

THE USE AND MISUSE OF RHETORIC BY DON QUIXOTE

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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This work of research aims to elucidate the structure and meaning of the “Quixotic rhetoric”, that is, persistent patterns in the protagonist’s delivery of discourses. Through a close reading of select episodes in the novel, the study explores their style, structure, with a particular attention devoted both to their connections to the rhetorical thought of Renaissance Spain and departures from the rhetorical tenets of the time.

Chapter I: Rhetorical Concepts and Renaissance Rhetoric. The chapter attempts to interpret the general trends of Don Quixote’s rhetorical behaviour through a “corpus” of Classical and Renaissance rhetorical concepts directly named or referenced in the text of the novel: *ingenio*, *discreción/prudencia*, *aptum*, *admiratio*, and rhetorical falsehood.

Chapter II: The Renaissance Rhetoric of Don Quixote. This chapter, elaborating on the connection between *Don Quixote* and

Renaissance rhetoric established in the previous one, explores the following “specialized” rhetorical modes: Humanist, forensic, ecclesiastic, and courtly. It demonstrates his versatility as an orator while also exploring how his departures from rhetorical decorum make the reader question the familiar messages of codified rhetorical forms.

Chapter III: The Chivalric Rhetoric of Don Quixote. Through a series of close readings, this chapter demonstrates how Don Quixote’s use of the flowery language of chivalric romances evolves from a straightforward comic device into a complex and varied form of discourse that defies convention, is not subject to traditional rhetorical rules, and generally question the very limits of rhetoric with its very existence.

Chapter IV: The Other Rhetorics of The Novel. Extending the scope to secondary characters of the novel, the chapter examines the rhetoric of Sancho Panza, “chivalric speakers” (characters adopting or mocking Don Quixote’s chivalric rhetoric), and Marcela, comparing and contrasting them with that of the protagonist. This serves to provide additional context to Don Quixote’s discourses, showing that many traits of his style are either consciously copied by other characters or are otherwise not unique to the protagonist.

Final Conclusions: Rhetoric, Ambiguity, and the Novel. Summarising the findings on persistent elements in Don Quixote’s rhetoric and going back to Bakhtin’s ideas on the relationship between rhetoric and the novel, the conclusion proposes an interpretation of Don Quixote’s use and misuse of rhetoric that ties it to the emergence of the novel as a genre.

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This work of research aims to elucidate the structure and meaning of the “Quixotic rhetoric”, that is, persistent patterns in the protagonist’s delivery of discourses. Through a close reading of select episodes in the novel, the study explores their style, structure, with a particular attention devoted both to their connections to the rhetorical thought of Renaissance Spain and departures from the rhetorical tenets of the time.

This thesis is focused on the following questions:

- 1) How exactly do Don Quixote’s discourses function (and/or fail to function)? What are the mechanisms used by Cervantes to create an impression of the protagonist’s rhetorical competence (or lack thereof)? How do the audience’s reaction, narrator’s comments, and further developments show that a particular speech is effective (ineffective)? Are there any discernible patterns in Don Quixote’s discourses that consistently lead him to rhetorical triumph or failure?
- 2) How does Don Quixote depart from the rhetorical rules and

expectations of the Spanish Golden Age? What do the subject and style of his discourses have in common with the rhetorical thought of his day, and “specialised” forms of rhetoric in particular (forensic, courtly, religious, etc.)? How does moving beyond the typical confines of rhetorical discourse affect the audience’s (and the reader’s) perception?

- 3) To what extent does the nature of *Don Quixote* as a work of fiction, and a putative originator of the novelistic genre, affect its representation of rhetorical discourse? Is the mad hidalgo’s mishandling of rhetorical rules a satire of rhetoric as a whole? What is the meaning of the protagonist’s use (and misuse) of rhetoric for the relationship between rhetoric and the novel?

Chapter I: Rhetorical Concepts and Renaissance Rhetoric

attempts to interpret the general trends of Don Quixote’s rhetorical behaviour through a “corpus” of Classical and Renaissance rhetorical concepts directly named or referenced in the text of the novel: *ingenio*, *discreción/prudencia*, *aptum*, *admiratio*, and rhetorical falsehood. These concepts recur, in one form or another, in most of Don Quixote’s speeches, and their presence illustrates fundamental traits of the protagonist’s handling of rhetoric. Exploring them allows one to understand how the hidalgo’s use and misuse of rhetoric would have been viewed vis-à-vis Renaissance rhetoric, and how Don Quixote manifests contradicting symptoms of competence and incompetence as a public speaker. The chapter adduces numerous examples from both Classical and Renaissance rhetorical sources to elucidate situations where Don Quixote’s words expressly or implicitly invoke a concept discussed by rhetorical theory.

The analysis concludes that Don Quixote's rhetorical woes stem not from a lack of understanding of its laws, or even from his madness, but from an exuberance of eloquence, a literal embarrassment of rhetorical riches. The protagonist is very well aware of the existence of rhetorical arts and has probably a background in Classical education sufficient to be familiar with the fundamentals of rhetoric.

The *ingenioso hidalgo* consistently excels at the elements of rhetoric where creativity, improvisation, or richness of vocabulary and themes (usually referred to as *copia* in rhetorical manuals) are involved. *Ingenium*, *admiratio*, and certain aspects of *discreción* are doubtlessly his strongest points. However, whenever the situation requires rhetorical self-restraint, careful choice of words, “polishing” the discourse, or avoiding audience-alienating topics or tropes, the protagonist much more often than not finds himself in dire straits. The concepts of *aptum* and *prudencia* are the ones that pose the greatest challenge to him and represent his single greatest weakness in the domain of rhetoric. His eschewing of deliberate falsehoods in his discourses is another self-imposed limitation that, at the same time, shows his adherence to the rhetorical *ideal* of a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* using eloquence to determine the truth while moving him away from the effective rhetorical *practice* of “white lies” and concealing one's true thoughts. Don Quixote's refusal to accommodate his discourses to his audience and impose restraints on his favourite tropes and topics is definitely connected to his mental state.

For Don Quixote, rhetoric is something other than an art, a skill, or a useful tool; in a certain way, it is *an end in itself*. The hidalgo is driven by rhetoric as if by some physical force. He clearly enjoys making discourses and excels in the epideictic mode of rhetoric, where the focus shifts from influencing audience opinions to a semi-ritualised display of

oratorical skill – which Don Quixote has in abundance. his exuberant creativity (*ingenio*) leading him to create memorable discourses. In addition, thanks to the presence of the reader who can see the entire scope of his rhetoric and understand it in its context and dialectic development, the protagonist's rhetorical flaws are converted into virtues. Thus the misuse of rhetoric becomes a complement to its use.

Chapter II: The Renaissance Rhetoric of Don Quixote elaborates on the connection between *Don Quixote* and Renaissance rhetoric established in the previous one, explores the following “specialized” rhetorical modes: Humanist, forensic, ecclesiastic, and courtly. It demonstrates his versatility as an orator while also exploring how his departures from rhetorical decorum make the reader question the familiar messages of codified rhetorical forms. The chapter both describes the general ideas on specific types of rhetoric generated by rhetorical tradition and uses select Don Quixote's speeches as an object of in-depth analysis, demonstrating how common concepts of situational rhetoric are represented and challenged in his discourses.

The overview of Don Quixote's “conventional” rhetoric concludes that there are recurring traits found throughout the novel. First of all, Don Quixote shows his amazing versatility as a rhetorician by employing multiple and varied types of rhetoric. He imitates, invokes, replicates, and references a variety of rhetorical styles and modes codified by Spanish rhetorical treatises of the era, both generic and specialised. However, in spite of the fact that Don Quixote's “conventional” discourses are straightforward and completely devoid of deliberate irony on the speaker's part or dialectic questioning of his own ideals, there is almost always a “deflating element” that undermines their message. It can appear as a bizarre leap of logic that renders an argument invalid (plea for convicts' release); a down-to-earth or inherently ludicrous context of

delivery (Golden Age, war and peace); drastic shifts of tone or mode (Sancho's advice), etc.

Whether he speaks on religious, legal, philosophical or courtly matters, there is always good evidence that Don Quixote is familiar with the usual themes, tropes, and methods of delivery that these forms of rhetoric require. His take on most of the topics is quite conventional and commonplace. However, the discourses, even if they start out as normal, inevitably become "Quixotic" due to the character's peculiar handling of rhetoric, namely his fixation on chivalric themes.

This obsession with chivalry and its effect on Don Quixote's rhetoric is explored in **Chapter III: The Chivalric Rhetoric of Don Quixote**. Through a series of close readings, this chapter demonstrates how Don Quixote's use of the flowery language of chivalric romances evolves from a straightforward comic device into a complex and varied form of discourse that defies convention, is not subject to traditional rhetorical rules, and generally questions the very limits of rhetoric with its very existence. The analysis is built around the concept of a gradual development from "chivalric archaism" (a comic device of making Don Quixote speak in a stilted pseudo-Medieval form of language commonly found in *Amadís de Gaula* and its imitators) to more nuanced usage of images, tropes, motifs, and stylistic elements typical of chivalric fiction in the protagonist's speech. Even more so than the previous chapter, it employs the "case study" model to showcase exactly how this evolution is realised, and how the mainstays of Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric interact with his speeches on non-chivalric themes.

The chivalric rhetoric employed by Don Quixote can act as a parody of specific discursive genres described in traditional rhetorical accounts; it can have all the trappings of normative rhetorical discourse save for the subject, which almost inevitably ruins the potential effect; it can be a

barely visible addition to an otherwise normal speech that goes largely unnoticed. In Sierra Morena, he deforms typical Classical/Humanist rhetorical set pieces (*synkresis*, apostrophe, letter-writing, etc.) by introducing unsuitable and sometimes inherently nonsensical chivalric elements or overblowing the usual style required of these genres. The result is a sequence of comical orations that serve as a parody of rhetorical tropes, with Don Quixote's chivalric madness denuding their worn-out nature. Conversely, every time he dabbles into chivalric discourse in Diego de Miranda's house, Don Quixote ruins whatever appreciation Don Diego and Don Lorenzo might have accumulated, with chivalry serving as a reminder of Don Quixote's insanity that cannot be erased by "lucid intervals". Conversely, his debate with the Canon is surprisingly effective in spite of revolving around the premise of chivalric authority, worthless to everyone save Don Quixote himself. The hidalgo manages to defend his patently insane case by applying typical arguments of Renaissance literary debates (arguments from moral or aesthetic value, authority of Classical or Biblical antiquity, etc.). By twisting logic in his favour, he both demonstrates excellent rhetorical acumen and exposes weaknesses in typical recycled arguments against the romances. The exchange with the Canon has all the requisite trappings of codified Renaissance speech genres.

The language of Classical/Humanist erudition and the language of fictional chivalry are two forms of heavily codified and endlessly recyclable discourse, purporting, each within its own domain, to be the only adequate vehicle of expression. From these equally monological and depersonalised elements, Cervantes blends Don Quixote's distinct and highly individual language that reflects his uniquely warped worldview. This interplay of chivalric rhetoric with other forms of discourse in *Don Quixote* creates a complex dialectic of non-traditional rhetorical

argumentation. A “comic” or completely ludicrous argument might stem from impeccably eloquent and internally consistent reasoning, and distinctions between lucidity and madness are fluid enough to provoke constant *admiratio* at their miraculous coexistence.

Extending the scope to secondary characters of the novel, **Chapter IV: The Other Rhetorics of The Novel** examines the rhetoric of Sancho Panza, “chivalric speakers” (characters adopting or mocking Don Quixote’s chivalric rhetoric, such as the innkeeper in the first sally, Dorotea/Micomicona and Sansón Carrasco), and Marcela, comparing and contrasting them with that of the protagonist. This serves to provide additional context to Don Quixote’s discourses, showing that many traits of his style are either consciously copied by other characters or are otherwise not unique to the protagonist.

The analysis of select examples of Sancho’s rhetoric shows that the rhetorical trajectory of this character mirrors the development of the protagonist. Don Quixote goes from a one-note lunatic speaking in a flowery mock-archaic language to a much more complex character. Likewise, Sancho evolves from speaking in broken proverbs and malapropisms to mimicking a wide variety of different discourses, including that of his master. Don Quixote’s madness places him outside the confines of traditional rhetorical competence. Sancho – both through his simplicity, the counterpart of Don Quixote’s madness, and his social standing – does not fit into conventional rhetorical roles, even that of a “wise fool”. Sancho’s words usually elicit a mixed reaction: laughter at his constant mangling of discourses and tropes is mixed with *admiratio* at his unexpectedly lucid speeches, some of which rival the best of Don Quixote’s in their eloquence.

Not limited to a rhetorical foil of the main character, Sancho as a speaker is created through mechanisms similar to Don Quixote’s. The ups

and downs of his rhetoric deliberately parallel those of the protagonist, but also have a distinct individual touch. His rhetoric is sewn together from such disparate elements as snippets of folk wisdom, rustic ignorance of rhetorical decorum, passages from the sermons of a village priest, Don Quixote's chivalric ramblings. Transformed by Sancho's unique capacity of both imitation and garbling of his models, they serve to create an alternative rhetoric that lies outside of conventional rules and leads to both spectacular rhetorical failures and even more memorable successes.

The different attempts of "chivalric speakers" to defeat or entrap Don Quixote contain a glaring contradiction between intentions and results. To restore Alonso Quijano to sanity (and, therefore, his speech to normalcy), the mock-chivalric speakers do their utmost to recreate the modus operandi and speech patterns of stock characters commonly found in the romances (mysterious rival knight, damsel in distress, lovesick maiden, etc.). In their imitation of chivalric discourse, they follow the lead of Don Quixote, who stylises his speech to reflect the pseudo-archaic parlance of his favourite reading, and in doing so proliferate the language of chivalry in mundane reality. Thus the protagonist succeeds in his quest "by proxy": even though none of Don Quixote's rhetorical efforts can completely persuade his immediate audience, the very fact that others adopt the language of chivalry (or borrow Don Quixote's speaking style in more conventional uses of rhetoric) reveals another layer of ambiguity in Cervantes' handling of rhetoric.

Final Conclusions: Rhetoric, Ambiguity, and the Novel is the ending section of the thesis. It concludes that contradictions and paradoxes as this are the essence of Cervantes' treatment of rhetoric in the novel, or, more precisely, of the way it functions whenever the protagonist is involved. Rhetoric, to Cervantes, is *a* discourse, not *the* discourse. It is a field of experiment, not an object of reverence, even if

its power is explicitly recognised. Different modes of rhetoric are contrasted with each other and joined together in eclectic ways. Don Quixote speaks of Amadís and Caesar with similar esteem, uses Ciceronian argumentation to defend the truth of the romances, and preaches peace and forgiveness while threatening his audience with violence.

This paradox of using/misusing rhetoric is functionally similar to the famed *loco/cuerdo* ambiguity, but is not completely isomorphic to it. Don Quixote's words seldom reach the inanity of his actions. He never lapses into outright gibberish or completely insane diatribes, always maintaining a sense of logic (however warped), organisation (however strange), and decorum (however misunderstood). While fighting windmills, sheep, or winesacks is a patently evident act of insanity that calls for no sympathy and understanding, praising chivalric romances and ideals commonly associated with chivalry almost always has at least a shred of reason presented in a rhetorically convincing form. Through Don Quixote's rhetorical power, the reader is forced to consider far-fetched propositions based around the existence of knights-errant, sorcerers, and giants. He is also forced to reconsider his ready-made opinions on justice, morals, ethics, good governance, and other subject, because beautifully expressed and strangely convincing opinions of a madman cast a shadow of insanity on them.

Don Quixote uses and misuses rhetorical discourses that are not his own, that have been employed countless times before. However, through this use/misuse, he transforms familiar discursive forms and overused tropes into a new form of language. What is usually taken for granted in the art of rhetoric becomes problematic and polemical in *Don Quixote*. A work both "old" and "new", *Don Quixote* is both engendered by rhetoric and resents its influence. The way the insane protagonist uses and

misuses it deprives rhetoric of absolute discursive monopoly, creating a complex, layered model of novelistic discourse far ahead of its time.

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POST TENEBRAS SPERO LUCEM

Note on Style and Presentation

The presentation of bibliographical data in the thesis follows the author-date system as described in the MHRA Guide, 7th edition.

Part and chapter numbers of *Don Quixote* are represented by capital Roman numerals for parts and Arabic numerals for chapters; i.e., II.58 – part two, chapter fifty-eight.

Primary and secondary sources in a language other than Spanish or English are usually quoted in English translations, where they exist. There are several exceptions: a) a version in a different language represents an updated version of a work previously published in English (as is the case with Close 2005); b) the Spanish translation enjoys the status of a classic and can be considered a text in its own right (such as Castiglione 1997).

Sources in Spanish, French, and other Romance languages are quoted without a translation. Sources in German are quoted in the original, accompanied by translation in square brackets. Sources in Russian are quoted solely in translation. All translations from the Russian and the German are mine.

All Russian terms and bibliographical data are transliterated according to the British Standard system, unless noted otherwise.

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INTRODUCTION

Don Quixote is a work with an established reputation for intentional ambiguity and paradox. Its protagonist is both mad and sane; his companion is both foolish and wise; their adventures are inspired by fanciful books of chivalry full of larger-than-life exploits, yet take place in quite prosaic and mundane settings. While these themes of the novel are often over-analysed or exaggerated to the point of turning Cervantes into a Postmodernist *avant la lettre*, they make up an important part of the book's artistic framework and enduring appeal.

Among the many paradoxical themes and motifs of *Don Quixote*, there is one in particular that is more often mentioned than given in-depth critical attention. I refer to the paradox of Don Quixote *as a public speaker, an orator, an artist of eloquence*. Its importance for the novel hardly needs to be argued; the novel is famously rich in monologue and dialogue, and what the protagonist and other characters have to say is at least as important as what they do. Dominick Finello's claim that "the *Quijote* is a novel about talking and about memorable conversations" (Finello 1998: 85) may possibly be exaggerated, but it still accurately describes the importance of speech and dialogue in the book.

The image of Don Quixote as a delirious savant and eloquent madman has been a source of unceasing fascination by readers, authors, and critics alike. One of the earliest testimonies of such admiration at the protagonist's combination of lunacy and articulacy is the oft-quoted Saint-Évremond's letter from 1671, which succinctly sums up the essence of the paradox:

J'admire comme dans la bouche du plus grand fou de la terre, Cervantès a trouvé le

moyen de se faire connaître l'homme le plus entendu et le plus grand connaisseur qu'on se puisse imaginer. (Bardon 1931: 30)

Neither did Don Quixote's flair for rhetorical spontaneity and improvisation escape the attention of Romantic critics. Juan Eugenio Hartzenbusch, a chief adherent of the Romantic cult of Cervantes and his creations, even went as far as suggesting that the entire novel, not just the protagonist's speeches, is a "discurso improvisado de un festivo orador, que en tono familiar de la conversación sabe hacerse bien entender de todos" (quoted in Close 2005: 82).

In his *Ein Meerfahrt mit Don Quijote* (1934), Thomas Mann famously lauded the knight-errant's eloquence:

They are excellent, these speeches; for instance, upon education, and upon the poesy of nature and of art, which the knight in the green mantle gets to hear. They are full of pure reason, justice, human benevolence, and nobility of form [...] It is his master's elegance of thought and diction that is often the source of Sancho's boundless admiration – and he is not the only one to be fascinated by it. (Mann 1947: 444).

Harald Weinrich, in his seminal work on the concept of *ingenio* in *Don Quixote*, interrogated how such lucid speeches could have been uttered by an insane character:

[N]icht Cervantes hält die Reden, sondern Don Quijote. Don Quijote, der unzeitgemäße, von Wahn besessene, verlachte and verspottete fahrende Ritter. Wie ist das möglich? Sollte sich Cervantes nichts dabei gedacht haben? ("It is not Cervantes who pronounces the discourses, but Don Quixote. Don Quixote, the out-of-season, delusional, mocked and derided knight-errant. How is this possible? Should not Cervantes have thought it through?") (Weinrich 1956: 70).

This brief and selective sampling of critical judgements about Don Quixote's discourses serves to paint a picture of an enduring fascination with an insane maker of lucid speeches. Yet we should also remember the knight-errant's rhetorical gaffes, no less numerous, that nurture both the comedy

and drama of the work. As an orator, Don Quixote is also infamous for his bombastic praises of chivalry and chivalric romances that draw the ridicule and the ire of his audience, his seemingly unmotivated and extemporaneous philosophical and moral pontificating that leaves the audience dumbfounded, his overly rude or incongruously courteous addresses to persons that he mistakes for characters in a chivalric romance. Evidently, the character's relationship with the art of speaking is complicated, ambiguous, and deserving of scholarly enquiry. Given that Don Quixote's discourses are moulded by the real-world conventions of rhetoric yet belong to a fictional character and are pronounced in a fictional context, this study would inevitably touch upon the general problems of rhetoric and the links between the art of eloquence and the genre of the novel.

Despite the obvious importance of the protagonist's discourses in the novel, and frequent mentions of Don Quixote's rhetorical skills in Cervantine criticism, there have been relatively few thorough attempts to study the character's use of rhetoric, at least until recent years. Emilio Hidalgo-Serna attributes this long-standing critical prejudice to a general rejection of rhetorical thought that has permeated modern literary criticism for a significant time:

...casi todas las interpretaciones sobre el Caballero de la Triste Figura fueron hechas siempre en perjuicio del decir y el pensar retóricos, y desde la perspectiva racionalista-idealista que ha dominado el pensamiento moderno. [...] Recordemos que el pensamiento moderno se hizo siempre el sordo a la palabra retórica y al ingenioso método de filosofar y revelar lo particular mediante un lenguaje imaginativo. El lenguaje racional y la lógica tradicional despreciaron sistemáticamente el discurso metafórico y retórico. (Hidalgo-Serna 2004: 1049-1050)

What This Study Is, and Is Not

This work of research aims first and foremost to elucidate, however

possible in a study of this length, the structure and meaning of the “Quixotic rhetoric”, that is, persistent patterns in the protagonist’s delivery of discourses. Through a close reading of select episodes in the novel, the study explores their style, structure, with a particular attention devoted both to their connections to the rhetorical thought of Renaissance Spain and departures from the rhetorical tenets of the time. In addition, it considers the reaction of other characters (including the narrator) to Don Quixote’s rhetorical displays, and especially the potential discrepancies between the discourse’s critical reputation and its fortune within the novel.

Defining what exactly constitutes an “act of rhetoric” and/or a “discourse” of Don Quixote’s is a complicated question that requires careful delineation and explanation. There are two extremes here: either discarding most of the novel as mere “filler” between Don Quixote’s orations and concentrating on a limited list of Quixotic speeches, or giving an overly generic and amorphous treatment of rhetoric in the novel, devoid of solid textual basis. If some sort of equilibrium is to be found, one has to find a working definition of a “discourse” within the context of the novel. Curiously, while most studies freely use the words *discurso* / “discourse” and their many synonyms, precise definitions are much harder to find. In Anglophone Cervantism, “speech” and “discourse” seem to be completely interchangeable, while Spanish-language studies of *Don Quixote* either exclusively use *discurso* or employ a number of synonyms found in the work itself (*arenga*, *plática*, *razonamiento*, etc.).

Also, there have been very few attempts to establish a corpus of Don Quixote’s speeches. Studies by Heinz-Peter Endress (Endress 2009: 142-144) and Ángel Rosenblat (Rosenblat 1971: 359) include a corpus of

discursos found in the novel, not limited to those of the protagonist but also including speeches made by secondary characters. Endress devotes considerable attention to establishing a certain benchmark for speeches and justifying his corpus, while admitting that the German word “speech” (*Rede*) has a very malleable definition and can vary significantly in scope and meaning. Even more importantly, he distinguishes “rhetoric inside a conversation” (“Rhetorik innerhalb der Konversation”, borrowing the term from Hatzfeld), for a speech addressed to a single person and used as a part of an ongoing conversation, and “proper discourses” (“regelrechte Reden”), implying a relatively large audience and a tangible goal to convince the listeners and sway their opinion (Endress 2004: 50).

In a later study dealing exclusively with Part II (Endress 2015), Endress suggests a similar but slightly more nuanced system of classification. He draws a distinction between a *discurso* (speeches addressed to a group of persons, a number of listeners, or a proper audience) and a *razonamiento* (directed to a single person and often a by-product of an ongoing dialogue or conversation; Endress 2015: 14-15). The difference between the two is not simply numerical. What Endress classifies as *discursos* aim at changing the audience's mind (“la intención y el fin de convencer y persuadir a los que están escuchando”; Endress 2015: 14-15). Conversely, *razonamientos* have little bearing on the plot, do not represent the protagonist's attempts to defend or impose his ideals, and generally amount to window dressing or “pausas en el movimiento narrativo” (Endress 2015: 15); however, they are still essential for rounding out Don Quixote's character.

While useful and mindful of the importance of audience in the novel, the *discurso/razonamiento* dichotomy has its flaws. For example, it is

arguable that Don Quixote's retort to the grave churchman in II.22 is actually directed at a single person, with the Duke's and Duchess' presence being purely incidental and only acknowledged in the final words of the speech. Also, criteria for what constitutes a proper "discourse" can be extremely shaky. Even a very inclusive corpus would fail to incorporate brief remarks, asides, dialogues, etc., which are often no less important to understanding the workings of the hidalgo's rhetoric than the lengthiest of discourses. Also, such a corpus would essentially reduce Cervantes' text to a jigsaw puzzle of rhetorical set pieces, undermining the thematic and textual connections between different displays of Don Quixote's rhetoric. Another potential complication is that not all of the protagonist's speeches throughout the novel have the same textual significance, cultural relevance, or amount of criticism devoted to them. The most famed discourses – such as the Golden Age, the Arms and Letters, and the debate with the Canon – have generated a sizeable critical literature, and it would be intellectually dishonest to simply brush aside what other researchers have written over the years. However, many critical clichés have been repeated in relation to the same number of select discourses, and many "lesser" speeches have been overshadowed by the more famous ones or simply under-analyzed. These nuances and complications could be found in other discourses as well, demonstrating the problems inherent in purely taxonomical categorisations of Don Quixote's speeches. Therefore, I have decided to abstain from establishing a fixed corpus of Don Quixote's oratory and/or a purely sequential analysis. Instead, I have opted to explore it in terms of recurring tropes, themes, and patterns (as a result, several examples from the same discourse appear in different chapters, as they illustrate different points or

facets of Don Quixote's rhetoric).

Over the last decade, various facets of the "rhetoric in *Don Quixote*" topic have developed considerable critical traction. This recent spurt of interest explains a certain slant toward recent works in the citations and the bibliography of this thesis, as excellent studies of various rhetorical concepts kept appearing literally as it was being written. That said, my analysis would have been incomplete without "close readings" that examine the finer points of Don Quixote's oratory. Moreover, it would be counterproductive to limit the scope to a general overview of the protagonist's rhetorical methods without going into specifics and seeing how they actually function throughout the text. Therefore, I endeavoured to maintain parity between the general and the specific, shifting the focus as required to elucidate the problem of the protagonist's rhetoric. In a work as sprawling and varied as *Don Quixote*, each individual discourse is as important as "the big picture" of the titular knight-errant's use and misuse of rhetoric.

This study is *not* a history of Spanish Renaissance rhetoric or an attempt to establish the exact sources from which Cervantes drew in creating Don Quixote's rhetorical portrait. Even though a study of the (mis)use of rhetoric in a fictional work is inconceivable without examining treatises and manuals both ancient and modern, I find tracing Cervantes' handling of rhetoric to specific and definite sources an almost impossible task. Cervantes, definitely not the *ingenio lego* of Romantic legend, was definitely familiar with the rules of rhetoric to the extent that was required from any writer of his time. His knowledge of Classical sources and interest in contemporary Humanist writing, including rhetorical treatises, has been, after many years of neglect, given due attention in more recent studies (such

as Barnés Vázquez 2009).

In his critique of Américo Castro's extreme fascination with Cervantes' alleged Neoplatonism and Erasmism, Close highlights the areas "que más debatían los propios humanistas, y que en el caso de Cervantes son mucho más significativos", among them Ciceronian controversies, rhetoric doctrines of *copia* and *amplificatio*, Castiglione's incorporation of eloquence into the courtly code (Close 2005: 246-247). However, the author of *Don Quixote* was not a learned Humanist attempting to write a manual of eloquence or a fictionalised commentary on the rhetorical conventions of his time. In addition, due to numerous gaps in Cervantes' biography, his familiarity with specific rhetorical manuals is more often than not a matter of pure conjecture. Even though assuming Cervantes' familiarity with the most fundamental and omnipresent of rhetorical sources (Classical writers or compendia thereof, rhetorical manuals and exercises) is perfectly valid, endlessly checking turns of *Don Quixote*'s phrase against rhetorical treatises of the day in order to establish some tenuous connection appears counterproductive.

Among other complications of this approach, one should also consider the highly formulaic nature of many works of rhetoric. Ideas and concepts first formulated in Classical Antiquity are often recycled with minor alterations by dozens of Renaissance theorists, and the same tropes and figures described in most treatises with remarkable repetitiveness. Given the amount of overlap between Classical and Renaissance treatises, I find it an almost futile endeavour to pinpoint the exact source of tropes or figures used in *Don Quixote*, or, for that matter, most other works of Golden Age prose fiction. While working with Classical and Renaissance sources, I found that

the following caveat perfectly encapsulates the potential problems of tracing the treatment of rhetoric in a work of fiction to one definite rhetorical source:

...la mayor parte de las veces, no parece ni que el texto literario sea resultado de unas directivas retóricas de época, ni que las leyes retóricas se hayan obtenido de textos literarios contemporáneos [...] Me parece a mí que, si los investigadores de la literatura del siglo XVI quieren sacar más frutos de textos retóricos, han de buscar también un nivel de generalidad más abstracto (Garrido Gallardo 2005: 69-70).

Long neglected, the rhetorical tradition of the Spanish Renaissance presently appears to be a rapidly developing field of Golden Age research, in synchrony with a globally reinvigorated interest in rhetoric as a whole. Over the last quarter of a century, it has undergone a veritable explosion. In his analysis of the growth of scholarship on the subject since the 1980s, Don Paul Abbot observes: “Renaissance rhetoric had perhaps become the most-studied subject in modern scholarship” (Abbott 2010: 82). The scholarship of the Spanish Renaissance is no exception; it would suffice to name excellent new critical editions of rhetorical treatises (such as: Vives 2000; Sánchez de las Brozas 2007; and many others) and collective volumes dedicated to Spanish Renaissance rhetoricians (e.g., Strosetzki 1995). A direct consequence of this renewed interest is the fact that existing general histories of Spanish rhetoric, once regarded as indispensable and cited in even the most recent articles related to rhetoric in *Don Quixote* (Rico Verdú 1973; Martí 1972; López Griguera 1994), are rapidly becoming obsolete. The lack of an up-to-date exhaustive overview of Spanish rhetorical thought that would serve as a compass to a non-specialist in the history of rhetoric becomes sorely noticeable, especially given the still nebulous and ill-defined limits of the Spanish rhetorical “canon”. In addition, a study concerned with

only a select few implications of rhetorical theory in a single work would be unable to do justice to the entire variety of Classical and Renaissance rhetorical ideas without degenerating into a tedious recapitulation of existing fundamental studies on the subject, eclipsing the main object of the study – that is, Cervantes’ novel.

Bearing this pitfall in mind, I have opted to put Cervantes’ text first and rhetorical treatises second, bringing them up only to illustrate or put into context a specific feature of the novel’s treatment of rhetoric. As a result, I decided to keep the various excursions, digressions about Spanish rhetorical thought, and quotations from primary rhetorical sources to a necessary minimum, always putting the text first, only using them to provide the context for certain traits and patterns in the novel, and only when such digressions are relevant for a historically correct analysis of Don Quixote’s discourses. I opted to limit myself to the sources that appeared shortly before or during Cervantes’ lifetime, preferably in print.¹ While not refraining from citing texts that would be deemed “obscure”, I placed the main emphasis on treatises that are most likely to have been well known in Renaissance Spain. That includes, among Classical authors, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian; among Renaissance theorists, Luís Vives, El Brocense, Huarte de San Juan, et al. I have also considered authors of more specialised treatises, such as courtly rhetoric (e.g., Castiglione, Gracián Dantisco and Della Casa) or church oratory (e.g., Luis de Granada et al.). Obviously, the major Roman and Greek writers on the arts of rhetoric (primarily Aristotle, Cicero,

¹ A notable exception includes Dámaso (or Damasio) de Frías *La conversación discreta*, (written around 1579, only published in the twentieth century). There is enough circumstantial evidence (the most prominent being Cervantes’ praise of Frías in *La Galatea*) supporting the conjecture that the author of *Don Quixote* was familiar with Frías’ works, even unpublished ones, and even knew him personally.

Quintilian) are brought up together with their Renaissance followers.

The division of rhetoric into “chivalric” and “Humanistic” has its flaws, even though this dichotomy is no mere critical *ad-hoc*. The reader is invited to draw a line between chivalric oratory and the rest by the novel itself, where Don Quixote’s audience or the narrator often comments on the difference between him speaking on chivalric matters and on philosophical or moral themes. However, while there are textual grounds for separating Don Quixote’s discourses into two categories, the separation should not be simplistic and driven to support a preconceived idea about how the character’s rhetoric actually works. All too often, this division can appear as an attempt to present Humanistic speeches as a manifestation of the character’s *lúcidos intervalos*, and thus “good”, while seeing chivalric orations as an expression of Don Quixote’s madness, and thus “bad”. As will be shown, there is significant overlap, both thematic and stylistic, between discourses inspired by romances and Classical culture.

The mechanistic application of the *loco/cuerdo* paradox to Don Quixote’s discourses, where conventional Renaissance rhetoric is all *cuerdo*, and chivalric speeches are all *loco*, loses much of its credibility after a close reading of the text. Even in the most lauded of Renaissance discourses, like the Golden Age or the Arms and Letters, there are more than enough holes in logic, incongruous arguments, or unwarranted shifts of style. In a similar manner, such a completely insane enterprise as praising Orlando and Amadís for their madness in I.26 is rhetorically impeccable from a technical standpoint. Therefore, while acknowledging and maintaining the distinction, I tried to avoid all of the facile critical solutions that it might suggest and heed Helmut Hatzfeld’s advice (“tenemos que abandonar la sencilla fórmula

que presentaba al hidalgo completamente loco en cuanto atañe a la caballería, pero cuerdo y prudente en todos los problemas vitales”; Hatzfeld 1966: 407).

Taking all of the above into account, it is useful to summarise that this thesis is focused on the following questions:

- 1) How exactly do Don Quixote’s discourses function (and/or fail to function)? What are the mechanisms used by Cervantes to create an impression of the protagonist’s rhetorical competence (or lack thereof)? How do the audience’s reaction, narrator’s comments, and further developments show that a particular speech is effective (ineffective)? Are there any discernible patterns in Don Quixote’s discourses that consistently lead him to rhetorical triumph or failure?
- 2) How does Don Quixote depart from the rhetorical rules and expectations of the Spanish Golden Age? What do the subject and style of his discourses have in common with the rhetorical thought of his day, and “specialised” forms of rhetoric in particular (forensic, courtly, religious, etc.)? How does moving beyond the typical confines of rhetorical discourse affect the audience’s (and the reader’s) perception?
- 3) To what extent does the nature of *Don Quixote* as a work of fiction, and a putative originator of the novelistic genre, affect its representation of rhetorical discourse? Is the mad hidalgo’s mishandling of rhetorical rules a satire of rhetoric as a whole? What is the meaning of the protagonist’s use (and misuse) of rhetoric for the relationship between rhetoric and the novel?

Cervantes, Rhetoric and the Novel: Bakhtin

The question of the relationship between rhetoric and the emergence of the novel as a genre requires a particular explanation. As described in a passage from Marc Fumaroli's seminal study of Early Modern rhetoric cited below, the very notion of a connection between the novel and rhetoric has long seemed problematic, especially when dealing with the genre's origins:

Les historiens de la littérature – et les écrivains parfois – se défendant de la rhétorique, même au sens généreux où je l'entends, en l'opposant au roman: la fiction narrative serait l'essence pure et indépendante de la littérature. Cette autre résistance à la rhétorique entraîne pour la littérature contemporaine un principe de rétrécissement et d'anémie, et pour la littérature d'Ancien Régime, une méconnaissance de sa véritable fonction. [...] Dans ses ressorts et dans sa genèse, le roman est une branche vigoureuse de l'art de bien dire, et il n'y a rien de déshonorant pour lui, au contraire, à avoir le *tronc commun* qu'il partage avec les autres genres littéraires de discours" (Fumaroli 1994: xvii).

The problem of the interrelationship between rhetoric and the novel (especially the Early Modern novel) is a complex one and has been given much less attention than it deserves. In relation to *Don Quixote*, I find Mikhail Bakhtin's treatment of the topic particularly relevant. In spite of Bakhtin's vision of the novel being based mostly on Dostoyevsky and Rabelais, it bears a direct connection to Cervantes. *Don Quixote* is copiously referenced throughout Bakhtin's writings, and Howard Mancing is correct in his assertion that "[n]o other author or work is cited nearly as often as Cervantes in this segment of Bakhtin's writings in which he most specifically sets forth his concept of the novel" (Mancing 2000: 154). So is Rachel Schmidt in noting that "[a]lthough Dostoyevsky and Rabelais enjoy marquis roles in Bakhtin's novelistics, gracing the titles of two major works, Cervantes plays a role that, in fact, serves to provide community and stability to Bakhtin's evolving thinking" (Schmidt 2011: 266).

The very act of bringing Bakhtin into Cervantine studies is hardly novel anymore, and reiterating the whole complex of his ideas on *Don Quixote* is hardly necessary. As Rachel Schmidt points out, “[d]ue largely to his prestige as a theorist, Bakhtin’s interpretation of *Don Quixote de la Mancha* has received broad airing, at times in an unquestioning mode, among literary scholars” (Schmidt 2011: 239). It is useful, however, to point out Bakhtin’s ideas regarding the relationship between the novel and rhetoric with direct relevance to *Don Quixote*, as they normally enjoy much less attention than such Bakhtinian concepts as “dialogism” and “the carnivalesque”. Far from fetishising them, this study uses Bakhtin’s thoughts on the novel-rhetoric relationship as a point of departure.

The notion of rhetoric is often referenced in Bakhtin’s work *Slovo v romane (Discourse in the Novel)*, which contains seminal thoughts on the generic relationship between novel and rhetorical discourse. Far from being polar opposites, they are, according to Bakhtin, locked in a state of mutual attraction and repulsion that is particularly relevant for the novel’s emergence as a genre (emphasis in the quote mine):

The novel, and artistic prose in general has the *closest genetic, family relationship to rhetorical forms*. And throughout the entire development of the novel, its intimate interaction (both peaceful and hostile) with living rhetorical genres (journalistic, moral, philosophical, etc.) has never ceased... But in this uninterrupted interrelationship, novelistic discourse preserved its own qualitative uniqueness and was never reducible to rhetorical discourse. (Bakhtin 1981: 269)

While being either ignorant of or hostile to other forms of language and discourse, rhetoric, by offering a systematic if rigid view of discourse, is ultimately beneficial for the development of the novel. However, the novel, a genre that, according to Bakhtin’s theory, encompasses all other forms of discourse and non-fictional genres, can never be explained from rhetoric

alone (even though Bakhtin places its birth in the Renaissance, in the midst of a dominant and triumphant rhetoric). Rhetoric is *a* discourse, not *the* discourse; it is not the ultimate answer to all stylistic and creative challenges. This “irreverence” of the novel as a genre, its dependence upon pre-existent rhetorical tradition mixed with its refusal to acknowledge its complete dominance and incorporation of different forms of “lower-class”, “unpolished”, “uncodified” discourse, has been explored at length by Bakhtin. As summarised by Kay Halasek, Bakhtin depicts rhetoric as one of the many discourses of a turbulent historical era, to be ultimately overcome and integrated by the nascent genre:

The novel is able to represent on a single plane of discourse the heteroglossia of an era, its various strata of everyday, professional, academic, ideological, and generational discourses. Rhetorical discourse is only one of these and remains secondary in Bakhtin's corpus. It is banished to the realm of everyday and pragmatic matters. Rhetorical genres play a role in Bakhtin's historical poetics but only insofar as they promote the novel. (Halasek 1992: 4)

Given the novel's propensity to assimilate wildly different forms of speech genres and registers of language, as well as challenge all sorts of commonplace, *idées reçues*, and truths pretending to be absolute, the ambiguity of its relationship to rhetoric becomes even deeper. For all of the novel's perceived iconoclasm, irreverence, and rejection of everything official and sanctified, it is still indebted to the dominating rhetorical culture. While it may ridicule and subvert the “rigid” and “fossilised” discourse of the officialdom, it accepts its rules by the very act of integrating those discursive forms in its structure. The novel is both engendered by a rhetorical culture and strives to break free from its bonds; the rhetorical discourse, with the entirety of its complex rules and decorum, is never simply cast aside, but neither is it venerated.

The relationship with rhetoric in Bakhtin's thought is one of the most important distinctions between *romance* (or, in his designation, the *First Stylistic Line* of the novel)² and (Early) modern novel (*Second Stylistic Line*). While the romance is already distinct from "pure" rhetoric or poetry, it knows only one language and one style. Other forms of discourse are at its periphery and influence its development in a limited but influential way. The romance, not unlike a rhetorical treatise, seeks to rationalise and streamline all discourse into a homogeneous whole. Still, according to Bakhtin, "the *auto-criticism of discourse* is one of the many distinguishing features of the novel as a genre" (Bakhtin 1981: 412), meaning that the novel as a genre is "programmed" to take apart, rethink, and challenge normative discourses, including its own. Further elaborating on the concept of auto-criticism, Bakhtin describes two extreme types of parody – "external and crude literary parody", where "nothing more than parody is intended", and "romantic irony", notable for its "almost complete solidarity with the parodied discourse". *Don Quixote*, he argues, stands "midway between the two extremes", with its "profound but cunningly balanced dialogism of parodying discourse" (Bakhtin 1981: 412).

The terminology used by Bakhtin in this passage is rather vague and anachronistic. What he calls "romantic irony" definitely predates the emergence of Romanticism; in fact, one has no need to look further than Cervantes' own send-up of pastoral tropes in *Coloquio de los perros*, coming from an author of a pastoral romance. In addition, "parody" is an infamously contested and ill-defined term, one that Bakhtin never properly

² Russian, as most other languages apart from English, knows no meaningful distinction between *romance* and *novel*; the only existing word, *roman*, is used to encompass both concepts, and the difference between the two is difficult to convey in Russian without resorting to ad-hoc terminology.

delineated, employing it in all its corresponding vagueness. Nevertheless, Bakhtinian concepts of the novel as a parody of rhetoric, autocriticism of discourse, and “romantic irony” (an affectionate parody that manifests solidarity with the very object of its ridicule) – all directly tied to *Don Quixote* by the author – are the ones that I believe to be most useful in elucidating the paradox of Quixotic rhetoric. The notion of Cervantes parodying the overused tropes and the flowery language of chivalric romances in his novel is a time-honoured critical cliché; the notion of this parody extending to rhetoric as a whole is an entirely different angle.

While this study does not completely take Bakhtin’s vision of rhetoric for granted, or stipulate that Cervantes was actively parodying the entirety of Renaissance rhetorical thought, it does adopt the notion of “auto-criticism of rhetoric” as an essential concept for a work both born out of the Renaissance rhetorical mind and rich in discourses outside the limits of rhetorical *decorum*. One of the principal goals of the study is tracing the auto-critical treatment of typical tropes, stylistic elements, and the entire mentality of rhetoric, as employed by the protagonist. Bakhtin interprets this auto-criticism as transposing discursive tropes and conventions into a “real-world” context that exposes their inner contradictions and inherent faults. Following this idea of Bakhtin’s but departing from his reliance on the notion of “realism”, this study enforces the “auto” in “auto-criticism”. In the Renaissance, subversion and challenge of the normative discourse more often than not comes from those nurtured by the rhetorical tradition: the example of *Persiles* shows that Cervantes was perfectly able to employ rhetorical discourse in a straightforward, non-ironic manner. Earlier, *Praise of Folly*, with its satire of pedantry and all forms of vacuous verbosity came

from one of the most learned and refined Humanists of the day. As a result, the close reading of Don Quixote's discourses in this thesis is equally attentive to traditional, expected and orthodox elements in the character's speeches and to manifold departures from the rhetorical standard – hence the “use” and “misuse” of the thesis title. A major part of the analysis is examining how *Don Quixote* manages to both uphold the rhetorical norm and subvert it by presenting norm-breaking discourses that appear convincing (or at least sympathetic) in spite of their failure to adhere to rhetorical laws.

Taking Bakhtin's theory of the *two stylistic lines* into account, it would be helpful to speak of *two stylistic lines* in the use of rhetorical tropes and conventions in Cervantes' novel. I am referring to rhetoric *per se*, as an art of speaking (and the use of language in general) formulated by generations of Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance theorists, and “rhetoric as purple prose”, the imaginative, elevated, and ornate language of the chivalric romance (*chivalric language*, to borrow Howard Mancing's term) that, in one of the most telling cases of life imitating art, influenced real-world rhetorical conventions and speech genres (e.g., the precedent of *Amadis* used as a letter-writing manual in France). Within this system of coordinates, exploring the varied array of Don Quixote's discourses allows us to understand Cervantes' skill in representing various forms of rhetoric through his character. Therefore, a significant part of the analysis will be devoted to the significance of Don Quixote's use and misuse of rhetoric for *Don Quixote* as a novel and for the novel as a genre.

CHAPTER I:
RHETORICAL CONCEPTS AND QUIXOTIC RHETORIC

As noted in the Introduction, the concepts employed in this chapter are not the ones used in traditional rhetorical analysis (such as *exordium*, *elocutio*, *pathos*, etc.) and pertain to the general notions of rhetorical thought. This choice was made to avoid a pedantic and largely formal anatomising of Don Quixote's discourses that would do little to explain their function in the text and eventually lead to a facile explanation of all instances of rhetorical misuse and failure as a simple deviation from an infallible code of laws. Far from being an arbitrary collection, the proposed list of concepts is directly related to the problem of rhetorical propriety and effectiveness, a central rhetorical tenet that Don Quixote constantly struggles with and never truly overcomes. An analysis of these concepts demonstrates how Don Quixote's discourses intersect with the preoccupations of the Renaissance rhetorical thought and even directly reference some debates of the day, showing their relevance for rhetorical thought in general. Moreover, the concepts presented are either directly mentioned or referenced in *Don Quixote* or are alluded to in more oblique ways. For example, if *admiración* (together with similar words) is used dozens of times, the concept of *aptum* is invoked with more discreet methods (like demonstrating Don Quixote's failure to impress his audience by using the wrong rhetorical devices). Finally, the concepts analysed in this chapter have previously been the object of critical attention, some of them (like *ingenio*) accumulating a vast literature of their own. Nevertheless, most of their studies have rarely been integrated into a discussion of Don Quixote's rhetoric and directly applied to

specific examples of the hidalgo's eloquence.

The names of the concepts are almost exclusively presented in their Spanish form, as opposed to Latin or English (e.g., *prudencia*, and not *prudentia* or prudence). This is done as a form of deliberate linguistic estrangement, as we are dealing with these words not in their modern English meaning, but within the context of the Spanish cultural milieu in the Golden Age. In addition, this would facilitate their application to Cervantes' text (and also to those of other Spanish authors cited in the chapter). Historical and linguistic digressions regarding the concepts were kept to a necessary minimum, ever subordinate to the governing task of exploring the peculiarities of Don Quixote's speaking style.

Ingenio

Throughout the history of Cervantine studies, the concept of *ingenio* and its relation to *Don Quixote* has never lacked of scholarly attention. One compelling reason is that it is, to cite the obvious, referenced in the full title of the novel as the appellation of the protagonist. As Amadís is a *virtuoso caballero*, as Esplandián is *esforçado*, so is Don Quixote *ingenioso*, and this characteristic is bound to have some deeper significance. The dominating critical tradition in the interpreting the characteristic of *ingenioso* and the concept of *ingenio* can be traced to Rafael Salillas' study *Un gran inspirador de Cervantes: El Doctor Juan Huarte y su Examen de ingenios* (Salillas 1905), which postulated the influence of Juan Huarte de San Juan's *Examen de los ingenios* on Cervantes' novel, particularly its portrayal of the protagonist's insanity, with manifold parallels to Huarte's theories of mental disease. For a significant period of time, *Examen de los ingenios* has been

lionised as an important, possibly even the principal, source of Cervantes' inspiration for *Don Quixote*, and as a first manifestation of modern psychology and psychiatry.

While the single-minded focus on Huarte's treatise as the ultimate explanation of Don Quixote's character has considerably waned, there are some residual effects that keep affecting the study of *ingenio* in relation to *Don Quixote*. For instance, *Examen de los ingenios*, while first and foremost a medical study, contains many unconventional ideas on the art of speaking, which justifies its study as a treatise on eloquence. However, Huarte's name is conspicuously absent from one authoritative general study of Spanish rhetoric (Rico Verdú 1973) and is mentioned only in passing in another one (Martí 1972: 85, 261, 262, 329). While there is a general study of Huarte's linguistic and literary ideas (Torre 1977), these have been rarely applied specifically to *Don Quixote* (especially in comparison with the purely medical side of Huarte's thought). In addition, the *Examen* tends to completely overshadow other Renaissance studies of *ingenium*. Even though Huarte de San Juan was far from the only author to have written on the concept, studying *ingenium* in relation to *Don Quixote* has for the most part become synonymous with studying *Examen de ingenios*. Even Harald Weinrich's classic study (Weinrich 1956), despite forays into many different Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance sources, is primarily centered around Huarte de San Juan as the ultimate source of Cervantes' inspiration.

My approach in studying *ingenio* within the novel is to center on the rhetorical dimension of the concept, while almost entirely avoiding its physiological and medical implications (already well studied elsewhere; see, for example, Green 1970). Not entirely discounting *Examen* as a source, I

will draw attention to the work's more "literary" (and usually glanced-over) theories.

It has been something of a tradition to interpret Don Quixote's *ingenio* as an unbridled, elemental creative force. The word's etymology, derived from the Latin verb *gignō* 'to beget', 'to spawn', implies a process of mental (pro-)creation not unlike its physical counterpart, with the natural instinct of propagation and reproduction transposed into the realm of the mind (Maldonado de Guevara 1958: 157). The urge is powerful, all-consuming, and, more often than not, not tempered by good judgement or self-restraint; the products of *ingenio* need to be subjected to the power of reason and discernment. Stephen Gilman notes that, "[i]n the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *el ingenio* and *la invención* were often used to signify two phases of the creative process. *Ingenio* engenders or generates (*engendra*), while *invención*, governed by the understanding (*entendimiento*), slowly and conscientiously gives artistic form and coherence to whatever was engendered" (Gilman 1989: 101). To make full use of *ingenio*, a good author or speaker needs both a creative gift and a cautious, tempered mind to bring his creations into shape, lest he produce a terrible freak of nature: "In other words, it is indispensable to possess the gift of *ingenio*, but it must be guided and shaped by invention [...] However, when, as in Don Quijote's mad romance of himself *ingenio* is divorced from invention and allowed to run wild, only bizarre and arbitrary apparitions can be expected" (Gilman 1989: 102). In a similar manner, Ernst Curtius argues that, in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance aesthetics, "[a] genius for clever invention degenerates into a fault if not coupled with judgment. *Ingenium* and *iudicium* can, then, be in opposition" (Curtius 1953: 296).

While this component of *ingenium* is an important part of the concept's wide and somewhat vague spectrum of meanings, it is by no means tied to irrationality or poetic furor, especially in its original incarnation. For instance, Cicero explicitly linked *ingenium*, reason, and eloquence in *Brutus* (xv. 59), seeing the latter as the ultimate expression of the former: “for as reason is the glory of man, so the lamp of reason is eloquence” (*ut enim hominis decus ingenium, sic ingeni ipsius lumen est eloquentia*) (Cicero 1971: 58-59). Therefore, it is entirely plausible, especially within Vives' interpretation of *ingenium*, to understand *ingenioso* as ‘rhetorician’:³

If rhetoric, like all arts, is a response to necessity, and if *elocutio* (public speaking) is its special object [...], then verbal beauty and keenness must each receive equal consideration inventing an oration: the art “of speaking with particular grace, and of inventing with especial keenness, originated in necessity” (*sed ornatius dicendi, et acutius inveniendi, ex necessitate fluxit*). The close relation of rhetoric to *ingenium* rests above all on *this keenness in invention – one of the essential components of rhetoric*. (Hidalgo-Serna 1983: 235-236)

Don Quixote is also *ingenioso* in the sense of an unstoppable zest for varied knowledge. Judging by the diversity of his discourses, his wide repertoire of literary and cultural references not in any way limited to the romances, and a general unmitigated fascination with the written and printed word, one can only agree with Harald Weinrich's assertion that “die Materie seines Ingeniums ist universal, sofern man die Universalität des Wissens nicht über Gebühr wörtlich nimmt” (“the matter of his *ingenium* is universal,

³ It would be tempting to extend the meaning of *ingenioso* to ‘writer’, ‘poet’, or ‘creator’, given Don Quixote's mastery of fabricating all forms of fictions and believing in them himself. However, Christine Orobítg's study of the evolution of the meaning of *ingenio* in the Spanish Golden Age (Orobítg 2014) shows that a direct link with literary creativity (later culminating in a complete semantic drift of *ingenioso* to ‘author’) did not occur until the later 17th century.

as long as one does not take universality of knowledge too literally”) (Weinrich 1956: 70).

Given that his knowledge of chivalric romances is at least equally impressive, Don Quixote possesses a unique set of knowledge, liberally borrowing from both the Classical/Humanist and the chivalric storehouses of tropes, images, similes, references, etc., freely combining them in unique ways. According to Anthony Close, Don Quixote’s tendency to cite and reference texts far beyond the scope of his fascination with Spanish chivalric romances – namely, Classical epic, pastoral poetry, *Orlando Furioso*, humanist treatises, moral maxims, the Bible, legal codes, etc. – is one of the major factors that make the character interesting to the sufficiently cultivated reader (Close 2005: 46). Likewise, Laplana Gil asks “hasta qué punto los versos heroicos y las figuras retóricas de la épica, los razonamientos amorosos de los libros de pastores, entre ellos *La Galatea*, o los discursos de libros de caballerías [...] pudieron instruir su fogosa imaginativa en el manejo intuitivo de la retórica” (Laplana Gil 2004: 103). This prodigious erudition highlights another consequence of Don Quixote’s status as *ingenioso*: his enormous memory and capacity for improvisation, both qualities being of great use to any orator. Alfonso Martín Jiménez goes as far as to affirm that “[e]n efecto, una característica fundamental de don Quijote, reflejada en la misma palabra «ingenioso» que aparece en el título de la obra, consiste precisamente en que es un magnífico orador, el mejor orador posible, y este aspecto esencial no ha sido suficientemente advertido por la crítica” (Martín Jiménez 2000: 172).

