

# Am I going mad?

## Adverse meditation events and the anthropology of ethics

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[At first] I started seeing lights in my practice ... and having very interesting shifts in my consciousness ... Then I started having periods of time when I didn't recognize [things] ... Like when you go away on a vacation and you come back and see things with fresh eyes, everything was strangely unfamiliar ... [I had] shifts in my sense of self too: I didn't recognize myself in pictures or in the mirror ... [Then later] I had a complete dissolution of everything. My sense of self, my body ... any kind of value system whatsoever ... I became completely disabled, dysfunctional. I lost 30 pounds. I spent the next year in bed and going to doctors ... I was incapacitated. The first year I couldn't even leave my house. The second two [years] ... I didn't have any sense of self. People would use my name and I wouldn't recognize it. – Mary.

Over the past several decades, mindfulness meditation has acquired credibility in science and society as a practice with distinct benefits for health, mental capital and human well-being. For some, however, meditation (sometimes mindfulness-based, sometimes other forms) may open the door to a wide variety of uncommon and unsettling experiences. Mary represents one instance of that: near-total dysfunction, in her view.<sup>1</sup> But hers is just one example of a range of strange and adverse experiences reported by some meditators, including hallucinations, disturbing emotions and alterations in senses of self, time, space, embodiment, agency and more besides.

Some call them 'meditation-induced adversities', though other terms have also been offered: 'nonordinary states of consciousness', 'unwanted effects' and 'meditation-related challenges' (Cebolla et al. 2017; Lindahl et al. 2017; VanderKooi 1997). Regardless of what one calls them, they can represent a shameful secret within contemplative communities and one for which practitioners are seldom prepared.

In recent years, there has been growing interest in meditation adversities amongst mindfulness communities. This article documents some of these issues for several 'meditators-in-distress' I met during the mid-2010s while researching mindfulness in the US. In highlighting stories of meditation adversity, I also note forms of secondary distress that sometimes emerged alongside those initial adversities and which arose from perceiving incoherence in the eclectic resources supporting meditation practice.<sup>2</sup> This potential for perceived incoherence prompts a question for the anthropology of ethics: how do we consider ethical self-cultivation practices when the traditions supporting them appear to fail? I conclude that attending to that question requires further research on how moral bricolage can help make incoherent eclectic traditions morally productive.

### Cheetah House

I first met Mary in 2014. An American meditation practitioner in her late thirties, she had been practising in the Buddhist tradition since the mid-1990s. I was introduced to her at Cheetah House, a non-profit organization in Providence, Rhode Island, whose mission is to conduct research, raise awareness and support 'meditators-in-distress'. Located a short walk from Brown University, Cheetah House was founded in 2008 by the Director of the Clinical and Affective Neuroscience Laboratory at Brown, Willoughby Britton. Britton, along with her now-husband, religious studies scholar and co-director of the lab Jared Lindahl, also led, from 2011, the Varieties of Contemplative Experience (VCE) research programme at Brown studying 'meditation-related challenges', as they

called them. I visited Cheetah House in the summer of 2014 to better understand the work done there.

'We have the largest data pool in the world on adverse effects of meditation', Britton tells me when I first arrive, 'and we're noticing some common themes ... depersonalization, re-experiencing traumatic memories, uncontrollable bodily twitches, things like that ... we're even getting reports of people trying to kill themselves... building support for that is my number one priority.' Research is one way they assist: documenting meditation adversities to normalize (and thereby destigmatize) them and to understand their mechanisms better, how they are interpreted and how they might be managed or resolved. The other way is through Cheetah House itself: initially a residential space for Brown students interested in contemplative lifestyles, it increasingly served, until 2013, as a place for meditators going through difficulties to live with, talk to and get advice from others like themselves (as well as from Dr Britton). Since 2013, Cheetah House has moved away from residential services to support its community online through its research activities and other forms of group support, consultations and referrals. Today it functions as a non-profit information hub and international support network for meditators-in-distress. Mary is just one of many people, apparently harmed by meditation, who has found help through the work of Cheetah House.

For those with an appreciation of the history of contemplative practices, the fact that meditation may harm rather than help is perhaps not surprising. Meditation adversities have been a consistent, if somewhat understated, theme in classic and clinical literature on contemplative practices. Since the 1970s, for instance, several studies looking at meditation safety have argued that meditation may contribute to a range of mental health problems, including anxiety, depression, mania, psychosis, traumatic memories and voice-hearing, to name a few notable issues (Anderson



Fig. 1. Cheetah House.

