

Cassius Dio,  
Human Nature  
and the late  
Roman Republic

DPhil thesis  
William Rees  
Brasenose College  
Michaelmas Term  
2011

## **Abstract: Cassius Dio, Human Nature and the late Roman Republic**

This thesis builds on recent scholarship on Dio's *φύσις* model to argue that Dio's view of the fall of the Republic can be explained in terms of his interest in the relationship between human nature and political constitution. Chapter One examines Dio's thinking on Classical debates surrounding the issue of *φύσις* and is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the terms that are important to Dio's understanding of Republican political life. The second chapter examines the relationship between *φύσις* and Roman theories of moral decline in the late Republic. Chapter Three examines the influence of Thucydides on Dio. Chapter Four examines Dio's reliance on Classical theories of democracy and monarchy. These four chapters, grouped into two sections, show how he explains the downfall of the Republic in the face of human ambition. Section Three will be the first of two case studies, exploring the life of Cicero, one of the main protagonists in Dio's history of the late Republic. In Chapter Five, I examine Dio's account of Cicero's career up to the civil war between Pompey and Caesar. Chapter Six explores Cicero's role in politics in the immediate aftermath of Caesar's death, first examining the amnesty speech and then the debate between Cicero and Calenus. Chapter Seven examines the dialogue between Cicero and Philiscus, found in Book 38. In Section Four is my other case study, Caesar. Chapter Eight discusses Caesar as a Republican politician. In Chapter Nine, I examine Dio's version of the mutiny at Vesontio and Caesar's speech. Chapter Ten examines Dio's portrayal of Caesar after he becomes dictator and the speech he delivers to the senate. The Epilogue ties together the main conclusions of the thesis and examines how the ideas explored by Dio in his explanation of the fall of the Republic are resolved in his portrait of the reign of Augustus.

William Rees  
Brasenose College  
DPhil Roman History  
Michaelmas Term 2011

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Abbreviations</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Section One: Cassius Dio and the Republic</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Chapter One: Cassius Dio and Φύσις</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Chapter Two: Moral Decline and Human Nature     in the Roman Republic</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Section One Conclusion</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Section Two: Dio's Influences</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Chapter Three: Thucydidean Influence on Cassius Dio</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Chapter Four: Cassius Dio and Political Philosophy</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Section Two Conclusion</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Section Three: Cassius Dio and Cicero</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>Chapter Five: Cicero's Political Career to 58 B.C.</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Chapter Six: Cicero and the death of Republicanism</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>Chapter Seven: The Philiscus Debate</b>	<b>164</b>
<b>Section Three Conclusion</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>Section Four: Cassius Dio and Caesar</b>	<b>184</b>
<b>Chapter Eight: A Man on the Make</b>	<b>192</b>
<b>Chapter Nine : A Man and his Men</b>	<b>212</b>
<b>Chapter Ten: A Man at the Top</b>	<b>229</b>
<b>Section Four Conclusion</b>	<b>240</b>

Epilogue	242
Bibliography	261

## **Abbreviations**

All references to Dio are as found in Boissevain's version of the text, including the numbering of the later Imperial books. Fragments from the earlier books are referred to as "frg.", Zonaras as "Zon." and the text proper after Book 36 as "Cass. Dio" in accordance with the practice adhered to in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (OCD). All other references to ancient material are in the form presented in the *OCD*. References in the Bibliography to journals follow the conventions of *Année Philologique*.

## Acknowledgements

A thesis is not the work of one person alone, despite the solipsism it seemingly induces for long periods of one's life. I have many people to thank, without all of whose efforts in encouraging, inspiring, badgering and, on occasion, threatening me into completing my thesis, it would not have been finished. Many times have I wandered off topic, lost interest, flown into violent rages and always the same people have kept me on track, even if they did so unknowingly. I wish, in the first instance to thank my supervisors, Anna Clark, Chris Pelling and Rosalind Thomas and to my transfer and confirmation examiners. Their hard work, suggestions and enthusiasm for Dio's cause have made this thesis what it is more than my paltry efforts. I also thank my college advisor, Ed Bispham, who put me onto Dio in the first place. Friends have come and gone with a high attrition rate; I must thank Sian Lewis, Benoit Guerin, Mark Clifford and Michael Bonner for their kindness and generosity, as well as their willingness to read what I've churned out over the last three years. My family deserves thanks perhaps most of all; it was my parents' patience, love and, ultimately, their hard cash that enabled me to start, study and complete my DPhil. I dedicate, however, this thesis to my grandfather, whose trips with me to Caerleon when I was a boy inspired in me a love of all things Roman. He sadly passed away during the first year of the thesis and would have loved to have lived to see it completed.

William Rees  
Oxford  
Autumn, 2011

## Introduction

Scholarly opinion of Lucius Cassius Dio's late Republican narrative has never been high.<sup>1</sup> Millar, whose work on Dio is still the most authoritative to date, claims of it that "the complex political and military events of the late Republic were a hopeless task for his narrative technique" and "to write a connected narrative of late Republican political history is a task that might daunt anyone. For Dio, who came to it only as part of the whole sweep of Roman history, the chances of dealing with it in a way that was profound or original were small indeed".<sup>2</sup> Millar, who was writing in the shadow of Syme's *Tacitus*, felt that Dio's history of the period, as with all others, could best be explained by his experiences of his own time:

"In Dio we can see not only the perspective of Roman history available to a man who was born in the reign of Marcus Aurelius and lived into that of Severus Alexander, but also, *not in his contemporary history alone*, the reactions of a conservative observer to an age full of stress and change".<sup>3</sup>

The only part of Dio's History with any intrinsic value in this analysis was the speech he inserted into the mouth of Maecenas in Book 52, which has been seen, as Rich notes, "as a kind of political pamphlet unrelated to its context".<sup>4</sup> In more recent decades, a

---

<sup>1</sup> For Dio's name, see Gowing (1990a): 49-54; Rich (1990): 1 n. 1; Roxan (1985): no.133, l. 18; *AE* (1971): 430.

<sup>2</sup> Millar (1964): 119; 46.

<sup>3</sup> Millar (1964): vii (the emphasis is mine). Dio's life, as well as the date of composition of his History are still matters of some contention. Millar (1964): 5-27 is still the best overview of Dio's life from childhood upwards. For the debate surrounding his career, see Schwartz (1899): 1684-1686; Vrind (1923): 163-8; Gabba (1955): 289-301; Eisman (1977): 657-673; Reinhold (1988): 1-4; Swan (2004): 1-3. For the date of Dio's composition (which ranges widely between the 190s and the 230s), see Schwartz (1899): 1686; Gabba (1955): 289-301; Millar (1964): 28-32; Letta (1979): 117-189; Barnes (1984): 240-255; Rich (1989): 89-92; (1990): 3-4; Sordi (2001): 393-5; Swan (2004): 28-34; Millar (2005): 17.

<sup>4</sup> Rich (1989): 99. Millar is not, of course, the first to see Maecenas' speech in this light. Scholarly opinion has been of the persuasion that it represents Dio's own thoughts since at least the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Meyer (1891) argued that the second half of Maecenas' speech was inserted into the debate by Dio during the reign of Severus Alexander as a proposal to the emperor that he make drastic reforms to the administration of the empire. This exact theory has been exploded, principally by Hammond (1932): 88-102 and Millar (1964): 102-4, but the idea that the speech represents Dio's ideal constitution has never been seriously challenged, despite

few scholars have begun to revise Millar's assumptions about the lack of merit in Dio's late Republican history. Fechner in 1986 argued that Dio's view of the Republic as a constitution played an important role in his formulation of his ideal constitution. He analysed Dio's speeches, looking for common sentiments about harmony, order, moderation and free speech, and concluded that they expressed a programmatic view of the benefits of 'Republican' ideals to Dio. Gowing in 1992 analysed Dio's narrative of the triumviral period, putting even greater weight on the importance of Dio's own era in his selection and treatment of events than Millar. In 1997, Lintott published a cursory treatment of Dio's narrative of the late Republic, focusing mostly on the chronological, historical and stylistic issues concerning Dio's narrative. Though these works have done something to challenge Millar's basic assumption about the lack of scholarly merit of Dio's late Republican history, they have all persisted in his claim that Dio's narrative of the period can best be explained by focus on the life and times of the historian himself. Dio's "literary and interpretative techniques" have been largely ignored.<sup>5</sup>

This viewpoint is not without some severe limitations, however. Gowing, for example, comparing Appian to Cassius Dio, claims that:

"Appian wrote in the relative stability of the Antonine Principate; Dio, in a period when revolution was virtually an everyday occurrence. The political climate, as well as their own very different temperaments and experiences, suggests that their views on the period of

---

the large number of studies that have been produced on the speeches over the years. Reinhold (1988): 179 claims that Maecenas' speech "is the authentic voice of Dio: it contains the essence of his pragmatic thinking about the Empire, the monarchy to which he was unreservedly committed, and the interests and role of his social class in the imperial governance". A notable exception is Berrigan (1968): 42-5, who argues that Agrippa's 'democratic' speech was closer to Dio's own opinions than Maecenas' 'self-serving' monarchical speech. Fechner (1986): 71-86 argues the same thing, but from a different perspective. Berrigan's idea has been rejected by MacKechnie (1981): 150-5 and is improbable for various historiographical reasons. Perhaps the most exhaustive study of the speech is that of Ruiz (1982), which reinforces the conclusions already made by Millar in 1964. So far, bar Rich and Pelling (1983): 221-6, no attempt has been made to think about the debate within Dio's broader narrative of Augustan monarchy and the late Republic in any literary sense, which I hope to remedy in the Epilogue at the end of this thesis. Pelling's argument that Agrippa's speech, though it is not as central to Dio's ideal constitution as Maecenas', held historiographical relevance because it provided Augustus with the *Schein* to his *Sein*, as it were, is important and we shall return to it at the end of the thesis.

<sup>5</sup> Pelling (1983): 221.

transition from Republic to Principate would differ dramatically. Even a cursory reading of the two historians' accounts of the triumviral period will confirm that this is the case".<sup>6</sup>

I am not sure what to make of Gowing's claim that revolutions were an everyday occurrence in Dio's life. The 'Crisis of the Third Century', as we understand it today, was still in the future when Dio is assumed to have died and Gowing here appears to confuse coups (of which there were several in Dio's life) with civil wars (of which there were two, the latter being little more than a battle in the Syrian desert).<sup>7</sup> This was certainly a *more* turbulent time than the preceding two centuries had been, though we should not exaggerate how far someone living under the Severans would have felt his circumstances to be the beginning of a new phase of Roman history – such judgements are usually a *post facto* affair.<sup>8</sup>

More importantly, it is not clear what unique perspective Gowing thinks that this gave to Dio that Appian lacked. Elsewhere, he attributes to Appian a desire to "illuminate the present prosperity [of Antonine Rome] through an event which, to anyone living under a benign monarchy, must have seemed utter madness" and "to illustrate the prosperity of Antonine Rome through comparison with the darker past".<sup>9</sup> He asserts:

"Nor is it surprising that Appian, writing under a regime noted for its humanitarianism, should often remark the misery to which the inhabitants of Italy were reduced, not only in his account of the triumviral period but in that of the troubled years from the Gracchi as well...Appian's reader would come away with a very clear sense of just how fortunate he or she was to live under a benign princeps".<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Gowing (1992): 5.

<sup>7</sup> It is also not clear that, when Dio left Rome, he would have been able to foresee what problems would beset Rome after 235. As Lot (1966<sup>3</sup>): 7 points out, "under the principate of quite a young man Alexander Severus (March 12<sup>th</sup>, 222 – February-March, 235) it seemed as though the Senate were going to recover its supremacy in the Roman State".

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Alföldy (1974): 92-3, "men such as Dio and Philostratus were still convinced that, in spite of all present evil, the sound world of the past could be restored". See de Blois (2002): 204-217 for a recent view of the extent of the Crisis and a summary of scholarship downplaying its extent. His criticisms of these arguments are fair.

<sup>9</sup> Gowing (1992): 268; (1990b): 161.

<sup>10</sup> Gowing (1992): 280.

In what way, we might ask, would this make his account of the period different to Dio's, whose attitudes to benign monarchy were essentially the same and who seems no more desensitised to the violence of the late Republic because of 'first hand' experience? Gowing even points to Appian's experiences in the Jewish revolts in Alexandria as a key factor in his focus on social struggle and *στάσις*.<sup>11</sup>

It has also been suggested that this influence manifests itself in Dio's view of Republican history as dominated by 'Big Men' all of whom lust for supreme power.<sup>12</sup> But this is nothing new in the historiography of the late Republic. Tacitus says of the period, "post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior, et numquam postea nisi de principatu quaesitum" and Appian's *prooemium* claims that *ἐπαναστάσεις ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτείαν φανεραὶ καὶ στρατεῖαι μεγάλαι καὶ βίαιοι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἐγένοντο φυγάδων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καταδίκων ἢ περὶ ἀρχῆς τινος ἢ στρατοπέδου φιλονικούντων ἐς ἀλλήλους. δυναστεῖαί τε ἦσαν...καὶ στασίαρχοι μοναρχικοί*.<sup>13</sup> Dio differs from these historians, if he differs at all, only in the *intensity* of his account.<sup>14</sup> This at least can be explained by his time, though in the sense that as a comparatively late writer, he might have struggled to make his mark on a well-worn period. There is no need to think that he was writing about Pompey or Caesar as though they were proto-Severi or Caracallae. We need to define more clearly what we mean by the influence of Dio's era on his History.

Scholars are on stronger ground when they argue that Dio's History was written as a response to the problems of his own day, though even this needs some qualification before it can be accepted. That Dio wrote his History because he was encouraged to by Septimius Severus (and *τὸ δαιμόνιον*) has long been noted, but few have inquired into

---

<sup>11</sup> Gowing (1992): 269.

<sup>12</sup> Lintott (1997): 2520; Kemezis (2006): 101-115.

<sup>13</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 2.38.10-11; App. *B Civ.* 1.2.6. Other examples are easily furnished from other writers: Cic. *ad Att.* 8.11.2; Sall. *Cat.* 9.2; 10.3; 10.5-6; 11.1; 11.4; 12.1; *Jug.* 4.7-9; Tac. *Hist.* 1.50.8-13; 2.38.1-2; *Ann.* 1.1; 3.27.1-28.2; 13.6.3; Livy, 1.11-12; Flor. 3.12.1-14; 3.13.1; 3.15.3; 3.21.1-2; 4.2.1-17; 4.3.1-8; 4.9.1-2.

<sup>14</sup> Millar (1964): 77 states that Dio's late Republican narrative is "unoriginal". Sion-Jenkis (2000): 65-121 shows just how conventional all accounts of the failure of the Republic were.

Dio's claims about it beyond this. Dio describes his guiding goddess, *Tyche*, as *καλὰς ἐλπίδας περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου διδοῦσάν μοι ὡς ὑπολειψομένου τὴν ἱστορίαν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀμαυρώσοντος*.<sup>15</sup> In the very first book of his History he claims that *σπουδὴν ἔχω συγγράψαι πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ εἰρηνοῦσι καὶ πολεμοῦσι ἀξίως μνήμης ἐπράχθη, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μήτε ἐκείνων τινὰ μήτε τῶν ἄλλων ποθῆσαι*.<sup>16</sup> Both of these passages place Dio in a historiographical tradition going back to Herodotus and Thucydides. His claim that he hoped his History would not fade into obscurity looks like a reference to Thucydides' hope that *his* History would remain a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί* and the second passage cited is something of a paraphrase of Herodotus' stated hope that the achievements he records would not be blotted out by time.<sup>17</sup> Dio also saw himself as an educator and felt that *παιδείσις* was the heart of history.<sup>18</sup> It is not clear who exactly his intended audience was, but certainly the educated elites of the Greek-speaking world and his fellow senators were included.<sup>19</sup>

If, as I believe, Dio felt that his History was a lasting monument, designed to educate future readers for as long as Rome should survive, we should think of the political lessons he was drawing out from that history, and which culminate in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, as being universal(ising), not specific to one time. His experience of the Third Century was a catalyst, which inspired him to write a history of the whole Roman world, seeking to analyse the successes and vicissitudes of the Roman people from the beginning of their history down to his own day and draw out from that important and general lessons about human nature, constitution and society. Though the Agrippa-

---

<sup>15</sup> Cass. Dio 72.23.4.

<sup>16</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 1.1.

<sup>17</sup> Thuc. 1.20.23; Htd. 1.1 (cf. also Thuc. 1.23.5 which Dio's second claim partially echoes). Dio's argument defending his use of high Attic styling (claiming that it does not detract from the truthfulness of his account) may also be a response to the Thucydidean promise that his history would not contain poetic or flowery elements (frg. 1.2 with Thuc. 1.21.1).

<sup>18</sup> Lintott (1997): 2499. Dio espouses the value of *παιδεία* at various places in his history; e.g. frg. 40.3; 54.3; 57.23; 57.51; 38.18.1; 38.23.2; 46.35.1.

<sup>19</sup> Aalders (1986): 282-304; Rich (1990): 5. "Perhaps his ideal readers were men like himself, Greeks who had become absorbed into the Roman governing class." Cf. Kemezis (2006): 94.

Maecenas debate is the culmination of this, we cannot separate it out from the rest of the narrative (as has often been the case in scholarly discussions). Plato and Aristotle's method was to compare a series of competing political systems, establish one as best and then give their verdict on the best version of that constitution. Dio, as a Classicising member of the intellectual elite of the High Empire, was influenced by Classical approaches to political philosophy (see Chapter Four) and we shall see that Dio does something rather similar but as a historian rather than a philosopher.

What is the relevance of this to Dio's narrative of the late Republic? This thesis has been written to show that the view of Dio's History shared by Millar, Fechner and Lintott is imprecise and unsatisfactory. Dio's Republican narrative will be seen to be dependent at all levels upon a detailed and thoroughgoing emphasis on *φύσις*, which we shall discuss shortly, inspired ultimately by Thucydidean thought but very much Dio's own, which he blends with other Classical Greek and Roman ideas about politics, society and human experience. This means that we should not view Dio's account of the period as though it were seen through the lens of Third Century politics (though they *were* his initial motivation to study history). Instead, I am arguing that we should read Dio as a historian engaging with the historiographical traditions about Republican politics, as well as the Classical models that are important to his account of the period, with the intention that this examination of the fall of the Republic in historical and intellectual terms would then flow into his explanation of the supremacy of the Augustan monarchy and his proposals for an ideal Roman state in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate.

This leads us on to the issue of how Dio explains the history/fall of the Roman Republic. There are two passages of fundamental importance to understanding Dio's history of the period. Comparing monarchy to democracy after the assassination of Caesar, he says:

Δημοκρατία γὰρ ὄνομα μὲν εὖσχημον ἔχει καὶ τινα καὶ ἰσομοιρίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῆς ἰσονομίας φέρειν δοκεῖ, ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλέγχεται μὴδὲν ὁμολογοῦσα τῷ προσήματι· καὶ τοῦναντίον ἢ μοναρχία δυσχερὲς μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, χρησιμώτατον δὲ ἐμπολιτεύασθαι ἐστί. ῥῶόν τε γὰρ ἓνα τινα χρηστὸν ἢ πολλοὺς εὐρεῖν· ἂν τε καὶ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τισιν εἶναι δοκῆ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνό γε ἀδύνατον ὁμολογηθῆναι εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρετὴν κτᾶσθαι. εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ φαῦλός τις αὐταρχήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε πλήθους τῶν ὁμοίων αἰρετώτερός ἐστιν, ὡσπερ που καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων, τῶν τε Ῥωμαίων αὐτῶν, τεκμηριοῖ. τὰ τε γὰρ ἀμείνω πολὺ μείζω καὶ πλείω καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ἐκ βασιλέων ἢ δῆμων αἰεὶ ποτε ἐγένετο, καὶ τὰ <ἦττον> δυσχερέστερα ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ἢ ταῖς ὀχλοκρατίαις συμβαίνει. εἰ γὰρ που καὶ δημοκρατία τις ἦνθησεν, ἀλλ' ἐν γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν, μέχρις οὐ μῆτε μέγεθος μῆτ' ἰσχὺν ἔσχον ὥστε ἢ βρεῖς σφίσι ἐξ εὐπραγίας ἢ φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι. πόλιν τε αὐτὴν τε τηλικαύτην οὖσαν καὶ τοῦ τε καλλίστου τοῦ τε πλείστου τῆς ἐμφανοῦς οἰκουμένης ἄρχουσαν, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ διάφορα κεκτημένην πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ μεγάλους πλούτους ἔχουσαν, ταῖς τε πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς τύχαις παντοδαπαῖς καὶ ἰδίαις καὶ δημοσίαις χρωμένην, ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονήσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ σωφρονοῦσαν ὁμοιοῦσαι.<sup>20</sup>

In the speech which Dio puts into the mouth of Maecenas, he expands upon this idea. Maecenas is made to advise the new emperor Augustus on how to set up power in his favour:

Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὰ τε πραττόμενα ὀρθῶς διοικηθῆι, μῆτε ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφερόμενα μῆτε ἐν τῷ φανερῷ βουλευόμενα μῆτε [ἐν] τοῖς παρακελευστοῖς ἐπιτρεπόμενα μῆτε ἐκ φιλοτιμίας κινδυνεύόμενα, καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν ἡδέως ἀπολαύσαιμεν, μῆτε πολέμους ἐπικινδύνους μῆτε στάσεις ἀνοσίους ποιούμενοι. ταῦτα γὰρ πᾶσα μὲν δημοκρατία ἔχει· οἱ γὰρ δυνατώτεροι, τῶν τε πρωτείων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους μισθούμενοι, πάντα ἄνω καὶ κάτω φύρουσι· πλείστα δὲ δὴ παρ' ἡμῖν γέγονε, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄλλως παύσεται. τεκμήριον δέ, πάμπολυς ἐξ οὗ χρόνος καὶ πολεμοῦμεν καὶ στασιάζομεν. αἴτιον δὲ τό τε πλήθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν πραγμάτων· ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ παντοδαποὶ καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰς φύσεις ὄντες καὶ ποικίλας καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐς τοσοῦτον προήκται ὥστε καὶ πάνυ δυσχερῶς ἂν διοικηθῆναι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γεγονότα. τέως μὲν γὰρ οὔτε πολλοὶ ἦμεν οὔτε μεγάλῳ τινὶ τῶν πλησιοχώρων διεφέρομεν, καλῶς τε ἐπολιτευόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν ὀλίγου τὴν Ἰταλίαν κατεστρεψάμεθα· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ ἔξω αὐτῆς ἐξήχθημεν, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ἠπείρων καὶ τῶν νήσων ἐπεραιώθημεν, καὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν πᾶσαν δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἡμῶν ἐνεπλήσαμεν, οὐδενὸς χρηστοῦ μετεσχέκαμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἴκοι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους κατὰ συστάσεις ἐστασιάσαμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰ στρατόπεδα τὸ νόσημα τοῦτο προηγάγομεν. καὶ διὰ ταῦθ' ἢ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὡσπερ ὀλκὰς μεγάλη καὶ πλήρης ὄχλου παντοδαποῦ χωρὶς κυβερνήτου, πολλὰς ἤδη γενεὰς ἐν κλύδωνι πολλῶ φερομένη σαλεύει τε καὶ ἄττει δεῦρο καὶ ἐκεῖσε, καθάπερ ἀνερμάτιστος οὖσα.<sup>21</sup>

These passages show that Dio believed that the Republic was unable to cope in the face of human competition and ambition, after it was inflamed by empire, wealth and

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.1-4. For the emendation ἦττον, see Boissevain's note on the text.

<sup>21</sup> Cass. Dio 52.15.4-16.3.

power. Dio argues that the Republic fell because the traditional model of competitive aristocracy in front of a popular audience failed both to meet the needs of an empire and to take account of the fact that an empire as large as Rome's raised the political stakes beyond what they were when the Republican institutions were founded.

In recent years much scholarly attention on Cassius Dio has focused on the question of his conception of human nature (or *φύσις*). Reinhold addressed the issue first of all, in an article on human nature in ancient historiography, in which he argued that Dio's interest in human nature is part of his broader attempt to emulate Thucydides.<sup>22</sup> Hose developed the argument further, mostly in challenging the notion that Dio was writing paradigmatic history.<sup>23</sup> In the last decade, two works have been written in German on the subject, Kuhn-Chen's *Geschichtskonzeptionen griechischer Historiker im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* and Sion-Jenkis' *Von der Republik zum Prinzipat*, exploring the various terms Dio and other historians of the Imperial Era use to discuss human nature throughout their histories. Sion-Jenkis comes to Dio's interest in *φύσις* as part of a broader discussion of the technical language used to describe Republican politics by Greek and Latin historians of the Imperial Era. The main terms that have been singled out for discussion are 'psychological' terms, which relate to political ambition or political competition among either members of the elite, or the different social classes in Rome. The terms that I shall focus on are *φιλοτιμία* (ambition), *πλεονεξία* (greed), *φιλονεικία* (quarrelsomeness), *ἐπιθυμία* (desire), *ἔχθρα* (hatred), *φθόνος* (jealousy) and *ὀργή* (anger or passion). Many of these words are used in the two passages above and are legion in Dio's narrative. Though studies of Dio's '*φύσις* model' to date have been rather mechanical, processing terms without thinking about their effects on the narrative in which they are embedded, I believe that this approach, which fits in with the two key passages we have

---

<sup>22</sup> Reinhold (1985): 21-40. Cf. Reinhold (1988): 215.

<sup>23</sup> Hose (1994): 381.

examined above, is vital to understanding how Dio structures his Republican history and its relevance to his broader historical, political and intellectual concerns.

Section One will consist of two chapters exploring Dio's *φύσις* terminology and showing how these ideas relate to the picture of moral/political decline he elaborates upon in our two passages, derived from the historiographical tradition. Section Two, again consisting of two chapters, will explore the intellectual models and ideas that Dio uses in account of the late Republic and show how his emphasis on *φύσις* shapes his employment of them. We shall focus on Dio's two major influences, Thucydides, and Greek political philosophy. These two sections describe the dominant themes and concerns of Dio's narrative, showing how they are shaped by his interest in *φύσις*. Sections Three and Four are two case studies, the careers and speeches of Caesar and Cicero, showing how the ideas explored in Sections One and Two permeate the narrative. Traditionally Dio's speeches have been seen as irrelevant to the narrative, preoccupied solely with themes that might have interested a Severan senator.<sup>24</sup> Instead of this I am proposing that we should try to understand their relevance to Dio's time through this 'universalising' project. We should examine their role within the narrative and the themes Dio felt were essential to explaining the course of Roman history in the late Republic.

In the Epilogue, I shall show how the ideas explored herein concerning Dio's *φύσις* model and its role in the downfall of the Republic relate to his bigger ideological project, as we see it in his narrative of the reign of Augustus.

---

<sup>24</sup> E.g. Fischer (1870): 33; Ferwer (1878): 1-2; Schwartz (1899): 1690; Vlachos (1905): 105; Millar (1961): 12-13; Millar (1964): 83; Van Stekelenburg (1971): 152-153; Kuhn-Chen (2002): 146. It has been argued, however, by Rich (1989): 98-9; (1990): 11-12 that the narrative function of Dio's speeches deserves more attention than previously thought. I shall work from this basis in my thesis.

## Section One: Cassius Dio and the Roman Republic

This section forms the background for the rest of my study. It is concerned with the way that Dio represents the history of the Republic both in terms of the *φύσις* model he uses and in terms of the view of the trajectory of Roman history in the period he takes.

The first chapter deals with the *φύσις* issue and will analyse Dio's thinking about *φύσις* in relation to important ancient debates about *φύσις* and *νόμος*, showing how his adoption of these ideas affected his History. The bulk of the chapter is a technical analysis of the terms Dio uses throughout the period to describe the motivations that dominate political life in his narrative.

The second chapter looks at Dio's relationship to the well-worn Roman concept of moral decline in the late Republic and how he incorporates this idea into a history ostensibly dominated by themes of *φύσις*. I reject the arguments of Hose that Dio did not believe in theories of moral decline, showing that such ideas do not contradict but enhance his Thucydidean perspective and that they allow him to explain how and why the Augustan monarchy was important in restoring the balance to the Roman state that had been lost over the course of the expansion of the late Republic (as our two passages in the Introduction suggest). This chapter then leads us onto the next section of the thesis, Dio's two main intellectual influences, where we shall show how Dio combines these themes, and his interest in *φύσις*, with other Thucydidean and Greek philosophical ideas.

## Chapter One: Cassius Dio and *Φύσις*

### Introduction

As I have noted in my Introduction, modern scholarship is beginning to move towards a ‘psychological’ model of Dio’s history, where certain motives dominate his history. Scholarship on this area, though it has grown in the last twenty years, is still fairly rudimentary, the closest to a full study of the issues being that of Kuhn-Chen.<sup>1</sup> Little attempt to think about Dio’s understanding of human nature within the context of broader debates in Classical culture has been made, or to understand how Dio felt his History was benefitting from his emphasis on it.<sup>2</sup> Kuhn-Chen herself simply claims that “seine spezialität auf der Ebene der endogenen Antriebskräfte sind vielmehr Sentenzen, die von einer konkreten Situation ausgehend dieses Verhalten als typisch menschlich erklären” but that these pronouncements never add up to a historical methodology.<sup>3</sup> We have suggested in the Introduction that this idea is wrong, since Dio clearly conceives the failure of the Republic as centred on these ideas, as well as his belief in the superiority of the successor constitution, the Principate. This chapter is designed to explore more deeply what ideas about *φύσις* Dio is influenced by and then to explore the terms which are of central importance to his discussion of the Republic. What we argue here may seem as yet lacking in focus, but that is because these topics are the important background to what we argue in the rest of the thesis.

---

<sup>1</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002).

<sup>2</sup> Reinhold (1985): 21-40 and (1988) 215-17 briefly discuss the Sophistic and Thucydidean legacy by which Dio was influenced.

<sup>3</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 143.

## Part One: Φύσις in Dio

Φύσις was the subject of vigorous debate in antiquity, the most important debates surrounding the issue of φύσις and νόμος.<sup>4</sup> The debate concerned whether φύσις could be improved through education and training, the relationship between φύσις and ethnicity, whether φύσις in the sense of reality was superior to νόμος as something ‘believed in, practised or held to be right’, or whether νόμος was simply a façade for φύσις.<sup>5</sup>

All of these ideas are present in Dio. On the issue of the improvement of φύσις, or φύσις and ἔθος, Kuhn-Chen, for example, has identified two strands in Dio’s conception of historical causation, the so-called ‘Exogenekraft’ and ‘Endogenekraft’, the former dealing with external factors, such as the divine, fortune and chance, and the latter concerning Dio’s views of human nature, and the effects of education and of moderation, with which we are concerned here. She argues that Dio felt that through education and self-control, the worst effects of human nature could be mitigated.<sup>6</sup> Hose has claimed, however, that Dio was influenced by Thucydides’ view that φύσις was entirely negative and untameable.<sup>7</sup> We shall return to Hose’s idea in the next chapter, where we shall show that even though Dio’s view of human nature is constant, his view is that its manifestation can shift and alter depending upon the conditions under which it exists.

The concept that ethnicity affects φύσις is likewise found in Dio. Famously he says of Caracalla that he combined τῆς μὲν Γαλατίας τὸ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ δειλὸν καὶ τὸ θρασύ, τῆς Ἀφρικῆς τὸ τραχὺ καὶ ἄγριον, τῆς Συρίας, ὄθεν πρὸς μητρὸς ἦν, τὸ πανούργον.<sup>8</sup> Gauls are irascible, enormous of build and harsh-voiced; they ὀργῇ ἀκράτῳ καὶ ὀρμῇ ἀπλήστῳ

---

<sup>4</sup> Reinhold (1985): 21. Guthrie (1971): 55.

<sup>5</sup> Guthrie (1971): 55-134.

<sup>6</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 147-219.

<sup>7</sup> Hose (1994): 405.

<sup>8</sup> Cass. Dio 77.6.1a.

χρῶνται, and, true to what Dio later says of Caracalla, their character contains something <κοῦφον> γάρ τι καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἄπιστον φύσει.<sup>9</sup> Egyptians fare no better; Cleopatra fled the Battle of Actium, apparently, as a woman and an Egyptian.<sup>10</sup> Egyptians have a facile and fickle quality (τὸ ῥάδιον τό τε κοῦφον) and Alexandrians are given over to self-destructive wantonness.<sup>11</sup> With the bitterness of a man who nearly lost his life at their hands, Dio rails savagely about the barbarity and impoverishment of the Pannonians' life and character.<sup>12</sup> All of these ideas are commonplace, but they serve as an important background to Dio's belief in Roman exceptionalism, which we shall explore in the next chapter.

It is, however, the division between *φύσις* and *νόμος* as reality versus justice, or where justice is really just the volition of the mighty, that Dio is most interested in. This is unsurprising, given the influence of Thucydides over his History. Dio's claim, as we saw in the Introduction, that *οἱ δυνατώτεροι, τῶν τε πρωτείων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους μισθούμενοι, πάντα ἄνω καὶ κάτω φύρουσι* has overtones of this debate, drawing upon the idea that the strong can command the weak to do their bidding.<sup>13</sup> The Athenian claim in Thucydides' Melian dialogue that *δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ πρῶχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν* is true for Dio's thinking about the realities of power.<sup>14</sup> For example, he claims that:

*καὶ αὐτοὶ τε ἐξέμαθον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξεδίδαξαν ὅτι οὐθ' οἱ τιμωρούμενοί τινος κατορθοῦσι πάντως, ὅτι προηδίκηνται, οὐθ' οἱ παρὰ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπαιτοῦντές τινα ἀπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ προσαπολύουσιν.*<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Frg. 50.2-3; 57.6b; cf. 25.2-3. For the textual difficulties of 57.6b, see Boissevain. The stock-in-trade idea that northerners were heavy of stature is found in Dio's discussion of battle scenes containing Germans, too (Cass. Dio 38.35.2; 38.47.5). See Pelling (1982): 147.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio 50.33.2.

<sup>11</sup> Cass. Dio 51.17.1; 65.8.7.

<sup>12</sup> Cass. Dio 49.36.1-6.

<sup>13</sup> Cass. Dio 52.15.5.

<sup>14</sup> Thuc. 5.89.

<sup>15</sup> Frg. 5.4.

During his narrative of the civil wars, Dio expresses the further Thucydidean thought that justice and right dependent on success and failure rather than intrinsic worth:

*οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαντες καὶ εὐβουλοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλιδες ἐνομίσθησαν, οἱ δὲ δὴ πταίσαντες καὶ πολέμοι τῆς πατρίδος καὶ ἀλιτήριοι ὠνομάσθησαν.*<sup>16</sup>

Dio, however, differs from some of our Classical authorities about *φύσις* and *νόμος* in that he refuses to accept the idea that equality among individuals brings stability, an idea that we shall see is very important to his explanation of the fall of the Republic and in his belief in the need for monarchy.<sup>17</sup> Humans, he says, are predisposed to resent rule by those they regard as their equals:

*οὕτω που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρὸς τε τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον.*<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, *στάσις* is an inevitability in a society of equals:

*ἀστασιά<στους> γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀσφαλῶς συμβῆναί σφας ἀδύνατον ἑώρων ὄν, ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμίας.*<sup>19</sup>

As well as the idea that societies of equals are inherently unstable, Dio's narrative of the Republic is more broadly one of the struggle between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. As we saw in the passage from Book 44 we cited in the Introduction, Dio believed that the Republican constitution was unable to cope with the increased opportunity for *φιλοτιμία* caused by empire and power, a problem resolved by the move towards monarchy that took place at that time. We shall return to this issue in the next chapter. Now, however, we must

---

<sup>16</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.5. Cf. Thuc. 1.76.2; 1.76.3; 1.77.3; 3.82.4-7.

<sup>17</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.11.1-2; Arist. *Pol.* 1301b 25-30; 1308a 11-15.

<sup>18</sup> Cass. Dio 5.12.

<sup>19</sup> Frg. 7.3. See Boissevain for various emendations for *ἀστασία*.

analyse those terms that show how Dio's 'φύσις model' is expressed in his narrative of the Republic. Some attempt at this has been made by Sion-Jenkis and Kuhn-Chen and their ideas will be explored as we discuss those terms that are salient for understanding Dio on the late Republic.

## **Part Two: Private ambition in Dio's narrative**

### **Φιλοτιμία<sup>20</sup>**

**Φιλοτιμία** is the dominant and most destructive vice in Dio's history. He perceives the downfall of Pyrrhus, the collapse of the Republic and the self-destruction of the Triumvirate through intoxication with **φιλοτιμία**. He claims of Pyrrhus, whilst generalising on the station of the tyrant, that:

*ὅτι ἢ τε φιλοτιμία καὶ ἡ ἀπιστία ἀεὶ τοῖς τυράννοις σύνεστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη μηδένα αὐτοῦ ἀκριβῆ φίλον ἔχειν.<sup>21</sup>*

Likewise, Dio accounts for the fall of the Republic in terms of **φιλοτιμία**. As we saw in the Introduction, he complains that, unlike in a monarchy, there are too many people in a democracy with their fingers in the political pie, all of whom vie with one another and are resentful of each other due to **φιλοτιμία** and insolent due to good fortune.<sup>22</sup> The triumvirs, too, despite the goodwill to one another built up during the struggle against their enemies, destroy one another through **φιλοτιμία**.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 79-80; Kuhn-Chen (2002): 168-9.

<sup>21</sup> Frg. 40.15.

<sup>22</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.3.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 48.1.3. Dio sees their division of the empire between themselves as ruinous, as they each allow their **φιλοτιμία** to seek mastery as a kind of prize (**ἄθλα**).

Despite the seriousness of this vice, there are times when Dio does not negatively portray *φιλοτιμία*.<sup>24</sup> This is unsurprising, given that the term was often used positively both within the social politics of the *πόλις*, where it signified the munificence of the local aristocracy towards the common people and in intellectual thought where *φιλοτιμία* was a motivation to glorious deeds and an important part of the statesman's character.<sup>25</sup> Dio, for example, praises the *φιλοτιμία* of the Romans who refuse to be cowed by naval defeats in the first Punic Wars, continuing to build ships and fight.<sup>26</sup> In his apology for democracy, Agrippa accredits citizens in a democracy with a willingness to contribute taxes to the running of the state, as they are spurred on by rivalry (*φιλοτιμία*) with one another to benefit society (in the Epilogue, we shall return to this idea, as it suggests the important role Dio feels an ambitious aristocracy can play in his monarchic constitution).<sup>27</sup> In the speech of the father of Rullus in 325 B.C., he celebrates men who act from *φιλοτιμία*, not *πονηρία*.<sup>28</sup>

*Φιλοτιμία* becomes wicked when it lacks the sense of civic duty the examples above possess and when it is the manifestation of personal interests. Tiberius Gracchus is cast as a slave to *φιλοτιμία* in Dio's narrative. He was ironically not led by his excellence of education and background into good behaviour, but into *φιλοτιμία*.<sup>29</sup> Resentment at his treatment over the Numantine affair led him to desire leadership in the state (*πρωτεῦσαι πάντως*).<sup>30</sup> For Tiberius Gracchus, *φιλοτιμία* was a stepping-stone from virtue into evil,

---

<sup>24</sup> *Contra* Kuhn-Chen (2002): 168.

<sup>25</sup> Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4.4; 44.5; Plut. *Pol. Prag.* 798C ; 819F.

<sup>26</sup> Frg. 43.7. *Contra* Kuhn-Chen (2002): 168, "Zahlreiche Personen der römischen Geschichte werden jedoch von Ehrgeiz getrieben, wobei dies für Dio stets ein negativer Zug ist".

<sup>27</sup> Cass. Dio 52.6.2. It is noteworthy that Maecenas speaks against the establishment of a democracy on the grounds that it would allow partisans to employ *φιλοτιμία* against one another several times in his speech. See Cass. Dio 52.15.4 and 52.37.10.

<sup>28</sup> Frg. 36.3.

<sup>29</sup> Frg. 83.1.

<sup>30</sup> Frg. 83.3.

unlike his brother who was naturally turbulent.<sup>31</sup> **Φιλοτιμία** usually stands as a precursor to rivalry and strife in Dio's narrative. In 91 B.C., he says that:

ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς στασιάρχοι, τὸ δὲ δὴ πλείστον κράτος τῶν μὲν Μάρκος, τῶν δὲ Κόντος εἶχον, δυναστείας τε ἐπιθυμηταὶ καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἄπληστοι, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλόνηκον προπετέστατοι ὄντες.<sup>32</sup>

By linking **δυναστεία** and **φιλοτιμία**, Dio is comparing overweening ambition to what he regards as the most savage and dishonest political system. **Δυναστεία** is the technical term Dio uses for the Triumvirate (meaning a kind of oligarchy), but he also accuses various politicians of aiming at **δυναστεία** over their fellow citizens. The word has overtones of slaughter, persecution and oppression in Dio's writing.<sup>33</sup> In this passage we see clearly that ambition and desire (**ἐπιθυμία**) lead to the **στάσις** of the late Republic.

Pompey's desire for political mastery of the state is spurred on by **φιλοτιμία**. He regards the command against the pirates as more than a simple honour or opportunity for glory, and the failure to obtain it a total disgrace because of his personal ambition and because he is spurred on by the people.<sup>34</sup> The dangerousness of Pompey's ambition is recognised by Catulus in his speech before the people.<sup>35</sup> He warns that human nature, once it experiences total power, is unwilling to abide by ancestral customs,<sup>36</sup> that Marius and Sulla were corrupted by too much power,<sup>37</sup> and that great honours and powers over-excite and ruin good humans.<sup>38</sup> As Pompey is inspired by **φιλοτιμία**, so is Caesar. Shortly before

---

<sup>31</sup> Frg. 85.1. ὅτι ὁ Γράκχος τὴν μὲν γνώμην ὁμοίαν τῷ ἀδελφῷ εἶχεν, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον ἐκεῖνος <μὲν> ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐς φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐς κακίαν ἐξώκειλεν, οὗτος δὲ ταραχώδης τε φύσει ἦν.

<sup>32</sup> Frg. 96.1.

<sup>33</sup> For Dio's use of **δυναστεία**, see Freyburger-Galland (1997): 127-131. It can occasionally be an equivalent to the Latin *potestas* and *dominatio*. Cf. Mason (1974): 40 for its use in other contexts.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 36.24.5.

<sup>35</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 89-90. Dio anachronistically dates Catulus' speech to 67, when it belongs to 66 and the speech recorded here probably does not represent the speech given by the real Catulus in any way. See Rodgers (2008): 295-318. Interestingly, Catulus uses **φιλοτιμία** in a positive light (at 36.36.2), when he suggests giving greater power to Pompey's legates, though this is surely ironic.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 36.31.4.

<sup>37</sup> Cass. Dio 36.31.3-4.

<sup>38</sup> Cass. Dio 36.35.1.

Dio's record of Caesar's speech at Vesontio, where Caesar wins back his troops' faith in him and is able to defeat the Germans, the soldiers are resentful at being led into a war that was neither proper (*οὔτε προσήκοντα*) nor voted for (*ἐψηφισμένον*), but is the direct result of Caesar's private ambition (*διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν*). We shall return to this in more detail in Chapter Nine.

### *Πλεονεξία*<sup>39</sup>

A strong link exists between Dio's use of *πλεονεξία* and his narrative of the Republic. Of the twenty five times the word is used in the extant history, only five occur in his history of the empire. Even then, two of those five times are found in the speeches of Agrippa and Maecenas and relate directly to his Republican narrative, and only one is later than Augustus.<sup>40</sup> As translated by Liddell & Scott, *πλεονεξία* can mean '(one's own) advantage', 'assumption' and 'arrogance' as well as straightforward greed, with extended meanings of 'gains derived' and 'undue gains'. It signifies 'grasping at more', with the implication of more than before and more than another. Given that the late Republic is characterised by the patricio-plebeian nobility competing before the people for public office, it seems likely that Dio would chose to discuss the drive for success and political glory as not only material greed, but also a desire to gain advantage over others and to earn an (unjust) reward for one's efforts. This is borne out in two ways by the evidence. Firstly, Dio claims in a digression about human nature when discussing the growing hostility between Pompey and Caesar in 56 B.C., that:

---

<sup>39</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 165-167, who compounds *πλεονεξία* in her discussion with *ἐπιθυμία*, which is misleading. As we shall see later, *ἐπιθυμία* means 'desire' or 'hope' whereas *πλεονεξία* means 'greed' or the 'desire for advantage over another'.

<sup>40</sup> Dio mentions *πλεονεξία* at Frg. 40.38 (twice); Frg. 73.4; Cass. Dio 36.1.2; 37.57.3; 39.26.2; 39.42.4; 41.28.2; 41.35.4; 41.55.4; 42.53.2; 43.38.1; 44.21.1; 44.29.2; 44.47.1; 45.14.1; 45.24.2; 45.26.1; 45.26.3; 46.41.2. From the Augustan narrative 52.12.7; 52.13.4; 53.23.4; 54.21.4. Non-Augustan usage 78.26.1.

καὶ οὕτως ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων τὸν μὲν τῇ ἐλαττώσει ἀγανακτοῦντα, τὸν δὲ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ ἐπαιρόμενον.<sup>41</sup>

Such feelings come about when people are not on an equal footing and one party feels itself to be inferior and turns against its friends. In a world of competition which concludes either in success or in failure, then there will be winners and losers, those buoyed up by arrogance and those made bitter by failure and from there, the inevitable descent into revenge and strife. Dio also says, when discussing Cato the Younger's character that **πλεονεξία** was endemic in the late Republic:

καθαρῶς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς ἰδίας πλεονεξίας οὐδεὶς τῶν τότε τὰ κοινὰ πλὴν τοῦ Κάτωνος ἔπραττεν.<sup>42</sup>

It is common for Dio to talk of people not setting boundaries to greed (**μηδένα ὄρον τῆς πλεονεξίας ποιεῖσθαι**)<sup>43</sup> and there are occasional references to people harbouring ambitions against the state.<sup>44</sup> This is suggested further by the fact that **πλεονεξία** is used more than once alongside **δυναστεία** in the Republican narrative.<sup>45</sup> Viriathus, the Lusitanian, is praised for his sincerity of emotion and not being driven by either **πλεονεξία** or **δυναστεία**.<sup>46</sup> In his speech at Placentia, Caesar justifies his actions by claiming that he has no desire for dominance or advantage (**οὔτε δυναστείας οὔτε πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμῶ**).<sup>47</sup> Brutus and Cassius **οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ δυναστεία οὔτ' ἐπ' ἄλλῃ πλεονεξία οὐδεμιᾷ ἀπεκτονέειν αὐτὸν ἔφασαν**, which jars tellingly with Dio's own statement that they were motivated by

---

<sup>41</sup> Cass. Dio 39.26.2.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio 37.57.3.

<sup>43</sup> Cass. Dio 36.1.2; 44.29.2.

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio 44.47.1.

<sup>45</sup> Frg. 73.4; Cass. Dio 41.35.4; 44.21.1.

<sup>46</sup> Frg. 73.4.

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 41.35.4.

jealousy (*φθόνος*) and hatred (*μίσος*) of Caesar's superior position.<sup>48</sup> Despite the fact that all these examples are of people denying that they are interested in overthrowing the state, the very fact that they are compelled to negation is because the expectation of a link is so great: *πλεονεξία* is strongly twinned, through its competitive and rapacious element, with *δυναστεία* and is thus a very Republican desire. It is for this reason that, although *πλεονεξία* is an extremely important part of Dio's Republican narrative I cannot agree with Hose that it has more wide-ranging impact in Dio's narrative. He claims that "Geschichte verläuft gemäß den als anthropologische Konstante begriffenden psychologischen Triebkräften, d.h. vornehmlich: *φιλοτιμία* und *πλεονεξία*".<sup>49</sup> Neither *φιλοτιμία* nor *πλεονεξία* (nor, for that matter, *φιλονεικία*) appear beyond a small handful of references in Dio's post-Republican narrative. For *πλεονεξία*, one needs competition among a free elite; as far as Dio is concerned, therefore, in the Empire these terms lose their significance in political life, as the emperor sets limits on the ability of the senate to compete so that they do not do so to excess. This is not to say that these are not permanent features of human nature as Dio sees it, but rather it represents an important way in which the failings of the Republic are resolved in Dio's narrative of the Principate.

Of all the figures Dio associates with *πλεονεξία*, Antony is the most frequently and forcefully accused. Dio's picture of Antony is painted in stark tones and Dio is definitely pro-Octavian in his bias. Dio claims, during his narrative of the triumvirate, that everyone hated Antony because of his natural greed (*ὕπ' ἐμφύτου πλεονεξίας*).<sup>50</sup> Twice Dio criticises Antony for bringing his private licentiousness and greed into political life (emphasising Dio's belief in the dichotomy between private habit and public conformity).<sup>51</sup> He makes Cicero talk of Antony being both a dictator in all but name and greedy for gain as a

<sup>48</sup> Cass. Dio 44.21.1; 44.1.1.

<sup>49</sup> Hose (1994): 436.

<sup>50</sup> Cass. Dio 45.14.1.

<sup>51</sup> Cass. Dio 45.26.1 *τὰς τε ἰδίας ἀσελγείας καὶ πλεονεξίας*; 45.26.3 *ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιῶν καὶ τὴν κιναιδίαν καὶ τὴν πλεονεξίαν προήγαγε*.

consul.<sup>52</sup> That accusation directly follows an accusation that he has siphoned state money into his own pocket, suggesting again that Mark Antony was not willing to distinguish between public and private spheres.

### **Ἐπιθυμία**<sup>53</sup>

Dio sees **ἐπιθυμία** as an integral, if corrupt, part of human nature but believes that it can be sublimated. He claims that:

ἀστασιά<στους> γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις ἀσφαλῶς συμβῆναί σφας <ἀδύνατον> ἐύρων ὄν, ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμίας.<sup>54</sup>

He believes, however, that making rationality (**λογισμός**), and not power (**ἐξουσία**), the basis of desire (**ἐπιθυμία**) is the proper use of one's disposition, though the logic here is strange, given that rationality is often a guide to desire, not a thing that is readily or clearly desired in itself.<sup>55</sup> Elsewhere, he insists that restraining one's desire (**ἐπιθυμία**) is nobler than gratifying it.<sup>56</sup> This suggests that whilst in Dio's opinion people apply their **ἐπιθυμία** in a negative and damaging way, the emotion is not *per se* a negative thing.<sup>57</sup>

**Ἐπιθυμία** is ascribed an important role in the destruction of the Republic. Dio follows the Sallustian concept of *cupido dominandi* with his use of the phrase **ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἄρχειν**.<sup>58</sup> Dio accuses Cicero, Pompey, Caesar, Lepidus, Brutus and Cassius, Octavian and

---

<sup>52</sup> Cass. Dio 45.24.2.

<sup>53</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 80.

<sup>54</sup> Frg. 7.3. The first clause of this sentence is slightly conjectural, though it does not affect my argument. See Boissevain.

<sup>55</sup> Frg. 55.6.

<sup>56</sup> Cass. Dio 41.27.3. See also Frg. 40.6

<sup>57</sup> Frg. 91.3. There is another neutral implication of **ἐπιθυμία** at frg. 7.3.

<sup>58</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 80.

Antony of this.<sup>59</sup> Maecenas, as we saw in the Introduction, claims that with an empire expanding across so many countries and incorporating so many men, a democracy cannot cope with so many different desires and temperaments (*ποικίλας καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσι*).<sup>60</sup> Cicero talks of “a cycle of evils” (*κύκλος τις τῶν κακῶν*) created by the feeling of power and the desire given to men by control over armies:

*οὕτως ἐπειδὴν ἄρχονται τινες στασιάζειν, καὶ τὰ βίαια αἰετὶ τοῖς βίαιοις ἀμύνεσθαι ζητῶσι, καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας μῆτε πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μῆτε πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὀπλῶν ποιῶνται, κύκλος τις ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰετὶ τῶν κακῶν γίγνεται.*<sup>61</sup>

**Ἐπιθυμία** is credited with creating the lawlessness of the first triumvirate.<sup>62</sup>

Fechner has argued very persuasively that Dio’s ideal constitution rests upon his belief in moderation. He argues that Dio perceives a ‘Stabilitätsideal’. He argues that Dio believes that in his history of the Republic, the state is perpetually threatened by internal instability.<sup>63</sup> Given the claim of “a cycle of evils” put into Cicero’s mouth and what Fechner says about Dio’s recognition of internal instability in the late Republic, we see the importance of **ἐπιθυμία** to the many troubles and eventual downfall of the Republic in Dio’s presentation.

This importance is manifest in other areas. The proscriptions are put down to **ἐπιθυμία**. For example, Marius and Cinna execute the leading citizens in 87 B.C. because they desire their money (*τούς τι ἔχοντας ἐπιθυμία χρημάτων ἐφθειρον*).<sup>64</sup> Equally horrifically, Dio claims a kind of “bloodlust” came over Marius a mere few lines later:

---

<sup>59</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 169-171.

<sup>60</sup> Cass. Dio 52.15.6. Agrippa talks of **ἐπιθυμία** at 52.2.5 and 52.7.4.

<sup>61</sup> Cass. Dio 44.29.1. Cicero later describes Antony as the reason why Caesar came to desire monarchy (Cass. Dio 45.40.3).

<sup>62</sup> Cass. Dio 41.57.4; 37.57.1.

<sup>63</sup> Fechner (1986): 186.

<sup>64</sup> Frg. 102.9.

ἢ τε ἐπιθυμία καὶ ἀπληστία τῶν φόνων τὸν Μάριον κατέσχευεν.<sup>65</sup>

This line comes directly before the slaughter of innocent civilians by Marius when he has them parade before him in the forum.<sup>66</sup> Likewise, Fimbria kills many “through lust and desire for slaughter” (ὀργῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ φόνων).<sup>67</sup> Under the triumvirs Antony, Octavian and Lepidus, ἐπιθυμία and τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον (private advantage) are at the heart of the proscriptions.<sup>68</sup>

Dio also sees ἐπιθυμία as an important cause for war. Viewing each other with envy, the Romans and Carthaginians start their long (and destructive) series of wars with one another.<sup>69</sup> The Aedui and Sequani manipulate Caesar’s ἐπιθυμία, encouraging him into leading Roman troops against their enemies.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, Caesar’s command in Gaul was to create in him an over-mighty desire (ἐπιθυμία) for dominance (δυναστείας).<sup>71</sup> It is perhaps important that of these examples, as we shall see in the next chapter, the first is treated as arguably positive by Dio – the Romans desiring communally the glory of defeating a powerful enemy – and the later ones as negative, where Caesar’s personal desire for glory leads him into illegal warfare. As we shall see, the former leads inevitably on to the latter in Dio’s narrative and represents the change between public ambition that generally characterises his depiction of the earlier Republic and the private ambitions that dominate his narrative of the last hundred years of Republican history.

---

<sup>65</sup> Frg. 102.10. It was apparently stronger even than hatred (ἔχθρα).

<sup>66</sup>For the rhetorical tropes employed by Dio to describe the hopelessness and slaughter of the proscriptions, see Lintott (1997): 2501-2.

<sup>67</sup> Frg. 104.6.

<sup>68</sup> Cass. Dio 47.9.2.

<sup>69</sup> Frg. 43.2.

<sup>70</sup> Cass. Dio 38.34.1.

<sup>71</sup> Cass. Dio 43.25.3.

## *Ἔχθρα*<sup>72</sup>

*Ἔχθρα* is the most commonly used trait in Dio to explain political partisanship. Antonius Hybrida, having supported Catiline in his conspiracy, decides to abandon him at the last moment:

*πρὸς τε γὰρ τὰς δυνάμεις τινῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν συμφέροντα καὶ τὰς ἔχθρας τὰς τε φιλίας οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦνται.*<sup>73</sup>

The association of hatred and greed is strong in Dio. Fulvia encourages her husband, Antony, in the proscriptions because of her “hatred and for money” (*καὶ κατ’ ἔχθραν καὶ διὰ χρήματα*).<sup>74</sup> Many more people lose their lives during the proscriptions, despite innocence, either because they were hated or because they were wealthy.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, Antony, Octavian and Lepidus even go as far as to feign hatred for certain rich citizens, so that they can steal their wealth:

*παμπόλλων τε γὰρ χρημάτων δεόμενοι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὁπόθεν ἄλλοθεν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποπληρώσωσι, κοινήν τινα κατὰ τῶν πλουσίων ἔχθραν προσέθεντο.*<sup>76</sup>

Most interestingly, *ἔχθρα* can be mollified.<sup>77</sup> A fragment from one of the speeches at the Caudine Forks states:

---

<sup>72</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 176-7.

<sup>73</sup> Cass. Dio 37.39.3.

<sup>74</sup> Cass. Dio 47.8.2.

<sup>75</sup> Cass. Dio 47.12.1.

<sup>76</sup> Cass. Dio 47.6.5.

<sup>77</sup> Although, not all the time. Elsewhere, Dio claims that those who give up their hatred are still suspicious of totally insignificant acts and random occurrences (Cass. Dio 45.8.3).

ὅτι αἱ διαφοραὶ εὐεργεσίαις παύονται καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν τις ἐπὶ μείζον ἔχθρας ἐλθὼν σωτηρίας ἀντὶ τιμωρίας παρὰ δόξαν τύχη, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνην τε ἐκὼν καταλύει καὶ ταύτης ἄσμενος ἡττάται.<sup>78</sup>

Kindness can be displayed in many different ways. Gracchus, the father of Tiberius and Gaius, put aside his hatred of the Scipiones in order to defend Scipio Africanus, who was on trial whilst away from the city. For so doing, the Scipiones gave up their hatred of him and offered him the hand of their daughter in marriage.<sup>79</sup> Caesar repairs the damage caused by hatred between Pompey and Crassus and unites them in alliance (although this doesn't stop one-upmanship or hostility by the three men towards one another).<sup>80</sup> Dio makes Cicero lay aside his hatred for Pompey after kindness is displayed when he helps lift the exile law.<sup>81</sup> Finally, 'Cicero' urges the senate to give up private hatred and return to the old-time peace and harmony of the ancestors.<sup>82</sup>

Appeals to kindness are typical in Dio's narrative. There are other examples of people being urged to put the state before their private interests, such as Rullus, who is urged by the people to give up his hatred of Papirius for the good of the commonwealth (*τὰ κοινὰ πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἔχθρας*).<sup>83</sup> Dio dwells at length on the problem of private hatred slipping over into public life. Laws, for example, are discarded and manipulated due to private hatred in Dio. Antony passes a decree confirming Sextus Pompey's rights in Spain out of both hatred for Octavian and friendship for Lepidus.<sup>84</sup> The praetors, who announce and publish laws by which they will try suspects, often allow 'errors' to creep in as a result of hatred (*ἔχθρα*) for certain people and favour for others, whence they are criticised and Gaius Cornelius is moved to try to set strict regulations upon them.<sup>85</sup> Dio particularly

---

<sup>78</sup> Frg. 36.12.

<sup>79</sup> Frg. 65.1.

<sup>80</sup> Cass. Dio 37.54.3.

<sup>81</sup> Cass. Dio 39.9.1.

<sup>82</sup> Cass. Dio 43.50.5.

<sup>83</sup> Frg. 36.26.

<sup>84</sup> Cass. Dio 45.10.6.

<sup>85</sup> Cass. Dio 36.40.2.

emphasises the carrying of private grudges into political life.<sup>86</sup> He criticises Drusus and Caepio because *ὁ Δροῦσος καὶ ὁ Καιπίων ἰδίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχθραν ἐκ φιλίας πολλῆς καὶ γάμων ἐπαλλαγῆς ποιησάμενοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πολιτικὰ αὐτὴν προήγαγον.*<sup>87</sup> Cicero is accused of personal enmity against Catiline in 63 by the senate, who do not take the threat of conspiracy seriously, and again later (several times) in the filibuster of Calenus.<sup>88</sup> Dio praises those who do not let private feuds interfere in public life and his speeches are littered with those trying to pretend that they are innocent of private grudges. Cato, for example, Dio's conception of the iconic Republican, is said to have opposed Pompey's command against the pirates not from some personal disagreement, but from his duty to the state.<sup>89</sup>

Private hatred has significance for factionalism, which we shall discuss here, but which also has implications for later sections of this thesis. Caesar was able to manipulate the hatred of both the crowd and the senate for one another in order to further his own private power (*ιδίας δυναστείας*), being careful not to earn the animosity of one group or the other.<sup>90</sup> Spinther chooses to help Pompey recall Cicero as a result of a private grudge he has borne against Clodius since the time of the latter's trial for adultery.<sup>91</sup> Likewise, Nepos sides with Clodius because of a private hatred of Cicero.<sup>92</sup>

It is a measure of the brutality of the Second Triumvirate that the proscriptions at times even surpass private enmity. Dio tells us that:

---

<sup>86</sup> There is an obscure example at frg. 95.2. Furius begrudges Metellus for depriving him of his public horse, although the context is missing.

<sup>87</sup> Frg. 96.3. "They bore their private hatred of one another into political life itself, from the great friendship they once had and despite marital links."

<sup>88</sup> Cass. Dio 37.29.3; 46.1.2; 46.28.1. There are two ways in which Dio discusses private hatred. The first is with the phrase *ἔχθρα ἰδία* and the second with *ἑαυτοῦ*. Both are contrasted to public duty, reinforcing the dichotomy between private and public.

<sup>89</sup> Cass. Dio 37.22.4.

<sup>90</sup> Cass. Dio 37.56.5.

<sup>91</sup> Cass Dio 39.6.2.

<sup>92</sup> Cass. Dio 39.6.3.

ἄλλως μὲν γὰρ ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς ἐς ἔχθραν ἀπ' ἰδίας τινὸς αἰτίας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις, ὡς καὶ σφαγῆναι πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἐληλύθει· τὰ δὲ δὴ κοινὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ τῶν δυναστειῶν διαλλαγὰ καὶ τὰς φιλίας τὰς τε ἔχθρας τὰς σφοδρὰς αὐτοῖς ἐπεποιήκεσαν.<sup>93</sup>

The most relevant point here is that those killed still earned the *ἔχθρα* of the Triumvirs, but that this was not for purely personal reasons. Most were killed simply for being on the wrong side of the fence and a nuisance to the political goals of Antony, Octavian and Lepidus. Others were killed because they chose to follow an individual triumvir and earned the anger of the others. Long lists were drawn up, inscribed with the names of these men, labelled under the headings of 'Friends' and 'Enemies'. *Ἐχθρα* fits in with what Lintott has termed the *reductio ad perniciosum* of the proscriptions.<sup>94</sup> The gist of the passage is to show how hopeless the situation is for the ordinary Roman. If they believe anything they are damned; if they follow one man or another, they are damned; if they follow a triumvir, they are still damned. The situation is bleak and clouded over with a kind of mechanical hatred.

### Φιλονεικία<sup>95</sup>

*Φιλονεικία* is one of the central features of Dio's *φύσις* model in his Republican narrative.<sup>96</sup> It is only found twice outside of his Republican narrative, which, given the fact that it refers to rivalry among members of the elite, is unsurprising.<sup>97</sup> Recently, however, Stadter has rejected the root *νείκος* for *φιλονεικία*, claiming that etymologically the word comes from *νίκη*, implying a 'love of victory' rather than a 'love of strife, rivalry etc.'<sup>98</sup> Regardless of whether his argument stands for Plutarch (the subject of

---

<sup>93</sup> Cass. Dio 47.5.3.

<sup>94</sup> Lintott (1997): 2502.

<sup>95</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 169-171.

<sup>96</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 169.

<sup>97</sup> Cass. Dio 58.20.4; 77.7.2.

<sup>98</sup> Stadter (2011): 238-241.

his study), it cannot stand for Dio. **Φιλονεικία** in Dio refers not to a desire to appear better than another person, as **φιλονικία** would imply, but to a desire not to be conceived of as inferior to that person.<sup>99</sup> Dio explains the cultivated rivalry (**φιλονεικία ἐπίκτητος**) between Pompey and Caesar as:

*πρὸς τε γὰρ τῶν ἴσων καὶ πρὸς τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἤκιστα τινες ἐλαττούμενοι φέρουσιν.*<sup>100</sup>

The crucial point here is Dio's assertion that a fear of defeat drives **φιλονεικία**, not a love of victory, which is expressed in their natural ambition (**φιλοτιμία ἔμφυτος**), mentioned alongside their rivalry. He argues elsewhere that, because of **φιλονεικία**, people inevitably overextend themselves whenever they feel they have been wronged in order to prove their equality to the situation.<sup>101</sup> During his speech after the death of Caesar, Cicero swears that he will speak out of goodwill (**χάρις**), not out of **φιλονεικία** and emphasises the need to put away factional strife.<sup>102</sup> Dio's critique of the Alexandrian character rests on his claims that, whilst they are cowardly in warfare, when it comes to political struggle, they happily put rivalry (**φιλονεικία**) before human life (**τὸ ζῆν παρ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονεικίαν τιθέμενοι**), suggesting that the word signifies rivalry more clearly than love of victory for Dio.<sup>103</sup> However, a meaning like **φιλονικία** is found occasionally. Dio says at the beginning of his history that:

*ἐκ τῆς ἔμφυτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμίας.*<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 169 describes it as a "Handlungsmotivation".

<sup>100</sup> Cass. Dio 41.53.3.

<sup>101</sup> Cass. Dio 44.27.3.

<sup>102</sup> Cass. Dio 44.23.1.

<sup>103</sup> Cass. Dio 39.58.2.

<sup>104</sup> Frg. 7.3.

We shall discuss in the rest of this thesis those individual cases where *φιλονεικία* may have a sense of *φιλονικία* or where Dio may be seen to be deliberately exploiting the confusion that could readily exist between the two words, close as they were in meaning and would have been in pronunciation.

Rivalry comes about due to a private cause, such as the dispute between Tiberius Gracchus and Marcus Octavius, which is the result of a family dispute and *φιλονεικία* is often here to the detriment of public business and even public security.<sup>105</sup> For example, the Romans of the early Republic kill the demagogues and *στάσις* erupts.<sup>106</sup> The soldiers of Servilius, though initially hoping that he will repair his rift with Mallius, disrupt the meeting, having succumbed to *φιλονεικία* and *λοιδορία*.<sup>107</sup> Occasionally, *φιλονεικία* does not just obstruct public business, but boils over into violence. When Pompey was attempting to recall Cicero from exile, Clodius opposed him, *φιλονεικία* set in, a struggle ensued, and people were left wounded and injured in fights that broke out.<sup>108</sup>

The best translation of *φιλονεικία* is ‘rivalry’, with ‘love of rivalry’ or ‘fractiousness’ better in certain instances (such as during speeches or Dio’s more abstract moments). However, there are two incidents in Dio’s Republican narrative where the word can refer more to the kind of exchanges that are the *product* of *φιλονεικία*:

Κίντος δὲ δὴ Φούβιος Καλῆμος ἀναμῖξ πάντων τὰς ψήφους ἔν γε ταις φιλονεικίαις...οὔσας εὐρών, ἐνομοθέτησε στρατηγῶν χωρὶς αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐκάστους ψηφίζεσθαι.<sup>109</sup>

*Φιλονεικία* implies fierce factional divisions in Dio’s account of the trial of Rabirius for *perduellio*, too. He claims that after Labienus and Caesar arraigned Rabirius for

---

<sup>105</sup> Frg. 83.4.

<sup>106</sup> Frg. 23.3.

<sup>107</sup> Frg. 91.4.

<sup>108</sup> Cass. Dio 38.30.4.

<sup>109</sup> Cass. Dio 38.8.1.

trial and the *duumviri* procedure was established there arose violent partisanships (*φιλονεικία*) around the court, presumably, those who supported Labienus and Caesar and those who supported Cicero in trying to disrupt the trial.<sup>110</sup>

### **Φθόνος**<sup>111</sup>

**Φθόνος** has overtones of the sense of *odium* in the Latin ‘*invidia*’, though the most common usage of the word in Dio contains some kind of jealousy at the advancement of another, especially someone who had been regarded as an equal beforehand.<sup>112</sup> Dio’s claim in Book 1 that we saw in the context of the division between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, sets the scene for much of its later appearance:

οὕτω που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρὸς τε τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον.<sup>113</sup>

Jealousy of one’s fellow magistrates seems a perpetual problem in Dio’s account of the Roman Republic. Claudius Pulcher in 143 B.C. was ‘spurred’ by jealousy of his colleague Metellus to invade the territory of the Salassi (Metellus had received a choice command whereas Pulcher had received Italy as his province).<sup>114</sup> In Book 27, Servilius’ jealousy of the magisterial superiority of his colleague Mallius nearly leads to military disaster against the Teutones and Cimbri and eventually *φιλονεικία* between the two men.<sup>115</sup> Augustus, in his speech ‘declaring’ his resignation from public life, paraphrases

---

<sup>110</sup> Cass. Dio 37.27.1.

<sup>111</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 179-181.

<sup>112</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 179.

<sup>113</sup> Frg. 5.12.

<sup>114</sup> Frg. 74.1

<sup>115</sup> Frg. 91.1.

Pericles on *φθόνος* in Thucydides. He claims that people are jealous of their superiors and so refuse to listen to anything that makes their own achievements look small.<sup>116</sup>

Pompey provides Dio with a take on *φθόνος* that relates to the *φύσις* and *νόμος* debate as he presents it elsewhere. Dio claims that Pompey:

*ἐνόμιζε δύο τε εἶναι τὰ τὰς φιλίας τινῶν συγγέοντα, τό τε δέος καὶ τὸν φθόνον, καὶ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀντιπάλου καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος μόνως μὴ συμβαίνειν· ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἰσομοιρῶσί τινες αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκεῖνας ἐρῶσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δ' ὑπεράρῳσί τι οἱ ἕτεροι, ἐνταῦθα τό τε ἐλαττούμενον φθονήσαν μισεῖν τὸν κρείττονα καὶ τὸ κρατοῦν καταφρονήσαν ἐξυβρίζειν ἐς τὸν χείρονα...πρὸς τε διαφορὰς καὶ πρὸς πολέμους ἐκ τῆς πρὶν φιλίας ἀφικνεῖσθαι.<sup>117</sup>*

Dio here follows the Thucydidean idea that friendships are based upon total equality, though like his model, he explores and subverts the idea in the 'reality' of his narrative.<sup>118</sup> Thucydides suggests in the Mytilenean Debate that equality does not bring freedom from *φθόνος*.<sup>119</sup> Dio asserts the same for democracy. Given the 'fact' that people dislike feeling inferior to those with whom they were once equals, this inevitably creates instability. In a monarchy, conversely, because one man is born to his rank, as it were, no such jealousy exists because people accept innate authority more naturally.<sup>120</sup>

Pompey's fear of popular opprobrium was well known in Antiquity, being first mentioned by Cicero.<sup>121</sup> Dio, as we see often in his narrative of the Republic, takes a familiar idea and exaggerates it. It is dotted around, for example, the debate over the command against the pirates which Pompey seeks and the rest of Pompey's political career more than any other figure in Dio's account of the late Republic or, as far as I can tell, for

---

<sup>116</sup> Cass. Dio 53.3.1. Compare with Thuc. 2.35.2 (Dio appears to have merged two sentences into one).

<sup>117</sup> Cass. Dio 39.26.1-2. Boissevain supplies *δέος* for *δέλος*, which appears in the manuscript.

<sup>118</sup> Thuc. 3.11.1-2; Macleod (1983): 89.

<sup>119</sup> Macleod (1983): 88-96.

<sup>120</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.1-4.

<sup>121</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2.21.3; 2.22.6; 2.23.2; Plut. 42.3; App. *B. Civ.* 2.9.1. For Dio on Pompey's fear of *φθονος* and the historical background, see Epstein (1987): 57-8.

any other period of Dio's history.<sup>122</sup> Pompey's fear of **φθόνος** is connected by Dio to his **φιλοτιμία**:

ὁ Πομπήσιος ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι, καὶ ἤδη γε ὑπὸ τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ δήμου σπουδῆς οὐδὲ τιμὴν ἔτι τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἀτιμίαν τὸ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ νομίζων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀντίταξιν τῶν δυνατῶν ὁρῶν, ἠβουλήθη δοκεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι. ἦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ὡς ἥκιστα προσποιούμενος ἐπιθυμῶν ὧν ἤθελε· τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, διὰ τε τὸ ἐπίφθονον ἂν γε ἐκῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀντιποιήσεται, καὶ διὰ [τοῦτο] τὸ εὐκλεῆς ἂν γε καὶ ἄκων ὡς γε καὶ ἀξιοστρατηγητότατος ὧν ἀποδειχθῆ, ἐπλάττετο.<sup>123</sup>

At Pharsalus, Dio states that Caesar and Pompey were driven on by ambition (**φιλοτιμία**), but that Pompey was inspired by the love of being honoured, whereas Caesar was inspired by the desire to dominate others.<sup>124</sup> This passage gives us a subtle distinction in character between Pompey and Caesar: both men are led by ambition (and both men's actions will ruin the state), but there is one major difference; that Pompey wanted to be **παρ' ἐκόντων τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἐθειλόντων προστατεῖν φιλεῖσθαι**, whereas Caesar's ambitions are more tyrannical.<sup>125</sup> It is this desire to be loved and accepted which leads Pompey to be so afraid of **φθόνος** throughout his career. This is an important idea that we shall see resurface in Dio's account of Augustus and his two-facedness. In many ways, Augustus will be seen to combine Pompey's 'good' traits with Caesar's, making him able to rule where the other two ultimately failed.

Pompey's fear of **φθόνος** is not without reason, however. In Dio's narrative of the *lex Gabinia*, the senate is no victim in this move by Pompey and Gabinus; Dio has already recounted how they tried to lynch Gabinus. He also states that:

---

<sup>122</sup> Debate in 67 B.C.: Cass. Dio 36.24.6; 26.1; 26.2; 29.2. Rest of career: Cass. Dio 36.43.4; 37.23.4; 37.50.5; 37.50.6; 39.25.4; 39.26.1-2; 40.51.1.

<sup>123</sup> Cass. Dio. 36.24.5-6.

<sup>124</sup> See Cass. Dio 41.54.1-3.

<sup>125</sup> Cass. Dio 41.54.1.

αὕτη γὰρ πᾶν ὀτιοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν ληστῶν παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνῳ τοσαύτην ἡγεμονίαν ἐγχειρίσαι ἡρεῖτο· καὶ ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπέκτειναν τὸν Γαβίνιον ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ.<sup>126</sup>

One gets a sense of Dio's shock at the extreme emotion the command evokes, by his use of the phrase, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ (in the senate-house itself). Clearly he is amazed that the senate would happily profane the senate house with the blood of a (technically) innocent man. The point is, nonetheless, that the senate are not free from the jealousy that Pompey fears, they themselves crave power and they are not happy with one of their number being elevated above them, which fits in with Dio's statements about the place of φθόνος in issues of φύσις and νόμος.<sup>127</sup> Dio undoubtedly exaggerates the importance of φθόνος in Pompey's political career. By linking it to his own concerns of φύσις and νόμος, he also misunderstands the true nature of *invidia* in Republican politics, which suggests opprobrium and *inimicitiae*, as well as the real danger that many must have felt in the 60s B.C. over the extraordinary commands that Pompey was given. Nevertheless, we can still appreciate the fact that there are several complex layers to his discussion of the history of the late Republic and their relationship to his broader idea of the role of φύσις in its downfall.

