy of Rousseau’s “General Will”’, History of Political Thought, 4 (1983), 281–315.

\textsuperscript{134} For a good study of Henry IV’s response to the Parlement’s remonstrances on 7 January 1599 see Garrisson, L’Edit, pp. 326–329.
malice que les autres." His purpose in rebutting Harlay's attacks on the Jesuits point by point was to show his own knowledge of the issues and to assert that the Parlement's interpretation was not the only one. The king implied that the Parlement lacked the dispassionate view which only he enjoyed. Moreover, he was not afraid to question the motives of his French advisers when, for instance, he rhetorically asked whether it might not be the case that the Sorbonne rejected the Jesuits 'par jalousie'? Once again Henry IV's public persona as King of France was emphasised in order to assert that the will of Henry IV transcended singular or selfish interests.

For Henry IV the acceptance or rejection of the Jesuit Order had always been in the monarch's hands:

S'ils n'ont esté a present en France que par tollerance Dieu me reservoit cette gloire que je tiens a grace de les y establir et que s'ils ny estoient que par maniere de provision. Ils y seront desormais par arrest et par Edict, la volonté de mes Predecesseurs les y retenoit ma volonté est de les y establir.

In this statement Henry IV stressed the royal prerogative in such matters. But, as his emphasis on 'par arrest et par Edict' implied, Henry IV was doing more than asserting his prerogative, he was ordering his magistrates to establish a legal standing for his judgement by registering it. The king returned in his closing to the question of his will and prerogative to emphasize that the time for remonstrances was over and that the king's mind was settled: 'Je scauray d'eux [the Jesuits] ce que ie voudray et ne leur communicqueray que ce que ie voudray. Laisser moy le maniement et la conduicte de cette Compagnie j'en ay maistrisé et gouverné de bien difficiles et malaysees a conduire

---

135 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 109: Response of Henry IV to the remonstrances of the premier président Achille de Harlay, December 1603.
136 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 108v°: idem..
137 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 108v°: idem..
Despite Henry IV’s personal response to their remonstrances, many in the Parlement were not persuaded by the king’s arguments and a second set of remonstrances was prepared for the king. The second set of remonstrances brought an end to royal tolerance and after a meeting with a delegation from the Parlement Henry IV expressed his anger, as one report recounts:

le Roy sortist du cabinet et les tança aigrement sur leur desobeissance leur reprochant leurs imperfections naturelles et acquises que chacun scait assez leur disant qu’ils avoient plusieurs livres mais qu’ils n’avoient encore bien estudié en celluy de l’experience et de l’obeissance qu’il se reservoit le Premier et leur laissoit le second ....

This anger was supported by a threat to remove the magistrates from their offices and replace them with ‘d’autres qui me seront plus utiles et plus obeissans que vous autres.’

In effect Henry IV’s threat marked the end of the king’s patience with the Parlement’s claim to be doing its duty. The magistrates continued to have important misgivings over the Jesuit return but there was little that they could do when faced with such a clear assertion of royal authority. The peculiar wording of the Parlement’s arrêt on 2 January 1604, in which the Parlement registered the Edict of Rouen, indicates that the magistrates had accepted the king’s authority to sanction a Jesuit return for the good of the kingdom. The magistrates defended as their duty the attempts to modify the Edict by appealing to their concern for the monarchy but they also accepted that their concerns had been addressed ‘par la bouche du Roy’ The lengthy registration passage notes that Henry IV had many reasons to allow a Jesuit return and that he had provided stipulations

---

138 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 111v°: idem.
139 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 113-113v°: idem.
140 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 113v°: idem.
141 BN Dupuy 438, fo. 64v°: Extract from the Registers of the Paris Parlement, 2 January 1604.
which protected the kingdom by restricting Jesuit participation in the French church. The Parlement accepted that the king, because of considerations which were not within their remit, had chosen for the good of the kingdom to allow the Jesuits to return.\textsuperscript{142} The registration passage makes clear that many in the Parlement were still not convinced by Henry IV’s reasons; but after having resisted the verification they felt obliged to register the Edict as: ‘commandement de la bouche du roy n’avoit qu’a luy obeyr.’\textsuperscript{143} The royal authority to make decisions within the church for the public good was accepted.

Henry IV’s decision not to revoke the *arrêt* which expelled the Jesuits in 1594 provided the Parlement with some consolation. However, the theoretical implications of the 1603 Edict for the Parlement were considerable. Henry IV’s right as monarch to override the advice of his Parlement was affirmed even on an issue as closely linked to French fundamental law as the Jesuit return. Thus, Henry IV succeeded in his purpose to reassert the monarch’s authority over the church. The clemency Henry IV publicly offered the Jesuits at court was indeed his to grant as the sovereign monarch of France. Moreover, Henry IV had established his right to transform his judgement into public law through its registration by the Parlement.

The public debate also had important implications for the Jesuits. The struggle between the opponents of the Jesuits and the king reinforced the perception of the Jesuit return as contingent on Henry IV’s will. Furthermore, the numerous royal statements of support for the Jesuits resulted in a new level of commitment by Henry IV to the Society as his refutation of advice by his Parlement was based on his own personal judgement

\textsuperscript{142} BN Dupuy 438, fos 65–66: idem. It is interesting to note that the Parlement’s registration parallels the concepts offered to justify royal actions in Bellièvre’s speech before a delegation from the Paris Parlement on 1 January 1600, see ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 172–172v°: Minutes of the meeting between Villeroy, Bellièvre and a delegation from the Paris Parlement, January 1600.
of the Society. This close association with the monarchy was a new situation for the Jesuits in France, and one which they were to both rely on and prosper under in the years which followed. The struggle to enforce his will inclined Henry IV to continue supporting the Jesuits and integrating the Society into the French church. The Edict of Rouen provided another context in which the Society of Jesus in France could construct a new image: as a loyal and obedient religious order within the French church.

V. The Edict of Rouen and the Society of Jesus

How were these developments viewed by the Society as a whole? The opportunity to return to France offered the Jesuits a real opportunity to re-establish themselves in an important Catholic kingdom. However, the king’s decision to sanction the Society’s return through his clemency rather than through a direct rebuttal of the charges levelled against the Society in 1594 raised difficult questions for the Society’s Roman hierarchy. In order to defuse some of the concerns over his clemency toward the Jesuits, Henry IV required that the Society’s Roman hierarchy make important concessions of corporate authority to himself and his officials. These requirements were apparent in the earlier draft of conditions sent to Rome by Henry IV in 1601, which had presented serious problems for the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva.144 Chief among these was Henry IV’s requirement that each Jesuit make a loyalty oath to the French Crown. To Aquaviva, this ‘è contro la libertà religiosa, contro l’uso di tutte le Religioni, e massime del repeterlo

---

143 BN Dupuy 438, fo. 64v°: Extract of the registers of the Paris Parlement, 2 January 1604.
144 Aquaviva’s hostility has been recorded see ARSI Galliae 60, fos 212–213v°: Response to the conditions sent by Henry IV, 12 January 1602; ANG, iv, 541–544: Aldobrandini to Bufalo, 23 August 1603.
ogn’anno, contro la dignità et autorità di questa S.ta Sedo ....' Thus, in 1601 Aquaviva had already expressed his conviction that the Pope’s privileges granted to the Society of Jesus must be honoured in France; but the Pope decided to make no formal reply to the king’s conditions.

In the autumn of 1603, Aquaviva maintained the same objections to the conditions in the Edict of Rouen. By mid-October the king’s decree had reached Rome and in a letter dated 20 October 1603 the Cardinal d'Ossat reported that the Father General had important misgivings over the Edict. A copy of Aquaviva's objections reveals that the Father General's concerns remained the same as in 1601 and it concludes that if the king could not soften these stipulations, particularly the requirement for each Jesuit to take a loyalty oath, then the Jesuits would prefer to remain in exile until such a time when the king could provide better conditions. Aquaviva, as head of an important international religious order, viewed Henry IV's stipulations as restrictive to the Society’s corporate privileges and thus wished to negotiate to protect Jesuit rights.

Aquaviva's formal objections arrived in Paris toward the end of November 1603, three months after the Edict was promulgated. Coton felt obliged to present the Father General’s awkward objections first to Villeroy and then to the king. Coton's account of his interviews offers a clear perspective of Henry IV’s policy toward the Jesuit hierarchy in Rome. The discussion was frank and presented the Father General with a stark choice between the acceptance of the king’s conditions or the withdrawal of the Society from France. No negotiation was acceptable. Villeroy met Aquaviva's demands coldly when

---

145 ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 212v: Response to the conditions sent by Henry IV, 12 January 1602.
146 D'Ossat, Lettres, v, 378: D'Ossat to Villeroy, 20 October 1603.
he stated:

repetens identidem Italos res nostras non intelligere et demirari se quomodo praefati Dominus orator et Cardinalis V.P. non significarunt quo consilio quaque deliberatione res ista peracta sit; cum praesertim probé norint ipsi solere Regem gratiam facere per partes, ut eos quibus bene facit magis ac magis sibi devinciat. Attuli ego rationes quot et quas potui ut emollirem animum sapientis viri, sed dimovere de mente nunquam potui; asserebat semper fore ut res Regi displierat. 148

Villeroy chose not to address Aquaviva's individual concerns but rather complained that the Father General did not appreciate the amount of thought and effort that went into the Edict.

If anything Henry IV appeared to be less understanding. When Coton raised the question of the loyalty oath, Henry IV noted that a similar oath was common in France where bishops were expected to take one. The king then expressed his impatience with the Father General when he stated: 'Extranei isti res gallicas ignorant et suo tamen volunt metiri omnia judicio. At propterea cum mihi fidem negent, nolo et ego illis fidere ....' 149

The message was clear from these two interviews: one does not negotiate for concessions, one relies on the king's good will for one's position in France. Implicit in the king's statement was the fact that Henry IV was bypassing the concerns of the Jesuit Roman hierarchy. Indeed, Henry dealt with the Father General's objections in the same manner as he bypassed the concerns of his most punctilious parlementaires. For Henry IV the implementation of the royal will was to be accomplished before the king was willing to discuss corporate privileges in his kingdom.

At the end of the interview the king did soften his stance and promised to write to the Father General to persuade him to accept the Edict. 150 The king wrote to Aquaviva

148 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 41: Coton to Aquaviva, 28 November 1603.
149 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 41: idem..
150 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 41v°: idem.
assuring him that he had the Company's best interest in mind; but it was Villeroy's letter to the French ambassador in Rome dated 18 November 1603 which elaborated on royal policy. Villeroy wished to make clear to Aquaviva that an oath was necessary to ensure that the Parlement of Paris accepted a Jesuit return. He indicated that the Jesuits did not have the best reputation for loyalty and that the oath would reassure many in France. Villeroy again stressed the importance of the oath, an issue which the king had chosen to regard as significant. A firm line on the oath served to reassure the Society's opponents that Henry IV had addressed the past guilt of the Jesuits and assured their future loyalty. Nevertheless, Villeroy emphasised that the oath and other restrictions were not designed to stop the Jesuits from conducting their ministry and that the king would always have the opportunity to extend the number of colleges and professed houses that the Society operated in France. Once again Henry IV's good will was presented as the source of preferment. However, at the same time it was clear that rejection of the king's will would preclude Jesuit integration.

This dispatch was particularly important as the French ambassador visited the Pope and Father General after receiving it and secured the assent of both men to the king's conditions. Notes written in Clement VIII's hand in the margins of the Nuncio Bufalo's letter of 10 November 1603 indicate that the Pope could see the advantages of submitting to the king's will. The Edict of Rouen was a success for the papacy which had pressed for a Jesuit return since 1594. Clement's desire for Henry IV to become

---

152 BN MS. Fr. 3487, fo. 186v°: Villeroy to Béthune, 18 November 1603.
154 AV Francia 48, fo. 188v°: Bufalo to Pope, 10 November 1603.
155 For examples of the Pope's continued interest in the Jesuit return see ARSI Galliae 60, fo. 75:
a second power in the Catholic church was even more pressing in 1603 than it had been when he had absolved Henry in 1595. Henry IV’s influence in England, where James I had recently acceded to the throne, and in Italy, through his marriage alliance to the Florentine Medicis, made him a potential source of support for Clement’s attempts to regain England for the Catholic faith, and for his efforts to undermine Spanish political power on the Italian peninsula. Thus, the Pope was happy to interpret the Jesuit return as an effort by Henry IV to address Clement’s concerns following the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes. Moreover, despite the conditions attached to the Jesuit return, the Society’s activities in France would advance the Pope’s efforts to restore the fortunes of the faith in one of the most important Catholic kingdoms in Europe.

The conditions imposed on the Jesuit return caused few concerns for Clement and his advisers. The corporate rights of the Society were not a priority in papal policy and the promise of royal good will towards the Society was sufficient for Clement VIII to give his assent to the Edict’s conditions on 8 December 1603. Eight days later the Father General also approved the conditions. There is no evidence as to why, despite his concerns for the corporate privileges of the Society, Aquaviva chose to accept the Edict of Rouen. The lack of papal support for his position must have contributed to his decision, but the potential for a split between French Jesuits and their Roman counterparts must also have weighed heavily on him.

A number of factors produced the contrast of perspective between the French Jesuits and their Father General in the autumn of 1603. First, the Vatican and Jesuit

Cardinal de Medicis to Pope, 1596; AV Francia 44, fo. 48: Cardinal de Medicis to Aldobrandini, 24 November 1596; AV Francia 45, fos 26–28: Cardinal de Medicis to Clement VIII, 8 March 1597; D’Ossat, Lettres, ii, 553: D’Ossat to Henry IV, 20 April 1597; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 68–68v: Clement VIII to Henry IV, 25 November 1598.
correspondence indicate that in the summer and early autumn of 1603 both Clement VIII and Aquaviva maintained their silence on the question of a Jesuit return as they expected to be consulted by Henry IV on the specific conditions of any Edict before it was promulgated in public. However, Henry IV avoided all discussion of the Edict with the papal nuncio before or after the announcement and only discussed individual privileges which the king planned to grant the Society with Coton and Armand.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, not only did Henry IV fail to send a copy of the conditions to Rome before promulgation, but he neglected to provide an overall indication of their content in discussions with Roman representatives in Paris.

A second factor which led to a split between the French Jesuits and Aquaviva was the king’s desire to implement the Edict swiftly. To Henry IV and his advisers the Jesuit controversy was a French matter to be concluded by the rightful leader of the French church. Thus, the day after the Edict of Rouen was promulgated, Henry IV ordered that the Edict be implemented before it was registered by the parlements. The king’s enthusiasm and good will, along with a lack of clear instruction from Aquaviva who was still awaiting news, resulted in a French Jesuit decision to begin to implement the conditions of the Edict before receiving the Father General’s pronouncements. Maggio, who had already written to Aquaviva on 20 July that the Father General’s expectations for the negotiations were excessive, was responsible for implementing the stipulations

\textsuperscript{156} For Cardinal Bufalo’s lack of information see ANG, iv, 482: Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 17 June 1603; ANG, iv, 499: Aldobrandini to Bufalo, 14 July 1603; ANG, iv, 517: Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 13 July 1603; ANG, iv, 592–593: Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 3 November 1603. For the limited knowledge of the Jesuits see ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 11–11v\textsuperscript{:} Armand to Aquaviva, 27 July 1603; ARSI Galliae 94, fos 15–16: Armand to Aquaviva, 11 August 1603; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 602–603: Coton to Baltazar, 30 July 1603; AFCJ Prat 32, p. 609: Coton to Baltazar, 14 August 1603.
in France before Aquaviva could reply. On 30 September 1603 Maggio wrote to the Father General in support of the Edict. Several days later Maggio sent a circular letter to the Father Provincials in the kingdom ordering that all Jesuits promptly take the required loyalty oath before a royal official and work to conform to the other conditions stipulated in the Edict, especially those concerned with the submission of the Society to the authority of the French church hierarchy.

There is no evidence to indicate that the French Jesuit Fathers deliberately disobeyed their Father General. Rather, the lack of clear instructions from Aquaviva, the king’s enthusiasm for implementing the Edict immediately, and the difficulties of communicating with Rome all worked to confront the Father General with a fait accompli. Whatever the motivation, it was apparent by October 1603 that if the Father General wished to press his claims that the Society was unable to accept the king’s conditions, then he needed to address the reality of Jesuit compliance in France. On 16 December 1603 Aquaviva chose to work within the new reality in France rather than reject it, and submitted to the king’s will with the hope that ‘dans quelque temps Sa Majesté réduirait le serment de chaque particulier, auquel les obligeoit l’édict ....’ The tone of Aquaviva’s request emphasises the change in the Father General’s policy. Aquaviva no longer defended the Society’s corporate rights but rather requested the king’s grâce.

Aquaviva’s new approach to negotiations with the king reflected the success of
the French Jesuits in appealing to Henry IV’s good will. For instance, in response to their obedience, the king in October 1603 held out the prospect of the College of Clermont in Paris being reopened and the Pyramid, built as a reminder of Jesuit complicity in the Chastell assassination attempt, being destroyed. Further, Henry IV accelerated efforts to reopen Jesuit colleges.\footnote{ARSI Galliae 61, fos 386–387: Coton to Maggio, 26 October 1603; ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 38: Coton to Aquaviva, 29 October 1603; ARSI Galliae 61, fos 395–396: Coton to Bufalo, 30 October 1603; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 651–653: Coton to Armand, 2 November 1603.} Finally, perhaps the most potent symbol of Henry IV’s patronage was the king’s decision to have his heart buried in the chapel of the new Jesuit royal foundation at La Flèche after his death.\footnote{This promise became the first article of the conditions of foundation see BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 120–120v: The royal conditions for the foundation of the College at La Flèche, 1603.} Each of these initiatives showed that the Edict was alterable by the royal will and that Henry IV’s good will was the crucial factor in deciding the nature of the agreement. The French Jesuits understood the king’s central role in implementing the Edict. Indeed, Armand and Coton received permission during this period to open two more colleges by appealing to Henry IV’s clemency.\footnote{ARSI Galliae 61, fos 38–39: Armand to Maggio, 3 September 1603.} It was this personal relationship that Coton presented to Aquaviva when he wrote to the Father General in October of 1603.\footnote{ARSI Galliae 94, fos 28–29: Armand to Maggio, 3 September 1603.} For instance, on 29 October 1603 Father Coton responded for the first time to Aquaviva’s objections to the Edict. Coton noted the numerous opponents of the Jesuits in France, and that the French Jesuits could not hope to return except through Henry IV’s good will. Then towards the closing of the letter he pleaded with the Father General to give the French monarch more and more reasons to promote the Society in the future through the Order’s obedience and loyal conduct.\footnote{ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 38: Coton to Aquaviva, 29 October 1603.}
It is impossible to speculate on how the French Jesuits would have reacted to Aquaviva’s rejection of Henry IV’s Edict. What is certain is that once Aquaviva took the decision to accept the Edict of Rouen, both the French Jesuits and the Society’s Roman hierarchy enthusiastically embraced the new situation in France. While several of the stipulations which governed their return were restrictive, the good will of Henry IV promised a bright future for the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits returned to France through an explicit assertion of royal authority. The circumstances surrounding their return established Henry IV’s interpretation of royal authority, and allowed him to acquire an important new ally within the Catholic church both in France and abroad. For the Society of Jesus the Edict of Rouen provided the opportunity to operate once again within the French Catholic church. Enthusiastic royal sponsorship of the Society ensured that the Jesuits re-entered the French Catholic Church with both a political and religious status which the Society had not enjoyed before its expulsion. Moreover, returning through royal clemency provided an opportunity to distance the Society from the events of 1594 and provided the context in which the Jesuits could build a new and quite different image: that of a loyal and obedient religious order at the heart of the movement for Catholic renewal in France.
Chapter Three

Supporters and opponents: the political position of the

Society of Jesus (1604–1610)

The promulgation of the Edict of Rouen in September 1603 was a seminal event for the Society of Jesus, but the extent of the Society’s participation in France was only gradually defined during the remainder of Henry IV’s reign. In 1604 the Jesuits returned to a new, more legitimate position within a French Catholic church which was experiencing the first flowering of the seventeenth-century French Catholic renewal. By 1610 the Society had succeeded in creating a significant presence in France because of continued royal support, developments within the French Catholic church and changing patterns of opposition to the Jesuits. Each of these three factors will be considered in this chapter which explores the Society’s rapidly expanding role in French society.

Between 1604 and 1610 the Society of Jesus was incorporated into important royal policy initiatives. The opening section of this chapter will consider several areas of royal sponsorship which served to define the Jesuits’ role in royal policy and French society in general. First, it will examine how Henry IV courted a receptive Jesuit international organisation in order to enhance French influence in Rome and improve the king’s reputation in Catholic Europe. Then it will assess how the Society became an important promoter of Henry IV’s attempt to renew the French elite through its educational endeavours. Finally it will look at how Henry IV embraced and promoted aspects of the Society’s missionary efforts to advance his policy of conversion through
persuasion of the Huguenot minority. These three topics provide clear examples of how the Society's missionary and educational endeavours were integrated into royal policy after the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen.

The second section of this chapter will examine how support for the Jesuits within France, along with changes in the French Catholic church, also served to integrate the Society into the French church. Royal support encouraged and legitimated the patronage of the Society by its allies. Moreover, the peculiarly dangerous threat of the Society to French church structure was diluted during this period through the foundation of other new or reformed religious orders with similar purposes and structures to the Society of Jesus. The genuine support for these new religious orders and the pious devotions which they promoted also brought the Society support in France and a leadership role in the seventeenth-century French Catholic reformation.

Finally, the third part of this chapter will explore the continued opposition to the Society. Royal patronage and the support of many influential figures for the Jesuit return stymied direct opposition to the right of the Society of Jesus to exist in France. Suspicion of the Society remained widespread but in the minds of many Frenchmen royal support for the Jesuits made public opposition to the Jesuits' presence in France unacceptable. Therefore, opposition for the most part was limited to defending existing French privileges against the encroachments of the rapidly expanding Society of Jesus. Because of its local particularist nature, this opposition was never a serious threat to the Society. Indeed, arguments over privilege and jurisdiction were not concerned with the expulsion of the Society but rather with the definition of what role the Jesuits were to play in France. Henry IV's death on 14 May 1610 at the hands of an assassin produced new problems for the Society which will be considered in Chapter Four, but this chapter is
concerned with the crucial years between the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen and Henry IV’s death when royal favour served to define the Society’s new role in France.

I. The Society of Jesus, royal policy and the government of the realm

On 1 May 1604 the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva in a letter to his French Father Provincials commented on the Society’s new position in France after the registration of the Edict of Rouen:

Ne s’è tralasciata diligenza o fatica, che si giudicasse opportuna per rimediare a quei danni: Ma in somma la prouidenza diuina, che, come dice San Leone, seruat rebus aliis temporibus ordinem suam, ha differito sin adesso il n.ro desiderio per impirlo poi piu comulatamento. Perioche in questi ultimi giorni hà toccato il cuore, e mossa la mente del Re Christianissimo in modo verso le cose della Compagnia n.ra, che non solo S.M.tà s’è contentata di restituirci in quel regno, ma apparechia fondationi di Collegio e di casa di probatione, e dà licenza per poter drizzare nuoui Collegi nelle più principali e più importanti città del Regno: ma quel ch’è piu, hà presa la protettione e diffesa della Compagnia, tutto che vi siano gagliardi e varij contradittori; che non solo col valore et animo suo reale spiana le difficoltà che s’attrauersano; ma con la prudenza e risposte sue mostra esser informatissimo delle cose, n.re confonde, e mette silentio a gli oppositori. Onde possiamo dire con verità, S.M.tà esser piu presto fondatore della Compagnia in tutto quel regno, che di qualche Collegio particolare.¹

Aquaviva’s ultra-royal tone offers an indication of the importance of the French monarch’s favour to the Society after the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen. According to Aquaviva, Henry IV’s patronage was the foundation on which Jesuit participation in France was based. Aquaviva describes the Society’s rapidly expanding network of foundations, along with their educational and missionary initiatives in France, as under the protection of the supportive king who had been convinced of their merits. For Aquaviva, the king had been inspired by the divine will, and the Society’s new role as supporters and advisers to the king’s evangelical mission in France was a development

¹ ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 414: Aquaviva to Father Provincials, 1 May 1604.
which must be embraced by the Order. In one sense Aquaviva’s letter, which emphasises the Roman hierarchy’s decision to enthusiastically accept the new situation in France, was designed to point up the successes of the Society and the close relationship between the Jesuits and Henry IV. However, the events of the next six years show that Aquaviva’s interpretation of the Jesuit return was not just a rhetorical extravagance, as it reflected a consistent effort by the king to protect and sponsor the Society’s work in France.

In 1604 Aquaviva was commenting on the favourable circumstances for a potential new role for the Society as a loyal, obedient and influential religious order in seventeenth-century France. By 1610 this prospect had gone some way to becoming a reality as continued royal support served to define the Society’s involvement in France. The Jesuits were recruited by the king to participate in a number of important policy initiatives including foreign policy, policies intended to renew the French Catholic elite and policy towards the Huguenots.

(a) Royal foreign policy and the Society of Jesus

Foreign policy continued to be a central preoccupation of the Crown after the conclusion of the Peace of Vervins in 1598. Potential opponents to Henry IV’s reign continued to rely on Spanish support and encouragement, as was vividly demonstrated by the Biron conspiracy. The threat to internal order plus the traditional animosity between the French and Spanish Crowns ensured that Henry IV, despite the peace, continued to actively undermine Spanish power whenever the opportunity arose. For instance, Henry IV still subsidised the Dutch war effort against Spain and on occasion allowed the Dutch
to raise mercenaries on French soil. Moreover, Henry’s war with Savoy in 1599–1600 served to weaken an important Spanish ally on the frontier of France and threatened the strategically important ‘Spanish Road’.

Finally, his marriage alliance with the Florentine Medicis was an important step in rebuilding French influence on the Italian peninsula to counteract Spanish dominance in this strategically sensitive region.

An important component in French foreign policy since the Peace of Vervins in 1598 was Henry IV’s efforts to gain influence in the international Catholic church at the expense of Spain. Again Henry IV exploited opportunities as they arose. For example, the king asserted his status as an important figure within the church when he negotiated a reconciliation between the Venetian Republic and Pope Paul V after the Pope in May 1606 placed Venice under an interdict. Henry paid particular attention to increasing his influence in Rome. For instance, he actively sought, through his able ambassador Philippe de Béthune, to increase French influence in the College of Cardinals. As these examples indicate, after 1598 Henry IV sought to re-establish French leadership in the church by challenging Spanish dominance in a variety of contexts; an initiative in which the Society of Jesus was to prove a useful ally.

The timing of Henry IV’s reconciliation with the Society of Jesus was favourable for royal efforts to increase French influence in Rome. At the opening of the seventeenth century the Roman hierarchy of the Jesuit Order resented the increasingly strong influence of both the Spanish monarch and the Spanish Jesuits over the international

---

6 W.J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberties* (Berkley, 1968), especially Chapters 7 and 8. See also, Mastellone, *La reggenza*, pp. 130–131
Order. Henry IV lost little time in presenting himself as an alternative patron and protector of the international Society of Jesus. This campaign took many forms. Symbolic of Henry IV's policy was the long series of attempts to canonise two of the founding Fathers of the Society, Ignatius Loyola and Francis Xavier. This campaign began in the summer of 1604 when Henry IV wrote to the Pope in their favour, and continued until his death. In the past the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of Poland and the King of Spain had also written in support of the two Jesuit Fathers, but Henry IV's sustained campaign in the opening decade of the seventeenth century consciously linked this issue to his monarchy. Henry IV identified the two Fathers with his kingdoms. Thus, in his first letter to the Pope in 1604 he noted that the Jesuits were founded in Paris and in a letter dated 27 July 1605 he pointed out that the two Fathers were his subjects as they were born in his hereditary lands of Spanish Navarre which had been taken from Henry's ancestors by King Ferdinand of Spain in 1512: 'des bienheureux peres Ignace de Layola [sic] et Francois Xavier tous deux navarrois.' Henry IV failed to get either Jesuit canonised, although Ignatius Loyola was beatified on 3 December 1609. Nevertheless, his efforts were received positively by the Jesuits in Rome. In 1608 the Jesuit Father Assistant at the Roman headquarters, Richeome, noted to the French ambassador in Rome that the king's initiatives had been met with great contentment within the Society and that the Italian and Spanish Jesuits were as pleased as the king's

---

7 R. Couzard, Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV (Paris, 1900).
8 ARSI Galliae 94, fos 247–248: Coton to Aquaviva, 16 August 1604; AFCJ Prat 32, p. 785: Coton to Possevin, 16 August 1604; ARSI Galliae 64, fo. 13: Henry IV to Pope, 1604; ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 259: Coton to Aquaviva, 4 September 1604; AFCJ Prat 34, p. 541: Henry IV to Breves, 10 October 1608; AFCJ Prat 34, p. 545: Henry IV to Paul V, January 1608; Xivrey, vii, 747–748: Henry IV to Paul V, July 1609.
9 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 247: Coton to Aquaviva, 16 August 1604.
10 For Paris see ARSI Galliae 69, 13: Henry IV to Pope, 1604. This theme is mentioned again in Xivrey, vii, 747–748: Henry IV to Paul V, July 1609. For Navarre see B. Barbiche (ed.), Lettres de Henri
own subjects. While Henry IV may have failed to make either Loyola or Xavier saints, he was successful in improving his relations with the Society of Jesus and in reinforcing his credentials as a Catholic monarch.

The beatification of Loyola was only one development in a wider programme to tie the Society of Jesus more closely to the French Crown. Henry IV’s activities on behalf of the international Order extended beyond the question of canonisations. Henry provided effective political protection in Rome against the Spanish Crown and the Spanish Dominicans over a bitter theological dispute during 1607–1608. Further, Henry IV defended Aquaviva’s authority from a Spanish Jesuit initiative to give greater autonomy to the Spanish Jesuit provinces. Henry IV’s strong desire to protect Aquaviva’s authority was displayed in the correspondence surrounding the Jesuit General Congregation held in Rome during the summer of 1607. The king took every opportunity to use his good relations with the Society to weaken Spanish influence over the Order. As Henry IV’s letter to the General Congregation in Rome explained, Henry IV wished ‘vous offrir ce qui despend de nostre autorite, protection et assistance.’

Tension between the Spanish Crown and the Roman administration of the Society

---


11 AFCJ Prat 34, p. 541: Breves to Henry IV, 30 October 1608.
12 AFCJ Prat 34, pp. 517–519: D’Alincourt to Henry IV, 2 April 1608. Despite the king’s continued support, this protection collapsed when the Cardinal du Perron returned to France.
14 ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 26: Coton to Aquaviva, 28 June 1607; ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 27: Coton to Aquaviva, 8 August 1607.
15 Xivrey, vii, 391: Henry IV to the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus in Rome, 28 November 1607.
offered the French monarch an opportunity to strengthen his ties to the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits were receptive to the king's offers. The international leadership of the Order was willing to alter the structure of the Society in order to provide the French Jesuits with influence at Jesuit headquarters in Rome. Thus, at the General Congregation of 1607 the Society of Jesus ordered the creation of a Father Assistant for France, in effect a French ambassador at the Jesuit headquarters in Rome. In the spring of 1608 Aquaviva appointed Father Louis Richeome, an important French Father Provincial and author of numerous theological and apologetic texts, to the post. Richeome joined four other Assistants representing Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany. His appointment served to underline the new French influence upon the Society of Jesus and the separate institutional structures which controlled the French Jesuits as opposed to other Jesuits.

Both Henry IV and Coton's interest in obtaining this concession was reflected in a string of letters from Coton to Aquaviva in August and September 1607. This concession was well-received by the king who, to show his favour, softened the conditions of the Edict of Rouen, exempted the Jesuits from clerical taxes and promised to open the College of Clermont in Paris. Richeome was to continue in the post of Father Assistant for the remainder of Henry IV's reign and proved an important French ally in Rome, particularly as war over the succession to the duchies of Cleves and Jülich approached.

Thus, as Henry IV's reign progressed, the king secured increasing influence amongst the Roman Jesuits who were to prove important allies in the international church.

---

16 ARSI Galliae 71, fos 41–42v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 22 March 1608. For further indication of Jesuit favour towards Henry IV see ARSI Galliae 69, fos 1–2: Panegyric to Henry IV, 1607.
17 ARSI Galliae 71, fos 27–36: Coton to Aquaviva, 8 August to 9 October 1607.
18 Xivrey, vii, 514–516: Henry IV to Aquaviva, 10 April 1608.
Sponsorship of Jesuit missions to convert the infidel also provided Henry IV with a useful platform on which to challenge the Spanish king’s dominance of the international Catholic church. In 1607 Henry IV publicly sponsored two important Jesuit evangelical missions to convert the infidels in foreign lands. One initiative that came to fruition during his reign was a mission to Constantinople. The mission was first publicly broached in a letter to the Pope dated February 1607 and its logistics were considered in the summer of the same year. The official reason for Henry IV’s mission was ‘la propagation de la religion christienne.’ Nevertheless, renewed emphasis upon Henry IV’s image as the Most Christian King and the cultivation of the Pope’s good will were both important considerations in the decision to sponsor the conversion of the Ottomans. When the mission was launched with royal funding in the autumn of 1609 it succeeded in establishing itself in Constantinople, despite Venetian opposition, and thus greatly improved the king’s reputation as a rising force in the international Catholic church.

During the summer of 1607 the king also sponsored a Jesuit mission to Canada which did not set sail until after his death. Nevertheless, Henry IV publicised his initial intentions and made a generous endowment of 2000 livres income in rentes for the new project. For Henry IV such a mission would break the monopoly enjoyed by the

1256: Henry IV to Breves, 11 May 1610.
22 ARSI Galliae 71, fos 41–42v: Coton to Aquaviva, 22 March 1608. See also the letters printed in P.J.M. Prat, Recherches historiques et critiques sur la Compagnie de Jésus en France du temps du P. Coton, 1564–1626 (Lyon, 1878), v, 258–269. For the king’s reputation in Rome see Prat, idem., v, 262–263: Breves to Villeroy, 29 November 1609.
23 ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 39: Coton to Aquaviva, 5 March 1608. See also A. Coté, Relations des Jésuites contenant ce qui s’est passé de plus remarquable dans les missions des pères de la Compagnie de Jésus (Québec, 1858), i, 24–29.
Spanish Habsburgs over the evangelisation of the New World: a monopoly they had enjoyed since the incorporation of the Portuguese colonies into their empire in the 1580s. It would also provide another useful high-profile example of his ambition to take on new roles in the Catholic church and reinforce his Catholic credentials on the international stage.

Thus, in the years following the Jesuit return Henry IV used the receptive Society of Jesus to challenge both Spain's dominance in Catholic Europe and Spain's previously unrivalled prestige in the conversion of the heathen. The Jesuits were well placed in the international Catholic church to aid the king and they proved a willing and able ally in his efforts. This provided the Society with a new importance to the king and his advisers as the challenge to Spain's dominance of the Catholic church was one of the most important aspects of Henry IV's foreign policy during this period. Moreover, the king's successful efforts to integrate the Society into his foreign policy helped the Jesuits establish and redeem themselves with domestic opinion in France, as Henry IV's policy to renew French prestige and authority on the international stage was popular in court and aristocratic circles.

(b) Royal sponsorship, Jesuits colleges and cultural renewal

Colleges run by the Society of Jesus were also used by Henry IV to promote important royal policy goals in France. This section will consider how Henry IV sponsored Jesuit educational foundations in order to advance his policy of cultural and moral renewal of the French nobility at the close of the religious wars. The foundation of Jesuit colleges was the largest single Jesuit initiative sponsored by Henry IV and his sponsorship went far beyond the simple desire to promote better education in France. Henry IV's
foundations were an important effort to reshape the nobility into the more service-minded and governable elite which was to become a feature of seventeenth-century French society.24 In the Society of Jesus, Henry IV had an able and willing promoter of his cultural renewal of post-League Catholic France. The conditions imposed by Henry for the Society’s return made the Jesuits the most responsive of any religious order in France to royal influence. Further, the Society’s central function as educators suited the king’s requirements well. In the weeks following the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen, Henry IV began to approve the foundation of Jesuit schools around France. These foundations, while often initiated locally, all had to be individually approved by the king. Royal sponsorship was advertised and served to link Jesuit colleges to Henry IV. Moreover, the royal Jesuit College at La Flèche provided a clear symbol of Henry’s sponsorship of Jesuit educational practices.

The College of La Flèche was sited in a town on the lesser Loir under the governorship of Guillaume Fouquet, the marquis de la Varenne, an important ally of the Jesuits and a close friend of Henry IV. The College was one of three mentioned directly in the Edict of Rouen which were to be founded or re-founded in jurisdictions from which the Society had been expelled. Indeed, La Flèche was the only college mentioned in the Edict of Rouen to be founded in a town where the Jesuits had not operated before their expulsion. Such a college had been part of Henry IV’s plans for a Jesuit return since at least 1601 and the specific mention of the College in the Edict of Rouen reflected his

desire to use Jesuit educational expertise to help renew the French nobility.  

La Flèche was conceived as a royal foundation with explicit royal approval. Thus, the first article of the foundation decree ordered that the king and queen’s hearts be buried in the College chapel after their deaths, while article thirteen donated the royal chateau in La Flèche to house the College. These grand symbolic gestures were reflected throughout the foundation stipulations. For instance, article fourteen stated that the College should be named ‘le College du Roy Henry IIII’. Moreover, article seven made the yearly subsidy for books conditional on the library being named ‘Bibliotecque du Roy Henry quatriesme’ while article six ordered that the monies left for church ornaments should be spent on pieces which included ‘les armoiries de leurs Majestez.’

Concern to maintain the association between the monarchy and the foundation was again emphasised when the king required in article fourteen that the College reject even the slightest donation ‘meuble ou immeuble’ aside from those granted by the king and his successors.

