

From Fig Leaves to Skinny Jeans: How Clothes Shape Our Experience of God,  
Ourselves, and Everything Else

Bryan David McCarthy

Balliol College

DPhil, Theology and Religion

## Abstract

In the history of sartorial reflection, the usual offerings for human motivations to dress are: protection (i.e. from the elements), modesty, decoration, and socio-political self-expression. The literature on clothing rarely attends, however, to the question of garments' impact on wearers' self-experience. There is some social science research, for example, suggesting that when we wear clothing we associate with individuals who have a high degree of mental focus and attention to detail, it causes us—probably, in most cases, pre-reflectively—to experience ourselves as such and therefore to perform better on tests that measure these qualities. Apart from this research, exploration into the matter, regardless of field, is scant, but it is especially thin in philosophy and theology.

This thesis seeks to address the shortfall in these fields by providing at least one model of the human relationship to clothes that, unlike what is currently on offer, accounts for findings like the above. To do so, it draws on the sartorial reflection of the British artist and essayist Eric Gill, who understands clothes as architectural spaces of sorts, as encasements that house our being, and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose philosophy of being and 'thinking about building' can do similar work less explicitly but more robustly.

After outlining this new way of looking at humanity's relationship to clothes, the thesis will conclude by discussing some theological implications. In particular, it discusses how the overlap between Gill's sacramental perspective and Heidegger's similar understanding of an inherently meaning-infused 'world' can yield an account of clothes as facilitators (or hinderers) of the

attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God through their potential to bear theological resonances.

## Introduction

According to the well-known story of Adam and Eve from the book of Genesis, the world's first temptation comes in the form of a snake promising Eve that, contrary to the words of YHWH, if she eats from the tree that holds the knowledge of good and evil, 'You will not die; for God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil' (Gen. 3: 5, NRSV). Of course, the first part of this guarantee is unmitigated fiction; she and Adam die. But the second part actually turns out to be true. They do come to know what YHWH knows, i.e. good and evil.

The genius of the prevarication is that the snake allows the first couple to assume that divine power will come with divine knowledge, when what instead awaits them is an all-too-human frailty and insecurity. It is not that, as they assumed, knowing good and evil renders them judges *par excellence* but that it causes them to understand that since there is a such thing as evil, it is possible to be judged and, more particularly, possible for they themselves to be judged. Adam and Eve feel unstable at this prospect, which exists precisely because they have done what gave them their newfound awareness, an act they now know to be 'evil' by virtue of violating the instructions of the one who, whether they knew it or not, always was and still remains the ultimate judge, YHWH.

In this state of instability, they scramble for a security blanket, which they find in what constitutes the first instance of putting on clothes:

Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for themselves. They heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden at the time of the evening breeze, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden. But the LORD

God called to the man, and said to him, 'Where are you?' He said, 'I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself.' [Gen. 3: 7-10, NRSV]

Adam and Eve make themselves clothes out of fig leaves because they have become aware of their nakedness. Obviously, there is a literal dimension to this; they are physically naked and want to cover up. But the figurative dimension is that they are naked in the sense of being vulnerable to judgement. They hear the sound of the ultimate judge in the garden, are afraid because of their newly acquired vulnerability, and therefore hide themselves, perhaps behind a tree but, also and more importantly, behind clothes. In so doing, they don clothing according to one of its dominant modes, that of instrument through which humans hide from or modulate the judgement of other judging agents.

But this is not all Genesis has to say on the matter, for, after administering punishments to the snake, to Eve, and then to Adam,

the LORD God made garments of skins for the man and for his wife, and clothed them. Then the LORD God said, 'See, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, he might reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever'—therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken. He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of Eden he placed the cherubim, and a sword flaming and turning to guard the way to the tree of life. [Gen. 3: 21-4]

Now that Adam and Eve have eaten the fruit that bestows knowledge of good and evil, YHWH must prevent them from eating the fruit that bestows immortality, lest the former capacity prove an eternal challenge to the divine will. To accomplish this, God exiles them from the garden and posts an angelic sentry at its gate, but not before robing them in dead animal skins. The purpose of the latter is not, as with their own donning, to hide them from or modulate judgement nor, as we might assume, to keep them warm but to shroud them in

the death from which their exile prevents escape. God thus provides them with clothes that help shape their self-experience in accordance with their being:

They are mortals—or, in German, *Sterblichen*—‘dying ones’ and the dead animal skins bring them into an experience of themselves as such.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> While few, if any, commentators on this passage specifically note the potential for Adam and Eve’s ‘garments of skins’ to shape their self-experience in accordance with death, several throughout the history of biblical interpretation speak of the garments’ significance in relation to the first couple’s mortality more generally. For example, in contrasting the Adamic skins with Aaron’s priestly vestments in Lev. 8, Origen says, ‘those were tunics of skins taken from animals [...], which are a symbol of the mortality which [man] received’ (Origen 1990 edn.: 120). Likewise, Augustine says ‘They were [...] all the while in paradise, although already under the sentence of the condemning God, until it came to the garments of skin, that is, to the mortality of this life. For what could more clearly signify the death that we experience in our body than skins which we get from dead animals?’ (Augustine 1991 edn.: 128). Bede and Martin Luther conclude similarly. In his commentary on Genesis, the former says, ‘by a garment of this kind the Lord teaches that they had now been made mortal. Skins, of course, which are not removed except from dead animals, contain the allegorical figure of death. Thus, *when, against the command, man desires to be God not by lawful imitation, but by unlawful pride, he is cast down to the mortal nature of wild beasts*’ (Bede 2008 edn.: 136; emphasis original). And, in his lectures on Genesis, Luther says, ‘He clothed them, not in foliage or in cotton but in the skins of slain animals, for a sign that they are mortal and that they are living in certain death’ (Luther 1958 edn.: 221). For modern commentary along these lines, see Fruchtenbaum 2008: 140, Jolly 1997: 63, and Stratton 1995: 63. Robert J. Ratner epitomises the point: ‘death has now become most tangible. The bitter truth of the curses just pronounced by God to the snake, the woman, and the man is very real. Adam and Eve learn that life has an end and, no doubt, the universal anxiety over one’s own mortality has taken hold of them’ (Ratner 1989-90: 75). Of course, I am here following the tradition that interprets ‘garments of skins’ as the hides of dead animals. It is important to note, however, that many commentators have, alternatively, taken the expression as a metaphor for human skin. This view takes its cue from the fact that ‘Midrash *Genesis Rabba* 20: 12 tells how Rabbi Meir was reputed to have had a manuscript in which, instead of ‘*ôr*—“skin”—there stood the reading ‘*ôr*—“light”’ (Brock 1982: 14; cf. Schneider and Seelenfreund 2012: 118-20 and Anderson 2000: 63) and, alternatively, from the fact that the Syriac version of Ps. 8: 5 says, ‘you clothed [man] with glory and honour’ (Anderson 2000: 71). Thus, the view reasons, YHWH initially robed Adam and Eve in ‘garments of light’ but, upon their disobedience, exchanged this raiment for human integument (see Anderson 2000: 64-5 for the basic features of the exegesis and argument). Gary A. Anderson details several versions of this position (Anderson 2000: 59-81). Among the proponents he cites are the medieval Jewish commentator Rashi and the Patristic exegetes Didymus the Blind, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ephrem the Syrian, and John Chrysostom, though Anderson’s analysis presents the latter two as, throughout their writings, waffling back and forth between this position and that of interpreting the garments as dead animal skins (see Anderson 2000: 72 n. 28 for Ephrem and Anderson 2000: 72 and 72 n. 28 for Chrysostom). Even when interpreting the clothes as human skin, however, the bulk of both Rabbinic and Patristic commentators ‘assume that when [Adam and Eve] put on mortal flesh they become susceptible to death. [...] The movement from a state of impassability to the capacity for pain, corruption, and death is marked by the donning of human skin’ (Anderson 2000: 74). In the case of the Rabbis, Anderson adduces the Rabbinic tradition concerning the Israelites at Sinai having their ‘garments (or even crowns) of glory’ ‘removed’ after they ‘constructed the Golden Calf’ (Anderson 2000: 65 n. 17). Similarly, ‘Ephrem like Didymus and Gregory Naziansus understood the fall to be defined by the assumption of mortal flesh. As Adam and Eve reach for leaves they are immediately clothed with perishable human flesh’ (Anderson 2000: 72). There is, then, a rich strain of Judaeo-Christian commentary emphasising the ‘garments of skins’ as evoking the role of death in the existence of the Adamic couple and, by extension, of all humans. My own offering simply draws out the phenomenological implications of this by suggesting that, given research I will delineate in this thesis, the fact that Adam and Eve are wearing what evokes their mortality means, further, that these skins shape their self-experience in accordance with that dying, giving it a significance that goes beyond mere perishing to what Heidegger calls ‘death as death’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152 and ‘Th’, in *PLT* 176 / *GA* 7: 180).

If this latter claim that the skins shape the first couple's self-experience in accordance with death—as opposed to merely reminding them of it at a later juncture—seems a stretch, it is because it anticipates the chapters to follow. I want to stress, however, that, as a phenomenologist of religion rather than a biblical exegete, I do not offer these remarks on Genesis to rival other perspectives in the history of its interpretation. Rather, I regard the current pericope as a primordial impetus for thinking theologically about clothes. What interests me here is not strictly what the original author or redactor intended to communicate or even what later communities would find creedally relevant in the extant text but the phenomenological significance thereof. As some of the research I examine in this thesis will show, there is good reason to believe that clothes have an impact on our self-experience. Thus, when Genesis says God fashions Adam and Eve new clothes out of dead animal skins once they are capable of dying, I am interested in the extent to which and the way in which God thereby shapes their self-experience in accordance with death.

Whichever analysis we proffer of the skins vis-à-vis Adam and Eve and their mortality, however, it is clear that God is not employing these clothes in the mode of instrument through which humans hide from or modulate judgement. Here, the dressing is not about what humans do with clothes but about what clothes do with humans. YHWH's 'garments of skins' operate in another of clothing's modes, that of facilitating an attunement or comportment in their wearers, i.e. a change in the underlying structure of the latter's relationship to and engagement with the entities around them. In this case, the attunement or comportment is the first couple's experience—or, at very least, later remembrance—of themselves as mortals or 'dying ones'. We have, then, in

relation to the account of Adam and Eve’s fall in the book of Genesis, a sartorial distinction: clothes as instruments for hiding from or modulating judgement vs. clothes as facilitators of an attunement or comportment.

I will herein be using this distinction to examine clothes in general as well as their potential for facilitating—and also not facilitating, i.e. hindering—the theological attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. In so doing, I will be departing from what Michael Carter and others call the ‘conventional answer’ to ‘why [...] human beings wear clothes at all’, which ‘proposed the existence of three “fundamental motives” out of which clothing was thought to have arisen—bodily protection, modesty, and decoration’ (Carter 2005: ii. 91). As it happens, even the early clothing theorists are not so unified as this account suggests. Some, like Harry Jones, do invoke the three ‘conventional’ motivations as the ‘objects for which dress is worn’ (see Jones 1887: 16), but others seek to determine which of them single-handedly prompted the initial donning of clothes.<sup>2</sup> In addition, several of the theorists modify their characterisation of one or more motivations, sometimes rendering

---

<sup>2</sup> After a careful survey of the options, Knight Dunlap, for example, concludes that ‘The origin of clothing, properly so called, can then be ascribed to the human need for protection from injurious and unpleasant agencies, although other factors have entered into its further development’ (Dunlap 1928: 69). Likewise, A. Ernst Crawley asserts that ‘The protection-hypothesis of the origin of dress may thus be adopted, if we qualify it by a scheme of development’ (Crawley 1931: 20). The influential English psychologist of clothes and Freudian psychoanalyst J. C. Flügel has a similarly developmental approach but, contrariwise, locates the initial impetus to dress in decoration: ‘The great majority of scholars, however, have unhesitatingly regarded decoration as the motive that led, in the first place, to the adoption of clothing, and consider that the warmth- and modesty-preserving functions of dress, however important they might later on become, were only discovered once the wearing of clothes had become habitual for other reasons’ (Flügel 1930: 17). Here, Flügel echoes Thomas Carlyle, the first, as far as I know, to speak of clothing’s origin in relation to the tripartite model: ‘The first purpose of Clothes [...] was not warmth or decency, but ornament’ (Carlyle 1833/4: 29).

the categories so elastic as to erode the usefulness of the paradigm altogether,<sup>3</sup> and at least one theorist divines a deeper origin behind all three.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, insofar as early treatises on clothing again and again affirm the tripartite paradigm in one way or another, it makes sense to speak of it as enjoying something of a consensus. Hence, many later commentators have thought it important to point out its limitations, suggesting we add more motivations,

---

<sup>3</sup> Crawley, for example, speaks of modesty under the heading of ‘concealment’, which he also identifies as productive of the opposite of modesty, i.e. ‘sexual’ ‘attraction by mystery’ (Crawley 1931: 9-12). With this expression, he refers to that phenomenon whereby, in particular, ‘the fashion of feminine garments (as also sometimes the use of scents) has the double object of concealing and attracting’ (Crawley 1931: 11) or whereby, as Yrjö Hirn puts it, clothes ‘practically accentuate the things they technically conceal’ (Hirn 1900: 205). Several of the early theorists speak of this phenomenon, including, as I will delineate in chapter two, Eric Gill: ‘the thing displayed is always displayed by a shield’ (C 119). Where Crawley and others make such display a concomitant of modesty and therefore a subdivision of its category, Dunlap lists attraction by concealment as a separate motivation alongside the conventional three, thereby modifying his use of the traditional paradigm: ‘*The immodesty theory* [...] maintains that the intent and purpose of clothing in the beginning was salacious, designed to attract attention to sexual organs and sexual functions, and in general to make the wearer a greater object of sexual interest’ (Dunlap 1928: 64; emphasis original). As a final example, Flügel explicitly affirms the tripartite paradigm (Flügel 1930: 16) but his category of ‘protection’ includes what he calls ‘protection against moral danger’ (Flügel 1930: 74). Clothing, he says, assists many ‘in attempting to avoid distracting influences that might lead them away from the straight and narrow path of virtue’ (Flügel 1930: 74). Moreover, in Carter’s words, Flügel ‘translate[s] the three categories of modesty, decoration, and protection into terms compatible with the developmental model of psychoanalysis’ (Carter 2003: 106; cf. Barthes *LF* 31 for a similar characterisation of Flügel).

<sup>4</sup> See Sylvia H. Bliss’ assertion that ‘Underlying all the various motives which apparently lead man to paint, tattoo, decorate and protect the body is the fundamental feeling of incompleteness, of dissatisfaction with self as it is, and clothing in its origin and subsequent development is the result of his attempt to remedy the deficiency, to replace what he has lost’, i.e. ‘[his] coat of hair’ (Bliss 1916: 221). ‘The covering and ornament which human beings supply for the body stand in lieu of fur, feathers, and all the varied exteriors found in lower nature and further, serve like ends of protection and adornment’ (Bliss 1916: 221).

such as signification/communication,<sup>5</sup> to the list or arguing that what we wear often has multiple purposes and therefore resists our shoehorning it into any single category (Riaz et al. 2004: 49 and Carter 2012: 347-9).

In contrast to such offerings, I do not characterise the tripartite paradigm as merely limiting and therefore seek to build upon or modify it. The

---

<sup>5</sup> The highly celebrated structuralist semiotician and fashion theorist Roland Barthes puts it this way: 'This brings us to revise a traditional point of view that at first glance seems reasonable and which maintained that Man invented clothing for three reasons: as protection against harsh weather, out of modesty for hiding nudity, and for ornamentation to get noticed. This is all true. But we must add another function, which seems to me to be more important: the function of meaning. Man has dressed himself in order to carry out a signifying activity. The wearing of an item of clothing is fundamentally an act of meaning that goes beyond modesty, ornamentation, and protection. It is an act of signification and therefore a profoundly social act right at the very heart of the dialectic of society' (*LF* 90-1). David W. Allen expresses the same sentiment (Allen 1974: 33). This should not, however, suggest, that signification/communication escaped early clothing theorists' notice as a motive for dressing. Even a thinker as chronologically distant from the twentieth century as Jean-Jacques Rousseau makes the point incipiently: 'How great was the attention that Romans paid to the language of signs! Different clothing according to ages and according to stations' (Rousseau 1762: 322). More recently, Crawley devotes entire sections on 'dress symbolism' and the 'social psychology of dress' (see Crawley 1931: 51-111) and affirms 'the idea that a person may be represented by his dress' (Crawley 1931: 58), that 'a garment is an expression of personality' (Crawley 1931: 65). And he, Herbert Spencer, Dunlap, and Flügel all discuss the notion of clothes that 'represent' or 'signify' 'rank' or 'preëminence' and other meanings in tribal settings (see Crawley 1931: 135; Spencer 1890 edn.: 178ff.; Dunlap 1928: 64, 67, and 70; and Flügel 1930: 29-33). Oftentimes, those who accept the tripartite paradigm, or a modification thereof, simply classify such signification/communication under one of its three motivations, more broadly construed. For example, see Dunlap's distribution of some types of signification/communication under 'protection' or its more elastic version, 'practical' (Dunlap 1928: 69ff.), and other types of it under 'ornament' (Dunlap 1928: 64 and 67). Similarly, witness Flügel's enumeration of various types of signification/communication under the heading 'decoration' (Flügel 1930: 25ff.). Indeed, Barthes does not claim to have noticed this impetus to dress before anyone else. Rather, he says 'Balzac, Proust, and Michelet' 'postulated the existence of a kind of language of apparel' (*GV* 44) and he credits Flügel with beginning to understand attire as a 'form of communication' and therefore encouraging us 'to posit clothing in terms of meaning' (*LF* 25; cf. *LF* 31-2). Moreover, he adds, 'it was a structuralist, Trubetskoy, who was the first to posit openly the linguistic nature of clothing' (*LF* 25). Barthes' contribution, then, lies not in establishing but in emphasising and systematising the fourth motivation of signification/communication, specifically, as I will explain in a subsequent note, in constructing a framework for understanding how high fashion magazines relay the meaning clothes have in their pages. Thus, contrary to what Barthes' comments about 'add[ing] another function' might seem to suggest, he is less concerned with declaring signification/communication a motivation to dress than he is with understanding clothes in light of the larger signification/communication 'system' of which they are part: 'What should really interest the researcher, historian, or sociologist is [...] the tendency of every bodily covering to insert itself into an organised, formal, and normative system that is recognised by society' (*LF* 6). Since the time Barthes raised these issues, however, theorists have continued, unabated, to list subspecies of the signification/communication motive (see, e.g. Roach and Eicher 1979: 7ff.; Rubinstein 1985: 245; and Barnard 2002: 59ff.), supporting their position with experimental research (see, e.g. Rosenfeld and Plax 1977; Holman 1980 and 1981; and McCracken and Roth 1989), sometimes at odds with Barthes' interests. In the latter regard, compare, on the one hand, some theorists' inclusion of 'individualistic expression' among the subspecies (e.g. Roach and Eicher 1979: 8-10 and Barnard 2002: 60-1) with, on the other, Barthes' dismissal of such theorists' concern for 'self-expression' as a 'specifically American' reduction of the 'fundamental function of clothing' (*LF* 24).

commentators are right that the traditional model leaves out motivations for dressing and that the theorists who espoused it did not sufficiently point out our tendency to put on clothes for more than one of its motivations at the same time. The paradigm's main and deeper drawback, however, lies not merely in neglecting but, moreover, in obscuring two sartorial phenomena I would like to highlight in the above Genesis account.

First, the motivations that the traditional view delineates as 'modesty' and 'decoration' are not essentially different. As Jones puts it, 'decency' and 'ornament' 'may be classed together, since they both imply a desire on the part of the wearer to present a more becoming appearance than bare nature provides' (Jones 1887: 16). In the terms I have proffered in relation to the Genesis story, at least part of what is fundamentally going on in the 'modesty' of putting on clothes is self-protection from the judgement of others. While clothed, others may judge our sartorial choices or think we do not spend enough time 'fixing ourselves up', but any decision about us in the nude is, in contrast, a judgement concerning something we 'are' that we may not be able to change. We therefore put on clothes to protect ourselves against such assessment. Likewise, when we 'decorate' ourselves with clothes, part of what is motivating us is a desire to be experienced by and thus thought of or judged by others as pretty, handsome, dashing, stylish, sexy, etc. We are attempting to control or modulate judgement.

This same objective is also behind the ‘signification’/‘communication’ that Barthes<sup>6</sup> and other theorists identified in our inclination to dress. Like being modest or self-decorating, ‘communicating’ involves encouraging others to judge or form an opinion or understanding in line with our intentions. At an academic conference, for example, I might dress in a tweed sports coat to communicate that I am a scholar, that I belong to that subcultural group. In so doing, I seek to be judged as ‘scholarly’ by others in the group and, if I am presenting, worthy of their attention in listening to me. If, in contrast, I clad myself entirely in black leather, garnishing the look with gothic makeup and a dog collar, I would probably elicit the opposite judgement. Even if I were inclined to dress this way in other circumstances, I would not do so at the academic conference because I want to be ‘taken seriously’.

If, on the other hand, I attend a night club or some event populated by young, single non-academics, I might shed my scholarly signifier in favour of garments that would not allow others to deem me the only person in the room not having a good time. In such a setting, I want to communicate or have others

---

<sup>6</sup> In point of fact, Barthes’ endeavour is not as straightforward as it might seem, for he jettisons studying “everyday” clothing’ in favour of analysing what he calls ‘printed fashion’ or ‘fashion clothing’ (see *LF* 28, 72-3, and 93 as well as *GV* 44, 57-8, and 64-5). In Barthes’ estimation, every piece of clothing we encounter in *Elle* or *Marie Claire* in fact entails three ‘garments’. There is, first, a ‘photographed’, ‘iconic’ (*FS* 6), or ‘image’ (*FS* 3-4) garment and, second, a ‘described’ or ‘written garment’ (*FS* 3-4). Together, these make up the ‘represented’ garment (*FS* 8) but are each distinct from a third garment, which Barthes calls the ‘technological’ (*FS* 6) or ‘real garment’, i.e. the ‘actual dress they both refer to’ (*FS* 4), ‘this dress worn on this day by this woman’ (*FS* 3). Barthes says that although his initial interest was in the last of these, as his understanding increased, he quickly restricted his emphasis to the second (see *LF* 72 and 93 as well as *GV* 44, 57-8, and 64-5). Thus, when he discusses apparel vis-à-vis signification or communication, this is less about the idea that, as Carter says, ‘clothes are “signs saying something about their wearers”’ (Carter 2003: 156) than it might appear. Of course, Barthes recognises that ‘everyone knows we exchange rather elementary information through the clothes we wear’ and that ‘fashion tries to make the garments it describes correspond to what we want to express about ourselves’ (*GV* 59; cf. *LF* 72). Moreover, he advocates revising the traditional understanding of why we dress accordingly (*LF* 90-1). Nevertheless, he has far more interest in clarifying what magazine descriptions like ‘a leather belt, with a rose stuck in it, worn above the waist on a soft shetland dress’ mean and how that relates to the larger ‘verbal’ clothing system of communication or ‘language’ to which they belong (*FS* 3 and 5ff.; cf. *GV* 44 and 57 and *LF* 93).

judge that I am a person who knows how to have fun and ‘let loose’, something not normally inferred from the stiff material and strict folds of a tweed sports coat.

In both scenarios, I utilise clothes to help me modulate the judgement—or hide from the negative judgement—of the group with whom I want to spend my time. Shifting from one outfit to the other and, after that, another and another thus constitutes an existence of modulating judgement through the communicative potential of clothes. Thus, the twentieth-century addition of ‘communication’ to the tripartite paradigm of protection, modesty, and decoration only amplifies the traditional understanding’s obscuration of the fact that hiding from or modulating judgement underlies the motivations it identifies.

What, however, of protection? While it is true that the mere act of fending off a heavy rain or icy blast by means of some outer-garment does not involve modulating judgement, this usual understanding of dressing for protection<sup>7</sup> does not render the phenomenon entirely transparent. What, after all, is going on in the ‘protection’ itself? Flügel and other commentators have been convinced that the supposed need for sartorial defences against the weather is purely a matter of physical and psychological conditioning.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, we continue to experience ourselves as ‘protected’ by raincoats

---

<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, Flügel contrariwise expands his understanding of the category to include more intuitively judgement-oriented phenomena like ‘protection adjacent the general unfriendliness of the world as a whole; or, expressed more psychologically, a reassurance against the lack of love’ (Flügel 1930: 77)

<sup>8</sup> See Flügel 1930: 16-17 as well as Roach and Eicher 1979: 7; Schwarz 1979: 25; and Barnard 2002: 52 and 55 for similar, if more reserved, characterisations. See also, however, Barthes’ critique that the analysis of Tierra del Fuego and similar cases on which the majority of these and other commentators base their conviction constitutes ‘taking liberties with certain ethnographic observations’ (*LF* 6). Finally, see Dunlap 1928: 69 and Crawley 1931: 20, both of whom, unlike Flügel et al., identify protection not only as necessary but as the primary motivation for dressing.

and fur-lined parkas. Regardless of whether we exactly need the kind of protection such garments purportedly offer, what is it that allows us to experience ourselves as protected in wearing them and what precisely does that self-experience entail?

These questions signal the second phenomenon that the traditional understanding of the motivation to dress and the signification/communication addition obscure. Each of the motivations stipulated therein involve our wearing clothes in order to do something with them, to use them for some purpose. As Michael Carter puts it, 'Although Barthes effected a transformation in the way in which dress was understood, usefulness, in the guise of communication, remained at the heart of his reformulation of human appearance' (Carter 2012: 344). On one level, all of this is perfectly appropriate, for we do, in fact, do things with clothes, i.e. we do use them. At the same time, however, our garments do things with us that might, whether we are aware of it or not, draw us much more strongly than their apparent usefulness. We may, for example, think we like outerwear because it protects us from climactic inclemencies, when the deeper draw is simply that it makes us experience ourselves as protected, regardless of whether or not any protection of the necessary sort is occurring.

What interests me in this thesis, then, is clothing's capacity to facilitate attunements or comportments, e.g. experiencing oneself as protected or, à la the Genesis story, as a 'dying one' and, ultimately, to facilitate or hinder the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. Because of this, I will not be emphasising the communication/signification understanding of clothes. Instead, I will employ a Heideggerian phenomenological approach,

by which I mean one that seeks to examine the underlying relationships between phenomena as a means to better understanding how and why they obtain as well as what they mean for and in the context of human existence. In terms of the present enquiry, this amounts to highlighting attunements and comportments that clothing facilitates, particularly when such facilitation is counter-intuitive, and drawing upon Heidegger's understanding of human being and of the human relationship to things to show what allows the facilitation to obtain. Only then will I be able to consider how and why clothes might facilitate or hinder the theological attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God.<sup>9</sup>

This is not to say Barthes' insight that 'The wearing of an item of clothing is fundamentally an act of meaning [...] and therefore a profoundly social act' (*LF* 90-1) and similar remarks made by other theorists are entirely irrelevant to the work I am doing here. In chapter one, for example, I discuss research by Hajo Adam and Adam Galinsky suggesting that when we wear clothes we associate with attentiveness and focus, we do better on tests that require these traits. As Adam and Galinsky put it, 'actually wearing a piece of clothing and having the accompanying physical experiences (e.g., seeing it on one's body, feeling it on one's skin, etc.) will make it significantly more likely for the piece of clothing to influence the wearer's psychological processes' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919). Crucial to this influence on their account, however, is

---

<sup>9</sup> Such a phenomenological analysis of clothing is surprisingly rare in philosophy and even rarer in theology. Among the few theorists who express explicit interest in phenomenology of clothes/garments, dress, or fashion are Entwistle 2001: 44; Calefato 2004: 3; Candy 2005: 3.2; Franklin 2014; and M. Lee 2015: 4, 31-2, and 52, but none of these proffer the foundation necessary to engage in it rigorously. Unsurprisingly, then, there is, as far as I am aware, no theological phenomenology of clothes, nor even any application of a more general sartorial phenomenology to theology or religion, apart from what might we might describe as Gill's proto-phenomenological theology of clothes I will be examining in chapter 2.

that we assign exactly the kind of meaning to what we are wearing that Barthes and others suggest we are trying to communicate in putting it on. As Adam and Galinsky show, if we do not think some garment has a given particular meaning, which we may or may not be trying to communicate in wearing it, then it cannot influence us according to that meaning while worn. So several Barthesian insights about the meaning of garments will still, throughout the thesis, be instructive for what is, nevertheless, at bottom, a more phenomenological approach.

Organisationally, I have divided the enquiry and argument into six chapters. The first examines several phenomenologically-relevant offerings from the history of reflection on clothes. My purpose in doing so is, first, to showcase work that already exists on issues surrounding clothing's ability to shape our self-experience and, therefore, second, to render more intuitive the claim that clothes have this ability. Chapter two then performs a close reading of the sartorial reflection by a particular commentator from this history, the English artist and essayist Eric Gill. On Gill's view, clothes function very similarly to various architectural spaces—houses, workshops, churches, town halls. While Gill was not a phenomenologist *per se*, his perspective will be decisive for this inquiry because it not only treats clothes as capable of helping shape our self-experience but, further, is the only account of which I am aware that does so in a theological context. It thus explicitly addresses something in the neighbourhood of our ultimate question as to how and why clothes might facilitate or hinder the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God.

Gill's perspective has the drawback, however, of lacking a sufficiently thoroughgoing account of human being and of the human relationship to things. Many of his onto-sartoriological claims therefore lack sufficient philosophical, phenomenological, and ontological grounding. He shares with Heidegger, however, a crucial ontological presupposition, i.e. in Gill's words, that all 'works of men and women' '[speak] to us of God', and do so even more obviously than Dante, 'the daisies, the dew-drops, and the dung' ('A', in *E* 19) or, in Heidegger's, that 'things' like handmade jugs 'gather the fourfold', a complex of fundamental phenomena including humans and the 'divinities' ('Th', in *PLT* 171ff. / *GA* 7: 175ff.). Together with this ontological overlap, the fact that, unlike Gill, Heidegger does have a thoroughgoing understanding of human being and of the human relationship to things makes it possible to draw on his philosophy to fill in the gaps Gill leaves.

Chapters three through five thus treat Heidegger. The first of these delineates his notion of 'dwelling', which is, as he puts it, a 'staying with things' [*Aufenthalt bei den Dingen*] ('BDT', in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153), and explicates his idiosyncratic understanding of the latter, allowing us to discern what would qualify a given garment as a 'thing' in his estimation. The answer, it turns out, is that it must 'gather the fourfold' and so the subsequent chapter delineates this complex in its four constituent parts. Chapter five then investigates three examples of a thing that Heidegger gives, discussing how each gathers the fourfold, and considers how a garment might similarly unite these elements.

Along the way, however, I will show how Heidegger critiques traditional theism in ways that obviate any wholesale adoption and application of his

philosophy to my question of how clothes might facilitate or hinder the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. In chapter six, therefore, I will return to Gill, strengthening his ontology with insights from Heidegger while leaving behind the parts of the latter's reflection that are incompatible with my aim. After doing so, I will conclude by showing how reflection on clothes from the perspective of a Gill enhanced by Heidegger and with regard to my question of facilitating or hindering openness and/or proximity to God reifies in the well-known phenomenon of 'church clothes' or one's 'Sunday Best'.

Chapter 1: The Impact of Clothes on Perception, Psychology, Bodily Function,  
Behaviour, and Self-Experience in Proto-Phenomenological Reflection

*This jacket has completely changed my life. When I leave the house in this, it's with a whole different confidence. Like tonight, I might have been a little nervous, but inside this jacket, I am composed, rounded, secure that I can meet any social challenge.—Jerry Seinfeld<sup>10</sup>*

*Putting on that S.S. uniform was really quite peculiar. [...] I stepped out of the caravan in this—what is, has to be—a very, very handsome uniform. The Germans, the Nazis, got in theatre designers to design the cut of these clothes. And it feels—it's odd to say, but it felt good; it felt powerful. And then I felt embarrassed that I felt good.—Ralph Fiennes<sup>11</sup>*

*If I waited for a proper occasion to get dressed up I'd never wear half of these clothes. Put on the clothes and you make things happen to match them. It doesn't work the other way around.—Erin Kelly<sup>12</sup>*

*If, for example, you put an emperor's robe on just anybody and put a crown on his head, and place him in the midst of other people, he will from that moment on become an emperor, because people will suddenly look up to him.—Friedensreich Hundertwasser<sup>13</sup>*

This chapter will present perspectives on clothing that bring out their capacity to shape our self-experience by facilitating attunements/comportments. Most of the theorists I consider, besides being foundational figures in clothing and fashion theory, were part of a late-nineteenth, early-twentieth-century intellectual culture trying to understand the philosophical significance of the human condition vis-à-vis the rapidly-developing modern scientific method. Consequently, many of their insights on clothing are relevant to the phenomenological discipline that would develop shortly thereafter and, in

---

<sup>10</sup> *Seinfeld*, S1/E3: 'The Jacket'.

<sup>11</sup> Fiennes 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Kelly 2009: 65-6.

<sup>13</sup> Hundertwasser 1982/3.

some cases, even have the character of what might be called proto-phenomenological reflection. In choosing these figures, I have neglected to consider at length other thinkers and theorists who speak about clothes in similarly proto-phenomenological, or even phenomenological, ways.<sup>14</sup> I have chosen the present theorists, however, because they indicate the general contours of the subfield, ‘phenomenology of clothes’, and because, except for the research pair I consider in the final section, each figure refers to the previous and, thus, together constitute a lineage. In the final section of this chapter, I treat exciting new research that could, if others follow suit, galvanise the still-nascent subfield, inciting several new debates and enriching general knowledge in the area. The analysis here will be primarily expository, yet always with an eye to the central claims of this thesis, that clothes can facilitate attunements/comportments, including, ultimately, theological ones like openness and/or proximity to God.

### The Inauguration of a Subfield: Hermann Lotze

The first analysis of clothing with something like a phenomenological approach appears in the work of the nineteenth-century German philosopher, psychologist, and physiologist, Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). A major philosophical voice in his own time, he influenced several subsequent thinkers, including Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, William James, and John Dewey (see Haupt 2000: 81-2; Watson 2004: 211 and 212ff.; and Martin 2002: 66).

---

<sup>14</sup> Specifically, I have in mind here Rousseau 1762: 42-4, 126-8, 322, 366-8, 371-3, and 393-4; Hegel 1835: i. 164-6 and ii. 742-50; Wollstonecraft 1993 edn.: 94; Wilde 1885: 9; James 1890: i. 115, 122, 291ff., 400-1, and 455 and ii. 426; Loos 1998 edn.: 39-44 and 89-117; Balla 1914: 39; Flügel 1930; Laver 1933; and Merleau-Ponty 1945: 101, 104, and 165-6, though others could easily be added.

Moreover, he provided a then-influential adjudication of the nineteenth-century dispute between materialism and neo-Kantian idealism by employing an almost proto-scientific methodology that satisfied materialists while delivering conclusions compatible with idealism (Haupt 2000: 81-2). In the fields of psychology and cognitive science, Lotze is famous for developing the ‘local signs’ theory of space, according to which any given perception has two components: On the one hand is the physical process that compels consciousness to generate a perceptual quality—to see a colour, to feel a certain degree of heat, etc. On the other is the ‘local sign’ that marks or situates this quality in a particular spot in relation to others (Beiser 2013: 231; cf. Lotze *MC*, i. 309 and Rollinger 2001: 108ff.).

Aside from making these contributions to philosophy and psychology, Lotze serves as a foundational figure in reflection on clothing because of a widely-cited section he devotes to the subject in his most seminal work, *Microcosmus*, the final volume of which he published in 1864. Lotze opens this section by discussing the perceptual effect of having something we are touching or holding come into contact with something else. For example, he says, when we brush a stick up against some surface, we feel as if we ourselves are touching that surface (*MC* ii. 588). Similarly, Lotze notes that standing on stone feels different from standing on wood, despite wearing the same pair of shoes in each case (*MC* ii. 589). We feel this difference in our body, as though we ourselves—rather than the shoes that lie between these surfaces and us—are touching the stone and wood.

On Lotze’s understanding, the soul, the self, or the life—he uses these terms more or less interchangeably—extends into the limbs so that when

something touches our fingertips, we experience it as touching us just as much as we would if it were touching our torso or any other part of our body (*MC ii. 589*). Lotze thus reasons that the soul must similarly extend into what we hold and wear: ‘In the cases referred to the soul extends still farther; exactly the same persuasive illusion that made us before say it was in the finger-tips, makes us now say it is present—percipient and sentient—at the end of the stick, of the probe, of the needle’ (*MC ii. 589*).

Here and elsewhere, Lotze is careful to say that this is just an illusion, that the soul does not really flow from body to stick, as if it were water (*MC ii. 590*). Nevertheless, his emphasis on phenomena like this illusory identification of things with our self leads him to emphasise clothing’s effect on the soul as the focus of his sartorial philosophy:

We speak not of other points of view [...] of the use of clothes as a protection against the inclemency of weather, of the sense of modesty that houses them as a covering; our inquiry is exclusively as to the source of the pleasure which they and other kinds of decoration afford to the human soul. It lies by no means only in the gratification of the vanity that seeks to be admired by others, but in the heightened and ennobled vital feeling of the wearer himself. [*MC ii. 590*]

In addition to setting aside the sartorial motivations of protection and modesty, then, Lotze insists that the decorative function of clothing is not merely (or even primarily) a matter of peacocking for others. It is about elevating the wearer’s conscious experience.

Lotze goes on to provide three categories of feelings that result from bringing the ‘foreign body’ of clothing into relationship with the surface of our own exterior: 1) the ‘expansion [or extension] of the proper self’; 2) the sense that we have acquired ‘a kind and amount of motion foreign to our natural organs’; and 3) the feeling of having ‘an unusual degree of vigour, power of

resistance, or steadiness in our bearing' (*MC* ii. 592). As an example of the expansion of the proper self, Lotze adduces those 'high erect helmets, bearskin caps, and lofty coiffures' that 'fortify the consciousness of the wearer with the feeling of a majestic upward extension of his personality' (*MC* ii. 593). In other words, clothing that increases our verticality or gives our head more prominence encourages us to experience ourselves as taller and higher, more elevated, more regal.

For the second category of feelings that result from wearing clothes—i.e. the sense that our body is experiencing motion in ways and amounts that would otherwise be alien to it—Lotze focuses on clothing with 'hanging and waving drapery' (*MC* ii. 593-4). Children attach make-believe tails on themselves, he says, because this allows them to experience sensations to which they would normally lack access, e.g. the feeling of having an appendage lightly trail along the soil as they walk or of having it flutter in the air as they run (*MC* ii. 594). Likewise, he adds, the purpose of feathers, beads, and bone pieces dangling from the attire of indigenous peoples, of women's sashes, ribbons, and earrings, and of uniform tassels, knots, chains, and crosses is 'not merely to expand our existence on all sides [i.e. the first category], but to create the pleasing delusion that it is ourselves that float and wave and sway in all these appendages' (*MC* ii. 594).

In his final category of feelings that come with wearing clothes, Lotze deals with the kind of apparel that covers our body during the normal course of living. For Lotze, the lack or presence of flexibility in such encasements is decisive for the feelings they impart: 'The greater or less tension and firmness possessed by the material in itself, or due to its cut, is transferred to us'. A

corset, for example, or—we might say—spandex, ‘is a means of imparting the feeling of a more vigorous and elastic existence’ (*MC* ii. 595). Similarly, he says, men enjoy wearing armour. While it may be heavy, attention is diverted from this fact, allowing them ‘to revel all the more in the majestic feeling of irresistible, unbending straightness’ it incites. In appreciation of this sensation, men, he says, are drawn to braces and other clothing whose tightness or rigidity approximates the experience of armour, filling them with ‘pride in the manly vigour’ of their existence (*MC* ii. 595).

Lotze says the female wardrobe complements this stiff apparel of men with its finer garments consisting of ‘light, gauzy stuffs with which she drapes her form’. This fluent attire is—Lotze again stresses—‘not merely intended to be graceful in the eyes of others’: ‘On the contrary, the wearer herself *is* by feeling directly present in all the graceful curves that with feather weight touch but a few points of the skin, and yet through these points excite the most distinct sensation of the breadth, lightness, and softness of their sweep’ (*MC* ii. 595; emphasis added to clarify the original significance).<sup>15</sup> He even goes so far as to claim that when we see a woman in such gracefully exquisite costume, our attraction to that costume is not primarily based on how lovely it looks but on how lovely we imagine it must feel (*MC* ii. 595).

---

<sup>15</sup> Compare the comment of one university student who participated in a study by then Professor of Textiles, Clothing, and Related Arts in University of Missouri’s now defunct School of Home Economics. When asked to describe her earliest clothing memories, the student said ‘When I was about four, I had a pink and grey taffeta checked dress with pink velvet on the bodice front. I liked the dress very much because it rustled when I moved’ (Rosencranz 1972: 6).

## Getting More Scientific: G. Stanley Hall and Louis W. Flaccus

Granville Stanley Hall (1844/46<sup>16</sup>-1924) was an American trailblazer in the field of psychology—particularly child and educational psychology—a lecturer in various disciplines, an academic administrator, and, occasionally, a minister. He taught at several universities, including Harvard, where he completed the first U.S. Ph.D in psychology during his spare time, studying with and becoming personally close to James (Wilson 1914: 64 and Evans 2005: ii. 1009). Upon finishing his doctoral course, Hall went to Germany to study under Wilhelm Wundt (Wilson 1914: 43), after which he returned to the U.S. and eventually acquired a professorship of psychology and pedagogy at the newly minted Johns Hopkins, where he had a seminal impact on John Dewey (Sheldon 1932: 127-8). Finally, he became the first president of Clark University, a post he held until his retirement some thirty years later.<sup>17</sup>

In psychology, Hall was a foundational figure who promoted the rise of the discipline and shaped its direction. He founded a number of American psychology journals—including the first one, the *American Journal of Psychology*—and he organised the formation of the American Psychological Association along with serving as its first president (Diehl 2000: 51 and Evans 2005: ii. 1009-10).<sup>18</sup> In addition to these administrative contributions, Hall is

---

<sup>16</sup> Curiously, several sources assign Hall's birth to 1 Feb. 1844, while several others record it as occurring on the same day in 1846. For three of the former, see Sheldon 1932: 127; Diehl 2000: 50; and Evans 2005: ii. 1009. For three of the latter, see Wilson 1914: 12; Thorndike 1925: 135; and Belzen 2010: 105.

<sup>17</sup> Notwithstanding the inaccurate reporting of Hall's Clark dates in recent encyclopaedic accounts (e.g. Diehl 2000: 51 and Evans 2005: ii. 1010), both Thorndike 1925: 137 and Sheldon 1932: 128 put Clark opening its doors in October 1889, though they differ slightly on Hall's retirement date, Thorndike 1925: 137 setting it at 1920 and Sheldon 1932: 130 at 1919.

<sup>18</sup> In addition to the *AJP*, Hall also started *Pedagogical Seminary* (which has become the *Journal of Genetic Psychology*), the *Journal of Applied Psychology*, and the *Journal of Religious Psychology* (Diehl 2000: 51).

widely credited with being amongst those who brought experimental psychology in general to the U.S.<sup>19</sup> and the first to apply it to child, developmental, and educational issues. Unlike Lotze, he had no interest in striking a creative compromise between idealism and materialism in his analyses but rather harboured quite fiercely anti-idealist sentiments (Martin 2002: 72 and 106). His own methodology was not without controversy concerning empirical rigour, though, for he pioneered the American usage of what he called the ‘method of topical syllabi’, sometimes referred to as the ‘questionnaire method’ (Diehl 2000: 51). Many psychologists even then—including Wundt—were sceptical of its reliability, opting instead for the more obviously dependable and rigorous experiment-based approach (see Belzen 2010: ch. 7, particularly pp. 112-17, for a helpful summary of the debate). As in most of his work, Hall’s practice of using questionnaires set the agenda for his studies in the psychology of clothes.<sup>20</sup>

In 1898, for example, Hall wrote an article called ‘Some Aspects of the Early Sense of Self’, in which he examines the process by which babies and young children come to recognise that this or that body part, etc. is, as we might say, ‘me’. After distributing a topical syllabus—or, questionnaire—on the subject to over five hundred educators and combining the results with a similar survey

---

<sup>19</sup> For example, Wundt, who is sometimes referred to as the ‘father of experimental psychology’, called Hall ‘the first to introduce experimental psychology into America’ (Wilson 1914: 47). On the other hand, the matter seems to be ground for lively debate. Some suggest that Hall’s efforts were technically second to the ‘psycho-physics’ laboratory work James organised at Harvard (Sheldon 1932: 128), while others argue that Hall deserves credit for ‘the first *research* laboratory in psychology in America’ since James’ work was ‘physiological’ (Evans 2005: ii. 1009; emphasis original).

<sup>20</sup> Barthes mocked this kind of enquiry, calling its fruits ‘an already dated collection of work, and very modest in its pretensions because it mainly concerns questionnaires given to students at a few American universities. [...] This research is barely distinguishable from the marketing polls carried out periodically by professional clothing companies [...]. It is quite clear that this is barely a psychology but at best a rudimentary psycho-sociology which can know nothing of the potential of phenomenological or psychoanalytical descriptions’ (LF 24).

on early ideas of the soul conducted by another professor at Clark (Hall 1898: 351), Hall set about categorising and describing various phenomena pertinent to young children's developing sense of self: their external body parts and internal organs; their image in mirrors and photographs; their name; their soul; their capacity for philosophical questioning; the distinction between themselves and others who influence them; and—most importantly for our purposes—their dress.

Pushing against the central insight of Lotze, Hall begins his discussion with the observation that although clothing certainly constitutes an important aspect of a child's self-consciousness, it is 'not usually included as a factor of the ego' (Hall 1898: 364). He is not entirely clear here, but I take this claim to be that the majority of children observed in the study did not appear to blur the line between their clothes and their 'self'. Hall particularly finds fault with Lotze's point that garments can lend our body or self a sense of stiffness or softness based on their own degree of flexibility (Hall 1898: 366). The results of his questionnaire suggest instead that children are far more interested in how clothes look than how they feel 'and this standpoint dominates often in those garments that are not seen' (Hall 1898: 366). This is peculiar. If it is true that children are not that concerned with how clothes feel and would wear uncomfortable garments for the sake of appearance, as Hall suggests (Hall 1898: 366), what could motivate them to do this for parts of their apparel that no one will ever see?

Hall does not elaborate, but this question will resurface in chapter five of this enquiry. In any case, Hall's point that children care more about the look than the feel as well as other comments show that, for him, clothes are relevant

to 'the early sense of self' inasmuch as they allow children to adorn their 'self'. He thus firmly situates himself within the tradition of those who approach the subject of raiment primarily by asking what explicitly and thematically motivates humans to dress and, then, further aligns himself with the only slightly smaller constituency who finally answer: 'decoration'.

Hall ventures further into proto-phenomenology where he addresses the effect of clothing: It shapes behaviour. A 'change of dress', he says, 'often involves a change of disposition, and almost character' (Hall 1898: 364). For example, 'Cleanliness of body like cleanliness of dress has a prodigious moral effect on children, who change manners, temper, conduct, and put on a better self after being well washed' (Hall 1898: 367). The effect can also be educative: 'The child who is rudely and poorly dressed [...] comes in closer contact with the world about him and acquires a knowledge more real and substantial' because he does not 'avoid acts and environments which tend to soil his clothes' (Hall 1898: 366).

At the end of his discussion on dress, Hall distinguishes what he calls 'body-consciousness', i.e. awareness of and attention to the body as associated with the self, from what he calls 'clothes-consciousness', i.e. awareness of and attention to clothing and its effects:

Many mention a corroding kind of self-pity with which they regard an old garment after it has been superseded by a newer and better one, and others preserve for themselves and later for their children all the articles of the dress of childhood and infancy, and regard them later with feelings curiously described, and no doubt still more curiously mingled. That, however, man's primitive body consciousness has been largely disguised and translated into clothes-consciousness, there can be no doubt. The comfort of clean garments, sensitiveness to texture and thickness, flexibility and fit are elements which are no doubt always present, and Lotze has done a real service in showing us that clothes are an integral part of our self-consciousness [...] but clothes are at best alter ego and

also in part mask and distort the primal sense of the physical self. [Hall 1898: 367]

This is a knotty passage with several ambiguities and places where a few more lines of explanation would be helpful to show how Hall's logic progresses from one sentence to the next. The overall point, however, is a corrective one. Hall raises two examples of a negative tendency he sees in humans to 'translat[e]' body-consciousness into clothes-consciousness, i.e. to think we are meditating on our body when, in fact, it is our clothes. Neither of his examples is as good as Lotze's in terms of picking out an instance of someone experiencing clothes as part of the self. We could easily pity ourselves, for example, after losing a beloved piece of clothing and yet, in no sense, experience that garment as part of our 'self'. This difficulty notwithstanding, it is, at least in theory, possible for such clothing-self identification to occur. What Hall wants to claim is that when it does, we are mistaking clothes-consciousness for body-consciousness and, by extension, our clothes for our body.

This might seem to suggest that Hall equates the self with the body, for he has drawn a parallel between identifying clothing with the self on the one hand and identifying clothing with the body on the other. But, if anything, he equates the self with the soul: 'Most children conceive the soul or self in some particular form. [...] It is thin, ghost-like, perhaps bluish, or light grey', etc. (Hall 1898: 372). I think the best interpretation of Hall's position is that he imagines the self to have a material component as well as a nonmaterial component. His oft-repeated reference to the 'physical self', as if to distinguish this from some other self, countenances such an interpretation. Thus, his suggestion that those who, like Lotze, identify a garment with the self are

mistaking their clothes for their body amounts to saying they have taken clothing to be the physical aspect of their self when they should not.

This is not an entirely unfounded critique, especially given Hall's interest in recovering the 'primitive body-consciousness'—or, 'primal sense of the physical self'—that he thinks identifying clothes with the self disguises. The problem is that Lotze fully acknowledged the illusory character of our tendency to associate clothing with our 'self' but was simply committed to explaining how this phenomenon occurs and why it is so common. Hall is probably right that the 'clothes-consciousness' operative in the phenomenon is covering up a kind of body-consciousness that is worth unveiling. But the important question for Lotze, and for us, is why is this possible in the first place, what does it say about us, and how can we harness it?

After writing this article, Hall made his most important contribution to the psychological study of clothing in collaboration with a junior colleague, Louis W. Flaccus (1876-1953/9<sup>21</sup>). If Lotze had employed a proto-scientific methodology in his reflection on clothes and other subjects, Hall and Flaccus advanced this to a full-blown, though contested, scientific method of raiment a little over forty years later. In 'Remarks on the Psychology of Clothes', Flaccus puts the matter this way:

No one, I think, will deny the general statement that clothes have a marked effect upon our mental life. But it is one thing to make a broad statement of this sort, and quite another thing to ground it scientifically, and to define with some approach to accuracy and thoroughness the nature of this effect and some of its causes. [Flaccus 1906: 61]

Interestingly, Flaccus did most of his work not in psychology but in philosophy of art and he spent the greater part his career as a professor of ethics and

---

<sup>21</sup> As with Hall, the biographical sources vary on some of Flaccus' dates. Anon. 1958: 335 puts his death at 15 Sept. 1953 while Cozzolino 2009: 107 assigns it to the same day in 1959.

aesthetics in the philosophy department at University of Pennsylvania (Anon. 1958: 335).

While Flaccus was still a Ph.D student at Harvard, however, he held the position of a ‘Sometime Fellow in Clark University’ during Hall’s presidency (Anon. 1958: 335 and Flaccus 1906: 61). Hall had drawn up a topical syllabus concerning ‘the effect of clothes on the psychological life’ and administered it to 181 girls from a school in the U.S. state of New York. He suggested Flaccus report and analyse the results (Flaccus 1906: 61-3). Flaccus’ paper—the aforementioned ‘Remarks’—divides the prompts and their responses into three groups, under the following headings: 1) ‘Minor and incidental matters’; 2) ‘Changes of self-feeling, fluctuations and changes in personality, differences in feeling-tone, diffusive and expansive effects’; and 3) ‘Effects on the self as a social reflex phenomenon’. Flaccus considers the prompts out of order and I will not treat all of them, but each section has a number of proto-phenomenological insights on clothes that are of interest to the present enquiry.

In the first section, Flaccus discusses appropriate expenditure on clothing, in connection with which he notes that ‘the mere change from a dark suit to a light one will often induce a direct change of mood’, which he says renders purchasing multiple suits intelligible (Flaccus 1906: 64). Later, in his analysis on the second group of prompts and responses, he similarly remarks that ‘Putting on a light tie or a white vest will often cause a distinct sense of changed personality’ (Flaccus 1906: 73). These comments parallel the

contentions of other early clothing commentators<sup>22</sup> and anticipate contemporary research on the psychology of colour as it relates to attire.<sup>23</sup> Like both of these strains of reflection, Flaccus' remarks here suggest that the colour of our clothing has significant impact on how we feel and behave.

---

<sup>22</sup> While I know of no early commentator who discusses specifically white or light-coloured clothes in relation to moods, behaviour, or 'personality', the Italian Futurist painter and essayist Giacomo Balla lobbied to 'abolish' 'neutral [...] and humble colours' in clothing (Balla 1914: 39). In lieu of these 'pedantic, professorial, and teutonic shapes and hues' that 'curb our excitement and slow us down', he said, 'We want to colour Italy with Futurist audacity and risk, and finally give Italians joyful and bellicose clothing' (Balla 1914: 39). He advocated garments that, *inter alia*: 'intensify the courage of the strong and overcome the sensitivity of the cowardly'; have 'muscular colours' that 'inspire the love of danger, speed, and assault, and loathing of peace and immobility'; and 'ignite temerity in a fearful crowd, spread light around when it rains, and meliorate the dimness of twilight in the streets and in the nerves' (Balla 1914: 39). All of this, he said, is necessary because 'One thinks and acts as one dresses' (Balla 1914: 39). In a different, and incompatible, vein, the English journalist, fashion and health lecturer, magazine founder, and inventor Ada S. Ballin argued that white, of all colours save a material's original pigmentation, is the healthiest to wear. She advocated this not only because dyes at the time bled into the skin but also because not being able to see dirt on coloured clothing encourages us to think it is clean, whereas white fabric displays filth transparently (Ballin 1885: 79-80). Insofar as cleanliness affects mood or behaviour, as Hall above indicates (Hall 1898: 367), such insights on clothing colour, too, are relevant here.

<sup>23</sup> Candy, for example, refers to the phenomenon of 'feeling fresh or clean or a sense of personal renewal' in wearing a white shirt as well as the concomitant 'anxieties that relate to keeping a shirt clean and white while it is being worn' (Candy 2005: 3.7). Less anecdotally, Mark Frank and Thomas Gilovich's study sets out to explain the 'observed tendency for professional sports teams that wear black uniforms to be penalised more than their rivals' (Frank and Gilovich 1988: 81). In line with the results of their experiments, Frank and Gilovich suggest a two-fold aetiology: On the one hand, 'Teams that wear black uniforms receive harsher treatment from the referees. Because we associate the colour black with meanness and aggressiveness, we "see" more aggressiveness or more malevolent intent in the actions of players wearing black uniforms' (Frank and Gilovich 1988: 81). On the other hand, however, 'subjects wearing black uniforms were more inclined than their white-uniformed counterparts to seek out opportunities for aggressive competition, providing some initial support for the idea that football and hockey players who wear black uniforms actually play more aggressively than their rivals' in white (Frank and Gilovich 1988: 83). Other studies corroborate this twofold conclusion, showing that offenders and suspects in black are perceived to be more aggressive than their counterparts in light-coloured clothing (see Vrij 1997: 48 and 52) and that 'participants using black-cloaked avatars developed more aggressive intentions and attitudes but less group cohesion than those using white-cloaked avatars' (Peña et al. 2009: 838). Contemporary research does not only identify such effects in black vs. white clothing, however. There is, for example, a large body of literature on the psychological import of red attire. This literature suggests that footballers who wear red jerseys both appear and experience themselves as more aggressive or dominant than players in other colours (Feltman and Elliot 2011: 312) and that red apparel makes women more attractive to men (see Roberts et al. 2010: 359; Guéguen 2012: 78; and Pazda et al. 2012: 789) and *vice versa* (Roberts et al. 2010: 359 and Elliot et al. 2010: 399). The research of Roberts et al. further showed that the reason individuals wearing red are more attractive than those wearing other colours lies not only in the clothing's impact on onlookers but also in its influence on the wearers themselves (Roberts et al. 2010: 352 and 360-1). In other words, red clothing subtly encourages its wearers to comport themselves more attractively through 'kinesic cues such as facial expression, posture, and head-tilt' (Roberts et al. 2010: 361), perhaps because, more fundamentally, it subtly encourages them to experience themselves as more attractive. While the field has shown particular interest in the colour red, for just a few the many studies on the emotional impact of a whole range of colours, see Wexner 1954; Aaronson 1964; Jacobs and Suess 1975; Kwallek et al. 1996; Kaya and Epps 2004; and Roberts et al. 2010.

Other interesting issues arise in connection with the first-section questionnaire prompt ‘What can you suggest about the care of clothes and its educative value?’ Amongst the responses Flaccus records are ‘The care of clothes teaches us the value of harmony with one’s surroundings’, ‘The care of clothes makes us methodical and careful also about other things’, and ‘When a person dresses nicely an amount of self-respect is given which cannot be had in any other way’ (Flaccus 1906: 65). The latter two comments are straightforward enough, but the first is vague. What, precisely, is the meaning of the term ‘surroundings’ here? Is it the outdoors, as when one puts on a raincoat (or not) to be in harmony with the surroundings of a rainy day in London? Is it social context, as when one puts on white-tie to be harmony with the surroundings of an evening affair? Perhaps the responder means both of these and more, but however we interpret her, the upshot of her comment is that we have a relationship to things around us. Furthermore, her words indicate that clothing is a decisive factor in rendering this relationship harmonious and teaching us to appreciate that harmony. The decisive question then becomes: what is the essential character of being in harmony with our surroundings and how does the specific harmony of our clothing with our surroundings teach us about this more general phenomenon? This enquiry will address such questions in the chapters on Heidegger to come.

The second group of prompts and responses is directly related to the concerns of this chapter: ‘Changes of self-feeling, fluctuations and changes in personality, differences in feeling-tone, diffusive and expansive effects’. Prompt three from this group asks:

Do the materials of your dress affect your feeling, i.e. whether they are filmy soft stuffs or stiffer and more unyielding material? Do you like the rustle of silk? Does the wearing of fur have any special effect upon your mental state? Does the character of your hat? Do you like to wear a train? Why? [Flaccus 1906: 62]

This cluster of questions takes its inspiration from Lotze's first and third categories of feelings that result from wearing clothes, i.e. the 'expansion [or extension] of the proper self' and 'an unusual degree of vigour, power of resistance, or steadiness in our bearing'. The responses to the prompt include: 'In a large, heavy hat my spirits are low', 'A broad hat makes me feel jolly', 'I feel brighter in a hat rolling away from the face', 'I feel starched in a stiff waist', 'I am cross when I touch rough materials', 'I can't bear to touch woollen goods; they make me shiver', 'I dislike the feeling of flannel next to my skin', 'I like to rub my hand on a velvety surface', and 'I cannot bear to touch velvet. I feel chills running up and down my back' (Flaccus 1906: 66-70).

In addition to offering perspectives on the physical and emotional effects of clothing, these responses highlight the possibility of variances in the first-hand experience of a garment from one person to the next (Flaccus 1906: 70). It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasise this principle, for, as we will see with George van Ness Dearborn below and throughout this thesis, many of clothing's effects are unknown to us, even when we are reflecting on what we are wearing. So the fact that, in Hall and Flaccus' study, one girl likes the feel of velvet and the other hates it does not by itself determine whether either of them is better off indulging in or avoiding it.

Covering another facet of the third prompt, Flaccus continues:

There is something characteristic and undeniably pleasing about a pair of gloves after they have been worn for some time. It is lack of such adaptability which gives to very stiff and new goods an unpleasant

feeling-tone. [...] That a few of the answers express dislike of very soft, clinging materials is further proof of the unpleasantness of checked natural movements, for clinging goods often interfere with these quite as effectively as do stiff goods. [Flaccus 1906: 67]

Unfortunately, the fact that no boys were given the questionnaire prevents us from deciding whether the results here confirm or refute Lotze's contention that females gravitate toward loose, flowing garments while men gravitate toward stiff ones that make them feel virile. In any case, Flaccus draws upon Lotze to explain why this issue of clothes interfering with movement provoked such strong reactions in the respondents: 'The stiffness or softness of the cloth affects the total conception of the self as a presented system of [...] feelings with the mark of intimacy and authority' (Flaccus 1906: 68). In other words, clothes are so intimately connected to us that if they are stiff, we ourselves feel stiff; if they feel soft, we ourselves feel soft.

While Flaccus suggests that Lotze takes this observation a bit far by using it to explain his 'fondness for high head gear, lofty coiffures, bearskin caps, [and] sugar-loaf hats' (Flaccus 1906: 68), he nevertheless says:

we must at least admit that the incorporation of originally unrelated objects into the 'Me' as a system of presented elements is one of the commonplaces of psychology.<sup>24</sup> Our clothing [...] is ordinarily felt as an integral part of ourselves. As one of the answers puts it: 'Clothing should be well cared for; it is part of us.' [Flaccus 1906: 68-9]

In fact, Flaccus goes even further and says 'It takes time for us to get accustomed to a new suit; new clothes make self-conscious. There is much pleasure in their gradually becoming part of ourselves' (Flaccus 1906: 70). Thus, when he says 'There is something characteristic and undeniably pleasing about a pair of gloves after they have been worn for some time' and 'It is lack of such

---

<sup>24</sup> As I will discuss in connection with Dearborn below, this is a reference to James' 'Empirical Me' or 'Empirical Self' (see James 1890: i. 291-2).

adaptability which gives to very stiff and new goods an unpleasant feeling-tone', he is suggesting that the latter unpleasantness lies in new goods not yet submitting to 'gradually becoming part of ourselves'.

Flaccus closes his commentary on prompt three by highlighting the respondents' consensus with regard to fabric texture: 'The disagreeable feeling-tone of rough materials is very marked. Rough woollen goods are disliked. They give a feeling of creepiness' (Flaccus 1906: 70). On this count, not only the student comments regarding wool but also those regarding flannel and velvet are relevant. Explicating these remarks, Flaccus notes that wearing such disagreeable fabrics tends to have an adverse emotional impact, which he likens to animal vexation: 'Rough materials rub against the fine hairs of the skin and irritate the sensory organs at their base. An irritable mood very often results. The ruffling of feathers is in birds an index to an excitable or irritable state. A dog or a cat resents being stroked the wrong way. We speak of a ruffled temper' (Flaccus 1906: 70). Flaccus further reports that 'Furs are disliked because they give a hot, choked, stuffed feeling' (Flaccus 1906: 71). When a garment in one way or another causes irritation, he points out, this diminishes its capability of extending the wearer's self: 'It is evident that the less the attention is distracted by irritating features in the surface of actual content, the more perfect will be the illusion' that the clothing is part of the body it encases (Flaccus 1906: 69).

Still in the second group—i.e. 'Changes of self-feeling, fluctuations and changes in personality, differences in feeling-tone, diffusive and expansive effects'— Flaccus turns his attention to prompt two: 'Do you feel a change in your personality, and if so describe it, from being (a) in a conventional evening

dress, (b) in an outing costume which gives unwonted freedom of action?’ (Flaccus 1906: 62). Of course, this question, like most in Hall’s survey, is highly leading, but the answers are nevertheless evocative: ‘In evening-dress I feel uncomfortable, gotten up for show; in an outing costume I enjoy a delightful sense of freedom’, ‘In evening-dress I feel unreal, like living in a different world; in an outing suit I feel exhilarated, free, younger, particularly glad to be alive’, ‘There is a slight change in my personality. I feel more dignified and grand [in evening-dress] and feel that all eyes are turned on me’ (Flaccus 1906: 73). Concerning the first of these statements in particular, it is no surprise that the respondent feels ‘gotten up for show’ in her evening attire because this is, in fact, what is happening. Part of the purpose of evening dress is to lend its wearer an air of elegance for contexts where this is appropriate. Of course, even outing clothes are not free of this dimension, as children are often dressed in such attire for the purpose of looking cute.

The interesting point, however, is that Flaccus identifies the looseness, among other things, of outing clothes as making the girls feel as though they are not on display or dressed to meet social expectations, even though they are, just in a different way. In glossing the above three and other responses to prompt two, he notes the changes in personality that accompany the donning of an outing costume: 1) a ‘Sense of greater freedom of action, of movement’; 2) the ‘Rise of animal spirits’ (‘I feel like running, jumping’, ‘I am boisterous, swing my arms’, ‘I feel Bohemian; like a tom-boy’, ‘Life to me seems worth living’); 3) ‘Naturalness, self-forgetfulness (‘I forget all about myself’); and 4) an ‘I don’t care’ feeling (Flaccus 1906: 73-4). Although, similar to the evening clothes, some of these effects are undoubtedly due, in part, to the fact that outing clothes

carry culturally-assigned associations of relaxation and play, such associations would not be enough to produce all of the effects on their own. Respondents would not, for example, feel a ‘sense of greater freedom of action, of movement’ from a straightjacket that their culture prescribed as appropriate for outings. Some of the effects here are a direct result of, *inter alia*, the experience, whether thematic or not, of sartorial looseness.

Flaccus begins his analysis of the prompts and responses in the third group—i.e. ‘Effects on the self as a social reflex phenomenon’—with the following admission: ‘This can hardly be separated from Group 2. Some changes in self-feelings, however, are more readily interpreted as reflex phenomena of social intercourse, and it is with these that we are to deal’ (Flaccus 1906: 76). Flaccus’ point is this: Many garments’ physical characteristics facilitate changes in self-feeling or personality, which is the domain of the second group. At the same time, however, some of the same garments also effect these psychological changes as a result of social conventions, making discussion of them relevant to the third group. An example of this overlap is the outing costume just considered. Outing suits give ‘unwonted freedom of action’ and respondents thus report feeling ‘exhilarated, free, younger’, ‘unrestrained, stronger, [...] ready for anything, reckless, more natural’, gay, jolly, and joyous (Flaccus 1906: 73). All of this is said, however, in the context of contrasting outing clothes with evening dress, which is worn in situations where social conventions are more strict. Thus, not only the outing suits’ ‘unwonted freedom of action’ but also the social convention of wearing them for informal occasions plays a role in the respondents’ feeling free and so on.