Given the fact that φθόνος has much to do with the dichotomy between the strong and the weak, success and failures, it is not surprising that Dio builds the term into his concept of the ideal emperor. Fabricius is made to advise Pyrrhus that the tyrant:

ἀπιστούμενός τε γὰρ καὶ φθονοῦμενός τις οὐδένα ἂν καθαρῶς ἀγαπήσειε.<sup>128</sup>

Good rulers and leaders shy away from envying their inferiors. Such is Dio's belief about Hannibal and about Trajan.<sup>129</sup> Bad monarchs abuse their position and thus incur

---

<sup>126</sup> Cass. Dio 36.24.1.

<sup>127</sup> Plutarch's account of the *lex Gabinia* has similar overtones of senatorial φθόνος: Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 25.3.

<sup>128</sup> Frg. 40.15.

jealousy and slander, whereas good monarchs carefully cultivate a reputation for integrity.<sup>130</sup> The fullest manifestation of Dio's impression of the relationship between **φθόνος** and the good ruler comes in his discussion of Augustus. Augustus, he notes, refused to accept titles and accolades which might bring him *invidia* and, most importantly of all, refused the title 'king', preferring 'imperator', again because he feared **φθόνος**.<sup>131</sup> In doing this, Augustus had learnt from the mistakes that lead Caesar to suffer the **φθόνος** of the assassins.<sup>132</sup> We shall return to this idea at the end of the thesis.

A person of good character may be fortunate enough to avoid the envy of his fellow citizens. Scipio Aemilianus never strove to make himself better than his superiors or equals, but the equal of his inferiors, so no one could criticise him for elitism.<sup>133</sup> Moderation is by far the best way in the Republic of avoiding **φθόνος**. Fabricius informs Pyrrhus that his personal wealth consists of self-sufficiency and the absence of a desire for more. This allows him to avoid the censure and jealousy of his fellow citizens.<sup>134</sup> Cicero is advised by Philiscus to curb his desire for greater gain, since excess inevitably leads to *invidia*, something that plays a large part in Dio's picture of Cicero, as we shall see in Section Three. Agrippa managed to avoid Augustus' *invidia* because no matter how excellent he was, he always humbled himself before the emperor without grudge. He was always happy to let Augustus take the credit for what he had done and thus avoided censure from both the emperor and the people.<sup>135</sup>

**Φθόνος** is used in connexion with other terms that I have described, particularly **φιλοτιμία**.<sup>136</sup> Fabricius, for example, Dio claims, was above jealousy because he possessed

---

<sup>129</sup> Frg. 54.8 (Hannibal); Cass. Dio 68.6.4 (Trajan). Cf. 52.33.8.

<sup>130</sup> Cass. Dio 66.18.2.

<sup>131</sup> Cass. Dio 54.1.5; 52.40.2.

<sup>132</sup> Cass. Dio 44.1.1.

<sup>133</sup> Frg. 70.9. See however the different judgement of him at frg. 84.1.

<sup>134</sup> Frg. 40.36.

<sup>135</sup> Cass. Dio 54.29.2-3.

<sup>136</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 179-180.

no *φιλοτιμία*.<sup>137</sup> *Φθόνος*, likewise, that is a product of *φιλοτιμία* causes terrible destruction to the state and ties in with what I have said about Pompey's digression on the matter.<sup>138</sup>

On occasion, *φθόνος* is also used in conjunction with anger or hatred.<sup>139</sup>

## *Ὀργή*

Kuhn-Chen describes *Ὀργή* as a 'Handlungsmotivation', a motivation to act that is essentially passive and dependent on a prior insult.<sup>140</sup> This would mean that *Ὀργή* is translatable as 'anger', 'rage' or 'outrage'. The majority of uses of the word do support her interpretation, though this by no means captures the whole range of a word that (as we shall see) is important to Dio's historiographical project on many levels and to which he gives a major role in the downfall of the Republic. The word in Dio implies something closer to an uncontrolled, volatile distemper than simple anger and this sets it at odds with the common interest of the Roman people and their powers of self-control.

In the Introduction, we saw that Dio claims that the Republic fell in part because it was unable to cope with the plenitude of desires and passions (*ἐπιθυμῖαι καὶ ὀργαί*) of the people it governed. Primarily, this refers to the commonplace trope that the Republic had become miscegenated by the first century B.C., and to classical ideas of democratic government, as we shall see in the next chapter. However, other passages link *ἐπιθυμία* and *Ὀργή* together, which suggests a further problem caused by these features of human character. He says of Fimbria that:

---

<sup>137</sup> Frg. 40.2.

<sup>138</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.3.

<sup>139</sup> Cass. Dio 44.23.2; 53.8.6.

<sup>140</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 176. E.g. frg. 18.6; 24.6; 36.21; 36.30; 56.1; 57.16; 78.2 111.1; Cass. Dio 36.44.4; 37.7.5; 37.34.4.

ὁ Φιμβρίας ἄνδρας πολλοὺς οὐ πρὸς τὸ δικαιοτάτον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ τῆ Ῥώμῃ συμφερώτατον,  
ἀλλ' ὄργῃ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ φόνων ἀπώλλυεν.<sup>141</sup>

In his narrative of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Dio discusses the emotions of the Roman people when they hear of Caesar's approach and Pompey's flight from Italy. He says:

καὶ τὰς ὄργας τὰς τε ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἐπιόντων καὶ πρῶτοι <ὑπομενοῦντες ἀπὸ> τῆς τῶν  
προτέρων παθημάτων μνήμης, οἱ μὲν αὐτοὶ πειραθέντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων ἀκούοντες ὅσα  
καὶ οἶα ὅ τε Μάριος καὶ ὁ Σύλλας ἐξειργάσαντο, μέτριον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸν Καίσαρα  
ὑπώπτειον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πλείω καὶ δεινότερα.<sup>142</sup>

This is a cruel and violent manifestation of the common theme of Dio's portrayal of late Republican politics, the bringing of private desires and ambitions into the public sphere.

**Ὀργή** has a major role in the downfall of the Republic in other ways. One of the major reasons for Caesar's assassination is the **ὄργῃ** he arouses at meeting the senate whilst sitting down.<sup>143</sup> In his narrative of the formation of the second triumvirate, Dio claims that the senate was responsible for the evils they suffered during this period. They stirred up the **ὄργῃ** of the powerful against themselves by attempting to play them off against each other.<sup>144</sup> Likewise, the triumvirs affect **ὄργῃ** against the assassins of Caesar, using it as an excuse to rid themselves of a dangerous threat to their **δυναστεία**.<sup>145</sup>

**Ὀργή** is a powerful catalyst to strife. People, Dio says, cherish anger more than gratitude towards one another.<sup>146</sup> People work harder against their enemies than they do in favour of their friends.<sup>147</sup> He makes Cicero say that:

---

<sup>141</sup> Frg. 104.6.

<sup>142</sup> Cass. Dio 41.8.5-6. The amendment is one suggested by Boissevain.

<sup>143</sup> Cass. Dio 44.8.2.

<sup>144</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1-2.

<sup>145</sup> Cass. Dio 47.18.2.

<sup>146</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.2.

<sup>147</sup> Cass. Dio 37.55.2.

τό τε γὰρ εὐτυχῆσαν ὑβρεῖ τε πλεονάζει καὶ οὐδένα ὄρον τῆς πλεονεξίας ποιεῖται, καὶ τὸ παύσαν ὀργῇ τῆς συμφορᾶς, ἂν γε μὴ παραχρῆμα ἀπόληται, ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἀδικήσαντα ἐπιθυμῆι μέχρις ἂν τὸν θυμὸν ἐκπλήσῃ.<sup>148</sup>

Ὀργή can, however, be the subject of control and temperance, usually through education. Scipio Aemilianus *μηδὲν ἀλογίστως μηδὲ ἐξ ὀργῆς ἢ καὶ δέους ποιῶν ἢ καὶ λέγων.*<sup>149</sup> Viriathus *οὔτε πλεονεξίας οὔτε δυναστείας ἢ καὶ ὀργῆς ἕνεκα τὸν πόλεμον...ἐποιεῖτο.*<sup>150</sup> Appius Claudius Pulcher ensures good relations with his otherwise troublesome colleague through not giving in to *ὀργή*, but being *ἐπιεικῆς* and *πράος* to him. *Ἐπιείκεια* (or the lack of it) is an important concept in Dio's explanation of the fall of the Republic, as we shall see in Chapters Two and Three.<sup>151</sup> All of these men possess it and (ignoring Viriathus) it is said by Dio to be one of the most important features of early Republican Rome that is destroyed through the acquisition of empire and power. Though *ὀργή* means something like 'anger' in these passages, I would suggest that the actual force is closer to my claim about uncontrolled distemper, so that the loss of *ἐπιείκεια* causes an overflow of violent emotion that destabilises the Republic, which is unable to cope. In this sense, *ὀργή* stands as an umbrella term (as, indeed, 'passion' does in English) standing for all of the negative drives of ambition, competition, hatred and greed that we have explored in this chapter.

The perversion of this relationship in the late Republic is shown in Dio's depiction of Caesar. Caesar possesses *ἐπιείκεια*, but he does not use it to the same positive ends as his predecessors. Dio says:

---

<sup>148</sup> Cass. Dio 44.29.2.

<sup>149</sup> Frg. 70.8.

<sup>150</sup> Frg. 73.4.

<sup>151</sup> See pp. 52-3; 71-76.

ἐπεικεστέραν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως φύσιν εἰλήχει, καὶ οὐ πάνυ ῥαδίως ἐθυμούτο· συχνοὺς δ' οὖν, ἅτε καὶ ἐν τοσούτοις πράγμασιν, ἐδικαίου, οὐ μὴν ὥστε καὶ δι' ὀργῆς ἢ καὶ παραχρήμα πάντως αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. θυμῷ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲν ἐχαρίζετο, τοῦ δὲ δὴ καιροῦ διεσκόπει, καὶ τοὺς γε πλείους οὐδὲ ἀσθανομένους μετῆει.<sup>152</sup>

Caesar, ever the master of deceit, knows how to show manly bluff and outrage when it suits his purpose. He deliberately provokes Ariovistus to insult the Roman people, at which insult Caesar becomes 'angry' and resolves to fight him.<sup>153</sup> Caesar's *ἐπιείκεια* and his *ὀργή* continue to be important themes in Dio's narrative into his dictatorship. However, here, Caesar begins to allow his *ὀργή* (in both senses) get the better of him and his behaviour becomes less moderate, which culminate ultimately in his death.<sup>154</sup> We shall return to this contrast in Caesar's behaviour later.

## Conclusion

We have seen how so-called psychological motives are central to Dio's understanding of the political life of the late Republic and beyond. The downfall of the state is regarded in terms of *φιλοτιμία*, *φιλονεικία*, *πλεονεξία*, *ἐπιθυμία*, *ἔχθρα*, *φθόνος* and *ὀργή* and political life is constantly thrown into disorder through grudges, private ambition and rivalry. It is interesting that in all of these terms, if the words *ἴδιος* or equivalent are not present, then their implication is never far away. Private ambition, private greed, personal gain, family rivalry, all represent one thing; the leeching into the public world of private aspirations. *Φύσις* gives to Dio a model whereby he can contrast the *νόμος* of Republican life with the bitter realities of human experience, particularly in democracies where no established head-of-state exists to suppress the excesses of the people. This is not to say that Dio's history of the Roman world is reductive, however. Thucydidean ideas of

---

<sup>152</sup> Cass. Dio 38.11.3-4.

<sup>153</sup> Cass. Dio 38.34.5.

<sup>154</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 44.10.1-2; 11.3.

the role of *φύσις* in history, as we shall argue elsewhere, provided the ancient historian with a universalising model for detecting important patterns in history. They allowed the historian, rather like Marxist theories of materialism, to move beyond competing claims (as we find them in, say, Herodotus) of the truth and to envisage a world of constant needs and phenomena which had to be fulfilled in human life. This gave the historian something on which to hang a narrative of potentially very disparate and different times, covering nearly a thousand years of Roman history, and to show how its evolution and development was a response to discernible and common features in human affairs. In so doing, the historian was proving the validity of the ideas he inherited from Thucydides and proving the importance of the history he was writing to Thucydidean ideas.

Moreover, this study shows that many of these terms, important for Dio's depiction of the fall of the Republic, are not entirely 'negative'. Though the *φύσις* terms do not disappear entirely from the narrative after the failure of the Republic, some, such as *πλεονεξία*, *φιλονεικία* and *φιλοτιμία* almost entirely vanish. This would suggest that Dio's view of human nature is not cynical and defeatist, which will come in important in his narrative of the Augustan regime;<sup>155</sup> with the necessary political balances in place (e.g. monarchical government), more moderate and therefore more 'benign' variations of many of these characteristics can flourish. It is a question of balancing the public and the private, as this chapter has established.

---

<sup>155</sup> *Contra* Gowing (1992): 297.

## Chapter Two: Moral Decline and Human Nature in the Roman Republic

### Introduction

In the 1980s, Fechner argued that Dio believed in the kind of moral decline upon the removal of *metus hostilis* in 146 B.C. that is a commonplace in the historiography of the Roman Republic, as found in Sallust, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, Florus and others.<sup>1</sup> Central to Fechner's analysis were the two passages which we saw in the Introduction were integral to Dio's explanation of the failure of the Republic, along with a reading of the fragments that survive of the early books of Dio's history.

Hose, however, has rejected this theory, stating that in Dio's view of Roman history, such a moral decline was impossible. He argued that, if Dio believed, as he supposed Thucydides to, in "fixed, ineluctable modalities" of human nature, then such a sense of moral evolution was not conceivable.<sup>2</sup> He states:

"Dios Geschichte der Republik ist mithin nicht nach einem Dekadenmodell konzipiert. Dies wiederum steht im Einklang mit der anthropologischen Konzeption, die Dio von Thukydides übernommen hat. Denn wenn die menschliche Natur gleich bleibt, ist die Vorstellung von einem *populus Romanus*, der *Pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus* bis zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt ist und erst dann unter dem Einfluß von Reichtum und Sicherheit in das Gegenteil mutiert, nicht denkbar. Vielmehr kann bei einem 'Thukydideischen' Menschenbild jederzeit der Mensch von Ehrgeiz und Gewinnstreben angetrieben sein. Und dies zeigt sich in Dios Darstellung der frühen Republik".<sup>3</sup>

In short, Hose rejects the idea that Dio could have espoused an analysis of moral decline in the Republic because it would have jarred with the view that human nature is a constant, which is found all throughout his history and which ultimately derives from Thucydides.<sup>4</sup> In my view, it is questionable whether we can say that Thucydides himself believed that unchanging human nature was incompatible with some kind of moral or

---

<sup>1</sup> Fechner (1986): 136-154.

<sup>2</sup> The phrase is that of Reinhold (1988): 215.

<sup>3</sup> Hose (1994): 405.

<sup>4</sup> Hose (1994): 381-383.

political change in circumstances. In his famous analysis of the Corcyraean stasis, Thucydides states that:

*Καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἴ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.<sup>5</sup>*

The Latin equivalent for *ἀμείνους* as given by Bétant in his *Lexicon Thucydideum* is *praestantior*, which captures the sense of moral excellence inherent in the word *ἀγαθός*, of which *ἀμείνων* is the comparative.<sup>6</sup> As Hornblower notes, “there can be no doubt that here we have a clear case where Th. in his own person is assimilating states and individuals in a moral judgement”.<sup>7</sup> If, as I am suggesting here, there is no Thucydidean contradiction in the idea that changes could be wrought upon the expression of a person’s nature by external circumstances, then Dio would not have been the first to apply this concept to the fall of the Republic. Tacitus, in his *Histories*, for example, notes that:

“Vetus ac iam pridem insita mortalibus potentiae cupido cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque; nam rebus modicis aequalitas facile habebatur. Sed ubi subacto orbe et aemulis urbibus regibusve excisis securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere...eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eadem scelerum causae in discordiam egere”.<sup>8</sup>

Dio’s point, as it appears from the two passages I cited in the Introduction, is that the wealth, power and opportunities for internal conflict and ambition offered by the growth of empire made the Republic an untenable system of government. Whereas before, some kind of *σωφροσύνη* had been possible, because the Roman aristocracy had been deprived of money and opportunity, after Rome had ascended to a position of untrammelled power, the competitive, ambitious instincts of the Roman nobility were able

---

<sup>5</sup> Thuc. 3.82.2.

<sup>6</sup> Bétant (1961): 2.

<sup>7</sup> Hornblower (1991): 482.

<sup>8</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 2.38.1. Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 2.1-2; 9.1-12.2 (part. 11.1-2); *Inq.* 1.4; 41.3. Tacitus’ obituary for Tiberius is structured similarly: Tac. *Ann.* 6.51.1-3; see Woodman (1998): 155-167.

to run riot and turn tumultuous. In other words, what we see is not so much a belief that human nature changes, but that its intensity, manner and effect can change. In Dio's view, it is true that the Republican system of government was predicated upon the notion of a competitive aristocracy, which was the cause of its instability and lack of suitability to running an empire. Equally, Dio did espouse constant themes in human nature that impact upon history eternally, but he did not, I think, believe the conditions that would culminate in the destruction of the Republic, and unleash the full fury of man's worst characteristics, could have come about until after Rome's rise in power, greatness, size and wealth. Moreover, it is clear from the passages we saw in the Introduction that Dio felt these problems could be limited and stabilised under monarchical institutions. I want to re-examine four passages which constitute the so-called 'epochal dates' in Dio's history, episodes which were held important by him in changing the constitutional circumstances under which human nature operated and, therefore, its effect upon history.

### **Part One: The First Punic War**

In the passage from the Maecenas speech cited in the Introduction, Maecenas claims that from the time the Romans began expanding into the Mediterranean and conquering a foreign empire, their problems started in earnest. Hose is right to point out that this ignores the often violent and bloodthirsty account Dio gives of the Struggle of the Orders (for example).<sup>9</sup> We should however recognise that there is a deal of rhetorical exaggeration in Maecenas' claims and these do not necessarily have to map out *exactly* onto Dio's account. We should look instead at the period to which Maecenas is referring and see if Dio's account in any way bears out Maecenas' assertion. The period in question is, of course, the First Punic War, after which Rome won its first overseas provinces, Sicily,

---

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Frg. 17.1-3; 17.6; 17.14; Zon. 7.15. Cf Hose (1994): 405. The examples cited are my own, not Hose's.

Sardinia and Corsica. In Book 11 of his history, Dio introduces the First Punic War. Dio's history is divided (roughly speaking) into decades, and he here begins the second decade of his history with an event he later states to have been pivotal in the collapse of the Republic, suggesting that he had planned his history within this theory of decline. It is also of great relevance that the third decade begins with the fall of Carthage in 146, the fourth with the civil war between Marius and Sulla (as far as we can tell given the fragmentary nature of book 31), the fifth with the civil war between Caesar and Pompey and the sixth with the reign of Augustus. In fact, these decades broadly speaking map onto Maecenas' explanation of the collapse of the Republic; first come the seeds of empire, then imperial mastery (the destruction of *aemulatores*), then, finally, civil strife boiling over into civil war.

The similarities become more apparent when we read Dio's introduction to the First Punic War, which survives only in the Byzantine summary of Zonaras. Though there are dangers of using Zonaras as a source for Dio, in the following case, we can be fairly sure that he has recorded Dio faithfully but edited out chunks, given the similarities between the following passage and the one from Maecenas' speech below.<sup>10</sup> Zonaras' record is as follows:

**Ἐντεῦθεν ἤρξαντο οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι διαποντίων ἀγώνων ναυτικῶν γὰρ οὔτι πάνυ πεπεύραντο· θαλαττουργοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς τε ἄλλας ἠπέιρους ἐπεραιώθησαν.<sup>11</sup>**

There is some extremely heavy contraction here, as can be seen from the fact that the various assertions read like *non sequiturs*. However, when we compare the last clause with the Maecenas speech, we notice striking linguistic similarity. Maecenas claims that the Romans “crossed over into many foreign lands and islands” (*ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ἠπειρῶν*

<sup>10</sup> Millar (1964): 3. Libourel (1968): 35 notes that ‘his omissions are...apparently guided by no specific historical principles except a certain desire to preserve the more picturesque and dramatic incidents of the history of Rome’. For the complexities of Zonaras as a source for Dio's history, see Vrind (1923): 7; Libourel (1968): 17; and the thorough recent study of Banchich & Lane (2009). Simons (2009): 29-32 has noted that there are three ways in which Zonaras distorts Dio, one of which is present in the passages below (notes 14 & 34). He often cuts Dio down to the bare minimum (*Kürzung*), or summarises and simplifies him (*Zusammenfassung und Konkretisierung*), though he does simply take over Dio's text at times (*Übernahme*).

<sup>11</sup> Zon. 8.8.1.

καὶ τῶν νήσων ἐπεραιώθημεν), which in the Greek is almost exactly the same as Dio's claim (as we have it from Zonaras) that the Romans ἐπὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς τε ἄλλας ἠπείρους ἐπεραιώθησαν. Cary's rendering "other divisions of the mainland" is not an adequate translation of ἄλλας ἠπείρους (which means 'other continents'), as it obfuscates the importance of this moment in Dio's conception of Roman imperialism. That is, that the conquest of Sicily gave them a taste for further conquest around the Mediterranean.<sup>12</sup> This sort of structuring is found also in Polybius, who claims of Sicily that ταύτη γὰρ τῆ γῆ πρῶτον ἐπέβησαν τῶν ἐκτὸς τόπων τῆς Ἰταλίας and talks of Roman incursions into Illyria and Greece as their next steps on the road to imperial domination.<sup>13</sup> The first fragment to survive of book 11 confirms this idea:

Ἔστι αἰτίαι ἐγένοντο τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορᾶς τοῖς μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ὅτι Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς Ταραντίνιοις ἐβοήθησαν, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδόνιοις ὅτι Ῥωμαῖοι φιλίαν τῷ Ἰέρωνι συνέθεντο. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, οἷα που πεφύκασιν οἱ τῶ μὲν ἔργῳ πλεονεκτεῖν βουλόμενοι τὴν δὲ δόξαν αὐτοῦ αἰσχυρόμενοι, σκήψεις ἐποιούντο· ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ἄλλως ἔχει. δυνάμενοι <μὲν> γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ἀξιοῦμενοι δὲ ἤδη οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀλλήλους τε ὑφειρωῶντο, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ αἰεὶ πλείονος κατὰ τὸ <τοῖς> πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν εὖ πράττωσιν, ἔμφυτον, τὰ δὲ καὶ φόβῳ προήχθησαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, <μίαν> καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκάτεροι τῶν οἰκείων σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ τὸ τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων προσκτήσασθαι νομίζοντες εἶναι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ χαλεπώτατον ἀδύνατον τε ἦν δύο δήμους ἐν τε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει φρονήματι τε ὄντας, καὶ βραχύτατον <ὡς> εἰπεῖν ταῖς τῆς ναυτιλίας ὀξύτησι διεσθηκότας, ἄλλων μὲν τινῶν ἄρχειν, ἀλλήλων δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐθελήσαι. τοιοῦτον κατὰ τύχην συμπεσὸν τὰς τε σπονδὰς σφῶν διέλυσε καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς συνέρρηξεν.<sup>14</sup>

Dio's division between αἰτίαι and πρόφασεις is very Thucydidean and it is perhaps no coincidence or surprise that the pivotal passage in Thucydides' history dealing with the causes of war between two powerful, imperial states, one a naval power, the other a land power, is borrowed from here by Dio, and very much recast within his own

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, likewise, sees the (slightly later) Roman capture of Agrigentum as the deciding moment in their desire to conquer the rest of Sicily (1.20.1-2) and claims shortly thereafter that the Roman victory in 241 inspired in them a desire for world domination (1.63.9). Dio's account may owe more to Livy, however. Cf. Flor. 2.1.2-2.4.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 1.5.2; 2.2.1; 18.12.5.

<sup>14</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 43.1-3. This fragment also appears in Zonaras' summary, where it directly succeeds the passage cited above. Cf. Polyb. 1.10.5-7, who claims that the Romans had been watching the growth of Carthaginian power fearfully before they decided for war in 264 B.C. Interesting is the reliance in both historians upon Thucydidean claims about Athens and Sparta prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

historiographical concerns: concerns that are ultimately the ones that lead to the death of the Republic.<sup>15</sup> We shall take this theme up in Chapter Three.<sup>16</sup>

## **Part Two: The Importation of Asiatic Decadence in 187 B.C.**

The second passage for analysis takes us 77 years further into the future, to Dio's account of Gnaeus Manlius Vulso's triumph over Antiochus III in 187 B.C. Dio claims that:

*Ὅτι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς τρυφῆς τῆς Ἀσιανῆς γευσάμενοι, καὶ μετὰ τῆς τῶν λαφύρων περιουσίας τῆς τε παρὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐξουσίας ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἡττηθέντων κτήμασιν ἐγχρονίσαντες, καὶ τὴν τε ἀσωτίαν αὐτῶν διὰ βραχέος ἐξήλωσαν, καὶ τὰ πάτρια ἔθνη οὐ διὰ μακροῦ κατεπάτησαν. οὕτω τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ' ἐκείθεν ἀρξάμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄστυ ἐνέπεσε.<sup>17</sup>*

It was something of a cliché among the ancient Roman historians to cite the influx of Asiatic wealth as a cause of Rome's decline but Dio is not entirely in step with other historians about what exactly went wrong after 187.<sup>18</sup> Livy, for example, states that:

*“Luxuriae enim peregrinae origo ab exercitu Asiatico invecta in urbem est. ii primum lectos aeratos, vestem stragulam pretiosam, plagulas et alia textilia, et quae tum magnificae suppellectilis habebantur, monopodia et abacos Romam advexerunt. Tunc psaltria sambucistriaeque et convivalia [alia] ludorum oblectamenta addita epulis; epulae quoque ipsae et cura et sumptu maiore adparari coepit...vix tamen illa quae tum conspiciebantur semina erant futurae luxuriae”<sup>19</sup>*

---

<sup>15</sup> Thuc. 1.23.6.

<sup>16</sup> See pp. 68-69.

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 64.

<sup>18</sup> E.g. Polyb. 31.25.4; Livy 25.40.1-3; 34.4.4; 36.6.1-2; Lucan 1.160ff; Plin. *HN*. 34.14. See Petrochilos (1974): 69. Hose (1994): 400-1 casts doubt on the placing of the fragment I have cited. He argues that it could either be from 189 or 187. However, given the similarities with Livy, Simons (2009): 144-5 places the fragment in 187. He concludes that Dio is here unlikely to have been aware of contemporary political debates and was following an ‘annalistic’ tradition, as was Livy. There is no reason to assume that Dio was not aware of contemporary debates, however, even if indirectly. Vulso came back to Rome not long after Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiaticus were accused and prosecuted for taking bribes and for public extravagance respectively. It may be that accusations about the immoral and luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by his army – and the effects of these upon life in the city – refer to charges trumped up against him in the second century B.C. (see Lintott (1972): 626-638). Evans (1993) 180-7 has argued that Livy (and probably Dio) may have been influenced by Cato's attempts to justify his actions during his censorship. Simons has also claimed that Dio derives his account from Livy and another source which mentioned the dangers of martial power for stability and law (152). However, though Dio may have been influenced by a previous source, there is no need to assume that he took the idea ‘hook-line-and-sinker’ from it, since the claim is perfectly in keeping with what we have seen in Dio's summary of the fall of the Republic above.

<sup>19</sup> Livy, 39.6.7-9. Cf. Plin. *HN*. 34.14; 33.14; Flor. 1.47.8.

Livy, unlike Dio, makes no reference here to the effects of power upon the Romans. Dio's claim that problems arose for the Romans from their military supremacy matches his claim in Book 44 that power and greatness led to *ὑβρις*, *φθόνος* and *φιλοτιμία* in political life. It matches the claim of Maecenas that Rome's venture into foreign lands led to strife and civil war inside the city and outside. Likewise, Dio's assertion about the *ἄσωτία* of the Romans is backed up by his assertion that excessive wealth corrupted the Republic irreparably. As the use of *epulae* in Livy is ambiguous, possibly referring to private excess, but also perhaps talking about the effects of *luxuria* in encouraging politicians to provide extravagant banquets (and, thus, moving beyond private decadence to make reference to socio-political changes like *ambitus*). A similar effect can be witnessed in Dio's use of the term *ἄσωτία*. Whilst *ἄσωτία* generally means private gluttony or extravagance (Dio claims it for a courtier of Nero, for example, who killed himself upon learning that he only had HS 10, 000, 000 in the bank because he felt he would shortly starve to death),<sup>20</sup> *ambitus* and bribery become notable problems in Dio's account of the late Republic<sup>21</sup> and *ἄσωτία* is used of a law passed by Caesar (collected in Dio among several laws of Caesar to reform the balance of the state), regulating political expenditure.<sup>22</sup> Certainly, in the Maecenas speech, Augustus is advised to curtail excessive public expenditure in the provinces because of its role in encouraging political strife.<sup>23</sup>

There are two statements in Dio's claims that stand out as arguably problematic. First is that the Romans abandoned their ancestral customs and, second, that *τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξάμενον* (that this malaise began here). I shall discuss the first problem

---

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 57.19.5.

<sup>21</sup> Particularly in the 50s B.C. when the Romans start meddling in Egyptian politics. See Cass. Dio 39.58.3-63.5. Siani-Davies (1997): 306-340 has noticed Dio's exaggerated emphasis on bribery and corruption here.

<sup>22</sup> Cass. Dio 43.25.1-2. We must also be aware of Dio's historiographical interests. The chapter immediately preceding this one talks of Caesar's lavish expenditure on and introduction of luxury into public festivals, where he, *inter alia*, provides awnings for the people to shelter under. The two passages (Caesar's actions and Caesar's dictats) jar, something which coheres with Dio's broader portrait of Caesar's dictatorship, where his actions become more monarchical, even though his protestations are to the contrary.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 52.30.3.

later, when I deal with fragment 52. We shall also argue for a further implication in the phrase in Chapter Three.<sup>24</sup> The second is rather easier to explain. *Τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ'* refers to *ἀσωτία*. The effects of wealth upon the history of the Republic were recognised by Dio and play a significant role in his narrative of the last hundred years (in particular in Gabinius' actions in Egypt as mentioned above). The passage, rather than a complete moral *volte-face*, is an evolution of the political strains placed upon the competitive desires of the Roman people. Whereas before they had been interested in war, glory and conquest, all admirable virtues in one way or another, now the dangers of competition turning nasty (and inverting in on Roman society) increases. Dio, of course, would not be the first to think this; Sallust argues something similar in his *Bellum Catilinae*.<sup>25</sup>

### **Part Three: The Fall of Carthage in 146 B.C.**

The last of the 'epochal dates' passages at issue concerns Rome's destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. The text of the senatorial debate which prefaces the destruction of Carthage is, sadly, entirely lost. We do, however, possess a very cursory summary in Zonaras. Zonaras presents us with a debate between Cato the Elder and Scipio Nasica, in which the former argues in favour of destroying Carthage and the latter of saving it. A commotion erupts in the senate house and an unnamed senator argues in favour of sparing Carthage to protect Roman manliness and virtue from corruption and decadence:<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> See pp. 71-6

<sup>25</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 10.1-11.7. He places the blame, however, on Sulla's campaigns in Asia and his proscriptions, though the sentiment is ultimately the same. Cf. Polyb. 6.57.5-6, who mentions a similar idea in more general terms.

<sup>26</sup> Hose (1994): 402 is puzzled by the seeming irrelevance of the debate to Dio's account of the siege of Carthage, since Rome's policy seems to have been (in Dio's eyes) to destroy Carthage from the start. Dio may have been thinking along the same lines as Polybius – that, though Rome intended to destroy Carthage from the start, she was looking for a justification for so doing – Polyb. 36.2.1. It is also worth noting that the debate does not change the Roman mind but simply throws up an awkward moral dilemma for the senate, which threatens to derail them from their very purpose. Compare, for example, the debate over the command of Pompey against the pirates in 67 B.C. The people there are intent on voting him the command (out of desperation) and the debate presented by Dio raises some serious 'home truths' about the weaknesses

*Ἐφη τις ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' οὐδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ γε ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα φείσασθαι αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον νομίζοιτο ἂν, ἢν' ἀνταγωνιστὰς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες ἀρετὴν ἀσκῶσι, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ τρυφήν τράπωνται, τῶν δυναμένων αὐτοὺς καταναγκάζειν εἰς ἀσκησιν τῶν πολεμικῶν περιαιρεθέντων, καὶ χείρους ὑπ' ἀνασκησίας γένωνται, ἀξιοχρέους ἀντιπολέμους μὴ ἔχοντες. ἐκ τούτων οὖν τῶν λόγων πάντες κατασκάψαι τὴν Καρχηδόνα ἀμογνωμόνησαν, μὴποτε εἰρηγήσειν ἐκείνους πιστεύσαντες ἀκριβῶς.<sup>27</sup>*

The unnamed speaker is ignored, however, and the senate votes to destroy Carthage. Hose argues that Dio's account differs from the traditional account in two ways: instead of focusing on moral decadence, Dio focuses on the effects upon military life of *ἡδονή* and *τρυφή*.<sup>28</sup> Secondly, he argues that Dio cannot have conceived of a period of strife after the fall of Carthage because strife is already endemic in his narrative of the Roman world:

*“Von einer solchen Sichtweise aus ist ein Modell, das lediglich zwei Phasen römischer innerer Geschichte kennt, eine harmonische vor Hereinströmen von Reichtum und dem Fall Karthagos und eine von Zwietracht und Bürgerkrieg geprägte hernach, unangemessen”.*<sup>29</sup>

I take issue with the idea that Dio is not referring to a moral decline, but a military one. Hose argues that:

*“Demgegenüber ist die Gefahr bei Zonaras anders gelagert: zwar drohen auch hier *ἡδονή* und *τρυφή*, indes wird eine Degeneration der Römer als Folge nicht hierin konstantiert, sondern eine Verschlechterung tritt ein infolge von *ἀνασκησία*, d.h. die militärische Leistungsfähigkeit...ist gesunken”.*<sup>30</sup>

---

of the Republic in the face of men like Pompey, and yet Catulus' speech is wilfully ignored by a crowd that, in essence, shouts him down. In other words, a debate in Dio need not have a direct impact on subsequent policy in order to direct the reader's attention towards moral and political dangers lying behind it and to point towards future developments in the body politic.

<sup>27</sup> Zon. 9.30.8.

<sup>28</sup> Hose (1994): 402-3. He compares Dio/Zonaras' account to Tacitus'. Unlike the latter, for whom the importance of the destruction of Carthage is its effect on the Roman ruling classes, “Zonaras aber läßt den Anonymus vor einer sinkenden militärischen Leistungsfähigkeit warnen, d.h. daß hier nicht der Gedanke der securae opes vorliegt, sondern die Möglichkeit einer weiteren Gefährdung insinuiert wird”. That hazard, Hose argues to be “Konsistent mit Dios Sicht auf die inneren Verhältnisse im republikanischen Rom” (404).

<sup>29</sup> Hose (1994): 404. He states in the same passage that “Dio behandelt die innerrömischen Konflikte mit all ihren Auswüchsen bisweilen in singulärer Weise”.

<sup>30</sup> Hose (1994): 402-3.

Hose's distinction is pointless; the decline of public morals and of martial capability are obviously here related (claiming that pleasure and luxury are destructive to military valour is a moral assertion, since it hardly refers to a loss of tactical ability or a decline in the quality of weaponry). The language used is moral: Dio/Zonaras talks of *ἡδονή* and *τρυφή* on the one hand, corresponding to Florus' focus on the dangers of *luxuria* mentioned by Scipio, the Latin equivalent of *τρυφή*. When Dio/Zonaras talks of the Romans becoming 'worse' (*χείρους*) as the result of the loss of *metus externus*, the word refers back to *αὐτοὺς* in the preceding clause. The passage, translated, reads that "if those who were able to compel them to practise warlike pursuits should be removed from the scene, they would become worse by lack of practice", and finishes with "not having worthy enough opponents in war". The use of the reflexive pronoun *ἑαυτῶν* at the beginning of the speech is important, assuming we can take Zonaras at face-value. The word refers back to the subjects of the sentence and would imply that the speaker meant that there would be some risk of moral degeneracy to the audience. Dio's speaker, with the use of *ἑαυτῶν*, if we can trust it, was perhaps attempting to spell out the threat to the senatorial class itself of the removal of *metus hostilis*.

Hose's argument rests on his claims about the nature of the *ἀρετή* lost after the destruction of Carthage. He claims that *virtus* (the Latin equivalent of *ἀρετή*) was a public, not a private virtue and could not have a moral force. This may be true, by and large, for the second century B.C., when a man's *virtus* could often be contrasted with his moral worth, but even at this time (and certainly from Cicero's time on), the word was beginning to pick up meanings derived from the Greek *ἀρετή*, meaning that *virtus* by Dio's day had picked up a solidly moral meaning as well as a martial one.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, Dio was writing

---

<sup>31</sup> McDonnell (2006): 74; 110-1. He claims that *virtus* began to be compared (in a moral sense) with *ἡδονή* and *τρυφή* from the second century B.C. onwards. Polyb. 32.13.6-7 also suggests the interrelationship in Roman ideology of the second century B.C. between military vigour and moral worth. The Romans war with the

in Greek and, even if he was translating from Latin into Greek, he would have been aware of the moral tones of *ἀρετή* and should have, if Hose is to be believed, preferred a ‘safer’ word like *ἀνδρεία*. Moreover, *ἀρετή* in Dio has a very clear sense of personal excellence, as Kuhn-Chen argues, and is tied in with Dio’s claims about moderation, or *σωφροσύνη* in the passage from book 44 cited above.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, Dio’s belief in a loss of *ἀρετή* among the political elites is suggested by his claim that Catulus was the *ultimus Romanorum* when he died in 61 B.C.<sup>33</sup> and is perfectly in keeping with his claim in Book 44 that the many are not disposed to possess *ἀρετή* and that a powerful and wealthy democracy lacks *σωφροσύνη* and, lacking it, lacks also harmony. We should also note that, for Thucydides, as we saw earlier, stress and strain could be placed upon people’s moral and civic virtue by changing conditions.

#### **Part Four: Rome at its Zenith in 218 B.C.**

There is one final passage for comment, which takes us back earlier. The passage is from Dio’s account of the outbreak of the Second Punic War (218 B.C.) and seems, at first glance, to contradict the claim presented above that Dio dates the origins of Rome’s problems to 241 and the conquest of the major islands of the Western Mediterranean. However, we shall see that this passage, too, fits into Dio’s depiction of the fall of the Republic as I have discussed it:

*Οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἤκμαζον καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίᾳ ἀκριβῶς ἐχρῶντο, ὥσθ’ ἄπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐκ μὲν ἀκράτου εὐπραγίας ἐς θάρασος, ἐκ δὲ ἰσχυροῦ δέους ἐς ἐπιείκειαν φέρει, ταῦτά τε αὐτοῖς τότε διαλλαγῆναι ὅσω γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον εὐτύχησαν, ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἐσωφρόνησαν, τὸ μὲν θάρασος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνδρείον μετέχει, πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐνδεικνύμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικὲς, οὐδὲ κοινῶν ἐὶ εὐταξία<sup>34</sup>, κατ’ ἀλλήλους παρεχόμενοι τήν*

---

Illyrians so that their men do not become effeminate through peace (κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον ἀποθηλύνεσθαι διὰ τὴν πολυχρόνιον εἰρήνην).

<sup>32</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 147-65.

<sup>33</sup> Cass. Dio 37.46.3-4.

<sup>34</sup> This word is problematic. Boissevain replicates the manuscript’s *εὐψυχία*, thinking that Dio has borrowed the word from Thucydides, but Bekker replaces it with *εὐταξία*, an emendation that has been accepted by

τε γὰρ ἰσχὺν πρὸς μετριότητος ἀκινδύνου ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὸ κόσμιον πρὸς ἀνδρείας ἀληθοῦς κτήσιν ἐλάμβανον, μήτε τὴν εὐπραγίαν ἐς ὕβριν μήτε τὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἐς δειλίαν ἐξάγοντες. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ τό τε σωφρονοῦν ἐξ ἀνδρείας καὶ τὸ θαρσοῦν ἐκ θάρσους<sup>35</sup> φθείρεσθαι, ἐκείνως δὲ τὸ μέτριον ὑπ’ ἀνδρείας ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ τὸ εὐτυχοῦν ὑπ’ εὐταξίας βεβαιότερον γίγνεσθαι ἐνόμιζον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τοὺς τε προσπεσόντας σφίσι πολέμους κράτιστα δῆνεγκαν καὶ τὰ σφέτερα τά τε τῶν συμμάχων ἄριστα ἐπολίτευσαν.<sup>36</sup>

That this passage is part of an analysis of decline needs little justification: the existence of **τότε** in the first sentence would suggest as much. Moreover, the passage talks of a zenith (**ἀκμή**) – Rome is at its height, the implication being that it will not remain so for too very long.<sup>37</sup> Simons has argued that this passage suggests that 218 was the first ‘epochal’ date in Dio’s history, rather than the first Punic War.<sup>38</sup> His assertion rests on the idea that Dio sees a growth in arrogance after this date, but, as Fechner notes, this is a prevalent feature of the first Punic War, too.<sup>39</sup> Yet Dio may not have meant that the conquest of Sicily led immediately to the decline of Rome. It is entirely possible that Dio recognised 241 as the first *cause*, but that its effects were not felt until much later. Such a claim is made, for example, in Florus:

“Haec est illa tertia aetas populi R. transmarina, qua Italia progredi ausus orbe toto arma circumtulit. Cuius aetatis superiores centum anni sancti pii et, ut diximus, aurei, sine flagitio, sine scelere, dum sincera adhuc et innoxia pastoriae illius sectae integritas, dumque Poenorum hostium imminens metus disciplinam veterem continebat”.<sup>40</sup>

---

Cary in his version of the text. I have reproduced Bekker/Cary, since the (re?)appearance of **εὐταξία** a few lines later makes me think that Bekker/Cary are right. Notice also **τὸ κόσμιον** in the succeeding clause.

<sup>35</sup> **Θάρσους** is also in some doubt. Boissevain states “**Θάρσους** mihi suspectum, exspectes synonymum **ἐπιεικείας, δέους?**” The latter suggestion is favoured by Cary, and I should follow his translation. Simons (2009): 134 n. 47, however, notes that all of our versions of this fragment (in Maximus the Confessor’s *Florilegium* and in the *Excerpta de sententiis*) have **θαρσοῦν ἐκ θάρσους**, meaning that the mistake must have been made very early on. On a related note, Simons (2009): 133-4 draws attention to the seemingly idiosyncratic switch in the meanings of **θάρσος** and **θράσος** in this passage. He points out that the former traditionally signifies ‘courage’ and ‘manliness’, whilst the later implies an over-boldness that often leads to tragedy (and indeed is a tragic word). Dio may here to be reversing their meanings, though, given the serious problems that we have already discussed with the state of the manuscript, it seems most likely that this is simply the result of some confusion in the copying process.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 52.1.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Polybius’ claim that Rome was at her **ἀκμή** at 216 (6.51.6). Notice Dio’s borrowing of the term.

<sup>38</sup> Simons (2009): 123.

<sup>39</sup> Fechner (1986): 142-3.

<sup>40</sup> Florus 3.12.1-2. Frg. 52 too bears some resemblance to Sallust’s claims about the Romans of old at *Cat.* 9.1-5.

Though it is difficult to tell from Zonaras whether there was any passage equivalent to this in Dio, the similarities between *aetas populi Romani transmarina* and Zonaras's claims about the Romans crossing over into other lands and islands would suggest the possibility. At the very least, it would not have been impossible for him to claim that there was a hiatus between the hugely significant invasion of Sicily and later, more destructive moments.

Dio's assertion that the Roman experience to this time was unique is critical for understanding the purpose of the passage in his history.<sup>41</sup> Unlike all other peoples, Dio states, the Romans were not led by good fortune (or 'prosperity') into boldness or by fear into good behaviour. This is a rejection of the idea that the Romans were kept in check by *metus hostilis* at this point in their history and the idea in Thucydides that prosperity leads to better motivations. But the idiosyncrasy of the Roman position will change as new circumstances arise. *Εὐπραγία* arises, as we have seen, in 187, when the Romans gain the *περιουσία τῶν λαφύρων* and the Romans learn to abide by the *ἄσωτία* of the Easterners. This moment breaks down two central parts of Dio's 'formula' for Roman behaviour in 218. Firstly, the Roman experience can no longer be identified as unique – they have borrowed a vice from a foreign race – and they are no longer resistant to the corrupting effects of good fortune. Dio's emphasis on the loss of the unique nature of Roman self-control is perhaps the point of his claim that after 187 the Romans lost *τὰ πατρία ἔθη* – they were now no different from other peoples. Logically, therefore, if the Romans had lost their uniqueness over their self-control in times of prosperity, then it follows that the other part of the claim – that they had no need of fear to keep them in check – must also be altered, hence Dio's emphasis on the destruction of Carthage. Rome in 218 may have had no need of an *aemulator*, after 187 it did. As much is suggested by Dio's claims in Book

---

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Polyb. 6.10.12-14 on Roman exceptionalism based upon similar ideas of experience and discipline as here.

44, cited in the Introduction. There he argues that *εἰ γάρ που καὶ δημοκρατία τις ἦνθησεν, ἀλλ' ἐν γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν, μέχρις οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτ' ἰσχὺν ἔσχον ὥστε ἢ ὑβρεῖς σφίσιν ἐξ εὐπραγίας ἢ φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας ἐγγενέσθαι*. The reappearance here of *εὐπραγία* must surely be in reference to his earlier claims, as is the use of the Polybian *ἀκμή*. Moreover, he argues that the history of the Greeks, barbarians and *even the Romans themselves* proves his assertion. This could only have made sense if the Roman situation, after 218, had begun to resemble the experiences of other peoples.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, then, I hope to have shown that Hose was wrong to believe that Dio could not have believed in Thucydidean *φύσις* and Roman moral decline; there is no contradiction between the two positions, not least because Thucydides himself felt that people's moral character could be improved or worsened by circumstance and situation. Likewise, I hope to have shown that Dio believed that the moral decline and imperial augmentation of Rome caused an acceleration in the problems 'inherent' in Republican politics, caused by human nature. Dio believed that constitutional change could affect human nature, either suppressing its worst elements or exaggerating and altering its effects: the change experienced in the Republic, caused by the influx of wealth, power and opportunity was a *de facto* constitutional change, related in inverse proportions to the positive change instituted by Augustus and an explicit factor in the growth of stasis and civil war in the late Republic. For Dio, as for Thucydides, moral decline was a symptom of changing factors, related to and symbiotic with the exaggeration of the negative aspects of human character. In the next chapter, we shall examine the exact nature of Thucydidean

influence on Dio, and the way that he links ideas and concerns he inherits from the father of Greek historiography to these issues of Roman moral decline.

## Section One: Conclusion

This section has examined Dio's interest in *φύσις* and his elaboration, in keeping with his interest in *φύσις*, on ideas of moral change and decline in the late Republic that he inherits from the historiography with which he must have been conversant. We have seen that terms like *φιλοτιμία*, *πλεονεξία*, *φιλονεικία*, *ἐπιθυμία*, *ὀργή*, *φθόνος* and *ἔχθρα* dominate his narrative and are used by him time and again to explain the historical processes of the Republic and beyond. We have seen that these terms, due to Dio's belief in Roman exceptionalism, do not necessarily have to represent motivations with negative consequences for the state, but that towards the late Republic, there is a loss of the traditional poverty, discipline and order that characterises the early Republic in Dio (and others) and a subsequent growth in selfish behaviour which brings about the collapse of the Republic and its replacement by monarchy. We saw that the emphasis lies strongly in Dio on the replacement of publically-minded virtue, as it was in the First Punic War and again at 218, with private ambitions that, though there always, flower in the later period. This belief in the possibility of moral change was entirely compatible with a universal, Thucydidean view of human nature, which change only in expression and manifestation. We shall return to this issue in the next chapter.

## Section Two: Dio's Influences

### Introduction

Dio lived during the “most complete development of Greek civilisation in antiquity”.<sup>1</sup> This period has earned the name the Second Sophistic, which perhaps assumes too much of a break between the original Sophists and the later ‘renaissance’ of the Roman Empire, but still captures the way that the Greek elites of the East reawakened Classical ideas for their time.<sup>2</sup> Its influence on his work is pronounced, and he shows familiarity with philosophical issues and Classical rhetoric and uses the language of high literary endeavour of his day, Attic Greek.<sup>3</sup>

It would be wrong to assume, however, as some scholars do, that Dio was culturally entirely Greek, only seeing his Romanness as a political label.<sup>4</sup> Swain has argued that “culturally and spiritually there is no reason to think that Dio would have seen himself as anything other than a Greek” and that there are even traces of hostility to Rome and things Roman in Dio’s writing.<sup>5</sup> Gowing has championed the second idea arguing that Dio may have included occasional Roman humiliations in order to please his Greek audience.<sup>6</sup> The first idea – that Dio was culturally exclusively Greek – is incorrect, the second – that he was somehow hostile to Rome – is absurd. Dio relied, as we saw in the last chapter, on Roman theories of moral and political decline in the late Republic; moreover, he knew his Virgil, and Dio’s cultural horizons “included acquaintance with the historical works of Sallust, the speeches of Cicero and probably the dialogues of Seneca, all in contexts other

---

<sup>1</sup> Millar (1964): 174.

<sup>2</sup> I am using the term in its broadest sense: Swain (1996): 2, “Philostratus’ term ‘second sophistic’ can be used as a convenient shorthand for the period as a whole rather than being restricted to the declamatory rhetoric then in vogue”.

<sup>3</sup> Millar (1964): 177-179; Aalders (1986): 293-5.

<sup>4</sup> Millar (1964): 182-191; Aalders (1986): 303; Swain (1996): 405; Sidebottom (2007): 77.

<sup>5</sup> Swain (1996): 405 and 401-9 generally.

<sup>6</sup> Gowing (1997): 2572.

than source-material for the facts of historical events”.<sup>7</sup> We shall see that Dio’s impression of Rome’s supremacy and exceptionalism, which we examined in the last chapter, is developed further in the themes discussed in this section; we must also not forget that he *was himself* a Roman senator, writing a (classically senatorial) annalistic history of Rome from her Trojan foundation to his own day (and ends his account of Roman history with his own Ordinary Consulship).

It is easy to forget that the Greeks were not the only ones calling upon the glorious past: Bowersock has pointed out that during the Second Sophistic “the Greeks looked back to Athens of the fifth century and to Attic purity, whereas the Romans turned to the Punic Wars, studying the old Cato and exploring archaic Latin vocabulary”.<sup>8</sup> Wallace-Hadrill has recently suggested that cultural identity in antiquity should be thought of in the same way as we see layers of debris in archaeological sites, with different layers and levels of culture superimposed on top of one another.<sup>9</sup> For example, I might be at one point Welsh, another point British and even European depending upon circumstance (and blends of two or all three at others; a Welshman might wish to be British in certain contexts, but also take advantage of the unique position within British culture that Welshness gives him, such as talking about the longbow or Rorke’s Drift in the context of British military history, or the Welsh history of temperance and non-conformism within a discussion of British values). Similar possibilities existed in the ancient world; Dio refers to Italy and Bithynia as his homelands at various points in his history.<sup>10</sup> We should, therefore,

---

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 76.10.1-3; Kemezis (2006): 99.

<sup>8</sup> Bowersock (1969): 16.

<sup>9</sup> Wallace-Hadrill (2008): 7-14.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 1.3; 75.15.3; 80.5.2. There is also the possibility that Dio wrote these claims at different stages in his life. If Dio wrote the beginning of his history at a younger age than the end, as Millar (1964) would suggest, then the claim about Italy might be the point of view of a younger senator thinking of Italy as where his career lies and the claim about Bithynia might be that of an older man thinking about retirement and even death. He is certainly to be contrasted to, say, Arrian, who deliberately shuns calling Rome his *πατρίς*, which Moles (1985): 165 contrasts with Dio. Cf. Marincola (1989): 189 who thinks this might be due to anti-Roman sentiment.

think instead of Dio's history as the product of "biculturalisme", as Freyburger-Galland puts it.<sup>11</sup>

Scholars assume one or two of the following things about Dio's literary influences; that Dio was indoctrinated by Thucydidean thought or that he was airing rhetorical and intellectual commonplaces.<sup>12</sup> Respect for Dio's originality or ingenuity has not been high. But Dio lived, as we have said, during the Second Sophistic, which was characterised by a preference for Classical language and thought; ideas from the Classical Greek past were revisited by Sophistic intellectuals for use in front of contemporary audiences. The reasons for this have been explored in a multitude of different ways, reflecting the fact that the Second Sophistic was a diverse and long period of intellectual history, with few men whose thoughts and attitudes can be easily pinned down. Some have detected 'anti-Roman' sentiment in the preference for the Classical Greek past in the literary culture of the era.<sup>13</sup> Others see the emphasis on the Greek past as the desire of the Greek people to retain their identity in an era of increasing 'multiculturalism' in the Roman world.<sup>14</sup> Others still see intellectual elites who emphasised awareness of ancient culture to confirm their role in the social hierarchy.<sup>15</sup> Finally, there are scholars who see these men valuing their *παιδεία* and their role as *πεπαιδευμένοι* in the Empire because their role as cultured 'well-rounded gentlemen', rather like the classically educated civil service that once existed in this country, gave them a place in the Roman hierarchy.<sup>16</sup> None of these opinions is necessarily invalid; even individuals like Dio of Prusa or Arrian can be seen falling into more than one of these categories. Cassius Dio, however, joins the group of pragmatic historians and politicians,

---

<sup>11</sup> Freyburger-Galland (1997): 23-26. Cf. Woolf (1994): 131, who also accords biculturalism to Dio

<sup>12</sup> Litsch (1893): *passim*; Kyhnitzsch (1894): *passim*; Schwartz (1899): 1690-1691; Millar (1964): 72; Manuwald (1979): 282; Reinhold (1985): 215-7; Gowing (1992): 46 fn. 25; 293; Rodgers (2008): 313 fn. 44; Parker (2008): 77.

<sup>13</sup> Bowie (1970): 3-41; Swain (1996); Goldhill (2001).

<sup>14</sup> Schmitz (1997): 193; Whitmarsh (2005): 15.

<sup>15</sup> Woolf (1994): 124; Whitmarsh (2005): 14.

<sup>16</sup> De Blois (1984): 361-2.

who were ‘realists’ in their attitude towards Roman power, to use Bowie’s phrase.<sup>17</sup> They sought to use their knowledge of Classical history to make statements about the present day; Dio of Prusa, in one of his guises, put his knowledge of Greek history to good use persuading the Nicomedians to stop their costly and destructive feud with their rival city Nicaea and apparently lectured Trajan on monarchy, through an exploration of Alexander the Great’s character.<sup>18</sup> The changing circumstances of the Third Century A.D. were likewise interpreted by these Greek writers “in the light of old commonplaces which they superimposed as a matrix”.<sup>19</sup> The appeal of these ancient models for such men was in their perceived universality and the desire of the writer to produce a work that was itself of universal importance. As Henderson points out:

“Pre-Roman Hellas is their eternal playground for ideas, and exemplary narratives, on how to align honour with security. Teaching the glories of (lost) Greece became a master strategy for binding the exercise of super-power, applied and reworked across the eastern provinces and down the centuries of Roman rule”.<sup>20</sup>

We have seen elements of this in Dio in our Introduction. We saw in the Introduction that there was some value in seeing into Dio’s History “the perspective of Roman history available to a man who was born in the reign of Marcus Aurelius and lived into that of Severus Alexander, [and] also, not in his contemporary history alone, the reactions of a conservative observer to an age full of stress and change”, as is found in the majority of modern scholarship.<sup>21</sup> I contended there also that we should take notice of his claim at 72.23.4, that he hoped his history would never lose its lustre, and at frg 1.1, that he was recording the affairs of the Romans and their enemies for future posterity, was

---

<sup>17</sup> Bowie (1970): 12-13.

<sup>18</sup> Dio Chrys. *Or.* 38.10; 24; 38; 40; 46; for the kingly orations, see *Or.* 1-4. Cf. Whitmarsh (2001): 200-216.

<sup>19</sup> De Blois (1984): 377.

<sup>20</sup> Henderson (2001): 49.

<sup>21</sup> Millar (1964): vii; Gabba (1955): 330; Ruiz (1982): 169-272; Gabba (1984): 70-71; Reinhold (1988): 9-10; Rich (1990): 4; Carsana (1990): 89-90; Lintott (1997): 2520.

important. These, we argued, suggest that he believed his history to have a universal relevance that would outlast him and his circumstances and was similar in spirit to Thucydides, who hoped that he had left a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰὶ* for future generations. Lucian advises in his guide to history-writing those historians who chose to engage with Roman history:

*κτῆμά τε γάρ φησι μᾶλλον ἐς αἰὶ συγγράφειν ἢ περ ἐς τὸ παρὸν ἀγώνισμα, καὶ μὴ τὸ μυθῶδες ἀσπάζεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν γεγενημένων ἀπολείπειν τοῖς ὕστερον...ὡς εἴ ποτε καὶ αἰθίς τὰ ὅμοια καταλάβοι, ἔχοιεν, φησι, πρὸς τὰ προγεγραμμένα ἀποβλέποντες εὖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐν ποσὶ. καὶ τὴν μὲν γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχων ὁ συγγραφεὺς...*<sup>22</sup>

This Section assumes, therefore, since Dio lived in an intellectual environment that cherished classical (and classical-style) learning, so must he have cherished it; equally, when he thought about the problems of the Roman world, the correct solutions to those problems and the value of *history* to such a proposal, he must have done so with classical models and ideas firmly in mind. In the last two chapters we analysed Dio’s general conception of *φύσις* and the way it shapes his retelling of the traditional Roman tale of moral change in the late Republic. In this section, I want to examine those ideas, culled from the intellectual past, through which Dio ties the ideas we explored above to broader intellectual trends in Classical thought. A preliminary attempt at this has been made by Sion-Jenkis in an article on the Amnesty Speech Dio gives to Cicero in Book Forty-four (we shall return to her arguments in Chapter Six below). She analyses the various intellectual affinities of Dio in the speech and argues correctly that “Cassius Dio nimmt insbesondere von den Sophisten beeinflusstes Gedankengut auf. Dies gilt vor allem für die Betonung des pragmatischen Nutzens der Dinge und Entscheidungen, aber auch für die geradezu ‘naturwissenschaftliche’ Analyse des menschlichen Verhaltens, die er v.a. (*sic*) mit Thukydides teilt”.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Lucian *Hist. Conscr.* 42-3.

<sup>23</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2002): 206.

This Section is not designed to be a catalogue of every idea that influenced Dio's thinking, however. Rather, it is designed to identify the main ideas from broader ancient intellectual culture and from a few direct influences (principally Thucydides) that Dio used in his history of the late Republic and of the role of human nature within that political system. The focus is very much on Dio and is designed to show not only that Dio's history of the period has focus and structure, but that his concerns about *φύσις* dominate that structure. In the first chapter, we shall explore Dio's direct indebtedness to Thucydides, his primary influence, showing how Dio's conception of *φύσις* and its relation to other historical factors derives from Thucydides. In the second chapter, we shall examine Dio's political thinking and how he responds to Classical ideas about democratic constitutions.

Although there was a long gap between Dio and many of these Classical ideas, this gap was by no means a void. Thucydides, for example, continued to inspire debate and emulation from the fourth century B.C. down to Dio's own day.<sup>24</sup> Dio, doubtless, was inspired by many of these intermediary ideas and interpretations. However, it would be as tedious as it would be senseless to try and determine what is direct and indirect influence from these Classical models (or how Dio responded to, say, Thucydideanising in his sources with his own detailed knowledge of Thucydides). If we speak here of the influences as though they were direct, this is not sloppily to ignore several hundred years of intellectual endeavour separating Dio from his Classical models, but to reflect the mindset of the cultured elites of the empire, which privileged the writers of the Classical era, of which Dio was himself a part and for whom he was writing.

---

<sup>24</sup> For the fourth century and Hellenistic influence of Thucydides, see Hornblower (1995): 47-68. More generally, Strelbel (1935): *passim* is still useful, if a bit mechanical, as is Luschkat (1971): 1266-97. Obviously, one cannot ignore the critical discussions of Thucydides in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Lucian (I briefly discuss Dio's relationship to these writers below), or the influence of Thucydidean historiographical conventions on Polybius and Sallust (among a great many others), both of whom may have been used as sources by Dio. Indeed, in one passage (discussed below – frg. 43.1-3) Dio's Thucydideanising is paralleled in Florus, suggesting a source for both.

## Chapter Three: Thucydidean Influence on Cassius Dio

### Introduction

It has long been known that Thucydides is Dio's major model, though discussions of his influence have seldom been favourable. In 1893, Litsch published a near exhaustive study of Dio's borrowings from Thucydides, including direct allusion, innuendo, and linguistic borrowing, showing the pervasive nature of the influence. This was followed a year later by Kyhnitzsch's study of the Thucydidean influence on Dio's speeches, examining those passages Dio borrows from Thucydides' speeches and inserts into his own. For Litsch, Dio was part of a cohort of imperial Roman historians (as ridiculed by Lucian) who sought to present Thucydideanised accounts of Rome's wars and politics. Victorian sentiment towards this sort of borrowing was not favourable, with accusations of slavish imitation and intellectual decadence abounding.<sup>1</sup> Twentieth century opinion (and indeed Twenty-first century opinion) has been far from sympathetic either, with Parker stating as recently as 2008 that Dio possessed a "near-pathological need to use Thucydidean words and phrases".<sup>2</sup> Of late, however, the trend in scholarship has been to reexamine, in response to advances made both in the discipline of intertextuality in general, and in the field of ancient historiography in particular, Dio's reason for relying as heavily as he does on Thucydides for ideas about human nature and its role in history. Such studies have been more favourable, though substantial treatments of Dio's Thucydidean elements have been scarce. Swan has argued that "the Thucydidean conception of human nature as power-maximising unlocked for Dio the motivation of the protagonists of Roman history,

---

<sup>1</sup> Melber (1891): 290-7; Litsch (1893): 45-6; Kyhnitzsch (1894): 5; Schwartz (1899): 1690-1.

<sup>2</sup> Parker (2008): 77. For similar viewpoints, see Millar (1964): 42; Manuwald (1979): 280-4; Aalders (1986): 294; Lintott (1997): 2499-500.

including the future Augustus. It was in emulation of Thucydides that he stripped away the façade of Augustan constitutionalism, revealing the monarchic realities of the Principate”.<sup>3</sup> Bertrand has pointed to the often subtle ways that Dio handles his Thucydidean influence, pointing (with particular relevance to this study) to Dio’s development of his ideas about *φιλοτιμία* away from Thucydidean thoughts about the word.<sup>4</sup> Pelling has argued that Dio and other ‘Thucydideanising’ historians were seeking to create “resonance” with their model, to both give their work authority and weight (in much the same way that Marxist historians use Marx’s ideas to support their own interpretations of history whilst confirming Marx’s ideas by the conformity of history to them) and to “remind [us] of the hard-edged political and military world that Thucydides described”.<sup>5</sup> Kordoš has even suggested that Dio’s defence of his high Attic styling may be a defence of his method against the criticisms of Dionysius of Halicarnassus *inter alia* about Thucydideanising in history.<sup>6</sup>

In this chapter, taking the assumptions of ‘revisionist’ scholarship as my base, I shall examine what seem to me to be Dio’s main reason for relying so heavily upon Thucydidean ideas about human nature and its effect on political life; what might be termed the ‘tragic’ element to Thucydides’ thought (we shall clarify our use of that term in due course). We have already explored Dio’s Thucydidean influence in terms of the *φύσις* terms he borrows. However, *φύσις* in Thucydides was not a stand-alone concept, but operated alongside other factors of historical causation. Does Dio, when he borrows Thucydides’ ideas about human nature, show awareness of these other factors as well? What factors are they? To answer these questions, we should look to Cornford’s superb study of 1907 of the mytho-historical background to Thucydidean thought, which, by placing him in his proper intellectual milieu, provides us with the kind of themes we should

---

<sup>3</sup> Swan (1997): 2525.

<sup>4</sup> Bertrand (2010): 74.

<sup>5</sup> Pelling (2010): 105-118.

<sup>6</sup> Kordoš (2010): 249-256.

be looking for in Dio. Obviously, not all of these themes, nor Dio's exact inflection of them, need to have come directly from Thucydides necessarily; they might have been filtered through other writers, as we suggested in the section introduction, or even have come from different origins entirely. However, we are concerned here with how these themes come together and it is this that allows us to talk of direct Thucydidean influence without worrying about how that influence was mediated, as it is within Thucydides' vision of human affairs that Dio arranges them.

Cornford argued that instead of the Nineteenth Century rationalist, confident of a scientific method that was not to be worked out until the Enlightenment, Thucydides was an intellectual giant in an age of primitive reasoning and wide-spread superstition. His thought was therefore limited to the kind of observations available to a man (albeit an exceptional one) of his era. Cornford rather wryly puts it that Thucydides' capacity for scientific thought is akin to a Nineteenth Century peasant, who understood that seeing four magpies could be no sign that a boy-child is on the way, but was still not sure that it was definitely unrelated.<sup>7</sup> In Thucydides' day, poetry, particularly in Epic form, was the main method by which information about the past, particularly mankind's achievements, could be understood and made sense of. Herodotus, for example, looked back to Epic poetry for his methodology, including speeches, dreams, divine intervention and he promised to record *τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων...καὶ ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά* lest over time they be diminished.<sup>8</sup> Thucydides' reliance on mythical form was apparently no less great than Herodotus, with, according to Cornford, Tragedy providing him with his main influence.<sup>9</sup> Over the last century, Cornford's idea has been revised and critiqued, but not entirely rejected nor disproved, with the emphasis falling now on the idea that Thucydides was inspired by tragic themes from a variety of writers tragic and non-tragic rather than

---

<sup>7</sup> Cornford (1907): 103 for the magpie reference.

<sup>8</sup> Hdt. 1.1. For Herodotus' other influences, particularly contemporary and previous historiography, see Fowler (1996): 62-87.

<sup>9</sup> Cornford (1907): 139-40.

Tragedy the genre itself. Macleod states that “Thucydides...can certainly be said to have constructed his history and interpreted events, in a strict sense of the term, tragically”, though he claims that any influence must have been subconscious rather than direct.<sup>10</sup> Thucydides was known at least to write tragically, as various passages in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ critical essay on him show.<sup>11</sup> Within this tragic framework, human experience is seen to be influenced by two interacting factors: *γνώμη*, “man’s own vices of character – ‘daring, covetousness and pride’ and the other irremediable and mastering powers which ‘possess’ him...supplied by the external circumstances of his condition (*τύχη*)”.<sup>12</sup> As in tragedy, human ambition (*γνώμη, ἐλπίς, ἔρως, ἐπιθυμία*) is brought low through *ὑβρις, ἄτη* and *ἀπάτη* according to the failure of humans to see the workings of *τύχη* and *ἀνάγκη*. For example, “the ‘causes’ of the Sicilian expedition...are ‘Fortune’, attending against all calculation the enterprises of Athens; ‘Covetousness’ impersonated in Cleon; Elpis, mad, delusive confidence and ambition, incarnate in the same individual”.<sup>13</sup>

It is obvious why, to a man like Thucydides, tragic themes would provide ideal models for the kind of history he sought to write. Thucydides saw the value of his history as lying in the universal truths about the human condition he aimed to prove:

ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει. κτήμᾳ τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.<sup>14</sup>

For an ‘abundant resource’ of axiom and truth about the human condition, where better to turn than poetry, in particular Tragedy? Aristotle remarks that Tragedy deals more with universal truths than history:

---

<sup>10</sup> Macleod (1983): 145; 157. This conclusion, though with revision in favour of greater tragic influence than Macleod allowed for, has been accepted by Hornblower (1987): 110-135.

<sup>11</sup> Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 18; 28.

<sup>12</sup> Cornford (1907): 123.

<sup>13</sup> Cornford (1907): 172.

<sup>14</sup> Thuc. 1.22.4.

διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποιήσεις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεις  
μᾶλλον τὰ καθ' ὅλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.<sup>15</sup>

Thucydides, however, was no Aeschylus, no matter how much he might have been inspired by him, nor was he writing a drama. Tragic ideas about human nature and its interaction with other aspects of the human condition were tools by which Thucydides sought to make sense of the political and social changes he witnessed in the course of his life. Moreover, Thucydides moved away from the religious and fantastic nature of the tragic ideals he had absorbed, focusing instead on the *human* nature of hitherto divine attributes, such as *ἐλπίς* and *φθόνος*, both of which are definitely 'lower-case' in Thucydides.<sup>16</sup> Whilst the tragic *schema* of self-destruction through pride and over-ambition is found in Thucydides, it is not applied to an individual (at least not in the first instance; figures like Cleon are secondary to the focus on the city of Athens), but to a collective (viz. the Athenian people). Nor should the reader think, when I refer to Thucydidean 'tragic' history, that I mean the kind of Tragic History supposedly written during the Hellenistic Era, characterised by overblown and emotional passages.<sup>17</sup> Neither Thucydides nor Dio were quite so crass. Thucydides' tragic thinking was the product of a variety of tragic and Tragic influences and affinities, as we mentioned above, including Herodotus and Homer as well as the tragedians.<sup>18</sup> Thucydides was influenced by the way that this variety of texts

---

<sup>15</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 9. 1451b. 5-10. For discussion of this passage, see de Ste Croix (1975): 45-58 (who argues that Thucydides bucks Aristotle's trend due to his focus on constant themes like *φύσις*); Walbank (1972): 34-40; Dovamur (1978): 3-9; Thomas Powell (1987): 343-357.

<sup>16</sup> Cornford (1907): 221-243, part. 242-3. Clark (2007): 20-1 discusses the problem of separating out the divine from the secular in ancient concepts, saying that 'lower' and 'upper' case letters do not do justice to the broad range of possible interpretations of these concepts in antiquity. This case could be made for Dio and Thucydides up to a point, since they both display some belief in interaction between gods and men (omens and the like), but as historians both deliberately and self-consciously secularise their use of these terms.

<sup>17</sup> The existence of a School of Tragic History during the Hellenistic Era goes back to the work of Schwartz in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (see Walbank (1960): 216 for a full bibliography of the early scholarship). The idea has soundly been rejected by Walbank (in two articles, one from 1955, the other 1960) and, despite unconvincing efforts to salvage the term by Brink (1960): 14-19, modern scholarship prefers to think in terms of 'tragic affinity' and 'tragic resonance' at most; Pelling (1999): 337-8; Mossman (1995): 212.

<sup>18</sup> Hornblower (1987): 110-119.

discussed the interaction of *φύσις* with other aspects of the human condition (e.g. fate and necessity). Thucydides then rearranged these ideas, putting greater emphasis on the human element, such as his focus on *ἐλπίς*. Dio, when he absorbed and redeployed Thucydides' ideas in his history (much the same intention of finding 'universal truths' about the human condition to apply to his history that led Thucydides to Tragedy led Dio to Thucydides) was, inevitably, influenced by the way that *φύσις* interacts with these other themes in Thucydidean thought. As we suggested above, though one cannot exclude the possibility that other writers influenced Dio's choice of these themes (or, indeed, his reliance on Thucydides for them), or that Tragedy itself did not influence Dio directly – he certainly quotes a fair number of tragedies in his history – tragic influence on Dio is mostly second-hand, filtered primarily through Thucydidean thought and logic.<sup>19</sup> For example, Dio's attitude to the role of *τύχη* in history (discussed below) is utterly secular, the only mention of the goddess Fortuna being either to her cult in Rome, or to Dio's personal observation of her worship.<sup>20</sup> This study is therefore limited to Dio's adoption of Thucydides' way of talking about human nature and its interaction with other historical phenomena which are both ultimately derived from 'tragic' forms. I want to show that the linguistic influence and intertexts that Dio takes from Thucydides (particularly in the *φύσις* borrowings) can be related to Thucydides' 'tragic' perception of the role of human nature and its interaction with other factors, and his explanation of the self-destruction of the Athenian people through over-ambition. We shall see that they help him to elaborate on the idea that the downfall of the Republic was the result of human ambition.

---

<sup>19</sup> There has been an attempt by Piatowski (1975): 263-269 to prove that Dio was inspired by the 'Tragic History' school, but this idea has failed to meet with widespread conviction (though see Lintott (1997): 2501-2502, who examines the purple nature of Dio's discussion of the proscriptions and detects strongly rhetorical influence). Freyburger-Galland (2007): 269-287 provides a cursory gloss on passages from tragic writers that Dio cites.

<sup>20</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 184-5. She claims also that for Dio history is "ein autonomer Prozeß, der nicht von höheren Gesetzen bestimmt wird". Cf. Kuhn-Chen (2002): 210-11, who over-exaggerates the role of the divine in Dio's history.

## Part One: Thucydides, democracy and the fall of the Republic

In the previous chapter, we examined the ways that Dio combines Roman theories of moral decline in the late Republic with Thucydidean views of human nature. However, most of our discussion was focused on the Roman elements of this *synkrisis*; in this chapter we shall analyse the Thucydidean elements in these passages.

Starting with 44.2.3 (cited in the Introduction), Dio claims that the growth of the Republic encouraged *ὑβρις* to arise from *εὐπραγία* and *φθόνος* from *φιλοτιμία*. We see here the *φύσις* terms Dio borrows from Thucydides, with which we are by now familiar, engaging with the other themes derived from Thucydidean thought. The role of *εὐπραγία* in Dio's 'moral' viewpoint of the fall of the Republic has been examined, but it has an arguably Thucydidean role, similar for instance to the Corinthian criticism of Corcyraean *ὑβρις* and *ἐξουσία*.<sup>21</sup> In Diodotus' speech to the Athenians, where Thucydides' 'tragic' conception is most explicitly elaborated, *ὑβρις* and *ἐξουσία* play an important role:

ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὑβρεῖ τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους.<sup>22</sup>

In 44.2 Dio's analysis of the failure of the Republic contains direct borrowings from Thucydides' claims about political factions in his analysis of civil war and *στάσις* at 3.82. Thucydides states that those factions assumed "fair-sounding names" (*μετ' ὀνομάτων εὐπρεποῦς*), with the democrats propounding the virtues of political equality for the masses (*πλήθους ἰσονομία πολιτικῆ*) and the oligarchs, aristocratic moderation.<sup>23</sup> Dio's rejection of democracy as a practical form of government starts off:

---

<sup>21</sup> Thuc. 1.28.5.

<sup>22</sup> Thuc. 3.45.4.

<sup>23</sup> Thuc. 3.82.8.