Henry IV’s enthusiasm for the foundation and the symbolic importance of the College were shown by the scale on which it was built and by the decision to start the project in early September 1603, several months before the Parlement had registered the Edict of Rouen. The royal endowment ensured that La Flèche College would be the largest Jesuit foundation in France. The initial conditions for the foundation provided a

---

25 ARSI Galliae 93, fo. 391: Maggio to Aquaviva, 22 January 1601. The original plan was to open a college in Vendôme.
27 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 122: Conditions for the Foundation of La Flèche college.
28 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 121: idem.
29 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 122: idem.
large endowment, while a record of expenses from 1606 show that the king had distributed 300,000 *livres* to the College in its first three years of existence.\(^{31}\) Moreover, the king offered a 2000 *écus* annuity and the priory of Saint-Jacques in La Flèche to found a central training centre for French Jesuits attached to La Flèche College.\(^{32}\)

Thus, Henry IV’s first action after proclaiming the Jesuit return was to endow a Jesuit college of immense proportions and link his royal person to the institution. The monarch, however, had further plans for his foundation. Henry IV’s official promotion of Jesuit education stretched beyond his foundation of La Flèche College, since he also provided the resources to assure that both the royal administration and court elite were educated at the College. Article four of the foundation document made provision for ‘vingt quatre Enfans qui seront nommez par sa M. et ses Successeurs des officiers domesticques de sa Maison et de celle de la Royne et les habilleront tous d’une mesme liurée que sa majesté leur specifiera et y demeureront chacun six ans.’\(^{33}\) This initial provision was significantly augmented in the summer of 1604 when Henry IV endowed places for one hundred nobles at the college.\(^{34}\) Henry’s decision to entrust the education of the court elite and royal officers to the Society of Jesus showed his public support for Jesuit teaching practices and was an important statement on the royal policy to re-educate the French elite as loyal servants of the monarchy.

\(^{30}\) ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 378: Coton to Maggio, 4 September 1603. See also ARSI, Galliae 61, fos 151–171: ‘Discourse on what happened at court during the re-establishment of the Jesuits, by Dezemat’.

\(^{31}\) BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 135–136: A statement on individual disbursements made to La Flèche by Henry IV, October 1606. For more on funding arrangements see ARSI Galliae 61, fos 464–465: Coton to Maggio, 13 February 1605; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605. See also M. de Burbure, *Essais historiques sur la ville et collège de la Flèche* (Angers, 1803), pp. 288–290.

\(^{32}\) ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 199v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604. See also BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 122: Conditions for the foundation of La Flèche College.

\(^{33}\) BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 120v°: idem. There is evidence that this royal initiative was put into operation, as Villeroy’s son studied at the Jesuit institution; BI Godefroy 15, fo. 221: Charlet to Villeroy, 1 May 1612.

\(^{34}\) ARSI Galliae 94, fos 233–233v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 18 July 1604; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 785–
La Flèche College was founded by Henry IV to restore the fortunes of the nobility after thirty years of civil war: or, in terms that contemporaries would have understood, Henry IV was seeking to renew the nobility’s virtue. Henry IV made this desire explicit in the Edict of foundation:

après avoir sainement jugé que cela dépend en partie de l’éducation, conduite et discipline de la jeunesse, qui se ressent toujours de la première habitude, nourriture, impression qui lui ont été données dans ses plus tendres années; nous avons résolu de mettre l’une de nos principales sollicitudes à rechercher les moyens de faire répandre de louables instructions dans notre royaume, de la faire instruire aux bonnes-lettres, et de la rendre amoureuse des fruits de l’honneur et de la vertu, autant que faire se pourra, pour tant plus capable, lorsqu’elle sera parvenue en âge, de servir le public; et d’autant plus que nous avons déjà vu, par expérience, combien les pères de la compagnie de Jésus sont propres à cet effet, et le grand profit qu’ils ont fait, tant par leur doctrine, que par bons et sages exemples, en plusieurs endroits de notre royaume ....

In this statement Henry IV articulated the increasingly fashionable belief amongst members of the nobility that education, as Mark Motley has recently written, ‘provided the surest means of restoring power and moral fibre to the [noble] order.’ Henry’s statement reflects the concerns of writers during this period who emphasised the need to teach ‘virtue’ to the young nobility in order to ensure that their energies were channelled into productive activities rather than vice. Henry IV, who had only recently re-established peace in France, saw the advantages in sponsoring the education of a virtuous nobility.

Henry IV’s success in attracting the sons of the court elite and important royal

786: Coton to Possevin, 16 August 1604.
35 Schalk, Valor to Pedigree, pp. 65–112.
36 Burbure, Essais historiques, pp. 288–289: Henry IV to the College of La Flèche, May 1607.
37 Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat, p. 3.
38 Schalk, Valor to Pedigree, pp. 130–134.
39 The king’s will on this issue was made public in a number of ways. Thus, in April 1605 Estoile reported a rumour that Henry IV had bought and read a book which attacked the vice and sin at court. However, instead of becoming angry the king commented that it ‘dit la vérité.’ Estoile, Mémoires, viii, 180.
office holders to La Flèche is reflected in the early enrolments. The Society drew many of its students from the sons of courtiers and from leading provincial families. For instance, the duc d’Epernon’s son, the future Cardinal La Valette, matriculated during these early years. In addition, the court-based, cosmopolitan Bonsi family sent several sons to La Flèche College during its first years of operation. An example of a provincial student is René de Rieux, from an important Bretagne family of ancient lineage, who left his college in the University of Paris to matriculate at the new Jesuit institution. The College also taught the sons of leading royal officers from such important families as the Neufville, Séguié, Zamet, de Vic and d’Attichy during this period. Joseph Bergin has noted that individuals nominated to bishoprics who had attended La Flèche were relatively young in comparison to their peers who had not. This observation indicates that the monarchy was inclined to reward those families which chose to send their children to this royal institution and that the College attracted the sort of students who had important connections within the royal court.

Henry IV was determined that his royal foundation at La Flèche would thrive as a centre for educating the French court elite and royal administration. Evidence for his concern to maintain La Flèche as one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the kingdom was reflected in his policy toward the re-establishment of historically the most important Jesuit teaching foundation, the College of Clermont. In the summer of 1604 Henry IV returned all Jesuit properties in Paris, including the buildings which formerly housed the College of Clermont. He also sanctioned an active Jesuit presence

---

41 Bergin, ibid., p. 221.
42 For Neufville see BI Godefroy 15, fo. 221: Father Charlet to Villeroy, 1 May 1612. See also Bergin, *French Episcopate*, p. 221.
in Paris as his decision to reopen the Jesuit professed house of Saint-Louis in Paris indicates. 44 This re-foundation was accompanied by the king’s public support as reflected in a consecration mass performed by the bishop of Paris, Henry Gondi, and a visit by the king who gave alms to the new house. 45 Nevertheless, Henry IV refused to sanction the opening of the Jesuit College of Clermont in Paris as ‘Cæterum vix puto ante absolutam fundationem Collegii Flexiensis consensurum regem vt instauretur Parisiense Collegium.’ 46 Indeed, while the king supported Jesuit preaching activities in Paris during the remainder of his reign, he did not agree to the reopening of the College of Clermont until April 1608. 47 La Flèche was to be the centrepiece of the royal initiative, untainted by previous history and unmistakably attached to the monarchy.

La Flèche was intended to provide a model on which provincial elites would base their own educational establishments. Henry IV founded and re-founded other Jesuit colleges both within the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris and throughout the kingdom. The Edict of Rouen specifically sanctioned the reopening of colleges in Lyon and Dijon and the founding of the College of La Flèche. However, within a month of the Edict’s promulgation, and several months before the Parlement registered the Edict, Henry IV had made clear his desire to expand the scope of Jesuit participation in France beyond these initial foundations, when he favourably acted upon requests to open

---

44 Recueil des lettres patentes octroyees aux Iesuites par les Roys Henry IV et Louys XIII concernants leurs restablissements (Paris, 1612), pp. 18–19.
46 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 235: Coton to Aquaviva, 18 July 1604; AFCJ Prat 32, p. 785: Coton to Possevin, 16 August 1604.
colleges at Rouen, Poitiers, Moulins, Brive and Vienne. Further, within a month of the registration of the Edict of Rouen, Coton reported that:

Rex certe charitatem ostendit non regiam modo, sed paternam ad stuporem usque neque finem de nobis præstantissimè promerendi fecit: nam et triginta duas vrbes Collegia Societatis ad suos usus singillatim flagitantes, exceptit humanissimè, nullam reiecit, quatuor decim admisit cumque tanto numero pares nos esse non posse ostenderem, nouem saltern admittenda dixit, habita ratione præstantissimarum ciuitatum.

Soon after this letter was written, permission to open colleges was granted by Henry IV to the towns of Amiens, Châlons, Cahors, Tours, Aix, Billom, Troyes, Bourges, Caen and Rennes. Although outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that the local situation had an important bearing on both the size of the foundation and local reception of a new Jesuit college. Henry IV was alert to the complex local situation and kept tight control over the foundation of colleges to avoid the most dangerous potential confrontations.

The Society of Jesus’s chronic shortage of human and material resources limited the number of foundations which could be opened. However, Henry IV remained committed to expanding their influence in France as is reflected in his decision in 1608 to increase the number of Jesuits by removing restrictions on the presence of foreign

---

48 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 338: Coton to Aquaviva, 13 October 1603.
49 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 199–199v: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604. See also ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 201: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604.
50 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 199–199v: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604.
51 See H. Fouqueray, Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France des origines à la suppression (1528–1762) (Paris 1922), iii, 25–61, 96–152 for commentary on individual colleges and direction to other related works. See also G. Huppert, Public Schools in Renaissance France (Urbana IL., 1984), pp. 104–115 which provides the most recent study of the rise of Jesuit colleges. While Huppert is right to note the fierce resistance of some towns to the Jesuit return, his account does not reflect the substantial support in many communities for the Jesuit foundations.
52 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 199–199v: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604. For an example of the letters of request see BI Godefroy 15, fo. 115: bishop Huralt of Chartres to Henry IV, 17 February 1602. See also Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 25–61.
Jesuits in the kingdom.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, in the final years of his reign Henry ordered the foundation or re-foundation of colleges in Paris, Nevers, Carpentras, Eu, Roanne, Langres, Saintes, Orléans and Metz.\textsuperscript{54} The number of colleges founded transformed the Society's position in France and numerous localities welcomed the Society as the chief educators in the community. Moreover, while more research needs to be done on the subject of noble education in the first half of the seventeenth century, it seems to be the case that an increasing number of nobles attended Jesuit colleges.\textsuperscript{55}

New Jesuit colleges were one of the most visible signs of royal religious and educational policy in the provinces. These new colleges established the Society in numerous important towns and cities across France and placed the Society in direct contact with the local elites through the education of their children. The foundation process indicates that these colleges, like La Flèche itself, were designed to assert the monarch's Catholic credentials and embrace his concern for the renewal of the French nobility.

\textbf{(c) Royal policy, the Jesuits and the Huguenots}

A third area of royal sponsorship where the Jesuits were actively integrated into royal policy was the conversion of the Huguenots by persuasion. Henry IV granted the Huguenots legal recognition in the Edict of Nantes to secure peace within the kingdom, but maintained his Catholic credentials both at home and abroad by directing a campaign

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{53} Xivrey, vii, 514–516: Henry IV to Aquaviva, 10 April 1608. Although since 1603 he had allowed foreign Jesuits to enter France on a case-by-case basis, see BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 124–144: Lettres patentes issued by Henry IV to the Jesuits. See also Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 96–120.

\textsuperscript{54} See AFCJ Recueil Rybeyrette, no. 15: Coton to Ayrault, 13 May 1608; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 1199–1201: Coton to the bishop of Orléans, 17 May 1609. See also Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 96–151.

\textsuperscript{55} Schalk, Valor to Pedigree, p. 197. See also Bergin, French Episcopate, pp. 221–223. For a breakdown by social class of enrolments at the Jesuit college in Bordeaux in 1644, see B. Peyrous, La
to convert the Huguenots through persuasion.\textsuperscript{56} The newly re-founded Society of Jesus
was to prove an important high-profile component of Henry IV’s policy toward the
Huguenots. The Society was already committed to missionary work to convert the
Huguenots, but Henry IV’s active sponsorship and support of Jesuit initiatives provides
an important example of how royal support shaped the Jesuit role within the royal church.

Even during the years of their official exile, the Jesuits had supported royal policy
as articulated in the Edict of Nantes and other decrees.\textsuperscript{57} For instance, before his visit to
court in 1603 Coton had engaged in public debates with Protestant leaders at Nîmes and
Grenoble in the hope of converting Huguenots to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{58} The Jesuit return to
royal favour brought royal support for their missionary endeavours which in turn served
to complement the royal policy of persuasive conversion. Henry IV took an active public
interest in the Society’s conversion work and his support of their initiatives was an
important aspect of the king’s renewal of his Catholic credentials. This is shown in a
letter from Coton to Pope Clement VIII in which he emphasised Henry IV’s personal
interest in Jesuit work: ‘Restituit antiqua collegia, addidit nova duplo plura et maiora.
Tria fundauit de suo plura pollicetur nostra opera utitur assidua [adsidua] in animorum
conuersione, adhibet ad mensam ad cubilia ad sedilia vt de rebus audiat cum ad pietatem
tum ad eruditionem spectantibus.’\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} M. Holt, \textit{The French Wars of Religion 1562–1629}, pp. 162–169. For a more detailed
discussion see Garrison, \textit{L’Edit}, pp. 318–331. See also C. Vivanti, \textit{Lotta politica e pace religiosa in
Francia fra Cinque e Seicento} (Turin, 1963).

\textsuperscript{57} For a history of Jesuit initiatives during this period see P.J.M. Prat, \textit{Recherches historique}, i,
194–334, 357–705.

\textsuperscript{58} AFCJ Prat 60, pp. 1–621: Collected documents on Father Coton’s missionary work in the south
of France. See also D. Chamier, \textit{Daniel Chamier: journal de son voyage à la cour de Henri IV en 1607
See also R. Sauzet, \textit{Contre-réforme et réforme Catholique en Bas-Languedoc au XVIIème siècle: Le
diocese de Nîmes de 1598 à 1694} (Lille, 1978), i, 142.

\textsuperscript{59} ARSI, Galliae 61, fo. 460v\textsuperscript{r}: Coton to Pope, 9 January 1605.
Royal sponsorship for Jesuit preaching missions to Huguenot strongholds was an important component of this policy. For instance, despite strong opposition from influential members of the Protestant church, Henry IV sent with his own personal backing the Jesuit Father Séguiran to the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle in January 1607 to preach to the Huguenot community. Further, in 1608 Henry IV sent the Jesuit Father Gontery to preach during Lent at Dieppe, a port with a large Protestant population. A final example of a significant missionary campaign is Henry IV’s decision to introduce the Jesuits into Béarn despite the opposition of the Parlement in Pau. The missionary purpose of the Society of Jesus was long established by the time of their reintegration into the French church. However, royal support for these high-profile missions both shaped the extent of their work in France and associated the Jesuits with the royal campaign to persuade the Huguenots to return to the Catholic church.

The monarch also encouraged the Jesuits to engage French Protestants in print. Jesuit Fathers Gaultier and Richeome intended to please the king and to associate their

---

60 P. Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance (Pairs, 1824), x, 197–198: Duplessis-Mornay to the Huguenot Synod of France held at La Rochelle, 22 February 1607. Estoile offers the same, if less detailed, account, see Estoile, Mémoires, viii, 277. Sully states that Henry IV was unaware of the royal letters sent with Father Séguiran but both Duplessis-Mornay and Estoile do not corroborate this story and thus Sully’s role as apologist for the Huguenot community is the most likely reason for this discrepancy. M. de Béthune, duc de Sully, ‘Mémoires des sages et royales Économies d’estat de Henry le Grand,’ Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l’histoire de France, M. Petitot (ed.), (Paris, 1821), vii, 164–167. From now on Sully’s text will be referred to as Économies royales. See also AFCJ Prat 32, p. 967: Henry IV to the town of La Rochelle, 17 September 1606.

61 Discours veritable de ce qui s’est passé a Dieppe, en Septembre dernier, sur le projet d’une Conference entre les Ministres du lieu, & Ieun Gontery, Jesuite. Avec la Refutation d’un dudit Jesuite sur ce sujet (n.pl., 1609). This tract recounts the conference held in September to clear up the controversy surrounding Gontery’s visit to Dieppe during Lent. See also D. Asseline, Les Antiquitez et chroniques de la ville de Dieppe (Dieppe, 1874), ii, 139–143. For an account of another Gontery mission see J. Gontery, La vraie procedvre pour terminer le different en matiere de religion. Extraict des sermons faicts à Caen (Caen, 1607).

62 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 190v–192: Royal lettres patentes which grant the right to the Society of Jesus to enter the principality of Béarn, 1608. See also Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 159–161.

63 A number of Jesuit Fathers produced a number of texts devoted to the persuasive conversion of the Huguenots during this period. For Father J. Gontery’s numerous works see C. Somervogel, Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus (Louvain, 1960), iii, cols. 1567–1574. For Father L. Richeome,
purpose with the royal will through the dedication of theological works to Henry IV. Moreover, Coton often sought royal approval for his publications and espoused in public the royal view that subjects of disagreement between the two faiths should be debated. Coton’s *Institution Catholique* is a good example of how the royal agenda shaped Jesuit publishing. This substantial two-volume critique of Calvin’s *Institutes*, published shortly after Henry IV’s death with the regent’s permission, included an introductory letter which asserted that Henry IV had directed and encouraged Coton to write the work. In the opening to his *Institution Catholique*, Coton writes ‘Voicy le liure qui se peut dire Posthume à son premier & principal autheur. C’estoit le grand Henry nostre Roy & vostre espoux qui luy donna les premiers lineamens, & qui depuis en a causé l’entiere & parfaicte formation.’ Henry IV’s policy of persuasive conversion was the focus of the text which was designed to win Huguenots over to Catholicism through its emphasis upon the compatibility of Calvinist and Catholic dogma. While the text was inspired by Henry IV’s policy, its publication soon after his assassination also served to re-emphasise the late king’s protection and support of the Jesuits just as the position of the Society in France was once again under threat during the first months of the regency.

---

see Somervogel, *Bibliothèque*, vi, cols. 1815–1831. For Father J. Gaultier see *Table Chronographique de l’estat du christianisme, depuis la naissance de Jesus-Christ jusqu’à l’année MDCVIII*. (Lyon, 1609).


65 AV Francia 53, fo. 87: Ubaldini to Borghese, 5 August 1608. See also Chamier, *Journal*, p. 47. For an example of Coton’s efforts to debate with the Huguenots see P. du Moulin, *Trente deux demandes proposees par le Pere Cotton avec les solutions adioustees au bout de chasque demande* (La Rochelle, 1607).


68 This topic was one which the king had supported since the Edict of Nantes. For instance, on 24 September 1607 Estoile reports that Hottman visited him in search of texts ‘pour la réformation de l’Église et réunion des deux religions’. A topic that, according to Estoile, a number of good men were working on with the support of the king, see Estoile, *Mémoires*, viii, 341–342. See also Vivanti, *Lotta*
The opening letter reminded the reader of Henry IV’s support for Jesuit publications and the Society’s support for Henry IV’s policies.

Moreover, the Jesuits also willingly took part in the debate between Catholics and Protestants at court, where royal pressure to convert was exerted on members of the Huguenot faith. These confrontations were an integral part of the conversion process as defined by Henry’s own conversion by persuasion. For instance, after a sermon in July 1608 Coton debated with the Protestant Minister Gigord over the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In a tract produced to publicise the exchange, Henry IV is reported to have returned from hunting to find the debate in progress and was pleased to see it. While the interpretation of Coton’s clear victory in the debate may reflect the author’s convictions, the general support by Henry IV for such debates was an accepted premise of the story and reinforces other observations of the period. 

The Jesuits were also responsible for many of the high profile conversions away from court. One of the best publicised victories for the Jesuits occurred in June 1606 when Jacques d’Hilaire, seigneur de Jovyac, his sons, an elder of the Huguenot church and some twenty other individuals converted to Catholicism after a disputation in the Vivarais. News of the disputation was published, with the Jesuit symbol on the frontispiece, in Tournon in 1607 and in Paris in 1608. In another text published by...
Jovyac, the opening letter is addressed to Henry IV and makes clear the central theme promoted by the Jesuits in their efforts to convert:

Sire, de moy & de tous ceux de la Religion pretendue Reformee, que nous auions bien les yeux bouchez, quand Dieu nous fit voir le miracle signalé de vostre conversion, de ne reconnoistre par cela, quelle estoit la vraye & la fausse Eglise, quelle la bonne & mauuaise Religion; & la connoissant nous conviennent tous à vostre example: Car nous ne pouuions pas auoir vn tesmoignage du ciel plus euident de la volonté de Dieu, que cellui-là, sinon que Dieu mesme eust parle à haute voix, & qu’il nous eust dit en paroles claires, Faites vous tous Catholiques Romains....

This piece of Jesuit propaganda, with its emphasis on the royal conversion as an example for other Huguenots, was a perfect illustration of royal policy succeeding in action and received royal support in the form of a letter from Henry IV dispatched to Jovyac congratulating the nobleman on his decision.

Perhaps the best single example of Jesuit support for Henry IV’s Huguenot policy, and the careful cultivation by the Society of a role as its chief proponent, is Gontery’s well-publicised letter to the king on 22 April 1609. This letter discusses the image of Henry IV as a wise and just king; Henry IV’s tolerant policy toward the Huguenots; and a recent success of the Jesuits in converting the noblewoman, Madame de Mazencourt, to the Catholic faith. The letter opens with the tale of four courtiers at the Persian King Darius’s court who disputed before their monarch over which was most powerful: wine, women, kings or the truth. According to Gontery, Darius ‘iugea que l’aduis concluant pour celle-ci estoit le meilleur. Le prix neantmoins deuoit estre reserué à qui diroit que le Roy & la verité joints ensemble sont encore plus inexpugnables.’

Gontery concludes with Darius’s judgement that ‘Le Monarque est vne viue image de la

des Escrits publiez au nom d’icelui sous le faux & fantastique titre de Converson des Huguenots a la foy Catholique (n.pl., 1608).

72 J. d’Illaire, L’Hevrevse conversion des Hvgvenots a la foy Catholique: Ou est respondu aux Articles de la Confession de Foy des Ministres (Rouen, 1609), p. a2.

73 Xivrey, vii, 516: Henry IV to D’Illaire, 10 April 1608.
Diuinité. La vérité seroit son ame comme la lumiere son corps, disoit vn ancien, si Dieu estoit capable de composition. The remainder of Gontery’s letter was underpinned by the idea that the truth, especially in issues of religion, was clarified through a king’s judgement. Royal justice and royal judgement were lauded as the foundation of religious peace: ‘Vostre valeur, SIRE, a coupé les racines de guerres comme Alexandre le nœud Gordien.’ Further, Gontery noted the king’s support for the Catholic faith at the Fontainebleau conference in 1600 as another example of the king’s judgement revealing the truth in religious affairs. Gontery returned to the theme at the closing of the letter to emphasize his confidence in the monarch’s judgement when he wrote that he was ready to sustain his theological stance ‘deuant les yeux de vostre Maiesté & du Soleil.’

Gontery stressed the monarch’s wisdom, as reflected in his ability to see through heretical theological points, in order to frame the substance of the letter, the conversion of Madame de Mazencourt. The letter places Gontery’s conversion of Madame de Mazencourt into the context of royal policy to show both its success and the Jesuits’ important role in prosecuting it. Gontery reported that he had presented to Madame de Mazencourt the same truths that had moved the king to convert, and concludes that despite the subterfuge of the Protestant ministers she chose to enter the Catholic faith. For Gontery this case showed that Henry IV’s persuasive policy was bound to succeed, as the truth that the king recognised at his conversion, and was intent on spreading to his subjects, would overcome all opposition. Thus, Gontery states ‘Je finirois ici, Sire, de crainte d’ennuyer vostre Maiesté, n’estoit qu’elle sera bien-aise de faire scauoir aux pays

74 Mercure françois, i, fos 242–244.
75 Mercure françois, i, fo. 242.
76 Mercure françois, i, fo. 242v°. Author’s use of upper case.
77 Mercure françois, i, fo. 243v°.
78 Mercure françois, i, fo. 243v°.
estrangers, que non seulement les Docteurs Catholiques de vostre Royaume, mais qu’aussi les Dames puuuent conuaincre les Ministres de la Religion pretendue reformee. According to Gontery, Henry IV provided his Huguenot subjects, through his conversion, with the means to see the truth in Catholic teachings. Thus, with the king’s example and leadership even a woman like Madame de Mazencourt could see through the fallacies of the reformed religion. The theme of the text was that Henry IV’s decision to allow the inherent truth in the Catholic message convert the Huguenots was correct and that the Jesuits were carrying out the royal policy with both loyalty and conviction.

Henry IV made the Society of Jesus one of his chief tools in the campaign to convert his Huguenot subjects. He integrated pre-existing Jesuit initiatives into his campaign and recruited the Jesuits into other initiatives. The king exerted strong control over their actions by channelling and directing Jesuit resources. Nevertheless, these initiatives were embraced and advocated by the Jesuits. The Jesuits were inclined to conduct missionary work in Huguenot communities even before the Edict of Rouen was promulgated. Royal support for their efforts and the promotion by Henry IV of high-profile missions, publications and disputations served to enhance the Society’s importance and the influence of their efforts. As with Jesuit educational endeavours, Henry IV succeeded in linking Jesuit initiatives to royal policy. In turn, Jesuit participation in royal policy legitimised their participation in French society.

While the three sets of initiatives reviewed here were the most important of the period, Henry IV’s use of the Society to promote royal interests was also evident in

---

79 Mercure français, i, fo. 243.
80 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 460–460v°: Coton to Paul V, 9 January 1605; AV Francia 53, fo. 164v°:
numerous other actions. Henry keenly promoted Jesuit preaching both at court and in Paris. This patronage can be viewed in part with reference to the king's desire to shape the French Catholic elite as the Jesuits used the pulpit to support royal policy on important issues related to the moral renewal of the nobility like duelling.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, Henry IV's decision to appoint Coton as his confessor upon the death of René Benoist in 1608 was another example of the monarch's increasing attachment to Jesuit religious practice.\textsuperscript{82} Coton had been a confessor to the king before his official appointment; however, this public support for his confessional practice was an important affirmation of royal backing for the distinct Jesuit spirituality represented by Coton. Coton promoted a spiritual outlook which minimised the effects of human corruption in order to stress humanity's residual goodness and the continued presence of human free will. There are a number of reasons why Henry IV may have found Coton's approach to spiritual guidance appealing. Coton's allowance for the difficult decisions required of a king would have catered for the compromises evident in royal foreign and domestic policy towards the Protestants. Moreover, Coton's acknowledgement of human frailties would have helped to address the king's frequent moral indiscretions. But whatever motivated Henry IV to choose Coton, this relationship between Jesuit confessional practice and the Bourbon monarchy, promoted by a string of Jesuit royal confessors in the seventeenth century, was to become a feature of royal spirituality which grew in prominence over the next 150 years.

No one royal initiative served to secure the Society in France, but the king's

\textsuperscript{81} See for instance AV Francia 53, fo. 203–203v\textsuperscript{a}: Ubaldini to Borghese, 31 March 1609; ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 234v\textsuperscript{a}: Coton to Aquaviva, 18 July 1604. See also Estoile, Mémoires, ix, 180, 242.

\textsuperscript{82} For more on Coton's appointment as confessor see Prat, Recherches, iii, 1–10.
favour played an important role in the legitimisation of the Society's actions. Royal support ensured that the Society was present in colleges and professed houses throughout France. There could be no mistaking the direct and personal royal support for the Society of Jesus. Henry IV benefited from his active sponsorship of the Society through improved Catholic credentials both within France and on the international stage. The Jesuits, through Henry IV's support, enjoyed an association with the French church which legitimised the Society's return to France.

II. The Society of Jesus, Jesuit patrons and the French church

Royal support after the promulgation of the Edict of Rouen offered the Society of Jesus an opportunity to return to the French church with legitimacy and purpose. Moreover, royal support also legitimised the Society's sponsorship by important individuals and groups within the French Catholic church who integrated the Society into the rapidly developing French Catholic reformation. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a detailed examination of Jesuit activities at the local level, a short consideration of a few important patrons and an overview of developments in the French Catholic church provide some indication of the depth of support for the Society in all three Estates of the realm.

Important churchmen who shared the Society's Counter-Reformation concerns were keen supporters of an active Jesuit presence in France. Bishops promoted Jesuit education within their dioceses. For example, François de la Rochefoucauld, bishop of Clermont and future cardinal; Gabriel de Laubespine, bishop of Orléans; Aymar Hennequin, bishop of Rennes; and Honoré du Laurens, bishop of Embrun all sponsored
colleges in their dioceses. Bishops were also important sponsors of the Society's missionary activities. Thus, François d'Escoubleau de Sourdis, archbishop of Bordeaux, sponsored a Jesuit noviciate in 1606 and a professed house in 1610 for his diocese. Moreover, Pierre Valernod, bishop of Nîmes, promoted Jesuit missionaries to combat the historically strong Huguenot presence in his diocese.

The Society also had important patrons in the Second Estate. Numerous members of the court nobility sponsored Jesuit colleges in their areas of influence. For instance, the maréchal de la Châtre supported the opening of a Jesuit college in Bourges; the duc de Montpensier, governor of Normandy, sponsored a college in Rouen; Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers, re-founded his father's college in Nevers; and the duc d'Epernon sponsored a college in Metz. Aside from these court figures important regional nobles also promoted the Society. The marquis de la Varenne's support for La Flèche college has already been noted. A second example of a long-standing patron was the comte de Tournon who refused to close the Jesuit college at Tournon during the years of Jesuit expulsion. Important noble women also actively supported the Society. For instance, Catherine de Clèves, duchesse de Guise, sponsored the reopening of the

---

84 Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 107–108. See also Peyrous, La réforme Catholique, i, 324. The professed house did not open until 1624.
85 Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 119–120. See also R. Sauzet, Contre-réforme et réforme Catholique, i, 144–146.
86 For La Châtre see Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 46. For the duc de Montpensier see Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 53. For Gonzague see Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 106 For D’Epernon see Sully, Economies royales, vii, 104–106.
87 See p. 122.
88 See pp. 53–55
Jesuit college in Eu. 89 In addition, Elenor de Bourbon’s request for Henry IV to send the Jesuit Father Gontery to preach before her provides another example of female patronage. 90 Most of the colleges founded around France had an important aristocratic patron, whether it was a bishop or noble, to protect the foundation in the locality. 91 These patrons reflected the support for the Society amongst some of the most important families in France.

The Jesuits also found support in wider circles than the aristocratic elite. Local office holders and urban elites in numerous towns, including Dijon, Lyon and Bourges, lobbied for Jesuit schools. 92 Aside from this general support, the Jesuits could also count on allies in the French legal and governmental administration which was charged with regulating the Society’s activities in France. The most important of these allies were those in the Parlements like président Antoine Séguier and his relatives in the Paris Parlement who were vigilant in their efforts to protect the Society’s interests. 93 Many of these supporters were former students who held important positions in the royal administration. For example, the important Jesuit ally Nicholas de Verdun, premier président at the Toulouse Parlement, who in 1611 became the premier président of the Paris Parlement, provided the Society with important support throughout his career. 94

The patronage of important individuals and the support of local communities

---

89 Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 112.
90 BL Godefroy 15, fo. 214: Elenor de Bourbon to Henry IV, 23 October 1603.
91 Although G. Huppert overstates the lack of local support for the Society, he is right to note the considerable support amongst churchmen for these foundations, see Huppert, Public Schools, pp. 104–115.
93 See pp. 48, 87–89, 166.
94 For information on Verdun and his support of the Society see Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 90–91. See also AV Francia 54, fôs 226–227v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 29 March 1611. See also F.T. Perrens, L’église et l’état en France sous le règne de Henri IV (Paris, 1873), i, 521–524.
were factors which helped to turn the general context of royal favour towards the Society into the reality of an active Jesuit presence in France. However, the patronage and support received by the Society reflected a wider development in French Catholic piety which was to produce another favourable context for the Jesuit return. New forms of Catholic devotion developed rapidly during the period and with royal support many of those most inclined to the new piety chose to accept and sponsor the Society as one aspect of this new movement. This study does not have the scope or space to consider these important developments in the French Catholic church between 1594 and 1615. It suffices to say that Catholic piety evolved rapidly during this period. The late religious war and Leaguer spirituality based on an active immanent God and the participation of devout Catholics in the protection of the pure church from contamination was rapidly discredited among many of the faithful. In its place quickly sprung a more internal and contemplative spirituality advocated by such influential figures as Madame d’Acarie and the future Cardinal de Bérulle which would become closely associated in time with the seventeenth-century French Catholic reformation. This development in the French church had important implications for the Society’s position in France. Moreover, the Society had a significant influence upon the movement through its support of the new spirituality.

One powerful feature of anti-Jesuit polemic since the 1550s had been the charge that the Society of Jesus did not fit within the regulatory framework of the French church and therefore was peculiarly dangerous. However, during the period between 1604 and

---

1610 a series of reformed religious orders and new Counter-Reformation orders entered
or rapidly grew in France, undermining the argument that the Jesuits presented a peculiar
threat to French church structure. For instance, the reformed Franciscan Récollets, or
Frères Mineurs de l'Étroite Observance, received royal permission to found a house in
a suburb of Paris in 1603. Moreover, the Capuchins who, like the Jesuits, had been
mistrusted by many in the Gallican church since their initial foundation in France by the
Cardinal de Lorraine in 1564, started to construct a grand new house on the Rue St-
Honoré in Paris in 1603. This house for both male and female members of the Order was
founded by important aristocratic figures including the duchesse de Mercœur and
reflected the growing influence of this new reformed branch of the Franciscan Order at
the opening of the seventeenth century. To these examples could be added the
Barnabites, who Henry IV invited to Béarn in 1608, and the Brothers of Charity who also
entered the French church during this period.

Several new female religious orders were also founded in France during the years
following the Jesuit return. The Carmelites received permission to found a house in Paris
in 1602 which was built in 1604. Further, in 1608 an Ursuline house was founded in
the capital. These female religious orders were brought into the French church from
abroad but others were founded within France. For example the Filles de Notre-Dame

---

96 Dagens, Bérulle, p. 175. Dagens argues that this development reflected royal support. For a
general discussion of religious life in Paris at the turn of the seventeenth century see R. Pillorget,
97 Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 177.
98 For the foundation of the Capuchin monastery see P. Larousse (ed.), Grand dictionnaire
universel du XIXe siècle, (Paris, 1867), iii, 341. Also see Pillorget, Nouvelle histoire de Paris, pp. 501-
504.
99 For these two orders see Barbiche (ed.), Henry IV, p. 123.
100 Dagens, Bérulle, pp. 191-204. See also M. Houssaye, M. de Bérulle et les Carmélites de
France (Paris, 1872).
were founded in Bordeaux to provide education for Catholic girls in a manner modelled on Jesuit colleges. These new orders operated within the community and possessed a number of traits which hindered magistrates’ efforts to regulate the Society of Jesus. Thus, these new foundations diluted the peculiar threat of the Jesuits to the French church structure as they took up similar positions in the French church hierarchy. Moreover, they also represented the increased influence in the French church of the piety advocated by the Jesuits.

The rapid growth of new, active Catholic reformation religious orders represented genuine support among an important section of the French church and French society for these groups. The Jesuits, who were publicly supported by the monarch, were welcomed by those most inclined towards the new piety. Indeed, the Jesuits quickly became an important force in this new pious movement. For instance, the young Pierre Bérulle, who for a time considered joining the Jesuit Order, viewed Coton as a protector, confident and spiritual adviser. Coton’s influence over the young Bérulle is reflected in the fact that Coton assisted at the first meeting of Bérulle’s nascent organisation, the Oratoire. Furthermore, Coton was a spiritual adviser to Madame d’Acarie and the Carmelite nunnery in the capital, while several Jesuit Fathers dominated the spiritual life of the Ursuline nunnery in Paris. The Jesuits were also influential away from the capital. For instance, in Bordeaux they were closely involved with Madame de Lestonnac’s

---

105 Dagens, *Bérulle*, p. 179.
foundation of the Filles de Notre-Dame which was dedicated to teaching girls with a technique borrowed from Jesuit pedagogy. These examples show that the Society actively supported and contributed to the religious life of many of the most important religious orders and groupings in the early seventeenth-century French Catholic reformation. Thus, within the French church the Jesuits received considerable support from important patrons in all three Estates of the realm.

The popularity of the French Catholic reformation and the support that this new movement provided the Society was evident in the private correspondence of the counsellor at the Paris Parlement and important Gallican, Jacques Gillot. Gillot perhaps best expressed his concern for protecting French identity from the foreign influences of the new Catholic piety when he wrote to Scaliger:

I’espere, que nous ramasserons de bons & rares traictez, concernant la liberté & les droict de la France, pour montrer, qu’elle s’est toujours garentie de cette puissance Transalpine, qui n’a aucun fondement, qu’en la teste des fous, n’y eût progres, que par la lascheté, ne quid pejus dicam, des ministres des monarques ... Je me delibere d’en amasser trois ou quatre [tracts], pour leur faire veoir le public, & d’autres petits traictéz, qui feront un autre volume.  

Or even more direct was Gillot’s comment to Scaliger: ‘Je ne travailleray en ma vie, qu’a ce la, afin que nous laissions quelques monuments, & reliques veritables de nostre pauvre nation, la plus gourmandée & asservie aux Jésuites, Feuillants et Cappuzzins, que jamais fut nation.‘ Gillot’s laments reflect the growing success of the French Catholic reformation, a reformation which many of his colleagues and peers supported and a reformation in which the Society of Jesus was to play an important role.