In the third group, though, Flaccus wants to deal with sartorial effects that are ‘more readily interpreted as reflex phenomena of social intercourse’ alone. Still, there is some overlap between self-feeling and social reflex in third group as well. Prompt one, for example, asks ‘How does a sense of being well dressed or the opposite affect you? How are you affected by shabby or ill-fitting gloves or shoes?’ (Flaccus 1906: 62). Obviously, ‘shabby or ill-fitting gloves or shoes’ are going to impart some self-feeling, but even the answers concerning the first of these questions involves an overlap: ‘I feel able to meet any person’, ‘I feel as if I could face the world’, ‘I feel equal to meeting any one’, ‘I feel at my best’, ‘I feel able to cope with any situation’, ‘I feel worth more’, ‘I have more respect for myself’, and ‘I feel somewhat morally better’ (Flaccus 1906: 76). While all these comments have some root in social convention, they do not merely recount ‘reflex phenomena of social intercourse’ but also describe self-feelings that arise from interaction with material. When we are well-dressed, i.e. when we wear clothes that are clean, well-made, and well-maintained, we feel taken care of. We feel ‘worth more’ and thus ‘able to meet any person’, able ‘to face the world’ and ‘cope with any situation’ it brings us.

#### A Medical Approach: George van Ness Dearborn

Hall and Flaccus may have succeeded in—as the latter put it—scientifically grounding and defining the nature and causes of clothing’s effect on mental life, but for the American psychologist and psychiatrist George van Ness Dearborn (1869-1938), this remains insufficient for the scientific study of clothes. After finishing his Bachelor of Letters at Dartmouth College, Dearborn obtained his M.D. from the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia

University (Dearborn 1899: 71). He then completed a Masters of Arts degree at Harvard, where—like Hall—he studied under and formed a lifelong friendship with James before returning to Columbia to undertake his Ph.D (Shook 1998: 471 and Dearborn 1899: 71). Dearborn employed this training primarily through his work as an educator and scholar. In his scholarly research, Dearborn was amongst the first to establish a connection between blood pressure and emotion, an endeavour he began with his doctoral thesis, *The Emotion of Joy* (Bondi 1995: 422). He was also an early—some even suggest the first (e.g. J. T. E. Richardson 2011: 134, though see Tulchin 1940: 1, who adduces an even earlier study by Alfred Binet)—user of inkblots in psychological research, publishing two papers (i.e. Dearborn 1897 and 1898) on the subject before completing his graduate studies and therefore over two decades before the advent of Hermann Rorschach’s *Psychodiagnostik*, which popularised the method.

At the beginning of his most comprehensive enquiry on clothes—the 1918 *Psychology of Clothing*—Dearborn announces that ‘The science of clothing so far has never been developed; it is something new, almost pioneer scientific work’ (Dearborn 1918: 1). In addressing this shortfall, Dearborn’s central claim is that ‘The public does need basic scientific information on how to clothe themselves properly so that they will be both more efficient and more happy, because continually more comfortable’ (Dearborn 1918: 1). But since ‘Comfort has both a physiological and a psychological aspect’ (Dearborn 1918: 2), Dearborn employs a twofold approach, developing both a ‘physiological psychology of clothing’ that explores raiment’s ‘multiform influences within and without over the body which wears it’ (Dearborn 1918: 4) and an ‘applied

psychology of clothing' that investigates clothes as 'powerful determinates of our own inner consciousness', which have 'direct relationships to our ejective, social environment' (Dearborn 1918: 49). In other words, Dearborn examines on the one hand how clothing affects our bodies physically/physiologically and on the other how it affects our view of ourselves and others as well as their view of us. In line with this bifurcation, he breaks his analysis into two major divisions, each corresponding to the respective psychology of clothing.

It is with regard to the physiological psychology that Dearborn seeks to redouble the scientific mindset of researchers like Hall and Flaccus:

My approach [to the physiological psychology of clothes] is mostly that of pure science from the universities and from the psychological and physiological laboratories, although no actual researches that I am able to hear of have as yet been done in a scientific laboratory on the psychology of clothing. There have been some questionary observations made, (at Clark and, I have heard, at Columbia), they have asked young people questions, but no psychological laboratory, so far as I am aware, has ever taken up the widely interesting matter experimentally. [Dearborn 1918: 3]

The 'Clark' reference here is to the Hall and Flaccus article, with which Dearborn scantily interacts but regarding which he later concludes: 'Little is to be found in the answers discussed concerning the physiological psychology of clothing, but what there is undoubtedly corroborates Lotze's keen hints' (Dearborn 1918: 49). While the former half of this evaluation is overstated since much of Flaccus' analysis about clothing features encouraging self-feelings is relevant for Dearborn's physiological psychology of clothes, the latter's sense that Hall and Flaccus' research lacks sufficient experimental grounding is hard to deny. The problem, Dearborn admits, is that no physiological or psychological lab work has been done on clothing and rectifying this is going to be expensive and time-consuming (Dearborn 1918: 3). Since at

the moment, these factors render such work on clothing forbidding for even Dearborn himself, he resolves to go at least one step further than Hall and Flaccus by basing his analysis on lab findings regarding other phenomena that have some application to clothes (Dearborn 1918: 3). This, he feels, will produce something approaching a truly scientific physiological psychology of clothing until he is ‘able to start in one way or another some actual relevant psychological experiments’ (Dearborn 1918: 3).

In the ensuing physiological analysis, Dearborn commends clothing that facilitates health in three general areas: skin, ‘bodily action’, and body temperature (Dearborn 1918: 4). In terms of skin, he says, ‘Proper clothes protect the person from sunburn’ and ‘from insects’ (Dearborn 1918: 12) in addition to softening ‘physical impacts’ (Dearborn 1918: v). Also, ‘clothing both hygienically and for comfort should be *loose*, and thus allow of a slight circulation of air’ between it and the skin (Dearborn 1918: 12; emphasis original).<sup>25</sup> Such clothing, Dearborn says, facilitates the pleasurable sensation of air subtly gliding over the skin receptors (Dearborn 1918: 11). Finally, also in the realm of sensation, Dearborn says ‘*clothes must not irritate the skin*’ and thus should not have a ‘scratchy linen collar’, a ‘coat-collar which comes habitually

---

<sup>25</sup> As I will shortly show, the commendation of loose clothing for one reason or another becomes something of a refrain for Dearborn, but it is not unique to him. As I noted above, the theme appears in Flaccus’ work and it similarly shows up in Ballin, though she also stresses that clothes should not be too loose (Ballin 1885: 91, 128, and 138). Then, in the lively essay ‘Lumbar Thought’, Umberto Eco speaks of the tightness of his jeans, suggesting that ‘A garment that squeezes the testicles makes a man think differently. [...] it obliged me to *live towards the exterior world*. It reduced, in other words, the exercise of my interior-ness’ (Eco 1986: 193; emphasis original). He contrasts both his jeans and the restrictive armour of medieval warriors, who ‘lived an exterior life’, with the robes of monks, who ‘were rich in interior life’: ‘the body, protected by a habit that, ennobling it, released it, was free to think, and to forget about itself’ (Eco 1986: 194). In a study on football kits, Viveka Berggren Torell, similarly judges clothing that is ‘not obtrusive in any way’ as most capable of facilitating the ‘disappearance of the body’ (Torell 2011: 92). She makes no final declarations, however, about whether this means footballers should get used to tighter, ‘body-altering’ kits or companies should consider making the uniforms looser if that is what is more comfortable for the players (Torell 2011: 96-7).

against the back of the neck’, ‘poisonous hosiery-dye’, or a ‘projecting heel-nail’ (Dearborn 1918: 9; emphasis original). Such features, he says, are an ‘extreme cause of irritation not only to the skin, but through the integrating nervous system to the entire individual’ (Dearborn 1918: 9).

In delineating Dearborn’s comments on the relation between clothing and ‘bodily action’, it is important to note that he devotes more space to this concern than to any other in his entire study. It is, therefore, where the bulk of his insights lie. To begin, he says our transverse colon is often full and that when it is, wearing tight clothing in the abdominal region is bound to cause discomfort, even if ‘subconscious’ (Dearborn 1918: 14). Accordingly, he again prescribes loose clothing, a theme that also continues with his recommendations in relation to cardio-pulmonary processes.<sup>26</sup>

For example, he criticises the use of corsets, with which women’s ‘abdomens, at least, often were so tightly compressed that their viscera were pressed upward and there interfered with the free action of the heart. The first thing one does ordinarily when a woman “faints away” is to loosen her clothing around the abdomen and chest, and so give her heart a chance to beat normally

---

<sup>26</sup> Interestingly, however, Dearborn later stipulates that ‘How much one eats and drinks (the very basis of much bodily comfort) is determined to some extent by the clothing’ (Dearborn 1918: 29). By this, I take him to mean that tighter clothes promote more moderate ingestion, which would seem to indicate a benefit he has not considered in resisting them.

again' (Dearborn 1918: 16). Like the descriptions of most commentators,<sup>27</sup> this is a far darker picture than Lotze's above assessment that the corset 'is a means of imparting the feeling of a more vigorous and elastic existence', with which Dearborn interacts directly:

a corset's firmness on all sides, thinks Lotze, makes us feel as if we ourselves were thus firm and self-reliant. Constraining garments thus may at times tend to give some one a self-consciousness which has distinctly self-exalting features, as here suggested, but personally I think that far oftener this oppressive restraint works quite the other way, namely to lessen self-confidence and to limit one's tendency to initiative and to action. It acts as a *suggested discouragement*, and therefore is "all to the bad" in the majority of cases. [Dearborn 1918: 32-3; emphasis original]

While the corset constitutes a more extreme example of tight clothing that hampers cardio-pulmonary processes and, therefore, has quite understandably been a matter of wide concern, Dearborn goes further. Analysing a previous experiment he conducted in his research on blood pressure, he says the

---

<sup>27</sup> The decial of corsetry—especially of its more extreme form, 'tight-lacing'—is ubiquitous in the history of fashion and textile theory. For just a few critical discussions, see Rousseau 1762: 366-7; Flower 1881: 22-4; Wilde 1885: 9; Ballin 1885: 73, 101-25, and 156; Veblen 1899: 114 and 120-23; Dunlap 1928: 76; Rudofsky 1947: 24-7 and 65-73 and 1971: 102-11; and, finally, Renbourn 1972: 9-12 and 45. Flügel mocks such aversion to corsets as 'curiously antiquated' (Flügel 1930: 43), taking a more Lotzean view that the garment's lack of physical looseness can encourage a lack of moral looseness (Flügel 1930: 75, 76 n. 2, and 99). Obviously, this effect would obtain much more readily in an era when, according to the general sensibility, 'Uncorseted women reeked of licence' (Rudofsky 1971: 111; cf. Steele 2001: 26 and 30). Paradoxically, however, Flügel also identifies the haptic 'pressure' of tight-lacing as a potential source of sexual pleasure for the wearer (Flügel 1930: 88-9, 99-100), an intuition corroborated by Australian feminist Beatrice Faust: 'corsets provide intense kinaesthetic stimulation for women, appealing to the sense of touch but extending more than skin deep. These frivolous accessories are not just visual stimuli for men: they are also tactile stimuli for women' (Faust 1980: 53). For a more recent analysis, see Valerie Steele's thorough and balanced retrospective that challenges the 'reductiveness' of characterising the corset as an 'instrument of women's oppression' (Steele 2001: 1) or as what *Punch* magazine called 'fashionable suicide' (Steele 2001: 67; cf. Anon. 1869: 198). Concerning the latter, Steele says: 'the corset did not—could not—cause all the diseases for which it has been blamed. This is not to say that corsetry had no negative health consequences, but it is important to be realistic about what those consequences were' (Steele 2001: 2). Dearborn's claims in this regard are fairly modest, however, and, as such, corroborated by Steele and cardiologist Lynn Kutsche's research: 'a tight corset does indeed push the ribs significantly in and up, altering the position of the internal organs' (Steele 2001: 69) and 'Reports of corseted women fainting are likely to have been accurate' (Steele 2001: 70). Despite this corroboration as well as the fact that Steele says 'The position of the corset indicates that it might affect the [...] heart' (Steele 2001: 68), she attributes the fainting not, as Dearborn does, to the corset's 'interfere[nce] with the free action of the heart' but to its 'interfere[nce] with respiration' (Steele 2001: 71).

normalised heart rate therein was ‘due solely to relaxation and to deep breathing, two of the physiological processes which cannot occur in an over-tight and ill-fitting suit of clothes’ (Dearborn 1918: 18). Hence, Dearborn also cites the American surgeon George Washington Crile’s use of a full-body rubber suit ‘to raise the peripheral blood-pressure of persons who were dying because their arterial tension was far too low’ (Dearborn 1918: 23): ‘universally over-tight [...] clothing must act in the same way as Crile’s shock-suit, namely to raise the blood-pressure, but now when it is already high enough, and so to help continue and make worse [...] the pace of mental tension and general strenuousness that kills’ (Dearborn 1918: 23).

Still addressing ‘bodily action’, Dearborn advances his notion that

Skill of a thousand kinds and grace of many varieties, the two combining into various kinds of efficiency, are concerned with clothing in this particular respect. It is the movements, the behaviour, of the man which is the important thing, and not, so to say, his chance shape when he is standing on the tailor's stool to be measured. Old clothes fit, and therein mostly arises the common satisfaction of wearing them, especially when one is at work. The psychology of this runs perhaps somewhat thus: The control of voluntary movements, of all movements in fact, is largely by the inherent sensations of the action-system, formerly and technically called the muscle-joint sense, but now increasingly often and more properly kinaesthesia. These guiding inherent sensations are normally (save in new and truly voluntary movements, which are rare) more or less subconscious or even wholly unconscious. [Dearborn 1918: 24]

In other words, even unreservedly stipulating that we have ‘voluntary’ movements, all of these are undergirded and made possible by ‘kinaesthesia’ (from the Greek for sensations of movement). These are the often totally unconscious perceptions within the body—in the muscles, tendons, joints, etc.—that inform the brain of various strains, restraints, and movements occurring in the body (Dearborn 1918: 13). Dearborn stresses that such events and the perceptions that signal them are relevant for skill development because,

as *The Literary Digest* put it in presenting Dearborn's research, 'this sense makes it possible for us subconsciously to control all our bodily acts; it enables us to possess that quality called skill; its deficiency, carried to an extreme, may result in utter feebleness of mind, lack of control, and inability to live the life of sanity and normality' (Anon. 1913: 1167).<sup>28</sup> As a result, 'the restraints, discomforts, irregular pressures, irritations, constrictions, lack of support, and other bothers of ill-fitting clothes [...] are *precisely the kind of interrupting sensations most certain to disturb ideal bodily action*, so intimately are they related to the disturbed flow of kinaesthetic sensations' (Dearborn 1918: 28; emphasis original). Thus, these 'irritations, fully felt or not [...] would be *most apt to disturb* the skilful flow of the skill-neurility' (Dearborn 1918: 26; emphasis original).

Dearborn concludes his excursus on clothes in relation to 'bodily action' by discussing the tiring effect of heavy raiment:

our day-clothes in general are distinctly and needlessly heavy, and confining and therefore unduly tiring to both the body and the mind. Everyone who wears our kind of clothes (unfortunately the fashion is diffusing over the entire Earth) has felt the almost "delicious" relief of getting them off, thus allowing the body, if only for a few moments, to be *free*. Unrestrainedly to breathe both by lungs and skin; heart free to beat; and to move limbs and torso unhindered by a thick and hindering mass of rigid clothes to which the sensitive and easily fatigued nervous system as yet has not wholly adapted itself! [Dearborn 1918: 41-2; emphasis original]

Obviously, Dearborn's phrase 'our kind of clothes' refers to an era of Western dress that is no longer entirely with us. According to the Czech-American architect and fashion historian Bernard Rudofsky, the full male costume of this

---

<sup>28</sup> Indeed, Dearborn even says the kinaesthetic stimuli 'give rise to the activity which [...] results in curiosity, interest, psychophysiological evolution and education. Education is the reaction of personality to its environment; and reaction is inconceivable without kinaesthesia' (Dearborn 1913: 234; also cited in Anon. 1913: 1168).

era incorporated ‘seven veils of the male stomach’—‘undershirt’, ‘drawers’, ‘shirt’, ‘trousers’, ‘vest’, ‘coat’, and ‘overcoat’—(Rudofsky 1947: 125), ‘two dozen pockets’, and ‘six to seven dozen buttons’ (Rudofsky 1947: 126; see 125, 120, and 121, respectively, for colourful and enlightening diagrams). Still, the experience of ‘delicious relief’ upon getting one’s clothes off at the end of the day is not unknown to us, as is evident in the businessman loosening his tie after work or the boy tripping over even the purportedly comfortable blue jeans because he so hastily removed them without taking off his shoes.

Finally, Dearborn’s physiological psychology addresses the relationship between attire and body temperature. In this regard, he cites the role of a given garment’s weave and material in facilitating evaporation, thus keeping its wearer cool, and trapping insulating air, thus keeping its wearer warm (Dearborn 1918: 43-4). He also adduces the well-known principle that white reflects warming light and therefore feels cool while black absorbs the radiant energy present in light and therefore feels warm (Dearborn 1918: 44). Although it is, at best, indirectly relevant to body temperature, Dearborn then proceeds to address ‘The *mental* influence of the colours of clothes’ (Dearborn 1918: 44; emphasis original):

red excites, and thus warms. Red and all the bright colours excite, even green. Blue is the least exciting. Colours exert more influence on observers than they do on the individual. Black, on the other hand, depresses both wearer (by suggestion?) and observer; and yet somehow it seems for general use the most suitable colour for dignified, responsible men and women. [Dearborn 1918: 44]

Dearborn acknowledges that these effects have been ‘more or less well worked out, but not yet in a psychological laboratory’ (Dearborn 1918: 44). As of now,

however, a large body of literature confirms much of what he says here,<sup>29</sup> though, importantly for this enquiry, some of the more recent studies controvert his balancing claim that non-black ‘colours exert more influence on observers than they do on the individual’.<sup>30</sup> In so doing, such research contributes to his aim of demonstrating that clothing impacts its wearer in such a way as to contribute to efficiency and happiness.

In addition to this ‘physiological psychology of clothing’ that addresses attire in relation to the skin, ‘bodily action’, and body temperature, Dearborn also proffers an ‘applied psychology of clothing’ that includes some insights of relevance to this enquiry. For example, he says:

The really well-dressed persons in general wear clothes which are not easily differentiated from the rest of their personality at all. Indeed, philosophically speaking, one’s selfness includes all of his relationships [...], what James pointed out as the pragmatic Me. The psychology of clothing emphasises it, as it is not hard to understand. *Naturally*, in a social community a man’s clothes are part of his very self. It is a worthy philosophic proposition. Clothes are not something that he puts on and may wholly take off; a parasite that bears no relation to his personality. The clothes a man wears are really part of his personality considered from a common-sense (the pragmatic) point of view. Therefore, they should fit into it as well as on to it. They should be for whom they are made unobtrusive. They should be part of the individual. And then, properly and socially speaking, they *are* part of him. [Dearborn 1918: 65-6; emphases original]

---

<sup>29</sup> With regard to the colour red’s tendency to excite, for example, see Roberts et al. 2010: 359; Elliot et al. 2010: 399; Guéguen 2012: 78; and Pazda et al. 2012: 789. Then, with regard to Dearborn’s claim that blue is the least exciting, see the literature’s findings of blue as the colour most often associated with ‘secure-comfortable’ and ‘tender-soothing’ (Wexner 1954: 434), as ‘calming and/or depressing’ relative to red and to white (Stone and English 1998: 184), and as ‘elicit[ing] [...] feelings of relaxation and calmness, happiness, comfort, peace, and hope’ (Kaya and Epps 2004: 400) / ‘slow, calm, mildly depressing’ feelings (Aaronson 1964: 30).

<sup>30</sup> While most studies do not specifically investigate whether the influence of a garment’s colour is greater on the wearer or the viewer, several show the impact on the former to be considerable, not only in the case of black (see Frank and Gilovich 1988: 83) but also in the case of red (see Roberts et al. 2010: 350 and Feltman and Elliot 2011: 312). Roberts et al., in particular, stress that ‘clothing colour has a psychological influence on wearers at least as much as on raters’ (Roberts et al. 2010: 350).

There are echoes of Lotze here, which is unsurprising given that Dearborn refers to James, who was particularly fond of Lotze's discussion of clothes in *Microcosmus* (see James 1890: i. 292 n. 1) and considered raiment intimately connected with the self (see James 1890: i. 292). Ostensibly following James,<sup>31</sup> Dearborn points out that we are in 'social community', where our self 'is' the sum of our relations, including that between us and our clothes. Thus, it makes most common—or 'pragmatic'—sense to treat them this way, wearing garments that are 'not easily differentiated from the rest of [our] personality', that are not 'obtrusive' but instead 'fit into it as well as on to it'.

This is because if, as per the social community understanding of self, we 'are' the sum of our relations, we cannot abide one member of the community standing out over against others. As Dearborn puts it,

There is a relative fitness for [the individual's] clothing, [...]; general appropriateness; above all, appropriateness to the personality; and this usually (see below) involves a relative

*Unobtrusiveness*. Indeed that is the next point I wish to emphasise. An essential thing about a well-fitting suit of clothes (remember we are not talking solely about the body any more, for clothing must fit the dual, the multiple, personality), an important element of fitting a personality, is that it must be unobtrusive. That is my idea of a well-fitting suit of clothes: one which fits and is unobtrusive. [Dearborn 1918: 54-5; emphasis original]

The 'see below' refers to the fact that some people, by virtue of profession and other concerns, have to wear clothes that render them conspicuous: clergy, prostitutes, butlers, army generals, maids, and police officers, all of whom are "sandwich men," with their business glaring front and back' (Dearborn 1918: 55). Others, however, should strive for unobtrusiveness, which will have the

---

<sup>31</sup> The 'pragmatic Me' here is probably James' 'Empirical Me' or 'Empirical Self', which is the 'Self' in the 'widest sense' or, more exactly, two of its three 'constituents', the 'material Self' and 'social Self' (see James 1890: i. 291-2).

secondary benefit of emancipating them from ‘servility to style and fashion’ (Dearborn 1918: 63).

This is not to say that Dearborn thinks we should all dress the same, for he decries uniforms. While he acknowledges that, in some cases—as with soldiers, police officers, fire fighters, and sailors—uniforms can preserve a ‘quite indispensable *esprit de corps*’, he nevertheless notes that the ‘minutemen’ militia of the U.S. Revolution, who volunteered to be ready ‘in a minute’ for combat, needed no such device to rouse solidarity (Dearborn 1918: 63-4). Some appropriate uniforms aside, however, ‘the clothes of the private individual should be unobtrusive but should not be uniform’ (Dearborn 1918: 64). Dearborn particularly denounces evening dress, which he says enforces an unscientific ‘uniformity’: Better for a man ‘to be in each case his own self rather than a fashionable in fashion’s uniform’ (Dearborn 1918: 64). One salutary aspect of such attire Dearborn elides, however, is the benefit of escaping sartorial comparison for a night. At white tie events, there may be a belle of the ball, but there is no cock of the block. Every man who has an invitation and can scrounge up a copy of ‘fashion’s uniform’ is equal, or at least looks it from any distance too great to scrutinise cufflinks and other minor accessories. Such functions offer one of the few and rare sartorial sabbaticals from what I have called modulating judgement.

As a conclusion to this presentation of Dearborn’s psychology of clothes, I would like to highlight two themes that permeate it. The first, to which I have already alluded and which is more obvious than the second, is his continual insistence that loose clothing is preferable to tight clothing. In general, I think he is identifying the right sorts of problems (if not all the right particulars) with

such apparel, but I want to trouble the claim a little. Obviously, he is addressing his own world of the late 1910s. The advent of the Men's Dress Reform Party was still about ten years away (see Burman 1995: 275) and, therefore, all the problems with men's clothes it sought to rectify, including tightness, were still in place.<sup>32</sup> In terms of female apparel, the corset was still in its transitional phase as designers scrambled to craft straighter and less rigid models to meet the demand for the 'corsetless' look (Steele 2001: 148). So frustration with tight clothing was in the air. In a time, though, when it would have been unimaginable to have large segments of the population wearing a t-shirt and jeans (to say nothing of how low such jeans are often worn) or jogging bottoms, they probably failed to discern the disadvantages of allowing the body to droop and twist in just any way the wearer's clothes will permit. Now that we have discarded most of what they criticised (not to mention brought in our own versions thereof with the arrival of skinny jeans, skinny suits, etc.), it might make more sense to consider a middle ground that could provide some structural guidance without going so far as to compress the body's tissues.

The second theme I would like to highlight is Dearborn's repeated qualifications that a given sartorial phenomenon might be largely unconscious: The ill effect of tight clothing around the abdomen is 'at first often subconscious'; the kinaesthesia are 'normally [...] more or less subconscious or even wholly unconscious'; those vexations of the skin, kinaesthesia, and viscera

---

<sup>32</sup> The MDRP, whose prominent members included Flügel (Burman 1995: 279 and 287), sought to bring about 'healthier and better clothes for men' (Burman 1995: 276). Among other things, the group argued that men's clothes were ugly and uncomfortable as well as unhealthy by virtue of being perpetually dirty (since they could not be washed), heavy, tight, and unventilated (Burman 1995: 277). Flügel and other members of the organisation therefore called for a more aesthetically pleasing and salutary costume for men on the order of that available to women. They also held dress reform competitions, in which they gave out prizes for beautiful and practical menswear, and ran a clothing shop featuring such progressive attire as shorts, sandals, open-necked shirts, and washable garments of all kinds (Burman 1995: 278, 280, and 281).

‘are just those [...] fully felt or not, which would be *most apt to disturb* the skilful flow of the skill-neurility’; and many of the fears from which clothes protect us ‘it is obviously true, are subconscious’ (Dearborn 1918: 14, 24, 26, emphasis original, and 51, respectively). I raise this point to underscore just how often, for Dearborn, the very subtle but deleterious effects of clothing escape our notice, even when we are trying to perceive them. This concern is important for my enquiry in two ways. First, it suggests that the issues he is raising cannot be quickly dismissed by appeals to personal experience; careful investigation and thinking is required. Second, this point about our unawareness of certain sartorial phenomena is itself part of what calls for the Heideggerian phenomenological approach to clothes I am employing. On Heidegger’s understanding, the ‘phenomenon’ ‘that phenomenology is to “let us see”’ is precisely ‘something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*’ (BT 59 / GA 2: 47; emphasis original).<sup>33</sup>

### Adam and Galinsky on ‘Enclothed Cognition’

The forgoing theorists constitute a tradition in the history of reflection on clothing in that they interact with each other and share concerns. While the researchers in this section are almost a hundred years removed from this

---

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger discusses several phenomena as thus ‘hidden’, ‘concealed’, or ‘covered up’, including: ‘the entities which we encounter in concern’ (BT 96 / GA 2: 91), i.e. pieces of ‘equipment [Zeug]’ (BT 97 / GA 2: 92); “‘Nature” (BT 100 / GA 2: 95); conscience (BT 336 / GA 2: 384); death (BT 478 / GA 2: 562); and the ‘origin’ of time (BT 485 / GA 2: 574). Ultimately, however, ‘that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only “in disguise”, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities’ (BT 59 / GA 2: 47). The way to uncover this ‘Being of entities’ is to uncover the entities or phenomena themselves: ‘Because phenomena, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare’ (BT 61 / GA 2: 49).

tradition, they likewise stress a point neglected in much of the intervening time, namely, that clothing impacts its wearer in ways that might not be immediately obvious.

Hence, Adam and Galinsky begin their article by pointing out that ‘a host of research has documented the effects that people’s clothes have on the perceptions and reactions of others’ while the ‘second facet of the power of clothing’, i.e. that ‘the clothes we wear have power not only over others, but also over ourselves’, ‘has received far less attention in scholarly work. Indeed, research on the effects of clothing on people’s own perceptions and behaviour is relatively scattered and disintegrated’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 918). Adam and Galinsky enumerate some of this scattered and disintegrated research: ‘wearing large hoods and capes makes people more likely to administer electric shocks to others’, ‘whereas wearing a nurse uniform makes people less likely to administer these shocks’; ‘professional sports teams wearing black uniforms are more aggressive than sports teams wearing non-black uniforms’; and ‘wearing a bikini makes women feel ashamed, eat less, and perform worse at math’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 918; see Zimbardo 1969; Johnson and Downing 1979; Frank and Gilovich 1988; and Fredrickson et. al. 1998, respectively, for the original studies). Adam and Galinsky then offer a hypothesis to explain these phenomena: ‘actually wearing a piece of clothing and having the accompanying physical experiences (e.g., seeing it on one’s body, feeling it on one’s skin, etc.) will make it significantly more likely for the piece of clothing to influence the wearer’s psychological processes’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919). It is this ‘systematic influence of clothes on the wearer’s psychological processes and

behavioural tendencies' that the authors dub 'enclothed cognition' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919).

To test a narrower version of this hypothesis, i.e. that 'wearing a lab coat increases performance on attention-related tasks', Adam and Galinsky conducted three experiments. In the first, experimenters randomly chose some participants to wear a white lab coat while having the rest remain as they came. They then tested all participants for 'selective attention', i.e. 'the ability to focus on relevant stimuli and ignore irrelevant ones' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919) with the result that 'Participants in the wearing-a-lab-coat condition made around half as many errors as participants in the not-wearing-a-lab-coat condition' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 920).

For the second experiment Adam and Galinsky wanted to determine whether the meaning wearers associate with the coat plays a role in the effect and whether 'actually wearing' the coat it is necessary or if mere exposure or 'material priming' is sufficient (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 920). They therefore randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: wearing 'a disposable white lab coat described as a medical doctor's coat', wearing 'the same disposable white lab coat [...] described as an artistic painter's coat', and simply seeing the coat described as a doctor's coat 'displayed on a table in the laboratory' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 920). This time, Adam and Galinsky tested participants for 'sustained attention', i.e. 'the ability to maintain focus on a continuous activity' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919). According to their report, 'Participants displayed greater sustained attention only when wearing a lab coat described as a doctor's coat, but not when wearing a lab coat described as a

painter's coat or when seeing a lab coat described as a doctor's coat' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 921).

Adam and Galinsky's final experiment sought to determine whether seeing the lab coat for longer might alter the results and whether the effect of wearing the coat is due to the wearing itself or to the connection the wearing establishes between person and garment, which might well be established some other way. Again, they randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: wearing 'a disposable white lab coat described as a medical doctor's coat', wearing 'the same disposable white lab coat [...] described as an artistic painter's coat', and an 'identifying-with-a-doctor's-coat' condition in which 'participants saw a disposable white lab coat described as a medical doctor's lab coat displayed on the desk in front of them throughout the entire experiment' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). To ensure that the third condition involved identifying with a doctor's coat, the experimenters had participants in all conditions write an essay. Those in the first two conditions 'were asked to write an essay about their thoughts on the coat (e.g. how the coat would look on doctors/painters)' while those in the identifying-with-a-doctor's-coat 'were asked to write an essay about how they identify with the coat (e.g. how the coat represents them and has a specific, personal meaning)' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). This would give all conditions the feature of writing an essay but prevent the first two from having any more identification with the lab coat than what comes from wearing it while allowing the third to identify with it detached from such wearing.

As in the second experiment, Adam and Galinsky tested for sustained attention with the result that participants in the wearing-a-doctor's-coat

condition performed better than participants in the identifying-with-a-doctor's-coat condition, who in turn performed better than participants in the wearing-a-painter's-coat condition (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). 'Thus, identifying with the doctor's lab coat increased the level of sustained attention [...]. However, consistent with our encloded cognition perspective, wearing the coat when it was described as a doctor's coat had an effect over and above simply being exposed to and identifying with it', even when the exposure was continuous (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922).

At the end of their analysis, Adam and Galinsky offer some commentary on the implications of their research for 'the scattered findings on the effects of clothing found in the literature' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). For example, the reason 'wearing a nurse uniform makes people less likely to administer [electric] shocks' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 918) might be that it 'trigger[s] associated concepts of caring and altruistic behaviour' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). In contrast, the reason 'wearing large hoods and capes makes people more likely to administer electric shocks to others' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 918) might be that such 'identity-concealing clothes [...] conjure up images of robbers, terrorists, and aggressive or deviant behaviours' (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). In this same vein, the authors pose questions

to stimulate future research on the impact of clothing on cognitive processes. Does wearing the robe of a priest or judge make people more ethical? Does putting on an expensive suit make people feel more powerful? Does putting on a uniform of a firefighter or police officer make people act more courageously? And, perhaps even more interestingly, do the effects of wearing a particular form of clothing wear off over time as people become habituated to it? Answering these kinds of questions would further elucidate how a seemingly trivial, yet ambiguous item like an article of clothing can influence how we think, feel, and act. [Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922]

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented several theorists who offer proto-phenomenological or phenomenological remarks on clothing. The first of these was Lotze, with his observation that we very often identify ourselves with our clothing, as when we feel like we are touching something that our clothes are touching. This, he says, allows us to feel elevated or regal in top hats, featherweight and fluttery in leather straps and beads, vigorous and upright in waistcoats and armour, elastic in corsets, and graceful and flowing in 'gauzy stuffs'. Then came Hall, who sought to nuance Lotze's claims by pointing out that much of what the latter adduced constitutes mistaking clothes-consciousness for body-consciousness. Nevertheless, says Hall, Lotze has at least shown us 'that clothes are an integral part of our self-consciousness', as evinced in our feeling that we have lost something essential in losing a beloved, oft-worn garment. Moreover, Hall thinks clothing shapes behaviour, e.g. when we 'put on a better self' while wearing clean clothes or, in contrast, as we say, 'get our hands dirty' when wearing clothes that do not require stringent maintenance.

After Hall, I considered Flaccus, who suggests that clothing colour can influence mood and even personality and that the physical sensations effected by clothes can have emotional impact, even the negative sort that prevents us from identifying our clothes with our self. Furthermore, Flaccus suggests that it often takes time for our clothes to become part of our self and that social convention and context has some role in how we experience ourselves in our clothes. Next was Dearborn, who drew upon physiological lab work to discern

clothing's role in bodily comfort, which, he argues, is decisive for efficiency and skill-acquisition. While he mentions the feel of clothing in this regard or even the effect of clothing colour on body temperature and mood, his chief warning is that tight garments cause us undue discomfort and therefore lack of efficiency and happiness, whether we are aware of it or not. Against such raiment as well as that which makes us feel, as the expression goes, uncomfortably 'out of place' in society, he commends clothing that is 'unobtrusive' both to body and to social context. Finally, I delineated the more recent research of Adam and Galinsky, who demonstrated that clothes have a 'systematic influence' 'on the wearer's psychological processes and behavioural tendencies', specifically inasmuch as both attaching a certain characteristic to a garment and wearing that garment leads to embodying that characteristic.

I will revisit some of these claims in future chapters, especially chapter six. Presently, however, I have presented these theorists, corroborating their intuitions with footnoted reference to the latest research where available, to highlight their shared but oft-neglected conclusion that, in various ways, clothing impacts our self-experience far more than we realise and, typically, admit. More importantly, it impacts our self-experience more than the view that clothes are for protection, modesty, decoration, and communication allows. This calls for a re-examination of the human relationship to clothes along different lines as well as some consideration for what the deeper, more integrated, more aware understanding of raiment that such a re-examination might yield means for human being more generally. Obviously, this thesis can only go so far in relation to such a prodigious endeavour, but I will begin

attending to it in the next chapter by appeal to Eric Gill's sartorial theology of clothes.

## Chapter 2: Eric Gill on Clothes as Architecture

*Fashion is like architecture; primarily a question of proportions.—Coco Chanel<sup>34</sup>*

*We need houses as we need clothes, architecture stimulates fashion. It's like hunger and thirst—you need them both.—Karl Lagerfeld<sup>35</sup>*

*Clothing is like a house, there is no reason for the interior to be less beautiful, less pleasant than the exterior. It is like with pyjamas. Pyjamas are very pleasant. You can sleep in them. You can in my suit, too. You don't feel dressed, you feel enveloped. One feels so much more comfortable in a suit which is too big. The sleeves are too long and not taken in. They cover the hands, but one feels secure. They have no seams, but end in a kind of natural fringing.—Friedensreich Hundertwasser<sup>36</sup>*

*A bank director will do anything not to be different from the lowliest employee at his bank. The bank director is even mistaken for the employee. It looks almost as if precautions had been taken so that the bank director, the king, the president can immediately run off and vanish in the crowd. He has a disguise, one might say, which he always has on.—Friedensreich Hundertwasser<sup>37</sup>*

In chapter one, I presented theorists who highlight the capacity of clothes to shape our self-experience, which is often neglected by secondary literature in fashion and textile studies and left completely unaddressed in philosophy and theology. In this chapter, I will address the lacuna with respect to philosophy and theology by explicating the understanding of clothes proffered by Eric Gill (1882-1940), the both celebrated and vilified English sculptor and stonemason, typeface designer, engraver, printmaker, and writer.

In 1931, Gill wrote a treatise entitled *Clothes*. Together with a few shorter tracts and scattered musings throughout his writings, this text speaks of apparel

---

<sup>34</sup> Haedrich 1972: 186.

<sup>35</sup> Samaha 2014.

<sup>36</sup> Hunderwasser 1982/3.

<sup>37</sup> Hunderwasser 1982/3.

not only in light of Gill's understanding of humanity and of people's relations to each other and their world but also in a way that is fundamentally rooted in and stemming from his understanding of God and the human-divine relationship. This is, as far as I know, the only extended meditation that treats clothes as they pertain to human being and, as such, it already deserves close examination here. Furthermore, however, Gill's treatise is important for this thesis because, for Gill, clothing is an essentially theological phenomenon. This will be decisive for the issue I explore in the final chapter, namely, how clothing might facilitate the attunement/comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. Before delineating Gill's sartorial perspective, however, I must contextualise it by providing some background on his life and influences as well as his theological aesthetics.

### Gill's Life and Influences

A well-known artist in his own time, Gill received several high-profile commissions, including the statues *Prospero and Ariel* and *Ariel between Wisdom and Gaiety* from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* on the BBC Broadcasting House as well as the statues of the North, South, and East Winds on the headquarters of the London Underground. He also designed several popular typefaces, *Perpetua*, *Joanna* (named for his youngest daughter), and, especially, *Gill Sans* among them. The English publisher Penguin Books famously employed the last of these for their classic, 'three-band' covers and the BBC also uses it in their current, three-unslanted *Blocks* logo. In addition to the many sculptures and typefaces as well as hundreds of engravings and drawings,

Gill wrote dozens of monographs and essays outlining his views on art, religion, sex, politics, and work.

Gill drew inspiration from a number of sources: the English art and social critic John Ruskin; the English artist, textile designer, and socialist writer William Morris; and the French neo-Thomist philosopher of religion, art, and politics Jacques Maritain. So great was the influence of these and other individuals on Gill that some have claimed he had no real voice of his own. J.M. Purcell summarises their concern: ‘The common form of the main charge against Gill, the theorist, is that his ideas were derivative, from Ruskin, Morris, and nineteenth-century neo-mediaevalism in general, in the sense that somebody else had said the same things first’ (Purcell 1982: 354).

Although this sentiment contains a kernel of truth, it fails to consider several points. First, Gill often creatively interpreted his sources of inspiration in accordance with the thinking he was developing with their help. He was, for example, an avid Distributist, being directly influenced by the writings of Anglo-French Catholic activist Hilaire Belloc as well as his relationships with the Irish Dominican street preacher Fr. Vincent McNabb and the English author and Roman Catholic convert G.K. Chesterton, all early figures in the Distributist movement. Gill embraced its doctrine that both capitalism and socialism enslave the majority of society by placing the means of production primarily in the hands of a limited number of agents, be it, in capitalism, the industrial and corporate elite or, in socialism, ‘the state’, i.e. its governors, who often corruptly use their power to pursue private interests. He also embraced their solution of ‘widespread small ownership as the basis of freedom’ (Wall 1979: 169), with

most members of society owning their own family subsistence farms, workshops, and retail operations (Sewell 1982: 295).

Where he differed was in his aetiology of the problem and in what other Distributists regarded as his compromise with modernity. Concerning the former, Lothian explains that

Instead of focusing on property, he stressed the role of the worker and the attitude to labour, arguing that work had previously been ‘a sacred and holy activity’ [A 274] but that it had been secularised as it had become mechanised. Because his subjects were primarily art and aesthetics, Gill’s historical analysis was somewhat different as well. Whereas Belloc believed that the Reformation had been the turning point, Gill pointed to the Renaissance, observing that it was then that man had become the measure of all things, that art had become divorced from work, and that the artist had become a critic of nature and society rather than a maker of things. [Lothian 2009: 98-9]

In terms of Gill’s purported compromise, there was some question as to how much he really championed Distributism’s anti-modernist, anti-industrialist principles. McNabb, for example, characterised Gill’s work in typeface as ‘earning *money* from the Machine’ and wished the Ditchling community had, instead, remained faithful to the ‘primary things: food, clothing, dyeing, spinning, weaving’ (Cunningham 1985: 300; emphasis original).<sup>38</sup> As Lothian points out, the Ditchling Common was, to some extent, financed through ‘what

---

<sup>38</sup> Such a critique rings a little hollow given the fact that Gill was one of the few who successfully implemented Distributism’s ideas in fully-functioning, privately-owned-and-run, intentional Christian communities of living, labour, and artisanship. This feat was not even attempted by most of the movement’s key figures, including McNabb, apart from the degree to which he participated in Gill’s endeavours.

Gill earned selling his work to the very people he attacked so sharply in his essays' (Lothian 2009: 103).<sup>39</sup>

The second point that the view of Gill's thought as entirely derivative fails to consider is that Gill often gravitated toward an influence because that person or system better articulated or augmented what he had already partially formulated himself. This was the case with, for example, his Catholicism. As Gill himself puts it,

'If religion is the first thing necessary—and, of course, by religion, I mean an answer to the primary and ultimate questions; what is man and why?—and I hadn't got one, then, obviously I must get a ready-made religion or make one up. Naturally I took the latter course [...] So I invented a new religion—and then discovered it was an old one.' [A 154-5; cf. 166]

Later, he elaborates that it was not so much a religion he invented as it was a 'metaphysic, a preamble to religion' in which 'Man is the consciousness of God' (A 165). For his part, Lothian flat out denies Gill's claim that the religion he was inventing was actually Catholicism (Lothian 2009: 95). Rather, he implies, Gill simply transplanted Chesterton's testimony onto his own experience: 'In claiming that he had invented a new religion that turned out to be Catholicism, Gill was borrowing G.K. Chesterton's description of his own conversion to orthodox Christianity' (Lothian 2009: 401 n. 48).

This is unnecessarily suspicious. While Gill's retrospective is plainly romanticised, the length of time he spent formulating his new religion before

---

<sup>39</sup> Gill took the pragmatic perspective on this issue: 'But if the artist wants to live more or less in the same way as his contemporaries (according to the same standard of living), wear the same kind of clothes, have baths as the best people in Wimbledon do, eat similar food and dwell in houses such as will pass the building regulations, then he must, he simply *must* make things which his contemporaries like, even if he makes things which they can only like for the wrong reasons.

Making things which people like for the wrong reasons is, indeed, the first trick to be acquired by the artist unless he be content either to live as a hermit in a desert or to depend for his livelihood upon the favour of a special coterie of wealthy aesthetes' ('PP', in *BLH* 170-1; emphasis original).

considering the possibility that Catholicism held the answers to his ‘primary and ultimate questions’ is strikingly short, as is evident in a series of letters to his friend and fellow English artist Sir William Rothenstein. On 5 December 1910, Gill corresponded with enthusiasm about the new religion he was inventing and, on 6 January 1911, (*LEG* 36), he expressed interest in Eastern approaches to ‘Heaven’ (*LEG* 37). Soon after this January letter, however, Gill’s experiments with alternative spirituality would transform into Roman Catholic devotion, for, on 5 November 1911, he tells Rothenstein that in an intervening conversation, ‘I had not made clear to you *my* reasons for wishing it possible that I could join the Church’ and then proceeds to lay out that argument (*LEG* 42). After a year and a few months more of letters back and forth, Gill wrote Rothenstein again, saying ‘I want to tell you that my wife and I have now been received into the Catholic Church,’ an event that occurred on Gill’s thirty-first birthday, 22 February 1913 (*LEG* 49).

Given that Gill went from wanting to start his own religion to considering conversion to Catholicism in less than a year, it is extremely likely, *pace* Lothian, that, whatever the differences between what he envisioned and Catholicism, he was able to see important parallels in the respective systems’ answers to the ‘primary and ultimate questions’. As Gill put it, ‘The more I inquired into it the more I discovered that, in spite of many necessary alterations in detail, the thing I had invented and the real thing were identical’ and, thus, ‘I invented the Roman Catholic Church. [...] any normal person can invent, that is to say find or discover the Church for himself’ (A 190).

The final point that viewing Gill’s thought as entirely derivative misses is that Gill often became disillusioned with thinkers who had previously inspired

him, dispensing with principal insights and integrating points he still liked with the perspective of someone new. John Hughes, for example, does an excellent job in his aim ‘to consider how [Gill] differs subtly from’ both Morris and Maritain, but his working premise is that ‘he was not a great original thinker [...] almost all his ideas can be traced to one of [these] two sources. D. H. Lawrence, whom Gill admired, described him in a review as a ‘crude and crass amateur’, a verdict Gill admitted to be largely true’ (Hughes 2007: 180).

What Hughes neglects to mention is that, in the same essay, Lawrence says ‘It seems to me there is more in those two paragraphs [of Gill’s ‘Slavery and Freedom’] than in all Karl Marx or Professor Whitehead or a dozen other philosophers rolled together’ (Lawrence 2005 edn.: 357) so it is not as if he thinks the ‘crude and crass amateur’ has nothing to offer. Moreover, even if Hughes’ critique that ‘almost all’ of Gill’s ideas were already present in Morris or Maritain is true with respect to Gill’s theology of work, the subject of Hughes’ chapter, the more erotic-oriented ideas in Gill’s theology, which I will be discussing in the next section, are not present in these thinkers.

But most importantly, while Hughes briefly mentions the influence of Belloc and Distributism, he never stresses that Gill gravitated toward these precisely as and insofar as they provided an alternative to the Morrisian and Ruskinian socialism he no longer found palatable. It is not just that Gill departed from Morris, as Hughes acknowledges (Hughes 2007: 187, 190, and 224); it is that he did so by weaving in substitute ideas from somewhere else, i.e. from the Distributists. So while he continued espousing certain principles of Morris and other influences throughout his life, it was always in the context of

his evolving perspective and what he was taking from others that would be compatible with it.

### Gill's Theological Aesthetics

As I have already intimated, Gill's religious trajectory involved a few developments, beginning with a break in the practice of his family's Anglicanism coupled with an enthusiasm for Nietzsche (MacCarthy 1989: 75 and 102). He then flirted with spiritualism before settling on Roman Catholicism, though the latter's content, like that of most ideas and systems he adopted, was partially of his own making since he championed select theological emphases that kept him in perpetual proximity to heterodoxy.

These theological emphases appear throughout his corpus piecemeal, almost aphoristically, and while several scholars have made article or chapter-length attempts to gather the scattered insights (Corrigan 1981 and 1983; Hughes 2007: 180-200; R. Williams 1977 and 2005: 45-55), usually with an eye to some specific theological issue, a comprehensive, monograph-length treatment of Gill's theology or even his thought more generally has yet to emerge. Such a treatment is similarly outside the scope of this thesis, but I will now adumbrate the main principle of his theological aesthetics.

For Gill, work shares in, emulates, and continues the creative activity of God:

Before the Renaissance, man the painter was not an outsider who looked on the world and told you in paint what he thought of it, or how he felt about it. He was an insider—one of the gang of men who made things—a collaborator with God in creating. He did not say: 'God made this thing and I am man enough to express my appreciation.' He said, in effect: 'God made trees of wood and leaves; I make trees of paint. God made men of flesh and blood; I make them of coloured earth. Without me

painted trees and men would not exist—any more than houses of stone or ships of iron. It matters little to me and still less to God what I think about the natural world. What matters to me is that I should be the vehicle, the appointed vehicle, for the continuation of creation. Paintings and sculptures, buildings and all things made, are as natural as blossoms on the rose.’ [‘AAS’, in *BLH* 89]

This passage contains some language that Gill uses recurrently but does not here explain. The main thrust, however, is that all makers—whether the local blacksmith or Michelangelo—are ‘collaborator[s] with God in creating’ and that ‘houses of stone or ships of iron’ are just as much art as the paintings and sculptures we might find in museums or private collections. All of these artefacts are a ‘continuation of creation’ because they would not, in the absence of human makers, exist as the made things they are. In other words, God does not make such items directly. Or, as Gill puts it at his strongest, ‘the works of men and women carry the work of creation on to a higher level than that of what we call Nature. We ourselves are creators. Through us exist things which God Himself could not otherwise have made’ (‘A’, in *E* 19).

This is not to say Gill finds all art equally good, however, for, as the just-displayed passage indicates, he has a strong distaste for work he perceives to emanate from an artist who has ‘looked on the world and told you in paint what he thought of it, or how he felt about it’ and who endeavours to ‘express [...] appreciation’ for the ‘natural world’ by communicating these thoughts and feelings through the work. Gill’s writings criticise two dominant understandings of art in his time. The first of these, to which these words allude and which finds expression in more academic art and, ultimately, photography, is the view that artists should pursue verisimilitude in representation, or, as Gill puts it, making ‘portraits and pictures as nearly resembling the appearance of things as may

be' (ACC 43). He regards such activity as a 'conquest of nature' ('SWC', in AN 51)<sup>40</sup> rather than a continuation of God's creative activity. In Gill's estimation, the task of the artist is not 'making things like things' in the sense of, for example, fashioning a painting or sculpture of a person that looks as much like a person as possible. Rather, it is using 'skill and imagination' ('AIE', in E 55) in 'making things like God' in the sense of making things that are good things like God is good:

while the Song of Solomon remains, poets and artists, as well as priests and philosophers and saints, may be encouraged to sing the praise of God as loudly, and to know that, whoever else may spurn them, the Catholic Church will not deny that all good things are types of the divine Goodness, and that beauty is not achieved by making things like things, but by making things like God. ['SWC', in AN 58; cf. ACC 50]

Of course, we must ask what exactly makes a made thing 'good' or tells us it embodies the 'divine Goodness', a question I will address after delineating the second view Gill opposes, but, for now, it is sufficient to say that whatever makes something good in his mind, it is clearly not that it looks as much like what we assume it to represent as possible.

---

<sup>40</sup> In the coming chapters, I will, *inter alia*, delineate Heidegger's parallel contention that the Western intellectual tradition constitutes an attempt to be 'lord of the earth' ('QCT', in QCT 27 / GA 7: 28). One of the major developments Heidegger identifies in this attempt is Descartes' quest for conceptual 'certainty' ('NWGD', in OBT 178 / GA 7: 238), which marks the beginning of philosophy's march toward 'completion' in the 'scientific attitude', whose fundamental characteristic is the 'technological mindset' ('EPTT', in BW 434 / GA 14: 72). In Heidegger's estimation, this quest for conceptual certainty sought to remove all doubt about the character of the world and thereby gain 'mastery [*Bewältigung*] of beings as a whole' ('AWP', in OBT 69 / GA 7: 92) through calculation and measurement. Heidegger maintains that these apparent means to understanding things are precisely what blocks all access to their essence ('OWA', in BW 172 / GA 5: 33). Moreover, what we might call the circumstantial 'certainty' or 'mastery' over time and situations that technological inventions supposedly provide often ends up mastering us right along with everything else, unlike that circumstantial certainty which was once more strongly felt in the Christian 'assurance'—to use the theological word—of salvation. (See WIT 99 / GA 41: 100 and N4 89-90 and 97 / GA 6.2: 116-18 and 125-6 for Heidegger's explanation of the Cartesian project as rooted in this Christian doctrine.) Gill and Heidegger are thus, in their respective ways and with regard to their respective fields of enquiry, pointing to a single phenomenon that emerged with the Renaissance and Descartes and intensified in the time between that and the present: an obsession with accuracy in art and thought that commandeers and subjugates the world by attempting to order it yet *ipso facto* misses its essence.

The second dominant understanding of art Gill criticises is the view that it is primarily about the expression of feelings or ‘self-expression’. He cites several formulations of the perspective:

‘Art is the expression of emotion’, said Tolstoy.

‘The business of the artist is to find a form to fit an emotion’; and

‘The question is not what a work of art represents but what it makes you feel’, says Mr. Clive Bell.

In all these modern definitions, there is a harping on the words ‘feeling’, ‘emotion’. Hence, the frequency of the phrase ‘art is self-expression’, and, hence, easily enough, art is not only the expression of the artist but also the response of the beholder. [‘AS’, in *BLH* 54]

Gill’s problem with such views is that they make art into ‘a more and more fantastic or at least eccentric extra’, ‘divorced from the common life in which men make useful things (whether hats or hammers, houses or ham-sandwiches)’ (‘PP’, in *BLH* 170). As previously noted, Gill understands art as the use of skill and imagination to make good things. Since industrial manufacturing removed the need for the average worker to employ such skill and imagination, these became the exclusive purview of ‘certain special people, specially trained or specially gifted, to exhibit in paint or stone or wood or sound, their special sensibilities and fine feelings—aesthetics’ (‘SSMI’, in *E* 78), i.e. ‘artists’ in the modern sense.

But, further, since machines rather than humans make most of our items of use, even if artists, unlike the rest of us, get to employ skill and imagination in their work, they do not get to do so in fashioning useful things. The only recourse, therefore, is to direct their skill and imagination toward communicating their thoughts and/or feelings. For Gill, this is a ‘psychological exhibitionism’ (‘PC’, in *BLH* 94) or ‘spiritual exhibitionism’ (*ACC* 13 and 33), the appetite for which puts artists on a ‘pedestal’ as ‘seers’ (‘AS’, in *BLH* 55-6).

While they may find this seeming honorific ‘profitable’, as Gill says, he considers it nothing more than a counterfeit salve providing them a role for which they are unqualified as a replacement for the proper role denied them by the Renaissance and Industrialism (‘PC’, in *BLH* 87-8).

*Art and a Changing Civilisation*, one of many places Gill discusses his position in this regard,<sup>41</sup> includes an appendix of two essays that respectively constitute ‘an admirable reinforcement of the author’s argument’ and ‘a good example of the specialised study referred to in the text’ (*ACC* 140). In other words, these appended articles more rigorously present some of the positions Gill puts forth in the main text of the volume and can therefore give us a more delineated sense of just what he seeks to establish therein. In the first, Rayner Heppenstall critiques modern art’s emphasis on self-expression by saying ‘a highly self-conscious art is a functionless art, the produce of men who, as artists, are set apart from society’ (*ACC* 142).

The author of the second essay, G.M. Turnell, takes the same view but discusses it more fully:

Instead of investigating the world in which he is placed—*la saint réalité*, as Claudel has magnificently called it—and seeking to penetrate to that deeper reality which is revealed to the artist’s intuition, the modern poet is only concerned with the emotions that this world rouses in him. (This is the only intelligible meaning of ‘self-expression’ in art.) Instead of a common, we get a purely personal vision. [*ACC* 147]

Turnell is speaking about poetry here, but the point also applies to Gill’s principle concern, art more broadly construed, though he would probably reject the notion that artists should be ‘investigating the world in which [they are] placed’ and ‘seeking to penetrate to that deeper reality which is revealed to

---

<sup>41</sup> In addition to the references I have already cited as describing the emphasis on self-expression in art as ‘spiritual exhibitionism’, see *ACC* 34, 66, 125-6.

[their] intuition' since that would elevate them to the position of 'seers', a point I will soon elucidate. What Gill must have found appealing in Turnell's commentary, however, is the notion that the artistic task is not, *pace* the romantics, to emphasise 'the emotions that [the artist's] world rouses in him'. As I have already explained, for Gill, machines have robbed artists of the opportunity to create beauty in the context of making useful things and thereby limited them to art as self-expression. But it is not always obvious that the self-expression of a given person, whether artist or not, is relevant for anyone else and, therefore, as Turnell says, 'The modern poet [or, for Gill's purposes, any artist emphasising self-expression] then is faced with the problem of finding a new common basis of experience' (ACC 147).

Turnell provides two options for this basis: 'the poetry of escape' and 'a new realism—a compromise between romanticism and naturalism' (ACC 147). In relation to the former, his position is that romantic poets and artists resolve the tension between their appointed task of self-expression and the resulting burden of 'finding a new common basis of experience' by constructing dream-worlds or making a world out of 'nature' idealised and sharing the emotions they feel with respect to those worlds (ACC 147-8). From Turnell's—and thus, vicariously, Gill's—perspective, this endeavour fails because no one else is in touch with these other worlds, nor therefore capable of relating to the emotions artists are trying to convey about them. As a result, this artistic self-expression amounts to nothing more than, in Gill's language, a 'psychological' or 'spiritual exhibitionism'.

Turnell's critique of the 'new realism' or 'compromise between romanticism and naturalism' is more subtle. Here, he cites 'Baudelaire and his

disciples', who 'are interested in things like decaying corpses, epileptics in cheap lodging-houses, drunkenness, and all the squalid horror of city-life. [...] It is not simply that romantic subjects go by the board; they deliberately ridicule all the things which had previously been admired' (*ACC* 148). But, for all their eschewal of romanticism, these new realists, on Turnell's view, have not veered very far from the essence of that movement's approach: 'in reading Baudelaire one has the impression that the poet is deliberately and consciously distorting what he has seen (often to the point of caricature) in order to intensify, in an altogether extraordinary degree, the emotion associated with the actual scene' (*ACC* 151). The new realism thus suffers the same fate as the romanticism it sought to replace. While Baudelaire may start with, as Turnell puts it, 'the world in which he is placed', he migrates toward 'distorting what he has seen' and the emotions we typically have about it 'to the point of caricature', thereby producing the same kind of inaccessible self-expression the romantics proffered with respect to their dream-worlds and world of idealised nature. Thus, the new realists, too, engage in 'psychological' or 'spiritual exhibitionism'.

We have, then, two dominant views of art that Gill seeks to avoid. On the one hand is art as verisimilitude in representation, which concentrates on 'superficial delights of fleshly appearance' and the 'charm' of things rather than their significance. On the other is art as self-expression, which, regardless of type, peddles otherworldly emotions that are inaccessible to all but other, similarly-disposed artists (or artist-types), via what Turnell calls 'the common despair brought about by their failure to discover a coherent world-order' (*ACC* 150).

Against these two views, Gill juxtaposes his own, according to which art is, as he says in numerous places (e.g. ‘AATP’, in *E* 151; ‘AB’, in *E* 230; *ACC* 43; and ‘Apology’, in *AN* v.), ‘the well-making of what needs making’:

we don’t *want* children to think of art as being only pictures and such. We want them to think of it as the exercise of human skill and imagination in *every* department of human work. We must therefore attempt to abolish the word except in its simple sense as meaning ‘the well making of what needs making’, and we shall never talk of art, but only of the arts. [‘AIE’, in *E* 55; emphases original]

Gill’s definition has two parts: ‘well-making’ and ‘what needs making’. Concerning the first, the question is: What does it mean to make something well, or, as I put it earlier, what exactly makes a made thing ‘good’ or tells us it embodies the ‘divine Goodness’? Gill’s response is that

When a thing is well made, well ordered, the mind of him who contemplates it is at rest, is satisfied—is pleased.

This pleasure is not of the senses—though the senses share it.

Nor is it the pleasure of knowing.

It is not simply that kind of pleasure which we have when we discover the right solution of a problem.

Nor is it simply that kind of pleasure which we have when we see or receive an act of kindness.

It is the delight of mind in seeing the thing itself.

It follows immediately upon the mind’s grasping or comprehension of the thing presented to it. [‘AAS’, in *BLH* 67-8]

So the well-made thing is the made thing that, when contemplated, allows the contemplator to see it ‘itself’—i.e. what it is rather than how it looks (‘SMB’, in *E* 216)—to see it in its essence.

But the reason the well-made thing allows this is that well-making itself entails understanding the essence of the thing to be made and thus fashioning it in accordance with that:<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Resonances between, on the one hand, this Aristotelian perspective, which Gill inherited from neo-Thomists like McNabb, Maritain, and others, and, on the other, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle will surface in the next chapter on the latter’s discussion of made things.

when we are confronted by the situation wherein a certain thing which delights us is abhorrent to our neighbour, all we can do is examine our conscience and attempt to discover wherein our delight resides. Is it derived from sentiment, or from sensuality, from appreciation of the thing's usefulness, or from appreciation of the thing itself—the thing *seen*? None of these derivations is bad, but one or other may become insubordinate. The good painter is not devoid of sentiment or sensuality; nor is he scornful of usefulness. But first of all a painting must look like paint and a stone carving like stone. Music whose chief claim to delightfulness is its imitation of birds singing may be delightfully intriguing, but it is not the thing that music can do best. A painting which looks like a hole in the wall through which we may see a doctor counting a child's pulse is more of a curiosity, however pathetic, than a painting—in fact, it does its best not to look like a painting at all. ['AS', in *BLH* 59; emphasis original]

Gill's example here incorporates his anti-representationalism. In his estimation, looking at a painting should not feel uncannily like looking at what it is supposed to represent. Instead, 'a painting must look like paint' or, we might say, be painterly in the sense of, for example, having conspicuous brushstrokes or cakes of pigment on its surface. For Gill, this amounts to having been made in accordance with the essence of a painting and when it is the case, our delight in the work derives 'from appreciation of the thing itself', the thing in its essence.

The rest of Gill's definition for art is that the well-making must make 'what needs making' or, as he sometimes says, 'what is wanted' ('AEN', in *E* 222). This might seem to fit the contemporary situation, wherein many fine artists who strive to communicate their vision do so in consultation with their expectations about what a buying public of collectors might 'want'. This, however, is the opposite of what Gill intends, for he says the task of the artist is 'not to supply ornaments for the amusement of a cultured rich class but to supply necessities for a whole people' ('SLM', in *BLH* 120). He is clear that such necessities or 'useful things' ('AEN', in *E* 221) include paintings and sculptures

that ‘may accidentally embellish [buildings] and should do so’ (‘SMB’, in *E* 214; cf. ‘AEN’, in *E* 221). Thus, we should not imagine him disqualifying these as works of art if they are made to order (‘SLM’, in *BLH* 115). Nevertheless, his larger point is that ‘chairs and tables and pots and pans’ (‘AEN’, in *E* 222) are works of art as well. This is because, for Gill, all ‘works of men and women’ ‘[speak] to us of God’, and do so even more obviously than ‘Dante [...] the daisies, the dew-drops, and the dung’ (‘A’, in *E* 19).<sup>43</sup>

### Gill on Clothes

If Gill’s theology has received insufficient attention from commentators, his reflection on clothes has seen even less. In his main treatise on the subject, Gill reformulates the traditional understanding of why we dress, moving away from the classic paradigm of decoration, modesty, and protection toward his own figurative rubrics and adding a new and interesting candidate for the central motivation. We use clothes, he says, as houses, as workshops, and, most importantly, as churches and town halls.

The first of these refers to wearing clothes in relation to what might be called our domestic concerns, among them our desire to be warm and protected from inclemencies of climate. Houses protect us from cold and precipitation and so do clothes. This is not, Gill says, the only function of houses or of clothing as houses, however:

The analogy between clothes and houses is obvious and may be taken much farther than in this mere need of protection, for if there is the hall for shelter and warmth there are also all the other apartments into which

---

<sup>43</sup> As with his point about naturalistic drawing constituting a ‘conquest of nature’, Gill’s perspective here will find parallel in the coming chapters on Heidegger, though this time with respect to the latter’s notion that ‘things’ like handmade jugs ‘gather the fourfold’, a complex of fundamental phenomena including humans and what he calls the ‘divinities’.

houses are divided, and these also have their analogy in dress. There are dining-rooms and dinner-jackets, and as a dining room is for dining in so is a dinner-jacket, and just as you may play billiards in a dinner-jacket so you may play ping-pong in a dining room. There are bed-rooms and bed-room clothes, and as you do not feel properly housed without a bed-room so you do not feel properly housed in a bed-room without your bed-room clothes. What about ball-room clothes and clothes for church on Sundays? [C 28]

In other words, we do not just use houses to protect us from what is outside; we also use them as containers for domestic living, as sites for household doings like dining and sleeping. Given that church frequently happens away from the domicile and especially given that Gill later argues for viewing clothes as churches, his inclusion of what is often dubbed one's 'Sunday Best' with other domestically-oriented raiment is striking. It might seem more sensible, that is, to categorise this sartorial phenomenon under the heading of clothes-as-churches or, at very least, some other classification not having to do with residential spaces. As I will show in the final chapter of this thesis, however, we have good reason to include many garments from other rubrics under the heading of this one. For the present, though, Gill's other examples, especially that of 'bed-room clothes', i.e. pyjamas, demonstrate the significance of what he is trying to say here: Some clothes facilitate household activity.