Ingenio-as-creativity suggests a possible answer to the fundamental rhetorical riddle: just where does Don Quixote’s awareness of rhetoric come

from? Don Quixote, as far as the reader is aware of his pre-chivalric life, has never studied or practiced the arts of speaking, and his library, as examined during the *donoso escrutinio*, is completely devoid of any Classical writers on rhetoric or contemporary rhetorical manuals. Neither do we see him engage in preparatory exercises, an imperative procedure for any student of rhetoric. Even a character as entirely devoid of formal learning as Sancho cites a specific discursive genre (sermons) and a specific rhetorician (the village priest) as a point of reference for his speeches (Cervantes 2004: 229; 397; 797). The protagonist, however, never acknowledges any rhetorician as his teacher or cites a treatise or manual to complement his point. As a result of this paradox, the following question posited by Harald Weinrich still remains valid:

Sind nun die Reden und Gespräche Don Quijotes Äußerungen des durch die Besessenheit gesteigerten Ingeniums oder des ursprünglich guten Ingeniums, das in den lichten Augenblicken zutage tritt? (Don Quixote's speeches and dialogues – are they utterances of an *ingenium* bolstered by obsession, or those of a once-sound *ingenium* that shows itself in lucid intervals?) (Weinrich 1956: 71)

Another substantial, if seldom-reflected upon paradox of writing on *ingenio* in *Don Quixote* is the paucity of direct references to the concept in the novel proper (as opposed to its title and paratexts such as chapter headings). Francisco Rico notes that, “en el volumen de 1605, para nuestra sorpresa (de incautos), *ingenioso* es palabra que no se aplica jamás al protagonista en el cuerpo del relato propiamente dicho” (Rico 2005: 128). Part I, as Francisco Rico mentions, is indeed entirely devoid of such mentions, and there are very few appellations of Don Quixote as *ingenioso* in Part II: Cide Hamete, in a direct aside to the reader, in II.8; The Duchess in II.30; and the narrator once again, in one of the novel's closing lines, in

II.74 (“[e]ste fin tuvo el ingenioso hidalgo de la Mancha”; II.74; Cervantes 2004: 1335). The last mention is a particularly important one: the protagonist is no longer referred to as “caballero” or “Don Quijote” (as he has been cured of his insanity and has repudiated his knight-errant identity), but the reference to *ingenio* remains intact.

This further implies that Don Quixote’s *ingenio* is much more than mad creativity, poetic lunacy, and other Romantic concepts. Even though he is no longer mad, he remains *ingenioso* to the very end, as if insanity were not a necessary condition to sustain it. Even more telling is that Cervantes reaffirms Don Quixote’s *ingenio* at the very end of the novel as he pronounces his hero dead. Aurora Egido sees it as a sign that the *ingenio* is a quality largely independent of the character’s madness: “la última palabra aplicada al héroe ya no tenga que ver con el par *discreción/locura*, sino con el ingenio [...] sólo un ingenioso pudo ser a la vez discreto, prudente y loco” (Egido 2011: 293). As a result, it can be argued that Don Quixote’s strange *ingenio* operates at an intersection between reason and insanity, both amplifying and hindering his rhetorical capabilities, empowering his fantasy and love of invention while hindering his rhetorical self-control and restraint.

Discreción and Prudencia

These virtues are perhaps even broader in scope than the concept of *ingenio*, and subject to a comparably convoluted change in meaning and lack of a simple, clear description. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the two concepts were subject to considerable mutations in both semantics and and developed, to quote Timothy Chesters, “overlapping and sometimes contradictory meanings” (Chesters 2013: 104). The connection between the

terms *discretio* and *prudentia* is an ancient one, particularly in the context of ascetic and moral theology. Both were used as a translation of the Greek philosophical term *μέτρον* (“measure”) and gradually became almost synonymous around the 13th century, largely due to the influence of Thomas Aquinas (Chesters 2013: 107). The interrelation of the two words endured well into the Golden Age; for example, Dámaso de Frías’ *La conversación discreta* (1579) advised that every prudent man would be discreet, but not every discreet man, prudent (Frías 1926: 14), clearly alluding to a governing confusion regarding the limits of the two virtues.

As the Spanish Golden Age unfolded, the rhetorical component of the *discreción* came to the fore. In later Golden Age texts, it is quite common to encounter *discreción* as a near-synonym for eloquence, and *discreto* as an epithet of a good speaker. Dámaso de Frías expressly claimed that “al bien hablado comúnmente le llaman discreto” (Frías 1926: 18). This association with eloquence became so ingrained in the language of the era that *discreción* underwent a further semantic drift, its precise meaning becoming increasingly loose. Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio notes “una cierta ambigüedad semántica del concepto de discreción que según los autores equivalía a prudencia (o a una de sus partes), entendimiento, discernimiento, juicio, *sindéresis*, cordura, agudeza de ingenio, sagacidad e incluso cautela” (Álvarez-Ossorio 1999: 36). The scope of meanings enumerated by Ryan Schmitz is even broader:

Exceptionally broad in its scope, discretion encompassed such diverse qualities as mental sharpness (*agudeza*); ingenuity (*ingenio*); clear judgment (*juicio*); and good sense (*cordura*). Additionally, discretion referred to social intelligence and the art of conversation; it was often paired with forethought, caution, and dissimulation (*circunspección*, *recato*, *disimulación*); grace and affability (*gracia*, *donaire*); and eloquent communication appropriate for the social context, including the use of

witticisms, clever repartee, and the proper use of humor, such that it would not harm third parties (*avisado, advertido, elocuencia, cortesanía*). (Schmitz 2013: 446-447)

Also, due to the strong association of *cortesanía* and *discreción*, the phrase *discreto cortesano* became a frequent and almost-tautological cliché. According to Margaret Bates, “*cortesano* and *discreto* are used synonymously so dependent is one upon the other” (Bates 1945: 77). This *discreto – cortesano* connection of the Spanish Golden Age culture is one that Cervantes was aware of; Harald Weinrich even states that, for the author of *Don Quixote*, *discreción* is a specifically courtly virtue (“spezifisch höfische Tugend”; Weinrich 1956: 84). This association is also attested by a minor character in the novel, who makes a brief but important comment on the subject. In II.19, a licentiate met by Don Quixote and Sancho gives the following appraisal of the courtly language: “El lenguaje puro, el propio, el elegante y claro, está en los discretos cortesanos, aunque hayan nacido en Majalahonda: dije *discretos* porque hay muchos que no lo son, y la *discreción* es la gramática del buen lenguaje, que se acompaña con el uso” (II.19; Cervantes 2004: 858). It is both typical and unusual that the licentiate (whether he is Cervantes’ mouthpiece or not is a whole different matter) associates courtiers with *discreción-as-eloquence*, but concedes that not all *cortesanos* are *discretos*, and not all *discretos* are *cortesanos*. In addition, the Salamanca-educated scholar lends his authority, however small, to the concept of *discreción-as-rhetoric*, equating the virtue with the art of eloquence. A similar understanding of *discreción-as-eloquence* is to be found in II.22, where the villagers express their gratitude to Don Quixote for intervening at Camacho’s wedding: “le graduaron la *discreción*, teniéndole por un Cid en las armas y por un Cicerón en la *elocuencia*” (II.22; Cervantes

2004: 882) or in II.51, where Don Quixote's letter⁴ to the newly-fledged governor of Barataria is met with following reaction: "oyó Sancho la carta con mucha atención, y fue celebrada y tenida por discreta, de los que la oyeron" (II.51; Cervantes 2004: 1146).

Prudence, discretion's twin virtue, is defined in just as vague and generic terms by the European Renaissance mind:

Le "vocabulaire de la prudence" dans différents genres de textes [...] lui confère une place singulière au milieu de ses sœurs, par le flou ou plasticité de ses définitions. Aussi, définir la prudence revient souvent à décrire l'homme prudent: c'est dans le champ d'expérimentation qu'elle peut être saisie [...] Visage changeant aussi parce qu'elle absorbe des notions voisines: mesure, vigilance, providence, entendement, considération, circonspection... (Berriot-Salvadore, Pascal, Roudaut, Tran 2012: 8)

Its prodigiously wide applications did include the domain of rhetoric, following the tradition of applying the concept of "practical reason" (*phronesis* in Greek, *sapientia* in Latin) developed by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* and Cicero in *Orator*. Victoria Kahn, analysing multiple passages from both Classical thinkers, concludes that

...[i]n Cicero's view, then, even more than in Aristotle's, the faculty of prudence is inseparable from the ideal practice of the orator. Both the orator and the prudent man are concerned with the domain of probability, and both know that they can only be effective in this domain by acting according the rhetorical standard of decorum. [...] Furthermore, the prudent man and the orator are not only analogous for Cicero; they are ideally the same [...] Cicero's point is not simply that the orator has the rhetorical skills of persuasion that will enable the prudent man to achieve a particular end, but the latter is prudent precisely by being an orator. (Kahn 1985: 35)

In the Renaissance, "it was Cicero's presentation of the orator that was particularly attractive to many Renaissance humanists" (Kahn 1985: 36). Among them, we can distinguish Juan Luis Vives, who gave it a particular

⁴ The fact that it is a letter and not a proper discourse should not confuse us, as epistolary arts of the Renaissance were seen as a subset of rhetoric (see, for example: Rice-Henderson 1993), and it is represented orally (if not by Don Quixote himself).

important place among the qualities of an ideal orator. In Vives' pedagogical programme, the virtue of prudence takes precedence over mere skill with words: "The aim of education is different for Vives than for other Humanists who take „vir eloquens“, rather than „vir bonus“, through prudentia, as the means to demonstrate worldly wisdom" (Strosetzki 2014: 530). Generally, while the definition of the concept in the Renaissance can be extremely nebulous. However, the core of their usage in Golden Age Spanish culture is visibly "social", revolving around not only common sense and good judgment, but also eloquence, reserved speech and calculated behaviour. Thus, every mention of *discreción* and/or *prudencia* in *Don Quixote* might hold a precise meaning heavily dependent on the situation, character, or idea in question, sometimes – to be expected of a master of wordplay – even folding several connotations into one.

Whatever the exact nuance of either *discreción* or *prudencia* used in the text, *Don Quixote*'s established chivalric madness places him in an extremely vulnerable position relative to these virtues. They invariably presuppose a sound mind, good judgement, an ability to act depending on the situation at hand, distinguish between wise and unwise decisions, and carefully pick one's words and actions. These attributes are rather evidently, and consistently, lacking in a protagonist out of his mind.

In *Don Quixote*, there is a consistent opposition between *discreción* and all forms of madness, stupidity, or incongruity. Margaret Bates (Bates 1945: 4-6) cites nearly twenty such examples. Rather than reiterate the list, I will adduce only the most telling ones, directly related to audience reactions. For example, Diego and Lorenzo de Miranda marvel at the knight-errant's praise of both poetry and chivalry: "de nuevo se admiraron padre y hijo de las

entremetidas razones de don Quijote, ya discretas y ya disparatadas” (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 852). Likewise, Don Juan and Don Jerónimo react to Don Quixote’s narration of his adventure in the following way: “Aquí le tenían por discreto y allí se les deslizaba por mentecato, sin saber determinarse qué grado le darían entre la discreción y la locura” (II.49; Cervantes 2004: 1216).

These descriptions only solidify the impression that, if discretion is to be understood as a separation of truth from falsehood, lucidity, or discernment and a property of a sound mind, the hidalgo fails; in fact, as a madman, he is directly *opposed* to *discreción*. Bizarre pronouncements and actions on Don Quixote’s part are a “testimonio extremo de su locura, por no hablar de su absoluta falta de discreción” (Egido 2011: 206). In II.6, there is even a moment when Don Quixote directly references discretion-as-discernment and gives it a borderline parodic treatment (emphasis in the quote mine):

Hombres bajos hay que revientan por parecer caballeros, y caballeros altos hay que parece que aposta mueren por parecer hombres bajos: aquellos se levantan o con la ambición o con la virtud, estos se abajan o con la flojedad o con el vicio; y *es menester aprovecharnos del conocimiento discreto para distinguir estas dos maneras de caballeros*, tan parecidos en los nombres y tan distantes en las acciones. (II.6; Cervantes 2004: 735)

Nevertheless, if there is any textual evidence of Don Quixote’s discretion-as-discernment (and his sense for eloquence in general) at all, it is his ability to *recognise good rhetorical displays made by other characters*. He praises Marcela’s passionate and well-constructed apology, and, in the mock-judicial environment of the episode, passes a semblance of a verdict based on her words: “Ella ha mostrado con claras y suficientes razones la poca o ninguna culpa que ha tenido en la muerte de Grisóstomo [...]; a cuya

causa es justo que, en lugar de ser seguida y perseguida, sea honrada y estimada de todos los buenos del mundo...” (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 170). Several times, Don Quixote lauds Sancho for presenting truly witty or unusually profound arguments or viewpoints. His praise includes direct references to the concept of discretion, such as “Sancho bueno, Sancho discreto, Sancho cristiano, y Sancho sincero” (II.9; Cervantes 2004: 782) and “...qué de discreciones dices a las veces! No parece sino que has estudiado” (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 398).

Regarding prudence, the twin virtue of *discreción*, understood as “common sense”, “good judgement”, or “discernment”, this is a quality obviously lacking in an insane character. If we define it as “the art of knowing when to act or sally forth and – especially – when to hold back” (Chesters 2013: 106), then the protagonist can only be qualified as singularly imprudent. Part I offers manifold and well-known examples of Don Quixote’s gross violations of common sense, inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and lack of caution or restraint. His obsessive and non-critical reading of chivalric romances is, by itself, a major sin against the virtue, in the words of Ángel Pérez Martínez, “la gran imprudencia” (Pérez Martínez 2012: 106). This imprudent obsession leads the protagonist to such ill-conceived acts as charging at the windmills/giants, the duel with the Biscayan, releasing the convicts, etc. While the pattern is less prevalent in Part II, it contains such telling episodes as the knight’s adventure with the caged lions or his consistent failure to see through the charade set up by the Duke and Duchess.

To elucidate the strange functioning of prudence in Don Quixote’s mind, it would be useful to turn to the character’s own references to the

concept, explicit and implicit, and especially to the supposed paragons of this virtue that the knight-errant recognises or professes to imitate. Don Quixote's praise of Amadís in Sierra Morena contains one of the first direct references to the concept. First, while explaining the very concept of paragons and imitation to Sancho, he cites the iconic example of Ulysses as an embodiment of prudence (“...así lo ha de hacer y hace el que quiere alcanzar *nombre de prudente y sufrido*, imitando a Ulises, en cuya persona y trabajos nos pinta Homero *un retrato vivo de prudencia y de sufrimiento*”; I.25; Cervantes 2004: 300; emphasis mine). However, the model that Don Quixote intends to follow is Amadís, who showed an example of multiple virtues during his penance: “Y una de las cosas en que más este caballero mostró su *prudencia*, valor, valentía, *sufrimiento*, firmeza y amor, fue cuando se retiró, desdeñado de la señora Oriana, a hacer penitencia en la Peña Pobre...” (Cervantes 2004: 300; emphasis mine). The described virtues of Amadís encompass both qualities that Ulysses is famous for, cited shortly before by Cervantes, implying the knight's superiority over the hero of antiquity, and making him a worthy substitute for Ulysses as a model of prudence. As a result, it is “la supuesta prudencia de Amadís que don Quijote quiere imitar, dándola por buena” (Egido 2011: 205).

The fact that Amadís' stint as a hermit is hardly illustrative of his prudence does not seem to dissuade Don Quixote, and neither does the evidence that “el retrato de un Amadís prudente, retirado a hacer penitencia como Beltenebros, está muy lejos de los supuestos tradicionales de la filosofía moral” (Egido 2011: 206). The model that he chooses is that of a

“chivalric prudence”,⁵ diametrically opposed to the expectations of prudent behaviour in the real world but reflecting those of the romances. As an additional example of chivalric prudence, Don Quixote also invokes another *Amadis* character, Queen Madasima, “muy prudente y muy sufrida en sus calamidades” (Cervantes 2004: 262).

An unusually subtle instance of “chivalric prudence” occurs in the episode with Holy Brotherhood, where Don Quixote tries to calm down the passions and makes a reference to the quarrel of Agramante and Sobrino in *Orlando Furioso*. While his words are clearly lost on the *cuadrilleros* (“no entendían el frasis de don Quijote”; I.45; Cervantes 2004: 576), and a peaceful solution is found through different means, the narrator wryly remarks that the passions were cooled “por la autoridad de Agramante y prudencia del rey Sobrino” (I.45; Cervantes 2004: 577). The purported prudence of an irate Moorish king comes up a second time during Don Quixote lengthy harangue on chivalric virtues that signifies his return to madness: “¿Quién más prudente que el rey Sobrino?” (II.1; Cervantes 2004: 691). The narrator is evidently ironic about Sobrino being an example of prudence (doubly so, as Don Quixote’s reference explicitly failed to resonate with the audience), while the knight-errant himself is apparently completely serious.

This recurrent citation of disparate “models” of prudence is hardly

⁵ It should be noted, however, that the virtue of prudence was often mentioned as befitting an ideal knight and enshrined by Medieval manuals of chivalry and/or government. For example, the Spanish translation of Egidio Colonna’s *De regimine principum* (1292) spoke of “prudencia caballeril”, necessary “para gobernar la caballería” (Rodríguez Velasco 1996: 325). In addition, Don Quixote does also invoke other conventional models of prudence, mentioning, apart from Ulysses, “Julio César, animosísimo, prudentísimo y valentísimo capitán” (II.2; Cervantes 2004: 702; emphasis mine).

unintentional and quite probably carries the same meaning as other contrasts of Classical and chivalric references in the novel. Ulysses and Caesar are universally accepted paragons of prudence, their status sustained by the authority of Greek and Roman culture; the concept of prudence applied to the characters of *Orlando Furioso* carries significantly less weight, and “prudencia de Amadís” is openly ridiculed by the narrator. Judging by these references, Don Quixote is doubtlessly aware of the concept and is trying to emulate it; however, the dissimilar models he tries to imitate distort this ideal and might be one of the reasons for the hidalgo’s failure, adversely affecting not only his actions, but also his rhetoric.

In the episode of Don Quixote’s ill-fated speech to the *rebuznadores* (II.27) – which will be brought up many more times – Cervantes imbues the protagonist with an uncharacteristic sense of prudence. Instead of rushing headlong into the battle and letting his *temeridad* sort out the quarrel of the two villages, Don Quixote resorts to careful use of words to assuage the villagers' tempers and appeal to their reason, common sense, and good judgement. Even if Sancho, and Sancho alone, is to blame for the failure of the discourse and the ensuing violence, Don Quixote avoids rash decisions and cautiously picks his words even when he has every reason to be furious at his squire. In the following chapter, instead of lashing out at Sancho – who not only fails to recognise his mistake, but even brazenly blames Don Quixote for a lack of courage – the protagonist presents a well-tempered rhetorical apology of his withdrawal from the battle. He explicitly refers to the virtue of prudence and showing restraint, and, while invoking chivalric authority, deliberately refrains from overly specific examples that tend to bog down his arguments:

...la valentía que no se funda sobre la basa de la prudencia se llama temeridad, y las hazañas del temerario más se atribuyen a la buena fortuna que a su ánimo. . Y, así, yo confieso que me he retirado, pero no huido, y en esto he imitado a muchos valientes que se han guardado para tiempos mejores, y desto están las historias llenas, las cuales, por no serte a ti de provecho ni a mí de gusto, no te las refiero ahora. (II.28; Cervantes 2004: 943)

Don Quixote's contrasting of *prudencia* and *temeridad*, even if probably made only to save face, is a direct callback to II.17, where he showed a singular lack of prudence while dealing with the caged lions. In his reproach, Diego de Miranda both invoked *temeridad* and, to make his speech more appealing to Don Quixote, quoted chivalric precedent, also non-specific:

Señor caballero, los caballeros andantes han de acometer las aventuras que prometen esperanza de salir bien dellas, y no aquellas que de en todo la quitan; porque la valentía que se entra en la jurisdicción de la temeridad, más tiene de locura que de fortaleza. (II.17; Cervantes 2004: 832)

Not only do Don Quixote's words echo those of the *discreto caballero de la Mancha* – he shows an uncharacteristic ability to learn from his mistakes and accept other viewpoints, both hallmarks of a prudent man. In addition, it is curious how closely Don Quixote's arguments echo Falstaff's definition of discretion as “better part of valour”, also presented to cover the character's escape. Also once again, he is using a sound argument based on a *discreto*'s moral philosophy to defend behaviour based on chivalric models – however, this time the imitation of chivalric models leads Don Quixote to a logical decision (retreat from a battle with an enemy both more numerous and better armed) instead of senseless acts like chopping wineskins or climbing into a lion cage.

Another important example of Don Quixote's rhetorical prudence can be encountered in II.32, where the hero faces constant rhetorical challenges

to his dignity and the things he holds dear, as well as outright verbal abuse. Even though his body language is as impulsive as ever and heedless of societal decorum (“sin guardar respeto a los duques, con semblante airado y alborotado rostro, se puso en pie y dijo...”; “temblando de los pies de cabeza como azogado, con presurosa y turbada lengua dijo...; II.32; Cervantes 2004: 970-971), his actual retort to the churchman is remarkably restrained. The beginning of the speech reveals Don Quixote's cognizance of his social situation and laws of courtly behaviour that preclude him from responding to the *eclesiástico's* vitriol with physical violence. He is moderating his characteristic *temeridad* with unusual *prudencia*:

El lugar donde estoy, y la presencia ante quien me hallo, y el respeto que siempre tuve y tengo al estado que vuesa merced profesa, tienen y atan las manos de mi justo enojo... (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 971)

Aurora Egido notes that, in his reaction, “Don Quijote demuestra [...] unas cualidades dialécticas implagables, poniendo todos los recursos de la oratoria al servicio de la justificación de sus actos como caballero andante” (Egido 2011: 258). The knight-errant's new-found prudence shows itself once more later in the chapter when the Duchess questions the existence of his damsel (her arguments and the knight's response are analysed at length in Chapter II). Here, the protagonist demonstrates unusual calm and restraint, carefully laying forward his defence of Dulcinea against one of the most devious attacks on her dignity in the entire novel. The Duchess even remarks that her interlocutor “va con pie de plomo y, como se dice, con la sonda en la mano” (Cervantes 2004: 981) – an expression meaning, according to the commentary on the same page, “con extremada prudencia y muy despacio”.

These examples of Don Quixote's hits and misses related to prudence and discretion suggest that, quite possibly, the protagonist can be at ease with some elements of the concepts while constantly enduring trouble with others. This parcelling of *discreción* and *prudencia* was actually considered by Golden Age rhetorical thought. A passage in Dámaso de Frías' treatise postulates that it is entirely possible to be *discreto* in some areas and lack *discreción* in others, and specifically addresses the rhetorical implications of the problem:

En la discreción [...] acaece semejantemente ser unos avisados y muy discretos en todo lo que es buena razón y estilo de conversación y trato, hombres en lo demás del todo perdidos y sin algún concierto [...] Veréis otros en las cosas ajenas discretos y de acertados consejos, sin que en las suyas ni para sí tengan alguno; otros que para sí solos saben y son prudentes; muchos hay discretísimos en cuanto es utilidad y provecho, en lo que es cortesía y conversar, rústicos y silvestres, como si nunca vieran gentes [...] tanto son entre sí diversos y más mucho que en rostros y semblantes en sus estudios y ejercicios los discretos. (Frías 1929: 72-73)

In addition, it is worth adducing the Canon's impassioned exhortation that urges Don Quixote to see the error of his chivalric ways. It shows an understanding of *discreción* specifically as an art of applying one's talents where they are due, as well as interpreting *ingenio* as an art of speaking and creativity – a “most felicitous talent” of Don Quixote's:

¡Ea, señor don Quijote, duélase de sí mismo y redúzgase al gremio de la discreción y sepa usar de la mucha que el cielo fue servido de darle, empleando el felicísimo talento de su ingenio en otra letura que redunde en aprovechamiento de su conciencia y en aumento de su honra! (Cervantes 2004: 616)

As a result, it can be postulated that Don Quixote (and Cervantes through him) put the concepts of discretion and prudence to the test by exploring most of their extremely wide spectrum of meanings, associations, and connotations. The protagonist consistently falters whenever discretion

and prudence are understood as a virtue of common sense, discernment, or moderation. In the rhetorical dimension, this deficiency implies an inability to rein in his flourishes of eloquence, adapt the discourse for the needs and abilities of the audience, or refrain from unnecessary verbiage when the moment is right. At the same time, Don Quixote does meet the more generic definition of *discreto* as an eloquent, learned, and educated speaker, as his speeches are often held in high regard and sometimes even create an impression of his renewed lucidity (another meaning of *discreción* and an essential component of *prudencia*). The main “culprit” in his deficiency of discretion and prudence is his chivalric-themed insanity. According to Maureen Ihrie, “Don Quijote’s fidelity to chivalric essences leads him to erroneous judgments more often than not, but the accuracy of the other elements involved in judging helps tie the errors closer to the truth” (Ihrie 1982: 61).

In general, the author of *Don Quixote* departs from conventional models and intentionally gives his characters some, but not all, traits of a broadly understood *discreción* and *prudencia*. In his sane condition, Don Quixote would reliably function as a brilliant speaker; were he a stock lunatic character, his speech would have none of these qualities. As argued by Aurora Egido, “donde Cervantes rompe los moldes tradicionales es en el desarrollo de los discursos concertados y discretos, además de ingeniosos, que van a salir de la boca de don Quijote y pese a su aparente carencia de juicio” (Egido 2011: 191).

The notion of the *aptum* referred to rendering the discourse appropriate to a certain audience, situation, or qualities of the speaker himself in order to maximise its effectiveness. The concept was closely related to the notion of *decorum* – propriety with respect to social standing and linguistic prestige – although some writers (e.g., Cicero) conflated the two. For all its basic nature, the notion was often seen as notoriously hard to pinpoint, and finding the correct tone and style for every situation was deemed a hallmark of a true orator. For instance, Cicero’s *Orator* (xx.70 – xxi.71) postulates that “[i]n an oration, as in life, nothing is harder than to determine what is appropriate [...] The universal rule, in oratory as in life, is to consider propriety. This depends on the subject under discussion and on the character of both the speaker and the audience” (Cicero 1971: V, 357-359). Whatever the true nature of a certain thing, its value is entirely dependent on proving it to the audience (xx.73): “Although a word has no force apart from the thing, yet the same thing is often approved or rejected according as it is expressed in one way or another” (Cicero 1971: V, 73). According to Alberto Blecua, Cervantes saw this precept of eloquence as the ultimate end of rhetorical arts:

Es muy probable que Cervantes creyera que el orador era un *vir bonus dicendi peritus* según la conocida definición de Catón difundida por Quintiliano; sí es seguro que para él el fin de la retórica era el conocimiento de los medios de persuasión del oyente o lector a través de un discurso que mantuviera perfectamente el decoro – lo *aptum* – entre el orador, el tema y el público. (Blecua 1985: 134)

Aptum, compared to others, is probably the rhetorical characteristic that Don Quixote is most consistently (and often disastrously) at odds with, doubly so when the speech in question has a connection to chivalry. The question of pervasive chivalric tropes or allusions in the protagonist’s

speeches will be dealt with at length in Chapter III. Here, it would be probably sufficient to acknowledge the evident fact that most of Don Quixote's audience have no immediate knowledge of or familiarity with romances of chivalry, chivalric poems or ballads, or any similar literature making references to such works highly counterproductive. Those who do (the innkeeper of the fist sally, Vivaldo, the Canon, the Duke and the Duchess) never give chivalric fiction the same amount of esteem, let alone reverence, as the protagonist does. At best, the romances are seen as guilty pleasures, at worst, an affront to good taste and morality. Invocations of Amadís and his ilk would hardly seem a worthy addition to even the most intelligent argument. Yet Don Quixote, for most of his chivalric career, refuses to acknowledge that referencing romances in the presence of non-enthusiasts is a quick path to self-induced rhetorical failure. Even if we perceive Don Quixote as an "evangelist" of chivalry, trying to "convert" the uninitiated to his chivalric "faith" by propagating it through word and deed, then we should also admit that his mission is an abject failure. Don Quixote's rhetorical behaviour has been characterised as "perverse stubbornness" (Close 1978: 104) and "deafness to his own lapses of tone and decorum as well as to other people's" (Williamson 1984: 158-159).

The character's problems with *aptum*, it seems, stem from the same difficulties that we have established with regard to *discreción* and *prudencia*. There is significant overlap between the concepts in certain areas, as all of them refer to the awareness of one's surrounding's, the ability to pick and choose, and manifest sound judgement and moderation. This connection, for example, is particularly evident in the following passage from *La conversación discreta*, arguing that true *discreción* is found in

accommodating one's speech and its presentation to the audience (emphasis in the quote mine):

Es, pues, su oficio del discreto no otro que con un gentil y acertado discurso de razón, saber *acomodar las cosas de que trata* y tratar dellas conforme al decoro del lugar, del tiempo o de las personas, del porqué, y así de las demás circunstancias [...] Y aunque el discreto deba tener muy sabidas las cosas de que hablare, pero *no tanto en conocimiento* dellas [...] *cuanto en el modo y manera de tratarlas* se echa de ver su discreción. (Frías 1929: 83-84)

Another significant feature of Don Quixote's rhetorical behaviour is his consistent – and insistent – attempt to control the flow of the conversation, regardless of its context, social setting, or general appropriateness. It seems that instigating a conversation and controlling its flow is an end in itself for the hidalgo. Saying that he always turns the subject of the discussion to his favourite subject (chivalry) would be an exaggeration reducing him into a one-note stock character. Still, Don Quixote's rhetoric is insistent and imperious; if he has an opinion or a point to make, it *will* be heard. This goes completely against the grain of what was advised by Classical rhetorical thought. Øivind Andersen observes that “[a]ncient writers on rhetoric seem overwhelmingly to hold that art must be concealed, and that the display of art is counterproductive to the speaker's trustworthiness and persuasiveness. They favour what is known as the principle of *dissimulatio artis*, or the *ne ars appareat* principle” (Andersen 1996: 69). Making oratory too obvious would place the speaker at a severe disadvantage: “In his deployment of *figures*, the orator must above all be careful not to overdo things. *Aptum* is to a large extent a matter of moderation. [...] An orator who overdoes it proves himself simply an inept speaker, who is not able to see what is appropriate. Too much ornamentation is the refuge of weakness” (Andersen 1996: 72-73).

While Classical rhetoric emphasises the forensic value of *aptum*, Renaissance rhetorical thought shifted the focus to social propriety, giving the virtue distinctly courtly features. Don Quixote is at odds with this aspect as well. All too often, the protagonist comes off as self-absorbed and egotistical, clashing with his self-proclaimed selfless ideals and completely subverting the subdued, non-adversarial discourse expected of courteous behaviour. The hidalgo's refusal to understand the demands of the audience and alter his rhetorical style can be seen as a sign of his fascination with the sound of his own discourses and their exquisite, if often overwrought and obtuse, syntax, vocabulary, and phonetic. Analysing his Golden Age speech as an example of this trend, Mary Mackey concludes:

As one would expect, Don Quijote, who makes almost no attempt to cater to his audience, neglects them in favor of the *figurae verborum*. He concentrates not on who hears his discourse, but on what is heard. (Mackey 1974: 61)

The tone-deaf insistence on being heard and ill-conceived choice of audience and place to deliver a discourse is, as Dale Shuger notes, a trait characteristic not only of Don Quixote but also of real-world madmen documented in early seventeenth-century Spain:

Real madmen, then and now, often take up topics and arguments from mainstream discourse. Men who voiced social criticism or theological disputes, but did so obsessively or in contexts where they did not seem appropriate (even as criticism or dispute), were often marked as mad. (Shuger 2012: 52)

The question of rhetorical effectiveness naturally grows out of the concept of *aptum*. As it logically stems from Classical treatises on rhetoric, a discourse delivered in the wrong way to the wrong audience in the wrong circumstance cannot be effective and is doomed to fail. That is exactly the result of most of Don Quixote's discourses in the novel. Be it the audience-

alienating speeches in favour of the chivalric order, laden with obscure references to the romances, the “inútil razonamiento” that is the Golden Age discourse delivered to illiterate goatswains, the misguided orations to the convict guards, or the dispute with the Canon or the Duke and the Duchess, there is always a gross miscalculation involved. Most of the time, Don Quixote never considers why certain arguments would always fall flat or why the audience might be indifferent or even hostile to his speech.

Nevertheless, a harsh verdict on Don Quixote’s relationship with *aptum* would be premature and unjust without considering how the concept is significantly stretched and modified in the novel. Don Quixote, however insane, seems to be cognizant of the concept’s existence, and some of his rhetorical displays, even clearly unsuccessful, do contain at least an attempt to size up the audience or make sure the speech would connect to them in some way. A typical example here is Don Quixote’s address to the *rebuznadores* in II.27, with a carefully executed *captatio benevolentiae* and a well-constructed argument appealing to the warring villagers’ common sense and piety. Its effects are ruined not by any fault of Don Quixote’s, but due to Sancho’s monumentally idiotic decision to imitate a donkey’s braying. After the ensuing battle, the knight-errant chastises his squire with a proverb that, in typical folklore imagery, describes the very concept of *aptum*: “¿Y dónde hallastes vos ser bueno el nombrar la sogá en casa del ahorcado?” (II.28; Cervantes 2004: 942).

Compare the Golden Age speech – completely lost on the entire audience, declared an “inútil razonamiento” by the narrator and often considered a thoroughly misplaced, if moving and eloquent, piece of oratory. An evident and gross violation of *aptum* in this case is Don Quixote's use of

an image taken from Classical myth and replete with numerous artistic and philosophical connotations when the audience lacks the requisite cultural background to appreciate, or even understand, the orator's handling of the subject. The rustic Sancho and the no less rustic goatswains are far removed from Humanistic erudition, and the speech leaves them “embobados y suspensos”. There is not much arguing that, from a traditional rhetorical standpoint, Don Quixote has failed to connect with his audience, and his failure is directly attributable to ignoring the absolute requirement of *aptum*. In the words of Heinz-Peter Endress, “Cervantes subraya que está perfectamente al corriente de la virtud elocutiva del *aptum* o decoro: con su discurso don Quijote ha infringido la ley fundamental de la retórica, válida desde Aristóteles hasta Perelman, según la cual el orador ha de adecuar el modo de tratar su asunto a la condición de su público” (Endress 2009: 206).

However, it would be all too easy to completely write off the case of the Golden Age speech as a flagrant violation of *aptum*. There is a certain *redoublement* of rhetorical aptitude in the episode, as Don Quixote clearly moulds his speech to appeal to the idealised image of the shepherd shaped by pastoral fiction. In Don Quixote's bookish mind, the pastoral setting not only invites references to the mythical idyllic Golden Age – it even makes them mandatory. While incongruous with the down-to-earth mores of “real-world” goatswains, it is just as much appropriate for the situation given the literary and cultural associations invoked by the setting. Barry Ife describes the heart of the problem: “There is low pastoral and high, the eloquence of Don Quixote's vision of the golden age and the bathos of Sancho's and the goatherds' response...” (Ife 1996: 120). Don Quixote did err with the register of “high” and “low”, but his speech is in no way a *non sequitur*: it is

firmly in line with the pastoral connotations of the episode and is directly inspired by its setting. The speaker is clearly cognisant of the concept and, to the best of his ability, delivers a speech he deems appropriate for the circumstances and the audience, with its main flaw being confusing literary and mundane versions of the pastoral.

Another layer of the *aptum* problem in the episode is that the implied reader of the novel, doubtlessly familiar with the common tropes of pastoral literature, would be expected to have the same set of associations and expectations of Arcadia as Don Quixote (who, as the *donoso escrutinio* of his library shows, is an avid reader of the pastoral). While analyzing the hidalgo's Golden Age discourse, Mary Mackey makes a singularly important observation that, to my knowledge, has been mostly overlooked by Cervantism in general and studies of Don Quixote's rhetoric in particular. She postulates that there are two sets of audiences for the Golden Age discourse: the *ostensible* (the one described in the novel) and the *actual* (the reader); while the implied reader of the novel has the requisite cultural background to appreciate the discourse, the rustic goatswains do not (Mackey 1974: 62). Dominick Finello uses similar terms to separate the reaction of the characters from that of the readers (emphasis in the quote mine): "Don Quijote's *immediate audience* may not find them pleasing because they cannot grasp the meaning of his address; but Don Quijote's audience is really a *universal audience*" (Finello 1998: 86).

Taking into account potentially contradictory reactions of the ostensible (characters) and actual (readers of the novel) pushes the understanding of rhetorical *aptum* into a completely different direction not covered by Classical or Renaissance rhetorical thought. Were Don Quixote's discourses

pronounced by an actual person in a real-world setting, they would be perceived as outright failures due to their violations of decorum, and rightfully deemed as such by traditional rhetorical theory. But the presence of the reader, stemming from *Don Quixote*'s status as a work of fiction, adds a whole new system of coordinates to their analysis. The "reader-oriented" interpretation of Don Quixote's discourses – implying that he speaks more to the reader of the novel than to other characters while engaged in a fit of oratory – is nothing new, dating from at least the Romantic era and perhaps most invoked in Perspectivist or Postmodern treatments of *Don Quixote*. Even researchers critical of Perspectivism acknowledge the potential of this interpretation; for example, Edwin Williamson points out Don Quixote's resonance with the reader's values and aesthetic sense in his best rhetorical displays, such as the Arms and Letters discourse or his conversations with Diego de Miranda:

It appears that Cervantes is interested in eliciting from his reader a degree of intellectual and moral identification with Don Quixote. There are occasions when the contemporary reader at least would have found himself in complete agreement with the ideas of the demented knight. (Williamson 1984: 157)

When applied specifically to the concept of *aptum*, this approach reveals manifold subtle strengths in Don Quixote's discourses that would be apparent only to the readers and not to the characters that form his audience in the novel. For example, the intricate interrelation of Golden Age and Arms and Letters discourses would only be noticed and appreciated by the "otiose reader", as their audiences are almost entirely different (the only character present in both episodes is Sancho, who definitely lacks the attention or cultural background to fully appreciate Don Quixote's rhetorical flourishes). Likewise, Don Quixote's epideictic oration on the incoming

flock of sheep (I.18), while doubtlessly rife with comedy, is not as entirely out of touch with its place and audience as it may seem. Much like in the Golden Age episode, Don Quixote is unwaveringly following “bookish logic”: the presence of shepherds warrants a pastoral-themed discourse; the presence of what resembles an advancing army calls for an elevated mock-Virgilian description. Frederick De Armas notes that Don Quixote, while mostly adhering to the rhetorical requirements of heroic narrative, is actually not that far from real-world rhetorical precepts. The deluded knight “contaminates the epic speech with elements from rhetoric, a part of what Cicero and Quintilian label *evidentia*, giving the impression that one is actually looking at events...” (De Armas 2011: 89). By evoking the sounds and sights of the dreamed-up opposing armies, Don Quixote heeds Quintilian's advice, and, De Armas argues, “as such he can be considered a good student of rhetoric – albeit one who believes in his imaginings” (De Armas 2011: 89). The irony of the protagonist's bizarre adherence to rhetorical rules in a ridiculous speech would not have been lost on a sufficiently educated reader. The potential of the speech to entertain the actual audience (the reader), as well demonstrate Don Quixote's familiarity with rhetorical tropes, is much greater than its function in the episode. Nonsensical in its immediate surroundings, the discourse becomes fascinating and impressive when read as a part of the larger whole – and this applies to many other displays of Don Quixote's oratory. At the same time, very few discourses are both appreciated by their ostensible audience and enjoy a high reputation with readers and critics. According to Mary Mackey,

[o]ne might even argue that Cervantes uses the problem of the dual audience to indicate Don Quijote's main intellectual flaw. The surest indication of his madness is his indecorousness. He speaks and reasons as though he were perfectly sane, yet he selects

the wrong time and place to indulge in such reasoning. His actions are seldom wrong in themselves and often correct for the actual audience, but they are completely inappropriate to his ostensible audience. (Mackey 1974: 63)

This additional layer of *aptum* is often ignored when judging the efficiency of Don Quixote's discourses, which – a point that needs to be reiterated – should not be judged as mere rhetorical exercises divorced from their function. Simply put, Don Quixote's failure to connect with his immediate audience does not equal his discourse not being apt for a reader. Many of his discourses, especially the *razonamientos* of Part II, might make little sense in their immediate surroundings – and Cervantes usually spares no effort in putting them in a “low” or comical deflating context. As noted by Edwin Williamson, the notion of having to agree with a madman over even the wisest and most profound of ideas is a source of endless confusion and unease for the implied reader:

Through Don Quixote, Cervantes seems to have decanted ideas, values and attitudes that express the ideological essence of the cultural tradition he has inherited. But this is precisely the nub of the mad/sane paradox: the vehicle of this ideology is a thoroughgoing lunatic, and the reader, when he happens to be in sympathy or agreement with the knight will find himself suddenly slipping into madness once again. (Williamson 1988: 158)

However, on their own, divorced from their immediate context, they can function as great examples of oratory, even though they fail to impress Don Quixote's listeners. Of course, some discourses (such as the famed Arms and Letters speech) score well with both audiences, and the reverse can also be true. For example, Sancho's interminable praise of his master's eloquence should be taken with a pinch of salt, as the speeches admired by the rustic often contain rhetorical flaws evident to the sufficiently educated reader. Thus, every discourse on Don Quixote's part resembles a

conversation with two persons at once, each able to draw his own conclusions and seeing the same utterance in a completely different light. Therefore, the dichotomy of audiences suggested by Finello and Mackey synergises well with Bakhtin's definition of *double-voiced discourse* (*dvugolosoie slovo*) – not directly applied by the Russian scholar to *Don Quixote*, but bearing great relevance for the character's use of rhetoric:

Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions... In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialog know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. Double-voiced discourse is always internally dialogised. (Bakhtin 1981: 324)

Admiratio

Admiración, together with related words (*admirado*, etc.) is perhaps the most frequently and explicitly mentioned rhetorical concept in *Don Quixote*. Eduardo Urbina counts more than 200 uses of the word in both parts of the novel and notes their even distribution over the text (“no predomina en ninguna de las dos Partes, y que no existe tampoco una concentración en un grupo limitado de capítulos o episodios”; Urbina 1989: 22). Jaime Fernández, by including near-synonyms and kindred words (*espanto*, *asombro*, *rareza*, *suspense*, etc.) raises this number to more than six hundred (Fernández 1999: 237). This abundance, however, is easily explained by *admiración* being a comparatively common word (and its kindred words even more widespread), and most of its use is non-terminological, referring to pure amazement or surprise rather than a category of rhetoric or poetics. Nevertheless, the concept merits particular attention, as much of its use in the novel is directly related to rhetorical acts and used in the description of

audience reactions.

In his study of *Don Quixote* as a “Menippean satire”, James A. Parr elevates *admiratio* to the rank of an “aesthetic imperative” (Parr 2006: 100, 215), considering its “requirements” a major driving force in Cervantes’ novel and using it as explanation for Don Quixote and Sancho “breaking character” by saying or doing something they normally would not. Parr’s interpretation of the concept seems to equate the expectations of Don Quixote’s or Sancho’s audience within the novel with those of the readers, as well being inadvertently paradoxical – if surprise and amazement are constant and expected, then their occurrences in the novel logically should quickly cease to be surprising and amazing for the reader. Nevertheless, there is a significant truth in this observation: rhetorical *admiratio* in the novel is, in fact, something of a constant. The textual formula of “*admirado(s) fue(ron) de...*” is introduced with very minor variations, whenever the speech, for good or ill, goes against the expectations of the audience.⁶

Unsurprisingly, Don Quixote is the character that most often causes *admiratio*, and, among audience reactions to his discourses, *admirado* is probably the single most frequent descriptor. While the stated reasons for the *admiratio* can be extremely varied, the frequency of the word signifies that Don Quixote’s discourses succeed in connecting with the emotions of the audience and stirring them. Whatever the reasons for the reaction, and whatever the consequences, the eloquent knight-errant always commands attention and leaves no one indifferent, even if his speech is bizarre or

⁶ An interesting narrator’s remark shows that this can happen even when a character is accustomed to Don Quixote’s weird behaviour: “Quedaron admirados los dos de lo que Sancho Panza les contaba; y, aunque ya sabían la locura de don Quijote y el género della, siempre que la oían se admiraban de nuevo” (I.26; Cervantes 2004: 322)

unintentionally hilarious. In fact, *admiratio* is an important sign of how Don Quixote's rhetorical power functions – while the ultimate message of the discourse may seem incomprehensible or completely detached from reality, the sheer rhetorical energy of the speaker is sure to challenge the preconceptions of the audience. John C. Adams makes a compelling case in favour of Don Quixote's discourses becoming more compelling thanks to the bizarrely creative nature of his illusions:

Quixote's hallucinations are a source of his rhetorical power for they inspire his speech and, in turn, effect [sic] one's judgments of his deeds[...] In the hierarchy of speech and action [...] speech triumphs over action, or put it another way – his speech is so compelling that it makes the common sense of the other characters in the novel seem seriously flawed to the point where the wiser characters may gauge their wisdom in the light of their susceptibility to Don Quixote's rhetoric. (Adams 1998: 434).

Conversely, Ángel Rosenblat sees the nucleus of the character's flair for causing *admiratio* in his ability to tackle moral and philosophical themes, something not expected from a character gone mad with chivalry: “Es el caballero de la palabra, sobre todo en la Segunda Parte, cuando sus discursos abordan cuestiones de filosofía moral que provocarán la admiración del narrador y de numerosos personajes” (Rosenblat 1971: 112). And, to add a Classical background to Rosenblat's chivalric comparison, the sheer abundance of *admiratio* caused by Don Quixote's rhetoric would have pleased Quintilian, who, together with Cicero (whom he cites as his predecessor), saw it as one of the principal components of oratorical arts:

Cicero in a letter to Brutus gets it right (I quote his exact words): “Eloquence which wins no admiration I judge no eloquence at all” (*Inst. Orat.* 8.3.5.; Quintilian 2001: III, 343)

While the general effect of *admiratio* does imply extreme amazement or fascination, the exact form and immediate reason for this reaction varies

considerably from discourse to discourse. In the following overview of audience reactions to Don Quixote's speeches that expressly mention *admiratio*, I found it useful to depart from Eduardo Urbina's distinction between "positive", "neutral", and "negative" forms of the concept. However, as this part of the study, unlike Urbina's article, is limited only to Don Quixote's discourses, and the evaluative terminology might prove subjective, I have opted to classify it according to *stated reasons* for *admiratio*. The first group encompasses reactions that reference the protagonist's *insanity* (or incongruous chivalric references) as the main reason; the second one includes those that either mention a *mixture of lucidity and madness* or acknowledge Don Quixote's sudden displays of sound reasoning or convincing eloquence. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of audience reactions illustrating the two proposed types of *admiratio* (most of them directly referring to the concept itself; emphasis in the quotations mine).

Admiratio at pure madness

El labrador estaba *admirado* oyendo aquellos disparates... (I.5; Cervantes 2004: 78)

...diéronle de comer, y quedóse otra vez dormido, y ellos, *admirados* de su locura. (I.7: 97)

Detuvieron los frailes las riendas, y quedaron *admirados*, así de la figura de don Quijote como de sus razones.... (I.8: Cervantes 2004: 108)

Por estas razones que dijo, acabaron de enterarse los caminantes que era don Quijote falto de juicio, y del género de locura que lo señoreaba, de lo cual recibieron la misma *admiración* que recibían todos aquellos que de nuevo venían en conocimiento della... (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 151)

Admirado quedó el oidor del razonamiento de don Quijote, a quien se puso a mirar muy de propósito, y no menos le *admiraba* su talle que sus palabras... (I.42; Cervantes 2004: 542)

Admirados se quedaron los nuevos caminantes de las palabras de don Quijote, pero el ventero les quitó de aquella *admiración*, diciéndoles que era don Quijote, y que no había que hacer caso dél, porque estaba fuera de juicio. (I.45; Cervantes 2004: 561)

...*admirábase* de ver la estrañeza de su grande locura. . . (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 614)

Admirado quedó el canónigo de los concertados disparates que don Quijote había dicho, del modo con que había pintado la aventura del Caballero del Lago...” (I.50; Cervantes 2004: 627)

...se rió y *admiró* el bachiller, considerando la agudeza y simplicidad de Sancho, como del extremo de la locura de don Quijote. (II.70; Cervantes 2004: 1303)

Admiratio at a mixture of lucidity and madness

Admirado quedó el canónigo de oír la mezcla que don Quijote hacía de verdades y mentiras... (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 620)

Admirado quedó el del Verde Gabán del razonamiento de don Quijote, y tanto, que fue perdiendo de la opinión que con él tenía, de ser mentecato. (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 828)

En todo este tiempo no había hablado palabra don Diego de Miranda, todo atento a mirar y a notar los hechos y palabras de don Quijote, pareciéndole que era un cuerdo loco y un loco que tiraba a cuerdo. No había aún llegado a su noticia la primera parte de su historia; que si la hubiera leído, cesara la *admiración* en que lo ponían sus hechos y sus palabras, pues ya supiera el género de su locura (II.17; Cervantes 2004: 838)

Díjoles que se llamaba de nombre propio don Quijote de la Mancha, y por el apelativo, el Caballero de los Leones. Todo esto para los labradores era hablarles en griego o en jerigonza, pero no para los estudiantes, que luego entendieron la flaqueza del cerebro de don Quijote; pero, con todo eso, le miraban con *admiración* y con respecto... (II.19; Cervantes 2004: 853)

(Sancho) ¡Válate Dios por señor! Y ¿es posible que hombre que sabe decir tales, tantas y tan buenas cosas como aquí ha dicho, diga que ha visto los disparates imposibles que cuenta de la cueva de Montesinos? (II.24; Cervantes 2004: 912)

El ventero, que no conocía a don Quijote, tan *admirado* le tenían sus locuras como su liberalidad. (II.26; Cervantes 2004: 933)

(after berating Sancho for his overly flattering praise of his discourse) Y con gran furia y muestras de enojo se levantó de la silla, dejando *admirados* a los circunstantes, haciéndoles dudar si le podían tener por loco o por cuerdo (II.48; Cervantes 2004: 1207).

...*admirados* de sus disparates como del elegante modo que los contaba. Aquí le tenían por discreto y allí se les deslizaba por mentecato, sin saber determinarse qué grado le darían entre la discreción y la locura (II. 49; Cervantes 2004: 1216).

Con esto se despidieron, y don Quijote y Sancho se retiraron a su aposento, dejando a don Juan y a don Jerónimo *admirados* de ver la mezcla que había hecho de su discreción y de su locura (II.59; Cervantes 2004: 1218)

Miráronse unos a otros, *admirados* de las razones de don Quijote, y, aunque en duda, le quisieron creer; y una de las señales por donde conjeturaron se moría fue el haber vuelto con tanta facilidad de loco a cuerdo... (II.74; Cervantes 2004: 1334)

To complement this list of *admiratio* in audience reactions, it is necessary to cite an occasion when Don Quixote is himself surprised to hear an eloquent speech from an unlikely orator (the brigand Roque Guinart):

Admirado quedó don Quijote de oír hablar a Roque tan buenas y concertadas razones, porque él se pensaba que entre los de oficios semejantes de robar, matar y saltar no podía haber alguno que tuviese buen discurso (II.60; Cervantes 2004: 1229).

The justification provided by the narrator explicitly parallels many surprised reactions to Don Quixote's own eloquence ("buen discurso" is unexpected both from a mad would-be knight and a highway robber), making it an important addendum to the *admiratio* repertoire. Another important subtext of this passage is the relationship between rhetoric and violence, most deeply explored within the novel by Don Quixote himself in his Arms and Letters discourse, but also often referred to in passing throughout the novel. In this episode, Don Quixote chafes at Roque for using violence for selfish gain, while imagining himself as a noble champion who only resorts to combat for a noble purpose. Surprised by Roque's skill with words, Don Quixote seems oblivious to the fact that the Catalan brigand is,

like himself, a man of Arms with an aptitude for Letters.

As an additional example, it is impossible to avoid mentioning an oft-debated phrase found in II.46. As the narrator temporarily abandons Sancho just before he assumes the role of governor, he exhorts the reader to laugh at Don Quixote instead, “porque los sucesos de don Quijote, o se han de celebrar *con admiración, o con risa*” (II.46; Cervantes 2004: 1072). The wording of the phrase implies a strict “either/or” dichotomy: the actions of the protagonist are, it appears, an object of either amazement or ridicule, but not both. In this context, the *admiratio* seems to be of the positive kind, antithetical to laughter and implying respect, possibly even awe; conversely, *risa* could be understood as “negative” *admiratio*, bafflement at the protagonist’s misadventures and ludicrous escapades. While the reader is always free to draw his own conclusions, “o con admiración, o con risa” is a precise portrayal of two extreme reactions of the novel’s *characters*, Don Quixote’s diegetic audience.

Yet, as the multiple examples above have shown, ridicule and amazement are often intertwined in the concept of *admiratio*. Eduardo Urbina ultimately concedes that “el carácter doble y dialógico de la parodia abre la posibilidad primero de un desdoblamiento de reacciones y de una admiración ambivalente, después, ante los sucesos, razonamientos y experiencias de don Quijote” (Urbina 1989: 30). Given the ambiguous nature of *admiratio*, it is entirely possible to understand “con admiración o con risa” as two recurrent or alternating (but not mutually exclusive) reactions to Don Quixote’s behaviour, as argues Jaime Fernández:

[N]o es un disyunción absoluta, por la que un término excluya al otro. No quiere decir que si un lector se ríe ya no tiene derecho a la admiración o viceversa. Tanto la admiración como la risa, insisto, tienen en el *Quijote* una extraordinaria polisemia,

compleja hasta la irritación para el crítico lector... (Fernández 1999: 102)

Another link between the reactions of admiration and laughter is that they are both caused by something bizarre and out of the ordinary – as Don Quixote’s actions and words often are. While *risa* demonstrates superiority over its object, reaffirms the status quo, and ultimately rejects the laughter-inducing entity as unworthy, *admiraación* is much more open to and respectful towards a departure from the expected norm. As argued by Edwin Williamson, “[a]lthough *admiratio* is not at odds with laughter, it calls for a more reflective and discriminating attitude from the reader. For *admiratio* is a kind of pleasure which comes when a work of art exposes one’s imagination to unfamiliar emotions or to strange mental experiences” (Williamson 1988: 9).

Judging by the examples given in this section, Don Quixote’s constant provoking of *admiratio* is a phenomenon that arises both from his strengths and weaknesses as an orator. The most intriguing type of *admiratio* is the one arising from a mixture of lucidity and madness. It contains a recurring pattern: first, Don Quixote’s specific actions or general demeanour establish him as a madman unworthy of being listened to; afterwards, he produces a piece of oratory that dispels this impression or at least makes it less categorical. Also, while *admiratio* at “pure” madness is mostly confined to Part I, it is Part II that contains the largest share of *admiratio* at a mixture of lucidity and insanity. Given that Part II is generally richer in the number of rhetorical set-pieces than the first one, it is only natural that the quantity of discourses in Part II would be complemented by the increasingly complex and contradictory reactions of the audience.