δημοκρατία γὰρ ὄνομα μὲν εὐσχημον ἔχει καὶ τινα καὶ ἰσομοιρίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῆς ἰσονομίας φέρειν δοκεῖ.<sup>24</sup>

*Ἴσονομία* (or *ἰσονομίη*), which started to be used as a political ideal in Solonian Athens and increasingly became an ideal associated strongly with democracy, was something of a commonplace in Fifth Century thought, though Thucydides is here the main influence for Dio.<sup>25</sup> Likewise, Thucydides' complaint in the same sentence that these values were nothing more than lip-service to ideals by men whose real aim was the "prize" (*ἀθλον*) of power is picked up by Dio in his account of Pompey and Caesar's motives during the civil war.<sup>26</sup> The intertext allows Dio to emphasise his rejection of democratic forms of government. Thucydides is talking about the effects of 'democratic' rhetoric at a time when law, order and decency have broken down under the stress of war; by recasting Thucydides' statements as a general assertion about democratic government, Dio is able to turn Thucydides' portrait of the cynical, violent and selfish behaviour of politicians into a general symptom of democratic government, particularly once it reaches the kind of power and wealth that Rome enjoyed. Dio's claim that this is inevitable (*πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνό γε ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονῆσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ σωφρονοῦσαν ὁμοιοῆσαι*) is perhaps a link to his inheritance from Thucydides, with all the retexturing of tragic themes that Thucydides introduced.<sup>27</sup>

The passages that we argued in the last chapter to be integral to Dio's understanding of the moral change and *φύσις* acceleration of the Roman Republic also have overtones from Thucydides' method. We noticed there that fragment 43 (from Book

---

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.1.

<sup>25</sup> See also Hdt. 3.80.6, however.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 41.10.1.

<sup>27</sup> A further reference to Thucydides 3.82.8 (with touches of Homer about it) exists in Dio's claim at 44.2.5 that if Brutus and Cassius had thought about the instability inherent in Democratic government they would not have killed Caesar and been the cause of countless evils to the Romans (*μυρίων αἴτιοι κακῶν*; comp. Thuc. *πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον*).

11) helps to link Dio's claims about Rome's imperial rise to his preoccupations concerning Republican government and that it contains clear reference to Thucydides' explanation of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. For example, Dio sweeps aside the *αἰτίαι* given for the war by claiming that they were the excuses of those *ἐν ἔργῳ πλεονεκτεῖν βουλόμενοι*; later he claims that the Carthaginians and Romans go to war because of the *ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἀεὶ πλείονος* frequently found in human nature (*τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων*).<sup>28</sup> Obviously, the language here is highly Thucydidean, particularly the division between *αἰτίαι* and *ἔργα* (which we shall go on to discuss later), but also the use of the neuter *τὸ*. More important for us, however, is the emphasis on human *ἔρως* in the form of *πλεονεξία* and *ἐπιθυμία*. Other themes first explored in Thucydides are also present in this early passage, so that Dio makes it clear that the first Punic War was destined to happen, partly because both sides feared the other's power and also because *χαλεπώτατον ἀδύνατόν τε ἦν δύο δήμους ἐν τε ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει φρονήματί τε ὄντας...ἀλλήλων δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι ἐθελήσαι*.<sup>29</sup> The passage ends with a final reference to Thucydides 1.23.6 that highlights the role of *τύχη* and *ἀνάγκη* in the outbreak of the war:

*τοιούτων κατὰ τύχην συμπεσόν τὰς τε σπονδὰς σφῶν διέλυσε καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς συνέρρηξεν.*<sup>30</sup>

Dio uses *συρράσσω* when borrowing the same passage from Thucydides in his account of the civil war between Octavian and Antony, though the use of the verb here is more appropriate than in Book 45.<sup>31</sup> This perhaps provides us with a link between the *prima causa* in the fall of the Republic and its final failure.

---

<sup>28</sup> Cass. Dio frg 43.1-2.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 43.3.

<sup>30</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 43.3.

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 45.11.2. Pelling (2010): 109-110.

Dio continues to explore these and other themes borrowed from Thucydides' ideas about human nature in his account of the early years of the war. For example, he states:

τὸ μὲν σωφρονοῦν καὶ κτᾶται τὰς νίκας καὶ γενομένας φυλάσσει, τὸ δ' ἀσελγαῖνον οὔτε περιγίγνεται τινος, κἂν ἄρα εὐτυχῆσῃ ποτὲ ἐν τινι, ῥᾶστα αὐτὸ ἀπόλλυσι· κἂν μὲν διασώσῃ τι, χεῖρον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ παρὰ λόγον εὐπραγῆσαι γενόμενον, οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκείνου τι δύναιται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ προσδιαφθείρεται. καὶ γὰρ πως πᾶν τὸ παρὰ λόγον θρασυνοόμενον καὶ δεδιέναι ἀλόγως πέφυκεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τὴν τε γνώμην τῇ προνοίᾳ βεβαίαν καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα πιστὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐχεγγύου αὐτῆς ἔχων, οὔτε καταπτῆσσειν τινὰ οὔθ' ὑπερφρονεῖν ἐᾷ· ἢ δ' ἀλόγιστος ἐμπληξία πολλοὺς ἐν τε ταῖς εὐπραγίαις ἐξάιρει κἂν ταῖς συμφοραῖς ταπεινοῖ, οἷα μηδὲν ἔρμα ἔχουσα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῷ συμπίπτοντι ἐξομοιουμένη.<sup>32</sup>

This passage stands as an examination of *ὑβρις*, in the guise of *ἀσελγεία* (notice the Thucydideanising abstract neuter form). *Ἵβρις* is linked with *ἐλπίς*, as Cornford means it,<sup>33</sup> in the form of *ἀλόγιστος ἐμπληξία* (contrasted with 'trustworthy hope' - *ἐλπίς πίστη*) and there is perhaps a touch of the Thucydidean about the use of *συμπίπτω* to describe the chance nature of the suffering that insolence causes.<sup>34</sup> *Ἐλπίς* is picked up again at 43.16, where Dio claims that the Carthaginians and the Romans at Mylae hoped (*ἐλπίζοντες*) that the action would decide the whole war, with Sicily as their prize (*ἄθλον*). We are perhaps reminded of the links between this passage and Dio's claims in Book 44, so that we again notice *εὐπραγία* and its effect in making men overconfident and insolent and that the late Republic lacked *σωφροσύνη* and therefore the ability to function politically. It would be wrong to assume that Dio would have expected his reader to remember such parallels across so many books, but we should look on this passage and the links it shows as evidence of the train of Dio's thoughts. When he was thinking of the effects of *ὑβρις* and *εὐπραγία*, *φθόνος* and *φιλοτιμία* on the Republic, we might assume he was thinking along the 'tragic' lines derived from Thucydides he seems to elaborate upon

---

<sup>32</sup> Frg. 43.14-15.

<sup>33</sup> Cornford (1907): 172 (see above, n. 13).

<sup>34</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.68.3; 7.70.4.

here. Other features (as I shall show shortly) can be linked to these ideas, such as Dio's claims about *λογισμός*.

Shanske has argued that the concept *τὸ δεινόν* is a key part of Thucydides' conception of history. *Δεινός* is a common Homeric word and refers to someone or something that is dreadful, awful or fearful, with a similar range of meanings as the English word 'terrible'.<sup>35</sup> Shanske argues that *τὸ δεινόν* in Thucydides refers to something that transgresses the limits of *νόμος* and is portrayed by Thucydides as the fruit of *ἔρως* (and therefore is to be feared). By extension, *τὸ δεινόν* has a strongly agonistic sense to it in Thucydidean thought. Shanske states that its "cyclical and expanding movement traces the path of...the competition within Greek, particularly Athenian, civic life. Returning to the Archaeology, it traces the advent of civilisation itself and now, through *stasis* and Plague, it traces its dissolution".<sup>36</sup> He goes on to argue that whilst *τὸ δεινόν* refers to the exaggeration of the competitive spirit in Athenian life, *ἐπιείκεια* is the boundary within which competitiveness can be/is healthy and productive. Thucydides believes that the size and prosperity of the Athenian empire render *ἐπιείκεια* impossible and cause the agonistic nature of Athenian politics to become transgressive.<sup>37</sup> We see something similar in Dio's account of the changes that take place in Roman politics after 218 B.C. Dio, as has been discussed, attributes to the Romans unparalleled levels of *ἐπιείκεια* at this point in their history. Unlike other peoples, they lack the need for fear to keep them within the bounds of *ἐπιείκεια*. Dio's understanding of *ἐπιείκεια* has here something of the healthy agonism of Thucydidean thought; the Romans display *τὸ θράσος* to their enemies, but *ἐπιείκεια* to one another (and with *ἐπιείκεια* comes *εὐταξία*).<sup>38</sup> Likewise, they do not allow their

---

<sup>35</sup> In the sense that Czar Ivan IV Vasilyevich was described as 'The Terrible' – originally meaning that he was a mighty and impressive ruler, but now (at least in the popular conscious) referring also to the sense of fear he inspired and even the notion that he was a bad king.

<sup>36</sup> Shanske (2007): 69-110.

<sup>37</sup> Shanske (2007): 110-112.

<sup>38</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 52.1.

*εὐπραγία* to become *ὑβρις*, nor their *ἐπιείκεια* to become *δειλία*. But Dio claims that there was such a thing as Roman exceptionalism, deliberately going beyond Thucydides' claims about Athenian agonism. Dio's Romans have something Thucydides' Athenians lack – *sang-froid* and discipline, both of which play to Roman stereotypes of themselves in relationship to Greeks – and thus are able to override the verdicts about *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον* Thucydides makes until they start to become an imperial power proper after 218 B.C. Framing these claims about the uniqueness of Roman virtue within Thucydides' generalisations about humanity allows Dio to make this assertion all the more striking. It also shows the ways that Dio actively and critically merged the lessons he took from Thucydides with those from other sources, casting doubt on the idea that Dio's Thucydideanising was unthinking or “pathological”.

*Τὸ δεινόν* is also the focus of several passages between Dio's account of 218 and 187 B.C., which seem to confirm this idea. Shortly after Dio describes the Roman situation in 218, he records a debate between Lentulus, Fabius and an unknown senator over whether Rome should declare war on Carthage or not. Lentulus' 'hawkish' pro-war policy and Fabius' 'dovish' concern for peace are extremely interesting for the light they shed on Dio's thinking about the relationship between *τὸ δεινόν* and *ἐπιείκεια*. Lentulus stands in opposition to Dio's own claims in asking the senate the rhetorical question, *ἐξαρκεῖν ὑμῖν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τὴν τε ἐπιείκειαν καὶ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν νομίζετε;*<sup>39</sup> He counsels a policy of total war against the Carthaginians, claiming that *ὁ μὲν πόλεμος καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖά τισι σώζει καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια προσκτᾶται, ἡ δὲ εἰρήνη οὐχ ὅπως τὰ πορισθέντα δι' ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτὴν προσαπόλλυσιν.*<sup>40</sup> This sentiment is rather similar to Dio's claims that both the Romans and Carthaginians were hopeful of acquiring each other's possessions at the beginning of the first Punic War, which Dio linked then to *πλεονεξία*. If Boissevain's

---

<sup>39</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.2.

<sup>40</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.3.

placing of the fragments is correct, somewhere close to the beginning of Lentulus' speech is a claim important in this Thucydidean conception of Republican history:

ὅτι πέφυκε πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον δεσπόζειν τε ἐπιθυμῆν τῶν ὑπείκόντων καὶ τῇ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ῥοπήν κατὰ τῶν ἐθελοδουλόντων χρῆσθαι.<sup>41</sup>

Fabius is last to speak in the discussion. In Dio's narrative of the second Punic War, he plays a vital role in keeping the Romans from becoming over-bold:

καὶ οἱ ὑπατοὶ δὲ οὐδὲν θρασέως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαβίου ὑποθήκην ἔπραξαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμείνωνι τὸ μὴ τι καταπρῶξαι τοῦ καὶ σφαλῆναι τιθέμενοι κατὰ χώραν πάντα τὸν τῆς ἡγεμονίας χρόνον ἔμειναν.<sup>42</sup>

As we saw in the last chapter, Dio uses Thucydidean assumptions about stability and self-control for his picture of the Romans down to 218, showing how they had no need of prosperity or *metus hostilis* to keep them in check.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, in his discussion of Fabius's part in the war, Dio uses Thucydidean language to make this louder. In his speech of 218, which mostly focuses on the potential dangers of war with Carthage to the moral well-being of the Roman people, he says:

αἰσχρὸν ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἥτοι τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὴ ὀρθῶς δόξαι τι πεποιηκέναι ἢ αὔθις μὴ δεόντως μετεγνωκέναι· τὸ τε γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς προπετῶς ἢ μὴ χρῆν πρᾶττειν δεινὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀρέσαντα ἅπαξ ἐμπλήκτως λύειν δεινότερον.<sup>44</sup>

The argument here is about the dangers of going to war without due preparation, though it is relevant that τὸ δεινόν plays an important role in this passage. For us the fact that τὸ δεινόν is used about the dangers of fighting a war on a whim is important, given what we have said about 'over-ambitiousness' in Dio. Fabius warns that carelessness is

---

<sup>41</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.1.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 57.21.

<sup>43</sup> See above, pp.54-5.

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.3a.

terrible, but that frantic (*ἐμπλήκτως*) behaviour is even worse, once again associating τὸ δεινόν with over-reaching behaviour. Dio has Fabius explore the risks this poses to the Romans throughout the rest of the speech. Success from bad-planning leads to over-confidence, since it relies on luck (*εὐτυχία*) rather than due consideration (*καλῶς βούλευσις*).<sup>45</sup> The senate should see it as their duty not to advise the people out of ὀργή, but in accordance with the best interests of the state.<sup>46</sup> Adversity and disaster help to keep people from becoming arrogant (*ὑβρις*), unlike successfulness (*εὖ τελείως*).<sup>47</sup> This is further developed:

*δοκεῖ γάρ πως ἢ κακοπραγία μέρος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔχειν ὠφελίας, ὅτι μήτε ἐκφρονεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μήτε ἐξυβρίξειν ἐᾷ. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει πρὸς πάντα τὰ ἀμείνονα τετράφθαι, καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας μέτρον μὴ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀλλὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ποιεῖσθαι.*<sup>48</sup>

The sentiment echoes Thucydides' claim about the Spartan seizure of Amphipolis, where he claims that τὸ δὲ πλεόν βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοία ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὁ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι.<sup>49</sup> The rest of Fabius' speech deals with the same issues: αἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐπραγίαι σφάλλουσιν ἔστιν ὅτε τοὺς ἀπερισκέπτως τι δι' αὐτὰς ἐλπίσαντας ὡς καὶ αὐθις κρατήσοντας.<sup>50</sup> Fabius' advice is heeded and the Romans try to make an initial compromise with the Carthaginians, which (need I say) fails.

Fabius is one of several generals in the war, who help to keep the Romans from over-exerting themselves, particularly when the desire for revenge against Hannibal is running high. Dio also points towards Paulus, Marcellus and Scipio Africanus as men who

---

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.4.

<sup>46</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.5.

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.6.

<sup>48</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.6.

<sup>49</sup> Thuc. 4.108.4.

<sup>50</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 55.7.

ensured Roman self-control during this trying period (and thus ensured victory). Paulus, for example, is explicitly said to possess *ἐπιείκεια*, which Dio contrasts with the *θράσος* of his colleague, Terentius.<sup>51</sup> Rome, then, in Dio's reckoning, was lucky that such a generation of men existed at such a time. However, after the war ends, as Dio's claims about Vulso's triumph inform us, the vigour and self-control of the Hannibalic War generation declines and those dangers which were warned about by men like Fabius begin to creep into politics. Dio, as we have seen in Chapter Two, talks of *εὐπραγία* having a destructive effect on *ἐπιείκεια* after 187 B.C.<sup>52</sup> The way that Dio claims this ties in with the Thucydidean distinction between *ἐπιείκεια* and *τὸ δεινόν* that Shanske has described, with Dio claiming that *τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξάμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄστυ ἐπέπεσε*.<sup>53</sup> The Thucydidean nature of the language here is obvious, not least the use of the verb *ἐμπίπτω*.<sup>54</sup> *Τὸ δεινόν* refers to *ἀσωτία*, which, with its emphasis on conspicuous consumption, suggests that *εὐπραγία* is tied in with *ὑβρις* and *πλεονεξία* by implication.<sup>55</sup> If what we have said above is true, then we might suspect that *τὸ δεινὸν τοῦτ' ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξάμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἄστυ ἐπέπεσε* has a double meaning; the Roman one where the horror unleashed is excessive wealth, and the Greek, where this wealth generates the excessive competition predicted by Thucydides. These meanings are of course far from mutually exclusive (as indeed we saw in Chapter Two) and the idea, that *ἀσωτία* creates the problem of reckless ambition in Roman life and, thus, shatters the fragile existence of the *ἐπιείκεια* of the late third-century B.C., shows how cleverly Dio was able to merge his use of Thucydides with that of his other influences. This is, perhaps, an example of the kind of layering spoken of by Wallace-Hadrill which we cited in the section introduction, where the

---

<sup>51</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 57.23-4.

<sup>52</sup> See above pp. 50-53.

<sup>53</sup> Cass. Dio frg 64.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.53.4; 2.61.2; 2.91.4; 7.80.3

<sup>55</sup> *Ὑβρις* had been linked to greed and wealth in Greek thought as far back as Hesiod. See Morris (2004): 53-4.

same idea can leave itself open to multiple interpretations depending upon the viewpoint and cultural background of the reader, though these interpretations all point in the same direction.

A re-analysis of the passages we discussed in the last section has shown us that as well as the conclusions we drew there, we can see Dio making these passages pivotal moments in a Thucydidean view of the inevitable rise and fall of the Roman state, where the ambitions of the Roman people are over-extended by a combination of external and internal factors, growing out of the initial desire for power, so that the end result is *στάσις*, civil war, proscription and *δυναστεία*, all of which Dio categorises as necessary features of democratic government. In the remainder of our discussion we shall turn our attention to how Thucydides' view of the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War has shaped the rest of Dio's narrative.

## **Part Two: Public *ἔλπις* and Private *ἔρως* in the late Republic**

One feature of the passages that have formed the basis of the discussion of this chapter so far is that they predominantly refer to the attitudes and ambitions of the Roman *people*. Yet, Dio's history of the late Republic is a history of individuals, who fight and argue, plot and intrigue, or manipulate and deceive. It is impossible to tell, given the fragmentary nature of his history before Book 36, quite how far individuals play an important role in Dio's history before the rise of men like Caesar or Pompey, although what we do have suggests that Dio gave prominence to 'big men' in all periods of Republican history.<sup>56</sup> Nonetheless, there is a switch in his history from what we might term popular, or public, *ἔλπις*, where it is the ambition and desire of the Roman people for conquest that leads to war, say, with Carthage, or to empire in the East, to the private and

---

<sup>56</sup> See Simons (2009): 187-299 for a discussion of individuals in Dio's mid-Republican narrative.

personal *ἔρως*, where the *cupido dominandi* and *πλεονεξία* of individual members of the political elite brings about civil war, *στάσις* and the ruin of the Republican state.

This switch is Thucydidean. At the beginning of his account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides works at the ‘inter-state’ level, perhaps, as Westlake argues, focusing on “the collective behaviour of whole communities under the stress of war”.<sup>57</sup> Certainly, in his explanation of the causes of the war, it is to the Spartans, and not to an individual Spartan, that Thucydides attributes the motive of fear (as Dio, when he borrows this passage from Thucydides, draws a division between the motives of Rome and Carthage). Likewise, it is grudges between Athens and Corinth, or Epidamnus and Corcyra, not between individuals that provoke the war. However, after the death of Pericles, Thucydides begins to allow for the motives of individual politicians when explaining the course of events in the war, so that, for example, the Athenian successes at Pylos and Sphacteria were the result of Cleon’s politicking against Nicias (and the attitudes of unnamed Athenian big-wigs, who hoped to see the back of either Cleon or the Spartans).<sup>58</sup> Obviously, Pericles himself plays an important role in the early years of the war, keeping the Athenians on the straight and narrow, but he does this by ensuring ‘group-cohesion’ and advancing the interests of the people as a whole, rather than his own.<sup>59</sup> After his death, this changes, and we can see the pattern that is also detectable in Dio, with public *ἐλπίς* becoming private *ἔρως*:

οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τὸναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἐς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο.<sup>60</sup>

Whereas Pericles was becoming more a *primus inter pares* than a democratic figure in Athenian political life, his successors play to the desires of the mob and feud with one

---

<sup>57</sup> Westlake (1968): 319.

<sup>58</sup> Thuc. 4.27.3-28.5.

<sup>59</sup> Thuc. 2.65.4. ὦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστον ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι.

<sup>60</sup> Thuc. 2.65.7.

another because *δρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτος ἕκαστος γίνεσθαι*.<sup>61</sup> In his digression on the miseries of *στάσις*, Thucydides once again blames *πλεονεξία* and *φιλοτιμία*:

*πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον.*<sup>62</sup>

Thucydides' claims, borrowed by Dio in his analysis of the failings of democracy in Book 44, that greed and ambition manifested themselves as factional lip-service to the ideologies of democracy and aristocracy is concordant with his claims about the manipulation of the *δῆμος* by the politicians of Athens after the death of Pericles. How Thucydides conceives of public *ἐλπίς* becoming private *ἔρως* is best demonstrated in the Sicilian Expedition. The war in Sicily is the product of a collective desire by the Athenians to conquer the island.<sup>63</sup> However, despite attempts by Nicias to disabuse the Athenians of their ambition, they are ultimately inspired to carry out their plan by Alcibiades, whose motives for encouraging them are personal and private:

*ἐνήγε δὲ προθυμώτατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὧν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικά καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν.*<sup>64</sup>

Thucydides makes it clear that this behaviour of Alcibiades *καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα*.<sup>65</sup> In other words, private *ἔρως* is able to manipulate popular volition, twisting it to its own advantage, exaggerating it hybridically beyond what is any longer in the public interest (and, at times, beyond even private interest itself). Dio explores the same idea in his account of the Republic. Pompey and Gabinius, for example,

---

<sup>61</sup> Thuc. 2.65.10.

<sup>62</sup> Thuc. 3.82.8.

<sup>63</sup> Thuc. 6.1.1; 8.4.

<sup>64</sup> Thuc. 6.15.2.

<sup>65</sup> Thuc. 6.15.3.

seek to manipulate popular volition and popular desperation when proposing the *lex Gabinia* (Pompey because of his *φιλοτιμία* and Gabinius because he sought to do a favour to Pompey; Dio states that he was not moved by any love of the public good).<sup>66</sup> Tiberius Gracchus, inspired by *φιλοτιμία, πρωτεύσαι πάντως επιθύμησας*, allies himself with the mob, seeing that they are more powerful than the senate, something we shall see Caesar do in Chapter Eight. Caesar's *φιλοτιμία ἴδια* inspires his men (after he 'justifies' his actions with a speech) at Vesontio, so that they themselves are *φιλοτιμούμενοι*.<sup>67</sup> Caesar's campaigns in Britain produce the kind of feeling among the people which we are discussing here:

*τήν τε μέλλουσαν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐλπίδα ὡς καὶ παροῦσαν ἔργῳ ἐλάμβανον, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα καταπράξειν προσεδέχοντο, ὡς καὶ ἔχοντες ἤδη ἠγάλλοντο.*<sup>68</sup>

There is a strong sense to these examples of a characteristic that is individual - *φιλοτιμία* – becoming collective, perhaps because it infects the sense of competition and reward inherent in ancient culture. Certainly, this is seen in Thucydides, where Nicias's attempt to discourage the Athenians from sailing to Sicily backfires as his over-ambitious plan excites the imagination of the crowd.<sup>69</sup>

How Dio divines these motives is also derived from Thucydides. Scholars have long noticed that Dio exploits Thucydides' famous distinction between professed motives and explanations and true(r), underlying ones. As Rich points out, "it is often in Thucydides' terms that he formulates his perceptions of the conflict between appearance and reality and the unchanging character of human nature".<sup>70</sup> Dio's motives for this are, as Crane notes, because of the preference among ancient writers for the abstract over the

<sup>66</sup> Cass. Dio 36.23.3-5; esp. 36.23.4.

<sup>67</sup> See p. 223.

<sup>68</sup> Cass. Dio 39.53.2.

<sup>69</sup> Thuc. 6.24.1-3.

<sup>70</sup> Rich (1990): 11.

specific (consider the emphasis on the ultra-logical world of geometry in Greek mathematics).<sup>71</sup> Thucydides promised to provide ‘abstract’ truths with his claim that his history would be a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί* and presented later historians with a kind of historical calculator – historical data were the numbers, and human behaviour, dependent upon the variables of condition, experience, time and society, was the algorithm. As Crane says, “Thucydides felt that he could work with partial or conflicting sources precisely because a certain number of major trends – the constant pull of human ambition, the tendency of the strong to dominate the weak, for example – shape human behaviour, and the historian can turn to these constants in order to unmask hidden motives, fill in gaps, and push beyond the surface of the evidence”.<sup>72</sup> Thucydides, in other words, provided historians like Dio with an extra layer of analysis; by understanding that there were certain features of human life that were universal – a kind of ancient version of the selfish gene theory – the historian could juxtapose people’s pretences about their actions with these and determine whether those pretences were truthful, or were a sham. This was, understandably, an appealing idea to historians, not only in terms of its heuristic promise, but also because, like my analogy to Karl Marx in the section introduction, it raised the status of their histories beyond the Aristotelean criticism that history prefers the particular to the universal – Thucydides enabled the historian to show the universal behind the particular.<sup>73</sup>

We explored one of these moments in Chapter Two when we analysed Dio’s Thucydideanisms in his account of the first Punic War, an allusion to his model which he

---

<sup>71</sup> Crane (1998): 43. Cf. Heath (1921): vol. 1, 24-5 for the primacy of geometry in Greek mathematics. Cuomo (2001): 4-5 notes that “whereas the mathematics we find earlier in Egypt or Mesopotamia consisted of specific exercises with verification of the result but no justification of the method employed, Greek mathematics introduced the quest for general propositions which could be proved in such a way as to be objectively persuasive. In other words...the Greeks found the general formula for the volume of any cylinder and proved why that formula was right.” We might also remember Socrates’ obsession in the *Meno* with the idea that one can give an abstract definition of morality in the way one can describe a circle or a square.

<sup>72</sup> Crane (1998): 296.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Pelling’s (2010): 115 similar claims about the popularity of Thucydidean intertextuality among later historians: he speaks of “the value of intertextuality in general, and Thucydidean intertextuality in particular, for historical interpretation: for pointing to patterns that recur and indicating the factors that may explain why they have recurred...and for the recurrent suggestion that perhaps, after all, the Roman experience is not so very different as all that.”

shares with Florus and, to a lesser extent, with Polybius. Perhaps the most famous example, however, of Dio's division of historical material into *ἔργον* and *λόγος* is the distinction Dio draws between *Sein und Schein* in the reign of Augustus. Dio makes no bones that Augustus was a monarch; he ruled through a combination of military power, personality, deception and, as far as Dio was concerned, divine will. Yet, Dio was also aware that Augustus was careful to make his constitutional position as Republican as possible, refusing to become dictator or king and working within traditional institutions as much as possible. The duplicity of Augustus' constitutional niceties and political realities fills Dio's narrative of the period, as has been shown by a variety of scholars, and is perhaps at its fullest expression when Dio is discussing conceptually the ideal constitution of the Agrippa-Maecenas debate.<sup>74</sup>

Dio does not just borrow Thucydides' method of analysis, however; he provides his own theory on how it should operate. He says:

*ἐς τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τότε τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πράγματα προήχθη, λέξω δὲ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ παιδευσίς ἐν τούτῳ τὰ μάλιστα εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅταν τις τὰ ἔργα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ὑπολέγων τὴν τε ἐκείνων φύσιν ἐκ τούτων ἐλέγχει καὶ τούτους ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων ὁμολογίας τεκμηριοῖ.<sup>75</sup>*

Into such a state had Roman affairs come; I shall relate them individually as they happened. Indeed, it strikes me as most instructive in this kind of thing when one, taking the things done as the basis of the rationale behind them, proves the nature of those deeds from these motives and proves the motives from their agreement with the things done.

In my translation of the passage, the reader will notice that I have disagreed with more traditional translations in rendering *λογίσμοι* as 'motives', or 'rationale'. Usually translators take it to refer to Dio's own suppositions, rather than the plans of the 'actors' in Dio's history. Millar, for example, translates the passage as "I consider it to be the chief characteristic of a trained mind to be able to apply rational principles to historical facts, thereby demonstrating the true nature of the facts and also, by co-ordinating the facts,

<sup>74</sup> Millar (1964): 97; Tränkle (1969): 108-130; Manuwald (1979): 66ff; Pelling (1983): 221-2.

<sup>75</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.5-35.1.

showing the truth of the principles”, citing Sempronius Asellio as an example of a similar train of thought elsewhere.<sup>76</sup> However, Sempronius Asellio’s claims, very similar to Dio’s, do not bear out Millar’s translation and stand rather closer to my own:

“nobis non modo satis esse video, quod factum esset, id pronuntiare, sed etiam quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent demonstrare”.<sup>77</sup>

He goes on to argue that “in bello gesta sint praedicare aut inter quid senatus decrevit aut quae lex rogatiove lata sit *neque quibus consiliis ea gesta sint iterare*: id fabulas pueris est narrare, non historias scribere”.<sup>78</sup>

Dio’s claim, then, is that it is possible to detect people’s motives from the outcomes of their actions and that, in so doing, we can prove something about their motives and the actions that derive from them, a thought he shares with not only Sempronius Asellio, but also, perhaps, Aristotle and Thucydides himself.<sup>79</sup> The idea informs Dio’s reading of the whole of Roman history, so that he imputes motives to Caesar, Cicero and Augustus, for example, at the beginning of their careers based upon their later actions. So far from Lintott’s assertion that “[the passage] shows that the emphasis in historiography had shifted from detailed narrative to generalised reflection and interpretation, since here... Dio is justifying the narrative, not the explanation of the underlying causes which he has already given”, Dio’s methodology is part of a long-standing historiographical tradition that he employs consistently throughout his narrative

---

<sup>76</sup> Millar (1964): 45. Cary translates this passage as “for it seems to me particularly instructive, when one takes facts as the basis of his reasoning, investigates the nature of the former by the latter, and thus proves his reasoning true by its correspondence with the facts”. Manuwald (1979): 51 renders it “In diesen Zustand war Rom damals gelangt, ich werde aber auch die einzelnen Ereignisse nennen. Denn darin scheint mir insbesondere Bildung zu liegen, wenn man, indem man die Fakten als Grundlage für Erwägungen nimmt, das Wesen der Fakten durch Erwägungen dartut und die Erwägungen durch ihre Übereinstimmung mit den Fakten als richtig erweist”.

<sup>77</sup> Aul. Gell. *NA*. 5.18.8.

<sup>78</sup> Aul. Gell. *NA*. 5.18.9.

<sup>79</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* γ. 3.15; 5.5; for Thucydides, see Cornford (1907): 67.

and which, in any event, is predicated on the importance of working out what are the ‘facts’ and using them as the corner-stone of one’s reasoning.<sup>80</sup>

In this section, we have seen, therefore, that Dio is able to show how popular volition for glory and empire was manipulated in the late Republic, based upon his borrowing of ideas from Thucydidean thought. This can be connected to the ‘tragic’ themes that exist in Thucydides, to which Dio was ultimately heir, since it shows the political elite causing a “hybristic” over-extension of the desires of the ordinary people for their own private profit and causing suffering to those self-same people in consequence. Dio is able to posit these private desires and ambitions because of his use of the Thucydidean theme of the distinction between appearance and reality, which he places at the centre of his historical method.

### Accepting one’s fate

*Τύχη* and *ανάγκη* operate in Dio’s history. It was inevitable that there was to be no harmony in the Republic and, thus, that the Republic was to fall (*πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνό γε ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονῆσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ σωφρονούσαν ὁμοιοῦσαι*). The same point is made in Book 47 that *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως δημοκρατία ἄκρατος, ἐς τοσοῦτον ἀρχῆς ὄγκον προχωρήσασα, σωφρονῆσαι δύναται*.<sup>81</sup> Dio’s depiction of Caesar and Pompey at Pharsalus has a strong sense of the inevitability of conflict – and of one man rule at the end of it:

*τὰ μέντοι ἔργα, δι’ ὧν ἠλπιζον πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐβούλοντο καταπράξειν, ἀμφοτέροι ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐποιοῦν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἦν αὐτῶν κατατυχεῖν τιμὴ μὴ οὐ τοῖς τε οἰκείοις πολεμοῦντι*

---

<sup>80</sup> Lintott (1997): 2499-500.

<sup>81</sup> Cass. Dio 47.39.5.

καὶ τοὺς ὀθνείους ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁμοφύλους ἄγοντι, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν χρήματα ἀδίκως συλῶντι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλτάτων ἀνόμως κτείνοντι.<sup>82</sup>

Dio also talks of the inevitability of monarchic rule explicitly on several occasions.<sup>83</sup>

*Λόγος*, according to Parry, was the intelligent perception of the reality (*τὰ ἔργα*) of one's situation; Thucydides' assigned credit and condemnation to historical figures depending upon how well they were able to do this.<sup>84</sup> So, for example, Nicias is praised for his moderating influence because he sees the impossibility of conquering an island the size of Sicily for Athens, whereas the Athenian people are criticised for conceiving of the plan based upon utter ignorance of the logistical realities. In Dio, *λόγος* perhaps has an added significance in that Dio talks of portents and omens from the gods that reveal to man the truth of his situation. That man, if he pays these divine warnings heed, can avert his danger, or make allowances for the inevitable is suggested by a comment Dio makes early on in his History.<sup>85</sup> Dio later on refers to these omens as *λόγια*, suggesting the link with *λόγος*.<sup>86</sup> Dio judges his historical figures depending on their understanding of the inevitability and reality of the rise of monarchy, or the character of monarchy. So, Brutus and Cassius are condemned for not understanding (*ἐξελογίσαντο*) the truth about democratic government and the superiority of monarchy, for example.<sup>87</sup> Likewise, Dio blames the senate for their own sufferings during the civil war and triumviral period because they should have realised the inevitability of monarchic rule.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Cass. Dio 41.54.2.

<sup>83</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.4: *μαχόμενοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὄτω δουλεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὅστις αὐτῶν δεσπόσει, τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως ἔφθειρον, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὴν τύχην διάφορον ἐκάτεροι δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο.* Cf. 47.39.2.

<sup>84</sup> Parry (1981): 86-8.

<sup>85</sup> Frg. 57.22.

<sup>86</sup> Cass. Dio 45.17.6.

<sup>87</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.4. Dio here is in some contrast to Thucydides, who is sceptical about the value of oracles (e.g. Thuc. 1.118.3). However, even here Thucydides does not reject oracles so much as the spin his contemporaries put on them (e.g. Thuc. 2.17.1-2; 2.54.1-3; 5.26.3-4). See Oost (1975): 186-196.

<sup>88</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1-5.

## Conclusion

Why, we might ask, Dio's reliance upon the Thucydidean themes we discussed in our introduction to this chapter? What role does it serve for Dio's history? It shows the inevitability of human ambition outgrowing itself in democratic government because of the manipulative nature of democratic politics, just as Thucydides himself showed for Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Popular *ἐλπίς* is manipulated by the private *ἔρως* of the political elite, like Caesar and Pompey, for the personal profit and gain of those politicians. The emphasis on *λόγος* and *ἔργον* allow Dio to 'confirm' this notion. Dio also provides us with a "resonance" to a familiar work on the failure of a democratic state to deal with its own ambition.<sup>89</sup> By linking the Roman theories of moral decline that we explored in the last chapter to this Thucydidean tale of *ὑβρις*, Dio shows how Rome's history after 218 B.C. falls into a well-worn pattern, observable in every nation – Greek, barbarian, and *even* Roman – of democratic failure in the face of power, wealth, empire and the thirst for ever more power that these things inevitably bring. We shall see in the next chapter how Dio's view of political collapse in the Republic relates to ancient theories of government.

---

<sup>89</sup> Pelling (2010): 107.

## Chapter Four: Cassius Dio and Political Philosophy

### Introduction

Chapter Two has shown us the influence of human nature on the Republican political system in Dio. It is, we have seen, a major part of Dio's thinking that *φύσις* is affected, if only in its intensity and manifestation, by the type of constitution in place. It is no surprise, therefore, that Dio spends a great deal of his time thinking about various political systems, principally *μοναρχία* and *δημοκρατία*. *Δυναστεία* is also mentioned as a political system by Dio, but its use is limited principally to the *junta*-like politics of the Second Triumvirate and lacks the developed discussion that Dio gives to *δημοκρατία*, by which he means the Republic, and *μοναρχία*, which he uses to describe both the Kingly era and the principate (Dio insists that the difference between the two is in nomenclature and procedure).<sup>1</sup> We have explored extensively Dio's thinking about *φύσις* within the context of the Republic and we should now think about Dio's understanding of the political systems that were clearly so important to his thinking about the influence of human nature in public life. The ancient world saw a great flowering of ideas about political philosophy, particularly under Plato and Aristotle, and it will be no wonder when we see that Dio has been influenced by these ideas, though, like Polybius, he was willing to add his own observations too.

---

<sup>1</sup> For the various political systems mentioned by Dio, see Ruiz (1982): 60-84; Fechner (1986): 19-135; Freyburger-Galland (1997): 113-153; Kuhn-Chen (2002): 182-201. Millar (1964): 74 for Dio on monarchy in the Principate and the Kingly Era.

## Δημοκρατία and Res Publica

For Cassius Dio, the Republic was a democracy in the style of Classical Athens. As Freyburger-Galland argues “s’il idéalise un peu la République romaine, elle appartient, pour un sénateur de l’époque sévérienne, à un passé aussi révolu que la démocratie athénienne”.<sup>2</sup> Dio has a clear difference in his mind between the *δημοκρατία* of the Republic and the *ὀλιγαρχία/δυναστεία* of the Second Triumvirate and displays his awareness of conventional theories of government when he examines the danger of *δημοκρατία* turning into *ὀχλοκρατία*.<sup>3</sup> The idea that Dio’s view of the Republic was shaped by Classical thinking has not convinced every reader, however. De Ste. Croix has argued that Dio, along with other writers of the Imperial Era, was responsible for “devaluing” the term *δημοκρατία* from its original meaning, conflating it with republican governments, however oligarchic.<sup>4</sup> Aside from the important recognition in the last twenty years of Republican Rome’s democratic elements by Millar, Yakobson, Morstein-Marx and even myself,<sup>5</sup> the assumption is incorrect for Dio, who does seem to be conflating Rome with a traditional democracy of the Classical era.<sup>6</sup> I suspect that if Dio had been accosted by an ancient de Ste. Croix and asked why he insists on conflating popular *δημοκρατία*

---

<sup>2</sup> Freyburger-Galland (1997): 122.

<sup>3</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 33-44, comparing Dio to Appian and Plutarch. Fechner (1986): 37 points out that Dio often talks abstractly about *δημοκρατία* without an article when discussing it philosophically.

<sup>4</sup> De Ste. Croix (1981): 323. This argument has been taken up by Reinhold (1988): 168; 172, who has argued that the term in Dio is “synonymous...with *libera res publica*, self-governing ‘republic’”, among others (Ruiz (1982): 79-84, Botteri & Raskolnikoff (1983): 93-4; Rich (1990): 13 n. 65 is more cautious in accepting de Ste. Croix’s argument and ponders the issue of the *δημος* in Dio).

<sup>5</sup> Millar (1998): *passim*; Yakobson (1999): *passim*; Morstein-Marx (2004): *passim*; Rees (2009): 85-106. Germanic scholarship has been less warm to the idea, however. See Mouritsen (2001): *passim*; Hölkeskamp (2010): *passim* (esp. 76-97) and Jehne (2010): 3-28 (esp. 14-23). These ideas, however, rest somewhat too heavily upon theoretical notions of power and elite control coined in a post-feudal world with its clear sense of *ruled* and *rulers* (even with clientship, the concept of liege and fealty found in mediaeval social relationships was entirely absent in ancient Rome) and either downplay or ignore the ability of news to spread outside of the immediate vicinity of the forum and the effectiveness of popular violence and expressions of discontent in political life. Dio, who does not ignore it, has a rather more realistic appraisal of the relationship between the elites and their ‘subjects’, presumably because it was the world he inherited.

<sup>6</sup> Freyburger-Galland (1997): 116. See also Aalders (1986): 296-299; Sion-Jenkis (2000): 43-44; Kuhn-Chen (2002): 195-201.

with supposedly oligarchical Republican systems of government, he would have failed to see the difference; the Republic had elected magistrates, who sat in office for a year, public assemblies for the ratification of *acta* and *rogationes* and to hear public debates (the debate over Pompey's command against the pirates in Book 36 is delivered before a public audience and many of our fragmentary speeches in Dio seem to be delivered *ad populum*; Caesar, Pompey and Crassus are also forced to debate their *lex agraria* in front of the people),<sup>7</sup> feuds between the elites and the masses (see below) and the franchise for all (male) citizens. That power was concentrated in the hands of an elite was no reason to doubt the democratic credentials of the Roman state; after all, did not Thucydides see Athenian politics in similar terms? As will become clear below, the Republic and Classical democracy need not be mutually exclusive categories; Dio was happy to think of the offices and institutions of the Republic as manifestations of a democratic constitution.

Dio's *Res Publica*, as the senators under Augustus realise, is **στασιῶδες**, and this **στάσις** is clearly explained in Classical democratic terms.<sup>8</sup> **Στάσις** in Dio rests heavily upon Thucydidean concepts of the struggle between either individual members of the political elites (and very occasionally their factions), or as a social problem between rich and poor.<sup>9</sup> For example, we have Maecenas' claim that we met in the introduction, where he says that the powerful hire the poor to do their bidding in a democracy.<sup>10</sup> Dio never uses any equivalent for the Latin *populares* or *optimates*; instead he talks, like other Greek historians, of feuding between **πλήθος** and **δυνατοί**, both of which are Thucydidean terms.<sup>11</sup> The ancient idea that social competition between the people in a democracy leads to the championing of a tyrant also finds its way into Dio in an interestingly modified form:

---

<sup>7</sup> Cass. Dio 36.25.1-36a; 38.4.1-5.5; frg. 12.1-11; frg. 70.2-3; Zon. 9.17.3-4.

<sup>8</sup> Cass. Dio 53.11.2.

<sup>9</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2000): 71-2; 89-91.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio 52.16.1.

<sup>11</sup> Freyburger-Galland (1997): 108-111. Similarly Plutarch: Pelling (2002a): 207-236.

αἴτιοι δὲ τῶν κακῶν τούτων αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οἱ βουλευταὶ ἐγένοντο. δέον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἕνα τινὰ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω φρονούντα προστήσασθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ διὰ παντὸς συνάρασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησαν, ὑπολαβόντες δὲ δὴ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐπαυξήσαντες ἔπειτα καὶ ἐκείνους ἀντικαθελεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν, κακὸν τούτου φίλον μὲν οὐδένα, ἐχθροὺς δὲ πάντας ἔσχον.<sup>12</sup>

Dio's point here is that the senate *should* have chosen a champion, as ancient thinkers like Plato and Aristotle thought would happen, and not try to mastermind the political situation; this fits well into his general appraisal of the need for and benefits of monarchy.

Dio's association of *δημοκρατία* with *ισονομία* and *ισομοιρία* is also indicative that he was thinking of the Republic in line with Classical models.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, a brief examination of the arguments made by Catulus in his speech in Book 36 against giving Pompey the command against the pirates should show that Dio, whilst displaying a reasonably good knowledge of the political institutions of the Republic, is fitting that regime into ideas about democracy in the Classical sense. Catulus' first claim in his speech is a warning to the Romans that giving Pompey such an all-powerful command would pose a threat to moderation in the Republic. His arguments are clearly in reference to a Classical democracy:

καὶ γὰρ εἴτε τιμὴν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις αὐτοῦ φέρει, πᾶσιν αὐτῆς, οἷς γε ἐπιβάλλει, προσήκει τυγχάνειν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δημοκρατία), εἴτε κάματον, καὶ τούτου πρὸς τὸ μέρος πάντας μεταλαμβάνειν δεῖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἰσομοιρία).<sup>14</sup>

However, Catulus' next argument concerns the dangers of redundancy in the elected (upper-class) magistrates of the late Republic, if extraordinary offices like Pompey's

---

<sup>12</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1. Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 565b 7-d27; Hdt. 3.82.4 (Dio may also have been thinking specifically of Darius' arguments at 3.82.2 with this passage); Arist. *Pol.* 1305a7-10; 1310b14-6. The idea is also found in other Greek discussions of the fall of the Republic; Plut. *Caes.* 28.5; *C. Min.* 45.7.

<sup>13</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.1.

<sup>14</sup> Cass. Dio 36.32.1.

became a regular feature of Republican life (which, of course, in Dio's narrative they do become with all of the consequences Catulus predicts):

*δεύτερον δὲ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι τεταγμένως ἐκ τῶν νόμων τὰς τε ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας λαμβανόντων καὶ ὑπάτων καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντὶ τούτων ἀρχόντων, οὔτ' ἄλλως καλῶς ὑμῖν ἔχει παριδόντας αὐτοὺς καινὴν τινα ἀρχὴν ἐπεσαγαγέσθαι <οὔτε> συμφέρει. τίνος μὲν γὰρ ἔνεκα καὶ τοὺς ἐνιαυσίους ἀρχοντας χειροτονεῖτε, εἴγε μὴδὲν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσεσθε;<sup>15</sup>*

There is no doubt that Dio is here referring to explicitly Republican institutions; the consulship and praetorship, yearly elections and the concept of pro-magistrates. Not only does Dio see no contradiction between what he says here and what he says above, but even this passage is resplendent with reference to Classical Athenian democracy; as Rogers points out, the passage is in part culled from Demosthenes.<sup>16</sup>

Dio's rejection of Republican government shows influence from Polybian thinking about the rise and decline of the Republican state. As well as his use of the term *ἀκμή* to describe the zenith of Rome during the mid-Republic, Dio seems to borrow Polybius' idea that the Romans (more or less) exercised balance and cohesion in their Republican constitution until the time of the Hannibalic War (in Dio's case 218 B.C., in Polybius' 216 and Cannae) but that the growth of the democratic element led to the destabilisation of the Republican government and its eventual collapse.<sup>17</sup> This is because the democratic element (by which Polybius seems to mean increased public competition) leads to greater internal strife and hostility among the political elite and then the whole people.<sup>18</sup> We have seen in the last two chapters how this affects Dio's history.

Likewise, Dio's explanation of the failure of the Republic in Book 44 strikes me as something of a rejection of Aristotle's generally favourable appraisal of democracy in his

---

<sup>15</sup> Cass. Dio 36.33.1.

<sup>16</sup> Dem. 4.26; Rogers (2008): 315.

<sup>17</sup> Polyb. 6.11.1-11; 18.1-8; 57.1-10.

<sup>18</sup> Polyb. 6.57.5-10.

*Politics*. For example, Dio claims that *εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ φαῦλός τις αὐταρχήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε πλήθους τῶν ὁμοίων αἰρετώτερός ἐστιν*.<sup>19</sup> *Φαῦλος* is an Aristotelian technical term, contrasted by him with *ἀγαθός* and used to distinguish between good forms and bad forms of constitutions.<sup>20</sup> Aristotle argues that it is better to have an aristocracy/democracy than a monarchy, *ἂν ᾗ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους*.<sup>21</sup> Dio's point, by throwing Aristotle's language back at him, being that, since it is impossible to find a large group of men of like character, monarchy is the only option.<sup>22</sup> Dio also rejects Aristotle's statement that a monarchy is a bad form of government where people of like race and background co-exist; this is simply a non-starter for an empire like Rome's.<sup>23</sup> The point is deepened with Dio's claims about the size of Rome's population. Aristotle's assumptions about the stability of democracy, as well as his ideal state, rest on the notion that a large democracy cannot operate; it needs a small population.<sup>24</sup> Dio points out that, for Rome, this is not an option:

*πόλιν δὲ αὐτὴν τε τηλικαύτην οὖσαν καὶ τοῦ τε καλλίστου τοῦ τε πλείστου τῆς ἐμφανούς οἰκουμένης ἄρχουσαν, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ διάφορα κεκτημένην πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ μεγάλους πλούτους ἔχουσαν, ταῖς τε πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς τύχαις παντοδαπαῖς καὶ ἰδίαι καὶ δημοσίαι χρωμένην, ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονῆσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ σωφρονοῦσαν ὁμοιοῦσαι.*<sup>25</sup>

But Dio goes further than simply pointing out the obvious fact that Rome, a mighty world empire, can no longer be ruled like a simple Greek *πόλις*. He argues, as we saw in Chapter Two that Rome and Carthage were brought to conflict because it was impossible for two warlike peoples not to want to conquer each other. With a view of human nature such as Dio's, Aristotle's entertainment of the notion that a population can

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.2.

<sup>20</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1258a 26-28; 1261b 2-3; 1267b 7; 1272b 5-9; Cf. Held (1984): 159-176; (1985): 280-293.

<sup>21</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1286b 7.

<sup>22</sup> Dio may have been thinking of Hdt. 3.82.2 in rejecting Aristotle's assertions: *ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐνὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ἂν φανείη*.

<sup>23</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1288a 1-6; Cass. Dio 44.2.4.

<sup>24</sup> E.g. Arist. *Pol.* 1320a 18-35.

<sup>25</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.4.

be kept small is ridiculous. Humans want to conquer and by doing so, they will increase the population of their state beyond the capacity of a democratic constitution.<sup>26</sup>

### **Constitutional Cycles in Dio**

Having explored some of the ideas that informed Dio's thinking of a Republican *δημοκρατία*, I shall limit the remainder of this discussion to an analysis of the picture of constitutional cycles as they appear in Dio, and the influence this has on our understanding of the value of his History. Within this context, Dio's insistence on the Republic as a democracy will be seen to be more than simply the regurgitation of Classical models; instead, it allows him to tie his thinking about the Republic to his Thucydidean theories of recurring patterns of behaviour in human affairs, something of importance for his projected audience.

Fechner has argued that Dio relies upon ancient theories of constitutional cycle in his explanation of the fall of the Republic.<sup>27</sup> At the beginning of Book 52, Dio states that:

*ταῦτα μὲν ἔν τε τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ ταῖς τε δυναστείαις, πέντε τε καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑπτακοσίοις ἔτεσι, καὶ ἔπραξαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ ἔπαθον· ἐκ δὲ τούτου μοναρχεῖσθαι αὐθις ἀκριβῶς ἤρξαντο.*<sup>28</sup>

A similar idea appears slightly earlier, in Dio's account of Actium:

*ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων τῆς μὲν δημοκρατίας ἀφήρητο, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐς μοναρχίαν ἀκριβῆ ἀπεκέκριτο.*<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Kuhn-Chen (2002): 189 n. 255 has noted that Dio was influenced by the 'Livian' tradition that the size and greatness of empire was too much for the Republic, which may feed into his rejection of Aristotelian thought here.

<sup>27</sup> Fechner (1986): 175-183.

<sup>28</sup> Cass. Dio 52.1.1.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 50.1.1. This passage suggests that, at this point at least, Dio was quite conventionally thinking along the lines of Platonic and Aristotelian theories about cycles, since here monarchy follows (more or less) directly from democracy.

Plato's theory of constitutional cycles was predicated on an idea of a 'democratic man' or a 'tyrannical man' and so on.<sup>30</sup> The idea is one where constitutional change is irreversibly inevitable; the product of changing historical and social phenomena.<sup>31</sup> Dio seems to add an extra dimension to this concept. He certainly accepts that the failure of the Republic was inevitable, but he also believes that some constitutional changes could have been avoided, if the people at the time had thought a bit harder about what they were doing. That much is obvious in his claims about Brutus and Cassius when they murder Caesar. After explaining the inability of democratic government to run an empire and the resulting benefit of monarchy (a statement which fits entirely into theories of constitutional change), Dio then argues that if the assassins had reflected on the need for monarchy, they would not have attempted to restore the Republic:

*ὥστ' εἶπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ὅ τε Βροῦτος ὁ Μάρκος καὶ ὁ Κάσιος ὁ Γάιος ἐξελογίσαντο, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τὸν τε προστάτην καὶ τὸν κηδεμόνα αὐτῆς ἀπέκτειναν, οὐδ' ἂν μυρίων αἰτίοι κακῶν καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο.<sup>32</sup>*

We saw that the word *ἐκλογίζομαι* had Thucydidean overtones, but I want to argue shortly that it alludes to Dio's emphasis on the value of *παιδείσις*. *Παίδεισις* is perhaps also the force of Dio's claims about the dangers of political changes when he recounts the establishment of the Republic in Book Three:

*πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ μεταβολαὶ σφαλέρωταταί εἰσι, μάλιστα δὲ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πλείστα δὴ καὶ μέγιστα καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ πόλεις βλάπτουσι. διὸ οἰνοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ, κἂν μὴ βέλτιστα ἦ, ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν ἢ μεταλαμβάνοντες ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ἀεὶ πλανᾶσθαι.<sup>33</sup>*

<sup>30</sup> Pl. *Resp.* 544a-580b. Compare Arist. *Pol.* 1316a 1-1316b 28 rejection of Plato's arguments.

<sup>31</sup> The idea resurfaces, in various forms, in Arist. *Pol.* 1286b 4-20; *Eth. Nic.* 1160b 10-20; Polyb. 6.4.7-13; Cic. *de Rep.* 1.45; elements of this idea in Hdt. 1.96.1-97.3; 3.82.3-4. As Walbank (1957): 643-4 notes, "it is indeed only with the combination of the two theories of cultural ascent and constitutional corruption that the full circle is possible; and this is found in no surviving work before P."

<sup>32</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.5.

<sup>33</sup> Frg. 12.3a.

The reason why Dio believes that these constitutional changes were avoidable was surely because they were from monarchy to democracy; whereas democracy is not a suitable or practical form of government in the long run, monarchy is and its fall can be avoided. This would be the force of the passage about Brutus and Cassius. Dio treats the failure of the Republic as inevitable and even good; it is Caesar's monarchy that is workable, however tyrannical it may have become.

It has been speculated, not entirely implausibly, that Dio may have argued this with an eye to his own time.<sup>34</sup> Having narrated the death of Marcus Aurelius, Dio claims:

*περὶ οὗ ἤδη ῥητέον, ἀπὸ χρυσῆς τε βασιλείας ἐς σιδηρᾶν καὶ κατιωμένην τῶν τε πραγμάτων τοῖς τότε Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν καταπεσούσης τῆς ἱστορίας.*<sup>35</sup>

So the argument runs, Dio saw the rise to power of the army and the military 'aristocracy' (a poor relation to the Senatorial nobility), populist emperors who imposed military reforms in favour of the common soldiery and the decline in status of senators like Dio as the loss of traditional senatorial hegemony in the Roman state, which he linked to this idea of constitutional change.<sup>36</sup> The idea of an Age of Iron goes back to Hesiod, whose description of the mythical version, which clearly influences Dio here, seems to bear out this assertion. Hesiod talks of the Age of Iron being characterised by disharmony, ζῆλος and ἀλκῆ; brother acts against brother, dishonest men rise to the top through lies and deceit, disrespect for parents and guests is endemic.<sup>37</sup>

The concept of an Age of Iron and Rust, however, by no means stopped with Hesiod. By Dio's day it had become a conventional part of the Roman narrative of decline

---

<sup>34</sup> Fechner (1986): 181-2.

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 71.36.4. Bering-Staschewski (1981): 126-134 argues that this passage suggests that Dio felt his History to have no educative purpose because he felt that the Roman state was doomed. However, her argument rests on the assumption that Dio, in comparing himself to Hector at the end of his History, was also comparing Rome to Troy. This is implausible, since Dio's claim is that he was brought out of a dangerous, treacherous and violent world by the grace of Zeus. He makes no suggestion that he himself could be compared to a 'tragic' figure.

<sup>36</sup> Fechner (1986): 181-2.

<sup>37</sup> Hes. *Op.* 176-201.

during the Republic and under the Empire (and was even subject to subversion by satirists and orators). For the Roman conservative, like Dio, Rust symbolised a lack of vigour, a tarnishing of the tools of war and of industry. Such embellishments could be removed through training, taking us back to Dio's (highly Catonian) emphasis on *ἄσκησις* in his debate over the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C.<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, I am not sure there is as clear a reason why the *decline* of a democracy would provide a obvious influence on Dio's thinking about the rise of 'democratic elements' in his narrative of his own period as Fechner would make out.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, surely a more suitable parallel, if we are thinking about a decline from the monarchy of Marcus Aurelius to the tyranny of Commodus, would be the fall of the kingly period, not the fall of the Republic? Furthermore, if *δυναστεία* represents the consolidation of power into the hands of an aristocratic minority in Dio, then the period of the late Republic shows far more the traditional senatorial nobility's unsuitability to rule (as Dio intimates when he claims that the senate was responsible for their own suffering) than that of a monarchy, as it was imposed as a result of the chaos by Augustus.<sup>40</sup>

His focus on the collapse of the Republic should be better seen, as I am arguing here, as part of his larger interest in explaining the establishment of the Augustan monarchy and how that came into being. However, it is precisely Dio's vision of the rise and success of the Augustan constitution that explains his interest in constitutional cycles, as they allowed Dio to explain the ways in which Augustus rebalanced the state and how that balance had come under threat in more recent years. Again, we have to be careful what we mean by this. Do we, as Fechner would have it, see this as a direct statement about the problems of the Third Century, or is Dio's point more nuanced? I want to argue that, instead of thinking that Dio's view of the past was influenced by his own experiences, we

---

<sup>38</sup> For a thorough discussion of the Rust trope in Roman literature, see Evans (2008): 130-188.

<sup>39</sup> The "democratic element" is implied in Fechner's table (180) and his claim about the rise of the military (181-2).

<sup>40</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1.

should think that his view of the past, taken from extensive reading of the historiography, shaped his attitude to the problems he sought to address both in his own day and more generally in the Roman state.<sup>41</sup> This would surely fit better with his desire that his History would have an educative role and his belief that his History would be a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*.<sup>42</sup>

This is suggested by the fact that the Iron and Rust passage cited above states that the change from Marcus Aurelius to Commodus was a decline for the Romans *of that day* (τότε). Dio's claim of a transfer from an Age of Gold to one of Iron and Rust seems also to have been written with ironic reference to Commodus' claim to have founded an Age of Gold (τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ χρυσοῦν τε ὀνομάζεσθαι).<sup>43</sup> The passage, moreover, fits into Dio's interest in the power of *παιδευσις*. The sentence immediately preceding the iron and rust claim states:

ἐν δ' οὖν τοῦτο ἐς τὴν οὐκ εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνηρέχθη, ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ θρέψας καὶ παιδεύσας ὡς οἶόν τε ἦν ἄριστα, πλείστον αὐτοῦ ὅσον διήμαρτε.<sup>44</sup>

Commodus, in fact, rules badly, not because he was of bad character *per se*, but because he dismisses his worthy advisors and devotes himself to sloth and luxury.<sup>45</sup> Dio also makes clear that this problem had disappeared by the time he had finished writing his History; he records Severus Alexander's mother surrounding him with good advisors in a fragment that is, unfortunately, unplaceable, but certainly comes from Book 80.<sup>46</sup> Dio's emphasis on the benefit of an educated emperor in these passage is undoubtedly linked to his belief in the importance of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*, for whom he was writing his history, in

---

<sup>41</sup> Frg. 1.2.

<sup>42</sup> Frg. 1.1; Cass. Dio 72.23.4. See pp4-5.

<sup>43</sup> Cass. Dio 72.15.6.

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio 71.36.4. It should be pointed out that Dio then says that 'this is our next topic' and that this was 'the decline into an age etc.'

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio 72.1.2.

<sup>46</sup> Zon. 12.15 p.571, 3-10B.

the running of the Empire. Agrippa is made to recommend to Augustus to shun the *ἀπαιδευτοί* and use only the educated elites already existing:

[ἂν δὲ δὴ τοῖς] φαύλοις καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι τὰ πράγματα προστάσης, τάχιστα μὲν ἂν ὀργὴν παρ' ἐκείνων ὡς ἀπιστουμένων λάβοις, τάχιστα δ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις πταίσειας. τί μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ἀμαθῆς ἢ ἀγεννῆς ἄνθρωπος ἐργάσαιτο; τίς δ' οὐκ ἂν καταφρονήσειεν αὐτοῦ τῶν πολεμίων; τίς δ' ἂν πειθαρχήσειεν οἱ τῶν συμμάχων; τίς δ' οὐκ ἂν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπαξιώσειεν ὑπὸ τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἄρχεσθαι; καὶ μὴν ὅσα ἐκ τούτου κακὰ γίγνεσθαι πέφυκε, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐδὲν δέομαί σοι σαφῶς εἰδῶτι διηγείσθαι, ἐκείνο δὲ δὴ μόνον ἀναγκαίως ἐρώ, ὅτι ἂν μὲν μηδὲν δέον ὁ τοιοῦτος πράττη, πολὺ πλείω ἂν σε τῶν πολεμίων βλάψειεν, ἂν δέ τι τῶν προσηκόντων ποιῆ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν σοι φοβερὸς ἐκφρονήσας ὑπ' ἀπαιδευσίας γένοιτο.<sup>47</sup>

We need to consider this argument alongside Dio's claim that *οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ, κὰν μὴ βέλτιστα ἦ, ἀξιούσιν ἐμμένειν ἢ μεταλαμβάνοντες ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ἀεὶ πλανᾶσθαι*, which strikes me as a universalising claim, given the use of *ἀεὶ*; the passage itself suggests that Dio is referring to those who, like him, were informed of the 'truth' of politics, human nature and constitution and sought to avoid radical change at all costs.<sup>48</sup> This, then, suggests to me the proper relationship between Dio's interest in constitutional cycles and his own era. Dio went back to history to provide lessons for present and future *πεπαιδευμένοι*, whom he envisioned as having a vital role in the running of empire. Having studied theories of constitutional rise and fall and having come to the Polybian conclusion that Republican Rome went through such an *ἀκμή* and a *μεταβολή*, he saw that something similar was happening in his own day. He subsequently sought to show how the Imperial monarchy, which he himself claims could stand beyond such problems, could best be put back to a position where it operated at its own *ἀκμή*. This meant that Dio was able to establish the Augustan monarchy, and its balanced settlement of power, as

---

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 52.8.6-8. Cf. Ruiz (1982): 293-295 and Reinhold (1988): 176 who share my opinions about this passage.

<sup>48</sup> Frg. 12.3a.

an ideal and to provide the necessary constitutional corrective to ensure that it survived and would continue to do so, presumably, *sine fine*.<sup>49</sup>

## **Conclusion**

We have seen, therefore, that Dio relies upon Greek theories of constitution to elaborate on his explanation for the fall of the Republic. We have seen that he borrows ideas, perhaps commonplace in the High Empire, from Plato and Aristotle about the key failings of democratic systems and the benefits of monarchy. Likewise, theories of constitutional cycles and constitutional change also find their way into Dio, who sees the change from monarchy to Republic and back to monarchy again within Classical terms. This, I argue, enabled him to confirm the strengths of the Augustan constitution, through a general emphasis on the exceptionalism of monarchic institutions, and to claim that it had solved the problems of government in a large empire with a competitive nobility, but whose fabric was being threatened during Dio's own lifetime. This was, perhaps, for the benefit of an elite intellectual audience.

---

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Hahn (2005): 466, "as a historian and statesman who saw constitutional stability as the basis for a nation's strength and success, Polybius was vitally concerned with constitutional change and needed a theory capable of explaining past changes and predicting them in the future".

## Section Two: Conclusion

This section has analysed the two most important influences on Dio's thought. We have seen how he explored themes that he inherits from Thucydides that might be called 'tragic', which allowed him to emphasise the changing nature of Roman ambition, the distance between the hopes of the Roman people and their fate and the inadequacy of the Republican system of government to deal with empire and its attendant consequences. These themes are in many ways extensions of the ideas we explored in Section One, particularly Chapter Two. We have seen how Dio was able to merge Roman ideas of moral decline with Thucydidean views of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, in both the sense of φύσις (Chapter One) and in terms of the 'tragic' themes we explored in Chapter Three. In Chapter Four, we saw how Dio's view of the Republic as a Greek-style democracy shapes his thinking about political systems, their rise and fall, and the value of his analysis of this phenomenon for his audience of πεπαιδευμένοι. I hope to have shown that it is wrong to think that Dio's view of the role of φύσις in politics was culled entirely from Thucydides or was bland and unoriginal. Instead, we have seen how Dio is capable of blending his Thucydidean influence with a variety of theories about the rise and fall of political systems. We have seen how Dio's influences, far from detracting from his historiographical purpose, as it was explored in Section One, help to reinforce it and to create a narrative that is compelling and, at times, convincing. Dio's motives for exploring these ideas surely lies with his audience, as we noted in the introduction to this section, who were thoroughly schooled in the wisdom of Classical Greece. These models provided Dio with recognisable and authoritative 'truths' that would make his assertions about the development of Roman history and his vision of a revamped yet conservative constitution acceptable to such an audience.

Perhaps the most noticeable gap in this study is Dio's explanation of what monarchy got right that democracy got so disastrously wrong. Dio claimed that Augustus saved the Romans from themselves by establishing the monarchy. Monarchy, as we saw, was to be preferred to democracy precisely because human nature could not run amok and because empire had caused the Romans to transcend the out-moded institutions of their state; institutions that could only have worked whilst Rome was weak and poor. Indeed, after Augustus comes to power, three terms of particular importance to this study drop almost entirely out of Dio's history (viz. *φιλοτιμία*, *πλεονεξία* and *φιλονεικία*), as we saw in Section One. Dio's admiration for and idealisation of Augustus' reforms was so great precisely because he strove to suppress and transform both the competitive urges of the Roman people and their gross expenditure and corruption.

We shall return to these issues in our Epilogue (along with some other themes that tie into what we have discussed in this section). First though, we turn in our next two sections to showing how many of the themes we have seen are developed and explored in Dio's accounts of the careers of Caesar and Cicero. These two men are the most substantial figures in Dio's narrative and receive the lion's share of the speeches; their careers, as Dio sees them, are prisms through which the bigger themes in the narrative, as I have explored them here and in Section One, are explored in the narrative. Moreover, since few studies have been produced on Dio's late Republican narrative, its themes and its shape, a study of these two figures will prove a useful resource for historians.

### **Section Three:** **Cassius Dio and Cicero: a revision**

*“As a politician Cicero’s reputation has suffered most from the fact that he was so often on the losing side. There is something in human nature that makes it difficult for the defeated to find any whole-hearted champions, except...those who can claim...a martyr’s death. But the martyr’s path calls for certain qualities of temperament that Cicero did not possess.”<sup>1</sup>*

Dio’s characterisation of Cicero has received a fair amount of attention from modern scholars, almost but not quite as much as his depiction of Octavian and of Caesar.<sup>2</sup> This is because, perhaps, preeminent among ancient writers, Dio’s portrait of Cicero appears critical and hostile, unnecessarily dismissive of Cicero’s ambitions and motivations. One scholar has even gone as far as to claim that Dio’s hostility to Cicero points to a fear of intellectuals in general in the historian-cum-politician.<sup>3</sup> It is true, as Zielinski has noted, that a hostile tradition against Cicero existed during the imperial era, but this is by no means the only attitude to Cicero adopted by ancient writers. After Quintilian, Cicero was held in high regard, at least in oratorical terms, and whilst a fair number of our accounts of Cicero’s career have moments of criticism as well as praise, their general trend is towards the positive.<sup>4</sup> Nor is Millar’s argument that Dio’s thought was heavily conditioned by extensive reading of anti-Ciceronian literature entirely satisfactory either, since Dio was aware of Cicero’s own letters and speeches (as has been argued very persuasively at least for the ‘Philippic’ of book 45 by the Budé editors and for the Philiscus dialogue by Claassen) and of the ‘positive’ tradition, which he employs extensively during the *consolatio*

---

<sup>1</sup> Dorey (1965): 27.

<sup>2</sup> Significant studies of Dio on Cicero include Millar (1961), which deals exclusively with Ciceronian speeches; Millar (1964): 46-55, which is still the definitive study of Dio’s portrayal of Cicero; van Stekelenburg (1971): 21-6; Lintott (1997): 2514-2517. More recently, there has been a glut of articles on Dio and Cicero (mostly focusing exclusively on the Philiscus debate), which have applied some newer, more interesting approaches to neglected aspects of Dio’s approach to Cicero. See Claassen (1996), which is by far the most convincing study to date; Gowing (1998), Sanna (2007), Lachenaud (2008).

<sup>3</sup> Lachenaud (2008): 215-18.

<sup>4</sup> Zielinski (1912): 280-288, which has been perpetuated by Gabba (1957): 317; for Quintilian, see Clarke (1965): 81-85. Cicero’s oratorical reputation: Sen. *Controv.* 1 Pref. 6; 1 Pref. 11-12; 3 Pref. 15-17; Tac. *Dial.* 18.2; 18.5-6; 21.6; 22.1-2; 25.3; 26.8; 30.5; 37.6; 40.4. Cicero’s character: Sen. *Controv.* 2.4.4; 7.2.1-14; 7.4.6; 10 Pref. 6; *Suas.* 6.1-27 (even Asinius Pollio’s criticism of Cicero is qualified by praise); 7.1-14.

*ad exulem* of Philiscus.<sup>5</sup> I seek to draw out throughout this Section the idea that it is Cicero's *intellectual* achievements that Dio values and his political contribution that Dio sees as both unsuccessful and damaging to himself and the state. In this, Dio is consistent with other ancient writers who passed comment on Cicero's life.<sup>6</sup>

Ultimately, the idea that Dio's portrayal of Cicero can be put down to hostility or contempt is an oversimplification of the issue. There are moments in Dio's history that are undeniably favourable or sympathetic to Cicero, which are either ignored, explained away by Dio's 'careless' use of sources, or made artificially to fit the model by those who subscribe to such a view.<sup>7</sup> Yet Dio has a *consistent* picture of Cicero, found throughout his entire 'biography', which transcends the more critical moments, as well as the more favourable ones. Dio sees Cicero's career in terms of ultimate failure (as does the quotation at the beginning of this Section), which was largely brought about by Cicero's failure of judgement, his querulousness, his desire to compete with those considerably more powerful than himself and his willingness to offend.<sup>8</sup> This gives Dio's history a severe tone, since Dio's Cicero is very often subject to these motivations, but, as we shall see below, these issues are present even when Dio appears to be approving of Cicero's policies and motives. This will be taken up in Chapter Five.

Cicero, we shall see, is portrayed as tactless, sometimes even foolish and careless. But this is a minor difference to his depiction of Caesar or Clodius, for example. All three men crave power in one form or another and all three are happy to disregard the welfare of the Republican state in order to achieve their personal political goals. Criticisms of Cicero

---

<sup>5</sup> Millar (1964): 55; Fromentin & Bertrand (2008): XX-XXXIII; Claassen (1996): 29-45.

<sup>6</sup> See Philiscus' advice to Cicero at Cass. Dio 38.28.1; 38.29.1-4, which I shall discuss below, Chapter Eight.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Gudemann (1902): 41 ascribes the sympathetic view of Cicero during his feud with Clodius to the selection of an 'anti-Clodian' source by Dio. His argument runs thus, "[Dio's sympathy] finds its only plausible explanation in the assumption that he did not hate Cicero less but Clodius more, and hence did not hesitate to base his account upon a writer who, though kindly disposed towards Cicero, appealed to him because of the exhaustive character of his treatment". Millar (1964): 51 explains the Philiscus debate, rather uncomfortably, as serving "no function within the History, unless to underline the weakness of Cicero's character", an argument I seek to challenge here and one which has been refuted in part already by Claassen (1996): 35.

<sup>8</sup> Millar (1964): 55. "Cicero suffered defeat and public humiliation, and this was all that could emerge in Dio."

have largely been taken out of context by modern scholars, who have tended to ignore Dio's historiographical purpose in his characterisation, or have treated Dio in relation to external accounts, rather than his own internal dynamics.<sup>9</sup> Caesar, for example, is portrayed quite consistently as a devious manipulator,<sup>10</sup> appealing to the people, whom he regards as a more potent ally than the senate,<sup>11</sup> and debasing and humiliating himself in front of his political enemies in order to hoodwink them.<sup>12</sup> The real difference here between Caesar and Cicero is that the former is far more successful. Such comparisons are spelled out by Dio himself, who seems to combine psychological explanations of the various political figures in his history, drawing out (particularly between Cicero and Caesar) the different characters through an examination of how they behave in similar conditions.<sup>13</sup> These themes will be discussed both here and in my Section on Caesar.

This Section will consist of three chapters. The first will analyse Dio's narrative of Cicero's actions, focusing principally on what Cicero does before he goes into exile. The reason for this relatively early focus is that Cicero becomes less significant in Dio's narrative after his exile, dropping out in 54 almost entirely and not reappearing as a significant political figure until 44 B.C. The second part will focus *ὑστερον πρότερον* the period 44-43 B.C., looking at how the amnesty speech and the Calenus debate fit into Dio's portrait of Cicero, as well as the relationship between the two speeches, which can give us insight into both Dio's impression of Cicero and of the broader historical situation. The third part will deal with the Philiscus debate, developing the approach started by

---

<sup>9</sup> One scholar who has noticed these points in passing is Dorey (1965): 33, who argues that "of all the Roman politicians who were active in that period, the only one to whom he [Dio] attributes honesty and consistency and courage was Cato". Even then, there are some negative aspects in Dio's portrayal of Cato, such as his grudge (*ἀχθόμενος*) against Cicero which encourages him to support Clodius in 56 B.C. Cass. Dio 39.22.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio 37.54.3ff, part. 56.1: *πάνυ γὰρ εὖ ἠπίστατο ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διὰ τῆς ἐκεῖνων φιλίας, αὐτῶν δ' οὐ πολλῶ ὑστερον δι' ἀλλήλων κρατήσοι.*

<sup>11</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.3; 37.22.1.

<sup>12</sup> Cass. Dio 37.37.3. *καὶ γὰρ θεραπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαι πάντα τινὰ καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἐτοιμότητος ἐγένετο, καὶ οὔτε λόγου οὔτε ἔργου οὐδενὸς ἐς τὸ κατατυχεῖν ὧν ἐσπούδαζεν ἐξίστατο· οὐδὲ ἐμελέν οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς ταπεινότητος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἰσχύν, ἀλλ' ὧν ἐπεχείρει πρωτεύσαι, τούτους ὡς καὶ κρείττους ὑπῆρχετο.* Cf. Cass. Dio 38.11.4-6.

<sup>13</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.3-44.2; 37.37.3-38.2; 38.9.1-11.6 for comparisons between Cicero and Caesar particularly. Other comparisons exist between other figures, as we shall see in Section Four between Caesar and Pompey.

Claassen and by Fechner, as well as showing the relationship between Dio's impressions of Cicero in that dialogue, the latter's character more generally and how it fits in with Dio's broader picture of the late Republic. The reason for this back-to-front approach is that we cannot understand the Philiscus debate (and the immediate narrative consequences that the speech has) without first understanding all the other areas of Dio's portrait of Cicero.