Evoking the traditional category of clothing as an instrument of modesty, Gill also discusses clothes-as-houses in terms of 'decency' (C 152ff.). On his conception of the matter, however, decency is not simply a lack of vanity and exhibitionism or a concern for shielding pudenda from prying eyes. Rather, it is a multi-faceted phenomenon that works itself out differently in each of Gill's figurative rubrics. In clothes-as-houses, it amounts to seeing and treating the house—and, by extension, the clothes—as a vehicle for privacy, 'a home, a place

for father and mother and children' (C 155), where they can be honest about themselves because no one's fooling anyone anyway and where they can discuss family business.<sup>44</sup>

Gill says we also use clothes as workshops. As the simile suggests, this is, at least partially, a utilitarian engagement, for, under this rubric, clothes are 'tools and places to work in' (C 52). Concerning the former, Gill says 'Tools are things to do things with; they are not ends in themselves [...]. And for the wearer of clothes, clothes are tools; they are things to do things with—to walk, to dance, to run, to dine, to ride, to work' (C 60). The presence of the 'to dine' here should signal another overlap in Gill's rubrics. The fact that one can dine in a dinner jacket makes it a house on the one hand because dining is a household activity and a workshop on the other because the jacket is a means to the end of dining as an undertaking. Again, I will discuss such overlap in the final chapter. For now, however, it is important to note that it does not prevent Gill's distinctions from being meaningful because one of the things that makes a garment a house is that we wear it in relation to domestic activities and this is not how we wear all of our clothes. 'Work clothes', for example, which fall under the present clothes-as-workshops rubric but have no relation to domestic activities and are not what we wear at home. We leave our houses to go to work and, upon returning, shed the attire necessary for such employment. Indeed, the phrase 'work from home' on utility pole adverts is appealing to would-be applicants precisely because we do not normally work there and one of the

---

<sup>44</sup> Compare Flügel's comment that 'there exists among those who have written on clothes a strong tendency to compare the functions of clothing with the functions of the house or room—and these latter, as we know, are among the most important of womb-symbols. Clothing and houses are both protections to the body, though situated at different distances from it. Our outdoor wraps are indeed a definite substitute for the house, when we leave its protecting shelter. But the same applies to the bed, again a recognised womb symbol, and in English we stress this similarity by speaking of our sheets and blankets as "bed-clothes"' (Flügel 1929: 213).

advantages of such remote employment is ‘getting rich in your underwear’ (Hupalo 2005), which is, apparently, the clothes-as-houses we would all prefer to wear most of the time.

More fundamentally, though, the distinction between the two rubrics concerns a difference in mode rather than a difference in location of operation. While remaining, in some ways, eminently ‘functional’ or ‘utilitarian’, the clothes-as-houses rubric highlights our use of clothing to do the things inherent to that special place where we can open up precisely because we are closed up: eating and preparing to eat, relaxing, sleeping, conceiving and raising children. Clothes-as-workshops, in contrast, focuses on our use of clothing to get something done, whether this is a [normally] domestic task such as cutting the grass or an expressly away-from-the-home endeavour like earning a living as a doctor. In this sense, Gill says, swimwear, deep-sea diving suits, and cowboy hats are all workshops (*C* 151). Such special-purpose garments accordingly come with features of ‘functional beauty’ (*C* 151) like pockets (*C* 53) or, in the case of sailors’ trousers, legs that roll up to permit wading out into the water when necessary (*C* 65-6). A similar point could be made about the ‘surgeon’s cuff’ of a suit or sport jacket, with its working buttons that initially allowed the good doctor of the nineteenth century to roll up his sleeves for surgery rather than shed his bourgeois signifier (Anon. 2010: 127-8), though Gill would not identify such class-exhibitionism as a proper ‘function’ of dress.

Just as, in the clothes-as-houses rubric, Gill is interested in clothing not solely for protection and for facilitating domestic activity but also as a place that allows us to relax and be ourselves, he does not intend the present rubric to address our use of clothing for work in the mere sense of some task we have

before us. Even more primarily, clothes-as-workshops envelop us in a kind of occupational shell of garments unique to our chosen (or given) profession:

Appropriate to different occasions and appropriate to different occupations—that is what the bother is about. The priest at the altar wears a chasuble—it is the appropriate garment, the ‘little house’ of the Roman citizen in which the representative of the man of peace is housed; neither the bridegroom nor the runner needs it. The clerk in the bank wears coat and trousers, collar and tie [...] neither the woman at home nor the girl in the dairy could wear them. Knights formerly wore armour—what need of armour had they when bed-time came? To be without armour in bed is not to be without appropriate clothes. But why wear bed-clothes in the street? Why wear swimming costumes in banks? Why wear tennis costumes in church? [C 167-8]

We might remark that Gill’s point here is less applicable in much of contemporary Western society: University students go to the post office in their pyjamas (or even less discreet attire), people fall asleep in their clothes after a hard day’s work (or merriment), many Protestant ministers look no more priestly than anyone else in their congregations, and though we frequently don uniforms unique to where we work, there is often little, save perhaps a company logo stitched on the shirt pocket, to distinguish one occupational uniform from another.

But even as he is writing in 1931, Gill is mournfully aware of such developments; he identifies what he sees as a fundamental change in dress since the Industrial Revolution: ‘Formerly, you could tell the trade or profession of any man by his clothes’ (C 67-8). People, he says, used to be proud of their trades and, when off work, wore only cleaner or smarter versions of their workaday dress; now, on the other hand, they are only proud of what they do in their spare time and would rather be seen in the attire appropriate to their leisure activity of choice (C 68):

The dress of the huntsman was formerly simply the dress of the huntsman; now it is the dress worn by the man of business when he indulges in the sport of hunting; and there are cricket clothes and clothes for golf, clothes for walking and clothes for swimming; clothes for rowing, clothes for football, clothes for tennis and clothes for motoring; clothes for dancing and clothes for going on a Cook's Tour. [C 68]

The urgency of Gill's statements here may not be immediately apparent. Is there something wrong with engaging in leisure activities like these during the evening or weekend hours? And is not the availability of clothing that is specific to each, making all of them more enjoyable, a welcome development?

Gill's idea, though, is that when there were people who hunted by trade, various kinds of blacksmith and other smiths, chandlers, potters, cobblers, saddlers as well as saddle tree makers, and on and on, people enjoyed their work because it drew on their creativity and expertise and resulted in material output of which they could be proud. Hence, they did not need to spend so much of their so-called free time looking for activities that would make them feel like they were enjoying their lives. That was already happening at work. And, in turn, they did not need all the activity-specific clothing to facilitate such pursuits or have any desire to wear that clothing when not doing the activity so as to parade their only pride. Industrial production, however, relegates most workers to operating machines that manufacture the shoes, candles, cookware, saddles, saddle trees, and so on that people used to make. The work is gruelling without being stimulating and so it is no wonder the machine operators cannot wait to get home, shed their work clothes, put on recreational attire, and do something they enjoy with the little energy they have left. In consequence, Gill says, only designers of products and others who get to use their creativity and/or expertise now enjoy the privilege of being fulfilled in their work (see 'AI', in

*BLH* 196 and *ACC* 95-6). Such people, Gill argues, have less need of specific free time activities to make their lives more bearable and, thus, of the specialised apparel that accompanies these endeavours.

This is not so hard to understand, even in the twenty-first century. It was easy to see that Steve Jobs found his work fulfilling and he probably rarely shed his trademark black turtleneck, Levi's jeans, and grey New Balance trainers since that personal uniform was a product of the same philosophical outlook that brought the rest of the world his company's iPods and other innovative gadgets. The desideratum in wardrobe selection and product design alike was aesthetic pleasure and simplicity. Job's clothes were elegant yet inelaborate, his fleet of products comprehensive and pretty yet small. But to reify his vision, someone had to clean the toilets at Apple and someone had to sit in a cubicle, entering tedious data into spreadsheets, even if—as was widely publicised—the designers and programmers got their own private think-spaces. Were Gill alive at the time, his estimation of these designers and programmers would probably be that they worked toward a more efficient world rather than a more delightful one filled with well-made things. While he regards such emphasis on efficiency as reflecting an impoverished aesthetic and often speaks of the 'mere designer' ('SSMI', in *E* 72 and 'SC', in *AN* 90; cf. *LEG* 329 and *ACC* 121) who 'never makes' ('SSMI', in *E* 73 and 'AB', in *E* 231; cf. *LEG* 329 and *ACC* 121), he says the resulting work nevertheless entails a kind of creative autonomy that allows the worker to take pride in his profession (*C* 93-8). Workers with more mundane and more mechanised but less creative or less expertise-driven jobs, however, are more inclined to find their source of joy and pride in extra-

occupational endeavours and thus more inclined to shed as quickly as possible the clothes necessary to do their jobs.

Completely apart from the issue of how much working for Apple would meet Gill's standards for dignified labour, however, not every company is Apple. Many workers have to dress in garments Gill describes as 'clothes of the puritan man of business who sees no justification for any human activity but financial success. You have a body of skin and bone—ghastly thought! Cover it up—put thick trousers on its legs and trousers [*sic*] on its arms' (C 64). For Gill, bankers and businessmen long ago established the sartorial agenda, determining what the rest of the professions would wear. They sought to clothe their workers in garb that could not offend or express too much individuality. These were to be predictable men of predictable institutions that could be trusted with people's money and business:

Let these things be of a dull and serviceable colour such as will not distract their wearer from his account books or give anyone the impression that he is anything but steady and reliable and fit to be trusted with money. Above all, let these trouserings be dull—dull and drab—drab and sober. Let there be no suggestion that the man of business has any concern with the passions, whether of love, of sport, or of art. Let him be clean and quiet and docile. [C 64]

In addition, Gill says the business professional's clothes had to be inexpensive and durable, with a cut that would enable 'counter-jumping—i.e. jumping on and off omnibuses, in and out of post offices, and up and down the back stairs of the governor's office' (C 64). Armed with a Protestant work ethic and a Puritan uneasiness with beauty, both of the body and of art (whether sanctuary décor or exhibition masterpieces), the business worker was best suited to a fully utilitarian costume of no consequence.

The problem for Gill is that the more the Industrial Revolution had people monitoring machines doing work they used to do themselves, the more artisan labour resembled that of business professionals, in terms of both the lack of creativity required and its ultimate motivation, i.e. not making but making money. On Gill's account, the latter in particular increased the need for everyone to wear the trustworthy duds of the 'counting-house':

real differences of trades have, in fact, disappeared. The process is not yet complete but it is sufficiently advanced for it to be said with truth that to-day the bricklayer is not a different sort of tradesman from a bank clerk; the shop-walker and the bookmaker, the butcher and all the others are all members of one trade union; they are all members of the great union of money-makers. There is only one trade left—all trades are merged in it and all men wear its uniform. But the King! is he also a money-maker and fellow-labourer with bank clerks and bricklayers? No, but he wears the clothes of a gentleman and the gentleman wears the clothes of the counting-house. The counting-house sets the fashion; the counting-house has swallowed everything else. [C 62-3]

Gill's point here is not as overstated as it might seem. The bricklayer pictured in the 1928 eponymous photograph by the German artist August Sander wears dress trousers, a waistcoat, and a scarf tied like an ascot. Although this photograph does not exhaustively represent workers' apparel in Gill's time, it by no means depicts something uncommon. Today, though, it would be strange to see a construction worker so arrayed. In fact, far from seeing the day-labourer adopt the money-maker's business apparel as work clothes, we can now witness one or another version of the former's jeans-and-t-shirt uniform in the free-time—and, increasingly, workaday—apparel of just about everyone in the West. So while Gill's observation about the distinction between work and play clothes still applies, it seems the blue collar has had just as much influence on our sartorial habits as the white.

Concerning the white, however, Gill interestingly thought the increasing presence of women in the workplace would ultimately dissolve the ubiquity of the business suit and tie. For him, women as a gender were never puritanical in the first place (C 50); they were always happy to affirm the value of beauty—on themselves and in the world, of the body and of things. Having them alongside men in the business world should therefore inspire the latter to be more intentional in terms of wearing garments fit for humans in the dignified role of workers:

the suburban housewife is going into business, and taking her clothes with her. It remains to be seen what effect this will have on the clothes of the counting-house and, in turn, what modification it will effect in her own. [...] it is unlikely that the women in the city will don the trouserings of their fathers and brothers; it is more likely that the men will don the clothes of their women partners! The great procession over London Bridge in the mornings and evenings which, throughout the nineteenth century, was as sombre as the city fog itself will very likely break out into all the colours of the rainbow. But if it does so the reign of the counting-house will be over. [C 69-70]

Gill here alludes to the possibility that female sartorial practice will influence men to start wearing skirts of sorts, a development he very much advocated and personally implemented on hygienic, functional, and egalitarian grounds (C 186ff.). Obviously, this wishful thinking on his part has not come to pass. Gill thought men would develop dresses modified for male proportions when, in fact, it is women who have created a feminine-physique-appropriate variation on the classic male business uniform. It might, however, be argued that male business clothes have gotten a bit more colourful, if only in the shirt and tie (or cuff links and socks), though it is difficult to discern how much women's presence in the workplace effected this shift, if at all.

Despite the waning prevalence of what Gill identifies as the hegemony of ‘counting-house’ apparel, however, his comments concerning this dynamic are no less apropos of contemporary Western society. When politicians meet with anyone not expressly interested in their ability to relate to ‘workin’ people’, they wear a business suit. When people—or, more particularly, men—go to the most seminal events of their lives—weddings, funerals, baptisms—or even fancy parties, they wear a business suit. In Gill’s estimation, the reason for this is that, on such occasions, they look to send a silent message: I am responsible, boring enough to be safe, and though perhaps important, not on account of helping to improve the world by making quality things but because I know how to be trustworthy, trustworthy enough to behave for this occasion and trustworthy enough to be given your money, be it purchasing pounds or campaign finance dollars. Gill’s concern, though, is that the deeper message behind ‘I am no one to worry about’ is ‘I am no one of consequence, just a cog in the machine’. If Gill is right about this, Adam and Galinsky’s work from chapter one reveals the further problem that, without realising it, we might also be experiencing ourselves according to this deeper message in wearing such apparel. We might not just be communicating ‘I am no one of consequence’; we might also be pre-conceptually experiencing ourselves as no one of consequence.

The final point concerning this clothes-as-workshops rubric is that Gill’s broad notion of decency has its instantiation here just as it does in the clothes-as-houses rubric. In the latter, decency amounts to the home’s quality of allowing people to relax and be themselves, as opposed to mere modesty; here, the decency lies in that the workshop is ‘a womb—a place of secrecy’ (C 118): ‘A workshop is not primarily a place for the whirring of machinery and the banging

of hammers; it is primarily a place for contemplation—beauty is known by intuition and the knowledge of it increased by contemplation, and of beautiful things the workshop is the womb’ (*C* 155).

Unfortunately, Gill does not explain how clothes on the analogy of workshops might be thus decent. We might infer, however, that if clothes are workshops and workshops are primarily places for contemplation, out of which blossoms the making of quality things, then the best work clothes are those that best facilitate the kind of contemplation essential to a given worker’s unique variety of quality-thing-making. But what example of this can we find? How can clothes facilitate contemplation at all, let alone a particular kind of it? I will address these issues in the final chapter of this thesis, but, for now, it is sufficient to say that the perspective I have here inferred from Gill’s words would accord with his understanding of art as ‘deliberate’ (‘AP’, in *BLH* 11 and ‘CWC’, in *E* 156) ‘skill in making’ (*ACC* 6ff.; ‘AN’, in *AN* 310; ‘AP’, in *BLH* 11; et. al.) and of the artist as ‘delightful’ (‘AS’, in *BLH* 52), ‘skilled workman’ (*ACC* 39; *C* 113; et al.).

Still, clothes are not, Gill says, just houses and workshops but also churches and town halls. Warmth, protection, and the facilitation of work and other doings are important, but ‘neither comfort nor convenience explain [one’s] delight in clothes’ and ‘putting on gaiters and galoshes and pants with pockets in them is not “dressing up” within the meaning of the act’ (*C* 88-9).

Thus,

It is evident that there is another and much more important aspect of clothes and one in which they are seen not simply as things for use, though usefulness be by no means neglected; not simply for decency, though decency be preserved and respected; but as the manifestation of

men's proper dignity and for the adornment of his person. Clothes are for dignity and adornment—that is the central truth of the matter. [C 88-9]

Put another way, 'Man's clothes are the sign of his pride; of his belief in himself rather than of his desire for comfort' (C 90). Gill stresses, however, that he does not mean pride in sense of the deadliest sin, but in the sense of a 'proper pride' that one should have 'because he knows himself the child of God, and his self-respect may be derived, not from his great possessions, whether in money, in goods or in talents, but from his knowledge that man has been redeemed' (C 90). We dress, then, as 'temple[s] of the Holy Ghost', knowing that 'finery is proper' to such an existence (C 103), and we will 'soon again be clothed as befits' such (C 109).

Continuing this line of thinking, Gill suggests,

Man needs more than a house to shelter in; he needs more than a place to work in; primarily and permanently he needs a church and a town-hall to *be* in. For these are the two indestructible sides of his being; he is spirit and matter; he is of another world as well as of this; he is a citizen of two cities and owes a double allegiance. Whether he lives in London or Hong-Kong, whether he lives in the largest town or the smallest village, he lives also in the Heavenly Jerusalem. [C 99-100; emphasis original]

This passage addresses clothing as both churches and town halls, the latter of which I will address shortly. But concerning the former, Gill says we need buildings—and, by analogy, clothes—that are fitting for beings who will one day meet and reign with their maker and who, on the supernatural level, already have and do. As he later puts it, 'clothes are not the rags with which man covers his filthiness, but the habit in which he walks with his Master' (C 185).

Admittedly, Gill says all this from a Judaeo-Christian perspective, in which the first humans 'heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden at the time of the evening breeze' (Gen. 3: 8, NRSV) and in which 'walk[ing]

with God' is a term for faithful living.<sup>45</sup> We might make a similar point more broadly, however, by saying that if we assume our only relation to clothing is the one that satisfies our desire for warmth, protection, and other utilitarian advantages, we risk neglecting the relationship we may have to them on the level of our eternity and infinity. Broadening the scope even more, we might say that on any conception of humanity—whether the traditional, Aristotle-inspired 'rational animal' or Heidegger's *Dasein*—people are different from every other living thing we know in ways that make an active choice to put on clothes even possible for them. Should not we be thinking, then, about how we relate to clothes in ways that would not matter to other creatures that would similarly find use for something that warmed, protected, or facilitated endeavours?

Despite Gill's panegyrics on adorning the person, he is careful to point out that instantiating humanity's proper pride is not necessarily a matter of ornament. Interestingly, he even says that 'if some future Pope would have the courage and the power to carve off all the carvings in the Vatican Basilica and remove all the mosaics and paintings, we should have a building so stupendously beautiful that even the lilies of the field [...] would agree that art improves on nature and that that is what it is for' (C 105). Similarly, he suggests ridding our houses of 'knick-knacks and frills' and reproductions of famous art as well as having 'a great bonfire, a great pillage, a great iconoclasm' of what he takes to be gaudy ornamentation in community buildings like the Römer at Frankfurt am Main (C 121-4).

There is, then, such a thing as excessive ornamentation in Gill's mind. His target in this, however, is not aestheticism as such but the more

---

<sup>45</sup> See Gen. 5: 22-4, Gen. 6: 9, Hos. 11: 12 for the assertion that Enoch, Noah, and the region of Judah, respectively, 'walked/s with God' as well as Mic. 6: 8 for the injunction to do so.

fundamental perspective he sees as leading to aestheticism. For Gill, medieval art and craftsmanship did not pursue beauty explicitly but rather produced it as an epiphenomenal feature of making something well. But with the advent of the Renaissance, he says, beauty itself became profitable, causing moderns to emphasise ornamentation to a fault ever since. As he puts the point in his essay ‘Sculpture on Machine-Made Buildings’,

And the outstanding thing to notice about the change which occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is that it was precisely the kind of change which, if you’d been clever enough to think of it, was the very one best calculated to tickle the fancy of the newly enfranchised, growing, and growing more and more powerful, class of rich merchants and bankers. [‘SMB’, in *E* 196]

Once ‘It was discovered that you could get round the Christian laws against usury by calling money-lending “investment” and by calling interest “a share in the profits”’ (‘SMB’, in *E* 190),<sup>46</sup> banking flourished and power and wealth began their shift out of the hands of kings and cardinals into those of bankers and merchants. Good art then became about producing ‘what will sell’ rather than ‘the well-making of what needs making’ and this meant ‘tickling the fancy of the rich by supplying them with what they naturally like best, portraits of themselves’ (*ACC* 43) and ‘pretty’, ‘life-like’ pictures of women and other objects of interest (‘SMB’, in *E* 200-1).

But since ‘you can camouflage a lot of bad construction with ornament’ (*ACC* 110), it would not be long before quality—thitherto the primary value in art—suffered. The new emphasis on profit and ‘what will sell’ led to the use of poor, because cheaper, materials as well as ‘bad construction’ that spent less time and, therefore, less capital, on quality so as to proceed in making more

---

<sup>46</sup> See Broton 2002: 46-8 and Strathem 2003: 17ff. for background on the conceptual bait and switch Gill quite correctly adduces here.

things poorly. Given that machines produce much faster than humans, the shortcuts in construction intensified in mechanised making. As I have already discussed in connection with the clothes-as-workshops rubric, this, in turn, relegated workers to the role of ‘machine-minders being simply parts of the machinery’ (‘AAIP’, in *E* 173) instead of skilled artists making products of ‘imagination directly operative upon material’ (*ACC* 77). Adding to the loss in quality concomitant with inferior material and shortcuts in construction, this disenfranchisement further deteriorated standards by removing accountability from the making process. As Gill puts it, a ‘degrading industrialism’ expunged the direct ‘give and take’ relationship between a client wanting a certain kind of thing and a maker capable of deciding the best way to fashion it (*ACC* 32-4), ‘Not for the good of the maker, Not for the good of the buyer, But for the good of *the thing itself*’ (‘AI’, in *BLH* 181; emphasis original). The fact that beauty had now become profitable meant merchants could ‘camouflage’ this departure from ‘the good of *the thing itself*’ with ‘what will sell’, i.e. ‘ornament’.

None of this is to say, however, that Gill does not have plenty of contempt for the garish titillation of aestheticism. Just as he denigrates self-expression and the exhibition of ‘fine feelings’ on the maker side, he also counsels against reducing art to the impartation of such feelings in the buyer: ‘Art is more than fine art, more than aesthetics, more than the business of producing psychophysical states’ (*ACC* 66) and ‘An art which pleases the senses only and does not make its appeal to the whole man is necessarily bad art’ (‘AP’, in *BLH* 27). Nevertheless, his principal aversion to aestheticism regards its emphasis on decoration and the negative impact thereof. Since ornament ‘can camouflage a lot of bad construction’, it encouraged industrial manufacturing,

which dispossessed workers of their role as artists and transformed art from something of quality one person makes for another into the exclusive purview of designers and art stars (or art star hopefuls), the latter of whom ‘owe much of their importance to the fact that the work of all other men has been reduced to inhuman dullness or imbecility’ (*ACC* 66).

For this reason, then, Gill advocates plainness and simplicity in modern building and manufacturing:

Industrialism means that one man designs the thing, another or several others design the machine to make it, innumerable nameless men use the machine because they are told to do so and their labour is economised by their employer because labour saved is equivalent to lower wages and bigger profits for him.

I am not here complaining about this. I am only saying that under the circumstances we are foolish if we go in for ornamental building. A plain wall is all right. Tons of concrete you can measure; millions of bricks you can count; thousands of “hands” you can command. But ornament cannot be made to measure and the best you can command is a lifeless copy of your full-size detail. [‘PA’, in *BLH* 158-9]

While this passage demonstrates that Gill thinks the vice of Industrialism—about which he does not ‘here’ complain—and the virtue of plainness are connected, it does not provide an argument for the last and most provocative claim that manufacturing cannot produce ornament.

The key to this mystery lies in his understanding of beauty as love made material. As he says elsewhere,

the modern West, following Nietzsche, says “when Power becometh gracious and steppeth down into visibleness—Beauty I call such stepping down” (i.e. that Beauty is incarnate *power*). Hence the huge development of Industrialism in nineteenth-century Europe and America. On the other hand, the ancient West and the East, both ancient and modern, hold that beauty is incarnate *Love*. [‘BLH’, in *BLH* 215-16; emphases original]

Notwithstanding the fact that, in the relevant passage, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra defines beauty not as power incarnate but as power set aside in the ‘self-

conquest' inherent to 'graciousness' and 'kindness' (see *Z II*, 'On Those Who Are Sublime', in *PN* 230), Gill makes an interesting contrast: On the one hand is the modern predilection for finding beauty in displays of power and, on the other, the supposedly pre-modern and non-Western understanding of beauty as love made manifest. In resistance to this picture, one could argue that behind the Roman appetite for blood sport—to take just one example—lies a perceived experience of beauty in watching well-executed violence, an expression not of love but of a kind of power. After all, Gill's oft-repeated contention is that 'The beautiful is "that which being seen pleases"' (e.g. *C* 12 and 170 and 'PA', in *BLH* 157) and it is fairly obvious that arena patrons of ancient Rome found the spectacles visually pleasing. Consequently, the line between the modern West and everyone else may not be quite as clear as Gill assumes.

What Gill's distinction demonstrates, however, is that his aversion to ornamentation in the modern era stems not from a disdain for flourish itself but from his definition of beauty. Once the latter is defined as the manifestation of skill applied lovingly, machine-made beauty becomes a contradiction in terms because machines do not create by love; they create by formula. In the best cases of industrial manufacturing, then, only the designer's (or designers') original drawings or prototypes can qualify as beautiful on Gill's definition. Furthermore, machines provide a distancing mechanism between designers and the customers who would hold them accountable for making things well. This allows the former to take shortcuts that reflect greed rather than love and care, further eroding the outcome's claim to beauty. Thus, while Gill speaks of 'admiring the ingenuity and power' ('PA', in *BLH* 163) of industrial products (which he imprecisely terms 'beauty' on occasion; see e.g. 'PA', in *BLH* 162), he

thinks ornamentation in such commodities is tawdry rather than beautiful because beauty entails the unmediated, loving interaction of an accountable maker with a made to ensure unimpeachable quality. Hence, in the modern era, the ‘degradation of the workman [...] has made plain building the only kind of good building, so the same degradation has made plain things the only good things and plain clothes the only good clothes’ (C 106-7). ‘And this determination is not the product of any hatred of ornament or images; it is due to our great love of those things—we refuse to have them unless they be good, and they can only be good when they are the fruit of love, when there has been great joy at their making, and they have not been begotten betwixt sleep and wake’ (C 124).

The upshot of all this is that when Gill says we dress because finery is proper to the temple of the Holy Ghost and that we will ‘soon again be clothed as befits’ such, he is not saying we will or should put on dazzling ensembles. Rather, he is advocating ‘plain’ (C 109) raiment born of an artisan’s love in the same way that the universe is born of God’s love.<sup>47</sup> In other words, he is suggesting we wear garments not made by a machine but by a person, ideally ourselves or someone we know, for ‘Only those things are really appreciated which we are able to do or make ourselves’ or that are made or done by those we ‘live among’ (C 108).

As in the other rubrics, Gill here discusses his idiosyncratic notion of decency as it relates to clothes-as-churches. Under this rubric, however, decency is not merely more than modesty but even complicates that notion. It is true, Gill says, that we like to cover certain things up: ‘while [man] delights in

---

<sup>47</sup> See C 9-10 for the comparison between human works and the universe on this count.

nakedness, he hates to be caught naked unprepared; the clothes which shield him from the weather also veil him from the wind of criticism' (C 118-9). On the other hand, Gill counts himself among those

who think all Being is beautiful and deny beauty to nothing (not even to microbes and boils; they simply find such things out of place in lungs or on buttocks), who find faces more expressive, but not more beautiful than feet, and the sexual organs as beautiful as either, for whom the sense of touch is also a means to the knowledge of the beautiful and the touch of the naked no less beautiful than the sight of it. [C 165]

The human body—in the male just as much as the female form—is beautiful. Thus, in shielding parts of it from certain eyes, we are not covering up anything embarrassing or ugly but making access to our most dignified parts a privilege. The church is 'a shrine—a place wherein what is holy is veiled' and clothes-as-churches are similarly vehicles for the 'veiling of sanctities' (C 118). With this language, Gill both more explicitly eroticises and more broadly applies St. Paul's injunction that women 'veil' the long hair that is their 'glory' by wearing a head covering (1 Cor. 5: 15, NRSV).

But, Gill says, this veiling occurs in a way that also unveils or displays.<sup>48</sup>

Or, to put it the other way round,

the thing displayed is always displayed by a shield. Do we wish to display our heads?—then we wear large hats. Is it our feet of which we are proud?—then we invent fantastic boots. Are women proud of their fine croups?—then they must tie bustles upon them to make them more magnificent still. Were young men at one time proud to be known as such?—then they must tie themselves up in great bulging cod-pieces. When girls were more proud of their hair they did it up in caps and

---

<sup>48</sup> Many thinkers and clothing theorists have engaged this issue. Rousseau describes it vividly: 'Her adornment is very modest in appearance and very coquettish in fact. She does not display her charms; she covers them, but, in covering them, she knows how to make them imagined. When someone sees her, he says, "Here is a modest, temperate girl". But so long as he stays near her, his eyes and his heart roam over her whole person without his being able to take them away; and one would say that all this very simple attire was put on only to be taken off piece by piece by the imagination' (Rousseau 1762: 394). See also Wilde 1885: 9; W. Thomas 1899: 246 and 253; Hirn 1900: 205; Ellis 1900: 47 and 61ff.; Grosse 1914: 98; Bliss 1916: 219; Sanborn 1927: 2 and 12; Dunlap 1928: 64, 66-7; Flügel 1929: 215 and 1934: 153; Crawley 1931: 9-12; Barthes *LF* 81 and 89; Rudofsky 1971: 26, 47, and 62-70; Steele 1985: 15; and Barnard 2002: 53-5.

ribands, and when women were prouder of reaching the estate of potential motherhood they put away the short kilts of childhood and wore skirts reaching to the ground. Are we pleased with our ears and noses?—the let us hang rings upon them. Let us have rings on our fingers and bracelets on our arms, gloves on our hands and stockings on our legs—and all these things, not in any spirit of modesty, not to hide our parts but to display them with honour. [C 119-20]

The idea that we display by shielding parallels Heidegger's view that the 'clearing' that exclusively 'grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are [...] is in itself at the same time concealment' where 'being presents itself as other than it is' ('OWA', in *BW* 178-9 / *GA* 5: 40). Could it be that the sorts of accessories Gill enumerates (and clothes in general) function as a vehicle through which the being we have and are invites engagement and even 'grants [...] access' to itself, yet, at the same time, presents itself (to others but also, and more importantly, to ourselves) as other than it is, as if behind a 'shield' or mask? Furthermore, could it be that such a vehicle is indispensable, i.e. that without our (ever?) wearing clothes, being is not concealed but also and *ipso facto*, no invitation is made to engage with it?

For Gill, clothes-as-churches are 'for dignity and adornment' of the person. While he recommends we don the kinds of accessories he lists above to 'display' given body parts, the reason these are worth displaying in the first place is that they belong to children of God, temples of the Holy Spirit, 'collaborators with God in creating' (C 129). That the host from the Roman Catholic Eucharist resides in the visually elaborate tabernacle may impress onlookers or communicate its centrality to Catholic faith and practice, but, beneath that, the centrality itself necessitates such a domicile, even if onlookers are never present. Similarly, Gill advocates what he takes to be proper raiment

primarily because such clothing functions like a church in providing us with the only appropriate encasement for a being as exalted as ours.

If we add Heidegger's concern for access to being to these insights, the question becomes: could clothes that are appropriate for our being, i.e. clothes that function like churches, also disclose this being to (and thereby conceal it from) us? Can what we wear, in one way or another, highlight our relationship to being and, if so, can some garments do so more effectively than others and thus better facilitate our understanding of that relationship? In other words, could some clothing be an example of what Heidegger's 'Guide' discusses in the 'Triadic Conversation': 'If the adornment (*Schmuck*), as the word says, adoringly nestles up against (*anschmeigt*) the matter, then through the adornment the matter can more beautifully shine forth; and it can do this without us especially noticing the adornment itself, which of course would not at all be its point' (*CPC* 31 / *GA* 77: 47)? This cluster of questions is one I will take up in the final chapter of this thesis.

In Gill's discussion of clothes as town halls, he is unfortunately quite brief. He addresses the rubric together in one chapter with clothes-as-churches, primarily focusing on the latter and seemingly lumping his comments on town halls into his churches remarks. Nevertheless, it seems possible to infer that the clothes-as-town-halls rubric concerns the public or social aspect of our apparel—not so much what it communicates but the ways it allows us to interact with others. For example, he suggests that Europe has lost its sense of dignity, which underlies, *inter alia*, the continent's diminished need for town halls, as evident in its shift from governance via town meetings to governance by big-business politicians:

It is not dignity that we in Europe are after. We have lost the sense of it; we scarcely any longer believe in it. Dignity sounds silly in our ears. [...] We do not need churches or town-halls; we neither make prayer nor give praise, and the business of government is done in the lobby. The church is a museum and the town-hall is let out on hire. [C 145]

Similarly, in his comments on decency with regard to this rubric, Gill says ‘a town-hall is primarily a meeting-house for citizens’ (C 156), though he fails to elaborate, making it difficult to discern how he applies the insight to clothes.

This and other gaps in Gill’s account need not be too problematic, however, for he has given us a good start in understanding clothes as a theological phenomenon. This will enable me, later, to draw upon him in addressing the central question of this thesis, namely, how clothes might help facilitate the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. Moreover, I have chosen Heidegger as a more phenomenologically and ontologically rigorous thinker who can engage the issues Gill raises in a way that fills some of the gaps he leaves. What exactly does it mean, for example, to say, as Gill does, that ‘Man needs more than a house to shelter in; he needs more than a place to work in; primarily and permanently he needs a church and a town-hall to *be* in’? (Recall that the emphasis on the word ‘be’ here is Gill’s.) How and why, if at all, do having shelter on the one hand and being on the other come apart here and what role do various edifices and their sartorial analogues play in this? How can clothes promote contemplation—or even what Heidegger calls ‘thinking’—in the way Gill’s workshop analogy intimates and how might adornment in clothes allow ‘the matter’—i.e. being—to ‘shine forth’ ‘more beautifully’, as Heidegger’s *Guide* suggests? How might clothes help facilitate our interactions with each other in the manner of a town hall? Heidegger’s own account of our relationship to things provides especially fertile ground for

exploring these questions and I will therefore refer to it as I undertake such exploration in the coming chapters, particularly the final one.

### Conclusion

I have presented Gill as offering the kind of phenomenological account of our relationship to clothes that the conclusions of the figures in the last chapter suggest we need. Unlike most of these figures, however, he does not add to or nuance the categories of the traditional view of clothing, whereby we dress for protection, modesty, and decoration (and, sometimes, depending on the theorist, communication). Instead, he entirely jettisons this understanding in favour of a paradigm based on the kinds of buildings that suit our needs: houses, which allow us to relax and be ourselves, thus incorporating elements of both protection and modesty but also much that is left untouched by the traditional picture; workshops, which facilitate contemplation as well as participation in and emulation of the creativity embodied in our universe, motivations not addressed by the traditional view; and churches and town halls that mediate our relations with God and each other, which involves both modesty and decoration but, again, also a great deal more that is outside the purview of the traditional model.

As I said in the last chapter, the view of wearing clothing as motivated by protection, modesty, and decoration (as well as communication) does offer some insight into how clothes shape our self-experience, especially in the proto-phenomenological theorists I adduced. But this insight comes piecemeal, as isolated instances of self-experience-shaping scattered throughout the three (or four) traditional rubrics rather than as an underlying analysis about why and

how our relation to clothes renders their shaping of our self-experience possible in the first place. Gill's clothes-as-buildings perspective contrariwise addresses the relation of clothes to our being and thus the role they play in shaping our self-experience. Where he falls short, however, is in saying very little about what this being of ours constitutes and how that relates to buildings or clothes.

For his part, Heidegger has much in common with Gill, including the presupposition that buildings are intimately related to human being, but, in contrast, delineates the features of such being and specifies just why architecture is so essential to it. In the next three chapters, therefore, I will detail Heidegger's understanding of human being and apply it to clothes, for, unlike Gill, Heidegger only—and very sparsely—hints at the connection between buildings and clothes and, similarly, at the ontological significance of apparel. In the final chapter, then, I will consult Gill and Heidegger in tandem, showing how doing so facilitates, through the latter, a phenomenologically and ontologically rigorous account of clothes that, through the former, addresses them in an explicitly theological way, thereby informing the central question of this thesis.

### Chapter 3: Heidegger on Dwelling with ‘Things’

*Regarding Binswanger’s article about a “heelpobia” [...], the girl does not have anxiety in the case of breaking the leg of a chair. The chair does not have the same closeness to the girl’s body as does the heel of the shoe, all of which belong to bodying forth in almost the same way as a button on a piece of clothing. Thus, one must carefully explore how these particular things like a heel, the leg of a chair, a button, or spittle are making a claim (Anspruch) on the girl.—Martin Heidegger<sup>49</sup>*

*I know about letting the world alone, not interfering. I do not know about running things. Letting things alone: so that men will not blow their nature out of shape! Not interfering, so that men will not be changed into something they are not!—Chuang Tzu<sup>50</sup>*

In the last chapter, I presented Eric Gill’s account of clothes as integral to the human experience of and relationship to the world. The problem with this account, aside from some clarity issues, is that it advances a theory of clothes in relation to being without working out the details. Gill says humans need clothes in which to ‘be’, as distinct from those in which they take shelter and in which they work, but he never says what it means to ‘be’. He also fails to provide a thoroughgoing explication of the relationship between our being and the being of clothes as well as the place of the latter in our relationship to other, non-sartorial entities, i.e. other things and humans. Such an explication is indispensable to any theory of clothes in relation to ‘being’, given that reflection on the latter amounts to reflection on the relation between the respective ‘beings’ or essences of various beings.

Heidegger’s phenomenology, however, provides the ontological foundation necessary to undergird Gill’s onto-sartorial claims and thus enhance

---

<sup>49</sup> ZS 205-6 / GA 89: 256-7.

<sup>50</sup> Merton 1965: 70.

his contribution to this inquiry. In the final two chapters, I will be making similar—though phenomenological rather than onto-sartorial—claims with recourse to the Heideggerian ontology and vocabulary I will be elucidating in this and the following chapter. This will involve speaking of clothes only intermittently for a time before foregrounding them again after these chapters.

For Heidegger, human being lies in ‘dwelling [*Wohnen* and its cognates]’ (*BT* 79-80 / *GA* 2: 73; ‘LH’, in *BW* 245 and 259-60 / *GA* 9: 342 and 358; ‘BDT’, in *BW* 349ff. / *GA* 7: 149ff.), a word he defines as ‘remain[ing] at peace within the free [...] that safeguards [or preserves: *schont*] each thing in its essence’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 350 / *GA* 7:150) or ‘let[ting] beings be the beings they are’ by ‘engag[ing] oneself with the open region and its openness’ (‘ET’, in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188). This prompts one of the most fundamental questions in Western ontological inquiry: What makes a thing a thing, such that we can ‘safeguard’ or ‘preserve’ it in its essence or let it be the being it is? In more simple terms, what is a thing?

I will take each of these two matters in turn, beginning with a fuller account of ‘dwelling’ from Heidegger’s perspective before discussing his rather idiosyncratic response to the question of the thing’s essence. The latter will occupy more space because it involves detailing what he thinks went wrong in the history of philosophy and how that led to the mistakenness of traditional Western approaches to the thing.

### Heidegger on Dwelling

In his essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Heidegger distinguishes between buildings that merely ‘house’ [*behausen*] us, those that further ‘provide

lodgings' [*gewähren Unterkunft*], and those that even further 'hold any guarantee that *dwelling* occurs in them [*daß ein Wohnen geschieht*]:

The truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not have his lodgings there; the working woman is at home in the spinning mill, but does not have her dwelling place there; the chief engineer is at home in the power station, but he does not dwell there. These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, if to dwell means solely to have our lodgings in them. In today's housing shortage even this much is reassuring and to the good; residential buildings do indeed provide lodgings; today's houses may even be well planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light, and sun, but—do the houses in themselves hold any guarantee that *dwelling* occurs in them? ['BDT', in *BW 347-8 / GA 7: 147*; emphasis original]

In this passage, Heidegger discusses the common distinction between structures such as trucks and workplaces that merely 'house' or, as Gill puts it, 'shelter' (C 28) us and those that do more by providing us lodgings. Structures that merely house or encase us, he says, 'are not dwelling-places [*Wohnungen*]' ('BDT', in *BW 348 / GA 7: 147*) 'if to dwell means solely to have our lodgings in them' but are rather 'in the domain of dwelling' ('BDT', in *BW 347 / GA 7: 147*) and 'serve man's dwelling' as a means to an end ('BDT', in *BW 348 / GA 7: 147*). While Heidegger notes that such a common understanding 'has something correct in it' ('BDT', in *BW 348 / GA 7: 148*), he pushes the distinction by asking whether dwelling in fact 'means solely to have our lodgings' in a given structure. Even though the houses of 'today' provide lodging, can we be sure, he asks, that dwelling is actually going on in all of them?

The implication is 'no' and Heidegger thus argues that talking about building and dwelling according to a 'means-end schema', where the former serves the latter, obscures the essential relation between them, namely, that 'building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—to build is in itself

already to dwell' ('BDT', in *BW* 348 / *GA* 7: 148). Because Heidegger believes some words in the Western tradition no longer bear their essential meaning due to translation and therefore cultural misappropriation,<sup>51</sup> he often demonstrates his points etymologically. Here, he notes that the Old High German for building, *buan*, which has evolved into the current German *bauen*, means 'to dwell'. This shade of meaning, he says, has fallen away from contemporary usage, but traces of it linger in the German word for 'neighbour', *Nachbar*, i.e. the *Nachgebauer* or 'near-dweller'. It also shows up in forms of the German auxiliary verb *sein*, 'to be': *ich bin* ('I am'), *du bist* ('you are'), and the imperative *bis* ('Be!'). Hence, 'The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans *are* on the earth, is *buan*, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell' ('BDT', in *BW* 349 / *GA* 7: 149; emphasis original).

The point is that when we speak of building, we are speaking of a phenomenon that, in an originally explicit but now hidden way, is interconnected—and, as a term, sometimes interchangeable—with dwelling. Heidegger notes that such building/dwelling has two modes, cultivation and construction. In the first of these, the meaning of 'to build' is 'to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine. Such building only takes care—it tends the growth that ripens into fruit of its own accord' ('BDT', in *BW* 349 / *GA* 7: 149). It is in this sense of cultivation that people use the metaphors 'building relationships' and 'building a business', but Heidegger is speaking literally here. As he describes it, this first mode of

---

<sup>51</sup> See 'OWA', in *BW* 149 / *GA* 5: 7-8 for one of the many places he discusses this.

building involves nurturing and cultivating a piece of land on which we have settled. Heidegger contrasts such activity with the second mode:

Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making anything. Ship-building and temple-building, on the other hand, do in a certain way make their own works. Here building, in contrast with cultivating, is a constructing. Both modes of building—building as cultivating, Latin *colere*, *cultura*, and building as the raising up of edifices, *aedificare*—are comprised within genuine building, that is dwelling. [‘BDT’, in *BW* 349 / *GA* 7: 149]

Thus far, Heidegger has stipulated that ‘Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings’ and that ‘all building is in itself a dwelling’, which is ‘the manner in which mortals are on the earth’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 350 / *GA* 7: 150). In other words, building, which has two modes, cultivating and constructing, is tantamount to dwelling, which is what he says it means for humans to ‘be’.

‘But in what’, he asks, ‘does the essence of dwelling consist?’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 350 / *GA* 7: 150). Again, he turns to etymology for his answer, this time to the Old Saxon and Gothic equivalents of the Old High German *buan/bauen*, viz. *wuon* and *wunian*, respectively:

The old Saxon *wuon*, Gothic *wunian*, like the old word *bauen*, mean to remain, to stay in a place. But the Gothic *wunian* says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. *Wunian* means to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Frye*; and *fry* means preserved [*bewahrt*] from harm and danger, preserved *from* something, safeguarded [*geschont*]. To free actually means to spare [also, to conserve, care for, or go easy on: *schonen*]. The sparing itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something *positive* and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we ‘free’ it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence [*Wohnen, zum Frieden gebracht sein, heißt: eingefriedet bleiben in das Frye, d.h. in das Freie, das jegliches in sein Wesen schont*]. [‘BDT’, *BW* 350-1 / *GA* 7:150-1; emphases original.]

According to Heidegger, human being / dwelling—to which building in its two modes is tantamount—is to ‘remain at peace within the free [...] that safeguards [or preserves] each thing in its essence’. The meaning of this assertion is far from clear, but some of the more difficult interpretive questions—e.g. what ‘the free’ that ‘safeguards each thing in its essence’ is and what it means to perform such safeguarding or to let things ‘be the beings they are’—hinge on a more fundamental question, namely: what is the essence of any given thing as a thing, such that we might remain in the free that safeguards it? In other words, what exactly is a thing? Since understanding what Heidegger means by safeguarding a thing in its essence or thingness—or envisioning the ‘free’ where that happens—depends on understanding what he means by thingness, I shall now explicate his response to this more fundamental question.

### Heidegger on ‘Things’

Heidegger’s most lengthy analysis of the ‘thing’, a lecture series from the winter of 1935-6 published as *What Is a Thing?*, begins by discussing three ways we generally employ the term:

1. A thing in the sense of being present-at-hand: a rock, a piece of wood, a pair of pliers, a watch, an apple, and a piece of bread. All inanimate and all animate things such as a rose, shrub, beech tree, spruce, lizard, and wasp....
2. Thing in the sense in which it means whatever is named but which includes also plans, decisions, reflections, loyalties, actions, historical things....
3. All these things and anything else that is a something (*ein Etwas*) and not nothing. [*WIT* 6 / *GA* 41: 6]

After enumerating these understandings, Heidegger says:

It is closer to our linguistic usage of today to understand the term ‘thing’ in the first (narrower) signification. Then each of these things (rock, rose,

apple, watch) is also something (*etwas*), but not every something (the number five, fortune, bravery) is a thing.

In asking 'What is a thing?' we shall adhere to the *first* meaning; not only because we want to stay close to the usage of language but also because the question concerning the thing, even where it is understood in its wider and widest meanings, mostly aims at this narrower field and begins from it. [*WIT* 6-7 / *GA* 41: 6; emphasis original]

Heidegger opts for what he here calls the 'present-at-hand' sense of the term 'thing' because even when we speak of 'something' like bravery, we use the same language and have the same sorts of ends as when we speak of 'things' in the present-at-hand sense. That is, we speak of bravery and so on as if they were entities sitting in front of us and think of them as though we could obtain or lose them like such entities. Heidegger therefore reasons that the second and third of our general understandings of the 'thing' amount to the first, that of the thing as an animate or inanimate, present-at-hand entity. While Heidegger's own definition of the thing is not the same as any of these common understandings, he uses the first to unfold his perspective, which he further develops in later works such as 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'The Thing', and 'Building Dwelling Thinking'.

In the 'Origin', Heidegger continues to operate with the above 'narrower signification' of the word 'thing' but divides it, identifying three conventional interpretations of the thing so understood: first, 'the thing as bearer of its characteristic traits' or 'substance with its accidents', i.e. 'that around which the properties have assembled' ('OWA', in *BW* 148-50 / *GA* 5: 7-9); second, the thing as 'the unity of a manifold of what is given in the senses' ('OWA', in *BW* 151 / *GA* 5: 10); and third, the thing as 'formed matter' ('OWA', in *BW* 152 / *GA* 5: 11). Heidegger finds each of these 'interpretations' of the thing inadequate. In this chapter, I will be delineating his criticisms of all three, which will involve

detailing what might seem excessive background. This is not scholarly pedantry, however, for the information will double as background for expositions and applications of Heidegger's philosophy at subsequent points in the thesis.

Concerning the first conventional view of the thing, Heidegger notes that it is easy to see why we in the West find it compelling, for it mirrors our Indo-European sentence structure:

According to current opinion, this definition of the thingness of the thing as the substance with its accidents seems to correspond to our natural outlook on things. No wonder that the current attitude toward things—our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about them—has adapted itself to this common view of the thing. A simple propositional statement consists of the subject, which is the Latin translation, hence already a reinterpretation, of *hypokeimenon*, and the predicate, in which the thing's traits are stated of it. Who would have the temerity to assail these simple fundamental relations between thing and statement, between sentence structure and thing-structure? ['OWA', in *BW* 149 / *GA* 5: 8]

When we make a statement in an Indo-European tongue, we have a phenomenon we are discussing, which, in grammatical terms, we call a 'subject', and a string of words making an affirmation or denial about it, which we call a 'predicate'. We use this linguistic structure to codify our experience in thought and speech and thereby make it part and parcel with that experience. It is no surprise, then, Heidegger says, that we gravitate toward an account of 'thingness' that is intimately harmonious with our customary linguistic structure, an account that portrays the thing as a phenomenon we are discussing using a string of words that apply to it, a kind of thing-properties version of the subject-predicate paradigm.

'Nevertheless', he continues, 'we must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)?

Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence?' ('OWA', in *BW* 149-50 / *GA* 5: 8). In other words, which comes first? Do we speak in terms of subjects with predicative attributes because we (rightly or wrongly) understand 'things' as bearers of properties (or as 'substances' with 'accidents', to use the Aristotelian terms as appropriated by Scholasticism) or the other way round? While—in the 'Origin' and elsewhere—Heidegger might seem to prefer the latter option, he says:

It even remains doubtful whether in this form the question is at all decidable.

Actually, the sentence structure does not provide the standard for the pattern of thing-structure nor is the latter simply mirrored in the former. Both sentence and thing-structure derive, in their typical form and their possible mutual relationship, from a common and more original source'. ['OWA', in *BW* 150 / *GA* 5: 9]

As Joseph J. Kockelmans observes, Heidegger 'refrains from going deeper into this important issue' of the 'more original source' behind the sentence structure and thing-structure (Kockelmans 1985: 115). That is, he does not say what it is. With a little work, however, we can see that this more original source is none other than the source he consistently divines behind what he takes to be the completed avenue of thought 'inevitably [*unumgängliche*]' ('NWGD', in *OBT* 158 / *GA* 5: 211) but erroneously taken by the Western philosophical tradition: metaphysics. Before further delineating Heidegger's commentary on the thing, I must explain how he understands this error to have departed from previous thinking.

Heidegger on the Greek Understanding of Being as 'Presence' and the West's Departure from It into 'Metaphysics'

Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics is atypical and involves a particular narrative relating it to the history of philosophy. Without a grasp of this narrative, much of what he says is unintelligible. Throughout his life, Heidegger explored a cluster of questions he took to be the most important and fundamental to thinking: 'What is being? If philosophy is the science of being, then the first and last and basic problem of philosophy must be, What does being signify? Whence can something like being in general be understood? How is understanding of being at all possible?' (*BPP* 15 / *GA* 24: 19).

According to Heidegger's narrative, meditation on this cluster of questions began with the 'early thinkers' ('AF', in *EGT* 14 / *GA* 5: 322), Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides,<sup>52</sup> from whom the Western tradition beginning with Plato erroneously departed. These early Greeks understood being as the 'presencing of what is present' ('AF', in *EGT* 39 / *GA* 5: 352). As Heidegger puts it in his 1939 essay 'On the Essence and Concept of *Physis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I', 'For the Greeks [...] "being" means: *presencing into the*

---

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger's frequent avoidance of the terms 'presocratic', 'preplatonic', and so on to refer to these figures reflects his view that, in such language, 'The unexpressed standard for considering and judging the early thinkers is the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. These are taken as the Greek philosophers who set the standard both before and after themselves', such that 'Platonic and Aristotelian representations and concepts, in modern transformations, still guide the interpretation' of early Greek texts ('AF', in *EGT* 14 / *GA* 5: 322). In other words, locutions like 'presocratic' are not merely innocent indicators of the time period in which a thinker so described arose in the history of philosophy. Rather, use of these terms all-too-frequently occurs in tandem with an investment in Platonic and/or Aristotelian concerns and methods of inquiry as well as an assumption that earlier Greek thinkers shared these concerns and methods. In Heidegger's estimation, this is already misleading enough since he believes the early Greek thinkers understood their fundamental concern, i.e. being, in very different terms from those of Plato and Aristotle. But the problem is even thornier than this for him because, as far as he is concerned, the modern understanding of the Platonic and Aristotelian tasks does not even correspond to the thinking of Plato and Aristotle but proffers 'modern transformations' or misunderstandings of these seminal thinkers. That is, what most modern scholars take to be the Platonic and Aristotelian concerns are, instead, a product of their own modern commitments engaging with an accumulated tradition of misinterpretation they learned from their similarly modern teachers. These scholars then read all of this back into Platonic and Aristotelian texts. Thus, it is not just that modern commentators interpret the early Greeks in light of Plato and Aristotle but that they further allow the cares and assumptions of modernity to nurture 'modern transformations' of these two thinkers before using those transformations to 'guide' or encourage second-level misinterpretations of earlier ones.

*unhidden*' ('ECP', in *PM* 206 / *GA* 9: 270; emphasis original). Heidegger uses various terms to describe this 'presencing [*Anwesung*]' phenomenon, including: 'becoming present [*Wesung*]' ('ECP', in *PM* 195 / *GA* 9: 254); 'showing up [*Sichzeigen*]' ('ECP', in *PM* 221 / *GA* 9: 290); 'break[ing] out into the open, i.e. com[ing] into appearance [*zum Ausschlag, d.h. in den Vorschein komm[en]*]' ('ECP', in *PM* 217 / *GA* 9: 285); 'unconceal[ing] itself [*sich entbergen*]' and 'emerging [*aufgehen*]', 'coming out/forth [*hervorkommen*]', or being 'placed forth [*her-gestellt*]' 'into the unhidden [*ins Unverborgene*]' or 'into unhiddenness [*in die Unverborgenheit*]' ('ECP', in *PM* 230 and 218 / *GA* 9: 300-1 and 285), amongst others. Unfortunately, Heidegger rarely defines these locutions in familiar terms or gives examples, but what he intends begins to emerge as one draws on various passages throughout his corpus. The idea is that when the early Greeks make any statement to the effect that something 'is', they do not assume that humans are subjects who 'see', 'view', or 'represent' things as objects they can master and condition. Rather, in Heidegger's understanding of the Greek mindset, it is the converse: To say things 'are' is to say they 'presence', 'show up', or manifest themselves to, and therefore condition, us.

This way of understanding the being of other entities in relation to us is most intelligible and compelling in reference to a passage from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who was influenced by Heidegger and took the latter's presence-based understanding of being as a starting point. In it, Merleau-Ponty discusses the classic Müller-Lyer illusion, in which two arrows with different ends—two arrowheads in one case and two fletchings in the other—appear to be of different lengths until measured:

The two straight lines in Müller-Lyer's optical illusion are neither of equal nor unequal length; it is only in the objective world that this question arises. The visual field is that strange zone in which contradictory notions jostle each other because the objects—the straight lines of Müller-Lyer—are not, in that field, assigned to the realm of being, in which a comparison would be possible, but each is taken in its private context as if it did not belong to the same universe as the other. [Merleau-Ponty 1945: 6-7]

A few pages later, he continues:

[Science] forces the phenomenal universe into categories which make sense only in the universe of science. It requires that two perceived lines, like two real lines, should be equal or unequal, that a perceived crystal should have a definite number of sides, without realising that the perceived, by its nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting, and is shaped by its context. In Müller-Lyer's illusion, one of the lines ceases to be equal to the other without becoming 'unequal': it becomes 'different'. That is to say, an isolated, objective line, and the same line taken in a figure, cease to be, for perception, 'the same'. It is identifiable in these two functions only by analytic perception, which is not natural. [Merleau-Ponty 1945: 12-13]

In a scientific approach, that is, we seek to delineate the being of things in definitive statements: What is the being of the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion? we ask. 'Are' they, respectively, of a length that requires us to deem them equal or unequal? For Merleau-Ponty, however, the answer is 'neither' because what we are looking at is not in some univocal 'realm of being' but in the 'visual field'. In this 'strange zone', 'contradictory notions jostle each other'. The lines of the Müller-Lyer illusion, for example, 'show up', to use Heidegger's locution, as equal in one instant and unequal in another because their being, like that of all things perceived, is 'ambiguous', i.e. the way they show up is 'shaped by [their] context'. In other words, the 'isolated' lines (minus any arrowheads or fletchings) are not 'the same' as those 'taken in [the] figure' of the two arrows with different ends. The mistake of the scientific approach is to privilege a particular perception, i.e. the one in which we put a ruler between the two lines/

arrows, causing them to ‘presence’ as equal. By thus relying on a particular perception, science affirms the authority of perception as such. This is, of course, unavoidable, but the problem is that such an affirmation could just as easily lead to privileging a different perception and, precisely because of this, must ultimately privilege none. On Merleau-Ponty’s account, affirming perception can only result in the conclusion that the being of the perceived is ambiguous since it shows up differently in different perceptual contexts.

Now, Heidegger does not go this far. Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to phenomenology was to say that the ‘world’ Heidegger talks about, i.e. the unity of meaning in which things show up, is a ‘world of perception’ (see Merleau-Ponty 1948) and therefore that a given perception with its unique context is going to condition how we understand the being of anything in that context. This reflects a development of Heidegger’s philosophy, which identifies the being of things with how they presence or show up more generally. As will become evident, Heidegger is more interested in how broad categories of things presence in different epochs than he is in whether more specific phenomena like the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are different phenomena when they are in a different context that causes them to show up differently. The point of utilising Merleau-Ponty here is simply to illustrate what he and Heidegger mean in understanding the being of things as ‘presencing’ or ‘showing up’, as opposed to whatever we measure them to be as part of one particular—i.e. the scientific—kind of showing up. In short, things are what they reveal themselves to be in presencing or showing up for us. But what, more precisely, does this mean?

To answer this question, I will draw on Heidegger’s aforementioned essay on Aristotle’s *Physics*, but, first, I must address a knotty interpretive issue

with respect to Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle in general. Heidegger's conviction that the Western philosophical tradition from Plato onwards inevitably but erroneously departed from early Greek thinking about being leads him, *inter alia*, to charge Aristotle with the error of 'metaphysics',<sup>53</sup> which I will be delineating in this section. But, Heidegger repeatedly stresses, while Aristotle, by virtue of these errors, shares in the mistaken philosophical trajectory of the West inaugurated by Plato, he nevertheless passed 'through Platonic metaphysics—to think Being in the primordial Greek way and, as it were, to retrace the step Plato had taken with the *idea tou agathou* [i.e. the 'Idea' or 'Form' of 'the Good' ]' (*N4* 171 / *GA* 6.2: 203). As Walter A. Brogan puts it, Heidegger offers

a revolutionary interpretation of Aristotle that aims to show his 'greatness', not because he gave birth to metaphysics, which is not untrue, but because he preserves, even in the face of his teacher Plato, an echo of originary Greek thinking. Heidegger tries to draw out of the inherited texts of Aristotle the resonances of this more radical way of thinking, if only in the end to be able more genuinely to trace the ambivalence and undecidability at the heart of Aristotle's thought. [Brogan 2005: 3]

For Heidegger, then, when well-interpreted, 'Aristotle's metaphysics is in essential respects a kind of swing back toward the beginning within Greek thought' (*N4* 172 / *GA* 6.2: 204), such that traces of the early Greek understanding of being pierce through his thereby attenuated metaphysics. These traces, Heidegger says, have been almost completely overlooked by the subsequent Western tradition (see, among other places, *ZS* 17 / *GA* 89: 20). Because of Heidegger's attention to them, however, many of his meditations on

---

<sup>53</sup> See 'HCE', in *OBT* 146-7 / *GA* 5: 195; 'NWGD', in *OBT* 196 / *GA* 5: 263; *N3* 25 / *GA* 6.1: 450; *N4* 209 / *GA* 6.2: 313; 'IWM', in *PM* 287 / *GA* 9: 378; 'EPTT', in *BW* 446 / *GA* 14: 85; and *FCM* 43 / *GA* 29-30: 65, among others. See also *ZS* 326 for Franz Myer's helpful elucidation of Heidegger on Aristotle's 'metaphysical understanding of language'.

Aristotle, including that on the *Physics*, also serve to articulate his understanding of the early Greeks.

Following his interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics*, then, Heidegger explicates the early Greek understanding of being by saying that *kinēsis* or 'movedness' [*Bewegtheit*] is of the essence of all things. In other words, what it means for something to 'be' or 'presence' is to be 'in movedness' ('ECP', in *PM* 189-90 / *GA* 9: 247). The claim here is not that all beings, in essence, move in the sense of changing location. Rather, Heidegger's point is that what it means to say any particular being 'is' or 'presences' is that it either currently undergoes some *metabolē*, some 'change from something (*ek tinos*) to something (*eis ti*)' ('ECP', in *PM* 191 / *GA* 9: 249), some 'process of movedness' ('ECP', in *PM* 190 / *GA* 9: 249), or rests therefrom. Such *metabolē* is not limited to 'change of place (locomotion)' but includes 'growth' 'diminution', 'alteration', and, most importantly, the change wherein 'something heretofore hidden and absent comes into appearance' ('ECP', in *PM* 190-1 / *GA* 9: 249). Additionally, any change along these lines is not a movement in contrast to rest, for

Plants and animals are *in* movedness even when they stand still and rest. Rest is a kind of movement; only that which is able to move can rest. It is absurd to speak of the number 3 as "resting". Because plants and animals are *in* movement regardless of whether they rest or move, for this reason not only are they in *movement*; they *are* in movedness. ['ECP', in *PM* 189 / *GA* 9: 247; emphasis original]

For Heidegger—and for Aristotle as he understands him—then, an entity's relationship to movedness is essential to it. To 'be' or 'presence' is to have such a relationship, whether one of changing from something into something in any number of ways or of resting from such *metabolē*.

Not all beings have their *kinēsis* or movedness in the same sense, however. Heidegger's explication of Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of being or presencing—*physis*, 'growing' [*das Wachsen*], and *poiēsis*, 'making' [*das Machen*]<sup>54</sup>—as well as the two kinds of entities that, respectively, have such being—*physei onta*, 'growing things' [*Gewächse*], and *poioumena*, 'artefacts' or what we might call 'made things' [*Gemächte*].<sup>54</sup> The difference between these two types of entities, Heidegger says, is that the former 'in itself and from itself and toward itself, orders its own movedness' ('ECP', in *PM* 195 / *GA* 9: 254). Here, Heidegger refers to his interpretation of Aristotle's assertion in the *Physics* that *entelecheia* and not *dynamis* is what makes something, i.e. a growing thing, what it is (cf. Aristotle 1984 edn.: i. 330 [*Physics* ii. 1; 193b6-8]). Unlike more traditional interpreters who translate this Aristotelian neologism *entelecheia* as 'actuality' or 'actualisation',<sup>55</sup> Heidegger opts for a more literal meaning based on the word's roots, rendering it 'having-itself-in-its-end' ('ECP', in *PM* 217-18 / *GA* 9: 284-5). For Heidegger and Heidegger's Aristotle, everything has a *telos* or 'end', a what-it-must-come-to ('ECP', in *PM* 192-3 / *GA* 9: 251-2).<sup>56</sup> Growing things, he says, have this end in themselves, meaning no other entity has the

---

<sup>54</sup> See 'ECP', in *PM* 221 / *GA* 9: 289 for Heidegger's rendering of *physis* and *poiēsis* as, respectively, 'growing' [*das Wachsen*] and 'making' [*das Machen*] and see 'ECP', in *PM* 191-2 / *GA* 9: 250 for his rendering of *physei onta* and *poioumena* as, respectively, 'growing things' [*Gewächse*] and 'artefacts' [*Gemächte*].

<sup>55</sup> Compare Joe Sachs' comment: 'In the central books of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle captures the heart of the meaning of being in a cluster of words and phrases that are the most powerful expressions of his thinking. The usual translations of them not only fall flat but miss the central point: that the thinghood (*ousia*) of a thing is what it keeps on being in order to be at all (*to ti ēn einai*), and must be a being-at-work (*energeia*) so that it may achieve and sustain its being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*). In the standard translations of those words and phrases, that rich and powerful thought turns into the following mush: the substance of a thing is its essence, and it must be an actuality, so that it may achieve and sustain its actuality' (Sachs 1995: 14-15). For contemporary studies relying on such 'usual' or 'standard translations' of *entelecheia* as 'actuality' or 'actualisation', see Coope 2005: 6-7; Reeve 2000: 145, 193, and 213; and Cohen 1996: 164-5.

<sup>56</sup> Aristotle's *Physics* also speaks of this *telos* or end as the last of four 'causes', dubbing it 'that for the sake of which [*hou henka*]' a thing is (see Aristotle 1984 edn.: i. 332-3 [*Physics*, bk. ii: ch. 3; 194b33-195a2]).

growing thing's end in mind and guides it toward that end. Instead, the growing thing itself has its end in mind, so to speak—and presences in that direction, 'from itself and toward itself', i.e. from itself as it currently presences, through more presencing, and toward the presencing of its end or what-it-must-come-to, all of which it 'is' because it must come to these presencings. A geranium, for example, presences from seed to bud to its end of being a mature flower then presences by 'absencing', wilting away in *sterēsis* as new geraniums presence as seeds within it.<sup>57</sup> The geranium's being is a kind of static movement or moving stasis, wherein the movement from origin to final destination to disappearance is what it 'is' at any point along that trajectory.

The essential structure of 'made things' differs from this. Since I will later discuss the possibility that certain clothes qualify as one or another type of made thing on Heidegger's understanding, I will spend a bit more time on the made thing's essential character than I did on that of the growing thing. Concerning the being or presencing as movedness that happens in the 'making' of 'artefacts', Heidegger says:

following Aristotle's approach we choose our example from the field of 'production', the 'making' of an artefact. Take a case of generation: a table coming into existence. Here we obviously find movements. But Aristotle does not mean the 'movements' performed by the carpenter in handling the tools and the wood. Rather, in the generation of the table, Aristotle is thinking precisely *of the movement of what is being generated itself and as such*. *Kinēsis* is *metabolē*, the change of something into something, such that in the change the very act of change itself breaks out into the open, i.e., comes into appearance along with the changing thing. The orderable wood in the workshop changes into a table. What sort of being does this change have? The thing that changes is the wood lying present here, not just any wood but *this* wood that is appropriate. But 'appropriate for' means: tailored to the appearance of a table, hence for that wherein the generating of the table—the movement—comes to its end. The change of the appropriate wood into a table

---

<sup>57</sup> See 'ECP', in *PM* 227 / *GA* 9: 297 for Heidegger's discussion of the presencing of absencing.

consists in the fact that the very appropriateness of what is appropriated emerges more fully into view and reaches its fulfilment in the appearance of a table and thus comes to stand in the table that has been produced, placed *forth*, i.e., into the unhidden. ['ECP', in *PM* 217-8 / *GA* 9: 285; emphases original]

This is a dense passage with a lot of important, complicated insights, but in terms of illuminating the being of made things as Heidegger takes the Greeks to have understood it, i.e. as their 'presencing', the main point is that such being has a particular character we normally miss. Usually, if we think of a table as 'presencing' or being present at all, we think of it in the sense of objectivity: That over there is an object, a table; it has certain properties and if we describe these to others, they can tell us we are thinking of a table. For reasons that will become clear, Heidegger rejects the idea that such objectification is illustrative of the being of artefacts.