It is arguable whether Don Quixote is any less insane in the sequel than

in the first part of the novel; however, by causing *admiratio*, the would-be knight-errant succeeds, at the very least, in forcing his audience to question his status as a madman, as well as to reconsider the limits to which his undeniable madness affects his eloquence. In addition, the phenomenon of dual audience described in the *aptum* section of the chapter is entirely applicable and relevant to the concept of *admiratio*. As the diegetic audience of Don Quixote's discourses expresses its bemusement or astonishment, the readers of the novel should follow suit, as they are directly exhorted to express their laughter or admiration by the narrator. There is a solid impression that the effect of surprise and amazement at Don Quixote's rhetoric, so firmly established within the text, is supposed to be fully shared by the readers. One need not go further than the introduction to this thesis for examples of *admiratio* at the character's unique form of madness expressed by critics throughout the ages. The *admiratio* caused in readers is what keeps many of Don Quixote's discourses from being classified as rhetorical failures.

Rhetorical Falsehood

The stock image of the mendacious orator, misleading audiences with twisted arguments, leading them to believe that white is black and vice versa, and brazenly abusing the art of persuasive language to his advantage, has probably existed for nearly as long as the art of rhetoric itself. Already known to Socrates, by the times of Quintilian the stereotype of rhetoric as the art of deception and orators as deeply immoral men was so pervasive that the Roman devoted a special passage of *Institutio Oratoria* (2.17.5) specifically to debunking it. While he rejected the notion of rhetoric as the

art of immorality and falsehood, Quintilian conceded that orators can and do employ falsehood in their speeches, but only as a form of a “white lie” and in dire cases where human wickedness can only be fought with subterfuge:

They allege also that rhetoric makes use of vices, which no art does, in speaking falsehoods and exciting emotions. But neither of these is disgraceful when it is done for a good reason; therefore it is not a vice either. To tell a lie is something occasionally allowed even to the wise man; and as for rousing emotions, the orator is bound to do this if the judge cannot be brought to give a fair judgement by other means. (Quintilian 2001: 389)

Similarly harsh condemnations of rhetorical falsehood were widespread in the Renaissance, the heyday of rhetorical thought, ostensibly contradicting the cult of rhetoric as an “art of arts” and an expression of human virtue. Anti-rhetorical clichés used in Classical Antiquity were often recycled in Early Modern works with minor alterations; for example, according to the *Examen de ingenios*, Roman and Greek orators “hacían entender las cosas falsas por verdaderas; y lo que el vulgo tenía recebido por bueno y provechoso, usando ellas los preceptos de su arte, persuadían lo contrario” (Huarte de San Juan 1989: 426). This reputation was not entirely undeserved, as many rhetorical treatises tried to reconcile falsehood and dissimulation with the image of rhetoric as a noble and virtuous art. As Wayne Rebhorn observes,

Renaissance rhetoricians in general want to have it both ways, to see *ethos* as an expression of a determined, individual identity and, at the same time, as the result of the rhetor’s verbal artifice. They create confusion by desiring the impossible, the *ethos* should be at once nature and art, reality and appearance, authentic and inauthentic [...] Despite the efforts to present the orator as a *vir bonus*, Renaissance theorists undermine his moral authority by using terms that make him a trickster and a deceiver. (Rebhorn 1995: 232 – 233)

A study of the general concept of falsehood notes that

when historians tell the history of lying and deception, it is a history of early modern Europe, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “the Age of Dissimulation”. Both religious controversies and the centralization of power in the various European states during this period lent particular urgency to questions about the morality of lying and deception. (Denery 2015: 6)

Anti-rhetorical attitudes and the equalization of eloquence and falsehood have survived to this day, even in intellectual circles. Paradoxically, even a thinker as engaged with the problems of dialogue, enunciation, and eloquence as Mikhail Bakhtin harboured a deep distrust of traditional rhetoric. This is perhaps most clearly represented by an outline of an unrealised article or essay, dated 12th October 1943 (and first published in 1992), usually referred to by its first words *Ritorika, v meru svoey lzhivosti* (“Rhetoric, by virtue of its mendacity”):

Rhetoric, by virtue of its mendacity, aims to invoke specifically fear or hope. This belongs to the essence of the rhetorical word (these affects were emphasized by Classical rhetoric as well). (Bakhtin 1995: 63)

Falsehood is the most modern and current form of evil. [...] Philosophy of falsehood. Rhetorical falsehood. Falsehood inherent in a fictional character. Falsehood in the forms of seriousness (joined with fear, threat, and violence). There is still no form of power (force, authority) without a necessary ingredient of falsehood. (Bakhtin 1995: 70)

As can be seen, the trope of rhetorician-as-deceiver is one that is reluctant to disappear, being, as it would seem, inextricable from the very nature of rhetoric as an art and serving as a perennial caveat about its potential misuse and abuse – as well as a testament to its power over the human mind. Thus, every time the characters of Cervantes’ novel recourse to rhetoric, the shadow of rhetorical falsehood lingers over their words. The protagonist is, of course, no exception, and it is tempting to examine the extent to which the image of the mendacious rhetorician is applicable to him. In more direct terms: does Don Quixote ever lie, or at least twist the truth in

his favour? Does he, even with the noblest of intentions, resort to lies to advance his argument?

Within the confines of the Romantic interpretation of the novel and its protagonist, and within those of the “soft” school in general, the question bordered on outright blasphemy. Even discounting outright “sanctifications” of Don Quixote, the character is quite often seen as essentially antithetical to all forms of falsehood and trickery, not only putting himself above them, but actively working to destroy them and restore the Golden Age where truth reigned supreme. In fact, Don Quixote himself specifically addresses the problem of lying by claiming that falsehood is explicitly prohibited by the chivalric code and is completely out of the question for a champion of truth (emphasis in the quote mine):

...todas estas cosas que hago no son de burlas, sino muy de veras, porque de otra manera sería *contravenir a las órdenes de caballería*, que nos mandan que no digamos *mentira alguna*, pena de relasos, y el hacer una cosa por otra lo mesmo es que mentir. (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 307)

While the insistence on truthfulness as essential component of chivalry is admirable, the context in which Don Quixote makes this statement is patently ridiculous. This affirmation of chivalric sincerity occurs as the protagonist prepares to engage in a ludicrous “penance” in Sierra Morena, and his insistence on truthfulness serves only to reconcile his mad antics with the chivalric code: “Ansí que mis calabazadas han de ser verdaderas, firmes y valederas, sin que lleven nada del sofístico ni del fantástico...” (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 307). In this closing statement of Don Quixote’s declaration, the notions of truthfulness and sincerity are comically deflated and reduced to the absurd. Don Quixote repudiates all forms of lies, sophistry, and idle imagination, as mandated by the code of knight-errantry,

but engages in a knowingly make-believe “penance”, re-enacts the trope of chivalric madness borrowed from books that are known to be *fantásticos* and *mentirosos*, and twists the meaning of words to conjure a convenient justification for his outrageous behaviour. Don Quixote is completely oblivious to how his claim undermines his idealistic message – yet paradoxically reinforces it, as this phrase is an excellent example of “blunt honesty”.

However, even without going into the problem of the unreliable narrator, it is evident that the protagonist is far from a flawless representation of chivalric virtues. Even if Don Quixote claims that the chivalric code precludes him from lying, it does not automatically mean that he would always observe this rule or avoid white lies, mincing his words, and other venial forms of everyday falsehood. An extension of the knight’s self-proclaimed sincerity is an apparent rejection of such Renaissance concepts as *sprezzatura* (the art of feigning artlessness) and *disimulatio* (concealing one’s true feelings or presenting a certain concept in a more favourable way by concealing its darker sides). While it will be dealt with at a greater length in my overview of courtly rhetoric, it is worth presenting two critical opinions that, while somewhat limited in their assessment of Don Quixote’s behaviour, do point out that his rejection of social codes is a conscious outward projection of sincerity:

Not does only Don Quixote reject *sprezzatura* in dress, he rejects it in language as well. Modeling himself on Garcilaso, Cervantes insists through Don Quixote’s comment on the correspondence between inner beauty and simplicity of outward appearance, between conceptual meaning and lack of rhetorical artifice. Meaning and style are one. (Wescott 2000: 225)

Although Cervantes sees the advantage of *disimulo*, his medieval hero, Don Quijote, would have none of it [...] This is a logical outcome of don Quijote's refusal to *acomodarse*. (Bates 1945: 42)

While the protagonist does insist on his allegiance to truth, whether he actually lives up to his own declarations is an entirely different matter. There are multiple examples within the novel where Don Quixote could be considered a liar, and several critics have been meticulous in bringing these examples to light. Howard Mancing (Mancing 1982) counts around ten examples of a deliberate falsehood committed by Don Quixote, most of them connected to refusing to admit his error, obstinately insisting on a chivalric interpretation of an event while it is patently obvious it is not the case, or masking the failures of his memory. For example, in the encounter with Vivaldo in I.13, Don Quixote asserts that every knight-errant is required to have a damsel for chaste adoration. Vivaldo is quick to point out that Galaor, Amadís' brother, knew no such love. Don Quixote's counterarguments are self-contradictory: first, he invokes the well-worn adage of "one swallow does not a summer make", and then claims that he knows that secretly Galaor did have an object of love (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 154). For Mancing, this is an example of Don Quixote deliberately bending the truth: he knows that he is wrong about Galaor, yet is loath to admit his mistake; most other examples involve similar hair-splitting over details of chivalric romances that Don Quixote gets wrong or tries to twist in his favour.

Regarding the Vivaldo episode (which will be explored in Chapter III), it is entirely possible that Don Quixote was earnest either in claiming that Galaor had a secret object of affection. For him, an exception, even as famous as the brother of his favourite knight, would only confirm the rule,

and Don Quixote is generally prone to thinking that he knows the personality and motivations of his heroes far better than anyone else. In any case, most other instances that Howard Mancing mentions revolve around similar instances of obstinacy on Don Quixote's part (he refuses to admit having been wrong or gives a roundabout interpretation of events that paint his actions in a favourable light). The only indisputable case where Don Quixote says something he knows to be false is the *rebuznadores* episode, as he tells the feuding villagers the following:

Días ha que he sabido vuestra desgracia y la causa que os mueve a tomar las armas a cada paso, para vengaros de vuestros enemigos; y habiendo discurrido una y muchas veces en mi entendimiento sobre vuestro negocio... (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 938)

In reality, Don Quixote had only heard the *rebuzno* story from a traveller shortly before the encounter (II.25; Cervantes 2004: 913-915), and, even though he did remember it before starting the speech (“[p]or esta insignia sacó Don Quijote que aquella gente debía de ser el pueblo del rebuzno”; II.27; Cervantes 2004: 936), nothing is said about his thoughts on the villager's plight before he meets them face to face. Even then, this utterance is nothing more than a rhetorical “white lie”, an admissible form of *captatio benevolentiae* to make the audience more receptive to his arguments. By employing this rhetorical technique, Don Quixote demonstrates his growth as an orator – but comes nowhere close to the master liar that Howard Mancing sees in him.

Even if what Don Quixote says is not true, it should be understood whether the untruth of his words is knowing and deliberate, what his true motives are, and whether he is deliberately trying to mislead and deceive his audience. In a study of the Renaissance concept of the “rhetorical man”,

Richard A. Lanham asserts that a “rhetorical man is trained not to discover reality, but to manipulate it” (Lanham 1976: 4). He contrasts the *homo rhetoricus* with the *homo seriusus*, claiming the rhetorical man “can not be serious” and “is not pledged to a single set of values and the cosmic orchestration they adumbrate” (Lanham 1976: 5). Like that of Lanham’s ideal *homo rhetoricus*, Don Quixote’s attitude towards reality is markedly proactive. The hidalgo strives to transform his surroundings according to the precepts of knight-errantry, and, in his quest, quite often relies on Letters to complement the Arms. What is more, by vigorously defending his chivalric cause by rhetorical means, he technically does try to induce his audience to, in Huarte de San Juan’s words, “entender las cosas falsas por verdaderas” – that is, accept the imaginary world of chivalric romance and his self-proclaimed identity as a heroic knight-errant as the ultimate reality. Given that the romances of chivalry are frequently referred to as *libros mentirosos* in the novel, and accusations of being fanciful, unnatural, and contrary to divine truth and good reason accompanied the genre for the majority of its existence, Don Quixote’s chivalric project can indeed be interpreted as an exercise in mendacity.

There is, however, a strange paradox involved in the notion. Fiction and lies, despite being connected, are not the same thing; the famous “dilemma of the Renaissance storyteller” – to borrow the title of William Nelson’s classic study (Nelson 1973) – is to prove the veracity of a story known by both its inventor and potential audience to have never happened in reality. Essentially, fiction is a socially accepted and codified form of lying: the author pretends to deceive (or claims that his story is a description of true events, like many authors of chivalric romances did) and the reader, to

be deceived. Paradoxically, Don Quixote *does not understand the concept of fiction*: in his worldview, there is either undebatable truth (and it is expressed, along with the Bible and writings on Classical and national history, in the chivalric romances) or outright lie (possibly conjured up by evil sorcery). The intermediate status of the romances (or fiction in general), their playful oscillation between truth and falsehood is completely lost on Don Quixote and is the principal reason why no other character shares his worldview, try as he might to convince them with rhetorical exhortations. The following interpretation of Don Quixote's relationship with truth and language appears to be particularly thought-provoking:

Don Quixote wishes to find truth by restoring an original unmediated relationship between words and things and consequently the world that rests on the belief in such a relationship, that of the Golden Age. His notion of truth is based on the longing for a mythic world where there is no gap between the object and the word, between the expression and understanding of meaning. And yet the knight imitates the speech of chivalric romance, he calls attention to the impossible existence of unmediated discourse. (Gorfkle 1993: 123)

While the strawman rhetorician knows beforehand that his speech is a sham and resorts to deceit willfully and deliberately, Don Quixote simply does not know any better and defends an objectively lost cause with unshakeable sincerity. If Don Quixote is supposed to be a *homo rhetoricus* because he doesn't believe in what he says, then he is a singular failure at his vocation – mainly because he *actually espouses the same ideals that he preaches*. From a traditional theological standpoint, a lie is only a lie when the speaker knows that what he says is false, yet attempts to pass it for for the truth.⁷ Don Quixote, in his madness, does not know or understand that

⁷ The Catholic understanding of falsehood in speech was largely codified by Augustine's treatise *De Mendacio*. While describing different types and nuances of spoken falsehood, Augustine emphasised that a lie is truly a lie only when the speaker knows his words to

chivalric characters and events are fictional, or that he is not really a knight-errant, or that giants are actually windmills, etc. Therefore, even when he utters a falsehood, Don Quixote does not use his rhetoric to deceive anyone. This trait is explicitly alluded to by the narrator when he claims that Don Quixote is almost physically incapable of lying:

Pues pensar yo que don Quijote mintiese, siendo el más verdadero hidalgo y el más noble caballero de sus tiempos, no es posible, que no dijera él una mentira si le asaetearan (II.24; Cervantes 2004: 905)

However, this confession by the spurious narrator is something to be taken with a pinch of salt: if a mendacious Moor is praising the hero of his yarn for his honesty, something is definitely amiss. This paradoxical praise is in many ways illustrative of the complex relationship between mendacity, sincerity, and madness present in Cervantes' novel. Don Quixote's self-styled and self-emphasised truthfulness can be also considered a direct reflection of his insanity, as well as the somewhat fickle nature of truth in the novel itself, where multiple characters assume false identities or engage in deception and subterfuge (Dorotea/Micomicona, Ginés de Pasamonte/Maese Pérez, Sansón Carrasco/Knight of the Forest, etc.). In addition, Don Quixote himself champions the veracity of the *mentirosos libros de caballería* and reinterprets reality to suit his warped worldview. Yet he does so during his grand self-imposed mission to defend chivalric ideals against all forms of subtlety, illusion, falsehood, and other barriers set before the primeval, unmediated Truth. Also, Don Quixote is prone to detecting

be wrong: "...for Augustine, the lie is deliberately duplicitous speech, insincere speech that deliberately contradicts what its speaker takes to be true. Or, in the abstract language of the analytical philosopher: for Augustine, you lie if and only if you speak in such a way as to deem to yourself at the time you speak intentionally to contradict your thought". (Griffith 2004: 31)

enchantments and illusions all around him – and, ironically, never seeing through any of the ruses, shams and charades employed against him. Thus, Don Quixote’s relationship with falsehood becomes even more multi-layered and complicated.

In the rhetorical dimension, he attempts to spread an untrue vision of reality (the one where chivalric fiction is factual and he is a true chivalric hero), yet never succeeds in convincing anyone. Yet, in a setting where many other characters employ rhetorical or other falsehood or base their existence on pretence, Don Quixote is really not that different from others. Dale Shuger makes a thought-provoking claim that, in following his delusions and obstinately defending them, Don Quixote is no more or less mendacious than many other characters:

Quixote is not alone in his difficulties in judging the ‘truth value’ of texts; all of the characters in *Don Quixote* share a confusion between historical truth, poetic or moral truth, entertaining fiction and outright forgeries and lies, yet only Don Quixote is considered mad because of it. Nor can his decision to participate in a fictional lifestyle be viewed as proof of madness per se; Don Quixote moves in a world of students and courtesans playing at shepherds, of dukes and duchesses playing at God. (Shuger 2012: 41)

A curious opinion useful as commentary on the complicated nexus of madness, sincerity, and falsehood in Don Quixote’s mind can be found in Jerónimo de Mondragón’s *Censura de la locura humana y exelencias della* (1598), an Erasmist treatise on madness in the vein of *Praise of Folly*. A madman, according to Mondragón,

[a]ssí mesmo, que puede hablar quanto quissiere, tanto de emperadores, reies, como de otra qualquier persona, sin recibir por ello heridas, ni oir amenazas, o palabras afrendosas, *ni tiene necesidad, para azerse escuchar con atención, de artificio alguno de Retórica.* (Mondragón 1953: 54; emphasis mine)

In this view, essentially a Humanist update of the folkloric “wise fool” archetype, rhetoric is seen as a limiting social constraint from which madness provides a form of liberation. Likewise, the art of eloquence is implicitly described as an art of dissimulation and lies, given that a person always telling the truth has no need to resort to rhetoric. With this thinking applied to Don Quixote, it does not take long to see that madness does *not* “liberate” the protagonist from the “artifices of rhetoric” – especially given that there were historical examples of lunatics famous for their oratory, such as an early 17th-century Sevillian madman known as “don loco Amaro”⁸ (see: Amaro Sánchez 1987; Shuger 2012). The knight-errant’s speech is not that of a brutally honest fool, but of a man who has definitely read his Cicero. However, like the madman described by Mondragón, the hidalgo almost always speaks his mind to any person he talks to, heedless of his or her social status, and often with scandalous results. As a result, Don Quixote’s madness does not completely undermine his connection to the rhetorical tradition, but does explain his failings in the *dissimulatio* aspect.

Don Quixote is demonstrably sincere in his absolute devotion to a completely misguided principle (truthfulness of chivalric romances and his own identity as a knight-errant). Everything that can be deemed as sophistry on his part are attempts to re-explain reality according to chivalric principles and enforce the laws of chivalry upon the world (by word and deed, rhetoric and force of arms), however counterproductive this approach might be. Even though many things claimed by Don Quixote are untrue, this does not make him a manipulator or sophisticated orator – he misleads the audience only

⁸ The real-world example of “don loco Amaro” is also cited in Laplana Gil 2004: 106-107 as one of the reasons why Don Quixote’s madness in no way disqualifies him from the possibility of being a great orator.

because he is himself deeply misled. His inability to understand fiction or any other forms of socially accepted lies (including the unavoidable element of mendacity in rhetoric) leads Don Quixote into a contradictory situation. He employs the arts of eloquence (all too commonly seen as the arts of falsehood to present the “libros mentirosos” of chivalry as verified facts. Don Quixote’s rhetorical argumentation in favour of the romances, based on a proposition too far-fetched to be true, does not convert anyone to the chivalric cause. However, his belief in the truth of the untruth both distances him from the stereotypical image of the mendacious orator and makes him a *homo rhetoricus* “by contradiction”.

Conclusions

Don Quixote’s rhetorical woes stem not from a lack of understanding of its laws, or even from his madness, but from an exuberance of eloquence, a literal embarrassment of rhetorical riches. The protagonist is very well aware of the existence of rhetorical arts and has probably a background in Classical education sufficient to be familiar with the fundamentals of rhetoric. Probably the most obvious evidence of this knowledge in the novel occurs when Don Quixote explains the word *demostina* to the Duchess: “Retórica *demostina* —respondió don Quijote— es lo mismo que decir retórica de Demóstenes, como *ciceroniana*, de Cicerón, que fueron los dos mayores retóricos del mundo” (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 978).

The *ingenioso hidalgo* consistently excels at the elements of rhetoric where creativity, improvisation, or richness of vocabulary and themes (usually referred to as *copia* in rhetorical manuals) are involved. *Ingenium*, *admiratio*, and certain aspects of *discreción* are doubtlessly his strongest

points. However, whenever the situation requires rhetorical self-restraint, careful choice of words, “polishing” the discourse, or avoiding audience-alienating topics or tropes, the protagonist much more often than not finds himself in dire straits. The concepts of *aptum* and *prudentia* are the ones that pose the greatest challenge to him and represent his single greatest weakness in the domain of rhetoric. His eschewing of deliberate falsehoods in his discourses is another self-imposed limitation that, at the same time, shows his adherence to the rhetorical *ideal* of a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* using eloquence to determine the truth while moving him away from the effective rhetorical *practice* of “white lies” and concealing one’s true thoughts. Don Quixote’s refusal to accommodate his discourses to his audience and impose restraints on his favourite tropes and topics is definitely connected to his mental state.

Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to reduce the entire complex of Don Quixote’s misuse of rhetoric to his madness and bring up his imprudence or ignorance of *aptum* as a one-size-fits-all explanation for his rhetorical gaffes. For Don Quixote, rhetoric is something other than an art, a skill, or a useful tool; in a certain way, it is *an end in itself*. The hidalgo is driven by rhetoric as if by some physical force. He clearly enjoys making discourses and excels in the epideictic mode of rhetoric, where the focus shifts from influencing audience opinions to a semi-ritualised display of oratorical skill – which Don Quixote has in abundance.

In *Institutio Oratoria* (II.xvii.23), Quintilian, breaking away from Ciceronian focus on utility and immediate rhetorical result, claimed that winning debates is not the ultimate end of the art: “My orator, and the art I have defined, do not depend on the outcome. The speaker certainly aims to

win; but when he has spoken well, even if he does not win, he has fulfilled the demands of his art” (Quintilian 2001: V, 387-389). In this regard, Don Quixote is a quite skilled and successful rhetorician, his exuberant creativity (*ingenio*) leading him to create memorable discourses. In addition, thanks to the nature and position of the reader who can see the entire scope of his rhetoric and understand it in its context and dialectic development, the protagonist’s rhetorical flaws are converted into virtues. The misuse of rhetoric becomes a complement to its use.

CHAPTER II: THE RENAISSANCE RHETORIC OF DON QUIXOTE

This part of the study, according to the principles presented in the Preface, explores Don Quixote's diverse forays into several types of "conventional" Renaissance rhetoric. It is worth reiterating the somewhat artificial nature of the division between Renaissance and chivalric "modes", which often overlap, and highlight the following unifying principles of the discourses presented in this chapter:

1) Even though many of them do contain chivalric references or imagery, and ultimately serve to praise chivalry, their principal function is to imitate or recreate genres and styles unrelated to chivalric romance;

2) They can, with certain reservations and omissions, be conceived as a faithful representation of their genre and style or even an archetypal example thereof; for instance, the Arms and Letters discourse reproduces a dissertation on these virtues that was extremely widespread in Humanist discourse.

According to these principles, I have suggested four principal modes that illustrate the variety of the protagonist's "conventional" rhetoric in the novel: *epideictic*; *forensic*; *ecclesiastic*; and *courtly*. Don Quixote as an epideictic speaker creates the image of a Humanist discourse praising a certain concept or virtue; as a forensic speaker, he attempts to recreate the logic and structure of legal discourse; by invoking moral themes and using religious imagery, the protagonist imitates the dominant ecclesiastic mode of theological writing and discourse; and, while discussing courtly virtues or interacting with nobility, he uses discursive tropes and topics particular to

Renaissance aulic literature. While there are many hybrid rhetorical situations, and this taxonomy does not present the entire variety of his discourse, it serves as a useful tool to demonstrate his variety and versatility as a speaker, present all over the mental map of the Spanish Renaissance.

Each overview of a certain style presents its requisite cultural and literary context and contains an in-depth exploration of one or more discourses that illustrate the essence of a certain style, along with shorter observations on other discourses of a similar type or minor pronouncements of Don Quixote pertaining to the same style. Given that certain discourses often have an unequally large amount of criticism devoted to them, particular effort has been made to represent the main existing viewpoint (or, in case of underappreciated discourses, give them an expanded treatment).

Genius of the Commonplace: Don Quixote and Epideictic Rhetoric

Whenever Don Quixote's rhetorical ability is discussed in a positive way, or his sudden lucidity and philosophical depths are mentioned, it is usually related to his discourses praising a certain virtue, ideal, or art. The most oft-cited and critically lauded are, without doubt, his discourses praising the Golden Age (I.11) and the comparative virtues of Arms and Letters (I.38). These two examples from Part I are joined by shorter, less influential, but much more numerous and varied discourses in Part II: on lineages (II.6); fame (II.8); comedy (II.12); poetry (II.16); valour (II.17); divination (II.25); freedom and omens (both in II.58), and several others. All these examples are centered around praise or blame, and all of them represent the epideictic mode – by far the most widespread and ubiquitous mode in Don Quixote's "conventional" oratory.

In *Ars Rhetorica*, Aristotle presents the epideictic mode, one of the three modes (along with forensic and deliberative) in his rhetorical system, as “especially suited to written compositions; for its function is reading” (III.xii.5; Aristotle 1926: 423).⁹ The epideictic mode “was indissolubly linked with ethical themes, and deeply affected all literary genres. Epic was the form most obviously influenced, with its tendency to divide characters into the polar extremes of virtuous and vicious...” (Vickers 2011: 62), and praise of a certain virtue (or blame of a certain vice) was generally seen as the ultimate goal of all literary work in the Renaissance (for a thorough exploration of this idea, see Hardison 1962).

Therefore, it is not surprising why a character as fascinated with the written word, as “bookish” as Don Quixote would engage in specifically that mode of rhetoric. While much of his chivalric discourse falls under the epideictic label, being a praise of chivalric ideals and characters, it is also manifestly present in speeches extolling more generic and timeless ideals. In fact, it is highly illustrative of Don Quixote’s speaking style that the objects of his praise are so universal, and discourses devoted to them devoid of any sense of urgency, immediacy, or necessity to prove a point or change the audience’s opinion on the matter – they are essentially rhetoric for rhetoric’s sake, and thus often criticised as being extraneous to the plot or slowing down the action. Another significant factor is that the speeches are usually delivered in placid, friendly surroundings, sometimes after the resolution of a crisis (the goatswains’ supper, Juan Palomeque’s inn, Dukes’ palace after defusing the incident with the *grave eclesiástico*, Roque Guinart’s

⁹ As Garrido Gallardo demonstrates with ample evidence, the Spanish Renaissance knew very little difference between rhetoric, stylistics, and poetics, with these three notions overlapping in the governing critical idiom; the same applies to the relationship between practical or “persuasive” and “literary” rhetoric (Garrido Gallardo 2005: 56-58).

encampment after gaining the brigands' trust); they are non-adversarial and non-confrontational. In spite of his own insanity, Don Quixote never falls into the expected comic *faux pas* of breaking into an impromptu epideictic discourse during an argument or other situation calling for the deliberative mode – a sign of his awareness of *aptum*, in this matter at least.

Another oft-observed trait of Don Quixote's epideictic discourses is their highly conventional, formulaic nature, at least in the choice of themes. The praise of Arms and Letters alone is one of the most common Renaissance rhetorical exercises, and praising virtues such as valour or arts such as poetry has been a staple of rhetorical arts since the times of its invention in Classical Greece. Most of them are textbook examples of the commonplace mentality of the Renaissance, where the re-use of the same rhetorical tropes and topics was the cornerstone of education and writing.¹⁰ Don Quixote's mastery of the commonplace, his wide plethora of ready-made discursive topics and willingness to deliver them in appropriate situations is perhaps the best sign of his aptitude as a "conventional" rhetorician. This is where his voracious reading works to his advantage:

Rabelais's Panurge and Sterne's Uncle Toby can prove anything under the sun with the aid of scholastic ratiotination and the citation of authorities. Don Quixote has rather similar accomplishments, except he is not just engaged in proving a case, but acting a part, and his equipment includes humanistic eloquence and its related topics, and more generally, the magpie-like store of bookish knowledge proper to a compulsive reader. (Close 1990: 66)

The Golden Age and the Arms and Letters discourses perfectly encapsulate the described traits of Don Quixote as an epideictic speaker. Not only do they treat favourite Classical and Renaissance themes constantly

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of the pervasive role of commonplace in the Renaissance thought, see: Lechner 1974; Moss 1996.

discussed and reinterpreted by thinkers, writers, and poets – they also demonstrate a different rhetorical side of Don Quixote. By tapping into these respected themes, the character reveals his ability to follow a logical development of a discourse and speak at length about something other than chivalry, presenting as a learned, highly cultured person. Even more importantly, these discourses appear in Part I (the Golden Age being perhaps the first “proper” discourse of the novel, chivalric or not), where the character’s complexity is not yet fully realised, presenting a counterpoint to his initial appearance as a one-note chivalry-obsessed lunatic and establishing a tension between his madness and the unusual lucidity of his discourses.

Geoffrey Stagg suggests that, within the fabric of the novel, the main purpose of the Golden Age discourse is to “demonstrate to the cultured reader the remarkable breadth and accuracy of the hidalgo’s knowledge of classical and modern Italian and Spanish literature” (Stagg 1985: 81). Anthony Close goes as far as to argue that the duo of Golden Age and Arms and Letters speeches is the only (apart from certain unnamed “sententious asides”) expressions of Don Quixote’s philosophical side (the “sage” persona) in Part I. The rest of his discourses are allegedly dominated by his humorous chivalric folly, only giving way to a more complex and balanced relationship between the “humourist” and the “sage” in Part II (Close 1978: 113). Most of other (quite extensive) criticism of both discourses also analyses them in pairs; for example, José Antonio Maravall produced an in-depth ideological analysis of both discourses, linking them through their utopian themes and even uniting them under the name of “la utopía de buen discurso” (Maravall 1976: 169-236).

Apart from an impressive critical reputation¹¹ and interconnected themes, there are many more grounds for examining these two pieces of oratory as something of a single text. One of the main grounds is suggested by the narration itself, specifically the similarity between the circumstances in which they are pronounced.

The two discourses are extemporaneous and unexpected, spawned by Don Quixote's sudden and unexplained rhetorical impetus. The Golden Age can be linked to its pastoral setting, but the narrator's explicit remark shows that it is not the vaguely Arcadian atmosphere of the goatswains' supper that spurs the protagonist to rhetorical musings on the innocent infancy of humankind, but the supper itself. Don Quixote's oratory is set into motion by some acorns he was given during the meal ("las bellotas que le dieron le trujeron a la memoria la edad dorada", I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135). Correspondingly, the *armas y letras* discourse is expressly brought to life by a force similar to the one that had inspired the Golden Age speech ("movido de otro semejante espíritu que el que le movió a hablar tanto como habló cuando cenó con los cabreros", I.37; Cervantes 2004: 484).

None of the two discourses is even, strictly speaking, necessary for plot development and functions as "rhetorical interludes" connected to subplots centered around secondary characters (Marcela and Grisóstomo; Cardenio's and the Captive). As they are also both steeped in Classical tradition and can theoretically function on their own as rhetorical exercises, they represent a

¹¹ As an example of the enduring critical favour (which does not exclude criticism of the speech, as will be shown in this very section), it would suffice to cite Heinz-Peter Endress' opinion of them as "dos discursos sobresalientes de la primera parte", along with a lengthy enumeration of preceding criticism sharing this interpretation (Endress 2009: 148).

shining example of the “art of the commonplace” delineated at the beginning of the chapter.

In addition to being highly “traditional” in their choice of theme, both discourses are entirely extemporaneous, exemplifying Don Quixote’s remarkable improvisational ability, already discussed previously. It is also definitely not coincidental that a rhetorical urge consumes Don Quixote immediately after a serving of food (the goatswains’ supper and the common meal at the inn). The Humanist significance of the venue is obvious (Plato’s *Banquet*, philosophical *symposia*, Renaissance *discursos de sobremesa* etc.). As noted by Michel Jeanneret, the Renaissance vision of the banquet merged a Classical tradition with Christian influences into a reinvigorated symposiastic myth, with the amicable banquet, offering pleasures of food, intellectual conversation, and good company, as its centrepiece: “After the divisions of the Fall, at table we rediscover, in imagination, elements of original happiness and unity” (Jeanneret 1991: 2).

There are also noticeable carnivalesque overtones in Don Quixote’s rhetorical situation. Caused by the consumption of food, Don Quixote’s effusions of eloquence can be seen as purely physiological acts, akin to digestion and disgorging. In this context, the imperious, compelling power of rhetoric and the protagonist’s overflowing rhetorical enthusiasm are reduced to basic bodily functions, which undermines and deflates the idealism and grandeur of the speech.¹² Essentially, food and words are entirely interchangeable in these surroundings: “El espacio alimenticio aquí es

¹² Henri Larose's affirmation (entirely contrary to textual evidence, which shows only an alimentary inspiration) that Don Quixote produces the Golden Age speech “saisi par la Divine inspiration” (Larose 1994: 82) is a curious evidence of how the speech's idealistic message distorts the critical perception of its unseemly inspiration.

un espacio discursivo. Y Don Quijote ocupa aquí un lugar central. [...] En vez de alimentos, se sirve con palabras” (Peyrebonne 2011: 74).

However, in another paradox typical of carnivalesque mentality, the discourses are devoted to lofty and highly idealistic matters, dissimilar to their down-to-earth surroundings. The humble venues for both speeches provide a perfect counterpoint to their highly idealistic message, both undermining and empowering it through the power of contrast. The reverse is also true: through the power of Don Quixote’s oratory, the mundane acquires a timeless, mythical quality. A lowly goatswain’s supper is elevated to an Arcadian scene of primordial innocence and a modest group meal suddenly turns into a Classical *symposion*, where feasting is accompanied by a friendly philosophical discussion.

The atmosphere of the Golden Age discourse, down to a pastoral setting and symposiastic overtones, serves perfectly well to underscore the Classical tradition present in Don Quixote’s speech. Much has been written about the sources and archetypal nature of this display of epideictic oratory, as well the speaker’s knowledge of and proficiency in Classical discursive tropes. What is even more remarkable about this discourse is not the use but the misuse of Classical rhetoric demonstrated by Don Quixote, not how he starts it but how he ends it.

The finale of the discourse seems to come entirely out of nowhere. Don Quixote’s condemnation of growing moral decline and spreading vice suddenly switches to a praise of his single most favourite subject – chivalry:

Para cuya seguridad, andando más los tiempos y creciendo más la malicia, se instituyó la orden de los caballeros andantes, para defender las doncellas, amparar las viudas y socorrer a los huérfanos y a los menesterosos. (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135)

This sudden appearance of knights-errant on the rhetorical stage is given no further explanation or development. After changing the subject, Don Quixote does not elaborate on the order's role in the world or *modus operandi*, taking another swerve and quickly turning the flow of the argument from the generic and timeless to the personal and immediate:

Desta orden soy yo, hermanos cabreros, a quien agradezco el gasaje, y buen acogimiento que hacéis a mí y a mi escudero. Que aunque por ley natural están todos los que viven obligados a favorecer a los caballeros andantes, todavía, por saber que sin saber vosotros esta obligación me acogistes y regalastes, es razón que, con la voluntad a mí posible, os agradezca la vuestra. (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135)

The closing passage (previously touched upon in the *aptum* section of Chapter I) contains an intricate combination of rhetorical highs and lows. The orator directly addresses his audience and expresses his gratitude – not for listening for the discourse itself, however, but for treating him well and sharing their meal. By itself, the invocation of “sacred hospitality” and primeval human brotherhood ties quite well into the main topic of the discourse. However, this message is undermined by an utterly illogical chivalric message. If the goatswains are *obliged*, even by a “natural law”, to serve and treat the knight, then the image of an idyllic communal life that Don Quixote had painted previously loses much of its lustre. In addition, their alleged “unwitting” observance of this law presents the things as if Don Quixote would have had a grievance against the rustics for ignoring this law, but now does not because they accidentally fumbled their way into this obligatory hospitality. The knight-errant's expression of gratitude, definitely made with the best intentions, thus comes off as patronising instead of polite because of illogical wording. Moreover, this flowery expression of gratitude

draws the emphasis of the speech upon itself, relegating the Golden Age discourse proper to the function of an overlong preamble.

Not only does the closing statement go against the grain of the discourse, it even, as observantly noted by Laplana Gil, is contrary to its rhetorical *mode*. What was a purely epideictic oration suddenly turns into a deliberative exhortation, going from a description of idyllic bygone years to a sudden and passionate appeal to restore chivalry and affirmation of its values (“finaliza inapropiada y abruptamente con una forzada mención a la caballería andante que rompe el carácter epidíctico y descriptivo que había mantenido el discurso hasta este momento”; Laplana Gil 2004: 110). Mary Mackey also comments on its abrupt change, attributing it to a relapse in Don Quixote’s chivalric madness: “Instead of growing naturally out of the first part, the last portion of the speech seems to be added on, almost as if, after a brilliant display of rational discourse, Don Quijote were once again possessed by his *idée fixe*” (Mackey 1974: 56). The combined aggravating effect of Don Quixote’s rambling conclusion to his otherwise impressive speech is what John C. Adams describes as an “air of weirdness” surrounding the discourse (Adams 1998: 440). Indeed, Don Quixote – apart from other strange rhetorical decisions – conflates two drastically different myths, that of the Classical Golden Age (which, among other things, knew no weapons or violence) and that of Medieval chivalry (which lives by the sword, yet, in Don Quixote’s roundabout logic, serves to restore the primeval era of idyllic peace).

The question of whether the discourse is completely destroyed by its finale or still stands on its own is further complicated by audience reactions. The initial reaction of the main diegetic audience (the goatswains) to Don

Quixote's "inútil razonamiento" is clearly that of *admiratio* (the rustics "embobados y suspensos, le estuvieron escuchando")¹³. Sancho, as befits his initial characterisation as a glutton, is too interested in food to pay proper attention, so his role here is minimal; it can be easily assumed that the discourse is completely lost on the rustic. The goatswains' reply to Don Quixote's "larga arenga" is remarkable and frequently overlooked in analyses of the episode; not only is it courteous, it is also phrased in the same elevated language as the knight's discourse:

Para que con más veras pueda vuestra merced decir, señor caballero andante, que le agasajamos con prompta y buena voluntad, queremos darle solaz y contento con hacer que cante un compañero nuestro que no tardará mucho en estar aquí... (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 136)

Without the bizarre finale, the discourse adds very little to the traditional use of Golden Age and associated pastoral imagery. While staying on purely pastoral ground, Don Quixote serves as a mouthpiece for ages-old ideas and rhetorical tropes. However brilliant and heartfelt his oratorical performance may be, it is still bereft of individuality, staying within the confines of rhetorical culture. As Henri Larose writes,

Don Quichotte ne propose pas un regard nouveau sur l'Âge d'or en soi, et dont il serait l'unique énonciateur. Il transmet des vérités indiscutables dont l'énonciateur est la tradition, la « sagesse des nations » et auxquelles il adhère à comme à des évidences. (Larose 1994: 83)

¹³ Usually, this *admiratio* is understood in a negative sense, as fatigue or inability to comprehend the hidalgo's discourse. Alberto Rodríguez, however, suggests an interesting divergent interpretation, seeing it as acknowledgement of Don Quixote's superior education and oratorical prowess: "Podemos palpar la admiración y desconcierto de los cabreros ante los profundos conocimientos que plantea Don Quijote aquí" (Rodríguez 2005: 62).

Among other typical statements on the originality of the discourses is Francisco Crosas', who claims that "a lo largo de su oración don Quijote no aporta nada sustancialmente distinto al «dichosa edad y dichosos siglos aquellos». Recurre, eso sí, a diferentes *topoi* para ilustrar esta afirmación" (Crosas 1995: 227). His judgement of the Arms and Letters discourse is similarly harsh:¹⁴

También en este discurso don Quijote adoctrina a sus oyentes y diserta sobre un tema nada práctico. Su especulación se mantiene en el campo de las puras ideas, aunque tiene un carácter principalmente ético. Es una reflexión en abstracto sobre la calidad de dos ocupaciones, la de letrado y la de caballero. Disputa nada original ni nueva, como tantos lugares cervantinos, pero recreada hábilmente; es otro de los momentos cuerdos del hidalgo. (Crosas 1995: 227-228).

An unprovoked chivalric detour of the discourse at the very end not only changes its purpose – it leaves a deeply personal mark on the entire oration. By mixing the chivalric and the pastoral, Don Quixote produces a chivalric apology that bases itself on one of the most enduring myths of Western civilization instead of the dubious authority of chivalric romances. And, from these lofty heights, the knight-errant descends back to earth by delivering his thanks to the hospitable goatswains. By doing so, he further dilutes the thematic and stylistic integrity of the discourse, which speech started off as an epideictic narration, then shifted to a chivalric apology, then a personal address to the goatswains, all of this caused by the sight of an acorn. The timeless theme and venerable commonplace tropes used in the discourse are employed in non-standard ways, creating a discourse of great originality that stands apart from any typical praise of the pastoral Golden

¹⁴ However, rather incongruously, it is later admitted that "[q]uien persuade aquí no es un don Quijote pedante sino el hidalgo cuerdo que no habla en exaltación ni en delirio, como lo perciben sus contertulios y corrobora el narrador" (Crosas 1995: 230)

Age. The complex rhetorical machinery of the seemingly Renaissance Humanist discourse is subordinate to the same objective as Don Quixote's discourses on chivalry: apologetics, praise and defence of the "order of chivalry" and his chosen vocation. Classical and Biblical imagery is intertwined with chivalric tropes, something entirely unthinkable in a discourse composed in full accordance with rhetorical precepts, much less in a "set piece" from a commonplace book.

Even though, as has been noted before, Don Quixote's Arms and Letters speech is composed entirely on the fly during dinner, his audience is near-perfect for the type of discourse he delivers. It is mainly composed of characters that can easily relate either to the Arms (the Captive, don Fernando, Cardenio, and other *caballeros*) or the Letters (the curate) part. Most of his listeners have the necessary education to appreciate the Classical allusions and the sublime style on a par with the Golden Age discourse. Don Quixote himself is a practitioner of both arms (by virtue of a being a self-styled knight-errant) and letters (his obsessive reading aside, the protagonist also composes his own poetry). Well-practised in both arts, the hidalgo "cumple con la exigencia fundamental de todo discurso logrado, formulada ya por Aristóteles y Cicerón, que consiste en buen conocimiento de la materia tratada" (Endress 2011: 207).

Like the one on the Golden Age, the Arms and Letters discourse belongs to Don Quixote's favoured epideictic mode and touches upon a tried-and-true, commonplace topic. From a technical standpoint, it can be even interpreted as a rhetorical exercise of *laus* (praise of a virtue or a virtuous subject) or, more precisely, a *comparatio*, where a speaker presents the virtues of two commensurately praiseworthy subjects and chooses the

better of the pair. Once again, Don Quixote's oration is built upon the most fundamental elements of rhetoric. And, also not unlike I.11, the setting of the speech serves to undermine the loftiness of the discourse. While a tavern meal is a more dignified venue than goatswains' supper, it is not by a large margin; while the audience is more sophisticated and potentially receptive, the discourse still catches it by surprise and appears jarring; and the mock-symposiastic atmosphere, which both evokes the Classical trope of learned table-talk and deflates it, stays mostly the same.

A rare and significant trait is not one, but two descriptions of audience reactions to the protracted speech. The reaction to the first part of the discourse is unambiguously positive – in fact, the knight-errant's rhetorical *tour de force* is so formidable that it makes the audience forget, if only for a moment, that the discourse is coming out from the mouth of a lunatic:

Para que con más veras pueda vuestra merced decir, señor caballero andante, que le agasajamos con prompta y buena voluntad, queremos darle solaz y contento con hacer que cante un compañero nuestro que no tardará mucho en estar aquí.... (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 136)

The audience reaction at the end of the discourse shows a particular type of *admiratio*: a mixture of amazement at the lucidity of the orator's reasoning and his rhetorical skill and regret that such a great mind is mostly wasted on chivalric nonsense:

En los que escuchado le habían sobrevino nueva lástima de ver que hombre que, al parecer, tenía buen entendimiento y buen discurso en todas las cosas que trataba, le hubiese perdido tan rematadamente, en tratándole de su negra y pizmienda caballería. (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 491-492)

The *admiratio* here is specifically created by a sudden surge in rhetorical competence; to borrow John C. Adams' description, "the madness

of his actions retreats to the background and the listener hears and believes and learns something quite profound” (Adams 1998: 440). This effect of restoring Don Quixote’s reputation with the audience and offsetting his insane behaviour and pronouncements full of chivalric archaism will later become an important part of the protagonist’s characterisation and his rhetorical reception, especially in the Diego de Miranda episode (analysed in Chapter III). While this reaction can be interpreted in terms of approval, it is probably less flattering than it may seem at first, due to subtle remarks and the context of the description. Don Quixote’s speech is characterised as a “[t]odo este largo preámbulo” (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 491), a parallel to the “[t]oda esta larga arenga” that is the Golden Age discourse (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135). Indeed, the discourse is extremely prolix, being probably the longest of Don Quixote’s perorations in the novel. In textual terms, it is spread over two chapters (I.37 and I.38), with the latter bearing the name of the discourse in its very title; the flow of the discourse is twice interrupted by similar formulae: “prosiguió diciendo” (I.37; Cervantes 2004: 486) and “[p]rosiguiendo don Quijote, dijo” (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 487). While there is no mention of speaker’s fatigue or the audience’s weariness and/or boredom, the narrator uses these remarks to convey the unusual lengthiness of the discourse.

The abnormal nature of the speech is enforced with a “deflating”, mundane detail juxtaposing Don Quixote’s flight of eloquence with prosaic reality (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 491). The eloquent hidalgo takes no breaks for eating during the discourse (“olvidándose de llevar bocado a la boca”), in spite of Sancho repeatedly alerting him to the fact (“algunas veces le había dicho Sancho Panza que cenase, que después habría lugar para decir todo lo

que quisiese”); everybody else at the table carries on dining as he speaks. This feature undermines the supposedly symposiastic atmosphere of the discourse: in a true Classical/Renaissance *symposion*, food should be in harmony with the flow of speech and thought, and one speaker should not completely dominate the conversation, or keep others from having their turn.¹⁵ Instead, there is a direct opposition between speaking and eating, as well as a direct inversion of the situation in I.11.¹⁶

Alberto Rodríguez acknowledges this difference between the initial approval and subsequent bewilderment:

Los oyentes reconocen la sapiencia y elocuencia del caballero andante, especialmente al principio del discurso; pero el auditorio se va distanciando paulatinamente de las ideas que expone Don Quijote a lo largo de su disertación. (Rodríguez 2005: 65)

It seems that he actually manages to convince the Curate, a follower of the Letters, that the Arms are at least as important: “El cura le dijo que tenía mucha razón en todo cuanto había dicho en favor de las armas, y que él, aunque letrado y graduado, estaba de su mismo parecer” (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 492). This description, however, comes after two deflating touches described above (the lack of attention and worries about Don Quixote’s

¹⁵ “Out of consideration for others, two kinds of excess should be avoided: *garrulitas*, the kind of chatter that monopolises attention, and *taciturnitas*, a laconic tendency which makes the atmosphere cold” (Jeanneret 1991: 93).

¹⁶ Before delivering the Golden Age discourse, Don Quixote had already sated his hunger (“don Quijote hubo bien satisfecho su estómago”; I.11; Cervantes 2004: 133) and, during the speech itself, Sancho carried on eating in complete silence (“callaba y comía bellotas”; I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135). In II.32, however, the knight-errant keeps talking while everybody eats, much like in the Arms and Letters episode; Natalie Peyrebonne sees it as a sign of the speaker’s alienation from his audience: “los unos comen y callan mientras que don Quijote no come: él interpreta y comenta. Así, impone entre él y los demás una separación, una pared hecha con palabras” (Peyrebonne 2011: 77).

sanity). In this context, the Curate's reaction loses much of its affirmative nature, even sounding like something of a white lie.

From a structural point of view, there is another significant link between Golden Age and Arms and Letters discourses. Laplana Gil observes that both are used to introduce the themes used in the subsequent interpolated episodes: the Golden Age speech prepares the reader for the pastoral episode of Grisóstomo's funeral, the one on Arms and Letters is directly relevant to the captive captain's story (Guillén 1988: 221; Laplana Gil 2004: 108). It should be added that Don Quixote's discourses are no mere appendices to these side stories or vice versa; they introduce not only subplots or themes, but *discourses* directly connected to the ones pronounced by the hidalgo. The centrepiece of the Grisóstomo's burial episode is Marcela's plea in her defence, delivered in a full-fledged pastoral setting; the Captive's story is, essentially, one unbroken speech narrating a veteran warrior's adventures and presented in a riveting literary form, thus combining the Arms and Letters glorified by Don Quixote in a speech that directly precedes his own. In these episodes, the protagonist acts as a Socratic gadfly, activating a certain discursive theme and inciting others (perhaps unwittingly so) to flesh it out with new viewpoints and divergent rhetorical styles. Don Quixote's discourses define the rhetorical spirit of a given episode and form a certain unity with speeches made by other characters, which further complicates the limits of *aptum* – if others make speeches on a similar theme, then Don Quixote is not as out of touch with his audience as it may seem at first.

In fact, *aptum*, the perennial Achilles' heel of Don Quixote's rhetoric, is what the critical consensus holds to be the principal fault of both speeches.

Indeed, the *aptum* problem affects both the audience inside the novel (as the discourses either make little sense or make the protagonist's madness too obvious) and the reader (as the discourses disrupt the flow of the narrative). For example, Henri Larose finds the Golden Age discourse “extérieur au récit” (Larose 1994: 81), and from Anthony Close comes perhaps the harshest condemnation of both speeches: “the two major discourses are presented as gratuitous and inopportune”, filled with “eloquent pseudo-rationality” (Close 1978: 113). Similarly, James A. Parr sees the first of the two discourses as a parody of rhetoric as a whole: “His oration on the Golden Age is a *parody of the oration as such* [emphasis mine] and also of utopian evasion of reality” (Parr 2006: 144). Regarding the Arms and Letters speech, Laplana Gil affirms that Don Quixote's overt and profuse chivalric references, including his self-nomination as the “Caballero de la Triste Figura”, hamper the effect of the Arms and Letters speech and expose him as a complete lunatic (Laplana Gil 2004: 110-111). Arthur Terry notes that the means used by the hidalgo to praise the profession of arms are “somewhat anachronistic” (Terry 1989: 117). In Christine Orobitg's recent judgement, the Golden Age speech is little more than action-slowing sound and fury: “el discurso de la Edad de Oro es un discurso «impertinente», un «disparate», que nos aleja de la recta vía narrativa y es fruto de un ingenio fantasioso, caprichoso y antojadizo” (Orobitg 2015: 94).

The flaws of the speech, in both cases, affect the immediate audience, either alienating them from the message of the discourse or, at best, causing an ambiguous *admiratio*. The enduring popularity and extraordinary reputation of the two discourses in Cervantism and Spanish culture at large prove that the speeches have found a considerably more benign fortune with

the novel's "external" audience. Once they are removed from their context of mundane reality (and the narrator's ironic or deflating remarks), the discourses become truly timeless, as if every well-worn trope and simile were fresh and original again.¹⁷ Conversely, the often-incongruous chivalric elements lose much of their undermining influence when eclipsed by the newly bolstered power of the Humanist imagery. This paradox has been touched upon by Henri Larose, who contrasts the two audiences in a terminology similar to Mary Mackey's. In his view, the Golden Age discourse is

fondé en ironie [...] si nous entendons par l'ironie l'ignorance de soi, la distance ménagée et opérante entre, d'une part, les signes émis par un personnage ou locuteur, signes correspondant à une fonction signifiante que ce dernier leur assigne, et la façon dont ils sont reçus par des spectateurs ou locuteurs intradiégétiques d'abord, méta-extra-diégétiques ensuite, et par les lecteurs successifs de l'œuvre, au fil des temps. (Larose 1994: 81)

Don Quixote's artistry of the commonplace is, of course, conveyed upon him by the author, who, as Arthur Terry notices, possesses an "ability to retrace the patterns observed by earlier, no less sensitive, writers and to work them into a synthesis whose ironic vision excludes none of the tensions of the age" (Terry 1989: 118). Anthony Close makes an important observation that the discourse is no mere self-aggrandisement packed with alienating chivalric references, as the speaker presents his case in a much subtler manner: "Don Quixote praises arms impersonally [...] rather than

¹⁷ It is telling that, while Geoffrey Stagg claims that "[v]irtually no element of Don Quixote's [Golden Age] discourse is original" (Stagg 1985: 81), his subsequent sentence-by-sentence analysis stops at Don Quixote's shift to chivalric themes – which cannot be traced to Classical or Italian Renaissance models, are not a traditional part of Golden Age mythology, and thus create a highly original spin on an age-old theme.

dragging eulogy back to knight-errantry and himself” (Close 1978: 107).¹⁸ In this way, the speaker avoids the usual failure of his chivalric apologies, namely overstuffing them with incomprehensible and alienating references and making them sound self-indulgent and sanctimonious. To develop and broaden Close’s thought, Don Quixote “dissolves” his usual chivalric discourse in the broader, more timeless, and more authoritative praise of arms as a whole. As a result, he finds a point of harmony between the commonplace and the individual, making his discourse undeniably pro-chivalry but rendered in more familiar, commonplace tropes in order to make it more palatable to the audience. This, of course, is additional evidence that his understanding of *aptum* is not as hopelessly flawed as it appears.

Advocate of Hopeless Cases: Don Quixote and Forensic Rhetoric

The relationship between Cervantes’ novel and law has been the object of a critical attention so enduring that it has become customary to comment on the vastness of literature accumulated on the topic. For example, in 1997, Jacques Lezra commented on an “enormous body of work that exists on the general topic of Cervantes’ relation to the law and jurisprudence” (Lezra 1997: 356), and a more recent article by Andrés Botero Bernal (Botero

¹⁸ However, Don Quixote does return to the theme later in a much more personal manner. While talking to his niece, he reiterates some points of the discourse, and also reveals his intimate connection to the Arms versus Letters problem through a rather incongruous astrological justification: “Dos caminos hay, hijas, por donde pueden ir los hombres a llegar a ser ricos y honrados: el uno es el de las letras; otro, el de las armas. Yo tengo más armas que letras, y nací, según me inclino a las armas, debajo de la influencia del planeta Marte, así que casi me es forzoso seguir por su camino, y por él tengo de ir a pesar de todo el mundo, y será en balde cansaros en persuadirme a que no quiera yo lo que los cielos quieren, la fortuna ordena y la razón pide, y, sobre todo, mi voluntad desea...” (II.6; Cervantes 2004: 737-738).