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**Fig. 2.** Mindfulness techniques are by no means free of danger. Here, Evil Mara is portrayed as tempting and menacing to prevent the Buddha-to-be from attaining Enlightenment. From a wall painting at a Burmese monastery in Penang, Malaysia. To the left is earth goddess Vasundhara wringing from her hair the protective water shed at the water libation ceremonies at the end of each meritorious deed the Buddha-to-be performed in past lives.

**Fig. 3.** St John of the Cross. His concept of the 'dark night of the soul' has become a popular metaphor for meditation adversities, while also serving to frame them as something to be expected and overcome.

et al. 2019; Cebolla et al. 2017; Lomas et al. 2015; Sharma et al. 2019).

Complementing the clinical literature, moreover, are classic accounts highlighting a more enigmatic, and sometimes disquieting, set of anomalies within various Buddhist traditions: moments of terror, misery and disgust as a result of cultivating the Theravada 'insight knowledges' (*vipassanā-ñāṇas*), prolonged forms of meditation sickness (*chanbing*) or 'disturbing conditions' and 'side effects' (*makyō*, trans. 'devil's realm' or 'realm of illusion') stemming from certain Zen practices, and various amplifications of thought, emotion and perception that fall under the category of *nyams* in the Tibetan tradition, and which may be appraised as either blissful or distressing (Anālayo 2019; Compson 2018; Lindahl et al. 2017; 2021; Sharf 2015; Vörös 2016).<sup>3</sup> Though each category here (except possibly for *chanbing*) would not necessarily be considered adverse in itself – more a standard and perhaps inevitable part of the practice – such experiences nevertheless could be seen as providing a challenge or difficulty for the meditator on the path of enlightenment.

As Lutkajtis notes (2019: 1), one recent metaphor for capturing these events has been that of the 'dark night of the soul', a phrase taken from the Christian mystic St John of the Cross (1542-1591), who used it to describe a sense of abandonment or alienation from God amongst those seeking communion with Him. St John's phrase, she notes, has become a poignant metaphor for the struggles one might encounter on the path to spiritual transformation. Especially in the American Theravada tradition under Jack Kornfield's influence, it refers to the sufferings associated with the Theravada insight knowledges. Since Kornfield's adoption, however, its meaning has extended, operating as a general term for meditation challenges, one peculiar not just to Buddhism but to other contemplative traditions as well (cf. Fisher 2021). Some meditators find this an unfortunate conflation since it can serve to label meditation adversities as something to be expected and overcome on the path of moral or spiritual development, thereby glossing over the possibility that these are more than temporary obstacles and may represent unique forms of meditation-induced distresses or even incitements of psychopathology.

### Secondary distress

Speaking with Mary about her challenges back in 2014, what interested me, anthropologically speaking, was not just the initial adversity, but a secondary problem she experienced, one that likely would not have been an issue



for St John. This is because Mary also went through a prolonged period of conceptual uncertainty due to unsettling meditation events and an ongoing confusion resulting from being caught between frameworks of understanding.<sup>4</sup>

It was an awful time ... I went to many teachers and got a whole bunch of advice ... [But] the supposed experts didn't know what was going on ... I spoke with [a well-known and well-respected meditation teacher]. He said it was a sign of my mind becoming more concentrated and that I should do some serious retreat time ... I went to a psychic ... I got acupuncture twice a week ... I went to Tibetan doctors, as some said it was an energetic disturbance; that all my energy is flowing into my head ... I did everything the teachers told me to do ... nothing helped ... That went on for about three years ... Meanwhile I was like: what the hell is true, which worldview is true?... So, in addition to being completely scared and dysfunctional I didn't know what belief system to take on.

This form of secondary distress is well known to Lindahl and Britton. '[T]here are multiple, and sometimes conflicting, interpretative frameworks at play for Western Buddhist meditators', they and their colleagues wrote sev-



1. I pseudonymize participants in this article, except for researchers Willoughby Britton and Jared Lindahl, whose names are used with permission.

2. I borrow the term 'meditators-in-distress' from the Cheetah House website, where it is used to describe those going through meditation adversities (<https://www.cheetahhouse.org/>).