Moreover, as I will soon show, the presencing of an artefact does not, for Heidegger, consist in the presencing of its 'matter' or 'raw material', of the 'form' this matter takes in the final product, or even of the 'matter' and 'form' combined. In so asserting, Heidegger contradicts a tendency in much of Western philosophy to interpret Aristotle's distinction between *hylē* and *morphē* as one between 'matter' and 'form'.<sup>58</sup> Heidegger argues that *hylē* and *morphē* are better translated, respectively, as 'the appropriate [*Geeignete*]' or 'the appropriateness for [*die Eignung zu*]' and the 'appearance [*Aussehen*]' or the 'placing into the appearance [*Gestellung in das Aussehen*]' of a thing.<sup>59</sup> In

---

<sup>58</sup> The reliance of Aquinas, for example, on understanding *hylē* and *morphē* as 'matter' [*materia*] and 'form' [*forma*], respectively, permeates the *Summa*, but see especially *Sum* i.3.2, i.50.2; i.66.1-4; i.75.5; i.76.1 and 4; and i.105.1. Examples of the interpretation among contemporary scholars are legion, but some notable representatives are: Charlton 1992: 52 and 71-3; M. L. Gill 2001: 236; Lear 1988: chs. 2-4; Makin 2006: xxxvii-xxxviii; and Shields 2007: 53-64.

<sup>59</sup> See 'ECP', in *PM* 214 and 218 / *GA* 9: 280-1 and 285 for his rendering of *hylē* and 'ECP', in *PM* 211 / *GA* 9: 276 for his rendering of *morphē*.

the above passage, Heidegger says these are what presences in the presencing of an artefact such as, to use a sartorial example, a pair of sandals. Since the passage does not contain the actual words *hylē* and *morphē*, however, but only his translations—that is, ‘appropriate for’ and ‘appearance’ / ‘placed forth [...] into the unhidden’, respectively—two other citations, one for *hylē* and one for *morphē*, will be instructive.

Concerning *hylē*, Heidegger says,

What does ‘matter’ mean? Does it mean just ‘raw material’? No, Aristotle characterises *hylē* as *to dynamēi*. *Dynamis* means the capacity, or better, the appropriateness for ... [sic] The wood present in the workshop is in a state of appropriateness for a ‘table’. But it is not just any wood that has the character of appropriateness for a table; rather, only this wood, selected and cut to order. But the selection and the cut, i.e., the very character of appropriateness, is decided in terms of the ‘production’ [*Herstellung*] of ‘what is to be produced’ [*Herzustellenden*]. [‘ECP’, in *PM* 214 / *GA* 9: 280-1]

For Heidegger, *hylē* is the same as *to dynamēi*, ‘the appropriate [*Geeignete*]’ (‘ECP’, in *PM* 218 / *GA* 9: 285), or—utilising the language of both this and the previous passages—something that ‘is in a state of appropriateness for [*ist in der Eignung zu*]’ changing into something. As Heidegger puts it in the Nietzsche lectures, ‘Force, the capacity to be gathered in itself and prepared to work effects, to be in a position to do something, is what the Greeks (above all, Aristotle) denoted as *dynamis*’ (*N1* 64 / *GA* 6.1: 61), and therefore as *hylē*.

Thus, the leather we choose to make our sandals is only the *hylē* that is proper to their essence insofar as it is ‘in the state of appropriateness for’ becoming those sandals, in line with their standards. If we leaf through some skins or survey a herd of cattle for our endeavour, the *hylē* that presences in the presencing of what we ultimately make is not the hide we strip off the cow; it is that hide insofar as it is in the ‘state of appropriateness for’ changing into our

sandals.<sup>60</sup> As Heidegger puts it, it is ‘not just any [leather] but *this* [leather]’, ‘selected and cut to order’ as ‘the appropriate’. For Heidegger, the presencing of the sandals entails both the presencing of this ‘appropriate’ leather, the *hylē*, and the presencing of its ‘appropriateness for’ (its *dynamis*).

Concerning the second phenomenon that presences in the presencing of an artefact, Heidegger says, ‘*morphē* is “appearance”, more precisely, the act of standing in and placing itself into the appearance; in general, *morphē* means: placing into the appearance’ (‘ECP’, in *PM* 211 / *GA* 9: 276). The idea here is that when an artefact such as a pair of sandals ‘appears’, ‘shows up’, or manifests itself to us, this ‘appearance’ or *morphē*—conventionally translated as ‘form’—is not the static phenomenon we customarily take it to be but the ‘movement’ or ‘change’ of the appropriate’s becoming yet also already being the

---

<sup>60</sup> In 1960, Heidegger gave a seminar entitled ‘Image and Word [*Bild und Wort*]’ (see *GA* 74: 185-7 for the outline), in which he engaged the Taoist story of Khing the woodcarver from the end of chapter 19 of the *Chuang-tzu*. Interestingly, the parable’s understanding of *hylē* bears striking resemblance to what Heidegger says in the present 1939 essay on Aristotle’s *Physics*. Thomas Merton’s rendition reads: ‘I fasted in order to set | My heart at rest. | [...] After seven days | I had forgotten my body | With all its limbs. | [...] I was collected in the single thought | Of the bell stand. | Then I went to the forest | To see the trees in their own natural state. | When the right tree appeared before my eyes, | The bell stand also appeared in it, clearly, beyond doubt. | All I had to do was to put forth my hand | And begin. | If I had not met this particular tree | There would have been | No bell stand at all. | What happened? | My own collected thought | Encountered the hidden potential in the wood; | From this live encounter came the work | Which you ascribe to the spirits’ (Merton 1965: 111; cf. Chuang Tzu 1996 edn.: 162-3 and 1968 edn.: 206). Emphasising a different point, Otto Pöggeler summarises the story’s significance for Heidegger: ‘through long fasting and through concentration and meditation the woodworker becomes able to find in the forest that one tree which is already the bell-stand yet to be made, in such a way that matter and form in this consummate work of art can be completely one’ (Pöggeler 1987: 36). For the *Chuang-tzu*, then, fasting, concentration, and meditation precipitate the kind of attunement/comportment that plays the role Heidegger ascribes to *technē* in his discussion of Aristotle’s *Physics*. Heidegger had already, prior to the seminar, been thinking along similar lines, for, in 1955, he gave the now-widely cited *Gelassenheit* lecture in honour of the German composer Conradin Kreutzer, in which he said: ‘releasement toward things and openness to the mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, courageous thinking. [...] If releasement toward things and openness to the mystery awaken within us, then we should arrive at a path that will lead to a new ground and foundation. In that ground the creativity which produces lasting works could strike new roots’ (‘MA’, in *DT* 67-7 / *GA* 16: 529). This ‘thinking’ that exclusively facilitates ‘releasement’, which, in turn, facilitates the ‘creativity’ of ‘lasting works’, is not, Heidegger says, ‘calculative thinking’ but the ‘meditative thinking’ that ‘contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is’ (‘MA’, in *DT* 46 / *GA* 16: 520). Thus, for both the *Chuang-tzu* and Heidegger’s *Gelassenheit* lecture, a concentrated, ‘collected thought’ or ‘meditative thinking’, somehow construed, is decisive for the ‘creativity’ of ‘lasting works’, ‘Which you ascribe to the spirits’.

appearance it must come to. Above, Heidegger stresses that this movedness is not to be confused with what we normally consider ‘the “movements” performed by the carpenter in handling the tools and the wood’ or the shoemaker in handling the leather of our sandals-to-be. Rather, it is the ‘very act of change itself’, the same static movement or moving stasis of the geranium *physei*-being that goes from origin to final destination to disappearance.

The difference, however, is that, unlike the *physei*-being’s final destination, the artefact’s end is not ‘in itself’ but is rather envisioned by an expert artisan guiding the placing forth of an ‘appropriate for’ into an ‘appearance’. In Heidegger’s understanding of how the Greeks conceived of making, an artisan’s *technē* or ‘know-how’ (‘ECP’, in *PM* 192 / *GA* 9: 251) envisions a *paradeigma* or ‘first’, paradigmatic, appearance (‘ECP’, in *PM* 221 / *GA* 9: 289-90) of ‘what the production of, e.g., a bedstead, must come to’ (‘ECP’, in *PM* 192 / *GA* 9: 251), i.e. the artefact’s *telos* or final cause. The *technē* then places ‘the appropriate’ of the artefact into a second appearance that derives from and matches the first (‘ECP’, in *PM* 192 and 221 / *GA* 9: 251 and 289-90). In our sandal example, the specific *technē* or ‘know-how’ of a shoemaker envisions a *paradeigma* or paradigmatic appearance for a particular pair of sandals the shoemaker intends to make and then places the *hylē* or ‘appropriate’ leather into the appearance that derives from and matches the *paradeigma* but ‘shows up’ or is manifest for everyone else.

In summary, then, the being, ‘presencing’, ‘showing up’, or emerging of an artefact involves the presencing of at least two phenomena: 1) the *hylē* or *dynamei*, i.e. ‘the appropriate’ or ‘changing thing’ that is placed into the appearance of the artefact manifest to us—along with the appropriate’s *dynamis*

or ‘appropriateness’ for being placed into that appearance; and 2) *morphē/kinēsis* or ‘movedness’, i.e. the change of something into something and therein change as such as ‘a mode of presencing, *ousia* [...] a way of being’, wherein ‘the appropriate’ has its ‘placing into the appearance’. As the two-fold presencing or being of the artefact, this ‘appropriate’ and its ‘placing into the appearance’ constitutes what the artefact is at any juncture in its trajectory from origin to destination to disappearance, regardless of how it happens to be more narrowly ‘showing up’ or ‘revealing itself’ to us in that moment.

So goes Heidegger’s understanding of the early Greek approach to being via what Brogan calls its ‘echoes’ in Aristotle. Given that my own inquiry is about clothes, I have emphasised the presencing of made things like a table or pair of sandals, as opposed to giving such presencing equal weight with that of growing things. According to Heidegger’s narrative of intellectual history, this early Greek approach began to change with the arrival of Plato, who, he says, drew a fundamental distinction ‘between a sensuous and a nonsensuous realm’ (*HHI* 17 / *GA* 53: 18):

The decisive drawing of this distinction, its unfolding and its structuring, which are normative for the Western world, occurred in Plato’s thought. What emerges as essential in that thought is that the nonsensuous [*nichtsinnliche*], the realm [*Bereich*] of the soul and of the spiritual, is the true actuality, and that the sensuous realm is a preliminary and subordinate stage. And if one designates the realm of the sensuous [*sinnliche*], taken in the broadest sense, as the ‘physical’ realm, then the nonsensuous and suprasensuous [*übersinnliche*] realm is that which lies over and beyond the physical.

Going over and beyond something is called *meta* in Greek. In relation to the physical, the suprasensuous realm is the metaphysical. The distinction made between the sensuous and the suprasensuous is a transition from the physical and from ‘physics’, taken in the broadest sense, to the metaphysical and to metaphysics. The distinction between the sensuous (*aisthēton*) and the nonsensuous (*noēton*) is the fundamental configuration of what has long since been called metaphysics. If we name ‘world’ the entirety of what is actual, including

its ground and cause, then we may say that, since Plato, all Western conceptions and interpretations of the world have been ‘metaphysical’.  
[HHI 17 / GA 53: 18-19]

So when Heidegger refers to ‘metaphysics’ or the ‘metaphysical’ tradition, he is talking about a history of thought that has, as a fundamental feature, the presupposition of a distinction between a sensuous realm on the one hand and a nonsensuous or supersensuous realm on the other.<sup>61</sup> This history of thought, he says, spans the entire Western canon from Plato to Nietzsche, the latter simply reversing the former’s order of priority in a quite accurately self-proclaimed ‘inverted Platonism’, wherein the sensuous receives undue emphasis only in reaction to the undue scorn Plato would never have given it had he not made the sensuous-nonsensuous distinction in the first place: ‘For Nietzsche’s completion of metaphysics is from the first an inversion of Platonism (the sensuous becomes the true, the supersensuous the semblant, world)’ (N3 176 / GA 6.2: 15).<sup>62</sup> For Heidegger, both Plato’s theory of Ideas or Forms and Nietzsche’s ‘inverted Platonism’—and, along with them, the entire Western tradition in between—make the mistake of drawing or accepting a distinction between what is sensuous and what is not.

In terms of the in-between, Heidegger details the development of the sensuous-nonsensuous distinction in not only its platonic and Nietzschean but

---

<sup>61</sup> See also ‘NWGD’, in *OBT* 157ff. / *GA* 5: 209ff., where he refers to these as the ‘sensory’ [*Sinnliche*] and ‘non-sensory’ [*Nichtsinnliche*] or ‘supersensory’ [*Übersinnliche*] and speaks of ‘the sensory world’ [*die sinnliche Welt*] and ‘the supersensory world’ [*die übersinnliche Welt*]. Similarly, in ‘DL’, in *OWL* 14 / *GA* 12: 96, he speaks of ‘the difference between a sensuous and a supersensuous world. This is the distinction on which rests what has long been called Western metaphysics’.

<sup>62</sup> See also, among other passages, *HHI* 24-5 / *GA* 53: 28-9; *N1* 153-5 and 162-3 / *GA* 6.1: 155-7 and 164-5; and ‘ECP’, in *PM* 183 / *GA* 9: 239-40. For Nietzsche’s own description of his philosophy as ‘inverted Platonism’, see the early preparatory note for his *Birth of Tragedy* in *KSA* 7: 199, 7 [156].

also its Aristotelian, Scholastic, Cartesian, Kantian, and Hegelian versions,<sup>63</sup> but I have here provided the basic sketch of the view. In addition to doubling as background for the remainder of this thesis, this sketch reveals the identity of what, in the ‘Origin’, Heidegger calls the ‘more original source’ behind our Indo-European sentence structure and the first traditional but mistaken view of the thing as ‘the thing as bearer of its characteristic traits’ or ‘substance with its accidents’, i.e. ‘that around which the properties have assembled’.

As I previously stated, this more original source is ‘metaphysics’ as Heidegger defines it. Rather than understanding the being of things as that which presences in one way or another, the West, on Heidegger’s view, has gotten tangled up in ontologies that make a distinction between the more real out or up there, so to speak, which we cannot experience with the senses, and a less real in or down here, which we can. This results both in a linguistic construction that presents a ‘subject’ deriving its sensuous content from a ‘predicate’ of attributes and in an ontology that takes things to have their real being in some nonsensuous substructure while nevertheless manifesting sensuous features. Whether one cashes out the latter in terms of Plato’s theory of Forms; the Aristotle-inspired, Scholastic discussion of ‘substances’ and ‘accidents’; the Cartesian *res cogitans* and *res extensa*; Kant’s ‘noumena’ and ‘phenomena’; Hegel’s notion of ‘Absolute Spirit’ sublating itself in concrete

---

<sup>63</sup> In different places, Heidegger calls both Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies the ‘completion’ of metaphysics. For instances of the former, see his discussion of Hegel as the ‘completion [Vollendung] of philosophy’ (‘HG’, in *PM* 323-36 / *GA* 9: 427-44) and his assertion that ‘For Hegel, as the completion [Vollender] of Western metaphysics, the entire dimension of the problem of being is oriented toward the *logos*’ (*HPS* 65 / *GA* 32: 92). For instances of the claim in reference to Nietzsche, see, among other places, *HHI* 88 / *GA* 53: 109; ‘NWGD’, in *OBT* 183-4 / *GA* 5: 246; *N1* 4 / *GA* 6.1: 3; and scattered passages throughout *N3* (i.e. *GA* 6.1: 425-94 and *GA* 6.2: 1-22 and 231-300) and *N4* (*GA* 6.2: 23-229 and 301-61). His assertion in *N3* 46 / *GA* 6.1: 473 is representative: ‘The metaphysical foundation of the pre-eminence of life has its ground not in an eccentric, far-fetched biological view of Nietzsche’s but in the fact that he brings the essence of Western metaphysics to completion [Vollendung] on the historical path that is allotted to it’.

appearance; or Nietzsche's—and, in a different way, empirical science's—emphasis on the sensuous and the bodily, for Heidegger, the move is, in essence, based on 'metaphysics', i.e. the initial Platonic error of distinguishing sensuous and nonsensuous, sensible and insensible.

Since the first conventional view of the thing as 'bearer of its characteristic traits' has its basis in this error, Heidegger dismisses it in favour of what he regards to be a more ontologically adequate solution. Before doing so, however, he discusses two other conventional interpretations of the thing, which I will now briefly adumbrate.

#### The Thing as Sense Manifold and as 'Formed Matter'

The second conventional view of the thing that Heidegger discusses understands it as 'the unity of a manifold of what is given in the senses [*die Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit des in den Sinnen Gegebenen*]' ('OWA', in *BW* 151 / *GA* 5: 10). Already, it should be evident that such a perspective is indebted to the very same metaphysical outlook Heidegger takes to be driving the first view of the thing because exalting 'what is given in the senses' relies on making metaphysics' distinction between sensuous and nonsensuous in the first place.

But this is not how Heidegger formulates his critique. Rather, he says:

We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves [*die Dinge selbst*]. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.

In the thing-concept just mentioned there is not so much an assault upon the thing as rather an inordinate attempt to bring it into the

greatest possible proximity to us. But a thing never reaches that position as long as we assign as its thingly feature what is perceived by the senses. Whereas the first interpretation keeps the thing at arm's length from us, as it were, and sets it too far off, the second makes it press too physically upon us. In both interpretations the thing vanishes [*verschwindet das Ding*]. ['OWA', in *BW* 151-2 / *GA* 5: 10-11]

Heidegger's idea is that the first—thing-properties/substance-accidents—view of the thing identifies its essence as lying in an ineffable, inaccessible abstraction, i.e. a 'substance', while the second—sense manifold—view is so concrete as to blur any line between a given thing and everything else, thus missing the essence of the thing altogether.

To illustrate, we may compare Heidegger's comment that hearing bare sounds requires abstractly 'listening away' from things with the currently in-fashion practice of 'mindfulness' meditation. In their highly successful book on the subject, Mark Williams and Danny Penman commend a 'Sounds and Thoughts' meditation that helps the reader 'hear the raw sounds without activating a corresponding concept in the mind, such as "car", "voice" or "central heating"' (Williams and Penman 2011: 142). Such concept activation, they say, amounts to our thoughts 'labelling' sounds in the process of creating associations and stories around them and sucking us into that drama (Williams and Penman 2011: 143).

In Heidegger's terms, what Williams and Penman are advocating in the 'Sounds and Thoughts' meditation is to eschew hearing the 'door shut in the house' as a door shutting in the house and, instead, to hear the 'bare sound' by 'listening away' from the door or 'diverting our ear' from it and 'listening abstractly'. Heidegger's point is that the understanding motivating any such activity obscures the being or presencing of the thing because 'We never really

first perceive a throng of sensations [...] We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.’ In other words, things, when we let them be what they are, show up or presence as what they are and not as a ‘throng of sensations’.<sup>64</sup> Thus, any understanding that ‘abstracts’ sensations ‘away from’ things causes the ‘things themselves’—not Kant’s noumenal ‘things-in-themselves’ but things as they show up or presence for us—to ‘press [so] physically upon us’ that they ‘vanish’. While this is precisely the goal in mindfulness meditation—though its proponents might not use the language of ‘vanishing’ to describe it—for Heidegger, it derails any inquiry into the thing’s essence.<sup>65</sup>

Heidegger lastly discusses a third conventional view of the thing, which defines it as ‘formed matter’: ‘That which gives things their constancy and pith [*Kerniges*] but is also at the same time the source of their particular mode of sensuous pressure—coloured, resonant, hard, massive—is the matter in things. In this analysis of the thing as matter (*hylē*), form (*morphē*) is already

---

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger also expresses this position earlier, in *Being and Time*: ‘It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to “hear” a “pure noise”. The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells *alongside* what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside “sensations”; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a “world”. *Dasein*, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood’ (*BT* 207 / *GA* 2: 217-18; emphasis original).

<sup>65</sup> For Heidegger’s interest in the kind of Eastern thought that inspired the contemporary Mindfulness movement, see n. 60 above as well as Parkes 1987 (specifically, the account of Heidegger’s collaboration with Paul Shi-yi Hsiao on an unfinished German translation of the *Lao-tzu* in Hsiao 1987) and May 1986. Moreover, Heidegger wrote a book called *Mindfulness* [*Besinnung*] (*M*), elsewhere elaborating on the title phenomenon thusly: ‘The evening—a time of meditation [*Besinnung*], a moment for reflection [*Nachdenken*]. Thinking [*Denken*] is indeed a serious matter, but at the same time a festive one. For in thinking, the insight into that which is is freed, i.e. given a free day for celebration. Meditation is not melancholy but gladness in which everything is gladdened, everything becomes clear and transparent’ (‘MSC’ 55 / *GA* 16: 582). Finally, Heidegger wrote a ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Enquirer’, the latter being the author of the ‘book *Being and Time*’ (‘DL’, in *OWL* 5 / *GA* 12: 86). Nevertheless, he repeatedly stresses the danger of too quickly drawing parallels between his or European thought on the one hand and Eastern thought on the other hand (see e.g. ‘DL’, in *OWL* 2, 3, 14, and 23 / *GA* 12: 82, 83, 97, and 107. According to Lin Ma’s meticulously argued study, Heidegger scholars have, on the whole, insufficiently heeded this warning (Ma 2008: 3-4).

coposited' ('OWA', in *BW* 152 / *GA* 5: 11). And again: 'The self-contained block of granite is something material in a definite if unshapely form. Form means here the distribution and arrangement of the material parts in spatial locations, resulting in a particular shape, namely, that of a block' ('OWA', in *BW* 154 / *GA* 5: 13). In these comments, Heidegger engages the prevailing interpretation of the aforementioned Aristotelian concepts *hylē* and *morphē*. On Heidegger's own understanding, *hylē*, the 'appropriate for', is unique to the essence of made things while *morphē*, change/'movedness', i.e. 'presencing', is decisive for the essence of both made and growing things. The dominant reading of Aristotle that Heidegger challenges, in contrast, holds that *hylē* is the raw material or bare stuff of all things—growing and made—and that the *morphē* is the spatial configuration of that bare stuff.

Now, one might discredit this ostensibly Aristotelian perspective as well as the 'formed matter' view of the thing it yields by pointing out the artificiality of the categories *hylē* and *morphē* as they are therein described: Can we really abstract *hylē* from *morphē*? What would it mean to be bare stuff in absence of any spatial configuration? That is, just what is *hylē qua hylē*, or bare stuff, on this picture? As Robert Brandom puts the point,

The distinction between form and matter is only a distinction of reason, for we can never have one without the other. Only by, e.g. rationally considering the relations a bronze cube stands in to a bronze sphere and a marble cube can we 'separate' its being bronze from its being a cube. Between a piece of bronze and a piece of marble, on the other hand, there exists a real distinction, for these can be nonmetaphorically separated without reliance on rational abstraction by comparison. [Brandom 1983: 388-9]

The difficulty becomes even clearer when we consider two pieces of bronze, or, given the subject matter of this thesis, two pieces of cloth, with ever-so-slightly

—perhaps even imperceptibly—different spatial configurations. If ‘form’ understood as spatial configuration is part of the essence of the thing, differences in form should have some essential consequence. The various samples should not all count as being pieces of bronze/cloth or, contrapositively, if they do, spatial configuration is not part of the essence of the thing, at least not at a very deep level. Heidegger alludes to this problem when he says ‘In this analysis of the thing as matter (*hylē*), form (*morphē*) is already coposited.’

But his stated objection to the ‘formed matter’ understanding of the thing is different from this. After showing how the view interprets the granite block as formed matter in the excerpt above, he says,

But a jug, an ax, a shoe are also matter occurring in a form. Form as shape is not the consequence here of a prior distribution of the matter. The form, on the contrary, determines the arrangement of the matter. Even more, it prescribes in each case the kind and selection of the matter—impermeable for a jug, sufficiently hard for an ax, firm yet flexible for shoes. The interfusion of form and matter prevailing here is, moreover, controlled beforehand by the purposes served by jug, ax, shoes. Such usefulness is never assigned or added on afterward to a being of the type of a jug, ax, or pair of shoes. But neither is it something that floats somewhere above it as an end.

Usefulness is the basic feature from which this being regards us, that is, flashes at us and thereby is present and thus is this being. Both the formative act and the choice of material—a choice given with the act—and therewith the dominance of the conjunction of matter and form, are all grounded in such usefulness. A being that falls under usefulness is always the product of a process of making. It is made as a piece of equipment for something. As determinations of beings, accordingly, matter and form have their proper place in the essential nature of equipment. [‘OWA’, in *BW* 152 / *GA* 5: 11]

In this passage, Heidegger is criticising the ‘formed matter’ view of the thing’s essence on the grounds that it imposes the essential structure of equipment—though it is really the essential structure of made things more generally—onto things as such. When we make a piece of equipment or anything else, we take

some ‘matter’ or raw material in sense of wood or clay, etc. and then give it ‘form’ by shaping it into whatever we have in mind so we can use it accordingly. Heidegger’s suggestion is that the ‘formed matter’ view unwittingly brings this experience to its ontological inquiry, assuming that things in general have the same essential structure as the useful things we make, such that some vague ‘matter’ is given ‘form’ to manifest as, for example, a tree.

The force of this assumption was, Heidegger says, further solidified in the Western mind when the Scholastics adopted it because of its compatibility with their notion of God as creator of everything who could be said to have ‘formed’ some primordial ‘matter’ into the universe:

The inclination to treat the matter-form structure as *the* constitution of every being receives an additional impulse from the fact that on the basis of a religious faith, namely, the biblical faith, the totality of all beings is represented in advance as something created, which here means made. [...] Nevertheless, if at the same time or even beforehand, in accordance with a presumed predetermination of Thomistic philosophy for interpreting the Bible, the *ens creatum* is conceived as a unity of *materia* and *forma*, then faith is expounded by way of a philosophy whose truth lies in an unconcealedness of beings which differs in kind from the world believed in by faith. [‘OWA’, in *BW* 155-6 / *GA* 5: 14-15; emphasis original]

I will address some of the theological issues implied in this passage in later chapters, but, for now, simply note that Heidegger regards the error he sees in the ‘formed matter’ view of the thing’s essence as rooted in the problematic if inevitable ontology or ‘world’ / ‘unconcealedness of beings’ that has been operative in the West for millennia.

In other words, the same metaphysical distinction that dogs the other two views of the thing also lurks at the heart of the ‘formed matter’ perspective: Here, we encounter a nonsensuous ‘form’ that, as Heidegger puts it above, ‘determines the arrangement of’ sensuous matter; form is conceptually prior to

matter, which, again, accords with the idea of God as creator. The result: a being who had some form in mind that then ‘determined the arrangement of’ matter. The conceptual priority of form over matter, however, amounts to the same privileging of the nonsensuous over the sensuous common to Western metaphysics, a tendency that, as previously noted, Nietzsche sought to reverse. Heidegger’s approach is to look past the issue of priority and expose the error of making the distinction in the first place as well as demonstrate the degree to which this error informs all the prevailing ontological positions, e.g. these three views of the thing’s essence.

As part of this approach, Heidegger suggests that a desire to master and subjugate our world, whether conceptually or technologically, is at the heart of the metaphysical distinction driving the ontologies of the West. This is especially clear with the ‘formed matter’ view of the thing because it projects the subjugation inherent in production onto the rest of the world: Subjugating sensuous ‘matter’ like wood, clay, etc. to the nonsensuous ‘form’ that allows us to use matter for our purposes becomes subjugating all entities in the sense of forcing them into an ontology based on the distinction between sensuous matter and nonsensuous form so we can be assured we understand our world. This desire for ontological certainty and its concomitant ontological subjugation, Heidegger says, underlies all our ‘metaphysically’-motivated dichotomies: senser-sensed, form-matter, substance-accidents, actual-potential / possible, necessary-contingent, ‘*a priori*’-‘*a posteriori*’, essence-existence, spirit-nature, spiritual-material, invisible-visible, mind-body / ‘external world’, subject-object, subject-predicate, noumenon-phenomenon, grace-nature, art-nature,

history-nature, and on and on. As Charles Spinoza puts it, though without fully elucidating the metaphysical distinction:

even around the period of *Being and Time*, Heidegger already saw the history of the West—at least from Plato onwards—as the history of understanding being in terms of productivity. This meant that the basic practice guiding our understanding of most other practices was the practice of a craftsman’s productivity, his *technē*. So, for example, the power of Plato’s ideas came from the sense that an idea preceded [*sic*] the way a craftsman formed his matter. Again, the notion of a Prime Mover or First Cause arose from fitting all beings into the mode of those made by a craftsman. This history of productivity took many different turns starting out with form/matter as the essential distinction, moving through essence/existence to subject/object. [Spinoza 1992: 487]

Heidegger, in contrast, wants an ontology that does not define things by imposing alien distinctions and categories on them but instead lets them ‘be the beings they are’ (‘ET’, in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188), by which he means: be what they were for those not entrenched in metaphysics, i.e. the early Greek thinkers and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle as Heidegger interprets him.

To give us a clue as to the character of such a non-metaphysical understanding of things, Heidegger, as elsewhere, draws on word origins:

the Old High German word *thing* means a gathering, and specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter. In consequence, the Old German words *thing* and *dinc* become the names for an affair or matter of pertinence. They denote anything that in anyway bears upon men [*Menschen*], concerns them, and that accordingly is a matter for discourse. [‘Th’, in *PLT* 172 / *GA* 7: 176]

Heidegger does not think this etymology is sufficient to deliver an adequate understanding of the thing’s essence, however:

Neither the general, long outworn meaning of the term ‘thing’, as used in philosophy [i.e. ‘that which is at all and is something in some way or other’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 174 / *GA* 7: 178)], nor the Old High German meaning of the word *thing*, however, are of the least help to us in our pressing need to discover and give adequate thought to the essential source of what we are now saying about the nature of the jug. However, *one* semantic factor in the old usage of the word *thing*, namely ‘gathering’,

does speak to the nature of the jug as we earlier had it in mind. [‘Th’ 175, in *PLT / GA 7*: 178-9; emphasis original]

In other words, the Old High German meaning of thing—i.e. ‘an affair or matter of pertinence [...] anything that in anyway bears upon men, concerns them, and that accordingly is a matter for discourse’—is insufficient to capture the essence of the thing as understood by those not entrenched in metaphysics, but it contains something that points in that direction, namely, its antecedent meaning of ‘gathering’. The ‘thing’, for Heidegger, is that which gathers.

But what and how does the thing gather? Heidegger’s response is that it gathers what he calls the ‘fourfold’ (see ‘Th’, in *PLT 171-2 / GA 7*: 175 and ‘BDT’, in *BW 355-6 / GA 7*: 155-6), which consists of ‘earth’, ‘sky’, ‘divinities’, and ‘mortals’ (see ‘BDT’, in *BW 350-3 / GA 7*: 150-3). The essence of the ‘thing’, then, is to gather this fourfold and our ‘dwelling’ or letting things ‘be the beings they are’ amounts to letting them do this. Continuing with the last sentence of a passage I cited early on in this chapter, Heidegger says,

To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards [*schont*] each thing in its essence. *The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing [Schonen]*. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we recall that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth.

But ‘on the earth’ already means ‘under the sky’. Both of these also mean ‘remaining before the divinities’ and include a ‘belonging to men’s being with one another’. By a *primal [ursprünglichen]*<sup>66</sup> oneness the four—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—belong together in one. [‘BDT’, *BW 350-1 / GA 7*: 150-1; emphases original.]

Dwelling means ‘sparing’, ‘safeguard[ing]’, ‘preserv[ing]’ ‘things’ in their essence, letting them be what they are. Since their essence, what they are, is to gather the fourfold, dwelling means letting them gather the fourfold. As

---

<sup>66</sup> The word *ursprünglichen* implies movement rather than a fixed point, suggesting that the unity of the fourfold here, though primordial, has the character of an ongoing *Ereignis*-event.

Heidegger puts it in the present passage, dwelling is a ‘stay of mortals on the earth’, which ‘already means’ a stay ‘under the sky’, ‘before the divinities’, and ‘with one another’. In staying, respectively, on, under, before, and with these elements by virtue of ‘staying with things [*Aufenthalt bei den Dingen*]’ (‘BDT’, in *BW 353 / GA 7: 153*), mortals dwell. But what exactly is the ‘fourfold’ and its ‘earth’, ‘sky’, ‘divinities’, and ‘mortals’ and what does it mean to ‘stay’ with things, i.e. to let them gather these elements? To get clear on just what ‘things’—and, therefore, clothes—are and how we relate to them on the Heideggerian ontology with which I aim to enhance Gill’s theological onto-sartoriology, these questions must receive extensive treatment. I will therefore devote the next chapter to them entirely.

### Conclusion

I began this chapter by noting that, although Gill provides the kind of deeper story about our relationship to clothes for which this thesis calls, he fails to provide the thoroughgoing elucidation of being necessary to flesh it out. That is, he tells us humans need clothes in which to ‘be’, as opposed to those in which to take shelter and in which to work, but he does not say what it means for any entity to ‘be’, nor does he address how our being relates to that of clothes or how the latter relates to the relationship between our being and that of other, non-sartorial, entities, i.e other humans and things.

Next, however, I noted that Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology elucidates being in the way that Gill does not, allowing us to address the above questions, such that Gill’s reflection can nevertheless contribute to this thesis. I therefore sketched Heidegger’s understanding of human being as dwelling.

Whether or not Heidegger would agree with Gill's claim that humans need clothes in which to 'be', it would, for him, amount to saying humans need clothes in which to dwell. Since Heidegger understands dwelling to mean 'safeguarding' or 'preserving' the entities he calls 'things' in their essence, i.e. to mean letting them be what they are, Gill's claim would further amount to saying that humans need clothes in which to preserve things in their essence. Such a 'staying with things', Heidegger says, allows things to 'gather the fourfold'. In the final analysis, then, a Heideggerian ontological undergirding to Gill's claim would yield the following insight: Humans need clothes in which to let things gather the fourfold. It is to the matter of what this 'fourfold' constitutes that I now turn.

## Chapter 4: Heidegger on the ‘Fourfold’ and Its ‘Divinities’

*Live in each season as it passes; breathe the air, drink the drink, taste the fruit, and resign yourself to the influences of each. Let these be your only diet drink and botanical medicines.—Henry David Thoreau<sup>67</sup>*

*We do not want merely to see beauty, though, God knows, even that is bounty enough. We want something else which can hardly be put into words—to be united with the beauty we see, to pass into it, to receive it into ourselves, to bathe in it, to become part of it. That is why we have peopled air and earth and water with gods and goddesses and nymphs and elves.—C. S. Lewis<sup>68</sup>*

*A human being is a part of the whole world, called by us ‘Universe’, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts, and feelings as something separate from the rest—a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. The striving to free oneself from this delusion is the one issue of true religion.—Albert Einstein<sup>69</sup>*

*No matter what, I want to continue living with the awareness that I will die. Without that, I am not alive. That is what makes the life I have now possible.—Banana Yoshimoto<sup>70</sup>*

I began my enquiry into Heidegger’s thinking about being by introducing his assertion that the particularly human kind of being lies in ‘dwelling’ or ‘safeguard[ing/preserving] each thing in its essence [*in sein Wesen schont*]’ (‘BDT’, *BW* 351 / *GA* 7:151). Such a claim presupposes some understanding of what essence things have. I therefore delineated his understanding of this essence or thingness, as distinct from more traditional conceptions that he says rely on what he calls ‘metaphysics’, with its ontological distinction between a sensuous and nonsensuous. Heidegger departs from this paradigm, offering instead an outlook whereby a ‘thing’ is that which ‘gathers

---

<sup>67</sup> Thoreau 1854: 267 n. 23.

<sup>68</sup> Lewis 1949: 31; emphasis original.

<sup>69</sup> Einstein 2005 edn.: 206.

<sup>70</sup> Yoshimoto 1993: 59-60.

the fourfold'. As a 'safeguarding' or 'preserving' of this essence, human being or 'dwelling' thus amounts to letting things do such essential gathering or, in Heideggerian parlance, to 'staying with things' and thereby 'staying on earth under the sky, before the divinities, among mortals' ('BDT', in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153). More precisely, dwelling, as a 'preserving', 'keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things' by 'saving the earth', 'receiving the sky', 'awaiting the divinities', and 'initiating mortals' ('BDT', in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153).

But without a proper sense of what the words 'earth', 'sky', 'divinities', and 'mortals' signal, we cannot be sure we have understood Heidegger's notion of dwelling. In this chapter, therefore, I seek to clarify the language and discussions surrounding Heidegger's 'fourfold'. This will put us in a better position not just to understand what he means by 'dwelling' or 'preserving the fourfold' by virtue of 'staying with things' but also, in the next chapter, to apply this notion to my own concern, i.e. to say what it might mean to dwell with and in those things called clothes.

### Heidegger's 'Earth' and 'Sky'

Heidegger's locution 'fourfold' appears in a handful of his essays—'The Thing', 'Language', and 'Building Dwelling Thinking' most notably—and refers to the unity of the four fundamental elements of human existence that constitutes the human being's 'world':<sup>71</sup> 'earth', 'sky' or 'heaven', 'divinities' or 'gods', and 'mortals'. As I said at the end of the last chapter, the unity lies in the fact that, for Heidegger, when we talk about 'dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth', "on the earth" already means "under the sky" and 'Both

---

<sup>71</sup> See 'L', in *PLT* 199 / *GA* 12: 21 for Heidegger's equation of 'fourfold' and 'world'; cf. Young 1999: 269 and 270.

of these also mean “remaining before the divinities” and include a “belonging to men’s being with one another”. By a *primal* oneness the four—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—belong together in one’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 351 / *GA* 7: 151; emphasis original). Heidegger illustrates the first of these elements thusly: Earth is the ‘serving bearer [*die dienend Tragende*]’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 351 / *GA* 7: 151) and ‘building bearer [*die bauend Tragende*]’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 176 / *GA* 7: 179), ‘blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 351 / *GA* 7: 151). In other words, the earth is the land and sea and all the things that come from and/or inhabit them. It is important, though, to stress that this is not a mere collection or even environment of stuff, as would be the Cartesian ‘totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world’ (*BT* 93 / *GA* 2: 87) that Heidegger challenges in *Being and Time* (*BT* 122ff. / *GA* 2: 119ff.). As John D. Caputo puts it, “The “earth” is not the substances studied in geology but the support of our step, the source of our nourishment, and the material womb to which we return at death’ (Caputo 1993: 182). While I would elide the term ‘material’ in this sentence because it suggests the presupposition of a metaphysical distinction between ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’, I regard the basic insight here as illustrative of what Heidegger intends. The earth is that which primordially supports and nourishes us.

Then, ‘The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 351 / *GA* 7: 151). James C. Edwards glosses this statement

by defining the sky as both ‘the source of light’ and, more importantly, ‘Heidegger’s way of talking about the fit (or, more likely, the lack of fit) of the human and its purposes into the inhuman and its impersonal cycles and necessities’ (Edwards 1997: 170). This perspective more or less explains what Heidegger has in mind with the term ‘sky’, but there are at least two problems with it.

First, it presents a false dichotomy. While the sky certainly provides light in various degrees throughout the day, this is not so much a separate feature in Heidegger’s explication but just one of what Edwards calls the ‘impersonal cycles’ into which humans and their purposes fit or do not fit. The fact that, beginning with Haussmann’s gas street lamps in nineteenth-century Paris, we moderns have found all sorts of ways to resist this ‘necessity’ of the sky, trying—as Heidegger puts it—to ‘turn night into day’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152), raises the question of just how much the sky constitutes ‘the’—that is, the singular—source of light. For both exegetical and conceptual reasons, then, this supposedly distinct feature of the sky is, instead, better understood as merely one of its cycles and the amalgam of these as the sky’s genuine sole feature.

Second, Edwards’ language has connotations that Heidegger’s own discussion lacks and that he probably would not have endorsed. For one, the words ‘inhuman’ and ‘impersonal’ usually have a negative cast, in this case suggesting that the sky’s patterns do not just conflict with various purposes humans might have but are also hostile to their humanity and personhood or basic needs as people. While the ‘sky’, as Heidegger describes it above, is certainly inflexible in many regards and sometimes requires a great deal of sacrifice from humans, aligning ourselves with its constraints often makes us

feel more human and more fulfilled in our basic needs. The extent to which our genuine purposes fit or do not fit with its cycles and necessities, then, is—at very least—a matter for debate. Indeed, much of Heidegger’s later work was dedicated to drawing attention to this very fact. My point, however, is not that I disagree with Edwards about Heidegger’s perspective here, but that vocabulary such as ‘non-human’ and non-anthropocentric’, rather than ‘inhuman’ and ‘impersonal’, is more apt. Thus, in a more neutral language, the sky is the integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and condition existence, though the precise manner in which this occurs depends on the level and kind of human submission to and participation in these forces.

One other point of language is decisive here, this time in reference to both earth and sky, not only in Edwards’ presentation but also in other Heidegger scholarship. It is tempting, as is the habit of some commentators, to conflate these two elements under the heading of ‘nature’ or the ‘natural world’. Julian Young, for example, says “‘Sky’ and ‘Earth,’ evidently, add up, in some sense of the word, to nature’ (Young 2006: 375), and therefore goes on to use the term unqualifiedly:

If, like Camus, we have the good fortune to come upon our own Tipasa (to have, what Heidegger calls an ‘*Ereignis* experience’ [CPE2 56 / GA 65: 70]), then we experience, with ‘gratitude’ (GA 52: 197), nature’s (Being’s) gift of our visible world, celebrate ‘the wonder that around us a world worlds [*die Welt weltet*], that there is something rather than nothing, that there are things, and we ourselves are in their midst’ (GA 52: 64). In the city, on the other hand, we can be proud only of our own cleverness. In the city we are alone, in nature we are not. [Young 2006: 390]

My contention here is not that there is nothing right in Young’s pronouncements. Rather, my burden is twofold. First, I want to stress that speaking, as Young does, of the ‘earth, sky, gods, and mortals’ as a ‘twofold of

nature and culture' (Young 2006: 375) or similarly describing them, in Edwards' words, as the 'intersection of two axes' (Edwards 1997: 167) is to break up the unity of the fourfold, undermining Heidegger's very point in calling them a 'fourfold'. Heidegger's claim is that when these elements are gathered, they are gathered as one, fourfold phenomenon, not as four separate phenomena or as two, 'twofold' phenomena or 'axes'.

To be sure, clarifying the character of the fourfold entails delineating its elements individually, but I see no merit in arranging them differently from how Heidegger does, just because it makes sense on a certain presupposition. After all, we might, like Young and Edwards, think the earth and sky are on one 'axis' because they come together to make up the 'physical' or 'natural' world we inhabit while the divinities and mortals are on another because they are both 'personal' beings or, as Young' says, 'cultural' phenomena (Young 2006: 381). But we could just as easily group earth and mortals together because the latter come from and stand on the former while grouping sky and the divinities together because, on a certain cosmology or cosmological myth not incompatible with Heidegger's vocabulary, the latter reside in the former. Opting for either or any such alternative, though, threatens to lead us completely off the path of Heidegger's point since he seeks to affirm these elements as one unified phenomenon.

Second, while Young's comment that "Sky" and "Earth," evidently, add up, in some sense of the word, to nature' might seem to concretise Heidegger's rather abstract language, the 'in some sense of the word' here is all important. A major problem is that Heidegger thinks our understanding of the word 'nature' is bound up with a Western tradition that has used it to refer to a 'physical' or

sensuous world, implying and presupposing the metaphysical distinction between that and a ‘non-physical’ or nonsensuous world. As a result, this tradition formulated ‘metaphysical’ dichotomies between ‘nature’ on the one hand and ‘grace (i.e. super-nature)’, ‘art’, ‘history’, and ‘spirit’ on the other hand (‘ECP’, in *PM* 183 / *GA* 9: 239).<sup>72</sup> We should not, Heidegger thinks, so quickly assume we have shaken these associations or that ‘nature’ can mean anything at all without meaning something that is distinct from some nonsensuous reality.

Another problem is that when we say ‘nature’, we typically imagine a place ‘unspotted from the world’, where we can ‘get away’ from the ‘hustle and bustle’ we have created, at which point we begin spotting this very place as we have spotted everything else. We set up hiking trails with mile markers, clear out camp grounds, even build ‘recreation’ centres with tennis courts and so on. In its less intrusive forms, such engagement can be salutary, but even in these less intrusive instances, what we are doing is using what we are calling ‘nature’ for some purpose, whether of entertainment, of ‘rest and relaxation’, or of ‘getting back to nature’. This is yet another case of the technological impulse to ‘master the earth and [...] subjugate it’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152) to our purposes rather than ‘let[ting] beings be the beings they are’ (‘ET’, in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188). Employing the term ‘nature’ thus distracts our attention away from Heidegger’s discussion of the earth as supporting, nourishing, and, ultimately, reabsorbing and the sky as conditioning or constraining and directs that attention towards precisely what he does not want to say, that the earth and sky presence for our purposes rather than gather in a manifold with us.

---

<sup>72</sup> For the fuller discussion, see ‘ECP’, in *PM* 183-6 / *GA* 9: 239-43. Also instructive is *BTr* 18 / *GA* 36-7: 21-2.

There are, then, a number of problems with collectively describing the phenomena Heidegger names ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ as ‘nature’. Hence, some commentators, following the philosopher’s own occasional practice, enclose the word in quotation marks to signify their qualified usage (besides Edwards 1997: 171, see, for example, Nelson 2004: 65; and Žižek 2008: 46; for examples from Heidegger, see *HHI* 16 and 22 / *GA* 53: 17 and 25). Though Heidegger himself sometimes unqualifiedly utilises the word ‘nature’ as well (see, for example, ‘QCT’, in *QCT* 11ff. / *GA* 7: 13ff. and ‘OWA’, in *BW* 172 / *GA* 5: 33), I will contrariwise avoid the problems of doing so by limiting myself, except in quoting, to his terms ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ or, instead, to referring to their, respectively, supportive/nurturing and conditioning/constraining characters.

### The ‘Divinities’

The ‘divinities [*Göttlichen* or, sometimes, *Götter*]’ of Heidegger’s fourfold are more difficult to elucidate. Since Heidegger was neither a theist in any recognisable sense nor a practising neopagan polytheist, the locution has puzzled and even disturbed many readers of his work. Heidegger provides us with two descriptions of these entities: ‘The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the hidden sway of the divinities the god emerges as what he is, which removes from him any comparison with beings that are present’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 176 / *GA* 7: 180) and ‘The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 351-2 / *GA* 7: 151).

These are quite similar pronouncements and, in the German, contain a slight ambiguity, but, on the best interpretation,<sup>73</sup> they together amount to the following overall description: The divinities ‘beckon’, wave, wink, or hint (*winken*) at us, which constitutes a kind of ‘sway’ or persuasion (*Walten*), inclining us toward the god or godhead who emerges (or withdraws!) out of this persuasion in divine singularity. But, in addition to remaining silent about how the god can either come or go via this waving persuasion, this fails to detail what kind of phenomenon the divinities are.

Very few scholars have attempted to address the latter difficulty, though three in particular merit attention, the first of them, Caputo, offering a strictly literal, and therefore religious, interpretation of the divinities and the other two, Young and Edwards, opting for metaphorical accounts. Although these scholars have very different interpretations, their offerings have been very influential<sup>74</sup> and are, respectively, the most intuitive of the strictly literal accounts, the most interesting proposal in general, and the most intuitive among metaphorical offerings. In my view, however, all of them fail for various reasons that I shall delineate in the next section.

---

<sup>73</sup> Both texts say the god emerges/appears (*erscheint*)—the second adds ‘withdraws’—‘out of the hidden/holy sway of *dieser*, which can mean either ‘these’ (signifying the divinities) or ‘it’ (signifying the godhead). Alfred Hofstadter, who translated both texts, elected one option for one text and the other for the other, which is consistent with the fact that either is acceptable for both. Given, however, that the purpose of these assertions is to elucidate the divinities and given that opting for ‘it’ over ‘these’ makes it unclear just how they are related to the god and the god’s doings, there is a slightly better case for choosing ‘these’ in both passages.

<sup>74</sup> As one example of their influence, both Caputo and Young present their accounts in, among other places, the widely read *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (see Caputo 2006: 339 and Young 2006: 374ff.). Similarly, the fourth chapter of Edwards 1997, which details his perspective on Heidegger’s divinities, has been anthologised as Edwards 2002.

### Caputo, Young, and Edwards on the ‘Divinities’

For his part, Caputo surmises that ‘The later Heidegger’s thought is a neopagan celebration of earth gods’ (Caputo 2003: 84) or ‘quite *pagan* religion’ (Caputo 2003: 83-4; emphasis original) that, ‘From the 1930s on’, began to feature ‘a pantheon of “pagan” “gods”, pure Greeks, [...] celebrated in an openly mythologizing thinking, which culminated in the hope that one day one of them would come and save us’ (Caputo 1993: 169).<sup>75</sup> In Caputo’s estimation, this purported affirmation of literal, ‘new Greek gods’ (Caputo 1993: 177) reflects an attempt to ‘reinstale’ a ‘pagan mythic world of mundane gods and divinised cosmic powers’ where ‘heavenly messengers’ or ‘angelic powers [...] shuttle messages back and forth between the heavens and earth’ (Caputo 1993: 181-2). This amounts, he says, not just to superstition but also to a philosophical manoeuvre Heidegger criticised all his life, namely, in Caputo’s words, ‘onto-theo-logical thinking’ (Caputo 1993: 181-2).

The precise meaning Heidegger assigns to the term ‘onto-theology’ is a matter of contentious debate in the scholarly literature,<sup>76</sup> and one outside the scope of this thesis to adjudicate. The important point for my purpose, however, is that Caputo’s interpretation of Heidegger’s commentary on the ‘divinities’ as ‘onto-theological thinking’ constitutes accusing the latter of rather obviously falling into his own trap. Caputo is not unaware of this, for he says that ‘after the 1920s’, Heidegger ‘turned more and more toward the search for the Origin (*Ursprung*) and Essential Being (*Wesen*)—of truth, of poetry and art, of

---

<sup>75</sup> Caputo here alludes, of course, to Heidegger’s infamous declaration that only a god, as opposed to ‘human contemplation and striving’, can save humanity from the uprooting it has suffered at the hands of modern technology (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 18 / *GA* 16: 671).

<sup>76</sup> See Caputo 1993: 73; Hart 2000: 75ff.; Thomson 2000: 300ff. and 2005: 2 and 11ff.; Westphal 2001: 2ff.; and Marion 2003: 40-3 for a handful of the more influential proposals.

technology, of thinking, of human being, of Being itself. He made it plain that “onto-theo-logic” [...] only served to block off the Origin’ (Caputo 1993: 73). In other words, Heidegger’s later writings sought to avoid the onto-theology and metaphysics of the Western tradition in hopes of clearing a straighter path to the meaning of being. Thus, any claim that the ‘divinities’ of these later writings evince ‘onto-theological thinking’ amounts to charging Heidegger with total and blissfully ignorant failure in his central endeavour.

While such a charge is not, in principle, illegitimate, it requires showing why it is impossible to interpret the relevant passages any other way, given how often and strongly Heidegger asserted that Western philosophy should take a ‘step back [*Schritt zurück*]’ from the onto-theological manoeuvre (‘OTCM’, in *ID* 49-56, et. al./ *GA* 11: 58-64 et. al.; ‘LH’, in *BW* 246 / *GA* 9: 343; *N4* 225-7 and 243-4 / *GA* 6.2: 332-5 and 353; and ‘Th’, in *PLT* 179 and 183 / *GA* 7: 183 and 186). The publication dates for the essays discussing the fourfold, i.e. ‘L’, ‘Th’, and ‘BDT’, are 1950, 1950, and 1951, respectively, but Heidegger criticised onto-theology in his *HPS* lectures of Winter 1930-1, in ‘HCE’ of 1942-3, in ‘IWM’ of 1949, in ‘OTCM’ of 1957, and in ‘KTB’ of 1961, among other places. Any account that identifies what Heidegger says about the ‘divinities’ as onto-theology must reckon with these texts because they show he was actively thinking about the issue throughout his career, both before—indeed, right before in the case of ‘IWM’—and after he wrote the essays discussing the fourfold. Since Caputo’s account lacks such a reckoning, it is not obvious he has not simply misunderstood Heidegger on this matter and, therefore, that his critique has not entirely missed its mark.

Young's metaphorical account, according to which the divinities are heroes, does not fare much better, though it has more components and therefore takes longer to address. His line of thinking goes like this: As per Heidegger's essay 'The Question concerning Technology', 'Greek tragedy [...] "brought the presence of the gods, (i.e.) brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings to radiance" In some sense, therefore, the gods *are* the "divine destinings"' (Young 2006: 374; cf. 'QCT', in *QCT* 34 / *GA* 7: 35). These divine 'destinings', Young further tells us, are divine 'laws' or 'edicts' in the senses Heidegger describes in 'Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry' and *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, respectively (see 'HEP', in *EB* 312 / *GA* 4: 46-7 and *HHI* 116 / *GA* 53: 145). For Young, all three of these are interchangeable terms signifying the 'fundamental *ethos* of a community' that 'creates the possibility of a critique of "the voice of the people", contemporary public opinion' (Young 2006: 374; cf. 'HEP', in *EB* 311-12 / *GA* 4: 46).

Finally, since, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of 'heroes' who have and embody something like their community's fundamental *ethos*, it is likely, Young says, that these heroes are 'the gods'/'divinities' of 'The Thing', 'Language', and 'Building Dwelling Thinking' (Young 2006: 374-5; cf. *BT* 422 and 437 / *GA* 2: 490 and 509). In a footnote, he provides examples of such heroes (or 'gods'/'divinities', on his understanding) 'who embody, collectively, what it is to live properly as an Athenian, a German, a New Zealander, or whatever' (Young 2006: 374): 'What is important about Edmund Hilary and Peter Blake for New Zealanders, George Washington and Martin Luther King for Americans, is that, qua mythologized, they exemplify, *par excellence*, not just the virtues of being a good sailor or politician but rather the virtues of being

a good human being' (Young 2006: 391, n. 2.). In other words, the divinities are divine laws, a expression that means the fundamental value-system of a given culture, and insofar as that culture's heroes embody its fundamental value-system, the divinities are those heroes.

There are several problems with this account. First, Young's citation of Heidegger's 'The Question concerning Technology' is not precise enough. What Heidegger says is not that 'Greek tragedy' but that the 'the arts [*die Künste*] [...] brought the presence (*Gegenwart*) of the gods, brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings, to radiance' (*QCT* 34 / *GA* 7: 35). The advantage of Young's change is that it makes it easier to argue that the gods/divinities are heroes because drama is an art form in which heroes that embody a community's fundamental *ethos* figure centrally. It is not hard, then, to see how this art form 'brought the presence of the gods', conceived as heroes, and how, if Greek tragedy is the only art form under consideration, Young's account makes a great deal of sense. If, however, one has to consider 'the arts' as a whole, i.e. more arts/*technai* than just Greek tragedy, Young's case is not as easy to proffer, for it is not as clear how ancient cisterns, woven baskets, and earthenware jugs made the Greek heroes present to those with such artefacts before them. But the fact that such products of seemingly humble *technai* do indeed play a role in making the divinities—on whatever interpretation—present to us is, I insist, the heartbeat of all three major 'fourfold' essays as well as what makes them so interesting.

Second, Young does not justify his conceptual progression. He does not say why he thinks the divine destinings in 'The Question concerning Technology' are the 'laws' from 'Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry' and

‘edicts’ from Hölderlin’s *Hymn ‘The Ister’* or why he thinks any of the three amount to the ‘fundamental *ethos* of the community’. On closer inspection, they turn out to mean something quite different in their original contexts. The ‘destinings [*Geshicken*]’, for example, are ‘sendings’ into what Heidegger calls a ‘way of revealing’ or ‘truth’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 11-12 and 33 / *GA* 7: 13 and 54), i.e. a particular way of coming to understand things and of relating to them. To use the language of chapter three, things ‘show up’ or ‘presence’ to us in a particular way, according to a particular ‘destining’.<sup>77</sup> In ‘The Question concerning Technology’, Heidegger is interested in the way the ancient Greek arts brought the divine and human ways of coming to understand and relate to things into dialogue or communion. There is no textual evidence to suggest that the divine side of this dialogue comes in the form of ‘laws’ or a ‘communal *ethos*’ mediated through the lives of people like Martin Luther King, Jr. and plenty of evidence that the whole conversation happens, i.e. *ereignet*, in ‘the fine arts, in poetry, and in everything poetical that obtained *poiēsis* as its proper name’ (*QCT* 34 / *GA* 7: 35), including non-technological artefacts like an earthenware jug.

Similarly, the ‘laws’ of ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’ are not the ‘fundamental *ethos* of the community’ intended to ‘critique [...] “the voice of the people”, contemporary public opinion’, nor even the usual sort of legislative principles communicated from some special source to humans. While the gods do, on Heidegger’s count, discharge such ‘hints’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 63-4 / *GA* 4: 46) or ‘lightning flashes’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 61 / *GA* 4: 43-4), the ‘voice of the people’,

---

<sup>77</sup> Heidegger discusses two such ‘ways’ or ‘modes’ (*Weisen* in both cases) (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 19, 21, 26 and 29 / *GA* 7: 19, 22, 27 and 30-1): 1) the ‘bringing-forth [*Her-vor-bringen*]’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 10 / *GA* 7: 12) of *physis* and *technē*; and 2) the ‘challenging-forth of enframing [*Herausforderung des Ge-stells*]’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 27 / *GA* 7: 28), the technological way of understanding and relating to things that involves seeing and treating them primarily as resources or what Heidegger calls ‘standing-reserve [*Bestand*]’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 17 / *GA* 7: 17).

he says, is a ‘saying in which a people remembers its belonging to beings as a whole’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 63 / *GA* 4: 46). ‘But often [t]his [*dieses*] voice falls silent and exhausts itself. It is not at all capable of saying by itself what is authentic—it has need of those who interpret it’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 63 / *GA* 4: 46). Thus, ‘The poet’s saying is the intercepting of these [i.e. the divine] hints, in order to pass them on to his people. [...] And at the same time the poetic word is only the interpretation of the “voice of the people”’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 63 / *GA* 4: 46). ‘The poet himself stands between the former—the gods—and the latter—the people’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 64 / *GA* 4: 47), joined or bound by ‘laws’ to both. The laws to which Young refers are not, then, the ‘fundamental *ethos* of the community’ but ‘laws of the hints of the gods and of the voice of the people [*Gesetze der Winke der Götter und der Stimme des Volkes*]’ (‘HEP’, in *EHP* 64 / *GA* 4: 46-7; translation altered), a kind of ‘laws of the universe’, so to speak, one of which weds poets and their sayings to the ‘hints’ that come down from the gods and the other of which weds them to the people’s ineffable voice / remembrance of their place in the world.

Finally, Young speaks of ‘edicts’ that he says amount to divine laws or a communal *ethos*, but, in the original text, the expression is singular and, Heidegger says, refers to ‘being itself’ (*HHI* 117-18 / *GA* 53: 147). The context is a meditation on the Hölderlin translation of Sophocles’ *Antigone*. Therein, the titular heroine, in confrontation with Creon, her uncle and king, appeals to the ‘edict divine’ that called for burying her brother, Polyneices, against official decree. In his analysis, Heidegger says this edict, ‘which determines Antigone in her being’ and ‘is beyond the upper and lower gods’ (*HHI* 116 / *GA* 53: 145), is neither duty toward the dead nor familial love (*HHI* 117 / *GA* 53: 147). Rather, it

is that particularly human kind of ‘being [or presencing] itself’ that involves presencing as on the way to death, about which I will have more to say later. While ‘Human beings, however, mostly know of this essential trait of themselves only in the manner of evading it and thereby conceding their exclusion from entry into their own essence’ (*HHI* 75-6 / *GA* 53: 92-3),<sup>78</sup> Antigone ‘takes as her all-determinative point of departure that against which nothing can avail, because it is that appearing that is destined for her’ (*HHI* 103 / *GA* 53: 128). Thus, she declares, ‘everywhere shall I experience nothing of the fact | that not to being my dying must belong’ (*HHI* 99 / *GA* 53: 123). That is, she has to do what she is preparing to do, even if it means death, because, in the language of *Being and Time*, she never wants to feel as though ‘Being-towards-death’ is not constitutive of *Dasein*. Thus, she not merely resigns herself to but indeed embraces the ‘that against which nothing can avail [...] that is destined for her’ and everyone else.

While Antigone refers to her death-constituted being as the ‘edict divine’, it is clear that, *pace* Young, it is not a divine edict in the sense of a principle delivered by the ‘gods’ of a particular culture, regardless of how those might be conceived, for ‘It was no Zeus that bade me this, | Nor was it Dike’ (*HHI* 116 / *GA* 53: 145). Rather, it is ‘beyond the upper and lower gods’ and so ‘no one knows from whence it once appeared’ (*HHI* 116 / *GA* 53: 145). Antigone’s use of the term ‘divine’ to describe the ‘edict’ simply marks the weightiness of ‘that which determines [her] in her being’ (*HHI* 116 / *GA* 53: 145), i.e. death.

---

<sup>78</sup> This, of course, recalls *Being and Time*’s discussion of ‘Being-towards-death’ as essential to *Dasein*, the distinctively human kind of being, and its view that ‘proximally and for the most part *Dasein* covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death, fleeing in the face of it’ (*BT* 295 / *GA* 2: 334). The position there as well as here is that when humans evade death by looking for a ‘way out’ (*HHI* 59 / *GA* 53: 72), which cannot be had, this constitutes a presumptuous forgetting of their being because death belongs to human being.

Heidegger is not concerned with Antigone as a simple token of the heroic-figure type who embodies the right and proper 'edicts' or fundamental value-system of her culture or of humanity. His interest rather stems from his sense that she has heard a different 'edict divine', i.e. being's call that 'Life is death, and death is also a life' (*HHI* 118 / *GA* 53: 147) and that the 'belonging to death and to blood that is proper to human beings and to them alone is itself first determined by the relation of human beings to being itself' (*HHI* 118 / *GA* 53: 147).

Upon careful reading, then, none of the texts Young cites accomplish the work for which he enlists them. Given this fact, we have no recourse but to reject the account.

The final offering, that of Edwards, fails not exegetically but by virtue of not fitting very well with the rest of Heidegger's philosophy. Like Young's account, it has several components. For Edwards, the divinities are 'presences from another world, annunciators of a place of haleness and wholeness. The divinities are the reality both of human need for such weal and of our hope that it will someday be vouchsafed to us' (Edwards 1997: 172). He stresses, though, that these annunciators are not actual deities:

In spite of using the trope of theological language, it is clear that Heidegger is not identifying the divinities with the personified supernatural presences of vulgar religious belief. His presences from another world may be poems, paintings, works of philosophy, revolutionary political practices, new vocabularies of self-description: in short, whatever holds the promise of our healing self-transformation. To 'await the divinities' is to solicit from the future—presumably by living a certain way here and now—the advent of some new 'god' and its dispensation. [Edwards 1997: 172]

While, unlike Caputo, I agree with Edwards that the divinities are not exactly 'the personified supernatural presences of vulgar religious belief', it is not obvious that Heidegger's religious language does not call for a more religious

description of the divinities than Edwards gives, at least not so obvious as to warrant his lack of any further commentary on the matter. Heidegger's most extensive discussions of the fourfold—again, those in 'The Thing', 'Language', and 'Building Dwelling Thinking'—are elusively taciturn on all sorts of specifics concerning the divinities so nothing about them, least of all their identity, is particularly 'clear'.

Unsurprisingly, then, Edwards' confident account, like Young's, has a number of problems. The biggest lies in his characterisation of the divinities—or, as he calls them, 'annunciators' and 'presences from another world'—as 'whatever holds the promise of our healing self-transformation'. Implicit here seems to be the idea that a term like 'this world' refers to our context, situation, or understanding and, therefore, that any agents or phenomena that bring transformation must function as benign irruptions from outside this context, situation, or understanding, i.e. as 'presences from another world'. In other words, Edwards' interpretation implies that Heidegger presupposes the metaphysical distinction and, unlike Caputo, he does not even raise this as an objection!

Second, taking the divinities to be benign in the way Edwards does here is purely assumptive: Heidegger does not say that encounter with the fourfold—and therein with the divinities—has to be 'healing' *per se*. The idea is that such encounter fosters connection to the fundamental elements of existence that are always already 'in the background', to borrow a phrase popularised by Hubert Dreyfus (see Dreyfus and Spinoza 1997: 167 and Dreyfus 1991: 4), through our being-in-the-world. While such connection constitutes a kind—Heidegger's kind—of truth and truth is ultimately healing in the sense of helping us become

more whole in the [sometimes very] long run, there is no reason to suppose that, on Heidegger's view, the actual encounter with the fourfold/divinities could not be painful and even psychologically damaging but necessary as a step on the path to such healing.

Third, while it is probably true that any encounter with the divinities or 'beckoning messengers of the godhead', however interpreted, involves transformation of some sort, there is nothing in Heidegger suggesting this is their *raison d'être*, as if we could use it as a criterion for deciding what qualifies as a divinity, *à la* Edwards: '[Heidegger's] presences from another world may be poems, paintings, [etc.]: in short, whatever holds the promise of our healing self-transformation.' The best reason for, in contrast, regarding such a criterion as insufficient is that the 'divinities' is not the only transformative phenomenon in Heidegger's fourfold. The earth, for example, is transformative in the sense that connection to, as Caputo calls it, 'the support of our step, the source of our nourishment, and the material womb to which we return' will inevitably transform us. The same is true of connection to the integrated matrix of cycles that shapes our existence, i.e. the sky.

Thus, inasmuch as transformation is even a decisive characteristic of the divinities, it is not the divinities as such that are so transformative but the fourfold complex in which they are integrated. When the divinities are brought near and do their transforming, it is really the whole fourfold that is being brought near and doing the transforming. Assigning the status of 'divinity' or 'annunciator' to anything that promises transformation therefore abstracts the divinities from their broader transformative context and identifies as their defining feature something they share with each of the other elements of the

fourfold or, more properly, the fourfold as a whole, thus leaving them with no distinctive characteristic or contribution of their own.