Bernal 2009) includes a lengthy bibliography on the subject. However, while studies of legal matter in *Don Quixote* are plentiful, most of them tend to fall into two extremes, either adopting a “positivist” stance by applying historical Spanish legislation and juridical theory to events in the novel or assuming an “idealistic” one, emphasising the protagonist’s, novel’s, or author’s perceived message of “spirit over letter” and alleged subversive criticism of legal abuses in the Early Modern Spanish monarchy. For the purposes of this thesis, the use of legal language in characters’ discourse and imitation of certain legal formulae, clichés, and entire speech genres with roots in forensic rhetoric (such as apologies or invectives) is of greater relevance than reconstructing Cervantes’ own views on legal matters or establishing the precise legal subtext of each of his actions. The importance of law as a self-contained form of discourse in *Don Quixote* and its ramifications for the work’s style and genre have only recently drawn the attention of Cervantists, with significant attention devoted to them in two recent book-length studies (Byrne 2012; González Echevarría 2005).

The possible cause for this paucity of literature on forensic discourse in *Don Quixote* is a historical paradox entrenched in the very fabric of the Early Modern Spanish legal system. González Echevarría argues that, as a result of a “legal revolution” that occurred in Spain between 1500 and 1700, jurisprudence became a ubiquitous part of everyday life and legal discourse a commonplace form of expression in what he defines as a “litigious society” (González Echevarría 2005: 26). Increasing centralization, ever-growing bureaucracy, and never-ending adoption of newer and newer laws (with Medieval legal codes such as *Fuero Juzgo* and *Las Siete partidas* still functioning as current legislation) made the Spanish legal system

increasingly impenetrable, often reliant on subjective interpretations of the law. Exposure to the typical rhetorical formulae and stylistic traits of legal discourse became more and more widespread, establishing rigid rhetorical patterns of describing events and presenting arguments and permeating other forms of writing, including poetry and prose fiction. The perceived importance of legalism and particularly *casuistry* (understood in its original meaning within moral theology, as a science of applying laws to specific cases) leads González Echevarría to naming it as one of the prime influences in the emergence of the early Spanish fiction, particularly *Celestina* and the picaresque (González Echevarría 2005: 26-30).

However, in spite of an ever-growing emphasis on legalism, the theory of forensic rhetoric, the earliest and the most enduring avatar of the art of eloquence was significantly underdeveloped. Most Spanish rhetorical treatises of the era devote little attention to the forensic mode, concentrating on deliberative or epideictic rhetoric as being more generally useful; consequently, this area of Spanish rhetorical legacy is significantly underresearched. One of the few existing studies qualifies Spanish forensic rhetoric of the Renaissance as being “de escaso valor”, noting that “[l]os oradores se limitaban a actuaciones en pleitos y cuestiones de derecho privado, eran en su mayoría jurisperitos y no oradores al estilo clásico” (Diez Coronado 2001: 435). This low esteem of the forensic mode seems to have accompanied Spanish Humanism from its earliest stage. A telling example is that Antonio de Nebrija’s *Artis rhetoricæ compendiosa coaptatio ex Aristotele, Cicerone, et Quintiliano* (1515) included no discussion of forensic rhetoric whatsoever. The humanist’s rationale for such a glaring omission (especially for a compendium of Classical rhetoric, born out of

judicial proceedings) was based on the assumption that Spain was governed by all-encompassing royal or ecclesiastical laws, leaving nothing for the individual judge to decide and eliminating the need for adversary proceedings; rhetoric in general, according to Nebrija, was used only by preachers and “almost gone” anyway (Garrido Gallardo 2005: 59-60). This was exacerbated by the fact that the political and cultural climate in Spain did not lend itself particularly well to the development of forensic rhetoric, due to a lack of a true adversarial system of justice resembling that of Greece or Rome. Even at much later stages of the Spanish Renaissance, the forensic mode was often sidelined or even altogether dispensed with in favour of a new “didascalie” (ecclesiastic) mode, even in secular rhetorical manuals, reflecting the post-Tridentine emphasis on preaching; according to Martí, “una de las razones de por qué la retórica forense quedó casi de todo abandonada se debe buscar en el hecho de que el Concilio estaba interesado solamente en promover la oratoria sacra” (Martí 1972: 112). Susan Byrne suggests another possible reason (the legislation becoming too incomprehensible to devote attention to):

In the various volumes, some laws disappear from one section only to migrate to another, or from one edition only to resurface in the next. This confusion would continue through the sixteenth century, by the end of which the Spanish legal system is in such a chaotic state that, much like Don Quixote, no one even bothers to abide by the laws. (Byrne 2012: 48).

As a result, forensic rhetoric in Golden Age Spain dwelled upon a paradox: although legal discourse permeated Spanish society, its intellectual elite put considerably little emphasis on rhetoric suited to legal needs, and lawyers received little specialised rhetorical training. Together with this paradox, we should also consider the one inherent in the notion of Don

Quixote as an agent of law or justice. While his chivalric lifestyle does not automatically make him an outlaw, there are quite a few occasions when he breaks the law or otherwise runs foul of the legal system. His behaviour is quite often destructive or at least disrespectful of the governing laws, and his transgressions are numerous, including particularly heinous ones, such as assaulting a religious procession or setting the convicts free. In the last act, Don Quixote not only committed a grievous offence by attacking representatives of the law and aiding and abetting known criminals, but, by doing so, automatically added their punishment to his own.¹⁹ The protagonist commits these offences not out of any real criminal intent, but, as expected, by imitating chivalric romances, where the knight-errant is all too often his own judge and jury. Whenever a chivalric hero slays evildoers, rescues prisoners from jail, or challenges tyrannical rulers and their servants, his actions are almost always justified and have no legal consequences.²⁰ David Quint observes that “[m]uch of Don Quijote’s pretensions to bring about justice, especially in Part One, are bound up with his crazy egotism” (Quint 2003: 157). Perhaps nothing else in the novel offers greater support to this assertion than the knight-errant’s famous exclamation to Sancho:

¿[Y] dónde has visto tú o leído jamás que caballero andante haya sido puesto ante la justicia, por más homicidios que haya cometido? (I.10; Cervantes 2004: 124)

¹⁹ Rodolfo Batiza cites a *Siete partidas* law (still in effect in the early seventeenth century) that prescribed the following: “si alguno fuere osado de sacar preso de la carcel del Rey [...] que debe recibir tal pena, qual deuia recebir aquel que ende sacado por fuerça...” (Batiza 1987: 123).

²⁰ Christoph Strosetzki argues that Don Quixote's proactive stance on freeing everyone he meets from all sorts of bondage is based on an automatic assumption of their innocence, induced by romances of chivalry: “La liberación por Amadís de 115 presos y 30 caballeros que resultan inocentes, don Quijote la interpreta como norma y mandato, y como consecuencia considera, a su vez, a Andrés y a los galeotes víctimas y los libera, a pesar de ser culpables” (Strosetzki 2015: 118).

Even though Don Quixote ostensibly has nothing to do with the intricacies of a real-world legal system, there are several occasions in which Don Quixote engages in a situation resembling a legal process, acts as an arbiter, advocate, or otherwise employs legal discourse; evidently, they are singularly important for his characterization. The knight-errant, seemingly unexpectedly, manifests an awareness of intricate legal concepts, which demonstrates his wide erudition that lies far beyond chivalric books, and an affinity for actual legal arguments and concepts of his historic era. While this interest in the affairs of justice goes far beyond what is expected of fictional knights-errant (or their real-world imitators), Don Quixote's connection to law is not entirely without precedent. For example, Christoph Strosetzki adduces multiple examples, both historical (*Siete partidas*, Lull's *Llibre de l'orde de cavalleria*) and fictional (an episode in *Amadís* where the protagonist compares different testimonies before passing a judgement), where a knight is legally or symbolically endowed with the power of administering justice and serving as an agent of law (Strosetzki 2015: 118-119). Susan Byrne notes that Cervantes upsets readers' expectations of a justice-administering knight by "tailoring his protagonist Alonso Quixano in strict compliance with the Siete Partidas prescription of a perfect knight and then setting him loose like a bull in a china shop" (Byrne 2012: 50-51).

Don Quixote's legal affinity shows itself very early on. After freeing Andrés, the protagonist makes a binding oath "por la ley de caballería" (I.4; Cervantes 2004: 70) and demands one from Juan Haldudo, his exhortation made of a curious mixture of chivalric flamboyance with legalese (emphasis in the following quote mine):

...dádselos en reales, que con eso me contento; y mirad que *lo cumpláis como lo habéis jurado*: si no, por *el mismo juramento os juro* de volver a buscaros y a castigaros, y que os tengo de hallar, aunque os escondáis más que una lagartija. Y si queréis saber quién os *manda esto*, para quedar con más veras *obligado a cumplirlo*, sabed que yo soy el valeroso don Quijote de la Mancha, el desfacedor de *agravios y sinrazones*, y a Dios quedad, y no se os parta de las mientes *lo prometido y jurado*, so *pena de la pena pronunciada*. (I.4; Cervantes 2004: 71)

As is well known, Juan Haldudo never fulfils his oath – which, due to the mythical “ley de caballería” being a non-entity, has no legal power anyway. When the badly flogged Andrés reappears in I.31 and tells of his misfortunes, the knight-errant is ready to take another oath to find and punish the culprit (“yo le torno a jurar y a prometer de nuevo de no parar hasta hacerle vengado y pagado”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 401). This statement further emphasises to the reader the inherent futility of such vows, predicated upon a non-existent code, and Andrés’ reaction (“No me creo desos juramentos”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 401) is abundantly clear and comprehensible. The bipartite adventure with Andrés is the first one in which Don Quixote attempts to unite legal and chivalric discourse, with spectacularly disastrous results, spreading violence and injustice instead of curtailing it.

Another episode sees the protagonist act as something of a judge, pronouncing an authoritative opinion in a mock-judicial environment. Grisóstomo’s funeral (I.14) unfolds much like a trial, with Marcela officially charged with causing Grisóstomo’s death and delivering a speech in her own defence, which acts a fully-fledged *apologia* in the Classical sense. After her passionate plea, Don Quixote delivers a coda, seeing as it as a fitting opportunity to display his chivalry (“pareciéndole que allí venía bien usar su caballería”; I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170). The knight-errant’s body language and delivery is more chivalric than anything else (“puesta la mano en el

puño de su espada, en altas e inteligibles voces dijo”; I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170), but his speech is once again full of legal terms, and sounds like a lawyer’s expert opinion on a legal matter (emphasis in the following quote mine):

Ninguna persona, de cualquier *estado y condición* que sea, se atreva a seguir a la hermosa Marcela, *so pena* de caer en la furiosa indignación mía. Ella ha mostrado con claras y *suficientes razones* la *poca o ninguna culpa* que ha tenido en la muerte de Grisóstomo y cuán ajena vive de condescender con los deseos de ninguno de sus amantes; a *cuya causa es justo* que, en lugar de ser *seguida y perseguida*, sea honrada y estimada de todos los buenos del mundo, pues muestra que en él ella es sola la que con tan honesta intención vive. (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170)

The judgement passed by Don Quixote is immediately established as law, and Marcela walks away unharmed. Thus, Don Quixote, on a rare occasion, successfully uses forensic rhetoric to defend a case in an environment closely resembling a court of law. However, the reasons provided by the narrator do tarnish his success somewhat, explaining that the audience took heed of his words “[o] ya que fuese por amenazas de don Quijote, o porque Ambrosio les dijo que concluyesen con lo que a su buen amigo debían” (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170). Whichever of the two reasons is true, the protagonist does not achieve his success through the force of rhetoric alone. His speech does contain explicit threats of physical violence, and the gesture of putting his hand on the sword only augments them. While this is a step up from previous episodes, where the knight-errant would erupt into violence at the slightest provocation, here he still relies on the power of his arms to get his point across, rather than presenting a convincing argument.

A development, and perhaps the apex, of forensic discourse in the novel is Don Quixote’s (mis)adventure with the convicts in I.22. It is one of the

most celebrated episodes of the novel, as well the subject of never-ending controversies and conflicting interpretations, particularly due to the presence of a strong picaresque subtext and the multiple legal conundrums of its events (the legality of the convicts' release, Don Quixote culpability for attacking the guards, etc.). The hero's attempt to free the convicts is usually explained in terms of Spanish legal or philosophical culture of the time, with widespread interpretations linking his theories of natural or divine justice that supersedes human laws (among more recent works, see Endress 2011).

Despite a kernel of good legal sense being present in Don Quixote's rhetorical behaviour, it does not take long for the reader to realise that his argument goes against all good judgement and is simply untenable. The transgressions committed by the convicts seem to be real (Don Quixote admits that "os han castigado por vuestras culpas"; I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267), and they show no remorse and immediately revert to crime after having been set free, yet the hero puts a lot of effort into presenting them as undeserving of punishment, if not entirely blameless. He takes the convicts' justifications of their innocence at face value, finding grounds for their innocence and release even though their law-breakings are evident to the reader.

Finally, Don Quixote goes as far as praising the office of the *alcahuete* (pimp) as an "oficio de discretos y necesarísimo en la república bien ordenada, y que no le debía ejercer sino gente muy bien nacida" (I.22; Cervantes 2004: 262). Pimps should not be condemned to the galleys; instead, they should command and helm them ("el alcahuete no merecía ir a bogar en las galeras, sino a mandallas y a ser general dellas"; I.22; Cervantes 2004: 261). The office of the pimp turns out to be integral to society, and its

proper functioning depends on upholding the hierarchy of social classes. The main reason for limiting the “noble” and “most necessary” profession to people of quality is that the trade of the pimp has been hijacked by “gente idiota y de poco entendimiento” who abuse their powers and harm the health of their clients. Also, pimps dabble in evil sorcery that cannot force the free will of the human being (even if “misturas y venenos” can cause bodily harm to unwitting clients), making it, to all intents and purposes, a victimless crime.

As a result, an alleged paragon of justice and courtly love becomes an apologist of crime and prostitution, his arguments, however legally sound, being seriously undermined by the sheer incongruity of the situation. It is even possible to see author’s intent to parody certain forms of legal and theological discourse. Arguably, Cervantes does so by delegating traditional arguments of natural and divine justice to a lunatic who defends and praises pimps and obviously unrepentant criminals in the most bizarre manner possible. Still, while there are doubtless parodic elements in Don Quixote’s attempt at legal discourse, and the entire episode can be validly interpreted as a satire of Spanish legal process, the ideological and rhetorical core of Don Quixote’s discourse, the theory of *jus naturalis*, is presented with remarkable earnestness. As Don Quixote’s arguments recreate those of a real-world school of legal thought, they might have still been effective in different circumstances (for example, in a learned legal debate), but definitely not in the type of situation that the knight-errant experiences.

A potential parody of legal discourse becomes even more plausible if we consider the fact that Don Quixote is not the only one employing forensic rhetoric. The hidalgo gives several convicts an opportunity to present

arguments in their defence, and only after listening to and analyzing their apologies does he plead for their immediate release. This sequence of events bears the trappings of an actual court proceeding, and Don Quixote almost literally acts as an advocate, by defending his “clients” in the face of a “jury” (represented by the guards) that, as he believes, might decide the “case” in their favour depending on his speech. As a result, Don Quixote attempts not only to undo the court sentence already passed, but, citing the cruelty of the punishment, to exonerate the guilty from any sort of retribution; what he calls for is technically amnesty on a grand scale.

Don Quixote’s speech is directed not at the judges who had passed the sentence, but at the guards, who had no word in passing the sentence, and most definitely have no legal power to release the convicts without themselves committing a serious crime. This problem is, in fact, immediately addressed by the captain of the guards, as he replies angrily: “¡Los forzados del rey quiere que le dejemos, como si tuviéramos autoridad para soltarlos, o él la tuviera para mandárnoslo!” (I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267-268). And, of course, in his plea the knight-errant does not cite any specific laws or other strictly defined legally sound grounds for releasing the prisoners. The only argument of Don Quixote’s that would have held water in a real legal situation is probably legal malpractice (“la falta de dineros déste, el poco favor del otro, y, finalmente, el torcido juicio del juez”; I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267). The rest dwells upon either personal judgement mixed with an appeal to a higher power (“me parece duro caso hacer esclavos a los que Dios y la naturaleza hicieron libres”) or to the immediate audience (“no han cometido nada contra vosotros”). Finally, the appeal ends with an unceremonious threat of violence (“cuando de grado no hagáis, esta lanza y

esta espada, con el valor de mi brazo, harán que lo hagáis por fuerza”; I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267), which completely undermines Don Quixote’s legal reasoning.

In essence, Don Quixote wants to uphold the spirit of the law by breaking its letter and subverting one of the cornerstones of the legal system, which would be evident to almost any reader of the novel, both in Cervantes’ time and nowadays. To cite Susan Byrne,

[w]hen it comes down to it, every reader of Don Quixote – sympathetic or not to the protagonist – recognizes that the sub rosa review of the galley slaves by Don Quixote is contrary to a juridical spirit that could not allow such interference in the transport of prisoners. (Byrne 2012: 74)

Overall, this speech is doomed from the very start, and Don Quixote’s argument is completely untenable. The new mock-trial that Don Quixote attempts to set up, and the new sentence that he tries to pass, spectacularly backfire. The conflict between his and the guard’s version of justice is simply unsolvable by rhetoric, as flawless and convincing as it may be. To reiterate, the arguments he presents are quite vague and devoid of actual legal basis; even if they had been juridically flawless, the guards (as the captain immediately emphasises) have no legal authority to undo the convicts’ sentence. As a result, their conflicting understanding of justice is promptly resolved by violence and brute force. The power of forensic rhetoric is reduced to a travesty, an attempt to redress justice degenerates into a free-for-all, and an advocate of the oppressed turns out to be a raving lunatic whose utterings are immediately dismissed as “donosa majadería” (I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267).

Judging by the circumstances of the discourse, the reaction, and the immediate aftermath, the convicts episode is perhaps Don Quixote's most

disastrous discourse. The argument is entirely miscalculated and legally untenable; the speaker is immediately dismissed as a madman; and a failed attempt to use rhetoric to end violence²¹ leads to even greater violence, first committed by Don Quixote and then against him. Forensic rhetoric, conceptualised as an alternative to violence and a bloodless way of resolving disputes, instead becomes a prelude to a violent melee. The discourse accomplishes nothing and destroys everything, punishing blameless guards who were only doing their duty and rewarding remorseless criminals with an unlawful and unjustified freedom, which they celebrate by wreaking havoc upon their liberator. A plea for an ideal justice leads to a grotesque mockery of law worthy of a carnivalesque topsy-turvy world.

Many reasons for Don Quixote's fiasco as forensic speaker, depending on the "softness" or "hardness" of the critical persuasion: either his appeal for liberty, forgiveness, and true justice was too idealistic for a deeply cynical and corrupt reality, or it his madness that prevents him from serving true justice.²² From a purely rhetorical standpoint, Don Quixote's failure is mostly due to his ignorance of the rhetorical *aptum*. His audience is doubly inadequate: the guards lack both the understanding of the "natural law" argument that he is presenting and the legal wherewithal to set the convicts

²¹ In Classical Antiquity, rhetoric was often imagined as antithetical to violence and outright abuse; according to Thomas Conley's study, "rhetoric is an alternative to the use of force, as it is the art *par excellence* of persuasion in place of coercion, of deliberation by examination of alternatives in place of autocracy" (Conley 1990: 110).

²² As noted by Christoph Strosetzki, Medieval legislation directly tied the capacities of a judge to having a sound mind. A madman could be neither a knight, nor a judge, nor any combination of the two, which leads the researcher to choose an obvious explanation for Don Quixote's abject failure as a dispenser of justice: "Es por ello que debe extrañarnos que don Quijote como juez sea un mal juez" (Strosetzki 2015: 119); "Allí donde asume como caballero la obligación de establecer la justicia, carece de juicio y de la usanza de razón" (Strosetzki 2015: 121).

free. Thus, Don Quixote's calamitous rhetorical ineffectiveness in this episode can be easily explained from the laws of rhetoric.

A different, if also rhetoric-based, interpretation, is championed by Anthony Close, in the already mentioned article on Don Quixote's "sophistry" and "wisdom" (Close 1978). According to Close, the knight-turned-lawyer twists the meaning of "gente forzada del rey" (a specific legal term) from the legally defined to the broadly generic so that it would fit his self-imposed chivalric mission and justify his romance-inspired attempt to free those forced into bondage. As a result,

[h]is behaviour is somewhat akin to sophistry in its pejorative sense: the use of intentionally deceptive arguments in a morally dubious case. This is the only occasion where Don Quixote argues that moral black is white. (Close 1978: 104)

The "sophistry" manifested here is, according to Close, not so much a conscious attempt to mislead and subvert but a combination of faulty logic, bizarre argumentation, and, most importantly, utterly wrong time and place to use those argument:

My main reason for calling this speech sophistical lies in its misuse of rhetorical argument based on maxims. Indeed, the fact that it is spattered with maxims is a primary reason for its high-sounding moral speciousness, which the critics have taken for seriousness. [...] We may note, however, that the step from the ridiculous to the sublime, though radical, is short. It is accomplished simply by changing the context in which the maxims appear. (Close 1978: 106)

Paradoxically, Close's argument for Don Quixote's sophistry completely changes the rhetorical perspective of the episode. Instead of rhetorical ineptitude or naiveté, the protagonist, even in his insane condition, shows cunning and willingness to twist words in his favour and distort reality by the means of rhetoric. Apparently, this contradiction can only be resolved by leaning on the generic, ever-reliable explanation centered

around Don Quixote's insanity, which Close actually uses in a later article dedicated to the same subject:

In making Don Quixote articulate it, Cervantes poses us with the problem of interpreting his motives. Innocently misplaced compassion? Scarcely. Caustic wit? But how would that square with the innocent idealism shown elsewhere in the adventure. Clearly, for Cervantes, madness cuts the Gordian knot of such dilemmas. (Close 2007: 21)

However, the discourse is incongruous even in the context of Don Quixote's lunacy. The would-be knight-errant's madness is neither random nor incoherent; it works in discernible patterns and is usually centered on chivalric images and situations – which the praise of the pimp is not. It would be tempting once again to invoke the biographical approach and view the discourse as Cervantes' satirical attack on corruption and injustice in the Spanish legal system (that he experienced first-hand) and Don Quixote once again relegated to the author's mouthpiece. However, in a roundabout way, the same discourse and its consequence can work as a compelling argument *in favour* of royal authority (and against “natural law” theories of justice), seeing how patently disastrous these theories seem to be when applied to the situation and how the convicts turn out to be wicked and violent, completely justifying their harsh penalty.

Whatever the interpretation of this contested episode may be, the speech is heavily geared towards the *actual audience* (the readers of the novel). The arguments invoked in Don Quixote's discourse (and his preliminary questioning of the convicts), echoing the judicial debates of his day, would be much better understood and appreciated by the *discreto lector* than by the guards, convicts, or Sancho. His attempts to justify the release of the galley slaves, as well as his praise of the *alcahuete* and logical gaps in

the plea, are rife with comedy, and, in the end, the reader is highly likely to be perplexed and bewildered by the discourse and its aftermath, experiencing the requisite *admiratio*. Throughout the entire episode, Cervantes uses the codes, tropes, and expectations of legal discourse and “stretches” them far enough to show their faults. Whether those were introduced by the insane protagonists or an inherent feature of legal discourse itself is left intentionally, and tantalizingly, ambiguous.

On a Mission from God: Don Quixote and Church Rhetoric

The topic of religion in *Don Quixote* is one of the most hotly debated in Cervantism. Using both textual and biographical evidence, successive generations of Cervantists have proposed widely divergent interpretations of Cervantes’ own attitude to religion and spirituality and the portrayal of different religions in his works, establishing him either as an adherent of post-Tridentine Counter-Reformation Catholicism, a Catholic moderate, a liberal Erasmist, or even as a secular anti-clerical freethinker. Evidently, theories about Cervantes’ religion do not limit themselves to Christianity, with significant attention to his possible Jewish, *converso*, or *morisco* origins, including readings of *Don Quixote* as a “coded” crypto-Jewish or Muslim book.

The religion controversy aside, Don Quixote as a character does not seem to lend himself well to being interpreted as a preacher of the holy word. By origin, behaviour, and aspiration, the protagonist is a knight, not a man of the cloth, and his encounters with religious characters, such as the Curate or especially the *grave eclesiástico*, are strangely ill-fated, if not downright hostile. An oft-cited fact is that neither Don Quixote nor his

squire visit a church at any point during their adventures. Some actions of the protagonist (such as using prayers as magical incantations while preparing “the balm of Fierabras” or attacking a funerary procession) may come off as irreverent and potentially blasphemous. From a rhetorical standpoint, Don Quixote’s and other characters’ discourses contain few direct references to the Scriptures or theological works; in his rhetorical flourishes and similes, the knight-errant, while using the most commonplace of Biblical quotes and comparisons, clearly prefers references to chivalric romances and Classical history. As a result, the style of Don Quixote’s discourses, at a first glance, seems to have little in common with the sermons, panegyrics, or other forms of church eloquence of his time, where it was customary to cite the Vulgate at length and employ numerous Biblical references and similes.

That said, the possibility of using Spanish ecclesiastical rhetoric as one of several tools used to interpret Don Quixote’s discourses is not completely out of the question. While church eloquence, the dominant rhetorical form of the Middle Ages, was considerably displaced by new Humanist rhetoric of the Renaissance, its influence and presence endured. Far from being inflexible and rooted in the past, it assimilated Humanist influences and constantly reinvented itself to respond to the challenges of the Reformation, with the sixteenth century producing a significant number of novel treatises on sacred oratory. The sheer ubiquity of the Catholic Church ensured that an absolute majority of the population would be exposed to ecclesiastical rhetoric, and its most common tropes and genres (such as the sermon) maintained a highly visible presence in the intellectual horizon of Golden Age Spain. Essentially, ecclesiastical rhetoric was no different from other

rhetorical forms in striving to become the *dominant discourse* and impose its norms and concepts on the art of speaking in general. *Don Quixote*, a work highly sensitive to different forms of language and discourse, would inevitably reflect the influence of church eloquence.

There is abundant textual evidence of other characters in the novel comparing the protagonist to a preacher or a theologian after listening to his display of rhetoric (despite Don Quixote's non-membership of the clergy and a prevailing secular strain in his discourse). For example, after the disastrous adventure with the flock of sheep, Don Quixote spurs his squire to action with a speech that is in part a paraphrase of Matthew 5:45:²³

...que Dios, que es proveedor de todas las cosas, no nos ha de faltar, y más andando tan en su servicio como andamos, pues no falta a los mosquitos del aire ni a los gusanillos de la tierra ni a los renacuajos del agua, y es tan piadoso, que hace salir su sol sobre los buenos y los malos y llueve sobre los injustos y justos. (I.18; Cervantes 2004: 215)

The impressed Sancho comments with the following words: “Más bueno era vuestra merced... para predicador que para caballero andante” (I.18; Cervantes 2004: 215). To which the hidalgo replies, reaffirming both the spiritual message of his discourses and the importance of rhetoric as a knightly virtue: “[P]orque caballero andante hubo en los pasados siglos que así se paraba a hacer un sermón o plática, en mitad de un campo real, como si fuera graduado por la Universidad de París” (I.18; Cervantes 2004: 215). In II.6, Don Quixote's niece, amazed by his effortless switch from the praise of chivalry to discussing morality and ideals, produces a vivid description of her uncle's potential career as a street preacher:

²³ Heinz-Peter Endress lists it as an example of the protagonist's command of ecclesiastic rhetoric (Endress 2009: 135).

—¡Válame Dios! —dijo la sobrina—. ¡Que sepa vuestra merced tanto, señor tío, que si fuese menester en una necesidad podría subir en un púlpito e irse a predicar por esas calles... (II.6; Cervantes 2004: 735)

Don Quixote seems to share this vision (“Tienes mucha razón, sobrina, en lo que dices”; II.6; Cervantes 2004: 735), but moves the discussion away from preaching in order not to “mezclar lo humano con lo divino”. After Don Quixote’s discourse directed at the warlike *rebuznadores*, Sancho compares him to a theologian (“tólogo”, in his usual mangling of “big words”; II.27; Cervantes 2004: 940). As Ernest Siciliano observes, “Sancho’s comment, of course, is humorous and consistent with his character, but this does not lessen the effect upon the reader who is already asking himself where, when, and how long had Cervantes studied theology” (Siciliano 1974: 40).

In a similar situation, on hearing Don Quixote’s discourse on pride and ingratitude “con grande atención” (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1206), his squire also resorts to likening him to a sermon-reading priest:

¿Es posible que haya en el mundo personas que se atrevan a decir y a jurar que este mi señor es loco? Digan vuestras mercedes, señores pastores: ¿hay cura de aldea, por discreto y por estudiante que sea, que pueda decir lo que mi amo ha dicho [...]? (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1206).

Generally, these comparisons could be dismissed as they are made by persons of insufficient cultural status to properly evaluate his discourses. To Sancho, being a preacher or a theologian probably signifies nothing more than being “book smart”; ecclesiastical rhetoric and learning are quite probably the only form of intellectual life he has been exposed to. The same could be generally said regarding Don Quixote’s niece. Nevertheless, these commentaries form a reliable pattern and resonate with the protagonist’s own thoughts and self-appraisals. The problem of his relationship to religion

(including from a discursive point of view) is specifically addressed by the character, and is a recurring subject of his discourses and monologues. In several instances, Don Quixote acts as a purveyor of moral truths and censor of human vice, making his discourses, despite a dearth of overt Biblical references, similar to actual sermons. The example of the speech in II.58 serves as evidence of that, as it is replete with vocabulary and imagery typical of theological or religious/didactic discourse, especially the constant repeating of the keywords and tropes of ecclesiastical discourse (emphasis in the following quote mine):

Entre los *pecados mayores* que los hombres cometen, aunque algunos dicen que es la *soberbia*, yo digo que es el *desagradecimiento*, ateniéndome a lo que suele decirse: que de los desagradecidos está lleno el *infierno*. Este *pecado*, en cuanto me ha sido posible, he procurado yo huir desde el instante que tuve uso de razón, y si no puedo pagar *las buenas obras* que me hacen con otras obras, pongo en su lugar los deseos de hacerlas, y cuando estos no bastan, las publico, porque quien dice y publica *las buenas obras* que recibe, también las recompensara con otras, si pudiera; porque por la mayor parte los que reciben son inferiores a los que dan, y así *es Dios sobre todos, porque es dador sobre todos*, y no pueden corresponder las *dádivas del hombre a las de Dios* con igualdad, por *infinita distancia*, y esta *estrechez* y cortedad en cierto modo la suple el agradecimiento... (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1205-1206)

In addition, Don Quixote's constant harangues on chivalric ideals, his status as a knight-errant, and praise of the heroes of chivalry have a significant religious element built into them. By engaging in this kind of discourse, Don Quixote acts as something of an evangelist of a chivalric faith, attempting to "convert" his listeners by convincing them of its reality and urging them to accept his status as its messenger. Eric Ziolkowski, without assuming this position himself, notes that, depending on the critical paradigm, "the "chivalric" can in all instances be read as "theological" or "sacred" (Ziolkowski 1991: 25), while Mar Marcos and Ramón Teja present a case for quixotic chivalry as a "civil religion":

...Alonso Quijano, una vez “convertido” al mito de la caballería andante, se entregó con el fervor religioso del converso a cumplir todos los ritos que la nueva religión requería, siguiendo los preceptos de su nueva “Sagrada Escritura”, los libros de caballería. (Marcos and Teja 2008: 687)

An example of such “chivalric sermons” is Don Quixote’s discourse on lineage pronounced to his niece, rife with typical religious imagery endlessly recycled and repeated in theological and moralistic writings. The language he uses to praise the vocation of knights-errant expressly compares it to a life of Christian virtue, contrasted with the wretched life of a sinner (including a paraphrase of Matthew 7: 13-14). The pontificating hidalgo even attributes salvific properties to his chosen career, implying that it leads to Heaven, while those who reject chivalric ideals deprive themselves of the divine gift of eternal life (emphasis on rhetorical tropes typical of ecclesiastical discourse in the following quote mine):

...como sé, los *innumerables trabajos* que son anejos a la andante caballería, sé también los infinitos bienes que se alcanzan con ella y sé que *la senda de la virtud es muy estrecha, y el camino del vicio, ancho y espacioso*; y sé que sus fines y paraderos son diferentes, porque el del *vicio*, dilatado y espacioso, *acaba en muerte*, y el de la *virtud*, angosto y trabajoso, *acaba en vida*, y no en vida que se acaba, sino en *la que no tendrá fin*. (II.6; Cervantes 2004: 738)

Before delving further into the ecclesiastical element of Don Quixote’s discourses, it would be useful to make two observations. First, there have been numerous attempts to analyze the conjunction of religious references in the protagonist’s speech, from multiple passages in Hatzfeld’s *Don Quixote als Wortkunstwerk*, originally published in 1927 (Hatzfeld 1972: 131-151) to a more recent detailed catalogue of Catholic references in *Don Quixote* (Muñoz Iglesias 1989). Rather than picking apart any mention of anything remotely religious in *Don Quixote*, or seeking to find a proof of the

protagonist's (or the author's) adherence to a certain religious viewpoint, this study examines religious matter in the novel as a form of discourse or a specific mode of rhetoric, starting with a brief overview of common issues discussed by the rhetorical thought of the Catholic Church in Golden Age Spain, followed by an examination of their echo in Cervantes' novel.

For a significant part of its existence, ecclesiastical rhetoric was faced with the dilemma of either embracing or rejecting the Classical system of rhetorical arts – a private case of the broader dilemma of the Christian Church vis-a-vis the legacy of Greco-Roman culture. Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* offered a moderate perspective, acknowledging both the challenge of adapting a pagan invention for Christian usage and its great benefit for the propagation of faith; his treatise became an indispensable source for both Medieval and Renaissance rhetorical treatises.²⁴ With the resurgence of Classical studies in the Renaissance, the problem of reconciling Christ with Cicero once again came to the fore, as well as the necessity of adapting existing rhetorical models to combat the intellectual challenge posed by Protestantism. In the course of the Counter-Reformation, a multitude of Renaissance preacher's manuals and ecclesiastical rhetorics were published to enforce the renewed theological emphasis on persuasion and the art of speaking. According to Peter Mack, "The Council of Trent recognised the necessity of preaching and promoted a restrained Christian eloquence based on the example of the Church Fathers, and especially St Augustine, rather than on Cicero" (Mack 2011: 176). Spain was one of the leaders of this process, and produced, in both Latin and the vernacular, highly influential works. Félix Herrero Salgado notes that the character of

²⁴ For its influence in Spain, see Tubau 2009.

the majority of treatises on sacred eloquence was much less abstract and charged with everyday, practical concerns: “[L]as Retóricas eclesiásticas, a diferencia de las profanas, son, en general, prácticas, noticiosas y fuertemente críticas con usos y costumbres” (Herrero Salgado 2009: 46).

Fray Luis de Granada’s *Rhetorica ecclesiastica* (1576) was perhaps the most influential and enduring treatise on church eloquence and rhetoric in general produced in Golden Age Spain, codifying the post-Tridentine attitude to rhetoric. The author wholly embraces most of the tenets of Classical rhetoric (for example, the Ciceronian breakdown of rhetorical stages) while modifying some of the core elements as it fitted his objective. For example, he disregards the forensic rhetorical kind described by Aristotle as he is instructing preachers, not advocates (Granada 1999: XXII, 121); instead, he proposes a fourth rhetorical mode, the *magistral* or *didascalic*, specifically to accommodate doctrinal sermons (XXIII, 13). Rather than rejecting rhetoric as unnecessary, excessively sumptuous verbosity tainted by pagan and heretic teachings, Luis de Granada calls for treating it as a useful tool devoid of any religious affiliation.²⁵ While it can be abused by enemies of the Church, its benefits far outweigh the potential harm:

Y si bien algunos dicen que los infelices herejes de nuestro siglo impugnaron la fe católica con solas las armas de su elocuencia, este argumento está ciertamente por nuestra parte. Porque, si tan grande es la fuerza de la elocuencia, que puede persuadir las mentiras más descaradas, ¿cuánto más esta misma fuerza o energía podrá defender las certísimas y santísimas verdades de la fe católica[...]? (Granada 1999: XXII, 57)

In the dilemma of choosing between Christ and Cicero, a famous

²⁵ “...[S]e engañan que piensan ser la elocuencia un tumultuario amontonamiento de vocablos sinónimos y un afectado gracejo y donaire de hablar, siendo así que no hay cosa más opuesta a la verdadera elocuencia” (Granada 1999: XXII, 119).

contemporary of Luis de Granada, Huarte de San Juan, adopts a staunchly anti-Ciceronian position by claiming that learning is irrelevant in making a good preacher, and can even be an obstacle. However, in defence of both religion and rhetoric, he claims that the triumph of the Christian faith was brought about, among other factors, by a good use of eloquence (“la doctrina evangélica, la cual se podía persuadir con el arte de oratoria mejor que cuantas ciencias hay en el mundo, por ser la más cierta y verdadera”; Huarte de San Juan 1989: 426). At the same time, the “true” Christian rhetoric differs significantly from its conventional counterpart. It eschews rhetorical ornaments, duplicity and sophistry in favour of an artless (but highly sincere, effective and convincing) rhetorical style: “Pero Cristo nuestro redentor mandó a San Pablo que no la [the doctrine of the Gospel] predicase *in sapientia verbi*, porque no pensasen las gentes que era alguna mentira bien ordenada que los oradores solían persuadir con la obra de su arte” (Huarte de San Juan 1989: 436). By claiming that “el lenguaje y manera de hablar era el natural de san Pablo, acomodado y proprio a la doctrina que escribía, porque la verdad y la teología escolástica aborrecen la muchedumbre de palabras” (Huarte de San Juan 1989: 429) and that “con tanta copia de decir y tanto ornamento de palabras no se puede juntar el entendimiento” (Huarte de San Juan 1989: 429-430), Huarte de San Juan values a low-key but effective style over flamboyant and ostentatious displays of eloquence.²⁶ And, in an

²⁶ This traditional argument against overly florid, “Ciceronian” eloquence gained even more traction in the later stages of the Renaissance as a reaction against an increased conflation of ecclesiastical and secular rhetorical norms. For instance, early 17th century preacher Fray Diego de Murillo wrote that Christian truth should be preached “sin adorno de la elocuencia profana” and “sin afeite y desnuda”. Another theorist and practitioner of the sermon, Tomás Ramón, adopted an even more radical stance by stating that God did not choose twelve Demosthenes, Ciceros or Homers to preach His Gospel. Therefore, the

observation particularly interesting in the light of Don Quixote's *ingenio*, he notes that melancholics "son los más ingeniosos y hábiles para el ministerio de predicación para cuantas cosas de prudencia hay en el mundo, porque tienen entendimiento para alcanzar la verdad y grande imaginativa para saberla persuadir" (Huarte 1989: 461-462). At the same time, Huarte de San Juan values the ability of preachers to cause *admiratio* in their audience, linking this ability to imagination and good memory (both qualities possessed in abundance by Don Quixote): "Sólo quiero dar a entender que la gracia y donaire que tienen los buenos predicadores con la cual atraen a sí el auditorio y lo tienen contento y suspenso, todo es obra de la imaginativa, y parte de ello de la buena memoria" (Huarte de San Juan 1989: 433).

An attempt to reconstruct an ideal of Christian rhetoric from these arguments inevitably leads to a paradox. In one sense, the true Christian rhetoric is the *absence of rhetoric*, if the latter is to be defined as a combination of unnecessary pomposity with trickery and falsehood that undermines the spiritual message that the discourse is supposed to convey. Free from all forms of selfish or malicious intent as well as extraneous adornments of eloquence, the Christian orator is able to convey the pure divinely inspired truth, in clear, uncorrupted language understandable by all. In essence, "profane" eloquence is the language of falsehood and duplicity, while its church counterpart is predicated on expressing absolute truth with absolute sincerity.²⁷ Therefore, ecclesiastical eloquence is jointly an *anti-*

knowledge of "profane eloquence" is not required for a preacher to do God's will and spread the faith (cited in Dansey Smith 1978: 95).

²⁷ For example, the preface to Cipriano Suárez's *De arte rhetorica* (1562), "the most successful rhetoric of the second half of the sixteenth century" (Mack 2011: 9), urged Christians to "purify rhetoric by avoiding the deceitfulness, aggressiveness, and pride characteristic of pagan oratory" (Mack 2011: 181).

rhetoric and a *super-rhetoric*, vying to represent the spirit, not the letter, of human discourse, and claiming divine inspiration (an omnipresent commonplace of treatises on church rhetoric is declaring Christ himself as the ideal orator and a model to follow). At the same time, church rhetoric acknowledged the influence and relevance of Classical sources and sought to find parallels in their ideals; for example, Luis de Granada praised Quintilian for connecting rhetorical prowess to morality and insisting that a perfect orator must also be a virtuous man.

The described traits of Spanish ecclesiastical rhetoric often find their way in Don Quixote's discourse, especially when the protagonist attempts to define his vocation in quasi-religious terms. I.13 contains the famous apology of knights-errant presented by the protagonist to Vivaldo, where Don Quixote defends the virtues of the order of chivalry and compares its ideals to those of other groups and social strata. Its standards of virtue are almost impossibly high; in fact, the near-ecclesiastical language used by Don Quixote suggests a religious nature of this organization:

Esto, pues, señores, es ser caballero andante, y la que he dicho es la orden de su caballería, en la cual, como otra vez he dicho, yo, aunque pecador, he hecho profesión, y lo mesmo que profesaron los caballeros referidos profesó yo. (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 150-151)

Furthermore, the demands exacted by the order of chivalry, especially the life of constant travel and combat, places knights in a similar position to monks. Although Don Quixote declines to place knights-errant above monks ("No quiero yo decir, ni me pasa por pensamiento, que es tan bueno estado el del caballero andante como el del encerrado religioso"; I.13; Cervantes 2004: 152), the reclusive life of the latter, while still favoured by God,

appears to fall short of the incredibly taxing and perilous life of the knights-errant:

No quiero yo decir, ni me pasa por pensamiento, que es tan buen estado el de caballero andante como el del encerrado religioso: solo quiero inferir, por lo que yo padezco, que sin duda es más trabajoso y más aporreado, y más hambriento y sediento, miserable, roto y piojoso, porque no hay duda sino que los caballeros andantes pasados pasaron mucha mala ventura en el discurso de su vida. (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 152)

This passage can be interpreted as anti-clerical, and its entire message as Don Quixote being holier-than-thou; at the same time, it reinforces the position of the knights-errant as doers of God's will and of Don Quixote himself as divinely inspired for his mission. The main line of contrast between monks and knights is the asceticism, hard labour and constant peril surrounding the lives of the latter; in fact, it is the same juxtaposition Don Quixote uses to condemn *blandos cortesanos* (this argument is examined in detail in the section devoted to courtly rhetoric). In an interesting parallel, Fray Luis de Granada describes the office of the preacher as being especially arduous and demanding, posing the same kind of challenge that Don Quixote would find acceptable:

...[E]s tan ardua y difícil empresa reducir al hombre de la esclavitud de la culpa a la libertad venturosa de la gracia... [P]odrá entender el predicador cual grave negocio se le ha confiado y cuán pesada carga se impuso sobre los hombros... (Granada 1999: XXII, 69).

In addition, Luis de Granada claims that, paradoxically, the ultimate weapon of the preacher is not eloquence itself, but humility and adherence to the ideal he represents, a message in line with the attitude of the knight-errant who considers himself to the lowliest of sinners but strives to spread the fame of chivalry with both word and deed:

[S]i no busca su gloria, sino la de su Señor y la salud de las almas, cuanto más se debe adelantar este negocio con oraciones que con sermones, más con lágrimas que con letras, más con ejemplos de virtudes que con las reglas de los retóricos” (Granada 1999: XXII, 71).

A further development of the monk/knight juxtaposition can be found in II.8, in a discussion between Sancho and Don Quixote about the veneration of holy relics. Sancho mentions two recently canonised Franciscan friars and how their chains are held in higher veneration than the sword of Roland, implying the superiority of the monastic life over the knightly. The discussion unfolds as follows:

...Así que, señor mío, más vale ser humilde frailecito, de cualquier orden que sea, que valiente y andante caballero; más alcanzan con Dios dos docenas de diciplinas que dos mil lanzadas, ora las den a gigantes, ora a vestiglos o a endriagos.

—Todo eso es así —respondió don Quijote—, pero no todos podemos ser frailes, y muchos son los caminos por donde lleva Dios a los suyos al cielo: religión es la caballería, caballeros santos hay en la gloria.

—Sí —respondió Sancho—, pero yo he oído decir que hay más frailes en el cielo que caballeros andantes.

—Eso es —respondió don Quijote— porque es mayor el número de los religiosos que el de los caballeros.

—Muchos son los andantes —dijo Sancho.

—Muchos —respondió don Quijote—, pero pocos los que merecen nombre de caballeros. (II.8; Cervantes 2004: 756-757)

Given the subject matter and tone of this exchange, and the supposedly identical authenticity of Roland’s sword and the friars’ chains, it is entirely possible to interpret it as an Erasmian jab at the excesses of folk piety and relic worship. However, in the light of Don Quixote’s previous attempt to define the relationship of his “order” to monkhood, it acquires a significantly different meaning. Monks or friars are not inferior to knights, they just follow a different path to sainthood, but knights-errant yet maintain something of a higher ground because of their smaller numbers and a stricter code, making their path more exclusive and even “esoteric”. At the same

time, once again conflating chivalric myth, history, and Christian religion, Don Quixote completely disregards the different status of a holy relic and a purported chivalric artifact. While belief in the sanctity of relics was integral to Medieval Christianity, and further enforced by Tridentine doctrine, artifacts purportedly connected to Arthurian or Carolingian tradition were never afforded the same degree of respect (Sancho is completely right in this regard). Still, in Don Quixote's mind, Roland's sword and a holy friar's chains belong in the same continuum, and their parity serves as further evidence of divine support for the chivalric order.²⁸

Another religious-themed comparison can be found in II.58. After seeing three images of saints (Saint George, Saint Martin, and Saint James “the Moorslayer”, all traditionally depicted as knights or mounted warriors), Don Quixote makes the following proclamation:

...estos santos y caballeros profesaron lo que yo profeso, que es el ejercicio de las armas, sino que la diferencia que hay entre mí y ellos es que ellos fueron santos y pelearon a lo divino y yo soy pecador y peleo a lo humano. Ellos conquistaron el cielo a fuerza de brazos, porque el cielo padece fuerza, y yo hasta agora no sé lo que conquisto a fuerza de mis trabajos. (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1198)

Once again Don Quixote relegates himself to the position of a humble sinner unable to compare with paragons of faith (a time-honoured rhetorical trope of ecclesiastical discourse); at the same time, he expresses his desire to imitate them, if only “a lo humano”. The hidalgo's confession of not knowing what he conquers by force of his deeds is both a development of his humility and an acknowledgement that the path he has taken does not

²⁸ In addition, it is worth mentioning a parallel between “Muchos [son los andantes], pero pocos los que merecen nombre de caballeros” and Matthew 22:14 (“For many are called, but few are chosen”); the syntax follows that of the Biblical expression, and the implied sense (contrast between the seeming abundance of followers and the real paucity of true believers) is remarkably similar.

necessarily lead him to heaven (as further proven by his deathbed repudiation of errant chivalry). While the gravity of this statement is undermined by Sancho's inane questions, it strengthens the connection between Don Quixote and religious imagery and ideals. In the previously mentioned discussion in II.8, he mentioned that "caballeros santos hay en la gloria". Now he actually encounters and shows the images of holy warriors to the more sceptical Sancho, bolstering his claim of divine favour for his actions and providing a solid argument for his cause.

Still, although knighthood is firmly established as favoured by God and a legitimate path to sainthood, Don Quixote insists on his own humility and "all too human nature"; while there *are* holy knights, he is not one of them. According to Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Don Quixote is so much better a Christian because subjectively he makes no claim to sanctity, and because objectively it is never possible, at any moment or in any respect, to count his ridiculous doings among the solemn deeds of God and Jesus Christ" (Balthasar 1995: 179-180). And, in all his attempts to define himself in relation to saints and monks, Don Quixote utilises the traditional tropes and rhetorical figures of ecclesiastical discourse.

Overall, in Don Quixote's self-fashioning, we can see conscious attempts both to move away from "official" religious imagery and discourse (carefully separating the vocations of a monk and a knight) and embracing the tropes and figures common in sermons, theological treatises, and other forms of ecclesiastical discourse. One interpretation of this curious relationship suggests a link to early Franciscan tradition which often drew upon the chivalric myth and combined monastic and knightly imagery:

Don Quixote bases his behaviour on both *fictional* knights-errant and *real-world* itinerant friars. Only this can explain why he acts in the novel not only as a knight-errant but as a wandering preacher; his set of “sermons” consists of famous “discourses” – on the Golden Age, on the purpose of chivalry, on the Arms and Letters, on chivalric romances and many other subjects. (Piskunova 2009: 200)

While the interpretations of both von Balthasar and Piskunova are somewhat extreme in their treatment of Don Quixote’s rhetoric (essentially suggesting a latent religious meaning in everything he utters), there is indeed a pervasive conflation of the chivalric and the religious throughout the novel, and belief in his divine mission and heavenly support for the “order of chivalry” is an integral part of Don Quixote’s identity. This conviction of being “on a mission from God” is already present in the Don Quixote’s failed case for freeing the convicts in I.22, where he claims that “me parece duro hacer esclavos a los que Dios y naturaleza hicieron libres” and “Dios hay en el cielo, que no se descuida de castigar al malo ni de premiar al bueno, y no es bien que los hombres honrados sean verdugos de los otros hombres” (I.22; Cervantes 2004: 267).

Don Quixote’s speech made during his disruption of Camacho’s wedding offers a curious mixture of several discourses at the same time, with that of religion serving as a unifying thread for the entire speech. As the protagonist majestically appears, “con la lanza sobre el brazo y bien cubierto de su escudo” (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 880), everyone gives way to the knight. He speaks “a grandes voces” (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 880), producing a rather eclectic harangue. Starting with the Classical trope of love-as-war (“advertid que el amor y la guerra son la misma cosa”; II.22; Cervantes 2004: 880), he develops it to defend Basilio’s trick as a legitimate ruse of war. This defence of trickery and subterfuge is strange for a champion of righteousness, but the discourse further leads into providing a divine

justification for Basilio's actions and his future union with Quiteria: "Quiteria era de Basilio, y Basilio de Quiteria, por justa y favorable disposición de los cielos [...] a los dos que Dios junta no podrá separar el hombre..." (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 881). However, this divine sanction is incongruously supported by a yet another threat of violence ("...y el que lo intentare, primero ha de pasar por la punta desta lanza"; II.22; Cervantes 2004: 881).

Much like in the Marcela episode, Don Quixote, despite having presented an engaging, if flawed, discourse, almost literally strongarms the audience into following his decree. It is the lance, not the discourse itself, that provokes awe (a form of *admiratio*) in the audience: "Y en esto la blandió tan fuerte y tan diestramente, que puso pavor en todos que no le conocían" (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 881). However, the effect on the audience proves to be lasting, as the villagers later take Don Quixote to enjoy the festivities with them, "estimándole un hombre de valor y de pelo en pecho" (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 882). In these precise circumstances, the war-like gesture complements the dramatic image of Don Quixote as something of a heavenly messenger dispensing divine justice. It is one of the few instances where the protagonist fulfils his "mission from God" successfully and with no complications. Don Quixote's numinous function in this episode is also hinted at (in a characteristically carnivalesque manner) by Sancho, who, at his appearance, hides behind a pot, "*pareciéndole aquel lugar como sagrado*, que había de ser tenido en respeto" (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 880; emphasis mine). Despite the threat, the message of the discourse is centred on a loving God willing to forgive transgressions and protect the oppressed, following a logic similar to that of the plea for releasing the convicts.

The episode where Don Quixote faces the raging “war of the brayers” (II.27) is rarely given due attention, despite containing one of the most efficient uses of rhetoric by the novel’s protagonist. Faced with violence, Don Quixote attempts to bring much-required peace through the power of rhetoric. Don Quixote not only manifests rhetorical prowess (which, were this discourse to follow the pattern set by previous ones, would be misplaced or fall flat), but also almost manages to win over his audience. Don Quixote’s plea for peace fails only because of Sancho’s spectacularly untimely intervention. Instead of actively seeking battle, the would-be knight-errant first attempts to end it, then flees from combat after encountering superior firepower – both things being highly uncharacteristic of how an imitator of Amadís is supposed to act.

Don Quixote did try to act as a rhetorical agent of peace before, trying to quell the violent struggle over the helmet of Mambrino in I.45 by appealing to the fighters’ good sense – and invoking a chivalric precedent, as well as God as an ultimate moderator and peacemaker:

¿No os dije yo, señores, que este castillo era encantado, y que alguna región de demonios debe de habitar en él? En confirmación de lo cual, quiero que veáis por vuestros ojos cómo se ha pasado aquí y trasladado entre nosotros la discordia del campo de Agramante. Mirad cómo allí se pelea por la espada, aquí por el caballo, acullá por el águila, acá por el yelmo, y todos peleamos y todos no nos entendemos. Venga, pues, vuestra merced, señor oidor, y vuestra merced, señor cura, y el uno sirva de rey Agramante y el otro de rey Sobrino, y póngannos en paz. Porque por Dios Todopoderoso que es gran bellaquería que tanta gente principal como aquí estamos se mate por causas tan livianas. (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 575-576).

The attempt, however, fails, because the troopers “no entendían el frasis de don Quijote” (I.45; Cervantes 2004: 576). Christian irenism, the nucleus of the message, is obscured by a torrent of chivalric references. Don Quixote bases his exhortation on the futility of war fought over trivial things,

the worth of which is incommensurate with that of God-given human life. As Cesáreo Bandera notes in his analysis of the *baciyelmo* episode, “from this Christian perspective [...] [a]ll human violence is always, in and of itself, at the very least, a little absurd, a little bit without real object” (Bandera 2006: 280). The struggle for the helmet is thus one of the “so many absurd battles in the Quixote” (Bandera 2006: 280).

What reconnects the *aventura del rebuzno* to this prior episode is an even more ridiculous excuse for a war, even larger number of belligerents, and (as they are quite well armed) even greater potential for senseless violence, mayhem, and loss of life. In spite of their manifestly “modern” firearms (which are, however, mixed with “quaint” armaments such as partisans, halberds, and bucklers), the *rebuznadores*, with their mock-medieval banners, their misguided and inflated sense of honour and vainglory, their eagerness to fight over trivialities that would appear patently ridiculous to the layman, appear more quixotic than Don Quixote himself. At the same time, the knight-errant, a would-be exemplar of military prowess, speaks out against war and becomes a herald of peace.²⁹ Compared to the feuding peasants, Don Quixote seems a paragon of common sense, cautious moderation, and *prudencia*, as evidenced not only by discourse but also by his withdrawal from a battle clearly out of his league.