3. Since the discourse on meditation 'challenges' cuts across times and places, there are various languages used to name them, including Pali, Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan, as is respectively the case here.

4. Arguably, St John would have had his own conceptual uncertainties, though they would no doubt be of a historically different kind to Mary's.

5. Eclecticism is not peculiar to American Buddhism. Insofar as contemplative traditions are plural and shaped by multiple historical influences, eclecticism, to some degree, is no doubt a feature of Buddhist and non-Buddhist contemplative practices, both in the US and elsewhere. What is of interest here is less the eclecticism itself, however, and more what happens when practitioners become aware of that eclecticism, especially when it is perceived as incoherent and therefore unhelpful for navigating meditation experiences.

eral years later when publishing the results of their study looking at the phenomenological changes and influencing factors for meditation adversities (Lindahl et al. 2017: 25). Insofar as these frameworks appear to conflict, they provide incoherent messages and strategies for coping with meditation adversities. Hence, the need for research like theirs, which hopes to better understand the mechanisms of meditation to develop more targeted diagnoses and interventions in the future (Lindahl et al. 2020). 'Not all practices are good for everyone', Britton tells me on this point. 'The Buddha probably thought that too. There are lots of Buddhist forms of personalized meditation. If you're that kind of person, then do this ... there might be good things these practices can do, but a mature approach is to know the benefits and limits and practice with that, rather than with an excessive faith in these practices.'

Britton and Lindahl's work highlights something crucial on this point. Meditation practices, it is commonly recognized, are transformative. They are not just about raising well-being levels but can also alter the human sensorium in profound ways: modifying senses of self, time, space, embodiment, agency, perception, emotions, reasoning, ethical dispositions and more besides. Indeed, in many ways, that is their point: to encourage a transformation in one's way of being in the world. Such modifications, however, may present themselves as anomalous or as a source of degrees of challenge and adversity for some meditators. And for those trying to seek help to understand those experiences, there is additional distress about whether their experiences are to be endured or to be worried about, inspiring questions like: 'What's going on here?' 'Who's telling the truth?' and 'Is this normal or is there something wrong with me?' That was one problem for Mary. It was also a problem for another meditator I met, Aaron.

Aaron was a 35-year-old American mindfulness practitioner I encountered at a local Shambhala meditation group in Chicago in late 2014, who had turned to meditation out of curiosity after hearing about the positive benefits of it in the media. During an interview, he explained his encounter with adversity to me:

I hadn't been doing mindfulness for very long. About 30 minutes each day, over a few months. Then, after a while, I started to get these strange moods ... Just this odd feeling of things not quite seeming right ... The best I can describe it is ... I guess it feels like what I'd imagine it's like to know you're just about to die ... I'd guess in that moment nothing much matters apart from your own existence, everything else sort of disappearing into irrelevancy ... That's what it was like for me: just hyper awareness of myself, and of my place in the universe, and nothing else really but a kind of bleak emptiness ... Strangely, it kept coming up, whether I wanted it to or not, and with increasing frequency. And after a while I started to wonder: am I going mad?

Unlike Mary, who had a decade of experience with meditation by the time she went through her adversities, Aaron was a beginning meditator, with much less practice under his belt. Also, unlike Mary, who, due to her facility with meditation, knew of different authorities she might turn to on the matter, Aaron had few sources of advice.

Part of the problem for me came from trying to integrate those experiences into my life. I didn't have a teacher, or any friends who practised meditation to learn from. I didn't belong to a religion ... I was just doing it at home based upon videos I saw online and through a meditation app ... I had no framework or context or community for the experiences I was having. I did try to tell a few friends about it, but it's hard when you can't find the right words to describe it ... I thought I was the only one having this experience.

### Eclectic traditions

It could be easy, at this point, to conflate the hermeneutic problem with the meditation problem by saying

that suffering comes from having a lack of conceptual frameworks for processing meditation events. Indeed, Jane Compson (2018: 1364) argued such a view. '[M]editation experiences', she writes, 'become problematic when there is no framework for working through difficult material or when the frameworks being offered to the meditator are so unfamiliar to them that they are not helpful in making meaning.' It is a strong claim. But it is also too strong. As Britton and Lindahl's research shows, many factors may influence meditation adversities: not just hermeneutic frameworks, but also prior psychiatric history; drug use; personality type; sleep and food deprivation; quality of instruction or teacher; and, crucially, *meditation itself* (Lindahl et al. 2017: 22). To blame only interpretation, or other personal factors such as prior psychiatric history, sleep deprivation and so on, not only overlooks that meditation is an important causal factor but could also lead to victim-blaming that locates the source of adversity in the practitioner instead of the practice. Britton and Lindahl note how they take this into account in their studies. 'Most of our sample', Britton tells me, 'doesn't have any identifiable red flags or history with psychiatric problems ... and they still ran into difficulties. Serious meditation experience can bring that about.'