This highlights a fourth problem. The earth and sky are transformative but, even on Edwards' account, have a deeper story that reveals how and why they are transformative. The earth, he says 'is a metaphor for the dark and unnameable substance of all things'<sup>79</sup> or the 'mystery' thereof, which has the 'power to affect us and to render void all our previous assumptions' (Edwards 1997: 170). Similarly, as I have already detailed, the sky is, for him, the 'source of light' and the matrix of 'cycles and necessities' to which we must 'always already answer' (Edwards 1997: 170-1; emphasis original). While I have jettisoned Edwards' account of the earth and modified his account of the sky, in both my presentation and his, the two phenomena are transformative because they, respectively, affect us and require an answer. In contrast, his reflection on the divinities says only that they are 'whatever holds the promise of our healing self-transformation'. This does not reveal any deeper structure that clarifies how or why the divinities are transformative but, at best, demythologises a typically mythological term so we can assign it to non-deities. Given the long history of deep freight sewn into words like 'God', 'gods', 'divinities', and 'spirit' across religious and philosophical traditions and texts, one would think that, if anything, there would be a deeper—not more shallow—story regarding the divinities than there is regarding the earth and sky, but Edwards' commentary does not provide this.

---

<sup>79</sup> Heidegger would surely regard the term 'metaphor' here in the same way he regards both it and 'symbolic image' in reference to Hölderlin's poetry, i.e. as metaphysically entrenched by virtue of assuming the sensuous-nonsensuous distinction (See *HHI* 16-18 and 23-7 / *GA* 53: 17-19 and 26-31). Nevertheless, Edwards' remarks on the 'earth' and 'sky' show that he regards these terms as referring to the deeper, more primordial structures or presencings of those things with which we normally associate them.

Fifth and finally, Edwards' transformation-centred account, as it were, 'double-books' all the phenomena on his list of divinities or annunciators since they already have easily-identifiable roles in Heidegger's economy. For example, Heidegger identifies poems and paintings as 'things'; more specifically, they are what he calls 'works of art'.<sup>80</sup> In the last chapter, I explained that, for Heidegger, 'things' are entities that gather the fourfold and, in the next chapter, I will discuss the unique ways in which various types of things, including the work of art, accomplish this and how we can understand clothing as doing so according to each type. Based on what I have said so far, however, if Edwards is right about the divinities, there is no distinction between them and certain types of things: Poems and paintings are both the divinities and the works of art that gather them. There may be a compelling reason to believe this is the best way to interpret Heidegger, but Edwards does not provide it.

Likewise, as long as the 'works of philosophy' and 'new vocabularies of self-description' that Edwards has in mind stem from genuine 'thinking',<sup>81</sup> they amount to instances of the 'purely spoken' ('L', in *PLT* 205 / *GA* 12: 28) language that, by naming things, calls them to 'bear upon men as things', in other words, to gather the fourfold ('L', in *PLT* 197 / *GA* 12: 19). There is, then, a similar problem here to the one with poems and paintings. When least connected to genuine thinking, 'works of philosophy' and 'new vocabularies of self-description' are what Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, calls 'idle talk [*Gerede*]' (see *BT* 211-24 / *GA* 2: 222-39) or, later, refers to as 'everyday

---

<sup>80</sup> See 'OWA', in *BW* 145 / *GA* 5: 3-4 for Heidegger's claim that there is a 'thingly aspect' of every work of art, including the poem or 'linguistic work' and the painting.

<sup>81</sup> For passages where Heidegger distinguishes genuine 'thinking' from most of what goes by the name of 'philosophy', see 'LH', in *BW* 218-21, 256, and 265 / *GA* 9: 314-17, 354, and 364; 'EPTT', in *BW* 436ff. / *GA* 14: 74ff.; 'WP', in *PLT* 93-4 / *GA* 5: 273-4; *WCT* 4-5 / *GA* 8: 6-7; and 'NL', in *OWL* 61 / *GA* 12: 154.

language' and a 'forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer' ('L', in *PLT* 205 / *GA* 12: 28). Alternatively, when most thoughtful, they are the 'purely spoken' language that still issues this 'naming call' ('L', in *PLT* 197 / *GA* 12: 19) to things, bidding them to gather the fourfold. Thus, if Edwards is right, we have, at best, a situation in which his 'works of philosophy' and 'new vocabularies of self-description' are both the divinities and the 'purely spoken' language that calls things to gather the divinities along with the rest of the fourfold. Again, it is unclear why we should accept this double-booking and not rather take it as an indication that Edwards' explanation misunderstands the essence of the phenomenon.

As to Edwards' final remaining offering, any attempt to identify 'revolutionary political practices' with Heidegger's divinities is going to be fraught with difficulty. The most obvious problem is that political revolutions are not singular or univocal phenomena but highly complex collections of interconnected, discretely assessable human behaviours. Not all such behaviours, or 'practices', as Edwards calls them, are going to '[hold] the promise of our healing self-transformation', the *sine qua non* Edwards assigns to the divinities.

That we are talking about human behaviours or practices at all, however, signals a more serious concern with identifying them as the divinities of Heidegger's fourfold. This becomes evident in relation to Heidegger's well-known jug illustration from 'The Thing'. Leaving aside the other problems with Edwards' transformation-oriented definition, it may well be that the 'practice' of making or using such a jug 'holds the promise of [...] healing self-transformation' for the makers or users, but that does not make the practice

equatable with the divinities, for Heidegger says the divinities are those for whom the ‘outpouring’ of the jug is a gift (‘Th’, in *PLT* 170 / *GA* 7: 174). The practice of using the jug is not the divinities; it is the human offer of a gift to divinities. Similarly, it may be true that some particular revolutionary political practice ‘holds the promise of [...] healing self-transformation’ for someone, but it does not follow that Heidegger would equate that practice with the divinities. On the contrary, practices such as making or using a jug and, depending on what is entailed, revolutionary action amount to human involvement in the fourfold. Such ‘practices’ are simply examples of what an element other than the divinities, i.e. mortals, do while gathered.

For all these reasons, Edwards’ account of the divinities as transformative agents, like the offerings of Caputo and Young, fails to illuminate the essence of this phenomenon. I now turn to an account I think is more faithful to Heidegger’s philosophy.

#### A Religious yet Not-Strictly-Literal and Non-Metaphorical Account

Aside from the individual problems I have raised with the views I discussed in this chapter, they share a further, overarching problem, which is that the very choice between the strictly literal and metaphorical interpretations presupposes the metaphysical distinction, whereby the divinities are some nonsensuous reality distinct from all that is sensuous. The sometimes-silent reasoning goes like this: Obviously, the divinities are not sensuous because we cannot sense them, so Heidegger must be talking about some nonsensuous phenomenon.

The reasoning continues by giving two options. The first, strictly literal, option is that Heidegger uses the term ‘divinities’ to refer to some group of nonsensuous beings, à la Caputo. The second option is that he uses it as a metaphor, e.g. Young’s and Edwards’. In the process of so reasoning, those who gravitate toward a strictly literal interpretation of the divinities imagine that since none of the metaphorical accounts seem plausible and/or sufficiently speak to the fact that Heidegger chose a religious locution, it makes more sense to construe the divinities as, in Caputo’s language, ‘new Greek gods’. Conversely, those on the metaphorical side of the debate will follow Edwards in thinking that since ‘it is clear that Heidegger is not identifying the divinities with the personified supernatural presences of vulgar religious belief’, the expression must be a symbolic image encouraging us to think nonsensuously about a sensuous phenomenon.

The problem with all this is that the choice between the strictly literal and metaphorical interpretations assumes that the divinities have to be, or at least have to be comparable to, some nonsensuous reality, which depends on differentiating sensuous and nonsensuous in the first place. But what if we take Heidegger at his word by assuming he is not making such a distinction and therefore conclude that he is neither interested in the question of whether the divinities, as nonsensuous beings, literally exist nor metaphorically comparing sensuous and nonsensuous phenomena? Is not it possible—indeed, intuitively likely—that Heidegger chose the religious expression ‘divinities’ because he intended to make a religious point yet without performing the metaphysical and onto-theological manoeuvres he spent the bulk of his life criticising? This is what I will be arguing in this section.

Earlier in this chapter, I combined two near-identical remarks about the divinities from ‘The Thing’ and ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ by saying: the divinities ‘beckon’, wave, wink, or hint (*winken*) at us, which constitutes a kind of ‘sway’ or persuasion (*Walten*), inclining us toward the god or godhead who emerges (or withdraws!) out of the persuasion in divine singularity. I further noted, however, that this does not provide any information about what kind of phenomenon the divinities are. Later in ‘The Thing’, Heidegger offers some comments that begin to address this shortfall by indicating that the divinities are not necessarily entities in the way that all three of the interpretations from this chapter suggest:

The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence is not nothing; rather it is precisely the presence, which must first be appropriated, of the hidden fullness and wealth of what has been and what, thus gathered, is presencing, of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus. This no-longer is in itself a not-yet of the veiled arrival of its inexhaustible nature. [‘Th’, in *PLT* 182 / *GA* 7: 185]

The sentences here are dense. The key insight, however, is that the ‘default [*Fehl*]<sup>82</sup> of both God and the divinities, i.e. their default mode of being, presencing, or ‘showing up’, to use Heidegger’s term from chapter three, is that of absence, absence of the ‘divine’ that used to presence ‘in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus’. In other words, the ‘divinities’ just are this Greco-Judeo-Christian ‘divine’, though we now experience it as ‘absent’ or—in the language of what Heidegger calls ‘crude [*grob*]’ (not to mention ‘metaphysical’) atheism (‘AWP’, in *OBT* 58 / *GA* 5: 76) —‘nonexistent’.

---

<sup>82</sup> Heidegger gets this phrase ‘default of God’ [*Fehl Gottes*] from Hölderlin’s ‘The Poet’s Vocation’ (*Dichterberuf*), stanza xvi: ‘Fearless yet, if he must, man stands, and lonely | Before God, simplicity protects him, no | Weapon he needs, nor subterfuge | Till God’s being not there helps him [*bis Gottes Fehl hilft*]’ (Hölderlin 1990 edn.: 157).

Interestingly, then, it is not that, as Caputo says, Heidegger's 'mythical Great Greek Origin [...] *exclude[s]* the biblical origin' or that 'From the 1930s on, Jews and Christians were shown the door and replaced by a pantheon of "pagan" "gods", pure Greeks' (Caputo 1993: 169). Rather, while Heidegger is admittedly not interested in anything like Caputo's 'biblical myth of justice' (Caputo 1993: 186), he has, even in his discussion of the divinities, his own kind of 'jewgreek'<sup>83</sup> religious reflection. This centres around 'God and the divinities' who constitute 'the divine' that is now absent but once presenced both in the ancient Greek world and in the proclamation of the Hebrew prophets and Jesus. As this 'divine', Heidegger's divinities correspond to what Julian Young calls 'the holy' or 'sacred', though the fact that Young equates the divinities with the 'heroes' of *Being and Time* forces him to conclude that the 'holy' is, instead, the 'fifth dimension' in what 'is really a five-dimensional place' rather than a fourfold (Young 2006: 377-8).

But what is the 'divine' or 'holy' or 'sacred' for Heidegger, as opposed to others who have used such terms? His answer in the last displayed passage is that this 'no-longer' and 'not-yet' is the 'has-been and coming destiny of Being'. In other words, 'the divine' is a 'destiny of'—or, to recall the discussion of Heidegger's essay 'The Question concerning Technology' earlier in this chapter, a 'destining', a presencing—of 'being' or presencing itself. That the essence of phenomena is to 'show up' rarely shows up and the same is true of 'showing up' as a showing up; presencing always presences according to a particular destining or way of revealing. The 'divine', then, is not simply 'being' or the phenomenon of presencing; it is this 'being' 'sent' or disclosed in a religious

---

<sup>83</sup> See Caputo 1993: 7 for Caputo's introduction of this term.

way. As William J. Richardson says, ‘In all probability, Heidegger is not using the word “god” here in any personal sense but in the sense that he gives to the word (often in the expression “god or the gods”) in his interpretations of Hölderlin, i.e. as the concrete manifestation of Being as “the Holy”’ (‘OGSU’, in Sheehan [ed.] 1981: 67 n. 27). Richardson’s use of the word ‘concrete’ here suggests a metaphysical distinction between a platonic-like nonsensuous abstraction or ‘Form’ and the sensuous ‘concrete’ reality in which it manifests, a consequence I think Heidegger would resist. Nevertheless, he is right to say that Heidegger intends expressions like ‘god’ and ‘gods’ or ‘divinities’ to refer to a particular, i.e. a religious, ‘destining’, ‘way of revealing’, or way ‘being’ ‘manifests’ or ‘shows up’.

It still remains, however, to delineate the religious character of this ‘Being as “the Holy”’ on Heidegger’s understanding. Several points in this regard emerge from the remainder of his comments about the divinities from the essays that discuss the fourfold.

First, the divinities are a locus of human hope: ‘In hope [mortals] hold up to the divinities what is un hoped for. They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 151). In other words, ‘Being as “the Holy”’ now holds the promise—or at least the possibility—that our erstwhile relationship to being will be renewed rather than remaining confined to the ‘world of the Greeks’, ‘prophetic Judaism’, and the ‘preaching of Jesus’. While, ‘In hope’, we wait for this renewal, it is also, in a sense, ‘un hoped for’ because we ‘do not mistake the signs of [the divinities] absence’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 151). That is, as Heidegger says elsewhere, we ‘keep ourselves open to [...] the arrival or absence of God’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ*

19 / *GA* 16: 673), not just the arrival alone. But the decisive point at present is that ‘Being as “the Holy”’ is—at least now, whether or not it was in the past—a phenomenon towards which we can appropriately direct our expectation. It makes sense, in other words, to keep enquiring into the meaning of ‘being’ because such enquiry is capable of yielding fruit, if not that of answers, at least that of aligning ourselves with our being by virtue of meditating on the ‘issue’ we have as a matter of having that ‘being’ (see, e.g. *BT* 32 / *GA* 2: 16 on this point). I will address this further in the next section.

Second, the divinities are ‘gather[ed]’ or brought near by ‘things’ like bread and wine in that the divinities are the source of these ‘gifts’, which they bestow upon mortals (‘L’, in *PLT* 203 / *GA* 12: 25). So another feature of ‘Being as “the Holy”’ is that it is gift-giving, but the fact that the gifts of bread and wine bring the divinities near means that, primordially speaking, the gift-giving is a self-giving in the sense of the ‘arrival’ I just discussed: ‘Mortals [...] await the divinities as divinities. [...] They wait for intimations of their coming’. Interestingly, however, while the ‘arrival’ of ‘Being as “the Holy”’ is its primordial gift, so, too, is the ‘absence’ thereof, given that, for Heidegger, absence is a kind of presence, a point about which I will soon have more to say.

Finally, while we often render the ‘divine presence [...] obstructed or even pushed wholly aside’, Heidegger intimates that this presence, which I have identified as a gift, is a phenomenon of which we should ‘explicitly think’ and for which we should ‘visibly *give thanks* [...], as in the figure of the saint of the bridge’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 355 / *GA* 7: 155; emphasis original).<sup>84</sup> In fact, the divine

---

<sup>84</sup> As an aside, the interrelatedness of these two responses to the divine presence is indicated by Heidegger’s discussions of thinking as thanking. See *WCT* 138-47 / *GA* 8: 142-7; *CPC* 64 and 97 / *GA* 77: 100 and 148; ‘WL’, in *OWL* 136 / *GA* 12: 56; ‘PWM’, in *PM* 235-7 / *GA* 9: 308-12; and *ZS* 74 / *GA* 89: 96.

presence is so worthy of this thanks as to merit what we sometimes call ‘giving back’. ‘Bread and wine are [...] gifts from the divinities to mortals’ (‘L’, in *PLT* 203 / *GA* 12: 25), but ‘The gift of the pouring [...] is the libation poured out [*gespendete Trank*] for the immortal gods’, a reciprocated ‘generosity’ that ‘genuinely uttered, is to donate, to offer in sacrifice, and hence to give’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 170-1 / *GA* 7: 174). The only gift we can give ‘being’, however, is the gift of enquiry into its meaning, which is what Heidegger commended throughout his writings. Being’s showing up in a religious way, *inter alia*, highlights the appropriateness of this response.

We have, then, a tripartite structure to the character of the divinities or ‘Being as “the Holy”’: It is a phenomenon for which we hope and wait, from which we receive, and to which we give thanks and give back. We hope and wait for its gifts—or, more precisely and primordially speaking, the gift of its presence or presencing—we receive such gifts, and, finally, we give thanks and give back to it for bestowing them. Each of our three movements in this structure suggests submission. For Heidegger, we are not, à la the spirit of ‘metaphysics’ and of technology, masters of the question concerning what makes beings what they are. As long as we ignore this, ‘being’ will continue to remain ‘unthought’.<sup>85</sup> The appropriate orientation for us, in contrast, is to be ‘open to [...] the arrival or absence of God’. Such hoping and waiting implies that we allow ‘being’ disclosed in a religious way to arrive or depart on its own terms and that when we receive it, we receive it on those terms. This submissive orientation also constitutes our thanks and giving back.

---

<sup>85</sup> See ‘EPTT’, in *BW* 446 / *GA* 14: 85 and ‘NWGD’, in *OBT* 196 / *GA* 5: 263 for discussions of this problem.

In line with such submission, a final feature emerges: Whether we ‘keep in mind’ or ‘forget’ the bridge and its meaning for us, we are ‘always [...] on [our] way to the last bridge, [...] striving to surmount all that is common and unsound in [us] in order to bring [ourselves] before the haleness of the divinities’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 354-5 / *GA* 7: 155). The divinities, then, is also a phenomenon for which we ready or refine ourselves by getting rid of ‘all that is uncommon and unsound’ in us.<sup>86</sup> We are always already moving toward the day, not necessarily after death but certainly in death, when we will come ‘before’ ‘Being as “the Holy”’ and our being will be fulfilled because, as I have intimated above and will discuss more fully below, our being, which is ‘Being-towards-death’, is fulfilled in death. In Heidegger’s view, the task of life is to be ready for this ‘last bridge’ by ‘striving to surmount’ what, in *Being and Time*, he called ‘falling’ or ‘inauthenticity’, which prevents us from ‘resolutely’ asking the question of being anew.<sup>87</sup>

Such is Heidegger’s understanding of how ‘being’ now shows up when doing so in a religious way. This is somewhat different from the religious way it showed up in the past—i.e. through the ‘world of the Greeks’ and ancient Judeo-Christian proclamation<sup>88</sup>—in that the emphasis is on ‘absence’ rather than ‘presence’. Sometimes—as with the language of the ‘coming destiny’—Heidegger seems to believe that ‘being’ will eventually show up in something like the old

---

<sup>86</sup> This parallels Heidegger’s contention elsewhere that ‘Man, as man, has always measured himself with and against something heavenly’ or the ‘godhead’ (‘PMD’, in *PLT* 218-19 / *GA* 7: 199).

<sup>87</sup> See especially his discussion of ‘Falling and thrownness’ (*BT* 219-24 / *GA* 2: 233-9) but also those of ‘Idle talk’ (*BT* 211-14 / *GA* 2: 222-6), ‘Curiosity’ (*BT* 214-17 / *GA* 2: 226-30), and ‘Ambiguity’ (*BT* 217-19 / *GA* 2: 230-3) as well as the various sections discussing ‘resoluteness’ (*BT* 343ff. / *GA* 2: 393ff.).

<sup>88</sup> Interestingly, Heidegger also, at one point, says that another religious way ‘being’ showed up in the past is through Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (‘Th’, in *PLT* 183 / *GA* 7: 186).

way again. Other times, he is more cautious, but, in either case, his continual position is that, currently, ‘being’ only shows up as the ‘divine’ insofar as we experience the latter as ‘absent’, though he stresses that this absence nevertheless constitutes a kind of presence. That is, the divine—or ‘being’ as it shows up in the mode of ‘the Holy’—is still here because we still encounter it; we just encounter it as gone. In this way, it remains with us as an element of the fourfold, as one of the four fundamental elements of our existence.

It is with reference to this absence as presence that Heidegger speaks of the ‘gods who [...] fled’ (‘P’, in *EHP* 211-12 and 224 / *GA* 4: 184-5 and 195; cf. ‘OWA’, in *BW* 168 / *GA* 5: 29; ‘AWP’, in *OBT* 58 / *GA* 5: 76; and ‘WP’, in *OBT* 200 / *GA* 5: 269) and instructs us that ‘Only a god can save us now. We can only through thinking and writing prepare to be prepared for the manifestation of God, or for the absence of God as things go downhill all the way’; ‘we can at the most only wake the readiness for the expectation’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 18 / *GA* 16: 671). He reiterates:

[We can do nothing except] to prepare to be ready, to keep ourselves open to, or prepared for the arrival or absence of God. Even the experience of absence is not ‘nothing’, but a liberation from what I call in *Being and Time* the ‘Falleness of Being’. To be prepared for preparation requires contemplating the present. [‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 19 / *GA* 16: 673]

This openness to and preparedness for ‘the arrival or absence of God’ constitutes openness to the ‘divine’ that is present through absence in the divinities, a ‘showing up’ of ‘being’ that is, in Heidegger’s estimation, unique to our era:

by providing anew the essence of poetry, Hölderlin first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods who have fled *and* of the god who is coming. It is the *time of need* because it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and in the not-yet

of the god who is coming. [‘HEP’, in *EHP* 64 / *GA* 4: 47; emphasis original]

Heidegger’s claim, then, is that while ‘the default of God which Hölderlin experienced does not deny that the Christian relationship with God lives on in individuals and in the churches’ or, still less, ‘assess this relationship negatively’ (‘WP’, in *PLT* 89 / *GA* 5: 269), something important of the divine has been lost: ‘The radiance of divinity is extinguished in world-history’ (‘WP’, in *OBT* 200 / *GA* 5: 269) because ‘a God no longer gathers men and things to himself visibly and unmistakably and from this gathering ordains world-history and man’s stay within it’ (‘WP’, in *OBT* 200 / *GA* 5: 269). ‘Because of this default, there fails to appear for the world the ground that grounds it’ (‘WP’, in *PLT* 90 / *GA* 5: 269). That is, we have lost our ‘soil in which to strike root and to stand’ (‘WP’, in *PLT* 90 / *GA* 5: 270), owing to the fact that nothing any longer gathers us to ‘being’—regardless of how it is showing up—and, therefore, that nothing any longer ‘ordains’ our ‘stay’.

Moreover, Heidegger says, this loss entirely escapes our notice. Like the contemporaries of Nietzsche’s madman, who, in the wake of the death of God, ‘do not imagine that they have lost anything by arranging their lives around entirely secular goals’ (Solomon and Higgins 2000: 96), ‘The time’, for Heidegger, ‘has already become so desolate that it is no longer able to see the default of God as a default’ (‘WP’, in *OBT* 200 / *GA* 5: 269). Instead, from our perspective, depending on whether we conceive of ourselves as faithful or not, either the ‘relationship with God lives on’ with no loss of the divine ‘radiance’ and unmistakable divine gathering and ordering or we simply regard ourselves as having given up a beautiful—or not-so-beautiful—fiction. But, for Heidegger,

the erstwhile religious orientation of the West provided an illuminating sense of our place within a whole that is no longer given in the same way or mode.

No ‘simply human contemplation and striving’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 18 / *GA* 16: 671), Heidegger says, least of all ‘thought’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 19 / *GA* 16: 673) since ‘Philosophy is over’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 19 / *GA* 16: 672), can directly bring back this divine radiance or former religious relationship to ‘being’ because ‘only a god can save us’. At the same time,

The turning of the age does not take place by some new god, or the old one renewed, bursting into the world from ambush at some time or other. Where would he turn on his return if men had not first prepared an abode for him? How could there ever be for the god an abode fit for a god, if a divine radiance did not first begin to shine in everything that is?

The gods who ‘were once there’, ‘return’ only at the ‘right time’—that is, when there has been a turn among men in the right place, in the right way. [‘WP’, in *PLT* 90 / *GA* 5: 270]

The divine radiance or religious relationship to ‘being’ is not simply going to arrive of its own accord, independently of what we do. We must be ready; there must be a ‘turn among men in the right place, in the right way’. If this homecoming or recurrence is ever to happen, therefore, we must, so to speak, get ready to be ready for it. Or, as Heidegger puts it, we must ‘wake the readiness for the expectation’, ‘prepare to be ready, [...] keep ourselves open to, or be prepared for the arrival or absence of God’. We do this by ‘thinking and writing’, but not just any thinking and writing; it must be a ‘thinking otherwise’, a ‘piety that stands and waits’ [*der Fromme, der sich offenhält*], in other words, a ‘questioning’ that amounts to continual enquiry about the meaning of being (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 20 / *GA* 16: 674). To do so is to ‘await the divinities as divinities’, thereby bringing this phenomenon near in its absence. This amounts to bringing near the ‘divine’ or ‘Being as the “Holy”’, that is, presencing

according to the religious destining, whereby 'being' is something for which we wait and hope, from which we receive, for which we have gratitude and give thanks, and for which we ready and refine ourselves to relate to anew. All of this provides us with a source for deep meaning, i.e. not the meaning we meaning-making beings accord just any phenomena to which we relate but the meaning implied by the call to be open to presencing as such, which is essential to all phenomena.

What I am advocating, then, is a religious yet not-strictly-literal and non-metaphorical account of the divinities. On this model, Heidegger does not intend us to take him as saying anything about whether such deities literally exist or ever did. He is not a neopagan, as Caputo charges. Neither, however, is he just, in Edwards' words, metaphorically 'using the trope of theological language' to make an entirely non-religious point about 'heroes' (on Young's view) or 'whatever holds the promise of our healing self-transformation' (on Edwards'). Rather, he is doing something subtly between these endeavours: making a religious yet not-strictly-literal and non-metaphorical point, i.e. that 'being' used to show up and still shows up in a religious way. Thus, while Heidegger's usage of religious language is not strictly literal in the sense that the term 'divinities' does not necessarily refer to literally existing-beings, this does not thereby consign it to being metaphorical. It is non-metaphorical in the sense that it is not comparing sensuous phenomena to nonsensuous phenomena, whether literally-existent or not, by means of a symbolic image or even making such a distinction. Instead, it is using religious language to make a religious point and, in that way, is also partly—but only partly—literal.

## Heidegger's 'Mortals'

The final element of Heidegger's fourfold is 'mortals', literally, the 'dying ones' [*Sterblichen*]. Heidegger says,

The mortals are human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies. The animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind it. Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. ['Th', in *PLT* 176 / *GA* 7: 180]

Similarly, he says,

Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities. ['BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152]

These comments, like others quoted in this chapter, echo Heidegger's famous analysis of death in *Being and Time* (see, in particular, *BT* 285-311 / *GA* 2: 321-54). Humans are the 'dying ones' in that they alone are 'capable of death as death', alone experience it as the 'Nothing' [*Nichts*] or 'possible impossibility' (*BT* 310 / *GA* 2: 352), i.e. as a phenomena they are always already approaching but will never be able to have experienced and still 'be'. While animals similarly no longer 'are' once they have undergone expiration, they are not concerned with their 'being' or its meaning and do not, therefore, experience death in such terms, i.e. 'as death'. They simply 'perish'.

The human being, in contrast, is, in the words of *Being and Time*, 'ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it [...] Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological' (*BT* 32 / *GA* 2: 16; emphasis original). Unlike animals and other entities, we experience existence such that we now 'are' yet, at some point, will not 'be', a fact about which we 'care'<sup>89</sup> along with the meaning of our being and of being in general as

---

<sup>89</sup> Concerning Heidegger's well-known remarks on the being of humans as 'care', see *BT* 153-68 and 225ff. / *GA* 2: 157-74 and 240ff.

well as a host of related questions. Our inevitable and always potentially impending death makes us primordially uncomfortable, allowing *Being and Time* to say that ‘anxiety’ is a ‘distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed’ (*BT* 228 / *GA* 2: 244): ‘That in the face of which one has anxiety [*das Wovor der Angst*] is Being-in-the-world as such’ (*BT* 230 / *GA* 2: 247), or, in other words, that uniquely human kind of being Heidegger calls *Dasein*. We have anxiety in the face of our own presencing or being because that being evanesces precisely in its fulfilment. Once we have undergone the ‘death as death’ that only we can undergo, we no longer ‘are’, at least not in the sense that we ‘are’ now.<sup>90</sup> Our response to the primordial anxiety we have about this, according to a *Being and Time* passage already cited in this chapter, is to ‘[cover] up [our] ownmost Being-towards-death, fleeing in the face of it’, which amounts to primordial ‘inauthenticity’: ‘Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic Being-towards-death’ (*BT* 303 / *GA* 2: 344).

In light of this essence of *Dasein* in ‘death as death’, Heidegger names its element in the fourfold the ‘dying ones’. The key to the human being’s place in that larger nexus, however, is that it is the entity for whom and with whose participation the rest of the elements are what they are. Precisely because our ‘being’ and ‘being’ more generally are issues for us, we relate to our fourfold ‘world’ through the meaning it and its elements have for us. The ‘earth’ is not just a ground that supports, nourishes, and, ultimately, reabsorbs beings. It is this ground for us. It has this meaning for us. It is part of the ‘world’ for the only

---

<sup>90</sup> Heidegger is careful to point out that ‘If “death” is defined as the “end” of Dasein—that is to say, of Being in-the-world—this does not imply any ontical decision whether “after death” still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein “lives on” or even “outlasts” itself and is “immortal”’ (*BT* 292 / *GA* 2: 329). The idea, rather, is that any ‘being’ we have after death will not be being-towards-death and will thus amount to an entirely different essence.

beings who experience existence as a world. Similarly, the sky is not just the integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and condition existence; it is this matrix for us. Finally, the phenomenon of the 'divinities' is not just 'Being as "the Holy"'; it is 'Being as "the Holy"' for us. The elements are what they are precisely for the dying ones.

Moreover, the elements are what they are precisely through our participation in the fourfold, though our 'preserving', which constitutes our 'dwelling': 'Mortals *are* in the fourfold by *dwelling*. But the basic character of dwelling is safeguarding [or preserving: *Schonen*]. Mortals dwell in the way they safeguard the fourfold in its essential unfolding [i.e. its essence or presencing: *Wesen*]' ('BDT', in *BW 352 / GA 7: 152*; emphasis original). In other words, our participation or gathering in the fourfold amounts to 'dwelling', which is to 'safeguard' or 'preserve' all its elements in their being or presencing, in short, to let them be what they are.

This 'safeguarding that dwells is fourfold' ('BDT', in *BW 352 / GA 7: 152*). First, mortals 'save the earth' ('BDT', in *BW 352 / GA 7: 152*) in that they do not 'exploit it', 'wear it out', 'master' it, or 'subjugate it' ('BDT', in *BW 352 / GA 7: 152*), but, more importantly, they let it be what it is, the supportive, nourishing, and, ultimately, reabsorbing 'earth'. Second, mortals 'receive the sky as sky' in that they 'leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest' ('BDT', in *BW 352 / GA 7: 152*). Obviously, with the advent of artificial light and other modern inventions, we do, indeed, 'turn night into day' and 'day into a harassed unrest', as anyone who, respectively, stays up after dusk or utilises the subway during the 'rush hour' of

any major city would have trouble denying. But Heidegger's point is not that we never fail to 'dwell' but that 'mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they *must ever learn to dwell*', and that precisely the 'homelessness' of or lack of dwelling by mortals 'is the sole summons that *calls* mortals into their dwelling' ('BDT', in *BW* 363 / *GA* 7: 164; emphasis original). Third, mortals dwell or preserve the 'divinities', which, in keeping with the interpretation for which I have argued in this chapter, amounts to letting 'being' 'be' 'presence', or 'show up' in a religious way. This means waiting or hoping for, receiving from, thanking by having gratitude for as well as giving back to by enquiring into, and preparing and refining ourselves for a new relationship to presencing as such. Finally, mortals dwell with or safeguard themselves and other mortals 'in that they initiate their own essential being—their being capable of death as death—into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152). This, Heidegger says, occurs when, as I discussed above, mortals like Antigone embrace and, therefore, do not prevent the end of their participation in the being that constitutes their proper home.

To preserve all four elements together in one movement of openness to 'being' is what it means to dwell. The 'only way' this happens, Heidegger says, is through our 'staying with things', which is the building-in-two-modes I discussed in the last chapter:

staying with things is the only way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple unity. Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the essence of the fourfold into things. But things themselves secure the fourfold *only when* they themselves *as* things are let be in their essence. How does this happen? In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and specially construct

things that do not grow. [‘BDT’, in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153; emphasis original]

Since dwelling constitutes both nursing/nurturing and specially constructing in tandem, it is somewhat misleading to separate these movements. Nevertheless, one of the aims of this thesis is to discuss a potential dwelling with respect to clothes, which are ‘things that do not grow’ and therefore call for an emphasis on the ‘specially constructing’. Heidegger’s qualifier ‘specially’ [*eigens*] will become important in this because, as I will discuss in the next chapter, not all construction of things in general and clothes in particular counts as contributive to dwelling on Heidegger’s terms.

### Conclusion

Over the course of this and the last chapter, I explicated Heidegger’s understanding of ‘dwelling’ as building-in-two-modes of growing and non-growing, or ‘made’, ‘things’ that amounts to preserving what he calls the fourfold in its four constitutive elements. This chapter focused on the latter part of that understanding, delineating the character of these elements, including the rather intractable phenomenon of the ‘divinities’. Given the controversy surrounding this element, my analysis engaged three influential—and, as I argued, unsatisfactory—accounts of it.

The decisive result of this chapter’s enquiry, like the phenomenon it addresses, is fourfold: The ‘earth’ is or ‘presences’ as—paraphrasing Caputo’s apt expression—the ground that supports, nourishes, and, ultimately, reabsorbs beings. Then, in a modification of Edwards’ formulation, the ‘sky’ is the integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and

condition existence, though the precise manner in which this occurs depends on the level of human submission to and participation in these forces. The ‘divinities’ are, as Richardson says, ‘Being as “the Holy”’, which amounts to a religious ‘presencing’ or ‘showing up’ of presencing itself. In such showing up, humans are called to comport themselves in the modes of waiting or hoping, receiving, thanking by having gratitude, giving back by enquiring, and, finally, preparing and refining themselves. Last, ‘mortals’ are the ‘dying ones’ whose task is not to shun but to die a ‘death as death’ and for whom and with whose participation the rest of the elements ‘are’ or presence in the ways I have delineated. The elements are what they are for mortals in that, without them, there is no one for whom to presence. Furthermore, they are what they are only with the participation of mortals in that ‘being’ charges the latter to let the former be what they are in letting ‘things’ be what they are. In the next chapter, I will present three models of things being or presencing as what they are—i.e. gathering the fourfold and thus being indicative of human dwelling—that Heidegger gives us and show how clothes can be such things on each model.

## Chapter 5: Dwelling in Sartorial Things

*The real reason I like natural fabrics is not just because they are traditional, but because of their provenance. I like the thought that, for example, a favourite tweed jacket was once a sheep, living upon a mountain in Scotland.—Fennel Hudson<sup>91</sup>*

*There are two spiritual dangers in not owning a farm. One is the danger of supposing that breakfast comes from the grocery, and the other that heat comes from the furnace.—Aldo Leopold<sup>92</sup>*

*I have intense childhood memories of the feelings of dressing in my winter school uniform on the first day back after the long summer holidays. Putting the uniform on symbolised school for me, but also made me feel that I was becoming the person who was going back to study and commune again with my peers. Even more than that, I remember that I felt I was somehow transforming with the seasons, becoming primed for winter. The weights, textures, colours and shapes of each garment of my school uniform combined to affect an anticipatory, wintry emotion made up of everything that this forthcoming time might entail for me. Even the ephemeral, sparkly frisson of Christmas would be evoked. I am still affected by the contrasting material qualities of cotton or of wool and of course, the fashion industry gains much of its momentum by appealing to the transient, cyclical emotions that relate season to fibre.—Fiona Jane Candy<sup>93</sup>*

Thus far, I have shown that ‘things’, as Heidegger defines them, are non-human entities—whether growing or made—that gather the four elements of the fourfold. In the present chapter, I will detail three examples Heidegger gives of specifically ‘made things’—the handmade artefact, the ‘built thing’, and the work of art—showing how each gathers the fourfold in its own way. After each presentation, I will show how clothing can gather the fourfold on that model and thus constitutes a made thing on all three.

---

<sup>91</sup> Hudson 2006.

<sup>92</sup> Leopold 1966: 6.

<sup>93</sup> Candy 2005: 4.6; emphasis original.

Two points of clarification before beginning, however: First, many scholars have ascribed to Heidegger a mawkish nostalgia for the country and pre-industrial ways.<sup>94</sup> Obviously, such a charge cannot help but partly hit its mark for a man who regularly retreated to his ‘Heidegger hut’<sup>95</sup> and who, on more than one occasion, expressed misgivings about things like TV antennas (see ‘MSC’ 43) and the possibility that our ‘hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology’ (‘Tu’, in *QCT* 48 / *GA* 11: 123). While Heidegger several times denied that he intended for us to go backwards,<sup>96</sup> I will neither attempt to defend him against his accusers nor endorse nostalgia. One of the burdens of this thesis is to demonstrate that everything we wear has phenomenologically-relevant advantages and

---

<sup>94</sup> The most famous of those accusing Heidegger of nostalgia are Adorno 1964: 50-1, 59 and Derrida 1972: 27, though the latter levels his critique in reference to Heidegger’s approaches to language and the Greeks rather than his thoughts on ‘the provinces’ (‘WSP’ 27-30) and industrialism. Following Derrida in this are Rorty 1984: 19 and Caputo 1988: 544-5. Like Adorno, however, Karsten Harries directs his nostalgia charge squarely at Heidegger’s comments on ‘the peasant’ and dwelling (Harries 2009: 84 and 1998b, respectively). Sharr 2007: 72 is similarly critical of Heidegger’s fondness for the country and summarises the collective point nicely: ‘Heidegger’s Black Forest farm is a striking example of his inclinations toward the romantic and archaic. His statement that the farmhouse’s particular ethos had passed suggests he anticipated the charges of nostalgia which are easily levelled at it. Although Heidegger made clear that the order it described should be reclaimed anew, that order is certainly more at home with country ways than with city life.’ Still, not everyone adopts such a critical perspective. Notable amongst Heidegger’s defenders against the nostalgia accusation are: Janicaud 1978: 73; Thomson 2000: 319; and Dreyfus 1995: 101. The last of these puts the defence this way: ‘But, of course, Heidegger uses and depends upon modern technological devices. He is no Luddite and he does not advocate a return to the pre-technological world. “It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to greater advances” [‘MA’ 53 / *GA* 16: 526]. Instead, Heidegger suggests that there is a way we can keep our technological devices and yet remain true to ourselves: “We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature” [‘MA’ 54 / *GA* 16: 527].’

<sup>95</sup> See Sharr 2006 for an illustrated discussion of this well-known aspect of Heidegger’s life.

<sup>96</sup> See, for example, his caveats that ‘Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that has been how it was able to build’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 362 / *GA* 7: 162) and that ‘It is just as childish to wish for a return to previous states of the world as it is to think that human beings could overcome metaphysics by denying it’ (*HFI* 53 / *GA* 53: 66). Similarly, he says, ‘in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of what is early’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 22 / *GA* 7: 23).

disadvantages. This is true of both non-technological apparel, perhaps that of Heidegger's 'peasant', and the most state-of-the-art 'techwear'.

Second, in delineating the three examples of the 'handmade artefact', the 'built thing', and the 'work of art', we must bear in mind that such delineation is only to clarify some ways Heidegger spoke about things gathering the fourfold and does not claim to capture how Heidegger himself would differentiate between made things. Moreover, these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary in that Heidegger probably never intended for us to conclude that differences in the gatherings of things should call for categories and, in fact, all such distinctions must, of necessity, be arbitrary since there will always be 'things' that share the characteristics of more than one of the categories. A bridge, for example, is Heidegger's paradigmatic example of the 'built thing'. In the right circumstances, however, it could count as both a 'handmade artefact' and a 'work of art' on his terms and, indeed, his example of the old stone bridge across the Neckar in Heidelberg seems especially conducive to this kind of overlap. But this does not mean there is nothing to learn from explicating the categories. Contrary to any kind of rigid formalism that tries to put things into categories that cannot hold them, the idea here is precisely to show that clothing is not restricted to any of the models but at home in all three, that so much more is going on with clothes than we realise.

### The Handmade Artefact

The handmade artefact gathers by involving earth, sky, mortals, and divinities in its functioning. All four elements, that is, are present as we use the artefact. In 'The Thing', Heidegger gives the example of an earthenware jug. In

pouring wine from this vessel, humans relate to fermented drink that results from the earth's seeds, minerals, and pollinators interacting with the sky's sun and rain. As Heidegger puts it, 'the marriage of sky and earth [...] stays in the wine given by the fruit of the vine, the fruit in which the earth's nourishment and the sky's sun are betrothed to one another. In the gift of water, in the gift of wine, sky and earth dwell' ['Th', in *PLT 170 / GA 7: 174*]. Moreover, Heidegger says, humans convene with one another in the presence of the divinities as they drink from this jug whose very function or essence is to facilitate sharing wine and making drink offerings:

The gift of the pouring out is drink for mortals. It quenches their thirst. It refreshes their leisure. It enlivens their conviviality. But the jug's gift is at times also given for consecration [*Weihe*]. If the pouring is for consecration, then it does not still a thirst. It stills and elevates the celebration of the feast. The gift of the pouring now is neither given in an inn nor is the poured gift a drink for mortals. The outpouring is the libation poured out [*gespendete Trank*] for the immortal gods. ['Th', in *PLT 170 / GA 7: 174*]

Although Heidegger does not discuss the making of the jug itself, this event also gathers the fourfold: Humans form clay of the earth in the presence of the divinities and set it out to bake under the sun of the sky.

In both using and making, an emphasis on the non-technological (in the modern sense) is conspicuous. Humans pour and share non-technological wine in which constitutive elements from the fourfold remain what they are: Both the earth as fruit and the sky as rain water remain identifiably present in the final libation. Similarly, potters make their earthenware by fashioning a piece of non-technological earth into an artefact in a way that involves non-technological hands and non-technological sun. This results in constituents that remain what they are because no inorganic process has manipulated them into something

else. Contrast this non-technological character in the wine and jug with the lack thereof in, for example, Coca-Cola and the plastic bottles that house it, both of which fail to accord with Heidegger's model of a thing. Ordinarily, it might seem that a plastic half-litre bottle of Coke is just as capable of gathering the fourfold as an earthenware jug of wine. After all, Coke is mostly water, a product of the sky, and the petroleum that ultimately becomes the plastic bottle is no less part of the earth than the clay that goes into the earthenware jug (not to mention the earthiness of banana peels, another potential source of plastic; see Bilgin 2013). Moreover, we could easily interpret the plastics manufacturing process to involve sky in one way or another, along with 'mortals' in their safety goggles and other manufacturing paraphernalia. (We will leave aside the question of whether Heidegger would acknowledge that divinities are present in such a scenario.) Thus, a plastic bottle of Coke might seem to gather the fourfold just as much as an earthenware jug of wine, if less obviously.

So why does not it on Heidegger's understanding? The answer lies precisely in that it is less obvious that the bottle of Coke gathers than that the jug of wine does. The former involves what we might call a much greater 'distance'<sup>97</sup> between the final product, a plastic bottle of Coke, and its basic constituents—which have their origin in the earth and/or sky. But when Heidegger speaks of things gathering, his point is not that we can concoct a

---

<sup>97</sup> As I will discuss in connection with the 'built thing', Heidegger contrasts 'mere distance, mere intervals of intervening space' ('BDT', in *BW* 357 / *GA* 7: 157), with both 'nearness' and 'remoteness' (see 'BDT', in *BW* 357ff. / *GA* 7: 157ff. as well as 'Th', in *PLT* 163ff. / *GA* 7: 167ff.), which pertain to, respectively, his notions of 'presencing' and 'absencing' as I discussed them in the last chapter. In using the term 'distance' here, I intend none of these but to evoke the difference between how a growing thing presences in itself and how it presences in being 'transformed' ('QCT', in *QCT* 16 / *GA* 7: 17) into a technological object in relation to the difference between the former and how it presences in being 'placed forth into the [...] appearance' ('ECP', in *PM* 221 / *GA* 9: 289) of a made thing or *poioumenon* according to the *paradeigma* of a *techē*.

story involving the four elements for some phenomena and not others, for we could do this for any of them.

Rather, given his views on *technē* and made things, ‘gathering the fourfold’ refers to an ‘event’ (*Ereignis* in Heidegger)—a moment laced with meaning—wherein humans relate to an artefact fashioned from an ‘appropriate for’ according to its *telos* and an artisan’s *technē* in the context of the fourfold remaining what it is. As I discussed in chapter three, Heidegger’s understanding is that any constituent from the earth and/or sky—that is, any ‘appropriate for’—has something for which it is appropriate, a *telos* or destination. A given piece of leather, for example, might have the *telos* of becoming a pair of sandals. The ‘distance’ between leather and sandal, however—i.e. the length and/or complexity of the movement from ‘appropriate for’ to destination—is not so much that the leather ‘disappears [*verschwindet*]’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 19 / *GA* 7: 19). Thus, the leather, and therefore the element of the fourfold whence it comes, i.e. the ‘earth’, still counts as remaining what it is.

The situation is different with the constituents of a plastic bottle of Coke, however, because, while Coca-Cola may be mostly water, the manufacturer manipulates this and the rest of the ingredients to produce what could never exist if the ‘appropriate fors’ that go into the Coca-Cola were left to be what they are (or were). In other words, the distance between the Coke on the one hand and most, if not all, of the constituents on the other is too great because the latter disappear in the former. Likewise, being a bottle is not petroleum’s *telos*. Plastics technicians take ‘appropriate fors’ from the fourfold and distort them to produce something new that would not result from those constituents remaining what they are. That ‘something new’ does not, therefore, count as

gathering the fourfold because what it would gather is no longer there; it has disappeared. Instead, the product comes into existence anew by ‘transforming’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 16 / *GA* 7: 17) what was there. Or, to keep with the language I have developed, there is too much distance between the final product and the original constituents, too little allowing the fourfold to be what it is.<sup>98</sup>

Thus, to speak of every conceivable item as a ‘thing’ in Heidegger’s sense, i.e. in terms of his notion of gathering, is to shoehorn much of existence into a conceptual space too small for it and, also, to overlook the distinction he draws between ‘things [*Dingen*], which gather, and ‘objects [*Gegenstände*], which do

---

<sup>98</sup> Interestingly, Bruce V. Foltz remarks that ‘Recycling can be a reminder that even the aluminium can bears the pliant yet sustaining character of the earth itself—and hence can be a saving of that character along with the metal’ (Foltz 1995: 166). Foltz does not elaborate on why he thinks aluminium cans are so earthy; he only stipulates that ‘Everything depends on whether the saving arises from dwelling’ (Foltz 1995: 166), which means ‘to use [the natural environment] while nevertheless keeping it sound and intact’ (Foltz 1995: 161). For Foltz, as long as one thus dwells instead of ‘embracing technology as an ethic’ (Foltz 1995: 169; emphasis original), using any given piece of technology is not, in principle, a problem. While, as I have acknowledged, Heidegger says, ‘We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us’ and while I will be considering how technological clothing might ‘gather the fourfold’, there is a reason none of Heidegger’s own examples of ‘things’ so facilitating dwelling are technological. The problem is that ‘enframing’ is always seducing us into what Foltz calls ‘embracing technology as an ethic’. To use Heidegger’s words, ‘it drives out every other possibility of revealing’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 27 / *GA* 7: 28), leaving us in ‘purely technical relations’ (‘OGSU’, in *GFPJ* 17 / *GA* 16: 670) with things, wherein everything ‘appears as something at our command’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 16 / *GA* 7: 16). That we can crush an aluminium can may show that it is ‘pliant’ like the earth, but Foltz provides no account for how the extensive process that transforms its constituents into the final product nevertheless keeps them ‘sound and intact’ and not at our command. Even if it does, can the same be said for plastic bottles made from petroleum (or banana peels)? What of the of silicon chips in mobile phones made from the earth’s sand? Heidegger’s aforementioned worries about TV antennas, radio, and film suggest that these questions have not been sufficiently attended by accounts like Foltz’.

not.<sup>99</sup> The fact that some ‘things’ are non-growing does not mean all non-growing entities are things, for they must come about in the right way. If earth goes into a thing, it must continue to be earth in that thing and not some other phenomenon to which we can no longer relate to as earth. Otherwise, the resulting thing is not a ‘thing’ at all but an ‘object’.

Clothes can gather the fourfold in much the same way. Like wine and earthen vessels, clothes made from non-synthetic fibres have the yield of the earth and sky’s betrothal in their fabric. Cotton plants, for example, sprout from the earth, taking in the sky’s rain and sunrays as they grow. Mortals take the fibres from the boll and spin it into thread to make fabric that they cut and stitch into garments. All this is done in the presence of the divinities, before whom mortals dwell in their clothes. In the same way a jug pours wine as a gift to mortals and a libation for divinities (or in the same way the artisan fashions the jug to facilitate that event), the clothier stitches garments as a gift to mortals in their worship before the divinities. In this case, the gift provides the former warmth and the possibility of various other kinds of well-being—e.g. pleasurable kinaesthetic sensations, physical health, and so on, as per the observations of

---

<sup>99</sup> For Heidegger, Western ‘man exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 27 / *GA* 7: 28), transforming ‘things’ into ‘objects’ through metaphysical categories and the technological impulse. In the Cartesian version, Western thought pursues conceptual mastery over existence by representing it in terms of a nonsensuous subject or I on the one hand and a sensuous object called the external world on the other. But, Heidegger says, by so juxtaposing the I and the external world in the process of deciding that the former exists because it thinks, Descartes turns ‘things’, to which humans relate, into ‘objects’ they represent: ‘man has risen up into the I-ness of the *ego cogito*. Through this uprising, all that is, is transformed into object’ (‘NWGD’, in *QCT* 107 / *GA* 5: 261). This Cartesian perspective spawns a new understanding of science, whereby a supposedly detached subject or researcher examines an ‘object [*Gegenstand*] of research’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 19 / *GA* 7: 19; cf. ‘AWP’, in *OBT* 57 and 64ff. / *GA* 5: 75 and 84ff.). At the same time, there arises a ‘transformation of praxis’ that ‘demands the employment of science so understood and thus resorts to ‘machine technology’ (‘AWP’, in *OBT* 57 / *GA* 5: 75) to transform non-technological things into technological objects of use rather than letting them ‘be the beings they are’ (‘ET’, in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188). The result is commodities like an ‘airliner [*Verkehrsflugzeug*]’, which ‘is surely an object [*Gegenstand*]’, ‘standing-reserve [*Bestand*]’ ‘in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts [*Bestandteile*]’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 17 / *GA* 7: 17-8).

the theorists in chapter one—as well as the opportunity to do what I have called modulating judgement, e.g. choosing garments that identify the wearer with desired social groupings. But, most importantly, the garments act as vestments that house mortals as worshippers of the divinities, whether liturgically, otherwise consciously, or altogether unconsciously. That is, it gives them a place to be as they stand in reverence before ‘being’ or presencing as such revealed in a religious way, as something for which they can wait and hope, from which they can receive, for which they can have gratitude and give thanks by enquiring into, and for which they can prepare and refine themselves so as to relate to anew.

Again, the non-technological is important. Spandex may be useful, but the question is whether it respects or forsakes the essential character of things. What do we lose while gaining the ease and efficiency of this now ubiquitous fabric and others similarly unavailable to us without manipulating the earth and sky as Heidegger defines them? We may stay drier on backpacking trips by employing gear made of such synthetic materials, but how might our relation to what Heidegger calls ‘earth’ and ‘sky’, not to mention our relation to other mortals and to the divinities, be stronger if we were willing to be wet, soggy, and miserable? What is really going on between us and other mortals when we make ourselves look thinner via compression garments? What does the practice do to our self-experience? How does choosing ‘performance’ athletic clothing differ from simply demanding better performance from ourselves? Why do ordinary citizens even concern themselves with shaving seconds off their ‘personal best’ via such attire and what role does athletic clothing play vis-à-vis that deeper issue?

These questions, like many of the insights from chapter one, suggest that our relationship to clothing is much deeper than we typically assume. The possibility that what we wear conditions how we experience ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ as well as ourselves and each other and that, unthematically— that is, deep down— we are already experiencing these, deserves our attention.

### The ‘Built Thing’

Heidegger also discusses what he calls the ‘built thing’, which spatially facilitates and expresses our ‘dwelling’. Such a definition, with its domestic connotations, might seem to limit the concept of the built thing to homes and perhaps office buildings or similar structures in which we spend lots of time, but Heidegger’s paradigmatic example is the bridge. Whereas the handmade artefact gathers the fourfold by involving each of the four elements in its functioning, Heidegger says bridges, homes, and other ‘built things’ gather by bringing the elements into spatial proximity with one another.

For Heidegger, though, the essence of proximity is not as straightforward as we might take it to be. According to his discussion of nearness in ‘The Thing’, technology has changed our experience by making us feel as though we can approach people, places, and things that would otherwise remain far away and inaccessible:

All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by plane [*Flugmaschine*], places which formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information, by radio [*Rundfunk*], of events which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all. The germination and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today’s street traffic. [‘Th’, in *PLT* 163 / *GA* 7: 167]

Thus, I may live in Maine while listening to a syndicated radio host from Houston and feel like we are in the same room. Similarly, I can live in Glasgow but visit the Middle East from my den (or, depending on perspective, have the Middle East brought to me) every night via broadcast news. The problem with this, according to Heidegger, is that, although such technology seems to bring things near, it contrariwise prevents us from being genuinely close to anything at all. For one, regardless of how it feels, we do not occupy those spaces that seem to come near: The radio talk show host and I are not in the same room; I have not gone to Houston and he has not come to Maine. Similarly, when I watch the news, I have not gone to the Middle East and it has not come to me. Second, under the spell of such technology, we cease to be fully involved in the space we do occupy. To change the example, if I am absorbed in a period film and my son is engrossed in a video game downstairs, the problem is not just that we falsely take ourselves to be in the 1950s and a fantastical forest, respectively, but also that neither of us are present to the space of the house we share. It is not just that I am not really amongst gangsters and dames and that he is not really surrounded by mythical beasts but also that both of us missed our cat gathering the fourfold as it passed.

One might counter Heidegger by pointing out that such captivation does not just occur with modern technological innovations like radio and film but also with books and that, indeed, this is part of the latter's appeal. Michael Ende's *The Neverending Story*, for example, resonates with us precisely because its plot, in which the protagonist literally becomes part of the narrative he is reading, trades on the fact that we often get drawn into stories. Such a

critique does not entirely miss its mark and Heidegger would, I think, identify the same problem with fantasy that he identifies with technology, namely, that it encourages us not only to be involved in another space and world but also to be uninvolved in our own. Heidegger's engagement with literature moves in the opposite direction, showing how it calls us to submit to things that bring our space and world or fourfold near or how it brings another world into interaction with ours. This is not to say there is no role for the imagination in Heidegger's understanding of nearness, for he says that, in meditating on the old bridge that spans the Neckar in Heidelberg, we 'may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing' ('BDT', in *BW* 359 / *GA* 7: 159).<sup>100</sup> True nearness, in his view, happens when we involve ourselves with the presencing fourfold. It happens, that is, when we show up for the fourfold's showing up instead of avoiding it by trying to show up for something else.

Regardless of whether Heidegger successfully distinguishes imaginative meditation from fantasy, one might protest that, yet again, nostalgia has crept into his philosophy. Before, he seemed to discourage the kind of technology that would produce synthetic fabrics and now we cannot watch television or play video games? But, again, the point—at least for us—is about being involved with what is present, being near what is near, and how clothing can facilitate this. As I will show, it is possible to affirm a technologically-produced garment as a

---

<sup>100</sup> There is, though, a tension between what I have called fantasy, à la period film and video game, and the kind of imaginative meditation Heidegger identifies as 'thinking toward [*Hindenken zu*]' ('BDT', in *BW* 358 / *GA* 7: 159). This tension calls for exploration on just what counts as imaginative meditation, though such exploration is outside the parameters of this thesis.

'built thing' that facilitates the kind of fourfold-presencing Heidegger emphasises.

According to 'Building Dwelling Thinking', bridges are the paradigmatic 'built thing' and, as such, facilitate true nearness or presence by allowing us to experience the fourfold's elements in 'each other's neighbourhood' ('BDT', in *BW 354 / GA 7: 154*). Bridges, Heidegger says, do not just connect two banks; rather, they make those banks part of a unity, which is to make them what they are: 'The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream' ('BDT', in *BW 354 / GA 7: 154*). At first, this claim seems wildly implausible. After all, we can imagine a river with its two banks in absence of a bridge. How, then, can Heidegger suggest that bridges make banks what they are?

With this question, however, we presuppose bridges without realising it: We imagine the kind of world that bridges allow, one where rivers fit between tidy banks we can occupy and line with buildings on the assumption of easy access across the relevant waterway. But the situation with rivers before humans get to them is different: In the pre-human context, what we have come to dub 'banks' are just beds of sand and/or rock that only sometimes remain uncovered by the water that creates them and subsequently recedes. It is, oftentimes, not even possible to see what we would regard as the 'opposite' bank, given the trees and brush that obscure it. Despite this, when humans happen upon one side of the water and look to the other, thinking of the two as 'banks' enclosing a river, they are already thinking in terms of getting to the other side, the easiest and most repeatable means of which is walking across the bridge they might build. Thus, when Heidegger says bridges make banks what they are, he means that understanding the land on both sides of the river as a

unity separable from other unities or ‘regions’<sup>101</sup> presupposes thinking of—and, ultimately, building—a bridge.

It is not only the two banks from Heidegger’s ‘earth’, however, that make up this unity; the oneness also includes the rest of the fourfold. The sky produces precipitation that results in rivers. Instead of trying to resist such a waterway’s partitioning of the landscape by building elsewhere and irrigating, the bridge makes the river part of the unity:

the sky’s floods from storm [*Gewittersturm*] or thaw [*Schneesmelze*] may shoot past the piers in torrential waves—the bridge is ready for the sky’s weather and its fickle [*wendisches*] nature. Even where the bridge covers the stream, it holds its flow up to the sky by taking it for a moment under the vaulted gateway and then setting it free [*freigibt*] once more. [‘BDT’, in *BW* 354 / *GA* 7: 154]

The imagery here is of a structure that allows the sky to touch the earth, allows water from one to enter the water of the other. We might object that the bridge does not have a genuine role here, for this interaction already happens without it and, in one way, this is precisely Heidegger’s point.

In another way, however, the bridge’s role is to elevate what would happen anyway into an ‘event’ (*Ereignis*), a moment laced with meaning, and this signals Heidegger’s discussion of the bridge’s gathering of mortals. The bridge makes the interaction between earth and sky matter by making it matter to the only beings for whom such significance is possible, i.e. us, and precisely by involving us. We participate in the earth and sky’s interaction, yet without subjugating them because what we have built lets these elements ‘be what [they]

---

<sup>101</sup> See Harries 1998a: 154-7 on ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and the capacity of buildings to delineate separable regions.

are'; it 'guards', 'safeguards', 'preserves', 'protects', and 'cares for' their essence.<sup>102</sup>

While Heidegger's account of this mortals-gathering might be relatively straightforward on its own, he offers it in conjunction with his far more opaque account of the bridge's gathering of the divinities: The bridge 'grants mortals [*Sterblichen*] their way, so that they may come and go from shore to shore. [...] the bridge initiates the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to other banks' ('BDT', in *BW* 354 / *GA* 7: 154-5). So far so good, but here's where it gets murky: After saying the bridge escorts men so they can get to other banks, Heidegger adds that it also ushers them 'in the end, as mortals, to the other side', even when they 'forget that they, always themselves on their way to the last bridge, are actually striving to surmount all that is common and unsound in them in order to bring themselves before the haleness of the divinities' ('BDT', in *BW* 354-5 / *GA* 7: 155).

This might appear to be a metaphor, wherein traversing a bridge symbolises the human journey through life, but Heidegger cautions against arriving at such a representational understanding of his analysis:

To be sure, people think of the bridge as primarily and properly *merely* a bridge; after that, and occasionally, it might possibly express much else besides; and as such an expression it would then become a symbol, for instance a symbol of those things we mentioned before. But the bridge, if it is a true bridge, is never first of all a mere bridge and then afterward a symbol. And just as little is the bridge in the first place exclusively a symbol, in the sense that it expresses something that strictly speaking

---

<sup>102</sup> See various discussions employing this vocabulary: 'letting [something] be what it is' ('ET', in *PM* 144ff. / *GA* 9: 188ff.); 'guarding' and 'safeguarding' ('BDT', in *BW* 350-2 and 360 / *GA* 7: 150-2 and 160-1 and 'Th', in *PLT* 182-3 / *GA* 7: 185-6); 'preserving', 'protecting', and 'caring for' ('OWA', in *BW* 191-203 / *GA* 5: 54-66; and 'BDT', in *BW* 348-53 / *GA* 7: 148-53). The conversation on 'waiting' in *CPC* 140ff. / *GA* 77: 160ff. is also helpful here. In contrast to such dwelling, consider Heidegger's comment that, in setting up a hydroelectric plant on the Rhine, 'even the Rhine itself [*Rheinstrom*] appears as something at our command [*etwas Bestelltes*]' because we force it to show up as 'water power supplier' rather than letting it be the river it is ('QCT', in *QCT* 16 / *GA* 7: 16).

does not belong to it. If we take the bridge strictly as such, it never appears as an expression. The bridge is a thing and *only that*. Only? As this thing it gathers the fourfold. ['BDT', in *BW* 355 / *GA* 7: 155; emphasis original; cf. *HFI* 16-20 and 23-7 / *GA* 53: 17-23 and 26-31]

Although 'people' might admit that bridges express something metaphorically—perhaps 'those things we mentioned before', i.e. the journey from birth to death — Heidegger says it is neither secondarily ('after that') nor primarily ('in the first place') this kind symbol, for the term 'symbol' suggests that such resonances are not part of what the bridge is in its essence. For Heidegger, however, what makes a bridge a thing at all is that it gathers mortals and the divinities along with the rest of the fourfold, but it does this precisely through the human actualisation of that 'Being-towards-death' Heidegger discusses in *Being and Time* (see especially *BT* 296-311 / *GA* 2: 335-54). That is to say, built things in general are what humans 'build' in the double sense—i.e. both construct and nurture—to establish the spaces in which they make their way toward death. As a structure that explicitly facilitates and calls for a slice of this larger pilgrimage, a kind of journey within a journey, the bridge epitomises the built thing. So the bridge is not a mere metaphor for the human journey 'to the other side' in preparation for 'the haleness of the divinities' but an actual part of this journey. The bridge gathers mortals and divinities, along with earth and sky, in a non-metaphorical sense.

Heidegger says the bridge accomplishes this literal gathering of the fourfold by 'mak[ing] space and a site for' it ('BDT', in *BW* 360 / *GA* 7: 161). At this point, some terminological clarification will be helpful. In 'Building Dwelling Thinking', Heidegger uses the word 'location' [*Ort*] to refer to the built thing and the region it occupies, which emerges as a region precisely in light of

the built thing's construction.<sup>103</sup> The region that the Golden Gate Bridge takes up, for example, only becomes identifiable as such when we put the Golden Gate Bridge there. In between locations like these are 'spaces' [*Räume*], which the locations 'set up' in much the same way that two mountains set up a valley. Locations and spaces so understood constitute the main elements in Heidegger's understanding of space more generally, which he contrasts with the traditional conception that prioritises distance and position. Under the latter paradigm, the world is not primarily a unity of built things humans raise as they make their way toward death on the one hand and the regions between these structures on the other. Rather, it is a multidimensional plane of contiguous positions or 'spots' [*Stellen*] that such locations and spaces occupy. We call this plane capital-S 'space' [*Raum*]. Heidegger's objection to this outlook is not that it is wrong but that it is too shallow and furthermore derivative of the deeper perspective that emphasises locations and spaces. That is, he thinks we only find it intuitive that there is a multidimensional grid of positions called 'space' because we have already carved up a large part of the world so described by means of building locations. So we do not get our notions of locations and spaces from a larger understanding or 'intuition' of capital-S space, as

---

<sup>103</sup> See not only the aforementioned Harries 1998a: 154-7 but also Malpas 2006: 260 and Pattison 2011: 145 for similar formulations of Heidegger's understanding of space and place in light of building. Both Malpas and Pattison note that *Erörterung*—'discussion', 'discourse', 'debate'—contains *Ort* as a root and is therefore 'indicative of an essential connection between language and place' (Malpas 2006: 30 and 266; cf. Pattison 2011: 144-5), though both also stress the thorny political ramifications of Heidegger's emphasis on this connection (see Malpas 2006: 18-27 and Pattison 2011: 144 n. 97). In particular, Pattison cites Paul Tillich's sense that a prioritisation of space over time lies behind both the pagan 'elevation of a special space to ultimate value and dignity'—as opposed to monotheism's worship of the 'God of time' and 'God of history'—and nationalism, where space's "beside-each-otherness" necessarily becomes an "against-each-otherness" in the moment in which a special space gets divine honour' (Tillich 1959: 31-3; cf. Pattison 2011: 140-1).

Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant thought.<sup>104</sup> Rather, it is the other way round: We get the idea or image of space as a whole by conceptually amalgamating the idea of locations as we are always already establishing them with the idea of spaces as we experience them nested between those locations.

Utilising some final terminology, Heidegger tells us that locations provide the fourfold with a 'site' [*Stätte*] or 'space' [*Raum*]. While these terms do pick out a physical domain, which includes but goes beyond the relevant location by virtue of containing many 'places' [*Plätze*]*—*Heidegger's umbrella term for both locations and spaces*—*'variously near or far from it' ('BDT', in *BW* 357 / *GA* 7: 157), they more importantly refer to an event wherein the elements of the fourfold interact. So when Heidegger says the bridge accomplishes the literal gathering of the fourfold by making a site for it, he means that, as a location, it brings other locations and spaces around it into one unified domain, such that the elements of the fourfold interrelate. In his words, the bridge, as a location, allows 'the simple onefold of earth and sky, of divinities and mortals, to enter into a site by arranging the site into spaces,' i.e. into that which have been made room for, have been freed ('BDT', in *BW* 360 and 356 / *GA* 7: 160 and 156).