Karl-Ludwig Selig, in a brief but thought-provoking examination of the episode, points out the following key developments in Don Quixote’s use of

²⁹ While using rhetoric to stop violence is an extremely rare occasion for chivalric characters, it does sporadically occur in the romances. Ángel Rosenblat suggests an interesting parallel with an episode of *Amadis de Gaula* where the protagonist breaks up a knightly duel, succeeding in calming passions with a short phrase about the importance of valour, while Don Quixote fails with “tan elegante y prolijo razonamiento” (Rosenblat 1971: 110-111).

rhetoric. The discourse is one of the protagonist's most ambitious and inspired rhetorical works, and by itself a great example of Renaissance rhetoric: "Don Quixote's address is a very noble, sober, dignified, and restrained speech. It begs comparison to his discourse to the goatherds on the age of gold or golden age and his speech on arms and letters" (Selig 1993: 139). Unusually for a knight-errant, and unlike his many past attempts to enforce justice by force of arms, he eschews direct action in favour of using language and the power of persuasion as his sole weapon: "He urges and imposes restraint; he does not interfere with arms but functions as an arbiter and instrument to restore order" (Selig 1993: 139). In general, the degree of Don Quixote's prudence and awareness is shown as significantly improved: "[T]he Knight is now much more reasonable, more prudent; he is wiser" (Selig 1993: 139).

While Selig's observations are generally correct, they are of a highly sketchy nature, and need further development, particularly in regard to their implications in the novel as a whole. First of all, one has to consider that the "pacifist" discourse is a big step up from Don Quixote's previous speeches, in terms of both preparation and execution. The knight, previously rather indifferent to whether the listeners actually wanted to listen to him or not, goes to great lengths to win their favour, even promising to cut short his discourse if it happens to offend the audience: "Si esto sucede, con la más mínima señal que me hagáis pondré un sello en mi boca y echaré una mordaza a mi lengua" (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 937). As we have observed in Chapter I, this detail is rare and noteworthy: Don Quixote has never before openly voiced a concern for the length of his speeches, or a desire to tailor his speech to a specific audience. In the light of the work's ambiguity, this

statement can also be seen as a time-honoured rhetorical trope of asking to excuse the shortcomings of the speech before it is even pronounced (*captatio benevolentiae*), which does not necessarily represent any genuine concern on the speaker's part.³⁰ Unusually, the audience is initially quite receptive, despite the speaker having interrupted their feud (“Todos le dijeron que dijese lo que quisiese, que de buena gana le escucharían”; II.27; Cervantes 2004: 938).

The speech proper is also superior in structure and style to even the best of previous rhetorical efforts. Don Quixote avoids references to books of chivalry or Roman history that would be incomprehensible to the audience; the only literary reference is to a *romance viejo* that the peasants are much more likely to relate to. While, among the reasons for just war he adduces in his speech, he does mention honour and insults, the speaker specifically draws the line between such instances and the villagers' conflict (foreshadowing his discourse on insults in II.32). His main argument against the war is well-constructed, appealing both to a sense of social order, and, much like the galley slaves episode, to “ley natural y divina”, which would resonate even better with the villagers' more down-to-earth and intuitive understanding of justice. With his usual lofty style, he mixes a popular idiom (“cuando la cólera sale de madre, no tiene la lengua padre”; II.27; Cervantes 2004: 938), which helps to lighten up the gravity of the discourse, as well as pointing out the absurdity of the villagers' feud.

The centrepiece of the oration mixes different rhetorical styles and forms of discourse. The legal subtext of the argument immediately

³⁰ In Chapter I, we have already examined how Don Quixote even resorts to a rhetorical “white lie”, claiming that he had pondered the *rebuznadores'* case for a long while, in order to catch the audience's attention.

reconnects the speech to the *galeotes* episode and its use of legal discourse; the reasoning on the limits of just war harks back to the Arms and Letters discourse. However, the principal argument of the discourse is built around divine justice and Christian ideals (emphasis in the following quote mine):

¡Bueno sería, por cierto, que todos estos insignes pueblos se corriesen y vengasen, y anduviesen contino hechas las espadas sacabuches a cualquier pendencia, por pequeña que fuese! No, no, ni *Dios lo permita o quiera* [...] el tomar venganza injusta, que justa no puede haber alguna que lo sea, va derechamente contra *la santa ley que profesamos*, en la cual se nos manda que *hagamos bien a nuestros enemigos y que amemos a los que nos aborrecen*; mandamiento que, aunque parece algo dificultoso de cumplir, no lo es sino para aquellos *que tienen menos de Dios que del mundo, y más de carne que de espíritu*; porque *Jesucristo*, Dios y hombre verdadero, que nunca mintió, ni pudo ni puede mentir, siendo *legislador nuestro*, dijo que su yugo era suave y su carga liviana... (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 939).

The invocation is remarkable in its earnestness, especially contrasted with the patent ridiculousness of the conflict that it aims to end. This emphasis on the moral and religious side of the argument, addressing the *afectos* of his audience, is perfectly in line with the recommendations of treatises on giving sermons. Even if the argument itself is quite commonplace,³¹ the delivery is perfectly tailored to the event and underscores what is evident to everyone except the warring villagers. Judging by this discourse in particular, Don Quixote is closer to the ideal of the preacher than any actual cleric character in the book. In addition, the outward simplicity of the speech belies a profound understanding of then-current moral, theological, and legal debates on the concept of war. Steven J.

³¹ Ernest Siciliano justly notes that just war is a topic “flirting with theological ramifications” (Siciliano 1974: 39-40). The Christian discourse on just war goes back to Augustine of Hippo (Langan 1984), and has remained a theological fixture for hundreds of years, up to this day. This is but a single case of how both Don Quixote and Sancho, in Robert Ricard’s words, “retoman casi siempre los lugares comunes en los cuales se han inspirado siempre los moralistas y predicadores, a partir de la Antigüedad clásica” (Ricard 1964: 265).

Rupp cites Dominican friar and Humanist Francisco de Vitoria and his *De iure belli* (1539) as the most probable source of inspiration for Cervantes and his character (Rupp 2014: 93-96). By tapping into the long tradition of Christian irenism and carefully presenting his arguments, Don Quixote “applies his rhetorical skills to a practical end that reflects the confidence of humanist advisers and jurists in their capacity to limit and contain violence through rational argument” (Rupp 2014: 96).³²

However, typical of Part II, Don Quixote’s efforts are undone by Sancho’s extremely untimely hijacking of his speech. The squire is ostensibly driven by the desire to help his master. Before he utters his disastrous speech, Sancho notes that Don Quixote is a “tólogo” (theologian, or, what Sancho really implies, a “really smart person”), and starts his intervention by extolling his virtues in both *letras* (“sabe romance y latín como un bachiller”) y *armas* (“muy buen soldado”), trying to lend his words more authority (“no hay más que hacer sino dejarse llevar por lo que él dijere”; II.27; Cervantes 2004: 940). After this eulogy, which is hilariously overdone but still serviceable as a commentary to Don Quixote’s masterful discourse, Sancho jumps to the subject of braying and imitates this sound, predictably infuriating the audience and rekindling the fight. In the next chapter, Don Quixote wastes little time in stressing the monumental stupidity of Sancho’s decision (which, in itself, is a rhetorical *faux pas* much

³² There is also another, less noticeable departure from the established pattern of Quixote’s discourses. The speaker stops to catch his breath before continuing with the speech, satisfied with capturing his audience’s attention: “Tomó un poco de aliento don Quijote y, viendo que todavía le prestaban silencio, quiso pasar adelante en su plática” (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 940). This realistic detail is entirely absent from Don Quixote’s previous discourses, even those that are much more prolix.

worse than any of Don Quixote's) and noting it could not have led to anything other than a beating:

¡Tan enhoramala supistes vos rebuznar, Sancho! ¿Y dónde hallastes vos ser bueno el nombrar la sogá en casa del ahorcado? A música de rebuznos, ¿qué contrapunto se había de llevar sino de varapalos? (II.28; Cervantes 2004: 942)

Overall, out of all Don Quixote's rhetorical failures, this one is positively the most unfortunate and undeserved. The aftermath of the discourse is a flurry of violence not unlike the one in the galley slaves episode. It erupts in spite of the hidalgo having been much more careful than usual in his choice of words. He avoided all of his usual errors (not conforming the speech to the audience, overusing certain tropes, etc.), and the audience seemed genuinely interested in what he had to say. For Don Quixote as a rhetorician, it represents a step in the right direction: possibly not towards complete lucidity, but definitely towards a more flexible and less automatic use of rhetoric. The requirements of *aptum* are followed to the point; this is definitely a kind of speech that resonates with both the diegetic audience and with the reader.

Nevertheless, there are, of course, significant deflating and borderline parodic elements inherent in the speech. First of all, Don Quixote's use of intricate theological and legal argumentation dissonates with the laughable premise of the conflict and the rustic nature of its participants. The author once again employs the contrast of wise and prudent argumentation and the risible circumstances of its delivery to elicit laughter from the reader. As Steven Rupp observes,

[i]n citing just war theory to the irate villagers, Don Quixote applies a concept from the sphere of politics and diplomacy to a local conflict among pastoral characters. Such

disjunction between rhetoric and circumstance is a typical source of comic effects in *Don Quixote*. (Rupp 2014: 93-94)

The intrinsically absurd context of the speech is evident in Don Quixote's own words, for instance, as he goes from an idealistic exhortation to a catalogue of ridiculous nicknames that should never be uttered:

Siendo, pues, esto así, que uno solo no puede afrentar a reino, provincia, ciudad, república, ni pueblo entero, queda en limpio que no hay para qué salir a la venganza del reto de la tal afrenta, pues no lo es; porque ¡bueno sería que se matasen a cada paso los del pueblo de la Reloja con quien se lo llama, ni los cazoleros, berenjeneros, ballenatos, jaboneros, ni los de otros nombres y apellidos que andan por ahí en boca de los muchachos y de gente de poco más a menos! (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 938-939)

Still, this incongruous clash of disparate elements is more justified than in other cases, as it serves to point out just how idiotic the quarrel seems to a slightly more prudent person. And, in the end, by appealing to the villagers' God-given sense of morality and justice, Don Quixote presents the religious side of his chivalric mission more convincingly than when he attempts to use ecclesiastical discourse to justify his chivalric escapades. In spite of the Sancho-induced failure of the speech and its violent aftermath, Don Quixote succeeds in demonstrating the breadth of his rhetorical abilities by successfully employing the tropes and style of a sermon to influence human passions.

El Galateo Quijotesco: *Don Quixote and Courtly Rhetoric*

This part of the study attempts to examine not merely the presence, but the use and function of courtly eloquence. Rather than studying the entire phenomenon of courtly culture within *Don Quixote*, it is concerned, first and foremost, with its *rhetorical* and *discursive* dimension, i.e. the presence of common courtly tropes and patterns in Don Quixote's discourses. Therefore,

the analysis of its philosophical, sociological, and other implications has been reduced to a necessary minimum.

The importance of the court and its associated social, cultural, and specifically linguistic and literary phenomena for the genesis and the development of the Renaissance hardly needs further introduction. What requires particular attention, however, is the importance of “courtiers’ manuals” for the dissemination of courtly attitudes to proper behaviour and proper speech. As in many other domains of Renaissance culture, Italy was the pacesetter of “courtliness” as a pan-European phenomenon, producing a large number of treatises on proper courtly behavior, the two most celebrated and seminal examples being Baldessare Castiglione’s *Il Cortigiano* and Giovanni della Casa’s *Il Galateo*.

Spain’s fascination with courtly speech started well before the Renaissance and can be traced to the courts of Mediæval Castile; however, the Golden Age was crucial in cementing the language of the court as the paragon of style. Among other European countries that assimilated the influence of Italian court culture, Spain occupies a special place. Juan Boscán’s translation of *Il Cortigiano* as *El cortesano* (1534) and Gracián Dantisco’s loose adaptation of Giovanni Della Casa’s *Il Galateo* as *El Galateo español* (1582) are brilliant examples of cultural translation that became instant and enduring cultural phenomena, helping shape and mould the court culture of the Spanish Renaissance.³³ Far from being purely practical manuals, they touched upon numerous issues of eloquence and

³³ The echo of *El Cortesano*, *El Galateo español*, and other manuals of courtly conduct in Cervantes’ novel has been well established by preceding criticism: Mades 1968; Raimondo 2013.

speaking, and, with a higher profile and accessibility than most purely rhetorical manuals; as Peter Mack notes,

One indication of the cultural importance of rhetoric in the sixteenth century was the discussion of often quite technical rhetorical issues in major vernacular treatises on polite conversation and the behaviour and education of courtiers. (Mack 2011: 296-297)

In Chapter I, we cited considerable evidence for courtliness having been linked with the concept of *discreción*, which, in its turn, was routinely employed as a near-synonym for eloquence. The word *cortesano* has been subject to similar semantic permutations. Examples of usage provided for the word *cortesano* in the *Suplementos* to Covarrubias' dictionary show that the principal meaning drifted towards the broader 'eloquent' rather than the strict 'related or pertaining to a court': "Aristófanés era tan cortesano en la lengua ática... Isaías escribió en estilo cortesano" (cited in González Ollé 2002: 186-187). The association between eloquence and courtliness went so far that some Golden Age writers saw no dissonance in applying the words *cortesano* even to Classical and Biblical figures: for example, Huarte de San Juan went even further than Covarrubias by assigning the prophet Isaiah an actual courtly upbringing as an explanation for his lofty style: "Isaías era caballero ilustre, criado en la corte y en la ciudad de Jerusalén, por la cual razón tenía ornamento y policía en hablar" (González Ollé 2002: 160).

Ramón Menéndez Pidal saw the "tipo lingüístico cortesano" as "el menos afectado de cuales se ejecutaban en los años más florecientes del siglo XVII" (cited in González Ollé 2002: 217). As a whole, treatises on courtly conduct praised brevity, simplicity and clarity over ostentatious bombast and discouraged displays of overly learned vocabulary or convoluted syntax. This trend resonates with Cervantes' own famous praise

of *llaneza* and rejection of ornamentation in the prologue to Part I (“procurar... a la llana, con palabras significantes, honestas y bien colocadas”; Cervantes 2004: 19).

It would be all the more logical to start the analysis with the protagonist’s own appraisals of courtiers. Don Quixote’s famous criticism of *blandos cortesanos* (“[e]l buen paso, el regalo y el reposo, allá se inventó para los blandos cortesanos; mas el trabajo, la inquietud y las armas sólo se inventaron e hicieron para aquellos que el mundo llama caballeros andantes”; I.13; Cervantes 2004: 149) seems to be entirely unambiguous in its censure of courtly values and lifestyle. Still, the contrast between the knight-errant and the courtier does not go any further than this. The hidalgo condemns the courtiers’ carefree lifestyle but levels no accusations of duplicity and hypocrisy, stressing their physical weakness rather than any supposed moral deficiency.

Don Quixote’s discourse addressed to his niece in II.6 is similar in his treatment of the *caballero/cortesano* dichotomy. Like the one in I.13, it is first and foremost an apology of errant chivalry. The courtier is once again used as a convenient strawman to highlight the virtues of the knight-errant. Nevertheless, the protagonist’s criticism of courtly men seems to have abated. He concedes that “no todos los caballeros pueden ser cortesanos, ni todos los cortesanos pueden ni deben ser caballeros andantes: de todos ha de haber en el mundo” (II.6; Cervantes 2004: 733). Naturally, he prefers the perilous life of the knight-errant to the indolence of the courtier, and the contrast is once again built around physical activity rather any moral disparity between the two. The courtiers are accused of being passive and

indolent, but are not linked to such vices as scheming, lust for power, trickery, etc.

According to Don Quixote's speech, knights-errant are superior to courtiers mainly because their code of conduct calls for more action, risk-taking, bravery, and fortitude in face of adversity. Essentially, chivalry is superior because it requires extraordinary displays of exceptional courage and larger-than-life feats of strength, while courtliness is based around daily routine and a sense of everyday tranquility. Curiously enough, manuals of courtly conduct did recognise the more day-to-day character of their espoused ideals. In a parallel never cited before, to my knowledge, the beginning of the original Italian *Galateo*, while evidently much more defensive of courtly values, contains a passage similar in tenor to Don Quixote's praise of heroism:

...[A]lthough liberality, courage, or generosity are without doubt far greater and more praiseworthy things than charm or manners, none the less, pleasant habits and decorous manners and words are perhaps no less useful to those who have them than noble spirit and self-assurance to others. This is so because everyone must deal with other men and speak to them every day; thus, good manners must be also practised many times daily, whereas justice and fortitude and other greater and nobler virtues are called into service much more seldom.... [M]en who are strong and courageous are rarely required to demonstrate their valour and virtue by their works. Thus, while the latter virtues easily surpass the former in greatness and weightiness, yet the qualities I speak of surpass others in number and frequency. (Della Casa 2009: 32)

In this context, Don Quixote's criticism of courtiers seems much less radical. Its sole *raison d'être* is complementing the praise of chivalry, and it is built around one specific trait that has been acknowledged by courtly culture itself: the superiority of chivalric prowess over courtly indolence. I find that this appraisal is highly illustrative of the ambiguity of Cervantes' use of rhetoric in general and courtly rhetoric in particular. It is clear that the

creator of *Don Quixote* expressly acknowledges the power and authority of courtly rhetoric. However, by changing the typical courtly topos or introducing subtle details, he challenges and re-examines the rules of courtly discourse rather than simply following their dictate. Don Quixote also freely mixes and combines courtly discourse with other discursive forms, especially the language of chivalry.

For instance, with his Arms and Letters discourse, Don Quixote produces a speech that is both insightful and entertaining for the audience and one that would not have been out of place at a real Renaissance court. In this chapter, the hidalgo lives up to ideals painted by Castiglione, Della Casa, and other writers on courtliness. Don Quixote's spontaneity and lack of premeditation or deliberateness in his choice of discourse reflects the concept of *sprezzatura* – apparent artlessness disguising a great deal of skill, learning, and preparation. *Pace* Howard Wescott's article on *sprezzatura* in *Don Quixote* (Wescott 2000), which seems to equate all forms of accommodating discourse with deceit and considers *sprezzatura* an endemic courtly vice,³⁴ I would suggest that Don Quixote is perfectly capable of embodying this virtue. He only fails when he is forced to defend perceived slights to his chivalric honour or expound the code of knighthood.

Unsurprisingly, the most apparent and memorable manifestation of Don Quixote as a courtly speaker occurs during his sojourn in the Duke's and Duchess' palace. The episode, spread over 27 chapters, is in many ways a cultural lynchpin of Part II, an enormous complex of themes, motifs, and cultural references contained inside one of Don Quixote's greatest and most

³⁴ “Indeed, the very quality that distinguishes Don Quixote from the courtier, his ethical sincerity, is what makes his struggle seem noble to us” (Wescott 2000: 226); “Don Quixote may be a spectacular pain in the neck at times, but one always knows where he stands, and in this he is the antithesis of Castiglione's courtier” (Wescott 2000: 227).

harrowing adventures. Given the setting and the social status of the knight-errant's hosts, it is hardly surprising that their behaviour has coloured the critical perception of courtly culture in the novel. The palatial adventure is doubtlessly the cornerstone of "anti-courtly" interpretations of the novel. The functioning of courtly rhetoric in the episode is further aggravated by the superior social status of the nobility. Normally, Don Quixote is superior to or commensurate with most of his audience in terms of social rank, and his interaction with Don Diego de Miranda (explored at length in Chapter III) is based around the idea of equality. At the palace, the protagonist has to interact with high aristocracy, which partly explains the general tenor of courtly rhetoric in the episode.

The first example of Don Quixote demonstrating his abilities as a courtly speaker is the incident with the *grave eclesiástico* and its aftermath (I.31). It occurs during a meal in a courtly setting, placing it (not unlike the Arms and Letters speech) firmly into the context of a *symposion* or *sobremesa*, with resulting requirements of speech and conduct. One of its fundamental, non-negotiable rules is that the conversation accompanying the meal should not be injurious or offensive to anyone, with everyone present at the table sharing both meal and discourse in peace. In fact, Renaissance Humanists often emphasised the etymology of *convivium*, 'feast': from *convivere*, 'live together', 'coexist' (Jeanneret 1991: 28). As noted by Jorge Chen Sham,

La sobremesa se define por el carácter "gustoso" en ambos casos. Ello no es casual en este contexto en el que la lectura es divertimento y se caracteriza por ser un ritual que no debería ni provocar confrontaciones ni comportamientos indecorosos por la parte de los comensales. Por otra parte, la sobremesa se distingue porque instaura un espacio de trato convivial y de conversación... (Chen Sham 2011: 37).

The *sobremesa* in the episode goes against these requirements in several ways, although Don Quixote is blameless in this debacle, as most rhetorical blunders are committed by other characters. First, Sancho (recently censured by his master and more mindful of social codes than ever) attempts to engage in obligatory symposiac storytelling, paying attention (to the best of his ability) to the etiquette and carefully asking for permission to take the lead in the table-talk (“Si sus mercedes me dan licencia, os contaré un cuento...”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 967). However, his rustic anecdotes almost immediately annoy the *grave eclesiástico*. The churchman is displeased with their rambling and nonsensical nature (“que camino lleváis de no parar con vuestro cuento hasta el otro mundo”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 968), and keeps urging the peasant to get over with his discourse. The Duke and the Duchess, instead of defusing the growing tension, derive a certain *Schadenfreude* from the situation (“Gran gusto recibían los duques del disgusto que mostraba tomar el buen religioso”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 969) and later feign amusement at Sancho’s story. Meanwhile, Don Quixote “se estaba consumiendo en cólera y en rabia” and finally “púsose [...] de mil colores” (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 969).

When Sancho terminates his ill-conceived attempt at courtly speaking, the entirety of his audience is either annoyed, angry, or entertained for all the wrong reasons (that is, not by the story, but by the speaker’s ineptitude). However, to put an end to Sancho’s never-ending tales, the Duchess urges Don Quixote to speak on even more far-fetched and ridiculous matters:

...por mudar de plática y hacer que Sancho no prosiguiese con otros disparates, preguntó la duquesa a don Quijote que nuevas tenía de la señora Dulcinea y que si le había enviado algunos presentes de gigantes o malandrines, pues no podía de haber vencido muchos (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 969).

It is hard to imagine that she would be unable to predict that such talk would drive the *grave eclesiástico* to boiling point, and the change accomplishes precisely that. The cleric finally explodes, expressing his indignation at the hosts' tolerance to the effusions of a confirmed lunatic and speaking "con mucha cólera" and, venting his indignation, resorts to name-calling: "don Tonto", "alma de cántaro" (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 970).

This is the precise point where all pretence of civility goes out of the window. While Sancho can be partly exonerated for trampling all over the courtly etiquette because of his rustic upbringing and lack of experience, neither the churchman nor the aristocrats have any excuse. The *sobremesa* ends in an abject, colossal failure. María Augusta da Costa Vieira sees a deliberate parody in the way courtly discourse is presented in the chapter: "Si el decoro propio del ceremonial cortesano respecto a la convivencia en la mesa es parodiado, los protocolos relacionados con la conversación también siguen los mismos senderos..." (Costa Vieira 2011: 273). In any case, it definitely represents the exact opposite of an ideal Renaissance feast described in Michel Jeanneret's study:

During a meal, conversation should erase differences, remove hierarchy and overcome inhibition; conversation will flow freely and everyone will have an equal share in it. Thus topics will be chosen to suit everyone's knowledge and tastes. There will be laughter, but no mockery, there will be jokes, but no provocation. [...] A micro-society is formed around the table in which the speaker can sense the effect of his or her words. A whole system of rhetoric is in operation, but it is one which seeks more to seduce than to persuade [...] The good guest is at pains to please and gets on well with people, for nothing enhances the joy of a feast more than friendship and trust... (Jeanneret 1991: 93-94)

Don Quixote's blame in this debacle is minimal compared to others (he only reveals his anger through gestures), and his response to the cleric's attack on his dignity is remarkably courteous and restrained. Even though

his body language is as impulsive as ever and antithetic to societal decorum (“sin guardar respeto a los duques, con semblante airado y alborotado rostro, se puso en pie y dijo...”; “temblando de los pies de cabeza como azogado, con presurosa y turbada lengua dijo...”; I.31; Cervantes 2004: 970-971), the hidalgo’s actual retort is as subdued as possible, given the circumstances. The beginning of the speech reveals Don Quixote's cognizance of his social situation and laws of courtly behaviour that preclude him from responding to the *eclesiástico's* vitriol with physical violence. The speaker moderates his characteristic *temeridad* with unusual *prudencia*:

El lugar donde estoy, y la presencia ante quien me hallo, y el respeto que siempre tuve y tengo al estado que vuesa merced profesa, tienen y atan las manos de mi justo enojo... (I.32; Cervantes 2004: 971)

Precluding any potential accusation of impiety, he clearly separates the respected rank of the preacher from the animosity he feels towards that person.³⁵ It is not the clergy as a whole that Don Quixote resents, just a particular clergyman. An additional reason for eschewing the force of arms is a masterfully executed rhetorical jab: “...saben todos que las armas de los togados son las mismas que las de la mujer, que son la lengua, entraré con la mía en igual batalla con vuesa merced” (I.32; Cervantes 2004: 971). Essentially, Don Quixote compares the churchman to a woman (as both clerics and women are barred from bearing arms and have only their tongues for weapons), an insinuation that is quite demeaning yet ingeniously and wittily phrased, unlike the *eclesiástico's* blunt insults. Also, using eloquence instead of arms is thus considered inferior, once again emphasising the tension between violence and rhetoric that accompanies Don Quixote

³⁵ Especially important since the *grave eclesiástico* later swears “por el hábito que tengo” (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 973), emphasising his identity as a member of the clergy.

throughout the novel. Yet, by taking up the arms of eloquence, modestly placed among the virtues of a knight-errant, the protagonist puts them to the defense of chivalric myth, using language instead of violence to repel challenges to his honour and identity. This is a significant change from his earlier behaviour.

Don Quixote's initial censure of the *grave eclesiástico* is precisely to the point. He correctly observes that the churchman not only broke decorum (delivering his vituperations at the wrong time and in the wrong tone) but also went against the spirit of the Gospel by treating a sinner with opprobrium instead of compassion:

...requieren y otros puntos piden: a lo menos, el haberme reprehendido en público y tan ásperamente ha pasado todos los límites de la buena reprehensión, pues las primeras mejor asientan sobre la blandura que sobre la aspereza, y no es bien que sin tener conocimiento del pecado que se reprehende llamar al pecador, sin más ni más, mentecato y tonto. (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 972).

However, the justified and well-structured part of the retort ends very fast, ceding its place to a juxtaposition of clerics and knights-errant, one of Don Quixote's beloved commonplaces. Before this episode, he had already expounded upon the comparison in I.13, while conversing with Vivaldo, but here he has the opportunity to directly challenge an actual man of the cloth. Martín de Riquer even refers to this part of the argument as a “versión renacentista del debate medieval entre el clérigo y el caballero” (Riquer 2010: 243). The final part of the discourse is essentially a *chivalric apology* (a specific subset of Don Quixote's discourses explored at more length in Chapter III), an exercise in propagating the values of chivalry and Don Quixote's own self-worth. While Aurora Egido argues that “Don Quijote demuestra [...] unas cualidades dialécticas implagables, poniendo todos los

recursos de la oratoria al servicio de la justificación de sus actos como caballero andante” (Egido 2011: 258), and there is undeniable passion in his defence, it does eventually degenerate into a torrent of self-affirmation:

...yo, inclinado de mi estrella, voy por la angosta senda de la caballería andante, por cuyo ejercicio desprecio la hacienda, pero no la honra. Yo he satisfecho agravios, enderezado tuertos, castigado insolencias, vencido gigantes y atropellado vestiglos; yo soy enamorado, no más de porque es forzoso que los caballeros andantes lo sean, y, siéndolo, no soy de los enamorados viciosos, sino de los platónicos continentes. Mis intenciones siempre las enderezo a buenos fines, que son de hacer bien a todos y mal a ninguno... (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 972)

The chivalric part of the discourse drastically undermines its message. Even though, as Edwin Williamson points out (Williamson 2011: 176-177), the *grave eclesiástico* has every reason to be displeased with Sancho and Don Quixote, he committed a far greater sin against the rules of courtly etiquette by openly venting his anger. Don Quixote’s criticism of the churchman’s behaviour is entirely valid in this respect. However, by trying to justify his chivalric way of life and defend himself against the *eclesiástico*’s accusations, the knight-errant appears too self-important, and, of course, the reference to defeating giants does little to strengthen his argument. Sancho’s subsequent incoherent praise also does more harm than good in presenting a case for chivalry: “No diga más vuestra merced, señor y amo mío, en su abono, porque no hay más que decir, ni más que pensar, ni más que perseverar en el mundo...” (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 972)

Despite some serious flaws in his reply to the *grave eclesiástico*, Don Quixote emerges as the most prudent, moderate, and morally sound person in the entire table-talk episode. Manuel Criado de Val, while lending too much praise to the discourse and overlooking its flaws, is correct in noting a new impression that this speech is bound to make: “La contestación de Don

Quijote es un prodigio dialéctico. No hay en ella ni la más leve incoherencia” (Criado de Val 2005: 42). This impression is further increased by the following exchange with the Duchess. After listening to Don Quixote’s lengthy praises of Dulcinea and lamentations for her enchantment, the Duchess questions the very existence of the damsel:

...hemos de dar crédito a la historia que del señor don Quijote de pocos días a esta parte ha salido a la luz del mundo, con general aplauso de las gentes, della se colige, si mal no me acuerdo, que nunca vuesa merced ha visto a la señora Dulcinea, y que esta tal señora no es en el mundo, sino que es dama fantástica, que vuesa merced la engendró y parió en su entendimiento, y la pintó con todas aquellas gracias y perfecciones que quiso. (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 97)

Previously in the novel, similar insinuations about Dulcinea’s non-existence and her lack of pedigree or virtue invariably provoked the ire of the knight-errant (for instance, in I.25 and II.9, he forces Sancho to speak of her with due respect) or even spurred him to violence (the encounter with merchants in I.4). Here, the protagonist stays calm and restrained, crafting his defence of Dulcinea with utmost care. Right from the very beginning, he turns the principal question (Dulcinea's real or fictional nature) into a non-issue: “Dios sabe si hay Dulcinea o no el mundo, o si es fantástica; y éstas no son de las cosas cuya averiguación se ha de llevar hasta el cabo” (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 980). He proceeds with another lengthy praise of the lady, with a specifically courtly accentuation of her nobility, both in blood and in virtue:

...hermosa sin tacha, grave sin soberbia, amorosa con honestidad, agradecida por cortés, cortés por bien criada, y, finalmente, alta por linaje, a causa que sobre la buena sangre resplandece y campea la hermosura con más grados de perfección que en las hermosas humildemente nacidas. (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 980)

But when the Duke points out that her lineage is of lesser stature than

that of Oriana, Madasima, or other damsels of the romances, Don Quixote quickly turns the emphasis of his praise to her nobility “in spirit”, calling her “hija de sus obras” and pointing out that “más se ha de estimar y tener un humilde virtuoso que un vicioso levantado” (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 980). While his line of defence seems to be quite malleable and borderline sophistic (stretching the concept of nobility to keep painting his damsel in a positive light), the knight’s artful wordplay and dedication is indeed remarkable. As pointed out in Chapter I, the Duchess commends Don Quixote for being prudent in his responses: “en todo cuanto vuestra merced dice va con pie de plomo y, como se dice, con la sonda en la mano” (II.32; Cervantes 2004: 981). Dominic Finello even argues that “in terms of rhetorical power, the Golden Age speech may even be outdone” by the discourse on Dulcinea’s lineage (Finello 1998: 89). Finally, when the Duke (a reader of Part I) mentions Sancho's trip to Toboso, Don Quixote embarks on a final round of his defence, not only reiterating his praise of Dulcinea, but also lauding Sancho and commending the Dukes' decision to give him a governorship.

Despite a barrage of probing and challenging questions from the Duke and the Duchess that, in different circumstances, would have driven him into a rage, Don Quixote retains calm, composure, mindfulness of the social situation and courtly etiquette. This would normally be a sign of his increased prudence and aptitude as a courtly gentleman. At the same time, he still believes unwaveringly in the reality of errant chivalry, employing scores of rhetorical elements taken from the romances and constantly reminding his audience of his madness. This contradiction, however, is diminished and almost entirely gives way to perfectly “mainstream”

Renaissance courtly discourse in the episode of his advice to Sancho (I.42-43).

Even from a structural standpoint, it is one of the more unusual of Don Quixote's discourses. Rather than being a single piece of oratory, or being delivered with a small pause (like the similarly lengthy Arms and Letters speech, also spread over two chapters), it is more of a dialogue than a discourse proper, with Sancho constantly replying to or discussing Don Quixote's words. This level of "feedback" is unprecedented for Don Quixote as a speaker; rather than delivering a pompous, preachy monologue, he turns Sancho's instruction into an engaging exchange of opinions. Even though it is far from a true dialogue (Don Quixote is clearly dominant, and Sancho is never supposed to dissent from his master's instructions), it is still a significant departure from the hidalgo's usual rhetorical fare.

Even more remarkable is the character of the advice dispensed by Don Quixote. His wisdom comes from multiple and varied sources, and, over the years, there have been multiple attempts to trace them (among others: Castro 1925; Bleznick 1957; Percas de Ponseti 1980; Rivero Iglesias 2009). In a certain sense, the advice is a potpourri of Renaissance political philosophy, a compendium of the science of good governance presented in an easily digestible form of brief aphorisms. Once again, Don Quixote acts as an artist of the commonplace, a dispenser of timeless wisdom of the ages – and, given the subject of the speech, also a master of courtly discourse. Most of his advice, both in terms of content, style, and presentation, could have found its way into a Golden Age courtly manual or political treatise. They are carefully stylised to emulate the aphoristic form of some popular Renaissance manuals; José María Paz Gago even remarks that Don Quixote

“[c]uando quiere dar consejos al futuro gobernador recurre a las estructuras retóricas de un Guevara” (Paz Gago 1995: 161). This trait speaks for the protagonist’s boundless erudition, his preoccupation with justice and ethics (the legal portions of the advice echo his pronouncements in the convicts episode), and, last but not the least, prodigious improvisation abilities. Moreover, the hidalgo meets all of the *aptum* requirements by scaling down on his lofty style without oversimplifying his advice, trying to avoid chivalric or Classical references, and generally finding a suitable rhetorical equilibrium; by appealing to timeless truths and the archetypal image of idealised good government that reflects naïve notions of natural justice and should be understandable even to a peasant. All in all, the following exclamation of the narrator at the beginning of I.53 makes it clear that Don Quixote’s words are meant to demonstrate his intellectual and rhetorical abilities to the reader:

¿Quién oyera el pasado razonamiento de don Quijote que no le tuviera por persona muy cuerda y mejor intencionada? (I.53; Cervantes 2004: 1062)

It is also significant that “[a]tentísimamente le escuchaba Sancho y procuraba conservar en la memoria sus consejos” (I.53; Cervantes 2004: 1062), meaning that Don Quixote, on a rare occasion, has entirely succeeded in getting his message across and fully commanding the audience’s attention. This fact alone speaks for a degree of success higher than almost anywhere else among the protagonist’s attempts at humanistic discourse. Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona places particular emphasis on Sancho’s attention to (though not necessarily a complete comprehension of) the discourse, comparing it favourably to Golden Age and Arms and Letters speeches:

...no nos encontramos ante palabras arrojadas al vacío, ajenas a los intereses del destinatario, como ocurre en el caso de los cabreros y el discurso de la Edad de Oro; aunque las entendederas del escudero son insuficientes para captar los matices del discurso del caballero, Sancho escucha con atención las palabras de don Quijote, consciente de la gravedad de su significado y de la oportunidad de decir las... (Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona 2011: 133)

However, this being Don Quixote, his voice never dissolves in the archetypal nature of the advice, and there are numerous very personal touches that instantly set the discourse apart from a typical oration on political matters. Much like the Arms and Letters discourse, there is a clear mid-point in the flow of the advice, after which the style of the speech significantly changes. The advice in II.43 sounds quite different to the one in II.42. The link with traditional courtier's manuals and good governance guides is almost completely severed, as Sancho is instructed in such things as cutting his nails, not eating onions or garlic to keep his breath fresh, or refraining from belching (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1062-1063). While manuals of courtly conduct such as *Il Galateo* did give advice on personal hygiene, the change in subject and tone of the advice is quite drastic and heavily geared towards what Bakhtin referred to as "material bodily lower stratum". Even the discussion on language (also a favored topic of courtier's manuals) is centered on distinctly coarse matters, like pondering which word for "belch" is more refined, *erutar* or *regoldar* (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1064), or how Sancho should cut down on his interminable proverbs, with Don Quixote himself using such rustic expressions as "¡Castígame mi madre, y yo trómpogelas!" (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1064).

It can be argued that, with all of these "down-to-earth" traits taken into account, the advice episode borders on a *carnavalesque parody* of courtly discourse. The context itself makes the significance of Don Quixote's speech

highly suspect – he is dispensing his advice not to an actual person of the court, but to an illiterate peasant elevated to a sham position of illusory power. Transplanting lofty discourse to a “low” setting, infusing it with the elements of a “low” speaking style, or providing ridiculous context for it is a time-honoured device of parodic ridicule. On the other hand, by incorporating crude and unseemly language and imagery into the speech, Don Quixote attempts to capture Sancho’s attention and makes the advice easily relatable and understandable, thus fulfilling the *aptum* requirement and manifesting his skill as a courtly speaker. While the extent to which Sancho actually heeds the advice is debatable, where Don Quixote undoubtedly succeeds is manifesting his ability to find the right arguments and present his ideas in a persuasive manner. As Dominick Finello points out, “[t]he *consejos* possess a special elegance, and despite the fact that Sancho does not appear to pay close attention to those statements made by Don Quijote, the knight’s discourse here epitomises his ability to talk and convince” (Finello 1998: 89).

Thus, in the two most rhetorically significant parts of the episode, Don Quixote, once a critic of the *blandos cortesanos*, paradoxically becomes an agent of courtliness and defender of its values. He can be himself as *cortesano* as the situation calls for – especially in the palace, where he is the only character defending the honour of true *cortesía*, especially when contrasted against such a deliberately wretched example of courtly values as the *grave eclesiástico*. The knight-errant becomes an ideal advisor to a ruler, faithfully implementing courtly precepts and showing previously unknown tact, subtlety, and common sense. This transformation could be explained by Sancho’s sudden promotion to governor and the ensuing change in social

status caused by the carnivalesque atmosphere of the ducal palace, where the rules of reality are changed by the vagaries of bored aristocrats. In this largely *fictional* and *illusory* world, Don Quixote finds unexpected efficiency as a speaker and advisor, and Sancho succeeds as a governor despite having no experience whatsoever. This circumstance renders the limits of Don Quixote's effectiveness as a court advisor and purveyor of moral and political truths much more ambiguous than it would appear. In a certain sense, Cervantes' attitude to courtly rhetoric is not unlike his treatment of chivalric romance. It allows for both ridicule of its current decay and acknowledgment of the ideals it once stood for; the typical discourses of both chivalry and courtliness is mixed with risible elements, still allowing the protagonist to reveal their inner power. Don Quixote's capacity as a courtly speaker reaches its apex with his advice to Sancho while the hidalgo's characteristic madness endures. The narrator makes it clear that, by mixing wise counsel with bizarre and sometimes crass detail (namely, referring to different verbs for belching), the protagonist "puso su discreción y su locura en un levantado punto" (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1062).

Conclusions

The overview of Don Quixote's "conventional" rhetoric shows the following recurring traits:

- 1) *Overflowing rhetoric*. Don Quixote employs multiple and varied types of rhetoric, showing his amazing versatility as a rhetorician. He imitates, invokes, replicates, and references a variety of rhetorical styles and modes codified by Spanish rhetorical treatises of the era, both generic and specialised. Most

of his discourses contain extremely familiar traits that would be immediately recognizable to the reader as references to a particular rhetorical tradition: for example, Biblical quotes and a didactic message places a discourse firmly in the context of ecclesiastic rhetoric, while legal formulae, argumentation and characteristically stilted language (“legalese”) are a mark of its forensic function. He always seeks to dominate the conversation, make his viewpoint known, or find an appropriate discourse for the situation, however tenuous the connection may be (e.g., a discourse filled with literary pastoral tropes delivered to real-life goatswains).

2) *Serious discourses in a ridiculous context.* Don Quixote’s “conventional” discourses are always *intended to be taken seriously*. His methods of delivery and ultimate rhetorical goals are straightforward and completely devoid of deliberate irony or dialectic questioning of his own ideals. However, there is almost always a “deflating element” even in the most conventional discourse: a bizarre leap of logic that renders an argument invalid (plea for convicts’ release); a down-to-earth or inherently ludicrous context of its delivery (Golden Age, war and peace); drastic shifts of tone or mode (Sancho’s advice), etc. Many of the discourses, fully or in part, function as typical, or sometimes even outstanding, examples of Renaissance rhetoric when divorced from the context of the novel. Within *Don Quixote*, however, they include a ridiculous component that precludes either the interior or exterior audience from taking it at face value. Moreover, this

component colours the perception not only of Don Quixote as a speaker, but also of a viewpoint he defends or an ideal he tries to uphold. This creates a possibility to interpret the discourses as deliberate Cervantine parodies of certain ideas (such as natural law) or types of rhetoric (such as ecclesiastic or forensic) by purposefully delegating them to an insane character as a form of reduction to the absurd – especially given that the protagonist himself is, more often than not, completely oblivious to his surroundings, audience, and the potential damage he can do to the message of his discourses by ignoring those elements.

3) *Conventional vs. Quixotic*. The strangely incongruous elements found in even the most critically lauded of Don Quixote's speeches are also a mark of the character's unique and personal approach to the theme. Mixing Golden Age pastoral themes with a praise of errant chivalry, lauding the art of pimping as a part of legal argument, or giving courtly advice to a peasant-turned-governor can all be attributed to the character's insanity or ignorance of rhetorical codes. There is more than enough evidence that Don Quixote does understand rhetorical rules and attempt to employ them in the "correct" fashion; nevertheless, there is always something that renders his discourses ineffective or at least dubious, keeping him from complete rhetorical success. Whether he speaks on religious, legal, philosophical or courtly matters, there is always good evidence that Don Quixote is familiar with the usual themes, tropes, and methods of delivery that these forms of rhetoric require. His take on most of the topics is quite

conventional and commonplace. However, as noticed before, the discourses, even if they start out as normal, inevitably become “Quixotic” due to the character’s peculiar handling of rhetoric, namely his fixation on chivalric themes.

CHAPTER III
DON QUIXOTE'S CHIVALRIC RHETORIC

The primary purpose of the novel, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, is “to represent speaking persons and their ideological worlds” (Bakhtin 1984: 365). In Cervantes’ novel, the protagonist does not simply act (or attempt to act) as a hero of chivalric fiction: he also strives to *sound* like one, to infuse his discourses with as many traits fitting a knight-errant as possible. “Discourse” here implies not just a rhetorical set-piece, but also any *utterance* in the Bakhtinian sense – any use of language in a determined social and historical setting. The importance of these chivalric discourses has even led some researchers to coin the term “chivalric rhetoric” to refer both to their sum total and certain recurring traits in their style and presentation. For example, Howard Mancing in his acclaimed study of chivalric themes in *Don Quixote* frequently uses this term or a variation thereof (“rhetoric of chivalry”, “rhetoric of pseudochivalry”; Mancing 1982: 15, 71, 72, 83, 129, 133, 167, 215).³⁶ There are grounds to the claim that the chivalric discourses in *Don Quixote* follow a system that sets them apart from the conventional rhetorical precepts, and that the protagonist is employing different techniques when extolling the virtues of Amadís than when he is explaining the concept of just war to the *rebuznadores* or praising poetry to Diego de Miranda. Therefore, a system of Don Quixote’s chivalric rhetoric should be

³⁶ In addition, there is a doubtlessly ironic but still significant bit of textual evidence for the term in the novel itself. In I.2, Don Quixote’s quotation from an old *romance* on Lancelot and his awkwardly archaic self-presentation as a knight-errant are described in the following way: “Las mozas, que no estaban hechas a oír semejantes *retóricas*, no respondían palabra...” (I.2; Cervantes 2004: 56; emphasis mine).

traced to understand the inner workings of such discourses and their place in the novel.

The analysis of Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric starts with an examination of recurring traits and patterns related to his rhetoric of chivalry. At the beginning of the chapter, I attempt to identify which features make his discourses on chivalry distinct and individualised and which contribute to their ultimate failure and set apart them apart from normative rhetorical conventions. The analysis is followed by "case studies" of several Quixotic discourses that not only employ chivalric language, but represent its conflict and contact with other forms of discourse. In the chosen episodes, Don Quixote's rhetoric of chivalry is either mixed with tropes and stylistic elements taken from other forms of discourse (legal language, commonplaces of Renaissance rhetoric) or challenged by other characters and forced to interact and compete with other languages. This kind of analysis, in my opinion, provides a balance between the general and the specific, allowing one to determine the constants of Don Quixote's style and the exact moments in the text where they undergo dialectic development.

A Rhetoric of Madness

Right at the very start of the novel, excessive reading of chivalric novels is presented as the principal reason for the protagonist's insanity: "del poco dormir y del mucho leer, se le secó el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el juicio" (I.1; Cervantes 2004: 42). Even among different possible forms of madness, chivalric madness is the most bizarre: "En efeto, rematado ya su juicio, vino a dar en el más extraño pensamiento que jamás dio loco en el mundo [...] hacerse caballero andante" (I.1; Cervantes 2004:

43). The hidalgo's madness is of a bookish sort, both engendered by literature and giving the author a convenient literary device to make his hero embark on make-believe chivalric adventures. It is what literally sustains the text: with Alonso Quijano keeping his sanity, there would have been no novel called *Don Quixote*, and the protagonist's recuperation of his wits is almost immediately followed by his death and the end of the novel.

Cervantes provides no more justification than this to explain the madness of his hero, and an explicit cause-effect relationship between reading too many romances – although not the invention of Cervantes alone³⁷ – forms the cornerstone of the treatment of insanity in the novel. In the words of Edwin Williamson, “Cervantes fastens on this simple cause and provides no further explanation. Medical or psychological theories of insanity – whether modern or contemporary – would offer little that could be relevant to an understanding of the nature of the *hidalgo*'s madness” (Williamson 1984: 92). Likewise, Diego Martínez Torrón claims that “la locura de Don Quijote se reduce a su obsesión por revivir los libros de caballerías” (Martínez Torrón 2003: 33). Sharing the opinions cited above, I find it futile to apply medical explanations of any sort to Don Quixote's insanity, opting to accept it as fact and focus on its *rhetorical implications*, especially *audience reactions*.

In general, invoking chivalric characters or situations or speaking in an outdated parlance immediately marks Don Quixote as a madman in the eyes of other characters, and quite possibly the reader. According to Paul Julian Smith, “Don Quijote's language is frequently rhetorical or artificial, but the

³⁷ Elisabetta Sarmati's analysis of sixteenth-century invectives against chivalric romances shows that the accusation of driving the readers mad used to be fairly common, with the words *loco*, *locura*, *turbar el juicio*, *hacer perder el seso* prominently featured in such diatribes (Sarmati 1996: 39).

reader may safely assign this quality to the madness of the Knight” (Smith 1988: 184-185). Examples abound: “apenas le oyeron esto, cuando todos le tuvieron por loco” (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 149); “en estas razones, cayeron todos los que las oyeron que don Quijote debía de ser algún hombre loco” (I.52; Cervantes 2004: 642); Sancho “acabó de conocer indubitablemente que su señor estaba fuera de juicio y loco de todo punto” (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 902). Don Quixote creates these situations by engaging in chivalric rhetoric, specifically praising Dulcinea. In general, whenever Don Quixote makes a protestation in favour of chivalry, it does not take long for other characters to (correctly) deem him a lunatic and treat his pro-chivalric discourses as either claptrap unworthy of serious consideration or, at best, a piece of refined rhetoric wasted on a completely ludicrous topic. To further emphasise the connection between madness and chivalric rhetoric, the narrator even claims that the hidalgo “solamente disparaba en tocándole en la caballería, y en los demás discursos mostraba tener claro y desenfadado entendimiento...” (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1062). Don Quixote's chivalric discourse, as Joseph Ricapito argues, serves as a means of undermining the protagonist's credibility as a speaker, derailing his discourses and revealing his madness to others – thus creating a reliable source of comedy:

It is precisely the incongruence between the speech patterns and the vocabulary of the Middle Ages and Don Quijote's own use of such speech that easily creates some humor and the occasional silliness. [...] This kind of speech immediately puts people on their guard and after some thinking a person realizes that he/she is dealing with a strange person. From then on, Don Quijote is not taken seriously; in fact, he is looked upon as a crazy individual, and it gives him very little credibility and mostly a lot of derision. (Ricapito 2007: 115)

However, the very existence of chivalric discourse is not meant to imply that Don Quixote is mad, or perceived as mad, merely because he

speaks about chivalry or reads chivalric romances. There are other characters that have read a number of such books (e.g., the Canon of Toledo and Vivaldo) and stayed sane, and the ideals espoused by fictional knights-errant (protecting the weak, fighting against evil, upholding justice, leading a life of constant travail and quest) are far from being intrinsically ridiculous. The principal cause of Don Quixote's rhetorical blunders throughout the novel is his unwavering faith in the *infallible authority* of chivalric romances. In his mind, they represent a degree of truth on a par with that of Classical Antiquity, the Bible, or national history. As a speaker, he operates under the assumption that Amadís and other knights-errant are always familiar to his audience and their deeds are accorded the same sort of reverence as, for instance, those of King David, Alexander the Great, or Cid Campeador. However, Don Quixote is the only person in the novel who elevates the authority of the romances to this stature. By constantly appealing to it, he ruins even the best-presented discourses in favour of chivalric ideals. Don Quixote's unshakeable faith in the veracity of the romances forces him to disregard several key laws of rhetoric. The most grievous error is his failure to adjust the discourse to the audience (*aptum*) and avoid affectation (superfluous ornaments and needlessly florid figures of speech). In addition, Don Quixote becomes a master of what Laura Gorfkle dubs "the comic argument" (Gorfkle 1993: 125-168), that is, a system of proof and debate that rests upon a false, dubious, or discredited authority (in this case, upon that of the "truthful" and "verified" chivalric romances), takes this authority entirely in earnest, and applies all the procedures of proper argumentation and "due process" to an inherently ridiculous premise.

Numerous characters of the novel make the link between Don Quixote's madness and his chivalric speeches. The Curate explicitly declares that, as long as no one touches the subject of chivalric romances, Don Quixote can be a perfectly sound and reasonable person: "que fuera de las simplicidades que este buen hidalgo dice tocantes a su locura, si le tratan de otras cosas, discurre con bonísimas razones y muestra tener un entendimiento claro y apacible en todo. De manera que, como no le toquen en sus caballerías, no habrá nadie que le juzgue sino por de muy buen entendimiento" (I.30; Cervantes 2004: 390).³⁸ His words are corroborated by numerous and well-known examples from the novel where Don Quixote either speaks on subjects other than romances or does not rely on their false authority alone. For instance, after the Arms and Letters speech, we are informed that "de tal manera, y por tan buenos términos, iba prosiguiendo en su plática don Quijote, que obligó a que por entonces ninguno de los que escuchándole estaban le tuviese por loco" (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 486). Don Diego de Miranda is amazed by the lucidity of Don Quixote's discourse on poetry: "Admirado quedó el del Verde Gabán del razonamiento de don Quijote, y tanto, que fue perdiendo de la opinión que con él tenía, de ser mentecato" (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 828). Later, Don Diego directly contrasts lucid words and insane deeds: "le he visto hacer cosas del mayor loco del mundo, y decir razones tan discretas que borran y deshacen sus hechos" (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 843).

A discourse need not be chivalry-free to dispel the impression of madness. It is worth reiterating that even the Golden Age and Arms and

³⁸ Helmut Hatzfeld reiterates the viewpoint of the character almost verbatim by claiming that "Don Quijote, cuando no habla de cualquier problema de la vida que no se refiere a lo caballeresco, se conduce siempre como la persona más cuerda [...] como un perfecto hidalgo" (Hatzfeld 1966: 401).

Letters discourses, dealing with quintessential Classical and Renaissance themes and most often mentioned as belonging to Don Quixote's most eloquent and well executed, are pronounced specifically to praise the order of chivalry and proclaim his chivalric mission. At the end of his bucolic discourse, the protagonist concludes his speech by claiming that, after the fall of the Golden Age and the spread of moral corruption, "se instituyó la orden de los caballeros andantes... Desta orden soy yo, hermanos cabreros..." (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135). Likewise, the Arms and Letters discourse ends with a chivalric proclamation: "Y así, considerando esto, estoy por decir que en el alma me pesa de haber tomado este ejercicio de caballero andante en edad tan detestable como es esta en que ahora vivimos..." (I.38; Cervantes 2004: 491). Also, as we have shown in Chapter II, even "non-chivalric" discourses of Don Quixote's contain stylistic blunders and departures from rhetorical rules that could have been easily avoided, and, given the character's clear familiarity with rhetoric and style, can only have his chivalric madness as the ultimate explanation.

These important exceptions, however, do not significantly alter the way Don Quixote presents his discourses on chivalry. Sustained by the *false authority* of chivalric romances, they significantly deviate from rhetorical rules. All too often, rhetorical faults, especially the ignorance of *aptum*, are the most prominent feature of Don Quixote's chivalric harangues, making them essentially a form of "anti-rhetoric" – which is in line with the declared parodic intent of the author and the madness of the character.

However, chivalric discourses are much more complex than being a topsy-turvy travesty of conventional rhetorical codes. Their flaws turn into advantages as they offer examples of how rhetorical conventions are

transformed by Don Quixote's insane creativity. Even the most flawed and incongruous of chivalric speeches have an air of untamed, insubordinate rhetorical power, distorted in unusual ways by the character's madness. What follows is an attempt to identify these madness-induced flaws and their function in the novel.

Automatism and Insistence

Throughout the novel, we can see that eloquence often appears as an imperious force that completely overwhelms Don Quixote. He literally cannot contain his desire to share his thoughts in the form of a discourse; to quote Antonio Barnés Vázquez, “Don Quijote no sólo domina la retórica, sino que es dominado por ella” (Barnés Vázquez 2009: 139). The two most famous examples are the Golden Age speech, where Don Quixote delivers after having been given some acorns “que le trujeron a la memoria la edad dorada” (I.11; Cervantes 2004: 135), and the Arms and Letters speech, also brought forward by a driving force highly similar to the one that had inspired the Golden Age speech (“movido de otro semejante espíritu que el que le movió a hablar tanto como habló cuando cenó con los cabreros”; I.38; Cervantes 2004: 484). A possible extension of this automatic or ritualistic attitude to rhetoric is Don Quixote's love of *apostrophe* (invocations of an absent third party, as well as non-sentient beings or objects and personified abstract concepts). For example, his insane “penance” in Sierra Morena is set off with a supplication to “rústicos dioses”, “napeas y driadas”, “ligeros y lascivos sátiros”, his chosen damsel Dulcinea del Toboso, “solitarios árboles”, and finally “escudero mío” – who is the only one among the list of

addressees physically present and/or able to respond (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 305).