From this perspective, hermeneutic frameworks are one of many influencing factors, then, but, in the post-adversity moment, may combine to produce a kind of secondary distress, in the form of confusion, existential questioning or a sense of loss as the tradition fails the practitioner: that is, as the practice goes counter to expectations (sometimes powerfully and intractably so). It is also here where the problem lies for the anthropology of ethics, for both the practice and the tradition can fail meditators seeking moral development in this way.

Many contemplatives I have spoken to could be said to exist within what one might call an 'eclectic tradition'. By this I mean a tradition made up of numerous bits and pieces of widely different traditions: in this case, the various branches of Buddhism itself (the multiple subdivisions of Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana and Zen), non-Buddhist contemplative traditions (Christian mysticism, New Age spirituality, contemplative prayer, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics), as well as modern psychological practices such as psychotherapy, the behavioural sciences and Western psychedelia.<sup>5</sup>

One might call this a 'spiritual marketplace'. However, following the anthropologist Anand Pandian, we could call it more constructively a 'tradition in fragments': the various inheritances influencing meditation represent a tradition insofar as they provide multiple 'ways of addressing the problem of how one ought to live' (2008: 471). As Pandian explains, 'traditions need not retain or attain coherence to survive and remain effective', for 'fragmentary forms ... may ... serve as effective orientations for an ethical life' (ibid.: 470, 466). 'Taken together, these remnants compose an irregular mosaic of moral possibility', 'a plurality of narrative forms ... [which] endow their subjects with diverse means of engaging themselves critically' (ibid.: 472, 467).

Fragmentary traditions for Pandian represent a rich set of practical and hermeneutic resources for existential, ethical and spiritual explorations and moral growth. However, for meditators-in-distress, fragmentation may add a further challenge and confusion to an already unbearable time.

'If you read descriptions of Christian and Buddhist hells, that maybe comes close to what it was like for me.' It was early 2014, and I spoke with Dom, an American meditation practitioner in his mid-thirties at a Shambhala meditation group in Boulder, Colorado. Dom had been

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**Fig. 4 (right).** A miscellany of spiritual material culture sold in a local bookstore, including moon spell books, gemstone key rings (quartz, amethyst) for crystal healing, mindfulness instruction manuals, journals and relaxation aids (coffee/teacups). Taken collectively, they illustrate either a spiritual marketplace or an eclectic tradition.

**Fig. 5 (below).** Illustration of Christian hell by Herrad of Landsberg (1125-1195) from Hortus deliciarum (garden of delights), the illuminated encyclopaedia aimed as a tool for young novices at the convent, 1185. Along with Fig. 6, it illustrates the different frameworks meditators may rely upon when trying to understand meditation adversities.



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Sincere thanks go to Willoughby Britton and Jared Lindahl, who provided not only help during fieldwork, but also in-depth comments that shaped the article in its current form. Thanks also go to the reviewers of the article, and Joanna Cook, Julia Cassaniti and Gustaaf Houtman, for putting together this special issue.

interested in various spiritual practices since his teenage years. He narrated experiences that had started for him about ten years earlier, after a meditation practice led to what he called a ‘death experience’.

It was horrible. Supremely painful... The experience, was not unlike the descriptions of dying, especially those stories about

painful afterlives ... It really was a hellish experience ... there was an eternal gnashing and tearing to pieces and then being put back together ... like descriptions of hell ... swallowing molten lava ... and an endlessness of this cycle ... and an absolute aloneness ... the effects of that impacted me dramatically for the next several years ... The first two years were spent in an acute state of shock. PTSD really. I went mute and lost 40 pounds ... And I was left alone to integrate it all over the next several years ... It was like an explosion which revealed certain aspects ... but there was no view or map to hold it. The impact of it and reverberations lasted for years ... it made a terrible event much worse.

As with Mary and Aaron, Dom recognized himself as lacking a coherent framework for navigating his meditation adversity and it served to add to the torment of it all in his view.