---

<sup>104</sup> Kant's position was that 'Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought *in it*. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations' (Kant 1781/2: 158 and 175 [A24-5/B39-40]; emphasis original). Unlike those to whom Kant is responding, Heidegger would not see his 'locations' and 'spaces' as 'parts' or 'components' of a larger whole and would not be interested in any 'general concept' that 'rests merely on limitations' since he is explicitly avoiding a philosophy of space based not just on limitations but even on position. Nevertheless, his point is precisely that locations and spaces and our experience of them do indeed 'as it were precede the single all-encompassing space', i.e. that the latter is only conceptualised on the basis of the former.

As previously intimated, Heidegger says that given the being of humans—*Dasein*—a location can gather the fourfold in this way for them without their being physically nearby. This happens through a phenomenon he calls ‘standing through [*durchsteht*]’ spaces (‘BDT’, in *BW* 358 / *GA* 7:159). His discussion of the Heidelberg bridge, for example, has us remain in our immediate surroundings while standing through the spaces between the location we are in—the one in which we are reading Heidegger’s essay—and another, the bridge, by means of ‘thinking toward [the latter] location’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 358 / *GA* 7:159). Such meditation, he says

is not a mere experience inside the persons present here; rather, it belongs to the essence of our thinking *of* that bridge that *in itself* thinking stands through (*durchsteht*), the distance to that location [*Ort*]. [...] To say that mortals *are* is to say that *in dwelling* they stand through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations [*Orten*]. And only because mortals stand through [*durchstehen*] spaces by their very essence are they able to go through [*durchgehen*] spaces’. [‘BDT’, in *BW* 358-9 / *GA* 7:159; emphasis original, translation altered]

The language here is dense, but Heidegger’s familiar notion of ‘Being-in-the-world’ will clarify the point. As discussed in previous chapters, he says humans are the only beings who dwell or have ‘worlds’, that is, the only ones who unite and organise existence into meaningful wholes (see *BT* 79-80 / *GA* 2: 73 and ‘LH’, in *BW* 259-60 / *GA* 9: 358 for the connection between dwelling and ‘Being-in-the-world’). One of the ways we do this is by erecting and maintaining locations for the express purpose of spending our womb-to-tomb years. This enables us to ‘stand through’ the spaces between one location and another because we are always already ‘standing’ in both locations by virtue of always already standing in a ‘world’ that includes both. Thus, when we ‘think toward’

the second location, our movement ‘through’ them is a ‘standing through’ rather than a ‘moving through’ or a ‘going through’.

In summary, then, built things can only gather the fourfold into a site provided by a location because humans build locations to begin with or, more precisely, because they relate to the world as a unity of locations and spaces to be in, i.e. because they dwell. We experience ourselves as being in a location we have set up, say, in our home, or as being in a space between such a location and another, say, in the yard between our home and that of a neighbour. This spatial self-experience is necessary for being able to ‘stand through’ the spaces between locations, meaning we can only ‘think toward’ and, thus, in a sense, be ‘in’ our neighbour’s house while physically inhabiting our own because we are the type of being whose experience is, in essence, explicitly spatial in the Heideggerian sense of being indexed to locations and spaces.

Heidegger says all this is true on what we might call a microlevel as well. It is not just that I can be in one building, ‘thinking toward’ another by virtue of ‘standing through’ the region between them. I am also in some particular ‘spot’ [*Stelle*] in my building, standing through the space between it and another spot a few metres away. Heidegger uses the example of a door:

we always go through [*durchgehen*] spaces in such a way that we already sustain [*ausstehen*] them by staying [*aufhalten*] constantly with near and remote locations [*Orten*] and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, already standing through [*durchstehend*] the space of the room [*Raum*], and only thus can I go through [*durchgehen*] it. [‘BDT’, in *BW 359 / GA 7: 159*; translation altered]

Thus, in addition to facilitating a standing through spaces between locations, our dwelling with its stay among things allows us to stand through the region

between the spot we physically inhabit and some 'thing', like a door, in a different spot within the same location. In our 'thinking toward' this thing, it acts as a built thing, setting up what I will call a micro-location.

It is in connection to Heidegger's understanding of space on this micro level that his notion of the 'built thing' relates to clothing. Recall Lotze's discussion of those times we seem to be touching a surface when something we are wearing or holding is touching it. In such moments, the distinction between ourselves and what we wear or hold loses its rough edge; the latter almost seem part of us. While Lotze's treatment is intriguing and provides a road into our inquiry, it offers no explanation of why the phenomenon occurs, of what it is about our relationship to things in general and clothing in particular that allows us to experience them as melding into ourselves. But given Heidegger's notions of 'dwelling', the 'built thing', and 'standing through', we can say more.

First, the reason we are even capable of experiencing the boundary between clothing and self as blurred is that we are human; we are those beings who are always already dwelling, who are always already experiencing existence as locations or micro-locations and spaces to be in on our journey toward death. Experiencing the blurring of the boundary between clothing and self requires being able to experience boundaries and experiencing boundaries requires experiencing the world as a world, as a unity of relations between people and growing and made things and between those things.

Second, we can say that what is happening in this blurring is that we are 'standing through' the space between ourselves and our clothes, though in a different way than we would be 'standing through' in a meditative encounter with the Heidelberg bridge. We do not, that is, 'think toward' a location, as we

do when we have a physically distant built thing in mind. Rather, we ‘feel toward’ or ‘wear toward’ a thing—in this case, a cloth thing, a garment—that acts as a micro-location. So, for example, I am not just in my friend’s flat in Barcelona, a location; I am also in my cotton university t-shirt, a micro-location within that location. I have already discussed the part of Heidegger’s analysis that suggests I could be sitting in this friend’s flat and ‘thinking toward’ the Sagrada Familia (though I could also just go down there) in such a way that I could be nearer to it, more in tune with its essence, than the other tourists currently in front of it but viewing it through their iPads. In the same way, I am also sitting in a particular spot in the flat, i.e. on this chair and in this t-shirt, a micro-location within a micro-location within a location, and I could be ‘wearing toward’ or ‘feeling toward’ the shirt, such that if somebody brushed it, I might say they were brushing me and such that if I spilt something on it, I would be just as likely to yell, ‘Do you have a towel? I have spilt something on myself!’ as to say I had spilt something on my shirt. As a micro-location, my t-shirt helps articulate the micro-space within my friend’s flat, putting a space between itself and ‘me’ more traditionally understood, i.e. my body, and encourages me to ‘stand through’ that micro-space in my ‘feeling toward’ or ‘wearing toward’ the shirt.

Fine, we may say; this demonstrates that clothes can act as built things in carving up space and setting up micro-locations, but the essence of a built thing is that it does all this in order to make a site for the fourfold, in order to gather the fourfold by bringing its elements into proximity with one another. How do clothes accomplish this?

The raincoat provides us an example. Like the bridge, it does not try to avoid the rain or prevent the sky and earth from interacting. Instead, it gathers the sky and earth by receiving the rain into its folds and ushering the water safely on its way to the earth through those channels. Yet the raincoat also gathers mortals because, in wearing (and perhaps making<sup>105</sup>) the waterproof garment, mortals are participating in the ‘marriage of sky and earth’ that would happily go on without them. Through this participation, the raincoat makes the flowing of the sky’s rain onto the earth’s ground an event. Moreover, the raincoat gathers mortals together with each other through the uniformity they share in their stand and stay with the rain: On a dry London day, there may be no two outfits alike in Trafalgar Square, but when it is raining, people all around the fountains alike embody their response to the sky; they are all participating in the event together through what they are wearing. Finally, the coat gathers the divinities in that this entire rain dance happens in their presence and in the midst of the elements they control, in much the same way that the ‘outpouring’ [*Guß*] or sharing of wine in Heidegger’s jug example ‘is the libation poured out [*gespendete Trank*] for the immortal gods’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 170 / *GA* 7: 174). All of this amounts to the fourfold ‘fouring’ (‘Th’, in *PLT* 178 / *GA* 7: 181) or being gathered.

In this way, Heidegger’s reflection on buildings is applicable to clothes. We walk around and dwell in a kind of mobile architecture. This parallels Eric Gill’s insight from chapter two. In his words, ‘clothes are not the rags with

---

<sup>105</sup> Heidegger would probably be pessimistic about the extent to which the manufacturing process plays a role in any gathering the raincoat might do since the former is only a derivative making, i.e. one that operates and monitors a machine that produces the raincoat, separate from any *technē* that would otherwise envision an end for its constituents and guide them toward that in *poiēsis*.

which man covers his filthiness, but the habit in which he walks with his Master' (C 185) and humanity 'needs a church and a town-hall [and therefore the garments to which Gill likens these] to *be in*' (C 99-100; emphasis original). The problem with Gill's account is that it does not explain just what it means to 'be' in such structures and garments, nor does it explain why humans and not other beings need these structures and habits in which to be and walk with their master. While Gill is clear that humans and not other beings are such that they put on clothes, that 'man is, by nature, a clothed animal' (C 16), the question is: why?

Heidegger, in contrast, provides us with these ontological details. First, on his account, 'being' in clothes means dwelling in them and, as I delineated in chapter three, to dwell is, most fundamentally, to build and amounts to 'remain[ing] at peace within the free [...] that safeguards [or preserves] each thing in its essence' ('BDT', in *BW* 351 / *GA* 7: 151). In other words, dwelling is constructing and living in buildings in such a way as to give the various elements of the fourfold a site to 'be what they are' in each other's proximity. Being or dwelling in clothes thus simply means making and wearing garments that likewise accomplish this. I have suggested the raincoat as one such piece of attire. Second, Heidegger's account tells us why humans and not other beings put on clothes and that is because humans and not other beings are spatial in Heidegger's sense; they alone experience existence in terms of locations or micro-locations and spaces.

## The Work of Art

Much ado has been made about whether fashion in the sense of the enterprise governing the catwalk qualifies as an art form and whether any given ensemble could qualify as a work of art.<sup>106</sup> For my purposes, this debate is only germane in the sense that, in Heidegger's estimation, the work of art is a particular type of 'thing' and is thus capable of facilitating dwelling. The question, then, is: just how does Heidegger conceive of the artwork and might it, so understood, share certain essential features with some articles of clothing?

In 'The Origin of the Work of Art', Heidegger says 'the work-being of the work', i.e. what makes an artwork an artwork, lies in 'two essential features': It both 'opens/sets up [*eröffnet/aufstellt*] a world' and 'sets forth [*herstellt*] the earth' ('OWA', in *BW* 169-175 / *GA* 5: 29-36). More specifically, Heidegger says the artwork's essence lies in the 'strife' [*Streit*] or 'counterplay' [*Widerspiel*] into which world and earth are brought by this opening/setting up and setting forth ('OWA', in *BW* 174-5 / *GA* 5: 35-6). This is a conceptually fertile minefield that offers us plenty of opportunity to lose our way so I will detail it carefully, taking each aspect of Heidegger's formulation—i.e. 'opening/setting up a world', 'setting forth the earth', and the 'strife' or 'counterplay' between them—in turn.

I have touched on Heidegger's notion of 'world' already, but one specific formulation of it in the 'Origin' helps illustrate what he means in saying the artwork 'opens/sets up a world':

It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline

---

<sup>106</sup> For just a few of the scholarly articles on the subject, see Weissman 1967; Kim 1998; and Miller 2007. For a professional take, consult Norell et. al. 1967, which interviews several prominent fashion designers on the question. Finally, for more popular approaches, see Rhodes and Rawsthorn 2003 and Blechman 2013.

acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people' ['OWA', in *BW* 167 / *GA* 5: 27-8].

Here, Heidegger says that what he intends by the term 'world' is the 'expanse'—or 'open region [*Offene*]', as he sometimes calls it (see 'ET', in *PM* 141-6 / *GA* 9: 184-90; 'LH', in *BW* 238, 252, 254, 256, and 258 / *GA* 9: 334, 350, 352, 354, 356; 'OWA', in *BW* 170-4, 180, 185-91, 194-9, and 210 / *GA* 5: 31-5, 42, 48-53, 57-62; 'EPTT', in *BW* 442 / *GA* 14: 81)—of 'paths and relations' that situate human being's entailments: being born, dying, fortune and hardship, and overcoming or buckling beneath such hardship.

In discussing one of van Gogh's shoe paintings, Heidegger describes this 'world' or expanse of relations as it looks in the case of a 'peasant woman':

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the *earth*, and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself. ['OWA', in *BW* 159-60 / *GA* 5: 19; emphases original]

This peasant woman's 'world', like any other, is an expanse or 'unity of those paths and relations' that situate human existence and the phenomena that accompany it: There is 'birth' (the 'childbed') and 'death' ('the surrounding menace of death'), there is 'disaster' (the 'furrows of the field swept by a raw wind', 'the loneliness of the field-path', and the lack of 'certainty of bread') and 'blessing' (the 'quiet gift of the ripening grain' and the worker's 'having once

more withstood want'), and, then, in response to this disaster and blessing, there is 'endurance' ('uncomplaining worry', 'trembling', and 'shivering') and 'victory' ('wordless joy'). For Heidegger, what makes van Gogh's painting an artwork is that it opens/sets up the expanse of paths and relations where these events happen; it invites us to see the 'world' as a [particular] world, the world of a peasant woman, just as a Greek temple invites us to see the world as the world of a Greek god or gods. As Heidegger puts it in one place, 'In the nearness of the work, we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be' ('OWA', in *BW* 161 / *GA* 5: 21). This parallels his notion of 'standing through' that we encountered in the last section and therefore invites similar questions about how such an experience differs from the technologically-or-otherwise-induced fantasy he would seemingly have to disdain. I shall attend to this matter momentarily but, for now, simply note that part of Heidegger's understanding of what makes artworks what they are is that they give us an opportunity to see the world reveal itself as organised differently than usual. His terminology for this is that the work has 'opened/set up a world'.

Similarly, Heidegger elucidates how an artwork, as an artwork, 'sets forth the earth' by contrasting the work with what he calls 'equipment' [*Zeug*]:

In fabricating equipment—e.g. an axe—stone is used [*gebraucht*], and used up [*verbraucht*]. It disappears into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists vanishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By contrast the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the open region of the work's world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing, the word to say. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and lustre of metal, into the brightening and darkening of colour, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word.

That into which the work sets itself back [*sich zurückstellt*] and which it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself we called the earth. ['OWA', in *BW* 171 / *GA* 5: 32]

When we use an axe, it does not invite us to meditate on the wood and stone or metal of which it is made; rather, these constituents 'vanish'. The less we focus on the axe in such a way as to think about what constitutes it, the better it has done its job (and the safer we are). As Heidegger says in reference to the shoes in van Gogh's painting, 'The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them' ('OWA', in *BW* 159 / *GA* 5: 18). For Heidegger, the essence of equipment is such that it eludes our reflection; it is most what it is when we do not think about it or its constituents and simply use it.

This is not the case with works of art. When we interact with an artwork as an artwork, we revel in, for example, the colours and lights and darks of a painting's paint and the fact that lumps of colour can so capture our imagination. Similarly, we revel in the perfect expression a poet has used to capture what we have always felt but never been able to describe and in the seemingly impenetrable stone that has somehow become Michelangelo's appropriation of a human being. Such works invite us to take note of their pigments, words, stone, and so on through the conspicuous role these constituents play in the works' showing us other worlds—or, more accurately, diverting us from the world as we normally see it to the world as differently organised. In Heidegger's terminology, this invitation to take note of the work's constituents amounts to 'setting forth the earth'.

The ‘earth’ set forth is not just the paint or stone, etc. of the work, however, but the deeper phenomenon that includes such constituents. While Heidegger scholars debate the exact character of the ‘earth’ as described in the ‘Origin’ and how that differs from the ‘earth’ as described in ‘The Thing’, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, and other late essays,<sup>107</sup> the two perspectives cohere on at least one fundamental point: Both see the earth as, in the words of the ‘Origin’, ‘that upon which man bases his dwelling [...] the sheltering agent’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 168 / *GA* 5: 28) or, in those of a later essay, as that which the soul seeks ‘so that she may poetically build and dwell upon it’ (‘LP’, in *OWL* 163 / *GA* 12: 37). It is the foundation upon which we dwell, in Caputo’s words, ‘the support of our step, the source of our nourishment, and the material womb to which we return at death’ (Caputo 1993: 182). The deeper idea behind Heidegger’s phrase ‘setting forth the earth’, then, is that when the artwork ‘opens/sets up a world’, it does so by putting before us in conspicuousness the foundation for everything of which the works’ constituents are part.

Since the constituents do not exhaust the essence of this foundation, they are not the only phenomenon in which the work sets forth that foundation. The work might, for example, accomplish this by evoking other parts of the earth—soil, trees, etc.—through the work’s depiction. In reference to the shoes of the

---

<sup>107</sup> See, for example, Joseph J. Kockelmans’ argument that that it is ‘extremely difficult to derive one homogeneous conception of earth from’ Heidegger’s various essays and that there are ‘two distinct, but related concerns as far as earth is concerned’ (Kockelmans 1985: 151). Karsten Harries responds to this comment with general agreement that the ‘Origin’s’ understanding of the earth is in tension with the later understanding, but stresses that ‘what is to be thought remains the same’ (Harries 2009: 123 n. 13). Derrida goes further: ‘there is no chance of understanding anything in these pages on “the famous picture [i.e. the van Gogh shoe painting from the ‘Origin’]”, no chance of making the slightest objection that could be pertinently measured against them, unless you follow, at least in principle, Heidegger’s trajectory for thinking the earth, the world and the four-part (*Geviert*), the ring (*Ring*), and the circuit (*Gering*), otherwise [than nature is conceived in the philosophical tradition]’ (Derrida 1978: 352; emphasis original). In other words, we cannot even make sense out of what Heidegger says about ‘earth’ in the ‘Origin’ unless we understand what he says about it in the later essays in a particular way.

van Gogh painting, Heidegger says, ‘On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 159 / *GA* 5: 19). In addition to opening/setting up the world, what we behold on van Gogh’s canvas also sets forth the earth through the painting’s depiction of the leather that goes into the shoes, the drops of water that rest on their uppers, and the mud that is caked on their sides. Similarly, the work further sets forth the earth in other aspects: the fields whence the mud comes, the ‘ripening grain’ in those fields, the wintry weather (which is part of the sky in Heidegger’s later writings). All of these phenomena, like the work’s constituents, are parts of the earth the work sets forth for our meditation.

The movement of opening/setting up a world by setting forth the earth creates a tension:

The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure [*duldet*] anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.

The opposition of world and earth is strife. [...]

[...] Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work accomplishes this strife. The work-being of the work consists in the instigation of strife between world and earth. [‘OWA’, in *BW* 174-5 / *GA* 5: 35-6]

Unfortunately, Heidegger is not clear about what he means by this strife between ‘world’ and ‘earth’. As David Farrell Krell puts it, ‘How through the work of art we are to envisage the creative strife of world and earth is perhaps the greatest challenge in “The Origin of the Work of Art”’ (Krell 1993: 141). What we can glean from the just-displayed quote and other passages, however,

is that the ‘self-opening’ or ‘clearing’ of the world is equivalent to the artwork opening/setting up a world and that when the artwork ‘sets forth the earth’, the earth is somehow ‘concealing’ itself.<sup>108</sup> But what does this mean?

Heidegger addresses the question directly:

What is the earth that it attains to the unconcealed in just such a manner? A stone presses downward and manifests its heaviness. But while this heaviness exerts an opposing pressure upon us it denies us any penetration into it. If we attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still does not display in its fragments anything inward that has been opened up. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into the same dull pressure and bulk of its fragments. If we try to lay hold of the stone’s heaviness in another way, by placing the stone on a balance, we merely bring the heaviness into the form of a calculated weight. This perhaps very precise determination of the stone remains a number, but the weight’s burden has escaped us. Colour shines and wants only to shine. When we analyse it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectivation [*sic*] of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will. [‘OWA’, in *BW* 172 / *GA* 5: 33]

When artworks ‘set forth the earth’ by making their constituents—paint, words, stone, tones, etc.—conspicuous, they are not setting forth something that can be securely grasped, e.g. through scientific observation and analysis. Rather, they are setting forth an entity that, as part of the ‘earth’, operates in the earthly mode of ‘concealing’ its [true] self or ‘remaining undisclosed’ by having an

---

<sup>108</sup> Heidegger is careful to point out that it is not as simple as the world being ‘self-disclosing’, ‘unconcealing’ and ‘clearing’ while the earth is ‘self-closing’ and ‘concealing’ but that each of these phenomena also has a bit of the other’s essence within it. This reflects a level of subtlety that is important but greater than needed for the purposes of this thesis. Here, nevertheless, is the relevant passage: ‘But the world is not simply the open region that corresponds to clearing, and the earth is not simply the closed region that corresponds to concealment. Rather, the world is the clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies. Every decision, however, bases itself on something not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never be a decision. The earth is not simply the closed region but rather that which rises up as self-closing’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 180 / *GA* 5: 42).

essence that cannot be scientifically delineated, e.g. burdensomeness, restfulness, supportiveness, etc.

What we have in an artwork, then, on Heidegger's understanding, is a 'strife' between the new and different glimpse of the world the artwork gives us on the one hand and the meaningful but elusive essence of the work's constituents and earth beneath them on the other. In such a strife, we experience a pull that encourages us to get swept up in the world of the work, yet, at the same time, an equally powerful force that calls us in the opposite direction, back to our world to meditate on the earth it shares with the world of the work. The latter movement in the strife provides the key to understanding how the problems attending the escapism of fantasy fail to arise with the artwork's opening/setting up a world. We may indeed be 'suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be' as a result of the work's opening/setting up a world. This phenomenon, however, is always tempered by the work's setting forth the earth, which simultaneously puts us back where 'we usually tend to be' so we may meditate on the world we inhabit with reference to the world we visit. In the successful work of art as Heidegger understands it, these two forces are always in tension or 'strife', coaxing us in opposite directions at the same time and at the prompting of the same entity, the artwork.

When we look, for example, at a great work of art like Géricault's *The Raft of the Medusa* (1818-19), which invites us to meditate on the aftermath of an 1816 shipwreck, it is clear that it opens/sets up a world, i.e. an expanse or unity of paths and relations that situate human existence and the phenomena that accompany it. There is plenty of 'death', for one. A corpse in the lower right hand corner slides off the raft, just one of several littering the foreground, and

everyone else in the scene is worried about how long they are going to continue feeding on such bodies. But one of the painting's instances of death also evokes 'birth': A father who is despondent to the point of numbness props up his adult son's cadaver against his inner forearm, as if it were a lifeless piece of luggage that would otherwise fall off the raft. But because we are seeing a father and son, as opposed to brothers or friends, Géricault's masterwork summons not just the end but also the beginning of life. In meditating on the relationship between the father and the son, we can encounter the former watching the latter come into the world, even as we see him reckon with his leaving it. Thus, the painting evokes the entire human life cycle.

'Disaster and blessing' are also there in the form of the shipwreck itself and the seeming harbinger of rescue on the horizon, one of the *Medusa's* companion ships, the *Argus*. The men on the raft have already been experiencing 'disgrace' and 'decline' as they 'endure' boredom, infighting, despair, and their bodies wasting away from starvation (though Géricault's neoclassically perfect physiques do not contribute to our awareness on this point). Now, however, their hopeful faces communicate the 'wordless joy' of 'victory' over what they have endured, until, that is—in the rest of the story undepicted here—the *Argus* passes by without noticing them. More disgrace, decline, and endurance.

So the painting opens/sets up a world, the world of the shipwrecked. And we would get swept up in it, get lost in that world if it were not for one thing: The painting also sets forth the earth. We revel in its dark and moody atmosphere, effected by its rich pigments, its ochres, siennas, and Prussian blue. We want to compare it to Caravaggio's shadowy and sinister chiaroscuros.

Similarly, some areas of paint have bubbled and cracked or become indistinguishable from surrounding colours, reminding us that we are very much meditating on a part of our own world too, a piece of ageing canvas not unlike that we ourselves use to make all sorts of things, just as those in Géricault's time did. Finally, even the piece's depiction contains evidences of this time-transcendent earth that allow us to imagine ourselves shipwrecked in our own world: The raft is made of timber from trees akin to those we regularly see, it is full of people like us, and it floats on seas we still sail. So the painting does not just transport us to the world of 19th-century France, England, and their colonies; it also does something that is in 'essential strife' with or works against such unadulterated abandonment: It calls us to stay in this world by setting forth the earth that our world shares with that of the Medusa-shipwrecked.

On Heidegger's way of thinking, it is those two tasks-in-tension that makes an artwork an artwork. The work of art reveals the being of beings as a whole in the process of revealing the being of some particular entity through the twin movement of opening/setting up its world and setting forth its (and our) earth: 'Truth happens in van Gogh's painting. This does not mean that something at hand is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes [*im Offenbarwerden des Zeugseins des Schuhzeuges*] beings as a whole—world and earth in their counterplay—attain to unconcealment' ('OWA', in *BW* 181 / *GA* 5: 43). Heidegger's idea is that when we meditate on a van Gogh shoe painting, its shoes are revealed in their being, i.e. as equipment, as that which is most what it is when it is reliably useful and therefore goes unnoticed as such. This is because meditating on the painting

involves meditating on its shoes and meditating on its shoes involves meditating on their place in the larger unity of relations, i.e. the 'world' of the shoes and the peasant woman who wears them, as well as on how that unity interacts with the earth. Since this kind of meditation on the world and earth is the same thing as thinking about 'beings as a whole', Heidegger concludes that meditation on the shoes just is meditation on beings as a whole and, therefore, that, as he puts it, in revealing the 'equipmental being of the shoes', the artwork reveals 'beings as a whole'.

Before moving on to the question of whether we could imagine clothing simultaneously accomplishing the artwork's twin-tasks-in-tension of opening/setting up a world and setting forth the earth, it will be interesting—and further illustrative of what I mean by simultaneously accomplishing these tasks—to observe that even many entities widely regarded as works of art emphasise one side of Heidegger's tension and de-emphasise—or, in some cases, entirely obliterate—the other. Many surrealist paintings, for example, open/set up strange new worlds for us but 'set forth' only a thin layer of pigment, making it possible to forget the work has been made with earthly constituents. Similarly, their depictions so heavily distort the earth of our world that, if we do not get swept up in the world they set up, it is not because the work also invites us to meditate on the earth the two worlds share but precisely because it does not: We cannot relate. In connection with this point, think of Dalí's *The Enigma of My Desire* (1929) with its giant, honeycomb-like rock formation that gradually morphs into swirly shapes and, well, what? A cartoonish face in profile? A rock Dalí stumbled upon in Catalonia? Both? Finally, in the background behind the main rock formation is another one made up of things swirled together: a hand,

knife, grasshopper, fish, Chinese New Year dragon head, and some torsos embracing. The distortion of the earth is so pronounced that it is hard to connect with the painting. World is emphasised, earth de-emphasised.

Conversely, in Jackson Pollock's 'number' paintings—e.g. *No. 5* (1948), *Number 22* (1949), and *Number 31* (1950)—the earth is extremely pronounced; lumps of paint are everywhere and we cannot help but focus on that fact, cannot help but think about what he has done with paint. This firmly roots us in our world, thinking about the earth, but the painting has not invited us to meditate on a new or different world, a new or different organisation of the paths and relations that situate human existence. A similar point can be made about Mark Rothko's *Brown and Black in Reds* (1957) or any of the various compositions of *Black on Maroon* (from 1958 and 1959) and *Red on Maroon* (all from 1959). In such works, Rothko gives us plenty of opportunity to meditate on paint and colour and what they can do and to bury ourselves in our psyches or connect with our emotions, but all of this is 'of this world', so to speak. He is not calling us out of the framework we normally inhabit; he is inviting us deeper into it.

The phenomenon of emphasising earth and de-emphasising world is not, however, exclusive to Abstract Expressionism, for even all traditional portraiture is not equal. Purely in terms of 'setting forth' a work's constituents—at least in the one sense of being 'painterly' or emphasising that a painting is made of paint—artists such as Rembrandt, Renoir, van Gogh, and Francis Bacon have more earth than Italian Renaissance painters like Botticelli and Michelangelo or Neoclassicists like David and Ingres. Then, in terms of depiction, a casual stroll through the National Portrait Gallery in London will reveal that, however technically masterful, some portraits simply fail to

accomplish what artists sometimes refer to as ‘capturing the essence’ of the sitter, i.e. as almost giving us the sense that we have met the person by encountering the painting. In Heideggerian terms, this would be to bring the being of the sitter (his or her *Dasein*) near and the failure to do so lies in the failure to open up that person’s world. The artwork, that is, has not succeeded in sweeping us up into the world of the sitter. Instead, we remain firmly rooted in our own, focused on the fact that we are viewing a painting as a result of the work’s success in setting forth the earth.

Clothes, like artworks, can emphasise either world over earth or earth over world. On the one hand, that is, they can major on drawing us into a new way of organising existence and minor on anchoring us in the supportive, nourishing, reabsorbing, and grounding source this new understanding shares with our current organisation. Or, conversely, they can major on the anchoring and minor on the drawing-in. With this pronouncement, however, we run into a problem. Heidegger’s analysis of van Gogh’s painting identifies the being of peasant shoes—and thereby probably most garments—as that of ‘equipment’, which is most fully what it is when someone uses it without reflecting on it or anything about it. But when an artwork opens/sets up a world and sets forth the earth, it is doing something that, as part of its essence, invites—or at least allows—us to think about it.

As equipment, then, a pair of shoes identical to that which van Gogh painted would not, in functioning according to its essence, open/set up a world or set forth the earth, much less emphasise one of these tasks over the other. Rather, being most fully what it is, such a pair of shoes would allow us to ‘trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw

wind' ('OWA', in *BW* 159 / *GA* 5:19) and do the rest of a farm peasant's work without reflecting on this footwear or understanding its essence. In Heidegger's words,

The equipmental quality of equipment was discovered. But how? Not by a description and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present [*wirklich vorliegenden*]; not by a report about the process of making shoes; and also not by the observation of the actual use of shoes occurring here and there; but only by bringing ourselves before van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke. ('OWA', in *BW* 161 / *GA* 5:20-1)

In contrast to 'actually present' footwear, the only reason van Gogh's painted shoes accomplish the twin movement is that they exist within a work of art, which, unlike actual equipment, invites meditation as a feature of its being. Similarly, theatrical costumes only draw us into a new way of organising existence by virtue of their place within an artwork, i.e. a play, musical, or opera, and this because part of the essence of such dramatic works, like that of all works of art, is to do just that, to encourage us to meditate on a new world.

On some level, we cannot get around this problem. All clothes share in the being of equipment and so whether a given garment is peasant shoes, a t-shirt, a spacesuit, a Superman costume, or a dinner jacket with tails, it is going to encourage us to forget we are wearing it and everything else about it for most of the time we have it on. But the insights from chapter one, particularly those of Adam and Galinsky, demonstrate that the relationship we have with clothes is integral to our being in counterintuitive ways, even and especially when we have forgotten we are wearing them and, thus, are not thinking about them. Consequently, if we are wearing a garment that, like any artwork on Heidegger's terms, opens/sets up a world and sets for the earth and we do not know it because its equipmental character has caused these events to 'vanish' in the

garment's usefulness/reliability, its twin-movement-accomplishing character as an artwork might still be impacting us on a deeper, unreflective level. So it might not matter that all clothes share in the being of equipment, as long as we can show that at least some clothes also share in the being of artworks by virtue of opening/setting up a world and setting forth the earth. It thus becomes important to describe the twin movement in a garment or ensemble we would normally consider to be merely functional or, at most, functional and ornamental, a 'decorated shed'.<sup>109</sup>

For such an enterprise, I offer the attire of Odette Swann from the second volume of Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time*. At one point, the narrator and protagonist of the novel contemplates Odette's wardrobe, observing that:

Mme Swann had managed to retain a vestige of some of [the former fashions], amid the others which had replaced them. [...] Before very long, young men, trying to define her ways of dressing, would be saying to each other, 'Mme Swann is a real period-piece, you know!' In her ways of dressing, as in a fine written style which embraces different forms of expression and is enriched by a concealed tradition, these semi-remembrances [...] filled the actual forms of what she did wear with a constant unformed suggestion of older ones, which no real seamstress or milliner could have contrived, but which hung about her all the time, surrounding her with something noble—possibly because the very uselessness of these trappings made them appear designed for more than utilitarian purpose, perhaps because of the remnant they preserved of former times, or even because of a kind of individuality in dress, peculiar to herself, which gave to what she wore, however dissimilar her ensembles, a sort of family resemblance. One could sense that, for her, dressing was not just a matter of comfort or adornment of the body:

---

<sup>109</sup> See Karsten Harries' use of this term from architectural theory in his similar effort to go beyond understanding buildings as 'essentially functional' structures 'with an added aesthetic component' (Harries 2009: 4). A good summary of his endeavour appears on pp. 4/6, which outline a richer approach to architecture that focuses on its 'task to help articulate a common *ethos*' where *ethos* 'names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling' (Harries 2009: 4). This parallels Heidegger's concern that in searching for a 'thingly substructure in the work, we have unwittingly taken the work as equipment, to which we then also ascribe a superstructure supposed to contain its artistic quality. But the work is not a piece of equipment that is fitted out in addition with an aesthetic value that adheres to it. The work is no more anything of the kind than the bare thing is a piece of equipment that merely lacks the specific equipmental characteristics of usefulness and being made' ('OWA', in *BW* 164 / *GA* 5: 24).

whatever she wore encompassed her like the delicate and etherealised epitome of a civilisation. [Proust 1919: 194-6]

In the final sentence of this passage, the narrator says Odette's clothes are 'not just a matter of comfort', i.e., they are not just functional attire or, in Heidegger's language, pieces of equipment; they serve, as Proust's narrator says, 'more than utilitarian purpose'. Moreover, they are not just for 'adornment of the body' or what Heidegger would call 'aesthetic' (see *N1* 77ff. / *GA* 6.1: 74ff.; 'OWA', in *BW* 204 / *GA* 5: 67; and *HHI* 87-8 / *GA* 53: 108-9). And while the narrator does not continue into greater levels of subtlety, it is clear from the rest of the sentence that they are also not merely a conglomeration of functional and ornamental, not aesthetic equipment or 'decorated sheds'. Their essence is rather much richer in that they evoke a 'delicate and etherealised epitome of a civilisation'; they open/set up a 'world'.

This world has the same fundamental character as Heidegger's 'world of the peasant': Odette's clothes open/set up the world of her past, a world more proper to those whose *Dasein* or 'Being-in-the-world' has run its course and, thus, whose understanding of the world or what I have called 'way of organising existence' amounts to a foreign totality that confronts us, causing us to make assertions such as 'Mme Swann is a real period-piece, you know!' This matches Heidegger's understanding of the world as an 'expanse' or 'unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being'. When Odette steps out of the house, her clothes invite us to meditate on existence organised differently, existence organised according to Odette's earlier years. Her attire opens/sets up this 'world'.

This is not all her clothes accomplish, however, for they also set forth the earth:

in accordance with her pious expertise in the rites and liturgies of such things, Mme Swann's ways of dressing were linked to the season and the time of day by a bond that was necessary and unique; the flowers on her soft straw hat and the little bows on her frock seemed a more natural product of May than any flowers cultivated in beds or growing wild in the woods; and to witness the thrilling onset of the new season, I needed to lift my eyes no higher than Mme Swann's sunshade, opened now and stretched above me like a nearer, more temperate sky, full of its constantly changing blue. Though subordinate to none, these rites were honour-bound, as was consequently Mme Swann herself, to defer to the morning, the springtime, and the sunshine, none of which I ever thought seemed flattered enough that such an elegant woman should make a point of respecting them, of choosing for their pleasure a frock in a brighter or lighter material. [Proust 1919: 213]

Like the ground-up flowers and other earthy constituents old masters mixed with linseed oil to produce the pigments their paintings set forth as part of setting forth the earth, the flowers on Odette's straw hat—not to mention the straw itself—are part of the earth her ensemble sets forth. Such constituents of her artwork so strongly evoke the earth shared by our world and the world of her past that these flowers '[seem] a more natural product of May than any flowers cultivated in beds or growing wild in the woods'.

The ingredients for characterising this example of clothes as a work of art on Heidegger's terms are thus in place: Odette's attire both opens/sets up a world and sets forth the earth. That it accomplishes both of these tasks so prominently as to avoid emphasising either world over earth or earth over world is apparent in the young men experiencing her as a period piece and the narrator getting lost in meditating on the constituents. The world and earth are properly in strife. In so accomplishing the twin tasks-in-tension, then, Odette's clothes offer us a model for characterising a garment or unity of garments as an

artwork on Heidegger's terms, as a 'thing' that operates according to the essentially thingly mode of facilitating dwelling by opening/setting up a world and setting forth the earth.

There is more to say about how Odette's clothes facilitate dwelling, for these passages from Proust's narrator also evoke Heidegger's language of things gathering the fourfold. The flowers 'set forth' in the twin-movement of the ensemble are similarly indicative of its gathering the 'earth'. In reference to its gathering of the sky, our second Proust passage says 'Mme Swann's ways of dressing were linked to the season and the time of day [...] these rites were honour-bound, as was consequently Mme Swann herself, to defer to the morning, the springtime, and the sunshine, none of which I ever thought seemed flattered enough that such an elegant woman should make a point of respecting them'. Such deference to the sky is indicative of what Heidegger says about humans who succeed at dwelling: 'They leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152). Odette selects darker and/or heavier fabrics for nighttime and winter, switching to 'a frock in a brighter or lighter material' for the pleasure of 'the morning, the springtime, and the sunshine'. In Heidegger's vocabulary, she leaves 'to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency' and, to adapt his other phrase, she does not turn winter into summer or summer into winter. Such dwelling happens in clothes that gather the sky.

The passages from Proust also demonstrate that Odette's attire gathers mortals. Elsewhere, the narrator says:

It was not just this suite of retainers, surrounding her and seeming not to notice passers-by, that suggested Mme Swann's indoor life: by reason of the lateness of her advent in the avenue, she brought to mind the house in which she had spent long morning hours, where she would soon have to return for lunch; the proximity of it was in the calm and leisured simplicity of her manner, as though she was strolling down her own garden path; the cool subdued light of its interior seemed to hang about her as she passed. [Proust 1919: 213]

Here, Proust's narrator speaks of Odette's 'suite of retainers', i.e. the gentlemen who escort her from place to place, as well as her 'lateness' and 'calm and leisured simplicity' bringing us into 'proximity'—or, as Heidegger would say, 'nearness [*Nähe*]' (see 'Th', in *PLT* 163-4 / *GA* 7: 167-8)—with what we might call her 'domestic world': her 'indoor life', as the narrator says, lived inside her house and on her garden path. These phenomena of her manner 'gather' us mortals in a way that parallels what her clothing accomplishes vis-à-vis the world of her past. By inviting us to get swept up in this world, Odette's ensemble brings us into proximity with her as well as those from her early life, those from the 'period' to which her clothes hearken back in her being a 'period-piece'. The ensemble thus gathers mortals, confronting us with the lives of other humans in their totality, which provokes us to reckon with the significance their death has for ours and for our life.

Finally, the reflection of Proust's narrator shows that Odette's attire gathers the divinities. The second of the above passages calls her sartorial approach to the seasons a 'pious expertise in the rites and liturgies' thereof. Even more pronounced in this regard are the narrator's comments towards the end of his discussion:

As we strolled, I realised that it was for her own sake that she observed these standards in dress, as though they were tenets of a superior form of worship, which she merely served as a high priestess; for if she felt too warm, if she unbuttoned or even took off and asked me to carry the

jacket that she had originally meant to keep buttoned, I discovered in the blouse she wore under it a host of details of handiwork which might well have never been noticed, after the manner of those orchestral parts which the composer has worked with exquisite care, although no ears among the audience will ever hear them. [Proust 1919: 214]

Odette's principled dressing goes deeper than an interest in personal style, even the type that is philosophically robust and replete with historical resonances. She selects her garments not so much with an eye to communicating something to others but 'for her own sake', as an attentive composer incorporates minor orchestral parts that no one will hear. She does this with a comportment the narrator cannot explain except with reference to religious locutions like 'pious', 'rites', 'liturgies', 'worship', and 'high priestess'. In other words, Odette's sartorial being-in-the-world borders on the religious. The difficulty of pinning down what exactly one is relating to in such orientation is precisely what motivated Heidegger to borrow the vocabulary of the divinities from Hölderlin in the first place.<sup>110</sup> Proust's narrator does not say that Odette 'worships' through dressing or that she is a 'high priestess' but that it is 'as though' these things were true. In Heidegger's terms, however, the Judaeo-Christian specificity of this vocabulary is less important than the more general phenomenon it is trying to signal and describe. In attempting to capture the character of Odette's approach to clothes in this way, Proust's narrator asks us to consider the phenomenological overlap between everyday dressing and

---

<sup>110</sup> While scholarship enjoys nothing like a consensus on the matter, several commentators (e.g. Kockelmans 1984: 94; Caldwell 2009: 276; and Ziarek 2011: 24) have noted that Heidegger, in one way or another, derived his understanding of the fourfold from Hölderlin. Graham Harman contests this view, calling it a 'widespread myth' (Harman 2009: 301 n. 3), yet without providing any argumentation as to why we should jettison it. Young, in contrast, suggests good, if not entirely unproblematic, reason for adopting the position: 'Heidegger disclaims originality with respect to the fourfold. Though not named as such, it is, nonetheless, he says, fully present in Hölderlin ['HEH', in *EHP* 195 / *GA* 4: 170]. This implies that the elements of the fourfold are taken from Hölderlin, that its gods, in particular, are identical with Hölderlin's gods' (Young 2002: 96 n. 8).

religious practice, that is, the potential of the former to share in the felt and unfelt significance we normally reserve for the latter. In the vaguer Hölderlinian-Heideggerian parlance, everyday clothes like those of Odette can instantiate our 'striving to surmount all that is common and unsound in [us] in order to bring [ourselves] before the haleness of the divinities' ('BDT', in *BW* 355 / *GA* 7: 155). That is, they can 'gather' those divinities.

But this final passage from Proust's narrator hints at another crucial point. We have primarily been demonstrating that the world-opening/setting-up, earth-setting-forth, and fourfold-gathering of Odette's attire happens for the narrator, us, and anyone else who might be in her presence. More importantly, however, these events are also happening for Odette herself, which is why the narrator can say she observes her standards of dress 'for her own sake'. Though Odette's clothes invite bystanders into the 'strife' between the world of her past and the earth it shares with their own world, such that they feel a resonance with both, the garments do this even more for her. She is an inhabitant of two eras.

Then, when Odette's clothes gather the fourfold, it is not just for external participants in Odette's event. It more primarily happens for her. She walks around in communion with the unity of these elements, which her attire brings near: the 'earth' or supportive, nourishing, reabsorbing, and grounding foundation of everything; the 'sky' or matrix of cycles that shape and condition existence; the 'mortals' or people of her past and their difficult but meaningful existence; and the 'divinities' or being/presencing showing up in a religious way. Odette's outfit brings all of this near, such that it shows up at once, as one

unified phenomenon, for others but especially for her, whether she happens to be thematically cognising it in a given moment or not.

The latter point is all important. The crucial insight of Adam and Galinsky's research from chapter one is that when a piece or set of clothes has a 'symbolic meaning' and we wear it, we 'embody' that meaning. That is, as they put it, the clothes 'influence [...] the wearer's psychological processes and behavioural tendencies' in accordance with the clothes' meaning or meanings (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919). While Adam and Galinsky are careful to stress that our clothes' ability in this regard depends on their having a meaning and our wearing them, this does not mean the ability is also dependent on our moment-to-moment consciousness of the meaning. After all, if the participants in the 'lab coat' group had been thinking about the meaning of their coats during the period of 'influence' measured by the study, i.e. while the participants were taking the tests, they would not have had the high degree of focus the coats imparted and the tests measured. Their 'focus' would have been hampered by focusing on the coats. The point, then, is that the 'symbolic meaning' of our clothes—e.g. attentiveness and 'focus' in the case of the lab coats—does not need to be in the front of our mind in order to shape our 'psychological processes' and 'behavioural tendencies' and thus our self-experience.

Applying this insight to the twin-movement-accomplishing and fourfold-gathering character of Odette's attire, however, requires shifting from the way Adam and Galinsky speak about the 'meaning' and 'influence' of garments. Recall that Heidegger rejects a 'symbolic' understanding of the bridge's gathering of mortals and the 'divinities': The bridge is not a symbol of the

human journey towards death but an instantiation and slice of it. Similarly, from a Heideggerian standpoint, Odette's clothes do not symbolically open/set up a world and set forth the earth or symbolically gather the earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. Rather, her garments' do these things as a part of their essence; they 'presence' or 'show up' in this way precisely in being what they are. To use Heidegger's language from chapter three, Odette makes them with that *paradeigma* in mind. The shift we have to make in thinking about her clothes, then, is to recognise that they are not just functional garments that happen to have the 'symbolic meaning' of accomplishing the twin movement and gathering the fourfold in the way that Adam and Galinsky imply that lab coats are functional garments that happen to have the symbolic meaning of being what 'focused' people wear. Rather, her ensembles actually are twin-movement-accomplishers and fourfold-gatherers.

But Adam and Galinsky's research remains decisive for this inquiry because even though the twin-movement-accomplishing and fourfold-gathering character of Odette's attire is not a 'symbolic meaning', it is still a 'meaning'; it is what we might call 'essential meaning'. While Adam and Galinsky do not make Heidegger's distinction between symbolic meaning and what I am calling essential meaning, there is nothing in their findings that would suggest we disqualify the latter as a kind of thing-imbedded meaning that can shape a person's self-experience. Moreover, everything they say about the way clothing can 'influence' our 'psychological processes and behavioural tendencies' signals exactly the sort of claim Heidegger thinks 'things' have on our being.

What Adam and Galinsky's research shows for our inquiry, then, is that it does not matter whether, in a given moment, Odette explicitly meditates on the

character or ‘meaning’ of her attire or, through her clothes, consciously experiences a world and the earth in strife or the fourfold coming near. She is going to embody and exhibit the meaning inherent in her past, whether she is meditating on it or not. The narrator’s description of Odette as late and of her manner as ‘leisured simplicity’ suggests this embodied meaning might pertain to the simplicity and slower pace of her ‘lost time’ and his comments that I linked to the divinities similarly suggest it involves reverence.

### Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that we can understand certain garments as ‘made things’ in Heidegger’s sense and delineated what this entails in terms of three different examples: the handmade artefact, the ‘built thing’, and the work of art. While Heidegger might not agree that, for example, a raincoat counts as a ‘built thing’ or that any of Odette’s ensembles count as works of art, I have adduced passages from him that suggest these share the essence of the bridge and van Gogh’s shoe paintings, respectively, and therefore that my contentions here are rooted in his texts.

The significance of this analysis of certain garments as Heideggerian ‘things’ is that our letting them be what they are attunes us to the gathering of the fourfold or, if they are artworks on Heidegger’s terms, the opening/setting up of different worlds though the setting forth of the earth. This means clothes can facilitate thinking about being. Importantly for this inquiry, however, fourfold-gathering (if not twin-movement-accomplishing) garments carry out this facilitation by precipitating an event of profound theological significance:

the unified intimate proximity of—or, if we like, ‘oneness’ with—‘earth’, ‘sky’, other people, and being or presencing showing up in a religious way.

There are, of course, dangers that attend treading into theological territory with Heideggerian commitments, not the least of which is that of slipping into what Heidegger calls ‘metaphysics’. The point in such exploration, however, is that since certain garments qualify as what Heidegger calls ‘things’ and since Gill’s explicitly theological perspective makes a similar claim, clothing in general is an immanently theological phenomenon and we therefore need a theology of clothes, one that has the robustness of Heidegger and the explicitness of Gill. Drawing out the continuities as well as divergences between these two thinkers gives us an idea of how such a theology might begin to take shape. To this matter I now turn.

## Chapter 6: Clothes as Bearers of Theological Resonances

*This consciousness of having a dress-waist that is not bunched in the back, lends to woman a peace which religion cannot give. • I know a person who, when dejected, goes and dresses up in good clothes. This person is a woman. • And how much of that sustaining peace that comes to people in church may be due to their best clothes!—Lyman Chandler<sup>111</sup>*

*I know that I'm going to wear the same kind of clothing everyday of my life. Part of it has to do with: it just makes me feel good, you know; it just always feels good to put on my clothes, my uniform. Second thing is, it comes out of the sixth chapter of Ephesians: 'Put on the whole armour of God'. So every time I put my clothes on, I'm feeling good, but I've also got my armour on. Because life is a battlefield, just as it's a festival. So I have fun in the festival, but the battlefield has a lot of bows and arrows and bullets and cannons and things.—Cornel West<sup>112</sup>*

In the last three chapters, I applied Heidegger's philosophy to my question concerning the ability of clothes to facilitate attunements or comportments and argued that certain garments can be understood as 'things' in the Heideggerian sense that they 'gather the fourfold', including a phenomenon he calls the 'divinities', which, modifying Richardson, I have called 'being' or 'presencing' showing up in a religious way. Such a perspective obviously lends clothing purchase for theological reflection insofar as it shows how, on at least the Heideggerian understanding, it can bring humans and some divine phenomenon into proximity with one another.

The problem, however, is that this Heideggerian understanding bears just as much dissimilarity to pre-existing theological paradigms as it does similarity. Consequently, the import that chapter five's application of Heidegger's philosophy to the question of this thesis has for these paradigms is

---

<sup>111</sup> Chandler 1903: 176.

<sup>112</sup> West 2010.

not as obvious as it could be. For Heidegger, the dissimilarity of his thinking to what came before is precisely a virtue and the impetus for his philosophy, as he esteems the pre-existing paradigms to be entrenched in metaphysics. His aim, therefore, is to describe some of the same phenomena that interest the various theological paradigms, such as humanity's relationship to the world and humanity's experience of the 'Holy' or source of deep meaning, without similarly slipping into metaphysics, which he takes precisely to have covered up the essence of such phenomena.

Whether virtuously or not, however, Heidegger's ontology does differ from that of the theological tradition that will be taken up in this chapter. Specifically, I aim to articulate my Heideggerian analysis of why clothing facilitates attunements or comportments as an ontological foundation for and enhancement of Eric Gill's onto-sartorial claims. Gill's claims, though, are based in a neo-medieval paradigm that Heidegger's critiques of metaphysics and ontology would seem to reject. The question, then, is whether Gill's theological paradigm, and therefore his onto-sartorial claims, does, in fact, reflect metaphysics as Heidegger understands it. After addressing this question, I will pursue the final aim of this chapter and thesis by demonstrating that a Gill enhanced by Heidegger can show us how clothes might facilitate or hinder the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God.

### A Heideggerian Assessment of Eric Gill in Terms of Metaphysics

In chapter three, I demonstrated that, for Heidegger, 'metaphysics' is a history of thought that has, as a fundamental feature, the presupposition of a distinction between a sensuous realm and a nonsensuous or supersensuous

realm. In Heidegger's estimation, 'Christian faith' delineates this distinction as, respectively, 'The being that we know as "world"' and 'the supersensible, whether it is the afterlife of the soul, the limits and cause of the nature-world-whole, or the physical ground of the totality itself' (*BTr* 20-1 / *GA* 36-7: 24-5). Heidegger's suggestion is that we take a 'step back [*Schritt zurück*]' ('OTCM', in *ID* 51ff. / *GA* 11: 60ff.; *N4* 225-7 and 243-4 / *GA* 6.2: 332-5 and 353; and 'Th', in *PLT* 183 / *GA* 7: 186) from this kind of philosophy and Christianity. This entails reflecting more profoundly on the presupposed distinction between sensuous and nonsensuous realms.

It is hard to imagine a Christianity that is more than merely ethical yet not metaphysical according to the Heideggerian understanding laid out here. After all, what Christianity would lack the basic Nicene distinction of 'all things visible and invisible'? Nevertheless, in discussing Heidegger and Gill as mutually supportive, it will be helpful to show the precise way in which the latter is metaphysical so as to identify the area where the two cannot meet.

As it happens, Gill frequently draws the metaphysical distinction between sensuous and nonsensuous or supersensuous, even explicitly: 'In contradistinction to the Pantheists, who say that all is God and that the distinction of matter and spirit is an illusion, and to the Manichees, who say that not all is God, and that what is not God is evil, we affirm that matter and spirit are both real and both good' ('CA', in *AN* 292). This declaration comes from an aside in which Gill pauses to 'review [the] foundations' ('CA', in *AN* 291) of his theology. Against Manichaeism and Pantheism, Gill explicitly distinguishes sensuous and nonsensuous or, in his words, 'matter and spirit' and, further, declares both valuable.

In addition to this explicit affirmation of the metaphysical distinction, Gill makes a number of comments indicative of an ontology that distinguishes sensuous and nonsensuous or supersensuous. For example, he says, ‘The love of God is sensible in beauty’ (‘EP’, in *AN* 5). In other words, there is some phenomenon called the ‘love of God’ that is somehow insensible or nonsensuous outside the context of beauty but ‘sensible’ or sensuous within it.<sup>113</sup>

This same metaphysical distinction of ‘world’ vs. a nonsensuous or supersensuous phenomenon is present in Gill’s philosophy of education:

No longer can we think merely of *getting on* in the commercial and materialistic sense. We must now think of getting on in the sense of getting heavenwards. And in everything we learn and in everything we teach to our children or our pupils, we must bear this fact in mind. We must learn to get on in the world—not as an end in itself, but as a means to getting heavenwards. [‘EFW’, in *E* 41; emphasis original]

For Gill, ‘the world’ and all things ‘materialistic’ or matter-related, i.e. sensuous, are valuable not just in themselves but also as ‘a means to getting heavenwards’, i.e. toward the nonsensuous or supersensuous realm that enables, in Heidegger’s words, the ‘afterlife of the soul’. Here again, then, Gill makes the distinction Heidegger dubs ‘metaphysical’.

It is interesting to note the productivity mindset operative in this last citation from Gill. As I quoted Charles Spinoza in chapter three, ‘Heidegger [...] saw the history of the West—at least from Plato onwards—as the history of understanding being in terms of productivity’, such that, ‘for example, the power of Plato’s ideas came from the sense that an idea preceded [*sic*] the way a craftsman formed his matter. [...] This history of productivity took many

---

<sup>113</sup> See also Gill’s citation of the ‘Penny Catechism’, which says God made humans ‘to serve him in this world and to be happy with him for ever in the next’ (‘GI’, in *AN* 7), which evokes the metaphysical distinction Heidegger describes as ‘The being that we know as “world” vs. ‘the supersensible, [...] the afterlife of the soul’.

different turns starting out with form/matter as the essential distinction, moving through essence/existence to subject/object' (Spinoza 1992: 487).

The productivity mindset focuses on a craftsman taking a *hyle* of, for example, wood or stone and fashioning it according to a *paradeigma*. On a metaphysical outlook, these phenomena are sensuous and nonsensuous, respectively. Thus, Spinoza's explanation of Heidegger's point is that the Western philosophical tradition since Plato applied its focus on productivity to ontology, resulting in a progression of metaphysical distinctions beginning with that which is most closely analogous to the productivity mindset, i.e. matter vs. form. For Heidegger, this mindset and the metaphysics it inspires when applied to ontology ultimately culminates in 'enframing' ('QCT', in *QCT* 19ff. / *GA* 7: 20ff.) or the technological impulse to treat everything as a resource or as 'standing-reserve [*Bestand*]' ('QCT', in *QCT* 17 / *GA* 7: 17), to 'master the earth and [...] subjugate it' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152) for our purposes, same as a craftsman guides a *hyle* to suit the purposes of its *paradeigma*. Hence, the productivity mindset operative in Gill's metaphysical assertions about 'the world' and all things 'materialistic' serving as a 'means' to the 'end' of 'getting heavenwards' bears striking resemblance to the metaphysical-technological approach to building and dwelling that Heidegger resists as a 'means-ends schema' ('BDT', in *BW* 348 / *GA* 7: 148).

Even without language indicative of the productivity mindset, the above 'means to getting heavenwards' passage betrays Gill's metaphysical outlook, according to which existence consists of 'world' and 'heaven', of a sensuous and a nonsensuous. While these 'are both real and both good' and while some 'commercial' or 'materialistic'—i.e. matter/world-related or sensuous—'getting

on' is necessary and appropriate, 'No longer can we think' of this sort of getting on except insofar as it helps us with the getting on of 'getting heavenwards', for heaven is somehow more important than world. This matches what Heidegger describes as drawing a distinction in which 'the nonsensuous [*nichtsinnliche*], the realm [*Bereich*] of the soul and of the spiritual, is the true actuality, and [...] the sensuous realm is a preliminary and subordinate stage' (*HHI 17 / GA 53: 18*). Since 'The distinction between the sensuous (*aisthēton*) and the nonsensuous (*noēton*) is the fundamental configuration of what has long since been called metaphysics' (*HHI 17 / GA 53: 18*), Gill's theology is, by virtue of making that distinction, metaphysical in Heidegger's sense. In the next section, I will therefore offer a plan for consulting Gill's theological understanding of clothes in conjunction with Heidegger's ontology and phenomenology without violating either in terms of where they are in opposition.

### Consulting Gill's Sartorial Theology in Tandem with Heidegger's Ontology and Phenomenology

It is important, at the outset, to note that, for Heidegger, the metaphysics of Plato, Christianity, Enlightenment thinkers, and even Nietzsche as well as modern science and global technology, has been 'unavoidable [*unumgängliche*]' ('NWGD', in *QCT 55 / GA 5: 211*). While Heidegger speaks of an 'overcoming [*Überwindung*]' ('ET', in *PM 154 / GA 9: 202* and 'LH', in *BW 254 / GA 9: 352*) of and 'step back' from metaphysics, such manoeuvres occur not through 'climbing still higher', 'surmounting', or 'transcending' but through 'climbing back down into' this 'nearest of the nearest' mode of thought ('LH', in *BW 254 / GA 9: 352*).

Thus, Heidegger says, 'It is just as childish to wish for a return to previous states of the world as it is to think that human beings could overcome metaphysics by denying it' (*HFI* 53 / *GA* 53: 66). Instead, 'Our thinking apparently remains on the path of metaphysics' yet 'accomplishes a change in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics' ('ET', in *PM* 154 / *GA* 9: 201-2). In other words, the task Heidegger commends is not exactly to ensure we never commit the error of metaphysics but primarily to investigate what is happening in them by asking different questions, i.e. to 'step back' or retrace our steps so as to have a deeper understanding. As George Pattison clarifies in relation to onto-theology, Heidegger is not interested in 'overcoming' the philosophical errors of the West in the usual sense of the word but 'coined a rather untranslatable term, which, though akin to "overcome", means something more like "recover" or "recuperate"' (Pattison 2011: 9). The idea in taking a 'step back' from these errors is 'to come into a free and thoughtful relation to' them (Pattison 2011: 9). Pretending to do anything more fails to understand the depth of our entrenchment in metaphysics: 'if the metaphysics of Being lives on in contemporary technology and in an academic culture shaped, even in the humanities, by technological thinking (as Heidegger himself believed), no one who speaks of their "research" or their "project" can safely assume they are thinking "after metaphysics"' (Pattison 2011: 3-4).

The problem with metaphysics, for Heidegger, is that the presuppositions of a distinction between sensuous and nonsensuous conditions how we think about being (which, in turn, has implications for what Pattison calls 'academic culture' and a host of other modern phenomena). Heidegger

says we should do the opposite, rethink being and then allow that to condition how we think about and, ultimately, ‘experience a relation’ to ‘God’:

Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy [*Heilige*] be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word ‘God’ is to signify. Or should we not first be able to hear and understand all these words carefully if we are to be permitted as men, that is, as ek-sistent creatures, to experience a relation of God to man? How can man at the present stage of world history ask at all seriously and rigorously whether the god nears or withdraws, when he has above all neglected to think into the dimension in which alone that question can be asked? But this is the dimension of the holy, which indeed remains closed as a dimension if the open region of Being is not cleared and in its clearing is near man. Perhaps what is distinctive about this world-epoch consists in the closure of the dimension of the hale (*Heil*). Perhaps that is the sole malignancy (*Unheil*). [‘LH’, in *BW* 253-4 / *GA* 9: 351-2]

Heidegger’s suggestion, then, is that, ‘at the present stage of world history’, we first rethink being and then, from the ‘region of Being’ that opens up through that rethinking, rethink ‘the holy’ or ‘the hale’. Then, out of the ‘dimension’ thereof, we can rethink the ‘essence of divinity’ and, subsequently, ‘what the word “God” is to signify’ as well as ‘whether the god nears or withdraws’ so that, ultimately, we can ‘experience a relation of God to man’.

But, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger says ‘to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the enquirer—transparent in his own Being’ (*BT* 27 / *GA* 2: 10). Thus, he begins the above task of the ‘present stage of world history’ by characterising the being of humans (*Dasein*) as ‘Being-in-the-world’ (*BT* 78ff. et. al. / *GA* 2: 71ff. et. al.). In other words, the being of the entity who enquires about the being of entities is to ‘be’ in a ‘world’, an ‘expanse’ or ‘unity’ of ‘relations’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 167 / *GA* 5: 27-8). As I footnoted in chapter four, Heidegger’s later writings refer to this expanse as the

‘fourfold’ and, thus, further specify that being in a world means being in a gathering of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities.

In the last chapter, I applied Heidegger’s preliminary groundwork about the being of humans to my question concerning clothing’s ability to facilitate attunements or comportments. Here, I seek to bring this application to Gill’s theological understanding of clothes by asking how raiment might facilitate the particularly theological attunement/comportment of openness and/or proximity to God or, to use Gill’s words, how it might ‘[speak] to us of God’. But, in so doing, how are we to avoid subordinating Heidegger’s analysis to what he would have seen as a metaphysically determined endeavour such as Gill’s?

The key to avoiding such an outcome lies in following Heidegger’s own characterisation of metaphysical reflection as one amongst history’s revelations of being. As I discussed in chapter four, Heidegger understands metaphysics, in all its ‘phases’ (‘NWGD’, in *QCT* 54 and 77 / *GA* 5: 210 and 233), as a ‘destining’ (‘NWGD’, in *QCT* 65 / *GA* 5: 221) or way in which being has, in the last twenty-five hundred years, revealed itself, through both ‘unconcealment’ and concealment (see ‘ECP’, in *PM* 213 and 229-30 / *GA* 9: 279 and 300-1 and ‘IWM’, in *PM* 278 / *GA* 9: 365-6). That is,

In whatever manner beings are interpreted—whether as spirit, after the fashion of spiritualism; or as matter and force, after the fashion of materialism; or as becoming and life; or as representation, will, substance, subject, or *energeia*; or as the eternal recurrence of the same—every time, beings as beings appear in the light of Being. Wherever metaphysics represents beings, Being has been cleared. Being has arrived in a state of unconcealedness (*alētheia*). But whether and how Being brings such unconcealedness with it, whether and how It brings itself within, and as, metaphysics, remains veiled. Being in its essence as revealing, i.e. in its truth, is not thought. Nevertheless, when metaphysics gives answers to its question concerning beings as such, metaphysics speaks from out of the unnoticed manifestness of Being.’ [‘IWM’, in *PM* 278 / *GA* 9: 365-6]

In Heidegger's estimation, being has for a long time concealed itself in the metaphysical thinking into which he suggests a 'climbing back down' that 'accomplishes a change in the questioning'. In this passage, he lists various interpretive conceptions of beings through which being has thus concealed itself: beings as 'spirit' (Hegel), 'matter and force' (Scholastic Aristotelianism), 'becoming and life' (Nietzsche), 'representation' (Kant and Schopenhauer), 'will' (Schopenhauer), 'substance' (Scholastic Aristotelianism), 'subject' (Descartes), '*energeia*' (Aristotle), and 'the eternal recurrence of the same' (Nietzsche). Nevertheless, it is precisely in such concealment that being 'in its truth', i.e. not just according to one revealing or 'manner' of interpretation, but 'as [the very phenomenon of] revealing', has also always revealed or unconcealed itself as that more primordial phenomenon.

There are, then, two tracks, in being's self-revelation: On the one track is being as whatever a particular 'manner [in which] beings are interpreted' reveals and on the other is being as the very phenomenon of revealing, i.e. of 'presencing' or 'showing up'. But Heidegger says that all of the manners of interpretation offered in the last twenty-five hundred years have operated within and subject to metaphysics and, later (beginning with the modern era), the technological mindset, 'enframing'. As I noted in chapter four, Heidegger says such modes of reflection cover up other modes and even the fact that they themselves are modes. In other words, whatever advantages these modes of reflection might have for other enquiries, when it comes to the question of being, their disadvantage is not allowing other modes to come to bear alongside them or even acknowledging that being is the kind of phenomenon for which

there could be modes. Heidegger's aim, then, is to discuss being or revealing in a way that is not uncritically within and subject to these modes of reflection.

Nevertheless, the possibility of consulting Heidegger together with Gill ensues from the fact that when metaphysics offers a 'manner [in which] beings are interpreted', this revelation of being is derivative of the deeper revelation of being as revealing. Given this fact, any insight he offers with regard to the deeper revelation is going to be interpretable in terms of what he regards as a derivative revelation. For example, when Heidegger offers his comments on the fourfold as a description of the 'world' through which humans receive the revelation of being as revealing, the four elements thereof are still interpretable by one of the various 'manner[s] [in which] beings are interpreted' that Heidegger describes as metaphysics: earth and sky as God's creation; mortals as fallen creatures and, ultimately, reigning heirs; and the divinities as the transcendent Lord of all creation.<sup>114</sup>

What Heidegger describes as being 'in its truth', then, has always been 'unconcealed' in the sense of available as receivable revelation. At the same time, however, it has, for the last twenty-five hundred years, also been 'concealed' in the sense of being revealed only according to certain, narrowly-construed metaphysical positions. Importantly, however, the latter, derivative revelation of being according to the metaphysical and technological modes of reflection does not undermine the integrity of the deeper revelation of being as revealing, except insofar as it covers it up. We can, then, speak about how the

---

<sup>114</sup> On the deeper vs. derivative revelations of being, see also Heidegger's distinction between, on the one hand, ontological or existential inquiries and understandings, which pertain to being, and, on the other, ontic/ontical or existentiell inquiries and understandings, which address entities and facts about them (*BT* 31-4 / *GA* 2: 15-8; cf. *BT* 31 n. 3). Heidegger offers Kierkegaard as an example of one who 'explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion' in contrast to Heidegger's own ontological pursuit (*BT* 494 n. §45. vi / *GA* 2: 313 n. 6).

features Heidegger assigns to the deeper revelation of being ‘show up’ in the derivative revelation of a metaphysical perspective like Gill’s, so long as we take care not to insinuate that the features of those ‘showings up’ are essential to the deeper revelation of being.