When there is a tangible interlocutor present, Don Quixote often shows a strong inclination to instruct and almost literally preach his chivalric ideals. According to Heinz-Peter Endress,

por una parte, la conciencia de su misión caballeresca, que lo motiva a convencer a su prójimo de lo justo y fundado de su actuar no sólo con la espada, sino también mediante la palabra. Su inspiración y entusiasmo, su inquebrantable idealismo e imperturbable seguridad en sí mismo (o, si se quiere, su obstinada locura) refuerzan su talante misionero y hacen que guste de presentarse como una persona que prefiere hablar a oír, instruir a ser instruido. (Endress 2009: 165-166)

If there is an at least minimally receptive audience, the hidalgo will not hesitate to share his chivalric programme with all requisite flourishes of rhetoric. Many supporting characters of the novel quickly become aware of this tendency and exploit it, be it for amusement, profit, or as an attempt to “cure” Don Quixote of his insanity. In Part I, the innkeeper imitates chivalric speech to trick the hidalgo, Vivaldo intentionally goads Don Quixote into discussing chivalry to entertain himself, the entire Micomicona sham is set into motion by her mock-chivalric plea for help, and the Canon openly challenges Don Quixote to a discussion of chivalric romances. In Part II, the entire episodes of the ducal palace and the duel with the “Knight of the White Moon” are built around the fact that the protagonist simply cannot ignore an opportunity to talk or act in a chivalric fashion. This constitutes what Dominick Finello calls the “rhetoric of insistence”, Don Quixote’s unstoppable drive to impose his chivalric vision upon others:

There are features of Don Quijote’s style which may turn the reader away. Their features constitute his *rhetoric of insistence*, which is a result, at first, of his naivete. Early in his story, he speaks with absolute certainty, though he has inspired little belief in his listeners to that point. [...] Don Quijote gleans their (that of the romances of chivalry)

words and images, especially the heroic kind, and absorbs them into his own discourse... He intends to use this language for his plan to impose chivalry on the reality at hand. And yet he generally speaks with ease and abandon, because he does not pay attention to the shortsightedness of others, so that he may proceed with what he wants to teach them regarding the virtues and advantages of chivalry. (Finello 1998: 84).

In general, a proclivity to impose discourses upon others is a common trait of many literary fools and madmen. Martine Bigeard identifies the following traits of lunatics in Spanish Renaissance literature:

Si la folie “littéraire” consiste le plus souvent en une inadéquation – fondamentalement burlesque – entre la pensée et son expression, il se produit également dans certains cas par une dissociation entre la pensée elle-même et son application : elle est sensée, mais employée hors de propos. Cette pensée raisonne juste par habitude, mais pousse la logique jusqu’à l’absurde, car elle n’a pas la souplesse suffisante pour s’adapter aux circonstances particulières, pour s’adhérer au réel. [...] Il ne s’agit plus alors à proprement parler d’un automatisme mental, mais d’une forme d’aliénation que l’on pourrait nommer ‘folie intellectuelle’. (Bigeard 1972: 82)

Bigeard’s observations are mostly based on characters from Lope de Vega’s plays, but can be easily adapted to *Don Quixote*. “Mental” automatism, in this case, parallels and complements the *more or less consistent* failure of the protagonist’s discourse to take potential audience reaction into account. In delivering his discourses, Don Quixote keeps falling into the same trap, failing to avoid the same pitfall of talking about chivalry even when it has proven itself as effective as casting pearls before swine. The protagonists’ chivalric speeches lay bare one of the most unfortunate traits of Quixotic worldview – a “dangerous indifference to objective reality” (Mackey 1974: 63).

However, it should be noted that Don Quixote is not completely defined by this implied automatism, at least starting with the second sally, where he gradually abandons his reliance on mock-chivalric speech for more varied topics for conversation and forms of expression. As a character, Don

Quixote is not completely defined by his automatic reactions and cliché-ridden speech, setting him apart from stock comic characters, including lunatics from Golden Age *comedias* described by Martine Bigeard or traditional *commedia dell'arte* types. Still, as argued by Erich Auerbach, his lapses into automatised chivalric speech often do reduce him to caricature and invoke timeless comic archetypes characterised by their ridiculous and clichéd form of speaking:

And yet Don Quixote is not only ridiculous. He is not like a bragging soldier or the comic old man or the pedantic and ignorant doctor [...] As soon as his madness, that is, the *idée fixe* of knight-errantry, takes hold of him, he acts unwisely, he acts like an automaton in the manner of the comic types mentioned above. (Auerbach 1953: 347)

Archaism and Affectation

The author colours Don Quixote's speech with a flamboyant mock-Medieæval style meant to evoke the antiquated (sometimes purposefully so) language of chivalric romances. The use of mock-archaic language in chivalric romances was a means to represent the purportedly ancient and exotic origins of the books, as well as the distance between the 16th-century Spain and the semi-legendary heroic past of Amadís and his ilk.³⁹ This archaic language, at least a century removed from the linguistic and stylistic conventions of Cervantes' time, is what most easily establishes Don Quixote as a living relic of an idealised chivalric past. An antiquated, archaism-laden

³⁹ The conceit, however, was so conspicuously artificial that it made itself an easy target for criticism. For example, Juan de Valdés noted (with a remarkably modern sense of historicism) that, even though the story of *Amadís* is alleged to have transpired soon after the Passion of Christ, “la lengua en que él escribe no se habló en España hasta muchos años después” (Valdés 1969: 47). The Humanist did concede, however, that the author's pseudo-Medieval style was shaped by a desire to convey a general sense of the past: “quiso acomodar su estilo al tiempo en que dize que aconteció su historia” (Valdés 1969: 47).

style is also a form of literary shorthand for showing that the speaker is at least out of touch with the world, if not completely insane.⁴⁰

In the early chapters of the novel, Cervantes makes liberal use of this device to establish his character as lunatic living in an imagined heroic past and re-enacting not only the exploits, but also the highly stylised speech patterns of the chivalric romances. According to Francisco Abad Nebot, “el hablar antiguo caracteriza a don Quijote, quien en efecto es hombre de otros tiempos que busca desarrollar el mismo esfuerzo heroico personal que correspondía a siglos anteriores a él; su tarea es la de un héroe extemporáneo” (Abad Nebot 2008: 61). In a similar manner, Mark Van Doren notes how the archaic language employed by Don Quixote fits his worldview and chosen lifestyle: “He really does talk like an old-world man, with connections running clear back to the Age of Gold which he can so handsomely apostrophise. He has the language of this time at all times at his tongue, as he has its logic” (Van Doren 1958: 16). The parodic and humoristic intent of putting typical clichéd chivalric proclamations in the mouth of a fifty-year old lunatic is also abundantly clear.

The aforementioned study by Howard Mancing (Mancing 1982) is a still-unsurpassed exploration of the function of this trope in Don Quixote; I will reiterate only the principal and most relevant points. Mancing sees “chivalric archaism” as the principal trait of Don Quixote’s speech in the novel; it is the foundation of the character’s “chivalric rhetoric” (Mancing 1982: 15). The nature of the principal traits of archaism is simultaneously phonetic (initial *f* instead of *h*, as in *fermosa*, *fablar*, etc.), grammatical

⁴⁰ In Castiglione’s *Il Cortegiano* (quoted here in Juan Boscán’s translation, which may well have been known by Cervantes himself), we find a claim that “locura sería darse al hablar antiguo, solamente por el deseo de hablar como se hablaba y no como se habla” (Castiglione 1997: 97).

(second-person plural in *-d*, as in *verédeis*), semantic (*cautivo* meaning “unfortunate”), and stylistic (pervasive inversions). During his first sally (I.1 – I.5), Don Quixote converses almost entirely in chivalric archaism, and instances of characters simply not understanding his words are concentrated there. Once the novelty of the comic effect caused by chivalric discourse wears off, the function of chivalric rhetoric becomes progressively complex and ambiguous. Howard Mancing notes that, at the beginning of the novel, Don Quixote “employed a ‘borrowed’ language, using only his chivalric style and not really communicating with anyone” (Mancing 1982: 50). Likewise, John J. Allen treats “the archaic language of the novels of chivalry” as “clearly a negative element. It is to be counted against Don Quixote, and thus serves to prepare the comic denouement of certain episodes or to obstruct a pathetic or tragic reaction” (Allen 2008: 70).

The introduction of Sancho Panza breaks the absolute hegemony of chivalric archaism, making Don Quixote’s style more varied and supplementing it with the alternative of Sancho’s rustic *socarronería* and homespun witticism. The protagonist’s chivalric language loses its rigidity and adapts to the requirements of reality. Sancho’s role as what Mancing calls a “reality instructor” (whose job is pointing out the difference between what Don Quixote imagines to be happening and what actually happens) ensures the gradual decline of archaism. Mancing demonstrates that archaic language, barring a few upsurges, declines throughout Part I and almost completely disappears in Part II.⁴¹ This, according to Mancing, parallels the decline of Don Quixote as a knight-errant: if in Part I he engaged in

⁴¹ Independently of Mancing, Juan Ignacio Ferreras also observes that “el empleo de anacronismos por Don Quijote desaparece virtualmente en la Segunda Parte” (Ferreras 1982a: 113), and Ángel Rosenblat affirms that “en la segunda parte el lenguaje arcaico aparece en muy contadas ocasiones” (Rosenblat 1971: 32).

numerous adventures, crazy as they might be, in Part II he is significantly less proactive and is virtually reduced to a spectator and commentator of events that unfold independent of his will.

While the general assertions of Mancing are well demonstrated and highly convincing, I do find a significant flaw in his conflation of chivalric rhetoric and chivalric archaism. The nadir of archaism in Part II is simultaneously the zenith of *chivalric apologies* – discourses aimed at justifying and lauding Don Quixote’s life as a knight-errant. The heroes of chivalric romances have no need to justify their existence or repeatedly explain the tenets of knighthood to unbelievers – the order of chivalry is an established part of the fictional worlds they inhabit. Conversely, Don Quixote is constantly faced with a need to defend his identity as a knight-errant from those who would deny the very existence of the chivalric order, question his motivation, or openly proclaim him a lunatic. Within a typical romance, chivalry requires no apologetics or explanation, and characters of the romances are definitely not in the habit of resorting to rhetoric to justify their existence, lifestyle, and ideals.⁴² The very fact of being a knight-orator, argues Ángel Rosenblat, sets Don Quixote apart from other chivalric heroes:

...o los caballeros no pronuncian discursos, o, si los pronuncian, no tienen nada que ver con los de don Quijote [...] Pese a lo que afirma don Quijote, no es rasgo característico ni usual entre caballeros el ejercicio de la oratoria. Ni forma parte de la profesión caballeresca ni hay caballero que haya alcanzado fama por la fuerza de sus palabras. Así pues, la facundia de don Quijote sirve más para diferenciarle que para identificarle con la profesión de la caballería andante. (Rosenblat 1971: 110)

⁴² It should also be noted, however, that Mary Malcolm Gaylord cites ample textual evidence from *Amadís de Gaula* demonstrating the titular knight’s frequent use of rhetoric as a prelude to or complement of his martial exploits (Gaylord 2007: 76-77).

Don Quixote himself makes no outward connection between chivalry and rhetoric and does not reference any actual discourse made by a chivalric character in any of the romances. In fact, as Laplana Gil points out, eloquence is conspicuously absent from the list of knightly virtues enumerated by Don Quixote in II.18, an omission even more significant given that the list is based on Classical and Renaissance discourses on the dignity of man, where eloquence would have been invariably mentioned as a virtue (Laplana Gil 2004: 109).⁴³

In *Don Quixote*, the protagonist puts much of his rhetorical talent to the task of vindicating his vocation as a knight-errant, the veracity of the books he draws his inspiration from, and the reality of the usual trappings of chivalric adventures (giants, wizards, magic swords, enchanted princesses, etc.). According to Peter Womack,

Don Quixote is engaged in an immense rhetorical struggle to redescribe the world so it fits what he reads [...] This is not simply to say that Don Quixote spends more of his time conversing than fighting giants, although he certainly does. It is also that he appears in the novel as the exponent of the *idea* of chivalry. In the stories he reads, chivalry is not an idea because it is the given condition of everything that happens; it is the air the characters breathe, and there is no room for differing opinions about it. (Womack 2011: 59).

He then argues that, because of the need to justify the existence and relevance of errant chivalry, Don Quixote becomes what Bakhtin dubs a “hero-ideologue”, a type of novelistic character mainly defined by the ideas of which he is the main exponent in the text.

⁴³ On the other hand (as we have already observed in Chapter II), the protagonist does mention the implied rhetorical training of knights-errant in the flock of sheep episode: “[P]orque caballero andante hubo en los pasados siglos que así se paraba a hacer un sermón o plática, en mitad de un campo real, como si fuera graduado por la Universidad de París” (I.18; Cervantes 2004: 215). However, this description of chivalric eloquence remains an isolated incident (and a part of one of the more ludicrous adventures of Don Quixote’s), and is not echoed or alluded to in any other part of the novel.

The number of chivalric apologies grows as the action unfolds, almost paralleling the decline of archaism. If the Don Quixote of Part I only justifies his mission to Vivaldo (I.13) and, much later, the Canon (I.49-50), in Part II we find him defending and praising the order of chivalry in the presence of his fellow-villagers (II.1), his niece (II.6), Diego and Lorenzo de Miranda (II.16-18), and the Duke, the Duchess, and the *grave eclesiástico* (II.32); his death-bed repudiation of chivalry (II.78) can also be counted, since it is a direct inversion of such apologies.

Therefore, it is not correct to claim that, as Don Quixote gradually stops being a chivalric *agent*, he also falls into decline as a chivalric *speaker*. In fact, his apologies become more and more elaborate as his attempts to re-enact chivalric adventure decrease, even if these vindications are free from the archaism of Part I. As a result, the hidalgo arguably appears in a more sympathetic light while talking about chivalry than attempting to act as a knight-errant would. To quote the opinion of Mark Van Doren,

the eloquence of Don Quixote is in a class all by itself. No other hero ever talked as richly and well. And this may seem strange if what he wanted to be, or to seem to be, was a knight at arms. The knights of the romances spoke handsomely upon occasion, but for the most part they rode and fought... He is busier talking about knights than being one; he contemplates rather than fulfills the role; but precisely there is where his charm comes in. (Van Doren 1958: 68)

Another observation is that, while archaism may gradually fade away, *chivalric affectation* is unchanged as the mainstay of Don Quixote's chivalric discourses. The irony of this situation is evident, given that the hidalgo himself denounces affectation in his advice to Sancho by stating "que toda afectación es mala" (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1063), and licentiate Márquez Torres, in his approbation of Part II, praises the style of Cervantes' book for "la lisura del lenguaje castellano, no adulterado con enfadosa y

estudiada afectación, vicio con razón aborrecido de hombres cuerdos” (Cervantes 2004: 668). Ángel Rosenblat sees the criticism of “hinchazón retórica” as one the principal literary polemics of the novel (Rosenblat 1971: 20-26).

Affectation is a term that is hard to define properly; most Classical and Renaissance treatise treat it as ornamentation gone wrong, an overabundance of colourful rhetorical imagery that detracts from the message of the discourse. For example, Book VIII of Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* is dedicated specifically to rhetorical ornamentation and the potential perils of overdoing it; there is a passage (VIII.III.56-57) that describes a “perverse affectation” similar to Don Quixote’s:

Cacozelia, or perverse affectation, is a fault in every kind of style: for it includes everything that is turgid, trivial, luscious, redundant, far-fetched or extravagant, while the same name is also applied to virtues carried to excess, where the mind loses its critical sense and is misled by the false appearance of beauty, the worst of all offences against style [...] Corruption of style is revealed in the employment of improper or redundant words, in obscurity of meaning, effeminacy of rhythm, or the childish search for similar or ambiguous expressions. (Quintilian 1922: 241-243)

Much like in the described example, Don Quixote routinely causes befuddlement or fatigue in his listeners by mentioning characters and episodes that appear unfamiliar, unrelatable, or overly extravagant to his audience. He loves to adorn his chivalric speeches with rhetorical questions, *anaphora*, colourful epithets and a multitude of other “flowers of eloquence”, mistakenly believing that replicating the purple prose of romances makes his words more convincing and impressive. Perhaps the most glorious example of chivalric affectation is Don Quixote’s description of the illusory armies in his adventure with the sheep. It is an unstoppable torrent of ridiculous-sounding chivalric names, exotic geographical

locations, and obscure references to chivalric deeds and artefacts that can only confuse and stupefy the listener:

Aquel caballero que allí ves de las armas jaldes, que trae en el escudo un león coronado, rendido a los pies de una doncella, es el valeroso Laurcalco, señor de la Puente de Plata; el otro de las armas de las flores de oro, que trae en el escudo tres coronas de plata en campo azul, es el temido Micocolemo, gran duque de Quirocia; el otro de los miembros gigantes, que está a su derecha mano, es el nunca medroso Brandabarbarán de Boliche, señor de las tres Arabias, que viene armado de aquel cuero de serpiente, y tiene por escudo una puerta que, según es fama, es una de las del templo que derribó Sansón, cuando con su muerte se vengó de sus enemigos... (I.18; Cervantes 2004: 207-208).

The cited pattern of enumerating characters, locations, artefacts, etc. of chivalric legend (or sometimes to those of Classical, Biblical, or Medieval Spanish history) to prove a point or to lend authority to an argument is repeated many times in the novel; in fact, one could argue that the *list* is one of the mainstays of Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric. Enumeration is in no way endemic to chivalric literature; as Umberto Eco points out, it has existed since the very origins of Classical rhetoric: "Since antiquity, rhetoric has encompassed rhythmically enunciated and enunciable lists, in which it was less important to hint at inexhaustible quantities than to attribute properties to things in a redundant manner, often for pure love of iteration" (Eco 2009: 133). The love for rhetorical lists endured for multiple historical eras and was rekindled in Cervantes' time. Early Baroque, according to Eco, marks "the beginning of a poetics of the list for the list, written for the love of lists, of the list *by excess*" (Eco 2009: 251). Therefore, Don Quixote's affection for protracted lists of chivalric or historical trivia is as ancient as it is contemporary, reflecting the stylistic trends of the time. While the list, as a rhetorical trope, lends itself particularly well to near-infinite dilation, the

knight-errant unwittingly reduces the trope to a grotesque caricature by making his lists particularly prolix and his references particularly obscure.

Chivalric language as used by Don Quixote is inseparable from flamboyant stylistic excess, larger-than-life similes, grandiose periods, and unusually sounding names. These kinds of rhetorical excess and affectation accompany nearly all of Don Quixote's chivalric discourses and form a hallmark of his style in general, creating an unmistakable linguistic and stylistic identity for the character. Unlike the waxing and waning chivalric archaism, chivalric affectation is more or less consistent throughout the novel.

The author colours Don Quixote's speech with a mock-Medieval, flamboyant style meant to invoke the antiquated (sometimes purposefully so) language of chivalric romances. His chivalric discourse is not limited to old-fashioned verbiage: it is overflowing with references to chivalric characters and episodes. There is hardly a discourse on chivalry where Don Quixote does not invoke the names of Amadís, Esplandián, Orlando and their exploits, to say nothing of more obscure knights and adventures. By speaking about chivalry, the protagonist manifests his self-proclaimed identity as a knight-errant, vindicates the ideals of his chosen profession, and, in Bakhtinian terms, makes his ideological world known to both the reader and other characters.

The would-be knight-errant hardly ever passes up an opportunity to defend or justify his actions, and his manner of speech gives away his madness even faster than his attempts to imitate fictional heroism. Don Quixote clearly enjoys speaking about chivalric themes, and assumes that

everyone is eager to listen to his discourses, or at least as familiar with their subject matter as he is. When the authority of chivalry is called in question, the would-be knight-errant defends the honour of his vocation with a lengthy speech in its praise and defence. Don Quixote's chivalric eloquence also usually falls on deaf ears, as no one accepts the underlying assumption of his rhetorical strategy – the literal truth of chivalric romances. As he fails to convince his audience that errant chivalry is real and worthy of praise, Don Quixote only solidifies his reputation as a lunatic. Still, as will be shown further, his chivalric speeches are often appreciated for their unintentional comic value, surprising insights on the human condition, or the raw power of fantasy that colours them.

Case Study:

Quixotic Eloquence in Sierra Morena (I.25-26)

The episode of Don Quixote's "penance" in Sierra Morena has justifiably attracted much critical attention, given the density of literary and cultural context of the hidalgo's self-induced chivalric madness. A feature of this episode I believe to be significantly underrepresented is the interplay of different forms of discourse (or "languages", in Bakhtinian terminology) in these two chapters. While carefully preparing his bout of imitational madness, Don Quixote delivers three pieces of eloquence: the conversations with Sancho, providing the rationale (or lack thereof) for his actions; the letter to Dulcinea coupled with an order for three ass-colts; and the "internal monologue" explaining the choice of Amadís over Orlando as his model in madness. All three discursive acts feature a mixture between Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric rife with the expected flaws of style, most prominently

“chivalric affectation”, and different forms of codified rhetorical discourse (love letter, legal note, and rhetorical exercise).

Before Don Quixote openly declares his desire to indulge in self-imposed chivalric madness, he prepares Sancho for the occasion with an *encomium* of Amadís of Gaul, “el solo, el primero, el único, el señor de todos cuantos hubo en su tiempo en el mundo”, “el norte, el lucero, el sol de los valientes y enamorados caballeros, a quien debemos de imitar todos aquellos que debajo de la bandera de amor y de la caballería militamos” (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 300). To illustrate the necessity of imitation, he uses a comparison with painting based on Greco-Roman myth and mentions Ulysses and Aeneas as exemplars of prudence, suffering, and personal prowess. Chivalric material is once again ennobled by an invocation of Classical authority. Sancho, unfamiliar with both, is unlikely to be swayed by such a comparison, but the *discreto lector*, presumably well versed in Classical myth, can at least appreciate the humour and irony of such a juxtaposition. The fusion of chivalry and Classical myth continues when Don Quixote goes from recapitulating *Orlando Furioso* to rhetorically invoking the “rústicos dioses”, “napeas y driadas”, “lascivos sátiros”, and other mythological creatures, mixing with their names that of Dulcinea (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 305).

When Sancho is completely baffled, Don Quixote changes his rhetorical strategy. With the alleged aim of illustrating Sancho’s stupidity and his own eloquence (“para que veas cuán necio eres tú y cuán discreto soy yo”; I.25; Cervantes 2004: 311), the hidalgo tells an anecdote (“breve cuento”) about a widow enamoured with a lay brother; it serves to parallel his situation with Dulcinea. By doing so, Don Quixote acts in perfect

accordance with typical rhetorical precepts (both Classical, Mediæval, and Renaissance) that advocated the use of *exempla* to draw the attention of the audience and present a certain point or moral in an easily palatable form. The Classical subtext becomes more prominent when Don Quixote shifts from a slightly frivolous anecdote to mentioning Helen of Troy and Lucrece (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 312). After that, Sancho can do nothing else but accept his master's superiority ("Digo que en todo tiene vuestra merced razón [...] y que yo soy un asno"; I.25; Cervantes 2004: 312). Overall, Don Quixote's "preparatory" conversations with Sancho show his ability to follow rhetorical precepts and effortlessly switch from chivalric to Classical imagery, even spicing up his discourse with some immodest folklore. The protagonist draws together the discourses of chivalric love, Classical womanly virtue, and bawdy folktales with the sole aim of praising his chosen damsel and professing his love for her.

Don Quixote's epistle to Dulcinea can be considered a rhetorical piece in its own right. According to Peter Mack (Mack 2011), vernacular letter-writing manuals of the Renaissance were based around the idea that epistolary arts were an extension of the arts of eloquence. Writing letters was akin to, in the words of a 1521 French manual by Pierre Fabri, "speaking to absent persons as if they were present and declaring one's will to them" (cited in Mack 2011: 286-291). In addition, it bears mentioning that *Amadis de Gaula* contains numerous examples of letter-writing. Thanks to the translation executed by Nicholas Herberay des Essarts and his followers, the romance became a manual of epistolary style and courtly manners in France, a shining example of "life imitating art" and the level of recursive influence between the rhetoric of romances and mainline rhetorical treatises. Also

importantly, Don Quixote *reads the letter aloud* to Sancho, further blurring the border between the conventions of written and spoken eloquence.

Don Quixote's very brief love-letter (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 313) is perhaps the most concentrated parody of chivalric discourse in the novel. The epistle features an amazing density of clichés and blunders of chivalric eloquence. It is replete with "chivalric archaism", both phonetic (*ferido*, *fermosura*) and lexical (*no es en mi pro*, *maguer que*, *acorrerme*). The invocations of Dulcinea are based around the images of cruelty and torment caused by unrequited affection ("ferido de punta de ausencia" "amada enemiga mía", "yo sea asaz de sufrido", "tu crueldad"), developing the love-as-war metaphor, a tired commonplace of courtly love discourse. The similarly overused topic of love driving the lover to death is also prominent ("te envía la salud que él no tiene"; "acabar mi vida"; "tuyo hasta la muerte"), to the point that the letter reads more like a suicide note. Moreover, the letter-writer does not use his customary name "Don Quijote de La Mancha", employing the appellation of "El Caballero de la Triste Figura" bestowed upon him by Sancho in I.19.⁴⁴

The comic effect is caused not only by the overabundance of well-worn banalities of amorous epistolary arts, but also by its context. Dulcinea has done nothing to Don Quixote to warrant such a desperate letter. Its existence has no cause to speak of (even within the limits of the hidalgo's

⁴⁴ It should be acknowledged, however, that the love-letter is not without its critical admirers, and is often quoted as a positive example of Don Quixote's rhetoric, or at least as one revealing more of his strengths than weaknesses. For instance, Erich Auerbach praises the letter and notes that "Cervantes is very fond of such rhythmically and pictorially rich, such beautifully articulated pieces of chivalric rhetoric (which are nevertheless rooted in the tradition of antiquity). [...] Here again he is not merely a destructive critic but a continuer and consummator of the great epico-rhetorical tradition for which prose too is art" (Auerbach 1953: 341).

chivalric make-believe), a fact that Sancho points out immediately when Don Quixote declares his desire to go mad:

Paréceme a mí —dijo Sancho— que los caballeros que lo tal hicieron fueron provocados y tuvieron causa para hacer esas necedades y penitencias; pero vuestra merced ¿qué causa tiene para volverse loco? (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 302)

Don Quixote's reasoning is brilliant in its non-existence: he nonchalantly claims that having no reason whatsoever to go insane is what makes a truly great knight-errant (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 302-303). This is a typical "comic argument", a patently inane justification quite fitting a character already established as mad. The lunatic now wants to engage in madness of the "second degree", that is, a behaviour that would have been considered insane even by a certified madman.⁴⁵ As a result, the letter serves no rhetorical purpose whatsoever, being an act of pure automatism on Don Quixote's behalf. It only exists because the laws of the chivalric adventure genre mandate it to. However, in spite of the ridiculous overtones of the entire epistolary enterprise, Sancho exclaims when Don Quixote finishes reading the letter to him: "Que es la más alta cosa que jamás he oído" (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 314). As is often the case, the reaction is ambiguous: either the letter appears lofty because it is beyond Sancho's rustic wits, or the squire has the wherewithal to be impressed, rather than confused and annoyed, by the flowers of chivalric style. The squire's *admiratio* is justified to some extent: for all its faults, Don Quixote's style does not descend into complete bathos, offering the reader an outré but engaging piece of misplaced chivalric eloquence. From a different perspective, however, the

⁴⁵ Curiously, Anthony Close considers this argument "at face value", not as a comic parody of rhetorical arguments but as a perfectly acceptable example thereof: "This, for rhetoricians, is a strong type of argument: admission of the fact coupled with the assertion that it is not prejudicial to one's case but favourable" (Close 1990: 67).

love-letter can be seen as rhetorically apt. As noted by Theresa Rosenhagen, it serves a double function, not only representing a form of dialogue with an absent interlocutor, but also serves as an illustration of Don Quixote's knowledge and mastery of chivalric rhetoric:

La carta a Dulcinea es un ejemplo excelente de la definición bajtiniana de la narración... Don Quijote responde a la voz ausente de Dulcinea; mientras, el lenguaje caballeresco revela su naturaleza verdadera en boca de Don Quijote. (Rosenhagen 2003: 199)

The humorous and parodic strain of the episode only increases when Sancho prompts Don Quixote to write for him a deed for three ass-colts, which the hidalgo does *on the reverse side of his love-letter*, an act rich in potential interpretations. The protagonist easily switches from amorous rhetoric to legalese, from poetic romance to prosaic household matters, from a lovesick knight-errant to a pragmatic landowner. His effortless change between two languages implies their equivalence: the trivial formulae of the legal language employed in the deed directly parallel the clichés of the chivalric love-language used in the letter to Dulcinea. These two languages acquire a certain unity by literally being two sides of the same parchment. They are not intermingled, preserving their identity; only a minor but significant detail links them together. Don Quixote lists the location of the writing as “en las entrañas de Sierra Morena” (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 314), a vividly poetic expression more becoming a chivalric discourse than a run-of-the-mill legal document. Even when writing a completely mundane note, the protagonist is unable (or unwilling) to abandon his chivalric style. In any case, the second letter both completes and perfects the epistolary comedy played out by Don Quixote and adds to the ambiguity of the episode. Much like Sancho, the reader can laugh at the grotesque nature of Don Quixote's

love-letter while appreciating his yearning for a lofty style and admire his ability to alternate between two entirely different languages on the spur of the moment.

The “disputation” on the relative virtues of Orlando and Amadís found in I.26 offers a very rare and valuable glimpse into Don Quixote’s mind and the warped yet internally consistent logic it operates on. Throughout the novel, the characters are defined and presented through what they say aloud and to a certain audience. Instances of “internal monologue” (usually introduced by the phrase “dijo entre sí” or a variation thereof) are quite rare, and usually limited to a single phrase. Here, we have not only a rather lengthy discourse played out entirely inside the protagonist’s mind, but also a unique instance where the character attempts to convince himself (as opposed to others) by using the artifices of rhetoric. There is no audience to speak of (the entire diatribe is what Don Quixote “hablando entre sí mismo decía”), no need to subject the discourse to *aptum* and, by extension, any rhetorical rules at all; the inner workings of Don Quixote’s dialectics and system of argumentation are revealed to the reader courtesy of the omniscient narrator:

—Si Roldán fue tan buen caballero y tan valiente como todos dicen, ¿qué maravilla, pues al fin era encantado, y no le podía matar nadie si no era metiéndole un alfiler de a blanca por la planta del pie, y él traía siempre los zapatos con siete suelas de hierro? Aunque no le valieron tretas contra Bernardo del Carpio, que se las entendió y le ahogó entre los brazos en Roncesvalles. Pero dejando en él lo de la valentía a una parte, vengamos a lo de perder el juicio, que es cierto que le perdió, por las señales que halló en la fontana y por las nuevas que le dio el pastor de que Angélica había dormido más de dos siestas con Medoro, un morillo de cabellos enrizados y paje de Agramante; y si él entendió que esto era verdad y que su dama le había cometido desaguizado, no hizo mucho en volverse loco. Pero yo ¿cómo puedo imitalle en las locuras, si no le imito en la ocasión dellas? [...] Por otra parte, veo que Amadís de Gaula, sin perder el juicio y sin hacer locuras, alcanzó tanta fama de enamorado como el que más, porque lo que hizo, según su historia, no fue más de que por verse desdeñado de su señora Oriana, que le

había mandado que no pareciese ante su presencia hasta que fuese su voluntad, de que se retiró a la Peña Pobre en compañía de un ermitaño, y allí se hartó de llorar y de encomendarse a Dios, hasta que el cielo le acorrió en medio de su mayor cuita y necesidad. Y si esto es verdad, como lo es, ¿para qué quiero yo tomar trabajo agora de desnudarme del todo, ni dar pesadumbre a estos árboles, que no me han hecho mal alguno? Ni tengo para qué enturbiar el agua clara destos arroyos, los cuales me han de dar de beber cuando tenga gana. Viva la memoria de Amadís, y sea imitado de don Quijote de la Mancha en todo lo que pudiere... (I.26; Cervantes 2004: 317-318)

However insane it may appear, this extraordinary soliloquy has a clearly defined subject (choice of a specific knight as a model for imitation during the upcoming bout of self-induced madness). Don Quixote's reasoning unfolds in a well-organised manner, with arguments presented in sequence and the "virtues" of both knights carefully compared and contrasted. The mad knight gives both Orlando and Amadís their due by presenting episodes from their respective adventures that speak in their favour, and examines the comparative worth of the two types of chivalric madness before making his final pronouncement. Among the stylistic features of the discourse, the most conspicuous is the *polysyndeton* (abundance of conjunctions); fitting the comparative theme, *si*, *pero/mas*, and *aunque* are employed more often than usual. In addition, Don Quixote carefully utilises certain concessive constructions to avoid making his arguments sound too categorical: "pero dejando en él lo de la valentía a una parte", "por otra parte", "y si esto es verdad, como lo es". To the logical finale of the argument in favour of Amadís, Don Quixote adds a rhetorical invocation of the knight's posthumous fame ("Viva la memoria de Amadís, y sea imitado de don Quijote de la Mancha en todo lo que pudiere"). And, typical of Don Quixote's speeches on chivalric matters and the "comic argument" trope, logical reasoning is mixed with intentionally silly-

sounding references to chivalric lore (e.g., Orlando's "Achilles heel" or his despoiling of nature during his insanity).

Given the proliferation of chivalric reminiscences, it is all the more understandable that the bulk of the studies of I.26 devote their attention to the literary subtext of this comparison. However, what has been overlooked by criticism is a significant intermingling of different languages in Don Quixote's speech. The Orlando – Amadís comparison is obviously a product of Don Quixote's fascination with romances. However, the chivalric discourse unfolds according to the laws of Classical and Renaissance rhetoric and explicitly mentions several key chivalric concepts. The hidalgo is looking for a model to imitate, and the concept of *imitatio* was a commonplace of multiple rhetoric manuals and poetics of the era and frequently found itself at the heart of literary and artistic debate. A classic study by Edward Riley (Riley 1954) interprets *imitatio* as a recurring and enormously important theme in the novel. Moreover, the structure and the argumentation of the discourse is essentially a parody of a basic and commonplace *rhetorical exercise* of comparing the virtues of the two heroes from ancient history and/or myth.

The system of rhetorical exercises, or *progymnasmata*, was codified in the late Antiquity by Hermogenes of Tarsus, Aelius Theon, and Aphthonius of Antioch. The rhetorical curriculum laid out in their treatises formed the basis of eloquence teaching well into the 17th century. It is generally safe to assume the knowledge of the most common *progymnasmata* by Cervantes,⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Alfonso Martín Jiménez affirms that Cervantes was familiar with Hermogenes' rhetorical system (Martín Jiménez 2000: 89), and Luisa López Griguera even suggests an interpretation of Don Quixote in the light of Hermogenes' rhetorical theories (López Griguera 1994). Violeta Pérez Custodio brings evidence for the presence of Theon's manual in Renaissance Spain: "La historia del texto de Teón en la España del XVI no

due to their extremely basic, even elementary nature and status as a cornerstone of the study of rhetoric; they were incorporated into countless Renaissance rhetorical treatises. Therefore, it would be useful to consider the exercise of comparison (*synkresis*) as a source of Don Quixote's discourse in I.26.

All extant school manuals of Greek rhetoric describe the *synkresis* exercise as a double praise (*encomion*), where the relative merits of two persons, objects, or concepts equally worthy of admiration are examined, and the ultimate model to imitate or an ideal to strive for is presented. The exercise was championed by Cicero, Quintilian, and Longinus as essential not only to the orator's education, but to human thinking in general, as it helps distinguish between vice and virtue. According to Ian Donaldson, the *synkresis* "serves as an exercise in comparison and discrimination, but also (critically) in persuasion, and in this respect may be seen as fundamental to the art of rhetoric" (Donaldson 2007: 168). A typical, even somewhat hackneyed comparison is contrasting two central characters of the *Iliad*, Achilles and Hector. In the version of the exercises attributed to Aphthonius, a sample dissertation on the topic starts with affirming the intent to imitate the nobler of the two warriors – exactly what Don Quixote is trying to determine. In the exercise, the abstract student of rhetoric begins his speech this way: "In seeking to compare virtue to virtue, I shall measure the son of Peleus against Hector; for virtues are to be honored for themselves, but when measured against each other they become more worthy of imitation" (Kennedy 2003: 114). What follows then is a recapitulation of Achilles' and Hector's biography and virtuous deeds, meant to evoke their exceptional

fue, desde luego, la de un gran éxito, pero los datos recopilados apuntan sin duda a una cierta difusión e interés por estos ejercicios" (Pérez Custodio 2013: 171).

qualities and demonstrate the speaker's erudition.

Don Quixote engages in something very similar, but the context and the content of his comparison significantly deviate from the premise. The protagonist's "dissertation" unfolds exactly as a commonplace comparison of two exemplary men, only instead of rival Trojan War heroes the hidalgo picks two famous knights of chivalric fiction (therefore using chivalric authority as a substitute for Classical). He compares their madness instead of, for example, their prowess in battle, magnanimity, or other virtues. While comparing vices and despicable people was within the limits of *synkresis*, Don Quixote clearly sees the madness of the two knights as a quality worthy of praise and imitation, not something to be condemned. The entire exercise is built around a ridiculous premise executed with complete seriousness and with all due algorithms and procedures required by the rhetorical genre.

It is possible to see in Don Quixote's rhetorical exercise an outright parody of rhetorical clichés on Cervantes' part. By inverting the typical moral message of a *synkresis* of two worthies and placing the rhetorical set piece in an inherently comic context (a lunatic choosing the better model for his madness), the author ridicules the triteness of the rhetorical exercise. It is also a rich source of comedy by virtue of being a protracted and ridiculously detailed "comic argument". However, there is more to the discourse than this interpretation alone. Given the evidence, I have to disagree with James A. Parr's assertion that the "monologue in Sierra Morena" reveals "no unsuspected hidden depths" about Don Quixote's character (Parr 2006: 100), and side with Laura Gorfkle, who, in a further elaboration of her comic argument theory, argues that

[i]n serious argumentation the speaker must consider that the success of his or her

comparison depends on certain social codes. In the deviant figuration of comic argumentation, the incompatibility between the terms of the comparison are emphasized, resulting in the inversion or destruction of the hierarchy upheld by means of the reasoning process. (Gorfkle 1993: 162)

Thus, the comic effect of Don Quixote's speech is not limited to laughter-inducing incongruity and *non sequitur*. It is built around a mixture of two speech genres (Renaissance rhetorical commonplace and apologetics of chivalry), and reduces to absurdity both the tropes of chivalric romance and the rigid structure of rhetorical exercises. In addition, it allows the reader to see "from within" the reasoning behind the knight's unreason and the bizarrely logical unfolding of Don Quixote's argumentation, which can be extrapolated on many of his other discourses.

Case Study: Vivaldo and the Canon (I.13 and I.49-50)

Don Quixote's discourses in I.13 and I.49-50 at the beginning and at the end of the 1605 novel, are two examples of chivalric apologies that include substantial dialogical elements. The first is pronounced to Vivaldo, a nobleman travelling with his retinue; the second, to the Canon of Toledo, after Don Quixote's capture and during his forced return to his village. Thus, both panegyrics to the art of knight-errantry are delivered literally *on the road*, framing the journey undertaken by Don Quixote in Part I. What also unites them is the fact that the self-styled knight does not merely pontificate about his chivalric mission, only to be immediately dismissed as a lunatic. His words are analyzed and challenged by others, sparking a friendly discussion in the first case and a proper debate on chivalric romances in the second. Don Quixote's discourses in both chapters are not presented as a single uninterrupted block of text – "feedback" from the audience forces the

knight-errant to break up the monolith of his rhetorical set pieces and engage in actual dialogue.

The first of the discourses is the first true chivalric apology of the novel and the most “interactive” instance thereof, second only to the lengthy debate with the Canon. Vivaldo, the person who challenges the authority of the romances, is a cunning opponent well versed in rhetoric. He, however, has no goal of dissuading Don Quixote from his chivalric faith and is merely looking for banter to pass the time on the road. The inoffensive playfulness inherent in Vivaldo’s rhetorical behaviour differentiates him from the Canon (who is determined to prove the *mentiras y disparates* of the romances to Don Quixote) and the Duke and Duchess (who also play along with the hidalgo’s chivalric madness, but with a much more malicious intent and effect).

The immediate reason for the dialogue with Vivaldo is Don Quixote’s prompt revelation of his madness. When asked the reason for travelling armed, Don Quixote affirms his identity as a knight-errant and favourably compares his vocation to that of courtly knights, which is enough to mark him as a lunatic, but also awakens Vivaldo’s curiosity:

Todos le tuvieron por loco; y, por averiguarlo más y ver qué género de locura era el suyo, le tornó a preguntar Vivaldo que qué quería decir “caballeros andantes”. (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 149)

Don Quixote’s response is typical of a chivalric apology invoking the false authority of the romances. He gives a brief history of the chivalric order, linking its origins to the times of King Arthur, and naming Lancelot, Amadís, Felixmarte, and Tirante among its prominent members. This genealogy of the order to which he allegedly belongs assumes the Matter of

Britain and the inventions of Spanish romance writers to be indubitable historical facts, thus justifying his identity and sense of chivalric mission. As typical for the argument from false authority, this not only confirms Don Quixote's folly in a general manner, but also determines the specific type of his madness:⁴⁷

Acabaron de enterarse los caminantes que era don Quijote falto de juicio y del género de locura que lo señoreaba, de lo cual recibieron la misma admiración que recibían todos aquellos que de nuevo venían en conocimiento della. (Cervantes 2004: 151)

With the hidalgo's madness established, Vivaldo, "persona muy discreta y de alegre condición", begins to rhetorically bait the lunatic in order to entertain himself. Unlike many other attempts to emulate Don Quixote's chivalric language or trick him into embarrassing situations (the quintessential example is the Duke and the Duchess in Part II) for the sole aim of entertainment, Vivaldo never does it maliciously or for petty, mischievous amusement. His baiting leads to Don Quixote delivering three small discourses on chivalry that establish many patterns of chivalric apology that will remain consistent throughout the novel.

Vivaldo's first bait is feigning amazement with the incredible strictness of the chivalric code of conduct, even more demanding than that of Carthusian friars. This comparison prompts Don Quixote into an interesting monologue on his chivalric vision (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 151-152). The would-be knight-errant places his profession at least on the same level as that of friars because it is a more direct, more tangible implementation of God's will, requiring constant dedication and exhausting travail. Knights-

⁴⁷ It is useful to recall that, at the very beginning of the novel, Cervantes explicitly marks the type of his character's insanity as being *the strangest of all*: "el más extraño pensamiento que jamás dio loco en el mundo" (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 49).

errant are “ministros de Dios en la tierra y brazos por quien se ejecuta en ella su justicia”, and they live “sudando, afanando y trabajando”, while friars pass their lives in contemplation, prayer, and overall “sosegada paz”. Don Quixote judiciously averts any potential charge of irreverence by humbly asserting that “No quiero yo decir, ni me pasa por pensamiento, que es tan buen estado el de caballero andante como el del encerrado religioso”; he still insists that, while being inferior to that of friars, the lives of knights-errant are definitely more demanding and arduous.

Up to this point, the argument presented by Don Quixote is quite engaging. He cleverly blends chivalric apologetics with theological language to paint a sympathetic picture of knights-errant as a type of *militia Christi* that overcome incredible hardships to implement Christian ideals on Earth. However, right at the end, Don Quixote manages to destroy his own argumentation by invoking the false authority of chivalric romances which ultimately undermines the authority of Christian ideals that he has been referencing up to that moment. Selfless service to God and neighbour is suddenly supplanted with that of personal gain and fame (“algunos subieron a ser emperadores por el valor de su brazo”). The mention of treacherous “encantadores y sabios” that help knights-errant gain the throne and then swindle it from them is similarly problematic. This rhetorical gaffe is a clear example of the protagonist’s chivalric madness taking over and weakening an otherwise evocative piece of eloquence.

Upon noticing the shift, Vivaldo almost immediately feigns acceptance of Don Quixote’s words by saying “De ese parecer estoy yo” (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 152) and spins the discussion into a different direction. He directly challenges Don Quixote’s claim of great piety among knights-errant,

noticing their tendency to dedicate themselves to their damsels instead of God in hours of great danger. Here, Vivaldo is extremely careful to present himself as both an enthusiast and a critic of chivalry. Even though he allegedly supports Don Quixote's ideals, Vivaldo points out how often the knights fall short of them, and that the custom of dedicating oneself to damsels, "que huele algo a gentilidad", is only one among many gripes he has with knights-errant.

This argument of Vivaldo's presents a more direct and tangible challenge to Don Quixote's ideals, one that does succeed in befuddling the knight-errant and make him go on the defensive by claiming that invoking God is so commonplace that it does not even bear mention. After that, the discussion moves on to splitting hairs around certain episodes and tropes of chivalric romances. Here, Vivaldo demonstrates first-hand familiarity with romances ("muchas veces he leído que se traban palabras entre dos caballeros andantes"; I.13; Cervantes 2004: 153) and turns out to be more knowledgeable in certain areas of chivalric literature than Don Quixote himself by correctly pointing out that Amadís' brother Galaor never had a chosen damsel, meaning that having one is not an absolute requirement for a knight-errant. Don Quixote has found his match in the knowledge of the books, but not in the attitude; while the hidalgo has to invent more and more far-fetched justifications for inconsistencies in chivalric romances, Vivaldo obviously enjoys uncovering contradictions while feigning respect for the genre.

When the discussion reaches Dulcinea, the description of her lineage is presented in a style normally reserved for recounting chivalric adventures. Instead of a stream of chivalric names, Don Quixote presents a list of noble

families past and present, where the last instant is an “odd man out” evident (and hilarious) to the reader and Vivaldo (who remarks: “Para decir verdad, semejante apellido hasta agora no ha llegado a mis oídos”) but apparently not to Don Quixote himself: “No es de los antiguos Curcios, Gayos y Cipiones romanos, ni de los modernos Colonas y Ursinos; ni de los Moncadas y Requesenes de Cataluña [...] pero es de los del Toboso de la Mancha” (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 155). The references to real-world noble families are supposed to give his argument a more dignified, Classical appearance while retaining its comic nature. Laura Gorfkle remarks: “This question and answer dialogue is drawn directly from the pre-established arguments of classical rhetoric called the *loci* which the orator can choose from and employ in support of the truth he or she is asserting” (Gorfkle 1993: 140). Vivaldo slyly acknowledges the modesty of his own claim to nobility (his family name is Cachopín de Laredo, a real Cantabrian minor noble house), poking fun at the unheard-of damsel of Toboso without offending Don Quixote. It is during the praise of Dulcinea when the narrator remarks that others have been listening to the conversation, and, after hearing hidalgo’s answers to Vivaldo’s inquiries, “aun hasta los mismos cabreros y pastores conocieron la demasiada falta de juicio de nuestro don Quijote” (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 156). An important exception is Sancho Panza, who thinks more highly of his master and has yet to learn the identity of the damsel.

After the Marcela and Grisóstomo subplot is over, Vivaldo disappears from the novel, but the part he plays in the context of Don Quixote’s discourses is considerable. He effortlessly adopts the strategy of feigning interest and acceptance of Don Quixote’s ideals, and manages to maintain a

more or less meaningful exchange with the knight-errant, preventing him from monopolising the conversation. The clash between everyday life and chivalric fantasy is generally averted in a peaceful, amicable manner, leaving everyone with his own opinion, even though Vivaldo's jovial skepticism and a mastery of argumentation clearly trump Don Quixote's chivalric orthodoxy.

The circumstances of the chivalric romance debate are entirely different. Technically, Don Quixote has been already defeated, and his vindication of chivalry can hardly change his fortunes. However, it is the Canon who is moved by Don Quixote's heartfelt conversation with Sancho and is given the impression that the mad knight still has some lucidity left in him: "Mirábalo el canónigo, y admirábase de ver la estrañeza de su grande locura y de que en cuanto hablaba y respondía mostraba tener bonísimo entendimiento" (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 614). "Movido de compasión", he tries to give Don Quixote a second chance by challenging him to a debate on the principal source of his madness – the chivalric romances. It is remarkable how the Canon, in his hilarious description of common clichés of the genre, ironically mimics (or even consciously parodies) the most vexing traits of Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric (abuse of *anaphora* and *enumeratio*, torrents of obscure and stupefying literary references, and general "chivalric affectation"):

¿Y cómo es posible que haya entendimiento humano que se dé a entender que ha habido en el mundo aquella infinidad de Amadises, y aquella turbamulta de tanto famoso caballero, tanto emperador de Trapisonda, tanto Felixmarte de Hircania, tanto palafren, tanta doncella andante, tantas sierpes, tantos endriagos, tantos gigantes, tantas inauditas aventuras, tanto género de encantamientos, tantas batallas, tantos desaforados encuentros, tanta bizarría de trajes, tantas princesas enamoradas, tantos escuderos condes, tantos enanos graciosos, tanto billete, tanto requiebro, tantas mujeres valientes; y, finalmente,

tantos y tan disparatados casos como los libros de caballerías contienen? (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 615)

Don Quixote reacts with most attentively listening to (“atentísimamente escuchando”) the Canon’s reasoning and carefully pondering his answer – unusually for a character so quick to improvise. However, after understanding that his opponent rejects the very existence of knights and their deeds, he starts his rebuttal with an *ad hominem*: “hallo por mi cuenta que el sin juicio y el encantado es vuestra merced” (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 618). After engaging in this rhetorical foul play, Don Quixote remarkably corrects himself by shifting to more complex argumentation. His first rebuttal is a fascinating piece of casuistry. Engaging in his usual name-dropping, Don Quixote enumerates and juxtaposes romance characters with those taken from actual history (Charlemagne, Cid Campeador, fifteenth-century Iberian knights etc.) and legends then commonly accepted as semi-historical fact (heroes of the Trojan War and the Matter of Britain). If they are real, why not Amadís?

Numerous Cervantists have emphasised that Don Quixote adopts an approach based on Classical and Scholastic argumentation to combat the arguments of his opponent – that is, using the Canon’s own weapon against him. In the words of Alban Forcione, “Don Quixote now begins his lengthy rebuttal of the canon’s arguments, proceeding along the lines laid down by traditional rhetoric. He briefly sums up what he considers to be the major arguments of the opponent, in this case the attack on the literal truth of the romances and their harmful effect on the readers, proceeds to a *refutatio* of these arguments, and concludes with a *confirmatio* of arguments in favor of the romance” (Forcione 1970: 108). Just as the Canon appropriates Don Quixote’s chivalric rhetoric to challenge and mock him, so does the knight-

errant borrow from the arsenal of Scholastic casuistry to prove his case. In doing so, Don Quixote demonstrates his facility with the finer points of argumentation elaborated by Classical rhetoric, all while adamantly defending something as patently ridiculous as romances of chivalry. He also turns the argument from history on its head by mentioning his descent from the legendary hero Gutierre Quijada. According to Alban Forcione, “the validity of the canon’s objection, which has up to this moment been honored by serious treatment, now suddenly dissolves before the calculated absurdity of Don Quixote’s response” (Forcione 1970: 110-111).

Don Quixote’s response, which both observes the rules of rhetorical argumentation and upsets them by applying them to chivalric matter, succeeds in confusing the Canon and throwing him off balance. The hidalgo’s opponent is “admirado [...] de oír la mezcla que don Quijote hacía de verdades y mentiras” (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 621); he is forced to admit that “no puedo yo negar [...] que no sea verdad algo de lo que vuestra merced ha dicho” (I.49; Cervantes 2004: 621). The Canon responds with even more casuistry, implying that if heroes of Carolingian and Medieval Spanish epics may have existed, that does not automatically extend to the “turbamulta de caballeros”. After the Canon concedes that chivalric heroes might be real (even though only those mentioned in more “reputable” sources), his argument is instantly weakened and Don Quixote gains considerable momentum, which he uses in I.50.

In the continuation of the debate, the hidalgo capitalises on the argument from authority borrowed from the Canon. He connects the false authority of chivalric romances to universally accepted authorities, such as that of monarchy (“los libros que están impresos con licencia de los reyes y

con aprobación de aquellos a quien se remitieron”; I.50; Cervantes 2004: 622). The true highlight, however, is the story of the Knight of the Boiling Lake, an imaginary scene from a typical romance of chivalry that Don Quixote lovingly recreates in his discourse. Despite the strictly chivalric nature of the description, the very act of creating or citing a story (*exemplum*) to support an argument is a time-honoured trope originating in Classical rhetoric. Overcome with poetic fervour, Don Quixote is carried away by his description, indulging in exclamations and rhetorical questions, splendiferous description, evocative detail, and other flourishes of chivalric eloquence. It seems even more remarkable given that Don Quixote’s discourse is, as usual, unrehearsed and improvised: “¿Qué, el verle echar agua a manos, toda de ámbar y de olorosas flores distilada? ¿Qué, el hacerle sentar sobre una silla de marfil? ¿Qué, verle servir todas las doncellas, guardando un maravilloso silencio?” (I.50; Cervantes 2004: 625). Once his story reaches its climax, the narrating knight realises that his fascination with his own eloquence might have taken him too far (“no quiero alargarme en eso”) and turns the discussion back to his own person.

The story of the Boiling Lake embodies the rhetorical duality that makes many of Don Quixote’s chivalric discourses so compelling. The hyperconcentration of romance tropes makes the narrative too grandiose to support his intent of demonstrating why the romances should be accepted and admired. However, by breaking rules of rhetorical argumentation, Don Quixote finds a different sort of support for this thesis. He paints an imaginative poetic canvas, making the story enjoyable specifically as an example of descriptive, epideictic eloquence. As he cannot convince the Canon through reasonable argumentation in favour of the romances, Don

Quixote attempts to do so by employing vivid descriptions and arresting storytelling, appealing to his emotions. Still short of his goal, the deluded knight-errant, at the very least, provokes *admiratio*⁴⁸ in both the Canon and the reader, making them ponder why the romances can be so attractive and seeing at least some sense in Don Quixote's fascination with them. This effect, as we have already established in Chapter I, is rooted in ambiguity, reflecting the contradictory structure of Don Quixote's rhetoric. It is both a misuse of rhetoric (ignoring the logical structure of the argument) and a very judicious use of its potential to appeal to the audience's imagination and sense of wonder – an effect which, within the episode, owes its appeal to the speaker's disregard for normal rhetorical structures and conceptions.