## Chapter Five: Cicero's Political Career to 58 B.C.

### Introduction

Dio's Cicero is most prominently a creature of the 60s and 50s B.C. Gowing has claimed that Cicero falls out of Dio's narrative after his exile in 58 B.C., not to reappear as a major historical figure.<sup>1</sup> This is not altogether accurate, since Dio devotes significant attention to Cicero's political career in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination, and indeed all of Cicero's speeches come from either his time in exile or his actions in Rome from 44 B.C. onwards. However, it is certainly true that Dio's Cicero fades out of the narrative somewhat after his exile and only reappears in the wake of Caesar's death. Millar has argued that this considerably limits the value of Dio's depiction of Cicero, as, because his narrative of the latter's career "of necessity moved from one major scene to the next", Dio was not able to present any unique, thoughtful, consistent, or interesting view of Cicero's character.<sup>2</sup> Millar goes on to assert that Dio "fails to deal adequately with Cicero" and that "Dio's handling of Cicero is a failure, perhaps the most complete failure in his History".<sup>3</sup> He argues this because he claims that Dio's narrative is too biased against Cicero and too negative in its portrayal, causing Dio to become glib and sweeping. This argument has been accepted by every modern scholar since.<sup>4</sup>

There are two responses we might make to these claims. Firstly, Dio's picture of Cicero is not substantially different from Plutarch's both in terms of the themes he sought to explore (as we shall discover below) and in his structure and emphasis. Both men

---

<sup>1</sup> Gowing (1998): 337.

<sup>2</sup> Millar (1964): 55.

<sup>3</sup> Millar (1964): 46; 55.

<sup>4</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 87-88; Claassen (1996): 43; Lintott (1997): 2517; Gowing (1998): 383; Lauchenaud (2008): 215-6.

believed that Cicero's strength lay in his pen, not his politics; both men believed that Cicero was led by ambition to pursue goals ultimately beyond and dangerous to himself; both believed that he fell foul of his contemporaries because of his glib tongue; and both believed that he contributed very little to Roman political culture apart from his "valiant" efforts against Catiline and Antony.<sup>5</sup> Admittedly, Dio is far less thorough than Plutarch and the two men often differ on points of detail; Dio likewise either ignores or only partially accounts for important factors in Cicero's political career, such as his origins as a *novus homo*,<sup>6</sup> but if we are to regard Dio's depiction as a failure, then we have to ask, "what kind of failure?" when we compare it to sources that enjoy greater prestige, but which are nevertheless very similar.

The second response is that it is hard to see what else Dio was supposed to do with Cicero, other than move between scenes in his life. Cicero left no lasting political legacy and his only major political achievements were to stifle reform and insurrection in 63 and to set Octavian on the road to political success. Cicero, even at his height, was never seen as a major political player, with a forceful impact upon the state, nor did he fight any major wars. His strength lay in speaking, forensically and politically, and in his cultural legacy, something that we post-Renaissance Europeans think of most naturally and which is also Dio's focus.<sup>7</sup> Only Caesar in the whole of the late Republican narrative has as many spoken moments as Cicero (both men speak three times: Cicero in the Philiscus debate, the amnesty speech and the Calenus debate; Caesar at Vesontio, Placentia and in the senate in 45 B.C.), suggesting the importance Dio gave to Ciceronian rhetoric, particularly when it was used in the service of the state. The speeches also serve to demonstrate the differences

---

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 2.2-5; 3.5; 4.5; 5.1; 5.4; 6.5, etc. For Plutarch's attitude towards Cicero, see Moles (1988): 9-12. Perhaps the major difference between Dio's account of Cicero and Plutarch's is the emphasis the former places on Cicero's *φιλονεικία* and the latter on his *φιλοτιμία*. It should be pointed out that Dio's interpretation of Cicero's last actions against Mark Antony portrays neither Cicero himself, Antony, Octavian or anyone else for that matter in 'positive' terms.

<sup>6</sup> Millar (1964): 46. It is not entirely ignored: Cass. Dio 46.4.2-7.4. For more on Cicero in Dio's narrative before Book 36, see below, fn. 9.

<sup>7</sup> For a slightly more positive, but nonetheless honest, encomium to Cicero, see Stockton (1971): 333-335.

between Dio's account of Cicero and that of the other major historical figures of the late Republic. Whereas Cicero's argumentative and dialectical character is exposed by the debates and arguments he is drawn into or encourages, Caesar, whose *φιλοτιμία* we shall examine in Section Four, speaks only from a position of command and authority – usually to ensure his political supremacy. Cicero was no Caesar, or Pompey, in short, and his minor political achievements and literary genius had to be weighed against the contributions of his more significant contemporaries by the serious-minded Roman historian, whose focus was on the causes of Republican collapse and the rise of the imperial regime.

In the course of this chapter, I want to move away from analyses that depend upon concepts of 'positive' and 'negative', to suggest that Dio's account is more subtle than such a basic dichotomy. Moreover, Dio's account can be read in a way that suggests it is not thoughtless, but often incisive, even though there are passages where Dio is mistaken on points of detail, or is unduly cynical.<sup>8</sup> To do this, we shall focus in this chapter on the three main issues surrounding Dio's narrative of Cicero's political career down to his exile; firstly that issue of 'positivity' and 'negativity'; secondly, I shall focus on the comparisons Dio draws between Cicero and Caesar's political careers and examine what they can tell us about his depiction of Cicero; finally, I shall explore Dio's narrative of the period leading up to Cicero's exile, where all of the major features of his character as Dio sees them become exacerbated. Throughout this, Dio links his portrayal of Cicero to his broader view of the failure of the Republic and we shall discuss this too.

---

<sup>8</sup> See for example, Dio's account of the trial of Gabinius in 54 B.C. (Cass. Dio 39.58.3-63.5). Cf. the discussion in Fantham (1975): 425-443; Williams (1985): 25-38; Siani-Davies (1997): 306-340. I discuss the historical implications of Dio's evidence for Cicero's political movements in 67 B.C. in the appendix to this chapter.

## Part One: Beyond Positive and Negative

In this section, we shall look at two early episodes in Dio's narrative that display common themes that surpass ideas of negativity. For the moment, let us put aside the issue of how this ties in with Dio's explanation for the fall of the Republic – that will become apparent when we see that the themes explored here tie in with Dio's *φύσις* model.

The first time (as far as we can tell) that Dio introduces Cicero is at 36.43.3.<sup>9</sup> The passage is instructive because it acts as an introduction to the major features of Cicero's character. The passage discusses Caesar's and Cicero's role in the *lex Manilia* and then jumps to the last days of Cicero's praetorship when Manilius was brought in front of him as a defendant in a *repetundae* trial.<sup>10</sup> The link between the two episodes is obviously Manilius, but more particularly Cicero's relationship to Manilius' political career. At the beginning of his account, Dio says:

[The *lex Manilia* is voted for by the plebs] *ἐναγόντων σφᾶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τοῦ τε Καίσαρος καὶ τοῦ Κικέρωνος τοῦ Μάρκου. οἷτοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνηγωνίσαντο οὐχ ὅτι καὶ συμφέρειν αὐτὰ τῇ πόλει ἐνόμιζον, οὐδ' ὅτι τῷ Πομπηίῳ χαρίσασθαι ἤθελον· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς γενήσεσθαι ἔμελλε, Καῖσαρ μὲν τὸν τε ὄχλον ἅμα ἐθεράπευσεν ἅτε καὶ ὀρῶν ὅσω τῆς βουλῆς ἐπικρατέστεροι ἦσαν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ τό τι τῶν ὁμοίων ψηφισθῆναί ποτε παρεσκεύασε, κὰν τούτῳ καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον καὶ ἐπιφθονώτερον καὶ ἐπαχθέστερον ἐκ τῶν διδομένων οἱ ποιῆσαι...ἠθέλησε... Κικέρων δὲ τὴν τε πολιτείαν ἄγειν ἡξίου, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς ὅτι, ὁποτέρους ἂν σφῶν πρόσθῃται, πάντως αὐτοὺς ἐπαυξήσει.*<sup>11</sup>

Cicero's motivations are explained further in the next paragraph. Dio states that

Cicero:

---

<sup>9</sup> There is an earlier reference to Cicero as a better orator than Hortensius (Cass. Dio 36.1a) and Calenus mentions Cicero's trial of Verres (45.7.3-4), suggesting that Dio might have mentioned it, at least in passing. However, the passage cited above has the feel of an introduction (Cicero's political ambitions are laid bare, as are the major features of his character), and it is almost certainly the first time Cicero appears as a significant figure in Dio's account. The earlier reference (or possibly references, since we lack virtually all of Dio's narrative of the 70s B.C.) may serve as a kind of presage to his first major appearance in the narrative. The comparison with Hortensius alludes to Cicero as the best orator of his day, as, more importantly, a *competitive* orator, and as a member of the antagonist aristocratic elite of the late Republic. Dio uses a similar device in his Imperial narrative, where he telegraphs his later depiction of figures like Tiberius in occasional, early references (see Pelling (1997): 117-144). Dio is not alone in this, of course – Tacitus does it of Sejanus, for example; Tac. *Ann.* 1.24.2; 1.69.5; 3.16.1; 3.29.4 etc.

<sup>10</sup> For the historical issues surrounding Dio's account, see appendix to this chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Cass. Dio 36. 43.2-4.

ἐπημφοτέριζέ τε γὰρ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τὰ τούτων ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων, ἵν' ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων σπουδάζηται, ἔπραττε. τοὺς γοῦν βελτίους πρότερον προαιρεῖσθαι λέγων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγορανομήσαι μᾶλλον ἢ δημαρχῆσαι ἐθέλησας, τότε πρὸς τοὺς συρφετώδεις μετέστη.<sup>12</sup>

The key part of these passages is the claim that Cicero was not acting in the state's best interest, or for Pompey's benefit either.<sup>13</sup> Rather, Dio claims that he *πολιτείαν ἄγειν ἡξίου*. How we interpret this is very much up to the reader, but I would contend that it could have a meaning as mundane as to reach the consulship, or at most, a post-consular role as a *princeps*, both of which contain the force of 'leading the state' found here.<sup>14</sup> Certainly, it is more mundane sounding than the *δυναστεία* aspired to by the more sinister and powerful players in the Republic. This, as we shall see in the next section, contrasts him with Caesar; Cicero is every bit as self-serving as Caesar but his ambitions are more limited, more 'Republican'; he lacks the vision and the awareness of the truly great figures of the period. As such, Caesar is considerably more successful, whereas Cicero is brought before the mob and humiliated.

Similarly, Dio's claim that Cicero had previously sought the aedileship instead of the tribunate in order to appeal to the various political groups in Roman society fits into Dio's broader portrayal of him. Phillips has described the statement as "too ridiculous to require comment", pointing to the opportunities for popular sympathy the aedile could acquire through controlling games and festivals.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the best argument in Dio's favour is presented by Wiseman. Analysing the unhappy relationship between *novi homines*

---

<sup>12</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.5.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Stockton (1971): 146 for Cicero's 'support' of Pompey. Pompey was a suitable choice for many popular politicians of the 60s B.C. (Q. Cic. *Comm. Pet.* 5; 51; Cic. *ad Att.* 1.16.11; Smith (1957): 84; Gruen (1974): 44-5), largely on account of his support for the tribunate in 70 B.C. and his sterling military career.

<sup>14</sup> The verb *ἄγω* is indeed used occasionally with *πολιτεία* by Dio when referring to transference of citizenship and in this case means something akin to *rem publicam gerere* or *capessere*. See Freyburger-Galland (1997): 44.

<sup>15</sup> Phillips (1970): 598-9. Certainly, Caesar took full advantage of this (something Dio himself notes – Cass. Dio 37.8.1. Cf. Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 5.9), and we know that Cicero was first in the elections to both the praetorship and the consulate (though this was in the more 'oligarchical' *comitia centuriata*). However, Cicero claims to have been parsimonious with his money during his tenure, suggesting that he neither bribed extensively, nor put on lavish games (Cic. *de Off.* 2.59. See Balsdon (1965): 178.).

and *populares*, he notices that the majority of the former started their senatorial careers as tribunes, the easiest and most popular way for a new man to make his mark. Cicero, however, is one of only a handful of *novi homines* of whom we are aware who did not canvass for the tribunate and preferred to stand for the aedileship.<sup>16</sup> If Wiseman is right, then it would suggest that Cicero was bucking the more secure trend for men of his station and seeking to cut a different political path from the (usually) *popularis* new men of his day. In this way, then, we see that Dio's claims about Cicero are not without accuracy.

We also need to consider this alongside Dio's narrative of the trial of Manilius. When Manilius is arraigned before him by the *optimates*, Cicero refuses to grant him the time he is legally allowed to prepare a defence. Cicero is subsequently dragged in front of an assembly of the people by the tribunes, where he faces the people's ire. Changing tack once again, Cicero rails against the senate and promises to defend Manilius. As a result of his serious mishandling of the situation, Cicero is spoken ill of (*κακῶς ἤκουε*) and receives the nickname *αὐτόμολος*.<sup>17</sup> Several features that are key to Dio's portrayal of Cicero are apparent in this passage. Cicero is rash: he tries to be too clever, playing off the people against the senate and ending up upsetting both of them.<sup>18</sup> Dio makes clear that navigating a path through politics in the late Republic was no easy task for ambitious politicians; Pompey's position, for example, is weakened severely when he begins to lose popular favour and he burns his fingers with the turbulent Clodius; likewise, Caesar has to resort to rather crude measures when passing his *lex agraria* in 59 B.C. because he fails to get the senate onside.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, these men came up against difficulties after they had established themselves and marked out their support bases. Cicero in 67 is still a new-comer to

---

<sup>16</sup> Wiseman (1971): 161-2.

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio 36.44.1-2.

<sup>18</sup> This seems to me to be a more natural reading of the passage than attempts to view it in terms of Cicero's political faithlessness, which rest too heavily on the assumption that Dio *himself* calls Cicero an *αὐτόμολος*. Dio merely notes that the term was applied to Cicero, precisely because he managed to bungle the situation so disastrously. Dio's point is surely that it was unsurprising that people *did* think he was treacherous. *Contra* Millar (1964): 48.

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 39.25.1-4; 39.18.2-19.3; 38.1.1-6.6.

political life and this makes his ‘actions’ seem more incautious. His failure to impress also serves to highlight how success operates in late Republican politics. The point is that Caesar and Pompey had already worked on their reputations before risking them (Caesar never seriously tarnishes his for that matter – he simply becomes more resolutely *popularis* after 59 B.C.). It is the singlemindedly popular politician who wields the power in Cicero’s day and Dio’s feeling is that Cicero’s big mistake is not realising that there was no meaningful *concordia ordinum*.

Our examination of the trial of Manilius has hopefully drawn out some of the chief concerns in Dio’s portrayal of Cicero. We have seen that Cicero is presented as politically incautious, that his inhibition when it comes to arraigning others and speaking publicly brings him animosity from both the people and senate and that his political designs are stymied by his own rashness. This is the same theme we find in one of the more ‘positive’ parts of Dio’s portrayal of Cicero, the account of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. That Cicero is given a favourable and commanding role in the crushing of the conspiracy cannot be seriously doubted, although it has been suppressed in some modern accounts.<sup>20</sup> At the end of his account, Dio says that Catiline *ἐπὶ πλείον γὰρ τῆς τῶν πραχθέντων ἀξίας ὄνομα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Κικέρωνος δόξαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς κατ’ αὐτοῦ λεχθέντας ἔσχε*.<sup>21</sup> Aside from the fact that Dio rather sharply picks up on the freak nature of the Catilinarian revolt and its lack of wide-ranging consequences, the passage focuses on the cultural legacy of Cicero’s Catilinarians. Dio references the Catilinarian orations, accrediting them with enough rhetorical power to make a small incident seem great and he thinks Cicero’s *δόξα* was enough to raise the conspiracy above the attention it deserved. Certainly, he himself dedicates twelve (of fifty-eight) chapters in Book 37 to the conspiracy.

---

<sup>20</sup> E.g. Millar (1964): 48.

<sup>21</sup> Cass. Dio 37.42.1.

Furthermore, Dio's portrait of Cicero in the conspiracy (and during his consulship more generally) is favourable. Cicero comes across in his consulship as a responsible adversary to the 'irresponsible' elements in the state (most prominently Rullus and Labienus), teaming up with other like-minded senators to crush these *popularis* moves before they can come to fruition.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, seeing through Catiline's corrupt attempts to secure the consulate, Cicero adds 10 years banishment to the sentence for bribery;<sup>23</sup> stops him from murdering leading men of the senate;<sup>24</sup> forces Catiline to go public about his plans;<sup>25</sup> exposes Catiline's plot by revealing letters he had sent;<sup>26</sup> wards off a plot to kill him;<sup>27</sup> staves off insurrection in the city by giving his province to Antonius Hybrida (Dio then claims that *ἐν καιρῷ γε ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις κατέμεινε*);<sup>28</sup> arrests Lentulus before he can burn down the city;<sup>29</sup> occupies the forum and Capitol to stop the freedmen and slaves of the conspirators rescuing them;<sup>30</sup> and, finally, is blest by the gods with a fortuitous omen that takes place at his house.<sup>31</sup>

The picture of Cicero, then is of a man who nobly defends his city against internal threat. Certainly, Dio's picture is perfectly conventional: there exists no ancient account of the Conspiracy that portrays Cicero in anything other than this way. Importantly, however, there are certain passages in Dio's narrative, listed above as favourable to Cicero, which do not feature in any other account, such as Cicero's occupation of the Capitol and forum to

---

<sup>22</sup> Cass. Dio 37.25.4.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 37.29.1.

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 37.29.3-4.

<sup>25</sup> Cass. Dio 37.30.1.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 37.31.1.

<sup>27</sup> Cass. Dio 37.32.4-33.1. Dio claims that the plot was discovered *ὁ γὰρ Κικέρων πολὺ δυνάμενος, συχνούς τε ἐκ τῶν συνηγορημάτων τους μὲν οἰκειούμενος, τοὺς δὲ ἐκφοβῶν, πολλοὺς τοὺς διαγγέλοντάς οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔσχε*. A mostly favourable picture, though perhaps with a hint of criticism, but criticism that fits the picture I am drawing.

<sup>28</sup> Cass. Dio 37.33.2-34.1. Millar (1964): 48 claims that this was not much praise from an author "whose own views on public order were so strict". This is precisely the kind of assertion that this chapter is seeking to nuance. If Cicero 'acts well' and Dio praises him, then so be it.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 37.34.2.

<sup>30</sup> Cass. Dio 37.35.3-4.

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 37.35.4.

stop slaves from attacking the *carver*.<sup>32</sup> Equally, Dio's depiction of the divine omen at the Vestal sacrifice is noticeably more flamboyant (pardon the pun) than Plutarch's.<sup>33</sup> Surely this cannot be dismissed as small beer in comparison to Dio's more hostile moments? Sallust is a worthy comparison; the fact that he has left a lot of these examples out of his account has led some to believe that he is hostile to Cicero – we cannot say the same about Dio.<sup>34</sup>

However, though Dio's account is obviously favourable and sympathetic to Cicero, the same features of his character present in the rest of the history are equally noticeable here. For example, though Cicero's arraignment of Catiline before he can kill leading senators is treated positively, Dio sees it as a moment of rashness on Cicero's part. He says:

*ἐπειδὴ τε οὐκ ἔπεισέ σφας ψηφίσασθαι τι ὧν ἡξίου (οὔτε γὰρ πιθανὰ ἐξηγγελκέναι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχθραν καταψεύδεσθαι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἰπωπτεύθη), ἐφοβήθη ἄτε καὶ προσπαρωξυγκῶς τὸν Κατιλίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν ἀπλῶς ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐσελθεῖν ὥσπερ εἰώθει.*<sup>35</sup>

We see in this passage Cicero's lack of caution politically. Though he accuses Catiline with good reason, he does so forcefully enough to provide serious provocation to Catiline, who now directs his plot not only against Cicero, but against the whole state. Cicero has also managed to put himself in a dangerous situation because he has accused Catiline without accumulating sufficient evidence, a mistake he does not repeat later on. The most interesting part of the passage is perhaps Dio's claim that people ascribed Cicero's move against Catiline to his *ἔχθρα*. Even after Cicero manages to provide evidence (in the form of letters) that damn Catiline, he is still suspected of maliciousness.<sup>36</sup> Dio is quite emphatic, however, that the claim is false: *ἐπὶ συκοφαντία τὸν Κικέρωνα*

---

<sup>32</sup> Only Appian mentions something similar, but his account is substantially different in several respects. He claims (App. B. *Civ.* 2.5.17) *ὧν ὁ Κικέρων πυθόμενος ἐξέδραμεν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου καὶ διαθείς ἐς τὰ ἐπίκαιρα φύλακας ἐπανήλθε καὶ τὴν γνώμην ἐπετάχυνε.*

<sup>33</sup> Gudeman (1902): 18-9.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of Sallust's view of Cicero, which debunks the assumption of hostility too, see Syme (1964): 105-108.

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 37.29.3.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 37.31.3.

διαβληθῆναι. Partly, Dio is reporting an accusation that seems to have taken place – Cicero talks of Torquatus accusing him of doctoring letters from the Allobroges. Moreover, as Cicero’s evidence suggests, a great many people seem to have doubted the existence of a murky conspiracy like Catiline’s, at least initially.<sup>37</sup> However, the disbelief presumably also relates to Dio’s emphasis on Cicero’s *παρρησία*. The difficulty of the situation required cautiousness and the patient collecting of evidence. Instead, however, Cicero’s actions inspired Catiline to turn against the state as a whole.<sup>38</sup>

For Dio, the accusations of grudges and slander may be untrue (and even unfair), but they can also be explained by another feature of Cicero’s character: his browbeating and scare-mongering. When Cicero goes to the assembly, having been made afraid of Catiline, he surrounds himself with a large group of supporters and wears a breast-plate *τῆς τε ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων διαβολῆς ἕνεκα, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν ἐσθῆτα, παραφαίνων δ’ αὐτὸν ἐξεπίτηδες*.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, Cicero has many supporters, who were won from fear,<sup>40</sup> and when he is delivering the fourth Catilinarian, Dio claims:

*αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν βουλὴν ἠθροισε, καὶ σφας συνταράξας τε καὶ ἐκφοβήσας ἔπεισε θάνατον τῶν συνειλημμένων καταγνῶναι.*<sup>41</sup>

In many ways, Cicero’s fear-mongering is part and parcel of his usual character: instead of winning true allies and friends, the supporters he accrues do not have any regard for him, but follow him from fear. The scaremongering, however, does have some purpose and is useful in expelling Catiline from Rome. Moreover, Dio accepts Cicero’s claims about the kind of men who flocked to Catiline’s banner in 63 B.C., suggesting that he felt Cicero’s emphasis on the dangers posed by Catiline was not too exaggerated.<sup>42</sup> Dio’s point

<sup>37</sup> Cic. *pro Sull.* 40; Cic. *pro Mur.* 51.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Philiscus’ claim that Cicero’s *παρρησία* both saved the state and got him exiled. See Cass. Dio 38.22.2 with 38.25.4.

<sup>39</sup> Cass. Dio 37.29.4.

<sup>40</sup> See below, n. 81.

<sup>41</sup> Cass. Dio 37.35.4.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio 37.30.1-5.

is that there are discernible features of Cicero's character that accompany him both in his stronger, more worthy, moments, like the Catilinarian Conspiracy, and in his weaker moments, when he is unwisely sparring with Caesar and Pompey. Unfortunately, Cicero's desire for glory and reputation force him into a more negative use of his talents, or at least to behave in a way that brings him much misfortune.

This section has set the tone for the rest of this chapter. We have seen that there are several important aspects of Dio's portrayal of Cicero's career, such as his outspokenness, his rashness, and the self-serving nature of his political career that are at the heart of Dio's depiction of him. These features go beyond simple hostility and criticism; they should be seen more appropriately as Dio's way of explaining why Cicero ultimately failed as a politician and how his actions can be compared to those of his rather more successful counterparts. These themes, as we shall see, tie into Dio's broader portrait of the Republic; for Cicero, as something of a case study of a more regular, less powerful Republican politician, is just as responsible for the breakdown of the Republican state as are Caesar, Pompey, Antony or Octavian in his own way. Cicero *could* and *did* act nobly and well in the Republic's interest, albeit in a way that was clumsy, when he defended Rome from Catiline. But Dio's point is that he preferred to behave selfishly and cynically, aping the ambitions of Caesar and Pompey, sparring with his fellow politicians and causing disruption and turmoil. Furthermore, his volatility and rashness exacerbated the tensions already present in the Republic, as his speech against Calenus was to do in 43 B.C., during a much more sensitive time and as he was to do shortly before his exile, where Dio accuses him of almost causing a civil war against Clodius.

## Part Two: Cicero and Caesar compared

The comparisons between Cicero and Caesar that we mentioned in the introduction to this Section have been noticed already by Pitcher, who argues that Cicero is something of a “foil” to Caesar during them.<sup>43</sup> They form an important part of Dio’s explanation of the rise of Caesar (as we shall explore further in Section Four) and Cicero’s personal failure and culpability in the problems of the Republic. What purpose Dio intended for them is hard to say, since he never makes it explicit, but it seems that their primary function is to explore nuanced differences in approach to the same problems and the same ambitions (usually a quest for power or supremacy in some way), both to ‘prove’ Dio’s conception of the individual’s character and, ultimately, why Caesar ends up dictator, Pompey and Cicero having been conquered.

Let us return to Dio’s narrative of the passage of the *Lex Manilia*, as it contains the first of our comparisons between Caesar and Cicero. As in other cases, this passage serves to draw out the differences in attitude and stance between the two men. Caesar’s *popularis* stance is pointed out through his resolute support for the *plebs*.<sup>44</sup> This picture reappears in various episodes until Caesar has the consulship, at which point he follows Cicero and courts both the senate *and* the people.<sup>45</sup> Both like Cicero and unlike Cicero, Caesar is unsuccessful and successful in his bid for joint support. As in Cicero’s case, the plan to appease both the senate and people (the *lex agraria* of 59 B.C.) backfires, ending in bloodshed, the withdrawal of Caesar’s fellow consul from political life and the state divided more radically into two factions.<sup>46</sup> Unlike Cicero, however, Caesar has by this time garnered so much support from the *plebs* that he is strong enough to push through his legislation, making himself considerably more popular among them.

---

<sup>43</sup> Pitcher (2009b): 272.

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.3

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio 37.44.1-3; 38.1.1-2.

<sup>46</sup> See pp. 202-4 for a more detailed discussion of Dio, Caesar and the *lex agraria*.

The *Lex Manilia* sees some similarity between the two men, as I have already noted. Both support the law with no regard for the state or its needs, nor, ironically, because either man wants to elicit support for Pompey, but because of the potential for popularity the law presents. Several features of this statement are typical of Dio. Firstly, the sense of social feud underlying the law: Pompey is the people's choice for the war, opposed by the constitutional senate and its optimate generals, Marcius and Acilius. Secondly, the belief that behind purported intentions lie darker, cruder motivations. Dio claims that Cicero's real aim is "leadership in the state", through a unification of the two major social groups in Rome. Obviously, this is a cynical reading of Cicero's political aims, but we should note that it hardly differs from what Dio says about Caesar, who uses popular sympathy as a stepping-stone to his (more sinister) aims to eclipse Pompey and himself become over-mighty (see pp.189-90). The only difference here is that he took a much more sensible and secure path in Dio's eyes – it is easier, he would argue, being a successful *popularis*, or even optimate, than trying to succour both the people and the senate. Given the hostility those groups entertained, it is only a matter of time before one is forced by circumstance to nail one's flag to a given mast. Attempts to maintain neutrality whilst still being actively involved in political affairs are destined to fail, as Cicero himself finds out to his cost.

The next comparison concerns the aftermath of the Catilinarian Conspiracy and the close of 63 B.C. Cicero suffers the political fallout of his actions immediately. When he goes before the people on the last day he has in office, the people display their anger at his actions (execution of citizens) and refuse to allow him to give a defence of his consulship.<sup>47</sup> The fickle mob (which Cicero had reassured and saved a few days before) exploits the malicious intentions of Metellus Nepos, but Cicero fails to display any grace or foresight in

---

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 37.38.1.

the matter.<sup>48</sup> Instead of showing dignity, Cicero *ἀντιφιλονεικήσας προσεπώμοσεν ὅτι σεσωκῶς τὴν πόλιν εἶη*.<sup>49</sup> Cicero’s combativeness is largely due to his arrogance and, as Dio puts it, because he ‘liked being praised by others and indeed praising himself’: he is cross that he has been deprived of the opportunity to boast of his achievements and that he is not being shown the respect he deserves.<sup>50</sup> But a deeper, more insidious part of Cicero’s character is opened up by the term *ἀντιφιλονεικήσας*, which I should translate as “taking the fight to them”. Cicero is querulous – he never backs down from a fight, nor does he know when to give up. There is here perhaps a touch of *φιλονικία* too, as Cicero is determined to prove himself right and the people wrong, even at the expense of his wider political goals. Dio’s account is obviously radically different from Plutarch’s and that of Cicero (hardly surprising), who claim that Metellus was the principal agent and his plans to stir up ill-feeling against Cicero backfired against him when the crowd began praising Cicero.<sup>51</sup> Whatever the truth of the situation (and I suspect that neither account is totally inaccurate), Dio’s claim rests upon his view that Cicero’s relationship with the mob was difficult and fractious, his tendency to argue (particularly against those who do not expect to be argued with)<sup>52</sup> and his ultimate political failure. Dio’s remark about Cicero’s enjoyment of praise (and self-praise) may be hostile, but it is less part of Dio’s consistent picture of Cicero that his aggressive and overly argumentative character was a symptom of the Republican malaise – he puts his private interests before the public good, as do they all.

The proof of this lies in the comparison Dio draws between Cicero and Caesar. The few chapters preceding Cicero’s laying down of office are occupied with Caesar’s bid

---

<sup>48</sup> Metellus Nepos is very much a trouble-maker in Dio, whose insidiousness is only matched by his willingness to ignore convention and custom both here and when he goes outside the *pomerium* to join Pompey whilst still tribune (Cass. Dio 37.43.1-4).

<sup>49</sup> Cass. Dio 37.38.2.

<sup>50</sup> Cass. Dio 37.38.2. I accept that this is mostly a cheap, throwaway remark on Dio’s part, since Cicero was entitled to defend his consulate by custom.

<sup>51</sup> Cic. *ad fam.* 5.2.7; Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 23.2-3.

<sup>52</sup> It should be noted that this causes his death, too, when he argues with a lowly centurion. Cass. Dio 46.43.4-5.

for the role of *Pontifex Maximus*. The comparison is made obvious by the connecting sentence Dio uses:

τῷ μὲν οὖν Καίσαρι διὰ ταῦθ' οἱ πολλοὶ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν, τὸν δὲ δὴ Κικέρωνα ἐν ὀργῇ ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν θανάτῳ ποιούμενοι τά τε ἄλλα ἤχθαιρον.<sup>53</sup>

Caesar had reconnected with Labienus (they had worked together on the trial of Rabirius) to restore to the people the right to elect *pontifices*. Caesar was successful in his candidacy because he had garnered popular support for his roles in the trial of Rabirius and had voted against the death of Lentulus (which fits nicely with the main reason Dio gives for the hostility of the people to Cicero).<sup>54</sup> But Dio delves deeper into the 'psychology of the individual'.<sup>55</sup> Caesar was really successful because:

θεραπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαι πάντα τινὰ καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἐτοιμότατος ἐγένετο, καὶ οὔτε λόγου οὔτε ἔργου οὔδενός ἐς τὸ κατατυχεῖν ὧν ἐσπούδαζεν ἐξίστατο· οὔδ' ἔμελέν οἱ τῆς αὐτίκα ταπεινότητος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἰσχύν, ἀλλ' ὧν ἐπεχείρει πρωτεύσαι, τούτους ὡς καὶ κρείττονας ὑπῆρχετο.<sup>56</sup>

In other words, Caesar is willing to debase and humiliate himself in front of even the most ordinary persons. A political realist, Caesar recognises that he cannot act *now* (*αὐτίκα*) and waits patiently for later opportunity (*ἔπειτα*). Likewise, unwilling to make himself odious to those who might be useful to him, he flatters and fawns upon them, in the way that he has done so far with Pompey, supporting him (always with malicious intent) in his command against Mithridates and in assigning the rebuilding of the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline to him.<sup>57</sup> Because of this subtlety and cunning, Caesar goes from strength to strength: there is not a single action in the whole of Dio's narrative that Caesar performs unsuccessfully before the moments leading up to the civil war, even if it were base, dishonest, criminal or upset the more traditional elements in the Republic. This

---

<sup>53</sup> Cass. Dio 37.38.1.

<sup>54</sup> Cass. Dio 37.37.2.

<sup>55</sup> Dio claims Caesar *τῆς ἱερωσύνης ἐπεθύμησε* (Cass. Dio 37.37.1).

<sup>56</sup> Cass. Dio 37.37.3.

<sup>57</sup> For the Capitoline, see Cass. Dio 37.44.1-3. Caesar's disregard for Pompey and his desire for popularity underpin this passage, too, as we shall discuss further on pp.196-9.

is in marked contrast to Cicero. Even when Cicero's actions are perfectly within custom, such as swearing his oath at the end of his consulate (admittedly Dio pours scorn over Cicero's self-satisfaction), his abrasive personality, combined with his unwillingness to show any form of grace serve only to anger the people. One could almost make a point by point comparison: Caesar debases himself before the people – Cicero argues against them *as equals* (the force of *φιλονεικία*, see pp.27-8); Caesar is in tune with the popular will (Rabirius, Lentulus), Cicero is very much out of touch; Caesar recognises who are the most powerful men in Rome and toadies to them – Cicero (as we shall see shortly) is determined to feud with them as though he was on an equal footing with them. Everything, in short that Caesar, corrupt, immoral, unscrupulous and ambitious, does with great success, Cicero, constitutional, comparatively more honest than though, albeit, perhaps as unscrupulous as Caesar, does with abject failure because of his antagonistic character.

The comparison is explored further. Cicero's *φιλονεικία* is made more pronounced in Dio's account of Cicero's exile, as is his rash, antagonistic character. Unlike our other accounts (viz. those of Plutarch and Cicero himself), Dio does not see Cicero's exile in terms only of his feud with Clodius, or the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, but sees it as a long process whereby Cicero's antagonism with Caesar and then with Clodius turns those men sufficiently against him that they become prepared to exile him. There are three principal parts to Dio's account: firstly, Cicero's part in the Vettius affair arouses the hostility of Pompey and Caesar, then Cicero upsets Caesar further with his speech in defence of Antonius Hybrida; and finally, Cicero is moved against by Clodius (who owes a debt of gratitude to Caesar) and he is sent into exile by a combination of Clodius and the 'Triumvirs'. Perhaps the most striking thing (and one which tells us a great deal about Dio's perception of Cicero) is that Cicero had ample opportunity to repair the damage done. Vettius, for example, was not believed by Pompey and Caesar, who only suspect Cicero rather than hold him guilty. Cicero confirms their suspicion by lambasting Caesar in

defence of Antonius, which forces Caesar to act against him.<sup>58</sup> Lastly, Cicero would not have been so badly mauled by Caesar if Clodius had not been on the scene over the Bona Dea scandal.<sup>59</sup> All the way through the narrative, Dio emphasises Cicero’s failure to accurately assess the forces with which he has to contend – not that he ever claims those forces were easy to assess. Dio never presents the web of political alliances that Cicero finds himself tangled in, as well as the hidden revenge Caesar has in store, as obvious or discernible.

This kind of structuring continues into our last major comparison between Cicero and Caesar. Perhaps the most striking feature of the passage is its reference to and exploration of Cicero’s *φιλονεικία*. Caesar, we are told refused to get angry about Cicero’s attack on him during the trial of Antonius Hybrida (see below), regarding him as a debased and inferior individual, the type readily led into *φιλονεικία*:

τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς ἔλεγε συχνὰ καὶ μάταια ἐξεπίτηδες ἐς τοὺς κρείττονάς σφωιν ἐς φιλονεικίαν αὐτοὺς ὑπάγοντας...ἢ ἴσοι σφίσι καὶ ὅμοιοι, ἂν γέ τι ὁμοιότροπον ἀντακούσωσι, δόξωσιν εἶναι.<sup>60</sup>

*Μάταιος* implies flippant and frivolous, a comment or person lacking seriousness, subtlety or weight. We have noted that ‘Cicero’ is notorious for his flippant tongue and here we have an example of how it was perceived in Dio’s late Republic. Likewise, Cicero’s *φιλονεικία* is drawn out by the claim that he desires to be seen as equal to those in positions of superiority to himself, if they abuse him in turn. Such abuse would of course raise Cicero to the level of an equal with the abuser, but it also implies Cicero’s love of tussle – he is never happier than when he has an enemy, someone or something to rail

<sup>58</sup> Cass. Dio 38. 9.4-10.1.

<sup>59</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.1. Crucial is Dio’s claim about Caesar (in relation to Cicero’s spat with him): ἐξ οὖν τούτων τῶν λογισμῶν καὶ τότε αὐτὸς μὲν τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἤγε, τὸν δὲ δὴ Κλώδιον ἀντιχαρίσασθαι τι αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῆς μοιχείας αὐτοῦ οὐ κατηγόρησε, βουλόμενον αἰσθόμενος παρεσκεύασε κρύφα κατὰ τοῦ Κικέρωνος.

<sup>60</sup> Cass. Dio 38.11.1. Boissevain gives two possible readings for the lacuna, either ἀπορρίπτειν or λέγειν.

against, provoke and assault.<sup>61</sup> So much is clear and consistent from Dio's earlier impression.

Again we have a contrast with Caesar. Cicero, vain, aggressive, and quarrelsome comes up against the calm of Caesar. If Cicero's rhetorical style is dominated by his *φιλονεικία*, Caesar's patience, effortless superiority and condescension are a rhetorical style of their own. His general assertions about 'the mob' patronise Cicero, especially since they do not deal with him directly (above). I have pointed out elsewhere that Dio seems not to make much of Cicero's background (or lack of it),<sup>62</sup> but it might be that here (and arguably elsewhere) it has an implicit effect – Cicero is presented by another contemporary as a social inferior constantly badgering his fellow statesmen for attention and to competition, an inferiority complex writ large. This is not to say that Dio himself espouses such a viewpoint – both references to Cicero's 'background' are put into the mouths of historical figures – but simply to show what effect those features of his 'character' had on his peers. This, of course, helps Dio in turn chart the success and failings of Cicero's political career.

Unlike Cicero, Caesar is aloof. This does not mean, however, that he is unwilling or incapable of punishing his foes, as Cicero will learn to his cost. Dio claims:

θυμῷ μὲν δὴ οὐδὲν ἐχαρίζετο, τοῦ δὲ δὴ καιροῦ διεσκόπει, καὶ τοὺς γε πλείους οὐδὲ αἰσθανομένους μετῆει. οὐ γὰρ ὅπως δόξειεν ἀμύνεσθαι τινὰς ἔπρασεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι ἀνεπιφθονώτατα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ πάντα διοικήσειε.<sup>63</sup>

Caesar's method of attack is designed to catch an opponent off his guard. Unlike Cicero, Caesar is not looking for a fight – he wants vengeance without reputation-damaging conflict and without the semblance of struggle. He has no place for feuding *inter*

---

<sup>61</sup> Such is made clear at Cass. Dio 38.11.2. τὸν Κικέρωνα ὁρῶν οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τι τοσοῦτον λοιδορήσασθαι ἐθέλοντα ὅσον ἀντακούσαι τι τῶν ὁμοίων, ὥστε καὶ παρσιωθῆναι οἱ, ἐπιθυμοῦντα – notice the repeat of ἀντακούω.

<sup>62</sup> It is referenced in Calenus' invective, where the slanderous comments (Cicero as a bothersome social inferior) seem to point in the same direction as I am heading in my analysis of this passage. See Cass. Dio 46.4.2-3: ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ <ὁ> κναφεύς, ὁ τὰς τε σταφυλὰς καὶ τὰς ἐλαίας αἰεὶ ποτε ἐργολαβῶν, ἢ γένος ἢ πλοῦτον κατέλιπεν, ἄνθρωπος ἀγαπητῶς ἐκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τῶν πλυνῶν διατρεφόμενος...ἐν οἷς αὐτὸς τραφεῖς οὐκ ἀπεικότως τοὺς κρείσσονας αὐτοῦ καὶ πατεῖ καὶ πλύνει, λοιδοραῖς τισὶν ἐξ ἐργαστηρίων καὶ τριόδων ἐπιτετηδευμέναις χρώμενος.

<sup>63</sup> Cass. Dio 38.11.4.

*paret*. Caesar's long-term vision is emphasised at the expense of Cicero's short-sightedness and ultimately reactionary attitude. Caesar can forgive an insult – it is a trifle that fails to stress the dignified mind of the *bon aristocrate* and can have little impact on the ultimately ruthless and pragmatic *φιλότιμος* whose only concern is power and how it can be obtained. But his forgiveness is only given out in accordance with his political career. If Caesar perceives a possible future threat, Caesar must act. Dio states that Caesar's vengeance was solely *προφυλάξασθαι ἢ καὶ προποιῆσαί τι δεινὸν αὐτόν, πρὶν παθεῖν* and *ἵνα τὰ μέλλοντα κωλυθείη*.<sup>64</sup> This kind of action worked, apparently, and Caesar suffered no harm. Whilst this is questionable historically at least, the historiographical dimension, a comparison between Cicero and Caesar, does draw out effectively some of the features we see in both men's characters: Cicero is impetuous, rash, incautious and querulous. He is unable to show grace or caution, he is an inferior who uses crude and caustic language to provoke his social superiors into feuding with him (in vain – in both senses of the word – hope of making himself equal to them). Caesar is just about the opposite. He is dignified and aloof – why does Caesar need to be recognised as an equal by people he intends to rule over one day? That much is made clear in Dio's later claim (before the battle of Pharsalus) that Caesar's only desire was to rule over the Romans and dominate them, whereas Pompey wanted to be *primus inter pares*. We shall return to this idea in Section Four.

### Part Three: Cicero's exile

The narrative leading up to Cicero's exile starts with the Vettius affair. Lachenaud has claimed that the fact that Dio records the incident must speak of his desire to 'discredit' Cicero.<sup>65</sup> Yet, Cicero is also implicated by Appian (along with Bibulus and Cato –

---

<sup>64</sup> Cass. Dio 38.11.5.

<sup>65</sup> Lachenaud (2008): 216. 'Ses relations...sont présentées de manière à le discréditer'.

Dio has Cicero and Lucullus) and Suetonius presents a garbled account.<sup>66</sup> Most interesting of all is what Cicero says of the matter himself. Cicero claims that Vettius, an old informer (*index*) of his, had not named Cicero as an ‘assassin’ in the curia, but when he was presented to the people, he alluded very strongly to Cicero (referring to ‘an eloquent consular’).<sup>67</sup> Obviously, Dio is tapping into existing rumours that Cicero was involved in the matter, but what sets him apart is that (though he agrees with Appian that the affair was not credited with serious belief), he *himself* is prepared to credit the rumour, something that confirms Dio’s stance on the parlous state of politics in the late Republic.

Cicero’s motives for trying to kill Pompey and Caesar are presented as the result of Caesar’s political successes, both as consul and in tricking Pompey. Whilst it may seem odd that Cicero, for these reasons, would want to kill Pompey as well, the connexion is, I think, intended to draw a further parallel between Caesar’s and Cicero’s actions. Cicero, as we have noted, mishandles the situation spectacularly and continually builds up against himself a wall of animosity. Caesar, as Dio notes, *πανταχόθεν ἐκρατύνηται*.<sup>68</sup> With his usual acumen and cunning, Caesar ensures that all laws passed for his benefit during his consulship (Dio specifies these as the proconsulship of Illyria and Cisalpine Gaul with three legions for five years)<sup>69</sup> are passed under the name of others, so that *ῥῆγον πάνθ’ ὅσων ἐπεθύμει κατειργάσατο*.<sup>70</sup> In fact, into such a position of prominence had Caesar risen that people *were willing* to do whatever he wanted (*ὅσα ἠθέλησε*), both in the senate and among the people.<sup>71</sup>

More interesting is the politicking that Caesar gets up to. Worried that Pompey might turn against him when he is fighting in Gaul, Caesar establishes marital connexions

---

<sup>66</sup> App. *B.C.* 2.43; Suet. *Div. Jul.* 17.2. Plut. *Vit. Luc.* 42.7 merely mentions that the ‘plot’ was an attempt by Pompey to discredit Lucullus

<sup>67</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2.24.2-3.

<sup>68</sup> Cass. Dio 38.9.2. The next part of the sentence begins *Κικέρων δὲ*.

<sup>69</sup> Cass. Dio 38.8.5.

<sup>70</sup> Cass. Dio 38.8.3.

<sup>71</sup> Cass. Dio 38.8.4. This was so because Caesar was judged *ἀναγκαίου καὶ χρησίμου τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐτοῦ ὄντος*.

with both Pompey himself and with Piso, the consul designate.<sup>72</sup> It is at this point that Dio leaves Caesar and narrates Cicero's part in the Vettius affair. The comparison, yet again, that Dio seems to be making is one between the astute, driven and popular Caesar and the erratic Cicero. Caesar carries out his actions through other people, like Cicero, but whereas he achieves his goal because people are willing to placate him, Cicero fails and ends up being distrusted when Vettius betrays him. Caesar neutralises a serious political threat through alliance and goodwill gestures. Cicero tries the cruder method of murder and achieves a cruder result. Another difference that seems to recur throughout these moments of comparison is Caesar's focus and Cicero's lack of it. Dio's Caesar is very much in control of his own destiny – he knows what he wants, knows precisely how to get it and manages to keep people onside (until his dictatorship, when public feeling turns against him and he does little to assuage it). All of his actions are driven by the same goal: the acquisition of power at the expense of his enemies. Cicero lacks Caesar's focus and he flits from one mistake to another (and between different sides). This in part seems to be a reason for his constant failure.

Immediately on the heels of Dio's account of the Vettius affair comes his narrative of Cicero's role in the trial of Antonius Hybrida. Hybrida had been accused of provincial maladministration, though Dio suggests that the main motivation for bringing him to trial had been his dubious role in the Catilinarian conspiracy. As we saw above Dio claims that Cicero used the opportunity to assail Caesar both with accusations (of filing the suit against Hybrida) and abuse.<sup>73</sup> Millar has argued that Dio has over-emphasised the caustic nature of Cicero's comments, which is probably broadly true, though the point is that what Dio sees as foolish self-confidence against overwhelming opposition has some bearing on reality -

---

<sup>72</sup> Cass. Dio 38.9.1.

<sup>73</sup> Cass. Dio 38.10.4.

Cicero (both in this speech and in several others) chose to stand against the men he thought were destroying the Republic and suffered the consequences.<sup>74</sup>

Dio takes up these themes in his account. He claims that Cicero attacked Caesar in the speech *ὡς καὶ αἰτίου τῆς δίκης αὐτῷ γεγενημένου*.<sup>75</sup> Cary translates this as ‘whom he held responsible for the suit against him’, which does little justice to Dio’s point. *Ὡς* here refers to what Cicero says, not what he thinks, so that our passage should read ‘[saying] that he had been responsible for the trial against him’. Cicero himself never explicitly mentioned Caesar in the trial, as Millar notes, and Dio is here making Cicero’s speech much more caustic than it was. Moreover, Dio’s assertion of Cicero’s lack of restraint in attacking a powerful (not to mention deadly) man, and doing so at a time when he is suspected of harbouring plans against Caesar highlights Cicero’s outspokenness. Dio’s belief that Cicero held his tongue for no man may be the reason Dio seems to suggest that the speech contained direct attacks on Caesar – after all, it would be perfectly commensurate with Cicero’s character as Dio understands it.

Ironically, Caesar’s policy towards vengeance, as we saw in Part Two, would normally have left Cicero well alone: he was an irritating gnat feeding from the elephantine bulk of the triumvirs. Cicero is again his own worst enemy – it is only because Clodius presents such a simple opportunity to move against Cicero that Caesar even bothers. Dio, I think, has either misunderstood the issue or misrepresented it carelessly. Dio says that Clodius was in Caesar’s debt because Caesar had not accused him of adultery with his wife. No mention is made either here or at 37.45.1-2, when the Bona Dea scandal is narrated, of Cicero’s evidence about Clodius’ actions. This is a fairly large omission on Dio’s part and is difficult to explain (particularly since the rest of his account is fairly faithful to the usual narrative). Dio *does* mention that Clodius felt a hatred of the *Optimates* for trying to

---

<sup>74</sup> Millar (1964): 48. He irrelevantly cites Cic. *Dom.* 16.41.

<sup>75</sup> Cass. Dio 38.10.4.

prosecute him for the Bona Dea scandal.<sup>76</sup> There is a lacuna in the text, though it is not likely to be very long and it is hard to see where Cicero could have been mentioned.<sup>77</sup> We should assume that Dio probably felt a general reference to the *Optimates* was enough to cover Cicero's involvement. He does the same thing in Book 46, when he claims that the senate sought to play Antony off against Octavian and Brutus and Cassius, which was rather more Cicero's personal policy.<sup>78</sup>

Clodius' attack represents perhaps the most famous passage in Dio's critique of Cicero, one that I hope can better be understood in the light of my study of the rest of Dio's narrative. Dio claims that Clodius was afraid of moving against Cicero, a man who had great influence as a result of his powers of speech, so he decided to try and alienate him from his power-base, the senate and *equites*.<sup>79</sup> He was able to do this because Cicero "held power because of fear more than good-will" (*διὰ φόβον μᾶλλον ἢ δι' εὐνοϊαν ἰσχύοντα*).<sup>80</sup> Cicero's aggressive speech-making had injured and alienated more people than it had ever helped during his time as a forensic lawyer – and, as Dio notes, people are more likely to nurture their anger and sense of injustice than they are to repay a kind favour.<sup>81</sup> There is nothing in this intrinsically ahistorical or hostile to Cicero. It has long been noted that the criticism here (and explored below) is also made by Plutarch.<sup>82</sup> Nor is the criticism simple hostility, but a statement of 'fact': Cicero failed to see the long-term consequences of his oratory. People, as Dio says, were not attracted to him because he made himself popular, but because they were bound to him by ties of clientship. His enemies were

---

<sup>76</sup> Cass. Dio 37.51.1.

<sup>77</sup> The two emendations given by Boissevain are *τὸ μισεῖν* or *δι' ὀργῆς ἔχων*. The passage reads *Κλώδιος δὲ ἐπεθύμησε μὲν διὰ ... τοὺς δυνατοὺς* etc. It is unlikely that Cicero would have been mentioned simply because Greek would normally place *οἱ δυνατοὶ* before Cicero (e.g. *τοὺς τε δυνατοὺς καὶ τὸν Κικέρωνα*). We would also have to extrapolate a word like 'especially' (*μάλιστα, ἄλλως τε καὶ*), making it seem even more unlikely.

<sup>78</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1-4.

<sup>79</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.4. One cannot help but feel that this passage contains elements 'favourable' to Cicero as well as negative.

<sup>80</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.4.

<sup>81</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.5.

<sup>82</sup> Millar (1964): 49, citing Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 5.6; 24; 27.1. Millar speculates that Dio might have used Plutarch's *Life of Cicero* as a source for some of this material.

embittered by their humiliation at his hands and their resentment was stronger than any friendship based upon a purely practical relationship could ever be.<sup>83</sup> One last comparison between Caesar and Cicero might occur to the reader – Caesar won Clodius’ obedience in a good-will gesture (not prosecuting him); Cicero’s clients are not so personally attached to him, since they paid him for his services – there was no surprise charity about it. This, as I have stated, is not so much hostility on Dio’s part as a kind of exasperation. Cicero should have shown more caution and more self-restraint than he did.

Cicero’s *φιλονεικία* is explored further. We have seen how Cicero attempted to antagonise Caesar, and here we are told that Caesar was not the only object of Cicero’s ambitions:

πικροτάτους ἐχθροὺς ἐαυτῷ ἐσεποίει περιεῖναι τε καὶ τῶν κρατίστων ἀεὶ ποτε ἐπιχειρῶν καὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ χρώμενος, ἅτε καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ δύνασθαι συνεῖναι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν ἂ μὴδεῖς ἄλλος, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χρηστὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν, θηρώμενος.<sup>84</sup>

Harsh words, it is true, and rather sweeping.<sup>85</sup> Plutarch’s account at least points to Crassus as an example of a person antagonised by Cicero with his rhetoric.<sup>86</sup> Here there is only a very broad generalisation (though not entirely inaccurate – even if the claim ignores the fact that Cicero quite often sought to avoid naming important people directly in his speeches, the references are usually far from subtle and are sometimes provocative, such as in his *in toga candida*).<sup>87</sup> The claim, however, fits in with the model we have been building up; Cicero earned so much hatred because of his *φιλονεικία* – he is determined to insult and goad even the most powerful men in the state, unlike, as we have seen, Caesar.

<sup>83</sup> There is a suggestion that Cicero would have it so. Cass. Dio 38.12.5 claims that people, when they have been insulted, *τοὺς δ’ ἀντιδικήσαντας ἀμύνεσθαι τρόπον τινὰ προαιρεῖσθαι*, which is suggestive of Cicero’s *φιλονεικία*, given what we saw earlier about his attempts to provoke a response.

<sup>84</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.6.

<sup>85</sup> Made harsher by the claims of the next sentence. Cicero, as well as all of this, was a terrible boaster, arrogant, superior and ended up being hated for these things by even those who otherwise liked him. Cass. Dio 38.12.7.

<sup>86</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 25.1-26.2.

<sup>87</sup> Asc. 83.18C. Particularly Cicero’s description of “*hominis nobilis et valde in hoc largitionis quaestu noti et cogniti*”, which Asconius ascribes to either Caesar or Crassus. I see no reason, therefore, to doubt the veracity of what Dio is saying, even if the comment is made in a sweeping and over-simplified manner.

Interestingly, Dio focuses (for a change) on Cicero's more intellectual pursuits, expressed as his desire for reputation. However, unlike Cicero's philosophical and historical pretensions (which are dealt with in the Philiscus dialogue), Dio has little time for his rhetorical abilities. Cicero puts his pursuit of oratorical greatness above the needs of the state and, given Dio's constant emphasis on Cicero's frankness, his speeches can have a very negative effect on political life indeed. However, it is Cicero's placing of his reputation before the good of Rome that is his cardinal failing in Dio's eyes. Dio was very concerned not only with public order but with civic responsibility. He believed that duty to the state (as well as obedience to its needs) was the highest aim for all people.<sup>88</sup> As we have seen elsewhere, Dio sees the fall of the Republic as intrinsically linked to the growth of personal ambition and the breakdown of public duty on the part of the political elite (among other causes) and so Cicero needs to be seen in context. Dio's history is full of cases where speeches are put to good (and to bad) use. Cicero had employed speeches that might have been colourful or shocking but were ultimately in the state's best interest (as in the Catilinarian conspiracy) and composes a speech in Book 44 providing a solution to the state's problems (viz. the amnesty speech) which is full of noble (and very Dionian) sentiment. But, inevitably, Cicero's oratorical ability mostly serves for Dio to increase Cicero's power or support, to provoke and antagonise or to slander and attack. Indeed, one of the things we shall explore in the amnesty speech is the relationship between the fine sentiments there (albeit ones imbued with *πάθος*) and Cicero's actions afterwards, particularly his *Philippic* (Calenus, tellingly, sees a major gulf between Cicero's professed sentiments in the former and the provocation in the latter, not to mention Cicero's desire for oratorical fame at the expense of the state). The point is that Dio's Cicero *could* have been a benefactor of the state, one who served its interest with his oratory, much as

---

<sup>88</sup> Millar (1964): 75.

Catulus did in Book 36, or Fabricius, who advised Pyrrhus.<sup>89</sup> Instead, he chooses to cultivate a reputation for speaking, and uses his oratory to upset and goad his superiors for the sake of victory, thus putting himself in the same category as the likes of Caesar or Pompey, both of whom let personal ambition get in the way of civic duty – and end up hastening the fall of the Republic, something Cicero himself arguably does when he attacks Antony (though the situation is by this stage out of everyone’s hands bar Antony’s and Octavian’s, as we shall see).

Clodius begins to move against Cicero and Cicero, for all his sagacity, is duped.<sup>90</sup> This sentence might seem dismissive, but Cicero’s gullibility becomes a significant theme in the moments leading up to his exile, arguably an extension of his incautiousness. Later, when Cicero gets wind of Clodius’ plans against him (after the passing of the *lex Clodia de civibus Romanis interemptis*), Cicero decides to turn to the triumvirs, more specifically Pompey and Caesar:

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ τε ἄλλα ἰσχυρῶς αὐτῷ ἀντέπρασε, καὶ τὴν βουλευτικὴν ἐσθῆτα ἀπορρίψας ἐν τῇ ἰππᾶδι περιενόστει, πάντας τε τοὺς τι δυναμένους, οὐχ ὅπως τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν τε Πομπήιον καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα ἅτε μὴδὲ τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοῦ προσποιούμενον, καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ὁμοίως περιῶν ἐθεράπευε.<sup>91</sup>

It is certainly rather surprising that Cicero seeks help from Pompey and Caesar given Dio’s narrative. These were both men whom he had attempted to have murdered and in the case of the latter, had recently insulted and lambasted him with a violent speech. Cicero’s naivety is quite incredible, though in part he is forced to desperate circumstances by Clodius’ plot.<sup>92</sup> If Cicero felt he was going to get any comfort from Caesar and Pompey, he was very much mistaken – they, after all, were the ones who set Clodius against him.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> Cass. Dio 36.31.1-36.3; frg. 40.29-38.

<sup>90</sup> Cass. Dio 38.14.3. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω, καίτοι φρονιμώτατος ἀξιῶν εἶναι, τότε ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλωδίου...ἠπατήθη. It is undeniable that Dio’s tone is hostile.

<sup>91</sup> Cass. Dio 38.14.7.

<sup>92</sup> For evidence that Dio’s exploration of Cicero’s naivety might not be too out of place for this period, see Cic. *ad Att.* 2.3.4.

<sup>93</sup> Cass. Dio 38.15.1.

However, true to deceptive form, Caesar and Pompey wish to distance themselves from Clodius, presumably to avoid the *odium* that Dio has claimed attaches to one who takes revenge. Again, they exploit Cicero's ignorance of their collusion, by giving him conflicting advice. Caesar advises him to retreat and leave the city, offering him a place with his legions in Gaul; Pompey, *casting aspersions on Caesar's motives*,<sup>94</sup> encourages Cicero to stand and fight.<sup>95</sup> It is hardly surprising which advice Cicero takes:

τῷ Πομπηίῳ προσέθετο. οὔτε γὰρ προῦπόπτει τί ἐς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐπίστευε πάντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σωθήσεσθαι. τῶν τε γὰρ ἄλλων πολλοὶ καὶ ἡδοῦντο αὐτόν καὶ ἐτίμων ὥστε καὶ κινδυνεύοντας συχνοὺς τοὺς μὲν παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν τοὺς δὲ καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγόρων ῥυέσθαι.<sup>96</sup>

Cicero's choice would seem reasonable and logical if Dio had not made us aware of 'Pompey's' real motives. Cicero's seems rather too trusting in his regard for Pompey's reputation and in Dio's use of the phrase **ἐπίστευε πάντως**. It is further compounded by two observations on 'Cicero's' reasoning that Dio gives later. He claims that Cicero felt he could trust Gabinius because the man was a friend and that he could trust Piso because he seemed well-disposed and *was a friend of Caesar*.<sup>97</sup> These men had long since been bribed to do his bidding by Clodius, but Cicero's flawed logic is the most interesting. It is the culmination of Dio's claim that our friends are less willing to help us than our enemies to wrong us and his depiction of the levels of deceit the Triumvirs were prepared to use to successfully push their policies through.<sup>98</sup>

It seems to me that Cicero's faith in Pompey ties in with his **φιλονεικία**. Dio nowhere makes this explicit (although I shall cite a passage which lends it weight), but it is very interesting that of the two options facing Cicero, he chooses the one telling him to stand and fight. Perhaps a comparison with Plutarch might draw this out. In Dio, Caesar offers Cicero an opportunity to join his legions in Gaul, **ὅπως μὴ μετ' ὀνειδούς ὡς καὶ**

---

<sup>94</sup> Unsurprisingly, Caesar's **ἔχθρα** is mentioned (Cass. Dio 38.15.3).

<sup>95</sup> Cass. Dio 38.15.2-4.

<sup>96</sup> Cass. Dio 38.15.4-5.

<sup>97</sup> Cass. Dio 38.15.6.

<sup>98</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.5.

ὑπεύθυνος ὢν, ἀλλὰ ἐπί τε ἀρχῆς καὶ μετὰ τιμῆς ἐκποδῶν δὴ τῷ Κλωδίῳ γένηται.<sup>99</sup> Cicero refuses and stays in Rome. Plutarch, however, couches this differently. He claims that the proposal was put *by* Cicero *to* Caesar, despite the mutual hostility and suspicion between the two men.<sup>100</sup> Clodius pretends a reconciliation before the latter accepts and the proposal is dropped by Cicero, much to Caesar’s chagrin.<sup>101</sup> Aside from the fact that Dio’s version here accords more closely with Cicero’s correspondence (and thus, almost certainly, what actually happened), Dio selects and emphasises this episode precisely because it fulfills his historiographical vision of Cicero and the failure of Republican government.<sup>102</sup> Cicero’s part is to feud, not give up once a challenge has been issued, the sum total of his **ἀντιφιλονεικία**.

I alluded above to a passage in Dio which lends weight to this conclusion. That passage is:

τούτοις τε οὖν τοῖς λογισμοῖς κρατήσῃ ἐλπίσας (καὶ γὰρ ἐθάρσει παρὰ λόγον ὥσπερ ἀνεξετάστως ἔδεδιει), καὶ φοβηθεὶς μὴ καὶ ἐκ πονηροῦ συνειδότες τὴν ἀποδημίαν πεποιήσθαι δόξῃ, τῷ μὲν Καίσαρι χάριν δὴ τινα ἔχειν ἔλεγε, τῷ δὲ δὴ Πομπηίῳ ἐπέισθη.<sup>103</sup>

The passage confirms Cicero’s lack of caution – he acts without reason or regard for the situation – as well as his turbulent character – he becomes confident and afraid in quick succession. The passage speaks of Cicero’s over-confidence, his willingness to fight because he is afraid of opprobrium and his clutching at all straws. This fits with his **φιλονεικία**, but also is suggestive of a certain **φιλονικία**, since Cicero is determined to defeat Clodius.

The language of Dio’s account is very much that of **στάσις** and **φιλονεικία**. Cicero, Dio tells us, was preparing for a tremendous victory and marshalling his supporters among

---

<sup>99</sup> Cass. Dio 38.15.2.

<sup>100</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 30.3.

<sup>101</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 30.4-5.

<sup>102</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2.20.2. Cicero, interestingly, gives weight to Dio’s assertions about his **φιλονεικία** (Cic. *ad Att.* 2.19.4): “honestior haec declinatio periculi, sed ego hoc non repudio. quid ergo est? pugnare malo”. Other passages also suggest violence: 2.20.5; 2.21.6; 2.22.2.

<sup>103</sup> Cass. Dio 38.16.1.

the *equites*.<sup>104</sup> Clearly, Clodius' attempts to wrest Cicero's support from him (as well as the impact of Cicero's abrasive personality) were not enough to undermine seriously his support among the upper echelons of Roman society. One might view the equestrian support (as well as that of distinguished senators, Hortensius and Curio), as a 'favourable' moment in Dio's narrative. The fact remains, however, that Cicero is gearing up for conflict and his over-confidence will harm both him and the state. However (again *φιλονεικία*), Dio claims that the conflict was mismatched:

ἀλλ' ἦν γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν αὐτοῦ δυνατώτερα, οὔτε ὁ Κλώδιος χρηματίσασθαι τι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τῷ Νιννίῳ ἐπέτρεψεν, οὔτε Γαβίνιος τὴν πρόσδοτον τοῖς ἰππεύουσιν ἐς τὴν βουλήν ἔδωκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἓνα τινὰ αὐτῶν, ὡς πολλὸς ἐνέκειτο, καὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξήλασε, τῷ τε Ὀρτησίῳ καὶ τῷ Κουρίωνι, ὅτι καὶ ἀθροισθεῖσι σφισι συνεγένοντο καὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν ὑπέστησαν, ἐπεκάλει.<sup>105</sup>

It is the fact that Cicero's enemies are able to defeat him comprehensively that interests us. Cicero's support is senatorial, elite and traditional (distinguished senators, petitions from the *equites* to the senate, the peaceful nature of the protest). His enemies use cruder methods to counter him: Clodius uses his tribunician veto, one of Cicero's supporters is expelled from the city because he is an inconvenience and the *equites* are forbidden from approaching the senate. Cicero himself may be unreasonably confident and determined to feud, but his support base is fundamentally the bluff support for a respected consular one expects in Republican Rome. His enemies are more populist and insidious. If anything, Cicero's exile in Dio's account says less about him and more about the sheer power (at the expense of the state) that the 'triumvirs' enjoy.

Cicero's reactions are consistent with Dio's normal portrayal and serve to highlight his *φιλονεικία*:

---

<sup>104</sup> Cass. Dio 38.16.2.

<sup>105</sup> Cass. Dio 38.16.4.

*Ἰδὼν οὖν ταῦθ' ὁ Κικέρων καὶ φοβηθεὶς αὐθις ἐπεχείρησε μὲν ὄπλα ἄρασθαι (τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον φανερώς προσηλάκιζε), κωλυθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τε τοῦ Κάτωνος καὶ τοῦ Ὀρτησίου, μὴ καὶ ἐμφύλιος ἐκ τούτου πόλεμος γένηται.<sup>106</sup>*

Plutarch's account is somewhat different. There, Cicero realises that there are only two options open to him: flight (*φεύγειν*) or to fight it out with Clodius with violence and iron (*βία καὶ σιδήρῳ κριθῆναι πρὸς τὸν Κλώδιον*).<sup>107</sup> Cicero realises that such action would be inappropriate and goes into exile voluntarily, though mournfully.<sup>108</sup> It is interesting (and I wish here to skirt the issue of sources) that Dio's version is truncated in comparison to Plutarch's. A case could be made that Dio's cynicism is more accurate than Plutarch's optimistic view of Cicero's character. One historian has put it that "Cicero, in spite of his claim that he voluntarily withdrew into exile in order to prevent bloodshed, would probably have resisted Clodius at the risk of civil war if he thought he had any chance of success" and Cicero's claim to Atticus that he is prepared to fight Clodius at any cost bears this out.<sup>109</sup> The real significance, however, is historiographical. The impetuosity, lack of restraint and the uncompromising *φιλονεικία* of Cicero are all highlighted (though probably not exaggerated) in the claim. This is borne out by his slander against Pompey once he realises that that man will not help him.

After this, Cicero goes into exile and there is a rather sympathetic moment in Dio's narrative as this happens. Dio mentions Cicero's placing of a statue of Minerva on the Capitoline and his words about Cicero's mental state when going into exile echo Cicero's fears when he began fighting back against Clodius, forming a kind of ring cycle, emphasising both Cicero's failure and weakness in the face of his enemies and also the humiliation of all of his political designs.<sup>110</sup> Perhaps we also get a sense of the futility of it all: Cicero was the whole time hood-winked, fighting against people who professed to be

---

<sup>106</sup> Cass. Dio 38.17.4.

<sup>107</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 31.2.

<sup>108</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 31.5.

<sup>109</sup> Dorey (1965): 34. For Cicero's correspondence, see above, n. 102. There is obviously some exaggeration here.

<sup>110</sup> Cass. Dio 38.17.5. Compare with 38.16.1.

his friends. Perhaps the greatest treachery of all is that, as soon as Cicero's back was turned, even those who were supposed to be his most ardent supporters vote to exile him. A further moment of sympathy lies in Dio's catalogue of measures taken against Cicero in his absence (his house is demolished "like that of an enemy" – *ἡ οἰκία ὡσπερ τινὸς πολεμίου κατεσκάφη*; he is forbidden by the terms of his exile to stay in Sicily, despite his hopes of being welcomed there).

### Conclusion

We have seen several salient features of Dio's portrait of Cicero's early political career, principally his *φιλονεικία*, a quality which has occasional overtones of a 'love of victory' as well as the more typical 'love of strife', his desire for glory and his ultimate failure, largely as a result of the mistakes he makes which we have discussed above. I have identified a kind of acceleration of Cicero's character flaws leading up to the moment of exile. Not only does Dio's Cicero become more desperate and determined to fight whatever the cost, but he becomes even more irrational and erratic: he flits between fear and confidence, clutches at straws, attempts to enlist the support of people whom he has antagonised past the point of reconciliation and happily prepares to let loose civil war on the state for the sake of his reputation (possibly a sly nod towards Caesar's professed motives for civil war). His deserts are not popular *odium*, or distrust, but full blown destruction. In all of these failures and mistakes we see the true dilemma facing the Republic. Cicero, strives too hard to be a senior statesman, causing political turmoil (and nearly civil war), feeds the divisions between the senate and the people and in the process vies jealously with those who are stronger than himself. The sense of social duty that characterises the early Republic in Dio is gone and it is replaced by selfishness on the part of the political elite. It is a tinderbox ready to ignite, as it surely does, in civil war, when someone more competent and cunning than Cicero sets the match to it – Caesar.

## Appendix

Dio's evidence for Cicero's involvement with Manilius in 67 B.C. has been the subject of scholarly dispute over the last century. An analysis of the discussion, as well as an argument in favour of Dio's evidence, will hopefully lend support to the historiographical conclusions we have drawn in this chapter.

Dio's description of the trial of Manilius is lacking in important detail. Firstly, Plutarch informs us that the trial took place two or three days before the end of Cicero's term in office, whereas Dio is less specific, noting merely that the year was coming to an end (*ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ τὸ ἔτος*). Secondly, Plutarch claims that Manilius was demanding the 10 days customary to collect evidence, whereas Dio claims merely that he was trying to stall the process (*ἐκεῖνου χρόνον τινὰ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῇ σπουδάζοντος*). But the most crucial difference between the two accounts concerns Cicero's actions when compelled by the tribunes to appear before the people. Plutarch states that Cicero claimed that in trying to bring Manilius to trial before the appointed 10 day interval *he was trying to help* Manilius and that Cicero inveighed against the enemies of Pompey and a small clique of *nobiles*.<sup>111</sup> Dio's account, as we have seen above, simply states that Cicero lambasted the senate as a whole and promised to take up the defence of Manilius in a future trial.<sup>112</sup>

Plutarch's viewpoint has been championed by Phillips, who argues that Cicero was honest in his claim. Manilius was tried for *repetundae*, the procedure for which involves a two-part trial with a break in between (the so-called *comperendinatio*) and Cicero hoped to

---

<sup>111</sup> Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 9.4-6 for all three examples. See Cass. Dio 36.44.1-2 for Dio's version.

<sup>112</sup> Cass. Dio 36.44.2.

hold the first half of the trial at the end of 66, in the hope that the *comperendinatio* would fall during a period of down-time for the courts and thus limit the effects of the prosecution's evidence (much as had been attempted against Cicero himself in the trial of Verres), by blunting it with forgetfulness and allowing Manilius time to acquire evidence to strengthen his defence.<sup>113</sup> "It is...hardly credible that Cicero tried to curry favour with the *Optimates* by endeavouring to secure Manilius' conviction and then made a last-minute volte-face to save his own skin", he claims.<sup>114</sup>

There are several problems with this view, however. Why do Cicero's and Manilius' actions seem so unsynchronised in all of the accounts if they were working together? Surely they would have co-ordinated better than to have Manilius demanding the full ten days allowed to a defendant of *repetundae* and Cicero refusing to let him have it? There is also the problem of the trial *de repetundis* itself. Normally, a trial for *repetundae* was reserved for magistrates who had commanded a province, since the *quaestio repetundarum* was established to allow provincials who had been abused by a rapacious governor the opportunity to penalise him. It is very unusual, therefore, to find a former Tribune of the plebs tried for *repetundae* and in Manilius we have our only example. The charge was most likely brought under an obscure clause concerning *vis*, since Manilius had resorted to gang violence to pass some of his legislation (the *lex de suffragiis libertinorum*).<sup>115</sup> But the legal details only reinforce the conclusion that Cicero, as Urban Praetor, and head of the *quaestio repetundarum* must have been a central factor in the minds of the men who brought Manilius to trial in 66 B.C.<sup>116</sup>

---

<sup>113</sup> Again, not mentioned in Dio. Plutarch has *κλοπή* (Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 9.4) which is clearly a mistranslation. Asconius, our most reliable source, informs us that the charge was *de repetundis* (Asc. 60.10-15C).

<sup>114</sup> Phillips (1970): 598.

<sup>115</sup> Asc. 45.12-16C. See Ward (1970): 546.

<sup>116</sup> Brennan (2000): 237-9.

The significance of the two stages to a trial *de repetundis* can be readily dismissed if we hypothesise that the trial was a red herring.<sup>117</sup> Whoever it was who brought Manilius to trial dropped it at the end of 66 and reinstated a new trial, *de maiestate*,<sup>118</sup> in the next year, more in keeping with the offences Manilius committed whilst in office (he had held illegal *contiones*, passed laws with violence and used slaves as voters, all of which offended both the majesty of the Roman state and the gods). This is given extra weight when we remember that in the late Republic, prosecutors often could employ several different laws for the same offence, meaning that the evidence assembled for a later prosecution *de maiestate* could be wheeled out at the end of 66 B.C. for a trial *de repetundis*.<sup>119</sup> Given Cicero's attempts to steer a path between the various groups of Roman society at the time, it seems to me most likely that the prosecution was an attempt to pin Cicero down; Cicero decided to hedge his bets by bringing the trial forward to his own praetorship (he could, and did, argue later that it was to help Manilius, whilst at the same time showing willing to the prosecutors) and when Pompey's supporters found out, they pressurised him in front of the people. This could presumably explain why Cicero later reneged on the promise to defend Manilius in 65 that he made *in contione*, excusing himself on the grounds that Manilius had resorted to violent measures in the courtroom.<sup>120</sup>

Dio's account is, of course, sweeping and almost certainly does not make the connections that I have here. Dio's picture of Cicero's railing against the senate, as well as the unpopularity he incurs as a result of his actions are typical features of his picture of Cicero, which jar with the more nuanced and favourable view of Plutarch (which is subject

---

<sup>117</sup> Ramsey (1980): 329 argues that the trial of Manilius could simply have been a one part trial, using the *quo ea pecunia* clause of the *lex Cornelia de repetundis*, which allowed prompt prosecution of those involved in with another litigant who had been previously convicted of *repetundae* (such as a prosecutor accused of collusion with the defence). Whilst an attractive theory, it lacks the authority of evidence; surely we would have heard of a successful trial *de repetundis* that occurred during Cicero's praetorship? If it were true, however, then it would raise interesting questions about Cicero's actions in the trial, since he could quite simply have thrown it out of court without a hearing, as Laterensis did some 10 years later (Cic. *Ad fam.* 8.8.2).

<sup>118</sup> Schol. Bob. 22.

<sup>119</sup> See Greenidge (1901): 418.

<sup>120</sup> Asc. 60.10-12.

to its own internal laws as well). These faults, however, are not arbitrary. They display Dio's tendency to elaborate on and exaggerate the themes he found in Republican history and not some deliberate attempt to falsify Cicero's actions in order to discredit him.