The next two sections will enhance Gill’s theological perspective on clothes with the Heideggerian approach from chapter five, taking care not to change Heidegger’s understanding into something that can no longer prepare for rethinking the question of being. Following this, I will highlight some insights from chapter one in light of the Heidegger-enhanced Gill to come before showing how such a Heideggerian phenomenology and ontology in consultation with Gill’s theo-sartoriology provides a way of thinking about clothes as capable of facilitating the attunement or comportment of proximity and/or openness to God, illustrating my analysis with the phenomenon of ‘church clothes’.

#### A Heidegger-Enhanced Gill on the Handmade Artefact / Work of Art

In chapter five, I detailed three types of Heideggerian things—the handmade artefact, the built thing, and the work of art—and showed how clothing could qualify as any of these types of things by gathering the fourfold in each of their ways. I will now show how this understanding and Gill’s perspective on clothes are mutual supportive, allowing us to fill out the latter ontologically while highlighting the former’s theological pertinence.

From Gill’s perspective, the handmade artefact and work of art categories collapse because, for him, a work of art emanates from an artisan, as opposed to being an industrial product conceived by a designer and fashioned by machines

that factory hands monitor. As Gill puts it, ‘a work of art is a thing which a man has made deliberately as well as he can and as well as he knows how’ (‘EMRA’, in *AN* 258) because ‘Beauty is the Love of God and his praise and worship sensible in the work of man’s hands’ (‘EP’, in *AN* 4). Hence, ‘That a man may *show* the love of God in his work he must be free. A factory hand may show the love of God in his life or his thought—he cannot show it in his work’ because, in a factory setting, workers cannot exercise their ‘right to make and to act upon an aesthetic judgement’ (‘EP’, in *AN* 4-5; emphasis original), i.e. to ‘[bring] God to the work’ (‘EP’, in *AN* 4-5).

Thus, while Gill criticises Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement as ‘tosh’ (*LEG* 93) that accomplishes nothing more than helping ‘men of business’ capitalise on the fetishisation of ‘handicraft’ (‘RH’, in *AN* 117), he lauds ‘hand-made goods or small workshops and their products’ and describes the ‘hand-made saucepan’ as ‘the best’ vis-a-vis other options like ‘enamelled iron’ (*LEG* 92-3). This is because he believes workers should be matching the goodness or holiness of creation with what he calls ‘holiness [...] in all [their] work’ (*LEG* 413) and that this latter holiness is only achieved in a context that, unlike the ‘factory system’ (‘AEN’, in *E* 223), gives workers the freedom to make things according to their sense of the holy:

In the nature of things, man is a responsible creature; he has free will. What he does, what he makes, are things for which he is responsible. The present organisation of industry deprives all but a few artists of any responsibility whatever. The bulk of things made to-day are made under what we call factory conditions, and those conditions are such that of no factory article can you say any man was responsible for making it—it is simply the result of a number of men doing precisely what they were told to do. [‘FS’, in *AN* 302-3; see also ‘EGPA’, in *AN* 256]

In sum, ‘The factory workman is a slave’, but ‘All free workmen are artists. All workmen who are not artists are slaves’ (‘EP’, in *AN* 5). Gill’s definition of art envisions artisans who, instead of ‘machine-minding’ (*ACC* 119), continue God’s creative activity by making something themselves, with their own hands: ‘if the thing to be made is to be as good as it can be [i.e. if it is to be a work of art according to Gill’s above definition], the artist himself must use his own hands to do the work’ (‘W’, in *E* 26). In speaking of handmade artefacts and works of art in relation to Gill, then, we address one and the same phenomenon.

Moreover, given that, for Gill, a ‘hand-made saucepan’ is no less a work of art than a Rembrandt or, as he says, that ‘Chairs and tables, pots and pans, paintings and sculptures are all endowed with the same character’ (*C* 12; see also ‘AEN’, in *E* 222; and ‘A’, in *E* 18-9), he does not think of art in terms of anything like Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘opening/setting up a world’. He certainly lobbies for ‘setting forth the earth’ in the sense of making things he would call ‘works of art’ with a conspicuously high-quality construction, but he is not, like Proust, interested in the capacity of clothes or anything else to call up the past or other worlds. Thus, in drawing upon Heidegger to address and enhance Gill’s understanding of the handmade artefact / work of art, I have no recourse to the former’s twin movement of ‘opening/setting up a world’ and ‘setting for the earth’. I must, then, speak of the handmade artefact / work of art using the vocabulary of the fourfold.

As it turns out, Gill has a strong intuitive grasp of Heidegger’s notion of ‘things’ ‘gathering’ as it pertains to the fourfold’s divinities and mortals, though he codifies the latter phenomena according to the metaphysical ‘way of revealing’ from which Heidegger seeks to ‘step back’. In terms of the divinities,

the handmade artefact / work of art is decisive for Gill because, like ‘Rocky mountains, grassy downs, rats, germs, and dung’ and no less than ‘books and dramatic plays, [...] poetry and music, [...] pictures and sculptures’, ‘the work of blacksmiths and navvies’ ‘are things singing to us of Him’, i.e. of God (‘A’, in *E* 18-9).

To illustrate this point, Gill quotes book ten, chapter six of Augustine’s

*Confessions*:

‘I asked the earth and it said: “I am not He”, and all things that are in the earth confessed the same. I asked the sea, the deeps, and all creeping things and they answered: “We are not your God, seek Him above us”. I asked the subtle air, and with all its inhabitants this air made answer: “Anaximenes is deceived, I am not your God”. I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars. “Neither are we”, said they, “the God you seek”. And to all they who stood before those portals of my soul, my senses five, I said “As to my God, you say you are not He; but tell me now somewhat of what He is?” And with a mighty voice did they cry out: “It is He that made us”.’ [‘A’, in *E* 18-9; cf. Augustine 1953 edn.: 270]

Gill’s gloss is:

Dante speaks to us of God, and so do the daisies, the dew-drops, and the dung. And if that is so, is it not even more obvious that pots and pans may do so? For the works of men and women carry the work of creation on to a higher level than that of what we call Nature. We are ourselves creators. Through us exist things which God Himself could not otherwise have made. The ‘natural’ world is God’s present to Himself. Our works are His works, but they are also in a strict sense our own, and if we present them to Him they are *our* presents to Him, and not simply His to Himself. They are free-will offerings. And, indeed, all things should thus be offered up. [‘A’, in *E* 19; emphasis original]

Elsewhere, Gill develops the point: The ‘sculptures of Chartres’ and the ‘paintings on the walls of the cave temples of Ajanta’, he says, ‘are not the work of man; “they are the work of ages, of nations”—that is to say, their makers are the means by which God produces an even more poignant exhibition of his infinite love of himself than can be produced through irrational nature’ (‘EMRA’, in *AN* 264). Gill’s point is that, through works of art, especially

‘great’ (‘EMRA’, in *AN* 264) ones, God creates on a higher level than that on which God creates through “‘natural’ things’ because ‘nature’ is ‘irrational’.

There is no need, however, to adjudicate whether it is ‘more obvious’ that ‘pots and pans’ ‘speak to us of God’ than do ‘the daisies, the dew-drops, and the dung’. More palatably, Gill’s point is that “‘natural things’” ‘are things singing to us of Him’ by virtue of being ‘God’s present to Himself’.<sup>115</sup> But, he stresses, ‘our works’ also sing in this way because ‘they are our presents to Him’. This is not to say that every entity thus sings. While handmade artefacts / works of art, just as much as ‘books and dramatic plays, [...] poetry and music, [...] pictures and sculptures’ as well as ‘what we call Nature’, are ‘holy’ in this way, Gill makes a sharp distinction between the holiness of ‘our workshops’ and the unholiness of ‘industrial products’:

All industrial products, however saleable, however flattering to our vanity, however useful in an ephemeral sort of way, are in their nature unholy or, if it will ease the reader’s mind, lacking in holiness, but not all the works of men in other periods, not all the works of men outside the factory system are holy. There has always been much bad work done; for there have always been selfishness and greed, and there have always been stupidity and insensitiveness and foolish knowledge. But there is at least this distinction between industrialism and human labour: in the former, holiness is ruled out both from the life and the work; in the latter, holiness is a constant potentiality. [‘A’, in *E* 16]

Here, we have something like Heidegger’s distinction between ‘things’ and ‘objects’ that I discussed in relation to the handmade artefact in chapter five, except that Gill uses the words ‘works’ and ‘products’, respectively. In the previous discussion, I said Heidegger’s ‘things’ are entities that gather the fourfold and ‘objects’ are entities that do not. The reason for this, I noted, is that

---

<sup>115</sup> As an aside, ‘Dante’, even in Gill’s sense, is a work of art and therefore cannot more obviously speak to us of God than ‘pots and pans’ since ‘there is no dividing line between’, on the one hand, ‘books and dramatic plays, [...] poetry and music, [...] pictures and sculptures’ and, on the other, ‘the work of blacksmiths and navvies’ (‘A’, in *E* 18-9).

in order for an entity that is made to qualify as a ‘made thing’ rather than as an ‘object’, it must be made in the right way, via a process that is not so lengthy or complex as to prevent the constituents, which start as part of the fourfold, from remaining so, from remaining what they are. That is, it does not put so much distance between the original constituents and the final product, as in, for example, the technological transformation of petroleum into a plastic bottle for storing Coca-Cola.

Heidegger and Gill thus laud and indict the same respective phenomena, and in terms of a similar distancing mechanism. The former lauds the handmade artefact for not distancing the ‘made thing’ from its constituent ‘things’ of the earth and/or sky and indicts the technological process for transforming such things into a final product that is far away from them. Similarly, Gill lauds the handmade artefact / work of art for not distancing the ‘work’ from the ‘worker’ and indicts industrial manufacturing for separating the latter from an ‘industrial product’ for which neither the worker nor anyone else is accountable. For both thinkers, then, the handmade artefact is a ‘thing’ or ‘work’ that facilitates or preserves a kind of nearness that the technological or industrial product allows to remain absent or abolishes.

As I explained in chapter five, for Heidegger, this distancing constitutes not ‘letting [a thing] be what it is’, not letting it gather the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. For Gill, the distancing amounts to making something that is unholy, that does not sing or speak to us of God. Here, too, the thinkers overlap. As I delineated above, Heidegger would regard Gill’s God as part of a specific, metaphysical ‘way of revealing’ in which what Richardson calls ‘Being as ‘the Holy’’ (‘OGSU’, in Sheehan [ed.] 1981: 67 n. 27) has disclosed itself for

the last twenty-five hundred years. The divinities are Heidegger's attempt to describe more primordially this same phenomenon of 'being' presencing with regard to 'the Holy', once 'in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, [and] in the preaching of Jesus' and now in absence ('Th', in *PLT* 182-3 / *GA* 7: 185-6). That is, via this element of the fourfold, Heidegger is trying to elucidate the essence of being as revealing with regard to the phenomenon I have called the source of deep meaning, which Gill, in line with the metaphysical revelation of being, finds in God. On Heidegger's view, it is this essence of being with regard to the source of deep meaning along with the rest of the fourfold that things but not objects bring near. Heidegger and Gill converge, then, in their sense that 'things' or 'works', including the handmade artefact, bring us nearer to this source of deep meaning while technological or industrial 'objects' or 'products' do not or even take us farther away.

A final point of convergence in terms of how Heidegger and Gill think of 'things' 'gathering' the divinities concerns their near-identical language with regard to how humans relate to the source of deep meaning, i.e. 'being' disclosed in a religious way for Heidegger and the God of Judaeo-Christianity for Gill. For his part, the former says,

The outpouring is the libation poured out [*gespendete Trank*] for the immortal gods. The gift of the outpouring as libation is the authentic gift. In giving the consecrated libation, the pouring jug occurs as the giving gift. The consecrated libation is what our word for a strong outpouring flow, 'gush', really designates: gift and sacrifice. 'Gush', Middle English *guschen*, *gosshen*—cf. German *Guss*, *giessen*—is the Greek *cheein*, the Indoeuropean *ghu*. It means to offer in sacrifice. To pour a gush, when it is achieved in its essence, thought through with sufficient generosity, and genuinely uttered, is to donate, to offer in sacrifice, and hence to give. ['Th', in *PLT* 170-1 / *GA* 7: 174]

Similarly, as I quoted him above, Gill says,

The ‘natural’ world is God’s present to Himself. Our works are His works, but they are also in a strict sense our own, and if we present them to Him they are *our* presents to Him, and not simply His to Himself. They are free-will offerings. And, indeed, all things should thus be offered up. [‘A’, in *E* 19; emphasis original]

The language of offering is conspicuous in both thinkers. ‘Things’ or ‘works’ ‘gather the divinities’ or ‘[speak] to us of God’ not just in the presencing of ‘being’ in the Greek World and Judaeo-Christian proclamation or in the “‘natural” world’ as ‘God’s present to Himself’. For both thinkers, they also gather in being a human ‘gift’ or ‘offerings’ to the ‘immortal gods’ or God.

Besides converging with regard to things gathering the divinities, Heidegger and Gill also overlap concerning the gathering of mortals. As I noted in chapter four, for Heidegger, ‘things’ are not just gifts from mortals to the divinities or immortal gods but also the reverse, gifts from those divinities or immortal gods to mortals: ‘Bread and wine are the fruits of heaven and earth, gifts from the divinities to mortals. Bread and wine gather these four to themselves from the simple unity of their fourfoldness’ (‘L’, in *PLT* 203 / *GA* 12: 25).

While, to my knowledge, Gill never describes ‘works’ as ‘gifts’ from God and, contrariwise, seems to think that the fact we, rather than God, give them is exactly what distinguishes them from “‘natural” things’, he does say that works bring ‘beatitude’ or ‘happiness’ to us and our fellow humans:

Man is a social animal. He is not self-sufficient. He cannot live without his neighbours; they cannot live without him. But the object of life is ‘your sanctification’. Therefore all our neighbourliness must have that end in view, and therefore we are all evangelists and all our works are in their true nature evangelical; they have for their object, their final cause, their end, the winning of beatitude; for each man his own beatitude and for each man the beatitudes of his friends and neighbours. [‘A’, in *E* 11]

Thus, even though Gill does not characterise works as ‘gifts’ from God to us and, in his ‘Dante speaks to us of God’ passage, rather emphasises that they are ‘in a strict sense our own’, he also therein acknowledges that ‘Our works are His works’. Then, as previously noted, he says the Chartres statues and Ajanta paintings are ‘the means by which God produces an even more poignant exhibition of his infinite love of himself’. Finally, in the present passage, says ‘our works’ are ‘evangelical’ in that they bring ‘beatitude’ or ‘happiness’ to us and our ‘friends and neighbours’. Putting these points together, we have something like a view of our works as gifts of happiness God gives, through us, to ourselves and each other. In this way, Gill’s ‘works’ ‘evangelise’ ‘man’ by being gifts just as Heidegger’s ‘things’ gather ‘mortals’ by being gifts.

As to the rest of the fourfold, Gill has little to say about the phenomena Heidegger calls ‘earth’ and ‘sky’. The two thinkers agree that technological and industrial production amount, in Heidegger’s words, to a ‘setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT* 15 / *GA* 7: 16) or, in Gill’s, a ‘conquest of nature’ (‘EMRA’, in *AN* 265 and ‘SSMI’, in *E* 82). Unlike Heidegger, however, Gill gives the matter very little attention and rarely speaks of what he calls ‘nature’ except in relation to art, which is, for him, its superior. Nevertheless, most of the works of art he commends in his examples integrate ‘earth’ and ‘sky’ according to the manner of one or another Heideggerian thing as discussed in chapter five, usually the handmade artefact. In other words, in spite of Gill’s de-emphasis on what he calls ‘nature’, the ‘works’ he lauds gather not just divinities and mortals but also the earth and sky. Heidegger would probably find this unsurprising since, on his understanding, the elements are never gathered in isolation, in a pair, or in a triad but always as a fourfold.

Thus, we have a Heidegger-enhanced Gill with regard to handmade artefacts / works of art. Since Gill says clothes can be works of art ('AL', in *AN* 211), this enhancement allows us to say with Gill that clothes can '[speak] to us of God' yet with a more robust phenomenological and ontological approach than Gill himself provides. But it allows the same in reference to any 'work' or 'thing'. Consequently, for an enhancement with more narrow application to clothes, we must turn to a consultation of these two thinkers with regard to Heidegger's notion of the 'built thing'.

#### A Heidegger-Enhanced Gill on the 'Built Thing'

Even this enhancement will not provide a reinforcement of Gill's perspective that applies exclusively to clothes. After all, Heidegger presents the 'built thing' as a phenomenologically and ontologically sound way of talking about dwelling places and his examples that of the old bridge over the Neckar in Heidelberg. But it is precisely this that makes Heidegger's notion of the 'built thing' so apt for filling out Gill's discussion of what makes clothes special, for Gill understands them as dwelling places. The aim in this section is, therefore, to use phenomenological-ontological analysis to flesh out Gill's claim that clothes are architectural spaces and therefore fitting encasements for the only beings who wear them, those children of God and temples of the Holy Spirit who are 'collaborators with God in creating' (*C* 129).

By way of beginning, it is important to note that, from a Heideggerian understanding, the reason Gill can even speak of garments as architectural spaces is that the two share what Heidegger identifies as the essential feature of a dwelling place. They both set up locations or micro-locations, allowing for

‘standing through’ and thus ‘thinking toward’ or, in experiencing our clothes as ‘us’, ‘feeling toward’ or ‘wearing toward’. All of this is possible on the basis of dwelling as setting up locations and spaces, which is rooted in the essence of humans to ‘care’ (*BT* 153-68 and 225ff. / *GA* 2: 157-74 and 240ff.) or, as Bruce Foltz puts it, to have things ‘matter to us’ (Foltz 1995: 45-6; cf. *BT* 141, 176-80, et. al. / *GA* 2: 142, 183-7, et. al.) and, therefore, to make meaning. For humans, to be is to organise existence according to relationships of significance, e.g. that amongst locations, micro-locations, and spaces. This inspires building and wearing.

So, from a Heideggerian point of view, Gill can only say ‘Houses are clothes, clothes are houses’ (*C* 17), because both things share in the essence of the dwelling place, instantiating the dwelling as building that constructs and maintains locations and spaces and therefore facilitates ‘standing through’. And it is only because this essence of the dwelling place similarly stems from the human essence of meaning-making and therefore of organising existence that Gill can say ‘It is because [man] knows himself to be the temple of the Holy Ghost that finery is proper to him’ (*C* 103). In other words, to the extent that Heidegger would agree with Gill that ‘man is, by nature, a clothed animal’ (*C* 16), he would modify the latter’s position on what makes this the case. From a Heideggerian understanding, ‘knowing [themselves] to be the temple of the Holy Ghost’ is meaning-making, which is exclusively essential to humans. If, therefore, the meaning therein entails that ‘finery is proper to’ humans, it does so on the essentially human meaning-making that would establish any characteristic as ‘proper’ to any entity in the first place. Moreover, Heidegger would not regard the specific meaning ‘knowing [themselves] to be the temple

of the Holy Ghost' to be what entails that clothes are proper to humans but would instead propose as decisive the more fundamental meaning-making that seeks to establish that significance.

The critical point for Gill's reflection on clothes, however, is that it is this identification that encourages humans to experience their clothes as any one of the various architectural spaces Gill enumerates. For example, it is what allows them to feel 'at home' or 'like themselves' in their clothes, to experience those garments as houses or homes. Like houses, clothes accommodate human beings, but neither do so just in the sense of having humans positioned within the coordinates they occupy on a grid of capital-S space. Insofar as houses have the essence of dwelling places, their capacity to accommodate extends to facilitating the human organisation of existence within and according to relationships of micro-locations and spaces. This, in turn, facilitates humans' 'feeling toward' the walls of the house or, in Heideggerian parlance, the 'horizon' of the home 'region', identifying the latter as a place uniquely their own, a kind of extension of the 'mineness' of *Dasein's* being that Heidegger discusses in *Being and Time* (BT 68 / GA 2: 57-8). This extension is what gives houses the sense of homeyness Gill discusses in his comment that 'a house is not primarily a shelter from the weather; it is primarily a home, a place for father and mother and children' (C 155).

Because clothes are also, in essence, dwelling places, they too accommodate in a sense that goes beyond that of merely having humans within their coordinates to that of facilitating the human organisation of the house-like existence-in-clothes into micro-locations and spaces. Just as with houses, this facilitation, in turn, encourages the wearer's 'feeling toward' or 'wearing toward'

the walls of the clothing, the 'horizon' of the home-like region it constitutes, extending the 'mineness' of *Dasein's* being to that region.

The connection between the extension of 'mineness' and Gill's other clothing-as-architecture rubrics is not as clear as that between this phenomenon and clothes-as-houses because the other rubrics do not as explicitly concern the sense of having the capacity to be one's own that is so present in feeling 'at home'. As I noted in chapter two, however, the non-house rubrics tend to overlap with the house rubric, as when Gill discusses the dinner jacket as a house because dining is a household activity but then also discusses such articles of clothing as workshops because they are 'things to do things with', in this case, 'to dine' (C 60). He does the same in speaking of 'clothes for church on Sundays' as houses (C 28) when they would seem to fit more easily with the clothes-as-churches rubric and in speaking of the 'chasuble' of the priest as an example of a workshop but in the language of a house: 'it is the appropriate garment, the "little house" of the Roman citizen in which the representative of the man of peace is housed' (C 167).

Part of the reason for such overlap, though, is precisely that, we often feel 'at home' in garments whose primary feature is that of a rubric other than clothes-as-houses. Thus, the primary feature of that rubric is also present in the others: Clothes that are workshops, churches, or town-halls are also locations set up by the 'building' Heidegger calls dwelling, which is what leads to the feeling 'at home', i.e. the feeling or wearing toward that extends the 'mineness' of our being. For Heidegger, though, any genuine dwelling in clothes would amount to humans allowing them to gather the fourfold 'into a site by arranging

the site into spaces' ('BDT', in *BW 360 / GA 7*: 160). Thus, I want to address this gathering in relation to Gill's rubrics.

### Heidegger's 'Fourfold' and Gill's 'Architecture of Clothing'

In exploring the potential of Gill's perspective, what is interesting about Heidegger's fourfold is not so much the prospect that a given ensemble might gather this complex but the implications of what is happening in each 'fold' of that event. This easily comes to light in drawing out the overlap between the fourfold and the four rubrics of Gill's 'architecture of clothing' (*C 38*). In certain ways I will adduce, the 'earth' corresponds to 'clothes-as-houses', the 'sky' to 'clothes-as-workshops', the 'divinities' to 'clothes-as-churches', and 'mortals' to 'clothes-as-town-halls'.

In terms of the first of these, I have already noted Gill's observation about the capacity of clothes-as-houses to make us feel 'at home' and further discussed what this means in relation to Heidegger's notions of 'standing through' and 'mineness'. The point I would like to add here is that this 'feeling at home' mirrors the nurturing and reabsorbing or welcoming character of the 'earth' in Heidegger's fourfold. The latter gives us a ground on which to stand and be ourselves, just as, in chapter two, I argued that Gill sees the house and, by extension, clothes-as-houses as a place where family members can be honest about themselves because no one's fooling anyone anyway. This provides us with sustenance and even when we experience the 'red in tooth and claw' of animal-things within the earth, this is itself the latter's welcoming us back into

the ‘womb [...] at death’.<sup>116</sup> Similarly, both houses and clothes-as-houses meet physical and emotional needs, welcoming us ‘home’ after tough endeavours in other confines.

No exact correlate for Heidegger’s ‘sky’ obtains in Gill’s ‘architecture of clothing’ and therefore the connection between the two is less obvious than that between other elements of the fourfold and the rubrics of Gill’s reflection. Nevertheless, some fruitful crosshatchings emerge from investigating the phenomenon of ‘sky’ in consultation with Gill’s rubric of clothes-as-workshops. In chapter four, I drew upon but modified Edward’s description of this element of the fourfold, understanding it as the integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and condition existence. The connection between this character of the ‘sky’ on the one hand and Gill’s clothes-as-workshops rubric on the other arises insofar as clothes are ‘things to do things with’ and thus limit or condition our possibilities as they facilitate a particular kind of contemplative work. As I explained in chapter two, for Gill, the workshop is ‘a womb—a place of secrecy’ (*C* 118), ‘a place for contemplation’ (*C* 155), out of which blossoms the making of quality things. In my discussion, I glossed these comments by inferring that the best work clothes are those that best facilitate the kind of contemplation essential to a given worker’s unique variety of quality-thing-making. But, to the extent that clothes shape skill acquisition, facilitate contemplation, or otherwise help us in our work or other endeavours, they also put constraints on us.

---

<sup>116</sup> Compare Gill’s insistence that the ‘beauty of the Natural world’, including ‘all the animal world, even when, yes indeed, even when most “red in tooth and claw”’, is ‘clear and heavenly’ (*A* 232), that ‘Nature “red in tooth and claw” is as much in accord with His will as small children singing hymns’ (‘A’, in *E* 18).

For example, when firefighters don their fire kits, these help them do their work by rendering them resistant to fire and other hazards as well as helping them carry tools needed for various situations they are likely to encounter. More importantly, just as lab coats helped facilitate a more focused attunement or comportment in Adam and Galinsky's study participants, fire kits help firefighters enter the mode of being firefighters. In Gill's language, they facilitate the kind of 'contemplation' essential to such work. At this moment, the firefighters are not playing with their kids or going surfing; they are pulling people out of blazing houses while minimising danger to themselves, an endeavour that requires consistently being in the firefighter mode with the relevant level and kind of focus and attitude. But precisely because fire kits encourage that attunement/comportment, they also constrain their wearers by hindering other kinds of activity and attunements/comportments. It is hard to chase kids around the yard while wearing all that heavy equipment and a fire kit is more likely to facilitate drowning than breaking a personal record on the longboard. The kit constrains its wearer to the mode it encourages by discouraging other modes. In Heideggerian terms, it 'reveals' or 'unconceals' what is relevant to being in the attunement/comportment of fighting fires by 'concealing' what is relevant to being in the mode of playing with children or surfing.

But this is an example of clothing's encouraging-restraining or revealing-concealing dynamic facilitating what Gill, following Maritain, would call 'doing', as opposed to 'making' (see *ACC* 22-3; 'AL', in *AN* 195-6; 'AP', in *BLH* 12-3; *C* 5ff.; 'EMRA', in *AN* 258; et. al.; cf. Maritain 1920: 5-22 and *passim*). Perhaps confusingly, Gill occasionally suggests that 'Skill in making and skill in doing

are both loosely called art' ('AP', in *BLH* 12; cf. 'AL', in *AN* 197-8). This is consistent with speaking of clothes-as-workshops as being just as decisive for the 'doing' of being a judge as it is for the 'making' of an artisan in a workshop more commonly understood: 'the business of the judge requires a certain kind of workshop' (*C* 66). Thus, Gill takes the contemplation that clothes-as-workshops facilitates to be just as important for doing as it is for making. In fact, he even goes so far as to say that monks, who, in Gill's example, do not do any kind of 'making' in the sense of making things, are 'artists' 'most completely' because of the wholeheartedness of their contemplation, even though it is not directed toward such making:

More particularly is art the peculiar and appropriate occupation of men when men are consciously devoted to the service and love of God. Then indeed no other manner of occupation will seem worthy. Those men who give themselves entirely to contemplation, who would seem therefore least to merit the name of artist, are in fact the most completely artists, for not only are they artificers in the shaping of their own souls, but they are, God guiding, artificers in the shaping of life itself. The religious life is man's greatest work of art. ['AL', in *AN* 197-8]

So the artist, broadly construed, for Gill, is the contemplator, and that designation applies just as much to the judge and others who focus more on 'doing' than on 'making' in Gill's sense of making things.

More primarily, however, Gill understands the artist as a maker. Clothes-as-workshops are therefore decisive for the artist so conceived because they facilitate the contemplation necessary for fashioning quality-made things. An interesting example of this phenomenon lies in the practice of contemporary artist Becky Slemmons, who uses video studies to begin her paintings: 'I [...] needed to sew the costumes of my characters, so that I could wear these costumes in the videos' and '[act] out my paintings [...] in order to discover

what the paintings needed to look like' (Deskins 2013). While Gill would probably contend with a great deal of Slemmons' practice and perspective, in his vocabulary, her process amounts to fashioning costume-'workshops' that facilitate the contemplation necessary for the 'well-making of what needs making'. But the Heideggerian insight here is that this facilitation of contemplation is also constraining in that its 'revealing' or 'unconcealment' of what is relevant to being in the attunement/comportment of creating Slemmons' paintings entails a 'concealing' of what is relevant to being in the mode of 'doing' or even other types of 'making'.

It is this facilitating-constraining or revealing-concealing dynamic that shows the overlap between Heidegger's 'sky' and Gill's clothes-as-workshops rubric. As I noted in chapter three, for Heidegger, to 'dwell' is to 'let beings be the beings they are' ('ET', in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188), which amounts to allowing them to gather the fourfold. This includes the 'sky' or integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and condition existence, with all the accompanying phenomena that do the shaping and conditioning. In terms of apparel, then, to dwell in and with clothes is to let them gather the 'sky' along with the rest of the elements of the fourfold and that means allowing them to shape and condition or constrain us, as in the case of the fire kit or Slemmons' costumes. But what consulting Heidegger and Gill together highlights is that this conditioning or constraining is also an encouraging that facilitates creative contemplation and, thus, quality work.

The connections between Heidegger's 'divinities' and Gill's 'architecture of clothing' are more obvious. In chapter four, I described the former as 'being' showing up in a religious way, relating to us as the source of deep meaning in

our existence by calling us to hope for and await it, receive from it, thank it, give back to it, and prepare and refine ourselves for it, all of which we do in enquiring into it. Gill addresses clothing's relation to this phenomenon in the language of Judaeo-Christianity by speaking of clothes as 'churches': Clothes, he says, are 'the manifestation of men's proper dignity and for the adornment of [their] person' (C 89). Again, they are 'the sign of [man's 'proper'] pride; of his belief in himself 'because he knows himself the child of God', who 'has been redeemed' (C 90). In short, 'clothes are [...] the habit in which [man] walks with his Master' (C 185).

Humans should therefore don garments appropriate to their exalted existence, effecting 'changes in human clothes' from the 'industrial', 'degraded raiment of an irrational nineteenth century' (C 102). For Gill, this amounts to making clothes, like everything else, with love (C 124; 'EP', in AN 4-5; 'BLH', in *BLH* 215-16; et. al.), such that they 'delight in the eyes of men not to-day only but to-morrow and all the to-morrows', which 'requires a type of intelligence equaled only by the highest sanctity and the highest wisdom' (C 98). After all, 'man's proper dress is the dress of pride. It is because he knows himself to be the temple of the Holy Ghost that finery is proper to him. It is for this reason that churches have always been the grandest buildings of men and vestments the grandest clothes' (C 103).

While, from a Heideggerian understanding, this language betrays metaphysical presuppositions, it is easy to forget that this does not mean Heidegger would say Gill is not, however graspingly, gesticulating toward the phenomenon he calls the 'divinities'. Indeed, Heidegger's description of this phenomenon is an attempt to characterise the 'hidden fullness and wealth of

what has been and what, thus gathered, is presencing, of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus', the 'no-longer' and 'not-yet' or 'has-been and coming destiny of Being' ('Th', in *PLT* 182 / *GA* 7: 185-6). Now, Heidegger is going to have a different understanding of this 'what has been and what [...] is presencing' than Gill. For example, he would modify the latter's insight that humans know themselves to be children of God by saying they are the only beings who even have a stake in being something particular and are therefore the only ones who can 'gather' the source of deep meaning Heidegger calls the 'divinities' and subsequently codify it as 'God'. Nevertheless, the two thinkers agree that humans are the only beings that can even possess such a self-understanding/experience. Thus, they are the only ones that can relate to 'things' like clothes as 'gathering' the 'divinities', in Heidegger's language, or 'speak[ing] to us of God', in Gill's.

Regarding clothes that gather the divinities also constituting clothes as churches, priestly vestments are an obvious example. They are designed precisely to '[speak] to us of God'. Within and underlying such speaking is what Heidegger would regard as the primordial, non-derivative phenomenon of 'being' showing up in a religious way, which awaits our hoping and waiting, receiving, thinking and thanking, giving back, self-preparing and self-refining, enquiring. But, in chapter five, I argued that such divinity-gathering or religious showing up of 'being' is also possible in what would otherwise seem to be non-religious or everyday clothing, specifically that of Odette Swann. Recall that Proust's narrator calls the attentiveness to weather in her dressing a 'pious expertise in the rites and liturgies' of 'the season and the time of day' (Proust 1919: 213) and says 'it was for her own sake that she observed these standards in

dress, as though they were tenets of a superior form of worship, which she merely served as a high priestess' (Proust 1919: 214).

In my commentary, I emphasised that the narrator does not say Odette 'worships' through dressing or that she is a 'high priestess' but that it is 'as though' these things were true. This distancing language signals that though he might like to describe Odette's comportment without recourse to religious locutions like 'pious', 'rites', 'liturgies', 'worship', and 'high priestess', there does not seem to be another way to accomplish the task. From a Heideggerian understanding, this is because the phenomenon he is trying to describe is the event of Odette's ensembles 'gathering' the 'divinities' or allowing 'being' to show up in a religious way, i.e. one indicative of deep meaning. This involves a phenomenological overlap between, on the one hand, everyday engagement with 'things' called clothes and, on the other, religious practice.

This phenomenological overlap is no less central to Gill's understanding of clothes as churches. When Odette 'observe[s]' her 'standards in dress' 'for her own sake', she is, in Gill's terms, directing her energy toward the 'good of the thing' that is so central to his understanding of art/quality-thing-making (*ACC* x and 22; *C* 12 and 14; et. al.). In Odette's case, it is the good of the ensemble. Moreover, the 'for her own sake' jibes with Gill's sense that clothes should be 'the manifestation of men's proper dignity and for the adornment of [their] person', 'the sign of [man's 'proper'] pride; of his belief in himself 'because he knows himself the child of God', who 'has been redeemed'. Odette's dress thus mirrors Gill's sartorial injunctions by virtue of heeding a call to something deeper than the traditionally-stated reasons for dressing, i.e. protection,

modesty, and decoration:<sup>117</sup> Her ‘standards in dress’ constitute, as Proust’s narrator puts it, ‘tenets of a superior form of worship, which she merely served as a high priestess’.

This worship involves dressing in clothes that ‘seemed to have a special meaning because they were no longer fashionable’, that ‘preserved’ a ‘remnant [...] of former times’ (Proust 1919: 195). To use Heideggerian parlance, they ‘open/set up the world’ of the past and, therefore, ‘la[y] bare’ ‘the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being’, i.e. ‘time’ or ‘temporality’ (*BT* 19 and 38 / *GA* 2: 1 and 24). Because we are temporal beings, we can only ever understand being in a time-structured way. Thus, when Odette’s ensemble makes temporality conspicuous in gathering the religious showing up of being, it reveals temporality as one of the essential features of being as it always presences for us and discloses the essential relation of religion and time. In this way, Odette practices what Heidegger’s *Guide* would regard as primordial adornment, which, precisely as ‘adornment (*Schmuck*), as the word says, adoringly nestles up against (*anschmeigt*) the matter’ for thought so that ‘through the adornment the matter can more beautifully shine forth’ (*CPC* 31 / *GA* 77: 47). While Gill does not offer such a primordial understanding, his attempt to locate in the human essence the depth of meaning he intuits in the human relation to raiment points to such an understanding to enrich and ground it.

---

<sup>117</sup> Even insofar as Odette’s aim is decoration, it is not the kind both Heidegger and Gill pejoratively refer to as ‘aesthetic’ in their comments about art (see *N1* 88 / *GA* 6.1: 87 for Heidegger on this point and ‘SSMI’, in *E* 78; cf. *ACC* 66; et. al. for Gill). However much Odette’s sartorial touches might, from the outside, seem to resemble those of someone with the aesthetic understanding of art and decoration Heidegger and Gill both oppose, her accessorising has a much deeper root in what Proust’s narrator calls the ‘tenets of a superior form of worship’. ‘One could sense’, he says, ‘that for her, dressing was not just a matter of comfort or adornment of the body: whatever she wore encompassed her like the delicate and etherealised epitome of a civilisation’ (Proust 1919: 196).

The connections between Heidegger's 'mortals' and Gill's 'architecture of clothing' are fewer and less fertile, though perhaps only because Gill speaks so briefly about his mortals-corresponding phenomenon, 'clothes-as-town-halls'. In chapter four and throughout the thesis, I characterised Heidegger's understanding of human being as meaning-making or 'in a world' or unity of 'significance' (*BT* 120-1 / *GA* 2: 116-17) or meaningful relations and therefore 'towards death' (*BT* 276-7 and 279ff. / *GA* 2: 310-11 and 315ff.) in the sense of experiencing 'death as death' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152 and 'Th', in *PLT* 176 / *GA* 7: 180), as a meaningful 'end' (*BT* 276ff. / *GA* 2: 309-10) or fulfilment of being. As such, it must, by its very essence, relate to its 'world' or 'be' by 'dwelling' or 'staying with things' ('BDT', in *BW* 353 and 358-9 / *GA* 7: 153 and 158-60) in the meaningful two-fold sense of 'nurs[ing] and nurtur[ing] the things that grow, and specially construct[ing] things that do not grow' ('BDT', in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153).

Such engagement with 'things' amounts to 'let[ting] beings be the beings they are' ('ET', in *PM* 144 / *GA* 9: 188) by allowing them to 'gather the fourfold' ('Th', in *PLT* 171-2 / *GA* 7: 175 and 'BDT', in *BW* 355-6 / *GA* 7: 155-6), which constitutes a fourfold 'preserving' or 'safeguarding' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152; et. al.) of that complex, as it pertains to each of the preserved or gathered elements: 'Mortals' 'save the earth' in that they do not 'exploit it', 'wear it out', 'master' it, or 'subjugate it' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152) but let it be the supportive, nourishing, and, ultimately, reabsorbing 'earth' it is. Similarly, they preserve the sky in that 'they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152) but allow the integrated matrix of celestial cycles and patterns that necessarily shape and condition existence to

do just that. They also preserve the ‘divinities’ or let ‘being’ ‘be’, ‘presence’, or ‘show up’ in a religious way, as the source of deep meaning, which means waiting and hoping for, receiving from, thanking by having gratitude for, giving back to by enquiring into, and preparing and refining ourselves for presencing as such. Finally, they safeguard themselves and other mortals by embracing rather than evading the ‘end’ of their participation in the being that constitutes their proper home, i.e. the being that is capable of ‘death as death’.

As I noted in chapter two, Gill says that since ‘[Man’s] nature can only find its full satisfaction in the contemplation of being’, ‘primarily and permanently he needs a church and a town-hall [and, by extension, their sartorial analogues] to *be* in’ (C 99; emphasis original). The reason humans need two structures to ‘be’ in, rather than one, is that the church and town-hall reflect the ‘two indestructible sides of [man’s] being; he is spirit and matter; he is of another world as well as of this; he is a citizen of two cities and owes a double allegiance. Whether he lives in London or Hong-Kong, whether he lives in the largest town or the smallest village, he lives also in the Heavenly Jerusalem’ (C 99-100). Of course, this reflects what Heidegger would regard as Gill’s metaphysical orientation.

Nevertheless, the passage as a whole reveals an overlap between Heidegger’s ‘mortals’ and Gill’s clothes-as-town-halls rubric, for Heidegger’s central thesis about human being, namely, that ‘Dasein [...] is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’ and, hence, ‘*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being*’ (BT 32 / GA 2: 16; emphasis original) parallels Gill’s contention that ‘[Man’s] nature can only find its full satisfaction in the contemplation of being’.

In other words, for both Heidegger and Gill, the ‘being’ or ‘nature’ of humans is to have an ‘understanding of being’ and have it be an ‘issue’, i.e. to ‘contemplate’ it. Heidegger develops the point by saying this meaning-making entails that human being is both ‘in a world’ of ‘significance’ and ‘toward death’, the former of which is what allows humans to engage with ‘things’ in the meaningful way that lets them ‘be the beings they are’ by ‘gathering’ the ‘fourfold’, including the human element, ‘mortals’. Such mortal-gathering amounts to bringing humans, and therefore human being, near, allowing the former to ‘preserve’ the latter by embracing rather than evading the ‘end’ of their participation in this being that is capable of ‘death as death’ and constitutes their ‘hearth’ or proper home (*HHI* 120 and 105-8 / *GA* 53: 150 and 130-4). As I discussed in chapter four, Heidegger calls this preservation by embrace ‘initiat[ing] their own essential being—their being capable of death as death’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152), and ‘initiat[ing] mortals into the essence of death’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 352-3 / *GA* 7: 152-3).

While, unlike Heidegger, Gill has surprisingly little to say about death, he does note that all humans are afraid of it (*C* 19-20) and that ‘By the very fact of living we are acclimatised to death’ (*A* 78) but that ‘facing death [...] is the chief business of life’ (*A* 278).<sup>118</sup> He offers little or no commentary on the first two statements so it is difficult to discern just how much overlap they have with Heidegger’s understanding. It nevertheless remains possible to make

---

<sup>118</sup> Others amongst his brief insights on the matter are that though the ‘body will die’, the ‘mind’, as ‘untouchable by physical means’, ‘will continue to be’ (*NB* 280) and that, as the ‘separation of matter and spirit, matter and mind’, ‘death is the actual aim of industrialism, its diabolical direction’, for ‘industrialism leads so clearly towards that separation’ (*NB* 265). This latter insight is, of course, contingent upon Gill’s view, which I outlined in chapter two, that the proper role for humans is not ‘machine-minders being simply parts of the machinery’ (‘AAIP’, in *E* 173) but skilled artists making products of ‘imagination directly operative upon material’ (*ACC* 77).

connections. Like Heidegger, Gill identifies a tendency in humans both to evade and to become accustomed to death, though in Gill, these tendencies carry far less weight than in Heidegger. Still, he affirms instead ‘facing’ death, an injunction that parallels, though is not identical to, what Pattison describes as Heidegger’s emphasis on the ‘courage to face up to and accept and even identify with [our] anxiety’ ‘about our lives as a whole’ ‘in the face of death’, ‘to run freely toward [our] death’, which is a ‘condition for raising the question as to the meaning of our being as a whole’ (Pattison 2013: 26-7 and 30).

By developing the understanding shared with Gill, according to which human being is to contemplate being, Heidegger provides Gill’s comments on clothes-as-town-halls with a primordial underpinning. Gill says ‘a town-hall is primarily a meeting-house for citizens’ (C 156) to do the ‘business of government’ that is now ‘done in the lobby’ (C 145). As I said in chapter two, it seems responsible to infer from even these brief comments that the clothes-as-town-halls rubric concerns the public or social aspect of our apparel. This involves not just or even primarily what it communicates but also how that, together with what it does to us in terms of our self-experience, facilitates and conditions intercourse with others. But, from a Heideggerian understanding, such mortal-gathering is only possible in the first place because humans are the kind of meaning-making beings that can develop language, relate to one another, and, thus, conduct ‘business’ and be ‘citizens’. In other words, the primordial reason that ‘primarily and permanently [man] needs’ a ‘town-hall [and, by extension, clothes-as-town-halls] to *be* in’ is that ‘Dasein [...] is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue

for it' and, hence, that '*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*'.

Unfortunately, Gill gives no example of clothes as town halls, but one sartorial phenomenon that illustrates the interpretation I am here presenting here is that of funeral attire or mourning clothes. Such garments rather straightforwardly gather the fourfold / exemplify all four of Gill's rubrics. Just like other cloth-things, they facilitate the feeling/wearing toward that extends our mineness, allowing us, albeit in our sadness, to be at 'home' in them after the manner of the nurturing earth / clothes-as-houses. Then, they facilitate the attunement/comportment of mourning with its mourner contemplation, not just of the loss but also of what the lost relationship meant and means, thus constraining us by ruling out more 'upbeat' attunements/comportments. This means they gather the sky and are, as Gill says, workshops or 'things to do things with', specifically, the doing of mourning. Finally, they gather the divinities, whose 'haleness' we prepare ourselves to meet upon reaching the 'other side' ('BDT', in *BW* 354-5 / *GA* 7: 155). In other words, such clothes relate us to the source of deep meaning by not allowing us to evade the various cluster of questions Heidegger calls the question of being, which automatically surface in the face of other mortals' death. We must sit with these questions as long as we are robed in black, an ever-present sartorial influence in terms of someone else's end and, thus, our own.

But, in a way related to the latter, mourning clothes also gather mortals, shaping the self-experience of the wearer according to the attunement/comportment of mourners as well as facilitating and conditioning the interaction between them and others. Those in the abode of mourning clothes

more palpably experience themselves as mourners. In such attire, they do not have to be happy, or even sad, necessarily. They do not have to be anything apart from what they palpably are by virtue of wearing the clothes: They are mourners. It is therefore inappropriate for others to tell them to 'cheer up'. And, where mourning attire is not just part of the funeral itself but also of the subsequent weeks or even years in the larger mourning process, people for whom the mourners would otherwise remain inconspicuous suddenly find them brought near by virtue of the mourning attire: Someone is dead to that person and, now, in the 'gathering' done by the clothes, someone is dead to me. The deceased was a 'dying one' [*Sterbliche*], the mourner is a dying one, I am a dying one. As John Donne famously put it, 'any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee' (Donne 1990 edn.: 272; emphasis original). This, in the language of Gill, is both the mourner's and my opportunity for 'facing death' or, on Pattison's explication of Heidegger, our opportunity 'to run freely toward [our] death', which constitutes a gathering of mortals by the mourner's cloth-things.

## Sartorial Theorists besides Heidegger and Gill

Over the course of this thesis and especially in consulting Heidegger and Gill in tandem, I have presented various silent ways clothes shape our self-experience. Shortly, I will culminate this endeavour in a discussion of the kinds of theological resonances clothes can bear in facilitating an attunement or comportment such as openness and/or proximity to God. Before doing so, however, I would like to highlight some of what I have presented in relation to theorists other than Heidegger and Gill, interpreting their insights in terms of the latter thinkers. Some of the theorists will bear on the discussion of theological resonances to come while others are relevant to the more basically phenomenological understanding of the human relationship to clothes I have sketched in light of gleanings from Heidegger and Gill.

I have already revisited Lotze's observation that when our body remains in contact with something, we identify ourselves with it and shown that this is an extension of 'mineness' of the kind that clothes-as-houses facilitate. I also noted that this extension stems from the meaning-making kind of being that can understand a 'world' in terms of locations and spaces to be in, making 'standing through' spaces possible so that we feel or wear toward clothes and therefore feel 'at home' in them. After my introduction of Lotze's ideas in chapter one, I presented G. Stanley Hall's discussion of those times we feel we have lost a part of ourselves after misplacing a long-worn, beloved piece of clothing. Hall thinks that, in such cases, we mistake 'clothes-consciousness' for 'body-consciousness', by which he means we think we are meditating on our body when, in fact, we are meditating on our clothes. While he believes such an error mistakes what is 'at best alter ego' for ego and therefore 'distort[s] the

primal sense of the physical self', he puzzlingly says 'Lotze has done a real service in showing us that clothes are an integral part of our self-consciousness' (Hall 1898: 367).

On the understanding I have outlined in this chapter, what Hall calls the 'translat[ion]' of 'body consciousness' into 'clothes-consciousness' is simply the 'feeling toward' or 'wearing toward' that extends what the 'mineness' of our being includes from, as he says, the 'primal sense of the physical self' to a 'self-consciousness' more broadly construed. In this sense, Hall is right that clothes are 'alter' or other than 'ego' because the 'mineness' cannot include them without extending. Equally, however, he is right that they are an 'integral part of our self-consciousness' in that such extension is even possible through the phenomenon of feeling or wearing toward. As Flaccus puts it in finishing Hall's work, 'There is much pleasure in [new clothes'] gradually becoming part of ourselves' (Flaccus 1906: 70), i.e. in the 'incorporation of originally unrelated objects into the "Me"' (Flaccus 1906: 69).

This tendency of our sense of self to incorporate what we are wearing lies at one end of what we might call a feeling/wearing-toward spectrum. At the other end lies resistance to the phenomenon. Flaccus alludes to the latter comportment in describing respondents' distaste for rough or hot garments, which he says lead to irritable moods (Flaccus 1906: 70-1). He assesses the situation by saying, 'It is evident that the less the attention is distracted by irritating features in the surface of actual content, the more perfect will be the illusion' that the clothing is part of the self wearing it (Flaccus 1906: 69).<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> Flügel says the inverse is also true: 'If the garment in question is liable to behave in a way that is not in accordance with the wishes of the wearer, it is apt to seem a troublesome foreign body rather than an agreeable extension of the self' (Flügel 1930: 37).

From the perspective of this chapter, the reason for this is the same as the reason we find other clothes ‘gradually becoming part of ourselves’. Given that clothes are ‘built things’ that set up micro-locations and therefore always encourage us to ‘stand through’ the spaces between them by feeling or wearing toward the clothes, we also respond strongly in the opposite direction when wearing something objectionable. We do not want to identify with a garment that feels alien and this is exactly what it would have us do as an essential feature of the kind of thing it is. Clothing’s tendency to make us feel at ‘home’ renders sartorial foreignness that much more offensive.

Finally, I want to highlight Dearborn’s thesis that since, ‘properly and socially speaking, [a man’s clothes] *are* part of him’, ‘They should be [...] unobtrusive’ (Dearborn 1918: 66; emphasis original), which, above all, means loose, because such clothing lends comfort and therefore yields a more efficient and happy life. One argument he provides for the claim that loose clothing increases efficiency is that it facilitates skill-development: ‘Constricting [...] clothes’ put pressure on the body, producing ‘vexations and discomposing sensations [...] of the kinaesthetic regions’ (Dearborn 1918: 26). Since these kinaesthetic regions ‘mak[e] it possible for us subconsciously to control all our bodily acts’ (Anon. 1913: 1167),<sup>120</sup> vexations in those regions ‘are *precisely the kind of interrupting sensations most certain to disturb ideal bodily action*’ (Dearborn 1918: 28; emphasis original). But since bodily action plays a role in skill-development;<sup>121</sup> if the former is disturbed, the latter suffers. As a

---

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Dearborn’s statement that ‘The control of voluntary movements, of all movements in fact, is largely by the [...] kinaesthesia’ (Dearborn 1918: 24).

<sup>121</sup> That is, in Dearborn’s technical phrasing, ‘The neuro-physiology of skill [is] in part determined by the afferent neurograms of movement’ (Dearborn 1918: 25)

result, 'the rational human worker in the long run everywhere tends to adapt his raiment so that it will not limit in any degree his bodily action, thus lessening his basal vocational skill, earner of his daily bread' (Dearborn 1918: 27). Dearborn's argument, then, is that wearing loose clothes that do not encumber the kinaesthesia results in comfort, which enables the development of skill, which, in turn, feeds into efficiency (Dearborn 1918: 24) and happiness.

This parallels the Heidegger-enhanced-Gill's understanding of clothes as workshops. Fire kits are the kind of clothes that are, in Gill's words, 'tools and places to work in' (C 52), 'things to do things with—to walk, to dance, to run, to dine, to ride, to work' (C 60). As such, they facilitate the contemplation necessary to do the kind of endeavour for which they are a tool and place to work; they encourage their wearers to enter the attunement/comportment of being firefighters. The kits' encouragement of this attunement/comportment renders the firefighter contemplation possible, which, in Dearborn's vocabulary, leads to the development of the firefighter skill. This is consistent with Gill's understanding of art: 'Art is skill—skill in doing or skill in making' ('AP', in *BLH* 11), at least 'loosely' ('AP', in *BLH* 12) construed. The latter of these two is the doing that 'becomes making' 'when a man's deeds are directed [...] to the good of a *thing*' ('AP', in *BLH* 12; emphasis original), but 'In both cases skill in doing is required' ('AP', in *BLH* 13). As I have previously quoted Gill as saying, clothes-as-workshops are 'place[s] for contemplation', which increases 'knowledge of the beautiful', making the clothes a 'womb' of 'beautiful things'. By wearing these 'workshops', then, workers encourage the attunement/comportment of contemplation that produces the 'skill in doing or skill in making' that Gill says constitutes art, loosely construed. In his narrower sense

of art as solely skill in making, this results in 'beautiful', i.e. well-made ('AB', in *E* 230), things, but the skill that leads to such handmade artefacts is undergirded by the 'contemplation' that increases knowledge of the beautiful more broadly and therefore also leads to 'skill in doing', a kind of beautiful action, so to speak.

In summary, then, we have several silent ways in which clothes shape our self-experience that I have highlighted throughout this thesis. First, we have Lotze's observation that clothes can lend an expansion or extension of the self, 'a kind and amount of motion foreign to our natural organs', and 'an unusual degree of vigour, power of resistance, or steadiness in our bearing'. Then, we have what Hall calls the confusion of 'clothes-consciousness' for 'body-consciousness' that occurs when we feel we have lost a part of ourselves after misplacing a long-worn, beloved piece of clothing. And, as per Flaccus and Flügel, clothes can cause us to assert our 'self' over against them or, as per Flaccus, Dearborn, Eco, and Torell, they can cause us to forget all about our 'self'. Finally, as per Dearborn and Gill, they can facilitate skill development.

Besides these insights, we have Gill's observations that clothes can make us feel at 'home', facilitate the contemplation necessary to do quality work, lend us 'habit in which [to walk with our] Master', inspire us to contemplate being, and allow us to intercourse with others. Finally, we have the numerous possibilities for 'gathering' that a Heideggerian analysis of clothes brings out: Clothes can nurture but also condition us by relating us to the nurturing and supporting earth and conditioning and constraining sky. At the same time, they can relate us to the divinities or source of deep meaning and help us contemplate death as mortals while relating to other 'dying ones'. This fourfold-

gathering can happen on the model of the handmade artefact that involves the elements in its making and/or functioning, on that of the built thing that makes a site for the elements, or on that of the work of art whose gathering of the elements occurs as part of the 'strife' between the 'earth' and the fourfold 'world'. But in addition to highlighting silent ways clothes shape our self-experience, consulting Gill and Heidegger in tandem articulates a deeper relationship between our being and clothes that renders that silent shaping possible in the first place. This 'being' is that which is meaning-making, having a 'world' or unity of significance on a number of understandings, one of which is that of the world as unity of locations or micro-locations and spaces.

Such an articulation also involves calling attention to the meaning or resonances that we, as the only meaning-making beings, impart to clothes. But human being is not outside its world or unity of relations, such that the impact of its meaning-based relating only goes from human to thing. Rather, it is precisely being 'in' the world, which is why Heidegger says the human mastering of the earth as 'standing reserve' ultimately so masters humans in return ('QCT', in *QCT* 26-7 / *GA* 7: 27-8). Thus, the meanings or resonances we impart to clothes have import not just for them but also for us insofar as these resonances play a role in our clothes' shaping of our self-experience. In this vein, I have, throughout this thesis, cited the study of Adam and Galinsky. According to their findings, not just assigning a meaning to but 'actually wearing a piece of clothing and having the accompanying physical experiences (e.g. seeing it on one's body, feeling it on one's skin, etc.) will make it significantly more likely for the piece of clothing to influence the wearer's psychological processes' and 'behavioural tendencies' (Adam and Galinsky

2012: 919). In other words, it is not just that we impart meanings or resonances to clothes; it is also that wearing such meaning-infused garments shapes our self-experience according to the resonances in such a way as to render our moods and behaviour, i.e. our attunement/comportment, more in line with those resonances than they would otherwise be. Some of these resonances are going to be theologically-relevant and, in the next section, I will complete this thesis by exploring such resonances through the theo-sartorial example of ‘church clothes’.

### Dwelling in Church Clothes

In chapter five, I delineated Heidegger’s understanding of the bridge as epitomising the built thing’s particular kind of fourfold-gathering and I further offered the raincoat as one way clothes might similarly bring the four fundamental elements of human existence into nearness with each other. In this section, I will similarly explicate Heidegger’s other example of a built thing gathering the fourfold, namely, ‘a farmhouse in the Black Forest’, showing how this example relates to phenomenon of ‘church clothes’. With this latter phrase, I have in mind the kind of apparel Christian worshippers in the West wore to church for the better part of the twentieth century, i.e. their ‘Sunday Best’: for

men, suits, ties and, prior to the 1960s, hats;<sup>122</sup> for women, ‘Sunday dresses’, shoes, hats, jewellery, and a panoply of other accessories. The idea in such dressing was that worshippers ‘look [their] best for God’, which, from one point of view, is curious, given that ‘God sees [them] all week’ (Richards and O’Brien 2012: 44). Hence, some commentators have argued that it is the specialness of the sanctuary and/or nave that warrants principled apparel. As George Weigel puts it in making another point, ‘Sacred space is different from other space; the inside of the church is different from the narthex’ (Weigel 2012). Unsurprisingly, then, he too counsels an intentional approach to clothes for worship: ‘Dressing in one’s “Sunday best” was not an affectation; it was an acknowledgment of our baptismal dignity. Let’s reclaim that dignity and its expression in our “Sunday best”’ (Weigel 2012).

Whether for God’s sight, God’s house, or our own dignity in God, however, wearing special and/or one’s best clothes for church is ubiquitous in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western culture.<sup>123</sup> One particularly

---

<sup>122</sup> The most celebrated explanation for the decline in men’s hats is that U.S. President John F. Kennedy supposedly refrained from wearing one at his inauguration and elsewhere, inspiring the country and world immediately to follow suit. Neil Steinberg’s research demonstrates that though Kennedy did often go hatless, he wore an especially foppish top hat to his inauguration and occasionally sported headwear of all sorts throughout his presidency (Steinberg 2004: xixff.). Moreover, despite the fact that even hat company executives blamed Kennedy for their dip in sales (Steinberg 2004: xviiff. and xxiff.), the numbers had, in fact, dropped decades earlier (Steinberg 2004: xix.). The aversion of Kennedy and others in his generation to wearing hats was thus a product of some other force. For his part, Steinberg offers the explanation that the end of WWI brought the tendency toward conformity to an end and therefore naturally saw the rise of men going hatless, thitherto an explicit taboo (Steinberg 2004: xxiii, 232, and 270-1). Of course, even in the heyday of male hat-wearing, men wore them to church but never in church, as per the Pauline prohibition in 1 Cor. 11.4. This deference was extended from church buildings to indoors more generally and from God to earthy authorities (Steinberg 2004: 146ff.).

<sup>123</sup> Western literature, for example, contains myriad references and allusions, including Andersen 2008 edn.: 240; Camus 1995 edn.: 21, 74, 103, and 191; Dickens 1860/1: 185; Grimm and Grimm 1857: 599; Kafka 1925: 11 and 28; H. Lee 1960: 156, 170, and 306; Proust 1913: 121; Robinson 2004: 32; D. Thomas 1971 edn.: 129, 208, and 340; Twain 1876: 31; and Wilder 1932: 83-9. Somewhat anachronistically, the OUP translation of *The Decameron* even renders the ornately-dressed Ricciardo’s nickname, *il Zima*, as ‘Sunday-best’ (Boccaccio 1993 edn.: 195-200). Literally, the Italian means ‘the summit’ (Boccaccio 1943 edn.: 192 n. 2) and, thus, other translators render it ‘The Height of Fashion’ (Boccaccio 2004 edn.: 214) or simply ‘the Dandy’ (Boccaccio 1995 edn.: 222).

interesting depiction of the phenomenon occurs in the musical *Hello Dolly*, which takes place amid the strong atmosphere of courtship and marriage indicative of the 1890s United States. At the relevant juncture in the narrative, the titular character, a matchmaker called Dolly Levi, has arranged an evening in New York City for several of the other characters, most of whom live in what one of them describes as ‘this hick town’, Yonkers. They all dress in their fanciest attire and make their way to the train for the city, singing ‘Put on Your Sunday Clothes’:

Put on your Sunday clothes when you feel down and out  
Strut down the street and have your picture took  
Dressed like a dream, your spirits seem to turn about  
That Sunday shine is a certain sign that you feel as fine as you look

Beneath your parasol, the world is all a smile  
That makes you feel brand new down to your toes  
Get out your feathers, your patent leathers  
Your beads and buckles and bows

For there’s no blue Monday in your Sunday  
No Monday in your Sunday  
No Monday in your Sunday clothes

[...]

Beneath your bowler brim the world’s a simple song  
A lovely lilt that makes you tilt your nose  
Get out your slickers, your flannel knickers,  
Your red suspenders and hose  
For there’s no blue Monday in your Sunday clothes

These lines are consistent with my general thesis that what we put on influences the way we experience ourselves. More particularly, however, they also suggest that, where prevalent, ‘church clothes’ accomplish this influence in line with whatever wearers take to be their Sunday disposition, in this case, feeling ‘as fine as you look’ and ‘brand new down to your toes’ in the midst of a world that is ‘all a smile’ and ‘simple song’.

Theologically speaking, the importance of wearing one's 'Sunday Best' partly lies in the fact that Sunday worship—and the Resurrection of Christ it implies—is cause for celebration, cause to 'Get out your feathers, your patent leathers | Your beads and buckles and bows', which, in turn, makes worshippers experience themselves as celebrants. Church thus becomes the regular outlet for such festiveness. But as American culture tended toward secularisation, church goers began, in the main, to transpose this celebratory Sunday disposition or 'Sunday shine' onto the events of their increasingly non-ecclesial social lives: Church became town; church clothes became 'town clothes'.<sup>124</sup> Interestingly, though, the fact that the erstwhile church goers' dressing up began ecclesially means that a vestige of Sundayness for a while remained in that fancy attire. This is evident in the fact that the characters in *Hello Dolly* use the term 'Sunday clothes' to refer to garments they and the society at large put on for increasingly secular purposes.

It is precisely this power of clothes to carry and retain such theological resonances that I want to consider in this section. To do so, I will compare church clothes to Heidegger's Black Forest farmhouse. Concerning the fourfold-gathering potential of the latter, Heidegger says:

The essence of building is letting dwell. Building accomplishes its essential process in the raising of locales by the joining of their spaces. *Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.* Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and sky, divinities and mortals enter *in simple oneness* into things ordered the house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope, looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and that, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did

---

<sup>124</sup> See, e.g. Degas' *Lady in Town Clothes* (1879).

not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the ‘tree of the dead’—for that is what they call a coffin there: the *Totenbaum*—and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft that, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and its gear as things, built the farmhouse. [‘BDT’, in *BW* 361-2 / *GA* 7: 162]

Unlike Heidegger’s description of the bridge’s gathering, this passage emphasises the built thing’s parts as ‘ordered’ according to their role in its fourfold-gathering ‘power’. The foundation gathers the earth in resting on and ‘plac[ing] the farm on’ the ‘slope’ of the earth, ‘looking south among’ its ‘meadows close to the spring’. The ‘wide overhanging shingle roof’ shields inhabitants from the sky’s wind, ‘burden of snow’, and ‘storms of the long winter nights’ while the ‘altar’ in the ‘corner behind the community table’ gathers the divinities by offering the inhabitants a reminder of and response to the source of deep meaning. Finally, the ‘childbed’ and ‘coffin’ gather mortals by embracing birth and death and involving the inhabitants in them.

In exploring the phenomenon of ‘church clothes’, I will take my cue from this passage, treating instances of church clothes insofar as they are a unity of parts, i.e. this or that person’s church clothes, a kind of uniform, as opposed to a collection of phenomena such as ‘church trousers’ and ‘church shoes’. It is true that locutions like the latter are part of the vocabulary worshippers use to speak of the larger ‘church clothes’ phenomenon and I will therefore employ them. Nevertheless, when speaking of how, for example, ‘church shoes’ gather the fourfold, the point is not how they do this of and by themselves but of how they thereby play a role in the larger fourfold-gathering of the ‘church clothes’ unity to which they belong. Moreover, some of the gathering potential of this unity will overlap with that of other sartorial unities. For example, much of the way

church clothes and ‘work clothes’ respectively gather the ‘earth’ are the same. While this does not show how the former, as distinct from other ensembles, gather, it is important to detail the gathering of church clothes in all four of its elements, even if this involves describing what is also part of the gathering of other sartorial unities. The aim of this thesis, however, necessitates a focus on the specifically theological character of church clothes, which shows up in a number of subtle ways, especially in the particular manner they gather the ‘divinities’.

The similarities between the fourfold-gathering of church clothes and that of Heidegger’s Black Forest farmhouse lie in the parallels between how the two phenomena are respectively ‘ordered’. Like the foundation of the house, the shoes of the church uniform (and many shoes in general) gather the earth by resting and standing on the ‘slope’ of the earth, perhaps ‘among the meadows close to the spring’. Also, while most worshippers are probably not wearing their church shoes to ‘trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 159 / *GA* 5: 19), the footwear nevertheless bear some resemblance to the ‘peasant shoes’ in the van Gogh painting Heidegger examines: ‘From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. [...] On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 159 / *GA* 5: 19). In other words, in addition to the fact that church shoes are the foundation in which worshippers stand on the earth, they also gather the latter by carrying the resonance of their wearers’ engagement with that earth. These church-goers have toiled. They have walked not only the

path to the door of the church but also the path of their existence, of which the former path is a part in the same way that the Heidelberg bridge is a part of the larger journey 'to the other side' made by those crossing it.

Similarly, just as the farmhouse has a 'wide overhanging shingle roof' that 'bears up under the burden of snow, and that, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights', church clothes also respond to the sky's weather. Worshippers don blazers, pashminas, and cardigans to shelter them from the wind, snow, and storms, 'leav[ing] to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152). On the one hand, this makes such raiment, to use Gill's phrase, 'clothes-as-houses' in the protective sense. On the other, it also makes these church clothes 'workshops' in the sense of being 'things to do things with', in this case, the winterly thing of staying warm. As such, they do not attempt to master the conditioning/constraining character of the sky but instead acknowledge its winterly presencing and respond by constraining the wearer's attunement/comportment to a winterly rather than summerly one.