396. For the Ursulines see Jegou, Les Ursulines, pp. 129–145.
107 Peyrous, La réforme Catholique, i, 327, 427–428.
108 P. Burmannus, Sylloges epistolae a viris illustris scriptarum (Leiden, 1727), ii, 370.
III. Changing patterns of opposition to the Society of Jesus in France

The new legitimacy for the Society’s existence and activities in France was reflected in the changing patterns of opposition to the Jesuits. After the registration of the Edict of Rouen direct attacks on the Society as a whole were relegated to the margins of the polemic. Perhaps the most dramatic instance of continued direct opposition manifested itself soon after the registration of the Edict in the attempted assassination of Father Coton on 13 January 1604. The knife attack by a lone assassin on Coton as he rode through Paris in a carriage symbolised the unease of many with his perceived influence over the king. However, Coton’s ‘miraculous’ survival of what could have been a fatal wound to the stomach, and the public concern shown by the king and queen for his well-being, only served to advertise the legitimacy of the Jesuit return. The assassination attempt highlighted the failure of anti-Jesuit polemic to convince the monarch and marked the end of any formal attempt by Catholics to persuade Henry to change his policy toward the Society of Jesus.

From January 1604 there were few public attacks on the Society in Paris. The anti-Jesuit material which did generate interest in Paris was generally produced by Protestants. A letter from the duc de la Force, the Huguenot governor of Béarn, to Henry IV in 1608 detailing an assassination plot against the king was typical of the new attacks.

---

110 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 375–375v°: Bérulle to Maggio, 14 January 1604; Second copy in ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 413–413v°: Bérulle to Maggio, 14 January 1604; AFCJ Prat 32, p. 737: Armand to Aquaviva, 15 January 1604; ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 201–201v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 412: Coton to Maggio, 4 February 1604. It is clear from Gillot’s letter that at least he would not have been upset if Coton’s wounds had proven fatal, see J. Scaliger, *Epistres françaises des personnages illustres & doctes a Monsr. Joseph Iste de la Scala*, 1. de Reves (ed.), (Hardervvyck, 1627), pp. 260–261.
111 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 412: Coton to Maggio, 5 February 1604. See also ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 413–413v°: Bérulle to Maggio, 14 January 1604; ARSI, Galliae 94, fo. 201–201v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 27 January 1604.
on the Society. This improbable tale chronicles the travels of a Spanish student from his Jesuit school in Spain to Paris. The purpose of the student’s trip was to assassinate Henry IV and the tale was careful to link the French Jesuits with their international brethren, theories of papal sovereignty and theories of tyrannicide. The story traced the Spaniard’s travels to a succession of French Jesuit foundations in Bayonne, Bordeaux and Paris, each of which aided and abetted his progress. Further, Coton was singled out as the chief supporter of the assassin in Paris and it was Coton who, according to the duc de la Force, introduced the Spaniard into the court. The letter implicated the French Jesuit hierarchy in an international Jesuit conspiracy based on support for papal sovereignty and the promotion of tyrannicide. The duc de la Force’s constant referral to French Jesuit complicity in what was essentially a foreign assassination plot betrays the concern of some Huguenots that by 1608 the French Jesuits had at least in part succeeded in integrating into French society as a separate entity from their foreign counterparts. However, the letter was a Huguenot fabrication in reaction to the king’s decision to allow the Jesuits to conduct their mission in Béarn, not a creation of the French Catholic opposition. This reflects well the source of public attacks upon the Society for subversion in Catholic Paris.

Other rumours which circulated in Paris were similar in character. Thus, after Coton’s appointment as confessor to the king, Maximilien de Béthune, the duc de Sully, attacked Coton for passing on to other Jesuits secret information taken from the king’s confessions. Moreover, rumours of Jesuit involvement in overthrowing the Russian

---

113 On confession see Sully, _Économies royales_, viii, 37–42. Coton’s letter of apology is also recorded Sully, _Économies royales_, viii, 44–45.
Czar and in the English Gunpowder Plot also circulated in Paris. A third example of
the new anti-Jesuit attacks is a rumour that Coton had asked a series of bizarre questions
about theological points and the king’s well-being to the devil who possessed Marthe
Brossier, the celebrated demoniac. These affairs are representative of the sort of
rumours which continued to circulate during these years.

Perhaps the best evidence of the new marginal environment in which anti-Jesuit
polemic operated can be found in the decline of domestic Catholic anti-Jesuit printed
literature following the registration of the Edict of Rouen. After the significant group of
tracts published between 1602 and early 1604 by important authors such as Pasquier and
Arnauld to persuade the king not to allow the Jesuits to return, the number of tracts
produced in France declined dramatically. Between 1605 and 1610 Estoile occasionally
noted the appearance of a secretly produced anti-Jesuit publication; nevertheless, the
tracts printed in France were notable for their rarity and the secret nature of their
publication underlined the new environment in which these texts operated. While these
tracts still attracted readers their marginal presence in the debate was reflected in the
publication of the one tract which received significant attention both in Paris and at court:
C. de Plaix’s *Le passe-par-tout des Peres Jesuites* first published in 1607. This tract,
which provided a burlesque, satirical account of the Jesuits and their educational
activities, was published secretly without the author or publisher’s name and, according

---

ix, 656–660; x, 57–73.
115 BN Dupuy 678, fo. 111–111v°: Printed broadsheet *Quæstiones spiritu immundo ad
explicandvm propositæ*. For a second copy see BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 147–151v°.
116 Estoile, *Mémoires*, viii, 201, 253, 348; ix, 197; x, 8, 30.
117 The full title of the tract is *Le passe-par-tout des Peres Jesuites, apporte d’Italie par le docteur
de Palestine gentilhomme Romain, ensemble L’A. Banny du François et nouuellement traduit del’Italien
imprimé à Rome* (n.pl., 1607).
to Duplessis-Mornay, irritated Henry IV. 118

After the assassination attempt on Coton, direct opposition to the Society in France was rarely a subject of public discussion. Polemists who had produced the most important anti-Jesuit rhetoric no longer wrote publicly about the Society. Moreover, those criticisms of the Society which did circulate failed to attack the Jesuits on a broad theoretical front as Pasquier or Arnauld had done earlier in Henry IV’s reign. The Edict of Rouen was registered after a clear articulation of the royal will and those who had opposed the Society accepted the new situation. Royalist polemic since the early 1590s had argued that even a king who acted unjustly needed to be obeyed for the sake of peace and order. 119 The same people who had argued this point when Henry IV pacified the country had often been opponents of the Society. Now they were required to accept the king’s will with reference to the Society and nearly all were grudgingly willing to maintain their public silence on this issue.

However, one apparent exception to this was the controversy between Henry IV and the Parlement over the removal of the Pyramid from in front of the main entrance to the Palais de Justice. The Pyramid was a monument installed in 1595 by the Parlement’s order, to commemorate the arrêt against Jean Chastell and the Society of Jesus through a programme of statues and a series of marble plaques. 120 The Pyramid became the central focus for a contentious controversy in the months following the Society’s return

118 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, x, 197.
120 For an engraving and a complete transcript of the plaques see J.-A. De Thou, Histoire, x, 26–29. See also BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 1–1v°: Printed page with an engraving of the Pyramid and transcriptions of the Pyramid’s plaques.
which was only concluded with the demolition of the Pyramid by the king’s men in June 1605. According to Coton, after months of opposition by the Parlement ‘Il Re si è risoluto di fare roninare la Pyramide non di notte ma di giorno, hauendo chiamato la Corte di Parla.te et significatoli questa essere sua voluntà.’ By the time Coton wrote this in February 1605, Henry IV was intent on removing the Pyramid because it commemorated the Society’s role in a crime which the king had forgiven them through his royal clemency. The Parlement, however, continued to object strongly to the king’s actions.

Clearly some important matters of public law were at stake in this issue. A number of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars have noted the importance that the Parlement attached to the issue and have linked the Parlement’s intransigence with the importance of the Pyramid as an anti-Jesuit symbol. Indeed, even moderate scholars have argued that the Pyramid controversy was the result of continued anti-Jesuit sentiment. For instance the Jesuit historian Fouqueray describes the motivation of the opposition in the Parlement as:

Quand il put enfin s’en occuper, certains parlementaires s’opposèrent par tous les moyens à une résolution qui blessait leur amour-propre et contrariait si fort leur rancune contre les Jésuites; ils allèrent jusqu’à menacer le roi de troubles graves dans la capitale, d’émeutes que l’indignation soulèverait dans tout le royaume.

This incident, for many historians like Fouqueray, was the only significant instance of public opposition to the Society in the Parlement during the final years of Henry IV’s reign.

However, despite the close relationship between the dispute over the Pyramid and

---

121 ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 234v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 18 July 1604; ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605. ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 8: Coton to Aquaviva, 20 June 1605. For the Parlement’s view see De Thou, Histoire, x, 27-30. See also Estoile, Mémoires, viii, 179.
the earlier court case against the Jesuits, modern historians like Fouqueray have misinterpreted the inspiration for the dispute. A close reading of the arguments which defined the issue reveals that, while many in the Parlement continued to distrust the Jesuits, the controversy was not primarily about the Society of Jesus but rather about the Parlement's anger over how the Pyramid issue was handled by the king. Indeed, the link between the Society and the conflict was deliberately toned down by important members of the Parlement who were fearful of diluting their particular grievances by allowing the Jesuit issue to enter into the dispute.

The primary grievance for members of the Parlement was the king’s decision to remove the Pyramid through his own authority without consulting the Parlement. De Thou, in his *Histoire*, expressed the Parlement’s concern for its reputation when he implied that it was unjust to remove the Pyramid: ‘On observa que la statuë de la justice qui servoit d’ornement à la pyramide, fut ôtée la première, comme s’il eût fallu renverser la justice, avant de détruire une barrière qui faisoit en quelque sorte la sûreté du trône.’ A similar concern was raised by the premier président Harlay to Chancellor Sillery when at a meeting to resolve the controversy he argued that he wanted to obey the king but had to protect the honour of the Parlement. The king’s advisers were aware of the Parlement’s concern but were intent on ensuring that the removal of the Pyramid was accepted as within the remit of royal authority.

In the end no compromise was possible because Henry IV was determined to

---

122 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605.
123 Fouqueray, *Histoire*, iii, 10.
define the issue as an assertion of his authority. He returned to the issue in February of 1605 to order in Council that the Pyramid be demolished. In a letter to Maggio, Coton provided an account of the decision and the royal purpose in destroying the Pyramid: ‘Il Re si è risoluto di fare rovinare la Pyramide non di notte ma di giorno, hauendo chiamato la Corte di Parla.te et significatoli questa essere sua volontà.’ Henry IV’s intentions as reported by Coton were reflected in the removal of the Pyramid in broad daylight by the king’s men in June 1605. For Henry the Parlement’s resistance was opposition to his ‘volontà’. The issue was not about justice but rather about authority and obedience. Henry IV’s ability to demolish the Pyramid without formally consulting the Parlement whose arrêt it symbolised underlined royal authority.

The Society of Jesus did not feature at any point in the public debate surrounding the Pyramid’s destruction. Indeed, the Parlement did not oppose the removal of the single plaque on the Pyramid which directly implicated the Society in the Chastell assassination attempt. There may have been members of the Parlement who saw this issue as an opportunity to undermine the Society by maintaining a symbol which would continue to associate the Jesuits with tyrannicide. However, many important members of the Parlement were concerned that the bitter controversy over the Jesuits would be rekindled by this issue which could threaten the king’s authority as his support for the Society had been clearly articulated in the Edict of Rouen. Harlay, for instance, in his

---

126 There is evidence that Henry IV may have been willing to compromise early in the controversy, see ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 234v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 18 July 1604. See also Rybeyrette (ed.), Documents, ii, 70. But continued opposition hardened the king’s stance on the issue and by February he had rejected compromise in favour of a clear assertion of his authority.

127 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605.

128 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605. ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 8: Coton to Aquaviva, 20 June 1605. For the Parlement’s view see De Thou, Histoire, x, 27–30.

129 ARSI Galliae 61, fo. 466: Coton to Maggio, 18 February 1605.

130 De Thou, Histoire, x, 27.
confrontations with the king’s advisers did not frame any of his objections with reference to the Jesuits. Moreover, De Thou in his *Histoire* voiced the concern that the Society could become embroiled in the controversy:

Car, disoit-on alors, si l’on renverse un monument qui semble être une des bases, & l’un des plus fermes appuis de la tranquillité publique, on trouble cette même tranquillité; ensorte que si la France reçoit encore un coup aussi funeste que celui qui a été porté par Chastel, ce crime sera justement imputé à la Société, & l’on pourra dire que les Jésuites, qui, si on les en croit, ne sont rentrés en France que pour l’utilité de ce Royaume, auront été cause de ses malheurs & de sa perte.

De Thou, whatever his personal view of the Jesuits, seems to have accepted that the royal will towards the Society had been articulated in the Edict of Rouen and that his duty as a member of the Parlement was to ensure that this issue did not return to the public debate where it could once again cause disorder. Thus, for many in the Parlement the most important issues addressed in the Pyramid crisis were best articulated without reference to the Society of Jesus.

The collapse of direct public opposition to the Society did not reflect a transformation in the private attitudes of individuals toward the important theoretical issues which the Jesuits had been associated with since 1594 or towards the Society itself. For example, the return of the Jesuits failed to address the underlying concerns over the possible assassination of the king as plots against his life continued to be uncovered with regularity during the final years of his reign. Nevertheless, the unease of many Frenchmen with the continued disorder and the Society’s presence in France did not lead to a conflation of the two issues. The absence of the Jesuits from the polemic is all the

---

131 ARSI Franciae 1: Coton to Possevin, 16 August 1604. Also see Rybeyrette, *Documents*, ii, 70.
more striking as there was no shortage of issues on the agenda which could have been associated with the Society. For instance, important texts on theories of papal authority and tyrannicide were republished, including those of Jean Gerson, the Paris theologian who had defended the inviolability of a monarch’s life against Jean Petit at the opening of the fifteenth century. Moreover, the period between 1604 and 1610 also witnessed a series of new publications by authors such as Gillot, De Thou and Leschassier which provided a more detailed framework of historical scholarship devoted to defining French law and privileges especially with reference to the Pope. The interest of French scholars was also drawn to the Venetian Interdict crisis and the English Gunpowder Plot, both of which entered the public debate in 1605. The Venetian Interdict crisis hinged upon the question of papal authority and church regulation within the Venetian state while the Gunpowder Plot dealt directly with the theory of tyrannicide. These foreign controversies were new contexts in which issues central to the anti-Jesuit rhetoric of 1594 were discussed, but the Society of Jesus was curiously absent as a significant factor in this polemic.

The French Jesuits worked during this period to encourage the separation of the Society from such discussions of papal authority and tyrannicide. A good example of this development was the refusal, despite the Papal Nuncio Ubaldini’s expectation, of

---

133 Buisseret, Henry IV, pp. 56–57.
134 For a detailed discussion of the tradition these individuals drew upon see. Mastellone, La reggenza, pp. 33–121.
Fathers Coton and Fronton to publish against James I’s text on papal authority, *Apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis.*\(^{137}\) Despite Ubaldini’s concerted efforts he could not convince the Jesuits in Paris to publish on the topic. Father Fronton’s response to Ubaldini is revealing as he refused

\[
\text{parte per le occupationi, che hà nell’editione de Padri Greci, parte che è qualche le piene dubbio di non potere trattando dell’autorità del Papa temperare si fattamente lo stile, che sodisfaccia alla consciencia, et al vero, et insieme all’orecchie regio, ch’io temo andrà la cosa in lungo, et passando questo fervore forse in obliuione.}\(^{138}\)
\]

The Jesuits were unwilling to become involved in such a conflict as they wished to distance themselves from the controversies that led to their original expulsion. Indeed, Coton was only willing to enter the controversy when Henry IV legitimised his participation by appointing him to a committee charged with examining the book.\(^{139}\) Thus, although the occasional theoretical work by a foreign Jesuit, most notably Bellarmine, associated the Jesuits with these controversies, the French Jesuits worked to separate themselves from the debate which preoccupied Frenchmen. This desire to distance the Society in France from theories about papal authority and tyrannicide was also reflected in the defence by the Jesuits of French scholars who published on French liberties. For instance, the Jesuit French Father Assistant in Rome, Louis Richeome, promised De Thou that he would work for the removal of the président’s *Histoire* from the Roman Index.\(^{140}\)

Despite the Society’s efforts, the Jesuits continued to be distrusted by many

---


\(^{139}\) BN 18004, fos 247v–248: Breves to Henry IV, 5 August 1609.

\(^{140}\) BOD Carte 101, pp. 78–80: Richeome to De Thou, 22 June 1610.
individuals in France, as reflected in their private actions. The letters of the Gallican Jacques Gillot to Scaliger in the Dutch Republic expose his continuing private hatred of the Society. But these private assertions were not reflected in Gillot’s important anti-papal statement, which was published in 1609, on the liberties of the Gallican church, _Traictz des droizt et libertez de l’eglise Gallicane_. This text covered many of the same issues that Pasquier and Arnauld had addressed in their attacks on the Society, but Gillot made no reference to the Jesuits in the entire tract.\footnote{For Gillot’s continued private dislike of the Society see P. Burmannus, _Sylloges epistolarum a viris illustribus scriptarum_ (Leiden, 1727), ii, 370. For Gillot’s published work see J. Gillot, _Traictz des droizt et libertez de l’eglise Gallicane_ (Paris, 1609).} A second example of the continued mistrust of the Society amongst important members of the French magistrature is provided by De Thou’s _Histoire Universelle_. Although De Thou did not write the final books of his _Histoire_ until 1612, he started organising the material for these books from 1609 at the latest and perhaps as early as 1607.\footnote{S. Kinser, _The Works of Jacques-Auguste de Thou_ (The Hague, 1966), pp. 83–84.} This material included a strong theme of Jesuit interference in sovereign states across Europe and the disorder and destruction that their interference caused.\footnote{On the Jesuits see De Thou, _Histoire_, ix, 706; x, 26–31. On England see De Thou, _Histoire_, ix, 656–660; x, 57–73. On Moscow see De Thou, _Histoire_, x, 46–57. On Danzig and Thorn see De Thou, _Histoire_, x, 89–90. On Venice see De Thou, _Histoire_, x, 136–188. On Transylvania and Poland see De Thou, _Histoire_, x, 160–161.} He drew much of the material for his _Histoire_ from the news and rumours circulating in Paris during this period, which reflects both his continued distrust of the Society and the circles in which anti-Jesuit material privately circulated. Nevertheless, his research betrays a private as opposed to public distrust of the Jesuits. De Thou gave no indication that he intended to publish the later books of his _Histoire_ and to his death he respected in public the royal decision to allow the Jesuits to return.\footnote{Kinser, _The Works of Jacques-Auguste de Thou_, pp. 83–84.} Thus, during the period between 1604 and the king’s assassination in 1610
many individuals continued to write about and debate important theoretical issues of state which had been associated with the issues surrounding the Society in 1594. Moreover, a number of individual magistrates continued to express their personal mistrust of the Society, but in the public debate these individuals did not choose to combine their concerns for royal sovereignty with their suspicion of the Jesuits.

The Jesuits were, however, the subject of strong opposition on issues of privilege and regulation. The varied conflicts which fall into the broad category of regulation provide a contrast with the rare appearance of the Society in substantive theoretical issues. These varied forms of local opposition shared the same purpose: to protect existing French rights and privileges from the encroachments of the Society of Jesus and the royal authority which sustained them. This opposition was primarily concerned with regulating the Order and provided a substantively different challenge to the Jesuits in France from what they had faced in 1594 or 1603. By their very nature these conflicts implied an acceptance that the Society existed and would continue to exist in France; but they also reflected opposition from groups which had not previously been active in the anti-Jesuit polemic.

This new tension and the emergence of new enemies is not surprising. Early modern France was a society built on rights and privileges which defined corporate and individual status. As the periodic conflicts between the University of Paris and the Jesuits indicate, privileges were defended vigorously by interested groups through the royal courts. The Society, with its new corporate rights granted by Henry IV, seemed particularly disruptive as it rapidly expanded with authorisation from the royal government into localities across the kingdom. The conflicts were in part inspired by the
types of foundations established by the Society of Jesus under royal direction. The Society’s activities in education and the spiritual life of local communities were bound to threaten the rights, privileges and authority of local groups. By Henry IV’s death in May 1610 the Jesuits had created a new province in France and could boast forty-five foundations, mostly colleges, employing 1379 Fathers. This rapid expansion brought the Jesuits a greatly enhanced role in the French church but also resulted in the Society coming into conflict with a number of local privileged groups.

These disputes over privilege and regulation took a number of different forms. For instance, while Henry IV’s lettres patentes provided the authority for the new Jesuit foundations the king rarely provided the funding. The Jesuits could usually rely upon the support of an enthusiastic bishop, nobleman or a section of the local community who had petitioned the king for a college, but the royal demand for additional monies to fund the establishment often met with hostility within the local community. The Jesuits were often portrayed as the outsiders and Jesuit reliance in certain circumstances on the royal will was underlined in Coton’s letters to Caen and Orléans where he emphasised Henry IV’s authority. Thus, on 1 December 1608 Coton wrote to the magistrates of Caen that ‘Le Roy qui ne se trompe aysement en ses iugements, l’a ainsi estime et faict entendre a Messieurs vos Deputes, comme vous la verrez aussy par ses lettres patentes.’

Furthermore, Henry IV’s policy of suppressing old abbeys to help fund colleges

---

145 Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 151–152.
146 See for instance Discours veritable de ce qui s’est passé en la ville de Troyes, sur les poursuites faites par les Jesuites pour s’y establir, depuis l’an 1603. jusques au mois de Juillet 1611 (n.pl., 1612), p. 7. See also A. Carayon (ed.), Documents inédits concernant la Compagnie de Jésus (Poitiers, 1863), i, 128. This document was taken from the Caen Municipal Archives, Henry IV to Présidal at Caen, 23 December 1607.
147 AFCJ Prat 32, p. 1081: Coton to maire et échevins de Caen, 12 March 1608. See also AFCJ Prat 32, p. 1083: Coton to M. Martin de Rouen, 7 December 1608; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 1169–1175: Coton to bishop of Orléans, 2 February 1609.
created tense relations between the Jesuits and many clergymen in the French church.\textsuperscript{148}

Already in the summer of 1604 Coton wrote to Aquaviva about the clergy’s hostility.\textsuperscript{149} Henry IV in effect transferred resources from the Gallican church to a new religious order. While such transfers were not new, the financial state of the Gallican church at the end of the religious wars meant that his initiative met with greater hostility than normal. In addition, the sequestering of French benefices for the Society only re-emphasised the long-running difficulties in regulating new religious orders.

Opposition by local notables was not always about funding. One focus for opposition was that some municipalities which were to receive Jesuit colleges had long traditions of municipal education which were defended by local interests. For instance, in 1607 François Pithou, in his well-publicised will, expressed his opposition to a proposed Jesuit college by leaving a bequest to found a municipal school not under Jesuit supervision in his native Troyes.\textsuperscript{150} People often complained about the length of time which had elapsed since the Jesuits had promised to open a college.\textsuperscript{151} These demands were sometimes followed by a request for royal approval of a municipal school instead.

Moreover, opposition to the Jesuits was not exclusively focused upon their teaching establishments, but also revolved around questions of regulation and the relationship between the Jesuits and other privileged groups in the French church. Thus, Estoile noted that in January 1605:

\textsuperscript{148} For examples of suppressed abbeys see: Xivrey, vii, 171–172: Henry IV to Paul V, 9 April 1607; Xivrey, vii, 313: Henry IV to Paul V, 10 July 1607. See also Fouqueray, Histoire, iii, 55, 58. See also Peyrous, La reforme Catholique, i, 323.

\textsuperscript{149} ARSI Galliae 94, fo. 247v°: Coton to Aquaviva, 16 August 1604. See also ANG, iv, 662–663: Bufalo to Aldobrandini, 10 February 1604. For an example of the issues brought up see BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 181–184: The resignation by M Philibert du Sault of benefices to the Jesuits, May 1605 to March 1606.

\textsuperscript{150} BN MS. Fr. 2761, fos 204–207: ‘Testament de Maistre Francois Pithou, Extract des registres du greffe du bailliage et presidial de Troyes’.

\textsuperscript{151} For Poitiers see Sully, Economies royales, vii, 168–170. For Troyes see Discours veritable
le Curé de St-Paul, à Paris, alla aux Jésuites, près le petit St-Anthoine, dès le matin, où, aient trouvé dans l’église les nappes mises sur la table pour communier en grande colère osta lesdites nappes, et avec une aspre et sévère remonstrance exhorta le peuple de venir communier chacun dans sa paroisse, et non là où ils ne le pouvoient faire sans permission de leurs curés, menassa d’excommunier ceux de ses paroissiens qui s’y trouveroient, prescha au mesme temps contre l’abus des bastons des confrairies, et excommunia ceux de sa paroisse qui doresnavant les prendroient.
Le Curé de St-Eustace fist le mesme en sa paroisse.\footnote{de ce qvi s’est passé en la ville de Troyes (n.pl., 1612), pp. 1–12.}

The clergy of Paris had long battled against mendicant and new religious orders to maintain control over the care of their parishioners’ souls. This long-running battle found a new purpose as the Jesuits and other religious orders increasingly tempted parishioners to their professed houses to participate in new Catholic reformation pious devotions.\footnote{Estoile, viii, 167.}

Thus, while the Society of Jesus benefited enormously from royal patronage, the nature of the initiatives often created a foundation imposed on the locality by central authority or one faction within the local power structure.\footnote{Preaching against the devotional practices of the Jesuits and other new religious orders was to be a feature of life in Paris throughout the period. For instance Ubaldini reported in 1614 that a number of preachers had used the pulpit to oppose frequent communion at Jesuit foundations and the houses of other religious orders. See AV Francia 56, fo. 46–46v: Ubaldini to Borghese, 25 March 1614.}

Local privilege and the need for resources to open new foundations brought the Jesuits into conflict with interest groups across France.\footnote{For example see AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 1169–1171: Coton to bishop of Orléans, 2 February 1609; AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 1173–1175: Coton to bishop of Orléans, 17 February 1609.}

These conflicts, however, were substantively different from the controversies of 1594 or 1603. The opposition argued over the limits of Jesuit participation in French society and not over the Society’s right to exist. Indeed, these disputes helped to define the corporate rights of the Jesuits which served to further legitimise their position in France.
By May 1610 the Society of Jesus had succeeded in its efforts to integrate itself into France. Royal support provided the Society with a number of Crown-sponsored initiatives in royal foreign policy, royal policies for the renewal of the French nobility and royal policy toward the Huguenots, which served both to legitimise and spread the Society's participation in the French church. Moreover, the patronage of many Frenchmen and the rapid development of the nascent seventeenth-century French Catholic reformation provided the Society with an active and supportive climate in an important section of the church. Finally, the lack of direct public opposition from the Society's opponents, while not reflecting the end of hostility, did create a situation where the question of the Society's right to participate in the French church was not publicly debated. Instead, the Jesuits' opponents concerned themselves with protecting French privileges in the face of a rapidly expanding Society. Henry IV's premature death at the hands of an assassin in May 1610 represented a blow for the Society as they lost their most important patron in the kingdom only seven years after their return. The regency years under Marie de Medicis would test the security of the Society's much changed position in France.

Chapter Four

Weathering the storm: the assassination of Henry IV
and the cementing of the Jesuit role in France (1610–1612)

The assassination of Henry IV on 14 May 1610 changed the political landscape in France as the security of Henry IV’s strong reign gave way to the uncertainty of a regency government led by the queen mother Marie de Medicis for her eight-year-old son and heir to the French throne, Louis XIII. The circumstances of Henry’s death at the hands of a Catholic fanatic, François Ravaillac, and the prospect of a regency government, brought fears of renewed political and religious disorder to the kingdom in the summer of 1610. Estoile noted his own concerns on the day of the assassination when he stated that the king’s death would open ‘la porte à une sédition sur laquelle avoit este basti en partie ce miserable dessein; et, que plus est, dans une ville de Paris, remplie d’infinis vagabonds, voleurs, traîtres, Ligueurs, et autres mal affectionnés à cest Estat ....’ 1 Estoile’s concern for sedition inspired by disloyal subjects of the French Crown proved unfounded. 2 Nevertheless, despite the smooth transition of power to the regency, the relative calm in Paris continued to be punctuated by rumours of further assassination attempts against the royal family and plots against the regency government. The uncertainty was reflected in the fact that both the English Ambassador Edmondes and French memoirist Estoile continued to note with great interest the arrest of even the most unlikely individuals.

1 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 222.
2 PRO SP France 78/56, fo. 133: Edmondes to Salisbury, 26 May 1610. Edmondes, who had arrived in Paris two days earlier, argued that there was little chance of general disorder although the grands did pose a threat to stability.
suspected of plotting further assassination attempts. The continued fears of renewed instability maintained the threat of political disorder as a focus of concern in Paris.

This chapter will examine how the king’s assassination and the first years of the regency government brought new challenges for the Society of Jesus in France. The first section will consider the return of tyrannicide to the forefront of polemic in the weeks following the assassination: the same topic which proved so dangerous to the Jesuits in 1594. Section two will examine how an ill-conceived initiative to reopen the Jesuit College of Clermont in August 1610 gave new scope for public attacks on the Jesuits. The final section will look at the last serious conflict between the Society and the University during the regency, in December 1611; in order to suggest that the Jesuits were relatively successful in maintaining their position in France after Henry IV’s assassination through the firm support of the new regency government and a tentative accommodation with the Paris Parlement.

I. The aftermath of Henry IV’s assassination: the issue of tyrannicide theory and the Jesuits

Even after the regency government succeeded in carrying out a smooth transition of power, the king’s assassination kept questions about wider conspiracies against the royal government and the royal family at the forefront of the debate. Under interrogation the assassin Ravaillac failed to implicate anyone in the murder of Henry IV; but the suspicion remained that Ravaillac, an unsuccessful solicitor from Angoulême, was

---

incapable of acting alone. Many consulted the past to identify those responsible and some placed responsibility for the assassination on the Society of Jesus. A few chose to blame the Society directly for the murder; while others argued that, as the Jesuits were the chief promoters of tyrannicide theory, they were indirectly responsible for inspiring Ravaillac and others.

Estoile’s journal provides the most detailed day-to-day account of the increasingly frequent and open attacks on the Society of Jesus as promoters of disorder and tyrannicide in the summer of 1610. Estoile took a great deal of interest in the anti-Jesuit polemic and his journal entries provide a useful record of the variety of attacks upon the Jesuits. He recorded rumours of accusations made at the royal court. For instance, the entry on 25 May 1610 records: ‘Il y eut prise, ce jour, entre M. de Loménie et le Père Cotton, en plain Conseil; auquel Loménie dit que c’estoit lui voirement qui avoit tué le Roy, et la Société de ses Jésuistses.’ Over the coming months Estoile also received numerous copies of letters, poems and tracts which criticise the Jesuits as supporters of tyrannicide theory. For example, on 12 June 1610 he recorded three manuscript letters by the abbé du Bois, one of the Society’s most outspoken critics, which he had received that day. On 17 June 1610 he noted that président Vergne had given him a tract by Du Bois entitled Les douze Articles de foy politique des Jésuites de France; avec les treize, contraires à iceux, des Catholiques, apostoliques et romains. On 30 June 1610 Estoile received both a poem critical of the Jesuits and a copy of an anti-Jesuit tract entitled Ad aphorismos from which he took extracts on the theory of

4 PRO SP France 78/56, fos 136–137v°: W. Becher to Salisbury, 20 May 1610. For an example of the information circulating around Paris during this period see the copy of Ravaillac’s interrogation in PRO SP France 78/56, fo. 80.
5 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 254. Coton confirms that such attacks were frequent, see AFCJ Prat 33, p. 59: Coton to Richeome, the Jesuit Father Assistant for France in Rome, July 1610.
tyrannicide. Finally, at the end of June, Estoile transcribed into his journal an account of the assassination which implied Jesuit culpability at several points.

While Estoile’s journal entries provide some sense of the amount and variety of material critical of the Jesuits which was available to the reading public in Paris during the summer of 1610, the single most important source of anti-Jesuit rhetoric that he recorded was from the pulpit. His journal entry for 23 May 1610 records the first report of anti-Jesuit sermons in Paris:

le père Portugais, Cordelier, avec quelques curés de Paris, entre autres celui de Berthélémi et S.-Pol, [preschérèrent et] prosnerèrent les Jésuistes, et en paroles couvertes (mais non tant toutesfois qu’elles ne fussent intelligibles [à beaucoup], les taxèrent comme fauteurs et complices de l’assassinat du feu Roy, les arguans et convaincans par leurs propres écrits et livres, nommément de Mariana et Bécanus. Par la lecture desquels il semble qu’on puisse justement colliger qu’une des principales charités de ces gens soit d’envoyer de bonne heure en paradis les rois et les princes que ne les favorisent assez à leur gré, ou qui ne soient pas bons catholiques à la Mariane.

The preachers, like others in Paris, were concerned with the possibility of public disorder and thus chose to speak in code about the Society’s involvement in the king’s assassination. Nevertheless, in the following weeks the most outspoken of Paris preachers were willing to make stronger statements against the Jesuits. This anti-Jesuit preaching peaked in intensity on 6 June 1610 when, according to Estoile:


---

6 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 281.
7 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 295–299. Coton also comments on the circulation of this tract, see AFCJ Prat 33, p. 57: Coton to Richeome, July 1610.
8 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 313–320.
9 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 254.
10 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 270. See also Mercure français, i, fo. 349v.
The preaching on 6 June was only one amongst many occasions in which a group of Paris preachers attacked the Jesuits either directly or indirectly as promoters of tyrannicide, but it was the most vehement and organised of the attacks.\textsuperscript{11}

Estoile’s journal provides a detailed view of the mistrust of the Society and its presumed role in the king’s death current in Paris in the weeks following Henry IV’s assassination; but it also gives some indication of the willingness amongst many in France to defend the Society against its opponents. For instance, as in 1594, Estoile indicates that long-standing supporters of the Jesuits like Antoine Séguier were willing to defend the Society in public from accusations that they promoted tyrannicide.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, although several preachers spoke out against the Society from the pulpits, Estoile recorded that a number of important Paris preachers never gave sermons against the Jesuits and that several Jesuit Fathers continued to preach in pulpits across Paris.\textsuperscript{13}

Further, unlike the aftermath of the Chastell assassination attempt in 1594, Estoile noted that there was strong public support for the Society at court. In the weeks following the assassination Estoile reported that such important figures as Bishop Henry Gondi of Paris and the duc d’Epernon were willing to publicly defend the Jesuits at court from accusations that they supported tyrannicide.\textsuperscript{14} In addition, Estoile noted that the regent and her advisers were also willing to defend the Society from accusations that they taught and advocated tyrannicide, an observation which was further supported by the regent’s

\textsuperscript{11} Estoile implies that these attacks were organized when he notes that the preachers all chose to address the subject on 6 June. For more information on the sort of sermons and rumours being spread in Paris see AFCJ Prat 33, pp. 57–59: Coton to Richeome, July 1610. For a further instance of anti-Jesuit preaching see Estoile, Mémoires, x, 293–295.

\textsuperscript{12} Estoile, Mémoires, x, 271, 273.

\textsuperscript{13} For Paris preachers see Estoile, Mémoires, x, 293–295. For Jesuit preachers see Estoile, Mémoires, x, 276–277. For the fact that the Jesuits were not a dominant theme in Paris preaching see Mercure françois, i, fo. 349. See also Estoile, Mémoires, x, 241–242, 253, 263.
active sponsorship of Jesuit efforts to articulate their innocence. Thus, the anti-Jesuit rhetoric of 1610 must be viewed with reference to a new, more complex, balance of interests which reflected the Society's stronger position in France as compared to 1594 or 1603.

Both the Society's established position and the continued support of their allies made open opposition to the Jesuits less appealing even to those, like Estoile, who were inclined to mistrust the Society. At the end of June 1610, Estoile explained why many opposed the immediate punishment of those presumed guilty of the king's death. His comments were made in a journal passage which recorded the response to a Huguenot proposal to punish the Society for its alleged role in the assassination of Henry IV:

> Les plus discrets, et ceux qui se pensoient mieux connoistre aux affaires, en quoi souvent ils se trompoient, disoient qu'en cela on suivoit sagement le conseil de Tacite, qui dit (en son livre Xle de ses *Annales*) qu'il faut premiérement pourvoir à sa seureté, puis après faire justice. Et (au XIVe livre desdites *Annales*), que si les grands qu'on ne peut punir promptement sans dangers, sont de la menee, le remede à tels maux est de n'en entendre rien, et feindre de n'en rien scavor.  

While Estoile disagreed with this line of argument, he implied in this account that it reflected an influential school of thought in the weeks following Henry IV's assassination.

Further, although Estoile was not personally willing to delay the prosecution of those implicated in the assassination, the need for peace during the regency, not the punishment of the Jesuits, dominated his considerations. Many individuals in Paris, including Estoile, viewed Marie's regency with the memory of the troubled regency of Marie's aunt, Catherine de Medicis, during the religious wars. Thus, Estoile's reaction

---

15 Estoile, *Mémoires*, x, 272. For an example of the regent's support for the Society's attempts to assert its innocence see the royal permission in P. Coton, *Lettre declaratoire de la doctrine des Peres*
to the attacks on the Jesuits reveals a nuanced response to the accusations that the Society supported tyrannicide. Estoile privately read and enjoyed circulating manuscripts and published tracts against the Jesuits, but he criticised the abbé du Bois, the most vehement of anti-Jesuit preachers, because the abbé's public declamations were often 'guères mieux' than his Jesuit opponents.\textsuperscript{17} Estoile had some sympathy for the criticism of the Jesuits that circulated in educated elite circles; but he feared that public peace could be compromised by political action outside the direct control of the regency government and against a Society which could rely on important supporters in France.\textsuperscript{18} While he refused to support the proposition that those in authority should not punish the guilty for their participation in Henry IV's assassination in order to preserve public peace, Estoile was suspicious of the public initiatives taken by private individuals to attack the Society as the promoters of tyrannicide.

