Hegel's Hidden History of the Fall

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SHORT ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that Hegel's claim that the coming of Christ is the central axis of history, entails a twofold punctuation of history by the Christ-Event. As Benedetto Croce recognised, Christianity inaugurates for Hegel a 'new' history, which he called the 'history of Truth'. I argue that this history of Truth is preceded, on the other side of the Christ-Event, by a hidden, 'history of the Fall'. I identify this 'history of the Fall' with Hegel's developmental narrative of religious history, which plots the movement from *Naturreligion* to the emergence of Christianity. The 'history of the Fall' is, accordingly, the history of the emergence of revelation from the immediacy of natural life. For Hegel, this life is historically 'lapsarian', having emerged with the breakdown of the *Zweck* of history into sin and slavery. The Jewish (and later Christian) religion represents this historical catastrophe as a 'Fall' of Adam, whom Hegel reads typologically as Christ. The Christ-Event is therefore both the goal and the starting point of history. It is the goal of the 'history of the Fall', and the starting point of the 'history of Truth', whose 'first man' is Christ, the second Adam. However, while this 'history of Truth' coincides with Christianity as 'revelation', the 'history of the Fall' is 'hidden' from the merely 'natural consciousness' of *Naturreligion*, just as sin is, for Christian theology, known only under grace. The emergence of the Genesis Fall narrative is therefore linked by Hegel to the possibility of understanding history because it is necessary for the possibility of human self-understanding (as unfree and, therefore, as not yet *Geis*t). The development of consciousness leading up to the Christ-Event, which I refer to as the 'history of the Fall', designates the concretisation of its self-understanding as 'fallen', from the 'pictorial' form of the *Genesis* narrative as 'story', to the revelation of human 'fallenness' in polemical antithesis to the life and teaching of Christ as 'history'. In this way, I argue that the Christ-Event constitutes humanity as a historical 'unity' in its rejection of the offer for the kingdom, and therefore constitutes the historical past as a 'history of the Fall'. I argue that highlighting the

role of the Fall narrative in this way, allows us to understand Hegel's philosophy of history as formulating a developmental narrative of the origins of human life as emerging from historical failure, without giving up on its essence as a Christian *Heilsgeschichte* (as is common with secularising readers, from Hyppolite and Kojève, to Žižek).

LONG ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that Hegel's claim, in the *Philosophy of History*, that the coming of Christ is the central axis of history, entails a twofold punctuation of history by the Christ-Event. As Benedetto Croce recognised, Christianity inaugurates for Hegel a 'new' history, which he called the 'history of Truth'[1]. I argue that this history of Truth is preceded, on the other side of the Christ-Event, by a hidden, 'history of the Fall'. I identify this 'history of the Fall' with Hegel's developmental narrative of religious history, which plots the movement from *Naturreligion* to the emergence of *die offenbare Religion* or Christianity. The 'history of the Fall' is, accordingly, the history of the emergence of revelation from the immediacy of natural life. For Hegel, this life is historically 'lapsarian', having emerged with the breakdown of the providential *Zweck* of history – freedom in and for a unified humanity as Geist – into sin and slavery. The Jewish (and later Christian) religion represents this historical catastrophe as a 'Fall' of Adam, whom Hegel reads typologically as Christ. The Christ-Event is therefore both the goal and the starting point of history. It is the goal of the 'history of the Fall', and the starting point of the 'history of Truth', whose 'first man' is Christ, the second Adam. However, while this 'history of Truth' coincides with Christianity as 'revelation', the 'history of the Fall' is 'hidden' from the merely 'natural consciousness' of *Naturreligion*, just as sin is, for Christian theology, known only under grace. The emergence of the Genesis Fall narrative is therefore linked by Hegel to the possibility of understanding history because it is necessary for the possibility of human self-understanding (as unfree and, therefore, as not yet *Geis*t). The development of consciousness leading up to the Christ-Event, which I refer to as the 'history of the Fall', designates the concretisation of its self-understanding as 'fallen', from the 'pictorial' form of the *Genesis* narrative as 'story', to the revelation of human 'fallenness' in

[1] B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice* trans. D. Ainslie (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), 205.

polemical antithesis to the life and teaching of Christ as 'history'. In this way, I argue that the Christ-Event constitutes humanity as a historical 'unity' in its rejection of the offer for the kingdom, and therefore constitutes the historical past as a 'history of the Fall'. I argue that highlighting the role of the Fall narrative in this way, allows us to understand Hegel's philosophy of history as formulating a developmental narrative of the origins of human life as emerging from historical failure, without giving up on its essence as a Christian *Heilsgeschichte* (as is common with secularising readers, from Hyppolite and Kojève, to Žižek).

Throughout the dissertation, I emphasise Hegel's Christo-absolutism as the determinate, historical form of what Rowan Williams has called his 'primitive condition for thinking'[2], but I do so while emphasising his Judeophilic insistence on the involvement of Jewish particularity in historically mediating this Christo-absolutist condition for the thinking of history. Furthermore, I aim to reconcile two impulses in Hegel which have largely been held to be irreconcilable, namely, a 'left' impulse, that highlights human striving in the face of an antagonistic development of history, and a 'counter-Enlightenment' impulse, that emphasises the emergence of faith in history through those antagonisms. This 'left counter-Enlightenment' reading of Hegel (as I call it) cuts across the dominant tendencies in the Hegelian commentariat today, reducing neither Hegel's commitment to philosophy as metaphysics, nor to Christian faith, and retaining his radical understanding of the possibilities of transformative change in history. Throughout, grapple with the fundamental question of how the Christ-Event, the life of one individual, can fundamentally 'split' history, understood in a Hegelian sense, as a developmental process. Following Graham Ward's suggestion that Hegel's mature philosophy

[2] R. Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', in *Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology*, ed. Mike Higton (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 40.

be read a working out of a Christological principle[3], I offer a reconstruction a reconstruction of Hegel's dialectic as a working out of the Christological principle of the life and history of Jesus Christ as a world-historically unique 'Christ-Event' that bridges the gap between the *presentation* and the *representation* of historical experience, and thereby makes history fully graspable as *Nachdenken*.

However, I emphasise the special role notions of sin play in Hegel's attempt to think Christologically. These are developed most clearly in Hegel's attempts to rethink the significance of the Fall narrative for philosophy (including as 'theology'). However, I argue that Hegel's hamartiological principle is itself a working out of his understanding of the Christ-Event as constitutive of both reconciliation as well as the need for it. Once again, following Ward, I argue that the dialectics of immediacy and mediation and the interaction of the universal with the particular, first developed through Hegel's early Christological investigations, are a working out of the idea of the 'omnidirectional' mediation of the Christ-Event from the displaced 'centre' of the Cross. However, the two-fold punctuation of history operative in Hegel's dialectic means that the Christ-Event mediates not only reconciliation, but also fallenness, as linked to the element of failure in the life of Jesus. Hence, I argue that Hegel's early obsession with the failure of Jesus' life was not a mere preoccupation of his juvenilia and did not, in fact, go away as Hegel developed the mature philosophy of history. Instead, I suggest that this element of failure in Jesus' life comes to be understood as constitutive of the very need for humans to be reconciled, with God, as well as with themselves, as *Geist*. The 'failure' of Jesus' life is therefore generalised as a failure inherent to the Christ-Event as expressing the

[3] G. Ward, 'How Hegel became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic', *Critical Research on Religion* 1 (2014), 275.

contradiction between the sinless individuality of Jesus and the violent, 'abstract' universality of humanity in the 'Roman world'.

My argument unfolds in the following way: firstly, I provide a metalogical interpretation of Hegelian logic, as admitting to two rival logics of *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, and involving competing structures of mediation and competing routes for the overturning of being and nothing. I argue that it is the second, 'alternate' logic of *Verstand*, rather than that of *Vernunft*, that grounds the development of consciousness as a postlapsarian inversion of the developmental process of the logic. I then show that revelation in history entails for Hegel creative, though teleologically ambiguous, emergences of theoretical and practical relationships to the divine, involving processes of 'metaphorical' transference, as 're-inversions' of historical experience. These processes lead to the preliminary conditions for the possibility of human *Sichdenken*, which Hegel identifies with the emergence in Jewish religious consciousness of monotheism in general, and the *Genesis* Fall narrative, in particular. I show that Jewish religious consciousness is a 'purified' form of the natural consciousness of finite religion (associated with various forms of Pagan religion), which dominates pre-Christian history, and is therefore posited as the mediation of the transition to Christian history from an historical 'outside'. In this way, Jewish 'particularity' mediates the 'individuality' of Christ, by disrupting the abstract 'universality' of the Roman world, as it were, from an historical 'outside'. Finally, I argue that it is only with the rejection of Christ, rather than an historical Fall from Eden, that human beings may be said to be universally guilty, for failing to realise the *Zweck* of history, and are therefore in a state of 'fallenness'. The Christ-Event constitutes humanity as a unity in its rejection of the offer for the kingdom.

INTRODUCTION

The Hidden History of the Fall?

'...I await a revolution in Germany...'[4]

'But what experience and history teach is this – that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history or acted on lessons learned from it.'[5]

1 Introduction and Thesis

In the first volume of *Fermenta Cognitionis*, the Catholic philosopher and theologian Franz Xaver von Baader referred to his contemporary G.W.F. Hegel, with whom he shared a complex intellectual relationship and friendship, as the '*auto-da-fé* of all previous philosophy', adding that, 'since the dialectical fire was lit by Hegel, one cannot help but be saved by it'.[6] Reading this reminded me of the young Marx's 1842 note to self: 'there is no other road for you to *truth* and *freedom* except that leading *through* the brook of fire', referring, of course, to Ludwig Feuerbach. 'Feuerbach', he adds, 'is the *purgatory* of the present times'.[7] In characteristic fashion, Marx inverts the insight; Hegel is not so much the purgation of all hitherto existing,

[4] G.W.F. Hegel, 'Hegel an Schelling [1803]', in *Briefe von und an Hegel 1: 1785–1812*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969), 23.
[5] G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrhamp, 1970), 17.
[6] F. Von Baader, *Fermenta Cognitionis* 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer Verlag, 1822), vi.
[7] Quoted in S. Critchley, *The Book of Dead Philosophers* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2008), 202.

and therefore 'dead', philosophies, as Hegelianism is the purification of the philosophy of the future. Marx's writing embodies the eschatological consciousness of the 1840s. It expresses the young Hegel's own demand 'to claim as man's property, the treasures which have been squandered on Heaven'[8], a demand which now reads like Feuerbachian anthropotheism *avant la lettre*, but which Hegel himself had proclaimed despairingly, adding 'but what age will have the strength to validate this right in practice and make itself its possessor?'.[9] In a characteristic misreading, William Desmond identifies this early proclamation of Hegel's with a 'concern for human power, and the slighting of gift', as well as reflecting his overall belief in the 'momentousness of the age',[10] which is to say, of the French Revolution, adding that 'Hegel was a left-wing post-Hegelian, like Feuerbach and Marx, before he became a 'Hegelian''.[11]

To the extent that the post-Hegelianisms of Feuerbach and Marx entail respective reductions of Hegel's 'philosophy' (read by both, following Hegel's own insistence, as 'theology'[12]), to 'anthropology' and 'politics',[13] the question of the 'becoming' of Hegelianism is necessarily linked to the question of how Hegel, for all intents and purposes a seminary drop-out, became a philosopher. Here, I would much more readily endorse the thesis that Hegel became a

[8] G. W. F. Hegel, 'Die Positivität der christlichen Religion', in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrhamp, 1971), 209.

[9] Hegel, ‚Die Positivität der christlichen Religion', Werke 1, 209.

[10] I would agree, instead, with György Lukács' account of Hegel's politics during the Berne period (when 'Die Positivität der christlichen Religion' was written). As Lukács has shown, Hegel was at best ambivalent about the momentousness of the French Revolution at this point in his life (which is not to say that he was either apolitical or a conservative). The major turning point of the Revolution at Thermidor which had happened one year before Hegel finished writing *Die Positivität*, appeared not to have made any immediate impression on him; see, G. Lukács, *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics* tr. R. Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1975), 93. For an account of Hegel's political views in Berne, see L. Dickey, *Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit, 1770-1807* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially 174-175.

[11] W. Desmond, *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* (London: Routledge, 2003), 42.

[12] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 342.

[13] While one cannot dispute Feuerbach's intention in effecting in his works an anthropological reduction of theology, I would hesitate to characterise Marx's critique of philosophy, as the critique of one aspect of bourgeois society (alongside religion and political economy), as a reduction to 'politics' in all but the broadest of ways. This would be to misread Marx as merely a left–Hegelian, rather than an immanent critic of left–Hegelianism. And as Marx's opening thesis on Feuerbach immediately establishes, the defect of all hitherto existing materialisms has been to regard practice as the 'dirty–judaical form of appearance' of theory, which is to say, to regard 'human sensuous activity' as 'political' in the sense of the time, as the externalisation of good and bad ideas; see K. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in *On Religion* (Atlanta: GA: Scholars Press, 1964), 69.

philosopher, because, as Raymond Plant has argued, he was faced with failure in responding to a series of problems in social, political and especially religious experience.[14] György Lukács argued that Hegel's early work, after abandoning a career in ministry and moving to Berne, which I quoted above, contained 'absolutely no sign of the important dialectical categories of his later method: immediacy and mediation, the dialectical interaction of the particular and the [universal]'.[15] In a recent work titled 'How Hegel became a philosopher', Graham Ward has argued against this view, pointing out that Hegel's early, typically Christological, investigations

> are investigations into that which makes dialectic possible at all: the logic of mediation through and in Christ of God's immediacy to humankind; the isolated singularity of Jesus of Nazareth and the universal embrace of the divine. The later dialectic is a working out of a Christological and philosophical principle.[16]

This dissertation is not intended to answer the question 'how did Hegel become a philosopher?', but rather to offer a reconstruction of his 'later dialectic' on the assumption that it is indeed the 'working out' of a Christological principle. To this extent, I offer a reconstruction of Hegel which works this Christological principle back into the exposition of his thought.

However, I will emphasise the role the notions of sin play in Hegel's attempt to think Christologically. These are developed most clearly in Hegel's attempts to rethink the significance of the Fall narrative for philosophy (including as 'theology'), in order to discern the element of 'failure' in the life of Jesus. I will argue that Hegel's early obsession with the failure of Jesus' life was not a mere preoccupation of his juvenilia and did not, in fact, go away as Hegel developed the mature philosophy of history. Instead, I will suggest that this element of failure in Jesus' life comes to be understood as constitutive of the very need for humans to

[14] R. Plant, *Hegel* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973), 15.
[15] Lukács, *The Young Hegel*, 84.
[16] Ward, 'How Hegel became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic', 275.

be reconciled, with God, as well as with themselves, as *Geist*. The 'failure' of Jesus' life is therefore generalised as a failure inherent to the Christ-Event as expressing the contradiction between the sinless individuality of Jesus and the violent, 'abstract' universality of humanity in the 'Roman world'. To this extent, I offer a reconstruction of Hegel's dialectic of *history* as a working out of Christological *and* hamartiological principles. However, I argue that Hegel's hamartiological principle is itself a working out of his understanding of the Christ-Event as constitutive of both reconciliation as well as the need for it.

My fundamental claim is that Hegel's view, in the *Philosophy of History*, that the coming of Christ is the central axis of history, entails a twofold punctuation of history by the Christ-Event, which mediates both sides of history 'omnidirectionally'. Throughout the dissertation I will grapple with the question of how the Christ-Event, the life of one individual, can fundamentally 'split' history, understood in a Hegelian sense, as a developmental process. Following Ward, I argue that the dialectics of immediacy and mediation, of the interaction of the universal with the particular, are a working out of this omnidirectional mediation of the Christ-Event from the displaced 'centre' of the Cross. However, the two-fold punctuation of history operative in Hegel's dialectic means that the Christ-Event mediates not only reconciliation, but also fallenness. As Benedetto Croce recognised in 1921, Christianity inaugurates for Hegel a 'new' history, which he called the 'history of Truth'. I argue that this history of Truth is preceded, on the other side of the Christ-Event, by a hidden, 'history of the Fall'. I identify this 'history of the Fall' with Hegel's developmental narrative of religious history, which plots the movement from *Naturreligion* to the emergence of *die offenbare Religion* or Christianity. The 'history of the Fall' is, accordingly, the history of the emergence of revelation from the

immediacy of natural life. For Hegel, this immediacy of natural life is historically 'lapsarian', having emerged with the breakdown of the providential *Zweck* of history – freedom in and for a unified humanity as *Geist* – into sin and slavery. The Jewish (and later Christian) religion represents this historical catastrophe as a 'Fall' of Adam, the first man, whom Hegel reads as referring, typologically, to Christ. The Christ-Event is therefore both the goal and the starting point of history. It is the goal of the 'history of the Fall', and the starting point of the 'history of Truth', whose 'first man' is Christ, the second Adam. However, while this 'history of Truth' coincides with Christianity as 'revelation', the 'history of the Fall' is 'hidden' from the merely 'natural consciousness' of *Naturreligion*, just as sin is, for Christian theology, known only under grace.

Hegel connects the possibility of a 'historical view' of the world to the possibility of revelation in history. And he connects the possibility of revelation in history to the 'purification' (*Reinigung*) of 'natural consciousness'. This 'purified consciousness' refers to Judaism as the first form of religious consciousness beyond what is 'hidden' to *Naturreligion* as the intuiting of the natural world. Central to this Judaic 'purified consciousness' is the emergence, through revelation, of the *Geschichte* or story of the Fall. The emergence of the *Genesis* Fall narrative is therefore linked by Hegel to the possibility of understanding history because it is necessary for the possibility of human self-understanding (as unfree and, therefore, as not yet *Geist*). The development of consciousness leading up to the Christ-Event, which I refer to as the 'history of the Fall', designates the concretisation of its self-understanding as 'fallen', from the 'representational' or 'pictorial' form of the *Genesis* narrative as 'story', to the revelation of human 'fallenness' in polemical antithesis to the life and teaching of Christ as 'history'. I argue that highlighting the role of the Fall narrative in this way, allows us to understand Hegel's philosophy of history as formulating a developmental narrative of the origins of human life as

emerging from historical failure, without giving up on its essence as a Christian *Heilsgeschichte* (as is common with secularising readers, from Hyppolite and Kojève, to Žižek).

Below, I situate my work in the context of the resurgence of 20th century Anglophone interest in Hegel as well as the reaction against the dominant tendency of Hegel scholarship, which I suggest has led to a resurgence of interest in Hegel's religious views. I will then develop my historiographical and hermeneutical approach to Hegel's thought, which I will characterise as a 'left counter-Enlightenment' reading of Hegel. Finally, I will clarify the use of any special terminology before expounding, in preliminary form, the structure of my argument as I develop it in each chapter.

2 The Hermeneutical and Ideological Situation since the *Hegeljahre*

1970 marked the 200-year anniversary of Hegel's birth and the beginning of a half-century of sustained Anglo-American interest in his thought. The ensuing flood of commentaries would be marked by an emphasis on 'non-' or 'anti-' or 'post-metaphysical' approaches to politics – no doubt reflecting the wider tendencies in critical thinking at the time. (It was an 'epoch of competing ends', as China Miéville would put it in his eschatological thriller, *Kraken*.) The Hegel who would emerge from this historical moment, beginning with a now highly influential essay by Klaus Hartmann, would be dubbed the 'non-metaphysical Hegel'.[17] This 'non-metaphysical Hegel' was the expression of what Gillian Rose identified as the 'neo-Kantian paradigm'[18]; and it represented 'a continuing line of sociological theory that wished to drop Hegel's notion of the 'absolute' spirit while retaining Hegel's commitment to social and

[17] K. Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non–Metaphysical View', in *Hegel – A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. A. MacIntyre (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 101–24. Originally published in 1972.

[18] This is the major argument of G. Rose's *Hegel Contra Sociology* (London: Verso, 2009).

cultural transformation'.[19] This continuity is sometimes underemphasised. As Ernst Cassirer (arguably the greatest thinker to emerge from the so-called 'Marburg school') pointed out as early 1946, Hegel's

> logic and metaphysics were at first regarded as the strongest bulwarks of his system; yet it was precisely from this side that the system was open to the most violent and dangerous attacks. And after a short struggle they seemed to have been successful. Yet Hegelianism has had a rebirth not in the field of logical or metaphysical thought, but in the field of political thought. There has hardly been a single great political system that has resisted its influence. All our modern political ideologies show us the strength, the durability and permanence of the principles that were first introduced and defended in Hegel's philosophy of right and his philosophy of history.[20]

Even in Cassirer's time, the two dominant 'Hegelian' traditions of Marxist social theory and existentialist philosophy were, as Allen Wood points out, 'distinctly anti-metaphysical in their orientation'[21].

The Hegel of post-1970 scholarship (in the English and sometimes even German speaking worlds) typically shares this orientation, with the classic notion of Hegelian *Nachdenken* being famously reworked by Jürgen Habermas into the notion of *nachmetaphysisches Denken*.[22] But there is one other important aspect to this scholarly tendency, and that is its connection, historically, to the relative abandonment of Hegel by Marxists. Here too, the aversion against 'metaphysics' and 'idealism' followed not from an ostensibly radical, 'postmodern' critique of Hegel as an arch-metaphysician, but from the tendencies inherent to the neo-Kantian 'reformism' of Eduard Bernstein and Léon Blum. As Lukács pointed out, this was the shape taken by the 'conservative' reaction against the eschatological fatalism of the Second

[19] G. Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 296; Rose, *Hegel contra Sociology*, 1–50.

[20] E. Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (London: Yale University Press, 1946), 248. The 'short struggle' referred to by Cassirer concerns the infamous debate, initiated by F. A. Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen* (Berlin: Bethge Verlag, 1840), on the tenability of Hegel's views regarding the possibility of a presuppositionless 'beginning' of logical science. I address this issue in chapter one.

[21] A. E. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5.

[22] J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

International.[23] In the 1970s, however, new 'anti-Hegelian' variants of Marxism emerged in Europe, especially under the neo-Kantian influence of Louis Althusser,[24] in France, and the 'anti-idealist' influence of Lucio Colletti,[25] in Italy. Althusser and Colletti separately articulated neo-Kantian approaches to 'scientific Marxism', in opposition to the dominant and Moscow-friendly Eurocommunism of the time, which, however, they regarded as representing the old Bernsteinian revisionism. The historical and intellectual result of their influence was to end the traditional and once invariable association of anti-Stalinism and 'Western' Hegelian humanism (in Lukács, Karl Korsch, and even Jean-Paul Sartre). Hegelian humanism would, instead, find a new, if smaller, home in post-Marxist and 'transcendental' approaches to Hegel, in the emergent field of especially Anglophone scholarship.

Confined as they were, however, within the neo-Kantian paradigm, such humanisms would remain limited to 'liberal' and 'American pragmatic' affirmations of the 'sociality of reason'[26] or 'ethical rationalism'[27], at the inevitable expense of some aspects of Hegel's own views on politics and society[28]. Furthermore, even if the thinkers associated with the non-metaphysical Hegel (such as Hartmann) belonged politically to the left, and could be found quoting Feuerbach, Marx, and Lenin much more often than their 'right-Hegelian' counterparts (such as Rosenkranz, Hinrichs, or Ulrici), their rejection of 'metaphysics', was a rejection of the

[23] G. Lukács , *The Ontology of Social Being, 2: Marx*, trans. D. Fernbach (London: Merlin Press, 1978), 149.

[24] L. Althusser, *Reading Capital* 1, trans. B. Brewster (London: NLB, 1970); and *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. B, Brewster (London: NLB, 1971). As Rose points out, 'Althusser is unique in making all the classic neo–Kantian moves solely within a project of rereading Marx'; see *Hegel contra Sociology*, 39.

[25] L. Colletti, *Il marxismo e Hegel*, 2 volumes (Bari: Laterza, 1969).

[26] T. Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[27] R. Pippin, *Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[28] One such example is Pippin's rejection of Hegel's 'ethical perfectionism'; see R. B Pippin, 'Leaving Nature Behind, or Two Cheers for Subjectivism: On John McDowell' in *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 186–206. For a recent defence of Hegel as a thinker belonging to the tradition of ethical perfectionism, see R. Stern, 'Freedom, Norms, and Nature in Hegel: Self–Legislation or Self–Realization?', in *Hegel on Philosophy in History* ed. R. Zuckert and J. Kreines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 88–106. For a history of perfectionist moral philosophy, including of Hegel and Marx, see T. Hurka, *Perfectionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For a constructive Hegelian theological ethics along perfectionist lines, see Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I* 289–231.

Hegelian system as it had been conceived by the Hegelian right. This is also conspicuously demonstrated by their relative neglect of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* and predictable neo-Kantian predilection for the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.[29] To some extent, this idea of a 'dialectical' rejection of a 'right-wing' element in Hegel's thought had existed at least since Engels' first book, *Schelling und die Offenbarung*, which had developed the political hermeneutic of the Hegelian dialectical method as 'revolutionary', over against the Hegelian system as 'conservative'.[30] But this rejection or 'negation' had ceased to be properly 'dialectical' in the hands of the neo-Kantians, which increasingly involved mere cancelation without preservation, ultimately resulting in a clean break with Hegel's logic and metaphysics, and therefore also with any of the latter's religious concerns.[31]

Even Cassirer's lightly ironic reference to Hegel's logic and metaphysics, as the 'bulwark' of his system, betrays an essentially right-Hegelian preconception of the latter's thought. This preconception was inherited by the anti-Hegelian Marxists of the 1970s. Althusser was a former Catholic Hegelian,[32] whereas Colletti belonged to the generation of wartime intellectuals in Italy who had come under the influence of the 'right-Hegelianism' of Benedetto Croce and

[29] The exception to the rule was Stanley Rosen's, who argued, against the trend, that 'Hegel is first and foremost a logician and not a philosopher of history, a political thinker, a theologian, or a *Lebensphilosoph'*; *G.W.F. Hegel: Introduction to the Science of Wisdom* (London: Yale University Press, 1974). The neo-Kantian predilection for the *Phenomenology*, over against the *Logic*, was noted by Deiter Henrich; see Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', in *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 79–80. This neo-Kantian privileging of the *Phenomenology* would later influence the more explicitly 'atheistic' French Hegelianism of Alexander Kojève and Jean Hyppolite.

[30] *Schelling und die Offenbarung* (Leipzig: Robert Binder, 1842), 50–51.

[31] Before the definitive 'return to Kant' in Marxism, religion had remained a theoretical issue (though one treated with varying degrees of seriousness) and not merely a practical issue of 'strategy'. To some, this may seem like an unlikely claim. But a series of relatively major attempts were made to treat the issue of religion theoretically after Joseph Dietzgen's 'The Religion of Social-Democracy' in 1875. These include not only Engels' critical work 'On the History of Early Christianity' in 1894–5 but also more programmatic political works such as Rosa Luxemburg's 'Socialism and the Churches' in 1905 and Anton Pannekoek 'Socialism and Religion' in 1907. Roland Boer's *Criticism of Religion: On Marxism and Theology* (London: Haymarket Books, 2011) is respectable scholarly work on some of these currents within Marxism.

[32] For the early, 'Catholic' Althusser, see L. Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel*, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 1997). For a more complete collection, see L. Althusser, *Écrits philosophiques et politiques* 1 (Paris: Stock/Imec, 1994).

Giovanni Gentile.[33] Both, in other words – before they had gone on to reject their inheritance – had inherited a different kind of Hegel; not the Hegel of the Marxist humanist left, but the Hegel of the religious right; the Hegel of the 'conservative' metaphysical system.[34] Althusser and Colletti therefore did not share the 'Western Marxist' admiration for Hegel, famously expressed by Karl Korsch on the centenary of the latter's death in 1931, as the greatest of all the 'progressive bourgeois' thinkers.[35] They believed, instead, that by abandoning Hegel Marxism would be abandoning the spurious influence of a Christian humanist, whose ideal of a 'Bourgeois-Christian' society was antithetical to that of radical and materialist politics, and whose increasing popularity after the second world-war (especially in existentialisms, both religious and secular) ultimately served to undermine the influence of Marx.[36]

That the 1970s' 'non-metaphysical Hegel' emerged out of the neo-Kantian critique of Marx and Marxism is readily acknowledged today, as it was by Terry Pinkard in an essay written shortly after the death of Hartmann and of 'really existing socialism' in 1992.[37] Indeed, the very context of the publication of Hartmann's influential essay – a collection of critically appropriative essays on Hegel edited by Alasdair MacIntyre – would suggest such a thing. But I would argue that the 'non-metaphysical Hegel' emerged also, in part, due to the Marxist critique and abandonment of Hegel at a time which divorced Hegelianism from its social

[33] For more on the, often infamous, Gentile, as well as Italian Hegelianism more generally, see the introduction to chapter one.
[34] For more on the Engelsian hermeneutic of the 'revolutionary' method and 'conservative' system in Hegel, see the introduction to chapter one.
[35] Reprinted in a special issue of *Alternative* on Korsch; K. Korsch, 'Hegel und die Revolution', *Alternative* (1965), 41; for Korsch's important study on the relationship between Hegel and Marxism, see Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1966).
[36] Compare Colletti, *Il marxismo e Hegel*, 403–434, and Althusser, 'The Return of Hegel: The Latest Word in Academic Revisionism', in *The Spectre of Hegel*, 177–190. Sartre, in his mature text on the relationship between Marxism and existentialism, also saw that the resurgence of interest in Hegel after the war had come at the expense of Marx. But he took the more complex view that the thought of Hegel tasked us, historically, to affirm dialectics in praxis, which is to say, through Marx, rather than through Kierkegaard. In this sense, 'bourgeois' interest in Hegel comes at the expense of Marx only as a 'refusal of praxis' and is, therefore, itself a partial rejection of Hegel himself; see J.-P. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. H.E. Barnes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 16.
[37] T. Pinkard, 'Klaus Hartmann: A Philosophical Appreciation', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 46.4 (1992), 600– 608. Though note that Pinkard's essay was written some years after Rose had elucidated for English-speaking readers the significance of the neo-Kantian paradigm.

purpose, which is to say, from socialist politics. This allowed a series of thinkers who were critical (or were becoming critical, as with MacIntyre) of Marxism, to develop a new and different socially engaged Hegelianism. Often, this emphasis on the social dimensions of Hegel's thought was not only constructive but additive, as with Hartmann's introduction of 'social categories' to the transcendental method which, as Pinkard notes, was intended to 'extend the transcendental categorial program initiated by Kant and purified by Hegel into the social realm'.[38] In retrospect, Hartmann's essay was not so much intended to argue for the possibility of a non-metaphysical Hegel,[39] as to articulate this programmatic expansion of 'transcendental philosophy' into social theory. Similar efforts would follow, as I have indicated, in the works of Pinkard and Pippin.

In order to effect this expansion, Hartmann and others advocated a 'minimal' interpretation of Hegel, one which singles out the 'systematic core' of Hegel's philosophy and suspends its relationship to world history and divine revelation, which is to say, one which suspends the 'extension of the dialectic into existence and contingency'.[40] In doing so, Hartmann broke with some of his most notable contemporaries, including Karl Löwith and Emil Fackenheim, who had provided accounts of this expansion of the dialectic into world history, especially where this concerned Hegel's views on the relationship between history and the divine Incarnation.[41] Were it not for his explicit repudiation of Marx's 'materialist' inversion of the maximal- metaphysical interpretation of Hegel as merely oppositely one-sided, Hartmann's concluding remarks on the 'systematic core' of Hegel's philosophy would seem to approach

[38] Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non–Metaphysical View', 117–121; Pinkard, 'Klaus Hartmann: A Philosophical Appreciation', 602.
[39] Hartmann had, in fact, already done this in an earlier essay; see K. Hartmann, 'Taking the Transcendental Turn'. *Review of Metaphysics* 20.2 (1966), 223–249.
[40] Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non–Metaphysical View', 123.
[41] See K. Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought*, trans. D.E. Green (London: Constable & Co., 1965); and E.L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

Marx's own on the 'rational kernel'. But for most subsequent Anglophone commentators, Hartmann actually provided a new freedom for the interpretation of the social and political dimensions of Hegel's thought apart from his erstwhile 'dogmatic' Marxist heirs. The whole of the renewed interest on Hegel in the emerging Anglophone scholarship, Charles Taylor argued at the time, concerned these social and political dimensions of his thought; that is what was (and, according to Cassirer, always will be) 'living' in Hegel, Taylor said, here invoking Croce. His 'logico- ontology', he argued, was 'quite dead': 'no one actually believes his central ontological thesis, that the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity'.[42] And if Hartmann is right, then, no one quite believes the Marxist inversion of Hegel's ontological thesis either.

In a general survey of the decade of Hegel scholarship since 1970, James Schmidt, highlighting Taylor's Crocean dictum, commented that '[s]tated this baldly, there is something clearly amiss in Taylor's characterization of the present attitude toward Hegel, although rectifying the judgment only makes matters worse'.[43] He continued:

> It is not so much that no one believes that "the universe is posited by a Spirit whose essence is rational necessity" as that it is not even clear if anyone can now believe that Hegel himself believed anything so straightforward (though perhaps outlandish). While Hegel's immediate heirs in the 1840s were left with a rough sense of what he was saying, and hence free to agree or disagree, and while the subsequent tradition of Marxian-influenced Hegel interpretation had its stock Hegel in whom rational kernel could be separated from mystical shell, we lack an equally clear and coherent — if misguided — sense of how to characterize Hegel. We have the ability to modify any simple statement of what Hegel was in fact doing into virtual incoherence; we have a sense of what is misguided as a characterization of Hegel's thought; but beyond accounts of Hegel's thought as a certain type of intention, historically situated within a certain peculiar context, there is little one can offer as a general characterization without an almost instantaneous sense of doing violence to his thought.[44]

[42] C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 538.
[43] J. Schmidt, 'Recent Hegel Literature: General Surveys and the Young Hegel' *Telos* 46 (1980), 113.
[44] Schmidt, 'Recent Hegel Literature', 113

Schmidt concludes that the main critical achievement of the new work on Hegel had therefore been to 'at last free Hegel from the various traditions of Hegelianism (right, left, British, or Neo-Marxian) in which he had been placed'.[45] Hence firstly, Marxists had begun to divorce Hegelianism from their own social practice, and secondly, a new generation of Hegel scholarship had sought to definitively divorce Hegelianism from all its traditional forms of appropriation. This had been underwritten by a kind of crisis of faith, not only 'for us' (or as Hegel would say, 'in itself') to 'believe Hegel', but also for 'Hegel' himself; to believe that Hegel ever believed himself. All this meant that the question of the relationship between what was living and what was dead in Hegel's thought, between the social and political dimensions on the one hand, and the metaphysical ones, on the other, had to be renewed. For many, this involved a return to Hegel's own, personal motivations.

3 The Reaction against the 'Liberal' Consensus

One can plausibly argue that a series of 'general characterisations' of Hegel's thought have, in fact, emerged in the forty years since Schmidt diagnosed the 'post-ideological' state of Anglophone Hegel scholarship. These have coincided with a general loosening of hermeneutical constraints as well as a deepening of our textual and historical knowledge about Hegel and his influences. (And, one could add, the critique of the post-metaphysical *qua* post-ideological Hegel has coincided, in the work of Slavoj Žižek, with attempts to reinstate the very concept of 'ideology' to critical discourse.) One could count Cyril O'Regan's recent characterisation of Hegel as a 'modern Gnostic', and of Hegelianism more generally, as a major part of a 'Gnostic return' in modernity, as one such example.[46] Of course, that there is something 'gnostic', or 'hermetic', or 'mystical' about Hegel's thought is not, as

[45] Schmidt, 'Recent Hegel Literature', 113.
[46] For O'Regan's more general project of developing a 'conceptual model' of *gnosis*, see C. O'Regan, *Gnostic Return in Modernity and Gnostic Apocalypse* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). O'Regan's work may be counted as following in the footsteps of the German scholarly tradition of Harnack, Baur, Staudenmaier, and Voegelin.

Glen Magee points out, an unfamiliar claim.[47] There is an entire tradition of scholarship which reads Hegel in this way, going back to Ferdinand Christian Baur, who first called Hegel a modern Gnostic in *Die christliche Gnosis*.[48] But O'Regan's general characterisation of Hegel as a modern Gnostic has helped contextualise and frame recent debates about Hegel, especially in theological circles, in more substantially ideological ways than has been common for some time. These have come to involve the often useful if undoubtedly unclear constellation between 'gnosticism', 'orthodox Christianity', and 'liberal Protestantism'. The upshot has been to reposition Hegel within the genealogical politics of, among other efforts, the project of Radical Orthodoxy which, particularly in the hands of John Milbank, identifies Hegel with a heterodox tradition of voluntarist nominalism against which Milbank affirms an 'orthodox' counternarrative.[49]

Such a 'repositioning' of Hegel is, again, nothing new in itself, but it has involved, in this case, a somewhat novel re-articulation of the Hegel debate in the terms of contemporary theological discourse about religious orthodoxy, secularism, and modernity. The perennial historiographic question has remained: to what extent should we force our vocabulary on the dead in order to make them our conversational partners? Certainly, 'modern gnostic' would be an anachronistic and impossible self-designation for Hegel, even if Baur's use of that epithet came a mere four years after the latter's death. The same could be said of Ernst Bloch's influential historiographic

[47] G. Magee, 'Hegel and the Mystics', in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth–Century Philosophy* ed. F.C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 253. These three categories are often confused, including in scholarship about Hegel. The most common conflation is of gnosticism and hermeticism. Magee accuses Baur of confusing Hegel's hermetic tendencies with gnostic ones in *Die christliche Gnosis.* For Magee, hermeticism is unlike gnosticism because it does not denigrate creation and often emphasises its ontological significance for the Godhead.

[48] F. C. Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Tübingen: Verlag von C.F. Osiander,1835). Another notable analysis, which relies on Baur, and identifies Hegelian philosophy as the modern appearance of gnostic theological traditions, can be found in Jacob Taubes' *Occidental Eschatology*, tr. D. Ratmoko (Stanford University Press, 2006), 36.

[49] For Milbank's most programmatic articulation of 'anti-Hegelianism' as a historical stance, see 'The Double Glory or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek', in S. Žižek and J. Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 111–117.

category of the 'Aristotelian left', with which Hegel has also been identified,[50] or the more recent 'Christian atheist' moniker imputed onto him by the 'death of God' theologians. And yet, as Paul Franks has suggested, the German idealists themselves were probably not developing transcendental idealism in accordance with Kant's original intentions, but were developing it in accordance with the intentions they believed Kant should have had.[51] The following question might then be raised: should we read Hegel in accordance with the intentions *we* think he ought to have had? Or, should we be much more conservative, following in the footsteps of Quentin Skinner, who famously argued that we should refrain from attributing to agents of the past behaviours which they could not have accepted as 'correct descriptions' of what they had meant or done?[52]

As Richard Rorty points out, obeying Skinner's constraint would, probably necessarily, mean limiting ourselves to what a thinker might have said merely in response to their contemporaries and probably merely those contemporaries whom they would have understood.[53] But the case can be plausibly made, for example, that the preface to the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* shows that Hegel did not very clearly understand the criticisms aimed at him by von Baader, or was at the very lease taken aback by them[54] (it would arguably take the young von

[50] Though it is worth noting that Bloch, somewhat like Desmond, believes in an originally 'left-wing' Hegel against which the mature system reacts; see E. Bloch, *Atheism in Christianity*, trans. J.T. Swann (London: Verso, 2009), 193.

[51] P. W. Franks, *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism* (London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 144.

[52] Q. Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', *History and Theory* 8 (1969), 3–53.

[53] R. Rorty, 'The historiography of philosophy: four genres', in *Philosophy in History*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 49–50.

[54] G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse I*, Werke 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 26–32. Hegel aims to show here that he does not disagree with von Baader in matters either of religious doctrine or philosophical method, and does so, partly by appealing to their shared opposition to mainstream Protestant theology (his scape-goat is August Tholuck and his infamously thin treatment of the Trinity). As Hegel's first biographer, Karl Rosenkranz points out, this ultra-orthodox attack on Tholuck, along with its defence of the Catholic Baader, led to accusations of cryptocatholicism; K. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1844), 407. Peter Koslowski thinks that Hegel felt that Baader's criticism hit him at the core of his system: 'Hegel mußte sich schone in der Vorrede zur gegen Baaders Kritik verteidigen, und es ist erkennbar, daß er sich von der Kritik an seiner Theorie, daß die Natur der Abfall der Idee von sich sei, im Kern seines Systems getroffen fühlte'; P. Koslowski, *Philosophien der Offenbarung: Antiker Gnostizismus, Franz von Baader, Schelling* (Vienna: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001), 547.

Balthasar to really tell us what von Baader himself had meant[55]). Despite this, the Baaderian objection against Hegelian thought, as an insidious ontologisation of the passage through evil in the Fall, and the more general identification in Hegel of the coincidence of creation and the *Logos* (which allows the anthropogenesis of evil to be reconfigured theogenetically, as a pleromatic 'Fall'), forms the now dominant theological framework through which Hegel is condemned as both gnostic and heterodox by theologians (Cyril O'Regan[56], John Milbank[57]) and some philosophers (William Desmond[58]) on behalf of Christian orthodoxy. Elsewhere, as with the theologian Thomas Altizer[59] or with philosophers like Žižek,[60] this 'heterodoxy' is upheld alongside the estimation of Hegel as a political radical,[61] Indeed, Ernst Bloch's recently translated text, *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke*, identifies much of the same proto-materialist and nominalist tradition of thought from Plotinus through to Hegel as does Milbank's genealogy,[62] except not as a genealogical object of theological critique, but as an affirmative tradition for expanding the philosophical sources of the Marxist left.[63] Indeed, as Milbank's three-book conversation with Žižek demonstrates, the debate can very easily be reduced to the identification of merely 'negative agreement',[64] agreeing on the 'correct' reading of Hegel (as a nominalist, a gnostic, and, in the final analysis, a 'Christian atheist'), in order to disagree on more general, and perhaps more urgent, ideological issues.

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[55] H. U. Von Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele* (Salzburg: Pustet, 1939). For a scholarly discussion of von Balthasar's reformulation of von Baader's critique of Hegel, see A. Nichols, *Scattering the Seed: A Guide through Balthasar's Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts* (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 123–125.

[56] C. O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). See especially 151–168, for the O'Regan's view that the anthropogenesis of evil in creation is reconfigured into a theogenetic narrative of divine becoming.

[57] J. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory* (2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 147–176; 'The Double Glory or Paradox versus Dialectics,110–233.

[58] Desmond, *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?*, especially 121–167.

[59] T. Altizer, *Godhead and the Nothing* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003).

[60] S. Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), especially 79–136.

[61] This is all quite apart from the fact that von Baader's original objections against Hegel were deeply ambiguous and tended to become less severe after the two met in 1823. On their meeting, see C. Muratori, *The First German Philosopher: The Mysticism of Jakob Böhme as interpreted by Hegel*, trans. R. Dixon and R. Burns (London: Springer, 2016), 80–81. Rosenkranz also notes that von Baader became friendlier towards Hegel after the two met; *Hegels Leben*, 408.

[62] Milbank stretches back his genealogy of modernity to Plotinus in the second edition of *Theology and Social Theory*, xix–xx.

[63] E. Bloch, *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1952).

[64] Milbank, 'The Double Glory or Paradox versus Dialectics', 112.

One can make the case that the main point of theological contention apropos of Hegel today, really concerns his views on the Fall. Since the 1980s, commentators as diverse as Michael Inwood,[65] Cyril O'Regan,[66] Daniel Berthold-Bond,[67] and Peter Dews[68] have identified the significance and even centrality of the Fall narrative for Hegel's overall project. O'Regan's 'discovery' of an occluded 'upward' depth grammar in Hegel's account of the Fall has perhaps been the most influential. But it undoubtedly echoes Michael Inwood's appraisal, nearly fifteen years earlier, that the 'myth of fall does not, on Hegel's view, record a fall, but a tortuous ascent'.[69] Inwood's analysis of the Fall proceeds not from concerns over Hegel's theological or religious alignment, as does O'Regan's, though it does similarly proceed from the recognition of the account's importance, which, however, Inwood reads as being chiefly heuristic for the *Encyclopaedic* system as a project concerned with solving traditional philosophical problems. His broadly non-theological concerns notwithstanding, Inwood has maintained a sympathetic stance towards the faction of commentators, including O'Regan and later Magee, who emphasise Hegel's theological alignment as constituting an occulted 'dark side' of gnosticism and hermeticism, respectively.[70] And to the extent that Inwood's reading of Hegel is broadly continuous with that of O'Regan or Magee, it is so against the emergent orthodoxy of the 'non-metaphysical' Hegel indicated above.[71]

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[65] M. J. Inwood, *Hegel* (London: Routledge, 1983), 91–107.
[66] O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel*, 151–168.
[67] D. Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 86–94.
[68] P. Dews, *The Idea of Evil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 81–118.
[69] Inwood, *Hegel*, 99.
[70] Note that, though Inwood seems to assume that the Fall is for Hegel structurally necessary for human becoming, the claim that it is a 'tortuous' or 'circuitous' ascent may also be read to mean that human becoming is structurally heterogenetic, or even that it is totally contingently heterogenetic. The traditional theological position is that the Fall into sin and slavery is itself historically contingent. In Hegel's case, this should be read as a contingent displacement by sin of a providentially necessary plan in history. The 'ascent', therefore, derives from the necessity of this divine plan, not the circumstance of the Fall, which, as it were, delays and displaces it. For Inwood's comments on the Fall, see Inwood, M., *Hegel*, 99; and M. Inwood, *Commentary on the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 374. Note von Baader's claim that '*Das Symbol des Fortschrifttes unserer Vervollkommnung ist darum nicht die gerade Linie, sondern die spirale, wie auch unser Gang nu rein wechselweises Fallen ist*'; von Baader, Werke 12, 183.
[71] Inwood, *Hegel*, 1; and Inwood, 'Review of *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*. By Glenn Alexander Magee', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 42 (2002), 399.

Indeed, Inwood was one of the first systematic Hegel commentators to (re)emphasise the metaphysical elements of Hegel's thought after the revival of Anglophone scholarship in the 1970s, as well as to display dissatisfaction against the attempts to 'underplay this [metaphysical] aspect or to reduce it to a more familiar, commonsensical view of things'.[72] And there has tended to exist a curious 'alliance' between those who, like Inwood, place Hegel in the mainstream tradition of German metaphysicians, which includes Leibniz and Christian Wolff, and those, like Magee, who place him in the underground 'hermetic tradition' of the *Corpus Hermeticum*. This curious and syncretic alliance, between what I am tempted to call 'Enlightenment' and 'counter-Enlightenment' readers of Hegel, is made visible when noting the general agreement of its members apropos of Hegel's religious views, in general, and his views on the Fall and evil, in particular. However, while the subject of religion discloses much of the agreement between the members of this alliance (as I am calling it), it is the object of their shared opposition, the 'non-metaphysical' Hegel, which perhaps most aptly illustrates the grounds for its formation. As Magee writes, the 'non-metaphysical reading of Hegel is simply Hegel shorn of everything offensive to the modern, secular, liberal mind'.[73] As Inwood remarked in a review of Magee's text:

> This is an excellent book. It performs a significant service by its uninhibited exposure of Hegel's dark side. It attempts to understand Hegel, or at least one aspect of him, instead of presenting him as a paragon of political correctness.[74]

The common enemy of the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment alliance is then secular, modern (in the sense of modern, 20th century analytic philosophy), 'politically correct', liberalism. Or, more reservedly, it is the secularising, modernising, and liberalising tendencies in Hegel scholarship. For a philosopher like Inwood, the opposition, whether to 'liberalism'

[72] Inwood, *Hegel*, 1. One of the recurring arguments of Fredric Jameson's recent book on the *Phenomenology* is that dialectics has always been faced with attempts to normalise and reduce it to the very Enlightenment 'common-sense empiricism' which had been one of the two main objects of criticism from which it had emerged (the other being some paradigmatic caricature of Jacobian religiosity); see F. Jameson, *The Hegel Variations: On the* Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Verso, 2010), 1–2, 12–18.
[73] G. A. Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 15.
[74] Inwood, 'Review of *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition.* By Glenn Alexander Magee', 401.

broadly understood or to liberalising tendencies in the scholarship, is chiefly philosophical, proceeding as it does from the recognition that modern analytic philosophy itself emerged through the fight against the hegemony of ostensible Hegelian idealism in Britain[75]. For Milbank, as for O'Regan and others, this opposition is compounded by the more general political opposition (which perhaps remains only implicit in Inwood) to secular liberalism on the one hand, and the religious opposition to liberal theology, on the other.

If this 'liberalism', broadly defined, is the common enemy underlying this alliance, then we can identify a third, 'anti-liberal' element in Hegelian scholarship which, though superficially opposed to the work of either Inwood, or Milbank, represents a serious challenge to the 1970s consensus on metaphysics. I am referring to that tradition which reads Hegel against liberalism not, as it were, from the right, but from the left. The paradigmatic instance of this reading today is Žižek, who has defended Hegel's 'madness' against Robert Brandom's recent attempts to 'normalise' him, attempts which he has moreover explicitly identified as 'liberal'.[76] Like all previous commentators considered here, Žižek both highlights the significance of the story of the Fall for Hegel and expounds it in a form highly modified from its 'orthodox' doctrinal configuration, not only relative to tradition, but to Hegel.[77] Once again, while the counter-Enlightenment and Christian readers typically either reject Hegel's philosophical project entirely, as with O'Regan, or 'regionalise' dialectics within an overarching Trinitarian

[75] As Fraser McBride has recently show, early analytic philosophers like Russell and Moore suppressed the Hegelian influence on their thought; see F. McBride, *On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[76] S. Žižek, 'In Defence of Hegel's Madness', *Filozofija i Dru*štvo 26 (2015), 785–812. For the identification of the non-metaphysical Hegel with liberalism, see S. Žižek, *Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2014), 17. Note, however, that at least since the publication of his book on Schelling, *The Indivisible Remainder* (London: Verso, 1996), Žižek has articulated increasingly anti-humanist positions which may be read as indicating a deepening of his critique of the Enlightenment more generally. Nevertheless, I would maintain that his reading of Hegel remains linked to the articulation of a radical Enlightenment, including in its criticism of the Adorno-Horkheimer thesis on the dialectic of Enlightenment.

[77] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 125–132.

metaphysics, as with Milbank or Desmond, the left anti-liberal Hegelians of Žižek's ilk, endorse the German philosopher as a representative of the most radical and emancipatory aspects of the Enlightenment. The alliance I have been describing may therefore be grossly but helpfully simplified as a three-way negative agreement between the 'Enlightenment right' (analytic philosophers like Inwood), the 'Enlightenment left' (Continental philosophers like Žižek), and the 'counter-Enlightenment right' (Christian philosophers and theologians like Milbank, Desmond, and O'Regan).[78]

4 My Historiographic and Interpretative Approach

In this thesis, I would like to open-up the space for a 'left counter-Enlightenment' reading of Hegel. This reading constitutes the 'missing link' in the matrix of views I have been surveying. However, I can identify two subtraditions of Hegelian interpretation which together converge on the sort of reading I am endorsing. The first is the Anglo-Catholic theological tendency represented by Graham Ward, Andrew Shanks, and (to some extent) Rowan Williams. These theologians all correctly recognise the theological origin of Hegel's thought in contradistinction to mere Enlightenment reason, and Ward and Shanks additionally correctly emphasise what Shanks calls the 'teleological ambiguity' of historical experience[79]. To this extent, they may be regarded as a subtradition of the counter-Enlightenment right. The deficiency of this tradition is the underdevelopment of Hegel's theory of historical time and its connection to his understanding of sin. The second may be regarded as a subtradition of the radical Enlightenment left and includes the 'secular' theological reflections of Jewish critical thought, including Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Jacob Taubes, and more recently, Agata

[78] To the extent that this uneasy alliance is united by a reading of Hegel in religiously heterodox terms, its members' approval of Hegel's overall project can be gauged roughly by their respective views on traditional or orthodox Christianity.

[79] Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology: The God of Greatest Hospitality* (London: Routledge, 2016), 1–10.

Bielik-Robson. Here too, we find the correct recognition of the theological origin of Hegelian thought, alongside a further recognition of what Bloch identified as Hegel's 'evolutionism'[80], articulated in historical-temporal and messianic terms. The deficiency of this tradition, as I have argued elsewhere[81], is that it suppresses the significance of Hegel's reading of the Fall narrative, though Taubes still recognises that the theological emerges out of the 'cleavage' (*Entzweiung*) between 'the ideal standard and the status quo of man's situation'[82], a cleavage which Hegel otherwise explicitly characterises in lapsarian terms. This suppression of the Fall narrative partly ensues from the need to account for what Fackenheim identified as the 'flaw' in the Hegelian mediation of religion[83]; the 'unsublateable' and therefore ostensibly anachronistic persistence of the Jewish standpoint. In chapters three and four, I provide a new account of Hegel's mediation of the Jewish 'moment' and the 'transition' to Christianity. If my thesis concerning Hegel's understanding of Christocentric historical time is correct, then the Hegelian dialectical scheme of history unravels not in a Joachite triad (as it does for Taubes and Bielik-Robson, but also for Milbank and O'Regan) which confines Judaism to the supplanted 'age of the Father', but in a dyad that 'doubles' history into what I am calling the 'history of the Fall' and the 'history of Truth'. On this scheme, all religious moments are carried over from one side of the Christ-Event to the other, allowing Hegel to do what so puzzled Rosenkranz[84], namely, to identify Judaism with Greek and Roman religion on one side of the Christ-Event, and to identify it with 'Germanic world' and the origins of modernity, on the other.

[80] Bloch, *Atheism in Christianity*, 201.
[81] D. Demjaha, 'Hegelianism and the Meta-Religion: Ernst Bloch's Archetype of the Fall', *Praktyka Teoretyczna* 35 (2020), 95–119.
[82] J. Taubes, 'Theodicy and Theology: A Philosophical Analysis of Karl Barth's Dialectical Theology', in *From Cult to Culture: Fragments Towards a Critique of Historical Reason*, ed. Charlotte E. Fonrobert and A. Engel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 178.
[83] E.L. Fackenheim, 'Hegel and Judaism: A Flaw in the Hegelian Mediation', in *The Legacy of Hegel*, ed. J.J. O'Malley, K.W. Algozin, H.P. Kainz, and L.C. Rice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
[84] Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 42.

Hegel's philosophy of history is frequently regarded as an exemplary form of romantic and idealist counter-Enlightenment thinking in Germany. In the Anglosphere, the romantic context of his ideas has been highlighted by the always influential work of Charles Taylor.[85] But as Lewis Hinchman notes, as 'true as this romantic characterization may be', one can 'easily read Hegel as a philosopher who criticized romanticism with almost as much vigor as he did the Enlightenment'.[86] Indeed, for Hegel, as Hinchman observes, the Enlightenment and the various forms of romantic protest against it, have conditioned each other for centuries.[87] The problem, as indicated by Hegel himself, is that the Enlightenment acquires a 'monopoly on the definition of rational thought' such that those who protest against it, 'feel they must go beyond the limits of rationality altogether'.[88] In *Theology and Social Theory*, Milbank affirms 'four Hegelian tasks' which remain crucial for Christian theology if it is to 'redo' Hegel:

> These are, first, a theological critique of Enlightenment; second, a historical narration of the interconnection between politics and religion; third, a self-critique of Christian historical practice; fourth, and most importantly, the transformation of the Greek philosophical *logos* through encounter with the theological *logos*, so that thought itself becomes inescapably Christian, and one is 'beyond secular reason'.[89]

These four points get to the core of Hegel as a thinker of the Christian counter-Enlightenment, who does not, however, abandon the centrality of human reason, and therefore moves beyond, not simply the 'secular reason' of the Enlightenment, but also the ostensible anti-rationalism of the romantic reaction against it. In this sense, Hegel may be regarded as moving beyond the counter-Enlightenment (or the most dominant strain of it, with which he was concerned) as well. But what makes an interpretation of Hegel, in this case, both 'left-wing' and 'counter-

[85] C. Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1–14; Taylor, *Hegel*, 1–75
[86] L.P., Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment* (Jacksonville: Florida University Press, 1984), 253.
[87] Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 94–186.
[88] Hinchman, *Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment*, 253; G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II: Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes*, Werke 17 *(*Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 348–351.
[89] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 147.

Enlightenment'?

The 'Counter-Enlightenment' Component

To the extent that Hegel believes that the general sundering of faith and knowledge, which leads to the Enlightenment monopoly on rational thought and the problematic shaping of the protests against it, occurred within Protestantism, but not immediately with the Reformation, he may be read as advocating a kind of 'long middle ages', or alternatively, a 'modern middle ages'. As Andrew Cole has recently emphasised:

> [w]hen it comes to interpreting Hegel, biography aligns with philosophy, life with work, thought with action. He held modern ideals, was ever impatient with antiquated, feudal institutions, but was thoroughly realistic about the mixed composition of the present, at once modern and medieval.[90]

Hegel is thus particularly uninterested in drawing the distinction between the modern and the premodern because, for him, 'the medieval is already modern or, to use Hegel's own terms, "romantic"'.[91] Hegel's historiographic tendencies here are, of course, somewhat inconsistent, because he was always experimenting with the drafts of his lectures. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, the Reformation is the final historical formation to express the medieval philosophical worldview.[92] On the other hand, in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel reads the Reformation as the beginning of modernity.[93] But this is only as the first of three divisions of the 'modern world', which is itself the third division of the 'German world'. There are modernities nested within other modernities in Hegel. The one which concerns us, the Enlightenment,[94] the '*last stage in History, our world, our own time*', is treated under the

[90] A. Cole, *The Birth of Theory* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2014), xvi.
[91] Cole, *The Birth of Theory*, xvi, 174–175; G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Werke 20 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 61–66.
[92] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Werke 20, 49.
[93] G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12 (Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 491–492.
[94] It is of course problematic, but far from uncommon, to regard the Enlightenment as a kind of 'modernity' unto

heading of 'the Enlightenment and the Revolution'.[95] Hegel's recognition of the mixed modern/medieval composition of this period, allows him to develop a response to the Enlightenment philosophy of his time, by drawing on the past dialectical habits of the middle ages, and the relevance of both medieval and postmedieval thought to the 'questions of present philosophy', which is to say, of 'bifurcation' and of 'opposites'.[96] Of the three opposites which Hegel identifies, the first two; the opposition of God and his being, and the opposition of good and evil, explicitly derive from the middle ages.

The third, the ostensibly Kant-derived opposition between freedom and necessity, is qualified as an extension of the first two, by Hegel's insistence that it really concerns consciousness of 'the Fall' under the conditions of modernity.[97] The appeal to the relevance of medieval thought subsequently comes to involve the medieval emphasis on the reconciliation of a postlapsarian consciousness through *Nachdenken* – Hegel's most important term for the thinking apprehension of unity through opposites. As Cole points out, it is 'clear that for Hegel this thought of opposition and unity was not available in antiquity', and that 'this medieval opposition is fundamental to the founding of modern philosophy itself'.[98] It is thus only dialectics as *Nachdenken,* as a thinking after the 'theological' *Logos* (as Milbank also emphasises), rather than a merely Heraclitean or Platonic dialectics, that can found a philosophical approach to the problem of an unreconciled, which is to say 'fallen', consciousness in history. This focus on bifurcation and opposition as postlapsarian, I argue, is what most crucially informs Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment, and, is the reason I will go on to characterise my view here as explicitly 'counter- Enlightenment'. The two divisions of 'left/right' and 'counter/Enlightenment', lead us to another, even more fundamental opposition in Hegel's thought: that between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*. But let's not jump the gun. The two pairs of left/right and counter/Enlightenment do not overlap as

itself. Oliver O'Donovan's historiographic construction of 'early modern liberalism' is intended, precisely, to demarcate a form of Grotian liberalism apart from later Enlightenment forms of modern political thought; O. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 226–227.

[95] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 524. The section begins at 520.

[96] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Werke 20, 67–73.

[97] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Werke 20, 68.

[98] Cole, *The Birth of Theory*, 175.

much as we might think. Of course, left and right Hegelianisms have their respective left- and right-wing political associations,[99] and the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, especially in Germany, are straightforwardly identified today as the direct sources of contemporary liberalism and conservatism.[100] But the latter division, between the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, has the virtue of being given directly in Hegel's own thought. The *Phenomenology*, as Fredric Jameson points out, contains a virtually autonomous treatise on 'religion' as its last substantive chapter,[101] a chapter which identifies 'Enlightenment' and 'faith' (which stands for the *Religiosität* of the German romantic counter-Enlightenment) as the paradigmatic modes of modern thought.[102] And even Hegel's most mature work, the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, not only begins, but also concludes, with a reassertion of this basic division in modernity between the 'vanity' of Enlightenment's *Verstand* and the 'ingenuousness' of the counter-Enlightenment's *Religiosität*,[103]

However, one thing that is often left unemphasised about Hegel's treatment of opposites is that they are generally ordered pairs. This is often recognised in the case of 'Enlightenment' and 'faith', where Enlightenment is understood as an illumination of a dogmatic and/or superstitious faith,[104] But Hegel, or in any case the mature Hegel of Berlin, inverts the order of the opposition, in his characterisation of faith as the inwardness of certainty. It is this inwardness, he insists, not doubt or any other negative form, which comprises thought, such

[99] Although the politics of the Hegelian 'right' were considerably more varied than those of the Hegelian 'left', especially if one buys Hyppolite's influential analysis of the origins of Marxist theory in the *Phenomenology*; see J. Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel* trans. J. O'Neill (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1969). For a discussion of right Hegelianism as itself splitting off into 'orthodox' and 'critical' camps, with political consequences, see chapter one

[100] For a survey, see M. Zafirovski, *The Enlightenment and its Effects on Modern Society* (London: Springer, 2011), 279–299

[101] Jameson, *The Hegel Variations*, 116.

[102] The major study in the English language on this dialectic of Enlightenment and faith as the dominant discourses of modernity, is Jane Bennett's *Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and Politics in a Post-Hegelian Era* (New York: New York University Press, 1987).

[103] G. W F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion 3*, Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte 5 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984), 269.

[104] A more sophisticated, dialectical, and measured Marxist response comes from Cyril Smith who points out that the Enlightenment should be theorised dialectically as an 'advance/retreat': 'It was an advance, because its conception of the individual free from state and church control opened the way for huge scientific, political and social changes. But it was also a retreat, whose effects are felt to this day, because it put a stop to all attempts to think about ourselves as a part of a unified self-changing world. The Enlightenment's defeat of 'superstition' was an advance, without doubt, but one for which we paid a price: it walled us off from many centuries of thought about humanity and its world, for this had almost entirely been couched in religious terms'. See C. Smith, 'Hegel, Marx and the Enlightenment: an Interim Report', *Marxist Internet Archive* (2020): https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith–cyril/works/articles/interim.htm

that it is not faith that must go through Enlightenment in order to become 'critical', but, rather, thought itself that must return to itself, to faith.[105] This return, however, then becomes the object of critique. In other words, and as Hegel's tripartite division of reason into *Verstand*, *Dialektik,* and *Spekulation* entails, the Enlightenment principle of *Verstand* is what is subject to critique, but this critique comes before Hegel; the return to faith is made by the counter-Enlightenment. The point is not 'to let this critique degenerate into *misology*'.[106] Hence what Hegel offers is a critique of this return, including as still constituting a 'modern' standpoint, and a self-critique of Christian practice[107].

To the extent that thought has lost faith, it has lost it not with the modern world but with the Enlightenment, which is an extreme limit of the Lutheran world and too abstract an appearance of the principle of thought (i.e. reason as inwardly faith). As such, the Enlightenment banishes the speculative from the human as well as the divine.[108] The question then becomes 'postlapsarian': 'whence this need for a *restitutio in integrum?*', given not that thought has gone through Enlightenment, but that it has remained trapped in it (and to misological protests against it). The opposition between Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment (as the valorisation of faith in Romantic form) is accordingly central to Hegel's analysis of the Enlightenment reduction of 'reason' (*Vernunft*) to mere 'understanding' (*Verstand*).[109] And the

[105] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 349.
[106] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen I,* Werke 8, 55.

[107] By analogy, Marx, who identified with the socialists of his time, offered a critique of socialism as still capitalist. In this sense, while Hegel is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, 'Hegelianism' may be thought of as a kind of immanent critique of the counter-Enlightenment return to faith against the Enlightenment.
[108] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 349; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 523.
[109] The opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is essentially medieval, deriving respectively from *ratio* and *intellectus.* Though Hegel follows Kant in inverting the medieval primacy of *intellectus* over *ratio* he, much more so than Kant, retains the medieval tendency to view *ratio* (or *Verstand*) as an imperfect form of *intelligere* (or *Vernunft*). This opposition first appears in his thought in what Eva Moldenhaur and Karl Michel now identify as his earliest surviving academic text, an essay belonging to the fragments on folk religion and Christianity from Tübingen. Written in 1793, and known largely by its opening line 'religion is one of our greatest concerns in life', it criticises the sundering of reason from the imagination and feeling, intellectually in the Enlightenment, and institutionally in Christianity, while arguing in favour of a new *Volksreligion* along the familiar philhellenic lines

route of return to reason is marked by *Nachdenken*, a teleologically ambiguous process during which consciousness must go through 'representation' or 'picture-thinking' (*Vorstellung*), the medium of religious consciousness. As I argue below, in relation to Nicholas Adams' recent book on Hegel, this triadic structure of *Verstand-Vorstellung-Vernunft* is often overlooked in favour of the opposition between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* (as in Adams[110]) or worse, *Vorstellung* and *Denken* (as in Conor Cunningham[111]), and the emphasis on *Vorstellung*, as part of the necessary drift away from *Verstand*, is lost, and with it the significance attributed by Hegel to processes of (re)presentation, and therefore, to religious consciousness. Following Hegel's own insistence in the *Encyclopaedia*, I emphasise the opposition between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*,[112] and the role of *Vorstellung* in mediating the elevation from the one to the other.

I therefore do not identify the movement of the dialectic with the negative and critical operation of thought as 'Enlightenment'.[113] It would be a mistake to do this, because Hegel identifies the Enlightenment, as it appears in his work, with his own historical moment, something he regards as the object of philosophy's critique.[114] (To the extent that he regards Kant a proto-dialectical figure, it is to highlight the difference between the formally religious German Aufklärung and the anti-religious French *éclaircissement*.[115]) His complaints against the anti-rationalism of the romantics are themselves grounded in this critique of the

taken in the late 18th century by the German romantics; '*Religion ist eine der wichtigsten Angelegenheiten unseres Lebens.*'; see Hegel, 'Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum', in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 9.

[110] N. Adams, *Eclipse of Grace: Divine and Human Action in Hegel* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 23.
[111] C. Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology* (London: Routledge, 2002), 101.
[112] Hegel affirms this programmatically at the end of the *Vorbegriff*, where he also insists it forms the chief opposition of the *Phenomenology;* see Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen I*, Werke 8, 91. This section of the *Encyclopaedia* is the conclusion to the earlier discussion on the Fall
[113] Adorno and Horkheimer, of course, argued that in criticising the 'positivist degeneracy' of the Enlightenment, Hegel had discovered the power of its negativity (but had nevertheless 'lapsed into mythology' by absolutising it); see T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* trans. J. Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), 24.
[114] Though sometimes Hegel insists that philosophy is itself opposed by his time; see Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 269.
[115] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 526.

Enlightenment and Verstand as a sundering of faith and reason (and hence of thought as itself dialectical and as falling into its negative[116]). But the counter-Enlightenment impulse (say, of Jacobi), in its recognition of speculative thought-contents in the forms of human feeling, is itself the dialectical movement of consciousness as *Nachdenken*, the free self-*Aufhebung* of consciousness towards God, or the Absolute. Hence, though Hegel offers a 'critique of dialectical reason' in the name of 'philosophy' as a speculative reconciliation of both Enlightenment and faith, his own 'thought' occupies the standpoint of this critique, with philosophy as reconciliation – what he also called 'theology' – often remaining an aspiration for the future, of history as well as of thought. I can therefore preliminarily define my approach to Hegel as 'counter-Enlightenment' because it positions Hegel's thought as critically identifying with the counterthesis to the Enlightenment as the spirit of his own historical moment. However, I will characterise my approach as constituting a 'left' reading, because it will emphasise dialectic over against speculation, though only to the extent that dialectic is constituted through its own self-critique; a critique which points toward but does not constitute the speculative. This is why Hegel's final *Lectures* conclude by pointing to the speculative horizon beyond the opposition of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, which they restate, rather than fully reconcile.