After the brilliant *exemplum* of the Knight of the Boiling Lake, Don Quixote's momentum starts to rapidly fade. By contrasting his present miserable condition with the potential to become a king or an emperor by his own hand, the hidalgo attracts Sancho's attention. The squire wastes no time in commandeering the dispute and drawing the attention away from its original theme (which, incidentally, will become a frequent occurrence in Part II). While Sancho's intervention muddles the effect of the Boiling Lake story somewhat, the Canon's final impression is once again that of *admiratio*: “Admirado quedó el canónigo de los concertados disparates que don Quijote había dicho, del modo con que había pintado la aventura del Caballero del Lago, de la impresión que en él habían hecho las pensadas

⁴⁸ According to Eduardo Urbina, the Boiling Lake narrative contains elements of both “positive” and “negative” *admiratio*: “por un lado sirve como confirmación de su locura y de vehículo paródico-burlesco a través del cual se satiriza la grotesca monstruosidad de los libros de caballerías (admiración negativa) por otro se pone en evidencia el gusto y poder de que tal ficción es capaz, encarnada en la imaginación recreadora de don Quijote (admiración positiva)” (Urbina 1989: 26).

mentiras de los libros que había leído, y, finalmente, le admiraba la necedad de Sancho, que con tanto ahínco deseaba alcanzar el condado que su amo le había prometido” (I.50; Cervantes 2004: 627-628). The debate is left inconclusive, although, given that, in the second part of the discussion, the Canon failed to produce any new arguments and was essentially reduced to a listener’s role, the mad knight was quite probably gaining the upper hand.

The debate, like no other episode in Part I at least, reveals the hidden depths of Don Quixote’s affinity with rhetoric. To defend the veracity of chivalric romances and the validity of his chosen mission, he challenges a learned, prepared, and driven opponent. Don Quixote uses the Canon’s arguments, based on the authority of the Scriptures, historical chronicles, and Classical literature, for his own ends. The argumentation he employs is peculiar and sometimes incongruous: the apologist of the romances invokes royal, divine, aesthetic and historical authority to defend implausible and generally despised books, in spite of how fundamentally silly some of the “historical” evidence in favour of the romances turns out to be. The context also deflates the seriousness of the discussion: a debate on verisimilitude and limits of acceptable fantasy, a *controversia* normally reserved for learned Renaissance Humanists, is played out between a canon and a mad would-be knight kept in a cage. “La mezcla de verdades y mentiras” that Don Quixote so intensely employs in his discourse has no tangible result. The Canon does not accept the authority of chivalry, and neither is Don Quixote cured of his chivalric insanity by the Canon’s reasoning. The fundamental ambiguity of the episode needs a different sort of audience to be resolved: the readership. The reader is free to draw his own conclusions from a thought-provoking but inconclusive discussion that offers contrasting viewpoints (with the two

sides trying to turn the opponent's arguments against their users), each with its own flaws and merits, but is left with no clear resolution and no apparent winner.

Case Study: Don Quixote and Diego de Miranda (II.16-18)

Don Quixote's stay at the house of the *Caballero del Verde Gabán* is one the most intensely debated episodes of Part II, and possibly the entire novel, with numerous attempts to determine the "true" attitude of the author to the character introduced in these chapters, his enigmatic nature, the meaning of Don Quixote's interaction with him, etc. What interests us here is not whether Diego de Miranda is supposed to be the mouthpiece for Cervantes' own views or a satirical portrait of Castilian gentry. The episode presents a unique assortment of audience reactions to the protagonist's speeches and an impressive versatility of Don Quixote as a speaker. The rhetorical dimension of the mad/sane paradox is presented here in a way more intriguing and complex than anywhere else in the novel, and the assortment of Don Diego's and his son's reactions to Don Quixote's words and deeds is highly varied. What follows is an overview of their rapidly changing nature and the protagonist's rhetorical behaviour.

Very soon after Don Diego's introduction, he has a small discussion with Don Quixote regarding the veracity of chivalric romances. The knight-errant's unwavering faith in their truthfulness immediately marks him as a lunatic ("Desta última razón de don Quijote tomó barruntos el caminante de que don Quijote debía de ser algún mentecato"; II.16; Cervantes 2004: 822), but it is important that the Knight of the Green Coat also wants to verify his first impression ("aguardaba que con otras lo confirmase"). Don Diego's

unfavourable opinion is very soon dispelled by Don Quixote's eloquent discourse on poetry: "Admirado quedó el del Verde Gabán del razonamiento de don Quijote, y tanto, que fue perdiendo de la opinión que con él tenía de ser mentecato" (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 828). But when Don Quixote shows his eagerness to fight the caged lions, Don Diego starts treating him as a madman once again ("no le pareció cordura tomarse con un loco, que ya se lo había parecido de todo punto don Quijote"; II.16; Cervantes 2004: 834). Once the adventure has finished with the mad knight intact, Don Diego is completely baffled. The narrator describes his reaction in oft-quoted words that clearly establish the difference between Don Quixote's words and deeds, as well as the importance of context (that is, reading Part I) to properly understand his actions:

En todo este tiempo no había hablado palabra don Diego de Miranda, todo atento a mirar y a notar los hechos y palabras de don Quijote, pareciéndole que era un cuerdo loco y un loco que tiraba a cuerdo. No había aún llegado a su noticia la primera parte de su historia, que si la hubiera leído cesara la admiración en que lo ponían sus hechos y sus palabras, pues ya supiera el género de su locura; pero como no la sabía, ya le tenía por cuerdo y ya por loco, porque lo que hablaba era concertado, elegante y bien dicho, y lo que hacía, disparatado, temerario y tonto. (II.17; Cervantes 2004: 838)

Don Quixote immediately catches the drift of his confusion and proceeds with an extended apology of his own actions, which does not fundamentally alter Don Diego's opinion. He shares his thoughts with his son, once again drawing the line between word and deed: "le he visto hacer cosas del mayor loco del mundo, y decir razones tan discretas que borran y deshacen sus hechos" (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 843). Lorenzo tests Don Quixote's sanity himself. While Don Quixote talks about poetry, he cannot determine his state of mind ("hasta ahora [...] no os podré juzgar por loco"; II.18; Cervantes 2004: 844). After another lengthy praise of chivalry,

Lorenzo concludes that “él es loco bizarro” and “no le sacarán del borrador de su locura cuantos médicos y buenos escribanos tiene el mundo: él es un entreverado loco, lleno de lúcidos intervalos” (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 846).

After dinner, in spite of Don Quixote praising Lorenzo’s poetry, he does not change his opinion, but is still flattered by his approval (“¿No es bueno que dicen que se holgó don Lorenzo de verse alabar de don Quijote, aunque le tenía por loco?”; II.18; Cervantes 2004: 849). After Don Quixote’s departure (preceded by his final praise of chivalry and an exhortation to join the order), the final verdict of both Diego and Lorenzo is a mixed one. The would-be knight, judging by his discourses, might be both mad and sane, and it is his single-minded obsession with chivalry that undermines the brilliance of his discourses:

De nuevo se admiraron padre y hijo de las entremetidas razones de don Quijote, ya discretas y ya disparatadas, y del tema y tesón que llevaba de acudir de todo en todo a la busca de sus desventuradas aventuras, que las tenía por fin y blanco de sus deseos. (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 852)

No other characters undergo as many changes of opinion about Don Quixote in such a small period of time (four days) as do Don Diego and Don Lorenzo. Their hesitations in the question of Don Quixote’s madness are directly caused by how their guest delivers his discourses. His proud chivalric apologies and the incident with the lions mark him as a lunatic, while his praise of poetry, completely devoid of references to chivalric romances and steeped in Classical erudition, partially restores his reputation. Antonio Barnés Vázquez affirms that “la respuesta de don Quijote al Caballero del Verde Gabán, inquietado por el interés de su hijo por la poesía, es un panegírico plenamente humanista” (Barnés Vázquez 2009: 77).

However, the judges of Don Quixote's sanity themselves possess certain Quixotic traits.

When Don Diego first presents himself, he does so in a somewhat pompous, self-lauding style characteristic of chivalric discourse in general and definitely not alien to Don Quixote's speaking style. While praising his own virtues, Don Diego sounds all too reminiscent of Don Quixote's chivalric apologies:

Oigo misa cada día, reparto de mis bienes con los pobres, sin hacer alarde de las buenas obras, por no dar entrada en mi corazón a la hipocresía y vanagloria, enemigos que blandamente se apoderan del corazón más recatado; procuro poner en paz los que sé que están desavenidos; soy devoto de Nuestra Señora y confío siempre en la misericordia infinita de Dios Nuestro Señor (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 823).

The parallel between “poner en paz los que sé que están desavenidos” and “enderezar tuertos y desfacer agravios” is particularly obvious. Sancho rushing to kiss Don Diego's feet and proclaiming him a living saint further weakens the effect of the speech, making the speaker appear self-righteous and sanctimonious: he literally fashions himself as being too perfect for an ordinary human being.

His son Don Lorenzo suffers from an extreme fascination with literature, which is by itself a most Quixotic endeavour, as Alonso Quijano transformed himself into Don Quixote after reading too many books. Judging by Don Diego's description (“Todo el día se le pasa en averiguar si dijo bien o mal Homero en tal verso de la *Ilíada*... En fin, todas sus conversaciones son con los libros de los referidos poetas”; II.16; Cervantes 2004: 824), Lorenzo is a poetic Quixote in the making who suffers from the same affinity for speaking about his favourite reading. The characters' own

latent Quixotism makes their judgements and appraisals of Don Quixote's speech more ambiguous and problematic.

What is remarkable in this episode is how Don Quixote stays true to his chivalric ideals and style while demonstrating previously unheard-of concern for the audience and solid argumentation, as we shall see below. After engaging in a potentially suicidal adventure with the lions, he presents a very unusual sort of apology to the perplexed Diego de Miranda. He starts with what could well be considered a *captatio benevolentiae*, openly admitting his flaws and declaring empathy with the listener's confusion about his actions:

¿Quién duda, señor don Diego de Miranda, que vuestra merced no me tenga en su opinión por un hombre disparatado y loco? Y no sería mucho que así fuese, porque mis obras no pueden dar testimonio de otra cosa. Pues, con todo esto, quiero que vuestra merced advierta que no soy tan loco ni tan menguado como debo de haberle parecido. (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 839)

This preoccupation with the opinion of others, as well as the awareness that his actions can understandably appear insane to others, are unheard of in his usual discourse of chivalric apologetics. The rest of his apology, however, unfolds with his typical argumentation: he once again presents the contrast of *caballero cortesano* and *caballero andante*; paints the life of the knight-errant as one of extreme peril and travail; and describes bravery as one of the principal chivalric virtues. His affinity for colourful, if somewhat excessive descriptions and general *affectatio* is once more evident:

Pero el andante caballero busque los rincones del mundo, éntrese en los más intrincados laberintos, acometa a cada paso lo imposible, resista en los páramos despoblados los ardientes rayos del sol en la mitad del verano, y en el invierno la dura inclemencia de los vientos y de los yelos... (II.16; Cervantes 2004: 840)

Still, Don Quixote does not allow himself to be carried away by describing chivalric exploits, finally returning to the point of his argument, directly addressing Don Diego and explaining the reason for his indulging in extreme recklessness: he did so only to avoid a different extreme of appearing timid and cowardly. Don Diego's reaction to what is yet another instance of the "comic argument" is distinctly ambiguous. By saying that "todo lo que vuesa merced ha dicho y hecho va nivelado con el fiel de la misma razón", he means one of two things: the protagonist enters the lions' cage and then passionately speaks about chivalry because he is either completely devoid of good reason or unwaveringly true to his chosen idealistic code of conduct, even in the face of common sense. In general, the defence of bravery (and, by extension, chivalry) is a remarkable mixture of the unique and the typical, a blending of tried-and-true formulae of chivalric discourse with an atypical concern for the audience and sound argumentation. Francisco Márquez Villanueva justly remarks that "el razonamiento de don Quijote no tiene fisura de ningún género" (Márquez Villanueva 1975: 185).

Don Quixote's conversation with Don Lorenzo also presents several surprises. When Lorenzo commends the hidalgo's education ("Paréceme que vuesa merced ha cursado las escuelas") and asks about the sciences he might have studied, Don Quixote explodes in a panegyric of the science of errant chivalry:

— Es una ciencia —replicó don Quijote— que encierra en sí todas o las más ciencias del mundo, a causa que el que la profesa ha de ser jurisperito, y saber las leyes de la justicia distributiva y comutativa, para dar a cada uno lo que es suyo y lo que le conviene; ha de ser teólogo, para saber dar razón de la cristiana ley que profesa, clara y distintamente, adondequiera que le fuere pedido; ha de ser médico y principalmente herbolario, para conocer en mitad de los despoblados y desiertos las yerbas que tienen

virtud de sanar las heridas, que no ha de andar el caballero andante a cada triquete buscando quien se las cure; ha de ser astrólogo, para conocer por las estrellas cuántas horas son pasadas de la noche, y en qué parte y en qué clima del mundo se halla; ha de saber las matemáticas, porque a cada paso se le ofrecerá tener necesidad dellas; y, dejando aparte que ha de estar adornado de todas las virtudes teologales y cardinales, decendiendo a otras menudencias, digo que ha de saber nadar como dicen que nadaba el peje Nicolás o Nicolao; ha de saber herrar un caballo y aderezar la silla y el freno; y, volviendo a lo de arriba, ha de guardar la fe a Dios y a su dama; ha de ser casto en los pensamientos, honesto en las palabras, liberal en las obras, valiente en los hechos, sufrido en los trabajos, caritativo con los menesterosos, y, finalmente, mantenedor de la verdad, aunque le cueste la vida el defenderla. (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 844-845)

This particular praise of chivalry is a *tour de force* of all highs and lows of Don Quixote's rhetoric, a deliberately oversaturated example of the hidalgo's self-fashioning. His ideal knight-errant possesses all conceivable knowledge joined with an impeccable moral compass and a vigorous desire to defend his ideals. Don Quixote blends two competing ideals of the perfect human being, that of a Renaissance polymath and that of a Medieval knight. The gap between these two images of human perfection should not be seen as unbridgeable, since the Humanist ideal of the perfect man and the Medieval chivalric ideal are merely versions of the same "anthropological myth" that attributes all positive human qualities to a single easily identifiable archetypal image.⁴⁹

Even in a cultural context that embraces chivalry as an ideal of human life, Don Quixote's discourse is unique. Rather than providing a justification of chivalry by invoking characters and episodes of chivalric romances, as he usually does, the would-be knight borrows commonplace comparisons and tropes from Renaissance discourses "on the dignity of man". Suddenly, he no longer assumes that his audience, especially as knowledgeable of

⁴⁹ Arguably, Don Quixote bridges the gap and merges the two ideals with additional ease because of a special role of chivalry in Spanish culture; according to Svetlana Piskunova, the chivalric myth "became the Spanish national variation of the Renaissance anthropological utopia" (Piskunova 2009: 48).

Classical culture as Diego and Lorenzo de Miranda, accepts the universe of Amadís and his ilk at face value. By tapping into the authority of Classical learning, Don Quixote observes the requirements of *aptum*. Peter Womack notes that, in this discourse, “Cervantes affords Don Quixote the ideological resources of Renaissance rhetoric: constructing knight-errantry as a combination of humanist learning, aristocratic honour, and Christian virtue” (Womack 2011: 60).

By presenting chivalry as an “art of arts”,⁵⁰ Don Quixote implicitly equates it with rhetoric. Heinz-Peter Endress remarks on the prerequisites of the perfect knight that “detrás de esta exigencia se reconoce sin mucho esfuerzo el ideal renacentista de universalidad, que se remonta a la concepción ciceroniana del perfecto orador” (Endress 2000: 124). Indeed, Don Quixote’s description of different arts and sciences that are to be mastered by an aspiring knight-errant harks back to Cicero’s argument in *De Oratore* I.45-78. Through the mouth of Crassus, Cicero defends the necessity of an ample and varied education for his ideal vision of an orator; this vision of the perfect speaker was thoroughly assimilated by Renaissance culture. The most vigorous part of the argument (I. 60-61) is thematically and even textually close to Don Quixote’s discourse:

I ask, for instance, whether an advocate can either assail or defend a commander-in-chief without experience of the art of war, or sometimes too without knowledge of the various regions of land or sea? Whether he can address the popular assembly in favour of

⁵⁰ Curiously, it is Sancho who often invokes the vision of the knight-errant as a polymath. In Part I, the squire, amazed by the style of Don Quixote’s love-letter, says “Digo de verdad que es vuestra merced el mesmo diablo y que no hay cosa que no sepa”, the hidalgo responds: “Todo es menester [...] para el oficio que traigo” (I.25; Cervantes 2004: 314). Likewise, in Part II, Sancho says to himself on hearing his master’s discourse on marriage: “¡Válate el diablo por caballero andante, que tantas cosas sabes! Yo pensaba en mi ánima que solo podía saber aquello que tocaba a sus caballerías, pero no hay cosa donde no pique y deje de meter su cucharada” (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 884).

the passing or rejection of legislative proposals, or the Senate concerning any of the departments of State administration, if he lacks consummate knowledge — practical as well as theoretical — of political science? Whether a speech can be directed to inflaming or even repressing feeling and passion — a faculty of the first importance to the orator — unless the speaker has made a most careful search into all those theories respecting the natural characters and the habits of conduct of mankind, which are unfolded by the philosophers? [...] Your natural science itself, your philosophy, mathematics, and other studies which you just now reckoned as belonging peculiarly to the rest of the arts, do indeed pertain to the knowledge of their professors, yet if anyone should wish by speaking to put these same arts in their full light, it is to oratorical skill that he must run for help. (Cicero 1967: 45-47)

Evidently, one should not take Don Quixote's discourse in complete earnest. While the individual arguments in favour of chivalry are by themselves engaging, and could actually work to support Don Quixote's point, the discourse is once again undermined by sheer overabundance of examples. The amount of virtues the ideal knight must possess is too unrealistic, and the fact that Don Quixote himself struggles to live up to the standard he depicts works against his argument. The presentation of the virtues is sometimes contradictory or erratic. For instance, Don Quixote makes, with little justification, a leap from theological and cardinal virtues to swimming, even citing a merman as a potential model ("digo que ha de saber nadar como dicen que nadaba el peje Nicolás o Nicolao"); the comic argument here is obvious. The principal irony here is that Don Quixote is endowed with considerable erudition and rhetorical skill, but the reader is not informed of his education or reading habits apart from the *donoso escrutinio* of his chivalric romance-dominated library. As a result, the hidalgo's manner of delivering the discourse both undermines and strengthens its message. There are enough ridiculous elements to rob it of any credibility, but the very fact that Don Quixote possesses at least some of the qualities he demands from a paragon of knight-errantry (for instance, knowledge of laws and theology, as already demonstrated in Chapter II)

works in his favour. A significant overlap with the Ciceronian vision of a true orator also solidifies the harmony of chivalric and Classical/Humanist virtues that is the centrepiece of Don Quixote's discourse.

The protagonist's parting advice to Don Lorenzo complements this union of the chivalric and the Classical. The knight-errant makes a final attempt at making chivalry attractive to the young nobleman:

No sé si he dicho a vuesa merced otra vez, y si lo he dicho lo vuelvo a decir, que cuando vuesa merced quisiere ahorrar caminos y trabajos para llegar a la inaccesible cumbre del templo de la Fama, no tiene que hacer otra cosa sino dejar a una parte la senda de la poesía, algo estrecha, y tomar la estrechísima de la andante caballería, bastante para hacerle emperador en daca las pajas. (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 851).

The Classical references to the temple of Fame and Lorenzo's poems are clearly meant to draw Don Diego's son into chivalry, which purportedly has the same virtues as poetry (already lauded by Don Quixote shortly before). Expectedly, the argument turns out to be more comic than sound, completely solidifying the impression of madness. The narrator emphasises that "con éstas razones acabó Don Quijote de cerrar el proceso de su locura" (II.18; Cervantes 2004: 852). Still, the reader can appreciate how the world of Classical poetry and chivalric romances forms the same continuum in Don Quixote's mind, and how the poet is second only to the peerless knight-errant in his hierarchy of professions. This appeal to the unity of poetry and chivalry serves as a testament to the complexity and flexibility of Don Quixote's argumentation and the dialectic interaction of the two languages in his mind.

Claudio Guillén notes that, while dialectics is more useful for analysing the dialogues of Don Quixote, and invoking Classical rhetoric is more fitting

for discourses and soliloquies (Guillén 1988: 220-223), there is a deep dialectical quality to all of Cervantes' text:

...Cervantes nos comunica y dramatiza la perplejidad, nos enseña a volver a empezar, nos incita a examinar los más distintos temas desde ángulos inéditos, diferentes y críticos... El diálogo llegará a ser [...] una dramatización que permite la encarnación novelesca de un problema. (Guillén 1988: 222)

Particularly addressing the episode with Diego de Miranda, he postulates that their dialectic exchange of opinions has led them to an avoidance of potential conflict:

Los dos hidalgos se han puesto de acuerdo en no estar de acuerdo, en respetar y admitir las convicciones ajenas. No habrá violencia, ni combate, ni tragedia. Mas las diferencias entre los dos sistemas contrastados no se resolverán. (Guillén 1988: 230)

This, however, is exactly one of the goals of Classical rhetoric: replacing wanton violence with civilised debate, physical conflict with a verbal duel. The dialogue between Diego de Miranda and Don Quixote is possible because both hidalgos are well versed in oratorical arts and can present their point of view using the arts of eloquence. In this respect, the entire episode with Diego de Miranda turns into an implicit praise of rhetoric as an art of communication.

Conclusions

To other characters of the novel, the rhetoric of chivalry is equivalent to the rhetoric of madness, and Don Quixote is at the peak of his insanity (at least the verbal dimension thereof) when speaking on chivalric themes. However, it is still remarkable how the knight's speech, even when dealing with chivalric matter that everyone else finds nonsensical, maintains the sense of sequence, structure, and orderly argumentation, and how different

he is from other knights-errant in being a practitioner of the rhetorical arts. According to Ángel Rosenblat, “él es «el solo, el primero, el único» miembro del gremio de la andante caballería que esgrime la oratoria como arma” (Rosenblat 1971: 112). However, as José Enrique Laplana Gil duly notes, even the best of Don Quixote’s chivalric discourses fall flat and fail to advance him in his futile goal: “Caballero de la Palabra, pero de las tristes palabras, pues tampoco con ellas saldrá victorioso de sus aventuras” (Laplana Gil 2004: 112).

The principal (and admittedly severe) flaw of Don Quixote’s chivalric harangues is his misguided acceptance of chivalric authority. No other character shares it or at least gives it weight comparable to the authority of Antiquity or the Bible. Any other transgressions against the rules of rhetoric are directly attributable to this flaw. Antonio Carreño uses the definitions “discurso de locura” and “lenguaje del loco” specifically to refer to Don Quixote’s chivalric discourses. The language of madness “fija [...] una perenne tradición de la literatura caballescica: del discurso solemne y perifrástico al casual, simplón y oblicuo, lleno de digresiones tautológicas y de extensas perífrasis” (Carreño 1999: 58). Yet even the most unintentionally hilarious chivalric speech of Don Quixote’s has within it the elements of a rhetorically sound discourse. To quote a thought-provoking suggestion, “la retórica del lenguaje es la máscara que encubre y da aliento al mismo tiempo a la locura” (Carreño 1999: 72). There is definitely rhyme and reason even in the depths of Don Quixote’s chivalric-rhetorical madness.

As argued by Edwin Williamson, “Don Quixote can be used so effectively to outwit common sense because his madness is not arbitrary;

there is a method in it which regulates his behaviour and structures his arguments” (Williamson 1984: 91). Indeed, Don Quixote’s use of rhetoric throughout the novel serves both to mitigate his insanity with occasional brilliant displays of lucid eloquence and to cement his reputation as a lunatic who makes audience-alienating speeches. The chivalric rhetoric employed by Don Quixote can act as a parody of specific discursive genres described in traditional rhetorical accounts; it can have all the trappings of normative rhetorical discourse save for the subject, which almost inevitably ruins the potential effect; it can be a barely visible addition to an otherwise normal speech that goes largely unnoticed.

In Sierra Morena, he deforms typical Classical/Humanist rhetorical set pieces (*synkresis*, apostrophe, letter-writing, etc.) by introducing unsuitable and sometimes inherently nonsensical chivalric elements or overblowing the usual style required of these genres. The result is a sequence of comical orations that serve as a parody of rhetorical tropes, with Don Quixote’s chivalric madness denuding their worn-out nature. Conversely, every time he dabbles in chivalric discourse in Diego de Miranda’s house, Don Quixote ruins whatever appreciation Don Diego and Don Lorenzo might have accumulated, with chivalry serving as a reminder of Don Quixote’s insanity that cannot be erased by “lucid intervals”. Conversely, his debate with the Canon is surprisingly effective in spite of revolving around the premise of chivalric authority, worthless to everyone save Don Quixote himself. The hidalgo manages to defend his patently insane case by applying typical arguments of Renaissance literary debates (arguments from moral or aesthetic value, authority of Classical or Biblical antiquity, etc.). By twisting logic in his favour, he both demonstrates excellent rhetorical acumen and

exposes weaknesses in typical recycled arguments against the romances. The exchange with the Canon, as well as others previously mentioned, has all the requisite trappings of codified Renaissance speech genres. The hidalgo, to quote Paz Gago,

...sigue el modelo discursivo de los diálogos humanistas en sus coloquios con el canónigo toledano o con el cura de su aldea, con el caballero del Verde gabán, con su hijo y con Vivaldo, reiterando los mecanismos dialécticos de la polémica renacentista en torno a los temas literarios o filosóficos. (Paz Gago 1995: 161)

This interplay of chivalric rhetoric with other forms of discourse in *Don Quixote* creates a complex dialectic of non-traditional rhetorical argumentation. A “comic” or completely ludicrous argument might stem from impeccably eloquent and internally consistent reasoning, and distinctions between lucidity and madness are fluid enough to provoke constant *admiratio* at their miraculous coexistence. Dominick Finello claims that the protagonist “successfully communicates his ideas despite being ridiculed and laughed at as an eccentric or madman. No one needs to be reminded that his “madness” is perplexing in the light of his uncanny ability to justify his actions and modify the behavior of others through language” (Finello 1998: 81). Based on the analysis of character reactions, Finello’s affirmations about Don Quixote’s “success” and ability to “modify” the behaviour of other characters seem problematic; however, this vision of the hidalgo’s rhetoric does hold ground if we consider its potential effect on the reader. Laplana Gil argues that this effect constitutes one of the very scant rhetorical victories of Don Quixote’s in the novel:

Ni con las armas ni con las palabras vence el caballero, tan desdichado andante como orador. [...] Pero si los discursos de don Quijote no consiguen su propósito ante quienes le escuchan en las páginas del libro, si han deleitado, enseñado y conmovido a generaciones de lectores. (Laplana Gil 2004: 113)

This important distinction can, and should, be applied to the entirety of Don Quixote's speeches, chivalric or not. Even when the ostensible audience finds a particular discourse incomprehensible, absurd, or offensive, their reactions should not always coincide with that of the readers. This bifurcation of audience for Don Quixote's discourses significantly broadens their potential impact and subverts the monologism of both chivalric and Classical discourse.

In Bakhtin's writing, monologism or simply "monologue" is the complete antithesis of dialogue, a form of discourse rejecting all other alternatives and individualities. From a rhetorical standpoint, monological discourse is meant to be accepted as the ultimate expression of absolute truths, contains no oblique or hidden meaning, rejects all other forms of discourse that might challenge its dominance:

Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme pure form) another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could change anything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deaf to other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any force. Monologue manages without the other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word*. It closes down the represented world and represented persons. (Bakhtin 1984: 292-293)

The language of Classical/Humanist erudition and the language of fictional chivalry are two forms of heavily codified and endlessly recyclable discourse, purporting, each within its own domain, to be the only adequate vehicle of expression. From these equally monological and depersonalised elements, Cervantes blends Don Quixote's distinct and highly individual language that reflects his uniquely warped worldview. The nature of Don Quixote's bookish madness and the contrarian logic of his mind is

adequately expressed through a personal rhetorical system, composed of familiar elements but much more complex and engaging than an amorphous potpourri of disparate discourses. As described by Bakhtin, “the image of another’s language and outlook on the world [čůžoe jazyk-mirovozzrenie]⁵¹, simultaneously represented and representing, is extremely typical of the novel; the greatest novelistic images (for example, the figure of Don Quixote) belong precisely to this type” (Bakhtin 1984: 45). If, according to José Ángel Ascunce Arrieta, “*El Quijote* como novela moderna se fundamenta en los discursos” (Ascunce Arrieta 1991: 410), then Don Quixote’s manifold rhetoric is a sign of the work’s innovative nature.

⁵¹ I preserve the translators’ Scientific System transliteration of the Russian text, which also contains a minor error in gender agreement of the adjective (the correct form, rendered here in the British Standard system, is *chuzhoi jazyk-mirovozzrenie*). In addition, the proposed translation is needlessly verbose, given that *mirovozzrenie* is a direct cognate of *world-view* (by virtue of being, like its English counterpart, a calque of the German *Weltanschauung*), and, in the original, forms an ad hoc compound noun with *jazyk*, ‘language’. “Worldview-language” is an arguably more precise and easy-to-use translation.

CHAPTER IV
THE OTHER RHETORICS OF THE NOVEL

As has been stated in the Introduction, this thesis is first and foremost a study of the protagonist's use and misuse of rhetoric and their effects; the function of all rhetoric in the novel would have been too forbidding a topic. Still, the knight-errant's displays of eloquence would have never existed without an audience that possesses its own visions of rhetoric that Don Quixote can interact with or be challenged by. The protagonist is far from being the only practitioner of rhetorical arts in the novel, and the way other characters come to grips with eloquence often provides a counterexample to the protagonist's rhetorical foibles – or mirrors and parallels his departures from the expected standards of rhetoric. Thus, the argument of this thesis would have been incomplete without examining alternative, non-Quixotic approaches to rhetoric presented in Cervantes' novel.

This chapter focuses on diverse secondary characters of the novel and their own use and misuse of rhetoric, especially on the episodes where it parallels that of Don Quixote, directly engages it, or offers an interesting counterpoise to his rhetorical style. This part of the study begins with, and devotes the bulk of attention to, Sancho Panza, warranted by the sheer amount of time he spends together with the protagonist and both the quantity and the quality of his rhetorical interventions. The second one unites disparate minor characters (often appearing in one chapter only) that either comment on "chivalric rhetoric" or even use it directly (invariably as a part of a prank or a wholesale deception directed at the protagonist). The third

singles out Marcela as a *casus sui generis* among episodic characters of *Don Quixote*, her use of rhetoric serving as an answer to many of the problems inherent in the protagonist's discourse.

Sancho Panza

Out of all supporting characters of *Don Quixote*, Sancho Panza is definitely the one that comes closest to be considered a deuteragonist or even a co-protagonist. He accompanies Don Quixote from his second sally (I.7) and spends the vast majority of the time in direct contact with his master, reacting to and commenting on many of the knight-errant's discourses. Evidently, Sancho is only second to the title character in the number of interpretations accumulated over the 400 years of the book's existence, and the amount of critical literature devoted specifically to the character is staggering. Even within the general focus of this thesis – the use and misuse of rhetoric – the character of Sancho offers sufficient material for a viable, book-length study devoted to this question. Given that the scope of this thesis is limited to the protagonist, and a thorough examination of all of Sancho's utterances may quickly derail the subject, I have consciously limited myself to highlighting only the most pertinent traits of the character's rhetoric, always viewed in conjunction and comparison with that of Don Quixote.

If there is one common, conspicuous, unifying trait that can be ascribed to all of Sancho's use (and, evidently, misuse) of rhetoric, it is the fact that he frequently employs forms of language that are *not his own* and consistently *twists and garbles* them. In Don Quixote's words, Sancho is a "prevaricador de buen lenguaje" (II.19; Cervantes 2004: 858). Sancho's

penchant for proverbs is easily the most famous, memorable, and commented trait of his discourse, with nary a mention of the character in both academic and popular studies of *Don Quixote* going without mentioning his effusions of folk wisdom. Sancho's attempts at replicating his master's "chivalric language" and forays into moral philosophy are also well known and observed, as are his pervasive malapropisms and manifold corruptions of proper names, learned and even common words, typical set phrases, etc. However, few attempts have been made to study these disparate traits of Sancho's discourse in concert or make direct parallels with the Quixote's reliance on other discourses (chivalric, Humanist, forensic, etc.).

Sancho's Garbled Paremiology

Proverbs are by definition eminently impersonal. They form the discourse of a timeless, featureless "popular wisdom of the ages", a cornucopia of ready-made phrases, similes, and puns prepared for every occasion. Devoid of a known author, ascribed to no particular creator, representing a traditional collective experience, transmitted orally and invoked in typical everyday situations, proverbs leave no room for invention, authorship, or individuality. In this aspect, they are the lower-class, oral, non-literary equivalent to two other prominent literary "borrowed languages"⁵² featured in the novel: the arsenal of chivalric clichés (recycled in dozens of interchangeable romances, mostly created by equally interchangeable writers bereft of any personal touches of style or plot) and that of Classical and Renaissance rhetoric (regularised, catalogised, and

⁵² An ad-hoc term used in Mancing 1982 to characterise Don Quixote's rhetoric; its French equivalent ("discours prêté") is also employed by Monique Joly to describe Sancho's speaking style (Joly 1996: 296).

formulaic by its very nature). A common critical trope is to equate Don Quixote with the written (or, better yet, printed) word,⁵³ and Sancho with orality. Within this dichotomy, it can be postulated that Don Quixote creates his personal style by borrowing from storehouses of impersonal literary rhetoric and depersonalised chivalric tropes, so does Sancho draw from the commensurately enormous treasury of equally impersonal “filosofía vulgar”. In a certain way, Sancho’s overdependence on and irritating overuse of *refranes* directly parallels Don Quixote’s propensity for chivalric archaism and/or obscure and lengthy chivalric references. As Manuel Martín Morán argues,

Don Quijote es la escritura y Sancho la voz. El repertorio de temas tratado por don Quijote en sus discursos, los consejos que da a Sancho, sus ideas sobre los libros de caballerías y la literatura en general, proceden de los libros. Los refranes, los chascarillos, los cuentos y anécdotas en los que Sancho apoya sus afirmaciones proceden de la cultura oral. (Martín Morán 2009: 159).

Sancho’s overuse of the *refranero*, often with no rhyme or reason and completely at odds with the current circumstances, is, within conventional rhetorical theory, a violation of *aptum*, fitting a character that would have no knowledge of the concept and little understanding of speech *decorum*. In one of his many chastisements, Don Quixote implicitly mentions the concept and instructs Sancho in its use. This serves well to illustrate both his familiarity

⁵³ According to Michel Foucault’s famous and controversial assertion, Don Quixote is a being literally made out of snippets from other discourses: “Tout son être n’est que langage, texte, feuillets imprimés, histoire déjà transcrite. Il est fait de mots entrecroisés; c’est de l’écriture errant dans le monde parmi la ressemblance des choses” (Foucault 1966: 161). James A. Parr puts forward a description of the novel’s protagonist that is a very close paraphrase of the Foucauldian definition: “Don Quixote himself is, first and foremost, the product of writing and its complement, reading. Surely can there be no discussion of that. He owes his existence to books – even his speech is bookish – and he becomes a book” (Parr 1991: 173).

with rhetorical rule and madness-induced myopia that keeps him from applying the same restraint to his own chivalric references:

—Mira, Sancho —respondió don Quijote—: yo traigo los refranes a propósito, y vienen cuando los digo como anillo en el dedo, pero tráelos tú tan por los cabellos, que los arrastras, y no los guías; y si no me acuerdo mal, otra vez te he dicho que los refranes son sentencias breves, sacadas de la experiencia y especulación de nuestros antiguos sabios, y el refrán que no viene a propósito antes es disparate que sentencia. (II.67; Cervantes 2004: 1287)

Another important trait of the kind of proverbs employed in Sancho's discourse is their *extremely banal* nature, even for a speech genre based around self-evident truths and overt didacticism. As Monique Joly points out, “[c]ontrairement à ce qui se passe pour d’autres œuvres célèbres de la littérature espagnole, les proverbes du Quichotte sont d’un repérage aisé, même pour un lecteur qui ne possède aucune connaissance préalable du *refranero*” (Joly 1996: 270). Sancho's repertoire of proverbs is composed “du fonds commun le plus vulgarisé” (Joly 1996: 270), the most “fundamental” of adages relating to the most basic elements of human life containing the most self-evident moral lessons. Don Quixote's epideictic discourses also treat the fundamentals of the human condition, ethics, and morals, and depend upon well-worn rhetorical tropes and similes; his treatment of the topics is also fairly standard, unless applied to chivalric matters.

An additional similarity between Sancho's and Don Quixote's rhetorical styles is their direct relation to the concerns of Renaissance Humanism. It is easy to imagine Sancho's rustic proverbs as diametrically opposed to his master's invocations of Demosthenes or Cicero. However, Humanists, especially in Spain, treated “vulgar eloquence” with interest and even fascination, doing their utmost to fuse together and harmonise

“popular” and “learned” rhetoric. As early as 1925, Américo Castro pointed out that “[e]l Renacimiento dignifica el refrán por ser expresión de la natural y mística sabiduría ínsita en la conciencia [...] el Renacimiento ha de dignificar la lengua hablada, la vulgar y usadera, considerándola como el más inmediato instrumento de expresión...” (Castro 1925: 195-196). Ángel Rosenblat also acknowledges this link between the two forms of eloquence: “La valoración y exaltación apasionada del refranero, como la exaltación de la lengua del pueblo en Nebrija o Fray Luis, nos muestra la segunda vertiente del humanismo: la dignificación de lo popular y de lo natural. [...] El refranero popular, el pan nuestro de cada día, alimentó el fondo utópico del humanismo” (Rosenblat 1971: 42-43).

Seminal collections of Spanish proverbs, assembled, commented, and published by leading Humanists of the day, include Hernán Núñez’s *Refranes o proverbios en romance* (1555) or Juan de Mal Lara’s *Philosophía vulgar* (1568), making “folk wisdom” a province not only of the spoken word but also the printed page, as well as lending it an authority and prestige commensurate with ancient classics. These links with Humanism seriously complicate the facile oral/print and rustic/learned dichotomies but are unfortunately rarely taken into account in analyses of Sancho’s discourse, despite the precedent set by Castro and Rosenblat.⁵⁴ As a result, Sancho’s rhetoric of the *refranero* can be considered a roundabout analogue to Don Quixote’s Humanist and moralistic speeches, their discourse of “vulgar philosophy” tying in to that of more learned and refined Humanist writing.

⁵⁴ An uncommon recent acknowledgement is James A. Parr’s observation: “We might also view Sancho’s adages, proverbs, and other sententiae, while seemingly popular in origin, as travesties of Erasmus’ well-known collection of such curiosities, his *Adagia*” (Parr 2006: 144).

Sancho, Rustic Theologian

In Sancho's discourses throughout the novel, there are surprisingly numerous references to theological concepts or words, phrases, and periods typical of ecclesiastical discourse. While many of the questions raised by this fact have already been well researched by Paul Ricard (Ricard 1965), there is still much to consider and to add. Obviously, Sancho, being illiterate and unlearned, is not an authority on theology or any form of ecclesiastical discourse (especially manifest in his inability to pronounce the word "teología", always rendered as "tología"). Nevertheless, the rustic's "naïve" theologising reveals an important mechanism of imitation that justifies his uncharacteristically profound observations on the human condition.

The immediate source of Sancho's interest in theological themes is an unnamed village preacher quoted by Don Quixote's squire as an authority almost every time he introduces a philosophical or moralistic observation that would not be out of place in a real-world sermon. The mentions of this preacher are, as can be seen from the following quotations (emphasis in which is mine), quite significant:⁵⁵

...yo he oído predicar al cura de nuestro lugar, que vuestra merced bien conoce, que quien busca el peligro perece en él. (I.20; Cervantes 2004: 229)

—Con esa manera de amor —dijo Sancho— he oído yo predicar que se ha de amar a Nuestro Señor, por sí solo, sin que nos mueva esperanza de gloria o temor de pena, aunque yo le querría amar y servir por lo que pudiese. (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 398)

...yo agora no hablo de mí, que todo lo que pienso decir son *sentencias del padre predicador que la cuaresma pasada predicó en este pueblo*; el cual, si mal no me acuerdo, dijo que todas las cosas presentes que los ojos están mirando se presentan, están

⁵⁵ The third quotation refers to a preacher who may or may not be the same one that Sancho has mentioned before. In any case, this particular rhetorician is also a man of the cloth, equally nameless, and treated by Sancho with the same amount of reverence.

y asisten en nuestra memoria mucho mejor y con más vehemencia que las cosas pasadas. (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 398)

Sancho's formula of "yo he oído predicar" is used, with some variations, as a form of justification of his words, as a means to lend them more weight by claiming they originally belong to someone possessing learning, wisdom, and spiritual authority. Paul Ricard even attributes to this mysterious preacher an exceptional level of education and rhetorical aptitude by asking: "¿de donde pudo Sancho haber aprendido todo esto sino en la iglesia de su aldea, escuchando a un párroco por lo demás excepcionalmente culto?" (Ricard 1965: 267-268).

Sancho's discourse on death during the episode of Camacho's wedding merits particular attention. Once again, the eloquent peasant credits his village preacher for his inspiration. This brief description of the "reign of Death" is vividly poetic, full of imaginative vigour and enough naturalistic detail to make the personification of Death seem both down-to-earth and uncanny in its similarity to living beings (emphasis in the quote mine):

—A buena fe, señor —respondió Sancho—, que no hay que fiar en la descarnada, digo, en la muerte, la cual tan bien come cordero como carnero; y a nuestro cura he oído decir que con igual pie pisaba las altas torres de los reyes como las humildes chozas de los pobres. Tiene esta señora más de poder que de melindre; no es nada asquerosa: de todo come y a todo hace, y de toda suerte de gentes, edades y preeminencias hinche sus alforjas. No es segador que duerme las siestas, que a todas horas siega, y corta así la seca como la verde yerba; y no parece que masca, sino que engulle y traga cuanto se le pone delante, porque tiene hambre canina, que nunca se harta; y aunque no tiene barriga, da a entender que está hidrópica y sedienta de beber solas las vidas de cuantos viven, como quien se bebe un jarro de agua fría. (II.20; Cervantes 2004: 872-873; emphasis in the quote mine)

This image of Death, inspired, as much of Sancho's rhetoric is, by the anonymous *cura*, is in line with the Baroque preaching of the day, often prone to similarly protracted depictions of anthropomorphised abstract

concepts; for example, Miguel Ángel Núñez Beltrán's study of sacred eloquence in seventeenth-century Seville explicitly compares Sancho's oration with real sermons from this period describing Death in similarly anthropomorphic detail (Núñez Beltrán 2000: 317-319).

Don Quixote's reaction and Sancho's response to it, despite their brevity, belong to the most thought-provoking discussions of rhetoric in the novel (emphasis in the quote mine):

Tente en buenas, y no te dejes caer, que en verdad que lo que has dicho de la muerte por tus rústicos términos es lo que pudiera decir un buen predicador. Dígote, Sancho, que si como tienes buen natural y discreción, pudieras tomar un púlpito en la mano y irte por ese mundo predicando lindezas.

—Bien predica quien bien vive —respondió Sancho—, y yo no sé otras tologías. (II.20; Cervantes 2004: 873)

Sancho's response – styled in his typical *rústicos términos* and garbling of “learned” words such as *teología* – resonates with one of the greatest concerns of Spanish ecclesiastical rhetoric: the relation of eloquence and Christian virtue. By claiming that “bien predica quien bien vive”, Sancho repeats a typical maxim used in theological debates on morality versus rhetoric, and, implicitly, places a preacher's personal virtue over his didascallic schooling as the main component of his rhetorical success. While the unlettered Sancho is indeed no authority on divinity, he unwittingly repeats a commonplace of ecclesiastical rhetoric (quite possibly also imbibed from the sermons of the *cura del lugar*) and suggests an explanation for his unexpectedly profound displays of eloquence: the essential goodness of his heart.

This praise and Sancho's unusually profound reaction to it are not a one-off, isolated episode. Very soon, on hearing Don Quixote's discourse on

marriage Sancho returns to this event, directly references and builds upon it while talking to himself (emphasis in the quote mine):

—Este mi amo, cuando yo hablo cosas de meollo y de sustancia suele decir que podría yo tomar *un púlpito en las manos* y irme por ese mundo adelante *predicando lindezas*; y yo digo dél que cuando comienza a enhilar sentencias y a dar consejos, no *solo puede tomar un púlpito en las manos, sino dos en cada dedo*, y andarse por esas plazas a ¿qué quieres, boca? ¡Válate el diablo por caballero andante, que tantas cosas sabes! Yo pensaba en mi ánima que solo podía saber aquello que tocaba a sus caballerías, pero no hay cosa donde no pique y deje de meter su cucharada. (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 884)

Sancho repeats the expressions previously used by his master (“tomar un púlpito en las manos”, “predicar lindezas”) and, in a certain form, “returns” them to their owner by means of this silent praise of Don Quixote’s rhetorical expertise. It should also be mentioned that, by this point in the novel, the hidalgo’s niece had made a similar comparison with an itinerant preacher (“podría subir en un púlpito e irse a predicar por esas calles”; II.6; Cervantes 2004: 735). Thus, in Part II, both Don Quixote and Sancho are compared to preachers, implying their rhetorical skills and a strong moral and spiritual undercurrent to their discourses – as well as their commensurability as rhetoricians.

In II.22, Sancho shows even more of his talent at “naïve theology” as he sets off a discussion with a pedantic student who prides himself on his learning by asking whether Adam was the first person ever to scratch his head and who was the first tightrope dancer in history. This parody of the *de inventoribus* trope (Parr 2006: 144) ridicules the type of Scholastic education prevalent at the time, focused on memorising Biblical and theological trivia and making seemingly logical but internally ludicrous

rationalisations such as the student’s argument “in favour” of Adam.⁵⁶ When, in a development of this comic argument, Sancho calls Lucifer the first tumbler, Don Quixote once again notes that his squire’s rhetoric seems far beyond his abilities (emphasis in the following quotation mine):

—Pues mire, señor —replicó Sancho—, no tome trabajo en esto, que ahora he caído en la cuenta de lo que le he preguntado: sepa que el primer volteador del mundo fue Lucifer, cuando le echaron o arrojaron del cielo, que vino volteando hasta los abismos.

—Tienes razón, amigo —dijo el primo.

Y dijo don Quijote:

—*Esa pregunta y respuesta no es tuya, Sancho: a alguno las has oído decir.*

—Calle, señor —replicó Sancho—, que a buena fe que si me doy a preguntar y a responder, que no acabe de aquí a mañana. Sí, que *para preguntar necedades y responder disparates* no he menester yo andar buscando ayuda de vecinos.

—*Más has dicho, Sancho, de lo que sabes* —dijo don Quijote—, que hay algunos que se cansan en saber y averiguar cosas que después de sabidas y averiguadas no importan un ardite al entendimiento ni a la memoria. (II.22; Cervantes 2004: 887-888)

While Sancho acknowledges the inherent silliness of his exchange with the *primo humanista* and downplays his own wit, Don Quixote’s observation is correct in pointing out Sancho’s mastery at “borrowed language” and capacity for *imitatio*.

One of the last of Sancho’s discourses in the novel, his “sermon” on omens and portents, reflects one of the chief theological preoccupations of

⁵⁶ As argued by Anthony J. Cascardi, the entire character of *primo humanista* is a parody of minutious Humanist erudition. The “somewhat pretentious” cousin speaks “in the idiom of Renaissance humanists”, and, while Cervantes was an admirer of some things about Renaissance Humanism, “his admiration was no obstacle for ridicule, and the Cousin’s discourse is not without its risible side” (Cascardi 2002: 65). Within this interpretation, Sancho’s development of the cousin’s argument should be seen as a form of *reductio ad absurdum* by way of comic argument, bringing the inherently ridiculous nature of pedantic erudition to the fore.

the Spanish Golden Age, often referenced in literature: the debate on fate, the limits of free will, and the extent that astrology, omens, and the like reflect or affect human destiny. He once again quotes the village preacher as the source of his opinion on the subject:

—He aquí, señor, rompidos y desbaratados estos agüeros, que no tienen que ver más con nuestros sucesos, según que yo imagino, aunque tonto, que con las nubes de antaño. Y, si no me acuerdo mal, *he oído decir al cura de nuestro pueblo* que no es de personas cristianas ni discretas mirar en estas niñerías, y aun vuesa merced mismo me lo dijo los días pasados, dándome a entender que eran tontos todos aquellos cristianos que miraban en agüeros. (II.73; Cervantes 2004: 1323-1324; emphasis mine)

As expected, the “sermon” is brought to life by a comic episode (Don Quixote interpreting the sight of a hare running away from hounds as a premonition of his never seeing Dulcinea again), but adds a sublime element to the situation, as well as serving as reassurance for Don Quixote, devastated by his obligation to abandon chivalry and return to the village.

Sancho the Imitator of Chivalry

Much has been written about the “quixotification” of Sancho in both thinking and speech; the latter is especially evident in the squire’s gradual adoption of the knight-errant characteristic “chivalric language”. The fact that Sancho starts employing the mock-archaic or otherwise flowery speech patterns of Don Quixote can be considered another manifestation of his capacity for *imitatio*, already seen in numerous tropes of ecclesiastical discourse percolating into his speech thanks to the sermons of the village preacher. According to Teresa Rosenhagen,

[a]unque Sancho no ha leído los libros de caballerías como don Quijote, puede aprender de la sabiduría de don Quijote a través de los diálogos caballeresco que ellos han compartido, y él, Sancho, utiliza esta información para sí mismo. [...] Don Quijote y

los libros de caballerías han tenido gran influencia sobre las capacidades dialógicas de Sancho. (Rosenhagen 2003: 201-202)

An example of such influence appears in I.52. At first, Sancho unleashes the following lamentation, believing his master dead:

—¡Oh flor de la caballería, que con solo un garrotazo acabaste la carrera de tus tan bien gastados años! ¡Oh honra de tu linaje, honor y gloria de toda la Mancha, y aun de todo el mundo, el cual, faltando tú en él, quedará lleno de malhechores sin temor de ser castigados de sus malas fechorías! ¡Oh liberal sobre todos los Alejandro, pues por solos ocho meses de servicio me tenías dada la mejor ínsula que el mar ciñe y rodea! ¡Oh humilde con los soberbios y arrogante con los humildes, acometedor de peligros, sufridor de afrentas, enamorado sin causa, imitador de los buenos, azote de los malos, enemigo de los ruines, en fin, caballero andante, que es todo lo que decir se puede! (I.52; Cervantes 2004: 643)

In this impromptu funeral lament, Sancho reproduces some of the typical elements of Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric: generally lofty style, *fabla* ("fechorías"), Classical allusions ("liberal sobre todos los Alejandro"), and *amplificatio* (the entirety of the last sentence) – all while having no idea why these elements are used in the first place, and with clearly comic results. The crowning malapropism of the speech ("humilde con los soberbios y arrogante con los humildes, acometedor de peligros, sufridor de afrentas"), aside from being a sterling example of bathos, inadvertently undermines the very discourse that he attempts to reproduce. While Don Quixote used chivalric affectation to paint himself as a worthy example of errant chivalry, Sancho, by inverting some elements of the discourse, paints the real picture of his master's attempts at heroism: constantly misplaced effort and never-ending failure.

The same chapter features a recapitulation of his adventures to his wife where he borrows Don Quixote's characteristic prolonged rhetorical period and finishes with an *amplificatio*. Sancho's description of "low" matters in

his master's elevated style exemplifies the usual garbling to which he subjects all borrowed discourses (emphasis in the following quote mine):

Solo te sabré decir, así de paso, que no hay cosa más gustosa en el mundo que ser un hombre honrado escudero de un caballero andante buscador de aventuras. Bien es verdad que las más que se hallan no salen tan a gusto como el hombre querría, porque, de ciento que se encuentran, las noventa y nueve suelen salir aviesas y torcidas. Sélo yo de experiencia, porque de algunas he salido manteado y de otras molido; pero, con todo eso, es linda cosa esperar los sucesos *atravesando montes, escudriñando selvas, pisando peñas, visitando castillos, alojando en ventas a toda discreción, sin pagar ofrecido sea al diablo el maravedí*. (I.52; Cervantes 2004: 646)

Sancho's treatment of "borrowed language" is similar to the effects of a funhouse mirror: it is not an accurate image of the language he borrows, but a comically exaggerated and distorted rendition of their haphazard parts. Be it a folk proverb, a learned idiom, or an overheard bit of chivalric purple prose, Sancho almost never reproduces it in the expected normality. The only possible exception is ecclesiastical and moralistic discourse, which earns Sancho most of the *admiratio* and, as a foil to his usually garbled speech, essentially acts as a counterpart to Don Quixote's Humanistic rhetoric. Not coincidentally, it is the area where he receives the most actual rhetorical training, if listening to and imitating the unnamed "cura de nuestro lugar" is any indication. Next to the preacher, his rhetorical model of imitation is Don Quixote himself. His influence slowly improves Sancho's speaking style and reaches its apex during Sancho's governorship. While a complete "quixotification" of Sancho's rhetoric never materialises, the rustic's exposure to Classical and chivalric eloquence through his master and his natural aptitude for imitation (though not necessarily a precise one) doubtlessly have a beneficial effect on his abilities.

This "distorted mirror effect" of Sancho's discourse undergoes a mutation both similar to and unlike the evolution of Don Quixote's

“chivalric archaism” in Part II. In the beginning of the novel, both Sancho’s incessant and often garbled proverbs and Don Quixote’s mock-archaic harangues serve as a reliable source of comedy; as the action unfolds, their speech increases in variety and depth, with the previously dominant mode of speaking losing most of its prominence.

The significant difference in Sancho’s case is, while Don Quixote starts off as a speaker in archaism, he does not acquire his iconic trait of proverb-sputtering until relatively late in the novel: his first proverb is uttered in I.19, and the first barrage of *refranes* appears in I.25. Overall, Sancho’s love for proverbs, unlike Don Quixote’s proclivity for archaism, only increases with the course of the action. Monique Joly counts 125 proverbs in Part I and 377 in Part II (Joly 1996: 259), a threefold increase. However, this growing use of proverbs is in no way mutually exclusive with an increase in character depth. As Sancho becomes more prominent in Part II, he simply speaks more. He does utter more proverbs, but also dabbles into types of discourse underplayed in Part I – those of “naïve theology” and imitational chivalry. Most of Don Quixote’s speeches on non-chivalric themes can be found in the second part of the novel, which also far outstrips Part I in terms of sheer number of discourses of any type. Likewise, the better part of Sancho’s lauded displays of rhetoric appears in Part II; as Heinz-Peter Endress points out, Sancho does not deliver “proper” discourses until the second part, his rhetorical manifestations in Part I being limited to conversations and dialogues (Endress 2009: 179).