## Chapter Six: Cicero and the death of Republicanism

### Introduction

In this chapter we shall jump to the end of Cicero's political career, to look more closely at what Cicero does in the moments succeeding Caesar's death. We shall focus on the speech he delivers shortly after the Ides of March in favour of amnesty (the so-called 'amnesty speech') and those which he and Calenus deliver in debate. Dio's speeches are not highly regarded among modern scholars, however, and we need to challenge these assumptions before we can move on. Millar has argued that Dio expresses two sole preoccupations with his speeches; the exercise of mercy and the nature of one man rule.<sup>1</sup>

Millar goes on to conclude that:

"Dio's speeches carry further the tendency towards generality and lack of apposite detail which characterises his History as a whole...they are undoubtedly an accurate reflection of Dio's time, when the principal causes of tension lay in relations between the Emperor and the governing class and between the army and society...they are disappointing, for Dio's reasoning is banal and unoriginal".<sup>2</sup>

Van Stekelenburg, who authors the only comprehensive study of Dio's speeches to date, accepts Millar's assertions, arguing that Dio's speeches are nothing more than rhetorical set pieces, of the kind schoolboys were familiar with writing in antiquity.<sup>3</sup> However, Millar's observations are not without challenge. Rich has argued that "Dio used speeches, like Thucydides, to develop ideas which were important to him".<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Millar's argument is based upon his overall conclusion about the value of Dio's work that

---

<sup>1</sup> Millar (1964): 78-83. Cf. Millar (1961): 11-22.

<sup>2</sup> Millar (1964): 83.

<sup>3</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 14-16.

<sup>4</sup> Rich (1990): 12.

“Dio...formulate[d] no general historical views whatsoever”.<sup>5</sup> We have elsewhere suggested that this is an unfair claim, ignoring the way that Dio structures his depiction of the fall of the Republic around issues of human nature, empire and political society.

As Pitcher points out, hard and fast generalisations about speeches in ancient history are unsafe and ignore potentially heated debates among ancient writers about what constituted good practice.<sup>6</sup> However, Dio does not express any novel or unique methodology, nor does he query the place of truth in speech-writing. It seems that he was happy enough to follow the general principle that the speech had to be ‘faithful’ to the speaker and the situation and that it could provide opportunity for “a more abstract analysis of the underlying issues at stake in actions that were seen as important or distinctive” as we shall demonstrate both here and in Chapters Seven, Nine and Ten.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, I argue against the idea that the amnesty speech bears no relationship to Cicero’s character, showing instead how it is integral to Dio’s conception of the last days of the Republic. I shall show that the debate with Calenus was written very much with the amnesty speech’s sentiments in mind, so that the whole forms an historiographic conceit, where Cicero is ‘reminded’ of his past service to the state. Calenus’ speech cannot be taken as an accurate record of Cicero’s political career or personality (as Lintott has read it), since the speech is obviously an attempt to recreate the polemics of the 40s B.C. Likewise, ‘Cicero’s *Philippic*’, as has been proved by the Budé editors, is full of references to Cicero’s real *Philippics*. Both speeches, therefore, represent an attempt by Dio to recreate the climate of 43 B.C. but they are also tied into Dio’s personal exegesis on the collapse of the Republic, and Cicero’s claims about Antony’s character are largely found, in one way or another, in Dio’s narrative of the period. Both speeches also serve another historiographical function in that they are both very partisan. When Calenus calls upon

---

<sup>5</sup> Millar (1964): 118.

<sup>6</sup> Pitcher (2009a): 103-111.

<sup>7</sup> Marincola (2007): 119. See more generally Fornara (1983): 142-168; Woodman (1988): 11-15; Hansen (1993): 161-180; Pitcher (2007): 110-112.

Cicero to heed his own words, for example, what are we readers meant to make of the advice? Calenus is on Antony's side and his proposal, not to act against Antony any further for the sake of peace, sits uneasily alongside Dio's claim that Antony wanted a revolution and was preparing to wage war on the state whilst the senate was sitting. Equally, Cicero is by this stage in Octavian's pocket – his speech willfully ignores that man's designs on power. The suggestion is that neither speech, or the values they express, will really solve the problems of Rome, nor are they designed to. Words are irrelevant, the power of the senate a joke. Power and the solution lie in the hands of Antony and Octavian: Cicero and Calenus are disingenuous pawns, at the service of their real masters, giving them a superficial constitutional veneer. This serves to confirm Dio's own post-mortem on the death of the Republic.

### **Part One: The Amnesty Speech**

Millar argues of the amnesty speech: "that Dio wrote the speech at all, thus emphasizing Cicero's importance and conciliatory role, must be a result of his fondness for the theme of civil concord and the exercise of mercy", pointing to a few commonplaces of Ciceronian rhetoric in the speech as the sum of Dio's attempt to capture the essence of the original.<sup>8</sup> Van Stekelenburg argues that the 'favourable' impression of Cicero one derives from the speech must be a Livian influence (from whom van Stekelenburg thinks Dio has acquired the model for his amnesty speech),<sup>9</sup> and that the speech is "more or less irrelevant" to the political situation.<sup>10</sup> Gowing has stated that "Dio's speech is not

---

<sup>8</sup> Millar (1964): 52. On the authenticity of the speech, see Fischer (1870): 36-42; Straumer (1872): 2; Gudeman (1894): 147 n.3; Millar (1961): 17-18; Gowing (1992): 232. Fischer has raised the possibility that the *acta senatus* lie behind Dio's speech, on which see Baldwin (1979): 189-293; Posner (1972): 160-185.

<sup>9</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 63, citing Millar (1961): 17, "whenever Dio deals generously with Cicero it is probably not Dio whom we read. In the present case probably Livy". Millar was himself citing another scholar and never entertained this view himself: see Millar (1961): *ibid.* and (1964): 52.

<sup>10</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 157.

uncharacteristic of Cicero”, but, unfortunately, provides no evidence to back this up; he goes on to say that the discussion of harmony and peace elaborated here is “indulging” in “extensive theorising about the necessity of subverting one’s private interests to the public good” and points out that “concrete references to the situation at hand are few”.<sup>11</sup> Other scholars are more direct in their dismissal.<sup>12</sup>

Fechner, who has studied the speech in greater depth, has argued that Dio posits a “Stabilitätsideal”, where the central values of *δμόνοια* and *εἰρήνη* are more important to Dio than monarchy and democracy.<sup>13</sup> Fechner’s discussion of this speech draws out the themes of harmony and peace here presented to support his theory. He argues that Dio through Cicero presents a dichotomy in the speech between the peace and harmony of the ancient Romans and the squabbling, feuding and greed of his (Cicero’s, though arguably Dio’s too) own day.<sup>14</sup> Dio’s point is simple: a return is needed to the good old days. There are problems with this, however. Fechner himself has recognised that Dio mentions *δμόνοια* and *εἰρήνη* because he is trying to replicate a speech of Cicero’s where the latter’s dogma of harmony and peace were an essential component to overcoming a major obstacle to co-operation and stability in the murder of Caesar. It is not a clear-cut representation of Dio’s personal convictions that he includes a call to peace in such a speech. Moreover, Dio’s calls for harmony in the speech are invariably about preserving the Republic (*δημοκρατία*); can we seriously entertain the idea that Dio, a man who firmly believed monarchy to be the only viable form of constitution, would have felt these calls plausible, or indeed relevant to his own time?<sup>15</sup> Indeed, shortly before the amnesty speech, we have one of our central passages, where Dio states that it is impossible for a democracy to abide by harmony (*ἀδύνατον μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ σωφρονῆσαι, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ μὴ*

---

<sup>11</sup> Gowing (1992): 232.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. Schwartz (1899): 1719.

<sup>13</sup> Fechner (1986): 184-197.

<sup>14</sup> Fechner (1986): 60-61.

<sup>15</sup> Fechner (1986): 191. Cf. Gowing (1992): 244

σωφρονοῦσαν ὁμονοῆσαι), that democracy always breeds resentment and jealousy and that it is an inefficient and incompetent form of government for running an empire.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, in the amnesty speech, Cicero says the following:

*Καὶ παρ' ὑμῶν ἦτοι τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ μετὰ ταύτης τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἣ στάσεις καὶ πολέμους ἐμφυλίουσ ἀθίς καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ δεσπότην λαβεῖν.<sup>17</sup>*

The benefit of hindsight informs the reader that there was no option of the former being realised. Dio's intended reader would have known, as soon as he read the passage, that Cicero's words will come to nothing, that harmony is hopeless and destruction and civil war inevitable. The immediate aftermath of the speech in Dio's account is informative. All the time that Cicero is speaking for amnesty, a war for the support of the soldiers is being waged outside between Lepidus and the assassins.<sup>18</sup> The assassins win control over the troops and the amnesty is maintained, but not through the volition of the main antagonists. Lepidus, we are told, was eager to use the death of Caesar as an opportunity to cause revolution (*νεωτέρων πραγμάτων ἐπεθύμει*) and Antony was only unwilling to start a revolution himself at that time (the crucial word is *τότε*) because he feared Lepidus' superiority, a manifestation of *φιλονεικία*.<sup>19</sup> At the beginning of Book 45, Octavian's arrival in Rome is announced, when Dio claims clearly that *ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ὥρμησεν ἐφ' οἷς ὃ τε Καῖσαρ ἐπεφόνευτο*.<sup>20</sup> Even Brutus and Cassius are not without reproach, even if they were less self-serving than the triumvirs; Dio claims that they had murdered Caesar out of *φθόνος*.<sup>21</sup> Where this speech calls for peace and harmony, it is not so much a message to Dio's contemporaries, as a moment deep with *πάθος*. How can amnesty be expected to

---

<sup>16</sup> Cass.Dio 44.2.3-4. Cf. fr 110.2.

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio 44.24.2.

<sup>18</sup> Cass. Dio 44.34.1-3.

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 44.34.4-5.

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 45.4.3.

<sup>21</sup> Cass. Dio 44.1.1.

work, Dio seems to ask, when the Republican system of government is predicated on competition, ambition and excess?

As Sion-Jenkis argues, the true theme of the speech is *φιλονεικία*.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, the word *φιλονεικία* is mentioned in over five of the ten chapters of the speech, as is *πλεονεξία*. She argues rightly that Dio's emphasis on *φιλονεικία* is because he believes that at this point the *στάσις* and civil war of the late Republic was unavoidable.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, Cicero presents his audience with a choice:

*τούτων οὖν οὕτως...ἐχόντων φημι δεῖν ἡμᾶς τὰς μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχθρας ἢ φιλονεικίας, ἢ ὅπως ἂν τις αὐτὰς ὀνομάσῃ, καταλύσασθαι, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὴν παλαιὰν ἐκείνην εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν καὶ δμόνοιαν ἐπανελθεῖν.*<sup>24</sup>

Anyone with but a cursory knowledge of Roman history will know what the outcome will be. The passage also ties in with Dio's claims about the decline of the *ἐπιείκεια* of the Romans of the early Republic; their descendants are no longer in the same position as they to exercise any moderation. As a feud becomes worse and one side looks to be destroyed, the people immediately take sides:

*Τῷ τε ἐλέω τοῦ νενικημένου καὶ τῷ φόβῳ τοῦ κεκρατηκότος, δεῖσάν τε ἅμα μὴ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ πάθῃ, καὶ ἐλπίσαν τὰ αὐτὰ τούτῳ δράσειν, συναίρεται.*<sup>25</sup>

Dio shows us a Rome where class by class, the citizens are sucked into the dispute until the whole populace is involved: the senate first, the *equites* next and then the people, until the whole state is destroyed through their chaos.<sup>26</sup> The language here is very Thucydidean, rich in abstract neuters. In tone it replicates the language of the Corcyraean *στάσις*.<sup>27</sup> This, perhaps, confirms the hopelessness of amnesty, given Thucydides' claims about human nature in the passage.<sup>28</sup> It also may hint at the impossibility of neutrality,

---

<sup>22</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2002): 197.

<sup>23</sup> Sion-Jenkis (2002): 202.

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 44.24.3.

<sup>25</sup> Cass. Dio 44.29.3.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 44.29.4.

<sup>27</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.82.8.

<sup>28</sup> Thuc. 3.82.2.

since at Corcyra those who tried to restrain from factional politics were either driven to collusion or killed (something Dio alludes to elsewhere in the speech).<sup>29</sup> The point Dio makes is a distressing one. Not only does feuding escalate to unnecessary heights of depravity and destruction, but it carries on unstoppably. The people favour now this side, now that, changing their allegiance depending which side is being worsted, never allowing a resolution, never allowing the power struggle to reach its necessary conclusion, but dragging out conflict through fear and ambition.

We also see Dio linking the issues he raises in this speech to ones we have seen him explore in Chapter Two (pp.45-7). Cicero says:

*ἔξεστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι, ἕως ἔτι τὸ δεινὸν ἄρχεται καὶ οὔτε πολλοὶ πω συνεστήκασιν, οἳ τε κεκινήμενοι οὔτε πεπλεονεκτήκασιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων οὔτ' ἡλάττωνται, ὥστ' ἢ ἐλπίδι τοῦ κρείττονος <ἢ> ὀργῇ τοῦ καταδεεστέρου καὶ παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον σφίσις ἀπερισκέπτως κινδυνεύσαι προαχθῆναι.<sup>30</sup>*

The phrase *τὸ δεινὸν ἄρχεται* is reminiscent of Dio's earlier claim about the problems caused by *ἄσωτία* in 187 B.C. Partly Cicero's words here are again ironic, as *τὸ δεινόν* had clearly entered Roman politics a long time before, but there is also the same sense of the *ἐπιείκεια* of the Romans being broken down. We noticed in Chapter One that Dio perceived a struggle between *ὀργή* and *ἐπιείκεια* (pp.37-8), in that the awakening of unreasoning passion was detrimental to Rome's stability. We saw in Chapter Three (pp. 72-7) that this was linked by Dio, in his narrative of the Second Punic War, with the issue of *τὸ δεινόν*. Here again, *τὸ δεινόν* has made itself felt (the meaning of *ἄσωτία* is perhaps echoed by Dio's use of *πλεονεξία* in this passage) with the predictable result that the Romans are led to feuding and fighting with one another due to both *ἐλπίς* and *ὀργή*. By

---

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 44.29.4 (compare Thuc. 3.82.8). Dio copies Thucydides' phrase *τὰ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν*. Thucydides also speaks of *τὸ φιλονεικεῖν* and *φιλονεικία* in this passage.

<sup>30</sup> Cass. Dio 44.31.3.

referencing back to this major idea in his History, Dio is confirming the idea that Rome had no future as a Republican state; the taint of τὸ δεινόν was much too great. In all of this, Cicero's analysis is 'accurate' and, were he himself and the rest of the senatorial nobility to heed it, potentially of tremendous benefit to the state. Regrettably, as Dio brings out in Books 44 and 45, that was not to be.

Dio has here given us a stark vision of what Rome can become in times of political duress, employing the concept of φιλονεικία in particular to draw this out effectively. There is, also, relevance in all of this to his portrait of Cicero. We have seen in Chapter Five (pp.121-124) that Cicero was led by φιλονεικία into, among other things, his dispute with Caesar. We also saw how Dio sees φιλονεικία as a central part of his depiction of Cicero and his political career. In light of that, it is hardly coincidence that, in Cicero's speech for amnesty, the first thing he says is:

Ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγε οἶμαι χρῆναι μηδένα μηδὲν <μήτε πρὸς χάριν μήτε πρὸς φιλονεικίαν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὃ βέλτιστον ἕκαστος εἶναι νομίζει, τοῦτ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι.<sup>31</sup>

Dio is surely making play with his earlier depiction of Cicero. It was, after all, in his speech on behalf of Antonius Hybrida that he lambasted Caesar out of the sense of inferiority and desire for strife made explicit by Dio's use of the word φιλονεικία there. Likewise, Dio sees Cicero often acting out of χάρις, such as when he passes legislation for Pompey on his return from exile, or when he again defends that man's interest in the prosecution of Gabinius. The speech contains similar *double entendres* in later moments:

καὶ γὰρ τοὶ καὶ νομίζω πάντας ὑμᾶς πεπεῖσθαι σαφῶς ὅτι οὔτε φιλίαν οὔτε ἔχθραν πρὸς οὐδένα πώποτε δι' ἑμαυτὸν ἀνειλόμην, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πάντας ὑμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς κοινῆς καὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ ὁμοιοῦς τοὺς μὲν ἐμίσησα τοὺς δε ἠγάπησα.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 44.23.1.

<sup>32</sup> Cass. Dio 44.33.2. This bears some resemblance to Philiscus' hortative speech, where he claims Cicero has acted always with the interests of his fellow Roman at heart (38.22.2). It was as untrue there as it is here, but it represents an interesting echo between the two speeches – that Cicero is more willing to say it than to act upon it, perhaps? Or that the sum of Philiscus's fine advice is that Cicero only pays lip-service to it (as we shall see happens elsewhere)?

Though ‘Cicero’ did seem to act with the state’s best interests at heart during the Catilinarian conspiracy, this statement can hardly be taken as genuinely representative of his political career to date. A cursory glance back over Dio’s narrative will remind the reader of Cicero’s flitting between the people and senate, attacking now this side, now that, purely for the sake of his own political career; Cicero’s hostility towards Caesar, inspired (in Dio at least) by Cicero’s sense of inferiority and desire for political capital; his willingness to resort to arms against Clodius. Then, of course, there is Dio’s statement that Cicero was prepared to overturn the state purely for the sake of his own reputation as a fine speaker.<sup>33</sup> In fairness to Cicero, however, he does intend to lead by example and whilst his speech may make unfounded claims about his political stance throughout his career, he is prepared to compromise (at least here) for the good of the state. ‘Cicero’ confirms Caesar’s bestowal of offices upon his supporters, arguing that their actions under Caesar should be forgiven, despite the fact that he himself was not pleased by them (*καίπερ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενός τισιν αὐτῶν*).<sup>34</sup> The most important part of the passage, however, is *οὔτε φιλίαν οὔτε ἔχθραν πρὸς οὐδένα ... δι’ ἑμαυτὸν ἀνειλόμην*, which we shall discuss further below.<sup>35</sup>

## **Part Two: The Calenus Debate as Sequel to the Amnesty Speech**

One cannot understand the significance of the amnesty speech to Dio’s perceptions of Cicero if one does not think of its relationship to the debate with Calenus that takes place in Books 45-6. The dramatic date of the debate is the 1<sup>st</sup> January 43 B.C. (the date of Cicero’s fifth Philippic, actually delivered against Calenus in the senate), after a

---

<sup>33</sup> Cass. Dio 38.12.6.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 44.33.3.

<sup>35</sup> It is also interesting to speculate what the ‘senate’ might have thought about ‘Cicero’s’ claim that they have believed him to be innocent of *ἔχθρα*, particularly since they accuse him of it during the Catilinarian conspiracy.

series of portents predicting the downfall of the Republic has shaken the city.<sup>36</sup> Cicero's opponent is Q. Fufius Calenus, a supporter of Antony.<sup>37</sup> Book 45 begins with Octavian coming to Rome and almost immediately entering into conflict with Antony.<sup>38</sup> The speeches of Cicero and Calenus stand in the middle of Dio's narrative of the conflict between Antony and Octavian, and, as van Stekelenburg has put it:

“Wij worden in dit debat geconfronteerd met de wijze waarop een historicus uit de keizertijd een hem vooral door de Philippicae bekend gegeven, nl. De heftige strijd binnen de senaat tussen de aanhangers van Antonius en die van Octavianus in de laatste helft van 44 en de eerste van 43”.<sup>39</sup>

Cicero and Calenus are important to this historiographical concern for several reasons, which we shall explore in depth below. Dio's main interest is to show that neither Cicero nor Calenus is acting with the best interests of the state at heart, but that they are pawns in Antony and Octavian's game. Manuwald has argued that Dio sees in this period a distinction between the appearance (*Schein*) and reality (*Sein*) of Octavian's actions. The debate in Books 45-6 can be seen in this light. Ostensibly, Cicero is 'defending' the Republic by attacking Antony, but the reality is (as we shall see later) that Cicero is simply championing Octavian's cause. Likewise, Calenus seems to be, on the surface, supporting the amnesty policy of peace at any costs, but in reality, he is driven by a desire to defend

---

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 45.17.1-9. Gabba (1957): 320. Millar (1964): 52 has speculated that Dio may have been thinking of a slightly later date for the debate, but this is by no means certain, given Dio's disregard for minutiae.

<sup>37</sup> Calenus occupies a minor role in Dio's narrative prior to the speech. He fights in Greece for Caesar against Cato Uticensis and is noted for his humane treatment of the Megarians (Cass. Dio 42.14.4). Other than that, there is only a brief note that he was made consul *suffectus* for 47 B.C. (42.55.4) before Cicero's reference to him in his 'Philippic'.

<sup>38</sup> Cass. Dio 45.6.1-9.4.

<sup>39</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 78. See also Fromentin & Bertrand (2008): XI-XII. Scholarship on the debate has tended to focus on the issue of Dio's sources, since the 'Philippic' contains a great many parallels with the real Philippics (mostly 1-6, with a few references to others) and Calenus' speech bears some resemblance to the canons of anti-Ciceronian invective. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, predictably, Livy was suggested as a source for much of this material, though that idea was exploded by Haupt (1884): 680-1. Gabba (1957): 317-339 links Calenus' speech to an hypothetical earlier speech, written shortly after Cicero's death. Millar (1964): 52-4 raises the possibility of a medley of sources for Calenus. Other writers, since at least the 18<sup>th</sup> century, have seen Calenus' speech as indicative of Dio's own attitudes towards Cicero. Middleton (1790): 27-8 claims that Dio's "malice...betrays and confutes itself. Thus in the debates of the senate about Antony, he dresses up a speech for Fufius Calenus, filled with all the obscene and brutal ribaldry against Cicero, that a profligate mind could invent". More recently, Lintott (1997): 2516 has stated that Dio's account of Cicero's career "takes its tone" from Calenus' speech.

Antony (as Dio implies in his later narrative).<sup>40</sup> Indeed, the debate fits the amnesty speech on one level by showing that the amnesty built up in 44 B.C. has largely broken down, and that there are no real champions of the Republic left, only Cicero and Calenus, who are simply front men for the political designs of others (and have their own agendas as well). Cicero's speech is in the form of one of his *Philippics* and takes the need for action against Antony to save the state as its theme. Then, we have the fiery and superb response from Calenus, calling upon Cicero to heed his own advice on amnesty and exposing the plans of Octavian (whilst covering up those of Antony).<sup>41</sup> There is further debate in the senate and, eventually, Octavian gets the war he wanted against Antony, as general along with Hirtius and Pansa.

Cicero champions this cause, as I have said, but not for any profound political reason. Rather, his sole identifiable motive is a personal grudge against Antony. Dio states this explicitly:

*διὰ γὰρ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχθος σφοδρότατον ὑπάρχον τὸν τε Καίσαρα [Κικέρων] ἐθεράπευε, καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἐδύνατο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ τε ἐβοήθει καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἐκάκου.*<sup>42</sup>

So much for Cicero's good-will during the amnesty. His words that one ought to take up *οὔτε φιλίαν οὔτε ἔχθραν πρὸς οὐδένα* are here almost parodied, most strikingly because Dio uses a cognate of *ἔχθρα*.<sup>43</sup> We have already seen how the amnesty speech was intended by Dio to be something of a dead letter, an ideal that would tragically never be realised. In this passage, we see that the very man who propounded it has forgotten its precepts. But it was ever thus with 'Cicero'. His tendency to put his own desires above the

<sup>40</sup> Manuwald (1979): 27-76. For evidence for this idea, see the way that Cicero's dissimulation about Octavian's intentions is exploded by Calenus in his speech (where Calenus accords with what Dio thinks is the reality and not Cicero). See Cass. Dio 45.12.2 with Manuwald (1979): 47.

<sup>41</sup> Gowing (1992): 239 describes Calenus' speech (and both speeches implicitly) as "tedious". This strikes me as rather unimaginative – the speeches may not contain much historical detail (though more than Gowing allows for), but they are enjoyable works of rhetoric and Calenus' speech genuinely funny in places, even to a modern sense of humour. Gowing (1992): 238.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio 45.15.4.

<sup>43</sup> Though Boissevain gives no indication that the word is in dispute, I suspect, given Calenus' opening line, that Dio may have actually used *ἔχθρα*, or at least clearly meant it to be obvious to his reader. Cass. Dio 46.1.2.

best interests of the state and the enjoyment he takes in feuding are too strong for him to dispense with readily.

Dio makes Cicero argue in defence of amnesty, therefore, for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, Cicero's words relate very strongly to Dio's own view of the fall of the Republic and the significance of Caesar's murder in that. But Cicero is himself linked to the downfall of the Republic, both in terms of his individual actions and in terms of the similarity between his desires and those of other individuals, groups and 'factions'. For Dio, Cicero represents the tragedy of the late Republic; he is the wrong man saying the right thing and whilst Dio discredits his motivation for speaking out after the Ides of March and later against Antony, Dio does not necessarily discredit the sentiments Cicero airs (including those about Antony's odious character). Certainly, the amnesty speech's language is mirrored in several places in book 45.<sup>44</sup> The amnesty was not destroyed by Antony or Octavian alone, as Dio sees it, but by the collective will of the Roman people who preferred factionalism and strife to harmony and stability. Cicero himself is only a part of this problem, but a significant part. Unlike others, he gave a speech on the need to forgive, forget and to lay aside personal grudges: he should have known better. But knowing and acting on that knowledge are two different things and Cicero shows himself unable to do both at various points in Dio's account (one thing we shall see in the Philiscus debate is how 'Cicero' is able to be comforted by advice but fails to heed it when he is back in Rome). By ignoring his own words on amnesty (a speech which in itself highlights Cicero's unsuitability for discoursing on such an important theme), we see Cicero's *ἀντιφιλονεικία* writ large. There are two factors that back up this idea. The first is Cicero's reentry into politics upon hearing of the feud between Antony and Octavian:

*καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, καίτοι ἐκχωρήσας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὡς καὶ τὸν υἱὸν Ἀθήναζε ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ  
προπέμψων, ἐπανήλθεν ἐπειδὴ περ ἐκπεπολεμημένους σφῶς ᾔσθετο.*<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See also Cass. Dio 45.4.1-2; 8.3; 8.4; 9.1; 10.6; 11.2; 11.4; 14.1.

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio 45.15.4.

The passage immediately follows Dio's discussion of Cicero's enmity for Antony. Dio makes much of the fact that Cicero abandoned his trip, since he sees it as indicative not only of Cicero's desire to take up his grudge against Antony, but also the lengths to which he is willing to go to do so. It might be that Dio is responding to Cicero's self-justification in his first *Philippic*. Cicero had argued that he had gone away from the city to Greece (though only getting as far as Leucopetra in Calabria) because of the tumultuous aftermath of Caesar's funeral. He claims that he returned because Antony and the assassins looked to be coming to terms.<sup>46</sup> Yet, Dio's version is very different. Where Cicero implies that he came back to Rome to be of service in shoring up the fragile amnesty, Dio claims that Cicero came back deliberately to *destroy* the amnesty, by favouring and aiding Octavian and vanquishing Antony.

That Dio's account is coloured by his own conceptions of Cicero's character is perhaps best shown by a comparison with Cicero's correspondence. In a letter to Atticus dated to the 19<sup>th</sup> of August 44 B.C., the introduction of which bears a strong resemblance to the prooemium of the first *Philippic*, Cicero declares that he intends to return to Rome because of the possibility of amnesty. He does not, however, intend to take part in the political processes and one infers that his motives are therefore to live in Rome at peace, something which has been made difficult by the tumultuous nature of life in the city.<sup>47</sup> When Octavian starts to become a significant political and military force and begins negotiating with Cicero, the latter does so with only the greatest reluctance and hesitation.<sup>48</sup> Clearly, in the months after his return, Cicero *did* begin working against Antony, cautiously at first, but more stridently later on and within two months of the letter cited above, Cicero

---

<sup>46</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 1.6-9.

<sup>47</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 16.7.1-8.

<sup>48</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 16.8.1-2. I ignore Brutus' claims in his letters that Cicero was in the thrall of Octavian, since Brutus (assuming that the letters are not forgeries) was motivated by his own deep distrust for Caesar's heir. See Cic. *ad Brut.* 17.5-6; 25.1-2.

had written his second *Philippic* and was discussing its publication with Atticus.<sup>49</sup> However, Cicero's professed motives for moving against Antony and supporting Octavian were essentially driven by his desire to help Brutus and Cassius. In Dio there is none of this. Cicero is shown to be a full-blown partisan of Octavian and his relationship with Brutus and Cassius is entirely overlooked.<sup>50</sup> This may be, as the editors of the Budé edition have argued, because books 45-6 have a 'biographical' nature, which raise Octavian to the centre of the political stage and downplay other figures. This they tie in with Dio's interest in "une période qui voit le passage progressif d'une République aux institutions moribondes à un pouvoir de type monarchique, ancêtre du Principat".<sup>51</sup> Cicero's role in the narrative is, therefore, to hasten this change.

The second factor is the ordering of Cicero's and Calenus' speeches. Van Stekelenburg has noted that Dio has reversed the order of speakers on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January.<sup>52</sup> Cicero's fifth *Philippic*, delivered on the day, was actually in response to Calenus' proposal that Antony be sent an embassy encouraging him to come to terms.<sup>53</sup> This is still the core around which Dio's 'Philippic' and Calenus' reply to it are built, but Dio has included a medley of passages from the other first six *Philippics* and from anti-Ciceronian invective. Part of the reason for giving Cicero a more violent speech, which employs heavily the polemical second *Philippic*, and making Cicero speak first is that it exaggerates Cicero's combative nature and willingness to act on his hatred of Antony.<sup>54</sup> Instead of responding to Calenus' proposal with a counter-proposal, Cicero's speech is an all-out assault on Antony, using a series of natural disasters as his opportunity. Likewise, Cicero's 'response'

---

<sup>49</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 15.3.1.

<sup>50</sup> Cass. Dio 45.15.4.

<sup>51</sup> See Fromentin & Bertrand (2008): XII-XIV.

<sup>52</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 79. Cf. Münzer (1910): 206-7.

<sup>53</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 5.1. Cic. *ad Brut.* 2.4.

<sup>54</sup> Though this is obviously not the whole reason. We have to remember, as many scholars have done, that Dio is also providing a synopsis of the debates, Ciceronian and anti-Ciceronian, that took place in 44-43 B.C. His *Philippic* is, as Gowing (1992): 238 points out, "[a] faithful if motley imitation of the originals and in this sense more historical than Appian's". Nonetheless, as I shall go on to argue, Dio's interest in providing 'historically accurate' speeches is commensurate with his broader historiographical pretensions, (however inaccurate) to explain the changing fortunes of the Roman state throughout its history.

to Calenus is pre-emptive (in trying to cajole him into not speaking in Antony's defence), something which provokes Calenus' slanderous attack:

*καὶ σοὶ δέ, ὦ Καλῆνε, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις τοῖς ταυτά σοι φρονούσι συμβουλεύω καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἐπιτρέψαι τῇ τε γερουσίᾳ τὰ προσήκοντα ψηφίσασθαι, καὶ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὑμῶν πρὸς Ἀντώνιον χάριτος ἕνεκα τὰ κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συμφέροντα καταπροδοῦναι.<sup>55</sup>*

We shall deal with how far this actually relates to Dio's depiction of Calenus later.

At the moment, we might notice that Cicero's words echo the amnesty speech in asking Calenus not to allow his personal loyalty to Antony to interfere with what is best for the state. This is part of the hypocrisy and dissimulation that Dio sees in this stage of Cicero's political career. What is more interesting is the way that Dio has used this passage to twist the order of the debates. Unlike in any of Cicero's actual Philippics, he has directly provoked his opponents. On one level, that allows Dio to 'respond' as Calenus, giving a version of what the supporters of Antony were arguing at the time (and, therefore, fulfilling one of the functions of the ancient historian by giving a 'true' impression of an important debate), but on another, it confirms Dio's perception of Cicero's character – he is assertive and argumentative. One might also be reminded of the passages in Dio's account of Clodius' move against Cicero, where the latter's strength through oratory is put down to similar brow-beating techniques. Here Cicero wastes the rest of the senate meeting in counter-slander.<sup>56</sup>

Cicero's unwillingness to heed his own advice is a significant part of the debate with Calenus, and particularly of Calenus' response. The principal aim of Cicero's 'Philippic' is, unsurprisingly, to show how the near-complete breakdown of amnesty is Antony's fault. Many of the charges accord with Dio's narrative (as we shall see below), but perhaps more interesting is the contrast 'Cicero' draws between his own actions in politics (as well as his own designs) and Antony's. Cicero's speech admits honestly, for example,

---

<sup>55</sup> Cass. Dio 45.46.1.

<sup>56</sup> Cass. Dio 46.29.1.

his outspokenness and fits Dio's impression that Cicero went to extreme lengths to be remembered as the best orator in Rome.<sup>57</sup> Other passages hint at Cicero's cowardice, which Dio spoke of during the trial of Milo.<sup>58</sup> In his criticism of Antony's consulship, Cicero mentions:

*ἐψηφίσασθε τὴν τε εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν δμόνοϊαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐμοὶ πεισθέντες...ἐβεβαιώσατε πάντα τὰ δοθέντα τισὶ καὶ νομοθετηθέντα πρὸς τοῦ Καίσαρος, οὐκ ὡς καλῶς πάντ' ἔχοντα (πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ) ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴδεν αὐτῶν μετακινήθηναί συνέφερον, ὅπως ἀνυπόπτως χωρὶς ὑποῦλου τινὸς ἀλλήλοις συνῶμεν.<sup>59</sup>*

Some of Cicero's charges are valid in Dio's eyes. Dio, for example, reports Antony's manipulation of Caesar's will for his own benefit, alluded to by Cicero in the passage I have omitted here.<sup>60</sup> Likewise, many other charges find support in Dio's narrative.<sup>61</sup> Nonetheless it is striking for the reader that Cicero, who is acting on the side of Octavian and has composed a speech assaulting Antony for the sake of his personal enmity and new friendship, is here boasting, somewhat hypocritically, of his part in the amnesty. Even more hypocritical is Cicero's claim that:

*καὶ πάντως που καὶ ἐκ τούτου συνιέναι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐν ἣ καὶ πλεῖστον ἰσχύω καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δόξαν ἐκτησάμην, ἀφείξ, εἴγε καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ εἰρήνη ἦν, πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν, εἰ μὴ γε καὶ συμφέρειν ἡγοῦμην, παρήγεσα.<sup>62</sup>*

This is the point where another passage, cited above, becomes crucial for contextualising this statement. Cicero talks of his lack of fear of death brought on by his *παρρησία*. He claims that his best moments politically have come as a result of his lack of verbal restraint and that he would not have achieved the glories he did against Catiline if it were not for his willingness to speak out without caution. He goes on to mention his quasi-

<sup>57</sup> Cass. Dio 45.46.3.

<sup>58</sup> Cass. Dio 45.30.3. I.e. Antony is not there to answer back.

<sup>59</sup> Cass. Dio 45.23.4-5.

<sup>60</sup> For Dio on Mark Antony and Caesar's legacy, see Cass. Dio 44.53.1-7; 45.5.3 (on his refusing to give Octavian his inheritance).

<sup>61</sup> E.g. Cowardice: 'Cicero' Cass. Dio 45.38.4, Dio *ipse* 51.15.2; Antony's love of wine, women and small boys: C. 45.26.1-34.6 (n.b. use of *πλεονεξία* to describe Antony's rapacity), D. 48.27.1-5; Antony's love of slaughter: C. 45.35.4, D. 47.7.1; Antony's playing off of factions for his own benefit: C. 45.29.3, D. 42.29.1-32.3; Antony's desire for power: C. 45.33.1-37.6, D. 44.34.4-6.

<sup>62</sup> Cass. Dio 45.45.5.

martial honours post-conspiracy.<sup>63</sup> He also desires to take a leading role in the state – for all his words here about being too old to care about real power any longer.<sup>64</sup> The fact is that ‘Cicero’, by delivering this speech, is using the political (and military) situation to his fullest advantage. He has the opportunity to destroy Antony, a man for whom he feels hatred and he gets to cement his political and oratorical career with his best remembered set of speeches.

It is small wonder, therefore, that Calenus, when Cicero warns him *καθ’ ἡσυχίαν...καὶ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὑμῶν πρὸς Ἀντώνιον χάριτος ἔνεκα τὰ κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἡμῶν συμφέροντα καταπροδοῦναι*, responds by assaulting Cicero’s hypocrisy.<sup>65</sup> *Καταπροδίδωμι* means ‘to betray utterly’ the public good for private motives, which here applies as much to Cicero as it might to Calenus. Aside from the polemical abuse and slander (which we shall come to shortly), Calenus’ speech focuses on reminding Cicero of his role in creating the amnesty and beseeching him not to desert the state now.<sup>66</sup> Calenus’ opening words are a clear and faithful (to Dio’s own account) exposition of Cicero’s real motivations for speaking:

*ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὗτος τὸν τε Ἀντώνιον κακῶς διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφισι λέγειν ἐπεχείρησεν, ὃν ἔχρην, εἶπερ τι ἡδίκηκει, ἐσηγγελκέναι, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐμοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνημόνευσεν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δεινότητα διαδείξας εἰ μὴ τινος ἀνέδην προπηλακίσαιε, προσήκει καὶ ἐμοὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπολύσασθαι τὰ δὲ ἀνταιτιάσασθαι, ἵνα μῆτε τοῦτον ἢ τε οἰκεία θρασύτης ἀντιλογίας ἀμαρτοῦσα καὶ ἡ ἐμῆ σιωπὴ πονηροῦ συνειδότης ὑποψίαν λαβοῦσα ὠφελήσῃ, μὴθ’ ὑμεῖς ἀπατηθέντες ὑφ’ ὧν εἶπεν χεῖρον βουλευθήσθε, τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ἀντώνιον ὄργην ἀντὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων ἀντικαταλλάμενοι.<sup>67</sup>*

All of the elements we have just been discussing are here present. We see Cicero’s *φιλονεικία* in his over-zealous desire for argument and in his personal grudge and hatred for Antony. Indeed, Calenus refers to it twice and twice he uses the term *ἰδία* to describe it.

---

<sup>63</sup> Cass. Dio 45.46.3.

<sup>64</sup> Cass. Dio 45.46.4. There seems to me to be an echo also of the Philiscus debate, adding weight to my argument that Cicero is more prepared to give lip-service to good ideas than to actually persevere with them.

<sup>65</sup> Cass. Dio 45.46.1.

<sup>66</sup> Gabba (1957): 320 has noted that Calenus has two purposes to his speech: firstly to defend Antony and himself and, secondly, to attack Cicero. See Cass. Dio 46.1.2.

<sup>67</sup> Cass. Dio 46.1.2-3.

Cicero's love of offensive oratory is also criticised, implying that here Cicero is putting his reputation before the good of the state.<sup>68</sup> The claim that Cicero is *ἐμοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνημόνευσεν* is perhaps an echo of precisely what Cicero counselled against in his speech on amnesty in Book 44.<sup>69</sup> Likewise, the last line mirrors (and perhaps parodies) a line in Cicero's amnesty speech on the need to dispense with private interest for the good of the state.<sup>70</sup>

The close of the speech returns to these themes. Calenus' proposal echoes the language of the amnesty speech:

*φημί γὰρ δεῖν μῆτε ἐχθρον πω μηδένα τούτων τῶν τὰ ὄπλα ἐχόντων ποιήσασθαι, μῆτ' ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζειν τί καὶ πῶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πέπρακται.*<sup>71</sup>

To Cicero, Calenus makes an appeal. Do not destroy the city for the sake of your private grudge (*ἰδία ἔχθρα*), he says, but reconcile with Antony, with whom you were once cordially cooperative.<sup>72</sup> Calenus then calls upon Cicero:

*ἀναμνησθεῖς τῆς τε ἡμέρας ἐκείνης καὶ τῶν λόγων ὧν ἐν τῆς Γῆς τεμένει ἐποίησα, χάρισαί τι καὶ τῇ Ὀμονοίᾳ ταύτῃ παρ' ἧ νῦν βουλευόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐκεῖνα διαβάλης ὡς οὐκ ἀπ' ὀρθῆς διανοίας ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τινος ἄλλου τότε λεχθέντα. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τῇ πόλει συμφέρει καὶ σοὶ πλείστην δόξαν οἴσει.*<sup>73</sup>

Calenus, of course, is appealing to Cicero's desire for reputation and this ties the passage in with that broader theme in Dio's narrative. But the central point here is that of Cicero's knowledge of what is in the best interests of the state, and the inconsistency of his political career. Calenus' almost naive remark that Cicero should beware lest he seem to have delivered his amnesty speech from cynical motives rings true. Though there is no evidence in Dio's account outside of the speech that 'Cicero' spoke at the amnesty for any

<sup>68</sup> The accusation is repeated later on in similar terms (46.9.4).

<sup>69</sup> Cass. Dio 44.23.1; 32.1 (*μὴ μνησικακεῖν ἀλλήλοις*); 32.3.

<sup>70</sup> Cass. Dio 44.23.2 (*τὰ κοινῇ συμφέροντα τῶν ἰδίων ἔνεκα πλεονεξιῶν προησόμεθα*). Further reference to this passage in the amnesty speech may exist at 46.27.1.

<sup>71</sup> Cass. Dio 46.27.2.

<sup>72</sup> Cass. Dio 46.28.1-2. The idea that Cicero was ever friendly with Antony is presumably a reference to their actions during the amnesty.

<sup>73</sup> Cass. Dio 46.28.3-4.

reason other than to protect the state, the hypocritical remarks that we have alluded to above may give reasons for the supposition that ‘Cicero’ had a hidden agenda. That this is tied to Cicero’s characterisation in Dio needs no stressing. He had always been suspected of corrupt motivations, even when he was acting in the best interests of the state – and very often he seems to have proved those suspicions rather than negated them.

We should not assume, however, that Calenus’ speech exactly mirrors Dio’s own perceptions of Cicero’s character. Many of Calenus’ claims about Cicero’s past political career do not match Dio’s own statements in his narrative. For example, he accuses Cicero of destroying (ἀπώλεσας) Catiline who was, apparently, merely canvassing for office.<sup>74</sup> The claim that Cicero put Catiline and Lentulus to death without trial is also at variance with the tone Dio takes on these matters in his narrative.<sup>75</sup> The claim relates more closely to Antony’s accusations which Cicero rebuts in the *Second Philippic*.<sup>76</sup> There are plenty of other examples: Cicero set Caesar against Pompey, Cicero killed Clodius through Milo, Cicero encouraged Brutus to murder Caesar.<sup>77</sup> Other claims exaggerate things Dio has said in his narrative in a much more toned down way. Cicero’s nervousness during the trial of Milo<sup>78</sup> is made universal, so that Calenus claims:

ἢ οἶε τινὰ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι μηδένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν σου τούτων λόγων οὐς ἐκδέδωκας εἴρηκας,  
ἀλλὰ πάντας αὐτοὺς μετὰ ταῦτα συγγέγραφας, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς  
ἱππάρχους τοὺς πηλίνους πλάττοντες;<sup>79</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Cass. Dio 46.20.2.

<sup>75</sup> Cass. Dio 46.2.3; 20.2.

<sup>76</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 2.12.

<sup>77</sup> Cass. Dio 46.2.2-3.

<sup>78</sup> See Cass. Dio 40.54.2. Lintott (1997): 2515-16 has argued that Dio’s account of the trial of Milo jars significantly with that of Asconius, being the result of Dio’s prejudice against Cicero. The argument runs that Dio claims Cicero was unable to continue speaking because his courage gave way in face of the soldiers Pompey had placed around the court. Asconius claims, however, that Cicero was made nervous by the *Clodiani* and lost *constantia* because he entered into an argument with them. However, *constantia* can be translated as ‘resolution’ or ‘fearlessness’ and whether Cicero lost focus or courage in the face of soldiers or gang leaders is a minor matter, more relevant to Dio’s (and Asconius’) understanding of the political background, rather than their impressions of Cicero. It should also be borne in mind that Dio says the same thing happened during the trial of Plancius. He claims that this was the result of Pompey acting against Cicero, suggesting that Dio did not think the problem lay with Cicero but with Pompey and his ability to assert his authority through force (Cass. Dio 40.55.4).

<sup>79</sup> Cass. Dio 46.7.3.

Similarly, Cicero's part in the trial of Gabinius, already distorted by Dio, is subject to Calenus' polemical rhetoric. He claims that Cicero deliberately defended Gabinius badly so that he would be convicted for certain. Again, this is not supported anywhere in Dio's narrative, though Cicero's role in the trial is subject to criticism of a very different kind in Dio (that Cicero went from prosecuting Gabinius to his best ability to defending him in like fashion – actually the direct opposite of what Calenus is here claiming).<sup>80</sup>

Unfortunately, some scholars have taken Calenus' words at face value as Dio's own. Lintott, for example, has gone too far in claiming that "Dio's attitude to Cicero's achievements as an orator and politician takes its tone from Fufius Calenus' speech".<sup>81</sup> This has led to confusion over the purpose of some passages of the speech Dio puts into the mouth of Calenus. The accusations made above, for example, do not accord with Dio's own account, but they do resemble the kinds of things said about Cicero by his political enemies in their attacks.<sup>82</sup> Appian shares with Dio an interest in the Philippics and anti-Philippics, positing a debate between Cicero and Piso.<sup>83</sup> Appian's version deals with similar aspects of Cicero's character. Cicero is accused of *φιλονικία*, his fickleness is pointed to (*μεταβολή*), and Piso claims that Cicero had been "led off into inconsistency by hatred" (*Κικέρωνα δὲ καὶ ἐς ἀναμωλίαν ἐξέστησεν ἢ ἔχθρα*).<sup>84</sup> This possibly suggests a common source for both historians, but given the greater divergence between the speeches put into the mouths of Cicero and Piso/Calenus than correlation, it is clear that both Appian and Dio have moved far beyond what may have lain behind them. Appian's speeches are considerably shorter, nor do they have as general a function in the narrative as Dio's

---

<sup>80</sup> Cass. Dio 46.8.1.

<sup>81</sup> Lintott (1997): 2516.

<sup>82</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 46.2.3 with Ps. Sall. 2.3; 46.3.4 with Ps. Sall 3.5. Some of the accusations made by Calenus accord with claims made by Antony which Cicero rebuts in his Philippics: 46.2.2 with Cic. *Phil.* 2.23; 46.2.3 with *Phil.* 2.21; 46.2.3 with *Phil.* 2.25 (+28-30); 46.2.3 with *Phil.* 2.17; 46.12.3 with *Phil.* 2.37 (+39); 46. 20 with *Phil.* 2.11.

<sup>83</sup> App. *Bell. Civ.* 3.52.213-59.245.

<sup>84</sup> App. *Bell. Civ.* 3.56.233.

speeches. Appian's '(anti-)Philippic' is focused on the question of Antony's legal position prior to Mutina. As Gowing notes:

"The entire speech [of Piso] is a skillfully contrived, well-organized, coldly logical piece of oratory, and there is no doubt who emerges the victor. The debate forms an important prelude to the approaching conflict at Mutina and clearly establishes that from a legal point of view, Antony was indeed operating within his rights. To judge from Appian's prefatory remark...this would appear to have been the deliberate reason for including this particular exchange".<sup>85</sup>

It is this difference from Appian that, I think, explains Dio's reason for inserting passages of anti-Ciceronian rhetoric into Calenus' speech which do not accord with his own narrative. Whereas in Appian it is clear that Piso has sent Cicero packing, victory in Dio's debate is a far harder to assess. Not only do Calenus and Cicero sling mud at each other, passing around false accusations, but the debate seems to have little overall impact. At the end of Calenus' speech, an enraged Cicero responds furiously, wasting the day in slander. Several more days are needed for Octavian's faction to achieve the result they wanted.<sup>86</sup> Whereas Piso's claim about Cicero's *ἔχθρα* is not supported anywhere else in Appian's narrative, Dio's Cicero acts largely from cynical motives. Calenus is the same. Shortly after the speech, Dio places Calenus very much in the camp of Antony:

*συχνοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου βουλόμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀντικρυσ πρὸς αὐτόν, ἄλλοι τε καὶ δῆμαρχοι στρατηγοὶ τέτινες, ἀπηήλθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ κατα χώραν μείναντες, ὧν καὶ ὁ Καλῆνος ἦν, ἔπραττον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐδύνατο, τὰ μὲν ἐπικρυπτόμενοι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικαιοῦντες. οὐκ οὐκ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐσθῆτα εὐθὺς ἠλλάξαντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς τὴν γερούσιαν πρέσβεις πρὸς τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἄλλους τε καὶ τὸν Κικέρωνα πέπεισαι, πρόφασιν μὲν ὡς καὶ πείσοντα αὐτὸν ὁμολογήσαι, ἔργω δὲ ἴν' ὑπεξαιρεθῆ σφισι.*<sup>87</sup>

Aside from the fact that Cicero's obstinacy and rhetorical tenacity has put him in danger of his life, one gets the impression, the passage shows us quite clearly that Calenus' actions are motivated by a desire to champion the cause of Antony. Thus, when Cicero accuses Calenus of an *ἰδία πρὸς Ἀντώνιον χάρις*, he is not exaggerating. Dio's point in all

---

<sup>85</sup> Gowing (1992): 237.

<sup>86</sup> Cass. Dio 46.29.1-2.

<sup>87</sup> Cass. Dio 46.32.2-3.

of this is that no one is acting from good, or honest, motives in this whole period. The lack of a clear victor in the debate draws this conclusion out; one side will eventually predominate, but it will be by force of arms not words, because the fearful situation Cicero himself predicts in the Amnesty speech is coming true. Partisanship and heated polemic play their part in causing the civil war.

### Conclusion

So the amnesty speech is deliberately bleak: the prospect of amnesty is still-born. The fact that one also gets the impression from the amnesty speech of Cicero's conceit and hypocrisy, and the fact that he contributes in the end to the breakdown by contravening his own advice in his argument with Calenus, add to this sense of doom and gloom. The choice of Cicero as a speaker is therefore ironic: how can the Republic be saved when this is its sole defendant? He embodies many of the faults of the Republican system – he is querulous, he holds grudges, he desires political power, he is prepared to countenance civil war for the sake of his career. It is small wonder that so much of what Cicero warns against on the Ides of March is found time and again in Dio's narrative of his character, and comes to a head in 43 B.C. with the 'Philippic' and Cicero's last stand against Antony. Obviously, the choice also rests on the fact that Cicero *did* give a speech on the amnesty, but, like Appian, Dio could easily have ignored Cicero's contribution and given another speech by Antony. This would, however, have not served Dio's purpose, which is less to emphasise Antony's role (which is still a major part of the narrative) than to show how everyone had a hand in the downfall of the Republic. This is perhaps confirmed by a passage in Book 45:

*αἴτιοι δὲ τῶν κακῶν τούτων αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οἱ βουλευταὶ ἐγένοντο. δεόν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἕνα τινὰ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω φρονούντα προστήσασθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ διὰ παντὸς συνάρασθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησαν, ὑπολαβόντες δὲ δὴ τινὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐπαυξήσαντες ἔπειτα καὶ ἐκείνους*

*ἀντικαθελεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαν, κακὸν τούτου φίλον μὲν οὐδένα ἐχθροὺς δὲ πάντας ἔσχον... ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ πολέμου μία πᾶσι σφισιν ἦν, τὸν τε δῆμον καταλυθῆναι καὶ δυναστείαν τινὰ γενέσθαι· μαχόμενοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὄτω δουλεύουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὅστις αὐτῶν δεσπόσει, τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως ἔφθειρον, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὴν τύχην διάφορον ἑκάτεροι δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο.<sup>88</sup>*

The passage is written with a great deal of hindsight, granted, and certainly has little resemblance to what figures such as Cicero thought they were fighting for (though, Dio would argue what they thought and what they did were two different things), but it accords well with the spirit of the amnesty speech. There is the same sense of universal culpability,<sup>89</sup> of factions changing tack to oppose those they have raised up,<sup>90</sup> and the people being destroyed by the feuding along with the state.<sup>91</sup> Cicero, in short, is more to blame than most because he who should have known better ignores his own advice. As such, his role in the amnesty is a major part of the tragedy of the last days of the Republic and confirms Dio's overall impression of a morally and politically bankrupt state, ready to make the transition to monarchy.

---

<sup>88</sup> Cass. Dio 46.34.1-4. See above, p. 84, for the Thucydidean nature of this passage.

<sup>89</sup> Compare the amnesty speech Cass. Dio 44.24.2.

<sup>90</sup> Comp. Cass. Dio 44.29.3

<sup>91</sup> Comp. Cass. Dio 44.25.1-6.

## Chapter Seven: The Philiscus Debate

We have seen over the last two chapters that Dio's depiction of Cicero rests upon a series of basic assumptions about his character. We have also seen how Dio believes that Cicero was, in this way, a symptom of the ague that beset the Republic in its last century. In Chapter Five, I argued that Dio's viewpoint was conditioned by Cicero's 'inevitable' failure and demise. We have seen that, to a certain extent, with the moments leading to his exile, but Chapter Six has not made fully clear that Cicero's failure is a motif running through the amnesty speech/Calenus debate: this will be better treated here, in connexion with Cicero's dialogue with Philiscus. Suffice it to say that Cicero's outspokenness and lack of regard for the consequences of his actions, as seen in the debate with Calenus, are the main reasons Antony has him killed.<sup>607</sup>

### Part One: The Dialogue in Modern Scholarship

The dialogue with Philiscus takes place whilst Cicero is in exile in 58 B.C. Philiscus is portrayed as a man Cicero had met in Athens during the 70s B.C. whilst a student there (see below). Philiscus, meeting his old 'college friend' for the first time in many years, offers him consolatory advice. What follows in the next eleven chapters of Book 38 is a dialogue between the two men on the theme of *consolatio ad exulem*. The dialogue follows the regular form for that *genre*, with a recognition of a friend's duty to help one who is suffering in the *prooemium*. There then follows a series of statements about what good fortune the exile still has and arguments about how he might alleviate his suffering (such as Cicero's physical and mental fitness, his great deeds in the law court and senate house, his intellectual achievements, and how he should devote

---

<sup>607</sup> 'Cicero' himself acknowledges as much, see Cass. Dio 45.46.3. Cf. 47.8.3.

himself to the latter, living in a secluded spot somewhere), and a final passage specifically suited to the individual being consoled (in this case, a flash forward to Cicero's death).<sup>608</sup>

The dialogue is rather strange and seemingly has no place in Dio's otherwise historical narrative. It has, indeed, puzzled and perplexed scholars for some time and it is only recently that explanations of its purpose have begun to surface. Indeed, Millar states quite boldly that "the dialogue has no function within the History, unless to underline the weakness of Cicero's character".<sup>609</sup> Whilst I hope to show later that the dialogue does have a narrative purpose later on, it is necessary here first to tackle the idea that Philiscus serves to undermine Cicero's character.<sup>610</sup> The argument rests on the idea that Philiscus' opening line (*οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ᾧ Κικέρων, θρηνῶν καὶ γυναικείως διακεῖμενος*;) is meant in mockery of Cicero.<sup>611</sup> However, the argument is doubtful for several reasons. Firstly, we have to bear in mind what Philiscus says next:

*ὡς ἔγωγε οὐποτ' ἂν σε προσεδόκησα οὕτω μαλακισθήσῃσαι, πολλῆς μὲν παιδείας καὶ παντοδαπῆς μετεσχηκότα, πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ συνηγορηκότα.*<sup>612</sup>

We should not take the directness of the opening lines necessarily as a criticism of Cicero: it is a matter of *genre*. Questions that bordered on the offensive or insensitive were perfectly common in the consolatory letters between Cicero and his friends. Wilcox has argued that, "we might expect these [*consolatio*] letters to offer gentle condolence...instead, the vocabulary and the rhetorical structure of consolatory letters show that Cicero and his friends regularly wrote even this kind of letter as though they were rivals".<sup>613</sup> Firstly, we have a case where Atticus apparently chided Cicero "ut si[t] firmior".<sup>614</sup> Cicero's reply to this criticism of his

---

<sup>608</sup> For the general format of a *consolatio* and for Plutarch as a useful comparison with Dio, see Claassen (1996): 32-35.

<sup>609</sup> Millar (1964): 51.

<sup>610</sup> Millar (1964): 51; Van Stekelenburg (1971): 22; Fechner (1986): 50; Claassen (1996): 29.

<sup>611</sup> Cass. Dio 38.18.1.

<sup>612</sup> Cass. Dio 38.18.1.

<sup>613</sup> Wilcox (2005a): 237. See also Wilcox (2005b).

<sup>614</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 3.15.1.

weakness is believed by Claassen to have been Dio's model for his own *consolatio*.<sup>615</sup> Likewise, a letter received by Cicero from his friend Luceius supports this supposition. He criticises Cicero for "losing himself to tears and weeping" (*lacrimis ac tristitiae te tradidisti*), of letting his grief interfere with his rational judgment and not seeing the path out of his misery.<sup>616</sup> As well as ascribing characteristically feminine attributes to Cicero, the letter is "alternately scolding and complimentary...it matches a conventional rhetorical question".<sup>617</sup> This rhetorical desire to win a debate helps to contextualise Philiscus' speech to Cicero; his series of direct and blunt questions are no different from the kinds of things one expects in a consolation, or from what Cicero's friends said to him.<sup>618</sup> The nature of *consolatio* literature, and its rhetorical significance, helps explain Cicero's constant questioning of the advice given to him by Philiscus. Wilcox has again noted that it was perfectly normal for the consoled person to write back to the consoler, defending their position and justifying their misery.<sup>619</sup> Cicero's retorts to Philiscus are not unreasonable ones; when Philiscus talks of the body, Cicero asks about the soul; when Philiscus talks of self-mastery, Cicero asks about one's fatherland and people; his questions demonstrate reasonable concerns about his fate that he wishes Philiscus (who has promised to help him) to tease out.

Other approaches have had more varied results. Van Stekelenburg has argued that the dialogue has little relevance to its historical context or to Cicero's character.<sup>620</sup> Other approaches have striven for answers. Gowing has claimed that the Philiscus debate was written by Dio for his fellow imperial senators, to comfort them in the prospect of 'exile' from politics. Dio himself would have felt a vested interest in this because he was 'exiled' during his consulship.<sup>621</sup> Aside from the fact that Gowing admits his only evidence for this is a sarcastic remark Dio makes

---

<sup>615</sup> Claassen (1996): 42.

<sup>616</sup> Cic. *ad fam.* 5.15.2.

<sup>617</sup> Wilcox (2005a): 245. Philiscus' opening reads (perhaps deliberately on Dio's part) like a direct reversal of the tone Cicero himself takes in Cic. *ad fam.* 4.8.1.

<sup>618</sup> Such caustic remarks were made to Cicero during his exile. See Cic. *ad Att.* 3.11.2.

<sup>619</sup> Wilcox (2005a): 245.

<sup>620</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 22.

<sup>621</sup> Gowing (1998): 381-7. See also Letta (1979): 158, who dates the dialogue to 229 and Dio's own consulship for similar reasons.

about a man who had been ‘exiled *to* the senate’ (it shares some linguistic similarity for the term Dio uses for describing Cicero’s passage to exile), there are myriad problems with the theory. Firstly, Dio was not, nor were many senators in this period, exiled: he was sent away from Rome (probably to Capua, where he lived) with full consular dignity by an emperor who cared for his welfare. Secondly, of all the people in his history, why choose Cicero? There were other figures, who were far less controversial in Dio’s narrative, such as Cato Uticensis, who might have served Dio’s purpose a great deal better. Cato’s ‘honourable’ removal from Rome in 58 B.C. equates more closely to Dio’s own experiences in A.D. 229 than does the acrimonious exile of Cicero. Cato also committed suicide rather than face a dictatorial figure, something a great deal more familiar to a Severan senator than exile by one’s *compadres*. It might be argued that Cato, as a far less complex character than Cicero, would be less in need of consolation, but Gowing’s argument hinges on his acceptance of Millar’s claim – which we saw in Chapter Six – that Dio’s speeches are entirely preoccupied with the relationship between emperor and senate.<sup>622</sup> Under that assumption, Cato becomes a much better choice of subject. A further problem with the argument is that it rests on Millar’s assumption that Philiscus was a contemporary of Dio, something I wish to show is unfounded. Other recent approaches have been more successful. Fechner has convincingly shown that the Philiscus dialogue relates to Dio’s broader political ideals and the problems he sees with the late Republic.<sup>623</sup> Claassen has argued, on the opposite tack, that the dialogue presents a Ciceronian take on the problem of Cicero in exile. Whilst I do not accept her conclusion (that Dio was trying to account for Cicero’s less than manly take on exile), I do accept her arguments that Dio was trying to get under Cicero’s skin with the debate and link Cicero’s character, his thoughts on consolation and his political actions together.<sup>624</sup> I shall show that the two approaches of Fechner and Claassen are by no means mutually exclusive,

---

<sup>622</sup> See p. 139.

<sup>623</sup> Fechner (1986): 48-58.

<sup>624</sup> Claassen (1996): 32-42.

but that they can be shown to represent the same preoccupations in the dialogue and in the whole History that Dio presents to us.<sup>625</sup>

Nearly every scholar who has focussed on the debate since Millar has accepted his conclusion that Philiscus was not a real contemporary of Cicero, but was in fact a contemporary of Dio's. The argument goes that Dio and Philiscus were both members of Julia Domna's circle in Rome and Dio wrote the dialogue sometime between February 212 to the spring of 213, or during the winter of 213-4, when Caracalla (and thus Julia Domna) was in Rome, in honour of Philiscus and for the general diversion of the court. This coincides neatly with Millar's calculations for the composition of Book 38, in which the dialogue is set.<sup>626</sup> This is hard to accept for several reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to believe that Dio would have inserted such a frivolous piece into a history in which he took immense pride. There is also the problem of chronology. It is not certain, by any means, that Dio was even in Rome at this time.<sup>627</sup> Nor is it certain that Dio was writing Book 38 when Millar claims that he was. Millar's argument rests on the assumption that Dio was following a strict timetable for writing his history, where he would have spent a few months per book, before moving onto the next one.<sup>628</sup> Bowersock has shown, however, that this model is implausible. He states that:

“because of various inner and outer pressures, few men can work with such regularity. Can one, for example, assume that Dio was writing at the same rate when he was curator in Pergamum and Smyrna as when he was living as a senator at Rome?”<sup>629</sup>

Millar's assumption has led him into some confusions, such as his twin claims that Dio was still in the preliminary stages of collecting material a few years before the death of Severus,

---

<sup>625</sup> See also Berrigan (1966): 59-61. His conclusion echoes my feelings on the dialogue, “the evil done by evil-doers to themselves, the intransigence of destiny, the joys of a retired statesman playing the role of a Clarendon are made more meaningful by that grisly Roman exhibition. The *consolatio* ends with the picture of a man who refused the solace offered him. The lesson stands strong and stark: nature will have its way”.

<sup>626</sup> Millar (1964): 50-1.

<sup>627</sup> Letta (1979): 158.

<sup>628</sup> Millar (1964): 38-40; 193-4.

<sup>629</sup> Bowersock (1965): 471.

but would have written twenty-four books over the same period.<sup>630</sup> Bowersock's own solution, that Philiscus might have been an ancestor of Dio, is not terribly convincing either.<sup>631</sup> So far, one scholar has argued in favour of Philiscus as a genuine contemporary of Cicero's.<sup>632</sup> We know from Athenaeus that there was a Sophist called Philiscus who was expelled from Rome in the consulship of Lucius Postumus (153 B.C.).<sup>633</sup> If we assume a generation gap of between 20-30 years, and bear in mind the Greek habit of naming first-born sons after their grandfathers, then it is entirely possible to have a grandson of this man called Philiscus who was a near contemporary of Cicero. This may be stretching the evidence somewhat, but it seems more plausible that Dio would have given a speech to a man who was a broad contemporary of Cicero than the notion that Dio would have inserted a *completely fictitious* individual into his history. Certainly, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to suggest seriously that Philiscus was a Third Century thinker.

## **Part Two: The Philiscus Dialogue**

In this section, I shall explore the relationship between the Philiscus dialogue and Dio's impression of Cicero's character at large. Not everything that Philiscus says to Cicero is 'true', though there is much overlap, but it can be explained in context. It will be shown that the Philiscus debate is generally faithful to Dio's overall verdict of Cicero's character. We shall examine the advice Philiscus gives to Cicero, tying it in with what we have explored above and, most crucially, to Cicero's actions both on return from exile and in his last moments. We shall also see that the use of Ciceronian correspondence to compose his *consolatio* gives the dialogue a Ciceronian cadence and is meant to echo several of the important themes in Dio's narrative. Indeed, the dialogue owes its shape, according to Claassen to a particular letter of Cicero's in

---

<sup>630</sup> Bowersock (1965): 471.

<sup>631</sup> Bowersock (1965): 472.

<sup>632</sup> Barnes (1984): 255 n. 64. Fechner (1986): 50 argues that Philiscus might have been seen by Dio as a generic name for a philosopher.

<sup>633</sup> Athen. 12.547a; Münzer (1910): 2379.

response to a *consolatio ad exulem* written by Atticus.<sup>634</sup> She claims that Dio's *consolatio* was a point by point response to Cicero's defence of his grief and panic. Atticus' insistence that Cicero act like a man is, as we have seen, mirrored in Philiscus' chiding (which we have stated to also relate to other parts of the Ciceronian consolatory tradition).<sup>635</sup> Cicero's next point, refuting accusations that exile had made him unhinged, is paralleled in Philiscus' reassurance that fear and panic are natural and human.<sup>636</sup> Likewise, Philiscus reassures Cicero that he should have no fear over loss of status, where the real Cicero bemoans his loss of status.<sup>637</sup> We shall refer to other parallels, and what light they might shed, as they come up.

Let us deal with the first point. Explaining to Cicero his success as a politician, Philiscus says:

καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πατρῶά σοι τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν γέγονεν ὥστε σε σπουδὴν ἰδιωτέραν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τε τῆς γλώττης καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων σου πεπόρισται, δι' οὗς καὶ ἀπόλωλεν.<sup>638</sup>

Dio here displays more awareness of Cicero's humble origins than usual, as well as his reliance on his oratory to achieve his political goals. We also notice that Philiscus' verdict on the reasons for Cicero's downfall and failure are the same as Dio's. Cicero has been raised up and eventually defeated by the same things – his speeches.

Cicero's outspokenness as the cause of his exile is explored elsewhere. Philiscus tells him that:

καὶ αὐτὰ γε ταῦτα ἃ νῦν πέπονθας, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι συμβέβηκέ σοι ἢ ὅτι πάνθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων διετέλεις.<sup>639</sup>

Ignoring for the moment the fact that Philiscus is obviously exaggerating Cicero's public spirit (we shall come back to this soon), it is clear that Philiscus is tying Cicero's downfall into his rhetorical ability, though more positively than Dio has (in keeping, as we shall see below, with

<sup>634</sup> Claassen (1996): 42. Cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 3.15.1-8.

<sup>635</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 3.15.1.

<sup>636</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 3.15.2; Cass. Dio 38.18.2-3; 20.1-22.5.

<sup>637</sup> Cass. Dio. 38.23.1-24.6; 28.1-6.

<sup>638</sup> Cass Dio 38.20.3.

<sup>639</sup> Cass. Dio 38.22.2.

the nature of the *genre*). This passage and the one cited above lend a kind of fatalism to the dialogue: it was inevitable, given Cicero’s verbosity, that he was going to be exiled. This sense of determinism is a core theme of the dialogue in both philosophical and historical terms. On the philosophical level, Philiscus explains to Cicero the workings of fate: the gods determine the course of our lives and we should accept their arbitration humbly and those who fight against fate end up worsted and miserable. Philiscus explains to Cicero that:

κουφαὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐφήμεροι καὶ ἄλλως αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐπραγίαι εἰσὶ, καὶ ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον τις ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἐπαύξῃ, ῥᾶτον ὥσπερ πνεῦμα πίπτει, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς στάσεσιν.<sup>640</sup>

The final clause links the passage to the situation. Following on from this passage is a list of Romans whose power (in Dio’s eyes) came from an innate involvement in strife. Mentioned are Drusus, Scipio, the Gracchi and Manlius Capitolinus.<sup>641</sup> All of these men are associated in Dio’s narrative with *φιλοτιμία* or *ταραχή* – Drusus, who was involved in the beginnings of the Social War and ended up being murdered; Scipio, who was presumably the Aemilianus who opposed Tiberius Gracchus, and who is accused of *φιλοτιμία* in Dio’s narrative; the Gracchi, whose characters are dwelt on by Dio in Books 24-5; and Manlius Capitolinus, about whom Dio records the usual tradition that he tried to seize control of the city.<sup>642</sup> Like Cicero, they became embroiled in factional disputes and suffered the consequences. Indeed, it is Cicero’s opposition to those much more powerful than himself which is the cause of his downfall. Philiscus says:

ὁ δεῖνα δὲ καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἐκ δυναστείας καὶ ἐπηρείας πάντα κατὰ σοῦ συνεσκευάσαντο, ὥστ’ ἐκείνοις μὲν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ προσήκει, σοὶ δὲ δὴ ἀνδρείως φέρειν τὰ δόξαντα τῷ δαίμονι καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν.<sup>643</sup>

The use of the term *δυναστεία*, particularly with the preposition *ἐκ*, is important. Cary renders it as “from their superior power”, which draws out the point nicely, though we might prefer here ‘on the basis of their superior power’: Cicero has gone up against, and lost to, men

<sup>640</sup> Cass. Dio 38.27.1.

<sup>641</sup> Cass. Dio 38.27.3. Also mentioned is Themistocles, but, for obvious reasons he plays no part in Dio’s history. He is, however, mentioned several times by Cicero as a stereotypical exile. See Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 1.2.4; 1.15.32-3.

<sup>642</sup> Frg. 96.1-3; 84.1; 26.1-3.

<sup>643</sup> Cass. Dio 38.25.3.

much more powerful and ruthless than he is. His demise has been wrought by powers he is incapable of fighting. Certainly, the most obvious point here is one of criticism of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, who have wrested control of the state from the senate. But there is a sense of Cicero's *φιλονεικία*, too. Philiscus expects Cicero to accept his fortune and not to go on resisting men who are too powerful for him; the assumption is that this is the mistake Cicero has made thus far.

Philiscus also appeals to Cicero's concern for his reputation, something that again responds to Cicero's own concerns in his correspondence.<sup>644</sup> He advises him that, if he cares about his fame, he should be glad to be exiled, since he was cast from Rome on account of his role in quelling the Catilinarian conspiracy, not because he perpetrated any malicious act.<sup>645</sup> Cicero is later told that he should not desire any further political office – he has obtained the consulship once, what worth is there in achieving it twice? He is told to look to Marius as an example of one who was made consul no less than seven times and met a miserable end.<sup>646</sup> Cicero is told to abandon politics and pursue the study of history. This would, Philiscus says, bring Cicero the immortality he craves.<sup>647</sup> This passage has a great deal of significance in other ways, which I shall discuss later. For the moment, however, suffice it to say that this passage supports the idea that Dio, like Plutarch, thought that Cicero's main achievements were in the intellectual sphere, not the political.<sup>648</sup> It also, as Fechner points out, provides Cicero with an alternative to the political pursuit of fame, which has proved so singularly destructive to himself and to the state.<sup>649</sup>

Other passages seem less clear cut. They present an unduly favourable picture of Cicero, which is not mirrored in the narrative. I would argue that these can be explained by two factors.

---

<sup>644</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 3.15.2. Claassen (1996): 40.

<sup>645</sup> Cass. Dio 38.25.5.

<sup>646</sup> Cass. Dio 38.28.3-4. This point is a nice rebuttal of the idea that the Philiscus dialogue relates to Dio's own political experience. Dio, of course, was consul twice and was very happy about it.

<sup>647</sup> Cass. Dio 38.28.2.

<sup>648</sup> See Gowing (1998): 374-6, who argues that Dio is unusual in the Greek world for taking an interest in Cicero's intellectual pursuits. The only other example he can find is Philostratus.

<sup>649</sup> Fechner (1986): 54.

Firstly, Philiscus is providing Cicero with comfort and a way to lead a better life – the consolatory tradition, though it may include criticism, would not descend into all-out character assassination. Secondly, we should not think of Philiscus as being omniscient – that is the mistake that accompanies an assumption that Philiscus and Dio are one and the same. Very often, when Philiscus mistakes Cicero’s bad intentions for good ones, he prefaces it with “so I have heard”, or “as I hear it”. Whilst these moments provide the reader with an insight through the well-intentioned irony of Philiscus into Cicero’s *real* motivations, they should also be seen as an attempt at encouragement, since Philiscus normally focuses on the episodes in Dio’s narrative where Cicero’s behaviour is spoken well of. An example of the latter:

καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀκούω τοῦθ', ὅτι οὐκ ἄκων οὐδ' ἄλοῦς μετέστης, ἀλλ' ἐθελοντῆς ἐμίσησας τὸν μετ' αὐτῶν βίον, ἅτε μήτε βελτίους σφῆς ποιῆσαι δυνάμενος μήτε συναπολέσθαι σφίσιν ὑπομένων, καὶ ἔφυγες οὐ τὴν πατρίδα ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτῇ.<sup>650</sup>

Cicero’s correspondence to friends in exile during Caesar’s dictatorship often waxes on similar themes. He advises them, as Claassen puts it, that “exile is a lesser evil than being present to watch the Republic crumble”.<sup>651</sup> In a letter to Torquatus, for example, he laments that no consolation can be made for the dangers of the Republic (*commune rei publicae...vereor ne consolatio nulla possit vera reperiri*) and states that there is no worse place to be at the time than in Rome (*mibi dubium non est quin hoc tempore bono viro Romae esse miserrimum sit*).<sup>652</sup> The passage has a further dimension, as it is the complete contrary of what Dio has to say about Cicero’s last moments before exile. Cicero, far from leaving willingly, had nearly brought the state to the point of civil war. The idea that he had tried to improve his opponents is perhaps because Philiscus is ‘aware’ of Cicero’s literary character, as philosophical and moral improver, rather than his political one: certainly, the last few months of his time in Rome were more preoccupied with attacking them in the law courts or sending assassins against them. Other passages need to be placed in their rightful context:

---

<sup>650</sup> Cass. Dio 38.26.1.

<sup>651</sup> Claassen (1996): 36-7.

<sup>652</sup> Cic. *ad fam.* 6.1.1-3; cf. 4.7.4; 4.8.1-2; 4.9.1-3; 6.4.3.