But first, another digression. This opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is so important to Hegel's work[117] it almost makes his thought appear fundamentally dyadic, rather than triadic, in structure. As Adams has recently argued, Hegel's work repeatedly admits to two 'rival

[116] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen I*, Werke 8, 55

[117] The distinction between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is presupposed in any attempt to grasp the three aforementioned oppositions of philosophy. As Hegel notes in the *History of Philosophy* (reiterating a point from the *Science of Logic*), medieval thought itself recognises that in order to approach the opposition of God and his being, we must first recognise the possibility of their thinkability as an 'absolute unity' alongside the 'extreme' alternative as a 'single unity'. The two possibilities refer, respectively, to those afforded by *Vernunft* and *Verstand.* In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel draws the crucial and comparable distinction between the 'unseparatedness' and 'unity' of being and nothing; see chapter one.

logics'.[118] This is because Hegel's thought proceeds from the recognition that the *oppositio* between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, to use Rosenkranz' formulation, has become a *repugnantia*, a contradiction'.[119] It is a response to a problem which presents a seemingly unsurpassable bifurcation. And the problem is fundamentally religious, having been first identified in the *Genesis* story of the Fall. Hence the form (but possibly also the content) of the opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* is (re)presented by the Christian religion as *Entzweiung* (meaning 'bifurcation', 'division', but also 'doubling'). This has led some commentators, such as Øjvind Larsen, to argue that *die Entzweiung* remains 'the central problem in all of Hegel's philosophical work'.[120] Rosenkranz' highlighting of the insidious transformation of mere opposition into contradiction is, moreover, theorised by Hegel in terms of the drift from *Entzweiung* to *Entfremdung* (meaning 'estrangement' or 'alienation'). As Joachim Ringleben points out, in what is possibly the only book-length treatment of Hegel's views on sin, *Entzweiung* means both the division of a unity into its moments, as well as the division of those moments from each other into opposition.[121] And the persisting reification of this oppositional differentiation in isolation marks the move from mere *Entzweiung* to *Entfremdung*.[122] As a

[118] Adams refers to these as a 'logic of opposition' and a 'logic distinction in inseparable relation' which he characterises as a 'Manichean logic' versus a 'Chalcedonian logic'; Adams, *Eclipse of Grace*, 23. However, Adams identifies these logics with Hegel's *Vorstellung* and *Begriff*, respectively. This, I think, is a mistake. I address Adams' reading of Hegel below.

[119] K. Rosenkranz, 'The Difference of Baader from Hegel', trans. T. Davidson. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2 (1868), 55–56. Rosenkranz adds: 'Opposition becomes necessary when things, in themselves opposed, manifest, instead of their proper unity, the diremption thereof. This possibility is necessary, but the actualization of it is accidental'. Rosenkranz is drawing on the medieval conception (most obviously traceable to Albert,via Boethius) of opposition as a weak and relative *repugnantia* and of contradiction as the highest *repugnantia*.

[120] Ø. Larsen,. *Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy*, trans. R. Dees (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2009), 260–262. Larsen is a critic of what he calls the 'recognition perspective' in Hegel scholarship. This is a slight historiographic alteration of the non- metaphysical perspective and refers to the largely overlapping tradition of interpreters who focus their attention on 'recognition' (and themes of normativity). Žižek also associates the deflated, non-metaphysical Hegel with the centrality of 'recognition'; see *Absolute Recoil*, 17.

[121] '*Entzweiung von Einheit* in *Momente und zugleich Entzweiung* der *Momente voneinander in gegensätzliche*'; see J. Ringleben, *Hegels Theorie der Sünde* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), 57. The emphases are Ringleben's. *Entfremdung* occurs, for Ringleben, when the oppositional differentiation of the two moments solidifies and each persist in isolation; cf. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen I*, Werke 8, 91–92. *Entfremdung* is the result of a practice that has become antagonistic to the actor. Ringleben's analysis furthermore, and in my view correctly, suggests that only the *Entzweiung* of a unity '*in Momente*' is a structural necessity of human spiritual becoming.

[122] A similar point to this was more recently made by Peter Hodgson; see P. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),

reification of the bifurcation of reason, this contradiction is furthermore a Manichean reduction of triplicity to duplicity, a preclusion of the natural falling of reason (as *Verstand*) into its negative.

The 'Left' Component

However one wishes to characterise one's Hegelianism; left, right, Enlightened or Romantic, one would unequivocally affirm *Vernunft*, 'reason', as the fundamental category of Hegel's thought (though others, such as *Geist* or *Aufhebung*, may be seen as doing all the work). Hegel is a rationalist; the question is simply what kind of rationalist. Even the neo-Kantians, who wished to drop Hegel's category of the Absolute, do not shy away from 'reason'. But reason is itself bifurcated by Hegel, as we have seen, including in the final distinction between dialectic and speculation. As John Burbidge points out, no doubt somewhat reductively, the post-Hegelian split may be analysed in terms of this final bifurcation of reason, with left Hegelians tending to make the dialectic, or the 'negativity' of reason, the foundation of philosophy, and the right Hegelians taking speculation, or the 'positivity' of reason as their foundation.[123] Anyone familiar with the dominant tendencies in Hegelianism will recognise that my emphasis on bifurcation and reconciliation, on *Entzweiung* and *Versöhnung* (including as an emphasis of Hegel's religious concerns), is a habit of the Hegelian 'right'. As an interpretative and ideological 'bias', this focus on bifurcation and reconciliation first expressed by Hegel's student, Hermann Hinrichs. Wolfgang Bonsiepen commended it, as the best interpretation (of,

149–153.

[123] J. Burbidge, 'Where is the Place of Understanding?' in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, ed. G. Giovanni (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 178. Note, again, the similarity to Engels' claim that '[w]hoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres [politics and religion]; whoever regarded the dialectical method as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion'; see F. Engels, 'Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy', in *On Religion*, 222.

specifically, the *Phenomenology*) to be developed by Hegel's students, as well as the first 'neo-Platonic' interpretation of Hegel.[124] Hinrichs' elevation of bifurcation and reconciliation, as Eric v.d. Luft points out, was the first in a series of attempts to reduce the *Phenomenology* to a 'single, basic, pervasive dialectic' (what Schmidt referred to as a 'general characterisation').[125] Another, perhaps more influential, attempt would be Alexandre Kojève's elevation of the master and slave dialectic. Both 'elevations', Luft points out, are biases, but Hinrichs' 'seems to coincide exactly with Hegel's own [bias]'.[126]

To the extent that I also emphasise 'rational religion and philosophical theology',[127] I am confirming and perpetuating this bias. This is connected to the counter-Enlightenment component of my reading. However, I am adopting what both Burbidge and Luft identify as the left-Hegelian tendency to derive one's fundamental interpretative orientation from a 'lower' or less 'concrete' stage of the overall Hegelian system. For example, the emphasis on dialectic (over against speculation), or of the master and slave opposition (over against their reconciliation) is a perhaps disproportional emphasis of a 'lower' standpoint within Hegel's thought over against a 'higher' one[128]. (Differently put, this left move could be characterised as reading Hegel from the standpoint of consciousness towards *Geist*, rather than of consciousness as already *Geist.*) Why openly admit to such a strategy? Firstly, because this approach emerges from thinking philosophically about the specificity of one's own historical

[124] W. Bonsiepen, 'Erste zeitgenössische Rezensionen der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*', *Hegel Studien* 14 (1979), 9–38.

[125] E. v. d. Luft, 'An early interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', in *Ruminations: Selected Philosophical, Historical, and Ideological Papers, vol. 1* (New York, NY: Gegensatz Press, 2019), 37.

[126] Luft, 'An early interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', 38.

[127] Luft, 'An early interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', 38.

[128] As Donald MacKinnon emphasised apropos of Marxism and in opposition to F.H. Bradley (but the point is really about left vs right Hegelianisms), the difference is between fashioning theory 'in accordance with the way in which things are' as opposed to 'in accordance with our aspirations'; D. MacKinnon, 'Absolute and Relative in History: a theological reflection on the centenary of Lenin's birth', in *Explorations in Theology 5* (London: SCM, 1976), 56.

moment; and secondly, because Hegelian philosophy is constituted as such, as philosophy, in response to the problem of the *Entzweiung*, rather than through some preliminary philosophical ideal. All of Hegel's thought proceeds from the recognition that, as Altizer points out, Christianity is the only major religious tradition to begin with 'profound internal opposition'.[129]And human 'thought' occupies that *op-position*. Hence, it is not simply that the emergence of humanity from the immediacy of its natural life laboriously requires historical and spiritual *Bildung.* Rather, the very emergence of that *Bildung* itself is laborious, having been complicated historically by what the Jewish and Christian religions (re)present as a 'Fall'.

In emphasising this 'left' component, I am emphasising human striving in history, but I am characterising it as primarily a 'postlapsarian' reality. This is not in order to reject some traditional 'left' emphases on human striving as 'class struggle', which undoubtedly have their place in Hegel, but in order to give them the theological context which has typically been denied to them. Most of the commonplaces about left and right Hegelianisms were developed in an early and now classic essay by H.S. Harris. There, Harris reproduces the idea that the left's link to Hegel was the 'dialectic', while the right's link was the 'Absolute',[130] associating each with emphases on human striving and individual moral value, on the left hand, and a denial of human moral endeavour in favour of an aestheticised intellectualism, on the right.[131] He furthermore adds, in reference to the British right Hegelian F.H. Bradley, that,

> [i]t has often been pointed out that Hegel's system was generally regarded by its English adherents as a bulwark for the truths of the Christian faith; and this was the paradox of the religious attitude as Bradley saw it – that the Christian is

[129] Altizer, *Godhead and the Nothing*, 4.
[130] This is far less good than Burbidge's claim that the right's link is speculation, since it was the right Hegelians who originally made the neo-Kantian turn and attempted to drop the category of the Absolute. This is caused by Harris' total identification of the Hegelian right with British idealism (over against the German Hegelian right, which had made the neo-Kantian move).
[131] Harris, H.S., 'Hegelianism of the 'Right' and 'Left'. *The Review of Metaphysics* 11 (1958), 606.

> required to believe that God exists while acting as if everything still depended upon himself. The only coherent alternative to Bradley's impersonal Absolute, and his denial of ultimate value to human moral striving, lies in regarding Hegel's Absolute as a pure ideal. This is tantamount to a denial of the existence of God; hence it was no accident that the split between "right" and "left" in the Hegelian tradition began on this issue.[132]

We are supposed to believe that the problem lies in human striving being denied when something is posited 'over and above' humanity as *Geist*. This is because any such being over and above humanity as *Geist* would have to be, on Hegel's view, 'Absolute', and therefore constitute a totality within which humanity as *Geist* would be so thoroughly 'integrated' that it would render human action meaningless.

As I understand this preposterous 'right-wing' caricature, it would also render meaningless the life of Christ, and so would paradoxically accrue accusations of demythologisation, as do the left Hegelian treatments of Christianity in Baur or Engels. It is now a commonplace to point out that all of this would have been ridiculous to Hegel, which is not to say that I will provide the thousandth interpretation of his thought claiming to be faithful to the old Master. It is the fate of Hegelianism, perhaps as the '*auto-da-fé* of all previous philosophy', to be used and abused, so I have no delusions about my 'left' and 'counter-Enlightenment' biases, as I have called them. However, I do believe that the 'problem' of left vs right Hegelianism (and the underlying Enlightenment/counter-Enlightenment division it always invokes) can be addressed, and Hegel interpretation moved beyond its opposition, by a reconstruction of Hegel's dialectic as a working out of Christological and hamartiological principles. In other words, the response, suggested but never fully worked out by Hegel himself, is that yes, God exists, but human consciousness is separated from God in history. This means that the human

[132] Harris, 'Hegelianism of the 'Right' and 'Left', 606.

striving for the divine is of absolute value, even if it is of limited capacity, something consistently emphasised by Hegel's insistence on failure and the frustration of will as a constituent of human action in history. And the life of Christ too, is no impotent myth, but is implicated in the postlapsarian contradiction of its historical moment; as the contradiction between sinless individuality and universal fallenness which leads to death and the crucifixion.

The 'ideal', then, as Hegel himself basically clarifies[133], is not the *Absolute*, but humanity itself, as *Geist*, as unified in history[134].

5 Explication of Special Terminology

The chapters in this thesis rely on the deployment of special terminology derived from Hegel's work and, in some cases, from Hegel scholarship, while the title of the thesis employs the construction 'history of the Fall', which is furthermore qualified as 'hidden'. I have attempted to limit the use of such terminology, except where necessary, though I have in many cases incorporated Hegel's original German in my prose, partly to bypass long-term translation disputes, and partly to retain their 'Hegelian' sense where a translation of the term into English would yield too common or casual a term. One such example is the frequent use of *Zweck*, commonly and not incorrectly translated as 'purpose' or 'goal', but these are too far removed from the teleological specification given to it by Hegel, in addition to being overly identified in our time with a self-appointed purpose or what the Existentialists call a 'project' (the notion of a *Selbstzweck* exists in Hegel, but it is a further elaboration of *Zweck* in the domain of *Begriff*). There is a class of Hegelian terminology (such as 'abstract', 'concrete', 'appearance', 'actuality', 'immediacy', 'mediation', etc.) which is explicated in the main text and does not require special clarification here. Furthermore, there is a smaller class of terminology I employ,

[133] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen III*, Werke 10, 232–233

[134] This is why my insistence on philosophy as *Spekulation* as an ideal in no way involves a right-Hegelian suspension of human striving in history.

particularly in the first chapter, which consists either of terms of my own creation (e.g. 'immediate mediation'), or terms I have appropriated from commentators (e.g. 'transitoriness'), to assist my argument. This terminology is also explicated in the main text. Here, I will provide some clarifications and rationales for the use of the following terms and constructions: (1) 'history of the Fall', its further specification, 'hidden history of the Fall', and its counterpart, 'history of Truth'; (2) 'omnidirectionality'; (3) Nachdenken; and (4) 'purified consciousness' and 'natural consciousness'.

(1) The 'history of the Fall' is perhaps the main concept underlying my argument. On one level, it is simply a reformulation of the 'story of the Fall'. The common formulation *Geschichte des Sündenfalls* is frequently used by Hegel, but with 'history of the Fall', I have attempted to bring to this common formulation the dual sense of the term *Geschichte*, as both 'story', 'narrative', 'report', as well as 'history'. This is connected to my argument that the 'story' of the Fall is the original presentation and prefiguration of the revelation of the failure of the divine *Zweck* of history in the life of Jesus, which Hegel argues is the first 'divine story' to become completely 'historical', which is to say, to be fully historically thinkable as an historical 'event'.[135] It therefore also invokes the connection between *Geschick* and *Schicksal* (meaning 'fate') so central to Hegel's preference for *Geschichte* over *Historie*. In my overall argument, this 'history of the Fall' designates the entire development of religious consciousness leading to the Christ-Event, at which point, history is 'opened' to 'truth' (Jn. 14.6). As Croce puts it, 'history becomes *history of the truth* with Christianity, it […] recognizes its own proper law [read: *Zweck*], which is no longer a natural law, blind fate, or even the influence of the stars, but rationality, intelligence, providence'.[136] This 'history of Truth' is the counterpart of the 'history of the Fall' and designates Hegel's account of the development of consciousness after the

[135] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3 , 294.
[136] B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, trans. D. Ainslie (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), 205. My emphasis.

vanishing of Jesus (as the condition for the coming of the Spirit; Jn. 16.7). The fundamental difference between the two 'histories', is that while the latter grounds an explicitly eschatological consciousness, the former is only revealed in its 'historical movement' (i.e. as the sequence of natural and finite religion spiralling ever further into degeneration and death) at the Christ-Event, before which it is perceived as an arbitrary 'blind destiny'. The 'history of the Fall' is therefore 'hidden' from what Hegel calls 'natural consciousness' because this consciousness cannot not recognise 'history', as the development of divine Providence in time.

(2) I use the term 'omnidirectional' to characterise the logic of mediation inherent in Christ as the 'centre of reconciliation' of human history.[137] Kojève famously argued that Hegel had problematically conflated cosmic and historical time.[138] I cannot really get into that issue here, but I can tentatively suggest that Hegel's understanding of the Incarnation demands a displacement of historical time as linear. History is either proceeding *to*, or proceeding *from* the Christ-Event which, as a return to the divine, is displaced precisely as the 'centre' of reconciliation. This is because the coming of Christ (as 'the fullness of time'; Gal. 4.4-7) omnidirectionally effects both the reconciliation of humanity with God, as well as the resetting of all human communal and ethical ties (and therefore the *historical* positing of the *Entzweiung* of the Fall narrative, in the contradiction between sinless individuality and universal fallenness) which establishes the historical need for that reconciliation. In this sense, the coming of Christ is a 'cosmic' constitution of an historical possibility in history, and this constitution or mediation is 'omnidirectional' for two reasons. Firstly, because it displaces the linearity of historical time, by mediating both the historical past as the 'history of the Fall', as well as the historical future as the 'history of Truth'. And secondly, because it displaces the linearity of

[137] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 249.
[138] A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. J. H. Nichols (London: Cornell University Press, 1980), 133.

cause and effect by both being reconciliation as well as being what makes the need for that reconciliation possible.

(3) *Nachdenken* may be translated literally as 'after-thinking' or 'thinking-after'. This has the benefit of highlighting it as something which presupposes *Denken* and is therefore posterior to it. For some, Hegel's *Nachdenken* helps clarify the extent to which Hegelian logic is a thinking after the *Logos*.[139] It is always a subjective thinking and is for this reason frequently rendered in English simply as 'reflection', or 'meditative thinking', but it has also been given more elaborate forms, such as 'thinking things over'. The latter translation accurately conveys Hegel's theorisation of *Nachdenken* as a thinking that 'takes things' and 'holds fast' to them. In this sense, it is connected to 'meditative thinking' through Hegel's definition of philosophy as a *denkende Betrachtung* of objects. A more technical terminological rendering of *Nachdenken* is Inwood's 'meta-thinking', which he defines as 'thought about things to which our primary and prior access was secured by some other means than thought'.[140] Understanding *Nachdenken* is, therefore, crucial to understanding Hegel's view on religion because, for Hegel, our primary and prior access to the contents of religious experience and ideas is not through thought, narrowly construed as 'conceptual thinking', but through the prior forms of intuition, feeling, and representation. *Nachdenken* is therefore the way in which Hegel suggests 'transposing' the contents of intuition and representational thinking to the higher form of 'thought proper'.[141] As Bethold-Bond has argued, *Nachdenken* is the answer given to Hegel's critique of *Vorsgtellungsdenken*.[142]

[139] This is Spaventa's view; see B. Spaventa, 'Frammento Inedito', in *Opere*, ed. F. Valagussa (Milano: Bompiani, 2008), 1196. I develop this view further in chapter one
[140] Inwood, *Hegel, 46.* Inwood is correct that the implication of the prefix is not that *Nachdenken* is thinking about thinking, as Quentin Lauer mistakenly suggests in his influential *Hegel's Concept of God* (Albany: SUNY, 1982), 62.
[141] Inwood, *Hegel*, 29.
[142] D. Bethold–Bond, *The Ethics of Authorship: Seduction, Communication, and Death in Hegel and Kierkegaard* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 165.

(4) 'Purified consciousness' and 'natural consciousness' are terms I have adopted from Hegel's discussions of the world religions. I use them almost exclusively as an oppositional pair. The notion figures prominently, alongside the similar concept of *Natursein*, in Hegel's analysis and critique of *Naturreligion,* in the lectures on both history and religion. And the whole of the first half of the *Phenomenology* may, of course, be read as a critique of natural consciousness (*natürliche Bewusstsein*). Traditionally, that means positing natural consciousness as antithetical to genuine self-consciousness.[143] I also emphasise 'natural consciousness' as antithetical to human self-knowing, but not primarily as *Selbstbewusstsein*, but as *Sichdenken.* This is because I emphasise Hegel's claim that the 'purification' (*Reinigung*) of natural consciousness in Jewish religion represents the beginning of *Sichdenken*. Hence, historically, the natural consciousness of the 'Eastern' religions is opposed to its purification in Jewish religion which, in the majority of Hegel's schematisations of world religions, represents the first 'elevation' of *Naturreligion* to religions of spiritual individuality. However, the use of the term 'natural' is here opposed to 'divine', in so far as the 'purification' of Jewish religious consciousness is a function of the transcendence of the monotheistic God, which relativises 'nature' as 'creation'. Hence natural consciousness is also opposed to revelation, and is attributable to the finite religions of Greece and Rome, whereas purified consciousness marks the beginning of an historical process of revelation leading to Christianity as the 'revealed religion'. The term *Reinugung* is the traditional German translation of *purgatio*, the first of the three mystical or spiritual ways, hence its links, for Hegel, with the beginnings of revelation and reconciliation with God.

[143] For a recent emphasis of this opposition, see B. Theunissen, 'Hegels *Phänomenologie* als metaphilosophische Theorie', *Hegel–Studien* 50 (2017), 289–292.

6 Structure of the Argument and Chapter Breakdown

This dissertation is divided into five chapters and three parts. The first part deals with predominantly theoretical issues: the first chapter with the beginning and possibility of logic, and the second with the beginning and possibility of historical revelation. The second parts deal with more overtly historical issues: the third chapter with the question of whether the transition from Judaism to Christianity in Hegel is 'supersessionist', and the fourth chapter with Hegel's account of the 'history of the Fall' as a developmental history of pre-Christian religions. The final part, which consists of the fifth chapter, is the most theological, addressing Hegel's understanding of the Christ-Event as a punctuation of history. By the end of the dissertation, I hope to have determined how, on a Hegelian understanding of history as a developmental process, the Christ-Event, as the life and history of one individual, can be said to have punctuated history into a history of the Fall and a history of the Truth. My interpretation will often go beyond what is explicit in the *Philosophy of History* and the rest of the system with which I will regularly engage. Hence, in attributing to Hegel the idea of a 'history of the Fall', I will be reconstructing a concept which I take to be implicit in the texts, as well as find to uniquely explain Hegel's many, if often unsystematic, statements about the relationship between history, sin, and the Christ-Event.

Chapter one ***Metalogic***

The most fundamental and controversial implication of the position I have been outlining so far is, perhaps, that the development of human historical consciousness somehow disrupts 'thought' as such. I develop the implications of this view in chapter one, where I argue for a 'metalogical' interpretation of the *Science of Logic*. To this extent I am aligned with therecent

attempt by David Carlson[144] to emphasise the structural limitations of human knowing in Hegel without overemphasising the *Phenomenology* over against the *Logic*. However, because many attempts to safeguard Hegelian logic from the possibly radical epistemological implications of the breakdown of consciousness, in the *Phenomenology* as well as in the lectures on history and religion, overemphasise the *Science of Logic* over against the latter texts, I develop an interpretation of Hegelian logic as an interplay between the two rival logics of *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, which I connect to the respective developmental processes of 'thought' as logic and consciousness. My argument is that the beginning of the development of consciousness (towards *Geist* as 'mind') is a postlapsarian inversion of the beginning of logic. Drawing on the important work of Dieter Henrich,[145] I suggest that there is a difference between the *science* of Hegelian logic and the immanent *process* of logical thought-determinations (*dem Prozess der logischen Gedankenbestimmungen*). Thus, while the beginning of the logic – the 'process' – proceeds 'unidirectionally' towards the absolute *Idee*, the 'scientific' (*wissenschaftlich*) grasping of this process, including its scientific grounding or justification, is retrograde (it is a *rückläufiges Begründung*), with a view to the whole, and therefore amounts to a kind of global metalogic.[146]

However, my 'metalogical' interpretation of the logic differs from Henrich's in three ways. Firstly, while I agree with Henrich that the metalogical grounding of the logic is 'reflective' and therefore involves a kind of *Nachdenken* which violates the *Science of Logic*'s claims, however tentative they may be, towards an absolutely grounded and presuppositionless knowledge, I disagree that this 'reflective' moment, which is surreptitiously involved in the

[144] D. Carlson, *A Commentary on Hegel's* Science of Logic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
[145] D. Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971).
[146] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', in *Hegel im Kontext*, 92–93.

'beginning' of the logic, has its source in the 'future' of the logic, i.e. in the doctrine of essence, where Hegel first develops the concept of reflection. Instead, I argue, following William Maker,[147] that this moment of reflection is to be located in the notion of *reine Wissen*, which terminates the development of consciousness as 'mind' in the *Phenomenology*. Secondly, I argue that the logic is only secondarily undermined by its epistemological over-optimism (which is what Henrich suggests). Instead, I expand on Cynthia Willet's claim that the *Science of Logic* contains a shadow narrative, a rival logic from the standpoint of *Verstand*, which allows for the possibility of an alternative beginning of the logic, one which resolves the opposition of being and nothing not into 'becoming', but into 'transitoriness'. Logic is therefore primarily undermined by an agonistic interplay of two rival logics. To this extent I am in somewhat of a negative agreement with Carlson, who argues that it is the standpoint of *Verstand* which 'disturbs the unity of Absolute Idea' and '[guarantees] that the process never comes to rest'.[148]

Thirdly, however, I argue that this agonistic or 'Manichean' interplay between the rival logics of *Verstand* of *Vernunft* is not immanently necessary for logical thinking but is the historical result of the reduction of the latter to the former, such that the very 'logic' of the relation between the two becomes one of *Verstand*, rather than of *Vernunft*. I develop this idea, apropos of the beginning of Hegel's logic by explicating Hegel's crucial distinction between thinking being and nothing as 'unseparatedness' and thinking being and nothing as mere 'unity'. This

[147] W. Maker, 'Beginning', in *Essays on Hegel's Logic* ed. G. Giovanni (Albany: SUNY, 1990).

[148] Carlson, *Commentary on Hegel's* Science of Logic, 599. Where I disagree with Carlson is in his insistence that *Verstand*'s 'disruption' of the logic is necessarily immanent to it. Milbank, in *Beyond Secular Order*, complains that 'the modern Hegelian 'dialectical' option is but a counterfeit mediation which involves a constant agonistic shuttle between sameness and difference that ultimately issues both in a swallowing of the different'. Milbank's use of the term 'modern' is strategic, conveying the extent to which he believes Hegel can only be read following modern revisionists like Kojève, Hyppolite, and Žižek, alongside the 'modernity' of Hegel as such. My point is that this is to overcommit to the leftist identification with a lower standpoint of Hegelian thought. What Milbank describes is a problem for Hegel as much as it is for him; see J. Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2014), 51–52.

divergence of approaches with regard to the initiation of the logic, which respectively corresponds to the logics of *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, subsequently overdetermines one's (re)presentation of the relation between the two, either as concretely inseparable or as abstractly unified (which reduces the operations of both to the logic of one). I argue that this 'intellective' (rather than 'rational' or 'dialectical') logic of the bifurcation of reason is linked to the historical development of religious consciousness as 'fallen', which disturbs its becoming as 'mind'. I conclude by offering a characterisation of *Verstand* as a postlapsarian mode of thinking in dialogue with Žižek, whose work affirms unity over against unseparatedness, which he grounds in the standpoint of *Verstand.* I argue that if the principle of unity proceeds from the standpoint of *Verstand*, the principle of unseparatedness (which is preferred by Hegel himself) must proceed from the standpoint of *Vorstellung*. This leads to the second chapter.

Chapter two ***Nachdenken as Revelation***

In the second chapter, I develop three fundamental claims which underpin Hegel's understanding of history, including his 'philosophical' understanding of history, as the development of divine providence in time. These are, firstly, Hegel's claim that history is constituted through the unity of historical events and their narration; secondly, and following from the first chapter, that the order of the development of consciousness is historically inverted, such that the thinking *Geist* only advances to thoughts and concepts through (re)presentation (*durchs Vorstellen*); and thirdly, that *Vorstellungen* or (re)presentations should be regarded as 'metaphors' of thoughts and concepts. I develop the significance of these claims for Hegel's understanding of history, as well as for the understanding of the link between this understanding of history and logic. Hegel recognised their significance for logic, which is why he also developed them in the introductory sections of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*.[149] Their

[149] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen I*, Werke 8, 41, 47, 67.

significance for logic is tied to the transition from 'consciousness' (as *reine Wissen*) in the *Phenomenology* and third *Encyclopaedia*, to 'being' (as *reine Sein*) in the *Science of Logic* and the first *Encyclopaedia.* This transition involves, for Hegel, a 'withdrawing' or 'pulling back' from (re)presentations into 'pure thoughts' (*reine Gedanke*). Hegel characterises this transition to logical thinking as difficult, on the one hand, because the withdrawal from the thought-form of *Vorstellungen* is difficult, requiring both 'strength' and 'training'. But he characterises it as easy, on the other, because the content of logical thinking is that of its own thinking itself. What this means is that the thinking of our own thought, especially as a 'self-thinking' (*Sichdenken*), which should be easy, is in actuality difficult. But why is this the case?

I argue that logical thinking is 'easy' from the standpoint of a 'mediated immediacy', which is to say, from the standpoint of the development of the logical process as such, because it involves nothing more than the mediation of our own thought. Logic does not begin, to use Hegel's famous metaphor, 'as if fired from a pistol'; it does not require the difficult explorations of inner revelation or faith.[150] History, however, *is* fired from a pistol, and it requires the development of consciousness through the completely disorganised experience of historical becoming. Logic is therefore 'difficult' from the standpoint of 'immediate mediation', or from the standpoint of the development of consciousness as a postlapsarian inversion, because more often than not, the logical thinker is much too muddled and mired in sensuous forms of 'natural consciousness' in order to move freely within the transparency and clarity of abstract and pure thinking. For this reason, the development of consciousness requires for Hegel the 'purification' of natural consciousness which culminates, phenomenologically, in *reine Wissen*. Further developing the idea of the history of consciousness as the overturning of 'immediate

[150] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 65–66.

mediation' into 'mediated immediacy', I explicate Hegel's account of the teleology of this overturning through the 'imaging' of abstract concepts into concrete (re)presentations.

Following Hermann Ulrici's insight that *Denken* presupposes for Hegel a form of *Sichdenken* coterminous with it, I develop a proposal for a *Sichdenken* in the form of *Nachdenken*, which I argue best characterises the complex historical emergence of human self-knowing as continuous with the 'revelation' of the divine. The necessity of both this process (*Nachdenken*) and the continuity of human self-knowing and divine revelation it entails, is attributed by Hegel to the inability of human beings to realise the *Zweck* of history, a failure he, in turn, associates with the Fall. This is most clearly illustrated by Hegel's account of the development of the concept of religion in general, and of the concept of the revealed religion or Christianity in particular. Revelation in history, or the emergence of the truth of faith, requires for Hegel the 'imaging' of the *abstrakte Begriff* of God in the *konkrete Vorstellung* of Christ and the subsequent unity of this concept and its 'image', through which the communion with the divine (which Hegel calls the *Kultus*) is constituted. I therefore argue that *Nachdenken* as revelation, economically constituted through the Father as *abstrakte Begriff*, the Son as *konkrete Vorstellung*, and the Spirit as *Kultus*, entails for Hegel, speculatively holding on to both the 'thought' or concept (*Begriff*) of God as well as its 'metaphor' or 'image' (as *Vorstellung*) at the same time.

Chapter three ***Supersession and Mediation***

The necessity of holding on to both the thought of God and to the metaphor of that thought derives from the 'metaphorical' displacement of spiritual primacy in history; the fact that the thinking *Geist* proceeds to *Vorstellungen* before it proceeds to *Begriffe*. This displacement, or

at least the specific historical form it takes, is linked by Hegel to our religious (re)presentation of the Fall, to the alienation of human beings from the divine and from themselves. Providence, as the *List der Vernunft* which directs history, is the attempt to overturn the displacement of spiritual primacy in history. This historical process involves the special role of Jewish religion, since it is Jewish religious consciousness that first (re)presents to itself, in *Genesis* and elsewhere, humankind as a universal and as universally caught up in catastrophe. This mediating role of Jewish religion in the origins of Christianity, however, has been accused amounting to a supersessionist account (in Hegel as well as more generally in Christianity). I address this issue in the third chapter. Hegel has been criticised, most notably by Stepelevich and Yovel, for a 'supersessionist' view of the transition from Judaism to Christianity.[151] The more severe of these complaints against Hegel are often expounded in the context of a broader critique of a German tradition of Protestant anti-Semitism beginning with Luther and, more often than not, culminating with Hegel himself. Such a tradition is moreover typically said to include figures as diverse as Kant, Goethe, and Schleiermacher.

This is the strategy taken by Amy Newman, whose critique of Hegel follows both Stepelevich and especially Yovel. Newman's critique highlights the 'death event' of Judaism (as a kind of counterpart to the Christ-Event) both as a 'fundamental myth of 19th century Protestantism' and as a logically necessary moment in the narrative of Christianity.[152] I defend Hegel from these accusations, but I recognise that the notion of a Judaic 'death-event' has played a crucial role in German philosophy, including in 'Hegelianism'. Žižek, for example, presents a Hegelian account of the absolutisation of consciousness as involving the mediation of a Judaic death-

[151] L. S. Stepelevich, 'Hegel and Judaism'. *Judaism* 24 (1975), 215–224; Y. Yovel, 'La religion de la sublimité', in *Hegel et la religion*, ed. G. P. Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1982), 151–176.

[152] A. Newman, 'The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel'. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 61 (1993), 450, 479–480.

event. However, because Žižek develops a 'death of God theology', he develops the transition from, and relationship between, Judaism and Christianity in terms of a 'doubling' of the death of God. For him, God 'has to die twice, in itself and for itself', which is also to say, firstly in Judaism and secondly in Christianity[153]. The 'first' death of God in this account is without a doubt a disguised Judaic death-event. However, where traditional forms of supersessionist thought have relied on the deployment of this concept of the Judaic death event for the mediation of the emergence of Christianity, Žižek relies on it, alongside a reworking of the Christian concept of the death of God, for the articulation of 'Christian atheism'. The content of this position largely consists in the claim that the absolute revelation of God made universally manifest to consciousness after the Christ-Event is that there is no God (because, as the Lutheran hymn goes, '*Gott selbst ist tot*'). The impetus behind Žižek's theory of the 'two deaths of God', however, is not unrecognisably Hegelian; it derives from the correct observation that the 'absolutisation' of historical consciousness must somehow mediate the 'duplication' of form inherent to historical becoming as the successive overturning of form and content in time.

In this chapter, I present an alternative to Žižek's problematic account of the 'duplication' of form involved in the historical process of the transition from Jewish religion to Christianity. By emphasising Hegel's own focus on the 'supersession' (as a proto-Freudian *Verdrängung* or 'repression') of pagan, and not Jewish, religion, as key for understanding the emergence of Christianity, I explicate the young Hegel's claim that the emergence of Christianity had to have been preceded by a 'silent, secret revolution in the Spirit of the age'.[154] Developing the distinction between the 'great' and 'secret' revolutions involved the emergence of Christianity, I argue that the great supersession of pagan religion required its unconscious ('psychic')

[153] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 104.
[154] Hegel, *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion,* in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 203.

repression in a secret revolution of the spirit. The great or wonderful revolution is also the 'eye-catching' one, in contradistinction to the secret revolution, which is imperceptible, and especially imperceptible to its contemporaries. This means that the secret revolution cannot be grasped from within the 'immediacy' of historical consciousness (which I defined, in the previous chapter, as the unity of the Geist of the time and that of its narrator). Instead, 'the secret revolution in the Spirit of the age' must be brought about from without; from an historical 'outside'. And when this mediation is achieved, Hegel says, quoting Paul, 'he fullness of time has come' and 'God [has] sent his Son'.

But what is this historical 'outside' from which the secret revolution of consciousness emerges? It is not, for Žižek, the hidden or imperceptible death of God in Judaism (and therefore also death of the Judaic God), but Jewish particularity and, in particular, the Judaic *Sichdenken* of humanity as 'fallen'. Hence, I argue that Hegel presents an account of this mediation of the emergence of Christianity 'from without' by linking it to the special *Schicksal* or fate of the Jewish people which is introduced from 'without' into the universal consciousness of the Roman world. I argue that the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, in particular, present a duplication not of the death of God, but of this *Sichdenken* of fallenness. There, this *Sichdenken* is posited twice, firstly for Jewish religion (in the section on *Judäa*[155]), and secondly, when it is 'reintroduced' for the 'pagan' (Roman) world as a precondition for the emergence of Christianity (in the third and final section of *Die römische Welt*[156]). Moreover, the Judaic *Sichdenken* of humanity as fallen is nested in the subsection on 'Christianity', such that Jewish 'particularity' is nested in the moment of the Christian 'individual' (the coming of Christ) within the 'universality' of the pagan or Roman world. The consciousness of human fallenness

[155] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241–244.
[156] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 385–405.

may subsequently be said to have emerged firstly 'in itself' in Judaism (which is dialectically to say that it emerged 'for us', from a later, 'Christian' standpoint, as an anticipation of the Christian doctrine of sin), and secondly, 'for itself', in the pagan world.[157] Finally, the exposition of 'World History' which concludes the *Philosophy of Right,* likewise highlights the special fate of Jewish people as 'held in readiness', as it were, from without, for the coming fate of the life and, especially, death of Christ. In order to back up this view, I address two closely intertwined issues: firstly, the issue of Hegel's antisemitism in connection with the issue of Jewish emancipation in the *Philosophy of Right*; and secondly, the involvement of a moment of supersession in the 'mediation' of the emergence of Christianity.

Chapter four ***Natural vs Purified Consciousness***

In this chapter, I introduce the notion of the hidden 'history of the Fall', as I explore the role of the Fall narrative in Hegel's philosophy of history and fully develop the account of the Jewish *Sichdenken* of human fallenness. This means theorising Hegel's claim in the *Philosophy of Right* that '[m]ind and its world are both lost and plunged in the infinite grief of that fate for which a people, the Jewish people, was heinterpretative approld in readiness [*bereitgehalten war*][158]'. (There is already here an anticipation of the Christ-Event in this chapter, which I treat directly in the fifth and final chapter.) It is well known, of course, that the philosophical question of history is for Hegel a religious one. But throughout this dissertation I have attempted to highlight the special role of the Jewish people and their binding to a fate leading up to the very death of God, in the analysis of both history as philosophically graspable and philosophy as historically thinkable (both of which may be designated as forms of *Nachdenken*). This chapter consists of the exposition of the Jewish *Schicksal* leading up to

[157] Whereas it emerged 'in-and-for-itself' in the self-contained tradition of Jewish religion which descends to this very day.
[158] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 511.

the Christ-Event, as Trinitarian in structure, that is, as disclosing the trinitarian periodisation of salvation history. In this way, Judaic religious consciousness is posited as the dominant consciousness on one side of the death of Christ, which Hegel calls the 'centre of reconciliation', while the Christian Church becomes especially associated with the liturgical development of the mediation of the human and the divine after the death of Christ.

> Hence, for Hegel, history (and, *a fortiori*, the history of religions) presents itself as two histories: as the 'history of the Fall' and the 'history of Truth'. The main strategy behind Alexandre Kojève's (in)famous attempt to 'de-Christianise' Hegel (in his still influential *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*) was precisely to retell the latter history as really the history of the Christian slave and to accordingly 'de-Christianise' truth and freedom. In the process, however, this also 'de-historicised' freedom, requiring the formulation of the end of history thesis in order to develop ideas about the constitution of the concrete individual to which Hegel himself gave a Christological grounding. Hegel does not, in any case, offer a linear parallel between a history of sin and a history of salvation, such that the narrative upshot of the whole sequence is seen in a series of transformations from slavery to freedom; from paganism to Christianity; from sin to salvation, with each transformation expressing a teleological advance over the other 'competing' side. Instead, Hegel presents history as punctuated by the Christ-Event, with both sides of the punctuation – what I have referred to as the history of the Fall and the history of Truth – moving toward and returning to, this Christ-Event which mediates both, as I put it in the following and final chapter, 'omnidirectionally'. As Hegel puts it in the *Philosophy of History*, 'history goes to [the Christ-Event] and from it'.[159]

[159] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386.

Hence, in this chapter, I explicate the special fate of the Jewish people as a 'particular' historical formation for the mediation of the 'universal' historical development of human beings. I develop, in other words, one of Hegel's key accounts in history of the role of the 'particular' in mediating the 'universal'. Secondly, I develop what Hegel means by 'fallenness' in history, arguing that while human *Geist* is irreducibly historical, the *Zweck* of its history has been separated from its willing of it, and therefore secondly, that history is not simply the attempt for *Geist* to become what it ought to be, but to determine, in the first place, what it ought to be; what the *Zweck* of its historical becoming even is. Following on from the previous chapters, I treat this process as involving an inverted development of consciousness which, however, I now argue can be understood in greater detail in terms of the distinction between 'natural' and 'purified' consciousness. Natural consciousness, which is historically first, is constitutive of what Hegel calls *Naturreligion*. It is historically first because history simply is the development of human consciousness after 'the Fall'. Fallenness is accordingly defined in terms of the separation of the *Zweck* of history from the *Begriff* of *Geist*, such that the *Aufhebung* of consciousness towards self-consciousness (as *Geist*) is not willed, and the goal of human freedom, defined as an eschatological unification of humanity, cannot be achieved.

Hegel points out that this natural consciousness does not recognise that the eschatological goal of human history is freedom through historical unification, but merely 'freedom of the one' or the freedom of the master to enslave the other. I argue that for natural consciousness, this 'freedom of the one' is reconfigured as the *Zweck* of history. As a result, the historical development of these spiritual and historical formations is defined not by *Schicksal* or fate but

by *Zucht*, a labourious 'dragging' through history by a 'blind fate'.[160] Natural consciousness may therefore be characterised as the continuation of human striving for the divine without consciousness of sin. It carries on as if there has occurred no catastrophe in the history of humankind. Jewish spirituality is the first 'elevation' above this *Naturreligion*. Its elevation is defined by its being a consciousness purified (*gereinigt*) of the primacy of the sensuous element (which predominates *Naturreligion*) through the positing of the Law (but also, more generally, of monotheism). To this extent, Hegel recognises the truth of Paul's statement that while sin was in the world before the Law, it was not recognised or reckoned with before the Law (Rom. 5.13). However, Hegel presents subsequent developments in the history of religions – the developments of Greek and Roman religion – as 'relapses' into natural consciousness. Hence while the world-historical significance of the Jewish self-conception of fallenness plays a role in the final overcoming of this relapse into natural consciousness, the ultimate promise of reconciliation, made to Abraham before the Law (Gal. 3.16), is upheld.

Chapter five ***Between the Histories of Fall and Truth***

This is the final chapter. It emphasises Hegel's specification of the *Logos* as the self-expressing word in the context of his understanding of the Christ-Event as the presentation (*Darstellung*) of the highest consciousness of humanity, in the 'life and history' of a single individual. The life and history of Jesus Christ is world-historically unique, because it temporarily bridges the gap between *Darstellung* and *Vorstellung.* As I argue in the second chapter, the fact that history emerges, as Hegel's original translator put it, out of humanity's 'abortive past',[161] means that the *res gestae* or 'events' of history are not naturally given or 'presented' (*Darstellt*) in their

[160] Hegel himself emphasises this connotation of *Zucht* (and *ziehen*); see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–389.
[161] G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), xii.

'eventality', which is to say, they cannot be naturally (re)presented as 'historical events'. Hegel therefore disagrees with Kant, for whom *Darstellung*, in the sense of 'being given' in the immediacy of intuition, is simply the way in which 'the representation [*Vorstellung*] through which an object is thought relates to actual or possible experience'.[162] For Hegel, unifying what is immediately given in intuition with the thinking of what is intuited as 'objective' (uniting, in other words, events and their narration), requires a process of *Nachdenken* that is itself historical and therefore limits our ability to transparently grasp it. The life and history of Jesus Christ is world-historically unique in that it bridges this gap between *presentation* and *representation* so that *Nachdenken* can be possible at all. The presentation of its content is given universally in its historical 'eventality', i.e. as an already constituted 'event'. Hence, where history is generally constituted only through the unity of its events and their narration through subjective *Vorstellen*, the life and history of Christ is paradoxically given both immediately and universally, in faith.

This chapter furthermore contains some re-elaboration in more straightforwardly 'Incarnational' terms. For Hegel, the Incarnation of divinity in a single individual in history is the necessary fulfilment of the 'concept' of Creation, as the concrete mediation of the human and the divine, as well as the completion of the 'highest consciousness' of the human individual. One of Hegel's ways of expressing the necessity of this Incarnation is through his claim that it is the central axis of history. The leading up to the Incarnation – the history of the Fall – is the 'working-out' of human potentiality, of the content of the human *Urbild*, through the attempt to (re)present the divine as *abstrakte Begriff*. The Incarnation is the concrete manifestation of this essence, against which human beings have existed in a state of antithesis. Hence history

[162] I. Kant, *Kritik der Reiner Vernunft* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1966), 193.

after the Christ-Event becomes 'reconciled', which is really to say that it is opened to truth, though it only became 'historically' graspable through the development of Jewish religious consciousness. This punctuation of history by the Christ-Event, as the 'centre' of reconciliation, is important for what I have called the 'omnidirectionality' of Christocentric mediation. By this I mean that the mediation of Christ issues from a displaced centre and is therefore omnidirectional. Hegel's account of the Christian Mass as the expansion and decompression of the mediation of the finite and the infinite after the death of Christ, expresses the displacement of Christ's body from the centre of the Cross (even where Hegel is anxious to fully affirm aspects of the materiality of the Eucharist that otherwise cohere with his own views[163]). This mediation affects the historical past, which it constitutes as a history of the Fall, as well as the historical future which it constitutes as a coming history of Truth.

The main thesis of this chapter is that Hegel should be taken to have understood the Christian notions of the Fall and sin as ultimately not from *Genesis* (nor, say, from *Hosea*), but from Paul and the Gospels. I believe this to be true theologically, apart from considerations about Hegel's view, but I also believe that it is essentially Hegel's position. Hence, in this chapter, I make the possibly radical claim that human fallenness and sin are 'constituted' for Hegel through the Christ-Event, which is to say, by the rejection of Christ. By 'constitution', I mean that human fallenness can only be 'posited' as a tendency towards evil and self-centredness within history, through the Christ-Event. Hegel argues that the Christ-Event constitutes a radical 'resetting' of human ethical and communal ties to a state of absolute *Entzweiung*. In this sense, 'the Fall' as an 'event' in history, coincides with the Christ-Event and its temporary conflation of *Darstellung* and *Vorstellung*. I address five specific issues in this chapter. Firstly, I register a

[163] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 453–455.

disagreement with Peter Hodgson on the issue of the relationship between the 'universal content' of the Fall narrative and the 'particular form' of the Jewish religious response to it. Secondly, I develop the idea of the Christocentric punctuation of history into the histories of the Fall and Truth as a result of the Christ-Event. Thirdly, I develop the notion of the historical coincidence of the Christ-Event and the Fall-Event. Fourthly, I address the form of end of finite religion with the emergence of Christianity. Fifthly and finally, I develop Hegel's account of the life and history of Christ, and its significance for the possibility of philosophical thinking. I conclude with a reflection on Hegel's lifelong preoccupation with the 'failure' of Jesus, which I argue should be understood as having been absorbed into the coincidence of the Christ-Event and Fall-Event.

Part I

CHAPTER 1

Metalogic *or* Not One Logic But Two?

Introduction

In what follows I develop a 'metalogical' reading of Hegel's system. The term 'metalogic' owes much of its contemporary meaning to Dieter Henrich's seminal study *Hegel im Kontext.*[164] Henrich's famous contention, particularly in the influential article on Hegel's 'beginning' (*Anfang*) of the logic,[165] is that there is a difference between the *science* of Hegelian logic and the immanent *process* of logical thought-determinations (*dem Prozess der logischen Gedankenbestimmungen*).[166] Thus while the beginning of the logic – the 'process' – proceeds 'unidirectionally' towards the absolute *Idee*, the 'scientific' (*wissenschaftlich*) grasping of this process, including its scientific grounding or justification, is retrograde (a *rückläufiges Begründung*) with a view to the whole, and therefore amounts to a kind of global *metalogic*.[167] Theologically, we might say that this involves passing the frontier between the revelation of the mind of God or the *Logos* (the logical process) and the reception and understanding of its content by human *Geist* (the science of logic). That Hegel intends his theory of *Vernunft* or reason in the logic as a theory of revelation is increasingly well-known, at least partly thanks to the work of Andrew Shanks.[168] What I wish to emphasise here, however, is how the 'metalogical' nature of Hegel's system in fact points to a theological opposition between a postlapsarian standpoint of *Verstand* and what may be called a 'graced' standpoint of *Vernunft* which reveals true knowledge of the former. Below I expound this

[164] D. Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971).
[165] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', *Hegel im Kontext*, 73–94, but see also 'Hegels Logik der Reflexion' in *Hegel im Kontext*, 95–156.
[166] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 92.
[167] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 92–93.
[168] A. Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology: The God of Greatest Hospitality* (London: Routledge, 2016), 1–10.

idea in relation to the 'beginning' of Hegel's logic and, in the conclusion, articulate a number of reasons why a metalogical account of Hegel's system, as it is developed here, is an important presupposition of my broader study of Hegel's philosophy, and especially the philosophy of history, as *Nachdenken*.

Henrich's metalogical critique of Hegel derives from the contention that the logical transition from being to nothing to becoming requires a reconstructive or external 'proof'.[169] Hegel's logic cannot for him, contrary to the apparent nature of Hegel's assertions about it, be grasped without recourse to a metalogical or externally-reflective standpoint. Henrich concedes that Hegel in a sense already provides this external proof: for though no justification or reason (*Grund*) for the 'transition to nothing' (*Übergang in Nichts*) is provided in any of the three chapters of the *Logic*'s first book, the 'doctrine of being', such a justification is in fact provided in the introductory or preliminary section – the 'general division of being'. The problem lies with this justification's externality; namely, that the justification provided is grounded in the categories of reflection which Hegel does not derive until the second book, the 'doctrine of essence', and for this reason makes the characterisation of the transition to nothingness as 'immediate' (*unmittelbar*) and 'indeterminate' (*unbestimmt*; together an *unbestimmte Unmittelbarkeit*) untenable.[170] In this sense, Hegel himself may be said to anticipate later

[169] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 88; see also W. Maker, 'Beginning' in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, ed. G. Giovanni (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 40

[170] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 88–89. Henrich correctly notes that it is for this reason that 'Sein sei zunächst qualitätslos und unbestimmt. Dieser Charakter der Unbestimmtheit komme ihm aber nur im Gegensatz gegen das Bestimmte zu, so daß es selbst als bestimmt aufzufassen sei. Dies Verfahren hat aber den gleichen Sinn, der auch den Ausdrücken zukommt, die dem Begriff des reinen Seins zugeordnet sind: Es verweist auf eine Notwendigkeit, die in unmittelbarer Gestalt einen übergang vorwegnimmt, der selbst reflektiert ist und dem deshalb Unmittelbarkeit gerade nicht zukommt'. For both an exposition of this part of Henrich's argument and a reply, see E. A. Beach, 'Hegel's Mediated Immediacies: A Reply to Dieter Henrich'. *The Owl of Minerva* 42.1–2 (2010–2011), 153–217.

'critical' attempts (e.g. by Rosenkranz[171] or Spaventa[172]) to reform his account of the beginning of the logic and of the logic's relationship to the rest of the system in a 'metalogical' direction. The correctness of Henrich's admonishment has more recently been upheld by Slavoj Žižek and David Carlson. Both, however, add a new dimension to the critique of the logic by affording a special significance to the standpoint of *Verstand* as that which 'disturbs the unity of Absolute Idea' and '[guarantees] that the process never comes to rest'.[173] The standpoint of *Verstand* has been read as a 'silent fourth', as an 'external reflection that witnesses the triadic steps of the Logic as it unfolds'.[174] This silent fourth is the metalogical reflection of the triadic logical process.

This suggests, firstly, that the metalogical or external standpoint of the *science* of logic is to be identified with subjectivity and therefore with the individual human thinker. (The early Louis Althusser is perhaps correct when he writes that before Hegel, 'philosophy had not succeeded in including the philosopher in its field of reflection'.[175]) And secondly, it suggests that the

[171] K. Rosenkranz, *Wissenschaft der logischen Idee II: Logik und Ideenlehre* and later *Epilegomena zu meiner Wissenschaft der logischen Idee: als Replik gegen die Kritik der Herren Michelet und Lassalle* (Königsberg: Verlag von Gebrüder Bornträger, 1859 and 1862). Rosenkranz's 'reformism', as Normal Levine has argued, was a kind of centrism; N. Levine, *Marx's Discourse with Hegel* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 70. Partly for this reason, he was attacked both by the conservative philosopher, spiritualist, and co-editor of Hegel's complete works, Karl Michelet, and the revolutionary philosopher and activist Ferdinand Lassalle. But the disagreement between all three was really theological: Rosenkranz presented Hegel as a theist concerned with the mediation of actuality and the idea as opposed to a pantheist who resisted all dualisms. For this reason, both Michelet and Lassalle accused Rosenkranz of regressing into Kantianism, something which the latter partially bit the bullet on.

[172] B. Spaventa, 'Le Prime Categorie Della Logica Di Hegel', 'Idealismo or Realismo?', 'Frammento Inedito', and 'False Accuse Contro L'Hegelismo', in *Opere*, ed. F. Valagussa (Milano: Bompiani, 2008).

[173] D. G. Carlson, *Commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic* (Hampshire-New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 599.

[174] Carlson, *Commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic*, 599; G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. and ed. by G. Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 746. Carlson accepts Henrich's account of the *Grund* of the unfolding of the logical as already reflective.

[175] L. Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings*, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London-New York: Verso, 1997), 101. As Henrich also notes, '[i]n der Logik der Reflexion ist ein Ontologiekern zum ersten Mal zugleich Methodenbegriff der Theorie jener Bedeutungssequenz, innerhalb deren er sich ergeben hat. Man weiss, dass Hegel gerade an dieser Selbstbeziehung seiner Theorie interessiert war. Es ist auch gar nicht zu bestreiten, daß eine letzte Theorie nur unter Einschluss solcher Selbstbeziehung definiert und konzipiert werden kann'; Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext*, 150.

subjectivity of the human thinker who carries out the science of logic is to be identified with the standpoint of *Verstand*. This is then not only a response to the question of whether the beginning of Hegel's logic can be understood on its own terms, viz. as 'absolutely immanent', but also addresses the important question of 'where' to place *Verstand* in the structure of the logic (and the *Logic*). The answer implied by the role afforded to *Verstand* by Carlson and Žižek is perhaps that explicitly argued for by John Burbidge, who places *Verstand* in the final 'doctrine of concept' or in the subjective logic.[176] This should come as no surprise. Žižek (implicitly) and Carlson (explicitly) link the subjective disturbance of the 'unity of the Absolute Idea' to the unceasing reproduction of the logical process,[177] such that the 'unity' of the Absolute *Idee* as absolutely immanent, but following Adorno also as 'totality',[178] is identified with the encroachment of the 'system' on *Geist* as free subjectivity. Adorno similarly emphasised that Hegel's system had a twofold character (*Doppelcharakter*) and indeed a dual tension, '*[z]wischen dessen Begriff, als abschließendem und damit stillstellendem, und dem der Dynamik, als dem der reinen autarkischen Erzeugung aus dem Subjekt'*.[179] For Adorno, this tension could only be overcome by determining *Geist* as simultaneously being-in-itself *and* pure becoming, something he regarded as wildly implausible.

For Žižek, on the other hand, the tension only exists because Hegel (and especially the early Hegel of the *Phenomenology*) 'does not unleash [the] power [of *Verstand*] to the very end, that

[176] J. Burbidge, 'What is the Place of the Understanding?', *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, 171–183.
[177] S. Žižek, *Less than Nothing* (London-New York: Verso, 2010), 188; Carlson, *Commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic*, 599.
[178] T. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), 33.
[179] Adorno, *Negative Dialektik*, 33.E.B. Ashton's translation takes some liberties but is still essentially correct: 'There is contradiction as well as kinship between this concept of the system – a concept that concludes, and thus brings to a standstill – and the concept of dynamism, of pure, autarkic, subjective generation'; see *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 2010), 25. Note, that a shift has occurred here from the recognition of the autarchy of the system in Engels' estimation of the system as the source of Hegel's affirmative-conservatism to the new positing of the autarchy of the dynamic Subject in opposition to the no longer (legitimately) sovereign State; cf. Engels, F., 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in *On Religion* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1964), 219, 222.

[he] takes it as external to the thing itself'[180]:

> the standard notion [is] that it is merely our Understanding ("mind"[181]) that separates in its imagination what in "reality" belongs together, so that the Understanding's "absolute power" is merely the power of our imagination which in no way concerns the reality of the thing analyzed. We pass from Understanding to Reason not when this analyzing, or tearing apart, is overcome in a synthesis which brings us back to the wealth of reality, but when this "tearing apart" is displaced from being "merely a power of our mind" onto things themselves, as their inherent power of negativity.—And the key dialectical insight is that the "synthesis," the bringing-together of what was torn apart by Understanding, is the absolute, most radical, act of tearing apart—a violent imposition of unity.[182]

Žižek's object of critique here is the author of the *Phenomenology*, but the *Phenomenology*, as it were, *in itself*, is somewhat obscurely posited as the way to save the *Science of Logic* (which itself does not schematise *Verstand*). Žižek, we might add, following Henrich's comment apropos earlier Hegelian 'reformers', belongs to 'a long series of attempts to conceive the Phenomenology as the core of the system [from which an] interpretation of the Logic could not emerge'.[183]

By positing *Verstand* as the 'silent fourth' which disturbs the triadic process of logical determinations, Žižek and Carlson suggest that Hegel presents us with a botched division of the logic. That is, the division of the logic into (1) 'understanding', (2) 'dialectical' reason, and (3) 'speculative' reason somehow fails to fully go beyond its first moment (and that it moreover fails to do so because *Verstand*, the first moment, is not fully 'realised'). But this

[180] Žižek, *Less than Nothing,* 188.
[181] By 'mind', Žižek means here the colloquial human mind, not the common English translation of *Geist* as 'mind'. However, he is also concerned to emphasise the identification of *Verstand* with human subjectivity more generally.
[182] Žižek, *Less than Nothing,* 188–189.
[183] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 83: 'einer langen Reihe von Versuchen dar, die Phänomenologie des Geistes als den Kern des Systems aufzufassen'. This point was made more recently by Graham Ward; see 'How Hegel became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic'. *Critical Research on Religion* 1.3 (2014), 272. Henrich is right to suggest that such 'reformist' developments of speculative logic after Hegel (e.g. Ulrici and Rosenkranz) were essentially 'metalogical' in nature, and is further right to suggest, the analogy between the history of Marxist politics and the manifestation of a post-Hegelian split between (neo-Kantian) 'reformism' and 'orthodoxy', here also including the slide into neo-Kantianism which they encouraged; 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 80.

tripartite division from the (preliminary conception of the) first *Encyclopaedia* has long puzzled commentators precisely because it includes *Verstand* in a triadic division which does not otherwise appear in the greater (*Science of*) *Logic*.[184] A tentative, if not implausible, view is to generalise this division from the *Encyclopaedia* as really presenting us with an opposition between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* (in its dialectical/negative and speculative/positive forms). As John Burbidge has pointed out, the 'left' Hegelians tend to make the dialectic (the 'negativity' of reason) the foundation of philosophy, while the 'right' Hegelians take as their foundation speculation (the 'positivity' of reason; that which generates the system).[185]

The split into 'reformist' (or 'critical') and 'orthodox' Hegelianism, as Henrich conceives it, is largely a split internal to the Hegelian 'right' (Rosenkranz, Karl Fischer, etc.).[186] The odd one out here is perhaps the Neapolitan Hegelian Spaventa. While ostensibly a reformer of the right,[187] being first in Henrich's (in)famous line of *Phenomenology*-centred

[184] This includes the 1831 second edition of the *Logic*, revised and published well after the first *Encyclopaedia*.

[185] J. Burbidge, 'Where is the Place of Understanding?' in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, 178. Note Engels' claim that '[w]hoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres [politics and religion]; whoever regarded the dialectical method as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion'; see F. Engels, 'Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy', in *On Religion*, 222.

[186] These figures were responding to the critique of the beginning of the logic made by F. A. Trendelenburg in his *Logische Untersuchungen*. Most left Hegelians were not concerned with Trendelenburg's critique. Already in 1842 Engels had developed the skeleton of his view that the 'conservative' Hegelian system would need to be in some sense abandoned in the name of the 'revolutionary' dialectical method; see F. Engels, *Schelling und die Offenbarung* (Leipzig: Robert Binder, 1842), 50–51. This view would be taken up by Plekhanov after the publication of 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' at which point it would become a commonplace of Russian Marxism, making its way into the writings of both Lenin and Stalin. For an account, see L. Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, trans. J. Merrington and J. White (Norfolk: Lowe & Brydone, 1972), 111–142.

[187] Following his unfortunate appropriation by Giovanni Gentile, Spaventa has become firmly, if inappropriately, established as a thinker of counter-revolution; see P. Piccone, *Italian Marxism* (London: University of California Press, 1983), 14–33. As Piccone points out, the Neapolitan Hegelians, of whom Spaventa was the most notable member, split into 'critical' ('reformist') and 'orthodox' Hegelians following the left/right split in Germany. Gentile was not in any case really a neo-Hegelian; his espousal of Spaventa's Neapolitan Hegelianism (and his probably implausible attempt to draw a line from Vico to Hegel) appears to have been strategic; as Daniela Coli has argued, it was part of the attempt to articulate his vision without seeming to disconnect Italian thought from the modern European project. This is perhaps why he focused above all of Spaventa's works on *La Filosofia Italiana Nelle Sue Relazioni Con La Filosofia Europea*; see D. Coli, 'Gentile and Modernity', in *Thought Thinking: The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*, ed. B. Haddock and J. Wakefield (La Vergne: Ingram Book Company, 2015), 134–163.

reformers[188], and siding with right Hegelians like Rosenkranz and Fischer on such issues as the relationship between the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology,* Spaventa actually provides a 'leftist' critique of right Hegelianism (especially in Italy) over against the conservative Hegelian 'orthodoxy' of such thinkers as Augusto Vera.[189]In this sense, Spaventa's 'reformism' allows for an 'immanent critique' of right Hegelianism, through which a leftist insistence on *Geist* as subjectivity can be articulated within the context of right Hegelianism's insistence on *Geist* as first and foremost religious. It is therefore no surprise that of all the Hegelian thinkers referred to in this brief discussion it is Spaventa who appeals to the notion of *Nachdenken,* writing:

> Subjective thinking (*pensiero soggettivo*) is generally reflection: *Nachdenken*; it presupposes *Denken* and is therefore posterior to it. In this sense, the logic, whatever it is, is posterior to the *Logos* (*logo*): as Hegel's *Nachdenken* is to *Denken,* whose secret he intended to reveal[190].

And because Spaventa 'maintains the absolute character of the logical determinations', as Henrich also approvingly notes, viz. because he maintains the primacy of the *Logos,* he avoids the slide into Ulrician neo-Kantianism which had been characteristic of the reformist Hegelian right in Germany.[191] It is this integrity of the logical process as connected to the primacy of the *Logos* as the original object and 'secret' of *Denken* that I wish to highlight in my metalogical account.

Žižek, partly following the work of Fredric Jameson, reconfigured the opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* in metalogical terms, reading the role of *Verstand* as a disturbance of the (especially dialectical) process of reason, as it were, from within *Denken*.[192] It is here that I

[188] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 83.
[189] Piccone, *Italian Marxism,* 33
[190] Spaventa, B., 'Frammento Inedito', *Opere,* 1196. My translation.
[191] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 82–83.
[192] S. Žižek, 'With Hegel Beyond Hegel'. *Criticism* 53 (2011), 295–313; *Less than Nothing,* 188–189.

wish to register quite a fundamental disagreement with this approach. The main difference between my metalogical reading of Hegel and Žižek's and Carlson's is that I argue that the conflict is not to be located *between* the logical and the metalogical. That is, a conflict between the triadic development of the logical thought-determinations of reason and the external, but silent, 'fourth' of *Verstand's* scientific gaze. The upshot of this view is to see *Verstand* as disturbing the process of logical thought-determinations themselves. My view, however, as I believe Hegel himself suggests, is that the conflict or 'disturbance' identified by Žižek and others is metalogical through and through, viz. that it is 'supralogical' and more to the point, religious. I mean by this, firstly, that *Verstand* does not disturb the logical process itself (which, following Spaventa, remains absolute) but rather the *science* or our cognition of the process. And this cognition is noetically disturbed because the human mind, as 'fallen', is epistemologically compromised by sin.

It seems to me (and here it is also Jameson whom we have to blame) that Žižek's view naturalises *Verstand* as a 'permanent, trans-historical fixture of our everyday reality' against which reason or *Vernunft* is always reacting by 'transforming', as Jameson puts it, 'the necessary errors of *Verstand*'.[193] It is the claim of the necessity of *Verstand*'s errors with which I disagree, since it forms a crucial part of Žižek's reconfiguration of the Fall as a necessary 'fall upward' for *Geist*. To this extent, Žižek implicitly recognises *Verstand* as a specifically postlapsarian standpoint, a view which I share, and about which Hegel was more explicit than is usually recognised.[194] Žižek's (not Hegel's), naturalisation of this standpoint and its errors is

[193] Žižek, *Less Than Nothing*, 269; F. Jameson, *The Hegel Variations* (London-New York: Verso, 2010), 116.

[194] G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse I*, Werke 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 91–92.

contiguous with the theologically problematic naturalisation of the Fall as dialectically 'necessary', if I may put it that way. The contribution of my own metalogical reading, its many disagreements with the aforementioned notwithstanding, is to emphasise the role of Fall as the structuring principle which allows us to account for the determinate shape of the metalogical antithesis between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*. In doing so, I will argue that Hegel's understanding of the Fall is both actualist and non-necessitarian. My argument reproduces some of Cynthia Willet's metalogical critique of Hegel in order to develop a series of claims about Hegel's logic.[195] Their derivation is somewhat convoluted, but their schematisation here need not be.

Thus I argue below, following Willet, that Hegel's logic ambiguously admits to two 'possible' processes of the logical thought-determinations; (i) a process of becoming and (ii) a process of 'transitoriness'. The intricacies of this claim will hopefully become clear below, but here I will say that (i), which designates the actual process described in the *Science of Logic*, should be taken to refer to a development of *Vernunft*, or a process based on the mediational logic of reason. This is in contradistinction to (ii) which refers to an alternate thinking of the logical thought-determinations that follows the mediational logic of *Verstand* (which, it should be said, is not true *Erkennen*, but merely a manifestation of human *Erfahrung* in history[196]). Though Willett should be given credit for highlighting this aspect of Hegel's logic, she herself points out that it is something Hegel himself was quite keen to emphasise.[197] The reason it remained an obscurity for most interpreters up until quite recently is not clear, though one possibility is the fact that it is not something easily reconcilable with a non-metalogical reading of Hegel,

[195] C. Willet, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, 85–98.

[196] As Ludwig Siep points out, *Erfahrung* or 'experience' is the path 'from the bottom up', from 'natural consciousness' to 'absolute knowledge'. There are two senses behind Hegel's use of 'experience'. The ordinary sense, implying the substitution of a true belief for a false one, and the sense, most essential to the *Phenomenology*, of experience as a 'reversal' of consciousness; as what one would call a 'conversion' in religious terms, and 'revelation' in secular terms; L. Siep, *Der Weg der "Phänomenologie des Geistes"* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 63-64.

[197] Willet, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 85–86.

which most sympathetic commentators (even amongst 'reformers') have hitherto been concerned to reject. However, if the problem with Žižek's metalogical account is that it has too much of the Fall in it, because it cannot conceive of a nonlapsarian counter-history of humanity (because it must posit the necessity of the Fall), the problem with Willett's account is that it does not have anywhere near enough of it.

I therefore criticise key aspects of Willet's argument below, including the critical part of her argument where she suggests that Hegel's logic should not 'privilege' either the process of becoming or transitoriness. I argue instead that the distinction between the two processes entails an oppositional structure which reflects the broader metalogical opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand,* and that this therefore further entails a distinction of mediational structures corresponding to both processes. Thus, while the process of becoming in the *Science of Logic* corresponds to the well-known concept of a 'mediated immediacy', the process of transitoriness corresponds to a concept I call 'immediate mediation', which designates a reversal of the directionality of mediation. However, rather than naturalise this structure to the logic, I argue that the process of transitoriness actually expounds the development and collapse of human consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit.* The beginning of Hegel's *Phenomenology,* which is to say, the beginning of human mind or spirit is thus an inversion of the famous beginning of the *Logic,* which Hegel tells us is an attempted reconstruction of the logic of divine creation *ex nihilo*.[198] Instead of the 'mediated immediacy' of *being,* the development or study of mind begins with an 'immediate mediation' of *nothing*.

[198] G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I,* Werke 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 44; 'Die Logik ist sonach als das System der reinen Vernunft, als das Reich des reinen Gedankens zu fassen. *Dieses Reich ist die Wahrheit, wie sie ohne Hülle an und für sich selbst ist.* Man kann sich deswegen ausdrücken, daß dieser Inhalt *die Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines endlichen Geistes ist*'.