The picture Estoile provides of Paris in the summer of 1610 is one of unease and fear of renewed disorder. Attacks on the Jesuits as promoters of tyrannicide theory and even as the murderers of Henry IV occur frequently throughout the period, but strong support for the Society and concern for the maintenance of peace made the rhetoric less of a serious threat to their position in France. William Becher, an English representative in Paris, summarised the situation well when he wrote to the English government on 20 May 1610 that 'there is generally conceaved a secret iealousy and horror agaynst the


\textsuperscript{16} Estoile, \textit{Mémoires}, x, 304.

\textsuperscript{17} Estoile, \textit{Mémoires}, x, 281, 325. See also F.T. Perrens, 'Le premier Abbé Dubois l'épisode d'histoire religieuse et diplomatique d'après des documents inédits', \textit{Revue historique} 74 (1900), 241–277; ibid., 75 (1901), 1–35.

\textsuperscript{18} As has already been noted, Estoile's concern for public order with reference to anti-Jesuit rhetoric was also reflected in a journal entry in 1594: Estoile, \textit{Mémoires}, vi, 217–218.
Jesuites, but it will soone passe over." Becher’s assessment reflects the fact that anti-Jesuit rhetoric was inspired by one event, the assassination, and did not endanger the Society of Jesus since it lacked a clear ongoing focus which would sustain it. If the elements of the 1594 anti-Jesuit polemic discussed in public in May and June 1610 were to prove dangerous to the Society, then the polemic needed some sort of context to focus the general unease into a coherent indictment of the Jesuits. The Society’s opponents could only seriously threaten the Jesuits’ position in France if the perceived need for action to protect the monarchy and to maintain political stability was focused on the Society as it had been in 1594. In the months following the assassination, Jesuit opponents did raise a series of potentially dangerous issues involving the Jesuits and, as in 1594, the Parlement and the University of Paris were the institutions in which these dangerous subjects were debated.

The first of these potential crises, the condemnation of the Spanish Jesuit Mariana’s *De rege et regis institutione*, was initiated in the Paris Parlement less than a month after the king’s assassination. The condemnation of Mariana’s text was one aspect of the Parlement’s wider effort to reassert that the French king’s person was recognised as inviolable by the fundamental laws of the kingdom. The Parlement’s quick action to renew the laws safeguarding the monarch reflected the Parlement’s traditionally more substantial role in protecting the fundamental laws and royal authority during a regency.

---

19 PRO SP France 78/56, fo. 136v°: W. Becher to Salisbury, 20 May 1610.
20 Both R. Doucet, *Étude sur le gouvernement de François Ier dans ses rapports avec le Parlement de Paris* (Paris, 1921 and 1926), ii; and E. Maugis, *Histoire du Parlement de Paris* (Paris, 1913) argue that the Parlement first asserted these rights in 1525 as a consequence of the growing sense and clearer definition of their position as royal office holders. C. Stocker offers, in ‘The Politics of the Parlement of Paris in 1525’, *French Historical Studies*, 8 (1973), 191–212, a much more convincing argument that the magistrates did not want to check royal power but rather to secure their rights as a unique source of royal
Marie and her regency government reaffirmed this increased authority within days of Henry IV’s assassination when it symbolically promoted an active role for the Parlement by holding a lit de justice at the Paris Parlement to declare the regency, instead of dispatching lettres patentes for the Parlement’s approval. This was a calculated symbolic move to secure the support of the Parlement for the regency through a public reaffirmation of the Parlement’s authority to approve such an arrangement during a regency government. This move also encouraged the Parlement to once again define its authority broadly and to take action to protect the authority of the monarchy.

The Parlement moved quickly in the weeks following the lit de justice both to establish the fundamental law on the inviolability of the French monarch and to establish the Parlement’s role as protector of this law. The centrepiece of this initiative was a reaffirmation of the arrêt made in the Paris Parlement at the opening of the fifteenth century against Jean Petit, who had defended the assassination of the king’s brother, duc d’Orléans, by Jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne. The judges at the Paris Parlement chose to renew this two-century old condemnation because of its relevance as a legal precedent against the theory that it is licit to kill a tyrant. Indeed, the case may have appeared particularly appropriate to the magistrates since it dealt directly with the sanctity of royal blood. But it is also likely that the Parlement chose to return to this famous precedent because it was drawn from its own registers and helped to establish its right to pass judgement on matters of fundamental law.


22 B. Guenée, Un meurtre, une société: L’assassinat du duc d’Orléans 23 Novembre 1407 (Paris,
The Paris Parlement, in a meeting of the Grand' chambre on 27 May 1610 asked the Sorbonne to reaffirm the Petit arrêt. This initiative reflected the Parlement’s own interpretation of its role in royal government during the regency. De Thou established the purpose of the condemnation in a short speech before the Parlement recorded in his *Histoire*:

Si on avoit ainsi traite ces dogmes, ajoutoit de Thou, lorsqu’ils n’avoient point encore produit de funestes effets, que ne doit-on pas faire contre eux, depuis qu’ils ont enfanté des monstres semblables aux Clémens, aux Barrières, aux Chastels & aux Ravaillacq? Avec quelle ardeur ne doit-on pas les condamner, après qu’ils ont poussé tant de scélérats à attenter à la vie de nos Rois depuis vingt ans.

Later Harlay spoke for the Parlement when he asserted that the Parlement’s duty in such a situation was to take steps to renew the fundamental laws of the kingdom. However, while the Parlement’s actions were swift and purposeful, they were also encouraging for the Society as the action made no direct or indirect reference to the Jesuits.

Following the Parlement’s request, the Sorbonne held a convocation at which the arrêt against Jean Petit was reaffirmed. The Sorbonne understood the Parlement’s purpose as the delegation sent to present their conclusion to the Parlement on 8 June 1610 also requested that several measures, such as an annual confirmation of the arrêt in all the Paris parishes and suburbs, be taken to prevent the law from being misinterpreted in...
the future.²⁶ These actions, designed to renew and publicise the fundamental law, were not controversial; however, the final Sorbonne request—that Emmanuel Sâ’s *Institution des Confesseurs*, Jean Mariana’s *De Rege et Regis institutione* and Nicholas Bonorius’s *Amphitheatrum honoris* all be condemned and burnt as texts espousing Jean Petit’s theories—met with mixed views in the Parlement.²⁷ The inclusion of these texts written by foreign Jesuits created the possibility that the Society of Jesus would once again become linked with important debates over sovereignty in France.

The concern of the Society’s supporters was reinforced when the Parlement chose to condemn the important tract by the Spanish Jesuit Mariana, *De Rege et Regis institutione*. In the French context Mariana’s work was the most unacceptable of all the Jesuit texts named by the Sorbonne. The text was written for a Spanish audience and thus Mariana’s views on royal authority were shaped by consideration of a Spanish monarch who lacked the theoretically absolute authority of a French monarch.²⁸ Mariana’s text, when taken out of context, was a serious threat to the foundations of French royal sovereignty. Indeed, even a French supporter of papal authority could see the danger, in the months following Henry IV’s assassination, of Mariana’s text which advocated popular control over a ruler and the right of a private citizen to kill a king who prevented the assembly of an estates or *cortes*.²⁹ Thus, the text provided a useful symbol for the Parlement’s concern that dangerous foreign theories had undermined French sovereignty.

For some members of the Parlement Mariana’s text was not only dangerous because of the theories it advocated; it was also an indictment of the Society’s teachings and provided a compelling reason to restrict their activities in France. Estoile reported that in the Parlement:

Il fut proposé aussi, en ceste assemblée, de défendre les chaires publiques aux Jésuistes, et qu’ils ne puissent plus prêcher, sinon à leurs assemblées et congrégations particulières. Mais ceste [sainte] opinion fust fort contredite, et entre autres, par un Président de là dedans, leur bon ami, avec telle passion et animosité, qu’il dit tout haut qu’il prenoit dès lors congé de la Cour, pour jamais ne rentrer au Palais, si elle avoit lieu. 30

Thus, some magistrates made a direct link between the condemnation of Mariana’s theories and the Society’s activities in France in a manner similar to, although less vehement than, the approach taken at the time of the 1594 expulsion.

However, Estoile’s reference to the ‘Président’ who threatened to leave the Parlement if any connection was made between the Society and Mariana, provides a sense of the conflict which raged within the Parlement. 31 In the end, the link between Mariana’s book and the activities of the Society of Jesus in France did not appear in the text of the arrêt which condemned Mariana’s tract. The condemnation made no reference to the restriction or expulsion of the Society in France. Indeed, the text of the arrêt served to hide the relationship between the Society and Mariana’s work since it did not even mention the fact that Mariana was a Jesuit. The separation between Mariana as an individual and the Society to which he belonged was unmistakable. Thus, while some in the Parlement were willing to link Mariana to the French Society of Jesus, the official condemnation arrêt did not mention Mariana’s position as an important Jesuit theologian.

---

30 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 271.
31 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 271. The président referred to was almost certainly Antoine Ségurier.
or give any indication that Mariana’s tract represented the Society of Jesus’s teachings.

The absence of direct references to the Society reflected the fact that the Mariana text was condemned as part of the Parlement’s efforts to reaffirm the long-standing arrêt against Petit. That this concern was an important factor in the Parlement’s considerations was demonstrated by the extended printed edition of the arrêt against Mariana’s text, which emphasised the reaffirmation of the Jean Petit condemnation by printing it first. The emphasis in this edition of the arrêt was on the dangerous theories about royal sovereignty advocated by Petit and Mariana, not the latter’s affiliation with the Society of Jesus which was wholly ignored.

The reaction of the Parlement’s critics reinforces the argument that the controversy surrounding the condemnation of Mariana’s tract was not considered by contemporaries as an attack upon the Society of Jesus in France. On 9 June 1610, one day after the condemnation of Mariana’s text, the regent called a delegation of the Parlement before her at the Louvre. The jurisdictional objections raised by Henry Gondi, bishop of Paris and the Nuncio Ubaldini at this meeting reflect the Parlement’s concern to establish its authority over such texts. Gondi argued ‘que la Cour n’avoit peu passer juridiquement au jugement de ce livre, que premierement il n’y fut appelé, attendu que c’estoit un fait purement ecclésiastique, lequel lui devoit estre communiqué ....’ While the Chancellor supported the authority of the Parlement to condemn such a text, the demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable action by the Parlement was defined by the duc d’Epernon, an important grand patron of the Society, who made clear in this

32 Arrest de la Covr de Parlement, ensemble la censvre de la Sorbonne, contre le livre de Jean Mariana, intitulé De Regis & Regis Institutione (Paris, 1610).
33 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 272.
34 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 272.
This comment was followed by a call to remove the abbé du Bois and other preachers who had preached specifically against the Jesuits from their pulpits. D'Epernon did not attack the Parlement’s decision to ban Mariana’s text but rather warned the delegation against using the text to attack the Society of Jesus. Thus, the meeting with the regent provided encouragement for the Parlement in its assertion of authority over ecclesiastical matters; but the encounter also made clear that any action against the Society was unacceptable.

The Parlement’s decision to remain silent on the relationship between the Society of Jesus and individual Jesuits who published on theories of tyrannicide had important implications for the French Jesuits. If the distinction between individual Jesuits who stepped beyond the line of acceptable argument and the Society in France as whole was maintained, then the Society would not be under threat as an organisation as it had been in 1594. Nevertheless, despite the positive aspects of the Mariana condemnation, the Society of Jesus remained concerned about its position in France. The continued hostile sermons, poems and tracts produced in France, along with public support by some parlementaires for strong action to be taken against the whole Society during the Mariana condemnation, left it in an insecure position.

The Society’s concern was reflected in their actions. Even before the Mariana
case they had set in motion a series of initiatives designed to present the Order as a loyal French organisation. Aquaviva ordered that Masses be said for the king and for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity. Moreover, the Society of Jesus in France used the burial of Henry IV's heart at La Flèche College as an opportunity to advertise its loyalty to the dynasty. Further, soon after Mariana's condemnation Aquaviva took the important step of publicly reissuing his circular letter forbidding any member of the Society to publish on the issue of papal authority. Finally, the Jesuits publicised their support for the French monarchy in print through public laments over the loss of their benefactor. Thus, the Jesuits organised a coherent campaign to distance themselves from Henry IV's assassination and to emphasise their loyalty to the French monarchy.

In addition to these general initiatives, Coton and the French Jesuits sought to build on the specific distinction between Mariana as an individual and the Society as a whole. Coton established himself as the chief spokesman for the French Jesuits when on 12 July 1610 he published a definitive statement of French Jesuit policy in a pamphlet dedicated to the regent entitled *Lettre declaratoire*. In this text Coton argued that the writings of individuals like Mariana did not represent the beliefs of the Order. Coton supported the Parlement's decision to condemn Mariana's tract. Moreover, Coton

---

37 *Mercure françois*, i, fos 331–333v°. This source recounts the numerous ceremonies which linked the Jesuits to the dead King. See also Estoile, *Mémoires*, x, 264–266. See also P. Calendini, 'Cœurs de Henri IV & Marie de Médicis à la Flèche', *Revue de Henri IV*, 1 (1905), 8–14.
38 This letter is alluded to by the Parlement in 1614, see AN X1a 1864, fo. 233–233v°: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 27 June 1614.
39 A good example is L. Richeome, *Consolation envoyée à la royne, mere du roy et regente en la France, sur la deplorable mort du feu roy très-chrestien de France et de Navarre Henry IV, son tres-honoré Seigneur et mary* (Lyon, 1610). For a later example see P. Coton, *Oraison funèbre pour l'anniversaire du feu Roy Henry le Grand* (La Flèche, 1611).
40 *Mercure françois*, i, fo. 350v°, although it is possible that the text was circulating around the end of June, as Edmondes claimed to enclose a copy of the text in his dispatch dated 27 June 1610, see PRO
accepted the Sorbonne's decree against Petit and noted that the Jesuits also accepted the decrees of the Council of Constance where a similar decree was proclaimed.\textsuperscript{41} By embracing these past pronouncements, which continued to have an important influence on French church identity, Coton was able to emphasise the Jesuit intention to defend French orthodoxy. Further, Coton offered fifteen distinct statements in support of the French monarchy which he defined as orthodox Jesuit belief.\textsuperscript{42} These statements did not satisfy critics of the Society who argued that numerous 'equivoques' were hidden within Coton's points.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, the need for critics to turn to theories of a hidden or unstated agenda to explain why Coton's points were unacceptable indicates that these fifteen points appealed on the surface to French sensibilities.

Coton's \textit{Lettre declaratoire} provided a platform on which the French Jesuits could be accepted as a separate entity from Jesuit theorists like Mariana. As Coton implied in his conclusion, the Society wished to build upon the Parlement's decision not to mention the Jesuits in the condemnation of Mariana:

\begin{quote}
Ce que meurement & sagement considéré, tant par la Cour de Parlement, que par le sacré Collège de Sorbonne, ils n'ont faict aucune mention en leur arrest & decrets, de la doctrine des Jesuites: Sçachans tresbien, comme Iuges & Docteurs equitables, que les fautes sont personnelles, qu'il n'y auroit point d'innocence au monde si la coulpe de l'vn estoit imputee à l'autre, & que ç'a esté vne deplorable, & incommunicable propriete du peché que commist le premier homme ...\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

The author Roussel reflected the development of the French-Jesuits' strategy to separate the Society from individual Jesuits in his tract entitled \textit{Antimariana} which was

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesuperscript{43} For instance, see \textit{Anticoton, ov refutation de la lettre declaratoire dv Pere Coton: Liure où est proué que les Jesuites sont coupables & auteurs du parricide execrable commis en la personne du Roy tres-CHRESTIEN HENRI IV} (Paris, 1610), pp. 55–65.
\end{footnotesize}
published in the summer or autumn of 1610. This 540-page text was devoted to a point-by-point condemnation of Mariana’s theories. However, Roussell was careful to qualify his criticism of Mariana with a defence of the French Jesuits: ‘En ces articles nous pouuons voir en substance la condamnation de la doctrine des autres Jesuites estrangers par vn François, car la communauté est elle pas composee des particuliers qui doiuent obeyr & endurer?’ In Roussell’s observation is the essence of Coton’s purpose: to separate the Society of Jesus in France from theories of tyrannicide produced by foreign Jesuits.

To maintain the distinction between individual theorists and the Society of Jesus was the central preoccupation of French Jesuit representatives during this period. In print and from the pulpit the French Jesuits emphasised their own rejection of Jesuit scholars who published on tyrannicide. Coton’s campaign after the Mariana condemnation built upon the Society’s actions earlier in the summer to emphasise the loyalty of the French Jesuits and their separation from the writings of individual foreign theorists like Mariana.

II. The threats to the Society of Jesus in the autumn and winter 1610

The Jesuits were successfully able to weather the difficulties of the Mariana condemnation. Nevertheless, more potential crises lay before the Society in 1610. Remarkably, the most important conflict, which centred on the University of Paris in the autumn, was not manufactured by their enemies in the University faculties or the Parlement, but rather was initiated by the Society’s supporters in the regency

---

44 Coton, Lettre declaratoire, p. 22.
45 M. Rovssel, Antimariana ov refutation des propositions de Mariana (Paris, 1610).
46 Rovssel, Antimariana, p. 429.
47 For instance, see Estoile, Mémoires, x, 276.
government. While the Jesuits actively sought to defend themselves, they also relied upon support from the regency government and important figures at court in the months following Henry IV’s death. Since their return in 1603 the Society had enjoyed strong royal favour and the continued support of the regency was of great importance to the Society. This backing reflected the regent’s own religious inclinations and her advisers’ decision to support a Society which continued to be a loyal ally of the monarchy.\(^{48}\) In the weeks following Henry IV’s assassination the Jesuits were publicly maintained as a feature of the royal church by the regency government as Coton’s appointment to the position of Louis XIII’s confessor emphasised.\(^{49}\) This favour was also evident during the Mariana affair when, for instance, the regent called a delegation of the Parlement to the Louvre so that they could reassure her that the condemnation of the Mariana tract was not linked to the Jesuits.\(^{50}\)

These initial signs of continued good will were augmented in August by more active measures, which were welcomed by the Society since they helped to silence Jesuit detractors. One important example of the regent’s support was the recruitment of the abbé du Bois, the most vehement anti-Jesuit critic of the period, to articulate the distinction between individual foreign Jesuit theorists and the French Jesuits.\(^{51}\) In August 1610 the royal government provided Du Bois with a pension of 600 écus and the possibility of benefices in the future.\(^{52}\) In return, Du Bois retracted his attacks upon the Jesuits and promoted the regency’s initiative to separate the French Society of Jesus from


\(^{49}\) ARSI Galliae 71, fo. 48–48v°: Coton to Richéome, May 1610.

\(^{50}\) Estoile, *Mémoires*, x, 272.

the writings of their foreign brethren. Du Bois was required to support this distinction repeatedly in printed tracts.\textsuperscript{53} The dedicatory letter to the regent at the opening of his printed funeral oration for Henry IV provides an example of what the regency required:

\textit{Je ne nie pas, MADAME, qu’en mes Predications ie n’aye esté pousse de grand zele à destruire les propositions de Mariana, qui apprend aux subjectcs, sous couleur de traicter des Tyrans, à tuér leurs Roys, où du moins à rebeller contre eux: mais ie nie bien que ce que ie dis contre luyfust, comme on a voulu dire & faire croire, pour diffamer les gens de bien, pour charger les Innocens, & pour rendre odieux les Peres lesuites.}\textsuperscript{54}

This tract, published with royal permission, provided a public retraction of Du Bois’s previous assertions. While Du Bois was not silenced in private, his statements reveal that the regency government was willing to use patronage to ensure that a critic who went beyond acceptable criticism of the Society was brought under control.\textsuperscript{55}

However, the regent’s success in promoting a pro-Jesuit policy also encouraged her to reissue Henry IV’s \textit{lettres patentes} of 1608, which ordered the reopening of the Jesuit College of Clermont in Paris, in the name of the young Louis XIII. This decision embroiled the Society in a new and dangerous court case with the University of Paris. The revival of this long-running dispute held risks for the Society especially because of the monarchy’s uncertain authority during a regency. Nevertheless, the regent and her advisers had a number of reasons to be optimistic. First, the \textit{lettres patentes} were a straightforward reissuing of Henry IV’s previous concession and, therefore, the authority for the reopening was bolstered by a direct appeal to the former king’s will. Second, the Parlement’s condemnation of Mariana without reference to French Jesuits and their teaching credentials gave reason to think that the Parlement would not bring the two

\textsuperscript{52} Perrens, ‘Le premier abbé Dubois’, 74 (1900), 260.
\textsuperscript{53} Abbé du Bois, \textit{Le povtraict royal de Henry Le Grand qvatriesme dv nom} (Paris, 1610). See also abbé du Bois, \textit{Aux bons Francois} (n.pl., n.d.).
issues together during a case over teaching privilege. Third, the influential président Jacques-Auguste de Thou, an important critic of the Society who was lobbying to become the next premier président, indicated that he would view a Jesuit application to teach in Paris favourably. Finally, a bitter internal conflict within the University meant that three of the four University of Paris faculties were inclined to support the Jesuit request. Therefore, despite the uncertainties over royal authority, the timing appeared favourable to bring to a conclusion the conflict over teaching in Paris which had first been heard in the Parlement in 1564.

The *lettres patentes* were presented to the Parlement by the Jesuits on 20 August 1610 but the University chose to oppose their registration and the Parlement scheduled a date to hear the case in November after its autumn recess. The weeks following the renewal of the Jesuit case were to prove that the regent and her advisers had misjudged the ease with which the Jesuits could be integrated into the Parisian educational network. During the Parlement’s autumn recess the University elected Jean Granger as rector, a man who brought the faculties together in opposition to the Jesuit request. Moreover, the University court case provided a dangerous focus for anti-Jesuit rhetoric in France because the arguments produced by the University’s supporters were published and spread widely.

The danger to the Society’s position in France was most fully articulated in the

---

54 Du Bois, *Le Povrtraict*, p. 3. Author’s own upper case and italics.
55 For the abbé du Bois’s covert campaign against the Jesuits see Estoile, *Mémoires*, x, 293.
56 AV Francia 54, fo. 98v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 14 September 1610.
58 See pp. 22–24
59 For a copy of the Jesuit *lettres patentes* see BN MS. Fr. 15782, fo. 391. For a discussion of the decision to delay the case see BN Dupuy 90, fos 53–54v°: ‘Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le
pamphlet literature which appeared during the autumn of 1610. These texts were written to publicise the case and were the first instance since the assassination of Henry IV in which the Jesuits were subjected to a sustained barrage of critical published pamphlets. The tracts were dominated by arguments which linked general mistrust of the Society of Jesus to the specific concerns of the University. Indeed, many of the general concerns emphasised in these pamphlets echoed earlier anti-Jesuit rhetoric from 1594 and 1603 as Estoile, who avidly collected them, noted: 'En effet, tous ces beaux livres-là, que j'ay leus et veus, parlent beaucoup et disent peu.' In one sense Estoile was correct because the pamphlet literature in 1610 drew many of its rhetorical devices and examples from works printed in 1594 and 1603; but it was the combination of this established rhetoric and the focus provided by the University case which threatened to revive the sort of arguments that had produced the rationale for the Jesuit expulsion in 1594.

The Anticoton was the most influential of the anti-Jesuit polemics written in early autumn 1610 and provides a clear indication of why the new pamphlet publications posed a potentially serious threat to the Society's position in France. The tract was split into five chapters each with a precise purpose in the argument. The first four chapters claimed to establish that the Society of Jesus taught in the past and continued to teach and support subversive theories on papal authority and tyrannicide. Chapter One returned to...
the condemnation of Mariana’s tract in the summer to argue that Mariana was not a misled individual but rather that his theories were representative of the Society’s teachings. Chapter Two reviewed a series of past assassination plots, some first presented in Arnauld’s *plaidoyer* and others drawn from more recent events, which proved that the Society of Jesus acted on its theories. Chapter Three attempted to apply these themes to Henry IV’s assassination by arguing that the Society of Jesus had plotted against him in the past and was at least indirectly responsible for his assassination by its continued promotion of tyrannicide theory. Through a critique of Cotin’s *Lettre declaratoire*, Chapter Four condemned as ‘equivoque’ Jesuit efforts since Henry IV’s death to distance themselves from theories of tyrannicide. All of these chapters served to emphasise the link between Mariana and the Society as a whole which the Jesuits had struggled to keep separate throughout the summer.

Chapter Five provided the culmination of the argument in a call for action in the pending University case. The author of the *Anticoton* criticised the Jesuits for seeking to dominate the French church rather than integrating into it. According to the author of the *Anticoton*, the best means to avoid this danger was to prevent the great wealth and influence of the Jesuits from destroying the University of Paris, as only the good French orthodox teaching of the young would save France from the dangerous subversive theories advocated by the Society. The rhetoric branded the Jesuits as subversive and put forward the University as a loyal alternative. Moreover, the *Anticoton*’s objections led the reader to conclude that the Jesuits were not just a threat to the University but

---

63 *Anticoton*, pp. 65–70.
64 *Anticoton*, pp. 71–72.
subversive to the kingdom. The text of the Anticoton expressed this view in the

‘QVATRAIN A LA ROYNE’ at the conclusion of the tract:

\[Si\;voulez\;que\;vostre\;Estat\;soit\;ferme,\]
\[Chassez\;bien\;loing\;ces\;Tygres\;inhumains,\]
\[Qui\;de\;leur\;Roy\;accourcissans\;le\;terme\]
\[Se\;sont\;payez\;de\;son\;ceur\;par\;leurs\; mains.\]

While this quatrain was the only overt call for the expulsion of the Society from the

kingdom in the Anticoton, the arguments in the text strongly supported the concluding

verse. The Anticoton’s primary purpose was to defend University privilege; nevertheless,

to support his argument that the Jesuits could not replace the University, the author

attempted to convince the reader that the Society taught subversive and dangerous

doctrines in contrast to the University’s orthodoxy. For the first time since the

assassination the Society was publicly attacked through a series of arguments which had

as their conclusion that the Jesuits should be expelled from France for their subversive

doctrines. While the Anticoton did not demand expulsion as explicitly as Arnauld’s

plaidoyer in 1594 the message was the same.

As the autumn progressed the Jesuits in France had further reason to be

concerned as the Anticoton’s dangerous arguments were replicated in other tracts. Some

focused more strictly on the comparison between loyal University teaching and

subversive Jesuit teaching. Thus, a published letter to the regent opened with a statement

of University doctrine:

Madame, l’Université de Paris remonstre en toute humilité à vostre Maiesté, que la

doctrine du massacre des Roys par assassins, qui par pieté se deuoient à la mort,

comme a vn Martyre agréable à Dieu, est vne engeance pestifere non jamais veue

ny leue dans tous les memoires de l’antiquité: Ny les Payens, ny les Chrestiens ne

65 Anticoton, pp. 67–74.
66 Anticoton, p. 74.
The tract then argued that, while the theory that it was licit to assassinate a king was still not found at the University of Paris, it had developed along with 'vne autre doctrine erronée, qui est de la toute-puissance du Pape' in the thought of the Jesuits. Thus, the organising framework of the tract mirrored the Anticoton. The subversive theories of tyrannicide were linked with Jesuit teaching in the body of the text in order to contrast the University’s rejection of such theories in the conclusion. As with the Anticoton, the primary purpose of the text was to defend the University but the foundation of the University’s defence was the contrast between the Society of Jesus which promoted tyrannicide theory and the University which taught only orthodox French doctrines.

Perhaps the most extreme anti-Jesuit pamphlet of the period, entitled Remonstrance à Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement, used the assassination of Henry IV to focus its anti-Jesuit rhetoric. The Remonstrance was the only tract to argue explicitly for the expulsion of the Jesuits in the body of the text:

"Ouy, mais chasser vne si grande Société, pour le forfait d’un seul, n’est-il point rude? Ains c’est reuenir mal a propos aux principes. C’est ceste Société qui a donné le coup, non ce Barbare, sa doctrine, son conseil, sa coniuration. Il est la preiuge, si au fait de Chastel, tant plus encore."

This call for Jesuit expulsion articulated the less explicit argument in the Anticoton. While, as in the other tracts, the Remonstrance noted in its closing pages the threat to the University, the primary argument was that the Society was responsible for the assassination of Henry IV and therefore that it should not be allowed to participate in the

---

68 A la Royne Regente, pp. 2–3.
69 Remonstrance à Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement sur le parricide commis en la personne du Roy Henry le Grand (n.pl., 1610).
70 Remonstrance, p. 33.
French church. Thus, this tract took the University's defence one step further to argue that if the Society taught dangerous doctrines it should not only be prohibited from teaching in Paris but rather should be expelled from the kingdom.

Aside from this rapid series of new publications the French Jesuits must also have been concerned that these tracts were accompanied by the published manuscript of Achille de Harlay's *Remonstrance faite au Roy* which placed in print for the first time Harlay's reasons for opposing the Edict of Rouen in 1603. The publication of the *Remonstrance* was another significant threat to the Society because it returned attention to the Jesuit expulsion and the reasons which had inspired their original exclusion from France. Moreover, the publication of this tract emphasised the increasing relevance of these past arguments to the current debate. Along with the publication of the *Anticoton* and similar pamphlets it posed a serious threat to the Society of Jesus by linking the question of whether the Jesuits should be allowed to teach in Paris with the possibility of Jesuit complicity in the assassination of Henry IV and with the general responsibility of the Society for the promotion of tyrannicide theories.

The threat of this new polemic to the Society was exacerbated by the publication of the *Aristogiton* and the *Advis de M. Guillaume*, both written by supporters of the Society of Jesus in the weeks following the *Anticoton*’s publication. These texts surrendered the polemical agenda of the court case to the anti-Jesuit authors by responding to the *Anticoton* with little reference to the still pending University case. They were devoted to refuting the *Anticoton*’s assertions of Jesuit culpability in the

---

73 *Mercure français*, i, fo. 354v; L. de Montgommery, *Le Fleau d'Aristogiton* (n.pl., 1610); and *Advis de Maistre Guillaume nouvellement retourné de l'autremonde, sur le sujet de l'Anticoton, composé*
assassination of monarchs. The polemical debate had shifted almost exclusively to whether the Society of Jesus supported papal authority in temporal affairs; whether it promoted tyrannicide theory; and whether the Jesuits were responsible for the assassination of Henry IV. The surrender of the polemical agenda was reflected in the satirical Les Remerciemens des Beurieres which appeared in response to the Aristogiton. This tract did not mention the University case at all but rather focused on the assertion that the Society of Jesus was responsible both for the theories of tyrannicide produced by its members and, indirectly, for Henry IV’s death through their promotion of tyrannicide theory.  

The polemic against the Society developed rapidly out of the renewed University case to create the possibility that the same rhetoric which justified the Society’s expulsion in 1594 would be presented before the Parlement in 1610. University polemicists sought to undermine attempts by the Jesuits to distance the Society from the theories of individual Jesuits, as the promotion of the University as protector of orthodox French teachings relied, like in 1594, upon the Jesuits presenting a serious threat to French law and hierarchy. Otherwise only self-interest justified the University’s objection to Jesuit teaching. By early November 1610 the polemic surrounding the University case was a very real threat to the Society of Jesus in France. The Mercure français noted that these dangerous tracts were 'assez librement sur les tables des meilleures families de France.' The Jesuits were once again in a position where the Society as a whole could become entangled in the polemical discourse with theories of tyrannicide and papal authority over temporal affairs.

par P.D.C. c’est a dire, Pierre du Coignet, iadis mort, & depuis n’a gueres resuccté (n.pl., 1611).

74 Le remerciment des Beurieres de Paris, au Sieur de Courbonzon Montgommery (Niort, 1610).
Nevertheless, the situation for the Jesuits in 1610 was different from their position in the summer of 1594. The regent's continued good will was drawn on by the Society as it moved quickly when the Parlement reconvened in November 1610 to prevent the University case from being pleaded before the Parlement. Estoile observed that the whole Jesuit outlook had changed and that the Society now wished 's'ils peuvent, leur cause, remise à estre plaidée le 18e de ce mois, laquelle ils voudroient bien estre reculée à dix-huit ans de là.' The Jesuits were not just interested in a delay to the case but rather its indefinite suspension. The papal nuncio understood and supported the Jesuits. In a letter to Rome he noted that the hostile new rector Granger at the University and his avocats would undoubtedly extend the Jesuit litigation to touch on 'i punti dell'autorità del Papa sopra il Concilio, e sopra il temporale dei Principi, ne quali tassando loro di tener opinioni contrarie all'opinioni, che si pretendono di questa facultà, et che essi dicono pregiudiciali à i dritti della pretesa Chiesa Gallicana et allo stato ....' In other words, the Society would be attacked, as in 1594, for advocating restrictions on royal sovereignty which were the basis of the theory that it was licit to kill a tyrant. Even if the purpose of the case was limited to the rejection of Jesuit claims to the right to teach in Paris rather than their expulsion from the kingdom, the Society of Jesus had no desire to be linked to such a set of accusations. Neither did the regency wish to allow a case connected with such a difficult issue to proceed and thus Marie sent word on 25 November to the premier président stating that she did not wish the case heard at this time.

---

75 Mercure françois, i, fo. 354v°.
76 Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 25.
77 AV, Francia 54, fo. 133v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 10 November 1610.
78 BN, Dupuy 90, 54v°: 'Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le reestablissement du College des Jesuits à Paris ...', 1610.
The regent’s suspension of the case prevented the University’s grievances becoming a focus for more general action against the Jesuits. Nevertheless, despite the regent’s continued support, it proved difficult for the Society to extricate itself from the polemic of the autumn. By late November the pamphlet literature had established a number of criticisms which could be raised independently of the University case. Proof of the Society’s new-found prominence is reflected in the fact that the Parlement’s time, freed by the suspension of the University case, was used by the avocat général du roi Servin to present for condemnation the Jesuit Cardinal Bellarmine’s work, *Tractatus de potestate summi Pontificis in temporalibus,* written in response to James I of England’s assertions on temporal sovereignty.79 During the Parlement’s autumn recess, Bellarmine’s tract, which argued that in certain circumstances the Pope could remove a monarch from his throne, became a *cause célèbre* in the pamphlet literature associated with the University case.80 Thus, while the regent was able to use her authority to suspend the University case, she could not suppress the issues already raised in the pamphlet literature of the autumn.

On the morning of 26 November 1610 the avocat général du roi Servin, a long-standing outspoken enemy of the Jesuits, placed the text before the Parlement for consideration and by doing so assured that the Jesuits were faced with another potentially major crisis. The condemnation of another Jesuit author for advocating theories similar to Mariana’s brought the issues surrounding Mariana’s tract back before the Parlement.

---

79 Cardinal R. Bellarmine, *Tractus de potestate summi pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium* (Cologne, 1610). The nuncio provided the names of those magistrates and royal officials most implicated in the Bellarmine controversy in a letter to Cardinal Borghese dated 4 December 1610: AV Francia 54, fo. 160r–160v. Ubaldini to Borghese, 4 December 1611.

80 For instance see *Anticotot,* p. 9.
But the question remained whether the *parlementaires* would choose to link the French Society of Jesus with the theories presented by Bellarmine in his text. They had been reluctant to make a connection between Mariana’s text and the Society in the summer, but the rhetoric of the autumn provided a context in which such action was more probable if far from certain.

Anti-Jesuit pamphlet literature which called for general action continued to be published during the controversy surrounding the Bellarmine text. These tracts borrowed from anti-Jesuit literature published in the autumn to produce a set of arguments which linked the Society as a whole to Bellarmine’s theories. Indeed, the points raised in these tracts were exactly the arguments which would prove most damaging to the Jesuits in France if they were linked to a condemnation of Bellarmine’s text. One pamphlet entitled *Le Tocsin*, attributed to an avocat at the Paris Parlement named Nicolas le Jay, had a wide circulation and is representative of the pamphlet debate of the period. Le Jay’s tract was designed to emphasise the threat to French society and royal authority that the Bellarmine text posed. Le Jay opens with a detailed critique of Bellarmine’s tract which argues that Bellarmine’s theories threatened the French king’s sovereignty. Thus, the opening lines of *Le Tocsin* articulates the familiar theme:

> France il est temps que le Tocsain [sic] batte fort & sans cesse en tous les cœurs de tes enfans, pour esueiller & donner l’alarme à ceux qui te doivent deffendre: puis que le Cardinal Bellarmin Iesuite autant impudemment que iniustement, a choisi ceste nuict de la mortalité de ton Roy, pour donner l’escalade à ta souueraineté, & pour mettre le petard aux Portes de ta Maiesté tousiours inviolée.

According to Le Jay all other considerations had to be subjugated to the threat embodied

---

in Bellarmine’s text. Hence, the Paris Parlement was praised for its consistent protection of the kingdom’s interests despite the powerful enemies they made. Villeroy and Sillery, the regent’s chief advisers, were accused, on the other hand, of being under the influence of the Jesuits. As with pamphlets like the Anticoton produced in the autumn, Le Tocsin’s argument builds towards its most vehement rhetoric when the French Jesuits are introduced as the embodiment of Bellarmine’s theories in action. Thus, Le Jay argued toward the conclusion of his text that Bellarmine’s tract represented the Society’s teachings: ‘Mais à cette heure que vostre masque est descouuert, & qu’il conste par le liure de Bellarmin que vous enseignez que France n’est plus France, c’est à dire Souueraine & independente ....’ Unlike in the Mariana controversy, the links between sinister foreign Jesuits and the Society in France were presented in a published tract. Indeed, Le Jay’s arguments reflected the influence of the autumn polemic against the College of Clermont which had linked the Jesuit’s past teaching of tyrannicide to the assassination of Henry IV. Le Jay’s emphasis upon the link between Bellarmine’s theory and disorder in France represented the potential threat to the Society of this new court case. There were a number of individuals both inside and outside the Parlement who would have supported Le Jay’s assessment of the Society of Jesus and members of the Society needed no reminders of the hostility that could be tapped by their opponents.