But church clothes also carry specifically theological resonances in connection with earth and sky. In coming through the church doors, out of the rain and into a dry foyer, worshippers wipe and scrape the mud of the earth off their church shoes; they shake the sky's rain off their hats and umbrellas before stashing their outerwear in the coat hold and hat rack. While they perform these actions before entering other places, here, such preparation feels even more justified. As Heidegger intimates, coming 'before the haleness of the divinities' requires 'surmount[ing] all that is common and unsound' ('BDT', in *BW* 355 /

GA 7: 155). Or, to use another Heideggerian phrase, the ‘sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of what is early’ (‘QCT’, in *QCT 22 / GA 7: 23*) necessitates an attentive attunement/comportment. Such performative reverence invokes the Mosaic burning bush: ‘Remove the sandals from your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground’ (Exod. 3: 5, NRSV). Church Fathers tend to interpret this saying as an exhortation to put off the world<sup>125</sup> and modern commentators debate the probable reasoning behind the injunction and its parallel in Josh. 5: 15 as literally construed (see Propp 1999: 200 for a good summary of the possibilities). Most of the suggestions from both of these groups, however, involve God’s instructing Moses to go barefoot ‘in his honour’, as Augustine puts it (Leinhard [ed.] 2001: 14), or reason that it is ‘presumptuous to appear before Yahweh shod’ (Propp 1999: 200).

But the pericope itself only says that the ground is holy, not specifically why it is holy. While the holiness is obviously connected with the theophany of the bush, from a Heideggerian perspective, this connectedness lies in the fact the fourfold is unified. For Heidegger, any theophanous gathering of the divinities will always accompany a corresponding gathering or ‘holiness’ of earth or ground, as well as of sky, and, together, these will also accompany a gathering of or response from mortals. In the Mosaic vocational narrative, this response is for Moses to take off his shoes, allowing his feet to interact directly with the soil of the earth.<sup>126</sup> Likewise, in the practice of churchgoers, it is to wipe

---

<sup>125</sup> Ambrose, for example, allegorises Moses’ shoes as ‘bonds of the body’, ‘bonds of the world’, and ‘garments of the flesh’, Gregory of Nazianzus as ‘what is dead’, Evagrius as ‘every thought that is coloured by passion’, and Augustine as ‘dead animals’ and therefore ‘dead works’ (Leinhard [ed.] 2001: 13-14).

<sup>126</sup> Interestingly, Ober et. al. 2010: 10-11 argue that ‘earthing’/‘grounding’, i.e. walking barefoot outdoors, leads to a number of health benefits by ‘difus[ing] inflammation’, ‘improv[ing] blood pressure’, ‘reliev[ing] muscle tension’, etc.

and scrape the mud from their shoes. But as part of the larger unified gathering of all four elements, the preparation of the worshippers also includes a response to the 'sky', whereby they doff their outerwear, shaking the weather that clings to it, to reveal their more primordial church clothes underneath. In a Heideggerian analysis, the theological resonance of these actions lies in their accompaniment of and preparation for the theophanous gathering of the divinities or proximity to God in the sanctuary in the same way that the Mosaic shoe-removal accompanies and prepares for the divinely burning bush. This theological resonance 'shows up' in the understanding of the worshipers via injunctions to keep 'God's house' or the 'tabernacle' clean by wiping one's feet or to 'take worship seriously' or even 'prepare for worship' by being quiet during such pre-service undertakings.

Because Heidegger speaks of the divinities element of the fourfold in explicitly theological language, however, the most straightforwardly theological resonance church clothes carry is in connection with it. Heidegger says the Black Forest farmhouse does 'not forget the altar corner behind the community table'. That is, in giving the fourfold space or room to gather, it gives the divinities room to gather, making a place for inhabitants to acknowledge and respond to the source of deep meaning. Church clothes make a similar place for divinity-gathering simply by being church clothes. When meaning-making beings set aside or 'consecrate' certain garments for a specific regular purpose, not using them for much else, the latter acquire a meaning or resonance in accordance with that purpose. In the case of the lab coat from Adam and Galinsky's study in chapter one, the purpose is to conduct scientific research, resulting in a resonance of attentiveness and scientific focus. According to the

findings of the study, this had a ‘systematic influence [...] on the wearer’s psychological processes and behavioural tendencies’ or, in the words of the hypothesis the study supported, ‘wearing a lab coat increases performance on attention-related tasks’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 919).

In the case at hand, however, the resonance is theological. Church clothes are clothes for worship. Like other clothes, they are ‘houses’ in the sense that they encourage the extension of ‘mineness’ and ‘workshops’ in the sense that they are ‘tools and places to do things in’ (C 52), in this case, to worship in. But they are also ‘churches’ in the sense of raiment fit for one who ‘lives also in the Heavenly Jerusalem’ (C 100), ‘habit in which [man] walks with his Master’ (C 185). While we have no studies specifically concerning the ‘systematic influence’ of church clothes ‘on the wearer’s psychological processes and behavioural tendencies’, Adam and Galinsky hypothesise that their findings might be extrapolated to infer that the reason ‘wearing a nurse uniform makes people less likely to administer [electric] shocks’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 918) is that it ‘trigger[s] associated concepts of caring and altruistic behaviour’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922). Similarly, they hypothesise that ‘wearing the robe of a priest or judge [might] make people more ethical’, that ‘putting on an expensive suit [might] make people feel more powerful’, and that ‘putting on a uniform of a firefighter or police officer [might] make people act more courageously’ (Adam and Galinsky 2012: 922).

A similar hypothesis is that donning church clothes or clothes set aside for worship and not used for much else makes people feel worshipful, makes them more inclined toward the worshipful attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. For example, worshippers might already

begin entering the openness/proximity before they ever get to church, in the early-morning *Ereignis*-event of dressing in front of their wardrobe, ‘put[ting] on the Lord Jesus Christ’, the ‘armour of light’ (Rom. 13: 12-14, NRSV). This entrance, a kind of worship-by-preparing-for-worship, would already constitute the ‘systematic influence’ of church clothes ‘on the wearer’s psychological processes and behavioural tendencies’. Further consequence in that domain would follow, however, insofar as openness/proximity to God facilitates the concomitant attunements or comportments that God encourages via the communication inherent to the relationship proximity entails. If, for example, as Adam and Galinsky suggest, ‘wearing the robe of a priest’ might ‘make people more ethical’, wearing one’s ‘Sunday Best’ might encourage ‘being on one’s best behaviour’, as one understands God to define it.

Finally, church clothes gather ‘mortals’. Heidegger says the Black Forest farmhouse ‘made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and [...] coffin’ or, in other words, ‘gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death [...] acquire the shape of destiny for human being’ (‘OWA’, in *BW* 167 / *GA* 5: 27-8). As with the ‘altar corner’ and the divinities, in giving the fourfold space or room to gather, the farmhouse gives mortals room to gather, making a place for them to acknowledge and respond to each other and the rest of the fourfold as mortals, as those beings who experience ‘death as death’. This occurs as they contemplate the life cycle to which the childbed and coffin witness, both in erecting them in the first place and in relating to them as they go about their daily tasks. Such ‘initiating mortals’ (‘BDT’, in *BW* 353 / *GA* 7: 153)—i.e. themselves and others—into ‘their own essential being [...] of death as death’, together with their response to the

rest of the fourfold, constitutes 'dwelling', which is how 'Mortals *are* in the fourfold' ('BDT', in *BW* 352 / *GA* 7: 152; emphasis original).

Church clothes gather similarly. In the example of the farmhouse, humans dwell or are gathered in the fourfold by attending the life cycle presencing in the childbed and coffin. Likewise, they are gathered in church clothes that have 'made room' for 'initiating mortals' by admitting resonances of birth and the 'death as death' that constitutes the 'essential being' of humans. Among other church events, worshippers wear their church clothes to baptisms/christenings and funerals. These happenings give mortals the opportunity to contemplate the life cycle in the same way that births and funerals do for Black-Forest-farmhouse dwellers. But the events also evoke the specifically Christian and therefore explicitly theological—and, on Heidegger's view, metaphysical—life cycle, in which one becomes 'born of' Christ (1 John 22, KJV), 'baptised into Christ' (Gal. 3: 27, KJV), and 'fallen asleep in Christ' (1 Cor. 15: 18, KJV), after which one will 'rise [...] to meet' Christ (1 Thess. 4: 16-17, KJV).

But the regularity with which baptisms/christenings and funerals happen in the church and therefore the regularity with which 'church clothes' used to be worn for them lent the latter these life cycle resonances for wearers to contemplate. This amounts to gathering mortals. Such gathering does not exhaust the phenomenon that 'ordered' the church clothes, just as there is more to the Black Forest farmhouse than its childbed and coffin, for 'the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and sky, divinities and mortals enter *in simple oneness* into things ordered the house'. In other words, neither the farmhouse nor church clothes are 'for' births and funerals *per se*; they do not

just gather mortals but the entire fourfold as a unity. In gathering the former as part of the latter, however, both phenomena have ‘made room in [their] chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and [...] coffin’. In the case of church clothes, this amounts to admitting or ‘mak[ing] room [...] for’ resonances of the life cycle and Christian life cycle amidst the other resonances, theological or otherwise, it admits in gathering the rest of the fourfold.

Finally, the gathering of mortals also happens in the communality of the church clothes. They are not a strictly private but also social phenomenon; they are, as Gill says, ‘town-halls’. Of course, one can surely wear the same clothes, or the same kind of clothes, to church every week as well as to the ecclesial community’s baptisms/christenings, funerals, and other events and this raiment will certainly thereby acquire resonances, both theological and otherwise. What makes such resonances even stronger, however, is that the clothes of a community are admitting them *en masse*. It is not just that I experience myself as a ‘dying one’ or a dying-and-rising-in-Christ-one via the resonances for which my church clothes have ‘made room’. Rather, I experience this even more because all of us in the community experience ourselves and each other in these ways via our clothes. I even more strongly experience myself as a dying-one or dying-and-rising-in-Christ-one when, through a shared relation to things called ‘church clothes’, we mortals, so understood, ‘gather’, i.e.

are palpably in the presence of other dying-ones or dying-and-rising-in-Christ-ones.<sup>127</sup>

Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, it is precisely because a shared relation to clothes has so much power that it makes little sense to advocate a reimplementing of church clothes in contemporary ecclesial society. In his comments on the farmhouse, Heidegger says, 'Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that *has been* how it was able to build' ('BDT', in *BW* 361-2 / *GA* 7: 162; emphasis original). The same is true of church clothes. While a return to worship raiment on the part of an individual worshipper or even a whole church would, no doubt, have some value, it cannot regain the power of society at large engaging with the phenomenon almost by accident. The sheer ubiquity of church clothes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western culture lent the relevant ensembles a resonance that cannot be retrieved by the act of an individual or small-collective will.

And we cannot reclaim the more broadly societal practice as such because the reason Western society embraced church clothes in the past is because it fit with the way it understood everything else, such that it could be a

---

<sup>127</sup> This would seem to be all the more true in cultures that subordinate private sartorial choices to religious prescriptions for clothing like the Jewish prayer shawl or Muslim veil. Also decisive in relation to such cultures, however, is Flaccus' and Flügel's insight that when a garment, prescribed or otherwise, is, as Flügel puts it, 'not in accordance with the wishes of the wearer, it is apt to seem a troublesome foreign body rather than an agreeable extension of the self'. To the extent that sartorial prescription entails a greater preponderance of such resistance to what I have called the extension of 'mineness', it will also entail resistance to self-experience in accordance with the resonances of the clothing prescribed. If such self-experience is desired, it will have to be sought elsewhere and if the resistance is sufficiently widespread, the resonance will begin to dissipate from the prescribed clothing. This is precisely what happened with church clothes in the West. Although the phenomenon remains alive and well in some niche communities, in the main, the increasing sense that church clothes were imposed from without rather than inspired from within and that they had more to do with pretence or the boring and contrived mores of the past than with attuning a worshipful comportment led to their scarcity and therefore the erosion of their theological resonances.

church-clothes culture without even trying. As Heidegger says, any “spirit”, e.g. that of ‘metaphysics’ or ‘Modern machine technology’, implies ‘a decision concerning the actuality of everything actual’ and since this decision is ‘essentially historical’, it further implies that ‘nothing of the historical world hitherto will return’ (*HHI* 53 / *GA* 53: 66). Previous instances of building and wearing are rooted in erstwhile ‘ways of revealing’ and we have to engage our current way, even if we do so by enquiring into or rethinking that way with reference to a phenomenon from a previous one. The idea in such an approach, however, is, as Heidegger says, to ‘illustrate’ the essence of dwelling in building or wearing so as to think about how we might do so in our own time.

Such has been the aim of this thesis as a whole. In this section specifically, however, I have compared church clothes to Heidegger’s Black Forest farmhouse so as to bring out a theologically-delineated dwelling-in-wearing. In such an attunement/comportment, clothes bear theological resonances, including the kinds outlined in discussing the farmhouse: a preparatory gathering they have in common with the Mosaic shoe-removal; their repeated association with worship, which facilitates openness/proximity to God in front of the wardrobe; and their witness to the Christian life cycle. The insights Dearborn and Adam and Galinsky make concerning wearer-consciousness suggest that, whether such resonances are entirely conspicuous or not, their gathering into the experience of worshippers is going to impact the latter’s ‘psychological processes and behavioural tendencies’. Specifically, the resonances facilitate the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God. For Heidegger and Gill, this is because humans are already in a more fundamentally spatial and therefore architectural and/or sartorial

attunement or comportment. This is rooted in humans' spatial kind of being that is, in turn, a feature of their existence as meaning-making beings that carve up space according to meaning in the first place.

### Conclusion

This chapter began by defending the mutual consultation of Heidegger and Gill in light of the former's qualms with what he would regard as the metaphysical presuppositions the latter's reflection assumes. I then interpreted Heidegger's phenomenological ontology of the fourfold and Gill's theological ontology of the 'architecture of clothing' as mutually supportive, arguing that both of them are rooted in a more primordial understanding of humans as spatial because meaning-making. Finally, I appealed to Heidegger's comments on the Black Forest farmhouse's fourfold-gathering to show how 'church clothes' can bear theological resonances, thereby facilitating the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God, as per the theological import Gill assigns clothing in general. To complete this thesis, I will, in a short epilogue, set this chapter in the context of the inquiry as a whole as well as comment on the kinds of research that might be done to build on the foundation the latter prepared.

## Epilogue

The burden of this thesis has been to determine, on a fundamental level, just what is going on between us and clothes. In line with this aim, I set aside questions concerning what we do with clothes in favour of those concerning what clothes do with us or, in the language of this thesis, what kinds of attunements or comportments they facilitate in us. Chapter one delineated the reflection and findings of theorists who have written on the latter concern and argued that these insights call for re-articulating our relationship to clothes. To accomplish this, I drew upon the works of Gill in chapter two and of Heidegger in chapters three and four. While the former explicitly addresses our relationship to clothes in speaking of human being as fundamentally architectural-sartorial, he does not provide the ontological foundation necessary to bolster that perspective. Since Heidegger also understands human being as spatial or architectural but does provide this foundation, I spent two chapters explicating his philosophy. Then, in chapter five, I extrapolated from this philosophy to develop a general account of being-in-clothes, giving examples on Heidegger's ontological foundation, i.e. in terms of his understanding that human being is dwelling or letting 'things' gather the fourfold. Finally, in the last chapter, I made a link between this work and Gill's to sketch a theological being-in-clothes, in the end, citing 'church clothes' as one example of how our attire can bear theological resonances, thereby facilitating the attunement or comportment of openness and/or proximity to God.

As I intimated several times throughout the thesis, however, none of this is to commend any particular kind of clothing or programme for dressing.

Rather, the idea is, in Pattison's words concerning onto-theology, 'to "step back"' from our thinking about clothes, 'so as to come into a free and thoughtful relation to it'. But more specific thoughts about dress could ensue from such a foundation. Continuing the line of thinking I presented in the last section, for example, one could reflect on how Christians might involve clothing in the liturgical movements of all worshippers, as opposed to limiting them to those of priests or other liturgical ministers. Exhorting parishioners/congregants to start wearing church clothes again is probably futile and will not, in any case, have the same significance it did in the past for the reason I adduced above. Ecclesial communities could, however, cultivate similar resonances, by, for example, involving some uniform piece of clothing in prayer during the mass or service, which individuals could also wear in supplication throughout the week to increase their resonant connection to the community.

Alternatively, fruitful discussion could emerge from examining women's experience of church clothes in terms of extending their 'mineness' to garments with which they may or may not want to identify as a result of any number of social implications. How does Heidegger's fourfold relate with regard to such questions? Similarly, one could explore the extension of 'mineness' and the potential for fourfold-gathering in connection with the cultural practice—and, in some cases, legal requirement—of Muslim women wearing a *burqa* or other head/body covering while in public. It would also be interesting to analyse the role of dress in the ecstatic devotion of Sufi whirling dervishes. Does the attire's ability to 'whirl' and, thus, à la Lotze, 'create the pleasing delusion that it is ourselves that float and wave and sway' facilitate the ecstasy or even the devotion in such experiences? Finally, given the 'influence', as Adam and

Galinsky say, of clothing on our 'psychological processes and behavioural tendencies', what kinds of garments should be part of an overall initiative to improve quality of life for those in developing regions or those of low socio-economic status in our own? All these questions, and many others, signal directions for further enquiry along the lines I have drawn in this thesis. The point here has been to lay a phenomenological foundation to countenance asking such questions anew and in a way that attends the silent and theoretically-neglected impact clothes have on our being through the resonances, both theological and otherwise, they can carry for us.

## References

- Aaronson, Bernard S.  
1964 'Hypnotic Induction of Coloured Environments', *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 18/1 (Feb.), 30. DOI: [10.2466/pms.1964.18.1.30](https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1964.18.1.30)
- Adam, Hajo, and Adam D. Galinsky  
2012 'Enclothed Cognition', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48/4 (July), 918-25. DOI: [10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.008)
- Adorno, Theodor W.  
1964 *The Jargon of Authenticity*, tr. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). ISBN: 9780810104075
- Albertazzi, Liliana (ed.)  
2001 *The Dawn of Cognitive Science: Early European Contributors* (Dordrecht: Kluwer). ISBN: 9789048156467
- Allen, David W.  
1974 *The Fear of Looking, or, Scopophilic-Exhibitionistic Conflicts* (Bristol: Wright). ISBN: 9780723603481
- Andersen, Hans Christian  
2008 edn. *The Annotated Hans Christian Andersen*, ed. and intro. Maria Tatar, tr. Maria Tatar and Julie K. Allen (New York: Norton). ISBN: 9780393060812
- Anderson, Gary A.  
2000 'The Punishment of Adam and Even in the *Life of Adam and Eve*', in Anderson et al. (eds.) 2000: 57-81. ISBN: 9789004116009
- Anderson, Gary A., Michael E. Stone, and Johannes Tromp (eds.)  
2000 *Literature on Adam and Eve: Collected Essays* (Leiden: Brill). ISBN: 9789004116009
- Anonymous  
1869 'Fashionable Suicide', *Punch*, 57/x (20 Nov.), 198.  
1913 'Kinesthesia: Queen of the Senses', *The Literary Digest*, 47/24 (13 Dec.), 1167-8.  
1958 'Flaccus, Louis William', in White (ed.) 1958: 335-6.  
2010 'Suitably Dressed', *The Economist*, 18-31 Dec., 127-8.

- Aristotle  
1984 edn. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: PUP). ISBN: 9780691016504 (i), 9780691016511 (ii)
- Augustine  
1953 edn. *Confessions (Fathers of the Church, v. 21)*, tr. Vernon J. Bourke (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press). ISBN: 9780813215617
- 1991 edn. *On Genesis: Two Books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Book (Fathers of the Church, v. 84)*, tr. Roland J. Teske, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press). ISBN: 9780813200842
- Balla, Giacomo  
1914 'The Antineutral Suit: Futurist Manifesto', in Braun 1995: 93.
- Ballin, Ada S.  
1885 *The Science of Dress in Theory and Practice* ([London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington]; repr. [Gloucester], UK: Dodo, [2009]). ISBN: 9781409961758
- Barnard, Malcolm  
2002 *Fashion as Communication* (2nd edn.; Abingdon, UK: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415260176
- Barthes, Roland  
*FS* *The Fashion System*, tr. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983; repr. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990). ISBN: 9780809044375
- GV* *The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962-1980*, tr. Linda Coverdale (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985; repr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2009). ISBN: 9780810126404
- LF* *The Language of Fashion*, ed. Andy Stafford and Michael Carter, tr. Andy Stafford (Oxford: Berg, 2006; repr. London: Bloomsbury, 2013). ISBN: 9781472505422
- Bede  
2008 edn. *On Genesis*, tr. and intro. Calvin B. Kendall (Liverpool: LUP). ISBN: 9781846310881

- Beiser, Frederick C.  
2013 *Late German Idealism: Trendelberg and Lotze* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780199682959
- Belzen, Jacob A.  
2010 *Towards Cultural Psychology of Religion: Principles, Approaches, Applications* (London: Springer). ISBN: 9789048134908, DOI: [10.1007/978-90-481-3491-5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3491-5)
- Bilgin, Elif  
2013 'Going Bananas: Redefining Plastics', *TedxVienna 2013: Unlimited* conference, Volkstheatre, Vienna, 2 Nov.; available at: <http://www.tedxvienna.at/watch/going-bananas-redefining-plastics-elif-bilgin-at-tedxvienna/>
- Blechman, Meredith  
2013 'Is Fashion Art?: Addressing the Ongoing Debate', *Artspace*, 12 Mar., available at: [http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews/features/is\\_fashion\\_art](http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews/features/is_fashion_art).
- Bliss, Sylvia H.  
1916 'The Significance of Clothes', *The American Journal of Psychology*, 27/2 (Apr.), 217-226.
- Boccaccio, Giovanni  
1943 edn. *The Decameron*, tr. John Payne, intro. Sir Walter Raleigh (New York: Liveright).  
1993 edn. *The Decameron*, ed. and intro. Jonathan Usher, tr. Guido Waldman (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780199540419  
1995 edn. *The Decameron*, tr. and intro. G. H. McWilliam (New York: Penguin). ISBN: 9780140449303  
2004 edn. *The Decameron*, tr. Cormac Ó Cuilleain (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth). ISBN: 9781840221336
- Bondi, Victor  
1995 *American Decades, v. 4: 1930-1939* (Toronto: Gale). ISBN: 9780810357259
- Brandom, Robert  
1983 'Heidegger's Categories in *Being and Time*', *The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry*, 66/3 (July), 387-409. DOI: [10.5840/monist198366327](https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198366327)

- Braun, Emily  
1995 'Futurist Fashion: Three Manifestoes', *Art Journal*, 54/1 (Spring), 34-41.
- Brock, Sebastian  
1982 'Clothing Metaphors as a Means of Theological Expression in Syriac Tradition', in Schmidt (ed.) 1982: 11-38. ISBN: 9783791707532
- Brogan, Walter A.  
2005 *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). ISBN: 9780791464922
- Broton, Jerry  
2002 *The Renaissance Bazaar: From the Silk Road to Michelangelo* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780192802682
- Burman Barbara  
1995 'Better and Brighter Clothes: The Men's Dress Reform Party, 1929-1940', *Journal of Design History*, 8/4, 275-90. DOI: [10.1093/jdh/8.4.275](https://doi.org/10.1093/jdh/8.4.275)
- Caldwell, Elizabeth  
2009 'A Purely Spoken Monologue: The Poem and Heidegger's Way to Language', *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, New Series, 23/4, 267-284. DOI: [10.1353/jsp.0.0089](https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.0.0089)
- Calefato, Patrizia  
2004 *The Clothed Body* (Oxford: Berg). ISBN: 9781859738009
- Camus, Albert  
1995 edn. *The First Man*, tr. David Hapgood (New York: Random House). ISBN: 9780679768166
- Candy, Fiona Jane  
2005 'The Fabric of Society: an Investigation of the Emotional and Sensory Experience of Wearing Denim Clothing', *Sociological Research Online*, 10/1 (Mar.). DOI: [10.5153/sro.965](https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.965)
- Caputo, John D.  
1988 'Demythologizing Heidegger: *Alētheia* and the History of Being', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 41/3 (Mar.), 519-46.  
1993 *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). ISBN: 9780253208385

- 2003 'Confessions of a Postmodern Catholic: From Saint Thomas to Derrida', in Hancock and Sweetman (eds.) 2003: 64-92. ISBN: 9780813213118
- 2006 'Heidegger and Theology', in Guignon (ed.) 2006: 326-344. ISBN: 9780521528887
- Carlyle, Thomas  
1833/4 *Sartor Resartus*, ed. Rodger L. Tarr and Mark Engel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). ISBN: 9780520209282
- Carter, Michael  
2003 *Fashion Classics from Carlyle to Barthes* (Oxford: Berg). ISBN: 9781859736067
- 2005 'Flügel, J.C.', in Steele (ed.) 2005: ii. 90-2. ISBN: 9780684313962
- 2012 'Stuff and Nonsense: The Limits of the Linguistic Model of Clothing', *Fashion Theory*, 16/3 (Sept.): 343-54. DOI: [10.2752/175174112X13340749707240](https://doi.org/10.2752/175174112X13340749707240)
- Chandler, Lyman  
1903 'Sartor Resartus', in *The Philistine*, 17/6 (Nov.), 175-83.
- Charlton, William  
1992 *Aristotle, Physics, Books I and II* (2nd edn., Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780198720256
- Chuang Tzu  
1968 edn. *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press). ISBN: 9780231031479
- 1996 edn. *The Book of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Penguin). ISBN: 9780140455373
- Cohen, Sheldon M.  
1996 *Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance* (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521560818
- Coope, Ursula  
2005 *Time for Aristotle: Physics IV: 10-14* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780199247905
- Cordwell, Justine M. and Ronald A. Schwarz (eds.)  
1979 *The Fabrics of Culture: The Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment* (The Hague: de Gruyter Mouton). ISBN: 9789027979100

- Corrigan, Maureen  
 1981 'A Search for Right Relationships: The Twentieth-Century Medievalism of Eric Gill', *English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920*, 24/3, 117-30. DOI: [10.1353/elt.2010.2643](https://doi.org/10.1353/elt.2010.2643)
- 1983 'Gill, Chesterton, and Ruskin: Mediaevalism in the Twentieth Century', *The Chesterton Review*, 9/1 (Feb.), 14-30. DOI: [10.5840/chesterton1983914](https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton1983914)
- Cozzolino, Robert  
 2009 *Elizabeth Osborne: The Colour of Light* (Piermont, NH: Bunker Hill).
- Crawley, A. Ernst  
 1931 *Dress, Drinks, and Drums: Further Studies of Savages and Sex* (London: Methuen).
- Cunningham, Angela  
 1985 'The Nature of Work in the Thought of Eric Gill and Vincent McNabb', *The Chesterton Review*, 11/3 (Aug.), 295-306. DOI: [10.5840/chesterton198511341](https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton198511341)
- Dearborn, George van Ness  
 1897 'Blots of Ink in Experimental Psychology', *Psychological Review*, 4/4 (July), 390-1. DOI: [10.1037/h0070916](https://doi.org/10.1037/h0070916)
- 1898 'A Study of Imaginations', *The American Journal of Psychology*, 9/2 (Jan.), 183-90.
- 1899 *The Emotion of Joy* (*Psychological Review Series of Monograph Supplements*, 2/5; New York: Macmillan, Apr.).
- 1913 'Kinesthesia and the Intelligent Will', *The American Journal of Psychology*, 24/2 (Apr.), 204-55.
- 1918 *The Psychology of Clothing*, in James Rowland Angell, Howard C. Warren, John B. Watson, Shepherd I. Franz, and Madison Bentley (eds.), *Psychological Monographs*, 26/1 (Princeton: Psychological Review), 1-72.
- Derrida, Jacques  
 1972 *Margins of Philosophy*, tr. Alan Bass (Brighton, UK: Harvester, 1982). ISBN: 9780710804549
- 1978 *The Truth in Painting*, tr. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: UCP, 1987). ISBN: 9780226143231

- Deskins, Sally  
2013 'Becky Slemmons, Artist', *Les Femmes Folles*, 17 Oct., available at: <http://femmesfollesnebraska.tumblr.com/post/64292288377/becky-slemmons-artist>
- Dickens, Charles  
1860/1 *Great Expectations* (New York: Penguin, 1991). ISBN: 9780141439563
- Diehl, Lesley A.  
2000 'Hall, Granville Stanley', in Kazdin (ed.) 2000: iv. 50-3. ISBN: 9781557981875 (set)
- Donne, John  
1990 edn. *Divine Poems, Sermons, Devotions, and Prayers*, ed. and intro. John Booty (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist). ISBN: 9780809104352
- Dreyfus, Hubert L.  
1991 *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). ISBN: 9780262041065  
  
1995 'Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology', in Feenberg and Hannay (eds.): 1995: 97-107. ISBN: 9780253321541
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Harrison Hall (eds.)  
1992 *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell). ISBN: 9780631163411
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Charles Spinosa  
1997 'Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology', *Man and World*, 30/2 (April), 159-77. DOI: [10.1023/A:1004299524653](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004299524653)
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Mark Wrathall (eds.)  
2002 *Heidegger Reexamined, v. 3: Art, Poetry, and Technology* (London: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415940443  
  
2005 *A Companion to Heidegger* (Oxford: Blackwell). ISBN: 9781405110921
- Dunlap, Knight  
1928 'The Development and Function of Clothing', *Journal of General Psychology*, 1/1, 64-78. DOI: [10.1080/00221309.1928.9923412](https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1928.9923412)

- Eco, Umberto  
1986 *Travels in Hyperreality* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace). ISBN: 9780156913218
- Edwards, James C.  
1997 *The Plain Sense of Things: The Fate of Religion in an Age of Normal Nihilism* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997). ISBN: 9780271016771  
2002 'Poetic Dwelling on the Earth as a Mortal' (ch. 4 of *The Plain Sense of Things*), in Dreyfus and Wrathall (eds.) 2002: 105-48. ISBN: 9780415940443
- Einstein, Albert  
2005 edn. *The New Quotable Einstein* (Princeton: PUP). ISBN: 9780691120744
- Elliot, Andrew J.; Daniela Niesta Kayser; Tobias Greitemeyer; Stephanie Lichtenfeld; Richard H. Gramzow; Markus A. Maier; and Huijun Liu  
2010 'Red, Rank, and Romance in Women Viewing Men', *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 139/3 (Aug.), 399-417. DOI: [10.1037/a0019689](https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019689)
- Ellis, Havelock  
1900 *Studies in the Psychology of Sex, v. 1: The Evolution of Modesty, The Phenomena of Sexual Periodicity, Autoerotism* (3rd edn., Philadelphia: Davis, 1920).
- Entwistle, Joanne  
2001 'The Dressed Body', in Entwistle and Wilson (eds.) 2001: 33-57. ISBN: 9781859734391
- Entwistle, Joanne and Elizabeth Wilson (eds.)  
2001 *Body Dressing* (Oxford: Berg). ISBN: 9781859734391
- Evans, Rand B.  
2005 'Hall, Granville Stanley (1844-1924)', in Shook (ed.) 2005: ii. 1009-11. ISBN: 9781843710370 (set)
- Faust, Beatrice  
1980 *Women, Sex, and Pornography: A Controversial and Unique Study* (New York: Macmillan). ISBN: 9780025370500
- Feltman, Roger and Andrew J. Elliot  
2011 'The Influence of Red on Perceptions of Relative Dominance and Threat in a Competitive Context', *Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology*, 33/2 (Apr.), 308-14.

- Feenberg, Andrew and Alastair Hannay (eds.)  
 1995 *Technology and the Politics of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). ISBN: 9780253321541
- Fiennes, Ralph  
 2000 Interview by Michael Parkinson, *Parkinson, BBC1*, 21 Jan., available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39XmZ4sTPlk>
- Flaccus, Louis W.  
 1906 'Remarks on the Psychology of Clothes', *Pedagogical Seminary*, 13/1, 61-83. DOI: [10.1080/08919402.1906.9943594](https://doi.org/10.1080/08919402.1906.9943594)
- Flower, William Henry  
 1881 *Fashion in Deformity* (New York: Humboldt, 1882).
- Flügel, J. C.  
 1929 'Clothes Symbolism and Clothes Ambivalence', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 10, 205-17.  
 1930 *The Psychology of Clothes* (London: Hogarth).
- Foltz, Bruce V.  
 1995 *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities). ISBN: 9781573926096
- Frank, Mark G. and Thomas Gilovich  
 1988 'The Dark Side of Self and Social Perception: Black Uniforms and Aggression in Professional Sports', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54/1 (Jan.), 74-85. DOI: [10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.74](https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.74)
- Franklin, Alex  
 2014 'Phenomenal Dress!: A Personal Phenomenology of Clothing', *Clothing Cultures*, 1/1 (Oct.), 83-91. DOI: [10.1386/cc.1.1.83\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1386/cc.1.1.83_1)
- Fredrickson, Barbara L.; Tomi-Ann Roberts; Stephanie M. Noll; Diane M. Quinn; and Jean M. Twenge  
 1998 'That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex Differences in Self-Objectification, Restrained Eating, and Math Performance', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75/1 (July), 269-84. DOI: [10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.269](https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.269)

- Fruchtenbaum, Arnold G.  
 2008 *The Book of Genesis* (San Antonio: Ariel). ISBN: 9781935174004
- Gill, Eric  
 A *Autobiography* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1940).
- ‘A’ ‘Art’, in *E* 9-20.
- ‘AAIP’ ‘All Art Is Propaganda’, in *E* 173-5.
- ‘AAS’ ‘Architecture as Sculpture’, in *BLH* 65-83.
- ‘AATP’ ‘Art and the People’, in *E* 141-51.
- ‘AB’ ‘Art and Business’, in *E* 230-3.
- ACC *Art and a Changing Civilisation* (London: Bodley Head, 1934).
- ‘AEN’ ‘Art in England Now...as It Seems to Me’, in *E* 221-9.
- ‘AI’ ‘Art and Industrialism’, in *BLH* 180-207.
- ‘AIE’ ‘Art in Education’, in *E* 53-7.
- AN *Art-Nonsense and Other Essays* (London: Cassell, 1929).
- ‘AN’ ‘Art-Nonsense’, in *AN* 310-24.
- ‘AP’ ‘Art and Prudence’, in *BLH* 11-29.
- ‘AS’ ‘Art and Sanctification’, in *BLH* 50-64.
- BLH *Beauty Looks after Herself*, intro. Catherine Pickstock (Tacoma, WA: Angelico, 2012). ISBN: 9781887593441
- ‘BLH’ ‘Beauty Looks after Herself’, in *BLH* 208-45.
- C *Clothes: An Essay upon the Nature and Significance of the Natural and Artificial Integuments Worn by Men and Women* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931).
- ‘CA’ ‘The Criterion in Art’, in *AN* 276-98.
- E *Essays: Last Essays and In a Strange Land*, intro. Mary Gill (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947).
- ‘EFW’ ‘Education for What?’, in *E* 37-45.

- ‘EGPA’ ‘Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Practical Aesthetics’, in *AN* 250-6.
- ‘EMRA’ ‘The Enormities of Modern Religious Art’, in *AN* 257-75.
- ‘EP’ ‘Essential Perfection’, in *AN* 3-5.
- ‘FS’ ‘The Future of Sculpture’, in *AN* 299-309
- ‘GI’ ‘A Grammar of Industry’, in *AN* 6-14.
- LEG* *Letters of Eric Gill*, ed. Walter Shewring (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947).
- NB* *The Necessity of Belief* (London: Faber and Faber, 1936).
- ‘PA’ ‘Plain Architecture’, in *BLH* 152-65.
- ‘PC’ ‘Painting and Criticism’, in *BLH* 84-94.
- ‘PP’ ‘Painting and the Public’, in *BLH* 166-79.
- ‘RH’ ‘The Revival of Handicraft’, in *AN* 115-23.
- ‘SC’ ‘Stone-Carving’, in *AN* 80-95.
- ‘SLM’ ‘Sculpture and the Living Model’, in *BLH* 95-122.
- ‘SMB’ ‘Sculpture on Machine-made Buildings’, in *E* 187-220.
- ‘SSMI’ ‘Sacred and Secular in Modern Industry’, in *E* 71-92.
- ‘SWC’ ‘Songs without Clothes’, in *AN* 27-58.
- ‘W’ ‘Work’, in *E* 21-7.
- Gill, Mary Louise  
2001 ‘Aristotle’s Attack on Universals’, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 20 (Sum.), 235-60. ISBN: 9780199245857
- Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm  
1857 *Grimms’ Complete Fairy Tales*, tr. Margaret Hunt (San Diego: Canterbury Classics, 2011). ISBN: 9781607103134
- Grosse, Ernst  
1914 *The Beginnings of Art* (New York: Appleton).

- Guéguen Nicolas  
2012 'Color and Women Hitchhikers' Attractiveness: Gentlemen Drivers Prefer Red', *Colour Research and Application*, 37/1 (Feb.), 76-8. DOI: [10.1002/col.20651](https://doi.org/10.1002/col.20651)
- Guignon, Charles B. (ed.)  
2006 *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (2nd edn., Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521528887
- Haedrich, Marcel  
1972 *Coco Chanel: Her Life, Her Secrets*, tr. Charles Lam Markmann (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.).
- Hall, G. Stanley  
1898 'Some Aspects of the Early Sense of Self', *The American Journal of Psychology*, 9/3 (Apr.), 351-95.
- Hancock, Curtis L. and Sweetman Brendan (eds.)  
2003 *Faith and the Life of the Intellect* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). ISBN: 9780813213118
- Harman, Graham  
2009 'Dwelling with the Fourfold', *Space and Culture*, 12/3 (Aug.), 292-302. DOI: [10.1177/1206331209337080](https://doi.org/10.1177/1206331209337080)
- Harms, Ernst  
1938 'The Psychology of Clothes', *American Journal of Sociology*, 44/2 (Sept.), 238-50.
- Harries, Karsten  
1998a *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). ISBN: 9780262082525
- 1998b 'In Search of Home', *Wolkenkuckucksheim / Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: Internationale Zeitschrift zur Theorie der Architektur / International Journal of Architectural Theory*, 3/2 [also appears in Eduard Führ (ed.), *Bauen und Wohnen / Building and Dwelling: Martin Heidegger's Foundation of a Phenomenology of Architecture* Münster: Waxmann, 2000), pp. 101-120.], available at: [http://www.tu-cottbus.de/theoriederarchitektur/Wolke/eng/Subjects/982/Harries/harries\\_t.html](http://www.tu-cottbus.de/theoriederarchitektur/Wolke/eng/Subjects/982/Harries/harries_t.html)
- 2009 *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's 'The Origin of the Work of Art'* (New York: Springer). ISBN: 9781402099885

- Hart, Kevin  
2000 *The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Philosophy, and Theology* (New York: Fordham University Press). ISBN: 9780823220496
- Haupt, E. J.  
2000 'Lotze, Rudolph Hermann', in Kazdin (ed.) 2000: v. 81-2. ISBN: 9781557981875 (set)
- Hegel, G. W. F.  
1835 *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 2 vols., tr. T.M. Knox (Oxford: OUP, 1975). ISBN: 9780198244981 (i) and 9780198243717 (ii)
- Heidegger, Martin  
'AF' 'The Anaximander Fragment', in *EGT* 13-58.  
'AWP' 'The Age of the World Picture', in *OBT* 57-85.  
'BDT' 'Building Dwelling Thinking', in *BW* 344-63.  
*BPP* *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. and intro. Albert Hofstadter, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982). ISBN: 9780253176875  
*BT* *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962). ISBN: 9780061575594  
*BTr* *Being and Truth*, tr. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010). ISBN: 9780253355119  
*BW* *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964)*, ed. David Farrell Krell (2nd edn., New York: Harper, 1993). ISBN: 9780060637637  
*CPC* *Country Path Conversations*, tr. Brett W. Davis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010). ISBN: 9780253354693.  
'DL' 'A Dialogue on Language', in *OWL* 1-54.  
*DT* *Discourse on Thinking*, tr. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper, 1966). ISBN: 9780061314599  
*EB* *Existence and Being*, ed. Werner Brock (London: Vision, 1949).

- ‘ECP’ ‘On the Essence and Concept of *Physis* in Aristotle’s *Physics B*, 1’, in *PM* 183-230.
- EGT* *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*, tr. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper, 1984). ISBN: 9780060638429
- EHP* *Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry*, tr. and intro. Keith Hoeller (Amherst, NY: Humanity, 2000). ISBN: 9781573927345
- EP* *The End of Philosophy*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1973). ISBN: 9780060638566
- ‘EPTT’ ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, in *BW* 431-449.
- ‘ET’ ‘On the Essence of Truth’, in *PM* 136-54 / *GA* 9: 177-202.
- FCM* *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995). ISBN: 9780253327499
- GA* *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann, 1978—).
- ‘HCE’ ‘Hegel’s Concept of Experience’, in *OBT* 86-156
- ‘HEH’ ‘Hölderlin’s Earth and Heaven’, in *EHP* 175-207.
- ‘HEP’ ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, tr. Paul de Man, *Quarterly Review of Literature*, 10/1 and 2, 79-94; also in *EB* 293-395 and *EHP* 51-65.
- ‘HG’ ‘Hegel and the Greeks’, in *PM* 323-36.
- HHI* *Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”*, tr. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996). ISBN: 9780253330642.
- HPS* *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). ISBN: 9789994092727
- ID* *Identity and Difference*, tr. and intro. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969).
- ‘IWM’ ‘Introduction to “What Is Metaphysics?”’, in *PM* 277-90.

- KPM* *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. Richard Taft (5th edn., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977). ISBN: 9780253332769
- ‘KTB’ ‘Kant’s Thesis about Being’, in *PM* 337-63.
- ‘L’ ‘Language’, in *PLT* 187-208.
- ‘LH’ ‘Letter on Humanism’, in *BW* 217-65 / *GA* 9: 313-64.
- ‘LP’ ‘Language in the Poem’, in *OWL* 159-98.
- M* *Mindfulness*, tr. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2005). ISBN: 9780826480811
- ‘MA’ ‘Memorial Address’, in *DT* 43-57.
- ‘MSC’ ‘Messkirch’s Seventh Centennial’, tr. Thomas J. Sheehan, *Listening*, 8/1-3 (1973), 40-57.
- N1* *Nietzsche, v. 1: The Will to Power as Art*, tr. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1979). ISBN: 9780060638474
- N3* *Nietzsche, v. 3: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics*, ed. David Farrell Krell, tr. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper, 1987). ISBN: 9780060638436
- N4* *Nietzsche, v. 4: Nihilism*, ed. David Farrell Krell, tr. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper, 1982). ISBN: 9780060638573
- ‘NL’ ‘The Nature of Language’, in *OWL* 57-108.
- ‘NWGD’ ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God Is Dead”’, in *OBT* 157-99 and *QCT* 53-112.
- OBT* *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. and tr. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). ISBN: 9780521801140
- ‘OGSU’ ‘Only a God Can Save Us Now: An Interview with Martin Heidegger’, tr. David Schendler, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 6/1 (Winter 1977), 5-27 and ‘Only a God Can Save Us: The *Spiegel* Interview (1966)’, tr. William J. Richardson, S. J. J., in Sheehan (ed.) 1981: 45-67.
- ‘OTCM’ ‘The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics’, in *ID* 42-74 / *GA* 11: 53-79.

- ‘OWA’ ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in *BW* 143-212 / *GA* 5: 1-74.
- OWL* *On the Way to Language*, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper, 1971). ISBN: 9780060638597
- ‘P’ ‘The Poem’, in *EHP* 209-19.
- PLT* *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. and intro. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971). ISBN: 9780060937287
- PM* *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: CUP, 1998). ISBN: 9780521433624
- ‘PMD’ ‘...Poetically Man Dwells...’, in *PLT* 211-27.
- ‘PWM’ ‘Postscript to “What Is Metaphysics?”’, in *PM* 231-8.
- QCT* *The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. and intro. William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977). ISBN: 9780061319693
- ‘QCT’ ‘The Question concerning Technology’, in *QCT* 3-35.
- ‘Th’ ‘The Thing’, in *PLT* 163-84.
- ‘Tu’ ‘The Turning’, in *QCT* 36-49.
- WCT* *What Is Called Thinking?*, tr. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1968). ISBN: 9780060905286
- WIT* *What Is a Thing?*, tr. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (South Bend, IN: Great Editions, 1967). ISBN: 9780895269799
- ‘WL’ ‘The Way to Language’, in *OWL* 111-36.
- ‘WP’ ‘What Are Poets For?’, in *PLT* 89-139 and ‘Why Poets’, in *OBT* 200-41.
- ‘WSP’ ‘Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?’, Sheehan (ed.) 1981: 27-30. ISBN: 9781412810845
- ZS* *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters*, ed. Medard Boss, tr. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001). ISBN: 9780810118324

- Hirn, Yrjö  
1900 *The Origins of Art: A Psychological and Sociological Inquiry* (London: Macmillan).
- Hölderlin, Friedrich  
1990 edn. *Hyperion and Selected Poems*, ed. Eric L. Santner (New York: Continuum). ISBN: 9780826403346
- Holman, Rebecca H.,  
1980 'Clothing as Communication: An Empirical Investigation', in Olson (ed.) 1980: 372-377.
- 1981 'Apparel as Communication', in Hirschman and Holbrook (eds.) 1981: 7-15.
- Hsiao, Paul Shih-yi  
1987 'Heidegger and Our Translation of the *Tao Te Ching*', in Parkes (ed.) 1987: 93-103. ISBN: 9780824810641
- Hudson, Fennel  
2006 *A Meaningful Life, No. 1* (Amazon Digital Services).
- Hughes, John  
2007 *The End of Work: Theological Critiques of Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell). ISBN: 9781405158923
- Hundertwasser, Friedensreich  
1982/3 'On the Second Skin', available at: <http://www.hundertwasser.com/text/1.2.1/>
- Hupalo, Peter I.  
2005 *Getting Rich in Your Underwear: How to Start and Run a Profitable Home-based Business* (Oakland, CA: HCM). ISBN: 9780967162485
- Jacobs, Keith W. and James F. Sues  
1975 'Effects of Four Psychological Primary Colours on Anxiety State', *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 41/1 (Aug.), 207-10. DOI: [10.2466/pms.1975.41.1.207](https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1975.41.1.207)
- James, William  
1890 *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols. (New York: Henry Holt).
- Janicaud, Dominique  
1978 'Presence and Appropriation Derrida and the Question of an Overcoming of Metaphysical Language', *Research in Phenomenology*, 8 / 1, 67 - 75. DOI: [10.1163/156916478X00030](https://doi.org/10.1163/156916478X00030)

- Johnson, Robert D. and Leslie L. Downing  
1979 'Deindividuation and Valence of Cues: Effects on Prosocial and Antisocial Behaviour', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37/9 (Sept.), 1532-8.
- Jolly, Penny Howell  
1997 *Made in God's Image?: Eve and Adam in the Genesis Mosaics at San Marco, Venice* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press). ISBN: 9780520205376
- Jones, Harry  
1887 *Practical Social Psychology* (London: Clowes).
- Kafka, Franz  
1925 *The Trial*, tr. Mike Mitchell (Oxford: OUP, 2009). ISBN: 9780199238293
- Kant, Immanuel  
1781/2 *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: CUP, 1998). ISBN: 9780521354028
- Kaya, Naz and Helen H. Epps  
2004 'Relationship between Color and Emotion: A Study of College Students', *College Student Journal*, 38/3 (Sept.), 396-405.
- Kazdin, Alan E. (ed.)  
2000 *Encyclopaedia of Psychology*, 8 vols. (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9781557981875 (set)
- Kelly, Erin  
2009 *The Poison Tree: A Novel* (London: Hodder & Stoughton). ISBN: 9781444701036
- Kim, Sung Bok  
1998 'Is Fashion Art?', *Fashion Theory*, 2/1 (Feb.), 51-71. DOI: [10.2752/136270498779754515](https://doi.org/10.2752/136270498779754515)
- Kockelmans, Joseph J.  
1984 *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). ISBN: 9780253342454
- 1985 *Heidegger on Art and Art Works* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff). ISBN: 9789024731022
- Krell, David Farrell  
1993 'Introduction to "The Origin of the Work of Art"', in Heidegger *BW* 140-2.

- Kwallek, N.; C. M. Lewis; J. W. D. Lin-Hsiao; and H. Woodson  
1996 'Effects of Nine Monochromatic Office Interior Colours on Clerical Tasks and Worker Mood', *Colour Research and Application*, 21/6 (Dec.), 448-58. DOI: [10.1002/\(SICI\)1520-6378\(199612\)21:6<448::AID-COL7>3.0.CO;2-W](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6378(199612)21:6<448::AID-COL7>3.0.CO;2-W)
- Laver, James  
1933 'The Triumph of Time', in Norman (ed.) 1933: 113-37.
- Lawrence, D. H.  
2005 edn. *The Works of D.H. Lawrence: Introductions and Reviews*, ed. N.H. Reeve and John Worthen (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521835848
- Lear, Jonathan  
1988 *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521345231
- Lee, Harper  
1960 *To Kill a Mockingbird* (New York: Grand Central, 1982). ISBN: 9780446310789
- Lee, Mireille M.  
2015 *Body, Dress, and Identity in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9781107055360
- Leinhard, Joseph T. (ed.)  
2001 *Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, v. 3: Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press). ISBN: 9780830814732
- Leopold, Aldo  
1966 *A Sand County Almanac* (Oxford: OUP).
- Lewis, C. S.  
1949 *Transposition and Other Addresses* (London: Geoffrey Bles).
- Loos, Adolf  
1998 edn. *Ornament and Crime: Selected Essays*, tr. Michael Mitchell (Riverside, CA: Ariadne). ISBN: 9781572410466
- Lothian, James R.  
2009 *The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual Community, 1910-1950* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press). ISBN: 9780268033828

- Lotze, Hermann  
 MC *Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World*, 2 vols., tr. Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones (2nd edn., Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887).
- Luther, Martin  
 1959 edn. *Luther's Works, v. 1: Lectures on Genesis*, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia). ISBN: 9780570064015
- Ma, Lin  
 2008 *Heidegger on East West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415957199
- MacCarthy, Fiona  
 1989 *Eric Gill* (London: Faber & Faber). ISBN: 9780571137541
- Makin, Stephen  
 2006 *Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Θ* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780198751076
- Malone, Dumas (ed.)  
 1932 *Dictionary of American Biography*, 21 vols. (New York: Scribner).
- Malpas, Jeff  
 2006 *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). ISBN: 9780262134705
- Marion, Jean-Luc  
 2003 'Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy', in Kessler and Sheppard (eds.) 2003: 38-74. ISBN: 9780226432090
- Maritain, Jacques  
 1920 *Art and Scholasticism* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1930).
- Martin, Jay  
 2002 *The Education of John Dewey: A Biography* (New York: Columbia University Press). ISBN: 9780231116763
- May, Reinhard  
 1996 *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work* (London: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415140379
- McCracken, Grant D. and Victor J. Roth  
 1989 'Does Clothing Have a Code?: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications in the Study of Clothing as a Means of Communication', *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 6 / 1 (Sept.), 13 - 33. DOI: [10.1016/0167-8116\(89\)90044-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-8116(89)90044-X)

- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice  
 1945 *Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002). ISBN: 9780415278416
- 1948 *The World of Perception*, tr. Oliver Davis (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2004). ISBN: 9780415312714
- Merton, Thomas  
 1965 *The Way of Chuang Tzu* (New York: New Directions).
- Miller, Sanda  
 2007 'Fashion as Art: Is Fashion Art?', *Fashion Theory*, 11/1 (Mar.), 25-40. DOI: [10.2752/136270407779934551](https://doi.org/10.2752/136270407779934551)
- Nelson, Eric S.  
 2004 'Responding to Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger, and Ecology', *Environmental Philosophy*, 1/2 (Fall), 65-74. DOI: [10.5840/envirophil2004127](https://doi.org/10.5840/envirophil2004127)
- Nietzsche, Friedrich  
 KSA *Kritische Studienausgabe*, 15 vols., ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).
- PN *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954). ISBN: 9780140150629
- Z 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', in PN 121-439.
- Norell, Norman, et. al.  
 1967 'Is Fashion an Art?' *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, New Series, 26/3 (Nov.), 129-40.
- Norman, Sylva (ed.)  
 1933 *Contemporary Essays: 1933* (London: Elkin Mathews and Marrot).
- Ober, Clinton; Stephen T. Sinatra; and Martin Zucker  
 2010 *Earthing: The Most Important Health Discovery Ever?* (Laguna Beach, CA: Basic Health). ISBN: 9781591202837
- Olson, Jerry C. (ed.)  
 1980 *NA - Advances in Consumer Research*, v. 7 (Ann Arbor: Association for Consumer Research).
- Parkes, Graham (ed.)  
 1987 *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii). ISBN: 9780824810641

- Pattison, George  
 2011 *God and Being: An Enquiry* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780199588688
- 2013 *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Theological Essay* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate). ISBN: 9781409466949
- Pazda, Adam D.; Andrew J. Elliot; and Tobias Greitemeyer  
 2012 'Sexy Red: Perceived Sexual Receptivity Mediates the Red-Attraction Relation in Men Viewing Woman', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48/3 (May), 787-90. DOI: [10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.009](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.009)
- Peña, Jorge; Jeffrey T. Hancock; and Nicholas A. Merola  
 2009 'The Priming Effects of Avatars in Virtual Settings', *Communication Research*, 36/6 (Dec.), 838-56. DOI: [10.1177/0093650209346802](https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650209346802)
- Pöggeler, Otto  
 1987 'West-East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-tzu', in Parkes (ed.) 1987: 47-78. ISBN: 9780824810641
- Propp, William H. C.  
 1999 *Exodus 1-18: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Random House). ISBN: 9780385148047
- Proust, Marcel  
 1913 *In Search of Lost Time, v. 1: The Way by Swann's*, tr. James Grieve (London: Penguin, 2002). ISBN: 9780713996043
- 1919 *In Search of Lost Time, v. 2: In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*, tr. Lydia Davis (London: Penguin, 2002). ISBN: 9780713996050
- Purcell, J. M.  
 1982 'Beauty Looks after Herself: Gill as Polemicist', *The Chesterton Review*, 8/4 (Nov.), 253-5. DOI: [10.5840/chesterton19828450](https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton19828450)
- Ratner, Robert J.  
 1989-90 "Garments of Skin" (Gen. 3: 21)', *Jewish Bible Quarterly*, 18/2 (Winter), 74-80.
- Reeve, C. D. C.  
 2000 *Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Indianapolis: Hackett). ISBN: 9780872205154

- Renbourn E. T.  
1972 *Materials and Clothing in Health and Disease: History, Physiology, and Hygiene: Medical and Psychological Aspects* (London: Lewis).
- Rhodes, Zandra and Alice Rawsthorn  
2003 'Is Fashion a True Art Form?', *The Observer*, 13 July, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2003/jul/13/art.artsfeatures1>.
- Riaz, Ayesha; Aisha Siddique; and Niaz Hussain Malik  
2004 'Identification of the Factors Responsible for the Usage of Clothes', *Pakistan Journal of Life and Social Sciences* 2/1: 49-50.
- Richardson, John T. E.  
2011 *Howard Andrew Knox: Pioneer of Intelligence Testing at Ellis Island* (New York: Columbia University Press). ISBN: 9780231141680
- Richardson, William J., S. J.  
2003 *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (4th edn., New York: Fordham University Press). ISBN: 9780823222551
- Roach, Mary Ellen and Joanne Bulbolz Eicher  
1979 'The Language of Personal Adornment', in Cordwell and Schwarz (eds.) 1979: 7-21. ISBN: 9789027979100
- Roberts, S. Craig; Roy C. Owen; and Jan Havlicek  
2010 'Distinguishing Between Perceiver and Wearer Effects in Clothing Colour-Associated Attributions', *Evolutionary Psychology*, 8/3, 350-364.
- Robinson, Marilynne  
2004 *Gilead: A Novel* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux). ISBN: 9780374153892
- Rollinger, Robin  
2001 'Lotze on the Sensory Representation of Space', in Albertazzi (ed.) 2001: 103-22. ISBN: 9789048156467
- Rorty, Richard  
1984 'Deconstruction and Circumvention', *Critical Inquiry*, 11/1 (Sept.), 1-23.
- Rosencranz, Mary Lou  
1972 *Clothing Concepts: A Social Psychological Approach* (New York: Macmillan).

- Rosenfeld, Lawrence B. and Timothy G. Plax  
1977 'Clothing as Communication', *Journal of Communication*, 27/2 (June), 24-31. DOI: [10.1111/j.1460-2466.1977.tb01823.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1977.tb01823.x)
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques  
1762 *Emile, or, On Education*, tr. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic, 1979). ISBN: 9780465019311
- Rubinstein, Ruth P.  
1985 'Colour, Circumcision, Tattoos, and Scars', in M. Solomon (ed.) 1985: 243-54. ISBN: 9780669091281
- Rudofsky, Bernard  
1947 *Are Clothes Modern? An Essay on Contemporary Apparel* (Chicago: Theobald).  
  
1971 *The Unfashionable Human Body* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday).
- Sachs, Joe  
1995 *Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). ISBN: 9780813521916
- Samaha, Barry  
2014 'Toolbox Treasures: Fashion's Underpinnings Are Brought to the Forefront', *Forbes Lifestyle*, 9 Oct., available at: <http://lifeforb.es/1CZG1E7>
- Sanborn, Herbert C.  
1927 'The Function of Clothing and of Bodily Adornment', *American Journal of Psychology*, 38/1 (Jan.), 1-20.
- Schmidt, Margot (ed.)  
1982 *Typus, Symbol, Allegorie bei den östlichen Vätern und ihren Parallelen im Mittelalter* (Regensburg: Verlag Pustet). ISBN: 9783791707532
- Schneider, Stanley and Morton Seelenfreund  
2012 'Kotnot Or (Genesis 3: 21): Skin, Leather, Light, or Blind?', in *Jewish Bible Quarterly*, 40/2 (Apr.-June), 16-24.
- Schwarz, Ronald A.  
1979 'Uncovering the Secret Vice: Toward an Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment', in Cordwell and Schwarz (eds.) 1979: 23-45. ISBN: 9789027979100

- Sewell, Brocard  
1982 'Aspects of Eric Gill, 1882-1940', *The Chesterton Review*, 8/4 (Nov.), 295-312. DOI: [10.5840/chesterton19828446](https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton19828446)
- Sharr, Adam  
2006 *Heidegger's Hut* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). ISBN: 9780262195515  
2007 *Heidegger for Architects* (London: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415415156
- Sheehan, Thomas (ed.)  
1981 *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent). ISBN: 9780913750162
- Sheldon, H.D.  
1932 'Hall, Granville Stanley', in Malone (ed.) 1932: viii. 127-30.
- Shields, Christopher  
2007 *Aristotle* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge). ISBN: 9780415283311
- Shook, John R.  
1998 *Pragmatism: An Annotated Bibliography, 1898-1940* (Value Inquiry Book Series, 66; Amsterdam: Rodopi). ISBN: 9789042002692
- Shook, John R. (ed.)  
2005 *The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, 4 vols. (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum). ISBN: 9781843710370 (set)
- Solomon, Michael R. (ed.)  
1985 *Psychology of Fashion* (Lexington, MA: Lexington). ISBN: 9780669091281
- Solomon, Robert C. and Kathleen M. Higgins  
2000 *What Nietzsche Really Said* (New York: Schocken). ISBN: 9780805241570
- Spencer, Herbert  
1855 *Principles of Sociology*, 2 vols. (2nd edn., New York: Appleton, 1890).
- Spinoza, Charles  
1992 'Derrida and Heidegger: Iterability and *Ereignis*', in Dreyfus and Hall (eds.) 1992: 270-97; citations are from the repr. in Dreyfus and Wrathall (eds.) 2005: 484-510.

- Steele, Valerie  
 1985 *Fashion and Eroticism: Ideals of Feminine Beauty from the Victorian Era to the Jazz Age* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780195035308
- 2001 *The Corset: A Cultural History* (New Haven: Yale University Press). ISBN: 9780300090710
- Steele, Valerie (ed.)  
 2005 *Encyclopaedia of Clothing and Fashion*, 3 vols. (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale). ISBN: 9780684313948 (set), 9780684313955 (i), 9780684313962 (ii), 9780684313979 (iii)
- Steinberg, Neil  
 2004 *Hatless Jack* (New York: Penguin). ISBN: 9780452285231
- Stone, Nancy J. and Anthony J. English  
 1998 'Task Type, Posters, and Workspace Colour on Mood, Satisfaction, and Performance', *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 18/2 (June), 175-85. DOI: [10.1006/jevp.1998.0084](https://doi.org/10.1006/jevp.1998.0084)
- Strathem, Paul  
 2003 *The Medici: The Godfathers of the Renaissance* (London: Jonathan Cape). ISBN: 9780224071062
- Stratton, Beverly J.  
 1995 *Out of Eden: Reading, Rhetoric, and Ideology in Genesis 2-3* (Sheffield: Sheffield). ISBN: 9781850755753
- Thomas, Dylan  
 1971 edn. *The Collected Stories* (New York: New Directions). ISBN: 9780811209984
- Thomas, William I.  
 1899 'The Psychology of Modesty and Clothing', *American Journal of Sociology*, 5/2 (Sept.), 246-62.
- Thomson, Iain  
 2000 'Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruktion* of Metaphysics', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 8/3 (Oct.), 297-327. DOI: [10.1080/096725500750039291](https://doi.org/10.1080/096725500750039291)
- 2005 *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521851152

- Thoreau, Henry David  
1854 *Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). ISBN: 9780300104660
- Thorndike, Edward L.  
1925 *Biographical Memoir of G. Stanley Hall, 1846-1924*, in *National Academy of Sciences Biographical Memoirs*, v. xii (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences), 133-80.
- Tillich, Paul  
1959 *Theology of Culture* (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780195007114
- Torell, Viveka Berggren  
2011 'As Fast as Possible Rather Than Well Protected: Experiences of Football Clothes', *Culture Unbound*, 3/8, 83-99. DOI: [10.3384/cu.2000.1525.11383](https://doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.11383)
- Tulchin, Simon H.  
1940 'The Pre-Rorschach Use of Inkblot Tests', *Rorschach Research Exchange*, 4/1, 1-7. DOI: [10.1080/08934037.1940.10381238](https://doi.org/10.1080/08934037.1940.10381238)
- Twain, Mark  
1876 *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (Oxford: OUP, 2007). ISBN: 9780192806826
- Veblen, Thorstein  
1899 *Theory of the Leisure Class*, ed. Martha Banta (Oxford: OUP, 2007). ISBN: 9780199552580
- Vrij, Aldert  
1997 'Wearing Black Clothes: The Impact of Offenders' and Suspects' Clothing on Impression Formation', *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, 11/1 (Feb.), 47-53. DOI: [10.1002/\(SICI\)1099-0720\(199702\)11:1<47::AID-ACP421>3.0.CO;2-H](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199702)11:1<47::AID-ACP421>3.0.CO;2-H)
- Wall, Barbara  
1979 'Eric Gill, Hilary Pepler, and the Ditchling Movement', *The Chesterton Review*, 5/2 (Spr.-Sum.), 165-87. DOI: [10.5840/chesterton19795217](https://doi.org/10.5840/chesterton19795217)
- Watson, Cecelia A.  
2004 'The Sartorial Self: William James's Philosophy of Dress', *History of Psychology*, 7/3 (Aug.), 211-24. DOI: [10.1037/1093-4510.7.3.211](https://doi.org/10.1037/1093-4510.7.3.211)

- Weigel, George  
2012 'Breaking Bad Liturgical Habits', *First Things* (4 Jan.), available at: <http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2012/01/breaking-bad-liturgical-habits-ii>
- Weissman, Polaire  
1967 'The Art of Fashion', *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, New Series, 26/3 (Nov.), 151-2.
- West, Cornel  
2010 'Cornel West on His Uniform', interview by Woody Hines, *Prepidemic Magazine* (Spring), available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPOIVmLz88I&feature=related>
- Westphal, Merold  
2001 *Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Post-modern Christian Faith* (New York: Fordham University Press). ISBN: 9780823221301
- Wexner, Lois B.  
1954 'The Degree to Which Colours (Hues) Are Associated with Mood-Tones', *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 38/6 (Dec.), 432-5. DOI: [10.1037/h0062181](https://doi.org/10.1037/h0062181)
- White, James T. (ed.)  
1958 *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography: Being the History of the United States as Illustrated in the Lives of the Founders, Builders, and Defenders of the Republic, and of the Men and Women who are Doing the Work and Moulding the Thought of the Present Time, v. 48* (New York: J.T. White).
- Wilde, Oscar  
1885 'The Philosophy of Dress', *New York Daily Tribune*, 19 Apr., 9.
- Wilder, Laura Ingalls  
1932 *Little House in the Big Woods* (New York: HarperCollins, 1971). ISBN: 9780060264307
- Williams, Mark and Danny Penman  
2011 *Mindfulness: A Practical Guide to Finding Peace in a Frantic World* (London: Piatkus). ISBN: 9781609611989
- Williams, Rowan  
1977 'Eric Gill', *Sobornost*, 7/4 (Winter-Spring), 261-9.  
2005 *Grace and Necessity: Reflections on Art and Love* (London: Continuum). ISBN: 9780819281180

- Wilson, Louis N.  
1914 *G. Stanley Hall: A Sketch* (New York: Stechert).
- Wollstonecraft, Mary  
1993 edn. *A Vindication of the Rights of Men, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, and An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution*, ed. Janet Todd (Oxford: OUP). ISBN: 9780199555468
- Yoshimoto, Banana  
1993 *Kitchen* (New York: Grove). ISBN: 9780802115164
- Young, Julian  
1999 'Artwork and Sportwork: Heideggerian Reflections', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 57/2 (Spr.), 267-277.  
2002 *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: CUP). ISBN: 9780521809221  
2006 'The Fourfold', in Guignon (ed.) 2006: 373-392. ISBN: 9780521528887
- Ziarek, Krzysztof  
2011 'The Limits of Life', *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 16/4 (Dec.), 19-30. DOI: [10.1080/0969725X.2011.641342](https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2011.641342)
- Zimbardo, Philip G.  
1969 'The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order vs. Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos', in W.J. Arnold and D. Levine (eds.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, v. 17 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), 237-307.
- Žižek, Slavoj  
2008 'Unbehagen in Der Natur: Ecology Against Nature', *Bedeutung*, 1/1 (May), 42-57.