Finally, I argue, partly following William Maker, that the beginning of the logic involves positing the self-elimination of the structure of human consciousness in the *Phenomenology* as the 'presupposition' to the *Logic's* beginning. Once again, the point here is to qualify the collapse of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* as connected to the historical process of decline Hegel associates with the failure of human becoming to align itself with the realisation of the Providential purpose (*Zweck*) *of* history. Accordingly, I argue that the *Phenomenology,* whose upshot is ultimately not the becoming of mind's concept, but the collapse of its consciousness' structure, privileges at its beginning the unity of transitoriness, a unity however, whose dialectical self-elimination philosophically grounds the privileging of the unity of becoming in the *Logic.* In the final analysis, this means that the *Logic* posits for its beginning one of the unities of the circle of becoming as a presupposition, which is then collapsed into the immediate moments that make up the opening sequence of the logic. Altogether, this forms what Hegel calls a 'mediated immediacy'; but my argument will be that this 'mediated immediacy' designates, as part of the concept's *Nachdenken,* the alteration or transformation of the collapsed structure of 'immediate mediation' in the *Phenomenology.* In this chapter, I explore the metalogical opposition between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* through the common contrasts between the *Logic* and the *Phenomenology;* but in the following chapters I explore this same opposition in relation to historical *Geist,* particularly as the collapse of the latter's development is posited in religious consciousness as self-consciousness of sin, and therefore focus on Hegel's lectures on history and religion.

1 Becoming vs Transitoriness

Cynthia Willet's 'The Shadow of Hegel's Science of Logic' is probably the most interesting critique of Hegel to have appeared in the last 30 years. It is interesting, in my opinion, not because it succeeds as critique (more on this later) but because its two main premises are highly insightful about the nature of Hegel's philosophy in general, and about the beginning of his logic in particular. Willet's chief claim is that Hegel's logic is built on an unfounded entitlement to the derivation of 'becoming' for the mediation of 'being' and 'nothing' in the doctrine of being. By 'derivation' is meant not the first *Aufhebung* of the logic, but the first movement of logical thought, which is to say, the thinking of being and nothing as 'becoming'. As we will see, this pre-sublationary movement is unfounded because its derivation of becoming proceeds from an external or metalogical privileging of being over nothing.

But first the argument. The first premise of this argument is that the categories of being and nothing are interchangeable with regard to the *order* of the beginning of philosophical science, so that Hegel's logic does begin with 'being' but may as well have begun with nothing[199] – as Hegel himself partly acknowledged.[200] The second and even more important premise is that the *directionalities* between (the orders of) being and nothing are not homogeneous and that the 'decision' to begin the logic with 'being' affects the connotation and directionality of the mediational third category 'becoming'. Willet suggests that an alternative directionality would privilege 'nothing' over 'being' as the initial category and accordingly change the positive connotation of 'becoming' to the negative connotation of 'transitoriness' or *Fluchtigkeit*. *Fluchtigkeit* derives from the German translation of Heraclitus' Πόλεμος as *Fliessen* which

[199] Willet, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 85.
[200] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 65–79.

Hegel identifies with the first historical comprehension in the West of the necessity of thinking being and nothing in their unity alongside the Eastern alternative of Chinese philosophy (which in fact begins, according to Hegel, with nothing[201]). To this extent, Hegel also associates *Fliessen* with *Werden* but rightly denies a non-homogeneity of directionalities in the 'Western' versus 'Eastern' dilemma, because Πόλεμος itself indicates change as predominantly destructive in contradistinction to *Werden* which suggests change as growth and progression. The non-homogeneity of directionalities is instead to be historically located, as Willet points out, in the opposition between Heraclitus' Πόλεμος and Aristotle's φύσις.[202]

As Hegel notes, becoming or *Werden* is a 'double determination' in so far as it designates not the *unity* but the *unseparatedness* (*Ungetrenntheit*) of being and nothing. Rather than picking out one structure containing the unity of being and nothing, 'becoming … contains being and nothing as two such unities', with Hegel describing *each* as 'a unity of being and nothing', with the directions of mediation reversed.[203] Because nothing is indistinguishable and therefore not antithetically other to being – simply 'bursting forth' from it, as Gadamer puts it,[204] without dialectical negation – the involvement of both as 'sublated moments' in *Werden* means that becoming is doubled, containing two unseparated unities, both *Entstehen* or coming-to-be and *Vergehen* or ceasing-to-be. Both, accordingly, trace the movement from being to nothing and nothing to being, respectively. (Note that what is crucial here is the directionality of mediation and not the directionality of transition, that is, the direction, whether positive or negative, of the derivation.) If the derivation of 'transitoriness' is just as legitimate – despite being neglected – for the mediation of 'being' and 'nothing' as the derivation of 'becoming,' it follows that the

[201] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 104–105.
[202] Willet, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 85–90.
[203] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, Werke 5, 111–112.
[204] H. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectics*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 89.

Hegelian system of philosophical knowledge and the dialectic more generally proceeds only from an incomplete, partial, and asymmetric movement. This it seems problematises both the totalising aspirations of the system's method of immanence as well as any reference – however tentative – to a 'totality' of knowledge. For this to be the case, however, the beginning of logic must be immanently asymmetrical so that the privileging of being over nothing is not determined by external reflection (including, perhaps, Hegel's own introductory and prefatory reflections on the beginning of logic), but by the unseparatedness of being and nothing itself. Thus if there is a privileging of the one over the other it must somehow be a privileging internal to becoming and therefore immanent to the *process* of logical thought-determinations. This further clarifies how each movement within this doubling has a separate directionality and how such a doubling of mediation is a prefiguring dialectical operation of 'negation of negation' itself, according to which the third category of the triad is a 'restatement' of the first which accommodates or adapts to the second. And becoming, as an adaptation of being to nothing, is different from any restatement of nothing as adapted to, or inclusive of, being.

Willet therefore claims, rightly, that becoming itself also has a directionality, but wrongly that it is possible for this directionality to be 'neutral' with regard to its internal unities. That is, for the directionality not to somehow privilege either a primacy of being or nothing.[205] This is Willet's chief error. The influence of Henrich is undoubtedly here: the difference between a neutral directionality and a one-sided one, even though it reproduces Hegel's usual language, really points to the distinction between the process of logical thought-determinations and the externally reflective scientific rendering of this process. And Willett's objection ultimately amounts to little more than the platitudinous proposal that an 'external' reflection would

[205] Willett allows, following Aristotle, for the doubling of one of these unities as an inferential ground for the concrete beginning of logic. It is not clear whether by this is meant the beginning of the logical process or the cognition of that process.

necessarily involve a 'subjective' privileging (Hegel's own privileging) whereas the 'objective' process of logical thought-determinations would correspondingly be 'neutral'. This is, I think, to ignore the whole Christian structure of Hegel's argument, including the nature of the argument as informed by Hegel's religious view of history as intimately related to the externalisation of the logical *Idee* in creation through the Incarnation. For while it is true that external reflection invariably posits, as François Laruelle might put it,[206] a 'decisional structure' which perhaps remains explicitly uncognised by Hegel, it does not reflect, I argue, a decision regarding the direction of the logical process itself but rather the metalogical 'choice' between two *opposed* decisional structures. Thus, far from falling short of promising a 'neutrally' derived logical process, Hegel affirms the logic of becoming as a privileging of *Vernunft* over *Verstand*. The part of Willett's account I am really rejecting here is the (often too implicit) claim that the directionality of *becoming* can (over against the directionality of the mediating process which produces it) be constituted through a neutral determination vis-à-vis *Entstehen* and *Vergehen*. As I argue below, Hegel himself quite explicitly links the 'double determination' of *Entstehen* and *Vergehen* involved in the derivation of becoming with an affirmation of *Vernunft* over against *Verstand*.

2 Mediated Immediacy vs Immediate Mediation

As Fichte had shown in the *Science of Knowledge*, the beginning of philosophy, which must be either something mediated or something immediate, could be shown to be neither.[207] This formed the background to Hegel's insistence that however this beginning was to be conceived it would be so on the basis of the inseparability of the mediate and immediate (which Fichte's

[206] F. Laruelle, 'Theory of Philosophical Decision', in *Philosophies of Difference* trans. R. Gangle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 196–223.
[207] J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, tr. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 93. Hegel alludes to this passage in the *Wissenschaft I*, Werke 5, 65.

antinomies he believed had demonstrated), and whose articulation is contiguous with the inseparability of being and nothing. The opposition between, or fixation of, mediation and immediacy as separate is accordingly not a real separation, but rather a product of the separative logic of *Verstand.*[208] Hence if the mediation of mediation and immediacy is paradoxically a possibility, then we seem to approach the same impasse concerning multiple directionalities of mediation as we did with the multiple directionalities of being and nothing. In fact, in so far as the difference in directionalities between the latter points precisely to a difference in the direction of their mediation, I would suggest a distinction between Hegel's 'mediated immediacy' and what we might call 'immediate mediation'. This is a distinction between the mediation of mediation and immediacy and its inverse. By 'inverse' I do not mean here a mere reversal of order – a 'mediation of immediacy and mediation' – but the alteration which inversion properly entails for Hegel: in this case, an *immediacy* of mediation and immediacy. The context for such a distinction – strongly implied in the *Science of Logic* – is the relationship between *Geist* (or spirit or mind) and *Logik* and the transition, in epistemological terms, from the philosophy of the former to the science of the latter.[209] It may therefore further be thought in ontological terms as a distinction between the horizontal mediational structure of human consciousness and the vertical divine mediational structure of logic, and, ultimately, in theological terms as the distinction between fallen knowing (*Verstand*) and knowledge of the Fall under grace, which is to say, through revelation (V*ernunft* as *vernehmen*). But how exactly does the 'immediate mediation' of mind differ from the 'mediated immediacy' of logic?

[208] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 56.

[209] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 79–82. The concrete forms of the opposition of mediation and immediacy, which appear as mediated and immediate knowledge, concern thought or cognition as such – which is the content of the philosophy of mind. The beginning of logic is accordingly a mediated immediacy because its concept is the result of the study of mind, and the determination of *reine Wissen* sublates any reference to mediation. Hegel describes this as a withdrawal into unity wherein is compressed the ground or origin and truth from which the logic is produced and on which it depends.

Only the study of mind is properly 'immediate' in so far as its beginning is made from empirical and sensuous consciousness or 'sense-certainty', so that the mediation involved in its development is posterior to a primary immediacy of its determinations as immediate. Note Hegel's famous claim that this knowledge cannot be anything other than immediate knowledge itself, which is to say, knowledge of immediacy as such.[210] However, the problem with sense-certainty is that its knowledge really lapses into mere opinion.[211] And opinion is both overdetermined by external mediations and traditions, historically as well as linguistically, and wholly self-certain of its contents as immediately and sensuously graspable. This is the well-known critique of 'familiarity' (*das Bekannte*) which is, however, not very well understood. This is partly because Hegel's call to juxtapose it to the beginning of the *Science of Logic* has been ignored.[212] I have intimated its core elements here: namely that 'familiarity' contradictorily involves a certainty about its immediate knowledge of familiar objects, a knowledge which is however then shown to be the product of a series of mediations mystified by the very structure of familiarity.[213] 'Familiarity' is accordingly a term for the immediacy of immediacy and mediation which I call 'immediate mediation'. Its knowledge of immediacy presents us with a unity but not an inseparability of immediacy and mediation, a contrast Hegel

[210] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 58.

[211] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 25–26. I feel the need to clarify here, following comments from my good friend Mark Aloysius, that Hegel's opposition to 'mere opinion' is an excoriation of δόξα as involving a bad trust-relation when compared with πίστις, the trust-relation (or 'certainty') of faith.

[212] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 11–22. Note also that this appears in the preface to the second edition of the *Logic*. A notable exception here is Heidegger's emphasis of the parallel which later influenced Jameson's reading; see M. Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Gesamtausgabe II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-1944*, Band 32 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1997), and for a recent account of Heidegger's critique of the beginning, A. Sell, *Martin Heideggers Gang durch Hegels „Phänomenologie des Geistes*" (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2016), 46–53.

[213] This is the argument of the whole 'sense-certainty'' chapter of the *Phenomenology*, but Hegel summarises it in §66 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*: 'Wir bleiben hiermit dabei stehen, daß das unmittelbare Wissen als *Tatsache* genommen werden soll […] In dieser Rücksicht ist anzuführen, daß es zu den gemeinsten Erfahrungen gehört, daß Wahrheiten, von welchen man sehr wohl weiß, daß sie Resultat der verwickeltsten, höchst vermittelten Betrachtungen sind, sich demjenigen, dem solche Erkenntnis geläufig geworden, *unmittelbar* in seinem Bewußtsein präsentieren'. Hegel then goes on to discuss fields of knowledge commonly accepted as examples of activities involving immediate knowledge (including mathematics and art) before concluding that '[i]n allen diesen Fällen schließt die Unmittelbarkeit des Wissens nicht nur die Vermittlung desselben nicht aus, sondern sie sind so verknüpft, daß das unmittelbare Wissen sogar Produkt und Resultat des vermittelten Wissens ist'; Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 156.

develops in the *Science of Logic* as the fundamental logical distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

Unlike a 'mediated immediacy' which is conceptually progressive by being reconstructive of the unity of the beginning of science, 'immediate mediation' is merely progressive by being integrative of external reflections for mind. (The difference between the 'progressive' or forward-facing logic of 'mediated immediacy' and 'immediate mediation' may be described in terms of the difference between *Werden* and *Bildung*, an opposition I also evaluate in section eight of this chapter.) Accordingly, and paradoxically, the progression of the logic is only a 'further determination' of the beginning, which is its ground, whereas the forms of representation, recollection, and desire are 'further determinations' of thought. As Hegel points out, what is essential to a beginning is not so much the epistemic primacy of immediacy, but the coherentist holism of the system where 'the first becomes the last and the last becomes the first'.[214] Furthermore, the beginning of the philosophy of spirit must also have as its ground the sublated result of nature which is the particularisation of the logical idea raised in spirit to universal individuality. But, if this spirit sublates its intuitions (*Anshauungen*) and representations (*Vorstellungen*) through self-externalisation, then the mode of this self-externalisation, which ultimately unifies the ground of the logic's beginning in the concept of *reine Wissen*,[215] is also a mode of the internalisation of the externality. The name of this mode for Hegel is desire.

[214] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 70; 'das Erste auch das Letzte und das Letzte auch das Erste wird'. This is obviously supposed to echo both Luther and Jesus in the Gospels.

[215] G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 410, 440, 465, 474–475, 492–493. For an account of *reine Wissen*, see S. Rosen, *The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic"* (London: Chicago University Press, 2014), 83–86.

3 *Verstand* vs *Dialektik* vs *Spekulation*

Thus when Hegel says that 'self-consciousness is desire in general', or first and foremost desire, he means that it is much like becoming, which, apart from being constituted by the passing-over (*übergehen*) of being into nothing, is itself such a passing-over. As Daniel Berthold-Bond puts it, desire 'presents itself as the movement in which this opposition is removed, and the identity of [the self] with itself is established'.[216] Desire as a specifically postlapsarian reality, that is, as lack, is essentially a desire for unity and therefore a desire for *Verstand*'s model of 'self-subsistence' (*Selbständigkeit)*. This unity which is revealed at the close of the syllogism of mind in the concept of *reine Wissen* is felt at its opening as the desire for the unity of the self with the world. However, because this is, at the same time, felt as a desire for unity of the self with itself, the subject sublates its externality through self-externalisation. In short, as Magee writes, 'Hegel shows that when the subject transforms objects according to its will it is really being moved by the desire to confront itself. The desire of the subject to annul the other and absolutise itself is just the same thing as the desire to be confronted by the self and no other'.[217] Thus the shape of one's desires is formed by the positing of either one's self as self-subsistent or as subsisting under God.[218]

Here Hegel reveals that other aspect of *Verstand*, not as the death-dealing power (from the *Phenomenology*[219]) cherished so much by the proponents of the Lacanian death-drive (like Žižek), but as corresponding to what theology calls 'the *goodness* of God'.[220] By this Hegel means the fact that 'finite things are', that they have a 'subsistence' at all (*ein Bestehen haben*) as part of the being of the *Absolute*; that they enjoy 'the joy of being-there' (*die Freude des Daseins*). The relevant thing here is the development of the concept of 'subsistence' as the

[216] D. Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 94.
[217] G. A. Magee, *The Hegel Dictionary* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 69–70.
[218] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 170.
[219] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 35–36.
[220] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 170–171.

goodness of God and as therefore given from without. Antithetical to this concept is that of finite '*self*-subsistence' as 'the ultimate, most stubborn error, one which takes itself as the ultimate truth'. It is a 'being-for-itself that destroys itself', because it is opposed to itself by being opposed to the Absolute – since matter requires 'reflection-into-another' (*Reflexion-in-Anderes*) as much as 'being-within-self' (*Insichseins*).[221] As Rowan Williams has emphasised, if *Verstand* is what theology calls the goodness of God, then *Dialektik* is what theology calls 'the power of God'.[222] Williams notes that *Verstand* denotes a kind of 'doctrine of providence', in so far as it says ''Everything can be thought', 'nothing is beyond reconciliation', every percept makes sense in a distinctness, a uniqueness, that is in harmony with an overall environment'.[223] In this sense, it satisfies the human desire for unity. But at the same time, this very thinking of finite particularity 'in its harmonies', Williams points out, 'breaks the frame of reference in which we think the particular'; i.e. the frame of the infinite goodness of divine creativity.[224] In other words, the application of human *Verstand* (as *subjektive Tätigkeit*) to finite particularity (as the *Objektive*), involves the subject's understanding of the object in separation from it and therefore the subject's self-understanding in separation from itself. God's goodness, must therefore 'give way to God's power'.[225]

'Goodness' gives way to 'power', however, because it is embedded in a Trinitarian pattern which manifests itself in history as structurally universal to consciousness. The subjective activity of human consciousness as *Verstand* is itself a unity of opposites, a unity of fixation and separation, of 'being-within-self' and 'reflection-into-another'. This *dialectical* conception

[221] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 192; Werke 8, 91, 260.
[222] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 37.
[223] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 37.
[224] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 262: 'Gott als das Wesen, so wie er die Güte ist, dadurch, daß er den Momenten seines Scheinens in sich Existenz verleiht, eine Welt zu erschaffen, erweist sich zugleich als die Macht über dieselbe und als die Gerechtigkeit, den Inhalt dieser existierenden Welt, insofern dieselbe für sich existieren will, als bloße Erscheinung zu manifestieren'. Earlier, Hegel refers to this creativity as an 'infinite goodness'.
[225] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 37.

of *Verstand* as always already in dialectical tension[226] is reflected in Hegel's account of the divine goodness of creation as always already proving (*erweisen*) that it is the power or might (*Macht*) that rules creation (we might call this the 'overturning' or *übergehen* of 'goodness' into 'power').[227] It is therefore also reflected in the account of the immediacy of creaturely life (as the *Schein* of the creative *Wesen*) as always already beyond mere subsistence and toward absolute relationship. Hegel identifies 'subsistence' as the 'appearance' or *Schein* of God's creative 'essence' or *Wesen. Self*-subsistence is accordingly identified with an existence as 'mere appearance' (*bloße Erscheinung*). Hegel's distinction between *Schein* und *Erscheinung* is subtle and complex (in addition to being different from that which we find in Kant[228]). Of primary importance here is the following: *Schein* refers to the appearance or manifestation of an essence which it does not fully disclose. At the same time, however, its distinctness from the essence it manifests is constituted only through its manifestation of it, such that *Schein* is a doubled determination, both externalising and being dependent on an essence. *Erscheinung*, on the other hand, is fully disclosive, but it is (in further contradistinction from *Schein*) not fully dependent on an essence, but on another *Erscheinung*, such that it is not opposed to an essence, but to *Wirklichkeit* or actuality itself. Thus when Williams argues that the goodness of God gives way to 'a [divine] power which acts only in a kind of self-devastation',[229] he means to convey Hegel's notion that divine 'power' is posited in opposition to human self-subsistence as 'actuality'.[230]

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[226] As H.S. Harris notes in the English language translation of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, 'this dialectical conception of the understanding [...] is not generally understood. Often, indeed, it is not even *remembered*'. Harris juxtaposes this account to that in the *Phenomenology*; G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic (with Zusätze),* trans. T. F. Geraets et al (Indianapolis / Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 323n.108.

[227] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 262.

[228] For a brief account on this matter, including on the differences between Kant and Hegel, see Inwood, M., 'Appearance, Illusion, Shining', in *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1992), 38–40.

[229] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 37.

[230] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 262. Hegel identifies this relativisation of creation through the 'positing' of divine actuality in his account of Judaism. There, he writes that '[d]as Geistige sagt sich hier vom Sinnlichen unmittelbar los, und die Natur wird zu einem Äußerlichen und Ungöttlichen herabgesetzt. Dies ist eigentlich die Wahrheit der Natur, denn erst später kann die Idee in dieser ihrer Äußerlichkeit zur Versöhnung gelangen; ihr erster Ausspruch wird gegen die Natur sein, denn der Geist, welcher bisher entwürdigt war, erhält erst hier seine Würde sowie die Natur ihre rechte Stellung wieder. Die Natur ist sich selbst äußerlich, sie ist das Gesetzte, sie ist erschaffen, und diese Vorstellung, daß Gott Herr und Schöpfer der Natur sei, bringt die Stellung Gottes als des

In this sense 'power' is the negativity of 'goodness', but only in so far as finite self-subsistence is opposed to God's creativity conceived dialectically, which is to say, not merely as *creatio ex nihilo* (goodness as the 'releasing' (*entlassen*) of God's *Wesen* into creaturely immediacy in nature) but also as *creatio continua* ('power' as the ongoing involvement of the divine in creation through providence in history). The third and 'speculative' stage completes the logical triad of *Verstand*, *Dialektik*, and *Spekulation* from the first *Encyclopaedia.* Williams identifies the speculative stage (to which dialectic leads) with what theology has called the mystical. This is not 'the fusion of subject and object but the concrete (historical?) unity or continuity or followability of what *Verstand* alone can only think fragmentarily or episodically'.[231] This identification of speculation with the mystical, however, derives not from the discussion on creation and *Verstand* (§§125-131), on which we have focused on until now, but from an earlier discussion[232] in the *Encyclopaedia* where Hegel outlines the triad of *Verstand*, *Dialektik*, and *Spekulation* in quasi-historical terms. There he identifies *Verstand* with the pre-Kantian or dogmatic 'metaphysics' of Continental Rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz, and perhaps especially Wolff,[233] *Dialektik* with empiricism and especially critical philosophy (whose common denominator is the acceptance of experience as the only basis of cognition[234]), and *Spekulation* with Jacobi's (and implicitly Schleiermacher's) *unmittelbare Wissen* and what

Erhabenen herbei, indem die ganze Natur Gottes Schmuck und gleichsam zu seinem Dienste verwendet ist'; G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrhamp, 1970), 242.

[231] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 38.

[232] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 178

[233] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 93–105.

[234] 'Die kritische Philosophie hat es mit dem Empirismus gemein, die Erfahrung für den *einzigen* Boden der Erkenntnisse anzunehmen, welche sie aber nicht für Wahrheiten, sondern nur für Erkenntnisse von Erscheinungen gelten läßt'; *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 112.

'used to be called' mysticism.[235]

The later theological points of reference linking *Verstand* and *Dialektik* to divine 'goodness' and 'power', respectively, are therefore of a different order of characterisation than those above, and *Spekulation* must be connected in this context with something other than merely the mystical. William's characterisation of that stage, however, viz. as constituting a historically concrete continuity of subject and object which *Verstand* 'can only think fragmentarily or episodically' remains correct. In fact, Hegel qualifies the metaphysics of *Verstand* as 'naïvely' and 'unconsciously' already speculative (and therefore something to which dialectics must return) in addition to being unconscious of the antitheses afflicting its finite determinations.[236] Its limit is therefore at least partly that of its 'unconsciousness' (*Bewußtlosigkeit*) which Hegel, in a typical chiasmic fashion, characterises as an unconsciousness of its limit.[237] (To this extent, the metaphysics of *Verstand* might also be said to lack a certain self-determination, which would entail the later, dialectical repudiation of it as impossibly 'self-subsistent'.) But Hegel

[235] In the case of *Spekulation* alone, Hegel identifies a unity or continuity of a 'present' and a 'past' stream of thought. Previously he had identified *Verstand* and *Dialektik* with readily identifiable historiographic units of philosophical thought ('rationalism', 'empiricism', 'Kantianism'). The reason for this digression is twofold. Firstly, *Spekulation* designates a return of *Verstand* and *Dialektik* as logical moments to logic, such that the latter becomes 'was die *gewöhnliche Logik* ist, eine *Historie* von mancherlei zusammengestellten Gedankenbestimmungen'; see *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 177. Secondly, Hegel, while wishing to state the fundamental correctness of Jacobi over against Kant in recognising the presence and involvement of thought-determinations in the immediate forms of feeling and intuition, also wishes to move beyond this standpoint of speculation which, he argues, like the designation 'mystical', has come to be associated with the mysterious and incomprehensible (*dem Geheimnisvollen und Unbegreiflichen*). Depending on one's cultural sensibilities, Hegel notes, this 'mysteriousness' may be regarded either as authentic and genuine or as superstitious and deceptive. To this he adds that the sides of the opposition are therefore necessarily one-sided because the mystical is only mysterious from the standpoint of *Verstand*, so that both those who oppose the mystical on the basis of its mysteriousness and those who embrace it on that same basis have an insufficiently dialectical qualification of *Verstand* itself; *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 177–179.

[236] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 93. The bringing to consciousness of these antitheses Hegel seems to associate with Kant's critique of the 'mathematical' antinomies of pure reason. The critique of both conclusions from the mathematical antinomies can be shown to be one–sided (and for Kant, therefore, also false). The conclusions from the dynamical antinomies, on the other hand, are epistemically undeterminable such that either may turn out to be true. For this reason, Kant's critique of the dynamical antinomies does not seem to be regarded by Hegel as properly 'dialectical'. Most famously, Hegel criticises Kant's treatment of the fourth antinomy, concerning the thesis of a necessary being; see G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*: *Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes,*Werke 17 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 528–535.

[237] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 93–96. Which is why Hegel argues against Kantian 'dialectic', which affirms this limit of metaphysics, that to know or posit this limit is overcome it as an impassable barrier; Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 142–147.

does not obviously provide a theological point of reference for what comes *after* the dialectical displacement of *Verstand* in *Spekulation.* The *locus classicus* on *Verstand* as the 'goodness of God' from the first *Encyclopaedia* refers, apart from goodness, also to power and *justice*, suggesting a triadic sequence of references for *Verstand*, *Dialektik*, and *Spekulation*. But is *Spekulation* what theology calls the 'justice of God'? Hardly. And it is both possible and plausible to read Hegel as saying that it is *Dialektik* that refers at the same time to what theology calls the power *and* justice of God, in so far as classical theology (like Hegel) generally identifies divine power with justice.[238] But this gets us nowhere in terms of identifying a theological point of reference for *Spekulation*.

That Hegel himself, however, does not explicitly provide one should neither surprise nor discourage us. For this discussion takes place in the section on the 'doctrine of essence' and therefore within the realm of the dialectical. The crucial analysis of *Verstand* is in this sense retrospective and its upshot is to highlight the 'dialectical' conception of *Verstand* over against earlier characterisations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Hegel does not provide a homologous point of reference for *Spekulation*. Unfortunately, one will struggle to find something readily available in the later section on the 'doctrine of concept'. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that 'desire' or the mutual desire of and for God (as *Aufhebung*) designates the correct and apposite theological reference point for *Spekulation*. It is worth highlighting three aspects of *Spekulation* relevant to this connection with the desire of and for God. Firstly, it is clear that in so far as God is neither a determinate object nor a member of a class, he can only enter human speculation within a negotiation of the subject-object relation reconfigured as a doubling of human self-consciousness,[239] which (as Hegel tell us) is 'desire in general'. Secondly, in so far

[238] And in so far as Williams does not mention this characterisation of *Dialektik* as 'justice', he may be taken to read it as implied by 'power'.

[239] Which Hegel will also go on to call a self-intuition of the Absolute; G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807,* Werke 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 72, cf.

as *Verstand* metaphysics is already unconsciously 'speculative' and therefore something to which thought must return, *Spekulation* is not that which makes the (re-)turn to *Verstand* but rather what is returned to. This means that it is *Dialektik* which must both overcome and return to *Verstand* as *Spekulation.* (Power must overcome and return to goodness as desire.) It is useful to think of this doubling of dialectic as referring theologically to 'power' and 'justice'. (I will argue below that these correspond to the teleologies of 'violence' and 'cunning' developed by Hegel in the *Science of Logic*, but in order to establish this I will need to further argue in favour of desire as a theological reference-point for *Spekulation.*) And thirdly and finally, the speculative stage, in so far as it brings to consciousness a concrete historical continuity of subjectivity and objectivity in *Geist*, must also bring to consciousness the spiritual continuity of speculation in history. It is for this third reason that Hegel insists on the continuity of 'speculative' thought in history (i.e. between the Dominican mysticism of Meister Eckhartand Johannes Tauler and the 19th century 'speculative' thought of Jacobi and his own 'absolute idealism').

The Danish Hegelian Hans Martensen, in his attempt to ground this continuity between medieval mysticism and German idealism in his book on Eckhart,[240] had arrived at the notion of *Salighed* (*Seligkeit* in German) or salvific bliss, which he had derived from Fichte's 1806 *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*,[241] as the key to reading the continuity[242]. For Fichte, *Seligkeit* is what satisfies the desire of consciousness; it is what propels it in its eschatological movement. Hegel does not use the term, except critically, in his repudiation of the Roman

[240] H. Martensen, *Mester Eckart*: *Et bidrag til at oplyse middelalderens mystik* (2nd ed., Kjøbenhavn: C.A. Reitzel, 1851).
[241] J. G. Fichte, *Anweisung zum seligen Leben*, Werke 5, ed. M. Holzinger (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845/1846).
[242] Martensen, *Mester Eckhart*, 44; For a more recent study, see M. Scherbaum, 'Fichte und Meister Eckhart: Fichtes "Anweisung zum seligen Leben" und Meister Eckharts "Deutsche Werke"'. *Sic et Non- Forum for Philosophy and Culture* 1 (2001).

religion of *Verstand* as a *Glückseligkeitsreligion*.[243] This association of *Verstand* and religious naïveté, however, is crucial, because it links *Seligkeit* to the characterisation of the standpoint of *Verstand* as 'unconscious speculation'. Notably, for Martensen, speculative thought is not a pantheism because it inherits from Eckhart's mysticism the idea of a personal search or quest (*personlig søgen*) – as the necessary precondition for the *personal* movement towards this salvific bliss (something he identifies in Fichte's 'instruction').[244] Speculative thought, ostensibly following Luther, reformulates this *unio mystica* from a product of human striving in the monastic life (which traditionally follows from the paths of *purgatio* and *illuminatio*) to a unification constituted in the believer by faith alone.[245] The problem, however, with Fichte's particular reformulation of the *seligen Leben*, from the Hegelian standpoint (as Martensen more or less approvingly notes) is that it requires the erasure of all images (*Billeder*) within the soul which obstruct the blissful unity of the soul and God, and ultimately a subjection of the will to an absolute identity with God. For this reason, the cognition (*Erkendelse*) of the divine essence (*det guddommelige væsen*) must be free of all affect; it must be 'pure' and 'unpathological'.[246]

[243] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 168; cf. C. O'Regan, 'Eckhart Reception in the 19th Century' *in A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, ed. J.M. Hackett (Boston: Brill, 2013), especially 658–660.
[244] Martensen is also highlighting the monastic context in which this personal search (*søgen*) occurs for the mystic. For what it's worth, the Danish '*sogn*' also means 'parish'.
[245] Martensen, *Mester Eckhart*, 70–71. Martensen is clear that Luther did not derive his doctrine of justification by faith by reformulating the *Theologia Germanica* or any other related mystical texts, which is partly why the reconstruction of the historical unity of German mysticism and speculative Protestantism is said to be of lingering importance.
[246] Martensen, *Mester Eckhart*, 44. Schubert's 1816 ironic, tongue-in-cheek adaptation of Ludwig Hölty's (earlier and perhaps more earnest) '*Seligkeit'* combines this overturning of (the always already melancholic) pagan world of fun and play with the ironies of the Christian angelic heaven. As David Gramit notes, 'having painted in the first two strophes a child-like vision of paradise, abruptly offers in the third to forgo that bliss in exchange for the hoped-for earthly delights offered by his beloved'. The opening dance, which is originally presented as allegorical, as merely a symbol of (pagan) worldly pleasure representing higher, heavenly pleasure, is revealed as literal: 'What we initially hear as like a dance turns out to be dance itself'; see also D. Gramit, 'Between "*Täuschung*" and "*Seligkeit*:" Situating Schubert's Dances'. *The Musical Quarterly* 84.2 (2000), 222. 'Schubert's song seems interested in exposing the danger inherent in completely 'sinking' (*versinken*, as Fichte put it) humanity into divinity, including as disguising a mere hollowing out of human finitude rather than supplementing and overcoming it 'from above' (the song's protagonist ultimately wishes to forgo his bliss in heaven for the company of his lost beloved, Laura); see F. Schubert, 'Seligkeit', Werke 4, ed. E. Mandyczewski (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1895).

For Hegel, however, it is precisely this position that is pathological, with Hegel comparing it to that of the Pietistic *Schwärmerei.*[247]

This critique of the Fichtean position is developed in the *Differenzschrift*:

> Wenn die Aufhebung der Entzweiung [of subject and object] als formale Aufgabe der Philosophie gesetzt wird, so kann die Vernunft die Lösung der Aufgabe auf die Art versuchen, daß sie eins der Entgegengesetzten vernichtet und das andere zu einem Unendlichen steigert. Dies ist der Sache nach im Fichteschen System geschehen; allein die Entgegensetzung bleibt auf diese Art, denn dasjenige, was als Absolutes gesetzt wird, ist durchs andere bedingt, und so wie es besteht, besteht auch das andere. Um die Entzweiung aufzuheben, müssen beide Entgegengesetzte, Subjekt und Objekt aufgehoben werden; sie werden als Subjekt und Objekt aufgehoben, indem sie identisch gesetzt sind. In der absoluten Identität ist Subjekt und Objekt aufeinander bezogen und damit vernichtet; insofern ist für die Reflexion und das Wissen nichts vorhanden.[248]

By contrast, Martensen may be said to have opted for another, broadly Schellingian option. For him, the true mystic seeks the cancellation of God and the world in order to arrive at 'that Third' (*det Tredie*), the *Urgrund*, which is prior to God and the world.[249] But Hegel clearly sees his own approach to the subject-object *Entzweiung* as involving not simply its cancellation (*Aufhebung* in the negatively dialectical sense) but its 'suspension'. This is unlike both Fichte's position where (according to Hegel) one side of the divide is necessarily annihilated (*vernichtet*) in favour of the absolutisation of (God as) an opposite, as well as Martensen's, where the divide is cancelled in favour of something outside of it (which, however, can only be arrived at through this cancellation).

Hegel's unwillingness to accept either of the aforementioned positions is at least partly connected to his understanding of what is meant for philosophy by '*Entzweiung*' ('division' or

[247] Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, Werke 2, 95.
[248] Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, Werke 2, 94–95.
[249] Martensen, *Mester Eckhart*, 48–49.

'bifurcation'; for Miller, it was 'dichotomy', but it may even be rendered as 'tear' or 'rip'). In order to understand this, we must focus on Hegel's understanding of *Entzweiung*, including as the subject-object difference, as 'process' and not merely as obstacle or limitation (*Schranke*). Eric v. d. Luft has emphasised Hegel's insistence, especially in the *Phenomenology*, on the need to 'bifurcate the negativity of the Concept' and has argued from that standpoint that *Entzweiung* as process is an 'indispensable logical constituent of the dialectic in general, not only on this highly mediated level [of 'speculation']'.[250] Achim Trebeß has similarly argued, from the historical context, that *Entzweiung* refers to the historically necessary process of cancelling *estrangement* or *alienation* (*Aufhebung von Entfremdung*) in modern society.[251] In other words, *Entzweiung* has a positive aspect as the bifurcation of the negativity of *Begriff*. The conservative German philosopher Joachim Ritter articulated this especially well when he wrote that *Entzweiung* is *'positiv als die Form, in der sich unter der Bedingung der modernen Welt ihre ursprüngliche Einheit geschichtlich erhält'*.[252] In this sense, we could say that *Entzweiung*, insofar as it includes the concept which expresses the division (though not yet the estrangement) of the human *Geist* at the Fall,[253] also denotes the preservation of an original unity as much as its sundering; a preservation, moreover, on the basis of which *Entfremdung* is to be overcome.[254] And this is why Hegel calls this possibility of subsistence in distinctness or separation (*Verstand*) the 'goodness of God'.

[250] E. v. d. Luft, 'An Early Interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit', in *Ruminations: Selected Philosophical, Historical, and Ideological Papers, vol. 1* (New York, NY: Gegensatz Press, 2019), 39; Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 581: 'Das *Entzweien* oder Hervortreten hat er an der *Reinheit* des Begriffs, denn sie ist die absolute Abstraktion oder Negativität'. Note also Luft's critique of Hinrich's development of the link between *Entzweiung* and *Entfremdung*; 41–42.
[251] A. Trebeß, *Entfremdung und Ästhetik* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2001), 45.
[252] J. Ritter, *Hegel und die französische Revolution* (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1957), 32.
[253] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 88–90.
[254] Hegel's understanding of the human condition in a state of *Entzweiung* is in this sense similar to von Baader's understanding of the human condition as fallen in time; 'Die Zeit ist das vornehmste Werkzeug der Leiden der Menschen und das machtigste Hinderniss, welches ihn von seinem Urheber entfernt halt'; von Baader, *Nachgelassene Werke,* Werke 2, 182. It may have influenced Lenin and those who follow him in making the claim that communism is the 'negation of capitalism on the basis of capitalism itself'; see, for example, T. Cliff, *State Capitalism in Russia* (London: Pluto Press, 1974), 158.

We can see how, on this understanding of the subject-object difference as *Entzweiung*, Hegel cannot opt for either the Fichtean or the Martensenian approach. But if the subject-object difference preserves the human subject (if only precariously) from the possibility of total estrangement from its object, in addition to forming the obstacle to its full unification with its object, how are we to theorise Hegel's claim that we must somehow 'suspend' it? Graham Ward has most recently brought the operation of this suspension into view, emphasising that Hegel 'views the science of logic as prescribing not the annihilation of the subject-object difference, which would be the eclipse of all conscious knowledge, but rather its suspension',[255] such that, as Hegel puts it, '[i]n the absolute identity subject and object are suspended, but because they are within the absolute identity they both have standing too. This standing is what makes knowledge possible'.[256] Hegel calls the form of consciousness which subsists in this absolute relationship to the divine '*reine Wissen*' or 'pure knowing'. (As we will see below, *reine Wissen* is overturned, in the transition from *Geist* to *Logik*, into *reine Sein* as the beginning of the science of logic.) In this sense, the suspension of the subject-object difference for consciousness refers to the positing of its actual self-consciousness (*sein wirkliches Selbstbewußtsein*) as its object.[257] Its *actual* self-consciousness is opposed to the object of religious consciousness as *Erscheinung*.[258] Hence, as Ward highlights, it is a '*self-intuition* of the Absolute, which is becoming object to itself in completed totality'.[259] Hegel therefore

[255] G. Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 299.
[256] Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807,* Werke 2, 95. I have also reproduced here Knox's translation from Ward's text because it tracks smoothly with that discussion.
[257] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Werke 3, 575
[258] In the *Phenomenology*, it is identified as 'natural' spirit or mind (*natürliche Geist*). Historically, it is identified in the lectures on history and religion with the consciousness of *Naturreligion* which is purified in Jewish religion; Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* Werke 3, 569; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* Werke 12 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 241–244; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I,* Werke 16 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 259; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 50–53.
[259] Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life 1*, 299; Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, Werke 2, 112.

'transposes the philosophical idiom into a theological one',[260] writing that this self-intuition 'must unite in the intuition of God's eternal human Incarnation, the begetting of the Word from the beginning' (*des Zeugens des Worts vom Anfang*).[261] Ward concludes with the elucidation that 'finite consciousness participates in the Logos because the object of that consciousness, the object galvanizing the very process of that consciousness towards knowledge, is the Logos itself'.[262]

But it is desire for the speculative unity of subject and object in the self-intuition of the Absolute which galvanises the process of consciousness towards knowledge. Because this desire as a generalised self-consciousness only exists for human consciousness as a *reine Wissen*, it is at the same time a purifying desire. The *Logos*, in other words, is an object for consciousness only as displaced, or as the desire for its purification. This is why Hegel says that the '*Entzweiung* ist der Quell des *Bedürfnisses der Philosophie*'.[263] Furthermore, 'des Zeugens des Worts vom Anfang' means 'the begetting of the Word from the beginning', but it may also mean the '*witnessing* of the Word from the beginning', referring to the eternal anticipation, in the speculative unity of *Logos* and human consciousness as *reine Wissen*, of the beginning of the *Logik* as the presentation (*die Darstellung*) of God's eternal essence (*ewigen Wesen*) before the creation of the world.[264] The satisfaction of desire through the suspension of the subject-object difference as *Entzweiung* is therefore linked, as Jonas Wollenhaupt also points out, to

[260] Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life 1*, 299.
[261] '...muß beides vereinigen in die Anschauung des sich selbst in vollendeter Totalität objektiv werdenden Absoluten — in die Anschauung der ewigen Menschwerdung Gottes, des Zeugens des Worts vom Anfang';Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, Werke 2, 112.
[262] Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life 1,* 300.
[263] Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807*, Werke 2, 20
[264] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 44.

philosophical reflection as a 'remembering' of the separation.[265] Wollenhaupt additionally notes that

> Hegel operiert jedoch nicht mehr, wie Rousseau oder auch Schiller, mit einem idealen Natur-Urzustand, aus dem der Mensch herausgetreten sei, da dieser Gedankengang selbst bereits durch ein entfremdetes Bewusstsein konstruktiert wurde.[266]

The point is precisely that the very suspension of the *Entzweiung* is made possible by the preservation of what the *Entzweiung* is a division of; viz. by the preservation, in the *Entzweiung*, of a constitutive unity of consciousness and the *Logos* as the object of its actual self-consciousness.

As Joachim Ringleben points out, however, *Entzweiung* means both '*Entzweiung von Einheit in Momente und zugleich Entzweiung der Momente voneinander in gegensätzliche'*.[267] The former is the source of the desire for a philosophical *Erinnerung* of the separation and indeed for its suspension more generally. The latter, on the other hand, is what preserves the separate moments (in this case, finite creaturely life) from annihilation outside of the frame of the original unity. Hence in so far as the suspension of the *Entzweiung* is itself propelled by the desire towards knowledge it generates, it is also a suspension of the preservation it provides. Hence the suspension of the subject-object difference involves a kind of self-cancellation or erasure, but it is a cancellation of subjectivity as self-subsistent. *Spekulation* may therefore be characterised as the desire for the knowledge of God without the desire to be a 'knower' with an 'object'. It is on this basis that Hegel rejects the appeal to the 'mysteriousness' of the

[265] J. Wollenhaupt, *Die Entfremdung des Subjekts* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2018), 36.
[266] Wollenhaupt, *Die Entfremdung des Subjekts*, 36. Wollenhaupt adds that 'Hegel operiert daher mit einemwesentlich komplexeren Modell der subjektiven und sozialen Welt'.
[267] J. Ringleben, *Hegels Theorie der Sünde* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977), 57. The emphases are Ringleben's. *Entfremdung*, by contrast, occurs when the oppositional differentiation of the two moments solidifies and each persist in isolation; cf. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 91–92. Ringleben's analysis furthermore, and, in my view correctly, suggests that only the *Entzweiung* of a unity *'in Momente'* is a structural necessity of spiritual becoming.

speculative-mystical because such an appeal entails either the view that *absolute Wissen* is possible and religiously authentic, but is therefore constituted in a privileged and particular knower, or that it is impossible and superstitious because there can be no such knower.[268] Hegel claims in the *Philosophy of History* that Scripture tells humanity that its highest duty is not merely to love but to also know God.[269] As Shanks has recently noted,[270] Hegel makes a distinction in the *Science of Logic* between two teleologies of revelation or between the emergence of the truth of faith by 'violence' and by 'cunning'.[271] What is emphasised there, however, is not the 'bottom-up' movement of the human subject seeking knowledge of God which is constituted beyond objectivity in a union of absolute self-intuition, but the 'top-down' movement of divine Providence in history, which is to say, the relation of the divine revelatory will to human communities in history.

In the first teleological form of revelation, the divine revelatory will, which manifests the purposive 'end' (*Zweck)* of history, relates itself *immediately* to its object and constitutes it as a 'means'. This constitutive relation may accordingly be regarded as '*violence* inasmuch as the end appears of an entirely different nature than the object, and the two objects are similarly mutually independent totalities'[272]. As Shanks points out, there are three entities involved in this 'violent' form of revelation:

> The 'end' and the two 'objects' are three separate minds: the mind of God, the mind of the prophet or apostle, and the mind of the community. And the relationship between them is simple. Without any apparent ambiguity, it is the

[268] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I* ,Werke 8, 178–179.
[269] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 26–27: 'nicht bloß zu lieben, sondern auch zu erkennen'. This sounds like a play on his well-known formulation *'*nicht als *Substanz,* sondern ebensosehr als *Subjekt*'; *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 23.
[270] Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology,* 1–10.
[271] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Werke 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969),, 452–453.
[272] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Werke 6, 452; 'Daß der Zweck sich unmittelbar auf ein Objekt bezieht und dasselbe zum Mittel macht, wie auch daß er durch dieses ein anderes bestimmt, kann als *Gewalt* betrachtet werden, insofern der Zweck als von ganz anderer Natur erscheint als das Objekt und die beiden Objekte ebenso gegeneinander selbständige Totalitäten sind'.

> interplay of a primary agency [Hegel's *außerweltlichen Verstandes*[273]], an instrument, and a passive material[274].

In the second teleology of revelation, the revelatory will posits itself in a '*mediate* relation with the object and *interposes* (*einschiebt*) *between* itself and this object another object'. This, second, constitutive relation may be regarded as 'the cunning of reason' (*die List der Vernunft*).[275] The point here is precisely that this interposition or insertion is not an 'interpolation'; in other words, it is not the insertion of something of a foreign nature into something else:

> What is 'interposed' between God and the interpreter, in the work of this 'cunning', is – by contrast – a whole historic process, which considered in itself is highly ambiguous: potentially a revelation of God's truth, but not in an immediately obvious way; and therefore requiring considerable work of discernment, on the part of the interpreter, to be recognised for what it is. So the divine Revealer 'interposes' a whole medium of teleological ambiguity, within which the truth of revelation is 'cunningly', so far as possible, slipped past the conservative resistances of sinful human instinct[276].

The interposition is precisely a 'slipping past' sinful resistances – though it is clear from Hegel's more concretely political and ethical writing that these resistances must be excoriated not simply through considerable efforts of intellectual discernment, but more generally through the purification of sinful impulses (*Reinigung der Triebe)*.[277] It is furthermore helpful to think of the two teleological forms outlined here as corresponding to what Hegel, in the lesser *Logic*, respectively referred to as the 'power' and 'justice' of God; in other words, as corresponding to the theological referents of *Dialektik* as 'teleologically ambiguous' (to use Shanks'

[273] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Werke 6, 438.
[274] Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology*, 1.
[275] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Werke 6, 452; 'Daß der Zweck sich aber in die *mittelbare* Beziehung mit dem Objekt setzt und *zwischen* sich und dasselbe ein anderes Objekt *einschiebt*, kann als die *List* der Vernunft angesehen werden'.
[276] Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology*, 1.
[277] G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*,Werke 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 70.

formulation).[278] Hence the attempt to suspend the subject-object difference, that is, to constitute its historical continuity through speculation, ultimately involves also the suspension of the subject as an 'immediate knower', of consciousness as emerging from a structure of what I earlier referred to as 'immediate mediation'. Differently put, it involves the suspension of human subjectivity as immediately related and immediately accessing not simply revelation, but also to the complex set of historical traditions, societal norms, and human instincts which serve to stultify the development of the *Zweck* of history.

4 Progressive vs Regressive Desire

Hegel's phenomenology presents us with a progressive and evolutionary aspect of desire which competes with a regressive and nostalgic one. As Berthold-Bond has convincingly argued, this anticipates the late Freud, in so far as it 'sketches out a psychology of the feeling soul that foreshadows the Nietzschean and Freudian calls for a depth psychology, an investigation of the pre-rational realm of unconscious motivations and drives'.[279] In referring to a 'pre-rational realm', Bond should not be taken to mean a realm or space which escapes the overreaching or overgrasping of thought, but a realm of unintention. The *locus* of this unintention is *Trieb* which is not, as Hegel obscurely admits, 'directed by thinking' though it in some way leads to it.[280] Thomas Altizer[281] highlighted this point with characteristic eloquence:

> Hegel is our only thinker who has made the forward movement of advance the very center and ground of pure thinking itself, and that advance is inseparable from the dark mystery of *Trieb*, that primal urge or instinct or drive, which Hegel can finally identify as the sole and absolute force of pure reason, its supreme and sole *Trieb* to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything. [...] If

[278] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 262.
[279] Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, 120–121.
[280] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse III*, Werke 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 215.
[281] Who is neglected in theology today, though looms large over philosophical thinkers, like Slavoj Žižek, often without their knowledge. For an account of Žižek as a 'death of God theologian', see A. Kotsko, *Žižek and Theology* (London: Continuum, 2008), especially, 149–155.

> *Trieb* is the darkest mystery in Hegel's system, it is that mystery which is the very essence of a purely Hegelian thinking, for apart from that mystery there would be no advance, and thus finally no thinking or process at all. Indeed, the primal conflict or *Qual* of Hegelian thinking may be understood as an ultimate struggle or war with a primordial nothingness or emptiness, a "nothing" which cannot become "being," and cannot become being if only because of the ultimacy and finality of its original or primordial identity. For *Trieb* or *Kenosis* is the Hegelian answer to the metaphysical question: why is there any being at all, why not far rather nothingness[282]?

Altizer's claims here are not so much false as they are out of context. Firstly, while Altizer is essentially correct in saying that '*Trieb* is the darkest mystery' of Hegel's system, this is only true as part of the mystery of the Fall, a story which reveals the context of its striving 'to find and cognize itself'. This is why, as Altizer goes on to say, there would be no advance, no *Bildung*, and hence no human thought without an originary mystery, since philosophy begins for Hegel with the secondary reality of the Fall, viz. with contingent historical catastrophe. And secondly, if Hegelian thinking is to be characterised by a primordial conflict of pre-rational drives, this is only to the extent that the primacy of its conflict is coordinate with the primacy of the mystery of the Fall, which is gnoseologically first for thinking, even though it is ontologically second, to Creation. It hardly needs saying that this recontextualisation undermines much if not all of the 'nihilist' core of the metaphysical project Altizer is propounding. But far from being a 'normalisation' of Hegel, this emphasis on the Fall as a constitutive and yet non-necessary structure of the *Nachdenken* of mind reveals the radical core of Hegel's theological project; of his ability to truly transform, without final negation or destruction.

The struggle of Hegelian thought is, then, not with an ontologically primordial nothingness, but a reactive postlapsarian nothingness (which as Altizer highlights, articulating the logic of transitoriness, is a nothingness which strives but fails to *become* being). It is, at the level of *Trieb*, a struggle between the progressive and regressive desires. 'Progressive desire', which

[282] T. J. Altizer, 'Hegel and the Christian God'. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 59 (1991), 73.

Hegel summarily defines (following Aristotle) as a desiring of form by matter and a privileging of life, is then sublationary in its very character. (Therefore, the question of why there arises a need and desire to suspend the *Entzweiung*; to sublate the contradictions of desire, is in a sense avoided rather than straightforwardly answered.[283]) However, just as desire as such is intrinsically a self-doubling, presenting a circle of two incompatible unities, so too the contronymic doubling of *Aufhebung* as both abolition and preservation is accompanied by the privileged and *speculative* connotation of elevation at the expense of the other internal unity of thought. (It is telling that Hegel only refers to abolition and preservation in his *explicit* treatments of sublation.) Thus some Hegelian or semi-Hegelian thinkers like Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite, and more recently Slavoj Žižek have inverted Hegel's emphasis on progressive sublation and the latter two have further identified negative or regressive sublation with regressive desire (or in Žižek's case the Lacanian death-drive or *Todestrieb*). Overall, it is mostly apposite, if not necessary, to consider the privileging of becoming over transitoriness in terms of the domination of one of these aspects of desire. And in so far as self-consciousness only emerges with the further doubling of progressive desire (since regressive desire seeks a return to the pre-conscious), then the privileging of becoming over transitoriness is not so much an externally reflective decision, as Willet intimates (and as someone like Laruelle surely would agree[284]) but is precisely constitutive of consciousness.

5 The Fall (i.e. Good vs Evil)

Hegel identifies the context for this doubling of desire in the story of the Fall which is the source of the originary doubling or division (*Entzweiung*) in mind or spirit. *Trieb*, as the *locus*

[283] On this issue, see M. Inwood, *A Commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 434–435; cf. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 215–217.
[284] Laruelle, 'Theory of Philosophical Decision', in *Philosophies of Difference*, 196–223.

of unintention is located within the structure of *Entzweiung*. The significance of the Fall for Hegel, at least as far as the major considerations of this chapter are concerned, is this: if, as I have already remarked, what counts most for the beginning of philosophy is that the beginning become the ending or the origin the result and *vice versa*, then an explanation is required for why the mediated immediacy of the beginning of logic is not reproduced for the beginning of mind which instead proceeds from what I have called an 'immediate mediation'. The Fall is identified by Hegel as the ideal candidate for this explanation because the Fall temporarily cuts off human spirit from the circular mediation of the divine.[285] Philosophy is for him a specifically postlapsarian possibility. To this extent, the claim that the order of the historical manifestations of philosophy follows the internal diachrony of his thought can be taken seriously, at least in this case, inasmuch as the first philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari have argued and Hegel himself also attempted to demonstrate, was both monistic and immanentist and emerged in opposition to the pre-philosophical mythical thought of the time.[286] (Hegel's dichotomy of Heraclitus and the Eleatics versus Aristotle is to this extent perfectly justified.) The withdrawal from the divine is shaped by a desire for a paradoxical and Luciferian self-centredness. What emerges is, in accordance with what I have so far discussed, the formal privileging of evil out of the two irreconcilable unities of good and evil. This is paradoxically because both the progressive and regressive desires, which may be generalised as respective desires for good and evil seek as such unity and peace.[287]

[285] I explain below the specific structure of this collapse of circular mediation.

[286] G. Deleuze, and F. Guattari, F., *What is Philosophy?* trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 35–61; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 65.

[287] I present here a view of evil in tension with the traditional Kantian account of 'radical evil'. The opposition between the Augustinian and Kantian accounts of evil is often expounded in terms of the difference between a theory of evil as 'privation' and a theory highlighting the 'decision to privilege the particular over the universal, or the individual's perceived good over the community's good'. This way of stating the opposition is in my view problematic since the first involves a claim about the ontological status of evil and the second, at least primarily, a claim about the behaviour of agents who commit morally evil acts. This is not to deny the sometimes bewildering differences between the accounts offered by Augustine and Kant, but to question the extent to which Kant's modern language of 'decision' and 'privileging' overdetermines his theory. For it is obviously the case that the fall into evil involves for both men the operation of the human will.

Regressive desire is therefore nostalgic, because it calls spirit back from the instability of any decision or *Entzweiung* to an earlier state which it 'yearns for as a scene of peace and repose'.[288] However, because humans are endowed with freedom, their communion with the divine must be freely willed, or, as Hegel puts it, they must sublate their immediate existence. This effort produces the *Entzweiung* in *Geist* which is, however, not yet an *Entfremdung*. Of the mysterious privileging or choice of 'evil', which occurs somewhere between *Geist*'s knowledge and desire, nothing is, or perhaps can, be said beyond the fact that there occurs a wavering towards self-centredness, which apparently consists of a rejection of the intense and free act of choosing the divine in favour of the regressive 'choice' to withdraw from the very urgency of the choice as such. This is, in short, Hegel's account of the Adamic *stasis*. Hegel's view, expressed most clearly in the *Philosophie des Rechts*, is that the idea that humankind is evil 'by nature' (*von Natur*) is 'higher' or truer than the idea that it is good (he is predominantly thinking here of Rousseau), but that this should not be taken as an ontological claim about humankind as *Geist.* It is rather a claim about 'original sin' (*Erbsünde*) without which Christianity would not be the 'religion of freedom'.[79] Thus, while humanity may be said to be evil by nature, it is not evil, as it were, 'by spirit'; since it only is spirit through its free *Aufhebung* for and towards God, and, therefore through the purification of its sinful impulses[289].

[288] Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness,* 73.

[289] The notion of 'purification' (*Reinigung*) is key for Hegel's understanding of the relationship between evil and *Sittlichkeit* as well as for his philosophy of history more generally. The purification of sinful impulses is connected for Hegel to the purification of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* (and in the *Philosophy of History*) and the derivation of the notion of *reine Wissen* as the precondition for the beginning of the *Logic* as science. In the *Philosophy of History*, the purification of consciousness is identified directly with Judaism and therefore with monotheism. *Reinigung* is the traditional German translation of *purgatio*. I predominantly use 'purification', which is arguably a better translation of *Reinigung* in the English language, in addition to being the traditional translation of the word in Hegel's works, but it should be clear that its use (both by Hegel and by myself) is very close to that of 'purgation', which is more common in traditional theological discussions

At the same time, however, humanity in the 'state of nature' is not indifferent apropos of the possibility of good and evil (as, once again, it might be for Rousseau), because Hegel draws the crucial distinction between the 'natural' goodness of humanity's creaturely immediacy (as it were, before the wilful decision to turn away from the divine) and its spiritual striving for the good. In other words, the distinction (which, as far as I am aware, is missing from all English-language editions of the *Philosophy of Right*[290]) between the will as 'good' (*gut*), designating the coincidence, or agreement (*Übereinstimmung*), of the natural immediacy of feeling and its *Vorbild*, and the will as actually striving for 'the Good' (*das Gute*) when it is in agreement with itself (and therefore striving beyond itself as natural towards itself as *Geist*).[291] (Note the parallel with Hegel's distinction between correctness (*Richtigkeit*) as the agreement between a content or object and its representation and truth (*Wahrheit*) as the agreement of a contentwith itself.[292]) Hegel locates evil in the failure to expand the former into the latter. He notes that as 'immanent and so positive', 'the determinations of the immediate will are good; thus man is said to be by nature good'.[293] However, to the extent that the reproduction of the merely natural will is prompted by natural impulses which are external to humankind as *Geist*, it is opposed to freedom as the principle of human spiritual becoming. And when this reproduction of the natural will is posited by the individual, the 'self-will of private particularity' is 'elevated above the universal' and made the principle of one's actions (and subsequently 'realised' through one's actions[294]).

[290] It should be on page 28 of T.M. Knox's canonical translation of the *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). I suspect that it is missing because Knox based his translation on Hegel's 1821 text (but not the later version which the author corrected) and on Lasson's often problematic edition from 1921. I am not sure that this omission makes it impossible to discern the intended meaning of Hegel's text, but it certainly makes it much more difficult.

[291] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 69.

[292] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 85–86.

[293] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 69.

[294] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* Werke 7, 260–261: *'Das Selbstbewußtsein in der Eitelkeit aller sonst geltenden Bestimmungen und in der reinen Innerlichkeit des Willens ist ebensosehr die Möglichkeit, das an und für sich Allgemeine, als die Willkür, die eigene Besonderheit über das Allgemeine zum Prinzipe zu machen und sie durch Handeln zu realisieren - böse zu sein*'; Hegel is undoubtedly talking here about individuals and their actions and not simply some procession of cosmic forms. The emphasis is mine.

The positing of this reproduction designates the potentiality or possibility (*die Möglichkeit*), rather than direct realisation, of evil. But Hegel still identifies 'the Fall' with this formal possibility of evil because while free, the elevation of the self-will of private particularity above the universal is at the same time a privileging of a regressive desire and therefore ultimately a failure of freedom. This is because its decision is 'arbitrary'. For if freedom, as Peter Dews emphasises, only exists for Hegel 'in the process of striving for its own realisation',[295] the willing of indecision through the privileging of regressive desire is a failure of freedom as the failure to will one's self-actualisation as *Geist*. The Fall accordingly means that the space of the schism between good and evil is 'occupied' by the standpoint of the latter so that, as he puts it, '[a]ll the finitude of thinking and willing falls within this standpoint of schism'.[296] Firstly, this means that to the extent that we repeat Adam's sin it is through ignorance as much as through weakness of will (which is why the necessity of the purification of sinful impulses is upheld by Hegel alongside the necessity of the epistemic purification of consciousness). And secondly, this closed off finitude of human thinking and willing which Hegel calls *Verstand* (and which privileges transitoriness over becoming) is itself an invention of the Fall, so that its hold on humanity is the spiritual ground for the transgenerational inheritance of original sin. And so the soteriological emphasis of philosophy which ensues from the postlapsarian burden of *Bildung* involves the overcoming of this one-sided aspect of mind.

6 Unseparatedness vs Unity

I propose, then, to read the beginning of spirit or mind as a postlapsarian inversion of the beginning of logic, or the spiritual 'immediate mediation' as an inversion of the logical

[295] P. Dews, *The Idea of Evil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 90.
[296] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 91.

'mediated immediacy'. There can be no successful analysis of the *Science of Logic* in general, and of Hegel's notorious account of its beginning in particular, which does not take into account his running commentary – consistent with Willet's thesis about the *Logic* – of how the *Logic might* have proceeded if it had been cognised by finite, abstract thought. Recognition of this fact is implied in Dieter Henrich's critique of Hegel's beginning of logic, which argues that the movement from being to nothing can only be made intelligible by involving in our reading of it operations of external reflection, or in other words, by including, as constitutive of the beginning's dialectic, the standpoint of the reader.[297] I would thus argue, firstly and *contra* Willet, that Hegel never lost sight of this 'transitoriness', of the 'shadow' of his Logic, but always kept it in view as the perpetual possibility of the fall into error. And secondly, that while Willet is essentially correct about the opposition between becoming and transitoriness, she is wrong to infer that this opposition entails mutual exclusivity. Indeed, the response that ought to be given to Willet's critique, *contra* George di Giovanni,[298] is to deny not the premises of her argument, but her conclusion: to insist that the developmental logic of becoming in some regard overgrasps the regressive or 'downward' logic of transitoriness. The whole postlapsarian character of philosophy as *Nachdenken* is marked by this constant struggle to overcome, as part of the sublationary alteration of thought-content into higher thought-forms, those inverse or 'shadow' forms which destroy their thought-content. In the following section I show how this overgrasping of the 'shadow form' is accomplished.

When Hegel says that the Fall opens up a schism within which is included all the finitude of thinking and willing, he is referring to a postlapsarian possibility for error and evil which

[297] Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext*, 73–94.
[298] G. Giovanni, 'A Reply to Cynthia Willett', *in Essays on Hegel's Logic*, 93–98.

constantly and consistently threatens his own work. Willet, on the other hand, writes that Hegel's dialectic,

> by initially giving priority to being over nothing, orients itself towards a return to being. This spiral upwards must forget its double pointed downwards. And because the spiralling dialectic cannot claim the neutrality of the circle, the second spiral is lost in the shadow of the Logic.[299]

Willett does not argue, however, for why we should take as a standard for the success of Hegel's beginning the ability of his dialectic to claim the neutrality of the circle. Neither does she explain what this neutrality would precisely entail. For one, she acknowledges that while 'a neutral circle orients itself in both of its two possible directions at once', it seems difficult to conceive of its ability to provide fruitful ground for any sort of concrete beginning. Citing Aristotle's similar point (against Heraclitus) Willet points out that an ambiguous starting point renders motion impossible and yields only paralysis.[300] (This is partly what leads her to compare Hegel's *Werden* with Aristotle's φύσις.) The formulation of the 'neutral circle' of becoming in contradistinction to Aristotle is telling. By suggesting that the circle of the two unities of being and nothing can be considered neutral in so far as it is oriented towards all of its *possible* directions, Willet is advocating a kind of *possibilism*. But one of Aristotle's chief innovations, especially in the *Metaphysics*, is to insist on the *actualist* thesis of the priority of the actual over against the possible or potential.[301]

If Willet means to suggest that the derivation of becoming from the mediational directionality of being and nothing (and not the other way round) is unfounded because it violates the possibilist requirement of a neutral circle of becoming, then her argument presupposes a defence of possibilism (meaning both its overall philosophical plausibility and its presence in

[299] Willet, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 92. Von Baader also posits a double spiral, envisioning the symbol of humanity's path to perfection not as a line, but as a spiral. Consequently, humanity's fall (which von Baader, unlike Hegel, understands as a real cosmic event designating a fall into time) entails the need for another fall 'back' into ourselves, envisioned as a fall back into the centre from the periphery; von Baader, Werke 12, 183.
[300] Willett, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 91; Aristotle, *Metaphysics, IV*, 3.1005a19–b33.
[301] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* trans. H. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1998), IX, 8.1049b4–1051a3; see also Z. Bechler, *Aristotle's Theory of Actuality* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995)

Hegel's work). While there is a tradition of reading Hegel's *Logic* along such possibilist lines,[302] there is at least as old a tradition of reading him as an actualist[303] – one which I would rather side with. Indeed, Hegel's treatments of 'actuality' in both the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopaedia Logic* suggest a position closer to that of contemporary actualists like Robert Stalnaker.[304] In that latter text, Hegel sides with Aristotle's actualism, but distinguishes it from the empiricist notion of actuality which asserts (in a manner which would contradict the *Phenomenology of Spirit)* the primacy of sensuous immediacy (and therefore also vulgar determinism)[305].

An actualist defence of Hegel (against Willet's demand for a neutral circle of becoming) can be made in the following way: actuality is for Hegel the first logical form which does not pass-over into its other.

> Das Wirkliche ist das *Gesetztsein* jener Einheit, das mit sich identisch gewordene Verhältnis; es ist daher dem *Übergehen* entnommen, und seine *Äußerlichkeit* ist seine Energie; es ist in ihr in sich reflektiert; sein Dasein ist nur die *Manifestation seiner selbst*, nicht eines Anderen[306].

Actuality is then the first logical form which moves beyond the determination with which the *Logic* begins, namely the passing over of being into nothing, and the coming from and going to ground of existence. Indeed, actuality is the positedness (*Gesetztsein*) of these unities. As such, it is the first concrete result of what Willett calls the 'privileging' of becoming over transitoriness. But the derivation of actuality is not a consequence of this privileging. As Hegel clarifies, and as Willett is aware[307], there are two ways of conceiving of being and nothing

[302] For a recent example, see R. Zambrana, *Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). Even Zambrana, however, presents Hegel as criticising Kant from an ostensibly actualist position.
[303] For a recent example, see P. Redding, 'Findlay's Hegel: Idealism as Modal Actualism'. *Critical Horizons* 18 (2017), 359–377
[304] R. Stalnaker, 'Possible Worlds', in *Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[305] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8,. 281
[306] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 279–280
[307] Willett, 'The Shadow of Hegel's Logic', 88.

together; correctly, as an 'unseparatedness of being and nothing', and abstractly, as 'a unity that abstracts from being and nothing'.[308] This latter way is the way of *Verstand*. Hence, there are not only differences in the directionality of mediation of being and nothing, such that a 'neutral' circle of their becoming must orient or direct itself towards both orientations, but there are also differences in how these mediations, in both directions, may be coupled, viz., as unseparatedness or as unity. Willett (rightly) never questions Hegel's claim that that it is the earlier of these forms of coupling – that which conceives being and nothing together as unseparatedness – which is the correct one. Hegel's reasoning in the *Science of Logic* (which Willett does not discuss) is that while as an abstract unity, being and nothing both equally 'are', as an unseparatedness being and nothing equally are 'not', except as sublated[309]. (The difference between the two, we are told, is that between sophistry and dialectics, respectively.[310]) The point of all of this is that according to Hegel it is the coupling of unseparatedness, of dialectics,[311] which engenders actuality, precisely in so far as thusly coupled being and nothing *are* only as sublated, and actuality emerges out of this sublation.[312] The coupling of unity, as the abstract unity of *Verstand*, maintains being and nothing, whatever the directionality of their relation, as mere possibilities because it denies their actualisation, defined here as their positedness in unity with existence.