οὐ μὲν γὰρ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα τοῖς πολίταις συνεβούλευσας καὶ ἔπραξας, οὐκ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ' ὑπατεύων, οὐδ' ἴδια τι πολυπραγμονῶν ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς βουλῆς δόγμασι πειθόμενος, οὐ κατὰ στάσιν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ γενομένοις.<sup>653</sup>

On the face of it, this looks like Dio is playing ironically with Philiscus' positive view of Cicero's character. He certainly cannot often be praised for putting the state before his own private grudges, nor for absenting himself from factional politics. However, the passage clearly relates to Cicero's consulship. As we have seen, Dio's view of Cicero's actions as consul is largely favourable (albeit one that is still tied to his general character traits), where Cicero's actions are consonant with the authority of the state and his courage in the face of Catiline's supporters is emphasised. Indeed, most of the passages that give a seemingly upbeat view of Cicero's character relate directly to his actions whilst consul. I would suggest that Dio is not deliberately setting up a 'pseudo-Cicero' with which to bash the Cicero of his narrative, but that his logic here is to have Philiscus 'remind' Cicero of what he could achieve, if he turned his back on the factionalism, feuding and over-bearing oratory to which he is more accustomed. Fastening on Cicero's positive role in 63 B.C. is a good tactic for the kind of hortatory *consolatio* that Dio is putting into the mouth of Philiscus. It is Cicero's misfortune that he does not listen to such advice and ends up succumbing to the fate Philiscus predicts for him. It also serves to demonstrate, as Fechner has argued, Dio's broader theories on the fall of the Republic.<sup>654</sup>

Obviously, all the points we have made so far have to be disentangled from the *genre* of the piece. Dio has composed a *consolatio* and many of the arguments we have seen here are intended to provide comfort. The arguments about Cicero's reputation, for example, need not relate directly to Dio's claims about Cicero's pursuit of his fame at the expense of the state: they are common stock in a *consolatio*.<sup>655</sup> The way they are couched, however, often suggests that Dio

---

<sup>653</sup> Cass. Dio 38.25.2.

<sup>654</sup> Fechner (1986): 58.

<sup>655</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 38.26.1, where Philiscus assures Cicero that the loss of honour for exile is not his, but his enemies'.

was thinking along the lines I suggest: a *consolatio* has to be suited to the character and situation of the recipient. Thus:

οὐ γὰρ που μᾶλλον ἂν ἐθελήσαις τῶ τε Κατιλίῳ συμπράξαις καὶ τῶ Λεντούλῳ συνομόσας, καὶ πάντα μὲν τὰναντία τῶν συμφερόντων τῇ πατρίδι παραινέσας, μηδὲν δὲ τῶν προσταχθέντων σοι ὑπ' αὐτῆς ποιήσας, οἴκοι μένειν ἀδικήσας <ἢ> κατορθώσας φυγεῖν. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τῆς δόξης σοι μέλει, πολλῶ που αἰρετώτερόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀδικήσαντά σε ἐκπεπτωκέναι ἢ κακοργήσαντά τι οἴκοι μεμενηκέναι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἡ αἰσχύνῃ τοῖς ἀδίκως ἐκβαλοῦσί τινα, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶ κατ' ἐπήρειαν ἐξελαθέντι προσγίγνεται.<sup>656</sup>

Though the passage contains many of the traditional elements of the *consolatio* – the assurance that shame lies on those who act unjustly, not on him who has been treated unjustly – the consolatory element is mediated through Cicero's political career. It was better to go into exile than wreak havoc with Catiline and Lentulus, or to sacrifice the best interests of the state. The penultimate line is perhaps the most important: the hortatory element that I perceive in the dialogue – linking Cicero's good behaviour in the past, the benefits of exile and the needs of the state – are found in the simple phrase *εἰ καὶ τῆς δόξης σοι μέλει*.<sup>657</sup>

With that in mind, let us now focus on Philiscus' advice to Cicero. Again, this pertains to Cicero's character. Philiscus, as we have briefly noted above, encourages Cicero to give up politics and write history, if he seeks an undying reputation. He states:

ἂν μὲν γὰρ μοι πεισθῆς, καὶ πάνυ ἀγαπήσεις χωρὶν τέ τι παραθαλασσίδιον ἔξω πάτου ἐκλεξάμενος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῶ γεωργῶν τε ἅμα καὶ συγγράφων τι, ὡς Ξενοφῶν, ὡς Θουκυδίδης.<sup>658</sup>

This passage has been seen to contain a sly nod to Dio himself. We know, after all, that Dio owned a villa near Capua and that Dio wrote part of his history there.<sup>659</sup> I do not wish to deny this, but would note that there is perhaps also a genuine reference to Cicero's correspondence around the time of his exile too.<sup>660</sup> One of these letters is particularly interesting because it talks of Cicero's desire to leave Rome for good and devote himself to the writing of

---

<sup>656</sup> Cass. Dio 38.25.4-5.

<sup>657</sup> Other passages tend to confirm this: e.g. Cass. Dio 38.25.1-2; 38.27.1-3; 38.28.6-29.1 (talks of *ἐπιθυμία*).

<sup>658</sup> Cass. Dio 38.28.1.

<sup>659</sup> Millar (1964): 51.

<sup>660</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2.5.2; 2.6.1-2; 2.14.2; 2.15.3. See Shackleton-Bailey (1971): 51.

history.<sup>661</sup> That this history would be in the form of scurrilous Theopompan *anecdota* is not irrelevant because the passage can also relate to Dio's depiction of Cicero's actions on coming back from exile. Dio claims that Cicero, checking his anger against Crassus and Caesar (see below), turned to writing a pamphlet denouncing them and defending his actions during his life.<sup>662</sup> This is a reference (though not garbled or anachronistic as some have claimed) to Cicero's *de consiliis suis*.<sup>663</sup> The passage suggests a more restrained Cicero, but one who is still subject to the antagonistic edge to his character – certainly, he seems (as we shall argue) to have given ear to the advice Philiscus gave him, but that beneath the sanguine exterior lies his true combative nature. It soon makes itself explicit hereafter. The reference to history writing is perhaps indicative of this. Philiscus' advice is to write the kind of stately history that Dio wrote, looking to one's posterity. Cicero distorts that, because of his excess of choler, and his history becomes a crude and vicious attack on his political enemies. Both the advice Philiscus gives and the passage on his return from exile are linked most strikingly with how they accord with Cicero's own statements of his plans: here is a case where Cicero had the opportunity to put his considerable intellectual talents to good use and instead, he wrote polemical and violent attacks on those he disliked. That much would seem pertinent to Dio at least.

Philiscus' warning is equally suited to Cicero's character:

οὕτω μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονήσεις, καί σου μέγα ὄνομα [εἶ] καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ καὶ ζῶντος ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἔσται· ἂν δὲ δὴ τὴν τε κάθοδον σπουδάσης καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ λαμπρότητα ζηλώσης, δυσχερὲς μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν βούλομαι, φοβοῦμαι δέ, ἕς τε τὰ πράγματα ἀποβλέπων καὶ τὴν σὴν παρρησίαν ἐννοῶν, τὴν τε δύναμιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν σου θεωρῶν, μήποτε τι καὶ αὐθις σφαλῆς.<sup>664</sup>

Not only is Cicero's *παρρησία* mentioned, but Philiscus warns Cicero about setting too much store by a successful political career, or seeking reputation. Interestingly, Philiscus talks of Cicero's *ἀντιστασιωταί*, which perhaps echoes the *ἀντί* from *ἀντιφιλονεικία*. Certainly, the

<sup>661</sup> Cic. *ad Att.* 2.6.2. *Contra* Gowing (1998): 379, who argues that Philiscus' advice to leave Rome resembles the *otium cum dignitate* of the imperial period and was alien to the Republican mentality.

<sup>662</sup> Cass. Dio 39.10.2-3.

<sup>663</sup> Syme (1964): 62-4; Millar (1964): 49.

<sup>664</sup> Cass. Dio 38.28.6-29.1.

implicit suggestion that Cicero would choose to compete with a ‘faction’ with vastly greater resources than he could muster points in that direction.

Following on from this comes the most famous passage in the dialogue, where Philiscus warns Cicero of his impending doom. If he goes back to politics in Rome, he is warned, he will face not merely exile, but death and the humiliation of his corpse at the hands of Antony’s wife.<sup>665</sup> Also important are the next few sentences, which are often ignored. Cicero is warned not to trust his friends, even though they may be powerful (a reference, most likely to Pompey, but also, as we saw in the last chapter, one which looks forward to Octavian), because his friends will not help him against his enemies and are just as prepared to sell him down the river for the sake of their own political ambitions.<sup>666</sup> This partly refers back to Cicero’s experience going into exile (Dio’s generalisation that enemies are more prepared to do one harm than those who are in our debt to help us), but refers more so to Cicero’s recall. Pompey, who had sided with Clodius to have Cicero removed switches allegiance back to his old ‘friend’ when Clodius becomes too unruly and recalls him from exile. Not only is Pompey’s ‘friendship’ very much at his convenience, but he recalls Cicero for his own immediate political concerns.<sup>667</sup> Dio states that Pompey, enraged that Clodius had used the tribunician authority that Pompey himself had restored, wanted to recall Cicero to have his revenge.<sup>668</sup> Again, arguably, we see another feature of Cicero’s political career, the fact that he is something of a pawn to other people.

Philiscus’ warning has direct impact on Dio’s narrative, certainly in the last few months of Cicero’s life. We have seen in Chapter Six how Cicero’s opposition to Antony and caustic speech cause him to be murdered at a time when his political enemies comprised not only dynasts and statesmen, but armies. Not only does Cicero fulfill the prophecy by speaking against Antony, but he also antagonises one of Octavian’s centurions. Soldiers had come to Rome from Gaul to demand that the consulship be given to Octavian; when refused, one of the centurions

---

<sup>665</sup> Cass. Dio 38.29.2.

<sup>666</sup> Cass. Dio 38.29.3-4.

<sup>667</sup> Cass. Dio 38.30.1-2.

<sup>668</sup> Cass. Dio 38.30.2.

touched his sword and made a threatening remark. Cicero responded in such a way as to threaten the assassination of Octavian. Dio ends the episode with the line, *ἐκείνω μὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸν ὄλεθρον παρεσκεύασεν* (“for Cicero, this too set him up for destruction”).<sup>669</sup> It is interesting to speculate how far Cicero’s *tête à tête* with the centurion is a product of his *φιλονεικία*: it certainly seems inappropriate for a distinguished *consularis* to be bickering with a lowly soldier.

The warning has more immediate relevance, however. When Cicero comes back from exile, as we have briefly noted, he exhibits a strange concatenation of restraint and subversive feuding. There are moments when Cicero seems to heed Philiscus’ advice and moments when we see Cicero’s innate love of strife and foolhardiness breaking through. We have already examined the example of Cicero’s efforts as an historian, and there is also the case of Cicero’s relationship with Pompey.

*τῷ τε Πομπηίῳ τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ φυγῇ μεθεῖς συνηλλάγη, καὶ τὴν γε εὐεργεσίαν παραχρῆμα ἀπέδωκε.*<sup>670</sup>

On the face of it, it looks like Cicero has learnt his lesson about striving with those more powerful than himself, but there is more. By championing Pompey, Cicero may have made his peace, but he is being gulled once more by his supposed ‘friends’ to work for their advantage. Pompey had recalled Cicero for his own advantage and that is precisely what he gets. ‘Cicero’ does, however, learn his lesson with Crassus and Caesar – Dio claims he had “lately reaped the rewards of unrestrained free-speech” (*τῶν τῆς ἀκράτου παρρησίας ἐπικαρπιῶν νεωστὶ πεπειραμένος*).<sup>671</sup> All well and good, and Cicero is to heed Philiscus’ advice (if in a distorted way) when he writes his pamphlet attacking Caesar and Crassus – at least it is better than attacking them to their faces. However, it is not to last. Cicero’s display of restraint and caution is ephemeral: soon he goes back to his usual pattern of foolish, clumsy and heavy-handed feuding.

---

<sup>669</sup> Cass. Dio 46.43.4.

<sup>670</sup> Cass. Dio 39.9.1.

<sup>671</sup> Cass. Dio 39.10.2.

Straight after the previous passage, Dio informs us that *Κικέρων μὲν οὖν αὐθις ἀνεβλάστανε*.<sup>672</sup> *Ἀναβλάστανω* has the force of “springing up” or “bursting forth” and perhaps emphasises the outpouring of Cicero’s *φιλονεικία* and perhaps picking up *ἐπικαρπιῶν*. The context would suggest so. Cicero reignites his feud with Clodius, attacking the legality of the latter’s transfer to the plebs and seizing, at the head of an armed mob, his laws from the Capitoline and taking them back to his house. The outcome was that neither Cicero nor Clodius was prepared to give an inch to the other and among the ‘shameful’ things they did was to slander and abuse one another, though these appear not to have been the worst according to Dio.<sup>673</sup>

### Conclusion

Philiscus’s *consolatio* then touches on many of the themes Dio explores in his narrative. He picks out genuinely ‘good’ moments in Dio’s portrait of Cicero and tries to build on them rhetorically. In other cases, he points to what might have been true of Cicero had he been the philosopher he claimed to be. He associates Cicero with good motives, many of which Cicero has claimed for himself, in a way that allows Dio to impress upon the reader what things Cicero fell short in. In the same vein is the encouragement to live beside the seaside, as it relates – in one way – to Cicero’s own professed ‘desire’ after his return from exile.

What can we say about this? One theme running through all the speeches that Dio composes concerning Cicero is the latter’s lack of ability to heed good advice – even his own. Philiscus rightly predicts Cicero’s death and, despite the fact that Cicero had been successfully comforted by him and seems to have displayed a fleeting regard for his advice, he chose to ignore his advice and continue to pursue the political path that would lead to his decapitation and humiliation by Antony and Fulvia. On the question of Cicero’s inability to heed good advice,

---

<sup>672</sup> Cass. Dio 39.11.1.

<sup>673</sup> Cass. Dio 39.21.1-2.

this is the reason for the relatively high number of parallels between Cicero's consolatory letters to his friends and the *consolatio* Philiscus delivers to him in Dio.<sup>674</sup> Dio seems to be saying that Cicero was perfectly capable of consoling others, but lacked the foresight or common sense to follow his own advice when he needed to. This much is admitted by 'Cicero' himself to Philiscus.<sup>675</sup> The dialogue also serves to draw out the inherent flaws in Cicero's character: he *could* act within the interests of the state, but more often than not he was confounded by his querulousness and outspokenness. In fact, the very time when Cicero's actions and the state's needs coincided was precisely when Cicero could put his peculiar talents for fiery and aggressive rhetoric and bullying political tactics to good use. The implicit assumption behind all of this, I think, is that Cicero will ultimately fail. Philiscus' prophecy is not just an ironic touch, but a rather tragic moment: it reminds the reader of something we all know well – that Cicero will meet his death in the way described because he refused to stand by and let Antony seize control of the state. Not only can he not take good advice, but his political efforts will themselves come to naught when he fights against a tyranny of three, very much like the one that exiled him, but far crueller and more ruthless. In Dio, there is no Octavian begging to protect Cicero – he is killed by a man he once defended in court, fulfilling Dio's claim that those we help are less eager to reward us than those we offend are to hurt us.<sup>676</sup> The feeling of Cicero's failure is exacerbated: he fails to listen, he fails to restrain himself, he fails to recognise the signs provided to him throughout his life and he fails in his political cause, murdered by men to whom he means nothing and to whom he was only ever a small pawn.

---

<sup>674</sup> See Claassen (1996): 36-45. Cf. Cic. *ad fam.* 4.5.2-4; 4.6.1-2; 5.12.5; 5.14.1; 5.16.2-4; 5.17.3; 5.18.1; 5.21.2; 6.10b.1; 9.11.1; Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 5.37.107.

<sup>675</sup> Cass. Dio 38.18.2.

<sup>676</sup> Cass. Dio 47.11.1.

## Section Three Conclusion

We have seen in this section that Dio believes *φιλονεικία* and *παρρησία* to be central themes in Cicero's character – he argues, feuds and holds grudges against those far more powerful, chooses to attack them wantonly and without caution and drives them into strife with him. He is also led by his desire for reputation and political office, something which perhaps ties in with his *φιλονεικία*. These features recur in Cicero's character, even when he puts them to good use in the service of the state during Catiline's conspiracy. The speeches tie into this because they both show the inherent hypocrisy of Cicero's position (and perhaps that of all Republican politicians) and desire to open up veins of strife – such as in the amnesty speech and the debate with Calenus – and Cicero's unwillingness to listen to sensible advice, even when it is he himself who is giving it. In the amnesty speech and Calenus debate, Dio shows that the insurmountable obstacle in the last days of the Republic was factionalism, represented by *φιλονεικία*, and the result of the ambitious characters of the leading men of the Republic. If the man who advocated harmony and amnesty was flawed in the manner he condemns, how could the state be saved, Dio asks. The debate with Calenus draws this out further in that neither Cicero nor Calenus act from anything approaching honest motivation: both are out to protect and champion their interests, Cicero his *ἔχθρα* and Calenus his *χαρίς*. All of this heightens the sense of *pathos* inherent in the amnesty speech and ties in with Dio's claims in his history that the Republic was a spent force and *φιλοτιμία* and *φιλονεικία* had brought it down. Philiscus, as Fechner has argued, champions a view of the Republic where the politician subordinates his ambition to the best interests of the state, but (*contra* Fechner) the fact that the subject of Philiscus' *bon mots* is Cicero adds to the sense that the Republic is doomed, since Cicero (as Philiscus prophesies) is incapable of heeding his advice. But Cicero was, for Dio, a senator

who lacked the power of the big men, despite his fame. He represents for Dio an opportunity to explore the machinations of the 'lesser' politicians to show that they were as incapable of saving the Republic – and as bent on its destruction – as were Caesar and those like him, as we shall now explore.

## Section Four: Cassius Dio and Caesar: the end of the Republic

No figure in history symbolises the Roman world like Caesar. He stands, in the eyes of many, as the axis between the Republic and the Empire. His legacy is pronounced: Kaiser and Tsar were so named in his honour (as were the future leaders of Rome and Byzantium from whom the German and Russian Emperors derive their titles), fascist, communist, democrat and political realist have all cited him as an exemplar of their cause, Napoleon was inspired by him, much as Caesar himself was inspired by Alexander and Mediaeval potentates were to justify their monarchy through him. Even in Welsh myth, where Macsen Wledig (Magnus Maximus) stands for Roman might and power, it is Caesar's sword, *croceea mors*, which deals death to all who are touched by it.<sup>1</sup>

Unlike his shady successor Augustus, Caesar is a human figure. Augustus comes from contemporary literature with barely a personality: we talk of an Augustan Age, where Augustus the man disappears to permeate his reign in idolised form. Caesar, on the other hand, is all man. His sexual appetites were and are cause for comment – Cleopatra, her bastard Caesarion, Nicomedes II, Sulla's snide remark about the looseness of his clothing, the noble ladies of Rome, his soldiers' crude humour, the question mark over Brutus' legitimacy. He has come down to us a great conqueror and general, but, like Napoleon, it is the small personal touches that give us a sense of the man more than the grand strategy. As those who studied Napoleon at school remember the fact that he would tweak the ear and

---

<sup>1</sup> For two superb collections on Caesar's reception in Western Culture over the last two thousand years, see Wyke (2006) and Wyke (2007). The Welsh Triads are an interesting source of historically very confused myths about Caesar, based partly upon extensive knowledge of the *Commentarii*, later Brythonic history and (one senses) touchy pride – the Welsh defeat Caesar twice when he lands and it is only after a third invasion and a piece of bad luck that Caswallawn (Casivellaunus) is finally defeated himself. Apparently, he took his vengeance pursuing Caesar across the sea with a mighty fleet, finally settling in Gascony. In one version, Afarwy ap Lludd ap Beli, who supposedly summoned Caesar to Britain, is placed alongside Vortigern and Mordred as one of the Three Dishonoured Men of Britain. These stories are variously collected in both the Peniarth Manuscript and the Red Book of Hergest.

pinch the cheek of favoured soldiers, so none can forget the amusement with which Caesar records the feud between Pullo and Vorenus, or his men's tongue-in-cheek remark about their hopes of being raised to the *equites*. His political vision and ruthlessness have always been weighed against his short-sighted generosity to friends and enemies who were to murder him. Whereas Augustus blends into his age, Caesar dominates his; he embodies the downfall of the Republic in his ambitions, his passions, his selfishness and his military might. Rome becomes Caesar, in short, where Augustus becomes Rome.

Caesar in antiquity enjoyed no less a vaunted reputation, certainly after the Augustan glow cooled down.<sup>2</sup> Velleius Paterculus famously found himself unable to mention Caesar's introduction to political life in passing, claiming that he could but linger on him.<sup>3</sup> The reason? Apart from his comeliness of appearance and his descent from the gods, Velleius points to his being “*vigore animi acerrimus, munificentia effusissimus...magnitudine cogitationum, celeritate bellandi, patientia periculorum Magno illi Alexandro...simillimus*”.<sup>4</sup> The tone for the rest of Velleius' depiction is set. Thus he passes over the twenty-odd years between Caesar's entry into political life under Sulla to his first consulship in 59 B.C. as though one event followed another in quick succession, beginning his account proper with Caesar's compact with Pompey and Crassus;<sup>5</sup> he

---

<sup>2</sup> Significant modern studies of Caesar in a variety of authors from Sallust to Suetonius include Shimron (1967): 335-345; Gugel (1970): 5-22; Geiger (1975): 444-453; Duxbury (1989); Pelling (2002b): 253-266; Pelling (2006b): 3-26; Leigh (2009): 239-251; Pelling (2009a): 252-266; Pitcher (2009b): 267-276; Toher (2009): 224-238. Impressions of Caesar obviously varied in antiquity and there are significant differences between how Caesar was viewed, say, under Augustus and how he was viewed under the High Empire (to which category Dio, Appian, Plutarch and Suetonius belong), yet there is much similarity nonetheless. See Toher (2006): 29-44 for Nicolaus of Damascus' portrayal of Caesar. His depiction of Caesar as vulnerable to manipulation and deception is very much akin to Dio's claim that the senate stirred up animosity against Caesar by encouraging his arrogance. Likewise, Sallust's *synkrisis* of Caesar and Cato has caused much controversy amongst scholars, but his emphasis on Caesar's desire for political glory (regardless of whether that claim is critical or not) is surely not dissimilar to what we see in other writers. For discussion of the controversy surrounding Sall. *Cat.* 53.6-54.6 as well as a full bibliography, see Duxbury (1989): 293-334. Duxbury's arguments have recently been examined in Toher (2009): 225-6.

<sup>3</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.41.1. “*Secutus deinde est consulatus C. Caesaris, qui scribenti manum iniicit et quamlibet festinantem in se morari cogit*”.

<sup>4</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.41.1.

<sup>5</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.41.2-44.5.

presents Caesar's Gallic war as the continuation of his *inmanis res*;<sup>6</sup> he talks of Caesar's customary speed and luck (*sua et celeritas et fortuna*);<sup>7</sup> he points to Caesar's generosity and clemency, spurned by Brutus, without having to again digress from his narrative.<sup>8</sup>

Dio's account of Caesar is by no means unconventional. Though Cassius Dio recognises Augustus as the first true emperor of Rome, he sees Caesar as something of a proto-emperor.<sup>9</sup> His emphasis on Caesar's role in the destruction of Republican government is suggested by the fact that he places his only direct, personal analysis of the fall of the Republic immediately before his account of Caesar's death: afterwards there is only *δυναστεία* and monarchy.<sup>10</sup> He places equal importance with our other ancient accounts on Caesar's political and military style: his ambition, his ruthlessness, his speed, his clemency, his growing arrogance as dictator, his desire to make himself king and god, the last two of which led to his death at the hands of the conspirators (whose actions are condemned as much by Dio as by Appian and Plutarch).<sup>11</sup> His account is as teleological about Caesar's motives as any other.

Even the way Dio introduces his account of Caesar's career is normative. Appian, for example, begins book two of his *Bellum Civile* with a *synkrisis* between Caesar and Pompey in much the same vein as we shall see that Dio does:

---

<sup>6</sup> Vell. Pat. 46.1.

<sup>7</sup> Vell. Pat. 51.2.

<sup>8</sup> Vell. Pat. 52.5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Pitcher (2009b): 271. Cf. Rich (1989): 92-3. Dio is not entirely consistent over the nature of Caesar's monarchy, claiming at 45.1.2 that Caesar selected Octavian to be his heir, but making fairly clear elsewhere (50.1.1; 52.1.1; 52.41.4; 53.11.2; 53.17.1) that Augustus was the first true emperor of Rome.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio 44.2.1-4. *Contra* Kemezis (2006): 107, who argues that Dio dates the beginning of *δυναστεία* to 69 B.C. This is still very much part of the Republican narrative in Dio (see Pelling (1997): 121 who points to there being significant space in Dio's account of the late Republic given to less important or powerful historical figures, such as Catiline or Caesar's lieutenants in Gaul). *Δυναστεία* in the 'constitutional' sense meant by Kemezis surely refers only to the Triumviral period (as the word would suggest, given that it means rule by a '*junta*' or '*cabal*'). Cf. Fechner (1986): 154-63 who analyses the various ways in which the word is used by Dio (he concurs (156) that *δυναστεία* in the sense of a type of government refers to the Triumviral period, even though there are elements of *δυναστεία* in Dio's account of earlier periods of the Republic); Freyburger-Galland (1997): 127 says of this passage that 'il semble bien que *δυναστεία* puisse aussi désigner le pouvoir triumviral'.

<sup>11</sup> App. B.C. 2.118.494; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 69.5; see the more ambivalent criticism at Plut. *Comp. Dio et Brut.* 3.3.

ὁ μὲν δὴ Πομπήϊος ἄρτι τὴν θάλασσαν καθήρας ἀπὸ τῶν ληστηρίων τότε μάλιστα πανταχοῦ πλεονασάντων Μιθριδάτην ἐπὶ τοῖς λησταῖς καθηρήκει, Πόντου βασιλέα, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔθνη προσέλαβεν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἕω, διετάσσετο· ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ ἦν ἔτι νέος, δεινὸς εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι τολμησαί τε ἐς πάντα καὶ ἐλπῖσαι περὶ ἀπάντων, ἐς δὲ δὴ φιλοτιμίαν ἀφειδῆς ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, ὡς ἀγορανομῶν ἔτι καὶ στρατηγῶν εἶναι κατάχρεως καὶ τῷ πλήθει δαιμονίως ὑπεραρέσκειν, τῶν δῆμων αἰεὶ τοὺς δασιλεῖς ἐπαινούντων.<sup>12</sup>

All of the ingredients of Caesar's character are here telegraphed once again, right at Caesar's introduction: his popularity and the lengths to which he was prepared to go to achieve it, his *φιλοτιμία* and his intellectual and political brilliance (we might compare this to Plutarch's contrast between Caesar and Cicero, where Caesar fails to realise his true potential as an orator due to his preference for political over intellectual glory – here there is no juxtaposition, Caesar having both at once).<sup>13</sup> The contrast with Pompey highlights these aspects of his character: Caesar has the vim and vigour of youth, deliberately placed against Pompey's grandeur. In fact, the comparison is an absurdity – Pompey was barely six years older than Caesar, who himself was thirty-five as aedile. Neither was 'young' in any real sense, nor was Pompey the worn-out old man that Caesar himself became in Shakespeare.<sup>14</sup> But that is to miss the point. Appian is seeking to present an image of Caesar as dynamic, eager to topple Pompey and replace him in popular affection, a man destined for glory, driven by high ideals and low ambitions; an impression that, placed at the beginning of the narrative, never leaves the reader's memory.

Dio's method is different, but the spirit is the same. Bar Octavian, historical figures in Dio are not graced with backgrounds; they first appear where they become relevant to the narrative, usually with their full name being their only formal introduction.<sup>15</sup> Dio, however, specialises in using anecdote to draw out the salient features of a person's character.<sup>16</sup> The first time Caesar is mentioned in our surviving text of Dio is in relation to

<sup>12</sup> App. *B.C.* 2.1.2-3. See Carsana (2007): 11-14 for a discussion of the *synkrisis* between Caesar and Catiline that takes place also at the beginning of Book 2 of the *Bellum Civile*, which is similar in exploring Caesar and Catiline's shared aristocratic birth and their *φιλοτιμία*.

<sup>13</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 3.1-2.

<sup>14</sup> Luc. 1.136-141 also plays up the notion of Pompey as a decrepit old man.

<sup>15</sup> Millar (1964): 46.

<sup>16</sup> Pelling (1997): 139.

his support for the *lex Manilia* alongside Cicero. Whilst it is highly likely that Caesar was mentioned before this since our reference to him here is simply to *Καῖσαρ* without the *Γαῖος Ιούλιος* one would expect, in what context it is impossible to say. It may be that, like Cicero, he was mentioned in passing during a reference to another person.<sup>17</sup> We can be fairly sure, I feel, that the manuscript does record the first formal time Caesar was mentioned in the narrative, since the passage has an ‘introductory’ feel and mentions several aspects of Caesar’s character that will be assumed without qualification in later episodes.<sup>18</sup> Dio says:

οἱτοὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνηγωνίσαντο οὐχ ὅτι καὶ συμφέρειν αὐτὰ τῇ πόλει ἐνόμιζον, οὐδ’ ὅτι τῷ Πομπηίῳ χαρίσασθαι ἤθελον· ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς γενήσεσθαι ἔμελλε, Καῖσαρ μὲν τὸν τε ὄχλον ἅμα ἐθεράπευσεν ἅτε καὶ ὁρῶν ὅσω τῆς βουλῆς ἐπικρατέστεροι ἦσαν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ τό τι τῶν ὁμοίων ψηφισθῆναι ποτε παρεσκεύασε, κὰν τούτῳ καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον καὶ ἐπιφθονώτερον καὶ ἐπαχθέστερον ἐκ τῶν διδομένων οἱ ποιῆσαι, ὅπως σφίσι πρὸς κόρου θᾶσσον γένηται, ἠθέλησε...<sup>19</sup>

The effectiveness of the episodic style needs no justification; we are introduced straightaway to the same features of Caesar’s character that Appian explores in a more formal analysis.<sup>20</sup> These features – Caesar’s awareness of the importance of popularity (contrasted in the rest of the passage with the *odium* Cicero earns for himself by upsetting the feelings of the crowd in prosecuting Manilius), his desire for power and command, his emulation of Pompey and desire to outdo him and his ruthlessness and awareness of the

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio 36.1a, though even here it is not clear that this is the first time Cicero is mentioned (see p. 108). There is the possibility that, in the manner of Tacitus, Dio could have made occasional reference to Caesar in the books covering the 70s B.C. (now lost), hinting at his future character and career. See Pelling (1997): 127-8.

<sup>18</sup> Indeed, Dio’s words at 37.22.1 would seem to refer back to the passage I cite in n. 19 below. *καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνου, ὅστις τε ἦν καὶ ὅτι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐθεράπευε, τὸν τε Πομπήιον ἄλλως μὲν καθήρει, δι’ ὧν δὲ δὴ τῷ τε ὁμίλῳ χαρίεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἰσχύσειν ἔμελλε προσεποιεῖτο, προείρηται.*

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.3-4. We detect something similar in Plutarch’s *Vita Caesaris*. Though, again, we cannot be certain how much of the beginning of the account we are missing, Plutarch’s first reference to Caesar’s political career at 1.2 has many similar elements, including Caesar’s daring, his bid for popularity and Sulla’s recognition of his future danger to the constitution. For discussion of the missing early portion of Plutarch’s text, see Niebuhr (1848): 28-9; Pelling (1973): 343-4; Pelling (1984): 33. Beneker (2005): 315-325 has argued very convincingly that the three ‘triumviral’ lives of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus form a composite whole, which, when read together present a picture of Caesar as the dominating figure, Pompey in second place and Crassus a poor third.

<sup>20</sup> The passage also correlates to Plutarch’s statements about Caesar’s support for the *lex Gabinia* in Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 25.4.

real mechanisms of politics (again in contrast to Cicero, who affects the same cynicism as Caesar but hasn't the ability to carry it off) – will dominate our discussion in Chapter Eight where we shall look at Caesar's political rise during the 60s and 50s B.C.<sup>21</sup>

During the 60s and 50s B.C., when he is still far from his goal to make himself master of Rome, Caesar is never far from the action, even where Dio is focusing his narrative on other political figures. In the passage discussed above, for example, we are told that Caesar both sought to render Pompey *ἐπιφθονώτερος* to the crowd and to emulate his example. Pompey's obsession with *φθόνος* predates Caesar's rise, but it grows more excessive with each passing victory for Caesar, with Pompey worried about his falling behind his rival in popular affection. Despite the focus being on Pompey in these discussions, we cannot help remembering Caesar's 'long-term project' at work in the background, and Pompey's inability to perceive it correctly or to combat it successfully.<sup>22</sup> Equally, Dio achieves the same effect when talking about Pompey's military successes in the East:

*ταῦτά τε πρὸς τὸν Φραάτην ἀπὸ τῆς παρουσίας οἱ δυνάμειος ἔπραξε, σαφέστατα τοῖς πλεονεκτεῖν βουλομένοις ἐπιδείξας ὅτι πάντα ἐκ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἤρτηται καὶ ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς κρατῶν νομοθέτης ὧν βούλεται ἀναγκαῖος γίγνεται.<sup>23</sup>*

To whom else other than Caesar does this apply? We also have Caesar firmly in mind when we read Dio's account of Pompey's return from the East, particularly when Dio talks of Pompey's 'insights' during the 50s about the folly of his actions:

*ὁ οὖν Πομπήιος ἐπειδὴ μηδὲν διὰ τε τὸν Μέτελλον καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἄλλους διεπράξατο, ἔφη μὲν φθονεῖσθαι τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει τοῦτο δηλώσειν, φοβηθεῖς δὲ μὴ καὶ ἐκείνου διαμαρτῶν μείζω αἰσχύνην ὄφλη, κατέβαλε τὴν ἀξίωσιν. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω γνοὺς ὅτι μηδὲν*

---

<sup>21</sup> See Cass. Dio 36.43.5-44.2 and my full discussion of the implications of this for Cicero's character in Chapter 5, pp. 108-111. Pelling (2006a): 260 has pointed out about the contrast between Caesar and Cicero that 'Cicero wanted to be a decisive factor in the balance for others; Caesar wants to outstrip others, and (by implication) to do without any balance at all. Whether or not Cicero's style belongs to the past, Caesar's certainly belongs to the future', tying into my point about Caesar's role as an axis for Roman history.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 37.22.1; 23.1-4; 44.2; 49.1-50.6. We also see Caesar in the background when Pompey gets it right: 37.23.2 talks of Pompey's awareness of the dangers of allowing excessive honours to be voted to him, something Caesar fails to grasp as dictator. Cf. Pelling (2006a): 260; (2006b): 11.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio. 37.6.1.

*ὄντως ἴσχυεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸν φθόνον ἐφ' οἷς ἠδυνήθη ποτὲ εἶχεν, ἔργῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀπάνητο, μετεμέλετο ὅτι τὰ τε στρατόπεδα προαφῆκε καὶ ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐξέδωκε.<sup>24</sup>*

The passage hints at several effects of Caesar's politicking, for Caesar had been successfully 'attempting' to make Pompey unpopular. Caesar's slow appropriation of the crowd away from support of Pompey to his own control underlies the passage; Pompey, who had once been loved by the fickle multitude, is now afraid of embarrassing himself if they are cool in their sympathy for him. Most importantly, though, the passage refers to Caesar in other ways: it conjures up impressions of what he will do in 49 B.C. Towards the beginning of Book 41, Caesar sends a letter to the senate declaring that if he is to disband his army, he expects Pompey to do the same, since it would be highly dangerous for him if *τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐκδοθῆ*. The repetition of the term is surely no accident, and highlights the way in which so much in Dio's narrative of the period presages the rise of Caesar as well as Caesar's control over political life.

There are three chapters in this Section. The first chapter is an exploration of general aspects of Caesar's character in Dio, who mostly discusses them in his analysis of Caesar's rise to power during the 60s and 50s B.C. These will include his ambitions, his relationship to Pompey, his political canniness and ruthlessness and his awareness of the need for popularity. In Section Three, I discussed Cicero's character and how the comparisons Dio draws between him and Caesar serve to highlight both Cicero's personality and its relationship to the key causes of constitutional stress in late Republican politics. Here I shall examine Caesar's characterisation (some of which we have already seen), linking the features Dio emphasises with his analysis of the decline of the Republic. I argued in Section Three that accusations of bias and hostility in Dio's portrayal of Cicero were unfounded; what instead characterises Dio's depiction is Cicero's ultimate failure – he plays the same game as Caesar and Pompey, but he lacks their natural talent and meets his

---

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 37.50.5-6.

comeuppance. Caesar, we shall see, is very much the opposite (as Dio's own comparisons between the two men show). He is typified by success right up until his dictatorship, when he begins transgressing the boundaries of his office and upsetting the senatorial elite.<sup>25</sup> Chapter Nine will examine the role of the Vesontio speech in Dio's presentation of Caesar's military career (in Gaul and more broadly) and how Dio ties these themes with his broader impression of Caesar's character and his role in the destruction of the Republic. In opposition to traditional interpretations of the speech, I shall argue that, far from a lengthy and uninspired discourse on the theme of defensive imperialism, or a collection of "commonplace philosophical terms",<sup>26</sup> the speech is a cleverly constructed and ironic critique of Caesar's motives both for war in Gaul and for his attack on Ariovistus, a man whom, by Caesar's own admission, he had previously declared a friend and ally of Rome.<sup>27</sup> Chapter Ten will explore Dio's depiction of Caesar's dictatorship, focusing on the function of Caesar's speech in the senate to explain why his 'reign' ended in failure.

---

<sup>25</sup> Pelling (2006a): 258-9.

<sup>26</sup> The first is the theory of Gabba (1955): 303, the second is the theory of Millar (1964): 81-3. Cf. Millar (1961): 13-14. Gabba's argument has been exploded by Fechner (1986): 219-225.

<sup>27</sup> For perhaps the most interesting modern analysis of the speech, see Hagendahl (1944): 1-40. A full discussion of scholarly approaches to the speech will be presented in Chapter Nine (pp.212-3).

## Chapter Eight: A Man on the Make

### Introduction

In this chapter, I want to expand on our exploration of the various strands of Caesar's character as Dio presents them in the passage concerning Caesar's role in the *lex Manilia*. We shall see here how Dio takes as his basis the theme of Caesar's ambition and draws his conclusions about other aspects of Caesar's behaviour and personality from this.

### Part One: Caesar's φιλοτιμία

Like his Greek *Doppelgänger*, Alexander the Great, perhaps the most salient feature of Caesar's character in all depictions of his actions from antiquity is his ambition. Approaches are, inevitably, ambivalent among the historians and biographers. Whether Sallust praises or disparages Caesar for his desire for political legacy is notoriously difficult to pin down, for example, whereas Velleius Paterculus now admires it, now condemns it.<sup>1</sup> Our Greek authorities are clearer about the destructive nature of Caesar's ambition. It has been shown that in Plutarch's *Life*, Caesar's *φιλοτιμία* is unrestrained, the product of his preference for military and political glory over intellectual legacy, and, as such, causes his

---

<sup>1</sup> For Sallust, see Section Four Introduction n. 3 above. Velleius' admiration has been noted in Section Four Introduction n. 5. He condemns Caesar's ambition (for its role in the formation of the 'first Triumvirate') at 2.44.2. Suetonius' stance is perhaps simpler, but still expresses ambivalence. Whilst he ascribes (Suet. *Div. Jul.* 19.2) the 'first Triumvirate' to Caesar's feeling of *maxima iniuria* at the hands of his political enemies (the *optimates*), and passes over Caesar's expenditure, his campaigning in Gaul and Spain and his actions as consul with a degree of neutrality (e.g. 20.1-3; 22.1; 26.2), he concludes that Caesar had been murdered lawfully because of his growing tyranny during his dictatorship (76.1).

own downfall and that of the Republic.<sup>2</sup> Appian, we have already seen, foregrounds Caesar's ambition, but his verdict on its effects is equally damning.<sup>3</sup> Dio likewise focuses on Caesar's *φιλοτιμία* and its ramifications. Most notably, Dio couples Caesar's and Pompey's motives in his highly rhetorical account of the Battle of Pharsalus:

αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τοῦ τε παντὸς κράτους ἀμφότεροι ἐφιέμενοι, καὶ πολλῇ μὲν φιλοτιμίᾳ ἐμφύτῳ πολλῇ δὲ καὶ φιλονεικίᾳ ἐπικτήτῳ χρώμενοι (πρὸς τε γὰρ τῶν ἴσων καὶ πρὸς τῶν οἰκειοτάτων ἤκιστα τινες ἐλαττούμενοι φέρουσιν) οὔτε τι συγχωρήσαι ἀλλήλοις ἤθελον, ὡσπερ ἀμφότεροι κρατῆσαι δυνάμενοι, οὔτε πιστεῦσαι, κἂν συμβαθῆτι, ἐδύναντο μὴ οὐ τοῦ πλείονός τε αἰείσφας ὀριγνήσεσθαι καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς αὔθις στασιάσειν. γνώμη μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων διέφερον ὅσον Πομπήιος μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων δεύτερος, Καῖσαρ δὲ καὶ πρῶτος πάντων εἶναι ἐπεθύμει, καὶ ὁ μὲν παρ' ἐκόντων τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἐθελόντων προστατεῖν φιλεῖσθαι τε ἐσπούδαζε, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔμελεν εἰ καὶ ἀκόντων ἄρχοι καὶ μισοῦσιν ἐπιτάσσοι, τὰς τε τιμὰς αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ διδοίη. τὰ μέντοι ἔργα, δι' ὧν ἠλπίζον πάντ' ὅσα ἐβούλοντο καταπράξειν, ἀμφότεροι ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἐποίουν... ὥστε εἰ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις διηλλαττον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γε πράξεσι, δι' ὧν ἀποπληρώσειν αὐτὰς ἠλπίζον, ὁμοιοῦντο.<sup>4</sup>

Dio is not only emphatic that Caesar and Pompey's ambitions are 'innate', but also that they lead in the same direction, political master- and rulership, with all of its implications for the Roman state.<sup>5</sup> Even so, Pompey's *φιλοτιμία* lacks Caesar's cold-bloodedness. He wants to be loved and revered by the men whom he dominates, whilst Caesar's only concern is that he achieve what he wants. It has been noticed that Dio's claim that *Πομπήιος μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων δεύτερος, Καῖσαρ δὲ καὶ πρῶτος πάντων εἶναι ἐπεθύμει* is taken from the same source as Florus and Lucan, though seemingly reversed by Dio.<sup>6</sup> If this is the case, the reversal is an important one, as it helps to shape Dio's portrayal of Caesar's dictatorship and his assassination.<sup>7</sup> But the most important point for

<sup>2</sup> Buszard (2008): 185-215. For Plutarch on Caesar's *φιλοτιμία*, see Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 1.2; 5.1-5; 6.1; 6.3; 7.2; 11.2; 17.1-2; 22.4-5; 54.2; 58.2.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. App. *B.C.* 2.77.322.

<sup>4</sup> Cass. Dio 41.53.2-3.

<sup>5</sup> Pelling (2006a): 261.

<sup>6</sup> Flor. 2.13.14 ("ne ille [Pompeius] ferebat parem, nec hic superiorem"); Luc. 1.124-5 ("nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarve priorem Pompeiusve parem"). Similar statements exist in Seneca *de cons. ad Marv.* 14.3; *Ep.* 94.66; and Vell. Pat. 2.29.4. Claims about Pompey's motivations during the civil war derive undoubtedly from Caesar *B.C.* 1.4.4; perhaps an intermediate source supplemented Caesar's assertion with a like claim about his motivations. See Kemezis (2006): 109 n. 322.

<sup>7</sup> This will be discussed in Chapter Ten. The reversal also repeats a theme Dio explores earlier in his narrative on Pompey's attitude towards Caesar. At 39.26.1-2, Pompey comes to regard *φθόνος* and *δέος* as the biggest destroyers of *amicitia*, which, he holds, can only be staved off by equality in fame and strength. If one

the present discussion is the notion that Caesar's *φιλοτιμία* is *ἐμφύτος*. It is not, like his rivalry with Pompey, engineered, but something that is inherent in his very character, something he was born with. Indeed, his *φιλονεκία* is entirely reliant upon his *φιλοτιμία* – without his desire for power, he would have looked for no quarrel with Pompey, nor would he have led his army across the Rubicon.

Dio talks of Caesar's *φιλοτιμία ἰδία*, and hints also at his *πλεονεξία ἰδία* (through an implicit comparison between the 'triumvirs' and Cato).<sup>8</sup> Though *ἰδία* obviously implies 'personal' (as opposed to 'public') ambition, there is a definite sense of the 'hidden' and 'private' nature of Caesar's actions to the word.<sup>9</sup> Caesar's ability to hide his true motivations was well-attested in antiquity and the subversive and secretive nature of Caesar's ambition is explored by Dio, in his own ironic way, most notably, during the speeches he puts into Caesar's mouth at Vesontio and Placentia.<sup>10</sup> I shall explore the Vesontio speech in Chapter Nine, but here I wish to look at Dio's account of the Placentia episode, where Caesar's men once again mutiny. The historical occasion is a revolt by Caesar's men because they had been forbidden the right to plunder the Italian towns that they had captured.<sup>11</sup> Scholarly opinion has tended towards the view that the speech Dio gives Caesar at Placentia is a condemnation of military insubordination relevant to Dio's

---

becomes stronger, he despises the weaker, and if weaker, resents the stronger. This language fits Dio's conception of *φιλονεκία* as we saw it in Chapter One (pp. 27-30), which backs up his assertion here that Pompey could brook no superior.

<sup>8</sup> Cass. Dio 38.35.2; 37.57.3. Pelling (2009b): 516 argues that this accusation, put into the mouths of Caesar's soldiers at Vesontio, "is particularly interesting, as it makes the double step: Dio finds his own key to events in his reconstruction of what one group is feeling (the soldiers), and makes those feelings themselves depend upon that group's mental picture of what a second figure (Caesar himself) is thinking – so primary, secondary and tertiary focalisers are all relevant".

<sup>9</sup> The phrase is also very Thucydidean – 2.65.7 *οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τὸναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἐς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο* – linking Caesar's desires to those of the demagogic politicians in Athens whom Thucydides credits with its defeat in the Peloponnesian War. In Thucydides, from whom Dio, as we have seen in Chapter Three (pp. 79-83), derives his interest in the concept of appearance and reality, such private motives are also hidden and secretive, as is suggested by his other use of *ἰδία φιλοτιμία* at 8.89.3. See Hornblower (2008): 1010.

<sup>10</sup> Eg. App. B.C. 2.9.31-10.36, where Caesar is described as *δεινὸς ὧν ὑποκρίνεσθαι*; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 13.2-3.

<sup>11</sup> Cass. Dio 41.26.1. Notice the use of *ἐπιθυμία*, which is picked up in Caesar's disingenuous statement at 41.35.3.

own day and written in reference to his personal experience in Pannonia, as though such close dating of Dio's history were even possible. Van Stekelenberg has argued that the speech is a collection of "worn-out clichés of the old philosophical schools" and that Dio's "interest in the matter of military discipline was inspired by the idiosyncracies (sic) of his own time...He seems to have personally supported the ideas he makes Julius Caesar profess in such a naïve way".<sup>12</sup> Though the speech is not as fine or intelligent a critique of Caesar's actions and motivations as the one at Vesontio (as we shall see), it does nonetheless serve the same purpose: the real intention of the speech is, on my reading, a look at Caesar's hypocrisy and deception. For example, Dio has Caesar say, with such irony that the thin veil on his political career surely slips, that:

<ἤ> ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι οὔτε δυναστείας οὔτε πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμῶ, οὐδέ μοι πρόκειται πάντως τι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου καταπρᾶξαι, ὥστε τι ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ψεύσασθαι καὶ θωπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαί τινας;<sup>13</sup>

We might remember Dio's claims about the *lex Manilia* that Caesar sought to placate the mob; a more interesting comparison (and one that helps to identify the irony in this passage) is with Dio's claims about Caesar's political tactics. When explaining Caesar's success in his petition to be *pontifex maximus*, Dio says:

καὶ γὰρ θεραπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαι πάντα τινὰ καὶ τῶν τυχόντων ἐτοιμότατος ἐγένετο, καὶ οὔτε λόγου οὔτε ἔργου οὐδενὸς ἐς τὸ κατατυχεῖν ὧν ἐσπούδαζεν ἐξίστατο· οὐδὲ ἔμελέν οἱ τῆς αὐτίκα ταπεινότητος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἰσχύν, ἀλλ' ὧν ἐπεχείρει πρωτεῦσαι, τούτους ὡς καὶ κρείττονας ὑπῆρχετο.<sup>14</sup>

Apart from the close similarity of *θεραπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαι* and *θωπεῦσαι καὶ κολακεῦσαί*, the hypocrisy of Caesar's words is drawn out by the juxtaposition of his *τινας* and Dio's *πάντα τινά*. The falsehood (*ψεύσασθαι*) to which Caesar denies he will stoop at

<sup>12</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1976): 43-58. His article remains the only significant study of the speech, though he seems to have ignored Millar's warning against assuming that Dio's "exhortations to troops...are dominated by his own experiences in Pannonia", for which Millar cites Placentia *inter alia* as an example (Millar (1961): 13).

<sup>13</sup> Cass. Dio 41.35.3-4.

<sup>14</sup> Cass. Dio 37.37.3.

Placentia is displayed in this passage by his willingness to deceive and puff up those men whom he seeks one day to rule. The dishonesty of *οὔτε δυναστείας οὔτε πλεονεξίας ἐπιθυμῶ* is obvious: in addition to the passage discussing Pharsalus above, we are told of Caesar's desire for military command,<sup>15</sup> his desire for glory (*δόξης ἐπιθυμία*),<sup>16</sup> to rival Alexander the Great,<sup>17</sup> and to be master over the whole of Rome.<sup>18</sup>

As we shall see at Vesontio, Dio has Caesar at Placentia accusing his men of his own crimes. This is a seemingly favoured rhetorical device of Dio's Caesar, as it helps him obfuscate his own motivations. For example, he chastises those among his men who would mislead others due to their personal greed:

*λέγω δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοιοῦτοί ἐστε) ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους μόνους οἵτινες τῇ ἑαυτῶν πλεονεξία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους διαβάλλουσιν. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ πάνυ ἀκριβῶς καὶ καλῶς τοῖς τε παραγγέλμασι τοῖς ἐμοῖς πείσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς πατρίοις ἐμμένετε, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ χώραν τοσαύτην καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δόξαν ἐκτήσασθε· ὀλίγοι δὲ δὴ τινες πολλὴν αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀδοξίαν ἅπασιν ἡμῖν προστρίβονται.*<sup>19</sup>

The use of *πλεονεξία* jars here with Caesar's sanctimonious claims about his own actions, as arguably it can be weighed against Dio's claims about Caesar's (and Pompey's and Crassus') *πλεονεξία ἰδία*. The theme is explored further in the speech when Caesar complains to his men that their behaviour has harmed his claims to be defending the Republic:

*οὐκοῦν πῶς μὲν οὐκ ἄτοπον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία παρόντας ἡμᾶς μηδὲν ἦττον ἐκείνων πλεονεκτοῦντας φανῆναι; πῶς δ' οὐ σφέλιον πρὸς ἐπικουρίαν τῆς πατρίδος ἀφιγμένους συμμάχων αὐτὴν ἐτέρων ἀναγκάσαι καθ' ἡμῶν δεηθῆναι; καίτοι ἔγωγε τοσοῦτον περιεῖναι τοῖς δικαίωμασι τοῦ Πομπηίου νομίζω ὥστε καὶ ἐς δίκην πολλακίς αὐτὸν προκαλέσασθαι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ γε μὴ ἠθέλησεν εἰρηνικῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ συνειδότης διακριθῆναι, πάντα μὲν τὸν δῆμον πάντας δὲ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐλπίσαι διὰ τοῦτο προσθήσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ νῦν, ἂν γε καὶ τοιαῦτα ποιῶμεν, οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐπιτήδειόν τι ἕξω προῖσχεσθαι οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀνεπιεικῆς ἐγκαλέσαι.*<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cass. Dio 36.43.3.

<sup>16</sup> Cass. Dio 37.52.1.

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio 37.52.2.

<sup>18</sup> Cass. Dio 37.56.1.

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 41.28.2.

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 41.32.3-4.

In this passage, Dio turns Caesar's civil war rhetoric on its head. The claim that Caesar's march on Rome was in protection of his fatherland from her enemies is contradicted by Dio's narrative of events leading up to the outbreak of civil war (not to mention Dio's claims about the impossibility of a peaceful settlement in the narrative build up to Pharsalus, as we saw above). There, Caesar's actions are cynical and provocative – hardly the policy of a man forced to action by a hostile and corrupt enemy.<sup>21</sup> After the outbreak of civil war, for example, Caesar sees clearly that Rome is a prize (τὸ ἄθλον) for which he is striving against Pompey; he dissembles here also, saying that he is in fact waging war against his ἀντιστασιώται.<sup>22</sup>

Caesar, as we have seen, does not just deny that he is motivated by πλεονεξία, but also rejects the charge of ἐπιθυμία. This clashes with Dio's statement that Caesar was possessed by δόξης ἐπιθυμία at 37.52.1 and Dio makes ironic reference to this in various passages of the speech. Caesar tells his men that μήτε τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπιμπλάναι γενναῖον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κρατεῖν αὐτῶν νομίσητε εἶναι, for example.<sup>23</sup>

When Caesar asks his soldiers, πῶς δ' οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σεμνύεσθαι μὲν ἡμᾶς καὶ λέγειν ὅτι ἡμεῖς πρῶτοι Ῥωμαίων καὶ τὸν Ῥῆνον διέβημεν καὶ τὸν ὠκεανὸν ἐπλεύσαμεν, τὴν δὲ οἰκείαν ἀπαθὴ κακῶν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὔσαν διαρπάσαι; we are tempted to remark that his men could have asked him the same thing.<sup>24</sup> Caesar is himself motivated by the greed and desire of which he accuses his men, he is the one who has led an army on his homeland when it was previously at peace (albeit turbulent due to στάσις – a large part of which was Caesar's fault again), he is the one who wants to rule over his fellow citizens and

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 40.60.1; 60.3; 62.4; 41.10.1; 12.1-2. Dio's account of Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon at 41.4.1 is surprisingly bland – the Rubicon itself is not even mentioned. There is no reference to his famous quotation, nor any suggestion that he had doubts about his course of action. Placentia is the first place we see any explicit discussion of Caesar's motives for leaving his province, perhaps deliberately in order to allow him to discuss the points I have suggested.

<sup>22</sup> Cass. Dio 41.10.1. His subsequent move is to challenge Pompey to a legal trial.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 41.27.3.

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 41.30.3.

wrest power from them. This is not to say that Caesar's men are innocent of transgression in Dio's eyes: he makes it very clear that they deserved to be punished and brought into line.<sup>25</sup> But by using the incident to show Caesar's hypocrisy over his decision to go to war in 49 B.C., Dio is able to explore the ways in which Caesar is able to obfuscate and hide his true motives from his political opponents, ensuring his success in gaining those objectives. Indeed, here, as at Vesontio, Caesar's men are inspired by his disingenuous words and renew the campaign without fuss – at the same moment that Lepidus has Caesar voted dictator *contrary to ancestral custom*.<sup>26</sup> In this way, Caesar's speech at Placentia reminds us of Cicero's speech for amnesty in Book 44. The sentiments are in and of themselves good ones, but they are meant to jar deliberately with Dio's characterisation of the speaker, whose own role in the problems he denounces is readily apparent to the reader.

## **Part Two: Caesar and Pompey**

We have seen that not only is Caesar guided by ambition, but that he is prepared to do anything to ensure success in his goals. This applies equally to his relationship with Pompey. We noticed in Dio's discussion of Caesar's support for the *lex Manilia* that not only was Caesar ambitious, but that his ambition was provoked by Pompey's example. The idea is taken up elsewhere by Dio, just as Caesar is about to wage unprovoked war on Lusitania in Spain:

δόξης τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον τοὺς τε ἄλλους τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ μέγα ποτὲ  
δυνηθέντας ζηλῶν, οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐφρόνει, ἀλλ' ἤλπιζεν, ἂν τι τότε κατεργάσῃται, ὑπατός τε  
εὐθὺς αἰρεθήσεσθαι καὶ ὑπερφυᾷ ἔργα ἀποδείξεσθαι.<sup>27</sup>

But Caesar, as we have seen, is not satisfied merely to emulate: he wishes to surpass. It has been noted that Dio sees the first triumvirate as plagued by intrigue and

---

<sup>25</sup> Cass. Dio 41.26.2.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 41.35.5-36.1.

<sup>27</sup> Cass. Dio 37.52.1-2. I shall discuss Caesar's war in Spain on pp.219-20.

mutual hostility from the very beginning, but Caesar’s moves against Pompey go back even further.<sup>28</sup> In Dio’s ‘introduction’ of Caesar, we saw him trying to render Pompey more envious and hated by supporting the *lex Manilia*. Dio explores the theme when discussing Caesar’s role in Pompey’s triumphal celebrations:

καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνου, ὅστις τε ἦν καὶ ὅτι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐθεράπευε, τὸν τε Πομπήιον ἄλλως μὲν καθήρει, δι’ ὧν δὲ δὴ τῷ τε ὀμίλῳ χαριεῖσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἰσχύσειν ἔμελλε προσεποιεῖτο, προείρηται.<sup>29</sup>

Caesar was of course not alone in supporting Pompey because of the popularity he felt would accrue to himself from it – Dio talks of Cicero and Metellus Nepos doing the same and Dio is borne out by the *Commentariolum Petitionis* (assuming it was written by Q. Cicero or someone else well informed of the realities of Republican politics), which advises Cicero to claim that his *popularis* stance was a way of ensuring Pompeian support for his petition for the consulship.<sup>30</sup> Caesar’s cynicism in supporting Pompey is best drawn out through a comparison Dio draws between him and Metellus Nepos. The latter had tried to have Pompey recalled from the East in order to put down Catiline’s revolt at the beginning of 62 B.C. This measure was opposed with such ferocity by the senate (which passed the *S.C.U.* on the matter), that Nepos broke his tribunician vows and fled the city to join

<sup>28</sup> Pelling (2009b): 517.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 37.22.1. The rest of the chapter (22.1-4) is a comparison with Cato Uticensis which helps to show off the disingenuousness of Caesar’s support for the popular cause and for Pompey: ὁ δὲ δὴ Κάτων οὗτος ἦν ἐκ τοῦ τῶν Πορκίων γένους καὶ τὸν Κάτωνα τὸν πάνυ ἐξήλου, πλήν καθ’ ὅσον παιδεία Ἑλληνικῇ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ἐκέχρητο. ἤσκει δὲ τὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἀκριβῶς, καὶ ἓνα μὲν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ἐθαύμαζε, τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινὸν ὑπερηγάπα, καὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους πεφυκὸς ὑποψία δυναστείας ἐμίσει, πᾶν δὲ τὸ δημοτικὸν ἐλέω τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐφίλει. καὶ δήμου ἐραστής τε ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου παρρησίαν καὶ μετὰ κινδύνων ἐποιεῖτο. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι πάντα οὔτε πρὸς ἰσχὴν οὔτε πρὸς δόξαν ἢ τιμὴν τινα, ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τε αὐτονόμου καὶ τῆς ἀτυρανέυτου διαίτης ἔπραττε. Lintott (1997): 2517 argues that Dio has confused Cato here with the ‘democratic’ Stoics of his day, whilst Rich (1989): 93 argues that Dio’s “concept of ‘democracy’ as meaning simply ‘republican government’ leads him to present Cato as the champion of the people, even a ‘lover of the people’”. Both of these positions neglect the comparison that is being drawn here between Caesar and Cato. Cato’s “love of the people” is being contrasted with Caesar’s selfish manipulation. Whereas Cato is concerned for the public good (whether that be *popularis*-inspired or otherwise – Cato, after all, was behind Rome’s first regular corn dole), Caesar is one of the men whom Cato suspects of striving for *δυναστεία* – see 40.58.1. Likewise, Cato has no beef with Pompey (as Dio spells out at 22.4), nor any desire to emulate him, which again is contrasted with Caesar’s deception and manipulation of him for his own ends, but cannot abide one man becoming more powerful than any other. Dio may be making, as Lintott and Rich think, Cato a *popularis* and democrat, but he is also trying to draw a highly conventional comparison between Cato’s righteousness and Caesar’s cynicism.

<sup>30</sup> Q. Cic. *Comm. Pet.* 5. For a full bibliography on the debate surrounding the authenticity of the *Commentariolum Petitionis*, see Morstein-Marx (1998): 259-288.

Pompey.<sup>31</sup> Unlike Nepos, however, Caesar is not prepared to support Pompey at the risk of his own career and certainly of his own safety. After informing the reader that in the wake of Nepos' flight that not even Caesar dared attempt any innovation (*οὐδ' ὁ Καῖσαρ οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἐνεωτέρισεν*), Dio states that:

ἔπραττε μὲν γὰρ ὅπως τὸ μὲν τοῦ Κατοῦλου ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Καπιτωλίου ἀφαιρεθείη... τῷ δὲ δὴ Πομπηίῳ τὰ λοιπὰ προσεξεργάσασθαι ἐπιτραπέη. ἦν γὰρ τινα, ὡς ἐν τηλικούτῳ καὶ τοιούτῳ ἔργῳ, ἡμιτέλεστα ἢ ἐκεῖνός γε ἐπλάττετο εἶναι, ὅπως ὁ Πομπηῖος τὴν τε δόξαν τῆς ἐκποιήσεως αὐτοῦ λάβῃ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ὄνομα ἀντεπιγράψῃ. οὐ μὴν οὕτω γε χαρίζεσθαι αὐτῷ ἠθέλεν ὥστε καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ διὰ τοῦτο ψηφισθῆναι τι τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ Νέπωτι ἐδέδοκτο, ὑπομεῖναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνου ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐποίει, ἀλλ' ἵνα αὐτὸς καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸ πλῆθος σφετερίσῃται.<sup>32</sup>

We should think of this passage in light of Dio's claims about Caesar's and Cicero's support for the *lex Manilia* (discussed pp. 117-8). There, too, Caesar came out successfully, where the other supporter of Pompey failed in his designs. Both Cicero and Nepos are after the same thing as Caesar – to use Pompey as means to securing their own power, so why do they fail where he succeeds? Partly, it is a matter of common sense; Caesar at the time of the *lex Manilia* goes after popular support only, whereas Cicero tries to win the support of both the people and the senate. In the end, he becomes hateful to both. Nepos, on the other hand, wants to exploit Pompey's popularity, but he lacks the necessary restraint to stop himself acting rashly. Caesar is not so incautious. He heeds Nepos' example and accepts temporary defeat. But the difference can be explored further. It has been noted about Caesar and Cicero's support for the *lex Manilia* that “Cicero wants to be a decisive factor in the balance *for others*; Caesar wants to outstrip others, and (by implication) to do without any balance at all”.<sup>33</sup> We can see something similar in Dio's depiction of Nepos' actions. He wanted to recall Pompey hoping *δι' αὐτοῦ, ἅτε τὰ τοῦ πλῆθους φρονούντος, ἰσχύσειν ἐν οἷς ἐτάρασεν*.<sup>34</sup> Nepos is not as passive as Cicero was

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 37.43.1-4.

<sup>32</sup> Cass. Dio 37.44.1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Pelling (2006a): 260.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 37.43.1.

over the *lex Manilia*, but just as foolish. Demonstrating his lack of awareness over the power difference between himself and Pompey, Nepos believes that he can use him and his army to indulge his political turbulence and his quest for power. Caesar's actions contrast with this for their common sense: he is using Pompey to build *his own* power base, which he will use against Pompey when he is ready. He also is building up a power base independent of Pompeian support. He carries off his aedilician and funerary games so lavishly that his colleague Bibulus is obscured by his expenditure;<sup>35</sup> Dio depicts his defence of the Catilinarian conspirators as bringing him popularity;<sup>36</sup> and Dio is one of only two ancient sources that mention the trial of Rabirius in 63 (bar, of course, Cicero's defence speech), where Caesar and Labienus sought to impugn the *S.C.U.* through a trial parodying the right of *provocatio*.<sup>37</sup> Caesar likewise looks to build up a reputation for military glory by waging war against the Spaniards when there is no just cause for fighting.<sup>38</sup> At the beginning of Book 38, Caesar wins support for himself from all of the non-senatorial sections of Roman society, starting with the *lex agraria* of 59 B.C. and then through absolving the debts of the *equites*.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 37.8.1-2. Cf. Suet. *Div. Jul.* 10.1-2; App. *B.C.* 2.1; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 5.1-5.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 37.37.2.

<sup>37</sup> Cass. Dio 37.26.1-28.4. The other source is Suetonius (*Div. Jul.* 12).

<sup>38</sup> Cass. Dio 37.52.1-3. Cf. Suet. *Div. Jul.* 18.1-2; App. *B.C.* 2.8; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 11.1-12.2.

<sup>39</sup> Cass. Dio 38.1.1-7.6. For the importance of Dio to the historical understanding of the *lex agraria*, see Taylor (1951): 254-268; (1968): 173-93; Richardson (1998): 299-312. Though Taylor and Richardson are right to follow Dio's claim that the bill was proposed at the beginning of the year, I have reservations about the idea that the law must have been passed also in January. Caesar, as senior consul, would have had the *fascēs* that month, yet we know from Appian (*B.C.* 2.11.38) that Bibulus' *fascēs* were smashed during the riots that accompanied the *contiones* over which the law was debated. I am inclined to follow Dio's claim that Caesar was attempting to 'cooperate' with the senate over the bill and to conclude, therefore, that the law was voted on in February, when Bibulus would have been presiding consul, in a spirit of fair play on Caesar's part. Interestingly, Dio's assumption that Caesar was always successful in his bid for popularity means that he mistakes the public reaction to the law. In fact, Caesar and Pompey fell foul of the people because of the excessive violence they used to pass the law. See Cic. *ad. Att.* 2.19.3; 2.21.5; 2.22.6; 2.25.2.

### Part Three: the ‘first Triumvirate’

Dio’s depiction of Caesar using Pompey to build up his own power base to use against him continues in his account of the formation of the ‘first Triumvirate’.<sup>40</sup> Caesar, having been deprived a triumph for his actions in Spain, returns to Rome and successfully courts Pompey and Crassus:

καίτοι τοῦτο τὴν σοφίαν ἐς τὰ μάλιστα αὐτοῦ τεκμηριοῖ, ὅτι τὸν τε καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον τῆς θεραπείας αὐτῶν καὶ ἔγνω καὶ διέθετο οὕτως ὥστ’ ἀμφοτέρους ἅμα καίπερ ἀντιπράττοντάς σφισι προσθέσθαι.<sup>41</sup>

He recognises that he needs to reconcile the two men to gain both their support for himself, since only garnering the support of one of them is not enough (we might compare this to Cicero and Nepos, who rely too heavily on Pompey to support them, rather than attempting a ‘third way’); he recognises also that men are more likely to work against enemies than for friends (something again Cicero fails to realise when he relies on Pompey and his former clients to protect him from Clodius).<sup>42</sup> Dio makes two claims that tie into his broader portrayal of Caesar’s relationship with Pompey:

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ προθυμότερον ἐδόκουν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀντιπράττειν ἢ συναγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν...ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ὁ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρου πράττων τὴν τε ἡδονὴν κατορθώσας καὶ τὴν λύπην σφαλὲὶς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν· τοῦτο δὲ προχειρότερον ἐμποδίζειν τέ τινος καὶ κωλύειν μηδεμίαν αὔξησιν λαβεῖν ἢ ἐπὶ μέγα προάγειν ἐθέλειν, διὰ τε τὰλλα καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅτι ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔων τινα αὔξησθαι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ χαρίζεται, ὁ δὲ ἐξ αἰρῶν τινὰ ἐπαχθῆ αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέροις σφίσι ποιεῖ.<sup>43</sup>

The first point, that he who acts on his own behalf enjoys more fruitful victories and less punishing disasters, surely shows Caesar’s unwillingness to be a pawn in anyone else’s game. Unlike the men who solicit the support of either Pompey or Crassus, Caesar is

---

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 51.1

<sup>41</sup> Cass. Dio 37.54.4.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio. 38.12.5; 15.5.

<sup>43</sup> Cass. Dio 37.55.2-3.

able to avoid getting tangled up in the problems of others; steering his own course allows him to get the best out of his dealings with others without suffering any of the consequences. The second point takes this one stage further, in that Caesar, in not being embroiled in the problems of the men he works with is able to win support for himself both by and in working against them (by and in because Dio says enigmatically that working against another brings one favour – the by – and because Caesar’s deceptive method of working against his political opponents allows him to ‘steal’ some of the popularity of the men he secretly intends to crush – the in).

We begin to see a slight evolution in Caesar’s position with regards to Pompey. When he was starting out on his political career, he had aspired to be like Pompey, but now he is *consul designatus* and had nearly enjoyed a triumph for his Herminian War before Cato’s confounding righteousness had stopped it taking place (not that that bothers Caesar very much who ‘knows’ there are plenty of other opportunities on offer). Caesar now sees Pompey not only as a competitor but one whose ambitions and capacity are beginning to look inferior to his own:

καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πομπηῖος ὃ τε Κράσσοσ ὡς ἀπ’ οἰκείας καὶ αὐτοῖ αἰτίας πρὸς τε ἀλλήλους, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ὤρμησαν, κατελύσαντο καὶ ἐκείνον ἐς τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν πραγμάτων προσέλαβον. Ἰδὲ Πομπηῖος μὲν γὰρ οὐτ’ αὐτὸς ὅσον ἤλπισεν ἰσχύων, καὶ τὸν Κράσσον ἐν δυνάμει ὄντα τὸν τε Καίσαρα αὐξανόμενον ὄρων, καὶ ἔδεισε μὴ παντάπασι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καταλυθῆ, καὶ ἐπήλπισε, προσκοινωνήσας σφίσι τῶν παρόντων, τὴν ἀρχαίαν δι’ αὐτῶν ἐξουσίαν ἀναλήψεσθαι. Κράσσοσ δὲ ἡξίου τε πάντων ἀπὸ τε τοῦ γένους καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλοῦτου περιεῖναι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τοῦ τε Πομπηίου παρὰ πολὺ ἡλαττοῦτο καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα ἐπὶ μέγα ἀρθήσεσθαι ἐνόμιζεν, ἐς ἀντίπαλον αὐτοῦ ἀλλήλοις καταστήσαι ἠθέλησεν, ὅπως μηδέτερός σφω ὑπέρσχη, προσδοκήσας ἐκείνους τε ἀνταγωνιστὰς ἰσοκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τούτῳ τὴν τε ἐκατέρου φιλίαν ἐκκαρπώσεσθαι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρους τιμηθήσεσθαι. ἀκριβῶσ μὲν γὰρ οὐτε τὰ τοῦ πλήθους οὐτε τὰ τῆσ βουλῆσ ἐπολίτευεν, τῆσ δὲ ἰδίας αὐτοῦ δυναστείας ἕνεκα πάντ’ ἔπραττε, καὶ διὰ τοῦθ’ ὑπῆρχετό τε ἀμφοτέρους σφῶσ ὁμοίωσ καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκατέρους ἔχθραν ἐξέκλινεν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐν τῷ μέρει κεχαρισμένα ἀμφοῖν σπουδάζων ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡμελλε τοῦ μὲν καταθυμίου παντὸς ἐκατέρους αἰτιαθήσεσθαι, τῶν δὲ δυσχερεστέρων μὴ μεταλήψεσθαι.<sup>44</sup>

Pompey and Crassus are here portrayed as having their own cynical motivations and Caesar is still seen by them as a third party in the whole affair. However, instead of

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio 37.56.2-5.

Caesar's sanguinity – his lack of fear that Pompey and Crassus might unite against him for example<sup>45</sup> – we see that in Pompey's case, ἔδεισε μὴ παντάπασιν ὑπ' αὐτῶν καταλυθῆ. Crassus and Pompey are also fairly reactionary, with Pompey seeking his old-time power and Crassus the rather weak desire to be honoured beyond Caesar and Pompey. Both men are spurred into action by their perception of each other's power (the contradictory nature of which may suggest a lack of understanding of the situation on their part; both feel that the other is more powerful than they are) and by Caesar's rise. Caesar, however, has no baggage, nor any real fear of either of them, despite the fact that he still requires their help to make himself powerful; for him they are simply stepping stones to be balanced on carefully.<sup>46</sup>

Caesar cements his union with Crassus and Pompey during his consulship with his *lex agraria*. He is, for the first time, the prime mover and beneficiary of the law, as Dio makes clear when he says:

τῷ δὲ ἐξῆς ἔπει ὁ Καῖσαρ τὸ σύμπαν θεραπεῦσαι πλῆθος ἠθέλησεν, ὅπως σφᾶς ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον σφετερίσῃται.<sup>47</sup>

In typical fashion, Caesar covers his tracks by claiming that he intends to gain nothing from the bill (which he says to be merely a proposal for the fair redistribution of land). Dio claims that:

αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ τῇ τε εὐρήσει καὶ τῇ ἐσηγήσει τοῦ πράγματος ἠρκείτο, ὡς γε ἔλεγε, τῷ δὲ δὴ Πομπηίῳ καὶ τῷ Κράσσῳ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις φανερώς ἐχαρίζετο.<sup>48</sup>

Caesar further favours Pompey and Crassus when he invites them to speak before the people. Though they were private citizens, Caesar employs them partly to honour them

---

<sup>45</sup> 37.56.1. οὐτ' αὐ ἐφοβήθη μὴ καὶ συμφρονήσαντες κρείττους αὐτοῦ γένωνται.

<sup>46</sup> Crassus comes out of Dio's assessment by far the closer figure to Caesar in terms of ability and design, though curiously, he plays very little role in Dio's narrative beyond helping Caesar's *lex agraria* through in 59 B.C., the exile of Cicero (for which he has no real motive beyond a personal dislike of Cicero) and his inconvenient death in Parthia. It is puzzling that a man with so much potential (in the way, that is, that Dio presents him) is given a minor role with little other significance.

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 38.1.1.

<sup>48</sup> Cass. Dio 38.1.7.

(ἐκείνοις τιμὴν προσθείη), partly to browbeat his opponents (τοὺς ἄλλους προσκαταπλήξῃ), but also (and most importantly, given what Dio has said about Caesar's initial motives for proposing the law) so that:

τῷ τε πλήθει καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο χάρισαιτο, τεκμηριῶν ὅτι μήτ' ἀτόπου μήτ' ἀδίκου τινὸς δρέγοντο, ἀλλ' ὧν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ δοκιμασταὶ καὶ ἐπαινέται γίνονται.<sup>49</sup>

Though Caesar is obviously in this passage supporting the interests of Pompey and Crassus, we see that, in the context of Dio's introductory statement to the legislation, he is most concerned to use them for his own benefit. They help him to provide the 'evidence' for the fairness of the bill, designed to win him the popular support he set out to achieve. Dio, like all of our ancient authorities, believed that the law was a populist measure passed by Caesar for the sake of his own political gain, though he alone of all of them records (implicitly) that Pompey is a beneficiary of the law, when Pompey explains his support for the bill as resting on the assignments his men receive.<sup>50</sup> Caesar may be favouring Pompey (with or without an eye to his own advantage), but there is surely something of his old policy, making Pompey odious, about the law, too. Dio tells us that Caesar, when Pompey had finished speaking in support of the bill, asked Pompey if he would help him in his struggle against those who sought to stymie it. Caesar encourages the people to start clamouring for Pompeian support. Pompey's response – and its effect – is telling:

γενομένου δὲ τούτου ἐπαρθεὶς ὁ Πομπήιος, ὅτι τῆς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπικουρίας, καίπερ μηδεμίαν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντας, καὶ ὁ ὕπατος καὶ ὁ ὄμιλος ἔχρηζεν, ἀλλά τε πολλὰ ἀνατιμῶν τε καὶ ἀποσεμνύων ἑαυτὸν διελέξατο, καὶ τέλος εἶπεν ὅτι, ἂν τις τολμήσῃ ξίφος ἀνελέσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀναλήψομαι. ταῦθ' οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ Πομπηίου λεχθέντα καὶ Κράσσοις ἐπήνεσεν. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ τισι τῶν ἄλλων μὴ ἤρεσκεν, ... ἄλλως τε ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ νομιζόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν Καίσαρα ἐχθρῶς, ὡς γε καὶ ἐδόκουν σφισιν, ἔχοντας (οὐ γὰρ πω ἢ καταλλαγή αὐτῶν ἔκδηλος ἦν) συνήνουν οἷς ἐγεγράφει, πρόθυμοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νόμου κύρωσιν ἐγένοντο.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Cass. Dio 38.4.6.