This reflects the gradual process of Sancho’s coming to grips with eloquence under the influence of his master, and of his rhetoric reflecting that of Don Quixote’s but also acquiring a deeply individual touch. Even

though Sancho mirrors his master in terms of rhetorical growth (both quantitative and qualitative), and owes most of his mock-chivalric and at least some of his “theological” discourse to Don Quixote’s influence, Sancho becomes more assertive and original in his discourses. Sancho’s language is a unique and bizarre mixture of different corrupted languages. Like his master, he departs from the demands of rhetorical unity of discourse, and thus from rhetorical competence. As a result, however, he creates something entirely novel and unheard of, his rhetorical style turning out much larger than the sum of its parts. As Paz Gago writes,

[e]l encanto y valor especial del lenguaje de Sancho reside [...] en su heterogeneidad, en la coexistencia de los registros rústico, académico y cortesano. Efectivamente, su sociolecto evoluciona, modificándose progresivamente y refinándose, hasta el punto de que Sancho asimila paulatinamente el habla culta a través de la conversación con su señor...(Paz Gago 1995: 156).

Sancho’s Rhetoric Praised and Blamed

Throughout the novel, the reader encounters many instances where Sancho, much like his master, causes “positive” or at least “neutral” *admiratio* in other characters, or is praised for his rhetorical efforts. The mechanisms of this surprise are also similar to Don Quixote’s, as described in Chapter I: the hidalgo’s initial madness in speech and behaviour lowers the expectations of the audience, only to flout them with a sudden display of well-constructed and moving rhetoric. Sancho’s counterpart to chivalric madness is his rustic simplicity; while Don Quixote presents himself as a delusional lunatic conversing in antiquated parlance, Sancho is routinely written off as a crude and dense bumpkin speaking in a debased rustic dialect. Paradoxically, this negative impression works to the advantage of

both characters, as it earns them due praise and admiration when they reveal their rhetorical potential. Below is a sampling of episodes where Sancho, explicitly or implicitly, causes *admiratio* in the audience, including his master (emphasis in the quotes mine):

—¡Válate el diablo por villano —dijo don Quijote—, y qué de *discreciones* dices a las veces! No parece sino que has estudiado. (I.31; Cervantes 2004: 398)

Admirado quedó el bachiller de oír *el término y modo de hablar* de Sancho Panza; que, puesto que había leído la primera historia de su señor, nunca creyó que era tan *gracioso* como allí le pintan... (II.7; Cervantes 2004: 746)

Sancho bueno, Sancho *discreto*, Sancho Cristiano, y Sancho sincero (II.11; Cervantes 2004: 782)⁵⁷

Quedaron todos *admirados*, y tuvieron a su gobernador por un nuevo Salomón. (II.45; Cervantes 2004: 1087)

El hombre le dio las gracias lo peor que supo, y fuese, y los circunstantes quedaron *admirados de nuevo de los juicios y sentencias* de su nuevo gobernador. (II.45; Cervantes 2004: 1090).

Todos los que conocían a Sancho Panza *se admiraban*, oyéndole hablar tan elegantemente, y no sabían a qué atribuirlo, sino a que los oficios y cargos graves, o adoban o entorpecen los entendimientos. (II.49; Cervantes 2004: 1119)

...y el mayordomo ocupó lo que della faltaba en escribir a sus señores lo que Sancho Panza hacía y decía, tan *admirado* de sus hechos como de sus dichos: porque andaban mezcladas sus palabras y sus acciones, con asomos discretos y tontos. (II.51; Cervantes 2004: 1141)

Los donaires de Sancho fueron tantos, que de su boca andaban como *colgados* todos los criados de casa y todos cuantos le oían... (II.43; Cervantes 2004: 1237)

Y así, dando de las espuelas a Rocinante, pasó adelante, dejándolos *admirados* de haber visto y notado así su estraña figura como la *discreción* de su criado, que por tal juzgaron a Sancho. Y otro de los labradores dijo:

— Si el criado es tan *discreto*, ¡cuál debe de ser el amo! (II.46; Cervantes 2004: 1279)

⁵⁷ This particular praise of Sancho is perhaps Don Quixote's most flattering reaction in the entire novel to his squire's words. Ernest Siciliano claims that "never has Don Quijote been so earnest, so sincere, so unstinting in his praise" (Siciliano 1974: 41).

...se rió y admiró el bachiller, considerando la *agudeza y simplicidad* de Sancho, como del extremo de la locura de don Quijote. (II.70; Cervantes 2004: 1303)

...dijo Sancho *tantos donaires y tantas malicias*, que dejaron de nuevo admirados a los duques, así *con su simplicidad como con su agudeza* (II.70; Cervantes 2004: 1308)

Among other instances of Sancho being praised or admired for his rhetoric, the following two stand out. The first is the endlessly quoted and reinterpreted claim of the narrator in II.5: allegedly, Sancho has overstepped his rhetorical limitations so greatly that his entire discourse might be deemed apocryphal (an implicit mention of *admiratio* and a wry commentary on Sancho's sudden rhetorical growth in Part II):

Todas estas razones que aquí va diciendo Sancho son las segundas por quien dice el tradutor que tiene por apócrifo este capítulo, que exceden a la capacidad de Sancho. (Cervantes 2004: 730)

Also, there is the case of Sancho's address to the Dukes as he resigns from his governorship of Barataria (II.55). In this discourse, Sancho exhibits a dignified, courteous style, devoid of his usual malapropisms and prevarications – although not without a slight touch of his usual rusticity, such as indecorously mentioning the children's game “Salta tú, y dámela tú” (II.55; Cervantes 2004: 1183). Heinz-Peter Endress considers it “una pieza maestra de oratoria [...] la cumbre absoluta de la elocuencia de Sancho” (Endress 2009: 184). The reaction of the audience is particularly telling: while the Duke and the Duchess' warm congratulations of Sancho may quite well have been planned from the start, Don Quixote is sincerely elated by his squire's enormous improvement as a speaker and his well-made, if not entirely perfect, discourse:

Con esto dio fin a su larga plática Sancho, temiendo siempre don Quijote que había de decir en ella millares de disparates; y cuando le vio acabar con tan pocos, dio en su corazón gracias al cielo, y el duque abrazó a Sancho y le dijo que le pesaba en el alma de que hubiese dejado tan presto el gobierno, pero que él haría de suerte que se le diese en su estado otro oficio de menos carga y de más provecho. Abrazóle la duquesa asimismo... (II.55; Cervantes 2004: 1183)

As we can see from these quotations, it is not a rare occasion when Sancho is praised by (or together with) Don Quixote or afforded the same intellectual virtues (for example, wit, discretion, and prudence – via a comparison with Solomon) as his master. One of these examples also hints at the mixture of madness and lucidity (or stupidity and wit in Sancho’s case) common in description of *admiratio*: compare Sancho’s “admirados [...] así con su simplicidad como con su agudeza” and “se rió y admiró el bachiller, considerando la agudeza y simplicidad de Sancho” and Don Quixote’s “admirados de sus disparates como del elegante modo con que los contaba” (II.59; Cervantes 2004: 1216). In addition, most of the praise is confined to Part II, and, more specifically, to the episode of the ducal palace and Sancho’s governorship – doubtlessly the pinnacle of Sancho’s prominence in the entire book, and, correspondingly, the zenith of his rhetorical ability.

As a result, it is possible to affirm that at least a significant part of reactions to Sancho as a speaker are deliberately presented in a manner similar to Don Quixote’s. However, there is a subtle undercurrent that clearly sets them apart. As we have noticed before, the reader is given almost no information about Alonso Quijano’s life before his transformation into Don Quixote, but, through his social status and erudite speaking style, we can assume a certain level of education, familiarity with Classical sources, and perhaps even some degree of rhetorical training. While

conjectural, these assumptions remain within the realm of the plausible, and the reader accepts the occasional brilliance of Don Quixote's discourses at face value. Even though, as we have explored previously in this chapter, Sancho compensates for his lack of education with a marvellous ability of imitation and replication (however imperfect) of other discourses, his rhetorical flourishes are somewhat harder to accept, at least for other characters. This makes his occasionally profound and moving speeches much more surprising and worthy of genuine *admiratio*.

Of course, there are multiple times when Sancho's rhetorical faults provoke the ire or annoyance of other characters, spelling trouble for the hapless rustic rhetorician. In spite of his natural wits, boundless memory for proverbs, and ear for imitating good rhetoric, Sancho's simplicity – much like Don Quixote's madness – often gets the better of him, preventing him from achieving true rhetorical success. Rather than listing all of Sancho's blunders, it is worth looking at select examples where the cause of failure or audience reaction is particularly illustrative.

As Sancho spends most of the time with Don Quixote, it is no surprise that most of the negative reactions are drawn from the protagonist of the novel. Minor annoyances (such as the famous interjection at Sancho's endless *refranes*) aside, there is an instance (insinuating that Dorotea/Micomicona should remunerate his efforts to prove that she is a real queen) when Sancho makes such a horrible *faux pas* that it provokes one of the greatest displays of Quixotic ire recorded the book. Don Quixote is so furious with his squire, and the torrent of insults he hurls at him is so lengthy that it even draws an exclamation from the narrator (emphasis in the quote mine):

¡Oh, váleme Dios y cuán grande que fue el enojo que recibió don Quijote oyendo las *descompuestas palabras* de su escudero! Digo que fue tanto, que con voz atropellada y tartamuda lengua, lanzando vivo fuego por los ojos, dijo:

—¡Oh bellaco villano, malmirado, descompuesto, ignorante, infacundo, deslenguado, atrevido, murmurador y maldiciente! ¿Tales *palabras has osado decir* en mi presencia y en la destas ínclitas señoras, y tales *deshonestidades y atrevimientos* osaste poner en tu confusa imaginación? ¡Vete de mi presencia, monstruo de naturaleza, depositario de mentiras, almario de embustes, silo de bellaquerías, inventor de maldades, publicador de sandeces, *enemigo del decoro* que se debe a las reales personas! ¡Vete, no parezcas delante de mí, so pena de mi ira! (I.46; Cervantes 2004: 584-585)

The expressions highlighted in the quote all refer, directly or obliquely, to the concepts of *decorum* and *aptum* and their breach by Sancho. This exclamation once again illustrates Don Quixote's knowledge of rhetorical rules, making his frequent failures to observe them all the more paradoxical, as well as justifying his anger at Sancho's impertinence and inability to contain his speaking impulses.

In fact, the second part of the novel presents even more telling examples that Sancho's rhetorical problems, as many of his master's, are related to *aptum* and *prudentia*. A downside of Sancho's growing rhetorical ability is his eagerness to interrupt the words of his master to add his own, mostly with the best of intentions (to agree with him or to praise his discourse or personal qualities), which brings about the most disastrous of possible results. There are three major instances in Part II when Sancho interrupts Don Quixote, with most unpleasant consequences in each case.

The first is the previously discussed *aventura del rebuzno* (II.27), where Sancho's untimely intervention completely wrecks an otherwise brilliant speech and provokes the wrath of the villagers. The first part of his intervention, as Don Quixote stops his speech to catch some breath, is grandiose flattery of his master, presented in a lofty style uncharacteristic of

the peasant's speech but fitting the object of this *encomium*. The actual virtues highlighted by Sancho (Don Quixote's proficiency with both Arms and Letters, all-around knowledge, prudence) are those that the hidalgo attributes to himself or that other characters had observed before; the goal of this praise is to bolster Don Quixote's authority as a speaker and move the audience to heed his words (emphasis of corresponding passages in the following quote mine):

Mi señor don Quijote de la Mancha, que un tiempo se llamó «el Caballero de la Triste Figura» y ahora se llama «el Caballero de los Leones», es un hidalgo *muy atentado*, que sabe latín y romance *como un bachiller*, y en todo cuanto trata y aconseja procede *como muy buen soldado*, y tiene *todas las leyes y ordenanzas* de lo que llaman el duelo en la uña, y, así, *no hay más que hacer sino dejarse llevar por lo que él dijere*, y sobre mí si lo erraren... (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 940).

What is truly disastrous in this intervention, however, is not this praise (at least partly justified), but a completely incongruous anecdote that follows, and, even worse, Sancho's decision to imitate a donkey's braying, which leads villagers into thinking "que hacía burla de ellos" (II.27; Cervantes 2004: 940). This action, reinforcing Sancho's stupidity and "bestial nature", destroys not only the point of his (admittedly well-constructed) praise, but Don Quixote's preceding speech as well.

In the *grave eclesiástico* episode (II.31), Sancho's words are responsible for both its beginning and ending. Before the dinner, Don Quixote gives him explicit instructions to be more prudent and careful in his speech, so as to avoid a breach of social decorum:

Enfrena la lengua, considera y rumia las palabras antes que te salgan de la boca, y advierte que hemos llegado a parte donde con el favor de Dios y valor de mi brazo hemos de salir mejorados en tercio y quinto en fama y en hacienda. (II.31; Cervantes 2004: 965)

However, Sancho pays little heed to his master's advice, as he quickly annoys the audience with an anecdote from village life, making a complete fool of himself. The described reaction of everyone involved is that of ridicule and/or extreme embarrassment: "Púsose don Quijote de mil colores, que sobre lo moreno le jaspeaban y se le parecían; los señores disimularon la risa, porque don Quijote no acabase de correrse, habiendo entendido la malicia de Sancho" (II.31; Cervantes 2004: 969). And finally, it is Sancho's exclamation about Dulcinea ("¡Tan encantada está como mi padre!"; II.31; Cervantes 2004: 970), not any particular utterance of Don Quixote's, that causes the irate tirade of the sombre priest, making the squire's role in the whole debacle perhaps even greater than that of the master's.

The final significant interruption occurs in the episode of the feigned Arcadia (II.58), rendered in a manner similar to the one in the *aventura del rebuzno*: a great discourse of Don Quixote's ruined by the untimely and excessive praise on Sancho's part. The brief but poignant speech itself is in some ways similar to the celebrated Golden Age piece: the setting is mock-pastoral, the moral theme timeless, the delivery extemporaneous, and, most importantly, the entire harangue is an elaborate way of expressing Don Quixote's gratitude to his pastoral hosts. Sancho's reaction reveals his attention to the speech, his high opinion of his master's rhetorical skills, as well as his awareness of the *loco/cuerdo* paradox and the fact that Don Quixote's discourses often dispel the impression of his insanity:

Oyendo lo cual Sancho, que con grande atención le había estado escuchando, dando una gran voz dijo:

—¿Es posible que haya en el mundo personas que se atrevan a decir y a jurar que este mi señor es loco? Digan vuestras mercedes, señores pastores: ¿hay cura de aldea, por discreto y por estudiante que sea, que pueda decir lo que mi amo ha dicho, ni hay caballero andante, por más fama que tenga de valiente, que pueda ofrecer lo que mi amo aquí ha ofrecido? (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1206).

This intervention, however, draws quite a disproportionate retribution from Don Quixote, who, even that late in the novel, does not take kindly to speculations about his insanity:

Volvióse don Quijote a Sancho, y encendido el rostro y colérico, le dijo:

—¿Es posible, ¡oh Sancho!, que haya en todo el orbe alguna persona que diga que no eres tonto, aforado de lo mismo, con no sé qué ribetes de malicioso y de bellaco? ¿Quién te mete a ti en mis cosas y en averiguar si soy discreto o majadero? Calla y no me repliques... (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1206).

Sancho's intervention and Don Quixote's furious reaction collectively mar the impression of the speech and make the audience return to the question of the hidalgo's madness: "haciéndoles dudar si le podían tener por loco o por cuerdo" (II.58; Cervantes 2004: 1207). The squire, however justified in his praise, once again undermines the knight-errant's rhetoric.

Sancho's Use and Misuse of Rhetoric

This brief analysis of select examples of Sancho's rhetoric shows that the rhetorical trajectory of this character mirrors the development of the protagonist. Don Quixote goes from a one-note lunatic speaking in a flowery mock-archaic language to a much more complex character. Likewise, Sancho evolves from speaking in broken proverbs and malapropisms to a mimicking a wide variety of different discourses, including that of his master. Don Quixote's madness places him outside the confines of traditional rhetorical competence. Sancho – both through his simplicity, the equivalent of Don Quixote's madness, and his social standing – does not fit into conventional rhetorical roles, even that of a "wise fool". Sancho's words usually elicit a mixed reaction: laughter at his constant mangling of

discourses and tropes is mixed with *admiratio* at his unexpectedly lucid speeches, some of which rival the best of Don Quixote's in their eloquence.

Not limited to a rhetorical foil of the main character, Sancho as a speaker is created through mechanisms similar to Don Quixote's. The ups and downs of his rhetoric deliberately parallel those of the protagonist, but also have a distinct individual touch. While Monique Joly characterises Sancho's mode of a speech as an "antirhétorique" (Joly 1996: 292), it is more usefully described as a "personal" or "private" rhetoric. Its elements are diverse and manifold: snippets of folk wisdom, rustic ignorance of rhetorical decorum, passages from the sermons of a village priest, Don Quixote's chivalric ramblings. Transformed by Sancho's unique capacity of both imitation and garbling of his models, they serve to create an alternative rhetoric that lies outside of conventional rules and leads to both spectacular rhetorical failures and even more memorable successes. As a result, it is entirely possible to apply Foucault's image of Don Quixote as a creature composed entirely of snippets, quotes, and shards of different discourses to the hidalgo's companion.

Chivalric Rhetoricians

As has been noted in Chapter III, Don Quixote is essentially incapable of converting others to his chivalric "faith" through the use of rhetoric. The hidalgo's self-fashioning as a knight-errant, his persistent attempts to convince others of chivalric reality are invariably conducive to his defeat. At the same time, Don Quixote is at his most vulnerable when other characters wield his rhetorical weapons. The protagonist's own brand of chivalric

rhetoric, employed by others to have fun at his expense or lure him into some sort of trap, proves consistently and devastatingly effective.

Don Quixote's chivalric rhetoric is concentrated in its purest form at the very beginning of the novel, during the protagonist's first sally. As the action unfolds, the would-be knight-errant's speech becomes more varied and complex, and the emphasis in its chivalric form is shifted from a reliance on archaism to a reliance on apology (praise of chivalric values and/or the veracity of the romances). However, it is during the period of straightforward archaism that the protagonist manages to completely dominate all conversations with his chivalric rhetoric.

During the first sally, all conversations between Don Quixote and other characters are held in the "chivalric language", constantly spouted by the protagonist and imitated by others as a form of trickery. Paradoxically, this complete dominance of chivalric rhetoric, right from the very beginning of the book, reinforces Don Quixote's power as a rhetorician. For better or worse, he literally *changes the way that others speak*. As an orator of fictional chivalry, Don Quixote imposes the style and sound of antiquated purple prose on reality by causing many of his interlocutors to adopt "chivalric rhetoric" as a their principal form of expression.

The first example of a discourse by a character other than Don Quixote, and one of the most unusual examples of rhetoric in the novel, is that of the giant Caraculiambro. While the creature does not make an actual appearance, the protagonist imagines how the giant would speak when he engages it in battle and forced it to admit defeat by kneeling before the damsel and saying:

Yo, señora, soy el gigante Caraculiambro, señor de la ínsula Malindrania, a quien

venció en singular batalla el jamás como se debe alabado caballero don Quijote de la Mancha, el cual me mandó que me presentase ante la vuestra merced, para que la vuestra grandeza disponga de mí a su talante... (I.1; Cervantes 2004: 47)

Even before inventing Dulcinea and sallying out on his quest, Don Quixote has already made another character speak in the chivalric language, even if said character is his own invention. It is remarkable just how excited he is about this imaginary discourse: “¡Oh, cómo se holgó nuestro buen caballero cuando hubo hecho este discurso, y más cuando halló a quien dar nombre de su dama!” (I.1; Cervantes 2004: 47). With the giant’s speech, Don Quixote reproduces the Classical rhetorical exercise of imagining characters from myth or history speak: “The Speech in Character was a particular favourite, in which it was necessary to impersonate some well-known character in myth or history, and to speak as he would have spoken in some dire crisis or dilemma” (Bonner 1977: 253).

In the course of the first sally, this pattern of the protagonist enforcing his chivalric rhetoric on other characters is constantly repeated, this time with real people who adopt Don Quixote’s parlance of their own free will. Jill Syverson-Stork notes that, even though most dialogue in the first five chapters is rendered in indirect speech, the actual first words of each minor character are uttered in “chivalric archaism” (Syverson-Stork 1986: 22-26). The first words of the innkeeper and one of the prostitutes is an imitation Don Quixote’s *fabla*. Later, an unnamed travelling merchant, Juan Haldudo, and, at the end of the sally, Alonso Quijano’s neighbour Pedro Alonso all attempt to either adopt the protagonist’s mock-archaic grammar and vocabulary or work chivalric references into their speech. The mimicry of chivalric language by other characters could be seen as one of the first manifestations of heteroglossia in the novel:

In the first sally, Cervantes experiments with one form of dialogue: dialogue which is contrived by Don Quixote and derived from literary sources. The “libros de caballerías” and the “romances” provide Alonso Quijano with verbal masks behind which he begins to develop his alter ego, Don Quixote. His words – literary pronouncements – resound in his meetings with others. These words are eventually answered, or rather echoed, but his interlocutor’s response is not to dialogue with Don Quixote but to mimic or mock him. (Syverson-Stork 1986: 27)

Juan Haldudo also shows an awareness of the rules and language of the romances of chivalry. After Don Quixote forces him to release Andrés and swear an oath, the peasant starts speaking in the knight’s idiom to make his hollow promises more appealing and persuasive:⁵⁸

—No niego, hermano Andrés —respondió el labrador—, y hacedme placer de veniros conmigo, que yo juro por todas las órdenes que de caballerías hay en el mundo de pagaros, como tengo dicho, un real sobre otro, y aun sahumados... Venid acá, hijo mío, que os quiero pagar lo que os debo, como aquel desfacedor de agravios me dejó mandado (I.4; Cervantes 2004: 70-71).

This prolific use of chivalric archaism by other characters does not appear with the same intensity in other parts of the novel, employed more sparingly but to great effect by “chivalric impostors” with the intention of mocking Don Quixote and/or luring him back to the village.

Two female characters, Dorotea/Micomicona and Altisidora, exploit the chivalric cult of the damsel and invoke the myth of chivalric love to their own ends. Their speech is a double, perhaps even treble, exercise in imitation. While Don Quixote imitates the language of the romances as a part of his self-reinvention as a knight-errant, the feigned damsels imitate the

⁵⁸ In addition, when Don Quixote is no longer present, Juan Haldudo resumes his punishment of Andrés and uses “chivalric archaism” once more, this time in mocking jest: “Llamad, señor Andrés, ahora —decía el labrador— al *desfacedor de agravios*: veréis cómo no *desface a queste*; aunque creo que no está acabado de hacer, porque me viene gana de desollaros vivo, como vos *temíades*” (I.4; Cervantes 2004: 71-72; emphasis mine).

protagonist's imitation as a part of a specially prepared ruse with a rhetorical component. While "Micomicona" wants to lure Don Quixote out of the mountains with the promise of a heroic deed (I.29-30), "Altisidora" (II.44-57) feigns love for the knight-errant as part of an elaborate practical joke set up by the Duke and the Duchess. While speaking to Don Quixote, both "damsels" employ a mock-archaic version of the chivalric language – which, incidentally, the protagonist had curtailed his use of by the point of Altisidora's appearance, and almost completely abandoned by the middle of Part II.

When Micomicona is first about to speak, the narrator switches to *fabla* ("le fabló en esta guisa"; I.29; Cervantes 2004: 370), and her words are rendered in the same pseudoarchaic manner, emulating the style of Don Quixote's "chilvaric language":

—De aquí no me levantaré, ¡oh valeroso y esforzado caballero!, fasta que la vuestra bondad y cortesía me otorgue un don, el cual redundará en honra y prez de vuestra persona y en pro de la más desconsolada y agraviada doncella que el sol ha visto... (I.29; Cervantes 2004: 370)

Her style remains consistent, recreating the archetypal speech manner of an archetypal chivalric heroine and invoking all of the necessary tropes to make Don Quixote follow her bidding. In Part II, the ruse of the false damsel conversing in chivalric archaism is repeated on a larger scale with Altisidora, who uses mock-chivalric language to manipulate Don Quixote and reinforce the illusion created by the Duke and Duchess. Statements like this one encompass all the usual tropes of Don Quixote's own chivalric rhetoric: archaic or lofty words, *amplificatio*, and a deflating comic element that highlights the inner absurdity of the discourse:

—Todas estas malandanzas te suceden, empedernido caballero, por el pecado de tu dureza y pertinacia; y plega a Dios que se le olvide a Sancho tu escudero el azotarse, porque nunca salga de su encanto esta tan amada tuya Dulcinea, ni tú lo goces, ni llegues a tálamo con ella, a lo menos viviendo yo, que te adoro. (II.46; Cervantes 2004: 1095)

Altisidora's charade takes a considerable amount of time and effort, and until the very end (II.70) Don Quixote is convinced that her passion for him is genuine – and her use of chivalric language, also continuing up to the very end, plays an important part in the effectiveness of the illusion.

Sansón Carrasco is the character that uses chivalric rhetoric most efficiently. In his initial guise of the Knight of the Mirrors (II.12), he makes his appearance with a Petrarchist sonnet extolling the beauty of his cruel damsel, and presents himself as a knight-errant looking to prove and defend her sublime beauty. His initial words are a pitch-perfect pastiche of common Petrarchist and chivalric clichés, and a grotesque reflection of Don Quixote's own lamentations on Dulcinea:

—¡Oh la más hermosa y la más ingrata mujer del orbe! ¿Cómo que será posible, serenísima Casildea de Vandalia, que has de consentir que se consuma y acabe en continuas peregrinaciones y en ásperos y duros trabajos este tu cautivo caballero? ¿No basta ya que he hecho que te confiesen por la más hermosa del mundo todos los caballeros de Navarra, todos los leoneses, todos los tartesios, todos los castellanos y finalmente todos los caballeros de la Mancha? (II, 12; Cervantes 2004: 789)

This immediately allows him to draw Don Quixote's attention and maintain the charade by invoking chivalric themes in conversations with the protagonist (and even discussing the life of squire's with Sancho), all while subtly goading the protagonist into battle. As the first attempt to defeat Don Quixote by force of arms fails, Carrasco's second stint as a knight-errant (II. 44) is much shorter and to the point. He immediately challenges Don Quixote to a duel, all the while uttering the requisite chivalric verbiage and exploiting the theme of the most beautiful damsel, an extremely sensitive

topic for the protagonist:

—Insigne caballero y jamás como se debe alabado don Quijote de la Mancha, yo soy el Caballero de la Blanca Luna, cuyas inauditas hazañas quizá te le habrán traído a la memoria. Vengo a contender contigo y a probar la fuerza de tus brazos, en razón de hacerte conocer y confesar que mi dama, sea quien fuere, es sin comparación más hermosa que tu Dulcinea del Toboso: la cual verdad si tú la confiesas de llano en llano, escusarás tu muerte y el trabajo que yo he de tomar en dártela... (II. 44; Cervantes 2004: 1264-1265)

The mock-knight's words provoke *admiratio* in the listener: "Don Quijote quedó suspenso y atónito, así de la arrogancia del Caballero de la Blanca Luna como de la causa por que le desafiaba" (II.44; Cervantes 2004: 1265). It is thus possible that, by eschewing all subtlety in his chivalric pretence, the bachelor achieves a greater degree of rhetorical success (immediately provoking Don Quixote to a duel) to supplement his greater luck in battle. Overall, Sansón Carrasco's successful tenure as a rival knight-errant further demonstrates Don Quixote's unique vulnerability to his own chivalric discourse that literally becomes his undoing.

All of these examples illustrate the strange power of chivalric rhetoric in the novel. As we have noted before, Don Quixote's use of this tool is entirely fruitless. He cannot convince anyone to join his cause, struggles to justify his mock-chivalric way of life and behaviour, and generally only strengthens his image of either an irredeemable lunatic or an intelligent and well-meaning man hopelessly lost among knightly illusions. When other characters use the rhetoric of chivalry against the protagonist, Don Quixote never fails to grab the bait, accepting the charade offered to him at face value and following the lead of the character masquerading as a knight-errant or a an exiled princess. Paradoxically, chivalric rhetoric is effective only when the speaker is completely detached from its tropes and images

and uses them to mislead and deceive. Don Quixote, the only character earnestly believing in what he says as a chivalric speaker, consistently fails at his goal. However, by the very fact of engaging in chivalric rhetoric, they fulfil, in a very roundabout way, Don Quixote's quest to spread the influence of chivalry and uphold its ideals. Even in a play-pretend form, the language of chivalry becomes a fact of the real world thanks to Don Quixote's influence, further blurring the boundaries of traditional rhetorical decorum.

Marcela

Of all other episodic characters of *Don Quixote*, I have decided to elect Marcela for this analysis, given the particular status of her discourse in the novel. It immediately follows the protagonist's *razonamiento* on the Golden Age, and, given the pastoral setting of the discourse, can be seen as a direct follow-up (or perhaps even a counterpoint) to Don Quixote's. Among the speeches of minor characters, it represents perhaps the most clear-cut and classic example of *forensic rhetoric* in the entire work, especially given the mock-judicial atmosphere of the episode involving her. Marcela, as is known, is blamed for causing Grisóstomo's death and presents the discourse to defend herself from the accusation – meaning that her speech belongs to the discursive genre known in Roman law as the *apologia*, where the defendant presents arguments in his favour, using rhetoric and the force of conviction to exonerate himself from the charges. As a result, Marcela's speech merits a comparison not only with Don Quixote's Golden Age discourse but also with his forensic orations and chivalric apologies (which, although not used in settings that close enough to a real court, carry the same function of justifying his actions and defending his ideals and behaviour from unjust accusations). For example, Marcela's final self-praise describes

a way of isolated but virtuous life, subordinated to ideals of honesty, modesty, and self-sufficiency. While the existence described by the female orator is more of a contemplative sort (while Don Quixote's system of ideals emphasises action), there is still much common ground in both their ethics. Marcela's sequence of strung-together brief phrases even resembles Don Quixote's "professions of chivalric faith":

Si yo conservo mi limpieza con la compañía de los árboles, ¿por qué ha de querer que la pierda el que quiere que la tenga con los hombres? Yo, como sabéis, tengo riquezas propias, y no codicio las ajenas; tengo libre condición, y no gusto de sujetarme; ni quiero ni aborrezco a nadie; no engaño a este ni solicito aquel; ni burlo con uno ni me entretengo con el otro. La conversación honesta de las zagalas destas aldeas y el cuidado de mis cabras me entretiene. Tienen mis deseos por término estas montañas, y si de aquí salen es a contemplar la hermosura del cielo, pasos con que camina el alma a su morada primera. (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 169-170).

The critical fortunes of Marcela's discourse have been ambiguous. Mary's Mackey article (Mackey 1974) is a well-known and frequently studied juxtaposition of Marcela's discourse and Don Quixote's rhetoric (particularly the Golden Age speech) that presents the former in a much more favourable light than the latter. Marcela's strengths, according to the study, lie in a strict adherence to the rules of Classical rhetoric. Even though "Don Quijote's discourse and Marcela's defense are both steeped in the conventions of classical rhetoric" (Mackey 1974: 51), the protagonist abruptly shifts styles and rhetorical mode in his speech, rambles, and has no clear rhetorical point to make. Marcela's oration, on the other hand, is carefully structured, has a clearly defined goal (defend herself from the accusation), and all of the speaker's efforts are concentrated on reaching it. The speech is also devoid of Don Quixote's pervasive affectation and elaborate metaphors, representing a much more subdued rhetorical style heaving very closely to Classical models of clarity and brevity. In short,

Marcela's rhetoric is standard and successful, while Don Quixote's deviates from the standard and fails. This, in the researcher's opinion, reflects Cervantes' own acceptance of rhetorical precepts and makes Marcela a rhetorical counter-example to the protagonist (who is thus criticised by the author for his departure from rhetorical norms):

The difference between the knight's character and that of Marcela, as reflected in the rhetoric of the discourse and the defense, is a measure of Don Quijote's deviation, not only from the classical ideal of decorum and sanity, but from the norms and conventions of Spanish culture which Cervantes admired and supported. (Mackey 1974: 66)

Thomas R. Hart's and Steven Rendall's response to the cited article (Hart; Rendall 1976) paints a wholly different picture of the speech. While they acknowledge that Marcela's discourse is impeccably logical in its argumentation (Hart; Rendall 1976: 291) – unlike most speeches of Don Quixote's, where leaps of logic and “comic arguments” make frequent appearances – it still falls short of achieving the required result. In Hart's and Randall's view, Marcela's reliance on rationality is more of a weakness than a strength. She ignores the sentimental and emotional side of the affair and shows no sympathy for Grisóstomo or his friends while demanding that everybody else sympathise with her plight. By doing so, she is inadvertently self-represented as cold, aloof, and heartless – exactly the vices that she is accused of. This is the opposite of her intentions and her rhetorical objective, creating a situation that the researchers consider similar to Don Quixote's lapses of *aptum* (especially the one in the Golden Age discourse):

Marcela's speech is scarcely better adapted to her audience than Don Quijote's to his. The style she adopts is doubtless more appropriate for addressing the shepherds, at least those who, like Ambrosio and like Grisóstomo himself, are *pastores estudiantes*, than the style of Don Quijote's discourse is for his audience of uneducated *cabreros*. But she is surely mistaken in her assumption that she is addressing an audience which is prepared to respond primarily on rational grounds, an assumption which leads her to base

her attempts at persuasion almost exclusively on appeals to reason. (Hart; Rendall 1976: 292)

There is subtle but convincing textual evidence that Marcela's discourse fails in the very reason for its existence: clearing her name and refuting the accusation. Immediately after the speech, Marcela leaves the scene without even caring for the reaction of the audience or ascertaining whether her arguments are taken into account ("sin querer oír respuesta alguna, volvió las espaldas y se entró por lo más cerrado de un monte"; I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170). With threats of violence, Don Quixote stops anyone from following the woman ("so pena de caer en furiosa indignación mía"; I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170) and prevents any further exchange of arguments between Marcela and her audience. As a logical consequence, the inscription on Grisóstomo's gravestone claims that he "[m]urió a manos de rigor / de una esquiva hermosa ingrata" (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 171), presenting the ultimate proof that Marcela's spirited apology did exactly nothing to prove her innocence to the audience, and her alleged responsibility for Grisóstomo's death has been immortalised for all posterity.

This contradiction between Marcela's undoubted rhetorical skill and her failure to convince her audience is complemented by references to *admiratio* found throughout the episode. When Marcela appears on the stage, she immediately commands attention and admiration: "Los que hasta entonces no la habían visto la miraban con admiración y silencio, y los que ya estaban acostumbrados a verla no quedaron menos suspensos que los que nunca la habían visto" (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 166). After the speech, the reaction of the audience is also full of even deeper *admiratio*: "dejando admirados tanto de su discreción como de su hermosura a todos los que allí estaban" (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170).

This impression of surprise is deepened by Marcela's being as unlikely an orator as Don Quixote. As we have noted before, it is a common occurrence for the audience being surprised at the wise words of an unseemly and mentally unstable old man imagining himself as a knight. Marcela, as a woman, also has much working against her. Even without taking into account the judicial inequality between men and women, rhetoric is, in Classical and Renaissance thought, a singularly masculine virtue. The orator is a *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, and rhetorical manuals often describe illogical or overly flowery rhetoric as effeminate; the best female rhetoric is an absence thereof, that is, silence. The mere act of speaking up in her defence, let alone with such oratorical flair, is comparable to Don Quixote's ever-surprising mastery of the arts of eloquence. Marcela's female nature is essentially analogous to Don Quixote's madness: the ambiguous phrase "admirados tanto de su discreción como de su hermosura" resembles the usual formula accompanying Don Quixote's displays of eloquence, such as "admirados de sus disparates como del elegante modo que los contaba". There is no doubt that Marcela's stunning looks complement her powerful words; but her appearance can also be seen as a distraction similar to Don Quixote's unsightly visage and weird behaviour, and also a reminder of her womanhood. Overall, being a brilliant female rhetorician works more against Marcela than in her favour; as Matthew A. Wyszynski observes, "Marcela's rhetoric, along with her other "eccentric" behaviors, further classify her as a woman apart—for the modern reader in a positive way, but for Cervantes' contemporaries, this is an aberration worthy of censure" (Wyszynski 2010: 88).

Don Quixote's reaction to Marcela's speech is no less ambiguous than

that of pastoral listeners. He recognises the merits of her discourse and sees Marcela's apology as utterly convincing and sufficient to exonerate her from the charge: "Ella ha mostrado con claras y suficientes razones la poca o ninguna culpa que ha tenido en la muerte de Grisóstomo [...]; a cuya causa es justo que, en lugar de ser seguida y perseguida, sea honrada y estimada de todos los buenos del mundo..." (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170). On the other hand, the immediate motive for uttering this praise, as described by the narrator, speaks more of Don Quixote's chivalric madness than his rhetorical lucidity. When some of the shepherds attempt to pursue the leaving Marcela, they trigger the knight-errant's instinct of saving damsels in distress: "Lo cual visto por don Quijote, pareciéndole que allí venía bien usar de su caballería, socorriendo a las doncellas menesterosas, puesta la mano en el puño de su espada, en altas e inteligibles voces dijo..." (I.14; Cervantes 2004: 170). Whatever the exact reason for Don Quixote's praise of Marcela, rhetorical appreciation or chivalric automatism, he is definitely as moved by the speech as the rest of the audience, underscoring Marcela's power of causing *admiratio*.

Conclusions

This analysis of "other" rhetorics of *Don Quixote* reveals a pattern that both connects them to the protagonist's rhetorical style and sets them apart, perpetuating the tendencies inherent in Don Quixote's eloquence and, at the same time, presenting a possible answer to many of the protagonist's problems as a speaker. Like the insane hidalgo, the "other" speakers are unlikely wielders of rhetoric that cause *admiratio* in the ostensible audience (Sancho, Marcela, the mock-chivalric speakers when talking to Don

Quixote) and, quite possibly, the reader. There is always something inherently strange about the appearance and social status of the speakers, as well the circumstances, content, and style of their discourses. Even when the orators unwittingly (Sancho as governor) or consciously (Marcela) follow the structure, tropes, and style of mainstream rhetoric, there is always an idiosyncratic element that sets them apart or causes some type of *admiratio*, “positive” or “negative”.

Sancho has the “excuse” of his “simplicity”, which, being a cognate of Don Quixote’s madness, similarly removes from the confines of rhetorical orthodoxy and enables him to go in completely unforeseen directions. Most other characters are intelligent, cunning, or at least of sound mind; sometimes, like in the case of Bachelor Sansón Carrasco, they possess actual rhetorical training. Yet their speeches are often delivered in unusual circumstances or pursue outrageous goals (such as entrapping a deluded knight-errant or dispensing justice on a make-believe island), and rhetorical arts are forced to adapt to this changed landscape, stretching their limits and adopting unorthodox methods.

This is particularly evident in the case of chivalric speakers. Different attempts to defeat or entrap Don Quixote contain a glaring contradiction between intentions and results. To restore Alonso Quijano to sanity (and, therefore, his speech to normalcy), the mock-chivalric speakers do their utmost to recreate the *modus operandi* and speech patterns of stock characters commonly found in the romances (mysterious rival knight, damsel in distress, lovesick maiden, etc.). In their imitation of chivalric discourse, they follow the lead of Don Quixote, who stylises his speech to reflect the pseudo-archaic parlance of his favourite reading, and in doing so

proliferate the language of chivalry in mundane reality.

By shouldering the chivalric mantle, Alonso Quijano/Don Quixote profoundly upsets the existing rhetorical order. As a result, the defence of rhetorical orthodoxy leads to the expansion of most heterodox departures from the expected normalcy. Before the rhetorical influence of Don Quixote is finally contained, it must spread and expand, “contaminating” the speech of the characters and firmly establishing itself in the world of everyday reality. Thus the protagonist succeeds in his quest “by proxy”: even though none of Don Quixote’s rhetorical efforts can completely persuade his immediate audience, the very fact that others adopt the language of chivalry (or borrow Don Quixote’s speaking style in more conventional uses of rhetoric) reveals another layer of ambiguity in Cervantes’ handling of rhetoric.

*FINAL CONCLUSIONS:
RHETORIC, AMBIGUITY, AND THE NOVEL*

As we have demonstrated in multiple instances, Don Quixote's speeches, however brilliant some of them might be, always have their effectiveness and the validity of their ideas called into question. The famous contradiction between Don Quixote's words and his deeds creates a profound ambiguity both of the medium and the message of his discourses. Can his defence of essential human goodness, the longing for a bygone Golden Age, or peacekeeping intentions be accepted at face value when the speaker constantly engages in cranky adventures and commits inane acts (and later blames them on evil sorcery)? Moreover, does the personality of the speaker cast a shadow upon the message itself? Are chivalric ideals (such as defence of the oppressed, humility, etc.) worthless only because their only exponent in the novel is a middle-aged lunatic who consistently fails at his self-imposed chivalric duty? Does delegating a peroration on the importance of lineage, the virtues of *jus naturalis*, or the literary value of chivalric romances to an insane and often ridiculed character constitute a derision of these ideals? And, most importantly, if *Don Quixote* is a work of fiction, purportedly written by a mendacious Moor and translated from the Arabic, does it not make Don Quixote's speeches not "real", and thus not subject to the same rhetorical scruples and structures as discourses pronounced by a flesh-and-blood person in the real world?

Don Quixote's use and misuse of rhetoric generates these questions, but does not provide a straight answer to any of them. By any broad or strict definition of rhetoric, his discourses belong to this art, the art of organising discourse in an efficient manner that can influence the audience's feelings

and responses. The laws of commonplace rhetoric are firmly in place, and Don Quixote's speeches can and should be judged according to them. Cervantes gives bizarrely convincing speeches to an insane character and also provides abundantly clear indications of their flaws and logical reasons for their failure inside the novel. The Romanticised interpretation of Don Quixote as a misunderstood messiah preaching ultimate truths to a corrupt, arrogant, and indifferent audience fails to account for the manifold rhetorical errors committed by the protagonist over the course of his chivalric career. If his speeches are not effective, the blame falls, most of the time, squarely on the insane hidalgo. The rhetorical system set up by Classical and Renaissance theorists is still perfectly functional, and most faults of Don Quixote's discourses are perfectly explainable from a purely rhetorical standpoint.

However, *Don Quixote* is not a collection of discourses, much less a manual of rhetoric, and all of the protagonist's speeches exist in a fictional space. Even though they directly reference the governing rhetorical style and are structured to resemble a bona fide discourse (or a more specific speech genre, such as a sermon, legal discourse, or rhetorical exercise), they are not "proper" discourses, at least ones that can be judged by rhetorical laws alone. Regarding Cervantes' use of parodic sonnets in *Don Quixote*, Bakhtin remarks that "what results is not a sonnet, but rather the *image of a sonnet*" (Bakhtin 1981: 51). The same reasoning should be applied to Don Quixote's discourses. They serve as an *image of rhetoric*, recreating and representing the look, sound, and style of real-world eloquence without being a "true" example of the represented speech genre (be it a sermon, apology, epideictic description, or anything else). While Cervantes' parodic sonnets could be

printed in an anthology of Golden Age poetry, and some of Don Quixote's speeches could, in theory, grace a handbook of Spanish rhetoric, their existence is tied to the novel, and being a part of a larger entity sets them apart from "straight" genre examples and calls for a different toolset for their analysis.

Bakhtin argued that, in the Renaissance, "a new mode developed for working creatively with language: the creating artist began to look at language from the outside, with another's eyes, from the point of view of a potentially different language and style" (Bakhtin 1981: 60). I find that this accurately represents the treatment of rhetoric in *Don Quixote*. The protagonist's madness allows common rhetorical tropes to be defamiliarised and reinvented, deprived of the normalcy that would accompany the use of rhetoric in everyday reality. Of course, Don Quixote is not the best representative of rhetoric, and his madness precludes him from using the arts of eloquence "correctly". At the same time, his insanity allows him to misuse rhetoric in new, unexpected, and creative ways. His misuse is, as our analysis has demonstrated, neither random nor nonsensical. The constants of Don Quixote's detours from rhetorical rules include an emphasis on improvisation and spontaneity over planning, self-restraint, and prudence, as well as a persistent failure to adapt his discourse to his audience. Another recurring trait is the introduction of "deflating" elements, such as incongruous chivalric references that do not mesh well with the rest of the speech, or ridiculous circumstances for its delivery. In this way, rhetoric is removed from the normal flow of its functioning, saddled with unusual elements, and presented in a wholly different light, denuding the entire system of rhetorical discourse and allowing its fundamentals to be examined

and questioned rather than being taken for granted. To quote David D. Presberg,

[i]t is hardly incidental to Cervantes' fiction, I believe, that the discourse, rhetoric, and poetic of *Don Quixote* should praise the "folly" of how we use discourse to fashion a life that is specifically human. (Presberg 2001: 235)

In the preface, we cited Bakhtin's definition of *Don Quixote* as a work located "midway between the two extremes" of "crude parody" and "romantic irony" (Bakhtin 1981: 412), understood as self-identification with the object of parody. While Bakhtin introduces this concept while discussing the parody of chivalric romances in the novel, I find it directly applicable to Cervantes' treatment of rhetoric. His knight-errant leaves the most persistent mark upon the world through his words – which is, if nothing else, a celebration of rhetoric and its power. By blundering through rhetorical rules, Don Quixote demonstrates, through counter-example, the necessity of their existence. At the same time, his memorable, if not entirely "correct" discourses (aided and amplified by Sancho's makeshift but impactful rhetorical style) subvert this power, or, at the very least, question its absolute character. As argued by Mary Mackey:

In the world of Cervantes' novel, aberrations of style reveal corresponding aberrations of intellect. On the level of characterization, Don Quijote's inappropriate indulgence in rhetorical ornament displays both his insensitivity to the requirements of his audience, and his own erratic judgment. At the same time, his violation of oratorical decorum and his abuse of embellishment raise the general question of the importance and validity of elaborate stylistic devices. (Mackey 1974: 63)

While postulating Cervantes' preoccupation with the art of eloquence, Mackey connects the author of *Don Quixote* with a general trend in late 16th-century rhetorical thought directed against affectation and pomposity and promoting a clearer, uncluttered rhetorical style (Mackey 1974: 63-65).

While it is plausible that contemporary rhetorical debates were reflected in *Don Quixote*, I deem it nearly impossible to connect Cervantes directly to a specific school of thought within Humanist circles, given that his writing transcends purely polemical goals. What is truly relevant in this interpretation is the dualistic attitude of Cervantes towards rhetoric reflected in the novel. Rather than being a vehicle for rhetoric-related debate, Cervantes' novel is an examination of rhetorical discourse in general. While he may insist that “toda afectación es mala”, there are more than enough examples of joyously exuberant oratory whose excess does not detract from its power.

Such contradictions and paradoxes as this are the essence of Cervantes' treatment of rhetoric in the novel, or, more precisely, of the way it functions whenever the protagonist is involved. Rhetoric, to Cervantes, is *a* discourse, not *the* discourse. It is a field of experiment, not an object of reverence, even if its power is explicitly recognised. Different modes of rhetoric are contrasted with each other and joined together in eclectic ways. Don Quixote speaks of Amadís and Caesar with the similar esteem, uses Ciceronian argumentation to defend the truth of the romances, and preaches peace and forgiveness while threatening his audience with violence.

This paradox of using/misusing rhetoric is functionally similar to the famed *loco/cuerdo* ambiguity, but is not completely isomorphic to it. Don Quixote's words seldom reach the inanity of his actions. He never lapses into outright gibberish or completely insane diatribes, always maintaining a sense of logic (however warped), organisation (however strange), and decorum (however misunderstood). While fighting windmills, sheep, or winesacks is a patently evident act of insanity that calls for no sympathy and

understanding, praising chivalric romances and ideals commonly associated with chivalry almost always has at least a shred of reason presented in a rhetorically convincing form. Through Don Quixote's rhetorical power, the reader is forced to consider far-fetched propositions based around the existence of knights-errant, sorcerers, and giants. He is also forced to reconsider his ready-made opinions on justice, morals, ethics, good governance, and other subjects, because beautifully expressed and strangely convincing opinions of a madman cast a shadow of insanity on them.

While Don Quixote generally stays in the confines of Classical and Renaissance rhetoric, his madness serves to highlight the problems and limitations of rhetorical conventions, as well as allowing irregular and novel ways of constructing discourses and assessing reality. According to Carla Mazzio, "departures from rhetorical competence, in both sacred and secular contexts, could be seen as enabling new forms of thinking, feeling, and acting" (Mazzio 1999: 2). While Don Quixote is much more articulate than love-sick youths, madmen, or marginalized characters of Elizabethan drama that Mazzio's study deals with (at the very least, he does not communicate in sighs, mumbles, and non sequiturs), this idea opens new ways in interpreting Don Quixote's relationship to rhetoric and crisis of the Renaissance. Later Mazzio mentions "alternative forms of perception, expression, and agency that were occasioned by departure from verbal coherence and efficacy" (Mazzio 2009: 256).

This statement, in my opinion, is directly applicable to Don Quixote's use and misuse of rhetoric. The character's sins against rhetorical regulations are many, and would have been inexcusable for a real-world speaker. However, the vehicle of fiction allows for discourse that both transgresses

the expected norms and is yet strangely respectful of them. Don Quixote is unmistakably mad and his speech is definitely off the norm, but his discourse is coherent enough to be understandable, even sometimes convincing, and strange enough to present familiar truths in an unfamiliar way. As noted before, Don Quixote is heavily attracted to the commonplace, and the themes and tropes of his discourses are those that have been employed many times before. However, as an author-certified lunatic, he is not constrained by rationality or traditional decorum, allowing his creativity, imagination, and inventiveness to run free while still not crossing over into stereotypical insane gibberish. This allows Don Quixote to present a perspective on commonplace matters that, however weird and initially alienating it might be, compels his audience within the novel (and the reader) to consider it, as well as rethink their own *idées reçues*. The complex dialectics of the debate in I.49-50 is a good example. Even though much of Don Quixote's argumentation is faulty, his spirited handling of an impossible rhetorical challenge (proving the worth of chivalric romances to their fierce critic) leaves the Canon baffled and shaken, and presents genuinely compelling arguments in favour of the romances (even if Cervantes' attitude is clearly quite different from that of his hero).

The literary device of madness also gives Cervantes free rein to imbue Don Quixote with knowledge of vastly divergent types of rhetoric, from the mock-chivalric style of the romances to different specialised forms of Renaissance eloquence. This represents a special case of what Bakhtin defined as heteroglossia:

Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the novel (whatever the forms for its incorporation), is *another's speech in another's language*, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech constitutes a special type of *double-voiced*

discourse. It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. (Bakhtin 1981: 324).

In *Don Quixote*, instead of being delegated to and embodied by different characters, varied forms of discourse are combined in the protagonist's unique mode of speech. Don Quixote uses and misuses rhetorical discourses that are not his own, that have been employed countless times before. However, through this use/misuse, he transforms familiar discursive forms and overused tropes into a new form of language. A strong and pervasive trend in *Don Quixote* is the appropriation and individualisation of discourse. The protagonist absorbs the mock-archaic language of chivalric romances, as well as countless well-worn rhetorical tropes, formulae, and themes. In the crucible of his warped mind, these discourses, while still identifiable as being a part of a tradition and retaining their archetypal nature, acquire a whole new dimension of meaning and interpretation. Don Quixote follows ready-made discursive models, paying homage to both Cicero and Amadís, reproducing the language of a sermon, legal plea, or courtly conversation, but the richness and suggestive power of his rhetoric are greater than the sum of its parts.

Consider the following passage description of Dulcinea:

[S]u hermosura, sobrehumana, pues en ella se vienen a hacer verdaderos todos los imposibles y quiméricos atributos de belleza que los poetas dan a sus damas: que sus cabellos son oro, su frente campos elíseos, sus cejas arcos del cielo, sus ojos soles, sus mejillas rosas, sus labios corales, perlas sus dientes, alabastro su cuello, mármol su pecho, marfil sus manos, su blancura nieve... (I.13; Cervantes 2004: 155)

This catalogue of tired Petrarchist tropes, all gathered in one place and dedicated to a fictional damsel based on a more than homely peasant woman, can be easily interpreted as Cervantes' satire of Golden Age

amatory poetry. However, what truly merits attention here is Don Quixote's attitude to these clichés. The knight-errant himself dismisses them as "imposibles y quiméricos", yet he accepts that, if applied to Dulcinea, these hackneyed poetic ornaments suddenly become truthful ("se vienen a hacer verdaderos"). The Dulcinea's alleged existence – or, more precisely, Don Quixote belief in it – is what makes rhetorical commonplaces fresh again. The same could be said about many other tropes and themes of Renaissance (and Classical) eloquence used in Don Quixote's discourses. When tried-and-true discursive forms come into contact with the protagonist's boundless fantasy, they are reinvented, reinterpreted, and reinvigorated as the protagonist's mind transfigures what seemed trite, generic, and featureless into something deeply personal and highly original.

Likewise, Don Quixote's squire twists and moulds garbled versions of his master's chivalric parlance, tidbits of ecclesiastic rhetoric borrowed from the local parish priest, and bastardised folk proverbs into his own unique rhapsody of rhetoric. It coincides with the rhetorical of treatises and manuals only sporadically, but, in spite of its chaotic and unpolished nature, turns into an effective vehicle for Sancho's thoughts, often earning him the praise of his master and the attention of the reader. The misuse of rhetoric, while undeniably related to Don Quixote's madness, thus becomes more than a personal quirk or a straightforward comic device. Rhetorical anomalies, as shown in Chapter IV, spread to other characters and strongly affect the perception of rhetorical discourse by the reader. Definitely not in the way he envisaged, Don Quixote inspires other characters to adopt new identities as chivalric characters and a new mock-chivalric method of speaking – which also ceases to be strictly Don Quixote's and becomes their own. As the

protagonist “contaminates” other characters with his misuse of rhetoric, traditional notions of rhetorical propriety and decorum lose their hold on their speech, or are at least no longer seen as integral components of a discourse. What is usually taken for granted in the art of rhetoric becomes problematic and polemical in *Don Quixote*.

Russian Cervantist Svetlana Piskunova, also a scholar of Bakhtin's influence on literary theory, postulates that Early Modern literature is marked by a struggle between an “authoritarian” spirit of the “rhetorical norm”, coercing the author to “imitate the ancients” and endlessly reproduce rhetorical topoi and clichés, and a “spirit of freedom”, characterised by *ingenium*-driven creativity, inventiveness, and expansion of the literary domain to include “the entire variety of everyday contemporary reality” (Piskunova 2006: 306). The works of Cervantes, she argues, are “at the centre” of this struggle, and one of the locations where “fault lines” between rhetorical poetics and the poetics of the novel lie are Don Quixote's discourses and the reactions of his audience. While Don Quixote's use and misuse of rhetoric is not necessarily “liberatory”, “progressist”, or “subversive” in any political or philosophical sense, what is compelling about this interpretation is its emphasis on a special role of rhetoric in Cervantes' novel. A work both “old” and “new”, *Don Quixote* is both engendered by rhetoric and resents its influence. The way the insane protagonist uses and misuses it deprives rhetoric of absolute discursive monopoly, creating a complex, layered model of novelistic discourse far ahead of its time.

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