The argument is somewhat convoluted, but it reveals a simple and essential truth. The two couplings of unseparatedness and unity are correlates of both dialectical *Vernunft* and *Verstand*

[308] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 111–112. 'Das Werden, Entstehen und Vergehen , ist die Ungetrenntheit *des Seins* und *Nichts*; nicht die Einheit, welche vom Sein und Nichts abstrahiert, sondern als Einheit des Seins und Nichts ist es diese *bestimmte* Einheit oder [die,] in welcher sowohl Sein als Nichts *ist.*'
[309] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 111–112.
[310] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 110–111.
[311] Though it is, strictly speaking, a pre-dialectical coupling; see Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectics*, 89.
[312] Ulrici is therefore wrong to insist (following an essentially Neo-Kantian line of thought) that the logic's beginning as *reine Sein* is unthinkable apart from an originary unity (*Einheit*) of being and nothing which always already contains the principle of the whole (the *Idee*); H. Ulrici, *Über Princip und Methode der hegelschen Philosophie* (Halle: Lippert Verlag, 1841), 60–61.

on the one hand, and becoming and transitoriness, on the other. And to the extent that *Verstand* does not 'grasp' the speculative, though the speculative 'overgrasps' it, then the standpoint of transitoriness (according to which being and nothing have being separately or immediately) does not comprehend the standpoint of becoming (according to which they have no being immediately but do so as sublated). To quote Hegel's bible, which was Luther's, '*das Licht scheint in der Finsternis, und die Finsternis hat's nicht ergriffen*'[313] (Jn. 1.5). This insight is essentially incompatible with the notion of a neutral circle of the two unities of being and nothing which Willett describes. For why, following a line of metaphysical thought foreign to Hegel's, i.e. one that separates theoretical reason from both practical reason and its willing, should it be supposed that becoming and transitoriness should not be considered asymmetrically, and that transitoriness ultimately be taken to reflect a failure of fully asserting the standpoint of becoming?[314]

As Henrich points out, the beginning of the *Logic* is often rendered more difficult by the opacity of the expression 'indeterminate immediacy' which obscures the fact that it is a mediated immediacy. That is, it is a product of a negation of the entirety of the previous work done by mind in the *Phenomenology* (and perhaps the third *Encyclopaedia*).[315] Mehmet Tabak's recent 'critical' commentary of the doctrine of being (the first third of the *Science of Logic*) commits this fallacy in an exemplary way.[316] Remarking, acerbically, that since 'a complete sentence would imply some sense of determination, Hegel begins [the *Logic*] with an incomplete

[313] It is difficult not to note the significance of Luther's translation of κατέλαβεν as *ergriffen* for Hegel
[314] It does not take a theological genius to figure out that this is a Chalcedonian theme, as Nicholas Adams has also pointed out. The unseparatedness of two parts of the mediation is an ordered pair, in the same way that Christ's divine nature is just as much in him as his human nature but nevertheless overreaches the latter. See N. Adams, *Eclipse of Grace: Divine and Human Action in Hegel* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 21.
[315] Henrich, *Hegel im Kontext*, 87–89.
[316] M. Tabak, *The Doctrine of Being in Hegel's Science of Logic: A Critical Commentary* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2017).

sentence: "Being, pure being, without any further determination"',[317] Tabak fails to acknowledge the Joycean circularity which constitutes the continuity between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*. (As Derrida wrote, Joyce is 'perhaps the most Hegelian of novelists'.[318]) Indeed, Hegel's 'incomplete' opening sentence of the *Logic* mirrors or follows the incomplete and abrupt concluding sentence of the *Phenomenology*, which terminates with a partial quotation of Schiller's fine early poem *Die Freundschaft.*

> Nur -
> aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches
> schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit.[319]

The poem, a dialectic between two, sometimes quite opposite men, Julius and Raphael, written as a letter from the former to the latter, is anticipatory of the union of the mind and logic. Donald Philip Verene brilliantly expounds the meaning of the final stanza which Hegel quotes:

> It is a double portrait of the divine: of divine mastery by its powers to create a spiritual realm, but also of divine failure to create a likeness, a companion. The divine is left with its own infinity as companion. It is thrown back into its own movement.[320]

For all its correctness, however, this description mistakenly abstracts from the whole poem, as the dialogue of two men, and so attributes to the divine the failure of coming to know a likeness. As such, it occludes the themes of Fall and error which pervade it, including in it those echoes of nature, themselves entangled in the failures of mind, which Hegel would not have wanted

[317] Tabak, *The Doctrine of Being in Hegel's Science of Logic,* 36.
[318] J. Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics', in *Writing and Difference* trans. A. Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), 153.
[319] Hegel, *Phänomenologie*, Werke 3 591.
[320] D. P. Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 6.

us to forget. Indeed, Verene's reading implies that the author of the 'letter' which makes up the poem, Julius, inhabits the divine perspective, as he fails to see himself in Raphael. But it is Julius who is this human likeness, the mind of the *Phenomenology*, facing his own infinitude as an *imago dei*, which it has failed to fully embrace. Hegel sets up this comparison with a characteristic Schwabian failure to approximate subtlety. In fact, Hegel's modification of the last verse consists in substituting '*seine* Unendlichkeit' for Schiller's original '*die* Unendlichkeit'. I believe this is to simply emphasise the point further, for Schiller himself quite clearly establishes Julius as the *imago* with such lines as *'Stünd' im All der Schöpfung ich alleine*'.[321] It is perhaps worth noting that this religious image, placed on the last page of the *Phenomenology*, represents the height of *das absolute Wissen.*

7 *Phenomenology* vs *Logic*

Following the theme of the 'immediate mediation' of the *Phenomenology* as a postlapsarian inversion of the 'mediately immediate' beginning of the logic, we should note that the latter's mystery is compounded by Hegel's frequent and apparent self-contradiction in the early stages of the *Logic*. That involves claiming that the *Logic* begins without making any presuppositions and that it at the same time presupposes the *Phenomenology*.[322] It is as if there exist two standpoints within the *Logic*: one which proceeds logically with the immanent development of philosophical science as unfolding of the logical process, and one which follows metalogically from the earlier self-sublating mediation of the philosophy of mind. As William Maker has noted, the *Phenomenology* or the entire development of human mind as consciousness (*Bewusstsein*), is a self-sublating mediation, a presupposition, 'whose own elimination is just

[321] Hegel gets, partly from Schiller and partly from the rejection of Kant (including via Schleiermacher), the habit of associating the *imago* as *Urbild* with an individual, viz., with Jesus Christ. See chapter four.
[322] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 42–43.

that which is "presupposed" for the beginning of science'[323]. Maker, however, takes this to mean two things: firstly, that the upshot of the development of mind ought to be taken as 'radically negative in the sense that what is presupposed for the work's argument is negatedin and by its outcome' (such that one outcome of the *Phenomenology*'s conclusion is 'to effect a negative lesson for anyone who would attempt to do science'[324]), and secondly, that this negation be engendered by the subject matter.[3325]

I wholeheartedly agree with the first of Maker's conclusions. But I remain unconvinced of the second, viz. the claim that the negation of the phenomenological structure of consciousness is an immanent self-sublation 'engendered by the subject matter' itself. And yet, for Maker's argument, which is intended as a counterexample to Henrich's contention that the beginning of the logic can only be grounded retrospectively and therefore metalogically, it is this second conclusion that is most key.[326] Henrich's claim is that the beginning of the logic can only be grounded *via negationis*, through the negation of the categories of reflection, or rather through the exclusion of reflection from the notion of indeterminate immediacy. This, Henrich argues, demonstrates that the 'source' of the thought of immediacy is 'transposed' to the logic of reflection, which is a conceptually later development of the *Logic*.[327] But Maker, in my view, both correctly and brilliantly, points out that consciousness is itself a structure 'whereby determinacy emerges out of a reflexive relation to opposition', and that the collapse of this structure into *reine Wissen* at the end of the *Phenomenology* shows why reflection is to be excluded from the pure thinking required for the beginning of logic.[328] In other words, the

[323] Maker, 'Beginning', in *Essays on Hegel's Logic*, 30.
[324] Maker, 'Beginning', 41
[325] Maker, 'Beginning', 31.
[326] Maker, 'Beginning', 42.
[327] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 85–86; Maker, 'Beginning', 40.
[328] Maker, 'Beginning', 41.

exclusion of reflection is not achieved *retrospectively* in the *logic* of reflection derived in the doctrine of essence (which would be an external reflection on the beginning of the logic), but *prospectively* at the end of the *Phenomenology.* In this way, 'what Henrich sees as illicitly involved in the logic of being – the negation or exclusion of reflection or mediation – can be said to have come about licitly through the *Phenomenology* in its role as the consummate suspension of this structure [of consciousness]'.[329] Hence Maker claims that Henrich's 'discovery of a need for the exclusion of reflection', 'no longer amounts to a critique'. 'Unbeknownst to Henrich, his analysis reinforces the preparatory role Hegel assigned to the *Phenomenology*'[330].

Maker's approach to Henrich's argument is not dissimilar to my approach to Willet's. But it is in my view too easy. For why should there occur at all such a doubling of reflection, determined firstly through its exclusion in the late stages of the *Phenomenology* and secondly through its affirmation in the middle stages of the *Logic*? Moreover, why should the first constitution involve a necessary 'negative lesson' for anyone wishing to do science? Furthermore, even if the *Phenomenology* does provide such a 'negative lesson', this lesson does not in any way logically *entail* the beginning of the logic as a mediated immediacy. (Indeed, Willet's critique establishes this.) We should not lose sight of Heidegger's important point (from his 1938/39 lectures on Hegel): that for Hegel, *reine Wissen* as the beginning of thought means not 'inception – where to proceed means to go forward – but that *to which* thinking holds on, *that wherein thinking has contained itself in advance*'. At the same time, Heidegger asks, on the last page of the lectures and without ever providing an answer: 'But why is this containing

[329] Maker, 'Beginning', 41. Here and elsewhere, I have italicised the title of the Phenomenology in Maker's quotations for consistency.
[330] Maker, 'Beginning', 42.

necessary?'[331] According to Stanley Rosen, *reine Wissen* must be immediate 'in order to serve as a beginning', and 'mediate if it is to have any consequences'.[332] This is one way of thinking about the beginning of logic as a 'mediated immediacy'. On this analysis, the inverted beginning of consciousness as an 'immediate mediation' is problematic because it is mediated by the metalogical '(in)decision' of the Fall which constitutes the Fall into mere 'natural consciousness' whose immediacy is posited as the consequence of an originally mediated moment.

Rosen highlights one other key aspect for Hegel's understanding of *reine Wissen*, and that is that while the identity of *reine Wissen* as the conclusion of the *Phenomenology* and *reine Sein* as the beginning of the *Logic* is 'actual' for Hegel, it is only 'possible' for us, in the same way that revolution for Marx is only actual through the 'act of will on the part of the participants'.[333] As Hegel puts it in the preliminary conception to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*:

> Das *Erheben* des Denkens über das Sinnliche, das *Hinausgehen* desselben über das Endliche zum Unendlichen, der *Sprung*, der mit Abbrechung der Reihen des Sinnlichen ins Übersinnliche gemacht werde, alles dieses ist das Denken selbst, dies Übergehen ist nur *Denken*[334].

And as he puts it in the beginning of the *Science of Logic*:

> Soll aber keine Voraussetzung gemacht, der Anfang selbst *unmittelbar* genommen werden, so bestimmt er sich nur dadurch, daß es der Anfang der Logik, des Denkens für sich, sein soll. Nur der *Entschluß*, den man auch für eine Willkür ansehen kann, nämlich daß man das *Denken als solches* betrachten wolle, ist vorhanden. So muß der Anfang absoluter oder, was hier gleichbedeutend ist, abstrakter Anfang sein[335].

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[331] M. Heidegger, *Hegel*, trans. J. Arel and N. Feuerhahn (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2015), 45.
[332] Rosen, *The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic",* 84.
[333] 'so too', Rosen continues, 'there will be no ascent to wisdom for us unless we will ourselves as it were to the level of the absolute'; see Rosen, *The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic",* 86.
[334] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 131.
[335] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 68. All emphases are Hegel's, except for "*Entschluss*", which I have highlighted.

To put these two together: it is only the decision to take the leap into the divine which constitutes the 'necessity' (the necessity of *sollen*) that the beginning of the logic can be 'absolute' (that the *Phenomenology*'s negative lesson is learned). *Reine Sein*, as Spaventa puts it, refers to thought abstracted from the *act* of thinking (*il Pensato, fatta astrazione dal Pensare, dall'atto del Pensare*); it is the 'thinkable' (*il Pensabile*).[336] *Reine Wissen* accordingly refers to 'thinkability' as both the potential thinkability of being and the being of thought. The two are united by the act of thought (hence the necessity of actualism), an act, however, whose necessity derives not from the process of the logical determinations (and is not, 'engendered by the subject matter', as Maker puts it), but from the direction and resolve of the human will,[337] which (if I am correct), is to be located in the structure of desire as self-consciousness.

Thus if the development of mind begins with 'immediate mediation', rather than a sublated or 'mediated immediacy' like the development of logic, it is for two reasons. From the 'logical' standpoint of mind developed in the *Phenomenology*, it is because the forms of consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) which mind traverses are revealed to be one-sided and ultimately both epistemologically and ontologically problematic. As Hegel writes in its *Preface*,

> Dies Werden der Wissenschaft überhaupt oder des Wissens ist es, was diese Phänomenologie des Geistes darstellt. Das Wissen, wie es zuerst ist, oder der unmittelbare Geist ist das Geistlose, das sinnliche Bewußtsein. Um zum eigentlichen Wissen zu werden oder das Element der Wissenschaft, das ihr reiner Begriff selbst ist, zu erzeugen, hat es sich durch einen langen Weg hindurchzuarbeiten. - Dieses Werden, wie es in seinem Inhalte und den Gestalten, die sich in ihm zeigen, sich aufstellen wird, wird nicht das sein, was man zunächst unter einer Anleitung des unwissenschaftlichen Bewußtseins zur

[336] Spaventa, 'Le Prime Categorie Della Ilogica Di Hegel', *Opere*, 194.

[337] Which is why depending on the orientation of the will the decision may be arbitrary (*willkürlich*). Hegel does not mean that the decision would be arbitrary relative to its alternative, but that a decision to privilege and elevate the will of one's private particularity and make it the ground of one's actions, which is the formal possibility of sin, does not in actuality constitute thinking nor constitute the will as a specialised form of thinking apropos of the universal; see Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 260–261.

> Wissenschaft sich vorstellt, auch etwas anderes als die Begründung der Wissenschaft[338].

The deduction of the concept of *reine Wissen*, which is the result of this study of mind and the ground for the beginning of the study of logic,[339] consists precisely in the rejection of the way of doing science which a phenomenologically immediate mediation of mind engenders. Maker is absolutely correct to insist on this aspect of the *Phenomenology* as a self-eliminating presupposition for the study of logic. However, his understanding of why the upshot of the latter is one of self-erasure, as we have seen, is limited to the 'logical' standpoint of that text, rather than the metalogical standpoint of the broader system.

> The outcome of the Phenomenology as the collapse of consciousness' structure and the self-induced suspension of what is presupposed for us to follow through the development to this culmination can be understood, *although not demonstrated*[340] insofar as we consider what would be required for consciousness to successfully prove that its own structure is definitive of cognition.[341]

The outcome of the *Phenomenology* (as well as its anticipation in both the introduction and preface) can better be understood (if not demonstrated) because consciousness' structure is phenomenologically an 'immediate mediation'. That is, it involves a beginning underwritten by the failure of the Fall. It is the story of the Fall which discloses, as Hegel tells us, 'the relationship between mind and cognition',[342] or tells us, in Maker's terms, 'what would be required for consciousness to successfully prove that its own structure is definitive of cognition', viz., not to fall. In other words, it is the *Phenomenology* which is the 'shadow' of Hegel's *Science of Logic.* Consequently, attributing to the Fall-Event the fact that the 'mediated immediacy' of the logic is not reproduced with the emergence of mind, allows us to understand the collapse of consciousness' structure in the *Phenomenology* from the 'metalogical'

[338] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* Werke 3, 31.
[339] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I,* Werke 5, 43.
[340] My emphasis.
[341] Maker, 'Beginning', 34–35.
[342] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 86–91.

standpoint of the entire Hegelian system (particularly since logic is from the standpoint of the system 'prior' to mind or spirit). We can then demonstrate that consciousness as 'immediately mediated' (rather than 'mediately immediate') is self-eliminating because it is a mistake, and a mistake, moreover, which Hegel identifies with the Fall-Event; a mistake reflected in the compression mind's '*Entzweiung in Momente'* into an '*Entzweiung der Momente'* and eventually, *Entfremdung*.

8 *Werden* vs *Bildung*

The identity of logic and metalogic in the *Phenomenology* demonstrates why the opposition of *Werden* and *Fluchtigkeit* is only discernible in the *Science of Logic.* Instead of privileging the former over the latter, the *Phenomenology* actually begins with a postlapsarian privileging of the latter: with the chaotic Heraclitean equivocity of sense-certainty. To the extent that the *Phenomenology* has a progressive and forward-facing developmental logic, it is one of *Bildung*, not of *Werden*.[343] *Bildung,* as I will argue in greater detail in the following chapters, is thematised by Hegel as a burden of the Fall and as a salvific and eschatological movement involving a desirous orientation towards the Absolute which predetermines the 'privileging' of becoming over transitoriness. Thus since mind or spirit is always already an *Entzweiung* which must be sublated, its being an immediate mediation (meaning here that its mediated element is not immanently contained in its beginning but mediates the immediate) shows why Hegel goes on to associate immediacy with evil. However, in so far as the *Phenomenology* ultimately involves this identity of logic and metalogic, its dialectic is precisely *reduced* to the metalogical

[343] For an account of *Bildung* in Hegel, see J. H. Smith, *The Spirit and its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel's Philosophy of Bildung* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988).

since, syllogistically speaking, a botched individualisation recoils back to its universal.[344]

The relevant difference between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* is then this: the former, having begun with a postlapsarian privileging of transitoriness, a privileging which however incurs a debt of *Bildung*, moves forward to correct the contradictions of consciousness' structure, which leads, ultimately, to its collapse. (We might say this is a purgation or purification.) The latter, on the other hand, having begun with the privileging of becoming, moves forward to articulate a correct course of logical development in contradistinction to its 'shadow' which it perpetually keeps in view and repudiates. Many examples of the latter can be found in the *Logic,* but we need not look further than the beginning itself which establishes the evolving 'unseparatedness' of being and nothing in contradistinction to the understanding's abstract 'unity' of the same pair.[345] Hegel's method here is as comparative as it is actualist, contrasting the two possible routes embodied either by the becoming reason or the transitory understanding.

However, as Hegel explicitly explains, though we habitually distinguish between concepts of reason and the 'mere concepts of the understanding', this is really the function of our 'decision' to privilege one over the other:

> Man pflegt demgemäß wohl auch bloße Verstandesbegriffe und Vernunftbegriffe zu unterscheiden, welches jedoch *nicht* so zu verstehen ist, *als gebe es zweierlei Arten von Begriffen*, sondern vielmehr so, *daß es unser Tun ist*, entweder bloß bei der negativen und abstrakten Form des Begriffs stehenzubleiben oder denselben, seiner wahren Natur nach, als das zugleich Positive und Konkrete aufzufassen. So ist es z. B. der bloße Verstandesbegriff

[344] It is 'thrown back into its own movement' as Verene put it, where, 'own movement', means on Verene's reading as we saw earlier, the universal.
[345] Hegel, *Wissenschaft I*, Werke 5,111–112.

> der Freiheit, wenn dieselbe als der abstrakte Gegensatz der Notwendigkeit betrachtet wird, wohingegen der wahre und vernünftige Begriff der Freiheit die Notwendigkeit als aufgehoben in sich enthält. Ebenso ist die vom sogenannten Deismus aufgestellte Definition Gottes der bloße Verstandesbegriff Gottes, wohingegen die christliche Religion, welche Gott als den dreieinigen weiß, den Vernunftbegriff Gottes enthält.[346]

As Hegel indicates, however, though there do not actually exist two kinds (*Arten*) of concepts, the fact that the abstract and negative 'concept' of the understanding is finite means that our decision to privilege it *can* be 'actualised' by finite human activity precisely in so far as the latter is also finite.

9 Necessity vs Contingency

We have been approaching for some time now, the issue of the 'foundation' of dialectics. What can be meant by this is sometimes difficult to explicate, but in the same way that, for instance, writers like Jean-Luc Nancy have surveyed the 'undeconstructable' in relation to Derrida's deconstruction,[347] Hegelian commentators have looked for the 'non-dialectical aspect' of the dialectical process. A worthy recent example is Žižek who, following Frank Ruda,[348] writes that the dialectical process, from the 'materialist standpoint', relies on a non-dialectical element which is not 'dialectically deducible'.[349] This is because dialectics involves a logic of retroactivity according to which there exists 'a procedure of unfolding consequences, of the attempt to cope with something that due to the logic of retroactivity logically lies before it, is prior to it'.[350] It seems to me that implicit in Žižek's argument (as in Willet's) is the view

[346] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 334; Hegel's point vindicates not only the present thesis but also Willett's fundamental distinction.
[347] For the classic treatment, see J. Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, trans. P. Connor, and L. Garbus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
[348] Žižek quotes Ruda's at the time forthcoming book *For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism.* Though the book has now been published, I retain Žižek's original quotations which in some cases were altered when the manuscript was published.
[349] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 73.
[350] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 73.

that the directionalities of the mediation of mediation and immediacy versus immediacy and mediation, are not homogenous. However, Žižek does not make this point, and instead reasserts his understanding of the logic of the Fall as necessary and constitutive of what it generates, and as only retroactively evental in virtue of what it generates. In other words, 'the Fall itself creates that from which it is a fall – or, in theological terms, 'God is not the Beginning'. Žižek goes on to add:

> If this sounds like yet another typical Hegelian dialectical tangle, then we should disentangle it by drawing a line of separation between the true Hegelian dialectical process and its caricature. In the caricature, we have an inner Essence externalising itself in the domain of contingent appearances, and then, gradually, reappropriating its alienated content, recognising itself in its Otherness - "we must first lose God in order to find Him," we must fall in order to be saved. Such a position opens up the space for the justification of Evil: if, as agents of historical Reason, we know that Evil is just a necessary detour on the path towards the final triumph of the Good, then of course we are justified in engaging in Evil as a means of achieving the Good. In true Hegelian spirit, however, we should insist that such a justification is always and a priori retroactive: there is no reason in History whose divine plan can justify Evil; the Good that may come out of Evil is a contingent by-product.[351]

The 'caricature' described above could refer to the Hegel of either the Leibnizian or Boehmian *felix culpa*, though both may be taken to 'open up the space for the justification of evil'. To that extent the above may be read as a partial (and partially successful) response by Žižek to Milbank who accuses the former of perpetuating the Boehmian-Hegelian 'myth of the negative'.[352] However, to the extent that Žižek, his qualifications notwithstanding, insists that the Fall reveals for Hegel that 'God is not the Beginning', a beginning which he moreover reads ontically rather than gnoseologically, he is still 'ontologising the Fall', only without committing himself to the view that this entails ontologising the passage through evil.[353] In this

[351] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 131.
[352] J. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory* (2nd, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); S. Žižek and J. Milbank, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People (*Oxford: Blackwell, 2013); Žižek and Milbank also debated at the release of *Absolute Recoil* in 2014.
[353] J. Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 149.

way, rather than investing the Fall with a teleological logic, as O'Regan claims Hegel does,[354] Žižek invests it with a retroactive logic. (Teleology versus retroactivity is incidentally a not entirely inaccurate shorthand for how Žižek characterises the opposition between the 'caricature' of Hegel and his own reading[355].)

Differently put, the view that the gnostic ontologisation of the Fall entails the ontologisation of the passage through evil is a heretical, though still Christian, position in so far as it establishes the foundation of metaphysics in terms of the priority of the relationship between good and evil. According to a theologically 'orthodox' view articulated by Milbank, what makes the gnostic view heretical is essentially its alteration in the directionality of good and evil. Thus what should properly be taken to be an originary peace of the good, in relation to which evil appears solely as a finite privation, is inverted, such that

> one starts with an irreducible scarcity and egotism, and the ethical becomes that which reacts to a bad situation which it is secretly in love with, and needs ceaselessly to reinstate, despite the fact that this compromises the very character of the ethical[356].

Žižek's claim in *Absolute Recoil*, on the other hand, is that we start neither with an irreducible (and therefore necessary) plenitude nor an irreducible scarcity, but that the ethical is only established as such contingently, which is to say retroactively. This means that we (human beings in general, but also philosophers and theologians) only come to recognise the ethical *qua* ethical after the case. Žižek's example is classically Žižekian.

> We can say that one result of Nazi Germany and its defeat was the institution of much higher ethical standards of human rights and international justice; but to claim that this result in any sense "justifies" Nazism would be an obscenity.[357]

[354] C. O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 162.
[355] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 73–74. Žižek's endorsement of Ruda's Althusserian sounding term 'expressive dialectics' for the 'teleological' view seems to suggest that he counts Charles Taylor's Hegel as a major representative of this view.
[356] Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 149.
[357] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 131.

As I understand it, Žižek means to say that the only way we can recognise as ethically 'good' the benefits of the post-war consensus is according to the very 'higher ethical standards' which it established. On this view, there can be no theodicic justification for any evil which contingently leads to some good, though there can be retained the retroactive recognition of the latter good *as* good.

However, while this view presupposes the contingency of historical events, it does not, as I have already indicated, allow for the Fall to be construed as a contingent event. The Fall-Event is instead the 'non-dialectical' condition for the possibility of dialectics; or, as Žižek puts it elsewhere, 'the non-dialectical aspect of a dialectical process [is] its contingent starting point'.[358] (Is it not apposite that such an account approximates Kant, himself the 'non-dialectical' foundation for Hegel's dialectic[359]?) The word which Žižek uses to convey the contingency of this phenomenon is Fichte's *Anstoss*, but its correlate *Trieb* (which Hegel gets from Fichte and Altizer from Hegel) would have been just as appropriate. Žižek's account thoroughly undermines the notion of a circular metalogic in Hegel's system, where mind's failed individualisation at the Fall recoils back to a self-correcting divine overreaching of itself. For Žižek, the problem is not 'how to explain temporal finite reality if our starting point is the eternal order of Ideas', but rather 'how to explain the rise of an eternal Idea out of the activity of people caught in a finite historical situation'.[360]

[358] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 74.
[359] I have in mind, of course, I. Kant, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* trans. W.S. Pluhar (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2009).
[360] Žižek, *Absolute Recoil*, 74.

Now I would not object to a beginning which starts from below, but I would object to one which starts from a below that does not already presuppose, or at least point to, an above. For the paradox of the Christian Fall is, precisely, that it is an origin-concept which at the same time occludes a different origin. As such, theology begins gnoseologically with the mysterious origin of humanity at the Fall (the fall into history, perhaps even time, and ultimately into human ethical life threatened by evil), whilst at the same time pointing towards an ontological origin in Creation prior to the Fall and a completion and elevation of that ontological origin (the *Urbild*) in the Christ-Event. The Hegelian 'negation of negation' in the triad of Creation – Fall – Fallen Creation points to this very fact that while we can conceive of the Fall as a negation of Creation, syllogistically or triadically, this negation turns out to be overreached by Creation. Žižek's argument is to insist that it is the Fall, as the first term of a sequence, which retroactively posits (as its presupposition) Creation but only as Fallen Creation (or even 'Created Fallenness'). As Peter Hodgson has noted vis-à-vis William Desmond's critique of Hegel, there is a tendency for those who deflate the theological core of Hegel's system to read his logical formula dyadically.[361] This means either treating the third term of a triad as essentially surviving the negation of the second and therefore being identical with the first, or, as in Žižek's case here, suspending the first term as a mere retroactive constitution of, viz., contingent by-product of, the second term. In the first case negation or difference is denied, in the second case, negation is the beginning and is privileged. Hodgson is right to point out that this all implies that Hegel's logical formula has the character of a judgement, which can express only identity (as in the former case) or difference (as in the latter), rather than a syllogism.[362]

[361] P. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2005), 252–253.
[362] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 253.

At the level of the foundation of dialectics, of the unintention of *Trieb* and *Anstoss*, it is possible to read the Žižekian position as one which treats being and nothing as a unity and therefore privileges the logic of transitoriness and death-drive, while celebrating (as Žižek often has) the 'powers' of *Verstand*.[363] However, it is also possible to read Žižek's position as articulating an augmented unity of being and nothing, or rather a circle which construes the privileging of either becoming or transitoriness as contingent by-products of history. This brings it as close to an account of Hegel which fulfils Willett's criterion of 'claiming the neutrality' of the circle of the unities of becoming and transitoriness. This claiming of the neutrality of the circle involves an, in my view, cynical privileging of *Verstand*. Is this really a surprise? The difference between the two pre-dialectical structures of unseparatednes and unity is that the former is itself an unseparatedness of two unities, whereas the latter is as such a unity which abstracts from that unseparatedness. And the opportunity for a 'neutral' circle or overall unity which instead of privileging submits both moments to contingency is underwritten by the abstracting powers of *Verstand* (which not only separate, but also fixate). If this is the case apropos of unity, then, I would argue, the logic which underlies the structure of unseparatedness is that of *Vorstellung*, particularly in its primary or religious mode. However, in order to understand the role that *Vorstellung* plays, we need to consider it, in keeping with the framework of becoming/transitoriness in general and unseparatedness/unity in particular, as in contradistinction to *Verstand*. This will lead us to a central question of our study, namely, if the beginning of the *Phenomenology* is to be understood metalogically as postlapsarian, how does this process unfold historically (including in the *Lectures* on history and on religion)? I address this question in the next chapter, focusing on the Hegel's analysis of natural consciousness as 'immediate mediation' and identify the purification of this consciousness in Jewish religious consciousness as the historical ground of the notion of *reine Wissen* and therefore as the precondition for all mediation.

[363] See, for example, Žižek, *Less Than Nothing*, 188–189.

CHAPTER 2

Nachdenken as Revelation *or* The Postlapsarian Inversion of History

Introduction

In this chapter, I develop three claims which underpin Hegel's understanding of history, including his 'philosophical' understanding of history, as the development of divine Providence in time[364]. These are, firstly, Hegel's claim that history is constituted through the unity of historical events and their narration[365]; secondly, that the order of the development of consciousness is historically inverted, producing (re)presentations before it produces concepts,[366], and that the thinking *Geist* accordingly only advances to thoughts and concepts through (re)presentation (*durchs Vorstellen*)[367]; and thirdly, that *Vorstellungen* or (re)presentations should be regarded as metaphors of thoughts and concepts[368]. While these ideas are fundamental for his understanding of history, Hegel recognised that they were likewise critical for his understanding of logic, which is why he also developed them in the introductory sections of the *Encyclopaedia Logic.* Their significance for logic is illustrated by the fact that the transition from 'consciousness' (as *reine Wissen*) in the *Philosophy of Mind* to 'being' (as *reine Sein*) in the *Science of Logic* (and the first *Encyclopaedia*), involves

[364] cf. Magee, 'Hegel's Philosophy of History and Kabbalist Eschatology', in *Hegel and History* ed. W. Dudley (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 231. Magee emphasises three, rather different, claims as central to Hegel's philosophy of history; namely, (1) that history has a knowable pattern that allows us to speak of its meaning and end point; (2) that the historical end point is to be understood as occurring within time; and (3) that the historical end point entails the objectification of God in human institutions.

[365] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 83.

[366] Even though *Begriffe* are spiritually the 'truth' of *Vorstellungen* in the same way that Geist is the truth of *Natur*; cf. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 43.

[367] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 41.

[368] *Vorstellungen* is meant here to broadly including feelings, intuitions, images, as well as representations of purposes and duties ('der Gefühle, Anschauungen, Bilder, Vorstellungen, der Zwecke, Pflichten usf.'); Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 44.

'withdrawing' or 'pulling back' from (re)presentations into 'pure thoughts' (*reine Gedanke*).[369] Hegel writes accordingly that

> [d]ie Logik ist insofern die *schwerste* Wissenschaft, als sie es nicht mit Anschauungen, nicht einmal wie die Geometrie mit abstrakten sinnlichen Vorstellungen, sondern mit reinen Abstraktionen zu tun hat und eine Kraft und Geübtheit erfordert, sich in den reinen Gedanken zurückzuziehen, ihn festzuhalten und in solchem sich zu bewegen. Auf der andern Seite könnte sie als die *leichteste* angesehen werden, weil der Inhalt nichts als das eigene Denken und dessen geläufige Bestimmungen und diese zugleich die *einfachsten* und das *Elementarische* sind.[370]

On the one hand, logical thought is difficult because the withdrawal from the *form* of *Vorstellungen* is difficult, requiring both 'strength' and 'training'. On the other hand, however, it is easy because its content is that of its own thinking itself. What this means is that the thinking of our own thought, especially, perhaps, as a 'self-thinking' (*Sichdenken*), which should be easy, is in actuality difficult. But why is this the case?

This concept of *Sichdenken* appears only rarely throughout Hegel's works, though it is an important aspect of his account of Jewish religion as the origin in history of human self-understanding (a theme I address in chapter four). It becomes an important concept for the revisionist right-Hegelian Hermann Ulrici (a close friend and colleague of Fichte's) for whom it designates both the principle of the ego's self-certainty and the demonstration for thought of the veridicality of that self-certainty.[371] Ulrici affirms, seemingly disagreeing with Hegel's claim above regarding the unity of the content of *Denken*, that there can be no *sich denkendes Denken*[372] without the ability to differentiate the content of thought from the content of what is

[369] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 67.
[370] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 67.
[371] H. Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie, kritisch und speculativ, vol. 2* (Leipzig: Weigel Verlag, 1846), 8–9. Ulrici's study begins with the question 'welches, Kriterium hat das menschliche Denken bei seiner Forschung nach dem Kriterium der Wahrheit?' and concludes with the view that there must exist a unity of these criteria and that thought is ultimately this unity.
[372] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2*, 25.

being thought.[373] Ulrici believes that we can discern this distinction because there is a difference between the ego (*das Ich*) as the already 'developed' (*das Entwickelte*) and thinking (*das Denken*) as the still 'developing' (*das Entwickelnde*). And this is a difference of content because the 'overreaching' of thought or the involvement of thought-contents in pre-cognitive forms entails, for Ulrici, the presence of immediate (*unmittelbaren*), unchangeable (*unveränderbaren*), and fully self-evident and certain (*schlechthin evidenten und gewissen*) thoughts that are given in the self-certainty of the ego.[374] Thus while *Denken*, as such, develops historically, the ego is 'developed' transcendentally.

Ulrici, therefore, revises all three of Hegel's claims that I outlined above. Firstly, the difference in the developmental orders of the ego (*Sichdenken*) and of *Denken* (and therefore also between the subjective and the objective in historical time), means that the rational intelligibility of history cannot be derived from the mutual constitution of event and narration in time, but must be derived from the transcendental subjective certainty of an ahistorical ego which grounds the very development of objectivity as 'thinkable'.[375] Secondly, consciousness does not, as for Hegel, only advance to a philosophical contemplation of objects as 'pure thoughts' through the prior operation of (re)presentational thinking. Rather, consciousness as the self-certainty of subjective human thought is itself the reflexive condition for the possibility of philosophy as the self-examination of this thought.[376] This is because the reversed order of the development of consciousness mentioned by Hegel in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* (to which Ulrici alludes) no longer designates a historical inversion of spiritual primacy, with the spiritual primacy now

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[373] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2*, 25; '[das] sichdenkendes Denken kann es nur sein, insofern es sich von dem Inhalte des Denkens unterscheidet'.
[374] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2*, 77.
[375] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2*, 26–27. It is for this reason that Henrich castigates Ulrici as a neo-Kantian revisionist of Hegel; see Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 82–83. Note, however, that Henrich primarily focuses on Ulrici's earlier and more exegetical text, *Über Princip und Methode der hegelschen Philosophie.*
[376] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2*, 25.

being maintained in the transcendental priority of the ego's 'immediate thought' of self-certainty.[377] Hence thirdly, and finally, the transition from *Vorstellung* to *Begriff* does not (and cannot) in any way involve processes of metaphorical transference and displacement which mediate that transition.

In this chapter I develop a view quite opposed to Ulrici's revisionist position, but before doing so I must acknowledge the kernel of truth inherent in it. Ulrici is fundamentally correct that *Denken* presupposes for Hegel a form of *Sichdenken* coterminous with it. This affirmation is perhaps in itself already 'revisionist' in so far as it concedes a metalogical aspect to the development of Hegelian logic. It is not (nor I do intend it to be) a reversion from Hegel to a 'critical' position, but an advance towards the radical 'historicism' already inherent in Hegel. By 'historicism', I moreover do not mean that Hegel provides us with a master code for reading 'history', understood as the 'text' of a master narrative of human *Geist*, and where the interpretation of the text (as Althusser put it) is premised on the identification of the principle and effectivity of the 'whole' on its constituent parts.[378] Henrich is correct that it is precisely the critical neo-Kantians who, in their insistence on the beginning of the logic as already the principle of the whole, most characteristically articulate what Althusser (in)famously castigated as 'expressive causality'.[379]

I would, in fact, agree with Fredric Jameson that the Hegelian (as well as, in a different way, Marxist) hermeneutic

[377] Ulrici, *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie 2,* 216.
[378] See L. Althusser, *Reading Capital* trans. B. Brewster (London-New York: Verso, 2016), 103.
[379] Henrich, 'Anfang und Methode der Logik', 82–83. And as Fredric Jameson has demonstrated, the Althusserian critique readily finds application against thinkers other than Hegel, including 'thinkers who are expressly non -or anti-Hegelian'; F. Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 26– 27.

> can be radically distinguished from all the other types, since its "master code" or transcendental signified is precisely not given as a representation but rather as an absent cause, as that which can never know full representation. […] History is not in any sense itself a text or master text or master narrative, but it is inaccessible to us except in textual or narrative form, or, in other words, that we approach it only by way of some prior textualization or narrative (re)construction.[380]

Hegel's proposal for a *Sichdenken* in the form of a *Nachdenken* involves, in fact, such a narrative (re)construction. The givenness of history, as an 'absent cause', points to the fact that history emerges, as Hegel's original translator put it, out of humanity's 'abortive past'.[381] The *res gestae* or 'events' of history are not naturally given or 'presented' (*Darstellt*) in their 'eventality', which is to say, they cannot be naturally (re)presented as 'historical events'. In this case, Hegel would be disagreeing with Kant for whom *Darstellung*, in the sense of 'being given' in the immediacy of intuition, is simply the way in which 'the representation [*Vorstellung*] through which an object is thought relates to actual or possible experience'.[382] For Hegel, unifying what is immediately given in intuition with the *thinking* of what is intuited as 'objective' (uniting, in other words, events and their narration) requires a process that is itself historical and therefore limits our ability to transparently grasp it. For this reason, he argues that concepts can only be approached through 'teleologically ambiguous' processes, often requiring a great deal of intellectual labour and involving the 're-presentation' (*Vorstellen*) of

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[380] F. Jameson, 'Marxism and Historicism' *New Literary History* 11.1 (1979), 42. Jameson is speaking here of the Marxist hermeneutic. However, to the extent that he is outlining a version of it in response to Althusser's critique which assimilates 'Hegelian Marxism' to Hegelianism, he is mounting a defence of the general Hegelian approach to history as the limit of human knowing. I cannot address here the differences between how Marx conceives history (as merely accessible through narrative form) differently from Hegel, but I do not see him as differing from Hegel in the context of Jameson's comments. Note that Jameson's semi-Althusserian use of 'representation', as a 'structure which allows the individual subject to conceive or imagine his or her lived relationship to transpersonal realities such as the social structure or the collective logic of History' is precisely opposed to Hegel's construal of *Vorstellen* as involving a metaphorically displaced 'imaging' of concepts and thoughts; Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, 30.

[381] Hegel, G.W.F., *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Pulications, 1956), xii.

[382] I. Kant, *Kritik der Reiner Vernunft* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1966), 193; see also M. B. Helfer, *The Retreat of Representation: The Concept of Darstellung in German Critical Discourse* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 24–26

what is 'presented' in order to arrive at metaphors of the concepts behind the objects that are being presented.

The necessity of this process (*Nachdenken)* is largely attributed by Hegel to the inability of human beings to realise the *Zweck* of history, a failure he, in turn, associates with the Fall. This is most clearly illustrated by Hegel's account of the development of the concept of religion in general, and of the concept of the revealed religion or Christianity in particular. Revelation in history, or the emergence of the truth of faith (which is for Hegel, *contra* Ulrici, the validation of subjective 'certainty') requires for Hegel the 'imaging' of the *abstrakte Begriff* of God in the *konkrete Vorstellung* of Christ and the subsequent unity of this concept and its 'image', through which the communion with the divine (which Hegel calls the *Kultus*) is constituted. I argued in the first chapter that the development of consciousness should be understood as proceeding in accordance with a structure of an 'immediate mediation'. This is in contradistinction to the science of logic which should be understood as proceeding in accordance with a structure of a 'mediated immediacy'. The science of logic is 'easy' from the standpoint of a 'mediated immediacy' because it involves nothing more than the mediation of our own thought. If, as G.W. Cunningham puts it, 'mediated immediacy' simply denotes 'completely organized experience',[383] it involves in the case of the science of logic merely the organisation of intimate determinations belonging to our own thought. Logic does not begin, to use Hegel's famous metaphor, 'as if fired from a pistol'; it does not require the difficult explorations of inner revelation or faith.[384] History, however, *is* fired from a pistol, and it requires the development of consciousness through the completely disorganised experience of historical becoming. Logic is therefore 'difficult' from the standpoint of consciousness or 'immediate mediation', because

[383] G. W. Cunningham, *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System* (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1910), 43
[384] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 65–66.

more often than not the logical thinker is much too muddled and mired in sensuous forms of 'natural consciousness' in order to move freely within the transparency and clarity of abstract and pure thinking[385]. For this reason, the development of consciousness requires for Hegel the 'purification' of natural consciousness which culminates, phenomenologically, in *reine Wissen*. In this chapter, I build on a key insight from the first chapter. Developing the idea of the history of consciousness as the overturning of 'immediate mediation' into 'mediated immediacy' (as I argued in chapter one), I explicate Hegel's account of the teleology of this overturning through the 'imaging' of abstract concepts into concrete (re)presentations.

1 The Unity of Events and their Narration

I will begin by treating the difficult interrelation of form and content which emerges with Hegel's attempts to articulate a philosophy of history. We should recall Hegel's principle for the philosophical understanding of history:

> Geschichte vereinigt in unserer Sprache die objektive sowohl als subjektive Seite und bedeutet ebensogut die *historiam rerum gestarum* als die *res gestas* selbst; sie ist das Geschehene nicht minder wie die Geschichtserzählung. Diese Vereinigung der beiden Bedeutungen müssen wir für höherer Art als für eine bloß äußerliche Zufälligkeit ansehen: es ist dafür zu halten, daß Geschichtserzählung mit eigentlich geschichtlichen Taten und Begebenheiten gleichzeitig erscheine; es ist eine innerliche gemeinsame Grundlage, welche sie zusammen hervortreibt.[386]

History, then, refers to the unity of both events and their narration by the common principle of reason (*Vernunft*). Hegel is quite serious about this point, and insists that history emerges only from an abortive past which failed to 'historicise' itself by achieving a unity of events and their narration:

> [d]ie Zeiträume, wir mögen sie uns von Jahrhunderten oder Jahrtausenden vorstellen, welche den Völkern vor der Geschichtsschreibung verflossen sind und mit Revolutionen, mit Wanderungen, mit den wildesten Veränderungen mögen

[385] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 67.
[386] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 83.

> angefüllt gewesen sein, sind darum ohne objektive Geschichte, weil sie keine subjektive, keine Geschichtserzählung aufweisen. Nicht wäre diese nur zufällig über solche Zeiträume untergegangen, sondern weil sie nicht hat vorhanden sein können, haben wir keine darüber.[387]

The unity of the evental and narrative standpoints, of objectivity and subjectivity, refers here to the connection between form and content which Hegel links to our very language about history.[388] (This usually means that Hegel does not consider his view to be idiosyncratic or esoteric, but to merely make explicit what is already implicit in our common ways of experiencing historical becoming.[389]) The *res gestae* of history, as he puts it, fill our consciousness as intuitions and feelings. Hegel does not then begin with what we might call 'historical subjectivity', but with the material 'objectivity' of the human beings as themselves part of a course of events. This preliminarily refers to human beings as subtracted from their essence as thinking *Geist.* To this extent, Hegel does not straightforwardly identify 'consciousness' with 'subjectivity' (which is irreducibly historical). Hence when Hegel says that the *res gestae* 'fill one's consciousness' he immediately qualifies that they may do so either as unmixed with (as we have discussed so far, as intuitions or feelings) or as mixed with reflective thought. The mixing in the latter stage denotes the moment of subjectivity. As George Dennis O'Brien noted in his influential essay on Hegel's philosophy of history, 'immediacy' here refers to Hegel's claim apropos of 'original history' that '*der Geist des Verfassers und der Geist der Handlungen, von denen er erzählt, ist* einer und derselbe'.[390]

[387] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* ,Werke 12, 84.
[388] Note that an overemphasis of either might lead to a privileging of the merely historical or metahistorical standpoints, respectively.
[389] And 'common' also in the genetic sense of the 'original' linguistic use.
[390] G. D. O'Brien, 'Does Hegel have a Philosophy of History?' in *Hegel* ed. M. Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 184–185; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 12. Hegel's paradigms for this sort of 'original' or first–hand historicising are Herodotus and Thucydides, though O'Brien argues that *Caesar's Commentaries* (also held in the highest regard by Hegel) would make a better paradigm because there the lack of opposition between the spirit of the narrator and the spirit of the events he narrates is compounded by a further lack of opposition between subject and object in the autobiographical mode of investigation. The unity in this case obtains both at the level of form and content.

Hegel is right to emphasise this 'immediacy' of consciousness as a unity of *form*. This is because even when consciousness is filled with the *immediate* intuitions of the *res gestae*; viz., when it possesses an immediacy of content, this content – the immediate intuitions of the *res gestae* – are themselves permeated by a *pre-reflective* thought-content. Hegel refers to this phenomenon as the 'overreaching' or 'overgrasping' (*übergreifen*) of thought or the involvement of the form of thought in the form (in this case) of immediate feeling as content. Hence the *unity* of *form* indicated in the 'original' or first-hand histories of Herodotus and Thucydides (where there is no difference in the *Geist* of the narrator and the narrated events) refers to the unity of the 'overgrasping' thought-contents in the forms (which is to say in the *Geist*) of the narrator and the narrated.[391] Because Hegel defines the concept or 'truth' of *Geist* as that which remains absolutely self-identical in its difference, it is primarily constituted as such by what truly belongs to it and yet remains beyond it. This is therefore how we should construe Hegel's claim above that in the objectivity of consciousness filled with the immediate intuitions and feelings of the *res gestas,* the determinacies (*Bestimmtheiten*) of forms '*join* [my emphasis] themselves onto the content' with the consequence that each form seems to give rise to a unique content.[392]

The translation of *schlagen* as 'join' is Geraets'.[393] It implies an alliance. (This is how Inwood translates it: 'the determinacies of these forms also *ally* themselves with the content [my emphasis]'[394].) A perhaps more accurate rendering would be that the determinacies of form '*throw themselves*' onto the (objective) content. In any case, this more accurately conveys the sense that the content is being altered or affected, including in at least one sense, from

[391] This is also why Hegel is not particularly interested in pointing out the coalescing of form and content in autobiography.
[392] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 44
[393] Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T.F. Geraets et al. (London: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 26.
[394] Inwood, *Hegel*, 28–29

without.[395] (Later, Hegel will speak of an *Umschalgen* of form and content which is typically and not too badly rendered as 'overturning'.) I do not know whether it is this difference in translation or something else which leads to a difference in interpretation, but suffice it to say, there seems to be a difference in interpretation between how I read the crucial passage above and how it is read, for example, by Inwood:

> [Hegel draws] a distinction not simply between the form and the content of a mental state but also between both of these and its object. What the object of a mental state or activity is determined primarily by its content. But the form also plays a part here. Two mental states which differ in form, but not in content, will, or might, have, or at least seem to have, different objects in virtue of their different forms[396].

Inwood then asks: 'In what sense do seeing an apple and the desire for an apple have, or seem to have, different objects or different contents?' There is an apparently inclusive disjunction: 'different *objects* or different *contents*'. In the citation above, Inwood only considers a possible alteration in the constitution of objects, and not contents, because he reads Hegel to be drawing a further distinction between the form and content, on the one hand, and their object on the other. This is indeed a possible interpretation of Hegel on form and content more generally, but I would like to draw closer attention here to what Hegel is actually saying in the passage.

Inwood seems to assume that the 'determinacies', that is, the states of being determined, of forms refer simply to their being one form and not another. From this follows his supposition that for Hegel, looking at and desiring an apple involves two different forms, i.e. perception and desire, and therefore two different objects. Hegel does say that feelings, intuitions, images (*Bilder*), (re)presentations, our purposes (*der Zwecke*), duties (*Pflichten*), etc., are all forms, but

[395] This aggressive attachment of different forms to *Geist*'s content, as I argue in the final section of this chapter, is connected to the pagan or Roman teleologic of historical movement.
[396] Inwood, *Hegel*, 28.

he sometimes generalises all these under the form of *Vorstellungen*.[397] Hegel also numerates all of the forms above as one part of a conjunction which includes thoughts and concepts. This seems to be what Inwood has in mind when he says that Hegel here is really concerned with the distinction between the form of thought and other forms.[398] But Hegel also says that the *determinacies* of forms are made by their contents.[399] So how can it be that in the 'objectivity' of consciousness, which is *also* the content, the determinacies of forms throw themselves onto the content?

The difficulty in interpreting Hegel's statement above seems to have to do with what appear to be two different uses of the term 'content'. Hence, I propose that 'content' be taken to refer here to the object on the one hand, and to the determinacies of form on the other, and not that both be paradoxically taken to refer to the same content. There, is in other words, one signifier ('content') for two signifieds. The two signifieds are: (1) the content that fills our consciousness, and (2) the *effect* of that content on the making of the determinacies of forms. (1) accordingly refers to the 'objectivity' of content or the object of consciousness, while (2) refers to the mixture (or lack thereof) of this content with (reflective) thought or 'overgrasping' thought or to what we might call the 'subjectivity' of the determinacies of form in consciousness' object. The 'effect' refers to the 'effect' of (1) when connected with the permeating thought-contents of precognitive forms. If one reads §3 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic* in this way, it is clear that what 'appears' to be altering the objects of our consciousness is precisely the overgrasping of thought or the involvement of the form of thought in the

[397] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 44.
[398] Inwood, *Hegel*, 29.
[399] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 44; 'Der Inhalt, der unser Bewußtsein erfüllt, von welcher Art er sei, macht die *Bestimmtheit* der Gefühle, Anschauungen, Bilder, Vorstellungen, der Zwecke, Pflichten usf'. My emphasis.

determinacies of 'lower' (precognitive) forms as content, particularly when this is itself mixed with reflective thought (through *Nachdenken*).

This reading furthermore seems to be supported by Hegel's later claim in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* that the dialectic of form and content involves a duplication (*Verdopplung*) of form:

> Bei dem Gegensatze von Form und Inhalt ist wesentlich festzuhalten, daß der Inhalt nicht formlos ist, sondern ebensowohl die *Form in ihm selbst* hat, *als* sie ihm *ein Äußerliches* ist. Es ist die Verdopplung der Form vorhanden, die das eine Mal als in sich reflektiert der Inhalt, das andere Mal als nicht in sich reflektiert die äußerliche, dem Inhalte gleichgültige Existenz ist. *An-sich* ist hier vorhanden das absolute Verhältnis des Inhalts und der Form, nämlich das Umschlagen derselben ineinander, so daß *der Inhalt* nichts ist als das *Umschlagen der Form* in Inhalt, und die *Form* nichts als *Umschlagen des Inhalts* in Form. Dies Umschlagen ist eine der wichtigsten Bestimmungen. *Gesetzt* aber ist dies erst im *absoluten Verhältnisse*.[400]

We must note, however, that this 'overturning' (*Umschlagen*) can be 'posited' (and therefore 'logicated') (*Gesetzt*) – that is, the duplication can be mediated – only in the 'absolute relationship' (*absoluten Verhältnisse*). The 'absolute relationship' refers to the 'necessity' involved in divine Providence,[401] and to the overcoming of merely mechanistic relations toward *purpose* (*Zweck*), the teleology of Providence. The *relata* of this absolute relationship are, of course, God and the world, but these are not to be construed as two independent beings in an ordinary (or non-absolute) relationship, but as existing in a relationship of absolute identity. The duplication of form in such an absolute relationship of form and content is accordingly mediated because in both the form as inwardly reflected and in the form as externally existent we find the involvement of the same divine element. As Julie Maybee has pointed out, the notion of 'absolute relationship' is fundamentally about offering a 'more refined definition of

[400] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*,Werke 8, 264–265.
[401] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*,Werke 8, 289–292. It also derives from Hegel's prioritisation of the fundamental medieval *opposition* of God and his being.

Reason [*Vernunft*]'[402] as an historical grasping of Providential overgrasping. Following Jacobi's definition of the two-fold nature of Reason, Hegel is suggesting that the duplication of form in the absolute relationship between God and the world mediates both the capacity of reason 'to perceive an existent divine outside and over the human' as well as to 'to perceive an existent divine in man'.[403]

However, because human beings are in a state of fallenness, that is, because *Geist* is not yet truly *Geist* and its existence does not stand in absolute agreement with its divine *Urbild*, and the 'overgrasping' of thought is, on the other hand, what draws *Geist* in its natural immediacy towards rational (*vernünftige*) purification,[404] historical existence is always 'dragging' or 'drawing' *Geist* towards the realisation of its own concept.[405] Stuck at the level of an 'alienated' duplication of its form, it perceives historical necessity, which is to say, Providence, as meaninglessly blind.[406] I will analyse Hegel's technical understanding of the historical motifs of 'drawing', 'dragging', and 'discipline' (generalised under *Zucht*), including the ways in which they refer not merely to progression but also to regression, in chapter four. Here it should be indicated that, for Hegel, the meaning of human beings as historical subjects entails a continuous coming to terms and being faced with our selves as made in the image of God and, more often than not, failing to '*selve'*, to recognise and become our selves in this reflection which is constantly given to human reason in history. This means that even before we *think* about historical happenings as stories, our 'immediate' experiences of historical happenings are

[402] J. E. Maybee, *Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 263.
[403] F. H. Jacobi, *Werke III* (Leipzig: G. Fleischer, 1812), 239
[404] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 232.
[405] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.
[406] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 289: 'Von der Notwendigkeit pflegt gesagt zu werden, daß sie *blind* sei, und zwar insofern mit Recht, als in ihrem Prozeß der *Zweck* noch nicht als solcher *für sich* vorhanden ist'. See also *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388: 'Aber zunächst erscheint dies nur *uns* als Zucht, und diese ist für die Gezogenen ein blindes Schicksal, dem sie sich im stumpfen Leiden ergeben.' This alienated duplication of form expresses the '*entfremdete Welt*'.

always already storied because they formally involve the determinacies of thinking which constitute the structure of narrative. And so, *Geist*'s human-divine *Urbild* is always given in the very structure of human *Vorstellungen.*

2 Metaphors of Thought[407]

Hegel writes in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* that *Vorstellungen* may be regarded as 'metaphors of thoughts and concepts'.[408] As Michael Spitzer points out, Hegel offers three definitions of metaphor in the *Aesthetics,* 'all of which, both individually and as a series, project a drift toward idealization'.[409] Here, however, I will only address the first two.[410] Metaphors, in their first and most basic definition, are 'unposited' or 'implicit' similes. This should be understood in the context of Hegel's triadic exposition of the forms of comparison (*Vergleichung*) which include metaphor (*die Metapher*), image (*das Bild*), and simile (*das Gleichnis*). (The *firs*t is in this sense the unposited *third*, which, it must be noted, does not fit the characteristic dialectical pattern.) Hegel basically recognises this as the distinction made by Aristotle in the *Poetics*,[411] where a metaphor is distinguished from a simile by the omission or lack of an explicit 'as' or

[407] There is a conversation I need to have with my good friend Travis LaCouter about Christ as metaphor in von Balthasar's *Theo-Logic* vol. 2 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), especially 273-275. There is much there that would undoubtedly help provide a subtler theological frame for Hegel's attempts to link revelation in history to processes of metaphorical transference and aesthetic interpretation. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to get into that here.

[408] Vorstellungen überhaupt können als *Metaphern* der Gedanken und Begriffe angesehen werden'; Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 44.

[409] M. Spitzer, *Metaphor and Musical Thought* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 311.

[410] This is because the third 'definition' of metaphor identified by Spitzer is not a definition but an instance of an abuse of metaphor. As Spitzer notes, 'Hegel's third definition is made much later in the Aesthetics, in the third and final section, which deals with the romantic arts'. There, he notes, it becomes 'generalized as an aspect of the romantic imagination'. Hegel does not here, however, offer a third definition of metaphor but an account of the romantic imagination as a metaphorical form of subjective *Denken.* Spitzer notes that in this 'third' account, metaphors are 'of value only as an impetus to thought' and are therefore denied 'their ontological reality as personifications', with their 'identity [being] entirely parasitic on that of the human subject'; see Spitzer, *Metaphor and Musical Thought,* 311. But even this characterisation is consistent with the fundamental definition of metaphor (from the *Encyclopaedia*) as the subjective externalisation of the contents of speculative thinking as *Vorstellungen* (i.e. *Vostellungen* as metaphors of 'thoughts'). Spitzer's account of Hegel's aesthetics ignores to varying extents both the *Encyclopaedia* and the fundamentally historical nature of the constitution of the aesthetic Idea, and therefore mistakes the impulse or movement inherent to the human imagination itself as spiritually expandable, through signification in religious practice, for a denial of the ontological reality of metaphorical personification (or a mere 'drift toward idealization').

[411] Aristotle, *Poetics* trans. J. Warrington (London: Everyman's Library, 1963), 36–40.

'like'. *Nachdenken* might then be described as including the process of translating metaphors of concepts into similes (of concepts), since their significance for *Denken* cannot be expressed in their immediately metaphorical form.[412] In the *Aesthetics*, Hegel more explicitly departs from the commonplace view of his time (which had originated in Jean Paul's characterisation of metaphor as 'abridged personification') by describing metaphor as a 'compressed' comparison, and, in doing so, suggests the connection between immediacy (metaphor as *unposited* comparison) and compression. As Franz von Baader put it in *Fermenta Cognitionis*, 'jede *union* ist *ascension* und *expansion* jede *isunion* ist *Descension* und *compression*',[413] such that the decompression of metaphorical transference results in a greater unity between the relata of the comparative relation. It is therefore no surprise that Hegel suggests that metaphors themselves, secondly, 'arise from the fact that a word which originally signifies only something sensuous is carried over into the spiritual sphere', which is to say, from the decompression and expansion of the sensuous into the spiritual.[414]

This linguistic drift from the sensuous to the spiritual[415] (or from the 'poetic' to the 'philosophical', in Herder's slightly different terms[416]) is central to the structure of *Nachdenken* which appears with the emergence of language itself as the formal alteration or transition from the *symbolisation* of the intuitions of natural consciousness to the *signification* of intuitions

[412] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 44.
[413] F. Von Baader, *Fermenta Cognitionis 1* (Berlin: G. Reimer Verlag, 1822), 25. Original emphases.
[414] Hegel, Werke 13, 518. Elsewhere Hegel speaks of the *geistige Expansion* of religious doctrine to speculation; *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 25.
[415] Hegel calls it a 'carrying over' or *übertragen*.
[416] J. G. Herder, 'On Recent German Literature', in J. G. Herder, *Selected Early Works 1764-1767: Addresses, Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 106–107; cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 522–523, where Hegel reproduces the key Herderian insights.

apart from their symbolic link to primordial natural signifieds.[417] As Hegel explains, following Herder,

> Erstens hat jede Sprache schon an sich selber eine Menge Metaphern. Sie entstehen dadurch, daß ein Wort, welches zunächst nur etwas ganz Sinnliches bedeutet, auf Geistiges übertragen wird. »*Fassen, begreifen*«, überhaupt viele Wörter, die sich auf das Wissen beziehen, haben in Rücksicht auf ihre eigentliche Bedeutung einen ganz sinnlichen Inhalt, der sodann aber verlassen und mit einer geistigen Bedeutung vertauscht wird; der erste Sinn ist sinnlich, der zweite geistig.[418]

Languages always already contain a 'mass of metaphors', because language as such emerges from the human 'soul' as the signification and alteration of the 'corporeal', and therefore as the middle (*das Mittlere*) between corporeality (*Lieblichkeit*) and *Geist*.[419] In this way, one can apply Hegel's definition of metaphor – as the carrying over of something 'originally' merely sensuous to the spiritual realm – to his account of embodied creaturely life, since signification as such refers to the carrying over of the body to the spiritual realm as *Geist*. Hence language is involved through the operations of metaphorical transference and 'comparison' more generally in the spiritual mediation of bodies.[420] The spiritual meaning of the word (including most fundamentally as *Word* or *Logos*) which emerges with this metaphorical transference is at the same time the truth of the sensuous meaning even though it appears *after* it. The same holds for *Begriffe* and *Vorstellungen*. Thus, the *Nachdenken* of *Vorstellungen*, of 'picture-thinking', consists in learning to see the image for the real thing behind (or beyond) it. As I argue below, Hegel's 'philosophy of history' consists precisely in learning to see the divine behind the images of history.[421]

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[417] In this sense, the emergence of language as such is the most primitive operation of *Nachdenken* as the 'alteration' (*Veränderung*) or carrying over of a content (which Hegel links to the human 'soul' as the signification of the body) from one form to another.

[418] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 518.

[419] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 247–248.

[420] Which is why Hegel ultimately turns to liturgy or the Christian Mass as the main form of the expansion and decompression of the mediation of the finite and the infinite after the death of Christ; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 453–455.

[421] Kathleen Magnus correctly identifies this 'substitution of the spiritual for the sensuous' as the target of Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics. To the extent that, for Hegel, 'the connotations of the original sensuous image are "lost" in the metaphorical transference', she argues, Derrida has 'grounds for complaint'. Magnus qualifies

The metaphor is closely related to the image (*Bild*). In the *Aesthetics*, Hegel develops the triad of 'comparison' through the forms of metaphor, image, and simile.[422] The image is a more detailed (*ausführlich*) and therefore partially clarified metaphor[423]. It therefore lies between the metaphor and the simile. It involves a further drift in the constitution of its internal properties and relations from abstract symbolisation toward concrete signification, but it is not, like the simile, 'a mere idle repetition' (*eine bloß müßige Wiederholung*)[424]. The simile involves the application of the logic of *Verstand* to the relation of comparison:

> Metapher und Bild veranschaulichen die Bedeutungen, *ohne* sie auszusprechen, so daß nur der Zusammenhang, in welchem Metaphern und Bilder vorkommen, offen anzeigt, was eigentlich mit ihnen gesagt sein soll. Im Gleichnis dagegen sind beide Seiten, Bild und Bedeutung – wenn zwar mit geringerer oder größerer Ausführlichkeit bald des Bildes, bald der Bedeutung — vollständig geschieden, jede für sich hingestellt und dann erst in dieser Trennung aufeinander der Ähnlichkeiten ihres Inhalts wegen bezogen[425].

This distinction between simile on the one hand, and metaphor and image on the other, illustrates Hegel's more general logical distinction between *Verstand* and *Vorstellung.* In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel affirms that that while *Verstand* 'isolates' the elements of relations (such as between universal and particular, cause and effect, or between the things compared in

Derrida's critique (which 'goes a bit too far') by pointing out that, for Hegel, metaphors are really 'an interruption to the process of thought'. The textual support offered for this, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that metaphor does not for Hegel 'succeed in the total obliteration of the power of the immediacy of the sensuous image'. On the other hand, Hegel definitely identifies such a metaphorical interruption (of 'thought') but does so (following Herder) in the historical context of the transition from a poetic to a prosaic *Sprachalter* in the ancients (as opposed to the implied 'philosophical' language–form of the moderns). As a result, Hegel writes that metaphors are '*eine Unterbrechung des Vorstellungsganges*', viz., an interruption of the imagination or of the course of (re)presentation (*Vorstellungsganges*), which, though a form of thinking, is not 'conceptual' or *begreifendes Denken*, which is what 'thinking' is in this context a shorthand for. See K. D. Magnus, *Hegel and the Symbolic Mediation of Spirit* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001), 65–66; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 522–523. It is perhaps telling that Magnus mistranslates '*des Vorstelungsganges*' as 'the conceptual course'. While some commentators (in the 80s, before the time of Magnus' book) used to translate *Vorstellung* as 'conception', this was at a time when *Begriff* was often rendered as 'notion'. In any case, even when 'conception' was used in this way, it was clearly distinguished from 'concept'; see Inwood, *Hegel*, 10–24.

[422] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 526–538

[423] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 523.

[424] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 524, 526.

[425] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 526.

a simile) and therefore posits them as both separate and necessarily related, *Vorstellung* posits them 'side by side' in their 'undetermined spaces' (*unbestimmten Räume*).[426]This 'equivocity' of the (re)presentational form makes up in flexibility what it lacks in clarity.[427] For example, the 'undetermined spaces' of *Vorstellungen* allow for illustration without expression; viz. they allow for the illustration (*Veranschaulichung*) of a meaning without 'speaking it out' (*ohne sie auszusprechen*).

These 'undetermined spaces' accordingly allow for what Hegel calls 'the unutterable' (*das Unaussprechliche*) to be conveyed.[428] Hegel develops a famous critique of 'sense-certainty' in the *Phenomenology,* which highlighted the structural inability of human language to express concrete particulars. Language, according to Hegel, has the 'divine nature' of immediately reversing or recoiling on the speaker's illocutionary force and preventing what is meant from 'getting into words'.[429] It is useful to understand this structural limitation of language as a kind of providential preclusion of the untrue, because as Hegel emphasises, the unutterable is merely the untrue (*das Unwahre*) and the irrational (*Unvernünftige*); it is what is merely meant but not actually expressed. Why then, should the unutterable or inexpressible be conveyed at all? I would like to link this issue to the problem of revelation in history, in general, and to the teleologies of revelation, which I discussed in chapter one, in particular. There I developed Hegel's distinction between revelation through the 'violence' of immediate relations and the 'cunning' of mediate relations. Hence, I would like here to suggest that to the extent that human

[426] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 8, 73.
[427] I cannot develop here Hegel's account of the difference between the 'logics' of *Verstand* and *Vorstellung*, but I believe that it somewhat anticipates William Desmond's neomedieval (but still quasi-Hegelian) account of the relationship between the univocal and equivocal (as pre–dialectical) 'senses' of being; see W. Desmond, *Being and the Between* (Albany: SUNY, 1995). The crucial difference would lie in the rigidity of regionalisation, since, for Hegel, 'thought' as dialectical by nature means that it must, as *Verstand*, fall into its negative.
[428] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 92.
[429] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 92; '...die göttliche Natur hat, die Meinung unmittelbar zu verkehren, zu etwas anderem zu machen und so sie gar nicht *zum Worte kommen* zu lassen'.

linguistic expression itself subverts and complicates the transmission of concrete particulars, which is to say, of complexly mediated particulars, it subverts and complicates the teleological processes of the transmission of revealed knowledge. The 'unutterable' is therefore not primarily irrational from the standpoint of content, but of form, since its irrationality consists in the falling apart from one another (*das Auseinanderfallen*) of inner meaning (*der inneren Bedeutung*) and external shape (*der äußeren Gestalt*) in the speaker.[430]

Of course, language's ability to really frustrate human intentions is limited and only symbolically indicative of the real frustrations of will and the ambiguities of action that face human beings in history. Hegel's account, in the *Science of Logic*, of the two teleologies of revelation highlights both the aspect of the frustration of the human will as well as that of the very 'teleological ambiguity' inherent in the possibility of sinful creatures to realise the *Zweck* of history and attain consciousness of God. This teleological ambiguity is the working of what Hegel calls the *List der Vernunft*. To reiterate Shanks' points from the first chapter, the historic process through which revelation is recognised, is 'considered in itself highly ambiguous'; it is 'potentially a revelation of God's truth, but not in an immediately obvious way', and therefore requires considerable work of discernment.[431] This ambiguity is constituted formally by the structure of *Vorstellungen* which manifest the contents of revelation through processes of the metaphorical transference of *Begriffe*. In other words, the work of discernment is precisely what Hegel calls *Nachdenken*. In Geraets' canonical translation of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, the 'thinking spirit' (*denkende Geist*) is described as only advancing to thinking by 'going *through* representation'.[432] This invokes the common picture according to which *Vorstellungen* form a

[430] This is an idea Hegel develops in *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II*, Werke 14, 239–240.
[431] Shanks, *A Neo-Hegelian Theology*, 1.
[432] Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, 24.

mere pitstop on the road towards *Begriffe.* But the German alternatively proposes that it is only through or by imagining or 'imaging' (*nur durchs Vorstellen*) that the thinking *Geist* advances towards *Begriffe,* and that *Vorstellen* moreover is itself the 'turning' (*Wenden*) towards *Begriffe*.[433] This suggests that the role of *Vorstellungen* as 'metaphors of thought', and more generally of *Vorstellen* as a kind of imaging of concepts, is about more than the usual speculative ascent from image to thought[434]. And it is: for it is also about seeing the 'real thing', the concept, as the image, because only manifestation through metaphorical transference opens up the space for the reception of the 'unutterable'. This manifestation of the spiritual through its imagining is then both the condition for the possibility of discerning revelation in history as well as what renders our efforts to discern revelation deeply ambiguous.