### The anthropology of virtue

Stories like Dom’s (or Mary’s or Aaron’s) pose a challenge for the anthropology of ethics. This is because there is a common assumption in the field that traditions ground ethical practice. The idea stems from the influence of Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) and continues through the works of anthropologists like Talal Asad (2009), Saba Mahmood (2005), Charles Hirschkind (2006), Anand Pandian (2008) and others (cf. McKay 2016). As MacIntyre (2007) puts it, traditions provide the ‘moral particulars’ and coherence needed to give ethical practices their content and, taken collectively, they enable practitioners to achieve the goods said to be essential to the practice and tradition. Asad (2009) refers to these as ‘discursive traditions’: that is, authoritative, historically situated, epistemic and moral frameworks that provide the context in which ethical practices acquire their meaning and performance standards. Moreover, Pandian argues that traditions can be fragmented and incoherent and still provide an orienting framework for ethical conduct.

We cannot dismiss the point that traditions, even if fragmented, ground ethical practice. Nevertheless, the above stories suggest that ethical traditions do not always ensure moral development or deliver their putative goods. Sometimes, they go in the opposite direction: inducing profound disablement and deep conceptual confusion. The anthropology of ethics does not have a strong language for talking about these moments of intractable failure, nor



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**Fig. 6.** Tibetan Thangka depicting Yama, the Lord of Death, holding the Wheel of Life. Hell realm located in the bottom section.

does it suggest how ethical practice might be possible in such cases.

One possible exception to this is the anthropologist Alireza Doostdar (2019), who has recently talked about failures of ethical practice within a tradition in an article discussing Islamic occultists in Iran. Doostdar notes how some occultists can fail to realize the goods said to belong to their tradition (e.g. esoteric insight, closeness to God, etc.) due to not fully embodying occult practice. Such a view he calls *participating*, rather than *practising*, and it involves making a distinction between those who embrace the teleology of the tradition and those who merely borrow, ad hoc, from occultism in order to serve their own pragmatic ends.

That looks to be the case for certain Islamic occultists. However, it would not be correct to say that Mary, Aaron and Dom were merely participating in their tradition, and that is why they were unable to obtain the goods said to be part of meditative practice. By all appearances, they were as committed as anyone. To argue otherwise would be to continue the victim-blaming often directed at meditators-in-distress for the apparent failure of their practice. Instead, their meditation practice unleashed an anomalous and adverse phenomenon that problematized any hope of acquiring the goods said to belong to a Buddhist tradition.

Meditators-in-distress have several options in such instances. As often advised, they can keep practising, hoping that their original expectations will be fulfilled eventually. All the meditators-in-distress quoted here tried this to some degree, but with little luck. Indeed, Mary was clear on this point:

It didn't even occur to me that mindfulness couldn't cure everything. I just thought if I just sit with it and fully accept this terror that will be OK ... I was so brainwashed that mindfulness could do anything. So for me the real waking up process has been to see that's not true.

They could also stop practising and seek medical help. That, however, would mean abandoning, as they saw it, any hope for a moral or spiritual path to orient their lives. Alternatively, they could embrace the eclecticism around them and practise as a kind of moral bricoleur. Though, indeed, many practitioners do find enjoyment in the richness and diversity of contemplative practices and traditions, Mary and Dom had both embraced eclecticism to some degree by turning to various meditation and spiritual authorities. However, the fragmentary advice they received was perceived as too incoherent for their moral bricolage to succeed.

These failures indicate why Cheetah House is interesting for both meditators and the anthropology of ethics. It provided a fourth option by opening a space for meditators to explore ethical practice despite experiencing their supporting traditions as incoherent. Using an evidence-based and person-centred framework, Cheetah House researchers were systematically investigating how meditation, context and the person interact. That was then used as a basis for helping practitioners to reflect on their chosen practice(s) or tradition(s), how they relate to their lifeworld and how they could continue to meditate while discovering what works for them over the long term.

In doing so, they also provoked questions that I had not thought about until hearing about their work and the stories of meditators-in-distress: to what extent is 'tradition' a necessary ground for practice? And might there be a way to practise ethics even when the eclecticism of tradition is so incoherent that it can be disabling of moral progress? Answering those questions requires more research in the anthropology of ethics on how moral bricolage functions to make such deep eclecticism morally productive. ●

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