Working paper

### Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning.

Abstract:

In trial and error learning, agents experiment with new strategies and adopt them with a probability that depends on their realized payoffs. Such rules are completely uncoupled, that is, each agent’s behaviour depends only on his own realized payoffs and not on the payoffs or actions of anyone else. We show that by modifying a trial and error learning rule proposed by Young (2009) we obtain a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a Pareto optimal equilibrium whenever a pure equ...

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### Authors

Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2010-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14728
Deposit date:
2011-08-16