Hence Hegel appeals to metaphor precisely because the metaphorical is involved, in a way which seems initially counterintuitive, in the very ascent from the sensuous to the spiritual (meaning here, also, the cognitive). Metaphor overturns bone into spirit. And it is best illustrated by Hegel's account of God's becoming known by humanity in history. This involves, of course, three steps. The first is the *abstrakte Begriff* and the second the *konkrete Vorstellung*. The third refers to what Hegel commonly calls *der Kultus* and involves what Peter Hodgson has in my view correctly called 'participation in or communion with God'.[435] This is, therefore, one of those triads which is really a speculative or triadic coming together of a dyad.[436]As is usual with Hegel, however, the structure of this mediation, of the speculative coming together, is doubled, so that we can point to a coming together of two dyads; the First and the Second in

[433] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 41.
[434] Unfortunately, Deleuze and Guattari's indebtedness to Hegel's *Vorstellung* for their notion of 'images of thought' remains almost wholly unacknowledged; see Deleuze, and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 35–61.
[435] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 85. Hegel's phrase is usually '*Lebendigkeit in Gott*'.
[436] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, II,* Werke 17, 452: 'das Spekulative besteht im allgemeinen in nichts anderem, als seine Gedanken, d. i. die man schon hat, nur zusammenzubringen'.

the Third, so that the abstract concept and concrete (re)presentation come together into *Kultus*, but more significantly, the second and the third, or the coming together of humanity's respective 'theoretical' and 'practical' relations to God, which absolutise the abstract concept of God and to therefore return to the First. This return, once mediated by the *Kultus*, allows us to see the First as the Father.

3 *Lebendigkeit* in God

What Hodgson does not refer to, though he is clearly quite aware of it, is the following elegant passage from the very end of the *Lectures on the Proofs for the Existence of God* (which is the last thing Hegel ever wrote):[437]

> In der Sphäre der offenbaren Religion ist zuerst der abstrakte Begriff Gottes zu betrachten. Der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff ist die Grundlage; seine Manifestation, sein Sein für Anderes ist sein Dasein, und der Boden seines Daseins ist der endliche Geist. Dies ist das Zweite; der endliche Geist und das endliche Bewußtsein sind konkret. Die Hauptsache in dieser Religion ist, diesen Prozeß zu erkennen, daß Gott sich im endlichen Geist manifestiert und darin identisch mit sich ist. Die Identität des Begriffs und des Daseins ist das Dritte. (Identität ist hier eigentlich ein schiefer Ausdruck, denn es ist wesentlich Lebendigkeit in Gott.)[438]

We find here a remarkably clear qualification of the relationship between the triadic moments in theological language. We have the element of the 'abstract concept of God'; the element of religious consciousness; and the element of religious practice or *Kultus*. The second of these, the *konkrete Vorstellung* of God, is God's manifestation as 'being for others' (in short, the entirety of our symbols, images, stories, and liturgical expressions of the divine[439]), and it is at

[437] Hegel often experimented with this structure in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. The argument in favour of quoting the text below is that it is Hegel's final articulation of that structure which appears, with various alterations, in a number of earlier texts. In addition to this, the *Lectures on the Proofs for the Existence of God*, were actually being prepared by Hegel for publication.

[438] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 528.

[439] These may be said to have an 'Incarnational' constitution in so far as they involve the being of the divine *Idee* (the abstract concept) being imaged by finite, human *Geist*.

the same time what constitutes his *Dasein.* This is Hegel's term for human being and presence, and, in this case, for the existence of Christ on Earth. This manifestation of the divine as *Logos* through the Incarnation therefore also projects the signification of corporeality. However, as Hodgson points out,

> [b]y descending from its eternal simplicity, the absolute being (the 'Father') attains for the first time its 'highest being'—which is not the remote and inaccessible deity of rationalism, but a divesting, absolving, relational being that comes down into history and makes itself manifest (the 'Son').[440]

God must therefore literally become a completely different kind of being in order to sustain this manifestation; in Hegelian logic this designates the transition from *Wesen* to *Dasein* (i.e. from spiritual 'essence' to earthly 'presence').

God must therefore even have a human, finite, soul. This is for Hegel necessary because it is part and parcel of the transformation of humanity brought about in the Incarnation. (Indeed, the human being as body and soul is an anticipation of the Incarnation.) As finite, the human soul begins in a place of opposition vis-à-vis the material body.

> *An sich* hat die Materie keine Wahrheit in der Seele; als fürsichseiende scheidet diese sich von ihrem unmittelbaren Sein und stellt sich dasselbe als Leiblichkeit gegenüber, die ihrem Einbilden in sie kein en Widerstand leisten kann.[441]

The whole process of human habituation, treated at some length in the *Philosophy of Mind*, concerns the '*höhere Erwachen der Seele zum* Ich*, der abstrakten Allgemeinheit, in sofern sie* für *die abstrakte Allgemeinheit ist'*.[442] But in Christ, this higher awakening is to (the abstract universality of) the Father and so in him is achieved the perfect union of the soul and the body, the immaterial and the material. Perfect, I say, but 'not absolute'. For as Hegel argues in the

[440] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 38.
[441] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 197.
[442] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 197.

Philosophy of Mind, the very nature (*Natur*[443]) of the logical idea's self-development, of creation, requires the irreducibility of materiality or corporeality to the immateriality of the soul. This is both in order to ensure the *Dasein* of creatures over against the substantiality of absolute being, as well as to ensure that the *individuality* of creatures is set over and against the 'universal immateriality' of the soul in nature. As Jens Halfwassen has argued, Hegel transforms Meister Eckhart's individual *Seelengrund* as the site of the presence of God (the *Gottesgeburt*) to the community (*Gemeinde*) or the *Kultus*.[444] And so, secondly, only through this irreducibility of the material or corporeal, expressed most clearly in the Incarnation, can we grasp the most important thing about Christianity; that God both manifests himself in finite *Geist* and moreover becomes identical with it (or in it). This identity is the Third and it is at the same time, the *Kultus*, the 'practical' relation between humanity and God. More so than an identity, *Kultus* is a *Lebendigkeit* in God.

The question is: how do we understand this *Lebendigkeit* in God? Hegel's answer involves going back to the idea of *Vorstellungen* as metaphors of thought. It is only in this sense that we can understand Hegel's idea of the *konkrete Vorstellung* as the manifestation of God as *Logos*. And we must likewise turn to this idea in order to grasp the threefold thought of *Begriff-Vorstellung-Kultus* in the Trinitarian form which Hegel gives it. Hegel associates what he calls the 'theoretical' and 'practical' relationships of humanity to God with *Verstand* and the will (*der Wille*).[445] As the structuring of natural being or natural existence (*natürlichen*

[443] Which means it is not part of the 'essence' (*Wessen*) of the absolute Idea, i.e. not a necessity God is submitted to by virtue of his essence, but something which is part of the divine plan of creation.

[444] J. Halfwassen, *Hegel und der spätantike Neuplatonismus: Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Einen und des Nous in Hegels spekulativer und geschichtlicher Deutung* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2016), 141–142.

[445] Incidentally, it is difficult not to note here a convergence with Augustine's analogies of the Trinitarian persons with mental forms; with memory, intellect, and will. That the 'theoretical' relationship of humanity to God, through the Son, and the 'practical' relationship of humanity to God, through the Spirit, links to understanding or intellect, on the one hand, and will, on the other, in Hegel as well as in Augustine, seems obvious. More problematic might seem (as it is for Augustine himself) the link between the abstract concept of God and memory.

Seins or *natürlichen Existenz*) according to an intellective principle (*Verstand*), the 'theoretical relationship' is a primarily formal structure (which relates natural consciousness to 'external being').[446] Consequently, in the case of at least some forms of *Naturreligion*, Hegel describes it as abstract and empty and as therefore giving way or overturning into contentless forms of practice.[447] The constitution of this theoretical relationship as *konkrete Vorstellung* therefore involves the 'turning' of consciousness toward self-consciousness as thinking *Geist.* And this involves the 'imaging' of the abstract concept of God which posits the contents of 'external being' into internally or subjectively constituted (re)presentations. But how is the abstract concept of God to be theorised? Hegel explicitly calls it the *Grundlage* of the whole structure. And this *Grundlage*, I would argue, should not be associated with 'memory' (as the Father is associated with memory for Augustine) in the sense of either *Erinnerung* or *Gedächtnis*, but with that from whose dark pit memory emerges: *Intelligenz.*

Lest there be any confusion, *Intelligenz* is, of course, a concept involved in (and presupposed by) Hegel's discussion of '*theoretische Geist*'.[448] This theoretical *Geist* may be construed as the form of subjectivity which emerges within the theoretical relationship of humanity to God as *konkrete Vorstellung*. The abstract concept of God does not therefore refer to the simple or immediate denotation of the *ontos* of *theos*, but is the 'result' of the whole of philosophy[449] and,

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However, as Paolo Virno has noted, 'Augustine does not consider memory, which imperfectly imitates the characteristics of the Father, to be just any kind of faculty comparable to the others'; on the contrary, memory 'coincides with the entire life of the mind; it is the ambit, or context in which all the particular faculties are inscribed, starting with will and the intellect'. As I noted in the second chapter, a similar view of memory inspired by Hegel was developed by Herbart. As Augustine puts it, 'these three then, memory, understanding, and will, are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind.'. Memory 'overreaches' in this sense the other faculties, rather like the notion of 'being' 'goes beyond (and itself comprises) every other category'; see P. Virno, *Déjà Vu and the End of History*, trans. D. Broder (London-New York: Verso, 2015), 5; Augustine, *De Trinitate*, trans. Edmund Hill, O. P. (New York: New City Press, 1991), X.18.

[446] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 174–175. Primarily involved here are feelings and needs and desires.

[447] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 389; 'Das theoretische Verhältnis, weil es in sich eigentlich leer ist, schlägt in das *praktische* der Zauberei um'.

[448] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 240–245.

[449] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 92.

is therefore in the background of all concrete (re)presentations of the divine. (This is because, for Hegel, the *ontos* of *theos* is really *Geist* or rather *Geist* as the being of God is how God has revealed himself to us and how we have revealed ourselves to him and to ourselves.) And it is not thus, in my view, problematic to suggest that this abstract concept be correlated with *Intelligenz,* since this concept is both the ground from which memory and the imagination emerge as well as what is remembered and imaged, since as the *Philosophy of Mind* suggests, the emergences of both memory and the imagination are connected to the attempt to image and subsequently reproduce the I's own inwardness (the *Innerlichkeit des Ich*).[450] As Inwood puts it in his commentary on the *Philosophy of Mind*,

> Intelligence imposes rationality on the scattered material given to it, i.e. simply presented to it, and transforms it into a 'concrete universal', i.e. not a thin, 'abstract' universal, whether it be a universal derived from the logical Idea (such as 'being') or a universal applicable to the untransformed empirical given (such as 'green'), but a complex universal, such as 'animal', 'horse', etc.[451]

This definition of *Intelligenz* supports Richard Winfield's thesis that it is the concept Hegel partly developed in order to distinguish 'mind' or *Geist* from mere 'consciousness' or *Bewusstsein*.[452] It is no surprise then that *Intelligenz*, as the emergence of subjectivity, involves the overcoming of the externalising limitations of consciousness *qua* sense-certainty. Furthermore, this relation between the abstract concept and *Intelligenz* may be drawn in connection with what Hegel, following Schelling, called *versteinerte Intelligenz,* in order to refer to the petrification of thought-content in nature *without* human *Geist,* the emergence of which, correspondingly, involves its 'depetrification' through representational concretion (which is to say, through signification). Hegel suggested that this is what Adam was doing to nature when he named the animals.[453]

[450] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III,* Werke 10, 262
[451] M. Inwood, *Commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 319.
[452] R. D. Winfield, *Hegel and Mind: Rethinking Philosophical Psychology* (Hampshire-NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xi; According to Winfield, most thinkers who have followed Kant 'have treated consciousness as inherently discursive, as if awareness of objectivity depended upon conceptual regularities rooted in linguistic intelligence. This makes unfathomable how language and thought can be acquired'.
[453] Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften 1801–1807,* Werke 2, 15.

It follows from this that the overcoming of the limitations of consciousness as sense-certainty (and therefore of language) requires the emergence of consciousness as religious consciousness or consciousness from the religious standpoint. For this reason, Hegel speaks of 'the necessity of the religious standpoint' (*Die Notwendigkeit des religiösen Standpunktes*) in contradistinction to the consciousness of mere natural being.[454] Schematically, this makes it seem as if the abstract concept of God – as the prior of religious consciousness – coincides with the abstractness of consciousness as sense-certainty. This is only true in so far as the 'coincidence' of the abstractness of sense-certainty and the abstractness of the concept of God refers to their mutual estrangement, such that the move beyond sense-certainty is achieved through the imaging or (re)presentation for consciousness of the concept of God. As the 'turning' of consciousness toward self-consciousness, this imaging is a turning towards the *Logos.* The *Logos,* as Ward puts it, is 'the object galvanizing the very process of that consciousness towards [self-]knowledge'.[455] However, the *Logos* (as this object of consciousness) is a 'displacement', or rather, it is displaced by being manifest only as an image, since the manifestation in the human imagination of the abstract concept of God always already involves the Trinitarian move from the Father to the Son (as *Logos*). More accurately put, there is an inversion (we could say, 'economically') in the Trinitarian periodisation of revelation in history, with the Father being revealed only through the Son (to paraphrase Matthew 11.27). This is the theological reference point for Hegel's idea that consciousness proceeds to(re)presentational manifestation before it proceeds to a speculative grasping of God as Absolute.

[454] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 105.
[455] Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I*, 299. Compare with von Baader's claim that, while '*Speculation ist nur Streben nach Erkenntniss; ein Thor oder Taglöhner, der immer strebet und sammelt, und nie geniesst*', '*Bilder thun der Seele wohl! Sie sind ihre eigentliche Speise*'; Werke 11, 26-27.

As I have already noted, *Geist*'s human-divine *Urbild* is always given in the very structure of human *Vorstellungen,* but because these are historically contingent, it is mediated by the *Logos* as its concrete manifestation. Because the soul is the body's signification – the body is transformed through the soul from mere materiality into corporeality – it is inscribed *qua* body against the background of mere matter. This is itself part of the elevation to the *Word.* The *Word* or *Logos* is universally presupposed in human consciousness because human consciousness is a striving toward the realisation of its *Urbild* and the *Logos,* as the Trinitarian mediation of this *Urbild*'s content in history, propels consciousness towards self-knowledge.[456] The *Logos* is, therefore, a displaced object of human consciousness at least partly (if not totally) because human consciousness is historically 'spiritually displaced'. Not only is natural consciousness historically anterior to spiritual self-consciousness, but the initial manifestation of the spiritual is itself an image or imaging of itself. And as I indicated earlier, the body-soul relation too must involve an irreducible gap between immateriality and materiality so that, ultimately, the 'identity' of the First and the Second, of *Begriff* and *Vorstellung* means holding on, at the same time, to both the thought of God and to the metaphor of that thought. But what does it mean to hold on to both the thought of God and to the metaphor of that thought? Hegel says that it means (or perhaps enacts) *Lebendigkeit* in God. This invites us to focus on the practicality of *Kultus* and especially on the coincidence of abstractness and concreteness, which such a practicality entails.

[456] Ward, *How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I,* 299.

For Hegel, as George Kline summarised in an influential article, 'abstract' means 'one-sided, inadequately related, relatively unmediated', while concrete means 'many-sided, adequately related, complexly mediated'.[457] Hence, we are supposed to hold on to both one-sidedness and many-sidedness, to both relation and nonrelation, and to both immediacy and mediation. The coincidence of abstractness and concreteness refers also to the identity of God as both One and Three, as simple but also complexly mediated. And the last pair correctly indicates that we are dealing here with what Hegel calls 'mediated immediacy' or the mediated identity of immediacy and mediation. The manner, however, in which consciousness proceeds to this 'mediated immediacy' is through the 'purification' of natural consciousness whose displacement of religious (self-)consciousness as historically 'primary' results in what I, in the first chapter, referred to as an 'immediate mediation'. The purpose of human *Vorstellen* as a metaphorical transference of concepts is accordingly required for the (re)inversion of this primacy and the establishing of the primacy of mediation for *Geist*.

Metaphor, lest it be forgotten, designates a kind of mediated identity. As even M. H. Abrams' somewhat unimaginative definition emphasises, we find metaphors when a word 'which in standard ("literal") usage denotes one kind of thing, quality, or action is applied to another, in the form of an identity'.[458] But how does metaphor mediate this identity? It clearly involves what in Hegelese is called a dialectic of reflection, a logic of *gleichzeitig Erscheinung*. It is only through metaphorical displacement that the literal (or 'standard') meaning of a word appears as such. And it is only by going through the complexly mediated manifestations of divinity in stories and images that we can 'abstract' the purified and simple concept of God,

[457] G. L. Kline, 'Some Recent Reinterpretations of Hegel's Philosophy'. *The Monist* 48 (1964), 41. As Klein points out, these are quite different from, though not necessarily inconsistent with, the Anglo–American or broadly empiricist accounts of abstractness and concreteness, such that, for example, the immediacy of sensory perception might be concrete in the latter sense but abstract in the former, Hegelian sense.
[458] M. H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (4th ed., New York, NY: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1981), 63.

which, as in all metaphors, is the 'literal' background of the metaphorically reflected image. This allows us to see how *Lebendigkeit* in God, possesses for Hegel a unique historicality, since our simultaneous holding on to both the *thought* of God and to its *metaphor* is formally indistinguishable from our simultaneous holding on to both the *events* of history and their *narration*; to both the *res gestae* and the *historia rerum gestarum.* Hence it also suggests that the coterminous generation of event and narration as the unity of history should be read alongside the coterminous generation of *Begriff* and *Vorstellung*, or thought and its metaphor, as the unity of religious consciousness.

4 The Inverted Development of Consciousness

I hope not to have implied here the totally preposterous conflation of the sensuous immediacy of historical *events* as they enter human consciousness and the immaterial and logical form of philosophical *Begriffe*. The tension between the two in Hegel is well-known, or rather it is known that there is a tension, which is not then always elaborated. Let it be clear that the sensuous immediacy of (1) historical events, in their initial, intuited form, and (2) philosophical concepts share a common abstractness, an abstractness which moreover facilitates their mutual opposition. Human historical subjectivity, Hegel's philosophy of history suggests, involves the interplay of the natural and the spiritual (which at previous points in this discussion were generalised as the material and immaterial) of sensuous immediacy and logical simplicity. But *both*, his philosophy uniquely maintains, come to us in essentially one-sided and only preliminarily mediated forms. They are, in other words, abstract. The conceptual and the sensuous are opposed as such, but they are both, at least initially, apprehended through a common abstractness. The encounter of the one with the other usually leads to what Hegel calls the 'purification' or *Reinigung* of the spiritual from the natural, such as when the religious self-

conception of the Jewish people is purified (*gereinigt*) from the sensuous elements of the previous, 'natural' religions.[459]

This Jewish principle of *Reinigung*, as I will argue in chapter four, is contrasted with the Greek principle of *Vereinigung* or unification.[460] History consists in part of the concretisation of the natural and spiritual elements of this historico-religious consciousness, and as such (Hegel points out) consciousness has united (*vereinigt*) the objective and subjective sides of *Geist* – it has united event and narration.[461] But this is only possible because it has at various points also sundered the natural and the spiritual.[462] The parallel between the sensuous immediacy of historical events and abstract conceptuality of their divine ground (the *Idee*) is a 'vertical' opposition which intersects the 'horizontal' oppositions between event and narration, *Begriff* and *Vorstellung.* Where we find opposition between sensuous immediacy and logical conceptuality, we find unity in (re)presentation. Hence it is through the concretisation of the vertical opposition of sensuousness and conceptuality, that the horizontal oppositions of event and narration have become united in human *Vorstellen*.

[459] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241.
[460] It is remarkable that Hegel does not appeal in this context to the stages of purgation, illumination, and union which Luther had rendered precisely as *Reinigung*, *Erleuchtung*, and *Vereinigung*, respectively. He is, after all, talking about almost the same thing, about what he calls not the ascent but the 'elevation' of humanity to God. Of course, at this point, he is talking about the Greeks, and he believes the union of the spiritual and the natural achieved in Greek religion to be hollow (if in some sense beautiful). And to the extent that it may be observed that it is the illuminative stage that is really missing, at least in his language, then one could be directed to his inheritance and use of the term *Einsicht* (whose connection in Luther and subsequent German theology I, perhaps, do not need to point out). Dieter Henrich, in his ground-breaking research on Hegel's indebtedness to the Platonism of the Tübingen School, coined the term *Vereinigungsphilosophie* to describe the thought of Hegel and his predecessors like Herder; see Henrich, 'Hegel und Hölderlin', in *Hegel im Kontext*, 12-17.
[461] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 83.
[462] And the context of the necessity of this sundering is furthermore postlapsarian since the Fall involves for Hegel a retreat into nature.

There is another way of explaining this. It is only through the narration of events and the (re)presentation of the conceptual that humanity's 'religious standpoint' emerges. Hegel argues, in connection with this view, for the 'necessity' of the religious standpoint (*Die Notwendigkeit des religiösen Standpunktes*). His point is precisely that religion, as Peter Hodgson puts it, 'does not merely *follow* from the natural-spiritual world but is its *truth*, its foundation'.[463] As Hegel argues:

> Das ganze Drängen und Leben der Natur geht aber nach der Empfindung und nach dem Geiste hin. Indem nun der Geist in diesem Fortgange als notwendig durch die Natur, als durch sie vermittelt erscheint, so ist diese Vermittlung eine solche, die sich selbst zugleich aufhebt. Das aus der Vermittlung Hervorgehende zeigt sich als den Grund und die Wahrheit desjenigen, woraus es hervorgegangen ist. Dem philosophischen Erkennen ist der Fortgang ein Strom mit *entgegengesetzter Richtung* fortleitend zum Anderen, aber so zugleich rückwirkend, daß dasjenige, was als das Letzte, als im Vorhergehenden begründet erscheint, vielmehr als das Erste, als der Grund erscheint[464].

One is tempted to translate the natural metaphor of the stream as flowing not in 'opposite directions' (as one finds Hodgson and others doing here[465]), but in an 'oppositional direction', since I think Hegel's use of the singular *Richtung* is not merely 'stylistically deliberate', but philosophically apposite. There *is* only one direction, and that is the logical direction from *Geist* to *Natur*. However, this conceptual primacy of *Geist* over *Natur*, of the immaterial over the material, in short, of the infinite over the finite, has been *metaphorically* reversed both in Hegel's account of it and in its historical manifestation as representationally mediated. This is a 'speculative reversal' in so far as it involves the mediated identity of the thought of spiritual primacy and its metaphorical displacement.

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[463] P. Hodgson, 'Editorial Introduction', in G. W. F. *Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume I*, trans. R. F. Brown et al (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), 70.
[464] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 110–111. Original emphases.
[465] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1*,227.

As Hegel emphasises in both the first and third *Encyclopaedias*, it is precisely such a reversal (of 'mediated immediacy' into 'immediate mediation') that is at the centre of *Nachdenken* (a reversal that holds for Hegel's system itself, given the *Phenomenology's* antedating of the *Logic*) where what is prior emerges through what is later.[466] Hence history must first show us the Old Testament before it can show us the New, and even the New Testament must first show us the Son (the *konkrete Vorstellung)* before it can show us the Father (the *abstrakte Begriff*). But the reversal or inversion itself seems to emerge from the primacy in history of natural consciousness (the consciousness of mere *Naturreligion*), a primacy depicted by the Fall narrative as erroneous. The metaphorical displacement of spiritual primacy, which is really a displacement of the logic of *Begriff* by the logic of *Vorstellung,* is expressed by the adjective *entgegengesetzter* – hence the temptation to render it as 'oppositional' rather than merely 'opposite'. The *Richtung* as such remains unchanged, but it is now 'oppositional'. It is submitted to the wild and contradictory 'logic' of *Vorstellungen*, which consists in this ability to negate, invert, and displace; to posit the elements of relations 'side by side', in their 'undetermined spaces' (*unbestimmten Räume*).[467]

As it happens, then, the significance for history of holding on to both the thought of God and to the metaphor of that thought concerns the need to mediate the primacies of appearance and the primacies of logic. This is important, because if we simply asserted '*daß* alles von Gott gemacht sei',[468] namely if we simply asserted the conceptual primacy, we would be ignoring the very thing which constitutes the *Lebendigkeit* of human religious consciousness. Such a concession, Hegel argues, '*ist kalt und tot, weil in ihr das, was die* Lebendigkeit *dieses*

[466] Though it may also be said that what is prior emerges as the suppressed truth of what is later.
[467] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 73.
[468] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 18.

Bewußtseins ausmacht, wo es bei sich selbst und Selbstbewußtsein ist, diese Einsicht *und Erkenntnis hier fehlt*'.[469] It would ignore the primacy of the appearance or *manifestation* of God and the irreducibility of human self-consciousness as a *Nachdenken.* Note that Hegel's word for divine creation above is not *schaffen* or *schöpfen* but *machen* or 'making'. And the abstract assertion of the conceptual primacy of this creative *making* is opposed to that which *makes* the *Lebendigkeit* of human religious consciousness. At one point in history, however, this reversed logic (of origin as return) is inverted back and the conceptual order of spiritual primacy is restored. This is what Hegel means when he links the origins of the thinking *Geist* with the life of Jesus Christ. Quoting John 16.7 (but also 16.13 and 15.26), Hegel emphasises that Christ must depart before the Spirit can come, and this procession from the Son to the Spirit 'restores' the previously 'inverted' order in the Bible which first gives us the Son and then the Father. Hegel's attachment to the fourth Gospel comes in part from the fact that it develops the structure of Son-Father-Son-Spirit, the structure of the doubling of mediation, which he sees everywhere in his history.

As James Collins somewhat famously suggested, the '*Vorstellung* of death' in Christ entails also the 'death of *Vorstellung*'.[470] This has often been used to argue that *Vorstellungsdenken* drops off the face of the Earth as soon as Christ dies and to furthermore push the reading of Hegel's relationship between *Vorstellungen* and *Begriffe* in a direction of a total supersession of the former by the latter.[471] In so far as by this chiasmus Collins seems to have meant that the

[469] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 19.

[470] J. Collins, *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 341.

[471] C. Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism* (London: Routledge, 2002), 101. Cunningham frames the formal difference between religion and philosophy in terms of an opposition between '*Vorstellung*' and '*Denken*'. This is wrong. As Nicholas Adams has pointed out, 'one will go badly wrong with Hegel if one thinks that "thinking" is the realm of "the concept." Absolutely not. Representation and concept are, alike, the realm of thinking. Common sense and wisdom are both forms of thought.'; see Adams, *Eclipse of Grace*, 25. Of course sometimes– such as in the third *Encyclopaedia* – Hegel will have a section called '*die Vorstellung*' followed by a later section called '*das Denken*', but he will qualify in that latter section that there is a type of thinking called 'pure thinking' (*reine Denken*) which is distinguished from thinking 'in all circumstances', in other words from 'sensation and representation'. In the case of 'pure thinking' alone, Hegel is talking about *Begriff*; Hegel,

death of Christ is the 'death of the representation of God held by humankind in its state of alienation',[472] he has only equivocated between the inadequacy of the abstract *concept* of God and the inadequacy of representations, generally speaking. The closest Hegel comes to saying this is in his claim that the (re)presentation of the death of Christ is the death of 'der Abstraktion des göttlichen Wesens, *das nicht als Selbst gesetzt ist*'.[473] As usual, there has been an attempt here to downplay the significance of *Vorstellungen*, and especially the religious *konkrete Vorstellung*. This isn't to say that there isn't, following the death of Christ, a kind of move beyond the *konkrete Vorstellung.* There *is* the move from humanity's theoretical relationship to God to its practical relationship to God, the move to *Kultus*. But this move forward is generated not by the 'death of representation', but by the death of the abstract concept of God. The point of this is the elimination of the abstract assertion '*daß alles von Gott gemacht sei*' but at the same time the move beyond the theoretical relationship to God as *konkrete Vorstellung* to *Lebendigkeit.*

In other words, the history and person of Christ does explode our alienated awareness of the divine, but this occurs through *Vorstellung* itself and not through the death of *Vorstellung*. The image that Hegel gives us (though admittedly he gives in in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, and not in the *Phenomenology*, where Christ's death is also discussed in similar capacity) comes from John 16.7; Christ leaves so that *he* may send the Spirit. What is completed here is the full 'imaging' of God, the development of the spiritual or metaphorical meaning of the Word.[474] To summarise: the necessity of holding on to both the thought of God and to the

Enzyklopädie III, Werke 10, 284.
[472] P. Merklinger, *Philosophy, Theology, and Hegel's Berlin Philosophy of Religion*, 1821–1827 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 174.
[473] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 572.
[474] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 518.

metaphor of that thought derives from the ‘metaphorical’ displacement of spiritual primacy in history. This displacement, or at least the specific historical form it takes, is linked by Hegel to the Fall, to the alienation of human beings from the divine and from themselves. Providence as the *List der Vernunft* which directs history is the attempt to overturn the displacement of spiritual primacy in history. This historical process involves the special role of Jewish religion. Its mediating role in the origins of Christianity, however, has been accused amounting to a supersessionist account. I address this issue in the following third chapter.

Part II

CHAPTER 3

Supersession and Mediation *or* The Judaic Death-Event and the Historical Outside

Introduction

The transition from Judaism to Christianity and the emergence of Christianity more generally, has traditionally been understood in terms of the 'supersession' of the former by the latter. This way of thinking about the supersession of Judaism by Christianity is often called 'replacement theology'. Thanks to Paul VI's *Nostra aetate* it is chiefly discussed today, among Christians, by Protestants. One way of thinking about this supersession, as Walter Kaiser points out, is to think about it is as involving the claim that Abraham's seed *qua* national Israel is superseded by his 'spiritual seed', the Christian Church.[475] This perhaps resonates with Hegel's emphasis on the particularity of the Jewish religion and its focus on the Abrahamic family (which Christianity somehow displaces[476]) as well as with the notion of a historically 'later' appearance of a 'primary' spiritual truth in a 'pre-spiritual' form (such as, for example, knowledge of sin under grace). The important thing here is not just the spirituality of the new Covenant, but the 'ideality' of the Old[477]. This is an idea that goes back to Justin Martyr who had said: 'For the *true spiritual* Israel […] are we who have been led to God through this crucified Christ'.[478] (This wasn't as frightful as Hyppolytus' *Treatise Against the Jews*,[479] but it put things into motion.) And one can see how this linking of the material Israel with ideality, as I have

[475] W. C. Kaiser, 'An Assessment of 'Replacement Theology'' *Mishkan* 24 (1994), 9.
[476] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243–244.
[477] It should be noted that Hegel never discusses the relationship between Christianity and Judaism as a relationship of different 'Covenants'.
[478] Justin Martyr, *Dialogue With Trypho* 11, in S. Means (ed.) *Saint Paul and the Ante–Nicene Church: An Unwritten Chapter of Church History* (London: A & C Black, 1903), 200.
[479] Hyppolytus, *Treatise Against the Jews*, in *Saint Paul and the Ante–Nicene Church*.

suggested, invites a further and parallel linking of the sort of finiteness Hegel has already castigated at the ontological level with pre-Christian 'finite' religion.

If one turns to the *Epistle to the Galatians* (which is also one of Hegel's favourite texts), one furthermore finds the idea that the eschatological promise of God is made to Abraham *before* the Law, and that it concerns his offspring Christ, not his many offspring who would inherit the Law (Gal. 3.15-17). To this extent, the 'New Covenant' predates, for Paul, the 'Old Covenant', because it is based on a promise made centuries before the Law. From a Hegelian perspective, we are already tangled here in the familiar web of 'universality' (all human beings), 'particularity' (Jews), and 'individuality' (Jesus Christ). And any account of the transition to Christianity from earlier religions as historically meaningful must (for Hegel) articulate the 'logic' of the relations between these three elements. For Hegel, universality as such 'particularises' itself into the moments of universality, particularity, and individuality, such that it designates both the genus and a species of that genus. Thus the universality of all human beings is particularised into the universality of gentiles, the particularity of Jews, and the individuality of Abraham's offspring: Jesus Christ. Hegel says that the truth of Christianity depends on the answer to two questions: has God sent his Son to the world and is this Son Jesus of Nazareth?[480] In 'logical' terms, this means that the truth of Christianity depends on the arrival, and our affirmation of, an individual.

Following this line of thought, there emerged 'Christological' forms of supersessionism. One such way is outlined by Soulen:

[480] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 308. Hegel actually says that this is one question which splits itself into those two questions.

> God chose the Jewish people after the fall of Adam in order to prepare the world for the coming of Jesus Christ, the Savior. After Christ came, however, the special role of the Jewish people came to an end and its place was taken by the church, the new Israel.[481]

Now we're getting closer to something *seemingly* Hegelian. For one, we have the idea of a special Jewish fate or *Schicksal*. As I also argue in the following fourth chapter, this special fate is required for the mediation in history of the coming of Christ. However, countless expositions of dialectics have unfortunately taught us to find acceptable the idea of Hegelian 'moments', such as the moment of Jewish particularity, falling off the 'dialectical chain' after they've outlived their usefulness, like Judaism is said to do have done above. On this picture, the preservation of some Jewish 'identity' or consciousness is unimportant because the Christian Church is a (purely?) *spiritual* community.[482] Hegel himself, whatever he would have thought of our 'replacement theologies', believed in the full emancipation of the Jewish people in the Prussian state (and his argument in favour of this view applies to all other states[483]) whose justification he otherwise regarded as religious (which is to say, Christian). However, his views on Judaism have had the ambivalent fortune of becoming 'well-known' and solidifying into a textbook account which is mostly untrue.

For example, Hegel has been criticised, most notably by Stepelevich and Yovel, for a 'supersessionist' view of the transition from Judaism to Christianity.[484] Fackenheim has pointed out that while being 'deeply immersed in the opening chapters of the Old Testament', Hegel's thought 'virtually passes over its entire remainder', ultimately being neither more nor less important than any other fragmentary anticipation of Christianity (such as the Greek or Roman

[481] R. R. K. Soulen. *The God of Israel and Christian Theology* (Minneapolis: Ausburg Fortress, 1996), 1–2.
[482] Soulen, *The God of Israel*, 2.
[483] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 421.
[484] L. S. Stepelevich, 'Hegel and Judaism'. *Judaism* 24 (1975), 215–224; Y. Yovel, 'La religion de la sublimité', in *Hegel et la religion,* ed. G. P. Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1982), 151-176.

religions).[485] The more severe of these complaints against Hegel are often expounded in the context of a broader critique of a German tradition of Protestant anti-Semitism beginning with Luther and, more often than not, culminating with Hegel himself.[486] Such a tradition is moreover typically said to include figures as diverse as Kant, Goethe, and Schleiermacher. This is the strategy taken by Amy Newman, whose critique of Hegel follows both Stepelevich and especially Yovel. Newman's critique highlights the 'death event' of Judaism (as a kind of counterpart to the Christ-Event) both as a 'fundamental myth of 19th century Protestantism' and as a logically necessary moment in the narrative of Christianity[487]:

> German philosophy, especially with Hegel, shakes off its traditional "allergy to concrete history" and reconfigures this death event as a logical necessity awaiting empirical verification, requiring only the formulation of effective strategies to this end.[488]

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[485] E. L. Fackenheim, E.L., *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 133.

[486] The most extreme statement of this view might be Reinhard Sonneschmidt's 'Zum philosophischen Antisemitismus bei G.W.F. Hegel' *Zeitschrift für Religions und Geistesgeschichte* 44 (1992), 289–301, though one cannot overlook the sheer ambition of Hubert Kiesewetter's *Von Hegel zu Hitler: Verwiklichung einer Totalitaeren Machtstaatstheorie in Deutschland (1815-1945)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995).

[487] A. Newman, 'The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel' *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, LXI.3 (1993), 450, 479–480.

[488] Newman, 'The Death of Judaism', 480. Note that the contours of this critique, particularly as far as the latter specification of the Judaic 'death event' as 'logically necessary' is concerned, are remarkably similar to the critique of Hegel as a Boehmian gnostic (whatever a Boehmian gnostic is) who posits the Fall as a logical necessity in a dialectical sequence of human historical becoming. Thus William Desmond, a friend if not an originator of this critique complains that Hegel 'is not Jewish enough', which I suppose is really a way of saying that he is too Greek. Hence the perennial question, asked also by Hodgson: 'how much is too much and how little is too little?' Helene Meyers suggests that reductions such as 'too Jewish' and 'not Jewish enough' may be glib; see H. Meyers, *Identity Papers: Contemporary Narratives about American Jewishness* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011) and W. Desmond, *Hegel's God: A Counterfeit Double?* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 122. This is a critique aimed at Hegel's account of the Fall vis-à-vis nature or Creation. But when the Fall is considered in the context of Hegel's account of history, it is the Fall as the specifically historical moment of humanity's arriving at a *Sichdenken* of 'fallenness' – the moment of Jewish self-consciousness – that is picked out for the accusation of a forced teleologisation. Those criticising Hegel's alleged antisemitism do not seem to ever indicate the obvious parallel between their critique and the (semi-)'Balthasarian' Catholic-conservative critique of the Fall as logically necessary for the development of the Idea. Nor do (either sides, as far as I am aware) realise the connection between Hegel's account of the Fall as revealing the relationship between cognition and spiritual life in the context of nature, and the account of the Fall as revealed historically by the Jewish people. Invariably and unsurprisingly, the reading of Hegel which emerges from critics like Newman (and to some extent, more recently from Timo Slootweg) owes more to the post-Kojèvean 'death of God' reading of Hegel most closely associated today with Žižek (and on which 'Balthasarian' critics of Hegel like John Milbank always rely), than with the account of Hegel as a Christian thinker that I develop in this thesis; see T. Slootweg, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Judaism' in *Hegel's Philosophy of the Historical Religions* ed. B. Labuschagne and T. Slootweg (Boston, MA: Brill, 2010); C. O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel*. What I lazily call the 'Balthasarian' critique of Hegel has its origins in the early von Balthasar's reading of Franz von Baader, whose objections to Hegel I address in chapter four; see H. U. Von Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele: Studien zu einer Lehre von Letzen Haltungen: Vol. 2, Im Zeichen Nietzsche* (Salzburg: Pustet, 1939).

Though Newman indicates that Judaism is crucial for the mediation of religious consciousness in its transition to Christianity, she does not construe this mediation as a process of 'absolutisation', i.e. as plotting the transition to absolute (Christian) religious consciousness, as Hegel's *Lectures* claim that we ought to.[489] What does it mean to say, however, that the emergence of Christianity is the historical moment of the absolutisation of religious consciousness? For Fackenheim, it means moving from merely 'fragmentary anticipations' of religious truth to that truth itself. But this suggests that what is 'fragmentary' or limited about pre-Christian religion is its content. Rather simplistically, if more correctly, this 'absolutisation' means that with the emergence of Christianity, the revelation of God becomes universally accessible to consciousness as self-consciousness, so that what should be primarily emphasised is the expansion or 'decompression' of form. This also entails many common Hegelian developments, such as the possibility of a truly 'concrete' historical understanding. There is therefore an irony in Newman's assertion that Hegel represents the moment of German philosophy shaking off its 'allergy to concrete history' through its thinking of the Judaic 'death-event', because Hegel identifies the origins of the possibility of this concrete historical understanding in Judaism.[490]

Nevertheless, Newman is right that the Judaic 'death-event' has played a crucial role in German philosophy, including in 'Hegelianism'. Žižek, for example, presents a Hegelian account of the absolutisation of consciousness as involving the mediation of a Judaic death-event. However, because Žižek (as Adam Kotsko has argued) develops a 'death of God theology',[491] he develops the transition from, and relationship between, Judaism and Christianity in terms of a 'doubling'

[489] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 185–187.
[490] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243.
[491] Kotsko, *Žižek and Theology*,149–154.

of the death of God. For Žižek, God 'has to die twice, in itself and for itself', which is also to say, firstly in Judaism and secondly in Christianity.[492] The 'first' death of God in this account is without a doubt a disguised Judaic death-event. However, where traditional forms of supersessionist thought have relied on the deployment of this concept of the Judaic death event for the mediation of the emergence of Christianity, Žižek relies on it, alongside a reworking of the Christian concept of the death of God, for the articulation of 'Christian atheism'. The content of this position largely consists in the claim that the absolute revelation of God made universally manifest to consciousness after the Christ-Event is that there is no God (because, as the Lutheran hymn goes, '*Gott selbst ist tot*'[493]). The impetus behind Žižek's theory of the 'two deaths of God', however, is not unrecognisably Hegelian – being derived from the correct observation that the 'absolutisation' of historical consciousness must somehow mediate the 'duplication' of form inherent to historical becoming as the successive overturning (*Umschalgen*) of form and content in time.

As Hegel put it in his early text *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion*,

> Die Verdrängung der heidnischen Religion durch die christliche ist eine von den wunderbaren Revolutionen, deren Ursachen aufzusuchen den denkenden Geschichtsforscher beschäftigen muß. Den großen, in die Augen fallenden Revolutionen muß vorher eine *stille, geheime Revolution in dem Geiste des Zeitalters* vorausgegangen sein, die nicht jedem Auge sichtbar, am wenigsten für die Zeitgenossen beobachtbar und ebenso schwer mit Worten darzustellen als aufzufassen ist.[494]

Note, firstly, that Hegel highlights the supersession of pagan, and not Jewish, religion, as key for understanding the emergence of Christianity, for it is a consciousness of the antagonisms of the Roman world (and its religion of *Verstand*) which must be achieved in order to effect the

[492] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 104.
[493] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 297.
[494] Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 203. My emphasis.

transition to Christianity. And note, secondly, the use of the proto-Freudian term *Verdrängung* ('repression') which, alongside the characterisation of the emergence of Christianity as preceded by a 'silent, secret revolution in the Spirit of the age', suggests the need for an unconscious ('psychic') repression of pagan religious consciousness. This further suggests a doubling of the absolutisation of consciousness in the forms of the 'wonderful' and the 'secret' revolutions. However, the great or wonderful revolution is also the 'eye-catching' one, in contradistinction to the secret revolution, which is imperceptible, and especially imperceptible to its contemporaries. This means that the secret revolution cannot be grasped from within the 'immediacy' of historical consciousness (which I defined, in the previous chapter, as the unity of the *Geist* of the time and that of its narrator[495]). Instead, 'the secret revolution in the Spirit of the age' must be brought about from without[496]. When this mediation is achieved, or as Hegel puts it by quoting Paul, 'when the fullness of time has come', 'God sent his Son'.[497]

But what is this historical 'outside' from which the secret revolution of consciousness emerges? It is not, as arguably for Žižek, the hidden or imperceptible death of God in Judaism (and therefore also death of the Judaic God), but it *is* Jewish particularity and, in particular, the Judaic *Sichdenken* of humanity as 'fallen'. I argue below that Hegel presents an account of this mediation of the emergence of Christianity 'from without' by linking it to the special *Schicksal* of the Jewish people which is introduced from without into the universal consciousness of the Roman world. The *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, in particular, present a duplication not of the death of God, but of this *Sichdenken* of fallenness. In the *Lectures*, this *Sichdenken*

[495] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 12.
[496] This is what Lenin meant when he said in *What Is to Be Done?* that workers could not be conscious of the irreconcilable antagonisms in the whole of the social and political system and that consciousness 'can be brought to [them] *only from without*'; V.I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, Works 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961), 384–385. Original emphasis.
[497] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 391

is posited twice, firstly for Jewish religion (in the section on *Judäa*[498]), and secondly when it is 'reintroduced' for the 'pagan' (Roman) world as a precondition for the emergence of Christianity (in the third and final section of *Die römische Welt*[499]). Moreover, the Judaic *Sichdenken* of humanity as fallen is nested in the subsection on 'Christianity', such that Jewish 'particularity' is nested in the moment of the Christian 'individual' (the coming of Christ) within the 'universality' of the pagan or Roman world. The consciousness of human fallenness may subsequently be said to have emerged firstly 'in itself' in Judaism (which is dialectically to say that it emerged 'for us', from a later, 'Christian' standpoint, as an anticipation of the Christian doctrine of sin), and secondly, 'for itself', in the pagan world. Finally, the exposition of 'World History' which concludes the *Philosophy of Right* likewise highlights the special fate of Jewish people as 'held in readiness', as it were, from without, for the coming fate of the life and, especially, death of Christ. In this chapter, I will address two closely intertwined issues: firstly, the issue of Hegel's antisemitism in connection with the issue of Jewish emancipation in the *Philosophy of Right*; and secondly, the involvement of a moment of supersession in the 'mediation' of the emergence of Christianity. The first theme will be analysed in the first two sections. These will address the extent to which Hegel's views on Judaism have been 'personally' inconsistent in relation to his overall philosophy, and whether they are ultimately linked to his overall philosophy. The second theme, analysed in the final, third section, will treat the 'immanent content' of Judaism in Hegel's philosophy of history, in juxtaposition to the account developed by Žižek. I will then fully develop the account of the Jewish *Sichdenken* of human fallenness in chapter four.

[498] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241–244.
[499] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 385–405.

1 Universal Rights and the Enlightenment Critique of Religion

The duplication of form in the historical overturning of form and content is a result of the structure of Hegelian mediation.[500] It is no surprise that Yovel, Newman, and Slootweg, all emphasise that 'it is mainly the dialectical structure of the Lectures […] that indeed makes all the difference for the evaluation' of Judaism and other religions.[501] This perhaps reinforces the emphasis on various dialectical moments logical 'necessity'. The focus of these critics is on the logical form of Hegel's exposition of the historical religions, and the 'abstractness' of the determinacies of this form, and thus the logical necessity for 'universal Christianity' to 'conclusively sublate particularistic Judaism'.[502] I will mostly remain at this level of form. However, it is worth noting that this appeal to the primacy of form and structure may be used to undermine the significance of certain facts about Hegel himself such as, for example, his support for Jewish civil rights (which was probably unmatched by any of his German intellectual contemporaries), or his politically acute rejection of the Wartburg demonstrators, whose anti-Semitism and proto-Fascistic tendencies historical hindsight has helped to highlight.[503] Hegel's critics have chosen to be unconvinced by such defences,[504] with Yovel going as far as to identify a contradiction between Hegel's overall rejection of the Enlightenment critique of religion and his alleged application of such a critique to Judaism[505]. The strategy here has often been to suggest a familiar inconsistency in Hegel between what is entailed by the Hegelian method and what Hegel derives from his application of it. In this way,

[500] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Werke 6, 564.
[501] Slootweg, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Judaism', 125–126. I quote only Slootweg but he emphasises the importance of this methodological approach vis-à-vis Yovel and Newman.
[502] Newman, 'The Death of Judaism', 475.
[503] See H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (2nd ed., London: Kegan & Routledge, 1941), 179–180; and N. Haines, 'Politics and Protest: Hegel and Social Criticism' *Political Science Quarterly* 86.3 (1971), 406–428.
[504] For some classic defences, see Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 169–223, and E. Weil, *Hegel et l'Etat* (Paris: Vrin, 1950). For a discussion of these texts and others in relation to the issue of Hegel's view on Jewish civil rights see S. Avineri, 'A note on Hegel's views on Jewish Emancipation'. *Jewish Social Studies* 25 (1963), 145–151.
[505] Y. Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews* (University. Park: Penn State University Press, 1998), 82.

Hegel's commitment to, for example, Jewish emancipation need not be taken as a corollary of any intellectual position vis-à-vis Judaism.

David S. Robinson has more recently suggested a similar contradiction between Hegel's supersessionism and his humanism. Quoting Hegel's claim that a 'human being counts as such because he is a human being' and not 'because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.', Robinson notes the contradiction between Hegel's supersessionism and his advocacy for universal human rights and further observes, following Yovel, that such a combination is only possible as a result of a clinging to an 'Enlightenment account of recognition beyond religious and ethnic identifications'.[506] This is of course to miss the whole point of Hegel's humanist plea for universal rights, or, at least, a part of it. The 'identity' of all human individuals is apprehended only in their being 'universal persons', which is to say, as thinking their consciousness in the form of universality. And it is only *as such* that human beings 'count' as human; as thinking their consciousness in the form of universality (which is also part of Hegel's definition of human freedom), and as being simply spiritual beings – not by being a German or a Christian – since thought, thusly conceived, is the *differentia* of human beings, as such.[507]

The justification here is formal (having to do with the identity of all persons under the form of universality). But the content of this form, that is, the content of the *differentia* of humanity as thinking *Geist*, is that of 'Christian' mediation, which is to say that it is only because the divine

[506] D. S. Robinson, *Christ and Revelatory Community in Bonhoeffer's Reception of Hegel* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 204.

[507] G. W F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse II*, Werke 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 42. I quote here the most programmatic treatment of the issue. Hegel makes this point so often that one almost believes his unlikely claim that the view that *Denken* is the *differentia* of human beings had been forgotten in 19th century Germany.

and human are 'in and of themselves one' that humans may be said to be distinguished at all from the natural realm.[508] Hegel accordingly devotes a great amount of attention to the historical development of this content through diverse religious forms and the subsequent reflection or *Nachdenken* of this content as the object of his philosophy and phenomenology of *Geist*. The complete quotation from the *Philosophy of Right* to which Robinson refers includes the qualification that this universal humanism 'becomes defective' when 'it is crystallised, e.g. as a cosmopolitanism'.[509] And here it should be affirmed that Hegel's account of recognition is not beyond religious identifications (he does not accept the Enlightenment universality of abstract persons that he criticises in the *Phenomenology*[510]), but is instead founded on the universal affirmation of 'every spiritual potency [*geistige Wirksamkeit*] and more so of every religion'.[511]

Of course, Hegel probably believes that in the case of the Prussian State of his time, the secular can no longer assert itself in opposition to the religious, or alternatively he thinks that we should strive for such non-opposition, including in the articulation of citizenship. ('Secularity', for him, implies an overcoming of the abstract opposition between the Church and the State rather than the positing of an opposition between the Church and the State[512].) The latter (and probably more sober) view is in essential agreement with something so obvious in the *Philosophy of*

[508] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 453: 'Das Wesen des christlichen Prinzips ist schon früher entwickelt worden, es ist das Prinzip der Vermittlung. Der Mensch wird erst als geistiges Wesen wirklich, wenn er seine Natürlichkeit überwindet. Diese Uberwindung wird nur durch die Voraussetzung möglich, daß die menschliche und göttliche Natur an und für sich eins seien und daß der Mensch, insofern er Geist ist, auch die Wesentlichkeit und Substantialität hat, die dem Begriffe Gottes angehört'.
[509] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 361.
[510] Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3, 400–424.
[511] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 242. Sibree made the probably correct observation that the latter clause of this claim is intended as an *a fortiori* argument; G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 195. 'Spiritual potencies' may also refer to national identifies, such as the German, which have adopted a nationally foreign religious principle (Christianity) and have therefore given it a formal alteration.
[512] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 415–428.

Right that it is often overlooked. Namely, that Hegel clearly and obviously does not think that all the human beings in 1821, to whom he wishes to grant civil rights, 'think their consciousness in the form of universality' (nor that they should in order to be granted those rights). The argument is rather that universal human rights are a necessary 'secular' precondition for the *Bildung* of religious consciousness in the form of universality. Such a self-consciousness in the form of universality is moreover only an achievement of the burgher class. But the realisation of the State which this class mediates must involve the objective grounding of universal civil rights for all and this is what Hegel means when he says that the burghers are a 'universal class' or 'universal estate' (*der allgemeine Stand*).[513]

One way of understanding Hegel's humanist universal rights project, more generally, is in terms of his view of society as directed towards human *Bildung*, and as consisting of the mediation of the human and the divine (whose Idea the State is the embodiment of).[514] And one way in which Hegel develops this project in the *Philosophy of Right* is through a critique (which, however, is most fully developed in the *Philosophy of History*) of the Middle ages (and, in particular, of Christendom after Charlemagne).[515] The *Philosophy of Right* is perhaps infamous for its suggestion that the State should be considered a kind of worldly or secular divinity.[516] This does not mean that the State represents any kind of 'descent' of the divine into the immanent realm. Rather, Hegel's point is that if the wisdom of God is to be invariably (and rightly) discerned in the realm of *Natur*, then some analogous (and perhaps proportionally higher) divine mediation should be recognised in the realm of *Geist*, lest *Natur* be regarded as

[513] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 355.
[514] Embodiment here means 'manifestation', in the sense that while the Church is the divine idea on Earth as Spirit, the State is this idea's manifestation or embodiment.
[515] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 434–492; *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 158–159, 459–460, and especially, 511–512.
[516] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 434.

higher or greater than *Geist*.[517] This is where the critique of the Middle ages comes in. The problem, for Hegel, with the Catholic Church in the Middle ages is not that it encroaches excessively on the autonomy of a secular sphere, but that it (the Church) is itself too secular because it represents a 'reaction' of the spiritual (*des Geistigen*) against the spiritualisation of the extra-ecclesial world.[518]

This 'reaction' involves an 'abstract' opposition between Church and State. The essence of the Christian principle, and therefore also of the Church, is simply that of 'mediation' and hence also of concreteness. Hegel believes that this principle of Christian mediation was actually affirmed in the Catholic Middle ages, in so far as it was understood as the truth of history, but it was not be adequately realised.[519] And that is because this mediation involves in the first place an overcoming (*Überwindung*) of humanity's similarly abstract and antithetical relationship to nature. This is why the State is affirmed in the *Philosophy of Right* as representing a higher mediation of the divine, in the realm of *Geist*, than that which we recognise in the realm of *Natur*. The Catholic Middle Ages, however, relied too greatly on this natural mediation of the divine over against a more 'purely' spiritual one. Hegel chiefly identifies this overreliance with the Catholic Eucharistic practice, which he described as

[517] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 434.

[518] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 460. The spiritual or *Geistig* is, contrary to Kojève, not an outworking of the contradiction of the ecclesiastical (the *Geistlich*) and the secular; see A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. J. H. Nichols (London: Cornell University Press, 1980), 67. Rather, the *Geistig* and the *Geistlich* designate the 'particularisation' of *Geist* into a universal and particular element. Both of these elements emerge from the Church, but they become opposed to one another in history for what Hegel describes as essentially contingent reasons; see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 440–487.

[519] Commenting on the beginning of 'Christian mediation' in the Church and the eventual opposition between it and the Empire, Hegel writes: 'Die Innerlichkeit des Prinzips, als die noch abstrakte, in Empfindung als Glaube, Liebe und Hoffnung existierende Versöhnung und Lösung alles Gegensatzes, entfaltet ihren Inhalt, ihn zur Wirklichkeit und selbstbewußten Vernünftigkeit zu erheben, zu einem vom Gemüte, der Treue und Genossenschaft Freier ausgehenden *weltlichen* Reiche, das in dieser seiner Subjektivität ebenso ein Reich der für sich seienden rohen Willkür und der Barbarei der Sitten ist – gegenüber einer jenseitigen Welt, einem *intellektuellen* Reiche, dessen Inhalt wohl jene Wahrheit seines Geistes, aber als noch *ungedacht* in die Barbarei der Vorstellung gehüllt ist und, als geistige Macht über das wirkliche Gemüt, sich als eine unfreie fürchterliche Gewalt gegen dasselbe verhält'; Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 511– 512.

involving an isolation of the sensuous or natural moment (of the Host) for itself (through adoration and elevation).[520] This, Hegel tells us, meant that the Host, as a merely 'external' (sensuous) thing, could be taken possession of by another against me (where the merely or purely spiritual presence of Christ granted by faith cannot). And this is what happened with the separation in the Middle ages between the clergy and the laity.[521]

This withholding of the Host from the laity by the clergy parallels the withholding of rights from various peoples by the State. The burgher class is this sense the 'modern', 'capitalist', and 'post-Reformation' homologue of the pre-Reformation clergy. Both are particular formations whose role it is to mediate the *Bildung* of society as a whole. In this sense, their roles may also be compared to that of Jewish particularity in bringing about the coming of Christ and the new 'revealed' religion. The difference is that Jewish particularity is required to 'complete' the history of the Fall, or the first 'part' of human history before the coming of Christ. But this 'punctuation' of history, as before and after the Christ-Event (which is configured as the centre of reconciliation), is precisely the result of the need for a special reconciliation in history.[522] Hence, on the *other* side of Christ – in the modern or 'German' world – the universal 'work' of a particular class in the form of a 'universal class' does not require the positing of a particular consciousness from 'without', as Jewish religious consciousness is required in the Roman world. This is because the German world begins not with the postlapsarian feeling as pain and desire for a new heart (what I referred to earlier as 'immediate mediation'), but with feeling as faith, love, and hope, and as the reconciliation of all contradiction (or what I referred to earlier as 'mediated immediacy').[523]

[520] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 454
[521] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 454–455.
[522] I address the punctuation of history into a 'history of the Fall' and a 'history of Truth' in chapter four, and I address the Christ–Event as the 'omnidirectional' mediation of both sides of this punctuation in chapter five
[523] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 7, 511.

Rather than occupying an historical 'outside' (such as Jewish religious consciousness in the Roman world), the universal class or burghers is relieved or freed from the particularity of its own, 'direct labour' by the State and therefore occupies the seat of the State, at the centre of society.[524] Hence, in so far as the State is the highest 'expression of rationality', the freeing of the universal class from the particularity of its direct labour (like the freeing of Plato's guardian class from property or auxiliary responsibilities) corresponds to the 'purification' (*Reinigung*) of sinful impulses (as freed from their form as immediate and natural determinations)[525] at the level of the whole (i.e. of society). In this sense, the modern State project is intended to be the final expression or form of 'purified consciousness' which begins with Jewish religion (more on this in the following, fourth chapter). The task of modern society is then to establish through class organisation the genuine rationality of its universal class, and to therefore establish an 'estate' whose task is the universal interest of society as a whole. In this sense, the modern State as concrete universal must 'redeem' all the concrete 'particulars' (which were, in a qualified sense, its anticipations). Hence, Hegel argues, to exclude Jewish particularity from civil society and Jewish people from civil rights would be to both confirm and preserve the very 'separateness' of the Jewish people from society which had been used to justify their exclusion from civil society. And the point here isn't to argue against the 'accusation' of the purported separateness of Jewish particularity (which would be to merely submit it to an abstract universality as the tendency of Enlightenment thought), but to argue that the accusation itself results from a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the principle of the State.[526] The point is also therefore not that the exclusion of the Jewish people from civil society would be an exclusion of private persons, but of a particularity without which society could not be objectively whole.

[524] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 7, 357.
[525] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 7, 70.
[526] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 7, 421.

2 Jewish Particularity and the *Schuld* of the State

Most problematic, then, for the evaluation of Hegel's views on Jewish emancipation, is that the argument of the *Philosophy of Right* is seldom expounded from the standpoint of the needs of the State itself. For the State's (and more generally society's) failure to recognise Jewish particularity (both as 'particular' and as 'universally' part of civil society) would not only fail the Jews but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, fail the State itself.[527] In addition, Hegel is clear that before this issue of religious identifications, which concerns the *content* of various religious forms, can even be taken up and examined in the philosophy of history, there must be an *a priori* affirmation and acceptance of the universal human spiritual (religious) form.[528]

> So sehr eine Religion irrt, hat sie doch die Wahrheit, wenn auch auf verkümmerte Weise. In jeder Religion ist göttliche Gegenwart, ein göttliches Verhältnis, und eine Philosophie der Geschichte hat in den verkümmertsten Gestalten das Moment des Geistigen aufzusuchen.[529]

And this affirmation of *form* is at the same time a commitment to a minimum divine *content* (of a divine presence). This affirmation must be dialectical, which is to say that it must be made both by various groups as well as the State. The rejection of such an affirmation Hegel calls 'sectarianism' and he gives as examples of such sects the Quakers and Anabaptists (especially in the North of the United States). The State at best can practice 'toleration' or tolerance towards such groups of people who refuse to recognise the universality of their duties towards it.[530]

[527] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 7, 421.
[528] The same does not apply to ethnic identifications, which emerge as a result of process of religious particularisation.
[529] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 242.
[530] Žižek has renewed the critique of 'tolerance' as an ideological category from a Hegelian Marxist perspective; see S. Žižek, 'Tolerance as an ideological category'. *Critical Inquiry* 34 (2008), 660–682.

But the State would at the same time be 'sectarian' in its refusal to recognise the necessity of its universal representation. There is something 'Nimrodian' (to use that ghastly epithet) about both the wandering sects who seek to separate themselves of something they are invariably part of, and the 'sectarian State' which attempts to exclude from itself what belongs properly to it. And in both cases, Hegel argues, there has occurred a failure of the recognition of the minimum of divine content of all human spiritual formations. It was the rejection of this commitment to the minimal divine content of all spiritual forms that made it possible for the 'left' Hegelians (who followed Bruno Bauer) to oppose Jewish emancipation on grounds actually informed by a secular Enlightenment critique of religion.[531] For Bauer, if Jews wanted to be able to live together with Christians, they had to renounce the condition of their antagonism – their religion. Marx's now famous reply to Bauer on the Jewish question was in this sense more consistently Hegelian, since by rejecting Bauer's argument for the disestablishment of a State religion it recognised the reality of all religious forms beyond the mere legitimation of the 'Christian state'.[532]

As Shlomo Avineri has pointed out, the

> attitude in early nineteenth-century German opinion to Jewish legal and social emancipation was mostly bound up with the view held of the nature of Judaism as a spiritual and historical phenomenon.[533]

Avineri refers to Bauer's rejection of Jewish legal emancipation as being determined, in parallel to the anti-Judaic theological positions of Orthodox Lutherans, by a secular opposition to Judaism as a spiritual phenomenon. He then singles out Hegel as uniquely combining a

[531] B. Bauer, *Die Judenfrage* (Braunschweig, 1843).
[532] K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, ed. D. McLellan (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 46–64.
[533] S. Avineri, 'A Note on Hegel's views on Jewish Emancipation'. *Jewish Social Studies* 25.2 (1963), 145.

condemnation of Judaism with an affirmation of Jewish emancipation.[534] Avineri's argument in support of Hegel's negative evaluation of Judaism is in my view undermined, amongst other things, by an indefensible view of the *Jugendschriften*'s reliance on Kant and of a simplistic account of the development of Hegel's views from there. But Avineri makes an interesting point when he says that the fact that 'Hegel's approach to Judaism was negative' suggests that 'his attitude towards emancipation should have been negative as well'.[535] And he is the third critic I have referred to in this chapter who relies on this strategy of identifying a contradiction between the 'principles' and 'conclusions' of Hegel's philosophy, between the anti-Enlightenment philosophy of religion and the Enlightenment critique of Judaism (Yovel), between the supersessionism of Judaism and the advocacy of universal human rights (Robinson), and finally between the condemnation of Jewish historical religion and the affirmation of Jewish emancipation (Avineri).[536]

> Unwilling to consider the possibility that Hegel's affirmation of Jewish emancipation might suggest an equally affirmative evaluation of the Jewish religion, Avineri concludes that Hegel's views on the granting of civil rights to Jews were 'completely divorced from his historico-philosophical attitude toward the immanent content of Judaism'.[537] This implies that Hegel's views on emancipation, which Avineri concedes were 'remarkable in his [Hegel's] generation', were purely 'formal', having to do not with the 'immanent content of Judaism', but with the formal criterion of Jews as human beings deserving of universal rights. As I have already

[534] Avineri, 'A Note on Hegel's views on Jewish Emancipation', 145.
[535] Avineri, 'A Note on Hegel's views on Jewish Emancipation', 145.
[536] Those familiar with the Marxist reception of Hegel's thought may be reminded of the old cliché from Engels' *Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, according to which Hegel combines a 'good' and 'revolutionary' dialectical method with a 'bad' 'conservative' and idealist system; see K. Marx and F. Engels, 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in *On Religion* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1957), 219. This idea was taken up by Plekhanov at which point it became a commonplace of Russian Marxism, making its way into the writings of both Lenin and Stalin. Engels toys with it even earlier, in his book *Schelling und die Offenbarung* (Leipzig: Robert Binder, 1842), 50–51.
[537] Avineri, 'A Note on Hegel's views on Jewish Emancipation', 147.

argued, even this merely formal affirmation produces its own content. But I don't need to rely on this view to argue against Avineri's thesis. Avineri is in particular responding to the following excerpt from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (and which I have already alluded to):

> But the fierce outcry raised against the Jews … [**from that point of view and others**] ignores the fact that they are, above all, *men*; and manhood [sic], so far from being a mere superficial, abstract quality … [**see Remark to Paragraph 209**] is, on the contrary itself the basis of the fact that what civil rights rouse in their possessors is the feeling of oneself as counting in civil society as a person with rights, and this feeling of self-hood, infinite and free from all restrictions, is the root from which the desired similarity indisposition and ways of thinking comes into being. To exclude the Jews from civil rights, on the other hand, would rather be to confirm the isolation with which they have been reproached – a result for which the state refusing them rights would be accountable and reproachable, because by so refusing, it would have misunderstood its own basic principle, its nature as an objective and powerful institution...[**compare the end of the Remark to Paragraph 268].**[538]

Avineri has made a number of alterations to this text – otherwise from the T.M. Knox translation of the *Philosophy of Right* – which he, however, does not indicate to have made. These include omissions (which I have added above, in bold) and a slightly problematic translation.

[538] G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox, 169. I have provided here the Knox translation *as it is quoted* by *Avineri*; for the German, see Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 421.

There are three ellipses, two of which cover up references to sections §209 and §268. §209 is an earlier section of the book which serves to contextualise the note on Jewish emancipation. The reference to §269 is cut from the end of the last quoted sentence. The exclusion of the context provided by both of these references, as I argue below, changes the character of the quoted passage. The final ellipsis, one could argue, makes the quotation more readable, but one questions Avineri's decision not to quote the entire passage. The original reads 'But the fierce outcry raised against the Jews, *from that point of view and others*[539] [*aus diesen und anderen Gesichtspunkten*]'. The addition of this clause is important because it shows that for Hegel the fact that Jews are human beings is something overlooked specifically by those arguing against Jewish emancipation from a specific 'point of view'. This is the point of view that the Jewish people are not merely a *besondere Religionspartei* but also a *fremden Volke*, a foreign people.[540] Hegel's appeal to universal human rights is then not even intended (or at least not intended primarily) to counter a claim of problematic Jewish *religious* particularity, but the claim of a problematic ethnic otherness.

Finally, Avineri probably problematically changes Knox's translation of *Schuld* from 'blamable', to 'accountable'. This has the effect of implying that the State is accountable for the civil rights of Jews, rather than that the State would be blamable for the isolation of the Jewish people – the very thing they are accused of – if it fails to grant them their rights (which is what Hegel, as we saw above, means to say). This might seem like a glib point, especially since 'accountability' is now a term widely used in Anglo-American moral philosophy, but I nevertheless believe that the translation of *Schuld* as 'accountable' is indicative of Avineri's overall misreading, if not a deliberate attempt to shift the emphasis of Hegel's claim. Of course,

[539] This is Knox's translation.
[540] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 421.

it is notoriously difficult to translate *Schuld*, and just as difficult to convey in the English language the technical meaning which Hegel gives it in the *Philosophy of Right*. Knox elsewhere renders it as 'responsibility', which is perhaps closer to Avineri's 'accountable', but I think that he (Knox, not Avineri) was correct to emphasise the religious sense of 'guilt' and 'blame' in the passage above over against the merely political and legalistic senses of 'accountability' and 'liability' implied by Avineri's rendering. For it is obvious that Hegel cannot be referring to the State's political accountability towards the Jews, since the State (or its government or civil servants) is by definition accountable only to its own legislative bodies and to the public (where the latter is conceived as consisting of all emancipated persons). Hence this cannot mean what Hegel means when he says that the denial of Jewish emancipation would entail a misunderstanding of the State's basic principle.