However, the official actions of the Parlement offer no reference to the argument that the Society should be punished as an Order for the writings of one of their members. The threat to the Jesuits was articulated only on the margins of the debate, primarily in

---

82 Le Jay, Le Tocsin, p. 3.
anonymous tracts like *Le Tocsin*. The Parlement chose to justify their condemnation of Bellarmine’s tract strictly on a series of very specific legal issues which carefully avoided any link with the general attacks on the Society of Jesus.

The Parlement’s purpose was reflected in the speech of the avocat général du roi Servin detailing the reasons for the condemnation of Bellarmine’s text on the morning of 26 November 1610. Servin, who was singled out by both Coton and Ubaldini as an outspoken opponent of the Society, was a committed Gallican who had been present at the opening of the Parlement at Tours in 1589. He was rewarded for his loyalty by Henry IV who named him avocat général du roi when the parlements at Tours and Paris were amalgamated in 1594. Thus, it is remarkable that Servin constructed his *plaidoyer* before the Parlement against Cardinal Bellarmine’s text without reference to the Society in general or, more specifically, to Bellarmine’s prominence in the Order. Instead, Servin argued before the Parlement that Bellarmine’s text should be condemned for containing:

> des propositions fausses & erronées contraires a la Saincte Escriture, et alloit plus avant a donner la puissance aux Papes de deposseder les Rois & Princes de leurs Royaumes et Estats par excommunication, absolution du serment de fidelité de leurs subiets, & puis les exposer aux meurtriers doctrine qui auoit tousiours esté reprouuée & condamnée.

The text was to be banned for its content with no reference to either the Jesuit author or the Society in general. Servin, who was inclined to oppose the Jesuits, avoided any

---


87 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 55: ‘Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le reestablissement du College des Jesuites a Paris …’, 1610.

88 *Extrait des registres, Paris. Contre le liure intitulé, tractatus de Potestate summi Pontificis in temporalibus aduersus Guillelmmum Barclaium, auctore R. Bellarmino Sanctae Ecclesiae Romane CARDINALI BELLARMINO (26 nov. 1610) (n.pl., 1610).*
explicit linkage between the Society and the condemnation.

Servin's *plaidoyer* to the Parlement set out the issues upon which the Bellarmine condemnation would rest. His oration was designed to emphasise both the dangers of Bellarmine's tract to the authority of the monarchy in France and the role of the Parlement in affairs associated with the fundamental laws. To Servin, Bellarmine's theory of the Pope's indirect temporal authority in France threatened the temporal authority of the king and would only serve to inspire more assassinations of French monarchs. According to Servin, Bellarmine's theories were rejected by Scripture and had been opposed throughout French history. For instance, Servin noted that the avocat du roi Jean le Coque stood before the Parlement on 20 March 1392 to state 'QVE LE ROY DE FRANCE NE RECOGNOIST POINCT DE SOVVERAIN EN TERRE EN TEMPOREL.' Jean le Coque's speech is only one of many historical examples but the use of upper-case letters in the text represents the emphasis of Servin's argument: that the King of France had traditionally been subject only to God in his own kingdom. Servin's arguments were closely linked to those used to reject Mariana's work and must be seen as part of the same reaffirmation of the fundamental laws.

The central purpose of Servin's oration was to argue the importance of the king's inviolability and sovereignty to French law. However, the decision by Servin to cite the former avocat du roi Le Coque to bolster his argument is representative of the second purpose of the oration: to emphasise the Parlement's authority to define and to defend the

---

sovereignty of the monarch. One important set of passages offers arguments which define a particularly important role for the Parlement as defenders of these laws during a regency. Servin states:

si en tout temps il est sainct, il est iuste, il est honorable, & est du courage & de l’amour des François enuers leur Roy, & le Royaume de tenir les maximes de vérité, & defendre la franchise & liberté Gallicane, certainement cela se doit principalement [durant la bas aage du Roy regnant soubz l’heureuse Regence de la Royne sa mere].

Here Servin made the important link between the minority of the king and the role of the Parlement which was also emphasised in the weeks following Henry IV’s assassination through the renewal of the arrêt against Jean Petit. According to Servin, the inviolable laws of the French monarchy must be defended by the king’s loyal servants when the monarch was unable to defend them himself. For Servin this responsibility fell upon the Parlement’s shoulders as he made clear in a later passage: ‘les luges de ce grand Parlement seroient inexcusables, voire blasmables non seulement aujourd’hui, mais à l’aduenir, lors mesme que le Roy sera rendu en aage, si au lieu de recepuoir ceste plainte comme iuste, ils lasssoon f passer tels escripts pernicieus, sans y apporter la censure conuenable.’ The Parlement would be liable when the king reached his majority if it had not fulfilled its duty to defend the king’s laws. Therefore, the flexibility which Henry IV had shown in his interpretation of the fundamental laws was out of place during the regency as only the careful and exact defence of French law could protect the monarch’s sovereignty until the next king could take personal control of the kingdom.

These two statements by the avocat général du roi Servin are crucial for any

90 Servin, Remonstrance, p. 41. The author’s use of italics.
91 Servin, Remonstrance, p. 44. The author’s use of italics.
understanding of the Parlement’s concern with Bellarmine’s work and the delicate relations with the regent over the banning of the tract. Servin argued that only an adult monarch could interpret the fundamental laws and defended an expanded role for the Parlement in situations where a monarch was unable to rule. Further, Servin contended that certain French customs and laws must be defended as fundamental to the state and dynasty. Despite Servin’s well-known dislike of the Jesuits and the similarities between Bellarmine’s theories and past criticisms of the entire Society, he did not implicate the Jesuits in his discourse. Instead his purpose and focus was to define royal authority with reference to papal authority.92 The Parlement, in the Grand’ Chambre, reviewed this text, accepted Servin’s interpretation, and duly condemned the work as containing ‘la doctrine en estant contraire a la dignité, auctorité & souueraineté du Roy.'93 The only mention of the Society of Jesus during the entire affair occurred from the floor of the Grand’ Chambre where a number of parlementaires called for the book to be burned immediately ‘pour eviter les importunes querimonies & sollicitations du Nunce & de ceux qui le favorisoient, & cette doctrine comme les Jesuites.'94 This comment reflected the grave mistrust of the Society by a number of parlementaires. However, it also served to emphasise that this anti-Jesuit feeling was not present in the official pronouncements of the Parlement.

Servin’s decision to avoid all reference to the Society of Jesus in the condemnation of Bellarmine’s tract is indicative of the effort by many in the Parlement to separate the important constitutional issues which Servin carefully pleaded from the

---

92 For Servin’s interaction with the Society of Jesus see Mastellone, La reggenza, pp. 33–121.
93 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 55v°: ‘Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le reestablissement du College des Jesuites a Paris ...’, 1610.
94 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 55v°: idem..
distraction of the Jesuit controversy. The Parlement was willing to use the Bellarmine
text, which had become a subject of debate thanks to the pamphlet literature associated
with the University case in the autumn, to define a very limited set of issues on royal
sovereignty and the Parlement’s authority. However, the Parlement displayed little desire
to attack the French Jesuits through the tract as advocated in pamphlet literature like Le
Tocsin. The concerns expressed by Servin about Bellarmine’s tract parallel the
Parlement’s criticisms of Mariana’s tract in the summer. The Parlement was not
attacking the Society of Jesus but rather using Jesuit tracts to define French fundamental
law and assert the Parlement’s authority to pass judgement on such issues during a
regency. The careful avoidance of any reference to the Society by an individual like
Servin, who was personally hostile to the Jesuits, is an important feature of these two
condemnations. The link between Mariana and Bellarmine’s tracts and the Society
would have been apparent to the individuals who condemned the tracts but was carefully
ignored or even hidden in each case.

For the parlementaires the central issue which united the corporation in the
condemnations of both Mariana and Bellarmine’s tracts was the authority of the
Parlement to defend and interpret the king’s laws during a regency. To attack the Society
at the same time would have been counter-productive to this central concern. First, many
members of the Parlement, including influential figures like président Seguier, were
inclined to support the Society and thus opposition within the Parlement to a
condemnation of the Society would limit the Parlement’s ability to assert its authority
over fundamental law. Second, the royal will, through Henry IV’s Edict of Rouen and
the late king’s favour, had established the right of the Jesuits to participate in the
kingdom in no uncertain terms. While many in the Parlement may have opposed the Society’s return, a period of regency government when the threat of disorder was great was not an appropriate time to raise such a difficult issue, especially when the regent and her advisers were so openly supportive of the Society. Instead, the period of a regency was a time to maintain French law and civil peace until an adult monarch could take over control of government. It was the defence of the fundamental laws, and the position of the Parlement in that defence, which inspired the magistrates to return to the issue of papal authority in December through Bellarmine’s tract.

The debate surrounding the Bellarmine condemnation provides an excellent setting with which to establish the Parlement’s primary concern in this controversy with the fundamental law and their authority to defend it. In the summer the conflict between Bishop Gondi of Paris and the Parlement over secular versus ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Mariana condemnation had served to emphasise the Parlement’s concern for its own authority in similar cases. On the day that the Bellarmine arrêt was handed down members of the Parlement had called for the quick burning of the text because of continued concern that outside influences might impinge upon its ruling. On 27 November 1610, one day after the arrêt against Bellarmine was issued, it became apparent that these fears were well founded, as rumours spread that the regent planned to take action against the arrêt. Premier président Harlay prepared to defend the Parlement’s decree and asked the avocat général du roi Servin to make the issue a public debate by printing the arrêt quickly, a task which Estoile reported was accomplished ‘avec telle promptitude, que, dès le soir du jour mesme, la ville estoit remplie

95 Evidence for this potential split can be found in BN Dupuy 90, fo. 55v°: idem.
d'imprimés, tant en placards qu'en demies-feuilles.96

The quick publication of the arrêt was intended to advertise the Parlement's arguments before the regency government suppressed discussion. It is thus particularly interesting that the themes emphasised in the arrêt were far removed from the Society of Jesus. In the most important and substantial of these publications, Remonstrance et conclusions des gents du roy, Servin published his discourse to the Parlement. This text provides the reasoning behind the case:

Bref chascun adouissant & reconnoissant la verité confessera deus maximes. La première, Que la puissance du Pape n'est sinon és choses spirituelles, mesmement en ce Royaume, & qu'elle ne se peut estendre directement ny indirectement au Temporel. La seconde, Que le Roy est le seul Souuerain en tous ses Estats sur tous ses subiects tant Laics qu'Ecclesiastiques.97

The purpose, as with the condemnation of Mariana's text, was to defend the fundamental law concerning the inviolability of the king's person. This was an issue that many in the Parlement argued was part of their obligations and within their authority. This was also an issue over which several important members of the Parlement, including premier président Harlay, were willing to confront the regency. However, none of these publications mentioned or even implied Jesuit complicity. As with Mariana's tract, the magistrates avoided allowing their primary concern with fundamental law and the Parlement's responsibility for it to be deflected by an attack on the Jesuits.

The fear that the regent could be influenced to ignore or alter the Parlement's arrêt caused the Parlement to act quickly to defend this assertion of its authority. The rationale by which the regent could take action against the arrêt was voiced during the debate over the Bellarmine tract in the Parlement. While on the day of the condemnation

96 Estoile, Mémoires, ix, 30.
97 Servin, Remonstrance, p. 45. The author's use of italics.
a majority of the Grand' Chambre pressed for immediate action, a small number of counsellors demanded that the court defer ‘au Roy & a la Roine comme estant un affaire d’estat; un autre a supplier la Roine quelle escriuist au Pape afin de faire censurer ce liure par luy mesme.’ The argument that this issue was an ‘affaire d’estat’ was what the Parlement feared would limit its authority, and was central to the regent’s reaction to the Bellarmine arrêt.

This disagreement over the extent of the regent’s authority resulted in a series of tense meetings in the Louvre between delegations from the Parlement, the regent and her advisers in late November and December 1610. The Parlement’s determination to defend what it perceived as a threat to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and the regent’s lack of authority to repudiate the Parlement’s arrêt, led to the regency government resorting to an ingenious compromise: ‘que la publication dudit Arrest sera tenue en surseance jusques a ce que par sa Maiesté soit autrement ordonné ....’ This compromise removed the issue from the Parlement’s jurisdiction without threatening its authority by referring the case to Louis XIII when he took over personal control of the kingdom. The regent sought to suppress the issue until Louis XIII was able to pass judgement on a subject that was beyond the competency of both herself as regent and the Parlement. The compromise acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Parlement for its authority, but even this concession met with stiff opposition when the Chancellor

---

98 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 55v°: ‘Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le reestablissement du College des Jesuites a Paris ...’, 1610.
99 These conflicts are well documented, see BN Dupuy 90, fos 57–63v°: idem.. See also Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 30–31. A document at the Bibliothèque de l’Institut offers an account of the meeting on 4 December 1610, see BI Godefroy 15, fo. 97: ‘Note sur un discourse du premier-président Achille de Harlay contre De Potestate Pontificis, du Cardinal Bellarmin’, 4 December 1610. Ubaldini also offers a remarkably similar account of the 4 December 1610 meeting in his dispatch to Rome, see AV, Francia 54, fos 149–161v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 4 December 1610. See also Du Perron’s letter to the Pope, BI Godefroy 15, fos 275–276v°: Cardinal du Perron to Paul V, 18 December 1610.
added to this original decree the words 'et execution', after the word 'publication', to satisfy the nuncio's continued criticisms. Thus, while after more protests the Parlement ultimately accepted the compromise and the addition of 'execution' to the original pronouncement, the affair tested the authority and political acumen of the regency government.

This conflict was important since it helped to define the precise relationship between the Parlement and the regent during the king's minority. However, its potential for damaging the Society did not materialise. At no point did the Parlement choose to expand its argument to imply that the Society of Jesus should be punished for the writings of its members. As in the Mariana controversy, this conflict was inspired by the Parlement's desire to safeguard the king and its own authority during a regency. Also, as with the Mariana controversy, those who advocated the condemnation in the Parlement believed that the introduction of the Society of Jesus into the debate would only serve to deflect the Parlement from their primary purpose.

Estoile noted in his journal, on the day Mariana's text was condemned, that 'des Jesuistes [...] avoient des amis et des ennemis en ceste Compagnie [the Parlement].' The French Jesuits did have allies who were ready to protect them from being implicated with the more dangerous theoretical texts of individual Jesuit scholars. It also had opponents in the Parlement, but opponents who had to accept that the king had granted in no uncertain terms privileges which allowed the Society to operate in France. This would explain why the Parlement concentrated on defining and enforcing the

---

100 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 61: 'Ce qui passa au Parlement pour le reestablissement du College des Jesuites a Paris ...', 1610.
101 BN Dupuy 90, fo. 63–63v°: idem.
102 Estoile, Mémoires, x, 270.
fundamental laws of the kingdom: a task which Henry IV and the regency government had affirmed was within the authority of the Parlement. Individual members of the magistrature did mistrust the Jesuits but their views were only reflected on the margins of the debate; in the anonymous pamphlet literature of the period and the occasional outburst in the chambers of the Parlement. While Jesuit theorists were condemned in the Paris Parlement, the attacks on Mariana and Bellarmine no longer suggested an automatic association between the Society in general and theories of tyrannicide.

III. Continued controversy: the loyalty of Jesuit preachers and teachers

The Jesuits had reason to believe at the opening of 1611 that the Society had weathered the worst problems thrown up by Henry IV's assassination. While the Society's conflict with the University had not been resolved, it had been suspended indefinitely. Moreover, the Jesuits could draw some encouragement from the Parlement's careful separation of the Society as a whole from individual Jesuit authors and their theories of tyrannicide. Nevertheless, despite their initial success, by the end of the year the Jesuits would once again be facing a potentially serious conflict with the University.

In the opening months of 1611 Bellarmine's tract, while officially suppressed by the regent, dominated the papal nuncio's correspondence. Indeed, it took until April to convince Ubaldini and the papacy that the regent's compromise was the only realistic option. Nevertheless, the Bellarmine controversy was only one increasingly marginal aspect of the public debate over royal sovereignty in France which soon found a new

103 BN MS. Fr. 18006, fo. 139: Brèves to Villeroy, 15 April 1611; BN MS. Fr. 18006, fo. 54: Brèves to Villeroy, 20 February 1611; AV Francia 54, fos 182–184: Ubaldini to Borghese, 20 January 1611. BN
focus in a series of Dominican disputations over the nature of papal authority, held at their general convocation in Paris in May 1611. These disputations resulted in a series of sharp exchanges between Dominican friars and several individuals, including Louis Servin and Emond Richer, the controversial syndic of the faculty of theology at the University of Paris, who were intent on protecting royal authority. Further, the disputation inspired Emond Richer to publish his *Libellus de Ecclesiastica et Politico Potestate* which was the source of further controversy.

Printed tracts also provided a medium through which aspects of the controversy were raised. While certain titles were banned, foreign texts were difficult to suppress before a scandal had already occurred, and French tracts could be quickly printed at moments when the regency was weak. These tracts did not have a royal licence but, as Ubaldini noted, the regency did not have control of the publishing industry in France. This was the case even in the capital where Servin republished his anti-Bellarmine tract in early August 1611, at a time when the regent, Villeroy and other important members of the government were absent from Paris. This particularly audacious example of disdain for the regency government’s authority led to a crackdown in Paris; but in general control over printing was beyond the power of the Crown.

As the debate over papal authority continued, the Jesuits in France were relatively

---

Dupuy 819, fo. 204–204v°: P. Catel to De Thou, 25 May 1611.


107 AV Francia 54, fo. 201–201v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 17 February 1611.

108 Estoile, *Mémoires*, xi, 135. See also AV Francia 54, fos 321–322v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 2 August 1611; AV Francia 54, fo. 336–336v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 16 August 1611; BN MS. Fr. 18006,
successful in their efforts to avoid becoming a central part of the debate. Even if their allies could not stop the Society from being linked to the controversy on occasion, the Jesuits were rarely the sole focus of attack.\textsuperscript{109} For instance, in January 1611 Ubaldini reported that preachers in Paris continued to offer ‘discorso molto empia, e scandolesam.te, dell’autorita dei Papi, e dei Gesuiti, et altri Religiosi reformati.’\textsuperscript{110} While Ubaldini’s comment does not indicate whether Jesuit theorists or the Society as a whole were attacked, it is clear that the Jesuits were not the only subject of these sermons. That is not to say that the Jesuits took no part in the debate, but rather that their efforts from late 1610 until the summer of 1611 were focused upon distancing themselves from the accusations of the previous autumn through substantial printed tracts.\textsuperscript{111} For instance, in Coton’s most important response to the polemic of the previous autumn, he defined his purpose as:

Examinez done, Amy lecteur, ces responces & les confrontez avec les obiections, puis jugez en conscience & selon Dieu, quelle peine est reservee a tels Architectes de mensonge, & s’ils sont trois, comme on le tient, qui ont compile l’Anticoton, le remerciement des Beurrieres, & le pretendu remonstrance a la Cour de Parlement, s’ils ne meritent pas d’estre surnommez LE TRIVMVIRAT D’IMPOSTVRE ....\textsuperscript{112}

The Society’s efforts were focused upon distancing itself from the dangerous polemic of the previous year rather than fending off new attacks.

In the spring of 1611, the Society of Jesus had reason to hope that the Parlement’s

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{109} Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 75–76, 80. See also AV Francia 54, fo. 211–211v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 February 1611. For a listing of a number of tracts published over the period against the Jesuits see Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 116–118.
\textsuperscript{110} AV Francia 54, fo. 174v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 4 January 1611.
\textsuperscript{111} For instance see P. Coton, Response apologetique a l’Anticoton et a ceux de sa suite. Presentée a la Royne, mere de Roy, regente en France. On il est monstré, que les Autheurs anonymes de ces libelles difamatoires sont attents des crimes d’Heresie, leze Majesté, Perfidie, Sacrilege, & tres-enorme Imposture (Pont, 1610). Another attempt to link the Society to Henry IV’s will was made in Coton, Oraison funèbre. See also A. Behotte, Response a l’Anticoton, de point en point, pour la defense de la doctrine & innocence des Peres Jesuites (Paris, 1611).
\textsuperscript{112} Coton, Response apologetique, pp. 12–13. The author’s own use of upper case letters.
reluctance to question the Society's right to participate in France would provide a basis on which the Jesuits could avoid further controversy. The retirement of the Paris Parlement's premier président Harlay in April 1611 and his replacement at the nomination of the Crown by Nicholas de Verdun, the Jesuit-educated premier président of the Toulouse Parlement, provided the Society with another important ally in the law courts. Furthermore, French Jesuits and their Father General understood the potential threat to the Society in France that the attack on Bellarmine's work implied. Therefore, in 1611 the French Jesuits and the Roman hierarchy worked with the regency to avoid the dissemination of controversial Jesuit tracts.

Nevertheless, the fact that nothing had been resolved between the University of Paris and the Society of Jesus over the issue of teaching rights in Paris ensured the University's continued hostility. Throughout the spring and summer of 1611 the University took a number of opportunities to criticise Jesuit theorists and Jesuit teaching practices. The theology faculty led the University initiative under the strong leadership of Emond Richer whose hard-line Gallican views placed him in opposition to the Society. In February 1611, the theology faculty disregarded the regent's desire for public silence on Jesuit texts in order to condemn the assertion in a pro-Jesuit tract that Mariana's work conformed to the decrees of the Council of Constance. This assertion was of particular concern to the opponents of the Society as Chancellor Gerson, from the University of Paris, played a central role in establishing the decrees at Constance which the Jesuits

---

113 Estoile, Mémoires, xi, 90-91. See also AV Francia 54, fos 226-227v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 29 March 1611.
114 BN MS. Fr. 18006, fo. 192-192v°: Brèves to Marie de Medicis, 13 May 1611; BN MS. Fr. 18006, fos 32v°-33: Brèves to Marie de Medicis, 6 February 1611; AV Francia 54, fos 202v°-204: Ubaldini to Borghese, 17 February 1611; AFCJ Prat 33, pp. 85-91: Jaiquinot to Aquaviva, 28 August 1611.
115 BN Dupuy 90, fos 213-215: Copy of the decree issued by the Sorbonne on 1 February 1611 against the proposition that Mariana's tract De rege et regis institutione conformed to the teaching of the
were now intent on accepting and interpreting. Thus, to Richer and his allies the Jesuits were trying to appropriate an important historical reference point both in the University’s identity and in more general Gallican traditions for its own use. Richer and his supporters were keen to maintain separation between the traditional teachings of the University and the subversive foreign doctrines allegedly imported by the Jesuits.

The potential danger of Jesuit teaching was further invoked through a high-profile court case at the Paris Parlement in July 1611, in which M. Leurcheon, the private physician of the duc de Lorraine, attempted to regain custody of his son: a recruit to the Society during his studies at the Jesuit College in Nancy. 116 Emond Richer, in a public denunciation in August 1611, linked this case to the issue of teaching at the College of Clermont. While premier président Verdun refused to take up Richer’s complaint in the Paris Parlement, pressure grew for a renewal of the court case suppressed by the regent on 25 November 1610. Furthermore, in October, the Sorbonne, again under Richer’s leadership, condemned a book of three sermons preached in Spain on the sanctity of Ignatius Loyola. 117 While the sermons had been preached by an Augustinian and two Dominicans, the Jesuit Father Solier, who had translated the texts into French, wrote and published a strong rebuttal of the Sorbonne’s condemnation, which served to renew the controversy. 118 The case was only brought to a close when the theology faculty’s censure was suppressed by premier président Verdun and the regency government; but the

---

116 BN Dupuy 74, fo. 134: ‘Arrêt contre les Jesuites de Nancy, Paris’, 29 July 1611. The Paris Parlement possessed an acknowledged jurisdiction over the Barrois despite it being part of the duc de Lorraine’s territories.
117 AV Francia 54, fos 368v-369: Ubaldini to Borghese, 11 October 1611. The censure was published as Censure de la sacree Faculté de Theologie de Paris, Sur trois Sermons pretenduz, faicts en l’honneur de P. Ignace (n.pl., 1611).
118 AV Francia 54, fos 382–383v, 399–400: Ubaldini to Borghese, 8 November and 7 December 1611. The rebuttal was published as F. Solier, Lettre justificative du Pere François Solier, respondant à
University quickly returned to the Jesuit question when in the same month the new rector Pierre Hardivillier used a court case involving one of the boarders at the Jesuit hostel for students in Paris to press once again for the dispute over Jesuit teaching rights in Paris to be reopened. This steady pressure by an important faction within the University resulted in the renewal of the case on 17 December 1611, despite the regent’s previous suspension of it. The possibility that the rhetoric from the pamphlet literature of the previous University conflict in the autumn of 1610 could return to the centre of polemic threatened to reverse Jesuit efforts to distance the Society from the debate over papal authority and tyrannicide theory.

The Society’s concerns were justified in the arguments presented by the avocat Pierre Martelliere in his *plaidoyer* as representative of the University before the Parlement on 17 and 19 December 1611. The overriding purpose of the *plaidoyer*, as in the pamphlet literature of autumn 1610, was to present the University as a loyal, orthodox, French institution in contrast to the subversive, foreign Jesuits. Martelliere summarised the inspirations for his case when he stated:

> Ce sont les moyens d’opposition que l’Université propose contre les lettres obtenues par les Jesuites, fondées sur l’autorité souveraine gruee de toute ancienneté dans l’airain des loix fondamentales de la Monarchie Françoise, sur sa police particulière, sur vos arrests, sur sa sainte doctrine constante laquelle affermist la couronne sur la teste des Roys, contraire à celle des Jesuites, qui attribuent au Pape sur nos Roys vne superiorité pareille que sur les moindres Prestres ou sur ses simples Officiers, & Vicaires, voire beaucoup plus grande, les

---

119 Little is known about the nature of the case. For the most complete discussion see Fouqueray, *Histoire*, iii, pp. 121, 278. It seems that the case was used to raise questions about the legality of the one theology class which the Society had received the right to teach by Henry IV in 1609. This class was intended as a first step in reopening the College of Clermont and thus had implications for their general teaching rights.

120 A second substantial discourse was offered to the Parlement by the University Rector P. Hardivillier, *Petri Hardivilerij Parisini, Academiar Rectoris, Actio Pro Academia Adversus Presbyteros & Scholasticos Collegii Claromontani, habita in Senatu Parisiensii* (Paris, 1612).
fait Rois precaires, sujets à estre chassez & tuez: fondez encor sur tant d’exemples de mal-heur à nous particulièrement si cuisans, qu’il n’y a personne aymant l’Estat & Religion, à qui il n’en soit demeuré apprehension & ressentiment. 121

Thus, Martelliere asserted that the University had numerous privileges that protected it from the Jesuit request to teach and, moreover, the University upheld doctrines in accordance with the fundamental laws and French custom which the Jesuits did not. Therefore, the Society, which since its arrival in France had as its goal ‘la ruine de la plus grande & fameuse Uniuersité qui ait esté sur la terre’, should not be allowed to teach in Paris. 122 In his conclusion, Martelliere acknowledged the accommodation between the Society and the Parlement in the Mariana and Bellarmine cases when he noted that the Jesuits in France had promised in the past to observe French law and privileges but concluded that these promises had turned out to be false: ‘En l’estat où nous sommes les Iesuites ne peuuent auoir vn plus grand obstacle, que l’obligation d’obseruer estroictement les conditions de leur restablissement.’ 123 For Martelliere the prospect of Jesuit integration into the Parisian educational establishment was unacceptable as the Order remained, as in the past, supporters of subversive doctrines and had proven unable to operate within the French church. Martelliere, unlike Arnauld in 1594, did not go beyond his remit in the case to call for the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France. While his rhetoric was strong, his demands were specific. Nevertheless, the arguments presented by Martelliere could have been used by a sympathetic Parlement to punish the Society as a whole.

While Martelliere’s *plaidoyer* threatened to revive the threats against the Society

---

which Coton and others had worked throughout 1611 to remove from the public arena, in the end the case proved far less dangerous. The earlier condemnations of Mariana and Bellarmine’s texts hinted at an accommodation between the Parlement and the Society of Jesus and, as it evolved in the second half of December 1611, the University case gave substance to this accommodation. Once again it would be the responsibility of the avocat général du roi Servin to spell out the terms of the debate to the Parlement and Servin was to argue that the Society should be allowed to return to Paris if it was willing to abide by French law and custom as required in the Edict of Rouen.

Thus, Servin in his *plaidoyer* before the Parlement in the name of the king explained that if the Jesuits were ‘resolus de persister en leur nouvelle poursuite, qu’ils fissent soubmission de se conformer aux anciennes maximes de l’Université de Paris, & Faculté de Theologie.’ Servin then proceeded to define four points which he asserted were the foundation of these ‘anciennes maximes’. These points were related to Martelliere’s chief distinctions between University doctrine and Jesuit doctrine. First, Servin provided a precise definition of tyrannicide and demanded that the Jesuits reject all theories which supported such an act. Second, Servin asserted that the French king in his state ‘ne reconnoist aultre superieur en choses temporeles que Dieu seul.’ Third, Servin argued that the Jesuits must ensure that they write and teach

Que nulle puissance qu’elle soit non pas mesmement l’Eglise assemble en Concile, ny aultrement n’ha droict de dispencser, ny d’absoudre les subiects du roy du serment de fidelité & obeissance qu’ils luy doibvent par toute sorte de droict divin, naturel & humain.

Finally, in order to protect royal authority and maintain the laws of the state, Servin

---

124 AN X1a 5333, p. 3: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 22 December 1611.
125 AN X1a 5333, pp. 3–4: idem..
126 AN X1a 5333, pp. 4–5: idem.
ordered that 'iceuls demandeurs en lettres maintiendront par parole & par escript les
droicts & libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane, dans laquelle ils font estat de vivre; sans dire,
escrire, ny proposer au contraire aulcunes choses soubz umbre de quelques Decrets.'\textsuperscript{128}
The intention of these four points, which were in line with the responsibilities of the
Parlement during a regency, was to define and to enforce the precise meaning of the
fundamental laws on the temporal power of French monarchs.

There is nothing in Servin's statements to suggest that this notoriously anti-Jesuit
avocat général was any less hostile to the Jesuits in principle than he had been in the past.
Indeed, De Thou would write in a private letter to Casaubon that neither Servin or
Martelliere 'n'ont rien oublie de tout ce qui se peut dire contre ceste Societe.'\textsuperscript{129} However,
Servin, and his supporters in the Parlement, were primarily concerned with providing a
clear definition of Gallican liberties and French royal sovereignty in relation to papal
power. If the Society of Jesus was unwilling to accept these stipulations then the Order
could not teach in Paris; if they were willing to accept them then they could. Servin's
chief concern was not the Jesuits but the precise definition of the fundamental laws which
the Parlement was duty-bound to defend. His concern for precision can be seen in his
demand that the oath to be taken

en la praesence d'un Officier signale en piete, doctrine, fidelite & affection a
l'Eglise, a la personne du Roy & a l'Estat, Praesident en vne compagnie souveraine,
lequel ayde a les exciter de faire franchement & ingenuement la submission qui leur
estoit proposee, & soubzscrire aux poincts que la Cour a oy: bref declare qu'ils les
approuvent sans aequivocation ny evasion.\textsuperscript{130}

Henry IV had granted the Jesuits the right to participate in the French church, but only

\textsuperscript{127} AN X1a 5333, p. 6: idem..
\textsuperscript{128} AN X1a 5333, pp. 6–7: idem..
\textsuperscript{129} BN Dupuy 707, fo. 14–14v\textsuperscript{6}: De Thou to Casaubon, 27 December 1611.
\textsuperscript{130} AN X1a 5333, pp. 7–8: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 22 December 1611.
if they undertook to obey the laws of the kingdom. As with Mariana and Bellarmine’s texts, the primary purpose of Servin’s speech was to fulfil the Parlement’s obligation to protect the king’s authority and the fundamental laws during a regency. Martelliere’s oration and the reputation of the Society of Jesus as supporters of tyrannicide made the case an ideal platform on which to define the fundamental laws. Servin intended to publicise a clear statement of French prerogatives in relation to the papacy; and a result of this was an unmistakable statement that the Jesuits could become loyal French subjects.

Servin’s *plaidoyer* confirmed the important shift in the Parlement’s treatment of the Society since the Edict of Rouen. Instead of arguing for the expulsion of the Jesuits as a symbol of unacceptable ultramontane doctrines, Servin now proposed to allow for the possibility of integration of the Society into the Parisian educational network if the Order publicly affirmed a series of principles which protected French fundamental laws. The demands made of the Society did not question the Jesuit’s rights and privileges in France. Instead, they were designed to ensure that the Society abided by the conditions laid down in the Edict of Rouen which stated that “Seront aussy ceux de ladicte Societe subiets en tout et partout aux loix de nostre Royaume et Iusticiables de nos officiers au cas et ainsy que les autres Ecclesiastieques et Religieux y sont subiets.” While many in the Parlement remained deeply mistrustful of the Society of Jesus, Servin’s speech provided a clear statement of what had been implied in the Mariana and Bellarmine condemnations: that the Parlement under certain conditions was prepared to grant the Jesuits the right to participate in French society.
The Jesuits understood what Servin had said. When asked to respond to Servin's demands, the Jesuit delegation at the Parlement did not argue with the points but rather responded to the principal demand. The Jesuit Father Fronton indicated that the Society could not give a final answer until they had consulted with their Father General but noted that their constitutions stipulated 'que pour choses concernantes la police il se faloit accommoder au temps & aus lieus où l'on auoit à viure.' According to Ubaldini, Richer responded to Fronton by asserting that 'i Padri promettevano due cose contrarie: l'uno, di conformarsi alla Dottrina della Sorbona; l'altra, di osservare le loro Constitutioni, le quali obligandogli di diffendere l'assoluta autorità del Papa nello spirituale e nel temporale non potevano compatirsi con la dottrina di detta Sorbona ....' For Richer it was inconceivable that the Jesuits could conform to such a clear definition of Gallican liberties, and Fronton's words were mere sophistry. While the Jesuits may not have satisfied Richer, their attitude was one of conciliation. Premier président Verdun accepted the Jesuits' initial positive response and delayed a final decision on the exact stipulations until a later meeting.

The positive Jesuit response was not merely intended to avoid an immediate condemnation of the Society in France. Indeed, the events of January and February 1612 suggest that once again the French Jesuits were prepared to pursue a separate policy from the papal nuncio in order to accommodate the Parlement's demands and distance the Society of Jesus in France from the debates over papal authority and tyrannicide. Faced with the events in Paris, the nuncio worked to defend his conception of ecclesiastical authority especially with reference to the Pope. However, in order to secure their

131 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100v*: Copy of the Edict of Rouen, 1603.
132 AN X1a 5333, pp. 8–9: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 22 December 1611.
position in France, the French Jesuits, when confronted with Ubaldini’s actions, chose to ignore the nuncio’s efforts to negotiate an agreement with the regent whereby the Society would not have to take the oath. This was reminiscent of the French Jesuit decision in 1603 to implement the Edict of Rouen before consulting the Father General; and thus once again emphasised the willingness of the French Jesuits to take action separate from Rome, despite their supposed absolute obedience to the their Father General and the Pope, in order to secure the Society’s interests in France.

Ubaldini rejected Servin’s conditions as he had rejected earlier attempts by the Parlement to limit papal authority and he made it clear shortly after the condemnation that a crisis in relations with the papacy would result from the arrêt.\textsuperscript{134} Pressure from Ubaldini and other supporters of the Pope resulted in the regency government brokering a compromise.\textsuperscript{135} The regent was not willing to evoke the case from the Parlement, but Ubaldini’s correspondence from 22 December 1611 and 3 January 1612 indicates that important alterations were made between what Servin demanded the Jesuits abide by on 22 December 1611 and what appeared in the Parlement’s arrêt on the subject.\textsuperscript{136} These alterations reflect Ubaldini’s initial concern that the offending passages by Servin not be entered into the Parlement’s registers. This was accomplished by the removal of the four points espoused by Servin and their replacement with the less precise: ‘conformer à la doctrine de l’École de Sorbonne même en ce qui concerne la conservation de la personne sacré des Rois, manutention de leur autorité royale et libertés de l’Église

\textsuperscript{133} AV Francia 55, fo. 5–5v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 January 1612.
\textsuperscript{134} AV Francia 55, fo. 6v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 January 1612.
\textsuperscript{135} AV Francia 55, fos 24v°–25: Ubaldini to Borghese, 19 January 1612.
Gallicane de tout temps et anciennement gardées et observées en ce Royaume. *137

Although the Parlement in reaction to Ubaldini’s meddling took the unusual step of including a transcription of Servin’s entire *plaidoyer* in its registers, this alteration was important for Ubaldini and the Pope as it ensured that the offending passages were not presented as the official position of the Parlement. *138*

This initial effort by Ubaldini did not settle the affair. Ubaldini also worked to ensure that the Jesuits would not be forced to take even the oath negotiated by the regent. While it was essential that Servin’s clear statement of Gallican principles did not receive official sanction in the registers of the Parlement, it was also important for Ubaldini that the Society was not forced to make an oath which could later be used as a basis on which to demand more specific assurances from the Society. In a dispatch dated 19 January 1612 Ubaldini indicated to Cardinal Borghese that the Jesuits might be able to continue operating in Paris without responding to the Parlement’s *arrêt*. *139* The nuncio was probably correct in this assessment and such a stalemate could only be viewed as a success by a nuncio who felt it was unlikely that papal prerogatives would be upheld in France until Louis XIII reached maturity. *140* Ubaldini was a strong and able defender of papal interests and his actions indicate his concern to protect papal authority in France. Indeed, his actions would appear to reflect Richer’s claim in the Parlement that the oath demanded by Servin could not be accepted by individuals who held strong ultramontane beliefs.