<sup>50</sup> Pompey's cash: Cass. Dio 38.1.5. Pompey's men receiving land: 38.5.1. Comp. with Dio App. B.C. 2.10.34-6; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 14.1-3. It seems to me highly likely that Appian and Plutarch share the same source as Dio, due to strong similarities in terms of detail and their chronology of the bill and other major events of 59 B.C.

<sup>51</sup> Cass. Dio 38.5.4-5. The lacuna is not present in the manuscript but has been noticed by several editors of the text who have all provided possible solutions. I prefer one of Boissevain's list of possibilities - <ὄμως

Pompey's caustic rhetoric is noticed also by Plutarch, where it is described as *μανικὴ καὶ μειρακιώδης*.<sup>52</sup> Unlike Plutarch, who dwells on the implications for such a demagogic piece of rhetoric (we might compare Gaius Gracchus' threat to throw daggers into the forum so that the people could fight it out) for a man of such esteem, Dio's claim about Pompey's impropriety rather rests on his lack of current political status.<sup>53</sup> He becomes boastful and arrogant, elated that the consul and people are calling upon his support, even though he is but a private citizen.<sup>54</sup> The irony of the situation is obvious. Pompey's delight is absurd since he was working with Caesar on the law and was being called upon as a 'false witness' (so to speak); this was no impromptu show of respect, yet Pompey appears to treat it like that. I do not know what to make of the fact that Crassus praises him, though I wonder whether, given Dio's presentation of Crassus as cast from a similar mould to Caesar at the end of the previous book, he is egging Pompey on for much the same reasons as the latter. Whatever Crassus' motives (and they are hardly explored at all in Dio), it seems that Caesar's are the same with regards to Pompey as they always have been; to use him for his own advantage and to encourage his unpopularity through over-familiarity. The overall effect of this, of course, is that the people become enthusiastic (*πρόθυμοι*) about a law that was designed to win Caesar the popular support that he desired.

Throughout his time in Gaul, Caesar continues to build up his defences against Pompey. He neutralises him as a political threat before he leaves, as well as men who were part of his 'faction':

---

*ὀρώντες ὅτι οὗτοι* – whilst Cary accepts Reiskius' emendation, *<ἐπειδὴ οὗτοι>*. The differences posed by different solutions, however, are slight.

<sup>52</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 14.3.

<sup>53</sup> Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 14.3.

<sup>54</sup> Pompey's self-importance as a private citizen is explored by Dio at 39.24.3. *ἐλύπει μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλωδίου γιγνόμενα, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερεωρᾶτο ὧν διέφερε, διὰ τε τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἀφ' ἧν καὶ ἰδιωτεύων ὑπὲρ πάντας αὐτοὺς τιμηθῆσεσθαι προσεδόκησεν ὑβριζόμενος. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ καταφρόνει παραχρήμα μὲν γὰρ κακῶς ἀκούων ἐδυσχέραιεν, διαλιπὼν δὲ καὶ ἐς ἀναλογισμὸν τῆς τε ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων κακίας ἀφικνούμενος οὐκέτ' αὐτῶν προετίμα.*

φοβηθεὶς δ' οὖν καὶ ὡς μὴ τι ὁ Πομπήιος ἐν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ ὁ Γαβίνιος ὁ Ἀδλος ὑπατεύσειν ἔμελλε, νεωτερίσῃ, ἐκεῖνόν τε ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὑπατον Λούκιον Πίσωνα συγγενείας ἀνάγκη προσηταιρίσατο· τῷ μὲν γὰρ Πομπηίῳ τὴν θυγατέρα καίπερ ἄλλω τινὶ ἡγγυγκῶς συνώκισε, καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τοῦ Πίσωνος ἔγημε. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἐκρατύνθη...<sup>55</sup>

When Dio famously ignores the conference at Luca, it is most plausibly to be explained by his emphasis on the fractiousness he sees existing among the triumvirs from very early on.<sup>56</sup> At the time the conference would have taken place, he has already begun telegraphing the eventual breakdown of the alliance with a compact between Pompey and Crassus against Caesar. The motives behind this compact support my argument that throughout the narrative Dio's Caesar has been building up a power base against Pompey about which the latter is now beginning to become seriously worried.

In Dio's narrative of 56 B.C., he discusses Pompey's role as *curator annonae* and his plans to be elected consul in the following year. Whilst Pompey is successful, for the most part, despite opposition from Clodius, Caesar is an ever-present threat, even when in Gaul:

ὁ δὲ δὴ Καῖσαρ ἀξινόμενος, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὰ τε κατειργασμένα αὐτῷ θαυμάζων ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἄνδρας ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ δεδουλωμένοις παντελῶς τοῖς Γαλάταις ἀποστεῖλαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐλπίδας ἐπαιρόμενος ὥστε καὶ χρήματά οἱ πολλὰ ψηφίσασθαι, δεινῶς αὐτὸν ἠνία.<sup>57</sup>

Pompey's concern is inspired ultimately by Caesar's successful exploitation of his reputation and career. His fear lies in Caesar's ever increasing *αὔξεισις* (as we saw also in Dio's narration of the formation of the 'first triumvirate') and in Caesar's popularity. In the preceding chapter, Dio describes Pompey's role as *curator annonae*, *ensor* and prospective consul for the next year.<sup>58</sup> Even though Pompey manages the *census* and the *annona* successfully and easily due to his wisdom, he fails to achieve any benefit from it, largely because of the political trouble that erupts when he canvasses for the consulship. He assuages his sense of disappointment and anger with a reflection on his own merit and the

---

<sup>55</sup> Cass. Dio 38.9.1.

<sup>56</sup> Pelling (2009b): 517.

<sup>57</sup> Cass. Dio 39.25.1.

<sup>58</sup> Cass. Dio 39.24.1-3.

corruption of his rivals, but this hardly detracts from the fact that he seemingly wins no popular support from two offices that should have brought him the popularity that he craves. Instead, he is left to watch Caesar enviously, the cat who gets the cream:

τοσαύτη γὰρ φιλοτιμία ἐχρήτη ὡσθ' ὅσα αὐτὸς τῷ Καίσαρι συνέπραξε καὶ βασκαίνειν καὶ καταλύειν, καὶ ἐκείνῳ τε ἄλλως τε μεγάλως ἐπαινουμένῳ καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ συσκιάζοντι ἄχθεσθαι, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἐγκαλεῖν ὅτι αὐτόν τε ἐν ὀλιγωρία ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα ὑπερσπούδαζε. τά τε γὰρ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡγανάκτει ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς τῶν τε προπονηθέντων τινὲ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον μνημονεύοντας ἐφ' ὅσον μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιγένοιτο, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀεὶ καθιστάμενον, κἂν ἔλαττον τοῦ προτέρου ἦ, προχειρότατα τῷ τε τοῦ συνήθους κόρῳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ξένου ἡδονῇ φερομένους, καὶ τὸ μὲν προευδοκιμοῦν πᾶν καταλύοντας ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου, τὸ δ' ἄρτι προφαινόμενον συνεπαύξοντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλπίδων.<sup>59</sup>

There are several things in this passage that link Pompey's epiphany with Caesar's alleged policy against him. Firstly, his recognition that the people grow jealous of those who had been well-reputed refers back to Caesar's hope to render Pompey *ἐπιφθονώτερος* through over-familiarity, as does the claim that people tire easily of familiar achievements and prefer novelty. The metamorphosis in his political career engineered by Caesar through building a power base against Pompey is complete. He has gone from bit player to a man whom Crassus and Pompey have to take seriously to one who now has no need of either of them:

δι' ὃν ταῦτα δυσχεραίνων, καὶ μήτε τι διὰ τῶν ὑπάτων διαπράξασθαι δυνηθεῖς καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα μείζω τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πίστεως γιγνόμενον ὁρῶν, οὐκ ἐν ἑλαφρῷ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐποίησατο.<sup>60</sup>

The extent to which the relationship between the three men has changed is demonstrated by the fact that now it is Crassus and Pompey who seek to emulate Caesar, because neither of them is powerful enough to take him on individually:

συμφρονήσαντες ὃν ἄλλως μὲν οὐδὲν [ἀν] ἰδιωτεύοντες πράξειν ἤλπισαν, ἂν δ' ὑπατεύσωσι κακ τούτου καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ πράγματα τῇ ἐκείνου ζηλώσει διαλάβωσι, καὶ ἀντίρροποὶ οἱ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ταχὺ αὐτοῦ, ἅτε καὶ δύο ἐνός, περιγενήσεσθαι προσεδόκησαν.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Cass. Dio 39.25.3-4. There is some debate about the use of *ἐπαινουμένῳ*. Boissevain replicates the manuscript *ταινιουμένῳ*, though Cary and Reiske prefer *ἐπαινουμένῳ*. In the context, I should side with Cary, though the two alternatives are entirely in keeping with Pompey's *φιλοτιμία*.

<sup>60</sup> Cass. Dio 39.26.1.

<sup>61</sup> Cass. Dio 39.27.1.

Even though Pompey and Crassus are successful in their bid for the consulship and enjoy a resurgence of fortune, in the end they cannot achieve what they set out to and have to come to a compromise with Caesar's supporters in Rome:

χαλεπῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ πολλῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοῦ Καίσαρος φίλων, ἐχόντων, ὅτι ἤμελλον ἐκεῖνοι, τυχόντες ἂν διωκοῦντο, τὸν Καίσαρα μηκέτ' ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξοντα καθεῖρξεν, καὶ παρασκευαζομένων διὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπεῖν τινῶν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, φοβηθέντες οἱ ὕπατοι μὴ διαμάρτωσιν ἂν ἔπραττον, προσεποιήσαντο αὐτοὺς ὥστε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ τρία ἔτη πλείω, ὡς γὰρ τὰ ληθῆς εὐρίσκειται, μηκῦναι.<sup>62</sup>

Even during this period, Pompey and Crassus are unable to win the people over fully and, in holding levies for the army, manage to upset the people.<sup>63</sup> After Crassus and Caesar's daughter die, the breakdown between Pompey and Caesar begins (as one might expect) in earnest.<sup>64</sup> Pompey capitalises, in Dio, on being the sole remaining triumvir in Rome to go from one powerful position to another, including the position of sole consul for 52. This is portrayed as a move by the senate to alienate Pompey from Caesar. The reasons behind this move are in accordance with Dio's earlier claims about Caesar's *popularitas*:

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἦττον τοῦ Καίσαρος τῷ ὁμίλῳ προσέκειτο, ἀπορρήξεν τε αὐτὸν ἀπ' ἐκείνου παντάσῃ καὶ σφετεριεῖσθαι ἠλπισαν. καὶ ἔσχεν οὕτως· τῷ τε γὰρ καινῶ καὶ τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς τιμῆς ἐπαρθεῖς οὐκέτ' οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν χάριν ἐβούλευσεν, ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς πάντα τὰ τῆ βουλή ἄρεσκοντα ἔπραξεν.<sup>65</sup>

It is testament to Caesar's 'skill' in building up his power-base against (and through) Pompey that the latter, who had once prided himself on his popularity has now to cede control of the people to Caesar. Yet, even with his new-found friends, Pompey cannot act against Caesar without fear of popular ire and is forced to compromise with

---

<sup>62</sup> Cass. Dio 39.33.3. Dio's hesitation at the end is clearly because some of his sources must have claimed five years rather than three (which he again claims at 44.43.2). See Cary's note on the text.

<sup>63</sup> Cass. Dio 39.39.1.

<sup>64</sup> Cass. Dio 40.44.2-3.

<sup>65</sup> Cass. Dio 40.50.5.

him.<sup>66</sup> On the eve of civil war, Pompey's moves against Caesar are thwarted not only by Caesar's political common sense (he fails to make Pompey's own mistake in disbanding his army;<sup>67</sup> he also recognises the importance of bribery, manipulation and connexion<sup>68</sup>), but by the fact that Caesar has popular support:

καὶ αὐτῷ ὃ τε Σουλπίκιος καὶ τῶν δημάρχων τινὲς ἀντέπραξαν, οὗτοι μὲν τῇ πρὸς τὸν Καίσαρα χάριτι· ἐκείνος δ' αὐτοῖς ἐκοινώσατο καὶ ὅτι τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐκ ἤρεσκε τό τινα μεταξὺ ἄρχοντα μηδὲν ἡδικηκότα παυθῆναι.<sup>69</sup>

The final straw in the outbreak of civil war comes after Caesar has crossed the Rubicon. Caesar proposes that he and Pompey should lay down their arms and submit to examination, which Pompey refuses to do because he knows that, before the people, he is inferior to Caesar. His decision, instead, is to leave Rome and raise an army in Campania.<sup>70</sup>

## Conclusion

In conclusion, then, we notice that all of Caesar's politicking, his manipulation of the people and his political adversaries as well as his desire to acquire a significant power base from which he might work against Pompey ultimately derive from his 'innate' ambition, something which he shares with Pompey and, in fact, all of the other major political figures of the late Republic (bar Cato and Catulus, whose actions are hardly of major political significance). As we saw for Cicero in Section Three, Dio has here again tied in all of the features of his discussion of Caesar with his conception of *φύσις* and thus the downfall of the Republic. Such is implied in Book 41, when Dio writes of Pompey and

---

<sup>66</sup> Cass. Dio 40.51.1-2. Pompey is later on forced to compromise with Caesar's friends over Caesar's right to canvass for the consulship *in absentia* at 40. 56.2.

<sup>67</sup> Cass. Dio 40.60.1.

<sup>68</sup> Cass. Dio 40.60.2-4; 63.1-3.

<sup>69</sup> Cass. Dio 40.59.1.

<sup>70</sup> Cass. Dio 41.6.1.

Caesar before Pharsalus, but it is stated perhaps most clearly in an insight which Dio gives

Cato about Caesar and Pompey's desire for power:

*ὁ δὲ δὴ Κάτων ἄλλως μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐδεῖτο, ἰδὼν δὲ τὸν τε Καίσαρα καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον ὑπὲρ τὴν κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας ἀξιαμένους, καὶ ὑποτοπήσας ἦτοι καὶ ἀμφοτέρους σφᾶς τὰ πράγματα ἕξειν, ἢ καὶ διενεχθέντας ἀλλήλοις στάσιν τε μεγίστην ποιήσειν καὶ τὸν κρατήσαντα αὐτῶν μοναρχήσειν, ἠθέλησε μὲν σφᾶς πρὶν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γενέσθαι καταλύσαι, καὶ τὴν ὑπατείαν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἤτησεν.<sup>71</sup>*

In the next chapter we shall examine Dio's discussion of the Vesontio mutiny, to show how Dio's depiction of Caesar's military career fits into his broader portrayal of Caesar's ambition and its role in the collapse of the Republic.

---

<sup>71</sup> Cass. Dio 40.58.1-2.

## Chapter Nine: A Man and his Men

### Introduction

The Roman soldier is a strange phenomenon to one used to modern armies. He exhibits brilliant discipline and yet, at the same time, a restlessness, ‘bolshieness’ and ingrained disrespect for his officers that modern military structures seem to have weeded out.<sup>1</sup> Caesar’s army is even more of an enigma: the later Roman army was to develop, as the British army has done, strong ‘regimental’ traditions that help to enforce discipline, even during the worst moments of battle. For example, John Company was able to storm and break a well-fortified Sikh position when outgunned and outmanned at the Battle of Sobraon during the first Anglo-Sikh War primarily due to the discipline and ruggedness of the common soldiery, enforced through centuries of tradition and regimentalisation.<sup>2</sup> It is not clear that Caesar’s men had such a tradition to call upon; legions in the late Republic were raised ‘from the dust’ as and when needed and even the gradual professionalism of the Roman army from Marius onwards would still have not been enough to instill it. Still, his men showed marvellous sanguinity and calm under pressure when they held their nerve at Alesia, when they repulsed surprise attacks and when, staring death in the face in the form of the Gallic hordes massed against them, they hitched their shields and waited.

---

<sup>1</sup> Such a contradiction was a significant trope in Latin literature. See Hammond (1993): 47-69.

<sup>2</sup> Gough & Innes (1897): 129-138. Gough’s brother, Hugh Gough, was in command at the battle. Cf. Prime Minister Robert Peel’s comments in his thanks-giving for the victory in Hansard HC. vol. 85 cc. 464. 02 April 1846. Gough’s own tactics left a lot to be desired (they were dubbed ‘Tipperary Tactics’ by his opponents, on account of his birthplace), consisting, as they did, of full-frontal assault on the enemy position. He is reported to have said, when the cannonade of the Sikh position was beginning to run out of ammunition, “Thank God! Then I shall be at them with the bayonet!” See Rait (1903): 40-79 for a fair account of his tactics and abilities.

## Part One: Dio and the Mutiny at Vesontio

There were times, however, when the discipline and morale of Caesar's army sagged. Cassius Dio's narrative of the mutiny at Vesontio explores the phenomenon of the Roman soldier as barrack-room lawyer, when Caesar's men criticise both the dubious legality and the personal motive (his *φιλοτιμία*) that had led Caesar to wage war against Ariovistus. Dio's account differs noticeably from Caesar's, which attributes the cause of the mutiny to fear, initially starting among Caesar's *amici* who had followed him from Rome and spreading to the common soldiery, stirred up by nonsense stories of German physical supremacy. Dio also differs in claiming that it was not the *amici* who started the trouble, but the common soldiery. One scholar, Hagendahl, has accepted Dio's interpretation of the event, arguing that he must have followed, in addition to Caesar's *Commentarii*, a source that laid bare the legal and political issues surrounding Caesar's prerogatives under the *lex Vatinia* to attack Ariovistus, a man who was, in any case, an *amicus* and *socius* of Rome.<sup>3</sup> His theory has not widely been accepted, however, nor have Dio's claims about Caesar's motives and his men's reaction to them. Collins argues that attempts to refute Caesar by recourse to Dio are "an old standby" and that "the secondary tradition for the *B.G.* contains nothing but Caesar and smoke, and that Dio is dangerously

---

<sup>3</sup> Hagendahl (1944): 1-40. The issue of Dio's sources for Vesontio is a hotly contested one and one on which it is difficult to give a definite answer. The traditional argument is that Dio was using Caesar's *Commentarii* as his principal source (Thouret (1878): 303-360; Haupt (1884): 678-9; Melber (1891): 71; Christ (1974): 273; Strasburger (1983): 272), a contention that has not convincingly been refuted (*contra* Zecchini (1978): 44; Schwartz (1899): 1718-9; Cf. Pelling's (1982): 147-8 criticisms of Zecchini's position), and one to which I subscribe. It is less clear, however, how far Dio is reliant upon a secondary source, which may or may not have been hostile to Caesar (Gabba (1955): 302; Van Stekelenberg (1971): 31-5 argues that even if Caesar is the ultimate source, an intermediate source cannot be ruled out. In the end, however, he plumps for Caesar as principle source with Livy as an additional influence). McDougall (1991): 618 argues that "not only does majority opinion make out that Caesar was at least one of Dio's sources, if not the only one, but one could cite a host of passages in Dio which paraphrase, indeed on occasion translate, Caesar's narrative so closely that, to my mind at least, no other conclusion is possible". As we shall see, none of Dio's cynicism need necessarily come from a secondary source and may simply be Dio 'reading between the lines' of Caesar's account.

unreliable in his attributions of motives and thoughts”.<sup>4</sup> Dio’s claims about the accusations of Caesar’s men for his invasion of Gaul need not be ascribed to a unique source, certainly, but they do not entirely belong to Dio’s imagination either. Some similarity between the two men’s accounts can be displayed which suggests that Dio was reading between the lines of Caesar’s account. Dio says:

καὶ ἐθύλουν ὅτι πόλεμον οὔτε προσήκοντα οὔτε ἐψηφισμένον διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν τοῦ Καίσαρος φιλοτιμίαν ἀναυροῖντο, καὶ προσεπηπέλουν ἐγκαταλείψειν αὐτὸν, ἂν μὴ μεταβάληται.<sup>5</sup>

The second part of this statement parallels loosely, and with some elaboration on Dio’s part, Caesar’s claim that “non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientis milites neque propter timorem signa laturos”.<sup>6</sup> In the introductory statement to his speech (and immediately after the preceding claim), Caesar states that he criticised his men for passing judgement on his authority as commander before he launches into the speech proper. His words are telling:

“Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio, omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent”.<sup>7</sup>

Christ has pointed out that Caesar’s *quo consilio* may have been the inspiration for Dio’s *φιλοτιμία ἰδία*. Likewise it may be that, if Hagendahl is right to assume that Dio’s use of *ἐψηφισμένος* is a reference to the *lex Vatinia* and thus to the limits of Caesar’s command, this word refers to the *quam in partem* part of the clause.<sup>8</sup> It has been noted that

---

<sup>4</sup> Collins (1963): 84. James (2000): 57 argues that Dio’s version of events is “elitist” because he ascribes the initial panic to the common soldiery rather than the elite officers. However, Dio’s reasons for doing so are most probably part of his agenda in the episode to discredit Caesar’s motives for going to war in Gaul; Kemezis (2006): 112-3 has argued that such a presentation allows Dio to portray Caesar and his officers establishing a “propaganda line” to sell to their men. Wiseman (1998): 1-9 has argued that Caesar may have been written with a popular audience in mind and thus preferred to place the blame often on senior officers whilst praising the lower ranks, citing the Vesontio episode as evidence (2-3), which may cast doubt on Dio’s supposed elitism.

<sup>5</sup> Cass. Dio 38.35.2.

<sup>6</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 1.39.7.

<sup>7</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 1.40.1.

<sup>8</sup> Christ (1974): 273-4; Hagendahl (1944): 8-15. Hagendahl assumes that Dio must have had a secondary source that explained the legal issues surrounding the *lex Vatinia*, though, if he is right, what the nature of this source was is open to question. One need not posit a source, for example, that even treated Vesontio, but

Caesar's presentation of himself in his *Commentarii* was the product of "extremely careful writing" and that, in them, Caesar was "an image-maker grappling with the need to win over contemporary public opinion".<sup>9</sup> Dio's recasting of this passage from Caesar in his own history suggests that he would happily have agreed with this claim. Whilst this does not suggest that Dio's account is 'true(τ)' in relation to Caesar's or that he was privy to a source criticising Caesar's actions, we can appreciate in this episode the subtlety with which Dio is able to spot relevant opportunities to implement his *φύσις* model in his history. As Pelling notes, "it may be guesswork, but we can admire it as rather intelligent guesswork".<sup>10</sup>

## **Part Two: Dio's Composition of the Speech**

Scholarly opinion has traditionally been divided between two broad positions on the speech itself: on the one hand, those who, like Gabba, believe that the speech has some relevance to Dio's personal views on the nature of Empire (there is a further debate within this school of thought about how exactly the speech fits into it) and those who, like Millar and Schwartz on the other, who believe that the speech was a trite rhetorical set piece. Gabba famously argued that the speech is Dio's justification of a policy of "defensive imperialism".<sup>11</sup> This argument has been criticised over the years both among scholars who broadly agree with Gabba about the purpose of the speech as well as by those who reject his theory. Christ argues instead that the speech is actually an examination of mutiny

---

one for the year 59 B.C. (when the law was passed), which Dio would have read for his narrative of Caesar's consulship and would have seen the relevance of to this episode. An alternative that does not rely on the existence of a secondary source is the possibility that Dio, knowing that Ariovistus was an *amicus* of Rome, felt that Caesar's men were criticising him for invading his territory. Cf. Pelling (1982): 147, who rejects the need for a source but still believes that Dio's claims are historically valid: "if Dio here accurately reproduces the suspicions which Caesar's contemporaries genuinely felt, that is simply a tribute to his historical insight: we too often underrate him".

<sup>9</sup> Welch (1998): x-xi.

<sup>10</sup> Pelling (1997): 137.

<sup>11</sup> Gabba (1955): 303-307. "La giustizia dell' imperialismo romano...rispondeva ad una necessità non più di Cesare, ma dello storico."

relevant to Dio's own day and possibly his own experiences.<sup>12</sup> Fechner noticed that the critical tone of Dio's presentation of Caesar is important to understanding the speech and concludes that the actions behind the speech stand in deliberate contrast to the traditionally defensive foreign policy pursued under the Republic which the speech itself praises and which Dio himself espouses for his own time.<sup>13</sup> Schwartz, whose ideas have been resurrected by Millar among others, argues that the speech is one of Dio's *ἄμιλλαι λόγων*, the theme of which he probably borrowed from Livy.<sup>14</sup> Millar accepts the suggestion that Dio may have got the subject matter of the speech from his sources, arguing that it represents nothing more than a series of "commonplace philosophical terms", where Dio joins ideas he has previously discussed under 218 B.C. and joins them with "stoic concepts of the mission of Empire and Rome's duty of trusteeship towards the provinces". He concludes that "what we have here is evidence not for Dio's views but for his acquaintance with a certain range of political thought, that is Greek philosophical justification for empire. Caesar's speech in Dio is an extrapolation in commonplace philosophical terms (with some examples from Republican history thrown in) of a speech in which a general urged his soldiers to fight".<sup>15</sup> Van Stekelenburg has followed Millar in claiming that the speech represents nothing more than a *μελετή* of Greek intellectual ideas.<sup>16</sup> Despite work by Kemezis and Pelling, there has not been very much interest in the importance of the speech for Dio's characterisation of Caesar, wherein lies, in my view, its real significance.<sup>17</sup> I wish in the remainder of this section to build on the work of Pelling, Christ and Fechner to examine how the sentiments Caesar expresses in the speech contradict his desires and ambitions at Vesontio, in Gaul in general and also the campaign he conducted in Spain in 61 B.C. whilst displaying the same level of dissimulation and

---

<sup>12</sup> Christ (1974): 251-292.

<sup>13</sup> Fechner (1986): 219-227.

<sup>14</sup> Schwartz (1899): 1719.

<sup>15</sup> Millar (1964): 81-83. See also Millar (1961): 13-14.

<sup>16</sup> Van Stekelenburg (1971): 29-39.

<sup>17</sup> Kemezis (2006): 111-112; Pelling (1982): 147. Pelling (2009b): 515-516.

dishonesty that we see in other parts of Dio's portrayal of his character. The speech allows Caesar to 'turn the tables' on his men, to accuse them of what he himself is guilty of – putting private interests before those of the state.

It has long been noticed that the speech contains many allusions and intertexts from both Thucydides and Demosthenes. Kyhnitzsch has shown that much of the Thucydidean in the speech derives from Pericles' funeral oration with overtones from a variety of other passages, most notably the debate between Corinth and Athens in Book One and Thucydides' description of Thracian savagery (used by Dio to describe Germanic barbarity).<sup>18</sup> Vlachos has analysed the debt to Demosthenes in the speech. He shows that Dio relies extensively on a variety of Demosthenic and Demosthenic sounding phrases, culled principally (though not exclusively) from speeches dealing with Philip of Macedon (such as *de Corona*, or the 'Philippics').<sup>19</sup> Despite the dismissive tone that these intertexts inspire in Dio's interpreters, their relevance to his historiographical designs should not be disregarded so easily.<sup>20</sup> For example, in his Vesontio speech Dio seems to paraphrase Demosthenes' claims in the first Olynthiac about how cities feel when a tyrant is their neighbour.<sup>21</sup> Vlachos says:

“Caesar implies that the nearness of Ariovistus' *τυραννίς* is a constant menace to the autonomy of the neighbouring peoples: they are naturally hostile to him. Of course the argument is absurd, in Caesar's mouth, and wholly superfluous; it was a well-known fact that both the contending factions of the Gauls were thoroughly alarmed at Ariovistus' encroachments: he could no longer find a willing and trustworthy ally among the Gallic tribes”.<sup>22</sup>

It might be asked how something can be both absurd and superfluous. Here, absurd would imply that 'Caesar' is speaking historical nonsense, which surely contradicts the statement that his words are superfluous to requirement since the situation was so

---

<sup>18</sup> Kyhnitzsch (1894): 9-25. For Dio's tendency to use stereotypical portrayals of barbaric and Northern European peoples and their fighting styles, see Pelling (1982): 147.

<sup>19</sup> Vlachos (1905): 102-106.

<sup>20</sup> Schwartz (1899): 1719.

<sup>21</sup> *Comp. Dem. Or.* 1.5 with Cass. Dio 38.45.3.

<sup>22</sup> Vlachos (1905): 105.

obvious. But the situation, in any event, was not so obvious. Not for the ‘real’ Caesar who expresses the belief in his speech that Ariovistus could still be reasoned with and made to honour his duties to Rome as *amicus et socius*. Nor to Dio’s Caesar, whose men have accused him of invading Gaul (and more specifically Ariovistus’ territory) for the sake of his political career. It is necessary for him to spell out that what he is doing is of vital necessity for the safety of Rome’s allies. In this we also see another purpose to the intertext. It is, in Dio’s account, Caesar himself who is the real aggressor, the man whose *τυραννίς* will have tremendous consequences for both Gaul and Rome. By passing the blame on to Ariovistus, Caesar is protecting himself from reproach by claiming that he is but a victim of necessity (rather as Caesar portrays himself in his *Commentarii*, as it happens) and, in having Caesar do this, Dio is casting the same aspersions on Caesar that Caesar is casting on Ariovistus.

Similarly it is easy to draw (fairly facile) comparisons between Philip and Ariovistus. Both men were essentially outside the civilised world (Macedonia was, obviously, not a barbarian state, but Demosthenes was known for casting Philip as a barbarian), both were political and military threats on the northern frontier of the Roman and Greek worlds, and both men had begun encroaching on the territory of allied states to Rome and Athens. These are, in fact, the *topoi* that Caesar’s speech explores when it borrows ideas from Demosthenic rhetoric.<sup>23</sup> Where Caesar’s portrayal of Ariovistus differs from Demosthenes (whilst still borrowing from him), there seems a rhetorical reason as well. For example, Demosthenes calls Philip *δυσπολέμητος*, whereas Caesar reassures his men that Ariovistus is not.<sup>24</sup> This surely is in reference to Caesar’s own claims (which Dio repeats at the end of the speech) that the Germans were not the invincible supermen the Romans had feared.

---

<sup>23</sup> E.g. (passages cited by Vlachos): Dem. *Or.* 4.4; 8.29; 10.19; 24-7; 29; 50; 70; 18.69.

<sup>24</sup> Dem. *Or.* 4.4 (comp. Cass. Dio 38.45.1).

Demosthenes is also exploited for Dio's depiction of Caesar's dissimulation. For example, when Demosthenes excuses some Athenian generals for acting unlawfully by saying that the real reason for Athens' troubles is Philip, the idea is borrowed by 'Caesar' when he justifies his decision to wage war without senatorial consent.<sup>25</sup> Likewise, *Oratio* 10.70, which is borrowed from by Dio on multiple occasions in the Vesontio speech talks of politicians who are led by their *φιλοτιμία* to incur danger for the sake of private gain, but counsel peace in foreign policy out of indifference to the fate of the city. This ties in with Caesar's desire in the speech to discredit accusations against him by creating his own 'counter-accusations' against his men; but Dio's audience, who were well-versed as Sophists in Demosthenic oratory, would perhaps have sensed an ironic ring, given Dio's own claims about Caesar's *φιλοτιμία*.

The Thucydidean allusions are not without value, either. Again, broad-brush comparisons can be made between Caesar and Pericles. Both were generals and statesmen and both gave resolve to their wavering troops/people with their respective speeches.<sup>26</sup> Both had been criticised for the wars they had started and both were seeking the opportunity to justify their actions. The similarities deepen when we consider the reaction of the people to the speeches. As we shall see, Caesar is able to persuade his audience of senior officers, even though some remain privately sceptical. Pericles has a similar effect on the Athenians: *οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπίθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἔπεμπον ἔς τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὠρμηγντο, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἔλυποῦντο.*<sup>27</sup> However, the comparison with Pericles cannot have been entirely meant as straight. One must assume that Dio chose Pericles' words because they were those of a general-cum-politician defending his decisions and therefore 'appropriate', but that he

<sup>25</sup> Dem. Or. 8.28-31; Cass. Dio 38.41.2.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Kyhnitzsch (1894): 12, "de ratione dicam qua materiam disposuit uterque historicus, et Pericles et Caesar animos eorum qui audiunt, excitare student et admonere, ne rebus adversis bello illatis nimium affligantur neve supra modum timori seu dolori indulgeant".

<sup>27</sup> Thuc. 2.65.2.

intended his readers to pick up on some sort of irony in his ‘comparison’.<sup>28</sup> Unlike Pericles’, Caesar’s speech was not the honest advice of a politician with the popular interest at heart, but a selfish piece, designed to enforce temporary obedience to an unjust and unprovoked war. Likewise, his was delivered (as we discuss below) in private, to his officers whom he intended to work on the men for him, whereas Pericles’ gave a full public account of his actions. In other words, the situations that both men face are rather similar, but their methods of dealing with it suggest the differences in the quality and morality of their leadership.

### **Part Three: Caesar’s Reply**

Let us now turn to the speech itself. I shall first trace the background and build up to the speech, moving from Caesar’s invasion of Gaul down to the mutiny in order to place Caesar’s speech within its proper context. Then we shall explore how the themes that Dio emphasises are presented in the speech.

Caesar’s motives for waging war in Gaul are not given by Dio first at Vesontio. Even before he leaves for Gaul, there is a hint of what he intends to achieve, as there is of his determination to hide his ambitions from his contemporaries:

τὰ δὲ δὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν δι’ ἐτέρων διήγει. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυρῶς ἐφυλάξατο, μηδὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ῥῆον πάνθ’ ὅσων ἐπεθύμει κατειργάσατο. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι ἔλεγεν...ἕτεροι δὲ, ὡς καὶ ἀναγκαίου καὶ χρησίμου τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ ἐσηγήσαντο ὅσα ἠθέλησε καὶ κυρωθῆναι ἐποίησαν, οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γερουσίᾳ. ὃ τε γὰρ ὄμιλος τοῦ τε Ἰλλυρικοῦ καὶ τῆς Γαλατίας τῆς ἐντὸς τῶν Ἄλπεων ἄρξαι αὐτῷ μετὰ τριῶν στρατοπέδων ἐπὶ ἔτη πέντε ἔδωκε, καὶ ἡ βουλή τὴν τε Γαλατίαν τὴν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄρων καὶ στρατόπεδον ἕτερον προσεπέτρεψε.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> E.g. When Dio’s Caesar paraphrases at 38.36.2 Pericles’ claim (Thuc. 2.63.3) that *τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον*, we might assume that his obvious hypocrisy is meant to jar with Periclean integrity, adding to his sense of dissimulation. For similar cases of ironic allusion in ancient historiography, see Levene (2000): 170-191 and Marincola (2011): 1-31, who argue that historians like Sallust and Xenophon chose ideas that they intended to contrast with the themes they were establishing as important in their histories.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 38.8.3-5.

The nature of Caesar's *ἐπιθυμία* is made clear when Caesar takes up his command in Gaul:

*Καῖσαρ δὲ εὔρε μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ Γαλατία πολέμιον, ἀλλὰ ἀκριβῶς πάντα ἡσύχαζεν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐν εἰρηγῇ διεγένετο, ἀλλὰ αὐτομάτου τὸ πρῶτον πολέμου τινὸς αὐτῷ συμβάντος ἕτερος συνηνέχθη, ὥστ' αὐτόν, ὅπερ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει, πάντα...καὶ πολεμῆσαι καὶ κατορθῶσαι.<sup>30</sup>*

Caesar's inability to keep his peace when faced with an opportunity for military adventurism is a common theme in Dio's presentation of him. For example, Caesar, *δοξῆς ἐπιθυμῶν*, attacks the bandits who plague Lusitania. Dio states that they could have been crushed without great difficulty (*ἀνευ μεγάλου τινὸς πόνου καθήρας*) and that Caesar could have otherwise had peace (*δυνηθεὶς ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν*), but that he wanted to achieve something grand in Spain in order to make himself consul of Rome and to enjoy the same kind of military glory that Pompey and others had achieved elsewhere. Dio's beginning of his account of the war that Caesar begins with these bandits in the Herminian mountains also echoes the above passage about the commencement of the Gallic War: *ἀπ' οὖν τούτων, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ εἰρηνεῖν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, πρὸς τὸ ὄρος τὸ Ἑρμίνιον ἐτράπετο.<sup>31</sup>*

Caesar is enabled to satisfy both his inability to keep quiet and his *ἐπιθυμία* again at Vesontio, when Rome's allies realise what his intentions are. Dio summarises the war against the Helvetii and introduces the war with Ariovistus thus:

*οὕτω μὲν δὴ τὸν πρῶτον πόλεμον ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐπολέμησεν, ἀρξάμενος δὲ ἐκείθεν οὐχ ἡσύχασεν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς τε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ βούλημα ἅμα ἀπεπλήρωσε καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἐχαρίσατο. οἳ τε γὰρ Σηκουανοὶ καὶ Αἰδοῦοι τήν τε ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτοῦ ἰδόντες καὶ τὰ ἔργα ὁμολογοῦντα ταῖς ἐλπίσιν αἰσθόμενοι, ἐκείνῳ τε εὐεργεσίαν ἅμα καταθέσθαι καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς τοὺς ὁμοχώρους σφίσι τιμωρήσασθαι ἠθέλησαν.<sup>32</sup>*

<sup>30</sup> Cass. Dio 38.31.1. There is a lacuna in the text: Boissevain supplies <τὸν τῆς ἡγεμονίας χρόνον> or <τὰ ἐ' ἔτη>.

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 37.52.3.

<sup>32</sup> Cass. Dio 38.34.1. The idea that the allies could detect Caesar's desires from his deeds sounds rather like Dio's methodological statement in the *παιδευσις* passage (46.35.1). See above, pp. 81-3.

The whole of the remainder of Dio's Gallic War narrative is written within this context, too. Thus, Caesar's reasons for crossing over into Britain and Germany are linked to his desire for glory and power. When he crosses the Rhine, for example, Dio places the military motivation (to keep the Germans out of Gaul) second, whereas he places most importance on Caesar's anxiety to do that which none of his predecessors had done. This, of course, ties in with his statement about Caesar's intervention in Spain and his emulation of Pompey and others like him. In Britain we see a similar phenomenon. Now that the whole of Gaul is peaceful, Caesar desires to cross the channel (*ἐπειδὴ τὰ τε ἄλλα τὰ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡσύχαζε καὶ τοὺς Μωρίνους προσεποιήσατο, ἐπεθύμησε διαβῆναι*).<sup>33</sup> The campaign, Dio states, achieved nothing militarily or politically for Rome except *τοῦ ἐστρατευκέναι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς δόξαι*: this is enough for Caesar, since, as Dio says rather epigrammatically, *καὶ οἱ οἴκοι Ῥωμαῖοι θαυμαστῶς ἐμεγαλύνοντο*.<sup>34</sup> Caesar's second campaign against Britain is yet again portrayed in this way. In Thucydidean style, Dio gives Caesar's *πρόφασιν* – that perfidious Albion had not given Caesar the hostages he demanded – and the reality (*ἐν ἔργῳ*) – that Caesar desired (*ἐφίεμενος*) the island so much that he would find any excuse to sail across.<sup>35</sup>

When we turn to the Vesontio episode itself, we see Caesar up to the same things. We have already noticed that Caesar's *ἐπιθυμία* was open to exploitation by Rome's allies, the Aedui and Sequani. 'Caesar' is open to their manipulation, disregarding the legal and political rights and wrongs of his ambition. Ariovistus, as Dio notes had been recognised as king by Caesar himself, however:

*πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἰσχὺν οὐδὲν τούτων ἐφρόντισε, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου πρόφασιν τῆς διαφορᾶς, μὴ καὶ προὔπαρχεν τι ἐς αὐτὸν νομισθῆναι, λαβεῖν ἠθέλησε.*<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Cass. Dio 39.51.1.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 39.53.1.

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 40.1.2.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 38.34.3.

Again we have the twin theme of Caesar’s ambition (or desire in this case) and the obfuscation with which he clouds it. Caesar goes on to summon Ariovistus, *pretending* that he had something to say to him (**δεόμενος**). When Ariovistus replies that if Caesar wishes to speak to him, he should come to him, since both men are equals, Caesar cultivates righteous anger about the insult Ariovistus was dealing to the Romans. That his bluff is disingenuous as stated by Dio:

ταῦτα δὲ ἔπραξεν οὐχ ὅτι καὶ καταπλήξειν αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐξοργιεῖν κακὰ τούτου πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μεγάλην καὶ εὐπρεπή λήψεσθαι ἤλπισεν.<sup>37</sup>

In other words, when ‘Caesar’s’ soldiers complain of his **φιλοτιμία ἰδία**, they are representing Dio’s own view throughout the narrative of the Gallic War and beyond.<sup>38</sup> It also explains why Caesar goes to such lengths in his speech to justify his course of action – not because Dio agrees with him or is expanding on an idea (ironic or not) of just war, but because Caesar is continuing in the same fashion he has throughout Dio’s narrative of disguising his desire for power and glory behind a veil of righteousness.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, Caesar begins his speech with an examination of public and private duty that attempts to take the moral highground from his opponents. The “**ἰδία**” of the first line of his speech picking up the **ἰδία** in his men’s accusation against him:

οὐ τὸν αὐτόν, ὦ ἄνδρες φίλοι, τρόπον ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς περὶ τε τῶν ἰδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν βουλευέσθαι.<sup>40</sup>

This passage is modelled upon one in Demosthenes 10.70, which, as we noted above, contained a condemnation of politicians who pursue their **φιλοτιμία** at the expense

---

<sup>37</sup> Cass. Dio 38.34.6.

<sup>38</sup> Pelling (2009b): 516. He argues that their accusation is “particularly interesting, as it makes the double step: Dio finds his own key to events in his reconstruction of what one group is feeling (the soldiers), and makes those feelings themselves depends on that group’s mental picture of what a second figure (Caesar himself) is thinking – so primary, secondary, and tertiary focalisers are all relevant”.

<sup>39</sup> Kemezis (2006): 112.

<sup>40</sup> Cass. Dio 38.36.1.

of the state.<sup>41</sup> Caesar continues in turning the tables on his men by presenting an abstract distinction between the private preference for safety and expedience and the need to endure hardship in the name of the state, which is in reference to his men's fear of fighting Ariovistus. 'Caesar' claims that *ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἐπιεικέστατα καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα, τῷ δὲ δήμῳ τὰ κράτιστα καὶ προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν προσήκει*.<sup>42</sup> Dio continues in the same vein in the rest of the chapter:

τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων, οὐδ' ὑμῶν οὐδὲνα χρὴ τὸ ἴδιον ἢδὲ καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἐν τῷ παρόντι μάλλον ἢ τὸ τοῖς πᾶσι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ εὐπρεπὲς καὶ συμφέρον προσκοπεῖν. λογίζεσθε γὰρ τὰ τε ἄλλα ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι δεῦρο ἦλθομεν αὐτοὶ τε τοσοῦτοι καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἔκ τε τῆς βουλῆς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰππέων ὄντες, καὶ πλῆθος πολὺ στρατιωτῶν χρήματά τε ἄφθονα λαβόντες, οὐχ ἵνα ῥαθυμώμεν, οὐδ' ἵνα ἀμελώμεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως τὰ τε τῶν ὑπηκόων ὀρθῶς διοικήσωμεν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἀσφαλῶς διασώσωμεν, τοὺς τε ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντάς σφας ἀμυνώμεθα, καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἐπαυξήσωμεν. ὡς εἴ γε μὴ ταῦθ' οὕτω φρονοῦντες ἦλθομεν, τί ποτε καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐξεστρατεύσαμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τρόπον γέ τινα οἴκοι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις κατεμείναμεν;<sup>43</sup>

The question that ends the passage shows Caesar throwing accusations of putting private interests before those of the state back at his men. It is a desire for peace and ease (which he imputes for his men – there is nothing in Dio's narrative to suggest that they actually want either) which is selfish, not waging war against Ariovistus and his German hordes. Thus, he claims that his men should chose a policy that is right and beneficial to the whole of the Roman people and not to their private interests.<sup>44</sup> Likewise, his claim that the Romans have been sent to Gaul in order to protect the allies and ward off aggressors is 'true' as it stands, but, as a sentiment in Caesar's mouth, is utterly contradicted by his own actions, where he has declared war on an *amicus* of Rome due to the internal politicking of Rome's Gallic allies.

That this opening passage is a 'rebuttal' by Caesar in disingenuous terms of his men's accusations against him is confirmed by the next passage:

---

<sup>41</sup> Vlachos (1905): 103.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio 38.36.1.

<sup>43</sup> Cass. Dio 38.36.3-6.

<sup>44</sup> There is perhaps some irony in Caesar's choice of *εὐπρεπὲς*, which has a sense of superficiality and speciousness.

λέγω δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες ἑταῖροί τε καὶ φίλοι...ἀλλ' ὅτι τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἤσθημαι αὐτοὺς τε θρυλοῦντας ὡς οὐ προσήκοντα τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηρῆμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους προσστασιάζοντας, ἵν' αὐτοὶ τε βεβαιοτέραν ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγων τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος προθυμίαν ποιήσῃσθε, καὶ ἐκείνους πάνθ' ἃ προσήκει διδάξῃσθε· πλείω γὰρ ἂν παρ' ὑμῶν ἰδίᾳ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκούοντες αὐτὰ ὠφελῆθειεν ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ἅπαξ πυθόμενοι.<sup>45</sup>

As Kemezis notes, “[the] audience is made up of lieutenants, who are explicitly being told to pass the speech on as a propaganda line”.<sup>46</sup> Not only has Caesar parsed and analysed the twin concepts of private and public virtue (using Classical concepts of both to structure his argument – Dio may be, as Millar notes, using “philosophical commonplaces”, but that does not render them irrelevant to either the episode or Dio’s broader narrative purpose) in order to discredit accusations against himself (accusations that we must always keep in mind are true), but he is now urging his officers to cast doubt in the minds of his men, to push the “propaganda line”, as it is called here. Caesar’s deception is even more sophisticated since he is aware that a quiet word from his officers is a better method of spreading the orthodoxy he establishes in the speech than for him to directly orate to his men. He also knows his men well, since Dio tells us at the end of the speech that:

ταῦτα τοῦ Καίσαρος εἰπόντος οὐ μόνον οὐδεὶς ἀντεῖπεν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τινες ἴσῃσαν τὰναντία σφίσι ἐγίγνωσκον, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνήνεσαν πάντες, καὶ οὐκ ἤκιστα οἱ δι' ὑποψίας αὐτῷ ὄντες, λογοποιεῖν ἃ ἤκουσαν.<sup>47</sup>

Dio’s statement that Caesar’s men give in because *τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ προκεκρίσθαι προθυμουμένους, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους δι' ἐκείνους φιλοτιμουμένους* suggests that Caesar had inspired his men with his own ambition through the speech.<sup>48</sup> Whether Dio intended to be ironic with his claim that the men who mutinied were motivated by the same *φιλοτιμία* as Caesar possessed is hard to tell, though I would argue that this fits Dio’s broader portrait

---

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio 38.37.1-2.

<sup>46</sup> Kemezis (2006): 112.

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 38.47.1.

<sup>48</sup> Cass. Dio 38.47.1.

of the private *ἔρως* of the politicians of the late Republic manipulating the public *ἐλπίς* of the ordinary Romans. Certainly, this would tie in with the pseudo-traditional rhetoric that Caesar employs about the need to defend the Republic against outside enemies.

Caesar moves onto a less general defence of the legality of his position. He deals with the absence of a legitimate declaration of war and his attack on a man who had formally been an ally of Rome. Caesar asks his men:

ἢ τίνας μὲν ἔνεκα ὑμῶς ἐνταῦθ' ὁ δῆμος ἐξέπεμψεν, τίνας δ' ἔνεκα ἐμὲ μετὰ τὴν ὑπατείαν εὐθὺς ἔστειλε, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ πέντε ἔτη καθάπαξ, ὁ μήπω πρότερον ἐγεγόνει, ἄρχειν ἐλόμενος, τοῦτο δὲ τέσσαραι στρατοπέδοις ὀπλίσας, εἰ μὴ καὶ πολεμήσαι πάντως ἡμῶς δεήσειν ἐνόμιζεν; οὐ γάρ που ἵνα μάτην τρεφώμεθα, οὐδ' ἵνα τὰς πόλεις τὰς συμμαχίδας καὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν ὑπήκοον περιμόντες χαλεπώτεροι καὶ τῶν πολεμίων αὐτοῖς γιγνώμεθα, (οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ταῦτα φήσειεν), ἀλλ' ἵνα τὴν οἰκείαν φυλάξωμεν, <ἵνα> τὴν τῶν πολεμίων πορθήσωμεν, ἢ ἄξιόν τι καὶ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων ἐργασώμεθα.<sup>49</sup>

This argument is even more specious than what we have seen previously. Firstly, Caesar was voted his command under the *lex Vatinia* because he manipulated other people to pass it for him (see above, p. 220). If the intention behind the law was that Caesar was to use it to wage war against Rome's 'enemies', then that intention was Caesar's to start with, not either the people's or the senate's. His claim that if he and his men were not fighting, they would be progressing around the province creating more havoc for the allies and subjects than their enemies is ironic in light of Dio's assertion that Ariovistus was an *amicus et socius* of Rome and of the fact that such an administrative progress is the proper function of the magistrate in his province – bellicose wars that were entirely unprovoked were not part of his brief.<sup>50</sup>

Caesar touches on the lack of government support for his wars in Gaul. Aside from the risible claim that *καὶ πάνυ γε φρονίμως ἐποίησαν ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὸ τίσι πολεμητέον εἶναι διαγνώναι καταλιπόντες καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ τὸν πόλεμον ψηφισάμενοι*,<sup>51</sup> he also argues that:

---

<sup>49</sup> Cass. Dio 38.41.4-5.

<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, Verres *et al* are good evidence of what damage a magistrate in the late Republic could do going about his 'official' duties and doubtless Dio had that in mind too.

<sup>51</sup> Cass. Dio 38.41.6.

οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν οὕτω χρή φρονεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἀντειπεῖν ὑμῶν νομίζω· εἰ δ' ὅτι μήτε ἐξήτασται περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τούτου παρὰ [τε] τῆ βουλῆ καὶ παρὰ τῶ δήμῳ μὴ ἐψηφίσται, διὰ τοῦτό τις ἦττον οἶεται δεῖν ἡμῶς προθυμηθῆναι, λογισάσθω τοῦθ', ὅτι πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ὅσοι πῶποτε γεγόνασιν ἡμῖν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ προεπαγγέλσεως οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ καιροῦ συμβεβήκασι.<sup>52</sup>

Again, this is sophistry. The war has not been voted on, it is true, because it is an impromptu affair, but its impromptu nature is precisely a result of Caesar's *φιλοτιμία ἰδία*. There is also perhaps a sense that Caesar does not want this matter to go beyond the camp – if 'he' allowed that to happen, the real motives for the war would surely come out and his men would be vindicated. Caesar then addresses the question of his attack on Ariovistus, a man he had formerly accepted as friend. His argument here is equally unconvincing:

καί μοι εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἐκεῖνο ὑπολαμβάνει, τί δὴ τηλικούτων ὁ Ἀριόουιστος πεπλημμέληκεν ὥστ' ἀντὶ φίλου καὶ συμμάχου πολέμιος ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, σκοπέιτω τοῦθ', ὅτι τοὺς ἀδικεῖν τι ἐπιχειροῦντας οὐκ ἐφ' οἷς ποιῶσι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς φρονούσιν ἀμύνασθαι δεῖ, καὶ τῆν τε αὔξησιν αὐτῶν πρὶν καὶ βλαβῆναί τι προκαταλαμβάνειν, καὶ μὴ περιμείναντας κακῶς ἔργῳ παθεῖν, τότε τιμωρεῖσθαι.<sup>53</sup>

Caesar's claim that his actions amount to 'pre-emptive non-aggression' do not stand up to scrutiny. It was he, after all, who, in Dio's account, provoked Ariovistus in order to give himself the excuse to wage war against him. Ariovistus had been no enemy in need of his comb cut or against whom Rome needed to strike the first blow. This is reinforced by his claims in the rest of the chapter. Caesar claims that he requested a meeting with Ariovistus in a friendly fashion (*φιλικῶς*) and then asks about Ariovistus' less than polite refusal of the invitation, how his actions could have been seen to be aggressive (*ὑβρις*) or licentious (*ἀσελγεια*).<sup>54</sup> This should be contrasted with Dio's account of Caesar's 'requests' to Ariovistus that were deliberately designed to provoke him (though without giving Caesar the reputation of antagonist) so that he might have a *casus belli*.

---

<sup>52</sup> Cass. Dio 38.41.1.

<sup>53</sup> Cass. Dio 38.42.1.

<sup>54</sup> Cass. Dio 38.42.2-3.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, then, we have seen that the speech continues to explore the same themes that Dio has been exploring throughout the rest of the narrative of Caesar's political career, viz. his ambition and the deception in which he obfuscates it. This demonstrates that it is impossible to think of the speech as a justification of imperialism on Dio's part, defensive or aggressive, since the speech is far too linked with Dio's depiction of Caesar to stand as a general discussion of Dio's personal and political beliefs. In fact, the speech fulfills the requirements for epideictic historical speeches, in that it is both relevant to the speaker and to the situation (if we believe that there was discussion among Caesar's men about the legality of his position in Gaul – certainly, Dio seems to have believed there was, based upon his reading of Caesar). Where it fits into Dio's politico-historical viewpoint is in its relationship to the rest of his portrayal of Caesar. Dio 'shows' Caesar here exploiting his command for the personal and political credit after which he lusts. The war is displayed as the result of his *ἐπιθυμία* and his *φιλοτιμία*, and it is a clear case of Caesar using military might, his ability to manipulate and handle other men and his leadership skills to achieve goals that are otherwise very questionable. All of this fits into Dio's perception of Caesar's role in the downfall of the Republic. But it is, of course, of wider significance. Dio's Caesar shares his *φιλοτιμία* with Pompey; he emulates Pompey's example in seeking a major command with potential for conquest and glory; and their *φιλοτιμία* is indisputably the reason for the collapse of Republican government in 49 B.C.

## Chapter Ten: A Man at the Top

### Introduction

We have looked thus far at Dio's portrayal of Caesar's rise to power and its implications for the Republican state. We have seen, as we saw for Cicero, how Caesar's personality and desire for power helped to unbalance the state, the difference between the two men being, on the one hand, Caesar's constant success and ability to move among the powerful as an equal and, on the other, Cicero's repeated failure and ostracism from those elites. In this brief chapter, I want to show how Dio, in his narrative of Caesar's dictatorship, points to the issues that concern his narrative of the imperial regime. Even though Caesar is dictator and not *princeps* and his behaviour as ruler shows the features that we have always seen, such as his love of increasing power, his ruthlessness, and his preference for popular favour over the respect of his peers, he is still, in Dio's eyes, a monarch and it is as a monarch he is assessed. He begins talking like an emperor too, in the speech he gives to the senate in Book 43 (to be discussed in this section). Likewise, the assassins are motivated also by concerns that will preoccupy Dio's later narrative. When they kill him, they do so partly because Caesar has proven himself an intolerable master, not because he is master in the first place.<sup>1</sup> This is an obvious anachronism on Dio's part, the reflections of a man comfortable with monarchy and interested only in its gradations, not of men for whom the very name of monarch was anathema. However, in the Epilogue we shall see that the idea is not without relevance for Dio's historical project, since the contrast between the metamorphosis that Augustus/Octavian undergoes and Caesar's exaggerated *φιλοτιμία* is vital for the implicit *comparatio* between Caesar and Augustus that

---

<sup>1</sup> Cass. Dio 44.3.1.

he makes. Caesar's failure to turn Rome from Republicanism to monarchy is used to explain Augustus' success under 'similar' conditions.

### **Part One: Caesar's Dictatorship in Context**

To understand Caesar's character as dictator we must turn, as we have throughout the whole of this chapter to Dio's statements about Pompey and Caesar at Pharsalus. The reader will no doubt remember that Dio claimed the chief difference between Pompey and Caesar as being that:

*Πομπήιος μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων δεύτερος, Καίσαρ δὲ καὶ πρῶτος πάντων εἶναι ἐπεθύμει, καὶ ὁ μὲν παρ' ἐκόντων τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἐθελόντων προστατεῖν φιλεῖσθαι τε ἐσπούδαζε, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔμελεν εἰ καὶ ἀκόντων ἄρχοι καὶ μισοῦσιν ἐπιτάσσοι, τὰς τε τιμὰς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ διδόη.<sup>2</sup>*

As we noted above, Dio ascribes to Pompey a desire to be loved, whilst to Caesar only an interest in making himself powerful, a reversal of the order of the passage as we find it in Lucan and Florus. Rich has argued that this passage contradicts Dio's claims about Caesar's dictatorship:

"However, when he comes to Caesar's dictatorship, he blithely contradicts himself: Caesar is now the exemplar of the good ruler. He never misses an opportunity to dilate on Caesar's clemency towards his opponents; Caesar's persistence in it shows, he holds, that it was not simply prudential but arose from his innate goodness. He represents Caesar as making a reassuring speech to the senate on his return to Rome in 46, in which he promises to be not a tyrant but a leader, protector and father, and his words are borne out by his subsequent conduct".<sup>3</sup>

To my mind, the truth is the other way around. Dio's Caesar undergoes no metamorphosis into the ideal ruler after his declaration as dictator. The speech Caesar gives to the senate in fact is contradicted by many of Caesar's actions in the subsequent narrative, as we shall soon see. Cary's translation of a pivotal passage in Dio's account of

---

<sup>2</sup> Cited p. 191.

<sup>3</sup> Rich (1989): 96.

Caesar's dictatorship is misleading. After the speech he gives to the senate professing his clemency, Dio claims of the senate:

τοιαῦτα ὁ Καῖσαρ ἔν τε τῷ συνεδρίῳ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἰπὼν ἐπεκούφισε μὲν πῶς αὐτοὺς τοῦ δέους, οὐ μόντοι καὶ ἡδυνήθη πείσαι παντάπασι θαρσεῖν, πρὶν καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τὰς ἐπαγγελίας βεβαιώσασθαι.<sup>4</sup>

Cary translates:

“By such statements in the senate and afterward before the people Caesar relieved them to some extent of their fears, but was not able to persuade them altogether to be of good courage until he confirmed his promises by his deeds”.

Cary's translation is not only contrary to the spirit of the rest of the narrative, as we shall see, but it also fails to put the correct weight on *πρὶν* + the infinitive. Smyth suggests a translation of 'before' and says that “the infinitive must be used, even with negative clauses, when *πρὶν* must mean only *before* (and not *until*)” and “the infinitive is obligatory in Attic when the action of the *πρὶν* clause *does not take place* or *is not to take place*”.<sup>5</sup> The passage would be clearer without the comma after *θαρσεῖν*, which would allow us to take *θαρσεῖν... βεβαιώσασθαι* more as a single concept. This would imply, I suggest, that the senate's attitude was one of 'wait and see' after the speech. Instead of Cary's assumption that this passage spoke in favour of Caesar, I argue rather that it is one of scepticism by his audience. Rather, it should confirm the view I express here that Caesar's increasing over-ambition caused him to lose favour with the Roman people; whereas they had once been willing to eat up his claims, however specious, now they are more distrusting of them and will, eventually, support the men who kill him.

Dio's portrayal of Caesar, however, is of a man naturally humane (*φιλόανθρωπος*), and one who is not given to acting on insults against him. This is evident as far back as Book 38, when Cicero manages to antagonise Caesar with his attempt to assassinate him and his slandering of him in his defence of Antonius Hybrida. But here, Caesar's clemency

---

<sup>4</sup> Cass. Dio 43.18.6.

<sup>5</sup> Smyth (1920): 553. The use of *πρὶν* here seems to be of an 'action unfulfilled' (554).

does not want for a certain ruthless pragmatism. Despite possessing an *ἐπιεικεστέραν φύσιν* and not being easily angered (*οὐ πάνυ ῥαδίως ἐθυμοῦτο*) and not being terribly interested in revenge, he attacks Cicero (among others) in order to protect his own interests. His “clemency” is unmistakably pragmatic:

οὐ γὰρ ὅπως δόξειεν ἀμύνεσθαι τινὰς ἔπρασεν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι ἀνεπιφθονώτατα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ πάντα διοικήσειε. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδήλως, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἥκιστα ἂν τις προσεδόκησε, τὰς τιμωρίας ἐπήγε, τῆς τε φήμης ἕνεκα, τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ὀργίλως ἔχειν, καὶ τοῦ μὴ τίνα προαισθανόμενον προφυλάξασθαι ἢ καὶ προποιῆσαί τι δεινὸν αὐτόν, πρὶν παθεῖν, ἐπιχειρήσαι.<sup>6</sup>

Caesar's attitude is by no means dissimilar in Dio's narrative of his dictatorship. Dio's account is full of praise for Caesar's *clementia* where he displays it and Dio certainly feels that Caesar's humanity is, as it is here, a genuinely positive part of his character.<sup>7</sup> However, there are instances where we see Caesar's *φιλανθρωπία* in a more pragmatic light, designed to curry favour and acquiescence from the Roman elite, or where Caesar dispenses with it entirely, preferring a more expedient solution to his problems. Dio's praise of Caesar's actions, in this light, seems to be because he favoured a tolerant policy more than because he happened to have been innately so inclined.

For example, after Pharsalus, Caesar deals with the men who had fought against him. Pompey's soldiers are recruited into his own army without fuss, the senators and *equites* who had fought against him are either spared, if it was their first time, or executed if they had previously opposed him (bar a few whom he allows his men to spare). As for the non-Romans, he spared those who had assisted Pompey, but praised those who had remained steadfast in their loyalty more than those who had betrayed him when the battle was turning against him. Caesar's reasons for doing this are practical. He spares Pompey's allies because *πᾶσι γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνέγνω, ἐννοῶν ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ἢ τίνα ἢ οὐδένα αὐτῶν*

<sup>6</sup> Cass. Dio 38.11.4-5. This passage contains a similar usage of *πρὶν* to the one I suggested earlier.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 41.63.5; 42.27.4; 43.50.2.

ἡπίστατο, παρ' ἐκείνου δὲ δὴ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ προεπεπόνθησαν.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, he praises those, paradoxically, who were the more loyal to Pompey because τοὺς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτῷ δι' εὐνοίας ἔσεσθαι ἤλπιζε, τοὺς δὲ, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἔδοξάν τί οἱ καὶ χαρίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ προδότας γε τοῦ νῦν φίλου γενομένους οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ ποτε φείσασθαι ἐνόμιζε.<sup>9</sup> None of this denies the positive tone that Dio adopts in this incident, of course, but it does give us an idea of the kind of clemency Caesar deployed. It is rational and calculated. Those he feels unable to trust he either executes (in the case of the members of the Roman elite, who are his most significant threat) or he distances himself from (in the case of the *amici*). This fits in with the impression Dio gives of Caesar's character in his account of Cicero's exile and relates to his depiction of Caesar before Pharsalus. This will become more apparent as we begin to think about Caesar's actions in relationship to Augustus' in the Epilogue.

Not only does Caesar dispense *clementia* cautiously, he is also more than prepared to drop it when his political need calls for it. Two passages from the narrative of his dictatorship stand out. The first is his murder of his cousin Lucius Caesar.<sup>10</sup> Again, Dio hesitates between two positions. On the one hand, Caesar burns the papers in Scipio's war-chests, spares his men and would have spared Cato too, if he had survived. However, this does not stop him killing a man related to him, even though he came before Caesar as a suppliant and Caesar was not able to face the *odium* of having executed him through a normal court of law. Importantly, Dio chooses this moment to expand upon the same theme as he explores when discussing Caesar's role in Cicero's demise. Caesar, he claims, was prepared to cause the deaths of even his own supporters if they were inconvenient (οὐκ ἐπιτήδειοι) to him:

---

<sup>8</sup> Cass. Dio 41.62.4.

<sup>9</sup> Cass. Dio 41.62.6.

<sup>10</sup> Cass. Dio 43.12.3-13.4.

οὐ γάρ τοι καὶ φανερώς πᾶσι τοῖς λυπήσασί τι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, ἐπεξήρει, ἀλλ' ὅσους  
μηδενὶ ἀξιοχρεῶ ἐγκλήματι μετελθεῖν ἐδύνατο, ἐν τρόπῳ δὴ τινὶ ἀφανεῖ ὑπεξήρει....<sup>11</sup>

Since Dio's claim can only refer to the passage we cited in Chapter Five about Caesar's attitude to Cicero's personal attacks on him, Dio's reader will be aware of the motives that led Caesar to follow his cynical, if mostly gentle, policies.<sup>12</sup> These are the same motives that Dio dilates on at Pharsalus.

The other passage concerns Caesar's attitude towards his men after they mutiny for the third time (including Vesontio). This is the famous incident where Caesar quiets the mutiny by simply uttering "*Quirites*". In Dio's account, Caesar negotiates with his men in a little more detail and concedes to many of their demands (largely because he realises that he cannot control them otherwise).<sup>13</sup> However, those of his soldiers whom he feels might be a risk to his position in future, he decides to "destroy" (ἀνάλωσε) in war, since **τούς τε γὰρ ἐναντίους ἅμα δι' αὐτῶν κατειργάζετο καὶ ἐκείνων ἀπηλλάττετο**.<sup>14</sup> Again, Dio draws a distinction between Caesar's benign character and his attitude towards those men who cross him.<sup>15</sup>

## **Part Two: Caesar's Mistakes**

Pelling has noted that Dio's depiction of Caesar's dictatorship differs from his narrative of his political rise in that Caesar begins to make mistakes, whereas before he had been able to gauge popular feeling so skillfully. His political enemies take advantage of this fact and use it to destroy him.<sup>16</sup> Though the mistakes that Caesar makes show differences between his character as a politician and as a dictator, they are born out of the same

---

<sup>11</sup> Cass Dio. 43.13.2.

<sup>12</sup> See pp. 122-3.

<sup>13</sup> Cass. Dio 42.52.3-4.

<sup>14</sup> Cass. Dio 42.55.2.

<sup>15</sup> Cass. Dio 42.55.3.

<sup>16</sup> Pelling (2009b): 519.

restless appetite for power and applause (to loosely paraphrase David Hume)<sup>17</sup> that characterise his earlier political rise and show that, though Dio praises Caesar for his (calculated) gentility, his Caesar is happy to tread on Roman toes for the sake of personal aggrandisement. Dio's point is that it is not appropriate for a leader such as Caesar to desire the same things as a 'democratic' politician and herein lies his mistake. As we shall see later on, Augustus' metamorphosis from Republican politician to Imperial statesman is the major factor in his success, just as the opposite is the reason for Caesar's failure.

The first mistake Caesar makes is to allow his opponents to "puff him up" (*φυσήσαντες*). They do so by awarding him *καινότητες καὶ ὑπερβόλαι τῶν τιμῶν* and using his acceptance of them to slander him.<sup>18</sup> In true tyrannical fashion, these honours go to Caesar's head and he begins to become more arrogant. The honours Dio notes down are increasingly absurd and the product of flattery rather than goodwill.<sup>19</sup> They decree things to him, such as his triumph over Juba and his Roman allies, of a character which was *ἐν δὲ δὴ τῇ τοῦ καιροῦ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἐπίφθονον καὶ νεμεσητὸν*,<sup>20</sup> and others which were out-and-out unconstitutional, such as the novel and unnecessary title of *praefectus moribus*.<sup>21</sup> Although Caesar perceives that the reason for the honours was *κολακεία*, and delivers a speech to the senate in an attempt to reassure them (see below), this does not cause any improvement in his behaviour. Towards the end of Book 43, we see another spurt of honours, violating precedent in the selection of consuls (this is the passage where Dio records the creation of the title of suffect consul),<sup>22</sup> and he is the first person to be called *imperator* as a proper title.<sup>23</sup> Caesar's speech has evidently failed to create the goodwill he seeks, since *τοσαύτη γε ὑπερβολῇ κολακείας ἐχρήσαντο ὥστε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς τε*

<sup>17</sup> Hume once quipped that "It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause".

<sup>18</sup> Cass. Dio 44.3.1.

<sup>19</sup> Cass. Dio 42.19.2; 43.15.1.

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 42.20.5.

<sup>21</sup> Cass. Dio 43.14.5.

<sup>22</sup> Cass. Dio 43.46.2.

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 43.44.2. He also receives the title *liberator*.

ἐγγόνους αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλεῖσθαι ψηφίσασθαι, μήτε τέκνον τι αὐτοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ γέροντος ἤδη ὄντος.<sup>24</sup> Pitcher has said of these honours that “such authorial interventions, to be sure, are a rhetorical gesture in themselves; they bring out the almost unexampled scale of all that is associated with Caesar through their very avowed unwillingness to go through everything”.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, Dio is able to exaggerate the scale of the honours awarded to Caesar by the deeply anachronistic way he treats them. In Book 44, Dio proceeds to give us a list of even more honours awarded to Caesar. He says of these honours that **μὴ πάντα ἅμα μήτε ἐσσηνέχθη μήτε ἐκυρώθη.**<sup>26</sup> In other words, Dio is lumping together honours that might have been passed months, if not years, separately and which may even have come before the “less absurd” honours of earlier books in his narrative. By doing so, Dio can exaggerate the blame he seeks to place on the senate for puffing Caesar up, and also on Caesar for being so prepared to accept ridiculous honours in the large blocks as Dio presents them.<sup>27</sup> Dio says:

ἤρξαντο μὲν γὰρ τιμᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς καὶ μετριάσσοντα· προχωροῦντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ χαίροντα τοῖς ψηφίζομένοις ἑώρων (πλὴν γὰρ ὀλίγων τινῶν πάντα αὐτὰ ἐδέξατο), αἰεὶ τι μείζον ἄλλος ἄλλο καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἐσέφερον, οἱ μὲν ὑπερκολακεύοντες αὐτὸν οἱ δὲ καὶ διασκώπτοντες.<sup>28</sup>

Obviously, the idea that the senate is alone responsible for the honours awarded Caesar cannot be sustained. Dio here states clearly that the honours they voted him were voted at first with the intention that he would not grow conceited. It is Caesar’s relentless love of honour and power that causes a snowballing of the flattery he suffers from the senate. In other parts of Dio’s narrative, such as his attempts to have himself crowned king at the *Lupercalia*,<sup>29</sup> his insulting of the senate by sitting down when they call upon him,<sup>30</sup> his

---

<sup>24</sup> Cass. Dio 43.44.3.

<sup>25</sup> Pitcher (2009b): 270.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 44.4.1.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Andersen (1938): 19-20.

<sup>28</sup> Cass. Dio 44.7.2.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 44.11.1-3.

<sup>30</sup> Cass. Dio 44.8.1-4.

punishment of the tribunes for protesting at their lack of free speech,<sup>31</sup> his declaration of himself as dictator for life<sup>32</sup> and his triumphs in celebration of his victories over fellow citizens,<sup>33</sup> Caesar shows himself to be a tyrant with, at best, a blasé attitude to the feelings of the citizen body.

Caesar's inability to control his *φιλοτιμία* is not simply a passive affair. Another mistake Caesar makes is to misinterpret an omen not meant for him. After Munda, Caesar spies a palm tree shooting out of the ground on the battlefield. The omen is in reference to Octavian, whose rise to power it presages, but Caesar, however, assumes that it must refer to himself. Being ignorant of the true purpose of the omen, Caesar *ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἔτι πολλά καὶ μεγάλα ἐλπίζων, οὐδὲν μέτριον ἔπραττεν, ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ ἀθάνατος ὦν ὑπερεφρόνησε*.<sup>34</sup> It should be stated that this incident happens several chapters after Caesar's 'reassuring' speech to the senate about his actions, which we now move on to discuss.

### **Part Three: Caesar's Speech to the Senate**

The relationship of the speech Dio gives Caesar in Book 43 to the surrounding narrative is contentious. Obviously the passages above, which sit fore and aft of the speech, suggest that it is unlikely that the traditional interpretation of the speech is correct. Clearly, Caesar's behaviour does not become exemplary after the speech; if anything it gets worse. We shall see, from a comparison of Caesar's claims in the speech with Dio's own claims about his actions that there is ample evidence to support this reading.

---

<sup>31</sup> Cass. Dio 44.10.1-4.

<sup>32</sup> Cass. Dio 44.8.4.

<sup>33</sup> Cass. Dio 43.24.1.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 43.41.3.

Firstly there is Caesar's claim that he had not attempted to deceive the senate during his rise to power, which is clearly at odds with Dio's narrative. When Caesar says in the same sentence that *οὐτ' αὖ ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς εὐπραγίας ἐξῆγμαι καὶ τετύφωμαι ὥστε καὶ τυραννῆσαι ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι*, we might be equally suspicious of his words, particularly given what we have seen about his "puffing up" above.<sup>35</sup> Likewise his claims that he will exhibit moderate behaviour does not bear up to what Dio says of his actions in Book 44.<sup>36</sup>

Caesar's major promise in the speech is not to take money from the citizens unlawfully. He apologises for the high taxation that exists under his regime, explaining that he needs to maintain an army to flush out seditious elements in the state. He then promises the senate that he has received no personal gain from the taxes he has levied and that he has spent all of his own money along with money that he has borrowed. He finally promises not to demand money from the rich or establish new taxes and to be satisfied with current funds.<sup>37</sup> These claims do not sit well with Caesar's previous or his later actions. Firstly, his claim about borrowed money sits uncomfortably next to Dio's narrative of his "borrowing". Dio claims that Caesar forcibly took money from citizens in Italy to use in his war which he had no intention of paying back, which he referred to as moneys "borrowed". He claims here also that he has spent his own money on the public good and was "borrowing" money because of it and no one believes him. Dio claims that *εὐδῆλος δὲ ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια τῇ δυναστείᾳ παρασπώμενος. οἳ τε οὖν ἄλλοι διὰ τοῦτο ἤχθοντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἐταῖροι*.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, Caesar's arguments that he needs taxation to fund the army in order to keep the people safe is sophistry. The army is there to prop up Caesar's power and he needs the money to stop them from rebelling or mutinying against him, as they had done in the past. Likewise, Caesar's lavish triumphs and games celebrating of his

---

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 43.15.5.

<sup>36</sup> Cass. Dio 43.16.3-4. The whole passage is written with what Dio will go on to say about the causes of Caesar's assassination in mind.