It is worth looking at the references to the earlier parts of the text in the excerpt above for more context on the use of *Schuld*. The first is to the section on the administration of justice. That Hegel considers the exclusion of the Jewish people from the constitution of the State an injustice should be no surprise, but it is at least noteworthy why this is the case. In §209 and its corresponding *Anmerkung* (which is referred to in the section above), we find the justification of the principle of the State as 'absolutely divine'. What Hegel means by this is that the State is part of the 'Trinitarian' historical mediation between the human, natural, and divine (or ideal) worlds as the sphere within which humanity's reconciliation with itself must occur.[541] This consists in the 'sphere of relatedness' of persons, the sphere of education (*Bildung*), which gives abstract *Recht* 'its determinate existence of being universally recognised and known'.[542] At the same time, the *Zusatz* to §209 adds that right (*Recht*) only becomes existent through the

[541] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 512.
[542] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 360

working of the system of particularity. Paradoxically, then, particular groups can only be excluded from the universal sphere of civil rights after a sufficiently complex development and integration of particularity within the State has already occurred. And this development and integration occurs in the 'sphere of relatedness' and *Bildung.*

Hence, the apprehension of the individual's ego as a universal person derives from processes of *Bildung* and the working of the system of particularity which leads to *Denken* 'as the consciousness of the single in the form of universality'.[543] The seemingly abstract claim that the Jews are 'above all, *men*', is emphasised to point out that humanity, as such, is the basis for the fact that the possession of civil rights rouses 'a feeling of self-hood, infinite and free' which alone justifies the objectivity of the State. In other words, emancipation is itself constitutive of one's 'worth' and 'dignity' as an emancipated person. But if humanity is as such the *basis* for this feeling, which, as feeling and therefore as universal, grounds the existence of universal rights, it is (as §209 affirms) the sphere of relatedness, the sphere of *Bildung* which arises from the reciprocal bearing (*Wechselbeziehung*) on one another of needs (*Bedürfnisse*) and labour (*Arbeit*) that makes up that existence.[544] *Bildung*, is, I think, essentially a union of need and labour, where 'need' also implies for Hegel 'desire', and (more specifically) a desire for self-conception as reflection (*Nachdenken*);[545] of moving from this feeling of need and desire to a thinking of 'contentment' (*Befriedigtsein*).

[543] Of course, as Allen Wood points out, Hegel lived most of his life as an educator and had reasons, both personal and philosophical, for believing in the significance of pedagogy. He was also a good friend of Immanuel Niethammer, an important reformer and administrator in the Bavarian system of education; see A. W. Wood, 'Hegel on Education', in *Philosophy as Education*, ed. A.O. Rorty (London: Routledge, 1998).
[544] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts,* Werke 7, 360.
[545] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 12–16, 37, 45.

As Hegel comments in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, education in his lifetime was often stifled by the unjust separation between feeling and thought, to the specific detriment of religion and the awakening of the need for and of philosophy.[546] And the need to grant Jews civil rights is part and parcel of the attempt to overcome this separation,[547] especially since, as the remark to §268 (omitted by Avineri) emphasises: the State is the '*Entwicklung der Idee zu ihren Unterschieden*',[548] whose identity can be maintained only through the 'organic' inclusion of all of its members, the exclusion of which would result in the falling apart of its identity. The Aristotelian analogy being employed here is that between the parts or members of the State as 'organism' and the *individual* parts of the organism as 'body', with the universal humanist element referring only to the 'infinite personality' reflected in the reciprocal relatedness of all the members in that unity.

Finally, and to return to the issue of *Schuld*, we must consider the way in which §209 and §268 are referenced because they comment on two, often opposed, phenomena. §209 criticises cosmopolitanism (*Kosmopolitismus*), whereas §268 develops an analysis of patriotism (*Patriotismus*). Hegel is aware that the 'accusation' against the Jewish people as irreconcilably 'foreign' includes the accusation that they are cosmopolitan and insufficiently patriotic. But cosmopolitanism is precisely criticised as the abstract crystallisation of that universality of diverse groups from which civil society derives its objectivity,[549] while the view of patriotism as arising subjectively from individuals' commitments to one's nation ('a readiness for exceptional sacrifices') is rejected as undermining that same objectivity. Instead, patriotism

[546] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 42, 45.
[547] This parallels Hegel's defence of Jewish (and Muslim) philosophy against the infamous charges of atheism in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*. See, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 295–296.
[548] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 415.
[549] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 361.

refers to the relation of individuals to the objective and true ground of rationality in the State.[550] As a result, patriotism is the 'practical proof' of the State's rationality (as the preservation of particular interests within the universal interest of society as a whole), but it (patriotism) is not constitutive of that rationality (whose actuality derives from the State itself). It follows from this that any lack of patriotism (such as in the case of the Jewish community) is a practical problem for the State itself, because it proves not its rationality but its failure to 'sublate' the particular interest of that community within itself. This, therefore, is what Hegel means by the State's fault, or *Schuld*, in the case of its exclusion of the Jewish particularity from civil society.

3 The Death of Judaism and the Death of God

I will now move from the issue of Hegel's support of Jewish emancipation in his time, and therefore, also, of the issue of his 'personal' consistency as a thinker, to the more abstract issue of the supersession of Judaism by Christianity, which includes Hegel's views on the 'immanent content of Judaism'. Newman argues that the 'traditional interpretation of the myth of the death of Judaism originated within orthodox Christianity, where the demise of Judaism was seen as one facet of the death of God'. She identifies in Luther three ways of expressing this Judaic death event; (1) metaphysically, as coinciding with the death of Christ on the cross; (2) historically, as referring 'to an ongoing struggle in the present, one battle in the larger Christian campaign against pagans and infidels of various sorts'; and (3) eschatologically, as an 'ideal to be realized at some future time'.[551] If Hegel can be accused of (re)presenting a 'death event' of Judaism, it can only be in the first or metaphysical sense, as a kind of *fait accompli.* Žižek has rendered such an account explicit, but he has introduced a crucial difference to his theory of the metaphysical death of Judaism. And that has been to reconfigure the death of Judaism not

[550] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 413.
[551] Newman, 'The Death of Judaism', 456–457.

as the 'negative' moment of the death of God in dialectical contraposition to the resurrection and ascension, but as the *first* negation in a doubled determinate negation or what Hegel calls a 'negation of negation'. Žižek is perhaps well-known for this formulation of dialectics as 'negation of negation', which he insists is 'nothing but repetition at its purest: in the first move, a certain gesture is accomplished and fails; then, in the second move, this same gesture is simply repeated'.[552] The death of Judaism then refers to the death of the Judaic God as a failed or incomplete death of God which must be 'repeated' in Christianity.

By the time of the publication of *Less than Nothing*, this doubling of the death of God, 'first in Judaism, then in Christianity', becomes a central part of Žižek's justification of the position of (a Hegelian) 'Christian atheism'.[553] We can see that the purpose of the 'myth of the death of Judaism' has already been altered here. Firstly, its formulation as a 'myth of orthodox Christianity' has essentially disappeared, and instead we find it alongside the additional 'myth' of the death of Christianity itself. (We might call both 'myths of Christian atheism'.) Secondly, this is itself supposed to transform the 'death of Judaism' from a supersessionist and antisemitic trope to an aspect of Hegelian philosophy consistent with the method Hegel's thought rather than his own 'empirical prejudice'. This allows Žižek to accepts Yovel's criticism of the application of the Hegelian method as giving way to personal prejudice in the case of the theorisation of Judaism,[554] while arguing, *à la* Bruno Bauer, that the method itself provides a theorisation which resists Christian antisemitic themes within the framework of atheism.[555] Thirdly and finally, this reformulation of the myth of death of Judaism allows Žižek to bring

[552] S. Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology* (New York, Verso, 1999), 74.
[553] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 119.
[554] S. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London-New York: Verso 1989), 227–228.
[555] A strategy he applies more generally in S. Žižek, *Violence* (London: Profile Books, 2008), 112–114.

the familiar opposition between the real and the virtual-symbolic into the purview of an atheist Christology.

Thus, when Žižek writes that God 'must die twice', he means that

> [i]n Judaism, the God of the real survives as Word, as the virtual-dead Other whose specter is kept alive by the ritual performance of his subjects; in Christianity, this virtual Other itself dies. In Judaism, the God perceived directly as real dies; in Christianity, the God who is unconscious dies.[556]

Apart from the complication introduced by the reference to the Lacanian *bon mot* that God is not dead but unconscious,[557] the exposition is relatively straightforward. What must be kept in mind is that these two steps – the two deaths of God – are part of a broader triadic structure, which is (re)presented as 'Trinitarian' in form, and which culminates in the recognition of the community of believers 'and its later versions, from emancipatory political movements to psychoanalytic societies', as the Holy Spirit. In other words, the structure already anticipates, as Kojève put it, that 'the whole evolution of the Christian World is nothing but a progress toward the atheistic awareness of the essential finiteness of human existence'.[558] The purpose of this formulation of the two deaths of God is therefore not to argue in favour of atheism, which Žižek, however, confidently asserts by quoting Robert Solomon's classic study: 'there is no 'alien' God who reaches down to us; God is Spirit and Spirit is us, nothing more'.[559]

The issue is, rather, the following:

> What one should render problematic here is the fateful "nothing more": of course there is no Spirit as a substantial entity above and beyond individuals, but this does not make Hegel a nominalist – there is "something more" than the

[556] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 119.
[557] See J. Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. A. Sheridan (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 59.
[558] Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 59.
[559] R. C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 629.

> reality of individuals, and this "more" is the virtual Real which always supplements reality, "more than nothing, but less than something". In other words, if there is "nothing more" than us (human individuals) in Spirit, how are we to account for the central tenet of Christianity, the event of Christ's incarnation? Why do humans not directly recognise themselves – their Spirit – in the figure of an alien substantial God? Why do they not directly "kill God"...?[560]

The problem, as Žižek is aware, is the Christological mediation of God as *Word*, as well as the fact that Hegel unambiguously identifies Jesus as the *differentia* of the Christian religion. Indeed, the Incarnation is the highest expression of the concept of religion as such, causing the greatest offence against human *Verstand.*[561] The challenge then becomes, as François Laruelle put it, to show how, '[i]f Christianity is the religion of the exit from religions, Christ [can be] the exit from Christianity itself'.[562] For Laruelle, the 'Jewish God is sacrificed for the undergoing of the Son'.[563] Here the emphasis is on the death of Judaism as a requirement for the coming of Christ. This is closer to Hegel's view of the coming of Christ as requiring the mediation of Jewish particularity, though, as I have argued (and will do so in greater detail in the following, fourth chapter), this mediation refers not to the death of the Judaic God but to the (re)presentation, from outside of the historical world of the Roman religion, of the Judaic *Sichdenken* of humanity as fallen. Similarly, for Hegel, Judaism stands for a particularity on the periphery of the Roman world, and not, as for Laruelle (who is following Freud), for the 'universal' God the Father.

In Žižek, we encounter two, seemingly opposed movements. On the one hand, it is not possible to 'directly kill God' (as Father), because one cannot directly kill the 'virtual Real' or fictional

[560] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 97.
[561] Cf. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel*, 628.
[562] F. Laruelle, *Christo-Fiction: The Ruins of Athens and Jerusalem*, trans. R. Mackay (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), ix.
[563] For Laruelle's account of this same issue, see *Christo-Fiction*, 217–228. Freud had the same view, which survives in Lacan; *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 59.

supplement of substantial reality. The 'death of Judaism' is therefore a failed death of God because it is precisely such an attempt to kill the alien God 'directly'. Its failure is symbolised by the coming of Christ as (symbolic) *Word*. On the other hand, the death of Christ is itself required as a 'repetition' of this failed death. The 'paradox', Žižek notes, is that 'in order for the virtual Substance to die, the price had to be paid in the real of flesh and blood [of Christ]'.[564] Even more fancifully put, though God is a fiction, this fiction structures reality to the extent that its destruction demands a partial destruction of the real. When thusly construed, the death of the Judaic God is abstract, it stands merely for the contradiction of human finitude expressed in the existence of religious consciousness alongside the lack of any transcendent divine Subject. Žižek's view ultimately reads like a topsy-turvy version of the account of Hegel's mediation of the coming and death of Christ outlined at the beginning of this chapter:

> Since the big Other as a virtual order, a symbolic fiction, is effective in its very inexistence – it does not exist, but it nevertheless works – it is thus not enough to destroy the fiction from the outside, to reduce it to reality, to demonstrate how it emerged from reality (*pace* "vulgar" atheists like Richard Dawkins). The fiction has to be destroyed from within, that is, its inherent falsity has to be brought out.

This bringing out of the inherent falsity of the fiction which structures reality is indeed required in Hegel's account of the mediation of the coming of Christ as he develops it in the *Philosophy of History.*

But there are two crucial differences. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, Hegel is operating with a pre-Lacanian understanding of the symbolic order (and pre-Saussurean understanding of language more generally). This at least makes it seem as if, for Hegel, what is required is the bringing out of the inherent falsity not of the fiction which structures reality, but immediately of that reality itself, i.e. of the reality of the 'Roman world'. But this 'reality' is itself a

[564] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 104.

manifestation of an abstract and irrational religious consciousness of *Verstand*, a consciousness of the infinite subjectivity of the Emperor.[565] Žižek's transposition of this historical-phenomenological critique of Roman religious consciousness into a structuralist-psychoanalytic critique of the structuring function of fiction in society as 'ideology', introduces an element of 'critique' which resists its own historical specificity. It is important to understand what this means. Instead of construing the 'subject' (the '*Moment der Innerlichkeit*') as a historically specific development of Roman religious consciousness,[566] Žižek, following Althusser[567] (rather than Hegel), construes the subject as a transhistorical category of underlying all human societies and their reproducibility through ideology. To quote Althusser:

> even if it only appears under this name (the subject) with the rise of bourgeois ideology, above all with the rise of legal ideology, the category of the subject (which may function under other names: e.g., as soul in Plato, as God, etc.) is the constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination (regional or class) and whatever its historical date – since ideology has no history[568].

As I argued in chapter one, this view is consistent with Žižek's (and Jameson's) naturalisation of *Verstand* as a 'permanent, trans-historical fixture of our everyday reality' against which reason or *Vernunft* is always reacting.[569] Hence *Verstand* too, in its 'ideological' function as bourgeois 'common sense', and, indeed, in its no less ideological function in the Roman world as the principle of *Privatrecht*,[570] is naturalised simply to 'man [as] an ideological animal by nature'[571]. And so is Paul's 'admirable' statement that it is 'in the 'Logos', meaning in ideology, that we 'live, move and have our being'.[572]

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[565] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–388.
[566] And, indeed, as constituting the transition from Greek to Roman religion; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387.
[567] For an account of Althusser's influence on Žižek, see Kotsko, *Žižek and Theology*, 21–28.
[568] L. Althusser, 'Ideology and the State', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. B. Brewster (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 170–171.
[569] Žižek, *Less Than Nothing*, 269; Jameson, *The Hegel Variations*, 116.
[570] Hegel, V*orlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–388.
[571] Althusser, 'Ideology and the State', 171.
[572] Althusser, 'Ideology and the State', 171.

For Hegel, this is plainly not the case. The *Philosophy of History* unambiguously stresses the historical specificity of both the form as well as the content of ideological meaning construction and reification.[573] But the point isn't to 'catch' Žižek on a disagreement with Hegel he would readily recognise. The point is to show how this 'ahistoricist' element in the critique of ideology alters the account of Judaism and its fate in relation to the emergence of Christianity. This brings us to the second difference between Žižek and Hegel's way of bringing out the inherent falsity of (ideological) reality. For Žižek, God 'survives' his first death as *Logos.* The theorisation of this 'survival' is plainly influenced by the Althusser's structuralist Marxist theorisation of 'ideological reproduction'; God survives as *Logos,* which is to say as ideology. From this, it follows that atheism requires for this ideological fiction 'to be destroyed from within', to have its inherent falsity brought out through an '*immanent* critique of ideology'. But for Hegel, the inherent falsity of Roman religious consciousness (which, however, leads not to atheism, but to Christianity), can only be brought out from without, which is to say, through a 'silent, secret revolution in the Spirit of the age' which, furthermore, suggests the need for an unconscious 'repression' of Roman religious consciousness.[574] Hegel points out explicitly, that the 'immanent' contradiction of Roman world – what he also calls the misery (*Elend*) of the Roman world – between the infinity of the subject, reflected in one's *Privatrecht* to property, on the one hand, and the total despotic submission of all subjects to the *monas monandum* of the Emperor, on the other, cannot be reflectively understood as contradictory from within the immediacy of its own historical moment.[575] It can only be understood as a submission to a blind fate (*ein blindes Schicksal*), and hence, as an external imposition.[576]

[573] For Marx, ideology explicitly has a history; see Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology', in *On Religion*, 76.
[574] Hegel, *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 203.
[575] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–388.
[576] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.

In fact, Hegel affirms that the realisation of Roman subjectivity is historically adequate to its own principle (*Verstand*).[577] And yet, it is, at the same time, in contradiction. How is this possible? In purely abstract and formal terms, the Roman religious consciousness of *Verstand* is not contradictory. In the following, fourth chapter, I argue that this is a feature of 'natural consciousness', which is to say, of a form of consciousness which presupposes the possibility of individual self-subsistence and freedom apart from the divine *Zweck* of history as ordered towards the unification of humanity and divinity (and the concept of freedom as *Geist* which that plan entails). In this abstract and formal sense, in which human subjectivity is presented as impossibly both infinite and separate from the divine, the misery of the Roman world is indeed an external imposition. But Hegel adds that this Roman consciousness can only really be understood as contradictory from the 'higher condition' (*die höhere Bestimmung*) of the consciousness of the Jewish people who *feel* that pain and contradiction.[578] The pain of Judaic *Sichdenken* is consciousness of sin and the longing for salvation which this consciousness demands. However, as Raymond Plant has emphasised, this is only possible through the affirmation of Jewish particularity.[579] The contradiction of the Roman world can then only be expressed in terms of the broader contradiction between a (Jewish) particularistic consciousness of contradiction and a (pagan) universalistic *lack* of consciousness of contradiction. This is a contradiction which, indeed, comes historically from without; from a historical 'outside'. The abstract and 'atomistic' universality of the Roman world means that a Jewish particularity can 'revolutionise' it from without, or can revolutionise it 'silently and

[577] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387.
[578] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.
[579] Plant, *Hegel*, 56–62.

secretly', in preparation or as 'training'[580] for the 'great' revolution of the coming of Christ and the 'revealed religion'.

There is no recognition of this special *Schicksal* of the Jewish people in Žižek, nor of the world-historical significance attributed to them by Hegel for their consciousness of sin.[581] Instead, the reformulation of the myth of the death of Judaism as the 'first' death of (the Jewish) God means it is Judaism, rather than the Roman religion of *Verstand* that is regarded as abstract, because it designates a pre-ideological and 'direct' (and therefore also pre-Christian) belief in God as 'merely real'. Christianity,[582] on the other hand, confronts 'the terror of the Big Other's non-existence', which is how Žižek, following Chesterton, reads Jesus' saying 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Matt. 27.46).[583] The irony, as ever, is that Jesus' saying is a quotation of David's Psalms, Hegel's explicit paradigm for the Judaic consciousness of sin.[584] Hence rather than (re)presenting, as Žižek forcefully argues,[585] a bringing forth of the falsity of the ideological fiction from within, Christ's 'self-abandonment' on the Cross is mediated from the historical outside of the Hebrew Bible. And it is precisely this emphasis on the Jewish occupation of a historical 'outside' that grounds, for Hegel, the preservation of their particularity. Indeed, as I argued above, the preservation of such a particularity becomes, for Hegel's project in the *Philosophy of Right*, the basic 'test' for the objectivity and rationality of a universal State (against which the Roman world expresses the highest antithesis).

[580] I develop Hegel's concept of *Zucht* in the following, fourth chapter.
[581] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.
[582] Though this is qualified as 'consistent Christianity', which is to say Christian atheism and its anticipations; *Less than Nothing*, 105.
[583] Hence, 'the formula of true atheism is that *God himself must be made to proclaim his own inexistence*, must stop believing in himself'; *Less than Nothing*, 104. Original emphasis.
[584] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388–389
[585] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 104

The difference between Hegel and Žižek is then this. What Hegel reads as the mediation of the Christ-Event in general, and the death of God, in particular, from a Jewish particularity that is historically 'outside', and thus internally preserved in the formulation of a new, concrete universality, Žižek reads as the supersession of the Jewish by the Christian. In other words, rather than construe Jesus' saying at Matthew 27.46 as meaningful to his world only through the 'dislocated' consciousness of the Psalms, Žižek reads Matthew as negatively 'repeating' the dead letter of the Psalms. The problem, as I see it, is that whilst correctly recognising the difficulty of thinking the emergence of Christianity against the seemingly unsurpassable horizon of 'pagan religion', Žižek does not recognise it as a specifically historical unsurpassability. As a result, his account of the involvement of Judaism in this process of emergence does not recognise Hegel's preservation of Jewish particularity as being brought in from a historical outside, but instead encourages a negative moment of supersession. This Jewish 'particularity' as historical 'dislocation' is, moreover, not only key for thinking Hegelian mediation without supersession, but also the condition for the possibility of the genuine understanding of history in Hegel. In order to explicate this paradox, I must develop Hegel's account of Jewish religion's 'purified consciousness' of sin as uniquely opposed to 'natural consciousness' in all of what I call the 'history of the Fall' prior to the Christ-Event. It is to this task that I now turn.

CHAPTER 4

Natural vs Purified Consciousness *or* A History of the Fall

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the role of the Fall in Hegel's philosophy of history,[586] or more precisely in his theological anthropology of persons as irreducibly historical. Much of the chapter will be connected to the complex and largely untheorised claim in the *Philosophy of Right* that '[m]ind and its world are both lost and plunged in the infinite grief of that fate for which a people, the Jewish people, was held in readiness [*bereitgehalten war*]'.[587] That is how T.M. Knox rendered it in his 1952 translation (which has put many subsequent efforts in the English language to shame). It is well known that the philosophical question of history is for Hegel a religious one.[588] But what is less known is the special role of the Jewish people and their binding to a fate leading up to the very death of God, that unthinkable scandal around which all history turns, in the analysis of both history as philosophically graspable and philosophy as historically thinkable (both of which are forms of *Nachdenken*). In all fairness, it is technically the Trinity which is said by Hegel to be the axis around which world history revolves,[589] but this only qualifies the task as requiring an exposition of the Jewish *Schicksal* leading up to the Incarnation and eventually the very death of Christ as Trinitarian in structure, that is, as disclosing the trinitarian periodisation of salvation history. In this way, Judaism is particularly associated with one side of the death of Christ, which Hegel calls the 'centre of

[586] Both in the lectures on that topic as well as those on the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of right. I justify my reference to these other texts below.
[587] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 222; Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 511.
[588] Hegel discusses the methodological issue which this raises for history as a science; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 25.
[589] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386.

reconciliation' (*Mittelpunkt der Versöhnung*),[590] while the Christian Church becomes especially associated with the liturgical development of the mediation of the human and the divine after the death of Christ which Hegel associates with freedom.[591]

Hence for Hegel, history (and, *a fortiori*, the history of religions) presents itself as *two* histories; as the 'history of the Fall' and the 'history of Truth'. The main strategy behind Alexandre Kojève's (in)famous attempt to 'de-Christianise' Hegel (in his still influential *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*) was precisely to retell the latter history as really the history of the Christian slave and to accordingly 'de-Christianise' freedom itself. In the process, however, this also 'de-*historicised*' freedom, requiring the formulation of the end of history thesis in order to develop ideas about the constitution of the concrete individual to which Hegel himself gave a Christological grounding.[592] Hegel does not, in any case, offer a linear parallel between a history of sin and a history of salvation, such that the narrative upshot of the whole sequence is seen in a series of transformations from slavery to freedom; from paganism to Christianity; from sin to salvation, with each transformation expressing a teleological advance over the other 'competing' side. Instead, Hegel presents history as punctuated by the Christ-Event, with both

[590] G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984), 249.

[591] As Hans Urs von Balthasar pointed out, this idea that the interpretation of the highest revelation of God by the Holy Spirit required the periodisation of history and a certain 'maturation of mankind', is ancient, originating with Gregory Nazianzen rather than merely Joachim of Fiore. Cyril O'Regan argues that it is Joachim that provides 'the basic frame for Hegelian eschatological discourse'; *The Heterodox Hegel*, 265–271. O'Regan does not, however, mention Balthasar's qualification of the notion of the trinitarian periodisation of salvation history as pre-Joachite, whose purpose in the section on Spirit-Christology in volume 3 of the *Theo-Logic* is precisely to preclude the premature dismissal of Hegelian Spirit-Christology; H. U. Von Balthasar, *Theo-Logic*, vol. 3, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2005), 35.

[592] A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 55–56; 'the Christian Slave can affirm his equality with the Master only by accepting the existence of an "other world" and a transcendent God. Now, this God is necessarily a Master, and an absolute Master. Thus the Christian frees himself from the human Master only to be enslaved to the divine Master. He does free himself – at least in his idea – from the human Master. But although he no longer has a Master, he does not cease to be a Slave. He is a Slave without a Master, he is a Slave in himself; he is the pure essence of Slavery. And this "absolute" Slavery engenders an equally absolute Master. It is before God that he is the-equal-of the Master'. Hence he is the Master's equal only in absolute slavery. Therefore he remains a Servant, the servant of a Master for whose glory and pleasure he works. And this new Master is such that the new Christian Slave is even more a Slave than the pagan Slave'.

sides of the punctuation – what I have referred to as the history of the Fall and the history of Truth – moving toward and returning to, this Christ-Event which mediates both, as I put it in the following and final chapter, 'omnidirectionally'. As Hegel puts it in the *Philosophy of History*, 'history goes *to* it and *from* it'.[593]

In this chapter, I explicate the special fate of the Jewish people as a *particular* historical formation for the mediation of the universal historical development of human beings. In other words, I develop, in other words, one of Hegel's key accounts in history of the role of the 'particular' in mediating the 'universal'. Secondly, I develop what Hegel means by 'fallenness' in history, arguing that while human *Geist* is irreducibly historical, the *Zweck* or *telos* of its history has been separated from its willing of it, and therefore secondly, that history is not simply the attempt for *Geist* to become what it ought to be, but to determine, in the first place, what it ought to be; what the *Zweck* of its historical becoming is. Following on from the previous chapters, I treat this process as involving an inverted development of consciousness which, however, I now argue can be understood in greater detail in terms of the distinction between 'natural' and 'purified' consciousness. Natural consciousness, which is historically first, is constitutive of what Hegel calls *Naturreligion*. It is historically first because history simply is the development of human consciousness after the Fall. Fallenness is accordingly defined in terms of the separation of the *Zweck* of history from the *Begriff* of *Geist*, such that the *Aufhebung* of consciousness towards self-consciousness (as *Geist*) is not willed and the goal of human freedom, defined as an eschatological unification of humanity, cannot be achieved.

[593] The original reads: 'Bis *hierher* und von *daher* geht die Geschichte'; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386.

Hegel points out that this natural consciousness does not recognise that the eschatological goal of human history is freedom through historical unification, but merely 'freedom of the one' or the freedom of the master to enslave the slave. I argue that this 'freedom of the one' is reconfigured as the *Zweck* of history for natural consciousness. As a result, the historical development of these spiritual and historical formations is defined not by *Schicksal* or fate but by *Zucht.* Natural consciousness in this sense represents the continuation of human striving for the divine without consciousness of sin. It carries on as if there has occurred no catastrophe in the history of humankind. Jewish spirituality is the first 'elevation' above this *Naturreligion.* Its elevation is defined by its being a consciousness purified (*gereinigt*) of the primacy of the sensuous element (which predominates *Naturreligion*) through the positing of the Law (but also, more generally, of monotheism). To this extent, Hegel recognises the truth of Paul's statement that while sin was in the world before the Law, it was not recognised or reckoned with before the Law (Rom. 5.13).[594] However, Hegel presents subsequent developments in the history of religions – the developments of Greek and Roman religion – as 'relapses' into natural consciousness. Hence while the world-historical significance of the Jewish self-conception of fallenness plays a role in the final overcoming of this relapse into natural consciousness, the ultimate promise of reconciliation, made to Abraham before the Law (Gal. 3.16), is upheld.

1 Freedom and the *Zweck* of History

For Hegel, the goal (*Zweck*) of history is human freedom. Freedom is furthermore defined in terms of self-consciousness. Historically, however, self-consciousness emerges only with self-consciousness of sin in the Jewish religion. Freedom cannot therefore be recognised as this goal

[594] Luther translates Rom. 5.13 as 'Denn die Sünde war wohl in der Welt, ehe das Gesetz kam; aber wo kein Gesetz ist, da wird Sünde nicht angerechnet'. The key term here is '*angerechnet'*, suggesting that, before the Law, sin could be neither expected, imputed, nor reckoned with.

of history by human beings without their coming to consciousness of their – our – lack of freedom. This lack of freedom, which is not, however, simply unfreedom or slavery, is for Hegel what theologians might sometimes call 'fallenness'. Hegel's language to describe this state will have to be elaborated upon in order to become intelligible for a sophisticated modern theology of the Fall and sin – it is, it should be said, not 'fallenness' or *Fehlbarkeit*, even thought is is perhaps the closest one really gets in German. This is partly because Hegel, with some plausibility, thinks that the over-elaboration and specialisation of religious language renders it useless for its vocation as a universal communal language – it renders it 'philosophical', knowing 'instead of beauty only correctness' – as Herder might have put it.[595] And in any case, religion, like philosophy, is ultimately not concerned with correctness (*Richtigkeit*) (which is always a mathematical or linguistic *ratio*), but with truth (*Wahrheit*).

Why is human freedom the 'goal' of history? Because: *Geist* is freedom. 'Wie die Substanz der Materie die Schwere ist, so, müssen wir sagen, ist die Substanz, das Wesen des Geistes die Freiheit.' *Geist* is not the freedom of human beings, but rather all that *Geist* is essentially it is so as free. If this sounds abstract and simplistic and ultimately like a dead end, that's because it is. And Hegel agrees, of course. We can't simply assert the nature of *Geist* (*der Natur des Geistes*) at the beginning of a work on history, having claimed that *Geist* is irreducibly historical.[596] The proposition that 'Geist is freedom' is a *result* of speculative philosophy, not a presupposition of it[597]–which is why Hegel ultimately says that the introduction to the *Philosophy of History* is not the occasion to present the unfolding of the idea of *Geist* speculatively.[598] It seems we immediately run into a problem: there can be no history, no

[595] J. G. Herder, *Selected Early Works 1764-1767: Addresses, Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 106.
[596] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 29.
[597] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30.
[598] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 28–29.

'unfolding of *Geist* in time',[599] without some self-consciousness of history as presenting *Geist* with the realisability of its own freedom. And this is why Hegel isn't just trolling us when he compares *Geist* and matter (*Materie*). He is quite serious when describing the dialectical relationship between the essence or 'substance' of *Geist* as freedom and the substance of *Materie* as 'gravity'. Of course, Hegel does not use the word *gravitation* but *Schwere*, meaning 'heaviness' (from *gravitas*),including in it the natural scientific sense, and he links it to 'difficulty' and toil, and hence to the physical and natural world as the realm of labour. *Geist* cannot straightforwardly 'realise' its freedom because it has been weighed down in the material world. (Note also Hegel's definition of 'World' apropos of 'World History' as involving both 'physical' and 'psychical' nature.[600]) And the labour or work (*Arbeit*) with which human beings have been weighed down is the result of the *Entzweiung*; the 'bifurcation' of the Fall described in Genesis 3.[601]

Labour is, however, also its overcoming (*Überwindung*). To repeat a previous theme, it is part of the preliminary negotiation with the natural world involved in the historical development of Christian mediation. But what is the *Grundprinzip* – the fundamental principle – of this mediation? Hegel gives us the outline of this early in the *Philosophy of History.* He clearly does so because he intends it as a guiding principle for the logical reading of history. In developing his account of historical mediation Hegel brings up the opposition of matter and spirit. At first, this seems like a *non sequitur*. His intention, however, is not to elaborate on the antithesis between matter and spirit, but rather to develop an account of history as the synthesis of nature and human labour; history as the spiritual temporalisation of the natural realm. On its own,

[599] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 96–97.
[600] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 29.
[601] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 89.

matter possesses 'gravity' because it possesses a tendency toward a central point. It strives (*treibt*) towards this *Mittelpunkt* (or propels itself toward it). It is essentially composite (*zusammengesetzt*); constituted by parts which exclude each other. As a result, it strives for unity, but this striving is invariably self-destructive. '*Wenn sie dieses erreichte, so wäre sie keine Materie mehr, sondern sie wäre untergegangen; sie strebt nach Idealität, denn in der Einheit ist sie ideell*'.[602] Spirit (*Geist*) on the contrary isn't a striving-outward toward a central point but instead has this central point in itself. It does not seek a unity outside of itself '*sondern er hat sie gefunden*'.[603] This does not mean that *Geist* has found what it is looking for. It means that freedom (defined in terms of self-consciousness as *Bei-sich-selbst-Sein* and therefore of the infinite return to self) is a possibility for *Geist* (the ideality of the unity for which matter strives means precisely that freedom is not a possibility for it). Hegel then tells us:

> Nach dieser abstrakten Bestimmung kann von der Weltgeschichte gesagt werden, daß sie die Darstellung des Geistes sei, wie er sich das Wissen dessen, was er an sich ist, erarbeitet; und wie der Keim die ganze Natur des Baumes, den Geschmack, die Form der Früchte in sich trägt, so enthalten auch schon die ersten Spuren des Geistes virtualiter die ganze Geschichte.[604]

Universal history is then the working out of the knowledge of what *Geist* is potentially. It is not, in other words, the working out of what it (actually) ought to be, if it isn't, that is, given what it (potentially) can be. The potentiality is not given, or it rather requires what Hegel calls spiritual expansion.

Ernst Bloch was correct to draw the distinction between Aristotle's *kata to dynaton* or *Nach-Möglichkeit-Sein* and *dynamei on* or *In-Möglichkeit-Sein* (which he also attributes in a more dialectical form to Hegel), for the purposes of distinguishing between what is possible and what

[602] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30.
[603] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30.
[604] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31.

may *become* possible.[605] Bloch gives the first mode (*Nach-Möglichkeit-Sein*) the idealist character of a *Schranke*, or of a limitation produced in part by the self-mediation of *Geist*, since what is currently possible is a necessary reflection of what is considered possible.[606] And what is historically considered possible for the development of the human *Geist* – before the emergence of Jewish religious self-consciousness – is limited to what Hegel calls the 'freedom of the one' (more on this below). The claim above, namely that the first traces of *Geist* – the 'germ of the tree' – contain virtually the whole of its history (i.e. as historically unified) is usually taken to mean that Hegel (who is of course often wrongly expounded as a possibilist[607]) gives us all the teleological potentialities in the concept alone. And these potentialities can then simply be realised, perhaps both intellectually and historically, by applying to them the dialectical method. This idea leaves no room for what the young (and still Catholic) Louis Althusser called Hegel's *méconnaissance du concept* or 'miscognition of the concept':

> The profound necessity of the content, a necessity that emerges before our very eyes in Hegel's text and is transformed into freedom there, this eternal kingdom in which man is God for man, this real church inhabited by God-become-man, this God Himself, at once Father and Son of man, this fully realized *plenitudo temporum*, this Advent whose prophet is Hegel – all this is presented so compellingly and with such rigour that the possibility of its falling apart would be unthinkable, if history did not offer us the spectacle of its disintegration.[608]

From another standpoint, Althusser affirms, 'mind does not easily grasp this Parousia [presence]'.[609]

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[605] Bloch, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, trans. L Goldman and P. Thompson (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019), 64.
[606] Loren Goldman and Peter Thompson have finally published an English-language translation of this important text and they have, I think totally correctly, rendered the distinction above as 'what-is-considered-possible' and 'what-may-become-possible'; see *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, 37.
[607] See, R. Zambrana, *Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), for a recent discussion of actuality and possibility in Hegel.
[608] I have quoted here the English translation; *The Spectre of Hegel*, 99. For the original French see *Écrits philosophiques et politiques 1* (Paris: Stock/Imec, 1994), 143.
[609] Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel*, 99.

Indeed, history, as the spectacle of the disintegration of the content of *Geist*, which is to say, of the unification of humanity through the self-mediation of the divine, refers to the enduring historical experience of human beings in a state of sin. Althusser does not quite thematise this, but he nonetheless emphasises the significance of the Fall in Hegel, noting that 'notion of the content-as-given' (i.e. as naturally *Darstellt*) is naïve and that the story of Adam and Eve reveals that the apple is *handgreiflich*; it is to hand. For Eve,

> the act by which she acquired knowledge of the apple, and, with it, of everything that had been given until then. This revelation brought the end of innocence, the end of the happy meaningfulness of things, and the discovery of the true essence of the immediacy of life: once it had become an object of cognition, the given revealed itself to be divided from itself and different from itself.[610]

The limitation of Althusser's reading of the Fall in Hegel is that he does not consistently develop (as his own writing demands) the end of innocence in terms of a historical process of disintegration. In this sense his elaboration or reconfiguration – the *Nachdenken* – of the (re)presentational form of the *Genesis* story is inadequate. It is too imagistic, too literal, and as a result it is insufficiently historical. Where Althusser is to be commended, however, is in his subtle and correct observation that the Fall is not the simple end of the immediacy of life, but the disruption of this immediacy through the revelation of its immanent division. This is in my view, both profound and hermeneutically prudent in so far as it precludes the possibility of reading the Fall in terms of the religiously problematic supersession of feeling and the immediacy of life by cognition and a life always mediated by thought and reflection.

2 The Fall and the Immediacy of Life

For Hegel, the story of the Fall tells us that the immediate is *as such* 'divided from itself' because it is 'overgrasped' by thought; it is a mediated immediacy. The Fall however does not

[610] Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel*, 65.

represent the event of this overgrasping or overreaching. On the contrary, it represents it as part of the essence of *Geist*.[611] The Fall is not in other words a fall into mediation; it is a coming to consciousness of this mediation. However, because Althusser links the Fall to the disintegration of the content *Geist* abstractly and not in terms of the concrete drama of human history (as he himself suggests we ought to do), he does not give any substance to the thinkability of its disintegration which he rightly proclaims conceptually unthinkable. For it is not simply the compelling rigour of Hegel's method which makes this disintegration of the content of *Geist* unthinkable; it is also the fact that the necessity of the Incarnation, even when generalised in terms of the necessity of mediating the infinite and the finite is deeply embedded in the method itself. But because Althusser does not represent this disintegration in concrete historical terms, he suggests the need for two contradictory or incompatible necessities: the necessary cognition of the concept and the necessary 'miscognition' of the concept as revealing the internally divided 'nature' of the immediacy of life. Of course, as Hegel recognises, this is the deadlock toward which the mystery of the Fall points us. Humanity is both fundamentally and necessarily good and fundamentally and necessarily evil.[612] Much of Christian tradition, and I would argue that Hegel should be included here, has addressed this deadlock by invoking the mystery of human freedom. This does not 'resolve' the mystery. If anything, it makes the human will appear much more mysterious than we originally thought it could be, and that is ultimately the point. The point is that while free, the human will is entangled in historical forces which go against it and it is implicated in its own choices which go against it. Hence, in order to hold on to both the necessity of the cognition of the concept and the inevitable (if unthinkable) miscognition or disintegration of that content. We cannot simply take it for granted that the internal division of the immediacy of life is unspiritual.

[611] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 89.
[612] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 78.

As I argued in the previous chapter, there is a tendency to conflate three uses of 'human nature', namely to conflate (i) 'human nature' or what is essential (*wesentlich*) to humanity; (ii) 'natural humanity' or humanity-in-relation-to-nature; and (iii) 'fallen humanity' or human freedom. Hegel, following the then commonplace Rousseauian practice, is interested in whether (ii) 'natural humanity' or humanity in the state of nature is good or evil. It is often overlooked that when highlighting the evil of natural humanity in this context, Hegel wishes to balance out the Rousseauian position of human 'natural' goodness, not with a Hobbesian view of 'natural' evil (which would be its direct, undialectical opposite), but the Christian view of original sin.[613] The point here is the fairly predictable Hegelian one that our relationship to nature and to the immediacy of our lives is always already mediated by the spiritual and that this is itself why the immediacy of life is internally divided. The character of this division is accordingly determined by the mediational structure of the spirit-nature relation. As soon as we turn to Hegel's philosophy of history, we find that this is exactly what it is concerned with – which is to say; the determinate form of the spirit-nature relation in human history and so the *particular* character of the *Entzweiung* of *Geist* or the internal division of the immediacy of life, and that this particularity is nothing more than its contingent historicality. What Hegel calls the *Geschichte des Sündenfalls*, which means both simply the story of the Fall as well as the *history* of the Fall, is narrated in the *Philosophy of History* (and the *Philosophy of Religion*) in the sequence of the natural and spiritual-individual religions. His theory or account of human fallenness emerges from the internal tension of narrative as both story and history, a tension which reflects the relationship between *Vorstellung* and *Vernunft*. Hegel discusses the gap

[613] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 251–252.

between the sinful nature of human beings and the description of sin in the story of the Fall,[614] though the reasons why he emphasises this distinction have been completely misunderstood.

'Being historical', Gadamer argues, 'means never rising to complete self-knowledge'.[615] Hegel also connects historical experience to self-knowledge, but he emphasises self-knowledge as a historical result of the development of various religious self-conceptions which are chiefly identified with noetic limitation (self-knowledge and self-conception also supervene here on *Vernunft* and *Vorstellung*). I said earlier, Hegel sees religious diversities as indicative of human fallenness. This is because he sees fallenness as denoting the inability of human beings to become unified in history. This is behind his claims on 'universal world-history'. Universal history is *Geist's* attempt to literally figure out what it is potentially, and this is because this is a potentiality only for a historically unified humanity. The Christ-Event as a whole (and the Incarnation in particular) is the revelation in history of what can and indeed has become possible for humanity: the infinite mediation of the human and the divine as the ground of a unified humanity. 'Abstractly', of course, we are told from the onset that *Geist* is freedom (and this is abstractly affirmed by Althusser as well). What is not known in history (and for any ahistoricist account of Hegel) is that this freedom abounds to *Geist* only as a self-unity, and to human beings only as historically unified (of which, it may be said to be a kind of result).

Hence Hegel writes early in the *Philosophy of History* that the 'Oriental [pre-Judaic] World'[616] historically never attained the knowledge that '*Geist oder der Mensch als solcher an sich frei*

[614] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 257–258.
[615] H. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. J. Weinshamer and D. Marshall (New York, NY: Continuum, 2000), 302.
[616] Hegel means primarily the Chinese and Persian empires.

ist'. They only know that 'one is free',[617] but this itself is a positing of unfreedom, since 'the freedom of the one' and the one alone is 'nur Willkür, Wildheit, Dumpfheit der Leidenschaft oder auch eine Milde, Zahmheit derselben, die selbst nur ein Naturzufall oder eine Willkür ist'.[618] The free individual, outside of the freedom of the community is only a despot. Even Plato and Aristotle were unaware of this fact and as a result could not resist slavery.[619] 'Graeco-Roman historiography', Benedetto Croce points out, 'was without doubt humanistic, but it was a Graeco-Roman humanism'.[620] This focus on individual freedom made it an accidental, transient, and limited (*beschränkte*) growth or development.[621] Already we find here two articulations of an evil and self-destructive unfreedom in the name of freedom. Or rather we find that the 'freedom of the one', of the Despot is, a freedom founded on the positing of the human community by the atomised 'free' self as a composite. This is an 'anti-spiritual' self-conception of human freedom since it involves a striving outwardly toward the central point of the self, posited as external to the community (which, to put it another way, means also unmediated by the community). Hegel's characterisation is unambiguous; this 'freedom of the one' is evil and this is at least partly because it understands to the Good only as the powerful.[622] This is the abstract outline of an account of *Geist* as weighed down by a merely 'material' logic of dissipation resulting from a forgetting of labour as the communal mediation of spiritual and the natural. As a result, this logic of self-destruction, which is at the core of Hegel's understanding of evil, manifests itself in opposition to the dialectical development of labour as the simultaneous result of and victory over the disunion of human fallenness.

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[617] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31; 'sie wissen nur, daß *Einer* frei ist'. Original emphasis.
[618] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31.
[619] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31. One can equally make the Marxist point that the structural reality of slavery is itself constitutive of the reality of a fallen 'freedom of the one'.
[620] Croce, *History, its Theory and Practice*, 200.
[621] Note that this is the sort of limitation which ought to be overcome and not the sort (*Grenze*) which simply constitutes what something is and is not.
[622] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 15.

Hegel in other words believes that freedom may be posited even in this fallen and disordered state of human self-understanding. Human striving (*treiben*) under sin may yet be purposive (*zweckmäßig*) because the disintegration or miscognition of the concept does not simply erase the goal (*Zweck*) of history. Sin simply causes us to miss the mark. This is because with 'natural religion', the self-conception of human *Geist* as spiritually unfree in relation to nature, human striving separates the goal from the concept:

> Hier bei der Bestimmung der Subjektivität, der für sich seienden Macht, hier ist der Zweck unterschieden von dem Begriff, und die Bestimmtheit des Zwecks ist eben deswegen nur zufällig, weil die Verschiedenheit noch nicht zurückgenommen ist in den göttlichen Begriff, noch nicht demselben gleichgesetzt ist.[623]

In other words, it is the subjectivity of the one as self-sufficient – which is a merely formal approximation of freedom as self-determination – which separates the goal or purpose of history from the concept of *Geist*. In the *Science of Logic* Hegel refers to this phenomenon as a self-destructive delusion of self-subsistence:

> Die Selbständigkeit, auf die Spitze des fürsichseienden Eins getrieben, ist die abstrakte, formelle Selbständigkeit, die sich selbst zerstört, der höchste, hartnäckigste Irrtum, der sich für die höchste Wahrheit nimmt, – in konkreteren Formen als abstrakte Freiheit, als reines Ich, und dann weiter als das Böse erscheinend.[624]

This is no longer 'natural religion' as Hegel himself acknowledges in the 1827 manuscript of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, but the 'final, extreme position of the abstract understanding' which, however, begins with the self-understanding of natural religion.[625] (The religious outcome of this position is, of course, Enlightenment Deism.) Nevertheless, Hegel connects natural religion's subjectivity of self-sufficient power to the power of *Verstand* and extends to it the commonplace of his day of regarding 'natural religion' as a set

[623] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 15–16.
[624] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 192.
[625] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: One Volume Edition: The Lectures of 1827*, ed. P. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown et al (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 206–207.

of beliefs arrived at merely through the use of the 'natural light of reason', and as therefore opposed to revelation.

This internal division of the immediacy of life in the 'naturally religious' standpoint – the division between the *Zweck* and the *Begriff* is historically contingent. In 1827 (and possibly in response to ongoing complaints from Franz von Baader[626]), Hegel clarifies that, conceived in this way, this '*Reflexion und Absonderung*' of *Geist* and *Natur* '*sei ursprünglich nicht vorhanden und die Freiheit mit dem Gesetz und dem vernünftigen Willen so identisch gewesen wie das Pflanzen-Individuum mit seiner Natur identisch ist*'.[627] In other words, the dissociation of freedom from the Law and the rational (*vernünftigen*) will (whose speculative identity is affirmed in the *Begriff*) is not dialectically necessary for the development of the former. It makes perfect sense that Hegel added this in response to the claim in the 1827 lectures that while it has often been assumed, following Herder and others, that the true, most excellent, and actually divine religion (*die wahrhafte, vortrefflichste, eigentlich göttliche Religion*) would have to have been the immediate *Naturreligion* – the historically first religion – the Hegelian schematisation identifies it as the lowest and *therefore* as the historically first.[628] But what Hegel means by 'first' here is not well-understood. Typically, it is understood in broad

[626] Hegel had responded to von Baader in 1827 – the same year he gave the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* from which I have quoted above – in the preface to the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, claiming that there were no real disagreements between the two; see Hegel, Werke 8, 27–31. Hegel addresses the fifth volume of von Baader's *Fermenta cognitionis*, though the following sixth volume also included some objections. Given the nature of the complaint there, it is not implausible that Hegel may have had it in mind when clarifying his earlier views on the relationship between *Geist* and *Natur* in 1831; see F. Von Baader, *Fermenta cognitionis* 6 (Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichssche Buchhandlung, 1825), xix–xx.

[627] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 260-261. The gap between both what *Geist* is and ought to be (its *Begriff*) and therefore both what it must become and how it will become that (the *Zweck* of history) entails a division between *Geist* and *Natur* as the realm of its external differentiation. Von Baader would sometimes characterise this separation of freedom and the law (*Gesetz*) as a dislocation or displacement (*Versetzung*); von Baader, *Nachgelassene Werke*, Werke 2, 78.

[628] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Vorlesungen 4, 143.

philosophical terms as an attempt to invert the medieval scholastic principle of *omne agens agit simile sibi.* As Battista Mondin notes:

> in a Hegelian system, where being comes from non-being, is it possible to conceive evolution in such a way that the effect can be more perfect than its cause. With such a Hegelian concept of evolution the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is certainly incompatible.[629]

This is also what Bloch means when he identifies Hegel as the culmination of a tradition of metaphysical 'evolution'.[630] But the point of Hegel's 1831 clarification is precisely to deny the simply evolutionary origin of being from non-being (the *ursprünglichkeit* of the division between *Geist* and *Natur*) while simultaneously affirming its *historical* primacy for human freedom.

As I have already argued, Hegel sees this displacement of spiritual primacy as constitutive of historical temporality and it is on these grounds that he justifies the need for *Nachdenken.*[631] The historical displacement of spiritual primacy should be read as reflecting on the method of the philosophy of history itself and on what is as such constituted as historical. In other words, *Naturreligion* is analysed as the spiritually lowest and only consequently as the historically first religion because history is as such constituted as an inverted presentation or miscognition of the concept. The fact that this is the case is revealed for Hegel in the story of the Fall. Hence even though Hegel denies the originary status of the *Absonderung* of *Geist* and *Natur,* of freedom and the Law and Will, he affirms its historical primacy since historicality is constituted in terms of the self-narration of human experience under sin. Hegel therefore emphasises that there may have been century and even millennium-long periods of pre-historical time filled

[629] B. Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (New York, NY: Springer, 1963), 88–89
[630] For an account of Hegelian 'evolutionist' metaphysics as opposed to what Bloch calls right-wing Aristotelian 'emanationism', see Demjaha, 'Hegelianism and the Meta-Religion: Ernst Bloch's Archetype of the Fall', 95–119.
[631] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 41.

with revolutions, nomadic wanderings, and other wild changes to the human community, but such periods lacked objective history because they presented no subjective history.[632] And he confidently suggests that we have no reason to believe that ancient records may have been erased or accidentally destroyed over time – like the evidence for Atlantis or the Hyborean Age for Robert E. Howard – since historical experience, as the unity of events and their narration, was by definition not possible for pre-historical time. The *Reflexion* and *Absonderung* of *Geist* and *Natur* is thus not originary in the sense that it is not intrinsic to a pre-historical human state of nature. At the same time, as the Fall narrative discloses, human self-narration and reflection coincides with sin and with the sundering of freedom from the project of human unification in history.

Interlude: The Challenge of Franz Von Baader

I would like to dedicate a few pages here to explicating the relationship between Hegel and Franz von Baader because I believe that it can helpfully frame this chapter's argument on the possibility of the mediation of human history by a particular (Jewish) religious consciousness. The result of the sundering of freedom from the project of human unification is the outpouring of history in inverted terms, as I argued also in chapter two, with immediate *Naturreligion* paradoxically reflecting a spiritual standpoint of hyper-immersion in the other – in nature. It is possible to suggest here the influence of von Baader who had made the distinction between the temporal and supertemporal (*überzeitlich*) realms with the former defined as a 'half-reality' into which human beings fall as a result of sin.[633] Now von Baader complained that Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all denied the sovereignty of the Good in created life and therefore

[632] All the religious, cultural, and national groups covered in the *Philosophy of History* include subjective history.

[633] F. Von Baader, *Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit, Vorlesungen über Philosophie der Sozietät, Erläuterungen zu Stellen aus Thomas von Aquin, Glossen zu einer reihe von Schriften samt Programm über de Wechselseitigkeit der Alimentation*, Werke 16 (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1987), 43.

denied the supertemporal being (*überzeitliche Sein*) of human existence, though he conceded the superiority of Hegel's position over the others' because at least for Hegel the overcoming of temporality is linked to deification.[634] For von Baader, the supertemporal realm refers to a created pleromatic heaven from which human beings fall into earthly time where their orientation to God is ambiguous and undecided.[635] In this way, the sovereignty of the Good, including the goodness of the human image, is safeguarded in a supertemporal 'centre' away from the perversions of evil, which, as a privation (though not an absolute privation which erases the *imago* entirely) of the good, obtains in a lower, half-real, temporality. We can see how the Hegelian notion of *Entzweiung*, of the site of the decision of the Will vis-à-vis Nature (and therefore as the seat of evil),[636] together with its role in the immediate and abstract beginnings of creaturely life, parallels von Baader's earthly temporal realm as a dimension of temporary spiritual undecidability, n so far as this temporary spiritual undecidability points to the inclusion of the possibility of evil in the primary possibility of good in the realm of creaturely freedom (this is the meaning of *Entzweiung* as both doubling and division). We there find in von Baader also the idea – so crucial to Hegel's view – that the creation of human beings in the image of God and therefore as free entails infinite spiritual expansion towards the Good[637] (including the spiritual expansion of our religious understanding as the rendering concrete of religious self- understanding).

However, rather than theorise the teleology of salvation in terms of supertemporal ascension, Hegel theorises it in terms of the *Zweck* of history, of the fulfilment of freedom as the goal of

[634] F. Von Baader, *Gesammelte Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie 4*, Werke 10 (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1987), 47.
[635] Von Baader's position here is semi-Augustinian; he argues that earthly or cosmic time was created for the undecided angels who had not yet turned against God and may have become oriented towards him.
[636] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 277.
[637] So that infinite human becoming is intrinsic to creaturely freedom, regardless of its qualified necessity following the fall into evil.

the infinite spiritual expansion and unification of *Geist*. The supreme expression of this is the Incarnation and the Christ-Event more generally and this is, ultimately, a major point of disagreement between Hegel and von Baader. Aidan Nichols, in his account of the early von Balthasar presents vonBaader's position as a 'Christian response' to Hegel, emphasising von Baader's views on the defects of Hegel's related views on personhood and Christology.[638] Nichols notes von Baader's claim that

> while *Aufhebung*, the notion of simultaneous annulment and transfiguration, is the key-idea of his philosophy, nowhere does Hegel consider the highest move possible in its practice. And this is the free *Aufhebung* of the person towards and for God.[639]

Of course, Hegel does consider this operation of *Aufhebung* and he theorises it as the leap (*der Sprung*) to the supersensible (*Übersinnliche*), a leap, moreover, whose goal is spiritual elevation (*Erhebung*)[640]. The problem – if there is one – is that Hegel seems to understand this leap, this *Aufhebung*, to be constitutive of human freedom rather than merely an expression of it. This is understandable in so far as salvation involves for Hegel, and not unreasonably, a (re)construction of human freedom in history. And the leap itself is not subject to any kind of dialectical necessity (which would render it, as a 'leap', entirely purposeless) but, it is argued for by Hegel as a 'necessity' if we understand that reason goes all the way down and that human beings are therefore essentially thinkers. But von Baader was correct to emphasise in *Fermenta cognitionis* that if, as Boehme had taught, Creation (*Schöpfung*) as the particularisation of the principle of Nature requires the elevation of Nature to selfhood (*Selbstheit*), then this implies a striving, a *treiben*, toward the divine and therefore toward the Good.[641] If this is the case, von Baader argues, evil is not thinkable as a *Beweggrund* but strictly as a *Grund*.[642] It is not

[638] A. Nichols, *Scattering the Seed: A Guide Through Balthasar's Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts* (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 123.
[639] Nichols, *Scattering the Seed*, 123.
[640] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 131.
[641] Baader, *Fermenta cognitionis* 1, 22–23.
[642] It is not thinkable, we might add, as an alternative 'goal' to the *Zweck* of history.

thinkable, in other words, as the ground of the creature's will, as constitutive of it, but only as something posited as ground by creature who accepts it, as it were, from without.

Hence, von Baader maintains against Hegel that Nature cannot be regarded as the *Abfall* of the Idea – but he arrives at this conclusion from what he sees as a Boehmian premise he otherwise shares with Hegel. He points out, no doubt correctly, that if this internal striving of selfhood, which is the elevation of Nature, contained also an internal principle of self-subversion as a result of Nature's ideality, then human striving would be eternally unattainable[643]. von Baader calls it '*ein ewig unerfüllbares, tantalisches Streben, gleich jenem eines Künstlers sein würde, dessen Loos es wäre in nur widerspänstigem unversöhnbaren Stoff zu bilden*'.[644] He draws the comparison with the doomed artist because he knows it is anathema to Hegelian aesthetics, as is the implication of human striving caught up in the series of a bad infinite. Indeed, the chief concern of von Baader's (especially the early volumes of) in *Fermenta cognitionis* is not that Hegel does not conceive of the operation of *Aufhebung* in terms of the free striving towards the divine, but that the 'suspension' (*Suspension*) of the innate human striving toward the divine after the Fall can only be *aufgehoben* in time.[645] And this focus on the *temporal* sublation of human fallenness, von Baader thinks, undermines the sovereignty of the Good, whose intermingling with evil in the realm of temporal amorality or indifference itself becomes a high expression of the Good and, at a stretch, the Trinitarian economy itself. Finally, and somewhat interestingly for this discussion, von Baader compares the endless deferral of eschatological satisfaction to a treatment of the soul as the wandering Jew.[646]

[643] Baader, *Fermenta cognitionis 1*, 24.
[644] Baader, *Fermenta cognitionis 1*, 24
[645] Baader, Fermenta cognitionis 1, 24–25.
[646] This point is highlighted by Nichols; *Scattering the Seed,* 124.

This is already a somewhat different presentation of von Baader's objection to Hegel than the one Nichols articulates, though Nichols is chiefly interested in the young Balthasar's (often tendentious) development of von Baader's position and does not quote the latter directly. A few more central points of his exposition would be both illustrative and useful for arriving at the account of Hegel's views on the Fall and history that I wish to develop here. Nichols highlights four important arguments from von Baader *via* von Balthasar which have in various forms become commonplaces of anti-Hegelianism. They occur here, however, with greater clarity than in most other places. Firstly, Nichols contends that for the von Baader of the *Fermenta cognitionis*, the Hegelian concrete universal, the 'way of showing how the objective and general on the one hand, the subjective and the particular on the other, need not be contraries or even sundered', can only possibly refer to 'Christ-and-the-Church as a single mystical body given from above by the Incarnation'. Secondly, von Baader insists 'that philosophy never leaves behind its origin in wonder' because human *Geist* reasons on the basis of listening; *Vernunft* as *Vernehmen.* Thirdly, the eschatological circumincession of the human and divine is not an 'exchange' in which the creature comes to comprehend God, but a self-abandonment, '*Sich-lassen*, to God's mystery that it lives, and accordingly its most vital function is prayer'. And fourthly and finally, the continual testing of this orientation toward and love for God is necessary but it is not sin. 'Testing is not, against Hegel once again, the Fall.' It is of course difficult to disagree with these statements. But it is not difficult to find Hegel saying them as well. Indeed, Nichols conclusion at the end of the fourth point, that the 'delivering over of spirit to mere nature *is* Hell',[647] is so thoroughly Hegelian that it at least rhetorically throws off balance von Baader's enduring focus on the possibility of an autonomy of *Natur* in the Hegelian system. There is furthermore a downplaying of the pervasiveness of time in Nichols' (and Balthasar's) account as the main problem highlighted by von Baader apropos of German

[647] Nichols, *Scattering the Seed*, 124

idealisms.

I would like to quickly respond to the four objections I listed above before providing the broader Hegelian-historicist reply to von Baader's critique of time. In my view, the first and third criticisms do not work, but the second and fourth express real differences between Hegel and von Baader (and perhaps a broader post-Balthasarian Catholic consensus). I address these objections here because they can only be replied to by highlighting four themes central to this chapter; viz. (1) the role of the particular in the mediation of the universal in nature and history; (2) the opposition between the respective standpoints of wonder and pain in natural (Greek) consciousness and purified (Jewish) consciousness; (3) the link between 'purification' and prayer in the eschatological context; and (4) the relationship between difficulty and the postlapsarian tendency towards doubt in matters of faith as linked to the inverted development of consciousness in history.

1. *Natur* and *Aufhebung*

In 1868, Rosenkranz addressed the president of the philosophical society of St Louis regarding his difference from von Baader, which he generalised as the difference between von Baader and Hegel.

> I have endeavoured, in my logic, to combat the confusion which has arisen in the school of Hegel between the concept of opposition and that of contradiction. Every opposition, *oppositio*, may become a contradiction, *repugnantia*, but in itself it is not necessarily one.
> […]
> I have endeavoured, in the doctrine of contradiction as well as in the doctrine of the negative, to deduce and to explain all the possible forms of the negative as a moment of the evolution of the idea. In connection with this, I have, in certain points, in the concepts of usurpation, of degradation, of monstrosity, approximated to Herr von Baader; but as regards the method in which he derives such forms originally from a "Fall" which he supposes to lie away beyond the origin of the world – from a hypothetical spirit-world – have assumed a position

of decided opposition.[648]

Rosenkranz immediately closes in on the real issue, namely *the Fall* – for both Hegel and von Baader – and especially the latter's account of a 'twofold Nature' of humanity; of the material production of humanity after the Fall in time and the enduring, nonlapsarian nature of humanity in God, subsisting in 'super-time'.

Hence, crucial for the first Baaderian objection above, that the 'concrete universal' can only be a function of 'Christ-and-the-Church as a single mystical body given from above by the Incarnation' is personal deification as supertemporal ascension. Hegel's view, on the other hand, theorises deification through the liturgical development of 'Christian mediation' as the historical condition for the possibility of the thinkability of the divine, with the Mass as the main event of the (re)presentation of God's self-revelation.[649] He thinks this, however, because the Trinitarian economic history entails the mediation of nature as part of the mediation of the human and the divine (hence the emphasis on the Mass as the main event of this mediation rather than prayer). For von Baader there can be no such negotiation with nature – despite the initial appearance of his view as more nature-friendly – since by securing the preservation of an undescended *imago* in the supertemporal he has removed the need for *Geist* to overcome its relationship with the natural as a falling away from the divine[650]. By theorising *Natur* as the *Abfall* of the Idea, Hegel may implicate our whole relationship with nature into the process of salvation history, but he thereby also undermines nature's autonomy. He therefore provides at least a framework for an understanding of the goodness of Creation as including the goodness

[648] K. Rosenkranz,'The Difference of Baader from Hegel', trans. T. Davidson. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2.1 (1868), 55–56.
[649] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 453–455
[650] Hegel may be said to be here on the side of Proclus, and Baader on the side of Plotinus; see J. Trouillard, *La Mystagogoie de Proclos* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982). I would like to thank Khegan Delport for pointing this out to me.

of nature, a goodness he moreover identifies (to the puzzlement of most commentators) with *Verstand* as the principle of the subsistence of the finite as such.[651]

By arguing that the very principle of the self-destructive self-subsistence of humanity in its fallen state is the same as 'the goodness of God' – what ultimately preserves humanity in existence after the Fall, Hegel displays a profound insight into the sovereignty of the Good. von Baader by contrast, as Rosenkranz argues, has 'profound insights into the region of the diabolical' but must be rejected, 'when he comes to diabolize cold, heat, rage, hurricanes, volcanoes, poisons, savage beasts, etc.'.[652] Finally, von Baader ultimately acknowledges that Hegel introduces the key difference between not merely the good and bad infinites but also the good and bad *finites*, pointing out that the account of the finite person for which Hegel is sometimes criticised expounds the constitution of creaturely life as a composite of the body and soul which remain separable and therefore as the '*"schlechte" Endlichkeit*'.[653] Von Baader implies, though he never openly accepts, what I argued above apropos of Hegel: namely, that the human constitution of body and soul as the spiritually *aufgehoben* opposition of the material and immaterial is an inadequate anticipation of the Incarnation (as the Temple sacrifices are anticipations of the Eucharist) and that the Incarnation therefore makes possible the liturgical reconstitution of the body and soul.

2. Pain vs Wonder

The second Baaderian objection, that 'that philosophy never leaves behind its origin in wonder' because human *Geist* reasons on the basis of listening, is more interesting. On the one hand, as

[651] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 170.
[652] Rosenkranz, 'The Difference of Baader from Hegel', 56.
[653] Baader, *Fermenta cognitionis 1*, 20: 'Wenn darum Hegel (Encyklopädie §. 165.) sagt: dass die Endlichkeit des Lebendigen darin besteht, dass Seele und Leib trennbar sind, so kann hier nur die „schlechte" Endlichkeit gemeint sein, welche, weil ihr die Einheit nicht innewohnt, nur eine "Composition" von Seele und Leib bildet. Nur das Dividuelle ist auch miscibel, das Individuelle dagegen auch immiscibel.'

Michael Forster has argued[654], Hegel himself (following Herder) highlights the origins of *Vernunft* in *Vernehmen,* and furthermore emphasises the superiority of hearing over vision. He associates the latter with the Protestant hermeneutical (and to some extent Enlightenment) account of reason as a 'natural light'.[655] On the other, Hegel certainly disagrees with von Baader on the matter of wonder as the origin of philosophy. Once again, this reflects a fundamental disagreement on the nature of fallenness (and one could add, on whether one tends to emphasise Jewish over Greek religion as originating the true *Bedürfnis der Philosophie*). In the third *Encyclopaedia,* he addresses Aristotle's view that intuition (*Anschauung*) is the beginning of cognition and consequently that wonder is the origin of or originary response to, knowledge. Hegel, however, disagrees somewhat, linking wonder to the prerational limitations of intuiting and furthermore to human fallenness and the obfuscation of human self-conception and religious understanding.

> Denn da die subjektive Vernunft als Anschauung die Gewißheit, aber auch nur die *unbestimmte* Gewißheit hat, in dem zunächst mit der Form der Unvernunft behafteten Objekte sich selber wiederzufinden, so flößt ihr die Sache Verwunderung und Ehrfurcht ein. Das *philosophische* Denken aber muß sich über den Standpunkt der Verwunderung erheben.[656]

The leaving behind of the standpoint of wonder is then part of *Nachdenken*; it is part of the elevation to philosophical thought as the overcoming of the burden of the form of unreason.

[654] M. N. Forster, *German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.
[655] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II* ,Werke 17, 351. According to Hodgson, Hegel is suggesting the influence of the ancient theory of natural light, as popularised by Descartes and expounded by Herbert of Cherbury, Leibniz, and Wolff on Protestant hermeneutics; 'for this hermeneutics had to relinquish a foundation based on tradition and teaching office'; see P. Hodgson, (ed,), *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011), 40 (editorial note 5). Hegel argues that the theory of reason as a natural light undermines the understanding of theology accomplished in the Middle ages as a scientific knowledge of Christian truths (*wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis der christlichen Wahrheiten*) and as therefore essentially connected to philosophical knowledge.
[656] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III,* Werke 10, 255.

This does not mean that Hegel qualifies intuition as inescapably problematic. He merely suggests that genuine intuition, which is a part of complete cognition, is only achieved by those who rise to the level of philosophical thought.[657] And this does not mean that wonder is completely neglected by Hegel. In his *Aesthetics,* Hegel clarifies that

> die Kunstanschauung überhaupt wie die religiöse – oder beide vielmehr in einem – und selbst die wissenschaftliche Forschung von der Verwunderung angefangen habe. Der Mensch, den noch nichts wundert, lebt noch in der Stumpfheit und Dumpfheit hin.[658]

So why should we seek to overcome, and in that sense *contra* von Baader, leave behind, the standpoint of wonder? To begin with, Hegel seems to agree with Aquinas that wonder is really a kind of fear of an 'enormously disagreeable object' and that it is to mental labour what laziness is to outward manual labour: essentially stupefying.[659] Ultimately, Aquinas draws a distinction between *admiratio* as a source of philosophy and stupor as an obstacle for it, but it is clear that he sees these two sides of wonder as typically occurring together. As John Llewelyn points out, this doubled determination of *Verwunderung* delights Hegel because it is similar, if not quite identical, to his favourite speculative contronyms (such as *Aufhebung*).[660] However, for Hegel, wonder is generated not by the enormity of the wonderer's object (though the object is indeed enormous) but by the crushing and compression of the object under the form of unreason. The object is 'burdened', it is weighed down, by the form of unreason. Hegel understands this in postlapsarian terms, since the burden of the form of unreason is at the same time a burden of labour, as the necessity of postlapsarian human *Bildung*, as well as the result of the forgetting and compression of *Vernunft* as the *Vernehmen* of the divine to the 'lowest' form of immediate intuition.

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[657] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III,* Werke 10, 255.
[658] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*, Werke 13, 408.
[659] T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, Fear and Anger, Vol. 21 (1a2ae.40-48),* trans. J. P. Reid (London: Blackfriars, 1967), 1a2ae, Q.41 art. 4.
[660] J. Llewelyn, *Seeing through God: A Geophenomenology* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 60.