But these actions reflect Ubaldini’s concerns not the Society’s. Scholars have

---

137 AN X1a 5333, pp. 18–19: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 22 December 1611.
140 AV Borghese 4c, fo. 106: Ubaldini to Borghese, 14 February 1612.
often mistakenly assumed too great a correlation of purpose between the French Jesuits and Ubaldini. Ubaldini defended the Society of Jesus in this controversy because he perceived a serious threat to papal authority in Servin’s four points. Nevertheless, it is important to note that evidence of Jesuit participation in Ubaldini’s campaign is conspicuously absent. Indeed, Ubaldini’s successful compromise was not viewed with the same sense of approval by the French Jesuits. The unresolved court case with the University was the catalyst for the current controversy and as long as the court case remained unresolved the French Jesuits could potentially be drawn into the debate on papal authority in France.

On 22 February 1612 the Jesuit Father Provincial Baltazar and five other Jesuits, with the blessing of Coton, acted to remove the Society from the debate by providing a written declaration which swore, in accordance with the *arrêt* of 21 December 1611, that the Society of Jesus: ‘declarent qu’ils pusent pour conformes & se conforman à le doctrine de l’Eglise de Sorbonne mesmes et ce qui concerne la conformation de la personne sacre des roys maintanues de leur assiste Royale & libertez de Eglise Gallicane de tous temps ....’ ¹⁴¹ Thus, the Jesuits took the oath negotiated by Ubaldini with the regent in order to separate themselves from the papal controversies. Ubaldini considered this a betrayal but the French Jesuits actively defended their decision.¹⁴² Coton told Ubaldini in a meeting shortly after the oath was declared that the French Jesuits believed that their action would secure their teaching rights in France without compromising their doctrines and constitutions.¹⁴³ Moreover, Coton told the nuncio that the French Jesuits

¹⁴² AV Francia 55, fo. 63: Ubaldini to Borghese, 28 February 1612.
¹⁴³ AV Francia 55, fo. 64vº: Ubaldini to Borghese, 28 February 1612.
had taken the advice of their important French ally, président Séguier, who encouraged the Society to distance themselves from the bitter debate over papal authority in France.

The French Jesuits had been considering this action for some time. A letter dated 31 January 1612 from Aquaviva to Father Provincial Baltazar indicates that the French Jesuits had written in early January to the Father General about the advantages of making the declaration.\textsuperscript{144} The Father General was clear in his response that the French Jesuits were not to take any decisions without the approval of the Cardinals Ubaldini and Du Perron since any action by the Jesuits had important potential implications for the Church as a whole.\textsuperscript{145} However, Aquaviva continued to receive letters from the Jesuit Father Baltazar in support of the oath which culminated in one announcing the French Jesuit intention of submitting to the Parlement.\textsuperscript{146} Aquaviva declared this to be a grave error as he perceived that the Jesuit Fathers' actions had submitted jurisdiction over the Society in France to the Parlements.\textsuperscript{147} While he agreed that their written declaration was general and not in itself dangerous to doctrine, Aquaviva was still concerned that the Parlement would continue to demand more specific declarations which could eventually separate the French Society of Jesus from Rome. Aquaviva preferred to maintain the less well-defined relationship between the Society and the French monarch which had served the Order satisfactorily since 1603.

When Ubaldini questioned Coton over the affair, Coton cited the danger to their colleges of the current situation and the opportunity to end their conflict with the University while also gaining the right to teach in Paris as reasons for taking the oath.

\textsuperscript{144} ARSI Franciae 2: Aquaviva to Baltazar, 31 January 1612.
\textsuperscript{145} ARSI Franciae 2: Aquaviva to Baltazar, 14 February 1612.
\textsuperscript{146} ARSI Franciae 2: Aquaviva to Baltazar, 28 February 1612.
\textsuperscript{147} ARSI Franciae 2: Aquaviva to Baltazar, 28 February 1612.
Further, as a rationale, Coton cited advice from supporters, including président Séguier, who argued that the declaration did not in fact contradict their constitutions and, as the Father Provincial had stated in the Parlement, the Jesuit constitutions allowed ‘che gli permettono di né i punti d’opinioni conformarsi alla dottrina delle Vniuersità doue hanno dèi Collegii.’ While these answers were designed to appease Ubaldini, the subtext of Coton’s responses was that the French Jesuits’ purpose did not necessarily correlate with those of Rome. Moreover, his responses also indicate that the Jesuits had enough support in France to contemplate an independent policy line on issues where their priorities diverged from his.

It is unclear whether the Jesuits had received a letter from Aquaviva rejecting their proposed actions by 22 February, when they arrived at the Parlement to submit their written oath. However, Ubaldini indicated in a letter to Borghese that the French Jesuits felt that ‘il loro Pr.e Gen.le habbino più facilmente da contentarsi, quando intenderanno che la dichiarazione sia da loro stata [illegible] già fatta.’ Whether the French Jesuits intended to defy their Father General is unclear but the French Jesuits must have been aware that their actions would be distasteful to many important churchmen. The opposition of Ubaldini and Cardinal du Perron to the Jesuits’ proposed action was apparent in their attempts to intercede to ensure that the Jesuits did not need to take the oath. Further, the fact that the Jesuits took action before receiving a response from their Father General indicates that they did not expect his support.

Nevertheless, the decision to take the oath was not as incomprehensible as it no doubt seemed to Ubaldini. The French Jesuits were following the same policy designed

---

148 AV Francia 55, fo. 63: Ubaldini to Borghese, 28 February 1612.
149 AV Francia 55, fo. 63–63v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 28 February 1612.
to detach the Society from debates over papal authority that they had pursued since 1604. The written oath of February 1612 provided an important watershed for the French Jesuits. While the Society did not reopen the College of Clermont after its submission to the oath, the oath did coincide with a period of relative calm in relations with the French authorities. The oath was not as specific as Servin would have liked, but it did underline the French Jesuits' desire to operate within the French church and its acceptance of the Parlement's jurisdiction over its affairs. Moreover, their action served to separate the French Jesuits from papal concerns on this public controversy.

Thus, although the Jesuits in Paris did not press for full recognition of their college after taking the oath, they did reaffirm that the relationship between the Society of Jesus and the Paris Parlement was based on the regulatory framework as established in the Edict of Rouen in 1603 rather than the rejection of the Society articulated in 1594. The reluctance of the Parlement to link the Jesuits to the Bellarmine controversy and Servin's use of conditions articulated in the Edict of Rouen to define the court case against the College of Clermont in 1611 confirmed the Society's new juridical status in the French church.

The period between May 1610 and February 1612 produced a series of potentially dangerous crises for the Society of Jesus. The king's assassination revived deep-seated concerns over the inviolability of the French monarch and over the theories of papal authority which appeared to threaten the king's sovereignty. The Society, which had been expelled in 1594 for its perceived support of these theories, had good reason to be anxious over its security in the kingdom. However, the Jesuits managed to defuse the

controversies which could have projected the general anxieties about royal authority onto the Society in France. This was in part because of the previous king’s favour; in part because of the residual legitimacy which his favour granted the Society; in part because of the continued support of the regent and other influential figures in France; and in part because of the Society’s willingness to accept an accommodation with the Parlement over its jurisdiction. Their enemies sought to link the Society with dangerous theories about tyrannicide and papal authority; but the formal resolutions of the Parlement never threatened the Jesuits as they avoided any linkage between the Society as a whole and the questions of royal sovereignty that were repeatedly defended in its chambers. The royal will as expressed in the Edict of Rouen proved a powerful advocate on behalf of the Society. The death of Henry IV allowed a number of dangerous old ideas to resurface which had characterised anti-Jesuit rhetoric in 1594. Nevertheless, many magistrates in the Parlement who could have acted on this renewed polemic chose to obey the royal will as stated in the Edict of Rouen until the new monarch was of age to pass his own judgement. The opponents of the Society in the Parlement continued to mistrust the Jesuits, but the magistrates’ actions focused on a strict and careful enforcement of the conditions of the Edict of Rouen: a policy on which friends, and most enemies, of the Society could agree.
Chapter Five

The Society of Jesus during the final years of the regency
and the Estates General (1613–1615)

The written oath taken by the French Jesuits in February 1612 did not resolve their difficulties in France. The Order continued to be involved in numerous disputes over regulation of the Society. For instance, a number of preachers used the pulpit to criticise the Jesuits and other newly established orders regarding communion and other points of discipline which infringed on the rights of parish priests over the care of their parishioners’ souls. Moreover, the Society’s significant presence across the kingdom ensured continued regulatory conflict with local interest groups over the expansion of their activities in individual communities. These issues of regulation and privilege dominated the anti-Jesuit polemic during these years and represented the continued opposition to the Society over a range of issues in France.

However, the French Jesuit oath did remove the University court case from the polemical agenda and distanced the Jesuits from the centre of the debate over papal authority. The Society of Jesus remained on the margins of the polemic in the years 1612 and 1613 when Emond Richer’s writings, and his eventual removal from the position of

1 AV Francia 56, fo. 46–46v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 25 March 1614.
2 For an example of the sort of conflicts which involved the Society see BN MS, Fr. 2761, fos 63v°–72: A series of letters between Maran and Joyeuse, January 1614. See also C. Jourdain, Histoire de l’Université de Paris au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1862), pièces justificatives, p. 40: Letter from the University of Paris to the University of Toulouse, n.d. For a general discussion of the conflicts see H. Fouqueray, Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France des origines à la suppression (1528–1762) (Paris, 1922), iii, 363–383.
syndic of the faculty of theology at the University of Paris, provided an alternative subject for debate over papal authority in France. Indeed, the French Jesuits were remarkably successful in avoiding these bitter disputes, with the relative peace only broken by an occasional reference to the writings of individual foreign Jesuits and a short controversy in the spring of 1613 over a text by Martin Becan, a Jesuit Father from Brabant. By the opening of 1614 the Society of Jesus had enjoyed two years on the margins of the dispute over papal authority and royal sovereignty which was still an important issue in France. However, as will be shown in this chapter, 1614 brought renewed political disorder in the kingdom through the open rebellion of important French nobles, most notably the prince de Condé and the duc de Vendôme, Henry IV’s illegitimate son. These conflicts were to ultimately lead to the convocation of an Estates General, which opened in October 1614, and a renewal of public concern to protect royal sovereignty and authority.

According to Pierre Blet, the most influential historian of the Jesuits in relation to the Estates General of 1614, this period of disorder also coincided with a concerted campaign by opponents of the Jesuits to expel the Society from France. Blet argues that the condemnation of a text by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez in June 1614 marked the opening of a renewed campaign by the Society’s opponents which seriously

4 M. Becan, *Controversia Anglicana de potestate regis e pontificis, contra Lancelottum Andream* (Mainz, 1612). Becan was perhaps more extreme in his theory of papal sovereignty than Mariana or Bellarmine but his tract did not provoke a full condemnation in the Paris Parlement as the Pope censured the work before action was taken in France. For a more detailed discussion of the reception of Becan’s tract in France see Fouqueray, *Histoire*, iii, 301–305. See also F.T. Perrens, *L’église et l’état en France sous le règne de Henri IV et la regence de Marie de Medicis* (Paris, 1873), ii, 209–215.
threatened to expel the Order from the kingdom for its support of papal authority in
temporal affairs and its promotion of tyrannicide theory. Moreover, Blet argues that the
first article of the Third Estate at the Estates General was a second indirect effort to expel
the Society: ‘Eût-il été en effet sanctionné par un Édit royal, l’article du Tiers était à
provoquer les plus graves difficultés avec Rome et à occasionner dans un délai plus ou
moins court, une nouvelle expulsion des jésuites de tout le Royaume.’ ⁷

This chapter re-considers both the condemnation of the Suarez text and the
Estates General of 1614 to draw a different set of conclusions. It argues that these two
events actually reaffirmed the accommodation with the royal legal and administrative
framework which underpinned the Society’s presence in France during the regency. The
first section re-examines the condemnation of Suarez’s text, concluding that the event
reinforced the Society’s accommodation with the Paris Parlement over foreign Jesuit
texts on papal authority and tyrannicide which had been established in 1610 through the
banning of Mariana’s tract. The second section re-considers the role of the Society in the
first article controversy, the printed polemic, and the cahiers of the Estates General, in
order to argue that the Society’s position in the royal regulatory framework was
reaffirmed, not undermined, at the Estates.

I. The condemnation of the Suarez text in June 1614

Despite Jesuit success at avoiding contentious controversies within the French church
after 1612, many in Paris continued to mistrust the Society. As political disorder
increased in the spring and summer of 1614, the avocat général du roi Louis Servin drew
the Jesuits into the political crisis when, in June 1614, he brought before the Parlement

⁷ Blet, ‘L’article’, p. 82.
for condemnation the *Defensio fidei*, written by the Spanish Jesuit Father Suarez who held the theology chair at the University of Coimbra in Portugal. The condemnation of Suarez’s work, like those of Mariana and Bellarmine in 1610, threatened to draw the Society of Jesus back into debates over papal authority and tyrannicide theory.

But how dangerous was the Suarez condemnation to the Society’s position in France? To be sure, Louis Servin and the *servini*, as Ubaldini described the avocat général’s supporters, did attempt to introduce restrictions on the Society’s activities in France to the condemnation of Suarez’s work. Moreover, because Servin’s arguments were the most fully recorded, scholars have placed great emphasis on his views. Yet by stressing Servin’s case historians have ignored the fact that Servin’s demands were not echoed in the official actions of the Parlement. This section will argue that the Suarez affair must be viewed in the light of the accommodation between the French Jesuits and the Parlement over the issue of foreign Jesuit publications on papal authority and tyrannicide: an accommodation which had been defined earlier in the regency through the condemnation of Mariana’s tract (1610), Aquaviva’s decree prohibiting any Jesuit to publish on the issue of tyrannicide (1610), and the French Jesuit oath on tyrannicide (1612). Indeed, it will conclude that the Suarez affair reaffirmed this accommodation rather than threatened the Society’s presence in France.

---

8 AFCJ Recueil Rybeyrete, no. 16: Elogius P. Fr. Suarez. See also F. Suarez, *Defensio fidei catholicae et apostolicae adversus anglicanae sectae errores, cum responsione ad apologiam pro juramento fidelitatis* (Coimbra, 1613). See also AN X1a 1864, fo. 133: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 26 June 1614. Both Coton and Ubaldini viewed Servin as a committed enemy of the Society. For Coton’s comment on Servin see AFCJ Prat 33, p. 59: Coton to Richeome, July 1610. For Ubaldini’s view of Servin see AV Francia 54, fo. 140: Ubaldini to Borghese, 26 November 1610.


10 Servin’s views are recorded in AN X1a 1864, fos 133–138v+: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 26 June 1614. They are also recorded in AV Francia 56, fos 83–84: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614.
On 26 June 1614, the avocat général du roi Servin, the procureur général and an avocat du roi brought before the Parlement a request to condemn Suarez's work. The Papal Nuncio Ubaldini reported that, despite the Chancellor’s attempts to control Servin, the avocat général had pushed for the work to be condemned in such a manner as to link the text to the Jesuits. Thus, Servin requested that it be burnt ‘dinanzi alle tre porte delle tre case, che ha la Compagnia in q’sta cità alla presenza di due di questi Padri’ and that Jesuit representatives be brought before the Parlement and questioned on their doctrine.

Further, according to Ubaldini, when the work was given to a deputation of conseillers for consideration, Servin came up with a more detailed plot so that ‘cessassero una volta i Padri di essa di scrivere, insegnare, e tenere simile doctrine.’

Servin’s dislike of the Jesuits was well known; but his call to punish the Society in France for the writings of Suarez is puzzling. After all, in the Bellarmine controversy of December 1610 Servin had carefully avoided any reference to the Society in his plaidoyer. The surviving source material does not reveal the motivation behind Servin’s decision to use the Suarez tract to attack the Society of Jesus, but it seems likely that the avocat général expected support in the Parlement during the summer of 1614. It is possible that Servin believed that, as the Society had promised on several occasions to prohibit such texts, their continued failure to stop such publications would motivate many in the Parlement to support a strong anti-Jesuit line of argument. Moreover, Servin could have been persuaded that the disorder of the noble rebellion, together with rumours

---

11 A reference to the letter sent by Aquaviva to every Father Provincial in 1610 is made in AN X1a 1864, fo. 233: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 27 June 1614.
12 Remonstrance et plainte dès gens du Roy à la Covr de Parlement, & Conclusions par eux prises le 20. de luin 1614 (Rouen, 1614).
13 AV Francia 56, fo. 83: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614. See also AN X1a 1864, fo. 138–138v°. Registers of the Paris Parlement, 26 June 1614.
14 AV Francia 56, fo. 84: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614.
of Spanish intervention on the side of the nobles, would rally support for a pre-emptive effort to limit the Society’s influence in the kingdom. Whatever Servin’s motivation, he did receive some support in the Parlement. According to Ubaldini a number of members of the Chambres des Enquetes proposed that the Jesuits be prohibited from hearing confessions and that one Jesuit be required to answer for Suarez on the charges against the text. Thus at the end of June 1614 calls for the exemplary punishment of the Society once again appeared to be spreading amongst the magistrates in Paris.

But the Parlement as a whole did not respond to Servin’s robust request for punishment. Indeed, the attempt by Servin’s supporters in the Chambres des Enquetes to bring their demands for punishment of the Society before the Grand’ Chambre was blocked. It is clear from the registers of the Parlement that the Society received a degree of protection from magistrates in the court’s decision. While Servin demanded the burning of the work in front of the three Jesuit houses in Paris as a symbolic link between the tract and the Order, the Parlement acted on the advice of the other gens du roi who asked only for suppression of the work: ‘senza scandolo ò pericolo alcuno dell’espulsione dei Padri.’ The Parlement decided, as with the Mariana and Bellarmine texts, to ban the work and to burn the copies in their possession; but it did not carry out Servin’s demand that the burning be used to publicly link the text to the Society. Instead, it was ordered that the text was ‘estre bruslé en la Cour du Palais.’ Moreover, the Parlement avoided emphasizing French Jesuit culpability when it ordered that ‘des Prestres & Escholiers du College de Clermont, & des quatre Mendians’ must not teach anything about the topic.

---

15 See pp. 192–196.
16 AV Francia 56, fo. 84v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614.
17 AV Francia 56, fo. 83v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614.
18 AN X1a 1864, fo. 227v°: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 27 June 1614.
19 AN X1a 1864, fo. 228: idem.. It is important to note that the College of Clermont remained
These actions hardly reflected Servin's demand that the Society be singled out for punishment; rather, they pointedly provided a more general admonition to the teaching orders of France who had traditionally been difficult to regulate.

The Parlement was not inclined to take up Servin's demands. However, it was concerned that the Society, despite its previous undertakings, had not only failed to prevent this publication but that the text had also seemingly been published with the approval of the Jesuit Order. On the same day as the judgement was handed down, the Parlement called before the court a delegation of French Jesuits, made up of Fathers Armand, Du Duc and Sirmond, in order to demand from them that the Society take action against Suarez's text. The central concern of the Parlement's complaint was that the Society had made declarations against the theories in Suarez's work before, and that in 1610 their Father General had even issued a decree which appeared to prohibit any member of their Society from writing, debating, teaching or supporting such maxims and propositions. Yet, despite all this, the Suarez text had not only been published but it had been 'fait & imprimé par permission du provincial en Espagne ....' When the Jesuits responded by denying that the Society had approved the text, the Parlement then formally criticised the Society's negligence. It stressed that the Society had failed to carry out its agreement to police its members and prohibit any further publications on this topic. Through this criticism the Parlement emphasised that it judged the Society's actions in light of Aquaviva's letter written shortly after the Mariana condemnation which prohibited any member of the Society to produce similar publications in the future. Finally, the Parlement demanded that the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva 'renouvelle son

officially closed during this period and had no official legal recognition in Paris as a teaching institution although it was allowed to board students in its buildings.
decret, l'envoier & faire publier en leurs colleges, tant de ceste ville qu'ailleurs, & soit observé en telle sorte qu'ils ne tiennent, ecrivent, disputent ou enseignent nulle par equivocues, ou autrement telles maximes & propositions. Yet, even in this strong reprimand, the Parlement avoided direct accusations against the Jesuits. Instead, it took this opportunity to re-emphasise its jurisdiction over publications and international groups which expressed such ideas. The Suarez condemnation was viewed not only as an opportunity to criticise Jesuit negligence but also as a chance to make a general statement to all the teaching orders as is shown in the demand that 'aucuns Augustins & Jacobins les [Suarez's theories] ont tenues, on les a condamnees.' The Jesuits were punished with a reprimand and demands for closer regulation of their future conduct: an outcome which did not reflect Servin's strong anti-Jesuit line.

The initial Jesuit response to the Parlement was also revealing. Ignace Armand spoke for the Society 'disant que pour empecher tels ecrits il avoit faict un voiage a Rome vers leur General, & un autre en Flandres, qu'ils continueroient a faire mieux a l'advenir, en sorte que la Cour n'auroit aucun mescontentement d'eux.' Unlike Ubaldini and the Pope, the French Jesuits were willing to accept the culpability of Suarez. Furthermore, the French Jesuits and the Father General promised to do everything possible to enforce their previous prohibition of any discussion by the Society's members of the Pope's temporal authority or tyrannicide theory. The Parlement accepted the Jesuits' good intentions. It ordered that the Father General's decree be reissued within six months; that the Jesuits not allow any more works to be

20 AN X1a 1864, fo. 233; idem.
21 AN X1a 1864, fo. 233–233v°; idem.
22 AN X1a 1864, fo. 233v°; idem.
23 AN X1a 1864, fo. 233v°; idem.
published; and that they not exhort the people to a contrary doctrine. The only hint of punishment occurred at the end of the arrêt condemning Suarez's text when the Parlement ordered that the Jesuits must meet the court's demands: 'Autrement la Cour procedera contre les contreuenans comme criminels de leze-Maisté, & perturbateurs du repos public.' Thus, the judges in the Parlement accepted, as they had in the Mariana condemnation, that as long as the Society submitted itself to their jurisdiction then the writings of a single theorist would not be interpreted as representing the beliefs of the French Jesuits.

In the weeks following the Suarez condemnation the Jesuit hierarchy acted to comply with the Paris Parlement's demands. On 29 June 1614, a letter from the Jesuit Father Armand to all the Father Provincials in Italy and Spain spelt out in clear terms the difficulties that theoretical tracts on papal authority and tyrannicide theory posed for the French Jesuits. Armand explained to his fellow provincials that their opponents used the condemnations of these tracts to argue that the French Fathers' teaching was a threat to France. Moreover, he noted that their opponents also contrasted the Father General's decrees prohibiting further publications with the condemned texts to the detriment of the Society's reputation. Finally, he emphasised that when these crises entered the public debate their opponents made threats to prohibit the Society from carrying out its mission or to expel the Society from France. Armand's letter was supported by a letter to all Jesuit Father Provincials from Aquaviva dated 1 August 1614. The Father General's letter was issued in accordance with the Parlement's demand in the Suarez condemnation and it reiterated that the Society of Jesus opposed the taking of a monarch's life under

---

24 Mercure français, iii, 307.
25 AFCJ Prat 61, pp. 691–698: Armand to the Father Provincials of Spain and Italy, 29 June 1614.
The extent to which the Jesuits in France were conducting a policy which separated the Society from the current debate over papal authority was reflected in the Papal Nuncio Ubaldini’s correspondence during the initial controversy in the Parlement. Ubaldini noted that, while the Jesuits in France showed great discretion during the controversy, some were too timid in their defence of papal authority. According to Ubaldini the Paris Jesuits had even spread a rumour that Suarez had published his tract on papal orders. Thus, even though Ubaldini was determined to defend the Jesuits in order to protect papal interests, it was impossible for him to ignore the fact that some in the Society were willing to distance themselves from issues vital to the Pope. The controversy over Suarez’s text, like the oath of 1612, emphasised the different purposes of the Jesuits in France and the Papal Nuncio Ubaldini. The principal cause of the tension between Ubaldini and the Jesuits was the Society’s unwillingness to compromise its position in France in order to defend papal authority.

Moreover, the separate priorities of the French Jesuits was also emphasised in the months following the controversy. The papacy, like Ubaldini, found the condemnation of Suarez’s text unpalatable. As a result, correspondence between the regent and Pope was dominated by this issue for the next six months until the regent offered a satisfactory suppression of the condemnation in mid-December 1614. For the Pope this matter was

26 AFCJ Prat 33, pp. 211–212: Aquaviva’s circular letter, 1 August 1614; BN MS. Fr. 18009, fo. 247–247v°: Tresnel to Puisieux, 16 August 1614.
27 AV Francia 56, fo. 85–85v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614.
28 AV Francia 56, fo. 85v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 3 July 1614. See also Memoires et advis pour rendre les jesuites utiles en France (n.pl., 1614), p. 35.
29 For the importance of the Suarez condemnation in the correspondence between France and Rome see BN MS. Fr. 18009, fos 247–326: Collected diplomatic correspondence with Rome, 16 August–23 November 1614; AV Francia 56, fos 92–129v°: Collected correspondence of Ubaldini to Borghese, July–November 1614. For the Regent’s suppression of the case see BN MS. Fr. 18009, fo. 322: Danozet
of the utmost importance and Ubaldini conducted a determined campaign at court throughout the autumn designed to pressure the regent into suppressing the Parlement’s arrêt.\(^{30}\) The nuncio summarised the reasons for the Pope’s concern in a letter to Villeroy dated 26 August 1614:

\[
\text{Havrà V.S. Ill.ma inteso per l’ultime lettere del Sre Marchese de Trenello [the French Ambassador in Rome] il grave dispiacere e sentimento che ha havuto la S.ta di N. S.re dell’arresto di questo Parlamento contro il libro del P. Suarez. Il quale m’assicuro ch’Ella havrà trovato tanto più giusto e ragionevole quanto è certissimo che il giudicare della dottrina di fede e di costumi è materia purè ecclesiastica, e propria della Santa Sede Apostolica e dei vescovi, e che resta gravemente lesa e conculcata la dignità e authorità quando i secolari n’usurpano la cognitione e censura.}^{31}\]

For the Pope and the papal nuncio the condemnation represented an attack on papal authority which required a strong defence. The English Ambassador Edmondes certainly received the impression that the Pope attached great importance to this issue.\(^{32}\) However, there is no hint in Edmondes’s report that the Jesuits in Paris shared the Pope’s concern; and it is interesting to note that despite Ubaldini’s constant search for allies to help reverse the Suarez arrêt, he at no point mentions the Jesuits as supporting his efforts either. Unlike Ubaldini, the Society of Jesus publicly accepted the culpability of Suarez, as the Parlement required. The Jesuit reaction to the controversy indicates that the Society’s first priority was to maintain its position in France.

**II. The Estates General of 1614 and the Society of Jesus**

During the same month that the Suarez case was brought before the Parlement, Marie de

---

\(^{30}\) BN MS. Fr. 18009, fos 251–253, 274v\(^{°}\), 279, 285v\(^{°}\): Tresnel to Puisieux, 5 August 1614, 3 September 1614, 14 September 1614, 27 September 1614. See also AV Francia 56, fos 103–104v\(^{°}\): Ubaldini to Villeroy, 26 August 1614.

\(^{31}\) AV Francia 56, fo. 103–103v\(^{°}\): Ubaldini to Villeroy, 26 August 1614.

\(^{32}\) PRO SP France 78/62, fo. 224v\(^{°}\): Edmondes to Winwood, 1 December 1614.
Medicis convoked an Estates General in response to a serious political crisis which threatened the survival of her government. In the first half of 1614 the deteriorating relationship between important nobles and the regency descended into open rebellion over long-standing grievances concerning the regent’s leadership and the narrowness of her influential inner circle. Peace was only re-established through an agreement on 15 May 1614 in which the rebel nobles agreed to cease hostilities and lay down their arms in return for a number of assurances, chief among which was the promise to convene an Estates General at Sens on 25 August 1614. Though the regency government had been forced into calling an Estates, it worked to turn this concession to its advantage. Between 7 and 10 June 1614 the regency government sent letters to local officials across France ordering them to commence the selection of delegates and the drafting of *cahiers* for the meeting. But, while the regent was careful to maintain all the traditional forms, she also intervened to ensure that supporters of the regency were elected. Moreover, Marie changed the venue of the Estates to Paris where it could be more closely controlled. Finally, the regent delayed the opening of the meeting until mid-October to allow the king to be declared of age, thereby providing the government with more authority, since actions could now be taken in the name of the king. Nevertheless, despite the government’s attempts to control the meeting, the Estates General had traditionally met to address fundamental issues in the kingdom and thus the potential for unrest remained.

For the Society of Jesus the prospect of an Estates General was unwelcome.

---

Despite the loss of their patron Henry IV, the Jesuits’ long campaign to distance themselves from arguments over papal authority and tyrannicide theory had met with a certain degree of success between 1610 and the summer of 1614. However, the crisis which threatened the regent’s control of government also weakened the royal authority which was the basis of the Society’s presence in France. Moreover, the Estates General would provide a forum for airing precisely those issues of sovereignty and authority that had threatened the Society’s position in France in 1594. The Jesuits feared that they might once again find themselves in the centre of French political and religious debate. The Father General expressed his concerns in a series of letters to Jesuit allies in the French ecclesiastical and political elite.\(^{37}\) In these, Aquaviva once again sought protection for the Society through the royal authority which had defined its position in France since 1603. In response, Villeroy, one of the Society’s most important allies in the royal government, reasserted his support for the Society and expressed his confidence that the Jesuits would not become embroiled in the controversies at the Estates: a view which one would expect from a member of the royal council who needed to appear in control of the situation.\(^{38}\) Nevertheless, it is remarkable, as will become apparent in the remainder of the chapter, that Villeroy’s confidence in the Society’s security would prove to be well founded.

This section will consider three aspects of the Estates General in order to establish the effect of the meeting on the Society’s presence and activities in France. First, it will look at the vehement debate over papal authority surrounding the first article of the Third Estate. Second, the study will broaden its considerations to examine the

pamphlet literature, a medium which in the past had been used by anti-Jesuit polemicists to articulate their opposition to the Jesuits. Finally, it will assess those cahier articles which directly address the Society.

(a) The first article of the Third Estate and the Society of Jesus

In mid-December 1614, the Third Estate commenced the drafting of a general cahier for presentation to the king. The delegates voted to use the Île-de-France provincial cahier as a model for the general cahier and on 15 December the first article of its opening section, concerned with the fundamental laws of the kingdom, was read before the Third Estate:

Que pour arrêter le cours de la pernicieuse doctrine qui s’introduit depuis quelques années contre les rois & puissances souveraines, établies de Dieu, par des esprits séditieux, qui ne tendent qu’à les troubler & subvertir, le roi sera supplié de faire arrêter en l’assemblée de ses Etats, pour loi fondamentale du royaume, qui soit inviolable & notoire à tous, que comme il est reconnu souverain en son état, ne tenant sa couronne que de Dieu seul, il n’y a puissance en terre, quelle qu’elle soit, spirituelle ou temporelle, qui ait aucun droit sur son royaume, pour en priver les personnes sacrées de nos rois, ni dispenser ou absoudre leurs sujets de la fidélité & obéissance qu’ils lui doivent, pour quelque cause ou prétexte que ce soit. Que tous les sujets, de quelque qualité & condition qu’ils soient, tiendront cette loi pour sainte & véritable, comme conforme à la parole de Dieu, sans distinction équivoque, ou limitation quelconque; laquelle sera jurée & signée par tous les députés des Etats, & dorénavant par tous les bénéficiers & officiers du royaume, avant que d’entrer en possession de leurs bénéfices, & d’être reçus en leurs offices, tous précepteurs, régens, docteurs & prédicateurs tenus de l’enseigner & publier. Que l’opinion contraire, même qu’il soit loisible de tuer ou déposer nos rois, s’élever & rebeller contre eux, secouer le joug de leur obéissance, pour quelqu’occassion que ce soit, est impie, détectable, contre vérité & contre l’establissement de l’état de la France, qui ne dépend immédiatement que de Dieu. Que tous livres qui enseignent telle fausse & perverse opinion, seront tenus pour séditieux & damnables; tous étrangers qui l’écriront & publieront, pour ennemis jurés de la couronne; tous sujets

38 BI Godefroy 15, fo. 272: Villeroy to Aquaviva, 12 September 1614.
de Sa Majeste qui y adhéreront, de quelque qualité & condition qu’ils soient, pour rebelles, infracteurs des loix fondamentales du royaume, & criminels de leze-majesté au premier chef. Et s’il se trouve aucun livre ou discours écrit par quelqu’étranger, ecclésiastique ou d’autre qualité, qu’il contienne proposition contraire à ladite loi, directement ou indirectement, seront les ecclésiastiques de même ordre établis en France, obligés d’y répondre, les impugner & contredire incessamment, sans respect, ambiguïté ni équivoque, sur peine d’être punis de même peine que dessus, comme fauteurs des ennemis de cest état. 39

This article, one of the most important statements of absolute royal sovereignty in the opening decades of the seventeenth century, was essentially a legal document which provided a clear definition of the French monarch’s authority in his kingdom, a means by which the statement was to be affirmed by public officials, and a series of enforcement clauses which labelled any contravention of the statement in word or action as treason. This statement was reflected in similar articles in other Third Estate provincial cahiers and represented a deep rooted concern for royal sovereignty amongst the middle level of provincial magistrates who dominated the Third Estate. 40

While the first article met with little opposition in the Third Estate, it was a contentious issue which dominated proceedings of the whole Estates General for several weeks in late December 1614 and early January 1615. 41 The dispute pitted members of the First Estate, who defended the Pope’s authority in extraordinary instances to sanction the removal of a monarch, against members of the Third Estate, who wanted to limit papal authority in temporal affairs by denying the Pope’s ability to sanction the removal


40 Middle level magistrates dominated proceedings both through the number of delegates drawn from this group and through their influence over the proceedings. For a detailed consideration of the social backgrounds of the delegates to the Third Estate see Hayden, France and the Estates, pp. 80–86, 96–97, 266-283.

41 For the importance of the first article see V. Martin, Le Gallicanisme politique et le clergé de France (Paris, 1929). For the importance of the article in the Estates General see PRO SP France 78/62, fos 247–279 and PRO SP France 78/63, fos 8–44: Dispatches from Edmondes to England, 30
of a French monarch under any circumstances. With great difficulty this article was finally removed from public debate through a compromise whereby the king accepted the first article for consideration but prohibited the Third Estate from including it in its general cahier.

While the article’s implications for papal authority were recognised by both contemporary commentators and later historians, some modern scholars have argued that the article was designed to facilitate the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from France.42 Pierre Blet, the most influential advocate of this interpretation, argues that the purpose of the article ‘étais toujours de réduire à l’impuissance, et si possible d’expulser du royaume, les jésuites français.’43 Blet addresses the fact that the article makes no explicit reference to the Jesuits by asserting that the Society’s enemies were careful to disguise their true purpose: ‘Ils résolurent d’envelopper la Compagnie de Jésus dans une mesure générale et présentée sous une forme capable de rallier les esprits non avertis. Et ce fut le premier article du Tiers État.’44 Thus, Blet’s hypothesis is of a secret cabal whose members constructed an article with a public purpose of protecting the king and a private purpose of advancing their campaign against the Jesuits. Given that no direct evidence survives to substantiate the existence of such a well-organized group of Jesuit opponents, let alone to throw light on the motivations behind those who drafted the article, it is naturally impossible to conclusively disprove Blet’s hypothesis. However, a close re-examination of the two passages in the first article that in Blet’s argument are central to his cabal’s plans, along with a consideration of contemporary reaction to the article,
produces evidence which casts serious doubts on his theory. Moreover, in the process of this enquiry a more plausible account will emerge: that the first article reflected a continuance of the policy toward papal authority and the publication of foreign texts in support of papal authority which had been established by the Paris Parlement in the Mariana (1610), Bellarmine (1610), University (1611) and Suarez (1614) cases. Blet’s hypothesis requires that a group of Jesuit opponents were intent upon undermining the Society’s position in France through the debate over papal authority and that they used the text of the first article as a cover for a surreptitious attack on the Society. This section will argue that the need to protect French royal authority as expressed in the first article was wholly compatible with the relationship between the French Jesuits and the Parlement which had developed over the previous five years and, therefore, that there is no need to speculate on secret cabals and hidden sub-texts to explain the article.

The first passage, which Blet cites as central to the purpose of the Society’s enemies, concerns the oath required from all individuals who held royal, ecclesiastical or teaching positions in France: ‘laquelle sera jurée & signée par tous les députés des Etats, & dorénavant par tous les bénéficiers & officiers du royaume, avant que d’entrer en possession de leurs bénéfices, & d’être reçus en leurs offices, tous précepteurs, régens, docteurs & prédicateurs tenus de l’enseigner & publier.’ 45 Blet argues that this clause was drafted to challenge the Society with an oath on royal sovereignty which was contrary to Jesuit constitutions and beliefs. 46 However, there was little in the statement on royal sovereignty contained in the first article oath which the Society would have found objectionable:

44 Blet, ‘L’article’, p. 91.
que comme il est reconnu souverain en son état, ne tenant sa couronne que de Dieu seul, il n’y a puissance en terre, quelle qu’elle soit, spirituelle ou temporelle, qui ait aucun droit sur son royaume, pour en priver les personnes sacrées de nos rois, ni dispenser ou absoudre leurs sujets de la fidélité & obéissance qu’ils lui doivent, pour quelque cause ou prétexte que ce soit.  

After all, article four of the Edict of Rouen had stipulated that the Jesuits, alone of all the religious orders in France, must swear an oath upon entering a French house ‘ne rien faire ny entreprendre contre nostre servuice la Paix publicque et repos de nostre Royaume.’  