<sup>37</sup> 43.18.1-5.

<sup>38</sup> 42.50.4-5.

victory do nothing to support his claims. As well as ill-feeling over the public humiliation of his enemies and the celebration of their death, there is much hostility to Caesar over the amount spent:

ἔσχε μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φονευομένων αἰτίαν, ὅτι μήτ' αὐτὸς διακορῆς σφαγῶν ἐγγεγόνει καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν εἰκόνας ἐπεδείκνυε, πολὺ δὲ δὴ μείζω ὅτι ἀμύθητα χρήματα ἐς πάντα ἐκείνα ἀνάλωσεν, ὡς καὶ καθ' ἑκάτερον ἐπιβοᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ἀδίκως αὐτῶν τὰ πλείω συνελέξατο, καὶ ὅτι ἐς τὰ τοιαῦτα αὐτοῖς κατεχρήσατο.<sup>39</sup>

These instances, along with others where Caesar wastes public money for his and his cronies' private gain, suggest that, in fact, the speech was written as a deliberate contrast by Dio with his narrative.<sup>40</sup> Here, as in all of his other speeches, Caesar is the great deceiver, attempting to cover over his dishonest and base motives with stirring sentiment. This time, however, it is suggested that his audience is wising up to him and soon he is killed.

## Conclusion

We have seen in this short chapter, therefore, that Caesar's behaviour, whilst conditioned by Dio's interest in monarchical government, is not that of an exemplary proto-*princeps*, but is consistent with his character as a Republican politician. He is rapacious, sly and ruthless, he cannot brook an equal, nor can he tolerate dissent on the part of his men. He does, however, mostly display the *clementia* that the real Caesar was famous for and for this Dio gives him full credit. However, like Caesar's gentility of character elsewhere in Dio's depiction this *clementia* is portrayed as part of his grand strategy to win and consolidate power.

---

<sup>39</sup> Cass. Dio 43.24.1.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 43.47.4-6.

## Section Four: Conclusion

We have seen Caesar at several phases in his political career. We have looked at his rise to power, his command in Gaul and his tenure as dictator. In all of these moments we see that Caesar is led by *φιλοτιμία*, *ἐπιθυμία* and *πλεονεξία* to pursue his political aims. During his rise to power, he is characterised by a tremendous ability to read political realities and dominate men even more powerful than himself. We have seen how his relationship to Pompey was always one of calculated self-interest and how the dynamics of that relationship changed as Caesar himself grew more powerful than Pompey. We also saw how the triumvirate was able to dominate political life in the 50s B.C., ultimately due to Caesar's politicking, even when he was in Gaul. Even where Pompey, or another politician like Cicero, is being discussed by Dio, Caesar is never far from the picture and is often being implicitly discussed. Such is especially true of the 'comparisons' Dio draws between Caesar and Cicero, Pompey and Cato. Cicero's querulousness and rashness, Pompey's ambitions to rule *inter pares* and Cato's Republicanism stand in contrast to Caesar's ruthless and ingenious politicking for his own domination.

In Gaul, he is ruthless in his desire for military glory. He wages war illegally against Ariovistus and his men's accusations are entirely 'accurate'. His move against Ariovistus is part of a larger portrayal of military ambition and exploitation of opportunity, however vague, for his political career. He waged war unnecessarily in Spain, he helped provoke the Helvetii, he outraged Ariovistus, crossed the Rhine simply for his vain glory and invaded Britain to little purpose as well. The speech he delivers in response to his men is disingenuous, playing with themes of duty and service that contrast with his own private ambitions. Nevertheless, Caesar here fits into Dio's Thucydidean vision in that he inspires

their *ἐλπίς* with his own private *ἔρως* and his men fight with tremendous bravery against the Germans. In both of these chapters we see the themes we have discussed throughout this thesis dominate Dio's discussion of Caesar.

As dictator, however, things begin to change and Caesar makes mistakes and becomes overweening, which leads to his death. However, even here, Dio's characterisation of Caesar depends upon his behaviour as a Republican politician. He does not become a changed man with the state's interests at heart, but his desire for personal domination – *πρῶτος πάντων εἶναι ἐπιθυμία* – causes him to become more domineering, until he is murdered by Brutus and Cassius and the final cycle of warfare, strife and private ambition comes round again to destroy the Republic once and for all. In this way, Caesar sets the scene for Augustus: indeed, the last two sections have shown that Caesar and Cicero represent all that is wrong with the late Republic and its political life, but only Caesar shows how the Augustan settlement could be achieved. We shall now take this up in our Epilogue.

## Epilogue

### Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis, we cited Millar's claim that Dio's narrative of the Republic was structureless and featureless. This thesis has been concerned with showing that this idea is unfounded and unfair. We have seen, rather, that Dio was heir to a way of thinking about *φύσις* inherited from Thucydides, which he uses to explain the fall of the Republic. We have seen him combine this view of *φύσις* with Roman views of moral decline and apply these to Greek theories of government, particularly the concept of constitutional cycles to show his audience of *πεπαιδευμένοι* the risks of allowing constitutional changes to happen unchallenged. We have seen, moreover, that these concerns, which may have informed his universalising project, shape his narrative of the last hundred years of the Republic. The speeches he puts into the mouths of Caesar and Cicero demonstrate the issues he felt important concerning their natures and their political careers that link to the wider theories of his narrative. Our two case studies made it clear how many of the themes discussed in Sections One and Two are interwoven in the narrative. For example, Thucydides' ideas about popular *ἐλπίς* and private *ἔρως* find their way into Dio's portrayal of Caesar and Cicero who both manipulate the people, senate and *equites* for the sake of their own political careers. Similarly, Caesar and Cicero both undergo a 'tragic' rise and fall caused by *φιλονεικία* in Cicero's case and *φιλοτιμία* in Caesar's. This is a microcosmic version of the travails of Rome in the late Republic and derives from Thucydides' portrayal of Athens and problems caused there by the competitive and ambitious spirit of her political class. The inevitability of Rome's ascent to monarchy is also

portrayed in Caesar's and Cicero's 'biographies'. Cicero's career after the assassination of Caesar shows the hopelessness of any prospect of peace and stability in this late stage of Republican history; Caesar's shows the ruthlessness and ease with which men such as himself can make themselves powerful at the expense of lawful government. Likewise, both fail, led on blind to their own fate by their *φύσις*. Cicero's failure may be more telegraphed than Caesar's, but in essence it is no different; both men's political careers lead to their slaughter by their opponents, who themselves are motivated by *φύσις* when they kill.

### **Epilogue: Dio and the Augustan restitution**

In this final section, I shall consider the implications of the argument of this thesis to future Dio scholarship. As promised in the Introduction, I shall focus now on Dio's portrait of Augustus and his monarchy, arguing that the issues he raises as his explanation for the fall of the Republic are those which Augustus goes on to resolve; this will confirm what instruction Dio felt he was leaving to his audience of *πεπαιδευμένοι*. I shall also suggest how Dio's desired political and historical legacy, which culminates in the Agrippa/Maecenas debate and the reign of Augustus more generally, is not some pamphlet independent of the rest of the narrative, but is dependent upon the broader and intellectual issues Dio raises in his history of the Republic (and, though we have not focused on it here, in the Imperial narrative too) and which he felt Augustus solved through his enlightened monarchy. Unlike the viewpoint espoused by Millar nearly fifty years ago, and written under the influence of Syme's *Tacitus*, which saw the relationship between Dio's History and his own time period as direct and clear cut, I want to show that that relationship is more subtle and mediated through Classical Graeco-Roman modelling, a desire to present an authoritative and lasting examination of Roman history for future

generations and a focused, intelligent and engaged narrative of the failings of the late Republic as we have explored them throughout this thesis. We shall hopefully see that Dio's solutions to Rome's problems grew out of his engagement with the Graeco-Roman cultural past and with Roman history and were designed to restore the Roman state to a balance that would help it endure *sine fine*.

As a word of caution, however, Dio's account of Augustus is not always consistent, sometimes giving a favourable picture of his intentions and, at others, a more hostile picture. The most striking example of this comes in Dio's summing up of Augustus' political career after his death, which seems to contradict much of what he had said in earlier portions of the narrative. Dio claims that the brutality Augustus had been responsible for during his rise to power was the result of circumstance, rather than any cruelty on his part, vastly downplaying the extent of the violence Augustus committed.<sup>1</sup> Tränkle (among others) has noted that Dio's account of Augustus' funeral bears similarities to Tacitus' and it is likely that both writers share a common source or sources for the material, which may explain why it jars with the earlier narrative.<sup>2</sup> Pelling has also argued that there is a literary dimension to the apparent contradiction: Dio is downplaying what he has claimed about Augustus to throw his criticisms of Tiberius into sharper focus.<sup>3</sup> This obviously raises problems for my argument, since it makes definite and neat conclusions very difficult. However, even here, the contradiction is not so striking that we cannot make some general observations that are both true and useful for our understanding of Dio's approach to the reign of Augustus. Rich has pointed out that, though Dio wrestles with the issue of Augustan clemency, and acknowledges negative traditions, he generally tends

---

<sup>1</sup> Cass. Dio 56.44.1-2. *εἰ γὰρ τινες καὶ τῶν προτέρων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις πολέμοις γενομένων ἐμνημόνευον, ἐκεῖνα μὲν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκῃ ἀνετίθεσαν...εἰ καὶ βιαιότερόν τι, οἷα ἐν τοῖς παραλόγοις φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, ἐπράχθη, δικαιότερον ἂν τινὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἢ ἐκείνον αἰτιάσασθαι.*

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Cass. Dio 56.43.1-6.5 with Tac. *Ann.* 1.9-10. Tränkle (1969): 108-130. See also Manuwald (1979): 153-166; Flach (1973): 131; Mehl (1981): 54-64; Giua (1983): 439-456; Pelling (1983): 225; Roddaz (1983): 86; Gowing (1992): 58.

<sup>3</sup> Pelling (1997): 128-130.

towards the view that Augustus' actions were benign and tempered by good character.<sup>4</sup> Turning to Dio's account of the proscriptions, we see that the blame is squarely on the shoulders of Antony and Lepidus,<sup>5</sup> whereas Octavian *οὐχ ὅσον πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔφθειρεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔσωσε πλείστους*.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, in this passage, Dio makes an identical claim to one he makes during his account of Augustus' funeral – proof of Augustus' otherwise good character can be found in his generally benign actions as emperor.<sup>7</sup> Gowing has pointed out in connexion with Octavian's role in the triumvirate that “it would appear that Dio failed to reconcile fully his own unfavourable view of the triumvirs and the proscriptions with his admiration for Augustus”.<sup>8</sup> Swan has pointed out that there is a difference between Dio's own statements about Octavian's “war-guilt” and the more “idealistic and abstract” sentiments he ascribes to Augustus' contemporaries: “it simply offsets the violence in his youthful career – which is not denied – with his achievements in building a better state”.<sup>9</sup> Octavian, in other words, may have blotted his historical copy-book by involving himself in the proscriptions but (in Dio's eyes) this was made up for by his record as emperor.<sup>10</sup>

We saw in Dio's analysis of the fall of the Republic, and his explanation of the superiority of monarchy as a constitution his claim, partly in rebuttal to Aristotle, that even rule by *φᾶυλός τις* is better than a democracy. That may be so, but a cursory glance at

<sup>4</sup> Rich (1989): 97-103; Rich (1990): 17.

<sup>5</sup> Manuwald (1979): 71. Cf. Kemezis (2007): 272, “thus, he is unscrupulous but not actually vicious, as Antony is in Dio”.

<sup>6</sup> Cass. Dio 47.7.3.

<sup>7</sup> Cass. Dio 47.7.3; 56.44.1.

<sup>8</sup> Gowing (1992): 254.

<sup>9</sup> Swan (2004): 349.

<sup>10</sup> Reinhold (1988): 13, “in previous books...Dio had depicted the rising heir of Julius Caesar as ambitious, driven by power...but with the turning point of the Battle of Actium Dio's image of Octavian takes a new solemn and princely form. True, he does not entirely suppress unfavourable aspects of Octavian's actions...but adverse statements and innuendos are now sharply reduced in Dio's account”. There are problems with this statement – Dio never drops his claim that Augustus shrouded his real intentions behind a veil of constitutional nicety, or that his true motivation was always power over his fellow citizens. However, in general terms Reinhold is correct to emphasise the difference between the two phases of Augustus' career, which can best be explained by the fact that Octavian is a creature of the Republic (albeit in a very advanced state of decay) and, as such, behaves like any Republican politician. After he becomes emperor, his association with the vices of the Republican age inevitably lessen and so the “better” aspects of his character have time to shine.

Dio's narrative of the Imperial Era suggests that he was almost as unhappy with tyrannical rule as a concept (possibly a very real concept) as with democracy/the Republic. Dio's preference for monarchy is predicated on the idea that it alone is suitable for administering such a large and powerful empire and only it can control the political ambitions of the ruling elite. Given that monarchy was as much a *faute de mieux* as a preferred constitution, it is no wonder that scholars have detected in Dio, since at least the time of Bleicken, a belief in constitutional monarchy, which retains as large a degree of senatorial freedom as would legitimately be feasible without the state collapsing into ruin and war, an idea which can ultimately be traced back as far as Plato and Aristotle and was of particular intellectual importance in Classicising literature of the Imperial Era.<sup>11</sup> This much is obvious in his account of Augustus, who stands in Dio closest to his image of an ideal monarch; Augustus is everywhere presented as having maintained democratic elements within his constitutional settlement. Perhaps the fullest extent of this idea comes in Dio's obituary of Augustus, when he states:

διά τε οὖν ταῦτα, καὶ ὅτι τὴν μοναρχίαν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ μίξας τό τε ἐλεύθερόν σφισιν ἐτήρησε καὶ τὸ κόσμιον τό τε ἀσφαλές προσπαρεσκεύασεν, ὥστ' ἕξω μὲν τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ θράσους ἕξω δὲ καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν ὕβρεων ὄντας ἐν τε ἐλευθερίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ ἀδεεῖ ζῆν, βασιλευμένους τε ἄνευ δουλείας καὶ δημοκρατουμένους ἄνευ διχοστασίας, δεινῶς αὐτὸν ἐπόθουν.<sup>12</sup>

There is some controversy over these lines, however. Manuwald thinks that they do not represent Dio's own views and are simply culled from a source he shares with Tacitus.<sup>13</sup> Swan feels that the passage is "abstract and simplistic", failing "to suggest how

<sup>11</sup> Bleicken (1952): 444-467. Bleicken was arguing against *inter alia* Meyer's (1891): 3-4 (*et passim*) argument that the Maecenas speech represented an anti-senatorial viewpoint on the part of Dio. Meyer's view was fairly standard in Victorian times: cf. Schwartz (1899): 1716, who calls Dio "ein loyaler Anhänger der Monarchie". For "good" and "bad" monarchy, see Pl. *Resp.* 590d 1-592b 5 (contrast with 565e 1-569c 9); Arist. *Pol.* 1285a 15-b 19; Plin. *Pan.* 54.1-7; 69.1-71.7; 86.1-87.5; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2.67-78.

<sup>12</sup> Cass. Dio 56.43.4.

<sup>13</sup> Manuwald (1979): 24-5. Millar (1964): 74-6 would agree with me that these words are the authentic voice of Dio.

the virtues of monarchy and Republic were retained while the vices of each disappeared”.<sup>14</sup> Be that as it may, the sentiments fit well, as we shall see, with those Dio expresses in the rest of his narrative of the reign of Augustus; the statement that Augustus *τὴν μοναρχίαν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ μίξας* is more a conclusion to the ideas Dio sets up in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate and then elaborates upon in the rest of his account of the regime.

There are, however, difficulties once more with accepting this viewpoint without qualification. Is the picture of Augustus’ happy blend of monarchy and democracy really as rosy as Dio claims here? Certainly, we saw above how in the broader funeral narrative, Dio seems to be setting up a deliberate contrast between Augustus and Tiberius and this may explain panegyric that is not supported in the rest of the narrative.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, the blend of monarchy and democracy that Augustus bequeaths the Romans is not always presented in a positive light. Manuwald points to a division in Dio’s narrative between Augustus’ *Sein* and *Schein* (what he is really about and what he purports to be about). The Augustan Republic, Syme-like, is a façade, beneath which beats a monarchic heart.<sup>16</sup> Witness:

*οὕτω μὲν δὴ τό τε τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὸ τῆς γεροσύνης κράτος πᾶν ἐς τὸν Αὔγουστον μετέστη, καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῆς μοναρχία κατέστη...καὶ ἵνα γε μὴ ἐκ δυναστείας ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν νόμων τοῦτ’ ἔχειν δοκῶσι, πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ μέγα παρ’ ἐκοῦσί σφισιν ἴσχυσεν, αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀνόμασι χωρὶς τοῦ τῆς δικτατορίας προσεποιήσαντο.*<sup>17</sup>

The sentiment is repeated elsewhere that Augustus’ Republicanism was as much about posturing as anything else.<sup>18</sup> However, a façade is better than no façade at all, as we shall see in Dio’s implicit *comparatio* of Caesar and Augustus, and what may be smoke and mirrors still depends, at least theoretically, on the existence of those forms of government being parodied and misrepresented. Augustus *could* have been a merciless tyrant, he *could*

<sup>14</sup> Swan (2004): 348.

<sup>15</sup> Pelling (1997): 127-8 (see above, p.242).

<sup>16</sup> Manuwald (1979): 273-277.

<sup>17</sup> Cass. Dio 53.17.1; 3.

<sup>18</sup> Generally, the whole of 53.17.1-19.1 deals with this issue and how it affects Dio’s narrative of Imperial history. See also 52.1.1; 53.1.3; 53.11.5-12.1.

have used his soldiers to protect a deeply unpopular and aggressive regime – he certainly did when he was in cahoots with Mark Antony and Lepidus – but, crucially, he chose not to. He chose to cloak his power in democratic forms and this cloak, Dio believes, was the best feature of his constitution, as he makes clear in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate, where Agrippa provides Augustus with the democratic obfuscation he needs.<sup>19</sup> Dio makes Maecenas claim that, with the monarchy he is proposing:

*οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν ἀληθῆ τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν τὴν ἀσφαλῆ κτήσονται.*<sup>20</sup>

On the basis of the passage I cited from Dio’s account of Augustus’ funeral, Carsana has convincingly and effectively argued that Dio’s ideal constitution is, in fact, a mixed constitution, rather than a monarchy outright.<sup>21</sup> In this Epilogue I want to expand on her arguments, showing how Dio’s theories about the successes and failures of Republican government, through the workings of human nature within politics, are resolved by Augustus. Indeed, the *φύσις* elements we have examined, but by being incorporated in the more moderate form as they existed in the early Republic, are put to good use in the reconstituted state. We must be clear, however, about how we use the term ‘mixed constitution’ for what Dio believes. I would prefer the term ‘mixed monarchy’, since, unlike Polybius or Cicero, Dio is not arguing for an equal balance of the different constitutional elements of monarchy and democracy (and aristocracy, which is ignored almost entirely by Dio).<sup>22</sup> The backbone of the constitution is clearly the monarch – he alone is safely able to handle power and to keep the senate and people from bubbling over

---

<sup>19</sup> Pelling (1983): 221-222.

<sup>20</sup> Cass. Dio 52.14.4.

<sup>21</sup> Carsana (1990): 83-94.

<sup>22</sup> *Contra* Carsana (1990): 85. Dio was not alone in his association of mixed constitution with the monarchical regime; firstly, there is the possibility that Dio is presenting an alternative to the bleak view of this kind of constitution in Tac. *Ann.* 4.33.1-2 and, more importantly, another Classiciser of the High Empire, Aelius Aristides, concurs in very broad terms with Dio’s equation of the Principate and mixed constitution (Aristid. *Or.* 35.60; 66).

into strife. There are few other checks and balances in Dio's constitution, apart from the idea that an emperor should rule in accordance with ancestral laws and customs.

What kind of democracy does Augustus restore? If the late Republican narrative is anything to go by, it cannot have been that. What, we might ask were the good elements of a politically bankrupt regime that Augustus could incorporate into his regime? Some answer to these questions is provided by the passage itself, where Dio talks of Augustus giving the people government *ἔξω μὲν τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ θράσους* and democracy *ἄνευ διχوستασίας*. The latter reminds us of Cicero's amnesty speech, which we examined in Chapter Six (*οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖνα προαιρούμενοι διχῆ τε ἤδη νενέμνηται καὶ διχῆ στρατοπεδεύονται*).<sup>23</sup> Augustus has managed to rid the Republic, Dio declares here, of its turbulent elements and restore moderation: yet another reference to the Republican narrative – we cannot fail to remember Dio's claim in Book 44 that a democracy lacks *σωφροσύνη* and thus *δμόνοια*. Democratic government without *στάσις*, on the basis of what we have seen in this thesis, implies that Augustus was able to limit and control the effects of *φύσις* in politics, which had grown so problematic in the late Republic. Implicitly, this suggests that Augustus was able to reinvigorate the *ἐπιείκεια* of the earlier Republic.<sup>24</sup> I would argue, therefore, that Dio's real concern for the 'democratic' element in the constitution is that the emperor should take full advantage of the ambitious spirit of the elite *πεπαιδευμένοι* of the empire, but channel it, so that lies closer to the *ἐλπίς* of old, rather than the *ἔρως* of the first century B.C. As Rich notes, "the Agrippa-Maecenas debate...enables Dio to present his most extensive statement of the political creed which he asserts at so many points in his history, that the best form of government for Rome was one in which one man had a monopoly of power but ruled with moderation and in

---

<sup>23</sup> Cass. Dio 44.25.1. See p. 143-4 for these sentiments, though not this passage.

<sup>24</sup> Augustus and *ἐπιείκεια*: Cass. Dio 46.49.5; 47.7.4; 53.6.1; 55.17.3.

partnership with the senate, using them to administer his empire and consulting them about his decisions’’.<sup>25</sup>

We see this concept at play in the Agrippa-Maecenas debate. Maecenas urges Augustus (as monarch rather than watchdog of a Republican constitution) to harness the competitive and honour-loving desires of the nobility by raising up only the deserving and virtuous.<sup>26</sup> Dio has him say:

*μη γάρ τοι οἰηθῆς ὅτι τυραννῆσαί σοι, τόν τε δήμον καί τήν βουλὴν δουλωσαμένω, παραινῶ...τό τε πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτόν σε μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν νομοθετεῖν...καί τὸ τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τε τιμωρίας ὑμᾶς ὀρίζειν...καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνευ φθόνου τιμῶνται, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ ἄνευ συστάσεως κολάζωνται.<sup>27</sup>*

Maecenas’ words perhaps echo Plato’s discussion of the tyrannical man, who surrounds himself with base men and body guards, enslaves the people and kills off the best men.<sup>28</sup> It is also interesting to note that there is a deliberate contrast between the *σοι* of the first line and the *ὑμᾶς* of the second, emphasising the collective nature of decision-making in Maecenas’ proposal. The passage immediately following, which we cited in the Introduction, then goes on to relate the problems faced by the Roman state during the Republic, where *φιλοτιμία* and corruption turn the state upside down, ending with the ship of state image:

*καὶ διὰ ταῦθ’ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὡσπερ ὀλκὰς μεγάλη καὶ πλήρης ὄχλου παντοδαποῦ χωρὶς κυβερνήτου, πολλὰς ἤδη γενεὰς ἐν κλύδωνι πολλῶ φερομένη σαλεύει τε καὶ ἄττει δεῦρο κἀκέϊσε, καθάπερ ἀνερμάτιστος οὖσα.<sup>29</sup>*

Augustus is urged to take the helm and stop Rome from sinking in a rough storm. Rome has a crew of all different types of men, but lacks a pilot to guide her, etc. A long-

---

<sup>25</sup> Rich (1989): 100.

<sup>26</sup> Cass. Dio 52.15.2.

<sup>27</sup> Cass. Dio 52.15.1-3.

<sup>28</sup> Pl. *Resp.* 565e 1-569c 9.

<sup>29</sup> Cass. Dio 52.16.3.

standing trope among ancient intellectuals, Dio's version is the product of several Classical influences.<sup>30</sup> However, by Dio's day the image of a crew working a ship had taken on overtones of a competitive aristocracy at work in their city. Philostratus, for example, shows Apollonius of Tyana drawing a parallel between some sailors working onboard a ship out-to-sea and the municipal aristocracy of a town:

*εἰ δὲ φιλοτιμήσονται πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ στασιάσουσι μὴ κακίων ἕτερος ἑτέρου δόξαι, καλοὶ μὲν ὄρμοι τῆ νηὶ ταύτῃ.*<sup>31</sup>

Apollonius claims that the townsfolk are of a similar mould with their *φιλοτιμία ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινού*.<sup>32</sup> Dio's thinking about Rome is similar, as is made clear by his claim in the passage that it was a superfluity of *φιλοτιμία* that caused the storm in which the ship of state was engulfed. Augustus' role is to moderate this ambition and bring it back into bounds. We must remember, of course, that Dio's attitude towards ambition in Roman politics is not always critical. We saw in Chapter One that many of the terms we have used throughout this thesis have 'positive' variations. We have explored elsewhere how Dio links together the Roman idea of moral decline with Thucydides' stance on human nature; we saw that the *ἐλπίς* of the Roman people was stirred up by cynical politicians who subjected it to their own *ἔρως*. Dio believed that the original *ἐλπίς* of the Roman people was in the best interests of the state – it was, after all, the driving force that led Rome to become a mighty empire. The emperor's duty is to restore the balance lost during the last century of the Republic. That Augustus does this is suggested in Dio's narrative of his and Agrippa's building programme:

---

<sup>30</sup> Reinhold (1988): 186-7 lists these influences; Alcaeus is apparently the most dominant one in linguistic terms.

<sup>31</sup> Phil. *Vit. Apoll.* 4.9.

<sup>32</sup> Phil. *Vit. Apoll.* 4.8.2.

οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, καίπερ ἐξ ἰδίων χρημάτων φιλοτιμούμενοι, καὶ ὑπεστέλλοντο καὶ ἐμετρίαζον.<sup>33</sup>

Elsewhere, Livia advises Augustus not to suppress the *φιλοτιμία* of the senatorial nobility, if it is just:

μήτ' αὖ τὰς περιουσίας τινῶν περικόπτειν ἢ τὰς φιλοτιμίας ταπεινοῦν μηδὲν γε πλημμελούντων χρῆ.<sup>34</sup>

Respect for the *φιλοτιμία* of the senatorial nobility is present in Agrippa's speech, albeit in a way that contrasts with Dio's own explanation of the fall of the Republic (though the irony arguably helps to reinforce Dio's ideas about the monarch's role as moderator of the ambition of the *πεπαιδευμένοι*). Agrippa argues that, unlike in monarchical government, the people in a democracy are inspired to give of their best. Taxation, he argues, would be less opposed in a democratic constitution because each person would feel that they have a vested interest in where their money goes. Moreover:

ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ἐκείναις μάλιστα μὲν ἐκόντες πολλὰ πολλὰ ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐν φιλοτίμιας μέρει τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιούμενοι καὶ τιμὰς ἀντ' αὐτῶν ἀξίας ἀντιλαμβάνοντες.<sup>35</sup>

It is unfortunate that some scholars have failed to see Agrippa's speech as part of the broader programme that Dio lays out in the Maecenas speech. Most think that Agrippa's speech is but a few platitudes in favour of democracy that contradict Dio's Republican narrative.<sup>36</sup> There is certainly an element of that, but Pelling has rightly argued that within the narrative context of the Augustan regime, Agrippa's speech represents the

---

<sup>33</sup> Cass. Dio 49.42.3.

<sup>34</sup> Cass. Dio 55.16.4.

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 52.6.2.

<sup>36</sup> Meyer (1891): 1; Millar (1964): 105-6; MacKechnie (1981): 150. The opposite extreme has been championed, unconvincingly, by Berrigan (1968): 42-45 and more recently Fechner (1986): 71-86 who argue that Dio's speech of Agrippa is a subversive rebuttal of the selfish monarchism of Maecenas. Both men ignore the ironic parallels between Agrippa's speech and Dio's explanation for the fall of the Republic, however.

*Schein* element of Dio's ideal constitution, whereas Maecenas' represents the *Sein*.<sup>37</sup> Dio certainly suggests that his advice is not ignored. At the end of the debate, he claims:

ὁ δὲ δὴ Καῖσαρ ἀμφοτέρους μὲν σφας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυνοίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πολυλογίᾳ τῇ τε παρρησίᾳ ἰσχυρῶς ἐπήνεσε, τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Μαικήνου μᾶλλον εἶλετο.<sup>38</sup>

“Caesar praised **both of them** heartily for their wealth of ideas and wealth of advice and their frankness, but he adopted **more** Maecenas' proposals.”

The bold-type is mine; the implication Dio's. It is incorrect to read the passage as though Dio meant that Augustus only listened to the advice of Maecenas. *Μᾶλλον* suggests that Augustus took *more* from Maecenas, but it does not mean he disregarded Agrippa's advice; likewise *ἀμφοτέρους*. His arguments about the restoration of the Republic are addressed to Augustus with the assumption that Augustus would still be running this 'democracy'.<sup>39</sup> Agrippa's argument is obviously naive, but is not designed to be taken at face value; its spirit is the key. Whilst his argument falls into rhetoric on occasion that is in flagrant contradiction with Dio's own account of the late Republic, the sentiments are very valid to Augustus' new constitution; I would go so far as to say that it is precisely the excesses that Agrippa's 'democracy' risks that help to justify the Augustan regime and its taming of those excesses. His defence of democracy rests on the notion of a monocultural, monoethnic Rome, something that simply did not exist in Augustus' (or Dio's) day.<sup>40</sup> However, his harking back to the time when Rome was innocent of these evils is surely deliberate. He is asking Augustus to reestablish the old Republican values of virtuous competition, though in this case, Augustus himself is the one who presides over them. Agrippa's idea is implicitly supported by Maecenas, who adds his own, more detailed proposals for the rental of public lands and the establishment of a system of agricultural

---

<sup>37</sup> Pelling (1983): 221-222. Ruiz (1982): 274-301 and Reinhold (1988): 170 concur, with the latter claiming that “there is no fundamental opposition between Agrippa and Maecenas; they complement each other, Agrippa presenting his ideal concept of *libertas*, Maecenas the practical details of *monarchia-principatus*”.

<sup>38</sup> Cass. Dio 52.41.1.

<sup>39</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 52.6.1; 7.1; 8.1.

<sup>40</sup> Cass. Dio 52.4.1.

credits based upon these.<sup>41</sup> Something of the importance to Dio's thinking of the views he gives to Agrippa is suggested by Maecenas' opening lines when he broaches the taxation question: *ὅτι κὰν δημοκρατηθῶμεν, πάντως που χρημάτων δεησόμεθα.*<sup>42</sup>

We saw in Chapter Four that Agrippa is made to advise Augustus not to entrust power to the ignorant and low born (another use of *φαῦλος*, no less), but to the well-educated and noble.<sup>43</sup> Elsewhere, Agrippa advises Augustus to surround himself with men who are brave (*ἀνδρείοι*) and wise (*φρόνιμοι*).<sup>44</sup> Though he concludes that this would be impossible in a monarchy, his recommendation of *φρόνιμοι* fits in entirely with what we see Maecenas suggest. Agrippa's arguments that Augustus should entrust power to the *πεπαιδευμένοι* alone are echoed in Maecenas' speech, where he argues, as we have seen, for "true and safe democracy". He urges Augustus to turn the state to greater moderation (*πρὸς τὸ σωφρονέστερον*), entrusting power and free speech not to the foolish masses, but to the wise and sensible (*οἱ εὖ φρονοῦντες*); this would allow Augustus to transcend the so-called democracy of the lowest elements of society and create a true democracy, based upon each person fulfilling the role nature intended (an idea going back, ultimately, to Platonic and Aristotelian thought).<sup>45</sup> Agrippa suggests that these men are most easily available in democratic states (as shown even by the history of the Greeks, supposedly):

*ὅσω ἂν πλείους καὶ πλουτῶσι καὶ ἀνδρίζωνται, τόσω μᾶλλον αὐτοί τε φιλοτιμοῦνται καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὔξουσι.*<sup>46</sup>

As we saw for Caesar and Cicero, the only thing they augmented were their own political careers. However, Agrippa's argument is again very close to what Maecenas

---

<sup>41</sup> Cass. Dio 52.28.1-29.3.

<sup>42</sup> Cass. Dio 52.28.1.

<sup>43</sup> Cass. Dio 52.8.6-8.

<sup>44</sup> Cass. Dio 52.8.4.

<sup>45</sup> Cass. Dio 52.14.1-5. Pl. *Resp.* 558c 1-4; Arist. *Pol.* 1280a 8-25; 1301b 29-40.

<sup>46</sup> Cass. Dio 52.9.1.

proposes and represents another angle on Dio's series of proposals about the creation of an educated – and moderately ambitious – elite to run the empire. Dio has Maecenas tell Augustus he should ensure that the senate is composed of men with the finest virtue, expelling the base; then he should include in the equites men of the second rank in birth, wealth and virtue.<sup>47</sup> Augustus is urged to educate the sons of senators and *equites*, so that they have the necessary virtue to make good servants of the empire. He should give them no excuse to shirk their duty and, more importantly, show them that they will not incur either *φθόνος* or *κίνδυνος* at the hands of the emperor.<sup>48</sup> The well-educated are not the ones to cause turmoil or rebellion, Maecenas contends, presumably because they too recognise the Thucydidean and politico-philosophical lessons Dio himself draws out in his History.<sup>49</sup> What the similarities between the two positions suggest is that, for Maecenas' proposals for an educated, wise elite to administer the empire on behalf of the emperor to work properly, they need to have the moderate form of ambition idealised by Agrippa and found in the earlier Republic. Within this context, then, we also see the relevance of Dio's History to the process of creating this elite. Not only does Dio present detailed recommendations for the kind of man the emperor needs to engage, which derive from his explanation of the rise, fall and rebirth of the Roman state, but also that the educated elite would presumably need to be aware of history as Dio saw it. We saw in the Introduction that Dio claimed that he wrote his History so that *μηδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μήτε ἐκείνων τινὰ μήτε τῶν ἄλλων ποθῆσαι*.<sup>50</sup> To my mind, this suggests that Dio saw his History as a reference tool for the *πεπαιδευμένοι*, both of his own day and of ever after, whose position in the empire he sought to strengthen.

---

<sup>47</sup> Cass. Dio 52.19.2-4.

<sup>48</sup> Cass. Dio 52.26.1-5.

<sup>49</sup> Cass. Dio 52.26.5-6.

<sup>50</sup> Cass. Dio frg. 1.1.

Over half of this thesis has been devoted to the analysis of two individuals from the late Republic. In the last section, I examined Dio's depiction of Caesar, ending with his dictatorship. In the final chapter, we saw how Caesar's murder was linked to failings inherent in his character. As the final part of this conclusion, I want to think about the way in which Dio's portrait of Caesar's mistakes informs his opinions on what Augustus did correctly. This will show us how Dio's ideas about *φύσις* help also to shape his idea of the ideal ruler.

Though there is no *synkrisis* in as many words between Caesar and Augustus, it may be suggested that Dio was thinking along these lines from the very beginning of his account of the latter's entry into politics. He says about Octavian's return to Italy:

καὶ τότε μὲν προπετῶς τέ τισι τοῦτο καὶ τολμηρῶς πεποιηκέναι ἔδοξεν, ὕστερον δὲ ἕκ τε τῆς εὐτυχίας καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπικατέρησε καὶ ἀνδρείας ὄνομα προσεκτήσατο. πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη τινὲς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιχειρήσαντες δόξαν, ὅτι ἐπιτυχεῖς αὐτῶν ἐγένοντο, εὐβουλίας ἔσχον· καὶ ἕτεροι ἄριστά τινα προελόμενοι μωρίαν, ὅτι μὴ κατέτυχον αὐτῶν, ὠφλον. καὶ ἐκεῖνος σφαλερῶς μὲν καὶ ἐπικινδύνως ἐποίησεν ὅτι τὴν τε ἡλικίαν τὴν ἄρτι ἐκ παιδῶν ἄγων (ὀκτωκαιδεκέτης γὰρ ἦν) καὶ τὴν διαδοχὴν καὶ τοῦ κλήρου καὶ τοῦ γένους καὶ ἐπίφθονον καὶ ἐπαίτιον ὀρῶν οὖσαν, ἔπειτ' ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ὤρμησεν ἐφ' οἷς ὁ τε Καῖσαρ ἐπεφόνευτο καὶ τιμωρία οὐδεμία αὐτοῦ ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οὔτε τοὺς σφαγέας οὔτε τὸν Λέπιδον τὸν τε Αντωνίων ἔδεισεν· οὐ μέντοι καὶ κακῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ἔδοξεν, ὅτι καὶ κατέρησε.<sup>51</sup>

Whilst there is much going on in this passage, I want to focus on his claim that Augustus was successful, despite setting out after the same thing that had led to Caesar's murder. Obviously, this can only refer to the role of sole ruler. The rest of the passage admittedly refers to Octavian's rise to power and the fact that he was prepared to risk everything at a vulnerable age, lacking any sort of political voice, experience or authority; because his gamble paid off, he was deemed successful when it could easily have all gone to pot. However, the claim about Caesar suggests to me that Dio was thinking beyond the triumviral period to Augustus as emperor. Caesar was murdered, if we remember, for becoming too arrogant and blasé in his pursuit of power whilst dictator. This invites the

---

<sup>51</sup> Cass Dio. 45.4.1-4.

question (to me at any rate, though I hope to show that Dio was thinking along similar lines), why was Augustus successful as emperor, when Caesar was not?

Evidence that Dio was thinking along these lines can be found in Dio's account of Octavian's involvement in the proscriptions. As I have noted above, this is a contentious period of Dio's history and I do not want to give an impression that is too one-sided. However, the passage is useful for us, if we think about its applicability to Dio's depiction of Augustus as emperor:

*ταῦτα δὲ ἐπράττετο μὲν ὑπὸ τε τοῦ Λεπίδου καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου μάλιστα...ἔδοκει δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος κατὰ τὴν τῆς δυναστείας κοινωνίαν γίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτός γε οὐδέν τι συχνοῦς ἀποκτεῖναι ἐδεήθη· τῇ τε γὰρ φύσει οὐκ ὤμδος ἦν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἤθεσιν ἐνετέθραπτο...καὶ φιλεῖσθαι ἤθελε.<sup>52</sup>*

Obviously, Octavian has learnt well from Caesar's pragmatic clemency, only killing where it was absolutely necessary. This, of course, is a reference to Caesar's *ἐπιείκεια*; though he possessed a perverted version of it, by 'passing' it on as a virtue to Augustus, he forms a link between the ancient moderation and self-discipline of the early Republicans (as we explored it in Chapters Two and Three) and the new monarchical regime. As well as moderating the behaviour of his fellow Romans, the emperor must, as Maecenas tells him, lead by example and moderate his own.<sup>53</sup> However, unlike Caesar, whom Dio claims did not care about the feelings of those men he dominated, Octavian wishes to be loved. We should remember Dio's claims about Pompey and Caesar at Pharsalus and the implications of that passage for what we have seen about Caesar's actions as dictator. Octavian here goes beyond Caesar's example – because he possesses a natural desire for the goodwill and affection of the men over whom he rules, he is kept in greater check than Caesar. For example, both Caesar and Octavian are reported in Dio to have been responsible for the gruesome murder of their political enemies. Caesar in 46 B.C. sacrifices three soldiers as a

---

<sup>52</sup> Cass Dio 47.7.1-2.

<sup>53</sup> Cass. Dio 52.35.1-36.4; 38.1-39.2.

kind of religious ritual on the Campus Martius and Octavian sacrifices the Perusine senate.<sup>54</sup> However, Dio's handling of each event is very different. He ponders the religious purpose behind the sacrifice on the Campus Martius, which he is unable to state certainly, but he is in no doubt that the men were sacrificed by the *pontifices* and the Priest of Mars. Dio, however, casts doubt on the reliability of the whole story as far as Octavian is concerned. He states that *λόγος γε ἔχει ὅτι*, suggesting that he either does not believe the story or that he is including it because of its salacious content. Either way, the force of *γε* implies strongly that the story was unbelievable. In other words, whereas Dio could readily believe that Caesar was prepared to carry out human sacrifice on men who opposed him, he does not believe (or is certainly uncomfortable with the idea that) Octavian could have done the same.

Augustus when he becomes emperor trumps Caesar's clemency further still, when he shows himself to exercise clemency unconditionally, not simply pragmatically. The event in question is the conspiracy of Cinna Magnus.<sup>55</sup> Livia's speech, which turns Augustus towards forgiveness councils pragmatic clemency, killing the ring-leaders, whilst sparing others, but Augustus releases all of the men accused, even appointing Cornelius consul for the next year.<sup>56</sup> It is interesting that Livia urges Augustus to be clement if he wishes to be loved, and this may explain his determination to be completely merciful.<sup>57</sup>

Other parallels can be drawn between Caesar and Augustus as sole rulers that suggest that Augustus was not prone to the same mistakes as Caesar, even if his intentions were no more honest. Very broadly, we might point to the Agrippa-Maecenas debate (which we have just been discussing), where Augustus resolves to establish a system of

---

<sup>54</sup> Cass. Dio 43.24.3-4; 48.14.4-6.

<sup>55</sup> There is mention of other conspiracies against Augustus in Dio, where the former's actions are not quite so benign. However, even here, we detect a policy of clemency and we should remember Dio's claims that Augustus sought to change the state slowly (52.41.1-2). It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that he becomes more tolerant as time goes by. See Adler (2011): 143 on Dio's employment of the trope that Augustus emigrated from *severitas* to *clementia*.

<sup>56</sup> Cass. Dio 55.18.1; Cass. Dio 55.22.1-2.. Cf. Adler (2011): 147-9.

<sup>57</sup> Cass. Dio 55.16.5.

government that allows for a democratic element, thereby ensuring the freedom and privilege of the senate under his rule.<sup>58</sup> This contrasts with Caesar, whose undemocratic actions (in rigging elections and unconstitutional honours) is a major cause of antagonism against him and whose hypocrisies and attempted obfuscation were far less skilful and more transparent.<sup>59</sup> In similar vein, Augustus is very careful in Dio's narrative to have his powers reaffirmed constitutionally, unlike Caesar's declaration as dictator for life.<sup>60</sup> Even though his speech to the senate in Book 53 is but a thin façade for his true political intentions, Augustus does at least make the effort to *ἑτέραν τινὰ μεγαλοψυχίαν διαδείξασθαι* and *παρ' ἐκόντων δὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν μοναρχίαν βεβαιώσασθαι τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἄκοντας αὐτοὺς βεβιάσθαι*.<sup>61</sup> The ambivalent effect of his speech – pretending to hand back government to the people – on his audience does not detract from these sentiments, as we have just seen.<sup>62</sup> Admittedly, Dio is clear that Augustus' attempt was rather hammy and was actually rather coercive, since the senate was forced to force Augustus to accept the position of monarch. But Dio enjoys finding the cynical in Augustus' good deeds and his doubts about Augustus' motives (power, ultimately) do not detract from the fact that his account is rather upbeat. The episode is awkward farce – the senate is not sure how to react, or how to read the mind of Augustus – but it could have been a lot worse. Consider what would happen under another emperor whose mind was difficult to read, Tiberius; the inability to read *his* mind causes the senators years of misery and grief.<sup>63</sup> The key is Augustus' desire for goodwill, and here he differs from both Caesar and Tiberius.

---

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Cass. Dio 53.12.1; 54.3.1; 56.43.4.

<sup>59</sup> Apart from Caesar's actions above, we might notice that Augustus refuses to take the title of dictator because he is afraid of *τὸ ἐπίφθονον* and *τὸ μισητὸν* that accompanies it (Cass. Dio 54.1.1-5), both of which are given by Dio as the immediate causes of Caesar's assassination (44.1.1).

<sup>60</sup> Cass. Dio 53.16.1-3.

<sup>61</sup> Cass. Dio 53.2.6.

<sup>62</sup> Cass. Dio 53. 11.1-5. Some of the men who are upset by the speech are men who see the value of his government for the stability of the state and are horrified at the risk of renewed democracy.

<sup>63</sup> Cass. Dio 57.1.1-6.

This has only been a cursory glance at the hugely problematic and controversial account of the reign of Augustus in Dio. I am aware that I have glided over many significant arguments. However, I hope that what we have seen here shows the way in which Dio draws a distinction between the characters of Caesar and Augustus that allows him to explain why the latter was a successful monarch and the former was not. We have seen that the crucial difference is that Augustus combined Caesar's natural good nature with Pompey's desire to be loved by the people over whom he ruled. This allowed him to be greater than the sum of either of those two parts. Even though his motivations were every bit as cynical and as greedy as Caesar's, because of his desire to be loved as a ruler he was more successful in making the change from Republican politician to Imperial statesman. We might link this to the ideas we explored above about the role of monarchy in the resettling of the constitution. Though Dio states that even *φᾶλός τις* is better than democracy, it is clear that for monarchy to work well, the emperor needs to respect both his own role in the constitution and that of the senate (not only in terms of emperor/senate relations, but also in terms of the efficient running of the state). An emperor who seeks the goodwill of the people over whom he rules, and who leads by good example (as the dialogue with Livia suggests), channelling their competitive energies so that they work in the best interest of the state, is vital in this image of what Rome ought to be. If his History helped ensure the continuation of a constitution he believed was Rome's strength, then it would serve the eternal purpose Dio envisioned for it.

## Bibliography

- Aalders, G.J.D. (1986): “Cassius Dio and the Greek World”, *Mnemosyne* 39, 282-304
- Adler, E. (2011): “Cassius Dio’s Livia and the Conspiracy of Cinna Magna”, *GRBS* 51, 133-154
- Alföldy, G. (1974): “The Crisis of the Third Century as Seen by Contemporaries”, *GRBS* 15, 89-111
- Andersen, H.A. (1938): *Cassius Dio und die Begründung des Principates*, Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, Berlin
- Baldwin, B (1979): “The Acta Diurna”, *Chiron* 9, 189 – 203
- Balsdon, J.P.V.D (1965): “Cicero the Man”, Dorey, T.A. (ed.): *Cicero*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 171-214
- Banchich, M. & Lane, E.N. (2009): *The Histories of Zonaras: from Alexander Severus to the death of Theodosius the Great*, Routledge, London
- Barnes, T. D. (1984): “The Composition of Cassius Dio’s *Roman History*”, *Phoenix* 38, 240-55
- Beneker, J. (2005): “Thematic Correspondences in Plutarch’s *Lives* of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus”, de Blois, L., Bons, J., Kessels, T. & Schenkeveld, D.M. (eds.): *The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works: proceedings of the sixth international conference of the international Plutarch society, Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1-5, 2002. Volume II: the statesman in Plutarch’s Greek and Roman Lives*, Brill, Leiden, 315-325
- Berrigan, J.R. (1966): “*Consolatio Philosophiae* in Dio Cassius”, *CB* 42, 59-61
- (1968): “Dio Cassius’ Defense of Democracy”, *CB* 44, 42-45
- Bétant, E.A. (1961): *Lexicon Thucydideum*, volume I, Georg Olms, Hildesheim
- Bertrand, E. (2010): “Les Référence thucydidiennes dans la cinquième decade de l’*Histoire romaine* de Dion Cassius”, Fromentin, V., Gotteland, S., Payen, P. (eds.): *Ombres de Thucydide: la réception de l’historien depuis l’Antiquité jusqu’au début du XXe siècle. Actes du Colloque de Bordeaux, les 16-*

17 mars 2007, de Bordeaux, les 30-31 mai 2008 et de Toulouse, les 23-25 octobre 2008. Éditions Ausonius, Bordeaux, 71-81

-Bleicken, J (1962): “Der politischen Standpunkt Dios gegenüber der Monarchie: die Rede des Maecenas Buch 52, 14-40”, *Hermes* 90, 444-467

-Boissevain, U.P. (1955<sup>2</sup>): *Cassii Dionis Cocceiani: Historiarum Romanarum quae supersunt*, Weidmann, Berlin, vols. 1-5

-Botteri, P & Raskolnikoff, M. (1983): “Diodore, Caius Gracchus et la Démokratie”, Nicolet, C. (ed.): *Demokratia et Aristokratia: à propos de Caius Gracchus: mots grecs et réalités romaines*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 59-101

-Bowersock, G. W. (1965): “Review of Fergus Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio*”, *Gnomon* 37, 469-74  
-(1969): *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire*, Clarendon Press, Oxford

-Bowie, E. (1970): “Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic”, *PE&P* 46, 3-41

-Brennan, T.C. (2000): *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford

-Brink, C.O. (1960): “Tragic History and Aristotle’s School”, *PCPS* 186, 14-19

-Buszard, B. (2008): “Caesar’s Ambition: a combined reading of Plutarch’s *Alexander-Caesar* and *Pyrrhus-Marius*”, *TAPhA* 138, 185-215

-Carsana, C. (1990): *La Theoria della “Costituzione Mista” nell’Età Imperiale Romana*, Edizioni New Press, Como

-(2007): *Commento Storico al Libro II delle Guerre Civili di Appiano, Parte I*, University of Padua Press, Padua

-Christ, K. (1974): “Caesar und Ariovist”, *Chiron* 4, 251-292

-Claassen, J.M. (1996): “Dio’s Cicero and the Consolatory Tradition”, *Papers of the Leeds Latin Seminar: ninth volume*, Cairns Publishing, Wiltshire, 29-45

-Clark, A.J. (2007): *Divine Qualities: cult and community in Republican Rome*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

- Clarke, M.L. (1965): “*Non hominis nomen, sed eloquentia*”, Dorey, T.A. (ed.): *Cicero*, Routledge and Paul Kegan, London, 81-107
- Collins, J.H. (1963): “A Selective Survey of Caesar Scholarship since 1935”, *CW* 57, 45-88
- Cornford, F.M. (1907): *Thucydides Mythbistoricus*, Edward Arnold, London
- Crane, G. (1998): *Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: the limits of political realism*, University of California Press, Berkeley
- Cuomo, S. (2001): *Ancient Mathematics*, Routledge, London
- De Blois, L. (1984): “The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire”, *Historia* 33, 358-377
- (2002): “The Crisis of the Third Century A.D. in the Roman Empire: a modern myth?”, De Blois, L. & Rich, J. (eds.): *The Transformation of Economic Life Under the Roman Empire: proceedings of the second workshop of the international network impact of empire (Roman Empire, c. 200 B.C. – A.D. 476) Nottingham, July 4-7, 2001*, Brill, Amsterdam, 204-217
- De Ste Croix, G.E.M. (1975): “Aristotle on History and Poetry”, Levick, B. (ed.): *The Ancient Historian and his Materials: essays in honour of C.E. Stevens on his seventieth birthday*, Gregg, Farnborough, 45-58
- (1981): *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, Duckworth Press, London
- Dorey, T.A. (1965): “Honesty in Roman Politics”, Dorey, T.A. (ed.): *Cicero*, Routledge and Paul Kegan, London, 27-45
- Dovamur, A.I. (1978): “Aristotle and History”, *VDI* 143, 3-9
- Duxbury, L. (1989): *Some Attitudes to Julius Caesar in the Roman Republic: Catullus, Cicero and Sallust*, DPhil. Oxford
- Eisman, M.M. (1977): “Dio and Josephus: parallel analyses”, *Latomus* 36, 657-673
- Epstein, D.F. (1987): *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics 218-43 B.C.*, Croom Helm, Beckenham
- Evans, R. (2008): *Utopia Antiqua: readings of the Golden Age and decline of Rome*, Routledge, London

- Evans, R.J. (1993): "The Structure and Sources of Livy, 38.44.9-39.44.9", *Klio* 75, 180-7
- Fantham, E. (1975): "The Trials of Gabinius in 54 B.C.", *Historia* 24, 425-443
- Fechner, D. (1986): *Untersuchungen zu Cassius Dios Sicht der Römischen Republik*, Olms-Weidmann, Hildesheim, Zürich
- Ferwer, R. (1878): *Die politischen Anschauungen des Cassius Dio*, Mosche, Leipzig
- Fischer, J.M (1870): *De Fontibus et Auctoritate Cassii Dionis in Enarrandis a Cicerone post Caesaris Mortem ad XVI Kal. Apr. de Pace et Kal. Jan. a Chr. N. 43 habitis orationibus*, Teubner, Leipzig
- Flach, D. (1973): *Tacitus in der Tradition der antiken Geschichtsschreibung*, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen
- Fornara, C.W. (1983): *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*, University of California Press, Berkeley
- Fowler, R.L. (1996): "Herodotus and his Contemporaries", *JHS* 116, 62-87
- Freyburger-Galland, M.-L. (1997): *Aspects du Vocabulaire Politique et Institutionnel de Dion Cassius*, De Boccard, Paris
- (2007): "Homère chez Dion Cassius", David, S. & Geny, E. (eds.): *Troïka. Parcours antiques. Mélanges offerts à Michel Woronoff*, vol. I, Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, Besançon, 269-287
- Fromentin, V. & Bertrand, E. (2008): *Dion Cassius: histoire romaine, livres 45-6*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris
- Gabba, E. (1955): "Sulla 'Storia romana' di Cassio Dione", *RSI* 67, 289-333
- (1957): "Note sulla polemica anticiceroniana di Asinio Pollione", *RSI* 69, 317-39
- (1984): "The Historians and Augustus", Millar, F. & Segal, E. (eds.): *Caesar Augustus: seven aspects*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 61-88
- Geiger, J. (1975): "Zum Bild Julius Caesars in der römischen Kaiserzeit", *Historia* 24, 444-453
- Giua, M.A. (1983): "Augusto nel Libro 56 della Storia romana di Cassio Dione", *Athenaeum* 61, 439-456

- Goldhill, S. (2001): "Introduction", Goldhill, S. (ed.): *Being Greek Under Rome. Cultural identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1-25
- Gough, C. & Innes, A.D. (1897): *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars: the rise, conquest, and annexation of the Punjab state*, Innes & Co., London
- Gowing, A. (1990a): "Dio's Name", *CP* 85, 49-54
- (1990b): "Appian and Cassius' Speech before Philippi (*Bella Civilia* 4,90-100)", *Phoenix* 44, 158-181
- (1992): *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press
- (1997): "Cassius Dio on the Reign of Nero", *ANRW* II 34.3, 2558-2590
- (1998): "Greek Advice for a Roman Senator: Cassius Dio and the dialogue between Philiscus and Cicero (38.18-29)", *Papers of the Leeds Latin Seminar: tenth volume*, Cairns Publishing, Wiltshire, 373-390
- Greenidge, A.H.J (1901): *The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- Gruen, E. (1974): *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles
- Gudeman, A. (1894): "Literary Frauds among the Romans", *TAPhA* 25, 140 – 164
- (1902): "The Sources of Plutarch's Life of Cicero", Publications of Pennsylvania University, Boston, Mass.
- Gugel, H. (1970): "Caesars Tod (Sueton, *Div. Jul.* 81, 4 – 82, 3): Aspekte zur Darstellungskunst und zum Caesarbild Suetons", *Gymnasium* 77, 5-22
- Guthrie, W.K.C. (1971): *The Sophists*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Hagendahl, H. (1944): "The Mutiny of Vesontio: a problem of tendency and credibility in Caesar's Gallic War", *C&M* 6, 1-40
- Hahn, D. E. (2005): "Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic theories", Rowe, C., Schofield, M., Harrison, S. & Lane, M. (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*,

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 457-476

-Hammond, C.J. (1993): *Narrative Explanation and the Roman Military Character*, Unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford

-Hammond, M. (1932): "The significance of the speech of Maecenas in Dio Cassius, Book LII", *TAPhA* 63, 88-102

-Hansen, M.H. (1993): "The Battle Exhortation in Ancient Historiography. Fact or Fiction?", *Historia* 42, 161-180

-Haupt, H. (1882): "Jahresberichte. Dio Cassius", *Philologus* 41, 140-158

- (1884): "Jahresberichte. Dio Cassius", *Philologus* 43, 678-701.

-Heath, T. (1921): *A History of Greek Mathematics*, two volumes, Clarendon Press, Oxford

-Held, G.F. (1984): "Σπουδαῖος and Teleology in the *Poetics*", *TAPhA* 114, 159-176

- (1985): "The Meaning of ἦθος in the 'Poetics'", *Hermes* 113, 280-293

-Henderson, J. (2001): "From Megalopolis to Cosmopolis: Polybius, or there and back again", Goldhill, S. (ed.): *Being Greek under Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 29-49

-Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2010): *Reconstructing the Roman Republic: an ancient political culture and modern research*, (trans. Heitmann-Gordon, H.), Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford

-Hornblower, S. (1987): *Thucydides*, Duckworth, London

- (1991): *A Commentary on Thucydides: volume I*, Clarendon Press, Oxford

- (1995): "The Fourth-Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides", *JHS* (115), 48-68

- (2010): *A Commentary on Thucydides: volume 3*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

-Hose, M. (1994): *Erneuerung der Vergangenheit: die Historiker im imperium Romanum von Florus bis Cassius Dio*, Teubner, Stuttgart

-James, B. (2000): "Speech, Authority, and Experience in Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum* 1.39-41", *Hermes* 128, 54-64

- Jehne, M. (2010): "Methods, Models, and Historiography", Rosenstein, N. & Morstein-Marx, R. (eds.): *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 3-28
- Kemezis, A.M. (2006): *The Roman Past in the Age of the Severans: Cassius Dio, Philostratus and Herodian*, Unpublished PhD, University of Michigan
- (2007): "Augustus the Ironic Paradigm: Cassius Dio's portrayal of the *lex Julia* and the *lex Pappia Poppaea*", *Phoenix* 61, 270-285
- Kordoš, J. (2010): "Thucydidean Elements in Cassius Dio", *AntHung* 50, 249-256
- Kuhn-Chen, B. (2002): *Geschichtskonzeption griechischer Historiker in 2. und 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr.: Untersuchungen zu den Werken von Appian, Cassius Dio und Herodian*, Frankfurt
- Kyhntzsch, E. (1894): *De Contionibus, quas Cassius Dio Historiae Suae intexuit, cum Thucydideis comparatis*, Hoffmann, Leipzig
- Lachenaud (2008): "Dion Cassius a-t-il horreur des intellectuels?", Auger, D. & Wolff, E. (eds.): *Culture Classique et Christianisme: mélanges offerts à Jean Bouffartigue*, Picard, Paris, 215-223
- Leigh, M. (2009): "Neronian Literature: Seneca and Lucan", Griffin, M. (ed.): *A Companion to Julius Caesar*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 239-251
- Letta, C (1979): "La composizione dell' Opera di Cassio Dione: cronologia e sfondo storico-politico", *Ricerche di Storiografia Greca di età Romana*, 117-189
- Levene, D.S. (2000): "Sallust's *Catiline* and Cato the Censor", *CQ* 50, 170-191
- Libourel, J.M. (1968): *Dio Cassius on the Early Roman Republic*, University of California PhD.
- Lintott, A.W. (1972): "Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic", *Historia* 21, 626-38
- (1997): "Cassius Dio and the History of the Late Roman Republic", Haase, W. & Temporini, H. (ed.): *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 34.3, Walter de Gruyter, 2497-2523
- Litsch, A. (1893): *De Cassio Dione Imitatore Thucydidis*, Diss. Freiburg
- Lot, F.V.H. (1966<sup>3</sup>): *The End of the Ancient World and the Beginning of the Middle Ages*, Kegan Paul, London

- Luschnat, O. (1971): "Thukydides der Historiker", *RE suppl. xii*, 1085-1354
- Manuwald, B. (1979): *Cassius Dio und Augustus: philologische Untersuchungen zu den Büchern 45-56 des Dionischen Geschichtswerkes*, Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden
- Macleod, C. (1983): *Collected Essays*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- MacKechnie, P. (1981): "Cassius Dio's Speech of Agrippa: a realistic alternative to Imperial government?", *GeR* 28, 150-155
- Marincola, J. (1989): "Some Suggestions on the Proem and 'Second Preface' of Arrian's *Anabasis*", *JHS* 99, 186-189
- (2007): "Speeches in Classical Historiography", Marincola, J. (ed.): *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography. Volume I*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 118-132
- (2011): "Intertextuality and *Exempla*", *Histos Working Papers*, 1-31
- Mason, H.J. (1974): *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: a lexicon and analysis*, Hakkert, Toronto
- McDonnell, M. (2006): *Roman Manliness: virtus and the Roman Republic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- McDougall, J. (1991): "Dio and his Sources for Caesar's Campaigns in Gaul", *Latomus* 50, 616-638
- Mehl, A. (1981): "Bemerkungen zu Dios und Tacitus' Arbeitsweise und zur Quellenlage im 'Totengericht' über Augustus", *Gymnasium* 88, 54-64
- Melber (1891): *Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über die gallischen Kriege Caesars. 1. Die Kriege mit den Helvetieren und gegen Ariovist*, Munich
- Meyer, P. (1891): *De Maecenatis Oratione a Dione Ficta*, Berlin
- Middleton, C. (1790): *The History of the Life of M. Tullius Cicero*, vol. I, Tourneisen & Legrand, Basil
- Millar, F (1961): "Some Speeches in Cassius Dio", *MH* 18, 11 – 22
- (1964): *A Study of Cassius Dio*, Oxford University Press, Oxford
- (1998): *The Crowd in Rome in the late Republic*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press

- (2005): "Rome in Greek Culture: Cassius Dio and Ulpian", Troiani, L. & Zecchini, G. (eds.): *La Cultura Storica nei Primi Due Secoli dell' Impero romano. Milano, 3-5 Giugno 2004*, "L'Erma di Bretschneider, Rome, 17-40.
- Moles, J.L. (1985): "The Interpretation of the 'Second Preface' in Arrian's *Anabasis*", *JHS* 95, 162-168
- (1988): *Plutarch: the Life of Cicero*, Aris and Phillips Ltd., Warminster
- Morris, I. (2004): "Equality and the Origins of Greek Democracy", Robinson, E.W. (ed.): *Ancient Greek Democracy*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 45-75
- Morstein-Marx, R. (1998): "Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*", *CA* 17, 259-288
- (2004): *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Mossman, J.M. (1995): "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's Alexander", Scardigli, B. (ed.): *Essays on Plutarch's Lives*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 209-228
- Mouritsen, H. (2001): *Plebs and Politics in the late Roman Republic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Münzer, F. (1910): "Fufius (10)", *RE* 8, 204-207
- Niebuhr, B.G. (1848): *Vorträge über römische Geschichte, dritter Band: von Pompejus' ersten Consulat bis zum Untergang des abendländischen Reichs*, G. Reimer, Berlin
- Oost, S.I. (1975): "Thucydides and the Irrational: sundry passages", *CP* 70, 186-196
- Parker, V. (2008): "Between Thucydides and Tacitus. The position of Sallust in the history of ancient historiography", *A&A* 54, 77-104
- Parry, A. (1981): *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, Arno Press, New York
- Pavano, G. (1958): *Dionisio d'Alicarnasso: Saggio su Thucidide*, G. Pricilla, Palermo
- Pelling, C. (1973): "Plutarch, *Alexander* and *Caesar*: two new fragments?", *CQ* 23, 343-4
- (1982): "Cassius Dio", *CR* 32, 146-8

- (1983): "Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus*", *Gnomon* 55, 221-226
- (1984): "Notes on Plutarch's *Caesar*", *RhM* 127, 33-45
- (1997) "Biographical History? Cassius Dio on the Early Principate", Edwards, M.J. & Swain, S. (eds.): *Portraits: biographical representation in the Greek and Latin literature of the Roman Empire*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 117-144
- (1999): "Epilogue", Kraus, C.S. (ed.): *The Limits of Historiography: genre and narrative in ancient historical texts*, Brill, Boston, 325-360
- (2002a): "Plutarch and Roman Politics", Pelling, C. (ed.): *Plutarch and History: eighteen studies*, Classical Press of Wales Llandysul, 207-236
- (2002b): "Plutarch's Caesar: a Caesar for the Caesars?", Pelling, C. (ed.): *Plutarch and History: eighteen studies*, Classical Press of Wales, Llandysul, 253-266
- (2006a): "Breaking the Bounds: writing about Julius Caesar", McGing, B. & Mossman, J. (eds.): *The Limits of Ancient Biography*, Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 255-279
- (2006b): "Judging Julius Caesar", Wyke, M. (ed.): *Julius Caesar in Western Culture*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 3-26
- (2009a): "The First Biographers: Plutarch and Suetonius", Griffin, M. (ed.): *A Companion to Julius Caesar*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 252-266
- (2009b): "Seeing Through Caesar's Eyes: Focalization and Interpretation", Grethlein, J. & Rengakos, A. (eds.): *Narratology and Interpretation: The Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 507-526
- (2010): "Learning from that Violent Schoolmaster?: Thucydidean intertextuality and some Greek views of Roman Civil War", C. Damon, A. Rossi, & B. Breed (ed.): *Citizens of Discord: Rome and its Civil Wars*, Oxford, 105-118
- Petrochilos, N. (1974): *Roman Attitudes to the Greeks*, Institut du Livre, Athens
- Phillips, E.J (1970): "Cicero and the Prosecution of C. Manilius", *Latomus* 29, 595-607

- Piatowski, A. (1975): “L’Influence de l’Historiographie tragique sur la Narration de Dion Cassius”, *Actes de la XII<sup>e</sup> Conférence internationale d’Études classique Eirene, Cluj-Napoca, 2-7 Octobre 1972*, Hakkert, Amsterdam
- Pitcher, L. (2007): “Characterization in Ancient Historiography”, Marincola, J. (ed.): *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography. Volume I*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 102-117
- (2009a): *Writing Ancient History: an introduction to classical historiography*, IB Tauris & Co, London
- (2009b): “The Roman Historians after Livy”, Griffin, M (ed.): *A Companion to Julius Caesar*, Blackwell, London, 267 – 276
- Posner, E.M. (1972): *Archives in the Ancient World*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Rait, R.S. (1903): *The Life and Campaigns of Hugh, first Viscount Gough, Field-Marshal*, volume II, Archibald Constable & Co., Westminster
- Ramsey, J.T. (1980): “The Prosecution of C. Manilius in 66 B.C. and Cicero’s *pro Manilio*”, *Phoenix* 34, 323-336
- Rees, W.J. (2009): “*Ex Italia...Convenerunt*’ (Cic. *Dom.* 12.30): Italian Participation in Roman Political Life”, Keaveney, A. & Earnshaw-Brown, L. (eds.): *The Italians on the Land: changing perspectives on Republican Italy then and now*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 85-106
- Reinhold, M. (1985): “Human Nature as Cause in Ancient Historiography”, in Eadie, J.W. and Ober, J. (eds.): *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: essays in honor of Chester G. Starr*, University Press of America, Lanham, 21-40
- (1988): *From Republic to Principate: an historical commentary on Cassius Dio’s Roman History 49-52 (36 – 29 B.C.)*, American Philological Association Monographs, Atlanta
- Rich, J.W. (1989): “Cassius Dio on Augustus”, Cameron, A. (ed.): *History as Text: the writing of ancient history*, Duckworth Press, London, 86-110
- (1990): *Cassius Dio: the Augustan settlement (Roman History 53-55.9)*, Aris & Philips, Warminster

- Richardson, L. (1998): “Cicero, Bibulus, and Caesar’s Agrarian Bills of 59 B.C.E.”, *Qui Misceat Utile Dulci: festschrift essays for Paul Lachlan MacKendrick*, Schmeling, G. & Mikalson, J.D., Bolchazy-Carducci, Wauconda, 299-312
- Roddaz, J.-M. (1983): “De César à Auguste – l’Image de la Monarchie chez un Historien du Siècle des Sévères. Réflexions sur l’oeuvre de Dion Cassius, à propos d’ouvrages récents”, *REA* 85, 67-87
- Rodgers, B.S. (2008): “Catulus’ Speech in Cassius Dio 36. 31 – 36”, *GR&B* 48, 295 – 318
- Roxan, M. (1985): *Roman Military Diplomas 1978-84*, Institute of Archaeology, London
- Ruiz, U.E. (1982): *Debate Agrippa-Mecenas en Dion Cassio. Respuesta Senatorial a la Crisis del Imperio Romano en Época Severiana*, Madrid
- Sanna, A. (2007): “τί τὸν Ἄννιον? Riflessioni a margine dell’emendatio di Fabricius nel dialogo tra Filisco e Cicerone in Cassio Dione 38.26.2-4”, *QS* 66, 47-80
- Schmitz, T. (1997): *Bildung und Macht: zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit*, Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich
- Schwartz, E. (1899): “Cassius (40)”: *Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1684 – 1722
- Shanske, D. (2007): *Thucydides and the Philosophical Origins of History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Shackleton-Bailey, D.R. (1971): *Cicero*, Duckworth Press, London
- Shimron, B. (1967): “Caesar’s Place in Sallust’s Political Theory”, *Athenaeum* 45, 335-345
- Siani-Davies, M. (1997): “Ptolemy XII Auletes and the Romans”, *Historia* 46, 306-340
- Sidebottom, H. (2007): “Severan Historiography: evidence, patterns and arguments”, Swain, S. Harrison, S. & Elsner, J. (eds.): *Severan Culture*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 52-82
- Simons, B. (2009): *Cassius Dio und die römische Republik: Untersuchungen zum Bild des römischen Gemeinwesens in den Büchern 3-35 der ‘Ρωμαϊκά*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin

- Sion-Jenkis, K. (2000): *Von der Republik zum Prinzipat: Ursachen für den Verfassungswandel in Rom im historischen Denken der Antike* (Palingenesia LXIX), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart
- (2002): “Griechisches Denken in Römischen Gewand: Überlegungen zu Ciceros Amnestie-Rede nach Caesars Ermordung bei Cassius Dio (44. 23 – 33)”, Ehrhart, N & Günther, L.-M. (Ed.): *Widerstand – Anpassung – Integration. Die griechische Staatenwelt und Rom. Festschrift für Jürgen Deininger zum 65 Geburtstag*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 189 – 206
- Smith, R.E. (1957): “The *Lex Plotia Agraria* and Pompey’s Spanish Veterans”, *CQ* 7, 82-85
- Smyth, H.W. (1920): *Greek Grammar*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Sordi, M. (2001): “Le Date di Composizione dell’ Opera di Dione Cassio”, Carpasso, M. & Pernigotti, S. (eds.): *Studium atque Urbanitas: miscellanea in onore di Sergio Daris*, Congedo Editore, Lecce, 393-5
- Stadter. P.A. (2011): “Competition and its Costs: *φιλονεικία* in Plutarch’s society and heroes”, Rocksam, G. & Van der Stockt, L. (eds.): *Virtues for the People: aspects of Plutarchan ethics*, Leuven University Press, Leuven, 237-255
- Stockton, D. (1971): *Cicero: a political biography*, Oxford University Press, London
- Strasburger, H. (1983): “Livius über Caesar – Unvollständige Überlegungen”, Lefèvre, E. & Olhausen, E. (Eds.): *Livius – Werk und Rezeption, Festschrift für E. Burk zum 80. Geburtstag*, Munich, 265-291
- Straumer, F (1872): *De Ciceronis, quae fertur, oratione apud Cassium Dionem, XLIV, 23 – 33 Commentatio*, Pickenhau & Sons, Chemnitz
- Strebel, H.G. (1935): *Wertung und Wirkung des Thukydideischen Geschichtswerkes in der griechisch-römischen Literatur*, Diss. Munich
- Swain, S. (1996): *Hellenism and Empire: language, classicism, and power in the Greek world, AD 50-250*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- Swan, P.M. (1997): “How Cassius Dio composed his Augustan books”, *ANRW* II 34.3, 2524-2557

- (2004): *The Augustan Succession: an historical commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History books 55-56 (9 B.C. – A.D. 14)*, Oxford University Press, New York
- Syme, R. (1964): *Sallust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Taylor, L.R. (1951): "On the Chronology of Caesar's First Consulship", *AJP* 72, 254-268
- (1968): "The Dating of Major Legislation and Elections in Caesar's First Consulship", *Historia* 17, 173-193
- Thomas Powell, C. (1987): "Why Aristotle has no Philosophy of History", *HPbQ* 4, 343-357
- Thouret, G. (1878): *De Cicerone, Asinio Pollio, C. Oppio rerum Caesarianum scriptoribus*, Studien zur Classische Philologie, Leipzig
- Toher, M. (2006): "The Earliest Depiction of Caesar and the later Tradition", Wyke, M. (ed.): *Julius Caesar in Western Culture*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 29-44
- (2009): "Augustan and Tiberian Literature", Griffin, M. (ed.): *A Companion to Julius Caesar*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 224-38
- Tränkle, H. (1969): "Augustus bei Tacitus, Cassius Dio und dem älteren Plinius", *WS* 82, 108-130
- Van Stekelenburg, A.V. (1971): *De Redevoeringen bij Cassius Dio*, Delft
- (1976): "Lucan and Cassius Dio as heirs to Livy: the speech of Julius Caesar at Placentia", *AClass* 19, 43-57
- Vlachos, N.P. (1905): "Demosthenes and Dio Cassius (D.C. 38.36-36)", *CR* 19, 102-106
- Vrind, G. (1923): *De Cassii Dionis Vocabulis Quae ad Ius Publicum Pertinent*, Bernard Mensing, Haege Comitis
- Walbank, F.W. (1957): *A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. I*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- (1960): "History and Tragedy", *Historia* 9, 216-234
- (1972): *Polybius*, University of California Press, Berkeley
- Wallace-Hadrill, A. (2008): *Rome's Cultural Revolution*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Ward, A.M. (1970): "Politics in the Trials of Manilius and Cornelius", *TAPhA* 101, 545-556

- Welch, K. (1998): "Introduction", Welch, K. (ed.): *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: the war commentaries as political instrument*, Duckworth, London, ix-xiii
- Westlake, H.D. (1968): *Individuals in Thucydides*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Whitmarsh, T. (2001): *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: the politics of imitation*, Oxford University Press, Oxford
- (2005): *The Second Sophistic*, Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Wilcox, A. (2005a): "Sympathetic rivals: *consolatio* in Cicero's letters", *AJP* 126, 237-255
- (2005b): "Paternal grief and the public eye: Cicero *ad familiares* 4. 6", *Phoenix* 54, 267-287
- Williams, R.S. (1985): "Rei publicae causa: Gabinius' defense of his restoration of Ptolemy Auletes", *CJ* 81, 25-38
- Wiseman, T.P. (1971): *New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C.-14 A.D.*, Oxford University Press, London
- (1998): "The Publication of *de Bello Gallico*", Welch, K. (ed.): *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: the war commentaries as political instrument*, Duckworth, London, 1-9
- Woodman, A.J. (1988): *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography: four studies*, Croom Helm, London
- (1998): *Tacitus Reviewed*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- Woolf, G. (1994): "Becoming Roman, Staying Greek: culture, identity and the civilising process in the Roman East", *PCPS* 40, 116-43
- Wyke, M. (ed.) (2006): *Julius Caesar in Western Culture*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
- (2007): *Caesar: a life in Western Culture*, Granta Books, London
- Yakobson, A. (1999): *Elections and Electioneering. A study in the political system of the late Republic*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart
- Zecchini, G. (1975): *Cassio Dione e la guerra gallica di Cesare*, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni della Università, Milan
- Zielinski, T. (1912<sup>3</sup>): *Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, Teubner, Leipzig