The standpoint of wonder corresponds to Hegel's broader claim that history is the attempt to work out what human *Geist* is potentially since (as Llewelyn points out), the *Stumpfheit* of wonder is not the failure to hear an answer, the failure of the *Vernehmen* of the divine, but the failure to hear a *question*. It is 'ignorance of ignorance'.[661] This is why the *par excellence* standpoint of wonder belongs to the Greek *Geist*. The Greek religion of beauty is the inversion of the Jewish religion of sublimity and the inversion of the Jewish self-conception of fallenness, of human depravity whose *Geist* alone listens to the question: 'who are we?' It is only from this standpoint of pain that sin, though it penetrates all of human history, can be recognised (Rom. 5.13). As a result, Hegel contrasts the Jewish beginning of pain with the Greek beginning of wonder; the 'sublime' *Reinigung* of the spiritual from the natural with the 'beautiful' *Vereinigung* of spirit and nature; David's cry and call to God for a new pure heart with Plato and Aristotle's discovery of 'Nature in harmony with Reason'.[662] For Greek religion, the freedom of *Geist* is essentially connected to the *Naturerregung*, to the natural impulse and excitation.[663] But it is not quite the von Baaderian position of *Geist's* striving for freedom as the elevation of *Natur*. For Jewish religion, human freedom instead depends on the overcoming of *Geist's* immersion in the natural and its own particularity as an expression of the *Naturerregung.* And because only the form of *Vernunft* accommodates thinking in the element of universality, the falling back on the merely particular intuiting of *Geist*, encourages the sundering of the relationship between freedom and the *Zweck* of history, which is to say to the abandonment of the unification of humanity in history, the pursuit of the 'freedom of the one', the idea that freedom is a goal attainable by individuals, and the subsequent rationalisation of slavery.[664]

[661] Llewelyn, *Seeing through God*, 60
[662] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 293, 388–389.
[663] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 193.
[664] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31.

3. Eschatology and Prayer

The third von Baaderian complaint is that the eschatological circumincession of the human and divine is not an 'exchange' in which the creature comes to comprehend God, but a self-abandonment: '*Sich-lassen*'. This objection comes more from Balthasar's reconfiguration of von Baader as a consummate anti-Hegelian than it does from the latter himself.[665] Hegel, of course, does not espouse a transactional eschatology and even explicitly develops an idea of self-abandonment. He defines God or the *Absolute* in terms of his absolute self-subsistence. And as we have seen freedom, too, is at least abstractly defined in terms of a self-centered or self-contained existence (*Bei-sich-selbst-sein*). But fallenness is finally also defined in terms of an impossible and self-destructive self-subsistence. If God is absolutely self-determined, he cannot be opposed, though, as Hegel argues after his account of the Fall in the first *Encyclopaedia*, this is exactly what the Fall narrative discloses, however ambiguously.[666] The false self-subsistence of postlapsarian finite life is self-destructive, because it is the attempt to be one among two absolutes, an attempt to relativise the infinite ('See, the man has become like one of us'). In a sense, Hegel insists, Genesis 3.22 has been misread and God has been construed as an ironist.[667] As Michael Inwood puts it: 'the general tendency of Hegel's interpretation [of Genesis] is to see the departure from Eden as an unequivocal ascent towards divinity', such that Adam *does* become 'like one of us'. 'But', Inwood continues, 'the attempt to insinuate evil into the account [of the Fall] leads to confusion'.[668] In my view, Inwood's characterisation expresses an abstract opposition of good and evil in the Fall narrative which Hegel is ultimately interested in overcoming.

[665] Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele*: *Vol. 2*, 623.
[666] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 91.
[667] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 90; Werke 17, 258.
[668] Inwood, *Hegel*, 97.

The abstract disjunction roughly rests on the elision of good and divinisation, on the one hand, and evil and Fall, on the other. It is not an exaggeration to claim that, if this is true, the Fall into evil as the unequivocal turning away from the divine would entail nothing less than the complete annihilation of the humanity. But, of course, Hegel goes in the opposite direction, gesturing towards divinisation *in light of* the Fall into evil (prompting Inwood to complain of confusion in the account). This invites the suggestion that Hegel is ontologising the passage through evil as a necessary moment in the dialectical sequence of human becoming. As Hegel puts it, however, there is a 'higher explanation', namely that the 'Adam' referred to in Gen. 3.22 is the second Adam or Christ, and that the divinisation being gestured at is a future historical divinisation in the Incarnation.[669] The statement from the *Encyclopaedia Logic* – that *Geist* both inflicts the wound and heals it – is qualified in the *Lectures* in terms of this doubling of Adam or the doubling of *Geist* more generally as always already human and divine. The point is precisely not to suggest that the Fall into evil conditionally necessitates the Incarnation, but that the Incarnation both precedes and succeeds the Fall which ultimately cannot not derail the plan of Creation. Instead, the Fall as the Adamic doubling into the first and second Adams reflects the pattern of history as structured by the displacement of spiritual primacy and the pattern of the development of consciousness as 'inverted'.

In so far as this falsely self-subsistent self-conception is the work of *Verstand*, of the attempt to think of one's relationship to the Absolute as one among the other, it is an abuse of *Verstand* as the 'goodness of God'. It is to paradoxically transform the principle of the subsistence of the finite – the very expression of our greatest dependence on the divine – into the principle of our self-dependence. The doubling of Adam into Christ refers therefore to the doubling of *Verstand* into a principle of finite *self*-subsistence alongside the divine on the one hand, and the principle

[669] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 258.

of the (continuing) subsistence of the finite under the goodness of God. But in addition to this, the difference between the first and second Adam should be understood in terms of the distinction between the conception of the divine as just another thing relative to myself – a conception underlying the postlapsarian idea that only the one, the particular, or the Despot can be free – and the conception of the divine as the ground of one's own unity, expressed most sublimely in the Incarnation, but presupposed historically in the goal of freedom as the development of the community of believers and the State. This involves the abandonment of oneself as a particularly self-subsistent being, something which Hegel describes in terms of a 'letting go' or 'release' of contingent being's negative being for itself (*Ablassen von der Negativität seines Fürsichseins*).[670] Indeed, the opposition of *Selbständigkeit* and *Ablassung* is a recurring one in Hegel, with the qualification of *Ablassung* as the release of *Selbständigkeit* or of one's negative subjectivity. For this reason, Hegel emphasises that the love of God entails knowledge of God since the eschatological horizon of history leads into Truth through the recognition of the divine plan of Providence.[671]

It is worth noting that the 'purest and most beautiful' (*reinsten und schönsten*) expression of human fallenness for Hegel is to be found not simply in the Psalms but specifically in David's prayers. This is connected to the higher spirituality of Jewish 'absolute self-consciousness' as both historical and as including a conception of human historical existence as defined by pain and division (*Entzweiung*) from God.[672] Roman religion, on the other hand, experiences this division of human beings from God in terms of *Zucht;* in terms of being 'dragged' through history by a 'blind fate'.[673] But only a self-consciousness of pain in history as directly linked to a turning away from the divine (rather than mere blind contingency) opens the spiritual

[670] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 192–193.
[671] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 26–27
[672] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.
[673] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–389.

possibility of the 'soul's thirsting for God' of which prayer is the primary expression.[674] Furthermore, as Hegel points out in the account of Judaism in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, this self-consciousness of fallenness is linked to the coming to consciousness of the providential *Zweck* of history, of the divine plan of creation as the elevation of the natural realm to the spiritual (inspired by Romans 3), or more precisely of the need to reveal the spiritual as the truth of the natural without collapsing the latter into the former (this latter qualification marks the difference between Hegel and von Baader). This is in turn linked to the divine justification or legitimation (*Berechtigung*) of human wellbeing in history through the divine Law which is also what allows for sin to be recognised and reckoned with (*angerechnet*). Hence David's prayers (especially from Psalm 51 which Hegel highlights) are, like the aporetic exclamations of the pagan philosophers, burdened, but not by wonder at the enormity of the philosophical content under a form of unreason, but by a thirst for a God he cannot find in his heart and a longing beyond this state of pain and fallenness toward the eschatological horizon of history. With the self-conception of fallenness in Jewish religious consciousness therefore comes the understanding that it is not the object we are confronted with that is enormous, but that, because of sin, the heart has been found to be too small.

In this sense, Hegel argues, Judaism marks the end of the blind bond of necessity (*das Band der Notwendigkeit*) to the divine and instead posits the 'concrete necessity' of the Law as the spiritual purification of humanity's inner spiritual striving. '*Es ist die geistige subjektive Einheit, und diese verdient erst für uns den Namen Gottes*'.[675] Only in this sense does it designate genuine human well-being (*Wohlsein*), justice, and goodness.[676] In so far as the Davidic prayers express the first true beginning of historical humanity towards reconciliation

[674] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 388–389.
[675] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 50.
[676] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 68–69.

with God and the fulfilling of the divine *Zweck* of history, they designate the beginning of the uniting of the divine, universal Will (*der göttliche, allgemeine Wille*) with the self-determining human Will which alone and as such, namely as free, has the power (*Macht*) to bring about this unity (*Zusammenhang*). In this sense, prayer is tied to the beginnings of human freedom because it is tied to the emergence of faith as the truth of the immediacy of life; faith as certainty and confidence in God, but a certainty and confidence simultaneously informed by the 'contradictory' self-consciousness of fallenness, by the consciousness of justice, which is absolute, and the incommensurability of one's situation with this justice (which Hegel identifies throughout Job). And the profundity of Jewish faith rests for Hegel precisely on the assertion of an absolute faith in God in light of the dissatisfaction (*Unzufriedenheit*) and discontent (*Missmut*) towards historical existence.[677] Finally, because prayer is thusly represented in terms of self-emptiness (as the Davidic longing for a new heart) and paradoxical subsequent self-emptying (as the emptying of one's negative subjectivity), it expresses a Hegelian rendering of the Augustinian notion of fallen humanity is not just nothing, but less than nothing.[678]

4. Difficulty and Sin

As Nichols notes, the continual testing of one's orientation toward and love for God is necessary, but it is not sin. 'Testing is not, against Hegel once again, the Fall', by which I believe he means that the necessity of one's faith being tested is not the result of the Fall. I believe I agree here with Nichols in so far as we probably both agree with Newman; namely, that there is a difference between the difficulty of being a Catholic and the difficulty of

[677] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 69.

[678] Augustine, *The Meditations: Treatise of the Love of God, Soliloquies, and Manual*, trans. G. Stanhope (London, 1818), 42. This is sometimes called a 'downward' *Aufhebung* by various Hegelian thinkers, a negation of negation which 'results in less than nothing, [...] creates something without substance that cannot be sublated or negated, is undead, a ghost, and the lowest level'. I believe the idea originated with Jane Bennett's *Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 56, 64, 73-75, 277. See also C. Fuchs, 'The Dialectic: Not just the Absolute Recoil, but the World's Living Fire that Extinguishes and Kindles Itself. Reflections on Slavoj Žižek's Version of Dialectical Philosophy in Absolute Recoil'. *TripleC: Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 12.2 (2014), 849.

believing in Catholicism.[679] In other words, that there is at least no *prima facie* commensurability between difficulty and doubt. However, as Newman also notes, modernity precisely maintains such a commensurability of difficulty and doubt. It is true that Hegel seems to think of the difficulty of human thought, especially of philosophy, of the sublimation of the familiar, and of human thought's attempts to pass from the finite to the infinite, as connected to its postlapsarian reality.[680] This is clearly one reason why he asserts that it is the knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) of human *Geist* or mind that is the most difficult; in other words, that the most difficult knowledge for human beings is self-knowledge.[681] The main and most explicit reason Hegel gives us for this in the third is that *Geist* deals with the most concrete and developed form of the Idea's self-actualisation (since it is, in other words, the highest form of Creation), but of course, he also asserts in that work that *Geist* is not yet truly *Geist* and needs to be properly recognised as the image of God.[682]

In the first *Encyclopaedia* or the lesser *Logic,* Hegel writes that logic is the most difficult science *(Wissenscahft*). And in the second *Encyclopaedia* or the *Philosophy of Nature*, he suggests, though less emphatically, that the sphere of nature consists of the most difficult objects for science to grasp.[683] However, this is not self-contradiction. Nor are we really dealing with different difficulties, reflecting, for example, the differences between *Erkenntnis* and *Wissenschaft*. Hegel's superlative attribution of difficulty to all three branches of the *Encyclopaedia* is continuous with his claims on the broad structural equivalences between logic, nature, and mind, as the circulating moments of the absolute syllogism. In all cases, however, their difficulty is directly connected to mind or *Geist*. Logic, for example, is

[679] J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 414.
[680] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I,* Werke 8, 14; 38, etc.
[681] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III,* Werke 10, 9.
[682] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III,* Werke 10, 9; 233.
[683] G. W. F . Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse II,* Werke 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 37; 54; 157–158.

supposedly the hardest science because it demands rising to pure thought and not merely dealing with perceptions or intuitions. From another standpoint, as we saw in chapter two, it is an easy science because it involves nothing other than our own thoughts, and yet it is precisely this familiarity or acquaintance that we have with the contents of logic, as I indicated in that chapter, that is the source of our difficulty.[684] The difficulty of logical thinking, consequently presupposes the difficulty of the *Erkenntnis* of mind since the familiarity with its subject matter, which consists of human thoughts, is problematic precisely because human beings' self-understand is problematic. And it is problematic because of the Fall, or because *Geist* does not know itself as such or as having been created the image of God.

It should be noted that Kierkegaard criticised Hans Lassen Martensen and other prominent right Hegelians for doing away with any sort of intellectual and religious difficulty in their work, and typically regarded this as a defining feature of speculative philosophy (or theology).[685] Though writing during a similar time as Newman, Kierkegaard expresses a somewhat different sentiment about Christian 'orthodoxy':

> it is comical to think of the words "few speak doubtfully about doubt" in reference to a time now recently past—when doubt was *taught*. Martensen was just as dogmatically rigid when he lectured on *de omnibus dubitandum* as when he lectured on a dogma.[686]

In truth, both Kierkegaard and Newman (though the latter, I think, somewhat more clearly) highlighted 'difficulty' as part and parcel of creaturely life, whilst at the same time distinguishing it from 'doubt' as a further postlapsarian complication of that creaturely life. However, where Newman often addressed the perceived 'difficulty' inherent, for example, in believing in the Eucharistic real difference, Kierkegaard addressed the lack of difficulty

[684] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 67.
[685] S. Kierkegaard, *Journals and Notebooks, Volume 8*, ed. N.J. Cappelørn et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 124.
[686] Kierkegaard, *Journals* 8, 60.

involved in the affirmations of high Lutheran theologians. Newman was really talking about doubt as the expression of the historical 'tendency toward a simple unbelief in matters of religion', a tendency which he rightly views as postlapsarian. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, even when he is talking about doubt – though this is usually the nondoubt of Danish Hegelians – is talking about the difficulty intrinsic to the highest forms of religious devotion and intellectual illumination.

James Stewart has plausibly argued that Martensen's phrase *de omnibus dubitandum*, for which he was bullied by Kierkegaard, actually comes from Hegel's account of Cartesian doubt in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*.[687] I bring this up because in those lectures Hegel appropriates Cartesian doubt, and the notion that everything is to be doubted, as really expressing the doubting or bracketing of the exteriority of *Geist*'s content in favour of an absolute beginning of philosophy, which consists purely of (the interiority of) our own thoughts.[688] Such a 'scientific' beginning is accordingly difficult and, Hegel suggests, Descartes' *de omnibus dubitandum* more or less adequately expresses the extent to which we will have to withdraw into the realm of thought in order to purify *Geist* and its delivering over to mere nature (as Nichols put it). This is not skepticism – doubting for the sake of doubting, as Hegel characterises it – but purification, which is typically also a purgation. But to insist on the intrinsic difficulty of this purification is not to conflate it with sin or some further specification of postlapsarian historical existence. Difficulty or the difficult testing of one's faith, properly conceived, is not sin. But Hegel maintains, in a manner consistent with his views on human fallenness, that it is no longer prior to it. The difficulties we encounter appear as

[687] J. Stewart, 'Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel and Quellenforschung: Some methodological considerations'. *Filozofia* 68 (2013), 22.
[688] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Werke 20, 127. It can be pointed out that that this is a liberal definition of 'everything', but Hegel's point is that Descartes' insight of an absolute beginning presupposes a metaphysics of *Verstand* and therefore a problematic conception of totality.

insurmountable, and chief amongst them (as Henri de Lubac points out) is the Gospel which is 'full of paradoxes, by which the mind is at first troubled'.[689] Hegel often makes this point apropos of philosophy, pointing out that the inherent difficulty of philosophy is usually confused with incomprehensibility.[690] And this is partly because speculative truth is as such 'mystical', which is to say that it is both opaque and perfectly clear.[691] The point of course is that the true difficulty consists precisely in that: in the speculative holding together of both sides. But this natural difficulty itself becomes altered or disordered with the Fall, where the standpoint of *Verstand* tends to dominate the standpoint of *Vorstellung* and therefore undermines their speculative unity demanded by reason or *Vernunft*. It is therefore incorrect to suggest that Hegel confuses difficulty and the testing of one's orientation towards God with sin, but correct to say that he envisions human fallenness as the disordering of particular aspects of creaturely life.

3 The Mediation of Universal History through Religious Particularity

Hegel singles out the specific historical formation of Jewish religious consciousness in the development of one side of 'universal history', or, what I earlier referred to as the 'history of the Fall'. He affirms what Paul called the 'advantage[692] of the Jew' (Rom. 3). Indeed, the world-historical significance of the Jewish people consists precisely in their coming to a 'purified' (self-)consciousness of sin.[693] And to the extent that history, as 'universal', is punctuated by the local or micro-history of the life of a single individual,[694] we should not be surprised that Hegel invokes the special role of the 'local' history of the Jews for the mediation of the whole

[689] H. De Lubac, *Paradoxes of Faith*, trans. E. Beaumont (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1955), 13.
[690] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I* ,Werke 8, 46.
[691] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 178.
[692] '*Vorzug*' in Luther's German.
[693] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 399
[694] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386.

of the history of the Fall. But how can a contingent historical formation move humanity as a whole in the direction of historical and spiritual unification? The main claim of my argument here is that Hegel sees the sundering of human freedom and the *Zweck* of history as the unified affirmation of that freedom as resulting in a particularised pursuit of freedom, one that is underwritten by a postlapsarian self-conception of *Geist*. This refers to what Hegel calls the 'freedom of the one', or the view that human freedom is only possible ontologically as an individual self-subsistence (*Selbständigkeit*) and therefore only realisable through the brutal and reckless pursuit of power. The consciousness of freedom first arises for Hegel with the Greeks.[695] This should cause us to pause because whilst Hegel considers freedom to be the principle of the West, he considers Judaism and not Greek religion to mark the transition from the East to the West. Yet this is precisely what the world-historical significance of the former consists of: not the origins of the consciousness of freedom but the origins of self-consciousness as such. The fact that there exists a gap between *Geist's* self-consciousness and its self-consciousness as free is a result of the sundering of human freedom and the *Zweck* of history. Hegel is clear in the *Philosophy of History* that *Geist's* freedom is its *Beisichselbstsein* and that '*Beisichselbstsein des Geistes ist Selbstbewußtsein'*.[696] But there is a gap between self-consciousness (in Judaism) and consciousness of freedom (in Greek religion), and this consists in the difference between the consciousness of the possibility of (a still disordered) freedom with the Greeks and the consciousness of a lack of real freedom with the Jews which is at the same time self-consciousness of human fallenness.

Judaism is typically schematised as the religion of 'sublimity'. But it is also, and perhaps primarily, the religion of purification (*Reinigung*). The Jewish principle appears historically as

[695] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 31.
[696] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 30.

the negation of not just the 'logically' previous religious-historical formation of the Phoenician people, but of the whole of what Hegel called 'natural religion'. Its negation of the standpoint of *Naturreligion* is nothing other than its self-consciousness of human fallenness. Furthermore, while 'das Geistige im phönizischen Volke noch durch die Naturseite beschränkt war, so zeigt es sich dagegen bei den Juden vollkommen gereinigt; das reine Produkt des Denkens'.[697] This 'purification', whose connection to the mystical way of *Reinigung* (sometimes also rendered as 'purgation') should be noted, denotes historical revelation as the differentiation of the religious community (*Gemeinde*) of the Jewish people. It also points to the historical coincidence in self-consciousness and revelation which is really a variant of the more general Hegelian unity of events and their narration. By contrast, the contents of the natural religions can be intuited or arrived at through the differentiation of a merely 'natural' consciousness. That is certainly the impression Hegel gives in the first half of the *Philosophy of History.* Since, for example, various trinitarian and incarnational intimations are represented by this natural consciousness, they are thought to be mere analogies which, as von Balthasar put it, lack the 'economic' basis of genuine trinitarian disclosures in history.[698] In concrete Hegelian terms, these analogies which emerge from a merely natural consciousness are external, or at least peripheral, to the nature *Geist* as the historical mediation of the human and the divine in the Trinitarian economy, and are not therefore 'historical' in the sense of appropriately and purposefully approaching the Incarnation.

Another way of putting it is that these analogies only represent Christian *triunity* at the expense of the slide into either tritheism (three Gods) or modalism (three modes of one God). At this

[697] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 241.
[698] H. U. Von Balthasar, *Theo–Drama, vol. 3* trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992), 508.

point, however, Hegel is clearly concerned with demarcating the purification of Jewish religious consciousness – which he reads as Trinitarian – from the anticipations (if we may call them that) of triunity in earlier religious forms. Indeed, he is interested in reading Jewish religion precisely as a purification of earlier, natural, religious consciousness. But putting it this way implies that the natural religions are not the imagining of a merely natural consciousness, but of a consciousness in need of purification from an overimmersion into nature. In this sense, the Jewish religion represents the first advance beyond the 'freedom of the one' as a mere *Naturzufall* and it qualifies the realm of natural contingency as a realm of historical suspension (this is also associated with 'immorality'). There is a further indication that Hegel wishes to extend a fundamental spirituality to earlier natural religions. He applies the term *Gottmenschen*, or God-Man to 'naturalistic' incarnations throughout world history, such as the Buddha.[699] Hegel does not use this term often. When he does, it is to describe Christ as the (re)presentation (*Vorstellung*) and presence[700] (*Gegenwart*) of the Christian principle of mediation. However, because all of world history is the attempt to develop this principle, Hegel uses the same language to describe the various elaborations of this mediation which the entire world has ever been the striving for.[701] Throughout the section on the Middle ages in the 1822/23 manuscript of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of [World-]History*, Hegel emphasises (more so than in the editorial reconstruction of that text) the juxtaposition and relationship between the realisation of the Christian principle of mediation in the Middle ages and the pre-Judeo-Christian intimations of incarnational and trinitarian structures[702].

[699] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 212.
[700] God's presence as Christ is for Hegel connected also to Christ as the manifestation and *Dasein* of the abstract concept of God.
[701] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 479; 'die Welt ewig sich getrieben hat'.
[702] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, Vorlesungen 12 (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1996), 447-499 passim.

He essentially emphasises three moments of spiritual emergence in history; the emergence of Judaism as the purification of the consciousness of natural religion, the emergence of Christianity as the purification of the Roman consciousness of *Verstand*, and the emergence of Protestantism as the purification Catholic sensuousness. This is a somewhat different triad from the ostensibly more obvious Christian sequence of Orthodoxy-Catholicism-Protestantism (which Hegel never mentions but which various commentators occasionally attribute to him).[703] It also follows the dialectical logic of 'negation of negation' where the middle or negative moment of the Roman religious consciousness of *Verstand* is overcome by the emergence of Christianity, but the Christian purification of this consciousness is a restatement of the Jewish purification of the consciousness of natural religion (the first moment or emergence). More precisely put, the Christian purification of pre-Christian Pagan consciousness *is* the preservation of Jewish religion within the development of Christian mediation. And this is where we finally get to the claim from the *Philosophy of Right* that I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter: 'Mind and its world are both lost and plunged in the infinite grief of that fate for which a people, the Jewish people, was held in readiness'.[704] For the overcoming of the Roman consciousness of *Verstand* requires nothing other than the death of God himself, that disgraceful death which is at the same time the death of death and therefore an outpouring of infinite love.[705] Hegel also specifies the death of death – the *Mittelpunkt der Versöhnung* – as the par excellence instance of the negation of negation and perhaps, therefore, the negation of negation as the facilitation of the atoning infinite love of God. This is consistent with the general characterisation of the atoning work of Christ as a *restitutio in integrum*. Hegel highlights this when he says that the death of God restores the possibility of the sensuous satisfaction of *Geist's* needs and therefore also the immediate grasping of its nature.[706] This

[703] Žižek, *Less than Nothing*, 108.
[704] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 222; Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 511.
[705] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 247.
[706] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 249.

Christian death of death is accordingly also the restoration of natural consciousness; it is really the reconciliation (*Vereinigung*) of *Naturreligion* and Judaism, which is the purification (*Reinigung*) of *Naturreligion.* As such, it is an at-one-ment, as Vincent Brümmer pointed out.[707] But the necessity of atonement (including more generally, as the mediation of the human and the divine in the Christ-Event) is simultaneously continuous with the created nature of human *Geist* as well as a response to the actual procession of historical *Geist* under sin. Hegel chiefly expresses the latter, in other words, fallenness in history, in terms of the pursuit of human freedom (which is the *Zweck* of history) as a 'freedom of the one', a freedom of the one individual against the other and in terms of the giving over of *Geist* to nature. It is therefore significant that the principle of freedom – as a I already indicated – is identified with Greek religion. This identification is strange because Hegel does not identify Greece with the principle of the West (which he in turn identifies with freedom), but it is perfectly intelligible in light of his characterisation of Greek religion as the finite religion of nature and as the first moment in the decline of finite religion which ends in degeneracy and death through its disordered pursuit of freedom.

As a result, Hegel often writes that the Jewish and Greek religions should be understood as two sides of the same unity, namely the moment of the elevation of the spiritual over the natural. Here I would like to make the claim that they also correspond, respectively, to the purification of fallen human consciousness, on the one hand, and the continuity of human striving in accordance with its created nature after the Fall, on the other. For this reason, Judaism may be said have conceptual as well as religious primacy over Greek religion. There is, of course, a good deal of controversy surrounding this issue. Because Hegel is interested in an overall

[707] V. Brümmer, 'Atonement and Reconciliation', *Religious Studies* 28 (1992), 435.

inverted schematisation of history as the presentation of human historical development under sin, the triad of the religions of spiritual individuality is by default interpreted as progressively linear; and the fact that he frequently (meaning in the 1821, 1824, and 1831 *Lectures*) places Judaism first (and therefore as 'lowest') in the triad is brought up alongside accusations of antisemitism. Furthermore, the 1827 lectures which place Judaism as second in the triad (and are sometimes taken as an example of moral improvement on Hegel's side) undermine (at the level of content rather than mere structure) the dyadic nature of the Jewish and Greek religions. Following Yovel's work on Hegel in the 1980s, Žižek approvingly picked up the theme of Hegelian antisemitism as prejudice (rather than systemic feature) in the opening of his now classic 'Not only as *Substance* but also as *Subject*':

> In his essay on 'The Religion of Sublimity', Yirmiyahu Yovel has pointed out a certain inconsistency in Hegel's systematization of religions, an inconsistency which does not result directly from the very principle of Hegel's philosophy but expresses rather a contingent, empirical prejudice of Hegel's as an individual, and can therefore be rectified by consequent use of Hegel's own dialectical procedure. This inconsistency concerns the place occupied respectively by Jewish and by ancient Greek religion: in Hegel's *Lessons* [*Vorlesungen*] *on the philosophy of Religion*, Christianity is immediately preceded by three forms of the 'religion of spiritual individuality': the Jewish religion of Sublimity [*Erhabenheit*], the Greek religion of Beauty, and the Roman religion of Understanding [*Verstand*]. In this succession the first, lowest place is taken by the Jewish religion – that is, Greek religion is conceived as a higher stage in spiritual development than the Jewish religion. According to Yovel, Hegel has here given way to his personal anti-Semitic prejudice, because to be consistent with the logic of the dialectical process it is undoubtedly the Jewish religion which should follow the Greek.[708]

He then sketches a new systematisation of the religions and offers some reasons in favour of it:

> the Greek, Jewish, and Christian religions do form a kind of triad which corresponds perfectly to the triad of reflection (positing, external and determinate reflection), to this elementary matrix of the dialectical process. Greek religion embodies the moment of 'positing reflection': in it, the plurality of spiritual individuals (gods) is immediately 'posited' as the given spiritual essence of the world. The Jewish religion introduces the moment of 'external reflection' – all positivity is abolished by reference to the unapproachable, transcendent God, the absolute Master, the One of absolute negativity, while Christianity conceives the individuality of man not as something external to God

[708] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 227.

> but as a 'reflective determination' of God himself (in the figure of Christ, God himself becomes man').[709]

In addition to pointing out the intuitively 'Hegelian' nature of this reordering, Žižek mentions the 'crucial argument' that if the Greek and Jewish religions are the respective religions of beauty and sublimity, then the former ought to precede the latter as beauty precedes sublimity in Kantian aesthetics.[710]

It should be pointed out, however, *contra* Žižek (and perhaps Yovel), that the primacy of beauty in the Kantian aesthetic dyad of beauty and sublimity does not count as a good reason for revising the order of the spiritual religions in the (1821, 1824, and 1831) *Lectures.* This is because Hegel does not see the two (in the manner of Kant) as coordinate but identifies sublimity with pre-Classical, which is to say, pre-Greek art, where it is associated, unsurprisingly, with Judaism.[711] Thus, to the extent that the logical relationship between the beautiful and the sublime plays any interpretative role, it is to determine the interpretation in favour of the original order. It should also be noted that Žižek does not refer to the 1827 lectures where Hegel *does* follow Greek religion with Judaism.[712] This is at least partly because, on the construal of the triad as progressively linear, Roman religion would still be dialectically 'higher' than Judaism. Hence because only Christianity seems worthy of the 'highest' place in the triad, Žižek (somewhat sneakily) rewrites the entire triad as Greek religion-Judaism-Christianity. This is in the *Sublime Object*. More recently, he has tended to employ the further abstracted triad of Paganism-Judaism-Christianity,[713] which further leads me to believe that Žižek (amongst other less prominent Hegelians) either doesn't understand the purpose of the

[709] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 227.
[710] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 227.
[711] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I,* Werke 13, 478–485.
[712] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 227; Žižek could have referred to the 1827 lectures where Judaism is placed second in the sequence; see Hodgson (ed.) *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 267n.
[713] Žižek, *Less than Nothing,* 119.

religious triad of spiritual individuality or, much more likely, isn't interested in its purpose because it highlights aspects, or at least parts, of Hegel's project which are uncongenial to his Christian atheist programme. The reason for this is connected to Žižek's dialectical account of the emergence of Christianity which excludes any reference to 'Pagan' finite religion in order to reposition theistic Christianity as the middle category which mediates the emergence of Christian atheism. As a result, the triad of the religions of spiritual individuality loses both its structural and substantive purpose; it is no longer needed (alongside the sequence of *Naturreligion)* for the triadic mediation of *Geist* and *Natur*, and the descent into sin, death, and degeneracy accomplished by finite religion does not lead to the reassertion of Judaic self-consciousness and the emergence of Christianity as it does in Hegel's account.

There does, nevertheless, appear to be an inconsistency in Hegel's systematisation of the religions, but it is not to be found in Hegel's brief experimentation with the order of the second triad, but with the apparent inconsistency between treating the Jewish and Greek religions as two sides of the same moment whilst also treating them as successive moments. The reason, however, that this appears as an inconsistency is because the triad may be implicitly understood as progressively linear. Once we understand that the triad of the religions of spiritual individuality is, however, a regressive triad this inconsistency largely disappears. The reason for this is the following: it is clear that Hegel regards the general development of *Naturreligion* as upwardly progressive, if albeit ultimately aporetic. As the purification of this consciousness, Judaism is the truth of natural religion as *Geist* is the truth of *Natur*. But the limitation of this overcoming is the excessive abandonment of the sensuous element in favour of ceremonial and liturgical representation in Judaic self-conception, an abandonment which Hegel, probably correctly, characterises as religiously necessary.[714] And it is necessary since the only response

[714] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243.

to what Hegel calls the 'freedom of the one' is to bite the bullet and affirm, as Jewish religion does, that yes, only one is free – the One God.[715] The Jewish affirmation of divine Oneness is what in dialectical terms is called the oppositional determination of the 'freedom of the one' as observed in *Naturreligion*. This is why Hegel focuses on Judaism as the religion of the purified and sublime One and therefore as the religion of monotheism. To say that *Geist* is the truth of *Natur* is consequently to affirm that the divine is known through *Sichdenken*, which leads also to the reconciliation of the *Begriff* of *Geist* and the *Zweck* of history in the striving towards freedom, rather than self-being in nature which is in the end mere *Naturzufall* and *Willkür*.[716]

However, it should be noted, that while Jewish religious consciousness is the origin of *Sichdenken* as such, this originary self-consciousness is nothing other than the purification of consciousness of sin under grace. I noted earlier that Jewish and Greek religions respectively correspond to the purification of fallen human consciousness, on the one hand, and the continuity of human striving in accordance with its created nature after the Fall, on the other. This division is itself indicative of human fallenness as the state of persisting in a state of *Entzweiung* within which historical humanity remains. For example, though Hegel defines freedom in terms of *Geist*'s self-consciousness, as *Beisichselbstsein*, he notes that the origins of self-consciousness in Judaism not only do not but cannot coincide with the origins of freedom, since Jewish consciousness of sin leads human *Geist* (by necessity) to bind itself to the Law which is only abstractly free.[717] Greek religion, on the other hand, is the origin of freedom but its spirituality is a merely sensuous *signification* of *Geist* or, rather, the natural is for Greek religion a sign in which *Geist* manifests itself.[718] *Naturreligion* – which exhibits a

[715] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241.
[716] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*,Werke 17, 15–16; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31.
[717] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243.
[718] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 294.

fully natural and, in this sense, 'pre-religious' consciousness – is also 'pre-historical' because it represents the spiritual *symbolically*. Jewish consciousness by contrast introduces the possibility of historical consciousness because it 'renaturalises' these symbols ('*Sonne als Sonne, Berge als Berge*')*.*[719]

But Greek religion, though an elevation of the spiritual above the natural, does not renaturalise the symbolising intuitions of *Naturreligion*, but is, instead, a further symbolic representation of *Naturreligion's* symbolising intuitions. And this *Symbol des Symbols* constitutes the meaning of the sensuous as a sign of the spiritual in Greek religion.[720] Greek religion is an elevation of *Naturreligion* not because it obtains a consciousness purified of the excessive sensuous element of the latter, but because it obtains a kind of aesthetic consummation of it. Hegel makes this point by observing that the profoundest form of *Naturreligion* – the *Geist* of Egyptian religion – ultimately presents itself as a problem to which the Greeks provide a solution.

> Daß aber vor dem Bewußtsein der Ägypter ihr Geist selbst in Form einer Aufgabe gewesen ist, darüber können wir uns auf die berühmte Inschrift des Allerheiligsten der Göttin Neith zu Sai's berufen: "Ich bin, was da ist, was war und sein wird: niemand hat meine Hülle gelüftet."[721]

Greek religious consciousness lifts the veil. Furthermore, Hegel suggests that *Naturreligion* itself points beyond its limitation, adding:

> Das sich selbst Klare also ist das Resultat jener Aufgabe und die Lösung. Dieses Klare ist der Geist, der Sohn der Neith, der verborgenen nächtlichen Gottheit. In der ägyptischen Neith ist die Wahrheit noch verschlossen, der griechische Apoll ist die Lösung; sein Ausspruch ist: *Mensch erkenne dich selbst*.

[719] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 257–258.; 243.
[720] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 258; 301.
[721] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 272.

The Delphic maxim, however, is qualified as applying not to the particularities of the individual, not merely to Socrates or Phaedrus, but to humanity as a unified whole.[722] As Hegel puts it apropos of Judaism, '*[d]ie Wahrheit des Besonderen ist die allgemeine Einheit*'.[723] And this Greek society and its religious consciousness cannot accomplish because it does not know that freedom is part of the nature of *Geist*; it only knows that the one is free.

Greek religion therefore attempts to carry out the *Zweck* of history, the project of human freedom. It is continuous with the human striving towards the divine innate to creaturely life, but it proceeds in accordance with it while lacking any consciousness of sin and of the way it has disordered this striving. As a result, it is also continuous with the postlapsarian consciousness of *Naturreligion*, a consciousness which gives over the spiritual to the natural and history to mere accident and the recklessness of passion. Hegel defines the constitution of Greek *Geist* in terms of a one-sided freedom conditioned by and essentially related to an external and natural impulse or prompting (*Naturerregung*).[724] Accordingly, Greek *Geist* is unfree in so far as, like *Naturreligion*, it is prompted and therefore determined by an other. But it is free in so far as it transforms this external prompting into aesthetic self-production and therefore elevates the spiritual above the natural.[725] This is another reason, Hegel suggests, why Greek *Geist* begins with wonder, because although it is self-productive, it is not self-stimulating; it contains an alien content. Greek *Geist*, which like Hegel's account of the 'sign' contains an 'alien soul', a mummy in the pyramid.[726] It is a symbol of a symbol and not yet a self-prompting (*Anregung ihrer selbst*).[727] Interestingly, Hegel also writes that Greek *Geist's*

[722] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 272–273.
[722] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 50.
[724] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 293.
[725] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 293–294: 'Der griechische Geist ist der plastische Künstler, welcher den Stein zum Kunstwerke bildet.'
[726] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie III*, Werke 10, 270–271.
[727] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 293.

determination as a one-sided and conditional freedom makes it a middle term between the total loss of subjectivity in *Naturreligion* and the infinite subjectivity of the Roman religion of *Verstand* (where 'the individual is seen as the basis for everything').[728] As Hegel further clarifies in the *Philosophy of Right*, the abstract self-certainty so characteristic of Roman religion is not itself evil, since it is formally the postlapsarian common root (*Wurzel*) of both moral conscience (not to be confused with ethical life) as well as evil. But where the possibility of the former necessitates an *Aufhebung* beyond oneself as the active willing of the universal concept (rather than the positing as a spiritual content of the self's particularity), the latter appears not merely as a possibility but is posited in the sphere of Roman spirituality as what is preserved from the sublation of Greek aesthetic self-production. Hence Hegel emphasises evil as the common outcome of abstract self-certainty, because he identifies its concrete emergence in the Roman religion of *Verstand* (which is the source of self-certainty) with the highest expression of postlapsarian death and degeneracy. Similarly, the fact that he highlights Greek spirituality's positing of a particularistic self-production in its constitution of the divine as the middle term that mediates Roman self-certainty means that Hegel sees Greek *Geist* as the second moment of an entirely different triad, one not schematised in the structure of the *Lectures*, namely the triad of nature, Greek, and Roman religions, a sequence which plots the continuity of postlapsarian human striving for the divine without consciousness of sin and which ends in degeneracy and death. In this sense, it stands opposed to the developments of Judaism and Christianity which proceed from the purification of its standpoint into a consciousness of sin (indeed the need to overcome the bias toward evil in the constitution of fallen subjectivity as self-certainty is part of this purification). Moreover, the duplication of Judaism which mediates the transition from the Roman religiosity of *Verstand* to the absolute Christian religiosity of *Vernunft* suggests that the Judaeo-Christian developmental sequence

[728] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 293–294.

forms a parallel triad to that of the nature, Greek, and Roman religions. We might call it the triad of purified or revealed consciousness and the latter the triad of natural consciousness.

This is all perfectly compatible with Hegel's characterisation of the Jewish and Greek religions as two sides of the same moment. However, though both are clearly part of the elevation of the natural to the spiritual (or the affirmation of the ideality of the natural vis-à-vis the spiritual), Hegel clarifies in the 1827 lectures (where he places Judaism higher in the triad) that they differ in so far as

> der Gott in der Religion der Schönheit hat noch einen besonderen Inhalt, oder er ist nur sittliche Macht in der Erscheinung der Schönheit, in einer Erscheinung also, die noch in einem sinnlichen Material, in dem Boden der sinnlichen Stoffe, der Stoffe der Vorstellung geschieht: der Boden ist noch nicht der Gedanke. Die Notwendigkeit der Erhebung zur Religion der Erhabenheit liegt darin, daß die besonderen geistigen und sittlichen Mächte zusammengefaßt werden aus der Besonderheit in eine geistige Einheit. Die Wahrheit des Besonderen ist die allgemeine Einheit, die konkret in sich ist, insofern sie das Besondere in sich hat, aber dieses so in sich hat, daß sie wesentlich als Subjektivität ist.[729]

Hegel is not only spelling out here the necessity of the elevation to Judaic spirituality, but also, the nature of Greek spirituality as aesthetic self-production; of its moral power as mere *Erscheinung* of beauty. Note that 'appearance' or 'shine' for Hegel often indicates a suspension of a content in the form of immediacy, a kind of temporary and transitory translation of the sublated element back to its earlier form.[730] In this sense, the partial relapse of Greek *Geist* into the consciousness of *Naturreligion* is part and parcel of its elevation above it, since the emergence and existence of moral power in that spiritual realm coincides with its appearance as 'beautiful', an appearance which precisely masks the sundering of its conception of freedom

[729] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 50.
[730] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 261–262.

from the *Zweck* of history and the moral Law, where even the gods, in order to be gods, must obtain their divinity through exercises that are essentially human moral activity.[731]

As Hodgson correctly observes, the 1827 reformulation of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, in which Judaism occupies the second place in the triad of the religions of 'spiritual individuality', reflects a shift from regarding Jewish and Greek religion as 'mutually complementary rather than as progressive' and that before the 1827 lectures, 'Hegel never referred to the "elevation" of one into the other'.[732] However, since the triad of the 1821 and especially 1824 lectures is an inverted triad, with the Roman religion of *Verstand* unambiguously characterised as the spiritually lowest, the status of Judaism as an elevation of the merely aesthetic constitution of the *sittliche Macht* of God in Greek religion is expressed in its status as an elevation of *Naturreligion*. This is further supported by the fact that the elevation of Greek spirituality achieved in Jewish spirituality is (in addition to an advance) also a restoration: a re-naturalisation of intuition after nature and Greek religious symbolisation of sensuous materials. In other words, and as I have already indicated, the pre- (and post-) 1827 lectures represent the elevation of Jewish over Greek religion by representing the latter as a partial relapse into *Naturreligion* (the ultimate one-sidedness of both notwithstanding). One can only fully grasp this if one accepts seriously Hegel's claim that the world-historical significance of the Jewish people derives from their attaining a consciousness of sin and of consequently being able to attribute a moral content both to God and to history which is conceived for the first time in fully providential terms.[733] Hodgson is perfectly aware that Roman religion is 'abortive and retrograde, arbitrary and expedient', including as an attempt to

[731] Hegel expresses this most clearly in the analysis of the spiritual role of the Heroes in Greek religion and literature; see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 108–109.
[732] Hodgson (ed.), *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 51.
[733] Hegel, V*orlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243.

mediate the one-sidedness of the Jewish and Greek religions.[734] He furthermore suggests that the 1827 lectures' reversal of the triadic order may express Hegel's 'conviction that the unity and spirituality of the God of Israel is the necessary foundation of the true and consummate religion', and that therefore Christianity must 'arise among the Jewish people'. He then clarifies that, though 'Hegel knew this already in 1821, his assessment of Judaism in the earlier lectures did not bear it out'.[735] It is certainly true that the 1827 lectures do a better job of establishing the spiritual primacy of Jewish over Greek religion than the earlier lectures on the philosophy of religion. However, the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* already developed this theme in 1824 (and of course, the *Philosophy of Right* originated the central claim which inspired this chapter in 1820). I am inclined to attribute this to the fact that history was in fact a more adequate context for Hegel's assessment of this issue. And it should be pointed out that Hegel does not simply affirm the unity and spirituality of the God of Israel as the necessary ground of Christianity as a matter of faith: he sees it as something the philosophy of history ought to demonstrate. In what remains of this chapter I will focus on how Jewish consciousness of sin is for Hegel the necessary ground for the emergence of the absolute religion.

Because Hegel believes that Jewish spirituality is a necessary foundation for the emergence of Christianity, he gives a Trinitarian reading of the purification of Jewish consciousness. This means that he gives a Trinitarian account of how the purification of natural consciousness can lead to, or at least point towards, the absolutisation of the relationship between humanity and God. In doing so, he affirms the 'necessity' of the religious standpoint, which he otherwise correctly claims is a necessary demonstration for the scientific study of religion. As Hodgson

[734] Hodgson (ed.), *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*,52.
[735] Hodgson (ed.), *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* 52.

reminds us, this is a demonstration of the necessity of religion, not of God.[736] Its significance here is the following. Firstly, what is needed for the study of religion is some kind of demonstration that religion is a matter of relationship between human consciousness and God – or between the subjective and objective sides. The necessity of the religious standpoint, of the purified (*gereinigt*) and reconciled (*verreinigt*) consciousness is then also a demonstration of the possibility of the elevation of finite consciousness to the Absolute.[737] One of the goals of Hegel's study of the religions is to show that finite religion, as it were, 'naturally' ends in death and degeneracy, in other words, it is to show that the historical development of human beings is disordered by sin. Therefore, beginning with the affirmation for the necessity of the religious standpoint means beginning with an awareness, which is itself religious, of the need to elevate finite consciousness to the Absolute. Hence while Jewish religion attains an anticipation of reconciliation,[738] Christianity posits a greater need for it than any previous religious consciousness. The correlate of this awareness for both is the necessity of God, which, however, is a *Nachdenken.* It is a *Nachdenken* because the philosophical study of religion comes after the study of philosophy as such. The highest and final result of philosophy is God, the demonstration that 'this universal, which is in and for itself, embracing and containing absolutely everything, is that through which alone everything is and has subsistence – that this universal is the truth'.[739] Likewise, the notion of 'the One' itself is a result of philosophy with which we begin the study of religions. However, once we do begin this study, we find that 'the One' is by no means a representation which religious consciousness finds ready to hand. It turns

[736] Hodgson (ed.), *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 16.
[737] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 70.
[738] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 389.
[739] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Hodgson, 115. I quote Hodgson's translation of the Lectures because it is perfect. For the German, see *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 92, but note some of the broad differences which arise from Hodgson's editorial construction of the one-volume 1827 lectures.

out that a purification of religious consciousness is necessary to elevate 'natural consciousness' to even this starting point.

The philosophical history of religion is then a crucial *Nachdenken* of the contents of philosophy as such. And this is far from making the study of religions dependent on a philosophical foundation. On the contrary, it shows that the study of religions, which comes 'after' the science of *Logik* and the philosophies of *Natur* and *Geist* more generally, is in fact before it. Hegel reinforces this point by making the proto-Barthian argument that though God is the highest and final result of philosophy, it is God's nature not to be a result.[740] In this sense it is also philosophy's nature not to be merely philosophy, but to belong to the larger history of human beings and their elevation to the Absolute. Philosophy is in this sense 'spiritually displaced', because it follows (perhaps paradoxically) the study of religion in the way that the concept of God paradoxically follows its 'metaphorical' manifestation in the *konkrete Vorstellung*. Hence philosophy is itself a 'result' of the history of religion to which it must return as a *Nachdenken* in order to grasp the purpose of its emergence. As I argued in chapter two, many of the conceptual results of the philosophical *Methode* seem to require an explication in the language of *Vorstellung*. The conception of 'the One', for example, is a profound result of philosophy, but its content discloses it in excess of its methodical derivation. As Carlson emphasises, the *Methode* as part of the subjective activity of human self-elevation to the Absolute, is itself self-erasure in so far as 'finite thoughts are only *truly* known when they pass away'.[741] However, part of the limitation of the *Methode* and therefore of much of the presentation of the science of *Logik* is its context as an elevation of human *Geist*. For example, to understand this context

[740] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 93; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 279–281. This is of course because God is 'Absolute'.
[741] Carlson, *Commentary on the Science of Logic*, 601–602.

for the conception of 'the One' one needs to attend to its emergence for human *Geist* in the history of Jewish religion. If one does not understand this context of the dialectical problematisation of 'the One' or *reine Sein* (as not merely a pure but a purified thought) as a development of a religiously problematic moment of purification in the history of human *Geist*, then the entire logic of 'beginning' looks like an absurd metaphysical exercise, and Hegel perhaps does begin to look suspicious of the infamous charge of atheism. But it should be no surprise that Hegel emphasised his (and the Christian mystics') belief in the sublimity of the Jewish Oneness of God as the starting point of his philosophy, noting that the being of the Absolute is the nonbeing (ideality) of the finite. Being and nothing are therefore, as I argued in the first chapter, not an actual unity, but an 'unseparatedness' (*Ungetrenntheit*) of purified subjectivity. In any case, Hegel concludes that a philosophy that affirms that God and God alone exists, ought not to be regarded as atheistic.[742]

Secondly, Hegel's 'demonstration' of the necessity of religion derives from the same source as his conviction of the necessity of the Incarnation; in other words, from the very 'content' of religion or the natures of humanity and divinity, and the structure of mediation.[743] This furthermore includes an affirmation of the relationship between humanity and divinity as the irreducible context of human becoming (and this extends to philosophy itself, as the opening of the *Science of Logic* affirms[744]). What is interesting is the qualification of this relationship as 'religious' and its necessity thereof. The difference between Judaism and *Naturreligion* (and Greek and Roman religions) is fundamentally one of the elevation of the mediation of humanity's relationship to itself from *Natur* to *Geist*, while the Jewish purification of the natural

[742] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 295–296.
[743] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 70.
[744] Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke 5, 19–20.

element in religious consciousness precludes it from productively including a link to the natural within this mediation. However, this is why Hegel emphasises that the fate of the Jewish people was to be held in readiness 'for that loss of mind and world when all are plunged into infinite grief for the death of God'. For if Hegel is really thinking here, as I have suggested, about parallel triads between the 'natural' striving of human beings for the divine without consciousness of sin on the one hand (natural consciousness), and a striving for the divine in light of consciousness of sin on the other (purified consciousness), then the doubling of Judaism in the latter triad expresses its necessity not simply for trivially mediating the transition from Roman religion to Christianity, but more substantially the suspension of subjectivity from the downward sensuous overdetermination it undergoes in the triad of 'natural consciousness'. Hence, finally, the necessity of the religious standpoint points to the need to spiritually insulate oneself from the blind *Zucht* of merely natural and finite religious striving.[745] The inverse of *Zucht* is accordingly *Schicksal* or fate; specifically, the fate of the Jewish people as bound to the coming and sacrifice of Christ, and a fate which includes Jesus Christ himself.

As I have already indicated, this 'religious standpoint' emerges only with the unity in historical consciousness of events and their narration. Even so, Hegel gives this unity a Trinitarian mediation. He notes that it is only with this purification of Jewish consciousness that 'self-conception' (*das Sichdenken*) first comes to consciousness and furthermore does so through the conception of 'Jehovah' (whom Hegel traditionally identifies with the Father) as 'the purely One' (*das reine Eine*). The consciousness of *Naturreligion* can by contrast merely identify with

[745] Note, therefore, the following: 'In jeder Religion ist göttliche Gegenwart, ein göttliches Verhältnis, und eine Philosophie der Geschichte hat in den verkümmertsten Gestalten das Moment des Geistigen aufzusuchen. Darum aber, weil sie Religion ist, ist sie als solche noch nicht gut; man muß nicht in die Schlaffheit verfallen zu sagen, daß es auf den Inhalt nicht ankomme, sondern lediglich auf die Form. Diese schlaffe Gutmütigkeit hatddie jüdische Religion nicht, indem sie absolut ausschließt'; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*,Werke 12, 242.

a One as the universal being of Nature (*das allgemeine Natursein*), but it cannot have it as an object of consciousness. It therefore posits the unity of the One in the human individual but as mediated externally by the universal being of nature. Because of this, natural consciousness lacks a conception of the human willing of the natural over against the Good. It lacks, in other words, a self-conception of human evil. The unity of the consciousness of God and human religious self-conception in Judaism, on the other hand, is both the first form of self-consciousness and therefore the beginning of the awareness that consciousness is always already a consciousness of an other. Hegel seems to have Matthew 11.25-27 in mind as he says all this. Jesus' thanking of the Father, a thanks both for the gracious revelation to the 'infants' and the hiddenness of that revelation from the 'wise', is part of what establishes the unity of the Father and the Son ('no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son'). The coming of self-conception to consciousness is then also the *par excellence* condition for the rational and spiritual grasping of history; it is what allows for the unity of events and their narration. And here I would add that Hegel's notion of *Nachdenken* denotes not just a thinking after the historical facts, the *res gestae* of history, but also a thinking after historical revelation including the revelation of 'history' as such; namely, as a providential outworking of the nature of human *Geist* after the Fall. Hence one reason Hegel insists on the unity of events and their narration is to open up the 'space' for revelation by providing a Trinitarian conception of historical experience where the unity of the *res gestae* and the *historia rerum gestarum* grounds the intelligibility (or graspability: *Begreiflichkeit*) of history as providentially ordered – something only understood in full by the revelation of the Father by the Son in Christianity, but nevertheless anticipated by Jewish discovery of the spiritual unity of the human self and the divine One (a unity later made manifest as the *Logos*).

Accordingly, and as I already indicated, Hegel's reading of the purification of Jewishreligious consciousness is Trinitarian because it expounds at least a prefiguration, in Trinitarian terms, of the Fall and of salvation. The Fall, as I have already noted, is what gives the Jewish people their 'world-historical significance'.[746] As such – and this seldom emphasised – it forms the principle of the West:

> Dadurch geschieht der Bruch zwischen dem Osten und dem Westen; der Geist geht in sich nieder und erfaßt das abstrakte Grundprinzip für das Geistige. Die Natur, die im Orient das Erste und die Grundlage ist, wird jetzt herabgedrückt zum Geschöpf; und der Geist ist nun das Erste. Von Gott wird gewußt, er sei der Schöpfer aller Menschen wie der ganzen Natur, sowie die absolute Wirksamkeit überhaupt.[747]

There is a complex interrelation here between human self-conception and fallenness. Self-conception, in the first place, involves *Geist's* descending or sinking into itself – not a calling out to a beyond, which comes later.[748] It is an *Erinnerung* of the spiritual as the *Grundprinzip* of itself and of creation more generally. Indeed, one of the direct consequences of Judaic purification is that nature is 'depressed' to the 'condition of a mere creature', which is to say that it is grasped as created and therefore as subordinate to the spiritual principle. It is conceived as posited, created, and mediated. This recollection of the spiritual as the inner truth of human beings coincides with the attenuation of *Verstand*: of human finite understanding. At this point it is made explicit that it is the spiritually unrestrained power of *Verstand* that is behind the 'freedom of the one' or the positing of the Despotic individual as deified by the State. Following

[746] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 388. The fact that Hegel only explicitly says this in a later section in the *Philosophy of History* (on the emergence of Christianity out of the Roman world, which Jewish self–conception mediates) after providing a brief outline of the section on Judaea, suggests that he intends the latter as a whole to expound the significance of the Jewish self-conception of fallenness. The most likely explanation for why Hegel only explicitly mentions original sin in the later section on Christianity is that he correctly recognises that this is a Christian 'discovery' and that the Jewish awareness of it ultimately lacks the subjective dimension of sin (about which more below) and is in this sense still 'abstract'.

[747] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 471.

[748] Note also a similar account of the dual mediation of the necessity of the religious standpoint; first inwardly, reaching out from the depths of Geist to religious consciousness, and then outwardly, from religious consciousness to the mediation of its object – the Logos; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I,* Werke 16, 70.

this attenuation of *Verstand*, the limited and circumscribed (*das Beschränkte und Umschriebene*) is put in its proper place and the sensual (*Sinnliche*) and immoral (*Unsittliche*) are no longer privileged. From this emerges the possibility of a historical view (*die Möglichkeit einer* geschichtlichen *Ansicht*[749]), both because history is no longer seen as a realm of indifference, moved only by the brutal recklessness of passion, and because this reckless passion or freedom of the one, of the Despot, is not imagined as theophanic.[750] The important word *Ansicht* (related to other key 19th century terms linked to our view of the world, such as *Anschauung*, *Betrachtung*, and *Ideal*) emphasises a preliminary movement toward what is visible. It indicates the beginning of our ability to see things 'historically'.

4 Jewish Particularity and the Origins of Philosophical Consciousness

According to Christina Crosby, the fact that the God of Judaism 'is not incarnate, is not realised in the world', means that Judaism is necessarily for Hegel of 'a limited "world-historical importance"'.[751] This implies not only that Jewish religion lacks, for Hegel, the world-historical significance of the Christian religion (which is true, if not exactly objectionable), but that the world-historical significance of the Christian religion as a whole is constituted by the Incarnation. This is problematic in so far as Hegel defines the challenge facing Christianity as consisting precisely of the need to sustain itself after the passing of the historical presence of Christ.[752] Another one of Crosby's objections is that Hegel considers the Jewish people to be 'philosophically speaking, a prehistoric people'.[753] It is not clear to me why Crosby would say

[749] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 243.
[750] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 243; 'Menschen werden als Individuen, nicht als Inkarnationen Gottes, Sonne als Sonne, Berge als Berge, nicht als in ihnen selbst Geist und Willen habend, genommen'.
[751] C. Crosby, *The Ends of History: Victorians and "The Woman Question"* (London: Routledge, 1991), 33.
[752] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 469–470. The Catholic Church is criticised for failing to deal with the passing of the earthly presence of Christ, and for attempting to rediscover this presence in the material world through various sensuous mediations.
[753] Crosby, *The Ends of History*, 33.

this, given that Hegel thinks that it is in Philo, the Alexandrian Jew who lived before and after the birth of Christ, in whom we first find the '*Wendung des allgemeinen Bewußtseins als philosophisches Bewußtsein*'.[754]

Philo articulates the Jewish consciousness of his time in a universal philosophical form. It is important to examine what this consists of. Hegel argues (with some license) that Philo does not take religious and philosophical truth as something which is 'given' from without, but as something which is to be drawn or brought out from within, through *Nachdenken*.[755] However, what is brought out from this 'within' had to be given from 'without', which is to say, it had to be revealed. Thus, for Hegel, the men who wrote the books of the Bible did not individually 'think' the deep thought contents contained therein (whose origin is properly attributable only to *Geist*). The bringing to consciousness, that is, to subjective thought, the '*Denken'* that is objectively contained in Scripture and tradition, is the origin of 'philosophical' consciousness. This 'second', reflective, and therefore subjective thinking of a prior *Denken* is what Hegel calls *Nachdenken*. It is in the section on Philo that Hegel develops one of his clearest discussions on the meaning of *Nachdenken*:

> Es ist überhaupt ein großer Unterschied zwischen dem, was darin liegt, und dem, was ausgesprochen ist. In der ganzen Geschichte, Kunst, Philosophie usf. kommt es darauf an, daß das, was darin ist, auch heraus sei; die Arbeit des Geistes ist ganz allein, das zum Bewußtsein zu bringen, was darin ist. Weiß man nur dies, so ist es schon an das Bewußtsein herausgebracht; dies Herausbringen ist also das Wesentliche. Das Andere ist, daß, wenn auch aus einer Gestaltung, Religion usf. das nicht herausgebracht wird vor das Bewußtsein, was darin gelegen hat, man doch nicht sagen kann, es habe nicht darin gelegen, es sei nicht im menschlichen Geist gewesen; im Bewußtsein war es nicht, in der Vorstellung auch nicht, aber darin ist es gewesen. Einerseits ist das Zum-bestimmten-Bewußtsein-Bringen des Gedankens ein Hineinlegen, aber andererseits, der

[754] G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Werke 19 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 418. Stephen Theron further emphasises Hegel's conception of the ancient Jews as 'a nation of philosophers'; see S. Theron, *Hegel's Apotheosis of Logic* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), ix.

[755] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II,* Werke 19, 420.

> Materie nach, ist es nicht ein Hineinlegen. Philons Manier hat vornehmlich diese Seite.[756]

Hence, Hegel adds that the writing of the Hebrew Bible involved precisely such a process:

> Beim göttlichen Buch (dessen Urheber der Geist ist) kann man nicht sagen, daß dies nicht darin gewesen sei. Es kommt darauf an, ob diese Geistigkeit tiefer oder oberflächlicher ist; ein Mann hat das Buch geschrieben, er hatte diese Gedanken nicht, aber im Intensiven des Verhältnisses sind diese Gedanken an sich enthalten.[757]

It is difficult not to think here of all theology as *Nachdenken* in this sense, as that which comes *after* revelation and brings it to determinate consciousness, or, to think especially of theological interpretation, here following Spaventa, as the revelation of the secret of *Denken*.[758]

The main implication of this view of *Nachdenken* as theological interpretation of revelation in history is that 'revelation' is not possible as 'original history'. This is to say, that revelation is not thinkable from within the immediacy of its historical situation, or more accurately, from within the historical consciousness to which revelation has been 'given' (in the sense of 'presented'). *Nachdenken* therefore refers to more than an immanently discursive 'reflection' on one's own historical consciousness. As I also argued *apropos* the difference between Jewish and Roman consciousness, the self-reflective expression or articulation of one's spiritual *Schicksal* requires what Hegel calls a 'higher condition' of consciousness.[759] To be sure, Hegel also gives us here the significance of *Nachdenken* as a specifically postlapsarian practice, with 'fallenness' being commensurate with a special sort of ignorance indicated by the depth of one's spirituality and of one's closeness to the Revealed. The point of importance, as Hegel puts it, concerns the 'gap' between what is simply contained in the sacred texts and what we express through them, the gap between *Darstellung* and *Vorstellung*. (This was also behind the

[756] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Werke 19, 450.
[757] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Werke 19, 420.
[758] B. Spaventa, 'Frammento Inedito', in *Opere*, 1196.
[759] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388.

antithesis of compression and expression or expansion maintained by von Baader.[760]) In other words, what is important is whether the spiritual or religious dimension or 'depth' is hermeneutically (in the Bible) and anthropologically (in human consciousness) given on the 'surface', or whether it has been compressed (and perhaps 'repressed') somewhere deeper as a result of sin and historical calamity. Hegel opts for the latter option, connecting (as he often does) Philo's deep, interpretative work to a more general religious *Arbeit des Geistes*.[761] One could, therefore, wholeheartedly endorse in connection with this issue Stephen Dunning's characterisation of *Geist* as the religious 'depth' of humanity.[762]

Philo himself is, according to Hegel, engaged in this sort of *Nachdenken*, and the Jewish people more generally were incited, by the '*Geist* of *Philosophie*', to (re)present their sacred texts as a system of divine wisdom (i.e. as philosophy). Because *Nachdenken* presupposes a given and prior *Denken* which is merely 'presented' (*Darstellt*) to consciousness, it necessarily involves (as I also argued in chapter two) *re*-presentation. *Nachdenken* requires *Vorstellung.* In the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel points out that the abstract 'definition' or 'determination' (*Bestimmung*) of history refers simply to the *Darstellung* of *Geist*.[763] This, however, means figuring out what *Geist* is in its potentiality, which in turn requires a more concrete understanding of history through its (re)presentation. For Hegel, the possibility of this concrete historical outlook, along with the principle of *Vorstellung* itself, is tied to the development of Jewish religious consciousness. Indeed, what Jameson has called the 'drift'[764] from *Verstand* to *Vorstellung,* in the process of the absolutisation of consciousness (toward *Vernunft*), is

[760] Baader, *Fermenta Cognitionis 1*, 25.
[761] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 19, 420.
[762] This is a basic characterisation of *Geist* throughout S. Dunning's *Tongues of Men: Hegel and Hamann on Religious Language and History* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979).
[763] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 31.
[764] Jameson, *The Hegel Variations*, 122.

associated by Hegel with the development of Jewish religious consciousness. This principle of Judaic *Vorstellung*, enacted by Philo himself, is what exists before and after Christ – himself the absolute and concrete (re)presentation (*konkrete Vorstellung*) – over against Roman *Verstand*, which the latter destroys.

Thus when Hegel writes that, for Philo, the soul should be subtracted from the sensuous element of the body and be elevated to an object of pure thought (*reinen Gegenstande des Gedankens*), he is referring to the general form of Jewish religious consciousness as divinely 'purified' (*gereinigt*) of its subservient relationship to nature, but also to the natural orientation of this purified consciousness towards philosophical consciousness. This is how Judaism arrives at its key (re)presentation: *monotheism*, an object of pure thought. Jehova is the *reine Eine*; he is simple.[765] But there is a limitation to this form of religious consciousness. Because it proceeds from the conjunction of the awareness of God as One, on the one hand, and a self-consciousness of mere fallenness (where reconciliation remains only a 'prophecy'[766]), on the other, Jewish consciousness '*kann nur wissen*, daß *er [Gott] ist*, *nicht*, was *er ist*'.[767] The difference between this Judaic standpoint and the 'absolute' standpoint of Christianity is that '*[i]m Christentum ist [...] das Einfache nur als Moment, und das Ganze ist Gott der Geist*'.[768] This specification of the Christian God as *Geist* (and, therefore, as Triune[769]) anticipates the Incarnation, and the irreducibility of Christian revelation as a union of the human and divine. Judaic religious consciousness therefore appears to exist in the midpoint between 'purified' and 'philosophical' consciousness, as *Vorstellung* exists in the midpoint between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

[765] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241.
[766] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 389–390.
[767] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Werke 19, 421. My emphasis.
[768] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Werke 19, 421.
[769] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386.

However, as Hegel unambiguously affirms in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, this Judaic consciousness (which in the case of Spinoza was reproached as atheistic for regarding God as merely One and, therefore, as merely *Lord*) is only pre- or para-philosophical from the standpoint of the *concept* of philosophy. From this standpoint, Hegel insists, all philosophers would be atheists, and indeed, inadequate philosophers,[770] since we are all, still, at the origins of philosophical consciousness. The completion of the highest human consciousness is only attained by Christ himself, though it remains a promise (beyond mere prophecy) made to a future reconciled community. The closing section of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* addresses this 'realisation of the spirituality of the community' after Christ's departure. There, Hegel makes an extraordinary leap, moving forward nearly two thousand years, from this departure, to the modern world of his own lifetime. There is an implicit recognition here of what the *Philosophy of History* affirms explicitly; that history – 'what has happened' –has not come to an end, but is 'happening every day.'[771] The promise of reconciliation remains for modern philosophy, which is here qualified as being, to this extent, theology.[772] Hegel concludes with a reference to *Philippians* 4.7, suggesting that this 'philosophical reconciliation' *qua* theology, is not 'higher' than all reason, but is precisely that peace through which reason is recognised as true, and through which philosophy will, one day, be 'realised':

> Diese Versöhnung ist dann der Friede Gottes, der nicht höher ist als alle Vernunft, sondern der durch die Vernunft erst gewußt, gedacht und als das Wahre erkannt wird.[773]

[770] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 295–296.
[771] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 540; '*was geschehen ist und alle Tage geschieht*'. My emphasis.
[772] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 342.
[773] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 269. This reference is from the 1827 manuscript and is unfortunately missing in the Suhrkamp edition of volume 17 of Hegel's collected works. Note, also, that Luther translates *nous* as *Vernunft* rather than *Verstand* (as in the NRSV's 'understanding'). Hegel generally associates *nous* with both *Vernunft* and *Geist*, hence, his approving statements, in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, on the ancient proposition that *nous* is the cause of the world and/or governs it; *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 52.

Part III

Dritëro Demjaha

CHAPTER 5

Between the Histories of Fall and Truth *or* The Omnidirectionality of Christocentric Mediation

Introduction

Hegel concludes the 1827 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* with a restatement of the classic opposition between the 'vanity' (*Eitelkeit*) of *Verstand* and the 'ingenuousness' (*Unbefangenheit*) of *Religiosität*.[774] The difficulty for philosophy lies in holding on to both of these dimensions of *Geist* in the 'rational [*vernünftige*] cognition of religion'.[775] More accurately put, the reconciliation of these two dimensions *is* philosophy.[776] The path toward philosophy as this reconciliation, therefore (and as Hegel repeatedly affirms[777]), lies in *Nachdenken*, in thinking 'theologically' after and in the *Logos*. As such, this concluding restatement in the *Lectures* serves as a reminder that the 'rational cognition of religion' is an infinite return to the *Logos* as that '*einfache Sichvernehmenlassen, das keinen festen Unterschied macht, kein fester Unterschied wird, sondern unmittelbar vernommen ist*'.[778] Hegel's specification of the *Logos* as the self-expressing word, has a special meaning in the context of his understanding of the Christ-Event as the presentation (*Darstellung*) of the highest consciousness of humanity, in the 'life and history' of a single individual. The life and history of Jesus Christ is world-historically unique, because the presentation of its content is given universally in its historical 'eventality', i.e. as always already constituted as an 'event'.

[774] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Vorlesungen 5, 269.
[775] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III*, Vorlesungen 5, 270.
[776] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 342.
[777] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie I*, Werke 8, 42–52 passim.
[778] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 239.