Moreover, the French Jesuits had also taken a written oath before the Parlement in February of 1612, which required them to obey the teachings of the Sorbonne on the issue of tyrannicide: essentially the same requirement as in the first article oath. If the authors of the article were interested in making the oath peculiarly unacceptable to the Society of Jesus, they did not add a stipulation, such as a prohibition of oaths offering absolute obedience to a pope or foreign ruler, which would have distinguished this oath from the one taken by the Jesuits in 1612. Thus, while many individuals in France might have wanted the Jesuits to take a more specific oath on the king’s sovereignty than the one they offered in 1612, there was little reason to presume that the requirement of such an oath would force the Society to abandon France.

Further, the very general requirement that ‘précepteurs, régens, docteurs & prédicateurs tenus de l’enseigner & publier’ be required to take the oath may have been, as Blet argues, an attempt to hide the fact that the article’s true concern was to undermine the Society’s position in France. However, a more compelling interpretation for this passage can be found simply by looking at the wording of the text, which asserted that the delegates were concerned with all preachers and teachers in general. The Jesuits may

---

have been the most prolific and controversial writers of tracts on papal authority but they were not the only religious order to generate concern amongst French magistrates in the years following Henry IV's assassination. For instance, the Dominicans, through the writings of their French Father Coëffetau and their public disputation on papal authority in Paris in the summer of 1611, were another religious order which had been criticised for holding similar views. Indeed, in one sense the Dominican assertions were more difficult to accept as they were made by French Fathers and in Paris. The more general nature of this concern had also been highlighted in the summer of 1614 when the Parlement had felt it necessary in its arrêt against Suarez's tract to order that the four mendicant orders be prohibited from teaching the condemned doctrines in the text.

Thus, it is perfectly plausible that the article was drafted to accomplish the task that its wording asserts: namely to require individuals in positions of influence both as teachers and writers in France to publicly accept a clear statement of royal sovereignty.

Moreover, this passage can usefully be placed in a wider western European context at the opening of the seventeenth century, where oaths were used to establish the loyalty of religious groups that were perceived as potential threats to the state. There is evidence that French jurisprudence had been influenced by this development. For instance, the oaths required of royal officials responsible for implementing peace edicts

---

48 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100: Copy of the Edict of Rouen, 1603.
50 AN X1a 1864, fo. 228: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 27 June 1614.
51 For Venice see W.J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberties (Berkley, 1968). For England see M.C. Questier, 'Loyalty, Religion and State Power in Early Modern England:
during the religious wars would have been taken by many of the middle level office holders who dominated the Third Estate. Many of these magistrates would also have been familiar with the administration of the oath required by each member of the Society upon entry into a French Jesuit house since 1603. Moreover, the passage concerned with teachers and preachers in the first article echoes the solution to lingering questions of Jesuit loyalty devised by the Parlement in December 1611 when the Society of Jesus had been asked to take an oath to establish their acceptance of a very similar set of propositions: an oath which the French Jesuits had taken, albeit in a less precise form, in February 1612. Thus, it is not surprising that the authors of the first article included a general oath as a means to establish both acceptance for the fundamental law by public officials, and publicity for the new law in France. When considered from this perspective, the inclusion of an oath in the first article requires no recourse to the hypothesis of a secret plot against the Society of Jesus. On the contrary, the oath included in the first article was by its nature a public act, modelled on other recent public acts, designed to reaffirm public authority.

A second crucial clause, on publications produced by foreign members of religious orders, is also cited by Blet as evidence that the first article was designed to undermine the Society’s position in the kingdom: ‘s’il se trouve aucun livre ou discours écrit par quelqu’étranger, ecclésiastique ou d’autre qualité, qu’il contienne proposition contraire à ladite loi, directement ou indirectement, seront les ecclésiastiques de même ordre établis en France, obligés d’y répondre.’ In a slightly earlier draft the clause was more precisely stated: ‘Si l’auteur est étranger ecclésiastique regulier, seront les

---


52 For more on this controversy see pp. 213–214.
ecclésiastiques du même ordre établi dans le royaume obligés d’y répondre. Blet is right to note that both of these versions of the passage almost certainly echo the concerns of Paris magistrates for the regulation of foreign Jesuit publications over the previous five years. However, there is no reason to speculate that this clause was designed to undermine the Society of Jesus’s position in France. The wording of these two drafts imply no necessary or culpable linkage between a religious order in France and the writings of one of their foreign brethren; instead they seem to assert French jurisdiction over the publication of texts, and the requirement that French members of a religious order disown the writings of their colleagues abroad. In other words, the requirement of the first article simply reflected the actions of the Parlement during the Suarez condemnation, which was nearly contemporaneous with the drafting of the article in the summer and early autumn of 1614. During the Suarez condemnation the representatives of the Society were forced to appear before the Parlement, take responsibility for the text, and disown it. Thus, the terms of the clause are entirely explicable as part of an emerging legal and administrative framework used to regulate the Jesuits.

Indeed, a third previously unconsidered draft of the article provides further evidence that the inspiration for this passage was the specific understanding between the Paris Parlement and the Society of Jesus. In this draft the passage is phrased: ‘Et encores sont & demeurent obliges tous ordres de religieux en France de refuter et par escript et de parolle les liures contenant la doctrine contraire faictz ou a faire par ceux de leur ordre

54 BN Dupuy 91, fo. 136: Draft of the first article of the Third Estate. Pierre Blet first pointed out the significant difference between these drafts and it is from his work that I draw the quote: Blet, ‘L’article’, p. 94. While one cannot be certain why the awkward phrase ‘ou d’autre qualité’ was added to the definitive version, it may have been in response to new religious groups, like the Oratoire, which failed to fit into the legal vocabulary.
estans dedans ou dehors le Royaume.' The crucial phrase 'encores sont & demeurent obliges' implies that the requirement of French religious orders to take responsibility for the writings of their foreign brethren had already been established in French law. The earlier version of the article thus provides evidence that those drafting the original article wished to develop procedures already established between the Society of Jesus and the Paris Parlement: not create a new requirement that could be used to surreptitiously undermine the Society's position in France. The passage concerned with the taking of an oath and the passage relating to publications by foreign members of religious orders offer little evidence of a plot to undermine the Society in France. However, these passages do provide evidence that those who drafted the article used practices accepted by the Paris Parlement and the French Jesuits as a model for the enforcement of the fundamental law articulated in the first article.

Further evidence that the first article reflected the established relationship between the Paris Parlement and the Society of Jesus rather than a new attempt to lay the groundwork for their expulsion can be found in the response of delegates to the Estates, none of whom viewed the first article as a threat to the Society. The Third Estate was

55 PRO SP France 78/62, fo. 220v°: Draft of the first article of the Third Estate sent in a dispatch from Edmondes to Winwood, 8 November 1614.
56 These and the following observations are drawn from a consideration of the following material: PRO SP France 78/62, fos 247–279 and PRO SP France 78/63, fos 8–44: Dispatches from Edmondes to England, 30 December 1614–30 January 1615; AV Francia 56, fos 140v°–143: Ubaldini to Borghese, 18 December 1614; AV Francia 56, fos 152–157: Ubaldini to Borghese, 17 January 1615; Rapine, 'Assemblée', xvi, 285–221 [sic]; Behety and Bretville, 'Procès-verbal contenant les propositions, délibérations et résolutions prises et reçus en la Chambre Ecclésiastique des États Généraux du royaume de France ...', in Lalouré (ed.), Recueil de pièces originales et authentiques, concernant la tenue des États-Généraux (Paris, 1789), vi, 261–356; Lieutenant-Général D'Evreux, 'Recueil ou journal de ce qui s'est negocié et arrette en la chambre du tiers estat en l'assemblee generale des estats tenus a Paris les années 1614 et 1615', Recueil des travaux de la société libre d'agriculture sciences, artes et belles-lettres de l'Eure, 8 (1892), 594–623; Montcassin, 'Recueil de ce qui s'est passé et observé durant la tenue des États généraux, à Paris, convoqués par le commandement
largely composed of provincial royal office holders from across the kingdom, many of whom arrived at the Estates with draft proposals which were similar in purpose to the first article.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, despite the fact that many representatives came from regions of France where the Jesuits enjoyed strong support and that many delegates had given serious consideration to the issue; no representative interpreted the \textit{arrêt} with reference to the Jesuits which further substantiates the view that the first article contained little which threatened the Society’s current position in France.\textsuperscript{58}

Moreover, the First Estate, which strongly opposed the first article and contained important allies of the Society, did not perceive the first article as a threat to the French Jesuits. For the clergy it was clear upon first hearing of the article that:

parmi des choses bonnes et justes, et sous l’apparence du soin et affection de la conservation de la personne et autorité du roi, qui doit être très-chère et précieuse à tous ses sujets, on mèle d’autres propositions curieuses et impertinentes, et lesquelles inventées et mises en avant par les ruses et industrie des hérétiques et leurs fauteurs, vont à introduire et susciter un schisme et division entre les catholiques, et à mettre sur la balance l’autorité du Saint-Siège et celle du roi ....\textsuperscript{59}

The First Estate’s response was well-defined and remained consistent during the debate. In its view, the Third Estate were interfering in issues which were within the church’s jurisdiction. Further, such a statement, if not suppressed, would cause schism as much ‘entre les catholiques de France, ou entre eux et le reste de la chrétienté.’\textsuperscript{60} It is


\textsuperscript{58} Rapine, ‘Assemblée’, xvi, 287–1 [sic 293].

\textsuperscript{59} Behety and Bretville, ‘Procès-verbal’, vi, 261–262.

\textsuperscript{60} Behety and Bretville, ‘Procès-verbal’, vi, 276.
remarkable that not once throughout the month of raging disputes did the clergy link this question to the Jesuits. Indeed, no mention of the Jesuits can be found in orations and comments by such notable churchmen as the Cardinal du Perron, the Cardinal de Joyeuse, and Archbishop Paul Hurault de l'Hospital of Aix. This fact is particularly remarkable with reference to the Cardinal du Perron, one of the most outspoken and politically astute members of the clergy. Du Perron was a strong supporter of the Jesuits whose views on the first article are documented in detail, but he gives no direct or indirect indication that the Jesuits were threatened by the article either in his oration before the Third Estate or in his discussions with the more sympathetic regent. Further, the orations and responses offered to the First Estate by members of the Third Estate, including Marmiesse, an important Third Estate spokesman, and Miron, the président of the Third Estate and delegate for the Ile-de-France, do not allude to the Jesuits. This heated and well-documented debate over the first article centred on the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authority in France: an issue which had focused on the Society of Jesus in 1594 but not in 1614.

Indeed, the only point during the lengthy controversy when the Jesuits were mentioned was on 2 January 1615 when the Parlement, under Servin's influence, delivered an arrêt which republished previous Parlement arrêts concerned with the temporal sovereignty of the French monarch. This arrêt included references to the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1594 along with the condemnations of Mariana, Bellarmine and Suarez's works. However, it also included the condemnation from 2 December 1561

---

61 AFCJ Prat 32, pp. 765–767: Coton to Du Perron, 12 July 1604. See also J. Du Perron, Les Ambassades et negotiations de l'Illustriissime & Reverendissime Cardinal du Perron (Paris, 1623), p. 707. For more references to Du Perron’s statements on this subject see Footnote 89 of this chapter.

62 AN X1a 1867, fos 114–115: Registers of the Paris Parlement, 2 January 1615.
against a bachelor at the University of Paris, Tanquerel, who had defended a proposition that popes could depose kings; Chastell’s death sentence from 1594, which had taken on an importance separate from the Society of Jesus when it was placed on the Roman Index; and a renewal of the decree against Jean Petit first issued in 1413. While texts by foreign Jesuit authors and the Society’s expulsion in 1594 were significant features of this arrêt, the ruling has to be placed in the context of its non-Jesuit components and the general debate which inspired it. The Jesuit arrêts were used as evidence for the Parlement’s claim to authority over the protection of laws which safeguarded the king; but the Society was not the focus of the issue.

Thus, both contemporary reaction to the article and a careful consideration of its wording indicate that the first article was an assertion of royal sovereignty in France rather than a veiled attack upon the Society of Jesus. Pierre Blet is right to note the close relationship between the controversies surrounding foreign Jesuit tracts in 1610 and 1614, the issues raised in the University case against the Jesuits in 1611, and the first article of the Third Estate. Indeed, Blet’s Jesuit training and scholarly interest in seventeenth-century church debates made him particularly sensitive to the similarities apparent between these controversies. However, Blet misinterpreted the issue which inspired these related concerns. The need to establish the fundamental law of the kingdom, not the expulsion of the Society, inspired the controversy. The first article was a statement by the Third Estate of what was required of individuals or corporate groups who wished to hold a position of responsibility or influence in the kingdom. It was a regulatory article which included a set of criteria and a series of punishments for non-compliance. It is true that if the Society, or any other corporation or individual, failed to comply with royal jurisdiction as defined in the article then they could be expelled
from the kingdom. It was also true that if the French Jesuits were willing to accept the sovereign jurisdiction of royal authority in France then they could be accommodated by the new law.

(b) Pamphlet literature, the Estates General cahiers and the Jesuits

The first-article controversy had threatened to raise issues which could have put at risk the Society’s position in France, but for the reasons discussed in the previous section the Jesuits were not drawn into such a dangerous situation. That is not to say that the Society was completely absent from debates at the Estates General, but that previous scholars have failed to emphasise the issues which did concern the Society. This section will look at the Jesuits in the wider debates of the Estates through two sets of evidence. First, it will consider the pamphlet literature surrounding the meeting: a medium which anti-Jesuit polemicists had previously used to attack the Society. Second, it will examine the cahiers of the three estates to identify the articles which directly implicated the Jesuits: an approach which should provide some indication of what concerned the delegates about the Society’s presence in France.

The marginal role of the Society in the printed polemic indicates that the Jesuits were not a significant feature of any contentious political conflict surrounding the Estates General of 1614. The pamphlet literature was vast in both the numbers of printed tracts and the topics covered in these texts. The royal government had virtually no control over the press, even in Paris, as was shown in its response to a complaint about a

publication against James I of England. According to Villeroy: ‘there was such a libertie
taken for the printing of thinges, even against the K. & Q. themselves, that they knew not
howe to prevent it; not withstanding anie diligence which they had to punish the same.’
Thus, the polemicists of the period were able to publish on whatever subjects were
central to the political debate, and consequently the pamphlet literature surrounding the
Estates provides an indication of the Society’s importance to the debate in 1614.

Little research on the Society of Jesus in the pamphlet literature during the
Estates General has been conducted beyond the level of impressionistic sampling. The
only study to devote any consideration to it is Denis Richet’s article ‘La polemique
politique en France de 1612 à 1615’, which examined a sample of forty-one texts from
the period. Richet based his interpretation of the Society’s role in the pamphlet debate
exclusively on one exchange of pamphlets written during the Estates General and
inspired by the widely disseminated tract Le Caton francois av Roy, by Jacques Gillot.
The Caton was written as a piece of advice, offered by an aged adviser in the Parlement
to the young king on how to conduct his monarchy. The Jesuits were not at the centre
of the author’s concerns. Indeed, at no point did the tract mention the Jesuits by name;
instead in one section it pleaded with the young monarch to hunt the killers of his father
from the kingdom. Further, in a related passage the author made reference to Italian
states [i.e., Venice] that secured their sovereignty by expelling such individuals [i.e., the

References

64 PRO SP France 78/63, fo. 30v: Edmondes to Winwood, 12 January 1615.
66 J. Gillot, Le Caton francois av Roy (n.pl., 1614); See also L’image de la France representee
a Messieurs des estats: Avec la Refutation d’un Libelle intitule LE CATON FRANCOIS, fait contre ceux
qui maintiennent la Religion & l’Estat (n.pl., 1615); See also Declaration de l’instint de la Compagnie
de Iesus. En laquelle sont contenues par deduction les responses aux principles objections faites iusques
a present contre les lesuites (Paris, 1615); See also Le Caton et Diogene Francois. Pour apologie contre
vn trait de l’image de la France, ou est represente la refutation du Caton François (n.pl., 1615).
Jesuits] from their territories. 67

L’image de la France, most likely written by a Jesuit, interpreted Le Caton’s veiled references as a direct attack upon the Society. The author of this tract provided a point-by-point refutation of the implied complicity of the Jesuits in the assassination of Henry IV. 68 This text emphasised the Society’s attempts to integrate into the French church and to distance themselves from theories of tyrannicide. 69 The response to this Jesuit tract made in the Caton et Diogene François attacked the claims of innocence by examining Jesuit theoretical texts and then linking the theories with the assassinations of both Henry III and Henry IV. The actions by the Society were contrasted with the loyal service of the University and the Parlement who protected their monarch regardless of the Pope’s wishes. 70 A final tract, Declaration de l’institut de la Compagnie de Iesvs, again almost certainly written by a Jesuit, was published shortly after the close of the Estates General. 71 This text was also inspired by the veiled attack on the Jesuits in Le Caton frangois. 72 However, instead of directly countering the Caton’s attacks, the text defended various aspects of the Jesuit constitutions. This rather predictable exchange was perhaps most notable for the reluctance of Jacques Gillot to mention the Jesuits by name in the Caton rather than Richet’s claim that: ‘Les Jesuites ... sont violemment pris à parti.’ 73

Despite the abundant pamphlet literature of the period, only two other Catholic tracts considered in this study of nearly one-hundred texts touched upon the Society to

67 Gillot, Caton, pp. 32–34.
69 L’image de la France, pp. 70–71, 74 [sic 83]–95.
70 Caton et Diogene, pp. 29–36 [sic 38].
71 The approbation of the Paris faculty of theology printed on the final page of the pamphlet is dated 15 March 1615.
72 Declaration de l’institut, p. 3.
make a substantive point. Both were printed cahiers from fictitious or unofficial sources each of which included a single article concerned with the Jesuits.\textsuperscript{74} First, in article thirty-five of its cahier, the \textit{Advis remonstrances et requestes aux Estats generaux tenus a Paris, 1614} rearticulated typical concerns about the Society operating within French law: ‘Que les Peres Jesuites ne hanteront point la Cour suivant leur institution fondamentalle, & ne se mesleront de l’Estat qu’à la façon des bons Peres Capussins sur peine de banissement perepetuel & n’iront plus en Garosse.’\textsuperscript{75} The second, an unofficial cahier produced by Richer and his allies and purporting to represent the University of Paris contained a lengthy article which, as expected, opposed Jesuit teaching in France.\textsuperscript{76} Aside from these two isolated examples, references to the Society were few and were never made for substantive reasons. For instance, in \textit{Le Pacifique pour la defense dv Parlement} the reference to the Jesuits was: ‘On le dit assez haut, Madame, mais ny pour cela: vous auez l’oeil fille, l’oreille Cottonnee & vostre cceur a l’Ancre. Et vous semble que rien ne peut rompre le cours de vos desseins tant que vous aurez la Plume, la Cire, le Coton & l’Ancre.’\textsuperscript{77} The useful dual meaning of Coton’s name, as much as the danger of the Order that he represented, probably explains his brief appearance in this tract.

\textsuperscript{73} Richet, ‘La polémique’, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{74} There were some Huguenot tracts which focused upon the Jesuits but their themes were far removed from Catholic debate. For instance see: \textit{L’assassinat dv roy ov maximes dv vieil de la Montagne Vaticane & de ses Assassins, pratiquées en la personne de defunct Henry le Grand} (n.pl., 1614).

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Advis remonstrances et requestes aux Estats generaux tenus a Paris, 1614. Par six paysans} (n.pl., n.d.), pp. 29–30.


\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Le Pacifique pour la defense dv Parlement} (n.pl., n.d), p. 1. A second tract that includes Coton in a similar context is \textit{Advertissement dv Sievr de Brvscambille svr le voyage d’Espagne} (n.pl., 1615), p. 18. Other examples of single mentions include \textit{Fovcade avx Estats} (n.pl., 1615), p. 7; and \textit{De l’authorité royale} (n.pl., 1615), p. 23.
The Jesuits were most commonly associated with the pamphlet debate through the works of Mariana, Bellarmine, Becan and Suarez; but the fact that these theorists were members of the Society was only rarely mentioned. The Society was no longer included as the central issue in any controversy. Thus, Richet’s decision to present the pamphlet exchange centred on Le Caton François as representative of the printed literature of the period is misleading. The Caton controversy was a distinctive and unrepresentative pamphlet exchange and was not typical of the period’s literature. A larger sampling reveals that the most striking feature of the pamphlet literature in 1614 and early 1615 was the Society’s absence from issues with which they had been closely associated since 1594.

One of the issues that the Society had been closely associated with in 1594, 1603 and 1610 was Spanish intrigue and foreign subversion, but in 1614–1615 the Society was completely absent from the polemic on these themes. For instance, a number of texts concentrated on the marriage contract of the king to a Spanish princess signed on 25 August 1612. Yet despite the vehement rhetoric opposed to Spanish influences, the Jesuits did not make an appearance either as the force behind or advisers to the marriage. The Jesuits were not mentioned even in such tracts as Responce à la lettre d’un gentil-homme, sur les pretextes de la guerre which argued that the Spanish marriages would bring with them the introduction of the Spanish church and Inquisition into France.

---

79 See the Appendix of this thesis for a listing of pamphlets examined for this section.
80 Cassandre francoise (n.pl, n.d); Responce à la lettre d’un gentil-homme, sur les pretextes de la guerre (Paris, 1615); Lettre du Roy à Monsieur le Prince de Condé (n.pl., 1615); L’accomplissement des alliances de France & d’Espagne (n.pl., 1615); Lettre écrite par vn bon François à vn Conseiller d’Estat, pour le secours que le Roy est obligé de donner au Due de Sauoye & ses autres alliez (n.pl., 1615).
81 Responce à la lettre d’un gentil-homme, pp. 10–11. The marriages were contracted between the Prince of the Asturias, Felipe, and Princess Elizabeth of France; and King Louis XIII and the
Spanish marriage controversy is an important example of a general trend as the Jesuits were not associated with international intrigue in any of the Catholic pamphlets considered. This contrasts sharply with the polemic of 1594 and 1603 which labelled the Society as minions of Spain and the Pope.

Moreover, unlike in 1594 or 1603, the Jesuits were no longer cited by pamphlet writers as a force responsible for disorder in French institutions. For instance, in the *Seianvs francois au Roy*, the author used Sejanus, the consul and head of the Roman guard who had plotted to take power during Tiberius’s reign, to symbolise the rise of disorder in France.\(^82\) Thus, «les diuisions que Sejanus a semees dans vostre Estat, & l’auctorité qu’il s’y est vsurpee, luy ont mis la couronne sur la teste, nous ont faict esclaues de ses desirs, & de ses passions desreiglees, & l’y font regner en Lyon deuorant.»\(^83\) Sejanus was compared with various individuals and corporations in France who had betrayed royal interests. The rebellions of the nobility were noted. Further, the clergy were accused:

Le Clergé qui est l’ordre le plus sainct & sacré, a courbé, a fleschy sous l’assurance de continuer ses desbauches, s’est mesme roidy contre vostre auctorité, & a troué bon qu’on mit la sacre personne des Roys, à l’abbandon & à la mercy des assassins, dés aussi tost qu’on leur a eu r’asseuré leursdits benefices en faueur de leurs coadiuteurs.\(^84\)

For the author of the *Seianvs*, it was the clergy in general not the Jesuits who were responsible for theories of tyrannicide. The purpose of these passages was to contrast the Parlement, which was presented as a steadfast, loyal supporter of royal authority, against Sejanus in his many forms. Nevertheless, it was remarkable that at no point did the

\(^{82}\) *Seianvs francois, au Roy* (n.pl., 1615).
\(^{83}\) *Seianvs*, p. 3.
\(^{84}\) *Seianvs*, p. 6.
author provide the Jesuits with even a small role in creating the disorder in the kingdom. Thus, even in the conclusion which stated that 'Les sorciers, les magiciens, les luifs, & les Anabaptistes sont establis dans vostre Louure' the Jesuits were not deemed an appropriate example despite the fact that, unlike many of these deviant groups, a number of Jesuits actually were present in the Louvre. Thus, despite the abundant and largely unregulated pamphlet literature of the period, there is little evidence that the Jesuits played anything more than a minor role in the pamphlet debates of 1614 and the first months of 1615.

If the Society was not a feature of the pamphlet polemic, it was the subject of four articles in the general cahiers of the three Estates, each of which reflect the ongoing regulatory concerns of many delegates to the Society’s presence in France. First, the jurisdictional control over the Society and its members was clarified in two articles of the Third Estate cahier. Second, Jesuit teaching rights were addressed in two similar articles, one in the First Estate cahier and the other in the Second Estate cahier.

The Third Estate’s concern with the Jesuits first appeared in a short dispute recounted in its procès-verbaux. According to Clapisson, a delegate of the Third Estate who kept a journal of proceedings, the committee for drafting articles on the church was unsure which name to give the Jesuits:

attendu que par le parlement ils sont diversement nommés, fit ladite proposition, savoir, comment ils seroient nommés es articles qui les concernent, l’Isle-de-France, Normandie, Bretagne, Picardie et Orléans, furent d’avis, que le compilateur mettroit au cahier ces termes, en parlant d’eux, les prêtres et écoliers du collège de Clermont soi-disant Jésuites; Guyenne, que Ton mettroit les prêtres-jésuites; Bourgogne et

---

85 Seianvs, p. 28.
This dispute, along with a comment by the nuncio, is the only evidence that survives of what appears to be a series of articles concerned with the Jesuits in the Third Estate’s provincial *cahiers*. 88

Unfortunately the sources are silent concerning the debates within the Third Estate committee charged with drawing up the section on the church; nevertheless, the articles of the general *cahier* survive. There is no one copy of the Third Estate *cahier* which is universally accepted as the definitive edition. The pamphlet entitled *Cahiers généraux des articles resolus et accordéz entre les députéz des 3 estats* is perhaps the least accurate source as it lacks articles included in other copies and offers fictitious royal answers to particular articles. 89 The best manuscript copy is the one signed by Hallé, the secretary of the Third Estate, which was published in 1789. 90 Another published edition in Mayer’s collection of documents from national assemblies offers a full but slightly different set of articles. 91 Even if one considers all the extant copies of the Third Estate *cahier*, only two articles directly address the Jesuits, both in the section concerned with the church.

One article was concerned with the problem of inheritance rights of the Society’s members. The Third Estate restated a long-standing assertion of the French royal courts:

*Que trois ans après qu’aucuns au roiy ont pris l'habit de Jesuite, ils ne soient plus*

---

87 Clapisson, ‘Recueil’, p. 168.
88 AV Francia 56, fo. 159v°: Ubaldini to Borghese, 17 January 1615.
capables de succession directes ou collaterales, ni même de disposer des biens qu’ils auroient auparavant, & après ledit temps, ne puissent estre mis hors de l’Ordre, sans leur estre, par la maison de laquelle ils auroient esté licentiez, donnée moyen de vivre. 

This article followed one which did not mention the Jesuits but did prohibit young people from joining religious orders who were ‘au-dessous de l’âge de vingt-cinq ans, sans le congé & consentement des peres & meres desdits mineurs ....’ These two issues had been the source of a series of causes célèbres involving the Jesuits which were tried in the royal courts. The conflict between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction over such issues had long been of special interest to the middle level French magistrates who dominated the Third Estate; and their concern for Jesuit inheritance rights must be viewed with reference to these long-term debates with the ecclesiastical courts and the religious orders.

The second article expressed a broad concern for the Jesuits’ presence in French society. According to the article the ‘Jesuites soyent obligés aux mesmes loix civiles et politiques que les autres Religieux establis en France, reconnoissent qu’ils sont sujets de Vostre Majesté, et ne puissent avoir Provinciaux autres qu’originaires François; et élus par jesuites aussi François, ayant fait leur premier voeu.’ Once again this was an article created by delegates who were concerned with French law and custom along with the maintenance of secular authority. The stipulation for elections of Jesuit provincials highlights the continued sympathy among French magistrates for Gallican electoral principles in the church. Moreover, through its demand for the Society to conform to

95 Lalourcé (ed.), *Recueil*, iv, 283.
French civil law, the article reflected the concerns of magistrates with secular law’s control of what was essentially becoming one religious order among others. The inclusion of these two articles in the general *cahier* reflected the desire of the royal magistrates who dominated the Third Estate to regulate the Society’s activities with reference to French law and custom, as was their duty according to the seventh article of the Edict of Rouen.96

The Third Estate’s general statement of jurisdictional control over the Society of Jesus in the *cahier*, along with their specific concern for one notable difficulty, the inheritance rights of Jesuit Fathers, were intended to prevent the Society from acquiring a special, exalted position in France above the normal laws of the kingdom. However, these demands did not single out the Jesuits as peculiarly dangerous. Indeed by asserting that the ‘Jesuites soyent obligés aux mesmes loix civiles et politiques que les autres Religieux establis en France’ the article states that the Jesuits possessed the same legal standing as other established religious orders in France.97

Like the Third Estate the First and Second Estates made reference to the Jesuits in their general *cahiers*. Their articles were concerned with defending Jesuit privileges rather than regulating the Society. The First and Second Estates demanded that the Society be allowed to open colleges throughout France, and called for the Society to be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the royal council in order to protect them from their enemies. These articles were in part a reaction to the published *cahier* produced by Richer and his allies in the University of Paris which condemned Jesuit teaching.98

---

96 BN MS. Fr. 2761, fo. 100v°: Copy of the Edict of Rouen, 1603.
97 Lalource (ed.), *Recueil*, iv, 283.
98 For more on the origins of the *cahier* and its interaction with the Estates see Rapine, ‘Assemble’, xvi, 207–208 [sic]. See also Le caver general des remonstrances qve l’université de Paris adressé, pour presenter au Roy nostre souuerain Seigneur, en l’Assemblee Generale des trois Ordres
Richer’s initiative met with hostility in the First Estate, which chose to respond to the attack in its own cahier and succeeded in persuading the Second Estate to include a similar article in its cahier. The articles included by the clergy and the nobility were an important statement of support for the Society’s educational mission in France, the clergy’s version requested:

Vostre Majesté est doncques tres-humblement suppliée restablir vos Vniuersitez, spécialement celle de Paris, les bien reformer, & y faire observer de bons Reglemens, y remettre les Peres Jesuistes, les sousmettant aux loix de vostre dite Vniuersité: Pour le restablissement de laquelle en sa premiere dignité & splendeur, plaira à vostre Majesté commettre tant de vostre Conseil, que de vos Cours Souueraines, personnages de scâuoir & singuliere experience.99

This article was important for two reasons. First, the First Estate’s support for the Society’s return was in part a response to meddling in affairs which the clergy felt were strictly their own. Thus, the traditional questions of jurisdiction and privilege first associated with the Jesuits in the 1560s, but marginalised in the 1590s, returned in 1615 to dominate the debate. Second, the request by the clergy that the monarch take the Jesuit issue into his own competence is a request for the return of Henry IV’s authority on these matters now that Louis XIII had reached maturity. This statement emphasised the importance and acceptance of royal authority as a defining feature of this debate. This second point is also interesting as the reopening of the Jesuit College of Clermont in 1617 was implemented by an arrêt from the king’s council which cites the request of the Estates as justification for this royal decree.100 Thus, while the Jesuits were the central focus of several articles in the general cahiers of 1614, each of these articles were concerned with issues of jurisdiction and privilege. These articles reflect the regulatory
concerns of the Estates General over the Society's presence and activities in France.

The Estates General provides evidence of the remarkable success of the Society in re-establishing itself in France. In 1594 the corporation was expelled from much of the kingdom as the chief supporters in France of both papal authority in temporal affairs and tyrannicide theory. By 1614 French Jesuits had in part succeeded in withdrawing themselves from the contentious public controversies over both of these issues at the Estates General. While Servin, in his condemnation of the Suarez tract in the summer of 1614, attempted to mobilise the continued distrust of the Jesuits in France, his efforts met with little success. Instead the Suarez condemnation was used to reaffirm the accommodation between the Jesuits and the royal legal and administrative framework which regulated their presence in France. Moreover, the first article of the Third Estate was not opposed to the accommodation reaffirmed earlier in the year through the Suarez arrêt. Indeed, the enforcement clauses of the first article echoed the Parlement's actions toward the Society during the Suarez case. In addition, if one considers the wider controversies at the Estates General, the Society was only the central issue in questions of regulation and privilege. The lack of substantive attacks upon the Society in the pamphlet literature surrounding the Estates General provides further evidence of the Society's success in distancing itself from contentious debates in France over the authority of the church, along with other traditional attacks on the Society as minions of foreign powers and as a peculiar danger to French institutions. Meanwhile, the cahiers at the Estates General show that the delegates were concerned to define and regulate the

99 Mercure français, iii, 110 [sic 510].
100 Mercure français, v, 12–13.
Society’s presence in France rather than reject it.

The events of 1614 had the potential to once again threaten the Society’s presence in France but the Society avoided the danger. After the close of the Estates, the Society remained in the favour of the regent who continued to be one of the Society’s most important patrons. Moreover, Coton remained Louis XIII’s confessor during the young monarch’s formative years. Thus, the Society’s relationship with the monarchy and its activities in France weathered the new challenges created by the uncertain period of regency government following Henry IV’s assassination. Indeed, the Society had reason to hope that the security of Louis XIII’s personal rule would soon provide the Jesuits with a stable political environment to further expand and integrate into France.
Conclusion

The months following Louis XIII’s seizure of personal control over royal government provide an appropriate epilogue to this study of the Jesuits’ presence in France. The young king’s decision both to assassinate Concini, Marie’s favourite, and to remove the queen mother from her dominant position on his council, dramatically altered the power structure of the royal government. This shift in the balance at court raised the possibility that Louis would abandon royal favour towards the Society, which had been an important feature of Marie’s religious policy. Indeed, Coton’s retirement from court only weeks into Louis XIII’s personal rule inspired rumours that the king would take a non-Jesuit confessor.¹

Yet this speculation proved unfounded. Not only did Louis chose the Jesuit Father Arnoux as Coton’s replacement, but by offering this sensitive position to a Jesuit, the king also publicly affirmed his favour towards the Society.² This impression was reinforced in January 1618 when Louis gave very public support for the reopening of the College of Clermont.³ The use of royal authority to decide such an important symbolic issue in favour of the Society was an unmistakable sign that the relationship between the monarchy and the Jesuits, established under Henry IV and maintained during the regency,

² Fouqueray, iii, 422–423.
³ See *Decretum praeclare a cvltatis etiwm Vniversitatis Parisiensis* (N.pl., 1618). See also *Mercur francois* (Giverny, 1620), v, 9–10.
had been embraced by the young king. These symbolic actions during the first year of the new monarchy were the foundation of a close relationship between the king and the Society which was further reinforced over the next three years by the opening of Jesuit colleges at Orléans, Châlons, Chaumont, Autun, Aurillac, Quimper and Tulle.4

Louis XIII’s actions at the opening of his personal rule were symbolic of the relationship between the Crown and the Society which continued to develop over the next century and a half until the Jesuits were once again expelled from France in 1761. Active royal patronage of Jesuit colleges was to continue into the eighteenth century and through this sponsorship the Jesuits were to establish themselves as the most important educators of the French elite during the ancien régime. Moreover, Louis’s decision to take a Jesuit confessor also reaffirmed what would prove to be another long-term association between the Society and the monarchy. The spiritual system advocated by the Jesuits was first introduced into the Bourbon court by Coton. Although its exact nature was shaped by the personalities of individual confessors, it was based upon a system that tended to minimise the effects of human corruption in order to stress humanity’s residual goodness and the continued presence of human free will. This view of sin provided the monarchy with a religious philosophy that catered for the needs of royal dynastic policy and the inevitable moral and ethical compromises required of an early-modern monarch.5 Jesuit confessors addressed royal religious shortcomings through frequent recourse to the sacraments and

an understanding that penitents were subject to moral lapses. Thus, the Jesuits provided a spiritual system better fitted for the active life of a monarch than the alternative Augustinian theory of human corruption promoted by the other major strain of religious thought in seventeenth-century Catholic France.6

The Society’s spiritual system was promoted by a succession of Jesuit confessors to Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Louis XV. As the seventeenth century progressed the ‘laxist’ Jesuit spirituality, as their critics labelled it, became increasingly linked to the justification of royal policy, while its alternative in the parti dévot and later Jansenist spiritual thought became increasingly linked with opposition to royal policy.7 Thus, Jesuit spirituality became identified with royal orthodoxy in the French church. Moreover, the French Jesuits also promoted a progressively more positive view of temporal royal sovereignty in support of their Bourbon patrons. The attempted condemnation of the foreign Jesuit Santarelli’s Tractatus de Haeresi in 1626 marked the final effort to ban a Jesuit tract for its arguments in support of papal authority in temporal affairs.8 Richelieu defused the conflict by imposing an oath, similar in wording to the one which the French Jesuits took by the Parlement’s order in February 1612.9 This reaffirmation of the 1612 oath represented both the renewed acceptance by Jesuits in France of French theories on royal temporal authority, and another step towards an accommodation on this difficult

---

8 A. Santarelli, Tractatus de haeresi, schismate, apostasia, sollicitatione in sacramento penitentiae (Rome, 1625).
9 For the particular format of the 1626 oath see Fouqueray, Histoire, iv, 156–158.
issue. Van Kley summarised the seventeenth-century French Jesuit compromise well when he noted that the Society 'effected some sort of compromise between the ecclesiastical and temporal aspects of ultramontanism and Gallicanism and that, while eschewing canonical and conciliar Gallicanism, they gradually accepted the newer “political” Gallicanism: namely, the principle of royal accountability to God alone.'

Thus, while there was some dissension by individual French Jesuits, the French Society of Jesus continued to define and promote a strongly royal vision of temporal sovereignty. This theory suited a monarchy which had seen the consultative elements of Gallican thought contribute to the resistance theories of both Calvinist and Leaguer polemicists during the French religious wars. This compromise also emphasised the lengths to which the French Jesuits were prepared to go to establish their French credentials. For instance, in the procès-verbal of the Santarelli case the Jesuit representative admitted:

— Ne savez vous pas bien que cette méchante doctrine est approuvée de votre général à Rome?
— Oui Messieurs, mais nous qui sommes ici ne pouvons mais de cette imprudence et nous la blâmons de toute notre force ....
— Mais votre général qui a approuvé ce livre tient pour infaillible ce que dessus; êtes-vous de différent créance?
— Messieurs lui qui est à Rome ne peut faire autrement que d’approuvé ce que la Cour de Rome approuve ....
— Et si vous étiez à Rome, que feriez vous?
— Nous ferions comme ceux qui y sont font.