Hence, where history is generally constituted only through the unity of its events and their narration in subjective *Vorstellen*, the life and history of Christ is paradoxically given both immediately and universally, viz. in faith.

For Hegel, the Incarnation of divinity in a single individual in history is the necessary fulfilment of the plan or 'concept' of Creation, as the concrete mediation of the human and the divine, as well as the completion of the 'highest consciousness' of the individual. One of Hegel's ways of expressing the necessity of this Incarnation is through his claim that it is the central axis of history; indeed, that 'history goes *to* it and *from* it'. The leading up to the Incarnation – the 'history of the Fall' – is the 'working-out' of human potentiality, of the content of the human *Urbild*, through the attempt to (re)present the divine as 'abstract concept'. The Incarnation is the concrete manifestation of the latter against which human beings have existed in a state of antithesis. Hence history after the Christ-Event becomes reconciled, which is really to say that it is opened to truth. As Benedetto Croce puts it, 'history becomes *history of the truth* with Christianity, it […] recognizes its own proper law, which is no longer a natural law, blind fate, or even the influence of the stars, but rationality, intelligence, providence'.[779] What Croce neglected to add, of course, was that history becomes historically graspable through the development of Jewish religious consciousness. Hence when John Sibree, the most famous English language translator of the *Philosophy of History,* writes that the Christ-Event is both '*the goal* and *the starting point* of History',[780] he should be taken to mean that while the Christ-Event is the starting 'point' of the 'history of Truth' or of history after reconciliation, this 'point' is itself the goal of history as the 'history of the Fall'. This 'doubling' of history posits

[779] Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 205. My emphasis.
[780] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Pulications, 1956), 319.

a 'doubling' of the *Logos* as the Son. The periodisation (as Hegel affirms) is Trinitarian, but it involves an 'inversion-reversion' in its operation, with the emergent economic formula of Son-Father-Son-Spirit.[781] The history of the Fall concludes with the Christ-Event as the revelation of the Father by the Son where the history of Truth is a promise of the Spirit by the Son. Thus when Alan M. Olson points out that the Trinitarian economy is the revelation in history 'of what is universally true as a structural feature of consciousness', this should be taken to refer to the disclosure of a higher consciousness in Christ which is promised to a future 'realised community'.[782]

The punctuation of history by the Christ-Event as the *Mittelpunkt* of reconciliation,[783] is important for what I have called the 'omnidirectionality' of Christocentric mediation. By this I mean that the Christ-Event affects its 'past' or the history of the Fall as well as its 'future' or the history of reconciliation. It is perhaps not controversial to claim that the understanding of the Fall and sin in Christianity derives ultimately not from *Genesis* (nor, perhaps, from *Hosea*[784]), but from Paul and the Gospels. I believe this to be true theologically, apart from considerations about Hegel's view, but I also believe that it is essentially Hegel's position. In this chapter, I wish to make the possibly radical claim that human fallenness and sin are 'constituted' for Hegel through the Christ-Event, which is to say, by the rejection of Christ[785].

[781] I describe this pattern, following von Balthasar, as inversion-reversion, but Hegel's own language of the doubling of mediation (which ultimately produces a somewhat different economic formula from von Balthasar's Father-Holy Spirit-Son) seems itself linked to the need to account both for inversions (in the overturning of form and content in history) and recurrences in patterns of history. For an account of the Trinitarian inversion in von Balthasar, see M. L. Sutton,. 'A Compelling Trinitarian Taxonomy: Hans Urs von Balthasar's Theology of the Trinitarian Inversion and Reversion' *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 14.2 (2012), 161– 176.

[782] A. M. Olson, *Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy as Pneumatology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 133.

[783] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 249.

[784] For a classic exegesis of *Hosea* as a crucial development of the idea of a rupture in an original Adamic covenant in Eden, see J. L. Mays, *Hosea: A Commentary* (London: SCM Press, 1969), especially 99–107.

[785] This may be read as a proto-Barthian move in so far as the doctrine of reconciliation is posited as the condition for the possibility of a doctrine of sin. The same may be said of the focus on Christ's death as the centre of

By ‘constitution’, I mean that human fallenness can only be ‘posited’ as a tendency towards evil and self-centredness within history, through the Christ-Event. Hegel argues that the Christ-Event constitutes a radical ‘resetting’ of human ethical and communal ties to a state of *absolute Entzweiung.* In this sense, ‘the Fall’ as an event in history, coincides with the Christ-Event. This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first, I register a disagreement with Hodgson on the issue of the relationship between the ‘universal content’ of the Fall narrative and the ‘particular form’ of the Jewish religious response to it. In the second section, I develop the idea of the Christocentric punctuation of history into the histories of the Fall and truth. In the third, I develop the notion of the historical coincidence of the Christ-Event and the Fall-Event. In the fourth section, I address the end of finite religion with the emergence of Christianity. And in the final fifth section, I develop Hegel’s account of the life and history of Christ, and its significance for the possibility of philosophical thinking.

reconciliation and revelation; cf. K. Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man* trans. A. Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 88. Barth’s starting point in *Church Dogmatics* 4 is that ‘[w]ithin its limit the nature created by God is indeed good and not bad. Within the sphere of the self-knowledge not enlightened and instructed by the Word of God there is no place for anything worthy of the name of a “knowledge of sin.” There is not revealed that which, if man is not to remain a sinner and perish, can be removed and made good only by the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. Men preoccupied with themselves have no eyes to see this or categories to grasp it. They do not have these because they lack the will to see it and to grasp it. Access to the knowledge that he is a sinner is lacking to man because he is a sinner’. All this is true for Hegel as far as ‘natural consciousness’ is concerned. Barth adds that ‘[a]ll serious theology has tried to win its knowledge of sin from the Word of God and to base it on that Word’; K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* 4 trans. G.W. Bromiley (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 361. This is also true, in one way or another, for all, including Hegel’s, ‘theology’, though Barth’s account of how knowledge is constituted in and through the revelation of God as Word is basically neo-Kantian (his insistence on *Nachdenken* notwithstanding), rather than genuinely ‘dialectical’ in the Hegelian sense of involving creative and teleological emergences in history through processes of metaphorical transference. Still, as Jacob Taubes insists, ‘[a]t no point does the *premise* of Barth’s pantheology contradict the *scheme* of Hegel’s dialectic’; Taubes, ‘Theodicy and Theology’, 188. There is a lot of work on Barth’s neo-Kantian tendencies, but a good starting place is J. Lyden ‘The Influence of Hermann Cohen on Karl Barth's Dialectical Theology’ *Modern Judaism* 12 (1992), 167-183. The linking of sin to the Christ-Event in general, and to the rejection of Christ in particular, was also made by the Dominican priest and philosopher Timothy McDermott in two articles for *New Blackfriars*. McDermott employs a quasi-Balthasarian theo-dramatic conception of history as a play through which human beings, as individual actors, must perform their unity in completing a plot. But in rejecting the Incarnation they spoil ‘the whole play from beginning to end; not meaning by this that they introduced into history for the first time a defect which was foreign to it, but that they abandoned history to its innate defectiveness’; T. McDermott, ‘Original Sin I’ and ‘Original Sin II’, *New Blackfriars* 49 (1968), 180-189, and 237-243, quotation from 239. McDermott’s emphasis on humankind as a botched historical unity is very close to Hegel’s. However, I am not sure that his theory of history is anywhere near sophisticated enough to ontologically ground the Christological constitution of a universal culpability (though von Balthasar’s maybe). For a theological critique of McDermott’s position see the anti-Hegelian gem by I. Trethowan, *Absolute Value: Study in Christian Theism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 166-171.

1 Judaism and the Universal Content of the Fall Narrative

Hodgson has suggested that, for Hegel, the *Genesis* creation and Fall narratives possess a universal content which becomes lost for Judaism as a result of the limitations of Jewish religious consciousness. This is obviously true in one way or another, but I would like to argue that it is not true if it means that the problem of the Fall, as a universal problem for '*die Natur des Menschen als Menschen*', is separate from the historical fate of the Jewish people. Hodgson is undoubtedly following Fackenheim's classic discussion of Hegel's 'remarkable assertion' (which Fackenheim, however, adds must be taken as rightly attributable to Christianity as 'supersessionist') that the doctrines of creation and fall 'had no influence on the subsequent development of Judaism... [but remained a mere] prophecy, the universal element in which did not become a truth for the people of Israel'.[786] As Fackenheim affirms, the *oppositio* of Judaism lies for Hegel in the difference posited between the transcendence of the monotheistic God (in contradistinction to all pagan deities) and the finiteness of human beings[787]. Hegel's claim then appears to be that the 'universality' of creation disclosed through the revelation of a God who is both One and transcendent is a universality which does not 'become a truth' for the Jewish people; it does not enter their religious consciousness. The point here, however, is *not* that there exists a contradiction between Jewish religious consciousness and practice, on the one hand, and the conception of God, on the other, but that there exists a contradiction between Jewish religious practice and the pagan world in which it attempts to enact its religious 'wisdom'. As I argued in chapter three, Jewish consciousness remains 'historically outside' of the Roman

[786] Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*, 134; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 72.

[787] It should be noted that Hegel, probably following Herder, believed that *Genesis* was the earliest written book of the entire Hebrew Bible. For Herder's view on this, see C. Bultmann, 'Creation At the Beginning of History: Johann Gottfried Herder's Interpretation of Genesis 1' *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 68 (1995), 23–32.

world due to the conjunction of its monotheism and its self-understanding as an 'exclusive unity'. But the opposition inherent to that conjunction is itself required to mediate the more fundamental contradiction between Jewish religious practice and the abstract universality of the Roman world of *Privatrecht*.

Hodgson, argues that

> on the one hand, God is universal, the God of all humanity ('all peoples are called upon to recognize him and glorify his name', Psalm 117:1–2), but on the other hand, God's purposes and operations are so limited as to be confined to just this one people, defined by birth and race. For this reason, in Hegel's view, the universal content of the story of the creation and fall of humanity in Genesis 1–3 became disconnected from subsequent Jewish piety.[788]

It is, of course, undeniable, that Hegel said in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* that the 'universal content' of creation and Fall had no influence on subsequent Jewish religion. The issue is that by 'subsequent Jewish religion', Hegel clearly means the rest of the five books of Moses ('which begin with creation and Fall'[789]). Hence, in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, the Davidic Psalms (which come after the Pentateuch) are identified as exemplaries of this consciousness of fallenness.[790] And, as we have seen, the *Shicksal* of the Jewish people is historically dislocated, because it involves being 'held in readiness', as an exclusive unity, for the coming and death of Christ, which is historically 'later' than the historically specific *Geist* of the origins of Jewish religion in the Pentateuch.[791]

[788] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 231.
[789] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 72.
[790] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 388–390.
[791] Hence, the 'duplication' of the account of Judaism in the *Philosophy of History*, under the headings of both 'Judaea' and the 'Roman world'.

Hodgson also points out that Jewish particularity is not 'polemical', though it is not clear whether in saying this he is implying (though not endorsing) that an obligation to convert, pursued with fanaticism, would have better cultivated the universal content of *Genesis*.[792] Another problem is that Hegel is himself somewhat inconsistent on this matter. For example, in the section on *die Vorstellung* in the lectures on religion, he argues that religion becomes polemical when it is elevated to the form of *Vorstellung*.[793] And he, of course, believes that this elevation first occurs with Judaism. In any case, I believe that it is possible to read the recognition of the non-polemical particularity of Jewish religious consciousness as uniquely constructive. For it would be entirely consistent with Hegel's account of the 'elevation' from *Naturreligion* to Jewish religion, to argue that the particularistic operation of the Jewish God in the context of the Jewish covenant as an *exclusive unity*, indicates the *Aufhebung* of the particularistic *disunion* of *Naturreligion* (from which derives the more general or 'universal' breakdown of the unity of humankind in history). This is already indicated in Hegel's account which (as Hodgson affirms) emphasises a 'negative' expression of Jewish religion as fear of God as Lord, and a 'positive' expression, as the fostering, through this relationship to God as Lord, of an infinite faith and trust. But this only obliquely conveys the fact that it is really only in direct contradistinction to *Naturreligion* that this positive expression may be derived in its connection to the negative (i.e. that faith can be derived from 'fear'). As a purification of the consciousness of *Naturreligion*, Jewish religion as an exclusive and moreover, negative unity, responds to natural consciousness' view of the freedom of the one by affirming that this is one-sidedly true; yes, only the one is free but only God is the One.[794]

[782] Islam is, for Hegel, thusly 'fanatical', but its doctrines of sin are likewise removed from the sort of 'universality' that interests him; cf. Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 231–232.
[793] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 139-140; 'Wenn die Religion in die Form der Vorstellung erhoben ist, so hat sie sogleich etwas *Polemisches* an sich'.
[794] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 241.

On this interpretation of Jewish particularity, self-conception, and moreover the self-conception of human fallenness, is but one moment of the human *Heilsgeschichte*. It is not the sole source of Christian views about sin and the Fall. Once again, this does not seem especially controversial: for example, there seems to be a clear shift from the *Genesis* story to the Gospels and Paul, from a universal condition of fallenness, on the one hand, to a universal guilt for that fallenness, on the other. Hegel identifies this as the Church's 'correction' to the *Genesis* account which he, however, also qualifies as a correction of the limitations of the 'sensible mode of expression'. The correction concerns the addition of a notion of a universal inheritance of sin and therefore of guilt, though Hegel ultimately emphasises that, from a philosophical standpoint, it is the universality of human consciousness as such that is of key importance.[795] As Aquinas also argued, individual responsibility (including as it is represented in *Genesis*) seems irreconcilable to the inheritance of sin (as it is represented in the New Testament).[796] What is needed is an account of humanity as a unified whole (and perhaps, for Aquinas, as somehow sharing a single will). Hegel, of course, provides this in his conception of of humanity as *Geist*, which allows him to not only think of human beings as a spiritual unity, but to also think of history in terms of the breakdown of that spiritual unity. And paired with the qualification of the correction above as a correction of the sensible mode of expression, this means that Hegel identifies in the revelation of the Christ-Event the principle for the transformation of human consciousness beyond the sensible intuiting of the spiritual. This principle is nothing other than the unified fate of all human beings as revealed by the life and death of Christ. Thus, while the Jewish purification of religious consciousness allows for the 'renaturalisation' of the natural contents of *Naturreligion*, and consequently for the possibility

[795] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 257–258.
[796] Aquinas, 1a-2a Q. 81 art 1; cf. *de Malo*, trans. R. Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Q.4 art.1.

of history, Christian revelation ultimately allows for the immanent spiritualisation of that history (beyond the Law) and consequently for Croce's history of Truth.

2 The Christocentric Punctuation of History

What Croce calls the history of Truth indicates a transformed understanding of the entirety of history under its 'proper law', past and future. However, in order to fully grasp this, we must be able to think the so-called history of the Fall. Hegel emphasises that the 'history of the Fall' is framed by Adam and Christ, where the Fall of Adam depicts his failure to achieve a becoming of self-mediated elevation to the divine. For this reason, Hegel qualifies Gen. 3.22 ('Behold, Adam has become like one of us') as really referring to Christ, the second Adam. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, rather than presenting Adam as the butt of a divine joke, Gen. 3.22 expresses the consolation that history and the providential plan of human salvation has been set in motion, the Adamic trespass notwithstanding. And secondly, it expresses the profound insight that the Adamic (re)presentation of a unified individuality will not be achieved until the Christ-Event, at which point it surpasses the merely (re)presentational form (the 'representation of the death of Christ as the death of representation'[797]). Hence the 'death of the representation of God held by humankind in its state of alienation', as Merklinger put it,[798] entails also the death of the (re)presentation of humankind held by itself in its state of alienation, something implied also by Rose.[799] Instead, the Christ-Event in general, and the death of Christ in particular, reveals that genuine human individuality, as presupposed for the realisation of freedom as the *Zweck* of history, requires the freedom of *Geist* as such and, therefore, the complete transfiguration of human consciousness into realised community. (In this sense,

[797] Collins, *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion*, 341.
[798] Merklinger, *Philosophy, Theology, and Hegel's Berlin Philosophy of Religion*,174.
[799] G. Rose, *Hegel contra Sociology* (London: Verso, 2009), 98.

Genesis points to its own 'correction'.) Moreover, because the historical becoming of finite human *Geist* constitutes the ground on which God's plan for Creation appears, God is *essentially* (rather than merely voluntarily) related to the self-consciousness of *Geist* as freedom.[800] For this reason, as Hegel suggests apropos of Gen. 3.22, the very Fall of humankind incites the self-consciousness of the divinity of human *Geist* (of the second Adam who 'has become like one of us').

There is, of course, a common (and frequently negative) perception about Hegel's treatment of the Fall as overestimating its effective possibilities, to the point of regarding it as dialectically or logically 'necessary' for human becoming. An alternative (and likewise negative) perception is that Hegel has no theory of the Fall at all which, from a traditional Christian theological standpoint, suffers the same problem as the position that the Fall is a structural necessity of human becoming, rather than a freely willed error (or something like that) which binds humanity to a state of sin and guilt. As Karl Rahner argued, if the origins of our present fragmented nature 'were not historically human, what we should have would be Manicheism (as Augustine would say) or a conception which saw inevitable sinfulness in the very fact of being creaturely'.[801] These perceptions, however, are mistaken. What is necessary for Hegel is simply human becoming. Another way of saying this is that any conception of original or Adamic justice used to argue that the origins of humanity do not immediately coincide with the self-centred willing of our natural impulses ('inevitable sinfulness in the very fact of being creaturely') should not entail a view of freedom undefined by self-movement. Freedom, including in the *status integritatis*, includes the need for its full realisation, so that the alignment

[800] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 79.
[801] K. Rahner, 'Theological Reflections on Monogenism', in *Theological Investigations 1* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), 281.

of the human will with the divine is not merely a possibility of freedom (alongside the alignment against it), but part of its realisability. Hegel is clearest about this in the *Philosophy of Right* where he argues that the concept of *Geist* as *causa sui* consists precisely in the fact that it ought to be explicitly or 'for itself', what it is implicitly or 'in itself'. And it is only because of this necessity of freedom as becoming that *Geist* can be actually, which is to say, historically (i.e. 'im Willen das Böse') what it is not potentially and 'conceptually'.[802]

The Christocentric division into the histories of Fall and reconciliation points to a doubling consequent on the failure of human beings to realise the plan of Creation; without the Fall and the direct development of natural immediacy there would have been no such division. However, with the arrival of Christ, the history of the Fall becomes also the history of the explication of the divine nature and therefore retains some of its immanent conceptual determination. *Geist* can only be free through the infinite return to the natural immediacy of its existence, particularly in its current state of sin.[803] The life and fate of Christ achieve this return and subsequent elevation to the Kingdom of God, achieving in the life of a single human being what has failed in history. Hegel makes this point explicitly, emphasising that the Gospels do not say anything about how the elevation of human souls to the Kingdom is mediated; they merely 'present' Christ's 'unmittelbare Sichversetzen *in die Wahrheit'.*[804] And while the teaching of Christ speaks to the religious imagination (*die Vorstellung*), since 'religion is the consciousness of absolute truth in so far as it occurs for all human beings',[805] it is also uniquely and *immediately*

[802] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 142. It may alternatively be said that what is dialectically necessary for Hegel is the necessity of dialectics itself. And this itself may be taken to entail a subversion of the traditional theological position because dialectical negation may be defined as necessarily agonistic. But to maintain this is to derive Hegel's reading of the Fall from an abstract interpretation of dialectics, rather than (at least partly) to seek the necessity of the latter in the context of Hegel's religious views in general, and his reading of the Fall, in particular, as his philosophy demands.

[803] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke 7, 142. This means that *Geist*'s 'return' is infinite, not that it returns an infinite number of times.

[804] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 282.

[805] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 291.

commensurate with the presentation (*Darstellung*) of the divine idea in his life and fate. In this way, the content of the teaching – the Kingdom of God – enters reality, '*so daß die, welche zu jenem Reich gelangen sollen, es nur durch jenes eine Individuum können*'.[806] This, at the same time, forms the ground which unites all of humankind. Christ is the Son of Man, which means that he belongs to all men, and he is the Son of God, which means that all are the children of God.[807] This focus on humanity, on the birth of Christ's consciousness within the natural immediacy of life, is crucial. For although his teaching demands a renunciation and an *Ablassen* of finite life and one's self-subsistence, it is not an 'external revelation' (*äußeren Offenbarung*) 'superhumanly' imposed from without but is the work of God by someone paradoxically and essentially both human and divine.[808]

3 Christ-Event as Fall-Event

Though it is seldom addressed, Hegel does believe that Christ was a sinless individual, and that the entering of this sinless and holy consciousness into a sinful and violent world demands bearing a martyr to the Truth (and to the coming of a new history of this truth), a fate which leads to 'death, brought about by injustice, hatred, and violence'[809] and a fate moreover sealed by faith. However, all finite life under sin is destined for death, as Hodgson emphasises.[810] This is, indeed, the fate of humanity under mere natural consciousness. Hence, the renunciation of finite life, alongside Christ's death, is itself a renunciation of death (Hegel reads some of this into Matt. 8.22).[811] Christ's death is therefore proof that the serpent's words (Gen. 3.5) were a lie, but at the same time, that God's (Gen. 3.22) were true. The history of the Fall (which is, in

[806] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 285.
[807] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 285.
[808] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 285.
[809] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 279 ,286, 288.
[810] P. Hodgson, 'Hegel's Christology: Shifting Nuances in the Berlin Lectures', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 53.1 (1985), 36.
[811] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 281.

this sense, the history of the serpent's lie) can and should be understood in terms of the tension between those two statements, such that 'fallenness' is historically constituted for Hegel under the conditions of its overcoming. And here it should be noted that for Hegel, as for Aquinas and others, the term 'original' in 'original sin' seems to refer not to the origins of humankind as a whole, but to the origins of individuals (hence not *ab origine* but *per originem*). This perhaps importantly qualifies sin as a fragmentation of the implicit unity of humankind or, perhaps more accurately, of the inability of humankind to build on the unity of humanity. Furthermore, 'original sin' as something 'transmitted' to all human persons at their individual origin qualifies the state of unfreedom (where freedom as in the *Philosophy of Right*, is defined as the transformation of spiritual potentiality into actuality) to which a human being born in a world of slavery and violence is bound, as based on an exclusivist or atomised mode of existence. And it is this mode of existence against which the teaching of Christ violently clashes.

Now I mentioned that for Hegel human fallenness or sin are historically fully constituted at the moment of their overcoming. I am not referring here to atonement but to Christ's personal sinlessness. How are these related? On the one hand, the emergence of Christianity proves the truth of Solomon's words that 'there is no man who does not sin' (1 Kings 8.46). The authors of the New Testament are of course anxious to make this point, with John the apostle arguing that its denial makes a liar of God (1 John 1.10). On the other hand, Christ is without sin and is separate from sinners (Heb. 7.26). This, Hegel calls the 'negative, polemical' side of his historical appearance. Christ is paradoxically separate from sinners because he is the first human being to go beyond himself by freely willing the universal concept (this is Hegelese for his obedience to the Father), which is to say, beyond the mere reproduction of the human will as merely natural, and to fulfil the exclusive self-transcendence *qua* purification of the Jewish

people, which is to say, within the realm of finite social life and therefore within the possibility of a universal community. Hence Christ's teaching, while radically at odds to the world, contains the principle of its renunciation within the affirmation of its new spirit (Hegel's favourite example is Matt. 19.21; '*wenn alles den Armen gegeben wird, so sind keine Armen*[812]).

Hegel refers to the effect of this teaching as a *Zurücksetzung,* a 'resetting' of human communal ethical ties. This resetting constitutes the beginning of Christian *Geist* and coincides with the full consciousness of the need for reconciliation. The reason for this, however, is that at the beginning of Christianity (which, lest we forget, involves for Hegel the rising world-historical awareness of the Jewish self-conception of human sin in the context of Roman decadence and death) consciousness is in a state of 'absolute' *Entzweiung*.

> In der christlichen Religion mußte aber das Bedürfnis dieser Versöhnung mehr als in den anderen Religionen hervortreten. Denn sie beginnt selbst von der *absoluten Entzweiung* und fängt von dem Schmerze an, indem sie die natürliche Einheit des Geistes zerreißt und den natürlichen Frieden zerstört. Der Mensch erscheint in ihr als böse von Hause aus, ist also in seinem Innersten ein Negatives mit sich selbst, und der Geist, wie er in sich zurückgetrieben ist, findet sich gegen das unendliche, absolute Wesen entzweit.[813]

It is, of course, not immediately clear what this 'absolute *Entzweiung*' is. We tend to think of God as the *absolutum*, in the context of Hegel as well as Nicholas of Cusa (who originated the notion and use of the term as a noun[814]). On the one hand, 'absolute' as *absolutus* denotes something detached, in which case an 'absolute *Entzweiung*' sounds pleonasmic. On the other, *absolutus* may also mean 'complete' which is directly antithetical to something which can be described as *entzweitet*.

[812] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 281. My empahsis.
[813] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Werke 16, 25–26. Hegel's emphasis.
[814] At least I cannot find any earlier uses, nor apparently, can Inwood; see *A Hegel Dictionary*, 27.

However, a relatively plausible meaning suggests itself, and that is that the absolutisation of an *Entzweiung* means the intensification of the division to the point where the separated halves of the whole are completely isolated to the point of the impossibility of their reconciliation.[815] Hegel of course gives no indication of the possibility of their reconcilability in the histories of earlier spiritual formations. But there the point is that *Geist* has no self-conception of sin and no consequent awareness of the need for this reconciliation. The 'awareness' of this need is important not because it is subjectively constitutive of human fallenness, but because the awareness of human fallenness is necessary for the possibility of recognising one's historicality. And fallenness, in its broadest outline, is a failure of human historical becoming; a failure of human beings to align with the providential *Zweck* of history. The process of coming to this consciousness, as we saw apropos of Jewish purification, is not autosoteriological, but it does play a central historical role in eventuating the need for reconciliation. Hegel emphasises that the *Genesis* protoevangelium, though prophesying reconciliation (Gen. 3.15), primarily expresses the inevitable continuation of human suffering and he links it in this context to Gen. 3.22.[816] Because, as we have seen, Hegel believes that Gen. 3.22 refers to Christ as the second Adam, the claim that 'Adam has become like one of us' can be corelated to the protoevangelium of 3.15, specifically the prediction 'the serpent's head shall be crushed'. This then results in the strange conjunction of God's 'confirmation' of the serpent's words at Gen. 3.5 and his prediction that the serpent's head shall be crushed. This interpretation of *Genesis*, as the self-conception of human fallenness in Jewish religion, is ultimately not supposed to point to the

[815] It might therefore be suggested than an *absolute Entzweiung* is simply what Hegel sometimes calls *Entfremdung*. As Hodgson suggests, the *absolute Entzweiung* is the source of the need for reconciliation, a need felt most acutely in the Christian religion 'because it is precisely in this religion that estrangement [*Entfremdung*] is most sharply thematized'. *Entfremdung* then, as I also indicated in the previous chapter, is an ethical state of human beings when they persist in a state of *Entzweiung*; see Hodgson (ed.) *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 1*,104n.

[816] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 389–390.

implication of humanity in some *past* aboriginal calamity, but to a *future* revelation of the natures of both sin as the rejection of the divine and reconciliation as the reuniting with it, in the Christ-Event.

Thus while all human beings are in a state of sin, the Fall as an 'event'– which is to say, as the evental constitution of the universal guilt of humanity under sin–coincides not with Eden but with the Christ-Event. The 'history of the Fall' between Eden and Calvary does not follow any 'Fall' event but builds up to and culminates in it. In this sense, Calvary mediates history *omnidirectionally* as its displaced centre; it constitutes the universal guilt of human beings under sin retroactively and atones for all of humankind proactively. This is what Hegel means when he says that it is the central axis of history, that 'history goes *to* it and *from* it'.[817] Firstly, this is the point of Hegel's displacement of the first Adam by the second at Gen. 3.22 –the would-be moment of the 'Fall upwards' as predicted by the serpent. But the point of this displacement itself is to subvert the truth of the serpent's claim, which, while 'true', is subverted by its own truth and therefore, to affirm the necessity of the Incarnation. Secondly, the *Genesis* account, employing the 'sensible mode of expression', (re)presents humanity's turning away from God as prompted externally by the temptation of the serpent's promise. Hegel clarifies that this externality is a product of the (re)presentational form, and that the Fall into evil is not as such prompted from without, but manifests an internal division of the natural will. However, because human beings are first and foremost *Geist*, their merely natural humanity *is* in fact 'external' to them such that the reproduction of the merely natural will always derives 'externally' from a *Naturerregung.* And thirdly and finally, the displacement of the first Adam by the second indicates the *Logos* as the displaced object of human consciousness in its

[817] Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 338.

universality (including, one might add, for the serpent), such that even the reproduction of the merely natural will as finite self-mediation participates in the *Logos* because 'the object of that consciousness', as Ward puts it, that is, 'the object galvanizing the very process of that consciousness towards knowledge, is the Logos itself.[818] This, as Hegel points out it in the *Encyclopaedia*, is the relationship between cognition and spiritual life disclosed by the Fall narrative.[819]

In his account of *die Vorstellung* in the 1827 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel clarifies that while religious '*Vorstellungen*', such as the familial characterisation of the Trinitarian persons, are attributed to God analogically,[820] there exists a divine story (*göttliche Geschichte*) that is entirely historical (*Geschichtliches*): the history of Jesus.[821] This is connected to the earlier claim that the teaching of Christ, which occurs in the form of *Vorstellungen*, is immediately commensurate with the presentation (*Darstellung*) of the divine idea in his life and fate. In the Gospels we are given a perfect unity of the events of Christ's life and their narration; we are given, in other words, a fully, speculatively graspable history. This means that the relationship between the two aspects of the (re)presentation, the literal and nonliteral, or alternatively the inner thought-content and its outward metaphorical manifestation, is no longer one of indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*). The cancellation (*Streichung*) of the one aspect is, furthermore, not required for the elevation of the other to consciousness.[822] The 'inner meaning' of the image (*Bild*) is no longer posited on the immediacy of the latter but is immediately united with it[823] (the spiritual meanings of the 'nativity, passion, and death of

[818] Ward, *How the Light Gets In*, 300.
[819] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* I, Werke 8, 88.
[820] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 293.
[821] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 294.
[822] Or, rather, the cancellation of the one aspect, the dialectically negative, is now inseparably related to its preservation, the speculatively positive.
[823] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 292–293.

Christ', Hegel points out, are themselves completely historical[824]). The thinkability of the spiritual through the historical is, in this, sense a genuine *Nachdenken.* The operation of this *Nachdenken* is 'eschatological', because it is directed not towards 'rational cognition' as such, but towards the 'theological' reconciliation of human *Denken* with itself, which such a cognition presupposes.[825] Here too, Hegel draws a contrast between the Greco-Roman presentation of divine stories as outwardly historical–such as the Homeric narratives of Jupiter and the other deities, where, however, the 'historical' is as such not taken 'seriously'–and the possibility of the historical standpoint achieved in the Judeo-Christian presentation of the life of Jesus. Thus, if the Jewish purification of natural consciousness is the condition for the possibility of the historical standpoint (because it leads to a 'renaturalisation' of its sensuous contents), the Christian consciousness of the unity of Christ's life and his teaching, is the condition for the possibility of spiritualising history, viz. of reconnecting the *Zweck* of history to the *Begriff* of *Geist.*

If the Fall-Event coincides with the Christ-Event as its rejection or antithesis, it is because the coming of Christ is a 'resetting' of human communal and ethical life to the state of *Entzweiung* depicted in *Genesis.* Note that this is paradoxically a 'resetting' to a retroactively posited past (in the way, perhaps, that the resurrection is the realisation of a proactively posited future). At the same time, however, it is a genuine historical resetting because the life of Christ is the first time that *Geist* wills truth, which is to say that it wills the *Begriff* of *Geist* and recognises *God* as *Geist,* thereby initiating the *Zweck* of history.[826] In this sense, as Sibree emphasised, the Christ-Event is the starting point of history, because Christ is the first to (even begin to)

[824] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I*, Vorlesungen 3, 294.
[825] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion III*, Vorlesungen 5, 269.
[826] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 278–279; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 386–387.

complete the higher consciousness of humanity that is its calling.[827] This starting point of history is accordingly the ending point of finite religion – the absolute *Entzweiung* produced at the collapse of the Roman *world.* The fate for which the Jewish people are said by Hegel to have been divinely held in readiness concerns the mediation in human consciousness of this *Entzweiung* as the *Mittelpunkt* of reconciliation in which finite life and death are renounced. By 'mediation in human consciousness' I mean simply that the state of absolute *Entzweiung* must become thinkable to religious consciousness in order for humanity to be driven back into itself (this is the idea of the possibility of freedom as an infinite return to natural immediacy) by the need for reconciliation. It is the infinitude of subjectivity's return to its natural immediacy that makes the *Entzweiung* of Christ's *Zurücksetzung* absolute.[828] Pagan religion, Hegel sardonically comments, is much too serene to achieve consciousness of this need and desire.[829] One is reminded here of Chesterton's later insight that the pagan was 'happier and happier as he approached the earth, but sadder and sadder as he approached the heavens'.[830] Žižek has therefore correctly suggested that 'paganism is the ultimate Christian dream'[831] since pagan religion exists as if the Fall never happened. The death and resurrection of Christ, however, means that Christianity is ultimately 'the only frame for pagan freedom'.[832]

4 Death of Finite Religion

It is worth recalling here Hegel's distinction between *Geist* and *Materie* as an analogy for the distinction between willing the realisation of human *Geist's* concept at the expense of the

[827] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* trans. J. Sibree, 319, 338; Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 278–279. In other words, the higher consciousness which overcomes the reproduction of the merely natural will which binds humanity to sin.
[828] This is necessary if Christ-consciousness is to be fully human rather than 'superhuman'.
[829] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion vol. 1,*105.
[830] G. K. Chesterton, 'Orthodoxy', in *The Wit and Whimsy, and Wisdom of G.K. Chesterton, Volume 4: Heretics, Orthodoxy, What's Wrong with the World* (Coachwhip Publications, 2009), 310.
[831] Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (London: MIT Press, 2003), 48.
[832] Chesterton, 'Orthodoxy', 309.

immediacy of the former, and willing the reproduction of the former at the expense of the realisation of the latter. Matter, it was argued, possesses 'gravity' because it possesses a tendency toward a *Mittelpunkt* towards which it strives. However, it is essentially composite, constituted by parts which exclude each other and tending in its expansion toward infinite atomisation.[833] *Geist*, on the other hand, isn't a striving-outward toward a central point but instead has this central point within itself. It does not seek a unity outside of itself 'sondern er hat sie gefunden'.[834] Hegel provides us with this *prima facie* insignificant distinction at the beginning of the *Philosophy of History* where, however, he insists on its significance.[835] But he does not deploy it anywhere in that book except when finally dealing with the death of finite religion at the nadir of the Roman religion of *Verstand*.[836] There are two very closely related ideas here which may in fact reflect an evolution in Hegel's views about the death of finite religion. First of all, it is worth noting Hegel's comments on Epicurean philosophy (which appear as early as *System der Sittlichkeit* in 1802), highlighted by H.S. Harris, according to which the understanding of nature implicit in the Roman religion of *Verstand* is a 'merely mechanical concourse of physical atoms', and further that 'in the triumph of the Roman Empire and of Roman law, in short of the *Pax Romana*, 'the ethical world became a concourse of spiritual atoms'.[837] Hegel calls this the 'boredom of the world' (*die Langeweile der Welt*). As Eric Voegelin famously put it, it is 'Hegel's symbol for the spiritual state of a society for whom its gods have died'.[838]

[833] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30.
[834] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30.
[835] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 30–31.
[836] In retrospect, the Pauline subtext of Hegel's account of matter may have been an indication of the context of its eventual relevance.
[837] H. S. Harris, 'Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation', in G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life* (1802/3) *and First Philosophy of Spirit*, trans. H.S. Harris and T.M Knox, ed. H.S. Harris (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1979), 84.
[838] E. Voegelin, 'On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery', in *Published Essays: 1966–1985*. The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin 12 (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 213.

Teshale Tibeu gets right to the heart of the matter when he says that Rome's world-historical significance was therefore twofold: 'it crushed particularity and provided the birthplace of Christianity'.[839] Hegel expresses this brutally in the *Philosophy of History* when he says that the Roman *Geist* was a violence (*Gewalt*)

> auserkoren, die sittlichen Individuen in Banden zu schlagen sowie alle Götter und alle Geister in das Pantheon der Weltherrschaft zu versammeln, um daraus ein abstrakt Allgemeines zu machen.[840]

This is a characterisation of *Geist* as materially 'weighed' down or as existing in the 'order of flesh', according to the principle of *Materie* expounded in the introduction of the text. The fate (*Schicksal*) of the Roman world is that of the infinite atomisation of ethical individuals and their subsequent concentration into the *Mittelpunkt* of the Pantheon and State. The concentration of this *Mittelpunkt* is the centre of the abstract universality of power – the infinite subjectivity of *Verstand*. We can see how this 'crushes particularity' into a universal centre; but how does it provide the birthplace of Christianity? The entropy of natural consciousness which this process accelerates sinks the world into a feeling of melancholy. This fate, however, is experienced by the Roman world as a blind and stupid fate, imposed from without,[841] which is why the actual religious consciousness of the situation, as Harris also emphasises, 'is expressed as "infinite grief" by the Jews',[842] who discern in the fate of the Roman world the fate of the death of Christ. And it is at least partly for this reason (though here we can find no affirmation in Harris), that is, due to the Jewish *Schicksal* as anticipatory of the death of Christ that purified consciousness is also a consciousness of sin. Hence, even the Jewish self-conception of fallenness, grounded though it is in *Genesis*, is constituted through the latter's anticipation of the Christ-Event in general and the death of Christ in particular.[843] Furthermore,

[839] T. Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 308.
[840] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 339.
[841] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 388–390.
[842] Harris, 'Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation', in*System of Ethical Life*, 84.
[843] Note that by linking the Old Testament's anticipation of the New to the Jews' historical fate, rather than its

it should be noted that, by contrast to the striving of Roman subjectivity of *Verstand* (which is characterised as a striving outwardly in accordance with the principle of *Materie*), Jewish religion manifests a subjectivity of *Vorstellung,* in so far as it strives inwardly towards self-conception and does so, therefore, in accordance with the principle of *Geist*.[844].

This brings us to the second idea concerning the death of finite religion: not the 'boredom of the world', but the 'discipline of the world' (*Zucht der Welt*).[845] Needless to say, '*Zucht*' may be rendered as 'discipline' (as in the canonical Sibree translation),[846] but it can also be translated as 'cultivation' (in the sense of both 'culture' and 'breeding'), 'correction', and 'training'. In the *Philosophy of History,* this notion of *Zucht* replaces the earlier idea of boredom, and with it comes a fuller articulation of the Roman world as elected for the fate outlined above while also emphasising what seems like its purgatorial procession. Hegel points out that *Zucht* derives from '*ziehen*', to draw, or drag, or pull (as *trainés* may also be rendered as 'dragged'). This drawing, of course, must be towards something. As we have seen, Roman religion, as possessing a natural consciousness which reproduces itself materially, strives towards a *Mittelpunkt.* With the affirmation of this striving as itself fated for the coming of Christ, we can recognise this *Mittelpunkt* as the *Mittelpunkt der Versöhnung*.[847] This becomes another essential expression of Hegel's idea of reconciliation as a subversion of natural consciousness, especially when one factors in the fact that the Jewish *Schicksal,* which includes coming to the correct religious consciousness of the Roman world, is at the same time a preservation of particularity. The necessary foundation for the emergence of Christianity then, requires both the crushing of

religious consciousness and worship, Hegel does not need to characterise the founding of the Christian church as entailing the supersession of that consciousness and worship, but merely the consummation and end of a given historical fate.

[844] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 30.
[845] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte,* Werke 12, 388.
[846] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree 339.
[847] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 296.

particularity into a universal centre as well as its preservation in the periphery of that centre. The fulfilment of these fates, Hegel calls the 'fullness of time'.[848]

5 The Life and History of Jesus Christ

Christ's life begins in the periphery. He is the source of human unity which he constitutes within himself through the Incarnation and the rest of humankind on the cross. The unity of humankind accordingly stems from the preservation of particularity in Jewish religion which, as I have already indicated, forms an 'exclusive unity' antithetically related to the universality of the Pantheon. Kierkegaard is therefore right to point out that Jesus' teaching is claimed to cause 'offence', not only because he claims to be the 'God-man' but because he is an individual against the established order.[849] Christ's history is a human history; indeed, it is the first human history. That is why it is the goal of humanity. Hegel insists that this life and this history are only understood in their spiritual significance after the death and resurrection. He is also clear that the death of Christ is brought about by his sinlessness, by his teaching and life, and by his complete devotion to God.[850] His life effects a reconciliation of humanity and divinity and is itself an already reconciled life. As a result, this life, which directly and even violently contradicts the state of humankind which it confronts, leads to death. Death, to be sure, is included as part of God's embracing of all that is finite in the Incarnation. But the death of God as a historical event is 'brought about by injustice, hatred, and violence'.[851] The death of Christ is, in other words, the result of his rejection. On the one hand, and as Hodgson points out, 'because death is the ultimate destiny and negativity of finite spirit, the death of this individual

[848] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 391.
[849] S. Kierkegaard, *Practice in Christianity*, ed. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 85.
[850] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 285–286.
[851] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II,* Werke 17, 279 ,286, 288.

is the supreme portrayal of the unity of the divine and the human, the highest divestment of the divine idea'.[852] On the other hand, the death of Christ points to humanity's full acceptance of this fate; its descent into sin.[853]

Christ's call to reject finite life and death itself leads to death, but it also leads to the death of death and finite life; '*[d]amit bestimmt sich dieser Tod nach dieser Seite hin als der Tod, der der Übergang zur Herrlichkeit, Verherrlichung ist, die aber nur Wiederherstellung der ursprünglichen Herrlichkeit ist*'.[854] This glory denotes the assumption of humanity into the divine idea. The mediational structure of this *Übergang zur Herrlichkeit*, however, is striking. Humanity is assumed into the divine idea because the most 'abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility', in short, 'natural death', becomes part of Christ on the cross: 'God himself is dead'. But the point isn't that this negative moment is needed in the life of God, but that even 'finitude, negativity, and otherness, do not hinder unity with God' (*Einheit mit Gott nicht hindert*).[855] In keeping with the emphasis on Christ's humanity in the centre of reconciliation, Hegel focuses not simply on the divine overcoming of human sin, but on Christ's sacrifice, which, because it coincides with the restoration of an original, prelapsarian glory, expresses for humanity a free *Aufhebung* toward and for God: '"To sacrifice" means to sublate the natural, to sublate otherness. It is said: "Christ has died for all." This is not a single act but the eternal divine history'; 'therefore all have died' (2 Cor. 5.14).[856] With this mediation, '*das Menschliche abgestreift wird, [und] das Ansichseiende zu sich zurückkommt und so erst Geist ist'*.[857] All human history after this event

[851] Hodgson, 'Hegel's Christology: Shifting Nuances in the Berlin Lectures', 37.
[853] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 294.
[854] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 296–297.
[855] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 297.
[856] For effect, I quote the Hodgson translation, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 469–470; cf. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 298.
[857] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 298.

is, accordingly, the Eucharistic repetition of this sacrifice 'in eternity'.

This 'mediation' of the human, however, is paradoxically nothing other than the life of the spirit (*Leben des Geistes*) which Christ has *immediately*.[858] Hegel is not wrong that this is partly what convinces us that Jesus is God, that he possesses a will and a consciousness in a 'real unity with the divine will' such that he can utter the words 'Your sins are forgiven' (Matt. 9.5) with authority.[859] But we should nevertheless pause to consider Hegel's quite uncharacteristic suggestion that the mediation of human forgiveness and reconciliation more generally is founded on the immediacy of the unity of Christ's two wills. There are a number of considerations about the interrelation between sin, reconciliation, and freedom, which lead him to this startling conclusion. The first of these is Hegel's idea that freedom must involve a return to oneself as a return to natural immediacy. This itself seems connected to the idea of Christ's sacrifice as a restoration of an original glory for God and, even more importantly, that the forgiveness of sins is a repetition and overcoming of the Edenic *Entzweiung*. The second is the idea that the sacrifice and death of Christ reveal for humanity their spiritual potentiality. As I indicated earlier, 'universal history' involves for Hegel the working out of what human beings are potentially. The sacrifice and death of Christ reveal this human potentiality as a potential unity, and furthermore as a spiritual community. The consciousness of this community allows for the transition from mere humanity to the God-man (*bloßen Menschen zu einem Gottmenschen*). Hence the Christ-Event as the starting-point of history involves the revelation of human potentiality as the basis for future human historical becoming as community, which is to say, as unity. The content revealed to this community and therefore the content of humanity as a unity is simply the certainty of the unity of the human and the divine, the certainty of

[858] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 284.
[856] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 285.

reconciliation; that humanity is not something alien to God.[860]

Thirdly, Hegel tells us that this history (of Jesus Christ), however, is also 'die Darstellung des Prozesses ist dessen, was der Mensch, der Geist ist: an sich Gott und tot'.[861] The sacrifice and death of Christ is the revelation both of God and death as the implicit identities and destinies of humanity. Sin means that humanity's very potentiality or implicit being, its *Ansichseiende*, is not only God, but also death. This reflects Hegel's characterisation of the history of Christ as a resetting to an absolute *Entzweiung*. But Hegel's claim is that this history is the presentation of the *process*, rather than merely the state, of what humanity is as a whole, such that the concrete history of Christ omnidirectionally constitutes not only the future of humanity as union with God (the history of reconciliation), but also the past of humanity as dead (the history of the Fall). This constitution of a past history is at the same time its overcoming, such that (as I indicated earlier) the 'evental' constitution of a Fall coincides with its overcoming on the cross (this past history is then itself declared 'dead'). *Geist's Ansichseiende* therefore has a historico-temporal character. This is connected to Hegel's view, famously highlighted by Alexandre Koyré, of the past as time's 'return to itself', and moreover as a return to immediacy, though an immediacy as 'absolutely mediatized'.[862] The parallels inherent here between Hegel's Christology and his philosophy of time are oblique, but they help clarify a number of things about the former. For example, Hegel writes that '*[d]ie Identität des Subjekts und Gottes kommt*

[860] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 298.
[861] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 297.
[862] A. Koyré, A., 'Hegel à Iéna' *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* 15.5 (1935), 420–458. See the more recent D. Tazi, 'Translation and introduction: Alexandre Koyre´'s "Hegel at Jena". *Continental Philosophy Review* 51 (2018), 361–400. Contrary to Koyré's claims, Hegel does not seem to have abandoned this basic characterisation of the past; see Hegel, *Enzyklopädie II*, Werke 9, 56. I would also question Koyré's attempt to affirm the primacy of futurity in Hegel; however, I do not think the notion of the past as mediated return is dependent on this invention. For a critical evaluation of Koyré's overall account, see C. Malabou, 'Negatifs de la dialectique entre Hegel et le Hegel de Heidegger: Hyppolite, Koyré, Kojève'. *Philosophie* 52 (1996), 37–53.

in die Welt, als die Zeit erfüllt war.[863] As we have seen, the same fullness of time discloses not only the identity of the subject and God but the identity of the subject and death. It designates the 'sending of the Son',[864] the presence of Christ. This 'presence' (*Gegenwart*), however, refers also to the temporal 'present', meaning the historical *nunc* as well as its 'depth' as 'eternally present', specifically in the case of Christ's sacrifice.[865]

Time, for Hegel, is 'that being which inasmuch as it *is*, is *not*, and inasmuch as it is *not*, *is*; it is Becoming directly *intuited*.[866] The coming of Christ is the *fullness* of time as well as the fullness of the presence of God, which is to say that it is time's realisation or fulfilment. With it, space and time, or correspondingly nature and history, are directly or immediately intuited as eternally or absolutely mediated. In this sense, time as the truth of space is in its fulfilment the 'negation of negation'.[867] We see here again the pattern of the naturalisation of nature into history (in Jewish religion) and the historicisation of history into spirituality (in Christian religion). Hegel writes that

> [d]ie Wahrheit des Raumes ist die Zeit, so wird der Raum zur Zeit; wir gehen nicht so subjektiv zur Zeit über, sondern der Raum selbst geht über. In der Vorstellung ist Raum und Zeit weit auseinander, da haben wir Raum und dann auch Zeit; dieses »Auch« bekämpft die Philosophie.[868]

The fullness of time is therefore the revelation of identity in the negative unity of self-externality (*die negative Einheit des Außersichseins*).[869] Christ is this pure (*reine*) identity which is both equal to itself and separates itself as the other of itself, '*als das Andere ihrer*

[863] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 391.
[864] The significance of the Trinitarian formulation consists in the fact that the recognition of God as *Geist* which is disclosed as this 'fullness of time' is at the same time a recognition of God as Triune; *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 391.
[865] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 105; Werke 17, 298.
[866] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie II*, Werke 9, 48. I have reproduced here Miller's translation; see G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 34.
[867] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie II*, Werke 9, 48.
[868] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie II*, Werke 9, 48.
[869] Hegel, *Enzyklopädie II*, Werke 9, 48.

selbst, als das Fürsich- und Insichsein gegen das Allgemeine'.[870] At the same time, Hegel's dual insistence on Christ's life as the completion of the highest human consciousness[871] and of all subsequent philosophical thought as a *Nachdenken*, as a thinking after and in the *Logos*, allows him to affirm that nothing in the past is lost to philosophy; that the '*Idee ist präsent, der Geist unsterblich, d. h. er ist nicht vorbei und ist nicht noch nicht, sondern ist wesentlich jetzt*'.[872] In short, that we do not have a past 'and' a present. Christ's life in general, but his sacrifice and death, in particular, occupy the space of this 'essential now', and therefore constitute the *content* of the absolute mediation of time, such that the past actually becomes *Geist's* past 'as dead', and the future actually becomes *Geist's* future 'as God'.

I am therefore, possibly, in disagreement with Hodgson's characterisation of Jesus' definitiveness for Hegel as primarily revelatory:

> ontologically, the unity of divinity and humanity is already established as the condition of possibility of reconciliation: Jesus instantiates this unity but does not add to it. Reconciliation occurs in actuality when the unity appears, is recognized, and is put into practice—and this depends on the revelatory impact of Jesus' distinctive life and death. For this reason Jesus is revelatorily definitive more than he is ontologically definitive for Hegel. To be sure, his revelatory impact follows from the fullness of God's presence in him, so the revelatory and the ontological are connected.[873]

While it is almost impossible to disagree with this nuanced and predominantly correct statement, it is necessary to point out that it comes to a probably incorrect conclusion about history from otherwise correct premises about the *Idee.* The unity of divinity and humanity as the ontological condition for reconciliation may be prior to the historical Incarnation, such that the latter predominantly reveals rather than ontologically constitutes the former, but this

[870] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 391.
[871] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 278–279.
[872] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 105.
[873] Hodgson, *Hegel and Christian Theology*, 163.

ontological unity is also prior to the *need* for reconciliation. And the need for reconciliation as something arising within history demands a specifically historical constitution of that unity, now as atonement. In other words, it is only because the Incarnation is for Hegel necessary, as Hodgson indirectly acknowledges, that its ontological possibility may paradoxically be said to lie outside of its historical realisation (hence Jn. 1.15). At the same time, and for the same reason, however, the fact that this necessity realises itself under the special historical conditions of human fallenness, and indeed as a special response to it as *Entzweiung*, qualifies it as irreducibly historical. By this I do not mean simply that the Incarnation of Christ, followed by his life, sacrifice, and death, are irreducibly 'historical' by virtue of their historicity, but that they are irreducibly historical because they are what for Hegel properly constitutes time as historical. Moreover, because human fallenness is expounded by Hegel in terms of the sundering of the *Begriff* of *Geist* from the *Zweck* of history, 'universal history', as the attempt to think humanity in its universality (i.e., as *Geist*) comes to consist of the working out of its *Ansichseiende.* And this *Ansichseiende* is mediated in its form and constituted in its content by the history of Jesus Christ; or rather, it is reconstituted, as 'Gott' *and* as 'tot'.[874]

This history then, is the presentation of the process of what humanity is in its universality, as *Geist.* God sends his Son to unify humankind so that it may exist as *Geist*, which is at the same time to exist as purposefully historical. The coming of Christ, in other words, indicates the failure of human beings to be purposefully historical or to align themselves with the *Zweck* of history and therefore bring about the unity of humanity and divinity themselves. Christ appears as the first historical human – as Adam – and Hegel argues that it is only through him that we understand *Genesis*.[875] Hegel does not believe in a literal first Adam, but he believes in a literal

[874] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 297.
[875] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 258.

second Adam, who, however, comes before all men. As with all history for Hegel, this literal Adam comes after the metaphorical, or rather the primacy of the spiritual is historically displaced. But the true spiritual understanding of the Gospel and of *Genesis* nevertheless requires holding on to both the concept and its image. Indeed, it is only with the coming of Christ and with his history as the centre of reconciliation towards which finite religion is fated, and within which reconciliation alone can occur, that humanity is posited as a unity and it is through its involvement in the life of Jesus that history is totally abandoned *as* history, leaving only a realm of indifference moved by brutal recklessness of passion. Hence Hegel ultimately focuses on Jesus' death, for it is through his rejection that humanity universally fails to will its universal *Begriff*, and through this death that humanity up to this point is constituted as 'dead'[876]. It is only with the rejection of Christ then, rather than the Fall from Eden, that human beings may be said to be universally guilty.[877] The life and teaching of Christ force human beings to respond to him as a unity. Not only is Jesus fully human and the fullness of the presence of God is immediately in him, he is also without sin. All of these things radically separate him, as the other of himself against the universal, from the rest of humanity as an abstract universality–though this itself reveals nothing more than the absolute separatedness of all human beings from themselves. Evil lies in this separation:

> es ist das Bewußtsein des Fürsichseins gegen anderes, aber auch gegen das Objekt, was in sich allgemein ist in dem Sinn des Begriffs, des vernünftigen Willens. Erst durch diese Trennung bin ich für mich, und darin liegt das Böse. Bösesein heißt abstrakt, mich vereinzeln. [878]

But the fact that Christ as fully human, or as the Son of Man can utter the words 'your sins are forgiven', is proof for faith not only that we have been reconciled with God, but that we will be reconciled with ourselves.[879]

[876] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 297.
[877] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 257–258.
[878] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 257.
[879] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II*, Werke 17, 284–285.

I would like to conclude with a few remarks on the element of 'failure' inherent in the life and history of Jesus. The young Hegel of the *Jugendschriften* was obsessed with this failure; with the fact that Jesus' offer of the kingdom of God was rejected. For most Hegel commentators (who follow Kaufmann[880]), this preoccupation is to be confined to the *Jugendschriften.* However, Hegel's discerning of this element of failure was quite central to Milbank's 'for and against' critique of Hegel in *Theology and Social Theory*[881], as Ben Quash[882] has more recently also highlighted. Milbank points out that while Hegel is correct to recognise this element of failure in the life of Jesus, he is wrong to deny its 'contingency', as 'the rejection by the political-economic order of a completely new sort of social imagination'[883]. Instead, Milbank complains, Hegel sees Jesus' failure as a result of his own blindness to fate, a blindness which, moreover, emerges from a contradiction of fate inherent to his Jewish situation, and is therefore posited as 'tragically' inescapable[884]. Some recent scholarship[885] has basically restated this view. And Quash has added to it, pointing out that the Hegelian dialectic seems to stifle the 'contingent, 'poetic' creativity of thinking subjects and of God', such that it cannot be identified

[880] Kaufmann, 'Hegel's Early Antitheological Phase', *The Philosophical Review* 63 (1954), 3-18.
[881] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 174.
[882] B. Quash, *Theology and the Drama of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 104-105.
[883] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 174.
[884] Milbank adds that this 'blindness to fate' means that Hegel 'places limits on the possibilities of reconciliation and forgiveness, which he so well grasps at the heart of Christian morality'; *Theology and Social Theory*, 174.
[885] P. Wake, *Tragedy in Hegel's* Early Theological Writings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014). However, see Robert Williams' critical, and in my view convincing, review; R.R. Williams, 'Review of Peter Wake's *Tragedy in Hegel's* Early Theological Writings' *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2014). Drawing on the work of Walter Jaeschke, Williams notes that Wake's reading 'is powerful, but it rests on a narrow reading of Jesus as a morbid beautiful soul implausibly identified as a tragic hero, and ignores entirely Hegel's philosophy of love and reconciliation in the second part of [Spirit of Christianity]'.

with the power of the God of Jesus Christ.[886] I have, of course, argued against such a view in the second chapter. But the complaint is legitimate from a theological standpoint. The question remains, however, whether it is merely a legitimate complaint about Hegel's *Jugendschriften*, or also a complaint about his later dialectic.

Though he does not say so, I believe Milbank to be relying on Dilthey's argument that the *Jugendschrifte*[887] together represent the development of the principles of the future dialectic, rather than a mostly abandoned, first attempt to solve the problems in response to which the later dialectic would emerge[888]. It is partly for this reason that Milbank, in contradistinction to most others who comment on Hegel, emphasises the young Hegel's views on the failure of Jesus as indicative of wider problems with the dialectic. I too believe that the significance of the element of failure in the life and history of Jesus should not be dismissed for the later Hegel. But it can also only be understood in light of a better overall analysis of the earlier Hegel. The tendency is to locate the idea of Jesus' failure as a development of *The Spirit of Christianity*, written between 1798-1800.[889] The real story goes something like this: Hegel was preoccupied

[886] Quash, *Theology and the Drama of History*, 105. I must, however, admonish Quash for suggesting that Hegel too quickly transforms his argument for the necessity of the State into an endorsement of the Prussian State of his own time. Engels, of course, argued that while Frederick William II and his toadies took the famous statement 'the actual is real' to imply a 'philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship', Hegel very obviously had meant that the 'Prussians of that day had the government that they deserved'; see 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy', 215-225. Scholarship since the 1970s has furthermore definitively disputed any reading of the *Philosophy of Right* as a philosophical argument in favour of the Prussian State of Hegel's time; see Avineri, *Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), especially, 115-133. As Avineri has highlighted, the source of the view that Hegel is a pro-Prussian reactionary, written by the actual reactionary Rudolf Haym in 1857, castigated Hegel as an enemy of German nationalism. Haym was so unhinged that he attacked Hegel as the 'State philosopher' of the conservative Prussian State of Frederick William II which he saw as 'liberal'. For more on this and other political urban legends, see H. Ottmann, 'Hegel and Political Trends: A Criticism of the Political Hegel Legends', in *Hegel Myths and Legends* ed. J. Stewart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 53-69. As Domenico Losurdo has shown (and as Hegel's first biographer Rosenkranz also knew), the published version of the *Philosophy of Right*, such as it is, was censored by Hegel, whose original lectures on the topic of *Right* were even more critical of the State; see D. Losurdo, *Hegel e la libertà dei moderni 1* (Napoli: la scuola di Pitagora, 2012), 28-29.

[887] W. Dilthey, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels und andere Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des Deutschen Idealismus*, Gesammelte Schriften 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 17-39.

[888] The latter would be something like Raymond Plant's view; see *Hegel*, 15.

[889] Hegel, *Der Geist des Christentums und Sein Schicksal* in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 274-418.

with the problem of the 'failure' of Christianity more generally in the period when he was a student at Tübingen.[890] Because he was still under the influence of various abstract conceptions of transcendence being taught there, he framed the problem in terms of 'positivity', and the solution in terms of a tragic immanentisation of conflict in history, when writing *The Positivity of the Christian Religion* in 1795-1796.[891] However, Hegel had written a highly neglected essay called *The Life of Jesus*[892], finished in the summer of 1795, shortly before he began work on the positivity essay. It is neglected, especially by the Anglophone commentariat, because T.M. Knox did not bother including it in his translation of the *Early Theological Writings*. When it is addressed at all, it is engaged under the auspices of Kaufmann's 'antitheological' hermeneutic, or some other such tendency, which takes its *Problemstellung* to be fundamentally Kantian.[893]

As Plant points out, such an approach does not

> explain the paradox which arises from accepting it – namely why, after so much time criticising Christianity in Tübingen and attempting to delineate a conception of folk religion that would revitalise the life of Germany, [Hegel] should suddenly be concerned to interpret the life of Jesus at all, particularly in Kantian terms which, as his MA thesis shows, he regarded as the embodiment of a deep bifurcation between reason and nature.[894]

[890] Hegel, *Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum* in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 9-103; for an account of this text as already grappling with the failure of Christianity, see Plant, *Hegel*, 15-40.

[891] Hegel, *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion* in *Frühe Schriften*, Werke 1, 104-216. For an account of 'tragedy' as an alternative to abstract forms of transcendence leading to positive determinations in religion, see Williams, *Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel and Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 120-142.

[892] Hegel, *Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften* (ed.) H. Nohl (Tübingen: 1907), 72-136.

[893] Knox, 'Hegel's Attitude to Kant's Ethics', *Kant-Studien* 49 (1958).

[894] Plant, *Hegel*, 41-42. As Ward has more recently pointed out, the text is informed by a distinctly un-Kantian anthropology. Citing the essay's opening – a philosophical translation of John 1.1-3 – Ward notes that Hegel makes a series of claims which both surpass and oppose Kant. These include appeals to reason as the revelation of human destiny within the plan of the world and as making up the 'spark of divinity' (a phrase possibly taken from Herder, but ultimately deriving from the neo-Platonic *logos spermatikos*) 'allotted' to finite life (as 'borrowed being', to use one of Hegel's mature formulations) and therefore grounding its unconditional purpose; see Ward, 'How Hegel Became a Philosopher', 273-274.

The real significance of the *Life of Jesus* essay is that it is an attempt to construct a totally idealised account of Jesus' life, resting on the crypto-Pelagian assumption that a perfect and sinless individual would lead such a perfect life.[895] From this point of view, the later *Positivity* and *Spirit* essays, written after the immediate rejection of the *Life* essay's approach as a viable solution to the Tübingen problems, represent a direct negation of this approach, presenting the element of failure in Jesus' life in overly deterministic terms. We can then turn to the later Hegel's work and see that this element is absorbed into a mature philosophy of history and Christology. By the time Hegel develops these, he has thoroughly reconfigured the 'blindness of fate' objection as uniquely applying to Roman world as natural consciousness[896], and whose context, as the historical moment of the rejection of Jesus, he has now given a political-economic explication (in the critique of *Privatrrecht*). As I have shown, the element of failure in Jesus' life becomes dialectically constitutive of the historical past as a history of the Fall through the rejection of Jesus' offer of the kingdom. The world that rejects this offer is a product of historical contingency, as is the rejection itself, but the 'contradiction' of this offer's rejection is so extreme for humankind that it produces the need for divine reconciliation. In this sense, as tradition affirms, Jesus' death was not the result of 'chance in an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances', but a part of the mystery of the faith and of God's plan in history. As St. Peter explained to the Jews of Jerusalem, in his first sermon on Pentecost: 'this man was handed over to you according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God'[897] (Acts 2.23).

[895] Dickey, who likewise challenges this conception of the essay as mere Kantian propaganda, has shown that it was influenced by the optimistic (bordering on Pelagian) group of Swiss Protestants gathered around J.S. Ith in Berne who had sought to 'give Protestantism an activist and reformist face'; Dickey, *Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit, 1770-1807*, 174-175.
[896] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 387–388.
[897] *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: Burns & Oates, 2002), 599.

CONCLUSION

The End of History (of Truth)?

In this dissertation, I have highlighted Hegel's Christo-absolutism, as the determinate, historical form of what Rowan Williams has called his 'primitive condition for thinking'[898], but I have done so while emphasising his Judeophilic insistence on the involvement of Jewish particularity in mediating the Christo-absolutist condition for the thinking of history. I have, furthermore, reconciled two impulses in Hegel which were previously largely held to be irreconcilable, namely, a 'left' impulse, that highlights human striving in the face of an antagonistic development of history, and a 'counter-Enlightenment' impulse, that emphasises the emergence of faith in history through those antagonisms. This 'left counter-Enlightenment' reading of Hegel cuts across the dominant tendencies in the Hegelian commentariat today, reducing neither Hegel's commitment to philosophy as metaphysics, nor to Christian faith, and retaining his radical understanding of the possibilities of transformative change in history. Throughout, I have grappled with the question of how the Christ-Event, the life of one individual, can fundamentally 'split' history, understood in a Hegelian sense, as a developmental process.

To answer this question, I have offered a reconstruction of Hegel's dialectic as a working out of the Christological principle of the life and history of Jesus Christ as a world-historically unique 'Christ-Event' that bridges the gap between the *presentation* and the *representation* of historical experience, and thereby makes history fully graspable as *Nachdenken*. I have argued, following Hegel's claim in the *Philosophy of History*, that the Christ-Event, as the

[898] Williams, 'Logic and spirit in Hegel', 40.

omnidirectional mediation of history from the displaced 'centre' of the Cross, punctuates history in two. This dissertation has developed Hegel's dialectic of one side of that world-historical punctuation, what I have called Hegel's 'hidden' history of the Fall. My argument unfolded in the following way: firstly, I have provided a metalogical interpretation of Hegelian logic, as admitting to two rival logics of *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, which involve competing structures of mediation and competing routes for the overturning of being and nothing. I have argued that it is the second, 'alternate' logic of *Verstand*, rather than that of *Vernunft*, that grounds the development of consciousness as a postlapsarian inversion of the developmental process of the logic. I have shown that revelation in history entails for Hegel creative, though teleologically ambiguous, emergences of theoretical and practical relationships to the divine involving processes of 'metaphorical' transference, as 're-inversions' of historical experience. These processes lead to the preliminary conditions for the possibility of human *Sichdenken*, which Hegel identifies with the emergence in Jewish religious consciousness of monotheism in general, and the *Genesis* Fall narrative, in particular. I have shown that Jewish religious consciousness is a 'purified' form of the natural consciousness of finite religion, which dominates pre-Christian history, and is therefore posited as the mediation of the transition to Christian history from an historical 'outside'. In this way, Jewish 'particularity' mediates the 'individuality' of Christ, by disrupting the abstract 'universality' of the Roman world, as it were, from an historical 'outside'. Finally, I have argued that it is only with the rejection of Christ, rather than an historical Fall from Eden, that human beings may be said to be universally guilty, for failing to realise the *Zweck* of history, and are therefore in a state of 'fallenness'. The Christ-Event constitutes humanity as a unity in its rejection of the offer for the kingdom.

However, since I have only focused on the dialectic of Hegel's history of the Fall, and of the Christo-centric constitution of that history as 'fallen', the issue of the ensuing dialectic of

Hegel's history of the Truth, and its Christo-centric constitution as 'truthful', remains open to further study. I have not, for example, addressed what is directly entails by my last chapter, viz. a Hegelian theology of the Cross drawing on the idea of the Cross' mediation of history as a displaced centre, nor what is hopefully opened up by my earlier work on Hegel and Judaism, which is to say, a theology of religions drawing on Hegel as a preserver religious particularity, beyond any establishing of a 'New Covenant' in history. The drift from one 'history' to the other, may be characterised in terms of the transition from *Darstellung* to *Vorstellung*. The history of the Truth requires a reconstruction, a *Nachdenken,* of the history of the Fall, a re-presentation of what has historically presented itself to consciousness, allowing forms from the first history to be carried over to the other. One illustration of this is Hegel's own example of the difference between *Naturreligion,* the historically lived phenomenon of early natural consciousness in religious history, and *natürliche religion*, its 'thought-form', in the subsequent attempts to understand religion in terms of 'natural religion' (as for example, in Hume). And another is the 'reappearance' of the Jewish standpoint as a foundational moment in modernity, not only in Spinoza but, more concretely, in Jewish Hegelianism itself.

All of this means, however, that it is also still possible to reproduce the problems and limitations of 'natural consciousness' from pre-Christian history, in our attempts to grasp that history. It is for that reason, that the *Nachdenken* of that history, of the origins of humanity and of the very possibility of our historical self-understanding, must be a thinking that is always returning to the *Logos*. There remains the need, therefore, for an account of Hegel's understanding of the 'Christian world' beyond Kojève's still influential account, which denies the reconciliation of the Christ-Event and the constitution of a new history of Truth. Kojève's account of the Christian world is simply the repetition and reassertion of a new history of the Fall, outlining the overcoming in history of the 'Christian slave'. However, Kojève's reduction

of the Christ-Event, to a 'particularistic, family, and slavish reaction against pagan universalism'[899], stifles historical futurity, which is possible for Hegel only through the infinite return of thought to the *Logos*, and therefore demands a determinate negative culmination in an 'end' of history. But Hegel is quite clear in *Philosophy of History* that, history – 'what has happened' – has not come to an end, but is 'happening every day'[900].

[899] Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 66.

[900] Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Werke 12, 540.

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