11 For an example of debate within the Society see Fouqueray, *Histoire*, iv, 158–159.
The French Jesuits had to strike a difficult balance, but except for a few particularly
difficult situations, like the Santarelli controversy, they succeeded in maintaining the
distinction between the inviolability of a French monarch's temporal authority and the
authority of the Popes. Pierre Blet argues that by the final years of Louis XIV's reign
un certain nombre de jésuites—sinon la majorité comme l'insinue d’Avrigny—
tiennent cette doctrine. Précisons que dans la pratique, La Chaize et d'autres sans
doute, traçant la ligne de partage entre spirituel et temporel, font assez belle la part
du Roi et du pouvoir civil. Mais cela ne préjuge en rien des droits du Pape par
rapport au concile et à ce qui touche la doctrine.  

Thus, over the course of the seventeenth century the Jesuits built upon their actions during
Henry IV's reign and Marie de Medicis's regency to create a doctrine of royal authority
that respected papal authority in spiritual matters, but at the same time was amongst the
most radical in its promotion of unhindered royal authority in the temporal affairs of the
French church.  

This change in Jesuit outlook reflected the new environment in which the Society relied upon royal authority to operate: an environment whose foundations
were first established by the Society's return under Henry IV.

Throughout the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-centuries the French Jesuits
proved an important source of support for the Crown. The alliance between the Society
and the monarchy was to extend into the realm of church controversy where Jesuit
spirituality and political outlook would provide the monarchy with a useful alternative to
dévot or later Jansenist opposition to royal foreign policy.  

15 The Jesuit articulation bears some resemblance to political Gallicanism as articulated by V. Martin in l
gallicanisme politique et le clergé de France (Paris, 1929).
16 Although there were exceptions, especially in the first half of the century. For instance, the Jesuit
to the *status quo* in the church was a blow to his authority and the Jesuits, who were the strongest supporters of the *étatiste* conception of religion, were viewed by Louis XIV as his chief allies in disputes which defined his authority.\(^{17}\) Louis XIV’s trust was not on the whole misplaced since he could count on active Jesuit support, even against the Pope. In 1675, for instance, the new confessor to the king, the Jesuit Father La Chaize, was to support Louis XIV’s position in the dispute with the Pope over *régle* rights.\(^{18}\) Moreover, Jesuit support for the monarchy would also be reflected in the innumerable libels, songs and pamphlet attacking the Society for their support of royal authority during the four-articles controversy.\(^{19}\) These struggles culminated in the controversy surrounding the papal bull of *Unigenitus* in 1713 on which Louis XIV defined orthodoxy and his authority in the church.\(^{20}\) Once again the Jesuits would be the chief supporters of the king’s attempt to stamp his authority on religious controversy. Consequently, as the seventeenth century progressed the Society of Jesus’s flexibility and sensitivity to the king’s needs produced a close relationship with the French monarchy which continued to define their position in France. The Society’s active support for royal authority—or, as the their enemies termed it, royal and sacerdotal despotism—allied the Jesuits with Louis XIV’s definition...
of absolute royal authority in the French church. Increasingly, in the eighteenth century the French monarchy was to come under attack for its ‘despotism’ in both political and religious affairs. In this context, opponents of absolutist royal government revived the Jesuits' image as dangerous promoters of subversion in France; but, in the language of the eighteenth century, the Society was accused of being the chief agents of the king in his efforts to subvert the people or even of manipulating the king into taking despotic actions against his loyal subjects. The Jesuit image as a subversive force proved salient in this new context. Thus, in its new form, the rhetoric of 1594, which had first produced the image in Catholic France of a subversive Society intent on undermining French political and cultural independence, was to once again threaten the Jesuit’s position in France, and was to prove a significant factor in their expulsion in 1761.

This thesis argues that it was the return of the Society through the Edict of Rouen in 1603, not their expulsion in 1594, that was the critical moment for the Jesuits in France. The events of 1603 continued to define their activities and role for more than a hundred years before the subversive image of 1594 began to revive in its altered form in the eighteenth century. Both the Edict and the royal good will which produced it, gave the Society a legal standing in France and established a set of conditions which made Jesuit participation in the church acceptable. Moreover, the accommodation between the Society and the French king (1603–1610) and the Society and the Paris Parlement (1610–1614) were to provide the regulatory foundation for the Society’s participation in France.

over the next century and a half. While aspects of the anti-Jesuit rhetoric of 1594 were to resurface at different points throughout the period covered by this thesis, continued royal support, along with the Society's willingness to accept the jurisdiction of the French secular authorities, ensured their continued presence in the kingdom. Previous scholars have focused their attention on the anti-Jesuit rhetoric and its association with the church debates of the period. In contrast, this thesis argues that the rhetoric tends to mask a deeper reality: namely, that it was accommodation not conflict, even during the regency, which was the most significant feature of the Society's relationship with the French authorities after 1603.

This study has emphasised that the Society in France under both Henry IV and the regency was willing to make important concessions regarding its privileges in the Catholic church in order to operate in France. The stipulations of the Edict of Rouen gave Henry IV an important role in approving Jesuit foundations, in regulating their foreign members, and in regulating their general activities in France. Moreover, in practice, Henry IV channelled Jesuit resources to support royal policies, including the renewal of the French Catholic elites and the conversion of the Huguenots. During Marie's regency the Society was willing to accept the jurisdiction of French civil law, as interpreted by the Paris Parlement, over the Society in France in order to maintain their presence and influence in the French church. At two crucial moments—in 1603 when Henry IV demanded that the Jesuits implement the Edict of Rouen immediately and in 1612 when the Jesuits took an oath to respect the Sorbonne's teaching on the inviolability of the

---

22 Van Kley, Jansenists, p. 231.
French monarch — Jesuits in France were willing to risk the rebuke of their own Father General in order to secure their position in the kingdom. Implicit in these actions was the Society’s recognition of the need to co-operate with the increasingly assertive secular authorities in France who were determined to maintain control of the church. Moreover, although the Jesuit Father General Aquaviva reprimanded his French Fathers for some of their most awkward concessions to secular authority, the fact remains that Aquaviva was willing to negotiate with the French monarchy and that he acquiesced in difficult concessions when faced with the alternative of withdrawing from the kingdom.

This deference to the requirements of Henry IV and to the jurisdiction of civil law by the Jesuits in France did not conflict with the Society’s international credentials. Ignatius Loyola in the Jesuit constitutions stated that the Society should strive to retain the good will ‘of the temporal rulers and noble and powerful persons whose favor or disfavor does much toward opening or closing the gate to the service of God and the good of souls.’ In this statement Loyola recognised the need to acknowledge local circumstances for the greater good of the Society’s mission. Scholars have rightly noted that the Jesuits were the most important of the international Counter-Reformation religious orders. Historians have often emphasised both their fourth vow to the Pope and their powerful centralised hierarchy as characteristics which contributed to its success.

While these factors were undoubtedly important, this thesis has emphasised another reason for the Society’s success: its ability to compromise with secular authorities to

---

24 R. Po-chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal 1540–1770 (Cambridge, 1998). Also see the
ensure their participation in individual states.

Although the flexibility of the Society was thus an important factor in its integration into the French church, it does not provide the main answer to the central question posed by this thesis. As we saw in the Introduction, the principal aim of this project has been to solve the puzzle of why the Society of Jesus was successfully able to integrate into the French church between 1603 and 1615, despite its expulsion from France in 1594 as a treasonous and subversive organisation for its role in an assassination attempt on the king. On the basis of the evidence presented in this study it seems safe to conclude that the Society was only able to integrate into the French church after 1603 because of Henry IV’s actions. Specifically, the king’s initiative established the Society’s legal presence in France through the Edict of Rouen. Moreover, between 1603 and his death in 1610, the king worked to define an important role for the Society in France through his sponsorship of the Jesuits in a number of royal policy initiatives. The uncertain period of regency government between 1610 and 1614 witnessed the revival of anti-Jesuit rhetoric in France, but as this thesis has shown this polemic had little influence on the actions of the Paris Parlement. Instead, the Parlement respected the patterns of accommodation established by the late king and sought to regulate the Society through the conditions established in the Edict of Rouen. Indeed, I would argue that the residual influence of Henry IV’s good will towards the Jesuits in many ways defined the realm of possible action against the Society.

To reiterate, therefore, in answer to the central question of this thesis, Henry IV’s...
support provided the context in which the Jesuits returned to France. Further, royal authority, along with the active efforts of the Society to conform to the monarch's requirements, defined an important role for the Society in France which it was able to maintain even after Henry IV's assassination in 1610. Henry IV's efforts to bring the Society back under his direct and exclusive control reflected the importance of religion and the church to the authority of Henry IV's government. But Henry's was not the only secular state determined to regulate aspects of the church in order to protect its authority at the opening of the seventeenth century. Indeed, the Society's flexibility was also being tested by both Venice and Spain who were anxious to increase their control over the Society's activities in their territories during this same period.  

---

Appendix: Pamphlet Literature 1614-1616

L’accomplissement des alliances de France & d’Espagne. N.pl., 1615.


Advertisement du Sieur de Brvscambille sur le voyage d’Espagne. N.pl., 1615.

Advis à Monsieur le Prince. N.pl., 1614.

Advis à Monsieur le Prince. N.pl., 1615.


Advis remonstrances et requestes aux Estats généraux tenus à Paris, 1614. Par six paysans. N.pl., n.d..

Advis sur les ordonnances d’Orleans, art. 59. & de Moulins, art. 57. concernant la réduction des degrés des substitutions. N.pl., 1615.

A la royne regente, et a nosseneuvrs les princes et seigneurs du conseil. N.pl., n.d..

A Messieurs des Estates. N.pl., n.d..

L’Anti-Mavregard ov le fantasme de bien public. N.pl., 1614.


Articles qve Monsieur de la Haye proposera a Messieurs de l’assemblée de Grenoble, tant en son nom que des autres Princes, Officiers de la Couronne, & Seigneurs joignent avec nous. N.pl., 1615.

L’assasinat du Roy ov maximes du vieil de la montagne Vaticane & de ses assassins, praticquées en la personne de deffunct HENRY LE GRAND. N.pl., 1614.

Le bon navarrois aux pieds du Roy. N.pl., 1615.


Le Cabinet du Vulcan. N.pl., n.d..

Cassinère francoise. N.pl., n.d..

Le Catholique christianisé. N.pl., 1615.


Le consevr, discovrs d’estat. Pour faire voir au Roy, en quoy sa Majesté a este mal servie. N.pl., 1615.


Conference tenu entre le Pape et le Roy d’Espagne, touchant les affaires de ce temps.

Item. Dialogye du Roy d’Espagne avec le Roy de Neye Moine, sur le pourparler des disdites affaires. N.pl., 1615.

Le conseiller fidele a son roy. N.pl., n.d..


Copie de la harangue faicte en la presence du Roy à l’enttee [sic] des estats, par les deputez de La Rochelle, pour les Eglises reformees. Av raport de Matavlt. N.pl., 1615.


Le covrier covrtisans. Arrive de Bovrdeaux. N.pl., 1615.

Declaration de la volonté du Roy addresseee a nos seigneurs de sa Cour de Parlement. N.pl., 1615.

Declaration de Monsieur le Prince, envoyee au Roy. N.pl., 1615.

De l’autorité royale. N.pl., 1615.

Le Diogene francois. N.pl., n.d..

Discours de Maistre Jean Iovffly sur les debats & diuisions de ce temps. N.pl., 1614.

Discours sur l’aliance faicte par le Roy Tres-Chrestien, avec le Roy Catholique. N.pl., 1615.

Discours sur les mariages de France et d’Espagne, contenant les raisons qui ont mené Monseigneur le Prince à en demander la suspension. N.pl., 1614.


Envis des paysans Champestres, adressés à la Royne Régente. N.pl., 1614.

Extraict de l’inventaire qui c’est trouvé dans les coffres de Monsieur le Cheuallier de Guise par madamoiselle d’Antraige, & mis en lumière par monsieur de Bassompierre. N.pl., 1615.

Extraict d’une lettre envoyée à l’un des grands de ce Royaume touchant la venalité des offices. N.pl., n.d..

Le financier aux Messieurs des Estats. N.pl., 1615.

Fovcave aux Estats. N.pl., 1615.

Franc et veritable discours sur la revocation du droit annuel. N.pl., n.d..

Gazette des estats, & de ce temps. Du seign. gio seruitour, de Piera grosa. N.pl., 1615.


La Harangue d’Achior l’amonite sur un avis donné à Monseigneur le Prince. N.pl., 1614.


Harangue de l’amateur de justice, aux trois estats. N.pl., 1615.

Harangue de Tvrlvpin le sovpretevx. N.pl., 1615.

Harangue faite par la noblesse de Champagne & de Brie. Insérée en ces Cayers, & presentée à sa Majesté. N.pl., 1615.


Lettre de Monsieur le Marquis de Bonniuet écrit au Roy. N.pl., 1615.

Lettre de Monseigneur le Prince envoyée au Roy & à la Reyne par le Sieur de Marcognet. N.pl., 1615.

Lettre de Nostre S. Pere le Pape, écrite à messieurs du clergé deputez aux Estats de ce Royaume. Avec la responce faicte par L.E.D. N.pl., n.d..


La lettre du Roy d'Espagne envoyée à leurs Maiestez tres-Chrestiennes en la ville de Bordeaux. Paris: Anthoine de Brueil, 1615.


Lettres envoyées au Roy et à la Royne, par l'Assemblee de Grenoble. N.pl., 1615.

Ludovici de beav manoir expostvlatoria defensio ad senatvm Parisiensem pro societate Iesv. In expositoriam Ludouici Seruini Regis Aduocati querelam contra Francium Suarium ex eadem societate Theologum perulgatem. N.pl., 1615.

Memoires pour presenter au Roy, sur la continuation du droit annuel, empeschant neantmoins le commerce & trafic des offices, & l'heredité perpetuelle d'iceux en une maison .... N.pl., 1615.

L'ombre de Henri Le Grand au Roy. N.pl., 1615.

Le pacifique pour la defence du Parlement. N.pl., n.d..

Le plaidoyer des préseances et difficultez des estats. Recueillis à l'Hostel de Monseigneur le Prince, premier Pair de France, reüniateur des subjects du roy. N.pl., n.d..

Le protecteur des princes, a la Reyne. N.pl., n.d..

Les regrets de cendrin. N.pl., 1615.

Remerciement des Poules. A Monsieur de Bovillon. N.pl., n.d..


Les résolutions et arrestez de la chambre du Tiers Estat touchant le premier article de leur cahier présenté au Roy. Paris, 1615.

Responce à la harangve faite par l'ilvstrissime Cardinal du Perron, à Paris l'an 1615. N.pl., n.d..

La sanglante chemise de Henry le Grand. N.pl., 1615.

Seianvs francois, av Roy. N.pl., 1615.


Le svreillant françois. N.pl., n.d..

Tyrtævs avx francois. N.pl., n.d.
Sources and Bibliography

1. Manuscript sources

A. Paris

Bibliothèque Nationale (BN):

Dupuy: 3, 37, 65, 74, 89, 90, 91, 111, 180, 212, 251, 266, 271, 286, 313, 358, 409, 438, 500, 591, 606, 654, 678, 706, 707, 708, 709, 712, 801, 806, 812, 819, 830, 836, 838, 869, 950

Manuscrit Français (MS.Fr.): 2761, 3654, 3484, 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489, 3490, 3491, 3492, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3496, 3497, 4047, 15463, 15580, 15588, 15779, 15780, 15781, 15798, 16536, 18001, 18003, 18004, 18005, 18006, 18007, 18008, 18009, 18010

Nouvelles Acquisitions (NA): 1395, 5130, 6282, 7795

Morel de Thoisy: 28, 30

Joly de Fleury: 2409

Cinq-Cents Colbert: 17

Archives Nationales (AN):

Series X1a: 1731, 1732, 1734, 1735, 1737, 1739, 1742, 1753, 1758, 1788, 1795, 1796, 1810, 1829, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1867, 4796, 4798, 5170, 5333, 8643

Series X2b: 170, 181, 185, 253

Series K: 674

Series MM: 249, 386, 387, 388, 389

Series M: 148

Series U: 510, 579, 800, 804, 10952, 10953, 10954, 10955, 10956

Series MI: 89 Mi 1; Bobine 133 Mi 36; Bobine 133 Mi 37
Bibliothèque de l'Institut (BI):

  Godefroy: 15, 276

Archives Française de la Compagnie de Jésus (AFCJ):

  Recueil Rybeyrete

  Prat: 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 45, 47, 48, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 70, 78

B. Rome

Archivio Segreto Vaticano (AV):

  Francia: 37, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56

  Borghèse: II 242, 244
    III 4c.

Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (ARSI):

  Franciae: 1, 2, 3, 3a

  Galliae: 39, 41, 44, 60, 61 I-II, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 93, 94 I-II

  Germaniae: 122

C. Oxford

Bodleian Library (BOD):

  Carte: 101

  D'Orville: 479

  Rawl E.: 186

  Smith: 77
D. London

Public Records Office (PRO):

State Papers (SP)/France 78: 34, 49, 50, 51, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68
State Papers (SP)/Dutch 84: 56, 57

British Library (BL):

Stowe: 173, 174, 175, 176, 177

2. Printed primary sources

L’accomplissement des alliances de France & d’Espagne. N.pl., 1615.

L’adiev de la Ligye av pevple francois. N.pl., n.d..

A discoverie of the most secret and subtile practices of the IESUITES. Translated out of French. London, 1610.

Advertissement dv Sievr de Brvscambille svr le voyage d’Espagne. N.pl., 1615.

Advis av roy touchant la permission octroyee par sa Majesté aux Peres Iesuites d’enseigner la jeunesse en la capitale ville de son Roiaume. N.pl., 1618.

Advis de ce qu’il y a à reformer en la Compagnie des Iesuites, presenté au Pape & à la congregation generale, par le Pere Hernando de Mendoça du mesme Ordre. N.pl., 1615.

Advis de Maistre Gvillavme nouvellement retovrne de l’autremonde, sur le sujet de l’Anticoton, compose par P.D.C. c’est a dire, Pierre du Coignet, iadis mort, & depuis n’a gueres resucite. N.pl., 1611.

Advis et resolution de messieurs de l’assemblee du Clergé de France tenuë à Poissi en l’an 1561. N.pl., 1594.

Advis remonstrances et requestes aux Estats generaux temus a Paris, 1614. Par six paysans. N.pl., n.d..

Amboise, J. Iacobi Ambosii academiae Rectoris amplissimi, et Regii Medici Orationes duae in Senatu habitae, pro vniuersis Academiae ordinibus, in Claro-montenses, qui se IESVITAS dicunt, XII maij & XIII Iul.. Paris:
Mettayer & Hvuillier, 1594.

Anticoton, ov refutation de la lettre declaratoire du Pere Cotot: Livre ou est pouue que les lesuites sont couplables & auteurs du parricide execrable commis du Roy tres Chrestien .... Paris, 1610.

Anti-Jesviste av Roy. Saumur, 1611.

Aphorismes ou sommaires de la doctrine des lesvites, & de quelques autres leurs docteurs. N.pl., 1610.


Arrest de la Cour de Parlement contre Jean Chastel escholier estudiant au College des Jesuites, pour le parricide par luy attente sur la personne du Roy. N.pl., 1595.


Arrest de la Cour de Parlement, ensemble la censure de la Sorbonne, contre le liure de Iean Mariana, intitulé De Rege & Rege Institutione. N.pl., 1610.

L'assassinat du Roy ov maximes du vieil de la montagne Vaticane & de ses assasins, pratiquées en la personne de deffunct HENRY LE GRAND. N.pl., 1614.


Baile, G. Responce aux inuectiues contenues en un liure intitule le grand Colisee, basti d'iniures contre les Camarades & Compagnons de Iesus Christ, imprimé à saint Geruais en Chrestienté en l'an 1611. N.pl., 1611.


Becan, M. Controversia Anglicana de potestate regis e pontificis, contra Lancelottum Andream. Mainz: Mogunt, 1612.


Bellièvre, P. de. Advertissement sur la conversion de Henry de Bourbon IIII. N.pl., 1593.

-----. Advis aux François sur la declaration faicte par le Roy, en l'église S. Denys en France, le XXVe jour de juillet 1593. N.pl., 1593.


Bérulle, P. Correspondance du Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, 3 vols., J. Dagens (ed.).
Paris, 1937.


Blase, I. Iacques Blase, Par la grace de Dieu et dv Saint Siege Apostolicque Euesque de Saint Omer, a tous ceux qui ces presentes lettres verrone ou liront .... N.pl., 1610.


------. Apologie pour Jehan Chastel Parisien, execute a mort, et pour les peres et escholliers, de la Societe de Jesus, bannis au royaume de France. N.pl., 1595.

------. Historie tragique et memorable, de Pierre de Gauerston, tirée des croniques de T. Valsingham, & tournée a lat. En Fr. Lyon, 1588.


------. Sermons de la simulée conversion, et nullité de la pretendue absolution de Henri de Bourbon, prince de Bearn. N.pl., 1594.


Burmannus, P. Syloges epistolarum a viris illustribus scriptarum, 5 vols. Leiden, 1727.


------. Relations inédites des missions de la Compagnie de Jésus à Constantinople et dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle. Poitiers: Henri Oudin, 1864.
Cassandre françoise. N.pl., n.d.


Censure de la sacree Faculté de Theologie de Paris, sur trois sermons pretendez, faicts en l’honneur de P Ignace. N.pl., 1611.


Complainte av roy sur la Pyramide. N.pl., n.d.

Complainte de l’Université de Paris, contre avcvns estrangers nouvellement venus, surnommez lesuites. N.pl., 1610.

Considerations à la France, sur la consolation envoyée de Rome, à la Royne mere du Roy Regente en France, par Louis Richeôme. N.pl., 1611.


Copie de l’anti-espagnol fait a Paris. Deffendu par les rebelles de Sa Maiesté.
Lyon: Pierre Ferdelat, 1594.

Coppie d'une lettre escrite à Monseigneur Pavlno autrefois dataire, soubs le Pontificate de Clement VIII. d'heureuse memoire, ou sont contenus plusieurs artifices & ruses des jesuites. N.pl., 1610.


------. Plaidoyer de Maitre Jacques de Montholon, avocat en la Cour. Rouen, 1612.


Decretum praeclaræ a cvltatis etivm Universitatis Parisiensis. N.pl., 1618.

La defence de la verité contre vne infinité de petits libelles qui courent aujourd'hui par le monde trop licentieusement au prejudice de l'honneur des Peres IESVISTES, & des Ecclesiastiques en General. Rouen: Marin Michel, 1614.

De l'autorité royale. N.pl., 1615.

Desjardins, A. Négoiciations diplomatiques de la france avec la toscane documents

*De studiis lesvitarum abstrvsioribvs relatio.* N.pl., 1608.


*Discours simple et veritable d\'trovble et changement aduenu en la ville d\'Aix en Allemaigne, au mois de Juillet dernier 1611.* Flamen, 1611.

*Discouvs veritable de ce qvi s\'est passé a Dieppe, en Septembre dernier, sur le projet d\'vn Conference, entre les Ministres du lieu, & lean Gontery, Iesuite. Avec la Refutation d\'vn dudit Iesuite, sur ce suiet.* N.pl., 1609.

*Discouvs veritable de ce qvi s\'est passé en la ville de Troyes, sur les poursuites faites par les Iesuites pour s\'y establir, depuis l\'an 1603. iusques au mois de Juillet 1611.* N.pl., 1612.


------. *Aux bons Francois.* N.pl., n.d..


*Edict et Declaration dv Roy, svr le bannissement des lesuites avec l’Arrest de la cour de Parlement de Rouen, sur la verification de iceluy.* Caen: Iaques le Bas, 1595.

*Edicto del Rey Don Phelippe d’Espana contra el tractado della monarchia de Sicilia enxerido por Cesar Baronio Cardenal en el tomo vndecimo de sus Annales ecclesiasticos.* N.pl., 1611.

*Epistole praepositorum generalivm ad patres et fratres Societatis Iesv.* Rome. 1615.


Espernon, J. d’. ‘Discours véritable des derniers propos qu’a tnuv Henry de Valois à Jean d’Espernon avec les regrets et doléances dudict d’Espernon sur la mort et trespas de son maistre.’ In *Archives curieuses de l’histoire de France*

Extraict de l’arrest de mort de François Rauallart, pour avoir commis l’assassin contre sa Majeste. Dijon, 1610.


Extraict des Registres de Parlement (Condemnation of Bellarmine’s Work). N.pl., n.d..

La finesse descouuerte des lesuites. N.pl., n.d..

Fovcade avx Estats. N.pl., 1615.


Gaultier, J. Table Chronographique de l’estat du Christianisme, depuis la naissance de Jesus-christ jusqu’à l’année MDCVIII. Lyon: Jacques Roussin, 1609.


L’hermaphrodite de ce temps. N.pl., n.d..


*Les lesvites establies et restablis en France, et le fruict que en est arriué à la France*. N.pl., 1610.


——. *De la liberte ancienne et canoniqve de l’eglise Gallicane, aux Cours souveraines de France*. Paris: Claude morel, 1606.


*Lettre de mesme Arnault de Pontac à M. de l’Ange Conseiller du Roy en sa cour de Parlement de Bourdeaux*. N.pl., 1594.


*Lettre escrite par vn bon frangois à vn Conseiller d’Estat, ou le secours que le Roy est obligé de donner au Due de Sauoy & les autres alliez*. N.pl., 1615.

*Lettres Patentes du ROY, contenantes Declaration, par laquelle sa Maiesté leve, &
oste toutes defenses d’aller à Rome y prendre Bulles & provisions


Ludovici de beav manoir expostvtioria defensio ad senatvm Parisiensem pro societate iesv. In expositoriam Ludouici Seruini Regis Advocati querelam contra Francism Suarium ex eadem societate Theologum perulgatem. N.pl., 1615.

Malescot, E. Le codicille de lessem Conte de Malte avqvel est fait vn brief recueil de ses principales oeuvres. Caen: Iaques le Bas, 1593.

----- Morologie des lesvites. Caen: Iaques le Bas, 1593.

----- Traite qui monstre qu’il faut tenir la Foy aux Heretiques. Caen: Iaques le Bas, 1593.

----- Trois Epistres par lesquelles il est monstre qu’il ne faut a voir en horreur ne craindre la mort corpelle. Caen: Iaques le Bas, 1593.


Marion, S. Plaidoyez de Mre Simon Marion, Baron de Drvy, cy devant advocat en Parlement et de present Conseiller du Roy en son Conseil d’Estat, & son Advocat General. Paris: Michel Sonivs, 1598.


Memoires et advis povr rendre les lesuites utiles en France. N.pl., 1614.

Le mercure françois, vol. 5. Giverny, 1620.


Mystère des Jesuites pour prendre resolution de tuer les Roys. N.pl., 1610.

Ode aux Ligiez Francois et Espagnolisez povr les advertir de songer & penser a ce qu’ils font & à levr conscience. Caen: laques le Has, 1593.

Ode prophetique trouée en l’estude de Philippe de Marnix, Sieur de Saincte Aldegonde. N.pl., 1601.

Opinions, et raisons d’estat, proposees en vn discerns tenv av Grand Conseil de Venise par le Clarissime L. B. N.pl., 1606.

Le pacifique povr la defence dv Parlement. N.pl., n.d..


------. Le catechisme des lesuites ov examen de leur doctrine. Ville-Franche: Guillaume Grenier, 1602.

------. Le Catechisme des Jésuites, ed. C. Sutto, (Sherbrooke Canada, 1982).


Procedure faicte contre Iean Chastel Escholier estudiant au College des Jesuites.


Pro libertate ac salute Gallici Imperii votvm, Ad augustissimae memoriae Henricvm Magnum Franciae & Navarrae Regem Christianissimum. N.pl., n.d..

Prosopopee de la Pyramide du Palais. N.pl., n.d..


Recueil de ce qui s’est fait en Sorbonne et ailleurs, contre vn Liure de Becanus, Iesuite. N.pl., 1613.


Le remerciment des beurrieres de Paris au Sieur de Courbouzon Montgommery. N.pl., 1610

Remonstrance à Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement sur le parricide commis en la personne du Roy Henry le Grand. N.pl., 1610.


Remonstrance dv clergé de France, faicte au Roy le 18. Iuillet: Par Reuerendissime
Pere en Dieu, Messire Philippe Cospeav, Euesque d’Ayre, Conseiller de sa

Novembre M DCX. N.pl., 1610.

Remonstrance et plainte des gens du Roy a la cour de Parlement, & conclusions par
eux prises le 20. de Juin 1614. Rouen: lean Berthelin, 1614.

Remonstrances fait a roy Henry Le Grand, par Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement
de Paris, le 24 Decembre 1603, Pour le dissuader de l’Edict par lequel les
Iesuites ont este depuis rappel et restablis en France. N.pl., 1610.

Remonstrance sur la remonstrance faicte a Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement. N.pl.,
1611.

Responce a la lettre d’un gentil-homme, sur les pretextes de la guerre. Paris:
Anthoine Champenois, 1615.

Response a un livret novvellement mis en lvmiere, intitule: la response du P. I.
Gontery. de la compagnie de Iesus à la demande d’un Gentle homme touchant

La Retraite de la Ligve par P.I.D.G.C. Lyon: Gvichard Ivllieron, 1594.

Scalager, J.. Epistres Francoises des personnages illustres & doctes a Mons.r
Joseph Ivste de la Scala, I. Reves (ed.). Amsterdam: Hardervvyck, 1624.

Richeome, L. Consolation envoyee a la Royne, mere du Roy et Regent en France sur
la mort deplorable du feu Roy tres chrestien de France et de Nauarre. N.pl.,
1610.

------. La Chase du Renard Pasquin, des couvert et pris en sa tanierie, du libelle
diffamatoire faux-marqué le Catechisme des Iesuites. Ville-Franche: H. Le
Pelletier, 1602.

------. Examen categoriqve du libelle Anticoton, avqvel est corrige le plaidoyé de
Maistre Pierre de la Marteliere, advocat au Parlement de Paris, & plusieurs
calomniateurs des Peres Iesuites refutez. Et les droicts inviolables de la

------. Expostvlatio apologetica ad Henricvm IV Grancorum & Nau. Regem expaniss.
Pro Societate Iesv infamosum libellum qui ingenva, et vera orao. & in alterum
qui catechismvs Iesvitarum inscribitur. Lyon: Horativm Cardon, 1606.

------. L’Idolatrie hugvenote figuree av Patron de la vieille payenne diuisee en huict
livres et dediee au Roy tres-chrestien de France et Nauarre Henri IIII. Lyon:
Pierre Rigaud, 1608.

------. La verité defendve pour la religion Catholique. En la cause des Iesuites. Contre
le plaidoyer d’Antoine Arnauld. Liège: Henry Houius, 1596.
Seianvs francois, av Roy. N.pl., 1615.
Sensuient les principales requestes de celles, qui on este cy deuant alleguees. Les autres, comme celles de Bourges, Eu, Bilom & villes d’Auvergne ont este omises pour briefuete. N.pl., 1594.
--------. Receuil des poincts principaux de la harangue faicte a la ouverture du Parlement, par M. L. Servain. Tours, 1589.
La sibylle française, ou dernière remonstrance au roy. Ville-Franche, 1602.
Simple et véritable discours de ce qui s’est passé en la Conference en commencee à Caen, entre le jésuite Gontieri, accompagné d’un Docteur Jacobin, & les Minstres de Caen, & de Sainte-Mère Eglise. N.pl., 1606.
Solier, F. Lettre justificative du Père François Solier, répondant à un sien amy touchant la censure de quelques sermons faits en Espagne à l’honneur du Bienheureux Père Ignace de Loyola, fondateur de la compagnie de IESVS. Poitier: A Mesnier, 1611.
Suarez, F. Defensio fidei catholicæ et apostolicae adversus Anglicanæ sectæ errores, cum responsione ad apologiam pro juramento fidelitatis. Coimbra: Coloniae Agripinæ, 1613.
——. Historiarvm svi temporis partis primæ, vol 2. Paris: Ambrosivm & Hieronymvm, 1604
Le Tribun Francois, ou tres-humble remonstrance faite à la Royne par son peuple. N.pl., 1611.
Vtile et salvtaire aduis au Roy, pour bien regner. N.pl., n.d..
Veritable narré de la conference entre les sieurs Du Moulin & Gontier, secondé par Madame la Baronne de Salignac. Le samedy vnziesme d’Auril 1609. N.pl., 1609.

### 3. Printed secondary works


------, ‘Was there a Bourbon Style of Government?’. In: K. Cameron (ed.), From
Valois to Bourbon: Dynasty, State & Society in Early Modern France (Exeter
UK, 1989).

Bossuat, A., ‘La formule “le roi est empereur en son royaume.” Son emploi au XVe
siècle devant le Parlement de Paris’, Revue historique de droit français et

Bossy, J., ‘Henry IV, the Appellants and the Jesuits’, Recusant History, 8 (1965), 80–
122.
------, ‘The Counter-Reformation and the People of Catholic Europe’, Past and
Present, 47 (1970), 51–70.

Boucher, J., La Cour de Henry III (Ouest-France, 1986).


------, ‘Gallicanism and the Nature of Christendom’. In: A. Molho and J.A. Tedeschi
(eds), Renaissance Studies in Honour of Hans Baron (Florence, 1971).

Quelques procès criminels des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1964).


Briere, Y. de la, ‘Comment fut adopté et accepté l’Édict de Nantes’, Études, 98 and 99

------, Communities of Belief: Cultural and Social Tensions in Early Modern France

Brockliss, L.W., ‘Richelieu: Education and the State’. In: J. Bergin and L.W.


Burbure, M. de, Essais historiques sur la ville et collège de la Flèche (Angers, 1803).


Calendini, P., ‘Cœurs de Henri IV & de Marie de Médicis à la Flèche’, Revue Henri
IV, 1 (1905), 8–14.

Cans, A., ‘Une manifestation de gallicanisme épiscopal (1586–7)’, Revue Henri IV, 2
(1907), 129–143.

Carayon, A., Bibliographie historique de la Compagnie de Jésus, ou Catalogue des
ouvrages des Jésuites (Paris, 1864).
Carroll, S., ‘The Guise Affinity and Popular Protest During the Wars of Religion’. 


Certeau, M. de, ‘Crise sociale et réformisme spirituel au début du XVII siècle: Une 
“Nouvelle spiritualité” chez les jésuites français’, *Revue d’ascétique et de 
mystique*, 41 (1965), 339–386.


Chartier, R. and Richet, D. (eds), *Représentation & vouloir politiques autour des 
États-Généraux de 1614* (Paris, 1982).

(eds), *Les Jésuites parmi les hommes aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Clermont- 
Ferrand, 1987).


Church, W., *Louis XIV in Historical Thought* (New York, 1976).

Clerici-Balmas, N., ‘Réalité et imaginaire dans les Mémoires-Journaux de Pierre de 

temps de Henri IV* (Pau, 1989).

Congar, Y., ‘Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et séculiers’, 


Coté, A., *Relations des Jésuites contenant ce qui s’est passé de plus remarquable ans 
les missions des pères de la Compagnie de Jésus* (3 vols, Quebec, 1858).

Couzard, R., *De Edicto Rothomagensi Jesuitas in Galliam Restituentie Die 1 
Septembris 1603* (Paris, 1900).

——. *Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV* (Paris, 1900).

——. ‘Philippe de Béthune: L’élection du Pape Léon XI et la victoire du parti 
Français en 1605,’ *Revue Henri IV*, 1 (1905), 133–141.

les Jésuites et l’audience royale du 24 Decembre 1603’, *Revue Henri IV*, 2 
(1909), 243–256.


Crouzet, D., ‘La représentation du temps à l’époque de la Ligue’, *Revue Historique*, 
270 (1983), 297–388.

——. ‘Henry IV, King of Reason?’. In: K. Cameron (ed.), *From Valois to Bourbon: 
Dynasty, State and Society in Early Modern France* (Exeter UK, 1989).

——. *Les guerriers de Dieu: la violence au temps des troubles de religion* (2 vols, 


Demerson, G. et al. (eds), *Les Jésuites parmi les hommes aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1987).


------, *Qui étaient les seize?* (Paris, 1983).


Dumont, F., ‘French Kingship and Absolute Monarchy in the Seventeenth Century’.


---, *La Faculté de Théologie de Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres* (vol. 1, Paris, 1900).


——, *France and the Estates General of 1614* (Cambridge, 1974).


——, ‘Putting Religion Back in the Wars of Religion’, *French Historical Studies*, 5


Labitte, C., De la démocratie chez les prédicateurs de la Ligue (Paris, 1841).
Legard, G., La naissance de l’esprit laique au déclin du moyen âge (vol. 6, Vienna, 1934–1946).


———, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles and Estates* (Baltimore, 1994).


Pasquier, E., Un curé de Paris pendant les guerres de religion: René Benoist, le pape des Halles (Paris, 1913).


Rashdall, H., *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (vol. 1, Oxford, 1895).


--------, *Etienne Pasquier Le Catéchisme des Jésuites* (Sherbrooke Canada, 1982).


Sypher, G.W., ‘Faisant ce qu’il leur vient à plaisir: Images of protestantism in French Catholic Polemic on the eve of the Religious Wars’, *Sixteenth Century*


Yardeni, M. ‘L’ordre des avocats et la grève du Barreau Parisien en 1602’, *Revue
d’histoire economique et sociale, 44 (1966), 481–507.
------, La minorité de Louis XIII, Marie de Médicis et Villeroy (Paris. 1897).

4. Unpublished theses
